m m Class Sl?£Oq Book_ » L 4 5^ AN ESSAY 0LO.I A 1 6^0 ON THE INFLUENCE OF AUTHORITY IN MATTERS OF OPINION. BY GEORGE CORNEWALL LEWIS, ESQ. LONDON: JOHN W. PARKER, WEST STRAND. MDCCCXLIX. LL / -$? V /x LONDON: SAVILL AND EDWARDS, PBINTEBS, 4, CHANDOS STREET, COVENT GARDEN. CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. ON THE NATURE OF AUTHORITY IN MATTERS OF OPINION. SECTION PAGE 1. Distinction between matters of fact and matters of opinion . 1 2. Subject of the Essay: authority in matters of opinion ex- plained 3 3. Relation between this subject and logical science .... 7 CHAPTER II. ON THE EXTENT OF OPINIONS FOUNDED UPON AUTHORITY. 1. Children derive their opinions from the authority of their parents 10 2. Extent to which these opinions are modified in after-life . . 12 3. Disposition to follow the crowd in matters of opinion ... 14 4. Disposition to defer to the authority of others, arising from the habit of holding opinions without remembering their grounds 15 5. Derivation of opinions from authority in matters of practice . 18 CHAPTER III, ON THE MARKS OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 1. Elements of credibility in a witness to a fact. Distinction between testimony and argument as to moral character . . 21 2. How far anonymous testimony may have weight 23 3. Cases in which testimony is strengthened by special training 25 4. Distinction between testimony, argument, and authority . . 25 VI CONTENTS. SECTION PAGE 5. Comparative frequency of qualities which render a man a credible witness, or an authority in matters of opinion . . 26 6. Qualifications of an authority in matters of opinion .... 27 7. First qualification: that a person must have studied the subject carefully in theory, or have had experience of it in practice 27 8. Second qualification : that his mental powers must be adequate to the subject 30 9. Third qualification: that his moral feelings must be in a proper state 33 10. Process by which the existence of these qualifications in any person is determined 40 11. Additional indications of trustworthy authority : — (1.) Agreement or consensus of competent judges .... 41 12. (2.) Marks of imposture in professors of science .... 50 13. (3.) The countries whose opinion is to be considered . . 59 14. The guides to opinion are chosen voluntarily 62 15. Supposed opposition between reason and authority .... 63 CHAPTER IV. ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 1. Gradual progress to agreement in scientific matters .... 66 2. All nations agree in recognising the existence of a God . . 67 3. All civilized nations agree in recognising some form of Chris- tianity 69 4. But they differ as to the form or mode of Christianity ... 69 5. Causes of the existence of numerous Christian churches and sects 70 6. The various Christian sects remain distinct, and do not tend to an agreement 72 7. Attempts which have been made to bring about an agreement in Christian belief 75 8. One portion of the Christian world makes the teaching of the true church the standard of religious truth 77 9. Differences of opinion as to the marks of the true church . . 77 10. Differences of opinion as to the organs of the true church . 85 CONTENTS. Vll SECTION PAGE 11. Differences of opinion as to the tradition of true doctrines from the Apostolic age 87 12. Differences of opinion as to Fundamentals and Non-funda- mentals, in matters of faith 90 13. Differences of .opinion between Roman Catholics and Pro- testants as to the Regula Fidei 92 14. No Christian church or sect can lay claim to a paramount authority in matters of truth 97 15. In the absence of a general agreement, the authority of each church or sect is limited to its own members 101 16. General results as to church authority and private judgment 103 Notes to Chapter IV 105 CHAPTER V. ON THE UTILITY AND PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 1. Extent to which an independent opinion can be formed by each person on scientific subjects Ill 2. Deference due to the opinions of competent and experienced judges 113 3. Expediency of being guided by the opinions of others in prac- tical questions 116 4. Advantage of professional advice 118 5. Rules for the selection of professional advisers 121 6. Origin of the prejudices against professional advice .... 122 7. Voluntary advice of friends upon domestic and private con- cerns. Auricular confession 123 8. Mode of obtaining advice in the purchase of goods .... 127 9. Advice in joint deliberation 128 10. Deliberation relates to the future. Extent of our powers of prediction 132 11. The advice of competent judges assists in determining the future, and guiding action 142 12. The superstitious reject such advice, and seek to determine the future by means of divination 143 13. Duty of counsellors to give honest advice 144 14. Marks of a trustworthy historian 145 Note to Chapter V 156 Vlll CONTENTS. CHAPTER VI. ON THE NUMBER OP THE PERSONS COMPETENT TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT, AS COMPARED WITH THE NUMBER OF THE REST OF THE COMMUNITY. SECTION PAGE 1. The competent judges on each subject are comparatively few in number 159 2. The opinion of the body of the people on each subject is devoid of authority 160 3. The authority of each competent judge is limited to his own class of subjects 164 4. Everybody is a competent judge on some subject . . . .166 5. No set of persons are competent judges on all subjects . . 167 6. The prevalence of an opinion is not a proof of its soundness . 167 7. Circumstances which give weight to a prevalent opinion . . 171 8. A high degree of knowledge and virtue cannot be formed by the aggregation of numerous individuals of ordinary qualities . 176 9. The value of proverbs as the expression of popular opinion . 178 10. Importance of numerical preponderance as a fact .... 180 11. Its importance in political affairs 181 12. In language 182 13. In style of composition and eloquence 184 14. But the popular taste is not the criterion of excellence in the arts 185 15. The control of public opinion over individuals in matters of taste ought to be exercised leniently 189 CHAPTER VII. ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 1. In the decisions of political bodies opinions must be counted, and not weighed 191 2. Sketch of the origin and nature of political bodies .... 191 3. Advantages and disadvantages of plurality of members in ad- ministrative and judicial bodies 197 CONTENTS. IX SECTION PAGE 4. And in legislative bodies 202 5. Manner in which the decision of a political body is made . . 204 6 In administrative and judicial bodies unanimity is sometimes required, but they generally decide by a majority .... 204 7. Legislative bodies always decide by a majority 206 8. The modes in which the majority of votes in a political body is determined 207 9. Eeason for decision by a majority in political bodies . . . 210 10. Defects of this mode of decision 213 11. Circumstances which tend to counteract these defects — first, in judicial and administrative bodies 214 12. Secondly, in legislative bodies 215 13. It is expedient that a decision by a majority, when made, should be acquiesced in 221 14. And that a political body, having adopted a measure, should not throw the responsibility upon its advisers 222 15. Securities for right decision in the case of an election of a re- presentative by the majority of a constituent body . . . 223 16. Contrivances adopted to modify the simple numerical prin- ciple in the summation of votes : — (1.) Voting by composite units 230 17. (2.) Plurality of votes to certain members 232 18. The excesses of a sound principle ought to be counteracted . 235 Notes to Chapter VII 241 CHAPTER VIII. ON THE RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY TO THE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE, AND TO THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. 1. The theory of aristocratic government is founded on the prin- ciple of Special Pitness 249 2. Objections to this theory as applied to government .... 255 3. The numerical principle of government is controlled in various ways by the principle of Special Fitness 261 4. Especially through the system of political representation . . 267 X CONTENTS. SECTION PAGE 5. The supposed ill effects of the tyranny of the majority of the people 273 6. The representative system of government is founded on a compromise between the Numerical Principle and the prin- ciple of Special Fitness ; difficulty of arranging the terms of this compromise in each individual case 278 Notes to Chapter VIII 282 CHAPTER IX. ON THE PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS, BY THE CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 1. The chief permanent influences for the authentication of opinions 286 2. I. The civil government. Duty of the state to encourage truth and discourage error, examined 288 3. The duty of the state with respect to religious truth and error depends upon its power 290 4. Power of the state to promote religious truth by punishment 291 5. By reward 296 6. By endowment 297 7. By public instruction 306 8. And by a censorship of the press 307 9. The state cannot effectually promote religious truth by any of these means 309 10. Objections made to the neutrality of the state in religious questions 310 11. Answer to these objections . 311 12. Power of the state to promote truth in secular matters by literary endowments and public instruction 317 13. Extent to which the government ought to attempt to influence opinion in secular matters 322 14. Moral authority of the government and effect of its example . 322 15. A government may countenance sound opinions by upholding good institutions 326 16. Censorship of the press in secular affairs 327 CONTENTS. XI SECTION PAGE 17. The qualifications of professional persons may be authenticated by diplomas and degrees 330 18. II. Churches and ecclesiastical bodies. The influence of the heads of each church is exercised over the members of that church exclusively 332 19. Authentication of ministers of religion by ordination . . . 333 20. III. Voluntary associations for political, scientific, and lite- rary purposes. Their influence upon opinion 334 21. Universities and places of learning 337 22. Political parties 338 23. TV. The periodical press. Origin and history of newspapers 339 24. Influence of newspapers upon opinion 342 25. The chief characteristic of newspapers is, that they are anonymous 343 26. Seasons of this peculiarity. Its evil consequences, and their correctives 343 27. Reviews and literary journals. Transactions of learned societies. Publications appearing in a series or set. Ency- clopedias 355 28. The powers of literary judgment ought to be impartially ex- ercised 359 29. Classes of subjects upon which the general diffusion of sound opinions is most important 361 CHAPTER X. ON THE ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 1. Reasons for illustrating the evils which arise from the abuses of the principle of authority 366 2. The reverence for the authority of scientific teachers must not be excessive 366 3. Distinction between excessive reverence for authority and conscious adoption of a defective philosophy 368 4. Distinction between opinions handed down from antiquity, and opinions of aged men 372 5. The chief question at present as to the authority of antiquity concerns political institutions 374 xii CONTENTS. SECTION PAGE 6. Sound legislative reforms are impeded by opposite errors as to the authority of established institutions 382 7. Authority of parties and party leaders in politics. Its abuses 384 8. Difference between the slow and rapid propagation of opinions 391 9. Influence of numbers in deliberative bodies 394 10. Concluding remarks 398 APPENDIX. ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY, AND ON THE PROVINCE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. 1. Aristocracy is usually denned to be a government of the minority, and democracy to be a government of the ma- jority of the people 403 2. The distinction between these two forms of government, is a distinction, not of kind, but of degree 404 3. Necessity of caution in laying down general propositions re- specting aristocratic and democratic government . . . 409 4. The neglect of proper precautions in speculations upon go- vernment has rendered political science uncertain .... 415 5. Province of political science. Its division into positive or descriptive, and ideal or speculative politics 416 6. Importance of treating these two branches of political science separately 422 ERRATA. P. 78, Notes, line 6 from bottom, for "to extend," read " of extending." P. 157, line 8 from bottom, for " septengentos," read " septingentos." P. 234, Notes, line 5 from bottom, for " arguments," read " argument." ON THE INFLUENCE OF AUTHORITY IN MATTERS OF OPINION. CHAPTEK I. ON THE NATURE OF AUTHORITY IN MATTERS OF OPINION. § 1. As the ensuing Essay relates to matters of opinion, it will be necessary for me, at the outset, without entering upon disputed questions of mental philosophy, to explain briefly what portion of the subjects of belief is understood to be included under this appellation, and what is the meaning of the generally received distinction between matters of opinion and matters of fact ; a dis- tinction which, though not scientifically precise, is, with a little explanation, sufficiently intelligible for the pur- poses of the present inquiry, and which marks, with toler- able accuracy, a distinction leading to important practical consequences. By a Matter of Fact I understand anything of which we obtain a conviction from our internal consciousness, or any individual event or phenomenon which is the object of sensation. It is true that even the simplest sensations involve some judgment : when a witness reports that he saw an object of a certain shape and size, or at a certain distance, he describes something more than a B 2 ON THE NATURE OF AUTHORITY [CH. mere impression on his sense of sight, and his statement implies a theory and explanation of the bare phenomenon. When, however, this judgment is of so simple a kind as to become wholly unconscious, and the interpretation of the appearances is a matter of general agreement, the object of sensation may, for our present purpose, be con- sidered a fact. A fact, as so defined, must be limited to individual sensible objects, and not extended to general expressions or formulas, descriptive of classes of facts, or sequences of phenomena, such as that the blood circulates, the sun attracts the planets, and the like.* Propositions of this sort, though descriptive of realities, and therefore, in one sense, of matters of fact, relate to large classes of phenomena, which cannot be grasped by a single sensation, which can only be deter- mined by a long series of observations, and are established by a process of intricate reasoning. Taken in this sense, matters of fact are decided by an appeal to our own consciousness or sensation, or to the testimony, direct or indirect, of the original and percipient witnesses. Doubts, indeed, frequently arise as to the exist- ence of a matter of fact, in consequence of the diversity of the reports made by the original witnesses, or the sus- piciousness of their testimony. A matter of fact may again be doubtful, in consequence of the different constructions which may be put upon admitted facts and appearances, in a case of proof by (what is termed) circumstantial evidence. Whenever such doubts exist they cannot be settled by a direct appeal to testimony, and can only be resolved by reasoning; instances of which are afforded by the pleadings of lawyers and the disquisitions of * See Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, B. I. c. i., B. VIII. c. L. and B. XI. c. iii. I.] IN MATTERS OF OPINION. 3 historians upon contested facts. When an individual fact is doubted upon reasonable grounds, its existence becomes a matter of opinion. The existence of such a fact, however, is not a general or scientific truth, but a question to be decided by a consideration of the testi- mony of witnesses. Matters of Opinion, not being disputed questions of fact, are general propositions or theorems relating to laws of nature or mind, principles and rules of human conduct, future probabilities, deductions from hypotheses, and the like, about which a doubt may reasonably exist. All doubtful questions, whether of speculation or prac- tice, are matters of opinion. With regard to these, the ultimate source of our belief is always a process of rea- soning.* The proper mode of conducting this process, of guarding against errors of induction and deduction, of testing the soundness of existing arguments, and of establishing new truths by ratiocination ; is the province * " I remember it was with extreme difficulty that I could bring my master to understand the meaning of the word opinion, or how a point could be disputable; because reason taught us to affirm or deny only where we are certain, and beyond our knowledge we cannot do either. So that controversies, wranglings, disputes, and positiveness in false or dubious propositions, are evils unknown among the Houyhnhnms." — Swift. The essential idea of opitiion seems to be that it is a matter about which doubt can reasonably exist, as to which two persons can without absurdity think differently. The existence of an object before the eyes of two persons would not be a matter of opinion, nor would it be a matter of opinion that twice two are four. But when testimony is divided, or uncertain, the existence of a fact may be- come doubtful, and, therefore, a matter of opinion. For example, it may be a matter of opinion whether there was a war of Troy, whether Romulus lived, who was the man in the iron mask, who B 2 4 ON THE NATURE OF AUTHORITY [CH. of logical science. The science of logic, having been created by the inventive and penetrating genius of Aris- totle, and afterwards systematized by the Schoolmen, was enlarged by the sagacious divinations of Bacon, who indicated its applications to natural philosophy, and freed it from much of the needless subtlety of the schools. Since the publication of the Novum Organon, the fundamental processes of thought connected with reasoning have been explored by Locke, Leibnitz, and the metaphysicians who have followed in their steps: and of late years, logical science has, in this country, received much illustration and improvement, from the writings of Archbishop Whately, Dr. Whewell, and Mr. John Mill: of whom, the first has improved the form of the scholastic logic, and adapted it to the wants of modern students; the second has expounded the philo- sophy of induction, and of its subsidiary processes, as applied to the whole field of the physical sciences ; while the latter has determined the province of logic with precision, has established its first principles on a sound wrote Junius, &c. So the tendency of a law or form of govern- ment, or social institution, the probability of a future event, the quality of an action or the character of an historical personage, may be a matter of opinion. Any proposition, the contradictory of which can be maintained with probability, is a matter of opinion. The distinction between matters of fact and matters of opinion i3 recognized by Bacon, Advancement of Learning, vol. ii. p. 42, ed. Montagu. See also Locke, Essay on the Understanding, B. IV. c. xvi. § 5; On the Conduct of the Understanding, § 24; and Whately, Rhetoric, Part. I. c. iii. § 3. In the language of jurists, questions of fact are opposed to ques- tions of law. Hence the maxim of our law: " De jure respondent judices, de facto jurati." On this subject, see Bentham On Judicial Evidence by Dumont, B. I, c. v. I.] IN MATTERS OF OPINION. 5 basis, and has systematized the methods of observa- tion and deduction, for all the subjects of scientific research. Upon the field of logical science, as defined by the writers whom I have referred to, I do not propose to encroach. The object of the following pages will be of a subordinate and more limited kind. Without entering into any inquiry into the process of reasoning, or at- tempting to throw any light upon scientific method, it will concern a portion of the application of logical science, which has often been discussed in a detached or fragmentary manner, but which seems of sufficient im- portance to deserve a connected consideration. It is familiarly known, that, in our progress from childhood to manhood, during the course of our educa- tion, and afterwards in the business of life, our belief, both speculative and practical, is, owing to our inability or unwillingness to investigate the subject for ourselves, often determined by the opinions of others. That the opinions of mankind should so often be formed in this manner, has been a matter of regret to many writers : others again have enforced the duty of submitting our convictions, in certain cases, to the guidance of fit judges; but all have admitted the wide extent to which the derivation of opinions upon trust prevails, and the desirableness that the choice of guides in these matters should be regulated by a sound discretion. It is, there- fore, proposed to inquire how far our opinions may be properly influenced by the mere authority* of others, * This use of the word authority is in accordance with its sense in classical writers. One of the meanings of auctoritas is ex- plained by Facciolati, as follows: "Item pro pondere ac momento quod habent res legitime, sapienter, ac prudenter constitute, ut 6 ON THE NATURE OF AUTHORITY [CH. independently of our own conviction founded upon appropriate reasoning. When any one forms an opinion on a question either of speculation or practice, without any appropriate pro- cess of reasoning, really or apparently leading to that conclusion, and without compulsion or inducement of interest, but simply because some other persons, whom he believes to be competent judges on the matter, en- tertain that opinion, he is said to have formed his opinion upon authority. If he is convinced by a legitimate process of reasoning — as by studying a scientific treatise on the subject — his opinion does not rest upon authority. Or if he adopts any opinion, either sincerely or professedly, from motives of interest, or from fear of persecution, he does not found his opinion upon authority. He who believes upon authority, entertains the opinion simply because it is entertained by a person who appears to him likely to think correctly on the subject. Whenever, in the course of this Essay, I speak of the sunt leges, decreta senatus, responsa prudentum, res prseclare gestae, sententise clarorum virorum." — See Cic. Top. c. xix. An auctor meant the originator or creator of anything. Hence Virgil speaks of the deified Augustus as " Auctorem frugum tem- pestatumque potentem," (Georg. i. 27;) and Sallust says that un- equal glory attends " Scriptorem et auctorem rerum," {Cat. c. ii.) Hence any person who determines our belief, even as a witness, is called an auctor. Thus Tacitus, in quoting Julius Caesar as a witness with respect to the former state of the Gauls, calls him " Summus auctorum," ( Germ. c. 28,) — i. e., the highest of autho- rities. As writers, particularly of history, were the authorities for facts, " auctor" came to mean a writer. Hence Juvenal speaks of a preceptor of the Roman youth being required, " Ut legat historias, auctores noverit omnes, Tamquam ungues digitosque suos." — VII. 231. Compare Quintilian, Inst. Or at. I. 8, §. 18—21. I.] IN MATTERS OF OPINION. 7 Principle of Authority, I shall understand the principle of adopting the belief of others, on a matter of opinion, without reference to the particular grounds on which that belief may rest. In pursuing the inquiry, thus indicated in general terms, I shall attempt, first, to describe the circum- stances under which opinions are usually derived from authority, and next, to ascertain the marks of sound or trustworthy authority in matters of opinion. Having shown what are the best indications of the competent judges in each subject, I shall inquire as to their nume- rical ratio to the rest of the community, and shall after- wards offer some remarks upon the application of the principle of authority to questions of civil government. Lastly, I shall make some suggestions upon the best means of creating a trustworthy authority in matters of opinion, and of guarding against the abuses to which the principle of authority is liable. § 3. It will be shown presently that a large propor- tion of the general opinions of mankind are derived merely from authority, and are entertained without any distinct understanding of the evidence on which they rest, or the argumentative grounds by which they are supported. Moreover, the advice of professional per- sons, or other competent judges in any subject matter, has great influence in questions of practice, both in public and private life. An inquiry, therefore, into the legitimate use of the principle of authority, and the con- sequences to which it tends, must be admitted to relate to an important subject. The importance of investiga- tions in the field of logical science is undoubtedly far superior, inasmuch as logic furnishes the ultimate tests for the discovery of truth. The rules of logic, con- sidered as an art, are a guide to the mind in the conduct 8 ON THE NATURE OF AUTHORITY [CH. of all processes of independent reasoning and intellectual investigation. A complete and philosophical scheme of logic is, therefore, a powerful instrument for facilitating the confutation of existing errors, and the discovery of new truths. It thus opens the way to the progressive advancement of science; all accurate knowledge must ultimately be derived from sound methods of investiga- tion. For all scientific truths we must be indebted to original researches, carried on according to logical rules. But when these truths have been discovered by original inquirers, and received by competent judges, it is chiefly by the influence of authority that they are accredited and diffused. Now, it is true that when a person derives an opinion from authority, the utmost he can hope is to adopt the belief of those who, at the time, are the least likely to be in error. If this opinion happens to be erroneous, the error is necessarily shared by those who receive it upon mere trust, and without any process of verification. For example, before the Copernican system of the world was demonstrated, and accepted by all com- petent astronomers, persons ignorant of astronomy natu- rally believed in the truth of the Ptolemaic system, which was received among all astronomers of authority. Until men of science had, by independent observation and reasoning, overthrown this erroneous doctrine, and established the true system of the world, the opinions of all those who relied upon authority were necessarily misled. It must be admitted that the formation of opinions by authority can never (except by indirect means), produce any increase or improvement of know- ledge, or bring about the discovery of new truths. Its influence is at best confined to the diffusion and exten- sion of sound opinions, when they are in existence; and the utmost that any rules on the subject can effect is to I.] IN MATTERS OF OPINION. 9 enable an uninformed person to discern who are the most competent judges of a question on which he is unable, from any cause, to judge for himself. But it is, nevertheless, of paramount importance that truth, and not error, should be accredited; that men, when they are led, should be led by safe guides ; and that they should thus profit by those processes of reasoning and investigation, which have been carried on in accordance with logical rules, but which they are not able to verify for themselves. With the view of arriving at the best means for the accomplishment of this desirable end, we shall proceed, first, to indicate the extent of the opinions necessarily founded on authority, and shall afterwards endeavour to trace the manner in which the principle of authority can be so applied as to be most conducive to the welfare of human society. 10 ON THE EXTENT OF THE OPINIONS [CH. CHAPTER II. ON THE EXTENT OF THE OPINIONS FOUNDED UPON AUTHORITY. § 1. The opinions of all children and young persons are necessarily derived from their parents and teachers, either without any knowledge, or with a very imperfect knowledge, of the grounds on which they rest, or the objections to which they may be liable. Even in cases where the reason is given with the opinion, the belief of a child is often determined rather by the authority of the teacher, than by the force of the argument. The subjects connected with the relations of physical objects, as well as with morals and religion, which are early pre- sented to the mind of a child, often involve considerations so numerous, so complex, and so remote from his limited experience, that a full explanation of them would neces- sarily bewilder, rather than enlighten his understanding. Much instruction, too, is conveyed to a child in language, the full import of which he cannot comprehend. Words are often counters, not money, to children. They coun- terfeit processes of thought, rather than represent them. Much of the benefit of such early tuition consists in its familiarizing the child with the names of ideas, which in its mind are still invested only with a vague and sha- dowy form, and in habituating it to the use of the great instrument of thought and discourse — language. Hence, in the education of children, a respect for the teacher as teacher, and for his precepts, independently of his II.] FOUNDED UPON AUTHORITY. 11 reasons for them, is necessary : and it is important to inculcate principles and truths, even though the evidence of them is not, and cannot be, fully understood.* In this manner a person grows up, having imbibed, almost unconsciously, from his parents, teachers, and friends, the opinions and sentiments on religion, mo- rality, government, history, and the relations of external nature, which are current in his country, at his time, among the persons under whose tuition he has been placed, and with whom he has associated.f This transmission of opinions from one generation to another, in a lump, (like the succession of property per universitatem, according to the expression of the Roman lawyers,) which results from family influences and the authority exercised by the parent and the senior upon the mind of the child and the junior, doubtless contains a considerable alloy of evil, inasmuch as it perpetuates error in combination with truth, and affords no test for their discrimination.! But it is mainly this process which, in each community, connects the present with the past, and creates a unity and continuity of national * Ael toiq 'ideffiv fi\QaL ko\u>q top irepl Kah&v Kal ducaiiov Kal 6\(oq riov ttcKitlkCjv aKovaufievop ikclv&q. dp^rj yap to on, Kal el rovro tyaivoiTO dpKovvTOjg, ovSev irpoaZeriaei rov Start. 6 $e toiovtoq 7} eyei rj Xafiot ay apx^Q pa(ti(*>£. — Aristot. Eth. Nic. i. 2. t Ceteri primum ante tenentur adstricti, quam, quid esset opti- mum, judicare potuerunt: deinde infirmissimo tempore aatatis, aut obsecuti amico cuidam, aut una alicujus, quern primum audierunt, oratione capti, de rebus incognitis judicant, et ad quamcunque sunt disciplinam quasi tempestate delati, ad earn, tamquam ad saxum, adhaerescunt. — Cicero, Acad. Prior. II. 3. \ Ratio ilia human a, quam habemus, ex multa fide et multo etiam casu, necnon ex puerilibus, quas primo hausimus, notionibus, far- rago quaedam est et congeries. — Bacon, Nov. Org. Lib. I. aph. 97. Compare Locke, On the Conduct of the Understanding y § 41. 12 ON THE EXTENT OF THE OPINIONS [CH. character and feeling. It is the insensible and inces- sant propagation of opinions from the old to the young within the circle of every family, and the uninquiring adoption by the growing generation of the moral and intellectual ideas of their immediate predecessors, which give to each nation its distinctive attributes — which enable it to maintain its characteristic peculiarities, and which prevent the general level of civilization through- out the country from receding or becoming irregular.* The traditions of civilization, if we may use the expres- sion, are, to a great extent, perpetuated by the implicit faith of children in the authority of their parents. § 2. To what extent a man, when his reason becomes mature, and he is emancipated from parental control, will modify the opinions with which he has been imbued during his childhood, depends upon the circumstances of his subsequent life. If he belongs to the working-classes, he will probably, unless his circumstances be peculiar, retain these opinions through life, with little verification or enlargement. His opportunities for observation will be principally confined to his relations with his employer, together with the manual operations in which he is occupied. Owing to the cheapness of newspapers and tracts, he may occa- sionally obtain imperfect and partial glimpses into some of the political questions of the day ; but he can rarely exercise any independent judgment, except upon the matters with which his labour makes him personally con- versant. This description applies particularly to the agricultural labourers, who are not within the influence of the more stirring life of towns. " A great part of Compare Comte, Cours de Philosophie Positive, torn. iv. p. 581. II.] FOUNDED UPON AUTHORITY. 13 mankind," (says Locke,) " are, by the natural and un- alterable state of things in this world, and the constitu- tion of human affairs, unavoidably given over to in- vincible ignorance of those proofs on which others build, and which are necessary to establish those opinions ; the greatest part of men, having much to do to get the means of living, are not in a condition to look after those of learned and laborious inquiries."* With the middle classes, there is more opportunity for the independent formation of opinions, by the ac- quirement of knowledge and observation of the world. Their time is, however, from an early age, engrossed with their industrial pursuits. Their daily business, combined with the care of their families, necessarily consumes the chief part of their attention, and leaves few opportunities for study and reflexion. Such knowledge, however, and fitness for judgment as springs from special skill, and from a familiar acquaintance with the mechanical pro- cesses of certain arts, trades, and manufactures, will often be found in this class. With regard to the wealthier classes,f comprising a large number of persons who have received a liberal education, and have leisure and means for study, obser- vation, investigation, and reflection, the facilities for the independent formation of opinions are greater. But many of these, particularly the more energetic, are occupied with business and the affairs of active life, which either leave little time for reading and thought, or restrict it to one subject. Others consume a large portion of their time in amusements, or, at the most, in * Essay on the Understanding, B. IV. c. xx. § 2. t See the remarks of Locke, ib. § 6. .14 ON THE EXTENT OF THE OPINIONS [CH. pursuits of mere curiosity; and still more acquiesce, without examination, in the opinions current amongst their friends and associates. Even persons of a specu- lative turn of mind, having leisure for speculation, con- fine their thoughts to a limited class of subjects, and entertain on all other subjects opinions mainly derived from authority. For example, a mathematician takes his historical and political opinions, a moral philosopher or an historian takes his physical opinions, on trust. The difficulty and labour of original thought and investiga- tion are great; the number of subjects is enormous; every year adds to the stock of known facts, both in his- tory and physics. The invention of printing and paper, by multiplying and perpetuating the records of facts and opinions, has rendered it impossible even for a professed student to explore more than certain portions of the field of knowledge. Hence (as we shall show more fully lower down ), the use of reviews, manuals, compendia, encyclopaedias, and other books of reference, which serve as guides to the character of works, which contain results and opinions without the scaffolding by which they were constructed, and abridge intellectual labour. § 3. Men in general, with regard even to their opi- nions, are influenced by the prevailing fashion. They fear singularity more than error; they accept numbers as the index of truth; and they follow the crowd. f The dislike of labour, the fear of unpopularity, the danger * Chapter ix. f Pendemus toti ex alienis judiciis, et id optimum nobis videtur, quod petitores laudatoresque multos habet, non id, quod laudandum petendumque est. Nee viam bonam ac malam per se sestimamus, sed turba vestigiorum, in quibus nulla sunt redeuntium. — Seneca de Ot. Sapient, c. xxviii. II.] FOUNDED UPON AUTHORITY. 15 even of setting up individual opinion against established convictions and the voice of the multitude, contribute to strengthen this inclination. In the voting of political bodies, it is necessary (as we shall see hereafter) to make the decision depend upon the numerical majority. But although everybody is aware that numbers are not a test of truth, yet many persons, while they recognise this maxim in theory, violate it in practice, and accept opinions simply because they are entertained by the people at large. It may be added, that a state of doubt, or suspense, as to opinions, particularly on important subjects, is painful to most minds, and men are im- patient of the delay, or unwilling to make the exertion needful for the independent examination of the evidence and arguments on both sides of a disputed question. Hence, they are prone to cut the knot by accepting with- out verification, or with a very partial examination of its grounds, the opinion of some person whom, for any reason, they look to with respect, and whom they con- sider a competent judge in the matter. This feeling is naturally much strengthened by a conviction which the modesty and candour of most persons will suggest to them — viz., that if they do their best to form an inde- pendent judgment, they are not more likely to be right than other persons who have previously examined the subject, and whose opinions are known. § 4. There is a further motive which induces us to rely upon the judgment of persons whom we believe to have previously examined a subject with care and atten- tion, and to be competent to form a sound opinion upon it. Even if we have, at some former time, gone through a process of study and examination, and have arrived at a given conclusion, the reasons for that conclusion do not always remain present to our mind. We may hold 16 ON THE EXTENT OF THE OPINIONS [CH. the opinion, rather upon the recollection of our having once ascertained it to be well grounded, than from a pre- sent perception of its grounds. " I confess, (says Locke,) in the opinions men have, and firmly stick to, in the world, their assent is not always from an actual view of the reasons that at first prevailed with them ; it being in many cases almost impossible, and in most very hard, even for those who have very admirable memories, to retain all the proofs which, upon a due examination, made them embrace that side of the question. It suffices that they have once with care and fairness sifted the matter as far as they could, and that they have searched into all the particulars that they could imagine to give any light to the question, and with the best of their skill cast up the account upon the whole evidence; and thus, having once found on which side the probability appeared to them, after as full and exact an inquiry as they can make, they lay up the conclusion in their memories as a truth they have discovered; and for the future they remain satisfied with the testimony of their memories, that this is the opinion that, by the proofs they have once seen of it, deserves such a degree of their assent as they afford it. This is all that the greatest part of men are capable of doing in regulating their opinions and judgments ; unless a man will exact of them either to retain distinctly in their memories all the proofs concerning any probable truth, and that, too, in the same order and regular deduction of consequences in which they have formerly placed or seen them, which sometimes is enough to fill a large volume on one single question; or else they must require a man, for every opinion that he embraces, every day to examine the proofs, both which are impossible. It is unavoidable, therefore, that the memory be relied on in the case, and II.] FOUNDED UPON AUTHORITY. 17 that men be persuaded of several opinions, whereof the proofs are not actually in their thoughts — nay, which perhaps they are not able actually to recal. Without this, the greatest part of men must be either very scep- tics, or change every moment, and yield themselves up to whoever, having lately studied the question, offers them arguments, which, for want of memory, they are not able presently to answer."* As is very clearly explained in the preceding passage of Locke, our belief in a matter of opinion often rests upon our memory of an investigation which we have formerly made ; we rely on a process of reasoning which we remember that we went through, though we cannot now recollect its several steps, and only recal its final result : we know that we had once sufficient reasons for the opinion, though the reasons themselves are no longer in our thoughts ; so that we believe, as it were, upon our own authority ; we refer to a foregone process of inquiry, as a ground of present belief, in the faith that it was adequately performed, but without feeling the force of the reasons by which our mind was originally satisfied. If men did not thus fall back upon their own authority ; if they did not for a time hold to an opinion in the confidence that their previous assent to it had been founded on adequate reasons, though these reasons may have faded from their memory, they would, as Locke truly remarks, be perpetually floating about in doubt, or they would be at the mercy of any person who had a readier and more retentive memory than themselves, or who happened from accidental circumstances to have mastered the arguments on one side of the question. There is one class of cases in particular, which may be On the Understanding, B. IV. c. xvi. §§1 and 2. 18 ON THE EXTENT OF THE OPINIONS [CH. referred to as illustrating our habit of entertaining opinions without any accurate memory of their grounds. This is, the estimates which we form of the characters of persons either in private or public life ; our judgment of a man's character is derived from observing a number of successive acts, forming in the aggregate his general course of conduct. Now in proportion as our oppor- tunities for observation are multiplied, our judgment is likely to be correct ; but the facts from which our ulti- mate opinion is collected are so numerous, and often so trivial in themselves, that however sound the opinion may be, a large part of them necessarily soon vanish from the memory. Being thus familiarized with the habit of entertaining an opinion without any present consciousness of its grounds, and from a mere remembrance of a process of investigation which we formerly went through, it is easy to transfer this origin of belief to another person, and to accept an opinion because that other person, (whom, moreover, we believe to be more competent to judge in the matter than ourselves) has gone through a similar process of investigation. Being accustomed to treat his former self as a sort of alter ego, and practically to divide his own identity, a man can easily apply the same mode of reference to another person. At all events, such a ground of belief is quite legitimate until we are able to examine the question for ourselves ; and is far preferable to the alternative of a temporary suspension of belief, (which in practical matters may tend to serious evils,) or subjection to a sophistical advocate whose business it is to present one side of the case in a favourable point of view. § 5. In the preceding remarks, we have had chiefly II.] FOUNDED UPON AUTHORITY. 19 in view those general opinions which are termed specu- lative ; and which, although they in fact ultimately determine men's conduct, yet have not an immediate bearing upon practice. The extensive department of Practice, however, also involves a constant succession of questions which cause a man to hesitate as to the course to be pursued, which give rise to diversity of opinions, and require the interference of a competent judge for their solution. In many of the affairs of private life, it is customary to follow the advice of professional and other persons having had an appropriate training and peculiar experience in the subject matter. Thus a phy- sician is consulted in questions of health, a lawyer in legal questions, an architect or engineer in questions of building, a gardener in questions of horticulture, a sailor in questions of navigation, and the like. There is like- wise frequent occasion in the administration of justice, and the transaction of public business, for appealing to the opinion of persons of professional and special know- ledge. In practical affairs, too, many opinions are formed upon the authority of the civil government, of public bodies and persons in conspicuous and responsible positions, of the heads of churches and religious bodies, of universities, academies, and places of learning, and of leaders of parties, and other voluntary associations. For the present, we merely indicate these sources of authority, as influencing the opinions of numerous per- sons: and we merely point out, in general terms, the extent of the opinions accepted upon trust, and formed without independent investigation, or a knowledge of the grounds on which they rest. We shall now attempt to distinguish the cases in which this mode of forming opinions is properly applicable, and thus to determine the c2 20 ON THE EXTENT OF THE OPINIONS, ETC. [CH. proper province of authority. As a first step in this inquiry, it will be necessary to consider what are the marks by which trustworthy authority in matters of opinion may be recognised, and what are the quali- fications of a competent guide in questions of speculative truth and practical conduct. III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 21 CHAPTER III. ON THE MARKS OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. § 1 . In the first chapter, we adverted to the received distinction between matters of fact and matters of opi- nion ; and we showed that, although this distinction may be wanting in scientific precision, it nevertheless classifies the objects of belief in a manner suitable to the purposes of this essay. Before, therefore, we proceed to enumerate the marks of trustworthy authority in matters of opinion, it will be convenient to ascertain the marks of trust- worthy testimony in matters of fact, and to compare the qualifications which render a person a credible wit- ness with those which give weight to a person's opinion, as such, independently of his reasons. The credibility of a witness to a fact seems to depend mainly on the four following conditions : viz. — 1. That the fact fell within the range of his senses. 2. That he observed or attended to it. 3. That he possesses a fair amount of intelligence and memory. 4. That he is free from any sinister or misleading interest ; or if not, that he is a person of ve- racity. If a person was present at any event, so as to see or hear it ; if he availed himself of his opportunity, so as to take note of what passed; if he has sufficient mental capacity to give an accurate report of the occurrence ; and if he is not influenced by personal favour, or dislike, or fear, or the hope of gain, to misreport the fact; or if, 22 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. notwithstanding such influence, his own conscience and moral or religious principle, or the fear of public opinion, deters him from mendacity, such a person is a credible witness. Upon considering these conditions for veracious testi- mony, we see that, with respect to statements of fact, everything depends on the source from which they emanate. They rest entirely on the credit due to known or assignable witnesses. But with arguments it is dif- ferent. They have a probative force quite independent of the person by whom they are invented or propounded. They depend on the relation of premises and conclusion, of antecedent and consequent. For the truth of his premises the author of an argument may be personally responsible; but the sequence of his conclusion is a matter quite independent of his individual veracity. Logic, therefore, as a science, or art, of reasoning, has no concern with moral character; all arguments, as argu- ments, and reduced to their bare logical elements, are equally conclusive, whatever may be the source from which they proceed. Thus, in judicial proceedings, an advocate may argue with equal force on either side of a question, though without any personal conviction on the subject. He may handle arguments (as a fencer handles his sword) with the skill of a practised disputant, regarding them merely as instruments for the attainment of his end, but without making himself responsible for the soundness of his conclusions.* So a person may, as * " Sir James Johnston happened to say that he paid no regard to arguments of counsel at the bar of the House of Commons, because they were paid for speaking. Johnson: * Nay, sir, argument is argument. You cannot help paying regard to their arguments, if they are good. If it were testimony, you might disregard it, if you III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 23 a rhetorical exercise, or for the purpose of eliciting the truth by the juxta-position of conflicting views, compose an argument on opposite sides of a question. Examples of this species of composition are afforded by all writings in the form of a controversial dialogue, such as the dia- logues of Plato and Cicero and the Minute Philosopher of Berkeley. A person who produces an argument, pro- duces something which can be judged without reference to himself, and which is not necessarily either confirmed or enfeebled by his individual qualities or circumstances. A new demonstration of a mathematical problem would in no way depend on the character of its inventor. But the witness to a fact can only depose truly to that fact; he cannot, like the arguer, choose his ground hypo- thetically ; and the credibility of his testimony depends solely on his own personal circumstances and moral character. § 2. Anonymous testimony to a matter of fact, is therefore wholly devoid of weight ; unless, indeed, there be circumstances which render it probable that a trust- worthy witness has adequate motives for concealment, or extraneous circumstances may support and accredit a statement, which, left to itself, would fall to the ground. Thus an anonymous communication may put a man on his guard, or may induce him to make inquiries in a certain direction, when it appears probable from the contents of the communication, or from other circum- knew that it were purchased. There is a beautiful image in Bacon upon this subject: ' Testimony is like an arrow shot from a long bow — the force of it depends on the strength of the hand that draws it; argument is like an arrow from a cross-bow, which has great force though shot by a child.' " — Boswell's Johnson, vol. viii. p. 281. 24 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. stances, that it may proceed from some quarter in which secrecy is rendered inevitable by a powerful interest. Such was the letter to Lord Monteagle concerning the Gunpowder Plot ; such are threatening letters, or letters giving private information respecting the conduct of in- dividuals, in a public or private capacity. Occasionally, it happens that important suggestions are conveyed in this manner; but, for the most part, information given anonymously turns out, on investigation, to be utterly worthless. An anonymous work, too, may sometimes exhibit internal evidence of truth ; that is, there may be certain marks in the writing which give it an air of ve- racity, though the author may have deemed it prudent to withhold his name from the public. It is in this manner that anonymous statements of facts in news- papers are authenticated : the periodical appearance of the newspaper and the character which its management may have acquired for correctness of intelligence, serving as guarantees for the truth of its statements.