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 TREATY OF VERSAILLES 
 
 SPEECH 
 
 OF 
 
 HON. PHILANDER CHASE KNOX 
 
 OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
 DELIVERED IN THE 
 
 SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 FRIDAY, AUGUST 29, 1919 
 
 m 
 
 ^^mr 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 1819 
 
 1347C8— 19802 
 
48 65 5 5 
 
 AUG 1 8 1942 
 
0) ^^^ 
 
 SPEECH 
 
 OF 
 
 HON. PHILANDEE OHASE KNOX. 
 
 TEEATY OF VEESAILLES. 
 
 Mr. KNOX. Mr, President, I wisli at the outset to make my 
 own position perfectly clear, that reason or excuse for mis- 
 understanding or misinterpretation may not exist. No one 
 more abhors Germany's lawlessness, her cruelty, her gross 
 inhumanity in the conduct of this war than do I. No one is 
 more determined than I to make her pay the full penalty for 
 the great wrongs she has inflicted on civilization and on the 
 world whose equipoise she has by her iniquities well-nigh 
 destroyed. It must not seem to be profitable for anyone to 
 violate the great eternal laws, of right, and we must vindicate 
 them now against Germany if we are to save ourselves from 
 chaos. The observations I shall make are therefore dictated 
 by no maudlin sympathy for Germany, the felon who must 
 guffer the penalty incident to his crime. 
 
 But I am vitally concerned in the peace of this world, and 
 peace we must have if it be attainable. But, Mr. President, I 
 am convinced after the most painstaking consideration that I 
 can give, that this treaty does not spell peace but war — war 
 more woeful and devastating than the one we have but now 
 closed. The instrument before us is not the treaty but the 
 truce of Versailles. It is for this body — the coordinate treaty- 
 making power of this great neutral Nation of ours — to make of 
 the document a peace treaty if possible, or if that be impos- 
 sible, then we must put this Nation in such relation to the 
 treaty and to the powers of the world that our voice may here- 
 after as heretofore be always raised for peace. 
 
 It is to be regretted that the whole matter has been so unfor- 
 tunately managed, that there has been so much of needless 
 134768—19802 3 
 
secrecy, so many times mere partial disclosure when tlie whole 
 truth could and should have been told, so much of assumed '■ 
 mystery in the whole affair, that it has become impossible for 
 any of us not in the confidences to tell when we have arrived at 
 the whole of any matter/ It is no fault of mine if the facts 
 themselves shall speak an impeachment of the wisdom, the pur- ^ 
 pose, or the result of the negotiations. 
 
 Fortunately it is no longer necessary to insist upon the high 
 importance of this treaty nor the fact that it marks the point in 
 our history where we turn from our old course of proved happi- 
 ness, prosperity, and safety to a new one, for us yet untried, of' 
 alliances, balance of power, and coalition with Countries and 
 peoples whose interests, aspirations, and ideals are foreign to 
 our own, because the people are waking to this as the true issu6. 
 Little by little they are bringing a divulgence of the facts con- 
 nected with the treaty and they may now hope finally to see the 
 whole of the great gaunt tragedy into Which those whom they 
 had charged with protecting them were about to betray them. 
 
 But as this treaty itself, as finally placed before us, is so iri- 
 tricate and all-embracing in its conceptton, is so ponderous and 
 voluminous in its execution, is so microscopic in detail, and," 
 because of these things, so inaccessible to the people upon whose 
 backs it is proposed to place its mighty burdens, it has seemed 
 due and proper that, to the extent of my power, I should add my 
 bit to the information which other Senators are so ably placing' 
 before them. For assuredly it is one of the calamities of this 
 situation that of the hundred million of us who are to sign this 
 great promissory note, but a paltry few thousand will be able to 
 read it before signature. And that, Mr. President, is at once 
 my reason and my excuse for again intruding my voice in this 
 discussion, for it is the duty of each of us who are charged with 
 the responsibility of speaking and acting for the people in this 
 matter to give to them in as concrete and understandable a form 
 as we may the actual provisions of this document. The people 
 will judge this matter rightly if they but know and understand 
 its facts. 
 
 But unfortunately this treaty, intricate, ponderous, and vol- 
 uminous as it is, yet is by no means the whole story. Many 
 134768—19802 - . . . 
 
documents involved in its making are before neither the Senate 
 nor tlie people. 
 
 Within the last week the Committee on Foreign Relations re- 
 quested that the proceedings of the peace conference and the 
 documents connected therewith should be furnished for our 
 information. The reply was that all were not here, only those 
 immediately at hand having been brought, and that those here 
 were being sorted and some would be finally sent to us. Why 
 should these documents need sorting? Do they hold secrets it is 
 thought best the American people should not know? 
 
 Nor have we yet the treaties with Germany's allies— the former 
 Austro-Hungarian Empire, Bulgaria, and Turkey— all of whom, 
 if we may credit report, are to be dismembered or shorn of ter- 
 ritory, or both. The provisions of the treaty before us are inti- 
 mately and inevitably entwined with those of these other 
 treaties. Can we wisely proceed without those treaties and 
 treat this situation piecemeal? 
 
 It was only this morning that the chairman of the Foreign 
 Relations Committee handed me a most important treaty, which 
 has already been completed and agreed upon— the treaty relat- 
 ing to international air navigation— access to which he was only 
 able to get through the British market at 9 pence per copy. 
 
 If the negotiators found it necessary, as they did, to consider 
 the whole situation at one time that they might arrive at har- 
 monious arrangements, must not we also to act intelligently and 
 Avisely have everything before us? 
 
 What is it, sir, about these things that the people can not 
 know? What is there to hide from them? Must we take tliis 
 thing, as the German people must take it, unsight and unseen? 
 Are we to be no more advantaged than our fallen enemies? We 
 are asking neither for a Saar Basin, a Fiume, nor a Shantung. 
 We have no hope or desire of aggrandizement to be disappointed. 
 We want merely to know what we are promising to do. 
 
 Mr. President, a treaty of peace has two great functions : In 
 tlie first place it ends the war and brings back peace ; and in the 
 next place it gives to the victor his spoils which normally take 
 the form of territorial adjustments and monetary or other In- 
 demnity, either merely to make good his losses, or in addition 
 134768—19802 
 
6 
 
 to impose a penalty. If the victor be guided by a wise states- 
 manship, he so accommodates his spoils as not to sow seeds 
 for another conflict with his erstwhile enemy. The great war 
 now ending was bottomed on Bismarck's violation of this funda- 
 mental principle. France overlooked her indemnity, but she 
 never forgot or forgave Alsace-Lorraine, There is, I warn you, 
 Senators, many another Alsace-Lorraine in the treaty laid before 
 us for action. 
 
 The first of the named functions of a peace treaty is performed 
 in this case not by an article specifically declaring that the 
 treaty brings peace to the parties belligerent but by two widely 
 separated clauses, one at the very beginning of the document 
 and another at the very end of it, from which you spell out the 
 time and occasion of the termination of this conflict. The initial 
 clause, which follows the recitation of the persons signing, says ; 
 
 From the coming into force of the present treaty the state of war 
 ■will terminate. From that moment, and subject to the provisions of 
 this treaty, official relations with Germany, and with any of the German 
 States, will be resumed by the allied and associated powers. 
 
 In the last article, the fourth and third clauses preceding the 
 
 testimonial clause, read as follows: 
 
 A first proces verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up 
 as soon as the treaty has been ratified by Germany, on the one hand, 
 and by three of the principal allied and associated powers, on the other 
 hand. 
 
 From the date of this first proces-verbal the treaty will come into force 
 between the high contracting parties who have ratified it. For the deter- 
 mination of all periods of time provided for in the present treaty this 
 date will be the date of the coming into force of the treaty. 
 
 Germany and Great Britain have already ratified the treaty. 
 So soon therefore as the treaty has been ratified by any two of 
 the remaining principal allied and associated powers, the re- 
 maining powers being the United States, France, Italy, and 
 Japan, and when the proces verbal of such deposit of ratifica- 
 tions has been drawn up, "the state of war will terminate," as 
 a reading of the many treaty clauses, coming into force at that 
 time and maldng the further conduct of the war impossible, will 
 clearly show. 
 
 It results from the foregoing that in order to bring peace be- 
 tween us and Germany it is not necessary that we shall ratify 
 1347G8— 19802 
 
this treaty. It is true Congress need not accept this treaty 
 termination of our belligerency, and might by proper resolution, 
 either joint, concurrent, or by separate resolution to the same 
 effect by the Senate and House, respectively, continue this war, 
 because to Congress exclusively belongs the authority to create 
 a status of war, and therefore it might continue such a status 
 by a new declaration. But Congress has no desire to do and 
 will not do this thing. 
 
