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 RIO GRAIDE AID OF MEXICO. 
 
 NOTICES OF THE RECENT WORK OF MAJOR RIPLEY. 
 
 BY 
 
 BREVET-MAJOR ISAAC I. STEVENS, 
 U. S. AEMY. 
 
 NEW-YORK : 
 D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, 
 
 200 BROADWAY. 
 
 MDCCCLI. 
 
 fee ^ /^,e&^^<^ 
 
 ■& . . Sl J J s P S-~> 
 

 Entered, according to Act of Congress, by 
 D. APPLETON & COMPANY, 
 
 in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the 
 Southern District of New-York. 
 
 • * 
 
 I N 
 
TO 
 
 -THE MEN OF MEXICO' 7 
 
 CTIjese $a$jfs 
 
 ARE RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED. 
 
 I. I. s. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 In presenting these pages to the public, the writer relied 
 much on manuscript notes, taken in the field and while 
 the events were occurring. His object in appearing before 
 the public was to testify to the services of those heroic offi- 
 cers and soldiers, who were in his judgment depreciated in 
 the work of Major Ripley. He felt impelled to this course 
 by a sense of duty ; and he appeals to all the actors in those 
 scenes to bear testimony in vindication of the truth. Other- 
 wise the work of Major Ripley will be considered authen- 
 tic in all respects, and its authority will perpetuate many 
 wrong views of these transactions. At the same time he 
 thinks the work has much positive merit. It shows deci- 
 ded ability and promises well for the future. Should Major 
 Ripley come to this task again, with powers matured by 
 a few years more study and reflection, and with entire 
 freedom from partisan feelings, there is no doubt his reputa- 
 tion as a military writer would be established, and his 
 work appealed to as authority. 
 
 Washington, May 10th. 1851. 
 
CAMPAIGNS 
 
 OF THE 
 
 RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 
 
 These pages have been occasioned by the publication 
 of a recent work by Major Ripley, giving in great detail 
 the events'of the Mexican War. 
 
 The work is professedly critical, and much space 
 is devoted to the discussion of the political and military 
 movements of both Mexico and the United States. A very 
 thorough exposition has been made of the plans both of 
 campaigns and of battles. The style is decidedly good. 
 The accuracy of the narrative we feel bound in general 
 terms to commend. But we shall be constrained to differ 
 from some of the military criticisms. Our own views we 
 shall present with entire freedom. Our object is the vindi- 
 cation of the truth of History. 
 
 We shall leave to others the duty of a more critical ex- 
 position of the literary qualities of Major Ripley's work 
 We propose simply to examine his narrative of the cam- 
 
8 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 paigns of Taylor and of Scott ; we shall at the same time 
 present some general views in relation to our operations in 
 Mexico ; we shall touch upon the military genius and the 
 military polity of our people ; and we shall inquire into 
 the causes of our wonderful success. 
 
 We particularly invite attention to his view of the origin 
 of the war, a view we deem eminently just, and of which 
 we will give the following summary. 
 
 Texas, by the battle of San Jacinto, established her sep- 
 arate existence and became acknowledged as one of the 
 independent nations of the earth. In the exercise of an un- 
 doubted right, and by her own voluntary act, she became a 
 member of the American Confederacy. This was declared 
 just cause of war by Mexico, her minister was recalled, and 
 preparations were made to appeal to arms. To meet this 
 contingency the American Government threw a force 
 into Texas, and assembled a fleet in the Gulf; to avert 
 it, attempts were made to negotiate for the settlement of 
 the questions in dispute. As regarded Texas, the only real 
 question in dispute was one of boundary. With Mexico, 
 however, the whole of Texas was at issue. The Sabine 
 was the boundary claimed. The proposition to negotiate 
 was met by the demand of withdrawing our fleet from the 
 coast, our troops from the soil of Mexico. Thus a quasi 
 state of war continued for many months. Finally, on 
 the administration of Herrera intimating a willingness to ne- 
 gotiate, a minister actually proceeded to Mexico. He was 
 not received, on the pretext that the proposition was to re- 
 ceive a special minister for the settlement of the Texas 
 question only. This abortive attempt at negotiation led' 
 to a pronunciamiento by Paredes, and the overthrow of the 
 administration of Herrera. And thus in the feverish, in- 
 flamed, unsettled state of the public mind of Mexico, it be- 
 came apparent that stronger measures were necessary. Un- 
 willing to resort at once to arms, which would have been 
 
EIO GEANDE AND OF MEXICO. 9 
 
 justified by the refusal of Mexrco to receive our Minister 
 and by constant vaunts of her intention to make that 
 appeal, it is resolved to make the bold political and military 
 move of marching our tooops to the extreme verge of our 
 claim ; and in April our little army is encamped on the banks 
 of the Rio Grande. Its positive effect was to bring to an end 
 that worst of all states, a quasi war, and to make Mexico 
 show her hand. It was hoped that, as a most significant 
 expression of the determination of the American Govern- 
 ment, it might induce the Mexican nation to negotiate. If 
 resort were had to the alternative of arms, none of us at 
 home, who knew the character of that little army, and the 
 great qualities of its commander, for a moment doubted the 
 result. By the act of Mexico the war was commenced. 
 The splendid achievements of Palo-Alto and Resaca rudely 
 dispelled the presumptuous hopes of the enemy, and fairly 
 opened the campaign. 
 
 Thus this war was a political necessity, which, as it 
 depended on causes beyond the control of the American 
 Government, could be averted by no sagacity of theirs. 
 These causes, not then well understood, are to be found in 
 the unstable, ever-changing policy of Mexican administra- 
 tion ; in that rule of faction which rent the land, and made 
 it the prey of one military dictator after another ; in that 
 utter ignorance of the resources of its antagonist, which was 
 characteristic of even its most enlightened public men. The 
 moderation of our government, and the reiterated attempts 
 to negotiate, were considered evidences of weakness. The 
 clamors of opposition, it was fancied, would soon ripen into 
 a pronunciamiento in their favor. The public mind could 
 only be pacified by an appeal to arms. Mexico needed 
 the sad experience of defeat and dismemberment, to be 
 awakened to a sense of her international duties. 
 
 It was fortunate that at this juncture we had at the 
 head of affairs so firm, so wise, so discreet a President as 
 
10 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 Mr. Polk, ably seconded by that true-hearted patriot and 
 statesman, Governor W. L. Marcy. Americans, through all 
 time, can refer with pride to the unceasing endeavors to avert 
 a hostile collision with a weak and neighboring republic, 
 which, almost at the expense of proper self-respect, were 
 made by our government. Not a lingering doubt can rest 
 upon the fact, that we were urged to it by causes beyond our 
 control, and that we entered upon it with clean hands. 
 
 Having thus been forced into the contest, it became the 
 duty of the American government, in prosecuting it with 
 energy, to demand indemnity for the past and security for 
 the future. Not doubting that a few vigorous blows would 
 end it, both our generals and statesmen were of opinion that 
 operations should be pushed from the existing base of the 
 Rio Grande. The object in view was not simply to termi- 
 nate the present state of actual collision, but that previous, 
 and more to be feared, condition of a quasi war, so unpropi- 
 tious to the progress of a frontier state. It was resolved, in 
 short, to " conquer a peace." 
 
 Before entering upon the narrative of the stirring events 
 of the war, we will premise the following general views of 
 the organization and disciplining of armies, some of which 
 we find happily set forth in the work under consideration. 
 The true military polity of a state provides for the most 
 effective calling forth and organizing of its public force, to 
 produce the greate t result against an enemy. It should 
 grow out of the spirit and genius of the people, and be in 
 harmony with all its institutions. Thus the science of 
 war is based upon political as well as military consider- 
 ations, and involves the thorough study of all the moral 
 and intellectual energies of man. The army of a state 
 should embody the heroic characteristics of its people, and 
 be a noble representative of its varied resources and capaci- 
 ties. Its commander, to devoted patriotism and a consum- 
 mate knowledge of his art, should add a thorough under- 
 
EIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 11 
 
 standing of the political institutions of his country, and a 
 comprehensive view of the problem of government. Man- 
 kind, not only in the embodiment of an army, but as 
 united under governments, by alliances, as associated in 
 neighborhoods and societies, and as expressed in individual 
 action, should have been his grand study. 
 
 A public force thus organized and commanded, in- 
 stinct with devotion to country, endowed with a noble 
 humanity, moving as one man, will be terrible in bat- 
 tle, merciful in victory, friends and not oppressors to the 
 people, upon whose hostile soil they march as conquer- 
 ors. 
 
 The circumstances attending the settlement and pro- 
 gress of the people of the United States have developed, 
 to a remarkable degree, those soldierly qualities essential to 
 the rapid organization of an army. The whole progress 
 of the country has been a war with the wilderness and 
 the savage. Our whole history has been renowned for its 
 peaceful conquests. Self-relying, rugged, indomitable ; 
 from earliest youth accustomed to the use of arms ; with 
 hands taught on the farm and in the workshop, ready for 
 any new enterprise ; with heads in many cases disciplined 
 in severe schools of study, — no recorded people can so 
 soon be converted into disciplined troops. 
 
 Thus it has become the established policy of the gov- 
 ernment to maintain in time of peace a small stand- 
 ing army in the highest state of discipline and efficiency, 
 serving as a nucleus to that larger force to be called 
 suddenly forth from civil life, whose peaceful mission, the 
 conquest of the wilderness and the savage, is a fit prepa- 
 ration for the contingency of war. 
 
 The most complete vindication of the wisdom of this 
 policy is to be found in the alacrity with which our citizens, 
 at the breaking out of the Mexican war, flocked to the 
 standard of their country, and endured the manifold ills of 
 
12 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 a sickly climate and an unprepared field, — in the rapidity 
 with which, in spite of want of organization and defects of 
 discipline, they became reliable troops, and in the general 
 constancy and good conduct they manifested in the various 
 vicissitudes of the campaign. 
 
 Disciplined troops are far more effective, both for the 
 multifarious duties of the campaign and the shock of bat- 
 tle, than hastily collected levies, whether under an or- 
 ganization of volunteers or additional regulars. Such 
 troops are more amenable to discipline, suffer less from 
 disease, are more patient and enduring under hardship, 
 and more firm and undaunted in a perilous crisis. 
 
 It is therefore important, that the veteran standing force 
 should be raised to that condition of numbers, discipline, 
 and organization, as really to afford the means of impart- 
 ing, in a short time, equal efficiency to the whole body of 
 new troops. The veterans give steadiness, confidence, 
 discipline to new troops, and new troops, in return, quicken 
 the patriotism and enthusiasm of veterans. 
 
 On the occurrence of our difficulties with Mexico, the 
 standing army was too small. A grave error had been 
 committed in the army reduction of 1842, making the 
 companies mere skeletons, and reducing the whole number 
 of bayonets and sabres to less than eight thousand. 
 This small force, moreover, had been disseminated through 
 the country in small garrisons, a condition utterly unpro- 
 pitious to high discipline and efficiency. There had been 
 few general camps of discipline, where all arms had met 
 together to learn the military art. In consequence of this 
 system of petty garrisons, and this neglect of camps of dis- 
 cipline, regiments were deficient in the regimental drill, and 
 practical instruction in evolutions of the line was almost un- 
 known. The officers, though thoroughly educated at the 
 military school, and anxious to master their profession, had 
 been allowed few opportunities of experience and instruc- 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 13 
 
 tion, except in the subordinate details of the particular arm 
 to which they were attached. The great body of the ar- 
 tillery even served as infantry. There were no engineer 
 troops, and little or nothing had been done in the instruc- 
 tion of special arms, excepting the light artillery. The army 
 had been regarded more as a police force to maintain forts, 
 and guard our Indian frontier, than as an embodiment of the 
 military skill and science of the country. A great portion of 
 the rank and file were foreigners. There had been no le- 
 gislation to bring a material into the army comparing favor- 
 ably with that to be found in the several trades and occupa- 
 tions of civil life. The army contemplated in the military 
 polity of the country had not been cherished by its legisla- 
 tion. No system had been adopted, considering the army 
 as a whole, impressing each officer and each man with the 
 spirit of his relations to it, and opening to all a professional 
 career. 
 
 It rnu^t be considered as one of the most happy chances 
 of this contest, that the troops who kept the flag of their 
 country high advanced on the battle-fields of the Rio 
 Grande, had been previously in training for this very 
 emergency, in their six months' camp at Corpus Christi, 
 and thus had been raised to a point of discipline and 
 efficiency, which, with proper forecast on the part of the 
 Government, might have been imparted to the whole army. 
 
 Grave errors, too, were committed in the mode of en- 
 larging the public force, and in not taking a sufficiently 
 extended view of the chances and vicissitudes of the cam- 
 paign. There were three modes of enlarging the public force : 
 1st, By an extension of the frame of the old army, increas- 
 ing the companies of the regiments to 24, organized in 
 three battalions, as in the French service ; advancing all 
 the officers, and filling the vacancies at the foot of the list 
 by selections from civil life, and increasing the number of 
 men in a company to 150. Thus would the veteran 
 
14 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 organization have been more than quintupled, regiments 
 and companies have been commanded by experienced 
 officers, and a portion of the new troops have been saved 
 from the privations and sufferings arising from the inex- 
 perience of new officers, who have to learn the making out 
 of the ordinary returns, to say nothing of more important 
 matters. 2d, By adding new regiments of regulars. 
 3d, By calling out volunteers. We think the calling out 
 of volunteers, organized in regiments officered by them- 
 selves, was a happy thought, in accordance with the spirit 
 of our institutions, and as best calculated, in an emer- 
 gency, to get troops promptly to the threatened point. 
 But, conjoined with this, we think it was an oversight 
 in not giving a greater increase to the regular force. 
 One regiment of rifles and a company of engineer soldiers 
 were added to the regular organization, and the number 
 of privates in a company was raised to one hundred. With 
 the expansion of the frame of the organization which we 
 have indicated, and which has its analogies in foreign 
 services, we should have provided for the emergencies 
 which actually occurred, and which a wise forecast would 
 have anticipated in embarking in a war. It would have 
 increased the regular force to 50,000 odd, rank and file, the 
 whole of which, with proper exertions, could have been 
 raised in the summer of 1846 ; and which, allowing one- 
 fifth at the depots, or en route for the seat of war, and 
 one-fifth for the permanent sick-list, would have left three- 
 fifths, or 30,000 regulars, for field service, at the beginning 
 of the healthy season in the fall. 
 
 But the capital error of the government, and one for 
 which it cannot be held blameless, consisted in not placing 
 a proper confidence in the counsels of some of the ablest 
 military men of the country — men who had devoted their 
 lives to the military profession, and had seen service in 
 former fields. Both the President and the Secretary of 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 15 
 
 War, experienced as statesmen, were totally inexperienced 
 in military affairs ; and it was a violation of the plainest 
 principles of administration, to endeavor to organize cam- 
 paigns without reference to the views of those who had 
 made campaigns their special study. It was unfortu- 
 nate that General Scott, altogether the ablest military 
 man then known to the country, was not admitted to 
 the confidence of the Executive, and the plan of cam- 
 paign modified to suit his views. They did not suit, 
 however, the impatient spirit of our government and 
 people. Results were eagerly grasped at, and though sound 
 policy approved the plan of seizing New Mexico and 
 California, as indemnity for the war, yet the plan of 
 General Scott, to call out the volunteers and place them in 
 camps of instruction at home, should have been pursued. 
 They would have acquired a respectable degree of disci- 
 pline, have become inured to the privations of the field, and 
 have thus been enabled to resist the inroads of disease in an 
 unhealthy climate. In the mean time, information could 
 have been obtained, depots established, means of transpor- 
 tation collected, and a plan of campaign could have been 
 decided on. Had this course been pursued, when our army 
 did move, one vigorous blow, one onward resistless march, 
 and the contest would have been over. We do not say 
 this in disparagement of the patriotic services of the 
 President and his Secretary. We are not unmindful of 
 the fact, that it is easy to write these things after the 
 event. The claims of these high functionaries to the 
 gratitude of their country lies in the fact, that they did 
 pursue a practicable, energetic course, that they did apply 
 with energy and success the public means to the prosecu- 
 tion of an inevitable contest, and that they availed them- 
 selves of the high state of exaltation of the public mind to 
 enlist troops and send them to the field. It is just, however, 
 to present their mistakes in an impartial view of this matter, 
 
16 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 so that we may profit by our own blunders, the readiest 
 mode of getting wisdom, both on the part of nations and of 
 individuals. 
 
 On certain essential points there was a most happy 
 union of sentiment between the government and the com- 
 manders of its armies. It was determined to conduct 
 the war on the most humane principles, so that none of its 
 calamities should fall on non-combatants. The laws of the 
 State were enforced, its religion respected, the inhabitants 
 protected in their property, their homes, and their lives. 
 The troops were not permitted to live at free quarters. 
 Every thing was purchased at a fair price. All violations 
 of the law were promptly punished. In the hour of victo- 
 ry mercy was shown to the conquered, and kindness was 
 lavished on the prisoner. The aim of all was to soothe and 
 tranquillize the people, and to make them feel we were 
 friends, and not oppressors. It was seen, from the nature 
 of the contest, that this course promised the only hope of 
 bringing the question to an amicable termination. It in- 
 volved larger trains in forwarding supplies, so that we might 
 not touch the sparse stores of the inhabitants, much delay 
 in prosecuting operations ; and the results were not apparent- 
 ly as rapid and brilliant as they would otherwise have been. 
 It was also agreed in prosecuting the contest, that it was a 
 cardinal point to maintain the highest possible ascendency 
 over the minds of the Mexican people, and that in conse- 
 quence it was necessary that not only should we conquer 
 in every encounter, but that after once having planted our 
 foot, it should not be withdrawn. Every movement must 
 be one of advance, which involved caution, and of course 
 delay in movement. 
 
 Yet the disciplining of the troops, and the details 
 of the campaign, are open to criticism. And first of all, 
 we will premise the following observations : In war, 
 troops should be kept actively employed, either in mov- 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OP MEXICO. 17 
 
 able columns, operating against the enemy, or in camps 
 of discipline, learning the military art ; and in -a mild 
 climate, as in Mexico, they should live under canvas, 
 and be kept out of large cities, those Capuas to troops. 
 Even the bulk of the garrisons of the cities should live out- 
 side the walls ; key-points within being simply held by de- 
 tachments from the main body, relieved daily. Thus the 
 garrison will have all the mobility of a column, a greater 
 prestige over the minds of the inhabitants, and be freed from 
 those demoralizing influences, which the strictest discipline 
 cannot counteract. 
 
 In operating against an enemy, it should be the study of 
 the general to make the superiority of his troops felt in 
 every particular : in rapidity of marches, aptitude for fa- 
 tigue, patience under hardship, steadiness and confi- 
 dence in vicissitude, as well as in the onslaught and the 
 pursuit. »With this view, from the first day of taking 
 the field, every man should be put in training, as those 
 were who contended for the honors of the Olympic games. 
 Officers and men should, of course, be well instructed in 
 the miscellaneous duties of the camp and march ; but every 
 effort should be made to invigorate the physique, and ele- 
 vate the morale. The exercises should not be restricted to 
 the drill. They should include marches ordinary and 
 forced, and the encountering of obstacles met with in the 
 field. They should be accustomed to carry burdens. 
 With the Romans, the exercises of peace were more 
 severe than those of war ; and their soldiers rejoiced when 
 they marched against an enemy. Every day should show 
 an increase of physical and moral force. 
 
 The geography and resources of the country, moreover, 
 require a careful examination, as they must necessarily 
 modify the details of the campaign. 
 
 But mobility is the essential quality to be given to an 
 army. It is better to run a little risk as regards food, cloth- 
 2 
 
18 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 ing, and even the materiel of war, than so to encumber an 
 army as to make it move at a snail's pace. In Mexico, 
 we think, all the operations were somewhat faulty in the 
 above respects. The six months' camp at Corpus Christi 
 gave that spirit and character to the army, which caused 
 it to triumph in its subsequent advance. In the march of 
 General Wool, from San Antonio to Parras, the troops made 
 their usual marches each day, and did not lose a man. In 
 Puebla, our troops preparing for the advance were assidu- 
 ous in their military exercises ; but at Vera Cruz — Jalapa 
 — Puebla — Mexico — they were quartered in cities. This 
 was unavoidable at Vera Cruz, but not so at the other 
 places ; and throughout it was admitted, that a Mexican 
 army had a mobility which could not be given to its antag- 
 onists. The Mexican troops are indeed remarkable for 
 their rapid marches, and their patient endurance of hunger 
 and fatigue. Ampudia, in four days, marched^a division 
 from Monterey to Matamoras, 180 miles. Santa Anna, after 
 concentrating his troops about Encarnacion, moved early on 
 the morning of the 21st of February, and after marching a 
 distance of 36 miles across a desert without food or water, 
 and finding the American troops in retreat, pushed his 
 wearied army forward and came in presence of General 
 Taylor about mid-day on the 22d ; his advance having 
 marched some fifty miles in thirty hours, though with dis- 
 astrous loss, both in men and morale. A portion of these 
 same troops made a counter-march of seven hundred miles, 
 and in fifty-five days were in position at Cerro-Gordo. Yet, 
 notwithstanding these facts, we have no hesitation in ex- 
 pressing the conviction that, with the training we have in- 
 dicated, an American army could be made to surpass the 
 Mexicans, and indeed any army of ancient or modern times, 
 in the rapidity of its marches, and in its patient endurance 
 of all the toils of the campaign. But to attain this, a severe 
 and constant discipline for many months is required ; and it 
 
EIO GKANDE AND OF MEXICO. 19 
 
 should be made the point of honor with the soldier, to excel 
 his enemy in every requisite to success. It is a question 
 worthy of consideration, too, whether pack-mules could not 
 have been chiefly relied upon, as a means of transportation 
 in prosecuting the first advantages, leaving the wagon 
 trains to bring forward the larger supplies subsequently. 
 Great mobility, too, could have been given to the movable 
 columns, by organizing an efficient mule train. Had the 
 contest continued, there is no doubt we could have 
 made ourselves as great a terror to the enemy by our 
 rapid marches, and by falling upon him unawares, as 
 in the pitched battles. 
 
 We have already presented the military and political 
 reasons for the march to the Rio Grande. General Taylor 
 occupied a menacing position opposite Matamoras, and se- 
 cured it by defensive works in the last days of April and 
 the early days of May. The capture of Thornton's party 
 left no doubt as to the hostile intentions of the Mexicans. 
 General Taylor immediately made a requisition for five 
 thousand troops. The country was thrown into the most 
 intense anxiety for the safety of his command. But before 
 reinforcements reached him, the enemy had been overcome 
 in the well-contested fields of Palo Alto and Resaca, and 
 driven across the Rio Grande. 
 
