E 450 . T37 Copy 1 A SERMON MOSES' FUGITIVE SLAVE BILL, PREACHED AT ASHLAND, MASS. 5Cooemb*r 3, 1850. B V WILLIAM M. THAYER. PASTOR OF THE ORTHODOX CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH. PUBLISHED BY REQUEST, BOSTON: ' PRINTED BY CHARLES C. P. MOODY, Old Dickinson Office 52 Washinston Street. 1850. Class^iT l+±_Q_ Book T3 w A SERMON MOSES' FUGITIVE SLAVE BILE, PREACHED AT ASHLAND, MASS. November 3, 1850. BY WILLIAM M. THAYER. PASTOR OF THE ORTHODOX CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH. PUBLISHED BY REQUEST BOSTON: PRINTED BY CHARLES C. P. MOODY, Old Dickinson Office 52 Washington Street. 1850. 7 F f 6 6 <• ? *~. SERMON. " Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the servant which is escaped from his master unto thee." — Dedteronomt 23: 15. The present is a crisis of thrilling interest. This the recent development of feeling in our social and national relations conspires to show. The land rings with excitement. From Maine to Louisiana, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, a tide of feeling swells like the waves of the troubled sea. All classes and conditions of men participate in it. The high and low, the rich and poor, the learned and unlearned, the bond and free — all feel the movings of unwonted sympathy. The laborer is appealed to by the sacredness of his rights, the statesman by the responsibilities of his high commission, the minister of justice by " the purity of his ermine," and the minister of religion by the sanctity of his calling, to feel, speak, act. Thousands aver that silence is unpardonable, and indifference is sin. And why this excitement ? How came we to such a crisis ? Politicians are out against Moses and the legislation of his God. Their decree has gone forth, that men shall deliver " unto his master the servant which is escaped from his master unto thee." This is the tidings that are borne on the wings of the wind to cause excitement from sea to sea. Sufficient cause for excitement this ! Our fathers, to settle a question that involved a similar principle, resorted to the musket and cannon. And yet our fathers' cause resulted from a wrong; less asroravat- ing than that which sends back the guiltless fugitive to his chains and tears. Theirs was simply to decide whether to submit to a paltry tax, — not whether they should be bought and sold as the cattle in their stalls. But the cause of the fleeing fugitive, whose only crime is being " guilty of a skin Not colored like our own," his cause is, whether he shall be robbed of his inaliena- ble rights, and submit to be treated, with his wife and children, as articles of merchandise ; — ■ whether he shall ever breathe the air of freedom, or wear the chains of perpetual servitude. If our fathers had a claim upon the sympathies of the world (and we think they had,) then the fugitive from a bondage, " one hour of which is fraught with more misery than ages of that which your fathers rose to rebellion to oppose," has a vastly better claim upon the hearts of all mankind. But, amid the general excitement, we witness two extremes in the expression of feeling. One class of persons would rise and show a forcible resistance to the law that sends back the slave, so fortunate as to escape from his master, to the clime of his sorrows. They would employ the bristling steel against the heartless slave-hunter, abroad upon an errand too base to be described. The other class would bow to the supremacy of law, right or wrong. They would aid " the hunter of human kind " in securing his prey. They would send back the man for whom the Saviour died as truly as for themselves, to the land where the story of a Saviour's love may not be told him. Regarding such conflicting views, the conscientious Christian inquires, what shall I do ? Which of the above named policies are right ? I answer, neither. Both are wrong ! And it becomes a subject of vast importance to decide upon the right principle of Christian action. For the question involves a principle eminently practical ; one which will frequently be tested, perhaps, generally in less important matters, in our future history. Remember, that it is not with the politician that we have to do, but with the Christian ; the man who has a high regard for the Constitution of his land, but a higher regard still for the moral Constitu- tion of God. We are not to brand our National Gov- ernment for enacting laws with as little moral sense as if no God were on the throne, as did infidel France. We are not to impugn any man's motive, nor reflect upon any party. Ours is a higher object — the relation of this subject to Christianity ; — whether he, who pro- fesses to be guided by the principles and precepts of the Gospel, can obey the law in question, and aid in sending back the fugitive to his bonds, and be innocent in the sight of God ? As the basis of my remarks, I have selected MOSES' FUGITIVE