* State- ments in an anonymous publication may likewise acquire credibility from their remaining uncontradicted by per- sons who have an interest in contradicting them, and are acquainted with the facts of the case. It may be added that a work may be anonymous, from the loss of the author's name, though its original publication may not have been anonymous. For instance, the Acts of the Apostles, and many chronicles of the middle ages, are now anonymous, though there is no reason to suppose that the authors concealed their names from their con- temporaries. With these exceptions — which are rather apparent See this subject further pursued in Chapter IX. III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 25 than real — it is essential to testimony that we should know the witness as well as the fact, and be able to estimate his individual qualifications, as a testifier or relator. Whereas, in the case of an argument, its conclusiveness, considered without reference to the truth of its premises, and judged merely by logical rules, is wholly independent of its author. This independence of an argument with respect to the character of its author, implies, however, both that its inferential force is thoroughly understood, and that the truth of its premises is conceded. Whenever this is not the case, the character of the person who advances the argument is a most material consideration; and it is to cases of this sort that our present inquiry relates — that is to say, to cases where an opinion is accepted out of confidence in the person who holds it, and without any full comprehension of its grounds. § 3. It may be added that for all purposes of philo- sophical observation, a knowledge of the proper science, and a peculiar training of the senses, are requisite, and therefore that a witness who possesses these qualifica- tions is far more credible than one who is destitute of them. For example, a scientific naturalist who reports that he has seen an undescribed animal or vegetable in a remote country, is far less likely to be mistaken than a common traveller, ignorant of natural history. A skilled witness of this sort may be considered, in a cer- tain sense, as a witness of authority, inasmuch as his previous study and habits of observation give a peculiar weight to his report of the phenomenon. § 4. The distinction between testimony, argument, and authority, may be briefly summed up thus : In questions of testimony, I believe a matter of fact, because the witness believes it. 26 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. In questions of argument, I believe the conclusion to be true, because it is proved by reasons satisfactory to my understanding. In questions of authority, I believe a matter of opinion, because it is believed by a person whom I consider a competent judge of the question. § 5. Now, on looking at the qualities which render any one a credible witness to a matter of fact, we may remark that they are of common occurrence. For testi- mony, nothing further is in general required than oppor- tunity of observation, ordinary attention and intelli- gence, and veracity. Almost every person of sound mind, who has reached a certain age, is a credible wit- ness as to matters which he has observed, and as to which he has no immediate interest in deception or concealment.* For purposes of scientific observation, indeed, (as has been remarked,) a certain skill and practice beyond that possessed by ordinary persons is requisite; but when this has been acquired, no extra- ordinary qualifications are needed. The qualities which render a person a competent authority in matters of opinion are of rarer occurrence. * For the administration of justice, it is important that there should be some recognised tests of the credibility of witnesses to facts in dispute before the court. In almost all systems of judicial procedure, an attempt has been made to lay down inflexible legal rules on this subject. Thus, in some cases, the concurrent testi- mony of two witnesses to the same fact has been rendered necessary; the evidence of persons standing in a near degree of affinity to one of the parties, or having a pecuniary interest in the cause, has been excluded. But experience has shown that, however useful maxims of this sort may be as guiding the discretion of the court in weigh- ing the credibility of witnesses, the entire exclusion of evidence on such grounds obstructs the administration of justice. III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 27 Many of them are, separately, not frequent; and the combination of them in the same individual is neces- sarily more uncommon ; a person whose testimony to a fact would be unimpeachable, might be utterly devoid of authority as a guide of opinion. Besides, a person who is a credible witness for one matter of fact, is equally credible for all others which may fall under his observa- tion; whereas (as we shall see hereafter) no man is equally competent as a guide of opinion in all subjects, and, in general, the authority of each person is, as com- pared with the sum total of human affairs, confined within a narrow range. § 6. The first qualification is, that a person should have devoted much study and thought to the subject- matter if it be merely speculative; and that if it be practical, he should also have had adequate experience respecting it. Secondly, his mental powers must be equal to the task of comprehending the subject, and they must be of the sort fitted to it. Thirdly, he ought to be exempt, as far as possible, from personal interest in the matter; or, if he be not exempt, his honesty and integrity ought to be such as to afford a reasonable security against the perversion of his opinions by views of his individual advantage. § 7. The three qualifications just stated may now be examined with somewhat more of detail. I. If the subject be extensive — if it be one of the great departments into which human knowledge is divided — a careful study of it, continued for several years, or even for a large part of a life, combined with frequent meditation, and, if possible, personal observa- tion, is requisite in order to enable a man to understand it thoroughly and to treat it with a sound and compre- 28 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. hensive judgment. All the great luminaries of science, whether mathematical, physical, metaphysical, ethical, or political, have fulfilled this condition. None of them would have acquired the authority, which their opinions, as such, independently of their reasons, possess, if they had not applied all their mental faculties during a large part of their lives to the subjects on which they wrote. The extent and complexity of the more important departments of science are so great, that no person, however penetrating his intellect, can master any of them without years of patient study and reflection. Each science involves the consideration of a vast number of particular facts and phenomena, which the mind can only apprehend by passing over them in succession, and examining them separately. In order that the founda- tions of a science should be duly laid, and its super- structure raised and enlarged, this process must be fre- quently repeated, either for parts or for the whole. The institution of proper experiments, and the verification of the experiments of others, are likewise often slow and delicate processes; though they are powerful aids, of which the physical sciences enjoy the exclusive use. In the moral sciences, new facts, and combinations of facts, are constantly presenting themselves ; but the observa- tion of these, and their verification, together with the subsequent elimination of such concomitant phenomena as do not properly enter into the problem, require patient and sustained attention on the part of the scientific inquirer. If the subject be one, not of mere speculation, but of knowledge to be applied in practice, a further condition is requisite. Not only must the guide of opinion have studied the subject theoretically, not only must he, if a lawyer, for example, have rendered himself familiar with III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 29 the system of law, if a physician, have learned the science of medicine, but he must have practised it; he must have acquired the ability of applying this theo- retical knowledge to actual cases, which experience alone can confer. In order that a person should be eminent in a learned profession, it is necessary that he should combine a knowledge of its principles, with that judg- ment, tact, dexterity, and promptitude of applying them to actual cases, which are derived from habits of prac- tice. The like may be said of persons conversant in the constructive arts, as architects and engineers, of the military and naval services, of agriculturists, gardeners, manufacturers of different sorts, &c. In order that they may give sound advice with respect to any practical question belonging to their own department, it is neces- sary that they should combine actual experience with abstract knowledge. In some cases, that experience implies even manual skill, which can only be acquired by practice. For example, a surgeon would not be a com- petent judge on a question of practical surgery, unless his judgment were assisted and corrected by actual manipulation of his instruments. In like manner, a person cannot be a competent judge of works of art, such as statues, pictures, coins, and engravings; or of articles of trade, as horses, wines, plate, &c, without practical observation and experience. In these cases, a certain training of the sight is necessary, analogous to the training of the hands and limbs in a mechanical em- ployment or trade requiring bodily dexterity. The senses can be educated so as to discern marks which are invisible to the unpractised observer. There are slight indicia, which guide the judgment of the man of expe- rience, and which no merely theoretical teaching can enable a person to detect. The occupation of the hunter 30 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. or the fisher, again, requires an actual observation of the habits of the animals to be caught, in order to guide the judgment. In this minor species of warfare, a practical knowledge of the probable movements of the enemy, and of the best means of diverting or lulling his attention, of falling on him unawares, and of overwhelming him with a superior force, is as necessary, for success, as in naval or military tactics. A similar practical knowledge is a necessary qualification for those who are entrusted with the care and training of animals, as shepherds, horse- breakers, &c. For purposes of scientific observation, a training of the senses is likewise necessary. A scientific observer must be not only familiar with the terminology of his science, and be able to apply its technical terms readily to the proper objects, but he ought likewise to have acquired that delicacy, rapidity, and correctness of discernment which the habit of observation, combined with knowledge, can alone confer.* § 8. II. In order that a person should originate sound opinions on a subject of speculation and science, he ought not merely to have devoted a long time to the assiduous study and contemplation of the subject, but his mental powers ought to be superior to the average. His mind ought to be more wMe-ranging and far-seeing. He ought to be able to take a comprehensive or synop- tical view of an extensive subject, and also to trace the remote consequences of an insulated principle. That high degree of intellectual power, which we call genius, and which the ancients attributed to the inspiration of the gods, is in itself inexplicable, and can only be judged by its effects. But some ray of that light is requisite in * See this subject well explained by Dr. Whewell, Philos. of 2nd. Sciences, B. XII. c. ii. §§ 26, 27. III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 31 order to enable a person to be classed among the original teachers and guides of mankind. Moreover, a man ought, in order to acquire authority as an inventor in matters of speculation, not merely to be superior in point of intellect to the average of men, but he ought also to possess the peculiar mental qualities which the subject demands. For example, in order to be pre-eminent in mathematical science, it is not sufficient for him to possess the faculties which fit him for the observation of outward nature. Nor will he be enabled to excel in speculation by powers which fit him exclu- sively for the solution of practical questions and the actual business of life. And, indeed, a person may be qualified to shine in one department or branch of a science, who has no aptitude for other portions of the same subject. As Pope expresses it in his Essay on Criticism : One science only will one genius fit, So vast is art, so narrow human wit. Not only bounded to peculiar arts, But oft in those confined to single parts. (v. 60—63.) Such eminence of intellectual power as enables a person to discover and establish important principles in the physical and moral world is of rare occurrence, and it is not necessary to qualify one who has studied a subject, to comprehend the views and reasonings of others, and to form a competent judgment upon their soundness. Having fulfilled the previous condition of study and reflection, a person of fair capacity may accredit speculative opinions, and serve as a safe guide to others in his capacity of a discriminating judge, although he may not be able to lead them on as an inventor. Such a person may be able to separate truth 32 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. from error among existing opinions, though he might not be able to discover the truth, if unknown, and pro- claim it to the world. Or he may be able to arrange and systematise existing knowledge ; to expound it with perspicuity ; to improve subordinate parts of a science, and to correct errors in accessories, without attempting to grapple with fundamental questions. For practice again, eminent intellectual superiority is not essential; and experience alone, combined with study, if there be a fair amount of ability, will suffice. A large number of the persons practising the learned professions are justly considered as safe and prudent guides in the subjects with which they are conversant, although their general mental powers may not be greatly superior to those of the majority of the educated classes in their own country. The same may be said of sailors, architects, engineers, and other classes of persons having a special training and aptitude for judgment with respect to their own subject. In each profession, how- ever, eminence can only be attained by remarkable ability, fitting its possessor for the peculiar department of practice which he has chosen. As opposed to unpro- fessional men generally, the judgment of any professional man, whatever may be his natural talents, is of weight ; but among men of the same profession, the opinion of those who are peculiarly fitted by nature, in addition to the advantages of experience, is that which is most highly valued. It is not sufficient for success in practice that a person should have mastered a science, and should comprehend its theory ; or even that he should attempt to apply its rules to actual cases. A certain dexterity and aptitude for the application of theory to practice is requisite. Not every man who has studied a system of rhetoric, and III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 33 made some speeches, can become a successful orator ; not every man who has studied law and medicine, and at- tended to the application of his knowledge, can be a good practising lawyer or physician. But, on the other hand, mere practical aptitude can never enable a man to prac- tise a profession with success, unless he is well grounded in its principles. By dexterity, and a sort of leger- demain, he may conceal his defects, and divert attention from his weak points ; but he never can be permanently successful. The great practitioners, whether in war, politics, law, medicine, the fine arts, or any other de- partment of applied knowledge, have all combined a careful study of principles, and patient observation, with practical genius. Practicians, who are ignorant of the principles of their profession or art, instead of acting according to general maxims, of which they understand the grounds, steer their course (and sometimes merely grope their way) by means of analogies ; that is to say, they argue from one case or instance to another, without being able to bring both of them under one general rule or premise. The practical man, who has studied the theory of the subject in which he is employed, combines that tact which results from experience, with the know- ledge of general principles. He is not only imbued with the theory, but he has also learned to apply it in prac- tice, and he has acquired the facility, promptitude, correctness, and confidence of judgment, which result from habit and experience in the practical application of a sound theory ; in the use of an art founded upon a matured science.* § 9. III. The third qualification for rendering a person an authority in matters of opinion, adverted to * Compare Mill's System of Logic, B. VI. c. xi. D 34 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. above, is honesty ; the absence of personal interests likely to deprave his judgment, or an integrity sufficient to overcome such influences. Even if a man has devoted much time and attention to the study of a subject, and is thoroughly conversant with its theory and practice ; if his intellect is powerful, and he possesses the kind of ability suited to the subject; still it is further necessary, in order that his authority should be trustworthy, that he should be exempt from the operation of any misleading interest, or, at least, be proof against its influence. Exemption from such misleading interest, with respect to an opinion, may be owing to the nature of the subject. For example,if the question relate to the mathematical or physical sciences, and have no close and immediate bearing on the concerns of life, it is not likely that the affections or desires should bias the mind in regard to it.* In questions of this sort, it is mainly the ardour of contention, the desire of gaining an argumentative victory over an antagonist, the dislike of a confession of error, or sometimes the jealousy of a rival or a superior, which can blind the judgment. The exemption may likewise arise from the circumstances of the individual. A subject which has a direct bearing on the interests of one person may have no connexion, or only a remote connexion, with the interests of another. It is uni- versally admitted that no man ought to be a judge in his own case. But, if the case were not his own, his competency to form a judgment upon it might be indis- putable. So, if any political measure be proposed which * Credibile est illos pariter vitiisque locisque Altius humanis exseruisse caput, says Ovid, in speaking of astronomers. III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 35 affects the interests of a profession, it may happen that persons belonging to that profession, though peculiarly competent to form an opinion respecting it, on account of their experience and knowledge, are disqualified on account of the probable bias of their judgment by per- sonal considerations ; and that the requisite indifference is only to be found among those who do not belong to the profession. Such out-lying persons may be the only impartial judges in the matter. Even, however, if personal interests should tend to obscure or distort the judgment, that tendency may be resisted by a consciousness of the natural bias, and a strength of moral principle sufficient to overcome it. A knowledge of the character of particular persons may induce us to rely on their integrity, and to reckon on their resistance to such misleading influences. But as such virtue and strength of purpose is rare, its absence must be presumed until it is known or proved to be present. It has been stated above, that the qualities which render a man a trustworthy authority in matters of opinion, are much rarer than those which render a man a credible witness in matters of fact. Accordingly, the honesty which induces a man to speak the truth, is more common than that which induces him to form sound opinions. There are many men who, under ordinary circumstances, would never be seduced by interest to report a fact falsely, or to express an insincere opinion, whose judgment might, nevertheless, be perverted by interest. It is commonly said that the belief is inde- pendent of the will, that is, of the desires or inclina- tions; and every one must be conscious that he cannot change the state of his belief, on matters either of fact or opinion, by merely wishing it to be otherwise. But d2 36 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. the operation of a personal interest, bearing closely and directly upon the question, generally causes a man, unless he be remarkably honest or perspicacious, insensibly to adopt prejudices, or partial and unexamined opinions.* The dislike of listening to unpalatable truths, induces him to shut his ears against evidence and arguments opposed to the views which he considers favourable to his own interest; while, on the other hand, the desire of hearing evidence of a different character, leads him to read only the books, and to frequent only the company of persons, where opinions, in accordance with his in- terest, are likely to be expressed, f The operation of a personal interest in perverting the judgment is so in- sidious, that great honesty, combined with perpetual vigilance, is necessary in order to guard against its in- fluence. Men utterly incapable of telling a deliberate untruth, or deliberately expressing an insincere opinion, are nevertheless liable to be warped by personal interest in the deliberate formation of opinions. When a strong bias of this sort exists, their minds, ready to receive every tittle of evidence on one side of a question, are utterly impervious to arguments on the other. Hence, we see opinions founded on a belief (and often a radi- cally erroneous belief) of self-interest pervade whole classes of persons. Frequently, the great majority of a * See on this subject the remarks of Mr. Mill, System of Logic, B. V. c. i. § 3. f " We know some men will not read a letter which is supposed to bring ill news ; and many men forbear to cast up their accounts, or so much as think upon their estates, who have reason to fear their affairs are in no very good posture." — Locke on the Understanding, B. IV. c. xx. § 6. See also §§ 12 and 16. III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 37 profession, or trade, or other body, adopt some opinion in which they have, or think they have, a common inte- rest, and urge it with almost unanimous vehemence against the public advantage. On occasions of this kind, the persons interested doubtless convince them- selves of the reasonableness of the view which they put forward ; they are guilty of no hypocrisy or insincerity ; but their judgment is warped by their belief as to their interest in the question. If, however, their view be in fact unsound and untenable, the more intelligent members of the class or body cannot fail, occasionally, to catch a few glimpses of the truth ; in searching for con- firmations of their opinion, they must sometimes stumble upon proofs of its weakness, and they must hence feel a misgiving as to the soundness of their cause. This mixed state of insincerity and interested prejudice is, probably, not uncommon in questions where the judgment is subject to a bias ; but, in general, the errors of mankind, both in opinion and action, so far as they arise from considera- tions of personal advantage, are to be attributed rather to sincere, though interested prejudice, than to the direct suggestions of conscious interest. When we speak of a man's conduct or opinions being determined by his interest, we of course mean, by his own opinions as to his interest. It is manifest that a man's real interest may differ from his apparent or sup- posed interest. In other words, the judgment of a foolish or ignorant man, with respect to his interest, may differ from that of wise and well-informed men on the same subject. When a man acts upon an enlightened view of his own interest — upon well ascertained grounds, and in accordance with the advice of judicious and dis- creet counsellors — he is said to act prudently. An im- 38 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. prudent man may, however, equally act from views of personal advantage, though upon hasty, ill-considered, and uninformed views. The practical judgment of men, in private affairs, is constantly liable to be misled by erroneous opinions of self-interest, which, however, are to a great extent obviated and counteracted by professional and skilled advice. In political affairs, it is necessary, for reasons which will be considered in another chapter, to give a freer scope to the opinion of each individual respecting his interest. The operation of this principle is, however, (as we shall see hereafter,) counteracted by numerous influences, in public as well as private affairs.* It may be remarked, that many unsound opinions have a certain affinity with one another, and are formed in knots and clusters. Hence, if one of these is adopted from interested motives, it naturally leads a person to the others ; so that a small portion of unconscious interest will sometimes leaven a man's opinions with a whole mass of error. The influence of a personal interest in perverting the judgment may be resisted by steady honesty and integrity, even where the understanding is not remarkably strong. On the other hand, the moral sentiments may be so ill- directed as to deprave the judgment, even when the understanding is remarkably strong. Men of this sort may be great, but can not be wise; for by wisdom we mean the power of judging, when the intellectual and moral faculties are both in a sound state. Napoleon affords a striking instance of the corruption of the judg- ment, in consequence of the misdirection of the moral * See Chapter VIII. III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 39 sentiments. His intense selfishness and unscrupulous restless ambition seem at last to have completely dis- torted his mental vision. The ancients observed, that a man who had acquired great power and eminence in a State, being rendered giddy by his elevation, often lost his self-command, cast away the maxims of sobriety and moderation, by which he had been restrained when in a less exalted position, and thus came to a speedy down- fall. His newly-acquired power depraved his moral cha- racter — the depravation of his moral character destroyed his judgment — and, having lost his judgment, his career became like that of a ship without a rudder. But, in accounting for this sequence of events, according to their popular religion, they said that the gods, being envious of his greatness, predetermined his ruin, and in order to effect his ruin, filled his mind with vain and foolish thoughts : thus representing his folly as the con- sequence of a precedent decision that he was to be humbled, and not as its sole and ultimate cause. Generally, it may be said that the undue ascendancy of any passion or affection by which the calmness of the reason is disturbed, necessarily for a time impairs the judgment, by deranging its equilibrium. The state of mind most favourable to the formation of a sound opinion is, that a person should be eager about a subject — that he should (according to the common phrase) take an interest in it; but that his mind should not, in the con- sideration, be influenced by any suggestions of personal advantage. " To be indifferent which of two opinions is true, (says Locke,) is the right temper of the mind that pre- serves it from being imposed on, and disposes it to exa- mine with that indifferency, till it has done its best to 40 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. find the truth, and this is the only direct and safe way to it. But to be indifferent whether we embrace false- hood or truth, is the great road to error."* For questions of practice, perfect honesty and freedom from personal bias are equally necessary in order to ensure trustworthy advice. Whether it be the opinion of a professional man in an individual case, or the exhorta- tions of a public speaker in a deliberative assembly, integrity of purpose, and an exclusive regard for the interests of those whom he advises, are qualifications requisite to render him worthy of their confidence, f § 10. In order, therefore, to determine whether a * On the Conduct of the Understanding ', § 12. " Ou l'on est indifferent a la chose qu'on juge, et des lors on est sans attention et sans esprit pour la bien juger; ou Ton est vive- ment affecte de cette meme chose, et c'est alors l'interet du moment qui presque toujours prononce nos jugements. Une decision juste suppose indifference pour la chose qu'on juge, et desir vif de la bien juger. Or, dans l'etat actuel des societes, peu d'hommes eprouvent ce double sentiment de desir et d'indifference, et se trouvent dans l'heureuse position qui le produit." — Helvetius de V Homme, S. IX. c. xviii. "I" Cicero de Off. II. ix. § 8, describes the qualities which render a man trustworthy in matters of practice. The qualities are pro- bity, (justitia,) and prudence or wisdom, (prudentia.) "lis fidem habemus, quos plus intelligere quam nos arbitramur, quosque et futura prospicere credimus, et cum res agatur, in discrimenque ventum sit, expedire rem, et consilium ex tempore capere posse." Of these qualities he considers the former as the most important. Honesty without sagacity has considerable authority, but cleverness without honesty inspires no faith. " Harum igitur duarum ad fidem faciendam justitia plus pollet: quippe cum ea sine prudentia satis habeat auctoritatis, prudentia sine justitia nihil valeat ad faciendam fidem: quo enim quis versutior et callidior est, hoc in- visior et suspectior, detracta opinione probitatis." — Compare Topica, c. xix. III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 41 person is a competent authority on a doubtful question, either of speculation or practice, it is necessary, as in the case of a witness to a fact, to go through a certain process of investigation and reasoning. With regard to a witness, we must satisfy ourselves that the alleged fact occurred within the range of his senses ; that he took note of it ; that he apprehended properly what he ob- served ; and that he reported it faithfully. With regard to an authority in a matter of opinion, we must be as- sured that he had time to study and consider the subject ; that he availed himself of his opportunity ; that he un- derstood what he studied ; and that he judged correctly. The process of investigating a person's competence as a guide in matters of opinion is, however, less difficult and tedious than an examination of the subject itself. For example, it would be much easier to ascertain who is a competent authority upon a question of mechanics or astronomy, than to master mechanical or astronomical science. Moreover, in practical questions, experience, which implies time, is indispensable. Thus, if any un- professional person wished to form an independent judg- ment upon a medical or surgical case, with a view to its treatment, he would be unable to decide and act with safety, however powerful and cultivated his understand- ing might be, and whatever diligence he might be will- ing to use in the study of the disease. The process of determining who is a competent authority is likewise, though a process of reasoning, not appropriate to the question. The truth of the opinion rests on evidence, which would be equally conclusive if the person whose authority is adopted had never existed. It is a second- best indication of the truth ; but nevertheless, in a vast number of cases, the only guide which is practicable. § 11. Whenever, therefore, we seek to determine who 42 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. is a competent authority to guide our opinion on any subject, we should select a person who combines the qualifications which have been just enumerated. We should look out for a man able, honest, and well-versed in the subject. Some further indications of trust- worthy authority, derived from other considerations, may however be obtained, which will assist us in this search. With respect to subjects of speculation and science, the existence of an agreement of the persons having the above qualifications is the most important matter. If all the able and honest men who have diligently studied the subject, or most of them, concur, and if this consent extends over several successive generations, at an en- lightened period, and in all or most civilized countries,* then the authority is at its greatest height. The agreement of competent judges upon a speculative opinion is analogous to the agreement of credible wit- nesses in their testimony to a fact. If ten credible wit- nesses agree in their testimony to a fact, the value of their concurrent testimony is more than ten times the value of the testimony of each.f So the joint probability of the agreement of ten competent judges in a right opinion is far greater than the sum of the probabilities of the rec- titude of the opinion of each taken separately. On the other hand, the joint probability of their agreement in error is far less than the sum of the probabilities of the erroneousness of the opinion of each taken sepa- * With respect to the influence of the political divisions of inde- pendent states in preventing the adoption of opinions without due examination, see Hume, Essay XIV. ; Works, vol. iii. p. 1 34. t See "Whately's Rhetoric, Part I. c. ii. § 4. III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 43 rately. Supposing that each person carefully checks and verifies the process of investigation, it is highly improbable that every one, of a considerable number, should overlook an ungrounded assumption, or a flaw in the reasoning, which may have escaped the attention of the original investigator; it is also very improbable that a tendency to error, which one person may have contracted, from peculiar habits of thought, or defective means of observation, should be shared by many others. Therefore, as the agreement in a scientific opinion among competent judges widens its area, the chances of rectitude increase, and the chances of error diminish, in a per- petually accelerated ratio.* Astronomy furnishes an example of a science, as to which there has been a general agreement of its profes- sors for more than a century. Additional discoveries have been made during that period, and subordinate differences have been removed ; but, as to the foundations of the science, there has, during that time, been a general agreement, and now even in details. This agree- ment extends to all scientific astronomers in all civilized countries. The astronomers of Berlin, Vienna, Milan, Paris, London, and New York, are agreed as to the motions of the bodies composing the solar system, and their mutual relations in space. The astronomical almanacs, calculated in different places, proceed on the same principles, and coincide in their predictions. * " In the unanimous or general consent of numerous and im- partial inquirers," Mr. Austin finds " that mark of trustworthiness which justifies reliance on authority, wherever we are debarred from the opportunity of examining the evidence for ourselves." — Prov. of Jurisprudence Determined, p. 84. 44 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. These predictions, moreover, are always confirmed by the events.* On the other hand, the dissensions of scientific writers, — of acute and disinterested men who have applied their minds with earnestness and patience to the cultivation of any science — show that this science is still in an im- perfect and unsettled state, and diminish the value of the authority of all parties. Such was the case with a large part both of the ethical and physical sciences among the ancients. The divisions of the philosophical sects into Academic, Stoic, Epicurean, &c, the peculiar tenets which each sect adopted, upon the fundamental principles of moral and natural science, the pertinacity with which these peculiarities were main- tained, and the length of time during which they were transmitted in schools by a succession of teachers and disciples, weakened the authority of each, and rendered it difficult for an inquirer to give a preference to any, without learning and comparing the opinions of all.f At present, there is a prevailing approach to agreement in the sciences founded on an observation of outward nature. When controversies arise in these sciences, they are generally confined to limited questions, and to points upon which attention has been recently turned ; and after a time they are settled by investigation and reasoning. In the moral and political sciences, there is a less general * Upon the present agreement of astronomical predictions with observation, see Whewell, Hist, of the Ind. Sciences, B. VII. c. vi. § 6. t See Lucian's dialogue of Hermotimus, a summary of which is appended as a note to Chapter IV. Compare what Cicero says of the sceptical method of the New Academy. — Acad. Prior. II. 3. III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 45 consensus than in the physical.* Thus the science of political economy — a science which for nearly a century has been cultivated by various writers of great ability — is still (particularly with reference to certain branches of it) in a controverted and unsettled state ; and, hence, the writers on political economy who have arrived at true conclusions do not carry the authority which is due to them, because those conclusions are still disputed by other scientific writers. For this difference between the moral and political sciences on the one hand, and the physical sciences on the other,f there are many reasons, which do not belong to this inquiry; but there is one, which, as it concerns the formation of a body of authority on the subject, may be here noticed. The physical sciences (with the partial exception of medicine) are cultivated exclusively by scientific persons, who pursue the subject merely in the interests of truth and for purposes of discovery, or expound it systematically for purposes of education. They either seek to enlarge science by new observations and infe- rences, or they digest existing knowledge into text-books for learners. Such, for example, is the case with me- chanics, optics, geology, mineralogy, chemistry, anatomy, natural history. The treatment of these subjects is therefore always scientific. Even when the exposition * The reasons why authority in the moral and political sciences is less trustworthy than authority in the physical sciences, are ably set forth by Mr. Austin, Province of Jurisprudence Determined, pp. 63 — 67. Compare Mill, System of Logic, B. VI. c. i. t The ancients differed and doubted more as to physics than ethics. " Ut enim modo dixi, (says the academic interlocutor in Cicero's dialogue De Natura Deorum,) omnibus fere in rebus, et maxime in physicis, quid non sit citius, quam quid sit, dixerim." I. 21. Compare Grote, Hist, of Gr., Vol. i. pp. 498, 499. 46 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. is rendered popular, in order to extend the circle of learners, yet it is always based on scientific principles. Now the moral and political sciences are, it is true, treated in a scientific manner by speculative writers. The principles of these sciences, however, are involved in the practical questions, to which the daily business of life gives birth, and which are discussed in newspapers and pamphlets, at public meetings and in large legislative assemblies. The best-ascertained principles are therefore constantly liable to be disputed, misinterpreted, or mis- applied, by persons imperfectly acquainted with the sub- ject, who take it up hastily and with a special object, and who are acted on by gusts of popular passion, or by the interests of particular individuals or classes. In this manner, opinions on moral or political subjects are mul- tiplied, the authority of sound and scientific principles is weakened, the judgment of the public is distracted and perplexed, the difficulty of a selection of safe guides is increased, and an anarchical state of public opinion is created. On the other hand, it ought not to be over- looked that municipal or positive law, among the political sciences, receives an exclusively scientific and professional treatment; and hence the utility of institutions which promote an enlightened spirit among the leaders of the legal profession, and the importance of improvements in jurisprudence, as directing the moral sentiments of a nation. The inconvenience of a popular treatment of the moral sciences, proceeding concurrently and in a parallel line with their scientific treatment, is illustrated by Dr. Whewell's remarks upon those technical terms, which have a popular acceptation in common discourse as well as a precise scientific import. " Since (he says) they have a meaning in common language, a careless reader III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 47 is prone to disregard the technical limitation of this meaning, and to attempt to collect their import in scien- tific books, in the same vague and conjectural manner in which he collects the purpose of words in common cases. Hence the language of science, when thus resembling common language, is liable to be employed with an absence of that scientific precision which alone gives it value. Popular writers and talkers, when they speak of force, momentum, action, and reaction, and the like, often afford examples of the inaccuracy thus arising from the scientific appropriation of common terms."* In like manner, the scientific discussions of questions in the political and ethical sciences often lose their preci- sion and value, when all the principal terms come to be expounded according to their loose and fluctuating applications in popular language. The practical result is, that the writer on the moral sciences is nearly de- barred from the use of technical terms, or that his use of them is unaccompanied with the advantage which results from them in the physical sciences. When he has affixed a precise and restricted meaning upon a term, and has framed a definition, not taken from his own arbitrary notions of clearness, but founded on an investigation of the properties of the class which it represents, his labour is vain as soon as the term comes to be employed in popular language ; its precision and restriction are lost as soon as it slips from his hand, and passes into the mouths of the multitude ; n d the propositions into which he has introduced it, with a technical sense, become, as they are now interpreted, either pointless and unmeaning, or paradoxical and false. Philos, of Ind. Sciences, vol. i. p. 52. 48 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. The diversities of opinion generated by popular dis- cussion are further aggravated by the rival pretensions of theorists and practicians to be considered as guides and authorities in practical affairs. Theorists, by an observation of particulars, and by generalizing upon them, attempt to construct a system of scientific propo- sitions with respect to a certain subject; upon which system a set of rules intended for the guidance of practice may be founded. These rules form an art. Many scientific investigations have been conducted, and scientific treatises composed, by persons unpractised in the corresponding art; thus, Aristotle composed a treatise on rhetoric, though not himself an orator and practical rhetorician. Clerk's work on naval tactics is another instance of a scientific treatise by an unprofessional writer. In other cases, scientific inquiries and treatises are due to practicians, as on medical and physiological subjects.* When a science has been fully developed, and the principles of the corresponding art fixed, its rules are recognised or adopted with little dispute, and the prac- tice is in as good a state as the bounds of our knowledge permit. The arts of navigation and of geodesy may be cited as examples in point. When an art is in this matured state, there is an agreement between theorists and practicians, and the rules of the latter conform with the principles laid down by the former. But when a science is still in an immature state, or when its con- clusions are still unrecognised, the practical men continue to follow certain traditional maxims which have become * On the relations of science and art, or of theory and practice, see Comte, Cours de Philos. Positive, Tom. iii. p. 280; Tom. vi. pp. 751, 870. Mill, System of Logic, B. VI. c xi. III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 49 current among the people, and have obtained authority. A conflict then takes place between these two classes as to the standard by which practice is to be tried. The theorists urge the application of their doctrines to prac- tice; the practicians deny their competency as judges, and contest their capacity of applying their principles to actual life. Sometimes this conflict arises from the real difficulty which exists in applying all abstract principles and rules to concrete cases; inasmuch as they are neces- sarily founded on hypotheses, which do not exhaust all the circumstances of the actual case. But while a theory is still in an imperfect state, practical men, attempting to apply it in reality, discover its defects, and often condemn it overhastily in toto, because they have satisfied themselves that a part is erroneous. Now, a precipitate and indiscriminating rejection of a theory, which contains the seeds of truth, though mixed with error, is always to be regretted, for it is by the succes- sive experiments of practical men, verifying what is sound in a theory, rejecting what is unsound, and sug- gesting the requisite corrections, that sciences are esta- blished and enlarged. Art, indeed, in an empirical form, or a technical practice of some sort, is necessarily, in almost every case, anterior to the corresponding science; the principles and maxims of which are sug- gested by the facts with which the art has to deal.* When any science is in an imperfect but constantly advancing state, the weight of authority increases as the tendency to agreement begins to exhibit itself; as the lines of independent thought converge ; as rival opinions coalesce under a common banner ; as sects expire ; * See Whewell, Hist of Ind. Sciences, vol. i. p. 333. E 50 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. as national schools and modes of thought and expression disappear ; as the transmission of erroneous and unverified opinions from one generation to another is interrupted by the recognition of newly-ascertained truths. It is by the gradual diminution of points of difference, and by the gradual increase of points of agreement, among men of science, that they acquire the authority which ac- credits their opinions, and propagates scientific truths. In general, it may be said that the authority of the pro- fessors of any science is trustworthy, in proportion as the points of agreement among them are numerous and im- portant, and the points of difference few and unim- portant. The doctrine of Agreement applies to scientific or speculative opinions; it does not apply to advice given on a single question of practice. In the latter case, the professional person consulted advises about the facts of a given case, and as his opinion is founded on a know- ledge of those facts, no general agreement can exist. It is only indirectly that the doctrine of agreement applies to opinions on practical questions. When a person has mastered the system which is sanctioned by the general consent of competent judges, and has combined expe- rience with this knowledge, he is likely to advise well in any question belonging to his subject. § 12. A further assistance in the selection of guides to opinion may be derived from a consideration of the marks of Imposture or Charlatanism, in respect both to science and practice. If such marks can be found, they will afford an additional means of distinguishing mock sciences from true ones, — the charlatan from the true philosopher or sound practitioner. In the first place, we may observe that mock sciences are rejected, after a patient examination and study of III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 51 facts, and not upon a hasty first impression, by the general agreement of competent judges. Such was the case with astrology, magic, and divination of all sorts, at the beginning of the last century ; which, having been reduced to a systematic form, and received by the general credulity, have since yielded to the light of reason.* The errors of the ancients in natural history, which were repeated by subsequent writers after the revival of letters, have been exploded by a similar process. The same may be said of the influence of the heavenly bodies upon diseases, believed at no distant date by scientific writers.f Mesmerism, homoeopathy, and phrenology, have now been before the world a sufficient time to be fairly and fully examined by competent judges; and as they have not stood the test of impartial scientific investigation, and therefore have not established themselves in pro- fessional opinion, they may be safely, on this ground alone, set down under the head of mock sciences; though, as in the case of alchemy, the researches to which they give rise, and the new hypotheses which they pro- mulgate, may assist in promoting genuine science. J True sciences establish themselves after a time, and acquire a recognised position in all civilized countries. * Upon the prevalence of the belief in astrology among educated and enlightened persons at the end of the 17th century, see some remarks by Dr. Johnson, in his Life of Butler. t See Dr. Mead's treatise concerning the influence of the sun and moon upon human bodies, and the diseases thereby produced. — Medical Works, p. 151. % See Nov. Org. I. aph. 85, where Bacon applies to the alchemists the fable of the old man, who told his sons, on dying, that a treasure was concealed in his vineyard, but he had forgotten the place; whereupon they fell to digging the ground in all direc- tions, and found no gold, but improved the cultivation of the vines. E 2 52 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. Moreover, they connect themselves with other true sciences; analogies and points of contact between the new truth and truths formerly known are perceived. Such has been the case with Geology, which has only taken its place as a science founded on accurate and extensive observation during the present century. But while it has assumed an independent position, it has re- ceived great assistance from comparative anatomy and other apparently unconnected sciences, and has thrown light upon them in return. Discoveries in medicine, too, which rest on a firm basis, as vaccination and the opera- tion for aneurism, are after a few years brought to a certain test, and make their way in all countries. Pseudo-sciences, on the other hand, are not accredited by the consentient reception of professional judges, but remain in an equivocal and unaccepted state. No ana- logies or affiliations with genuine sciences are discovered ; the new comer continues an alien, unincorporated with the established scientific system; if any connexion is attempted to be proved, it is with another spurious science, as in the case of plireno-mesmerism, where one delusion is supported by another. Mock sciences, again, not making their way universally, are sometimes con- fined to a particular nation; or, at all events, to a limited body of sectarians, who stand aloof from the professors of the established science. Another means of distinguishing real from unreal sciences, may be found in the character and objects of the persons by whom they are respectively cultivated. The professors of genuine sciences, for the most part, make the investigation or the communication of truth their primary object. Even teachers, who are remu- nerated for their services, are in general careful to communicate only true and sound opinions to their III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 53 disciples, and would consider the inculcation of error as a breach of their duty. The desire of knowing the truth is, indeed, no preservative against error. No such preservative exists. But the desire of ascertaining the truth is a necessary condition for ascertaining it. He who does not seek will not find. The charlatan, on the other hand, is almost invariably actuated by the love of gain. His purpose is to dupe the world, and to extract money from the pockets of his dupes. Paracelsus and Mesmer afford an example on a large scale ; a village mountebank on a small one. Occasionally, there may be the love of attracting attention, for its own sake, and a disinterested pleasure in cheating the world ; but gain is the leading motive. Some indications may likewise be derived from the form and method in which a new science is propounded. Genuine science is in general simple, precise, perspicuous, devoid of ornament, dry and unattractive, modest in its pretensions, free from all undue contrivances for exciting applause or obtaining attention. Charlatanism, on the other hand, is tricky, obtrusive, full of display — now wearing the mask of impassioned enthusiasm — now as- suming an aspect of solemn gravity, vague and mystical in its language, sometimes propounding elaborate schemes of new classification and nomenclature, dealing in vast promises and undertakings.* Imposture, however, particularly in the cases where it is combined with mysticism, is rarely altogether inten- * " There are three forms of speaking, which are, as it were, the style and phrase of imposture. The first kind is of them who, as soon as they have gotten any subject or matter, do straight cast it into an art, inventing new terms of art, reducing all into divisions and distinctions; thence drawing assertions or positions, and so 54 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. tional, and the result of mere knavery. There is a close affinity between imposture and credulity : a credulous man is generally a deceiver, and believes the delusions with which he ensnares the faith of others.