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35 
 
 
 LORD BACON'S 
 
 PROFICIENCE AND ADVANCEMENT 
 
 OF LEARNING. 
 
t. white, printer, 
 johnson's court, fleet street. 
 
THE TWO BOOKS OF 
 •a*~rw, FRANCIS LORD VERULAM. 
 
 M 
 
 OF THE 
 
 PROFICIENCE AND ADVANCEMENT 
 
 OF LEARNING, 
 
 DIVINE AND HUMAN. 
 
 TO THE KING. 
 
 LONDON. 
 
 WILLIAM PICKERING. 
 M.DCCC.XXV. 
 
■f 
 
 
 ^■&&4> 
 
 ■/. 
 
 l 7 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 Francis Bacon, the youngest son of Sir Nicholas 
 Bacon, counsellor to Queen Elizabeth, and lord 
 keeper of the great seal, and of Anne, the learned 
 daughter of Sir Anthony Cooke, tutor to King 
 Edward the Sixth, was born at York House in the 
 Strand, on the 2 c 2nd day of January, 1560. 
 
 H Whilst he was commorant in the univerity," 
 says his faithful secretary*, " about sixteen years of 
 " age, (as his lordship hath been pleased to impart 
 " unto myself,) he first fell into the dislike of the 
 " philosophy of Aristotle, not for the worthlesnesse 
 " of the authour, to whom he would ever ascribe 
 " all high attributes, but for the unfruitfulnesse of 
 " the way ; being a philosophy, as his lordship used 
 " to say, onely strong for disputations and con- 
 " tentions, but barren of the production of works 
 " for the benefit of the life of Man." Such 
 were his sentiments when a youth at Cambridgea 
 " As the time of sowing the seed may be known, but 
 " the time of coming up and disclosing is casual or 
 " according to the season," so the time of declaring 
 these opinions was subjected to much uncertainty. 
 In the year 1592, he says, in a letter to his relation, 
 Lord Treasurer Burleigh — " I confess, that I have as 
 * Dr. Rawley, Life of Bacon. 
 
IV PREFACE. 
 
 " vast contemplative ends, as I have moderate civil 
 " ends; for I have taken all knowledge to be my 
 " province ; and if I could purge it of two sorts 
 " of rovers, whereof the one with frivolous dispu- 
 " tations, confutations, and verbosities ; the other 
 " with blind experiments, and auricular traditions 
 " and impostures, hath committed so many spoils ; 
 " I hope I should bring in industrious observations, 
 " grounded conclusions, and profitable inventions 
 ". and discoveries, the best state of that province. 
 u This, whether it be. curiosity, or vain glory, or 
 " nature, or (if one take it favourably) Philanthro- 
 " pia, is so fixed in my mind, as it cannot be re- 
 " moved." 
 
 After the lapse of twelve more years, the time 
 arrived when a favourable opportunity presented itself 
 to the mind of Lord Bacon for the publication of 
 his Philosophy. A time, indeed, which always ex- 
 isted, but for the desire by which this great man seems 
 to have been too much influenced to accelerate the 
 advancement of knowledge, by reserving its com- 
 munication to times and circumstances which he 
 supposed favourable for its reception. " I do easily 
 " see," he says, " that place of any reasonable 
 " countenance doth bring commandment of more 
 " wits than a man's own, which is the thing I greatly 
 " affect*." And, in a letter to the king, respecting 
 his Novum Organum, he says, " This work is but 
 " a new body of clay, whereunto your majesty, by 
 
 * The same letter to Lord Burleigh. 
 
PREFACE. V 
 
 " your countenance and protection, may breathe life. 
 " And to tell your majesty truly what I think, I ac- 
 " count your favour maybe to this work as much as 
 " an hundred years' time, for I am persuaded the 
 " work will gain upon men's minds in ages, but your 
 " gracing it may make it take hold more swiftly, 
 ic which 1 would be very glad of, it being a work 
 " meant, not for praise or glory, but for practice and 
 " the good of men*." 
 
 Such were the doubtings and compliances and 
 feverish hesitations by which this philosopher tarn 
 pered as a politician with his better nature ; for, in 
 his solitary and retired thoughts, he never doubted 
 either the power of truth, or the impotence of 
 these forced attempts to assist its progress. " I 
 " have," he says, in the true spirit of philosophy, 
 " unassisted by any mortalf, steadfastly entered the 
 " true path which was absolutely untrod before, and 
 " held out a light to posterity by a torch set up in 
 " the obscurity of philosophy " 
 
 On the 23rd of July, 1603, the day previous to 
 the coronation of King James, which was so- 
 lemnized on the 24th, Francis Bacon was knighted. 
 In August, 1604, the king constituted him one of 
 his counsel, learned in the law, with a fee of forty 
 pounds a year, which is said to have been the first 
 act of royal power of that nature ; and on the same 
 
 * Letter to the king, 12th October, 1620. 
 t See Novum Organum on the hope that knowledge will be 
 progressive. 
 
