° brilHant second," which William II grandiloquently bestowed on the Foreign Minister of the Dual Mon- archy. The course which Italy was to pursue at the conference was of necessity complex. Bound to the Central Empires in all matters concerning Continental policy, Italy had entered into agree- ments with Great Britain regarding the Mediter- ranean. Furthermore, Italy was bound by a recent understanding^ with France not to oppose French expansion in Morocco, in return for the recognition of Italian pre-eminence in Tripoli. Italy chose to regard her agreements with France and Great Britain iSeep. 116. THE DICTATORSHIP OF GIOLITTI 101 as more important than her alHance with Germany, so that in principle the Itahan delegates supported the French thesis at the conference, and Italy was thus instrumental in bringing about the triumph of France and the exclusion of Germany from Mediter- ranean affairs. The anger of Germany on learning of the independent attitude which Italy had dared to assume in opposing her all-powerful German ally was very great, and for the year following the con- ference in both Berlin and Rome there was an ex- change of official visits, and an endeavour on the part of prominent Triphsts to efface the unpleasant mem- ory of the Algeciras Conference. It was no surprise, therefore, that the Triple Alliance, notwithstanding the fact that it had lost all but formal significance, was not denounced in the summer of 1907, and thus automatically remained in force until 1914. Relations with Austria were far from friendly. In Vienna the conviction was gaining ground that the Itahans could not be relied upon in a crisis, while it was evident to many Italians that the yoke of the alliance with the Dual Monarchy had become un- bearable. Austria, as early as 1904, took steps which could only be interpreted as overtly hostile acts by Italy. Along the Italo-Austrian boundary the Aus- trian General Staff initiated at great cost an elaborate system of fortifications, manned with heavy-cahbre guns. Fresh troops from remote confines of the Haps- burg Empire were now garrisoned here. The Emperor Francis Joseph attended in person the Grand Manoeu- vres held in Tyrol in 1905. In November of the same year the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the Heir Apparent to the throne, the recognised leader of the 102 GREATER ITALY anti-Italian party, approved the vote of a Catholic congress, held under his presidency, in favour of the re-establishment of the temporal power of the Papacy. The advent of a "strong man," Baron von Aehrenthal, in October, 1906, at the Foreign Office, in Vienna, was to put to severe test the cohesive strength of the Triple Affiance. Reverting at first to a more friendly poUcy towards Italy in order to allay Itahan sus- picions, the new Austrian Foreign Minister after a reasonable delay in January, 1908, announced that he had obtained from the Ottoman Government a concession to build a railway across the Sanjak of Novi Bazar, uniting the Bosnian hues with the Vardar road running from Mitrovitza to Salonika. This project aroused the apprehensions of the Italians. The Roman Cabinet was accused of weakness in permitting Austria to upset the status quo in the Bal- kans as stipulated by Article VII of their treaty of affiance. Giolitti, to escape further recriminations, through his Foreign Minister declared that Italy had not given her consent to the Austrian project, but on the contrary favoured the counter-proposal presented by Russia, wffich was to hnk Serbia with the Adriatic. Tffis announcement, as was to be expected, brought about a period of tension between the Austro-Itahan affies, which was only relieved by the energetic in- tervention on the part of Berlin. Yet this episode has a wider significance in that it marks the first active co-operation on the part of Italy and Russia. The friendly relations between the two countries were further strengthened by the visit of M. Isvolsky the Russian Foreign Minister, to the King of Italy at Racconigi, on September 29. Thus a new orientation in Italian foreign policy was inaugurated. THE DICTATORSHIP OF GIOLITTI 103 A week later, on October 5, 1908, Austria pro- claimed the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Giolittian laisser-aller policy in foreign affairs had exposed Italy to so many humiliations, both within and without the Triple Alliance, and guaran- teed so little the security of the Kingdom that the more enlightened elements of the nation were loudly indignant at this fresh affront, by so flagrant a dis- turbance of the status quo in the Balkans, the corner- stone of the alHance with Austria. Popular exaspera- tion reached its culmination in Italy when it was learned that, in spite of the declaration made at Carate the next day, October 6, by M. Tittoni, that "Italy might await events with serenity" — ^words inter- preted to mean that Italy was to receive adequate compensation — instead of the rectification of the Austro-Italian frontier, which was confidently ex- pected, Austria merely agreed to evacuate the San- jak of Novi Bazar which she had formerly policed. In Pome, when the news became generally known, disorders broke out. The Austrian Embassy was as- saulted, the windows smashed, and popular disap- proval was loudly voiced in the Chamber. The in- ternational situation was acute. War, again con- jured up by the Central Empires was menacingly near. For a moment it seemed as though Russia would come to the support of Serbia and protect the interests of the Jugo-Slavs. But the bellicose attitude of Germany, who made Austria's quarrel her own, prevented armed intervention, as neither France nor Great Britain were in a position to act in concert. Once again Italy found herself on the brink of a great European war, in an ambiguous position in which her unnatural alliance with the 104 GREATER ITALY Central Empires placed her. In the midst of the crisis a terrible national calamity overwhelmed the ItaHan people and plunged the country into mourn- ing. On the 28th of December an earthquake of un- precedented intensity destroyed Messina, Reggio di Calabre, and the towns and villages of the surround- ing territory, causing desolation and ruin unequalled in modern times. According to carefully compiled official records 77,283 persons perished. The dis- aster was rendered more terrible by the fact that for twelve hours no help arrived, as all the local author- ities had perished and the few survivors had no means of communicating with the outside world. Sailors from British and Russian battleships, which happened to be in the neighbourhood, were the first to render aid. The King and Queen of Italy arrived soon after- wards and personally took part in the work of salvage and rescue, which continued for two full weeks, while all Italy united in providing for the homeless and destitute. This national disaster had a political influence of no small import to Italy. Distracted from any con- sideration of foreign affairs, Italy for the time being forgot the European crisis, and the Italians from all parts of the peninsula proved the solidarity of the Kingdom in their efforts to help their hapless brethren of Sicily and Calabria. The events of October, 1908, were in the nature of a dress-rehearsal for the great drama, staged by the Central Empires, on which they were to ring up the curtain in August, 1914. In 1908 the Powers, who were later to form the Triple Entente, were not yet THE DICTATORSHIP OF GIOLITTI 105 ready to act in concert to oppose the Pan-German Drang nach Osten. But it was plainly evident that henceforth Italy did not consider herself as part of the Triple AlHance in any campaign of aggression which the Central Empires might see fit to under- take, and that in the event of a European war, such as had been threatened in 1905 and 1908, Italy could be expected to pursue a policy which her best in- terests alone would dictate, regardless of treaty agree- ments. It is not surprising that Austria took full advantage of the circumstances which had rendered Italy help- less. When the Italians were once again able to con- sider their position in international affairs they had to acknowledge that their prestige had suffered greatly at the hands of Austria. By the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 19,696 square miles of territory, with a population of over 1,800,000 inhabitants, was added to the realm of the Hapsburgs. Yet after pro- longed negotiations, Italy was only able to obtain the aboUtion of the privilege granted to Austria by the Treaty of BerHn to pohce Montenegrin waters and the promise of the establishment of an Italian univer- sity at Vienna. Baron Sonnino, speaking in February, 1909, stated: "It behooves the country to recognise that it has lost weight and influence in the world, and to study how best to repair the damage done." The crisis was thus passed, but it left in the hearts of the Italian people the profound conviction that Austria had ridden rough-shod over Italian national aspirations. It was clear to all Italy that, after en- deavouring loyally for nearly thirty years to live on terms of friendship with the Dual Monarchy, the 106 GREATER ITALY solution of their difficulties must of necessity be sought on the field of battle. To prepare for this eventuality- must henceforth be the single purpose of Italy's for- eign relations. In March, 1909, Giolitti dissolved the Chamber, and, notwithstanding the discontent of the country with his foreign policy, by means of coercive measures he was able to control the elec- tions and was returned with a good majority. An era of more careful consideration of Italy's for- eign poHcy is now entered upon. The period of what has come to be known as the "interpenetration of alHances" had begun. Though no official announce- ments were made, and the Triple Affiance remained in force as in the past, the friendship of the Entente Powers was again openly courted. On April 12, 1909, a British squadron visited Genoa. On the 29th, the King and Queen of Italy entertained very cordially King Edward VII and Queen Alexandra at Baia. A fortnight later the German Emperor was received at Brindisi, while the newly appointed German Am- bassador to Italy, M. von Jagow, who was believed in Italy to be strongly pro-Italian, arrived at Rome to counteract the tendency of Italy to ''flirt" with the other Powers, and announced that it was admitted in Italy that "the Triple Affiance is best for the peace of Europe." A month later a delegation of French officers was sent to Italy to take part in the celebrations com- memorating the fiftieth anniversary of the battles of Magenta and Solferino. But the most important visitor of this eventful year was the Tsar of all the Russias. In 1903, Nicholas II had abeady con- templated paying an official visit to Italy, but was prevented from carrying out his project by the op- THE DICTATORSHIP OF GIOLITTI 107 position of Italian Socialists. This opposition had since died down. The Tsar now arrived in Italy, and was received by Victor Emmanuel at Racconigi on October 23. Nicholas II during his journey from Russia to Italy had made it a point carefully to avoid entering Austrian territory. The warmth of his re- ception and the friendly nature of the toasts exchanged was the source of great satisfaction to all Italians, and created a deep impression throughout Europe. In France public opinion was gratified to find that Italy was daily becoming more detached from the Cen- tral Empires. In Austria the news "of the visit of the Tsar was received with marked ill-humour, and in of- ficial circles an excuse was eagerly sought to humiliate Italy for her boldness in daring to initiate an indepen- dent policy. The occasion was not long in arising. Shortly after the Russian Imperial visit, the Vienna Government peremptorily demanded the dismissal from the Itahan army of one of Italy's most distin- guished superior officers, General Asinari di Bernezzo, the commander of an army corps, who, in the course of a speech, in presenting the flag to a body of recruits, remarked that he hoped that they would see it float over the irredente provinces. Italy, in order to keep the peace, complied with the Austrian demand, and on November 11, the general was placed on the re- tired list. Italian national pride was deeply wounded by this summary interference on the part of Aus- tria, and while the Vienna Govermnent gloated over the success of the browbeating which it had ad- ministered to Italy, the incident added fuel to the fire of hatred smouldering in the hearts of the Italian people. 108 GREATER ITALY In December, Giolitti, following his now well- established custom, resigned from office, and in order to give a semblance of reality to the parliamentary system of responsible government, the leader of the Opposition was again called upon to take office. Baron Sonnino accepted the offer, and constituted his Cabinet, but owing to the Giohttian methods of party erosion which had won over nearly all the members of the Chamber, the Opposition represented only 30 members out of a total of 508 Deputies. Baron Sonnino, in spite of his moral courage and good intentions, was, owing to his uncompromising atti- tude, unable to win the good-will of the Chamber. In the face of the hostihty of a majority which frankly despised him, Sonnino's Cabinet could not be expected to survive, and after another brief rule lasting three months, he was overthrown. Giolitti chose as his successor M. Luzzatti, a distinguished authority on finances, who had held a portfolio in previous Cabinets. M. Luzzatti, who was the direct opposite of Baron Sonnino in temperament, desired to please everybody. He promised many reforms, among them universal suffrage, which had been loudly demanded by the Sociahsts, in spite of the fact that GioHtti had de- clared himself opposed to it. However, he succeeded no better than Sonnino in conciliating the Chamber, so that the majority would have eagerly seized the first opportunity to overthrow him but for the fact that Giohtti bade them refrain, as he wished to en- joy a period of rest in the country, freed from the worries of poUtical hfe. The Luzzatti Ministry thus dragged on its feeble existence through the summer and autumn of 1910. No untoward event disturbed THE DICTATORSHIP OF GIOLITTI 109 the even tenor of world affairs. Relations with Aus- tria resumed, outwardly at least, a more friendly course. The Marchese di San Guliano, the new Ital- ian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was imbued with a deep admiration for all things German, made ev- ery endeavour to smooth over the strained relations between Italy and Austria. In August he journeyed to Salzburg to confer with Count Aehrenthal, and later to Ischl to pay his respects to Emperor Francis' Joseph. His visit was promptly returned by the Austrian Foreign Minister. As a result of these visits it was announced that the two countries were in per- fect accord regarding the status quo in the Balkans, and that the maintenance of the Triple Alliance in its full strength and vigour was the ardent wish of its signatories. Meanwhile the discontent of the Cham- ber with the Luzzatti Cabinet was steadily growing. Even the country felt that it was being weakly gov- erned. The crash came in March, 1911. GioHtti, with his usual dexterity, presented himself to all Italy as the man of the hour. He was welcomed by the Chamber and the country as the only man who could not merely rule, but govern. He thus again took up the duties of Premier on March 29, 1911. The question of uni- versal suffrage brought before the country by Luz- zatti in a complicated form was now advocated by Giolitti as zealously as he had hitherto opposed it. He proposed a much broader enfranchisement than had hitherto been considered advisable. At the same time he introduced a bill for the creation of a Government monopoly for life insurance. This latter measure was badly drawn, in flagrant violation of 110 GREATER ITALY existing provisions of the law, so that it amounted almost to a confiscatory measure. These proposals aroused wide-spread opposition in the Lower House. The dictator found that the Chamber, hitherto so docile, was preparing to dispute with its maker the right of sovereignty. Notwithstanding the recalcitrant temper of Parliament, Giolitti stubbornly persisted in forcing the insurance bill through. The discontent of the Deputies increased daily. The despotism of the Giolittian regime was at last beginning to bear fruit. Yet few were found who dared to attack the dictator, for all knew that he might at any time dis- solve the Chamber, and as his electoral machine was still in perfect working order he would see to it that the "rebels" were not returned at the next elections. This was the situation when Parliament rose at the end of June. On July 1, the German gunboat Panther, appeared off Agadir. For a third time within the brief space of five years a European war was threatened by the "mailed-fist" policy of the Central Empires. The Moroccan question had, to all intents and purposes, been settled at the Algeciras Conference, which was further confirmed by the Franco-German convention of 1909. When France was compelled to extend the sphere of her operations in Morocco, Berlin, believing that the opportunity was propitious to reopen the whole question de novo, despatched the Panther, fol- lowed by the cruiser Berlin, to Agadir ostensibly to protect German trading interests in southern Mo- rocco. Once again Great Britain stood shoulder to shoulder iwith France. Germany thereupon (July 15) demanded territorial compensations in Mo- THE DICTATORSHIP OF GIOLITTI 111 rocco itself. This demand was firmly declined by France.^ The Moroccan question, which had been one of the most thorny problems in international politics, was now tending towards a solution, and it was evi- dent that the establishment of a French protectorate over Morocco would not be long delayed. Suddenly Italy remembered the engagements entered into by France and Great Britain regarding Italian rights in TripoH. In the dismal, confused twilight of Italian public opinion, depressed by long years of political servitude and by a system of government which had enfeebled and enslaved even the more vigorous intellects of the community, there flared forth a flame which now burned brightly, illuminating the darkened corners of Italian life and, in its fierce, white heat, sought to amalgamate the struggling elements [of a people en- deavouring to find itself. Such was the mission of Italian nationalism a half century after the founding of the Kingdom as expressed by M. Corradini and the small group which had gathered around him. This newer nationalism was in the nature of a revival of the older, virile spirit which had made the Risor- gimento possible. In the words of its leader i^ "Patriotism is altruistic. Nationalism is egoistic. When we want to express our love for Italy let us say 'our country' (patria); when we wish to aj95rm the power of Italy, let us say 'nation' (nazione)." ^ The matter was finally settled by the Franco-German treaties, signed November 4, 1911. Germany agreed to recognise a French protectorate over Morocco; France ceded to Germany approximately 100,000 square miles of territory in the Congo. 2E. Corradini: "II Nationalismo ItaUano," Treves, Milan, 1914, p. 28. 112 GREATER ITALY To assert the strength and vigour of Italy as a na- tion, to arouse the Itahans to a sense of their position as a World Power, was the chief aim of the nationalist propaganda which was now carried on actively through- out Italy. It was not until 1911 that the new move- ment came out openly with a definite, political programme, and ardently advocated the Tripolitan enterprise. The prospect of the conquest of Tripoli was a concrete fact which could easily be built upon. The propaganda of the Nationalists gained number- less wilHng proselytes. Few Italians recalled the fact that Tripoli belonged to Turkey, and that the Porte at the time ruled over a vast empire potentially pow- erful, the integrity of which was zealously watched over by the Powers. Fewer still concerned themselves with the fact that to assault Turkey, and to wrest from her her last remaining African possessions, would inevitably be the signal for a general assault on the Ottoman Empire, which would upset the balance of power of Europe, on which the peace of the world depended. Even the better informed, who had re- sisted all attempts to drag Italy into a war to redeem the irredente provinces, on the ground that it would lead to a general European conflict, light-heartedly gave their support to the Tripolitan expedition. Many, perhaps, confidently believed that the Porte would offer no armed resistance, and would give way to the pressure of Italian demands. The causes of this change must be sought in the fact that the Italian people, worn out and enervated by the long debilitating rule of Giohtti, were ready to plunge into any enterprise which they thought would simultaneously increase their national wealth THE DICTATORSHIP OF GIOLITTI 113 and strength as a World Power, and bring about a change in government. Above all, Italy through the great expansion of her resources, and the increase in her material wealth, was eager to assert the growth of her power as a nation. A victorious campaign, so the Nationalists believed, alone could proclaim this growth. The clamour for war grew insistently. Many beheved that Giolitti would never dare to undertake a foreign campaign. It was not expected that he would willingly permit Italy to enter into any enter- prise which might jeopardise his hold over Parliament and the country. Already it was whispered that he again would betray the best interests of Italy. Giohtti did not want war, yet he could find no way out of the crisis. His power had been so badly shaken as a result of his attempts to force unpopular measures through the Chamber during the spring session, that the dictator realised that he would be unable to withstand the ever-increasing clamour of public opinion, tutored by the Nationahsts, demand- ing the acquisition of TripoH. TripoU had been promised to Italy by the Powers. The subject had been thrashed out both in and out of Parliament for many years past. The conditions stipulated by the Powers had been fulfilled and, above all, the shadow of the German eagle had spread suddenly over the Tripolitan coastland which all Italians had been brought up to consider their rightful heritage. The time for action had come. Giolitti, after vain at- tempts to resist the popular outcry, unwilling to sur- render his dictatorship, gave way to the demand of the multitude, and led Italy into the Libyan War. CHAPTER VI THE LIBYAN WAR Aims and Aspirations. Account of the Conflict, The War AND After Italian aspirations to a share of the lands of Northern Africa, bordering on the Mediterranean, date back to the chaotic days before unity was achieved. Even as early as 1838, only three years after Tripoli had been declared a Turkish vilayet, Mazzini and other Italian patriots, looking , to the future, asserted that Tripoli must become an Italian colony. In 1866 Bismarck, writing to Mazzini, de- clared : "Italy and France cannot be associated to their common benefit in the Mediterranean. That sea is a heritage which it is impossible to divide among relatives. The empire of the Mediterranean incon- testably belongs to Italy, who possesses there coast- lands twice as long as those of France. Marseilles and Toulon cannot be compared with Genoa, Leg- horn, Naples, Palermo, Ancona, and Venice. The empire of the Mediterranean must be the constant thought of Italy, the objective of her Ministers, the fundamental aim of the Cabinet of Florence." ^ Words pleasant to Italian ears, though obviously intended to embroil Franco-Italian relations. 1 "Politica Segreta ItaKana" (1863-70), Turin, 1881. Published by Diamilla MuUa, Mazzini's secretary. 114 THE LIBYAN WAR 115 When Italy attained to nationhood aimost her first sohcitude was to turn her attention to the North African Uttoral. The severe check to ItaHan am- bitions administered by France in occupying Tunis, made Itahan statesmen all the more determined to gain the control of Tripoli. In 1890 Crispi resolutely set about to secure Italian sovereignty of the Barbary Coast, and by making friends with Hassuna Pasha KaramanH, the direct descendant of the old Tripohtan "Bashaws," took the first decisive step in behalf of Italy. In a communication dated July 25, 1890, Crispi addressed an informal Note to Lord Sahsbury with a view to receiving British sanction to his programme. But Lord Salisbury, while acknowledging that in the event of any change of the status quo in the Mediterranean it was indispensable for Italy to occupy TripoU, stated that the time for such a step had not yet arrived, and he bade Italy wait, adding: "The ItaHan Government will have Tripolitana, but the huntsman to bring down the stag must wait until it comes within the range of his gun, so that even wounded, it will not escape."^ This programme was not followed up by Crispi's successors in office, and the disaster at Adua so damp- ened the colonial ardour of the Itahans that during the years which followed no effort was made openly to press Italy's claim to Tripolitana. However, towards the end of this same year (1896) the Marchese Visconti Venosta, who had taken over the direction of the Foreign Office, entered into an agreement with France regarding the revision of the treaties respect- 1 Crispi: "PoUtica Estera," Treves, Milan, 1912, p. 369. 116 GREATER ITALY ing Tunis, and he pointed out clearly that Italy ex- pected compensations for this step in Tripolitana. Italy, in recognising French sovereignty over Tunis, had opened the road for her own occupation of Tripoli. Tunis was now admittedly for all time the terra perduta for the Italians, while Tripoli had become the terra promessa. In March, 1899, France and Great Britain without informing Italy, signed a treaty defining the spheres of their respective influence in Central Africa, which directly concerned the Tripolitan hinterland. The Italians were thoroughly alarmed. They feared a repetition of the Tunisian fiasco. The Government was unable to give a satisfactory explanation of its policy. The Ministry fell, and the Marchese Visconti Venosta, once again called upon to direct the destinies of the Foreign Office, was able to arrange a detente with France, which later led to definite agreements regarding the recognition of the priority of Italian interests in Tripoli. Thus in 1902 M. Delcasse, at the time French Minister for Foreign Affairs, was able to declare: "In exchange for assurance given by France, not to interfere in Tripolitana, Italy has promised to do nothing which could obstruct French policy in Mo- rocco." From this time onward Tripoli and Morocco were Hnked together in the minds of the Italians, so that it was inevitable that when the Moroccan question should come up for settlement, Italy would press for a solution of the Tripolitan affair. Italian negotiations with Great Britain regarding THE LIBYAN WAR 117 Tripoli are less clear. Questioned concerning the at- titude of England, M. Prinetti, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in May, 1902, replying in the Chamber to the query: "Whether we (Italy) could hope to obtain from England, regarding Tripoli's eastern boundary-line, a declaration identical with that re- ceived from France," stated "Yes, certainly, these same assurances have been given." ^ From 1902 onward, Italy showed that she meant to be faithful to her agreement with France respect- ing Morocco, and in pursuance of this poHcy, at the Algeciras Conference (1906), the Italian delegate voted with France against his ally, Germany, proving conclusively that Italy would not permit the Triple AUiance to stand in the path of her vital interests in the Mediterranean. The Italian Government repeatedly made it evi- dent that they had no desire to force matters. But when the French column marched on Fez, and Ger- many despatched the Panther to Agadir (July 1, 1911), the Itahans were spurred to action. For not only did the liquidation of Moroccan affairs point logically to a solution of the pending Tripolitan question, but in responsible quarters in Italy it was widely beheved that if Italy did not occupy Tripoli, Germany would do so. In recent years Germany had shown a singular interest in Tripolitana. A German Consulate was newly established at Tripoli, and a German line of steamers now made the city a regular port of call; German capital was being invested in local enter- prises, and towards the end of the spring of 1911, the Italians learned that a German group was on the ^ "L'ltalie et la Tripolitaine," Le Correspondant, October 10, 1911. 118 GREATER ITALY eve of securing considerable concessions from the Ottoman Government, which would have given the German interests essential commercial advantages in Tripoli which had hitherto been refused to Italians. The Italian Cabinet understood only too well the methods of German Interessenpolitik, which created political capital out of commercial enterprise. Itahans throughout the peninsula believed that the hour had come for Italy to pursue a vigorous policy in North Africa. The modification of the status quo in the Mediterranean, by French occupation of Morocco, stipulated by Lord Salisbury twenty years before, as a sine qua non, had at last occurred. The assent of the Powers had been secured. Italy, therefore, felt justified in seizing the occasion to vindicate her claims to Tripolitana and Cyrenaica. Italian grievances against Turkish rule in Tripol- itana were numerous. Italians were, so it was alleged, hostilely treated by Turkish officials. The new Young Turk regime had made matters worse rather than better. Insults to the Italian flag; the forcible ab- duction and conversion to Islamism of a young Italian working girl; obstacles to commercial development; obstruction and bad faith were charged.'^ On July 29, 1911, the Italian Government in- structed its representatives abroad that, unless there was an improvement in their relations with Turkey regarding TripoH, Italy would take action. Negotia- tions dragged on. Italy, it cannot be denied, desired no other solution than one which would give her complete control of Tripolitana. The Porte made ^See semiofl&cial statement of Italian case, also Turkish reply. Times, September 30, 1911. THE LIBYAN WAR 119 belated concessions when it was realised that Italy- was in earnest. Wide commercial privileges were suggested. Italy refused these offers. On September 22, an anti-Italian demonstration took place in Con- stantinople. The next day Italian reservists of the class of 1888 were called to the colours. Then the news reached Rome that a Turkish vessel, laden with arms and munitions, was due to arrive at TripoU. On September 25, the Italian Charge 6! Affaires at Constantinople presented an emphatic Note to the Porte, warning Turkey that its attitude was un- friendly, and that the shipment of arms and suppHes to Tripoli at such a time could only be interpreted as a hostile act. Three days later, on September 28, the Italians delivered an ultimatum wherein, after setting forth Italy's grievances, it was stated: ''The Italian Government, therefore, finding itself forced to safeguard its dignity and its interests, has decided to proceed to the military occupation of TripoU and Cyrenaica. This solution is the only one which Italy can accept, and the Italian Government rehes upon the Imperial Government giving such orders as may prevent any opposition on the part of the Ottoman representatives, in order that all neces- sary measures may be effected without difficulty." The Turkish reply to the ultimatum, though con- ciliatory in tone, was not held to be adequate. The ItaUan Government, therefore, announced that: "As the Ottoman Government has not accepted the demand contained in the Italian ultimatum, Italy and Turkey are from this date, September 29, 2.30 p. M., in a state of war." 120 GREATER ITALY The announcement took Europe by surprise. In England the Turks were held to be the victims of Italian greed. ''Only once in the memory of Uving man has any war to such an extent as the present one taken the world by surprise. On September 25, for the first time, we heard that Italy had any serious grievance against Turkey." ^ All shades of English opinion were at the outset unfriendly to Italy, who was looked upon as a wanton aggressor. Yet for the past ten years the Tripolitan question had been continuously discussed in Italy, and for the past nine years Italy's rights in Tripolitana had been agreed to by the Powers, more especially by France and Great Britain. Up to the last moment it was believed at Rome that the Porte would accede to Italian demands, and that the Tripolitan expedition would be in the nature of a 'promenade militaire. On September 28 an Italian squadron proceeded to North African waters. The blockade of the coast of Cyrenaica and Tripol- tana was announced, and Italy notified Turkey that unless within three days Tripoli surrendered, the city would be bombarded. On the morning of October 1 the cable binding Tripoli with the outside world was cut, and the next day the Italian fleet cleared for action. Even then it was not beheved that the Turks would resist. But word was passed that a show of resistance was to be made. Large numbers of the native civilian population fled, and on October 3, at 3.30 p. M., the first Itahan shell struck the old Spanish fort which defends the seaside of Tripoli.^ i"The Tur co-Italian War and Its Problems," by Sir Thomas Bar- clay, Constable, London, 1912, p. 21. 2 For a detailed account of the Italian campaign, see "Italy in North Africa," by W. K. McClurei Constable, London, 1913. THE LIBYAN WAR 121 Two hours later all resistance had been silenced. No troops, however, had arrived from Italy to occupy the town. A sudden change in Italian plans had diverted the first transports from heading for Tripoli to Tobruk, the spot which it was feared Germany had intention of seizing. Time had to be gained until troops could arrive. On October 4 another bombard- ment of the forts took place, and on the next day the Turkish troops having evacuated the city, the Arabs began to pillage the town. It was imperative that the Itahans should land to maintain order. Therefore, a detachment of 1,600 sailors was landed, and the Italian flag hoisted over the city. On October 7 Rear-Admiral Borea Ricci took over the governorship of Tripoli. A large number of sheiks and Arab notables swore al- legiance to the Italian Government; most conspicuous among them was Hassuna Pasha, whose friendship Crispi had gained twenty years before. Without incident the expeditionary force landed, and by October 20, after brief skirmishes, the chief towns of Tripolitana and Cyrenaica: Tripoli, Derna, Homs, and Tobruk were safely in Italian possession. At Benghazi alone did the Italians encounter serious obstacles, but the capital of Cyrenaica also fell into ItaUan hands after a two days' assault. Elsewhere Turkish resistance had been feeble, and in Tripoli order was so speedily estabhshed that the campaign seemed over before it had properly begun. The na- tives seemed to accept Italian rule with equanimity. Three days later, on October 23, came a rude awakening at Tripoli. The Turco-Arab forces had withdrawn to the south and west of the city; their numbers were not definitely known, but they were 122 GREATER ITALY believed to be well over 12,000. At 8 a. m. they began an attack on the Italian intrenched positions to the eastward of the El Hanni plateau. It was soon rumoured that the Italian left had been crushed, and that the Turks were about to enter the town. Panic seized hold of the inhabitants. Suddenly the cry arose: "Death to the Christians." Italian soldiers were attacked with knives and sticks; some shots were fired, and in a moment what seemed to be a serious uprising burst forth. Orders were given to clear the streets, and natives found with weapons in hand were in some cases shot down. Whenever pos- sible the Italian soldiery refrained from extreme measures. The rumour of the Turkish advance proved unfounded, and order was soon restored. On the next day it was deemed advisable to clear out what- ever rebels remained. The work was trying. It re- quired a house-to-house search. Sharp encounters took place between the Italian troops and the Arabs who had hidden in the oasis. "But by the evening of October 27 the task was practically completed. Several thousand Arabs had been brought into Tripoli, and of these some 2,500 were deported to Tremiti and Ustica."^ The Italians had lost heavily; 13 officers and 361 men killed, and 16 officers and 142 men wounded. In quelling this native rising harsh measures were inevitable, but Europe soon rang with the tales of Italian atrocities, of wilful murder of helpless men and women, which would seem altogether unfounded. The opinion of Field-Marshal Lord Roberts on the events in Tripoli as stated in the Times of November 1 McClure: "Italy in North Africa," p. 67. THE LIBYAN WAR 123 29, 1911, is a valuable commentary in extenuation of the Italian action: "It is totally unfair, as we are a friendly nation, to criticise any military measures which the Italian Commander-in-Chief may have found it necessary to put in force, without having access to the informa- tion upon which he acted. As far as can be learnt from the more trustworthy reports that have reached this country, the Italians were suddenly faced with a rising of Arabs in the direct rear of their line of resistance. Such a desperate state of affairs would, in any case, warrant desperate measures to re-establish the equilibrium of battle. Time also was pressing, as the main attack by the Turks and Arabs was im- minent. That the means employed to re-estabhsh what I have called the equilibrium of battle was severe, is doubtless true, but in war it is usually the severest measures that are, in the long run, the most humane. No soldier will put any credence in the reports that women and children were deliberately killed by the Italians, but, doubtless, in the act of clearing hostile villages behind the Italian Hues many innocent people suffered with the guilty. Such things are, unfortunately, inevitable in war. "In no army in the world could the orders which General Caneva found it imperative to issue for the clearance of the Tripoli oasis have been carried out without instances of regrettable severity. The very urgency of the operation alone would necessitate this severity. Only those who have the experience of war in all its phases have the right to judge of the ex- pediency of reprisals, and then only when they have access to the information which was at the time in the possession of the directing staff." It cannot be denied that, after the rising of October 23, the Italians were looked upon with mistrust and 124 GREATER ITALY suspicion by the native population, and their posi- tion became more difficult. On November 5 Tripolitana and Cyrenaica were, by a royal decree, annexed to Italy under the generic nanie of Libya. The work of conquest had not, how- ever, been completed. The Italians held only the main towns along the coast and the territory imme- diately surrounding these. Fighting continued in a desultory fashion throughout the ensuing months, with long periods of inactivity. In Cyrenaica more particularly, Tiu-kish resistance was tenacious. Enver Bey, who at the time of the outbreak of the war was Turkish Military Attache at Berhn, left his post, pro- ceeded to the scene of action, and organised the war- like Arabs into an efficient force which seriously menaced the Italians during the early months of 1912. Desperate fighting took place in the neigh- bourhood of Benghazi, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. It would seem reasonable to lend credence to the report that Turkish resistance to Italy was encouraged and supported by Germany. Von der Goltz Pasha, the chief of the German mihtary mission at Constan- tinople, urged in so far as lay in his power — ^and this was very great — the continuation of the struggle, while the arrival of Enver Bey on the scene, coming directly from Berhn, would in the light of his pro- nounced pro-German sympathies conclusively prove that Germany had a direct interest in making the Tripolitan campaign as burdensome as possible to the Italians. There seems little doubt that the Berlin Government had expected to receive Tobruk for its own uses as a naval base in the Mediterranean, in THE LIBYAN WAR 125 return for its acquiescence in the Italian occupation of Libya. This explains the undue haste of the Ital- ians in occupying this base to the detriment of the broader needs of the campaign. Further than this it is not unreasonable to assume that the Central Empires, no longer able to count on Italian support in the event of a European war, wished to make the campaign of North Africa so arduous as not merely materially to weaken the resources of the Kingdom, but actually to deter the Italians from further miH- tary enterprise for some time to come. The war against Turkey was also carried on in other spheres. At the very outset of hostiUties on September 29 and 30, an ItaUan squadron under the command of the Duke of the Abruzzi attacked and sank two Turkish torpedo-boats off Prevesa in the Adriatic. But Italy was prevented from carrying the war into European Turkey by the vigorous pro- tests of Austria. In November, 1911, Count Aehren- thal, the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Af- fairs, declared that '' Italian action on the Ottoman coasts of European Turkey or the ^Egean Islands could not be permitted, as contrary to Article VII^ of the treaty of alliance." This protest, which Italy could not fail to heed in view of the fact that Ger- ^ This clause, as published in the "Austro-Hungarian Red Book" in May, 1915, reads: "Austria-Hungary and Italy, who have solely in view the mainte- nance, as far as possible, of the territorial statiis quo in the East, engage themselves to use their influence to prevent aU territorial changes which might be disadvantageous to the one or the other of the Powers signatory of the present Treaty. To this end they wiU give reciprocally all information calculated to enlighten each other concerning their own intentions and those of other Powers. Should, however, the case arise that, in the course of events, the maintenance of the status quo 126 GREATER ITALY many let it be known that she fully supported the Austrian thesis, restricted for the time being the scene of operations. Throughout the early months of the campaign Austria had shown herself singularly hostile to Italy. An Italophobe party, which found strong supporters in exalted circles in Vienna, led by the Chief of the Austrian General Staff, Baron Conrad von Hotzen- dorf, asserted in no veiled language that the moment had come to attack Italy, who was daily growing stronger, and at the first opportunity would fall upon the Dual Monarchy. The Austrian Press welcomed the news of Italian difficulties, and gave wide publicity to exaggerated reports emanating from Turkish quarters. Count Aehrenthal, unwilhng to precipitate a conflict with Italy at this time, when the Balkan problem had not been settled and a possible pathway to Salonika still lay open, was able to bring about the temporary retirement of General Conrad, but not before exten- sive military preparations had been effected by Aus- tria along her Italian boundary, which caused deep annoyance to the Italians. The German Press was even more bitter. The Italian expedition was treated as an '^act of piracy," and German statesmen were especially resentful that in the territory of the Balkans or of the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic or the ^Egean Seas becomes impossible, and that, either in consequence of the action of a third Power or for any other reason, Austria-Hungary or Italy should be obliged to change the statics quo for their part by a temporary or permanent occupation, such occupa- tion would only take place after previous agreement between the two Powers, which would have to be based upon the principle of a reciprocal compensation for all territorial or other advantages that either of them might acquire over and above the existing status quo, and would have to satisfy the interests and rightful claims of both parties." THE LIBYAN WAR 127 Italy as a member of the Triple Alliance should have dared to endanger the position of predominance which Germany had acquired in the Ottoman Empire. Of all the European nations France had received with the most fair-minded equanimity the news of the ItaUan advance into Libya. During the early days of the campaign, notwithstanding the efforts of the pohtico-financial Press to discredit the Itahan enterprise, the majority of the French people looked upon the Tripolitan venture as a sequel to their own Moroccan campaign. No untoward incident had marred the friendly relations of the two countries, when, on January 16, 1912, the Italian cruiser Agordat stopped the French mail packet Carthage, bound for Tunis, and took it into Cagliari, the Sardinian port, on the pretext that it was carrying aeroplanes destined for the enemy. This action on the part of the Itahan authorities aroused the anger of the French, who demanded the immediate release of the detained vessel, and public opinion was united in its support of the most energetic measures that the Government might deem necessary to take. Two days later, when the anti-Itahan agitation was at its height, news reached Paris that another French steamer, the Ma- nouha, also bound for Tunis, had been taken, in a similar manner, into custody by the Italians on the ground that 29 Turkish passengers, who were travelling as doctors and nurses of the Turkish Red Crescent, were in reahty Turkish army officials. The French beheved this second incident to be a direct affront to their national dignity. The Government peremptorily demanded the immediate release of the steamers. On January 20 the Carthage and Manouha were al- 128 GREATER ITALY lowed to proceed. The next day the French Govern- ment required the release of the 29 Turkish officials. M. Poincare, then Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, speaking in the Chamber, in answer to a number of violent questions regarding the incident, used what may be termed extremely firm, if not un- friendly, language towards Italy. A week later the affair was Uquidated. Italy was compelled to hand over the Turkish passengers of the Manouha to the French authorities, while it was agreed by both parties to refer the whole matter to The Hague Tribunal.