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 COFHUGliT DEPOSIT. 
 
The 
 Battle of Plattsburg; 
 
 A Study 
 
 in and of 
 
 The War of 1812. 
 
 To remind our troops of the actions of their brave 
 
 countrymen. — General Macomb, in his 
 
 Report of the Battle of 
 
 Plattsburg. 
 
 By J 
 
 JOHN M. STAHL, 
 
 Ex-President of the Society of the War of 1812 in Illinois 
 Author of 
 
 The Real Farmer; Just Stories; The Story 
 of Ed; The Invasion of Washington. 
 
 THE VAN TRUMP COMPANY 
 Publishers 
 
APR 24 1918 
 
 ^ 
 
 ■ai t *^ 
 
To 
 
 The Daughters of 1812, 
 
 The Society of the War of 1812, 
 
 and 
 
 All that Love Liberty and Democracy, 
 
 Honor the Brave, 
 
 and 
 
 Glory in the Star Spangled Banner. 
 
 Copyright. 1918, 
 By John M. Stahl 
 
1. 
 
 THIS BOOK HAS BEEN WRITTEN BECAUSE 
 
 In the War of 1812 both our soldiers and our 
 sailors fought as well as soldiers and sailors have 
 fought through any war in the history of the world. 
 
 Notwithstanding the apocryphal increment made 
 by the centuries to the deeds of ancient warriors, or 
 the enhancement of the valor of other warriors by the 
 cunning of the writers of romance — rather often in the 
 guise of history — no soldiers or sailors, of any people 
 or any age, have fought better than the soldiers and 
 sailors that have fought under the Star Spangled Ban- 
 ner (or its colonial prototypes) from the first day of 
 the War of the Revolution to this day; and when the 
 odds were not greatly against them, they have needed 
 no messenger of defeat. 
 
 The War of 1812 does not furnish an exception. 
 In fact, it might be contended that the battles of 
 Plattsburg and New Orleans, in both of which our 
 soldiers proved far more than a match, man for man, 
 for Wellington's seasoned and best soldiers, showed 
 the most skillful and resourceful fighting done on this 
 continent ; and inferior to none anywhere in the his- 
 tory of war in bravery or brilliancy of achievement. 
 
Grievous injustice has been and is yet done the 
 soldiers of the War of 1812. The ignorance of that war 
 among- the people of the United States is almost as 
 incredible as it is discreditable. 
 
 Our people know a very few facts about that part 
 of the battle of New Orleans that was fought on the 
 left bank of the Mississippi ; they know of Perry's 
 "We have met the enemy and they are ours"; of the 
 destruction of our Capital — and nearly all that we 
 know about that is untrue and all that is untrue is a 
 vile slander on our brave militia that fought surpris- 
 ingly well; of Lawrence's "Don't give up the ship"; 
 of the "disgraceful surrender" of Detroit by Hull — and 
 very few indeed know that Hull fought well until the 
 women and children in the fort were imminently 
 threatened with the horrors of unrestrained Indian 
 savagery; and that there was a battle or something of 
 the sort at Baltimore, for it was during a battle or 
 something of the sort in or near Baltimore that a fel- 
 low named Key wrote "The Star Spangled Banner". 
 
 The foregoing is more than many know, and is 
 even more than many think that they know about the 
 War of 1812; and some of it, as supposed to be known, 
 is distorted and largely untrue, and unjust to our 
 forces ; while more than half of our people cannot even 
 name some of the most important engagements of the 
 War — battles of great importance because of their 
 secondary results. 
 
The adult citizen of the United States, though he 
 may be a descendant of one of the valorous soldiers 
 of the War of 1812, has less definite knowledge, and 
 much less a just, accurate conception, of the events of 
 that War and the achievements of those that fought 
 it, than he has of some wars between foreign nations 
 or of ancient times, of far less importance to the peo- 
 ple directly involved or to mankind, and of yet less 
 moment to us. Bancroft well termed the War of 1812 
 our "Second War of Independence". Yet while our 
 children, in our public as well as our private schools, 
 are taught well about the warriors of ancient Greece 
 and Rome, they are taught almost, or quite, nothing 
 about the War of 1812. Yet worse, what is taught is, 
 in nearly every case, and particular, erroneous so far as 
 it relates to the land engagements, and is unjust to, 
 and fails far from giving due honor to, the brave sol- 
 diers of that War. Our soldiers of the War of 1812 
 fought with bravery at least equal to, and with intelli- 
 gence and resource much above, that of the ancient 
 soldiers our children are taught, in our schools, to 
 admire; while what little notion our children get of 
 our soldiers in the War of 1812 is that they almost — 
 and on frequent occasions altogether — disgraced their 
 flag and country !— a notion shamefully false, and 
 monstrous in its injustice to the dead! 
 
 For several reasons it is unfortunate that for all 
 too many years much of our public writing, including 
 that labelled, and libelled, History, was the direct or 
 
 9 
 
indirect product of New England. This section was 
 early notable for its mental narrowness, its intolerance, 
 its self-righteousness and assumption of superior wis- 
 dom — characteristics much more pronounced than the 
 desire of its writers to know or state the truth about 
 the War of 1812. Long before the beginning of that 
 War the people of this section had begun vigorously 
 and diligently to admit by proclamation that they had 
 more wisdom and virtue than any one else. For this 
 purpose, and other purposes, they acquired such fa- 
 cility with the pen, that their writings exceeded in 
 quantity and far exceeded in noise those of the rest of 
 the country. Because of quantity, and even more be- 
 cause of confident egotism, the publications, of various 
 sorts, of New England exerted a great influence on 
 public opinion. Because the War of 1812 was unpopu- 
 lar in New England, the writers of that section wrote 
 that which was not true, and that which has given our 
 people, especially since the Civil War, a wrong notion 
 of our soldiers in the War of 1812. I say especially 
 since the Civil War, because a cataclysm in national 
 life, like our Civil War, allows a lie to live until it can 
 pass for the truth ; and, also, misrepresentation gener- 
 ally escapes scrutiny and is accepted as the truth when 
 it has become tradition. Before the Civil War the 
 large majority of our people yet had a correct knowl- 
 edge of the War of 1812, and the conduct of its sol- 
 diers. They justly regarded that War as of equal im- 
 portance with the War of the Revolution, and its sol- 
 
 10 
 
diers as brave and praiseworthy. It is one of the 
 ironies and cruelties of history — ironies and cruelties 
 that mankind, because of its frailties, cannot escape — 
 that the valorous deeds of the brave soldiers of the 
 Civil War have contributed to the injustice done the 
 equally brave soldiers of the War of 1812 — a result for 
 which the brave men of the Sixties are not in the least 
 to blame, which they could never for a moment de- 
 sire, and which they certainly deplore. 
 
 It is indeed a sad fact that there have been writers 
 that struck at the dead — not enemies, but their own 
 countrymen : soldiers that had given their lives brave- 
 ly for their country. Surely it is among the most de- 
 spicable of crimes to malign the character and belittle 
 or deny the heroic achievements of those patriots that 
 die on the field of battle with their faces to the foe. 
 This crime is all the blacker because it is not only for 
 the then present time, but continues through the years 
 of the lives of the children and the children's children 
 of the defamed soldiers — soldiers, in the War of 1812, 
 whose patriotism was not bounded by State lines or 
 whose bravery was not of the pitiable brand that will 
 not fight until well paid. 
 
 As the result of this crime committed against the 
 soldiers of the War of 1812, they, as brave and intelli- 
 gent in warfare as any, are generally regarded as near- 
 ly always incompetent and very often cowardly; and 
 our Second War of Independence, the equal in what it 
 achieved to make and keep us a nation, to the War of 
 
 11 
 
the Revolution or the Civil War, is generally regarded 
 as insignificant in purpose and inconclusive and dis- 
 creditable in results. 
 
 Certainly it is time that the truth about the War 
 of 1812 should be known. Certainly it is time that the 
 shameful injustice done our soldiers in the War of 
 1812 should be corrected. Certainly it is time that the 
 great importance of that "Second War of Independ- 
 ence" should be realized. Certainly it is time, and now 
 is the time, that the glory our soldiers of 1812 added 
 to the Star Spangled Banner should enthuse and con- 
 secrate yet more the soldiers of this present war — 
 soldiers that, we may be sure, will prove themselves 
 worthy of the proud name of those that have fought 
 — and fought well — in every war in which the United 
 States has engaged. 
 
 Our antagonists of 1812 are our allies of today. 
 We do not need to forget the past in order to fight with 
 the British now to make democracy safe throughout 
 the world. Because they are our allies in this great 
 war it is not necessary that we regard the British 
 even now as perfect. It would be despicable to con- 
 ceal the facts of 1812. In a hundred years and more 
 the world has changed. Certain things permitted in 
 war a century past, are now not tolerated by people 
 really civilized. And "War is hell" — the culmination 
 of cruelty ; it can not be made otherwise — if it were 
 made otherwise it would no longer be war; few indeed 
 are the wars of any duration that have not bred atro- 
 
 12 
 
cities. A hundred years are many years too many for 
 a nation such as this to harbor hate against an ancient 
 foe. The British soldiers in the War of 1812 were as 
 brave as Europe has ever produced. All the greater, 
 therefore, the glory of, for example, our "rabble" of 
 convalescents and militia successfully withstanding 
 three times their number of the very flower of Welling- 
 ton's army victorious in the Peninsula — the best sol- 
 diers, by long odds, that the Iron Duke ever com- 
 manded! 
 
 And because we know the facts about that, we may 
 all the better fight today beside the soldiers of our old 
 foe that has nation-wide resurrected the finest there 
 was in chivalry and is fighting to save not itself alone, 
 but our early friend, our beloved France. 
 
 This suggests another reason why we should in- 
 form ourselves about the War of 1812 and have the 
 added enthusiasm and patriotism we will gain — the 
 War of 1812 was fought by the United States as the 
 friend of France. One of the criticisms of those re- 
 sponsible for that war, most frequently made, was that 
 those that advocated and conducted the War were 
 influenced by too great friendship for France — the 
 friend without which the War of the Revolution 
 would have failed. In all the weary days and months 
 and years of the presejit war, not one intelligent word 
 of criticism of France has been 'heard. It is the one 
 nation that has, during this war, earned most of the 
 world's esteem and love. It is the one nation that, 
 
 13 
 
during this war, has had laid at its door the least of 
 blame or fault. Let the War of 1812 remind us that 
 though we were slow to put it into acts, our friend- 
 ship for our earliest friend was not allowed to die ! Let 
 the War of 1812 animate us, though again we are slow 
 to put it into acts, to prove to the world that we are 
 not without gratitude and to do our utmost for our old 
 ally and friend, to the bitter end — and glorious victory. 
 Out of the horrors and losses of war grow beau- 
 ties and gains. A British king spoke of the French 
 as "our sweet enemies". This present war has re- 
 vealed such qualities and has been glorified by such 
 deeds as Americans, French, British and Canadians 
 can never forget. Before the present war — and far 
 more now — the people of the United States and Can- 
 ada were one nation more than they were separate 
 peoples. Three thousand miles of boundary line has 
 not a hostile foot! The political division that separates 
 the people of the United States and Canada is of far 
 less consequence than the many strong ties that bind 
 them together. Very many Canadians have employ- 
 ment, business, domicil and welcome in the United 
 States. Even greater numbers of the citizens of the 
 United States have found a home and good neighbors 
 and hearty welcome and the same ideas of govern- 
 ment, in the Dominion of Canada. Surely French, 
 British, Canadians and Americans know that it is 
 silly, and worse, to recall with ill-will the events of a 
 hundred years ago; and that it is even more silly to 
 
 14 
 
assume that such events cannot be recalled without 
 ill-will. We recall the events of the War of 1812 to 
 honor the brave, victor or vanquished, friend or foe; 
 and to gain inspiration and devotion to give, in peace 
 or war, that full measure of patriotic citizenship that 
 was so freely given by those that with little wordy 
 proclamation, but many brave deeds, blazed the way of 
 "Liberty and Democracy." 
 
 NOTE: — Several times the author has not balked at the 
 repetition that promised to give adequate prominence to, and 
 to direct proper attention to the importance of, certain 
 events, too long forgotten by the American people. 
 
 15 
 
2. 
 
 AUTHORITIES 
 
 I have read diligently something more than two 
 score of the many books about the War of 1812 — and 
 I fear that I must be almost the only person that has 
 read some of these books for many years, for I find 
 that those that consider themselves well informed 
 about this War of 1812, did not know of these books. 
 In some of these forgotten books I have found the 
 best written and undoubtedly the fairest and most ac- 
 curate accounts of the events of the War. For the 
 most part, the sooner after the War the book was 
 written, the more valuable it is as history. It is not 
 true that the perspective of time gives an advantage in 
 writing about stirring, vital events. The contrary is 
 the case. Nor is it true that time lessens prejudice or 
 modifies errors. Much oftener it allows prejudices to 
 grow and errors to become better entrenched as truth. 
 It is true that some that wrote shortly after the close 
 of the War of 1812, were very much prejudiced. But 
 they made no efifort to hide that prejudice. On the 
 contrary, they proclaimed their bias. They were 
 frankly, openly more concerned to make out their 
 case than to state only the facts and all the facts. 
 
 16 
 
Hence, one can rather easily arrive at the truth : truth 
 in their books ; and truth outside of them, plainly in- 
 dicated. One can rather easily detect the misstate- 
 ments made through the prejudice then loudly ac- 
 claimed as patriotism. The task of getting the truth, 
 from these books, is made not only easy, but humanly 
 certain, when one has before him, let us say, one book 
 on each side. Then all that he has to do is to guide 
 his pen midway between the contending files of state- 
 ments, or, at times, veer a little to one side or the other 
 of the middle line as is plainly indicated by the heat 
 of the heady writers. 
 
 Of those that have made books about the War 
 of 1812, I like best of all the Canadian, Auchinleck, 
 whose "History of the War between Great Britain 
 and the United States", was published by MacLean 
 and Co., of Toronto, Canada. I like Auchinleck be- 
 cause his bias, his prejudice, is so open, so frank, so 
 honest, that it is refreshing and charming. He is so 
 scrupulously, so boldly, biased that it reveals rather 
 than camouflages the truth. Auchinleck begins by 
 saying: 
 
 "We write, jealously observant of truth, so far 
 as we can discern it ; but, at the same time, we are not 
 ashamed to confess that we write with emotion — as 
 from the heart — and a heart, too, which to its last 
 pulsation, will remain true, we hope, to the glorious 
 British constitution." 
 
 17 
 
The honest Auchinleck could not avoid the warn- 
 ing that he would write the truth only so far as he 
 could discern it; and. in addition, he would depend 
 on his emotions straight from his heart to discern 
 the truth. Of course, we are not surprised that his 
 pulsating fidelity to the glorious British constitution 
 has led him often far from the truth when the truth 
 was not complimentary to the British. But that has 
 been the failing always of the subjects of the British 
 Empire — a failing that some of the offspring or off- 
 shoots of the said Empire, let us confess, have inher- 
 ited or taken with them. 
 
 It seems proper that right here we should pro- 
 ceed with our quotation from Auchinleck's introduc- 
 tory remarks. He proceeds in this frank fashion : 
 
 "Thus had Canada the credit of contributing her 
 quota to the brilliant evidence which history supplies 
 — in patriotic struggles and sacrifices such as the peas- 
 ant-warfare of the Tyrol, and the conflagration of 
 Moscow — that monarchy may evoke in its behalf a 
 spirit of chivalrous devotion, and implant a depth of 
 religious faith, equal even in the strength and vigor 
 and courage of the moment, to democratic fervor, and 
 infinitely superior to it in sustained effort and pa- 
 tient endurance." 
 
 If Auchinleck's style is at times somewhat turbid, 
 this is fully compensated for by the clarity of his bias; 
 anr] if sometimes his pen meanders and stumbles, this 
 matters not because it does not dim his purpose to 
 
 18 
 
make the best case possible for Canada and the glori- 
 ous British constitution. 
 
 I can not forgive Auchinleck for one thing — his 
 fidelity to the glorious British constitution is such that 
 he not only excuses, he justifies, he almost glories in, 
 the British use of the Indians in the War of 1812. 
 This use led to hellish, all but unbelievable, and con- 
 tinued, atrocities. It makes a page as black as any in 
 history. But in the life of the peoples of this New 
 World, a century is so long, and we of the United 
 States are so ready generously to forgive, that the 
 Indian atrocities of the War of 1812 may well be 
 counted as ancient history — to be read for infor- 
 mation, and because necessary to do justice to our 
 brave soldiers, but not to be allowed to nourish hate 
 or revenge. Even more : one hundred years is too 
 long to remember with hatred the deeds of any foe, 
 a fortiori if, for a hundred years, that foe has been 
 drawing closer and closer to us as a friend, and also is 
 the one nation of the same language as ours. Even yet 
 more, it is now our ally — our brave, honorable ally- 
 in war. But, also, one hundred years is far too short 
 for us to forget, much less belittle, the heroic deeds 
 of our soldier-forefathers ; and it is indeed a strange 
 doctrine for a brave, free, patriotic people, that it must 
 not, in any good spirit and fair words, recall the heroic 
 deeds of its soldiers and sailors because to do that it 
 must recall also the deeds of its former foes ! He that 
 
 19 
 
would withhold honor from our brave is mean enough 
 and treasonable enough to dishonor our brave. 
 
 But if Canada and the glorious British constitu- 
 tion have their Auchinleck, we have our Ingersoll. 
 Ingersoll soon attained such glory of bias that it was 
 to combat and correct his misstatements that Auchin- 
 leck wrote — so says Auchinleck. Ingersoll's "History 
 of the Second War between the United States of 
 America and Great Britain" was published in three 
 volumes in Philadelphia by Lea & Blanchard. Inger- 
 soll was a member of the Congress of the United 
 States. He took his seat at the opening of the first 
 session of the 13th Congress — in May, 1813. He had 
 unusually good opportunities to get "inside facts" 
 about the War, and he had the ability and the assurance 
 to take full advantage of these opportunities. He 
 knew very many of the public men of the period of the 
 War, and was very proud of this, especially of his 
 having, as he at least believed, the friendship 
 of many of the most prominent men of the South and 
 the (old) Republican (anti-Federalist) party. He was 
 a brilliant example of the snob. He was also a very 
 strong partisan. Being a strong party man, and be- 
 longing to the party that favored the War, he em- 
 phatically approved of the War and all that pertained 
 thereto. It should be remembered that in his time 
 partisan rancor, prejudice, spirit, was very much 
 greater than now, and in much higher repute. The 
 bitter, narrow partisan rancor was even more expected 
 
 20 
 
of a public man, and more surely and openly brought 
 him public favor, than his attacks on intoxicants 
 wherein his bravery and ambition were greater than 
 his discretion and endurance. 
 
 Of the other authors that I have used for informa- 
 tion, for comparison, to get at the truth partly hidden 
 in the books of some by using the truth partly re- 
 vealed in the others, I quote, with a very few excep- 
 tions, in addition to Auchinleck and Ingersoll, only 
 Christie and Low. 
 
 "The Military and Naval Operations in the Cana- 
 das During the Late War with the United States", by 
 Robert Christie, Esq., was published in Quebec im- 
 mediately after the close of the War. According to 
 competent authority (Mons. Jules de Wallenstein) 
 Christie was an officer in the Canadian army. "Gener- 
 al Macomb", Wallenstein states, "remembered him as 
 a polite young gentleman, with whom he had once an 
 interview, during the War, on military business. The 
 Canadian militia behaved generally, it seems, with 
 great politeness towards the Americans, at that time 
 very dififerently from the English officers." 
 
 "An Impartial and Correct History of the War 
 between the United States of America and Great 
 Britain," was published by John Low, at Shakespeare's 
 Head, 17 Chatham St., New York, in 1816. Its im- 
 partiality and correctness is of such nature that it is 
 a good foil for the impartiality and correctness of 
 
 21 
 
Christie. Both were undoubtedly honest. Both 
 sometimes erred. It was impossible to get all of the 
 exact truth ; and neither was perfect, or claimed to be, 
 or wished to be. 
 
 22 
 
3. 
 
 OPPOSITION TO THE WAR OF 1812 
 
 As already stated, there was much opposition to 
 the War of 1812 in New England. Probably a ma- 
 jority of the people of New England did not disap- 
 prove of the War at any time. On more than one 
 occasion the troops of the New England states fought 
 exceedingly well. But the element of the New Eng- 
 land population that opposed the War was certainly 
 the most aggressive and made the most noise. The 
 bitterest opposition to the War was in Massachusetts. 
 At one time the dominant element in the population 
 of Maryland voiced disapproval of the War. Some 
 of the militia of Pennsylvania, and of other states, re- 
 fused to go beyond the boundary of the United States. 
 These same troops fought well, but they believed that 
 they should not be sent, as militia, beyond the United 
 States. 
 
 The vote on the Declaration of War in the House 
 of Representatives was on June 5th, 1812. It was as 
 follows : 
 
 23 
 
State 
 
 Yeas 
 
 Nays 
 
 N. H. 
 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 Mass. 
 
 6 
 
 8 
 
 R. I. 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 Vt. 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 Conn. 
 
 
 
 7 
 
 N. Y. 
 
 3 . 
 
 11 
 
 N. J. 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 
 Pa. 
 
 16 
 
 2 
 
 Del. 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 Md. 
 
 6 
 
 3 
 
 Va. 
 
 14 
 
 5 
 
 N. C. 
 
 6 
 
 3 
 
 S. C. 
 
 8 
 
 
 
 Ga. 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 Ky. 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 Tenn. 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 Ohio 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 Total 79 49 
 
 The bill from the ?Iouse was before the Senate 
 from clay to day until June 18, when it was passed by 
 a vote of 19 ayes to 13 nays. 
 
 The vote in both the House and the Senate 
 showed that the southern part of the United States 
 generally favored the War and that the northern part 
 generally opposed it. The vote in the House would 
 best reflect the public opinion of each state, if for no 
 other rea.son than that representation in the House 
 was based on population. If we take the line between 
 
 24 
 
New York and Pennsylvania as the dividing line, we 
 will find that the vote on the Declaration of War from 
 north of that line was 15 yeas to 31 nays — more than 
 2 to 1 against the War; while the vote from south of 
 this line was 64 yeas to 18 nays — more than 3 to 1 
 in favor of the War. 
 
 The public attitude towards the War was based 
 nearly altogether on partisan politics ; commerce ; 
 slavery; free speech and free press; and the faults of 
 the national administration. 
 
 The (old) Republican — anti-Federalist — party 
 was dominant in the South. It was the party of Jef- 
 ferson and Monroe, and by this time of Madison. It 
 was the party of the national administration. The 
 opposing party — the Federalist — was strong in the 
 northern part of the country. To many of the Fed- 
 eralists, the very fact that another political party was 
 in power at Washington and favored the War and was 
 conducting the War, would have been, alone, sufficient 
 reason to oppose the War. 
 
 But there was another reason, and to a good many 
 northern people it was the more powerful reason : the 
 measures that had been taken by the administrations 
 of Jefferson and Madison — both Republican admin- 
 istrations and closely allied — had proved very hurt- 
 ful to the most important business interests of New 
 England and New York. Boston was, for the United 
 States of that date, a very important port. Upon its 
 foreign trade depended the prosperity of not only 
 
 25 
 
Massachusetts, but of a yet larger part of New Eng- 
 land. The Embargo and the Non-intercourse Act be- 
 fore the War, and then the War itself, were almost 
 ruinous to the commerce of Massachusetts and other 
 New England states. The fisheries also of some of 
 these states were important, and were seriously in- 
 jured by the War. Outside of New England, the ports 
 of New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore were the 
 most important of the United States; and the injury to 
 the business of the states of New York, Pennsylvania 
 and Maryland was responsible for some of the opposi- 
 tion to the War in those states — more in New York 
 than in Pennsylvania or Maryland. There was truth 
 in the indictment that those that "liked as well to 
 carry on their trade with the neighboring British 
 provinces as to be successful in the War" found in 
 their lessened gains fi'om business a reason to com- 
 plain of "the costly military", and to be in opposition 
 to the War. In this War, as in others, the many suf- 
 fered from lessened income and higher costs, while 
 the few profited ; and the attachment to the Union was 
 yet so frail, that the many were sometimes disposed to 
 put their loss above the objects of the War. 
 