Vl PREFACE. 
 
 day his majesty granted him a pension of sixty 
 pounds a-year, for special services received from his 
 brother Anthony Bacon and himself: and, from 
 this time, he was a special servant of the crown. 
 In obedience to his favourite doctrine, " That 
 " will indeed dignify and exalt knowledge, if con- 
 " templation and action may be more nearly and 
 " strongly conjoined and united together, than they 
 " have been: a conjunction like unto that of the 
 ie two highest planets, Saturn the planet of rest and 
 u contemplation, and Jupiter the planet of civil 
 " society and action, ''he, in the year 1605, when he 
 was 44 years of age, published his Advancement of 
 Learning. It is entitled 
 
 THE 
 
 TVVOO BOOKES OF 
 
 Francis Bacon. 
 
 Of the proficience and aduancement of Learning, 
 
 diuine and humane. 
 
 to the king. 
 
 At London, 
 
 H Printed for Henri Tomes, and are to be sould at his 
 
 shop in Graies Inne Gate in Holborne. 1605. 
 It is a small thin quarto, of 119 pages, somewhat 
 incorrectly printed, the subjects being distinguished 
 by capitals and italics introduced into the text, with 
 a few marginal notes in Latin. The following is an 
 exact specimen: 
 
 " History is Natvrall, Civile, Ecclesi- 
 " asticall & literary, whereof the three first I 
 « allow as extant, the fourth I note as deficient. For 
 
PREFACE. Vll 
 
 " no man hath propounded to himselfe the generall 
 " state of learning to bee described and represented 
 " from age to age, as many haue done the works 
 " of nature, & the State ciuile and Ecclesiastical; 
 " without which the History of the world seemeth to 
 " me, to be as the Statua of Polyphemus with his 
 " eye out, that part being wanting, which doth 
 " most shew the spirit, and life of the person." 
 
 Of this work he sent a copy, with a letter, to 
 the king; to the university of Cambridge; to 
 Trinity college, Cambridge; to the university of 
 Oxford; to Sir Thomas Bodley ; to Lord Chancellor 
 Egerton ; to the Earl of Salisbury ; to the Lord 
 Treasurer Buckhurst ; and to Mr. Matthews. From 
 these letters, which are all in existence*, the letter 
 to the Lord Chancellor, as a favourable specimen, 
 is annexed : 
 
 " MAY IT PLEASE YOUR LORDSHIP, 
 
 " I humbly present your lordship w!th a Work, 
 " wherein, as you have much commandment over 
 " the author ; so your lordship hath great interest in 
 " the argument : For to speak without flattery, 
 " few have like use of learning, or like judgment 
 " in learning, as I have observed in your lordship. 
 " And again, your lordship hath been a great planter 
 " of learning, not only in those places in the 
 " church, which have been in your own gift, but 
 " also in your commendatory vote, no man hath 
 " more constantly held ; let it be given to the most 
 
 * See Shaw's edition of Philosophical Works of Bacon, page 
 477, and the different collections of Bacon's letters. 
 
Vlll PREFACE. 
 
 " deserving, detur digniori : And therefore, both 
 " your lordship is beholding to learning, and learn- 
 " ing beholding to you ; which maketh me presume 
 " with good assurance that your lordship will accept 
 u well of these my labours ; the rather because your 
 "lordship in private speech hath often begun to me 
 " in expressing your admiration of his majesty's 
 " learning, to whom I have dedicated this work ; 
 " and whose virtue and perfection in that kind did 
 " chiefly move me to a work of this nature. And 
 " so with signification of my most humble duty and 
 " affection to your lordship, I remain. " 
 
 Some short time after the publication of this 
 work, probably about the year 1608, Sir Francis 
 Bacon was desirous that the Advancement of 
 Learning should be translated into Latin ; and, for 
 this purpose, he applied to Dr. Playfer, the Mar- 
 garet professor of divinity in the university of 
 Cambridge.* 
 
 * This appears by the following letter, without 
 any date : 
 
 " MR. DR. PLAYFER, 
 
 " A great desire will take a small occasion to 
 " hope and put in trial that which is desired. It 
 " pleased you a good while since, to express unto me 
 " the good liking which you conceived of my book 
 " of the Advancement of Learning ; and that more 
 " significantly, (as it seemed to me) than out of 
 " courtesie, or civil respect. Myself, as I then 
 " took contentment in your approbation thereof; so 
 
PREFACE, IX 
 
 Upon the subject of this application Archbishop 
 Tennison says in his Baconiana — " The doctor was 
 