^ This regrettable incident once again, at a critical moment, disturbed Franco-Italian relations when they seemed on the eve of becoming friendly. In Italy the conviction was wide-spread that the Italians had been browbeaten by the French, while in France, what seemed to the French the high-handed policy of Italy in the Mediterranean was keenly resented. The war in Libya dragged on. The Italians were making very slow headway. The cost of the cam- paign now amounting to nearly 1,500,000 lire (£60,- 000) per day was growing burdensome. In Cyrenaica the enemy was still able to put up a strong resistance. Nowhere had the Italians penetrated far into the interior. Though peace rumours had been at various times circulated, it was evident that the Porte did not feel itself beaten, and was unwilling to consider ^ In May, 1913, The Hague Tribunal rendered its decision. It sus- tained the Italian contention that neither incident could be interpreted as an act of intentional hostiUty towards France. No damages were awarded for alleged affront to the French flag. In the case of the Carthage, £6,400 were awarded, while for the detention of the Manouha, only £200 were assessed. This verdict virtually proclaims that ItaUan action was justified. THE LIBYAN WAR 129 the question of surrendering the last Turkish pos- sessions in North Africa. Early in January the Ital- ians gained a victory at sea, when near Kunfida, off the Arabian coast, an Italian cruiser, assisted by two torpedo-boats, sank seven Turkish torpedo-boats and captured an armed yacht. But the Ottoman Government seemed in nowise impressed by reverses, secure in the protection of the Powers and the ban placed on carrying the war into any other than the African zone. On February 27 the Italians, wearied of the inde- cisive nature of the contest, braved the anger of the European Powers, and sank two Turkish ships in the harbour of Beyrout. Italy by this act had once again opened up the Near Eastern Question. Russia, France, and Great Britain expressed grave concern. None were eager to precipitate a crisis in the Near East. Within ten days, Russia, acting in behalf of the Powers, made confidential inquiries at Rome regarding the terms of peace which Italy would be ready to accept. On March 15, the Italian Government formulated its proposals, which included the recognition of Italian sovereignty over Libya. The Porte refused these terms, and the negotiations fell through. Italy had now carried the war into the eastern Mediterranean, and she was soon to prove that she meant to push operations vigorously in this quarter. After due preparations, a month later, on April 18, an imposing Itahan squadron appeared off the entrance of the Dardanelles. The land batteries of the forts of Kum Kaleh and Sedil-Bahr opened fire. The Ital- ian guns soon reduced them to silence. The Ottoman Government became, for the first time, thoroughly 130 GREATER ITALY alarmed. The closing of the Dardanelles was imme- diately ordered, and the chancelleries of Europe were busied with negotiations regarding this event, while Austria threateningly announced that it declined to admit the right of Italy to make an attack on Turkey in Europe, and that further action in this quarter would result in serious consequences. A month later the Dardanelles were reopened for traffic. But the bold course pursued by the Italians was to have a profound repercussion throughout Europe and the Near East. Italy in the face of the protests of Europe had dared to hunt the Turk in his lair. The Near Eastern Question, which for the past thirty years had never been faced since the Congress of Berlin had patched up a makeshift peace in the Balkans, was once again the problem of the hour. The Itahan fleet now cruised unmolested about the ^gean, cutting cables, and shelhng various points both on the mainland and the Turkish Islands. Reahsing that the umbrage of the Powers was not very terrible, the Italians made ready to gain a foot- hold in the JEgean which could not fail to prove useful in the future. On May 4, an Italian expeditionary force landed at the Island of Rhodes, and, overcoming the tenacious resistance of the Turkish garrison, en- tered the city of Rhodes, while the Turks retreated to Psithos, in the interior of the island. Simulta- neously other islands of the Sporades, known as the Dodecanese group, were occupied by the Itahan forces. On May 17 the Turkish troops at Psithos were surrounded, and after a stiff encounter were forced to surrender. By the end of May, Italian rule was firmly estabHshed in the ^Egean Islands, though THE LIBYAN WAR 131 the occupation was reported to be merely tempo- rary. In the meantime a period of renewed activity had been inaugurated in TripoUtana. The ItaHan forces pushed westward and encountered a stubborn re- sistance at Zanzur. The Turks had dug themselves in and strongly fortified their positions about the oasis. Here one of the bloodiest battles of the cam- paign was fought, and though the ItaUans gained a notable success, it was not until three months later, on September 20, that the oasis was occupied. Not- withstanding the torrid summer heat, the Itahans pushed their operations in aU directions. The Arabs, now well organised, put up a plucky fight, but were slowly succumbing to the methodical ItaUan advance. The war in many sectors had settled down to static, trench-warfare, with frequent salHes by the Itahans and fm-ious counter-attacks by the Turco-Arab troops. The Porte at last reahsed that nothing was to be gained by prolonging the conflict. Furthermore, news was reaching Constantinople of efforts which were being made to form a league of the Balkan States, directed against Tm-key. The thunder of the Itahan guns in the iEgean had drifted across the Balkans and aroused the longing of the Serbs, the Greeks, and the Bulgars to emancipate their kinsmen still under Turkish rule. On July 12 secret peace negotiations were initiated at Ouchy, near Lausanne, Switzerland, between Prince Said HaHm, the Turkish representative, and a com- mission of three ItaUan delegates, MM. Bertolini, Fusi- nato, and Volpi. It was evident at once that there seemed httle chance of securing a satisfactory settle- 132 GREATER ITALY ment. The ItaKan Government realised that the only way by which it could hope to attain its de- mands was to push military activities ahead with all possible energy. A week after 'pourparlers had been begun, five Italian torpedo-boats sUpped up the Dardanelles on a raiding expedition which, though a daring enterprise, achieved no tangible advantage. Fighting continued actively in Tripolitana, while the peace negotiations, which had been interrupted, were resumed at Caux between the Itahan delegates and two new Turkish envoys, Naby Bey and Fahreddin Bey. The Italian Government now made permanent arrangements for the governance of Libya. General Caneva, who had been in sole command since the outbreak of the war, after receiving high honours was relieved, and as the principal as well as minor points along the coast were now safely in Italian hands, Libya was divided into two distinct provinces of Cyrenaica and Tripolitana, each having its own governor and separate administration. Through August and September the peace negotia- tions were tortuously pursued. The patience of the ItaUan delegates, their firm resolve to obtain their own terms, contrasted with the indirect ''bluff" of the Turkish envoys, who made desperate attempts to secm-e a more favourable peace. On October 1, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece mobil- ised their forces. Reshid Pasha thereupon arrived in Switzerland from Constantinople with full powers. Eight days later Montenegro declared war on Turkey, and the other States of the Balkan League joined in the war. The position of the Ottoman Empire was critical, assailed by the strong league of Balkan States, THE LIBYAN WAR 133 with the ItaHan war unfinished. The Porte never- theless procrastinated. On October 12 the ItaHan Government forwarded what amounted to an ul- timatum to Turkey, demanding that its terms of peace be accepted within five days, and at the same time the ItaHan fleet was ordered into the iEgean. Thus under pressure, Turkey, on October 16, signed the preHminaries of peace. Two days later the Italian and Turkish plenipotentiaries affixed their signatures to the final draft of the Treaty of Lausanne. By the terms of the treaty Italy acquired the sover- eignty over Tripolitana and Cyrenaica. The Italians engaged to evacuate the Dodecanese as soon as the Turkish officials, both civil and miHtary, had left Libya. In view of the fact that the Turkish Govern- ment had reason to fear that Greece would seize the islands if Italy evacuated them, no steps were taken to carry out this provision, and Italy stiU holds the islands. Wide reHgious freedom was granted by special decree to the populations of Libya, and the complete freedom of worship assured; the name of the Sultan was stiU to be pronounced in public prayers, and the Sultan was to appoint his representative in Libya, who was to look after Mohammedan interests. Thus the war, which had lasted for nearly thirteen months, came to an end. Russia, who throughout the campaign had shown herself friendly to ItaHan interests, immediately recognised ItaHan sovereignty over the conquered provinces, followed by the other Powers, except France, who delayed her recognition for several days; a fact which was widely commented upon at the time. The Turk had been driven out of Africa, and the act of the Italians was a signal for the 134 GREATER ITALY Balkan peoples to unite and drive him "bag and bag- gage out of Europe." Italy had entered the war believing that it would be more of a miUtary promenade than a serious cam- paign. As time passed, and the war became more costly; as the number of casualties increased, and the expenses of the expedition mounted to unprec- edented figures, many Italians expressed concern lest the people become discontented; lest scenes such as were witnessed during the Abyssinian war be re- peated. But the Italian people had progressed greatly since those days. The war in Africa was to show that Itahans of all parts of the peninsula had attained to a sense of national consciousness. The Italian army had undertaken a difficult campaign abroad on a large scale, and had acquitted itself with great credit. The slowness in the operations and a certain timidity of command were due mainly to political reasons. The Government of Giolitti, which had entered upon the war only after much pressure had been brought to bear, constantly dreaded a serious reverse, which might end in an episode such as accompanied the fall of Crispi. Yet when peace with Turkey was finally concluded, Giolitti, speaking in the Chamber on December 3, 1912, could exclaim with truth: "The peace which we have concluded, leaves Italy stronger and more respected; it gives her a great colony in the Mediterranean opposite her own terri- tory; it gives her a mission to perform (and it is not a small matter for a great people to have a mission to perform); it gives her, furthermore, as a great Power, full Hberty of action. With this full Hberty of action in times of difficulty we can provide ef- THE LIBYAN WAR 135 ficaciously for the defense of our interests, and we can at the same time enforce our authority to pro- tect the legitimate interests of other people." The Libyan war up to this time had cost Italy 458,000,000 hre (£18,320,000.)' Notwithstanding the fact that the campaign was difficult and casualties rel- atively very heavy, the Italian people sustained the ordeal with splendid spirit. Nearly 200,000 men had taken part in the fighting, and the patriotism of the Itahan people had brilKantly asserted the growth of soHdarity and unity throughout the length and breadth of the Kingdom. The African campaign had, however, again alienated the friendship of the Powers. The inimical attitude of France after the Carthage incident, the sulky mood of the French people regarding the fait accompli when Itahan sovereignty over Libya was finally acknowl- edged, and the harsh British criticism of Itahan methods and motives, made a strong impression in Italy. For the ItaHans had counted on the support and sympathy of France and Great Britain, with whose approval the Tripolitan campaign had been undertaken. The active opposition of Austria and Germany had not surprised the people of Italy, and made them desirous of freeing themselves from the shackles of the Triple Alliance. But Itahan leaders beheved that the Triple Alliance still served the best interests of peace. Germany was quick to gauge the significance of the dissatisfaction, rife in Italy, with France and Great Britain. To bind Italy more firmly ^ The estimate of the actual total cost of the campaign made in February, 1914, was £46,000,000. 136 GREATER ITALY to the Central Empires it was expedient to proclaim unequivocally the strength of the Triple Alliance. Thus on December 7, 1912, eighteen months before the date of expiration, the Triple Alliance was once again renewed. Italy now entered upon a period of what appeared to be the closest intimacy with Austria-Hungary. Not for many years had there been such a seemingly amicable understanding. Italy supported the Aus- trian contention regarding the inviolability of Al- bania. The Itahan Government agreed to co-operate with the Dual Monarchy to compel Montenegro to evacuate Scutari; an Austro-Itahan Note was handed to Greece, demanding its withdrawal from southern Albania. Yet everywhere Italy was actively safe- guarding her interests, compelhng the Vienna Govern- ment to consider Italian aims. During the spring of 1913 severe fighting continued to take place in Libya, where the Itahans encountered a determined opposition on the part of the Arabs. In Cyrenaica the problem of pacification was ex- tremely difficult, owing to the um'uly nature of the population. Fresh troops were despatched to Africa, and engagements took place intermittently throughout the summer with bands of raiding Arabs. On July 2 the King and Queen of Italy, on their way to pay a visit to the Swedish Court, were enter- tained with much cordiahty by William II and the Empress at Kiel. Though no official communication was made, it was known that at this meeting Itahan interests in Asia Minor were considered. The Italian Press now for the first time discussed Italy's ''Asiatic policy," and three months later it was announced THE LIBYAN WAR 137 that a group of Italian financiers had been granted a concession to build a railway in southwest Asia Minor, from Adalia on the Mediterranean northwest of Cyprus, to a junction point on the Bagdad Railway. Meanwhile, the Italians had established themselves firmly in the Dodecanese. At Rhodes municipal im- provements had been taken rigorously in hand; city lighting and road building had been speedily pushed forward; a good postal-service was estabhshed, and plans were made to open ItaUan schools, in spite of the fact that France, inspired in part by phil-Hellenic motives, expressed grave concern regarding the con- tinuance of the Italian occupation of the islands. Thereupon Sir Edward Grey, on behalf of the Entente Powers, addressed a formal Note to Italy, demanding the evacuation of the islands in accordance with her promise. The Triple Alliance repHed to this Note, on behalf of Italy, though no definite assurances were given regarding evacuation. Thus Italy, who two years before had been satis- fied to play a negative role in world poHtics, sud- denly found herself in a position of doixiinant in- fluence. She had possessed herself of Libya in the face of the opposition of nearly all the Powers; she had matched her strength against Austria; assured the integrity of Montenegro and the neutrality of the Otranto Channel; she had furthered the estab- Hshment of an independent Albanian kingdom, and thus blocked the designs of Serbia to an outlet to the Adriatic, and prevented the expansion of Greece. But if on the surface Italy seemed in agreement with her Austrian ally, many incidents showed how precarious were the foundations of their friendly 138 GREATER ITALY understanding. The Libyan war had aroused afresh the irredentist aspirations of the Itahans, while Aus- tria deUberately chose to continue her anti-Itahan policy in the Adriatic. In August, 1913, at the time when General Caneva, the conqueror of Libya, was paying an official visit to Vienna, orders were issued dismissing all the ItaUan employees of the municipal- ity of Trieste. This intentional affront to Italy could not fail to excite popular indignation throughout the peninsula. The relations between the two countries were further strained when, during this same month, the Vienna Government broached to Italy the project of attacking Serbia, in order to break the rising power of the Serbs (a plan which the Dual Monarchy was to put into execution twelve months later), and re- quested Italian acquiescence to this plan. Rome categorically refused to consider such a project, and warned Count Berchtold that such a policy of aggres- sion could not be undertaken with the consent of Italy. General Conrad von Hotzendorf had been reappointed to the position of Chief of the Austrian General Staff, and there were many indications that the Dual Monarchy proposed at the opportune time to carry out its Balkan poUcy, relying only on the support of Germany. Giolitti, who had been in office during these event- ful years, took unto himself the full credit of the vic- torious TripoUtan war and the successful peace. He had renewed the Triple Alliance, and Affirmed the important position of Italy in European affairs. In October, 1913, the universal suffrage law which he had decreed was put to test. The number of voters had been raised from three million to eight million, yet THE LIBYAN WAR 139 so well did the dictator control the situation, that the elections resulted in an overwhelming majority for himself. Nevertheless, five months later, in March, 1914, Giohtti retired from office. There was no ap- parent reason for his retirement except that, as was his custom, he withdrew for the time being from pubhc affairs in order that his successor should grapple with the difficulties arising out of his own administration, or rather maladministration, which could no longer be staved off. Thus after a dictatorship lasting eleven years and four months Giolitti, still the most power- ful personage in Italian public affairs, retired to private Hfe to watch and wait for an opportune moment to return to power. During the decade of his "regency," he had cor- rupted the poHtical life of Italy; he had demoralised Parliament by his methods of party-erosion so that no vigorous opposition remained. He had blotted out party fines so that though there were groups, there were no real parties. He had been a Liberal and then turned Conservative, and even semi-Clerical. He had adopted the programmes and policy which seemed most likely to succeed, and taken unto him- self the credit thereof. He left office with the finances of the country compromised, its foreign policy obscure, and the subversive forces of the State strengthened. Notwithstanding the demoralised state of Itafian political life, the resilient strength of the Italian people was soon to reassert itself. Giolitti's hold on the country was wide-spread but had nowhere taken deep root. It had undermined, but not sapped, the vitality of the country. So that when, during the great up- heaval that was to come in May, 1915, Giolitti en- 140 GREATER ITALY deavoured to oppose the will of the nation, he was swept aside by the mighty current of popular opinion, by the sacred desire of the Italian people to fulfil their manifest destiny. CHAPTER VII ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Social and Vital Statistics. Industrial and Commercial Expansion. Colonial Dominions The fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Kingdom was celebrated in 1911 throughout Italy, with appropriate ceremonies. In Rome the vast monument to King Victor Emmanuel II was un- veiled. Covering the greater part of the slope of the Capitoline Hill, facing the Corso, glitteringly new, of white marble with the equestrian statue of the King in gilt bronze, it symbolised characteristically ItaUan aspirations for expansion and world power, and represented the achievement of United Italy under the leadership of the House of Savoy. No other monument in Italy since the days of the Rome of the Caesars had been undertaken on such a grandiose scale. Aside from any discussion of its artistic merit, it proclaimed significantly the Italian craving for "bigness," and was a forceful assertion of the unity of the nation. In Turin, the home of the Piedmontese Kings, an international industrial exhibition was held, which showed to the world for the first time the giant strides of Italian economic development. The statistics, carefully compiled at this time, afford a gHmpse of the position of present-day Italy in the affairs of the world, and bring home the saHent features of Italian growth and expansion. 141 142 GREATER ITALY The area of the Kingdom of Italy, including Sicily and Sardinia, is 110,623 square miles. According to the census, taken in the Jubilee year (June 10, 1911), the population amounted to 34,686,683 inhabitants, as compared with only 28,801,154 in 1871, which is an increase of nearly 23 per 100. When it is taken into consideration that during this period over five and a half million Italians have emigrated, and still retained their Italian nationality, the figures here given are representative of a vast growth in population well over 50.1 per 100, which Russia (103.4 per 100) and Germany (58.1 per 100) alone of European na- tions have outdistanced during the same period. Com- pared with the growth of the other great Latin State of Europe, France, whose increase of population during this half century has only been 9.7 per 100, it would seem probable that within a very brief space of time the population of Italy will be greater than that of France, which in 1911 had 39,601,500 inhabitants,^ and is now reported as stationary or even declining. In examining the records of Itahan vital statistics, marked improvement is everywhere met with. Italy to-day occupies third place among European nations in point of natural increase of her population, as against fifth in 1871. Though her birth-rate has declined in common with that of the rest of Europe, (32.4 per 1,000 inhabitants), only Russia and Hun- gary can show a better record. For many years Italy had almost the highest death- ^ The Italian population in Europe, not incorporated in the Kingdom of Italy, is estimated at 2,495,549, occupying a territory of approxi- mately 23,288 square miles, distributed as follows: Monaco, 19,121; Switzerland, 171,166; Malta, 228,442; France (Nice and Corsica), 536,820; Austria, 1,540,000. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 143 rate in Europe. To-day, by great amelioration in the sanitary condition of the population, not merely in the cities, but more especially in the rural dis- tricts, the ratio of mortality has been materially re- duced. The manner in which malaria, which as re- cently as 1900 still averaged as high as 31 per 100 of the population in the contaminated districts of the Maremma, was reduced to only 2 per 100 in 1908, and pellagra, which in 1881 totalled 104,000 cases, and notwithstanding the insidious character of the disease was reduced by over two-thirds, are fair ex- amples of the advance made in stamping out prevent- able disease in Italy. However, the death-rate in Italy is still higher than in the other chief European States, varying between 19.6 to 21.9 per 1,000, as compared with Great Britain (14.8), France (17.98). The excess of births over deaths in 1911 in Italy amounted to 350,734 or 10.1 per 1,000. The principal cause of this relatively small in- crease in population, notwithstanding the fecundity of the race, is emigration. Bad crops, low wages, bad housing conditions in the south of Italy, the desire to improve their economic status, and the ex- ample of so many successful emigrants who have re- turned home prosperous after a few years abroad are the chief causes of emigration. For a long period these able-bodied young Itahans, who had gone forth into the world to earn a Hvelihood, owing to the short-sighted policy of the Government, which endeavoured to obstruct emigration, found themselves abandoned to their own resources. This is no longer the case. The Italian Government now reaUses that this great stream of emigrants is not merely a means 144 GREATER ITALY of propagating Italian influence in the less populous districts of the New World, more particularly in South America, but that it is the source of an ever- increasing income, which has begun to flow into Ital- ian coffers from abroad. Moreover, many of those who have emigrated in poverty, return to Italy to enjoy the fruits of their hard- won fortunes, bringing with them modern ideas and influences, which has done much to rouse the peasantry of the South from its apathy. From 135,832 emigrants who left Italy in 1881, when the tide of emigration set in, the figures have risen until they reached the astonishing total of 872,598 in 1913. Of these 313,032 emigrated to Em-opean or Mediterranean countries, while 407,475 set out for the United States and Canada, and 145,- 702 for the Argentine Republic and the other South American States. The number of ItaHan emigrants who returned to Italy during this year, numbered 188,978. According to the official pubhcation, An- nuario Statistico Italiano (1913), the number of Ital- ians resident abroad mmibered 5,557,746. In recent years, these Italian emigrants, living abroad, have remitted annually important sums of money to their relatives and famihes who have remained in Italy. According to computation made of the postal money- orders received in Italy from emigrants abroad, these amounted to nearly £5,000,000 in 1913 from this one source, and showed an increase of £1,360,000 since 1906. Sixty per cent of the population of Italy are en- gaged in agriculture. Though the trend towards in- dustrial pursuits is increasing, agriculture in its varied forms still remains the foundation of the nation's ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 145 wealth. The total value of the whole agricultural produce in 1910 was estimated at £28,000,000. Great efforts are being made to increase the productivity of the soil by the use of carefully selected fertilisers. The vineyards are now the subject of scientific atten- tion, and greater care is being paid to the quahty of the wines. Mechanical implements are being in- troduced, and in certain regions in the northern dis- tricts, more particularly in Emilia, where co-operative methods are much in vogue, the initiative and im- provements introduced in dairy-farming and in the making of cheese, butter, etc., have been widely copied abroad. These co-operative societies, which have sprung up everywhere in the north of Italy, are spread- ing rapidly and have proved themselves eminently successful, contributing much to the prosperity of Italy. ^ Rural credit banks to help the farmers with loans, agrarian unions, and Government travelhng teachers of agriculture, who visit every district to instruct the farmers in the most approved and modern methods of carrying on their particular type of farm- ing, have multiplied. The case of the South is different, the conditions there are still far from satisfactory. The appalhng poverty of the people — a man's wages are often not more than 6d. a day — ^is here the chief incentive to emigration, as a way out of an unbearable situation. Vast estates, absent landlordism, and all the evils of a defective agrarian system, have for so long been the rule, that the progress that is being made has as yet borne but little fruit. ^ In 1910 there were 5,064 co-operative societies, and the returns from 4,222 showed 817,529 members. 146 GREATER ITALY Though Italy is not a country of mineral wealth, the output of her mines in 1910 was valued at £3,210,000. Owing to the fall in the price of sulphur, the output of the SiciHan sulphur mines, which two decades ago was of great importance, has materially decreased, whereas the tonnage of iron has increased greatly, amounting to 551,000 in 1910. Copper, zinc, and lead were also mined in small quantities. The value of the products of the rock quarries, travertine, marble, etc., has increased to approximately £2,000,000. Italy produces only about one-twelfth (562,000 tons in 1910) the amount of coal which is annually consumed there, and though this has in a measure retarded her industrial development, it has encouraged her en- gineers to seek methods of emancipating Italy from the need of coal. It has been conservatively estimated that the streams and rivers of Italy could furnish her with over 5,000,000 horse-power. According to recent reports (1914), 968,100 electrical horse-power were in operation. Italy thus leads all Europe, and is second only to the United States in this field. The first electrified railway to be successfully operated in Eu- rope was inaugurated in 1890 on the line between Florence and Fiesole, and the work of electrification has been steadily extended. A direct electric line from Rome to Naples, a distance of 120 miles, is near- ing completion, and it is hoped that eventually the entire railway system of the peninsula will be operated exclusively by electricity. Notwithstanding the high price of coal in Italy, industrial progress has been steady. According to the census taken in 1911, 2,305,720 persons were en- gaged in industrial labour, of whom one-fourth were in Lombardy. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 147 Whereas very little pig-iron was produced in Italy as recently as 1900, and the production was only seriously undertaken within the present decade, the output, 353,000 tons (1910), was nearly threefold as great as when the census was taken four years before; while in the same four-year period the output of WTOught-iron increased from 237,000 to 311,000, and steel from 333,000 to 670,000 tons. During this period the value of the products of chemical industries increased from £4,093,000 to £6,001,000. The textile industries also developed most rapidly. The pro- duction of raw silk has more than tripled since 1875, while the value of silk and woven silk products ex- ported in 1911 is estimated at close to £18,000,000, so that Milan now rivals Lyons as the centre of the silk trade of the world. Cotton-mills have sprung up everywhere in northern Italy, and Itahan cotton fabrics were already competing in foreign markets, the exports to Turkey alone amounting to over 10,000 tons, while the value of cotton exports totalled (1911) £7,320,000. The beet-sugar industry shows an equal expansion. In 1899 only 5,972 tons were produced, while the figures for the production eleven years later are 173,184 tons, besides 62,700 tons of syrups and molasses. Italy supplies nearly one-third of the total world consumption of ohve-oil, her exports (1911) in this article amounting to £1,800,000. The Italian automobile industry has won for itself a position of creditable pre-eminence, and the export of Itahan automobiles, though numerically small, were valued at £1,100,000. Italy was a late comer in world markets, yet the figures of her commercial development are amazing. In 1910 imports into Italy, excluding precious metals. 148 GREATER ITALY amounted to £129,839,039, and her exports during this year were valued at £83,199,095. "It was cal- culated that between 1898 and 1910, Italian imports had risen 143 per cent, and her exports 124 per cent — increases which surpass those of all other countries except the exportation figiu"es of the United States." ^ Italy's chief imports are cereals, raw cotton, coal, chemical products, machinery, and wood. Her chief exports are silk, cotton and silk goods, fruits, wine, and agricultural produce. Exclusive of coal, which came chiefly from Great Britain, and raw cotton from the United States, Germany, as was to be expected from her position of control over Italian markets, fm-nished Italy with nearly one-foiu-th of her total imports; while Germany was Italy's best customer, ItaUan exports to Germany being nearly £4,000,000 greater than to the next best customer, the United States, with Great Britain third on the list, in 1911.^ As in other fields, the increase in Itahan maritime trade has been important. The number of ships which entered and cleared Italian ports in 1910 was 312,689, with a tonnage of 102,390,908 as compared with only 32,070,704 tons in 1881, while the Itahan mercantile marine numbered 680 steamships, with a tonnage of about 630,000, and 4,723 saihng ships of approximately 440,000 tons. Naples is now the first port of Italy, and has shown the extraordinary increase of nearly 50 per cent in tonnage in the four-year period 1906-10. The harbour facilities have been greatly extended, and 1 The " Britannica Year Book," 1913, p. 1045. 2 For the year 1914, that is, before Italian participation in the Euro- pean War, the imports from Great Britain to Italy exceeded those of any other country. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 149 large sums have been voted for harbour improvements. Genoa, long the most important port in Italy, has now taken second place. The congestion of traffic at Genoa and the difficulty of increasing dockage facilities have hampered its growth. Venice is Italy's third mercantile port, though Palermo is competing strongly and has already won third place in passenger traffic. The total mileage of railways in 1907 amounted to 10,368, and there have been few new hnes opened, though a certain amount of doubling of existing Hnes has taken place. ItaHan railways have passed through many vicissitudes. At the outset, built and operated by the State, they were, in 1885 turned over to private corporations, and then repurchased by the State in 1905. The value of ItaHan railways in 1911 was estimated at £295,500,000 and the profits at £6,000,- 000. There has been much improvement in adminis- tration in recent years, and great efforts are being made to bring the passenger traffic up to the level of that of the chief European States. Steam and electric tramways have a mileage of 3,018, while motor-onmibus service is steadily being extended through rural districts not tapped by the railways, and over 2,000 miles of highroad were thus under operation. The motor Hnes receive subvention from the Government. The number of post-offices in Italy in 1910 was 10,238, while the number of letters handled increased by 600,000,000 between 1906 and 1912. There were 8,147 telegraph offices in 1912, as compared with only 1,930 eight years before. The figures for 1912 include 22 wireless stations. The development of the tele- 150 GREATER ITALY ^ phone system has been even more rapid. In 1904 there were only 92 urban and 66 interurban systems, while by 1910 there were 219 urban and 426 inter- urban systems, and the expansion continues steadily. The great economic development during the past two decades has brought Italy up from the rank of a ''poor" country, to which she was long confined, to that of a nation of ever-increasing wealth and well- being. The North of Italy is one of the most prosperous regions of Europe, and if the total of Italian wealth is still much below that of the other Great Powers its increase has been considerable. According to esti- mates of an ItaHan economist, the private wealth of the nation is estimated at over eighty milhard lire,^ nearly three and a fifth thousand millions sterling or about £90 per capita. This amount is an estimated increase of a thousand milhon sterling in a decade. These figures are of necessity only approximate, and a more accurate insight into the increasing wealth of Italy is gained by looking into the condition of the savings-banks. In 1901 the total deposits in the savings-banks, credit banks, and other similar insti- tutions, averaged about £3-4-0 per head. At the end of 1910 these deposits had increased to £6-3-0 or nearly 50 per cent, in the nine-year period, and the total amounts thus deposited were £214,500,000. To this figure must be added £74,000,000 in the postal savings-bank, and £98,000,000 in savings in ordinary banks. During the early years of Italy's existence as a united Kingdom, her financial position was precarious. ^Prinzivalli: "L'ltalia nella sua Vita Economica," Treves, Milan, 1915, p. 66. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 151 The new State had inherited a long Hst of debts from the various units incorporated in the Kingdom. The war of 1866 had added to the ah-eady overburdened Itahan finances. This year ended with a deficit of £28,840,000. Only the most stringent econoihy and drastic forms of taxation could save the young State from bankruptcy. A grist tax {macinato) was in- troduced, which, though highly unpopular as it in- creased the price of bread appreciably, netted the relatively large sum of £3,200,000 a year; while econ- omies introduced in all State and Government depart- ments and the expropriation of Church property saved the situation. Yet the period of financial dif- ficulties was not at an end, and though the deficits were reduced from year to year, the size of the budget increased rapidly. It was not until after the incor- poration of Rome in the Kingdom, and the unsettled state of the country came to an end, that Italian finances began to be on a more stable footing. The year 1875 showed the first surplus, and for the ensuing decade the financial situation of the country was on a solvent basis. The economies were by degrees abandoned; the country now entered upon a period of premature expansion. The grist tax was abolished, extravagant expenditures on railways, unsound bank- ing, and later, burdensome colonial enterprises again brought on a period of financial difficulties, and the long years of increasing deficits from 1884 to 1898 were finally terminated by careful economies and reforms which once again rescued Italy from financial chaos. Din-ing the ensuing fourteen years, owing in part to the great economic development of the coun- try, Italian finances showed a yearly surplus, not- 152 GREATER ITALY withstanding the fact that expenditures increased over thirty milUons sterhng. The Itahan Rente, which stood at 78 in 1893 soon passed par, while a conversion of the Debt, carried out in 1906, brought about an economy of a miUion and a half sterling a year. Though at the time it seemed as though the Tripolitan war had not affected Italy's financial position, yet a period of appreciable deficits was again inaugurated during the past three fiscal years. During the year 1913-14 the receipts of the exchequer amounted to £100,950,- 000, and the expenditure was £107,506,400, showing a deficit of £6,556,400. Revenues are derived chiefly from imposts on lands, buildings, and personal estates; monopolies on salt, tobacco, and the lottery, and taxation on im- ports. Italy has not only a high protective tariff, but also taxes necessities, not produced in the coun- try, such as wheat, sugar, coffee, etc. The expenses of collection are heavy, the burden of taxation is very unevenly distributed, and weighs onerously on the poor. The service of the National Debt still repre- sents a great proportion of expenditure, amounting to about twenty and a quarter millions sterling yearly. In 1913 the figures of the debt on the Grand Livre amounted to £551,920,000, of which only approx- imately 12 per cent is owned abroad. The gold held by the Bank of Italy (June, 1912) was £40,976,000. Crime in Italy is decreasing. Brigandage, in its more picturesque forms, which was once indigenous in Calabria, has been wiped out, and the "Camorra" has been shorn of much of its vigour as a result of the Viterbo trial of 1912. Vendettas still survive in the southern provinces, and though homicides are pro- ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 153 portionately more frequent in Italy than in any other European country, their number is rapidly diminishing, having decreased by nearly 50 per cent since 1880. Hand in hand with this decrease in criminality, there has been a slow though steady increase in edu- cational faciUties. The Italian Kingdom's inheritance of ilUteracy was appalling. The percentage of il- literates in 1871 was 73 per cent, the second highest in Europe. In 1910 it was still 50 per cent for the total and 30 per cent for the male population. In the North of Italy education is widely diffused, and the schools are efficient; in the South they are still defec- tive, yet much progress has been made in elementary schools, both in numbers and attendance. The total number of schoolrooms has risen in a decade from 61,777 to 68,031 (1911), while attendance has increased during this period nearly 400,000 to 3,150,249 or 9.3 per 100 of the population. Schools for adult illiterates, estabhshed in 1906, had an attendance of 128,000, of whom four-fifths were men. Though increasingly large credits have been voted for educational pur- poses, there is still much room for improvement, especially in the South of Italy where school build- ings are inadequate, the teachers poorly paid, and evasions from school attendance common. Though the Ginnasi and Licei, or classical secondary schools, show a distinct decrease both in number and atten- dance, the technical schools and institutes have gained appreciably, both of these latter gaining nearly 50 per cent in numbers of scholars in the eight-year period 1902-10. The 500 technical schools had in this latter year 83,621, and the technical institutes 20,305, schol- ars in attendance. This trend towards technical train- 154 GREATER ITALY ing cannot fail to have a very beneficial effect in Italy, where in the past the liberal professions were far too overcrowded. The rapid economic development of Italy is now attracting more and more the type of men into business who hitherto wasted their time in some Government sinecure after completing a course of study at a university. So that it is not surprising to find that the number of students in attendance at the uni- versities (28,000) has been practically stationary during the past decade. Italy, in order to protect herself from foreign ag- gression, from the earliest days of her existence felt the necessity of having a strong army. After her en- trance into the Triple Alhance she further increased her effectives, and voted large credits for military purposes, which caused serious financial embarrass- ment. Though the army budget was subsequently reduced, the Italian General Staff has always been directed by intelligent and efficient officers, whose spirit of initiative has kept the Italian forces in the vanguard of development in all branches of military science. Italy was the country first to train troops for mountain warfare, and her corps of Alpini were imitated by both France and Austria; as were her Bersaglieri, the first chasseurs a pied or light infantry in Europe. Aviation was actively encouraged as an essential branch of the service from the very earhest days of its practical usefulness, and dirigibles were first used in modern warfare by the ItaHans during the Tripolitan campaign. Italy was one of the first countries to adopt an "invisible" field uni- form. Though hampered by lack of funds, her armies have been kept up to a high standard of efficiency ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 155 and discipline. Service in the Italian army is com- pulsory, beginning with the age of 20; the men re- maining 19 years with the colom-s. Active service, formerly 3 years in the infantry and 5 years in the cavalry, was reduced to 2 years, while those paying £48 and passing an examination were required to serve only one year. The peace footing of the Italian army was 14,000 officers and 255,000 men, while the nominal war footing was 1,215,000. The actual war footing, however, was 41,692 officers and 3,433,150 men in 1913. Concerned with her position as a naval Power, and owing to the great length of her coast-line, Italy, when she entered upon the period of colonial ex- pansion, made a great effort to bring her navy up to a high standard. She embarked upon a daring pro- gramme of naval construction, and set the example of building monster ships, armed with monster guns, the preciu-sors of the modern Dreadnoughts. As the result of great enterprise and efforts, by 1893 Italy had reached the position of third naval Power in the world, ranking immediately after Great Britain and France. But, owing to financial difficulties, her am- bitious policy of naval expansion had to be abandoned, so that one by one the United States, Germany, and Japan passed her, and the Italian navy now ranks sixth. During the past decade Italian expenditures for naval purposes have again risen. The total naval effectives in 1913, on a peace footing, included 2,016 officers and 32,984 men, with 329 vessels of all types. Her programme of naval construction for that year provided for seven new ''Super-Dreadnoughts," a num- ber exceeded only by Great Britain and France. 