* This is often the case with philosophical as well as religious enthusiasts. Pythagoras, for example, so far as we can discern him in the dim distance, may apparently be taken as a type of the union between the man of science and the impostor : and the same may doubtless be said of Van Helmont, and many of the other professors of mystical medicine, alchemists, astrologers, diviners, theosophs, and masters of occult sciences, whose lives are collected in the seven volumes of Adelung's curious History of Human Folly. f Nothing is more striking, in this repertory of self-deceit and imposture, than the framing oppositions by questions and answers. Hence issueth the cobwebs and clatterings of the schoolmen. " The second kind is of them who, out of the vanity of their wit, (as church poets,) do make and devise all variety of tales, stories, and examples, whereby they may lead men's minds to a belief, from whence did grow the legends and infinite fabulous inventions and dreams of the ancient heretics. " The third kind is of them who fill men's cares [qu. ears'] with mysteries, high parables, allegories, and illusions, which mystical and profound form many of the heretics also made choice of. By the first kind of these the capacity and wit of man is fettered and entangled; by the second, it is trained on and inveigled ; by the third, it is astonished and enchanted; but by every of them the while it is seduced and abused." — Lord Bacon, Of the several hinds of Imposture. Worhs, vol. i. p. 214; ed. Montagu. * See Adv. of Learning, vol. ii. p. 42. t Geschichte der menschlichen narrheit, oder lebensbeschrei- bungen beruhmter schwarzkunstler, goldmacher, teufelsbanner, zeichen-und liniendeuter, schwarmer, wahrsager, und anderer phi- losophischer unholden. Leipzig, 1785 — 9. 7 vols. III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 55 gigantic dimensions of the supposed discoveries of these pseudo-philosophers, compared with their actual per- formances, and with the powers which man really possesses over outward nature. At every turn we meet with infallible remedies, with universal medicines — with receipts for changing one substance into another — with new methods of a universal philosophy. The per- formances of these " homines vaniloqui et phantastici," who, partly from credulity, and partly from imposture, a genus humanum promissis onerarunt," stand (according to Bacon's comparison) in the same relation to the works of genuine philosophers, as the exploits of Amadis de Gaul or King Arthur, to those of Julius Caesar or Alex- ander the Great.* No species of imposture is so captivating, so well- suited to the present time, and consequently so likely to meet with temporary success, as that which assumes the garb, and mimics the phraseology, of science. As hypocrisy has been said to be the homage which vice renders to virtue, so is the imitation of scientific forms the homage which imposture renders to science; it is, however, a species of homage by which the vassal often obtains, for a time, a superiority over the lord. Still, the existence of a scientific spirit, on which the delusion rests, proves, in the end, too strong for the delusion itself. Those who, with a mere smattering of scientific know- ledge, seek to impose on the multitude by a parade of mystical jargon, and a whole apparatus of learned phrase- ology, are quickly detected by competent and instructed judges. Their mode of proceeding is, in fact, only one degree removed above that of the well-known impostor * Nov. Org. I. aph. 87. 56 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. in the novel, with his quotations of Greek and his appeals to Sanchoniathon and Berosus. " Qui stultis videri eruditi volunt, stulti eruditis videntur." * Even, therefore, if we are unable, from want of time or opportunity, or the requisite knowledge, to form an independent judgment upon a new scientific system, we may nevertheless be able to judge if the writer has pur- sued a sound and correct method of investigation, and if he has conformed to the rules by which the most emi- nent discoverers in that branch of science have been guided. If we find that a vitious method has been pur- sued, and that the requisite securities and precautions against error have not been adopted, we may reasonably distrust his fitness to guide our judgment. Nothing is more characteristic of the pretender to philosophy than his readiness to explain, without exami- nation or reflection, all phenomena which may be pre- sented to him. Doubt, hesitation, suspense of the judg- ment, inquiry before decision, balancing of apparently opposite facts, followed, perhaps, by a qualified and pro- visional opinion, — all these are processes utterly foreign to his mind, and indicative, in his view, of nothing but weakness and ignorance. Inasmuch as his real know- ledge is shallow, limited, and unprecise, it is nearly as easy for him to explain one thing as another; and his universal systems of philosophy are doubtless equally true for all subjects. f * Quintil. Hist. Orat. X. 7, § 21. t Fontenelle, Hist, des Oracles, Diss. I. ch. iv., after narrating the story of the boy with the supposed golden tooth, as an example of the ingenuity of philosophers in explaining false facts, proceeds thus: "Rien n'est plus naturel que d'en faire autant sur toutes sortes de matieres. Je ne suis pas si convaincu de notre ignorance III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 57 It has been already remarked that, in the present state of our knowledge, the physical are better ascer- tained than the moral sciences. There is, however, one important exception to the comparative certainty of the physical sciences — viz., the science and art of medicine. The anatomy of the human body has been carefully studied, and is well understood. Pathology and the nature of diseases have likewise been carefully explored, and reduced to system; but they are still enveloped in much obscurity. Still more are the diagnosis of dis- eases in the living subject, and the treatment of them, (or therapeutics,) subject to great uncertainty. Dif- ferent opinions as to the nature of the malady with which any living person is afflicted, and as to the mode of treating it if ascertained, may be held by eminent professors of medicine, recognised by their profession as competent judges. Moreover, even in a case where there is a generally received mode of treatment, and where the diagnosis is certain, the patient, from ignorance of the limited powers of the medical art, is often unreason- able in his expectations, and dissatisfied with the pro- ceedings of the regular practitioner. Being unable, from defect of knowledge, to judge of the mode of treat- ment, he judges merely by the event, and if this does not correspond with his anticipations, he condemns the physician. Owing to these causes, medical practice always has been the favourite field of charlatans,* and par les choses qui sont, et dont la raison nous est inconnue, que par celles qui ne sont point, et dont nous trouvons la raison. Cela veut dire que, non seulement nous n'avons pas les principes qui menent au vrai, mais nous en avons d'autres qui s'accommodent tres bien avec le faux." * According to the fable of Phaedrus, a bad cobbler, unable to 58 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. their success is proportionate to the credulity and igno- rance of the public. Medical impostors generally deal largely in panaceas and specifics — -in infallible and uni- versal remedies. Their success — so far as they are able to impose upon the public — is owing partly to the diffi- culty of ascertaining the true origin and nature of disease during life, and to the still greater difficulty of finding any means of removing or mitigating the disease when ascertained. The success of the charlatan is gene- rally proportioned to the obscurity of the malady, and the uncertainty of the treatment. Hence, he selects medical rather than surgical cases; and among medical cases, those which are chronic and constitutional, rather than those which are acute, and have a clearly defined seat.* gain a livelihood, took to practising medicine. The king sent for him, and proposed to him to find an antidote for a cup of poison: Timore mortis ille tunc professus est, Non artis ulla medicse se prudentia, Verum stupore vulgi, factum nobilem. (I. 14.) Lord Bacon remarks of medicine, that "its subject (the human body) being so variable, hath made the art by consequence more conjectural; an art being conjectural hath made so much the more place to be left for imposture." Other arts are judged by their acts or masterpieces, but physicians, and perhaps politicians, are judged only by the event. " "We see the weakness and credulity of men is such, as they will often prefer a mountebank or witch be- fore a learned physician In all times, in the opinion of the multitude, witches and old women and impostors have had a com- petition with physicians." — Adv. of Learn, vol. ii. p. 159. M. Comte, (Cours de Phil. Positive, torn. iii. p. 612 — 14,) remarks upon the prevalence of charlatanism in medicine, which he attributes to the unsettled and unsatisfactory state of physiological science. * The words which express the idea of charlatan generally agree in the common idea of loquacity and noise ; a clamorous attempt to III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 59 § 13. Lastly, it is worthy of consideration, what countries are important with reference to the general agreement of opinion. In determining the question as to the existence of a consensus of opinions on any speculative subject, it would be absurd to take barbarous or half-civilized communities into the account. Whether the question concerned the physical or the moral sciences, it would be needless to inquire what are the opinions of Australian savages, or of the native African or American tribes, or even of the Chinese, the Hindus, the Persians, or the Turks, on the subject. For, although these Oriental nations are not to be confounded with uncivilized societies, and although they have, at different periods, made considerable pro- gress in literature and the useful arts, yet their progress, both in political institutions and scientific knowledge, has been so limited, as to place them on a low intellectual level. u The prevalence of vague, visionary, and barren notions among these nations," (says Dr. Whewell,) " can- not surprise us ; for we have no evidence from them, as from Europeans we have, that they are capable, on sub- jects of physical speculation, of originating sound and attract the attention of a crowd is a leading characteristic of the charlatan. The Greek yorjg was originally a sorcerer, who howled over his magic rites. In Italian, ciarlatano is from ciarlare, to chatter (hence the French charlatan): cantambanco and saltimbanco derive their names from the habit of standing on a bench to address the people and exhibit their drugs, &c, like the English mountebank. Quacksalber, German, and quacksalver, English, (whence quack, by abbreviation,) are derived from the garrulity of the itinerant vender of drugs and nostrums. The German quackeln corresponds to our cackle. 'AyvpmQ, a collector of alms or money, resembles the Latin circulator, a vagrant mountebank. 60 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. rational general principles. The arts may have had their birth in all parts of the globe; but it is only- Europe, at particular favoured periods of its history, which has ever produced sciences." * Our field of vision may therefore be narrowed to the civilized nations of Europe, at the head of which we may place the Greeks, together with the Eomans, whose scientific and literary cultivation was of Hellenic origin. All the branches of knowledge, not even excepting J:he moral sciences, have made an immense, though an unequal, progress since the close of ancient history : the world has likewise, since that era, obtained the expe- rience of many centuries, in which contemporary facts have been recorded with more or less diligence and accuracy. Nevertheless, the origin of all positive science and philosophy, as well as of all literature and art, in the forms in which they exist in civilized Europe, must be traced to the Greeks, and therefore the opinions of that extraordinary people can never be indifferent to us, even on subjects in which they have been far outstripped by modern discovery. They made the first great step from barbarism to scientific knowledge, which, perhaps, is more difficult and more important than any further advance which they left to be made by their succes- sors. On turning our eyes to modern nations, it can scarcely be disputed that France and Germany, on the continent of Europe, together with England, stand at the head of contemporary science and literature. Whatever pecu- liarities and excellences may belong to the national character of each, the decision of competent judges in Hist, of Ind. Sciences, vol. i. p. 302. III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 61 these three countries must be admitted to be of para- mount importance. With these may be ranked, as partaking of the same degree of civilization, and enjoying free institutions in education and religion, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, together with the three Scan- dinavian nations of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. Italy, to whom Europe owes so large a debt of gratitude for the revival of literature, of the arts, and of philo- sophy, after the stagnation of the mediaeval period, has, on account of the long-continued suppression of free dis- cussion and education by its various governments, lay and ecclesiastical, lost its former and well-merited pre- eminence. The benumbing influence of the Inquisition, of a severe censorship of the press, reaching uninter- ruptedly from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, and of despotic governments administered (with some remarkable exceptions) in a jealous and coercive spirit, has reduced Italy to a secondary intellectual position ; though it has never been able to extinguish all sparks of the fire which she had derived from her early cultiva- tion. Let us hope, however, that the recent political changes may lead to her intellectual emancipation and improvement, without exposing her to the evils of civil war, revolution, and social anarchy. The Spanish Peninsula has been reduced to intellectual decrepitude by the same causes which operated in Italy, but more intense in their force, and therefore acting with more decisive effect. Besides, after the revival of letters, Spain had, in every department of science and art, shown less mental vigour and activity than the kin- dred peninsula to the East. It had, therefore, less elasticity of force opposed to a more powerful com- pression, and hence, independence of thought, which had 62 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. only been crippled in Italy, was fairly annihilated in Spain.* The kingdom of Greece has been too recently released from its Turkish yoke, and made a member of the European family of nations, to hold, as yet, any place in the intellectual scale. In Kussia, civilization is still an exotic, and it has never fairly taken an independent root among this semi-oriental people. In the United States of America, the places of educa- tion are gradually forming a body of scientific professors ; the study of jurisprudence and of some branches of poli- tics has made great progress ; the physical sciences are not neglected, and an active taste for literature pervades the whole country. The other American States appear to have no mental cultivation, and are even below their parent States, Spain and Portugal. As to the colonies and settlements of the European nations, so far as they are young communities, occupied with taming the wild earth, and performing the functions of pioneers of civi- lization, they cannot enjoy much leisure or opportunity for mental cultivation. But they are insensibly imbued with the opinions and culture of the mother country, and, by degrees, take their place in the great civilized community. § 14. We have now endeavoured to show what are the indications by which trustworthy authority, in matters of opinion, may be best recognised. As has been already remarked, there is a necessity for inquiry, and room for judgment and discretion, in the application of these tests, and thus we may observe that judicious and discreet persons generally choose safe and able guides, * Compare Comte, Cours de Philosophie Positive, torn. vi. pp. 32, 631—642. III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 63 in matters where they cannot, or ought not, to judge for themselves ; whereas unwise persons select unsound guides, who, from ignorance, inexperience, or weakness of judgment, are incapable of giving them good advice. Sometimes, indeed, the latter class of persons are so credulous that they fall into the hands of impostors, who intentionally mislead them for interested purposes. In the choice of guides of opinion, a double option is exercised. First, a person decides whether he will judge for himself, or rely on the opinion of others ; and secondly, having decided in favour of the latter alter- native, he has an option as to the guide whom he will select. Even when he has made this selection, he may, if he think fit, reject the opinion of the person whom he has selected. Nothing, therefore, can be more ex- clusively a man's own act than the choice of his guides and the adoption of their opinion. But, partly because the mind, when the choice has once been made, is passive in following an opinion, and partly because the word authority sometimes signifies compulsory power, it seems to be believed that a deference to authority, in matters of opinion, implies some coercive influence on the under- standing. If, however, such a belief is ever entertained, it is erroneous. The submission of the understanding to the opinion of another is purely voluntary, at more than one stage. The choice of a guide is as much a matter of free determination, as the adoption of an opinion on argumentative grounds. If I believe a truth in astronomy or optics because men of science believe it — if I adopt the advice of a physician or lawyer in a question of practice, my decision is as free and uncon- strained as if I judged for myself without assistance, although I arrive at the conclusion by a different road. § 15. Hence, too, we may see that the opposition 64 ON THE MARKS OF [CH. which is sometimes made between Authority and Eeason* rests on a confusion of thought. Authority is un- doubtedly opposed to reasoning, if, by reasoning, we understand a process of appropriate inquiry conducted by the person himself. But between Authority and Reason there is no opposition, nor does the one exclude the other. In the first place, as has been just remarked, a person who chooses his own guides, chooses them by the light of his own reason ; he exercises a free and unconstrained choice; and although the process of reasoning through which he travels does not bear directly upon his con- clusion, it bears directly upon the means of leading him safely to that conclusion. From the ultimate respon- sibility of this determination nothing can relieve him. A Eoman Catholic, who relies implicitly upon the au- thority of his own church, must decide for himself to prefer that authority to the authority of other churches ; or (what comes to the same,) to deny to other religious communions the appellation of churches. In the last result, he is driven of necessity to the exercise of private individual judgment. The appropriate grounds of decision may be removed from us a few steps by an intermediate process ; but the selection of our authority, and our reliance upon it, must be the work of our own reason. In the second place, it cannot be presumed, generally, that an appropriate process of reasoning upon any sub- ject is a better or wiser principle of judgment than a * See, for example, Hume's Essay XVI., near the beginning — Works, vol. iii. p. 561; "WheweU's Hist, of the Ind. Sciences, vol. i. p. 312 ; and the Pasquinade of Boileau, cited by him, vol. ii. p. 138. III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 65 recourse to the authority of others. Even in speculative subjects, a person whose time, or habits of thought and study, do not incline him to a particular department of knowledge, may reasonably adopt the views of persons who are conversant with it. In practice, however, where special attainments and experience are necessary for a safe decision, a man who prefers his own judgment to that of competent advisers certainly does not follow either a wise or a usual course. It surely cannot be laid down as a general thesis, that a private individual is likely, in professional matters, to judge better than professional men. A person who thinks that in legal matters his own judgment is better than that of a lawyer, in medical matters better than that of a physician, in questions of building better than that of an architect, &c, is not likely to find that the rectitude of his practical decisions corresponds with the independence of his judgment. In such cases, (as we shall show more fully in a subsequent chapter,) reason does not forbid, but prescribes a reliance upon authority. Where a person is necessarily ignorant of the grounds of decision, to decide for himself is an act of suicidal folly. He ought to recur to a competent adviser, as a blind man relies upon a guide. 66 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. CHAPTER IV. ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. § 1. In the preceding chapter a description has been given of the process by which, in scientific matters, an agreement of the competent judges, and consequently a body of trustworthy authority, is gradually formed.* In each subject, the first attempts at a scientific treat- ment are crude, imperfect, and alloyed with rash hypotheses; and there is much hasty induction from single facts or partial phenomena. Numerous discor- dant opinions thus arise, and there are rival schools and sects, each with its own set of distinctive tenets. But, by degrees, some system or body of doctrine acquires the ascendancy; there is an approach to agreement in im- portant matters ; a progressive improvement, a gradual advance, are visible; the controversies begin to turn chiefly on subordinate points, and peculiar opinions are no longer handed down in schools by a succession of mas- ters and disciples. Certain doctrines cease to predomi- nate in certain countries ; they are no longer hereditary or local, but are common to the whole scientific world. They are diffused by the force of mere evidence and demonstration acting upon the reason of competent * There is an Essay by Lord Bolingbroke concerning Au- thority in matters of Religion, vols. vi. and vii. of his fVorhs ; but its contents do not correspond with its title. IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 67 judges — not by persecution, or reward, or the influence of the civil government. A trustworthy authority is thus at length formed, to which a person, uninformed on the subject, may reasonably defer, satisfied that he adopts those opinions which, so far as existing researches and reflection have gone, are the most deserving of credit. § 2. This description, however, is not applicable to religion, or at least is only applicable to it within certain limits. All mankind, at all times, and in all countries (with the exception, perhaps of some of the lowest tribes of savages) have agreed in recognising some form of re- ligious belief. All nations have believed in the existence of some supernatural and supersensual beings, whose favour they have sought to obtain, and whose dis- pleasure they have sought to avert, by sacrifices, prayers, and other ceremonies of worship. The argument of consensus gentium applies with peculiar force to the belief in a divine power, and accordingly it has always been placed in the front rank by writers on Natural Religion. Thus Cicero, speaking of the existence of a supreme God, says, " Quod nisi cognitum comprehensumque animis haberemus, non tarn stabilis opinio permaneret, nee confirmaretur diuturnitate temporis, nee una cum sseculis aetatibusque hominum inveterare potuisset. Etenim videmus caateras opiniones fictas atque vanas diuturnitate extabuisse Opinionum enim com- menta delet dies, naturae judicia confirmat".* A passage from the Dissertations of Maximus Tyrius, a Greek philosopher who lived in the age of the Antonines, has * De Nat. Deor. II. 2. F 2 68 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. often been quoted by modern writers as a proof of the general diffusion of a religious belief among the ancient nations : — " In the midst of universal disagreement and discord as to the divine attributes, and as to laws and customs, (he says,) one uniform maxim and doctrine may be seen in every land — that there is one God, the supreme governor and father of all, and many Gods, his sons and joint rulers. This the Greek says — this the barbarian — this the dweller on the mainland and the dweller on the sea- coast — the wise and foolish. " # Among modern writers it is sufficient to cite the words of Bishop Burnet : — " That there is a God, is a proposition which, in all ages, has been so universally received and believed, some very few instances being only assigned of such as either have denied or doubted of it, that the very consent of so many ages and nations, of such different tempers and languages, so vastly remote from one another, has been long esteemed a good argu- ment to prove that either there is somewhat in the nature of man, that by a secret sort of instinct does dic- tate this to him; or that all mankind has descended from one common stock, and that this belief has passed down from the first man to all his posterity. If the more polite nations had only received this, some might suggest that wise men had introduced it as a mean to govern human society, and to keep it in order: or if only the more barbarous had received this, it might be thought to be the effect of their fear and their ignorance ; but since all sorts, as well as all ages, of men have re- * Diss. XVII. 5, vol. i. p. 316; Reiske. Compare Cud worth, Syst. Intellect, vol. i. p. 685; ed. Mosheim, 1773; and Leland, Advantage and Necessity of the Christian Revelation shown from the State of Religion in the Ancient World, vol. i. p. 422. IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 69 ceived it, this alone goes a great way to assure us of the being of a God."* It is, undoubtedly, true that, in the positive religions, and in the sacred rites, practices, and doctrines of the pagan world, the greatest diversity has existed ; and not only between barbarous or half-civilized tribes, but among the Greek and Eoman philosophers, whose controversies on the nature of the gods were interminable.f But in the substantial recognition of a Divine power, super- human and imperceptible by our senses, all nations have agreed. § 3. The agreement, moreover, does not stop here. All the civilized nations of the modern world, together with their colonies and settlements, in all parts of the earth, agree, not merely in believing in the existence of a God — a belief which they have in common with Maho- metans, Hindus, and heathens generally — but in re- cognising some form of the Christian religion. Christen- dom includes the entire civilized world — that is to say, all nations whose agreement on a matter of opinion has any real weight or authority. § 4. When, however, we advance a step beyond this point, and inquire how far there is a general agreement throughout Christendom with respect to any particular form of Christianity, and whether all Christians are members of one church, recognising the same set of doctrines, we find a state of things wholly different. We * Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles. On Art. I. ■f Qui vero deos esse dixerunt, tanta sunt in varietate ac dissen- sione, ut eorum molestum sit dinumerare sententias. Nam et de figuris deorum, et de locis atque sedibus, et actione vitae multa dicuntur: deque his summa philosophorum dissensione certatur. — Cicero de Nat. Deor. T. 1. 70 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. perceive a variety of churches, some confined to a single country, some common to several countries, but each with its own ecclesiastical superiors and peculiar creed, and each condemning the members of other churches as heretics, schismatics, separatists, and dissenters, or, at least, as infected with grave errors; and sometimes not even recognising them as Christians.* § 5. Various causes have conspired to prevent a general agreement throughout the civilized world re- specting the particular doctrines of Christianity. The Christian religion first assumed a dogmatic form in the hands of the later Greeks, who had received from their ancestors the inheritance of a subtle, refined, and abstruse metaphysical philosophy. This instrument of reasoning and exposition they applied to the Christian religion, and particularly to its more mysterious portions; such as the doctrine of the Trinity, the relations of the three Divine persons, and their common essence or substance; the union of the Divine and human natures in the Saviour; and the procession of the Holy Ghost. At a later time, the Christian theology, now reduced to a more systematic form, passed through the hands of the schoolmen, and was treated in the spirit of the scho- * For a complete account of the distribution of the several Chris- tian communions over the world, the constitution and tenets of each church, their mutual relations, and other characteristics, see the Kirchliche Statistik of Dr. Wiggers, 2 vols. 8vo; Hamburg, 1842 and 1843. According to a calculation cited by him in vol. i. p. 22, the chief divisions of Christendom consist of the following numbers: — Roman Catholics . . 142,145,000 Protestants .... 62,785,000 Greek Church . . . 57,110,000 Armenians, Copts, &c. 5,850,000 IY.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 71 lastic philosophy.* Afterwards, the Eeformation awakened new controversies, or gave increased importance to old ones, concerning the eucharistic sacrament, the commu- nion of the laity in both kinds, and the alleged substan- tial change and real presence in the consecrated elements ; also as to the nature and operation of grace and good works, and the theory of original sin, regeneration, justification, and predestination. These, combined with other questions as to church authority, tradition, general councils, the power of the pope and of national churches, episcopal government, ecclesiastical ceremonies and vest- ments, monastic vows, ordination, celibacy of the clergy, auricular confession, purgatory, baptism, individual in- spiration, &c, have served to divide Christians into numerous churches and sects, and to keep up continual controversies between their respective advocates, which have never received any final settlement, and, when intermitted, are rather discontinued than decided. The difficulty of determining the controversies re- * " It was gravely said by some of the prelates in the Council of Trent, where the doctrine of the schoolmen bare great sway, that the schoolmen were like astronomers, which did feign eccentrics and epicycles, and such engines of orbs, to save the phenomena, though they knew there were no such things; and, in like manner, that the schoolmen had framed a number of subtle and intricate axioms and theorems to save the practice of the Church." — Lord Bacon, Essay XVII. In his Novum Org anon he speaks of the Theologi Scholastici — " qui cum theologiam (satis pro potestate) in ordinem redegerint et in artis formam effinxerint, hoc insuper effecerunt, ut pugnax et spinosa Aristotelis philosophia corpori religionis plus quam par erat immisceretur." — Lib. I. Aph. 89. Compare his Apophthegms, 274, 275, where a dictum of some Roman divines concerning the canons of the Council of Trent is reported; " that they were be- holden to Aristotle for many articles of their faith." 72 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. spec ting the different questions to which the interpre- tation of the Christian records has given rise is, in great measure, owing to the fact that religion, as such, is con- versant with matters which are neither the subjects of consciousness or intuition, nor within the range of the senses. This is necessarily the case with all questions concerning the nature of the Deity and his attributes; his permanent relations with mankind; and the state of human existence after death. Upon these subjects, we have no experience, derived either from internal consciousness or external sensation, to guide us; and, accordingly, not only the abstract reasonings of natural religion, but the interpretation of the records of revealed religion, give rise to questions, for the settlement of which it is difficult to find any decisive rule of judgment. § 6. Owing to the operation of these causes, the various Christian churches and sects into which the civilized world is divided continue to co-exist side by side with one another, and show little or no tendency to coalesce into a common belief, or to recognise a com- mon organ of religious truth. Eeligious opinions thus become hereditary, and national or local ; they sometimes run on for centuries in parallel lines, without converging to a central focus of agreement. Opinions on scientific matters, although they may spring from different sources, and follow for a time dis- tinct courses, at last flow together into one main stream ; whereas the distinctive tenets of the several Christian churches not only spring from different sources, but con- tinue to run in different channels. The religious state of Europe since the Eeformation bears witness to the truth of this description. The boundaries of religion, which were fixed in the sixteenth IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 73 and seventeenth centuries, remain more unchanged than those of states.* A peculiar form of Christianity is, in each district of Europe, handed down faithfully from one generation to another. National laws and consti- tutions, and forms of civil government, undergo funda- mental changes. Even national manners and usages are modified by the reciprocal intercourse of persons and ideas which trade, literature, and newspapers promote, and by progressive inventions and improve- ments in the arts of civilized life. But national and local churches propagate their peculiar modes of faith and ecclesiastical discipline, without feeling the influence of the ideas which are moving in external spheres. Each continues to revolve in its own orbit, without altering its course, or approximating to other bodies.f We may discern a certain analogy between the per- petuation of a particular form of Christianity, and the perpetuation of a particular language. Both belong to a class of which the forms are various ; but each variety, having once arisen, is unchanging, and, when adopted by a nation, remains. Both prevail locally, and are transmitted, by a faithful tradition, from father to son. Moreover, it often happens that both are diffused by colonization or conquest. The diversity of Christian creeds is the more appa- rent, when it is contrasted with the general uniformity * On this subject, see the remarks of Mr. Macaulay, Essays, vol. ii. p. 304. {On Lord Bacon.) t With respect to the fusion of the peculiar creed of each nation with its native institutions, and the present equilibrium of opposite forces in the Christian world, see the observations of Prof. Ranke, in Note A. at the end of the chapter. 74 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. upon moral questions which prevails throughout the civilized world. Amongst all civilized nations, a nearly uniform standard of morality is recognised: the same books on ethical subjects are consulted for the guidance of life; and if the practice differs, the difference is not, in general, owing to a diversity of theoretical rules of conduct.* It will be observed, that the great contro- versies between the Christian sects either turn upon questions which have no direct bearing upon human con- duct, (such as the doctrines of the Trinity and tran- substantiation,) or upon forms of church government and discipline, which are matters of positive institution. They rarely turn upon the moral doctrines which are involved in Christianity. Upon these, there is a pre- vailing tendency and approximation to an agreement.f Scientific opinions follow a certain law of progressive development. While error is gradually diminished, truth is established, by a continually enlarging consensus, like the successive circles made upon the surface of water. Opinion, however, in the several Christian churches, with respect to their distinctive tenets, is rather variable than progressive. It oscillates backwards and forwards, but does not tend by a joint action to a common centre. This permanent diversity of religious opinions through- out Christendom, exists not only in spite of the attempts which have been made to produce uniformity of belief, * Compare the celebrated passage of Cicero, on the universality of the moral law as to time and place. — De Rep. III. 22. t Perhaps one of the most practical of the tenets controverted between the Roman and Protestant churches is that relating to marriage, with respect to its indissolubility and its contraction within certain degrees of affinity. The Predestinarian doctrines, as has been often remarked, exercise little influence upon conduct. IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 75 but partly even in consequence of them. Governments have attempted to extirpate religious error by persecu- tion, and to favour religious truth by endowment ; but as the governments of different countries adopted dif- ferent creeds, that which was considered religious error by one government was considered religious truth by another. Hence, although governments have succeeded to a certain extent in producing uniformity of faith in their own territory by persecution, (as in Italy and Spain,) yet they have not been able to prevent other governments from encouraging the opinions which they discouraged. This has been the case with communities immediately contiguous to each other, and included even within the same national federation. Thus, after the thirty years' war, some of the German States remained Protestant and others Catholic, and the mutual rights of the two confessions were guaranteed by solemn treaty. And the Catholic and Protestant Cantons of Switzer- land remain as they were left by the great reformation. In other countries, as in Ireland, the faith of one sect has resisted all attempts of the government to produce uniformity, and the ancient landmarks of religion have been maintained in defiance of the endeavours of the civil power to obliterate them. § 7. Now, it must not be supposed that this diversity of religious opinions, and the existence of heterodox sects within the pale of Christianity, has escaped the notice of the heads of the church. On the contrary, it has at- tracted the incessant attention of theologians and theo- logical politicians for ages, as indeed is sufficiently ap- . parent from the ineffectual attempts of governments to produce uniformity of religious belief, already alluded to. It has always been perceived and admitted that diversity of opinion, in religious as well as in scientific matters, is 76 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. necessarily a mark of error, and that, of several con- flicting or discordant opinions, one only can be true.* It has, therefore, been the great aim of writers on theology, to whatever sect or denomination they might belong, to discover one standard or canon of religious truth, which should be universally applicable to the Christian world, should serve as a decisive authority in matters of faith, and thus give unity to the church. f All Christians, whatever might be their creed, would be glad to find any living person, or body of persons, whom they could conscientiously recognise as an infal- lible organ and exponent of religious truth. The general feeling on this subject is bluntly expressed by Dryden, in his Religio Laid, — Such an omniscient church we wish indeed; 'Twere worth both Testaments, cast in the creed. * Cicero makes the following remarks upon the diversity of the religious opinions of his time: " Res nulla est de qua tantopere non solum indocti, sed etiam docti dissentiant; quorum opiniones cum tarn variae sint, tamque inter se dissidentes, alterum fieri profecto potest, ut earum nulla, alterum certe non potest, ut plus una vera sit." — De Nat. Deor. I. 2. Bossuet lays down the same maxim with respect to Christianity: " Lorsque, parmi les Chretiens, on a vu des variations dans l'exposition de la foi, on les a toujours regardees comme une marque de faussete" et d'inconsequence (qu'on me per- mette ce mot) dans la doctrine exposee." — Variations des Eglises Protestantes, Pref. § 2. t Sir T. More told his son-in-law and biographer, Roper, that if three things were well established in Christendom, he wished he were put into a sack and thrown into the Thames. The second of these three wishes was, that " whereas the church of Christ is at present sore afflicted with many errors and heresies, it were well settled in perfect uniformity of religion." — Lord Campbell's Lives of the Chancellors, vol. i. ch. xxxii. See also Lord Bacon's Essay on Unity in Religion, and his Tract on Church Controversies, vol. ii. p. 28—60. IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 77 § 8. A large portion of the Christian world, viz., the Church of Rome and the Eastern Churches, together with that section of the Church of England which approxi- mates to the Roman doctrine, make the standard of religious truth to consist in the teaching of the church. They profess to be able to lay down certain marks of the true church ; and having determined the true church by means of these marks, they hold that whatever this church teaches is true, and is entitled to belief without examination, simply because the church so teaches.* § 9. But when these marks come to be examined, it will be found that they are so vague and obscure as merely to shift the ground of controversy, and that there is as much doubt and difference of opinion respecting the determination of the marks, or their application to a particular church, as concerning the doctrines which that church teaches. In the first place, an attempt is made to determine the true church by representing it as " catholic" or " universal." But it cannot be disputed that, from the Apostolic age, there have been divisions among Christians, and separatist or heretical bodies, which prevented the universal reception of any one orthodox faith amongst the professors of the Christian religion.f Even in the * See Mohler's Symbolik, § 37; Palmer's Treatise on the Church of Christ, Part I. c. ii.; Burnet on Art. XIX. The marks of the true church, adopted by the Church of Rome, (see Catechismus Cone. Trid., Pars I. c. x.,) and retained by Mr. Palmer, are, that it is Una, Sancta, Catholica, and Apostolica. These marks are, as may be seen, too vague to characterize any church for a practical purpose. For example, every religious institute, not merely of Christendom, but of Mahometans and heathens, since the beginning of the world, has claimed to be " holy." t " The heretics, or seceders from the primitive church, were ex- 78 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. first centuries, there never was a universal or catholic church, in the strict acceptation of the word ;* and since the separation of the Eastern and Western Churches, and the great reformation of the 16th century, the non- existence of one universal church, having external com- munion and membership, and recognising common ecclesiastical superiors, is still more apparent. To assume, therefore, that there is a really existing " catholic" or " universal" church, one and indivisible, tremely various, at least in name, and there is no period in eccle- siastical history in which dissent has appeared under so many- denominations as the earliest." — Waddington, History of the Church, vol. i. p. 138; ed. 2. These differences of opinion were, however, confined to small knots and sections of dissidents, who disappeared in the larger and more important heresies which came in the following centuries. * As to the origin of the name Catholic, which signified the prevailing and most widely spread church, as opposed to local and partial heresies, see Bingham's Antiquities of the Christian Church, B. I. ch. i. § 7. Pearson on the Creed, Art. IX., (vol. i. p. 584, ed. Oxford,) explains the Catholicism of the church to " consist generally in universality, as embracing all sorts of persons, as to be disseminated through all nations, as comprehending all ages, as containing all necessary and saving truths, as obliging all conditions of men to all kinds of obedience, as curing all diseases, and planting all graces, in the souls of men." Mr. Palmer states that the universality of the church " does not suppose a physical and absolute universality, including all men" [sed qu. all Christians?] All that is meant is a " moral univer- sality," which he explains to be a power of obtaining adherents in all the nations of the known world, and to extend its limits in pro- portion as new nations and countries are discovered. — On the Church of Christ, Part I. ch. vii. Walter, Kirchenrecht, §11, (ed. 9,) gives a similar explanation. He says that the church is called catholic or universal, because the work of salvation is destined for all nations and times, and the IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 79 which acts as a body, and is capable of pronouncing decisions and expressing opinions, implies a manifest disregard of notorious facts ; and to found practical con- clusions upon this ungrounded assumption is a barren labour, which can only satisfy those who are already convinced of the proposition to be proved. No two churches whose tenets are substantially different agree as to the marks of the true church.* The Church of Rome holds that it is alone the true and church has always made this her aim. Klee, Katholische Dog- matik, vol. i. p. 93, says, that the catholicity of the church refers to its being intended for mankind at all places and times, and its in- cluding everything holy on earth and in heaven. The catechism of the Council of Trent is more distinct in its definition of catholica ecclesia. " Neque enim, ut in humanis rebus publicis aut haereti- corum conventibus, unius tantum regni terminis, aut uno hominum genere ecclesia definita est; verum omnes homines, sive illi barbari sint sive Scythae, sive servi sive liberi, sive masculi sive feminas, caritatis sinu complectitur. . . . Universalis etiam ob earn causam dicitur, quod omnes, qui salutem asternam consequi cupiunt, earn tenere et amplecti debeant." — Pars I. c. x. qu. 14. * Properly speaking, nothing is true but propositions. Truth can only be predicated where something is affirmed or denied. It is, therefore, an elliptical expression to speak of the true church. What is meant is, that the religious community in question can be alone truly said to constitute a church; whereas other communities, calling themselves churches, are not churches in fact. Thus, in cases of forgery, we speak of the true or genuine document or sig- nature, as opposed to the false or counterfeit one: hence crimen falsi. The true church does not mean the church which teaches the truth, though it may accidentally possess that attribute. " A true church (says Bishop Burnet) is, in one sense, a society that preserves the essentials and fundamentals of Christianity: in an- other sense, it stands for a society, all whose doctrines are true, that has corrupted no part of this religion, nor mixed any errors with it."— On Art. XIX. p. 237. 80 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. catholic or universal church, and that no person who is not in communion with it is a member of the true church. All such persons it considers schismatics or heretics, unless they be Mahometans or heathens.* This position is denied by all Protestant churches. Many Protestant theologians hold that the Church of Pome is not even a portion of the true church. f One school of Anglican divines maintains that the Eastern Churches, the Church of Rome, and the Established Church of England and Ireland are members or portions of the true and catholic church ; but that the dissenting churches of England, the presbyterians of Scotland and Ireland, and the protes- tant churches of Germany, Holland, France, Switzerland, and North America, are not included in the true church. J It is, however, the general doctrine of Pro- testant divines, that (with a few exceptions, as quakers, unitarians, &c. ) all the protestant churches belong to the true church, and form an integral part of Christendom, though some of them may err in minor questions, both of faith and discipline. But no church or sect, whatever its doctrines may be, can ever admit any definition of the marks of the true or universal church, which excludes itself from that com- munion. No approach, therefore, is made to the recog- * Besides the infidels, and the heretics and schismatics, who are without the pale of the Church of Rome, there are also excommuni- cated persons, ( Cat. Cone. Trid. Pars I. c. x. qu. 8 ;) but their ex- clusion may be considered as penal and temporary. f Even Mr. Palmer admits that those who deny the claim of the Roman to the title of a true church since the Reformation " are not without some probability on their side." — Part I. ch. xi. § 2. See on this subject, Bossuet, Variations des Egl. Prot. XV. 26. J See Palmer On the Church of Christ, Part I. ch. ix.; ch. x. § 4; ch. xi. § 2; xii. § 4; ch. xiii. § 1; Part II. ch. x. IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 81 nition of a common authority, or the establishment of christian unity, by laying down the maxim, that all that the true church teaches is true. There is as much difference of opinion respecting the truth of the church, as respecting the truth of the doctrines which it teaches. * " Those questions (says Bishop Jeremy Taylor) which are concerning the judge of questions, must be deter- mined before you can submit to his judgment; and if you can yourselves determine those great questions which consist much in universalities, then also you may determine the particulars, as being of less difficulty." f And, while we profess to give to each Christian a short and easy method of avoiding controversies, too abstruse * Burnet, on Art. XIX., (p. 234, ed. Oxford,) after adverting to the method of determining the true church by certain marks or notes, proceeds thus : " Upon all this endless questions will arise, so far will it be from ending controversies and settling us upon infallibility. If all these must be believed to be the marks of the infallible church, upon the account of which we ought to believe it and submit to it, then two inquiries upon every one of these notes must be discussed, before we can be obliged to acquiesce in the infallibility: first, whether that is a true mark of infallibility or not? and next, whether it belongs to the church which they call infallible or not? And then another very intricate question will arise upon the whole, whether they must all be found together? or how many, or which of them together, will give us the entire cha- racters of the invisible church." Afterwards he adds: " Thus it appears that these pretended notes, instead of giving us a clear thread to lead us up to infallibility, and to end all controversies, they do start a great variety of questions that engage us into a labyrinth, out of which it cannot be easy for any to extricate them- selves." In this view, Burnet agrees with Jeremy Taylor, whom he has followed. — Liberty of Prophesying, Sect. IX. Jeremy Taylor lays it down generally, that the church, in its diffusive capacity, is incompetent to be the judge of controversies. t Liberty of Prophesying^ Sect. IX. G 82 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. and complex for ordinary men, we involve him in questions equally hard of solution. Of what avail is it to tell a man that the judgment of the universal church is infallible,* if the means of determining the univer- sality of the church are as much disputed between the contending sects, as the tenets to which this test of soundness is to be applied? It is only with regard to that intangible and indeterminate standard — the opinion of the universal church — that a claim is made for an infallible authority. With respect to the doctrines of particular churches, every church admits the possibility of error — except, indeed, for itself. Thus, the Church of England lays it down in Art. XIX, that "as the churches of Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Antioch, have erred, so also the Church of Eome hath erred, not only in their living and manner of ceremonies, but also in matters of faith." Therule of faith laid down by Vincentius of Lirinum, in the fifth century, Quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus, is inapplicable as a practical guide; because none of the distinctive tenets of the Christian sects — . none of the doctrines which divide Christianity, answer this description. No article of faith has been held by all Christians, at all times, and in all places. None combines the three attributes required by him, of universality, antiquity, and agreement, f If, in order to make this maxim applicable, we arbitrarily exclude a certain portion of those who have laid claim to the appellation of Christians ; if we call certain sects heretical and schismatical, and thus eliminate them from the ag- * See Palmer, Part IV. c. 4. t Universitas, antiquitas, consensio. IT.