 In the background was Slavery. While the 
 slavery question did not become acute until 1821, 
 when Missouri was admitted as a state, the purchase 
 of Louisiana had awakened apprehensions in the 
 North that had grown to a real force by 1812. The 
 northern part of the country had not found slavery 
 
 26 
 
profitable. It did not fit well iuto the industrial struc- 
 ture of the North. It died out in the North. On the con- 
 trary, it did fit well into the agriculture of the South, 
 it was profitable there, and the majority of South- 
 erners favored it. The anti-slavery element did not 
 like the acquisition of Louisiana. The northern part 
 of the United States was generally opposed to the ad- 
 dition to the United States of so much slave territory. 
 This opposition to the Louisiana purchase was con- 
 tinued through the War and for years afterwards. 
 The purchase was denounced as unconstitutional. It 
 was contended that there was nothing in the consti- 
 tution of the United States to authorize the annexa- 
 tion of Louisiana to the original Union, and that, 
 therefore, the annexation might be lawfully resisted 
 by both states and individuals — to resist it was patri- 
 otic if it was hurtful to the country. Both President 
 Jefferson and John Adams conceded, when the pur- 
 chase was made and also when Louisiana was an- 
 nexed, that both the purchase and the annexation 
 were, at the least, extra-constitutional. This was made 
 the leading pretext for the opposition to the acquisi- 
 tion of Louisiana ; but the increase of slave territory 
 was feared by some and resented by others. A rather 
 weighty reason for the opposition to the Adminis- 
 tration and consequently the War, in the North, was 
 closely allied to the foregoing — it was the growing 
 political power of the South and the Republican — War 
 — party. The success of the War of 1812 would add to 
 
 27 
 
the power and fame of the party of Madison and Mon- 
 roe and would greatly increase the political influence 
 of the South. On the other hand, an important ele- 
 ment in the South — many of the' large slave-holders 
 — did not desire the success of any military expedition 
 into Canada. Before the War began it was boldly 
 asserted in the United States that one important ob- 
 ject of the War would be to annex Canada. Several 
 pretentious military expeditions were openly planned 
 to secure the annexation of Canada. More than one 
 general from the United States, in grandiloquent pro- 
 clamation, indicated plainly to the people of Canada 
 that he came to make them citizens of the United 
 States. A good many people in the United States and 
 Great Britain, and even in Canada, thought the allegi- 
 ance of many Canadians to Great Britain was very 
 weak and that it would not be difficult to induce these 
 Canadians to join our forces. The North hoped for 
 the annexation of Canada. A very powerful element 
 in the South feared and opposed this annexation of 
 free territory, and which would also add greatly to 
 the political influence of the North. Hence northern 
 commanders and northern troops were in many ways 
 hampered and hindered whenever they invaded Can- 
 ada or attemi)ted to do so. Apparently there was 
 treachery and treason in the war and other depart- 
 ments of the national government — on more than one 
 occasion, when an important movement was to be made 
 against Canada, the British had copies of the orders 
 
 28 
 
to our commanders, and knew the objectives and 
 routes of our troops, before the orders reached our 
 commanders or they knew the objectives of our troops 
 and the routes of march. No wonder that although 
 our troops were brave and fought well, they were at 
 times made to taste the bitterness of defeat — bitter- 
 ness because they knew that inefficiency or treachery 
 at Washington or treason in state capitols, was re- 
 sponsible for defeat. 
 
 Ingersoll says that opposition to the War "com- 
 prehended most of the merchants for whose relief and 
 at whose instance it was made, their dependents, the 
 lawyers of the seaports, the traders and mechanics 
 connected with navigation. Jefferson's restrictive 
 
 system, embargo, non-importation, non-intercourse, 
 fell with severe force on eastern navigation interests, 
 and soured that intolerant population. Their clergy, 
 the champions of war against England in 1775, were 
 bitter and uncompromising opponents of it in 1812." 
 Of course there were notable exceptions. John 
 Adams favored the War. He spoke for it and voted 
 for it. He steadfastly rebuked those that opposed it. 
 Apparently it was hard for Ingersoll, as it was for 
 others, to understand why it was that, as he puts it, 
 "the most violent opposition to the War came from 
 Massachusetts, particularly Boston, the cradle of the 
 Revolution, where they seemed to become as strong 
 in English attachments as they once were in aver- 
 sions." In 1812 Caleb Strong was elected governor 
 
 29 
 
of Massachusetts on a peace platform. His election 
 was plainly a victory for the opposition to the War. 
 His opponent was Elbridge Gerry, an advocate of the 
 War, and whose party was known as the war party. 
 Governor Strong, in his first message to the IMassa- 
 chusetts legislature, denounced Madison's adminis- * 
 tration as subservient to France, and discredited the 
 War loans. He is accused of having sown the seeds 
 of the Hartford Convention, the next year. But he 
 was not the only governor to disapprove of the War. 
 
 i 
 
 Both the governor of Maryland and of Connecticut 
 were outspoken and bitter in their denunciation, k 
 Many newspapers denounced those that su])scribed y 
 to the War loans and in this "the pulpit of Boston 
 vied with the press." Ingersoll quotes a New Englanc' 
 clergyman as saying, "No peace will ever be made \\\ 
 until the people say there shall be no war. If the rich I) 
 men continue to furnish money, the War will continue \ r 
 till the mountains are wetted with blood, till every ^ V 
 field in America is white with the bones of the peo- \ 
 ])le." That balderdash sounds familiar now, and ' 
 doubtless it is as silly and false now as it was in 1812. 
 So great was the intimidation attempted and actually 
 accomplished in Massachusetts that certain Boston 
 papers contained advertisements promising to con- 
 ceal the names of those patriots tliat subscribed to 
 the War loans! 
 
 Several states refused to allow their militia to be 
 commanded by the officers of the national army, and 
 
 30 
 
proposed that the people of the states refuse to pay 
 
 ' axes for the national treasury unless these taxes paid 
 
 by the people of each state could be disbursed by the 
 
 (>tate officers for such purposes and in such amounts 
 
 IS these officers might determine. But more serious 
 
 ,vas the refusal to allow the state militia to go beyond 
 
 the United States or even outside the state "The 
 
 constituted authorities of Massachusetts, legislature, 
 
 j Igovernor and judiciary, unanimously resolved that 
 
 heir militia were not liable to be called out when the 
 
 resident of the United States thought necessary, 
 
 nd that when called out he could not depute his au- 
 
 ority to command them. To these heresies was 
 
 ded the other extremely mischievous blow to the 
 
 ar, that militia cannot lawfully be marched beyond 
 
 xie frontiers of their own country." 
 
 I All too frequently this proved disastrous to our 
 
 /mies, and inflicted defeat on our brave troops and 
 
 frustrated carefully prepared plans. In speaking of 
 
 ^his, Auchinleck says : 
 
 "We contend that the conduct of the greater part 
 of the American militia on this occasion*, may be 
 fairly adduced as an additional proof that the war was 
 far from being as popular as one party in Congress 
 would fain have represented it. It is notorious that 
 many of the Pennsylvania militia refused to cross into 
 Canada, while others returned, after having crossed 
 
 *The battle of Queenstown Heights, in which Brock was 
 killed, and which should have been a most decisive victory 
 for our forces. 
 
 31 
 
the line, on constitutional pretexts Tluj 
 
 truth is, and American writers may blink it or explain' 
 it as they please, that the refusal to cross the border 
 on the plea of its being unconstitutional, was one o 
 the factious dogmas of the war, preached by the disi 
 afTected of Massachusetts, who imagined, doubtless^ 
 that the doctrine might be very convenient in the' 
 event of war in that region. The Kentuckiansi 
 marched anywhere, they had no scruples. WMiy? Be-j 
 cause the war was popular with them and they laughe/' 
 at the idea that it was unconstitutional to cross a rive|| 
 or an ideal frontier, in the service of their country.'.' 
 
 In another place, in speaking of the unsuccessf 
 attempt of General Smyth, in November, 1812, c ; 
 Canada, Auchinleck says: "The results may be state •' 
 
 to have been additional proofs, if su' , 
 
 were required, to the American nation, that the w ,1 
 feeling was popular only with a small portion of t\) { ' 
 Union. The first demonstration of this feeling ocV i 
 curred in the resolutions passed in the legislature « 
 Maryland a short time after General Smyth's defeat 1 
 
 The resolutions named w^ere passed, after Ion i 
 discussion, January 2, 1813. In the preamble to then ■• 
 it is most emphatically laid down that "War resortec 
 to without just cause must inevitably provoke the Al- 
 mighty Arbiter of the universe; produce boundless 
 waste of blood and treasure ; demoralise the habits of 
 the i)cople ; give birth to standing armies and clothe 
 a dominant faction with power, in addition to the 
 
 32 
 
inclination to infringe the dearest privileges of free- 
 men, to violate the constitution by implication and by- 
 new definitions of treason under the mask of law, and 
 to subject to persecution, perhaps to punishment, citi- 
 zens whose only crime was an opposition fairly, hon- 
 estly, and constitutionally based on the system of the 
 national administration." 
 
 This sounds very much like the pronouncements 
 of New England. It is the only considerable opposi- 
 tion to the War that found such weighty expression 
 from any part of the United States south of the line 
 named early in this chapter. 
 
 Several strong resolutions were adopted. The 
 third read as follows : 
 
 "Resolved, that the declaration of war against 
 Great Britain by a small majority of the Congress of 
 the United States, was unwise and unpolitic." 
 
 The fifth resolution was : 
 
 "Resolved, that the conduct of the governors of 
 Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, re- 
 specting the quota of militia demanded from them*, 
 respectively, by the Secretary of War of the United 
 States, was constitutional, and merits our deserved ap- 
 probation." 
 
 It need only be pointed out that the constant, 
 adroit and determined opposition to the War, when 
 the bond of national union was yet weak and the states 
 were jealous to assert their rights and were powerful 
 
 *And refused. 
 
 33 
 
as compared with the national government, could not 
 have otherwise than an almost paralyzing influence 
 on the conduct of the War at critical times ; that it 
 must frequently be responsible for defeat ; and that 
 at all times it must have discouraged our troops. It 
 would be reasonable to suppose that it weakened their 
 morale and made them less than the very best of sol- 
 diers and sailors — but it did not. 
 
 The conclusion of the Preamble of the Maryland 
 legislature, quoted above, merits very careful consid- 
 eration. Possibly as potent an influence as any in 
 creating and intensifying opposition to the War was 
 the silly zeal of some public officials of small calibre, 
 that, like such small-bore politicians of all periods, 
 delighted in showing their authority. These officers 
 were not in LSI 2, exceptions — they vented petLy spite, 
 took despicable personal revenge, and especially and 
 most frequently then — as such officials do always — 
 they acted to gratify their desire for publicity and no- 
 toriety and to lord it over others and magnify and 
 show their authority, by suppressing a proper free- 
 dom of speech. Nothing else will quite so surely 
 arouse the opposition and resentment of a brave and 
 liberty-loving people as needlessly and by ofifensive 
 manners to attempt the suppression of free speech and 
 a free press. It is a sad fact that the first blood shed 
 in the War of 1812 was American blood shed by 
 Americans, and resulted from mob effort to suppress 
 a free press in the city of Baltimore. The death of 
 
 34 
 
prominent citizens and the injury of others lit a fire 
 of opposition to the War of 1812 that spread and 
 burned to the close of the War. In time of war and 
 national danger, the things permissible are, of course, 
 more limited than in times of peace and external se- 
 curity. It is extremely difficult to determine just 
 where lies the line between proper freedom and im- 
 proper license of speech and press. In times of peace 
 the citizen may be given the benefit of the doubt. But 
 in times of war, doubtful questions should be decided 
 against the citizen and for the security of the nation. 
 Yet even here the greatest care and most impartial 
 consideraton are necessary to the real public welfare 
 Border-line cases, and, in fact, all cases as far as pos- 
 sible, should be handled under the specific directions 
 of, not subordinates of any degree, but of only the 
 highest officials, who, presumably, have the greatest 
 ability, intelligence and patriotism. And always, re- 
 strictions on free speech and a free press, should be 
 placed in such manner as to give the least possible of- 
 fense. It is well to consider also that attempted sup- 
 pression of sedition is sometimes the most effective 
 means to spread it; and that an intelligent people is 
 inclined to lose respect for a government that is afraid 
 to have the truth known and yet more if it fears to 
 allow falsehoods to be published, for the history of 
 all mankind shows that the quickest way to expose 
 and defeat a lie is to allow the fullest publicity. When 
 it IS attempted to curb free speech, rumors and wild 
 
 35 
 
tales and whispered insinuations multiply and grow 
 and flourish best; and they are always the favorite and 
 most potent devices of the traitor. Also, by interfer- 
 ing with his mouthings it is easy to make a martyr of 
 a demagogue, and secure for him far more of a hearing 
 and give him far more influence, than he would have 
 if those in authority ignored him. Silent contempt is, 
 to a rather far removed point, the best weapon against 
 fools or traitors, and the one they most dislike, There 
 can be no other danger as great to free institutions 
 and a free people as the assumption of the part of the 
 judge by the sheriff or prosecuting attorney. This is 
 more damnably treasonable than the words of any 
 private citizen, for it is striking directly and indeed 
 dangerously at the fundamental rights and liberties 
 of a free people. For the prosecutor or sherift' to act as 
 judge also, to act on suspicion, and to pronounce the 
 citizen guilty, is a relic of the insupportable tyranny 
 to end which thousands of our ancestors have shed 
 their blood. A free people, like ours. w\\\ always, and 
 properly, be jealous of free speech and a free press. 
 Their opposition to any administration will be cer- 
 tainly aroused by attempts to suppress the utterances 
 of anyone, when there is not clear, unmistakable need 
 of such suppression, or when officials of jietty minds 
 and swelled ego are allowed to strut with their au- 
 thority. We may be sure that the people will note 
 and resent imprisonment or other punishment without 
 due process of law. especially if the right of orderly 
 
 36 
 
trial by jury in a regularly constituted court, is ig- 
 nored ; and the anger and distrust of the people will 
 be all the greater, and in time will burst forth with 
 all the more relentless force, if through fear it is not 
 readily voiced. The national administration during the 
 War of 1812 would have encountered less opposition, 
 the War would have sooner reached the same conclu- 
 sion, and lives and suffering would have been spared, 
 had it not been for the attempts to suppress free 
 speech and a free press by an unnecessarily offensive 
 display of unlawful authority and the zeal of small 
 minds. Unfortunately Madison was lacking in the 
 sense of humor and the line perception of the motives 
 and spirit of the demagogue or the traitor, and of the 
 people, shown by a Lincoln dealing with a Valland- 
 ingham. 
 
 But Madison was far removed from Lincoln. The 
 war was prolonged and its progress made unsatisfac- 
 tory by faults in the national administration and the 
 faults in the national administration grew from the 
 faults of Madison. 
 
 At times some one in this or that department of 
 the national administration was guilty of that for 
 which treason would be the easiest explanation, and 
 the first to suggest itself ; but for which inefficiency, 
 and that stubborn exalted egotism which comes to 
 believe in the perfection of self and satellites, are 
 doubtless the true explanation. To illustrate, on more 
 than one occasion information of vital importance, 
 
 Z7 
 
and which should have been carefully guarded from 
 the enemy, was carefully conveyed to them ; and not 
 only this, care was taken to convey it to them by the 
 most expeditious and certain means, whereas our own 
 commanders, who should have had this information 
 with certainty and at the earliest moment, were kept 
 in ignorance until slow and circuitous and almost 
 chance means, had given them the information. This 
 alone was responsible for more than one failure when 
 with commonsense and ordinary intelligence in the 
 offending office of the national administration, or ab- 
 solute inaction there, our forces would doubtless have 
 been successful. All too often officials of the national 
 administration apparently thought the Canadians and 
 Britishers as dense and inefficient as themselves, and 
 held from our forces, that should have had it, and from 
 the nation, that it would have reassured, information 
 that the enemy already had ; the only grounds for the 
 action of our officials being that they did not think 
 that the enemy had this information or that they could 
 get it if these officials did not communicate it to our 
 own commanders or people. At times the weakness 
 and inefficiency of the national administration pressed 
 close to the incredible; and the contempt for t!ie na- 
 tional government felt in certain state capitals and 
 among many of our peo]:)lc, and only too well main- 
 tained by the conduct of the national administration, 
 led to only partial responses to the call of the secretary 
 of war on states to furnish men and supplies. 
 
 38 
 
Madison was a man of irreproachable character. 
 He was a patriot. He was a man of profound thought 
 and great scholarship. He had been a Federalist. He 
 wrote twenty-nine of the eighty-five numbers of "The 
 Federalist" — Jay contributed only five numbers, and 
 Hamilton the rest. When he graduated from Prince- 
 ton he remained a year longer to study Hebrew. He 
 was justly renowned as a thinker and writer on gov- 
 ernment ; but his liking for theology was fully as 
 strong as for the science of government, and had he 
 been born at a different time he would probably have 
 been a professor of theology and then president of 
 Princeton, or some other college, in which he would 
 have been also professor of Hebrew or theology or 
 government. He was a man of very great ability. 
 That the national constitution was accepted by the 
 states was probably due more to him than to any one 
 else. He broke with old friends and had bitter ene- 
 mies, but his honesty or virtue was never questioned. 
 Naturally enough, the dominant element in his ad- 
 ministration was, in its own estimation, at least, 
 scholastic and philosophical ; and it had the character- 
 istics of the soi-disant scholarly "statesman" of the 
 time — and later dates — who was pleased not to be 
 "practical." There was indeed one prominent excep- 
 tion — the commonsense, positive, bold Monroe. If, 
 before the destruction of the capitol he had been sec- 
 retary of war instead of secretary of state, the course 
 of the war would have been different. Madison had 
 
 39 
 
argued for universal military training and for a stand- 
 ing army and a navy sufficient for defense. He did 
 this when eloquently endeavoring to secure the adop- 
 tion of the national constitution. This required real 
 moral courage, for the people of that time greatly 
 feared, and were bitterly opposed to, a standing army. 
 "How could a readiness for war in time of peace be 
 safely prohibited, unless we could prohibit, in like 
 manner, the preparations and establishments of every 
 hostile nation?" he asked in The Federalist. "If", he 
 continued, "one nation maintains constantly a dis- 
 ciplined army, ready for the service of ambition or re- 
 venge, it obliges the most pacific nations, who may be 
 within the reach of its enterprises, to take correspond- 
 ing precautions -...The veteran legions of 
 
 Rome were an overmatch for the undisciplined valor 
 of all other nations, and rendered her mistress of the 
 world." 
 
 That was written in 1788. Immediately following 
 what has just been quoted he wrote : "Not the less true 
 is it that the liberties of Rome proved the final victim 
 of her military triumphs ; and that the liberties of 
 Europe, as far as they ever existed, have, with few 
 exceptions, been the price of her military establish- 
 ments. A standing force, therefore, is dangerous". 
 
 This view grew more and more in his mind, to the 
 exclusion of the need of military preparedness for na- 
 tional defense. His genius was for scholarship and 
 theology and literature and philosophy rather than 
 
 40 
 
practical statesmanship and wise administration. He 
 was by nature antagonistic to war, to force. Jefferson, 
 his warmest admirer and friend, said of him that his 
 nature and method were "soothing always the feel- 
 ings of his adversaries by civilities and softness of 
 expression". He was, in early life, exceedingly diffi- 
 dent ; almost timid. Few have reached higher planes 
 of thought or spiritual or patriotic expression ; but, 
 with Britain and France not only at war already in- 
 volving or threatening to involve all nations that could 
 really fight, he was content with embargo and "non- 
 intercourse" and beautifully worded remonstrances, 
 and no effective effort was made to get, equip and 
 train soldiers or to build up a navy. "What has 
 brought on other nations those immense debts," he 
 wrote, "under the pressure of which many of them 
 labor? Not the expenses of their government, but 
 war". He was opposed to war. He entered into war 
 reluctantly. Doubtless he never forgot that in allying 
 himself with the war party he had parted from his 
 early political friends — the Federalists. Doubtless his 
 heart was not in the war ; but he was by birth of the 
 section that favored the war, and he went with his 
 section. And though his heart had been in the war, 
 his administration would probably not have been more 
 successful in the prosecution of the war. He became 
 stubbornly deaf to advice. 
 
 Inevitably a President is pressed around by sub- 
 tly intrusive selfish or silly sychophants who know the 
 
 41 
 
pouer of flalteiy. A President is continually told, if 
 he will listen to it. if he will not positively refuse to 
 listen to it — and unfortunately it is not characteristic 
 of human beings to dread "praise, not blame" — that 
 he is the greatest statesman and ablest administrator 
 that ever occupied his exalted position ; and unless he 
 is quite exceptional, he comes to believe some or much 
 of this and to less or greater degree refuses to listen 
 to criticism, resents advice, constantly seeks greater 
 power, is more and more in sympathy with men and 
 measures that take from the liberties of the people, 
 and undertakes more and more the direction of that 
 for the proper direction of which he lacks ability or 
 energy, or both. He is content with inefficient officials 
 and aids, for, he having chosen them, they must be the 
 best that can be had ! The War of 1812 was prolonged 
 and its conclusion was unsatisfactory, lives were sac- 
 rificed, hardships were put upon the people, because 
 the national administration attempted what was, for 
 it, impossible ; would not supplant the inefficient of 
 men and methods with the efficient; and at times was 
 successful in accomplishing the astoundingly inoppor- 
 tune and inad\isal)le, if not actually criminal. 
 
 Yet time has been kinder to Madison than it has 
 been to his critics, and for this we may all well be 
 content. It has preserved a remembrance of his good 
 qualities rather than of his shortcomings. Before he 
 became President, even before he became Jefferson's 
 Secretary of State, he had given to his country a vast 
 
 42 
 
service that required the highest and greatest and 
 most varied of talents coupled with true patriotism 
 and prodigious industry. If he had never been Presi- 
 dent he would nevertheless merit very nearly as much 
 praise and gratitude from the American people as any 
 one in all our history. Possibly the Presidency took 
 from his high fame rather than added to it. And it is 
 certain that of those that criticised him during the 
 War, a good many would better have kept silent. Some 
 there were who criticised with wisdom and from pa- 
 triotic motives ; and it would have been better for 
 Madison and the country he loved if he had listened 
 to these critics. He was not perfect. He was ill- 
 suited to be a war President. But he was patriotic. 
 So were some of his critics. But not all — not some of 
 the loudest, that sought most to hector and hinder. 
 
 43 
 
4. 
 
 THE HARTFORD CONVENTION 
 
 New England continued in loud-mouthed opposi- 
 tion to the War, and the resolutions of the Maryland 
 legislature were mild compared with the speech made 
 the 15th of the same month by Mr. Josiah Quincy, of 
 Massachusetts, in the House of Representatives. 
 Auchinleck makes extracts from this speech ; and re- 
 ferring to them, and others of like tenor, he says : 
 
 "These extracts sufficiently establish our position, 
 to ascertain that the War of 1812 was considered by 
 the majority of the citizens of the United States as un- 
 necessary, impolitic, and, with reference to the inter- 
 ests of the country, almost suicidal. These and sub- 
 sequent debates almost justify the opinion entertained 
 by some writers of that day, who did not hesitate to 
 declare that a continuance of the War must lead to a 
 disruption of the Union." 
 
 This danger of the {lisrui)ti()n of the Union may 
 never have been serious. The writer of this thinks 
 that Lincoln's "plain people" of that time were sin- 
 cerely devoted to the Union, and that while many dis- 
 
 44 
 
appro\ed of the war, not many would have followed 
 the noisy politicians and agitators had they attempted 
 to lead as far as the dissolution of the Union. 
 
 Tiie verbal opposition to the war culminated in 
 what is known as the "Hartford Convention", because 
 held in Hartford, Connecticut. 
 
 The genesis of this convention is in doubt. It was 
 probably years before 1812. John Quincy Adams as- 
 serted that during the first session of Congress after 
 the Louisiana purchase — sometime in the spring of 
 ISO-! — he was told by Senator Uriah Tracy of Con- 
 necticut, or another member of Congress, and prob- 
 ably both — but of that he was not sure — of a project 
 of the Federalist members of Congress from New 
 England to establish a separate government. The ter- 
 ritory of this separate government was to be all of 
 New England, and also New York, New Jersey and 
 Pennsylvania if this were found practicable. Unfor- 
 tunately Mr. Adams did not make his statements 
 about this project until Senator Tracy and the other 
 member of Congress were dead. Few would dispute 
 Mr. Adams' truthfulness, yet more than a few doubted 
 the correctness of his assertions. However, in 1828 
 Hon. William Plumer, a senator from New Hampshire 
 in 1803-4, and afterwards governor of that State, in- 
 formed Mr. Adams that he was aware of the projected 
 disunion in 1803-4. In fact, he allowed it to be un- 
 derstood that he had participated in the discussion and 
 planning. A preliminary meeting was to have been 
 
 45 
 
held in Boston in the autumn of 1804, but this was 
 abandoned because of the death of Hamilton in June 
 of that year. During the 1804-5 session of Congress, 
 Mr. Plumer was told, he said, by one of the conspira- 
 tors, that a meeting to consider ways and means to 
 form a separate government for the Northern States, 
 to include Pennsylvania, would be held notwithstand- 
 ing Hamilton's death. Mr. Plumer was assured that 
 the secession project had not been and would not be 
 abandoned. But so far as Mr. Plumer knew, the pro- 
 ject slept until 1808-9, when because of opposition to 
 the embargo and non-intercourse acts, it was revived, 
 but did not get beyond the stage of informal discus- 
 sion. When it was revived during the war of 1812, 
 Mr. Plumer, according to his own statements, opposed 
 it energetically, both privately and publicly. 
 
 It is quite probable that a great deal of the talk 
 Senator Plumer heard was rather academic. Jeffer- 
 son, Madison, Monroe and Adams, all publicly ac- 
 knowledged that the incorporation of foreign territory 
 into the United States was not provided for in the 
 Constitution. The purchase of Louisiana gave oppor- 
 tunity for much constitutional discussion by those 
 that wished to oppose Jefiferson because of party affil- 
 iation or sectional location. When the T.mbargo was 
 laid, able and conscientious jurists were certain that 
 a.i indefinite embargo was extra-constitutional, if not 
 actually unconstitutional. But there are times when the 
 necessities of a nation may justify action beyond writ- 
 
 46 
 
ten laws or a written constitution. In time of war 
 nice distinctions of law can not be regarded as it may 
 be proper to regard them in time of peace. It was 
 not long after the close of the War of 1812 that public 
 opinion was well nigh unanimous that neither the ac- 
 quisition of Louisiana nor the Embargo was justi- 
 fication — not even an excuse — for any state having, 
 during the crisis and stress of war, refused the men or 
 money indispensable to the successful prosecution of 
 the War. It may be well for some to remember at this 
 time that when the nation is at war is a poor time to 
 quibble over legal technicalities or to be slack in any 
 endeavor to bring the war to a victorious end. 
 