156 GREATER ITALY The total area of Italy's colonial domain is approxi- mately 1,250,000 square miles, with a population of 1,580,000 inhabitants. The area of Libya is roughly 1,000,000 square miles, and has a population estimated at 900,000. The ItaUan occupation of Libya has en- tailed considerable expenditure amounting to well over £50,000,000, though the rapid increase in trade be- tween Italy and her new colony has, in a measure, compensated therefor. The number of steamships ar- riving in Italian ports from Libya has risen from 9, with a tonnage of 9,637 in the year 1908, to 705 with a tonnage of 1,408,000 in 1912; while during the same period the number of ships clearing from Italy for Libyan ports rose from 42, with a tonnage of 55,342 to 990 with a tonnage of 1,863,825. The value of the annual exports from Libya to Italy has increased nine- fold during this same four-year period from £27,053 to £236,098; imports from Italy to Libya having risen from £120,822 to £4,031,542. Communications be- tween Libya and Italy have been greatly improved, so that Tripoli may now be reached in forty-eight hours from Rome. Eritrea, with an area of about 85,000 square miles, had a population of 278,893 at the last census, of whom 3,949 are Europeans. The military force is chiefly native, commanded by Italian officers. The expendi- tures for the year 1911 amounted to £559,000, of which Italy contributed one-half. During the four-year period, 1908-12, imports have doubled, totalling nearly £1,000,000, while exports from Eritrea proper have increased threefold to £374,872. Though the development of Eritrea has hitherto been slow, Italy has high hopes for the future of the colony. A care- ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 157 ful investigation has shown that as soon as adequate transportation faciUties are provided, Eritrea will be able to produce enough cotton to make Italy inde- pendent of American cotton. The work of railway construction is being rapidly carried on. The lines in existence now extend to 111.5 miles, and £200,000 was allotted in 1911 for extensions. Italian Somaliland is an extensive tract of land hitherto Httle exploited. The annual expenditures amount to about £200,000. The colony exports ivory, coffee, cotton, and gums, and imports cotton goods, chiefly from Italy, the total trade of the colony amount- ing to £430,506. Italy further occupied in the ^gean, Rhodes and other smaller islands. The expenses of occupation at the end of 1913 amounted to £850,000. In looking over this very brief survey of the econ- omic and social development of Italy, one cannot fail to be impressed by the great progress which the coun- try had made during the half century since unity had been achieved. A new force was arising, which, with the passing years, was more and more to assert its power in the world. The Italian people were not blind to the fact that there remained much to be done to establish on a solid foundation this vast economic edifice, which had sprung up so rapidly. To check the wastage of emigration, to educate her peoples of the South up to the standards of the Western world, still awaited to be carried out. But of greater imme- diate importance was the necessity of freeing the economic life of Italy from foreign control, of eman- cipating the country from German domination. These were the two great tasks to which Italy was next to 158 GREATER ITALY turn her energies. Confident in her strength, relying on the united effort of her peoples, who under the aegis of the House of Savoy were rapidly losing their regionalist traditions, so that ''Italy" was no longer merely a word, but meant to each and every Italian "la patria/' such was the Italy which could calmly elect to follow the course best suited to her vital interests, when the hour came. In this hour the true strength of the nation was to be revealed. CHAPTER VIII THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL Rome the Capital of the Kingdom of Italy. The Law of GUABANTEES. ThE RoMAN QUESTION Among the various problems which have con- fronted the new Kingdom of Italy, none has been more difficult and vexatious than that of its relations with the Papacy. Though an Italian Pontiff, elected by a majority of Italian cardinals, sits on the throne of St. Peter, no Pope has hitherto become openly reconciled to the loss of his temporal power, and the King of Italy is still considered by the Vatican and its entourage as the unlawful usurper of the rights and privileges, as well as the estates, of the Holy See. It was on September 19, 1870, that the Italian troops under the command of General Raffaele Cadorna stood before the walls of Rome. King Victor Emmanuel had, in a letter couched in terms of filial affection, prayed the Pope, Pius IX, to renounce his temporal prerogatives, and thus permit the peaceable accom- plishment of ItaHan unity, which with the incorpora- tion of Rome in the Kingdom would be complete. The Pope refused to comply with this request, stating that he would resist by force of arms all attempts to de- prive him of his dominions. On September 20 the Italian forces, after a bombardment of the city last- ing five hours, entered Rome through a breach in the walls near the Porta Pia. Seeing that further resis- 159 160 GREATER ITALY tance was useless, the Pope ordered his troops to re- tire, and as a protest to the world against the violation of his sovereignty, Pius IX shut himself up in the Vatican, never to leave it, a self-interned prisoner. This was not the first time in recent years that the Popes lost their temporal power. As a result of the Napoleonic invasion of Italy a republic was proclaimed in Rome in 1798 which lasted but a brief period. In May, 1809,, the Papal States were, by a decree issued by Napoleon from Vienna, annexed to the French Empire, and not until his downfall, five years later, did the Pope again enter into possession of his domain. The Papal authority was for a third time overthrown in 1849. In February, Mazzini, the hero of Italy's early struggles for unity and independence, hastened to Rome; Pope Pius IX was driven from the city; a repubhcan form of government was set up under the leadership of Mazzini. The Romans believed that they could rally around them all Italy, but the at- tempts failed. Tuscany refused the invitation to join the Romans, and the disastrous effort to throw off the yoke of the Austrians in the North dampened the ardour of the Itahans. The Pope from his exile at Gaeta sought foreign aid to bring about his re- establishment. France, though at this time a repubhc under the presidency of Louis Napoleon, the future Emperor, under the pretext of protecting the new Roman republic, fitted out a small expedition and despatched the force under General Oudinot to Rome. The Republicans, led by Garibaldi, suspecting the good faith of the French, gave battle and obliged them to retreat. The French, further reinforced, now openly announced their object of reinstating the Papal au- THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL 161 thority. On June 3, they began the siege of Rome. For a month Garibaldi's legions held out against the French besiegers. Finally on July 2, it was deemed impossible to hold the city any longer. Garibaldi, with the remnant of his forces withdrew, and Rome once again was compelled to accept the rule of the Popes. But the temper of the Roman people during this last uprising showed clearly that they would not rest con- tent until they had overthrown for all time the rule of the Papacy. Rome was now permanently garrisoned by French troops. This force of some 15,000 men was not withdrawn until 1866. As soon as the French left the city. Garibaldi again planned an expedition to conquer the capital. Italian unity had now pro- gressed towards its triumphant achievement. Under the House of Savoy all Italy had been united into one great State. Rome alone remained outside the union. The Itahan Government, out of fear of France, had by a convention, signed September 15, 1864, agreed not to undertake an expedition against Rome, or to make any attempt to incorporate the city in the new Kingdom. Knowing that Garibaldi was contemplat- ing such an expedition, the Italian authorities re- moved him to Caprera, a small island close to the coast of Sardinia, under an armed guard. Garibaldi, how- ever, eluding his guardians, made his way safely back to Tuscany, and gathering together his legionaries, marched against Rome. In a first encounter the Papal troops were defeated at Monte Rotondo on October 29, 1867. In the meantime Napoleon III had despatched a fresh army to the assistance of the Pope. On November 3, at Mentana the Garibaldians 162 GREATER ITALY met the French and were badly beaten. Garibaldi returned to his exile at Caprera, and the French again garrisoned Rome. The fifth and final attempt to deliver Rome from Papal rule was at last successful. The French troops were withdrawn from Rome at the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. At the downfall of the French Empire, on September 4, 1870, the Italian Government, released from the engagement entered into with Napoleon not to occupy Rome, set about the undertaking which they so speedily brought to a successful issue. On October 2, the inhabitants of Rome and the Papal States, by a plebiscite solemnly voted their adherence to the Kingdom of Italy. Rome was there- upon proclaimed the capital of the country. King Victor Emmanuel II and the Government removed from Florence to Rome. The King took up his res- idence in the Quirinal, the former summer palace of the Popes. Thus the temporal power of the Papacy, which with brief interregnums had lasted for eleven centuries, came to an end. Pius IX continued, however, not to recognise the new authorities, or to treat with them in any manner. The ItaHan Government, wishing to regulate by statute its relations with the Papacy, had, in May, 1871, passed the so-called "Law of Guarantees," whereby the Pope is conceded nominal privileges and prerogatives as a sovereign, his person is invio- lable, his residence at the Vatican, as well as at the Lateran and the Villa Castel Gandolfo, enjoy ex- territorial rights. The Pope is to have his own armed guards, receive Envoys and Ministers from foreign THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL 163 sovereigns unmolested by the Italian authorities. Furthermore, besides other provisions wliich provide for every probable eventuahty, the Italian Govern- ment pledged itself to pay an annual indemnity of 3,225,000 lire (£129,000) towards the maintenance of the Holy See; a sum which was equal to the normal Papal budget. The perplexities of the Italian authorities were not, however, smoothed over by the passage of the Law of Guarantees. Pius J.X throughout his pontificate obstinately continued to ignore its terms. He refused to accept the proffered indemnity, and repeated his protests to the world against the usurpation of his temporal authority. Though there was a small and cultured element among the Roman churchmen, who were convinced that the Church could develop its prestige and ex- tend its spiritual sway throughout the world more widely if the Pope no longer had to concern himself with temporal problems of civil administration, the majority of the Curia, as well as pious Catholics throughout Italy, felt that the Pope must inevitably be impeded in the exercise of his Papal functions by the presence of another authority in Rome. The entry of the ItaUans into Rome, instead of solv- ing the Roman Question, had thus on the contrary virulently revived it. Foreign nations which had hitherto shown undivided sympathy for the cause of Italian unity, England, Prussia, and Belgium — ^in the first the Irish Catholics, in the latter the Clericals — joined in protesting, both in and out of Parliament, against the Italian occupation of the Eternal City. Cavour's programme of a "free Church within a free 164 GREATER ITALY State," was the plan which the Itahan Government set about loyally to execute. The separation of the Church and State, it was believed, might be carried out without prejudice to either. And though Pius IX, who had been despoiled of his temporal sov- ereignty, could not be expected to accept the new status, it was confidently hoped that his successor would in time inaugurate a more conciliatory poHcy. As long as Pius IX lived the Italian Governments maintained an attitude of patient toleration. The anathemas and invectives hurled against them were borne in a spirit of contrition. They were waiting for better days. In 1878 the Pope died. The Conclave assembled to elect his successor. Unmolested, and in complete security and privacy, the College of Cardinals met for the first time under the new regime. In the most im- posing, as well as well-ordered Conclave held in many centuries, after an unusually brief meeting of only thirty- six hours, Cardinal Pecci was elected Pope, and as- sumed the title of Leo XIIL The new Pontiff in no- wise resembled his predecessor. A man of broad views, and in many respects fully aUve to the needs and con- ditions of our times, an acute observer and skilful poHtician, he nevertheless, in the very first act of his reign dealt a cruel blow to the hopes of the Quirinal. It was confidently expected that Leo XIII would consent to be crowned publicly in St. Peter's. Instead, his coronation took place in strict privacy in the Sistine Chapel and the new Pope at once let it be known that he saw fit to consider himself the prisoner of the Italian Government, and locked himself up in the Vatican. THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL 165 Moderate in his acts as in his language, conciliatory in his attitude towards the peculiar needs of his Cath- ohc subjects within the boundaries of their respective States, amenable to new ideas, Leo XIII was anxious and wilHng to compromise on almost every question except that of Rome. Undaunted, the partisans of a reconciliation between the Vatican and the Quirinal endeavom-ed to accommodate the relations between them. In the Itahan Chamber the matter was favour- ably discussed, and proved the eagerness of the Ital- ians to put an end to an equivocal situation. Leo XIII speedily quashed these negotiations when he sharply asserted his inalienable right to the temporal sovereignty of Rome. He maintained that Rome was not large enough to hold both a King and a Pope. Unable to persuade the Italian Government to leave the city and estabhsh the capital in Florence or Naples, the Pope outwardly made preparations to leave Rome. He caused an inventory to be made of the treasures of the Vatican, which he proposed to convey abroad. The Italian Government became alarmed, for though the presence of a recalcitrant Pontiff in their midst was a source of much embar- rassment, nevertheless, the removal of the Papacy would be a serious blow to the prestige of the young Kingdom. Leo XIII, in order to strengthen his position in his conflict with the Italian Government, came to an understanding with Bismarck. A reconciliation be- tween the Pope and the instigator of Catholic per- secution in Germany was effected. The Kulturkampf came to an end, and we see Leo XIII using his in- fluence with the German Catholics to persuade them 166 GREATER ITALY to accept Bismarck's dictates, while the Iron Chan- cellor offered the Pope a dignified asylum in Germany, should he wish to remove the Papacy from Rome, although this project was never carried out. The chief aim of Leo XIII had been to increase his moral in- fluence abroad, as well as to raise the status of ascen- dency of the Pope in poUtical matters. A skilled diplomatist, and a genial Pontiff, he readily created for the Papacy a high place in international affairs. He was selected by various foreign States to act as ar- bitrator in their territorial quarrels, and his verdicts are luminous examples of astute and sound judgment, tempered by moderation and justice. Yet Leo XIII never ceased to look upon the Italian Government with a hostile eye. He was able to cause innumerable embarrassments to the Quirinal, and during the early years of the new Kingdom the dom- inant figure of Leo XIII in the affairs of Rome pre- vented the Italians from developing their national strength and consciousness as rapidly as would have been otherwise possible. The Papacy, throughout his long reign, continued to ignore the Italian Government, and refused to treat with the Quirinal or to permit any loyal CathoHcs to take part in the public hfe of Italy. Wherever possible the Roman Curia placed obstacles in the path of the Italian authorities. The Pope forbade Catholic sovereigns to pay visits of State to the Italian capital, and the pride of the Italians was humbled by the strict observance of this command by the rulers of all Catholic States. Leo XIII, while receiving Ministers and Embassies from other States, refused to negotiate even distantly with the Italian authorities, and in matters both great and THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL 167 small, the influence of the Papacy tenaciously op- posed the increasing strength of the new Italy. So that within the Kingdom there remained this polit- ically hostile power which militated against the best interests of the country, and continued to be a source of disintegration rather than of unity. As the years passed, and the Papacy tacitly tolerated the status quo, a new programme to regulate the posi- tion of the Vatican was brought forward, which though not enunciated clearly until the succeeding pontificate, further complicated the situation. When the Pope reahsed that no moral suasion would induce the King of Italy to leave Rome, and that no foreign State would undertake an armed expedition to re-establish the temporal authority of the Papacy, it became the ambition of many churchmen to place the Vatican under international protection — ^in other words, to internationahse the Roman Question — and secure the enforcement of the Law of Guarantees or other similar statutes, by international sanction, thus placing the Pope beyond the jurisdiction of the Italian author- ities. This plan, in view of the fact that Catho- lics, nominally subjects of the Pope, are to be found in all countries of the world, seemed peculiarly well adapted to secure greater liberties for the Papacy, as well as increased prestige. However, from the outset this proposal was vigorously opposed by the Itahan Government. They maintained that the Roman Question was cosmopolitan and not international. It was cosmopolitan because the Catholic Church, as its name implies, embraces the whole world; it was not international because no one group of nations has the right to guarantee by treaty the maintenance 168 GREATER ITALY of the Papacy. Italy's Law of Guarantees regarding the Holy See is a unilateral contract, arising out of the fact that the residence of the head of the Catholic Church is situated within the boundaries of Italy, and that some arrangement had to be made to define the relations of the Papacy towards the civil author- ities. Italy thus endeavoured to combat any ten- dency, which might arise abroad, to regard favourably the plan of internationalisation, and to affirm pos- itively her right to be the sole arbiter of the Roman Question which she considered a purely domestic problem. Upon the death of Leo XIII in July, 1903, the Con- clave again met at Rome, to consider the election of his successor. Leo XIII, throughout his pontificate, had been ably assisted by Cardinal RampoUa del Tindaro, his Secretary of State, a man who by his training, natural gifts, and his tolerant views, seemed well-fitted to bear the Papal burden. The candidature of Cardinal RampoUa had received the support of the French Government, and the Italian authorities would have welcomed his election, but the Emperor of Austria, at the suggestion of Germany, on this oc- casion made use of his ancient prerogative of veto, and prevented the elevation to the Papacy of a man who, it was believed, would have considered the re- lations of the Vatican and the Quirinal in a new light. Cardinal Sarto, Archbishop of Venice, was the com- promise candidate upon whom the election fell. Of humble parentage, he had risen from the position of village priest, through all the grades of the ecclesias- tical career, to the throne of St. Peter. A man of great humility and rehgious zeal, whose piety and devotion THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL 169 were known throughout Italy, yet unversed in the legal aspects of the position of the Vatican and the intricacies of the Roman Question, he took little in- terest in the pohtical role of the pontificate. Pius X, a "rehgious Pope," more engrossed with the affairs of heaven than those of this earth, engaged in sup- pressing ''Modernism," concerned with matters of ritual and dogma, neglected the more immediate problem of the relation of the Papacy to Italy. Though he departed from the policy of Leo XIII of playing an active political role, this did not imply that he held a more tolerant view of the matter of temporal juris- diction. He followed and thus stamped as a tradi- tional custom the idea of considering the Pope the "Prisoner of St. Peter's," and rejected the Law of Guarantees. In his first encyclical of October 4, 1903, Pius X seemed to indicate that the Roman Question was closed. A number of Italians already proclaimed that the day of reconciliation of the Kingdom and the Papacy had at last arrived. Pius X withdrew the non expedit and freely granted permission to all loyal Catholics to take an active part in the political life of Italy, which the intransigent policy of his predeces- sors had prohibited; he assumed a more conciliatory attitude regarding the giving of religious instruction in the schools; sanctioned the singing of the Italian national anthem by the Catholic societies, and ad- mitted the Italian flag within the precincts of the Vatican. But it was soon evident that these con- cessions were of no real significance when compared with the broader issue of the sovereignty of Rome. Pius X was to seize the first opportunity to voice 170 GREATER ITALY his protest against the usurpation of the Kings of Italy. In the autumn of 1904, President Loubet of France paid an official visit to the King of Italy at Rome. The Pope immediately issued a circular note to the Powers, protesting against the visit of the chief of a great Catholic State to "him who, against all right, holds my temporal sovereignty, and impedes its liberty and independence." The result of this protest was the severing of diplomatic relations between France and the Vatican. Pius X had ascended the Papal throne accompanied by the best wishes of the Italian people. The sim- plicity of his court contrasted vividly with the pomp and ceremony of the reign of Leo XIII. His humble birth, his affectionate regard for his sisters, who still remained simple peasant women, as well as the peace- ful atmosphere of goodness, which impressed all those who came in contact with the Pope, created a legend which enveloped the Pontiff in a halo of sanctity. Never before had a Pope received Venetian peasants in the sumptuous private apartments of the Vatican; received them not as a sovereign but as a friend. Christian and Jew were alike admitted into his pres- ence, and every one who so desired had access to the Holy Father, who was intent upon re-establishing the rule of Christ in its literal form of "peace on earth, good-will to men." So that the repressive acts which took place under Pius X were ascribed chiefly to the Papal entourage. During the later years of the pontificate of Pius X, the Papacy revived virulently its anti-Italian policy. The celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL 171 founding of the Kingdom of Italy, in 1911, was seized upon by the Pope to proclaim that all good Catholics must consider these, ''days of deep mourning." Hence- forth Pius X took every opportunity to bring before the world the thorny subject of the temporal powers of the Papacy. At the same time the question of in- ternationalising the Law of Guarantees was brought to the fore, and became the object of careful con- sideration and study by Vatican jurists. The outbreak of the European War found Pius X still occupying the throne of St. Peter. The terrible conflict which had been enkindled throughout the Christian world was said to have been a source of deep anguish to the Holy Father. Borne down by age and infirmity, bewaihng the fate of his fellow men, Pius X sank into his grave on August 21, 1914. Ten days later fifty-seven Cardinals assembled in the Vatican to elect the two hundred and sixtieth Pope. Many of the prelates who had gathered here came from States now at war, and none could entirely divest themselves of their national allegiance, or put out of their thoughts the national passions and prej- udices engendered by the conflict. The state of the Church might well give them cause for preoccupation. Under the late Pontiff the prestige of the Papacy had been slowly decfining. The gravity of the moment demanded that the reins of the CathoHc Church be placed in able hands if the Papacy was again to play an important part in worldly affairs. It, therefore, was evident that a "political" Pope must be intrusted with the keys of St. Peter's. The papabili, as the candidates for Papal honours are designated, were not numerous. No strong 172 GREATER ITALY personality dominated the Conclave. During the first and second of September, when the ballots were counted, none of the candidates received two-thirds of the total votes "necessary for election. It was noticed, however, that the Cardinal Delia Chiesa, Archbishop of Bologna, who had come into the Con- clave a relatively unsupported candidate, not even ranked among the more important papdbili was slowly gaining the suffrages of his colleagues. During the ballot taking of September 3, no agreement could be reached. Finally to break the deadlock, when it became evident that neither of the leading candidates, Cardinals Maffi and Serafini, could secure the neces- sary majority, on the first ballot of September 4, Cardinal Delia Chiesa received 39 votes, the number strictly necessary for his election. During the Conclave the Pope-elect had followed the proceedings with a cool and dispassionate eye. He seemed to take little interest in what was going on; upon hearing the announcement of his election, the new Pontiff seemed unmoved. In answer to the question of what name he would assume, the Pope replied in a calm voice, ''Benedict XV." In taking the name of Benedict, the new Pope wished to show that he intended to break away from the tradition of both Leo XIII and Pius X. According to custom, three sets of white Papal robes of different sizes are prepared in advance, as the Pope on his election is immediately clad in his new vestments, and receives the homage of the assembled Cardinals. Benedict XV now entered the Sistine Chapel arrayed in the Papal robes of the smallest size, yet even these were too large, and they shrouded his THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL 173 shrunken form in deep folds. His face, thin and drawn, wearing heavy lensed, gold-rimmed spectacles, peered out from over his white-caped gown, inquisitive, yet confident and self-possessed. The Pope received the obeisances of the Princes of the Church with great dignity. His countenance bore no trace of emotion. Those who saw him declare that it seemed as though the new Pope had been accustomed to his role all his life. On placing the triple tiara on the head of Cardinal Delia Chiesa, the Conclave had fulfilled its mission and elected a "political" Pope. The reign of Pius X already seemed covered with the dust of ages. A new era was to open in the history of Rome. Never before had a Pope been called upon to face a more grave and serious crisis, both within and without the Church. Benedict XV, undaunted by the diflSculties which loomed before him, entered resolutely upon his new duties, and the evening of the day of his election to the throne of St. Peter, found the Pope busy, person- ally dictating telegrams, announcing his accession, to foreign sovereigns. Benedict XV is the son of the Marchese Delia Chiesa, of an ancient Genoese patrician family. Born at Genoa on November 21, 1854, he was ordained a priest in 1879, and then pursued his studies in canon law, more especially in ecclesiastical diplomacy at Rome. When Cardinal Rampolla, at the time a monsignor, was sent as Papal Nuncio to Spain in 1883, he took with him as his secretary, Delia Chiesa. The young priest, who soon revealed great diplomatic aptitude, became the confidential adviser of his chief, and when later Cardinal Rampolla assumed the office of Secretary of State at the Vatican, Monsignor Delia 174 GREATER ITALY Chiesa became his principal secretary, and was the active collaborator of RampoUa and Leo XIII during the busy days of the Leonine pontificate. When at the death of Leo XIII, Cardinal Rampolla retired from participation in Papal affairs, Delia Chiesa did not follow his example. He remained at his post at the Vatican, ready to serve his new master. Cardinal Merry del Val, who became Secretary of State. But an astute and skilled diplomatist such as Monsignor Delia Chiesa, could not long tolerate the careless trend which Papal policy now followed, nor did he ingratiate himself with his new chief. It was, there- fore, not long before he was relieved of his func- tions, and in 1907 he was sent into relative exile to Bologna, as Archbishop. Raised to the cardinalate, he continued to interest himself in the broader issues of Papal affairs, and refused to be drawn into the local dissensions of his diocese. Thus Benedict XV came to the pontifical magistracy endowed by long years of patient training, as well as by his natural gifts, with those qualifications of statecraft most useful to a "political" Pope. The Roman Curia could well believe that it had chosen wisely in selecting this skilled manipulator of diplo- matic niceties, who was so familiar with both ec- clesiastical and lay problems of international import; Benedict XV could be counted on to direct, guide, and govern in a manner worthy of the best worldly tradi- tions of the Vatican. Firm, subtle, adaptable, he had devoted his life to the cause of affirming the temporal power of the Vatican, and had had a large share in its triumphs under Leo XIII. The new Pope could not fail to grasp the significance which his accession THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL 175 to the pontificate would have to the world. Never in recent years had the civilised nations of the earth looked to Rome in such a mood of humility. In a world where the moral code was being daily violated, where treachery and treason and a ruthless disregard for the rights of mankind had become the rule, where the most elemental laws of justice and humanity were wholly disregarded, the figure of the Pope rose out of the flames of battle, the calm and just arbiter, whose word would at this juncture carry the full weight of divine inspiration. Belhgerents and neutrals alike waited for the pro- nouncement of the new Pontiff. By a frank, out- spoken statement of policy, by a condemnation and censure of the violation of the accepted code of war and of international law, by a high-minded and af- firmatively authoritative exposition of broad. Chris- tian principles, which even belligerents would be bound to respect, it was confidently expected that the Papacy would lend its great moral support in main- taining the structural fabric of society. But the Pope had too long been accustomed to the arts of diplomacy to be able to view with a broader and more statesmanlike grasp the value of such an undertaking. In his first encyclical, Benedict XV proved that he was more concerned with what he believed to be the immediate needs of the CathoHc Church than with those of mankind. The Pope showed himself eager to take advantage of this seem- ingly favourable opportunity to rehearse the grudges and grievances of the Vatican. After fulminating against present-day society and discoursing on the tendencies towards ''independence," deploring the 176 GREATER ITALY absence of all respect for authority, and dwelling on the "absurdity of socialism," the Pope discusses the dissensions within the Church, condemns Modernism, and, in the concluding and more important paragraphs, reaffirms "that for too long a time the Church has not enjoyed that liberty of which it has need," and joins in a prayer for the prompt re-establishment of peace among nations, "the desire for the cessation of that abnormal condition in which the head of the Church finds himself." These are the chief contents of the first important statement of the new Pope to the world. To many influential Catholics this encycHcal came as a distinct disappointment; to the world at large it appeared as a weak and insignificant document. The Italians were visibly annoyed that the Pope should see fit to make use of the occasion to bring to the notice of Europe the petty quarrel of the Vatican with the Italian Government. The Allies had expected at least a reference to the war, and a condemnation of its instigators. In France, the election of Benedict XV, the confidential adviser of Cardinal Rampolla, who had always been a warm friend of France, was hailed with much sympathy, and it was hoped that the new Pope would show some traces of the former's friendship for France. It was even confidently pre- dicted that the estrangement between the Vatican and the French Republic would be brought to an end by Benedict XV. The revulsion of feeling was spon- taneous and immediate when the attitude of the Pope regarding the war became known. For the Papacy proclaimed its strict neutrality, just as the States not engaged in the war had done. It was the aim of THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL 177 the Vatican, leaving aside its moral and spiritual r61e, to conform itself to the habitual acts of non-bellig- erent, temporal States. It soon appeared evident that the Vatican was by degrees falling under the influence of the Central Empires. The diplomatic representatives of Prus- sia, Bavaria, and Austria at the Vatican, owing in part to the fact that neither France nor Great Brit- ain maintained a mission at the Papal Court, while the Russian Envoy was without influence, had by direct negotiations been able to persuade the Pope that the best interests of the Holy See were more closely Hnked with those of the Central Powers, than with those of the Allies. As Prussia was pictured as representing law and order, blind obedience, systematic control, and Austria is the greatest Catholic State, it is not difficult to understand that the Pope felt more sym- pathy with these than with republican France, heret- ical England, or schismatic Russia. Nor were the Austro-German envoys slow to make definite promises that the question of the re-establishment of the tem- poral power of the Papacy would receive careful con- sideration at the coming peace conference, and they are reported to have pledged the support of the Central Empires to the project of internationalis- ing the Law of Guarantees, should the broader issue fail. Busied with his diplomatic negotiations, careful not to displease Germany or Austria, the Pope re- frained from expressing any opinion regarding the violation of Belgian neutrality, even when it was presented to his notice by Cardinal Mercier, Primate of Belgium. The reply of Benedict XV to the vibrant 178 GREATER ITALY appeal of the Belgian Cardinal is a vague expression of generalities, devoid of significance. In order to present the cause of the Allies directly to the Vatican, Great Britain, in December, 1914, decided to send a duly accredited, diplomatic mission to the Papal Court. Though well received, the British Envoy was unable to wean the Papacy from its now decidedly pro-German tendencies. England had other causes for grave discontent with the Vatican. In Rome the Irish Catholics were in direct relations with the Germans, and it is rumoured that it was through their medium that the intercourse, which later re- sulted in the Easter Revolution of 1916 in Ireland, was actively carried on. It was noticeable and com- mented upon in the Eternal City, that the Irish Catholics continued their relationship with the Ger- man Envoy to the Vatican, even after the arrival of the British mission, which they feigned to ignore. Papal temporal prestige was greatly increased by the presence of a Minister Plenipotentiary from Great Britain, who after a period of four centuries again renewed diplomatic relations between the Vatican and the Court of St. James. Benedict XV was to be gratified with further solicitations for the opening up of diplomatic intercourse, first from the Ottoman Empire, then from the Netherlands. While the Vatican, under the guidance of Benedict XV was increasing its temporal prestige, the Quirinal was leading United Italy through the tortuous nego- tiations with the Dual Monarchy, which were ulti- mately to end in JtaHan intervention in the European War. As soon as the course which the Italian Government THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL 179 was pursuing became more clearly defined, as soon as it became evident that Italy was preparing to range herself on the side of the Allied Powers, the Papacy began to exert all its influence to maintain Italian neutrality. For the Vatican feared that if Italy were to declare war on the Central Empires the position of the Austro-German representatives, accredited to the Papal Court, would become untenable, and they would be forced to leave Rome. In this question, as well as in all others which have arisen under the Bene- dictine pontificate, what was believed to be the best interests of the Vatican were alone considered. It so came about that the Vatican mobilised all its resources to prevent Italian participation in the war, and thus actively supported the efforts of the Austro-Germans. Spiritual and secular arguments were linked together, and presented to the numerous loyal Catholics of the Kingdom, bidding them to resist the current of inter- vention. The Vatican let it be understood that if Italy should engage in the war, the Papacy would consider seriously the question of emigrating to some neutral country, and negotiations were actually set in motion with a view to securing asylum for the Pope in Spain. Thus the Quirinal found itself in open conflict with the Vatican, and though ItaUan participation in the war was brought about, there nevertheless remained a remnant of "Neutralists" who, encouraged as much by the Vatican as from independent sources, prevented Italy from putting forth a strong and united effort during the first year of the war. The declaration of war against Austria, and the consequent departure of the diplomatic representatives 180 GREATER ITALY of the Central Empires, accredited to the Holy See, in May, 1915, gave the Vatican the opportunity again to voice through the Papal Press its protest against the intolerable position in which the Papacy found itself, in that it "would henceforth be able to com- municate only with one group of beUigerents, and thus would not be in a position to obtain all the in- formation which is necessary for an exact under- standing of the international situation." This as- sertion is not borne out by facts. In an official ut- terance the Italian authorities stated, "The Pope continues to exercise his apostolic office with all pos- sible liberty. The Law of Guarantees remains in force in its entirety, and the Pontiff despatches to- day, as he did before the war, his communications in cipher, while his diplomatic couriers travel with sealed despatches, which are not subject to any cen- sorship." The establishment of the Austrian and German Embassies to the Papacy, at Lugano in Swit- zerland, bears out the truth of this statement. During the first year of the Italian participation in the war, the Vatican was able to exercise great influence on its conduct. The lack of cohesion of public opinion regarding the war, the efforts made to prevent Italy from putting forth her full strength, and above all the undisguised sympathy which num- bers of Italians, belonging to "Black" circles at Rome, professed for the Central Empires, were a direct out- come of Vatican influences. However, the patriotism of the Italian Catholics finally triumphed, and in the "National Ministry," which was formed in June, 1916, we find the leader of the CathoHc party as Min- ister of Finance. The attitude of neutrality of the THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL 181 Italian-born Pontiff is deemed unpatriotic. Had the Pope confined his efforts to playing a purely spiritual part, had he remained aloof from the conflict, his pohcy might, if not understood, at least have been condoned. But the patent efforts of the Papacy to frustrate the plans of the Quirinal, to obstruct the fulfilment of the obvious destiny of national expansion of the Kingdom of Italy, has wounded the sensibilities of the majority of Italians, while even loyal Catholics cannot forgive the Pope the fact that in the face of the grave moral crisis, brought about by the outbreak of the war, the head of the Catholic Church, when sum- moned to speak, remained silent, purposely avoided to commit himself, and preferred the cautious, hollow phraseology of the diplomatist to that of a shepherd of the people. In considering the relation of the Church and State in Italy, it must be borne in mind that, for more than a thousand years the fortunes of the Catholic Church have been intimately bound up with those of the ItaUan peninsula. For the past five centuries the direction of the Catholic Church has been in the hands of Italians. Roman Catholicism, the most complete theocracy that man has ever created, is the handiwork of Italians. The presence of the Papal Court at Rome has, during the past forty-five years, been the cause of much anxiety to the Italian Govern- ment. However, both parties seemed to have grown accustomed to the anomalies of their relationship. The efforts of Benedict XV to revive the Roman Question at such a critical period in the history of the Kingdom would seem to indicate that under the gui- dance of the "political" Pontiff elected at the last 182 GREATER ITALY Conclave, the Papacy in endeavouring to embarrass the Italian Government, by playing into the hands of her enemies, has sacrificed its moral and religious ascendency for the attainment of chimerical, temporal gains. For it is not alone the Italians whom the Pope has alienated. At a time when a religious renascence is unmistakably manifesting itself, there are many signs that would lead one to conclude that French and Belgian Catholics may wish to emancipate them- selves from the control of the Vatican. While the Papacy has made indirect overtures, soliciting the renewal of diplomatic intercourse between France and the Vatican, which have been coldly received, the French clergy, whether cardinal or village priest, maintaining a lofty spirit of patriotism, are letting France know that "God is not neutral" whatever may be the attitude of "glacial serenity" of the Holy Father, as the neutrahty of the Pope is stigmatised. Notwithstanding the opposition which has arisen against the Vatican, the Italians do not forget that the Catholic Church is greater than its Popes: "a huge, slumbering giant whose head rests in the lap of Italy, and whose body spreads over the world." This great mass, long inert, may some day awaken. The World War, with its far-reaching results, may be the cause of such a resurrection. The days have passed when the Quirinal trembled at a threat of the Vatican to reassert its temporal rights. As a result of a victorious war, with the econ- omic and pohtical strength of the Kingdom greatly increased, and with the stability of Italy as a World Power thereby assured, the temporal pretensions of the Papacy must inevitably vanish. Though the oft- THE VATICAN AND THE QUIRINAL 183 repeated menace of the Papacy to abandon Rome may again be made, and all Italians recognise that such a step would be a severe blow to Italian prestige, it is well-known that the Papacy cannot leave the Eternal City without losing the influence and moral ascen- dency wliich San Pietro presso Roma alone can confer. The delicate problem of internationahsing the Law of Guarantees is of difficult solution. The great ma- jority of the people of Italy are actively opposed to any such programme, and as long as the Papacy re- mains at Rome Italians would consider it an infringe- ment of their sovereign rights for any foreign Powers to concern themselves with, what they hold to be, an internal problem. On the other hand, it is not im- probable that, in view of the difficulties which the secular sovereign rights, conferred on the Pope by the Law of Guarantees, have created, the Italian Govern- ment may impose further restrictions on Papal sover- eignty, and, by depriving the Papacy of all vestige and semblance of temporal power, settle for all time, by drastic measures, the vexed Roman Question. CHAPTER IX ITALY AND GERMANY Gekman Peaceful Peneteation. Industrial Servitude. The Breaking prom Bondage When Italy, only a decade after the achievement of national independence, badgered by Austria, dis- dained by Great Britain, and fearing an assault on the part of France which threatened her national existence, was isolated in Europe, she besought the friendship of Germany and sought to place herself under German protection. In order to secure this protection, Italy, at the behest of Berhn, even went to the length of becoming an ally of Austria, as Ital- ian statesmen believed that by their alliance with Germany they were pursuing the only course open to them which would guarantee the integrity of the new Kingdom. Though by courtesy admitted into the comity of the Great Powers, Italy was at the time in no posi- tion to assert her rights. In the twelve years which had elapsed since the House of Savoy had united the disjointed patchwork of ItaHan States, many of them the most backward and misgoverned in Europe, into a nation, much progress had been made in develop- ing the national strength of the Italian people. Yet Italy remained the poorest and weakest of the Powers, seemingly unquaHfied, either practically or potentially, to aspire to great expansion. 