Class _IlAieS. .1^ Book .W4TSS 5^ /^9r APPLETON'S POPULAR LIBRARY. OF THE BEST AUTHORS. LIVES OF WELLINGTON AND PEEL. JUST PUBLISHED. ESSAYS FROM ^HE LONDON TIMES ; One Volume, 16mo. 50 Cents. Containing Papers on Lady Hamilton, Dean Swift, the Frencti Revolution, •fee, &C. NOW READY. ESSAYS FROM THE LONDON TIMES; SECOND SERIES. One Volume, 16mo. 50 Cents. Containing Papers on Alfred Tennyson, Dickens, and Thackeray, Grote's Greece, Thomas Carlyle, Lord Holland, Kingslej', the Arctic Expedi- tions, Lord Langdale, Uncle Tom's Cabin. Nathaniel Hawthorne, &c WUliam B. Smith, L I I*- S-gotanlc Garden, MI.C. OF WELLOGTON AND PEEL. FROM THE LONDON TIMES. NEW-YORK : D. APPLETON & COMPANY, 200 BROADWAY. 1852. t PUBLISHERS' ADVERTISEMENT. The following Biographies appeared in the London Times immediately upon the annoimcement of the deaths of their illustrious subjects. They are here re- printed in full, accompanied with the leading articles from the same journal expressive of the sentiments of the occasion. The newspaper of the day has probably never afforded a more complete or distinguished con- tribution to historical literature. The condensation of facts is admirable, presenting what every reader of in- telligence just now demands, an able and comprehen- sive review of the many incidents of the career of Eng- land's great soldier and statesman of the present century Without seeking points of affinity in the course of the two, or looking beyond the reader's convenience in the preparation of this volume, there may yet be a pro- priety in the arrangement of these biographies from the personal relations of Peel and Wellington. " It is an interesting foct," observes a London jour- nal, " that when the first passages in the Peninsular PUBLISHERS' ADVERTISEMENT. campaigns were severely criticised in Parliament, ayoimg man, the son of a manufacturer, defended tliem again and again with admirable talent and great readiness in debate. This was -the late Sir Robert Peel, whose epitaph the Duke of Wellington lived to speak nobly and touchingly in the House of Lords. New York, Oct., 1852. CONTENTS. PAGE. Life of the Duke of "Wellington, .... 9 The Times Leadek of Sept. 15, 1852, . . . 170 The Times Leader on the Death of Peei^ . . .1*79 The Life of Sir Robert Peel, .... 189 LIVES OF WELLINGTON AND PEEL. ARTHUR WELLESLEY, DUKE OF WELLINGTON. It is a circumstance of rather iiiuisiial occurrence that the day and place of a famous birth should be un- known even to contemporary inquirers ; yet such is the case on the present occasion. It is certain that the Duke of Wellington was born in Ireland, and of an Irish family, and that the year in which he saw the light was that which ushered also Napoleon Bonaparte into the world. For most purposes but those of astro- logy these verifications of fact would be sufficient ; but it is not unlikely that the event which has now thrown Britain into mourning, may reanimate a controversy not without its attractions to inquisitive minds. The 1st of May, 1769, is specified, with few variations, as the birth- day of Arthur Wellesley by those of his biographei-s who venture on such circumstantiality, and Dangan Castle, county of Meath, has been selected with similar unanimity as the place of the event. The former of Uiese statements has received a kind of confirmation by the adoption of the Duke's name and sponsoi*ship for a I* 10 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. Royal infant born on the day in question ; yet, in the registry of St. Peter's Church, Dublin, it is duly record- ed that "Arthur, son of the Right Hon. Eai-1 and Countess of Moi-nington," was there christened by "Isaac Maun, archdeacon, on the 30th of April, 1769." This entry, while it conclusively negatives one of the two foregoing presumptions, materially invalidates the other also ; for, though not impossible, it is certainly not likely that the infant, if born at Dangan, would have been baptized in Dublin. Our own information leads us to believe that the illustrious subject of this biogra- phy fii'st saw the light in the town residence of his pa- rents, Mornington-house, a mansion of some pretensions in the centre of the eastern side of Upper Merrion-street, Dublin, and which, as it abutted 80 years ago as a cor- ner house upon a large area, since enclosed with build- ings, was occasionally desciibed as situate in Merrion- square. We are not inclined, however, to pursue a question of which the most notable point is the indifter- ence with which it was treated by the person most im- mediately concerned. The Duke kept his birthday on the 18th of June. Two families, both English by original extraction, and but Irish by settlement and adoption, were centred in the lineage from which our great Captain sprung. We shall be giving sufficient prominence to points pos- sessing little beyond incidental interest if we state that in the year 1*728 Richard Colley, of Castle Carbery, in the county of Kildare, succeeded to the name and estates of Garret Wesley, of Dangan Castle, in the county of Meath. The Colleys had migrated in the 16th century from Rutlandshire ; the Wesleys at an earlier date fi-om FAMILY NAME. H Sussex. The two families had been already connected by a recent alliance, so that Richard Colley was the fii'st cousin of Garret Wesley, whose estates in default of lineal issue he was called to inherit. The former of these two names was indiscriminately specified as Coo- ley, Colley, or Cowley ; the third of which forms ob- tained the preference at a recent revival of the family designation ; the latter was usually written Westley or Wesley till 1797, when the first Marquis adopted the orthography of Wellesley, now familiar to the world. It was, however, as "Arthur Wesley" that the subject of these memoii-s was first known as a soldier, and the young officer will be found so designated in contempo- rary descriptions of his earlier services. The double notoriety attaching itself to the name of Wesley will be suggestive, we doubt not, of some edifying thoughts, and to the ready pen which chronicled both reputations in the respective history of Methodism and the Peninsu- lar War, we owe an anecdote curious enough to be transcribed into our more concise biography. When Charles, the brother of John Wesley, was at Westmin- ster School, his father received a communication from an Irish gentleman, oft'ering to adopt the boy as heir ; but the overture, strange as it may seem, was declined. It was for this Charles Wesley that Richard Colley was substituted by the owner of Dangan, and thus, but for a capricious and improbable transfer of fortune, " we might," says Southey in his speculative reflections, "have had no Methodists ; the British empire in India might still have been menaced from Seringapatam, and the undisputed tyrant of Europe miglit still have insulted and threatened us on our own shores." The Richard I 12 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. Colley thus favoured was created Baron Mornington, of the Irish peerage, in 1746, a title which was exchanged for an earldom, 14 years later, in ftivour of his son. This second Lord Mornington, of musical celebrity, left by his wife, Anne, daughter of Arthur Hill, Viscount Dungannon, nine children surviving, of whom one be- came Marquis Wellesley, one Baron Cowley, and one, christened we presume after his maternal grandfather, Duke of Wellington. Arthur Wellesley, by the death of his father in 1*781, became dependent at an early age upon the care and prudence of his mother, a lady, as it fortunately happened, of talents not unequal to the task. Under this direction of his studies he was sent to Eton, from which college he was transferred, first, to private tuition at Brighton, and subsequently to the military seminary of Angers, in France. For the deficiency of any early promise in the future hero we are not confined to nega- tive evidence alone. His relative inferiority was the subject of some concern to his vigilant mother, and had its influence, as we are led to conclude, in the selection of the military profession for one who displayed so little of the family aptitude for elegant scholarship. At An- gers, though the young student left no signal reputation behind him, it is clear that his time must have been productively employed. Pignerol, the director of the seminary, was an engineer of high repute, and the op- portunities of acquiring, not only professional knowledge, but a serviceable mastery of the French tongue, were not likely to have been lost on such a mind as that of his pupil. Altogether, six years were consumed in this iourse of education, which, though partial enough in FOUNDER OF HIS OWN FORTUNES, 13 itself, was so far in advance of the age that we may conceive the young cadet to have carried with him to his corps a more than average store of professional ac- quirements. On the Yth of March, 1787, the Hon. Arthur Wellesley, being then in his 18th year, received his Qi'st commission as an ensign in the 73d Regiment of Foot. The only point of interest in his position at this minute is the degree of advantage over his contem- poraries which might be derived from the family con- nexions above described ; and a review of the facts will lead, we think, to the conclusion that, though the young officer commanded sufficient interest to bring his deserts into immediate and favourable notice, he was not so circumstanced as to rely exclusively on such considera- tions for advancement. A French historian, indeed, has indulged in a sneer at the readiness with which the haughty aristocracy of Britain submitted themselves, in after times, to the ascendancy of an Irish parvenu, but this assumption is as little warrantable as that by which the distinctions of the young cadet are attributed to the nobility of his extraction. The pretensions of Arthur Wellesley were insufficient, even at a somewhat later period, to secure him from failure in that test of social position — the choice of a wife ; nor could his opportu- nities have produced more than commonplace^ success to a man of ordinary capacity. On the other hand, they relieved him from those risks of neglect and injustice which must occasionally be fatal even to eminent worth, and they carried him rapidly over those early stages in which, under other circumstances, the fortunes of a life might have been perhaps consumed. He possessed in- terest enough to make merit available, but not enough to dispense with it. , 14 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. His promotion was accordingly rapid, but not more so in its first stops tlian in examples visible at the pre- sent day, and nuieh less so than in the case of some of his contemporaries. He remained a subaltern four years and three months, at the expiration of which period of service he received his captaincy. The ho- nour of having trained the Duke of Wellington would be highly regarded in the traditions of any particular corps, but so numerous and rapid were his exchanges at this period that the distinction can hardly be claimed by any of the regiments on the rolls of which he was temporarily borne. He entered the array, as we have said, in the TSd, but in the same year he moved, as lieutenant, to the '76th, and within the next eighteen months was transferred, still in a subaltern's capacity, to the 41st foot and the I'Jth Light Dragoons, succes- sively. On the 30th of June, 1791, he was promoted to a captaincy in the oSth, from which corps he ex- changed into the 18th Light l^ragoons in the October of the following year. At length, on the 30th of April, 1T03, he obtained his majority in the 33d, a regiment which may boast of considerable indentification with his renown, for he proceeded in it to his lieutenant- colonelcy and colonelcy, and commanded it pei-sonally throughout tlie early stages of his active career. These rapid exchanges bespeak the operation of somewhat un- usual interest in pushing the young oflBcer forward ; (or in those days a soldier ordinarily continued in the corps to which he was first gazetted, and to which his hopes, prospects, and connections were mainly confined. So close, indeed, and permanent were the ties thus formed, that when Colonel Wellesley's own comrade EARLY POSITION. 1^ and commander, General Harris, was asked to name the title by which he would desire to enter the peerage, he could only refer to the 5th Fusihers as having been for nearlv six and twenty years his constant home. The brother of Lord Momington was raised above these necessities. of routine; but what is chiefly notice- able in the incidents described is that the period of his probationary service was divided between cavalry and infontry alike— a circumstance of some advantage to so observant a mind. Before the active career of the young oiheer com- menced he was attached as aide-de-camp to the staft of the Earl of Westmoreland, then Lord-Lieutenant of Ir^ land, and in 1790, having just come of age, he was re- turned to the L-ish Parliament for the f^^mily borough of Trim. The most eager researches into this period ot his career, have not elicited any thing to prove that he was distinguished from those around him. In one par- ticuhxr, indeed, he shared the failings common to his class and times, after a fashion singularly contrasted ^vith the subsequent developments of his character. Captain Wellesley got seriously into debt. So pressmg, in fact, ^v^re his obligations, that he accepted tempo- rary relief from a bootmaker in whose house he lodged ; and before quitting England on foreign service confided the arrangement of his atfairs to another Dublin trades- man, whom he empowered for this purpose to receive the disposable portion of his income. At lenc^th, in the month of May, 1V94, Ar hur Welleslev, being then in his twenty-sixth year and m command of the. 33d Regiment-a position which he owed to his brother's hberality-embarked at Cork lor 16 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. service on the continent of Europe, so that his first active duties involved great independent responsibility. The aspect of affairs at that period was unpromising in the extreme. War had been declared about twelve months previously between England and France, and 10,000 British troops, under the command of the Duke of York, had been despatched to aid the operations of the Allied Powers in the Low Countries. It would be difficult to impress an Englishman of the present gene- ration with a true conception of the character and repu- tation of the British army at that period. Forty yeai-s had elapsed since the appearance of any considerable English force on the European continent, and the recol- lections of the campaigns in question were not calcu- lated to suggest any high opinions of British prowess. In fact, the Duke of Cumberland had been systematically beaten by Marshal Saxe, and the traditions of Marl- borough's wars had been obliterated by contests in which the superiority of the French soldiery seemed to be declared. The ascendancy, too, so signally acquired at this time by our navy tended to confirm the im- pressions referred to, and it was argned that the ocean had been clearly marked out as the exclusive scene of our preponderance. Throughout a great part of the century these opinions had been rather justified than belied by our own proceedings. AVe fought many of our colonial battles with mercenaries, and we hired German battalions even to defend our coasts and pro- tect the established succession of the Throne. A new school of war, to which the attention of the reader will be presently directed, was, indeed, forming in the East; but its influence was hardly yet known, and the Duke THE DUKE OF VORKS REPULSE. 17 of York's corps was disembarked at Osteiid with, per- haps, less prestige than any division of the alHed army. Though the exertions of the Royal commander had al- ready been directed, and with some success, to military reforms, yet the conditions of the service were still miserably bad. The commissariat was wretched, the medical department shamefully ineffective, and rapa- city, peculation, and mismanagement prevailed to a most serious extent. Such was the army which Colonel Wellesley proceeded to join. It was no wonder that English as well as Imperialists were worsted by Repub- lican levies, not only numerically superior, but whose system confounded all received tactics as utterly as the campaigns of Charles VIII. in Italy demolished the conceptions of medianal warl^ire. The Duke of York was repulsed in a series of engagements w^hich we need not describe, and it was in aid of his discomfited force that Colonel Wellesley cariied out the 33d Regiment to the scene of his first, as well as of his last service — the plains of Belgium. The first military operation performed by the con- queror of Waterloo was the evacuation of a town in the face of the enemy. The 33d had been landed at Os- tend ; but when Lord Moira, who had the chief com- mand of the reinforcements sent out, arrived at that port with the main bodv, he saw reason for promptly withdrawing the garrison and abandoning the place. Orders were issued accoi-dingly, and though the Repub- licans, under Pichegru, were at the gates of the town before the English had quitted it, the 33d was safely embarked. Lord Moira by a flank march eftected a timely junction with the Duke of York at Maline.s. 18 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. Colonel Wellesley took his corps round by the Scheldt, and landed at Antwerp, whence he moved without de- lay to the head-quarters of the Duke. This was in Ju- ly, 1*794. The operations which followed, and which terminated in the following spring with the re-embar- catiou of the British troops at Bremerlehe, a town at the mouth of the Weser, constituted Arthur Wellesley's first campaign. They do not, for the purposes of our memoir, require any circumstantial description. The total force of the Allied Powers was strong, but it was extended over a long line of country, composed of he- terogeneous troops, and commanded by generals, not only independent, but suspicious of each other's deci- sions. In the face of an enemy, first animated by des- peration and then intoxicated by success, there existed no unity of plan or concert of movements. After the defeat sustained by the Austrians at Fleurus the cam- paign was resolved into retreat on the part of the Allies and pursuit of fortune on the part of the French. The Austrians were on the middle Rhine, the British on the Meuse. The route taken by the Duke of York in his successive retirements from one position to another lay tlirough Breda, Bois le Due, and Nimeguen, at which latter place he maintained himself against the enemy with some credit. Early in December, however, he re- signed his command to General Walmoden, and re- turned to England, leaving the unfortunate division to struggle with even greater difliculties than they had yet experienced. Disengaged by repeated triumphs from their Austrian antagonists, the Republican forces closed in tremendous strength round the English and their comrades. The winter set in with such excessive severi- FIRST CAMPAIGN. 19 ty that the rivers were passable for the heaviest class of cannon, provisions were scanty, and little aid was forth- coming from the inhabitants against either the inclem- ency of tlie season or the casualties of war. It was found necessary to retire into Westphalia, and in this retreat, which was commenced on the 15th of January, 1795, the troops are said to have endured for some days privations and sufferings little short of those en- countered by the French in the Moscow campaign. So deep was the snow that all ti'aces of roads were lost, wagons laden with sick and wounded were unavoidably abandoned, and to straggle from the column was to perish. The enemy were in hot pursuit, and the popu- lation undisguisedly hostile to their nominal allies. At length the Yssel was crossed, and the troops reposed for awhile in cantonments along the Ems ; but as the French still prepared to push forward, the alhed force continued its retreat, and as they entered Westphalia tlie tardy appearance of a strong Prussian corps secured them from further molestation till the embarcation took place. Such was the Duke of Wellington's first campaign. Whatever might have been the actual precocity of his talent, there was obviously no room in such operations for the exercise on his part of anything beyond intrepidi- ty and steadiness, and these qualities, as we learn, were made visibly manifest. His post was that which in a retreat is the post of honour — the rearguard. The com- mand of a brigade devolved on him by seniority, and the able dispositions of Colonel Wellesley in checking' the enemy or executing an assault are circumstances of special remark in contemporary accounts of the trans- 'JO THE DIKE OF ^VE1.L1^•GT0N. actions. In partiouhir, the affaii-s of Druyten, Moteren, and Geldermansel, are mentioned uith some detail, as reflecting considerable credit on the 33d and its com- mander. Beyond this point Colonel \^'ellesley's repn- t^ntion was not extended, but Ave may readily imagine how material a portion of his professional character might have been formed in this Dutch campaign. Irrespec- tively of the general uses of advei'sity, the miscarriages of this ill-starreii expedition must have been fraught with invaluable lessons to the future heiv. He observeil the absolute need of undivided authority in an enemy's presence, and the hopelessness of all such imperfect combinations as State jealousies stiggested. We are justitied in inferring from his subsequent demonstrations of character tbat no error escaped either his notice or his memory, lie saw a powerful force frittered away by divisions, and utterly routed by an enemy which but a few months before had been scared at the very news of its approach. He saw the indispensability of pieserv- ing discipline in a friendly country, and of conciliating the dispositions of a local population, always powerful for good or evil. Though a master hand was wantiiig at head-quart el's, yet Abercromby was present, and the young Picton was making his tii-st essay by the side of his future comrade. Austrian, Pi'ussian, Hanoverian, French, Dutch, and British wei'e in the field together, and the care exemplitied in appointing and piwisioning the respective battalions might K^ serviceably contrasted. Every check, every repulse, every privation, and every loss brought, we may be sure, its enduring moral to Ar- thur AVellesley ; and although Englishmen may not re- flect without emotion on the destiuios which were thus ILL HEALTH. 