 Massachusetts has been most blamed for the 
 Hartford Convention, in which the opposition to the 
 war and especially the national administration, found 
 expression that approached nearest to disunion. This 
 may be unjust. Otis declared that Rhode Island made 
 the first advances — to Massachusetts and Connecticut. 
 It is certain that other New England States had done 
 their share to embarrass the conduct of the war and 
 to hinder its successful prosecution. On one occas- 
 ion the governor of Vermont actually ordered back 
 the willing militia, much more patriotic than the poli- 
 ticians of the State. As a time-server he was wiser 
 than Governor Gilmer, of New Hampshire, who was 
 defeated for re-election because he honored the Presi- 
 dent's requisition for troops. In August, 1812, at its 
 first session after Congress declared war, the Con- 
 
 47 
 
necticut legislature enacted a law that the volunteers 
 of the State should not be liable for any military duty 
 except the call of the governor for the defense of the 
 State; that on no occasion were they to be subject to 
 any military duty outside the State ; and that they 
 could be commanded by only their own officers. 
 
 It will be seen from what has already been written 
 in this and the preceding chapter that the Hartford 
 Convention and its action were the logical outcome of 
 what had been begun in 1804 and continued in Massa- 
 chusetts and other New England States, and yet other 
 States. 
 
 In February, 1814, a committee of the Massa- 
 chusetts legislature declared that the Constitution of 
 the United States had been violated by the federal 
 government, and the committee suggested the ap- 
 pointment of delegates to meet delegates appointed by 
 other States to devise "proper measures to procure 
 the united efforts of the commercial states to obtain 
 such amendments or explanations of the Constitution 
 as will secure them from future evils." The New 
 England states claimed during 1814 that liie defense 
 of their coasts had been neglected by the federal gov- 
 ernment. So far as this was true it applied to the rest 
 of the Atlantic and to the Gulf coast. The federal gov- 
 ernment could not protect all of the long coast line. 
 It lacked the means to do so. It could not get the 
 means necessary to do so. While some of the New 
 England coast had been attacked and devastated, this 
 
 48 
 
was true of some of the coast farther south, and of 
 some of the Gulf coast. However, in October, 1814, 
 another committee of the Massachusetts legislature 
 reported that either the state must submit to the Brit- 
 ish, which could not be considered, or appropriate to 
 the defense of its own people the revenues it had been 
 contributing for defense to the national government. 
 This committee also recommended a convention of 
 the New England states to take action necessary to 
 defend and to protect their interests. This report of 
 the committee was adopted by the Massachusetts legis- 
 lature by a vote of more than three to one. A circular 
 letter was sent to the other New England States, call- 
 ing on them to appoint delegates to meet in a conven- 
 tion. In response to this the legislatures of Connecti- 
 cut and Rhode Island appointed delegates. Two dele- 
 gates came to the convention from New Hampshire 
 and one from Vermont, but they were not appointed 
 by the State. The convention met at Hartford, Con- 
 necticut, December 15th, 1814. After being in secret 
 session for twenty days, the convention addressed a 
 manifesto to the States having delegates present. This 
 manifesto was moderate in tone and expressed a pa- 
 triotic devotion to the United States. It declared, how- 
 ever, that the federal constitution had been disregard- 
 ed by the national administration in its claims of 
 power over the militia ; in the increase of the regular 
 army by conscription ; and in authorizing the enlist- 
 ment of minors without the consent of their parents or 
 
 49 
 
guardians. It recommended — and it was for this that 
 the convention was most condemned — that the state 
 legislatures adopt whatever measures might be neces- 
 sary effectually to protect the citizens of the States 
 from the operation of those acts of congress that sub- 
 jected the militia and others to forcible draft, or con- 
 scription, etc., not authorized by the Constitution of 
 the United States. It was easy to construe this, and 
 especially because of the language employed, as a re- 
 commendation of forcible opposition, by the New 
 England States, to the authority of the national gov- 
 ernment. The convention also proposed several 
 amendments to the Constitution of the United States, 
 of which the most significant were that representation 
 in the national House of Representatives be based on 
 free population and that a two-thirds vote of congress 
 be required to admit a state into the Union or declare 
 war. Among the proposed amendments was one that 
 embargoes be limited to sixty days ; that each state 
 should expend the national revenues collected from 
 it; and that its militia should not be sent beyond its 
 borders or be commanded by other than the militia's 
 own (state) officers. 
 
 The national administration professed to see 
 much danger in the Hartford convention and to fear 
 that it might result in open rebellion against the fed- 
 eral authority ; and it stationed a regiment of the reg- 
 ular army at Hartford during the convention. But 
 the officer commanding this regiment reported that he 
 
 50 
 
found no occasion to make use of his troops in any 
 way. 
 
 The war came to an end almost as soon as the 
 Hartford convention adjourned and interest in the 
 questions that had brought the convention into exist- 
 ence rapidly waned. The bitter partisan rancor of 
 Madison's administration was followed during Mon- 
 roe's administration — "the era of good feeling" — by 
 the minimum of partisan feeling in our history. How- 
 ever, there remained such memory of the Hartford con- 
 vention that those prominent in it could never attain 
 political preferment, not even in Massachusetts. 
 
 Space has been given to the opposition to the War 
 because unless we have knowledge and just apprecia- 
 tion of this opposition, we cannot render fair judgment 
 on our soldiers and sailors in that war. If our soldiers 
 failed to achieve victory it was far more due to the 
 effects of this opposition than it was to the incompe- 
 tency of officers or rawness of the men, and it was 
 never due to cowardice. Among the effects of that 
 opposition were : 
 
 Insufficient forces — states called on for so many 
 militia neglected to comply or sent only a part of the 
 number asked for. 
 
 Lack of equipment and munitions — the states 
 were supposed to supply certain equipment and mu- 
 nitions, and neglected to do so ; and, also, the national 
 loans and revenue measures were so opposed and 
 hindered that the national government lacked neces- 
 sary funds for equipment and munitions. 
 
 51 
 
There would have been little enough unity of ac- 
 tion at best among the States, but the opposition to 
 the war reduced this unity of action until at times it 
 almost ceased to exist at all. 
 
 The opposition to the War increased the distrust 
 and jealousy among the commanding officers. 
 
 Inevitably this opposition interfered with disci- 
 pline and encouraged insubordination. Sedition was 
 openly preached among the troops. Many of the 
 troops were led to believe that the war was unneces- 
 sary, if not a crime. 
 
 Finally, the defiant attitude of some of the States 
 increased the vacillation, weakness, hesitancy and 
 tardiness of the national administration. 
 
 The opposition to the War, and the conditions 
 that resulted from that opposition, would have de- 
 stroyed the morale of ordinary troops. 
 
 But it did not destroy the morale of our soldiers 
 or sailors, and although inferior in numbers, often al- 
 most without military training, and lacking woefully 
 in munitions and supplies, and hindered and thwarted 
 in many ways by the incompetent, self-conceited and 
 stubborn federal officials, they nevertheless fought 
 valiantly against not only the white British soldiers, 
 but the merciless, treacherous red soldiers ; and when 
 the odds were not very greatly against them, defeated 
 their foes, white and red — and at Plattsburg and New 
 Orleans defeated armies that far outnumbered them 
 and were the flower of Wellington's veteran troops. 
 
 .S2 
 
5. 
 
 WHY PLATTSBURG? 
 
 To give an account of all, or of several, of the bat- 
 tles of our Second War of Independence, would make 
 a book too big for these busy, stirring times, when the 
 highest considerations call for the utmost of action 
 True, the call is also for the recital of facts that will 
 stir to the utmost of patriotic endeavor, but it is 
 equally insistent that the recital be no longer than will 
 accomplish the desired end. When we have come to 
 understand the discouragements and obstacles en- 
 countered by our soldiers and sailors in the War of 
 1812, and view their achievements in the light of that 
 understanding, we are certainly dull and lethargic and 
 poor citizens of the United States indeed, if the facts 
 of even one notable battle of that War do not stir us 
 mightily to that supreme efifort that may rightfully be 
 expected of every inheritor, whether by blood or adop- 
 tion, of the Liberty and Democracy firmly established 
 by this Second War of Independence. 
 
 It is extremely difficult for anyone now to under- 
 stand how true it is that the War of 1812 was our Sec- 
 
 53 
 
ond War of Independence; that up to 1(S12 the bonds 
 that held the States together in the Union were so 
 weak, and were so lightly regarded by the States, that 
 they were scarcely bonds at all ; and that because of 
 the doubtful attitude toward the Union that yet pre- 
 vailed and the distrust of the national government as 
 a national government and therefore the indecision 
 and weakness of its administration, the United States 
 could not assert its independence abroad and as 
 against foreign nations, nor could it effectively assert 
 its independence at home and above and over the 
 States. There was not that pride of country, that af- 
 fection for and devotion to the Flag, that grew up in 
 later years and that began its real growth during this 
 War. Half of the public men did not favor such a 
 form of national government as we had, and did not 
 believe that our national government would endure : 
 and among the others were many that had no real 
 affection for the national government and were by no 
 means certain that it, yet an experiment, would prove 
 successful. The United States was yet "these United 
 States" — yet plural ; the United States were not yet a 
 Nation, "one and indivisible", but only a league, a 
 confederation, and in every State there were many that 
 believed that a State had the right to withdraw from 
 this league whenever it so desired. The means of trans- 
 portation and communication were such that a hun- 
 dred miles made two groups far more separate peoples 
 than three thousand miles would make them today. 
 
 54 
 
Each group was nearly altogether influenced by only 
 its own particular interests, and had little regard for 
 tile interests of the other groups or for the national 
 interests. Each State was jealous of its rights and in- 
 terests, cared little for the rights and interests of 
 others, and all distrusted and disparaged the national 
 government. Hence both at home and abroad the 
 United States suffered many ills because it was yet 
 only a league, only an aggregation in which each part 
 stood out more prominently than the whole, in which 
 the centrifugal force was yet almost as strong as the 
 weak bands that bound the States together. It re- 
 quired the War of 1812 to make these United States 
 into the United States* ; to weld the States into a 
 close, real Union ; to make the federal government 
 over the States and beyond them One National gov- 
 ernment ; and to fuse the different groups of our peo- 
 ple, separated in spirit and sentiment and by material 
 interests as well as by real barriers of distance, into 
 one Nation. 
 
 It is this condition that existed prior to the War 
 of 1812 and which lessened very much during that 
 
 *Those that yet speak or write of these United States 
 are guilty of being a hundred years "behind the times", be- 
 hind the events of their own country. They yet cling to an 
 expression proper enough before the War of 1812, but made 
 improper and untrue by the events of that war and facts of 
 great moment in our subsequent history. "These United 
 States" used now is the expression of those that have not 
 learned the most important and the most firmly established 
 fact in our history. 
 
 55 
 
War, yet persisted for years afterwards, that gave 
 vital significance to the battle of Plattsburg, and 
 made it one of the four or five most important battles 
 in our history. 
 
 This is the first reason why, having to choose 
 among the battles of the War of 1812, the Battle of 
 Plattsburg was selected. 
 
 Great Britain fought the battle of New Orleans 
 because that power believed that if it won that battle 
 it would as well win all of the Louisiana sold by 
 France to the United States, and even more — that it 
 would divide the United States by the Mississippi and 
 control the mouth of that river ; that it would make all 
 the vast domain west of that river a part of the British 
 Kingdom. The papers of Lord Castlereagh make its 
 hopes and design plain. For that reason, with the ' 
 army sent to Louisiana were sent all the officers of a 
 permanent civil government. That most charming 
 writer about the War of 1812, "A Subaltern in Amer- 
 ica", says that the expedition to New Orleans was to 
 efifect "a permanent conquest". It is official history, 
 as revealed by the Bathurst papers (State Papers of- 
 fice, London) that the civil government staff that the 
 Packeniiam expedition brought to what was signifi- 
 cantly called, in the official papers, the "province" of 
 Louisiana, consisted of "a lieutenant-governor; a col- 
 lector of customs ; an attorney-general ; an admiralty 
 judge ; a secretary for the colony ; and a superintend- 
 ent of Indian affairs". Great Britain fully expected to 
 
 56 
 
make all west of the Mississippi a part of the British 
 Kingdom ; and it knew that if it could divide the Unit- 
 ed States by the Mississippi, and hold Canada, before 
 many years it could conquer and return to the British 
 Kingdom all of the United States. 
 
 The same idea, combined with one of the great rules 
 of strategy, was back of the battle of Plattsburg. The 
 British believed — and had indeed good grounds for 
 so believing — that if they won at Plattsburg, defeating 
 both the fleet on Lake Champlain and the land forces, 
 they could divide as regards military operations. New 
 England and at least part of New York from the rest 
 of the United States. They believed that they would 
 be aided in winning the battle at Plattsburg by the 
 weakness of the federal authority and the strong state 
 feeling, which had thus far in the War prevented that 
 prompt assembling of forces in sufficient number, and 
 that furnishing of equipment and supplies, which were 
 essential to the successful prosecution of the War by 
 the Americans. They knew that this, plus sectional 
 jealousies and the envy of commanders, had reduced 
 the land forces of the United States at Plattsburg to a 
 handful of convalescents, and that the United States 
 fleet was not ready for battle. But they counted on 
 the weak federal authority and the strong state feel- 
 ing not only to aid them in this way in their military 
 operations and make easy the movements dictated by 
 strategy, but to aid them also in the political result 
 that would be yet more important — the political and 
 
 57 
 
permanent separation of New England and possibly 
 New York from the United States and the annexa- 
 tion of this territory to Canada or its erection into an- 
 other province. In either case, this part of the United 
 States would be a part of the British Kingdom ; and 
 this accomplished, and British forts erected at strategic 
 points and British troops brought to Canada as they 
 could be transported and thoroughly equipped and 
 supplied, the subjugation of the rest of the United 
 States and its reincorporation into the British King- 
 dom would be easy. 
 
 The strategy of the British — to separate one part 
 of the territory and of the forces of the foe from the 
 other, and thus be able to strike in succession with 
 superior forces — has been the strategy of the greatest 
 commanders from Caeser to the present war. It had 
 been pounded through the thick skulls into the slow 
 brains of the British by the master of it — Bonaparte. 
 It was his favorite strategy from Montenotte to Ligny. 
 Why did he ignore it immediately after Ligny— June 
 18, 1815? There have been various answers. The 
 answer must be uncertain ; but the result was 
 certain — Waterloo. It was this strategy of Grant's 
 that divided the Confederacy and its forces by the 
 Mississii)pi, and again by the March to the Sea. It 
 was the strategy often employed, and successfully, 
 by Lee — and so well and tersely defined by his ablest 
 lieutenant, if not, indeed, the ablest commander of the 
 Civil War*, as "getting there fust with the mostest 
 
 *"StonewaH" Jackson. 
 
 58 
 
men". Defying it, or ignoring it, has often brought 
 disaster. Jackson's battery and troops on the right 
 bank of the Mississippi did effective service before the 
 day of the battle of New Orleans. But they could 
 have been placed on the left bank to do effective work ; 
 and if Jackson had not divided his forces by the broad 
 river, he would not have been humiliated by the de- 
 feat on the right bank, and he would have been able 
 to compel the surrender of the entire British army 
 surviving that day of awful slaughter. Instead of 
 abusing and condemning the Kentucky and Louisiana 
 militia, "armed with nothing better than old Spanish 
 escophetas," (yet nevertheless inflicted a loss of 108 
 on the superior force opposed to them) Jackson should 
 have placed his curses on his positively and inexcus- 
 ably bad strategy. 
 
 But to return to the British strategy of the Platts- 
 burg campaign. If the British had been the victors 
 in the battle of Plattsburg, they could have cut the 
 United States in two along the line of the Hudson, 
 and, later, could have added to New England all of 
 New York except, possibly, the western part ; and, 
 further, the expressed attitude of New England to- 
 ward the War and toward the national government 
 gave the British good reason to believe that not only 
 would the military opposition to British plans be 
 weak, but that the opposition to political reunion with 
 Great Britain could rather easily be overcome. Hence, 
 when Prevost, the commander-in-chief of the expedi- 
 
 59 
 
tion, was about to enter the United States, he (to use 
 the language of Rossiter Johnson in his "History of 
 the War of 1812-15") in accordance with this purpose, 
 issued a proclamation to the inhabitants calling upon 
 them to renounce allegiance to the United States, and 
 to renew their allegiance to Great Britain. The writer 
 of this is certain that as regards the feeling of the peo- 
 ple of New England and New York, the British were 
 mistaken, but only because those in New England that 
 made themselves heard were not the majority. Un- 
 doubtedly four-fifths of the people of New England 
 were sincerely attached to the Union, and they yet 
 hated Great Britain fiercely ; but they were only the 
 unheard common people. 
 
 It will be seen that in its objectives the battle of 
 Plattsburg was the most important of the War of 1812 
 — more important than even the battle of New 
 Orleans. Auchinleck says of the Plattsburg expedi- 
 tion that it was the "most important expedition un- 
 dertaken during the three years war." 
 
 Another reason for selecting the battle of Platts- 
 burg is that in it both the naval and the land forces 
 participated and at the same time. In this it is unique 
 — in no other real Ixittle in our history have the full 
 strength of both the land and water forces so partici- 
 pated at the same time. Out of the little knowledge 
 of the War of 1812 among the people of tiie United 
 States — and that knowledge bound up with ten parts 
 of error to one part of truth — has come the general 
 
 60 
 
notion that in that War our sailors fought better than 
 our soldiers. This error can be laid at the door of the 
 New England writers spoken of in an earlier chapter. 
 As New England was largely maritime as compared 
 with the rest of the country, and New England ports 
 were the most important naval bases and New Eng- 
 land sailors manned many of our ships, New England 
 writers magnified and glorified naval victories while 
 belittling or misrepresenting land engagements. New 
 England troops were not conspicuous in land battles. 
 For this the soldiers — or, rather, the citizenry that 
 gladly would have been real soldiers — were not so 
 much at fault as the prominent men, the state officers, 
 of the New England states. At Plattsburg our sailors 
 fought well indeed as they have always fought, for 
 they defeated superior forces of ships, guns and men 
 — and many of the men were the best, seasoned sailors 
 of the British navy. At Plattsburg our soldiers fought 
 well, for they defeated several times their number, and 
 their opponents were the best soldiers Great Britain 
 had. Our soldiers and sailors fought in truth side by 
 side; and the victory of the sailors aided the soldiers 
 much indeed to win their victory. Undoubtedly the 
 defeat of our sailors would have brought defeat to our 
 soldiers. But the triumph of our sailors would have 
 been balanced by the defeat of our soldiers. The bat- 
 tle of Plattsburg is the best and most brilliant example 
 in our history, of what can be accomplished by our 
 sailors and soldiers when they co-operate in their fight- 
 
 61 
 
ing, when they strike at the same time, when they co- 
 ordinate their efforts; have no jealousy Ijut to be 
 jealous, not one of the other, but one for the other; 
 and fight, above all else, for victory, liberty and coun- 
 try. Because of this glorious feature, not less than its 
 other peculiar circumstances, the battle of Plattsburg 
 should be an inspiration as well as a reason for joint, 
 co-ordinated efTort by our army and navy when pos- 
 sible — if not in the same battle, at least in the same 
 eiTort. 
 
 The battle of Plattsburg has been selected be- 
 cause so much of the victory was due to raw, un- 
 trained volunteers and militia — only a minority of 
 those engaged had ever been in a battle before — pit- 
 ted against men whose life business it was to be sol- 
 diers, who had been in many battles under Wellington 
 and who in Spain, Portugal and France, from Oporto 
 to Toulouse, had become past-master fighters, inured 
 to hardships and defeat, yet accustomed to victory. 
 Please understand that because at Plattsburg un- 
 trained volunteers and militia fought well against 
 trained, seasoned troops, is not, in the humble opinion 
 of the writer, an argument against training soldiers, 
 or any argument that soldiers while yet untrained are 
 as good soldiers as when trained. In fact, the writer 
 believes in universal military service, and a service 
 that is a real, thorough training ; and the more he 
 studies the War of 1812 and other wars, and the his- 
 tory of free peoples, the more he is in favor of a real, 
 
 62 
 
universal military service. But if wars have demon- 
 strated that the training of soldiers is important, and 
 an important preparation for victory, they have equal- 
 ly demonstrated that the morale of the soldiers is as 
 important as their training and that it is independent 
 of their training; and that in that morale, that spirit, 
 that is so important, the raw volunteers, fighting for 
 an ideal, for liberty and fireside, are far superior to the 
 men that fight for pay, as a business, and have no fire- 
 sides to defend. History further shows that training 
 men into soldiers, while adding something to the man, 
 very often takes something out of him ; so that while 
 an efficiency that is not a part of him is added to him 
 as a garment put on or an implement in the hand, 
 something that is his very self, a part of his spirit or 
 soul, is taken from him or covered up or dulled into 
 inaction. A soldier may actually be too well trained 
 to be the best soldier. He may become alto- 
 gether too much of an automaton, lacking in quick 
 thinking and initiative as well as in spirit and senti- 
 ment. It is granted that what some military men tell 
 us is true — that a soldier must be trained until he acts 
 often without thinking; but he is overtrained, and 
 made less valuable as a soldier, if he is trained until 
 he is incapable of bold, intelligent, resourceful, inde- 
 pendent thinking and acting. Making a man so much 
 of a soldier that he is more of a soldier than he is a 
 man, is a soldier rather than a lover of some woman, 
 and perhaps of children that call him father, and of a 
 
 63 
 
home and a country: that training takes the soldier 
 past the point of greatest efficiency. We should have 
 trained soldiers. Every youth in the United States 
 should have real military training — for his own good, 
 as an individual, and for that adequate defense of the 
 nation that will always be the best guarantee of peace. 
 But always we should remember that our own history, 
 and the history of other nations, show that mere sol- 
 diers, though trained for years by a Wellington, cannot 
 defeat even a less number of patriots who fight will- 
 ingly, though awkwardly, for some such ideal concep- 
 tion, such birth of the exalted spirit, as we verbally em- 
 body in the word Liberty or Country or Flag or Home 
 or Family. Our decline and fall will begin, not be- 
 cause of raw troops, but when we have lost that pa- 
 triotic fervor that has animated our untrained volun- 
 teers on many fields of battle and has driven them on 
 to victory — that fervor, that morale, to which must 
 be added training to make the best soldiers, but with- 
 out which training is of little use — that morale which 
 coupled with adequate training and equipment, is in- 
 vincible. 
 
 It is proper that one more reason be given for the 
 selection of Plattsburg: with the exception of the en- 
 gagements of the expedition to the Chesapeake, 
 Plattsburg is the only engagement of any real conse- 
 quence in the War of 1812 in which the English did 
 not use Indians. Of that War Bladensburg is the 
 only real battle in which the British were victorious in 
 
 64 
 
which their victory was not due to their Indian war- 
 riors — if, indeed, a battle can be called a victory when 
 the victorious ( ?) army must slink away in the dark- 
 ness of the night and leave its wounded, including 
 officers, in the hands of the defeated !* At times the 
 British were defeated notwithstanding their use of 
 Indians, and in the battle of New Orleans they em- 
 ployed not only red men, but fifteen hundred blacks. 
 
 *Says "A Subaltern in America": 
 
 "For our part, it was not without some difficulty that we 
 succeeded in bringing our stragglers together, whilst day- 
 light lasted In the meanwhile, the officers of the 
 
 diflferent corps had been directed in a whisper to make ready 
 for falling back as soon as darkness should set in. From 
 the men, however, the thing was kept profoundly secret. 
 
 The night was very dark No man spoke above 
 
 his breath, our very steps were planted lightly I 
 
 stepped to the hospital and paid a hasty visit to the poor fel- 
 lows who occupied it It was a mortifying reflection 
 
 that the total absence of all adequate means of 
 
 conveyance laid us under the necessity of leaving very many 
 of them behind; nor could the non-commissioned officers or 
 private soldiers conceal their chagrin. One of these, a 
 
 sergeant of my own company actually shed tears 
 
 as he bade me farewell It was in vain that I re- 
 minded him that he was not singular; that Colonel Thorn- 
 ton, Colonel Wood, and Major Brown, besides others of less 
 note, were doomed to be his companions in captivity. The 
 strictest orders had been issued that no one should speak. 
 By seven o'clock in the following morning, it was perfectly 
 manifest that an hour's rest must be taken, otherwise one- 
 half of the troops would be in danger of falling into the 
 hands of the enemy .....In the humanity of their con- 
 duct towards such English soldiers as fell into their hands, 
 the .Americans can be surpassed by no people whatever. To 
 this the wounded whom we were compelled to abandon bore, 
 after their release, ample testimony." 
 