 On the other hand, Congress, while it can not negotiate a peace 
 with the enemy, can nevertheless end hostilities with him by 
 declaring as no longer existant the status of war with him, 
 which the Congress created by its own act. 
 
 Thus so soon as the first proces-verbal is drawn under this 
 treaty, Congress may with all propriety, and should to insure 
 full legality to the act of the Executive in negotiating this par- 
 ticular treaty provision, pass a resolution— concurrent, because 
 the Executive having already committed himself to the substance 
 thereof, his approval would be superfluous— which shall declare 
 that the status of war created by its resolution of April 6, 1917, 
 no longer exists, and that a status of peace from that moment 
 obtains. Thus we shall put the country immediately upon a com- 
 plete peace basis and may at once resume all our normal com- 
 mercial and other relations with Germany, unhampered by any 
 restrictions. So much for that part of the treaty which ends 
 the war. 
 
 I pass now to the second branch of the treaty, which comprises 
 its whole volume aside from the brief clauses I have quoted, and 
 which deals with the victor's spoils. 
 
 In order that we may better appraise the value of the pro- 
 visions to wliich I shall call your attention it seems well that we 
 recall the bearings of the course we laid for ourselves when we 
 entered this war, when we literally pledged the lives of our 
 own sons to tlie accomplishment of a purpose stated— a pledge 
 redeemed in full necessary measure as the mourning in 50,000 
 homes bears ^vitness. To refresh our recollection of a few 
 salient facts, I shall, in tlie first place, read the words of Presi- 
 dent Wilson when he invited Congress to declare war. Said he, 
 134768—19802 
 
8 
 
 after adverting to tlie course of the Imperial German Govern- 
 ment in submarine warfare: 
 
 I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imp.eri<al 
 German Government to be in fact nothing less than wkr against the 
 Government and people of the United States ; that it formally accept the; 
 status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it ; and that it 
 take immediate steps not only to put the couhtr'y in a more thorough 
 state of defense but also to exert all its po-wer, and employ all its re- 
 sources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and 
 end the war. 
 
 A little later in the same address he said : 
 
 We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling 
 toward them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon' their 
 impulse that their Government acted in entering the war. It w^as not 
 with their previous knowledge and approval. 
 
 Still further on, asserting that Prussian autocracy — • 
 
 has filled our unsuspecting communities and even our offices of Govern- 
 ment with spies and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against 
 our national unity of counsel, our peace within and without, our indus- 
 tries, and our commerce — 
 
 He said : 
 
 We knew that their source lay not in any hostile feeling or purpose 
 of the German people toward us — who were no doubt as ignorant of them 
 as we ourselves were — but only in the selfish designs of a Government 
 that did what it pleased and told its people nothing. 
 
 Again, still later : 
 
 We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense 
 about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for 
 the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included ; for the rights 
 of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to 
 choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made 
 safe for democracy. 
 
 And finally he said : 
 
 It will be all the easier for us to conduct ourselves as belligerents in 
 a high spirit of right and fairness, because we act without animus, not 
 in enmity toward a people or with a desire to bring injury or disad- 
 vantage upon them, but only in armed opposition to an irresponsible 
 Government which has thrown aside all consideration of humanity and 
 of right and is running amuck. We are, lot me say again, the sincere 
 friends of the German people, and shall desire nothing so much as the 
 early reestablishment of intimate relations of mutual advantage be- 
 tween us. 
 
 Or, to put it shortly, our purposes as stated by Mr. Wilson were 
 threefold — first, the defeat and elimination of the Imperial Ger- 
 man Government and Prussian autocracy; next, the liberation 
 from their yoke of despotism of the German people themselves — • 
 for whom we had nothing but sympathy and friendship — to the 
 
 134768—19802 
 
9 
 
 end tliat they might be masters of their own fates and fortunes; 
 and, lastly, th3 reestablishment, as sincere friends of the German 
 people, " of intimate relations of mutual advantage between them 
 and us." 
 
 But we here in Congress were not quite so sure-footed in our 
 estimate of our relations to the German people in case we w^ent 
 to war. It became difficult for us to work out just how we could 
 confine our hostility to the Imperial German Government when 
 the German people and not the German royalty Avere to shoot 
 down our sons, and Avhile we were bending all our efforts to 
 kill the German people. But we did see this in the situation : 
 Our own citizens of German ancestry w^ere among our best, most 
 stalwart, and freedom-loving, patriotic citizens, Avhose ancestors 
 in many cases had fled Germany to escape the despotism against 
 which we were about to wage war. We recalled that the Teu- 
 tonic peoples were in origin and early tradition a free people 
 who knew no masters. And we judged that rid of thosie rulers 
 who had debauched their intellects for generations this mighty 
 people would reassert their racial characteristics as had their 
 sons who had come to us, and that they would become in turn a 
 great, free people, as they had been a great monarchical nation. 
 And this is my faith to-day, if we but give that great people a 
 fair chance, consistent with the punishment they have earned 
 and must suffer. 
 
 But no one here was such an ecstatic as to conceive that, going 
 forward, we should not make war on the German people, or 
 that before the war should end we should not have engendered 
 hostility toward them. Congress, therefore, on April 6 four 
 days after the delivery of the President's address, declared in a 
 joint resolution the existence of a state of war between the 
 United States and the Imperial German Government, solemnly 
 affirmed that the Imperial Government had so " committed re- 
 peated acts of war against the Government and people of the 
 United States " that a state of war has been thrust upon them by 
 that Government, and therefore formally pledged the whole 
 military and national resources of the country " to bring the 
 conflict to a successful termination." 
 134768—19802 
 
10 
 
 These were the aims, the purposes, and the reasons for enti-y 
 into the conflict as stated in our former record. How mighty 
 was the accord of our whole people therein was shown by their 
 full and quick approval of the measures Congress took to make 
 good the pledge we gave— the passing of the selective service 
 act and of tlie measures imposing our enormous financial powers 
 and obligations. 
 
 These were the ends and the purposes which threw into the 
 conflict with their whole hearts and souls our great, splendid 
 body of loyal citizens of German ancestry. Fired with the spirit 
 of liberty and freedom and weighted with the blessings of free 
 Government, they saw in the war an opportunity to bring to the 
 home folk in the old fatherland the same inalienable rights of 
 life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Their sons rushed to 
 our standards to fight first that we might continue to live free 
 and next that liberty and its blessings might come to their kin- 
 dred across the sea. 
 
 We did have, we had to have, a quarrel with the German peo- 
 ple; it was inevitable that we should entertain toward them 
 hostile feelings. But we had and have a sympathy for them as 
 misguided and misdirected, and we did hope that winning the 
 war we should liberate them from an intellectual despotism 
 they seemed not to sense, and that thereafter they would arise a 
 free, great people. 
 
 So we entered the war. Eighteen months later Germany, stag- 
 gering, asked for an armistice to arrange a peace. Before the 
 armistice was granted the Emperor and the Crown Prince fled 
 their dominions, followed by certain of their military chieftains. 
 Next came the abdication of the Emperor and the initiation of 
 proceedings looking to the democratization of Germany. 
 
 Thus, prima facie, we had achieved the full purpose for 
 which we entered the war ; our enemy was defeated, the Im- 
 perial Government destroyed, and the German people were 
 liberated, free — again quoting the President — to " choose their 
 way of life and of obedience," 
 
 Following this came the signing of the armistice of November 
 11, the terms of which wisely and properly put it beyond the 
 power of Germany thereafter effectively to continue this war. 
 
 1347Q8— 19802 
 
11 
 
 There we, who sought no territory, nor indemnity, nor ag- 
 grandized power, should have rested, signed our peace when our 
 associates made peace, and quit the war as we entered it, still 
 free and independent, masters of our own destiny, able to work 
 for the benefit of all mankind, unhampered by entangling alli- 
 ances or commitments. 
 
 We should have left the political adjustments and the in- 
 demnities to the powers of Europe who alone were immediately 
 concerned, we at most exercising a restraining hand to see, first, 
 that justice was done to a fallen foe — and this in spite of the 
 fact that he initiated and carried out the most cruel, relentless, 
 inhuman war of modern times — and in the next place to insure 
 that no more dragon's teeth were sown in Europe than the 
 indispensable necessities imperatively required. Such a course 
 would neither have endangered nor sacrificed those threatened 
 peoples to whose assistance we came, for Germany had been dis- 
 armed, and our two millions of young men, now for the first 
 time fairly equipped, were still in France at the behest of any 
 military exigency which might arise. 
 