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 83 gregate body whose consent constitutes authority, then our reasoning proceeds in a circle. We begin by assuming as solved, the very problem of which we are seeking the solution. We propose to test the soundness of certain doctrines by the judgment of a certain tri- bunal, and we make the constitution of the tribunal depend upon those very doctrines. We exclude a part of the Christian world from our definition of " all Chris- tians," on account of the unsoundness of their doctrines, in order to ascertain what is sound doctrine. We say that a certain doctrine is true, because it was held at all times and in all places ; and when we find that it was not held by a certain Christian sect at a certain time and place, we say that they are not to be considered, because they are not a part of the true church; but when we inquire why they are not a part of the true church, we learn that it is because they do not hold the very doctrine in question. If the student asks what is the doctrine on the subject of the Trinity, which fulfils the condition, Quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omni- bus, he is told that it is the Athanasian. If he then points to the Arians as having been a large portion of the Christian world who held a different doctrine, he is told that they were heretics, and not to be reckoned as a part of the church. If he asks why they are heretics, and excluded from the church, the answer is, because they rejected the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity.* * Compare the circular reasoning of those ethical philosophers, adverted to by Mr. Mill, who take for their standard of moral truth what they deem to be the natural or instinctive sentiments of mankind, and explain away the numerous instances of divergence, by saying that they are cases in which the perceptions are un- healthy or unnatural. — System of Logic, vol. II. p. 466. g2 84 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE P1UNCIPLE OF [CH. The doctrine of a " catholic" or " universal" church, when those terms are used, not as mere appellatives sanctioned by historical usage, or in some vague and mystical sense, but as an argument to establish the paramount authority of the church in matters of faith, is, in fact, nothing more than an attempt to give to a majority a decisive voice with respect to a question of opinion, as against a minority. Whether the majority be large or small, the catholic church is, as so under- stood, nothing more than a majority of Christians; its universality, in the view even of its advocates, is merely a preponderance of numbers over the heretical sects; and, therefore, an appeal to the catholicity of the church, in proof that its doctrines are true, is an appeal to the voice of the multitude upon a dispute as to truth. " The characteristic of the heretic," (says Bossuet,) "that is to say, of the man who has formed a private judgment, is, that he holds to his own notions ; the cha- racteristic of the catholic, that is, of the universal, is, that he prefers to his own opinions the common opinion of the entire church."* In the very passage in which Bossuet thus attempts to determine the question against the heretics, by assuming the universality of his own church, he opposes the catholics to the heretics, and virtually admits the claim of both to be Christians. At the same moment, therefore, that he is claiming to his own church the attribute of universality, he confesses that this universality is nothing more than a numerical * "Le propre de l'heretique, c'est-a-dire, de celui qui a une opinion particuliere, est de s'attacher a ses propres pen sees; et le propre du Catholique, c'est-a-dire, de l'universel, est de preferer a ses sentimens le sentiment commun de toute l'Eglise." — Hist, des Variations, Pref. § 29. IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 85 majority. Yet it has been thought that, by marks such as these, the true church could be discerned, and that the truth of the Gospel could be made to rest upon the authority of the catholic church. Hence the celebrated declaration of Augustine: " Ego vero evangelio non crederem, nisi me ecclesia3 catholicse commoveret auc- toritas." § 10. But even if we admit the maxim, that " what the true church teaches is true," and are further agreed as to the marks by which the true church is to be re- cognised, there may still be serious differences of opinion within the precincts of that very church, as to what constitutes the authoritative voice of the church, and by what marks its valid decrees are to be determined. Thus, among Eoman divines, some hold that the decision of the pope, as head of the church, is sufficient, without the concurrence of a council; others require the con- currence of a council with the pope; while others hold that a council without the pope is infallible. * There are again further disputes as to what constitutes an oecumenical or universal council; as to the authority by which it is summoned, the members of which it is to be composed, the means by which it is to decide, and as to the necessity of a subsequent consent of the universal * The infallibility of the pope is stated by the highest autho- rities to be still an unsettled doctrinal question in the Church of Eome. See Walter's Kirchenrecht, § 178. Compare Bossuet, Variations des Egl Prot. XV. 165. That " the church is infallible," is a dogma universally admitted in the Church of Rome. The same doctrine is held by the Anglo-catholic school. See Palmer, Part IV. c. 4. But as soon as we proceed another step, and inquire how the infallible voice of the church is to be ascertained, the dis- cordance of opinions, even within the Church of Rome, becomes irreconcileable. See the quotations in Palmer, Part IV. c. 12. 86 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. church to its decrees.* " There are so many questions" (says Jeremy Taylor) "concerning the efficient, the form, the matter of General Councils, and their manner of pro- ceeding, and their final sanction, that after a question is determined by a conciliary assembly, there are perhaps twenty more questions to be disputed before we can, with confidence, either believe the council upon its mere authority, or obtrude it upon others." f With regard to General Councils, the Church of England holds, that " when they be gathered together, (forasmuch as they be an assembly of men whereof all be not governed with the spirit and word of God,) they may err, and some- times have erred, even in things pertaining unto God." (Art. XXI.) The doctrine of the Church of England on the subject of church authority is contained in Art. XX. ; " The church hath power to decree rites or ceremonies, and authority in matters of faith. And yet it is not lawful for the church to ordain anything that is contrary to God's word written ; neither may it so expound one place of Scripture, that it be repugnant to another." In com- menting upon this passage, Bishop Burnet says — " Here a distinction is to be made between an authority that is absolute, and founded on infallibility, and an authority of order. The former is very formally disclaimed by our church, but the second may be well maintained, though we assert no unerring authority. . . . When any synod of the clergy has so far examined a point as to settle their opinions about it, they may certainly decree that such is their doctrine; and as they judge it to be more * Palmer, Part IV. ch. 7. t Liberty of Prophesying, § 6. See also Burnet and Tomline on Art XXI., and Bretschneider, Dogmatik, vol. I. § 43. IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 87 or less important, they may either restrain any other opinion, or may require positive declarations about it, either of all in their communion, or at least of all whom they admit to minister to holy things. This is only an authority or order for the maintaining of union and edification ; and in this a body does no more, as it is a body, than what every single individual has a right to do for himself. He examines a doctrine that is laid before him, he forms his own opinion upon it, and pur- suant to that he must judge with whom he can hold communion, and from whom he must separate. When such definitions are made by the body of the pastors of any church, all persons within that church do owe great respect to their decision This is due to the con- siderations of peace and union, and to that authority which the church has to maintain it. But if, after all possible methods of inquiry, a man cannot master his thoughts, or make them agree with the public decisions, his conscience is not under bonds; since this authority is not absolute, nor grounded upon a promise of infalli- bility."* § 11. The argument in favour of establishing a true church, as a source of infallible authority, is further sup- ported by an attempt to represent it as having main- tained a continuous succession from the Apostles, and having handed down the true doctrines of Christianity, and the true interpretation of Scripture, by an uninter- rupted tradition, f Here, again, we meet with the same method of prov- * See, further, Tomline upon Art. XX., who agrees with Burnet. t For theKoman and Anglo-catholic doctrine of church tradition, see Walter, Kirchenrecht, § 17 ; Klee, Katholische Dogmatik, 88 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. ing incertumper incertius, and of solving one indetermi- nate problem by substituting for it another equally in- determinate. There is no general agreement as to what constitutes authentic and catholic tradition ; or as to the distinction between the private opinions and inferences of the fathers of the church, by whom the doctrines are recorded, and tradition derived from an Apostolic source. The witnesses to whom reference is made often differ, and it cannot be proved that any constant and invariable oral tradition, ascending to the origin of Christianity, has continued to the present time. # Besides, the Chris- tian church never professed to be in possession of a secret and mysterious doctrine, inaccessible to the rest of the world, and preserved in its exclusive custody. It can- not, in this sense, be a tradux tradiiionum. The doctrines of Christianity have always been published and promul- gated; and there is no reason to suppose that a holy tradition would have been more faithfully preserved among the living members of the church than in the vol. I. pp. 271—84; Mohler, Symbolik, §§ 38, 39; and Palmer on the Church, Part II. c. 6; Part III. c. 3. * See J. Taylor's Lib. of Prophesying, § 5. As to the doctrine of the reformed churches, compare Bretschneider, Dogmatik, § 43. " The custom is so universal amongst those who wrestle to support the strength of every opinion in religion, to appeal to the judgment and the practice of the primitive times, that standers-by are apt to believe that every one of the litigants know very well where to find the judge to whom he appeals; and yet there was never any difficulty reconciled and determined by that judicatory: nor in truth do the appellants well understand what themselves mean by the appeal they make; nor would have reason to acquiesce in the judgment if they could receive it by agreeing upon it." — Lord Cla- rendon, Essay on the Reverence due to Antiquity, p. 218. IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 89 books and writings in which it was originally recorded. In fact, where there are contemporary records, the office of oral tradition ceases. Under such circumstances, oral tradition can only be supplementary to the written record ; where it agrees, the agreement gives little con- firmation, ' on account of the superior certainty of an authentic contemporary record, and the unfaithfulness, imperfection, and liability to foreign admixture, of tra- dition; where it differs, its claim to a Divine origin cannot be admitted until it is proved by direct evidence equal to contemporary attestation. If the rule of faith is to consist both of scripture and tradition, both of the written and the unwritten word of God, it is necessary that those doctrines which are referred exclusively to tradition as their origin, which are derived merely from the verbum Dei non scriptum, should be distinctly traced to their source, and that the tradition should be proved, by authentic evidence, to be not of a subsequent growth, but to be founded on a con- temporary recollection of the fact recorded.* A histo- rical event may be handed down by oral tradition as well as by a contemporary written record ; but, in that case, satisfactory proof must be given that the tradition is * Van Espen, as quoted by Walter, ubi sup. § 176, affirms that this is the case: " Indubitatum est ecclesiam Catholicam eandem semper et ubique fidem ex traditione apostolica sive scripto sive sine scripto conservasse, nee circa articulos fidei quidquam novi post tempora apostolorum accidisse." Compare Bossuet, Varia* tions, Pref. § 26. This position is disputed by all the Protestant churches. For example, Protestants would not admit that such doctrines as purgatory, works of supererogation, transubstantiation, the sacrifice of the mass, and adoration of images, can be proved by authentic evidence to have been taught by Christ, and to be of 90 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. derived from contemporary witnesses.* The mere pre- valence of a belief in a certain tenet within a church does not prove that tenet to have been derived from an authentic source, as Bossuet assumes ;f its pedigree must be deduced from the first ancestor, and it must be proved by positive evidence, not by general presump- tions, to have formed a part of primitive and Apostolic Christianity. § 12. An additional support of the doctrines of an infallible universal church, and of an authoritative church-tradition, is sought to be derived from the dis- tinction between Fundamentals and Non-fundamentals, or (in other words,) between matters of faith, to be held de fide, and matters of mere opinion. It is afiirmed, that the authority of the true church, and of church-tradi- tion, is decisive with respect to fundamentals and matters of faith, but that, in other things, entire agreement is not necessary ; so that a Christian who rejects any of the latter, does not incur the sin of heresy. But here, again, the difficulty is merely shifted, not solved; it is transferred to another point, but it is not diminished. There is no received or certain test for dis- tinguishing between fundamental and non-fundamental doctrines — between matters of strict faith and matters of apostolic institution. The theory of a gradual development of the Christian doctrines from certain seminal principles, which was pro- pounded a few years ago by Mr. Newman, is, if not peculiar to himself, at all events quite inconsistent with the systems both of the Church of Rome and of Protestantism. * See Note B. at the end of the chapter, f " Toutes les fois qu'on trouvera en un certain temps une doc- trine etablie dans toute l'eglise catholique, ce ne sera jamais que par erreur qu'on croira qu'elle est nouvelle." — Var. des Egl. Prot. XV. 97. IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 91 mere opinion. That which one divine or one church may consider fundamental, another may consider imma- terial, and the converse. We know from experience, that the most discordant views as to the character and ex- tent of fundamentals have been taken by different theo- logians of authority in different countries, and under the influence of different general views on the Christian scheme. " Unity in the fundamental articles of faith," (says Dr. Waterland, who has treated this subject ex professo,) " was always strictly insisted upon as one necessary con- dition of church-membership; and if any man openly and resolutely opposed those articles, or any of them, he was rejected as a deserter of the common faith, and treated as an alien. . . . Hence it is, that we have almost as many different rules for determining fundamentals, as there are different sects or parties ; and that which might otherwise serve (if all men were reasonable) to end all differences, has itself been too often made one principal bone of contention."* " A distinction," (says Burnet,) " is to be made * A Discourse of Fundamentals, Works, vol. VIII. p. 90. Water- land, however, proposes his own enumeration of fundamentals. Compare Palmer on the Church, Part I. ch. 5; App. Various writings on the subject of fundamentals are cited by Waterland; others are mentioned in Bretschneider, Dogmatik der Lutherisch- evangelischen Kirche, vol. I. § 47. Mr. Gladstone, The State in its relations with the Church, ch. 2, § 105; ch. 7, § 97, (ed. 4,) agrees as to the uncertainty of the defi- nition of fundamentals. Dr. Hampden, Bampton Lectures, p. 352, ed. 2, condemns the distinction as being a remnant of scholasticism. Klee, on the other hand, Katholische Dogmatik, vol. I. p. 60, (ed. 3,) considers it a Protestant invention, and rejects it as inconsistent with the Catholic doctrine. Compare Chilling worth, Works, vol. I. ch. 3. Hallam, Lit. of Eur., vol. II. ch. 2, § 31. 92 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. between those capital and fundamental articles, with- out which a man cannot be esteemed a true Chris- tian, nor a church a true church; and other truths, which, being delivered in Scripture, all men are, indeed, obliged to believe them, yet they are not of that nature that the ignorance of them, or an error in them, can exclude from salvation." " Here," (he continues,) " a controversy does natu- rally arise, that wise people are unwilling to meddle with — what articles are fundamental, and what are not? The defining of fundamental articles seems, on the one hand, to deny salvation to such as do not receive them all, which men are not willing to do. And, on the other hand, it may seem a leaving men at liberty as to all other particulars that are not reckoned up among the fundamentals."* § 13. The attempt to give authenticity to religious opinions by defining the church, and to establish a living standard and canon for the right interpretation of Scripture, independently of the intrinsic grounds of the decision, never met with entire success; inasmuch as there were heretical sects, who denied the authority of the predominant, or self-styled orthodox catholic church, from the earliest period of Christianity. Its failure was, however, rendered most conspicuous by the Eeformation in the sixteenth century, when rival churches were set up, under the protection of the state, in the most civilized countries of Europe, contesting the pretensions of the Church of Eome, and, indeed, denouncing it as false and unchristian. The leaders of the Eeformation, and the protestant On Art. XIX., (p. 236.) IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 93 churches in general, rejected the maxim that " the church," (however determined,) is the decisive authority for religious truth ; and they laid little or no stress on the doctrines of tradition and Apostolic succession as guides in the interpretation of Scripture. For the most part, the protestant churches framed certain authorita- tive summaries of their faith, (such as the Augsburg Confession, the Thirty-nine Articles, &c. ;) but they founded the authority of their creeds, and the obligation of Christians to adopt them, not on the teaching of their church, and its possession of an authentic tradition and an authoritative voice, but on their accordance with Scripture.* The creeds of all the reformed churches are particu- larly explicit on this point, which was, indeed, a funda- mental and characteristic doctrine of Protestantism. Instead, like the Church of Rome, of recognising a com- pound rule of faith, which comprehended both Scripture and oral tradition, and placed the two upon an equal footing, the Protestant churches, however they might differ in other respects, agreed in establishing a simple rule of faith, consisting exclusively of Scripture. This principle is expressed in the clearest terms in the Articles of the Church of England, and, indeed, pervades their * With respect to the doctrines of the early reformers on Scrip- ture and tradition, and their condemnation by the Council of Trent, see Sarpi, Hist, du Concile de Trente, 1. II. c. 43 — 6, 56, trad, de Courayer. Sarpi states that one of the members of the council urged their laying down, " that every Christian is bound to believe in the Church;" but that this proposition was unanimously rejected, partly on the ground that the heretics would pretend to be the true church, to which so much authority was given, c. 45. Compare Mohler, Symbolik, § 44 — 51; Bretschneider, Dogmatik, vol. I. § 33; Walter, Kirchenrecht, § 35. 94 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. whole substance. Art. VI. states that " holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation; so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man, that it should be believed as an article of faith, or to be thought requi- site or necessary to salvation."* Art. VIII. declares that the three creeds — the Mcene, Athanasian, and Apostles' creed — " ought thoroughly to be received and believed," not because they were received by the early church, and founded upon an authoritative tradition, but because " they may be proved by most certain warrants of Scripture." So, again, Art. XX. lays it down that the church cannot ordain or decree anything contrary to holy writ, or enforce anything beside the same, to be believed for necessity of salvation; and Art. XXI. decides, that things ordained by General Councils as necessary to salvation have neither strength nor autho- rity, unless it may be declared that they be taken out of holy Scripture. f Again, Art. XXXIV. says that " it is not necessary that traditions and ceremonies be in all places one, or utterly like, for at all times they have been diverse, and may be changed according to the diversity of countries and men's manners, so that nothing be ordained against God's word." In all these passages, the reference to Scripture as the paramount and exclu- sive standard of faith is manifest. * See Burnet's commentary on this article, as to the antithesis between the doctrines of the church of Rome and that of England on this head. A similar view is taken by Bishop Tomline on the same article. t Commenting on this article, Burnet says of the early coun- cils — " We reverence those councils for the sake of their doctrine, but do not believe the doctrine for the authority of the councils." IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 95 The distinctive theories of the Church of Eome and of the Protestant churches on this subject, may be stated thus : — According to the Church of Rome, there are certain marks by which the one true Christian church can be recognised. Those marks exist in the Church of Rome, and in no other. The true and genuine doctrines have been preserved by an uninterrupted tradition in the true church. Therefore, whatever the Church of Rome teaches is true, and her authority is a legitimate ground of belief in things spiritual. All Christians who reject her au- thority in matters of faith are heretics, and without the pale of the church. On the other hand, the Protestant churches hold that the scriptures of the Old and New Testament contain everything which goes to make up Christianity, and that they are the exclusive and ultimate rule of faith. They deny the existence of any uninterrupted and exclusive transmission of true doctrine in any church since the time of the Apostles. Each Protestant church lays down certain doctrines, which it considers to constitute, in the aggregate, the true exposition of the Christian religion ; but it claims Divine authority to this body of doctrines, simply on the ground that they are all expressly con- tained in Scripture, or can be inferred from it by a legi- timate process of deduction. It was on account of this exclusive reference to Scrip- ture, that the Protestant divines laid more stress on the inspiration of the holy writings than the theologians of the Church of Rome ; and that the Protestants were ac- cused of bibliolatry. Owing to this deposition of church authority, and to 96 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. the adoption of the maxim that " the Bible only is the religion of Protestants,"* it has been commonly asserted that the reformed churches have admitted the right of private judgment in religious matters. Now, in a certain sense, every church which possesses a fixed written confession of faith predetermines the most important articles of Christian belief, and therefore can hardly be said to leave a free scope to private judgment.f But the reformed churches agree in making the Scrip- tures the exclusive canon of religious faith; they admit that their creed is only entitled to acceptance so far as it is supported by Scripture ; and they do not assume that their church, in its collective capacity, is alone competent to decide on the correct interpretation of the Divine records. In this sense, therefore, the reformed churches admit the right of private judgment. They do not claim for the decrees of any church an authority independent of, or extraneous to, Scripture. It has been stated by an eminent text writer, that, when the two forms of belief are reduced to their ele- ments, Catholicism is the complete recognition of the * Chillingworth, Religion of Protestants, ch. 6, § 56, (vol. 2, p. 450.) t The Church of England declares that " they are to be accursed that presume to say that every man shall be saved by the law or sect which he professeth, so that he be diligent to frame his life according to that law and the light of nature," (Art. XVIII.) This article, however, appears from its sequel to refer to heathens, or others not professing Christianity, and to be intended to exclude from salvation only those who are not Christians. It does not affect those who claim to be Christians, though they may not be members of the Church of England. As to the sense in which pro- testantism involved the principle of private judgment, see the re- marks of Mr. Hallam, Literature of Europe, vol. I. ch. 6, § 33. IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 97 authority of the church; while Protestantism is the negation of that authority, and the substitution of the private judgment of each individual.* But although a Protestant denies the authority of the Church of Kome, he recognises the authority of his own Church. The difference properly does not consist in the recognition of the principle of authority by one party, and the rejection of that principle by the other, but in the recognition of different authorities. § 14. On looking back to what has been said, it will be seen that no one church can justly make any claim to authority in matters of religious belief, upon the grounds on which opinions in matters of science acquire authority. There is no consent of competent judges over the civilized world. Inconsistent and opposite forms of Christianity continue to exist side by side. There is not any general agreement among divines of different churches, as there is among men of science as to their respective subjects in different countries; and scarcely even any tendency to such an agreement. f Attempts at mutual conversion on a large scale entirely fail ; while those which are limited in their numbers give rise to questions as to the motives of the converts, and add but little strength to the church which receives them. J Even a government cannot safely adopt any * See Klee, Kath. Dogm. vol. i. p. 312. t Compare Note C. at the end of the chapter. % Lord Clarendon, in his Essay Against the Multiplying Con- troversies, remarks upon the fact, " that all the conferences held, and all the books written, between those of the Roman and those of the reformed religion, for the space of above 150 years, by men of unquestionable knowledge and virtue, should not work upon any one man, for ought appears, to change the opinion he brought with H 98 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. authority in ecclesiastical matters, or assume the exclu- sive truth of any one form of Christianity. It must look mainly to the numbers of each religious persuasion, in deciding the question of endowments for religious and educational purposes; and to the religion of parents in establishing the rules for determining the creed in which children, incapable of judging for them- selves, are to be brought up.* The Church of Rome makes boldly the claim of autho- rity for its own decisions. But there is a large, and that not the least enlightened and intelligent, portion of the Christian world which peremptorily denies this claim. Moreover, even among its own members, there is great difference of opinion as to the organs of that authority. The ultramontane doctrines differ on this head from those of some of the national churches. Decisions, which some classes of Roman-catholics consider as authoritative, others refuse to admit as genuine ex- pressions of the voice of the church. Even if it is conceded that the teaching of the church carries with it an authority binding upon the consciences of all the faithful, yet there is no general agreement as him; for of those who run from one communion to another, they are such who do not pretend to judge of arguments, or such who seldom give an account of their true inducements," &c, p. 241, ed. fol. And in his History of the Rebellion, he says — " Our observa- tion and experience can give us few examples of men who have changed their religion, and not fallen into some jealousy and dis- trust, or disreputation, even with those with whom they side, that have made their future life less pleasant and delightsome; which, it may be, happens only because we have rare instances of men of extraordinary parts, or great minds, who have entertained those conversions," vol. iv. p. 317, ed. 12mo. * On this subject, some further remarks are made in Chapter IX. IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 99 to the extent of the church, or the communion signified by this term. The member of the Church of Eome limits the acceptation of church to his own church ; Protestants include under it different ecclesiastical communities, agreeing only in the profession of the Christian faith, or agreeing in certain fundamental tenets, such as the Athanasian doctrine of the Trinity — or in a certain form of church government, such as episcopacy. Even as to the term '• Catholic church," there is no general agree- ment in Christendom. The historical usage limits this term to the Church of Eome, which never was a uni- versal church, in the sense of its including, de facto, all Christians; but was universal, or Catholic, only in the sense of its claiming to be orthodox, and therefore to include, de jure, all Christendom, and also as not being a merely national church, but comprehending several nations and countries. Protestant divines in general, however, extend the term Catholic church either to all Christendom,* or they limit it by some condition, as to which there is a variety of opinion. The " Catholic church," or " Catholic consent " of the modern Oxford school, is a perfectly arbitrary standard, which can satisfy no marked denomination of Christians. Of what avail is it to imagine an invisible ideal church, formed of such heterogeneous and mutually repelling bodies, as the Church of Eome, the Greek Church, and the Church of England? What agreement exists, or can exist, between them, and how can it be defined or expressed? * As to the claim of the reformed churches to be members of the Catholic church, and the declarations on the subject in their con- fessions, see Klee, Kathol. Dogmatik, vol. i. p. 98. See Bretschn eider, Glaubenslehre, § 55, for the views of the modern German Pro- testants on the meaning of " Catholic church." As to Jurieu's doc- trine, see Palmer, vol. i. p. 128. H 2 100 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. The Church of Borne, by its authentic organs, proscribes the Church of England as heretical, and will hold no communion or church-membership with it. The Church of England lays it down, in an equally authentic man- ner, that the Church of Eome has erred in matters both of faith and discipline; and authoritative divines of the Anglican Church teach that the Church of Eome is a church without a religion. Under these circumstances, no practical solution of sectarian differences can be derived by a reference to " Catholic consent," so deter- mined. It follows that no person can accept the doctrines of the Church of Eome, upon the mere authority of the rulers and doctors of that church, with the same well-founded security against error which he possesses for his belief in adopting the established truths of astronomy or mechanics, upon the mere credit of mathematicians and men of science. The same objection, founded on the absence of a general agreement, or tendency to agreement, among the principal theologians of Christendom, applies also to each of the Protestant creeds. The existence of the non-Protestant sects weakens the authority of the divines of the Protestant churches ; the existence of the non-Catholic sects weakens the authority of the divines of the Church of Eome. The authority of each Pro- testant church is, again, still further weakened by the existence of mutual differences between Protestants as to their respective tenets.* Besides which, the Protestant writers lay less stress on the authoritative teaching of the church ; they admit See Bossuet, Variations des Eglises Protestantes, Pref. sect. 16. IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 101 that national churches have erred ; and they hold that no doctrine of any church is binding, unless it can be proved by Scripture. The teaching of the church is not, as such, according to them, decisive; it must be demonstrably founded on Scripture authority. Add to which, that while they refer to Scripture as their ex- clusive canon of religious truth, they scarcely claim to possess any rule of interpreting Scripture, or of resolving doubts as to the signification of particular passages. For the interpretation of Scripture, each Protestant church relies upon the expositions of approved commen- tators, and, in doctrinal passages, principally on those of its own communion, but without setting up any infallible rule or standard of interpretation.* § 15. On account of the intrinsic obscurity and transcendental nature of the leading ideas in theology, and of the difficulty of arriving, even with the aid of revelation, at distinct and intelligible conclusions on subjects lying without the domain of human consciousness j 1 or sensation, it would be extremely desirable, for the . guidance of people in general, that a consentient autho- ) rity in questions of Christian theology should exist. The attempts to remove error, to enlighten dissidents from the true faith, to create a trustworthy authority in things spiritual, and to produce a unity of the church, have been ill-devised and unsuccessful — but they have almost invariably been sincere. They have originated in a sense of the evils springing from diversity of religious opinion, without a common living point of reference, and of the advantages likely to accrue from uniformity of * See the Protestant doctrine of Scripture-interpretation ex- plained at large, by Jeremy Taylor, in the Liberty of Prophesying, sect. 4. 102 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. faith and church discipline. Instead, however, of re- sorting to conciliatory courses, and of endeavouring to diminish differences by amicable explanations and mutual concessions, the teachers of theology and leaders of churches and sects have, in general, condemned diver- sities of opinion with asperity, and in a confident and intolerant spirit, which has provoked retaliation and perpetuated division. By seeking thus to propagate truth in a matter in which allowances ought peculiarly to be made for difference of opinion, divines have multi- plied controversies beyond all reasonable limits ; so that the most patient student is bewildered in the labyrinth of discussion, and the most deferential inquirer is at a loss to which authority he is to bow. When, however, a person, either from a firm reliance on the creed of the church in which he has been brought up, or from inde- pendent examination, is satisfied of the general truth of the doctrines of any particular church, he will naturally regard with respect the divines who are considered as authorities within that religious communion. In all controversies and discussions, too, carried on between members of the same church, the works of the received text-writers and leading divines of that church will be referred to as a common authority and standard of deci- sion. It is in this sense that the Church of England, according to the opinion of the best expositors of its articles, claims authority in matters of faith, (Art. XX.) Its authority is limited to its own members. This is, in substance, the view of church authority which is taken by Hooker. In determining the Kule of Faith, he places Scripture in the first rank; and, in the next, such direct and manifest inferences from it as each person may make by his own unassisted judgment. The last place he assigns to the authority of the church, IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 103 which he justly considers as more competent, in a corpo- rate capacity, to decide doubtful questions than any of its individual members.* § 16. On reviewing what has been said above on the state of religious opinion in Christendom, and the claim to authority possessed by any one of its churches or sections, we are led to the following conclusions : — 1. That no agreement as to the distinctive or charac- teristic doctrines of the several Christian sects exists among the theologians of Christendom, and, consequently, that no church or denomination of Christians can claim assent to its tenets, and by its legitimate authority com- mand the belief of a conscientious inquirer, on the grounds on which a reasonable deference may be paid to authority in secular matters. 2. That although there is no agreement as to the peculiar doctrines of any Christian church, there is an agreement among all civilized nations in accepting some form of Christianity, and in recognising the Christian revelation according to some construction of its effect and intent. The practical deduction from these results seems to * "Be it matter of the one kind or of the other fi : . e., matter of order or of doctrine], what Scripture doth plainly deliver, to that the first place both of credit and obedience is due; the next whereunto is whatsoever any man can necessarily conclude by force of reason; after these the voice of the church succeedeth. That which the church by her ecclesiastical authority shall probably think and define to be true or good, must in congruity of reason overrule all other inferior judgments whatsoever." — Eccl. Pol. b. v. ch. viii. § 2. Compare also Pref. c. iii. §§ 1, 2, and b. ii., where, confuting the exaggerations of the Puritans, he shows that human reason is the ultimate test in judging of Scripture. A similar view of church authority is taken by Dr. Hampden, Bampton Lectures, Lect. 8, p. 372, ed. 2. 104 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. be, that the mere authority of any church or sect cannot of itself reasonably command assent to its distinctive and peculiar tenets, while the present divisions of Chris- tendom continue ; and that a person born in a Christian country can only with propriety adopt one of two alter- natives — viz., either to adhere to the faith of his parents and predecessors, and that of the church in which he has been educated, or, if he is unwilling to abide by this creed, to form his own judgment as to the choice of his sect by means of the best independent investigation which his understanding and opportunities for study enable him to make. This conclusion is, in the main, identical with the result at which Jeremy Taylor arrives in his Liberty of Prophesying, with whose words I will conclude this chapter. " Although," (he says,) " we are secured in funda- mental points from involuntary error, by the plain, ex- press, and dogmatical places of Scripture, yet in other things we are not, but may be invincibly mistaken, be- cause of the obscurity and difficulty in the controverted parts of Scripture, by reason of the uncertainty of the means of its interpretation ; since tradition is of an un- certain reputation, and sometimes evidently false; councils are contradictory to each other, and therefore certainly are equally deceived many of them, and there- fore all may; and then the popes of Rome are very likely to mislead us, but cannot ascertain us of truth in matter of question ; and in this world we believe in part, and prophesy in part ; and this imperfection shall never be done away till we be translated to a more glorious state : either we must throw our chances, and get truth by accident or predestination, or else we must lie safe in IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 105 a mutual toleration, and private liberty of persuasion, unless some other anchor can be thought upon, where we may fasten our floating vessels, and ride safely." — Sect. VII., ad fin. Notes to Chapter IY. Note A. (page 73.) " It is, indeed, true that the prevalence of internal differences dis- turbed the unity of collective Christendom; but, if we do not de- ceive ourselves, it is another universal law of human things that this disturbance prepared a higher and a larger development of the human mind. " In the press of the universal struggle, religion was conceived by different nations after the different varieties of its dogmatical forms. The peculiar dogma adopted was incorporated with the feeling of nationality, as a possession of the community — of the state or the people. It was won by the sword — maintained amidst a thousand dangers; it had become part of the life's blood of the nation. " Hence it has come to pass, that the states on either side have grown into great ecclesiastico-political bodies, whose individuality is marked — on the Catholic, by the measure of their devotedness to the Roman see, and of the degree of toleration or exclusion of non- Catholics; but still more strongly on the Protestant, where the departure from the symbolical books adopted as tests, the mixture of the Lutheran and the Calvinistic creeds, the greater or less approximation to an episcopal constitution of the church, form so many striking and obvious distinctions. The first question in every country is — what is its predominant religion? Christianity appears under various forms; but, however great be the dis- crepancies between them, no party can deny to another the pos- session of the fundamentals of faith. On the contrary, these several forms are guaranteed by compacts and by treaties of peace, to which all are parties, and which are, as it were, the fundamental laws of a universal republic. Never more can the thought of ex- alting the one or the other confession to universal supremacy find place among men. The only consideration now is, how each state, 106 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. each people, can best proceed from the basis of its own politico- religious principles to the development of its intellectual and moral powers. On this depends the future condition of the world." — Ranke's Popes of Rome, vol. ii. ad Jin. Engl. Transl. Note B. (page 90.) The transmission of the evidence for an historical fact by oral tra- dition may be illustrated by the celebrated story of the ring, which the favourite Essex is said to have sent to Queen Elizabeth before his execution. This story was handed down by tradition in the family of the Earl of Monmouth, and was first published, in an authentic form, by Mr. Birch, in 1 749. The Countess of Notting- ham, who appears as a principal party in the transaction, was the wife of the Lord High Admiral, and sister of Robert, Earl of Mon- mouth. Henry, Earl of Monmouth, son of Earl Robert, had a daughter Martha, who married John, Earl of Middleton. Lady Elizabeth Spelman was the daughter of the Earl and Countess of Middleton; and from her report, (who was the great-granddaughter of the Countess of Nottingham's brother,) Birch published the par- ticulars of the tradition in the reign of George II. (Negotiations, p. 206.) The story had, however, obtained publicity at an earlier period; it was known in the reign of Charles I. to Mr. Hyde, who disbelieved it — to Sir Dudley Carleton, who told it to Prince Maurice in Holland, (see Birch's Memoirs of Queen Elizabeth, pp. 481, 490,) and to Francis Osborn, who published it in his Traditional Memoirs on the reign of Queen Elizabeth, in 1658, pp. 92 — o. According to these versions of the story, the ring was sent by Essex to the Countess of Nottingham, to be given to the Queen; but according to Lady Elizabeth Spelman's version, the ring was sent to Lady Scrope, and given by mistake to her sister, Lady Nottingham. Upon the evidence of the tradition published by Birch, the story has been accepted as true by Hume and other historians. Note C. (page 97.) It is curious to compare the difficulties started by Lucian with respect to the choice of a particular sect among the several schools of ancient philosophy. The impossibility of personally investigating IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 107 the doctrines of each sect, and the absence of all a priori authority in favour of any, are urged by him with his usual ingenuity and power of sarcasm in the dialogue entitled Hermotimus, f/ irepl alpe(T€(ov. In this dialogue, Hermotimus, a Stoic philosopher, is pressed by his friend Lycinus to state his reasons for selecting the Stoic sect in preference to the others. The following is an outline of the argument: — Lycinus begins by asking Hermotimus what induced him, when there were so many philosophic schools, to prefer the stoic sect, while he was still a common man, an ISiwrrjg, and ignorant of philo- sophy? Were you (he says) directed to it by the voice of an oracle? (c. 15.) Hermotimus answers that he made the choice upon his own judgment, and that, in choosing the true philosophy, he was guided by the numbers of its adherents. Being asked how he knew that the Stoics were more numerous than the Epicureans or Peripatetics, and whether he counted them as at a public vote, (fcaQaVfjO iv ralg x^poropiaig,) he says that he guessed their number. Lycinus remarks upon the unsatisfactory nature of this test, and Hermotimus then adds that he had another reason; he had heard everybody say that the Epicureans were addicted to pleasure, that the Peripatetics were fond of money, and the Platonics full of con- ceit; but that the Stoics were enduring and wise, and that their followers were the only perfect men, (c. 16.) Having furnished this second test, he is forced to admit that he did not take this favourable character of the Stoics from the Stoics themselves, or the unfavourable character of the other sects from those sects; and he does not deny that he took it from the ignorant and illiterate. Upon Lycinus expressing his wonder that any one should have derived his opinions respecting philosophy from such an authority, Hermotimus tries another ground. He had always observed (he says) that the Stoics were decent and serious in their demeanour, properly clothed, holding a fit medium between effeminacy and negligence, with their heads close shaven. Lycinus inquires whether we are to judge of merit merely by gravity of deportment, dress, and long beards. Surely (he says) there must be some universal criterion to judge by; and we are not left to decide whether a man is a good or bad philosopher by his outward appear- ance, (c. 18, 19.) Lycinus, unable to obtain from his friend any satisfactory mark of the true sect, says that he will try to discover it for himself, (c. 21.) 108 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [CH. He proceeds to compare philosophy with a happy and well- governed city, and to represent himself as seeking the way to it. Many persons offer themselves as guides, and point out different roads — one leading to the east and another to the west; one to the south and another to the north; one passing through a pleasant country, others rough and laborious, but all supposed to bring the traveller to the same city, (c. 22 — 5.) " Thus I am still left in doubt and uncertainty, for at the entrance of every path I am met by a man, worthy no doubt of all confidence, who stretches out his hand and desires me to follow him, telling me that his is the only right way, and that all the other guides are wandering in ignorance, having neither come from the city themselves, nor being able to direct others to it. The next and the next I meet tells me the same story of his own path, and abuses the other guides; and so will every one of them. It is this variety of ways which distracts and confounds us; where each guide contends for and praises his own, I cannot tell which to follow, or how I am ever to arrive at this happy city," (c. 26.) Hermotimus now says that he can remove all his friend's doubts : let him trust those who have gone the journey before him, and he cannot err. Lycinus, however, is not satisfied with this receipt: each guide (he says) praises his own road exclusively: one takes Plato's, another Zeno's, but no one knows more than his own, and it is impossible to be sure that the road leads, after all, to the right city: the guide may be mistaken, (c. 27.) Hermotimus then assures him that he may go the whole round, but he will never find better guides than the Stoics. Let him follow Zeno and Chrysippus, and they will lead him aright, (c. 29.) Lycinus repeats that this assurance is unsatisfactory, and that a similar one would be given by the Platonists and Epicureans of their leaders. Each thinks his own sect the best, and vaunts his own guide. Besides, you are only acquainted with your own doc- trines, and you condemn those of the other sects without knowing them. Hermotimus denies this. The Stoic teachers (he says) in their lectures always mention the tenets of the other schools, and refute them, (c. 32.) Lycinus treats this argument as futile. The other philosophers would not (he replies) be content to be so judged. Your philosophers set up men of straw, in order that they may be easily knocked down. Such a controversy is no real conflict, but a sham fight, in which the victory is certain beforehand. " In short, (concludes IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 109 Lycinus,) while it remains uncertain which is the best sect in phi- losophy, I am resolved not to follow any one, as that would be an affront upon all the rest," (c. 34.) Hermotimus insists that it is needless to study the other philo- sophies. Truth (he says) may be learnt from the Stoics without going to all the other sects. If a man told you that two and two are four, it would not be necessar}' for you to suspend your belief until you had consulted all persons versed in arithmetical science, (c. 35.) Lycinus denies the applicability of this argument. The subjects about which the philosophic sects differ are doubtful; there is no mode of resolving the doubt, and no common agreement, (c. 36.) With regard to philosophy, the only man (he continues) in whom I can repose confidence is one who has mastered the doctrines of all the sects, has tried them all, and has chosen that which, by his own experience, he is satisfied is the only one which can guide him to true happiness. If we can meet with such a man, our labour is at an end. But such a man (says Hermotimus) cannot easily be found, (c. 46.) The two disputants then enter into a calculation as to the length of time which must be allowed for obtaining a familiar knowledge of the tenets of each sect, and they reckon ten sects at twenty years each, (c. 48.) Hermotimus remarks that, make what reduction they will, very few persons would be able to go through all the sects, though they began as soon as they were born. On this Lycinus repeats, that unless a man knows all the systems, he can- not select the best, except by chance; he can only stumble upon it accidentally in the dark, (c. 49.) Hermotimus complains that Lycinus requires impossibilities. He will neither accept the opinion of those who judge for themselves, unless they have lived the life of a phoenix, nor will he follow those who are satisfied with the consent of the multitude. Lycinus asks who are the multitude? If it consists of men who understand the subject, one will suffice; but if of the ignorant, their number does not influence his belief, (c. 53.) Hermotimus then returns to self- judgment. It may be right (he admits) to inquire into the opinions of each sect, but the length of time assigned by Lycinus is exces- sive. A judgment maybe formed from a portion or sample — ex ungue leonem. Lycinus replies that when the whole is known, it can be judged from a part; but in this case the whole is not known. If the philosophers had thought their principles simple and easy of 110 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE, ETC. [CH. acquisition, they probably would not have written so many thou- sand volumes, (c. 54 — 6.) He adds, that if his friend is impatient of the time and labour necessary for examination, he had better send for a diviner, or draw lots for the best, (c. 57.) Hermotimus inquires if he is to give up the matter in despair, unless he can live a hundred years? (c. 63.) Lycinus then under- takes to point out the qualifications requisite for inquiring into the subject. These are acuteness of mind, long-continued labour and study, and perfect impartiality, (c. 64.) Even with these qualifica- tions, a person is not secured against error. It is possible that all the different sects of philosophy may be in error, and that the truth has not yet been discovered, (c. 65, 66.) Lycinus then proceeds to another objection. He asks his friend whether, in all the sects, there are not teachers who say that they alone understand the subject, and that all the others are mere pre- tenders to knowledge. Hermotimus assents to this proposition, and admits that it is difficult to distinguish between the true philo- sophers and the impostors, (c. 68.) If, therefore, (says Lycinus,) you can meet with a master who himself knows, and can teach you the art of demonstration, and how to determine in doubtful cases, your labour is at an end, for then what is good and true will im- mediately appear; falsehood will be detected; you will be able to make choice of the best philosophy — will acquire that happiness which you have so long been in search of, and possess everything that is desirable. Hermotimus is delighted with this view, and declares that he will instantly look out for such a guide, (c. 69.) Lycinus, however, immediately destroys his satisfaction by show- ing that this man, if found, could not be relied on, until another person was discovered, who could decide if he was a safe guide, and so on, to a third. His demonstrations, too, would be called in question; everything would revolve in a circle of uncertainty, and nothing would be determined, (c. 70.) After some further arguments of Lycinus against the Stoic system in particular, Hermotimus owns that he is convinced of his error, and declares his intention to renounce philosophy hence- forth, (c. 83.) Lycinus adds that he should have used precisely the same arguments if his friend had belonged to any one of the other philosophic sects, (c. 85.) V.] UTILITY AND PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. Ill CHAPTEE Y. ON THE UTILITY AND PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. § 1. It has been shown briefly in Chapter II., that a large portion of the opinions of mankind are necessarily derived from authority. Children necessarily imbibe the opinions of their parents and teachers ; the time and means for the independent investigation of speculative opinions on a large number of subjects are wanting; and on questions of practice it is necessary for a man to be guided by the advice of professional persons, having had a special training and experience in the matter. We have, in a subsequent chapter, attempted to trace the marks of a trustworthy authority in matters of spe- culation and practice, and have described the means by which trustworthy authority is gradually formed. This description, as we have further shown, does not apply, without considerable qualifications, to religious questions. We now turn to consider what are the proper uses of authority, and what are the circumstances in which it can be resorted to with advantage, for the guidance of opinion, and the management of the affairs of life, both private and public. As to speculative questions of science and philosophy, every person ought, as far as his leisure and opportuni- ties for reading and reflection will permit, to attempt to form for himself an independent judgment. Every person, however, will find in numerous subjects that he 1T2 ON THE UTILITY AND [CH. is unable to go through the processes necessary for forming such a judgment; and, with respect to these, he ought, in the choice of his authority, to be guided by the maxims stated above. Vita brevis, ars longa, says the old Hippocratean aphorism ;* and even when a per- son succeeds in mastering a great variety of subjects, the result is not always satisfactory. Men of encyclopsediacal minds are not always perspicuous or precise; still less often are they original and inventive. Multum leg ere, non multa, is a good maxim for all who desire to extend the bounds of a science, or to be sound practitioners in any art or profession. The division of scientific labour, like the division of mechanical labour, increases both its productiveness and its precision. Where the attention is concentrated upon the same intellectual object, the result is a performance at once more finished and more complete. It is, how- ever, necessary that men of comprehensive minds should survey the whole circle of the sciences, should under- stand their mutual relations, and adapt them to each other, as, in the progress of discovery, they change their respective positions. Those who devote the chief part of their thoughts and studies to one science, ought to be aware of its place in the scientific system, and to appre- ciate the extent to which it may be influenced by the cultivation of other sciences. They ought to avoid that narrowing influence which is produced by restricting the mind to the exclusive contemplation of one subject. Above all, every person should, as far as his means extend, make himself master of the methods of scientific investigation, so as to be able to judge whether, in the treatment of any question, a sound and correct method, See Hippocrat., Aphorism. I. § 1, (torn. iv. p, 458, ed. Littre.) V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 113 conformable to the precepts of a philosophical logic, has been observed. Provided with this organon or instru- ment for determining the truth, he may, after apply- ing it to subjects lying out of his own special province, rest satisfied with a knowledge of the results, without attempting a verification of all the steps by which they have been obtained.