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 DISCOURSE 
 
 THE COVENANT WITH JUDAS 
 
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 By JOHN PJERPONT. 
 
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 A DISCOURSE 
 
 THE COVENANT WITH JUDAS, 
 
 PREACHED IN 
 
 HOLLIS-STREET CHURCH, NOV. 6, 1842. 
 
 By JOHN PIERPONT. 
 
 BOSTON: 
 
 CHARLES C. LITTLE AND JAMES BROWN. 
 1842. 
 

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 £e 
 
 as 
 
 
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 - 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 That part of this Discourse, which was preached in the 
 
 morning, was fully written out ; and is printed as it was delivered. 
 
 The part, preached in the afternoon, was delivered chiefly from 
 
 notes ; and though, in preparing it for the press, I have followed, 
 
 as closely as I could, the train of thought and argument, I pretend 
 
 not to give the language as spoken. 
 
 J. P. 
 
- 
 
DISCOURSE. 
 
 Matthew xxvi. 15. 
 They covenanted with him for thirty pieces of silver. 
 
 It is not my object, in the present discourse, to treat of, or 
 attempt to measure, the guilt of that unworthy disciple of the 
 Lord Jesus, whose covenant to betray Ms Master, as well as the 
 consideration of that covenant, is stated in these words. Nor 
 yet do I propose to inquire what could have been the motive of 
 a disciple who, like Judas, had had a more than ordinary trust 
 reposed in him by his Master and his feUow disciples, to prove 
 false to that trust, and deliver him by whom he had been treated 
 with such confidence, into the hands of those who were seeking his 
 life. But I take, rather, this statement of a particular covenant, to 
 do an act of acknowledged baseness and iniquity, as an occasion of 
 considering the general question of the binding force or obliga- 
 tion of all agreements, contracts, promises, vows or oaths, to do 
 that which is a violation of natural right, and which, were there 
 no such solemn engagement, would be acknowledged to be 
 wrong. 
 
 This subject appears to me to be especially pertinent to the 
 present occasion, when, at the Communion table, we are called 
 to commemorate the death of one man, who was given up, or 
 betrayed to those who were hunting after his life, bv virtue of a 
 
\ » 
 
 covenant that he should be thus betrayed ; and when, at the same 
 time, our city is moved by the spectacle of another man, that is 
 to be give'n up or betrayed to perpetual and hopeless bondage, if 
 not to a cruel death, by virtue of a covenant that he shall be thus 
 betrayed. 
 
 The essential morality of these two covenants is the same. 
 The one was a covenant to give up an innocent man to death, in 
 consideration of thirty pieces of silver. The other is a covenant 
 to give up an innocent man to a bondage worse than death, in 
 consideration of certain real or supposed political advantages, 
 from which the covenanting parties expect to make more than 
 thirty pieces of silver. Thus we see that, although there may be 
 some difference in the consideration of the two covenants, by 
 which, in one case the life, and, in the other the liberty of a 
 man is to be sacrificed, the essential morality in both cases is < 
 
 precisely the same : both of them being to do an act which is 
 a violation of a natural right ; in the one case the natural right of 
 a man to his life ; and in the other, Iris natural right to his liberty. 
 And, as every violation of a right is a wrong, a sin, a transgres- 
 sion of the moral law of God, each of these covenants comes, 
 alike, under the cognizance of the Christian teacher, whose 
 province it is to lift up his voice against wrong — ' to show his 
 people their sins,' as a means of effecting the great work for 
 which God, having raised up Ins son Jesus, sent him to bless us, by 
 by turning every one of us away from his iniquities. And I deem 
 such a subject of discourse, — useful as it must be at all times, — 
 especially seasonable, at a time when the consequences of a \ 
 
 covenant to do a wrong are brought so forcibly and so formidably 
 before us as they are in the case already alluded to ; — and I 
 deem no day too holy — no Christian rites too . sacred — to have 
 this great question of Christian — nay, of universal — morality, 
 thought of and spoken of, in connexion with it' 
 
This morning, then, I propose to take up and consider the 
 general question of the obligation, or binding force, in the forum 
 of conscience, and at the bar of God, of all covenants, engage- 
 ments, compacts, vows, promises or oaths, to do that, which, 
 without such oath, promise or covenant, is confessedly wrong : — 
 and, in the afternoon I propose to apply the general principle at 
 which we may arrive, to several cases of oaths or covenants of 
 this kind, winch occur in the sacred history ; and especially to 
 the case now occurring in this community, of a fugitive slave, 
 now in a Massachusetts prison, by order or direction of a citizen 
 of Virginia, who claims him as his property. 
 
 The idea seems to have prevailed, in all nations, and ages that 
 vows, or promises made with the solemnity of a direct invocation 
 of the name of the Supreme Power, and under the penal sanc- 
 tions of religion, impose an extraordinary obligation ; and the 
 opinion has been widely extended that such vows cannot, under 
 any circumstances, be broken, without incurring guilt, of peculiar 
 enormity, and deserving a corresponding severity of punishment. 
 
 To the diligent reader of the sacred volume, especially, cases 
 of vows will occur, which seem to have involved the parties 
 making them in great embarrassment, and to have been, to them 
 or to others, the occasion of guilt or suffering, which way soever 
 the person making them might turn himself. The vow of Jephtha, 
 that he would offer, as a burnt offering unto the Lord, whatso- 
 ever should come forth from the doors of his house to meet him, 
 returning in peace from the slaughter of the children of Am- 
 nion ;* — that of the Jews residing in 'Egypt in the days of Jere- 
 miah, that they would burn incense to the queen of heaven and 
 pour out drink offerings unto her ;t — that of Herod, who prom- 
 ised with an oath, to the daughter of Herodias, that he would 
 give her whatsoever she should ask, even to the half of his 
 
 * Judges xi. 30, 31. t Jeremiah xliv. 17, 25. 
 
8 
 
 kingdom;* — that of the Jews, who bound thomsfilves with an 
 Dath, that they would neither eat nor drink till they had slain 
 Paul ;t — and the promise or covenant of Judas, that he would 
 betray his Master to those who were thirsting for his blood,$ — 
 all prove to us that oaths, or solemn obligations, to do that which 
 is either of questionable right, or of unquestionable wrong, 
 are not things of recent origin : — and when the same diligent 
 reader of the sacred oracles finds, among those oracles, language 
 like the following, — ' If a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or 
 swear an oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break 
 his word ; he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his 
 mouth' § — 'Thou shalt perform unto the Lord thy vows 'II — 
 ' He shall dwell on thy holy hill ' — ' who sweareth to his own 
 hurt and changeth not'H — it is not very wonderful, that questions, 
 relating to the binding force of such vows, should be regarded as 
 those that are attended with difficulty, or as those that are worthy 
 of serious consideration, and of public discussion by such as 
 come up into the house of God with an earnest desire to know 
 what is his will, and how they may practically conform them- 
 selves to it. 
 
 Of all the various forms of engagement which I have named, 
 an oath is probably regarded as the most solemn and binding. 
 Let us first see, then, what is the obligation of an oath to do 
 wrong : for if that is not binding, it will probably be admitted 
 that no other engagement can be. 
 
 An oath, or a vow, may be defined to be a promise, made with 
 the solemnities and sanctions of religion, to do, or not to do a specific 
 thing. 
 
 The question is, What obligation is created, and imposed by 
 such a promise ? This question, it is obvious, cannot be an- 
 swered without first asking, what are the obligations under 
 
 * Matthew xiv. 8. t Acts xxiii. 12, 14, 21. % Matt. xxvi. 15. 
 
 § Numbers xxx. 2. II Matthew v. 33. 1 Psalms xv. 1. 4. 
 
