THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR Facts and Documents BY KARL FEDERN AUTHOR OF "DANTE AND HIS TIME," "HISTORY OF CARDINAL MAZARIN," "essays on AMERICAN LITERATURE," ETC. G. W. DILLINGHAM COMPANY PUBLISHERS NEW YORK ^f'l ,^^ 6 Copyright, iqis; by KARL FEDERN Copyright, 191S, by G. W. DILLINGHAM COMPANY TBe Orkitt of the War ©CI.A416661 DEC -I 1915 CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. Introductory Words 5 II. War Preparations 8 III. The Crisis. Russia and the Austro-Serv- ian Question 42 IV. A Digression on the British Blue Book 105 V. The Crisis. England and the Belgian Question 124 App. I. The German Ultimatum 170 " 11. The French Yellow Book ..... 173 I. INTRODUCTORY WORDS These pages have not been written to gratify the passions of nationalism of any kind or to indulge in hatred of hostile countries and na- tions. I believe that if the peoples of civilized countries had correct notions of each other's real disposition and were not misled by interested persons, this fearful war might never have been precipitated. And I fear that an increase of hatred between the civilized nations of the eartK will be its most deplorable result. I have lived in England and France, and have in both these countries very real sympathies. French history and French literature have been the chief subject of my studies and publications for many years, as my readers know: I cannot but love the country and the nation whose spirit has attracted me so far as to make me give my ORIGIN OF THE WAR chief attention to its development. And I am deeply indebted to French scholars for the kind assistance given by them to my work. I have been a member of the Comite for the Rapproche- ment Intellectuel Franco- Allemand ; and as for England, I wrote articles during the Boer war to defend the British point of view, when I was almost alone in my nation to do so. I have for a long time considered English civilization as foremost and the English constitution as a model. I have constantly been pleading for an under- standing between Germany and France and Eng- land as the most advanced nations of Europe. I do not believe in Lord Palmerston's maxim, ''Right or wrong, my country" ; on the contrary, I do believe it to be a most pernicious principle. I trust I may be able to discuss the present situa- tion with calmness and impartiality. From an international viewpoint I have at- tempted to scrutinize as briefly as possible the ORIGIN OF THE WAR facts which led to the war. These facts cover a much larger field than those contained in the multicolored books, particularly the German White Book and the British White Papers, the documents most generally known. IL WAR-PREPARATIONS On the very last day on which postal inter- course between France and Germany seemed pos- sible, I wrote to a dear friend in Paris who is now doing his duty as an officer in the French army, the following words: ''These are days of horrible suspense. The iattitude of the Government as well as that of the public here in Berlin is admirable, very quiet and very resolute; if it is to be war, they will fight with a fury which will be the more terrible, 'for the very reason that they do not desire to fight ! Do not believe what your papers tell you ; I live here and I see: Neither the emperor, nor the Government, nor the people want war; it is Russia who forces them by threatening Austria, their ally. And if the war is to be, Germany will win, do not doubt that; but my heart is op- ORIGIN OF THE WAR pressed by the thought of what a new defeat will mean for France. France will pay for the crime of her statesmen who have made the shameful al- liance with Russia, an alliance contradictory to all that is really great and glorious in French history." I am still convinced that in writing these words I have chanced upon the wound of which Europe is now bleeding. The league of England and France with Rus- sia, the league of the two most advanced, the two most western states of Europe, with the oriental empire whose spirit is directly opposed to theirs, is the most astonishing political fac- tor in this war. Surely, powerful political rea- sons must have induced Western statesmen to forget such an antagonism; considerations of great weight must have covered the abyss which separated the lands of freedom and democracy from the despotic state where hanging, torturing, lo ORIGIN OF THE WAR and political exile are the means of government. Was it a moral or let us rather say a com- pelling political reason, the true interest of their country, which moved French statesmen to con- clude that famous alliance so often deplored by Frenchmen of mark? Or was it the old desire for ''Revanche" for Sedan that made the Re- publican Government give Russian despotism some twenty billions to continue its rule of op- pression over the Poles, Finlanders, Jews, Ru- thenians, and the other subjugated races ? With- out such assistance the political freedom of the Russian people themselves would have made rapid strides/ Was it all in the interest of as- suring the peace of Europe — for this was the official formula of the alliance — that in these last years loans were furnished for the special *See Prince Kropotkin's pamphlet, "The White Terror," and the speech on "The Horrors of Russian Prisons," made by the late Frangois de Pressense, on February 13, 1913, in the "Hotel des Societes Savantes" in Paris. ORIGIN OF THE WAR ii purpose of building strategic railways on the Austrian border? Was it all disinterested pa- triotism, when the French Boulevard Press wrote on behalf of Russia and inflamed the French mind against Germany, systematically reviving that thirst for revenge which was beginning to fade in the new generation? It is an open se- cret that this campaign was headed with par- ticular vigour by the "Matin" after its direc- tor's journey to Russia about two years ago, and that the "Temps,'' seeing the growing influence of the "Matin," attempted to vie with its rival. England, on the other hand, was actuated by the desire to secure the so-called balance of power in Europe, and seeing Germany's rapid growth, tried and succeeded in reconciling France after the "affront" of Fashoda and in making the "Entente Cordiale" with that Power. France and England, however, had been friends and allies before. It was a much bigger 12 ORIGIN OF THE WAR change in England's foreign politics when it be- came the friend of its old formidable opponent in Europe and Asia. How often has war seemed imminent between Russia and England since the English fleet appeared in the ^Egean in 1878, down to 1904, when England's Japanese ally de- feated the Russians in Manchuria, and Russian warships shot at British boats in the North Sea ! The clever monarch, the shrewd politician who caused English politics to veer around to such an extent was King Edward VII. After the period of England's "splendid isolation" he origi- nated a policy if not exactly of alliances yet one of "ententes" and succeeded in forming what Sir Edward Grey chose to call "not an alliance but a diplomatic group"; though the "Entente"- of this "diplomatic group," as everybody is now able to ascertain, has proved more binding and effective than other alliances. Was it Germany who threatened the world's ORIGIN OF THE WAR 13 peace and made this powerful league necessary in order to preserve it? It is true that since her wonderful resurrection from division and decay : — an incredible and incomparable resurrection after the country's having been divided in itself and powerless for ages, the toy of foreign in- fluences, the battle-field of foreign ambitions, — it is true, I say, that since the reconstruction of the Empire in 1871, Germany has constantly risen in power, commerce, industry, — it is true that she has built a great fleet and has gone on organizing a great army. Yet with all her power, with an army which though far from being the biggest, may perhaps be considered the best of the world, with an ever-growing fleet, she has preserved peace for full forty-three years, though occasions for making war on one of her neighbours were not wanting. I ask any man who knows history : Is there in 'the history of Europe the case of a nation which, 14 ORIGIN OF THE WAR after three victorious wars, with an ever-grow- ing population and an ever better organized mili- tary force, did nevertheless keep peace for full forty-three years? When did France remain peaceful under such conditions? She waged war after war whenever she had the power to do so. And Russia ? And England ? How many wars, conquests, expeditions in all parts of the world in the same period! The German colonies were all gained by ami- cable arrangement, as far as civilized nations are concerned, while those of other countries have been almost all conquered by the sword. Even America has obtained possession of the Philip- pines by conquest. Occasions, as I said, were not wanting. If Ger- many considered Russia's power dangerous, what an opportunity for crushing it in 1904, during the Japanese war, when England was bound to assist Japan! If she thought England her rival, ORIGIN OF THE WAR 15 what an occasion during the Boer War, when England was hated all around and by no nation more fiercely than by the French! And yet there are men who dare say that Ger- many, who gave such an example of peace ful- ness, an example unparalleled in history, threat- ened the other nations. But, they say, Germany was a threat by her very existence! And there is a hidden truth in their saying so; though this truth is quite the contrary of that which they intend to convey. The truth is, they chose to consider Germany's existence a threat because they disliked her grow- ing power, her commerce, her riches, her influ- ence, the successful competition of her manufac- tures, her merchants, her ships throughout the world. They saw indeed a threat in all this. But what else does such a feeling imply, what else the numerous expressions of dislike and fear, but that they would have liked to threaten Ger- i6 ORIGIN OF THE WAR many and, waiting for the favorable moment, continued to prepare the world for their plans by crying out: "See how Germany threatens us!'