* § 2. Even in cases where a person undertakes to form an independent judgment for himself, by an examination of the appropriate evidence, and by the proper logical processes, he ought to treat with respect the opinions of competent judges, and yield a reasonable deference to their authority. Upon all doubtful questions, in which the elements of decision are numerous and complex, and the evidence conflicting, the opinion of able and honest judges is entitled to great weight, and will cause any candid and cautious person, if he comes to an oppo- site conclusion, to distrust his own judgment, and enounce his own opinion with modesty and hesitation. Whenever a person, having formed an opinion upon grounds which appear satisfactory to himself, asserts it confidently, and adheres to it resolutely, without show- ing due deference to the authority of others, he is justly exposed to the charge of arrogance or presumption in judging.f The opinion of experienced men, having a special acquaintance with the subject, is always en- titled to weight, even if it be unsupported by argu- * Compare Comte, Cours de Philosophic Positive, torn. i. pp. 29-32; torn. iv. p. 214; torn. vi. pp. 462, 475; Whewell, Phil, of Ind. Sciences, b. XI. c. 6, § 9. t The appeal to authority is called by Locke argumentum ad verecundiam, because it is thought a breach of modesty to question the opinion of men of authority. — Essay on the Vender standing, b. iv. c. 17, § 19. I 114 ON THE UTILITY AND [CH. merit.* Hence, all young persons, who attempt to judge for themselves, either are, or appear to be, arrogant; as they can scarcely fail to set at nought the opinions of persons more experienced and of greater authority than themselves. It is difficult for a young man, on account of the narrow circle of his experience, to discriminate between the cases in which he ought to judge for him- self, and those in which he ought to defer to the opinions of others. He ought not to form, in youth, a habit of blind submission to authority, such as the Jesuits in- culcated upon their disciples ; but a spirit of docility, and respect for the opinions of their elders, undoubtedly be- comes the young ; and it is certain that their opinions, especially on practical questions, however formed, will * AeT ■KpoaLyziv t&v efnreipojv ical 7rpev £&W laroplcu, " Inquiries (or Researches) concerning Animals" which has, in the modern editions, V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 149 The following remarks, therefore, will be confined to the political historian ; leaving the other class of his- torians to be distributed under the departments of their respective subjects. A historian, then, as so understood, may, in the first place, be looked upon as a chronicler and recorder of contemporary events, of which he is either a direct and personal witness, or of which he collects the evidence himself from original witnesses.* The original witnesses, from whose information the contemporary historian builds up his narrative, cannot themselves be styled historians, although their materials are necessary for his work. They are, to the historian, what the quarryman and mason are to the architect. A short-hand writer, who reports a parliamentary debate, or the proceedings before a court of justice ; a person been literally rendered into Latin, as Naturalis Historia. The encyclopaediacal work of Pliny, too, was called by the comprehen- sive title of Naturalis Historia, " A Description (or Exposition) of Nature." On account of the titles of these two celebrated works, the term Natural History has been applied to a scientific description of animals and other natural objects. But (according to a just re- mark of Mohs, cited by Dr. Whewell, Hist, oflnd. Sciences, vol. iii. p. 486), " Natural history, when systematically treated, rigorously excludes all that is historical, for it classes objects by their perma- nent and universal qualities." The essence of history, properly so called, is, that it narrates a series of successive states, all differing from one another. In this sense, the history of a science or an art is properly a history; but not a description of the species of animals, and of their characteristic differences and resemblances. * Gellius, N. A., V. 18, mentions an opinion that historia, as distinguished from annales, is a narrative of events by a contempo- rary witness: " Earum proprie rerum sit historia, quibus rebus gerendis interfuerit is qui narret." He remarks, however, that this limitation was not consistent with the received use of the term. 150 ON THE UTILITY AND [CH. who procures intelligence for newspapers ; a collector of statistical facts, such as those relating to population, public revenue and expenditure, military and naval force, exports and imports, currency, &c. ; also heralds and framers of pedigrees; registrars of births, deaths, and marriages, and other civil facts ; keepers of judicial records and journals of parliament; compilers of procla- mations, laws, charters, deeds, wills, state-papers, treaties, and other authentic documents; copiers of inscriptions and coins; — all belong to that useful class of persons, who prepare the materials out of which the framework of political history is constructed. Such functions do not, indeed, themselves deserve the name of history; but we ought not to forget that it is to these obscure, though important, services that we owe the superior cer- tainty and completeness of modern, as compared with ancient history. Everything in history depends upon the accuracy and fulness of the contemporary records — upon the sufficiency of the means adopted by the original witnesses for perpetuating the memory of the events. Without an authentic memorial derived from the actors in the events, or from contemporary observers, history is a fiction, more or less specious. Without this solid foundation of well-attested fact, it is, at the best, but an historical romance, in which a general probability of manners, institutions, and state of society, is maintained. A faithful registrar of contemporary events is like a painter of portraits or landscapes after nature : the author of fictitious history is like the painter of an ideal history-piece, which may resemble the truth, but does not portray it. The first approach to contemporary history, properly so called, is the composition of diaries, journals, and personal memoirs; narratives of events in which the V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 151 writer plays a part himself, or of which he is merely a passive spectator. When these are confined to a parti- cular transaction — as a siege, a battle, the negotiation of a treaty, the deliberations of a synod, the formation or overthrow of a government — they hold, in general, an intermediate place between the materials for history and history itself. When, however, they include a long series of memorable events, affecting the destinies of one or more nations, they rise to the dignity and amplitude of history. As examples of the latter class, it will be sufficient to mention such periodical works as the Annual Eegister, and other previous publications of the same sort — and such histories as those of Herodotus, Thucy- dides, Xenophon, Polybius, Sallust, Caesar, Tacitus, Froissart, Comines, Sleidan, Guicciardini, Thuanus, Sully, Clarendon, Burnet, &c. Works of this sort are valuable as original testimony, and constitute the materials out of which other histories are formed, not less than mere collections of state papers or docu- ments. Their most essential quality, therefore, is vera- city, and contemporary historians are mainly to be considered as witnesses and relaters of events. They may have other good qualities besides veracity ; they may show discretion in selecting, and skill in arranging facts; their style in narration may be perspicuous and impressive ; they may judge events and characters with sagacity and penetration ; but it is principally as authentic witnesses and recorders of contemporary facts that they are important.* If we did not consider their * Since the time of Thucydides, (see I. 21, 22,) the essence of history has been made to consist in its veracity. Thus, Cicero says that History is " testis temporum, lux veritatis, vita memoriae, magistra vitae, nuncia vetustatis." — De Orat. II. 9. Again: " Quis 152 ON THE UTILITY AND [CH. testimony as true, we should pay no regard to their writings. "It is the true office of history (says Lord Bacon) to represent the events themselves, together with the counsels, and to leave the observations and conclusions thereupon to the liberty and faculty of every man's judgment."* In order to determine how far a historian of this class is trustworthy, we should apply to him the tests which are used for trying the credibility of testimony. This process may lead only to uncertain results, and there may be, as in evidence before a court of justice, conflict- ing considerations on the question ; but the contemporary historian and annalist is mainly to be regarded as a wit- nescit primam esse historic legem, ne quid falsi dicere audeat? deinde, ne quid veri non audeat? nequa suspicio gratiae sit in scri- bendo? ne qua simultatis? haec scilicet fundamenta nota sunt om- nibus." — lb. c. 15. So Lucian (jQuom. Hist, sit conscrib. c. 9.) lays it down that the end of history is utility, which arises from truth alone. The two principal qualifications of a historian (he says) are penetration and judgment in political affairs, and a good style of writing (c. 34); moreover, a historian ought to have had some civil and military experience. Truth is the goddess to whom alone he must sacrifice; and he must be impartial, independent, and incorrupt, so as not to distort facts either from fear or favour, (c. 37 — 41.) Polybius likewise says, that as an animal is rendered useless by the loss of its sight, so history, without truth, is an idle tale, (I. 14, § 6.) In another place he says, that the end of tragedy is to produce emotion by fiction — the end of history is to convey instruction by truth, (II. 56, § 11.) Dr. Arnold, in his Lectures on Modern History, (lect. viii.,) also lays it down that " the one great qualification in a historian is an earnest craving after truth, and utter impatience, not of falsehood merely, but of error," (p. 293.) He adds, that these qualities "are intellectual as well as moral, and are as incompatible with great feebleness of mind as they are with dishonesty," (p. 297.) * Advancement of Learning, vol. ii. p. 114. V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 153 ness, or a collector of original evidence, and to be esti- mated as such. There is, however, another class of historians, who are not themselves witnesses, or the original collectors and reporters of the oral testimony of others. For the most part, they are not contemporary with the events which they describe; and when they are, it is usually as narrators of the history of foreign countries, in which case they have to deal with what Madame de Stael called " contemporary posterity." These are what may be termed the Learned Historians : who compile history from the recorded testimony of original witnesses, and the contemporary monuments and accounts. Among the Greeks — Ephorus, Timseus, Diodorus, Dionysius, Plutarch, and Arrian: among the Latins — Livy, Cor- nelius Nepos, and Quintus Curtius ; among the moderns — Machiavel, Raleigh, Muratori, Giannone, Mariana, Hume, Eobertson, Gibbon, Rollin, Sismondi, Niebuhr, &c, may serve as examples. Their business consists in collecting and collating the evidence of the original witnesses, either preserved by contemporary writers, or handed down by a faithful oral tradition ; in balancing inconsistent or contradictory accounts; in illustrating past events and past states of society by the light of subsequent experience and knowledge; and in tracing the successive steps in which the progress of mankind consists. It is to this class of historians that we princi- pally owe that which is styled philosophical or serolo- gical history ; that is to say, history accompanied with deductions of causes and effects, often extending over long periods of time, and therefore only possible upon a retrospect of past ages. Writers of this class, having no value as witnesses or original reporters of events, seem peculiarly required to comment upon the transactions 154 ON THE UTILITY AND [CH. which they describe ; and being, as judges, exempt from the passions and interests of contemporaries, and neces- sarily free from all personal bias, their comments ought, on this account, to be the more enlightened and im- partial. For success in this difficult and important department of history, a writer ought to possess qualifications similar to those indicated above with respect to science; he ought to have studied the subject with attention for a considerable time; he ought to have ability sufficient to master it, and also an honest desire of arriving at the truth, and not perverting the evidence to suit his own interests or inclinations. Looking to the unsettled state of many portions of the moral and political sciences, and to the unpractical nature of the reveries in which speculators on an ideal com- monwealth have indulged, it is natural that writers of history should be the chief guides of opinion on questions of government. As the historian's subject keeps him in perpetual contact with facts, his general conclusions always possess some value, and represent some fraction of truth, even when they are founded on an imperfect induction, or derived from a mass of contemporary facts not sufficiently dissected and decomposed. Besides, if the facts are fully and faithfully stated, his conclusions may be corrected and limited by his premises, which is never the case where the forms of an ideal state are constructed out of first principles, according to what Mr. Mill has styled the Geometrical Method of Political Reasoning. The increased tendency of modern times to historical studies, to the collection of a well-ascertained body of facts respecting the successive states of a civil community, and to their philosophical appreciation, as illustrating the progress of society, corresponds with the V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 155 tendency to careful observation and induction in the physical sciences.* Hence, with the exception of the writers on the law of nations, on positive law, and on political economy, historians are now the great teachers of political wisdom — of civilis sciential And it is only by a close examination of the results obtained by trust- worthy and enlightened historians, and by a careful generalization from them, assigning each effect to its proper cause, that Political Philosophy can ever be placed on a sound basis. * See the just remarks of M. Comte, Cours de Phil. Pos. torn. iv. p. 284, upon the benefits to be anticipated from the historical ten- dency of the present age. t The following remarks of Bacon illustrate the applicability of history to practical politics: — " The form of writing which of all others is fittest for this variable argument of negotiation and occa- sion, is that which Machiavel chose wisely and aptly for govern- ment — namely, discourse upon histories or examples ; for knowledge drawn freshly, and in our view, out of particulars, knoweth the way best to particulars again; and it hath much greater life for practice when the discourse attendeth upon the example, than when the example attendeth upon the discourse. For this is no point of order, as it seemeth at first, but of substance; for when the example is the ground, being set down in a history at large, it is set down with all circumstances, which may sometimes control the discourse thereupon made, and sometimes supply it as a very pattern for action ; whereas the examples alleged for the discourse's sake are cited succinctly, and without particularity, and carry a servile aspect toward the discourse which they are brought in to make good." — Adv. of Learning, vol. ii. p. 266. Legal precedents, in like manner, are of little value, unless the case cited has been re- ported fully, so that it can be seen whether the rule of law, said to have been laid down, was necessarily involved in the decision of the case. 156 ON THE UTILITY AND [CH. Note to Chapter V. Note A. (p. 144.) Some of the numerous guesses of diviners have, as is not wonderful, hit the truth with great exactness. Thus John Cario, the astro- loger of Joachim I., elector of Brandenburg, published in the year 1 522 a Prognostication constructed according to the rules of the art, in which he predicted a destructive inundation, famine, pestilence, and civil and ecclesiastical troubles, for the year 1524,* and the birth of Antichrist for the year 1693. But the year 1789 was to be the most terrible of all. In this year, there were to be great and marvellous events, changes, and catastrophes. Adelung, who re- ports this prediction in a volume published in 1787, does not doubt that the astrologer will prove to be as much mistaken with respect to the year 1789, as he had already proved to be with respect to the year 1693. — Geschichte der Narrheit, vol. iii. p. 118. There is likewise a curious prediction of the extinction of the independence of Venice, in the Satire of Luigi Alamanni, an Italian poet, who died about the middle of the sixteenth century, and whose poems were published at Lyons in 1532-3. In Satira xii. is the following address to Venice : — Se non cangi pensier, Tun secol solo Non contera sopra'l millesimo anno Tua liberta, che va fuggendo a volo. Gringuene, who first called attention to this passage, (Hist. Litte- raire d'ltalie, torn. ix. p. 144, ed. 2,) remarks, that the election of the first doge falls in 697; and that if to this epoch we add 1100 years, we obtain the year 1797, which is the precise year next after that in which Venice ceased to be independent. Few predictions, however, were so lucky as those of Cario for the year 1789, and of Alamanni for the year 1796; and, accordingly, it was in general necessary to alter them after the event, in order to * It seems that the astrologers had predicted the destruction of the world by inundation in 1524, and that some persons had pro- vided themselves with ships in order to be prepared against the calamity. — Bodin. de Rep. IV. c. ii. V.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 157 produce a close agreement between the prediction and the thing foretold. Thus in the Quatrains of Nostradamus, first published in 1555, there was the following stanza: — Gand et Bruxelles marcheront contre Anvers, Senat de Londres mettront a mort leur roy: Le sel et vin luy seront a l'envers, Pour eux avoir le regne en desarroy. After the execution of Charles L, this passage of Nostradamus was applied in France to the striking event, and it was long con- sidered by his admirers as a strong proof of his prophetic power. Adelung, however, considers the supposed prophecy as taking its origin in the troubles in Flanders, which were contemporary with its composition; and he refers " leur roy" to the Flemish cities, not to the senate of London. He understands Nostradamus to have meant, that the English government would put to death some sup- posed King of Flanders. — Ut sup. vol. vii. p. 133. Another more remarkable example of the subsequent perversion of a prophecy, in order to adapt it to an important event, may be added: — A German writer, named Gaspar Brusch, published the following prophetic verses in the year 1553: — Post mille expletos a partu virginis annos, Et post quingentos rursus ab orbe datos, Octogesimus octavus mirabilis annus Ingruet: is secum tristia fata trahet. Si non hoc anno totus malus occidet orbis, Si non in nihilum terra fretumque ruent: Cuncta tamen mundi sursum ibunt atque deorsum Imperia, et luctus undique grandis erit. The most remarkable event of the year 1588 was the Spanish armada. The prediction was forgotten for two hundred years, and was reprinted in the Mercure de France in the middle of the last century, with the substitution of " septengintos" for " post quin- gentos," in v. 2, and a story about its having been found in the tomb of Regiomontanus, at Liska, in Hungary. Since the French revolution — which recalled attention to the supposed prophecy — the true origin of the verses, and the nature of the fraud, have been pointed out. — Biog. Univ. in Brusch. It is singular that, by some similar adaptation, a Jacobite should not have applied it to the Eng- lish revolution of 1688. Compare the remarks of Mr. Grote, Hist. 158 UTILITY AND PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. [CH. of Gr. vol. vi. p. 214, upon the flexibility of the Greek prophecies, and the manner in which they were moulded to suit any striking occurrence. We must not, however, suppose that all astrological diviners were conscious impostors, and intentionally fabricated their predictions in such a manner as to admit of no certain interpretation. Many, or perhaps most, of them doubtless believed, to a certain extent, in the reality of the art which they practised. Thus Andrew Goldmayer, who was offered the professorship of mathematics at Strasburg in the year 1635, composed a chronicle of that city upon astrological princi- ples. He complained that ordinary historians paid no attention to the state of the stars, in connexion with the events which they narrated; whereas these events could not be understood without their causes, and their causes could only be explained by astrology. He began, therefore, to compose, not only a history of Strasburg, but also a universal history, according to this method, and believed that he would thus throw great light both upon astrology and history. For this purpose, he extracted the chief events out of chronicles; he calculated the position of the stars backwards, and believed himself, by this process, to have discovered the true cause of every im- portant event. — Adelung, ut sup. vol. iv. p. 215. The process here described is a scientific process, and was an attempt to found judicial astrology upon inductive reasoning. It therefore proves the good faith of the astrologer. Compare also Kepler's astro- logical doctrine in Bethune's Life of Kepler, c. vii. ; and the opinions of Bodinus de Rep. IV. c. 2. VI.] NUMBER OF THE PERSONS, ETC. 159 CHAPTER VI. ON THE NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT, AS COMPARED WITH THE NUMBER OF THE REST OF THE COMMUNITY. § 1. It has been shown, in the preceding pages, that the men of special information and experience, combined with the proper moral and intellectual qualifications, are the competent judges on each branch of knowledge, and therefore the legitimate guides of opinion. Now if we take each subject, whether of speculation or practice, in succession, these persons must always be a small section of the community ; in fact, a mere handful, as compared with the entire population. In sciences and arts, the persons versed in those particular departments of know- ledge, — in history, historians; in general literature, literary men and poets; in practical questions of law, medicine, architecture, navigation, &c, the men of the respective professions — who form respectively the standard and canon of authority, are but few in number, if set against the body of their fellow-countrymen. Moreover, even with respect to each of these classes, it is prin- cipally the ablest, the most learned, the most experienced, the most skilful, whose opinion constitutes authority. So long as we admit the maxim, " Unicuique in sua arte credendum," the class or body of persons competent to judge in each matter must be numerically insignificant in comparison with the whole people. If we divide the nation into two parts-^-one consisting of a profession, or 160 NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT [CH. body of persons specially conversant with a particular subject, the other consisting of the rest of the popula- tion, the numbers of the latter portion will immensely preponderate : The few, by nature formed, with learning fraught, Born to instruct, as others to be taught. § 2. In each subject, therefore, the opinion of the great bulk of the people is, taken as a standard of truth and rectitude, unworthy of consideration, and destitute of weight and authority. It is the opinion of uninformed and inexperienced persons, whose incapacity to judge is not cured by the multiplication of their numbers. The mere aggregation of incompetent judges will not produce a right judgment, more than the aggregation of per- sons who have no knowledge of a matter of fact, will supply credible testimony to its existence.* This is equally the case, whether the multitude agree in opinion with the few competent judges, or disagree with them. If they agree, the opinion of the unscientific or un- professional many, whether right or wrong, can scarcely fail to be derived, more or less remotely, from that of a few persons either being, or considered to be, competent judges. Now, whether the opinion be sound or unsound, it is in general derived without any adequate process of examination or verification, and is held merely upon trust; so that the concurrence of the multitude adds little or no weight to the judgment of the former.f * " An quicquam stultius quam quos singulos (sicut operarios, barbarosque,) contemnas, eos esse aliquid putare universos?" — Cicero, Tusc. QucbsL V. 36. f " Les hommes, en general, approuvent ou condamnent au hasard, et la verite me me est, par la plupart d'entre eux, recue VI.] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT. 161 Thus, at present the Newtonian system of the world is accepted by the people at large, in all civilized countries, who therefore believe that the world moves round the sun. But they entertain this opinion merely on the authority of the agreement of scientific astronomers, and with no better knowledge of the grounds of their belief than their ancestors, who recognised the Ptolemaic system, and believed that the sun moves round the earth. On the other hand, the agreement between men of science and the multitude may exist in cases where the opinion is erroneous; and it may arise from the absence of original research and of an enlightened scepticism, from the passive retention of ancient errors and the blind adherence to traditionary prejudices. Of this state of things, the history of the physical sciences in antiquity and the middle ages affords numerous examples, which it would be useless to particularize, and many examples might be cited from the moral sciences at the present time. If they disagree, the preference is justly due to the opinion of the few competent judges, and the opinion of the uninformed and inexperienced multitude is inferior in authority to that of the select body. In cases where there is an agreement of opinion between the competent few and the incompetent many, the concurrence adds little or no weight to the opinion of the former. In cases where there is a conflict of opinion between the same two classes of persons, the preference must be given to the latter, as a measure of truth, and a canon for the judgments of others. So numerous are the cases in which the opinion comme Terreur, sans examen et par prejuge." — Helvetius de VHomme, sect. XI. ch. 8. M 162 NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT [CH. of the multitude conflicts with that of the few competent judges, that a majority of voices has, in questions not involving a legal decision, been considered as a mark of error. " Argumentum pessimi turba," says the Latin proverbial verse, cited by Seneca.* It has been said, not only that a majority of voices is no conclusive proof of rectitude, and that moral questions cannot be decided, like questions in a legislative assembly, by a division of * " Est turba semper argumentum pessimi." Publius Syrus, v. 190. That is to say, " the concurrence of the crowd is a proof of the worst side." Compare Seneca, De Vit. Beat, c. 1,2. " Sanabimur, si modo separemur a coetu: nunc vero stat contra rationem, defensor mali sui, populus. Itaque id evenit, quod in comitiis, in quibus eos factos prastores iidem qui fecere mirantur, quum se mobilis favor circumegit. Eadem probamus, eadem reprehendimus: hie exitus est omnis judicii, in quo secundum plures datur. Quum de beata vita agitur, non est quod mihi illud discessionum more respondeas: ' Hsec pars major esse videtur.' Ideo enim pejor est. Non tam bene cum humanis rebus agitur, ut meliora pluribus placeant: argumentum pessimi turba est." There is likewise a verse of the old tragedian, Attius : "Probis probatum potius quam multis fore." P. 201, ed. Bothe. Cicero gives the following description of the manner in which opinions were formed in his time: — " The seeds of virtues are (he says) planted by nature in our minds; but as soon as we are born, we are surrounded with false opinions, so that we almost imbibe error with our nurse's milk. As our education proceeds, we contract further errors from our parents and teachers, and we learn the fables of the poets, which take root in our mind: ' Cum vero accedit eodem quasi maximus quidam magister, populus, atque omnis undique ad vitia consentiens multitudo, turn plane inficimur opinionum pravitate, a naturaque desciscimus."' — Tusc. Qucest.lII. 1, 2. Compare a similar passage in De Off. I. 32. VI.] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT. 163 the ayes and noes — but that a person ought to be ashamed of finding his opinion or conduct approved by the mul- titude, and that the concurrence of the many raises a presumption of being in the wrong.* " Pessimum omnium est augurium (says Lord Bacon) quod ex con- sensu capitur in rebus intellect ualib us : exceptis divinis et politicis, in quibus suffragiorum jus est. Nihil enim multis placet, nisi imaginationem feriat, aut intellectum * Plutarch relates a celebrated saying of Phocion, who, on receiving the applause of the people for a speech which he had made in the Athenian assembly, turned round to his friends, and expressed his fear that he had said something which he ought not to have said. — {Phocion, c. 8.) Speaking of the Optimates, or aristocratic party in the Roman State, about the time of the Gracchi, Cicero says : " Qui autem adversabantur ei generi [to the popular party], graves et magni homines habebantur: sed valebant in senatu multum, apud bonos viros plurimum; multitudini jucundi non erant : suffragiis offende- batur ssepe eorum voluntas : plausum vero etiamsi quis eorum ali- quando acceperat, ne quid peccasset, pertimescebat. Attamen, si qua res erat major, idem ille populus horum auctoritate maxime commovebatur." — Pro Sextio, c. 49. Plutarch, De Lib. Educ. c. 9, advises that youths should not be allowed to listen to popular speeches or discourses at the public festivals: to yup rdlg koWoTq apiffKeiv, roig aoV ol yap 7to\\ol nvpiol elcriv, ov^ tbg etcaoTog, aWh irdvreg. He then goes on to observe that, when Homer speaks of TroXvKoipavir] being a bad thing, it is uncertain whether he means this sort of plurality of rulers, or where there are several rulers acting singly. It may seem presumptuous to decide a question of this sort, which Aristotle left in uncertainty ; but I can hardly doubt Homer's meaning to have been, that there should not be several kings acting independently of each other, especially as commanding in war. His poems contain no trace of a political body, (see Odyssey, VIII. 390, on the Phasacian kings,) nor do they mention voting. As the Athenian courts de- cided by a majority in later times, JEschylus supposes the Areo- pagus to have voted on the trial of Orestes, (Eumen. 748-53;) R 2 244 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. thus carrying back this comparatively recent principle to the heroic age. Other cases of a similar prochronism occur. Thus, Ephorus (ap. Strab. IX. 2, § 4) tells a mythical story relating to Dodona, in which a vote of a judicial court, consisting of three men and three women, is introduced. Again, Myseelus of Argos, the founder of Crotona, is said to have been condemned to death, by the unanimous votes of the judges, for the crime of preparing to leave his native city. Hercules changed the colour of the pebbles from black to white, and thus saved the culprit. — Ovid, Met. XV. 19—48: Mos erat antiquus, niveis atrisque lapillis, His damnare reos, illis absolvere culpa. Where there was a board consisting of several functionaries, the ancient practice probably was, that the powers were divided among them, and that each exercised certain functions separately, as in the case of the Athenian archons. Aristotle lays it down generally, that the principle of decision by a majority applies to all republics, whether oligarchies or demo- cracies: to cTon av doty tolq irXelocnv, kv ndaaig v7rap^£L' Kal yap kv oXiyapyia Kal kv apiaroKparia Kal kv dfjfjoig, uri av doty rw ttKeiovl fiiptL tuiv jj,ere)(6vT(t)v rfjg 7roXiTEiag, tovt karc Kvpiov. IV. 8, cf. IV. 4. teat yap kv Talg oXiyapyiaig Kal Travraypv to kXeov pipog Kvpiov. Also, VI. 2. For an example of this principle in a treaty between independent states, see Thucyd. v. 30 : eiprjuivov Kvptov elvai ort av to TrXrjQog twv cvfxiJidxuv i^^' 0,7 ? 7 " 01 ^ Compare Grotius, de J. B. et P. II. 5, § 17; III. 20, § 4, with Barbeyrac's notes. Before the battle of Marathon, the ten strategi were equally divided in opinion. The polemarch archon (who, Herodotus says, had from early times an equal vote with the generals) gave his vote in favour of fighting, and decided the question, upon which the minority acquiesced. — (Herod. VI. 109.) This is the earliest decision by a majority of votes recorded in authentic history. We know from Thucydides, that the Spartan kings had not each a double vote in the Council of Thirty, though such was the popular belief throughout Greece in his time. — I. 20. The five Spartan ephors decided by a majority of votes: hence, if three agreed, the consent of the board was obtained. — Xen. Hellen. II. 4, § 29. The Greeks voted openly, by holding up the hand; and in the Spartan assembly, by shouting. For secret voting, pebbles, pots- herds, and sometimes leaves, were used. VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 245 Note C. (page 196.) In a German tribe, (according to Tacit. Germ. c. 11,) during peace, the supreme decision of its affairs was vested in a general assembly of the fighting men, the subjects having previously been considered in a smaller council of the chiefs. One of the chiefs addressed the general assembly, which expressed its opinion, not by a regular vote, but by a murmur, or a clashing of arms: the former, in token of disapprobation — the latter, of approbation. This state of things corresponds with the second form of the Greek eccl^ia, after it had passed out of the Homeric stage, and had acquired a supreme, though not strictly defined power. It closely resembles the Spartan ecclesia, as described by Thucydides, in which the magistrates alone spoke, and which expressed its decision by shouting, and not by a division with counted votes. (kqIvovoi fiorj iced ov \pr/(p(o. — Thuc. I. 87. See Miiller, Dor. III. 5, §§ 9, 10.) In the case referred to, the ephor, not satisfied with this rude method of voting, required the ayes and the noes to stand apart, in order that their respective numbers might be seen. As to the German concilia, see Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. I. pp. 290-1; Ukert, Geogr. III. 1, p. 231; Grimm, D. R. p. 244; Mannert, Geschichte der alien Deutschen, vol. I. p. 62, who says that counting votes would have been too tedious a process; and observes that, in the Hungarian Diet, the ancient mode of voting was still retained. As to the national assemblies of the early German empire, Eichhorn, D. R. und R. Geschichte, vol. I. §§ 137, 161, 220. There was likewise an assembly or concilium in the tribes of Gaul in Caesar's time, as well as a senate. — B. G. VI. 20, 23; Ukert, Geogr. II. 2, pp. 248, 250, 255. Concilia of the Cisalpine Gauls are also mentioned, Livy, XXL 20. A congress of Gallic deputies was held at Bibracte, at which. Vercingetorix was chosen commander by a majority of voices. — Caesar, B. G. VII. 63. " Multitudinis suffragiis res permittitur." It is not unlikely that the practice of a regular vote may have been learned by the Gaulish tribes from their intercourse with the Greek and Roman republics in their vicinity. Thus, the Gauls borrowed from the Massiliots the important invention of alphabetical writing, and used Greek letters both for public and private purposes. — B. G. VI. 14. 246 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. Note D. (page 197.) One important incident of a political body is, that it is pre- served, by the perpetual substitution of new members in the vacancies as they occur, against the effects of natural death, and is kept in constant existence. Hence, there is no ground for holding that its acts have only a temporary force, or that treaties and other engagements made with it are not perpetual. (See Grot, de J. B. et P. II. 9, § 3.) There may, indeed, be a continual succession of single persons, and each newly-substituted individual may regard himself only as a link in a chain, and may be bound by the acts of his predecessors. But the doctrine of the English law respecting a corporation sole is only suited to a refined state of society, and in the succession of individual rulers the tendency in rude times has been to a different doctrine. In the Oriental governments, the acts of a sovereign or minister are almost invariably set aside by a successor when it suits his purpose; and the doctrine of mere personal responsibility in political matters is, in Asia, fully established. A similar doctrine obtained to some extent among the Greeks and Romans, particu- larly in the case of absolute princes, whose acts were generally set aside when they were killed or dethroned. (Cic. ad Att. XIV. 6, 9.14.) It is well known, that, in our early history, important laws made by one king were often expressly renewed by his suc- cessors. So treaties made with kings have been frequently disavowed by their successors, on the ground that the engagement was merely personal.— See Grot, de J. B. et. P. II. 16, § 16; Vatel, §§ 183-97. The principle of fieri non debuit, factum valet, is of great im- portance in politics. When once a government has been established, its acts are legal, however unjust or inexpedient; and although it may be displaced by a violent revolution, or other sudden change, it is desirable that its acts should be recognised, and be only altered, when necessary, by legislative amendment. Note E. (page 211.) The reason for the rule of decision by a majority is thus given by Grotius : " Omnino ea credenda est fuisse voluntas in societatem coeuntium, ut ratio aliqua esset expediendi negotia : est autem VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 247 manifeste iniquum, ut pars major sequatur minorem : quare natu- raliter, et seclusis pactis ac legibus quae formam tractandis negotiis imponunt, pars major jus habet integri." — De J. B. et P. II. 5, § 17. This explanation amounts merely to saying, that it is natural and equitable that the vote of the majority should prevail over that of the minority. Dr. Rutherforth is more explicit on the subject : " The next question will be, whether it is more reason- able and more equitable that the minority should be bound by the act of the majority, or the contrary? The answer to this question is obvious. It is plainly most consistent with reason, that the sentiments of the majority should prevail and conclude the whole; because it is not so likely that a greater number of men should be mistaken, when they concur in their judgment, as that a smaller number should be mistaken. And this is likewise most consistent with equity; because, in general, the greater number have a pro- portionally greater interest that the purposes of the society should succeed well, and have more at stake if those purposes should mis- carry or be disappointed." — Institutes of Nat. Law, II. 1, § 1. Of the two propositions here laid down by Dr. Rutherforth, the first is decidedly false. It cannot be affirmed generally, either that a larger number of men is less likely to be mistaken than a smaller number, or that a smaller number is less likely to be mistaken than a larger number. The second proposition, with respect to the interest of the majority, is subject to the deduction, that by interest must be understood their true interest, as determined by competent judges, and not their interest as conceived by themselves. The truth is, that no explanation can be given of this rule, except that it is resorted to as the only possible expedient. The problem is well solved by Puffendorf, whose remarks exhaust the question: — " Dans toutes les assemblies, ce qui a passe a la pluralite de voix est regarde comme l'avis de chacun des membres; non que cela soit necessaire en vertu du droit naturel, mais parcequ'il n'y a presque point d'autre expedient pour terminer les affaires, et pour prendre quelques mesures: quoique par la il arrive quelquefois, que le sentiment le plus honnete et le plus avantageux a l'Etat est rejete. Comme les affaires humaines sont souvent fort diversifies et fort embrouillees, et que dans ces sortes d'assemblees etablies pour en decider, il n'est pas possible de trouver quelque voie qui soit sans aucun inconvenient, il faut prendre le parti, ou il y en a le moins, et qui est d'ordinaire le plus avantageux. C'est done en vain qu'on objecte qu'il repugne a, la nature, que l'avis des moins 248 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE, ETC. [CH. sage prevaille sur celui des plus sages, parceque ceux-ci se trouvent en plus petit nombre, et que les premiers meme puissent obliger les autres a faire, contre leur propre sentiment, quelque chose de mal concerte. J'avoue qu'en matiere de verites speculatives il faut peser les voix, et non pas les compter; et que souvent meme Tap- probation de la multitude est regardee avec raison comme une marque d'erreur. Mais on ne sauroit appliquer cette maxime a la decision des affaires, qui sont entre les mains d'une assemblee, dont les membres ont tous un droit egal. En effet, qui decidera laquelle des deux opinions est la plus conforme aux regies de la prudence? Ce ne seront pas les parties memes: car aucune ne voudra rece- voir l'autre pour juge en sa propre cause. Et y a-t-il quelcun qui ne se croie pas plus eclaire et plus habile que les autres? ... II n'y a guere moyen non plus de s'en remettre au jugement d'un tiers: car on peut aisement con tester sur l'habilete ou sur 1'integrite de l'arbitre; et alors voila une nouvelle dispute, pour la decision de laquelle il faudroit un autre arbitre, et ainsi de suite." — Droit de la Nature et des Gens, trad, de Barbeyrac, VII. 2, § 15. See also Grot, de Imp. Summ. Pot. circa Sacra, cap. 4, § 6; Bayle, (Euvres, torn. III. p. 194. VIII.] RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE, ETC. 249 CHAPTER VIII. ON THE RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY TO THE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE, A TIVE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. THE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE, AND TO THE REPRESENTA- § 1. In the preceding chapter, we have considered the bearing of the principle of authority upon the action of a political body, and have shown how its mode of deci- sion, though contravening that principle formally, is, in practice, brought more or less into conformity with it, and that the legal method of counting the votes is coun- teracted by many moral influences. It is proposed now to pursue the same subject further, and to inquire how far this principle serves as a basis for other political arrangements — and whether a similar conflict of forces may not be discerned in other departments of civil government. The question as to the principle of special fitness, and its opposition to the principle of a simple arithmetical majority, is not confined to the action of political bodies, but it extends to some of the fundamental considerations affecting the structure and composition of a government, and the collocation of the sovereign power. In former chapters, we have contrasted the small number of the competent judges on each subject — the guides to opinion who constitute authority — with the large majority who are uninformed and inexperienced in the matter, and unfit to guide others by their judgment. Now, the opposition between these two classes has always 250 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. been recognised with respect to fitness for exercising the powers of government. The antithesis, in its various forms, more or less distinctly conceived, of — The few wise, and the many foolish; The few good, and the many bad; The few learned, and the many ignorant; The few philosophers, and the many anti-thinkers; The few competent, and the many incompetent; The few professional, and the many non-professional,* has been the foundation of all the arguments and in- stincts in favour of aristocratic as against democratic rule,f so far as they have not had an interested origin, and have not arisen from a desire of retaining political privileges for a class to which the individual himself belonged. On this principle, the words, ayaQol, apiGroi, KaXoi- KayaOoi, E7TI£ik:h£, caflAot, ao(j>oi 1 {SeXtigtoi, ^pr/oro/, 00711, optimi, optimates, were used by the Greeks and Romans to signify the governing few, while the majority, or mere people, were called kclkoi, ^owi/hm, &a\ot, mali cives, &c. By degrees, the former words lost their primitive moral acceptation, and came to signify merely the oligarchical class. J In like manner, the term apiaTOKparia^ which originally, as used by Plato and Aristotle, signified the government of the best citizens, has come to mean the * Or tdiajrcu, according to the Greek phrase. The word lay- man, Xdkug, though properly opposed to a clergyman, is in English sometimes used in the general sense of non-professional. f Compare Lord Brougham's chapter on the Natural Aristo- cracy. — Pol. Phil. vol. II. c. 4. t See Welcker's Pref. to Theognis, § 9—17; Grote, Hist, of Greece, vol. III. p. 62. Pindar, Pyth. II. 160, calls the Few (as distinguished both from the One and the Many) ol aocpoi. § See Mr. Stanley on dpLaroKparta, Classical Museum, vol. IV. p. 286. VIII.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 251 government of the Few, in a sense equivalent to oli- garchy. Expressions similar to those just mentioned occur in more modern times, as the German boni homines* and probi homines, or gude manner, the Italian buon- uomini, the French prudhommes, and the Witena-gemot of the Saxons, as applied to magistrates and governing persons. The councils of old men in antiquity, ((3ov\rj yepovrwv in Homer, the gerusia of Sparta, the senate of Eome,f ) and the seniors and aldermen of the Germanic nations,^ had likewise the same meaning; inasmuch as wisdom, the fruit of experience, was considered the attribute of old age, and the peculiar characteristic of aged councillors. On the other hand, many words which denoted originally a low class in society have, by a reverse process, acquired in modern times a moral signification ; thus villain, rogue, rascal, scoundrel, cattivo, chetif, and caitiff, from captivus, have been trans- ferred from baseness of social condition to baseness of conduct. It was upon the view just stated, that the opinions of the Socratic school of philosophers concerning govern- ment were mainly founded. They looked upon govern- ment as an art, which was to be exercised by the ablest and most virtuous men in the State for the general benefit, in the same manner that a ship was steered by * On the German boni homines, — Grimm D. Rechts alterthii- mer, p. 294. t BovXr) yepovTwv among the Greeks, Iliad II. 53; among the Trojans, III. 149-52. Sallust, Bell. Cat. c. 6, says of the Roman senate : " Delecti, quibus corpus annis infirmum, ingenium sapi- entia validum erat, reipublicae consultabant. Hi vel setate vel curse similitudine Patres appellabantur. Compare Bodin. De Rep. III. c. 1. % See Grimm, ib. pp. 266, 268. 252 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. the best pilot for the sake of all the crew. Thus, Xeno- phon, in his tract upon the Athenian State, completely identifies the aristocratic and popular parties respec- tively with the good and bad in a moral sense : " In every country (he says) the best portion of the citizens is hostile to the democracy ; for among the best citizens there is the least dishonesty and irregularity of conduct, and the greatest strictness of principle, while among the people there is the greatest want of intelligence and of good conduct, and the least virtue. " # In another passage, he remarks that the people wish to be governed by a person of bad character and without education, but well-dis- posed to them, rather than by a person of good character and education, but hostile to them.f Elsewhere, he considers government in the light of a craft, for which nothing more than dexterity and management are requi- site. In the introduction to his Cyropcedia, he contrasts the proneness of men to revolt against their rulers with the obedience of horses to their grooms, and of cattle and sheep to their herdsmen ; whence he infers, that man is the most difficult of all animals to govern ; but, on considering the example of Cyrus, he thinks that the government of men is not an impossible, or even a difficult task, pro- vided it be performed with skill.