 Referring to our author for the narrative of these battles, 
 we will state that in our opinion he does not do justice to 
 the sagacity, promptitude, and judgment of the American 
 commander. It would be inferred that General Taylor was 
 wanting in decision, and that he had been worked up to his 
 duty by the more energetic counsels of younger officers. 
 General Taylor's whole course was well weighed, and was 
 pursued with the most indomitable resolution. Major Ripley 
 states, that on the morning of the 9th General Taylor was 
 doubtful as to the* propriety of an advance, and that, in conse- 
 quence, he convened a council of war to discuss the ques- 
 
20 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 tion. This is an entire mistake. General Taylor never 
 hesitated for one moment, and he called the council simply 
 at the instance of one or two of the senior officers who were 
 opposed to the step. This council never had the slightest 
 weight with General Taylor, as is apparent from the fact, 
 that a large majority of the officers were opposed to an ad- 
 vance, and yet the advance was made. Moreover, it is 
 stated, that only Duncan and Belknap were in favor of 
 an advance. Justice to the dead requires it to be said that 
 Cols. Macintosh and Martin Scott were equally strenu- 
 ous in favor of an advance — two gallant men who subse- 
 quently, on the bloody field of Molino, gave up their lives 
 to their country. The march to the Rio Grande, the occu- 
 pying a defensive position opposite Matamoras, and the re- 
 turn to Point Isabel, were all important steps in the plan of 
 maintaining American ascendency on the eastern bank of 
 the Rio Grande. These flanking points made essentially 
 secure, General Taylor marched directly forward to his ob- 
 ject ; and we know not which most to admire, his cool and 
 steady encounter of the enemy on the field of Palo Alto, 
 or the extraordinary and terrible energy with which he 
 sent his little force to the attack of the Resaca. The one 
 gave confidence to his troops and prepared them for the 
 other. 
 
 Thus had the war unexpectedly arisen and been ush- 
 ered in by the glorious victories of the Rio Grande. The 
 necessary information upon which to base a large and sys- 
 tematic campaign was not collected, nor were there the 
 supplies and means of transportation to advance with vigor 
 into the interior. But both the General and the Govern- 
 ment were of opinion that no delay should occur in striking 
 another blow at the enemy. The President was particu- 
 larly desirous to avail himself of the enthusiasm of the na- 
 tion, and accordingly a large number of troops was sent 
 out to the theatre of war. And whilst, in reference to ulte- 
 
KIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 21 
 
 rior operations, neither the authorities at Washington nor 
 the General in the field were able at once to settle upon a 
 practicable plan, they both came simultaneously to the con- 
 clusion that Monterey, the capital of New Leon, the first 
 position of strength on the highway to Mexico, and the 
 key to the Northern provinces, should be promptly seized. 
 It was hoped that when this was accomplished, the Mexi- 
 can government would be ready to negotiate. 
 
 But the administration did not appreciate the difficulty 
 of moving troops in an enemy's country, and amidst a 
 sparse and impoverished population ; nor did it consider 
 that while it was an easy matter, with our immense 
 steamboat facilities, to disembark reinforcements near the 
 base of the Rio Grande, it was a work of time to organize 
 the wagon trains to transport the same into the interior. 
 
 It would seem, indeed, that while so much vigor was 
 shown in transporting troops to the Rio Grande, very little 
 was exhibited in furnishing the means for transporting 
 them after their disembarkation. It was the duty of the 
 authorities to see that the usual supplies, means of trans- 
 portation, <fcc, were sent with them, leaving it simply to 
 the General in the field to make requisitions for unusual 
 supplies and means of transportation. Thus, while some 
 twenty thousand volunteers were sent to the theatre of war, 
 not a wagon reached the advance of Gen. Taylor till after 
 the capture of Monterey. 
 
 Gen. Taylor found himself in a situation of great em- 
 barrassment. Availing himself of the Rio Grande for for- 
 warding supplies and troops by steam to a new depot at 
 Camargo, he saw himself obliged either to make the move- 
 ment on Monterey with the trains that had accompanied 
 his advance from Corpus Christi, when his force was less 
 than three thousand men ; or else to defer his movement to 
 so late a period, as to occasion serious dissatisfaction to 
 the authorities at home. 
 
22 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 But the question of subsistence is a controlling one in 
 the movement of armies, and all the information that was 
 gained went to show that only about six thousand men 
 could be subsisted in the country about Monterey; 
 moreover, this was the maximum force for which the 
 American general could transport the munitions of war 
 and subsistence indispensable before the occupation of the 
 country placed in his hands its resources. 
 
 If, therefore, a movement were made at all, the column 
 was necessarily restricted to that number, though a much 
 larger force was at hand. Confident that it would be 
 adequate to the single object of reducing Monterey, and 
 concurring with the Government in the policy of vigorous- 
 ly prosecuting operations, Gen. Taylor determined upon 
 advancing. Having arrived before Monterey, on the 19th 
 of September, a vigorous reconnaissance was ordered of the 
 various approaches, which resulted in the determination of 
 Gen. Taylor to occupy the Saltillo road by Worth's veteran 
 division, holding the remainder of the army in position 
 on the eastern side of the town. Previous to arriving be- 
 fore Monterey, Gen. Taylor had contemplated a movement 
 of this kind, with the view of intercepting reinforcements, 
 and capturing the enemy's entire force. And, within twelve 
 hours after his arrival, Major Mansfield, with a squadron 
 of Texan horse, had gone over the whole distance to the 
 Saltillo road, and had ascertained the entire practicability 
 of the movement. 
 
 On the Saltillo side of the town were the two imposing 
 heights of the Independence and Federation, defended by 
 the respective works of the Bishop's Palace and old Fort 
 Soldado. The possession of these works made certain the 
 reduction of the city. Worth was put in movement on 
 the 20th, and, to distract the enemy's attention, the remain- 
 der of the army was displayed on the eastern front of the 
 city. Worth encamped about three miles from the Saltillo 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 23 
 
 road, and at daybreak the next morning resumed his 
 march. After a sharp skirmish at the junction of the Sal- 
 tillo road with the one he was pursuing, the enemy was 
 repulsed and the Saltillo road was gained. Putting his 
 train in a secure position on the Saltillo road, and disposing 
 his troops for its protection, he made his arrangements to 
 storm the heights of the Federation. Suffice it to say, that it 
 met with the most complete success. Capt. C. F. Smith 
 conducted the front attack against the heights with a 
 chosen body of 300 men, while Col. P. F. Smith, with the 
 5th and 7th Infantry, directed another more to the south and 
 west, directly against Fort Soldado itself. Col. Smith's 
 movement, made on his own responsibility, against the 
 Soldado, was in happy conjunction with that of Capt. 
 Smith, made somewhat earlier, against the highest point, 
 of the Federation. The garrison of Soldado, shaken by 
 Capt. Smith's appearance on this height, was in no condi- 
 tion to resist the charge of the 5th and 7th. But before 
 Worth's stormers had crowned the height of the Federation, 
 the other side of Monterey had been penetrated, and a de- 
 cisive triumph had been achieved over the main bulk of 
 the enemy's force. 
 
 On the northern and eastern fronts of the city the 
 ground was low, and the view obstructed by corn and 
 chaparral. On the morning of the 21st, Gen. Taylor 
 displayed his whole command, and ordered forward Major 
 Mansfield and three battalions of Twiggs' division under 
 Garland, to make a close reconnaissance of the enemy's 
 works, and, if circumstances favored, to seize a position in 
 the city itself. In the execution of this order, Mansfield, 
 supported by two companies of Garland's command, cau- 
 tiously advanced, and came upon an abandoned field-work, 
 at only a stone's throw from some deserted stone houses in 
 the suburbs, affording excellent cover for troops, and appa- 
 rently giving access to the gorge of a redoubt on the ex- 
 
24 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 treme left. This redoubt, called the Tannery Redoubt, was 
 the key-point of the enemy's defences on this front of attack, 
 and its possession was indispensable to the effective prose- 
 cution of operations. 
 
 Word was now sent to Garland to come on, and Mans- 
 field moved down the street in search of a way to move to 
 the left on the gorge. Before this was accomplished the 
 whole command of Garland came into the suburb on the 
 run, without suffering material'loss, and pushing eagerly for- 
 ward, became exposed to a severe fire from masked batteries 
 beyond the San Juan. Mansfield still advanced with the 
 companies of Backus and Lamotte, and a position was taken 
 in a tannery, whence a severe fire was directed upon the 
 gorge of the redoubt and upon another tannery which pro- 
 tected this gorge. But this attack was not supported, and 
 Garland's command was withdrawn out of range, at the 
 very moment the 4th Infantry and three regiments of 
 volunteers under General Butler were sent to its support. 
 These troops gallantly advanced upon the tannery redoubt ; 
 and its garrison, all the while severely pelted by Backus and 
 Lamotte, immediately took to flight and crossed the San 
 Juan. Operations were still further prosecuted, and attempts 
 were made to storm the Tete de Pont, and a redoubt to the 
 left of the tannery redoubt, but after experiencing considera- 
 ble loss they were abandoned. No further attempts were 
 made to effect a lodgment in the streets of the city. Gar- 
 land's command was stationed as a guard to the tannery 
 redoubt, and the remainder of the troops were withdrawn 
 to the camp of San Domingo. This severe conflict, involv- 
 ing a loss of 394 men, killed and wounded, completely with- 
 drew the attention of the enemy from the western front, and 
 opened the way for Worth's success. It covered the time 
 occupied by Worth from his movement in the morning to 
 his seizing the height of the Federation. 
 
 On the 22d, Worth followed up his successes by the 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 25 
 
 storming of the Independence, closely followed by that of 
 the Bishop's Palace. On the eastern front, the body of the 
 enemy occupied their position of the previous day, and 
 poured a storm of fire upon the tannery redoubt. A road 
 thereto from the camp was constructed, entirely sheltering 
 the troops from the flank fire of the Citadel, except for about 
 the last hundred yards. The strength of the tannery re- 
 doubt itself was also increased by additional works. 
 
 In the night of the 22d and 23d, the enemy concentrated 
 the bulk of his troops in the vicinity of the main plaza, and 
 on the morning of the 23d, the troops on the eastern front 
 occupied several of the works in the vicinity of the tannery 
 redoubt. General Taylor directed the cautious advance of 
 Quitman into the city. Quitman, by 2 o'clock, had ap- 
 proached to within a square of the plaza. But General 
 Taylor, although he had been engaged full four hours, 
 hearing up to this time nothing from Worth, concluded that 
 no attack would be made by him during the day, and he 
 accordingly withdrew the troops to the edge of the city, to 
 concert a combined attack. Worth, notwithstanding, had 
 been making his arrangements to attack the western portion 
 of the city. He organized two parties, which, working from 
 house to house with picks, made good every step of their 
 advance. Towards nightfall Worth established the mortar 
 which had been sent round from the other front, within ef- 
 fective distance of the heart of the city, and threw a shell 
 into the main plaza every twenty minutes during the night. 
 
 On the morning of the 24th, a proposition to capitulate 
 was submitted by Ampudia to the American General, and 
 after several meetings on the part of Commissioners from 
 the two parties, terms were agreed upon. The city and the 
 military stores of the Mexican army were turned over to 
 the Americans ; the garrison marched out with the honors 
 of war, retaining their arms and a field battery of six 
 pieces ; and an armistice of eight weeks was agreed 
 
26 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 upon, subject to the approval of the respective govern- 
 ments. 
 
 Commending Major Ripley's narrative as in the main 
 a perspicuous, graphic, and faithful account of these opera- 
 tions, we will express our dissent from some of his military 
 views. In his criticisms upon these operations, he influ- 
 ence of the operations of General Worth are unduly mag- 
 nified at the expense of those on the eastern front ; thus 
 enhancing the military reputation of General Worth, 
 at the expense of that of General Taylor. General 
 Worth in command of a division, and charged with an in- 
 dependent and most important operation, exhibited great 
 skill and good conduct. He showed admirable executive 
 qualities ; care in providing for the safety of his trains, pre- 
 cautions against surprise, and skill in preparation for his 
 multifarious enterprises. His combinations for carrying the 
 heights of the Federation and Fort Soldado, the heights 
 of the Independence and the Bishop's palace, were happily 
 conceived, and boldly executed. Too much praise can- 
 not be ascribed to his cautious, and yet sustained vigorous 
 advance into the city. 
 
 But it must be borne in mind, that it was General Tay- 
 lor to whom the merit of the conception of this flank move- 
 ment of Worth was due, and that, thoroughly understand- 
 ing the character of his enemy, he omitted no precaution to 
 secure its complete success. His bold attack upon the city 
 on the morning of the 21st, gaining an important work, and 
 his unflinching attitude throughout that day, and the suc- 
 ceeding day, in the teeth of the main force of the enemy 
 and under the incessant fire of his heavy guns, not only 
 was Worth's safety on the Saltillo road, but it absolutely 
 disgarnished that quarter of the city of a great portion of 
 its defenders, and required of Worth at no time to put forth 
 half the strength of his division. This combined move- 
 ment against the common enemy, caused all the heights and 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 27 
 
 defences 'of the western front to fall into the hands of 
 Worth, with small loss to his division. 
 
 Moreover, on the 23d, Gen. Taylor, by his early, bold, 
 and consecutive movements, continued to withdraw the 
 enemy's attention from Worth, and enabled the latter 
 to establish himself securely in the western suburb of the 
 city, without seriously encountering the enemy. Though 
 we think Gen. Worth deserving of censure for his pro- 
 crastination in responding to Taylor's attack in the early 
 part of the day, he is to be commended highly for 
 continuing his advance in the latter portion, after Taylor's 
 fire had ceased and his troops had been withdrawn. It 
 must also be admitted, that, as regards the details of opera- 
 tions in the city, the eastern attack was not characterized 
 by the skill and caution of the western attack. Thus, on 
 the 21st, we think, there were movements subsequent to 
 the taking of the tannery redoubt, which were unneces- 
 sarily rash and headlong, and that the suburb previously 
 occupied should have been subsequently held and se- 
 cured by works. We think the mortar, instead of having 
 been sent round to Worth, should have been established in 
 that redoubt immediately on its fall. Shells thrown there- 
 from into the enemy's lines, would have done much towards 
 silencing his fire on the 22d. Instead of restricting ope- 
 rations on the 22d to the occupation and strengthening of 
 the works of the tannery redoubt, ground northward and 
 westward should have been gained and secured by lodg- 
 ments, with a view of opening a communication with 
 Worth and of isolating the citadel. 
 
 On the third day, Worth being in possession of the oppo- 
 site heights, and the way being open for his entrance into 
 the city, Gen. Taylor should early have sent an order to 
 Worth to advance with promptitude. There would have 
 been no difficulty in sending the order. At all events, his 
 own troops should not have been withdrawn. With early 
 
28 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 notice sent to Worth, and decisive orders for his prompt 
 advance, a communication must have been established to- 
 wards night. 
 
 Exposed as Gen. Taylor's column was to the close fire 
 of the enemy's main force, it was important that his suc- 
 cessive advances should have been secured by works. 
 
 We will remark, however, there was a great deficiency 
 of intrenching tools, due to the limited amount of trans- 
 portation, and that all the operations at Monterey were 
 greatly influenced, both by this cause and the entire want 
 of breaching guns. 
 
 Major Ripley enlarges much upon the dangerous char- 
 acter of the flank movement executed by Worth. To 
 which we reply : Gen. Taylor knew his enemy ; he also 
 knew the reliable character of Worth and Worth's division. 
 The operation promised large results, without hazard of 
 disaster or unnecessary loss. It was made perfectly 
 safe by Taylor's prompt conduct in first displaying 
 his troops, and sending large corps of cavalry towards the 
 western suburb, with orders even to charge through the 
 open streets, should circumstances favor, whilst Worth was 
 in movement ; and, second, in his stern attack on the city, 
 while Worth was making his dispositions to do the work 
 assigned to him. 
 
 Major Ripley also censures the eastern attack, for 
 being made under the flank fire of the citadel, and with- 
 out a proper knowledge of the ground. To which we 
 reply : The citadel was a strong field-work, defended 
 by a formidable stone keep. Two breaching guns, de- 
 signed for the attack on the city, had been left be- 
 hind, in consequence of the small amount of transportation 
 rendering it utterly impossible to take them along. The 
 enemy were greatly superior in heavy guns. The citadel 
 could only have been taken by an infantry assault, which 
 would have been, in a military sense, almost madness, and 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 29 
 
 could only have succeeded at at an enormous sacrifice of 
 life. Time pressed. Boldness and rapidity could alone 
 insure success. The safety of the army was in decided 
 action and in prompt results ; although some loss and some 
 hazard were incurred in disregarding the citadel, there 
 would have been more by delaying the attack on the city 
 and carrying the citadel. It was impossible to get information 
 of the eastern works, without bringing a portion of the com- 
 mand into action ; and though the ardor of the troops 
 brought the whole force of Garland into close action before 
 the reconnaissance was accomplished, it may be just cause 
 for censuring subordinates, but not the directing general. 
 Taylor's orders to Garland and to Mansfield to examine 
 the enemy's position, and, if circumstances favored, to 
 seize a point in the city, we pronounce to be emphatically 
 wise and proper. His promptitude, on hearing the report 
 of arms, in advancing the remainder of his troops, saved 
 Backus in his gallant stand in rear of the tannery redoubt, 
 entirely isolated in consequence of the withdrawal of Gar- 
 land, and resulted in wresting a strong position from the 
 enemy, and driving him beyond the San Juan. His gene- 
 ral dispositions and orders were just and urgently demand- 
 ed, in view of the movement of Worth. 
 
 We cannot see how General Taylor could have made a 
 better general plan for his operations against Monterey, 
 or a better general disposition of his troops. Nor will 
 it be denied that his operations as a whole were character- 
 ized by vigor, boldness, and judgment. Upon these 
 considerations must rest the vindication of his qualities as 
 a commander. 
 
 We now come to the capitulation of Monterey, and 
 feel bound to express our entire dissent from Major Rip- 
 ley's views. 
 
 General Taylor, though in the first instance disposed to 
 insist upon the surrender of the Mexican army as prisoners 
 
30 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 of war, finally agreed to the capitulation for the following 
 reasons : 
 
 1. His army was not large enough to make a complete 
 investment of the city, and he could not prevent the enemy 
 evacuating it during the night. 
 
 2. He was assured by General Ampudia that the new 
 Mexican administration was favorable to negotiations, and 
 he was induced to grant the mild terms of the capitulation 
 providing for an eight weeks' armistice, in the belief that it 
 would be an auspicious entering upon a more friendly in- 
 tercourse between the two governments, and would end in 
 a treaty of peace. 
 
 3. Considerations of humanity to non-combatants. 
 The difficulty with Major Ripley's criticisms, as indeed 
 
 with the criticisms of all who have censured General Tay- 
 lor for this capitulation, is, that in discussing the terms and 
 measuring the advantages of the capitulation, sight has 
 been lost of the fact that a most signal triumph was 
 achieved, and an important point gained. The Mexicans, 
 in agreeing to a capitulation, acknowledged most signifi- 
 cantly the prowess of the American army. The expedition 
 was limited to six thousand men, for the simple reason that 
 a larger force could not be transported to, and subsisted in 
 the valley of the San Juan. It is admitted, that a more 
 formidable resistance was encountered than was anticipated. 
 Does this sustain our author's statement, that the expe- 
 dition was chiefly an experiment on the agricultural ca- 
 pacity of the San Juan ; that its object was statistical 
 and not military ? This idea has its refutation in the bold, 
 prompt, resolute going to work of the American General ; 
 in his stern, vigorous blows, compelling the enemy to seek 
 the cover of his works on the first day of the attack ; and 
 in all his subsequent movements. We think that General 
 Taylor deserves high praise for his vigor and foresight in 
 so prosecuting operations, that the enemy agreed to ca- 
 
EIO GEAJSTDE AND OF MEXICO. 81 
 
 pitulate, instead of resorting to the evacuation of the 
 city. 
 
 The real alternative is this : did General Taylor judge 
 rightly as a military man, and therefore does he deserve 
 well of his country for advancing when he did ad- 
 vance, and accomplishing what he did accomplish? Or 
 ought he to have remained on the Rio Grande four to 
 six weeks longer, in order that he might organize the neces- 
 sary means to raise his expedition to 10,000 or 12,000 men ? 
 This, it seems to us, is the real and only alternative. 
 
 The result therefore of the operations against Monterey 
 was its capitulation, and the withdrawal of the Mexican 
 force. But in consequence of the known fact that a change of 
 administration had occurred in Mexico, and the assurances 
 of the Mexican General that the new rulers were friendly 
 to negotiations, the political measure of an eight weeks' 
 armistice was determined upon, for the purpose of giving 
 the Mexican Government an opportunity to treat for peace. 
 Major Ripley errs in treating this armistice as a military 
 necessity, growing out of the inadequate means of the Amer- 
 ican General ; whereas it was a question of state, which, 
 under the new circumstances of the case, General Taylor 
 felt authorized to entertain ; and to entertain the more 
 readily, because it could not interfere in the slightest degree 
 with a forward movement, the alternative of failure in ne- 
 gotiations, and to prepare for which he well knew would 
 require the whole period covered by the armistice. 
 
 The practical sagacity of General Taylor in this mea- 
 sure is displayed in his never having for a moment intermit- 
 ted his exertions to prepare for the advance, and in the 
 armistice itself never having paralyzed in the least his 
 operations. 
 
 Although we think it probable that the Mexican army 
 would have surrendered prisoners of war, we neverthe- 
 less think that General Taylor acted wisely in agreeing to 
 
32 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 the capitulation. He could not have foreseen Mexican facili- 
 ty in giving assurances that were not to be fulfilled. Our ob- 
 ject was to conquer a peace. How could this be accom- 
 plished if we rejected all overtures from the enemy, on the 
 ground they could not be trusted ? With such a principle 
 we might have subjugated the country, but manifestly it 
 would have been impossible to treat for peace. 
 
 About the time of the reduction of Monterey, the Govern- 
 ment was directing its attention to operations in another 
 quarter, and our author, in his endeavor to account for the 
 policy of initiating the Vera Cruz expedition, has in our 
 judgment fairly presented neither the military views and 
 recommendations of Gen. Taylor, nor the main historical 
 facts of this most interesting period of the Mexican war. 
 In general terms, he sets forth the statement that Gen. 
 Taylor, in reply to the many inquiries of the Government as 
 to the proper mode of prosecuting operations, was deficient 
 in enlarged views ; that his counsels were simply limited to 
 objections ; and that the Administration, finding they could 
 get nothing out of him, were obliged to act without regard 
 to him. The facts are simply these. Their simple reca- 
 pitulation will show the important part played by Gen. 
 Taylor even in the Vera Cruz expedition, and the concur- 
 rence of opinion that subsisted between Marcy, Scott, and 
 Taylor, in reference to setting on foot and prosecuting that 
 expedition. We will give them without reference to autho- 
 rities, but we challenge contradiction. 
 