9 
 
 which the promising party previously lay, to do, or not to do 
 the thing that he lias sworn : and, in as much as our obligations, 
 or duties, result altogether from the relations in which we 
 stand to other beings, some of which relations We voluntarily 
 take upon ourselves, and others arc cast upon us without bur act, 
 or the consent of our own will, there is, in every case of this 
 nature, a question still antecedent to that of our duties or obli- 
 gations — viz : What are the relations in which we stand to other 
 beings ? Now all those relations that arc cast upon us, or in 
 which we find ourselves placed without our own act or choice, 
 bring with themselves their specific duties, which we may no 
 more refuse to perform, than we may refuse to stand in the rela- 
 tions, out of which they grow. The filial relation, or the relation 
 of a child to a parent, is of this class : so also the fraternal rela- 
 tion, or the relation of brother and sister, in the family. It does 
 not depend upon my will, act or choice, whether I will be the 
 child of my parents, or the brother of their other children. I 
 may not say, I am their child, or their brother no longer : and, as 
 I cannot withdraw myself from either of these relations, I can- 
 not withdraw myself, without guilt, from those duties which God 
 has inseparably connected with them. By the high ordinances 
 of the Most High, I am bound to these, his creatures, by a chain 
 which I cannot break and cannot tlnow off. By this chain I am 
 bound to show obedience to my parents, in my childhood, in 
 respect to every command wliich they have a right to give me, 
 a in I to show them reverence and an affectionate deference, so 
 long as they live. 
 
 Now, what if I make a vow unto the Lord, that I ici/l thus 
 Ileal my parents? Cs any new obligation created, any addition- 
 al forc< given to the pre-existing obligation thai was upon me 
 to obe) or revere my parents ? Most obviously not. Th< com- 
 mand of God, that I should honor my father and my mother, 
 
10 
 
 was anterior to my vow that I would honor them. The precept, 
 ' Children, obey your parents/ was anterior, and the reason of that 
 precept, ' for this is right,' has existed, as long as the relation of 
 parent and child has existed among the creatures of God. No 
 new weight is given to the obligation by my vow ; for it was upon 
 me before, with all the weight that Divine authority could give 
 it ; and its weight, therefore, cannot be enhanced. If, indeed, I 
 distrust my own resolutions to discharge my duties to my parents, 
 or if I have been so inconsiderate, or so thankless, as to make 
 no such resolutions, I may, perhaps, in the secrecy of my own 
 mind, or under the solemnities of a public oath, promise that I 
 will hereafter perform the duties that I have heretofore neglected. 
 But, in such a case, my vow creates no new obligation. I may 
 use it, as I may use any other means of virtue, — the example, 
 or the exhortations, or the rebukes of others, or the suggestions 
 of my own conscience, or a fearful looking for of judgement, — to 
 break in upon my habitual thoughtlessness, or to give strength to 
 my weak resolutions, and to help me thus to do what, without 
 my vow, I ought to have done ; and what, shonld I continue to 
 neglect it, I shall suffer for not doing. It is upon this ground 
 that, as members of a Christian church, we covenant with each 
 other that, at certain times, or under certain circumstances, we 
 will unite in commemorating the love, life and death of our 
 Saviour, Jesus Christ, in the rite of ' the Lord's supper.' Our 
 obligation to cherish a reverent and grateful remembrance of Him 
 who has given us an immortal hope, and is calling us to glory in 
 calling us to virtue, is not created — is not, in the least, affected 
 by this our covenant. That obligation is contemporaneous with 
 our relation to Jesus as his disciples. It grows out of that 
 relation, and must last as long as the relation itself lasts. 
 By our covenant we may strengthen our purposes of meeting 
 this obligation, and, so far as it can ever be discharged, of 
 
11 
 
 discharging it. And that may be a good reason for onr entering 
 into the church covenant. It may help us meet an old obliga- 
 tion, but it creates no new one. The Temperance Fledge 
 stands upon precisely the same ground. It lays me under no 
 new obligation, though it may help me to discharge an old 
 one ; for the obligation to ' live soberly, in the present evil world,' 
 has lain upon me, from the first, and will do so to the last day of 
 my life. I did not voluntarily assume the obligation. It was 
 cast upon me by the Maker of my frame, and I cannot cast it 
 off Experience shows that the pledge, which is of the nature 
 of a vow, or oath, has, in multitudes of cases, been one, among 
 the means of redeeming the poor slave of an evil habit from his 
 thraldom ; and if he breaks it after having taken it, he adds sin 
 to sin, and thus doubly wrongs his own soul ; but, neither by 
 subscribing a pledge does he bind himself to be temperate, nor 
 by erasing his name, does he loose himself from the cords with 
 which the hand of God has bound him. My vow, in short, may 
 help my virtue, but does not- strengthen, or in the least degree 
 affect, my obligation. 
 
 There is another class of relations, which are voluntarily 
 assumed or entered into, and which, under certain circumstances, 
 may be assumed or declined, according to the choice or pleasure 
 of the individual. The conjugal relation is of this kind. As a 
 general rule, it is a duty, at a proper season, to enter hito this 
 relation. But there are many exceptions to this general rule. 
 The case of Paul, not to press the higher one of Iris Master, 
 was of this character ; and there arc, in all ages and countries, 
 other cases, in which a person is free to marry or not to many, 
 according to his convictions of duty or propriety, the circumstan- 
 ces of his particular case being duly considered ; in other words, 
 in which he may innocently marry or not, as he shall choose. 
 But, having once determined to marry, and having entered into 
 
12 
 
 the conjugal relation, he is not free to choose whether he will 
 discharge or neglect the duties of that relation. He is then 
 bound; — bound, not by his inarriage vows, or by any vow after 
 his marriage, but bound by the very nature of the relation into 
 which he has chosen to enter. Having put on the relation of 
 husband, he cannot, at his pleasure, put on or put off the obliga- 
 tions which belong to the character, that he has assumed. So 
 long as he stands in that relation, he is a debtor to it, and must 
 perform his relative duties as faithfully, and by refusing to per- 
 form them he incurs as deep a stain of guilt, as if the relation 
 had been cast upon him by the act of God, without his own 
 co-operation or consent. 
 
 So, too, from the moment that one stands in the relation 
 of parent, although, to a certain extent, that relation may have 
 been voluntarily assumed, the person standing in it is under 
 bonds which can be neither strengthened nor weakened by any 
 vow, to meet the claims of duty that are urged upon the parent's 
 heart, by the voice of the child, and by the voice of conscience, 
 and of God, that comes with the child, to ensure for its helpless- 
 ness defence, and instruction for it in its ignorance. And, to all 
 the other creatures of God, that fall within the compass of our 
 influence or regards, we hold certain specific relations, every one 
 of which has duties or obligations connected with it, varying in 
 then nature so as to correspond, in every instance, with the rela- 
 tion from which they spring, and alike above and beyond the 
 control of him who is bound by them : — a truth intimated by the 
 force of the veiy language used in treating of oligations : — for 
 is it not absurd to say of a man that he is hound, by a cord that 
 he can tie or untie at his pleasure ? 
 
 To the Author of our being we are all related, as his creatures, 
 his children, his subjects, his dependants. These various rela- 
 tions, existing from the first, and enduring to the last moment that 
 
 * 
 
13 
 
 we exist, are the source of obligations equally enduring; and as 
 
 these relations are cast upon us absolutely, without our own 
 co-operation or choice, so the duties or obligations thai result 
 from them are absolute and beyond our control. To our constant. 
 Benefactor we owe gratitude for the past and trust for the time 
 to come: — to our Supreme Ruler, allegiance which cannot be 
 withheld without sin. And these, our obligations to be thankful 
 and obedient, we cannot strengthen — we can give them no new 
 force — by any vow, that we arill thank and obey him. His own 
 irrefragable bonds arc upon us, from the first moment that we 
 knew him, and were acquainted with the relations in which we 
 stand to him, and in which he stands to us; and we can make 
 those bonds no stronger by any labors of our own, though we lift 
 up our weak hands, in oaths or imprecations, at the horns of his 
 altar, or at the footstool of his throne. Here, indeed, as in cases 
 already stated, we may seek help for the infirmity of our own pur- 
 poses of obedience, in vows or oaths that we will obey ; we may 
 awaken our dormant gratitude, by solemn engagements in his 
 presence that we will, in all things, render him the thanks that 
 are due for his benefits, and the obedience due to him as our 
 Sovereign, for the wisdom and perfectness of his laws. But, 
 by these our vows, we affect not our obligations. We assume, 
 no new ones, and we discharge no old ones. True, we may 
 perform our vows ; and, when we vow unto the Lord, we should 
 perform our vows : but, in no such case does the vow give to 
 God a new claim upon our hearts or our efforts, nor docs it lay 
 us under any new obligation. Those claims grow out of God's 
 benefits, and are as constant as the blessings from which they 
 spring. Those obligations already exist, and arc as strong as is 
 the right hand that is stretched out to uphold us. 
 