% So Plato founded his aristocracy, or Perfect State, not on the family, or wealth, but on the intelligence of the ruling body.§ Aristotle says that " aristocracy is the government of the best men absolutely, tried by the standard of moral virtue, and not by some arbitrary standard of excellence." * De. Rep. Ath. c. 1. § 1-— 9, 14-15. See particularly § 5. t §7. J dv tlq l7TL(TTafxkvu>g tovto Trpaoay. I. 1, 3. § See Hitter, Gesch. der Phil. vol. II. pp. 444-6. VIII.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 253 {Pol. IV. 5.) " It is a government in which the magis- tracies are distributed according to virtue and moral worth" (III. 3). Xenophon and Aristotle agree in thinking that government is an art to be exercised by the best men in the State, for the benefit of the com- munity.* This view of the most perfect commonwealth prevailed generally among the ancient philosophers, of all sects. They agreed, almost universally, in holding that a State ought to be governed by the wisest and best citizens, selected from the entire body on account of those qualities. This opinion is shared by Cicero, and is expounded by him in his treatise De Republica. He shows, moreover, how this moral notion of government is obliterated in process of time. " As virtue (he says) is not only con- fined to a few, but can be recognised and discerned only by a few, the people begin to think that men of large possessions, as well as those of noble descent, are the best men. Accordingly, when, on account of this popular error, the wealth, not the virtue, of a few has come to govern the State, these great men continue to keep a firm hold on the name of Optimates, though they are devoid of the reality. For no form of government is worse than that in which the richest are considered the best" (I. 34). Nor does Cicero treat this as a mere speculative and ideal distinction, but he applies it in practice. In his oration Pro Sextio, in the celebrated passage on the opposition between the Optimates and Populares in the Roman State, in his own time, he rests the distinction mainly on moral grounds : " Those who said and did what they thought would be acceptable to the multitude were called Populares ; whereas they who * Xen. Mem. III. 2; Aristot. Pol. III. 4. 254 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. so conducted themselves that their advice received the approbation of all the best men, were called Opti mates. " He proceeds to say that the latter class are numerous, and are to be found in every rank of citizens, from the leaders of the senate to men residing in municipia and the country, traders, and even freedmen. He concludes by declaring, that although this class of persons is widely diffused through the community, their character may be summed up in this brief definition : " Omnes optimates sunt, qui neque nocentes sunt, nee natura improbi, nee furiosi, nee malis domesticis impediti," (c. 45.) Many writers who witnessed the working of the popular influence in the republics of antiquity, and in those of Italy during the Middle age, have expressed, in strong terms, their sense of the unfitness of the people for guiding and governing the State. They have dwelt upon its ignorance, its incapacity, its want of virtue and moral principle, its inexperience in public affairs, and its inability to form a sound judgment, or to devise useful measures in reference to them, its proneness to be acted upon by sudden passions, its turbulence, and its blind headlong violence, which hurries it forward like a winter torrent. It would be as reasonable, they say, to consult the multitude about the management of public affairs, as to expect sanity of mind from a madman. # More modern writers have (with Cicero) remarked that the word people may have a double signification : it may either signify the populace, or the multitude, as op- posed to the rich and great; or it may mean ordinary persons, as opposed to the wise, the able, and the vir- See Note A. at the end of the chapter. VIII.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 255 tuous; in which latter case it includes members of all classes in society, high as well as low.* In the free States of recent times, the direct action of the mass of the people upon the government has been moderated by the representative system, which has established an intermediate stage between the popular suffrage and the legislative measure. This circumstance, combined with the invention of printing, and the con- sequent diffusion of knowledge, has caused the democratic action to be regarded with less alarm. Nevertheless, a certain amount of intelligence and education has almost always been pointed out as a qualification for the exer- cise of the powers of government; and the existence of a franchise founded on property has been defended, in part, on the ground of its securing a requisite amount of education. This feeling in modern societies has likewise been sharpened by the fact, that the entire community consists of freemen, and that the working classes, forming the bulk of the poor population, are not slaves, as in the ancient republics. The alleged defect of capacity for government, and of a respect for order and the rights of property, in the multitude, has repeatedly been urged as a reason for excluding them from political power. § 2. The theory of government, which we have now described in general terms, proceeds on the assumption, that there is a complete analogy between the choice of * " Qui dit le peuple dit plus d'une chose; c'est une vaste expres- sion; et Ton s'etonneroit de voir ce qu'elle embrasse, et jusques ou elle s'etend; il y a le peuple qui est oppose aux grands — c'est la populace et la multitude : il y a le peuple qui est oppose aux sages, aux habiles, aux vertueux ; ce sont les grands comme les petits." — La Bruyere, Caracteres, c. 9. 256 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. governors and the choice of persons skilled in any pro- fession, art, or handicraft ; and that the choice of rulers can be made on the same principle as the choice of a lawyer, or physician, or skilled artificer. The analogy, however, fails in several essential points : — First : The province of government is so vast — it com- prehends so many, and such multifarious subjects, that it scarcely admits of any special training.* The very idea of a sovereign government is, that it can regulate all the concerns and interests of its subjects ; that its field of power is unlimited in the matters which it em- braces : " The union of several heads of families (says Grotius) into a Nation or State, gives to the body the greatest power over its members which it can possess — for it is the most perfect of societies ; and there is no external act of a man which does not, of itself, refer to that society, or which may not refer to it under certain circumstances." f There is no branch of human know- ledge, no art or applied science, which may not be put in requisition for the purposes of civil government. For this reason, (as has been already remarked,) no special or professional training can be devised which will fit a person for a civil governor, in the same manner as a person may be fitted for the profession of a lawyer, a physician, a soldier, or a clergyman. To a certain ex- tent, indeed, a person may qualify himself professionally for the career of a statesman. He may study political * See above, c. 7, § 15. Aristotle refers to an idea entertained by some that there is a training proper to a ruler; thus, he says, the sons of kings are taught the management of horses, and political knowledge; and he cites some lines of Euripides bearing on the subject. — Pol. III. 2. As to the inexpediency of the profession of politician, see Lord Brougham's Pol. Phil. vol. II. pp. 29 — 33. t B. J. et P. II. 5, § 23. VIII.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 257 science and political history — he may acquire some knowledge of general jurisprudence, and of the positive law of the country — he may, by experience, learn all the practical questions of the day — he may become con- versant with the forms of business, and the proceedings of parliamentary, judicial, and official bodies — he may study public opinion in its various manifestations — he may watch the character and feelings of the different classes and sections of the community — he may observe international relations, the changes and interests of foreign states, and the commerce of the world. It can scarcely be disputed that such a habit of mind as this will fit a person for the work of government better than an entire absence of such a direction of the thoughts. Sach qualifications are, however, to a certain extent, possessed or claimed by almost every educated man, and every reader of a newspaper ; and it is difficult to judge as to their comparative degree.* It is true that there may be a special training for persons employed in subordinate executive offices under a government — as judges, soldiers, sailors, &c. Each one of these may qualify himself, by study and expe- rience, for a definite and limited department of public business ; and he may continue to discharge his functions, * Aristotle remarks that to perceive a political evil in its germ, before it has become considerable, requires a statesman, and is beyond the reach of an ordinary man : to kv apxfj yivofitvov kukov yvuivai oh rov Tvyovroc, aXkh. isokiriKov dvdpog — Pol. V. 8. Mr. Henry Taylor's able work, entitled the Statesman, is in fact a collection of practical maxims with respect to the transaction of official business, and the conduct of a public man in office ; very valu- able and instructive, as being the result of long, intelligent obser- vation; but it is confined within these limits. — See Note B. at the end of the chapter. S 258 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [CH. undisturbed by the changes which affect the persons composing the supreme legislative body. But the diffi- culty stated above arises, because the supreme govern- ment of a country has no limited department, (like a subordinate executive functionary,) but has a sphere of action perfectly indefinite. Secondly : in cases where we consult a professional person, or peritus, on a question relating to his own art, we invest him with no power over ourselves. We ask his advice upon a matter awaiting our decision, and if we think fit we abide by that advice. The physician pre- scribes a certain regimen of health, and we follow his prescription ; a lawyer advises us to bring an action, in order to establish or defend a right, and we commence legal proceedings accordingly. But in both cases the decision is our own; we act voluntarily, although we may follow the advice blindly, and without understand- ing its grounds. In the choice of our rulers, however, the case is widely different. By appointing persons to exercise the sovereign government of the country, we give them an absolute, unlimited, and irresponsible power over us, so far as legal securities are concerned. How- ever extensive may be their knowledge of politics, and however good their private character and morals, they cannot be treated as mere artists in government ; the temptation to the abuse of their power, for their own benefit and that of their own class, cannot be altogether overlooked.* The Greek demagogues, who acquired poli- tical power by defending the people against the oli- garchical party, and afterwards abused the confidence thus obtained by investing themselves with despotic power, were doubtless, in many cases, originally men of See Note C. at the end of the chapter. VIII.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 259 patriotic sentiments, who yielded to the temptations of their position. # If it were true (as several speculators on politics have thought) that, by some contrivance of constitutional checks, and balance of powers, the supreme government of a country can be legally limited, this objection might, to a certain extent, be got over. The liability to abuse might be repressed by the system of checks ; and the ruler might be chosen merely for his skill and dexterity, as we choose the pilot of a ship. But unfortunately all these speculations are vain — there is no power to which a sovereign government is legally subject; it is only controlled by moral influences, and the force of public opinion. f Thirdly : it must be borne in mind that, even in cases where persons are disposed to select their governors on the principle in question, their choice is generally limited by considerations of political party. They may be will- ing to select their own party leaders, or persons recom- mended by their party leaders, or belonging to their own party — but they will not raise to power persons who are connected with a political party opposed to their own. Fourthly : it must not be overlooked that, in questions of government, it is often important to conciliate sup- port to public measures, by giving to persons a voice in the decision, and by interesting them in the proper *. See Herod. III. 82; Grote, Hist, of Gr. vol. Ill, pp. 2.5, 29; eomp. Aristot. Pol. VI. 1 : aei yap Zwrovai to \aov /ecu to Bikcuov oi ijTTOVQ, ol Ze. tcpaTOVVTSQ older 9eei ts sfX7rev av9pdJ7T(t)v tpavXov. More. avaytcaZov Gvuflaivetv 07np IgtIv w^sXi- pijjTaTov sv Tctig icoXiTtiaig, dpx^v tovq sinsiKug dva/xapTrjTovg ovrag, fxrjdev sXaTTovfikvov tov irXrjOovg. In another place, the same philosopher points out the fallacious- ness of an argument, founded on the supposed analogy between government and arts. It had been alleged, as an argument in favour of an arbitrary king, as opposed to a government according to laws, that a physician ought not to be bound by written rules, but should be left to his own discretion. To which Aristotle answers, that physicians gain their pay for curing a sick man, and have no motive of favour to deprave their judgment; but that persons in- vested with political power do many things from grounds of affec- tion or dislike. Even physicians, he says, when sick, call in other physicians, and trainers for the games employ other trainers, as distrusting their own judgment about themselves. — (Pol. III. 11.) Note D. (page 262.) The principle of numerical equality in government, as the cha- racteristic of democracy, is clearly opposed to the principle of special worth or fitness by Aristotle, in the following passage: — to diicaiov to SrjfioTiKOV to 'Lvov e%siv £gtI /car' dpiOfibv, dXXd firj /car' d%iav' tovtov d' ovtoq tov SiKCtiov, to irXrjOog dvayKaiov ilvai Kvpiov, Kal on av do%y toTq ttXhogi toii^ dvai Kal tsXoq, Kal tovt slvai to diKaiov acl yap SeXv laov lytw Uaorov tS>v ttoXit&v. Pol. VI. 1 ; and lower down he says, that to diKaiov to dt]fiOKpaTiKov is to loov f% £lv a-rravTaq fear' dpi9fiov. 286 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. CHAPTER IX. ON THE PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. § 1. New opinions, founded on a legitimate process of observation and inference, are generally worked out in solitude by persons of studious and reflective habits ; and they are, when once accredited and established among men of science, expounded, illustrated, and dif- fused, by popular writers. The two provinces of dis- covery and diffusion are usually divided; for the power of original thought, and the power of perspicuous ele- mentary exposition, are often not combined in the same mind. Eespecting opinions so formed and so propagated, no general proposition can be laid down. Their character as to soundness will depend on the peculiarities of the several persons with whom they originate ; and the re- ception which they meet with from the public will be determined by its capacity to form a judgment on the matter. For example : the existence of a man with such mighty powers of discovery and demonstration as New- ton, and the recognition of his doctrines among his con- temporaries, depend upon causes which do not admit of being generalized. The same remark applies to indivi- dual writers belonging to professions, or specially con- versant with any subject, who treat the question with the authority derived from their own appropriate know- ledge and fitness. IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 287 In this chapter, it is proposed to consider what are the chief permanent influences, in a modern civilized country, for the authentication of opinions; from what authoritative sources opinions are chiefly diffused; and what securities exist for rendering those guides of general opinion trustworthy. It may be observed, how- ever, that in treating this question, it is difficult always to distinguish the diffusion of opinions by authority, from their diffusion by argument; for that which is argument to one man, is often authority to another. A reasoned proof of a certain position is put forward in writing, or in oral discourse; one person may be con- vinced by the reasoning, while another, who has not followed, or perhaps even become aware of the argument, adopts the conclusion, because he has confidence in its promulgator. All opinions are diffused by a mixture of self-conviction and authority : B believes a general truth, because A has proved it ; and C believes it like- wise, because B is satisfied with the proof. Thus, in a battle, when one part of an army has yielded before an overwhelming attack, the other parts retreat — not be- cause they are attacked, but because the remainder has been repulsed. Independently of single writers (who cannot be brought under any general description,) the principal agents in the authorization and diffusion of opinions may be classed under the four following heads : — I. The supreme civil government of a country, and the persons exercising public functions under it. II. The heads of an established church, and of other churches or religious bodies. III. Subordinate associations for political, scientific, literary, and other miscellaneous purposes, including universities and places of learning. 288 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. IV. The periodical press: daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly. We will now attempt to ascertain how far each of the influences in question operates, and to what extent its operation is beneficial, or otherwise, for the purpose under consideration. § 2. I. Before we can examine the influence of a government in authorizing and propagating opinions, we have first to consider the preliminary question — how far is it the duty of a government to diffuse and encourage truth, and to repress and discourage error? This ques- tion divides itself into two branches, — viz., the encou- ragement or discouragement of opinions on religion, and the encouragement or discouragement of opinions on secular subjects. In one sense, the province of a government is un- limited. There is no subject within the circle of human affairs and interests which it does not comprehend. The State is called omnipotent — that is to say, it can exercise for any purpose, and to any extent, the powers which are at its command. But although its province is theo- retically unlimited, and its powers theoretically un- bounded, there are in practice limits, not only to its powers, but to the purposes to which these powers can be applied with propriety and advantage. There is no subject with which it cannot legally interfere ; but there are many subjects with which it cannot fitly interfere. Now, when we speak of the duty of the State to inter- fere with any matter, there is no other criterion for trying this duty than the fitness of the interference. If the interference is likely to be attended with advantage to the community — if the end to which it is directed be good, and it be likely to promote that end, then the duty of the State is to interfere. But if, although the end IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 289 is admitted to be good, the interference of the State is not likely to promote its accomplishment, and may even tend, on the whole, to counteract it, then it is not the duty of the State to interfere. For example, it may be conceded to be a desirable object that the maritime slave- trade should be suppressed all over the world. But whether it be the duty of any particular State to take active steps for the suppression of that trade, is a ques- tion which depends on the probable success which would attend the attempts made for this purpose, and their general result. The question as to the duty of the State, with respect to the encouragement of truth and the discouragement of error, must be decided on these grounds. Everybody admits that (provided his own standard of judgment be adopted) it is right and fitting to encourage truth and discourage error. About the desirableness of the end there is an universal agreement. That the promotion of this end lies, theoretically and legally, within the pro- vince of the State — that a government possesses powers which can be directed towards this object — is certain. It follows that, if the attempt is likely to be attended with success, and to be, on the whole, advantageous to the community, it ought to be made ;* but that, if the attempt * Burlamaqui, Principles of Nat. and Pol. Law, part III. c. 2, lays it down, that as men's opinions influence their conduct, and thus strongly contribute to the good or evil of the State, it is the duty of the sovereign to neglect nothing that can contribute to the education of youth, to the advancement of the sciences, and to the progress of truth. Further, he assigns to the sovereign a right of judging of the doctrines publicly taught, and of proscribing all those which may be opposite to the public good and tranquillity. Hence he infers, that it belongs to the sovereign alone to establish academies and public schools of all kinds, and to authorize the U 290 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. is likely to fail, and the cause of truth is not likely to be promoted by it, the State ought not to interfere. The question, therefore, which we have to consider is, whether the State is likely to succeed in promoting truth and repressing error. In order to arrive at a solution of this problem, we will confine ourselves, first, to the influence of the State with respect to religious truth — that portion of the subject upon which the greatest discrepancy of opinion prevails. § 3. In considering this question, we may limit our- selves to Christianity — the religion of the civilized world ; and we may begin by observing, that the govern- ment of every civilized community may be expected to protect the ministers and congregations of all the reco- gnised Christian sects in the public exercise of their religion, and to confer on them all the rights necessary for this purpose. It will, likewise, impose penalties upon certain acts which are condemned by all the different forms of Christianity, such as blasphemy, and the viola- tion of the Lord's Day. An interference to this extent is implied in the general recognition of Christianity. In order, however, to ascertain how far the State is fit to perform the function of encouraging religious truth, and discouraging religious error, we must confine our view to the distinctive marks of the several Christian confessions ; and by religious truth and error, we must understand the truth of the peculiar tenets of one sect as distinguished from the errors of another sect. Now respective professors; also to take care that nothing be taught in them, under any pretext, contrary to the fundamental maxims of natural law, or to the principles of religion or good politics — in a word, nothing capable of producing impressions prejudicial to the happiness of the State. IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 291 the fitness of the State for the performance of this func- tion depends upon the efficacy of the means at its com- mand, applicable to the purpose. These means may be reduced to the five following heads : — 1. Punishment for religious error. 2. Keward for religious orthodoxy. 3. Endowment of clergy and of public worship. 4. Public instruction. 5. Censorship of the press.* Upon the efficacy of these means, or some of them, for the establishment of the true form of Christianity in a country, as opposed to erroneous, heterodox, and he- retical forms, the question before us turns. § 4. Until the age of the Reformation, the received doctrine in Christian Europe was, that the State was bound to treat religious error as a crime, to legislate pro * Mr. Gladstone gives the following enumeration of the modes in which it is possible for the State to lend aid to religion: — " 1. By the example of its profession and worship. " 2. By the adaptation of its laws to the rules of religion, wher- ever the same subject matter is within the view of both. " 3. By the constitutional recognition of a clerical estate as one of the great forces of society, and suitable provision for its action in that capacity. " 4. By supplying the temporal or pecuniary means for the pro- pagation of the national creed. "5. By repressive measures, such as the laws against blasphemy. " 6. By such general and indirect influences upon the quality of subjective religion, and upon the permanency or purity of sacred institutions, as result from a connexion between the Church and the State." — The State in its Relations with the Church, vol. I. ch. 4, § 65. The second, fifth, and sixth of these modes would be satisfied by a general recognition of Christianity, without giving a preference to any peculiar form of it. The first, third, and fourth, amount merely to the endowment of the clergy of a particular sect. u2 292 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. salute animce, and to punish heresy as it would punish homicide or theft. Every Christian State acted upon the received interpretation of the famous text, compelle en- trare* and drove into the fold of the Church all sheep which had either strayed, or belonged to any other shep- herd. Conformity, exile, or death, were the three alter- natives which it presented to the heterodox believer, owning its allegiance, and resident within its territory. That the system of enforcing religious truth by punishment — the system which its enemies call religious persecution — has been, to a great extent, successful, cannot be disputed. It is impossible to doubt that, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the protestant or reformed faith was greatly checked by the temporal power of the catholic governments. It was checked in two ways : by preventing its entrance into a country, (as in Italy and Spain,) and by expelling it from countries in which it had taken root, (as in Southern Germany, France, and Flanders. )f The transportation of the Moriscoes from Spain, the expulsion of the Jews from several countries, and the destruction of the Christians in Japan,J afford other examples of the success of forcible measures for the extirpation of a creed which the government deemed erroneous. The protestants, being in general the weaker party in the age of the reformation, and having set the example of * St. Luke, XIV. 23. See Bayle's Dissertation, (Euvres, torn. II. p. 357. Compare Mr. Gladstone, ib. vol. II. ch. 8, §§ 91-3, where the progress of legislation in Europe with respect to religion is accurately deduced. On the duty of a prince to punish heretics, see Bayle, ib. p. 416; and on the degrees of severity with which religious error was repressed, ib. p. 414. t See Ranke's Popes. % See Bayle, Diet. art. Japon, note E. IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 293 dissenting from the established faith protected by the State, were, both by their logical position and their interest, led to question the received doctrine as to the employment of force for the propagation of religious truth. Nevertheless, the ancient rule was upheld for a long time by protestant, as well as catholic governments ; and enlightened writers of protestant confessions called it in question with hesitation and fear. Thus, Jeremy Taylor, in his Liberty of Prophesying, (1647,) discusses the question, " Whether it be lawful for a prince to give toleration to several religions?" (sect. 16;) and Grotius, in his treatise De Jure Belli et Pads, (1625,) examines the similar question, " Whether it be permitted to make treaties and alliances with those who are not of the true religion," (II. 15, §§ 8 — 22.) It is remarkable, too, that, notwithstanding the complaints justly made by the presbyterians and puritans of England and Scotland, with respect to their treatment by the Established Church, they nevertheless, when they had the power, showed a similar disposition to enforce their own faith by penal sanctions.* By degrees, a different standard of duty, with respect to the enforcement of religious truth by penal sanctions, was established, and more tolerant notions as to freedom of conscience and discussion, in questions of religion, became prevalent. It was seen that religious error could * Concerning the general reception of the maxim, that Christian princes are bound to enforce religion by the civil sword, see Palmer on the Church, part. V. c. 5, who still upholds the maxim. Con- cerning persecution by Protestant princes, see Bayle, CEuvres, torn. II. pp. 411, 509, 554. And as to the general maintenance of this principle by the reformers, though with progressive remon- strances against it, see Hallam, Hist, of Lit. of Europe, vol. II. c. 1, §§ 29—32; vol. III. c. 2, §§ 50-2. 294 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. not be effectually suppressed by severity, inasmuch as that which one nation regarded as error, another regarded as truth, and no common effort of the European govern- ments would be made to put down or set up any one form of Christianity.* Moreover, the principle of leaving opinion free, where it does not tend to some act immediately and manifestly detrimental to society, has been gradually gaining strength since the sixteenth century, and has included religious opinions in its opera- tion. The attempt to propagate religious truth, and to crush religious error, by the criminal law and by penal inflictions, though it has, to a certain extent, met with a very decided success, is subject to strong counteract- ing forces. A man who attests the sincerity of his religious faith by the sacrifice of his life, or of his native country, his worldly possessions, and his means of gain- ing a subsistence, is respected for his fortitude, disinte- restedness, and honesty, even by those who do not share his opinions. He is not regarded as a common male- factor, whose overt acts have been dangerous and perni- cious to the security and peace of society, and have drawn down upon him the deserved punishment of the law. There is a sympathy with his sufferings, and a consciousness that the State, instead of gaining his con- viction by the legitimate weapons of persuasion and reason, has, being the stronger, used its strength for causing its own opinion to prevail. A man who, like Galileo, makes a feigned and insincere submission to the opinion of the supreme power, and reads his recanta- tion under duress, is scarcely considered a free agent, * This conviction, brought about by the long continued miseries and devastations of the thirty years' war, was finally embodied in the treaty of Westphalia. IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 295 and his conversion confers but little credit upon the coercing party.* Hence, the use of force to diffuse re- ligious opinions, by admitting the failure of reason in the individual case, has seemed to raise a presumption that reason was on the weaker side. True opinions in religion can, in the long run, only be propagated by reason, and that voluntary deference to authority which implies reason ; but false opinions in religion can be as well propagated by force as true ones. The sword, the stake, or the gibbet, are as good arguments in behalf of Mahometanism as of Christianity. In this way, the use of the civil power to repress religious error, has been ac- counted almost as an admission that the other side were in the right; martyrdom has been regarded as a sign of truth as well as of sincerity ; and the infant church has been said to have been watered by the blood of its martyrs. From the combination of these causes, the system of enforcing religious doctrines by the civil sword, has been condemned by the general opinion of the civilized countries of Europe, and penal sanctions are no longer extended to the profession of a creed not authorized by the State. Both the reason and feelings of mankind are outraged, by applying to the diffusion of truth means which are used reluctantly and sparingly even for the punishment of overt acts against society. Cum ventum ad verum est, sensus moresque repugnant, Atque ipsa utilitas, justi prope mater et sequi. The system of exterminating heresy by capital executions and wholesale deportation, may be considered as exploded in civilized Europe; but the discourage- * Upon the insincerity caused by religious persecution, see Bayle, ut sup. p. 399. 296 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. raent of religious error by civil disabilities — by exclusion from certain political rights — still maintains its ground in some cases. Deprivation of civil rights is a species of penal infliction, and has been so considered in all systems of criminal law. The objection to its use for the purpose of repressing religious error, though less in degree, is therefore the same in principle. § 5. Penal measures for enforcing religious truth are, from their nature, directed exclusively against those who are without the pale of the orthodox church; they are intended partly, by their direct operation, to reduce the obstinate heretic to a right course — and partly, by their example, to deter those who are "within the pale from straying out of it. Kemuneratory measures, on the other hand, tending in the same direction, leave the obstinate heretic in his error, but seek to allure the more flexible, or more interested, adherent of heterodoxy to the adoption of the true faith, by the attraction of temporal advantage. Such, for instance, would be pecuniary rewards to any member of an erroneous faith who adopted the orthodox faith ; or an offer of employ- ment in the public service on the same terms. Of this nature were some of the measures in the penal laws against the Irish catholics ; such as that which enabled a son who changed his creed to take possession of his father's property. Measures of this sort are, however, considered as a sort of seduction, or tampering with a man's conscience ; the witnesses to the truth so obtained are regarded as purchased by a species of subornation, and their testimony is not of much weight. As it has always been thought the part of a courageous and con- scientious man, not to surrender his religious opinions at the dictation of superior force, so it has always been considered disgraceful for a man to become an apostate IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 297 from his religion for pecuniary gain. Martyrdom for opinion's sake has ever been accounted honourable ; and proselytism effected by bribery is rarely eulogized, even by those who are members of the church into which the convert has been received. Hence the sense of honour, operating in a proscribed sect, holds its members together, and restrains them from swallowing the tempting baits held out to their cupidity by the State. The attempt to draw away persons from the camp of error by direct re- ward, and to induce them by a bounty to enlist under the banners of truth, obtains, therefore, only a limited and partial success. So far, however, as pecuniary tempta- tions connected with the transmission of property, and rewards offered by a government in the way of official emolument and public honours, exercise any proselytizing influence, the proselytes are chiefly to be found among the wealthier classes. If James II. had succeeded in giving the Roman-catholics of England a monopoly of all public employments and distinctions, he would doubtless have gained over many converts in the upper ranks of society ; but the body of the people (as in Ireland, under a similar system) would have retained their religious convictions unchanged. § 6. But, besides punishment and reward, the State can likewise employ Endowment as a means of encou- raging religious truth. The endowment of the clergy, the provision of funds for the building and maintenance of churches, or for the support of ecclesiastical seminaries, and other similar applications of the national property or income, may be considered as serving the double purpose of consolidating and confirming the religious community which is thus exclusively assisted by the State, and of attracting into it the members of the other unendowed churches. 298 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. That an ecclesiastical endowment will diffuse religious truth, where apathy and indifference on religious matters exist, and where religion is untaught because there is no provision for teaching it, cannot be doubted. Where the ground is unoccupied, the endowed teacher will step into possession, and cultivate his allotted district. If he be industrious and skilful, his seed, being thrown into a field ready to receive it, will take root, and spring up and bear fruit. But it will be otherwise if the ground be already occupied by others, who contest the possession with him. In this case, his seed will be scattered to the winds, and there will be little or no harvest to gather into his garner. When an endowed clergyman supplies a void which otherwise would remain unfilled — when he affords reli- gious instruction to persons who would otherwise be uninstructed — when he preaches religious doctrine to persons who would otherwise hear no religious doctrine, — his influence in the propagation of the opinions of his confession cannot fail to be felt, provided that he ad- dresses persons of the requisite amount of intelligence and information. But if he comes into conflict with unendowed clergymen — if he addresses persons who already receive religious instruction from others, whose minds are preoccupied with the doctrines of a different sect, and whose conscience is bound to the practice of other religious rites and observances — his influence becomes less important, and may perhaps be nearly im- perceptible. If religion was a subject on which all men were agreed, or if there was any one living authority on religious questions to which they were willing to defer — if religious opinions were not a matter of conscientious conviction, and maintained from a sense of moral obli- gation — if, when religious instruction and the means of IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 299 religious worship were provided gratuitously by the State, every person might be expected to use them, rather than incur the expense of providing them for himself — if people flocked to the lessons of the endowed clergyman, as they would flock to the distribution of relief by the State, or as the Romans went to the public games — if men looked upon religion as an article to be procured at the cheapest cost, and for which they would make no pecuniary sacrifice — then the influence of Endowment, in propagating the peculiar religious opi- nions of the endowed sect, would be decisive. But these necessary conditions for its success, as a means of gaining over converts from other confessions, are wanting ; and we accordingly find that it has failed, as an engine of proselytism. The most striking and decisive example is the case of the Irish Established Church — a complete system of exclusive endowment, founded on a territorial division of parishes, furnishing Protestant Episcopalian clergymen and churches, gratuitously, over the whole of Ireland, and intended to bring over the entire population to its creed. And yet, although it has existed since the Reformation, and has been assisted by active persecution and penal laws, it has never made any sensible impression upon the Presbyterian and Roman-catholic portions of the community, and it cannot, even at present, reckon among its adherents a ninth part of the population. Dr. Chalmers has pointed out, with great clearness, the error of supposing that, if religious instruction be left to the natural laws of demand and supply, it will be obtained like any other marketable commodity. He remarks that, in the case of food or clothing, or any other article of necessity or comfort, the want is felt the more keenly the longer it remains unsatisfied; but that if a person has received no religious instruction, and is 300 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. not in the habit of attending a place of religious worship, he does not require the services of any minister of reli- gion, or seek to provide them for himself, if not provided for him by a public endowment. Hence, Dr. Chalmers speaks of the aggressive influence of an endowed clergy : he says that they must, by their teaching, create the very want which they satisfy; and he adverts to the efforts of missionaries, who are paid by the country which sends them out, not by the country which receives them.* The arguments of Dr. Chalmers on this subject are undoubtedly sound, so far as an opening to the labours of an endowed clergy is afforded by religious indifference, or the absence of other religious teachers. But if the endowed ministers are of a creed different from that of the people among whom they are planted, their aggres- sive efforts will probably not produce conversions to their own faith, but will merely irritate their hearers by the revival of slumbering controversies, and create divisions and discord, without increasing the numbers of their own flock. The same remark applies to Christian missionaries in a heathen country. Without an endow- ment, temporary or permanent, they cannot exist; but it is by no means certain that their efforts will be suc- cessful, or that their aggressions, even on the most mis- chievous and degrading forms of superstition, will be successful, f More may be said in favour of the influence of en- dowment in imparting solidity and coherence to a re- ligious body, in maintaining the consistency and purity * See his Lectures on National Churches, pp. 50-2, 72; On En- dowments, pp. 113, 118. + According to Warburton, Alliance of Church and State, b. II., IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 301 of its doctrine, and in preventing defections from its ranks. Even in this respect, however, its efficacy is probably less than is often supposed. There is, in general, a tendency to overrate the influence of wealth and power in giving currency to opinions.* Reasoning and new doctrines have a sort of electric force; they penetrate unseen from mind to mind, and give a shock to intelligences far removed from the origin of impulse. This subtle influence not only despises the seductions of wealth and station, but even defies the threats of power. It is therefore dangerous for any church to rely on the mere agency of endowment, in maintaining it against adverse forces. Unless the lives and doctrines of its clergy are such as would influence the minds of their hearers, supposing the church were unendowed, it runs the risk of seeing its sphere of action curtailed. Up to the Revolution of 1789, the French Catholic Church c. 3, the reasons of a public endowment for the ministers of a church are as follows: — " 1. To render the religious society, whose assistance the State so much wants, more firm and durable. " 2. To invite and "encourage the clergy's best service to the State, in rendering those committed to their care, virtuous. " 3. And principally, in order to destroy that mutual dependency between the clergy and people, which arises from the former's being maintained by the voluntary contributions of the latter." Warburton does not appear to consider the propagation of reli- gious truth, by conversion, as one of the ends of a church endow- ment. * Thus Pius VI., when he visited the emperor Joseph at Vienna, in remonstrating against his measures of ecclesiastical reform, is reported by Botta to have used (among others) the following argument: " Altra dover esser la condizione della chiesa ristretta, povera, e perseguitata, altra quella della chiesa estesa quanto il mondo, ricca, e trionfante." — Storia oV Italia dal 1789 al 1814, torn. I. p. 11. 302 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. had every advantage which could be derived from the countenance, assistance, protection, and favour of the State. It was established by law; it was exclusively and richly endowed ; its clergy were numerous, held a high social position, and enjoyed important political privileges. Dissidents were discountenanced, oppressed, and scarcely tolerated. Everything that the State could do, or could give — exclusive favour, rank, wealth, consi- deration, political power, persecution of rivals and ene- mies — was done for and given to the French Church. Yet we know what was the result. It nursed up within its bosom a body of writers, who attacked not only Catho- licism, but Christianity, with every weapon of argument, irony, ridicule and invective, and whose attacks circulated throughout Europe, and gave the tone to all aristocratic society and literature. And when the Eevolution broke out, and the old French government was destroyed, the whole ecclesiastical system of France — establishment, endowment, and all their appendages — was swept away, as being a part of the political abuses against which the popular frenzy was directed ; and it was found that what- ever religious feeling survived, owed its continuance to causes wholly independent of the State endowment. Even in England, during the last century, much apathy and neglect of duty pervaded the Established Church, notwithstanding its endowed clergy ; and their exertions were much stimulated by the disinterested efforts of the unendowed preachers called into action by Wesley and Whitefield.* * " In general, every religious sect, when it has once enjoyed for a century or two the security of a legal establishment, has found itself incapable of making any vigorous defence against any new sect which chose to attack its doctrine or discipline. Upon such occasions, the advantage in point of learning and good writing IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 303 In fine, where there is a large body of people hesitat- ing which creed to adopt, (as was the case in England during the reign of Elizabeth,) or where there is indif- ference or ignorance about religious matters, arising from the want of pastors, (as is the case in some of our large towns and manufacturing districts,) a State-endow- ment may be effectual in propagating religious doctrine. But where the boundaries of sects are well-defined, and their religious convictions deeply rooted ; where an active, zealous body of unendowed clergy exists ; where there is no religious indifference, but, on the contrary, a jealous maintenance of the distinctive doctrines of the particular creed, and a sensitive abhorrence of proselytism; where every member is regarded as the property of the congre- gation, whose defection to another sect is regretted as a common loss, and whose seduction is resented as a com- mon injury — there the endeavours of an endowed clergy to draw the entire people within their fold, however earnest and unremitting, will certainly fail of success. Upon an impartial consideration of the question, it will probably be seen that the beneficial influence of endowment, in religious matters, is felt less in the pro- motion of truth, than in improving the moral character of the minister as respects his flock, and in elevating may sometimes be on the side of the Established Church; but the arts of popularity, all the arts of gaining proselytes, are constantly on the side of its adversaries. In England, those arts have been long neglected by the well-endowed clergy of the Established Church, and are at present chiefly cultivated by the dissenters and by the methodists." — Smith, Wealth of Nations, b. I. ch. 1, art. 3. The example of the Church of Rome might alone have convinced Adam Smith, that his proposition as to established churches required much limitation. But these remarks indicate the advantages of zeal, which may belong to an unendowed clergy. 304 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. and purifying the style of his teaching. A clergy de- pendent on the voluntary donations of their congrega- tions are less likely to exercise a wholesome and inde- pendent influence upon their hearers, to abstain from fanatical appeals to their fears and hopes, and to preserve a sober and even course, than a clergy whose means of subsistence are derived from a fixed endowment. This effect of Endowment, however, does not properly belong to its power of propagating opinion, and therefore need not be here examined. When a government tolerates no other creed than that which itself thinks good, and extirpates all other sects, diversity of religious opinion is prevented, and the opinion of the ruling power is the declared standard of religious truth. But when the government tolerates all religious opinions, and thus permits the existence of a plurality of sects, it must, if it desires to endow the clergy of one church exclusively, select the creed of the majority of the people.* If its choice was made solely on the ground of its obligation to promote religious truth, it could not consistently stop at an endowment of the orthodox creed, but must proscribe the heterodox sects. * Vatel, Law of Nations, § 130, lays it down generally, that the religion of the majority of the people ought to be established by law, and become the religion of the State. The case of Ireland may seem an exception to this rule, inasmuch as, in practice, Ire- land is treated as a separate country : but it is to be borne in mind that the arrangement was made by the Protestant government of England; and the defenders of the Established Church of Ireland generally refer to its union with that of England, and say that the population of both countries ought to be taken jointly, in which case the Protestants are a majority. If Ireland had been an inde- pendent State, the entire church-endowment would not have been given by its government to the Protestant clergy. IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 305 Now, on merely political grounds, there is much to be said in favour of endowing the clergy of the numerical majority of the people. If the endowment is to be ex- clusive, this is the most equitable and useful application which the State can make of the church property. But this system, though productive of considerable practical advantages, is nevertheless liable to serious objections. In the first place, the opinion of the majority of the po- pulation is not a correct, or, indeed, a recognised standard of belief, even in secular matters. In religious matters, it is still less applicable. The smaller sects, each of which constitutes an inconsiderable minority of the population, utterly repudiate any such measure of truth, and recognise only their own conscientious convictions, and the dicta of the teachers whose authority they re- verence. By adopting this criterion, the State admits its own unfitness to judge of religious truth; and yet it refers to no other judge of acknowledged competency. In the second place, exclusive endowment, though less oppressive and intolerant than a proscription of religious error, and less offensive and vexatious than a system of State proselytism, nevertheless implies political inequality on religious grounds, and therefore creates a certain amount of religious discontent and discord. The unen- dowed sects, though they cannot complain of the in- tolerance of the government, yet complain of its par- tiality ; and transfer to the political institutions of the State a portion of the dislike with which they regard a rival, but more favoured church. Owing to these difficulties, both in theory and prac- tice, two other plans have been resorted to by the governments of countries in which there is a plurality of Christian sects. One of them sacrifices the principle of church endowment — the other widens its operation. x 306 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. The one is, for the State to abstain altogether from the recognition of any religious body, from the establishment of any political standard of religious truth, and from the endowment of any church; the other is, for all the Christian churches and sects to be concurrently endowed by the State. Both of these plans avoid the evils of religious inequality — the latter by admitting, the former by rejecting, all sects indiscriminately. Neither of them sets up the opinion of the majority of the people or any other political standard of religious truth. The former is adopted in France, Belgium, Prussia, and other continental States, and, to a certain extent, in the United Kingdom ; inasmuch as the Episcopal Protestant Church is established in England, while the Presbyterian Church is established in Scotland, and endowed in Ireland*— not to mention the colonies. The latter plan is adopted in the United States. The old system of exclusive tole- ration still subsists in the purely Catholic States of Southern Europe. § 7. Besides endowing the clergy of a particular sect, and defraying the expenses of its public worship, the State may also seek to promote religious truth by an inter- ference with Public Instruction. It may establish schools having a certain religious character, and it may afford facilities for religious instruction of the same complexion. Its influence over public instruction may be exercised for the purpose of favouring the doctrines of a certain religious persuasion, so as to confirm some children in their actual faith, and to convert others to that faith. * Mr. Gladstone, The State in its Relations ivith the Church, ch. 3, § 47, sees no decisive objection to this system. He thinks that the connexion of the State need not, in all cases, be exclusively with one church. IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 307 Arguments similar to those which have been used above, in the case of ecclesiastical endowments, apply in the case of public instruction. Where children remain untaught in religion, from the want of teachers, and from mere neglect and indifference about religion, there the establishment of schools by the State, and the supply of religious instruction, will promote the spread of the peculiar religious opinions which may be inculcated in such schools : but where a spirit of sectarian repugnance exists, and the religious doctrines taught in the schools are considered by the people as unsound, parents will not send their children to receive the instruction, even gratuitously, or permit them to become attendants for the purpose of learning what they themselves believe to be error. Hence the establishment of government schools, for purposes of religious proselytism, may be expected to be attended with no better success than that which accompanied the Protestant Charter Schools of Ireland. The objections to an exclusive assistance of the schools of one religious denomination by the State, when the funds granted come, not from a permanent endowment, but from the annual taxation, have been so strongly felt, that in most modern countries, which give a public aid to instruction, the grant has been divested of an exclusive character, and has been made indiscriminately to schools of all religious sects. The principle of Concurrent En- dowment, which has been more reluctantly admitted with respect to the maintenance of public worship, has been more readily applied to the assistance of public instruc- tion. § 8. Besides punishment and reward, endowment of the clergy and public instruction, the only means avail- able to the State for the promotion of religious truth, x 2 308 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. and the repression of religious error, is the Regulation of the Press by a Censorship. A censorship of the press, rigorously and consistently exercised, may unquestionably do much for preventing the circulation of heterodox religious opinions in a country. It did much for this purpose in most parts of Europe, in the first centuries after the invention of printing,* and it still does much for the same purpose in Italy and Spain. A censor- ship of the press has, however, at all times been met by evasions and indirect violations, and thus has been found an imperfect means of preventing the circulation of religious ideas. Books prohibited in one country were printed in another ; they were introduced clandestinely, and were sought with the greater eagerness on account of the prohibition : the interest of the smuggler defeated the zeal of the censor.