* But Germany constantly increased her army and her fleet! you may say. Has not Russia al- ways had an army greater than the German forces? Has not France devised an immense army of white, black and brown men, and not civilized blacks and browns, as known in the States, but from aboriginal savages? Has not England constantly increased her own fleet? and the other states as well?^ You may perhaps answer : It is true, but they were forced to do so because of Germany's con- * That the German fleet whose constant increase was a special reproach made to Germany by English writers, was too small, has been proved in the present war by its being unable to protect Germany's commerce and her colonies. And surely it will be conceded as a just demand that a nation whose commercial fleet is the second in the world, has the right, as well as the duty, to build a fleet sufficient to protect it. Germany never raised the exorbitant claim that her navy — or for that, neither her army — had to be the biggest in the world as England did. ORIGIN OF THE WAR 17 slant and powerful preparations and her alli- ances. But, Germany and Austria and Italy to- gether — had from the very beginning fewer men, a smaller army, and a much smaller fleet than the Triple Entente, — Besides, the two Empires could count upon Italy only in some very particular cases; and English statesmen knew this very well} The forces of the European armies in March, 19 14, were (according to Capt Rottmann) : Number Army plus number of men on of men in trained peace footing reserve German Army 781,000 4,000,000 Austro-Hungarian 4i4,QQO ^ 3,720,000 Armies of Germany and Aus- tria-Hungary 1,195,000 7,720,000 French Army 900,000 4,600,000 English Army 258,000 730,ooo Russian Army , 1,850,000 7,400,000 Armies of the Triple- War- Entente 3,008,000 force 12,730,000 * Including "Landsturm." *In the "Nineteenth Century and After" of July, 1911, Sir William H. White, late Director of Naval Construction, in an article entitled "The Naval Outlook," stated his "belief that the i8 ORIGIN OF THE WAR This shows clearly that, in March, 19 14, the armies of the Triple-Entente on peace-footing outnumbered those of Germany and Austria- Hungary by nearly 2,000,000; while the war- force of the Triple-Entente outnumbered that of Germany and Austria-Hungary by no less than I 5,000,000!! The most striking fact to be deduced from these figures is that the peace- force of the Triple- Entente, the peace- force which forms the nucleus of every standing army and which forms the regular and most expensive part of war-prep- arations, was nearly three times as big as that of the two central Powers, Germany and Aus- tria-Hungary — a fact which seems almost suffi- cient to prove which side was preparing war against the other ! Italian Navy will never be found arrayed against the British Navy," and he begs it "to be understood that although Italy has been included by him in some hypothetical anti-British com- binations, the assumption is adopted solely for statistical pur- poses." ORIGIN OF THE WAR 19 It is therefore erroneous to believe that these powerful preparations which weighed on Europe, and their constant increase, were due to German politics. Still more erroneous is the notion, wide- spread though it be, that the system of armed peace, that ^'Modern Militarism,'' so to speak, is a German invention. On the contrary, it is a purely French invention. Public opinion is quickly made to forget the origin of an insti- tution, but History does not lose sight of great events. It was Lazare Carnot, member of the '"Comite de Salut Public," who invented the '"levees en masses," the transforming of the whole nation into an immense army. It was Na- poleon who used for his conquests the instrument that the republic had prepared for him and who threatened the whole world by militarising the French nation to the youngest boy who was able to carry arms. Remembering past danger, and desirous of preventing its return, Prussia — and 20 ORIGIN OF THE WAR after the foundation of the Empire, Germany — adopted and perfected the French system. Germany had every reason to adopt this sys- tem. The reader is requested to give one short look at the map. He will see Germany in her central situation, with an open border on every side, without any natural defences, any natural [frontier — with the sole exception of the Austrian border, — ^with a widely stretched coast open fo any aggression, particularly if England were to be among her enemies. The German borderline is long, flat, absolutely open towards Russia. The Vosges mountains which form the French border, are of easy access from the French side. Steep and ragged towards Germany, they form a kind of bulwark only for France. They are, as they have proved in the present war, a con- venient door for inroads into Germany. A single look at the map is sufficient to show ORIGIN OF THE WAR 21 that Germany, unless surrounded by friends and allies, had to maintain an efficient army, if she intended to continue her existence unimpaired. She had a friend, an ally in the south only. In the east, along an unprotected borderline of about a thousand miles in length, her neighbour was immense Russia, with almost double the number of inhabitants, with an army of many millions of men. Nicolas I — the great-grandfather of the present Czar — said as early as 1849 ^^ ^^ French General Lamoriciere: ''If, against my wish and yours, Germany should succeed in becoming a unified state, she will, in order to enjoy her re- gained union, need a man able to do what Na- poleon himself could not accomplish. And if such a man should be born, if the armed mass should become dangerous, it will be incumbent on us, on France and Russia, to subdue her V ^ That ^ Letter of General Lamoriciere to Alexis de Tocqueville, pub- lished in Tocqueville's "Souvenirs," Paris, 1893, p. 383. 22 ORIGIN OF THE WAR was the feeling and the program in Russia in 1849. Nicolas II, the present Czar, concluded the Treaty of Alliance with France which was to realize this program. In addition, Russia was the rival and irreconcilable enemy of Austria, Germany's only reliable friend, — but more of this later. That France was Germany's enemy, that she would have gladly profited by any occasion to humiliate her may be called a truism. I do not believe there is a Frenchman who will deny that France's alliance with Russia was prompted by a desire to regain her two much loved provinces. Whether or not this desire was justifiable from the French standpoint, it was certainly a seri- ous menace to the peace of the German people. And if in English politics such a change took place as to make friends not only with France after having stood at the brink of war with her, but even with Russia, her arch enemy of old, — ORIGIN OF THE WAR 23 there is but one Power against which her policy could be directed. There never existed any doubt about this in the world During all this time the German Empire had not changed its political attitude toward one of the three Powers. As to Russia, an old friend- ship united the two dynasties. Germany gave a signal proof of it in 1904. There was even too much of friendship for Russia, many people felt. Germany never had had a quarrel with Eng- land, never even the thought of a quarrel with her. The Imperial Government remained firm even during the Boer War, when popular feel- ing in Germany — as indeed all over Europe — seemed to demand an intervention, less out of animosity toward England than out of sympathy for the two Dutch republics. As late as August 6, 1914, Mr. Asquith stated in his speech in Par- liament that ''for many years and indeed genera- tions past Germany had been a friendly Power." 24 ORIGIN OF THE WAR The danger that Germany might ever make an aggressive war on England was altogether chi- merical. The fact that Germany accepted the British proposal of keeping the respective num- bers of battleships at the ratio of i6: lO is proof of Germany's attitude. There had been times of tension between Ger- many and France, particularly concerning Mo- rocco, where both Powers had great commercial interests. But the difficulties had been adjusted, certainly not to the disadvantage of France. Moreover, it is a known fact that Germany — foreseeing great danger from other parts — ar- dently wished to reconcile France. There is a most interesting letter from Sir E. Goschen, Brit- ish Ambassador in Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey, — published in the English Blue Book (on page 78, No. 159). While relating his last decisive interview with the German Foreign Secretary on August 4, in which he stated for the second time ORIGIN OF THE WAR 25 that "unless Germany could give the assurance that they would stop their advance in Belgium he should have to demand his passports," the Ambassador states: 'In a short conversation v^hich ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain to get closer to France," After this Sir E. Goschen went to see the Chan- cellor, whom he found "very agitated" ; and who said: "that Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his acces- sion to office, had tumbled down like a house of cards." Now these are statements, which states- men in office would not make, unless 'Very agi- 26 ORIGIN OF THE WAR tated.'' But the change in British politics from diplomatic into warlike moves was overwhelming. Germany had never taken one aggressive step against England, had in fact since the time of the Berlin Congress taken many in her favor. She was satisfied to "have her place in the sun," satisfied to see her own growing industry and commerce, to develop her social legislation, to develop the tendencies of art, music, science, and invention, inborn in the nation. In this development England scented danget to her own prosperity, but instead of rejuve-' nating the inner structure of her Empire on the basis of good old English ideals, she chose the easier way of forming diplomatic alliances with Russia, France, Japan, and Portugal. The result of this war and the development of the next generation will show whether a strengthening of England by these auxiliaries which lay outside ORIGIN OF THE WAR 27 of the Kingdom, was as sound as the consolida- tion of the inner forces of its rival. Germany, ever rising during peace, had no rea- son to risk, by a dangerous v^ar, the great re- sults she had attained. According to this view, they arranged the bias of their politics and made their preparations. Of the nations that encircled Germany by the most powerful league the world has ever seen, it was England's task to increase the sphere of diplo- matic influence, which she succeeded in doing by attaching Japan and Portugal. France organized her 'Jorce noire" ^ Russia in 1912 created the "Balkan-League.'' This league would have added another million of warriors to the army which the powers of the Triple- Entente could have opposed to Germany and ^ A book was published in France in 1908 by an officer, Lt.