 We are, moreover, in a strictly literal sense, related to our- 
 selves; in as much as our own moral conduct, in all its bearings 
 
— K 
 
 14 
 
 and consequences, is, by the unchanging principles of our own 
 constitution, and of God's moral government, brought back, or 
 re-fated to ourselves. Our moral condition, or the state of our 
 moral feelings, has constant reference, or relation to our moral 
 acts, so far as we have, ourselves, been the subjects of them. 
 In perfect harmony with this constitution of our nature, the 
 Great Being who thus constituted it, having a desire to the work 
 of his hand, and a regard for its well being, has given us com- 
 mands, or laid us under obligations, to do nothing to ourselves by 
 which our own well being shall be endangered or destroyed. By 
 his ordinances he has hedged us in, upon the right and left, that 
 we stray not from our own peace. He has laid us under obliga- 
 tion, — and that without consulting us, or asking our consent 
 
 to live soberly, temperately, purely, regarding ourselves as the 
 servants of God, who are bound to minister to him with clean 
 hands ; or as temples of God, which ought always to stand before 
 him ' in the beauty of holiness.' Now, our obligations to be thus 
 holy are not of our assuming. They are laid upon us by our 
 Maker's hand, in all the weight which he sees necessary to the 
 well balancing, and to the setting in motion, of the exquisite 
 moral machinery by which the good of his creatures is wrought 
 out. Our promises that we will meet and discharge these obliga- 
 tions give them no new weight, with whatever solemnities those 
 promises are made. No vow can draw closer the cords by which 
 we are bound. An Almighty hand has adjusted these, and put 
 them out of the reach of all other hands, as entirely as he has, 
 the cords that hold the planets in their place, as they whirl in 
 their everlasting orbits. We can add nothing to their strength, — 
 nothing to their Scicredness, — nothing to their duration. 
 
 Can we break them, then, by our word ! Can we shake them 
 oif by our oath that we tcitt shake them off! Can we cast off 
 the cords of the Almighty merely by swearing that we will no 
 
15 
 
 longer follow his guidance ? — If we must answer these questions 
 in the negative, — andean it be doubted that we must.' — aie 
 we not furnished with a ready and conclusive answer to the 
 question, What is the binding force, or obligation, of those vows 
 or oaths, by winch men, in all ages, have sought to bind them- 
 selves, to a violation or breach of the laws of God? — The 
 government of God is not one which we have ordained, each for 
 himself, and winch, therefore, each for himself can annul or throw 
 off at his pleasure. We are not free to choose whether we will 
 come under, or remain under his laws, or not. As we did not 
 enact, we cannot repeal them ; as we did not ordain, we cannot 
 annul them. By his law we are bound to tell the truth, before 
 we can bind ourselves by an oath that we will tell a falsehood. 
 The hand of the Most High had laid us under an obligation, 
 attended by fearful sanctions, to do our brother good, long before 
 we thought of bmding ourselves, under penalty of a great curse, 
 to do him evil. His obligations, then, are prior and paramount 
 to those under which we may seek to lay ourselves, in opposition 
 to them; — unless, indeed, we are ready to take the ground that 
 our authority over God's laws is higher than his own. To what 
 an absurdity, indeed, should we be reduced, — to say nothing of 
 the tremendous anarchy, — by admitting the doctrine that a man 
 is excusable in breaking a law of God, — nay, that he ought to 
 break it, because he has bound himself by an oath that he will 
 break it ! — that he may, or must, refuse to obey a commandment 
 of the Most High, if once the oath of the Most High is upon 
 him that he will not obey it! The whole code of the divine 
 laws might thus be easily repealed, as to their bearing, and their 
 binding force, upon any individual ; and he might innocently break 
 them all, merely because he had impiously sworn that he would 
 break them all ! 
 
 By the course of our reasoning, from the ground assumed, as 
 
16 
 
 well as by the reduction to an absurdity which comes from assum- 
 ing an opposite ground, we are brought to this conclusion : — that 
 all engagements, promises, covenants, vows or oaths to do a thing 
 which is contrary to any one of the laws of God, or not to do a thing 
 which any one of his laws requires, are utterly null, and void of 
 binding force : — that a vow, even, to do what the law of God 
 requires, creates no new obligation ; and therefore, for a stronger 
 reason, an oath not to do what it requires, or to do what it forbids, 
 annuls no obligation that existed before : — that a man, so far from 
 being justified or excused in doing -wrong, by an oath which he has 
 taken, that he will do wrong, is involved, by that oath in still deeper 
 guilt, since, by that very oath, he gives evidence of acting delibe- 
 rately and with premeditation, and adds to the sin of violating 
 God's law, the effrontery of swearing, in the presence of God, that 
 he will violate it. He commits one sin in taking the oath, and 
 another and still a greater sin in keeping it. And this I there- 
 fore venture to lay down as a general — nay, as a universal princi- 
 ple ; that no vow or oath, to do that which is forbidden by any 
 law of God, or not to do that which is required, is of any binding 
 force, or imposes any obligation whatever; let the solemnities of 
 the oath be as awful, and let the penalties imprecated with it, at 
 the hand of cither man or God, be as severe or as fearful as they 
 may. 
 
 Before proceeding, as I proposed, to apply this great principle 
 of morality to the several cases which occur in the sacred 
 writings, and in the ordinary course of affairs at the present day, 
 of vows oaths or covenants to do that which, without such 
 engagement would be confessedly wrong; I must advert to a 
 few passages in the Scriptures, which, at first view, seem to 
 inculcate the doctrine that all vows are obligatory, at all events. 
 
17 
 
 To the questions, ' Who shall abide in thy tabernacle ? "Who 
 shall dwell in thy holy hill?' the psalmist replies, — among 
 others, ' lie that sweareth to his own hurt, and changeth not.'* 
 This is well; nor does it conlliet with the general principle. 
 already established. To swear to one's own hurt docs not even 
 imply that he sweareth in his own wrong. Where there is a 
 good consideration (or a promise, covenant, or oath, or even where 
 there is not a corrupt or bad consideration, a man is bound by his 
 oath, or other engagement, even though it be to his own hurt; — 
 to his loss of personal ease or comfort, his loss of fortune, friends, 
 or the estimation of those whose good opinion he most values. 
 Nay, he may give his body to be burned, rather than prove false 
 to his oath of allegiance to his earthly sovereign, or to his Lord 
 and Saviour Jesus Christ. 
 
 ' He fears to change the thing lie swears, 
 Whatever pain or loss he bears.' 
 
 But he may not even take an oath, and, for a stronger reason, he 
 may not perform one, that is itself an act, or that binds him to do 
 an act, in derogation of his fealty to God. 
 
 Again, it is said,! ' If a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or 
 swear an oath, to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break 
 his word : he shall do all that proceedeth out of his mouth.' But 
 there is no reason to suppose that the oath, here intended, is to 
 do an act, in itself wrong. Indeed, the contrary is implied ; for 
 the oath in supposition is one unto the Lord, and not one against 
 him. Besides, Moses, in immediate connexion with the text 
 just cited, goes on to provide, in the case of oaths taken by wo- 
 men, that if the woman be unmarried and living in her father's 
 house, if the father disapprove the oath, it is null and void ; as it 
 is, also, if the woman be married, and her oath be disapproved by 
 her husband. Li each of these cases, ' not any of her vows, or 
 
 * Psalms xv. 4. t Numbers xxx. 2. 
 