 Gen. Taylor from the outset was of opinion, that opera- 
 tions from the Rio Grande should be restricted to cutting off 
 the Northern Provinces. In reference to the simple opera- 
 tion of reducing Monterey, he was uniformly of opinion 
 that six thousand men were adequate. Whether San Louis 
 Potosi should be included under the general class of North- 
 ern Provinces, he declined giving an opinion, till more 
 accurate information could be gained by advancing upon 
 
EIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 35 
 
 and reducing Monterey. Previous to the advance to Monte- 
 rey, he had thought it probable that a column of 10,000 
 men advanced to San Louis Potosi would bring proposals 
 of peace, but after the advance he was of opinion that 20,000 
 men would be requisite — that this number could not be 
 pushed forward — that this advance must be abandoned and 
 a defensive line occupied, — and that the decisive blow must 
 be struck against the capital from the neighborhood of 
 Vera Cruz. He early expressed the opinion that a move- 
 ment upon the capital from Tampico was impracticable. 
 The Secretary on his part concurred fully in the opinion, 
 early expressed and uniformly maintained, as to the extent 
 of operations from the base of the Rio Grande. He shared 
 equally with the general, his hopes and his fears in reference 
 to an advance upon San Louis Potosi. He hoped, as did 
 the general, that such an advance might be practicable, and 
 that it might terminate the war. Both the Secretary and 
 the General, when it was seen that the change of Govern- 
 ment brought with it no hopes of negotiating a peace, came 
 to the conclusion that the decisive blow against Mexico 
 should not be struck from the Northern line. Their respec- 
 tive letters announcing this conclusion passed each other on 
 their way to their several destinations. This change of 
 rulers was a grand political element that controlled the 
 military operations. Major Ripley will find in this new 
 element a conclusive reason for the change of opinion of 
 Gen. Taylor, after the reduction of Monterey, as to the force 
 that would be adequate to occupy San Louis Potosi. In 
 August, when, he expressed the opinion that 10,000 men 
 were adequate, it was believed the Northern Provinces, in- 
 cluding San Louis Potosi, were hostile to the general govern- 
 ment, and would be disposed to welcome our advance. In 
 October, affairs were entirely changed. The Government 
 had gone into the hands of more energetic rulers, and the 
 3 
 
34 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 whole country was united in one sentiment of hostility 
 and resistance to American conquest. 
 
 The War Department, in a dispatch to Gen. Taylor of 
 the 22d September, announced the rejection of overtures for 
 negotiating a peace by the Mexican Government, and the 
 determination of the American Government to prosecute the 
 contest with vigor, and on the 22d October that an expe- 
 dition against Vera Cruz was resolved upon. At this time 
 no ulterior views beyond the reduction of Vera Cruz seem 
 to have been entertained by the Secretary, and 4000 men 
 was the force suggested as adequate to this service in con- 
 nection with the navy. But for definite and large views, 
 both as regards the whole field of operations in Mexico, and 
 the particular objects and organization of this expedition, 
 the country is mainly indebted to Gen. Scott. He now 
 seems to have been taken into the confidence of the Govern- 
 ment. In a memoir addressed to the Secretary on the 27th 
 October, he showed that the possession of Vera Cruz and 
 its castle, as a step towards compelling Mexico to sue for 
 peace, was of no value, unless promptly followed by a 
 march upon the capital. Ten thousand men he deemed 
 the minimum force to attempt the reduction of the city, to 
 be increased to 20,000 men on opening the campaign. In 
 subsequent memoirs of the 12th and 16th November, he 
 proposed prosecuting a great campaign with 30,000 effectives, 
 to be organized in advance of Monterey and at Vera Cruz, 
 in two columns of ten and twenty thousand men. and to 
 operate respectively upon San Louis Potosi, and the capital. 
 These memoirs are masterly. We think no one need do 
 more than carefully read them to satisfy himself why the 
 Government a few days afterwards sent the Commander-in- 
 Chief of the army to the field, with full powers to organize 
 both lines according to his own best judgment. And it 
 was not till this decisive step had been taken, that the 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 35 
 
 Government was placed in possession of Gen. Taylor's plan 
 of the campaign ; which was to assume a defensive attitude 
 on the northern line, and to strike the decisive blow from 
 Vera Cruz on the Capital with an army of 25,000 men. 
 
 Gen. Scott's plan we deem admirably adapted to the 
 present conjuncture of affairs in Mexico. The great leader 
 of Mexico was now at the head of its armies. Ten thou- 
 sand effectives in advance of Monterey would have resisted 
 any offensive movements, with the large force he was now 
 organizing at San Louis Potosi. If Santa Anna remained 
 in observation at San Louis Potosi, Gen. Scott would have 
 advanced almost unresisted upon the capital. If he de- 
 tached, and he must have detached largely if he detached 
 at all, Gen. Taylor would have advanced almost unresisted 
 upon San Louis Potosi. And with 20,000 men, Gen. Scott 
 could have overcome any Mexican force, whether in the 
 open field, or behind defensive works. Detachments would 
 probably have been made, and the whole Mexican army, 
 and the two strong points of the North and the South of 
 Mexico, would have succumbed to -our arms. Menacing 
 columns operating from these points must have prevented 
 any further organization of the public force of Mexico, and 
 no alternative would have remained than to sue for peace. 
 The question was emphatically one of moral ascendancy, 
 and bold consecutive movements on two converging lines 
 were calculated to produce the greatest impression on the 
 excitable Mexican mind. 
 
 General Taylor's plan we deem an eminently safe and 
 practicable plan — and though not so imposing and complete 
 as that of General Scott, and not calculated to produce as 
 large results, yet requiring a smaller force, it was more in 
 accordance with the state of American preparation, and was 
 in the sequel adopted. 
 
 We prefer obvious, simple, natural explanations of acts 
 
36 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 and motives to possible hypotheses, however ingenious they 
 may be. And therefore we do not believe with Major Rip- 
 ley, that as regards Scott and Taylor, the question had 
 now become personal ; that each was fixed on his own 
 special part without reference to the general good. We do 
 not believe that General Scott went to the field to play a 
 monopolizing part ; nor do we believe that General Tay- 
 lor had a thought that did not harmonize with the most 
 single-minded devotion to his duty and his country. 
 
 The administration was impelled to its course by high 
 
 national considerations. It was its paramount duty, as it 
 
 was its evident interest, to organize victory. A crisis had 
 
 indeed occurred, demanding that all the military ability of 
 
 the country should be applied to the direction of its military 
 
 force. The presence of General Taylor on the northern 
 
 line was needed whilst the Vera Cruz expedition was going 
 
 forward. A strong force was assembling in his front, and 
 
 whether our troops operated offensively, or remained in 
 
 observation, a wary and experienced commander, having a 
 
 knowledge of the country and possessing the confidence of 
 
 his troops, was imperiously required. What other course 
 
 could the administration have taken than to send Scott to 
 
 the new field, and continue Taylor in the command which 
 
 he had so long and so ably filled ? 
 
 To organize this campaign, nine additional regiments 
 of volunteers had then been called out. 20,500 effectives 
 was General Taylor's estimated force. General Scott pro- 
 posed detaching 4,000 regulars and 5,500 volunteers from 
 the northern line for the expedition against Vera Cruz-r- 
 leaving 11,000 men to General Taylor, and 8,000 for a 
 movable column in advance of Monterey. Two thousand 
 two hundred and fifty new volunteers sent to the northern 
 line would increase this movable column to more than 
 10,000. His own force — 9,500 men drawn from General 
 
EIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 37 
 
 Taylor, 4,500 new volunteers and 1000 sailors and marines 
 adequate to the reduction of Vera Cruz — was to be in- 
 creased to 20,000 effectives by new regiments of regulars 
 in season for a movement into the interior. 
 
 Throughout the Mexican war the effective force in the 
 field was greatly overrated. Nor was the estimate of Gen- 
 eral Scott an exception to this fact. Thus General Tay- 
 lor's effective force did not exceed at the moment of writing 
 this memoir 16,000 men. 
 
 The toils and hardships of the first campaign, without 
 including casualties in battle, will, in a distant and untried 
 theatre, reduce the effective force of regulars to three-fourths 
 or four-fifths, and of volunteers to one-half or two-thirds 
 of the original number. To have insured a column of 
 10,000 effectives in advance of Monterey, and one of 20,000 
 throughout the Vera Cruz campaign, estimating the force 
 to keep open the northern line at 3,000 men, required an 
 additional force of 10,000 volunteers and 12,000 regulars. 
 And 15,000 additional volunteers would have been required 
 to supply the places of the twelve months' men, whose 
 terms of service would expire before midsummer, and who 
 could not be expected to re-enlist, and giving an aggregate 
 of 25,000 volunteers and 12,000 regulars. The force actu- 
 ally called out was 8,000 volunteers, and 8,500 regulars. 
 We do not take into the account 6,500 volunteers called out 
 in April, and at so late a period as neither to be able to 
 supply the place of the discharged volunteers till months 
 after their return, nor to be of any use in the campaign in 
 question. 
 
 With such inadequate means therefore was the govern- 
 ment proposing to conduct a large campaign. And the 
 consequence was that the shock of battle had to be borne 
 by half the numbers originally contemplated. Great risk 
 of disaster was incurred on both lines. Impossibilities 
 
38 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 almost were attempted, and impossibilities almost were 
 achieved. 
 
 Meanwhile, General Taylor proceeded to organize his 
 defensive line. Saltillo, the capital of Coahuila, was seized. 
 The Chihuahua expedition was abandoned, and General 
 Wool was placed in position at Parras, and early in Janua- 
 ry, General Taylor brought together a force of five thou- 
 sand three hundred men at Victoria, the capital of Ta- 
 maulipas, to occupy that position, examine the passes of the 
 mountains, and have in readiness two thousand regulars 
 and two thousand volunteers for the Vera Cruz expedition. 
 On the 15th of January, he received General Scott's letters 
 of the 3d inst., addressed respectively to himself and Gen- 
 eral Butler, directing 9000 men to be detached for this pur- 
 pose. The occupation of Victoria was abandoned, and all 
 the troops were sent to Tampico, save the escort required by 
 the General to accompany his return to Monterey. 
 
 General Scott, on reaching Camargo on the 3d of Janu- 
 ary, estimated General Taylor's force at 7000 regulars and 
 10,000 volunteers, and deeming 2000 regulars and 5000 
 volunteers sufficient to occupy a defensive line, he proposed, 
 detaching 4500 regulars, 4500 volunteers, and two field 
 batteries, leaving to General Taylor 2500 regulars and 
 5500 volunteers. The troops actually placed at his dis- 
 posal, General Butler acting from information somewhat im- 
 perfect in reference to the number of regular and volunteer 
 troops at Victoria and Tampico, were, in round numberSj 
 Gen. Worth's column 2,700 strong, and Gen. Patterson's at 
 Tampico 6,000 strong, or about 5,100 regulars and 3,600 
 volunteers, leaving to Gen. Taylor less than a thousand 
 regulars and 7,300 volunteers ; of which one company of 
 artillery and the Maryland battalion were left in garrison 
 at Tampico, and giving to the Northern line proper, say 
 900 regulars and 7000 volunteers, an aggregate of 7,900 
 men. 
 
EIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 39 
 
 Thus, though the aggregate force rather exceeded Gen. 
 Scott's estimate of what was needed to defend the line, 
 there was not so large a regular force as was desirable or as 
 Gen. Scott in the first instance contemplated. At the in- 
 stance of the War Department and in view of the character 
 of the force, Gen. Scott strongly advised Gen. Taylor to re- 
 tire upon the defensive position of Monterey. 
 
 The problem to be solved was a somewhat difficult one, 
 and it must be admitted that neither of the American Gene- 
 rals found its complete solution. 
 
 Both were of opinion, up to the last moment, that Gen. 
 Santa Anna would countermarch, and resist the landing at 
 Vera Cruz ; yet both saw the necessity of providing against 
 an advance movement from St. Louis — Gen. Scott by ad- 
 vising the retiring upon Monterey, and making the stand 
 with the aid of its strong defences ; Gen. Taylor by advanc- 
 ing and assuming a threatening attitude at the very edge 
 of the desert, and giving battle before the enemy could 
 recover from the fatigue of his exhausting marches. 
 
 Scott's plan, whilst it insured the safety of Gen. Taylor's 
 command, exposed his own enterprise to imminent peril. 
 Had Gen. Taylor retired upon Monterey, Santa Anna would 
 not have followed him. Against its strong defences with 
 an army of six thousand five hundred men, he could have 
 made no impression. But Saltillo abandoned, Santa Anna 
 could have so exalted the impressionable Mexican mind 
 that, leaving Taylor intact, and rapidly countermarching ) 
 he could have brought 40,000 men into the lines of Cerro 
 Gordo. Santa Anna even coined a victory out of the sad 
 retreat from Buena Vista. What could he not have done, 
 coming back to the Capital as the deliverer of the State of 
 Coahuila ? For these reasons we consider Gen. Scott's plan 
 of retiring upon Monterey as equivalent to a defeat, and 
 that the abandonment of the Vera Cruz expedition would 
 have been infinitely preferable. 
 
40 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 We think, therefore, that Gen. Taylor judged rightly in 
 holding his position in advance of Saltillo. It maintained 
 the prestige of the American arms, and was worth all the 
 risk incurred. 
 
 The truth was, our means were entirely inadequate to 
 maintain our acquisitions on the Northern line, and to open 
 a new line of operations. Could the delays in raising the 
 new volunteers and regulars have been foreseen, we think 
 the decision should have been to restrict operations to the 
 Northern line. The amount of transportation collected on 
 that line was already large, — 1200 wagons. It could in 
 two months have been largely increased. The country 
 would no doubt have furnished several thousand pack 
 mules. Three thousand actually accompanied the march 
 to Monterey. The effect of a movement on San Louis 
 would have been to relieve our rear. Santa Anna would 
 have called in his advanced parties to its defence. Fifteen 
 hundred men could in the first instance have maintained 
 •our whole rear from Tampico to Saltillo. 
 
 Early in March, with simply the diligence exhibited 
 throughout this campaign, the advance could have been 
 made from Saltillo with 19,000 men with ample means of 
 transportation, and the great battle of the war could have 
 been fought under the walls of San Louis Potosi. In the 
 mean time the remaining regiments of new volunteers could 
 have sufficiently increased the force in rear, and converged 
 a large train for the troops at San Louis by the circuitous 
 route of Monterey. Tampico could have been made in 
 part the base, the mule-paths leading thence to San Louis 
 serving for the reinforcements of foot and transportation by 
 pack mules. With scarcely a pause in its movement, our 
 army could have advanced upon the capital, leaving a 
 large garrison at Q,ueretaro. Thus in forty or fifty days 
 from the movement in advance of Saltillo, the whole centre 
 
EIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 41 
 
 of the country could have been firmly seized and the enemy 
 been reduced to sue for peace. Had he still held out, the 
 line with Vera Cruz could have been operied in the fall. 
 
 Thus, operating on this long, circuitous and difficult 
 line would have been safer and more practicable than were 
 the operations on the Vera Cruz line, in consequence of the 
 utter inadequacy of our means. Nor could the army have 
 possibly been involved in any conflict with the enemy of 
 the fearful character of the great contest of Buena Vista, 
 or the terrible battles of Mexico. 
 
 Both the Secretary and General Scott indulged the 
 hope, that the two columns would at least be raised to 
 20,000 men, and that the capital and San Luis would have 
 been seized, and a peace have been conquered by the time 
 the terms of service of the old volunteers had expired. 
 General Scott left Washington with this confident belief. 
 His plan of the campaign was an admirable one, and 
 promised large results. He was unwilling to relinquish it, 
 notwithstanding that from day to day, the inadequacy of 
 his means became more and more apparent. He persevered, 
 and success on both lines crowned our arms. 
 
 This result was due, under Providence, to the qualities 
 of our two leaders. General Taylor, left with a force sim- 
 ply adequate to maintain a defensive position at Monterey, 
 determined to surrender none of his acquisitions. His bold 
 position at the edge of the desert in advance of Saltillo, 
 invites the attack of the Mexican leader, and the conse- 
 quence is, that that admirable army, the best Mexico ever 
 saw, is defeated, demoralized, and reduced to half its origi- 
 nal numbers. This was the most effective aid rendered to 
 the Vera Cruz expedition. Had it not been for the battle 
 of Buena Vista, Scott could not have advanced upon the 
 capital. 
 
 Nor was Scott's undertaking less bold and dangerous. 
 
42 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 He approached Vera Cruz in the full expectation of finding 
 Santa Anna ready to receive him with an army of 20,000 
 or 30,000 men. His own force did not exceed 13,000, and 
 it is a matter of record, that he was determined to attempt 
 the landing with 8,000, whatever force might be opposed to 
 him. Thanks to the events on the northern line, his land- 
 ing was unresisted. 
 
 Yet we find that, delayed for many months by the want 
 of troops, and after a preparation for resistance even greater 
 than what he had anticipated, he finally advances upon 
 the capital with 10,000 instead of 20,000 men. 
 
 The event shows that the distribution made by Scott 
 was most fortunate. Five hundred more men could not 
 have made the victory of Buena Vista more decisive. It 
 might have made the valley of Mexico the magnificent 
 mausoleum of the American army. Be it remembered, it 
 was the large, profound, disinterested view of his field of 
 operations by General Taylor, his noble confidence in him- 
 self, his extraordinary soundness of judgment and energy 
 of will, that led to meeting the enemy on that memorable 
 .field, and that led to that signal triumph. It was the genius 
 and enterprise, the indomitable resolution and heroic spirit 
 of Scott, that led to the advance upon and capture of Mex- 
 ico. 
 
 Whilst General Scott was organizing his own expedi- 
 tion, and Taylor was maintaining his defensive attitude in 
 advance of Saltillo, General Santa Anna, the American 
 plan having been discovered to him by the capture of Gen- 
 eral Scott's dispatches of January 3d, resolved upon a 
 campaign equalling in greatness of conception the most 
 masterly of Frederick's, and which, had it been successful, 
 would have placed him high on the roll of the masters of 
 the military art. It was to launch his whole force in suc- 
 cession against the two columns into which our army was 
 now divided, and by one great effort, to drive from the soil 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 43 
 
 of Mexico the armies of her invaders. It being doubtful 
 whether he could reach Vera Cruz in season to resist the 
 landing of General Scott's column, his first movement was 
 of necessity against General Taylor. No where else could 
 he be so sure of bringing a preponderating force to bear 
 upon his enemy. 
 
 The great want of Mexico was a victory, and the resto- 
 ration of her moral power. The northern line broken up, 
 and the American army driven beyond the Rio Grande, the 
 full deliverance of Mexico would have been wrought. One 
 victory achieved, the memory of former defeats would have 
 been wiped away, and Mexico would have been placed in a 
 position stronger than the one she occupied before the battle of 
 the Rio Grande. The whole nation would have been raised 
 to the highest pitch of enthusiasm ; and the column mov- 
 ing upon the capital would have had to encounter, in firm 
 and disciplined array, the entire military strength of Mex- 
 ico, directed by its great chief. The veterans of the North, 
 flushed with recent victory, would have given confidence 
 to every soldier of the line, and the whole army would 
 have been an army of veterans. Thus this movement 
 was the great bow of promise to Mexico, and we think the 
 Mexican general, if he determined to resist at all, could 
 not, in any other way, have so wisely applied his force. 
 
 It was the misfortune of Mexico throughout this war to 
 be beaten, and the vindication of this movement consists 
 in the fact, that it was the only one which came near be- 
 ing successful. Buena Yista was won by policy, by skill, 
 by fortune. It was General Taylor's bold attitude for sev- 
 eral weeks at Agua Nueva that restored confidence to his 
 own troops, shaken by many previous rumors, and that 
 imparted to them additional skill and discipline. It was 
 his apparently precipitate retreat from this position, that 
 lured the Mexicans on to that unprepared attack, with 
 troops exhausted by fifty miles continuous march, still suf- 
 
4A CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 fering from thirst and hunger. It was that clear eye that 
 saw that here must the victory be achieved if achieved at 
 all — that iron will that would not swerve from this convic- 
 tion — that unabated confidence that all would yet go well, 
 that made our troops so nobly sustain their chief. All 
 these have made Buena Vista the pride of every patriot 
 and the theme of history. 
 
 We do not propose to go into any further detail in rela- 
 tion to the battle of Buena Vista. With such evidence, on 
 all sides, of the great ability of the general in chief com- 
 mand, the large facts all thoroughly weighed and all cor- 
 rectly understood, we have really not the space in this brief 
 article to notice errors of detail. No doubt many occurred, 
 and we have yet to learn that battles can be fought and 
 won even without the commission of large errors. 
 
 We accord to our author the general accuracy in his 
 narrative of these operations, and we approve of many of 
 his military criticisms. 
 
 We think he has stated with great force and eloquence 
 the reasons for Santa Anna's march upon Gen. Taylor, and 
 we concur in his. general views as to the defensive line. 
 Our troops were too much disseminated. Wool's force 
 should have been drawn in from Parras and a threatening 
 attitude assumed at Agua Nueva immediately on the oc- 
 cupation of Saltillo. Had the war sunk into a quasi peace, 
 as was proposed by many of our public men, by the occu- 
 pation of a defensive line, we think San Louis Potosi should 
 have been seized as essential to its security. It was the 
 key-point of the whole line. It was not essential however, 
 after the Vera Cruz line had been opened and the attention 
 of the enemy had been fixed in that direction. 
 
 We think, however, the author does injustice to both 
 Generals in asserting that the resources of the country was 
 the bone of contention between them: that their views 
 were partial, and that each was fixed on his own line. On 
 
EIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 45 
 
 the contrary, their whole course was of a very different 
 character. 
 