*j- The Reformers of the sixteenth * See Sarpi, 1. VI. c. 5. The entire passage, with the answer of Pallavicini, is given in Brischar, Controversen Sarpi's und PallavicinHs in der Geschichte des Trienter Concils, vol. II. pp. 347-58. See also Hoffmann, Geschichte der Biichercensur, (Berlin, 1819,) c. 2; Hallam, Literature of Europe, vol. II. c. 8. §§ 69-72; Disraeli, Curiosities of Literature, p. 250. ed. 10. t Madame de Stael makes the following remarks upon the effi- cacy of the censorship of the press in the last century : " On se plait a dire en France que c'est precisement par egard pour la reli- gion et pour les moeurs qu'on a de tout temps eu des censeurs, et neanmoins il suffit de comparer l'esprit de la litterature en Angle- terre, depuis que la liberte de la presse y est etablie, avec les divers ecrits qui ont paru sous le regne arbitraire de Charles IL, et sous celui du Regent et Louis XV. en France. La licence des ecrits a ete portee chez les Francais, dans le dernier siecle, a un degre qui fait horreur. II en est de meme en Italie, ou, de tout temps, on a soumis cependant la presse aux restrictions les plus genantes; L'ignorance dans la masse, et l'independance la plus desordonnee dans les esprits distingues, est toujours le resultat de la contrainte." « — Considerations sur la Revolution Francaise, part VI. c. 5. IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 309 and seventeenth, and the Freethinkers of the eighteenth century, were able to inundate Europe with their writings, in spite of the Catholic censors of the press. At present, a censorship of the press, either for reli- gious or other purposes, would not be submitted to by the countries which enjoy a popular government. In those States of Germany which have retained a censor- ship, it has been lately applied almost exclusively to the current political discussion, and has left a wide latitude to theological controversy. Practically, therefore, a censorship of the press can scarcely be enumerated among the engines which a government can now use for the repression of religious error. The same remark applies with still greater force to a Law of Libel, the practical effect of which, in regulating serious argumen- tative controversy on religious questions, may be consi- dered as nearly insensible. § 9. The general result, therefore, at which we arrive is, that although the promotion of religious truth, and the repression of religious error, are universally admitted to be desirable objects, yet the State is not able, by the means at its disposal, to compass them effectually; and that not only will its attempts to attain them be wholly or in great part unsuccessful, but that they will be at- tended with serious incidental evils. For the fruitless efforts made by the State are not merely so much labour wasted and thrown away : the attempts to propagate its own religious creed disturb civil society — they aggra- vate and embitter the existing dissensions and animosities of the rival sects, and create new causes of discord, which would not otherwise have existed.* * Sully represented to the king — " Qu'il y avait assez long- temps que la difference des religions donnait en France les scenes 310 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. § 10. This result, however, which establishes the practical doctrine, that the State is to be neutral in questions involving religious truth and error, startles many persons, both practical statesmen and speculative reasoners. It seems to them to involve the conse- quence that, by being neutral, the State declares its indifference to religious truth, or even its hostility to religion. They think that the State, by its omission to take a part in the controversy, implies an opinion that the question at issue is unimportant. The abstinence of the State from identifying itself with one of the rival churches, appears to them in the light of a sinful neglect of religious duty — or even a profession of religious unbe- lief. The following seems to be the train of thought by which they are led to this conclusion : — " The State is the highest, most important, and most comprehensive of all societies. Its ends and its powers are unlimited. It embraces the whole circle of human interests. It commands the whole sum of human facul- ties and powers. The mind and the body, the hopes of a future, and the reality of the present life, are equally within the scope of its influence. All other societies are limited in their objects. A church is limited to religion, a municipality to the care of its local interests, a uni- versity to learning, a mercantile company to trading, a scientific society to science, and so on. All other so- cieties are limited likewise in their powers. They are all subordinate to the State ; they derive their legal rights les plus tragiques ; qu'elle etait une source de calamites et de desordres, par l'aversion qu'on inspirait au peuple contre ceux qui etaient d'une croyance differente de la sienne: ce qui se pratiquait egalement de la part des catholiques et des protestans." — Memoires, liv. V. torn. V, p. 165. IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 311 from its grant, and are restricted by its control to a defined province. But a State is unlimited, both in its objects and its powers. It may select any end; it may employ any means for compassing that end. It may assume any character; it may, if it thinks fit, make the cultivation of literature, art, or science, one of its objects, and direct all its political agents and powers towards the attainment of that object. " Now, the noblest and most exalted end of the State is, to make its citizens virtuous and happy, and to pro- mote, not only their temporal, but also their eternal hap- piness. This object is best accomplished by making them religious ; and, therefore, if a State observes neu- trality in religious affairs, and leaves them exclusively to the care of the church — if it does not establish a political standard of truth, and a political conscience, in" matters of religious faith, it abandons its highest duty, it desecrates its noblest functions, and it allows the largest powers, applicable to the most important object, to lie unused. The most valuable talent committed to its keeping is suffered, through its culpable neglect and in- difference, to remain in the napkin. The State is not merely an institution for the protection of life and pro- perty : it comprehends higher interests ; it seeks to make men good, as well as safe and rich ; it seeks, not merely to protect their bodies, but also to improve their minds and benefit their souls — it aims at spiritual, as well as secular and temporal ends. At all events, though its agencies be laic, it has a religious character, and reco- gnises religion as the basis of civil polity. It is a per- sona moralis, and, as such, it has a corporate conscience in affairs of religion." § 11. Such appears to be a summary of the principal arguments used against the neutrality of the State in 312 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. questions involving religious truth. Assuming it to be a correct representation of their general tenor, I would remark that, although the basis may be admitted to be sound, the superstructure is of very different materials. It is true that the State is not necessarily limited to the protection of life and property: its objects are un- limited, not less than the means at its disposal. There is nothing in the nature or essence of a State which would prevent it from making the promotion of religious truth one of its ends, and from seeking to attain that end by all the means in its power. Unquestionably, the State might propose to itself the same end, and assume the same duties as the church ; it might lay down articles of faith, regulate forms of worship, condemn propositions; in short, exercise all the spiritual functions which are exercised by the pope, if it thought fit so to do * In the middle ages, it was considered the duty of a Christian State to prevent Jerusalem from remaining in the pos- session of a Mahometan nation. It is competent to a State to adopt this, or any similar religious end, and to pursue it at any sacrifice of life, treasure, and temporal tranquillity or prosperity, provided such sacrifice were needed for the attainment of the religious end. But, (as we have shown in the preceding remarks,) * The treatise of Grotius, De Imperio Summarum Potestatum circa Sacra, has for its object to prove, that things sacred and spiritual are subject to the dominion of the sovereign of the State, and that the Church is not independent of the Civil power, see c. 1. and 8. It is directed against those writers of the Church of Rome who maintained the legal and temporal supremacy of the Church in things ecclesiastical and spiritual. As to the supremacy of the civil sovereign in things spiritual as well as temporal, see Burlamaqui, Principles of Nat. and Pol. Law, part III. c. 3,- Vatel, Law of Nations, §§ 139, 140. IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 313 experience has proved that the State is not fit for the office of promoting religious truth, and repressing reli- gious error ; that these functions are not successfully dis- charged by the civil magistrate, and that they are better performed when left to the exclusive care of spiritual and ecclesiastical teachers.* There is nothing in the consti- tution or essence of a State which is inconsistent with its being a judge of religious truth, but it discharges this duty ill. It is capable of doing the work of the church ; but the work is better done by the church without its assistance. The State ought to abstain from the as- sumption of a sectarian character, and from undertaking to decide on disputed questions of religious truth, for the same reason that it ought to abstain from carrying on trade or manufactures. It is capable of trading, but it makes a bad trader ; it is capable of manufacturing, but it makes a bad manufacturer. So the State is capable * Warburton, in his Alliance of Church and State, b. II. c. 1, lays it down, that " the care of civil society extends only to the body and its concerns, and the care of religious society only to the soul." His whole theory is accurately summed up in Mr. Gladstone's treatise, On the Relations of Church and State, ch. I. §§ 16, 17. Mr. Gladstone remarks upon it : " It is a very low theory of government which teaches, that it has only the care of the body and bodily goods, and might almost seem to imply that all physi- cians are more peculiarly statesmen." Warburton, however, pro- bably never meant to teach that the mind, considered with reference to its temporal and secular relations, was not within the legitimate province of the State. Warburton's doctrine is borrowed from Locke, who, in his Letters on Toleration, lays it down, that a commonwealth is instituted for civil interests, and that its care does not extend to the salvation of souls. — Works, vol. VI. pp. 10 and 120. Compare pp. 211-18, where he answers the objection that the State comprehends spi- ritual ends. Locke here resorts to his favourite resource of a fiction, by which the ends of the State are limited. 314 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. of acting the part of a theologian, but it makes a bad theologian. Hence, it is a manifest sophism to infer that, because a person does not wish to see the State undertake to promote religious truth, he is indifferent or hostile to religion. As well might it be inferred that, because he does not wish to see the State engage in trade, he is hostile to trade. If he thinks the promotion of religious truth a function unsuited to the State, and suited exclusively to the church — if he thinks that it ought to be performed by an ecclesiastical, and not by a political agency, he cannot, supposing him to be friendly both to Church and State, desire to see it assumed by the latter. There is a constant tendency, not only among the con- trivers of political Utopias and ideal commonwealths, but also among practical politicians, to over-estimate the capabilities of a government ; to assume that it can ex- ercise a greater influence over the community than it really possesses; and to forget that it can only act within a sphere determined by certain conditions, and is endowed with legal omnipotence in no other sense, than that its powers have no legal limit. If the practical province of a State, in matters involving truth, had been considered with greater attention — if facts, and not ideas, had been consulted, it would not have been invested with a character which is unsuited to it, and been loaded with so many moral obligations to which it is not properly subject. The error of those politicians who exaggerate and misapprehend the powers of a government over the people may be compared, as to its results, with the error of those speculators who, in the middle ages, exaggerated their command over external nature. While the alche- mists, the astrologers, and the praotisers of occult IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 315 sciences, undertook to transmute metals, to cure all diseases, to reanimate the dead, and to predict the course of the weather and the fates of men and empires, they overlooked, while engaged in the pursuit of these unattain- able objects, the discovery of such processes of nature as lie within the reach of our faculties, and can be made available for our service. So political theorizers and statesmen, who, from an ignorance of the true limits to the practical powers of a government, extend its action beyond its proper province, not only waste its resources in vain efforts, but withdraw its effective powers from the subjects to which they are properly applicable, and thus diminish its efficiency in its own field. The aversion to the neutrality of the State in contro- verted questions of religion — the belief that it is bound to assume a religious character, and to promote religious truth, may perhaps be founded on the assumption, that the State ought to use its powers for furthering all the good ends to which its powers are applicable, whether its attempt is likely to be successful or not.* The promo- * Speaking of the speculators on a perfect or ideal pattern of civil government, Warburton says : " The end of government coming first under consideration, and the general practice of society seeming to declare this end to be only, (what, in truth, it is,) secu- rity to our temporal liberty and property; the simplicity of it dis- pleased, and the plan appeared defective. They imagined that, by enlarging the bottom, they should ennoble the structure, and there- fore formed a romantic project of making civil society serve for all the good purposes it was even accidentally capable of producing. And thus, instead of giving us a true picture of government, they jumbled together all sorts of societies into one, and confounded the religious, the literary, the mercantile, the convivial, with the civil." — Alliance of Church and State, b. I. ch. 3. The speculators to whom Warburton alludes were, however, right in supposing, that the State potentially includes all these objects. 316 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. tion of religious truth is a good end ; the State is capable of applying its powers to the promotion of that end ; therefore, if it neglects so to apply them, it is guilty of a sinful omission, and of practical unbelief. Such is the simple argument on which many minds seem to rely ; but if they will extend the same mode of reasoning to other subjects, they will soon be startled by the conse- quences to which it will lead them, and will thus be brought to doubt of the soundness of their premises. If we only leave out of our calculation the probability of success, and require the State to undertake the promo- tion of all objects which are intrinsically good, whether they be attainable by it or not, we shall soon find it en- gaged in a multiplicity of impracticable pursuits, which might fill an academy of Laputa with envy. The State, like subordinate societies, and like individuals, is dis- pensed from the pursuit of unattainable goods. There is no moral obligation which binds a ruler to make an attempt, where success cannot reasonably be expected, A forlorn hope may be sometimes necessary in war; but it forms no part of the functions of a State, in the ordi- nary administration of its affairs. Writers who dwell on the religious functions of the State — who (like Dr. Arnold) almost identify the State and the Church, and merge the one in the other, are considered on that account as friends to religion ; while those who take a different view of the province of the State, are treated as hostile to religion and the Church. But all experience shows that, where this intimate union of the Church and State exists, instead of the Church spiritualizing the State, the State secularizes the Church. Where the political and ecclesiastical powers are exer- cised by the same hands, the former are sure to prevail over the latter. Practically, the religious theory of IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 317 government will end in perfect Hobbism ; and therefore no enlightened friend to religion will seek to confound the province of the State with that of the Church,* or to confer upon the State spiritual, and upon the Church political, functions. § 12. Having arrived at the conclusion, that it is not the province of the State to diffuse religious truth and to discourage religious error, we need not dwell at equal length upon its duty in diffusing truth and discouraging error as to matters other than religion. Even those who have attached the greatest importance to the enforcement of religious truth by the State, have not, in general, thought that it was the office of the State to diffuse truth on secular matters. It has rarely been maintained that, in questions of science, history, literature, art, &c, it is incumbent on the State to establish a standard of sound opinions, and to use its power for the purpose of main- taining and diffusing the truth. j* By founding univer- * " Articles of faith, as well as all other spiritual matters, it is evi- dent enough, are not within the proper department of a temporal sovereign, who, though he may be very well qualified for protecting, is seldom supposed to be so for instructing the people." — Smith, Wealth of Nations, b. V. ch. 1, art. 3. t The Ptolemaic system of the world was taught till a few years ago in the university of Salamanca; but the prohibition of the New- tonian system was doubtless made on religious grounds — in the same manner that the Jesuit editors of Newton's Principia found it necessary to declare that, in illustrating the propositions relative to the heliocentric theory, they treated it as a mere hypothesis, and they professed, with a grave irony, their submission to the decrees of the church against the motion of the earth : " Cseterum latis a summis Pontificibus contra telluris motum decretis nos obsequi pro- fitemur." The works of Galileo and Copernicus were inserted in the index of prohibited books; and to this day the Ptolemaic system is the official doctrine of the Church of Rome. 318 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. sities, and other places of education ; by endowing pro- fessorships and lecturerships ; by creating literary aca- demies ; by patronizing literature and science, and by assisting public instruction, it has, indeed, contributed powerfully to the diffusion of opinions on many im- portant subjects ; but it has left, in general, to the several professors and teachers the liberty of forming their own judgment as to the opinions which they would inculcate, and has not sought to induce them to make the matter of their teaching square with a prescribed standard. Without going the length of saying, that a government ought to be wholly indifferent to the character of the opinions diffused under its superintendence — without adopting the maxim, Sipopalus vult decipi, decipiatur — we may affirm that, after it has taken effectual means for encouraging the diffusion of knowledge, and for pro- moting the selection of fit teachers, it ought to exercise extreme reserve in regulating the opinions of the persons so employed. And we may here add that, if the State ought not to prescribe the opinions of endowed teachers of scientific, literary, and historical branches of know- ledge — in most of which there are recognised standards, and a generally admitted authority — still less ought it to take a decisive part in religious questions, as to which there is no common authority generally received and respected by all the Christian sects. It is by scientific and literary endowments, in con- nexion with universities, places of learning, academies, observatories, botanical gardens, museums, public libraries, and similar institutions, that the best pro- vision can be made for those men of science and letters, whose pursuits are not of such a nature as to afford them IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 319 the means of a decent and permanent subsistence.* Poets, writers of fiction, and others, who can amuse and delight the public, may derive a profit from their literary works; those, again, who digest and arrange existing knowledge for the instruction of their readers, may ob- tain considerable pecuniary rewards for their labours, in the present state of civilization ; but those who originate new ideas, who explore the untrodden, and cultivate the waste tracts of science, cannot expect to reap any profit from their exertions. Unless they possess the means of independent support, the best maintenance for them is a literary endowment, of the sort just described ; professors, too, in a place of learning, who are remunerated for the lectures which they give, can study a subject in order to teach it, and devote their spare time to the composition of books.f Why teachers should not be rewarded for their services, I can see no valid reason; the objection of Socrates to the paid teaching of the Sophists of his time seems to have been partly founded in his opinion, that * Lord Bacon, Adv. of Learning, vol. II. p. 94, speaks " of the defect which is in public lectures ; namely, in the smallness and meanness of the salary or reward which, in most places, is assigned unto them ; whether they be lectures of arts or professions. For it is necessary to the progression of sciences that readers [i. e. lec- turers] be of the most able and sufficient men ; as those which are ordained for generating and propagating of sciences, and not for transitory use. This cannot be, except their condition and endow- ment be such as may content the ablest man to appropriate his whole labour, and continue his whole age, in that function and attendance ; and therefore must have a proportion answerable to that mediocrity or competency of advancement which may be expected from a profession, or the practice of a profession." t Mr. John Mill, in his Principles of Political Economy, vol. I. p. 468, throws out a doubt whether there is not " something radi- 320 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. their lessons were valueless, and partly in the Greek prejudice against illiberal arts.* As has been just remarked, the State may, as wii. respect to religious instruction, interfere for the support and patronage of the secular instruction of the young, so as to give currency to certain opinions on subjects un- connected with religion. Aristotle,f apparently, approves of the Lacedaemonian system, according to which all free children, after a certain age, were taken out of the care of their parents, and placed under the discipline of the State. This system, however, had almost exclusively a military object. J Though carried, for a long time, into effect by the singularly rigid spirit of that little commonwealth, it was too extensive an interference with parental authority and natural affection for imitation, even by the most military republics of antiquity, such as the Romans ; cally amiss in the idea of authorship as a profession; and whether any social arrangement, under which the teachers of mankind con- sist of persons giving out doctrines for bread, is suited to be, or can possibly be, a permanent thing." Compare Comte, Cours de Phil. Pos. torn. VI. p. 466. * Adam Smith was led, by the abuses of universities in his time, and by their lazy and unimproving spirit, to underrate the advan- tages of literary endowments, in promoting the cultivation of those branches of knowledge which are not useful, (in the vulgar sense of the word,) — that is, which do not yield an immediate return to the learner, by fitting him for a gainful occupation, ( Wealth of Nations, b. V. ch. 1, art. 2). He admits, however, the advantage of an endowment for the instruction of the poor. See, with respect to this subject, the instructive work of Dr. Chalmers, On Endowments. The recent history of the German universities sufficiently proves, that literary endowments do not necessarily lead to the abuses adverted to by Adam Smith. t Eth. Me. X. 10; Pol VIII. 1. X Aristot. Pol. VII. 2. Compare c. 14. IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 321 and, in modern times, no such entire substitution of the political for domestic control over children is likely to be seriously entertained. The chief patronage which the State, in modern times, gives to instruction, is by appointing and endowing teachers, of different sorts and degrees, from universities and colleges, down to elementary schools for the poor.* This assistance is afforded on the assumption, that some public contribution is requisite for enabling the parents to instruct and train their children in their respective callings and walks of life; and that the State has an interest in the proper education, moral and intellectual, of its members. Aids afforded from the public purse, for the establish- ment and maintenance of astronomical observatories and botanical gardens ; for scientific voyages and travels ; for the formation of museums of natural history and anti- quities, of public libraries, and of collections of works of art; for the publication of expensive books; for the en- couragement of literature ; and for the support or remu- neration of persons connected with these several institu- tions or purposes, fall under the same general head. Public expenditure of this sort is intended to afford to the cultivators of sound knowledge and learning facilities which they could not derive, in an equal degree, either from their own means or from private patronage. f * The cases in which the State maintains as well as teaches the scholar, and therefore stands to him in loco parentis, are those in which a child is destitute, through the death or desertion of his parents. The assumption of the parental authority by the State, in these cases, is not sought, but forced upon it. t The establishment of the observatories of Paris and Green- wich, in 1667 and 1675, "may be considered (says Dr. Whewell) to be a kind of public recognition of the astronomy of observation, Y 322 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. § 13. In every case, however, in which the govern- ment interferes to assist and encourage science and learning, or to diffuse secular knowledge, it ought to avoid predetermining any set of opinions to be adopted by the teacher, or other object of its patronage. It ought to abstain from stereotyping any modes or formulas of thought; from imposing any test, or requiring an adhe- sion to any party or section, scientific, literary, or his- torical. The persons who may be thus assisted by the State, ought merely to receive facilities for prosecuting an independent and unprejudiced search after truth, but ought not to be expected to work up to a prescribed conclusion. The influence of a government, as an authority in matters of opinion and practice, is greatly enhanced by its confining itself to its legitimate province, and not attempting to pronounce on questions which it is not competent to decide. A court of justice, which was highly esteemed for its judgments on questions of law, would render itself ridiculous, and shake its authority, even within its own sphere, if it attempted to determine questions of science or literature. If a government should suborn, as it were, its endowed teachers, by in- ducing them to take its own opinion, and not truth, as their standard, it would impair their influence with the public, and at the same time diminish its own authority upon questions, as to which its judgment would otherwise be respected and valued. as an object on which it was the advantage and the duty of nations to bestow their wealth." — Phil, of Ind. Sci. vol. II. p. 432. See also his account of public observatories, of patronage of astronomy by governments, and of astronomical expeditions made at the public expense, in his History of the Inductive Sciences, b. VII. c. 6, §§ 2, 4, and 5. I IX.] CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 323 § 14. For a government, although it cannot regulate opinion as it can fix the rates of the public taxes, the forms of judicial procedure, or the scale of legal punishments, can yet exercise a considerable influence upon its move- ments and direction. Without undertaking to pronounce definitively a precise judgment upon disputed questions of speculation, or to enforce that judgment by its legal and coercive powers, a government possesses a moral authority, by which it can stamp a character of public approbation upon certain acts and certain opinions. It is placed on a high and conspicuous eminence ; its voice will be heard far and wide; many people will incline to imitate its tendencies; and its judgments, on subjects upon which it is competent to judge, will not fail to produce a powerful impression on the public. A government, considered as a source of authority, furnishes a model, or pattern, and does not act by com- pulsory and imperative laws. Its subjects fashion their actions, by a voluntary and self-imposed imitation, ac- cording to the type which it places before them — like the pupils copying a model in a school of design. They are not coerced into uniformity by the voice of com- mand, like soldiers at drill. In absolute monarchies, the personal influence of the monarch, or of his court, in establishing a standard of manners and morals, as well as of taste, and in deter- mining the aim and course of personal ambition in the numerous aspirers to honour and public employment, has often been most extensive. In constitutional monarchies, and other free governments, the ruling power is more divided, and its influence less concentrated; but, even here, its moral weight, in determining public opinion and conduct, is not inconsiderable. Bad examples set by rulers are almost invariably y2 324 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [CH. followed, to a greater or less extent, by their subjects. And, on the other hand, a good moral influence, in re- spect either of conduct or opinion, on the part of a govern- ment, can scarcely fail to produce a beneficial effect.* Indirectly, in the way of example and patronage, by the remuneration of merit and the distribution of honours, a government, and persons in eminent stations, can do much to countenance sound opinions, to establish a correct standard of conduct, and to encourage persons of genuine merit. But a government has little direct power of influencing opinion, except by preventing the free expression of thought, and by thus producing an intellectual stagnation, such as prevails in Spain, and, to a certain extent, even in Italy. No government of a * ttoKiq yap scttl iraaa ru>v rfyovjxkvhiv, vrparoQ ts crvfiirag' oi ffaKOGfXovvTiQ (3poTu>v 8i8ais proof against this influence ; and all men ought to dis- trust, not only the judgment. of others, but their own judgment also, when formed under such circumstances. f § 9. The mental disposition just described is impor- tant with reference to the numbers of a deliberative body. A large body is much more liable than a small one to this nervous conflagration — to this contagious in- toxication of the emotions and judgment; for example, a numerous public meeting than a jury or a vestry. Where the address is to the reason and understanding, a body consisting of a moderate number is best fitted for deliberation — not a great multitude, such as used to crowd the ecclesia or comitia of the ancient republics, the numbers of which, as all adult male citizens were members of it, were practically unlimited. A defined limit to the numbers of a legislative assembly has been secured by the contrivance of a representative govern- ment, and is one of the best results of that excellent political system. On the other hand, where the appeal * Upon the Dancing Mania of the fourteenth and following cen- turies, and other impetuous nervous affections produced by sympa- thetic causes, see the interesting account in Hecker's Epidemics of the Middle Ages, translated by Dr. Babington, pp. 87 — 152, par- ticularly c. 4. Concerning mesmerism, see Burdin et Dubois, His- toire Academique du Magnetisme Animal, Paris, 1841. f See Hume's Essays, vol. HI. p. 572; Lord Brougham's Pol. Phil. vol. III. p. 99; Grote, Hist, of Gr. vol. IV. pp. ^05, 6. X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 395 is, properly and avowedly, to the feelings, emotions, and taste of the audience, not to their practical reason and judgment — where their moral and aesthetic sentiments, not their deliberative faculties,, are called into action, the numbers of the assembly can scarcely be too great, provided that they comply with the mechanical condi- tions necessary for hearing and seeing. Such, for example, are all theatrical representations, which con- sist in dramatic performances, and are not (like combats of gladiators, bull fights, or dancing) addressed merely to the sight. The drama is an embellished portraiture of life, serious or comic, intended, not to create illusion^ as represented on the stage, but to produce a vivid effect upon the feelings of the audience, by the closeness of the resem- blance and the truth of the imitation. This impression is greatly strengthened by the simultaneous influence of the acting upon the audience, and the sympathetic play of their feelings. Laughter, as we know, is essentially a social emotion. No man can laugh in solitude. A comedy which would convulse a whole N theatre with laughter, would be read in the closet without a smile. The same is also the case, to a great extent, with the emotions of compassion and grief. Many more tears would be shed over the mimic sorrows of Juliet or Desde- mona in the theatre than in the study. # The art of the actor consists in working upon the emotions, either of pity, or admiration, or tenderness, or ridicule — in gently exciting the moral sensibilities of his audience, or in awakening mirth. These effects he pro- duces by recitation and gesticulation, and by personating * " Ut ridentibus adrident, ita flentibus adflent Humani vultus." Horace. 396 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [CH. an assumed character; and in this his whole art is summed up. He aims at no ulterior object. The deliberative orator speaks in his own person ; and although he may use as instruments what the actor regards as ends — although he may arouse the passions and move the mirth of his hearers, yet he addresses their understanding, and seeks to influence their practical judgment. The histrionic powers of the orator are worthless in themselves ; they are valuable only so far as they assist him in accomplishing his end — the conviction of his hearers.* In a theatre, the actors have alone a part to perform ; the audience are the passive recipients of the dialogue which passes on the stage. They sit by and listen, and, as it were, overhear it : though substan- tially intended for their amusement, it is not addressed to them in form.f Their enjoyment is derived from * There is a current mistake as to a saying of Demosthenes upon oratory, which is reported by Cicero in two different passages {De Orat. III. 56; Brut. 38). Being asked what is the first thing in oratory, and what the second, and what the third, he replied always actio. This is usually translated action, which, according to the common acceptation of the word in our language, would mean the motion of the body in speaking. It ought to be translated acting, or rather, as we should say, delivery. Plutarch, in his Lives of the Ten Orators, c. 8, and Valerius Maximus, VIII. 10, ext. 1, in relating the same anecdote, use the Greek word v-KOKpiaig ; while Quintilian, XI. 3, § 6, renders it by pronunciatio. Actio, or vwoKpiaig, was defined by the ancients to consist in all that belonged to voice and gesture. Thus Cicero, in his Orator, c. 17, says — " Est enim actio quasi corporis qusedam eloquentia, quum constet e voce atque motu." Compare Ernesti, Lex. Techn. Lat. in agere ; Lex. Techn. Gr. in vTroKpiaig; and Quintil. XI. 3, § 1. Undoubt- edly, the characteristic excellence of a speech, as distinguished from a written composition, consists in the delivery. t The parabasis of the ancient Greek comedy was a violation of the theatrical conventions, and of dramatic propriety. X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 397 hearing a good dramatic composition recited with suitable tones, gestures, and feeling, and with a faculty which identifies each actor with the character repre- sented by him. In producing this enjoyment, the whole business and purpose of a theatrical performance con- sists : the audience have nothing to do, or to decide ; they have merely to take delight in the imitation. But, in a deliberative assembly, the orator speaks as one of the body ; he tenders his counsel as on a matter in which all the members deliberating have a common interest; he does not stand on a stage, aloof from the others, to be gazed at and admired ; nor does he play a part distinct from the rest of the assembly. He attempts to lead them to his view of a practical question, in the decision of which they are all to concur. His words are directly and pointedly addressed to his audience, and intended to influence their convictions. However he may, by his rhetorical powers, gratify the taste of his hearers — however he may charm them by his brilliancy, or amuse them by his wit, still his work is not completed by the mere enjoyment communicated to them: they have a part to perform as well as himself; they are equally actors in the drama ; their collective act decides the question at issue; and they have a judgment to pass on the arguments and declamations addressed to them. His influence upon them, moreover, depends, to a great extent, upon their belief in his sincerity ; if they think, or suspect, that his earnestness and impetuosity are feigned, and that he is merely acting a part, he will never reach their convictions. It is manifest, therefore, that in theatrical repre- sentations the sympathetic play of the emotions is an advantage, inasmuch as it heightens the effect of the dramatic imitation upon each spectator; stimulates the 398 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [CH, actor to a more lively and impassioned performance of his part ; and contributes essentially to the success of the entire work of art. But in deliberative assemblies, where the orator who delivers his opinion leads his hearers to a practical conclusion, there is no place for the exhibition of histrionic skill, or the mere indulgence of aesthetic feelings ; the play of sympathies excited in a large audience disturbs the judgment, and produces a mental anarchy. Where instruction is conveyed to an audience, who listen in respectful silence to the words of the teacher, it is immaterial how numerous they may be. In schools and churches, the pupils and congregation are, indeed, a necessary part of the assembly ; but as they exercise no power, and indulge in no expression of feeling, incon- venience cannot arise from numbers. With regard to schools, indeed, the emulation of the pupils may con- tribute essentially to enforce the lessons of the master'; and some assistance may be derived from mutual in- struction; so that numbers are an important element in scholastic instruction. § 10. The inquiry undertaken in this essay has now been brought to a close. The different subjects proposed in the first chapter for investigation have been passed under review; and an attempt has been made to deter- mine the marks by which trustworthy guides in matters of opinion may be recognised — to ascertain the legitimate province of authority — and to discover the conditions most conducive to its beneficial influence. Before, however, we take a final leave of the subject, it may seem natural to ask whether, after having looked at the Principle of Authority under so many aspects, and after having traced it in so many of its applications, we X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 399 have arrived at any simple and practical maxim as the fruit of our researches. The most important general formula which appears deducible from this inquiry is, that one of the main ele- ments of civilization is well-placed confidence. One leading condition for the improvement of man- kind, both in their public and private relations, is to find the means of promoting confidence in other persons, and of teaching how these persons can be properly selected. A disposition to confide, combined with a knowledge how to choose competent guides, and with a careful exercise of that choice, is both a mark of a civilized state of society, and a means of further social improvement. On the other hand, a general tendency to distrust and suspicion, combined with occasional blind deference to dishonest and unfit guides, is a mark of a backward state of society, and a hindrance to ulterior progress. The state of things last described may arise, either from a practical resistance to the Principle of Authority in every form ; or from a misplaced confidence, and the choice of an unsound authority. Both of these failings may be seen, on a large scale, in an Oriental country. A general prevalence of a habit of unfounded distrust can only be rectified, when men, instead of permitting " the proud feebleness of their understanding " (to use the words of a modern philosopher) to mislead them into judging upon matters on which they are not competent to form an independent judgment, evince a disposition to defer to the opinions of guides selected with care and discretion. Perhaps, however, the prevalence of distrust is more often owing to the want of fit guides than to a popular dislike of the Principle of Authority. It appears to be a frequent occurrence, in a backward state of 400 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [CH. society, that men are willing to waive their exercise of the right of private judgment, but place their faith in impostors and misleaders, who are candidates for their confidence, but are unworthy of it ; who seek to act as their trustees, but are unfit for the trust. That there is a strong inclination to the adoption of the opinion of competent judges, when competent judges can be clearly discerned to exist, is plain from the de- ference which is universally paid to the authority of the great luminaries of physical science. If there was a body of authority upon moral and political subjects, equally fulfilling the conditions which entitle it to public respect; if the choice of the people was not dis- tracted by the wide divergence of opinions upon funda- mental questions in this department of knowledge; it may be presumed that they would be equally inclined to place themselves under that guidance. The extension of well-placed confidence is not only wholesome in our domestic and private relations — in those points of conduct and management of our worldly affairs to which professional advice is applicable — in our pecuniary dealings, where we are unable, of ourselves, to ascertain the value and quality of commodities — and even in speculative opinions, as to which our time and opportunities for study do not permit the safe exercise of private judgment ; but it is also productive of eminent benefit in political affairs, in which a due selection of leaders, and a steady reliance upon their advice, is a far more effectual method of arriving at good government, than can ever be derived from those barren and wearisome changes in mere political forms, which practical states- men so often introduce blindly, at the suggestion of the fabricators of ideal commonwealths. X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 401 Well-placed confidence, in questions of opinion and conduct, is what sound credit is in mercantile affairs. Credit does not create wealth ; neither does confidence create rectitude of judgment. The material commodity, and the mental capacity, must both pre-exist; but, in each case, the confidence turns it to the best account, and converts to a useful purpose that which might other- wise be locked up unproductively in the coffers or in the- breast of its possessor. In proportion as the circle of our confidence is en- larged, the probability that this confidence will meet with a fair return increases. He who confides justly in others, may expect that they will confide justly in him. At all events, it is only by evincing a disposition on one side to relax the precautions of mutual distrust, that the foundations of a general system of mutual reliance, as- cending from private to political, and from political to international relations, can ever be securely laid. In the present state of the civilized world, the progress of society will depend in part upon legislative improve- ments, and upon those measures which a government can command or influence ; but it will depend still more upon the substitution of competent for incompetent guides of public opinion; upon the continued extension of their influence ; and upon the consequent organization of a sound authority in all the departments of theory and practice. Every one may, within his own sphere, and by means of his own vocation, contribute his share to the accomplishment of this great end; and mankind may thus approach more and more to a state in which opinion will constantly predominate over violence, in which reason will hold the ascendancy over passion, and wisdom will be diffused from various sources through a D D 402 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. thousand channels. Under the operation of these in- fluences, it will be found that the increased mental activity which accompanies progressive civilization is not inconsistent with social tranquillity ; that the extension of knowledge among the people does not promote anar- chical doctrines; and that the principle of moral authority is too strong for the principle of political revolution. 403 APPENDIX. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY, AND ON THE PROVINCE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. § 1. In ch. VIII. of the preceding Essay, the Democratic form of government, and the power of the Majority of the People, as characteristic of that form, have been referred to, as something clearly understood, and having a recognised meaning. The subject is, however, still involved in some obscurity, notwithstanding the frequent use of the terms, and our apparent familiarity with the ideas which they represent; and I have, therefore, thought it advisable to append to the Essay, some remarks, in which an attempt will be made to ascertain, in what the received opposition between aristocracy and democracy, as generally understood, really consists. The difference between governments in which one person exer- cises the entire sovereign power, and governments in which this power is shared among several persons, is obvious and precise. It is analogous to the difference between the singular and plural numbers in grammar. The former are called Absolute or Pure Monarchies, or simply Despotisms: the latter are called Limited Monarchies and Republics, and are generally known by the common name of Free Governments. There is, however, greater difficulty in defining the distinction between the two varieties of the latter class of governments, which are respectively called Aristocracies and Democracies. The distinction between these two forms of government is com- monly made to depend on the sovereign power residing, or not residing, in a majority of the people. If, it is said, the sovereign power is vested in the people at large, or in a Majority of the DD 2 404 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [APPEN. people, the government is a democracy:* if only in a Minority of the people, the government is an aristocracy. Now, from what has been stated above, in chapter VIII. (p. 262) it is apparent that, in speaking of the Majority of the People, we mean not the majority of the entire population, but a majority of a certain portion of the community. It is necessary, in the first place, to strike off all the women and children, and in States where slavery exists, all the slaves ;t the residue, consisting of the free adult males, constitutes the people, for the purpose of determining the form of government. § 2. Having, by these eliminations, obtained the body which practically constitutes the people, we have next to consider whether the distinction between aristocracy and democracy turns upon a precise demarcation of the majority and minority of this body. Now, (waiving, for the present, the question whether a right of * Aristotle, in more than one place, speaks of the sovereign power of the majority of the people being the mark of a democracy, Pol. iv. 4. v. 9. In de- fining the three forms of government, he says, " One, or the Few, or the Many, must be sovereign." lb. III. 7. Bodinus de Hep. II. 6, 7, defines aris- tocracy and democracy thus: — " Aristocratia reipublicse forma qusedam est, in qua minor pars civium in universos et singulos cives summse potestatis jus habet." (p. 339.) " Eespublica popularis est, in qua cives universi, aut maxima pars civium, cseteris omnibus non tantum singulatim sed etiam simul coacervatis et collectis, imperandi jus habent." (p. 359, and compare another version of the same definition, in p. 364.) He rightly remarks that there can be only three forms of government, determined by the number of the rulers (p. 366) ; and he objects to the system of Aristotle, which makes the distinction between oligarchy and democracy depend partly on the comparative wealth and poverty of the governing section of the citizens, (p. 356. 