 But such was not the course follow^ed, and our representa- 
 tives sat at the peace table as coequal negotiators. 
 
 Twenty-seven powers (besides Germany) have signed this 
 treaty. Five of these— the United States, the British Empire, 
 France, Italy, and Japan— are designated as the principal allied 
 and associated powers. These 5 with the other 22 signing 
 the treaty (besides Germany) are termed the allied and asso- 
 ciated powers. Of these 22, 4 only were European powers 
 in existence at the outbreak of the war, namely, Belgium, 
 Greece, Portugal, and Roumania; three others of Europe are 
 created or recognized by the treaty — Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
 and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, the boundaries of which nor 
 its location the treaty does not disclose. Of the remaining 
 15 States, 3 are Asiatic— Siam, China — who has the sole dis- 
 tinction of being robbed by her allies — and the Hedjaz — like- 
 Avise with undefined boundaries and, as to the treaty, unlocated. 
 The 11 remaining States are of Latin-America as follows: 
 Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
 Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay. I have mentioned 
 134768—10802 
 
12 
 
 these 22 States so we may have clearly in mind the fact that 
 all of them combined could not under the most favorable condi- 
 tions one could hope for, withstand the armies of Germany 
 one day, or enforce against Germany's will the most inoffensive 
 treaty stipulation. In the domain of force, in which Germany 
 has lived and will continue for a time to live, these powers 
 count for naught. The great responsibilities of the treaty, the 
 only power behind the treaty, is that of the five principal 
 allied and associated powers. Nor does the treaty in any of 
 its parts blink this. There is no single important function in 
 the treaty, performable by the victor powers, which is not con- 
 signed to the five great powers. There is no single important 
 immediate function consigned to the league of nations which 
 does not run to the council of the league which these five powers 
 control and of which they are the sanctioning force. The 
 small powers are named that may be granted benefits. The load 
 of the world, the keeping of the peace of the world, under this 
 treaty rests on the five powers. 
 
 But there is one power we miss in all this, the power which 
 met the brunt of the German shock while the rest of the world 
 got ready ; the power that mobilized in the allied cause some 
 21,000,000 men ; that lost— killed in action— 2,500,000 ; that lost 
 in other casualties 3,500,000, of whom 1,500,000 are absolute in- 
 valids and badly mutilated ; that lost in prisoners 2,000,000, of 
 whom half died in prison ; a power whose armies at the beginning 
 of February in 1917 numbered 14,000,000 men under arms ; who 
 fought during the war over a front of 3,500 miles, and who had 
 there pitted against her one-third of the wliole German Army, 
 two-thirds of the whole Austrian Army, all of the Hungarian 
 Army, and two-thirds of the whole Turkish Army ; a power who 
 took as prisoners of war 400,000 Germans, 300,000 Hungarians, 
 300,000 Turks, and 1,000,000 Austrians. I speak of poor, ever 
 despot-ridden Russia. I have but said CJIiina enjoyed a unique 
 position ; but I spoke in haste. Russia, who raised three times 
 as many men as we planned to raise as a maximum; Russia, 
 whose losses if imposed on us would have made every home in 
 this land a house of mourning ; Russia, whose men in battle front, 
 unarmed and unequipped, stopped the German onrush of cold 
 134768—19802 
 
13 
 
 steel with bare breasts and clenched fists, so saving us and Eu- 
 rope from slavery ; Russia, whose people and rulers stood fore- 
 front, our friends, even in the hours of our sore and most threat- 
 ening distress ; this Russia, with this record, is mentioned in this 
 treaty, but only with ominous words that presage her national 
 destruction. 
 
 Russia, sir, is a problem ; but dismemberment by others is not 
 its solution. And shall I tell you, Mr. President, what the intelli- 
 gent Russians, those of the great so-called middle classes, are 
 saying? It is this : We must first recover ourselves and wipe out 
 the dishonor of our collapse, the dishonor of forsaking our Allies 
 in the hour of their dire need. And then we must readjust our 
 dominions as we wish them, for Russia can never be bound by 
 the Russia-disposing portions of a treaty to which Russia is not 
 a party. And I ask you, sir, would we? 
 
 And this thought brings me to speak again of what I have 
 said heretofore, that this treaty, stripped of its meaningless 
 beatific provisions, provides merely and simply for an alliance 
 between the five great powers in a coalition against the balance 
 of the world. And again I ask, has history ever answered this 
 save in one way — by destroying the coalition and at times all or 
 some of its constituent members? 
 
 Think you Germany — smarting and staggering under the terms 
 of this, the hardest treaty of modern times — will, even if we 
 were to set up the league and she should join it, supinely rest 
 content with the dole of grace and sufferance we are vouchsafing 
 her, the crumbs from her victors' table? It is beside the point 
 to say that such is but her just deserts and the full measure 
 thereof. Lacking the wisdom to go forward and inflict a mili- 
 tary punishment that would have uprooted their philosophy of 
 force and taught them the lesson of live and let live, we have 
 left them, beaten but proud and arrogant, with their mighty 
 spirit bent for the time but unbroken, with their damning philoso- 
 phy unchanged, and v/ith a will, fired by hate, to- mete out re- 
 venge. 
 
 That people will no more cease to plot and plan to recover their 
 former high estate than did Satan, plunged into the abysmal 
 depths of Hell. Whether they are in the league if formed or out 
 
 134768—19802 
 
14 
 
 of it, Germany* agents, secretly or openly, will be at work with 
 her former allies, and with injured Russia, and with Japan — 
 whose conceptions, ideals, aspirations, and ambitions are of 
 Imperial Germany, not democratic America, Britain, and France. 
 As Russia goes, so will go the whole Slavic and affiliated peoples. 
 And if Germany succeed in this and be able to unite these powers 
 to herself, to turn the teeming millions of Russia to swell her 
 own ranks, and to augment this by the great yellow races of the 
 Pacific, who, through Russia, would have unimpeded access to 
 the battle front, western Europe, at least, must perish. Think 
 you, Germany, revengeful, will turn aside from so imposing and 
 grateful a vision in order to grace for generations a conqueror's 
 triumph? 
 
 Why have we invited this vision? Was there none at all of 
 that much- vaunted forward-looking at the peace table? The 
 wise, the obviously wise course required not months of inventing 
 and piling up penalties, but a few hours devoted to a plan that 
 should rid Germany of the Hohenzollerns, that should provide 
 for her democratization, that should impose a lesson-bearing 
 indemnity, and that should then bind with rivets of steel, be- 
 cause rivets of friendship, the German people to western Europe, 
 to Fra,nce, who can hot hope to keep Germany under her feet. 
 Napoleon tried to conquer a people and failed — this should be 
 France's lesson. The only possible wise course for France, her 
 only permanent safety, is closest friendship with Germany. The 
 restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, the payment of a suitable indem- 
 nity, and then forgetfulness as the past, hard as that might 
 prove — this should have sufficed. It may seem I am unsympa- 
 thetic, unmindful, and forgetful of wrongs and injuries, un- 
 moved by suffering and grief. I am none of these. 1 am trying 
 to point out how France herself might escape further and more 
 overwhelming wrong, suffering, and grief. For as certain as 
 the sun rises, if we follow the road in which this treaty sets our 
 feet, France and ourselves shall meet those on the way. 
 
 The treaty of peace is divided into 15 parts. All of them deal 
 with territorial adjustments, penalties, and indemnities of the 
 war except Part I — containing the covenant of the league of 
 nations — ^and Part XIII, labor — ^providing for an international 
 
 . 134768—19802 
 
15 
 
 labor organization. The other parts are, in their order : Part II, 
 boundaries of Germany ; Part III, political clauses for Europe ; 
 Part IV, German rights and interests outside Germany ; Part V, 
 military, naval, and air clauses ; Part VI, prisoners of war and 
 graves; Part VII, penalties; Part VIII, reparation; Part IX, 
 financial clauses; Part X, economic clauses; Part XI, aerial 
 navigation; Part XII, ports, waterways, and railways; Part 
 XIV, guaranties ; and Part XV, miscellaneous provisions. 
 
 It is of course impossible to give even a detailed summary of 
 a volume of some eighty thousand odd words, doubtless the 
 longest treaty in history. But I shall also aim to give a pic- 
 ture of certain general features to which I wish to invite special 
 attention. 
 