184 ITALY AND GERMANY 185 With the help of France, Magenta and Solferino had won the first steps of Itahan unity. Sadowa and Sedan had been German victories, which had made it possible to incorporate Venice and Rome in the Kingdom. Thus Italy had been created with the aid of both France and Germany, and now had to make a choice between the two. Owing to the antag- onistic attitude of France at this time, it was not surprising that the Itahans chose the alliance with Germany. During the first years of the Triple Al- liance, Germany, as the result of her victorious wars, ruled as absolute master in Continental Europe. Italy had to content herself with playing a very secondary role. Yet these years were not without their benefit to her. Germany was the model and pattern. Quick to learn, eager to improve, the Italian people were laying the foundation of the future economic power of the State. When, after 1890 and the subsequent Franco- Russian alhance, a semblance of the balance of power was re-estabhshed in Europe, Italy breathed more freely. Her importance as an ally increased, and she began to play a more independent and personal part in European affairs. The danger of a foreign in- vasion had passed. Italy was now entering upon a period of colonial expansion. She was, however, still not merely poor financially and industrially, but ignorant of the ways and means of increasing her worldly wealth. She understood little of the methods of industrial exploitation, so astonishingly perfected by the Germans. Germany was rapidly rising to the industrial leadership of the world and had become the master of modern efficiency in all forms of organ- 186 GREATER ITALY isation of industrial and commercial enterprise, which was the foundation of economic expansion. Italy- had allied herself with Germany for the protection of her national boundaries; when this protection was no longer needed, when no enemies threatened her, and the political aspects of her treaty with Germany assured her few advantages, Italy deliberately turned to Germany and prayed to be instructed in the methods and secrets of this modern alchemy. It was Crispi, in his sincere desire to foster the greatness and increase the wealth and power of Italy, who openly sought German economic aid. The op- portunity was propitious for the German industrial invasion of Italy. France, after carrying on a pro- longed commercial warfare against Italy, suddenly in a moment of childHke anger dumped all the Italian se- cxu-ities that she held on the market.^ Italy was help- less and found herself in an embarrassed position. To assist Italian finances there was formed in the year 1895, by certain German financiers, chief among them Herr Schwabach, the head of the banking-house of Bleichroder of Berlin, an Italian bank, v/ith its head- quarters at Milan, known as the ^'Banca Conamerciale." Ever since the first visit of Wilham II to Italy a few months after his accession to the throne in 1888, the possibihty of the industrial exploitations of Italy had formed a cherished part of his programme of world expansion. The story of German peaceful penetra- tion throughout the world is one of the most amazing chapters in contemporary history. While the Govern- ments of other nations were content to permit their nationals to trade abroad, and open up markets for iSee p. 60. ITALY AND GERMANY 187 their products, giving them no encouragement and Uttle protection, Germany, from the earUest days of her existence as an Empire, reahsed that financial, industrial, and commercial enterprise are essential, determining factors in world politics. While other Governments still clung to the antiquated notion of a wide gulf between economics and politics, Germany closely co-ordinated and allied the two branches of this same science. It was thus that Berlin became the headquarters of the Great General Staff of '^ Peaceful Penetration." Plans were here devised to achieve the economic servitude of the world. With methodical, plod- ding patience and scientific zeal, alhed with a bold- ness of conception and brilliancy in execution worthy of the greatest mihtary genius, the invaders prepared the outlines of the plans of their campaigns, devised the strategy, studied the tactics to be pursued. Just as at the War College across the Spree the weekly Kriegsspiel (war game) took place, which initiated the more brilHant younger officers in the plans for the mihtary conquest of Europe, so within the silent, double-doored rooms of the Deutsche Bank, of the Dresdener Bank, of the A. E. G., and other great Ger- man concerns, the programmes for the industrial conquest of Europe and the world were matured. Italy, Belgium, Holland, Spain, Turkey, Bulgaria, Chile, Brazil, France, and even Great Britain were the subject of careful study. The methods of procedure adopted to achieve the desired results were manifold. The Church, Parlia- ments, the Press were influenced, bribed, subsidised, and, if need be, coerced. The natural cupidity and 188 GREATER ITALY the ignorance of international politics of the average business man were preyed upon. The almost uni- versal desire for material well-being, which was daily- becoming more wide-spread among all classes, was exploited. To gain secret information regarding markets, trade spies, both German and native, were widely made use of. The well-trained German chemist or engineer was subventioned, and thus willing to work abroad for a trifling stipend, until he had learned the secrets of competitors' processes. By German methods of factory efficiency, superior organisation and preferential transportation rates accorded by the home railways, the German manufacturer was soon able to drive the native products out of the market with a cheaper German substitute. German capital was often judiciously invested with native capital abroad, and later, when prosperity had crowned the enterprise, withdrawn. Yet the management almost invariably remained in German hands, as the average stockholder was more interested in regular dividends than in questions of international influence. In each and every case the peculiarities and particular needs of a given situation were maturely investigated and studied, and then when the field had been prepared, the German was ready to reap the fruits of his labour. For it must be recalled that every German thus en- gaged felt himself an essential unit of the Empire, and the Government saw to it that this spirit was kept ahve. Thus the mighty tide of German penetration spread irresistibly. As the years passed, on the maps and charts of Europe and the world, which hung in the halls of the great banks of Berlin, the black, white, and red flags of Germany, marking the deep inroads ITALY AND GERMANY 189 of German trade abroad, spread their network ever more broadly and thickly. The grandiose plan of the Pan-Germans for world domination had found, in the material greed of the peoples of all nations, the pawns of their policy. The international character of world trade and commerce made it easy for the Germans to wear the cloak of a given nationality, which could be cast off at the opportune moment. German peaceful penetration, advocated and en- couraged by the Emperor himself, seconded by the united strength of the German Empire, having at its immediate disposal not merely the channels of diplomacy and the full support of the Government, but also the most powerful army in the world, ready to intimidate any presumptuous competitor, found opposed to it only the weak, individual initiative of a few groups, divided by internal dissensions. In many cases the Germans readily found influential personages abroad, who, in order to secure the co- operation of foreign capital, were willing to assist the invaders. In no country was this more true than in Italy. Bound by the ties of their alliance with Germany, the Italians readily welcomed the Germans. Anxious to learn the methods and means of acquiring an in- crease in their material well-being, they guilelessly placed their resources at the disposal of their allies for exploitation along German lines. The country was new, the people, inspired by their successful struggle for national unity to attempt greater things, were ready to follow the German lead. A certain affinity of spirit, and the similarity of the recent his- torical development of the two nations, led the more 190 GREATER ITALY intellectual classes in Italy, who were coming more and more under Germanic influence, to look favourably on the increasing number of Germans, who now flocked to Italy to take up positions of trust, as directors, managers, and superintendents in the newly estab- lished factories which were everywhere springing up. The Germans brought with them to Italy a feehng of contempt for the Italian people, and, while exploit- ing the excellent and cheap labour which everywhere abounded, in the successful development of their enterprises, they remained faithful to their German allegiance. It cannot be gainsaid that, during the early years of German penetration in Italy, their presence was of immense material benefit to the coun- try. Initiated into the secrets of German methods of industry, trade, and commerce, the country flourished. It was not, however, until after the estabHshment of the Banca Commerciale, in 1895, that the German plan for the economic conquest of Italy was seriously undertaken. The moment was opportune. The bold colonial enterprise, which Italy had so enthu- siastically begun, had collapsed; a period of strikes and internal dissensions was beginning. PubHc credit was at a low ebb; the confidence of the people in their financial institutions and government was shaken; the antagonism of France was more virulent than it had been for some years past. It was at this juncture that the Pan-Germans turned their attention to Italy. They now realised that Italy, notwithstand- ing recent failures, had the possibility of developing into a great industrial State. Though still largely given to agriculture, Italy, with her abundant supply of labour, the cheapest in Western Europe, and at the ITALY AND GERMANY 191 same time the most frugal, hard-working, and adapt- able, might, if not held in check, at no distant date rival Germany herself in the markets of the world. It thus came about that when Crispi called upon Germany for financial assistance, the Germans, officially encouraged by their Government, founded a bank in co-operation with Italian capital, at Milan, with a capital stock of only 5,000,000 hre (£200,000). Here, ready to hand, the Germans were soon to have the means of directing and dominating not merely the economic, but even the poHtical life of Italy, in the interests of Germany. Such was the Banca Com- mercial, which by degrees increased its capital until it reached the total of 150,000,000 lire (£6,000,000), and had an annual overturn of 800,000,000 lire (£32,- 000,000). Throughout the years of its growth this banking institution was ruled over by three Ger- mans.^ It is furthermore astonishing to note that, notwithstanding the fact that this bank, which soon became the leading financial institution in Italy and was in a position to control the economic life of the country, though it had long since passed from German ownership, so that at the outbreak of the European War only 3,000,000 lire (£120,000) of the capital stock remained in German hands, its policy was directed from Berlin and its power made use of in Pan-German interests. It was not long after the establishment of this bank that it succeeded in gaining control of the chief in- dustrial and commercial enterprises in Italy. The ^ C/. G. Preziosi: "La Germania alia Conquista dell' Italia," Firenze, 1916, p. 62. This volume sheds an interesting light oa the question of German penetration in Italy. 192 GREATER ITALY number of the joint stock companies in Italy is stated to be 793, with a capital of 3,898,174,049 Hre^ (£155,- 926,961). By skilful manipulation, the Commerciale has been able to control this vast capital, and thus the economic Kfe of Italy. The favourite device to secure voting control was to offer a small sum for the privilege of representing the stock of individual holders in the directors' meetings. The shares were deposited with the bank for the time being, and the bank was authorised to represent its owners. By this simple method, year in and year out, the bank was able at very trifling cost, to dominate secretly the economic hfe of the country. The enormous power which was at the disposal of this bank was made use of to favour by all possible means the sale of German products, with a twofold object of keep- ing out of ItaUan markets products coming from other countries and of preventing any serious expan- sion of ItaHan industries. ^ It thus came about that great credit facihties were offered through the bank, both to German firms and to the ItaUan customers of German firms. Furthermore, when an ItaHan firm was in the need of new machinery or other materials, should it dare seek to obtain them in the open market, a strong "recommendation" from the bank would almost invariably be received, urging it to choose a German product, purchased from a German firm or one bound up with German interests, otherwise it would find its credit cut off, and would soon be ruined. By means of a slowly and carefully woven web of in- terests, within comparatively few years, the Commer- ciale gained control of the chief industries of Italy; 1 Op. cit., p. 75. 2 Ibidem, p. 77. ITALY AND GERMANY 193 steel plants, machine-shops, ship-building yards, ship- ping companies, power plants, armament firms, all passed under German control and were exploited in German interests. The steel plants at Terni, the Vickers Arms factory at Spezia, the smelters at Savona and at Elba, the Italian Lloyd, the General Naviga- tion Company, as well as many of the other more im- portant industries of Italy, it is alleged came under German domination. Slowly the grip tightened until, towards the end of the first decade of the present century, Germany had succeeded in gaining a strangle- hold at the throat of Italy. The German invasion was so insidiously carried on that the majority of the ItaUans did not even reaKse its existence. Its growth was facihtated by the fact that the leading men of Italy, both in poht- ical and commercial spheres, had been brought up to admire Germany and all things German. The great and ever-increasing prosperity of the country was ascribed to German co-operation, and few were in a position to know the full extent of German penetra- tion. Few knew that the greater part of the Itahan merchant marine was in German hands. Though the Italian flag flew over the ships, the poHcy of the com- panies was controlled by the Banca Commerciale, and the bank saw to it that its numberless employees and agents pursued a pohcy which was distinctly Germanophil. And so it was with the steel and iron industries, which the bank dominated. More dan- gerous to the vital strength of Italy was the German control exercised over the electric-power plants. Re- cent development of electrical energy in Italy has been very marked. Those controUing its supply and 194 GREATER ITALY distribution have in their hands a source whence they can derive secret information concerning the most intimate particulars of any given district. The engineers and employees of electric light and power companies must, in the course of their business, be admitted everywhere. Arsenals and factories, private homes and ministries, staff colleges and fortresses, all are thrown open to the electrician. The ease with which intelHgent espionage can thus be carried out, unobserved, can be readily understood. Yet, not- withstanding the peril of intrusting the control of this most vital interest to foreigners, in Italy in the province of Venetia, bordering along the Austrian frontier, 99 per cent of the electrical horse-power was in German hands.^ The hold exerted by Germany over the economic life of Italy soon led to active interference in the polit- ical life of the country. In carrying on its campaign of penetration, the Press was from the outset the most essential means used to influence public opinion. Thus certain important Italian daily newspapers were subventioned to act in the interests of the Com- merciale and to proclaim the superiority of German methods and German goods. "The method of the Commerciale is in the main always the same; each one of the corporations con- trolled by the bank is compelled to subscribe to a definite share of the capital stock of a given news- paper or periodical. The journals, moreover, are in receipt of subsidies of various kinds, generally in the 1 Op. cit., p. 118. Out of a total of 74,800,000 lire (£2,992,000) in- vested in electrical enterprises in Venetia, 72,000,000 lire (£2,880,000) was in German hands. ITALY AND GERMANY 195 form of advertising contracts and advertisements of the industries which are estabHshed in the region where they are pubhshed and circulated. . . . Cer- tain industries have their own journals. It is beyond doubt that a goodly part of the daily and periodical Press, technical as well as political, whether of large or small circulation, without distinction as regards poUtical affiliation, obeys the mandates of the Com- merciale, which are those of German policy. It is thus that a great share of the Italian Press, by means of biased leaders, or news articles, by reports or ac- counts apparently dealing with technical matters, by telegrams, sensational despatches, parliamentary reports, and local comments, in brief by means of all those elements which constitute the spirit and policy of a newspaper, is enlisted in the service of this non- ItaUan Bank, to create public opinion, propagate its ideas, and mould the thoughts of the people." ("La Germania alia Conquista dell'Italia," p. 130.) Fm-ther than this, with multifarious ramifications stretching in every corner of the peninsula, the in- fluence of the bank could make itself potently felt. It was no very difficult matter to materially assist the candidacy of a Deputy who was favoiu-able to the German interests of the Commerciale in Italy. Not content with taking an active part in internal pontics, the bank now interfered in Italy's foreign relations. It would not seem doubtful that, acting on instructions received from Berlin, the bank exerted every influence to prevent the Italo-Turkish War, and when this was no longer possible, pressure was brought to bear to bring the campaign to a speedy conclusion, and save Turkish susceptibilities. Unable 196 GREATER ITALY to prevent the war, the German 'interests" were, however, able to negotiate the terms of peace. Two of the three delegates who negotiated the Treaty of Lausanne were closely identified with the bank. It has been suggested that the dictatorship of Gio- litti was alone made possible by the fact that he was supported by this Pan-German institution. What- ever the truth of the matter may be, it would seem that during the latter years of his administration Giolitti entered into close relations with the bank. The concession of AdaHa in Asia Minor, granted to Italy in 1913, was turned over to the Commerciale. The establishment of the Bank of Albania was, in so far as it concerned its Italian share, intrusted to this same institution. Several men, closely allied to the bank, were appointed Senators by Giolitti,^ and other proofs have been brought forward to show that Giolitti and the Banca Commerciale held Italy in subjection bordering on political and economic slavery. Writing of the condition of Italy as the result of the manoeuvres of this Pan-German institution, M. Preziosi declares : "The great calamity of Italy is that this bank not only controls the navigation companies, the metal- lurgical and manufacturing industries, but likewise the greater part, if not all, the industrial enterprises which speciahse in the manufacture of armaments. This explains not only the power of the bank, but also its poUcy. The Commerciale, controlling such an enormous and formidable mass of interests, exercises an almost overpowering influence on our political life and public opinion. Many of our so-called leading lawyers, numberless engineers, manufacturers, sena- 1 Ov. cit., p. 145. ITALY AND GERMANY 197 tors, deputies, statesmen, officers of the army and of the navy, members of the clergy, etc., obey its com- mands. The Banca Commerciale had its candidate for the premiership "in reserve," and there was a moment in which this candidacy nearly triumphed. The influence which the bank exercises is vast, and is increasing continuously. Newspapers great and small in the capitals and in the provinces, smaller banks, stock companies held in leash — these are means by which the Commerciale dominates and directs the life of Italy."! It is one of the most curious phenomena of Ger- man penetration in Italy that it rallied to its sup- port many sincere and ardent partisans among the upper and more intelhgent classes of the country, unsoUcited. The causes of this trend must be sought in the temper of our times. For the past sixty years, economic development has been the sole objective of Western civilisation. The unbridled exploitation wliich would turn man into an automaton, and make him an adjunct of a machine, has been the result of the frenzy for efficiency and organisation, inaugurated by Germany. The megalomania of Germany, the triumphant struggle for commercial and industrial expansion, for the conquest of world markets, the dreams of world dominion, the Pan- German programmes of world hegemony awakened in the minds of the Italians profound and unbounded admiration. Whether they saw mirrored in German aims and German ambitions their own longings is not easily determined; whether by an atavism which hearkened back through the ages to the times of Imperial Rome, they sought to conceive a future Im- 1 Op. cit., p. 86. 198 GREATER ITALY perial Italy, ruling again both shores of the Mediter- ranean, the sober fact remains that the bond which united Italy with Germany was the source of exulta- tion and pride. It was not the men who concluded the Triple AlHance, but their successors twenty or even thirty years later, the Italians of to-day, who, before the European War broke out, were the most enthusi- astic Germanophiles. During the present century Ger- many, in the eyes of the people of Italy, has stood forth as the embodiment of all the essential characteristics by which world power is achieved. Blinded by the glare of the shining armour of Germany, by the dis- ciphne of her regiments, the efficiency of her military organisation, by the amazing piles of statistical tables which computed by hundreds of thousands and mil- lions the increase in her population, the expansion of her commerce, the production of her industries, the accumulation of her wealth, Italy stood bewildered at the thought that she would perhaps share this power, enjoy this wealth and prosperity. So that within recent years all Italy, save a few isolated groups, had become frankly Germanophil. Socialists, con- servatives and nationalists, freethinkers and clericals, university professors, scientists and philosophers, art- ists and musicians, the nobility and the middle classes, all joined in a public profession of faith, in a hymn of praise to this new deity, '^ Germany." Hand in hand with this untrammelled ^'Germanism" there was a growing, contemptuous disregard for France, owing in part to the German trumpetings of French decadence, wjiich resounded broadcast throughout Italy; while the conviction that Great Britain was being rapidly driven out of the world's markets, and ITALY AND GERMANY 199 was no longer in a position to compete with Germany, was daily gaining headway. It is interesting in looking-for the immediate pal- pable causes of this astonishing ^'Germanophilism" to note the part played by the German Emperor, William II. We are still in too close propinquity to the conditions under discussion to gain a clear-cut perspective of events, but it would seem beyond ques- tion that the influence of William II was preponderant in bringing about this pro-German intoxication. Not a year passed without repeated visits of the Hohen- zoUern Emperor to Italy. Now it was Venice, then Brindisi, now Rome or Naples, or Palermo which caught a gHmpse of the Imperial presence, in ghtter- ing state and glory. Not once or twice, but again and again Wilham II came on one pretext or another. Now, he appeared in Rome, and presented to the Imperial City a statue of Goethe, which was unveiled with much ceremony in the gardens of the Villa Bor- ghese. Then in the company of the King of Italy he visited the Abbey of Montecassino, a German monas- tery which was the centre of much valuable German propaganda; or again the Imperial yacht Hohenzollern cruised in SiciHan waters, or appeared suddenly amid the lagoons of Venice, and cast anchor close to St. Mark's. Whether these repeated visits to Italy were pure policy or predilection, is difficult to infer. In all probabiHty it was a combination of both. Thus during recent years while insidiously the chains of Itahan servitude were being forged, on the surface the cordial- ity, consideration, and friendship of the most power- ful monarch in the world, won for Germany many stanch and faithful adherents throughout Italy. It 200 GREATER ITALY was not only the Emperor, but his most able and brilliant Chancellor, Prince Biilow, who sought to weave the Prussian spell over Italy. Retiring from the Chancellorship, he took up his residence in Rome, and soon succeeded in forming a pro-German coterie, which was made up of Italians more devoted to Ger- man than to ItaKan interests. And in the wake of the Emperor and the former Chancellor each year saw a more numerous tide of invasion of Germans of all classes. Italy has always been the land of promise for the peoples of the North. The Germans now came in droves as tourists. Many remained to take up their residence. They built hotels along the coast of Liguria; their villas dotted the hillsides of Rapallo and Capri, the Lido and Taormina. They opened small shops and large bazaars. German doctors established their sanatoria, and in their train came German patients, nurses, and chemists. In the region of the Lake of Garda, the Germans almost drove out the natives. In recent years German signs were everywhere to be seen along the lake side, and at the small stations around the lake the names of the towns were called out in the German language. German commercial travellers crossed Italy from one end of the country to the other, selling German wares. Ac- cording to statistics gathered in 1914, there were 80,000 Germans permanently or semi-permanently resident in Italy, of whom 40,000 lived in Lombardy and Venetia. These same statistics showed only 3,000 British and 4,000 French residents. To hasten the Germanisation of Italy, which was aheady making such rapid strides, other mediums were now openly made use of. The Prussian Historical Institute, which ITALY AND GERMANY 201 had been founded in 1888 for the purpose of permit- ting German scholars to pursue their studies in the Vatican Archives, the German Archaeological Society (Jstituto Germanico in Campidoglio a Roma), where the study of art, science, and the humanities had hitherto been pursued in cloistered seclusion, now became focal centres, directing and propagating Pan-German doc- trines of Germanic world superiority and racial su- premacy. While the web of Pan-Germanism was thus being woven ever more intricately, and the upper classes in Italy had become thoroughly saturated with Ger- man ideas and ideals, the masses had remained rela- tively untouched by the alien taint. The prosperity which Italy was enjoying, the relatively high wages, and soHd benefits which the people were receiving, were their sole immediate interest. But when, after the outbreak of the European War, the Italian people became convinced that Germany was responsible for the war, when the stories of the violation of Belgium came to be known, the century-old hatred for the Germans, which had slumbered in the hearts of the masses since the days of the Guelphs and the Ghib- beUnes, burst forth. Italy, during the early weeks of the European War passed through long days of careful searching of heart, and awoke to the full realisation of her plight. She was no longer the master in her own home. The Ger- mans and the pro-Germans held the country bound and gagged. Though Germany was unable to force Italy into a war against her best interests — ^it has even been suggested that up to the last minute Berlin had assigned to Italy a role of most friendly and useful 202 GREATER ITALY "neutrality," as best suited to Pan-German aims — she was able to confuse public opinion and scatter the seeds of distrust and perplexity throughout the peninsula. Among a small section of the upper classes the significance of the enormity of the situation dawned slowly. They soon became convinced that only a war could shake off the shackles of bondage, could arouse the national spirit of the people. But the masses were unanimously in favour of peace, and a ma- jority of the upper classes were still openly pro-Ger- man in their sympathies. Italy had been friendly to Germany ever since the days of the founding of the Kingdom; the Italians had trusted the Germans blindly; many still trusted, and the remainder feared Germany. The Italians had learned thoroughly from their German masters the lessons of ruthless reahsm in pohtics. The most enthusiastic pro-Germans in Italy could not consistently oppose the putting into practice at this opportune moment of those principles and methods of world pohtics which Germany had taught so forcefully. Though Italy was bound by ties of alhance with Austria, the alliance was regarded openly by the most fervid "Triplists" as merely as an opportunist arrangement. It had been imposed on Italy in the days of Italy's weakness. The European War had suddenly placed Italy in a position of mastery towards Austria. The national aspirations of the ItaHan people had long been held in check, and these must now be reahsed. Applying the German lessons of RealpoUtik to her own case, Italy must seize this opportunity to satisfy her vital interests. With the bulk of the Aus- trian forces engaged in a lif e-and-death struggle against ITALY AND GERMANY 203 Russia, the moment had arrived for Italy to strike. Here was a stepping-stone to world power. And so the weapons which Germany had placed in Italian hands were to be tm'ned against her. The economic development of the country, which had been of Ger- man origin and had been carried on in German in- terests, had rendered the Italians strong and confident; now the Pan-German doctrines of ruthless aggression which had been so assertively reiterated, were to be made use of to stab Germany to the heart. Such was the tragedy which was to be enacted. But Germany still felt confident in her abihty to hold Italy pinioned to the ground. Italy grew more restive as the months passed, and the speedy con- clusion of a victorious war, so often proclaimed by Germany, was again and again postponed. The moral forces of the Italian people began to gather strength. Defections from the pro-German ranks, among the younger, more intelligent and aggressive Italians, grew daily more numerous. The conduct of foreign affairs had been intrusted to Baron Sonnino, a man imbued with German doc- trines and a chief protagonist of the Triple Alliance, who now saw clearly that the best interests of Italy demanded that the chains of this alliance be severed. WilHam II thereupon sent his most skilled emissary. Prince Biilow, to Rome. On his arrival he conducted himself in the manner of a Proconsul in conquered territory. He mobihsed the Pan-German organisa- tion, so patiently perfected in times of peace. The mission of Prince Biilow was to impose upon Italy a poUcy of continued neutrality. The Banca Com- merciale, the Vatican, and Giolitti became the chief 204 GREATER ITALY auxiliaries of his efforts. His obstruction was for a time successful. Italy, bewildered by the strength and resource of the Germans, hesitated to pursue an independent policy. German gold and German threats for a time held the country in leash. To appease the more aggressive elements, the German envoy offered Italy territorial compensations at the expense of Aus- tria, and endeavoured to direct Italian attention towards Tunis, Corsica, and Malta. But the Italians were not to be deceived by these machinations. They had been thoroughly initiated into the secrets of German methods. They understood fully German deductive processes and the mechanism of Pan- Germanic procedure. They knew that the liberty and independence of Italy could only be regained by the defeat of Germany. They now understood clearly that it would be of no value to Italy to have her flag float over the Trentino and Trieste, if the German flag flew at Tangier, or the Austrian over Salonika. Nevertheless, Italy proceeded with caution. The bitter lessons of "isolation" had taught her to weigh her policy step by step. A storm of moral conversion was sweeping over the land. Dull rumblings, like those of some great volcano ready to erupt, shook the peninsula. The Germans redoubled their zeal. The pressure of Prince Billow's ''diplomacy" in- creased in violence and brutality. Then when he per- ceived that his efforts were doomed to failure, the Germans made frantic efTorts to retain for them- selves at least a portion of their former dominance. In this they were in part successful. The rupture of diplomatic relations between Italy and Germany at the outbreak of the Austro-Italian War was preceded ITALY AND GERMANY 205 by the negotiation of a treaty which was to safeguard German economic interests in Italy. In return for certain privileges granted to Italians who had long been resident in Germany, more especially by an ar- rangement by which Germany agreed to pay the pensions due to Italian workmen who were Uving or had hved in Germany, Italy consented not to sequester property belonging to Germans in the peninsula. By this agreement Germany had protected over £150,- 000,000 worth of property, owned by Germans in Italy, and in return was to continue the payments to Italians, amounting to about £200,000 annually. This arrangement was at the time interpreted in the nature of a "reinsurance" treaty. Whether Italian politicians, uncertain of the temper of the Italian people, wished to safeguard themselves in so far as possible, or whether as seems more likely, the Italian Ambassador at Berlin who was known to be distinctly pro-German, was able to influence his Govermnent to accede to the German proposal, the treaty was hailed by the Germans as a sign that their hold over Italy had not been broken. It would be useless to contend that in a few months the work of three decades can be wiped out. The roots of Pan- Germanism have struck deep in Italy. The process of uprooting must of necessity be slow if it is to be thorough. Thus Italy waged war on the ally of Ger- many for over a year, before the pressure of events from abroad forced her to declare war on Germany. But during that time the process of purification had continued. The majority of the pro-Germans have been weaned from their former allegiance, and the work of national redemption continues. 