 65 
 
The British, generally brave and most dogged fighters 
 when hard pressed or when finally aroused, have been, 
 especially until recent years, disposed to have others 
 do a good deal of their fighting for them. They have 
 been liberal in the use of the lives and resources of 
 their allies.* Formerly they rather often were of opin- 
 ion that it was the better plan to hire mercenaries — 
 and considering the character of those they nearly 
 alway hired, compared with an Englishman, we must 
 commend their w^isdom as well as their discretion. 
 Sometimes the employment of mercenaries had an- 
 other use — when "beauty and booty" excited too much 
 horror and indignation, the excesses were blamed, as 
 in the case of Hampton, on the mercenaries. It must 
 be considered that wdiile in the War of 1812, ("ireat 
 Britain did things that may well excite horror, those 
 things were done more than one hundred years ago, 
 and the world has advanced far in humanity and 
 decency during this more than a century. We recall 
 the barbarities of the War of 1812 only that we may 
 fully understand what our soldiers in the War had to 
 fear, that we may intelligently judge them in the 
 knowledge of the character of their opponents ; for we 
 will fall far short of doing them justice, and of taking 
 from their deeds that inspiration that freemen con- 
 stantly need, if we do not consider that they fought, 
 
 *But not always. And the accusation that they have been, 
 has, of late, been gloriously belied. 
 
 66 
 
not only the very best soldiers of Europe, but the 
 crafty, merciless, treacherous savages. Great Britain 
 employed these from the very beginning. In the first 
 battle of the War of 1812 on American soil — at 
 Brownstown, August 5, 1812 — the only British troops 
 in actual combat were Indians, under Tecumseh. The 
 first United States soldier to be killed in the War of 
 1812 was Captain McCullough, killed in this battle of 
 Brownstown, and he was scalped by an Indian be- 
 fore he was dead. The first victory of the British in 
 the War of 1812 was the capture of Mackinac, and it 
 is well to remember that the government of the United 
 States took especial pains to inform the British com- 
 manders of the declaration of war a week or ten days 
 before it informed the commanders of our own forts 
 and troops, and as a result the commander of the fort 
 at Mackinac did not know of the declaration of war 
 until he was summoned to surrender although that 
 was more than a week after that declaration was 
 known, to the British forces that summoned him to 
 surrender! Those British forces were composed of 
 46 regulars, 260 Canadian militia, and 572 Indians! 
 Our troops surrendered because of the character of the 
 Indians and, wrote Captain John Askin, who com- 
 manded 280 of the savages, "It was a fortunate cir- 
 cumstance that the fort surrendered without firing a 
 single gun, for had they done so, I firmly believe not 
 a soul of them would have been saved." That the 
 savages gave no quarter, or if they took prisoners, 
 
 67 
 
took them only to torture them, was well known, of 
 course, to the troops of the United States and also the 
 white British soldiers. The white British officers gen- 
 erally did not attempt to restrain their savage soldiers, 
 and gave the remarkable excuse that to restrain them 
 was impossible. The second British victory was the 
 surrender of Hull at Detroit. Before it, however, and 
 after Brownstown, was the battle of the Oak Woods. 
 In this battle the Indians were more than one half the 
 British forces. According to official reports, the Brit- 
 ish regulars and the Canadians broke and fled in con- 
 fusion, leaving Tecumseh and his savages to bear the 
 brunt of the battle. They fought well, but this battle 
 was a victory for our forces. The first of our soldiers 
 killed in this battle was shot from ambush by an In- 
 dian, and scalped. When General Brock, the British 
 commander, summoned General Hull to surrender 
 at Detroit, he wrote : 
 
 "It is far from my inclination to join in a war of 
 extermination, but you must be aware that the num- 
 erous body of Indians who have attached themselves 
 to my troops will be beyond my control the moment 
 the contest commences". Auchinleck says coolly that 
 what most influenced Hull to surrender Detroit was 
 his knowledge of Indian warfare. Lessing says: 
 
 "This covert threat of letting loose the bloodthirsty 
 savages upon the town and garri.son of Detroit deeply 
 impressed the commanding general with contending 
 emotions, fijs whole effective force then at his dis- 
 
posal did not exceed 1000 men* and the Fort was 
 thronged with trembling women and children and de- 
 crepit old men of the town and country, who had fled 
 to escape the blows of the tomahawk and the keen 
 blade of the scalping knife". General Hull did not 
 surrender until, after hours of battle, Tecumseh, with 
 two British colonels* under cover of night took 600 
 Indians and placed them in the woods to attack the 
 Americans on the flank and in the rear. After the sur- 
 render General Brock publicly placed his rich crimson 
 silk sash around the waist of Tecumseh. The warfare 
 of the Indians reached its culmination, certainly the 
 limit of fiendishness, at the second battle on the Raisin 
 river, known sometimes as the battle of Frenchtown. 
 Here, without any effort on the part of the white Brit- 
 ish to prevent them, the Indians tomahawked and 
 scalped or burned alive, the wounded American 
 prisoners. The committee of the Congress of the 
 United States, appointed to investigate and report on 
 the conduct of the War by the British, denounced in 
 the strongest possible terms the barbarities of this 
 second battle on the river Raisin, and, also, "the re- 
 fusal of the last offices of humanity to the bodies of 
 the dead. The bodies of our countrymen were ex- 
 posed to every indignity and became food for brutes." 
 If any feel that they must judge the British for 
 their use of the Indians, let them be careful to judge. 
 
 ♦At this time he had only 700. 
 69 
 
not by the standards of today, but of a hundred years 
 ago. Further, let them take into account that the In- 
 dians were our bitter enemies, and had reason to be, 
 and needed no urging to fight us. In fact, the Indians 
 were more disposed than were the British to fight us, 
 or than the British were to have them fight us. 
 
 Furthermore, it is a safe conjecture that the com- 
 mon people of Great Britain did not approve of the 
 use of Indians in the British armies, and there is no 
 small evidence to support this. The use of the Indians 
 was denounced as well as defended in both parliament 
 and the reviews. But the very character of the com- 
 mon people of Great Britain is conclusive that they 
 abhorred the use of the savages. In 1814 the govern- 
 ing class in Great Britain was far removed from the 
 masses. They had little in common. Whatever the 
 sins of royalty or nobility, the common people were 
 right, as they always are, at heart. They were right 
 in the dark years of our Civil War. When the pen 
 fell from the hand of Henry Ward Beecher, he had just 
 written an immortal tribute to the heroism of the 
 English weaver who, though forced to the point of 
 starvation, yet stood by our Union. It is almost im- 
 possil)le, in these days of Lloyd George, Reading and 
 Geddes, to have an accurate conception of the British 
 government, classes and masses in 1814; and without 
 that conception we should not sit in judgment. 
 
 We must know of the Indians in the British 
 forces, however, to pass an intelligent judgment on the 
 
 70 
 
battle of Plattsburg. Our troops in that battle knew 
 only too well what Indian warfare meant. They had 
 no means of knowing that a large Indian force was not 
 a part of the British army attacking them and they 
 had good reason indeed to suppose that a considerable 
 part of the British army was composed of the red 
 devils. This explains in large part their cautious tac- 
 tics during the fighting before the final day of the bat- 
 tle and especially their fear of and their precautions 
 against ambush — the Indians were pastmasters of am- 
 bush, and the dense, virgin wood presented very favor- 
 able conditions for ambush. Had our troops known 
 the truth — that for once the British forces were all 
 white — and had fought just as they did, they would 
 have been entitled to the highest praise for their clev- 
 erness, resourcefulness, bravery and fortitude ; but 
 when we consider that they had every reason to ex- 
 pect that at any moment, the stealthy, merciless sav- 
 ages might break from the dark woods on either flank, 
 with tomahawk and knife, our admiration of the brav- 
 ery and fighting of our troops must be all the greater. 
 It is a pleasure to record here that the soldiers of 
 Wellington never desired to have the Indians to fight 
 with them. The army under Prevost was composed 
 of Wellington veterans and no savages marched or 
 fought with them. The British troops at Bladensburg 
 and Baltimore were from Wellington's Peninsular 
 army, and they had no Indians with them. And when 
 those same troops were taken to fight below New 
 
 71 
 
Orleans, they did not desire to have associated with 
 them the savages that were made a part of the British 
 army in Louisiana, and these soldiers of Wellington 
 saw to it that the savages committed no barbarities. 
 And today there are no more honorable or chivalrous 
 soldiers than those battling in France and elsewhere 
 under British banners. 
 
 Although our troops could not know it until, per- 
 haps, the last day of the battle of Plattsburg, in that 
 battle all the troops engaged were white, of the same 
 blood. Whether they fought under the flag of Britain 
 or under the Stars and Stripes, they spoke the same 
 language, they were of the same breed, their fore- 
 fathers had been suckled at the same breasts. Both 
 sides fought the same — not as savages, but as civil- 
 ized men, playing the bloody, savage game of war ac- 
 cording to the recognized rules and ready to car-e, even 
 with tenderness, for the wounded foe. Better than 
 any other battle of the War of 1812, the battle of 
 Plattsburg revealed the fighting qualities and merits 
 of the soldiers and sailors of the United States and 
 Great Britain. Their sailors were picked men from 
 the British high seas fleet. Our sailors, less in num- 
 ber, in ships, in guns, were the victors. Their soldiers 
 were the very flower of Wellington's Peninsular army. 
 Our soldiers had far less of numbers and equipment, 
 were composed very largely of raw militia and volun- 
 teers, but they were the victors ! Yet when the battle 
 
 72 
 
is carefully studied it is plain that Great Britain also 
 may have pride in that battle, for both its soldiers and 
 sailors fought as brave and honorable men. 
 
 71 
 
6. 
 
 BRITISH HUMILIATION 
 
 We must know of the chagrin and humiliation of 
 the British because of the results of the Plattsburgh 
 expedition, for their bitter feeling and shame is the 
 best evidence of the importance they attached to the 
 battle of Plattsburg. 
 
 Few events in the military history of Great 
 Britain have proved as humiliating to the people of 
 that kingdom as the battle of Plattsburg. Its favor- 
 able result would have had transcendent effect. It 
 was the supreme effort of Great Britain in the War. 
 Many of the British sailors had been selected from the 
 British high seas fleet. The soldiers were the very 
 best of all the British armies — the flower of Welling- 
 ton's triumphant legions — better men than those sent 
 against Washington, Baltimore or New Orleans. 
 They were the troops so nuich desired by the Iron 
 Duke at Waterloo. The British army and navy and 
 people were, as so often, extremely over-confident. All 
 the odds were so greatly in favor of the British that 
 
 74 
 
defeat was not contemplated by them as a possibility 
 because it was not contemplated at all ! And defeat — 
 defeat without that fraction of victory which temp- 
 ered New Orleans — was administered, not by the best 
 that the United States had as regards training and 
 ccjuipment, but by sailors and soldiers whose chief 
 equipment was the blood of their Revolutionary moth- 
 ers and sires, and whose chief training was the hard 
 conditions of the life of the pioneer more than a cent- 
 ury ago — a training that produced courage, fortitude, 
 and resourcefulness. The fleet of the United States 
 had been hastily built from trees taken from the for- 
 est only a short time before, and it was manned largely 
 by sailors that had never been in a battle. The army 
 was more than two thirds raw volunteers and militia, 
 and the regulars were nearly all convalescents. The 
 commanders of both the United States fleet and army 
 were young and without renown. The British com- 
 mander-in-chief. Sir George Prevost, was the idol of 
 Canada, and by his exploits he had fairly won the 
 high regard in which he was held ; and the land forces 
 under him were led by four major-generals who had 
 distinguished themselves under Wellington in Spain 
 and France. The soldiers of the United States were 
 indeed indiiTerently equipped. General Izard had 
 been sent, scarce a month before, with the best troops, 
 to General Brown on the Niagara, and he had taken 
 the best munitions and supplies with him. The Brit- 
 ish soldiers had the very best equipment that the most 
 
 75 
 
powerful military nation of the world could supply. 
 Small wonder, indeed, that the British had never 
 thought of defeat, and that defeat brought humilia- 
 tion so keen and deep that no attempt was made to 
 hide it. The British expressed their humiliation 
 openly and in words of extreme bitterness. "So amaz- 
 ing a defeat," says Ingersoll, "occasioned recrimina- 
 tions between the British navy and army." 
 
 With the exception of Prevost, each of the Brit- 
 ish commanders tried to shift the blame from himself 
 to the others. Their numerous letters, reports, mani- 
 festoes and charges and counter-charges make amus- 
 ing reading, and prove one thing — and it only — that 
 in their hands, at least, the pen was mightier than the 
 sword. 
 
 Auchinleck, always interesting, frequently amus- 
 ing — and all the more amusing because he had not the 
 least intention to be so — and always honest, begins 
 his account of the battle of Plattsburg as follows : 
 
 "Hitherto our task has been comparatively pain- 
 less, as when we had to chronicle defeat, we had been 
 able to show that to superior numbers alone was it 
 attributable, and, we have also proved by figures from 
 American writers, that, in almost every instance in 
 which victory was achieved, it was against a superior 
 force". We must confess that while we have read 
 and reread Auchinleck very carefully, we have not 
 been able to find the proof or showing of superior 
 numbers of which he speaks. But it is well to con- 
 
 76 
 
sider Auchinleck's frank prejudice at the beginning. 
 He continues: 
 
 "It is now our duty, however, to chronicle one of 
 the most humiliating defeats ever sustained by a Brit- 
 ish force, and the task is the more painful as the 
 defeat arose from no misconduct on the part of the 
 troops, but was solely produced by the imbecility and 
 vacillation of Sir George Prevost". 
 
 It will be seen that Auchinleck is angry. He is 
 mad. He is peeved. His placing the blame on Pre- 
 vost is unjust. Subsequent pages will show that the 
 British commander-in-chief was neither weak nor va- 
 cillating in the events leading up to the battle of Platts- 
 burg or during that battle. But it is certainly true 
 that Plattsburg was "one of the most humiliating de- 
 feats ever sustained by a British force." 
 
 Christie, the officer of the Canadian army, says in 
 his history of the War : 
 
 "Thus terminated the luckless and humiliating 
 expedition to Plattsburg, with the loss of the squad- 
 ron (the gunboats, owing to the mis-conduct of the 
 officer in command, excepted) and five hundred men 
 of the land forces killed, wounded and missing." 
 
 There is no ground for placing the Plattsburg de- 
 feat on any ill luck of the British and it may well be 
 stated here, also, that while others agree with Christie 
 that the British gunboats did not fight well, there is 
 much evidence that they did as well as they could. 
 But there is no conflict of evidence that the expe- 
 
 77 
 
dition was, as Christie says, "humiliating" to the 
 British. 
 
 Doubtless the British soldiers and sailors fought 
 well. They had been well seasoned, they had fought 
 well in other engagements, and they were accustomed 
 to victory. Their feelings were doubtless even less 
 pleasant than those of the civilians. Christie says : 
 
 "So circumstanced, the army, indignant at being 
 obliged to retire before an enemy their inferior in dis- 
 cipline and renown, fell back upon Chazy in the even- 
 ing, with little molestation from the Americans 
 
 The unfortunate result of this expedition 
 
 irritated the army, which felt itself humiliated in be- 
 ing compelled to retire before an enemy which they 
 had been taught to disdain." 
 
 To return to Auchinleck. He says : 
 
 "The unfortunate commander of the British 
 forces, in the expedition against Plattsburg, has been 
 almost universally made the target against which the 
 most envenomed arrows have been directed. Peace 
 be to his ashes, as his death was occasioned by over- 
 anxiety to hasten home in order to clear his character 
 from the imputations cast on it, and we would that 
 justice permitted us to pass over in silence the last act 
 of the drama. This, however, may not be. and did 
 not even impartiality demand a faithful narration of 
 the unfortunate result of the most important expe- 
 dition undertaken during the three years war, the 
 
 78 
 
loud boastings of the Americans would impose on us 
 the necessity of showing that it was not to the men 
 that the defeat at Plattsburg was attributable, but 
 that to the commander alone was the disgraceful term- 
 ination of the expedition due." 
 
 While the British were divided as to where the 
 blame should be placed, they were not divided in the 
 opinion that the result of the expedition was disgrace- 
 ful. It may well be remarked, also, that the conduct 
 and character of some, at least, of his accusers were 
 such that they would not have dared to put the blame 
 on Prevost had he been alive. 
 
 To understand the chagrin and bitterness of the 
 British, we must consider the disparity of the forces 
 engaged, both in numbers and character. That be- 
 longs properly to another chapter. We may well close 
 this one with another quotation from Auchinleck : 
 
 "Well does it become the leader who, at Platts- 
 burg, covered the British army with shame, and him- 
 self with enduring infamy, retiring at the head of fif- 
 teen thousand men — chiefly the flower of the Duke 
 of Wellington's army — before a force of Americans 
 
 not exceeding as many hundreds, . . • the elite 
 
 of the armv under his command recently from France 
 and Spain — men accustomed to victory, and again 
 marching to it, as they believed — well provided with 
 an abundant commissariat, and stores of all kinds, and 
 led on by experienced and able officers". 
 
 79 
 
I 
 
 The British felt that the defeat at Plattsburg cov- 
 ered their army and navy with shame. They may be 
 pardoned this feeling — it was fully justified. Yet their 
 soldiers and sailors added to their honorable renown. 
 
 80 
 
7. 
 
 FORCES ENGAGED 
 
 In his history of the War of 1812, Gilliland says 
 that when General Izard took four thousand of the 
 best troops from Plattsburg in August, 1814, "Gener- 
 al Macomb was left in command with little better than 
 fourteen hundred regulars, many of whom were in- 
 valids." All the historians, British as well as Amer- 
 icans, put the regular troops under Macomb at sub- 
 stantially this figure. None places the number above 
 fifteen hundred. Macomb said himself in his official 
 report of the battle: 
 
 "I had but just returned from the lines, where I 
 had commanded a fine brigade which was broken up 
 to form the division under major-general Izard, and 
 ordered to the westward. Being senior officer, he left 
 me in command ; and, except the four companies of the 
 6th regiment, I had not an organized battallion among 
 those remaining. The garrison was composed of con- 
 valescents and recruits of the new regiments, all in 
 the greatest confusion, as well as the ordnance and 
 
 81 
 
stores, and the works in no state of defense. To cre- 
 ate an emulation and zeal among the officers and men 
 in completing the works, I divided them into detach- 
 ments, and placed them near the several forts ; de- 
 claring in orders that each detachment was the garri- 
 son of its own work, and bound to defend it to the last 
 extremity. The enemy marched continually and by 
 short marches, and our soldiers worked day and night, 
 so that by the time he made his appearance before the 
 place we were prepared to receive him. General Izard 
 named the principal work Fort Moreau ; and, to re- 
 mind the troops of the actions of their brave country- 
 men, I called the redoubt on the right Fort Brown, 
 and on the left Fort Scott. Besides these three works, 
 we had two block houses strongly fortified. Finding, 
 on examining the returns of the garrison, that our 
 force did not exceed fifteen hundred effective men for 
 duty, and well informed that the enemy had as many 
 thousand, I called on General Mooers, of the New 
 York militia, and arranged with him plans for bring- 
 ing forth the militia en masse. The inhabitants of the 
 village fled with their families and elTects, except a 
 few worthy citizens and some boys, who formed them- 
 selves into a party, received rifles, and were exceed- 
 ingly useful. By the 4th of the month General Mooers 
 collected about 700 militia, and advanced seven miles 
 on the Beekman-town road, to watch the motions of 
 the enemy, and to skirmish with him as he advanced ; 
 also to obstruct the roads with fallen trees and to 
 
 82 
 
break up the bridges By this time the militia 
 
 of New York and the volunteers of Vermont were 
 pouring in from all quarters." 
 
 Let us stop for a moment to consider the fore- 
 going. The inhabitants of Plattsburg incapable of 
 fighting, did only the wise thing to leave^the village. 
 Those that could fight, remained to do so, even to the 
 boys. In speaking of this Gilliland says : "The fe- 
 males and children were sent out of the way, and every 
 person capable of bearing arms, were provided with 
 muskets to aid in repelling the invaders of their altars 
 and firesides. Even boys were armed, and, forming 
 themselves into a company, were found efficient on the 
 day of the battle." These boys were doubtless de- 
 scendants of the boys that fought in the Revolution. 
 
 The foregoing reveals General Macomb as the 
 able, resourceful, patriotic general that he was. His 
 brigade was taken from him. He was left with a few 
 convalescents. Many generals would have sulked. 
 But he took hold aggressively, with what he had, and 
 used both brains and energy. He shrewdly made the 
 diflferent detachments of his troops responsible for 
 their own defensive works — the better they worked to 
 make the defenses efifective, the 1)etter they would be 
 protected. And again he showed his broadmindedness 
 and his patriotism by naming the two redoubts after 
 two generals that had been successful on the New 
 York frontier — another move of not only the patriotic, 
 but the able commander, able to understand psy- 
 
 83 
 
chology and to create morale. Yet further, as shown 
 by the foregoing, and as will appear more completely 
 hereafter, he sent his militia to skirmish with and an- 
 noy and retard the British, thus accomplishing two 
 important purposes at the same time — he gave the 
 militia needed training and experience in actual 
 warfare ; and they did retard and hinder the British, 
 thus giving valuable time to complete the works on 
 the south side of the Saranac. 
 
 There is a little uncertainty about the number of 
 volunteers and militia that participated in the battle, 
 but their number can be determined within two hun- 
 dred or less. Auchinleck puts the number at three 
 thousand and this is substantially correct. It is cer- 
 tain that the number was not greater than 3,200, the 
 figure named by Ingersoll. Auchinleck says that Ma- 
 comb's forces were "fifteen hundred of the refuse of 
 the American army and three thousand raw militia." 
 
 Prevost certainly had all of fourteen thousand and 
 there is evidence that he had more, possibly close to 
 sixteen thousand men. Christie says: 
 
 "The arrival of a strong reinforcement of near 
 sixteen thousand men from the Garonne, of the Duke 
 of Wellington's army, in July and August (1814), de- 
 termined Sir George Prevost to invade the State of 
 New York by way of Lake Champlain." He already 
 had some troops l)efore he received this reinforcement 
 of sixteen thousand. 
 
 84 
 
Macomb says that Prevost had fifteen thousand. 
 Tngersoll gives him the same number. The best esti- 
 mate that can be made from the availa1)le fucts is that 
 the total force of Macumb was 4.700; of Prevost 14,000 
 to 15,000. The figure named for Macomb's forces is very 
 nearly accurate ; that for Provost's may be almost o • 
 quite two thousand too low. Naturally enough the 
 British concealed, as far as possible, the number of 
 their troops before the battle and certainly they did 
 not make the number too large after the battle. 
 
 As already indicated, there was as great disparity 
 in the character and equipment of the two armies as 
 there was in their number. The Low history says that 
 the "British land forces consisted of four bri- 
 gades, each commanded by a major-general of experi- 
 ence ; a light squadron of dragoons, and an immense 
 train of artillery, and all the engines of war." \Vhile, 
 measured by the standards of today, this "immense 
 train of artillery" would be insignificant, measured by 
 the standards of 1814 Prevost was indeed well sup- 
 plied with artillery. In his report of the battle he 
 speaks of his "batteries" being erected as his forces 
 reached Plattsburg, and again he states that "the bat- 
 teries opened their fire the instant the ships were en- 
 gaged" ; and he also says in his report that he had "or- 
 dered the batteries to be dismantled." Not only were 
 the British well supplied with cannon, but they had 
 abundant ammunition and stores of all kinds. 
 
 85 
 
"The British were not merely veterans," Inger- 
 soU says, "but renowned, fresh from European cam- 
 paigns, completely equipped, supplied and corrobor- 
 ated by recollections of recent exploits, the admiration 
 and master-strokes of the world." As for the Amer- 
 ican forces, the few regular troops, ill supplied by the 
 weak and inefficient national administration, and the 
 volunteers, supplied only by themselves, were poorly 
 supplied indeed with guns, ammunition, food and 
 clothing. The one thing they possessed in abundance 
 was real patriotism. 
 
 Regarding the forces employed in the naval bat- 
 tle, the various reports and histories substantially 
 agree as to the ships. There are some differences as to 
 guns and men. But all agree, and positively, that the 
 British fleet was the superior in all three particulars- 
 ships, guns and men. In the following table— and 
 which makes easy a comparison of the two fleets — that 
 number of ships is given on which all agree, and that 
 number of guns and men that is supported by the pre- 
 ponderance of evidence : 
 
 American Fleet 
 
 Saratoga (ship) 
 
 Eagle (brig) 
 
 Ticonderoga (schooner) 
 
 Preble (sloop) 
 
 Ten gun boats 
 
 Total 86 " 820 
 
 86 
 
 26 guns 
 
 210 
 
 men 
 
 20 " 
 
 120 
 
 )) 
 
 ) 17 " 
 
 110 
 
 )> 
 
 7 " 
 
 30 
 
 jj 
 
 16 " 
 
 350 
 
 >> 
 
39 guns 
 
 300 men 
 
 16 " 
 
 120 " 
 
 11 " 
 
 40 " 
 
 11 " 
 
 40 " 
 
 18 " 
 
 550 " 
 
 British Fleet 
 
 Confiance (frigate) 
 
 Linnet (brig) 
 
 Chub 
 
 Finch 
 
 Twelve gun boats 
 
 Total 95 " 1050 " 
 
 Some make the superiority of the British in guns 
 quite a little greater. Some credit the British with 
 thirteen gun boats, or barges. But the thirteenth 
 barge was undoubtedly the one that the British, ab- 
 solutely sure of victory, loaded with civilians, includ- 
 ing women, to witness tlie battle and aid in celebrat- 
 ing the British victory. 
 