364.) '- Sive igitur optimi (he says) sive flagitiosissimi, sive ditissimi, sive nobilissimi, sive egentissimi, sive belli- cosissimi summum imperium teneant, modo civium pars minor extiterit, aristo- cratiam appellamus." (p. 341.) He lays it down that the decisive mark of an aristocratic government is, that the rulers should be less in number than half the entire community. — " Igitur in optimatum statu civium paucitatem spectare nihil est necesse, modo ii, qui in cseteros dominationem habent, dimidio pauciores sint universis." (p. 342.) + Referring to slaves and freedmen, Aristotle says that all are not to be con* sidered as citizens, without whom a state could not exist: ov iravTaq Qereov 7roXt'rac, w aviv ovk av tin ttoXiq, Pol. III. 5. Again, he remarks, that in order to determine the proper size of a state, as to population, we must look, not to the number of slaves and resident aliens, but to those who are, in fac% the component parts and members of the state: oaoi TroXewg slat p'epoc ical s% u>v avvLGTaTcii tcoXiq oiksiojv /xopiu>v. — ib. VII. 4. So he says that in calling a state APPEN.] ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY. 405 voting for a representative in a supreme assembly can be fairly considered a portion of the sovereign power,) is it possible to found the distinction between aristocracy and democracy on any such minute difference? Mr. James Mill, in his Essay on Government, has apparently taken the words in this rigorous acceptation; for he has argued in favour of democracy, on the ground that each member of the majority of the people will have an interest in governing well, because he will have less than one person to oppress; whereas, each member of a minority of the people will have an interest in governing ill, because he will have more than one person to oppress.* But the ordinary usage of the words appears to me to be less precise, and it is doubtful whether, even in scientific reasoning, they can be advantageously used with greater strictness. The distinction between aristocracy and democracy, as commonly conceived and understood, is not a logical distinction of kind, founded on a precise line of separation, but merely a distinction of degree. Aristocracy and democracy cannot be considered as de- scribing governments in which a majority or minority of the people is sovereign, such majority or minority to be determined with numerical precision, like the numbers of voters in a parlia- mentary assembly, or at a popular election. Let us, for example, suppose that, in an independent State, there are 20,000 adult males, and that a law for the regulation of their political suffrage is in question. Everybody would feel that there was a wide and prac- tical difference between a suffrage co-extensive with this entire body, (i. e. universal suffrage,) or a suffrage dependent on a high property qualification, which would limit the voters to 1000 or 1500. The former would be properly called a democratic, the happy, we must look not to a part, but to all the citizens: evdaifiova di ttoXiv ovk dg [xspog r* fiXtyavrag fot Xsyeiv avrrjg, dXX' tig rcavrag rovg TroXirag, Pol. VII. 9. He means, however, to exclude all who are not strictly free citizens ; i. e. — all aliens, freedmen, and slaves, the great numerical majority of the popu- lation. Compare Grot, J. B. et P. I. 3, § 8, n. 6. " Quid quod nulla respublica adeo reperta est popularis, in qua non aliqui aut valde inopes aut externi, turn vero et fceminse et adolescentes, a deliberationibus publicis arceantur." Where see Barbeyrac's note. " Servos antea ex albo civium eximi omnium pcene popu- lorum consensu diximus," says Bodinus de Rep. III. 8. p. 544 ; who however states it to be his own opinion, that slaves ought to be admitted to political rights. * Suppt. to Enc. Brit. vol. IV. p. 500-1. 406 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [APPEN. latter an aristocratic arrangement. But no one would consider it of any importance whether the suffrage extended to 10,001, or to 9999 persons; and it would plainly be a distinction founded on a merely fanciful and unpractical line, if the difference between aris- tocracy and democracy was made to depend on such an impercep- tible shade. In cases where an assembly decides by a majority of votes, the difference between a majority and a minority founded even on a single vote, may, in a particular case, be all-important. But, where men are thrown into large masses, where public opinion acts irregularly, and by impulses, and where no legal effect is given to the numerical majority of the aggregate, but the constituent body is divided into distinct sections, all reference to the precise prepon- derance of numbers is nugatory. It would be as futile as an attempt to make the distinction between heat and cold depend on the ther- mometer being above or below some fixed degree in the scale. We know that the variations of the thermometer, for a few degrees above or below a medium point of temperature, are scarcely per- ceptible: but we can, nevertheless, distinguish between frost and summer's heat. Where a few persons, nobles, or rich men, monopolize the entire governing power, and give themselves important and exclusive privileges, there everybody recognises an aristocracy.* Where the great body of the people possess political rights and franchises, and a complete civil and political equality prevails, there everybody perceives democracy. But these two political states pass into one another by insensible degrees — like the conditions of rich and poor — and cannot be * In the definitions of aristocracy and democracy, both in ancient and modern writers, there is often no reference to a precise demarcation. The People, the Many, or the Poor, are spoken of as having the chief power in a democracy ; — the Nobles, the Rich, the Senate, or the Few, in an aristocracy. Pindar opposes the aotpoi to the \aj3pbg arpar6g, Pyth. II. 157. Tacitus says: " Cunctas nationes et urbespopulus aut primores aut singuli regunt." — Ann. IV. 33. Seneca names pop ulus, senatus, and singuli. — Epist. 14, § 6.. Quintilian names populus, panci, and unus. — Inst. Or. V. 10, § 63. Cicero names unus, delecti, and populus. — Be Rep. I, 26. Montesquieu says that when the people in a body has the sovereign power, it is a democracy ; when the sovereign power is in the hands of a part of the people, it is an aristocracy. — Esp. desLoix, I. 2. Puffen- dorf says, that in a democracy, the people is sovereign ; in an aristocracy, the principal persons of the state.— Law of N. and N. VII. 5, § 3. APPEN.] ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY. 407 marked off by a precise boundary. Accordingly, it is often said, that a constitution is more or less aristocratic or democratic;* meaning that it approaches nearer to one or the other extremity of the scale, the opposite ends of which are thus characterized. Whereas, if the distinction were founded on a logical difference, a gradation such as this would not be possible. A number is either odd or even, and it cannot be more odd or more even. It is conceiv- able, likewise, that a government might be so tempered, that it has no decided inclination either to aristocracy or democracy; it might occupy that middle part of the scale to which neither designation could with confidence be applied, and which would correspond to the degrees of a thermometer which are styled temperate, to the period of life which is called middle age, and is neither old nor young, to the crepuscular state, which is neither night nor day, and the like.t Consistent with this view, is Aristotle's definition of a democracy, and its distinction from an oligarchy. He says, that the former is a government in which the poor, the latter, a government in which the rich are rulers. % That is to say, in order to characterize the form of government, he looks to the opposite extremities of the * Aristotle says that seditions take place concerning the different degrees of oligarchy and democracy — whether a government shall be more or less oli- garchical or democratical. 'in 7repi tov fiaXKov ical rjrrov olov ri okiyapx'iav ovaav eig to fiaWov 6\iy applied ai r/ eig to tJttov, rj drjfiOKpaTiav ovaav dg to fiaXXov SrifioKpctTeivQai fj eig to tjttov. — Pol. V. 1. Again, in V. 9, he speaks of the most democratic democracies, kv TcCig dt][xoKpaTiaig rdlg judXiora elvai doKovaatg dwoKpaTwcug. So, Montesquieu, on aristocracies: " Plus une aris- tocratie approchera de la democratic, plus elle sera parfaite -, et elle le deviendra moins a mesure qu'elle approchera de la monarchic." — Esp. des Loix, 1. II. ch. 3. Montesquieu here conceives aristocracy as oscillating between the extremes of monarchy and democracy — between the government of the one and that of themany — and as capable of resting at any point intermediate between these two limits. f Grotius refers to a middle state of this kind, as frequently creating uncer- tainty in the moral sciences : he compares it with the dawn, an intermediate state between night and day, and with water in a lukewarm state, between heat and cold. — De J. B. et P. II. 23, § 1. Puffendorf, in commenting on this passage, remarks that a medium state of this kind is called, in the schools, a participa- tive mean, as partaking of the two extremes in both directions. — Law of N. and N. I. 2, § 9. X Pol. III. 5, IV. 3. He reconciles this with the numerical definition by saying, that democracy \s when the free citizens and the poor, being the majority, are sovereign; oligarchy, when the rich and noble, being few in number, are sovereign. 408 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [APPEN. social scale, without adverting to the middle class of citizens; of whose importance he is, nevertheless, well aware.* He speaks, indeed, in many places, of the danger of making a government too democratic, or too oligarchical, by inclining too exclusively to the interest of the rich or the poor. He considers it fortunate for a commonwealth when the middle class of citizens is large and powerful, and he advises that this class should always, when it is possible, be invested with political power, so as to make a con- stitution mixed of oligarchy and democracy, f It may be added, that aristocracy and democracy are, properly speaking, forms of government ; and that, in distinguishing between them, the distribution of the sovereign powers, or of the political suffrage, must alone be considered. But, inasmuch as certain states of society are in general found to accompany these forms of government, a people is sometimes called aristocratic or democratic, although its form of government may * Pol IV. 11 and 12. f In Pol. IV. 11, Aristotle remarks, that "in all states the community con- sists of three parts — the very rich, the very poor, and those "between these two classes." In this and the following chapter, he enlarges, at length, on the advantages arising from investing with power the middle class of citizens. Again, in V. 8, he dwells on the importance of a moderate constitution, avoid- ing the extremes both of oligarchy and democracy, but founded on the interests of the middle class. Aristotle, however, remarks, that of the two extremes, the oligarchical is the most dangerous : the excesses of the rich destroy the State (he says) more often than the excesses of the people, (IV. 12.) Oligarchies are likewise more instable and short lived than democracies, (V. 1 and 12.) A moderate constitution, in which the rights of all the citizens are regarded, founded mainly on the support of the middle class, but inclining to democracy, is what Aristotle calls a 7roXir«/a, (V. 7.) Bodinus, de Repub. II. 6, (p. 345,) thinks: "Civitates optimatum imperio moderatas, stabiliores esse quam populares ;" and, indeed, he says: "aristo- cratic semper diuturniores fuerunt in quibus pauciores erant optimates." — VI. 4, p. 1102. Muratori likewise speaks of the mixture of aristocracy and democracy in the Italian republics: " Non una sorte di governo stabilimente si conservo una volta nelle citta libere d'ltalia, ma di tre differenti spezie di governo or l'una or l'altra si pratico. U Aristocratic o fu de' soli nobili, con esclusione della plebe, come tuttavia si osserva nelle repubbliche di Venezia, Genova, e Lucca. II democra- tico del solo popolo, esclusi i nobili, come sovente avvenne in Siena, e talvolta anche in Genova, Bologna, &c. II misto composto di nobili e popolari, con dividere fra loro gli ufizj ; il che si osservo non rade volte per quasi tutte le libere citta. L'ltalia e la Grecia anticamente diedero esempli di questi tre governi."— Muratori, Diss. 52, (torn. III. p. 119.) APPEN.] ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY. 409 not be entitled to be so called. For example, M. de Tocqueville, in his work on the United States, often calls the English people, or state of society, aristocratic; and the French people, or state of society, democratic. There is more social equality, in point of actual wealth, among the upper and middle classes in France than in England;* but looking to political institutions — to the power of the crown, the extent of the suffrage, the liberties of the subject, the facility of political association, the freedom of the press, &c, England was, when M. de Tocqueville wrote, more democratic than France. So the state of society in France, before the revolu- tion of 1789, is usually called aristocratic, although the govern- ment was a pure monarchy. An aristocratic or democratic period is likewise spoken of, mean- ing a period characterized by the existence of those political insti- tutions, and that social state, which naturally result from these several forms of government, or by a tendency to their adoption. § 3. If the preceding view of the difference between aristocracy and democracy is correct — if the distinction between them is of degree, and not of kind, it follows that much caution ought to be used in laying down general propositions respecting them. Unquestionably, there are certain tendencies which are common to all aristocracies and all democracies. Where the powers of government are confined to a, few, there is a tendency to political inequality — to a system of privilege for the persons possessing those powers, and probably to social inequalities of wealth, hereditary rank, &c. Where they are common to a large number — to an actual majority or a large minority of the people, there is a ten- dency to political equality, to the absence of privilege, and to social equality in respect of wealth and private position. From these distinctions certain consequences may be derived, which it may be possible to express in general terms. By care- fully analyzing the phenomena which accompany the aristocratic * " Quand un peuple a un etat social democratique, (says M. de Tocqueville,) c'est a dire qu'il n'existe plus dans son sein de castes ni de classes, et que tous les citoyens y sont a peu pres egaux en lumieres et en biens." — La Dem. en Am. torn. IV. p. 243. There is, however, no country in which the people are nearly equal in intelligence and knowledge. By a democratic state of society, is meant a state of society in which there are no privileged orders, and in which there is an approximation to an equal distribution of property : where the legal equality is complete, and the social inequality is not considerable. 410 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [APPEN. and democratic forms of government; by excluding those which are traceable to other causes, (such as religion, race, geographical position, state of the useful arts, &c.) by thus isolating the residuary phenomena, and referring them to their true cause; certain general theorems respecting the several tendencies of these two forms of government may be constructed.* After all, however, nothing more than general or prevailing tendencies can be predicated. t It can only be affirmed that, sup- posing men who have the power will use that power as men hitherto have for the most part used it, such and such consequences will follow. For it is conceivable, for instance, that in a narrow aristo- cracy, the ruling body might, under the guidance of some far-sighted and public-spirited leader, administer the government upon liberal and popular principles. % Of such a process of reasoning, confined within its proper limits, no better example can, perhaps, yet be named, than the analysis of the Greek oligarchies and democracies, in Aristotle's Politics. Even his inferences require, in many cases, to be limited by the peculiar data of his problem. Amongst the modern speculators on Politics, several have, how- ever, carried the attempt too far, and have selected, as distinctive marks, or invariable accompaniments, of aristocracy and democracy, or of free governments generally, circumstances which do not * " So great is the force of laws, and of particular forms of government, and so little dependence have they on the humours and tempers of men, that con- sequences almost as general and certain may sometimes be deduced from them, as any which the mathematical sciences afford us." — Hume, Essays, Part I. Essay 3 — That Politics may be reduced to a Science. See also, Mill, System of Logic, b. VI. c. 6. + See above, p. 140. J " It has often happened (says Aristotle) that the constitution according to law is not popular; but, as to its spirit and conduct, is administered in a popular manner: and again, in other cases, the constitution has been according to law of a popular tendency; but in its spirit and conduct is rather oligarchical." —Polit. IV. 5. In like manner, Bodinus, De Rep. II. 2 (p. 295) : " Optimates pauci rem- publicam populari modo regere possunt, si cives omnes omnium magistratuum participes fecerint : aut aristocratice, si paucis quibusdam, [paucos quosdam ?] qui aut virtute, aut censu, aut nobilitate cseteris prsestent." He makes the same remark with respect to a king, viz. — that he may govern the State either on popular or on aristocratic principles. APPEN.] ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY. 411 belong to the essence of these forms of government, and only are in certain cases accidentally found in connexion with them.* Thus, it cannot be laid down universally, with Montesquieu, that Virtue is the principle of democratic, and Moderation of aristocratic governments.t Neither can it be affirmed, with him, generally, that luxury is advantageous to monarchies, and detrimental to aristocracies and democracies; J or, that the Catholic religion best suits a monarchy, and the Protestant religion a republic.§ Some of the theorems respecting free or popular government, laid down by Hume, in his Essays, appear, in like manner, to be derived from an imperfect induction, and therefore not to admit the generality which he assigns to them. Thus, he lays it down, as a general truth in politics, " invariable by the humour or educa- tion both of subject or sovereign," that free governments, though commonly the most happy for those who partake of their freedom, are the most ruinous and oppressive to their provinces. " The pro- vinces of absolute monarchies (he adds) are always better treated than those of free States." || That many free States, as well aristocratic as democratic, have misgoverned their dependent pro- vinces, cannot be disputed; and it may, perhaps, be admitted, that the peculiar opinions and customs of a dependent community are more likely to be treated with respect where the paramount nation is governed by a monarch, than where it is under an aristocratic or democratic regimen; though the treatment of Flanders and the American provinces by Spain affords a remarkable proof of a similar tendency in a despotic government. But it cannot be conceded, * Hume remarks, that many of MachiavePs general inferences on political forms are founded on too narrow an induction for general application : " Ma- chiavel (he says) was certainly a great genius; but, having confined his study to the furious and tyrannical governments of ancient times, or to the little dis- orderly principalities of Italy, his reasonings, especially upon monarchical government, have been found extremely defective; and there is scarcely any maxim in his Prince, which subsequent experience has not entirely refuted." — Part I. Essay 12— Of Civil Liberty. \ Esprit des Loix, liv. III. ch. 3, 4; V. 2—8. \ lb. 1. VII. c. 2, 3, and 4. He concludes the latter chapter thus : " Tout ceci mene a une reflexion ; les republiques finissent par le luxe, les monarchies par la pauvrete." Under republic, Montesquieu includes both aristocracy and democracy. § lb. 1. 24, ch. 5. || Essays, Part I. Essay 3 — That Politics may be reduced to a Science. 412 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [APPEN. that there is anything in the essence of a free government (i. e. a government which is not an absolute monarchy*), necessarily tending to produce oppression of dependencies. Hume, himself, on the other hand, refutes a position which he found laid down by many writers, that the arts and sciences never can flourish but under a free government.t He likewise questions the universality of another established opinion on the same subject, that trade can only flourish under free institutions; though he admits, that this latter opinion rests on a wider observation than the former one. J Elsewhere, however, he lays it down, that "it is impossible for the arts and sciences to arise, at first, among any people, unless that people enjoy the blessing of a free government:" and that, "though the only proper nursery of those noble plants [the arts and sciences] be a free state, yet may they be transplanted into any government; and that a republic is most favourable to the growth of the sciences, and a civilized monarchy to that of the polite arts."§ Positions such as these, respecting the attraction or repulsion, of either monarchy, on the one hand, or of aristocracy and democracy on the other, for the arts and sciences, and for commerce, seem to me scarcely to admit of satisfactory demonstration. No one, however, has carried this mode of reasoning so far as M. de Tocqueville, in his work on Democracy in America. In this able treatise he attempts to lay down a number of general pro- positions respecting democracy, and a democratic people or age; not confined to the more immediate and palpable effects of the form of government, but extending to very remote consequences, and comprehending subjects having no obvious connexion with political institutions. For example, he lays it down that a democratic age has a natural tendency to pantheism ; he believes that this philosophic or religious system has a peculiar attraction for a democratic people. || He thinks * " The government, which in common appellations [parlance?] receives the appellation of free, is that which admits of a partition of power among several members, whose united authority is no less, or is commonly greater, than that of any monarch ; but who, in the usual course of administration, must act by general and equal laws, that are previously known to all the members, and to all their subjects." — Hume, Part I. Essay 5 — Of the Origin of Government. f Part I. Essay 12.-0/ Civil Liberty. t Ibid. § Part I. Essay 14, — Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences. ]| La Democratic en Amerique, torn. III. p. 59. APPEN.] ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY. 413 that democratic nations are passionately fond of abstract and generic terms* Again, with regard to the fine arts; he is of opinion that a love for numerous small works of painting or sculpture, executed by inferior artists, characterizes a democratic people.t He thinks likewise that in architecture the democratic taste inclines to build- ings devoid of solidity, and made only for outward show. As an example of the latter, he refers to a row of small palaces, of Grecian architecture, near the shore, at New York, which at a distance he supposed to be of white marble, but on a near approach he dis- covered to be of brick and plaster, with painted wooden columns. £ As to poetry, he fears that, finding no fit subject for it in the real life of his country, a democratic poet will depart widely from nature, will lose himself in the clouds, and pursue the wild, the monstrous, and the exaggerated. § He affirms that a democratic nation despise the coarse and noisy amusements which please the common people in an aristocracy, but that they cannot appreciate the intellectual and refined amusements of the aristocratic classes; that they require something productive and substantial even in their diversions.! He thinks farther, that a democratic age is peculiarly characterized by a fondness for easy successes and present enjoyments.^" He even believes that, in an aristocracy, every person has a single object which he pursues without cessation ; whereas in a democratic society each person follows several objects at the same time.** Now, on considering these and similar general propositions with which M. de Tocqueville's ingenious and suggestive work abounds, it is easy to see that he has not sufficiently borne in mind a caution which he has himself laid down, as a guide in inquiries, such as that which he has undertaken. He remarks elsewhere, that it is necessary not to confound that which is democratic with that which is only American. He warns his readers against seeing all democratic nations under the type of the American people. He says that he cannot consent to separate America from Europe, not- withstanding the ocean which divides them. For that he considers the people of the United States as only a portion of the English people, employed in clearing the forests of the New World; while * La Democratie en Amerique, torn. III. p. 135. f lb. p. 100. % lb. p. 101. § lb. p. 155. || lb. torn. IV. p. 118. f Tom. III. p. 29. ** Tom. IV. p. 122. 414 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [APPEN. the rest of the nation, possessed of greater leisure, and less en- grossed with the care of procuring a livelihood, can occupy itself more with mental pursuits.* In these just remarks, M. de Tocqueville indicates the necessity of attending to other circumstances than political institutions in characterizing the acts and dispositions of a community, He shows that he bears in mind the important influence which national origin, race, religion, manners, climate, geographical position, as well as the state of the useful arts, cannot fail to exercise upon the opinions, feelings, acts, and character of a political society. He points to the many features of resemblance between the people of England and that of the United States, notwithstanding that the one (according to his view) is an aristocratic, the other a democratic community. It would, perhaps, be not difficult, if this were the proper place, to trace many of the phenomena, selected by M. de Tocqueville, to various unconnected sources, wholly independent of democratic or other political influences. For instance, the prevalence of pan- theistic opinions (so far as they are prevalent) is to be sought for in the diffusion of the modern German philosophy — the taste for cheap works of art in numerous mechanical inventions for facili- tating their production. In order to see at once that M. de Tocque- ville's theorems respecting aristocracy and democracy are, in fact, founded on an imperfect induction — that he has not disentangled all the antecedent facts concurring in the production of the observed phenomenon — and that he has generalized the single case of America, or, at most, of America and France, it is only necessary to test his propositions by the ancient republics. Now, nobody would think of saying that, in the Grecian demo- cracies, the people had any tendency to pantheism, or to the use of abstract terms; and certainly it could not be affirmed of Athens, in the age of Pericles, that its taste in poetry ran into the unnatural and grotesque, or that its taste in sculpture and architecture was turned to petty and perishable works. So the row of white plaster palaces at New York, which M. de Tocqueville considered a mark and consequence of democracy, has, I fear, many parallels, and pro- bably patterns, in aristocratic England. M. de Tocqueville doubtless saw that most of his general apoph- thegms concerning democracy, were not applicable to the republics Tom. III. pp. 68,70,71. APPEN.] ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY. 415 which the ancients regarded as democratic, and which the moderns have generally recognised as such. Accordingly, he considers the governments, both of Athens and Rome, at their most popular periods, as being, in fact, aristocratic on account of the exclusion of the slaves from political rights.* It is no doubt right, in reasoning upon the ancient democracies, and in instituting a comparison between them and modern demo- cracies, to bear constantly in mind the important fact, that the former contained a numerous class of slaves, and that the free citizens were only a small minority of the entire population. But it would, in my opinion, be a disturbance of the established land- marks of history, and an unauthorized departure from the received language of all writers, ancient and modern, to treat the Athenian and Roman governments, in their developed forms, as aristocracies. Nor, indeed, would even this phraseology render M. de Tocque- ville's generalizations correct ; for assuming these governments to be aristocratic, it will be found that his general affirmations respect- ing aristocracies are often as inapplicable to those ancient republics as other of his general affirmations respecting democracies. The utmost caution is requisite in laying down general propo- sitions respecting the tendencies of aristocratic and democratic governments, or the characteristics of aristocratic and democratic communities. Even the induction of Aristotle, which was neces- sarily confined to the Greek and other republics on the shores of the Western Mediterranean, is, in many cases, inapplicable to modern Christian communities, having no class of slaves, and ac- quainted with the use of gunpowder, printing, the compass, and the steam-engine. M. de Tocqueville remarks, that " two neighbour- ing nations cannot have the same democratic social state without adopting similar opinions and manners."t Admitting the truth of this remark, (which, however, I must be permitted to think very questionable,) it does not follow that this similarity will exist in cases where communities are separated, not only by wide intervals of space, but also by wide intervals of time, and whose religion, race, language, and civilization, are widely different. § 4. It is by a neglect to observe the cautions above indicated — * Tom. III. p. 122. In like manner, he says, that the Americans who inhabit the States where slavery does not exist, alone present the complete image of a democratic society, torn. IV. p. 147. + Tom. IV. p. 243. 416 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [APPEN. by hasty attempts to generalize without a sufficient basis of facts, and to found universal theorems upon a complex but undissected phenomenon — by the consequent establishment of imaginary laws of connexion between facts related to each other only by juxta- position in place or time — and by subjecting intricate problems of plurality of causes to the direct inductive method, without verifi- cation or correction, that the Science of Politics has been rendered uncertain and uninstructive, and that practical politicians and statesmen have been deterred from regarding it as resting on a sure foundation, or as tending to useful applications.* If political science be properly understood — if it be confined within the limits of its legitimate province — and if its vocabulary be well fixed by sound definitions and a consistent usage, there is no reason why it should not possess the same degree of certainty which belongs to other sciences founded on observation. § 5. Political science may be conveniently distributed into the following three great departments : — 1. The nature of a sovereign government, and its relations with the individual persons immediately subject to it. 2. The relation of a sovereign government to a political com- munity dependent upon it. 3. The mutual relations of the sovereign governments of independent communities. Each of these departments admits of being considered in a double point of view. Each may be either treated merely as something existing, as something which is, without reference to its tendencies, or to any standard of rectitude ; or, again, it may be assumed that the existing state of each is known, and it may be treated with reference to its probable future tendencies and effects, as well as with reference to its most improved and erfect state, or what it ought to be. The former may be called Positive or Descriptive, the latter, Ideal, or Speculative Politics. The science of Positive or Descriptive Politics would, with regard to the first of the three departments above mentioned, comprehend an exposition of the structure of a sovereign government, and its powers — the nature of laws and of their execution — the nature of legal rights and obligations, and their classes, and other cognate * As to the defectiveness of the ordinary methods of proof in the moral sciences, see the exposition of Mr. Mill, System of Logic, b. III. c. 10, §8; b. V.c.5.§4; b. VI. c. 7. APPEN.] ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY. 417 subjects. This exposition would be generally applicable to all governments, laws, rights, obligations, &c, without reference to their comparative goodness or badness, or to their conformity with some ideal standard; it would treat political society merely as a subject of observation, and political institutions as something to be noted and described.* Portions of Aristotle's Politics, of Cicero's Republic, of Hobbes' Leviathan, of the works of Grotius and Puffendorf on the Law of Nations, and of their followers, fall under this head. Most of the writers on general jurisprudence likewise contain an exposition of the nature and action of a sovereign government. On the other hand, the Republic and Laws of Plato, a large part of Aristotle's Politics, the works of Bodinus, Machiavel, Montesquieu, Sir T. More, and others, are occupied almost ex- clusively with considering the tendencies and effects of certain political forms and institutions, or the best form of government. The second department above mentioned, viz. — that which con- cerns the relation between a paramount or imperial community, and its dependency, has been considered more or less at length by many writers, but has been generally treated in connexion with the question of colonies, both as respects the actual form of the relation, and the rules of expediency by which it ought to be governed. The third department, viz. — that of the Law of Nations, or International Law, may be regarded under the same double aspect. It may be either considered as an actually existing system of moral rules, to which the governments of civilized nations usually conform in their mutual relations, and to which they habitually appeal as something recognised in common. Or it may be considered as an ideal or theoretical type, to which the practice of independent nations ought to conform. Such, for example, would be a system of conventional rules for the prevention of war between civilized nations, and for the settlement of international differences without an appeal to arms. The former of these has been called the Positive Law of Nations ; the latter might be called Speculative Inter- national Law. In the earlier writers, as Grotius and his imitators, the Law of Nations as it is, and the Law of Nations as it ought to be, are frequently confounded; and, indeed, scarcely any attempt is made * " General jurisprudence, or the philosophy of positive law, is concerned with law as it necessarily is, rather than with law as it ought to be : with law as it must be, be it good or bad, rather than with law as it must be, if it be good." — Austin, Outline of Lectures on General Jurisprudence, p. 3. E E 418 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [APPEN. to separate them. By the more recent writers on this important branch of political science — as Martens and Wheaton — this dis- tinction has been generally observed.* The Positive or Descriptive Branch of Political Science, (whether it treats of the relations of a sovereign government to its immediate subjects, or of its relations to its dependencies, or of international law,) is concerned merely with the past and present. It considers exclusively what a sovereign government is, and must be ; what is necessarily its mode of action; what are its relations, in every con- ceivable state of things, with those who are subject to its power. In like manner, it describes the rules which have been actually ob- served and recognised by sovereign governments in their relations with each other. It is partly founded on facts observable, and within the reach of our senses, and partly on facts recorded in history. This portion of political science admits of as much certainty as the physical sciences; and it might, by due attention, and the absence of political prejudice, be brought immediately to scientific perfection. Within its proper province, there is no fact or phe- nomenon requiring notice which eludes observation; nor is there any combination of facts for which an adequate general expression cannot be found. Let us, for example, take such propositions as the following : — A sovereign government is free from all legal restraint. A positive law is a general command, proceeding directly or in- directly from a sovereign government. A legal right is conferred, a legal obligation is created, by a sovereign government. A dependency is a political community under a subordinate government. International law is not enforced by any tribunal common to two or more independent nations. Such propositions as these are as certain, and rest on as good evidence, as general propositions in mechanics, optics, or chemistry. If they are not true, the fault must be imputed, not to the subject- * The distinction between the Positive and the Natural Law of Nations is clearly laid down hy Vatel, (Law of Nations, §§ 24-7,) and he says: "We shall be careful to distinguish them, without, however, treating of them sepa- rately." Martens points out the same distinction, and dwells on its importance. — Law of Nations, Introd. §§ 3, 4. APPEN.] ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY. 419 matter, but to imperfect or inaccurate induction, or defective lan- guage. The facts upon which these propositions are founded lie as open to observation, and are determined with the same amount of certainty as those which support propositions in physical science. It is true that political science cannot be made the subject of experiment ; we cannot arrange the phenomena at will so as to test a certain principle ; but the relations of government and society, in a state of equilibrium, are all within the range of our senses, and can be determined with scientific certainty. Politics, considered as a descriptive and positive science, deals merely with the relations of men to one another. All these are manifested in outward acts, and are, therefore, exempt from the obscurity which envelops the internal processes of thought, the subject of metaphysics — and the operation of our vital organs, the subject of physiology.* The prevalent belief in the inferior certainty of political, as com- pared with physical science, arises in part from a confusion between the certainty and the precision of sciences. It has been truly remarked by M. Comte, that a proposition may be certain without being pre- cise, and precise without being certain. f There is such a thing as precise falsehood; and in cases where we can only approximate to the truth, a statement which is true may be couched in vague and general terms. Thus, in politics, many of the definitions — such as those of aristocracy and democracy, illustrated in this Ap- pendix — are founded on distinctions of degree, and are, therefore, necessarily unprecise. Many, if not most, political forms are sepa- rated from one another rather by gradation than by a logical limit. Yet the distinctions which they indicate, though wanting in the sharpness and rigour of geometrical determinations, are just as real and certain as lines, angles, surfaces, and solids. The speculative or ideal branch of political science, on the other hand, (with whatever department of politics it may be occupied,) considers the tendencies, actual or possible, of governments, political institutions, and laws; it also considers what are the best and most perfect political forms and institutions, or what a government and its acts ought to be. It is concerned primarily and directly with the future, and only incidentally and by reference with the past. * Compare Mill's System of Logic, vol. I. p. 537. f Cours de Phil Positive, torn. I. p. 103. 420 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [APPEN. It professes to furnish the statesman with a manual of legislation; to teach how States ought to be constituted, organized, and governed ; what rules ought to be observed in the intercourse of independent nations; and, generally, to lay down the maxims which should guide mankind in all the relations and forms which political government can assume. Positive and speculative politics stand to one another in the same relation as that in which the descriptive and preceptive departments of ethics stand to each other; in which an account of the passions and moral sentiments stands to a set of moral rules for the guidance of life, and the formation of a virtuous character; or in which anatomy and pathology stand to therapeutics. The speculative branch of politics, from its nature, does not admit the same amount of certainty as the positive branch. While the latter treads on the sure and firm ground of the past, the former partakes of the uncertainty and obscurity which generally cover the future. It professes to describe the tendencies of political institutions, collecting them from the past by a process of observa- tion and inference. But when the theory so established is applied to any practical case, it becomes necessary to consider whether the tendency will operate unchecked, or whether its operation will be counteracted, either wholly or partially, by opposing and disturbing forces. In politics, as in other sciences, the probable consequences of any efficient cause can only be expressed in general terms, by supposing that cause to act freely, and without impediment or re- sistance. But, in applying such a general theorem to practice, allowance must be made for the action of the opposing or retarding influences; and it is in the detection of these influences, in their due appreciation, and in the calculation of their number, duration, direction, and intensity, that the practical skill of the politician, to a great extent, resides. The same is the case with the science of mechanics, in which the tendencies of bodies in movement, or of mechanical powers, are calculated without reference to friction; and with the science of medicine, which teaches the probable effect of a drug or other remedy when the human body is in an ordinary state, but leaves to the skill of the physician to judge how far these effects will be heightened or diminished by an abnormal state of the system. Thus, for example, it may be affirmed that the natural tendency of aristocracy is to produce political inequality, and of democracy to produce political equality; that certain forms of criminal law APPEN.] ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY. 421 and systems of punishment tend to repress crime, and that others fail in this respect; that high duties counteract, and low duties facilitate, the importation of goods. But it cannot be predicted with confidence, in any individual case, that each of these tendencies will produce its natural effect. Thus, an aristocratic government may abolish slavery, while a democratic government may maintain it. A high duty may be so far neutralized by smuggling, as to be inoperative; while the natural tendency of low duties to encourage importation may be frustrated by a deficient supply, by high freights, or by maritime insecurity. In like manner, the natural tendency of mankind, in a state of imperfect civilization, is to increase their numbers at a more rapid rate than their means of subsistence. But this tendency may, in any given country, and at a given time, be effectually counteracted by prudence, industry, the love of accumulation, and judicious political and domestic arrangements. The general tendency of monastic institutions is to produce laziness and ignorance in their members; nevertheless, some monastic bodies have been distinguished for their learning, and, during the dark ages, such learning as existed was principally to be found in convents. In practical politics, moreover, there is the additional difficulty, that not only is the future hard to determine, even where time is afforded for the inquiry, on account of the multitude, intricacy, and diversity of the influences to be considered, but it often happens that a decision must be made on the spur of the moment, and with imperfect information.* This difficulty, however, besets every department of active life, and is not peculiar either to politics or ethics. A traveller in an unknown country must act on such information or indications as he can obtain in order to reach his destination, or perhaps to save his life. A commander of a vessel, threatened with shipwreck, must judge, as he best can, how to ex- tricate it from its peril. The general of an army must regulate his manoeuvres according to the best information he can obtain re- specting the state of the roads and bridges, the feelings of the people, the supply of food, and the enemy's movements. Moreover, in practical politics, as in the conduct of private affairs, there is much intentional deceit. False reports are circu- * See, on this subject, the remarks of Puffendorf, Law of N. and N. 1. I. ch. 2, § 4. 422 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [APPEN. lated, and false information sent, in order to mislead the govern- ment; false testimony is given, in order to pervert the course of justice; documents are forged, and other contrivances are resorted to, for the purpose either of concealing the truth, or accrediting falsehood. From this source of error, the physical sciences are nearly free — the chemist, the astronomer, or the optician, has to deal with natural phenomena, in which there is no motive or opportunity for deception; and, even in medical science, the risk of intentional fraud is not in general considerable. § 6. Inasmuch as the positive and speculative branches of politics aim at different objects, and rest on evidence of unequal certainty, it is advisable to treat them separately, and to keep their provinces distinct in discussion as much as possible.* Posi- tive politics may be taught as a system, in connexion with juris- prudence and law. It may be reduced to a small number of elementary principles, liable to little doubt or controversy; it admits of as much certainty and simplicity as other sciences, which enter into the course of a liberal education; and it ought not, if pro- perly handled, to involve any questions calculated to arouse party feelings, or to alarm established authorities in Church or State. To which it may be added, that a judicious selection from the best existing works on political philosophy, the law of nature and nations, and general jurisprudence, will furnish most of the materials which are needed for such a scientific exposition. Speculative * " Speculative systems have, in all ages of the world, heen adopted for reasons too frivolous to have determined the judgment of any man of common sense, in a matter of the smallest pecuniary interest. Gross sophistry has scarce ever had any influence upon the opinions of mankind, except in matters of philosophy and speculation; and in these it has frequently had the greatest." — Wealth of Nations, b. V. ch. 1, art. 2. Undoubtedly, men have been, and continue to be, deceived by gross sophistry in speculative matters. But I cannot perceive that entire exemption from the dominion of sophistry in questions of practice which Adam Smith believes to exist. That there have been popular delusions, of the most dangerous kind, in practical matters where fear operates, is notorious. Religious impostures, divina- tion, astrology, witchcraft, have also exercised, and in many countries continue to exercise, an almost unbounded sway. Nor has pecuniary interest, (as Adam Smith seems to think,) been any preservative against error. Commercial bubbles of all sorts — from the South Sea scheme downwards — make a long chapter; and surely the various economical delusions, which Adam Smith himself exposed, and which are still to a great extent current, have a close connexion with practice. ArPEN.] ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY. 423 politics, on the other hand, is a subject which requires a gentle and cautious treatment. Its province is vast, and almost unbounded; its problems are nearly indeterminate; it has been cultivated with- out a due regard to the laws of scientific analysis, and has been overlaid with fanciful and unsound theories, by writers whose very genius has only served to give currency to their errors, without guiding or illuminating their way; it is likewise, in each country, connected with some of the most stimulating questions by which political, religious, and historical parties are divided from and em- bittered against each other. If, by a science of government, is meant a science which teaches what is the one best form of government, at all times, in all coun tries, and under all circumstances, I agree with Mr. Mill,* that no such science can exist. In like manner, the science of mechanics cannot show what is the best machine for accomplishing a given purpose, in every combination of circumstances; the science of navi- gation cannot teach how a ship is to be navigated, in every com- bination of circumstances; the science of strategy cannot teach how an army is to be moved, or a fortress attacked, in every combination of circumstances. The science of government, as it has been treated by the speculators on ideal states, stands in nearly the same relation to positive politics, as that in which the sacred theories of the earth propounded by Burnet and others, and the systems of the Plutonian s and Neptunians, stand to the modern descriptive geology; or as that in which the speculations on the philosopher's stone and the elixir vitae stand to modern chemistry and medicine. But if, by the science of government, is understood the science of legislation, such a science can and does exist; although its objects are different from those of positive politics, and its certainty inferior, while its impor- tance is greater. In whatever manner we look at these two departments of political science — whether we compare their objects, the evidence on which they rest, or the subjects with which they are connected — it is mani- fest that the cultivation of positive politics has everything to lose, and nothing to gain, by an association with its more ambitious and pre- tending neighbour. These remarks, however, are not intended to discourage the in- vestigation of that important class of subjects which fall under the See his System of Logic, vol. II. p. 578 Compare p. 598. 424 ON THE DISTINCTION, ETC. [APPEN. domain of speculative politics, or the science of legislation. Their purpose is merely to recommend the separation of departments of knowledge, which are in their nature different. The field of poli- tical science will be better cultivated, if its several portions are clearly marked off, and placed under appropriate labourers. The speculative branch of politics, consisting of inquiries into the tendencies of political forms, the probable effects of certain laws and institutions, and the best means of promoting the welfare of a civil society, must be combined, to a great extent, with historical and statistical researches; and, perhaps, some of its most useful and soundest theories are to be found in connexion with avowed collections or narratives of facts. With the prevailing tendency of the civilized world to look in all things scientific for a positive basis of fact, historical writers, in all the various forms which the registration of human transactions can assume, and not speculators on the most perfect form of government, are the principal teachers of political wisdom.* It ought not, however, to be overlooked, that a distinct, precise, and complete conception of positive politics, and of the ideas in- volved in it, is a necessary preliminary to a successful excursion into the region of speculative politics. In order that a person should describe the character, trace the effects, and predict the pro- bable future operation, of political forms and institutions, he must previously understand what they are, how they arise, and in what they consist. He must have a familiar knowledge of the tools with which he is to work; he must know the value of the coins with which his traffic is to be carried on. If, therefore, the separation of these two departments should tend to give greater clearness and certainty to those fundamental ideas on which all political science is built, it would, in its consequences, prove an effectual assistance to Political Speculation. * See above, p. 154. THE END. LBJl'25 S, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS^ 021 060 169 7 ranK