 By this treaty Germany cedes outright portions of her Euro- 
 pean territory to Belgium ; to France, a recession of Alsace- 
 Lorraine; to Poland; to the Czecho-Slovak State; and to the 
 principal allied and associated powers, including the United 
 States, who get unconditionally IMeuiel — a small strip of terri- 
 tory in the extreme northeastern tip of Germany — and the free 
 city of Danzig with its adjacent territory, to be placed under tho 
 protection of the leagiie of nations. Germany also cedes, con- 
 tingent upon the wishes of the people in the area affected as ex- 
 pressed by a vote, further portions of her territory to Belgium, 
 to Poland, and to the allied and associated powers, who thus take 
 Schleswig with an obligation at some time to hand it over to 
 Denmark if the people so vote. The Czecho-Slovak State se- 
 cures a further bit of territory if a determination of the Polish 
 frontier should isolate it from Germany; and the league of 
 nations takes as trustee the Saar Basin, which shall be governed, 
 however, by a commission appointed, not by the league but by 
 the council of the league, pending the plebiscite of 15 years 
 hence. Thus the United States becomes the owner in fee of a 
 tenant in common of European territory and a trustee as to 
 other territory. 
 
 For tliis territory so ceded nobody pays Germany anything, 
 
 nor is any credit allowed Germany for it on her reparation 
 
 account, to which I shall shortly refer. However, all cessionary 
 
 powers, except France and the league of nations as to the 
 
 134768—19802 
 
16 
 
 Saar Basin, assume that portion of the imperial and State 
 debt attaching to the ceded area — ^fixed, stated roughly, upon 
 the basis of the prewar revenue of the area to the prewar 
 total imperial and State revenue, respectively. 
 
 The imperial and State property in all these areas, including 
 the private property of the former German Emperor and other 
 royal personages, is turned over to the cessionary of the area, 
 who must pay the value of the same to reparation commission, 
 which places the same to the credit of Germany on the repara- 
 tion account. This does not apply to France, who takes such 
 property in Alsace-Lorraine without payment, nor to Belgium, 
 nor to the Saar Basin. 
 
 Germany cedes all her overseas possessions in fee simple to 
 the allied and associated powers, who do not assume the 
 debts and who take all the property, without any compensation 
 whatever running to Germany, either for the territory ceded 
 or for the actual property taken. Thus the United States 
 becomes a tenant in common with the British Empire, France, - 
 Italy, and Japan, of Germany's African possessions, compris- 
 ing Togo, Kamerun, German Southwest Africa, and German 
 East Africa, with an area of nearly 1,000,000 square miles — 
 almost one-third the size of the United States — and a native 
 population of about eleven and a half millions ; of her Pacific 
 possessions, including Kaiser Wilhelm's Land, Bismarck's Archi- 
 pelago, Carolina Island, Palau or Pelew Islands, Marianne 
 Islands, Solomon Islands, and Marshall Islands. It may be 
 noted in passing that certain of these island possessions form 
 a barrier ring to access to the Philippines, and their possession 
 by any other power other than ourselves is big with potential 
 troubles for us. 
 
 Germany cedes also, without compensation of any sort or de- 
 scription, her extraterritorial and analogous rights in Siam, 
 Morocco, Egypt, and Samoa, and recognizes the French pro- 
 tectorate in Morocco and the British protectorate in Egypt. The 
 imperial and State property in these areas go to the cessionaries 
 without compensation. The same is true of such property 
 located in and ceded to China. Germany's rights in Shantung 
 1347G8— 19802 
 
17 
 
 and German i>roperty also are ceded to Japan " free and clear 
 of air charges and encumbrances." 
 
 :Tluis territorially Germany has been closed out in all the 
 world without a penny's compensation. Moreover, she loses the 
 efforts of a generation to provide an outlet for her rapidly 
 increasing surplus population, whicli now must and will find 
 expanding room elsewhere. To this situation is added a re- 
 striction of Germany's European area, which would have taken 
 care of a part of this expansion. • . 
 
 The indemnities provided by the treaty may be classed roughly 
 into two divisions: (1) Restitution in cash of cash taken away, 
 seized, or sequestrated, and also restitution of animals, objects 
 of every nature, and securities taken away, seized, or seques- 
 trated in the cases in which it proves possible to identify them 
 in territory belonging to Germany or to her allies; and (2) 
 reparation for all the damage done to the civilian popiilation 
 of the allied and associated powers and to their property during 
 the period of the belligerency of each as an allied or associated 
 power against Germany by lier aggression by land, by sea, and 
 from the air, and this includes damages inflicted not only by 
 Germany but by Germany's allies, and also by the allied and 
 associated powers themselves upon their own nationals. 
 
 There can, of course, be no question as to the propriety of com- 
 pelling Germany to disgorge the loot which she seized and which 
 she still has, nor in requiring her to replace that which she 
 seized and has since consumed or otherwise used or destroyed. 
 No matter what this may mean to Germany, no matter how it 
 may leave her, this must be done. The thief must not be heard 
 to plead necessity for the article he stole nor inconvenience from 
 restoring it. This is the most elemental justice and the whole- 
 somest morality. Thus far we move on solid ground. 
 
 But when we get away from and go beyond this, it behooves 
 us to proceed with care, lest we go beyond the bounds of 
 wise statesmanship and, in the homelj^ adage, kill the goose that 
 we expect to lay the golden eggs. 
 
 But the treaty edges in on the perfectly proper theory of 
 restitution Iiy a theory designated as replacement, which places 
 Geimany under rather startling obligations. She is first made 
 1:J470S— 19802 2 
 
18 
 
 to "recognize (s) the right of the allied and associated power* 
 to the replacement, ton for ton (gross tonnage) and class for 
 class, of all merchant ships and fishing boats lost or damaged 
 owing to the wdr." She then acknowledges " that the tonnage 
 of German shipping at present in existence is much less than 
 that lost by the allied and associated powers in consequence of 
 the Grerman aggression," and agrees that " the right thus rec- 
 ognized will be enforced on German ships and boats under the 
 following conditions " : Germany cedes to the allied and asso- 
 ciated powers, on behalf of herself and of all other parties in- 
 terested, all German merchant ships which are of 1,600 tons gross 
 and upward. Included in these will doubtless be the 32 aux- 
 iliary cruisers and fleet auxiliary — named in another part of 
 the treaty — which are to be disarmed and treated as merchant 
 ships. In addition to the foregoing, Germany further cedes 
 one-half, reckoned in tonnage, of the ships which are between 
 1,000 tons and 1,600 tons gross ; one-guarter, reckoned in ton- 
 nage, of the steam trawlers ; and one-quarter, reckoned in ton- 
 nage, of the other fishing boats. All the foregoing must be de- 
 livered to the reparation commission within two months of the 
 coming into force of the present treaty. 
 
 Thus, we take practically all of Germany's means of conduct- 
 ing commerce through her own vessels with overseas countries, 
 of whom we are the farthest away and of which we shall stand 
 most in need, for it is an open secret that before the war the 
 German shipping was the peer at least of any shipping in the 
 world. 
 
 But the treaty goes further than this and compels Germany to 
 lay down in her own shipyards a maximum of 200,000 tons of 
 shipping for each of the next five years — approximately half, I 
 am told, of her shipbuilding capacity — and our representatives, 
 the reparation commission, determine the specifications, con- 
 ditions of building, price to be paid — ^by giving credit against 
 the reparation bill the commission will make up — and all other 
 questions relating to the accounting, building, and delivery of 
 the ships. 
 
 Thus, for a number of years at least, we have pretty effectively 
 barred German vessels from the seas. 
 
 134768—19802 
 
19 
 
 But this is onlj^ half the story. She is also in good part 
 stripped of her inland shipping, for by this treaty she very 
 property undertakes to restore in kind and in normal condition of 
 upkeep to the allied and associated powers any boats and other 
 morable appliances belonging to inland navigation which since 
 August 1, 1914, have by any means whatever come into her pos- 
 session or into the possession of her nationals, and which can be 
 identified. This would, of course, cover boats purchased by 
 Germans for full value, transactions that might have been car- 
 ried out through neutrals. 
 
 Nor is this all. With a view to making good the loss of the 
 allied and associated powers in inland-navigation tonnage which 
 can not be made good by the restitution already recited, Ger- 
 many agrees to cede to the reparation commission a portion 
 of her river fleet up to the amount of the loss mentioned to a 
 maximum extent of 20 per cent of the river fleet as it existed 
 November 11, 191S. 
 