-Col Mangin, in which the author divulges that, by realizing her plans, France would soon be able to hurl 100,000 Arabs and 40,000 black men into the first battle which would take place at 28 ORIGIN OF THE WAR Austria, had things but gone as was hoped for. One could scarcely attribute it to an excess of caution when, seeing this tremendous array and increase of forces around her, the German Gov- ernment demanded sums for the necessary in- crease of her own defence in the form of the "Wehrheitrag" and at the same time induced Austria to hasten the completion of her much neglected preparations. Yet such was the ef- fect of a clever agitation and of long repeated assertions that all Europe was made to see in this a confirmation of Germany's threatening attitude toward her neighbours, and even clever men credited the legend that France was forced to introduce the very unpopular law of the Three Years' Service as a measure against the results the end of the third week after the declaration of war. The author is fully confident — as early as in 1908 — that the "Allies" of France would hold the Atlantic open for the transportation of that force. The reader may judge how carefully the Anglo- French plans have been prepared, how exactly they have been carried out! ORIGIN OF THE WAR 29 of the German Wehrheitrag} I confess that I would have beheved it myself had I not happened to be in France at the time, where a well-known politician told me that the French bill had been prepared by the war-office two months before any- body had had the least notice of the German plan. It is only to avoid giving annoyance that I am silent about his name. Finally, in the year 191 3, the French Ambas- sador in Petersburg, M. Delcasse, arranged with the Russian Government for a further loan of 2j^ milliards of francs, which sum France was to furnish to Russia in five annual rates for the chief purpose of the construction of strategic railways on the German and Austrian borders. The purpose was openly avowed; the proposed lines were mentioned with every necessary de- * Compare the passage concerning that law in the Note of M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, of March 17, 1913 (French Yellow Book No. i). 30 ORIGIN OF THE WAR tail in the treaty presented to the French Cham- ber, as well as in the bill which was brought before the Duma; the whole matter was dis- cussed for weeks in French papers and reviews of all kinds, but being adopted by Russia and France against Germany, it does not seem to have been considered a threatening step. Quite to the contrary, it was all done in the interest of peace. These were public transactions; others whicH might seem almost still more important were secret, though they did not remain so to the Ger- man Government. In November, 191 2, the Brit- ish Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, and the French Ambassador in London, M. Paul Cambon, exchanged letters of almost literally the same tenor, which ran thus : ORIGIN OF THE WAR 31 Foreign Office, Nov. 22, 19 12. My dear Ambassador, From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and miHtary experts have con- suhed together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the free- dom of either Government to decide at any fu- ture time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consulta- tion between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposi- tion, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war. You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an un- provoked attack by a third power, it might be- come essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other. I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the general 32 ORIGIN OF THE WAR peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act to- gether to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Government would then decide what effect should be given to them. Yours, E. Gre:y. These important documents were not published until September, 1914, but they had come to the knowledge of the German Government as early as in March, 191 3. Formally they were not to "restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force.'' In the English letter it is even carefully stated that the "contingency has not arisen and may never arise"; the omis- sion of the same words in the French Ambas- sador's letter is rather remarkable. But to be- ORIGIN OF THE WAR 33 lieve that, because of these restrictions, the exchange of the two letters was a mere act of international courtesy would be a glaring ab- surdity. Ministers of Great Powers do not write such letters or arrange consultations of military and naval experts without most seriously con- sidering and desiring a future co-operation in war. They could not express their common re- solve in a more binding form without disclosing their plans to the eyes of all the world. A formal treaty would have required the sanction of the English Parliament; the debate would have proven to all the world who was really prepar- ing for war and endangering the peace of Eu- rope. Moreover, it was to be feared that the majority of the English Parliament would refuse to sanction the proceeding of the Government It was Sir Edward Grey's business to prepare English public opinion for the ''contingency that might never arise," and still more to convince 34 ORIGIN OF THE WAR the Parliament of the necessity of co-operation with France when the contingency had come. He could therefore not go further than he did. He remained cautious to the last. He wrote to the British Ambassador in Paris, Sir F. Bertie, on July 31, 1914, when the danger of a general conflagration was imminent: ''I have told the French Ambassador that we should not be jus- tified in giving a definite pledge to intervene in a war at the present moment but that we will certainly consider the situation again directly there is a new development/' (Brit. Blue Book No. 116; French Yellow Book No. no.) An English statesman is a very responsible person, the Commons and Public Opinion are his mas- ters, and he has to manage them carefully in order to make them do his will. The "new de- velopment" could not fail to arrive. Such was the condition of affairs as far as England and France were concerned. Negotia- ORIGIN OF THE WAR 35 tions for bringing about a similar agreement for future military, and more particularly naval, co- operation between England and Russia, began in the spring of 19 14, at the occasion of King George's visit to Paris. It seems that the idea was M. Iswolskij's. It was warmly recommended by Sir Edward Grey in the English Cabinet. On May 26, a conference, presided over by the chief of the Russian Navy Staff, took place in St. Pe- tersburg. This conference came to the conclu- sion that a naval agreement was highly desir- able and that an understanding should be ef- fected between the two navies concerning sig- nals, ciphers, and wireless telegraphy; that both staffs should communicate on all questions of interest, and that strategic co-operation in the case of war should be prepared. Operations of the Russian fleet in the Bosporus, in the Darda- nelles, and in the Mediterranean should be dis- cussed. But the most interesting part of the 36 ORIGIN OF THE WAR plan outlined is the following: England should force as many German ships as possible to re- main in the North-Sea, and to facilitate a Rus- sian invasion of the German coast, the English Government should send as many transport-ships as possible to Russian ports before the begin- ning of maritime operations, that is to say in time of peace. If Sir Edward Grey's policy was not hostile to Germany and a menace to the peace of Eu- rope, what policy may be called hostile and a menace to peace? And if this was not prepar- ing war against Germany, what is preparing war against a country ? It is an extraordinary institution which per- mits a statesman to conclude most important and even fatal "agreements'' with foreign Powers and yet enables him to say in Parliament again and again and even as late as on the third of August, 1914: "1 have assured the House that ORIGIN OF THE WAR 37 if any crisis such as this arose the House of Com- mons should be free to decide what the British attitude should be; that there was no secret en- gagement which the Government could spring upon the House and tell the House that, because they had entered into that engagement, there was an obligation of honour upon the country!" No, indeed, it was not a question of honour, it was all a matter of sagacious management! It was this mode of procedure which caused Mr. Ramsay Macdonald to write in the "Labour Leader": "During the last eight years Sir Ed- ward Grey has been a menace to the peace of Europe and his policy disastrous to England!" while a liberal member of the British Parliament, Mr. Ponsonby, wrote in the ^'Nation" that "he could find Sir Edward Grey's agreements neither right nor reasonable." Sir Edward Grey as a constitutional minister had to employ great diplomacy in his choice of 38 ORIGIN OF THE WAR words. Mr. Sazonof as a Russian minister had an easier task. When asked by a German states- man about the naval agreement — for this time every stage of the negotiations had immediately come to the knowledge of the German Govern- ment, and thanks to French indiscretion even the press had got hints of it — when thus questioned, Mr. Sazonof bluntly answered that "such an agreement only existed in the moon and in the imagination of the 'Berliner TageUattf '' Contrast with these utterances the well-remem- bered speech made by the German Emperor in the London Guildhall; and later in Bremen on March 22, 1905 : ''History has taught me never to aspire to the hollow ideal of a Universal Mon- archy. I have sworn to myself that this thought shall never enter my