21 perilled in the swamps of Holland, the future General had perhaps little reason to repine at the rug-ged tuition of his iii-st campaign. On the return of the expedition to England the 3od was landed at Harwich, and for a short time encamped at Warley, whore it soon recovered its effective strength. In the autumn of the same year Colonel Wellesley con- ducted his corps to Southampton, where it was embark- ed on board the outward-bound fleet, under the flag of Admiral Christian. The destination of the force was the AYest Indies, but through a series of accidents so re- markable as to acquire, in conjunction w4th subsequent events, a providential character, the orders were ulti- mately changed, and the services of the young Colonel were employed on a scene far better calculated to devel- ope his military genius. For some time the winds were so adverse that the vessels were unable to quit the port at all, and when they had at length succeeded in put- ting to sea they encountered such tempestuous weather as to be finally compelled, after experiencing serious casualties, to return to Portsmouth. Meantime new exi- gencies had arisen, and in the spring of 1796 the wea- ther-beaten 33d received directions to embark for Ben- gal. At this critical period, however, the health of Colonel AVellesley suddenly foiled him. Considering that strength of constitution and temperament with which we have since become familiar, it is remarkable to observe how repeatedly the Iron Duke, in earlier days, was attacked, and apparently almost mastered, by debility and sickness. On the present occasion he w'as actually unable to embark with his regiment, but a favourable change afterwards supervened, and he sue- 22 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. ceeded in joining the corps at the Cape of Good Hope. The remainder of the voyage was soon completed, and in February, 1 Y 97, Arthur Wellesley landed at Calcutta to commence in earnest that career of service which will reflect such eternal lustre on his name. Before recounting those memoi'able campaigns by which our empire in the East was finally established, it will be desirable to premise some intelligible description of the scenes and persons to which Colonel Wellesley was now introduced. Half the unpopularity attributed to Indian history resides in the strangeness of Oriental names, and we are pei-suaded that any reader of ordi- nary attention who would familiarise himself with the geographical expressions and family titles current in these parts, would afterwards comprehend the affairs of India with as much readiness as those of any European country. In 1*797 there still existed, and in something more than name, a Great Mogul, that is to say, a representa- tive of that Mogul or Tartar dynasty which since the commencement of the 16th century had established it- self in the Imperial Sovereignty of India. He was not, however, directly possessed of any substantial power, though there was eager competition for the exercise of his traditional authority. He resided at Delhi, and in histories of this period is often termed '' the King," a title which, though afterwards conferred by us on the Nabob of Oude, was long considered in India as the exclusive property of the supreme territorial lord. The power lost by this monarch in the decline of his domin- ion had been seized by two classes of people — his own lieutenants, who had converted their governments into IN INDIA. 23 independent heritages ; and his Hindoo subjects, who had embraced the opportunity of renouncing an alle- giance which they had never willingly or perhaps abso- lutely acknowledged. Of the former class were the Nabobs of Oude and Bengal in Hindostan, i e., in that part of India, commonly so called, which is north of the Nerbudda river, and the still more powerful lieutenant who administered singly the whole of the " Deccan " or "South," under which designation was nominally comprised almost all the southern portion of the penin- sular exclusive of " the Carnatic," a name attached to its south-eastern districts between the river Kistnah and Cape Comorin. The first of these Princes was usually termed " the Nabob-Vizier," or " Vizier," in conse- quence of that office having been monopolised by his family during the decline of the Mogul empire. The second, the " Nabob " or " Subahdar " of Bengal, had been conquered by us at Plassey, and we had virtually assumed his inheritance ourselves. The third, he of the Deccan, was termed " the Nizam," or " Lieutenant," — a title which had been given purely for personal dis- tinction to the first Viceroy of this pro\ince on his ac- cepting office, but which had been perpetuated in favour 3f his successors, as we see to this day. The Carnatic was not held immediately of the Mogul Sovereign, but of his lieutenant in the Deccan, who thus claimed the allegiance of a feudatory not greatly inferior to himself. The Prince in question was called the Nabob of the Carnatic, or, more familiarly, from his place of resi- dence, the Nabob of Arcot. These were the Mahome- tan Powers with which we had then to deal. The Hindoo pretenders to dominion were represent- 24 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. ed by the Mahrattas, a powerful and warlike tribe of the Malabar coast, which had successfully resisted the great Aiiruugzebe, and which had turned to such profit the imbecility of his successors as to have almost reviv- ed in their own favor the Imperial claims of the Mo- guls themselves. They had extended their power by dispatching their great captains in vaijous directions on the common errand of conquest ; such conquests to be retained by the individual victors on condition of alle- giance and tribute payable to the supreme family. This family held court originally at Sattara, under a title which has been made familiar to the present gene- ration by the importunities of its soi-disant representa- tive ; but the Rajahs of Sattara had been superseded in all effective or cognizable authority by the " Peishwa " oi* " chief " of their own privy council — an office which had been made hereditary in a particular family, and to which the pnncely power had been wholly transfer- red. The Peishwa resided at Poonah, but his lieuten- ants had already assumed an independence little less substantial than that of the Mogul viceroys just describ- ed. One named Scindiah, then the most formidable of the cousinhood, had established himself in Malwa, and was pretending to extraordinary dominion in western Hindostan ; another, named Ilolkar, had set up his standard a little to the south of Scindiah, in the town of Indore ; the Bhonsla family were settled with great possessions at Nagpore, in the north-east of the Deccan ; and the " Guicowar," or " herdsman," was installed in the government of Guzerat, contiguous to the Peishwa's territory. Of this great and formidable Mahratta con- federacy only two members now survive as substantive HINDOO PRINCIPALITIES. 26 powers of India — the Guicowar, still called by his an- cestral appellative ; and the Nagpore prince, at present styled the Rajah of Berai* ; the Peishwa's prerogatives having been extinguished and absorbed by Lord Hast- ings in 1819, and Scindiah and Holkar having succumb- ed in the stubborn contests which we shall have pre- sently to recount It will further be requisite to men- tion that an inconsiderable Hindoo principality in the south had been usurped by a Mahometan adventurer, who was consolidating an inheritance with true Oriental success, a"nd that the Abdalla empire, founded about 40 years previously in Affghanistan, was still vigorously administered by Zemaum Shah, the identical prince visited by our own generals but the other day. Our remarks refer to a period of Indian history so compara- tively early, that any actor in these half-forgotten scenes appears like a phantom of the past ; but it will stimu- late our interest in the subject before us, if we endeavour to realize to our own imaginations that the grey-headed old soldier who but yesterday was riding down White- hall was the identical hero who fifty years since drove Dowlut Rao to capitulate, and packed oft' Dhoondiah on the carriage of a galloper gun. It is strange that the commander of an army should be one of its last survi- vors. The position of the Indian Government relatively to the Home Administration was not, when Colonel Wel- lesley arrived in those parts, materially difterent from that which exists at present. The great step of iden- tifying these prodigious acquisitions with the dominions of the British Crown had virtually been taken already ; and Lord Cornwallis, in the last war, had wielded, to 2 26 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. Tippoo's cost, the resources of'an Empire instead of the arms of a Company. A few years earlier India had scarcely been reputed among the fields open to the sol- diers of the British army, and regiments were reluc- tantly despatched to quarters not looked upon at first with any favourable eye. But the scene had been changed by late achievements ; and though a com- mand in India was not what it has since become, it was an object of reasonable ambition. Napoleon pre- tended, even after the victories of Seringapatam and Assaye, to slight the sei-vices of a " sepoy general," but Wellesley established for the school, in the eyes of all Europe, a reputation which it has never since lost. Small as were the anticipations of such active ser- vice which the young Colonel could have entertained at his first landing in India, a few months saw him in the field with his corps against a resolute and formidable enemy. By a notable instance of fortune, the elder brother of Arthur Wellesley was nominated to the Gov- ernor-Generalship of India within a few months after the subject of these memoiis had arrived at Calcutta, and the talents of a most accomplished statesman were thus at hand to develope and reward the genius of the rising soldier. Lord Mornington, like many of his successors, went out in the confident expectation of maintaining peace, but found himself engaged in hostiHties against his most ardent desire. At that time the three Presi- dencies of India shared pretty evenly between them the perils and prospects of active service in the field. Ben- gal, since the definite submission of Oude, had been comparatively quiet ; but it was the Imperial presidency, and its troops were held readily disposable for the exi- POLITICAL INFLUENCES. 27 gencies of the others. Bombay vibrated with every convulsion of the Mahratta States, by which it was sur- rounded; and Madras, in earh'er times the leading gov- ernment, had recovered much of its importance from the virtual absorption of the Carnatic, the formidable resources and uncertain disposition of the Nizam, and, above all, the menacing attitude of Tippoo Sultaun, the adventurer of Mysore. It was against this barbaric chieftain that the spurs of Arthur Wellesley were won. When the two brothers met at Calcutta, in 1798, the principal risk of war was created by the unruly resentments of Tippoo. Oude had been subdued; Ben- gal was our own ; the Carnatic had been absorbed, and the Nizam of the Deccan, like the other Prinzes still in- dependent, w^as trimming between the British alliance and that of States whom he dreaded still more than ourselves. There still remained, however, a considerable element of French influence in the peninsula. We had, it is true, definitely expelled these dangerous rivals by the capture of Pondicherry in 1761, and they no lon- ger worked openly on their own account; but the Nizam maintained an imposing force disciplined by more than 100 French officers, under M. Raymond, and Scindiah employed with similar views the services of General Perron. It can be little matter of surprise, therefore, that the dread of French influence should still predominate at Madras, and it Avas the assumed iden- tification of Tippoo with these inveterate antagonists of Britain which rendered the wars with him, and with him only of all Indian Princes, so generally popular at home. Tippoo had recently made peace with the Company, 28 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. but the treaty as regarded his stipulations was so essen- tially of a penal character that his patient acquiescence in its operation was not to be expected, though Lord Mornington, as we have seen, did both desire and an- ticipate a perpetuation of the truce. Within a very few weeks, however, of his arrival at the seat of his govern- ment, he learnt that the Mysore Sultaun had been ac- tively intriguing with the French for the purpose of expelling us from the Peninsula. It is more likely, perhaps, that this idea should have been suggested to Tippoo by some one of the many Frenchmen still lurk- ing in India than that the Oriental despot should of himself have descried the resources presented to him by the unscrupulous ambition of the Republican Directory. However this may be, he undoubtedly despatched am- bassadors with this object to the Mauritius, the nearest French settlement, and these envoys actually disem- barked at Mangalore on their return voyage, with a body of European recruits, at the very moment that the new Governor-General on his way to Calcutta touched at Madras. It does not fall within our purpose to dis- cuss the respective cases of the belligerents. It is enough to remark that Tippoo's suspicions of ourselves were most cordially reciprocated, and that this new dynasty of Mysore had been always regarded, both in India and at home, with excessive jealousy and alarm. A war with Tippoo was counted as a life and death struggle, and although the last campaign of Cornwalhs had pretty clearly prognosticated the ultimate issue, yet the whole resources of the Indian Government were now sum- moned as to a deadly strife. Those resolutions nearly affected the rising fortunes of Arthur Wellesley. On NEW SCENE OF DUTY. ^9 landing, as we have seen, at Calcutta in February, 1*797, he had been despatched upon an expedition di- rected against Manilla, but transports sailed slowly in those days, and by the time that the several vessels had arrived at their fii-st rendezvous the alarm had been given at Madras, and they were overtaken by a pe- remptory recall. Each Presidency mustered its whole strength for the conflict, and as a reinforcement of that most immediately menaced, the 33d was transferred from Bengal and placed upon the Madras establishment. On this new scene of duty Colonel Wellesley arrived in September, 1798. It had happened, and, as we may reasonably con- clude, by something more than accident, that the young Colonel was already well acquainted with the future theatre of war. On returning from the Straits he had paid a visit to Lord Hobart, then Governor of Madras. His stay extended over a few weeks only ; but this sliort period had enabled him to cast his eagle glance over the military establishments of that Presidency, and over the various capabilities of the Carnatic. He brought, therefore, to the duties which he now assumed, information of a most serviceable character. The Com- mander-in-Chief at Madras was General, afterwards Lord Harns, under whose auspices Colonel Wellesley was stationed at Wallajahbad, with the responsible commission of organizing, equipping, and practising the forces of the Presidency destined for the expedition. Ths state of feeling in India at that period partook of no such confidence as was afterwards displayed. The troops at the Governor's command were neither numer- ous nor well provided ; the resources of the Treasury 30 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. were scanty, and the alliances of the Company had been seriously damaged by the temporizing and ungenerous policy of the late Governor-General, Sir John Shore. Moreover, although the last campaign had been un- doubtedly successful in its results, recollections of a dis- agreeable character were created by its vast consump- tion of blood and treasure, and by the perils of mis- carriage which had been experienced in its coui-se. It is natural enough from our present point of view to consider these apprehensions as having been unduly magnified, but it should be remembered at the very moment when Colonel Wellesley was ordered to Ma- dras, Bonaparte had actually disembarked a French army on the shores of Egypt, and had put himself in communication with Tippoo — fiicts quite menacing enough to warrant unusual misgivings. The strength, too, of the Mysore army gave at least 70,000 troops, admirably equipped, and in no contemptible state of discipline, while tlie Madnis muster rolls showed a total of no more tlian 14,000 of all arms, including less tlian 4,000 Europeans. In f;\ct. Lord Mornington had been compelled to exchange the scheme of attack originally contemplated for a more cautious and regular exertion of his strength. With these reluctant conclusions he ordered General Harris to stand on the defensive along the Mysore frontier, and to augment the efficiency of his army by all available means, while he turned his own attention to the native Courts, whose alliance or neutrality it was desirable to secure. That nothing on his part might be wanting to the success of the enterprise, he had transferred himself and his staff from Calcutta to Madras, and the effects of ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT. 31 his policy and his presence were quickly discernible in the impulse communicated to every department of the service, and the restoration of energy and confidence throughout the Presidency. Those efforts were admi- rably seconded by the practical exertions of his brother at Wallajahbad. So effectually had Colonel Wellesley employed the three months of his local command, that the division under his charge from being weak and ill provided had become conspicuous for its organization and equipment, and when the whole arm)'- presently took the field in unparalleled efficiency, the especial ser- vices of Colonel Wellesley in bringing about this result were acknowledged in a general order of the Comman- der-in-Chief. The whole force now put in motion against the famous Tiger of Mysore comprised three di- visions — that of the Carnatic, 30,000 strong, that of Bombay, two-thirds less numerous, and the contingent of our ally, the Nizam. The latter consisted of the British detachment in the Nizam's service, of a few battalions of his own infantry, including some of M. Raymond's force lately disbanded, and of a large body of cavalry. To complete the efficiency of this power- ful division it was resolved to add a King's regiment to its rolls, and at the express wish of the Nizam's Min- ister, coupled with the prompt approval of General Harris, Colonel Wellesley's corps was selected for this duty, and on him the general coinmand of the whole contingent was suffered to devolve. By these arrange- ments, which were to the unqualified satisfaction of all parties concerned. Colonel Wellesley assumed a promi- nent place in the conduct of the war, and enjoyed op- portunities of displaying both his special intelligence 32 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. and his intuitive military powei-s. Few opportunities indeed could be better calculated for the full develop- ment of his genius. He held a command sufficiently independent to elicit all his talents ; he formed one of the political commission attached to the Commander-in- Chief; and he acted imder the eyes of a Governor whose acuteness in discerning merit and promptitude in rewarding it were quickened on this occasion by the natural impulses of affection. Nor were there wanting in the same ranks either models of excellence or stout competitors for fome. Besides Harris himself, there were Baird and Cotton, Dallas and Brown, Floyd and Malcolm — soldiers all of them of high distinction and extraordinary renown, who either sought or staked a professional reputation in this memorable war against Tippoo Sultaun. By the end of February, 1799, the invading forces had penetrated into the dominions of Mysore, though so difficult was the country and so insufficient, notwith- standing tlie previous preparations, were the means of transport, that half-a-dozen miles constituted an ordi- nary day's march, and three weeks were consumed in conveying intelligence from the western division of the army to the eastern. The first movements of Tippoo from his central position had been judiciously directed against the weaker corps which was advancing from Cananore, but in his attempt on this little force he was signally repulsed ; on which, wheeling to the right about, and retracing his steps, he brought himself foce to face with the main army under General Harris near Malavelly, a place within 30 miles of his capital city, Seringapatam. His desires to engage were promptly BEFORE SEKINGAPATAM. 