 It is admitted that they did not altogether foresee the 
 future, and that in particular they did not appreciate the 
 1 consummate ability of Santa Anna. Yet we find a remarka- 
 ble disinterestedness on the part of both. Taylor advised 
 the suspension of offensive operations on his own line where 
 he had every thing to gain, and the opening of a new line, 
 where the victor's crown was to be placed on the brow of 
 another. Scott anxiously sought the safety of the com- 
 mand of Taylor, preferring to expose his own force to the 
 jeopardy and disaster involved in the change of the plan 
 of campaign. We have given our reasons why we think 
 Gen. Scott erred in advising a withdrawal to Monterey, and 
 why we consider Taylor's course was more fortunate for 
 his country. A careful examination will show that Scott 
 acted in' a most generous and disinterested spirit. This 
 view is confirmed by his course, when he believed Santa 
 Anna was in movement from San Louis to meet him at 
 Vera Cruz — a movement which most assuredly, in our 
 opinion, would have been made had Taylor retired to 
 Monterey. He must have believed his own enterprise diffi- 
 cult and his own force inadequate, yet we find him making 
 no further detachments from Taylor's command, but on the 
 contrary his aim was to reinforce Gen. Taylor by new regi- 
 ments of volunteers, to enable him to assume the offensive. 
 We see throughout a great anxiety on the part of Scott to 
 leave sufficient troops with Taylor to enable him thus to 
 act. Gen. Scott was true throughout to his original plan of 
 the campaign, wherein Taylor was to act a conspicuous 
 part. 
 
 The evidences which our author adduces to establish 
 the fact that General Taylor was governed by per- 
 sonal views proves to our mind the very reverse. Taylor 
 did feel aggrieved in seeing 9,000 troops detached from his 
 
46 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 command, without any previous consultation, after he had 
 reported that he could not spare more than 4,000, and he 
 must have been more than human, not to have felt ag- 
 grieved. 
 
 Yet it is remarkable with what singleness of purpose 
 he at once adjusted himself to the new condition of things. 
 In the words of Scripture, instead of looking back to the 
 things that were behind, he pressed forward to the things 
 that were before. It made him feel strong, and he there- 
 fore announces to his government his ability to maintain 
 his position. Such is the legitimate fruit of the spirit of 
 self-abnegation — the true heroic spirit. Who dreamed at 
 this time of advancing upon the capital with 10,000 men 7 
 Yet it was done this same year by men raised in like man- 
 ner to a consciousness of power and moved in like manner 
 to the determination to exert it. 
 
 Had General Taylor, after his troops were withdrawn, 
 expended his strength in clamoring about it, instead of de- 
 voting himself to his great work of maintaining his posi- 
 tion, his former views would have been sustained by his 
 own destruction. There is no inconsistency between his 
 first opinion that only 4,000 men could be detached with 
 safety to his command, and his subsequent expression of 
 confidence, that though 9,000 men were detached, he could 
 still maintain his line ; and in charging this upon General 
 Taylor, we think our author has not shown that apprecia- 
 tion of the influences of moral causes in shaping great 
 events, which generally characterizes his work. 
 
 Meanwhile General Scott was organizing his own expe- 
 dition, and in March, landed in the vicinity of and invested 
 Vera Cruz. But before proceeding with the narrative of 
 his campaign, we feel bound to give certain extracts from 
 dispatches in illustration of the spirit with which he en- 
 tered upon his duties. We think the practical effect of 
 Major Ripley's work is to represent General Scott as having 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 47 
 
 rushed to the field simply to share the harvest of glory with 
 Taylor, and to regain his former prestige before the people. 
 His dispatches, however, give a very different aspect to the 
 case. Their uniform tenor exhibits in the most convincing 
 light the single-mindedness with which he sought to serve 
 his country in the field, and the remarkable steadiness and 
 force with which, in spite of manifold difficulties, he pushed 
 forward to his object. They exhibit him in his true char- 
 acter in times of emergency — a calm, steadfast, indomitable, 
 enterprising, noble-minded man, whom his country should 
 delight to honor, and whom posterity will not fail to revere. 
 We extract as follows : 
 
 Oct. 27th, 1846. — In a memoir to the Secretary of War, 
 General Scott says : " An army of at least 10,000 men, con- 
 s isting of cavalry, (say) 2,000 men ; artillery, (say) 600, 
 and the remainder infantry. The whole of the artillery, 
 and at least half of the cavalry and infantry, ought to be 
 regular troops. * By this time, (say in 
 
 the month of March) that army might be augmented to 
 about 20,000 men for ulterior operations, by new regiments 
 of regulars and volunteers." 
 
 Nov. 12th, 1846.—" The minimum force, (10,000 men) 
 then proposed, I still deem indispensable. Personally, I 
 would be willing to attempt the capture of Vera Cruz and 
 through it the castle of San Juan Ulloa with perhaps a 
 smaller army, aided by the blockading squadron of that 
 coast. But I very much doubt whether the government 
 ought to risk the expedition, under any commander, with 
 a land force less than 12, perhaps 15,000 men. To reach 
 that point (city of Mexico), or to place it in imminent dan- 
 ger of capture, an army of more than 20,000 men may be 
 needed." 
 
 On the 23d November, it having been determined to 
 send General Scott to the field in chief command, he 
 sketched a project of instructions, which in his judgment 
 
48 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 should be given to him by the President. The following 
 is an extract : " The President, respecting your judgment, is 
 pleased with the assurance that, although you think 15,000 
 land troops not an unreasonable force for the expedition in 
 question, and that 10,000 ought to be considered the mini- 
 mum number, if it can be obtained in time, you are yet of 
 opinion that the expedition ought to go forward, even with 
 the first 8,000 men that may be embarked off Point Isabel, 
 sooner than incur the danger of losing your men and ob- 
 ject by the yellow fever, in consequence of waiting too 
 long for either of the larger numbers that have been men- 
 tioned." 
 
 Gen. Scott writes to Gen. Taylor, Dec. 20th, 1846, from 
 New Orleans : 
 
 "I have supposed that 15,000 land troops, including 5 
 of regulars, and the cooperation of the blockading squad- 
 ron, desirable, if not altogether necessary, but am now 
 inclined to move forward to the attack, should I be able to 
 assemble the 5,000 regulars, and say three of volunteers." 
 
 Again, he writes to Gen. Taylor from Camargo, January 
 3d, 1847 : 
 
 " I believe my arrangements of every sort to be com- 
 plete, except that every thing depends on my drawing from 
 your command about 5,000 regulars and thousand 
 
 volunteers." 
 
 To the Secretary of War, Gen. Scott writes on the 12th 
 January, from the Brasos, that he hopes to arrive off Vera 
 Cruz by February 10th or 15th, and adds : "I shall at- 
 tempt the descent, &c., with even half the numbers I should 
 wish to give to any one of my juniors for the same ser- 
 vice." ******** 
 " Should success crown our arms on the coast — and I will 
 not anticipate a failure — I beg to repeat that a reinforcemen t 
 of 10 or 12,000 regulars (new regiments and recruits for 
 the old) will be indispensable (about April) to enable me to 
 make a consecutive advance on the enemy's capital." 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 49 
 
 Again from off Lobos, February 28th, 1847. '-Never- 
 theless, this army is in heart, and crippled as I am in the 
 means required and promised, I shall go forward, and expect 
 to take Vera Cruz and its Castle in time to escape, by 
 pursuing the enemy, the pestilence of the coast." 
 
 Again from Jalapa, April 6th, 1847. Referring to the 
 expected levies not arriving, Gen. Scott writes, "I shall 
 nevertheless advance, but whether beyond Puebla, will de- 
 pend on intervening information and reflection. The gene- 
 ral panic given to the enemy at Cerro Gordo still remaining, 
 I think it probable that we shall go to Mexico ; or if the 
 enemy recover from that, we must renew the consternation 
 by another blow." 
 
 Again from Jalapa, May 20th, 1847. Referring to a 
 second train expected from Vera Cruz. " If it has a second 
 third of the essential supplies — now long waited for — I 
 shall advance, having lost the hope of receiving further 
 reinforcements." 
 
 These extracts, taken in connection, show how firmly 
 and how perseveringly he adhered to the plan of the cam- 
 paign. The two most important facts leading to this 
 conclusion, are his discharge of the volunteers and his 
 movement to Puebla, sundering his connection with home. 
 
 Major Ripley on these two points takes essentially the 
 view of Gov. Marcy in his famous reply to Gen. Scott — that 
 reply which elicited so much admiration at the time, for its 
 great ability — but which a careful examination shows to 
 have been, in some respects, " more ostentatious than pro- 
 found ;" and of which one of the distinguishing charac- 
 teristics is, that it very successfully exposes to the public 
 gaze the infirmities of one of the country's most devoted and 
 most meritorious sons. 
 
 The Secretary of War had repeatedly communicated 
 to Gen. Scott the instructions of the President, to be care- 
 ful of the lives and of the health of the troops— to put 
 4 
 
50 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 them in healthy positions during the sickly season — to run 
 no risk in occupying unhealthy localities. In May, Gen. 
 Scott learned that the new levies had been diverted to the 
 Rio Grande. The unhealthy season was approaching. 
 Nearly the whole distance from Vera Cruz to Jalapa was 
 exposed to the malaria of the coast. Not doubting that the 
 Secretary would, in his own sphere, conform to the spirit of 
 his own instructions, Gen. Scott presumed that if rein- 
 forcements came at all, they would come within the two or 
 three following weeks, that were to be occupied by him at 
 Jalapa, getting up indispensable supplies. At the end of 
 that time, he had every reason to believe that the connection 
 with Yera Cruz would be entirely cut off, and that the 
 army would be left to itself till the close of the sickly sea- 
 son in the fall. Thus the volunteers on the expiration of 
 their term of service in six or seven weeks, would have 
 found themselves in the heart of the enemy's country 
 utterly unable to reach the coast, and to be transported to 
 their homes. The Government was bound in good faith to 
 discharge these men at the expiration of their term of ser- 
 vice, and it became evident that this involved their dis- 
 charge at the very time it occurred — the only time indeed 
 when, according to the information possessed by the General 
 of the health of the country, they could be sent home in 
 safety. Who more needed their services than Gen. Scott? 
 Who was more strongly interested to strain a point, to keep 
 them to the standard of their country ! What' else could 
 have influenced the General than a sense of what was due 
 these men, ajid an earnest desire to carry out the instruc- 
 tions of his Government ? When Gen. Scott reached 
 Puebla, he found the sick list so enormously large, that to 
 advance upon Mexico, it was deemed necessary to bring to 
 his aid the garrison of Jalapa. His breaking up of that 
 post, shows how much he was in earnest, and that through 
 the most trying circumstances, he kept his eye fixed on the 
 
EIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 51 
 
 great object of the campaign. Referring again to the Sec- 
 retary's repeated instructions in reference to the health of 
 the troops, the General could not have dreamed that the 
 Secretary would make troops run the gauntlet of disease 
 and death from Vera Cruz to come to his aid. On the con- 
 trary, he was obliged to presume that there would be no 
 necessity of opening the communications till fall. And the 
 garrison of Jalapa, not needed for this purpose, would be a 
 great, and might be a decisive element in the success of the 
 advance upon Mexico, and he felt obliged not to dispense 
 with its aid. And yet the Secretary in his letter speaks 
 in terms of ridicule and of reprehension of these two mea- 
 sures — measures which were the natural consequence of 
 his own instructions — and which all men would have pro- 
 nounced eminently wise and fortunate, had the Secretary 
 adhered to his own doctrines. When Secretary Marcy 
 reprehended Gen. Scott for these measures, he in fact repre- 
 hended Gen. Scott for not disobeying his own express in- 
 structions. He in fact said, " I did tell you to be careful of 
 the health of the troops — but this was all mere talk — and 
 you should have paid no attention to it." Let the appeal 
 be made from the Secretary's letter to the Secretary's in- 
 structions. Can the Secretary exclaim, " Thou canst not 
 say I did it?" 
 
 When the President committed to General Scott the 
 chief command of all the armies operating in Mexico, and 
 sent him to the field with assurances that he had his en- 
 tire confidence, he banished every feeling of resentment, 
 and entered upon his duties in the spirit of entire subordi- 
 nation to the wishes and instructions of the government. 
 Under these circumstances, what other construction could 
 he put upon the attempt to supplant him in command by 
 the appointment of a lieutenant-general, than that he had 
 lost the confidence of his government ? And must he not 
 have been confirmed in this impression on seeing a gentle- 
 
52 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 man sent out in a diplomatic capacity, who was understood 
 to be unfriendly to him, and whose instructions were so 
 loosely framed, that, in connection with his subsequent 
 assumption of high prerogative, General Scott was natu- 
 rally led to the conclusion that it was the intention to de- 
 prive him of a portion of his rights as commander of the 
 army ? The President committed two inexcusable blun- 
 ders, in the lieutenant-general scheme, and in sending out 
 in a diplomatic capacity a gentleman unfriendly to General 
 Scott. Fortunately, Congress did not sanction the first, and 
 the sound sense and exceeding uprightness of character of 
 Mr. Trist rectified the second. The reconciliation between 
 General Scott and Mr. Trist is one of the brightest events 
 in this whole campaign. It was the natural result of two 
 strong, honest, direct minds laboring in singleness of pur- 
 pose for a common object. We bear testimony to the man- 
 liness and thorough disinterestedness of Mr. Trist's course 
 in Mexico. His errors in the outset grew out of the atmos- 
 phere of distrust at Washington, from which he had just 
 emerged, but he soon, with the native energy of a strong 
 and independent character, saw and rectified his mistake. 
 
 While we thus feel bound to expose the blunders of the 
 administration, and particularly the sophistry of certain 
 portions of Mr. Marcy's celebrated reply to General Scott, 
 we are free to admit that the latter erred greatly in the 
 unmeasured character of his complaints. He erred in at- 
 tributing to design, what was partly due to ignorance and 
 partly to accident. We have already expressed our opinion 
 of the wise and patriotic services in general of both Mr. 
 Polk and Mr. Marcy. Both General Scott and General 
 Taylor ought not to have overlooked the fact, that the 
 government could have no other interest than their own 
 success. Disaster to our armies in the field, would have 
 been disastrous to the statesmen at the head of the govern- 
 ment. 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 53 
 
 Whilst, therefore, we contend that in view of the in- 
 structions of his government, General Scott was bound to 
 discharge the volunteers and break up the garrison of Ja- 
 lapa, we believe that, disregarding these instructions and 
 exacting of the volunteers the last hour of their terms of 
 service, he had it in his power to push forward to the Mex- 
 ican capital and to occupy it almost unresisted. We think 
 that, with the immediate prospect of entering the halls of 
 the Montezumas, many of the volunteers might have been 
 induced to re-enlist. The rapid movement of our army 
 must have prevented any rapid organization of the public 
 force of Mexico. The movement would not have been 
 dangerous in the first stage, but it would have been ex- 
 tremely hazardous in the second, when the terms of service 
 of the volunteers had expired and they were being sent to 
 their homes. Had it been the avowed determination of the 
 government entirely to disregard the season, and to push 
 troops forward in spite of disease and death, there could 
 have been no hesitation as to the propriety of the move- 
 ment. But such was not the policy of the government, and 
 the subsequent delay was the price of a regard to consid- 
 erations of humanity. With these general observations, 
 we will come at once to the siege of Vera Cruz. 
 
 The landing at and reduction of Vera Cruz was effected 
 in March. The most remarkable thing about the siege 
 was the excessive labor of the troops owing to the preva- 
 lence of continued and distressing northers, frequently 
 destroying the works. The batteries were planted with 
 great judgment, and at some eight or nine hundred yards 
 from the city. Trenches connected the batteries with each 
 other and with the lines in rear, insuring throughout the 
 siege safe and easy communications to the troops. The 
 main reliance was on the mortars. A portion of the troops 
 were impatient of the delay, and were anxious to be sent 
 to the assault, without waiting for the effect of the bom- 
 
54 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 bardment. The wisdom of the course pursued was soon 
 vindicated, by a proposition of the Mexican commander to 
 surrendt. on terms ; and on the 29th of March our flag was 
 planted on the enemy's works. 
 
 Meanwhile news had come of the crowning victory 
 of Angostura, and that General Santa Anna had been sent 
 back headlong upon San Luis Potosi, his army depressed, 
 demoralized, and fearfully reduced in numbers. The sick- 
 ly season was fast approaching. To gain healthy positions 
 and to anticipate the enemy at the first mountain barrier, 
 it was important to lose no time in sending forward the 
 troops. As fast as means of transportation could be col- 
 lected, they were put in motion — Twiggs's division in ad- 
 vance. But with that remarkable celerity for which the 
 Mexican armies were distinguished throughout the war, 
 they were found in position at Cerro Gordo, and the battle 
 of that name again vindicated American prowess. 
 
 We do not propose to go into a particular examination 
 of this celebrated action, certainly, both in its conception 
 and execution, one of the most remarkable in the Mexican 
 war. An attack was made in front by a brigade of volun- 
 teers under the command of General Pillow. But the 
 grand movement was by the flank, against the enemy's 
 left and rear, thus cutting off his retreat and compelling 
 him to lay down his arms. This involved the storming of 
 the Cerro Gordo hill, the key point of his position. The 
 ground had been reconnoitred by the engineers with ex- 
 treme care. The movements were all known to be per- 
 fectly practicable. Before the battle commenced, General 
 Scott verified the dispositions and movements. Twiggs 
 was in chief command of the advanced forces. To Harney 
 was committed the main attack against the hill. To Riley 
 a more advanced movement, flanking Harney's, and look- 
 ing to the Jalapa road. To Shields a movement still 
 more extended, bringing him to the Jalapa road well to the 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 55 
 
 rear, and insuring, in conjunction with the other two move- 
 ments, the success of the general plan. 
 
 General Twiggs, early in advance, at a critical moment, 
 ordered up a portion of Riley's command to relieve the 
 pressure upon Harney of the enemy's flankers. In a won- 
 derfully short space of time the Cerro Gordo was seized, 
 and the Jalapa road occupied in force — Santa Anna with 
 great difficulty making his escape on the wheel-mule of his 
 carriage down an almost impracticable mule-path across 
 the river. A portion of the enemy made good their escape, 
 but those within the pass were compelled to lay down their 
 arms. This too, notwithstanding the attack of Pillow had 
 been repulsed, and the commander of the Mexican bat- 
 teries attacked by him had insisted upon terms. 
 
 Pillow was unfortunate in his point of attack. The 
 enemy's strongest point, between batteries 1 and 2, was 
 selected — instead of his weakest point, the right of battery 
 1, along the river bank, as advised by his engineer officer, 
 Lieutenant, now Brevet-Major Tower. And there was too 
 much precipitation in pushing forward his assaulting col- 
 umns before they were properly formed, and before his sup- 
 porting columns were within distance. It had the effect, 
 however, of distracting the attention of Santa Anna, who 
 rode to that portion of the field in the belief that it was 
 the main attack, nor was he disabused of this impression 
 till it was too late to retrieve the field on the left. 
 
 Major Ripley's description of the battle is good, with 
 the exception that whilst he praises the deportment of com- 
 mands and subordinates, he depreciates commanders. Gen- 
 eral Twiggs is referred to in terms of disparagement, and 
 with great injustice, and General Scott is spoken of as more 
 of an indifferent spectator than an active participant. The 
 order of battle is pronounced impracticable. He gives to it 
 however an exposition which is at total variance with all 
 the initial movements. It Avas indeed admirably drawn 
 
56 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 up, pointing out with great clearness the general movement, 
 and leaving a proper discretion to commanders. 
 
 We agree with Major Ripley that the anticipated num- 
 ber of prisoners was not taken, but not in consequence, as 
 he alleges, of the impracticable order of General Scott, but 
 of another fact which he himself furnishes, viz. : — That 
 General Canalizo, surnamed the " lion of Mexico," instead 
 of bringing up his reserves to the attack, as ordered by- 
 Santa Anna, took to precipitate and seasonable flight along 
 the main Jalapa road. 
 
 The battle of Cerro Gordo was followed by the occu- 
 pation, in quick succession, of Jalapa and Perote. Mean- 
 while, from the strategic position of Orazava, Santa Anna 
 threatened our whole flank from Perote to Vera Cruz. The 
 forward movement to Puebla drew him from that position 
 to the defence of the capital. 
 
 The advance to Mexico, steadily contemplated, and 
 early expected, insensibly raised the minds of all men to a 
 most admirable state of self-reliance unmixed with arro- 
 gance or vainglory. From the commander to the private 
 in the ranks, it was believed that a great work was to be 
 done, and that, with steadfast hearts and strong arms, it 
 could and would be done. 
 
 During the pause at Puebla, General Scott gave especial 
 directions to the engineers to collect information in refer- 
 ence to the several routes to the capital, the obstacles of na- 
 ture and of art which would obstruct our advance, the 
 troops and the material which would be at the disposal of 
 the enemy. Humboldt and other authorities were consult- 
 ed, many intelligent persons who had passed over the sev- 
 eral routes were examined, and in several instances spies 
 were sent to make special examinations. 
 
 From the information thus collected it was known that 
 the city was entirely surrounded either by an inundation 
 or by marshy ground, and was approached by eight cause- 
 ways flanked with wet ditches, and provided with numer- 
 
EIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 57 
 
 ous cuts, — that the whole city was protected by a double, 
 and in some places by a triple line of defensive works, well 
 armed with cannon and defended by some thirty thousand 
 men. The direct approach along the great national road 
 was defended by the strong position of the Penon, seven 
 miles from the city. Chapultepec stood boldly out on the 
 southwest, and on the north there were known to be for- 
 midable works in advance of Guadaloupe. 
 
 After entering the valley along the national road, there 
 were three general modes of approaching the city : the 
 direct, along the national road ; around Lake Tezcuco 
 on the north ; around Chalco and Jochimilco on the south. 
 
 Early attention had been given to the Chalco route, and 
 to the south and west, as the proper quarter whence to at- 
 tack the city. The south presented an extended front, 
 with four of the eight causeways of approach nearly par- 
 allel to each other, and was necessarily weak. On the 
 west the suburb of San Cosme, a single street lined with 
 houses on either side, extended well into the country, and 
 offered a vulnerable point. Chapultepec, not deemed a 
 very formidable obstacle, required to be swept away, to be 
 free to select the point of attack. Hence Tacubaya, a 
 strong village overawing Chapultepec, became the key 
 point of the whole operation. In the particular operation 
 against the southern front, the occupancy of the church 
 and village of Piedad was of the last importance, in view 
 of all the southern gates, communicating directly with all 
 the villages in rear from Tacubaya to San Augustin, and 
 by a good cross-road, controlling the three causeways of 
 San Antonio, Nino Perdido, and Piedad. 
 