 3 
 
18 
 
 of her bonds, wherewith she hath bound her soul, shall stand. 7 
 The Lord shall forgive her, because her father or her husband 
 disallowed her. Can we doubt that God, the universal Father, 
 will annul a vow that he disapproves of, when he gives a human 
 father authority to annul a vow of which he disapproves ? 
 
 Let us now look at some of the cases, that occur in the sacred 
 histoiy, of vows to do a wrong, by violating a natural right. 
 
 1. The case of Jephtha* is of this kind ; — the case brought so 
 near to the hearts of many of my hearers by the touching song, 
 'Jephtha's Daughter.' Supposing you, my friends, to be ac- 
 quainted with the fact, in this case, I ask you, whether it is 
 possible that the father's vow imposed upon him the slightest 
 obligation, to oiler his daughter as a burnt offering unto the Lord. 
 These two considerations are enough to satisfy us all that it 
 did not, and that it could not. First, it is a principle of construc- 
 tion, in all compacts, vows, or promises, that they must be con- 
 strued, and if they bind, at all, that they are binding, in the sense 
 in which the party making them intends that they should be, and 
 supposes that they are, understood by the other party. Now, if 
 the father, in this case, had not the daughter in his mind, when he 
 made the vow, he must have known that the other party, who, 
 in this case, was the ' Searcher of hearts,' could not have under- 
 stood him to have his daughter in liis mind : — in other words, 
 must have known that he never vowed to sacrifice his daughter. 
 Of course he was under no obligation to do it. And, secondly, 
 even had Jephtha, — who lived in the darkest age of Israel's 
 history, and who, though he may have been a good fighter, was 
 yet an illegitimate child, and, as such, was, from his boyhood, 
 made an outcast from his father's house, and got what moral 
 education he had, in a gang of banditti, — been so little imbued 
 with moral science, as to have embraced his daughter in the 
 
 * Judges xi. 
 
19 
 
 scope of his vow, we know that his offering could not. have 
 been accepted of God; first, because no sacrifice could be offered 
 except by the priest, and thai, too, where the ark of the Lord 
 'was; and, secondly, because, by the laws of Moses, no human 
 sacrifice was allowed on any terms. — (Note 1.) 
 
 2. The oath of Herod * that he would give to the daughter of 
 Herodias whatsoever she should ask, is like the vow of Jcphlha, 
 and was void for the same reasons. It could not be legitimately 
 construed into a promise to do an act in itself wrong. The king 
 could not have had the head of John the Baptist in his mind, 
 when he made the promise, nor yet did the party to whom the 
 promise was made so understand him. Nor, even if he had 
 meant that particular gift, and had supposed that he was so 
 understood, would he have laid himself under any obligation to 
 commit the murder, that was asked at his hands. 
 
 3. The oath by which more than forty Jews bound — or sou -lit 
 to bind — themselves, that they would neither eat nor drink till 
 they had killed Paul,f is of a different character, in this point, 
 namely, that the contracting parties did understand themselves 
 perfectly, and understood that the act in view was a wrong — a 
 violation of a man's natural, inalienable right to his life. This 
 compact was void, for two reasons. First, because it was to 
 violate a natural right; and, secondly, because it was, "what in 
 law is termed a nudum pactum — a hare promise, without any 
 consideration. 'A consideration, of some sort or other,' Bays Sir 
 William Blackstone,t 'is so absolutely necessary to the forming 
 of a contmrt thai a nudum pactum, oi an agreement to do or pay 
 any thing on one side, without any compensation on the other, 
 is totally void inlaw and a man cannot be compelled to perform it .' 
 
 4. The case brought under our notice in the text, the covenant 
 between the chief priests, as one parly, ami Judas [scariol as the 
 
 * Matthew xiv. 0— li f Acts xziii. 21 % Comraenlari U ll"> 
 
20 
 
 other, differs in this point from all those already considered; 
 namely, — it was not understood by either party as a religions 
 act. like that of Jephtha ; nor was it exactly an oath, like that of 
 Herod, or like that of the Jews conspiring to kill Paul ; nor, like 
 this last, was it without consideration ; — for here, the considera- 
 tion paid and received was, ' thirty pieces of silver.' But does a 
 difference in this point make a difference in the moral character 
 of the act covenanted for ? We have seen that a covenant or 
 promise, with no consideration, is void. Does a consideration, 
 worse than none, make it other than void ? ' The civilians hold,' 
 says the great commentator upon English law, already quoted, 
 ' that in all contracts, either express or implied, there must be 
 something given in exchange, something that is mutual and re- 
 ciprocal. This thing, which is the price or motive of the con- 
 tract, we call the consideration : and it must be a thing lawful in 
 itself, or else the contract is void.'* In fact, no principle in law is 
 better established than this, that a corrupt or immoral considera- 
 tion so thoroughly vitiates a contract or covenant, that, as between 
 the parties themselves, it can never be purged. And this is law 
 all over the world. If, in the streets of Borne or Naples, I hire 
 an assassin to do his work, on credit, I am under no obligation to 
 pay him when it is done. If I pay him in advance, he is under 
 no obligation to do the work. No solemnity of form, no amount 
 of consideration, can sanctify the compact, or make it binding 
 upon the soul of either party. Indeed, so universally is this truth 
 admitted, that it has passed into a proverb, that ' a bad promise is 
 better broke than kept' 
 
 If need were, the high authority of our Great Master might 
 be appealed to, in support of the position which has been taken, 
 and which I am endeavoring to defend in this discourse. The 
 Saviour does not indeed mention any specific instance of a vow, 
 
 * Blackstone's Commentaries, II. 444, 
 
21 
 
 sinful in itself, and therefore void. But he takes notice of, and 
 pointedly condemns a practice, at the bottom of which lay the 
 same corrupt popular sentiment, which, even in our own day, has 
 done so much to give a practical validity to vows and covenants, 
 in themselves immoral. This was, the practice, on the part of 
 children, of devoting to God, as a religious offering, what they 
 ought to apply to the support of their aged and helpless parents ; 
 thus, by their tradition, making of none effect the commands of 
 God, ' Honor thy father and mother,' and ' Whoso curseth father 
 or mother, let him die the death.' — (Note 2.) 
 
 This is ' making thorough work.' It is going to the bottom of 
 the whole matter. For, if I may not bind myself, by a vow, to 
 give up even to God, i. e. if I may not, without sin, devote to 
 pious uses, that which is my own, when, in so doing, I withhold 
 from another, that to which he has a natural right ; much less can 
 I, without sin, bind myself, by a covenant, vow or oath, to <nve 
 up, to impious uses, that which is not my own. And, if I cannot 
 bind myself to do this, by my own covenant or oath, a fortiori 
 another cannot bind me to do it, by covenanting for me that I 
 shall. 
 
 This brings us directly upon the case that is now regarded 
 with such intense interest in this community. 
 
 A man — a creature of God, made in his image, — a child of 
 God, as much as any one of us is — who was a slave in Virginia, 
 and, by the laws of that State, held to be a chattel — a thing — has 
 been brought out of his house of bondage, and stands here, upon 
 Massachusetts ground, and breathes Massachusetts air, in sight 
 of the monument that stands on Bunker's Hill, to toll where 
 Massachusetts men poured out their life-blood in the cause of 
 Liberty. He is pursued by a man. who calls himself Ins mener 
 He is hunted down by slavery's minions in Boston ; is seized 
 
22 
 
 and cast into a Boston jail ; where, by direction of the Virginian, 
 not even the ministers of Jesus Christ are allowed to ' come unto 
 him ;' though, in the humane spirit- — nay, by the letter — of Mas- 
 sachusetts law, they are allowed to visit a prisoner, whose hands 
 are reeking with his brother's blood. His pursuer demands that 
 he be given up. Will he be ? I suppose, he will. On what 
 ground? By virtue of a covenant, which, it is said, our fathers 
 made with the Virginian's fathers, that, in such cases, the fugi- 
 tive should be given up. 
 