206 GREATER ITALY What the relations of Italy and Germany will be in the future can only be surmised. The Italians, whether they willed it or not, have accepted many German poUtical precepts. The political and econ- omic life of Italy during the past twenty years has not been conducive to bringing forth the type of statesman or financier who could lead the country boldly into the safe channels of national emancipa- tion. Whatever the course of the relations between Italy and^Germany may be in the future, the legend of German superiority and invincibility has been shat- tered. If cordial intercourse with Germany is re- sumed by Italy more rapidly than by the other Powers, it will be on the terms of perfect equality, in pur- suance of a policy of self-interest. Italy would seem to have taken firmly into her own hands the conduct of her affairs. The German has been driven out of Italy; the vigilance of the Italian people can be re- lied upon to see to it that he will not be permitted to return. CHAPTER X THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC Relations with Austria. The Need of Hegemony. Italians and Slavs Italy, on entering the Triple Alliance, had ar- bitrarily sacrificed her interests in the Adriatic in order to safeguard what she believed to be her more vital interests in the Mediterranean. When, by her increased strength and subsequent agreements with Great Britain, these interests were protected, the Itahans felt themselves at hberty to again turn their eyes eastward and take up the threads of their plans to secure the control of the Adriatic. Among the varied imperiahst ambitions which have been fanned to flame by the growth of na- tionahsm during recent years, the one most Ukely to cause unending difficulties to those upon whom it will be incumbent to rearrange the map of Europe, will be the allotment of the lands bordering the East- ern Adriatic. Whereas in other fields the issues are relatively well defined, and since the outbreak of the European War the struggle may be quahfied as German vs. French, German vs. British, German vs. Russian, none of the conflicts impinging but correla- tive; in the Adriatic a threefold struggle to the death is going on, which would appear likely to continue as a menace to the peace of Europe. Leaving out- 207 208 GREATER ITALY side of immediate consideration Germany's interest in the affairs of the Adriatic, which is chiefly an out- growth of the Pan-Germanic movement, and as such essentially alien to the Adriatic, the grave danger lies in the fact that the conflict here is one of ethnic imperiaHsm — Itahan and Slav. The Adriatic has become the scene of a struggle where these opposing influences, both equally strong and equally deter- mined to resist a outrance any intrusion of the other, stand face to face. The Italians are striving to re- gain their ancient prestige in the Adriatic, to redeem their irredente provinces, and once again extend the sway of Rome eastward. The Jugo-Slavs, after centuries of oppression in turn by the Turks and the Austrians, when finally they shall have thrown off the yoke of the latter, are eager to realise their na- tional independence. Looking at a map of the Adriatic, it would appear at first sight as though Italy and the Dual Monarchy held respectively an equal share of the littoral. But a brief study of the topographical configuration of these regions will at once reveal the inferiority of Italy's share. The Italian coast-line is, from one end of Italy to the other, a slow-sloping, sandy beach land, affording few harbours, none of which are of strategic value, whereas the opposite shore, held by Austria- Hungary, is a rocky coastland, dotted with over 600 islands, containing some of the finest natural har- bours in the world, such as Cattaro and Sebenico, affording a preponderant strategic advantage to the country possessing them. With the Austrian navy- able to protect itself behind these natural ramparts, leaving the Italian coast-line exposed and vulnerable, THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 209 it can readily be understood that Italy felt herself threatened as long as Austria should remain, or any other power succeeding to the Austrian heritage should be permitted to become established along the Adriatic. This geographical inferiority of Italy was further emphasised by the fact that by the Con- gress of Berlin in 1878, Austria was intrusted with the police duties of the Montenegrin waters, which indirectly gave her commercial fleet a great impetus, so that within recent years Austrian ships (17,230) in the Adriatic outnumbered the Italian ten to one, while their total tonnage (605,551) was nearly twenty times as great. However, the Italians to-day hold the Adriatic to be an indivisible unit, whose domination must eventually again rest with Italy, if Italy is to survive as a great Power. According to a favourite Italian interpretation, and it cannot be denied that it is not altogether unjustified, geographically speaking, the nat- ural boundary of Italy lies beyond the shore-line of the Eastern Adriatic. Since earliest historic times this region has, with brief interregnums, been indissolubly linked with the West by the ties of Rome. A study of the map, so they claim, will indicate that it is not the Adriatic but the JuHan Alps, the Velebit Mountains, and the Dinaric Alps, towering along the coastal fringe of the Northern and Eastern Adriatic, which form the bulwark, which, according to the Italian thesis, is the natural boundary of Italy. Already as early as 177 B. C. the Romans realised the necessity of acquiring the control of the lands beyond the Adriatic in order to insure the safety of the Italian peninsula, when in that year they conquered the territory of the North- 210 GREATER ITALY eastern Adriatic, which is present-day Istria, and formed the province of Illyricum. Two centuries later under Augustus, Dalmatia was annexed to Illyria, and for centuries continued a flourishing Roman do- minion whose former splendour is testified to by the Palace of Diocletian at Spalato, and ruins at Zara and elsewhere. The Gothic invasions followed, and during the era of darkness of the Middle Ages, the lands of the Eastern Adriatic sank to a level of quasi- barbarism under Slavic dominion, from the sixth to the eleventh century. Then once again these regions passed into the hands of the ItaHans under the pro- tection of the Venetian Republic, to continue Italian with varying fortunes for eight centuries. In the heyday of the power of Venice, the Adriatic was a mare clausum); both its shores from Bari to Venice in the west, and from Trieste to Ragusa and Corfu in the east, were lined with thriving, wealthy cities, where ItaHan culture, language, and customs held undisputed sway. A people of more ancient and unquestionably superior culture, the Itahans who settled in the cities along the shores of the Eastern Adriatic concerned themselves Httle with the rural inhabitants, whether Croat, Slovene, Serb, or Albanian. Satisfied with a thin strip of coastland, they made no attempt to penetrate into the interior, nor to colonise in any real sense of the word, content with the trade and commerce of the littoral and the wealth gained thereby. As long as no competitor appeared in the field, the "ItaUanism" of the Eastern Adriatic re- tained its hold, long after the power of Venice had passed away and Austria had succeeded to the Vene- tian domain. When, in 1866, Venice was united with THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 211 the Kingdom of Italy, Austria still retained the an- cient Venetian possessions of the Eastern Adriatic. Then out of the East, as an indirect result of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, the ever-rising tide of Pan-Slavism rolled across the Balkans. The Arch- duke Francis Ferdinand, the heir to the Hapsburg throne, seconded by his morganatic wife, the Countess Chotek, herself a Slav, who was devoted to the Slav cause in so far as it coincided with her personal ambi- tions, conceived a plan of uniting all the Jugo-Slav elements of southeastern Europe with the Czechs and Poles of the north, and making the Slavs the dom- inant factor in the Dual Monarchy. The increased strength of the Slavs thus channelled would, so the Archduke believed, rejuvenate the senile Hapsburg realm. Excluded by Prussia from participation in the affairs of Germany in 1866, and by Italy from those of the Italian peninsula in the same year, Aus- tria turned her eyes on the Balkans and fixed upon Salonika as the goal of her ambitions in the south, while all the intervening territory of the Balkans to the shores of the Adriatic, acquired by "penetra- tion" or conquest, was to round out this new pre- ponderately Slav-Hapsburg Empire. This programme had two chief antagonists — the free Serbs and the Itahans. The eHmination of Serbia was required to reach Salonika, while that of the irredente Italians was necessary to secure the hegemony of the Adriatic. To this latter task the Austrians first turned their attention. By favouring the Slav elements of the populations of the Adriatic, by encouraging them to persecute the Italians of their districts, at the same time placing every sort of hardship and difficulty 212 GREATER ITALY in the path of these Italians, by arousing in the basest manner the race prejudice and hatred of the Jugo- slavs against the Italians, the future ruler of the Dual Monarchy hoped to accomplish his designs. He was zealously assisted in the undertaking by the Slav clergy, which has always lent itself willingly to any political design of the Hapsburgs. Up to the opening years of the present century Italy was too weak to give any material support to her nationals abroad, and Austria, under the tutelage of the Heir Apparent, with unabated fury strove to crush and extirpate the Italian population and in- fluence along the Eastern Adriatic. When, by 1903, Italy had strengthened her position as a World Power, and was able to lend a hand to her compatriots across the Adriatic, she set to work with great skill and en- ergy, not only to keep aHve the Italianism of such lo- calities as were of Italian character, but eager to gain a position of preponderant influence across the water and forestall the aims of Hapsburg expansion, she con- cerned herself with the affairs of Montenegro. This small Slav State, the outpost of Slav independence in the west, was bound to Italy by family ties, as Italy's Queen is the daughter of King Nicholas, at that time the ruling prince of Montenegro. The Italians had little difficulty in gaining a secure economic foothold here. Encouraged by this success, Italian agents became active in Albania. This country, then a semi- independent Turkish province, soon became a profit- able field for the extension of Italian influence. As the Albanians lived in a state of semi-mediseval feu- dalism — each man an arsenal, each village a fortress, without any real government — it was not difficult for THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 213 Italy to find frequent pretexts for interfering in Al- banian affairs. The Italians established schools, newspapers, banks, etc., and carried on an extensive propaganda. It soon became evident that Italy would not tolerate that any other Power should become es- tablished in Albania at the dissolution of the Turkish Empire in Europe, which could not be long delayed. For, aside from the fact that Albania was a region wliich offered promising prospects of future develop- ment, the port of Avlona, situated opposite Brindisi across the narrow straits of Otranto, would, if held by a foreign Power, bottle Italy up in the Adriatic. As it had long been foreseen that Albania might be- come a casus belli between Austria and Italy, as early as 1897 a verbal agreement had been entered into between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Goluchowski, and the King of Italy, by which both parties agreed to refrain from acquiring any portion of Albania, though both agreed to favour the establishment of an autonomous Albania, in case Turkey should disappear from the Balkans. This agreement was in 1899 set down in writing and sub- sequently reaffirmed in 1905. However, Austria did not remain inactive in Albanian affairs. She feignedly espoused the cause of Albania independence, fostered the expansion of the Albanian language, combated Italian propaganda as well as Turkish suzerainty, and with the help of the Vatican, as the protector of the 220,000 Albanian Roman Catholics, succeeded in gaining a dominant position in the country. In 1906 the Austrian Imperialists, who were in the confidence of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, be- came impatient. They were anxious to make a trial 214 GREATER ITALY of the new strength of the Hapsburg realm. The combined Grand Manoeuvres of the Austro-Hun- garian army and navy were in that year held in Dal- matia, which was intended as a threat towards Italy. This was followed by the appointment of General Conrad von Hotzendorf to the position of Chief of the Austrian General Staff. The appointment could not fail to arouse the apprehension of Italy, as General Conrad was known to have gained the confidence of Francis Ferdinand chiefly because of his violent hatred of Italy, and his reiterated memorials of the necessity of declaring war against Italy at the first opportunity. He even went so far as to outline in detail the plan of campaign. In October of the same year Baron von Aehrenthal was appointed Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was known to be a man of action who would push forward the plans of Hapsburg aggrandisement with utmost vigour. The era of Austrian expansion was thus inaugurated. The ensuing two years were busily employed by the new Foreign Minister, on the one hand in putting to sleep Italian suspicions regarding Aus- trian expansion along the Adriatic, which had been aroused by the acts above mentioned, and at the same time in paving the way for the realisation of the Arch- duke's plans. In how far Austria was directly responsible for the ''Young Turk" revolution which broke out in July, 1908, Hes beyond the scope of this work, but it was the spark which Ughted the trail of powder which crossed the Balkans from one end to the other. Three months afterwards, on October 5, came Count Aehren- thal's grand coup; the proclamation of the definitive THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 215 annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Dual Monarchy. By this bold stroke 1,800,000 Slavs were added to the ranks of Hapsburg subjects. For a moment the peace of Europe hung in the balance. But the promise of German support to Austria im- mobihsed whatever desire Russia may have had to protect the Jugo-Slavs. Italy viewed with misgivings the reviving strength of the Dual Monarchy, and she felt her interests in the Adriatic now seriously endangered. Under the fostering hand of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand the Slavs of the Adriatic had prospered. They had already gained an overwhelming numerical superior- ity along the whole eastern littoral. In Dalmatia, out of a population of 645,000 inhabitants in 1910, 96 per cent were Slavs (Serbo-Croats) and only 3 per cent ItaUans. Along the Croatian httoral the popu- lation is wholly Slav, with the exception of the city of Fiume with a population of 49,822, of whom ap- proximately one-half are Italians. In Istria of 403,- 566 inhabitants two-thirds are Slavs, the remainder are Italian. Trieste itself, the chief centre of the Italianism of the Eastern Adriatic, was slowly giving way under the repeated onslaughts of the Slavs, and though in the city itself they maintained a majority (118,959 ItaHans, 60,074 Slavs), yet the Slavic pop- ulations were daily encroaching on the surrounding territory so that within two miles of the city only Slav villages and towns are to be found. In the prov- ince of Gorizia the Slavs have already gained com- plete numerical control with 155,275 Slovenes as against 90,119 Itahans. While the Archduke was busily engaged with his 216 GREATER ITALY plans of eventually bringing all the Jugo-Slavs under Hapsburg hegemony, forces were at work which gave a new trend to events in the Eastern Adriatic. This is the Pan-Serb movement which, with independent Serbia as its kernel, supported and protected by Rus- sia and having enlisted the open sympathy of leading publicists and statesmen in France and Great Britain, was to rally the entire Jugo-Slav world to its standard. By arousing the latent nationalism among the Southern Slavs, Serbia hoped to unite these diverse elements of kindred race under her national leadership, as Prussia and Piedmont within their respective lands had done a half century before. The most active supporters of this movement were the Slavs of the Adriatic, chiefly Dalmatians who had tasted the first-fruits of liberty under the protecting hand of the Austrian Heir Apparent, and now wished to turn to their own advantage their acquired strength; while Russia saw in this new State the possibility of dominat- ing the Balkans, and France and England a tangible safeguard against the Austro-German Drang nach Osten. After the Pan-Serb Congress held in 1909 at Laibach, the capital of Carniola, the political ambitions of the Jugo-Slavs became a living factor in the affairs of the Adriatic. The creation of a great Slav State, under the hegemony of Serbia, stretching from the confines of Bulgaria to the eastern boundary of Venetia, in- cluding Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slavonia, Is- tria, Dalmatia, and Carniola and possibly Albania, with a population of over 12,000,000 people, kindred in race, language, and tradition; this is the programme which the Jugo-Slavs set for themselves. Of these, THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 217 8,100,000 were under Hapsburg rule. This new State, if it should become a Jait accompli, controlling, as planned, the great ports of Trieste, Cattaro, Avlona, and Salonika, was held by the Italians to be a grave menace to their vital interests and its establishment must at all cost be combated. Though fact and fiction regarding the aims and plans of the Dual Monarchy are so closely inter- mingled, and the events of so recent origin as to preclude a thorough and dispassionate examination of the conflicting factors, it nevertheless is evident that as soon as the Pan-Serb programme above men- tioned was clearly formulated, as soon as the Aus- trians realised the potential strength of this new Slav movement, which they believed could count almost unreservedly on the full support of the Russian Em- pire, they threw themselves into the arms of their German allies, and the reins of independent leader- ship in foreign affairs virtually passed from Vienna to the Berlin Government. The position of Italy, bound by the Triple Al- liance, was perplexing. Though the leading Italian statesmen were all loyal supporters of the Triple Al- liance, they began to realise that Italy would, sooner or later, be confronted by a coalition of Austro-Ger- man interests in the Adriatic, bent on destroying Italian prestige and influence along its eastern lit- toral, while on the other hand, the peril of a Slav em- .pire, confronting them across the narrow waters, was an altogether unpleasant alternative. Inspired by confidence in Austria's new, closely knit relations with Germany which materially weak- ened the Russian menace, the Archduke continued 218 GREATER ITALY with redoubled zeal his policy of favouring the Slavs and persecuting the Italians. The most influential Viennese personages made no secret of the fact that they believed that in the Adriatic, Austria, as in- heritor of the domains of Venice, alone had the right to dominate this body of water, and that at the first favourable opportunity Austria would assert her in- aUenable rights. To be in a position to do so she in- creased the size and efficiency of her navy. Two of the most faithful servants of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand were despatched to the Adriatic littoral to stamp out the last embers of Italian national spirit which still lingered there — the Prince Hohenlohe as Governor of Trieste and the Count Wickenburg to Fiume. They rivalled one another in their zeal in crushing the Italian elements of their respective dis- tricts, and made no attempt to disguise their efforts, while they fostered the loyalty of the Slavs for the Hapsburgs, which was still strong, by ever more blat- ant cajolery and favoritism. The problem of the Adriatic now entered upon a new phase. Under the stress of the anger aroused in Italy by these events, the irredentist movement there, which had long been dormant, or at least had taken on the form of a literary, rather than a political, move- ment, again burst forth. Early in 1909 Gabriel d'An- nunzio, entering for the first time the arena of national political discussion in which he was to play so de- cisive a part later on, published his poem ''La Nave," and referred therein to the ''most bitter waters of the Adriatic," hinting clearly that the time had come for Italy to assert herself in the Adriatic if the eastern shorelands were not to be irretrievably lost. Though THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 219 in popular opinion the sufferings of the unredeemed Italians aroused the ire of the people of Italy, and revived acutely the vexed irredente question, yet many of the more intelligent Italians foresaw that the orientation of events portended a clash of forces in the Adriatic and the Near East, which would in- volve all the nations of Europe and that Italy, owing to her peculiar position, must be strong enough to defend her vital interests. The Slav ambitions in the Adriatic must hence- forth be considered independently from the Austrian, while the Pan-German aims now demand brief at- tention. If one should attempt to trace back to its source the interference of Prussia in the affairs of the Adriatic, no more significant document could be produced than the copy of a letter from the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs which Count Brassier de St. Simon, the Prussian Minister at Turin, left with Count Cavour in December, 1860. It throws an illuminating light on Prussian sentiment at this early date. Though conditions have altered materially, and Trieste is no longer within the boundaries of the '^ Germanic Con- federation," Prussian and Pan-German sentiments have in nowise changed. ''To Count Brassier de Saint-Simon, Turin. "BerUn, 24/12, 1860. "My Dear Count: "It is only a few days since we have knowledge of a decree, dated November 8, and published in the official gazette, II Corriere delle Marche, according to which the Commissioner Extraordinary of H. M. the King of Sardinia in the Marches, M. Lorenzo 220 GREATER ITALY Valerio, confirms in the name of his Sovereign all the privileges which the Papal Government has granted to the Austrian Lloyd. If we had not been unaware of the existence of this document up to the present time we would not have failed to call the attention of Count Cavour sooner to two passages which it contains, and which were for us the cause of acute and painful surprise. M. Lorenzo Valerio in the preamble of his above mentioned decree asserts among other things that the company known under the name of Austrian Lloyd, does not belong to the Power whose name it bears. I must confess that it has been impossible for me to follow the arguments on the strength of which M. Lorenzo Valerio arrived at the conclusion of his strange assertion, though I do not hesitate to declare that in our eyes the Austrian Lloyd, a company whose head offices are located in the German city of Trieste {la ville allemande de Trieste), is in truth an Austrian company. M. Valerio furthermore expresses the opinion that Trieste is not a German city, and that it is only by duress that the treaties have incorporated it in Germany. He also affirms that the city of Trieste has given unequiv- ocal proofs that she considers herself as belonging to Italy and not to Germany. I do not know on what facts M. Valerio rehes for accusing the city of Trieste of manifestations which, from our point of view, would have to be quahfied as treason against our common country. However, we must vigorously protest against the conclusion which M. Valerio has evidently drawn based on facts to which he refers without knowing them. Prussia has refrained from interfering up to the present in all the disturbances which have arisen in the Peninsula recently. But she has always reserved for herself the right to object in case the Italian movement developed so as to no longer respect the German frontiers, as delineated by treaties, which frontiers by virtue of these same treaties Prussia is obliged to defend. But it is evident that THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 221 the decree of M. Lorenzo Valerio raises pretensions altogether incompatible with the rights of the Ger- manic Confederation. I do not doubt that Count Cavour disapproves wholly of the language of M. Valerio. But inasmuch as this official has spoken in the name of His Majesty King Victor Emmanuel, we would fail to fulfil our duty if we passed over in silence an incident which must necessarily worry Germany regarding the ultimate aim of the Italian movement. By order of His Royal Highness, the Prince Regent, I request you to ask the President of the Council: (1) Whether the Commissioner Extraordinary in the Marches really spoke in the name of his Sovereign as the text of the decree announces, and if he ex- pressed the opinion of his Government regarding the Austrian Lloyd and the city of Trieste. (2) Whether if this is not the case, M. Valerio has been admonished. Requesting you to advise me as soon as possible of the answer of Count Cavour, I authorise you to leave with him, if he so desires, a copy of the present despatch.^ "Kindly accept, etc., etc. " SCHLEINITZ." After the creation of the German Empire, Bismarck never failed to impress upon Italy that Germany would not tolerate that Trieste should fall into the hands of the Italians. Repeated efforts were made to encourage and increase German prestige in Trieste and other cities of the northern Adriatic. For two decades every effort was made by the German ele- ments of Vienna, at the instigation of the Germans of Germany, to establish a flourishing German colony in these regions. But the attempts were only par- tially successful. Many of the descendants of these ^ Chiala: "Lettere edite e inedite di Camillo Cavour," Vol. TV. 222 GREATER ITALY German "colonists" became assimilated with the Italian elements of the community, and soon joined the ranks of the most ardent irredentists. Those few who remained steadfast to their German allegiance formed the nucleus of a group of wealthy industrial and commercial firms whose affiliations with Germany rendered them influential, though numerically insig- nificant.^ When, early in the present century, Germany had created for herself a dominant position in Asia Minor, and, by the so-called "trust of thrones" had woven a web of Germanophil sovereigns over all the Balkan States, with the exception of Serbia, and was thus artfully paving the way for the realisation of Hohen- zollern hegemony from Berlin to Bagdad, it became evident that Trieste had been selected as the south- western outlet of the great Central European State which the Pan-German Imperialists had set about to create. The Adriatic was the shortest water route from the German hinterland to the Mediterranean, while the domination of the shores of the Eastern Adriatic, as well as the road to Salonika, by the docile Hapsburgs, seemed from the German point of view the best solution of the difficult problem of ruling the Jugo -Slavs. These plans were being matured with all the patience and skill with which the Germans enter upon any enterprise, and, with the puissant resources that they were able to command, would, if realised, not only destroy the prosperity of the in- ^ Wickham Steed, in hia brilliant study of the "Hapsburg Monarchy" (p. 275), remarks that'the German, " Drang nach Triest has always been and remains a much more positive and practical factor of European politics than the Austro-Hungarian Drang nach Osten, or the dream of a ' March to Salonika.' " THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 223 dustrial and economic life which the ItaHans were laboriously building up, as well as their markets in the Mediterranean, but would thwart for all time Italian ambitions across the Adriatic. In order to protect herself against this imminent Austro-German peril, Italy now chose to pursue a policy of rapprochement with Russia, and indirectly with the Jugo-Slavs. The visit of the Tsar to the King of Italy at Racconigi in October, 1909, had inaugurated an era of friendliness between Rome and Petrograd which it was easy to cultivate. Though this policy must be judged as purely opportunist, yet it served its purpose in that it acted as a timely warning to Austria of the possibiUty of a joint action on the part of the Serbs and their Russian protectors, together with the ItaHans. This eventuality alone, it is believed, prevented the Austrians from attacking Italy when the latter was engaged in her Tripohtan campaign against Turkey (1911). Though the Arch- duke Francis Ferdinand paraded his belhcose inten- tions by a showy inspection of the Austrian fortifica- tions in the Trentino, he became convinced that the setthng of accounts with Serbia was a more urgent problem, which must be carried through before at- tacking Italy. For the programme of a '^Greater Serbia" was now assuming in Austrian eyes alarming proportions. Russian interest in Balkan affairs had become insistently active. A recrudescence of na- tionaHst enthusiasm incited by Russia began to assert itself. The Balkan peoples, in their eagerness to oust the Turk from the peninsula, forgot, for the time being, their differences and united in a common ac- tion. Then came the first Balkan War in the autumn 224 GREATER ITALY of 1912. Through the machinations of Vienna, the Serbs, who had borne the brunt of the conflict, were deprived of the fruits of their victorious campaign. Their moral prestige, however, had grown in stature, so as to become a real rather than a fancied menace to Hapsburg interests within the boundaries of the monarchy. The second Balkan War (1913), when Bulgaria fell upon her former allies, unleashed in all probabihty as the result of intrigues to which the en- tourage of the Austrian Heir Apparent was not alien, was to crush the growing power of the Serbs. Serbia, however, was again victorious, though she achieved no tangible benefits, and still found herself without an outlet to the sea. The repercussion of these events along the Eastern Adriatic was violent. The epic campaigns of the Serbs had fired the imagination of the Pan-Serbs, who be- Heved that their deliverance was at hand. Albania, freed from the Turkish yoke, was erected into an in- dependent kingdom by the London Conference in December, 1912. Italy sanctioned the candidature of Prince William of Wied as the ruler of the new king- dom, beheving it to be to her best interests to create an independent Albania, even though weakly gov- erned, and thus remove this vital segment of the Adriatic coastland from the field of expansion of either Hapsburg or Serb. Events now matured rapidly. The Jugo-Slav populations of the Dual Monarchy had become in- creasingly restive, and the Pan-Serb propaganda was daily gaining in strength. In order to forestall a Jugo-Slav revolution, which many Austrians feared would break out within the boundaries of the Mon- THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 225 archy, the Vienna Government, at the instigation of the Archduke, determined to strike a blow at the root of the Serb agitation, and by subjugating Serbia put an end to the dreams of the Pan-Serbs. The stage- setting for this coup de main was similar to that in the episode of the annexation of Bosnia. The meeting of the German Emperor and the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at Konopischt,^ in early June, 1914, seems to indicate that the Austrian Heir Apparent there laid his plans before his powerful ally. These consisted, after a suitable pretext had been found, of an Aus- trian punitive expedition against Serbia, the over- throw of the Karageorgevich dynasty, and the substitution of a servile sovereign who would work in the best interests of the Hapsburgs and Hohen- zollerns, as did the rulers of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Greece, at that time. The question of more drastic measures was left open. Judging from the confused state of public opinion and from the internal dissensions rife in France and Great Britain in the early summer of 1914, it seemed more than Hkely that this plan could be carried out without European interference. Though Italy, as an ally of Austria and Germany, had every right to be informed of these plans, the more so as Article VII of the treaty of the alliance definitely stipulated that "the Austro-Hungarian Government is obliged in exchange for the occupation of territory, even tem- ^ Konopischt is an old chdteau which belonged to the Archduke, situated in central Bohemia about thirty miles south of Prague. Here WiUiam II, accompanied by Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, arrived on June 11. The object of the Imperial visit was solemnly stated to be that "the Emperor desired to see the gardens of his friend, the Arch- duke, in full bloom." 226 GREATER ITALY porarily, to make a preventive agreement, and offer compensations," Rome was kept completely in the dark regarding Austro-German intentions, as it was evident that Italy could not be made a party to a bargain which was to increase the power and pos- sibly the dominions of the Dual Monarchy without any regard for Italian interests in the Adriatic, where the Archduke was more unwilling than ever to make any concessions. Francis Ferdinand then visited Bosnia for the pur- pose of military inspection. The expedition against Serbia, if it should take place, was to be launched along this lateral frontier. To disarm suspicion he was accompanied by his wife, now raised to the rank of a Highness and known as the Duchess of Hohen- berg, who looked forward confidently to the realisa- tion of her long-cherished desire of placing her son Maximilian, who was debarred by his morganatic birth from occup3dng the throne of the Hapsburgs, on another throne. The Sarajevo tragedy followed. The assassination of the Archduke and the Duchess cannot from the most reliable evidence as yet available be Unked with a prearranged political plot. It seems not unreasonable to suppose that this deed, like so many of the tragedies which have dogged the steps of the Hapsburgs in recent years, had no immediate relation whatever with impending events, and as such was merely fortuitous. Its causes must be sought outside the realm of politics, in all probability in court intrigues and designs of personal ambition. The murder of the Duchess of Hohenberg would appear to confirm this opinion. The removal of the Archduke from the scene came THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 227 too late to change the course of events. Half measures would no longer suffice. The survival of the Haps- burg Empire demanded that the Serbian undertaking be pushed to its logical conclusion. The ultimatum and declaration of war against Serbia found Russia, France, and Great Britain ready to act in concert against the Austro-German combination. Italy alone remained outside the conflict. No treaty obligations bound her to assist her allies in a war of aggres- sion. After the first days of upheaval Italy began to realise the inherent strength of her position as a neu- tral. Those in authority in Vienna were now aware of the mistake which the late Archduke had made in encouraging the Jugo-Slavs of the Adriatic to the detriment of the Italian populations and endeavoured to remedy matters by a poHcy of favoritism towards the Italians. The Prince Hohenlohe was removed from the governorship of Trieste and other concihatory measures were hastily introduced. But the Italians were in nowise deceived by these belated concessions. The opportunity was at last at hand for Italy to carry out her plans for the undisputed domination of the Adriatic. No longer content to lay claim only to the irredente coast towns, Italy foresaw the possibiHty of reahsing her ambition to become sole arbiter of aU the lands bordering the Adriatic. By November, 1914, ItaUan pretensions as voiced in a section of the ItaHan Press were formulated: the whole Eastern Adriatic from Trieste to Avlona, with the exception of a small strip of territory which would give Serbia an outlet to the sea, must become Italian. Eager to be avenged for the humiliations imposed on their 228 GREATER ITALY Italian brethren by Austria in recent years, and for the torture which Venetia and Lombardy had suf- fered at the hands of Austria before Itahan unity was achieved, it was the ambition of Italy to exclude Austria from any participation in the affairs of the Adriatic. Feeling secure in her armed neutrality, Italy took the first step to carry out her designs. On Christmas Day, 1914, the Italian Admiral Patris landed a body of marines at Avlona, where the preceding day a disturbance had occurred which caused the Italian Consul to demand protection. Avlona, it will be re- called, commands the entrance to the Adriatic. A magnificent natural harbour protected by steep cliffs, rising mountain high with only one narrow navigable channel of access, easily fortified, it could speedily be transformed into one of the strongest naval centres in the world. To place it outside the realm of Austro- Italian ambitions, Avlona had by the London Con- ference been incorporated in the Kingdom of Albania. Albania, owing to the weakness of its ruler, had not long survived its birth, and the ''King" having fled, the kingdom was held to be a defunct State. With Avlona in her possession, Italy now held securely the keys to the Adriatic. Even Russia, the protagonist of Jugo-Slav interests, appeared to approve of Italian occupation of Avlona. M. Sazonoff, the Russian Min- ister for Foreign Affairs, on congratulating Italy on her bold step, declared: "Albania no longer exists as an independent state; but Russia wishes that other peoples, the Serbs and Montenegrins, should be permitted to live, and their imprescriptible rights respected," wishing to affirm THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 229 thereby the right of the future Serbia to the north- ern portion of the late Albanian State. Italy immediately set about to establish herself firmly at Avlona. She extended the limits of the territory acquired until the city was safe from attack by land and sea. In the meantime Italy, while con- tinuing her attitude of friendly neutrality towards her ally Germany, did not lend a deaf ear to the pro- posals of the Allies to take up arms against Austria. As long as the Russian armies were victorious, Italy found the Allies unwilling to negotiate regarding such concessions in the Adriatic as the Italians believed essential to their vital interests. On the other hand, Germany was eager to secure the guarantee of Italy's permanent neutrality and urged the ItaHan Govern- ment to initiate negotiations with Vienna to this end. After various preliminary discussions, on April 8, 1915, Italy formally presented her claims to Austria-Hun- gary regarding the territorial concessions she re- quired in return for continued neutrality. The clauses which more particularly concern the Eastern Adriatic littoral are: "I. The cession of the Trentino, according to the frontiers of 1911. "II. A rectification of Italy's eastern frontier in her (Italy's) favour, comprising in the ceded territory the cities of Gradisca and Gorizia. The fine to run from Trogkofel eastward to Osternig; then via Saifnitz between the valley of the Seisera and the Schhtza to the Wischberg; from here along the existing frontier to the Nevea Saddle, and thence to the Isonzo east of Plezzo; continuing along the Isonzo to Tol- mino, whence it runs via Chiaporano and Comen to the sea, which it reaches at a point east of Nabresina, between Monfalcone and Trieste. 230 GREATER ITALY "III. The city of Trieste and its neighbourhood, including Nabresina up to the new Itahan frontier, and extending to the south to include the judicial districts of Capo dTstria and Pirano, to be constituted into an autonomous State, independent in all respects regarding international relations, military, legislative, financial and administrative affairs; Austria-Hungary renouncing all rights of sovereignty over the new State. Trieste to remain a free port. No troops, either Austro-Hungarian or Itahan shall be permitted to enter. The new State to assume its share of the Austrian public debt, in proportion to its population. "IV. Austria-Hungary shall cede to Italy the Cur- zolari Islands of the Dalmatian coast, including Lissa, Lesina, Curzola, Sagosta, etc. "V. Italy shall occupy immediately the ceded ter- ritory, and Trieste and its territory shall be imme- diately evacuated by Austro-Hungarian troops and civil authorities. "VI. The recognition of Italian sovereignty over Avlona, its bay including Sasseno, and hinterland necessary to their defense. "VII. Austria-Hungary renounces all claims to Al- bania."^ In return Italy pledged herself to remain neutral throughout the duration of the war and, furthermore, to pay an indemnification to Austria for Government property, debts, etc., amounting to £8,000,000. This programme, though moderate, nevertheless included the annexation of certain territory exclusively Slav. Towards the middle of April, 1915, or about a week after the above proposals were made by Italy, the Russian offensive had spent itself. The Germano- Austro-Hungarian forces were already initiating the movement that was to clear GaHcia and break the 1 The "Italian Official Green Book, May, 1915," Document No. 64. THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 231 Russian advance. The necessity of Italian inter- vention on the side of the AlHes became urgent. Rus- sia, after conceding to Italy the principle that no "Greater Serbia," as outlined by the Jugo-Slav pro- gramme, would be permitted to be created — ^but in- stead two Jugo-Slav States — made the following offer to Italy in return for her co-operation in the war on the side of the AlHes. In the event of the success of the Allied arms, which with Italian assistance seemed assured, Italy was to receive: "I. Aside from the Trentino, all of Friuli, Trieste, and the western shores of Istria, including Pirano, Capo dTstria, and the great naval base, Pola. *'II. The eastern shore of Istria and all territory as far south as the river Narenta was to belong to the new independent Croatian state, which was to be made up of Croatia, Slavonia, Carniola, and the greater part of Dalmatia; a State of some 4,000,000 inhab- itants, almost exclusively Slav, with Fiume, Zara, and Sebenico as its ports. "III. The remainder of the Dalmatian coast to be ceded to Serbia and Montenegro; Serbia was to receive also all of Bosnia and Herzegovina." It will be seen that this Russian proposal, while abandoning some of the chief Jugo-Slav preten- sions, ceded to Italy nearly all the territory which, before the war, had been claimed by ItaHan irre- dentists, and is far more comprehensive in scope than the demands made by Italy to Austria only a few days previous. Italy, however, rejected the Russian offer. The cause thereof may be sought in the fact that rumours had reached Rome, that in Russia there was a shortage of arms and mimitions, 232 GREATER ITALY that the Allies were in a more difficult position than they had been in since the beginning of the war, and that Italian co-operation was more valuable than could be estimated in mere terms of territorial con- cessions. Italy here had the opportunity she had long been waiting for, to secure the acquiescence of Great Britain, France, and Russia to the absolute Italian domina- tion in the Adriatic. Austria-Hungary, feeling more secure as the result of the recent successes of her arms under German leadership, rejected the Italian pro- posals, and Germany was content to threaten Italy with the well-known German "f rightfulness," should she dare to take up arms against her former ally. Whatever Russian or other opposition there may have been to abandoning the pretensions of the Jugo-Slavs to the right of united independence, in accordance with the principle of nationality, were silenced by the military necessity of the moment and the urgent need of securing active Italian co-operation. Italy thereupon presented her counter-proposals to the Al- lies, which were reported to be as follows: "I. The Trentino up to the Brenner, to be Italian. "II. All of Friuli and Istria, including Gorizia and Gradisca and the ports of Trieste, Pola, and Fiume, to be ceded unconditionally to Italy. "III. To the new Croat state, the sea-coast begin- ning just east of Fiume, and extending as far south as the river Zermagna was to be given. However, all the islands commanding the coast were to be handed over to Italy. "IV. From the Zermagna River, as far south as the Narenta the Dalmatian coast, as well as the Dalmatian Islands, to be ceded to Italy. THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 233 "V. The remaining coast land, as far as Durazzo, was to belong to Serbia and Montenegro, while the Italian possession of Avlona and surrounding terri- tory had already been agreed upon." These are, in outline, the territorial demands which Italy made to the Allies. The territory includes a population of over 1,500,000 Slavs, and gives Italy dominant control of the Adriatic, both strategically and commercially. These demands were in principle accepted by the Allies, ^ and definite financial assistance guaranteed to Italy on April 24, 1915, with a proviso that, within one month from date, Italy should de- clare war on Austria. Italy's declaration of war against Austria on May 24, automatically ratified the agreement entered into with France, Great Brit- ain, and Russia, guaranteeing ItaHan hegemony of the Adriatic. The difficult problem of the Adriatic is thus tending towards a solution. According to those in sympathy with the broader Jugo-Slav nationalism, Slav aspirations in the Eastern Adriatic have been trampled under foot. They already point to a Slav "irredentist" movement, directed ^ Though the exact terms of the compact entered into have been kept secret, according to an authoritative statement the following outlines the agreement reached between Italy and the Allies regarding the distribu- tion of the lands of the Eastern Adriatic, and the irredente territory guar- anteed to Italy: 1. The Trentino up to the Brenner to be Italian. 2. Friuli and Istria to be handed over to Italy. The eastern bound- ary to run through Adelsberg to a point a little west of Fiume, 3. Fiume and the coast, as far as the Zermagna River to be given to Croatia. 4. From the Zermagna to a point three miles northwest of Spalato to be Italian, as well as certain of the Dalmatian Islands, including Lissa. 