 These views occupied the mind of the General in Chief 
 at Puebla, and they naturally grew out of the information 
 collected by the engineers, and which was embodied in a 
 map that, on reaching the valley, was found to be in the main 
 correct, and sufficiently in detail to point out the strategic 
 movements. A copy of this map was sent to each division 
 
58 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 commander. It shows a road round Chalco, connecting 
 villages a few miles apart. There was no doubt as to its 
 practicability for our troops and for light trains. But there 
 was doubt as to whether large trains and heavy guns could 
 be taken over it. The lake it was believed, could be used 
 for this latter purpose. Gen. Scott, on leaving Puebla, though 
 impressed with the great advantages of the Chalco route 
 over all others, determined, however, before finally resolving 
 upon his course, to march into the valley, and by reconnais- 
 sance, verify the information that had been collected, and 
 to collect all the supplementary information that entered 
 into the determination of the question. 
 
 Major Ripley states that about the time of leaving 
 Pnebla, Gen. Scott was of opinion that the Chalco route 
 was impracticable, and that his attention was fixed upon 
 the more direct routes. That he was confirmed in his 
 opinion by the result of his reconnaissances after entering 
 the valley, and that in consequence, he fell upon the Mexi- 
 calcingo project : and that he was finally induced to revert 
 to the Chalco route in consequence of the advice of Gen. 
 Worth, and the reconnaissance of Col. Duncan. Granting 
 that this route was not practicable for trains, he censures the 
 Mexicalcingo project as in violation of the rules of art and 
 as fraught with danger to the safety of the army. 
 
 We think that a fair and full view of the whole subject 
 matter will show that Major Ripley has fallen into great 
 mistakes, both as to his facts and his conclusions. The 
 map itself furnished by Gen. Scott to all the division com- 
 manders, would seem to be conclusive as to his information, 
 as to the existence of a road round Chalco, and as to 
 his attention not having been withdrawn from it. But 
 other facts are no less conclusive. The very day of 
 reaching Ayotla, a spy was sent to pass over the road 
 to San Augustin, and the next morning the engineers 
 were sent out with an escort from Twiggs's division to make 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 59 
 
 an ostentatious reconnaissance before the Penon, with the 
 special charge to run no risk, as the object was to amuse the 
 enemy. The road, however, to Mexicalcingo, which at 
 Puebla had been reported to be under water, was found to 
 be hard and good for one or two miles, and the Peones in 
 the vicinity were positive that it was equally good for the 
 whole distance. This introduced a new element into the 
 calculations, and Gen. Scott then began to consider whether 
 Tacubaya could not be reached by this direct and more 
 practicable road. Accordingly, he ordered a particular ex- 
 amination of the Mexicalcingo route the next day. The 
 escort of the engineers consisted of a squadron of dragoons 
 and the rifle regiment. Two veteran regiments and a field 
 battery, the whole under the command of Gen. Smith, 
 blocked up the Penon, and covered the reconnaissance. 
 This protection was ample. No Mexican force could have 
 issued from a narrow causeway with this body in front. 
 
 Major Ripley wastes a whole page and a half of criticism 
 on the erroneous supposition that the Penon was left wholly 
 unguarded, that the whole brigade of Smith had gone to 
 Mexicalcingo, and that Santa Anna could have sallied 
 forth and cut him off before succor could have been 
 brought from the main army. 
 
 The goodness of the road was confirmed, though Mexi- 
 calcingo was found to be very strongly fortified. The spies, 
 two of whom had been dispatched, reported the road round 
 Chalco to be practicable but rough. Boats and material for 
 rafts were collected to be used on the lakes. 
 
 Gen. Scott the same day visited Worth at Chalco, and 
 directed the latter to make additional inquiries as to the 
 character of the road. Duncan suggested to Worth an open 
 reconnaissance, and was by Worth ordered to conduct it. 
 
 In his quarters, that evening, the Mexicalcingo project 
 was discussed — which was, simply to block up the Penon 
 with Pillow's division, and to force Mexicalcingo with the 
 
60 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 three remaining divisions — Twiggs and Quitman attacking 
 in front, and Worth (moving rapidly round the lakes with lit- 
 tle or no baggage) in flank and rear. A single division not 
 only would keep the enemy, known to be collected in great 
 force, guns and men, in position at the Peiion, but would 
 prevent his issuing therefrom to fall upon our rear. The 
 road to Mexicalcingo was beyond cannon range, so that our 
 troops could not be annoyed in their march. Thus, whilst 
 a very large proportion of the enemy would have been 
 amused by a single division, the three remaining divisions 
 would have been thrown on a single point. Mexicalcingo 
 forced, we should have been beforehand with the enemy ; 
 and concentrating our force, whilst his own troops and guns 
 were in movement from the Penon, we could have pierced 
 his extended line, and by one grand blow have ended the 
 campaign. 
 
 Mexicalcingo was strong. But the road round Chalco 
 was long and difficult. The march must have been slow and 
 toilsome. Delay and accidents might occur in transporting 
 the baggage along the lakes. We should expect that the 
 enemy, rapid in movement and in throwing up defensive 
 works, would meet us on the south and west with the same 
 troops and guns in position that we turned our backs upon 
 at the Penon, and with works perhaps not less formidable. 
 
 In view of all these considerations was the Mexicalcingo 
 project entertained. But it was not deemed safe to send 
 Worth's division round Chalco, unless a communication 
 could be constanty kept up by boats with the bulk of the 
 army operating on the direct route. 
 
 The practicability of keeping up this communication was 
 therefore to be determined ; which duty was assigned to 
 Capt. Wayne, Quartermaster, and to Lieut. Tower, Engineer. 
 
 In the morning, Gen. Scott, anticipating a favorable re- 
 sult as regarded this examination, gave some initial orders 
 looking to the Mexicalcingo route. But towards night, learn- 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 61 
 
 ing from Capt. Wayne and Lieut. Tower that nothing what- 
 ever could he done with the lakes, and from Col. Duncan 
 that the road round the lakes was excellent, he reverted to 
 his original intention of moving the whole army round 
 Chalco. 
 
 The utter impracticability of using the lakes as a means 
 of communication, led of necessity to the abandonment of 
 the attack on Mexicalcingo. A direct attack only was 
 never for a moment contemplated, and it was impossible to 
 concert a combined attack against the front and in flank and 
 rear. 
 
 The reconnaissance of Col. Duncan removed all doubts 
 as to the entire practicability of the Chalco route for our 
 immense trains and our heavy guns. This reconnaissance, 
 under existing circumstances, was absolutely necessary. If 
 it had not been made by Duncan on the 14th, it must have 
 been made by some other officer on the 15th. Worth and 
 Duncan are entitled to the credit of having from the first 
 seen the importance of the route. They took the initiative 
 in making an open examination of it, and thereby probably 
 saved one day in the movement. But the promptitude and 
 decision of Gen. Scott in resolving upon his course as soon 
 as this supplementary information came in, is conclusive as 
 to his grasp of the whole field, and, in connection with facts 
 already recapitulated, is equally conclusive as to the Chalco 
 route equally with the other routes having ever been kept 
 in mind. 
 
 The friends of Worth and Duncan expose the ser- 
 vices of these officers to depreciation in claiming for them 
 the whole credit of the movement round Chalco. They 
 did a positive service in accelerating a movement, the suc- 
 cess of which depended so much upon time. But we think a 
 careful inquiry into the facts will show that the Chalco 
 route would and must have been pursued, even though they 
 both had opposed it. It was a fixed fact which had im- 
 
62 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 pressed itself upon many officers of that army. We say 
 this in simple justice to all the participants in that move- 
 ment, and with no intention to disparage Worth or Duncan. 
 Their names have now become historical, and should be 
 cherished by their companions in arms. 
 
 To Worth we shall hereafter allude. Duncan, stricken 
 down in the midst of a still opening manhood, was, in 
 many respects, altogether the ablest of our younger officers. 
 He showed throughout the war abilities of the highest 
 order, and on both lines his services were conspicuous. On 
 the battle-field, wonderfully quick, cool, and resolute — 
 piercing with a glance through the plans of the enemy, 
 and discovering the strong and weak points of the field ; 
 and in council patient, deliberative, and full of forecast. 
 His fame is dear to us, and it is not for us to pluck a single 
 laurel from his brow. 
 
 The march round Chalco was therefore resolved upon, 
 and it was made. Worth, in advance, seized San Augustin 
 on the 17th, the rear under Twiggs not getting up till the 
 morning of the 19th. Gen. Scott, on reaching the advance 
 on the morning of the 18th, summoned his engineer offi- 
 cers, and observing, ' ; to-day the enemy may feel us, to- 
 morrow we must feel him," ordered prompt and careful 
 reconnaissances of the different routes to the capital. 
 
 The San Antonio causeway led due north from San 
 Augustin twelve miles to the city. A mule-path running 
 nearly west led to the nearly parallel and equally good 
 road of San Angel. The reconnoitring officers were 
 divided, and proceeded in these two directions. 
 
 With Worth's division as a support, and Thornton's 
 dragoons as an escort, the engineers proceeded on the San 
 Antonio causeway, and found the enemy in force in the 
 strongly fortified position of San Antonio. Worth's divi- 
 sion seized the Hacienda Capua in front of San Antonio, 
 and the reconnaissance was pushed to the right and left. 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 63 
 
 The right was found impracticable, and the left extremely 
 difficult, in consequence of the Pedregal. The reconnais- 
 sance towards the San Angel road verified the infor- 
 mation collected in Puebla. that, by a little work, the 
 mule-path leading thereto could be made practicable for 
 wagons. A division of the enemy was, however, found in 
 full force opposite the egress of this path. 
 
 Two plans were discussed at the quarters of the General 
 in Chief the same evening — one to force San Antonio, the 
 other to mask San Antonio, and gain the San Angel road. 
 The forcing of San Antonio would be done in near 
 presence of the main Mexican army, and might lead to 
 a general contest in his strongly fortified line of works. 
 The gaining the San Angel road involved at the most 
 encountering a single division of the enemy, at a distance 
 from his main body, and could not but lead the army to 
 the desired strategic position of Tacubaya with little loss. 
 But the policy of the enemy being to fight behind his works, 
 the office of this division was that of observation!, and it 
 was to be expected that, as soon as our movement was 
 developed, it would retire upon the main body. The 
 forcing of San Antonio would certainly involve a sharp 
 conflict, and might lead to a general action. The crossing 
 to the San Angel road would not probably be seriously 
 opposed by the enemy. If a fight did ensue, it would be 
 outside his works, under the most advantageous circum- 
 stances for us, and the most disadvantageous for him, and 
 it was the very thing to be desired. 
 
 The movement upon San Angel was decided upon, and 
 Worth was kept in front of San Antonio to mask it. Quit- 
 man's division was ordered to hold San Augustin, now 
 become the key of operations. 
 
 On the morning of the 19th, Pillow's division was sent 
 forward to make the mule-path practicable for the trains, 
 and Twiggs, on coming up from the rear, was ordered to 
 
64 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 the front to cover it and brush away the enemy. In case 
 the action became general, Pillow was to assume the com- 
 mand until the General in Chief came upon the field. 
 
 Accordingly Pillow's division worked the road. Twiggs 
 pushed his division past Pillow's, who placed at his dispo- 
 sal his own batteries, and immediately began his part of 
 brushing away the enemy. All the engineers and topo- 
 graphical engineers of the general staif, save three, were 
 at that time serving with Twiggs and actively engaged in 
 reconnoitring. 
 
 The result was, that Twiggs was advised to make the 
 main attack against the enemy's left, to cut him off from 
 his reinforcements from the city, and to hurl him into the 
 gorges of the mountains. To cover this movement, he was 
 advised to make a bold demonstration in front, and to 
 employ Callender's howitzer battery in driving the enemy's 
 skirmishers in great force from the Pedregal. The demon- 
 stration, to be effective, must be sharp, fierce, bold, like a 
 real attack, and Magruder's battery was pushed forward to 
 give countenance to it. Accordingly, Twiggs dispatched 
 Riley against the left and Smith to the front. 
 
 The front attack was made with exceeding vigor and 
 effect; it held firmly the attention of the enemy, and ena- 
 bled Riley to seize the village of Ansaldo. 
 
 But though Pillow gave independently to Riley the 
 order which had been received from Twiggs, he allowed 
 more than an hour to elapse before doing any thing to sup- 
 port either the front or flank attack. This unfortunate de- 
 lay gave time for the enemy's reinforcements to come up, 
 and prevented carrying into effect on that day the original 
 suggestions of the staff-officers of the General in Chief. 
 
 Riley moved about half past one o'clock, Cadwallader 
 not till nearly three. Riley moved to the rear of, and re- 
 connoitred the enemy's camp, with two successful encoun- 
 ters with the enemy's lancers. Cadwallader was obliged 
 
EIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 65 
 
 to halt at the village to keep the immense reinforcements of 
 the enemy in check. 
 
 Though Cadwalader moved too late to attack the rear 
 of the enemy's camp in concert with Riley, he moved in 
 time to prevent the junction of the enemy with the com- 
 mand of Valencia. 
 
 Simultaneously with the movement of Cadwalader 
 two regiments of Pierce, at the request of Twiggs, were 
 ordered to the front. They advanced with great spirit, and 
 under the guidance of the engineer-officers seized the ra- 
 vine within four hundred yards of the camp. 
 
 The bold demonstration in front, and particularly the 
 daring and prompt movement of Pierce, distracting the at- 
 tention of the enemy, was Riley's safety in his isolated posi- 
 tion encountering the lancers, it being remembered that 
 Cadwalader was still struggling through the Pedregal. 
 
 Morgan's regiment, which had been detached as a re- 
 serve, was not sent to reinforce Cadwalader, though the 
 reinforcements of the enemy were now seen coming from 
 the city, till Cadwalader had been a whole hour in move- 
 ment. 
 
 About this time also, the demonstration in front having 
 done its work. Smith moved also to the village. 
 
 On reaching the village General Smith assumed com- 
 mand, and resolved to attack the reserves of the enemy. 
 But after making all his arrangements, he was obliged to 
 abandon the attempt in consequence of the approach of 
 night. 
 
 General Scott came upon the ground about four o'clock, 
 and on the arrival of Shields an hour and a half later, he 
 immediately dispatched him to the same point. 
 
 At nightfall therefore the enemy was intact in his in- 
 trenched camp. The San Angel road was seized, and two 
 strong villages occupied, cutting Valencia off from succor. 
 Two regiments of Pierce, the batteries and a few rifles, 
 5 
 
66 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 were in front. The troops had worked and suffered pro- 
 digiously, and nothing apparently had been done. Cheer 
 upon cheer came from the enemy's lines. The rain began 
 to fall, and in their dreary bivouac, our brave troops looked 
 forward with anxiety to the day. 
 
 General Smith resolved to attack the intrenched camp 
 at three in the morning. He sent Captain Lee to the Gen- 
 eral in Chief to communicate his plans, and if they met his 
 approbation, to arrange an attack in front. But with the 
 true spirit of a soldier, he declared his determination to prose- 
 cute his attack in case the difficulties of the way prevented 
 his getting a response from the General in Chief. 
 
 It was a memorable evening, that of the 19th of Au- 
 gust, in the quarters of General Scott. Many officers of 
 his general, as well as personal staff, were present. There 
 was some despondency on the part of those who simply 
 looked to the fact that after a day of incessant labor and 
 great exposure, the enemy had not been seriously touched. 
 But the confidence of all was restored by the great cool- 
 ness and steadiness of the General in Chief. As his officers 
 came in from the field, wet and hungry, he made them sit 
 at his table and break their fast. He neglected none of the 
 courtesies due to guests. His bearing was most noble. It 
 exalted the spirits of all present. 
 
 About eleven o'clook, Capt. Lee came in from beyond 
 the Pedregal, stated the aspect of the field, and submitted 
 the plan of General Smith. From other officers was ascer- 
 tained the position of each regiment in front. At this junc- 
 ture Generals Pillow and Twiggs came in. They had 
 struggled for several hours in the Pedregal, after nightfall, 
 in the endeavor to reach their commands, and had been 
 obliged to abandon the attempt. 
 
 General Scott made known to them the position of their 
 respective commands and the whole state of the field. He 
 expressed his entire approbation of the plan of General 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 67 
 
 Smith, and his determination to support it by an attack or 
 demonstration in front. Not a suggestion had either of 
 these, the two division commanders of the force in that 
 village of San Geionimo, to make, in reference to the con- 
 templated plan of attack. 
 
 About midnight Capt. Lee was ordered back to the 
 field, with the orders of General Scott to collect and form a 
 temporary brigade under Ransom, of the two regiments of 
 Pillow's division on this side of the Pedregal, and some 
 scattered troops of other commands, to support General 
 Smith's attack. General Twiggs, though a heavy man, 
 advanced in years, and much injured by a fall in the Pedre- 
 gal, peremptorily declined General Scott's invitation to 
 take lodgings in his quarters, and returned to the field. 
 General Pillow was ordered to remain. 
 
 Contreras is embalmed in history, and we need not re- 
 peat the glorious story. The veteran division of Valencia 
 was broken into pieces, and our army resumed its move- 
 ment upon the capital. 
 
 Thus pursuing the San Angel route to Tacubaya, the 
 enemy, in his folly, had offered his flank to our blow, and 
 now in return we were pressing on his centre, and on his 
 rear. Every man in that glorious army saw before him a 
 beaten and dispirited enemy, who must be pursued to his 
 final overthrow. All eyes saw before them that splendid 
 city, all hearts felt that the decisive moment had come. 
 The toils of the morning, the sleepless bivouac, the inces- 
 sant labors of the Pedregal were forgotten. Shields, Twiggs, 
 Pillow, successively in command, pushed forward the 
 troops on the heels of the retreating enemy. One terrific 
 blow, and peace would be restored to that unequalled val- 
 ley, and the high mission of that band of heroes would be 
 accomplished. 
 
 General Scott, at early dawn, had ordered a brigade of 
 Worth to proceed in the direction of Contreras, to guard 
 
68 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 against the possibility of disaster, and proceeded himself to 
 the field. As soon as information of the victory was re- 
 ceived, the brigade was ordered back, and the General in 
 Chief, on reaching the intrenched camp, at once resolved 
 upon his plans. They were in perfect accordance with the 
 state of affairs so entirely unexpected, on initiating the 
 movement of the previous day. Not Tacubaya was to be 
 reached, but the enemy himself was to be struck. 
 
 General Scott sent word to General Worth that he 
 should attack the rear of San Antonio with the victorious 
 troops now pushing forward from the battle-field of Contre- 
 ras. Worth was ordered to display his division in front of 
 San Antonio — to be on the alert, and on hearing the report 
 of arms to fall upon the enemy in front. 
 
 In reply to a message from General Pillow suggesting 
 the same movement, General Scott ordered him to move on 
 cautiously ; and he soon after followed himself. He 
 reached the army some fifteen minutes after it was halted 
 by his orders at Coyacan, and was received with the most 
 enthusiastic cheering. 
 
 He immediately directed one engineer officer, with 
 Kearney's troop of dragoons and the rifle regiment as an 
 escort, to reconnoitre the rear of San Antonio, and another 
 to observe the field from the steeple of the church. In 
 some ten minutes the latter officer reported that the enemy 
 were abandoning San Antonio, and that the road for a mile 
 was occupied by his troops and baggage in retreat. 
 
 Immediately General Twiggs was ordered, by a cross 
 road running to the east, to fall upon the retreating enemy 
 with Smith's brigade. Pillow, with a single brigade (Cad- 
 walader's), was sent on a road to the southeast, to co- 
 operate with the advance of Worth. The brigades of Riley, 
 Pierce, and Shields, were held in reserve, to await the de- 
 velopment of the field. 
 
 Twiggs pushed forward Smith's brigade, and halted its 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 69 
 
 head at a fork of the road. Two of the engineer officers, 
 on duty with him, rode rapidly forward on these two roads, 
 which were found to lead respectively to and in front of a 
 strong stone building that was filled with the enemy's 
 troops. At the junction of the north road with the San 
 Antonio causeway, some 500 yards distant, the troops of 
 the enemy were seen in full retreat. Without delay the 
 engineer company was brought up to the front of the con- 
 vent to push the reconnaissance. A prisoner was taken, 
 who declared that the enemy had only two guns in position. 
 The position itself was shrouded with trees and chapparel, 
 so that only the upper portion of the works could be seen. 
 
 Whilst Twiggs was interrogating the prisoner a firing 
 was heard on the right. It was believed by some to be the 
 rifles, and by others, the engineer company prosecuting 
 its reconnaissance of the enemy's position. Immediately 
 Twiggs determined to attack the convent and carry it 
 by a "coup de main," thus succoring our own troops, 
 supposed to be engaged in reconnaissance, and striking 
 the retreating enemy on the San Antonio causeway. 
 The position was believed to have been taken for the 
 moment, to cover this very retreat. To enable the storm- 
 ers to advance, he ordered Taylor's battery to be planted 
 in front of the convent, to drive its defenders from the 
 roof and windows by grape. 
 
 Thus, in the vigorous pursuit of a defeated and retreat- 
 ing enemy, was the advance brigade of the veteran divi- 
 sion of Twiggs brought up against the key-point of the 
 enemy's position ; and the terrible conflict of Churubusco 
 was commenced. 
 
 It must be remembered that Twiggs, at the head of his 
 division at the fork of the roads, was only 400 yards from 
 the walls of the convent, on the direct road, and 300 yards 
 from the position afterwards occupied by Taylor's battery, 
 and that he became hotly engaged with the enemy in thirty 
 
70 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 minutes from the first commencement of the reconnais- 
 sance. 
 
 The return fire of the enemy admonished both the 
 division commander and the General in Chief of the true 
 state of the field. Immediately the latter ordered Pierce to ad- 
 vance with his brigade, by a road running nearly due north, 
 and, making a detour, to fall upon the rear of the enemy ; 
 and Shields soon after was sent in the same direction, with 
 orders to assume command of the temporary division, and 
 execute the orders orginally given to Pierce. Riley's bri- 
 gade was sent to the support of Twiggs, and was by him 
 ordered to attack the right and rear of the convent. 
 
 But the firing which led to the prompt advance of 
 Twiggs was really the shock of Worth's advance, a por- 
 tion of the gallant 6th infantry, and a few men of the 5th 
 (not more than 150 men), upon the Tete de Pont, a strong 
 field-work covering the bridge of Churubusco on the San 
 Antonio causeway, and a little retired behind the convent. 
 Entirely unsupported, these brave men were obliged to seek 
 cover, and await the coming up of the division. 
 