soul. What has become of all the large empires which were extended over a great part of the world? Alexander the Great, Napoleon, all the great warriors weltered in ORIGIN OF THE WAR 39 blood and at their death left conquered nations which arose at the first occasion. And the Em- pires soon crumbled to pieces. The world-wide Empire of which I dream will come into existence when the new German Empire will be recognized as a quiet, honest, and peaceful neighbour, when it will enjoy the fullest confidence from every side; and if History should ever record a Ger- man Universal Monarchy, a world-wide rule of the Hohenzollern, such rule and such Mon- archy shall not be founded on conquests won by the sword but on the mutual confidence of na- tions striving for the same ends. To express it in the words of the great poet I wish it to be ''Limited in its boundaries, boundless inwardly !" That the monarch, who has now been so un- justly abused by a hostile press, was sincere, that he really gave expression to his inmost thought, is proven by the fact that he has kept his word and stuck to his resolution for full 40 ORIGIN OF THE WAR twenty-six years, in spite of various occasions which might have well drawn him into war. In doing so he has only acted in accordance with the spirit of the nation. Everybody who knows the German nation knows how essentially peace- ful it is by nature. Perhaps, for the very rea- son that it is so slow to be stirred, it is so terrible in war, when once aroused. If any one thing above all others has obtained for the Emperor the love of his subjects, the esteem and well- meaning even of radicals and socialists, it is the fact that he has kept peace for so long a period. Compared with such fundamentals, the war cries of the jingoes, or clever and enthusiastic books on war, written by generals out of service, prove nothing. In the Parliament there was absolutely no war-party at all, and in the Nation the party that advocated war was small to insignificance. It is curious to observe the contrast between William II and Napoleon III, who when he be- ORIGIN OF THE WAR 41 came Emperor of France in 1852 pronoimced the famous words: ''U Empire c'est la paixT and who, only two years later, undertook the Crimean War (1854), made war on Austria in 1859, un- dertook the expedition to Mexico in 1862, the Italian expedition in 1867, and the war against Germany in 1870— all of this in the short eigh- teen years of his reign. III. THE CRISIS RUSSIA AND THE AUSTRO-SERVIAN QUESTION When the diplomatic group which formed the Triple-Entente prepared for the war, they pre- pared for a war on their own terms, that is to say, when the Russian fleet would be recon- structed, the Russian railway completed, the French army perfected and increased by the Three Years' Service, the unity among the Bal- kan Slavs restored, and Turkey — which might be expected to side with Germany — reduced to utter prostration and helplessness. But suddenly the Servian question projected itself as an appalling crisis. It is impossible, nor would it be of importance to speak here at any length of the constant troubles in the Balkans which so often have kept 42 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 43 Europe in tension and in fear of imminent war. Of the four Christian nations which Hve in the Peninsula the Servians and the Roumanians are Austria's neighbours. But the relations between Austria and Servia are much older and have al- ways been incomparably more intimate than those between Austria and Roumania. The border- line between Austria and the two Servian coun- tries, Servia and Montenegro, is more than four hundred miles in length. In the Middle Ages the Servians had repeatedly been rescued from the Turks by Hungarian armies. When they were finally subjugated, in the fifteenth century, a great part of them fled to Hungary and settled there for good, in the two provinces called Bacska and Banat. In later times those who had passed under the Mussulman yoke were again freed by the Austrians under Prince Eugene. In the eigh- teenth century Servia had long been an Aus- trian province. And when reconquered by the 44 ORIGIN OF THE WAR Turks, the Servians repeatedly rose up and wanted to return to Austrian rule, although the Imperial Government was, in those times, scarcely less despotic. The same desire was ex- pressed by them more than once during the nine- teenth century. It was not until then that the rival influence of Russia began to make itself felt. Since that time the Servians were assisted now by the one and now by the other power and finally the inhabitants of the present kingdom recovered their full independence, in 1878, by fighting successfully against the Turks after the latter had been defeated by the Russians and the Roumanians at Plevna. The control of Bosnia and Herzegovina was allotted to Austria-Hun- gary in the same year at the Berlin Congress, remaining nominally under Turkish suzerainty from which it had in reality been freed. In the new kingdom of Servia Austrian influ- ence was soon again predominant and remained ORIGIN OF THE WAR 45 so for many years. When in 1885 the Bulgarians defeated the Servian army at Slivnitza, Austria saved Servia by the threat of an armed inter- vention in her behalf. There v^as, however, a Russophile as well as an Austrophile party in Servia. Russian agents, certainly not for love of their "Servian brethren" but rather from political op- position to Austria — incited the Nationalist party in Servia to strive toward uniting under the same rule the whole territory inhabited by their race. For, only about 3,000,000 Serbo- Croatians, as the race is called, live in the King- dom of Servia, while no less than 5,000,000 live in Austria, Hungary, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. That the Servians of Servia should wish to re- conquer this whole big territory and in this way become the most powerful state in the Peninsula may perhaps be considered quite natural. But certainly it is quite as natural and even much 46 ORIGIN OF THE WAR more natural that Austria should regard such aspiration with disquietude and should refuse to part with five millions of her people, most of whom have lived under her rule for centuries and only a very small number of whom after much secret agitation and more or less secret bribery, would willingly go from her and be in- corporated in the kingdom of "Greater Servia." There is another point of view from which the question is to be regarded and which is never kept in mind by foreign writers — the matter of religion, so much more powerful in those parts than race or nationality can ever become. The 3,000,000 Servians of Servia are almost all Or- thodox^; while of the 3,500,000 Servians who live in Austria and Hungary 2j^ millions are Ro- man Catholics (it is they who call themselves Croatians) and of the 1,500,000 Servians in Bos- *That is to say, members of the Greek Church. They are 3,000,000 or more since the aggrandizement of tlie Kingdom in 1912. ORIGIN OF THE WAR 47 nia and Herzegovina almost two-thirds are either Catholic or Mahometan. Now both Ma- hometans and Catholics look on the Orthodox Servians with abhorrence. They would as soon think of going to perdition as of becoming the countrymen of the ''Servians" ; they have proven their feelings by their fury in the present war. The Catholic Servians, the Croatians, have al- ways been the staunchest adherents and most faithful subjects of the Austrian Dynasty. The oldest Infantry Regiment in the Austrian Army, the 53d Warasdin Regiment, is a Croatian regi- ment, and none has fought so brilliantly in Servia in the present war as this particular regiment. Administration is certainly much better in the Austrian parts than in the Kingdom. Commerce, agriculture, industry are flourishing in quite an- other way in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina than in Servia; justice, public security and of- 48 ORIGIN OF THE WAR ficial integrity are to be found there in a degree unknown in Servia, Let us compare the results attained in Bosnia and Herzegovina which have now been under Austro-Hungarian control for 36 years with the corresponding achievements in the Kingdom, the foundation of which coincides with that of the provinces. We shall find that under an able gov- ernment the progress of Bosnia has been such as could never have been attained in the Kingdom. Though the birth rate has increased in about an equal degree, the increase of Commerce — import and export together, — in Bosnia was, in spite of the smaller population, from 8 milHons of crowns in 1879 to 226 millions in 1906 and 2"]^ milHons in 1910; in Servia from 80 millions in 1879 to 127 millions in 1906 and 204 millions in 19 10. The number of horses in Bosnia in 1879 was 160,- CHDo; in 1895 it had increased to 237,000, while their number in Servia in 1906, that is eleven ORIGIN OF THE WAR 49 years later, amounted to only 172,000 head Neat cattle in Bosnia increased in the same time from 762,000 to 1,417,000 head; in Servia, on the other hand, the number as late as in 1906 was 932,000 head. Bosnia contains thrice the num- ber of goats, many more sheep; only swine are slightly more numerous in Servia. If the amount of cattle in the provinces has since remained more or less stationary, the fact is chiefly owing to the ever increasing export of cattle to the Em- pire. Though Bosnia is a more mountainous and barren country than Servia and though the lat- ter's population is bigger by more than a mil- lion, the railways constructed in Bosnia were 963 km. in length in 1902, while in Servia they measured only 562 km. in 1906. Similar is the proportion as to public roads and highways.