5. Remaining coastlands as far as Durazzo (?) to be Serb. 6. Italy to be confirmed in possession of Avlona. , , 234 GREATER ITALY against Italy, if Italian pretensions as stipulated are realised in full, more threatening and dangerous to the peace of Europe in the future than any other factor in the international situation. A representative Jugo-Slav committee in London issued a manifesto in May, 1915, from which the following significant passages are quoted: "The Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes pray for the victory of the Triple Entente and confidently await from it the salvation of the Jugo-Slav nation. The conviction that the Triple Entente is fighting for the triumph of the principle of Nationality, inspired the moral energy and superhuman efforts of Serbia and Montenegro and prevented their kinsmen across the frontier from utterly losing heart. ''For Serbia and Montenegro this war is one of self- defense and hberation, not of conquest; they are fighting to emancipate our people from a foreign yoke and to unite them as a single free nation. The mih- tary and poHtical overthrow of Austria-Hungary will forever put an end to that system of Divide et Impera by which our people has for centuries been governed. The Jugo-Slavs form a single nation, ahke by identity of language, by the unanswerable laws of geography, and by national consciousness. Only if united will they possess the resources necessary for an independent existence. "The Jugo-Slavs (Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) in- habit the following countries: the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro; the Triune Kingdom of Croatia- Slavonia-Dalmatia (with Fiume and district); the provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Carniola; con- siderable portions of the provinces of Istria, Trieste, Gorizia-Gradisca, Carinthia, and Styria; and finally the Jugo-Slav zone of Hungary proper. "To perpetuate the disunion of these territories by leaving so many under Austro-Hungarian rule, or to THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 235 transfer even 'portions of them to another alien rule, would be a flagrant violation of our ethnographical, geographical, and economic unity, and to this our people would unquestionably oppose an energetic and justifiable resistance. '^The Southern Slav people aspires to unite its terri- tories in a single independent state. The internal arrangements of the new state will be determined by the nation itself, in accordance with its own wishes and needs." This proclamation, issued in the name of 12,000,000 Jugo-Slavs, voices their determined opposition to Ital- ian plans of aggrandisement. Though a small minority of Italian Nationalists may wish to push to extreme limits Italian expansion along the Eastern Adriatic, the more reasonable and influential sections of public opinion in Italy are in favour of a more moderate programme, which will give the Jugo-Slavs full liberty for their economic, social, and national development. It is evident that Italy sought to secure wide territorial guarantees in the East- ern Adriatic in order to be able to use these as pawns in the general exchange of territory which will inevi- tably follow upon the remaking of the map of the world. Recent developments would tend to indicate clearly that Italy expects, in the event of the partition of Asia Minor, to receive a large share of the rich terri- tory in southern and western Anatolia. The vilayets of Smyrna and Konia have been suggested as possible future spheres of ItaUan development, while a vic- torious campaign in Europe will no doubt assure Italy a large share of the Ethiopian Empire of Abys- sinia, which now stands on the threshold of disrup- tion. It is not unhkely, therefore, that Italy will be 236 GREATER ITALY willing to forego certain territories in the Eastern Adriatic guaranteed to her by France, Great Britain, and Russia for adequate compensation elsewhere. Nevertheless, it cannot be contested that Italy would seem destined to become the chief Power in the Adri- atic. Through long centuries Italians have dominated its waters, and under their domination busy, populous cities sprang up, where the arts, industry, and commerce flourished. The memory of the glories of Venice, the Queen of the Adriatic, still lives in the hearts of all Italians. It would seem unreasonable to wish to ex- clude the new and greater Italy from the right of in- heriting this Venetian hegemony. The Adriatic through two thousand years of its known history has always after brief periods of estrangements returned under Italian protection. It is not to be believed that for many decades to come the Jugo-Slavic peoples, even if their territorial aspirations were realised, could contest Italian supremacy. Many years must elapse before the educational, social, and economic standard of the Jugo-Slavs could reach a stage of development to be able to cope, even feebly, with the ancient and vigorous Italian culture. As long as Italy was linked with Austria and Ger- many by the bonds of the Triple Alliance, France and Great Britain, looked askance at Italian aspira- tions in the Adriatic, which they believed to be a part of a broader Central European scheme. Italian par- ticipation in the European War on the side of the Allies conclusively proves that these fears were un- founded. When Napoleon, after his triumphant cam- paign in Italy, had wrested the lands of the Eastern Adriatic from Venice, the Italian envoy, Count Rocco THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC 237 Sanfermo, endeavoured to persuade the French Direc- tory of the advisabUity of ceding Istria and Dalmatia to Italy, "so that it could defend its coast and protect its commerce, as Italy united in a single body, governed according to the principles of liberty, would become an efficacious factor for stability and, joined with France, offer a strong defense against Austria." Since that time the history of the Italian people has been one long struggle to attain their confini naturali, their natural boundaries, to redeem the irredente provinces, to incorporate in one compact and great State all Itahans. Italy is to-day by the force of her arms as- serting what she believes to- be her inalienable right to the domination of the Adriatic. CHAPTER XI THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY The Trend of Policy. Neutbalists and Interventionists. The Mat Revolution In March, 1914, Giolitti relinquished office, and the Government was intrusted to M. Salandra. As the weeks passed the malaise of Europe became more pronounced. In Italy the restlessness of the people showed itself in mild revolutionary outbreaks in Romagna; though soon suppressed, they indicated a pervading discontent, which was current throughout Europe. On June 28, came the report of the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. Italy received the news with undisguised relief. It seemed to por- tend an era of more amicable relations with Austria. These hopes were soon shattered by the announce- ment of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, followed by the declaration of war. These events came as a complete surprise to Italy. How carefully the plan of aggression against Serbia at this time had been con- cealed by the Berlin and Vienna Cabinets from their Italian ally is difficult to ascertain. Italian official documents proclaim that Italy was in nowise ap- prised of the course of action which the Vienna Govern- ment proposed to pursue. It would seem reasonable, in the hght of events, to place fullest confidence in this official version. 238 THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 239 Berlin and Vienna both believed that, owing to the disturbed state of Italy, the depletion of her military- resources of which they had very definite informa- tion, and the financial weakness of the country result- ing from the vast expenditures of the Tripolitan cam- paign, Austria would be unmolested by Italy in her proposed punitive expedition against Serbia. When the conflict between Vienna and Belgrade, contrary to the expectations at least of Vienna if not of Berlin, no longer locahsed, became a world conjflagration which soon was to involve all Europe, when Russia, and then France, espoused the cause of Serbia, Austria endeavoured at the last moment to summon Italy to her side. The famous despatch casus fcederis was hurriedly sent to Rome. General Cadorna, the Chief of the Italian General Staff, was convoked to confer with General Conrad respecting the measures to be taken jointly to defend the Dual Monarchy against the threatened Russian invasion. Italy's reply was the prompt declaration of her neutrahty on August 3. This declaration must be regarded as one of the most important factors of the first phase of the Eu- ropean War. It is incontestable that Italy's straight- forward declaration of neutrality radically changed the course of world history. By merely mobihsing her armies along the French frontier, from the Mediter- ranean to the Rhone, Italy would have kept 400,000 French troops in this area, and would thus have pre- vented France from throwing her whole strength into the balance against the German invaders from the north. The battle of the Marne instead of a brilhant French victory would, in all probabihty, have had an- other issuS; and the triumphant German advance would 240 GREATER ITALY have swept across France instead of being stemmed in Picardy, Champagne, and the Argonne. Further- more, the mobihsation of the Italian fleet in the Med- iterranean could not fail to have dislocated French plans for the transport of troops from northern Africa, which rendered such great assistance from the very- first days of the war; while it is not generally ap- preciated that during those first weeks, which found England wholly unprepared, British lines of com- munication with India would have been at the mercy of the Italian torpedo flotilla, whose conveniently situated base in Eritrea along the western shores of the Red Sea would have made it no very difiicult task to cut British communications with the East, leaving Egypt open to invasion. Italy, however, spontaneously and clearly showed what her intentions were by withdrawing her gar- risons some distance from the French frontier and by concentrating her fleet at the entrance of the Adriatic. The ItaUans now began to feel the strength of their new position. Italy's declaration of neutrality was in reality to prove a declaration of independence. Dur- ing the half century which had elapsed since Itahan unity had been achieved, Italy had felt herself obliged by the weakness of her international position to play a part of minor importance in world politics, incom- patible with her population, resources, and national dignity, while the best interests of the Kingdom had often been sacrificed. Italy had never been free from foreign influences: first, that of Napoleon III and the French, during the formative days of the new Italy; later that of Bismarck and Germany. Repeatedly, during the long years of Italy's servitude, she had THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 241 sacrificed her legitimate ambitions for the sake of national security. Now, suddenly she found herself the mistress of her destiny. By her declaration of neutrality she had cut loose from the moorings to which, for more than thirty years, the ship of state had been anchored. Italy was thus confronted by a new set of problems, which for the first time in her history she was called upon to solve for herself; she was now free to consult only her own interests. From a position of minority and dependence in world affairs, the Itahans had reached man's estate, and on the decisions which they were now called upon to make, the future of the country rested. As the only great Power in Europe which had re- mained outside the war, Italy became at the same time the object of suspicion and solicitude on the part of both belhgerents. On the one hand, Germany and the Dual Monarchy, while privately considering the conduct of Italy as traitorous in not coming to the assistance of her alhes in a war of such magnitude no matter what its causes might have been, were nevertheless eager that Italy should continue in her attitude of friendly neutrality, as the Itahans were at that time rendering great assistance by securing supplies from abroad. On the other hand, the Allied Powers though by habit of mind they classed Italy with their enemies, yet, eager to enlist whatever arms they might find in their cause, and appreciating the great strength Italian armies would add to their forces, soon began a campaign of propaganda in Italy to arouse the sympathy and active support of the Italian people. The Itahans themselves were divided in their con- 242 GREATER ITALY victions. The Triplist tradition had for a generation moulded the public opinion of the country. The lead- ing statesmen, politicians, professors, and the more intelligent classes were confirmed believers in the advantages which Italy had derived from the Triple Alliance. The nation had been tutored in a faith in Germanic ideals of statecraft. German Realpolitik had in Italy many influential advocates, while the ascendency of Germans in the affairs of the peninsula has never been doubted or denied by the Italians themselves. , Italy soon found herself divided into two distinct camps or parties — the Neutralists and the Interven- tionists. The first were in favour of continuing the policy of neutrality and of deriving whatever advantages possible from this attitude, both in in- creased wealth and in territorial concessions; the second, in favour of seizing the opportunity offered to vindicate Italy's national aspirations by the force of arms. But whatever policy was to be pursued, both parties were agreed that it was to be a purely Italian policy. Though the cause of the Allies aroused re- sponsive sympathy throughout Italy, all Italians were convinced that in this crisis the best interests of Italy alone must be consulted. While the Neutralists appeared to be playing the part of defenders of the Central Powers, such- groups as the Nationalists, that is, those who had hitherto urged violently the need of a war against Austria, to regain the mastery of the Adriatic, were the first to declare: "Let us have no stupid Austrophobe policy." Italy, wide-awake to the opportunities of her position was to choose a course of action most suited to her national needs. THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 243 The problem resolved itself at once into whether Italy should remain neutral or take up arms on the side of the AlHes. The few, who in the first days of the war may have been in favour of actively support- ing the Central Empires, soon became silent or joined the ranks of the Neutralists. Italy was now in the throes of a moral and political conflict, the like of which has never hitherto been witnessed in a great State. On behalf of the Neutralists Giolitti, whose following was wide-spread and whose voice was Hs- tened to with attention, sounded the key-note of their convictions when he exclaimed: "It would not seem improbable that, owing to the present condition of Europe, much can be obtained without going to war." The Neutralists further had enlisted the sympathy and support of such divergent elements as the Papacy and the Socialists. The Roman CathoHcs, who by tradition and principle were hostile to any policy which might increase the strength and popularity of the House of Savoy, opposed Italian participation in the war on the side of the Allies, on the grounds of a natural distrust of France, and jealousy and fear of any further expansion of Russia, the great Or- thodox Catholic State. Moreover, the Roman Curia was bound by many ties of sympathy to Austria, now the "eldest and most faithful daughter of the Church." The Papal entourage knew that in the event of a war with Austria, the diplomatic rela- tions between the Pope and the representatives of the Central European Sovereigns would be broken off, and that the Papacy would be greatly hampered 244 GREATER ITALY in playing the part to which it aspired of moral arbi- trator and pacificator in a world where all law and order had been violated. The elevation of Benedict XV to the Papacy showed that the Catholic Church had not altogether abandoned its aspirations to regain its temporal powers. Both Berlin and Vienna let it be known clearly that should Italy pursue a course of action prejudicial to their interests, the Pope could expect every assistance from them towards the real- isation of these temporal desires; while the efforts of the Catholics to maintain Italian neutrality would not go without recompense. The Socialist members of the Chamber of Deputies, though not unanimously (several groups soon joined the Interventionists), basing their arguments on the grounds of pacifism and international brotherhood, maintained that it was in the best interests of Italy that the country should continue its policy of strict and stringent neutrality. But the most important and numerous group of Neutralists were not those directly affiliated with any political or religious party, but were what might be called ''debtors of Germany." As has been pointed out in a previous chapter, German penetration had so thoroughly permeated Italian industrial and economic life that it was difficult to find even an unimportant branch of industry or commerce which was not de- pendent in a measure on German capital and sup- port. The whole ItaKan economic structure had been built up on German foundations. To break with Germany meant, so they feared, the collapse and ruin of their hard-won prosperity. Further than this, during the thirty-three years of a close alliance with THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 245 Germany, a very considerable number of Italians had intermarried with Germans, and were now bound to Germany by these tics of marriage and blood re- lationship, while others, trained at the German tech- nical schools and universities, had retained a very deep respect for their German masters. The great majority of the working and peasant classes were also opposed to war, cliiefly on the ground that it would upset their economic well-being. At the other end of the social scale, many members of the higher aristocracy, enriched bourgeoisie, and university pro- fessors of the older and more rigid type who had ab- sorbed the German point of view, rallied to the cause of the Neutralists. The opinions of the ItaKans varied widely in the different parts of the country. In Venetia, the prov- ince closest to the frontier, though the district hkely to suffer the most from the consequences of a war, the people were enthusiastically Interventionist, as they were also in Romagna. The Piedmontese, how- ever, mindful of their historical afiinity with Prussia, were actively opposed to the idea of a war against the Central Empires. In Lombardy, the industrial heart of Italy, opinions were divided, though the NeutraUsts were in a majority. In Liguria, Genoa was enjoying a period of unwonted prosperity on ac- count of her traffic of imports, ultimately destined for Germany, and was thus not eager for any change in the status quo; while Rome and Naples and the remainder of Italy were undecided or indifferent re- garding the war with Austria which the Interven- tionists now demanded. With Germany few Italians found any cause for 246 GREATER ITALY, quarrel, nor were there many who wished to seek far afield for such a pretext. With Austria the century- long feud subsisted, and the violence of the hatred of the Itahans of Northern Italy was soon aflame. But Germany had espoused the cause of the Dual Monarchy so completely that it did not seem pos- sible for Italy to declare war against Austria without German interference, and the legend of German in- vincibility was deeply rooted in Italy. The Interventionists had a difficult task before them. At first composed only of an unimportant minority of young men, army officers, professional men, writers, journalists, and teachers, they beHeved that Italy could obtain her legitimate ends only by participation in the war on the side of the AlHes. But for years past Italians had been temperamentally hostile to France. They could not forget the con- duct of Napoleon III in regard to Nice, the Tunisian episode, and the many vexatious incidents which had clouded Franco-Italian relations within very recent years. Even more unpalatable to the Italians was the idea of fighting hand in hand with Russia, the protector of the Jugo-Slavs, and a possible antagonist in the Adriatic. Those in favour of intervention were materially assisted in their propaganda, by the campaign of ruthless terrorism which the Germans had pursued in France and Belgium. The violation of Belgian neutrality had a less concrete influence than the de- struction of the Cloth Hall at Ypres and the Cathedral at Rheims. The Italian people, whose aesthetic sense is more highly developed than that of any other modern European nation, could understand and gauge minutely THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 247 the sacrilege of the German invaders against the monuments and rich treasure stores of the past, and they were aroused to anger by the vandalism which was vividly pictured to them by distinguished Bel- gians who soon flocked to Italy. However, the Italians were not to be persuaded by sentimental arguments. Though they deplored the loss of the historic monuments, they deemed that the war, if declared, must be an Italian war, definitely outUned as pm-suant of a definite plan of action. By degrees the Interventionists rallied to their support the leading journalists and publicists of Italy; in politics. Liberals, Radicals, and Conservatives soon ranged themselves on their side. In the uni- versities many of the younger professors and the whole student body joined the party which now clamoured loudly for war — ^war against Austria. For throughout this campaign of persuasion there was httle or no mention of war against Germany. Austria was the enemy and Austria alone was to be assaulted. In every city in Italy the propaganda for and against intervention was carried on. The man in the street was called upon to decide for himself in advance a problem which would eventually confront the Government. For all Italians felt that Italy could not long remain a neutral spectator. The future of the nation was at stake. Italy must sooner or later play an active part in the war which was to settle the destiny of Europe. While in the pubHc forum of the newspaper, street, and theatre the question of participation or non- participation in the war was being hotly debated, and the various opinions argued in pamphlet, leaflet, 248 GREATER ITALY and viva voce, the Government found itself assailed by the two belligerent groups. On the death of the Marchese di San Guiliano, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in October, 1914, this office was assumed by Baron Sonnino; a clear-headed, silent man, who, though in the past a confirmed sup- porter of the Triple Alliance, was nevertheless admira- bly fitted by his realist training and temperament to guide Italy through the intricate negotiations which were to follow. Early in December, Italy took the first official action when Austrian forces crossed the Danube and began the invasion of Serbia. The Italian Govern- ment at once made inquiries in Vienna regarding Austrian plans in the Balkans, and what compensa- tion the Vienna Government was ready to make to Italy in accordance with the terms of their treaty of alliance, which demanded reciprocal compensation in the event of either party acquiring further terri- tory in the Balkans. At the same time Baron Sonnino communicated with Berlin, and added these significant words: "The current which manifests itself in a sec- tion of public opinion in favour of neutrality, does not mean that it abandons Italian interests in the Balkans and the Adriatic, nor the national aspirations, but rather it is persuaded of the possibility of pro- tecting these interests and realising these aspirations, at the same time remaining faithful to neutrality." ^ While the Vienna Government endeavoured to turn a deaf ear to Italian demands and let matters drift, Germany soon discovered that the party in Italy ^ Despatch to Italian Ambassador at Berlin, dated December 9, 1914. "Italian Official Green Book," Document No. 2. THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 249 favouring Italian intervention was daily gaining ground. William II, who took a very personal interest in Italian affairs, despatched the former Im- perial Chancellor, Prince Biilow, to Rome as Am- bassador Extraordinary to open negotiations with the Italian Government with a view to securing Italy's permanent neutrality for the duration of the war. If any man was fitted to succeed in this difiicult task it was Prince Biilow. His residence at Rome, the Villa Malta, was still the centre of a wide and in- fluential circle of important personages in Italian public life. Confident in his ability to accomplish his mission, Prince Biilow arrived in Rome. On December 19 he was received by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. During this interview. Baron Sonnino frankly told Prince Biilow that, though the majority of the population was still willing to support the Government's policy of neutrality, their support was based on the belief that the Government would secure adequate compensation — ^in other words, the realisation of Italy's national aspirations — and that he felt himself quite in accord with this point of view. For the next three months the Italian Govern- ment, chiefly through the medium of the German Envoy, was engaged in negotiations with the Vienna Government, respecting the territorial concessions to be made to Italy in return for her continued and friendly neutrality. In the meantime the war had developed into a new phase. The German invasion in the West had been permanently checked, and the Russian armies were advancing victoriously through Galicia and stood on the heights of the Carpathians, ready to invade 250 GREATER ITALY the Hungarian plain. At the same time the Serbs had achieved an overwhelming victory over their enemies, and after a brief and brilliant campaign had driven the Austrians completely out of Serbia and captured many thousand prisoners and great booty. The Italians looked with no little concern at this sudden triumph of the Slavs. They believed that their plans for the domination of the Adriatic were definitely imperilled. The news of further Russian successes continued to reach Rome. Negotiations with Vienna were dragging on slowly. The Austrians, after much bickering, had finally conceded the prin- ciple of territorial compensation. The Italian Govern- ment had been persuaded to forego some of its chief pretensions in order that a settlement might be reached. Italy, thereupon, on April 8, 1915, presented a definite proposal to Austria, regarding what she deemed the minimum compensations in the form of territorial concessions^ by Austria, in the Trentino and the Adri- atic; in the words of M. Sonnino, "indispensable for the purpose of creating between the two States a normal and stable status of reciprocal cordiality and possible co-operation in the future." The representatives of the Allied Powers at Rome were watching closely the changing attitude of the Italian Government. For the Allies were, notwith- standing the Russian victories, fully aware of their intrinsic military inferiority vis a vis the Central Em- pires. When it seemed that Italy was about to con- clude negotiations with Vienna, and Prince Biilow was already congratulating himself on the success of his efforts, the Allies decided to make a bold offer for 1 C/. Chap. X, p. 229. THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 251 Italian assistance. Though for long months the cam- paign of preparing Italian public opinion for armed intervention had been going on, the Allied Govern- ments had hitherto been unable to agree as to the terms to be offered to Italy. When it became known that the Russian advance had been checked, and that Russia had so taxed her resources as to be unable to cope effectively with the enemy, even on the defen- sive, the Allied Governments felt that the moment had arrived to secure Italy's active co-operation at all costs. Then followed the series of Russian reverses. The Austrians again victorious, through the assistance of their German allies, were not anxious to accept Italy's proposals, while the Allies, who were passing through the most critical phase of the war, were willing to make almost any concessions demanded to secure Italian aid. It is chiefly owing to the skill and tact of the French Ambassador at Rome, M. Barrere, that the negotia- tions which actually led to Italian intervention were brought to a successful issue in a very brief space of time. By April 24, 1915, the ItaUan Government had pledged itself under certain contingencies, and in return for guarantees given by the Allies,^ to declare war on Austria. The Government in contracting this engagement had kept in close touch with the will and temper of the Italian people. During the months which had elapsed since the outbreak of the European War, the campaign of the Interventionists in Italy had progressed from day to day with increasing vio- lence. The plight of the irredente provinces had again 1 Cf. Chap. X, pp. 232-233. 252 GREATER ITALY aroused the sympathy of all Italians. The day of their redemption was at hand. The opportunity must not be missed to complete the unification of Italy. The European War lost its significance and interest in comparison with the war which Italy was to declare on Austria. Italians concerned themselves little with the other struggle; their whole interest centred on Itahan affairs. It is not unnatural that observers in France and Great Britain should have misinterpreted the Italian attitude, and the numerous delays which arose. "Italy will fly to the rescue of the victors," was a hon mot which plainly voiced their impatience and their mistrust of Italian policy. But Italy had good reason for delay in declaring herself openly. Few foreigners could rightly ap- preciate how disorganised and unprepared for war the Italian armies were in the late summer of 1914. The Italian military authorities at once foresaw that sooner or later they would be called upon to take up a quarrel which was being fanned to flame by the national will of the Italian people. They must be ready to assume the responsibility when that mo- ment should come. Under the leadership of that brilliant and methodical officer, General Count Ca- dorna, the Italian armies were being put into shape to be prepared for every eventuality. The task was arduous. The lessons of the first months of the war had to be learned; the methods of the new warfare assimilated. Slowly the armies were making ready. By the end of April, 1915, it was evident that the great gaps in the cadres had been filled; the empty caissons replenished; stores and munitions accumu- lated. THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 253 On May 3, Baron Sonnino transmitted to the Ital- ian Ambassador at Vienna instructions to denounce the treaty of alliance with Austria. This document, so lucid and concise, sets forth in a succinct manner the justifications of the Italian Government in tak- ing this step: The Minister of Foreign Affairs TO The Royal Ambassador at Vienna " (Telegram) Rome, May 3, 1915. " I pray your Excellency to communicate the follow- ing to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and leave with him a written copy: '"The alliance between Italy and Austria-Hungary proclaimed itself since its beginning as an element and a guarantee of peace, and aimed first as its prin- cipal object at mutual defense. In the presence of subsequent events, and of the new situation which arose therefrom, the Governments of the two coun- tries were obliged to propose another object no less essential, and in the course of the successive renewals of the treaty, endeavoured to safeguard the continuity of their alliance by stipulating the principle of prelim- inary agreements regarding the Balkans, with a view to conciliating the interests and the divergent ten- dencies of the two Powers. '' ' It is plainly evident that these stipulations, loyally fulfilled, would have sufficed to furnish a solid basis for common and fruitful action. On the contrary Austria-Hungary during the summer of 1914, without making any agreement with Italy, without even giv- ing her the least notice, and paying no attention to the counsels of moderation which were addressed to her (Austria-Hungary) by the Royal Government, handed to Serbia the ultimatum of July 23, which was the cause and the beginning of the present Euro- pean conflagration. 254 GREATER ITALY "'Austria-Hungary in neglecting the obligations of the treaty, disturbed profoundly the status quo in the Balkans, and brought about a situation by which she alone would be called upon to profit to the great detriment of the interests of greatest importance, which her ally had so often aflirmed and proclaimed. "'A violation so flagrant of the letter as well as the spirit of the treaty, not only justified the refusal of Italy to range herself on the side of her allies in a war brought about without her advice, but at the same time it took away from the alliance its essential factors as well as its raison d'etre. "/Even the clause concerning benevolent neutrality provided for by the treaty, was compromised by this violation. Reason as well as opinion agree in pre- cluding that benevolent neutrality can be maintained when one of the allies takes up arms to realise a pro- gramme diametrically opposed to the vital interests of the other ally, interests the safeguarding of which constituted the principal reason for the alliance it- self. " ' Notwithstanding this, Italy during several months, endeavoured to create a favourable situation for the re-establishment between the two States of those friendly relations which constitute the essential foun- dation of all co-operation in the realm of general politics. "'With this object in view, and with this hope, the Royal Government declared itself disposed to lend it- self to an arrangement having for its object the satis- faction, in an equitable manner of the legitimate national aspirations of Italy, and which at the same time would have served to reduce the existing dis- parity between the two States in the Adriatic. "'These negotiations, however, arrived at no ap- parent result. " ' All the efforts of the Royal Government met with resistance on the part of the Imperial and Royal Gov- ernment, which after several months has only made THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 255 up its mind to admit the claim of the special interests of Italy at Avlona, and to promise an insufficient concession of territory in the Trentino; a concession which provides in no way for a normal adjustment of the situation, either from an ethnic, political, or military point of view. '"This concession furthermore was not to be car- ried out until some undetermined date; that is to say only at the end of the war. '''In this state of affairs, the Italian Goverrmient must renounce all hope of arriving at an arrangement, and sees itself obhged to withdraw all its proposals of agreement. '"It is likewise useless to give to the alliance an outward form, which would only be destined to dis- simulate the reality of continual suspicion and daily differences. "'Therefore, Italy confident in her good right, af- firms and proclaims that she resumes henceforth her full liberty of action and declares her treaty of al- liance with Austria-Hungary annulled and without effect.'i "SONNINO." Thus the Government had executed the mandate which it believed intrusted to it by the people of Italy. For in this Italian war it was the voice of the people that dominated. Italy alone of all the belligerent Powers was to enter into the conflict with her eyes wide open. The first decisive step had been taken. The treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary had been de- clared null and void, yet the Neutralists did not give up hope that war might be averted. They had worked with great skill and much tenacity to spread abroad their views. They had proclaimed their admiration 1" Italian Official Green Book," Document No. 76. 256 GREATER ITALY for the genius of the German people, its strength and virility. The historical associations and similarity of the rise to nationhood of Italy and Germany had been evoked. The necessity of Italy's remaining faithful to her treaty obligations was emphasised; the threat of a Slav peril in the Adriatic was reiterated. But the most trenchant argument of the Neutralists was that of the added burden in the form of increased taxation and disturbed industrial conditions which would be brought upon Italy in the event of war, to say nothing of the thousands of useful lives that would be sacrificed on the field of battle; while by negotiations much might be obtained without going to war. To these arguments the Interventionists had op- posed others equally strong. First and foremost was the problem of the irredente provinces, which they were now prepared to solve. As a result of unforeseen circumstances, Austria found herself embarrassed and in a difficult position. Italy must not refrain from seizing this opportunity of rescuing the unredeemed Italians, whose survival under the pressure of the Germans of Tyrol and the Slavs of the Adriatic was daily more threatened. Secondly, military considera- tions demanded that Italy's northern frontier should be rearranged so as to secure Venetia from invasion, which, under existing conditions, could be launched without difiiculty, and with every chance of success by the Austrians. The gates of Italy were in the hands of a potential enemy. The time had come for Italy to act as her own gatekeeper. A third, more cogent argument was that .Italy could not afford to remain outside the conflict. Isolated in the midst of THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 257 the combatants, no matter which group of belligerents won, Italy would find herself unable to vindicate her position as a World Power, and would inevitably sink to the position of a State of the second rank. Italian aspirations in the Adriatic would be definitively thwarted. Should the Austro-German Powers be victorious, Italy would be forced to accept a sub- servient part in their scheme of a great Central Eu- ropean Empire, and would become another Bavaria. Should the Allies win without Italian co-operation, they would have no time nor desire to consider Ital- ian needs or ambitions. Notwithstanding the apparent gains of the Inter- ventionist cause, the Neutralists were still confident in their strength. The ferment of the ItaHans had already reached such a height that any shght inci- dent might at the last moment determine the course of action which the nation was to pursue. On the very day. May 4, that the Italian Ambas- sador at Vienna dehvered the Note denouncing the Austro-Itahan alliance, there arrived in Italy, coming from France, a man whose voice was to carry the day; a man who seemed by temper and character, as well as by his past record, wholly unsuited for the part that was to be allotted to him in the great Italian drama. It was Gabriel d'Annunzio. Known abroad chiefly through his novels, wherein the vision of the poet is often obscured by a sordid, egotistical mate- riaHsm, d'Annunzio in his own country was hailed as a poet whose knowledge and flexible use of the Italian language, as well as his unerring poetical instinct, rank him with the greatest in the Italian tongue. Many of his later poems breathe a lofty spirit of pa- 258 GREATER ITALY triotism and devotion to the cause of a Greater Italy. Of aesthetic temperament, he had hitherto kept him- self aloof from crowds, and seemed wholly unfit to become the leader of the people and to force a Par- liament and a Government to obey his mandate. It is more than probable that d'Annunzio had only a very vague notion of the part that he was to be called upon to play. His chief object in coming to Italy, after an absence of nearly five years, was to deliver an address at the unveiling of a monument at Quarto, near Genoa, where, on May 5, fifty-five years before, *Hhe Thousand" under Garibaldi had set sail, to undertake the first step to bring about the unifica- tion of Southern Italy. Though d'Annunzio had never before played an important political role, he never- theless appreciated the psychological possibilities of his position and the influence he could exert on his fellow countrymen in this crisis. From time to time during the past months, he had, since the war began, by his articles in the Press set forth his convictions as to the necessity of Italian intervention. On his arrival at Bardonnechia, the fiist small station on Italian soil, d'Annunzio was greeted with enthusiasm by a group of officers and soldiers who had assembled on the railway quay. At every station where the train stopped he was the object of a bois- terous ovation. At Turin, the chief centre of the NeutraHsts, a great crowd of students gathered to welcome the return to Italy of the poet. By the time he had reached Genoa all- Italy was aflame with the news. The poet had become the vates, the seer of the new Italy. The Italians were ready to be led, eager to find a hero. D'Annunzio, by his stirring ad- THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 259 dresses to the people, by the appeal that he made to the grandeur and splendour of the past glory of Italy, aroused his Hsteners to an enthusiasm which bor- dered on frenzy. At the fetes at Quarto d'Annunzio was to be the principal speaker. The ICing of Italy had signified his intention of being present. At the last moment, however, the King, not wishing to show his sympathies for one party or the other, before the people had through the Government proclaimed their will, cancelled the engagement. D'Annunzio thus became the chief figure of the celebration. His oration, couched in high-flowing, allegorical language, did not arouse more acclaim than his mere presence. He became the ob- ject of an ovation the like of which has rarely been given to any civilian. His carriage was surrounded by excited admirers; he was showered with flowers, and with difficulty escaped from the hands of his well-wishers. Everywhere he was called upon again and again to harangue the assembled crowds. His words, inspired by an intense sincerity, carried with them a conviction and authority which increased hourly. D'Annunzio's reception at Genoa and Quarto was merely a precursor of other and greater triumphs. He became the embodiment of the idea which he preached. To an audience of university students who had presented him with a gold medalhon of homage, d'Annunzio exclaimed: "If it is true, as I swear it is, that the Italians have lighted again the flame on the altar of Italy, take torches lighted in its fires in your hands, and fan them to flame ! Hold them in your clenched fists, brandish them aloft wherever you may go! Sow the warlike 260 GREATER ITALY fire, my young companions ! Be ye the intrepid in- cendiaries of your great country. 'Begone! Obey! said the priest of Mars to the consecrated youth.' You are the seeds of a new world. Begone! Make ready! Obey! I can command you to do this be- cause you have made me worthy to consecrate you since you are the sparks of the divine fire. Sow broad- cast this fire ! to-morrow let the souls of all be aflame ! Let the voice of all arise in one single flaming clamour, 'Italy! Italy!'" Thus d'Annunzio exhorted others to carry on the task which he had assumed for himself. His mission was to inflame the hearts of all Italians for war. After a triumphant progress through various Italian cities, on the evening of May 12 d'Annunzio was to ar- rive at Rome. The city was in a turmoil. Giolitti, at the head of a group of influential Neutralists, who were apparently working in close co-operation with Prince Billow, had arrived in Rome on May 9. Though no longer in office, Giolitti was omnipotent in Italian political circles. He still controlled a majority in the Chamber. It was said that he had come to the capital for the purpose of overthrowing the Government, and of forming a new Cabinet under his own leadership; he would then repudiate the Sonnino-Salandra agree- ment of April 24 with the Allies, reopen negotiations with Austria, and secure in return for Italy's neu- trality wider and more extensive concessions from the Dual Monarchy, which the latter at this eleventh hour would be compelled to grant. The fact that Giolitti on his arrival had been received by the King as well as by M. Salandra, seemed to confirm these rumours, notwithstanding the fact that Giolitti em- phatically denied the allegations, and stated that he THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 261 had come to Rome at the invitation of the King to confer on the situation in general. For a moment it seemed as though the GioUttian plot was about to suc- ceed, and that Parliament, in face of a strong though disjointed and incoherent public opinion, would readily veto the arrangement entered into by the Salandra Cabinet in favour of intervention. It is at this junc- ture that d'Annunzio arrived at Rome. In the square in front of the railway-station in the vast Piazza delle Terme, with the imposing back- ground of the massive brick arches of the Baths of Diocletian rising against the deep blue of the evening sky, 150,000 Romans had assembled to welcome the arrival of the modern Tribune, for such d'Annunzio had now become in the eyes of the Italians. To the people of Rome d'Annunzio came in the guise of a dehverer. By some strange whim of fate, d'Annunzio the poet, the artist, the maker of elegant verses, had been clad by popular fancy with the virtues of a hero of ancient Rome. The Romans, ever ready to ap- plaud, to be led, willing to be admonished, exhorted, inflamed to action, greeted their new idol with scenes of wild and exultant tumult. D'Annunzio was borne aloft on the shoulders of the people. Finally he was able to reach his automobile; the car was compelled to proceed at a snail's pace, halting at almost every yard, cutting as it advanced a lane through the dense throng which lined the streets from side to side. Es- corted by torch-bearers, the car made a slow progress through the city. The multitudes formed in procession in the rear, and with banners and flags unfurled, among which those of Trent and Trieste were con- spicuous, bearing thousands of torches and vari- 262 GREATER ITALY coloured lanterns, the procession wound its way- through the streets of the capital, up the Pincian hill to the Hotel Regina, opposite the palace of the Queen-Mother. Queen Margherita, surrounded by her ladies-in-waiting, stood at the window of the palace, and added her applause to that of the multitude. The next day Rome awoke to learn important tidings. The Salandra Cabinet, not feeling itself strong enough to confront Parliament at its opening on May 20, intended, so it was reported, in view of the uncompromising attitude assumed by the Neu- tralists, who controlled a majority in the Chamber, to tender its resignation to the King. The situation was critical. The honour of Italy was at stake. The Salandra Government had pledged itself to foreign Powers on behalf of intervention; the accession of Giolitti to office would mean that the Italian Govern- ment would repudiate these pledges. It appeared as though Giolitti and the Neutralists, working in con- cert with Prince Biilow, were about to frustrate the aims and manifest will of the Italian people. It was then that d'Annunzio, in an improvised speech during a performance at the Costanzi Theatre, voiced a direct accusation against the ^Hraitors," and bade the Romans fight against this enemy with- in their gates : "Giolitti knew the terms of our treaty with Aus- tria and Germany; knew that on May 4, we had denounced it — at least so far as Austria is concerned. He also knew the terms of our recent agreement with the Triple Entente, and the engagements entered into by us with France, England, and Russia. Never- theless, he is making every effort to compel us to break THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 263 our given word. ... He is betraying the King and the country. ... He is guilty of treason. This is not merely a manner of speaking, a simple phrase. Giolitti is a traitor according to the usual interpre- tation of the word. ... If the Italian Parliament re- opens on May 20, we must by every manner and means forbid the entrance of the lackeys of the Villa Malta and send them back one by one to their master. . . . At the Italian Parliament on May 20, the sacred Gari- baldian anniversary, the liberation of the country and the realisation of its ambitions must alone be pro- claimed." '• Rome, on learning the confirmation of the news of the resignation of the Salandra Government, was in an uproar. "War or revolution," was the ugly cry that now spread through the remotest corners of the Eternal City. Insurrection committees were formed, and a barricade was even erected in one of the streets. The outburst was not directed against the King, but against Giolitti and the Neutralists, against the "lackeys of the Villa Malta," as d'An- nunzio had branded the pro-Germans. The violence of the mob grew. In the streets well-known Neutralists, who dared to venture abroad, were openly maltreated. The police authorities were forced in the interests of pubhc safety to advise Giolitti to leave Rome. In the meantime the King was called upon to find a solution of the crisis. Victor Emmanuel III, though a constitutional monarch in the most exact mean- ing of the word, could not fail to take into account the will of the majority of his people. One after an- other, the most important officials were called in con- sultation by the King. This constitutional formality 1 Corriere delta Sera, May 15, 19 15. 