 Worth's division was still well in rear. Before he 
 received his orders from General Scott to co-operate in the 
 attack in the rear of San Antonio, he had put Clarke's 
 brigade in motion. Clarke pursuing the route reconnoitered 
 on the two previous days, passed his command over the 
 Pedregal to the right of the enemy. So difficult was the 
 way, that only about one hundred men had emerged from 
 the rocks, and approached the main road to the capital, as 
 the enemy's retreating column, three thousand strong, was 
 filing by. But under the advice and guidance of CapL 
 Mason, of the engineers, this small body charged the 
 enemy's column, and cut it in two. The brigade coming 
 up, one-half of the enemy's force was so closely pursued 
 by the 6th infantry, and one company of the 5th, that 
 though the latter were unable to continue their advance, 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 71 
 
 and were obliged to fall back from the terrible fire of the 
 bridge head of Cherubusco, the former passed directly 
 through and took no further part in the battle. The other 
 half of the enemy's force was pushed back towards San 
 Antonio, and across' the fields, by the bulk of Clarke's 
 brigade, which, continuing its course, met Garland's bri- 
 gade, put in motion one hour after the movement of Clarke, 
 at no great distance in advance of the abandoned works. 
 
 Clarke now countermarched, and, uniting his brigade 
 with that of Garland, the division pushed forward on the 
 causeway, and after gaining the position from which the gal- 
 lant charge of Hoffman had been made more than an hour 
 earlier, and whither he had withdrawn his command, was 
 formed under the personal direction of Gen. Worth, and a 
 portion against the front of the Tete de Pont, the remainder 
 against its left flank, some along the causeway, and others 
 in the corn-fields on the right, it was sent against the 
 enemy's position. 
 
 At this juncture, one sheet of flame proceeded from the 
 enemy's extended line, and amid that terrific din of 
 battle, bold assailants and bold defenders contested every 
 foot of ground. Taylor's splendid battery nobly did its 
 work, enabling Smith's stormers to gain a near position to 
 the front of the convent. Riley had already opened his 
 fire on its right. Worth's troops, now driven back, now 
 gallantly advancing, finding certain death in one direction, 
 and changing their course only to meet it in another, still 
 with stout hearts, slowly gaining ground, inch by inch, sus- 
 tained nobly the battle on the right. 
 
 But the great strategic movement of the field was now 
 well in progress, and the battle was near its termination. 
 Shields, in command of his own and Pierce's brigade, had 
 steadily pursued his way, and crossing the river of Churu- 
 busco directed his command upon the San Antonio road. 
 As he approached, the enemy detached from his main line, 
 
72 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 extending a new line of battle along the causeway, in the 
 direction of the city. Shields moved more and more to the 
 left, and the enemy extended his line in the same direction, 
 more and more reducing his force in front. 
 
 First, the regiments of Pierce, and then those of Shields, 
 came under the fire of the enemy. It is not a subject of re- 
 proach to these troops, all new, and those of Pierce just 
 from home, that under the most dreadful fire of the battle 
 they fell into confusion, and, gaining the shelter of some 
 buildings, were with some difficulty re-formed. Their offi- 
 cers made the most extraordinary exertions. Shields was 
 conspicuous for his gallant bearing and his great personal 
 exposure. The emergency required it. The only safety to 
 his command, perhaps to the army itself, was to reach the 
 causeway. Nobly did the gallant Palmettos sustain the 
 honor of their State. Their colonel shot dead, their lieu- 
 tenant-colonel wounded, four color-bearers successively 
 shot down, and nearly one half their officers disabled, they, 
 in conjunction with the New York regiment, were led on 
 by Shields to the road, and the enemy's line was cut. 
 
 About the same moment, the enemy's left flank, includ- 
 ing the Tete de Pont, yielded to Worth's onset, and he in 
 conjunction with Pillow, whose troops . (Cadwalader's 
 brigade) had come up in season to be exposed to the fire, 
 but not to take a decisive part in the operations, passed on 
 towards the city. 
 
 The convent, whose fire, half an hour previous to the 
 success of Worth and Shields, had been nearly silenced, 
 still held out. But attacked in front and right flank by 
 Twiggs, all retreat cut off by Worth and Shields occupying 
 the Tete de Pont and causeway in the rear, Duncan open- 
 ing two guns on one of the long faces of the work, and 
 Larkin Smith directing a 4-lb a gainst the convent, the white 
 flag was hung out at the very moment that the 2d and 3d 
 infantry carried the work at the point of the bayonet. 
 
KIO GKANDE AND OF MEXICO. 73 
 
 Immediately the flag of the 3d infantry was planted on 
 the roof of the building, and over one thousand prisoners, 
 including three general officers, surrendered to Twiggs. 
 
 Thus, by the prompt and masterly arrangements of the 
 General in Chief, and the gallant conduct of commanders 
 and of troops, was the terrible and decisive victory of Chu- 
 rubusco achieved. It was won by a combined movement 
 of all the divisions. All suffered in nearly equal proportion, 
 and to no particular one belongs the glory. 
 
 The gallant charge of Hoffman led to the prompt attack 
 of Twiggs. It was the stern, steady attitude of Twiggs, 
 and in particular the admirable serving of Taylor's battery, 
 that paved the way for Worth's subsequent advance. 
 Twiggs and Worth hotly engaged, it was the soldierly and 
 admirable advance of Shields, that led to the weakening of 
 the enemy's force in front. And it was Shields' final 
 charge and Twiggs' unflinching attack, that led to the 
 abandonment of the Tete de Pont to the vehement assault 
 of Worth. The convent, the key of the position, was of 
 course the last to hold out. 
 
 Worth deserves great credit for his movements about 
 San Antonio, not in consequence of its abandonment by 
 the enemy, which resulted as a matter of course, from the 
 advance of the main army to its rear, but for passing Clarke 
 over the Pedregal, cutting the whole retreating force of the 
 enemy in two, and preventing their taking any part in the 
 subsequent battle. Worth was opposed to the Contreras 
 movement as determined upon by Gen. Scott on the evening 
 of the 18th, and was in favor of forcing San Antonio by the 
 movements which he carried into effect on the 20th. Being 
 advised by Gen. Scott of the movement of the main army, 
 and knowing as a commander what its effect must be upon 
 the garrison of San Antonio, he exercised a sound discretion 
 in anticipating and modifying the order to attack in front 
 when he heard a firing in rear. 
 
74 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 Shields especially commands our admiration, by his un- 
 flinching resolution and gallant bearing in presence of the 
 overwhelming force of the enemy. Although his troops 
 faltered and broke, so terrible was the fire, and so great their 
 loss, he succeeded in rallying and forming them, and glori- 
 ously won that portion of the field. This gallant and mod- 
 est officer, on reaching the village of Ansaldo, the evening 
 before, after Smith had matured his plans to assault the 
 heights, with a rare magnanimity declined all interference 
 and direction, and contented himself with holding that key- 
 point against the reserves of the enemy. But in the terrible 
 agony of Churubusco, his was no secondary part, and we 
 hesitate not to pronounce him second to no division com- 
 mander on that field. 
 
 We will now notice certain criticisms of Major Ripley in 
 relation to general dispositions and movements. 
 
 1. He censures the course of General Scott, in working 
 the road before fighting the battle of Contreras. The battle 
 should have been fought, and the road worked afterwards. 
 To which we reply as follows : The enemy's force was 
 known to consist of 30,000 men. There were 24,000 in his 
 main lines, and only 6,000 in this camp. Their presence 
 could have no other object than to observe our movements. 
 Had we marched our two divisions against them, they would 
 have retired, and the divisions would have marched back 
 to work the road. 
 
 If, however, contrary to their whole military system, the 
 enemy had determined to make the grand struggle on that 
 field, it was important that we should be able to bring to bear 
 our whole disposable force, and have our artillery at com- 
 mand. This involved working the road. General Scott 
 foresaw and provided for both alternatives. 
 
 Again, Maj. Ripley censures the dispositions of General 
 Scott, on the ground that they contemplated the battle being 
 commenced by one General, continued by a second, and ter- 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 75 
 
 minated by a third. To which we reply, that the observa- 
 tion will apply with equal force to many of the most cele- 
 brated battles of Napoleon, particularly to Rivoli, where 
 Napoleon did not come upon the ground till the battle was 
 well commenced. And we presume, neither Maj. Ripley, 
 nor any other well-informed military person, will contest 
 the fact, that the maxims of Napoleon are to be illustrated 
 by his campaigns. But the criticism of our author, though 
 ingenious, is unsound. The orders of General Scott provid- 
 ed for one direction. He placed at the head of the column 
 his own staff-officers — men who knew his plans, and upon 
 whose advice not only division commanders could rely, but 
 were expected to rely with confidence. General Pillow 
 was ordered to take command in case the action be- 
 came general, that is, if the affair was any thing more 
 than an affair of pickets, which we had all along the 
 road during our marches in the valley, with the advise- 
 ment, that the General himself vould promptly come on 
 the field. We really cannot see what other course Gen. 
 Scott could have pursued. If the criticism means any 
 thing, it means this: that Gen. Scott should have been 
 in the very advance, to direct the attack of our skir- 
 mishers upon the enemy, or to resist their attack upon us ; 
 that is, he should have been both in front of Twiggs at Con- 
 treras, and in front of Worth at San Antonio. For how 
 could Gen. Scott have foreseen that the 6,000 men of Valen- 
 cia, arrayed on the height of Contreras, was not a feint, and 
 that as soon as Twiggs and Pillow were well drawn out 
 from San Augustin, the remaining 24,000 men of the enemy, 
 would not have been hurled against Worth, and the main 
 battle have been fought in defence of San Augustin, the key 
 of all our operations ? Now, it is remarkable, that General 
 Scott, in assigning to Quitman the command of this depot, 
 enlarged upon this very consideration ; and it shows how 
 comprehensive was his grasp of the whole field of opera- 
 
76 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 tions. It was necessary for the safety of the army, that 
 Gen. Scott should remain in San Augustin till the enemy 
 had shown his hand ; then was the time for him to repair 
 to the field, which he did. 
 
 Again, Major Ripley contends, that though Gen. Scott 
 committed the military error of providing three successive 
 commanders for that field, yet that by good fortune all the 
 movements were under the supervision of one person, and 
 he was Gen. Pillow. The facts are these : Twiggs' own 
 division went into action by Twiggs' special order, and 
 under his immediate supervision. Pillow placed his own 
 batteries at Twiggs' disposal ; and with some general re- 
 marks about opening the battle, refrained from all interfe- 
 rence. The first dispositions were made by Twiggs, under 
 the advisement of the staff officers of the General in Chief. 
 The course to be pursued was manifest. The young lieu- 
 tenants even saying to Twiggs before a battery had been 
 pushed to the front : " The main attack should be against 
 the enemy's left. Attack his left — you cut him off from his 
 reserves, and hurl him into the gorges of the mountains." 
 Pillow gave to Riley the same order which had previously 
 been given by Twiggs, though without concert between 
 them, and afterwards made a disposition of his own force 
 similar to that of Twiggs. Pillow undoubtedly saw the 
 necessity of the movements. He had the counsel of several 
 highly intelligent staff officers, one being the author of the 
 work under review. 
 
 Inasmuch as he adopted General Twiggs' dispositions, 
 conforming his own thereto, it may be said that the earlier 
 movements of the day were made under his supervision, 
 but not the subsequent movements. We will, however, 
 respectfully ask, why was Pillow's course so vacillating and 
 uncertain ? Why did he send an order to Riley, still strug- 
 gling through the Pedregal, to return ? Why did he delay 
 the march of Cadwalader and of Morgan ? Why did he 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 77 
 
 send all three on an uncertain errand, without even indi- 
 cating what they should do ? We answer, because he was 
 wanting in the clear conception and prompt decision re- 
 quired by the emergency, which is the gist of the whole 
 matter. The known fact, that when the whole force was 
 collected in that village no allusion was made to his orders, 
 is very significant. 
 
 In simple justice to Twiggs, he showed on that field, as 
 well as on the field of Churubusco, great steadiness, resolu- 
 tion, and intrepidity. We regret that Major Ripley has in- 
 dulged in sneers at his conduct and soldiership. There are 
 too many witnesses to his cool and gallant bearing to per- 
 mit this to pass without rebuke. 
 
 It has not been the fortune of courts of inquiry to be- 
 come historical. Nor will a better fate await their com- 
 mentators. The historian, in narrating the events of the 
 second conquest of Mexico, will appeal to all the actors in 
 that great drama. That entire army will be his witnesses, 
 the world and latest posterity his judges. The court of 
 inquiry upon which Major Ripley draws so largely, did not 
 have before them the management of that army, but simply 
 the part played by one of the subordinates. General Pillow 
 was at its bar to exculpate himself from weighty charges, 
 and yet the court, with but a fraction of the immense mass 
 of testimony to guide their decisions, and under circum- 
 stances making it their duty to give to the General the ben- 
 efit of all doubts, came to the conclusion that he had arro- 
 gated to himself too much credit for that field. Had 
 Twiggs likewise been on his trial, and had all the officers 
 serving with him been examined, the whole aspect of the 
 case would have been changed. 
 
 We consider the author's description of the battle of 
 Churubusco as graphic and true. He fails in his observa- 
 tions on the general movements. 
 
 One of the most extraordinary views presented is this. 
 
78 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 That General Scott should not have fought the battle at 
 all, but adhering essentially to his original plan, he first 
 should have carefully reconnoitered the ground to the left 
 of the position of Churubusco, and after bringing forward 
 his trains from San Augustin, and establishing his depots, 
 he should have advanced on the Ninon Perdido road and 
 compelled the enemy to fight in the open field. This ob- 
 servation is predicated on the fact that the Ninon Perdido 
 road was totally unfortified when the battle of Churu- 
 busco was fought. To which we reply: That a General 
 who either by a blind adherence to an original purpose, or 
 by too much care in selecting the most favorable point of 
 attack, shall neglect to avail himself of the unforeseen chances 
 of the contest, and particularly shall fail to strike his enemy 
 when in full retreat and before he can have time to embody 
 his troops, and especially when that enemy is demoralized 
 by a disaster and his own troops are raised to the highest 
 pitch of confidence and exaltation, is surely destined to be 
 overthrown. This groping for a field of battle was the vice 
 of that continental system, which led to Napoleon's extraor- 
 dinary successes. General Scott would have criminally 
 endangered the safety of his army and would have sadly 
 depreciated his own reputation, had he hesitated for a mo- 
 ment. 
 
 What are the great facts of the battle of Churubusco ? 
 They are these : General Scott launched his whole force 
 against a point of the enemy's extended line, and with such 
 vigor and resolution, that a very large proportion of the 
 enemy's force never reached the field of battle. Our losses 
 to be sure were great. But this was unavoidable in so un- 
 equal a contest. Fortune favored us, and we had a chief 
 who knew how to avail himself of her smiles. 
 
 But we totally deny the alternative of our author. The 
 establishing of our depots and the selecting of a new point 
 of attack would have occupied the whole of the 20th, and 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 79 
 
 probably a portion of the 21st. The enemy would have 
 seen our hand, would have embodied all his force, and have 
 completed his inner line of defensive works. Instead of 
 righting in the open field where our field batteries could have 
 been brought into play, we should have fought him behind 
 his works in close proximity to the city, with his whole 
 army embodied and confirmed in heart by the twenty- 
 four to forty-eight hours' delay. 
 
 There would have been no opportunity for a great strat- 
 egic movement like that of Shields, essentially afield move- 
 ment. We no doubt should have conquered ; but it would 
 have been a prolonged struggle for many days, not one ter- 
 rible onset of three hours, as really occurred. 
 
 General Scott had but these two alternatives : to strike 
 at once and with unflinching resolution, a retreating and 
 demoralized enemy, at a distance from the city and essen- 
 tially in the open field ; or to delay to strike and select a 
 new point of attack, allowing the ardor of our troops to sub- 
 side, insuring no increase of force, showing our hand to the 
 enemy, giving him time to complete his interior line of de- 
 fenses and to embody his whole force in firm array, to re- 
 cover in fact from the discouragement of defeat. Who can 
 doubt that General Scott showed the qualities of a great 
 commander by his course ? 
 
 But it is made a matter of accusation against General 
 Scott, that he left his commanders without orders, and that 
 the credit of the first general disposition of the troops belongs 
 to fortune, and to no general officer whatever. To which 
 we reply, that when General Scott gave his orders at Co- 
 yacan, directing two brigades on two roads to strike the San 
 Antonio causeway at two different points, the enemy were 
 seen in full retreat on that causeway, towards the city. As 
 soon as the fire of the enemy opened, developing better 
 his position, the three remaining brigades were immediately 
 pushed to the front and flank. This prompt movement 
 
80 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 against the enemy on the San Antonio road was in fact sub- 
 stantially an order to General Worth, to press the enemy on 
 that road. It was so understood, and must have been so 
 understood by Worth. Pillow was sent to the rear of San 
 Antonio. Why so? Was San Antonio his object, or the 
 enemy, supposed to be near San Antonio ? The enemy ; 
 and hence Pillow's change of direction. We are rather of 
 opinion that had General Pillow pursued a fruitless errand 
 towards San Antonio, and had General Worth failed to move 
 upon the road, there would have been some emphatic orders 
 from the General in Chief. 
 
 The movements of Pillow and Worth, the change of di- 
 rection of the former, and the embodying and pushing for- 
 ward the division of the latter, after cutting the column of 
 the enemy retreating from San Antonio, resulted as a mat- 
 ter of course from the fact that we were now seeking the 
 enemy and nothing else. A great fact of which the hum- 
 blest soldier in that army was cognizant. Such move- 
 ments belong to the responsibilities and discretion of divi- 
 sion commanders, and in the present case, could not have 
 been mistaken by the most ordinary capacity. 
 
 General Scott throughout this campaign maintained his 
 character of Commander in Chief, and never committed the 
 folly of playing the part of a subordinate. 
 
 We now quote, as having great significance in this con- 
 nection, the following from Marshal Saxe. " Many com- 
 manders-in-chief have been so limited in their ideas of war- 
 fare, that when events have brought the contest to issue, and 
 two rival armies have been drawn out for action, their 
 whole attention has devolved upon a straight alignment, 
 an equality of step, or a regular distance in intervals of col- 
 umns. They have considered it sufficient to give answers 
 to questions proposed by their aides-de-camp, to send orders 
 in various directions, and to gallop themselves from one 
 quarter to another, without steadily adhering to the fluctu- 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 81 
 
 ations of the day, or calmly watching for an opportunity to 
 strike a decisive blow. They endeavor, in fact, to do every 
 thing, and thereby do nothing." 
 
 We respectfully inquire what orders did Gen. Scott for. 
 bear to give, which ought to have been given? What or- 
 ders did he give, which ought to have been forborne ? Mil- 
 itary critics will find these questions hard to answer. 
 
 The difficulty with Major Ripley's military criticisms 
 is, that he does not discriminate between the sphere of 
 the General in Chief and the spheres of division comman- 
 ders Whilst Gen. Scott was responsible for the general 
 direction of the divisions, the particular management of the 
 divisions, the particular mode in which the advance of these 
 divisions became engaged with the enemy, were matters of 
 detail for which division commanders were responsible. 
 
 Worth on the San Antonio causeway, Pillow in support, 
 Twiggs on the cross-road, Shields to the rear — all had for 
 their object the enemy — the enemy were to be attacked— a 
 battle was to be fought — the war was to be ended. So 
 much for Gen. Scott. In the execution of these move- 
 ments each became engaged in a particular way, and the 
 merit or the censure must inure to each accordingly. 
 
 Objection is made that the country was not known ; to 
 which we reply, that it was known sufficiently for the pur- 
 pose of engaging the battle. The battle had to be entered 
 into to get further knowledge. The prompt attack of 
 Twiggs developed the whole front of the enemy, and ena- 
 bled the General in Chief to make those final dispositions 
 which achieved the victory. 
 
 We do not mean to say that a vastly better hypothetical 
 order of battle could not have been devised. But such a 
 mode of treating the subject we consider puerile.* The 
 question is simply this, with all the facts which the General 
 in Chief had in his possession, it being admitted that much 
 was unknown, was he justified in fighting the battle, and 
 6 
 
82 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 would these facts have enabled him to make a better dis- 
 tribution of his forces 1 
 
 War itself is an operation where at all times much is ne- 
 cessarily unknown. The great quality of a commander is> 
 seizing essential crowning.facts, so to arrange his plans, as 
 not to be disturbed by that terra incognita, which no mili- 
 tary prescience can unveil. 
 
 We unhesitatingly refer to the battle of Churubusco as 
 affording incontestable proof of the great energy and ca- 
 pacity of Gen. Scott on the field of battle. 
 
 The consequence of this decisive conflict, demoralizing 
 and fearfully reducing the public force of Mexico, was that 
 an armistice was entered into for the purpose of negotiating 
 a treaty of peace. At the moment of concluding this ar- 
 mistice, Gen. Scott had in his possession ample proofs of 
 the small military force which the enemy had at his dispo- 
 sal, and few persons doubted that a treaty of peace would be 
 finally concluded upon. In consequence of this conviction? 
 shared by the General in Chief and the body of the army, the 
 former determined to impose no condition which would in 
 any respect throw obstacles in the way of negotiation, or 
 unnecessarily humble Mexican pride. And in this spirit he 
 receded from his first demand, that Chapultepec should be 
 surrendered. 
 
 This armistice is the subject of severe animadversion on 
 the part of our author, and Gen. Scott is held up as endan- 
 gering the safety and sacrificing the lives of his gallant 
 troops, for the selfish object of winning popular favor and 
 reaching the grand object of his life — the Presidency. 
 
 We deem this a most unjust and illiberal view of the 
 whole transaction. It requires but a very cursory examina- 
 tion of the page of history to learn, that almost all the 
 treaties of peace, resulting from the issue of arms, have 
 first been preceded by an armistice, and this armistice has 
 not unfrequently been proposed by the victorious party. 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 83 
 
 An armistice, is at least a most desirable preliminary to a 
 treaty of peace, though not absolutely essential. And yet, 
 our author contends, that the Government, in sending out 
 Mr. Trist, never intended there should be a suspension of 
 hostilities until a treaty was actually signed. It will not be 
 denied, that our government and people were exceedingly 
 anxious to bring difficulties to a close. Every one was look- 
 ing to the campaign of Scott to conquer a peace. This 
 expression was in every body's mouth. Peace was the 
 great object desired by all, and more grateful to all than 
 the most splendid achievements of arms. Is not this fact 
 the simple, obvious explication of Gen. Scott's whole course ? 
 Was it not his plain and obvious duty, to let no opportunity 
 slip that should promise to secure the accomplishment of 
 this object 1 Personally, had he not more to gain by his 
 triumphal entry into the magnificent city of the Astecs 
 than by forbearing to enter for the sake of a peace, the nego- 
 tiating of which was to redound to the honor of another? 
 