 Here, then, two inquiries present themselves : 
 
 First, Is it so ? 
 
 Secondly, What if it is so? 
 
 First, Is it so ? I place myself, by supposition, upon the judge- 
 ment-seat, with a religious sense of my responsibleness to God 
 and to man, for the present and all future ages, for time and eter- 
 nity : and I ask, Is this so ? In reply, I say, — If it is so, it can be 
 proved to be so, by inspection of the covenant itself. Let me 
 look at it. I am told that it is found in the third clause of the 
 second section of the fourth Article of the Constitution of the 
 United States. I look at the clause, and find that it provides for 
 the surrender of 'persons held to service or labor in one State, under 
 the laws thereof, escaping into another ;' but this is, by no means, 
 conclusive against a man in the position of the party before me. 
 Nay, so far as the letter of the covenant is concerned, it does not 
 raise even a presumption against him. That clause contains a 
 description, which embraces persons or classes totally distinct 
 from slaves ; a description, moreover, which, in some of its points, 
 is utterly inapplicable to a slave. It provides for the case of a 
 minor, who escapes from the control and service of his parent; — 
 for that of an apprentice, who escapes from the service due to 
 his master, in consideration of the instruction that his master 
 gives him, in the art or mystery of which he is an apprentice ; — 
 
23 
 
 for that of an emigrant from abroad, who is held, by his own 
 contract, to repay, by his service or labor, the money advanced 
 by another for his conveyance to our shores; — nay, even for the 
 case of a minister of the gospel, who is held, personally, to the 
 service of his people, by his own contract ; but who deserts his 
 flock, and withdraws into another State, leaving his sheep to the 
 wolves. All these persons are fugitives from justice, — from the 
 demands of natural right, and, therefore, of the moral law ; — 
 whereas, the man before me is a fugitive from injustice. Justice 
 has no claims upon him. And, as this clause of the Constitution 
 immediately follows a clause, which provides for the surrender of 
 other fugitives from justice — offenders, that is, against criminal 
 law — I conclude that the intention of the framers of the Consti- 
 tution was, to provide, in the one clause, for graver, and, in the 
 other, for minor offences against natural law. 
 
 I then look still further ; and, though I see that the framers of 
 the Constitution have carefully abstained from laying the word 
 slave upon the face of that instrument, they have, in another part 
 of it,* enumerated several other classes of persons, among which 
 are, ' free persons, including those hound to service for a term of 
 years :' — a description, so nearly identical with that in the clause, 
 relied upon in the present case, that, if I construe one part of the 
 instrument by another, as, by the laws of construction, I am bound 
 to do, I have good reason to believe that they meant the same 
 sort of persons, in the one case as in the other. And this infer- 
 ence's fortified by the fact that, in the clause last cited, by com- 
 mon admission, and by practice under the Constitution ever since 
 its adoption, slaves are brought in under the phrase ' other per- 
 sons.' Slaves, then, in the language of the Constitution, are 
 ' other persons ' than such as are described, in one place, as 
 ' persons bound to service for a term of years,' and, in the other, 
 
 * Article I. Section 2, *[3. 
 
24 
 
 as ' persons held to service or labor.' If, then, slaves are other 
 persons than these, they are not these persons. 
 
 This construction is favored — nay, it is demonstrably enforced, 
 by the closing words of the clause appealed to, which provides that 
 the persons therein described ' shall be delivered up, on claim of 
 the party to whom such service or labor may be due! Now, all 
 duties or dues result, as has been shown, from the natural rela- 
 tions ; those in which, according to the laws and ordinances of 
 God, men stand to each other. But the relation of owner and 
 slave is not a natural relation. No duty, then, can result from it. 
 Nothing can be due from a slave to his holder. I ask the party 
 making this claim, by what law, the service of the party claimed 
 is due to him ? Does he say, ' By the laws of Virginia ' ? I 
 reply, Those laws are of no force in Massachusetts. Does he 
 say, ' By the laws of the United States ' ? I answer, Show me 
 the law, declaring that the service or labor of the slave is due to 
 his owner. — (Note 3.) Does he say, ' By the Constitution of the 
 United States ' ? I answer, You beg the question. Does he say, 
 ' By the law of nature ' ? I answer, By that law your service 
 and labor, or your money, is due to him, in consideration of his 
 liberty, which you have wrongfully taken from him, and of the 
 labor and services, which you have wrung from him, for years, 
 and the wages for which ' is, of you, kept back by fraud.' If, 
 therefore, you appeal to the law of nature, you will find that, 
 instead of that man's service and labor being due to you, yours 
 are due to him. 
 
 And, once more : I look at the Preamble of the Constitution, 
 the part, that is, which declares its object, its final cause, the 
 purpose for which it was framed. Among other objects, is this — 
 ' to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.' 
 Now, not only am I bound, as a minister of justice, in all cases 
 of doubtful meaning, to give the language of the law such a con- 
 
25 
 
 struction as shall favor natural right ; and in all cases, where the 
 life or liberty of a man is in question, to give it such a construction 
 as shall favor life and liberty ; for both which reasons, I must 
 construe the clause, here hi question, hi favor of the freedom of 
 the party claimed ; but I am also bound, to give to every legal 
 instrument such a construction as to make all the parts of it 
 harmonious; so as to give "validity to the whole instrument; ut 
 res rnagis valeat quam per eat ; and not so to construe one part of 
 it as to make it destroy another. But, if I construe the clause in 
 question so as to give this claimant Ins demand, I give it a con- 
 struction which is in direct conflict with the Preamble. I make 
 the means defeat the end ; and, instead of making the Constitu- 
 tion, which I have sworn to support, a means of securing the 
 ' blessings of hberty ' to the people of the United States, I make 
 it the means of securing the curse of slavery to one-sixth part of 
 those people, and the concomitant curses of it to all the rest 
 If, then, I give this clause the construction that shall deliver up 
 one of the men before me, as the slave of the other, I violate a 
 fundamental law, observed in the construction of all laws; I 
 make the laws of man paramount to the laws of God, in that I 
 construe this instrument against natural right ; and, at the same 
 time, I put one part of it, which provides the means, in direct 
 antagonism with another, which sets forth the end, proposed to 
 be effected by the instrument itself. Judgement must, therefore, 
 be against the man who claims the other as Ids slave, under this 
 instrument, unless he can show, aliunde, that it was the intention 
 of the framers of it to uphold slavery by the veiy document, 
 which, they declare, they are framing as a security to freedom ; 
 in other words, that, on one page, they go about to break down, 
 what, on another, they declare that they have set about building 
 up. 
 