33 met by the Britisli Commander, who received his at- tack with the right wing of the army, leaving the left, which was composed of the Nizam's contingent under Colonel Wellesley, to charge and turn the flank of the enemy opposed to it. Colonel Wellesley's dispositions for this assault were speedily made, and, having been approved by General Harris, were executed with com- plete success. The conduct of the 33d decided the action. Knowing that if he could break the European regi- ment the native battalions might be expected to despair, the Sultaun directed a column of his choicest troops against Colonel Wellesley's corps ; which, reserving its fire till the enemy had closed, delivered a searching volley, charged, and threw the whole column into a disorder which the sabres of the Dragoons were not long in converting to a rout. After this essay it was clear that the campaign would turn upon the siege of the capital, and on the 4tli of April the army, by the judicious strategy of Harris, arrived in eftective condition before the ramparts of Seringapatam. Between the camp of the besiegers and the walls of this famous fortress stretched a considerable extent of irregular and broken ground, aftbrding excellent cover to the enemy for annoying the British lines with musketry and rocket practice. At one extremity was a "tope" or grove called the Sultaunpettah tope, com- posed mainly of betel trees, and intersected by numer- ous water-courses for the purposes of irrigation. The first operations of the besiegers were directed to the occupation of a position so peculiarly serviceable to the party maintaining it. Accordingly, on the night of the 4th General Baird was ordered to scour this tope — a 2* 34 THE DUKE OF WKLLlNtaUN. commission wliicli he discharged without encountering any opposition. Next morning Tippoo's troops were again seen to occupy it in great force, on which General Harris resolved to repeat the attack on the succeeding night, and to retain the position when carried. The duty was intrusted on this occasion to Colonel AYellos- ley of the 33d and a native battalion, who was to be supported by another detachment of similar strength under Colonel Shawe. This was the famous alfair of Avhich so much has been said, and which, with such various colourings, hjis been described as the first serv- ice of Arthur, Duke of WelUngton. On receiving the order. Colonel AVellesley addressed to his commander the following note, remarkable j\s being the first of that series of despatches which now constitute so extraordi- nary a monument of his fame : — "to UKITENANT-GENKBAL HARRIS, COMMANDER-IN-CHIKF. " Camp, 5th April, 1*799. " My pkau Sir, — I do not know whore you mean tlie post to bo ostablishod, aiui I sluill therefore be obliged to you if you will do mo the favour to meet me this afternoon in front of the lines and show it to mc. In the meantime I will order my battalion to be in readiness. "• Upon looking at the tope as 1 eame in just now, it ap- peared to me that when you get possession of the bank of the nullah you have tlie tope as a matter of course, as the latter is in the rear of the former. However, von are the best judge, and I shall be ready. " I am, my dear Sir, your most faitJiful sei-vant, '" ARTHUR WELLESLEY." This letter has been often appealed io as evidence of that brevity, pej*spicacity, and decision afterwards ONLY FAILURE. 35 recognized as such notable characteristics of the great Duke's stjde. Without stopping to challenge the criti- cism, we would rather point to it as signally exomplity- ing the change which had taken place in the young Colonel's official position since we last saw him in the Dutch campaign. Instead of simply conducting a regi- ment, we now find him, though still only a colonel, in command of a powerful division of an army, influencing the character of its operations, corresponding on terms of freedom with the General-in-Chief, and preserving his despatches for the edification of posterity. Reserv- ing, however, any further comment on these circum- stances, we must now state that the attack in question was a fiiilure. Bewildered in the darkness of the night, and entangled in the difficulties of the tope, tha assault- ing parties were thrown into confusion, and, although Shawe was enabled to report himself in possession of the post assigned to him. Colonel Wellesley was com- pelled, as the General records in his private diary, to come, "in a good deal of agitation, to say he had not carried the tope." When daylight broke the attack was renewed with instantaneous success, showing; at once what had been the nature of the obstacles on the previous night ; but the affiiir has been frequently quoted as Wellington's " only failure," and the particu- lars of the occurrence were turned to some account in the jealousies and scandals from which no camp is wholly free. The reader will at once perceive that the circumstances suggest no discussion whatever. A night attack, by the most natural of results, failed of its ob- ject, and w^as successfully executed the next morning as soon as the troops discovered the nature of their duties. 36 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. When these advanced posts had fallen into our hands, the last liour of Tippoo's reign might be thought to have struck, and the final results of the expedition to be beyond peril. But there is an aspect.of facility about Indian campaigning which is extremely delusive to those unexperienced in its risks. All goes apparently without a check, and all is thought easy and insignifi- cant; but the truth is, that a single check, however slight, will often turn the whole tide of success. It is the characteristic of this warfare that reverses which in other countries would be endured without serious dam- age are here liable to be fotal. To our check before the little fort of Kalunga, in 1814, we owed probably the duration and losses of the Nepaul war, and it has been credibly averred that if the ingenious operations of our officers had failed before the gates of Ghuznee, the disasters of the Cabul retreat would have been antici- pated in that fii*st Aftghan expedition, which now reads like a triumphal march. It is true that Tippoo's forces proved unequal to encounter in the field even the weak- est of the invading armies, and that our position before Seringapatam had been taken up without any resist- ance proportioned to the renown or resources of our enemy. But the fort was extremely strong, the place unhealthy to the last degree, and any material pro- traction of the siege would have exhausted the pro- visions of the army, and given time for the season to do its work. The river Cauvery is periodically swelled during the monsoon, and, had this occurred earlier than usual, the siege must have been raised, and a disastrous retreat — for in India all retreats are disastrous — nmst have been the inevitable consequence. As it was, the CONDUCT OF THE SIEGE. 37 Commander-in-Chief was full of apprehensions, and Sir John Malcolm used in after days to relate an anecdote which shows better than any calculation how many chances still remained in Tippoo's favour. On the day appointed for the storm, he entered the General's tent, and saluted him by anticipation with the title which proved afterwards the reward of his services. " Mal- colm," was the serious reply of the old chief, " this is no time for compliments. We have serious work on hand. Don't you see that the European sentry over my tent is so weak from want of food and exhaustion that a Sepoy could push him down ? We must take this fort or perish in the attempt. I have ordered Baird to persevere in his attack to the last extremity ; if he is beat off, Wellesley is to proceed with the troops from the trenches ; if he also should not succeed, I shall put myself at the head of the remainder of the army, for success is necessary to our existence." In fact, these arrangements had been actually made. Colonel Wellesley, whose unremitting atten- tion to all the duties of the siege is shown in a multi- plicity of despatches, and the value of whose sugges- tions is proved by their effect upon the operations, re- ceived orders to head the reserve in the advanced trenches and to await the success of the storm. The fighting in the batteries had already been desperate and the losses heavy, but 2,500 Europeans still sur- vived to lead the assault, and a chosen column of Se- poys followed them. It was midday on the 4th of May. Colonel Wellesley had received reports of the state of the breach, had revised them in terms exactly like tliose afterwards used atCiudad Rodrigo and Bada- 38 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. joz, had superintended tlie final preparations, and was expecting the result from his appointed post. "It was," says one near him, " a moment of agony, and we continued with aching eyes to watch the result, until, after a short and appalling interval, we saw the accliv- ity of the breach, covered with a cloud of crimson." The assault succeeded, and Colonel Wellesley advanced from his position, not to renew a desperate attempt, but to restore some order in the captured city, and to certify the death of our dreaded enemy by discovering his body yet warm and palpitating under a mountain of slain. Duties little less arduous than those of the actual storm devolved presently upon the troops of the reserve and their commander. The captured city presented a scene of rapine, terror, and confusion, in which not even the conquerors were safe, and the despatches of Colonel Wellesley from within the walls to Gene- ral Harris, who still remained without, assumed an al- most peremptory tone in their demands for positive in- structions and summary authority to arrest the evil. The suggestions of the writer were acknowledged by an appointment conferring upon himself the powers re- quired for restoring order. The establishment of a per- manent garrison under Colonel Wellesley's immediate command speedily brought the city to its ordinary state of tranquillity and confidence, and his services or his claims were still more conspicuously recognized by his subsequent nomination to the commission instituted for disposing of the con(|Ucred territories. Of these one portion was conferred on the Nizam, another ofiered to the Peishwa, a third retained by ourselves under the pro- GOVERNOR OF SERINGAPATAM. 39 visional government of Colonel Wellesley himself, and the remainder restored to the original proprietors, dispos- sessed by the usui-pation of Tippoo and his father. In these hands it still remains, and the residence of the Court having been again transferred to its ancient capi- tal, Mysore, Seringapatam, the creation of Hyder and Tippoo, and the scene of British triumphs, is now crumbling to ruins from desertion and neglect, and will probably leave as little visible trace as the dynasty which raised it. Such was the end of the famous war in Which Arthur Wellesley first won consideration and renown. It is not easy, perhaps, at this period of time to appreciate the extraordinary interest with which it was viewed by contemporary observers, but it deserves to be remarked that these impressions were by no means confined to the shores of Britain. In the negotiations for the peace of Amiens the French plenipotentiaries repeatedly specified the conquest of Mysore as counter- balancing the continental triumphs of Napoleon him- self, and the argument was acknowledged by Mr. Fox and his party to be founded on substantial reason. We have now, within little more than two years of Colonel Wellesley 's first landing at Calcutta, accompanied his rising fortunes to the point of independent and al- most viceregal command. In July, 1799, he was actual Governor of Seringapatam and Mysore, — that is to say, of territories nearly equivalent to Tippoo's late kingdom ; and as General Harris, on returning to the Presidency, had, in obedience to orders, surrendered to him the command in chief of the army of occupation, the civil and military authorities were united in his single person. The use which he made of these discre- 40 THE DUKE OF \YELLINGTON. tionary powers, and the account to wbicli he turned such cxtraoivHiiary o}>portunitios of developing, correct- ing, and maturing his natural talents for organization and command, may be readily conceived. For some months he was now actively engaged in reconstituting the various departments of an Administration wholly disorganized by the overthrow of its chief; he selected and appointed othcers in every capacity, giving prefer- ence to those who had faithfully discharged their duties under the former recfhne ; he repaireti roads, opened communications, attended to the claims of every class of the population, and executed with admirable sagacity all the functions of a Governor. Of the assiduity and talents which he brought to the performance of his du- ties his correspondence during this period with Colonel Close, the Resident at Mysore, contains copious illustra- tion ; but his services were soon to be again demanded in tliat capacity wliich was more peculiarly and memor- ably his own. It is a characteristic of Oriental life that a few deeds of daring and a few turns of fortune will sullicc to con- vert a freebooting adventurer into a popular captain, a mighty chief, and a recognised sovereign. Ilyder Ali himself had been little more, and the existing rights of some princes of India are derived from a similar title. Scarcely had Tippoo's standard been overthrown whei^ it was raised again by a rival, who, but for the oppfelF tune antagonism of Wellesley, might have repeateFon a larger scale the pretensions and aggressions of the ^[ysorean usurper. The name of this desperado was Dhoondiah Waugh. Having been unable, even dur- ing Tippoo's life, to restrain his predatory propensities, DIIOONDIAII WAUGH. 41 he had been incarcerated in Seringapatam, and was only released at the general deliverance which attended our conquest of the capital. On escaping from his dungeon he betook himself to the district of Bednore, on the Mahratta frontier, collected a numerous force from the disbanded levies of the Sultaun, and proceeded to lay the country under contribution after the usual fashion of such aspirants. On being pui-sued by a British detachment he crossed the frontier, and ensconced himself in a territory which it was then thought very undesirable to violate. Just at this conjuncture Colonel Wellesley received an offer which might have exercised considerable influence on his subsequent career. It had been resolved to attempt, though by negotiation rather than force, the reduction of the Dutch settlement at Batavia, and the military command of the expedition was placed by Lord Mornington at the disposal of his brother. As the appointment was eventually declined, little notice would have been due to the incident but for the indirect testimonies which it elicited to Colonel Wellesley's services. Lord Clive, then Governor of Madras, dissuaded, in emphatic terms, the removal of a commander so indispensable to the peace of the Presi- dency, and Colonel Close alludes to the mere report of the project with expressions of unfeigned alarm. Wel- lesley himself remitted the question to the judgment of Lord Clive, not concealing his appreciation of the op- portunity, but resolutely postponing all other considera- tions to those of the public service, and candidly avow- ing that Dhoondiah's progress was taking a very se- rious turn indeed. His disinterestedness on this occa- sion suffirested the most advantageous policy he could 42 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. possibly have adopted, for if Dhoondiah, whose fortunes were watched by a far more powerful foe, had been permitted to gather strength, either our Indian empire must have been crushed in its infancy, or the glories of the Mahratta war must have been gathered by other hands than those of Wellesley. In point of fact, at the moment of writing the des- patches with his conclusions on this critical subject. Colonel Wellesley was in the field on Dhoondiah's track. Towards the end of May he had put his troops in motion against this rapacious marauder, who, having assumed the title of " King of the Two Worlds," had a])peared in imposing force C4i the borders of Mysore, alarming the well aftected, enlisting the malcontents, and ravaging the whole country before him. There was, indeed, little likelihood that he would aftect to make head against Colonel Wellesley's force in open field, but his troops were almost wholly composed of light cavalry and artil- lery, extremely difficult to overtake, and the seat of war, which was the " Dooab," or space between two rivers called the Kistnah and Toombudra, was peculiarly cal- culated to facilitate his plans. The country was inter • sected in all directions by rivers, which swelled prodi- giously after rains, it was under no regular government, and had been exhausted by Dhoondiah's previous ravages. The exertions, therefore, of Colonel AVellesley in this, the first campaign which he ever directed in person, were turned to the moans of concentrating his detach- ments in this difficult region, of provisioning his troops, and of either " running down" his adversary by rapid movements, or surprising him by adroit manoeuvres. A subject of extreme importance was the disposition AN UNHANDSOME OFFER. 43 likely to be entertained at the Mahratta Court of Poohah, since the instructions of the British commander now empowered him to cross the frontier, if necessary, in pursuit of his antagonist — a step which he foresaw might entail a Mahratta war. The Peishwa, however, profess- ed liis readiness to co-operate in the campaign, but his contingent was routed by Dhoondiah with such promp- titude, that little positive service was experienced from our allies, who would, there was little doubt, have de- clared against us on any of those reverses rendered so probable by the difficulties of the campaign. For several weeks Dhoondiah, by doubling and countermarching, succeeded in eluding his pursuers, and it seemed doubt- ful how long the expedition might be protracted, when Colonel Wellesley received an offer from a native to terminate the whole business by a stroke of a poniard. His reply was as follows : — " To ofter a public reward by proclamation for a man's life, and to make a secret bargain to have it taken away, are two different things ; the one is to be done ; the other, in my opinion, cannot, by an officer at the head of his troops." The contest was continued, therefore, on even terms. More than once did the British commander succeed in driving his adversary into a position from which there appeared no escape, but as often did the wily freebooter defeat the imperfect vigilance of our allies, or avail himself of some unforeseen opportunity for eluding his pursuers. At length, on the 10th of September, 1800, after two months of a campaign in which he had extemporized from his own resources all the means of the commis- sariat and engineer department, and had subsisted his army almost by his own skill. Colonel Wellesley came 44 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. upon the camp of his enemy. Though tlie whole force with him at that moment consisted but of four regi- ments of cavahy, harassed and overworked by constant marching, lie at once " made a dash" at his prey, and put his army to the rout by a single charge, in encoun- tering which 1 )hoondiah fell. The corpse of "* his Majesty" being recognized, was lashed to a galloper gun and carried back to the British camp, but a certain item of the spoil deserves more particular mention. Among the baggage was found a boy about four years old, who proved to be the favourite son of Dhoondiah. Colonel Wellesley took charge of the child himself, carried him to his own tent, protected him through his boyhood, and, on quitting India, left a sum of money in the hands of a friend to bo applied to his use. This little war, if such a term can be applied to any hostilities in a country like India, was a simple rehearsal, both in character and result, of the great expeditions which were to follow. Against any antagonist but Wellesley it is highly probable that Dhoondiah 's auda- city and enterprise might have established him in a dominion equal to that of the Mahratta chiefs, whose power, indeed, had risen from an origin not dissimilar. At this moment the authority of the Peishwa was clearly on the decline, and threatened speedily to fall to the strongest, nor was there any reason why Dhoondiah should not have competed with Scindiah himself for the prize. The success of the recent cam]viign at once ter- minated all these risks, and confirmed Colonel Wellesley in an extraordinary reputation both with the native Courts and the British Government. The former were peculiarly qualified to appreciate such a victory as he AT THE TOr OF THE TREE. 45 had recently achieved, and tlie latter could not withhold their testimonies to the abilities by which the brother of the Governor-General had justified the appointments conferred upon him. In fact, though still a simple colonel, Arthur Welleslcy was already, as he himself expressed it, " at the top of the tree," being intrusted with commissions above his rank, and honoured with the entire confidence of those whom he served. Ilis attention, after the fall of Dhoondiah, had been directed under the ever present apprehension of Mahratta policy, to the Court of Poonah, but the jealousies subsisting between the Peishwa and his own feudatories, especially Scindiah-, superseded for the moment any intrigues against the British dominion, and Colonel Wellesley was pre- paring to neutralize the ambition of the confederacy by supporting one of its members against the other, when events occurred which severely tested his moral forti- tude, and which tlireatened at one time a serious inter- ruption of his professional career. It was in the autumn of the year 1 800. Napoleon had struck down the powers of the continent, and was devising means for restoring to the French army in Egypt the resources they had lost by Nelson's victory of the Nile. In the eyes of Englishmen of those days, Egypt was always considered in the light of a high road to India ; nor was it ever imagined that Napo- leon's views in this direction could be bounded by the Red Sea. When, therefore, the force under Sir Ralph Abercromby was despatched to counterbalance the an- ticipated expedition of Napoleon, a scheme was conceiv- ed of making India contribute to its own security, by taking the French in rear, while Abercromby's army at- 40 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. tacked them in front. In pursuance of this remarkable plan, orio'inally suggestecl, we believe, by the Marquis Wellesley himself, a force, composed of detachments" from the Indian armies, was to sail westward, to rendez- vous at