 The course pursued by General Scott in entering into 
 the Tacubaya armistice, will form one of the brightest 
 pages of the history of our country. Through all time it 
 can be referred to, as convincing proof of the moderation, of 
 the sincerity, and of the magnanimity of the government he 
 represented. And when we consider the fact, that Commis- 
 sioners on both sides did meet, and that the negotiations at 
 one time, were all but successful ; that Santa Anna himself 
 had almost determined to sign the treaty, and that he deli- 
 berated long before he concluded to make a second appeal 
 to arms, we consider General Scott to be entirely vindicated 
 in his course. 
 
 We speak thus in general terms of the armistice. In 
 reference to details, we think a mistake was made in not 
 insisting upon the surrender of Chapultepec. But we do 
 not consider this serious cause of censure, when we reflect, 
 how utterly prostrate in the dust was the enemy, and how 
 
84 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 strong in himself and his galfcmt troops, was the victorious 
 General. Major Ripley sneers at this magnanimity of Gen. 
 Scott : we, however, thank God for its exhibition, and we 
 have only to hope, that in our future wars, our armies shall 
 have the guidance of a chief of equal skill and valor in the 
 shock of battle, and of equal magnanimity to a conquered 
 foe. 
 
 The armistice proved of no avail. The conflict was re- 
 newed, and in nine short days, Santa Anna and his army 
 were driven fugitives from that valley, which all the wiles 
 of policy, and all the resources of the state could not save 
 from the iron grasp of his terrible antagonist. 
 
 The armistice was brought to an end at twelve o'clock 
 M., September 7th. During the morning of that day, the 
 Mexican troops were seen marching out from the city, and 
 taking a position in the vicinity of Molino del Rey. Gene- 
 ral Scott had received information that the enemy had a 
 boring apparatus at this place, and were at the time actively 
 engaged in casting cannon. He determined to seize the 
 foundry by a night attack, and to cut off this source of sup- 
 ply. Gen. Worth was intrusted with the management of 
 the enterprise, and Cadwalader's brigade reinforced his 
 own command. The attack, made at dawn of day, was 
 the most dreadful shock of arms of the whole war, and was 
 finally won at all points by our gallant troops, after expe- 
 riencing a greater proportionate loss than that of the English 
 at the assault of Badajoz. The foundry was found, how- 
 ever, to have no apparatus for boring cannon, and our troops 
 were withdrawn from the position. 
 
 We cannot but highly praise Maj. Ripley's description of 
 this brilliant achievement, and we agree with most that he 
 has to say in commendation of the skill of commanders, 
 and the devotion of officers and of men. The surprise is? 
 that after such a loss, and against such odds, the field was 
 won at all ; and it exemplifies the hardihood, the patriot- 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 85 
 
 ism, and the self-sacrifice of American troops. We more- 
 over find his criticisms more just and discriminating, than 
 many that have before come under our notice, and we con- 
 cur with much that he has to say in animadversion of the 
 measures of the General in Chief. We think with him, that 
 Gen. Scott committed a mistake in directing a partial attack, 
 for the mere purpose of destroying a foundry. We think 
 the object was not of sufficient consequence, to have enter- 
 ed for a moment into his plans. The battle of Molino 
 should have been fought on the morning of the 8th of Sep- 
 tember, not by three brigades simply, but by six brigades 
 under the command of the General in Chief. Chapultepec, 
 the pride, and the hope of the enemy, should have been 
 seized. When on the morning of the seventh, Gen. Scott 
 saw the enemy place himself without his city, and in strik- 
 ing distance of his force, he should have hailed it as a fa- 
 vor of fortune, and should have profited by it in the same 
 masterly manner, as he did by the folly of Valencia, in stu- 
 pidly maintaining his position in his intrenched' camp at 
 Contreras. On the 6th, when he gave notice to Santa Anna, 
 that the armistice would be terminated at 12 M. on the 7th, 
 he should at the same moment have ordered Twiggs and 
 Quitman, at San Angel and San Augustin, to be ready 
 *o move to new positions on its expiration. When on the 
 morniug of the next day, the movement of the enemy was 
 developed, these Generals should have been ordered to con- 
 centrate their troops at Mixcoac, and Pillow should have 
 been advanced to Piedad. 
 
 This disposition rendering it uncertain whether Scott 
 would attack Molino, or the southern front, would doubtless 
 have led to some detachments from the Mexican force to 
 guard other avenues, and thus bringing up the divisions of 
 Twiggs and Quitman at early dawn, the bulk of our army 
 could have been directed with resistless force, and Chapul- 
 £epee must have fallen almost without resistance. We hesi- 
 
86 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 tate not to say that in one short hour the battle would have 
 been fought and won. It was the most splendid opportu- 
 nity of the war. Not one division, but the bulk of Santa 
 Anna's army had offered itself to our blow. 
 
 It is said that General Scott did not contemplate a 
 battle. To which we reply : it w*as utterly impossible to 
 seize the foundry, without driving the enemy from his en- 
 tire position — in other words, without fighting the battle. 
 Let the friends of General Scott frankly admit that he 
 committed a mistake. The vindication of General Scott at 
 Molino is to be found in his splendid conduct at Chapul te- 
 pee. Thus was it with Napoleon at Marengo. Thus, alas ? 
 was it not with Napoleon at Ligny, and at Waterloo. 
 
 But General Worth's dispositions were faulty ; the at- 
 tack should either have been made at night, as originally 
 intended by General Scott, or if deferred until dawn of.day, 
 his dispositions should have been materially modified* 
 With a fine veteran division we think a night attack would 
 have succeeded. Suchet's Peninsular Campaigns are full 
 of examples of the success of night attacks against disparity 
 of numbers. The French troops were not superior to the 
 veterans of Worth's division, and the Mexican troops were 
 of the same character with those of Spain. Suchet always 
 succeeded in his night attacks. 
 
 In consideration, however, of the somewhat intricate 
 nature and our limited knowledge of the position, we think 
 it was safer to make the attack by daylight. Worth, there- 
 fore, we think, ought not to be censured for deferring the at- 
 tack until dawn of day, but for adhering to dispositions 
 which were proper only for a night attack. He should have 
 kept back his troops altogether, till the enemy were shaken 
 by the fire of his artillery, and then have sent them to the 
 assault. Not simply a select party of five hundred men, 
 but that party followed closely by a veteran brigade, and a 
 light battery, should have pierced the centre of his line. 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 87 
 
 Then turning to the left, this body in conjunction with an- 
 other brigade, should have swept the Casa-Matar, the artil- 
 lery supported by the third brigade all the while playing on 
 the foundry. The cavalry would have maintained our left 
 flank and rear against the enemy's lancers. The Casa- 
 Matar in our hands, against the attack of three brigades, 
 and the whole of his artillery, the foundry could not long 
 have held out. With such dispositions, and with a proper 
 use of his artillery, we think General Worth could have 
 carried the entire position with one third of the loss he ac- 
 tually experienced. 
 
 It was certainly a great mistake to push on that isolated 
 column of five hundred men against the enemy's immense 
 force, all the other troops remaining behind in position. 
 Before succor was brought to this little band, four- fifths of 
 their number were killed or wounded. It was a most ter- 
 rible and unnecessary sacrifice of life. 
 
 We consider these grave faults in- the preliminary dis- 
 positions. The order of battle was of the parallel order, 
 and in the very case where the parallel order should have 
 been avoided. After the storming party was cut up, and 
 driven back, the whole line with strong defensive works 
 was attacked at once by the bayonet. The artillery was 
 not used until the first assaults had failed and until the 
 heavy losses had been experienced. But the battle having 
 been, engaged, General Worth deserves great credit for his 
 gallantry and resolution in maintaining the field,and for 
 skilful dispositions in the heat of the contest. The final 
 skill exhibited and success achieved more than redeemed 
 the commencement, and justly entitle him to the favorable 
 judgment of his countrymen. It is simple justice to Worth 
 to state that he advised a general action and the storming of 
 Chapultepec, and that from the first he was of opinion that 
 destroying the foundry would be a more serious operation 
 than was contemplated by General Scott. It was in conse- 
 
88 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 quence of this belief, and at his suggestion, that he was re- 
 inforced by Cadwalader's brigade. 
 
 We regret that our author, in animadverting with great 
 freedom and severity upon General Scott's part in the battle 
 of Molino, should find all of Worth's conduct entitled to eu- 
 logium — and that obvious departures from the principles of 
 war should have been entirely overlooked. 
 
 We will pass on rapidly to the operations about Chapul- 
 tepec, commencing with the council of war at Piedad, on 
 the 11th of September. We shall give these operations the 
 more careful attention, as Major Ripley has most laboriously 
 endeavored to make them subserve the elevation of the mili- 
 tary reputation of certain subordinate commanders, at the 
 expense of the well-earned fame of the General in Chief. 
 
 After the battle of Molino, Worth's division was posted 
 at Tacubaya, and the remainder of the army was cantoned 
 in the villages along the southern front, with a strong 
 advanced post at Piedad. 
 
 Whilst the sick and wounded were being transferred to 
 Mixcoac, now become the general depot, the enemy's lines 
 on the southern front were reconnoitred by the engineers, 
 and on the 11th General Scott convened a council of offi- 
 cers at Piedad, and submitted his views in reference to the 
 plan of attack against the city. 
 
 On this day, as on the two previous days, the enemy 
 were rapidly strengthening their works on the southern 
 front, and had already eleven guns in position. 
 
 There were two projects of attack proposed by General 
 Scott and submitted to the council — one was to attack the 
 southern front, the other to attack Chapultepec. 
 
 The attack against the southern front, and in close 
 proximity to the city, almost unavoidably involved a pro- 
 longed and murderous contest in the streets of the city, and 
 with the small force at the disposal of the American Gen- 
 eral, there was danger that, exasperated and inflamed by 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 89 
 
 the remembrance of the sad scenes of Molino, onr troops 
 would abandon themselves to pillage, and thus be liable to 
 be cut off in detail. 
 
 The attack against Chapultepec, standing boldly out 
 full two miles from the city, would assimilate the contest 
 more to one of the field, and might of itself induce the sur- 
 render of the city. It was not to be expected that the force 
 of the enemy, well broken in defence of Chapultepec, could 
 be rallied very effectually in defence of the city. The 
 taking of Chapultepec, moreover, opened the way to an ad- 
 vance on the San Cosme suburb, referred to in a former part 
 of this article as the strategic point of attack. Thus the 
 storming of Chapultepec, besides striking a severe blow 
 upon the enemy at a distance from the city, and snatching 
 from him that place of strength upon which he relied for its 
 defence, opened the way at once to the most vulnerable point. 
 
 Most of the officers at the council of Piedad, instead of 
 taking this large view of the two projects of attack, simply 
 considered the relative facility with which the southern line 
 of works, and those about Chapultepec, could be forced. 
 Nor did they much weigh the fact that the enemy were evi- 
 dently expecting us on the southern front, and that in storm- 
 ing Chapultepec, we might reasonably expect, in prosecuting 
 subsequent operations, to find them unprepared in the Cosme 
 suburb. No one doubted the success of the American 
 arms,- whichever project was adopted. But there was a 
 general disposition to exaggerate the strength of Chapulte- 
 pec. Now, a work on an eminence, with trees and inequali- 
 ties of ground to its very walls, as was the case with Cha- 
 pultepec, is the most easy to carry by storm, and the loss 
 to be apprehended is but slight compared to an attack on 
 level and open ground, as on the southern front. 
 
 It was pretty evident that General Scott, on assembling 
 the council, had determined to attack Chapultepec, both 
 from the tenor of his opening remarks, and from his having 
 
90 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 previously directed sites to be selected for establishing coun- 
 ter batteries, and accordingly the attack was resolved upon, 
 although a majority of his officers inclined to the attack 
 against the southern front. 
 
 Thus far no allusion has been made to a demonstration 
 against the southern front in connection with the attack 
 against Chapultepec, for the simple reason that a demon- 
 stration against Chapultepec, supported by counter batteries, 
 must have necessarily entered into the plan of an attack 
 against the southern front. A demonstration would have 
 been effective in both attacks, and was not, therefore, a de- 
 termining circumstance in either. 
 
 Our author, taking the same restricted view as did a 
 majority of the officers at the council of Piedad, is of opinion 
 that the southern front of the city was the true point of at- 
 tack, and, that the southern lines forced, the city would 
 have been in our hands, and the citadel — a strong bastioned 
 work in the southwestern quarter of the city — and Chapul- 
 tepec, would have fallen by their own weight. 
 
 The southern lines forced, as we advanced into the city, 
 we should have been obliged to detach largely to guard our 
 depots, and to maintain a firm attitude in front of Chapul- 
 tepec, occupied in force by the enemy ; whereas, Chapulte- 
 pec forced, a small garrison would have held it, and in the 
 progress against the city, the diverting force at Piedad could 
 have been drawn to the main body. 
 
 Thus the southern attack in its subsequent prosecution 
 involved large detachments from the attacking force. The 
 attack against Chapultepec involved an increase of the at- 
 tacking force, by an incorporation of the diverting force 
 with the main body. 
 
 For all these reasons the conclusion of the General in 
 Chief was most fortunate. 
 
 When the council of war broke up, although the Gene- 
 ral in Chief was almost alone in favor of operating against 
 
EIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 91 
 
 Chapultepec, the utmost ardor and confidence was infused 
 among the officers who were present, and soon, throughout 
 the army. 
 
 The spirit of the army, at first somewhat depressed by 
 the losses of Molino, had been gradually rising, and it now 
 reached its highest point of exaltation. Not for a single 
 moment had the General in Chief been otherwise than vigi- 
 lant, cool and self-sustained, never doubting our ultimate 
 triumph, and not for' a single moment had either his officers 
 or his men a doubt as to his safely leading them through 
 the perils that encompassed them. 
 
 The plan of attack against Chapultepec, was to counter- 
 batter with heavy metal, until an impression was made on 
 the defences and the morale of the garrison was well shaken, 
 and then to carry it by storm. It was to be supported by 
 a bold demonstration against the southern front on the part 
 of Twiggs (Riley's brigade), at Piedad. 
 
 Accordingly, the remainder of the army (excepting 
 Smith's brigade), on the evening of the llth, was concen- 
 trated at Tacubaya, and all the batteries but one were got 
 in readiness during the night, and opened their fire in the 
 morning. The battery referred to did not open its fire till 
 towards night, in consequence of delays in furnishing work- 
 ing parties ; and not, as stated by Major Ripley, in conse- 
 quence of the severity of the fire rendering it impracticable 
 to work. 
 
 The necessary scaling-ladders were collected early in the 
 day, and the plan of attack was definitely settled. There 
 were to be two main columns of attack, consisting of the 
 respective commands of Generals Pillow and Quitman, each 
 furnished with a storming party of two hundred and fifty 
 men, from the veteran divisions of Worth and Twiggs. 
 
 Chapultepec, in reference to the entire line of the enemy 
 in view of the American army, was but a point. Nearly 
 one half the Mexican army could be kept in the lints in 
 
92 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 immediate proximity to the city, by a single brigade. This 
 left disposable for the attack of Chapultepec seven-eighths 
 of the American army. The ground was more unfavorable 
 for the development of troops in the defence than in the at- 
 tack. The attack pushed with vigor and resolution, the 
 enemy would have found it difficult to bring to its defence 
 one half his force, and still more difficult to apply it. 
 
 Towards night, Gen. Scott summoned Generals Pillow 
 and Quitman to his quarters, to arrange the plan of attack. 
 
 The plan consisted essentially in moving down on the 
 two sides of Chapultepec, and seizing the point of junction 
 of the two roads of communication with the city, thus com- 
 pletely isolating this important position ; and then, in con- 
 junction with a movement of one of Pillow's brigades from 
 the Molino, through the Cypress Grove, to storm the work 
 itself. 
 
 Pillow made many objections to this plan, and express- 
 ed great fears as to his division being able to do the work 
 that was assigned to it. He particularly objected to the 
 division of his command, and was of opinion, that a single 
 brigade was not sufficient to storm Chapultepec from the 
 direction of the Cypress Grove. Gen. Scott showed that 
 this was the weak point of the position ; that the difficulties 
 of the advance were very much magnified, and that in con- 
 junction with the other movements,, a single brigade only 
 was necessary. Finally, Gen. Pillow, after yielding objec- 
 tion after objection, stated his willingness to make the 
 attack if his whole division was given to him, to which Gen- 
 Scott assented. 
 
 The plan of attack was therefore so modified, that Gen. 
 Pillow's whole division was to be sent to the storming of 
 Chapultepec, from the Molino and through the Cypress 
 Grove, and Gen. Quitman's command was to move down 
 on the Tacubaya road, and seize the batteries at its base. 
 
 4-t early dawn, all the batteries opened a vigorous fire 
 
EIO GEANDE AND OF MEXICO. 93 
 
 upon the enemy. Smith's brigade was withdrawn from 
 Piedad to reinforce Quitman ; and Worth's entire division 
 was advanced to the Molino, to be held in readiness for con- 
 tingencies. Pillow was authorized to call upon Worth for 
 reinforcements. 
 
 At about 8 o'clock, the batteries ceased their fire by order 
 of the General in Chief, and the two commands advanced 
 to the assault. 
 
 Our troops showed great ardor, and eagerly pushed for- 
 ward on both lines. Pillow and Quitman were both at the 
 heads of their commands. The resistance of the enemy 
 was obstinate. But after a fierce contest of one hour's con- 
 tinuance, Chapultepec was seized, and the enemy were 
 driven from the entire position, with a heavy loss in killed, 
 wounded, and prisoners. Quitman on the direct Tacubaya 
 causeway, and Worth on the causeway leading to the wes- 
 tern suburb of San Cosme, followed in pursuit ; Pillow, early 
 wounded in the assault on Chapultepec, having been disa- 
 bled for the rest of the day. 
 
 After a protracted contest, in which Quitman exhibited 
 remarkable energy, force, and gallantry, he seized at half- 
 past one, the gate of Belen ; but directly in front of the cita- 
 del exposed to a tremendous fire of the enemy, he was un- 
 able to continue his advance, and was obliged to take shel- 
 ter till nightfall. Worth — pausing in his advance to the 
 Cosme suburb, in order to lend a hand to Quitman, hotly 
 pressed on the Tacubaya causeway — finally advanced and 
 seized the field-work at the junction of the road from Cha- 
 pultepec and the Cosme causeway, and the western end of 
 the suburb itself, at about half past twelve, and awaited the 
 coming up of the engineer and ordnance trains, to prose- 
 cute his further advance into the city. Resorting in part to 
 the pick, and in part to artillery and the bayonet, at night- 
 fall he was well advanced into the city, a majority of his 
 command lodging within the Garita. During the night, 
 
94: CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 both Quitman and Worth made preparations to renew the 
 attack in the morning, and Worth threw some shells into 
 the centre of the city. 
 
 Santa Anna withdrew his troops during the night, and 
 took up a position at Guadaloupe, some two or three miles 
 distant. 
 
 The next morning the main plaza, and the national pa- 
 lace were occupied early by Quitman's command, Worth 
 having received orders to advance no farther than the Ala- 
 meda ; and the General in Chief declining in the night to 
 listen to the proposition of the City Council, to surrender on 
 terms, announced in an order his occupancy of the Mexican 
 capital. 
 
 Still a desultory contest was kept up throughout the 
 day from the houses of the city, by an intermingled body 
 of soldiers and leperos led on by officers of the army, and 
 was only stopped by the vigorous measures of the General 
 in Chief, who ordered every house to be blown up from 
 which a hostile shot should be fired, and every Mexican 
 with arms in his hands to be put to death. 
 
 Santa Anna, finding his plan of inciting our troops to 
 pillage, by the natural exasperation of the street contest thus 
 referred to, had signally failed, and that there was no chance 
 of his being able to sin-prise them when abandoned to 
 drunkenness and disorder, after waiting two or three days at 
 Guadaloupe, divided his command. With a portion he re- 
 paired to Puebla to try his fortune against Childs, the gov- 
 ernor of that place, and to watch his opportunity to fall upon 
 our reinforcements coming up from Vera Cruz. The re- 
 mainder — a disorderly mob — repaired to Queretero, where 
 the government was to be temporarily established. 
 
 Both the city and valley of Mexico were now in undis- 
 puted possession of our troops. 
 
 We will refer the reader for a more minute description 
 of the splendid operations of the day of Chapultepec, to 
 
EIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 95 
 
 Ripley's narrative ; it is correct in its details, and is in the 
 main to be relied on. 
 
 We regret to be obliged to disapprove the whole spirit of 
 his criticisms of these operations. Had it been his professed 
 object to depreciate as much as possible the services of Gen- 
 eral Scott, he could not have said less in his behalf. Had 
 it been his professed object to give the most favorable view 
 of the conduct and services of Generals Worth and Pillow, 
 he could not have said more. 
 
 But to the criticisms themselves : 
 
 1. Pillow's disposition of his troops for the assault and 
 his management in prosecuting it, are spoken of in terms of 
 the most unqualified praise. 
 
 Let us examine these dispositions a little in detail. 
 
 Pillow objected to a separation of his division — the send- 
 ing of one brigade to the rear of Chapultepec in conjunction 
 with Q,uitman to cut it off entirely from the city and to 
 prevent the throwing in of reinforcements — and the sending 
 of the other to the direct assault through the Cypress Grove, 
 and was allowed, at his urgent solicitation, to apply his 
 whole command to the accomplishment of this latter pur- 
 pose. Yet, what disposition does he make '? We use the 
 words of the author : " The battalions of the eleventh and 
 fourteenth regiments, and the two pieces of Magruder's bat- 
 tery, all under Colonel Trousdale, were posted at the north- 
 western angle of Molino del Rey for the double purpose of 
 watching Alvarez, and the position of Pena-y-Barragan on 
 the northern road of the Aqueduct. Except under a contin- 
 gency, this corps were to be held in position until the castle 
 fell, but in case reinforcements were seen to be entering the 
 castle it was to engage them at all hazards." 
 
 In other words, Pillow, though supported by the whole 
 of Worth's division, instead of applying the whole of his 
 division to the work of storming Chapultepec, actually 
 placed nearly the whole of one of his brigades in observa- 
 
96 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 tion, with orders, however, to engage the enemy in case he 
 was seen to be entering the castle. Scott's plan was prompt- 
 ly to advance the brigade, to prevent all possibility of throw- 
 ing in reinforcements. 
 
 In the progress of the attack. Pillow, deeming a reinforce- 
 ment necessary, instead of calling to his aid those regiments 
 left in observation, called for one of Worth's brigades. 
 Thus, though he objected to the division of his own com- 
 mand, he had no objection to dividing Worth's. 
 