SLAVE BILL, contained in the words of the text. And if it be in- quired, whether it is just to bring forth this obsolete statute from the archives of the Mosaic dispensation, it may be replied, that, although designed for the Hebrews alone, it is founded upon principles of justice, humanity, and truth, which are the same to-day as then. There are certain laws of right, affected by no time or circumstances — the same from eternity to eternity — changeless as their author — God. Such is justice, humanity, and truth. There is that which is just, and no power can make it unjust. There is that which is humane, and no power can make it inhuman. There is that which is truth, and no power can make it untruth. In other words, there is a something which God ordained to be the same in all ages, and we call it justice, humanity, truth. Of course, these principles were the same in the days of Moses as now, and the same now as then. It is in accordance with these just, humane, and righteous prin- ciples, that Moses commanded that the fugitive slave should not be returned to his bonds. So clear and decisive is honest conviction on this point, that, ho man can make himself believe that the great Jewish legis- lator acted upon any other principles. Even the slave- holder cannot believe that Moses acted otherwise than from regard to these immutable laws — justice, human- 1* ity, truth. Hence, the reason of the law of Moses, in the text, is a reason existing still. The very fact, that, at this late day, we cannot read the text without associat- ing the notions of justice and humanity with it, shows that these principles are a part of our moral being — unchangeable. So that if the law of Moses had been published yesterday, and designed for all nations, the principles of moral right upon which it was based, could have been no different. It was morally right to pro- claim such a law then. It is so now. And if such a law is based upon an immutable moral right, then its opposite — the prcserd fugitive slave law — cannot be. Also, the text then implied three truths, sufficient for our purpose. (1.) It implied a wrong in slavery itself. Admit, as we are told, that the law protected only the fugitives from the heathen, it is still true, that it implied a wrong in slavery. If our National Legislature should enact such a law, proclaiming this land to be an asylum to all the fugitives from other lands, it would imply that they were escaping from a wrong. So did it three thousand years ago. Had Moses regarded the condition from which they were fleeing as just, and desirable, and good, would he not, as a righteous man, have directed them to return to their masters? Independent of the question whether slavery existed among the Hebrews, and why it existed, this single piece of Mosaic legisla- tion branded human bondage as a wrong. (2.) It im- plied that the slave had a right to his freedom. By this law, Moses presented inducements to slaves to escape from bondage. He really invited them to tiee to Pal- estine as a refuge from the oppressed, assuring them that there their shackles should never more bo riveted. Now, we cannot suppose, for a moment, that Moses, so regardful of truth, would have encouraged the slave to secure what he had no moral right to possess. This would have been to induce him to sin. (o.) It implied that the master had no moral right to withhold freedom from the slave — that he retained him in bondage un- justly. If the master had a right to the slave as his property, it would have been no ordinary offence for Moses to protect him, and thus deprive the master of his right. No righteous man could do this. Whatever slave-holders may think of Moses, in this particular, we have more' respect for the man than to believe he would be thus recreant to justice and truth. If slavery were wrong, then, and if the slave had a right to his freedom, and the master no right to withhold it, then, who can show, that the same is not true notv ? We grant that Moses lived many years ago, but his example is as bright as ever, and his words and acts as 'full of truth. God's ancient, chosen people could trust him, and so can we. Here, then, are reasons sufficient to render Moses' Fugitive Slave Law as good for our present purpose as if fresh from the Hebrew council-halls. Moses would not send back the fugitive, whom he greatly pitied, to the wrongs and cruelty of slavery. Not he. His heart was too full of love to God and man to be guilty of so base a deed. With Moses for our example, and his mo- del legislation for our guide, we proceed to give some reasons, why it is not consistent with Christianity to aid in delivering up the fugitive slave to his master. In order, however, to divest the mind of certain objections, and prepare it to consider, unprejudiced, the reasons we give, it may be necessary to state, briefly, the following five propositions: 1. All admit, that instances