Mocha, to proceed thence to Cosseir, and to carry their co-operation across the Desert to the scene of war. The conception was actually executed ; but so serious Avere the delays, in an enterprise without prece- dent or parallel, that the expedition only arrived at Cairo on the 10th of August, 1801, three months after the capitulation of General Belliard at that city had ex- tinguished the prospects of the French in Egypt. With the expedition itself, therefore, not only as having been superfluous, but as not having included Colonel Welles- ley among the officei-s employed, our present subject has little concern ; but the circumstances attending its execution touched the fortunes of the tuture hero in some critical points, and served to display his constitu- tional qualities in a very instructive degree. We have mentioned that among the expeditions projected by the Indian Government was one directed against Batavia. On the intelligence of Napoleon's de- monstrations against our eastern possessions this scheme was abandoned, and it was resolved to substitute ope- rations more immediately calculated to impede the ad- vances of the French. With these views, a force of about 5,000 troops was collected at Trincomalee, in Ceylon, not with any fixed destination, but for the pur- pose of being thrown on such points as might be con- sidered most advisable. Of this force Colonel "Welles- ley received the command, and he repaired accordingly to Trincomalee. from the theatre of his recent services in ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY. 47 * Mysore. At the time of liis arrival it was thought that the Mauritius offered the most promising point of at- tack ; but the young commander soon discovered reasons for discarding this opinion, and liad communicated his conclusions to the Governor-General, when he received intelligence which he permitted to decided his move- ments at once. A despatch from the home government had been forwarded to the Governor-General, directino- the immediate preparation of the expedition mentioned above, and containing an authority for the prompt ex- ecution of the scheme, if circumstances should so advise, without waiting for instructions from Calcutta. A copy of this despatch had been left with the Governor of Madras, who transmitted it, without any directions of his own, to Colonel Wellesley at Trincomalee. The situation thus created was one of great delicacy and re- sponsibility. Colonel Wellesley was convinced from the terms of the despatch that the expedition to Egypt must be immediately executed. He was perfectly aware that the troops linder his command formed the only force available for the service ; and he also knew that the destination now specially ordered had been among those contemplated for his detachment. Before he could receive from Calcutta any instructions founded on the despatch, four or five precious weeks would be sacrificed, and the aid of the expiring monsoon would be lost to his voyage. On the other hand, it required extraordinary confidence to assume so important a com- mand, and to anticipate the orders of Government on a point of such serious magnitude. Colonel Wellesley's decision was characteristic. Relying, perhaps, partly on his brother's good opinion, but mainly, as we may 48 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. fairly conceive, on the zeal for the service which had* evidently prompted the resolution, he issued the neces- sary orders of his own authority, and set sail with the force under his command for the shores of the Red Sea. Learning, however, from the naval officers that the voyage would not be materially protracted by touch- ing at Bombay, he resolved on adopting that course, for the double purpose of re victualling the transports and of receiving overland orders from the Governor-General, to whom he had immediately forwarded a statement of uis mientions. On his arrival at Bombay he had the mortification to find his proceedings condemned, and himself superseded in his command. From the light now thrown upon this subject hy the Duke's despatches, we can perceive that the Gover- nor-General, though privately acknowledging the sub stantial wisdom of his brother's decision, conceived that the general eff'ect of the precedent, if uncensured, would more than counterbalance the advantages directly de- livable, on any recurrence of a similar exigency. The actual supercession, however, of Colonel Wellesley, was not intended to carry a penal character. The Governor General had concluded, with obvious reason, that a command so important as the projected expedition in- volved should be given to a general officer, and he had, in fact, already selected General Baird for the appoint- ment, while still under the impression that the troops were at Trincomalee, and that Batavia would be their fittest destination. In these conclusions it is not diffi- cult to hold with the Governor-General ; but, on the other hand. Colonel Wellesley argued that the decision on the point of standing required in the commanding SACRIFICES PRIVATE VIEWS. 49 officer should have been taken at the first notification of the appointment ; that he had been pubhcly in- trusted with the command in question, although it was thought possible that Egypt might be the destination of the expedition ; that he had been recalled for this purpose from a lucrative and honourable commission in Mysore ; and that to supersede him without cause given by his own deftiult was seriously to injure his re- putation and prospects. His behaviour under these circumstances was highly characteristic and exemplary. Lord Mornington rightly considered that, apart from the good of the service, it concerned his brother's profes- sional character that he should not be positively ex- cluded from an expedition of this active kind, and he therefore offered him the appointment of second in command to General Baird, at the same time leaving him the option of returning to his post in Mysore. The jealousies previously created between General Baird and Colonel Wellesley aggravated the unpleasantness of the affair, but under the obvious suggestions of the situa- tion Colonel Wellesley had no doubts. He recorded his own annoyance, and his sense of the injustice he conceived himself to have suffered; but he remained at his post at Bombay, sent pledges of his cordial co- operation to General Baird, and, on hearing that the work had actually commenced in Egypt, prepared him- self again to anticipate his superior officer by starting for the Red Sea without delay. " You will have seen," says he in a private letter to his brother Henry, " how much this resolution will annoy me, but I have never had much value for the public spirit of any man who jdoes not sacrifice his private views and convenience 3 50 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. when it is necessary." This was written on the 25th oi March, 1801 ; but on the same evening Colonel Wel- lesley was seized with a fever at Bombay, and wholly disabled from embarking- on the expedition at all. In this annoying conjuncture he addressed General Baird with great candour and generosity of sentiment, and enclosed him a memorandum on his operations in tlie Red Sea, evincing in a most remarkable degree tlie re- search and reflection he had expended on his anticipated command. These events, discouraging as they ap- peared, proved ultimately calculated, as the reader is aware, to develope even more signally than before the genius they seemed to repress. Colonel Wellesley re- turned to his command in Mysore, not for a service oi inaction or routine, but to plan and conduct the operations of a war so extensive as to demand the highest efforts of professional skill, and so successful as to establish con- clusively the supremacy of Britain in the East. We delineated in a foregoing portion of this me- moir the nature and extent of the empire or confederacy of the Mahrattas, which now constituted the only powei from which the British Government had anything to dread. Though no permanent tranquillity was ever to have been anticipated by the side of these formidable rivals, yet so averse were the British authorities to war, and so eager to maintain the peace conducive to mercan- tile prosperity, that the Governor-General would willingly have retarded to the utmost the inevitable rupture, had not circumstances clearly demonstrated the expediency of immediate action. Independently of the apprehen- sions created by their immense resources and their in- veterate aggressiveness, the Mahrattas were evoking at FRENCH INFLUENCE. 51 this moment the dreaded vision of French influence and ascendency. Though the peace of Amiens had checked the overt operations of our redoubtable rivals, their intrigues were continued with characteristic tena- city. Napoleon had sent Decaen to India with strict injunctions to provide for war while observing the sti- pulations of peace. Nor was this all ; for Perron, a French adventurer, who had arrived in Ilindostan twenty years previously, as a petty officer in SuftVein's squadron, was rising rapidly to the command- of the whole Mah- ratta forces. He had disciplined and armed some 15,000 or 20,000 men for Scindiah's service, who were oflScered by his own countrymen, and who were not inferior to the trained battalions of the Company. His influence with Scindiah was so unbounded as actually to excite jealousy among the Mahratta chiefs ; and if he had possessed the national spirit of Dupleix, or been opposed by any less a soldier than Arthur Wellesley, it is not too much to conceive that our Eastern empire might have hung upon a thread. So formidable even of itself was the Mahi-atta power, that nothing but the fortunate antagonism of the Aflfghans could have saved us fi-om a rivalry which, in the infancy of our dominion, must have been fatal, and such an imposing mass of strength was now constituted by this addition of Euro- pean discipline, that we may well rejoice in the destiny which reserved the struggle for the hero of Assaye. Beyond the probabilities inseparable from Oriental policy, there was no reason for presuming that the se- veral chiefs of the Mahratta nation had concerted any designs against the British Government. At that mo- ment their intrigues had found a more immediate ob- 52 THE DUKE OP WELLINGTON. jcct in the headship of their own confederacy. The Peishwa — their nominal lord — was rapidly losing the power whicli had been usurped from the original sove- reigns, and three of his sons, great feudatories, were preparing to contest his place. The Chiicowar, having more to fear than to hope from his brethren, had per- mitted himself to be detached from their councils into an alliance with ourselves, which has subsisted to the })resent day ; but Scindiah, ITolkar, and the Berar Ra- jah were all resolute competitors for the supreme seat at Poonah. From these circumstances the British Government drew both the motives and means of ac- tion. The most powerful candidate was Scindiah, whoso success, as we have shown above, would have virtually resulted in the establishment of French influ- ence on a most formidable scale. This consummation, therefoi'c, was, if possible, to be averted, and the Gov- ernor-General hoped that by conceding to the Peish- wa that support which, in his weakness and peril, he had begged at our hands, and, by playing oft" against each other the mutual jealousies of his rivals, we might succeed, at least for a time, in obviating the dangers descried. With these views a considerable force, under the command of General Stuart, was collected on the fron- tier of the Poonah territory, recently the scene of l>hoondiah's exploits. This was to servo the double l>urpose of demonstrating our strength, and protecting our own provinces, while a detachment about VOOO strong w;is to enter the dominions of the Peishwa for more active co-operation with that prince. It was in November, 1802, that Major-General Wellesley (for RESPONSIBLE COMMAND. 53 such, since April previous, had been his rank) received intelligence that an army was to be collected at the point in question. He had then been for eighteen months unobtrusively but vigorously engaged in the government of Mysore, to which, as we saw, ho return- ed after being disappointed of his Egyptian command. The results of liis administration were immediately conspicuous in the facilities of communication and un- exampled copiousness of his supplies. The resources of Madras were outdone by the productiveness of My- sore. Though not yet aware that the direction of ac- tive operations was to devolve upon liimself, his exer- tions were unremitting, and the interest he instinctively felt in the expedition will be seen in a remarkable journal which he kept of his daily proceedings, and which is published in the first volume of his despatches. So involuntarily was he engrossed by the idea of the campaign, that he even sketched out a plan of action for the benefit of the officer who might be employed. In point of fact, however, there could be but one opinion on this point. Whatever might be the reluc- tance entertained to part with (leneral Wellesley from Mysore, or whatever the jealousies suggested by his rapid rise, it was perfectly undeniable that he, not only from his military talents, but from the peculiar know- ledge he had acquired, both of the country and of the enemy with which we had to deal, was marked out for the appointment in question. lie received it accord- ingly, in February, 1803, and, as his commission was extended four months afterwards to the supreme mili- tary and political charge of British aff*airs on the scene of operations, he found himself now invested with a 54 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. command almost as responsible as those which he was afterwards to hold in Europe. There was, as we observed, no declaration of war at this moment between the Mahrattas and the Bri- tish, nor was the force of the detachment originally sent into the Peishwa's territory in any degree mea- sured by the known resources of the Mahratta chiefs, although their open hostility was a matter of probable occurrence. The immediate object of General Wel- lesley was to protect the Peishwa from summary de- thronement, a result which he accomplished by a skil- ful and rapid movement upon Poonah. After the establishment of the legitimate authority by this open demonstration of British alliance, and by the encour- agement of well-disposed vassals, the proceedings of the British were to be regulated by the attitude of the refractory chiefs ; and this attitude grew daily so me- nacing, that the Governor-General resolved to attempt his ulterior objects of dispersing M. Perron's battalions and circumscribing the enormous pretensions of Scin- diah. Accordingly, while Lake took the field in Hin- dostan for the memorable campaign of Laswarree, General Wellesley was invested, as we have said, with full powers to commence active operations against the Mahratta forces in the Deccan. The force at his com- mand for these purposes consisted of about 10,000 men of all arms, Europeans and natives, including the 19th dragoons, and the '74th regiment of foot. He had de- sired that his old corps, the 33d, should be attached to his division, but circumstances prevented the arrange- ment. The duty of co-operating with his movements devolved on Colonel Stevenson, an excellent officer, who FACILITIES OF FORESIGHT. 55 commanded for this purpose the subsidiary force of the Nizam, wliich, by the addition of the 94th regiment, had been raised to about the same strength as General Wellesley's division. In the ensuing campaign General Wellesley's duties consisted in so combining his movements that none of his detachments were taken at a disadvantage, that the peculiar qualities of the British troops might be turned to the best account, and that the difficulties of Indian warfare might be obviated by wary provision, or sur- mounted by vigorous enterprise. It was now that his contemporaries had the opportunity of observing his singular faculties of foresight and his extraordinary aptitude in all departments of his profession. In his afftiir with Dhoondiah he had accurately noted the cha- racteristics of native warfare, the chief features and ser- viceable points of the country, the strength of the forts, and the course, depth, and periodical variations of the rivers. From these observations he had conceived his plans of a Mahratta campaign. Selecting a season when the rivers were not fordable, he turned this fea- ture of the country to the advantage of the British by preparing boats and pontoons, with which he knew the enemy would be unprovided. His despatches contain the most minute instructions for the fabrication of these bridges and boats, for the establishment of particular ferries, and for their protection by proper guards. Aware that a native army relied on the superior rapidi- ty of its movements, he had been indefatigable in im- proving the breed of draught-bullocks by the aid of Tippoo's femous stock ; and he had resolved, when oc- casion came, to discard the traditional rules of march- 66 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. ing and halting-. The forts, he observed, were strong enough, if well defended, lo give serious trouble, and too numerous to be b*?sieged in form. He gave orders, therefore, by way of conveying an adequate idea of British prowess, that one or two of them should be carried by simple escalade, and that an example should be made of the garrison in case of any desperate re- sistance. These tactics were completely successful. A Mahratta chief wrote to his friend as follows : — " These English are a strange people, and their general a won- derful man. They came in here this morning, looked at the Pettah wall, walked over it, killed all the garrison, and returned to breakfast. Who can withstand them ?" The result was that the strongest forts in the country were afterwards taken with little or no loss of life on either side. Meantime the demonstrations of the great Mahratta chiefs grew more and more overtly hostile. For the main body of Scindiah's troops Lake was finding ample work between Delhi and Agra, but a force including 10,000 of his disciplined infantry was hovering over the Deccan ; Ilolkar, though he had hitherto retired before the British, was known to be dangerous, and the Rajah of Berar was more than suspected of sharing their common views. The object, therefore, was first to compel these chieftains to an avowal of their intentions, and next, in the event of the probable result, to bring them to a decisive action. The plenary authority which General Wellesley received on the 2Cth of June ena- bled him to cut short the negotiations which had been purposely protracted, and to reduce Scindiah to his proper character. After some wearisome manoeuvres ASSAYE. 67 he at length learnt that the enemy was on the north bank of the Godavery, meditating a swoop on Hy- derabad. " If the river," he now wrote, " does not become fordable six weeks sooner than usual, I hope to strike a blow against their myriads of horse in a few days." This was on the 30th of August. On the 21st of September, having received more particular informa- tion, he concerted measures with Colonel Stevenson that one should take a western route and the other an eastern, and both fall together from opposite quarters on the enemy's camp early on the 24th. The next day the two divisions diverged accordingly, and pursued their respective routes, when on the 23d General Wel- lesley learnt from his spies that the Mahratta cavalry had moved off, but that the infantry were still encamp- ed at about six miles distance. Pushing on with his dragoons he presently descried not only the infantry, but the entire army of the Mahrattas in the Deccan, numbering at least .50,000 combatants, and strongly posted, with 100 pieces of cannon before the fortified village of Assaye. At this critical moment of his fortunes the force which General Wellesley had in hand, including the infantry which was coming up, did not exceed 4,500 men ; his few light guns were utterly unable to make head against the tremendous batteries of the Mahrattas, and his draught cattle, notwithstanding the pains he had expended on them, were sinking under the severity of the campaign. His resolution, however, was taken at once, and without measuring the relative proportion of the two armies, or waiting for Colonel Stevenson to share the perils and glories of the field, he gave instant 3* 68 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. orders for the attack. Owing to a misapprehension of instructions, his precautionary directions for avoiding the most menacing points of the Mahratta position were disregarded, and the battle was won with a terri- ble carnage with the bayonet alone, exactly like some of the actions recently witnessed with the Sikhs. But nothing could be more decisive than the victory ob- tained, which not only at once brought Scindiah to terms, but served, in the estimation of competent judges, to proclaim beyond reach of further chal- lenge the military supremacy of the British. Taught by our example, and the aid of Eui-opean officers, the natives had gradually brought their armies to an appa- rent equality with our own. The cumbrous and ill- served artillery trains, the unwieldy masses and irregu- lar hordes of our early antagonists, had now given place to disciplined battalions formed of the same ma- terial as those of the Company, and to batteries of deadly strength, manned by skilful and devoted gun- ners. It now remained to be seen whether the success of the British arms depended on any element inaccessi- ble to native emulation, and this enigma was solved, once and for all, by Wellesley at Assaye. With forces almost as numerically disproportionate as those of Clive, he had surpassed the glories of Arcot and Plassey against an enemy far more formidable than Chunda Sahib, or Suraj-a-Dowlah. With all odds but those of science and spirit against him, he had maintained and confirmed the prestige superstitiously attached to the arms of England, and to this, the first pitched battle in which he ever commanded, has been plausibly traced the establishment of that ascendency which we enjoy in India to this very day. MAIIRATTA WARFARE. 