 Can this be shown ? There is a strong antecedent probability 
 4 
 
26 
 
 against it. The evidence to sustain such a position, therefore, 
 must be proportionally clear and strong. It may be sought for, 
 and it may be found, in the reports that have come down to us of 
 the dehberations, debates, and other doings of the Convention 
 that framed the Constitution of the United States. I know not 
 that it is impossible to draw, from any such sources, the evidence 
 winch the case demands, ; but, till it is produced, if I am told that 
 the Constitution of the United States provides that slaves, escaping 
 from a State where they were held as such, and coming into this 
 State, shall be given up, on demand of the owner ; and if I am 
 asked, ' Is it not so?' I reply, In my judgement, it is not. But — 
 and this brings us to the other of the two questions just pro- 
 posed ; viz : 
 
 Secondly, What if it is so ? To this I answer : — Even if it 
 is so — if it is clearly proved that this was the intention and un- 
 derstanding of the framers of the Constitution, then, I say that 
 that provision, being against natural right, and, consequently, in 
 derogation of a higher law, and requiring me to do what God for- 
 bids me to do, is of no binding force whatever, but is utterly void. 
 This particular covenant, — for the Constitution of the United 
 States is a covenant, or, rather, a number of covenants, entered 
 into by the People of the United States, each with all the rest, — 
 must come under the law of all human covenants, compacts or 
 agreements, in this, that it is of no binding force, if it is contrary 
 to the laws of God. The consideration that a Constitution is the 
 act of a Convention, and an ordinary law, an act of a Congress ; 
 that the former is called the fundamental law, lying at the founda- 
 tion of the government, or of the Union, does not alter its moral 
 character. There is a government that hath still deeper founda- 
 tions — foundations, that under-lie those of any human govern- 
 ment, and on which, alone, the soul of man can build up for itself 
 an ' everlasting habitation.' Says Sir William Blackstone — 
 
27 
 
 1 Man, considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the 
 laws of his Creator, for he is entirely a dependent being. A being 
 independent of any other, has no rule to pursue, but such as he 
 prescribes to himself; but a state of dependence will inevitably 
 oblige the inferior to take the will of him, on whom he depends, as 
 the rule of his conduct : not, indeed, in every particular, but in all 
 those points wherein his dependence consists. This principle, 
 therefore, has more or less extent and effect, in proportion as the 
 superiority of the one, and the dependence of the other, is greater 
 or less, absolute or limited. And, consequently, as man depends 
 absolutely upon his Maker for every thing, it is necessary that he 
 should, in all points, conform to his Maker's will. This will of his 
 Maker is called " the law of nature." ' And ' This law of nature, 
 being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is, of 
 course, superior in obligation to any other. It is binding all over 
 the globe, in all countries, and at all times. No human laws are 
 of any validity, if contrary to this.'* Lord Chief Justice Hobart, 
 too, holds that ' even an act of Parliament, made against natural 
 justice, is void in itself, for the laws of nature are immutable, and 
 are leges legum, the laws to whose authority all other other laws 
 must give place.'t ' No human laws,' says Blackstone, again,$ 
 ' should be suffered to contradict these. To instance in the case 
 of murder : — this is expressly forbidden by the divine, and de- 
 monstrably by the natural law: and from these prohibitions 
 arises the true unlawfulness of this crime. Those human laws, 
 that annex a punishment to it, do not at all increase its moral guilt, 
 or superadd any fresh obligation in foro conscientiae to abstain 
 from its perpetration. Nay, if any human law should allow or 
 enjoin us to commit it, we are bound to transgress that human law, 
 or else ice must offend both the natural and the divine.' 
 
 * Blackstone's Commentaries, I. 39, 41. % Vol. I. p. I ■ 
 
 t Blackstone's Coram. I. p 41, Christian's Note.— (Xote 4.) 
 
This is as trite as Truth herself. Nothing on earth can shake 
 this position. Now, then, let us reason from it. ' If any human 
 law should allow or enjoin murder, we are bound to transgress 
 that law.' But the Constitution of the United States is a human 
 law. Should it enjoin murder, which is, the taking away of 
 a man's hfe, in violation of a natural or divine law, we are bound 
 to transgress that Constitution. Now, the claimant, in this case, 
 says, and for the sake of the argument, I admit, that the Consti- 
 tution enjoins me to aid him in kidnapping, which is, the taking 
 away of another man's liberty, in violation of a natural or divine 
 law. Then I am bound to transgress that Constitution. — All 
 writers on Natural Law admit our Declaration of Independence 
 and many of our State Constitutions expressly declare, that a 
 man's natural right to his liberty is as clear as his natural right to 
 his life. Which is the greater blessing, I am not called upon, in 
 this case, to decide. But I know, that thousands of the noblest 
 of our revolutionary fathers and patriots judged, that life without 
 liberty was not worth the holding : and especially do the words 
 of one of the most eloquent of Virginia's own sons continually 
 ring in my ear. ' Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be 
 purchased at the price of chains and slavery ? Forbid it, Almighty 
 God ! I know not what course others may take, but as for me, 
 give me liberty, or give me death ! ' 
 
 If, then, the clause of the Constitution that is appealed to, by 
 the claimant in this case, does enjoin it upon me, as a judge, to 
 deliver up the man before me to Virginia's ' chains and slavery,' 
 I feel myself bound by a higher law, — by the authority of the 
 Judge of all judges, — to declare that clause of the Constitution 
 of no binding force before this tribunal, and the judgement oi 
 this court is, that the prisoner be discharged. 
 
29 
 
 Before leaving the bench, upon which I have supposed myself 
 to be sitting, I must dispose of a few objections that may be 
 Urged, in opposition to the judgement just pronounced. 
 
 1. I am reminded that, as a Judge, I have sworn to support the 
 Constitution of the United States. 
 
 I reply, first, I swore to support the Constitution according to 
 my understanding of it : — not according to yours, or any other 
 man's. And I have already given it as my understanding of the 
 clause in question, that it never was intended by the framers of 
 the instrument to provide for the delivering up of a fugitive 
 slave ; but, that it was intended to apply to fugitives from justice ; 
 that is, the just claims or demands of citizens in another State. 
 And, thus understood, my present judgement does support the 
 Constitution. 
 
 And I answer, secondly, — admitting that the present claim- 
 ant's construction of the clause in question is the true one ; — 
 nay, admitting that I so understood it when I took my oath, and 
 that I so understand it now; — it only follows that my oath is, 
 void. It was taken in sin, and, if performed, would be so in a 
 still greater sin. 
 
 "T is a great sin to swear unto a sin ; 
 But greater sin to keep a sinful oath.'* 
 
 2. I am told that this part of the Constitution of the United 
 States was a compromise between the friends of freedom at the 
 North, and those of slavery, at the South. 
 
 Answer, 1. Admit it. It was a sinful compromise ; a compro- 
 mise that the delegates, in neither interest, had any right to make ; 
 a compromise, on the part of the North, of moral principle ; a 
 compromise void, for its immorality, even as to the contracting 
 parties themselves ; and, if possible, still more void as to all who 
 shall come after them. It was just the compromise that Judas 
 
 * Pericles, Prince of Tyre, Act V. Scen^ S. 
 
30 
 
 toade with the chief priests. Each party was anxious to get 
 something that he had not got. The chief priests would gladly 
 keep their money, and get then* victim too : but then victim they 
 must have at all events. Judas would gladly hold fast his integ' 
 rity ; but, at any rate, the chief priests' money he must have. 
 The one party gave up then money to get then victim ; the other 
 gave up his integrity and his Saviour, to get the money. This 
 Was the compromise, in the one case. In the other case, — ad- 
 mitting the compromise, — both parties were desirous of the 
 Union. The South had her slavery, the North her integrity. But 
 these could not co-exist, if the Union was effected. There 
 was a natural incompatibility between them. One or the other 
 must be laid upon the altar of the Union. Which should be 
 given up as the sacrifice ? Certainly not our slavery, said the 
 South — let the Union go rather than that. Well, then, said the 
 North, rather than not get the Union, let our integrity go. That 
 Was the compromise in the other case : — if it is a fact, which I 
 do not admit, except for sake of the argument, but on the 
 contrary, 
 
 2. And in the second place, I deny. For, it is essential to a 
 compromise, between two parties, that something should be 
 given up by each. What was given up by the South ? On the 
 construction contended for, she got the Union — a thing much 
 more essential to her than to the North. She held fast to her 
 slavery, and secured a new guaranty to it, by binding the freemen 
 of the North to be her slave -catchers and whippers-in, for all 
 future time ! 
 
 3. Once more, it is said that this stipulation or provision in 
 favor of southern slavery was a sine qua non> a condition without 
 which the slave States would never have come into the Union 
 
 Answer 1st. Then let them have stayed out. 
 