 Auchinleck. who certainly would not knowingly 
 make the strength of the Americans any less or the 
 British force greater than it was, gives the flotillas as 
 follows: 
 
 American — Saratoga, 26 guns; Surprise (Eagle) 
 20 guns ; Thunderer (Ticonderoga) 16 guns ; Preble, 
 7 guns ; 10 gun boats, 14 guns ; total, 83 guns. 
 
 British — Confiance, 36 guns; Linnet, 18 guns; 
 Broke (Chub) 10 guns; Shannon (Finch) 10 guns; 12 
 gun boats. 16 guns ; total, 90 guns. 
 
 Ingersoll says that the American fleet "consisted 
 of four vessels and 10 gun boats, or barges, altogether 
 14 craft, carrying 102 cannon, manned by 850 men. 
 The British squadron had also four vessels, with 12 
 
 87 
 
gun boats, or barges, altogether 16, carrying 115 guns, 
 and manned by 1,000 seamen and officers." 
 
 Gilliland, in his history generally correct as to 
 numbers and relative strength of forces although his 
 pages are filled with a just indignation against the 
 British, says that "as an instance of the wonderful 
 exertion made on this important occasion, he (Mac- 
 Donough) added a brig to his force, before greatly in- 
 ferior to the enemy's, in the short period of twenty 
 days, the timber of which was actually growing on 
 the Lake, when the work was begun." 
 
 Considering the means and appliances available 
 at that time, and especially those to which MacDon- 
 ough was limited, this achievement was truly remark- 
 able, although the warships of a hundred years ago 
 now appear to be almost ludicrously small. Inger- 
 soll's statement is undoubtedly correct that "Com- 
 modore Downie's frigate" — the Confiance — was "160 
 feet long by 40 feet beam." That, of course, was the 
 largest vessel in either squadron. It was so far the 
 superior that Downie "assured the army that with his 
 ship alone he could take the whole American squad- 
 ron." 
 
 We now know that Downie was over-confident ; 
 but it is nevertheless true that among the British, both 
 officers and men, both lake and land forces, "entire 
 confidence prevailed in the superiority of the British 
 vessels, their heavier metal, more numerous veteran 
 crews, and much more experienced officers." 
 
8. 
 
 THE BATTLE UP TO SEPTEMBER IITH 
 
 The River Chazy flows from the west into Lake 
 Champlain a few miles south of the boundary line be- 
 tween the United States and Canada. 
 
 The Saranac River flows also from the west into 
 Lake Champlain, but about twenty-five miles south of 
 the United States-Canada boundary line. For some 
 miles before it reaches the lake it flows east and west. 
 As it nears the lake its banks become higher, steeper 
 and rocky. It empties into a little bay known as 
 Plattsburg Bay, partially enclosed by a promontory 
 known as Cumberland Head. The village of Platts- 
 burg was, in 1814, nearly altogether on the north of 
 the Saranac. Running for some distance, and termin- 
 ating near the lake, on the south of the Saranac is a 
 considerable elevation, and it was here that Macomb 
 located his principal works. In his official report of 
 the battle, Prevost said : 
 
 "I found the enemy in the occupation of an ele- 
 vated ridge of land on the south branch (bank) of the 
 
 89 
 
Saranac, crowned with three strong redoubts, and 
 other field works." 
 
 Of this hereafter. 
 
 The naval battle was fought in the Bay of Platts- 
 burg. 
 
 While the decisive part of the land battle was 
 fought on the banks of the Saranac, that battle began 
 several days before and near the Chazy. 
 
 In his official report of the battle to Earl Bathurst, 
 written the evening of September 11th — the date of 
 tlie naval battle and the defeat of the land forces, and 
 while his army was already in retreat — Prevost says : 
 
 "Upon the arrival of the reinforcements from the 
 Garonne, I lost no time in assembling three brigades 
 
 on the frontier of Lower Canada As the troops 
 
 concentrated and approached the line of separation 
 between this province and the United States, the 
 American army abandoned its entrenched camp on the 
 river Chazy, a position I immediately seized and oc- 
 cupied in force on the 3rd inst. The following day 
 the whole of the left division advanced to the village 
 of Chazy, without meeting the least opposition from 
 the enemy. On the 5th, it halted within eight miles 
 of this place, having surmounted the difficulties cre- 
 ated by the obstructions in the road from the felling 
 of trees and the removal of bridges. The next day the 
 division moved to Plattsburg. in two columns, on par- 
 allel roads ; the right column led by Major-General 
 Power's brigade, supported l)y four companies of light 
 
 90 ' 
 
infantry and a demi-brigade, under Major-General 
 Robinson ; the left by Major-General Brisbane's brig- 
 ade. The enemy's militia supported by his regulars, 
 attempted to impede the advance of the right column, 
 but they were driven before it from all their positions, 
 and the column entered Plattsburg. This rapid move- 
 ment having reversed the strong position taken up by 
 the enemy at Dead Creek, it was precipitately aband- 
 oned by him, and his gun boats alone left to defend the 
 ford, and to prevent our restoring the bridges, which 
 had been imperfectly destroyed — an inconvenience- 
 soon surmounted." 
 
 In justice to Sir George Prevost it should be con- 
 sidered that he wrote this dispatch the evening of the 
 day on which the British had been defeated, when his 
 troops were retiring in confusion, abandoning not only 
 the greater part of their stores, but their wounded and 
 dead ; therefore, he is probably excusable for omitting 
 some really important facts about his advance to 
 Plattsburg. It was only natural that he should de- 
 scril)e his march as an easy, and, up to the 11th, a com- 
 plete, triumph. But the preponderance of evidence is 
 to the efifect that Prevost minimized the opposition 
 to his advance put up by the United States militia and 
 regulars, and magnified his success. 
 
 General Macomb, not writing his report on the 
 11th, goes more into details. He says: 
 
 "By the 4th of the month General Mooers collect- 
 ed about 700 militia, and advanced seven miles on the 
 
 91 
 
Beekman-town road, to watch the motions of the 
 enemy, and to skirmish with him as he advanced ; also 
 obstruct the road with fallen trees, and to break up the 
 bridges. On the Lake Road at Dead Creek bridge, I 
 posted 200 men under Captain Sproul, of the 13th regi- 
 ment, with orders to abattis the woods, to place ob- 
 structions in the road, and to fortify himself; to this 
 party I added two field pieces. In advance of that po- 
 sition was lieut.-col. Appling, with 110 riflemen, 
 watching the movements of the enemy, and procuring 
 intelligence. It was ascertained, that before daylight 
 on the 6th, the enemy would advance in two columns 
 on the two roads before mentioned, dividing at Samp- 
 son's, a little below Chazy village. The columns on the 
 Beekman-town road proceeded most rapidly; the mi- 
 litia skirmished with his advanced parties, and except 
 a few brave men, fell back most precipitately in the 
 greatest disorder, notwithstanding the British troops 
 did not deign to fire on them, except by their flankers 
 and advanced patroles. The night previous, I ordered 
 Major Wool to advance with a detachment of 250 
 men to support the militia, and set them an 
 example of firmness, also Captain Leonard, of the 
 light-artillery, was directed to proceed with two pieces 
 to be on the ground before day ; yet he did not make 
 his appearance until eight o'clock when the enemy had 
 approached within two miles of the village. With his 
 conduct, therefore, I am not well pleased. Major 
 Wool with his party, disputed the road with great ob- 
 
 92 
 
stinacy, but the militia could not be prevailed on to 
 stand, notwithstanding the exertions of the generals 
 and staff-officers; although the fields were divided by- 
 strong stone walls, and they were told that the enemy 
 could not possibly cut them off. The state dragoons 
 of New York wear red coats ; and they being on the 
 heights to watch the enemy gave constant alarm to 
 the militia, who mistook them for the enemy and 
 feared his getting in their rear.* 
 
 "Finding the enemy's column had penetrated 
 within a mile of Plattsburg, I dispatched my aid-de- 
 camp. Lieutenant Root, to bring off the detachment 
 at Dead Creek, and to inform Lieut. -Colonel Appling 
 that I wished him to fall on the enemy's right flank. 
 The colonel fortunately arrived just in time to save his 
 retreat, and to fall in with the head of a column de- 
 bouching from the woods. Here he poured in a de- 
 structive fire from his riflemen at rest, and continued 
 to annoy the enemy until he formed a junction with 
 Major Wool. The field-pieces did considerable exe- 
 cution among the enemy's columns. So undaunted, 
 however, was the enemy, that he never deployed in 
 his whole march, always passing on in columns. Find- 
 ing that every road was full of troops, crowding on us 
 on all sides, I ordered the field pieces to retire across 
 
 *At this time the militia had great fear of being am- 
 bushed by Indians — the militia had good reason to suppose 
 that Indians were a part of the British forces and had no 
 means of learning that Prevost had no Indians. 
 
 93 
 
the bridge, and form a battery for its protection, and 
 to cover the retreat of the infantry, which was accord- 
 ingly done, and the parties of Appling and Wool, as 
 well as that of Sproul, retired, alternately keeping up 
 a brisk fire until they got under cover of the works. 
 The enemy's light troops occupied the houses near the 
 bridge, and kept up a constant firing from the win- 
 dows and balconies, and annoyed us much. I ordered 
 them to be driven out with hot shot, which soon put 
 the houses in flames, and obliged those sharp shoot- 
 ers to retire. The whole day, until it was too late to 
 see, the enemy's light troops endeavored to drive our 
 guards from the bridge, but they suffered dearly for 
 their perseverance. An attempt was also made to cross 
 the upper bridge, where the militia handsomely drove 
 them back. The column which marched by the lake- 
 road was much impeded by the obstructions, and the 
 removal of the bridge at Dead Creek ; and, as it passed 
 the creek and beach, the gallies kept up a lively and 
 galling fire. Our troops being now all on the south 
 side of the Saranac, I directed the planks to be taken 
 off the bridges and piled up in the form of breast 
 works, to cover our parties intended for disputing the 
 passage, which afterwards enabled us to hold the 
 bridges against very superior numbers. From the 
 7th to the 11th the enemy was employed in getting on 
 his battering train, and erecting his batteries and ap- 
 proaches, and constantly skirmishing at the bridges 
 and fords. By this time the militia from New York 
 
 94 
 
and the volunteers of Vermont were pouring in from 
 all quarters. I advised General Mooers to keep his 
 forces along the Saranac to prevent the enemy's cross- 
 ing the river, and to send a strong body in his rear to 
 harass him day and night, and keep him in continual 
 alarm. The militia behaved with great spirit after the 
 first day and the volunteers of Vermont were exceed- 
 ingly serviceable. Our regular troops, notwithstand- 
 ing the constant skirmishing, and repeated endeavors 
 of the enemy to cross the river, kept at their work day 
 and night, strengthening the defenses, and evinced a 
 determination to hold out to the last extremity. It 
 was reported that the enemy only awaited the arrival 
 of his flotilla to make the general attack." 
 
 It is plain that the 700 militia did not stand, the 
 first day, before at least ten times their number of 
 Wellington's famous soldiers. They can hardly be 
 blamed. We have no evidence from any source that 
 any of them had ever been in a battle. It seems quite 
 certain that at the most very few of them had ever 
 been under fire before. And not all gave way precipi- 
 tately. We may be sure that Macomb, young, impa- 
 tient of retreat, did not make their conduct appear any 
 better than it was that first day ; yet he says that some 
 fought well, and he also says that "the militia l)ehaved 
 with great spirit after the first day". Possibly they 
 did not do so badly the first day. They were opposed 
 by ten times their number of what were known as the 
 best soldiers in the world, and who had grained in 
 
 95 
 
Spain a reputation not only for bravery, but ferocity. 
 Furthermore, the militia did not know that there were 
 not stealing through the woods, for sudden attack, the 
 merciless savages that so often had ambushed our 
 troops or attacked them in flank and rear. No ; one 
 cannot blame the militia for their conduct that first 
 day, and one must admire them for their good fighting 
 afterwards, as he must admire the brave handful of 
 regulars that Macomb spared from the labor of build- 
 ing his works of defense, to delay the advance of the 
 British until those works could be completed. Nor 
 can one fail to admire the British soldiers. They were 
 brave men and they fought honorably. One cannot 
 escape a feeling of sorrow that such brave, well trained 
 troops should have suffered because of the over-confi- 
 dence that has so often brought disaster to British 
 forces. They disdained to break their columns to fight 
 with the handful of raw troops they despised. And 
 in justice to them it should be said again, that there is 
 no evidence that Wellington's soldiers ever desired 
 any aid from the Indians. No Indians accompanied 
 these soldiers to Plattsburg, Washington or Balti- 
 more; and the few at the battle of New Orleans were 
 probably not more in number than those General Jack- 
 son employed in the woods on his left flank. The men 
 that fought at Plattsburg, on both land and water, on 
 both sides, were brave men ! 
 
 Against the more than 14,000 veterans from the 
 Peninsula, lavishly equipped, Macomb could send 700 
 
 96 
 
militia, 560 regulars, and four cannon ; yet they ac- 
 complished the purpose for which they were sent — ob- 
 structed the roads, harassed the enemy, retired volun- 
 tarily from Dead Creek, and when the more than 
 14,000 veterans reached the Saranac, held them there ; 
 being now aided by the Vermont volunteers, who 
 "were exceedingly serviceable". 
 
 The Low history gives a terse account of the 
 events up to the 11th. It says: 
 
 "The army left at Plattsburg, after the march of 
 General Izard, was very weak ; the command devolved 
 on General Macomb. The enemy embraced this op- 
 portunity for making an incursion into the state of 
 New York, on the side of Lake Champlain, with a 
 view to secure a strong position at Crown Point, or 
 Ticonderoga, previous to going into winter quarters ; 
 and, ultimately, to co-operate with an army, that was 
 to invade the state of New York, or Connecticut, on 
 the seaboard; and thus effect the great object of the 
 British government, the political separation of the 
 eastern from the southern states. General Sir George 
 Prevost commanded the British land forces, destined 
 for this service, consisting of four brigades, each com- 
 manded by a major-general of experience. While the 
 troops advanced by land, the fleet, apparently super- 
 ior to the American, advanced by water No 
 
 sooner was the intention of the enemy discovered, 
 than the militia was called out ; those of the county of 
 Clinton assembled on the 2nd September, near the 
 
 97 
 
village of Chazy. On the following day, Gen. Wright 
 took position, with his brigade, seven miles in advance 
 of Plattsburg. On the advance of the enemy, Col. 
 Appling, who was placed with his command on the 
 lake road, fell back to Dead Creek, where he posted 
 himself, and impeded the approach of the pursuers so 
 much by blocking up the passage, that the enemy was 
 compelled to alter his course toward the Beekmantown 
 road. On the morning of the 6th, the advance of the 
 enemy attacked the militia, about 700, under General 
 Mooers, and a small detachment of regulars under 
 Major Wool. Unfortunately a part of the militia broke 
 and fled, the remainder, together with the regulars, 
 made a bold and masterly opposition, retiring slowly 
 and regularly, before a large force for six miles, when 
 they were reinforced within a mile of Plattsburg by a 
 Captain Leonard and a few men with two pieces of 
 artillery. This force, by taking advantage of the cover 
 of a stone wall, made a stand and checked the progress 
 of the enemy, until overpowered by superior num- 
 bers, it retired, as before, slowly, dealing death among 
 the enemy, until it reached the south bank of the Sar- 
 anac, where the pursuit of the enemy was effectually 
 checked and he was forced to retire. From this time 
 until the morning that was to decide the fate of 
 Plattsburg, and perhaps of Albany, continual skir- 
 mishing was kept up. each party preparing itself for 
 the bloody conflict. The enemy occupied an extent of 
 about three miles, he erected seven heavy batteries, 
 
 98 
 
and fully supplied himself with all the usual means of 
 attack. The Americans were engaged in annoying the 
 enemy and strengthening their own works." 
 
 It is well for us to have before us this extract from 
 the Low history, for this history is founded on state 
 rather than national records, and it is written from the 
 New York militia viewpoint. It agrees in the sub- 
 stantial facts with the other records and is additional 
 evidence that the 700 militia and handful of regulars 
 stoutly opposed the march of the British, and kept 
 them busy while Macomb was completing his defen- 
 sive works and until the volunteers asembled. 
 
 Christie says that of the two columns in which the 
 British troops marched, "the column advancing by the 
 western road was smartly opposed by the enemy's 
 militia." He continues that this column "drove the 
 enemy back on Plattsburg on the sixth, and opened the 
 way for the left brigade, by Dead Creek, a strong po- 
 sition upon the border of Lake Champlain, which the 
 enemy had occupied in force, after destroying a bridge 
 over the stream, which in this place was not fordable, 
 having so distributed their gun boats (ten in number 
 six of which each carried one long twenty-four, and an 
 eighteen pound carronade, the others a long twelve 
 each) as to take the British in flank on their approach. 
 The enemy fell back upon their redoubts beyond the 
 Saranac, keeping a vigilant outlook upon the fords 
 of the river with strong picquets of light troops. On 
 the seventh the heavy artillery being brought forward. 
 
 99' 
 
eligible situations were chosen to place them in bat- 
 tery, when it was observed that the squadron had 
 changed their position from that of the preceding 
 day, and were anchored out of reach of their own, as 
 well as of the British batteries." 
 
 It was truly inconsiderate and annoying on the 
 part of the United States squadron thus to get out of 
 range of the British batteries of heavy guns. All 
 the more, as there was no apparent reason why the 
 squadron should remain, at that time, within range of 
 our batteries. 
 
 The United States gun boats at Dead Creek, that 
 fired on the flank of the British column, spoken of by 
 Christie, the Canadian officer with the British forces, 
 were the "gallies" spoken of by Macomb. This use of 
 the gun boats should be noted, as it shows that our 
 forces lost no opportunity to interfere with the plans 
 of the British. Both Macomb and MacDonough were 
 alert and resourceful. And the British were capable, 
 confident and imperturbable. 
 
 Ingersoll is so helpful in understanding the in- 
 fluences and spirit that moulded and animated the 
 United States forces, and especially the militia and 
 volunteers, that we will lengthen a little this chapter, 
 already long, by quoting from him : 
 
 "War had always been Macomb's vocation, which 
 he had followed as his only profession from the time 
 
 he entered the army as a very young lieutenant 
 
 Macomb accessible, sociable, playful, was a well 
 
 100 
 
 I 
 
 L 
 
trained and industrious soldier, with no supercilious 
 aversion to militia, volunteers and those irregular 
 troops whom Izard contemptuously designated as 
 people requiring a popular leader. Macomb's brigade 
 was broken up by Izard in selecting his men to take 
 from that station, where he left only fifteen hundred 
 fit for field duty to make head against the British four- 
 teen thousand. Falling back upon Plattsburg, Ma- 
 comb had but a few days in which to prepare for the 
 most serious attack, as to disparity of numbers, ever 
 made on the Americans: nearly ten to one. . . .Militia 
 were called out from New York and Vermont, about 
 3,200 of whom repaired, of all parties, to Macomb's 
 standard ; good troops as they proved, as such troops 
 are for any sudden and defensive operation, especially 
 whenever they are protected by streams, woods, and 
 forts, associated with regular soldiers, and command- 
 ed by a leader willing to make the best, instead of 
 inclined to make the worst, of such indispensable com- 
 rades in arms in nearly every American conflict. Be- 
 sides completing his intrenchments, Macomb em- 
 ployed his men in harassing the enemy as they ad- 
 vanced, and preparing by such apprenticeship for the 
 contests soon to ensue General Macomb, to re- 
 mind his troops of their brave countrymen, of whom 
 he had no invidious feelings, named the two redoubts 
 he constructed Forts Brown and Scott, names dear to 
 American soldiers, and electrifying the ardor pervad- 
 ing their ranks. Generals Izard and Macomb differed 
 
 101 
 
much as to the condition of the place and troops left 
 by the former to the latter's care, who found it, he 
 said, in great confusion, the ordnance, the stores, the 
 works, in no state of defense : the garrison composed 
 of convalescents and recruits of new regiments, unor- 
 ganized and unprepared for their difficult tasks. To 
 excite their emulation Macomb assigned to dif- 
 ferent parties the separate defense of the several forts, 
 declaring, by general orders, that he relied on each 
 party to defend its particular charge to the last ex- 
 tremity. From the 6th to the 11th of September, con- 
 tested every inch of ground with the enemy. The 
 militia in the field, and even in the woods, often timor- 
 ous but a few days practice under officers who 
 
 gave every encouragement, brought them to the Sar- 
 anac river better disciplined, and, when on their own 
 side of it, easily rallied to resist and successfully repel 
 attempts of the British to force their way across the 
 fords." 
 
 Here we have a really good portrait of the able, 
 resourceful and patriotic commander. If Macomb had 
 been like many generals — and the war of 1812 had its 
 full quota — ^he would have sulked when his brigade 
 was broken up. Rut he did nothing of the kind. He 
 started out at once to do, cheerfully, energetically, the 
 best he could with the meagre means he had. He 
 might easily have been discouraged. The wonder is 
 that he was not greatly discouraged. Surely he was 
 of stout heart. When Izard marched from Plattsburg 
 
 102 
 
with very nearly all the well seasoned troops there, he 
 wrote to the Secretary of War that "everything in the 
 vicinity, and the lately erected works at Plattsburg and 
 Cumberland Head, would in less than three days be in 
 possession of the enemy." This shows his opinion of 
 the force he left with Macomb, but shows that he did 
 not know that general. At that date a part of Ma- 
 comb's force was worth to that general less than noth- 
 ing, for convalescents are a burden, not an aid. One 
 can easily see what must have been the morale of the 
 troops left to Macomb — they knew that they were left 
 because Izard considered them inferior and undesir- 
 able. Yet it appears that within twenty-four hours 
 this enthusiastic, shrewd general had created emula- 
 tion, vigor and morale. As Ingersoll points out, he 
 understood and prized the militia and volunteers. He 
 and they were en rapport. Like Jackson at New Or- 
 leans, he was one among his men, yet much above 
 them. He knew that these raw soldiers were brave 
 and intelligent, and steadying them with veterans, he 
 used them to delay Prevost, and, at the same time, 
 gave them the very best intensive training! Macomb 
 knew how to employ time and men to the very best 
 advantage. He both commanded and led. He was 
 so big and broad and generous that he, the better to 
 enthuse and encourage his men, named the two re- 
 doubts after the two popular generals of the United 
 States at that time. There have been generals so nar- 
 row and envious that they would not have done that. 
 
 103 
 
In his generosity and big-heartedness and freedom 
 from envy and jealousy, Macomb made for iiimself a 
 place among such commanders as Washington and 
 Lafayette, Grant and Sherman, Lee and Jackson, 
 Thomas and Sheridan. Plattsburg was a victory for 
 our troops as well as our fleet because intelligent men, 
 quick to learn, brave and patriotic, were so fortunate 
 as to be commanded by such a general as Macomb. 
 
 104 
 
9. 
 
 THE BATTLE ON THE LAKE 
 
 We must consider that when the battle of Platts- 
 burg was fought there were no railroads. Much of Pre- 
 vost's march to the Saranac had been through dense 
 woods, along roads hardly deserving the name. If he 
 won at Plattsburg and in due time passed on to the 
 south, to divide New England from the rest of the 
 United States, he must, to be safe as regards supplies 
 and against attack in his rear, have the mastery on 
 Lake Champlain. It would have been fatal to leave a 
 hostile naval force on the lake. Hence when his land 
 forces reached Plattsburg, and had mounted their 
 cannon in batteries on the north bank of the Saranac, 
 he felt compelled to delay his attempt to advance 
 farther until the British fleet on Lake Champlain was 
 ready to go into action. 
 