69 Though it was clear, both to Britisli and Mahrattas, that the whole campaign was virtually decided by such a triumph as that of Assaye, yet the native chiefs, who, as Wellesley on this occasion described them, were "rashness personified," evinced resolutions of provoking yet another battle. Scindiah, it is true, under the combi- ned teaching of Wellesley and Lake, had received a lesson which, to the latest days of his life, he never forgot ; but the Rajah of Berar was still in the field, and as General Wellesley two months afterwards was on the Mahratta track to compel adherence to the covenanted stipulations, and to clear the country of any dangerous gatherings, he came one evening upon the whole re- maining force of the enemy, drawn up in battle array before the village of Argaum, fo renew again the ex- periment of September. Consideiing that since the last battle the British had been strengthened almost as much as they themselves had been weakened, it was a forlorn hazard, yet a body of Persian cavalry in the Berar service made a desperate charge on the Euro- pean regiments, and Scindiah's horsemen, who, not- withstanding the recent treaty, were found in the ranks of our adversaries, made a show of supporting the attack. The advance of the British line, however, was not waited for by the main body of the Mahrattas, who in the hopeless confusion abandoned their guns and fled, but only to fall, through the long hours of a moonlight night, under the sabres of their pui-suers. With these operations, the capture of some strong- holds, and the surprise and destruction of a new com- petitor for ])hoondiah's fame, ended our first Mahratta war, in which, owing to the genius and energy of our 60 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. generals, \ve had prosti-ated, with incredible rapidity, that redoubtable foe wliose enmity had been for yeais the traditional dread of tlie Indian Govennnent. THh personal contributions of Wellesley towards this consum- mation were well appreciated by those most intimately concerned. The British inhabitants of Calcutta voted him a valuable sword, the native population of Sering- apatam received him with unfeigned congratulations on his return, and upon his departure from India, which soon followed, the thanks, the addresses, and the offer- ings of civilians, soldiers, and presidencies poured upon him in quick succession. A yet more remarkable tes- timony to the value of his services may be gathered from the opinions of that mighty antagonist with whom, at a future day, he was to compete in deadly grapple for the championship of the world. While Wellesley was clearing the Deccan of England's last enemies, Napoleon was mustering the whole resources of his empire on the heights of Boulogne for a descent on the island of liis hate. The flotilla was ready, the camps were formed, and the conveying squadron anxiously ex- pected from the west, wlien, at this very moment, with a vision of conquest before his eyes, he wavered, as we are now told by his latest biographer, for some weeks together, between the ideas of destroying us by invasion or attacking us through the side of India by reviving the Mahratta war ! It was in the month of September, 1805, that Sir Arthur Wellesley — after an absence of nine yeai-s, dur- ing wliicli his services in* the East had earned him a Major-Generalship, the Knighthood of the Bath, the thanks of the King and Parliament, and a confirmed THREE YEARS AT HOME. 61 professional reputation — landed once more on the shores of England. Between this period and his de- parture on those memorable campaigns with which his name will be immortally connected there elapsed an interval in the Duke's life of nearly three years, which a seat in Parliament, an Irish Secretaryship, and a Privy Councillorship enabled him to turn actively to account. His proper talents, however, were not over- looked, and he bore his part in those notable " expe- ditions" which were then conceived to measure the military power of England. His arrival from India had exactly coincided with the renewal of the war against France by the third European coalition — a compact to which England was a party. Our specific duties in these alHances were usually limited to the supply of ships and money. We swept the ocean with our fleets, and we subsidized the great Powers whose forces were actually in the field. As to the British army itself, that had been hitherto reckoned among the con- tingents of second and third-rate States, which might be united perhaps for a convenient diversion, but which could make no pretension to service in the great Euro- pean line of battle. At the beginning of the war these demonstrations had usually been made on the coasts of France, but they were now principally directed against the northern and southern extremities of the Continent, and for these reasons : — the dominion, actual or con- fessed, of Napoleon, against which the contest was undertaken, embraced all the ports of Europe, from the Texel to Genoa, while his battle array extended along the length of the Rhine. The masses, therefore, of the Austrian and Bussian hosts were moved directly against 62 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. France from the east, and to the minor allies was left the charge of penetrating either upwards from Naples, or downwards from Swedism Pomerania, to the theatre of action. Sometimes detachments from Gibraltar and Malta disembarked in Italy in conjunction with Rus- sians from Corfu and Neapolitans from Calabria, and sometimes we landed in Hanover to compose a joint stock force with Swedes, Norwegians, and Finlanders. One of these latter expeditions fell to the lot of Sir Arthur AYellesley immediately after his retui-n, but with results even fewer than usual. The brigades were put on shore at Bremen at the close of 1805 ; but Napo- leon in the meantime had done his work so efteetually on the Danube that our contingent returned to England after a few weeks' absence without striking a blow. Sir Arthur's next service was one of greater distinction. In 1807, when the British Ministry had boldly deter- mined upon anticipating Napoleon at Copenhagen by one of his own strokes of policy, the feelings of the Danes were consulted by the despatch of a force so powerful as to justify a bloodless capitulation, and in this army Sir Arthur Wellesley received a command which brought under his charge the chief military op- eration of the expedition. While the main body was menacing Copenhagen a demonstration was observed on the part of the Danes against the English rear, and Sir x\rthur was detached to disperse their gathering battalions. This service he effectually performed by engaging them in their position of Kioge, and putting them to the rout with the loss of 1,500 prisoners and 14 pieces of cannon. He was afterwards intrusted with the negotiations for the capitulation of the city — SERVICES AT COrENIIAGEN. 63 a duty which was skilfully discharged. This short episode in his military life has been thrown into shadow by his mightier achievements ; but its merits were ac- knowledged by the special thanks of Parliament ; and M. Thiers, in his history, introduces Sir Arthur Welles- ley to French readers as an officer who had certainly seen service in India, but who was principally known by his able conduct at Copenhagen. At length, at the very moment when England seemed to be excluded from all participation in the military contests of the age, and the services of the British soldier appeared likely to be measured by the demands of colonial duty, events brought an opportu- nity to pass which ultimately resulted in one of the most memorable wars on record, and enabled Britain to support a glorious part in what, without figure of rhetoric, we may term the liberation of Europe. The coalition eftected against France at the period of Sir Arthur Wellesley's return had been scattered to the winds under the blows of Napoleon. Russia had been partly driven and partly inveigled into a concert of politics with her redoubtable adversary ; Austria had been put hors de combat, and Prussia was helplessly prostrate. To complete the concern experienced at this prospect of universal dominion Napoleon had availed himself of the occasion to seize and appropriate the whole of the Spanish Peninsula. Under tlie pretence of a treaty with Spain for the partition of Portugal he had poured his troops into the former country, overrun the latter, and then repudiated the stipulations of his compact by retaining undivided possession of the prize. A few months later he established himself in a similar 64 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. authority at Madrid, and made open avowal of his in- tentions by bestowing on his own brother the inherit- ance of the Spanish Bourbons. Scarcely, however, had his projects been disclosed when he encountered a tempest of popular opposition ; the nations of the Pe- ninsula rose almost as one man ; a French army was compelled to capitulate, King Joseph decamped from Madrid, and Marshal Junot was with difficulty enabled to maintain himself in Lisbon. At the intelligence of this unexpected display of vigour England tendered her substantial sympathies to the Spanish patriots ; the overtures of their juntas were favourably received, and at length it was decided by the Portland Ministry that Portugal would be as good a point as any other on which to throw 10,000 troops, who were waiting at Cork for embarcation on the next " expedition" sug- gesting itselt^ Such was the origin of the Peninsular War — an enterprise at first considered, and even for some time afterwards reputed, as importing little more to the interests or renown of the nation than a diversion at-Stralsund or Otranto, but which now, enshrined in the pages of a fiimous history and viewed by the light of experience, will take its place among the most memorable contests which the annals of Europe record. Beyond doubt, the entliusiasm of the British nation at this conjuncture was unusually great, and there were not wanting arguments to prove that the contemplated expedition differed greatly in its promise from those heretofore recommended to favour. It was urged that Napoleon was now for the fii-st time encountered by strong popular opinion, and that the scene of action, moreover, was a sea-girt territory, giving full scope for SPANISH AFFAIRS. 65 the exercise of our naval supremacy. These observa- tions were sound, but it must needs have been expected by many tliat the " particular service" now announced to tlie nation would have the ordinary termination, and that the transports bound for Portugal would soon re- turn, as others had returned before them from St. Do- mingo and the Ilelder, from Quiberon 13ay and Ferrol. Nor was it owing, indeed, either to the wisdom of tlie nation or the strength of the cause that sucli predictions were belied by the triumphs and glories of an immortal war. To comprehend the service now intrusted to Sir A. Wellesley it will be necessary to retain constantly in mind the circumstances and persuasions under which it was undertaken. The actual state of the countries which it was proposed to succour was only known from the exaggerated descriptions of the Spanish pa- triots, who represented themselves as irresistible in military strength, and as needing nothing but stores and money to expel the French from the Peninsula. Nothing was ascertained respecting Napoleon's actual force in these parts ; and, although it might reasonably have been infeiTed, from the continental peace, that the whole hosts of the French Empire were disposable on the one side, and, from the contradictory reports of the Spanish envoys themselves, that neither unity nor in- telligence existed on the other, these simple deductions were not drawn. The British Ministry had despatched the expedition without any purpose more definite than that of aiding in the resistance unexpectedly offered to France on the Peninsular territories. It had not been determined whether the landing should be effected in 66 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. Portugal or Spain, and, with the latter country, indeed, we were nominally at war when the armament was de- creed. Neither was the single appointment which compensated all these deficiencies the result of any general or deliberate convictions. The nomination of Sir Arthur Wellesley to the command was chiefly due to the individual sagacity of Lord Castlereagh, whose judgment on this point was considerably in advance of that of other and higher authorities. Even this ap- pointment itself, too, was intended to be nugatory, for Sir Arthur was to suri-ender tlie command to Sir Harry Burrard, who was in turn to make way for Sir Hew Dalrymple, and in the form which the expedition shortly afterwards assumed no fewer than six general officers were placed above him, into whose hands the conduct of the war was ultimately to fall. True, however, to that spirit of his profession which forbade him to balance his own feelino-s ajyainst the good of the service or the decisions of the Government, Sir Arthur departed on his mission, preceding the ex- peditionary armament in a fast frigate, for the purpose of obtaining more information than was already pos- sessed respecting the destination to be given to it. With these views he landed on the coast, and conferred with the juntas directing the affairs of the insurrection. His inquiries soon proved conclusive if not satisfactory, and lie decided with characteristic penetration, that "it was impossible to learn the truth." In point of fact, at the moment when the expedition was hovering ir- resolutely between the Douro and the Tagus — that i« to say at the conclusion of July, 1808 — the Spaniards had really experienced extraordinary success at Baylen ; PROSPECTS. 6Y but this victory was unknown to those who vaunted to Sir Arthur the magnitude of their forces, and whose ignorant vain-gloriousness was instantly detected by his acute and impartial vision. Dupont had been circum- vented in the south, but the other French Generals had been easily victorious in the north, and a force was at hand under Napoleon sufficient to sweep the country between the Pyrenees and Madrid, The patriot levies were miserably destitute of equipments and discipline, and below their reported strength even in mere num- bers ; their rulers were mostly devoid of any better qualities for the contest than national obstinacy and thoroughgoing hate, while as to unity of purpose or or- ganization of means there were no such features visible in any quarter of the Peninsula. Portugal offered somewhat better opportunities. Its geographical po- sition favoured the designs of the English commander, and its internal conditions offered considerable induce- ments to a descent on these parts. Junot, cut oft' from all communication with his colleagues in the Peninsula, was maintaining his ground with difficulty at Lisbon between the insurgents of Portugal and the menacing patriots of Spain. The troops under his command amounted to fully 25,000 men, but so many detach- ments were required for various services that his dis- posable force could only become formidable by virtue of greater military skill than he happened to possess. He himself lay with a large garrison at Lisbon, and on the first rumours of the British expedition he despatched General Loison with a movable column of some 7,000 men, to scour the country, overwhelm the insuri'ection, and " drive the English into the sea." 68 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. After ascertaining and estimating these prospects to the best of his power, Sir Arthur Wellesley decided on the disembarking his troops in Mondego Bay, about midway between Oporto and Lisbon — a resolution which ho successfullv executed at the beo-innino; of Au- gust. The force actually landed from the transports amounted to about 9,000 men ; but they were presently joined by that of another little expedition which had been operating in the south of Spain, and Sir Arthur thus found himself at the head of some 14,000 excel- lent soldiers. Besides these, however, the British Go- vernment, as the design of liberating the Peninsula gradually assumed substance and dignity, determined on despatching two others of their corps-errant, one of which, nearly 12,000 strong, under Sir John Moore, was in a state of discipline not inferior to that of Napo- leon's best brigades. 30,000 troops, therefore, were eventually to represent the arms of England in tliis memorable service ; but wisdom had to be learnt be- fore Wellesley was placed at their head, and it was with 13,000 only, and a provisional command, that the great captain of the age commenced on the 9th of August his first march in the Peninsular AVar. The intention of Sir Arthur, who in the absence of his two seniors still retained the direction of affairs, was to march on Lisbon by the seacoast, in order to draw from the English store-ships in the offing those supplies which he had already discovered it was hopeless to ex- pect from the resources of Portugal itself ; one of the earliest piopositions of the Portuguese commander hav- ing suggested that his own troops should be fed from the British commissariat instead of the British troops FIRST ACTION OF THE WAR. 69 from his. Reinforced, if the term can be used, at this period with a small detachment of the native army, Sir Arthur now mustered nearly 15,000 sabres and bayo- nets. To oppose him, Loison had about 7,000 men, Laborde about 5,000, and Junot, at headquarters, some 10,000 more. Of these commanders Loison was on the left of the British route, and Laborde in front; nor was Sir Arthur's information accurate enough to enable him to estimate the point or period of their probable junction. As events turned out, his military instinct had divined the course proper to be pursued, for by pressing forward on Laborde he interposed himself be- tween this general and Loison, and encountered his enemies in detail. Laborde's outposts at Ovidos were promptly driven in on the 15th, and on the iVth Sir Arthur came up with his antagonist on the heights of Roli(;a, and there gained the first action of the war. The engagement was sustained with great spirit; for Laborde, though outnumbered, availed himself to the utmost of his strength of position, nor was it without serious loss on both sides that he was at length com- pelled to retire. After this satisfactory essay of arms Sir Arthur prepared to meet Junot, who would, he was well aware, summon all his strength for the now in- evitable encounter, and who had in fact concentrated 16,000 men with 21 guns at Torres Vedras, between Sir Arthur's position and Lisbon. Still moving by the coast, the British commander was fortunately reinforced on his march by one of the detachments despatched from home, as we before observed, to participate in the expedition, and his force was thus augmented to 18,000 effective men. With these means he proposed to turn 70 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. Junot's position at Torres Vedras b}" passing between it and the sea with his advanced guard, while the main body occupied the enemy's attention in front, so that the French general would either be cut oft* from Lisbon or driven to a precipitate retreat. These able disposi- tions, however, were not brought to the test of trial ; for at this moment Sir Harry Burrard arrived off the coast, and, without quitting his ship or troubling him- self to confirm by his own observation the representa- tions of Sir Arthur, counter-ordered the proposed march, and gave directions for halting on the ground then oc- cupied — the hills of Vimiera — until the arrival of the other and larger reinforcement expected from England under Sir John Moore. Among the facts which Sir Arthur had laboured to impress on his intractable superior, was that of the cer- tainty of imniediately receiving the attack which he was declining to give — a conclusion which was prompt- ly verified by the appearance of Junot in battle array the very next morning. The estimates, therefore, re- spectively formed by Sir Harry and Sir Arthur con- cerning the rehxtive capacities of the two armies were presently to be certified by experience, and the decisive defeat of Junot at every point of his attack, with the loss of 3,000 men and nearly all his artillery, might have been thought decisive of the question in the eyes of imj^artial observers. Sir Harry, however, was still lUK'onvinced, and, in his firm pereuasion of the supe- riority of the French, refused the permission now earnestly entreated by Sir Arthur to intercept the en- cumbered brigades of the enemy, and complete his dis- comfiture by cutting oft' his retreat to Torres Vedras. CONVENTION AT CINTRA. 