264 GREATER ITALY having been gone through with, the King requested M. Salandra to reassume office as Premier and recon- stitute his Ministry. Thus assured of the support of his sovereign, as well as of that of the people, Salandra on May 16 accepted the mandate of the King, and was ready to lay before Parliament at its opening the project of Italian intervention on the side of the Allies. King Victor Emmanuel had by his firm con- duct in this crisis averted an armed outbreak which might have menaced the existence of the dynasty. Had the King chosen to dissolve Parliament, or taken any other course than the one followed, grave dis- orders would have undoubtedly arisen. The more active elements of the population had been aroused and incited to action by the impassioned speeches of d'Annunzio, and had been led to expect an affirmative outcome, a declaration of war. On May 20, Parfiament reassembled. The historic session opened. D'Annunzio's commands had been obeyed. Giolitti, fearing for his fife, had fled to Pied- mont. The Neutrahst Deputies, hooted and threatened by the crowd, had been compelled to take refuge in a hotel adjoining the Chamber the day before the session. Here, protected by a strong guard, they remained in order to be able to attend the meetings unmolested. The newly constituted Ministry under M. Salandra, having received a vote of confidence, was granted full powers. Even the Neutralists, cowed into sub- mission, voted for war. D'Annunzio thereupon ar- rived at the Chamber. The Deputies rose to their feet, and with prolonged cheers acclaimed the poet: "Long live d'Annunzio! Long live Italy!" Three THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 265 days later Italy declared war against Austria-Hun- gary. Wliat course Italy would have followed had d'An- nunzio not appeared on the scene is difficult to deter- mine. Before his arrival the work of preparing public opinion had been zealously carried on by the Inter- ventionists. D'Annunzio did not create the current of opinion which brought Italy into the war. He merely aroused popular imagination, and by the vivid imagery of his speeches, by the searching sincerity of his words, made the people visuaUse the passions, hopes, and desires which slumbered in their hearts. But it cannot be gainsaid that had not some such a dynamic force awakened the patriotism of the more alert elements of the population, the Giolittian Neutrahsts, who controlled a majority of the Chamber, would have been able to force the country to accept the role of neutrahty and would have prevented ItaUan intervention. To d'Annunzio must be al- lotted a great share of the responsibiHty for Italy's declaration of war. Thus the days of neutrahty had come to an end. Italy during the ten months which had elapsed since the outbreak of the European War had undergone a radical national metamorphosis. She had abandoned her poUcy of alliance with the Central Empires; had emancipated herself from foreign control. She had weighed carefully the advantages and disadvantages which she might expect to reap from her continued neutrahty, and then calmly faced the alternative of war. At the outbreak of the European War, the great majority of Italians had been strongly in favour of neutrality. Even after the campaign of the Inter- 266 GREATER ITALY ventionists had been carried on for many months, the great mass of the people still favom-ed non-inter- vention. The Neutralist arguments were subtle and feasible. The "much can be obtained without war," enunciated by Giolitti, and summed up by him in the Piedmontese term of parecchio, which was inter- preted to mean "a good deal" when referring to territorial compensations offered by Austria in return for Italy's continued neutrality, had captivated the steadier elements of the population. It was then that the Salandra Government, making itself the in- terpreter of the more virile elements of the country, showed signs that it deemed war with the Dual Mon- archy inevitable, if Italy were to realise her greater territorial ambitions, i maggiori destini d' Italia. The nation was quick to respond to the cue given it. But there arose the figure of GioHtti, who for twelve years had cast his shadow over the pubHc life of Italy. He held the reins of power firmly in his hands. He had behind him a docile parliamentary majority. The Salandra Government knew itself to be helpless. Who bade d'Annunzio to return to Italy? Who intrusted him with the task he so successfully carried out ? Was it the Nationalists, or a Francophil coterie at Rome? Or was it the private invitation of the Salandra Government? Future historians will tell us. An account of the struggle of those two mid-May weeks has been briefly related. It is the story of a nation coming into its own heritage, and forms one of the most brilliant pages in the history of the Ital- ian people. When the effervescent enthusiasm had died down, THE DAYS OF NEUTRALITY 267 and the Italians took up the business of waging war in earnest, M. Salandra, rising to address the vast crowds who had assembled on the Capitohne Hill (June 3, 1915), eloquently interpreted the feelings of the Italian people when he exclaimed: ''As destiny has allotted to our generation the terrible though sublime task of realising the ideal of a Greater Italy, which our heroes of the Risor- gimento did not live to see, let us undertake this task with an invincible courage, ready to give ourselves wholly to our country, to give what we are and what we have." CHAPTER XII ITALY AT WAR Pebiod of Aloofness. Military and Political Crises. Unity Italy had entered into the war with her eyes wide open, in pursuance of a carefully matured programme of poHcy. She had ranged herself on the side of the Allies not only to safeguard her vital interests, but with the clear intention of increasing not merely her prestige and power, but her territory. The scenes of enthusiasm for the war against Austria, witnessed in Rome, Milan, and elsewhere, were effervescent out- bursts of long pent-up feeUngs; they soon died down, and the people of Italy prepared themselves calmly to face the trials and hardships of war. Italy had chosen her own time to open hostilities. Though the actual declaration of war was postponed for some days, owing to the Giolittian cowp d'etat, which gave the Austrians more time to bring up rein- forcements and fortify their positions, yet they were unable to carry out their long and carefully prepared plan, drawn up personally by the Austrian Chief of the General Staff, General Conrad von Hotzendorf, of a smashing offensive into the Italian plain. Never- theless, Austria's strategic superiority was not with- out its dangers to the Italians. Italy had to close securely her Trentino gates, and see to it that they remained tightly shut, for only then would she have 268 ITALY AT WAR 269 a free hand to conduct an offensive in the east. Both plans required superhuman efforts on the part of the Itahan troops, owing to the geographical configura- tion of the boundary-line. In the north the high Alpine passes, leading straight down into the Italian plain, were in the hands of the Austrians. In the .east the Isonzo River and the rock-ribbed Carso plateau pre- sented formidable barriers to any advancing armies. The Italian General Staff realised fully the dif- ficulties of the task which was to be intrusted to them. The war which had been raging for nine months throughout Europe had taught them many valuable lessons. They had learned the advantages to be de- rived from a body-blow delivered at the very outset of the campaign. If this was an advantage in other zones of operations, it was an absolute necessity along the Italian battle-line, otherwise Italy would find herself in a difficult position; therefore, she prepared to wage an offensive campaign. Throughout the winter and spring the Italian armies had been moulded into shape; the cadres brought up to full strength; the transport perfected; munition and supply depots arranged for. By the end of April everything was in readiness; the ''armed neutrahty" declared by Salandra, which the Vienna Government had long believed to be a ''bluff," was to prove itself an important factor in the early days of the war. For when the declaration of war came, there was no stoppage of the ordinary life of the coun- try; there was none of the chaos and confusion such as was witnessed in France when mobilisation was ordered there. In Italy on May 22 the general mobil- isation orders were issued. Except for the delimita- 270 GREATER ITALY tion of the Zona di Guerra (war zone) — ^which included virtually only Venetia and a very small sector of Lombardy — a slight delay of some trains, and the movement of troop trains, there was little to indicate that Italy had entered into the conflict. On May 25, the King left Rome for General Headquarters, where he personally assumed the duties of Commander- in-Chief of all the Italian armies, after appointing his uncle, the Duke of Genoa, "Lieutenant-General" of the Kingdom during his absence. The actual control of the conduct of the war was intrusted to General Count Luigi Cadorna, the son of the General Cadorna who had played such an im- portant part in the wars of liberation and had directed the operation which resulted in the taking of Rome. To the father had been intrusted the task of setting the seal of consummation on the plan of Italian unity; to the son was to be intrusted the task of bringing about the redemption of the Italians who Kved be- yond the boundaries and the creation of Greater Italy. No man knew better than General Cadorna the dif- ficulties which would confront his troops. No man knew better than he did the regions of the Trentino and Trieste. Though he had never commanded an army in the field, his skill as a commander had been brilliantly displayed during several Grand Manoeu- vres. Furthermore, by his writings on military sub- jects he had won for himself a high reputation. His "Frontal Attack," first published in 1898, set forth lucidly the advantages to be gained by a well-executed offensive. The temper of the man is well given in his own words, when in the preface of his book he remarks: "It is impossible to achieve success in war, ITALY AT WAR 271 if the stanch disciphne of the men is not joined to a stern disciphne of the leaders. The first makes the body of troops docile in the hands of their chiefs, the second makes these capable of guiding the operations with that unity of opinion and conception which is indispensable to victory." He himself superintended, even down to the most minute details, the reorganisa- tion of the Itahan armies during the days of neutrality. Though hampered by the lack of funds, he was able to bring his armies up to a high standard of efl&ciency. His organising faculties are remarkable, so that it became a byword throughout Italy, soon after the outbreak of the war, that "General Cadorna has organised his armies too well not to be able to organ- ise victory." Possessing in a superior degree calm- ness in the face of danger, yet deprecating individual bravery as detrimental to the smooth working of the mihtary machine; brilHant in his method, though consistently, almost ploddingly methodical, he was to lead Italy into war as coolly and calmly as though it were merely the usual Grand Manoeuvres. The sobriety of his communiques won the confidence not merely of his troops, but of the civiHan population. Trusted implicitly by all Italy, from the King down to the humblest peasant, he was to be able to carry out his plans of campaign, even at the most crucial moments, undisturbed. It is beUeved that General Cadorna had planned to begin his campaign on May 15, and, thus taking the enemy by surprise, to carry the warfare by swift, bold strokes deep into the enemy country. The machinations of Prince Biilow and Giolitti prevented this plan from being realised, and the enemy had ten 272 GREATER ITALY days at his disposal to reinforce his positions as soon as he saw that war was inevitable. Yet General Cadorna kept to the main outline of his plan. In one mighty bound, along Italy's four-hundred-mile Aus- trian frontier, from the Stelvio at nine thousand feet above sea-level, to the shores of the Adriatic, the Italian troops sprang forward. During the first days of the campaign the Italians secured the keys to the passes leading into Italy, while the Austrians retired all along the line to well-fortified positions. The war had been everywhere carried into enemy territory. The Austrians offered little resistance. It was obvious that General Cadorna planned to carry on his offen- sive in the east, at the same time exerting an ever- increasing pressure in the north. The operations along the Isonzo were, however, hampered. Mistakes and delays occurred during those first days which, though perhaps inevitable, cost the Italian armies many valuable lives. The crossing of the Isonzo, which it was hoped to carry out in a few days, was delayed three weeks, and it was not until June 18, that a general forward movement was made. But the Austrian guns, posted on the Carso heights, still dominated the river, which is here nearly a mile wide. The Italians worked with dauntless courage to repair the broken bridges, to build new ones, to get across the river by boats. It was at Sagrado that the most determined attacks were made. By dint of persistent efforts and dogged courage, the ItaHans crossed the river, established themselves firmly at Sagrado, and pushed up the flank of the Carso to Castello Nuovo. By June 27, the Italians held the bridge-head, which now made it possible to carry on ITALY AT WAR 273 a general attack on the Carso. Soon a general ad- vance began, so that early in July the Italians had everywhere crossed the lower Isonzo and securely held its left bank. Only in one sector the two almost impregnable positions of the Monte Sabotino and the Podgora, defending the town of Gorizia, the former rising two thousand feet and the latter eight hundred above the plain and fortified with great skill by the Austrians, remained in Austrian hands on the right bank. Though the ItaHans made repeated assaults, one of which at least almost succeeded, the fire of the enemy batteries, posted on even higher peaks beyond the river, drove off the assailants, and the fighting soon settled down to trench-warfare. In the region of the upper Isonzo minor successes were gained by the Itahans. In the Alpine regions the Alpini battalions, the most daring mountain troops in the world, had achieved astonishing successes. They climbed over seemingly impassable rock ledges; they clambered up perpen- dicular cliffs and drove out the Austrians. As they advanced the resistance of the enemy stiffened. By the end of June the impetuous onslaught of the Ital- ian mountain regiments had slackened. The Alpini dug themselves in, and here as elsewhere trench fight- ing began. It was soon found that the enemy had been able to spare more troops from his Galician front than had been expected, and that he was equipped with a more numerous artillery than the Italians. Above all, his skilful and flexible use of his heavy guns had rendered the task of assault difficult. Though the Italians had settled down to trench-warfare, this did not mean 274 GREATER ITALY that they had abandoned their offensive tactics. Along the Isonzo they pushed their trenches forward and kept the enemy constantly engaged. Steadily the pressure along the whole Carso line continued. The Italians took many prisoners, and were daily consohdating their positions more strongly. Suddenly, during the last week in July, the Austrians began a furious offensive. The attack was well conducted, but the Italians by bringing up reserves soon counter- attacked with increased vigour. For nearly a fortnight the battle raged violently with varying fortunes. The crest of the Carso was won and again lost by the Italians, and when the fighting ceased at the beginning of the second week in August the Italians found them- selves established in strong positions close to the top of the plateau. Throughout the summer the fighting in the high Alps continued. It was more in the nature of skir- mishes and brushes with the enemy, than well-defined warfare. The Austrians frequently held niches above ravines commanding an important fine of communi- cations, where a corporal's squad with a machine-gun or two and plenty of ammunition could do an im- mense amount of damage to transport columns and passing troops, until destroyed by a bold assault on the part of a few intrepid volunteers. The Itahans were slowly gaining the summits. The fighting was now carried on from at seven to nine thousand feet above sea-level. The Austrians under the protection of their heavy-cahbre guns, which jutted out from thick armoured, revolving turrets on the mountain tops, were able to maintain themselves in relative security. The task of destroying these gun emplacements was ITALY AT WAR 275 stupendous. The Italian forces had to bring up their big guns. There were no roads. Roads were built. Then by hand, by harnessing a company, even a battalion to one gun, the guns were hauled slowly and laboriously to the mountain tops. Artillery duels followed, while the infantry remained inactive until the enemy guns were silenced and the infantry could then move forward. Winter set in early, but the Alpini did not abandon their positions. By the end of September deep snow had made the high Alps almost impenetrable. Yet these mountain troops stuck to their posts. The silence of the Alpine valleys was suddenly and unex- pectedly disturbed by the crash of exploding shells or a dull hiss as the hot metal buried itself deep in the new-banked snow. Thus the heights above the valley of Cortina d'Ampezzo were mastered. The Monte Baldo, and the mountains dominating the Val Sugana and the Val Lagarina and all the other valleys which converge on Trent, one by one fell into Italian hands. But the work was slow, and throughout the winter and early spring the positions maintained were relatively unchanged. On the Isonzo the campaign was active, even if no great progress was recorded. During October and November the fighting continued. The Italians attacked furiously, hoping to gain the Monte Sabo- tino. They advanced their trench Hues, and once, early in November, actually held the heights, but were obHged to evacuate the position. Nor was the enemy inactive. He fought doggedly and never gave ground until it had been dearly paid for. The morale of the Itahan troops was excellent. Though their 276 GREATER ITALY offensive had not progressed as rapidly as they had desired, they were everywhere fighting on enemy territory. Two thousand square miles of the cherished Italia irredente had been redeemed, including 125 villages and townships, with a normal population of nearly 100,000 inhabitants. While General Cadorna was vigorously prosecut- ing his campaign, the attitude of Italy at large re- mained perplexing. The country had entered into the war in the face of a Parliament whose majority was distinctly Neutralist. After the ''week of Pas- sion," as d'Annunzio so strikingly characterised those eventful May days, which culminated in the historic session of May 20 and the declaration of war, the country regained its normal aspect with astonishing rapidity. Not two weeks elapsed before the Germans (for though Rome had broken off diplomatic rela- tions with Berlin, numerous partisans remained to take up their cause) were again at work. Italy had declared war against Austria. There were few who were in favour of declaring war on Germany. The most active Interventionists had hoped that the declaration of war would come from Berlin. But when the weeks passed, and Germany maintained an attitude of stolid silence, it became evident that the Germans had other plans. The position of M. Salandra was one beset with difficulties. He had skilfully guided Italy into the war, and was a sincere Interventionist, yet he reaHsed that the Chamber was still controlled by Giolitti; that the majority was still secretly Neutralist while he himself commanded only a small following. Further- ITALY AT WAR 277 more M. Salandra's part in Italian public affairs had been local in character. ''A modest burgher of Apulia," as he was wont to characterise himself, he was not in the habit of thinking nationally; he displayed few of those qualities of statesmanship, the breadth of view or the bold initiative needed in such a crisis. He had led the country into war, and having thereby won the high esteem of the majority of the Italian people, it seemed as though he felt that his task had been ac- complished. A warm friend and admirer of Baron Sonnino, whose faithful lieutenant he had been until he had rallied to the Giolittian majority in 1913, Sa- landra had called Baron Sonnino to the Foreign Office, and together they had laboured in the cause of war. However, neither possessed the gift of magnetic leader- ship necessary to inspire the country with buoyant confidence. As was to be expected, it was soon evi- dent that the Government had lost touch with Par- liament and the people. Though Italy had entered the war on the side of the Alhes, during the first months she seemed to wish to let it be known that she was fighting her own war independently; that Italy's war against Austria was only indirectly connected with the war being waged along the other fronts. Italy maintained an attitude of aloofness towards the Alhed Powers. They, in turn, regarded Italy with some misgivings. The fact that Italy had not altogether broken off indirect commer- cial intercourse with Germany, and that goods from Italy were still reaching Germany, rankled in their minds. The belief that some secret arrangement be- tween Rome and Berlin existed, readily gained wide credence in both France and England. Though there 278 GREATER ITALY was no truth in these rumours as circulated, the com- mercial agreement/ entered into by Italy before the rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany, was dis- torted to fit the circumstances. The Salandra Govern- ment did not exert itself to dispel the false impression which had gained currency, so that it was not sur- prising that Italy was regarded with increasing sus- picion abroad. In Italy itself there was a party with German affiliations, who soon after the declaration of war began a campaign in favour of what came to be known as la piccola guerra or ''small war," which meant that Italy should only put forth a half-hearted effort, instead of energetically prosecuting the war. It can- not be denied that during the early months many obstacles were placed in the way of mobilising Italian resources to the fullest for war purposes. The peculiar timidity of Governments, which manifested itself in all the Allied States, in London as well as in Paris and Petrograd, where the several Cabinets, fearing pop- ular discontent, were afraid to ask their countries to bear burdens which were subsequently looked upon as trifling, was a contributing factor in preventing the Salandra Ministry from pursuing a vigorous policy, though the nation at large was ready and eager to bear manfully its share. On August 21, Italy declared war on Turkey. This action was taken in view of Italy's increasing interests in ^gean affairs, more particularly in Asia Minor, rather than from any probabihty of direct conflict, though the Turks had stirred up some trouble in Libya. The declaration of war against Germany was, 1 See page 205. ITALY AT WAR 279 however, still deferred. The active Interventionists became restive. Parliament was not to reopen be- fore December 1. It soon became known that the Itahan forces in the field did not possess the neces- sary munitions to carry on an aggressive campaign, and that this was the main cause of the slow prog- ress on the Isonzo. Machine-guns and heavy-cahbre artillery were also lacking. To this was added the report of a shortage of coal, due to insufficient trans- portation facilities. Other disquieting rumours soon gathered strength, yet the Government vouchsafed no explanations, and the country was left in the darJc as to the true circumstances. It is doubtless true that the discontent rife in Italy was increased by the fact that the war was going against the Allies. In October Italy declared war on Bulgaria, and still the long-expected declaration of war against Germany was once again postponed.. The position of Italy had grown increasingly dif- ficult. In France and Great Britain it was not easily forgotten that for thirty-three years Italy had been alHed to the Central Empires, and that the treaty of alliance with Germany had not been denounced. In Paris and London it could not be understood why Italy had not declared war on Germany. No temporising excuses were accepted. At home there was an increasing number of Italians who were strongly dissatisfied with Italy's ambiguous position. At this time the cry arose for greater solidarity among the Allies. Italy must co-operate more closely with the Allies, both militarily and politically. On December 1, the day of the opening of the Chamber, Baron Sonnino, in the course of a speech 280 GREATER ITALY on Italy's foreign relations, announced that Italy had formally adhered to the Pact of London, pledging herself not to sign a separate peace. This was a first step in the right direction. About this time Italy arranged to make use of the German ships interned in Italian ports, 'Ho be paid for after the war," in order to relieve the shortage of tonnage which was daily growing more acute. The year 1915 closed with the country in a state of restless uneasiness. The Government had failed to come forward with a clear-cut statement of the situ- ation. Though the integrity of Sonnino and Salan- dra was above reproach, their methods had done much to leave doubts in men's minds as to Italy's aims and intentions. The military situation in the Near East was caus- ing serious concern to the Allies. The Austro-German armies under von Mackensen had swept across the Balkans; Serbia had been crushed and the Austrian forces were now directing their energies to the con- quering of Montenegro and Albania. Their advance was -not long delayed. On January 12 (1916) the news reached Rome that Cettinje had fallen in the hands of the Austrians, and that the Montenegrins were retreating towards the Albanian coast. On January 28, the Italian forces occupied Durazzo. It was now decided to rescue the Serbian army, which had retreated through Albania to the coast, as well as the scattered forces of the Montenegrins, together with the civilian population which had fled before the invaders. This task was intrusted to the Itahan navy. The work was beset with great peril. Enemy submarines infested the Adriatic, yet the undertaking ITALY AT WAR 281 was successfully carried out. The Serbian armies, estimated at over 50,000 men, were transported to Corfu. The sick and wounded, as well as the civilian population, were taken to Italy; stores and supplies were taken over to Albania; Italian troops were transported; in all 250,000 men and 10,000 horses, with supplies, etc., were safely carried. Italy had fulfilled the task intrusted to her with remarkable ability. Her forces held on at Durazzo until the town was completely evacuated, and then only retired on Avlona, which they continued to hold. Notwith- standing Italy's admirable work of rescue in Albania, the rumour soon spread that Italy was in part to blame for the defeats of the Allies in the Balkans, as she had refused to send a force to Salonika to co- operate with the French and British. No consider- ation was taken of the fact that Italy had first to protect her own battle-line, and that she could spare no men or guns for a far-distant expedition. But the effort to secure close co-operation among the Allies was now being systematically carried out. In February M. Briand, the French Premier, came to Rome to pave the way for the politico-military conference of the Allies which was to take place the following month in Paris. Here, on March 27, M. Salandra, Baron Sonnino, and General Cadorna for the first time came in personal, official contact with the representatives of the Allied Governments. Hence- forth Italy was to act in close co-operation with her AlHes in all matters, whether diplomatic, military, or economic. The effect of this conference was of great value in co-ordinating closely the joint efforts of the AlHes. Exchanges of official visits also took place be- 282 GREATER ITALY tween Great Britain and Italy. General Cadorna visited London; Mr. Asquith came to Rome and paid his respects to King Victor Emmanuel at the Italian front. The relations between Italy and her AlHes now entered upon a new phase of friendliness and mutual confidence. Italy no longer was isolated in the war, fighting her own battles unaided; she had finked her fortunes with those of the AUies, yet re- tained her liberty of action. In the words of Baron Sonnino, who, speaking in the Chamber on April 16, declared : "Our aim is simple: to fight with all our strength in the common cause, at the same time protecting the supreme, vital interests of the nation." The steps towards a closer co-operation with the Allies had greatly strengthened the Government, but the question of declaring war against Germany still hung like a dark cloud over the horizon. It has often been suggested that Italian statesmen are fond of dalljdng with equivocal situations, and that in their desire to appear crafty, their diplomacy often becomes entangled in the woof of their own weaving. It is impossible as yet to determine whether the Sa- landra Government aimed purposely to continue its semi-friendly relations with Germany or whether it was afraid to break off entirely with Germany, in view of the strong pro-German sentiments which still existed in Italy. The disasters which had be- faUen Allied arms in the eastern theatre of war — ^the conquest of Poland and much Russian territory, of Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania — the Titan blows which the German armies were striking at Verdun ITALY AT WAR 283 made it appear desirable to many Italians not to pro- voke a war with Germany, who still loomed all-power- ful. The Government at all events continued its course unchanged. The Interventionist members of the Chamber were now consolidated into a hloc of 140 members under the leadership of M. Bissolati, the brilliant Socialist Deputy who at the outbreak of the war had volunteered for active services, and was a sergeant in an Alpini battaUon. They had hoped for a reconstruction of the Cabinet which would lead to a more vigorous prosecution of the war. But M. Bissolati was unwilhng to precipitate a crisis. He counselled patience and prudence, and urged his followers not to upset the Government, even though he himself would have been the first to welcome the declaration of an energetic policy in the prosecution of the war. On the other hand, the Official Socialists, who numbered 36 members of the Chamber, were still solidly opposed to the war, and daily voiced embit- tered criticisms of the Government for having dragged Italy into the conflict. At the same time the impor- tant group of Germanophiles, who had numerous sup- porters throughout Italy, frankly stated that though Italy's declaration of war against Austria was justi- fied and justifiable, to declare war on Germany would be an act of wholly unwarranted aggression. On the battle-fields of the Isonzo, with the return of spring, activity was being renewed. The German onslaught at Verdun, which the French were heroically withstanding, had brought to the fore more insistently than ever the cry for unity of action on all the fronts. Some even went so far as to suggest that Italy should 284 GREATER ITALY send an expeditionary force to France. But the Ital- ian Higher Command knew that in the near future it would need all its available strength. However, a heavy bombardment was opened along the Isonzo, and though no general assault took place, this diver- sion had a salutary effect, and stopped the Austrians from transporting artillery to France. The reason why the Italians were unable to assist the French at this time soon was made known. Dur- ing the winter months the Austrians had been slowly concentrating a considerable force in the Trentino. Spurred on by Austria's recent successes in the Bal- kans, General Conrad could not resist the temptation of putting into execution his long-matured plan for the invasion of Italy. There can be no doubt that it seemed certain that with due caution, adequate prepara- tion, and sufficient effectives both in men and guns, the project would succeed. The prospect was allur- ing. Russia was, at this time, so it was believed within the Central Empires, wholly hors de combat, and before she could take the field again it was pro- posed to break through the Italian defenses in the Trentino, pour into the Italian plain, and thus getting in behind General Cadorna's main forces operating on the Isonzo, crush the armies of Italy by one swift stroke. Once the Austrians were in the Venetian plain, they were confident that Italy would be ready to sue for peace. A glance at the map will readily show that this "Napoleonic" plan of campaign offered many chances of success. The Italian forces had pushed northward, up through the chaotic valley systems which converge on Trent, without much regard for the defensive ITALY AT WAR 285 strength of their positions. They held a Hne, in the sector which was to be the scene of the great battle, running roughly from a point a little south of Rovereto, north of the Col Santo, supported by the Pasubio, which has an altitude of 7,353 feet, then following the old Italian frontier Hne across the Valle Maggie and the Val Sugana to the Monte Collo, northwest of Borgo. For nearly a year the Italians had been carrying on an offensive campaign, and as the enemy had never counter-attacked in force, the result was that in certain sectors the Italians had neglected to strengthen their positions as adequately as would have been desirable. The rumours of an impending Aus- trian offensive were current as early as March, but as time wore on and the enemy made no move, whatever apprehensions there may have been were quieted, more particularly so as the Italian General Staff had learned of the great offensive preparations of the Russians, in their southern sector, and they could not believe that Austria would dare to weaken her Eastern front. The young Archduke Charles Francis Joseph, the Heir Apparent of the Hapsburg throne,^ arrived in Trent to take command in person of the invading forces; while General Conrad hovered in the back- ground, retouching his strategy and amending his tac- tics. Fifteen divisions, totalling 350,000 men, the picked troops of the Dual Monarchy, were gathered here for this great undertaking. The most powerful big guns which Austria possessed had been brought from remote confines of the Empire and beyond, and were now concentrated along the short sector of the 1 The present Emperor Charles I. 286 GREATER ITALY battle-line, stretching from the Val Sugana to the Val Lagarina. Here forty-five great 12-inch howitzers from the Skodawerke, which had reduced Li^ge, Antwerp, and Laon in the West, Novo Georgievsk, Ivangorod, and Brest Litovsk in the East, the most powerful, easily handled heavy-calibre guns that have been used in this war, were disposed along the Alpine pla- teaux, ready to move forward and batter down all resistance. There were, furthermore, at least six of the monster German 420-mm. guns, and as many more long-range 15-inch naval guns, to say nothing of the smaller calibres. It is estimated that over 2,000 pieces of artillery were massed along a short front, extending not much over 22 miles — that is to say nearly 100 guns to the mile, or one gun every 20 yards. Great reserves of munitions were piled up, and it was soon evident that the Strafexpedition or ^'punitive ex- pedition," as the Austrians termed their proposed offensive, was to be carried out on a formidable scale. Everything was done to arouse the enthusiasm of the polyglot divisions of the Hapsburg realm. The beauties of the rich Venetian plain were extolled, and it was noisily proclaimed that this was to be the final offensive, and that the crushing of the Italians would bring about the end of the war. During the last week in April, General Cadorna, after making a tour of inspection of the Trentino defenses, took up his headquarters with the First Army, commanded by General Brusati,^ which held what was to be the centre of the battle-Hne; as it was 1 General Brusati was removed from his command of the First Army at the opening of the Austrian offensive and was retired from the army a few weeks later. ITALY AT WAR 287 evident that the General commanding here had made insufficient provision in the event of a strong attack, the Commander-in-Chief set about to remedy the defective defenses. The ItaHan Hues in the Trentino were at best ill-suited to hold up an assault pushed home with the vigour which modern artillery has made possible. The valleys leading into the Italian plain radiate, fan-like, from Trent as a centre. The Austrians could choose any of these six valleys as a channel to pour into the plain. The Italian lines of defense were isolated and only poorly provided with lateral communications. General Cadorna expected a violent attack, but had not counted on the tremen- dous battering ram of shells which crumpled the Ital- ian advance positions when the bombardment opened on May 14. The attack began with a general bom- bardment along the whole front from the Val Guidi- caria to the Adriatic, and was of peculiar violence at Monfalcone. But it was soon evident that the Aus- trian Command was well informed as to the weakest link in the Italian trench line, and concentrated its greatest efforts there. It was along the sector between the Val Lagarina and the Val Sugana that the main attack developed. Prolonged bombardments of un- precedented violence were followed up by massed in- fantry attacks, driven home with great skill. The co-ordination of the Austrian artillery fire was ad- mirable, and in no battle of the European War had artillery been used more efficaciously, and at the same time more flexibly in delivering its full force where most effective. The Austrian blow was well aimed, and it would be useless to deny that Italy reeled under the on- 288 GREATER ITALY slaught. The Italian troops were forced slowly but continuously backward. Step by step the Austrian armies advanced under the cover of their big guns, which were moved forward with unusual celerity. The Italians were compelled to evacuate their advance positions. Their lines of communication were seriously disturbed by the Austrian long-distance fire. Aus- trian shells were now dropping ten miles behind the ItaKan first-line trenches. Italian towns and villages, which had hitherto been immune from the destruction of war, were razed to the ground by the great Austrian shells which fell thickly on the Asiago and Asiero plateaux. A great stream of refugees, with their goods and chattels and flocks of goats and cattle, hurried to safety in the plain, as the highlands of the fertile Sette Communi now came within the range of battle. The Itahans fought everywhere with unusual courage and determination, but it was impossible to withstand the deadly enemy shell fire. Along this sector there were few bomb-proof dugouts, few shelters, and to hold out beyond a certain limit meant an unnecessary and needless sacrifice of life. The task of checking the advance was further hampered by the lack of an adequate number of guns. The Austrians continued to advance. Thereupon General Cadorna decided to withdraw his centre, to the south of the Posina torrent, in order to consolidate his position. This manoeuvre meant the abandonment of much valuable territory, but there was no alternative, as the Italians were still outnumbered four to one both in men and guns. The Austrians were now pouring down from the heights, and the Italians had no time to dig them- selves in. Trench-warfare was abandoned. Great ITALY AT WAR 289 masses of troops were manoeuvring in the open. The battle raged on the mountain tops and in the valleys. On the heights the contending armies were fighting in the snow; in the valleys the heat and dust of the Italian mid-May days was suffocating. The operations of withdrawal, which now brought the battle-line several miles beyond the old ItaUan boundary into Italy, were successfully carried out by May 22. The Austrian attack had now slackened, but it was only a temporary lull in the battle, which was to be resumed with renewed fury within a very few days. In fact by the 24th, the Austrians' onslaught on the left centre was renewed with increasing violence. There seemed to be no shortage in the Austrian supply of shells, of which the expenditure had been prodigious. The Italian resistance was now beginning to stiffen, yet the situation was still precarious. On the right centre the enemy was pressing steadily onward; he had crossed the Posina and was pushing southward. To the east in the Altipiano dei Sette Communi, the Itahans were compelled to evacuate its chief centre, Asiago. The fighting continued desperately. Only three miles of highland country lay between the Aus- trians and the ItaUan plain. Already General Cadorna had made provision for the constitution of a new army for the defense of Venetia. The organising capacity of the Italian General Staff was here put to a supreme test. Notwithstanding the great battle that was being fought in the highlands, in less than ten days, centring around Vicenza, a complete army of 500,000 men with mule and motor transport columns, field kitchens, sanitary corps, as well as its full comple- ment both of men and guns was assembled ready for 290 GREATER ITALY action, and during all this time a steady stream of reinforcements, munitions, and supplies was being despatched to the troops in action. On the evening of June 1, it seemed as though the Austrian invasion of Italy had succeeded. Only two short miles lay between the Austrians and the plain. In massed formation the enemy came