 2nd. How is that known ? — How can it be known ? Who is 
 
31 
 
 it that has such a knowledge of the possible result of the delib- 
 erations of such minds as were in the Convention of the fraraers 
 of the Constitution of the United States, — deliberations held 
 under the pressing exigencies of that period, — as to enable him 
 to say what result could, and what could not, have been reached, 
 without a sacrifice of moral principle? But, even if were so : — 
 if, instead of a Convention of patriots, it had been a Conven- 
 tion of prophets, that framed the Constitution, and those old 
 seers had distinctly seen that, without a provision that should 
 make the north-men slave-hunters for the South, the present Union 
 would never have been formed : — could a worse destiny have 
 awaited the disunited colonies, under the British crown, than 
 to have, within the life of man, from that moment, as many 
 human beings as then breathed American air, bound in the chains 
 of absolute slavery; and thrice as many more, so much more 
 degraded and debased, than the slaves themselves, as to consent 
 to be converted into iron, and worked up into tools, — vises and 
 hammers — to fasten on those chains ? A ruinous price docs lie 
 pay for his civil liberty, icho, to purchase it, gives himself up the 
 bond-slave at once of sinners and of sin ! 
 
 My friends and brethren, I have supposed myself an incum- 
 bent, for a time, of the judgement-seat, before which a fellow 
 man is to be brought, whose condition as a freeman or a slave is 
 to be fixed by my decision. I have given you my judgement, 
 and stand now before you, not a magistrate, but a minister of 
 Jesus Christ ; feeling the responsibleness that lies on me as such, 
 to you, to my profession, to my country and to God. I have 
 spoken, and will yet speak, freely, on this subject at this crisis : 
 for I feel as the great statesman of our own city felt, more than 
 twenty years ago, when standing by Plymouth rock, and, speaking 
 of the veiy work which is now going on in the temples of jus- 
 
32 
 
 tice and the prisons of this city — namely, the catching, chaining 
 and dooming to hopeless slavery of our fellow men — he said, — 
 \ I hear the sound of the hammer. I see the smoke of the 
 furnaces, where manacles and fetters are forged for human limbs. 
 I see the visages of those who, by stealth, and at midnight, labor 
 in this work of hell, foul and dark as may become the artificers 
 of such instruments of misery and torture. * * * I would in- 
 voke those who fill the seats of justice, and all who minister at 
 the altar, that they administer the wholesome and necessary 
 severity of the law. I invoke the ministers of religion, that they 
 proclaim its denunciation of these crimes, and add its solemn 
 sanctions to the authority of human laws. If the pulpit be 
 silent, whenever or wherever there may be a sinner, bloody with 
 this guilt, within the hearing of its voice, that pulpit is false to its 
 trust.'* I know that this was spoken with special reference to 
 the foreign slave trade. But I know, too, that, foreign or domes- 
 tic, sin is sin. I know that God's laws take, within their compass, 
 all latitudes and all longitudes, that they sweep over all seas 
 and all lands alike ; regarding the enslaving of a man with no 
 more favor in Boston than in Congo; and pronouncing the 
 panders of this sin no less guilty, when sitting on a judgement- 
 seat, than when standing on a slaver's deck. I know that a man 
 cannot take himself out of the hand of these laws, by swearing 
 that they shall not hold him ; — that he cannot shake them off, by 
 his oath that he mil; and, however it may appear to the moral 
 vision of other men, to mine, the morality that requires and 
 compels me to deliver up a fellow man to chains and torture — to 
 hopeless slavery, if not to death, because others have covenanted 
 for me that I shall do so, and because of my own oath that I will 
 keep that covenant ; — is, essentially, the morality of a Judas, 
 who would deliver up the Son of Man to be scourged and cruci- 
 
 * Daniel Webster's Oration at Plymouth, 1S20. 
 
33 
 
 fled, because he had covenanted to do so; — the morality of a 
 Herod, who, ./or his oath's sake, would murder a prophet of God ; — 
 the morality of the female fiend of the great English dramatist, 
 who says of herself — 
 
 ' I have given suck, and know 
 
 How tender 't is, to love the babe that milks me : 
 I would, while it was smiling in my face, 
 Have pluck'd my nipple from its boneless gums, 
 And dash'd the brains out, had I so but sworn, 
 As you have done to this.'* 
 
 I am aware that this is not popular doctrine. I know that 
 the current of public sentiment, in the great thoroughfares of 
 business, and along the channels of commerce, sets strongly 
 against it. I know that in the eyes, of the many — yea, and of 
 the mighty — the Constitution of these United States is su- 
 preme ; — that it over-rides God's laws, and that it must stand, 
 though they he trodden under foot. But it is the object of this 
 discourse to lift up God's law, to make^it honorable in my hear- 
 ers' eyes, and to make even the highest of human ordinances to 
 do it homage. Though State may league with State, and mil- 
 lions covenant with millions more, to sustain a wrong, they cannot 
 hold it up. Though hand join in hand, the wicked shall not go 
 unpunished. Even yet, ' Righteousness exalteth a nation, but 
 sin is a reproach to any people.' 
 
 I would not, indeed, reproach the noble band of patriots, who 
 framed the Constitution of the United States. I would not wil- 
 lingly believe that they deserve the reproach that is cast upon 
 them by those who hold, that, into the great charter of our coun- 
 try's freedom they covertly inwrought the charter of perpetual 
 slavery, for themselves and their posterity. But, even if they 
 did, — if the proof that they did were ever so overwhelming, — 
 
 * Macbeth, Act I. Scene vii. 
 
34 
 
 though I may feel myself afflicted on being compelled to ad- 
 mit it — 
 
 ' And, sad as angels, at a good man's sin, 
 Weep to record, and blush to give it in ! ' 
 
 yet, even then, that charter shall have no binding force upon my 
 soul. If, by both the letter and the spirit of that covenant, they 
 meant to bind me to do the slaveholder's work, and minister to 
 his sin, I cannot forget the word of the Lord, which he spake by 
 his servant Moses : ' Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the 
 servant which is escaped from Ins master unto thee.'* Nor can I 
 forget my Master's words : ' He loveth father or mother more than 
 me, is not worthy of me ;' and I shall regard their covenant, in 
 that particular, as utterly null and void. If, on my heavenward 
 journey, I see even the Constitution of the United States stand- 
 ing in my path, like the visionary ladder of the patriarch, it shall 
 not hinder — it shall help me on my way; for I will mount up- 
 ward by treading it under my feet. 
 
 My brethren, much as we may venerate our fathers, we must 
 venerate still more the rights of man, and his Maker's laws. 
 Though we may reverently cherish their memory, and jealously 
 guard their fame, we must not forget that there is One, whose 
 authority is liigher than theirs ; and, if it be true that, in the laws 
 which they made for us, they have required us to do any tiling, 
 so incompatible with the commads of the Most High, that we 
 cannot obey them both, I most seriously ask you, Which shall we 
 obey — our dead fathers? or, our Living God? 
 
 * Deuteronomy xsiii. 15. 
 
NOTES. 
 
 Note 1. Pasre 19. 
 
 I may, I trust, be allowed to throw into a note here, the remarks 
 of Michaelis, in his Commentanj on the Laws of Moses, (Art. 
 144, 145,) touching vows in general, of the kind now under con- 
 sideration ; and the vow of Jephtha, in particular. 
 