 As will appear later, there developed, after the 
 battle, a very bitter controversy between the friends 
 of Prevost and of Sir James Yeo, commodore and com- 
 mander-in-chief of the British naval forces operating 
 
 105 
 
against the United States on Lake Ontario and Cham- 
 plain, and especially Captain Downie, Commander of 
 the British flotilla on Lake Champlain,over the circum- 
 stances that led up to the beginning of the naval battle. 
 It appears quite certain that Prevost wished the Brit- 
 ish flotilla to attack as soon as he reached the Saranac, 
 and expected it to do so ; and that Captain Downie, of 
 the Confiance, and who was in immediate command of 
 the lake flotilla, was not ready to fight until the morn- 
 ing of the 11th. In his report, from which we have al- 
 ready quoted, Prevost says that when he reached the 
 Saranac the 7th, he found the flotilla of the United 
 States at anchor in Plattsburg Bay, but out of gun 
 shot from the shore and that he "immediately commun- 
 icated this circumstance to Captain Downie, who had 
 been recently appointed to command the vessels on 
 Lake Champlain, and requested his co-operation, and 
 in the meantime batteries were constructed for the 
 guns brought from the rear. On the morning of the 
 11th our flotilla was seen over the Isthmus which 
 joins Cumberland-head, steering for Plattsburg bay." 
 It will be noticed that Prevost says nothing about 
 communications between him and Downie during the 
 period from the morning of the 7th to the morning of 
 the 11th. As will appear hereafter. Sir James Yeo 
 stated in his dispatch about the battle that it appeared 
 to him that "Captain Downie was urged, and his ship 
 hurried into action, before he was in a fit state to meet 
 the enemy". Captain Pring, who succeeded to the 
 
 106 
 
command of the British flotilla on the death of Captain 
 Dovvnie, said in his account of the battle that "in con- 
 sequence of the earnest solicitation of his excellency, 
 Sir George Prevost, for the co-operation of the naval 
 forces on this lake to attack that of the enemy. . .every 
 possible exertion was used to accelerate the armament 
 of the new ship, that the military movements might 
 not be postponed at such an advanced season of the 
 year, longer than was absolutely necessary." The 
 enemies of Prevost made much of this ; yet there is 
 nothing in it to show that the British flotilla went into 
 action until it was fully prepared to do so or that Pre- 
 vost asked it, or desired it, to engage our ships before 
 it was ready to do so. He asked only haste in prepar- 
 ation, which was really important, and which he cer- 
 tainly had a right to ask. There is abundant evidence 
 that Downie did not attack until he was ready to do 
 so, and also the evidence is unanimous to that effect. 
 It is probable that the chief cause of Downie's de- 
 lay was lack of wind or unfavorable wind. We get 
 interesting and instructive light on this and other 
 points of the battle on the lake and the reason for it, 
 from what is said by Christie. He states that Prevost 
 informed Downie "of the position of the American 
 squadron ; and that the attack by land and water might 
 be simultaneous, he deferred an attack upon the works 
 until the arrival of the squadron. This resolution 
 (it is said) was adopted with the unanimous concur- 
 rence of the General Officers present. The escape of 
 
 107 
 
the enemy's fleet to the narrow channels at the head of 
 the Lake might render it impracticable to engage them 
 with any prospect of success : a final decision of the 
 naval ascendency, on the Lake at the present juncture, 
 was therefore of the utmost importance to the ulterior 
 operations of the army, and the expediency of such a 
 measure was universally acknowledged, particularly 
 as the strongest confidence prevailed in the superior- 
 ity of the British vessels, their weight of metal, and in 
 the capacity and experience of their officers and crews ; 
 and as the Commander of the Forces was informed by 
 an officer of his staff, who had been dispatched to 
 Captain Downie, that he considered himself, with his 
 own vessel alone (the Confiance) a match for the 
 whole American squadron. At midnight on the 9th of 
 September, Sir George Prevost received a communi- 
 cation from Captain Downie, stating that he was pre- 
 pared for service and proposed getting under weigh 
 with his squadron the same night at twelve o'clock, 
 with the intention of doul)ling Cumberland Head (at 
 the entrance of Plattsburg Bay) about day-break and 
 engaging the enemy's squadron if anchored in a posi- 
 tion to justify such a measure. The troops at dawn of 
 day were under arms, but there being no appearance of 
 the fleet at the expected hour, they were sent into 
 quarters. Sir George Prevost wrote a note to Captain 
 Downie acquainting him that the army had been held 
 in readiness that morning for the expected arrival, and 
 expressing his hopes that the wind only had delayed 
 
 108 
 
the appearance of the squadron. The brave Downie, 
 who to the noble and manly virtues characteristic of 
 his profession, united the nicest sense of honor, is said 
 to have been fired with indignation at the reflection 
 contained in the note. No communication subsequent 
 to that of the 9th was, however, received from him at 
 Head Quarters." 
 
 The evidence is conclusive that it was agreed and 
 fully understood that Prevost was not to attack the 
 American forces until Downie began the naval en- 
 gagement, and that Prevost was to attack as soon as 
 Downie got into action. Ingersoll says that "in a 
 council of war held by the British generals, it was 
 unanimously resolved that the attack on Plattsburg 
 must be simultaneous by land and water, and there- 
 fore that of the army was deferred till the whole 
 squadron arrived." Undoubtedly this was well un- 
 derstood by Downie. This subject will be taken up 
 again later, 1)ut it is necessary to understand, at this 
 time, that both the land and naval forces understood 
 that they were to attack at the sam^e time ; and that the 
 land forces were ready to attack before the flotilla ap- 
 peared for battle. 
 
 MacDonough. the commander of the American 
 flotilla on Lake Champlain, was a shrewd, able and 
 courageous commander. He was well aware that his 
 squadron was the weaker in ships, guns and men. 
 Naturally and properly he took what advantage of po- 
 sition he could. His ships were in Plattsburg Bay, 
 
 109 
 
just beyond the range of the British land batteries, and 
 also where the British ships would be hampered and 
 hindered in manoeuvering. This was a matter of 
 great importance in the days of sailing vessels, and 
 with nearly all their guns fixed — long before the day 
 of the revolving turret. Furthermore, MacDonough 
 arranged his ships in line in such a way that the Brit- 
 ish flotilla could not enter the bay without being ex- 
 posed to a broadside from all of them. The prows 
 were to the north : first the Eagle, at the head of the 
 line, and then the Saratoga, Ticonderoga and Preble 
 in order. The Preble was placed so near a shoal that 
 the British vessels could not pass around it. MacDon- 
 ough placed his ten gun boats inside of his line, op- 
 posite the intervals between the larger vessels. 
 
 MacDonough showed his originality and resource 
 by an original device that probably made it possible 
 for him to win the battle. The credit for this device 
 has been given by some to the sailing master of the 
 Saratoga, MacDonough's flag ship. Whether the 
 credit belongs to MacDonough or someone else, he 
 laid a kedge anchor broad off each of the bows of the 
 Saratoga, and carried the hawsers to the quarters. 
 Thus by winding in one or the other of the hawsers the 
 stern of the ship could be swung one way or the other, 
 while the cable of the main anchor kept her bow in one 
 place. By this arrangement the Saratoga could be 
 turned quickly, so as to bring her broadside to bear on 
 any point. This original and masterly stroke of sea- 
 
 110 
 
manship proved to be of the greatest importance. 
 
 Here is timely an extract from IngersoU's account 
 of the battle that is so characteristic of that entertain- 
 ing, if not always accurate, writer, that, as it states a 
 historical fact, I feel justified in placing it before my 
 readers : 
 
 "The young American commander, then 31 years 
 of age, introduced his appeal to mortal combat by in- 
 tercession to Almighty God among other pious 
 
 invocations, reading that ordained by the Protestant 
 Episcopal ritual before a sea fight : 'O ! most powerful 
 and glorious Lord God, we make our address to Thy 
 divine Majesty in this necessity : that Thou wouldst 
 take the cause into Thy own hands, and judge be- 
 tween us and our enemies. Stir up Thy strength, O 
 Lord, and come and help us ; for Thou givest not al- 
 ways the battle to the strong, but canst save by many 
 or by few. Make it appear that Thou art our Savior 
 and Mighty Deliverer, through Jesus Christ our Lord.' 
 While the Governor of Vermont, under the influence 
 of the Governor of Massachusetts and his abettors held 
 back from MacDonough's help, denouncing the war as 
 wickedly waged against the bulwarks of our holy re- 
 ligion, a young lieutenant, in all the beauty of holiness, 
 by prayers of the church of the country, against which 
 his own was accused of iniquitous hostilites, sancti- 
 fied his immolation, if God so willed it, on the altar of 
 his church and country, with the prayers of the Eng- 
 lish church for the safety of its American offspring." 
 
 Ill 
 
Another episode of this battle, that is fairly well 
 authenticated, appealed strongly to the popular fancy 
 at the time. A vigorous young rooster, certainly ani- 
 mated by pure patriotism, escaped from his coop on 
 the deck of the Saratoga, at the first boom of the can- 
 non, flew upon a gun slide, flapped his wings, and 
 crowed loudly. This story is varied by some and elab- 
 orated by others. Some go so far as to assert that the 
 rooster suddenly appeared, no one knew from where, 
 on the Saratoga; others say that he flew to the high- 
 est cross piece of the mast and crowed lustily. But 
 the version given above has the best evidence to sup- 
 port it, and is the most plausible. It appears certain 
 that a rooster did crow on the Saratoga at the begin- 
 ning of the battle and tliat this greatly heartened the 
 sailors of the ship. 
 
 The British did not entertain any thought of de- 
 feat. They knew that their flotilla was superior in 
 ships, guns and numl^er of men. Captain Downie is 
 quoted by Christie as saying that with his flagship, 
 the Confiance, alone he could defeat the flotilla of the 
 United States — a fine, characteristic example of British 
 over-confidence. Christie says of the beginning of the 
 battle : 
 
 "At the dawn of day on the 11th, the wind being 
 observed to be favorable for the advance of the squad- 
 ron, the troops were put under arms, and at seven 
 o'clock its approach was announced by the scaling of 
 the guns of the Confiance, which rounded Cumberland 
 
 112 
 
Head, with a leading breeze, leaving the other vfessels 
 and gun boats far in her wake. At 8 o'clock the whole 
 fire of the enemy's squadron, moored in line, was di- 
 rected upon the Confiance, which moved gallantly in- 
 to action without returning a shot (Captain Downie 
 intending to lay his ship athwart hause of the enemy's 
 largest ship) until within two cable lengths of the 
 enemy's line, when, having two anchors shot away, 
 and the wind bafifling, she came to anchor and opened 
 a destructive fire upon the enemy. The Linnet and 
 Chub, some time after, took their stations at a short 
 distance, but the Chub having had her cables, bow- 
 sprit, and main boom shot away, became unmanage- 
 able, and drifting within the enemy's line, was 
 obliged to surrender." 
 
 It will be observed that, as has been generally the 
 case, the United States tars could shoot. 
 
 This must be said also of the British tars, as ap- 
 pears from the excellent account of the battle given 
 by Rossiter Johnson. His account of the beginning 
 of the battle differs in details from Christie's account : 
 
 "The English line bore down on the American in 
 fine style, the first two vessels firing as they ap- 
 proached. The flagship Confiance did not open fire 
 till she had dropped anchor within a quarter of a mile 
 of her foe. The Eagle, at the head of the American 
 line, began firing in a wild way, without orders, be- 
 fore her shots could reach the enemy. Then a long 
 gun, sighted by MacDonough himself, was fired, and 
 
 113 
 
as the shot raked the deck of the Confiance, the whole 
 line opened and the battle became general. The first 
 broadside from the Confiance disabled forty men on 
 the Saratoga ; for fifteen minutes everything was 
 ablaze, and the roar was continuous. Then the ves- 
 sel at the head of the British line struck her colors. 
 The enemy's shot cut away the Eagle's springs — ropes 
 fastened either to the anchor or the cable, and passed 
 to the quarter, in order to sway the ship to one side or 
 the other and bring the guns to bear on any desired 
 point. Her commander, Lieutenant Henley, then cut 
 his cable, sheeted home the top sails, ran behind the 
 Saratoga, and took a position between her and the 
 Ticonderoga, anchoring by the stern, which brought 
 the fresh guns of her larboard battery to bear on the 
 enemy, when they were served with good effect. The 
 Preble was attacked by the enemy's gun boats, and 
 driven from her position ; but they were stopped by 
 the next line, which they vainly tried to board. Every 
 gun of the starboard battery — the side nearest the 
 enemy — on the American flagship was disabled. Then 
 MacDonough proceeded to 'wind ship', that is, to turn 
 the vessel completely round by winding at the hawsers 
 attached to the kedges. This was accomplished with- 
 out accident, and his gunners, springing to the lar- 
 board battery, poured out fresh broadsides that made 
 dreadful havoc with the Confiance. The commander 
 of that vessel attempted to copy MacDonough's man- 
 oeuver, for her battery on the side presented to the 
 
 114 
 
enemy was also nearly used up, but failed, and two 
 hours and a quarter after the fight began her colors 
 came down. The remaining British vessels also sur- 
 rendered, and the victory was complete." 
 
 Of this part of the battle, Christie says : "Shortly 
 after the commencement of the fire from the Confi- 
 ance, the gallant commander fell, and the command of 
 the squadron devolved on Captain Pring, of the Linnet. 
 The Confiance after the fall of Captain Downie, fought 
 for some time most gallantly under the command of 
 Lieut. Robertson, but was compelled to strike her col- 
 ors to the enemy's ship, the Saratoga, which at one 
 moment had slackened her fire, several of her guns 
 being dismounted ; she, however, cut her cable, 
 winded her larboard broadside so as to bear on the 
 Confiance, which being much shattered in her hull and 
 injured in her rigging, endeavored in vain to efifect the 
 same movement. The Finch struck on a reef of rocks 
 to the eastward of Crab Island early in the action, and 
 was of no service in the engagement. The Linnet only 
 
 remained Captain Pring finding not a 
 
 hope remained of retrieving the disaster of the day, 
 his men falling fast, was reluctantly compelled to give 
 the painful orders to strike the colors." 
 
 Ingersoll is one of those that do not credit Mac- 
 Donough with the idea of swinging the Saratoga 
 around. He says : 
 
 "Three times MacDonough had been prostrated 
 by falling spars, senseless on the deck of his ship, 
 
 115 
 
fought almost to the water's edge, and incapable of 
 further effort. An old seaman named Brun, the 
 master, at that critical moment suggested the contriv- 
 ance, by means of an anchor, to turn the ship around 
 so as to bring into action the side remaining unim- 
 paired, instead of that entirely useless. That move- 
 ment being effected, a fresh broadside soon silenced 
 
 the Confiance struck by more than a hundred 
 
 large balls in her hull, her Captain killed, and half her 
 crew killed or wounded, and her escape impossible, 
 after more than two hours of the bravest, over-confi- 
 dent conflict, the first lieutenant, Robertson, hauled 
 down the British flag. The other British vessels, suf- 
 ferers in nearly similar proportions, all struck their 
 
 colors The officer commanding the British 
 
 barges was accused by his own countrymen of cow- 
 ardice, and so far countenanced the accusation as to 
 abscond after a court-martial had been ordered for his 
 trial. But to the Americans no such misconduct was 
 evident. The barges, not anchored as the large ves- 
 sels were, fought under sail and oars, but in close 
 contact with our vessels, with no apparent indisposi- 
 tion to take their appropriate share of danger." 
 
 The turning manoeuver and the device to accom- 
 plish it may have been the thought of Brun. It is 
 quite certain, however, that Ingersoll is mistaken 
 when he says that Brun thought of the manoeuver in 
 the heat of the battle and then made the device by 
 
 116 
 
which it was executed. All the arrangements for the 
 turning manoeuver were made before the battle began. 
 
 As for the part played by the barges, or gun boats, 
 it is certain that they did not refuse to participate in 
 the battle, as stated by Christie, who says that Captain 
 Pring, who succeeded Downie in command of the 
 British flotilla, found that "the gun boats had shame- 
 fully abandoned the object assigned to them, and were 
 flying from the scene of action." In his report of the 
 battle, Prevost says the gun boats sought safety in 
 flight after the Confiance and Linnet had lowered their 
 colors. This is undoubtedly the truth of the matter. 
 When the Confiance and Linnet were out of the fight, 
 there was choice of only one of two things for the gun 
 boats to do — surrender or flee. Clearly they chose the 
 proper alternative. It is certain, also, that in going to 
 the battle ground the larger ships outstripped them 
 and therefore they did not get into action as soon as 
 the Confiance, or even the Linnet or Preble ; but they 
 got into action as soon as they could, and, when in, 
 certainly did some fighting. 
 
 Several state a fact that may be an explanation of 
 the belief of some that the gun boats did not fight well, 
 or, as some state, did not fight at all. As revealed in 
 the extract from Chrisie in this chapter, the usual Brit- 
 ish over-confidence — over-rating themselves and un- 
 der-rating their foe — prevailed in the British flotilla. So 
 confident were the British of the outcome of the battle 
 that a vessel was loaded with certain civilians, includ- 
 
 117 
 
ing some women, to follow the war ships, observe the 
 combat, and participate in the triumphant rejoicings. 
 Of course this vessel did not attempt to do the im- 
 possible — fight — and it wisely fled very early in the 
 engagement. 
 
 The damage done to the American squadron 
 proved that the British fought well. The British lost 
 the action, not because they did not fight well, but be- 
 cause the Americans fought better. The British were 
 as brave as the Americans, but the Americans were 
 their superiors in tactics and resourcefulness. The 
 Confiance received 105 round shot in her hull; the 
 Saratoga, 55. The killed and wounded were as fol- 
 lows: American Fleet 
 
 SHIPS KILLED WOUNDED 
 
 Saratoga 23 29 
 
 Eagle 13 20 
 
 Ticonderoga 6 6 
 
 Preble 2 
 
 Gun Boats 3 3 
 
 Total 47 58 
 
 British Fleet 
 
 Confiance 50 60 
 
 Linnet 20 30 
 
 Chub 6 10 
 
 Finch 8 10 
 
 Gun Boats 
 
 Total ..84 Tio" 
 
 118 
 
Christie says that "the British loss in killed and 
 wounded was 129, of which 3 officers, 38 men, were 
 killed and one officer and 39 men wounded on the Con- 
 fiance." These figures are certainly too low. 
 
 Neither Macomb nor Prevost gives any details 
 in his account of the battle of the losses of the men 
 on the fleets, nor does Yeo or Pring in his letter about 
 the engagement. MacDonough was as modest, and 
 almost as brief, as Perry. His letter to the Secretary 
 of the Navy was as follows : 
 
 "The Almighty has been pleased to grant us a 
 signal victory on Lake Champlain, in the capture of 
 one frigate, one brig, and two sloops of war, of the 
 enemy." 
 
 All, including Christie, .speak of the Confiance as 
 a frigate. It is interesting to know something of the 
 size of this major fighting ship in 1814, which Downie 
 considered an over-match for all of the American flo- 
 tilla. As stated elsewhere, it was 160 feet long, by 
 40 foot beam. It had a crew of more than 300 men — 
 picked men, largely from the high seas fleet anchored 
 in the St. Lawrence, and who had participated in more 
 than one naval battle. 
 
 As for the gun boats, we are, as previously stated, 
 trustworthily informed that of the ten American gun 
 boats, each of six "carried one long twenty-four, and 
 an eighteen pound carronade, the others a long twelve 
 each." 
 
 119 
 
Of course such boats were not taken very seri- 
 ously. They were propelled by oars as well as sail. 
 Hence it is not strange that the American gun boats 
 suffered total casualties of only six — three killed and 
 three wounded. The fact that there were no casual- 
 ties on the British gun boats might be considered good 
 evidence of the charge that they did no fighting. 
 But likely little attention was paid to them — it was 
 well known that the task of the American fleet was to 
 put the Confiance out of action. However, there is 
 apparently quite a little to show that the British gun 
 boats might have fought better. For one thing, they 
 escaped, though in bad condition. Low says that the 
 American "gallies" (gun boats) were "about pursuing 
 those of the enemy, that were making their escape, but, 
 it being discovered, that all the vessels* were in a 
 sinking state, it became necessary to annul the signal 
 to chase, and order the men from the gallies to the 
 pumps. T could only', observed Com. MacDouough, 
 'look at the enemy's galleys going off in a shattered 
 condition, for there was not a mast in either squadron 
 that could stand to make sail on ; the lower rigging 
 being nearly all shot away, hung down as though it 
 had just been placed over the mast heads.' " Christie 
 explains that "the fire on both sides proved very de- 
 structive from tlic light airs and the smoothness of 
 the water." 
 
 The disparity in the flotillas was really greater 
 than might appear from the foregoing. As Ingersoll 
 
 ♦The American ships; not the British gallies. 
 120 
 
points out, the British "were able to go forth on the 
 lake with not only more guns and men than we, but 
 the great advantage of more and heavier guns on the 
 decks of one and the same ship ; not only more num- 
 erous crews, but veteran seamen, many of them fresh 
 from their large ships of war at Quebec, commanded 
 by officers of greater experience than ours, nearly all 
 
 of the Americans being untried in action The 
 
 American shipping manned by 850 men, many 
 
 of them not seamen, and their marines supplied by 
 
 . soldiers from the army. The British squadron 
 
 manned by 1,000 mostly tried and veteran seamen and 
 officers." 
 
 In this connection, Ingersoll incidentally throws 
 light on the alleged jealousy between the land and 
 naval forces, which culminated in the letters of Yeo 
 and Pring (to be quoted later) and the charges against 
 Prevost. Ingersoll says : 
 
 "As soon as the Governor-General of Canada was 
 reinforced by large bodies of Wellington's troops in 
 July and August, fresh from their triumphs in Spain 
 and France, he was ordered to carry the war into New 
 
 York by way of Lake Champlain Positive 
 
 orders were given to the quartermaster-general to 
 suspend all other work, and every branch of service 
 whatever that would interfere with the construction 
 and the equipment of the frigate Confiance. Her size, 
 tonnage and armament were all made so much greater 
 than those of the largest American ship, the Saratoga, 
 
 121 
 
as to leave no doubt of the capacity of the English 
 
 vessel to overwhelm the American Early 
 
 in August, Commodore Yeo, who commanded both 
 Lake Ontario and Champlain, was called on by the 
 Governor-General to put the Champlain division of 
 his command under immediate orders for the contem- 
 plated service. Then it was that the jealousy be- 
 tween the sea and land officers, seldom sleeping, be- 
 gan to show itself. Yeo answered Prevost's impor- 
 tunity that the Champlain squadron had already near- 
 ly a hundred men more than its complement, and he 
 sent Captain Downie, of the ship Montreal, to take the 
 place of Captain Fisher, who had prepared the squad- 
 ron for action. Disappointed by Yeo, the Governor- 
 General applied to Admiral Otway, at Quebec, and 
 Captain Lord James O'Brien, who instantly sent from 
 their ships, the Ajax and Warsprite, the required sup- 
 ply of experienced seamen." 
 
 It is certain that the governor-general and com- 
 mander-in-chief did not do anything to weaken the 
 flotilla, but that he co-operated heartily to give it the 
 greatest possible strength and efficiency. The taking 
 for it of the best seamen on the warships in the St. 
 Lawrence, has just been mentioned. Christie says: 
 
 "The flotilla at Isle-aux-Noix was necessary to 
 co-operate with the land forces, and the Commissary- 
 General and Quartcr-Master-General, in order to ex- 
 pedite the new Frigate (the Confiance) were directed 
 to suspend every other branch of the public service 
 
 122 
 
which interfered with its equipment. Sir James L. 
 Yeo was urged by the Commander of the Forces 
 (early in August) to put this division of his command 
 into an effective state, for the contemplated service. 
 In answer to this, he was acquainted by the Commo- 
 dore, that the squadron on Lake Champlain was al- 
 ready ninety men over complete, and immediately su- 
 perseded Captain Fisher, who with much exertion had 
 already prepared the flotilla for active service, ap- 
 pointing Captain Downie from the Lake Ontario 
 squadron in his stead." Christie then goes on to state 
 the facts about the sailors being brought from the 
 Ajax and the Warsprite— this is quoted elsewhere. 
 
 Prevost has been blamed — and by the partisans 
 of Yeo ! — for removing Captain Fisher and bringing 
 the sailors from the Ajax and Warsprite. They ig- 
 nore that it was not Prevost, but Yeo, that was di- 
 rectly responsible for the removal of Fisher. There 
 can be no question that Yeo was a patriotic Britisher, 
 and that when he put Captain Downie in command 
 he believed that he was doing what was best for the 
 British expedition. Further, at the least there is no 
 evidence to show that what he did was not to the 
 benefit of the British flotilla. Some have sought to 
 make much of the alleged strangeness of Captain 
 Downie and the sailors of the fleet to each other, and 
 of the lack of cordial feeling between the sailors orig- 
 inally on the lake and those from the St. Lawrence ; 
 but they have not brought forward the least evidence 
 ^ 123 
 
of the lack of this cordial feeling, or that the lake and 
 high seas seamen did not fight well together ; nor have 
 they produced the least evidence to show that the fleet 
 would have been fought better if Captain Fisher had 
 been in command. Downie and all the seamen under 
 him fought like brave men ; and no one can reasonably 
 c|uestion in the least the sincere desire of both Yeo and 
 Prevost to do everything possible to make the Platts- 
 burg expedition a great success. 
 
 The only thing that can possibly appear to the dis- 
 credit of the British, aside from their over-confidence, 
 appears in the statement of Ingersoll that "contrary 
 to naval usage, if not honor, there was a furnace in 
 the Confiance to prepare red hot shot, several of which 
 struck and set fire to the Saratoga." But there is, at 
 the least, doubt about this, although later on Inger- 
 soll says that "the Saratoga was twice on fire by per- 
 fidious hot shot from the Confiance." The writer of 
 this has not found any complaint or criticism, because 
 of the alleged furnace, from either MacDonough or 
 Macomb. It would appear to be a proper conclusion 
 that Ingersoll was mistaken either about the furnace 
 or about it being "contrary to naval usage, if not hon- 
 or," at that time. It is safe to say that Ingersoll is 
 not always accurate in his statements. Thus he says 
 that "at break of day, on the 11th of September, the 
 troops were all drawn out in expectation of the prom- 
 ised action on the water ; but as the British ships did 
 not appear, Sir George Prevost ordered the army to 
 
 124 
 
return to their quarters and sent Commodore Downie 
 the insulting message, that the army were all at their 
 post at the time appointed by the navy, and the Gen- 
 eral hoped that nothing but weather had prevented 
 the Commodore being as good as his word. Stung 
 by that unmerited and harsh reproach, Downie hast- 
 ened his attack, the only reply he deigned to give". It 
 is true that Prevost did send the message quoted, but 
 it is certain that he did not send this message the 11th, 
 but at an earlier date. 
 