on resolutely, to break down the last remaining barrier. Blow upon blow, well aimed and carried out with astonishing valour and great courage, was directed at these last Italian defenses, but General Cadorna's men had been ordered to die in their positions, rather than give ground. The hom* had struck for Italy to show her mettle, and it found the Italians ready. The at- tacks of the Austrians had not slackened; they had the advantage of terrain as well as a superiority in artillery, yet the Itahans held on. It would be im- possible to recount even fragmentarily the heroic fighting of those early June days. It was not one battle but a hundred battles fused into one terrible struggle. The Austrians stood on the heights looking down into the Italian plain. Before them lay the rich cities of Venetia: Vicenza, Bassano, Padua; even Venice and the Adriatic could be faintly discerned through the haze. Sixty-six invasions have been launched into Italy since the days of Rome, and of these only nine had failed. Would this invasion, the most carefully planned and executed, as well as the greatest of them all, succeed? For a week the decision hung in the balance. Again and again, with sledge-hammer blows, the massed columns of the Aus- trian infantry advanced to the attack and broke against the Italian lines. The Italians were still com- ITALY AT WAR 291 pelled to give ground, but at no point were they obliged to surrender an important position. By June 3 General Cadorna, who throughout the fortnight of fighting had not sought to deceive the country as to the gravity of the situation, was able to announce that the imminent danger of invasion had passed. The fighting still continued with un- abated fury. The Austrians renewed their onslaught, and the Italians now fought with increased stubborn- ness. The great army which had been mobilised for the defense of the plain was now sent forward to take part in the battle in the highlands. The Aus- trians, seeing their prize eluding them, fought with desperation. The Italians throughout the second and third weeks in June had to meet repeated assaults, executed with great gallantry and skill. But the tide had begun to turn. The mastery of battle now lay with the ItaHans, but the Austrians would not concede defeat. They poured an unending stream of shells on the Italian lines; their attacks were still pushed home with vigour. The Itahans suffered ter- rible losses. In some brigades as high as 60 per cent of the cadres, including officers, were wiped out. The Italians from all over the peninsula had vied with each other in indomitable courage to turn the tide of invasion. The early onslaughts were stayed by the Sicilians; the Ligurians, the Calabrians, the Sardinian troops, all had a part in the fierce fighting. But the greatest share of the terrific struggle fell to the Alpini battalions. They won immortal glory in the defense of the last fines of trenches against which the invading armies stormed in vain, and when the current of battle turned and the Italians, on June 25, 292 GREATER ITALY began to drive the Austrians before them the Alpini were in the vanguard of every assault and blasted open the road which made possible the advance of General Cadorna's main forces. During the last week in June the Austrians began to retire. The Italians were now in a position to move forward. The fighting was difficult. The Austrians withdrew slowly, destroying the towns and villages in their path, but they held on stubbornly to the heights, and were only driven out after hot fighting. The Italians were now taking numbers of prisoners, and gathering in many guns, stores, and other booty abandoned by the enemy. By the first week in July the great battle of the Trentino had come to an end. The Austrians still held a line, roughly from about three to seven miles in advance of their former positions before the be- ginning of the offensive, and they dug themselves in firmly in their new positions, but the great objective of the offensive had failed miserably. Italy was saved from invasion, but, more than this, the great battle had given the Italian troops a renewed and greater confidence in themselves, and the world at large who were informed of the prowess of the Italians could not fail to be impressed by the greatness of this achieve- ment. No other battle of the European War, with the possible exception of the assault on the fortress of Verdun, brought forth a more potently concentrated mass of artillery on so short a frontal sector. Even the defense of Verdun presented no such difficult problem as that which faced the defending armies in the Trentino when the Austrian attack was once launched. ITALY AT WAR 293 It has been suggested that had not General Bru- silof early in June initiated his great drive in the East, which was to sweep the Russians rapidly through the Bukowina, and thus prevented new forces from being despatched to the Trentino, the Austrian attack here would have succeeded. It cannot be denied that the Russian thrust in the East was of timely assistance, but this can in no way detract from the greatness of the Italian exploit. General Cadorna had won a great victory, the significance of which is not even to-day fully appreciated. He did more than merely to stem an invasion; he proclaimed Italian unity on the battle- field. Here for the first time in the history of the ItaHan people, Italians from all parts of the peninsula, from the North, the South, the mountains, and the plain, had a share in the fighting, and acquitted themselves in a manner worthy of the highest admi- ration. While Italy was in the throes of the greatest battle of her war, with the Austrians pushing onward, another crisis arose within her boundaries which was precip- itated by this event. The discontent with the Salan- dra Government had steadily grown during the spring months, though it was kept in check by a desire not to appear disunited in face of the enemy. When the Chamber reopened on June 6, it was evident that unless M. Salandra departed radically from his atti- tude of aloofness he would soon be in open conflict with the Chamber, which would lead to his down- fall. The Chamber was in a restless frame of mind. The Government had maintained absolute silence re- garding the military situation in the Trentino, and insisted on pursuing routine business. The Chamber 294 GREATER ITALY bowed to the demand and passed financial bills in rapid succession without discussion. Thereupon M. Salandra, in demanding a vote of confidence on June 10, made a reference to the war which may have been the truth, but which, under the circumstances, was decidedly tactless. In speaking of the defensive posi- tions of the Trentino and the Austrian oJEfensive, he remarked : "We must manfully recognise that had the posi- tions been better prepared and better defended, these positions would have at least held out longer." Here was an open criticism of the Italian Higher Command which, though it was not directed against General Cadorna personally, but rather against Gen- eral Brusati, spoken by the head of the Government in so grave a moment, could only be interpreted as an accusation. It was evident that M. Salandra was sincere when he spoke, and that he did not wish to give the country mere sentimental bombast, but it was also patent that he was tired of the struggle with a recalcitrant Parliament, and that if he had to fall it would be by his own hand rather than by that of another. As was inevitable, the Government motion for a vote of confidence was defeated; two days later M. Salandra announced his resignation. The men who had compassed his overthrow did so actuated by the most diverse motives; the Official Socialists and Giohttians because he had led the country into war; the Interventionists because he had not prosecuted the war with sufficient vigour. The King, who for a year had been living unin- terruptedly at the front and had personally visited ITALY AT WAR 295 all the zones and sectors of his long and varied battle- line, was obUged to return to select a new Premier. Though M. Salandra had by his lack of souplesse ahenated the sympathy of many, he, nevertheless, was still strong in the country, and the King was unwilHng that he should not remain at his post at the head of a larger, more representative Ministry. But apparently M. Salandra wished to retire. The In- terventionists loudly clamoured for a National Min- istry which would take firm hold of the business of waging war with greater zeal and energy. After due consultations M. Boselh, the dean of Itahan Deputies, was intrusted with the formation of a ''National Cabinet." It was a difficult task. It was held desir- able to have Baron Sonnino remain at the Foreign Office, but he was unwilhng to do so unless M. Sa- landra also remained in the Cabinet. Baron Sonnino's objections were finally overcome, and after some de- lays, on June 18, the composition of the National Ministry was announced. The new Ministry had been increased in size from 13 to 19 members, in order to include in so far as pos- sible the representatives of all ParHamentary 'groups. Here for the first time we find a Catholic and a Re- pubHcan with a portfolio in the same Cabinet, which also included a Sociahst, M. Bissolati, the leader of the Interventionists. The Salandra Ministry thus came to an end, and the new National Ministry took up the reins of power. M. Salandra's name, however, stands in high honour in his country; he played a leading part in the work of constructing the new Cabinet. For the first time in many years the name of Giolitti was not openly mentioned, though he re- 296 GREATER ITALY turned to Rome from his home in Piedmont about this time, for the first time in nearly a year. M. BoselH, though seventy-eight years of age, with an unquenchable optimism assumed the respon- sibilities of government, and was soon to give proof that the National Ministry was to keep its pledge to prosecute the war with full energy. While the ministerial crisis may be regarded as an affair of internal politics, the attention of the world was soon to be centred on Italy's battle-line. General Cadorna, though busy parrying the Austrian blow in the Trentino with his left hand, when the danger of invasion had passed set to work immediately to pre- pare for his own advance in the East. With the guns still thundering in the Trentino, and with the ItaHans still keeping the enemy busily engaged there, the great final assault against the Podgora and the Monte Sabotino was launched. The onslaught was irresis- tible. The Italians drove the enemy before them, cleared the heights which dominated Gorizia, crossed the Isonzo, captured the city, and by August 14, ten days after this great offensive thrust had begun, they had pushed their fine forward along the Carso and firmly held Gorizia. These operations netted the ItaHans not only a great gain of territory, including the city of Gorizia, which next to Trieste is the largest city of Italia irredenta, but 18,758 Austrian prisoners, including 393 officers, and 32 large-calibre guns, be- sides great quantities of munitions, machine-guns, rifles, etc. This was but the first of a series of vigorous offen- sives which General Cadorna was to carry out on the Carso front, extending from Gorizia southward. To- wards the middle of September another movement was ITALY AT WAR 297 initiated here, which gained for the ItaHans several important positions, including San Grado and some 4,000 prisoners. This was quickly followed by a third and even more powerful blow, which straightened out the Italian lines which had by this time eaten deep into the Carso plateau. In a furious surprise attack, developed October 10, the Italians were able to take nearly 8,000 prisoners. But General Cadorna would give the enemy no respite, and three weeks later, dur- ing the first days of November, he launched another assault along this same front, which, though tena- ciously opposed, left 8,982 prisoners in his hands, be- sides guns and war materiel of all sorts, making in all over 40,000 Austrian prisoners, including 1,008 officers taken by the Itahans during three months' fighting on the Carso front. Everywhere along the whole Italian front the enemy is on the defensive. Though the Austrians still hold a small segment of Italian territory along the Tren- tino front, and make occasional offensive sallies, they are being each day more closely invested, and with the return of spring may be expected to be driven out. But the eyes of all Italy are turned towards the Carso front. Here by a series of hard, well-directed blows, the Italians have forged ahead and will con- tinue to do so. Trieste at the present writing Kes not much more than twelve miles beyond the ItaUan ad- vance positions. The enveloping movement which General Cadorna is executing it is hoped will spare Trieste from destruction, at the same time placing it safely within Italian hands, as the troops push ahead towards Istria to complete the task of ''redemption" of the northeastern Adriatic. In the Balkan war zone Italy is pursuing consis- 298 GREATER ITALY tently her new plan of an energetic prosecution of the war, not merely by sending a strong force to co-operate with the Allied armies assembled at Salonika, but has undertaken the task of opening a road across Epirus to form a junction with the AlUed armies, pushing northward into Serbia. During the first week in October (1916), it was announced that a consider- able ItaHan force had landed at Santi Quaranta, north of the island of Corfu, and was proceeding rapidly northward towards the lake of Prespa across the Albanian frontier where it had come in contact with the Alhed forces. The unity of front is now becoming a reality. Italy is closely co-operating with the Allies in the conduct of the campaign, and though great obstacles still remain to be surmounted, the Italian people look forward with full confidence in their armies to attain the principal object of their participation in the war; the redemption of the Trentino and the Italian lands of the Eastern Adriatic. It would be too dogmatic an explanation of the decisive step the new National Ministry was to take in regard to its relations with Germany to state that it spontaneously declared war on Germany. The preparation for this event had been slowly and cov- ertly proceeding under the Salandra Government. One by one the bonds which bound Italy to Germany had been severed. The process was perhaps over- cautious, and during many months kept Italy in a false position. It must, however, be recalled that it was a current behef among many Italians, during the greater part of the first year of their war, that inasmuch as the entire ItaUan economic structure rested on Ger- ITALY AT WAR 299 man foundations, a drastic severing of all connection with Germany would inevitably lead to a catastrophe. But when the ItaUans realised that they could carry on their industrial and commercial life as well, if not better, alone than under German tutelage, they pro- ceeded patiently and thoroughly to eliminate German influence and control. Italy throughout her conduct of foreign affairs since August, 1914, had shown a marked capacity for safeguarding her paramount interests and for visual- ising clearly her national needs. Her policy has been strikingly free from rash and immature decisions. When Italy was ready, and not before, she followed to its logical end the other great object for her entry into the war — the emancipation of Italy from Ger- man control. Therefore the declaration of war against Germany on August 28, 1916, came as no great surprise in Italy. The justifications for the step were not lacking. Ger- many had from the outset of hostilities furnished great assistance to her Austrian ally in the campaign against Italy. During the recent offensive in the Trentino German guns and German shells contributed largely to the success which the Austrians were able to obtain. But further than this, Germany had broken her agreement entered into with Italy in May, 1915, and had stopped the payment of pensions due to Italian workmen. But these excuses were a mere formahty embodied in the official declaration of war. The real cause lay deeper. Italy had thrown in her lot with the nations who were opposing the spread of Pan-Germanism. Italy had for twenty years lived under its influence, and knows more thoroughly than 300 GREATER ITALY any of the other belligerents the dangers to national independence to which this vassalage may lead. To emancipate herself from German influence, to become a free and powerful agent in the affairs of the world, is one of the chief underlying causes for the Itahan declaration of war on. Germany. Whatever may have been the motives of the Gov- ernment in openly breaking off all connections with Germany, the declaration of war was to prove an important step towards the increase of Italian prestige and independence. Italy was now to be received on terms of intimacy, confidence, and equality by the Allied Powers. The Quadruple Alliance was a fait accompli. The last ties which bound Italy formally to Germany were severed. Henceforth no loyal ItaUan could maintain friendly relations with Germany with- out being a traitor to his country. For the people of Italy the future has much in store. The pathway to a Greater Italy lies open. By pur- suing the cautious, clear-sighted, constructive policy which Baron Sonnino has so consistently followed it would appear probable that the '^ greater destinies" of Italy are on the eve of fulfilment. The apparent ehmination of Greece from- the participation in the affairs of the ^gean and the Adriatic has greatly simpUfied a problem the solution of which would have caused much vexation. Italy may now assert openly, without undue clandestine bickering, her claims to a share of dominance in the eastern ^gean. Serbia, for the time being, no longer exists as an in- dependent State. It would be premature to predict an immediate and vigorous revival of Pan-Serb as- ITALY AT WAR 301 pirations. The drain of the present struggle will have been too great for the Serbs to reassert any unreason- able claims to national expansion, in the immediate future. Italy at all events can afford to be magnan- imous towards her stricken neighbour in the Eastern Adriatic. Is it too soon to speak of victory? Whatever may be the decision arrived at on the field of battle, whatever may be the fate that befalls Italian arms, Italy has already won a great victory. For she is fighting not solely for the aggrandisement of her territory nor the increase of her wealth: she is fighting for the greatness of her national soul; not exalted by any chimerical idealism, not in pursuit of some high-sounding phrasemaker's catchword such as ''humanity" or ''civilisation," but as an upholder of the right of nationhood she is helping to bring once again peace, security, and liberty to Europe. INDEX Abruzzl. Duke of tbe, Italian Ad- miral, 125. Abyssinia, 40, 235 ; "Green Book " on War with, 72 ; Military strength of, 64: War with. 63-66, 70. Adalla Railway, Concession of, 137, 196, 235. Adis Ababa, Treaty of, 70-71. Adriatic, Geographical survey of, 208-209; Italianism of, 210; The Slavs of, 27, 211, 215; Italian policy of expansion in, 227, 231, 233; Rus- sian proposal of territorial distri- bution in Eastern, 231; Gabriel d'Annunzio, regarding, 218; see also under Francis Ferdinand and Irre- dentism. Aehrenthal, Baron von Oater Count), Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by, 214-215; Railway concession through Saniak of Novi Bazar, 102; Meeting of, with di San Guliano, 109; Attitude of, during Italo-Tvu-kish War, 125- 126. Mge&n Islands, see Rhodes. Agadlr (1911), 110, 117. Agriculture, 145. Albania, Inviolability of, 136; Es- tablishment of Kingdom of, 157; Bank of, 196; Defimct state, 228. Alexandra, Queen of England, 106. Algeciras Conference (1906), 100-101, 110, 117. Allegemeiner Deutscher Schulverein, 28. Alpini. 154. 273, 275. Amadeus VIII, Duke of Savoy, elected Pope (1439), 87. AndrSasy, Coimt, 11. Annuario Statistico Italiano, quoted, 144. Annimzlo. Gabriel d", 218; Character of, 257-258; Italian intervention in European War championed by, 258; Speech of, at Quarto. 268; Re- ception of, at Rome. 261; Accuses Giolitti and Pro-Germans. 362-363; Triumph of. 264-266, 276. Argentine Republic, ItaUan emigra- tion to, 144. Army, Constitution of, 154; Credits for, 50; Increase of, 39; Service in, 155; Condition of, at outbreak of European War, 250, 269; Shortage of supplies and munitions of. 279. Asinari di Bemezzo, Italian General, 107. AsQuith, Mr., British Prime Minister; 282. Augustus Caesar. 210. Austria. Attitude of, towards Pied- mont (1859), 2; Belations with, 15. Austria-Hungary, Army manoeuvres of, 101,214; Attitude of at Algeciras. 100-101; Unfriendly attitude of, 101-103, 107; Annexation of Bosnia by, compensations therefor to Italy. 105 ; Amelioration of relations with. 109. 136; PoUcy of, during Italo- Turkish War, 125-126; Policy of, re Albania, 135-136. 213; In Adri- atic, see under Francis Ferdinand; German ascendency in, 217, 260; War declared by Italy against, 265 ; see also under European War, Cen- tral Powers, Avlona, 213, 228, 229, 230. 303 304 INDEX Bagdad Railway, 137. Baldissera, General, 65, 68-70. Balkans, Violation of status quo in, by Austria, 102-103; Austro-Italian agreement regarding, 109, 125-126 and note, 253 ; War in, 130-132, 138, 224; Austrian plans in, 211-212; see under Eiiropean "War, Balkans. Banca Commerciale, Establishment of, 186; German control of, 190; Con- trol over Italian joint stock com- panies gained by, 192; Favours German firms and products, 192; Increase in affairs of, 191; Influ- ence of, over press, 194; Interfer- ence of, in home and foreign poli- tics, 195-196, 203. Baratieri, General, 62-65. Barrfire, French Ambassador, 251. Bava-Beccaris, General, 80. Belgium, Relations of, with Papacy, 163, 177; Influence of, on Italian public opinion in 1915, 246. Benedict XV, 'Pope, Election of, 171- 173; Biography and qualifications of, 173-175; First encycUcal of, 176; Policy of, during European War, 176-179; Conflict of, with Quir- inal, 179-183. Benghazi, Battle for, 121. Berchtold, Count, Austrian Foreign Minister, 138. Berlin, Congress of, 11, 25, 130; Right conferred on Austria to police Montenegrin waters, by, rescinded, 209. Berlin, Treaty of, 105. Bersaglieri, see under Army. Bertolini, M., Italian delegate. Treaty of Lausanne, 131. Beyrout, Bombardment of, 129. Bismarck, Count Herbert, 49. Bismarck, Prince, 6; Crispi's first visit to (1877), 10; Attitude of, to- wards Italy in Triple Alliance, 15, 41, 42, 44; Crispi's second visit to (1887), 46-48; Relations of, with Leo XIII, 165-166; Concerning Mediterranean policy of Italy, 114; Policy of, re Trieste, 221, 222 note. 240. Bissolati, M., Socialist Deputy, 283; Cabinet Minister, 295. Borgia, Lucrezia, 33. BoseUi, M., Italiaii Premier (1916), forms National Ministry, 295, 296; Bosnia and Herzegovina, 11, 25. Annexation of, by Austria (1908), 103, 105, 216. Boxer Uprising, 82. Brassier, de St. Simon, Prussian Minister, 219. Briand, M., French Premier, visits Rome, 281. Brusati, General, 286 and note, 294. Brusilof, Russian General, 293. BtUow, Prince von, German Imperial Chancellor, Mission of, to Rome, 249-250; Residence of, at Rome, 200, 203; Pressure exerted in Italy by, 204, 260. 262, 271. Cadoma, Count Lulgi, Chief of the Italian General Staff, 239, 252; Personality and work of, 270-271 ; Plan of campaign of, 272, 276; In Paris and London, 281-282, 284; Takes personal command in Tren- tino, 286, 287-292; Constitutes new army, 287; Defeat of Austrians by, 292, 293; Criticism of, 294; Pre- pares Carso offensive, 296; Cap- tures Gorizia, 296-297. Cadoma, Raffaele, General, Captures Rome, 159, 270. Caesar, 33. CsetanI di Sermoneta, Duke, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 73, 75. Canada, Italian emigration to, 144. Caneva, General, 132, 138. Canevaro, Count, Admiral and Ital- ian Foreign Minister, 71, 82. INDEX 305 Caprivi, Count, German Imperial Chancellor (1890), 52. Carnot, M., President of French" Re- public, Assassination of, 61. Carthage, S.S. Incident, 127-128 and note, 135. Caux, Peace negotiations at, 132. Cavallotti, M., Italian Radical lead- er, 77. Cavour, Count, Meeting of, with Napoleon III, 1; Plans for Italian unity of, 2, 87; Character of, 45; PoUcy, re Papacy, 163-164; Letter to, 219. Cellini, Benvenuto, 33. Central Powers, see under Austria- Hxmgary, Germany, and European War. Charles Albert, King of Piedmont, 85, 88. Charles, Francis Joseph, Archdiike, 285. Chemical industries, 147. Chlala, quoted, 73, 221. Chiesa, Cardinal della, see Benedict XV. Chotek, Countess, see Duchess of Hohenberg. Cicero, 33. Coatit, 62. Colombia, Italy secures redress from, 82. Conrad von Hotzendorf, Baron, Chief of the Austrian General Staff, 126, 138, 214, 239, 268; Plan of invading Italy of, 284-285. Co-operative societies, 145. Corradini, E., quoted. 111. Corti, Count, 11. Crete, ItaUan participation in affairs of, 71, 76. Crime, decrease of, 152. Crispi, Francesco, Tour of Eiu-ope of (1877), 10, 191; First Ministry of (1887), 44; Character of, 45^6; Visit of, to Bismarck (1887), 46-47; At Berlin, 51 ; And Triple Alliance, 46-47, 52, 56-57; Colonial policy of, 53-55, 62, 66-67, 70-71; Re armaments, 50; Relations of with France, 10, 50, 51 ; Re Tripoli, 55, 115, 121; Retires from office, 56; Second Ministry of, (1893), 61; Suppression of irredentist propa- ganda by, 62; Re Abyssinia, 54, 62- 65; Overthrow of , 66-67, 134; Per- secution of, ,72, 77, Economic pol- icy of, 186. Dante, 33. Dante Aligheri Society, Objects of, 31. Dardanelles, Closing of, 129-130, 132. Delcasse, M., French Foreign Min- ister, quoted, 116. Depretis, M., Italian Premier, 9, 23, 59. Diocletian, 210, 261. Dodecanese, see under Rhodes. Dogali, Defeat at (1887), 40; Influ- ence of, on Triple Alliance, 43. Dual Monarchy, see under Austria- Hungary. Education,' 153. Edward VII, King of England, 106. Electrical Power, Development of, 146, 194 and note. Emigration, Cause of, 143; Distribu- tion of, 144. Emilia, United to Italy, 5. England, Attitude of, towards Italy, 3, 8, 10, 11, 14, 163; Re Egypt, 17 18; Understanding with, re Medi- terranean, 44, 74; Tension between Italy and, 72; Co-operation in Greece with, 76; Policy of, re Morocco, 100, 110; Attitude of, during Bosnian crisis, 103; Friendly relations with, 106; Attitude of, re Tripoli, 111, 115, 116, 120; Atti- 306 INDEX tude of, towards Italy, re Libyan War, 120, 129, 135; Re occupation of Rhodes, 137; Diplomatic mis- sion of, to the Vatican, 178; see also under European War, The Allies. Enver Bey, 124. Eritrea, Expedition to, 39-40; Bound- ary of, 71; Population of, 156; Trade and commerce of, 156; Railways of, 157, see under Abys- sinia.? European War — Balkans: Occupation of Avlona by Italians, 228; Territorial de- mands of Italians in, 229-233; Protests of Jugo-Slavs, 234-235; Austrian invasion of Serbia (1915), 248; Austrians driven from, 250; Austro-German in- vasion of (1916), 280; Fall of Cettinje, 280; Serbs rescued by Italians, 280-281 ; allied expedi- tion to Salonika, 281; Disasters to Allied arms in, and effect in Italy. 282-283; Italy declares war on Bulgaria, 279 ; ItaUan Partic- ipation in Campaign, 298. Central Powers: Failure of, to no- tify Italy of proposed attack on Serbia, 238; Summon Italy to give aid, 239; Italy declares neu- trality, 239; Desire of, to secure permanent Italian neutrality, 241; Vienna and Rome take up negotiations, re compensations, 229, 248; Rupture of Austro- Italian alliance, 253; War de- clared by Italy against Austria, 265 ; Rupture of diplomatic rela- tions by Italy with Germany and consequences to, 276-277, 279, 280; Opposition to Italian decla- ration of war against Germany, 282-283; German Attack on Ver- dim, 283; Success in Balkans of, 284; Austrian preparations for invasion of Italy (1916), 282- 286; Battle of the Trentino, 287- 292; ItaUan declaration of war against Germany (August 28, 1916), 299-300. The Allies {France, Great Britain, and Russia) : Assistance of Italian neutrality to, 239-240; Russian victories and reverses, 250-251; Terms proposed by, to Italy, 231-233; Secvu-e participation of Italy |in war, ?251 ; Distrust of Italian policy, 252, 277, 279; France repiilses assault at Ver- dxm, 283; Russia, 284, 293; Close co-operation of Italy with, 298- 300. Italy : Not notified of plans of her Allies, 238; Declares neutrality, 239; Negotiations of, with Aus- tria, 229, 248; Occupation of Avlona by, 228; Rupture of Alli- ance with Austria by, 253; De- clares war on Austria (May 24, 1915), 265; Plan of campaign, 271, first phases, 272, trench-war- fare, 273, Alpine warfare of, 273, 275, Morale of annies of, 275 ; Ter- ritorial conquests of, dvutog first six months, 276 ; Declares war on Turkey (August 21, 1915), 278; Shortage of munitions in, 279; Declares war on Bulgaria (Octo- ber, 1915), 279; Seizure of Ger- man ships by, 280; Adheres to Pact of London, 280; Occupation of Durazzo by, 280; Rescue of Serbs by, 280-281 ; Delegates of, attend Paris Conference (1916), 281; Attitude of Official Social- ists in, 283 ; Threatened invasion of, 285; Enemy preparations against, 286; Battle of the Tren- tino, 287-292; National Ministry in, 290-291 ; Campaign of, on the Isonzo, 283-296, Gorizia cap- tured by, 296-298; Declares war on Germany (Augiist 28, 1916) INDEX 307 299 ; Participation of, in Balkan campaign (October, 1916), 298. Papacy: Policy of, towards bellig- erents, 175-176; Favours Cen- tral Powers, 177, 243; England and, 178; Re Italy, 179-180; France and, 182."' Ex-diplomat, quoted, 43 and not«. Vlllafranca, 4; Visit of, to Trieste (1882), 18; At Venice, 23; In Ty- rol, 101; Receives Italian Foreign Minister, 109. Franco-Prussian War (1870), 6, 162. Frederick, German Emperor, Death of, 47. Fuslnato, M., Italian Delegate, 131. Futurism, 32 «t seq. Fahreddln Bey, Tiu-kish Delegate, 132. Felix V, Pope, see under Amadeus VIII. Ferrero, G., Italian Historian, quoted, 96 note. Fortis, M., Italian Premier, 97. France, Relations of, with Piedmont, 2-4; African policy of, 12; Acquisi- tion of Timls by, 12-14, 75; Italian difficulties with, 44, 50-51, 59, 61; Russian relations with, 58; Liqui- dates Italian securities, 60; Co- operates with Italy, re Crete, 71; Friendly relations with, 72, 74-75, 99; Be Morocco, 100-101, 110-111. 117; Be TripoU and Libyan War, 111-114, 116-117, 120; attitude of, re S.S. Carthage and Manouba inci- dent, 127-128 and note; Recogni- tion of ItaUan sovereignty over Libya by, 133. Relations of, with Vatican, 160, 161-162; Severs dip- lomatic relations with Vatican, 170; Benedict XV and, 176-177, 182, see also under Em-opean War, The Allies. Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, Re temporal power of Papacy, 101- 102; Slav policy of, 211, 215, 218; Anti-Italian policy of, 102, 212, 214, 218, 223; Meeting of, with Ger- man Emperor at Konopischt, 225 and note; Visit to Bosnia of, 226; Assassination of, 226, 228. Francis Joseph, Emperor of Austria. Meeting of, with Napoleon III at Galileo, 33. Garibaldi, Sails from Quarto, 5. 258; In the Trentino, 23, quoted, 25, 88; Attempts to captiu-e Rome. 160- 162. Genoa, Duke of, 84. Genoa, Port of, 194; British Squadron at. 106. George, Prince, of Greece, 72. Germans of Tyrol, 28. Germany, 60; Relations with, 73-75 • At Algeciras Conference, 100-101, 117; Be Tripoli, 117-118; Attitude of, during Libyan War, 126, 135; Commercial relations with, 148; And the Vatican, 177, 179; Peace- ful penetration by, 185, 187-189; And Banca Commerciale, 190-196; Ascendency of, in Italy, 197; At- tempts to dominate Italian aflfairs, 203 ; Future relations with, 206, see also under Eiiropean War. Central Powers. Giolittl, Giovanni, Italian Premier, Birth and early years of, 92-93; Fh-st Ministry of (1892), 58; Policy of, 51-61; Second Ministry of, 94; Control over Chamber by, 95-96; Retires from office (1905), 97-98; Third Ministry of, 99, 102, 106; Again retires (1909), 108; Fovu-th Ministry of, 109; Growing opposi- tion to, 110; Be Tripoli, 112-113; Quoted, 134; Resigns (1914), 139, 238; Survey of dictatorship of, 138- 139; Relations of with Banca Com- 308 INDEX merciale, 196, 203; Neutrality ad- vocated by, 243; Opposes Italian participation in war, 260; Resigna- tion of Government forced by, 262; Accused of being a traitor, 263; Is compelled to leave Rome, 263-264; The parecchio of, 266, 268; Present position of, 295. Giotto, 33. Goethe, 199. Goltz, von der, Pasha, 124. GoluchowsM, Count, Austro-Hun- garian Minister for Foreign Af- fairs, 74, 213. Gorizia, Conquest of (1916), 296. Great Britain, see under England. Greece, Cretan difaciolties of, 132, 137; Elimination of, 300. Grey, Sir Edward, British Foreign Secretary, 137. Hamburger Nachrichten, quoted, 41 note. Helena, Princess of Montenegro, Marriage of, to Victor Emmanuel, later Kmg of Italy (1896), 75, 212. Henry, Prince, of Prussia, 49. Hohenberg, Duchess of, 211; death of, 226. Hohenlohe, Prince, Governor of Trieste, 218, 227. Humbert, The Whitehanded, Pound- er of the House of Savoy, 86. Humbert I, King of Italy, 51, 59, 67, 74; Priendsliip of, for Germany, 76;'Death of (1900), 83; Reign of, 83-85, 90. Irish Revolution (1916), 178. Iron and Steel, 147. Irredentism, Growth of, 24; Active agitation of, 25-26; Change in objective of, 31-32; Suppression of, 52; Revival of, 219, 256. Ischia, Earthquake at, 83. Isvolsky, M., Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 102 ; Quoted, 228. Italia irredenta, definition of, 21-24; Redemption of, 279, 296. Italy, Area, population, vital statis- tics of, 141-143. Jagow, von, German Ambassador, 106. Jugo-Slavs, see under Pan-Serbs. Karageorgevich, Ruling dynasty of Serbia, Contemplated overthrow of, 225. Karamanli, Hassuna Pasha, Tripoli- tan Sheik, 55, 115, 121. Kassala, 62, 70-71. King, Bolton, Italy To-day, quoted, 80 and note. Kulturkampf, 165. Kxmflda, Naval engagement at, 129. Launay di, M., Italian Ambassador, 42. Lausanne, Treaty of (1912), 131-133, 196. Law of Guarantees, ' provisions of, 162-163; proposal to international- ise, 167-168; Papacy and, 169, 171; Present status of, 180, 183. Lega Nazionale, 31. Leo XIII, Pope, Election of, 164; At- titude towards Italy, ^,164, 166; Death of (1903), 168. Libya, Annexation of, 124; Area, etc., of, 156, see also under Tripoli. Lombardy, Liberation of, 3. Loubet, President of French Re- public, Visit to Rome of, 99, 170. Luzzatti, Italian Premier, 108-109. MachiaveUi, 33; Quoted, 19. Mackensen, von, German Field-Mar- shal, 280. INDEX 309 Magenta, Battle of (1859); 3, 106, 185. Makallg, Siege of, 63. Malaria, Prevalence of, 143. Mangasha, Ras, 62, 70. Manin, at Venice, 85. Manouba, S.S., see Carthage'. Marches, The, United to Italy, 5. Margherita, Queen of Italy, Marriage of, to King Humbert, 84; Quoted, 84; Personality of, 84. 262. Marinetti, M., 36. Maximilian, Son of the Duchess of Hohenberg, 226. MazzLni, 45, 84, 145; Struggles of, at Rome, 160. McClure, W. K., Italy in North Af- rica, quoted, 67, 120. Menelek, Ascends Abyssinian throne, 54; Treaty of UcciaUl denounced by, 62; Attacks Italian forces, 63; De- feats Italians at Adua, 65-66; Peace negotiations of, with Italy, 69-71. Mentana, Battle of (1867), 161. Merchant Marine, 148. Mercier, Cardinal, Primate of Bel- gium, 177. Merry del Val, Cardinal, Papal Sec- retary of State, 174. Messina, Earthquake at, 104. Milan, Disturbances at, 78-81. Mines and Minerals, 146. Modane, Race riots at, 51. Modernism, Suppression of, 169, 176. Monte Rotondo, Battle of (1867), 161. Montenegro, 132, 136, 137. Morocco, see under France. Mulla, Diamilla, 114- note. Naby Bey, Turkish delegate, 132. Naples, 49; United to Italy, 5; flrst port of Italy, 148. Napoleon, 236. Napoleon III, at Plombieres, 1; In- terest of, in Italian unity, 2; Cam- paign of, in co-operation with Piedmont against Austria, 3-4, 88; Meeting of, with Francis Joseph at Villafranca, 4; Defeats Italian at- tempts to take Rome, 161-162; In- fluence of, in Italy, 240, 246. National Debt, 151; Conversion of, 152. NationaUsm, 20-21, 111-113. Navy, 155. Near Eastern Question, see Balkans. Nerazzini, Doctor, ItaUan Envoy to Abyssinia, 70. Nice, ceded to France, 4. Nicholas, King of Montenegro, 212. Nicholas II, Tsar of Russia, Visit of, to Italy, 106-107, 223. Nigra, Count, Italian Ambassador, quoted, 26. Nuova Antologia, quoted, 43 note. Oberdank, W., 18. Oddone, Count of Savoy, 86. Otranto, Channel of, Italian policy, re, 137. Ottoman Empire, see Turkey. Oudinot, General, 160. Pan-Germanic movement, 28, 99; Be Adriatic, 208, 219-221 ; Methods of, 186-189; Italy and, 190-205. Pan-Serbs, Programme of, 216-217; Disavowed by Russia, 231; Proc- lamation of, 234. Panther, at Agadir, 110. Papacy, Bismarck and, 15; Loss of temporal powers of, 159-162; Struggle of, to regain temporal rights, 102, 166, 176; PoUcy of, re Italy, 163, 165-167, 169, 176; Pro- posal of, to remove abroad, 165, 179, 183; Proposal to internation- alise jxirisdiction over, 167, 171; Suspends non expedit, 97, 169; Be 310 INDEX Albania, 213, see also under Euro- pean War. Patris, Italian Admiral, takes pos- session of Avlona on behalf of Italy (1914). 228. Pecci, Cardinal, see Leo XIII. Pellagra, Prevalence of, 143. Pelloux, General, Italian Premier, 80-82. Petrarch, 33. Piedmont, Relations of, with France, 2-4, 88; With Prussia, 5-7; Kernel of Italian imity, 5 ; Under House of Savoy, 87; Loss of ascendency of, 9, 89; Attitude of, re Italian inter- vention in European War, 245. Pius IX, Pope, First driven from Home, 160; Refuses to renounce temporal power, 159; Loss of sov- ereignty by, 162; Prisoner in the Vatican (1870), 160; Ignores Law of Guarantees, 163; Death of, 164. Pius X, Pope, Policy of, 168-171. Poincarg, M., French Premier, 99. Pope, see Pius IX, Pius X, Leo XIII, Benedict XV. Postal Service, 149. Preziosi, G., La Germania alia Con- quista deU'Italia, 191 note; Quoted, 196, et seq, Prinetti, M., Italian Foreign Min- ister, quoted, 117. Prinzivalll, L'ltalia nella sua Vita Economica, quoted, 150 note. Prussia, Relations with Piedmont of, 5-7, 99, 245; Re Papacy, 163; Be city of Trieste, 220-221. Quarto, 5, 258. Quirinal, King of Italy first takes up residence at, 162. Railways, Mileage of, 149. Rampolla, Cardinal, Papal Secre- tary of State, 168, 173-174; Friend of France, 176. Re-Insurance Treaty (1884), 41 and note, 68. Reshid Pasha, signs Treaty of Lau- sanne, 132. Rhodes, Italian occupation of, 130, 137; Development of, by Italy, 157. Ricci, Borea, Italian Admiral, 121. Roberts, Field Marshal Lord, quoted, 122. Robilant, Coimt di, Italian Foreign Minister, Policy of, re Triple Al- liance, 42. Rocco di Sanfermo, Count, 237. Roman Question, 163, 167, 169, 177, 180, 183; See Papacy. Rudini, Marchese di, Italian Premier. 57-58; Second Ministry of, 67; Policy of, re Abyssinia, 68-71; Persecution of Crispi by, 72, 77; Foreign policy of, 72-74, 76; Weak- ness of, in home affairs, 76-77; And Milan disturbances, 78-79 ; Re- tirement of, 80. Rural Credit Banks, 145. Russia, Rapprochement of, with France, 68 ; Relations with, 72, 74- 75, 102, 133, 216, 223; And Vati- can, 177; Terms offered by, to se- cure Italian intervention, 231; ■See also under European War. The Allies, Sadowa, Battle of (1866), 6, 185. Said HaUm, Prince, 131. St. Francis of Assisi, 33. Salandra, Italian Premier, 238; Resig- nation of, 260; Forms new Min- istry, 264; Speech of, on the Capitoline, quoted, 267; Armed neutrality of, 269; Difficulties of, with Chamber, 276; Character of, 277-278; Attends Paris Conference, 281; Relations of, with Germany, INDEX 311 282, 293; Speech of, In Chamber, 294; Second resignation of, 299. Sallsbiu-y, Lord, 76; Re Tripoli, quoted, 115, 118. Salonika, 43, 102-103, 126; Italy sends force to, 298. Salsa, Major, 69. Salvemini, Professor, 43 note. San Gmliano, Marchese dl, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 109; Death of, 248. Sanjalc of Novi Bazar, 102-103. San Mim Bay, 82. Saracco, M., Ministry of, 83. Sarto, Cardinal, see Piiis X. Savings-Banks, 150. Savoy, House of, 60; Leaders of Italian unity, 5, 89, 184; Histor- ical survey of, 84-91. Sazonofl, M., Russian Foreign Min- ister, quoted, 228. Schleinltz, Prussian Foreign Minister, letter of, concerning Trieste, 219- 221. Schwabach, Herr von, German finan- cier, 186. Scutari, 136. Sedan, Battle of (1870), 185. Serbia, 102, 103, 132, 137-138; R&- latlons of, with Austria, 2-3, 211; See also under Pan-Serbs and Euro- pean "War, Balkans. Sicily, Disturbances in, 61; Sul- phur mines in, 146. Solferlno, Battle of (1859), 3, 106, 185. Somaliland, Occupation of, 53; Eco- nomic status of, 157. Sonnino, Baron Sidney, Character of, 98 and note, 203, 248; Premier, 98, 108; And Triple AUiance. 203, 248; Sets forth Italian position, re neu- trality, 248; Receives Prince Biilow, 249 ; Presents terms to Vienna, 250. Despatches note annulling Treaty of AlUance with Austria, 253-255; Relations of, with Salandra, 260, 277. 295; Attends Paris Confer- ence (1916), 281; Policy of, 300; Quoted, 105, 248, 282. South of Italy, Economic conditions of, 145. Steed, Wickham, Hapsburg Monarchy, quoted, 222 note. Sildmark, 28. Taxation, 152. Telephones, telegraph, and wireless. Development of, 149-150. Ticino, Swiss Canton, 21. Tientsin, ItaUan concession at, 82. Tlrpitz, Grand Admiral von, 225 note. Titian, 33. TIttonI, Italian Foreign Minister, 94* 97; Quoted, 103. Trenttao, Description of, 22, 24; Austrian persecution of Italians in, 27; Battle of, see under European War. Trieste, 22, 138; Historical reference to, 22 note; Encroachments of Slavs in, 29-30; Population of, 215; Ville allemande, 219-221 ; Efforts to Germanise, 221-222. Triple Alliance, First negotiations of, 14; Italy's share in, 14-15, 18; Date of signature of, 15; Terms of, 16 and note; Renewal of (1887), 44, (1891), 57; Crispi and, 46-47, 52, 56-57; Prolongation of (1896), 74- 75 ; King Humbert, supporter of, 83 ; Giolitti and, 99, 138; Prolongation of, 101; Difficulties of, 102-103; Italy and, 105, 106, 185, 198; Be Balkans, 109, 125 note ; And Italian interests in the Mediterranean, 117; Loosening of bonds of, by Italy, 135; Renewal of, eighteen months before expiration (1912), 136; And Triple Entente, re Mg.e&a. Islands, 137; Baron Sonnino and, 203; De- noimced by Italy, to Austria, 252. Tripoli, Crispi's Interest in, 55, 115; Italian plans concerning, 100, 112, 312 INDEX 114; Attitude of France re, 116, 127, 135; German interest in af- fairs of, 113, 121, 124, 126; Nego- tiations •with England, re, 115, 117; Italian grievances in regard to, 118; Ultimatum to Turkey, re, 119; Opening of hostilities in, 120; Campaign in, 121; Annexation of, to Italy, 124; Treaty of Lausanne, re, 133. Tunis, Italian interest in, 12-14; Franco-ItaUan competition in, 12; Acquisition of, by France, 13, 116; Treaty, re, 75; And Tripoli, 116. Tiirin, International exhibition at, 141. Turkey, War of, with Greece (1897), 76; Relations of, with Italy, see under Tripoli and European War. Tuscany, United to Italy, 5. Uccialli, Treaty'of (1889), 54-55; De- nounced by Menelek, 62; Annul- ment of, 71. Umbria, United to Italy, 5. United States, Italian emigration to; 144. Valerio, Lorenzo, 220. Vatican, see Papacy. Venetia, Annexation of, to Italy, 6; Attitude of, re war with Austria, 245. Verdun, Battle of (1916), 292. Victor Emmanuel II, King of United Italy, 2, 6, 86-88; At Vienna, 23; .Government removed to Rome by, 162; Death of, 25, 89; Monimaent to, 141. Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy, Marriage of, 75; Early life and training of, 84-85; Liberal policy of, 90; Receives Tsar, 106; Atti- tude of, during crisis, re Eviropean War, 263-264; With his armies, 270, 295. Villafranca, Armistice of, 4. Virgil, 33. Visconti Venosta, Marchess, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 73, 76, 82; Negotiations of, with Prance, re Timis, 115-116. Volpi, M., 131. Wickenberg, Count, 218. Wied, Prince William of. King of Albania, 224, 228. WUham I, German Emperor, Death of, 1888, 47. WUliam II, German Emperor, First visit of, to Italy (1888), 47-49; Receives King Humbert, at Ber- lin, 51; In Italy, 62, 73; At Tangier and consequences of visit of, 99- 100; Personal propaganda of, in Italy, 199, 203; Encoiu-agement of German peaceful penetration by, 189; Entertains Italian sovereigns at Kiel (1913), 136; Interview of, with Archduke Francis Ferdinand at Konopischt (1914), 225 and note ; Personal interest of, in Italian af- fairs (1914), 249. Young Turks, 118, 214. Zanardelli, M., Italian Premier, 94. Zanzur, Battle of (1912), 131. Ziirich, Treaty of, 4. H 18 89 4i i ' "^w^^ « ^0^ .0- -1 ^^^-^ ^^^^* ^OV^ O > V .^ ^'d^i/i\ u .^ * - 2001 PreservationTechnologies A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATIO^ 111 Thomson Parte Drive Cranberry Township, PA 16066 . (724)779-2111 •^o^