71 It was on this occasion that Sir Arthur, seeing the sacrifice of an opportunity wliich might have been turned to tlie completion of the war, turned round and said to his staff — " Well, then, gentlemen, we may go now and shoot red-legged partridges." No sooner had this supercession of Sir Arthur Wcl- lesley occurred than a second change took place in the command of the English force, and the arrangements of the British Government were notably exemplified by the arrival on the scene of Sir Hew Dalrymple, who im- mediately displaced Sir Henry Burrard, as Sir Henry Burrard had displaced Sir Arthur Wellesley. Unfortu- nately, the new general inclined to the opinions of his second in command, rather than to the more enterpris- ing tactics of the future hero of the Peninsula, and he persisted in the belief that Sir Jolm Moore's corps should be allowed to come up before operations were recom- menced. The best commentary on Sir Arthur's advice is to be found in the fact that Junot himself presently proposed a suspension of arms, with a view to the com- plete evacuation of Portugal by the French. A con- vention, in fiict, was concluded on these terms, at Cintra, within a fortnight after the battle ; but so adroitly had Junot and his comrades availed themselves of the im- pressions existing at the British head-quarters that, though beaten in the field, they maintained in the ne- gotiations the ascendency of the stronger party, and eventually secured conditions far more favourable than they were entitled to demand. It happened that Sir Arthur Wellesley had been made, under Sir Hew ])al- rymple's immediate orders, the negotiating oflScer at the first agreement between the belligerents, and it was his 72 TFIE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. name which appeared at the foot of the instrument. When, therefore, the indignation of Englishmen was, with some justice, roused at this sacrifice of their tri- umphs, and the convention made the subject of official inquiry, CJoneral Wollesley incurred the first shock of public censure. Further investigation, however, not only exculpated him from all responsibility, but brought to light his earnest, though ineffectual endeavours, to procure a ditferent result, and the country was soon satisfied that if the conqueror of Roli^a and Vimiera had been undisturbed in his arrangements, the whole French army must have been prisoners of war. Yet, even as things stood, the success achieved was of no or- dinary character. The British soldiers had measured their swords against some of ihe best troops of the Em- pire, and with signal success. The "Sepoy General" had indisputably shown that his powei-s were not lim- ited to Oriental campaigns. lie had eft'ected the dis- embarcation of his troops — always a most hazardous feat — without loss, had gained two well contested bat- tles; and in less than a single month liad actually cleared the kingdom of Portugal of its invaders. The army, with its intuitive judgment, had formed a correct appreciation of his services, and tlie field-officers engaged at Vimiera testified their opinions of their commander by a valuable gift ; but it was clear that no place re- mained for General AVellesley under his new superiors, and he accordingly returned to England, bringing with him conceptions of Spanish afi'airs which were but too speedily verified by events. While Sir Arthur Wellesley, having resumed his Irish Secretaryship and his seat in Parliament, was oc- AFFAIRS IN PORTUGAL. 73 cupyiiig: himself with the civil duties of his oflice, and endenvouring to promote ii bettor comprehension of Pe- ninsular politics, an abrupt change of fortune had whol- ly reversed the relative positions of the French and English in those parts. The successes of the summer and autumn had expelled Napoleon's forces from Portu- gal, and from nearly nine-tenths of the territory of Spain, the only ground still occupied by the invaders being a portion of the mountainous districts behind the Ebro. Thus, after sweeping the whole Peninsula before them by a single ma?^h, and establishing themselves at Madrid and Lisbon with less trouble than had been ex- perienced at Brussels or Amsterdam, the French armies found themselves suddenly driven back, by a return tide of conquest, to the very foot of the Pyrenees ; and now, in like manner, the English, after gaining possession of Portugal in a month's campaign, and closing round upon their enemies in Spain as if to complete the victo- ry, were as suddenly hurled back again to the coast, while the Peninsula again passed apparently under the dominion of Napoleon, to be finally rescued by a strug- gle of tenfold severity. Sir Arthur Wellesley quitted Portugal towards the end of September, leaving behind him a British force of some 30,000 men, committed to an indefinite co-operation with the Spanish patriots. At this period the remains of the French armies of oc- cupation were, as we have said, collected behind the l^^bro, in mimber, perhaps, about 50,000 or 00,000, while the Spanish forces, in numerical strength at least double, wt'i'c disposed around them in a wide semicir- cular cordon, from Bilbao to r)ar(.'clona; and it was conceived that an English army advancing from the 74 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. west would at once give the finishing impulse to the campaign. But, in point of fact, these appearances were on both sides delusive. The Spanish armies were deficient in every point but that of individual enthusi- asm. They were almost destitute of military provisions and were under no efi'ective command. The adminis- tration of the country since the insurrection had been conducted by provincial juntas acting independently of each other, and, although an attempt had been made to centralize these powers by the organization of a su- preme junta at Aranjuez, little success had as yet attend- ed the experiment. The consequence was a total dis- traction of counsels, an utter confusion of government, and a general spirit of self-will and insubordination, which the recent successes only tended to increase. Such was the true condition of the patriot forces. On the other hand, the Fi-ench, though repulsed for the moment, were close to the inexhaustible resources of their own country ; and Napoleon, with a perfect ap- preciation of the scene before him, was preparing one of those decisive blows which none better than he knew how to deal. The army behind the Ebro had been rapidly reinforced to the amount of 150,000 men, and at tlie beginning of November the Emperor arrived in person to assume the command. At this conjuncture Sir John Moore, who, it will be remembered, had brought the last and largest detachment to the array of Portugal, and who had remained in that country while the other generals had repaired to England pending the inquiry into the convention of Cintra, was directed to take the command of 21,000 men from the army of Portugal, to unite with a corps of 7,000 more despatched SIR JOHN' MOORE. 75 to Corunna under Sir David Baird, and to co-operate with the Spanish forces beleagnerin ;• the French, as we have described, in the south-eastern ano-le of the Penin- sula. In pursuance of these instructions. Sir John Moore, by a series of movements which we are not called upon in this place to criticise, succeeded in collecting at Salamanca by the end of November the troops under his own command, while Sir David Faird's corps had penetrated as far as Astorga. But the opportunity of favourable action, if ever it had really existed, was now past. Suddenly advancing with an imposing force of the finest troops of the empire. Napoleon had burst through the weak lines of his opponents, had crushed their armies to the right and left by a succession of irre- sistible blows, was scouring with his cavalry the plains of Leon and Castile, forced the Somosierra pass on the 30th of November, and four days afterwards was in un- disputed possession of Madrid. Meantime Sir John Moore, misled by false intelligence, disturbed by the importunities of our own Minister at Aranjuez, disheart- ened by his observation of Spanish politics, and despair- ing of any substantial success against an enemy of whose strength he was now aware, determined, after long hesitation, on advancing into the country, with the hope of some advantage against the corps of Soult, iso- lated, as he thought, at Saldanha. The result of this movement was to bring Napoleon from' Madrid "n such force as to compel the rapid retreat of the English to Corunna under circumstances which we need not re- count ; and thus by the commencement of tlie year 1809, Spain was again occupied by the French, while the English army, so recently victorious in Portugal, TIIK UVKK OK WKI.LINU ION. was saving itself by sea without having struck a blow, except in selt'-dotenco at its euibaivntion. Napoleon, botore ISKhmv's corps li;ul actually loft Coniiuia, conceived the war at an end, and, in issuing instructions to his marshals, antici}>ateil, with no uu- reasiuiable ciuilidence, the complete subjugation oi' the Peninsida. Excepting, indeed, some isolated district* in the south-east, the oidy j^arts now in possession of the Spaniards or their alhes were Andalusia, which had been saved by the i>recipitate recall of Napoleon to the North, and Tortugal, which, still in arms against the French, was nonunally occupiinl by a l^ritish corps of 10,000 men, left there muler Sir John C'radock at the time of (icneral Moore's de}\arture with the bulk of the army tor Spain. The ]n'oct\'ding"s of the French mai*shals tor the recovery o{' the entire IVninsula were speedily arranged. Lannes took the direction o\' tiie siege i>f Saragossa, where the Spaniards, lighting as usual with admirable constancy from behind stone walls, were holding two French corps at bay. Lefebvre dro'" one S]>anish army into the recesses of the Sierra Mi and \ictor chased another into the fastnesses of Murcia. Meantime Soult, at\er recoiling awhile from the dying blows oi' Moore, had ]>romptly occupied tiallicia after the departure o\' the Fnglish, and was preparing to crojis the Portuguese frontier on his work of conquest In aid of this design, it was concerted that while the last-named ma>-shal advanced from the north, Victor, bv way of IClvas, and l.apisse, b}' way ot' Almeida, sho\dd converge together ujhmi IVrlugal, and that when the Fuiilish at LisKui had been driven to their ships, tilt) several corps should unite for the tinal subjugation KAllLY KMHAKUASSMKNTS. 77 of the Peninsula, by the oeeupntion of Andulusin. Ac- cordingly, leaving Ney to maintain the ground already won, Soult descended with 30,000 men u])on tlie Douro, and by the end of Mardi was in secure possession of ()j)()rto. Had he continued his advance, it is not im- possible that the campaign might have had the termina- tion he desired ; but at this point, ho waited for intelli- geiice of tlie Englisli in liis front and of Victor and La- pisse on liis tlank. His caution saved Portugal, for, while he still hesitated on the brink of the Douro, there again arrived in the Tagus that renowned comman- der, before whose genius tlie fortunes not only of the marshals, but of their imperial master, were finally to fail. England was now at the commencement of her greatest war. The system of small expeditions and insignificant divtirsions, though not yet conclusively abandoned, was soon superseded by the glories of a visible contest; and in a short time it was known and "'Ui-by a great majority of llic nation, that on the field iA Peninsula Kngland was fairly j>itted against France, and playing her own chosen part in the Euro- pean struggle. Put thes(i convictions were not pre- valent enough at the outset to facilitate in any material degree the duties of the Ministry or the work of the (Jeneral; on tlie contrary, so com]>licat(d were the (Mubarrassments attending the prosecution of the war on the scale required, that to surmount them de- manded little less wisdom or patience than the conduct of the actual campaign. In the first instance, the Pritish nation had been extravagantly excited by the successful insurrections of the Spaniards, and the events 78 TIIK DUKK OF WKLLINOTON. of our Gxpcri mental campai£>'n in Portup^al had so in- spired lli.> piiMic mind, (li.'it ovoii tho cvaoualion ol' tliat kiii<>(loin l)y (lur iM-tnich was ooiisidorod, as wo liavo so»Mi, in t.lio liu'lit of an iinporfoct rosnlt. Whon, liow- ovMj\ llioso conditions of tlio slrn<;'<;lo woro vai)idly ox- c) nno'i'd for tho total disoonitituro of tlio ]^a(rio(s, the iv.'ajihirc (»f Madrid, and the precipitate retreat of the British army, witii the loss of its commander, and the aalvatii>n of little but its honor, popidar opinion veered (juii'lvly towards its customary point, and it was loudly proelaimeii that the French Kniperor was invincible by land, and that a contest with liis legions on that ele- ment must inevitably prove ruinous to l^ritain. But the government of the day, originally receiving it.s im- pulse froni j)ublic feeling, had gradually acquired iiide- pendent convictions on tins mighty (piestion, and was imw prepared to maintain the interests of the nation against the clamours oi' the nation itself. Acc(U-dingly, at the commencement of the year 18011, when the pros- poctvS of Spanish in(K>pendence were at their very gloomiest ]>oint, the Ihitish Cabinet had proposed and ciMiclnded a con>j>rehcnsive treaty of alliance witli tho Provisional Administration of Spain ; and it was now resolved that the contest in the reninsnla should be continued o\\ a scale more eflectual than before, and that the principal, instead of the secondary, part should be borne by Kngland. Vet this decision was not taken without nuuh hesitation and considerable resistance; and it was elear to all observant spectators that, though the t»j>inions o\' the (unernmcnt, rather than those of the opposition, might preptuulerate in the public mind, tlioir ascendency was not so complete but that the tii-st I'ROPOHTIONS OF TllK VORCES. 79 incidents of failure, loss, or difficulty, would be turned to licrious account against the promoters and conduc- tors of the war. Nor were these misgivini>s, though often ])ret»Muled for the ])ur])ose of faction, without a certain warrant of trulh; indeed, few can read the history of this strugirlo without perceiving that the single point which concluded it in our favour, was the genius of that great man who lias just exi)ired. It has been attempted to show that the military forces of France and England at this period were not in reality so dis])roportioned as they appeared to be, but we confess our own inability to discover the balance alleged. It is beyond doubt that the national spirit remained unchanged, and that the individual excellence of the British soldier Avas unimpeachable Much, too, liad been done in the way of organization by the measures consequent on the protracted menace of invasion, and much in the way of encouragement by the succeswes in I^'gypt and l\>i;tugal no less than the triumphs in India. lint in war numerical force must needs tell with enormous eftect, and on this point Eng- land's colonial requirements left licr little to show against the myriads of the continent. It was calculated at the lime that 00,000 liritish soldiers iniyht have been made disposable for the I^eninsular service, but at no |Ku-iod of the war was such a force ever actually collected under the standards of Wellington, while Na- poleon could m.'iintain his ^500,000 warriors in Spain, whithout disabling the arms of the Empire on the Danube or the Rhine. We had allies, it is true, in the troops of the country ; but these at first were little better thati refractory recruits, recjuiring all- the acce«- 80 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. scries of discipline, equipment, and organization ; jeal- ous of all foreigners even as friends, and not unreason- ably suspicious of supporters, who could always tind in their ships a refuge which was denied to themselves. But above all these difficulties was that arising from the inexperience uf the Government in continental warfere. Habituated to expeditions reducible to the compass of a few transports, unaccustomed to the contingencies of regular war, and harassed by a vigilant and not always conscientious Opposition, the Ministry had to consume half its strength at home ; and the commander of the army, in justifying his most skilful dispositions, or pro- curing needful supplies for the troops under his charge, was driven to the very extremities of expostulation and remonstrance. AVhen, however, with these ambiguous prospects, the Government did at length resolve on the systematic prosecution of the Peninsular war, the eyes of the na- tion were at once instinctively turned on Sir Arthur Wellesley as the general to conduct it. Independently of the proofs he had already given of his quality at Rolicja and Vimiera, this enterprising and sagacious soldier stood almost alone in his confidence respecting the undertaking on hand. Arguing from the military position of Portugal, as flanking the long territory of Spain, from the natural features of the country (which he had already studied), and from the means of reinforcement and retreat securely provided by the sea, he stoutly declared his opinion that Portugal was tenable against the French, even if actual possessoi"s of Spain, and that it offered ample opportunities of influ- encing the great result of the wai*. With these views ARRIVAL IN THE TAGUS. 81 he recommended that the Portuguese army should be organized at its full strength ; that it should be in part taken into British pay and under the direction of British officers, and that a force of not less than 30,000 English troops should be despatched to keep this army together. So provided, he undertook the management of the war, and such were his resources, his tenacity, and his skill, that though 280,000 French soldiers were closing round Portugal as he landed at Lisbon, and though difficulties of the most arduous kind awaited him in his task, he neither flinched nor failed until he had led his little army in triumph, not only from the Tagus to the Ebro, but across the Pyrenees into France, and returned himself by Calais to England after wit- nessing the downfall of the French capital. Yet, so perilous was the conjuncture when the weight of afi'airs was thus thrown upon his shoulders, that a few weeks' more delay must have destroyed every pros- pect of success. Not only was Soult, as we stated, collecting himself for a swoop on the towers of Lisbon, but the Portuguese themselves were distrustful of our support, and the English troops, while daily preparing for embarcation, were com})elled to assume a defensive attitude against those whose cause they were maintain- ing. But such was the j)restiue already attached to Wellesley's name that his arrival in the Tagus changed every feature of the scene. No longer suspicious of our intentions, the Portuguese Government gave prompt effect to the suggestions of the English commander; levies wei-e decreed and organized, provisions collected, depots established, and a spirit of confidence again per- vaded the country, which was unqualified on this occa "'4* 82 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. sion by that jealous distrust which liad formerly neutral- ized its effects. The oominand in chief of the native army was intrusted to an English officer of great dis- tinction, General Ueresford, and no time was lost in once more testing the efficacy of the Britisli arms. Our description of the positions relatively occujiied by the contending parties at this juncture will, perhaps, be remembered. Soult, having left Ney to control the north, was at Oporto, with 24,000 men, preparing to cross the Doiiro and descend upon Lisbon, w'hile Victor and Lapisse, with 30,000 more, were to co-o]->erate in the attack from the contiguous provinces of Kstrema- dura and Leon. Of the Spanish armies we need only say that they had been repeatedly routed with more or less disgrace, though Cuesta still held a certain force together in the valley of the Tagus. There w'ere there- fore two courses open to the British commander — either to repel the menaced advance of Soult by marching on Oporto or to effect a junction witli Cuesta, and try the result of a demonstration upon Madrid. The latter of these plans was wisely postponed for the moment, and, preference having been decisively given to the former, the troops^ at once commeneed their march upon the Douro. The British force under Sir Arthur Wellesley's command amounted at this time to about 20,000 men, to which about 15,000 Portuguese in a respectable state of organization were added by the exertions of Beresford. Of these about 24,000 were now led against Soult, who, though not inferior in strength, no sooner ascertained the advance of the English com- mander tlian he arranged for a retreat, by detaching Loison with 6,000 men to dislodge a Portuguese post PJ^SSAGE OF THE DOURO. 83 in his left rear. Sir Arthur's intention was to envelope, if possible, the French corps by pushing forward a strong force upon its left, and then intercepting its re- treat towards Ney's position, while the main body as- saulted Soult in his quarters at Oporto. The former of these operations he intrusted to Beresford, the latter he directed in person. On the 12th of May the troops reached the southern bank of the Douro ; the waters of which, 300 yards in width, rolled between them and their adversaries. In anticipation of the attack Soult had destroyed the floating-bridge, had collected all the boats on the opposite side, and there, with his forces well in hand for action or retreat, was looking from the window of his lodging, enjoying the presumed discom- fiture of his opponent. To attempt such a passage as this in face of one of the ablest marshals of France was, indeed, an audacious stroke, but it was not beyond the daring of that genius which M. Thiers describes as cal- culated only for the stolid operations of defensive war. Availing himself of a point where the river by a bend in its course was not easily visible from the town. Sir Arthur determined on transporting, if possible, a few troops to the northern bank, and occupying an unfin- ished stone building, which he perceived was capable of afibrding temporary cover. The means were soon supplied by the activity of Colonel Waters — an officer whose habitual audacity rendered him one of the heroes of this memorable war. Crossing in a skiff* to the op posite bank, he retunied with two or three, boats, and in a few minutes a company of the Buffs was estab- lished in the building. Reinforcements quickly fol- lowed, but not without discovery. The alai-m was 84 TMK m'KIC OK WKLLINOTON. given, and presently the oditiee was enveloped by the eager battalions of the Frenoli. The Britisli, however, lield their ground ; a passage was eft'ected at other points during the struggle ; the French, after an inef- footiial resistance, were fain to abandon the city in pre- ci})italion, and Sir Arthur, after his unexampled feat of arms, sat down that evening to the dinner which had been ]>re[)ared for Soult. Nor did the disasters of the French mai-shal terminate here, for, though the designs of the British commander had been partially frustrated by the intelligence gained by the enemy, yet the Frcncli communications were so far intercepted, that Soult only joined Ney after losses and privations little short of those which had been experienced by Sir John Moore. Tliis brilliant operation being etfccted, Sir Arthur was now at liberty to turn to the main project of the campaign — that to whicli, in fact, the attack upon Soult had been subsidiary — the defeat of Victor in Estrema- dun» ; and, as the force under this marshal's command was not greater than tliat which liad been so decisively defeated at Oporto, some contidence might naturally be entertained in calculating upon the result, l^ut, at this time, the various ditViculties of the English commander began to disclose themselves. Though his losses had been extremely small in the recent actions, considering the im]>ortance of their results, the troops were sutfcriug severely from sickness, at least 4,000 being in liospital, while supplies of all kinds were miserably deticient^ through the imperfections of the commissariat. The soldiers were nearly barcf»H>tcil, their j>ay was largely in arrear, anil the military chest was empty. In ad- dition to this, although the real weakness of the Spanish TALAVKllA. 