 It is easy to perceive that Prevost might have sent 
 his message without any thought of reflecting on 
 Downie, and that an oversensitive person could misin- 
 terpet Prevost's message. Likely it was far from 
 Prevost's intent to insinuate that cowardice or procras- 
 tination or jealousy was responsible for Downie's de- 
 lay. Likely he had in mind that the delay might be 
 due to some discovered incompleteness or defect that 
 must be remedied. If Downie interpreted Prevost's 
 message as an insinuation reflecting on him, he chose 
 to give to it a meaning rather forced and certainly not 
 the only meaning it could have. 
 
 Some of the partisans of Downie blame Prevost 
 because he did not begin the attack on land as soon as 
 the Confiance rounded Cumberland Head and which 
 was some time before the naval action began. They 
 claim that Downie scaled his guns as he rounded the 
 promontory and that this signal had been agreed upon 
 between Downie and Prevost and that Prevost was to 
 
 125 
 
attack as soon as this signal was given. Granting that 
 Downie did scale his guns — the evidence as to this is 
 not conclusive — the friends of Prevost are justified in 
 their contention that scaling the guns (cleaning them 
 v^nth a light charge of powder) was only a precaution 
 the competent commander took just before going into 
 action and Downie's doing this need not be construed 
 as a signal to Prevost. The preponderance of evidence 
 is that he was to attack, not when Downie scaled his 
 guns or when he appeared around Cumberland Head, 
 but when he actually engaged the American flotilla. 
 
 The bitter controversy between the British land 
 and naval forces, resulting in court-martials and long 
 and bitter discussion in Canada and England, is proof 
 of the very great importance the British attached to the 
 battle of Plattsburg and their chagrin because of the 
 result. Their notion of the battle was correct — the bat- 
 tle of Plattsburg was one of the most important ever 
 fought ; had it resulted in a British victory the political 
 geography of North America, and probably of Europe, 
 would be today far from what it is ; and the resource- 
 fulness, valor and patriotism of our forces in that bat- 
 tle, on both land and water, will inspire us to nobler, 
 worthier deeds, in l)oth peace and war, in proportion 
 to our knowledge and a])preciation of this momentous 
 battle. 
 
 126 
 
10. 
 
 THE LAND BATTLE OF SEPTEMBER 11 
 
 The reader doubtless has ah-eady a good idea of 
 the topography of the battle ground of the 11th ; but 
 Ingersoll's description is so good that it will not be 
 amiss to introduce it here, to refresh the memory, if 
 that be necessary: 
 
 "The village of Plattsburg is situated on the west 
 side of Lake Champlain; and a river called Saranac, 
 on its way easterly, passes through the village, divid- 
 ing it into two parts and emptying its waters into the 
 bay, being a part of Lake Champlain. This stream for 
 the distance of four miles, or more, in consequence of 
 its rocky shores and bottom is rendered impassable 
 by fording, and at that time there were but two places 
 where they crossed it on bridges. On the south side 
 of the stream, a short distance from the lower bridge, 
 was the place selected for the forts, it being on an 
 eminence commanding a view of the whole village. 
 The inhabitants, together with the troops, threw down 
 the upper bridge and took the plank off from the lower 
 
 127 
 
one, and made every other arrangement to prevent the 
 enemy from reaching the fort." 
 
 The anger of the British because of the stinging 
 defeat at Plattsburg, became, shortly after that humili- 
 ating event, so bitter as to be unreasoning to the de- 
 gree that some actually blamed, and scolded at, Ma- 
 comb for taking advantage of the topographical fea- 
 tures of his battle ground, and spoke and wrote as if 
 he was unfair in locating his works at the most ad- 
 vantageous point. They also scolded at MacDonough 
 for placing his vessels just beyond the range of the 
 British land batteries, yet so near the shore that the 
 British fleet did not have every advantage ! 
 
 It is now necessary, in order to understand fully 
 the land battle of the 11th, to return to the controversy 
 between the partisans of Prevost on the one hand 
 and of Downie, Pring and Yeo on the other, which 
 was, of course, at bottom between the British army 
 and the British navy. We must consider that the 
 chagrin and humiliation of the British because of the 
 Plattsburg defeat were indeed deep and poignant. 
 Auchinleck says of the Plattsburg expedition, "We 
 wish that it could be blotted from the page of Eng- 
 lish history." It is doubtful if any other event in the 
 history of the British army or navy, before or since, 
 was felt at the time to be as disgraceful or occasioned 
 as much resentment. New Orleans was tempered by 
 the victory on the right bank of the Mississippi and 
 by the victories before and after, part of the same cam- 
 
 128 
 
 I 
 
paign. But the Plattsburg expedition was defeat, 
 felt to be shameful, and only defeat. That the British 
 flotilla, superior in every particular except the char- 
 acter of the seamen, and a part of the proud and ar- 
 rogant British navy that for years had flouted inter- 
 national law, and "had driven every other flag from 
 the seas", should be so decisively beaten was disgrace 
 enough ; but that the very best of Wellington's famous 
 Peninsular army, that the British were cocksure were 
 the best soldiers in the history of the world, should 
 be compelled to retreat, losing most of their stores, 
 and leaving their wounded and dead behind, and be 
 thus defeated by less than one third of their number, 
 and of troops to which the British had applied the 
 terms of disdain and ridicule, was, indeed, enough to 
 bring to any people the keenest chagrin and humilia- 
 tion ! The mortification and anger of the British were all 
 the greater because they had regarded and published 
 the Plattsburg campaign as their most important un- 
 dertaking of the War. They had not the least doubt of 
 its success, and they were just as certain that its suc- 
 cess, which would cut the United States in half mili- 
 tarily and materially, would also divide it politically, 
 and thus would add New England and much or all 
 of New York to the British Kingdom, while the re- 
 mainder of the United States would be forced to make 
 an ignominious peace, and would be so weak that it 
 would really be an humble vassal state until again re- 
 stored to the mother country. 
 
 129 
 
Well has it been said that the land battle on the 
 11th was "a most interesting conflict. On the one 
 side, the best troops of Britain led on by her most 
 consummate officers — men and officers selected from 
 those soldiers, who, under the command of the Duke 
 of Wellington, had acquired the character of 'invin- 
 cible', men who had conquered in Portugal, Spain, 
 France, and the Indies ; on the other side, men not 
 reared to arms, not used to battle, most of them born 
 since their sires had immortalized themselves in com- 
 bat on the same ground, the descendants of the 'Green 
 Mountain Boys' and of those heroes who conquered at 
 Saratoga. The object of the contest was great; on it 
 was to hang, probably, every future event of the war." 
 
 Out of the feeling between the British army and 
 navy, intensified and embittered by the disgrace of 
 the defeat, came the charge from the navy that the 
 army did not attack as soon as the fleet appeared 
 around Cumberland Head ; that the army did not 
 fight during the naval combat ; that the army fled 
 ingloriously as soon as the naval combat was finish- 
 ed ; and that notwithstanding the defeat on the lake, 
 the land forces could have defeated and captured the 
 American army and certainly should have done so. 
 The army replied that it was well understood that 
 the victory of the ships was vital, and that the army 
 would have invited disaster had it remained where it 
 Avas, with a victorious American flotilla to carry and 
 land troops at any point on the lake ; that the army 
 
 130 
 
went into action, and with the utmost vigor, as soon 
 as it understood that it was to give battle; that 
 Downie did not send to Prevost the promised notice 
 that he would attack at a certain hour; and that the 
 army certainly fought as well as the navy, and, instead 
 of retreating as soon as the naval battle was finished, 
 which was at 11:15 a. m., it fought throughout the 
 day, until five in the evening. 
 
 Thirteen days after the battle on the lake, Sir 
 James Lucas Yeo, who signed himself "Commodore 
 and Commander-in-Chief," on his flagship penned 
 this official letter: 
 
 "I have the honor to submit, for the information 
 of the lords commissioners of the admiralty, a copy of 
 a letter from Captain Pring, late Commander of his 
 majesty's brig. Linnet. 
 
 "It appears to me, and I have good reasons to 
 believe, that Captain Downie was urged and his ship 
 hurried into action, before she was in a fit state to 
 meet the enemy. 
 
 "I am also of opinion that there was not the least 
 necessity for our squadron giving the enemy such 
 decided advantages, by going into their bay to en- 
 gage them. Even had they been successful, it would 
 not in the least have assisted the troops in storming 
 the batteries ; whereas had our troops taken their bat- 
 teries first, it would have obliged the enemy's squad- 
 ron to quit the bay, and give ours a fair chance". 
 In his report of the battle, Prevost said : 
 131 
 
"On the morning of the 11th, our flotilla was seen 
 over the isthmus which joins Cumberland-head with 
 the mainland, steering for Plattsburg bay. I im- 
 mediately ordered that part of the brigade under Ma- 
 jor-General Robinson, which had been brought for- 
 ward, consisting of our light infantry companies, 
 third battalion 27th and 76th regiments, and Major- 
 General Powers' brigade, consisting of the third, 
 fifth, and the first battalion of the 27th and the 58th 
 regiment, to force the fords by the Saranac, and ad- 
 vance, provided with scaling ladders, to escalade the 
 enemy's works upon the heights ; this force was 
 placed under the command of Major-General Robin- 
 son. The batteries opened their fire the instant the 
 ships were engaged. 
 
 "It is now with deep concern I inform your lord- 
 ship, that notwithstanding the intrepid valor with 
 which Captain Downie led his flotilla into action, my 
 most sanguine hopes of complete success were not 
 long afterwards blasted, by a combination, as ap- 
 peared to us, of unfortunate events, to which naval 
 warfare is peculiarly exposed. Scarcely had his maj- 
 esty's troops forced a passage across the Saranac, and 
 ascended the heights on which stand the enemy's 
 works, when I had the extreme mortification to hear 
 the shout of victory from the enemy's works, in con- 
 sequence of the British flag being lowered on board 
 the Confiance and Linnet, and to see our gunboats 
 seeking their safety in flight. This unlooked-for 
 
 132 
 
event deprived me of the co-operation of the fleet, 
 without which the future prosecution of the service 
 was become impracticable. I did not hestitate to ar- 
 rest the course of the troops advancing to attack, be- 
 cause the most complete success would have been 
 unavailing, and the possession of the enemy's works 
 offered no advantage to compensate for the loss we 
 must have sustained in acquiring possession of them. 
 "I have ordered the batteries to be dismantled, the 
 guns withdrawn, and the baggage, with the wounded 
 men who can be removed to be sent to the rear, in 
 order that the troops may return to the Chazy to- 
 morrow and the following day to Champlain, where 
 I propose to halt until I have ascertained the use the 
 enemy propose making of the naval ascendency they 
 have acquired on Lake Champlain." 
 
 We will stop for a moment here to note that in this 
 dispatch, written when the sting of defeat was keen- 
 est, Prevost, far from trying to put any blame on 
 Downie or his men, sought to excuse the naval de- 
 feat, as due to "a. combination of unfortunate events 
 to which naval warfare is peculiarly exposed". It 
 must be said that the more one studies this brave, 
 generous, chivalrous man, the more one comes to ad- 
 mire him, and the less patience one has with his 
 critics that hounded him to an untimely death — -critics 
 either inexcusably ignorant and unintelligent or in- 
 famously malignant, or both. 
 
 133 
 
it is now timely to quote from Macomb's official 
 report of the land battle of the 11th: 
 
 "About eight in the morning of the 11th, as we 
 expected, the flotilla appeared in sight around Cum- 
 berland Head, and at nine bore down and engaged at 
 anchor in the bay off the town. At the same instant 
 the batteries were opened on us, and continued 
 throwing bomb-shells, shrapnells, bombs and Con- 
 greve rocketts, until sun-set, when the bombardment 
 ceased, every battery of the enemy being silenced by 
 the superiority of our fire. The naval engagement 
 lasted but two hours, in full view of both armies. 
 Three efforts were made by the enemy to pass the river 
 at the commencement of the cannonade and bombard- 
 ment, and they prepared for that work an immense 
 number of scaling-ladders. One attempt was made 
 to cross at the village bridge, another at the upper 
 bridge and a third at a ford about three miles from 
 the works. At the first two he was repulsed by the 
 regulars — at the third by the brave volunteers and 
 militia, where he suffered severely in killed and 
 wounded, and prisoners ; a considerable body crossed 
 the stream, but were either killed, taken or driven 
 back. The woods at this place were very favorable 
 to the operation of the militia. A whole company of 
 the 76th regiment was here destroyed, the three Lieu- 
 tenants and 27 men prisoners, the Captain and the rest 
 killed. T cannot forego the pleasure of here stating 
 the gallant conduct of Captain M'Glassin, of the 15th 
 
 134 
 
regiment, who was ordered to ford the river, and jit- 
 tack a party constructing a battery on the right of the 
 enemy's Hne, within 500 yards of Fort-Brown, which 
 he handsomely executed at midnight, with 50 men; 
 drove off the working party, consisting of 150 men, 
 and defeated a covering party of the same number, 
 killing one officer and sixteen in the charge, and 
 wounding many. At dusk the enemy withdrew his 
 artillery etc." 
 
 We have given the conclusion of Macomb's dis- 
 patch just as written. Undoubtedly the exploit of 
 Captain M'Glassin was at some midnight, as stated, 
 and not during the battle of the 11th. 
 
 It will be observed that both Prevost and Macomb 
 say that the British land forces vigorously attacked 
 the moment the action on the lake began. 
 
 It will be observed, further, that Macomb and 
 Prevost do not exactly agree as to the progress made 
 by the British soldiers during the battle. Both say 
 that British soldiers succeeded in crossing the Sara- 
 nac. From the dispatch of Sir George Prevost it 
 might be inferred that his troops were generally suc- 
 cessful in crossing the river and were ready to escal- 
 ade the works when the naval defeat induced him to 
 call back his forces. Some have reached this con- 
 clusion from his dispatch. Macomb's report indicates 
 rather that the British succeeded in crossing the river 
 at only one point — the ford — and that even here the 
 Americans had decidedly the best of the fighting. A 
 
 135 
 
careful examination of all the accounts of the battle 
 will show that the account given by Macomb is cor- 
 rect. Likely Prevost thought it not improper to soften 
 the defeat by exaggerating the exploits of the troops. 
 
 It will be seen that the charge made by the Brit- 
 ish navy, that the land forces did not co-operate, was 
 false. The troops got into action as soon as the naval 
 battle began, and they fought bravely and vigorously. 
 Furthermore, they fought bravely, even desperately, as 
 long as the naval conflict lasted, and they stopped 
 fighting only when ordered to withdraw by their wise 
 and capable commander-in-chief. Yet further, it is 
 certain that a considerable force of the British troops 
 fought, as stated by Macomb, until sun-down. This 
 was undoubtedly done to permit of the removal of 
 some of the stores and the guns in the batteries, and 
 also to exhaust the Americans and their scant am- 
 munition to such an extent that the British troops 
 could retreat to the Chazy without serious attack 
 and loss. 
 
 Undoubtedly both the British sailors and soldiers 
 were brave and fought well indeed. They were worthy 
 of the reputation the one had gained on the high seas 
 and the other in the Peninsula. But they were out- 
 matched — if not in bravery, then in initiative, re- 
 source and intelligence. As at New Orleans four 
 months later, the Britisli fought by rote. In the woods 
 at the Saranac they fought as they had fought in Spain 
 and Portugal and the Garonne. If they had learned 
 
 136 
 
anything from defeat at Fort DuQuesne or, later, 
 during the Revolution, they had forgotten it. The 
 intelhgent, thinking American troops were command- 
 ed by a general that threw to the winds half the rules 
 then laid down for land fighting, adapted to his ad- 
 vantage all the natural features of the battle ground, 
 and made able and original use of the circumstances 
 in his favor as well as of his limited resources. The 
 British commanders and forces were indeed good. 
 But the Americans were better. 
 
 And none were better than the volunteers that 
 a few days before received the rebuke of even the gen- 
 erous Macomb. It was they that on the 11th were 
 "brave", and successfully held the most difficult post 
 — the ford. It was easier to hold back the British 
 where the bridges had been for the stream was deeper 
 there, its banks were steep and rocky — there it was 
 not considered fordable — and the planks of the bridg- 
 es had been made into effective barricades. Further, 
 this ford was "about three miles from the works" — 
 the volunteers and militia were far removed from the 
 support of the regulars, were hid from them by the 
 woods, and lacked the support and encouragement 
 from both the works and the fleet that the regulars 
 had. Yet they fought so well that the few British 
 troops that succeeded in crossing the Saranac at the 
 ford, were annihilated. The few days of actual train- 
 ing given them by Macomb had made these militia 
 
 137 
 
and volunteers as good soldiers as any in the world 
 at that time. 
 
 Ingersoll's description of the land battle is so 
 entertaining that another quotation is certainly al- 
 lowable : 
 
 "The surrounding hills were crowded with com- 
 batants or spectators. The British land batteries open- 
 ed their bombardment on the American redoubts of 
 bombs, shrapnells and rockets, which the forts re- 
 turned with interest. Attempts at the ford and bridges 
 to force a passage across the Saranac were repulsed ; 
 one at the village, a second at an upper bridge, and a 
 third at a ford three miles above. The British with 
 scaling ladders trying all those approaches were al- 
 ways repulsed by the regulars or militia ; and the few 
 that got over were instantly killed or taken." 
 
 The author of the Low history is always fair to 
 the British — at times it seems that he had a British 
 leaning. His account confirms what has preceded. He 
 says: 
 
 "At the same hour that the fleets engaged, the 
 enemy opened his batteries on the American forts, 
 throwing hundreds of shells, balls and rockets; and 
 attempted, at the same time, to cross the Saranac 
 river, at three diiiferent points, to assault the American 
 works. At the upper ford he was met by the Vermont 
 
 volunteers and New York militia The 
 
 enemy fire was returned with effect from the batteries; 
 by sunset seven of his newly raised batteries were 
 
 138 
 
silenced, and he was seen retiring to his camp. Beaten 
 by land and by water, the British governor-general 
 withdrew his artillery, and raised the siege. Lender 
 favor of a dark night he sent ofif his heavy baggage, 
 and retreated with his whole army, towards Canada, 
 leaving his wounded in the field, and a vast quantity 
 of provisions and munitons of war, which he had not 
 time to destroy. The light troops, volunteers and 
 militia pursued him on the following day, capturing 
 several soldiers and covering the escape of a great 
 number of deserters; bad weather prevented the pur- 
 suit to be continued beyond the Chazy. Thus has 14,- 
 000 regulars with the best British officers, and the 
 best military equipment, been beaten by a regular 
 force of only 1,500 men, and 2,500 militia and volun- 
 teers; the militia commanded by Gen. Mooers, and the 
 volunteers by General Strong. The enemy having re- 
 tired from republican ground, the militia and volun- 
 teers were dismissed." 
 
 As stated in an early chapter, in New York and 
 Vermont as well as in Massachusetts, and the other 
 New England states, it was held that the militia or 
 volunteers could not be sent beyond the United States, 
 by even the national government. But aside from this, 
 the forces under Macomb were so weak compared with 
 the British that to have made any greater pursuit than 
 was made, would have been foolhardy. Macomb was in 
 no position to attempt the capture of Prevost's army, 
 or any considerable part of it ; just as MacDonough re- 
 
 139 
 
ported that when, at the close of the naval battle, he 
 looked around for vessels to pursue the fleeing British 
 galleys, he found that he had none in condition for 
 pursuit. 
 
 Ingersoll says of the British retreat: "As soon 
 as the dusk of the evening added its pall, the renown- 
 ed veterans of Wellington fled wnth such haste and 
 dread that they got back to Chazy, eight miles from 
 Plattsburg, before their retreat was discovered. Leav- 
 ing their sick and wounded, with a note requesting 
 General Macomb's care of them, vast quantities of 
 provisions and ammunition, entrenching tools of all 
 sorts, tents, marquees, upon the ground, and con- 
 siderable quantities buried under it, or thrown into 
 the water, the strongest British army that ever in- 
 vaded any part of the United States north of the Hud- 
 son, which was by that river to sunder the states, 
 took to flight from less than 2,300 recruits, many of 
 them invalids of the American army, but bravely 
 commanded and reinforced by what were called a 
 rabble of militia. As soon as this flight was discover- 
 ed, the panic-stricken British were pursued by the 
 militia, although not one fourth of their number 
 
 till they found sanctuary beyond their 
 
 own borders". 
 
 Ingersoll, if not always exactly correct, is always 
 animated. 
 
 The official returns of the loss of the y\merican 
 regulars were 1 subaltern, 1 sergeant, 1 musician, and 
 
 140 
 
34 privates killed — total, 37; 2 subalterns, 1 sergeant- 
 major, 4 sergeants, 2 corporals, 4 musicians and 49 
 privates wounded — total, 62. Total killed, wounded, 
 and missing, 119. 
 
 There is no complete report of the losses of the 
 militia and volunteers. 
 
 Apparently the only report of the British losses 
 on land was a partial one that Prevost enclosed with 
 his report written the evening of the 11th. In closing 
 that report he wrote : 
 
 'T have the honor to transmit herewith returns of 
 the loss sustained by the left division of this army in 
 its advance to Plattsburg, and in forcing a passage 
 across the Saranac river." 
 
 The returns mentioned were signed by "Edw. 
 Baynes, Adj.-Gen. N. A." and read as follows: 
 
 "Return of killed and wounded. — 2 captains, 1 
 ensign, 4 sergeants, 30 rank and file, 1 horse, killed ; 
 1 general staff, 1 captain, 6 lieutenants, 7 sergeants, 
 135 rank and file, 2 horses, wounded; 4 lieutenants, 2 
 sergeants, 1 drummer, 48 rank and file, 6 horses, 
 missing. 
 
 "Missing — 76th foot; — Lieutenants G. Hutch, G. 
 Ogilvie, and E. Marchington. 
 
 "Canadian Chasseurs ; — Lieut. E. A^igneau". 
 
 In explanation of only a partial return being re- 
 ported by Prevost, it is to be said that Prevost wrote 
 his report the evening of the 11th, after an all-day 
 battle, and during the confusion of retreat, 
 
 141 
 
The Low history states that General Macomb 
 put the total "loss of the enemy, on the land and lake, 
 at not less than 2,500 men." This included, of course, 
 prisoners and deserters. 
 
 Christie gives an interesting account of the land 
 battle of the 11th, and we may be sure that it is as 
 favorable to the British as the facts would warrant. 
 It will be noted that Christie states positively that 
 the British troops went into action as soon as the 
 naval engagement opened ; also, that the Americans 
 had taken full advantage of the natural features of 
 the battle ground and had shown consummate skill 
 in the location of their works and the disposition of 
 men and guns. Christie says: 
 
 "The batteries on shore were put into action 
 against the enemy's line of fortifications, as soon as 
 the enemy's ships commenced firing. As the approach 
 to the front of their works was rough and exposed to 
 a fire of grape and musketry, as well as a flank fire 
 from a Block-House, a column of assault, under Maj- 
 or-General Robinson, was ordered to move by the rear 
 of their bivouacs, the better to conceal their move- 
 ments, and cross a ford previously reconnoitered. some 
 distance up the Saranac ; thence to penetrate through 
 the wood to a clear space of ground in the vicinity 
 of the enemy's position, where the necessary prepara- 
 tions might be made to carry their works by assault 
 on their rcA^erse front. 
 
 142 
 
"The second brigade under Major-General Bris- 
 bane, was so distributed as to create a diversion in 
 favor of the column under Major-General Robinson, 
 which, through the mistake of the guides, had been 
 led upon a wrong path and missed the ford. Before 
 the error was rectified by a countermarch, shouts of 
 huzzah were distinctly heard by this column in the 
 direction of the American works. To have carried 
 these works would have been no difficult task for the 
 brave troops composing this column, but their at- 
 tainment after the loss of the squadron, could not 
 have been attended with any permanent advantage. 
 Orders were, therefore, sent to General Robinson 
 (who, upon hearing the shouts, had halted and sent 
 to Head-Quarters, to ascertain the cause and to re- 
 ceive such further orders from the Commander of the 
 Forces as was necessary) to return with his column. 
 The loss of the squadron gave the enemy the means 
 of conveying their troops to such points as might be 
 deemed expedient, and the numerous reinforcements 
 which momently crowded in, gave them a great dis- 
 posable force, whose superiority in numbers was such, 
 that a delay of a few hours might place the British in 
 a critical position. So circumstanced, the army, in- 
 dignant at being obliged to retire before an enemy 
 their inferior in discipline and renown, fell back upon 
 Chazy in the evening, with little molestation from the 
 Americans. On the ensuing day they continued their 
 retreat towards the lines, bringing away such of the 
 
 143 
 
ordnance and commissariat stores as had not been 
 injured by the rain which, from the commencement 
 of the invasion, and during the retreat of the army, 
 had been almost incessant." 
 
 Christie is, of course, amusing, though commend- 
 able, in his efforts to excuse the retreat of the land 
 forces. His assertion that reinforcements were com- 
 ing in so fast that in a few hours the British might 
 liave been outnumbered is, of course, ridiculous. As 
 a matter of fact, no reinforcements were in sight. At 
 the best, they could have been only a few of the de- 
 spi-sed raw volunteers and militia. Equally amusing 
 is what Christie says of the rain. That rain, we may 
 be sure, fell on the just as well as the British, but 
 Macomb nowheres complains of it — he does not even 
 mention it. The truth is that the battle was regarded 
 as such a disgrace to the British that even as fair 
 and honorable a soldier as Christie felt compelled to 
 find some excuse. We cannot blame Christie for his at- 
 tempt ; and, considering that the best fighters are 
 frequently not highly skilled in the use of the tongue 
 or the pen, he should not be blamed that his eiTort to 
 excuse the British troops is almost as great a failure 
 as their part fn the battle. 
 