 As to all the foregoing ocean-going and inland-navigation 
 vessels, Germany agrees to take any measures indicated to her 
 by the reparation commission for obtaining the full title to the 
 property in all ships which have dxiring the war been trans- 
 ferred, or are in process of tz'ansfer, to neutral flags without 
 the consent of the allied and associated Governments. 
 
 Nor is this all. She waives all claims against the allied or 
 associated powers for the detention, employment, loss, or dam- 
 age of any German ships, except as called for by the armistice 
 agreement ; all claims to vessels or cargoes sunk by naval action, 
 and subsequently salved, in which the nationals of the allied 
 and associated powers or the powers themselves may be interested 
 either as owners, charterers, insurers, or otherwise, notwith- 
 standing any decree of condemnation which may have been 
 made by a prize court of Germanj- or her allies. 
 
 But I am compelled to note still further shipping deHveries. 
 The treaty obliges Germany to cede to France tugs and vessels 
 from among those remaining registered in German Rhine ports — 
 after the above deductions — to an amount fixed not by the 
 treaty even in maximum but by an arbitrator appointed by the 
 United States. The tugs and vessels so taken must have with 
 13476S— 19802 
 
20 
 
 them fbeir fittings and gear, shall be in a good state of repair 
 to carrj- on traffic, and shall be selected from among those most 
 recently built. - : i 
 
 Similarly and under like conditions, tugs and vessels to an 
 unnamed amount must be transferred: to the allied and asso- 
 ciated powers from those used on the river systems of the Elbe, 
 the Oder, the Nlemen, and the Danube; and, in addition, Ger- 
 many must cede material of all kinds necessary for the utiliza- 
 tion of these river sjstems by the allied and associated powers 
 concerned. 
 
 France also gets all installations, berthing and anchorage 
 accommodations, platforms, docks, warehouses, plants, and so 
 forth, which German subjects or German companies owned on 
 August 1, 1934, in Rotterdam, and tiie shares or interests pos- 
 sessed by such nationals or companies therein. 
 
 Thus seemingly under a theory of replacement the treaty 
 likewise strips Germany of much of her inland shipping. 
 
 The effect of all this upon Germany's future and upon her 
 ability to meet the other requirements of this treaty are well 
 worthy of deep and mature reflection. 
 
 I5ut drastic and pos.sibly ruinous as all this is, it yet is but 
 the beginning. 
 
 The next inroad on the doctrine of restitution is made under 
 the name of physical restoration. Germany undertakes to 
 devote her economic resources directly to the physical restora- 
 tion of the invaded areas of the allied and associated powers to 
 the extent that these powers may determine. Under this pro- 
 vision the allied and associated governments may list the ani- 
 mals, machinery, equipment, tools, and like articles of a com- 
 mercial character, which have been seized, consumed, or de- 
 stroyed by Germany or destroyed in direct consequence of mili- 
 tary operation.s — this would include military operations by 
 the allied and associated powers themselves — which such 
 powers urgently and immediately need and which they desire 
 to have replaced by animals and articles of the same nature, 
 in being in Germany at the coming into force of this treaty. 
 .\fi an immediate advance of animals on this acc(-uiit. Ger- 
 many must within three months deliver to France 80,500 
 13476S— 19802 
 
21 
 
 horses, 92,000 cattle, 101,000 sheep, and 10,000 goats ; and to Bel- 
 gium 10,200 horses, 92,000 cattle, 20,200 sheep, and 15,000 sows. 
 As to such animals, machinery, equipment, tools, and like articles 
 of a commercial character, the reparation commission in decid- 
 ing the amount which shall ultimately be given by Germany must 
 take into consideration German's needs, having in mind the 
 maintenance of German's social and economic life and the gen- 
 eral interest of the allied and associated powers that the indus- 
 trial life of Germany shall not be so impaired as adversely to 
 affect Germany's ability to perform the other acts of reparation 
 called for. It is, however, provided that of machinery, tools, 
 equipment, and like commercial articles a maximum of 30 per 
 cent may be taken of the quantity actually in use in any one 
 establishment. 
 
 Similar lists, subject to the same regTilations may be made by 
 the allied and associated powers of reconstruction materials — 
 stones, bricks, refractory bricks, tiles, wood, window glass, 
 steel, lime, cement, and so forth — machinery, heating appara- 
 tus, and like commercial articles which the powers may desire 
 to have produced in Germany. 
 
 In addition to the foregoing and of like character is the obli- 
 gation of Germany to furnish coal to France at France's op- 
 tion, up to a maximum of 20,000,000 tons for each of the first 
 five years and 8,000,000 tons for any one of the succeeding 
 five years ; to Belgium, at her option, 8,000,000 tons per year for 
 10 j-ears ; to Italy, at her option, amounts beginning at 4,500,000 
 tons for the first year and increasing to 8,500,000 tons for the 
 last six years ; and to Luxembourg, her annual prewar supply, if 
 the reparation commission so directs ; a possible total of 32,- 
 000,000 to 35,000,000 tons for the first five years and of 25,- 
 000,000 tons for the next five years. At the option of the 
 vendees, metallurgical coke instead of coal must be deliv- 
 ered at fixed ratios. In this category also is to be placed the 
 German obligation to deliver to France for the next three succes- 
 sive years some 115,000 tons of coal distillation products, and 
 to the reparation commission 50 per cent of the total dye stuffe 
 and chemical drugs in Germany or under German control at the 
 date of the coming into force of the. present treaty. 
 134768—19802 
 
22 
 
 In consiaering the question of supplying coal we must not 
 lose sight of the cession of the Saar Basin coal mines to 
 France. 
 
 But we come now to an item which is not to be accounted 
 for as restitution, as replacement, or physical restoration. I 
 refer to the cession by Germany on her own behalf and on be- 
 half of her nationals of her submarine cables. By this act the 
 treaty takes from Germany all direct telegraph relations with 
 overseas countries. 
 
 As a final entry under this general head I wish to observe 
 that, speaking generally, Germany also cedes to the States 
 which secure portions of her territory all railways situated 
 therein, and I find in the treaty no positive provision for the 
 payment therefor by anyone. This cession carries with it 
 the works and installations; the rolling stock, complete where 
 a ceded road has its own stock, in a normal state of upkeep, 
 and where a ceded road has no rolling stock of its own, then 
 rolling stock from German lines with which the ceded por- 
 tion forms a system; and stocks of stores, fittings, and plants. 
 And while on this point I may add that Germany must build 
 for Czechoslovakia a designated railroad if that State so 
 elects, at the latter's cost, and must build for Belgium the 
 German portion of a deep-draft Rhine-Meuse navigable water- 
 way at her own cost, seemingly, if Belgium decides the canal 
 should be built. 
 
 Now, as to the bill against Germany. Germany is made to 
 admit as a basis of her liability, the responsibility for herself, 
 and for all her allies, for causing all the loss and damage to 
 which the allied and associated Governments and their na- 
 tionals have been subjected as a consequence of the war. 
 
 The allied and associated powers, recognizing the burden 
 thus stated is too heavy for German resources to bear " after 
 taking into account permanent diminution of such resources 
 which will result from other provisions of the present treaty," 
 require, and she so undertakes, that Germany make compen- 
 sation for all damage done to the civilian population of the 
 allied and associated powers and to their property during the 
 184768—19802 
 
23 
 
 period of belligerency of each as an allied or associated power, 
 by land, by sea, and by air. 
 