 ' Suppose a person to make a vow to God, which involved the 
 commission of a crime; — that he will commit adultery, for in- 
 stance, or be guilty of regicide, of which the Polish history fur- 
 nishes an example : — is it to be imagined that the Deity would 
 accept such a vow? None but a miscreant or a blasphemer 
 
 IT* Jv i UQ t0 „ Say S °- Illdeed ' the Vel T ^ea were horrible.' 
 * * .But a still grosser abuse of the Cherem, (or vow to the 
 Lord,) proceedmg from imitation of foreign and heathenish prac- 
 tices, we shall probably find in the history of Jephtha. This 
 brave barbarian, an illegitimate child, and without inheritance, 
 who had, from his youth, been a robber, and was now, from bein- 
 the leader of banditti, transformed into a general, had vowed if 
 he conquered the Ammonites, to make a burnt offering to the 
 Lord of whatever should first come out of his house to meet 
 aim, on his return. His vow was so absurd, and, at the same 
 fame, so contrary to the Mosaic law, that it could not possibly 
 ™?« 25 T e f pted °f . God > or obligatory. For, what if a dog or 
 anasshad first met him? Could he have offered it ? By the 
 
 rtlff 8 ' n ° lmd f an b / ast could be brou § ht to ^ itar; 
 ™IZ S T\ T S '' hU \ ° f 1 q uadr "P^s only oxen, sheep, and 
 Mnlt . Wha lf a T n had &st met hira ? Human sacrifices 
 ™ S had u mos * stnctl y Prohibited, and described as the abom- 
 dnven f,°nn, W C " laamtes : ** Je P»tha, who had early been 
 driven fiom his home, and had grown up to manhood among 
 
36 
 
 banditti, in the land of Tob, might not know much of the laws 
 of Moses, and probably was but a bad Lawyer, and just as bad 
 a Theologian. The neighboring nations used human sacrifices. 
 The Canaanites, especially, are, by Moses and other sacred wri- 
 ters, often accused of this abominable idolatry ; of which we 
 find still more in the Greek and Latin authors ; and possibly, 
 therefore, Jephtha, when he made the vow, may have thought of 
 being met not merely by a beast, but by a slave, whom, of course, 
 he would sacrifice after the heathen* fashion. His words are, 
 " If thou givest the Ammonites into my hands, whatever first 
 cometh forth from my house to meet me, on my happy return 
 from the Ammonites, shall be the Lord's, and I will bring it to 
 him as a burnt offering." Most unfortunately, his only daughter 
 first came out to congratulate him : and the ignorant barbarian, 
 though extremely affected at the sight, was yet so superstitious, 
 and so unacquainted with the religion and laws of his country, 
 as to suppose he could not recall his vow.' 
 
 Note 2. Page 21. 
 
 Matthew xv. 4 — 6. Mark vii. 9—13. For the sake of pre- 
 senting the iniquity of this practice more distinctly before the 
 mind of the ordinary reader than it is presented by the words of 
 the Evangelists, I subjoin the commentary of Michaelis upon 
 their language. 
 
 ' It seems that it was then not uncommon for an undutifal and 
 degenerate son, who wanted to be rid of the burden of support- 
 ing his parents, and, in his wrath, to turn them adrift upon the 
 wide world, to say to his father and mother Korban, or Be that 
 Korban (consecrated) which I should appropriate to thy support; 
 that is, Every thing ivhcreicith I might ever aid or serve thee, and, 
 of course, every thing, which I ought to devote to thy relief, in the 
 days of helpless old age, I here vow unto God. A most abominable 
 vow, indeed ! and one which God would, unquestionably, as little 
 approve or accept as he would, a vow to commit adultery or sod- 
 omy. And yet, some of the Pharisees pronounced on such oaths 
 
 *We sacrifice slaves, even judicially, after a Christian fashion. When shall we cease to be 
 bound by precedents from these old barbarians ! 
 
37 
 
 this strange decision, that they were absolutely obligatory ;* and 
 that the son, who uttered such words, was bound to abstain from 
 contributing, in the smallest article, to the behoof of his parents ; 
 because every thing that should have been appropriated, had 
 become consecrated to God, and could no longer be applied to 
 their use, without sacrilege and a breach of his vow. But on 
 this exposition, Christ not only remarked, that it abrogated the 
 fifth commandment, but he likewise added, as a counter doctrine, 
 that Moses, their own legislator, had expressly declared, that the 
 man who cursed father or mother, deserved to die. Now it is im- 
 possible for a man to curse his parents more effectually than by 
 a vow like this, when he interprets it with such rigor, as to pre- 
 clude him from doing any thing in future for their benefit. It is 
 not imprecating upon them a curse, in the common style of curses ; 
 which but evaporate into air, because neither the devil nor the 
 lightning is wont to be so obsequious as to obey our wishes, every 
 time we call upon the one to take, or the other to strike dead, onr 
 adversaries : — but it is fulfilling the curse, and making it, to all 
 intents and purposes, effectual.' — Mich. Comm. on the Laws of 
 Moses, Art. 293. 
 
 Note 3. Page 24. 
 
 A clause in the Constitution, providing that a fugitive slave 
 shall be given up, on claim of the party to whom his service or 
 labor may be due, certainly does not prove that, in any particular 
 case, service is due from a slave, to the party claiming him. 
 That, if proved at all, must be proved aliunde ; and, as we have 
 seen, in the discourse, that nothing can be due from a slave to his 
 holder, it follows that nothing can be proved to be due. 
 
 Again, if the pursuer and claimant, here, appeals to the laws 
 of Virginia, and the Court here should acknowledge their author- 
 ity in Massachusetts, in order to meet the exigencies of the 
 present case ; nay, should the claimant prove slavery to exist in 
 
 *Just as the official oaths of our magistrates, to support the Constitution of the United 
 States, with the understanding that it requires the giving up of a fugitive slave to bondage, 
 torture, and even death, are pretty generally understood, in our day, to be obligatory. O, 
 when shall our righteousness exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees ! 
 
38 
 
 Virginia, and to be recognized by her laws ; — should he go still 
 farther, and prove that, under those laws, the man claimed was a 
 slave, and his slave ; that is not enough to show that service or 
 labor is due from his slave, to himself as owner. By natural 
 law it is >jiot due. If due at all, even in Virginia, it must be 
 made so by a declaratory act of the Virginia Legislature. Let 
 that act be produced. 
 
 Note 4. Page 27. 
 
 I am aware that Mr. Christian differs in opinion, on this point, 
 with Mr. Justice Blackstone, and Chief Justice Hobart. He 
 conceives ' that, in no case whatever, can a Judge oppose Ins 
 opinion and authority to the clear will and declaration of the 
 Legislature. His province is, to interpret and obey the mandates 
 of the supreme power of the State. And, if an act of Parlia- 
 ment, if we could suppose such a case, should, like the edict of 
 Herod, command all the children under a certain age to be slain, 
 the Judge ought to resign his office, rather than be auxiliary in 
 its execution ; but it could only be declared void by the same 
 legislative power by which it was ordained.' But this cannot be 
 true doctrine, especially in this country, where no one doubts the 
 authority of the bench to declare an act of the Legislature void, 
 for that it is against the Constitution. This, as I understand, 
 was lately done by the Supreme Court of the United States, in 
 regard to a part of a law of Congress, touching the very clause 
 of the Constitution now under consideration. That part of an 
 act of Congress was declared void, because in conflict with the 
 Constitution of the United States, — a higher law. On the same 
 principle, the clause of the Constitution now in question, if it 
 must be so construed as to demand the delivering up of a fugitive 
 slave, must be declared void, because it is clearly in conflict with 
 a higher law, the Constitution of Man, and the law of the 
 Supreme Power of the Universe. 
 
39 
 
 Besides, see to what a consequence the doctrine of Mr. Chris- 
 tian would bring us. If ' it is the province of a Judge to interpret 
 and obey the supreme power of the State,' and that supreme 
 power be corrupt, the Judge changes his function, at once ; and 
 from a judicial, becomes a ministerial officer. Instead of declar- 
 ing what the law is, he must do its bidding. Instead of sitting 
 in judgement upon legislative acts, he becomes a tool in the hand 
 of the legislative power; and his function is performed when he 
 has done the legislative will ; — the boasted independence of the 
 Judiciary is all a sham ; and there is no barrier between the 
 despot and the subject, whether the despot be king One, or Icing 
 Million. To be sure, Mr. Christian says that, in case the legis- 
 lative power should enact the Herod, then, ' the Judge ought to 
 resign his office, rather than be auxiliary to its execution.' Yes, — 
 and give place to one that would be auxiliary ! Who doubts that 
 a second James, on the throne, could find a second Jeffries, for 
 the bench ? 
 
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