^ For the provincial Diet, whose constituencies are di- *It is but fair to state that the division of landed property, the situation of the peasantry, seems better in the Kingdom, owing to special difficulties in the provinces; the redemption of 50 ORIGIN OF THE WAR vided according to religion, as being the decisive distinction in the land, the Catholics elect 30 mem- bers, the Mahometans 42, the Jews i and the Orthodox Servians 54 members, so that there is certainly no injustice done to the Orthodox. I do not mean to say that the Austrian Gov- ernment in treating Servia may never have made a mistake. But where is the Government to be found that never has made a mistake? Par- ticularly in a situation where intricate political and social problems had to be solved, where con- flicting interests — agrarian and commercial — de- manded satisfaction, where national and reli- gious questions had to be settled. How easy in comparison was the task of the Russian diplomatists! Separated from Servia by two interjacent countries — Roumania, and Bulgaria — with no commercial relations to speak the "Kmets," the replacement of tenants by or their change into freeholders in Bosnia is, however, going on at a very progres- sive rate. ORIGIN OF THE WAR 51 of/ no political problem or interest that inter- fered with her own, Russia, distant and uncon- cerned, had in reality no interests at all in Ser- via save those instilled by ambition; her agents therefore had only to bribe, to give promises, and to create difficulties for the Austrian Gov- ernment. Nothing is more easily stirred up in our days than Nationalist- feelings; and though only a small part even of the Orthodox Servians, that is of the minority of Servians living in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Hungary could be misled, the Pan-Servian Propaganda, secretly and even openly encouraged and assisted by the Servian authorities, could not fail to lead to trouble. Servian hostility increased when Austria in 1908 proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia and * Almost all the commerce of Servia is with Austria and Hun- gary; only a small part of the export trade goes to Italy and Egypt; 60 per cent, of imported goods come from Austria, the rest from Germany, France and other countries. 52 ORIGIN OF THE WAR Herzegovina to her Empire, though in doing so it changed only in form what had been an ac- compHshed fact since the Berlin Congress in 1878. The Servian Government protested to the Powers against the annexation as a ''deep injury done to the feelings, interests, and rights of the Servian people." Now it always hurts the "feel- ings and interests" of a person or a people to see a thing definitely put into another man's pos- session which they crave for themselves ; but we are absolutely unable to conceive any right of Servia to possess these provinces, unless it be deduced from the fact that in the Middle Ages — some seven hundred years ago— Servian kings had ruled them and that a small part of the popu- lation are Orthodox Servians to this day. With much the same right Austria could claim a con- siderable part of Switzerland, because in the Mid- dle Ages it had been in her dominion and because ORIGIN OF THE WAR 53 a good part of the population are Germans and Catholics to this day? Austria had been commissioned to occupy the provinces by a European Congress; she had con- quered them by force of arms, not from the Ser- vians, remember, but from the Mahometans, their deadly enemies. She had given the provinces an excellent administration and brought them to a flourishing condition, such as they never had known before; she had reconciled the Mahome- tans living in those provinces and converted them into her most loyal subjects; she had invested immense capital — only a madman could imagine that she would ever give them up again. The annexation was but the official and formal ex- pression of an actual 3tate of things that had lasted since the Berlin Congress. Turkey, of course, had a formal right to protest against the annexation, but never Servia, And as to Turkey, 54 ORIGIN OF THE WAR Austria has since come to an agreement with her upon the subject All this has to be said because in the Intro- duction to the British Blue Book the annexa- tion of Bosnia is mentioned casually and in such a way as to create the impression that great wrong had been done to Servia, while all the real import of the event is carefully passed in silence. The Servians of Servia, however, stirred up by a highly nationalistic propaganda, became deeply incensed by the annexation, and their ir- ritation increased when, after their successes in the Balkan War in 191 2, Austria formally op- posed and prevented their being put into posses- sion of a port on the Adriatic. Everybody will, of course, understand their irritation on that head; yet Austria could not act otherwise with- out grievously damaging herself, so long as Ser- via acted as a vassal-state of Russia, blindly obey- ing the Russian Ambassador's orders. A Ser- ORIGIN OF THE WAR 55 vian port on the Adriatic would have served as a harbour to the fleet of any hostile power that was allied with Russia; the Franco-English fleet would have found in it an excellent point of sup- port in the present war. For this reason Austria could not consent to what she would willingly have granted to Servia if she had not only been her neighbour but also her friend. Under the actual conditions she could as little consent to such an acquisition being made by Servia as the United States could consent to a port near San Francisco being occupied by a power that was absolutely dependent on Japan. Otherwise Aus- tria presented no obstacle to the expansion of Servia, which during the last Balkan war had vastly increased its territory. After the murder of the last King of the house of Obrenovic the Russophile party acquired as- cendency in Belgrade, and the treasonable Pan- Servian agitation in the Austro-Hungarian 56 ORIGIN OF THE WAR provinces began to increase in violence. It may be sufficient to state that a Servian nationalist society in the kingdom, called the ''Narodna Ohrana" with which 762 sharpshooters' com- panies were affiliated, kept two schools in which armed bands — **komitatschis" — were trained in the art of throwing bombs, laying mines, blow- ing up railway-bridges and similar practices. In the paper edited by the "Narodna Ohrand' a "war of extermination'' was preached against Austria as being the "first and greatest enemy of the Servian race," Secret societies in Austria were organized; a particular organisation was founded among Ser- vian students in Austria for the purpose of "liberating the Slavs of the South" ; its statutes proclaimed that "revolution had to be prepared by acts of terrorism." In fact, a series of at- tempts on the life of high Austro-Hungarian of- ficials followed. ORIGIN OF THE WAR 57 On June 8, 1912, the Royal Commissary for Croatia, Baron Cuvaj, was wounded while driv- ing through the streets of Agram, and Councillor von Herwic, who was sitting in the same car, killed by a man called Jukic* The perpetrator of this crime had just returned from Belgrade, where he had been furnished with a bomb and a browning by an officer of the Servian army. On August 18, of the same year, a certain Stefan Dojcic made a similar attempt on the life of Commissary Baron Skerlecz. On May 2, 1913, Jacob Schafer tried to assas- sinate Baron Skerlecz, who in the meantime had been appointed Banus (Governor) of Croatia. Readers are also to bear in mind that the reign- ing King Peter of Servia owes his crown to the murder perpetrated on his predecessor, King Alexander. A certain Bogdan Serajic who had tried to as- sassinate the governor of Bosnia, General Baron 58 ORIGIN OF THE WAR Varesanin, was even glorified in Servian papers as a national hero. Assassination is in fact an established form of political agitation in Servia. In Servian school-books, nay, in the very guide- books which were sold to travellers and which are written in the German language, the Austro- Hungarian provinces are called the "parts of Servia which are not yet freed from the foreign yoke/^ The simplest Austrian students of Ser- vian race who came to visit Belgrade were sure to be received by the Servian Crown-Prince or at least by Servian generals. On the wall of the Servian war-office at Belgrade an allegory is painted representing an armed female on whose shield are written the names of the ''unredeemed" Austrian provinces. The schools in which the above-mentioned banditti were trained for fu- ture armed inroads into Austria were inspected at regular intervals by the President of the ORIGIN OF THE WAR 59 "Narodna Obrana/' the Servian general Boso Jankovic.^ This Pan-Servian movement was a serious danger because it tended to a dismemberment of the Empire and could not but lead to war. There has been a widespread though errone- ous notion in foreign countries that Austria was a state which threatened dissolution and which could not hold together much longer. Nothing could be more false than this idea which has proven one of the great mistakes of Austria's enemies. With all her political dissensions, her national difficulties, the dual monarchy, the Aus- tro-Hungarian Empire, is a unity, bound together by old historical ties and new economic interests, by an administration in most parts excellent, by ^ See depositions of prisoners and witnesses during the trial in Sarajewo, particularly of Misko Jovanovics and Lazar Kranjcsevics, prisoners, examined on October 17; Trifko Krstanovics, witness, examined on October 20; depositions of Lazar Stanarincsics and Dragan Bublic, witnesses, read on Octo- ber 20 and 21. 6o ORIGIN OF THE WAR a national army, and by a deep and universal feeling for the reigning house. The twelve or more races who form the population of the Em- pire are geographically so intermixed that ili would be difficult to sever them. If these races, whose population varies from i^/^ to 9 millions, were made independent, there would be endless internecine war between them. History has or- ganized them in the Austro-Hungarian Mon- archy, and though quarrelling — as parties will do in a country inhabited by a homogeneous popu- lation — they have learnt to understand their common interests, and they are ready to die, nay, they are actually giving their lives by thousands for the Empire that unites them through a com- mon bond. If the Federated Empire of Aus- tro-Hungary did not exist, it would have to be invented and constructed in order to save fli-e population of the fertile regions along the D^jft- ube from eternal war and anarchy. ORIGIN OF THE WAR 6i Suddenly the Pan-Servian movement sprang a ferrible climax; the murder of Sarajevo sent its horrors through the Austro-Hungarian Em- pire, through all the world. In all Servian towns the news of the murder produced public rejoicing: In Belgrade, in Ueskub, in Nisch, people embraced each other in the streets, exclamations of joy were heard in the coffee-houses- The president of the local com- mittee of the Narodna Obrana in Nisch made a speech in which he said : "Servia has been saved by this deed, and one of those who were dan- gerous to her is out of the way. Now Servia will have peace for several years, for the new heir of the Austrian throne will beware of walk- ing in the steps of his predecessor!" (Reports of Austro-Hungarian Consuls, etc. Red Book No. I, 2, 3, 5, lo, End. lo.) The Austrian Government waited till the in- iquiry had proven that the murderers of the Arch- 62 ORIGIN OF THE WAR duke had not only been furnished with bombs ^ and pistols from the Servian State Arsenal at Kragujewac, but also had been instructed in the use of these arms by Servian officers, particu- larly by Major Tankosic; that one of them, Ca- brinowic, the man who threw the bomb at the Archduke's automobile, had had an audience given to him by the Servian Crown-Prince Alex- ander ; that the murderers had been led over the Bosnian border by Servian police officers, etc.