 The reparation commission is to find one bill against Ger- 
 many for this damage, the elements of which are of such im- 
 portance that I feel I onght to cover them in some detail. 
 They are as follows: 1. Damage to injured persons and to 
 surviving dependents by personal injury to or death of civilians 
 caused by acts of war, including all attacks on land, on sea, 
 or in the air, and all the direct consequences thereof, and of 
 all operations of war by the two groups of belligerents wherever 
 arising. 2. Damage to civilian persons, caused by Germany or 
 her allies, by acts of cruelty, violence, or maltreatment— in- 
 cluding injuries to life or health as a consequence of im- 
 prisonment, deportation, internment, or evacuation, of exposure 
 at sea or of being forced to labor— wherever arising, and to the 
 surviving dependents of such victims. 8. Damage to civilian 
 persons injured either in German territory or invaded terri- 
 tory, caused by Germany or her allies by acts injurious to health 
 or capacity to work or to honor, as well as to their surviving 
 dependents. 4, Damage caused by any kind of maltreatment 
 of prisoners of war. 5. As damages, the pensions and com- 
 pensations in the nature of pensions to naval and military — 
 including members of the air force — victims, whether muti- 
 lated, wounded, sick or invalided, and to the dependents of 
 such victims, sums so due to be capitalized on the basis of 
 the French scale in force on the coming into effect of the pres- 
 ent treaty. 6. The cost of assistance extended to prisoners of 
 war and their families. 7. Allowances by the Governments of 
 the Allies and associated powers to the families and depend- 
 ents of mobilized persons or persons serving in the forces, the 
 sum to be paid to be capitalized on the basis of the French 
 scale in force during the year the payment was made. 8. 
 Damage to civiUans by being forced by Germany or her allies 
 to work without just remuneration. 9. Damage to all prop- 
 erty, wherever situated belonging to any of the allied or as- 
 sociated States or their nationals, with the exception of naval 
 or military works or materials, which has been carried off, 
 seized, injured, or destroyed by the acts of Germany or her 
 
 134768—19802 
 
24: 
 
 allies on land, on sea, or from the air, or damages directly in 
 consequence of hostilities or of any operations of war. 10. 
 Damages in the form of levies, fines, and other similar exac- 
 tions imposed by Germany or her allies upon the civil popula- 
 tion. 
 
 It is admitted that certain of these damage rules violate the 
 principles of international law as hitherto recognized and ob- 
 served by the family of nations. The reason why we as well as 
 the enemy should discard such benign principles as have been 
 worked out by the nations in the last centuries is not clear. 
 
 The thought has been entertained that the treaty fixes, at 
 least tentatively, the German indemnity under these rules at 
 120,000,000,000 gold marks, about $24,000,000,000, but such an 
 idea is not justified. 
 
 In the first place, Germany agrees, in addition to the sum 
 named, to pay Belgium's debt to the Allies and associated powers, 
 whatever the debt may be. This payment is to be considered 
 restoration. 
 
 In the next place, the treaty stipulates that the $24,000,000,000 
 worth of gold bonds which Germany undertakes to issue is to 
 cover " whatever part of the full amount of the approved claims 
 is not paid in gold, or in ships, securities, and commodities, or 
 otherwise." Thus the total values of all the materials to be 
 turned over as heretofore mentioned seem quite clearly to be in 
 addition to this 24,000,000,000 of gold bonds. 
 
 Moreover, it is provided that " further issues [of bonds] by 
 way of acknowledgment and security may be required as the 
 [reparation] commission subsequently determined from time 
 to time." 
 
 So that the bill against Germany will clearly not stop at 
 $24,000,000,000 and may run to any amount. 
 
 I may here also correct another impression that has gone 
 out, namely, that somehow the reparation commission can re- 
 duce the amounts to be paid by Germany, if they decide such a 
 course is M'ise and just. Now, the reparation commission is 
 made up of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, 
 France, and Italy, who always sit at its sessions, and the repi'e- 
 sentatives of one other power, either Belgium, Japan, or the 
 13476S— 19S02 
 
25 
 
 Serb-Oroat-Slovene State. While eacli other allied and asso-, 
 ciated power may have a representative present when its. in-, 
 terest^ are. . involved, such representative may not vote. . gchi^ 
 coramission decides the amount of the claims against Germany 
 by a majority vote — that is to say, the representatives of Great 
 Britain, France, and Italy, or Belgium, or Japan, or the Serb- 
 Croat-Slovene State, any three of them — may fix tlie amount of 
 this indemnity. But a decision to cancel the whole or any part 
 of the German debt or obligation requires a unanimous vote of 
 all of them sitting, and before this decision can become operative 
 the commission must have the specific authority of the several 
 Governments represented on the commission. In other words, 
 unless the four great powers and Belgium or Japan or the 
 Serb-Croat-Slovene State unanimously so agree, the claims once, 
 fixed by a majority of the commission can not be abated one 
 penny, except by the consent of all the powers represented on 
 the commission. Moreover, the commission is closely limited 
 even as to the postponement of total or partial reparation pay- 
 ments, for all such postponements beyond 1930 of payments 
 falling due between May 1, 1921, and the end of 1926, and of any 
 postponement, for more than three years, of any installment 
 falling due after 1926 requires a unanimous vote. 
 
 Assuming, for the sake of the argument, that some one of the 
 powders represented on the commission is determined to exact 
 the pound of flesh, there is no way under this treaty to prevent 
 it, short of the application of coercive measures. The reparation 
 commission is not and is not intended to be a beneficent philan- 
 thropic or eleemosynary institution; it is and must be the en- 
 forcer of stern retribution, imposing on the vanquished the, 
 utmost burden his back will bear. 
 
 But these measures are by no means the end of the story. 
 
 Reference has already been made to the payment by Germany in 
 
 securities of what I shall designate her nonbond debt. On 
 
 this point I quote from the treaty : 
 
 Germany will within six months from the coming into force of the 
 present treaty deliver to each allied and associated power all securi- 
 ties, certificates, deeds, or other documents of title held by its nationals 
 and relating to property, rights, or interests situated in the territory of 
 that allied or associated power, including any shares, stock, debentures, 
 134768—19802 
 
26 
 
 debenture stock, or other obligations of any company incorporated in 
 accordance with the laws of that power. 
 
 That is to say, German investments in allied or associated 
 countries and held in Germany are to be wholly closed out. 
 
 Moreover, all other property held by Germans or German 
 companies in allied or associated countries, or territories, colo- 
 nies, possessions, and protectorates, may be retained or liqui- 
 dated by such powers. This completes the closing out of 
 German interests in allied and associated countries. Nor is this 
 all, for this last provision applies to territories ceded to the 
 allied and associated powers by this treaty, so that Poland, 
 Czecho-Slovakia, the free city of Danzig, the principal allied 
 and associated powers in Memel, Denmark, Belgium, and 
 France may sell out property and interest of every German 
 national or company within their newly acquired territory. 
 
 Furthermore, the i;ep.aration commission may require, by a 
 majority vote, the German Government to acquire and turn 
 over to it the rights and interests of German nationals in any 
 public utility or concession operating in Russia, China, Turkey, 
 Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, or in the possessions or de- 
 pendencies of these States, or in any territory formerly belong- 
 ing to Germany or her allies, or to be administered by a 
 mandatory under this treaty. 
 
 Nor is this the end. Germany must fully compensate, and 
 most properly so, the nationals of all allied and associated 
 powers for the losses they have suffered with reference to 
 property located in German territory, and this includes all 
 property acquired or in course of acquisition by the German 
 alien property custodian, this compensation to be reduced by 
 the actual value of any property restored to the owners. 
 
 For all property rights or interests taken by the allied and 
 associated powers from German nationals, Germany undertakes 
 to compensate them. 
 
 Now the disposition of the proceeds of all this German prop- 
 erty is obviously of the utmost importance. The treaty pro- 
 poses two methods, one of which is so fantastic that it is 
 difficult to believe our Avildest dreamer would, on study, care 
 to adopt it. I shall give you the effect of a few of its salient 
 
 134768—19802 
 
27 
 
 features: If we should proceed under it, tlie United States 
 would guai-antee tlie payment of all specified debts owed by 
 our citizens — who were solvent at the beginning of the war- 
 to Germans. We would establish a clearing office which would 
 take over all such debts due to our citizens from Germans, and 
 we would undertake to act as a collection agent for all such 
 debts due from our citizens to Germans, making good any we 
 did not collect. From the coming into force of this treaty all 
 payments or acceptance of payments and all communications 
 regarding the settlement of specified obligations would be 
 absolutely prohibited between our citizens and Germans, under 
 I)enalties imposed for trading with the enemy, except corre- 
 spondence through our clearing office, and each Government 
 would promise to do its utmost to ferret out and report viola- 
 tions of the prohibitions to the others. 
 
 If an American citizen made a claim which was not allowed, 
 he would be fined. If he contested a claim which was allowed, 
 he would be fined. Where he and the German could not agree, 
 the two clearing offices would settle it if they could ; if they 
 could not agree, it would go to the mixed arbitral tribunal. If, 
 finally, a debt were held either by the clearing offices or the 
 mixed tribunal not to be within the specified classes, permis- 
 sion is graciously given to the parties to go to court. 
 
 When all such debts are liquidated any credit balance in 
 favor of Germany goes to the reparation commission to be 
 credited on Grermauy's account. That is to say, the excess 
 proceeds of German property in the United States would go 
 to compensate Italian or Greek or some other power's losses. 
 