 The humiliation of both the British naval and 
 land forces, and the l)itterness that grew out of it, led 
 Auchinleck, who up to this time had been an ardent 
 admirer of Sir George Prevost, to make an unfair at- 
 
 144 
 
tack on that commander, in his history of the war. 
 Auchinleck says : 
 
 "Sir George Prevost's dispatches all tend to prove 
 the correctness of Captain Pring's statement, that the 
 attacks were to be simultaneous ; and so confident of 
 this was poor Captain Downie that he addressed his 
 men to this efifect before going into action: 'My lads, 
 we shall be immediately assisted by the army on shore, 
 let us show them that our part of the duty is well 
 done.' This presumption on the part of Downie was 
 fully warranted by Sir George's plans, and it is there- 
 fore a most extraordinary fact, that a general, who had 
 on previous occasions proved himself a brave and en- 
 ergetic officer, should have on this occasion by his in- 
 decision and timidity have cast a lasting slur on him- 
 self and the army under his command." 
 
 Auchinleck proceeds to criticize Prevost and his 
 army because they did not get into action when the 
 naval battle begun and because they did not con- 
 tinue to fight. But we now know that Prevost stated 
 the fact when he reported that he, when Downie began 
 his battle, "immediately ordered ... to force the 
 fords of the Saranac . . . The batteries opened 
 their fire the instant the ships engaged". Gen. Macomb 
 said in his report, "at the same instant the batteries 
 were opened on us." Further, by referring back to 
 Macomb's report it will be seen that he stated that 
 the land battle lasted throughout the day, and this is 
 confirmed by the most trustworthy reports of others. 
 
 145 
 
The British soldiers fought well and hard. Prevost, 
 generous and magnanimous, to minimize the defeat of 
 his soldiers minimized the land engagement of the 
 11th. He put no blame, as we have already seen, on 
 Downie or any one under him, and he puts no blame 
 on any member, officer or private, of the land forces. 
 He assumes full responsibility. Auchinleck accuses 
 him of indecision and timidity. We know how unjust 
 are these accusations. He was certainly neither timid 
 nor undecided in his actions previous to the 11th. He 
 was not guilty of timidity or indecision when he ord- 
 ered his forces into action the instant the naval battle 
 began. Nor was he guilty of indecision or timidity 
 wdien, as he reported, he "did not hesitate to arrest 
 the course of the troops advancing to the attack", when 
 the British flotilla was defeated. 
 
 The quarrel between the partisans of Downie and 
 Prevost would not warrant so much space did it not 
 afford such excellent evidence of the importance the 
 British attached to the Plattsburg expedition — the 
 most important expedition of the war, Auchinleck says 
 — and the British realization of the completeness of 
 their extraordinary defeat. 
 
 As already noted, at Plattsburg there was no 
 partial success, as there was at New Orleans and else- 
 where, to relieve the defeat and lessen the luunilia- 
 tion. 
 
 While Prevost (loul)tless ordered back Robinson, 
 it is equally true that, as Macomb stated in his report, 
 
 146 
 
"the batteries .... continued throwing bomb- 
 shells, shrapnells, balls and Congreve rockets until 
 sunset" ; and Macomb was not far wrong when he con- 
 tinued in his report, that "when the bombardment 
 ceased, every battery of the enemy being silenced by 
 the superiority of our fire". Prevost doubtless order- 
 ed the dismantling of the batteries, as he says ; but 
 before he had done so, the Americans had made the 
 work rather easy. 
 
 In concluding this topic, we heartily agree with 
 the interesting and edifying historian, Auchinleck, 
 that "it must not be supposed that in the attempt to 
 vindicate the conduct of the sailors, we intend to cast 
 any reflection whatsoever on the troops. No, the men 
 who had braved danger in many a well fought field 
 in the Peninsula, and who had shared in the perils of 
 Burgos, Badajoz, and St. Sebastian, were not likely 
 to be daunted by the feeble opposition oflfered by 
 fifteen hundred of the refuse of the American army." 
 
 We are again pleased to record our opinion that 
 both the British sailors and soldiers were brave and 
 capable and fought well indeed — their losses of ships 
 and men are proof of that. It is a great temptation 
 to suggest that the heroes of Badajoz might have 
 fought better if "beauty and booty" had been in pros- 
 pect; but there is no evidence that the British sol- 
 diers hesitated to incur any risk that they were called 
 on to take in the battle, and it is certain that when 
 sailors fight until their vessels are disabled or soldiers 
 
 147 
 
all day until their batteries are silenced, they must be 
 given, as we give them gladly, full credit for being 
 brave men indeed. 
 
 They were defeated because the British were out- 
 generaled and outfought. All agree that MacDonough 
 made the best possible arrangement of his ships. He 
 selected his battle ground with the greatest wisdom. 
 He put Downie at a disadvantage from the beginning, 
 and he fought his ships with greater skill than the 
 British did theirs. He proved himself to be the su- 
 perior tactician and commander. Prevost was not utter- 
 ly incompetent, as Auchinleck bitterly declares, and it 
 is not true that he "did not evince on this occasion the 
 smallest combination of plan, or sign of execution." 
 We know that in his march to the Saranac, his erec- 
 tion of batteries on the north bank, his disposition of 
 his forces, and his orders of the 11th, he was working 
 out a carefully conceived plan, and that he showed 
 unusual executive ability in putting his plans into 
 effect. But in both plans and execution he was sur- 
 passed by Macomb. 
 
 Prevost had an army of Wellington's "invin- 
 cibles.' They were outfought by less than one third 
 of their number, and by "the refuse of the American 
 army" and a "rabble" of raw militia and volunteers — 
 men of whom their commander said with justice and 
 without exaggeration that "the militia behaved with 
 great spirit after the first day and the volunteers of 
 Vermont were exceedingly serviceable" ; "the brave 
 
 148 
 
volunteers and militia", who opposed the British at 
 the ford, where the British "suffered severely in killed, 
 and wounded, and prisoners" ; and regulars, that held 
 the British at the bridges and silenced by superior 
 fire the British batteries that were so far superior in 
 cannon. The memory of these American regulars, 
 militia and volunteers may well enthuse and inspire, 
 and will enthuse and inspire, our brave regulars, mil- 
 itia and volunteers of today. 
 
 It is only justice to the British soldiers and sailors 
 and to Christie himself, that we quote from the his- 
 tory of this Canadian officer, a courteous gentleman, 
 what he wrote about the battle of Plattsburg, and the 
 controversy that grew out of it : 
 
 "The Naval Commander in the Canadas, in his 
 official letter to the Admiralty, did not scruple to at- 
 tribute the loss of the lake squadron to the misconduct 
 of the Commander of the Forces. The opinion of that 
 officer, remote from the place of action, and of which 
 he had no local knowledge, must necessarily have re- 
 lied on the statements of others ; and when we con- 
 sider the variance in the relation of facts, as given ])y 
 those immediately concerned, an impartial person 
 will pause in forming an opinion. In justification of 
 the conduct of Captain Downie, it has been said that 
 he was hurried into action before his ship was in a 
 state to meet the enemy, and that the Commander of 
 the Forces failed to give the proper co-operation to 
 the fleet, by not commencing an assault upon the bat- 
 
 149 
 
teries, upon a signal given by the Confiance, in con- 
 sequence of which the whole attention of the enemy 
 was directed against the fleet. That if the land bat- 
 teries had been assaulted in time, the American fleet 
 would have been compelled to leave the bay, when 
 they might have been attacked by the British squad- 
 ron on the open lake to much better advantage. On 
 the other hand, it has been urged that Captain Downie 
 so far from being hurried into action, entertained the 
 fullest confidence in the superiority of his squadron, 
 and that he felt equally certain of success whether he 
 should meet the enemy on the open lake, or attack 
 them at anchor in Plattsburg bay. That there was 
 no signal agreed upon between the commander of the 
 land forces and Captain Downie ; and that the circum- 
 stances of his scaling the guns was considered by the 
 former as no more than the usual precaution before 
 the commencement of a naval action. That the storm- 
 ing of the works on shore could not have been of any 
 service to the British squadron, as the American ships 
 during the action, were moved out of range of the 
 land batteries. That it would have been imprudent 
 to have carried the American batteries before the 
 naval ascendancy should have been decided, as the 
 enemy's squadron, after such an event, by retiring to 
 the narrows of the Lake, before the British squadron 
 should have been off Plattsburg, to intercept their 
 retreat, might have secured themselves against every 
 future effort to attack them to advantage. Amidst the 
 
 150 
 
contradictory relations of facts and diversity of opin- 
 ions, which have been given from responsible author- 
 ity, spectators of the event, it is difficult to say what 
 were the grand errors which occasioned the failure 
 of the expedition to Plattsburg, or whether it may not 
 be considered as one of those misfortunes incidental to 
 warfare, which human prudence can neither see nor 
 prevent". 
 
 To this may well be added the fine comment of the 
 American author of Low's history: "For two hours 
 and fifteen minutes the contest was maintained, with 
 an obstinacy which, while it added to, or rather per- 
 fected, the renown already acquired by the American 
 seamen, did not disgrace the vanquished." 
 
 151 
 
11. 
 
 AFTER THE BATTLE 
 
 The British land forces not only lost the greatei- 
 part of their stores, but, like the naval forces, had to 
 leave their wounded and dead to the care of the 
 Americans. 
 
 As already stated, Captain Pring succeeded to the 
 command of the British squadron on the death of 
 Captain Dow^nie. In his ofHcial report of the battle, 
 Captain Pring closed with the statement that he had 
 "much satisfaction in making known the humane treat- 
 ment the wounded have received from Commodore 
 MacDonough. They were immediately removed to 
 his own hospital on Coral Island, and furnished with 
 every requisite. His generous and polite attention to 
 myself, the ofificers and the men, will ever hereafter 
 be gratefully remembered." 
 
 Captain Pring was court-martialled, but this dis- 
 graced, not him, but the British responsible for it. He 
 was a brave and generous officer, as his conduct the 
 
 152 
 
day of the battle and the quotation above, made mani- 
 fest. 
 
 It is indeed gratifying that it can be recorded that, 
 notwithstanding the atrocities to which our wounded 
 were subjected at the hands of the Indians of the 
 British armies, or the neglect to bury our dead, our 
 forces always treated the British wounded with gen- 
 erous care and the British dead with decent respect. 
 Even after the gross excesses of the Chesapeake ex- 
 pedition and the burning of our national capitol, our 
 forces gave in full measure the treatment of a civilized 
 and Christain people to the British wounded and dead, 
 which, as already stated, were abandoned by the Brit- 
 ish in their flight. In speaking of the feeling of the 
 British army about the abandoned wounded, "A Sub- 
 altern in America" says : "Yet no apprehension could 
 
 be more unfounded in the humanity of their 
 
 conduct towards such English soldiers as fell into 
 their hands, the Americans can be surpassed by no 
 people whatever. To this the wounded whom we were 
 compelled to abandon bore, after their release, ample 
 testimony; and they told a tale which hundreds be- 
 sides have corroborated". Again, in speaking of the 
 battle of Baltimore, September 12th — the day after 
 the battle of Plattsburg — he said : 
 
 "Nor did it appear to us as being the least re- 
 markable feature in the case that not one of the (Brit- 
 ish) slain was stripped. They had laid already some 
 
 153 
 
hours exposed, yet .... they still lay, as they 
 had fallen." 
 
 This British historian wrote of the operations of 
 the British army that burned the national capitol and 
 attacked Baltimore, that they "reminded me more of 
 the operations of the ancient Danes against Alfred and 
 his subjects, than anything in the annals of modern and 
 civilized warfare."* Yet when this army was com- 
 pelled to abandon its wounded after these operations 
 those wounded that could be moved were returned to 
 the British as they were about to sail to Jamaica, in 
 
 *It is proper to state here that this British soldier speaks 
 in high terms of the militia that fought at Bladensburg to 
 defend the national capitol. This is true of the other British 
 soldiers that wrote of this campaign. They all agree that 
 the militia fought remarkably well, and the severe losses 
 of the British are conclusive evidence of this. It was left 
 to our own American historians (!) to dishonor our brave 
 soldiers, including the dead and wounded, to write that our 
 militia fled like cowards and as a panic-stricken rabble. 
 This infamous work of slandering our soldiers has been done, 
 not by their British foemen, but by Americans! "A Subaltern 
 in America" speaks in words of praise of the conduct of the 
 militia while marvelline at the utter inefficiency and stu- 
 pidity of their high officers, who were so utterly incom- 
 petent that, for example, they made no attempt to defend 
 the easily defended town of Bladensburg! Many of the 
 officers commanding our militia and volunteers were fine ex- 
 amples of the officers that can boast of only two things 
 military — gold l)raid and a sword; politicians put in command 
 of soldiers because of partisan fidelity and political activity; 
 the pets of the smugly complacent mediocre war department 
 of a national administration, the head of which was opposed 
 to war, had begun war reluctantly, and apparently had been 
 made to believe that he was its pastmaster. 
 
 154 
 
this wise as narrated by this same generous British 
 soldier : 
 
 "A beautiful schooner, carrying a white flag at 
 her main-topmost head, shot after us from the Patux- 
 ent ; she overtook us just as we were preparing to 
 bring up for the night, and great was the joy of every- 
 one on board, when it appeared that she was the 
 bearer of the majority of the men and officers who had 
 been left behind wounded at Bladensburg. Among 
 the individuals thus restored to the army were Colonels 
 Thornton and Wood. Major Brown's hurts were too 
 serious to admit of his removal." 
 
 Certainly an officer could hardly have had less 
 right to expect any humane treatment from the Ameri- 
 cans than Colonel Thornton; yet he was given the 
 best of medical treatment and of care, and was re- 
 turned to his friends — there was no exchange of pris- 
 oners, for the victorious* (according to most of our 
 school histories!) British army had no prisoners to 
 exchange. And it was he that commanded the victor- 
 ious British troops in the battle of New Orleans — on 
 the right bank of the Mississippi.' 
 
 The treatment Macomb and MacDonough gave 
 the wounded and dead abandoned by Prevost was 
 
 *Let it be said to the honor of the brave British soldiers 
 that wrote of this army that they never claimed that it was 
 victorious. That claim was left for American writers whose 
 statements are as false as they are disgraceful to their ren- 
 egade authors. 
 
 155 
 
strikingly similar to that described above. Ingersoll 
 says : 
 
 "The Thursday after the Sunday of MacDonough's 
 victory, was consecrated by him to the pious and ex- 
 emplary duty of interning together the Americans and 
 British who fell on Lake Champlain. MacDonough 
 and his officers, with the remains of their honored dead, 
 were towed in their boats from the Saratoga to the 
 Confiance. The Saratoga fired minute guns as the 
 boats with measured strokes of the oarsmen rowed 
 from the victor to the vanquished ship. From the Con- 
 fiance the British dead and surviving officers were 
 received in the American boats with the attention and 
 honors due to unfortunate brave men ; and the pro- 
 cession of boats slowly moved to the place of intern- 
 ment ashore. 
 
 "Numerous escorts of infantry and artillery from 
 the army, waited their landing on shore, and joining 
 the procession, while minute guns from the forts ac- 
 companied the firing from the shipping. Crowds of 
 the neighboring people followed, in respectful silence, 
 to the public burial-ground, where the funeral service 
 was performed, and closed by discharges of fire arms 
 over the graves, in which those who slew each other 
 were laid together. 
 
 "Honors due to unfortunate, brave men." 
 
 These words of even the prejudiced Ingersoll 
 show how the brave British soldiers and sailors were 
 regarded by their foes, and shame any thought that, 
 after a hundred years, is not kind and generous. 
 
 156 
 
With the bodies of the British our soldiers and 
 sailors buried all enmity toward them, and from the 
 grave sprang the friendship which has endured for 
 a century. 
 
 Surely at least the descendants of those generous 
 and chivalrous soldiers and sailors may fervently hope 
 that that friendship may be yet closer and firmer, and 
 never be broken. 
 
 157 
 
12. 
 
 "THE END OF THE MATTER" 
 
 As we now know, our brave soldiers and sailors 
 — generous and chivalrous, as the brave always are 
 — did not hesitate to give honor to brave foes, liv- 
 ing or dead ; and the bravest of the brave of Welling- 
 ton's Peninsular Army, being also generous and chi- 
 valrous, were ready and glad to bear testimony to the 
 valor and nobility of their foe. 
 
 Neither Americans nor British thought that honor 
 must be withheld from the brave because they had 
 fought their foes! 
 
 That absurd notion has been reserved for a hundred 
 years later. Needless to say that in nearly every case, if 
 not every case, those that would translate it into acts 
 to deprive the brave of honor, to prohibit the recital 
 of the deeds of those who have fought and died for 
 their country, are those who have not fought them- 
 selves, nor have any of their ancestors fought, for the 
 United States. 
 
 158 
 
It is also significant that many of these show th : 
 over-zeal that the spy and traitor always show, the 
 better, as they think, to hide their real character ; and 
 some there are whose deeds and many words might 
 stamp them as renegades — false to weak and long- 
 oppressed peoples. 
 
 He that would withhold honor from the brave 
 would dishonor the brave. He that would withhold 
 honor from his brave countrymen is little removed, if 
 at all, from a traitor. He that opposes the recital of 
 the brave deeds of his countrymen opposes the best 
 evangel of patriotism. 
 
 If we are loyal, true Americans, we will diligently 
 study the history of our "Second War of Independ- 
 ence" — the War of 1(S12 — one of the most important 
 wars ever fought, and fought well. 
 
 It is not to the disgrace of the soldiers and sailors 
 of that war that grievous injustice has been done 
 them by envious and traitorous pens. The disgrace is 
 to their countrymen that have permitted this. It is 
 not to their shame that those that enjoy the form of 
 government and structure of society they fought to 
 secure, are indifferent to their glorious deeds. The 
 shame is to them that should jealously preserve a 
 knowledge of those deeds as a sacred heritage. Not 
 the dead, but the living, are dishonored. 
 
 It is not their dishonor, but the disgrace of the 
 people of the United States, that some of our most 
 pretentious encyclopedias and most used school his- 
 
 159 
 
tories are so unjust to the soldiers and sailors of our 
 Second War of Independence that they do not men- 
 tion the land fighting- of the battle of Plattsburg at 
 all! 
 
 That is true — almost incredible as it is, and al- 
 together disgraceful and shameful. 
 
 The shame and disgrace of the British defeat at 
 Plattsburg was not as deep as is the shame and dis- 
 grace of our ignorance and neglect of the bravery of 
 our soldiers and sailors in that battle. 
 
 And of other battles of that war as well. Yet 
 even more: Some, not content with silence about and 
 ignorance of the glorious deeds of our soldiers and 
 sailors in that war. have, like foul ghouls that won' ' 
 mutilate and dishonor the dead, written lies that reek 
 and drip with vileness.* 
 
 This is written in an hour of great national peril. 
 And, also, there is never an hour in the life of a nation 
 that is unprepared to defend itself, that is not an hour 
 of peril. 
 
 *As malodorous an example of this as perhaps can be 
 found, is a certain miscalled history of the U. S., given a 
 forced circulation by those that probably were actuated by 
 unworthy motives. Tliis makes it indeed regrettable that the 
 book had for its apparent object the advancement of a most 
 worthy movement — that for universal military training. The 
 achievements of the raw troops at Plattsburg furnish no 
 argument against universal military training. They were 
 accustomed to the rifle, and to hardships. Warfare in 1814 
 was indeed simple as compared with today. Every Ameri- 
 can youth should have military training for his individual 
 benefit and the safety of the nation. 
 
 160 
 
The greatest danger in any hour of peril of any 
 nation is within it — lack of patriotism. Without pa- 
 triotism a nation will not make the sacrifices of ease 
 and wealth and ambition and life that every nation 
 must make if it escapes decline and dishonor, protects 
 the weak, stands effectively for justice, and leads on to 
 liberty and democracy. 
 
 The fundamental need of every nation is patriot- 
 ism. And all history shows that the greatest inspira- 
 tion to patriotism, the greatest fount of patriotism, is 
 knowledge of and honor to those that have given to 
 their country "the last full measure of devotion." 
 
 161 
 
United 
 
 Two Empires by the Sea, 
 Two Nations great and free 
 
 One Anthem raise. 
 One race of ancient fame, 
 One tongue, one faith, we claim. 
 One God, whose glorious name 
 
 We love and praise. 
 
 Now may the God above 
 Guard the dear lands we love, 
 
 Both East and West. 
 Let love more fervent glow. 
 As peaceful ages go, 
 And strength yet stronger grow. 
 
 Blessing the blest. 
 
 The above was sung at the Blessing of the (American) 
 Flags in St. Paul's Cathedral when the first American soldiers 
 reached London. 
 
 162 
 
The Marsellaise 
 
 Ye sons of France, awake to glory! 
 
 Hark! Hark! What myriads bid you rise! 
 Your children, wives, and grandsires hoary: 
 
 Behold their tears, and hear their cries. 
 
 Behold their tears, and hear their cries! 
 Shall hateful tyrants mischief breeding, 
 
 With hireling hosts, a ruffian band. 
 
 Affright and desolate the land. 
 While peace and liberty lie bleeding? 
 
 To arms, to arms, ye brave! 
 
 Th' avenging sword unsheathe! 
 
 March on, march on, all hearts resolved 
 On victory or death! 
 
 Oh Liberty! can man resign thee, 
 
 Once having felt thy generous flame? 
 Can dungeons, bolts and bars confine thee? 
 Or whips thy nol)le spirit tame, 
 Or whips thy noble spirit tame? 
 Too long the world has wept bewailing 
 
 That falsehood's dagger tyrants wield; 
 But freedom is our sword and shield, 
 And all their arts are unavailing: 
 To arms, to arms, ye brave! 
 
 Th' avenging sword unsheathe! 
 March on, march on, all hearts resolved 
 On victory or death! 
 
 The author of the above was Captain Rouget de Lisle, 
 stationed at Strasburg (Alsace), in 1792. He wrote the 
 stirring words and the music in April of that year, and en- 
 titled the production "A War Song for the Army of the 
 Rhine." Because it was first heard in Paris when sung there 
 by the Revolutionary deputation of Marseilles, it was called 
 the "Marseilles Hymn", and is now popularly named "The 
 Marsellaise." 
 
 163 
 
The Star Spangled Banner 
 
 Oh, say, can you see, by the dawn's early light, 
 
 What so proudly we hail'd at the twilight's last gleaming, 
 Whose broad stripes and bright stars, thro' the perilous fight, 
 O'er the ramparts we watch'd, were so gallantly streaming? 
 And the rocket's red glare, the bombs bursting in air. 
 Gave proof thro' the night that our flag was still there. 
 Oh, say, does that star-spangled banner yet wave 
 O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave? 
 
 On the shore dimly seen thro' the mists of the deep, 
 
 Where the foe's haughty host in dread silence reposes. 
 What is that which the breeze, o'er the towering steep, 
 
 As it fitfully blows, half conceals, half discloses? 
 Now it catches the gleam of the morning's first beam, 
 In full glory reflected, now shines on the stream: 
 'Tis the star-spangled banner: oh, long may it wave 
 O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave. 
 
 And where is that band who so vauntingly swore. 
 
 That the havoc of war and the battle's confusion, 
 A home and a country should leave us no more? 
 
 Their blood has wash'd out their foul footstep's pollution. 
 No refuge could save the hireling and slave 
 From the terror of flight or the gloom of the grave: 
 And the star-spangled banner in triumph doth wave 
 O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave. 
 
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Oh, thus be it ever when freeman shall stand 
 
 Between their loved home and wild war's desolation; 
 Blest with vict'ry and peace, may the heav'n rescued land 
 
 Praise the power that has made and preserv'd us a nation! 
 Then conquer we must, when our cause it is just. 
 And this be our motto: "In God is our trust!" 
 And the star-spangled banner in triumph shall wave. 
 O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave. 
 
 The War of 1812 gave to our beloved country its na- 
 tional anthem. Doubtless every American knows that the 
 words were written by Francis Scott Key of Baltimore, dur- 
 ing the bombardment of Fort McHenry, near Baltimore, by 
 the British, shortly after the battle of Plattsburg; but prob- 
 ably all do not know that the music is an old French air, 
 long known in England as "Anacreon", and afterwards in 
 America as "Adams and Liberty". This is another example 
 of the many things we owe to the genius and art of the 
 French. 
 
 165 
 
Our Toast 
 
 Here's to the blue of the wind-swept North 
 When we meet on the fields of France; 
 
 May the spirit of Grant be over them all 
 When the sons of the North advance. 
 
 Here's to the gray of the sun-kissed South 
 When we meet on the fields of France; 
 
 May the spirit of Lee be over them all 
 When the sons of the South advance. 
 
 And here's to the blue and the gray as one 
 When we meet on the fields of France; 
 
 May the spirit of God be over them all 
 When the sons of the Flag advance. 
 
 — Author Unknown. 
 
 166