^ Only when all this had been proven beyond ^The bombs were of the particular kind of hand-grenades used in the Servian army. ^ One cannot help feeling pity for these poor misled boys who perpetrated the deed, and indignation toward those who cow- ardly thrust them into crime and misery, when one reads the last words which one of them, Nedelko Cabrinowic, uttered at the end of the trial. He said that the idea of murdering the Archduke had not originated in their own minds; that they had been taught in Belgrade to look upon such a deed as noble and beautiful ; that they were all sorry for it, though Gawrilo Princip might choose to take a hero's attitude ; that they had not known that the Archduke had children; that they repented what they had done and implored pardon of the children; that they were no criminals, but had sacrificed themselves for what they be- lieved to be a good cause. ORIGIN OF THE WAR 63 a doubt, only then did the Austrian Government present the well-known ultimatum to Servia, on July 24. Unquestionably by this action absolute submission from Servia was intended. A de- served submission and a necessary one. The English and the Russian Ambassadors at Vi- enna repeatedly said in their telegrams, that they ''thought" or ''had heard" that the German Am- bassador in Vienna, Herr von Tschirschky^^ had advised the Austrian Government to be severe.^ There is, however, not the slightest evidence of the fact that the German Ambassador really did so, at any rate there was no need of such advice. ^In a note of July 22d the French Ambassador, M. Dumaine, declares, without however giving proof of any kind (Yellow Book No. 18), that Herr von Tschirschky expressed his inclina- tion to violent measures against Servia, giving at the same time to understand that his Government were not quite of his opinion. No place nor date being given, the acting French Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Bienvenu-Martin, in a note dated on the following day (Yellow Book No. 20) added — as a piece of evi- dence aflforded by his creative fancy — that Herr von Tschirschky had made utterances of this kind in "the diplomatic circles of Vienna." 64 ORIGIN OF THE WAR Austria had tolerated only too lopf what no other state could or would have tolerated, and she had done so for the sole reason that the old Emperor wished to end his reign in peace. Now things could be tolerated no longer. Indignation was running high at the court, in the church, in the press, through the whole people. There is no nation in the world that would not and has not made war on less provocation. There is no monarchy in the world that would permit the heir-apparent of the throne to be murdered with the guilty connivance of another country's gov- ernment without making war on that country^ un- less the most perfect, the most humble, the most instantaneous atonement was offered. There is no Power in the world that would have tolerated another Power's intercession in such a case. Sup- posing that the Russian Czarewitsch or the Vice- roy of India had been murdered by Afghans with the connivance of the Afghan Court and ORIGIN OF THE WAR 65 Government — I most humbly beg Afghanistan's pardon for the supposition — what would the Rus- sian, what would the English Government have done, what penance, what atonement would they have asked or accepted, especially if the murder had been but the climax of many that had gone before! Would they really have been contented with "concern and regret,'' as Sir Edward Grey proposed Servia ought to express?^ It was a useless task for diplomats to analyze and criticize the answer which the Servian Government gave to the Austrian note, on July 25, and to discuss how far it could be considered as satisfactory or as the basis of further negotiations. It could not be considered at all, because only absolute sub- mission was intended. Moreover, the answer was for the most part evasive. Besides, Servian promises had been given before and had always ^In his note to the British Charge d'Aif aires at Belgrade of July 24, Blue Book No. 12. 66 ORIGIN OF THE WAR proved ineffective and unreliable/ The whole Servian note, even the apparent concessions which it contained, were in fact a mockery; for while it was handed to the Austrian Ambassador in Belgrade, Baron Giesl, at 6 o'clock on July 25, at 3 o'clock on the same day the Servian Gov- ernment had issued the order for general mobili- sation. (Notes of Baron Giesl to Count Berch- told of July 25; of Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff of July 26. Red Book No. 22, 23, 29.) And what nation will accept a few promises to take care in the future if possible, as a satis- faction for the murder of the chief representa- tive of the State, the Heir to the Crown? How *Only one small instance: On July 25 the British Charge d'Affaires at Belgrade, Mr. Crackanthorpe, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey: 'The Servian Government have already arrested the officer referred to in the Austrian note." I have no doubt that Mr. Crackanthorpe had been informed to that effect; but in fact Major Tankosic has never been arrested. He was al- lowed to escape, and later he returned to Belgrade. Afterwards he was severely wounded, fighting in the Servian ranks, and is now lying in a hospital at Nisch. ORIGIN OF THE WAR 67 often have the guns of British warships thun- dered at foreign ports because a British subject's storehouse had been plundered or his bills re- fused ? On July 26y war between Austria and Servia became inevitable. It would have been "lo- calised/' that is to say, it would have remained a war between Austria and Servia but for the in- tervention of Russia. This fact is the nucleus, and at the same time the explanation of the war that is now ruining so many peaceful and flourishing countries ; it is the cause of such immense bloodshed, and it is almost needless to follow the stages of the diplo- matic Calvary that led to the outbreak of the greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen. Servians unsatisfactory reply would never have been given but for the advice of the same persons who had encouraged all the Servian pro- ceedings which led to the final catastrophe. On 68 ORIGIN OF THE WAR the very day on which the Austrian note was com- municated to the Servian Government, July 23, the Crown-Prince-Regent of Servia wrote an im- ploring letter to the Czar. (Published in the Rus- sian Orange Book as No. 10.) We do not know whether the telegram from St. Petersburg with the short and energetic advice "Mobilize ! we are mobilizing also !'' was really sent from St. Peters- burg to Belgrade, or whether it represents only one of those happy historical legends which origi- nate on the spot and, though not absolutely cor- rect, are highly expressive of the actual situa- tion. It is certainly most astonishing that the Rus- sian Orange Book observes an absolute silence on the notes exchanged between the Russian and Servian Governments during the important forty-eight hours which elapsed between the mo- ment of the communication of the Austrian Ul- timatum in Belgrade and the Servian Reply. The ORIGIN OF THE WAR 69 official Russian publication contains nothing bu£ the answer given by the Czar to the Crown-Prince (No. 40), which was not written until July 27^ It is evident that the Russian Government does: not wish to have it known by the public of Eu- rope or America what advice it gave to Servia in those critical days, and its silence is a confes- sion of its guilt. But for Russia's encouragement Servia would have been forced to yield and to give Austria the satisfaction desired; thus might even the war between Austria and Servia have been avoided. That the Russian Government was from the very first considering war against Austria — • which, as it knew, meant war against Germany also — is proven by an important passage in a note from Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey, on July 24 (Brit. Blue Book No. 6), according to which the Ambassador declared to M. Sazonof, as his per- 70 ORIGIN OF THE WAR sonal opinion, that ''an unconditional engagement on the British Government's part to support Rus- sia and France by force of arms was not to be expected." The Ambassador then asked whether, if Austria proceeded to embark on miHtary meas- ures against Servia, it was the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to declare war on Austria? Thereupon M. Sazonof answered that the ''Russian mobilisation would at any rate have to be carried out" and that "a decision would be come to" probably on the next day at a council which the Czar would preside. In his next note, dated July 25 (Bl. B. Note No. 17), the Brit- ish Ambassador says that he expressed the earnest hope that "Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising until Sir Edward Grey had had time to use his influence in favour of peace," whereupon M. Sazonof assured him that "Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced upon her. Austria's ORIGIN OF THE WAR 71 action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Ger- many really wanted war, but her attitude would be decided by ours (the British attitude) . . .'' Sir G. Buchanan concludes with the following words : — ''I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would prob- ably declare war at once. His Excellency re- plied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the sup- port of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany 72 ORIGIN OF THE WAR could restrain Austria I could regard the situa- tion as desperate." This is plain language. It proves several in- teresting things. First that English statesmen in the beginning of the crisis stood aghast at the possible consequences and were not desirous of a general conflict at that moment, while on the contrary Russia was quite resolute now to '"face all the risks of war." The conversation reported in the note proves further that even the Russian Minister, according to his own words, Hid not believe that Germany wanted war, and that even the English Ambassador recognized the necessity which would compel Germany to declare war if Russia mobilised. , When, on July 23, Sir Edward Grey had at- 'tempted to explain to the Austrian Ambassador at London, Count Mensdorff, how terrible the consequences of the ultimatum might be. Count Mensdorff had answered, that "all depended on ORIGIN OF THE WAR 7.I Russia." This was so very clear that even Sir Edward Grey could only give a diplomatic an- swer which said nothing at all. Sir G. Buchanan had stated to M. Sazonof that ''direct British interests in Servia were nil'' ; the same might be said of France; Germany had repeatedly declared that she had no interest there. There was an un- questionable conflict between Austria and Ser- via because the latter had instigated a revolu- tionary movement on Austro-Hungarian terri- tory and had sent out murderers who had killed the heir apparent of the throne. The Austrian Government had declared in the most formal manner that it did not aim at territorial aggran- dizernent in Servia. All this was so very clear that Sir Edward Grey had found nothing to say in answer to Count Mensdorff, and Russian diplo- matists could only note the ''icy indifference'' with which Servian complaints met in English official circles. In fact, the British Ambassador 74 ORIGIN OF THE WAR in Vienna, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, said to Count Berchtold as late as on July 28: ''The English Government have followed the development of the crisis with great interest and wish to assure the Austrian Government that they feel all sym- pathy for their standpoint and perfectly under- stand their griefs against Servia." (Red Book No. 41.) There was at that time nobody in the diplomatic world — or indeed anywhere at all — who did not see and feel that all depended on Rus- sia. When, however, in the course of the next days or rather hours — so quickly the situation de- veloped into a crisis — it became clear that Russia intended to interfere, France and England, her allies, at once altered their view ; things suddenly ceased to depend on Russia, and the responsi- bility was quickly shuffled off to Germany. They found out that Germany was bound to exert an influence upon Austria in order to make her ORIGIN OF THE WAR 75 change her measures as far as they gave dis- pleasure to Russia. On July 24, the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Count Pour tales, informed the Chancellor that M. Sazonof had "indulged in immoderate accusations against Austria and had declared in the most positive way that Russia could by no means permit the Austro-Servian difference to be settled between the two parties alone." (Tel. of July 24, German White Book No. 4.) Thereupon the French Government changed its tone.^ ' In an article in the "Figaro" entitled "Un Faux Allemand," M. Denys Cochin, the well-known Royalist member of the French Chamber of Deputies, declared that the date of Count Pour- tales' telegram, as given in the White Book, must needs be a falsification, the Russian threats having not been uttered until a Russian demand for prolongation of the time-limit in the Aus- trian Ultimatum had been refused by the Austrian Government. He concludes this from the fact that this Russian demand is quoted in the Russian Orange Book (No. 15) as dated July 24. In fact, the falsification — it may, of course, be an error due to Russian inexactness — is to be found in the Russian Orange Book, and M. Denys Cochin is in error in all his statements. The Russian demand for a prolongation of the time-limit was tele- 76 ORIGIN OF THE WAR This change in the attitude of the EngHsh and French Cabinets was very curious and impor- tant. The situation was perfectly clear. If France and England, who had no interests at all at stake in Servia, accepted the Russian view, for the sole reason that Russia was their friend and ally, graphed by the Russian Charge d'Affaires in Vienna, Prince Koudascheff, to Count Berchtold, who had left for Ischl to confer with the Emperor on July 2$. The negative answer, therefore, could not possibly reach the Russian Embassy in Vienna, and still less the Foreign Office at St. Petersburg, until later in the course of the day (July 25), while the Russian threats had been published by the Viennese papers in their morning editions of the same day. It is, therefore, quite evident that the threatening utterances of the Russian Cabinet must needs have been made before and not after the demand for a prorogation of the time-limit, the refusal of which demand they and their French friend now wish to pass off as the cause of their hostile attitude. The attempt to find such an excuse is the more preposterous, as in a note of the French Ambassador at Vienna, M. Dumaine, to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs of July 25 (published in the French Yellow Book as No. 45), not only the real date of the telegrams (two having been sent, one to reach Count Berchtold on his way, and one to Ischl) is stated as being the 25th of July — ^but the confession is added that Prince Kouda- scheff did not expect that his telegrams would have the slightest effect; literally: '7/ n'en attend aucun effet." ORIGIN OF THE WAR 77 why should Germany not be allowed to take the side of her friend and ally Austria, whom she knew, moreover, to be perfectly in the right? Why should she also be bound to accept the views of Russia, who was neither her friend nor her ally and whom she knew to be thoroughly in the wrong? Austria had the greatest interest in a decisive and final solution of the difficulties produced by Servian agitation and assassinations. Austria had been frightfully wronged; if her Government desisted from exacting necessary reparation, Austria would become an object of contempt to the Balkans as well as to her own population. Why then should Germany be bound to give her advice which she must needs know to be bad, and which would never be accepted unless the German Government exerted such pres- sure as to do irreparable harm to her faithful [friend and ally ! It may be that such an estrange- ment between the two central Powers was one of 78 ORIGIN OF THE WAR the objects in view; Russia, at any rate, had been wronged by nobody, no revolutionary agitation in her provinces had been encouraged, no grand- duke had been killed; nobody had asked anything of her but to keep quiet — and because Russia would not keep quiet but chose to threaten with war, Germany was bound to accept the Russian view, and when she refused to do so, her "atti- tude was most alarming !" The demand was the most preposterous that could be imagined. In the Introduction to the British Blue Book it is said: "At this critical moment everything depended on Germany." But not the slightest reason is advanced to prove this statement. The author of the Introduction, who- soever he be, follows up with the words: "As the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said a little later, 'the key of the situation was to be found in Berlin.' " Now this is a repetition of the same phrase but not a proof. Is anything a ORIGIN OF THE WAR 79 truth because a Russian Minister says so?' I think that since the time of old Potemkin the augurs themselves would smile at such a sugges- tion. We ask again: why did everything depend on Germany? Had Germany threatened anybody? Did she refuse to keep quiet, as Russia did ? She only refused to give advice which would be det- rimental to Austria, or to exert pressure on her, just because Russia pleased to desire it. Sir Edward Grey says he confessed that he felt help- less. In the Introduction to the Blue Book he or his deputy who wrote it says that "there was no time to advise Russia." Why was there no time for doing so ? And if there was not time for England to advise Russia, who had not yet fixed any time-limit or come to a final decision, how could there be time for Germany to advise Aus- tin the French Yellow Book the same thing is repeated of «^se,^over and over again, without ever !ny re^nti^ 8o ORIGIN OF THE WAR tria, who had made her final decision and fixed a time-Hmit from which she could not withdraw without making herself ridiculous? I am afraid Sir Edward will have to answer with Sir John Falstaff: ''If reasons were as plenty as black- berries, I would not give a man a reason upon compulsion, I." It may be important to add just here that Ger- many, though refusing to ''put pressure on the authorities at Vienna" — this was literally asked from her by Sir Edward Grey (cf. Brit. Blue Book No. 112) — nevertheless did her best to in- fluence Austria in the direction desired. She not only forwarded the English propositions to the Austrian Foreign Office, but she also did her ut- most to facilitate direct negotiations between the Russian and the Austrian Cabinets; finally the German Emperor appealed to the Czar. The Austrian Red Book contains as No. 44 a note communicated by Count Berchtold to the Aus- ORIGIN OF THE WAR 8ii trian Ambassadors in London, St. Petersburg, Paris and Rome on July 29, informing them of the Austrian Government's being forced to de- cline, much to its regret, the English proposi- tions forwarded to it by the German Ambassa- dor, Herr von Tschirschky; and under No. 47 a note of Count Szapary, Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg, in which he informs Count Berchtold of conciliatory steps taken by the Ger- man Ambassador, Count Pourtales. Proof of Germany's earnestness of effort in this direction is afforded not only by the published notes but by a most unimpeachable witness, the Belgian Charge d' Affaires in St. Petersburg, M. d'Escailles, who wrote to his Government on July 30: "It is undeniable that Germany has tried here (in St. Petersburg) as well as in Vienna to find some expedient to avoid a general war.''