 If this clearing-office systeni be not adopted, then Germany 
 pays directly to the allied and associated Governments, or 
 their interested nationals, the cash assets and the proceeds of 
 the property, rights, and interests in her hands belonging to 
 them ; but each of the allied and associated powers shall dis- 
 pose of the proceeds of the property rights and interests and 
 of the cash assets of German nationals in accordance Math Its 
 laws and regulations. They may apply them if they wish to 
 the payment of claims and debts held by their nationals 
 against German nationals, including claims against the German 
 134768—19802 
 
28 
 
 Government for acts committed by it after July 31, 1914, and 
 before the particular power concerned entered tbe war against 
 Germany, Or, and this is most remarkable, the power may 
 use this money derived from the proceeds of property owned 
 by German nationals to pay debts due the power's nationals 
 from nationals of German allies. That is, we may use German 
 money to pay a Turk's debt. 
 
 And in all of this it is well to remember that by the treaty 
 the property rights and interests of German nationals will con- 
 tinue to be subject to exceptional war measures that have been 
 or will be taken against them. 
 
 It had not been and is not my purpose to attempt a discussion 
 of the number of provisions of this instrument which run 
 counter to our constitutional guaranties, but I can not forbear 
 the observation that no one will, I apprehend, be so hardy as 
 to contend that, peace being established, we shall continue to 
 have power to take private property without compensation. 
 
 Under this plan also the excess of German property over 
 American debts will go to the reparation commission, if we 
 retain the excess. The treaty is not clear as to any other dis- 
 position of the surplus. 
 
 Now, for all this German property so disposed of, and for 
 which Germany assumes liability to her own nationals, no credit 
 is given on the reparation account, save as to that part which 
 may be ultimately turned over to the reparation commission. 
 
 One point more and I shall be done with this part of the 
 treaty. It is stipulated that all investments, wheresoever 
 affected with the cash assets of nationals of the high contract- 
 ing parties, including companies and associations in which 
 such nationals were interested, by persons responsible for the 
 administration of enemy properties or having control over such 
 administration, or by order of such persons, or of any authority 
 whatsoever, shall be annulled. That is to say, either the treaty 
 annuls or we obligate ourselves to annul all investments by 
 our Alien Property Custodian of enemy funds. The disposition 
 of such funds is not clear. 
 
 Thus we close out German interests in all allied and asso- 
 ciated countries. 
 134768—19802 
 
29 
 
 But we also take other commercial measures no less far- 
 reaeliing. The treaty terminates all multilateral treaties to 
 which Germany is a part except those specifically named in the, 
 instrument, and all bilateral treaties and conventions between 
 her and, other powers save only those which the other powers 
 notify their intention to revive. Thus another presumed tenet 
 of international law passes out with this treaty. 
 
 Moreover, under this treaty the allied and associated powers 
 acquire all the treaty and conventional rights and advantages 
 enjoyed by Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, or Turkey, and such 
 rights and advantages granted to and enjoyed by nonbelligerent 
 States or their nationals since August 1, 1914, so long as such 
 treaties, conventions, or agreements remain in force. Thus no 
 power having with Germany a treaty which gave to Germany a 
 favored position at the expense of the power will revive such ■ 
 a treaty, and every power having a treaty which gives her an 
 advantage over Germany will revive that treaty. Furthermore, 
 if Germany shall undertake to make with any foreign coimtry 
 any reciprocity treaty in regard to the importation, exporta- 
 tion, or transit of any goods, then all favors, immunities, and 
 privileges granted by it shall simultaneously and unconditionally 
 and without request or compensation be extended to all the 
 allied and associated States. The treaty thus effectually pre- 
 vents Germany from fostering her commerce by special trade 
 agreements with other countries. 
 
 The tariff and customs provisions are equally drastic. Not- 
 withstanding the increased costs of production throughout the 
 world, Germany may not, for the first six months after the 
 coming into force of this treaty, impose higher tariffs than the 
 most favorable duties applied to imports into Germany on July 
 31, 1914; and for a period of 30 months thereafter the same 
 rule shall apply to all imports covered by a designated schedule 
 which enjoyed rates conventionalized by treaties, to which im- 
 ports are added other named articles. 
 
 Furthermore, as to all duties, charges, prohibitions, and re- 
 strictions on both exports and imports, the allied and associated 
 powers enjoy favored-nation treatment. I shall make no at- 
 
 134768—19802 
 
30 
 
 tempt even to list the exceptional tariff privileges granted to 
 France, to Poland, to Luxemburg, to Morocco, and to Egypt. 
 
 The nationals of allied and associated powers resident in Ger- 
 many have as to all measures relating to occupation, profes- 
 sions, trade, and industry most-favored-nation treatment; and 
 as to taxes, charges, and imports, direct or indirect, touching 
 the property rights or interests of nationals or companies of 
 such powers or restrictions, the treatment must be that accorded 
 to German nationals. In all the foregoing I do not recall one 
 reciprocal favor granted to Germany or her nationals. 
 
 The general principle of favored-nation treatment, and in 
 some cases national treatment, is granted to the allied and asso- 
 ciated countries and their nationals in all matters referring to 
 transit, which Germany must expedite over and through Ger- 
 man territory, and as to all charges connected therewith, all 
 without any reciprocal undertaking in favor of Germany. All 
 regulations governing such traffic must be equal and nondis- 
 criminating as against the allied or associated powers or their 
 nationals. Moreover, all inland traffic, our " coastwise " trade, 
 is open to the vessels of the allied and associated powers on the 
 same terms as German vessels, while Germany may not engage 
 without permission in the like traffic of any other power. 
 
 Existing free zones in ports shall be maintained, and, in 
 addition, Germany shall lease to Czechoslovakia areas in Ham- 
 burg and Stettin, which shall be phiced under the regime of free 
 zones. 
 
 Certain specified areas of the great German river systems of 
 the Elbe, the Oder, the Niemen, and additional parts of the 
 Danube, and all navigable parts of these river systems, are 
 internationalized and placed under the administration of inter- 
 national commissions. The internationalization of the Rhine 
 is extended. On these the traffic is open to the vessels of all 
 nations on terms of perfect equality. Special concessions are 
 given to France and Belgium on the Ehine, which need not be 
 further noted. 
 
 Finally, Germany undertakes so to adapt her railway rolling 
 Btock that it may accommodate the inclusion in German trains 
 134768—19802 
 
31 
 
 of the rolling stock of the allied and associated powers, and 
 that the trains of tlie latter may incorporate German rolling 
 stock. In addition to this, regulations are laid down as to rates 
 and traffic on through trains, which Germany undertake to 
 accept and operate. 
 
 These are broad statements, covering an almost infinity of 
 details on these vai'ious subjects. For no one of these various 
 trade concessions and agreements is Germany given any credit 
 or compensation nor any direct or conspicuous advantage named 
 in the treaty. 
 
 In addition to all this, she waives aU claims arising out of 
 the internment or repatriation of German nationals and all 
 claims arising out of the capture and condemnation of German 
 ships or the liquidation of German property in China and Siam. 
 Germany waives to aU of the allied and associated powers and 
 their nationals — as already noted — all claims of any descrip- 
 tion in respect to the detention, employment (except under the 
 armistice terms), loss or damage of any German ships or boats, 
 and all claims to vessels or cargoes sunk by or in consequence 
 of naval action and subsequently salved, in which any of the 
 allied or associated Governments or their nationals may have 
 any interest either as owner, charterer, insurer, or otherwise, 
 notwithstanding any decree or condemnation by a German prize 
 coui't. Finally, Germany imdertakes not to put forward, directly 
 or indirectly, against any allied or associated power signatory 
 of the present treaty, including those which without having 
 declared war have broken ofE diplomatic relations with the 
 German Empire, any pecuniary claim based on events which 
 occurred at any time before the coming into force of the present 
 treaty, such claims by this provision to be finally and completely 
 barred. 
 
 And as a capstone to this whole remarkable edifice let me 
 refer to that provision by which Germany, on the one hand, 
 accepts and agrees to be bound by all decrees and orders con- 
 cerning German ships and goods made by any prize court of the 
 allied and associated powers and agrees to put forward no 
 claim arising out of such orders and decrees, and on the other 
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32 
 
 hand acknowledges the right of the allied and associated powers 
 to challenge all German prize-court decisions and orders. 
 
 As to that part of the treaty which deals with labor, I shall 
 now merely say : Either it will never be enforced as drawn, and 
 perhaps was never intended to be enforced as drawn, but to be 
 merely a sop thrown to labor, or if enforced as written and in the 
 spirit its provisions seem to carry it will wreck the world. It 
 compels the class antagonism between capital and labor which 
 wisdom requires that we lessen, not increase, if we are to re- 
 main a free people ; and makes possible an ultimate interference 
 of foreign nations in our labor disputes at the instance of resi- 
 dents of our own country. 
 