86 amnios was not yet fully known, it was clearly discerni- ble that the character of their coinin;ui(l(!rs would pre- clude any clfective concert in tli«'. joint opcrutioiiH of the allied force. Cuesta would take no advic*^, and in- Hist(Ml on the adoption of his own sehcnK^H, with Huch obstinacy, that Sir Arthur was compelled to frame his plans accordiufrly. instead, therefore, of circumventinuj Victor, as he had intended, he advanced into Spain at tiie beginning of July, to ett'ect a junction with (Juosta, and f(!el his way towards Madrid. Tiie arnii(!s, when united, formed a mass of 7H, ()()() (•(»nd)atanls ; but, of these, 50,000 were Spanisii, :iiid f(»r tiu! brunt of war Sir Arthur could only nnkon on his '22,000 liritish troops — Beresford's J 'ortuguisse having been despatched to the north of Tortugal. On the other side, Victor's forci! h.'id b(!en strenglluMied by the succours which ,)()scph Uonaparte, alarmed for tlui safety of Madrid, had hastily conc«!ntrat<'(l at Toledo ; and when the two armies at length confronted each other at Talavera, it was found that .05,000 excellent Friiuch troops W(!ro arrayed against Sir Arthur and his ally, while nearly as many more were (hisct-nding from (he north on the line of the 15ritish communications along the valley of the Tagus. On the 28th of July, the liritish ('om- mander, after making the Ixjst dispcjsitions in his power, Hiceived the attack of the French, directetl by J()se[)h Bonaparte in person, with Victor and Jourdan at his sid<^, and after an engagement of great sev(!rity, in which the Spaniards were virtually inaclJve, he re- mained master of the iield against double his numbers, having repulsed the enemy at all points, with heavy loss, and having captured several iiundred prisoners 86 TIIK DUKE OB' WELLINGTON. and seventeen pieces of cannon, in this, the fii-st gi'eat pitched battle between the French and English in the Poninsula. In this well fought field o\' Talavora, tl»o French had thrown, for the first time, their whole dispa^able foicc u]>on the British army, without success; and Sir Ar- tlmr NA'ellesley inferred, with a justifiable confidence, that the relative superiority of his troops to those of the KmjH^ror. was practically decided. Jomini, the French militMry historian, confesses almost as much, and the opinions of Napoleon himself, as visible in his correspondence, underwent from that moment a serious change. Yet at home, the people, wholly unaccus- tomed to the contingencies of a real war, and the Op- position, unscrupulously employing the delusions of the people, combined in decrying the victx^ry, denouncing the successful general, anil despairing of the whole en- terprise. The city of London, even, recorded on a petition, its discontent with the " raslnivit.t, oafcntation, and vfu'less j'rt/owr," of that commander whom M. Thiers depicts as endowed solely with the slugfjish and phleg- matic tenacity of his countrymen ; and though Minis- ters succeeded in procuring an acknowledgment of the services performed, and a warrant for pei"sisting in the ettbrt; both they and the l^ritish General were sadly crampCil in the means of action. Sir Arthur Welles- ley became, indeed, " Baron Pouro, of AVellesley, and VisciMint Wellington of Talavern, and of Wellington, in the county o\' Somerset;" but the Government wjis afraid to maintain his etfective means even at the nuHlerate amount for which he had stipulated, an*! they gave him plainly to nnderst.nul that the responsibility EFFOUTS l)K N AI'OI.KON. 87 of the war must rest upon his own shouklors. He aecepted it, and, in full relijince on liis own resources and the tried v.-Uour ol'liis troo])s, .-iwailiHl llie sluxk wlilch was at liaiid. The battle of Talavera acted on the Emperor Napo- leon exactly like the Kattle of Viniiera. His best sol- diei-s had failed aoainst tliose leil by (he " Sepoy Gene- ral," and he became seriously alarmed for his con((uest of Spain. After Vimiera he rushed, at the head of his guards, throuoli Sonu)sierra to Mach-id ; and now, after Talavera, he prepared a still nioi'O redoubtable invasion. Relieved from his continental liabilities by the cam- paigns of Aspern and Waijrani, and from nearer ap])re- hensions by the discomfiture of our ex})edition to Wal- cheren, he poured his now disposable leii^ions in extra- ordinary numbers through the j)asses of the Pyrenees. Nine powerful corps, mustering fully 280,000 eftective men, under Marshals Victor, Ney, Soult, Mortier, and Massena, with a crowd of asjtiring generals besides, re- presented the force detinitely charged with the final sub- jugation of the Peninsula.. To meet the shock of this stupendous array Wellington had the 20,000 troops of Talavera augmented, besides other reinforcements, by that memorable brigade which, under the name of the Light Division, became afterwards the admiration of both armies. In addition, lie had Beresford's Portu- guese levies, now 30,000 strong, well discii>liued, and capabk* as events showed, of becoming first-rate sol- diers, making a total of some 55,000 disposable troops, independent of garrisons and detachments. All hopes of eftectual co-operation from Spain had now vanished. Disregarding the sage advice of Wellington, the Spanish 88 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. generals had consigned themselves and their armies to inevitable destruction, and of the whole kingdom Gibral- tar and Cadiz alone had escaped the swoop of the vic- torious French. The Provisional Administration dis- played neither resolution nor sincerity, the British forces were sutlered absolutely to starve, and AVellington was unable to extort from the leaders around him the small- est assistance for that army which was the last support of Spanish freedom. It was under such circumstances, with forces full of spirit, but numerically weak, without any assurance of sympathy at home, without money or supplies on the spot, and in the face of Napoleon's best marshal, with 80,000 troops in line, and 40,000 in re- serve, that Wellington entered on the campaign of 1810 — a campaign pronounced by military critics to bo inferior to none in his whole career. AVithdrawing, after the victory oi' Talavera, from the concentrating forces of the enemy attracted by his ad- vance, he had at first taken post on the Cniadiana, until, wearied out by Spanisli insincerity and perverseness, he moved his army to the ^londego, preparatory to those encounters which he foresaw the defence of I'ortugal must presently bring to pass. Already had he divined by his own sagacity the character and necessities of the coming campaign. Massena, as the best representative of the Emperor himself, having under his orders Ney, Regnier, and .Tunot, was gathering his forces on the north-eastern frontier of Portugal to fulfil his ntaster's commands by " sweeping the English leopard into the sea " Against such hosts sis lie brought to the assault a defensive attitude was all that could be maintained, and Welliiigton's eye had detected the true mode of LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS. 89 operation. He proposed to make the immediate district of Lisbon perform that service for Portno-nl which Por- tugal itself performed for the Peninsula at large, by furnishing- an impregnable fastness and a secure retreat. Py canying lines of fortification from the Atlantic coast, through Torres Vedras, to the bank of the Tagus a little above Lisbon, he succeeded in constructing an artificial stronghold within which his retiring forces would be inaccessible, and from which, as opportunities invited, he might issue at will. These provisions silently and unobtrusively made, he calmly took post on the Coa, and awaited the assault. Hesitating or undecided, from some motive or other, Massena for weeks delayed the blow, till at length, after feeling the mettle of the Light Division on the Coa, he put his army in motion after the British commander, who slowly retired to his de- fences. Deeming, however, that a passage of arms would tend both to inspirit his own troops in what seemed like a retreat, and to teach Massena the true quality of the antagonist before him, he deliberately halted at Busaco and ofi'ered battle. Unable to refuse the challenge, the French marshal directed his bravest troops against the British position, but they were foiled with immense loss at every point of the attack, and Wellington proved, by one of his most brilliant victo- ries, that his retreat partook neither of discomfiture nor fear. Ivapidly recovering himself, however, Massena followed on his formidable foe, and was dreaming of little less than a second evacuation of Portugal, when, to his astonishment and dismay, he found himself ab- ruptly arrested in his course by the tremendous lines of Torres Vedras. 90 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. These prodigious intrenchments comprised a triple line of fortiiications one within th^ other, the innermost being intended to cover the embarcation of the troops in the last resort. The main strength of the works had been thrown on the^second line, at which it had been intended to make the final stand, but even the outer barrier was found in etfect to be so formidable as to de- ter the enemy from all hopes of a successful assault. Thus checked in mid career, the French mai-shal chafed and fumed in front of these impregnable lines, afraid to attack, yet unwiUing to retire. For a whole month did he lie here inactive, tenacious of his purpose, though aware of his defeat, and eagerly watching for the fii-st advantage which the chances of war or the mistakes of the ] British general might offer him. Meantime, how- ever, while AVellington's concentrated forces were en- joying, through his sage provisions, the utmost comfort and abundance within their lines, the Frencli army was gradually reduced to the last extremities of destitution and disease, and Massena at length broke up in despair, to commence a retreat which was never afterwards ex- changed for an advance. Confident in hope and spirit, and overjoyed to see retiring before them one of those real IinjuM-ial armies which had swept the continent from the Rhine to the Vistula, the British troops issued from their works in hot pui*suit, and, though the extra- ordinary genius of the French commander pi'eserved his forces from what in ordinary cases would have been the ruin of a rout, yet his sufferings were so extreme and his losses so heavy that he carried to the frontier scarce- ly one-half of the force with which he had plunged blindly into Portugal. Following up his wary enemy IMPHKSSIONK AT IIOMK. 91 with a caution which no success was permitted to dis- turb, Wellington presently availed himself of his posi- tion to fittempt the reeovery of Almeida, a fortress wliieli, with (Jiudad luxlrigo, forms tlie key of north- eastern Poi'tug-al, and which had been taken by Masse- na in his advance. Anxious to preserve this important place, the French marshal tuined with his whole force upon the foe, but Wellinfvton met him at Fuentes d'Onoro, repulsed his attempts in a sanguinary engage- ment, and Almeida fell. As at this point the tide of French conquest had been actually turned, and the British army, so lightly held by Napoleon, was now manifestly chasing his eagles from the field, it might liavo been presumed that popularity and sup]>ort would have rewarded the unex- ampled successes of the English general. Yet it was not so. The reverses experienced during the same pe- riod in Spain were loudly appealed to as neutralizing the triumphs in rortugnl, and at no moment was there a more vehement denunciation of the whole Peninsular war. Though Cadiz resolutely held out, and Graham, indeed, on the heights of Barossa, had emulated the glories of Busaco, yet even tlie strong fortress of l^ada- joz had now fallen before the vigorous audacity of Soult; and Suchet, a rising general of extraordinary abilities, was ellectinj)^ by the reduction of hitherto impregnable stron:^holds the complete conquest of Catalonia and Valencia. Eagei'ly turning these disasters to account, and inspii-ited by the accession of the Prince Regent to power, the 0})position in the British Parliament so op- pressed the Ministry, that at the very moment when Wellington, after his unrivalled strategy, was on the 92 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. track of his retreating foe, he could scarcely count for common support on the Government he was serving. He was represented in England, as his letters show us, to be " in a scrape," and he fought with the conscious- ness that all his reverses would be magnified and all his successes denied. Yet he failed neither in heart nor hand. He had verified all his own assertions re- specting the defeusibility of Portugal. His army had become a perfect model in discipline and daring, he was driving before him 80,000 of the best troops of the Empire, and he relied on the resources of his own ge- nius for compensating those disadvantages to which he foresaw he must be still exposed. Such was the cam- paign of 1810, — better conceived and woi-se appreciated than any which we shall have to record. As the maintenance of Portugal was subsidiary to the great object of the war, — the deliverance of tlie Peninsula from French domination, — AVellington of course proceeded, after successfully repulsing the in- vaders from Portuguese soil, to assume the ofiensive, by carrying his arms into Spain. Thus, after defeating Junot, he had been induced to try the battle of Tala- vera ; and now% after expelling Massena, he betook him- self to similar designs, with this difi'erence — that in- stead of operating by the valley of the Tagus against Madrid, he now moved to the valley of the Guadiana for the purpose of recovering Badajoz, a fortress, like that of Ciudad Rodrigo, so critically situated on the frontier, that with these two places in the enemy's hands, as they now were, it became hazardous either to quit Por- tugal or to penetrate into Spain. At this point, there- fore, were now to commence the famous sieges of the COMPARISON OF FORCES. 93 Peninsula — sieges which will always reflect immortal honor on the troops engaged, and which will always attract the interest of the English reader ; but which must, nevertheless, be appealed to as illustrations of the straits to which an army may be led by want of mili- tary experience in the Government at home. By this time the repeated victories of Wellington and his col- leagues had raised the renown of British soldiers to at least an equality with that of Napoleon's veterans, and the incomparable efficiency, in particular, of the light division was acknowledged to be without a parallel in any European service. But in those departments of the army where excellence is less the result of intuitive ability, the forces under Wellington were still greatly surpassed by the trained legions of the Emperor. While Napoleon had devoted his whole genius to the organization of the parks and trains which attend the march of an army in the field, the British troops had only the most imperfect resources on which to rely. The Engineer corps, though admirable in quality, was so deficient in numbers that commissions were placed at the free disposal of Cambridge mathematicians. The siege trains were weak and worthless against the solid ramparts of Peninsula strongholds, the intrench- ing tools were so ill made that they snapped in the hands of the workmen, and the art of sapping and mining was so little known that this branch of the siege duties was carried on by draughts from regiments of the line, imperfectly and hastily instructed for the purpose. Unhappily, these results can only be ob- viated by long foresight, patient training, and costly provision ; it was not in the power of a single mind, 94 THE DUKK OF WELLINGTON. however capacious, to effect an instantaneous reform, and Wellington was compelled to supply the deficien- cies by the best blood of his troops. The command of the force commissioned to recover Badnjoz hi\d been intrusted to Marshal Beresford until Lord Wellington could repair in person to the ?cene, and it was against Soult, who was marching rapidly from the South to the relief of the place, that the glori- ous but sanguinary battle of Albuera was fought on the lOth of May. Having chocked the enemy by this bloody defeat Beresford resumed his duties of the siege until he was supei*seded by the Commander-in-Chief. But all the efforts of Wellington and his troops were vain, for the present, against this celebrated fortress ; two assaults were repulsed, and the British general de- ternu'ned on relinquishing the attempt, and returning to the northern frontier of Portugal for more favourable opportunities of action. He had now by his extraordi- nary genius so far changed the character of the war, that the British, heretofore fighting with desperate te- nacity for a footing at Lisbon or Cadiz, were now open- ly assuming the offensive, and Napoleon had been actu- ally compelled to direct defensive pre}>arations along the road leading tlirough Vittoria to Bayonne — that very road which Wellington in spite of these defences wjis soon to traverse in triumph. Meantime fresh troops were pouring over the Pyrenees into Spain, and a new plan of operations was dictated by the Emperor himself. One powerful army in the north was to guard Castile and Leon, and watch the road by which Wellington might be expected to advance ; another, under Soult, strongly reinforced, was to maintain French iuteiests in CONDITIONS OF THE WAR. 95 Andalusia and menace Portugal from the south ; while Marinont, who had succeeded Massena, took post with 30,000 men in the valley of the Tagns, resting on Tole- do and Madrid, and prepared to concert movements with either of his colleagues as occasion might arise. To encounter these antagonists, who could rai)id!y con- centrate 90,000 splendid troops against him, Welling- ton could barely bring 50,000 into the held ; and though this disparity of numbers was afterwards somewhat les- sened, yet it is scarcely in reason to expect that even the genius of Wellington or the valour of his troops could have ultimately prevailed against such odds but for circumstances which favoured the designs of the British and rendered the contest less unequal. In the first place, the jealousies of the French marshals, wdien unrepressed by the Empei-or's presence, were so inveter- ate as to disconcert the best operations, being sometimes little less suicidal than those of the Trinces of India. Next, although the Spanish armies had ceased to ofter regular resistance to the invaders, yet the guerilla sys- tem of warfare, aided by interminable insurrections, act- ed to the incessant embairassment of the French, whose duties, perils, and fatigues were doubled by the restless activity of these daring enemies. But the most import- ant of Wellington's advantages was that of position. With an impregnable retreat at Lisbon, with free water carriage in his rear, and with the great arteries of the Douro and the Tagus for conducting his supplies, he could operate at will from his central fastness towards the north, east, or south. If the northern provinces were temporarily disengaged from the enemy's presence, lie could issue by Almeida and Salamanca upon the 96 TJIK DUKK OF WELLINGTON. {vroat line of commiinicition botwcfMi the Tyrenees and Madrid; if the valley of the Tagus were left unrjnarded, lie could march directly upon the capital by the well- known route of Talavera ; while if Soult, by any of these donionsl rations, was tempted to cross the Ouadiana, he could carry his arms into Andalusia by Elvas and Ixi- dajoz. Relying, too, on the excellence of his troops, ho confidently accounted himself a match for any single army of the enemy, while he was well aware, from the exhausted state of the country and the diflicultios of procuring subsistence no concentration of the l^^ench forces could be maintained for many days together. In this way, availing himself of the far superior intelHgonco which he enjoyctl through the agency of the guerillas, and of his own exclusive facilities for commanding sup- plies, he succeeded in paralysing the enormous hosts of Napoleon, by constant alarms and well-directed blows, till at length when the time of action came he advanced from cantonments and drove King Joseph and all his mai-shals headlong across the Pyrenees. The position taken up by Wellington when he trans- ferred his operations from the south to the north fron- tier of Tortugal was at Fuente (Juinaldo, a locality possessing some advantageous features in the neigbour- IukhI of Oiudad Kodrigo. His thoughts being still oc- cupied by the means of gaining the border fortresses, he had promptly turned to Kodrigo from Padajoz, and liad arranged his plans with a double prospect of suc- cess. Knowing that the j^lace was inadeipuitely pro- visioned he cont'oivi>d hopes of blockading it into sulv- missiou tVom his post at Kuente (Juinaldo, since in the presence o{' this force no supplies ould be thrown into SIEGE OF CIUDAD llODRIOO. 