may occur, in which civil law ought not to be obeyed. It so clearly conflicts with men's sense of justice and right, that they feel bound to disregard it. Such are laws that infringe upon the rights of conscience. Not a few of the revolutions, that have shattered in pieces despotic governments, have been the result of popular resistance to unrighteous laws restricting religious liberty. The church of Christ to-day is achieving the moral conquest of the world in opposition to numerous laws of the nations where her missions are sustained. And our fathers, to whom allu- sion has already been made, resisted unto blood a law 8 of the mother country, and we are accustomed to ap- plaud them for it. Hence there is a limit beyond which we may not go, and ought not to go, in our obedience to civil law. And where is that line of separation ? Just where the Apostles placed it, when, opposing a law of the land, they said, u we ought to obey God rather than men." This plainly teaches that, sometimes, obedience to civil law may be refused. This leads me to remark, 2. There is a " Higher Law " than the civil code, to be first regarded. The Gospel recognizes two grounds of moral obligation. The first arises from " our duty to man as man, that is, on the ground of the relation which men sustain to each other ; the second is, our duty to man as a creature of God, that is, on the ground of the relation which we all sustain to God. On the latter ground, many things become our duty that would not be on the former." * Hence, when the fugitive from bondage presents himself at our gate for assistance, if we could exclude from the mind the latter ground of moral obligation, and look upon him only in his relation to man, as a fugitive from justice, we might refuse our sympathy, and assume hardihood enough to send him back to his chains. But when we regard our relation to him as a " creature of God," having the Divine image stamped upon his soul, — a subject of Divine law, — we are bound to treat him as a brother, to sympathize with him in his wrongs, to show him compassion, and in love to render him needful aid. But whether this reasoning be correct, or not, it is true, in general, that the laws of Christianity have jurisdiction over all other laws. We all feel, that, in whatever community our lot is cast, we are responsible to God first, to man last, — primarily to the Divine, and secondarily to human government. "We might quote many passages of scripture upon this point ; but the one already quoted is as good as a thousand, — " we ought to obey God rather than men." It is an explicit recognition of a " Higher Law," to be first obeyed. * Wayland's Moral Science, p. 215. Each man is to be his own judge. Whenever he con- scientiously believes a civil law conflicts with the Divine, he must obey the latter. He can obey but one. It is proper and christian, that he obey God rather than men. 3. The slave is a man ! I mean, that, in the light of Christianity he is a man. It is true, that human law says, " Slaves shall be claimed, held, taken, reputed, and adjudged in law, to be chattels personal in the hands of their owners and possessors, and their executors, admin- istrators and assigns, to all intents, constructions and purposes whatsoever."^ But recollect, there is a " Higher Law," and that says no such thing. The Gos- pel excludes no one from the claim to humanity because of color. It recognizes the being who possesses a mind and a soul as an intelligent, responsible, immortal man ! This leads me to remark, 4. Man has no moral right to claim property in his fellow-man. Some have the impression, that the master has a moral title to the slave, because he has paid for, or inherited him, and therefore we are obligated to restore him. But the same persons con- tend that it would be shamefully wrong to make a slave of a free colored man. What is this but denying the original right to possess property in man ? And if ever wrong it is wrong still. It seems almost trifling to argue a point so evident as this. But admit, for a mo- ment, that the slaveholder has a moral right to make merchandise of a man. If he has a moral rio;ht to such property, then you have, and all mankind have. Our moral rights are the same, whether we are Americans, Europeans, Asiatics, or Africans. Hence the slave can morally possess property in his master as rightfully as his master can in him. Whether the act of paying money for him can destroy that original right, you can very easily determine. Remember, when we look upon a slave in the light of Christianity we are to regard his moral rights, — himself the responsible owner of his own * Law of South Carolina. 