 I regret, sir, that this has been a long and tedious process, 
 but its importance could be satisfied in no other way. It has 
 shown us the treaty takes Germany's territory, European and 
 foreign, without compensation ; that it takes from her practi- 
 cally all of her ocean shipping and a large portion of her inland 
 vessels ; that it deprives her of all special benefits of treaties 
 and conventions ; that it takes her cables ; that it compels her 
 to supply large quantities of raw materials ; that it internation- 
 alizes her great river system and throws them open to traffic 
 of all nations on a national basis as if they were the high seas ; 
 that it opens her coastwise shipping to all nations ; that it com- 
 pels her to grant exceptional import and export privileges and 
 to accept important restrictions ; that it lays down far-reaching 
 principles governing her internal commerce and transportation ; 
 that it closes out German interests in practically the whole 
 civilized world — outside the territories of her late allies — in- 
 cluding those areas which have been taken from her and given 
 to others ; that it closes out the interests of that same world in 
 Germany. It has shown that having done all this it assesses 
 against her provisionally, with a stipulation permitting an in- 
 crease, a debt of 120,000,000,000 gold marks, which is in addi- 
 tion to the property restored in kind, and to the value of the 
 boats, gold, and securities delivered ; that it makes her responsi- 
 ble for these damages inflicted not only by herself but by her 
 allies, and even by the allied and associated powers themselves, 
 134768—19802 
 
with a list of items which includes some admittedly contrary 
 to the rules of international law hitherto existing and that 
 finally and in addition she is compelled to answer to her own 
 nationals for the value of the property taken by the allied and 
 associated powers. 
 
 It remains for me to add that the United States is bound up 
 in every one of the obligations and duties incident to the en- 
 forcement of these terms, with the great responsibilities attached 
 thereto. 
 
 We are participants, either as one of the principal allied and 
 associated powers, or as a member of the council of the league 
 of nations, in the Belgian, Saar Basin, Czecho-Slovak State, 
 Polish, free city of Danzig, and Schleswig boundary commis- 
 sions. We are in like manner participants in the Saar Basin 
 governing commission, with all the inevitable difficulties and 
 dangers attached thereto. We participate in plebiscite commis- 
 sions of Poland, Schleswig, and East Prussia, and the interallied 
 military, naval, and aeronautical commissions of control charged 
 with enforcing the disarmament provisions of this treaty. In 
 addition we have our own prisoners and graves commissions, 
 our own clearing offices if we adopt that method of adjusting 
 the enumerated debts. Finally, we are one of the four powers 
 whose representatives are to sit as a reparation commission to 
 assess damages against Germany, to appraise credits, to judge 
 of her economic requirements as affecting her ability to furnish 
 certain raw materials, to pass on her tax system, to postpone 
 payment on her debts, to prescribe the conditions of her bonds, 
 to recommend abatement of her debt, to appraise the value of 
 public property in ceded territories, and a great bulk of other 
 duties that need not be here referred to, all of which may make 
 or break the peace of Europe, with an obligation on our part 
 that having so participated in the breaking we shall once more 
 contribute our millions of men and our billions of dollars to the 
 readjustments. 
 
 In addition to this, the United States is to appoint arbitrators 
 to determine the amount of river craft that shall go to France 
 on the Rhine and to the allied and associated powers— includ- 
 
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34 
 
 log ourselves— on tlie Elbe, the Oder, the Niemen, and the 
 Danube, and to determine the conditions under which the in- 
 ternational convention relative to the St. Gothard Railway may 
 me denounced. 
 
 Mr. President, the more I consider this treaty the more I am 
 convinced that the only safe way for us to deal with it is to 
 decline to be a party to it at all. I think we should renounce 
 in favor of Germany any and all claims for indemnity because 
 of the war and see that she gets credit for what we renounce, as 
 indeed she should for the value of all she gives up as against a 
 fixed and ample indemnity. I agree with the President when he 
 says the indemnity should have been a fixed amount. We ought 
 to renounce all participation or membership in commissions, 
 committees, boards, or otherwise provided for in the treaty in 
 aid of its execution to Avhich by its terms we are parties. We 
 ought not to accept cessions of German territory. We ought to 
 declare a general policy to regard with concern any thi'eat of 
 disturbance of general world peace, but at the sariie time we 
 should reserve complete liberty of action either independently or 
 in conjunction with other powers in taking such steps as we 
 determine wise for preserving the peace. We ought, then, to 
 carry out the spirit of the act of 1916, which authorized the 
 President to convene the nations of the world together to estab- 
 lish a code of international law, reduce armaments, to establish 
 an international tribunal and go as far as possible in the direc- 
 tion of securing peace through justice, through a league to which 
 all the Avorld are parties in its formation. This would be a fit- 
 ting, generous, and dignified exit from a situation in which pri- 
 marily we had no direct concern. 
 
 It is indeed a hard and cruel peace that this treaty stipulates, 
 and I have no objections to its being so, but see no reason why 
 we, who do not partake in its spoils, should become parties to 
 its harshness and cruelty. I see no reason why we should be 
 parties to imposing upon Germany a treaty whose terms, our 
 negotiators say, she will not be able to meet ; a treaty that robs 
 9ar ancient friend, China, in a way disapproved by our negotia- 
 tors; a treaty that lays the foundation for centuries of blood- 
 
 134768—19802 
 
35 
 
 letting, into which we should not be drawn ; a treaty that, con- 
 trary to our own judgment, fails to fix the amount of indemnity 
 to be paid, leaving that vast question to the whim of a majority 
 of a commission on reparations; a treaty predicated upon the 
 assertion that a stricken and helpless world requires our coun- 
 sel and support but leaves to the beneficiaries the decision as to 
 the measure and character of the benefactions they are to re- 
 ceive; a treaty that with ominous words presages our involve- 
 ment in the eruptions of suppressed volcanic world conditions ; a 
 treaty thatwould require us to underwrite all the regional under- 
 standings between nations recognized by the league, most of 
 which are based upon oppression of weaker nations, many of 
 Avhich are as yet secret and undisclosed, and when disclosed 
 might drive us to acts of injustice similar to that in which the 
 President felt himself compelled to acquiesce in the case of 
 Shantung. 
 
 The mind stands appalled and refuses to grasp the infinite 
 possibilities which arise from the ramifications of the obligations 
 we are asked to assume. Looking at the treaty as a whole, is it 
 to be wondered at that we are asked to guarantee by our arms 
 and our resources the territorial status which it creates? 
 
 Sir, I have all but finished. I have not sought to propound 
 or establish any thesis beyond this : The treaty as it stands 
 can not be enforced. This is admitted by its proponents. The 
 treaty as it stands is but a harbinger of other and greater wars. 
 This being true, the question must come. Why was this treaty so 
 drawn and the vanquished compelled to sign it? It may be 
 when we get all the documents this will appear. And yet in 
 spite of all these great duties and obligations we assume for the 
 future, in spite of our great contribution in men and resources 
 to the successful fruition of the great joint enterprise we entered, 
 it seems to be proposed that we are to waive all participation 
 in the benefits of this treaty, and that we are to add further to 
 the general burdens of the people by ourselves compensating our 
 citizens who have suffered losses in this war. 
 
 The weight of the task resting upon us is not light, but the 
 people demand that we fully perform it, in accordance with our 
 sworn duty. We can in this matter take the ipse dixit of no man. 
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 I have sought ill my x-emarks to put before the people as. tersely: 
 as I could the salient features of this treaty so that, knowing 
 them, their counsel might assist us in our work. For one of the 
 great defects thus far incident to the treaty is that too few 
 minds have functioned on its provisions, and perusing it one 
 finds it impossible to believe that any responsible mind liad 
 sought to coordinate its provisions and trace out their ultimate 
 logical conclusions. 
 
 Nothing in all our history, sir, has called for a clearer per- 
 ception of present and future, a keener or juster understanding 
 of our free institutions, a clearer vision of the. mighty mission: 
 of our great Nation in the world, or the dedication of a purer • 
 and loftier patriotism than the consideration of this treaty. 
 
 Unless, sir, we shall have the guidance of the infinite wisdom 
 we shall fail in our duty, and, wrecking our beloved country, 
 earn the odium of its treasonable betrayal. [Applause in the 
 galleries.] 
 
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