 But we in substance quote still farther : 
 
 " Tronsdale, believing he saw reinforcements enter the 
 castle, advanced two pieces of Magruder's battery and the 
 fourteenth infantry to support it. Worth arrived at the 
 angle whilst the fire upon Jackson's section and the four- 
 teenth infantry was continued and heavy. He ordered 
 Captain Magruder to withdraw the pieces, and threw a por- 
 tion of Garland's brigade to the left of the road, to take the 
 barricades in flank. These troops came in as the enemy 
 retreated, and the point was carried. This having been 
 accomplished, the ditch was filled up, and the artillery and 
 troops of the command were advanced along the designated 
 route, in pursuit." Now, whilst Pillow was still making 
 his way in the Cypress Grove, and Quitman was struggling 
 along the causeway, the enemy making an obstinate re- 
 sistance on both points, General Scott, fully expecting that 
 General Pillow had used his division as he had asked to 
 use it, ordered Worth to send one of his brigades around 
 Chapultepec to relieve both Pillow and Quitman. This 
 order, though distinctly heard by Worth, was not promptly 
 carried out. He observed that before he moved a brigade 
 in that direction, he wished to know more of the ground. 
 Hence the late movement of its execution, as above. Now, 
 if it was a proper disposition of Pillow to place two of his 
 regiments in observation to be ready to attack the enemy 
 in the act of throwing in reinforcements, and if it was right 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 97 
 
 for Tronsdale thus to apply his force and for Worth to sus- 
 tain him in it, most surely it was right for Scott in an earli- 
 er stage of the contest to order the advance of Worth, when 
 in addition to providing against this contingency, he cer- 
 tainly relieved both Pillow and Quitman, hotly pressed. 
 Yet, Major Ripley says in the first place, that, the order was 
 probably never given. 2d. That it was a perfectly useless 
 order if given ; and, 3d, that General Worth, at all events, 
 made no attempt to execute it. We think that every unpreju- 
 diced reader cannot fail to agree with us in opinion, that 
 this is pretty rapid criticism. 
 
 2. But we will take a more extended view of these op- 
 erations. 
 
 The whole southern and southwestern front of the city, 
 of which Chapultepec was the point of attack in the opera- 
 tions against the city, was to the whole army what the 
 southwestern front of Chapultepec was to Pillow's division. 
 What was the relative course of the Commander in Chief 
 and his subordinate ? 
 
 Against that single strategic point, General Scott direct- 
 ed the force of his whole army, excepting one brigade, 
 which boldly faced the remainder of the enemy's extended 
 line, and diverted nearly one half of the enemy's force. 
 
 Pillow left two of his regiments in his rear, to act as a 
 picket — a duty to which, one would suppose, the whole of 
 Worth's division was adequate. And then finding his force 
 inadequate, instead of calling them to his aid, he asks for a 
 brigade of Worth's. Scott, seeing from his position at Tacu- 
 baya that both he and Quitman were hotly engaged with 
 the enemy, and that the enemy were making a hot resist- 
 ance, at this critical moment orders Worth to strike the 
 other flank and create a diversion in favor of both. 
 
 If it were wrong for Gen. Scott, to whom the whole of 
 Chapultepec was the point of attack, to order a whole bri- 
 gade to move on one of its flanks, and which otherwise 
 7 
 
98 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 could not be brought into action, it was surely a violation 
 of the rules of art, for Gan. Pillow, to whom the southwest- 
 ern front was the line of attack, to send two of his regi- 
 ments in another direction, whilst complaining of the inade- 
 quacy cf his division. 
 
 Oar author has much to say about bringing a preponder- 
 ating force to bear upon the decisive point. What was the 
 relative course of the General in Chief and his subordinate 
 in their respective spheres ? The General in Chief brought 
 to bear upon his decisive point, Chapultepec, seven-eighths 
 of his whole force, with which he proposed to attack on all 
 sides, leaving none of his battalions out. 
 
 Pillow's whole sphere of operations was the southwestern 
 front of Chapultepec. Yet, instead of directing his whole 
 force to the decisive point of that front, in his first disposi- 
 tions, he left nearly one half of his command entirely out 
 of his sphere of operations, assigning to them a duty which 
 the General in Ct ief had in view for Worth. 
 
 Yet Major Ripley contends, that Gen. Scott violated that 
 great principle of the military art, of bringing a preponder- 
 ating force to bear on the decisive point, and that Gen. Pil- 
 low illustrated it. 
 
 The whole gist of Major Ripley's criticisms, as was that 
 of Gen. Pillow's defence before the court of inquiry, is, that 
 Scott was an indifferent spectator of the attack on Chapul- 
 tepec, a mile-and-a-half in rear, in Tacubaya — and that 
 Pillow was entitled to the chief merit, both of the plan of 
 attack and its execut n. 
 
 In truth, it is pretty evident that Pillow was ambitious 
 of the whole honor of the western attack ; and it does not 
 seem an illiberal criticism to say, that he made his arrange- 
 ments with a special view of making Worth's operations 
 entirely subordinate to his own. 
 
 How else can we account for the separation of his com- 
 mand, sending but little more than one-half to the attack of 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 99 
 
 the western front, and leaving the remainder at the north- 
 western angle of Molino to remain in observation, or to at- 
 tack according to circumstances, when Worth's entire divi- 
 sion was in close proximity? Why was he not content to 
 apply his division to its special work? The General in 
 Chief acted on the presumption that Pillow had applied his 
 division to the work assigned it ; nor did he dream that Pil- 
 low, after objecting to a separation of his brigades, had actu- 
 ally separated them in his subsequent dispositions. 
 
 The General in Chief, then, applied a preponderating 
 force — or seven-eighths of his entire command to the decisive 
 point. His subordinate leaves out of his sphere of opera- 
 tions entirely, nearly one half of his command. 
 
 We quote again: "All the moral force of the American 
 army was restored at the moment when Pillow's victorious 
 troops crossed the parapet of Chapidtepec, and in the pride 
 and exaltation of the moment, none doubted that the great 
 victory of the war had been accomplished, and that the final 
 object of the campaign was within reach. The various jea- 
 lousies which had place in the American army at a later date, 
 had no place then ; and the congratulations of friends, the 
 acclaiming shouts of the soldiery, as the commander of the 
 western attack was borne wounded into the castle of Cha- 
 pultepec, which had been the end of his dispositions and 
 his efforts ; and the commendations of the General in Chief 
 soon afterwards, told at that time of the imporlance of the 
 capture, and to whom its glory belonged." 
 
 We will save the real services of Gen. Pillow from the 
 depreciation which must result from such ridiculous exag- 
 gerations as the above. He had a simple executive duty to 
 perform in the storming of Chapultepec, and he did it well. 
 We think his disposition of that portion of his command, 
 which he applied to that work, was good. He indeed made 
 use of just about the force that could be applied advanta- 
 geously, namely, one brigade. Had his other brigade been 
 
100 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 disposed of as a support, leaving Worth's division entire, his 
 arrangements would have been very complete. 
 
 Whilst, therefore, we feel bound to rebuke the attempt 
 to manufacture a great commander out of Pillow, we bear 
 witness to his zeal, vigor, and gallantry, and we do not 
 hesitate to say, that had his friends possessed the virtue of 
 silence, his former mistakes would have been passed over 
 as the natural result of inexperience, and no one would 
 have been found to gainsay his having deserved well of 
 his country. We think he earned the reputation of a good 
 executive officer ; but this has been withheld from him in 
 consequence of the attempts that have been made to exalt his 
 reputation at the expense of his commander. The endea- 
 vors to raise him above his proper level, have caused him 
 to sink much below it. 
 
 It may be asked, why did not Scott persist in his origi- 
 nal design of promptly advancing a strong force on either 
 side of Chapultepec, seizing its communication with the 
 city, and cutting off reinforcements, making it, to use his 
 own words, feel its isolation 1 Why did he suspend the 
 advance on the road running north of Chapultepec, in order 
 that Pillow might move through the Cypress Grove with 
 his whole division ? We answer, Gen. Scott knew it was 
 the prime condition of success, that the particular com- 
 manders should have confidence in themselves. And he 
 yielded to Pillow, to insure that the success of Pillow's 
 division, so far as it depended on Pillow himself having 
 confidence that it would succeed, should not be left to 
 chance. Moreover, Gen. Scott did persist in his original 
 designs ; for we see that in a few moments after the battle 
 commenced, and as soon as the enemy's attention is fixed 
 on Pillow and Quitman, Worth is ordered to strike the 
 other flank. 
 
 We will bestow a few words on our author's criticisms 
 as regards Worth and Quitman. 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 101 
 
 Without dwelling further upon Worth's want of prompt- 
 ness in attacking the other flank of Chapultepec, when 
 Pillow and Quitman were hotly pressed, we have a 
 remark to make on the following observation of our author : 
 
 " The subsequent movements, both on the Belen and 
 San Cosme road, had the great element of success — celerity. 
 Worth's movements were such as might have been ex- 
 pected of him in the pursuit of the victory. They were 
 characterized by celerity, until celerity became incompatible 
 with prudence, and, meanwhile, by a careful observation 
 of the points of the whole field of operations." 
 
 Now, what are the facts ? Worth halted his division for 
 one hour and a half on the road leading to the San Cosme 
 suburb, its head being within some six hundred yards of a 
 strong field work at the junction of the two roads. He 
 halted it against the remonstrances of at least one officer 
 of his staff, who informed him that the enemy had no guns 
 then, but if he delayed, they would bring guns, and sweep 
 away the head of his column with grape. He delayed it, 
 in spite of the repeated orders of the General in Chief to push 
 forward. And for what object? To succor Quitman by 
 sending Duncan's battery, and an infantry force, to take 
 the enemy in front of Quitman in flank. That it had this 
 effect we have no doubt. But the most efficient mode for 
 Worth to succor Quitman was to push forward on his own 
 line. He would have found the enemy utterly unprepared ; 
 and he would have appeared in force at the western en- 
 trance, and would have advanced almost unresisted to the 
 rear of the citadel, before the terrible fire of that citadel had 
 compelled Quitman to bow his head, and keep to cover for 
 the remainder of the day. We venture the opinion that 
 the city would have been evacuated early in the afternoon. 
 
 The division of Quitman, on the contrary, was pushed 
 forward with unexampled vigor ; first by Shields, though 
 wounded, turning the head of the command in the direction 
 
102 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 of the Belen gate, immediately on the fall of Chapultepec, 
 and by Quitman bringing up the remainder, and joining 
 the advance half way to the city. Yes ; with such vigor 
 and resolution was this attack prosecuted, that no one of 
 Scott's statf officers, sent out one a/ter another with infor- 
 mation that the Cosme suburb was the real point of attack, 
 were either able or thought it advisable to deliver the 
 order. The division was hotly engaged, and no other 
 course remained than to fight it out. 
 
 Thus it happened in the chapter of accidents, that the 
 demonstration was converted into a real attack, and the 
 real attack was for a time simply a demonstration — a de- 
 monstration putting the division in imminent peril, endan- 
 gering the defeat of the plans of the General in Chief, in- 
 volving much unnecessary delay, giving time to the enemy 
 to bring up his guns, and to dispute the advance of Worth's 
 division into the city. 
 
 Worth was greatly afflicted by the losses of his division 
 at Molino, and was in conseqence admonished of the ne- 
 cessity of knowing thoroughly his ground, and of incurring 
 no risks. He was on the thirteenth extremely solicitous 
 about the safety of his troops. But excepting his delay at 
 Chapultepec, and his still more reprehensible delay in ad- 
 vancing upon the Cosme suburb, his operations were cha- 
 racterized by sound judgment, and were exceedingly 
 creditable to him. 
 
 Worth was indeed a gallant soldier, of splendid manners, 
 of quick apprehension, zealous, indefatigable, energetic — 
 himself fertile in suggestions, and prompt to avail himself 
 of the suggestions of others. He has now gone to his long 
 home. To the state has he rendered eminent service, and 
 let the state ever hold his memory in grateful remem- 
 brance. 
 
 Quitman's conduct on the day of the storming of Cha- 
 pultepec, is worthy of the highest praise. His sustained 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 103 
 
 energy, his prompt decision, his dauntless bearing, and 
 the terrible ordeal through which he pushed his com- 
 mand, are proofs of his possessing some of the highest 
 qualities of an executive officer. 
 
 Our author to the contrary notwithstanding, General 
 Scott was the master-spirit of the operations about Cha- 
 pultepec. It was due, under Providence, to his cool head 
 and steady hand, that our little army was conducted in 
 safety through these scenes of deadly peril. He is equally 
 to be dtmmended for his resolution in determining to at- 
 tack Chapultepec against the advice of a majority of his 
 officers, and for his dispositions in prosecuting that attack. 
 All those who had an opportunity to observe him on the 
 day of the thirteenth, will remember his remarkable cool- 
 ness, steadiness and grasp of the entire field of operations. 
 General Scott, in this campaign, combined two qualities 
 in an eminent degree — qualities seldom united, yet indis- 
 pensable to a great commander the quality' of adhering 
 to his plans, always carefully weighed and thoroughly 
 digested, with great pertinacity, so long as the circum- 
 stances remained the same, with great facility in incor- 
 porating new circumstances, and changing his plans to 
 conform thereto. This is exemplified in the battle of Chu- 
 rubusco. It was fought on the spur of the moment, with- 
 out any matured plan, yet the dispositions made were no 
 less complete and masterly than the carefully organized 
 plan of operations which, commencing with the storming 
 of Chapultepee, resulted the next day in the fall of the 
 capital. The whole campaign was characterized by large- 
 ness of view and exactitude of execution. But the heroic 
 element predominated over all others, both in the general 
 and his troops. Without it we could not have succeeded. 
 
 We will close this article by submitting our own views 
 of the causes of the success of the American arms in Mexico. 
 This is necessary in consequence of the erroneous ideas that 
 
104 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 pervade the public mind as to the qualities required, both 
 on the part of soldiers and commanders, to insure success, 
 ideas that Major Ripley's work has rather tended to confirm 
 than to correct. The impression left on the mind of his 
 reader is, that the battles in Mexico were fought and won, 
 simply in consequence of the good conduct of the subordi- 
 nate officers and the men, and that whoever had been in 
 chief command the result would doubtless have been the 
 same. This is totally wrong. Nothing is ever accomplish- 
 ed without a directing head : and in no position #re cool 
 judgment, a large grasp of the whole field of operations, 
 and a will that shall rise superior to partial and timid views, 
 so much needed as in command of an army. Nor is this 
 all. It is a most mistaken idea that a knowledge of what 
 is technically called the military art is alone essential. It 
 is only a subordinate quality. It is impossible to conduct 
 large military operations without the possession of the same 
 civil and adtninistrative qualities, which are required to 
 govern a state or rule an empire. I unhesitatingly refer to 
 the whole history of the world in proof of this. Alexander 
 conquered the world, because in addition to that great soul 
 and that extended knowledge which enabled him to direct 
 his Greeks with such signal skill and success, he was the 
 most consummate statesman of his age. Without the pos- 
 session of the same qualities, Wellington would early have 
 been driven from Spain, and the famous Italian campaigns 
 of Napoleon would yet have to be written. Washington 
 was so eminently fitted to conduct his countrymen through 
 the war of Independence, from his happy blending of civil 
 and military qualities. And this is the secret of the mis- 
 erable failure of many military men, whose reputations, once 
 almost colossal, have long since departed. They have been 
 able to shine on a battle-field, and to exhibit constancy and 
 conduct in the vicissitudes of a campaign, but when risen 
 to high command they have failed, because they knew not 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 105 
 
 how to pacificate a state, to impress law and order upon a 
 people that had succumbed to their arms. 
 
 It was the exceeding good fortune of the American peo- 
 ple, that their chiefs in Mexico were men remarkable for 
 their qualities of administration. Indeed, as regards both 
 Taylor and Scott, it would seem, that the secret of all their 
 successes was to be found in the possession of one quality 
 — judgment. They had the power of grasping and weigh- 
 ing and understanding their whole field. The careful ob- 
 server and thinker cannot fail to see that this large faculty, 
 the growth and fruit of a noble soul and a large intellect, 
 would have caused both to have been distinguished in 
 almost any sphere. They strike us as not particularly mili- 
 tary men, but as having succeeded in their military opera- 
 tions simply in consequence of the application of large fac- 
 ulties in a military direction. 
 
 Whilst, therefore, we insist that the largest element in 
 our success was the able direction of our force, we con- 
 cur with every thing Major Ripley says in praise of the sub- 
 ordinate officers and men. They were worthy of and nobly 
 seconded their chiefs. 
 
 But the statesmen at the head of our government are 
 entitled to a large share of the gratitude of posterity, for 
 these astonishing successes. They had faith in American 
 progress, and in the great destinies in reserve for the Ameri- 
 can people. They entered upon the discharge of their du- 
 ties with the fixed determination to promote the honor and 
 renown of their country. Their whole force was applied to 
 administering the government with entire fidelity to its in- 
 terests, its wants, and the great laws of its progress. They 
 cordially supported our generals in the field, though these 
 generals belonged to the conservative party in politics. The 
 exertions of Gov. Marcy to this effect were not only unspar- 
 ing, but his success was so complete as to make his admin- 
 istration an epoch in the history of the war department. 
 
106 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 No war in our history, no war in English history, has ex- 
 hibited such a union of ability and good faith on the part of 
 the government, whose duty it was to point out the general 
 object to be accomplished and to supply the means, and on 
 the part of the generals, whose duty it was to apply the 
 means to the accomplishment of the desired object. The 
 correspondence of the War Department especially, will com- 
 mand the admiration of all reflecting men, for its unsur- 
 passed ability. We have felt obliged in justice to the truth, 
 to animadvert with some severity upon portions of Marcy's 
 reply to Scott. But to his great ability, his incorruptible 
 integrity, we shall ever bear willing and grateful testi- 
 mony. 
 
 Indeed, as regards the American people, its government 
 and its army, there was but one voice, one hand. With- 
 out this union in sentiment and in action, we could not 
 have achieved so large a measure of success. 
 
 But Mexico too had able leaders, a brave and loyal 
 people. All authority was in the hands of one man. 
 Santa Anna, trained in her war of Independence, and 
 having a large experience in civil duties, was fully equal 
 to the command of a large army, and to the direction of 
 varied and difficult operations. His success in developing 
 and thf'ice re-organizing the resources of his country, after 
 the successive disasters of Monterey, Buena Vista, and 
 Cerro Gordo, are conclusive as to his extended genius for 
 administration. As a strategist he was certainly not infe- 
 rior to either of his great antagonists, and his enemies are 
 compelled to bear witness to his personal conduct on the 
 field of battle. The protracted resistance of Churubusco, 
 and the stern front of Belen and of Cosme, were due to 
 his personal exertions. In defeat and vicissitude, he 
 showed admirable constancy and a heroic spirit. His oc- 
 cupancy of Orazava, after the disaster of Cerro Gordo, his 
 abandonment of civil trusts, and his march upon Puebla, 
 
RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 107 
 
 after having been driven from the valley, remind us of 
 Marius sitting on the ruins of Carthage. 
 
 A critical examination of his whole management of the 
 Mexican war will show that he is deserving the gratitude 
 of his countrymen, and the respect of his antagonists. In 
 the valley of Mexico, the earlier defeats were due to a posi- 
 tive disobedience of his orders by Valencia ; and after the 
 armistice, his only mistake was in offering his flank to our 
 blow at Molino. The defences of the city were arranged 
 with judgment. They were well provided with armaments. 
 The Mexican troops not only thrice outnumbered the 
 American army, but they were brave troops, who fought 
 hopefully for their country, and died manfully at their 
 posts. We must therefore consider another element that 
 was the main cause of our success. 
 
 That element is the disparity of races. We prevailed 
 over the Mexicans for the same reasons that the Greeks 
 conquered Persia. The Persians were brave, high-spirited, 
 proud of their ancient prowess, and confident that they 
 were invincible against a world. Yet the troops prepared 
 by Philip of Macedon prevailed in every encounter, and 
 Alexander died at thirty-two the master of the world. The 
 people of Asia were living on their past renown, and were 
 in the full fruition of the accumulations of past generations. 
 They succumbed to a people having a future which they 
 were resolved to achieve. 
 
 So of the people of Mexico. Their future is in their 
 past. They have neither the spirit of enterprise, nor the 
 individuality of the people of the United States. They 
 have not had our two hundred years of discipline and of 
 culture, in the full enjoyment of regulated liberty. Origi- 
 nally a military despotism, they have sadly fallen away 
 from the stern virtues of the men of Cortez, and still suffer 
 from military license, without receiving the protection 
 which should be guaranteed by military authority. 
 
108 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
 
 The people of the United States, always free, always 
 living under a government of their own choice, have at- 
 tained a development in all the elements that make a 
 people great that has never been approached. They have 
 great destinies before them. We warn our countrymen 
 that in future wars, discipline, skill, conduct, are indis- 
 pensable elements of success. That an army may accom- 
 plish the greatest things, each man must feel that on his 
 single arm rests the victory, yet the whole mass must 
 move as one man. We must surpass the chosen troops of 
 all other powers in all those things which tend to make 
 men effective, as well as in the men themselves. Our 
 military establishments must be cherished, arms be deemed 
 a great and noble profession, improvements be encouraged, 
 and a nucleus be maintained upon which we can rely in 
 time of war. Otherwise we shall be shamefully beaten in 
 our first campaigns with those great powers, with whom 
 we shall one day be brought in collision, in consequence 
 of their endeavoring to obstruct our rapid march to great- 
 ness, and thus injury be done to the honor and glory of our 
 country. At this moment our army organization is much 
 inferior to those of the other great powers. Let our army 
 be cherished, let an organization be effected, based on our 
 own experience, and which shall be the natural product of 
 our own glorious free institutions. It will be superior to 
 all existing organizations, and we shall surpass the world 
 in arms as in arts, in war as well as peace. 
 
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 with Supplement. 8vo., Bheep 5 00 
 
 Supplement to do., separate. 8vo., 
 
 sheep 1 £0 
 
 InP> 
 A PRACTICAL TREATISE UN THE MA- 
 RINE ENGINE. For t'.ie use of Mechanics 
 and Engineers. By Thos. J. Main and Thos. 
 Brown, with American Additions. 8vo., il- 
 lustrated. 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MECHANICS OF 
 NATURE, and of the Source and Modes of 
 Propagation of Natural Motive Powers. By 
 Z. Allen. One vol., Svo 
 
 METALLURGY; Embracing the Elements of 
 Mining Operations, and Analyses of Ores : 
 a full Description of all Smelting and other 
 Operations for the Production of Metuls from 
 the Ores. With numerous Wood Engrav- 
 ings of Machinery, Furnaces, and Apparatus. 
 By Frederick Overman, Author of a Treatise 
 on the Manufacture of Iron, &c. One vol., 
 8vo., of 500 or 600 pages 
 
 H 1 5S 70 
 

 
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