10 body and soul. But it is inquired still, do we not de- prive the slaveholder of that which he purchased, if we refuse to send back his slave ? What then shall we do ? Do ? Do as reason bids us in a thousand other instances- If a thief disposes of stolen goods to one person, and he disposes of the same to the second, and the second to a third, and so on, until the property is purchased by yourself, innocently, we are not to inquire how you are to be re-paid when the original owner presents his claim for the goods. Your claim is upon the person of whom you purchased, and not upon the propert} 7- . And the person of whom you purchased has claim only upon the person of w'hom he purchased. And thus we trace it back to the original claimant, no one having a title to the property save him. And thus it is with the slave- holder. His claim is not upon the slave, but upon the person of whom he bought him, and the claim of the latter upon the person of whom he purchased him ; and thus on, back to the time when the first sto- len property in a slave was assumed, (for the first slaves in our land were stolen from their native soil.) No person has a just claim upon him, save the original claimant — himself. So that when the fugitive slave presents himself at our doors, we are not obligated to ask how his master shall be re-paid. It may be added, also, that the natural aversion of the human heart to this idea of property, in man, is so great, that such a law as I have quoted, is necessary to make them property in the eye of popular senti- ment. That law declares that slaves shall be regarded "chattels personal," to all "intents, constructions and pur- jjoses, whatsoever." It implies, that, by general consent, they are not property, but for certain reasons they shall be so regarded, whatever be the "construction" of men. And the present Fugitive Slave Law. implies the same thing. It is not necessary that Congress should enact such a law with reference to cattle and swine, because the right to property in them is universally acknowl- edged. Wherever they stray, the owner can claim 11 them. So that the present law implies that fugitive slaves are not rightful property, and cannot be claimed as such without a law enacted to this end. If there were in the hearts of men an inherent recognition of the title to property in negroes, as in cattle, there would be no more need of legislating for " runaway slaves " than for runaway oxen. And yet more, (and I dwell upon this point because so many feel that slaveholders have a moral title to property in man) when slaves are inherited it does not alter the case When I see a man having inherited property upon which his ancestors had no just claim, I certainly shall not conclude that ^6 has a rightful claim upon it. A false claim in them, cannot become right in passing over to him. The same is true of inherited slaves. And shall the slaveholder, when his eyes are opened to see that his title is not good and righteous, be held guiltless before God, if he persists in retaining his possession of human beings ? Surely not. A prevailing idea seems to be that the longer the mas- ter retains a slave the better is his title. But the Christian is guilty if he reasons thus. In the light of the gospel, the longer a man deprives his fel- low of his rights and immunities, the greater is his obli- gation to compassionate and bless him. The longer he has wronged him, the more zealously should he hasten to atone for the past. 5. A statement of the fugitive's case as we are to con- sider it. Mens' minds are frequently prejudiced by the association of words and phrases. So here they have been accustomed to associate with the terms " runaway" and "fugitive " some dark deed of shame. When the terms fall upon the ear, they think of a fugitive from justice — a guilty man escaping from the penalty of vi- olated law, eluding the grasp of commissioned officers — a free man when he ought to be in irons. But not so with the slave. The mind should be divested of all such associations while contemplating this subject. A runaway slave ! a fdgitive slave ! ! He is not a man of crime. He is not a runaway because he is guilty of 12 unhallowed deeds. He is fleeing from the land of op- pression, where the very air is vocal with the cries of suffering liberty. He is escaping from a land of horrid sights and fearful sounds — the sight of his wife, torn forever from his humble household, and his daughter, the unwilling victim of her master's brutal lusts; and the sound of clanking chains, and ringing whips, and wailing hearts. Yes ! he is running from the sight of tears and blood, accursed shackles, and partings in- describable. He is absconding from a master who has no moral right " To buy and sell, to barter, whip, and hold In chains, a being of celestial make." And he comes to us — an unoffending man — and asks to be delivered from injustice, inhumanity, and w r oe. He asks for life, for liberty, for love. He implores us by the truth, that he is a " creature of God," pointing us to the seal of immortality upon his soul, to treat him as a crushed and injured brother, with whom we shall