9Y the town unless escorted by a convoy equal to the army under liis command. Kitlicr, tlicrcforo, the French mar- shal must abandon Kodiigo to its fate, or ho must go through the difficult operation of concentrating all his foj-ces to form the convoy required. Marmont chose the latter alternative, and uniting his army with that of ])orsGnnc advanced to the relief of Rodrigo with an immense train of stores and 00,000 lighting men. By this extraordinary effort not only was the jilaco pro- visioned, but Wellington himself was brought into a situation of some }>cril, for after successfully repulsing an attempt of the French in the memorable combat of El Bodon he found himself the next day, with only 15,000 men actually at his disposal, exposed to the at- tack of the entire French army. Fortunately Marmont was unaware of the chance thus offered him, and while he was occupying himself in evolutions and displays, Wellington collected his troops and stood once more in security on his position. This movement, however, of the French commander destroyed all hopes of reducing Rodrigo by blockade, and the British general recurred accordingly to the alternative he had been contemplat- ing of an assault by force. To comprehend the ditHculties of this enterprise, it must be remembered that the superiority of strength was indisputably with the French whenever they con- centrated their forces, and that it was certain such con- centration would be attempted, at any risk, to save such a place as Rodrigo. Wellington, therefore, had to prepare, with such secrecy as to elude the suspicions of his enemy, the enormous mass of materials required for such a siege as that he projected. As the town stood 5 98 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. on the opposite or Spanish bank of the river Agueda, and as the approaches were commanded by the guns of the garrison, it became necessary to construct a tem- porary bridge. Moreover, the heavy battering train, which alone required 5000 bullocks to draw it, had to be brought up secretly to the spot, though it was a work almost of impossibility to get a score of cattle together. But these difficulties were surmounted by the inventive genius of the British commander. Preparing his bat- tering train at Lisbon, he shipped it at that port as if for Cadiz, transhipped it into smaller craft at sea, and then brought it up the stream of the Douro. In the next place, lie succeeded, beyond the hopes of his en- gineers, in rendering the Douro navigable for a space of 40 miles beyond the limit previously presumed, and at length he collected the whole necessary materials in the rear of his array without any knowledge on the part of his antagonist. He was now to reap the reward of his precaution and skill. Towards the close of the year the French armies having — conformably to directions of the Emperor, framed entirely on the supposition that Wellington had no heavy artillery — been dispersed in cantonments, the Bi-istish general suddenly threw his bridge across the Agueda, and besieged Ciudad Rodrigo in force. Ten days only elapsed between the invest- ment and the storm. On the 8th of January, 1812, the Agueda was crossed, and on the 19th the British were in the city. The loss of life greatly exceeded the limit assigned to snch expenditure in the scientific cal- culations of military engineers ; but the enterprise was undertaken in the face of a superior force, which could at once have defeated it by appearing on the scene of FALL OF BADAJOZ. 99 action ; and so eftectually was Marmont baffled by the vigour of the British that the phice had fallen before his army was collected for its relief. The repetition of such a stroke at Badajoz, which was now Wellington's aim, presented still greater difficulties, for the vigilance of the French was alarmed, the garrison of the place had been reconstituted by equal draughts from the various armies in order to interest each marshal personally in its relief^ and Soult in Andalusia, like Marmont in Cas- tile, possessed a force competent to overwhelm any covering army which Wellington could detach. Yet on the 7th of April Badajoz likewise fell, and after opening a new campaign with these famous demonstra- tions of his own sagacity and the courage of his troops, he prepared for a third time to advance definitely from Portugal into Spain. Though the forces of Napoleon in the Peninsula were presently to be somewhat weakened by the re- quirements of the Russian war, yet at the moment when these strongholds were wrenched from their grasp the ascendency of the Emperor was yet uncon- tested, and from the Niemen to the Atlantic there was hterally no resistance to his universal dominion save by this army, which was clinging with invincible tenacity to the rocks of Portugal, at the western extremity of Europe. From these well defended lines, however, they were now to emerge, and while Hill, by his sur- prise of Gerard at Arroyo Molinos and his brilliant capture of the forts at the bridge of Almaraz, was alarming the French for the safety of Andalusia, Wel- lington began his march to the Pyrenees. On this oc- casion he was at first unimpeded. So established was 100 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. the reputation of the troops and their general that Marmont retired as he advanced, and Salamanca, after four years of oppressive occupation, was evacuated before the liberating army. But the hosts into which Wellington had thus boldly plunged with 40,000 troops still numbered fully 270,000 soldiers, and though these forces were divided by distance and jealousies, Marmont had no difficulty in collecting an army numerically superior to that of his antagonist. Returning, therefore, to the contest, and hovering about the English general for the opportunity of pouncing at an advantage upon his troops, he gave promise of a decisive battle, and, after some days of elaborate ma- noeuvring, the opposing armies found themselves con- fronted, on the 2 2d of July, in the vicinity of Sala- manca. It was a trial of strategy, but in strategy as well as vigour the French marshal was surpassed by his redoubtable adversary. Seizing with intuitive genius an occasion which Marmont offered, Wellington fell upon his army and routed it so completely that half of its effective force was destroyed in the engage- ment. So decisively had the blow been dealt, and so skilfully had it been directed, that, as Napoleon had long foretold of such an event, it paralysed the entire French force in Spain, and reduced it to the relative position so long maintained by the English — that of tenacious defence. The only two considerable armies now remaining were those of Suchet in the east, and Soult in the south. Suchet, on hearing of Marmont's defeat, proposed that the French should make a Portu- gal of their own in Catalonia, and defend themselves in its fastnesses till aid could arrive from the Pyrenees ; IN POSSESSION OF THE CAPITAL. 101 while Soult advocated with equal warmth a retirement into Andalusia and a concentration behind the Guadi- ana. There was little time for deliberation, for Wel- lington was hot upon his prey, but as King Joseph de- camped from his capital he sent orders to Soult to evacuate Andalusia ; and the victorious army of the British, after thus, by a single blow, clearing half Spain of its invaders, made its triumphant entry into Madrid. Wellington was now in possession of the capital of Spain. He had succeeded in delivering that blow which had so long been meditated, and had signalized the growing ascendency of his army by the total defeat of his chief opponent in open field. But his work was far from finished, and while all around was rejoicing and triumph, his forecast was anxiously revolving the imminent contingencies of the war. In one sense, in- deed, the recent victory had increased rather than les- sened the dangers of his position, for it had driven his adversaries by force of common peril into a temporary concert, and Wellington well knew that any such con- cert would reduce him again to the defensive. Mar- shal Soult, it was true, had evacuated Andalusia, and King Joseph Madrid ; but their forces had been carried to Suchet's quarters in Valencia, where they would thus form an overpowering concentration of strength ; and in like manner, though Marmont's army had been shorn of half its numbers, it was rapidly recovering it- self under Clauzel by the absorption of all the detach- ments which had been operating in the north. Wel- lington saw, therefore, that he must prepare himself for a still more decisive struggle, if not for another retreat ; 102 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. and conceiving it most important to disembarrass his rear, he turned round upon Clauzel with the intention of crushing him before he could be fully reinforced, and thus establishing himself securely on the line of the Douro to await the advance of King Joseph from the east. With these views, after leaving a strong garrison at Madrid, he put his army in motion, drove Clauzel be- fore him from Valladolid, and on the 18th of September appeared before Burgos. This place, though not a fortification of the first rank, had been recently strengthened by the orders of Napoleon, whose sagacity had divined the use to which its defences might possi- bly be turned. It lay in the great road to Bayonne, and was now one of the chief depots retained by the French in the Peninsula, for the campaign had stripped them of Rodrigo, Badajoz, Madrid, Salamanca, and Seville. It became, therefore, of great importance to effect its reduction, and Wellington sat down before it with a force which, although theoretically unequal to the work, might, perhaps, from past recollections, have warranted some expectations of success. But our Pe- ninsular sieges supply, as we have said, rather warnings than examples. Badajoz and Rodrigo were only won by a profuse expenditure of life, and Burgos, though attacked with equal intrepidity, was not won at all. After consuming no less than five weeks before its walls Wellington gave reluctant orders for raising the siege and retiring. It was, indeed, ticfte, for the Northern army, now under the command of Souham, mustered 44,000 men in his rear, and Soult and Joseph were ad- vancing with fully 70,000 more upon the Tagus. To ACHIEVEMENT OF THE FRENCH. 103 oppose these forces Wellington had only 33,000 troops, Spaniards included, under his immediate command, while Hill, with the garrison of Madrid, could only muster some 20,000 to resist the advances of Soult. The British commander determined, therefore, on re- calling Hill from Madrid and resuming his former po- sition on the Agueda — a resolution which he success- fully executed in the face of the difficulties around him, though the suftering and discouragement of the troops during this unwelcome retreat were extremely severe. A detailed criticism of these operations would be beyond our province. It is enough to say that the French made a successful defence, and we have no oc- casion to begrudge them the single achievement against the English arms which could be contributed to the historic gallery of Versailles by the whole Peninsular War. Such, however, was in those times the incredulity or perverseness of party spirit in England that, while no successes were rated at their true import, every incom- plete operation was magnified into a disaster, and des- cribed as a warning. The retreat from Burgos was cited, like the retreat from Talavera, as a proof of the mismanagement of the war ; and occasion was taken in Parliament to compare even the victory of Salamanca with the battles of Marlborough, to the disparagement of Wellington and his army. Nor did any great enlight- enment yet prevail on the subject of military operations; for a considerable force, destined to act on the eastern coast of Spain, was diverted by Lord William Bentinck to Sicily at a moment when its appearance in Valencia would have disconcerted all the plans of the French, 104 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. and, by providing occupation for Josepli and his mar- shals, have relieved Wellington from that concentration of his enemies before which he was compelled to retire. But neither the wilfulness of faction nor the tenacity of folly could do more than obstruct events which were now steadily in course. Even the inherent obstinacy of Spanish character had at length yielded to the visi- ble genius of Wellington, and the wdiole military force of the country was now at length, in the fifth year of the war, placed under his paramount command. But these powers were little more than nominal ; and, in or- der to derive an effective support from the favourable disposition of the Spanish Government, the British gen- eral availed himself of the winter season to repair in person to Cadiz. It will be remembered that when, after the battle of Talavera and the retirement of Wellington to Por- tugal, the French poured their accumulated legions into Andalusia, Cadiz alone had been preserved from the deluge. Since that time the troops of Soult had en- vironed it in vain. Secured by a British garrison, strongly fortified by nature, and well supplied from the sea, it was in little danger of capture ; and it discharg- ed, indeed, a substantial service, by detaining a large detachment from the general operations of the war. In fact, the French could scarcely be described as besieging it; for, though they maintained their guard with imceasing vigilance, it was at so respectful a distance, that the great mortar which now stands in St. James's Park w^as cast especially for this extra- ordinary length of range ; and their own position was entrenched with an anxiety sufliciently indicative of CAMPAIGN OF 1813. 105 tlicir anticipations. Exempted in this manner from many of the troubles of war wliile cooped in the nar- row space of a single town, the Spanish patn-iotfi enjoy- ed ample Hberty of political discussion, and the fermen- tation of spirits was proportionate to the occasion. It was here that the affairs of the war, as regarded the Spanish armies, were regulated by a popular assembly under the control of a licentious mob ; and it was here tliat those democratic principles of government were first proiiuilgated which in later times so intimately affected the fortunes of the Peninsular monarchies. "The Cortes," wrote Wellington, "have framed a Con- stitution very much on the principle that a painter paints a picture — viz., to be looked at. I have not met any person of any description who considers that Spain either is or can be governed by such a system." From this body, however, the British commander suc- ceeded in temporarily obtaining the power he desired, and ho returned to Portugal prepared to open, with invigorated spirit and confidence, the campaign of 1813. Several circumstances now combined to promise a decisive turn in the operations of the war. The initi- ative, once taken by Wellington, had been never lost, and although he had retrograded from l^urgos, it was without any discomfiture at the hands of the enemy. The reinforcements despatched from England, though proportioned neither to the needs of the war nor the resources of the country, were considerable, and the ef- fective strength of the army — a term which excludes the Spanish contingents — reachei^ tr* full 70,000 men. On the other hand, the reverses r^ y^poleon in the 5* 106 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. Russian campaign had not only reduced his forces in the Peninsula, but had rendered it improbable that they could be succoured on any emergency with the same promptitude as before. Above all, Wellington himself was now unfettered in his command ; for if the direction in chief of the Spanish armies brought but little direct accession of strength, it at any rate relieved him from the necessity of concerting operations with generals on whose discretion he had found it impossible to rely. These considerations, coupled with an instinc- tive confidence in his dispositions for the campaign, and an irresisti.ble presage of the succcoo . hich at length awaited his patience, so inspired theBri.ish commander that, in putting his troops once more in motion for Spain, he rose in his stirrups as the frontier was passed, and waving his hat, exclaimed prophetically, " Farewell, Portugal !" Events soon verified the finality of this adieu, for a few short months carried the "Sepoy Gene- ral" in triumph to Paris. At the commencement of the famous campaign of 1813, the material superiority still lay apparently with the French, for King Joseph disposed of a force little short of 200,000 men — a strength exceeding that of the army under Wellington's command — even if all denominations of troops are included in the calcu- lation. But the British general reasonably concluded that he had by this time experienced the worst of what the enemy could do. He knew that the difficulties of subsistence, no less than the jealousies of the several commanders, would render any large or permanent concentration impossible, and he had satisfactorily mea- sured the power of his own army against any likely to VITTORIA. 107 be brought into the field against him. He confidently calculated, therefore, on making an end of the war ; his troops were in the highest spirits, and the lessons of the retreat from Burgos had been turned to seasonable advantage. In comparison with his previous restric- tions all might now be said to be in his own hands, and the result of the change was soon made conclu- sively manifest. Hitherto, as we have seen, the offensive movements of Wellington from his Portuguese stronghold had been usually directed against Madrid, by one of the two great roads of Salamanca or Talavera, and the French had been studiously led to anticipate similar dispositions on the present occasion. Under such im- pressions they collected their main strength on the north bank of the Douro, to defend that river to the last, intending, as Wellington moved upon Salamanca, to fall on his left flank by the bridges of Toro and Zamora. The British general, however, had conceived a. very different plan of operations. Availing himself of preparations carefully made, and information anx- iously collected, he moved the left wing of his army through a province hitherto untravei-sed to the north bank of the Douro, and then, after demonstrations at Salamanca, suddenly joining it with the remainder of the army, he took the French defences in reverse, and showed himself in in-esistible force on the line of their communications. The effect was decisive. Constantly menaced by the British left, which was kept steadily in advance, Joseph evacuated one position after another without hazarding an engagement, blew up the castle of Burgos in the precipitancy of his retreat, and only 108 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. took post at ViTTORiA to experience the most conclu- sive defeat ever sustained by the French arms since the battle of Blenheim. His entire army was routed, with inconsiderable slaughter, but with irrecoverable discomfiture. All the plunder of the Peninsula fell into the hands of the victors. Jourdan's hdtmi, and Joseph's travelling carriage became the trophies of the British general, and the walls of Apsley-house display to this hour in their most precious ornaments the spoils of this memorable battle. The occasion was improved as skilfully as it had been created. Pressing on his retiring foe, Wellington drove him into the recesses of the Pyrenees, and surrounding the frontier fortresses of St. Sebastian and Pampeluna, prepared to maintain the mountain passes against a renewed invasion. His an- ticipations of the future proved correct. Detaching what force he could spare from his own emergencies, Napoleon sent Soult again with plenary powers to re- trieve the credit and fortunes of the army. Impressed with the peril of the crisis, and not disguising the abi- lities of the commander opposed to him, this able "Lieutenant of the Emperor" collected his whole strength, and suddenly poured with impetuous valor through the passes of the Pyrenees, on the isolated posts of his antagonibL. But at Maya and Sorauven the French were once more repulsed by the vigorous determination of the British ; St. Sebastian, after a sanguinaiy siege, was carried by storm, and on the 9th of November, four months after the battle of Vitto- ria, Wellington slept, for the last time during the war, on the territory of the Peninsula. The Bidassoa and the Nivelle were successfully crossed in despite of all END OF THE PENINSULA WAR. 109 the resistance which Soult could oppose, and the Bri- tish army, which five years before, amid the menacing hosts of the. enemy and the ill-boding omens of its friends, had maintained a precarious footing on the crags of Portugal, now bivouacked in uncontested tri- umph on the soil of France. With these strokes the mighty game had at length been won, for though Soult clung with convulsive tenacity to every defensible point of ground, and though at Toulouse he drew such vigour from despair as suggested an equivocal claim to the honours of the combat, yet the result of the struggle was now beyond the reach of fortune. Not only was Wellington advancing in irresistible strength, but Napoleon himself had succumbed to his more immediate antagonists ; and the French mar- shals, discovering themselves without authority or sup- port, desisted from hostilities which had become both gratuitous and hopeless. Thus terminated, with unexampled glory to Eng- land and its army, the great Peninsular War — a strug- gle commenced with ambiguous views and prosecuted with doubtful expectations, but carried to a triumphant conclusion by the extraordinary genius of a single man. We are not imputing any prodigies of heroism to the conquerors or their chief. N«