^ ' Quoted from a letter which was sent by post to the covered address of "Madame Costermans in Brussels" and which, while traversing Germany, was confiscated by the German authorities 82 ORIGIN OF THE WAR The Introduction to the British Blue Book was of necessity written post festiim. In the notes themselves as collected in the Blue Book this shuffling off of the responsibility from Russia to Germany is evident to all eyes, and all the art employed in arranging them is insufficient to hide it. Some pretext, however, had to be found, an interest of Russia had to be constructed which forced her to interfere. As such an interest did not exist in reality, it had to be founded on a fiction. The fiction was ready at hand. As early as on July 24, Sir Edward Grey had written to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, that "Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Ser- via." The same argument is repeated in several English notes during the following days, and — after hostilities had begun. The envelope, being opened, proved to contain a letter to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. ORIGIN OF THE WAR 83 if I am not mistaken — it was even brought forth in the English House of Parliament. Public opinion in Russia! If public opinion had aught to say in Russia, would the present Government, the whole present system of gov- ernment, exist one day longer? "Russian public opinion'' is a mannikin which is put forth when- ever the Russian Government chooses not to as- sume the responsibility of certain acts, but lifeless and utterly unable to ask for anything of its own accord. Whenever real public opinion in Russia dares to utter wishes which displease the Gov- ernment, the newspaper is suppressed; whenever it dares to lift its voice in meetings, it is trodden down by Cossacks. "Public opinion" in Russia, as quoted by M. Sazonof or by Sir Edward Grey, means newspaper-articles, commanded by the Government or printed by its leave ; it is a thing compelled, not a thing compelling. Sir Edward Grey is, of course, not so ignorant that he would 84 ORIGIN OF THE WAR not be aware of this fact; but the average British newspaper-reader is grossly ignorant of the state of foreign countries, and, knowing public opin- ion to be a real power in his own country, he might easily be made to believe that the Russian Government, however loath to disturb the world's peace, were indeed forced to intercede. Thus the fiction of ''Russian public opinion" is used as a means to deceive English public opinion. There stands, however, behind this fiction an idea, known to all the world and widespread in certain parts of Russian society, an idea that is itself a fiction, a monstrous fiction in European politics. Fictions, as we all know, may be power- ful agents in history, and, as their power is based on their being taken for truths, it is time to show that this fiction is but a dangerous sham. It is the fiction of Pan-Slavism, the fiction that Russia is destined by "divine mission'' to unite all Slavic nations under her kind and beneficent rule. It ORIGIN OF THE WAR 85 was in the name of the Pan-Slavist idea or fiction that Russia felt herself bound to intercede for Servia. Now, if the Pan-Slavist idea were one of love and brotherhood among all Slavs, it should be welcome. However, the so-called Pan- Slavism is in reality but a euphemistic term for the Pan-Russian idea, Pan-Moskovitism. The Slavic nations who have fallen victim to Russia's divine mission, the Poles, the Ukrainians, have felt this fact with vengeance. Hanging, tor- turing, banishment, deprivation of all political rights, fiercest oppression, forbidding of their very language and religion, whipping of men and violation of women by hundreds because they would not turn Orthodox, has been the lot of those blessed with Russian Pan-Slavism. Read the English consuls' reports from Poland which have been published. Ask the Poles, the Ukrain- ians, ask the Russians themselves what they think of their Government. Ask the Poles, the 86 ORIGIN OF THE WAR Circassians, the Georgians, the Fins and what- soever other nation has undergone the horrible fate of being incorporated in the Russian Empire. Russia protect other Slav states and their inde- pendence! Is it not grotesque? Is it not like Medea wishing to adopt other people's children, and alleging the brilliant treatment she gave her own! Let the Russian Government first free its own subjects from constant oppression and from inef- fable suffering before it pretends to liberate other nations ! Let the Czar first keep his oath to re- spect the constitution and independence of Fin- land, before he dare intercede for the indepen- dence of Servia! Let him set free thousands of his own innocent subjects who are dying a slow death in the prisons on the Lake of Ladoga or in the deserts of Siberia before he presumes to protect the ringleaders of the crime that was per- petrated in Sarajewo! ORIGIN OF THE WAR 87 It was by chance that the monstrous treachery which is hiding under the name of the '^Divine Mission" of Russia was unveiled to some of its destined victims and to all the world, — as far as it has eyes to see— during the second Balkan War. The Balkan League had been framed, the Balkan War had been instigated by Russian Di- plomacy. But when the Russian Government saw that the Bulgarians, one of the favoured na- tions set free by Russia, were too victorious, that they threatened to become too strong and to conquer, sooner or later, the Turkish Capital whose possession was coveted by Russia herself, it changed its attitude toward them. All the world looked on with astonishment while the Rus- sian protectors delivered the Bulgarians up into the hands of the Servians, their "brethren" and enemies of old, and even into the hands of those races who were the natural enemies of the Slavic race in the Balkans— the Roumanian and the 88 ORIGIN OF THE WAR Greek. They remained passive spectators of the war in which their beloved "brethren'' butchered and weakened each other and through which Bul- garia in particular was humbled and deprived of the best part of her conquests. This was the true face of Russian Pan-Slavism. The crime, as crimes so often are, was at the same time a blun- der. The Balkan League fell to pieces, and the million of Balkan warriors ceased to number in the calculations of the Triple Entente for the present war. The Bulgarians, betrayed as they were, turned into Austria's and even Turkey's devoted friends. Of the mixed populations of 48 millions which inhabit Austria-Hungary, about 23 millions be- long to the Slavic race. They are more numer- ous than the inhabitants belonging to any other race. In the Austrian Parliament the members elected by them form the majority. There are al- ways two or three ministers of Slavic nationality ORIGIN OF THE WAR 89 in the Austrian cabinet. The murdered Arch- duke had married a lady from an old Slavic house. Generals of Slavic blood are leading th^ Austro-Hungarian armies into battle against the Russians. Even in Hungary where the Slavs form a much smaller percentage of the popula- tion and are not so well treated as in Austria, they still enjoy rights surpassing the boldest dreams of those who live under Russian rule. Almost all the Slav peoples in Austria and Hun- gary may boast of a University where the lectures are given in their own language, where rector, council and professors are of their nationality: — there is a Tschech University in Prague, a Polish University in Krakaw, a Polish and Ruthenian one in Lemberg, a Croatian University in Agram, a Tschech College of Engineering in Briinn, etc. ; that they have their own Latin schools and high schools, not to speak of grammar-schools, is a matter of course. No Slavic nation under Rus- 90 ORIGIN OF THE WAR sian rule enjoys the privilege of having a Uni- versity of her own. At the University of War- saw, the capital of Poland, all the lectures are given in the Russian language, Polish lectures are strictly forbidden ; and the same is the case in all lower schools. Austria might call herself with infinitely more right than Russia, a friend of the Slavic races. Russian Pan-Slavism is but a cover, a smiling mask for the expansion of the Russian empire, for the rapacious desire of making sooner or later a prey of the other nations around her, while it is a matter of perfect indifference to her whether these nations be Slav or German or Finnish or Chinese. This constant tendency of the Russian Empire to expand has become a sort of political axiom. And there are writers, there are historians, who have accepted this axiom and who repeat that it ORIGIN OF THE WAR 91 is a necessity for Russia to expand. This proves again that if there is a person bold enough to state with a certain emphasis the most evident falsehood, other people will repeat it, and after a time it will be accepted as a truth of which there is no further need of proof. Is it because she owns the vastest territory with the thinnest popu- lation ^ that Russia is forced to expand ? Or because in this immense territory there are the vastest stretches of soil not yet cultivated while even those which are devoted to agriculture ^ are far from being reasonably and thoroughly ex- ploited? Or does it seem needful to expand her Government because her administration is most corrupted, oppressive, and incapable? Is it a reason to expand that she has already rendered so many nations the most unhappy on earth? I ^19 inhabitants to the square kilometer (1.3 in the Asiatic possessions) to "jo. in France, 87 in Austria, 120 in Germany. ^2^ 0^ Deacidified using the Bookkeeper proc Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide f3: A^ PreservationTechnologi ^* - h ^ WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVA1 /I. ^.,£^4^ 111 Thomson Park Drive Cranberry Township, PA 16066 (724) 779-2111 •*&£>!.■• " ^ .^ -^ " *" '. ^<^ /^ o V . '^ -ov^'' -:Sm'- -^-^..r .-; JAN 7 9 N. MANCHESTER, INDIANA 46962 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 007 628 978 5