 " I should esteem and acknowledge, not onely my 
 " contentment encreased, but my labours advanced, 
 " if I might obtain your help in that nature which I 
 " desire. Wherein before I set down in plain terms, 
 " my request unto you, I will open myself, what 
 " it was which I chiefly sought and propounded to 
 " myself in that work ; that you may perceive that 
 " which I now desire, to be persuant thereupon. If I 
 u do not much err, (for any judgment that a man 
 " maketh of his own doings, had need be spoken 
 " witji a Si nunquam fallit Imago, I have this 
 *' opinion, that if I had sought mine own commenda- 
 " tion, it had been a much fitter course for me to 
 " have done as gardeners used to do, by taking 
 " their seed and slips, and rearing them first into 
 " plants, and so uttering them in pots, when they 
 " are in flower, and in their best state. But for as 
 u much as my end was Merit of the State of Learn- 
 " ing (to my power) and not Glory ; and because my 
 " purpose was rather to excite other mens wits than 
 " to magnifie mine own ; I was desirous to prevent 
 " the uncertainness of mine own life and times, by 
 " uttering rather seeds than plants : Nay and 
 " further, (as the proverb is) by sowing with the 
 " basket, rather than with the hand : Wherefore, 
 " since I have onely taken upon me to ring a bell, to 
 " call other w;ts together, (which is the meanest 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 " willing to serve so excellent a person, and so 
 " worthy a design ; and, within a while, sent him a 
 
 a office) it cannot but be consonant to my desire, to 
 " have that bell heard as far as can be. And 
 " since they are but sparks which can work but 
 " upon matter prepared, I have the more reason to 
 " wish, that those sparks may fly abroad, that they 
 " may the better find and light upon those minds 
 " and spirits which are apt to be kindled. And 
 li therefore the privateness of the language con- 
 u sidered, wherein it is written, excluding so many 
 66 readers; as on the other side, the obscurity of the 
 " argument in many parts of it, excludeth many 
 " others ; I must account it a second birth of that 
 " work, if it might be translated into Latin, without 
 " manifest loss of the sense and matter. For this 
 " purpose I could not represent to myself any 
 " man into whose hands T do more earnestly de- 
 " sire that work should fall than yourself; for by 
 u that I have heard and read, I know no man, a 
 " greater master in commanding words to serve 
 " matter. Nevertheless, I am not ignorant of the 
 " worth of your labours, whether such as your 
 "place and profession imposeth, or such as your 
 " own virtue may upon your voluntary election take 
 " in hand. But I can lay before you no other per- 
 66 swasions than either the work itself may affect 
 " you with ; or the honour of his majesty, to whom 
 16 it is dedicated, or your particular inclination to 
 
PREFACE. Xi 
 
 " specimen of a latine translation. But men, ge- 
 " nerally, come short of themselves when they 
 " strive to out-doe themselves. They put a force 
 t( upon their natural genius, and, by straining of it, 
 " crack and disable it. And so, it seems, it hap- 
 " pened to that worthy and elegant man. Upon 
 " this great occasion, he would be over-accurate; 
 " and he sent a specimen of such superfine latinity, 
 " that the Lord Bacon did not encourage him to 
 " labour further in that work, in the penning of 
 " which, he desired not so much neat and polite, as 
 " clear masculine, and apt expression." 
 
 On the 12th of October, J 620, in a letter to the 
 king, presenting the Novum Organum to his majesty, 
 Lord Bacon says, " I hear my former book of the 
 " Advancement of Learning, is well tasted in the 
 " universities here, and the English colleges abroad : 
 " and this is the same argument sunk deeper." 
 
 " myself; who, as I never took so much comfort in 
 " any labours of mine own, so I shall never ac- 
 " knowledge myself more obliged in any thing 
 " to the labours of another, than in that which shall 
 " assist it. Which your labour, if I can by my 
 " place, profession, means, friends, travel, work, 
 " deed, requite unto you, I shall esteem myself so 
 " streightly bound thereunto, as I shall be ever 
 " most ready both to take and seek occasion of 
 " thankfulness. So leaving it nevertheless, Salvd 
 " Amicitid, as reason is to your good liking. I 
 11 remain/' 
 
XU PREFACE. 
 
 An edition in 8vo. was published in 1629*; and 
 a third edition, corrected from the original edition 
 of 1605, was published at Oxford in l(>33f. These 
 are the only editions of the Advancement of Learn- 
 ing, which were published before the year 1/36, 
 a period of ten years after the death of Lord Bacon. 
 In the year lc>23, the treatise <De Augmentis 
 Scientiarum" was published in Latin by Lord Bacon. 
 This work has very generally but erroneously been 
 supposed to be a mere translation of the Advance- 
 ment of Learning, but they differ in extent, and 
 there are many passages in each of these works 
 which are not contained in the other. The beautiful 
 passage, for instance, upon Queen Elizabeth, which 
 is contained in page 80, of this volume, is omitted 
 in the treatise De Augmentis J. 
 
 The treatise " De Augmentis," being in nine 
 books and more extensive, abounds with passages 
 that are not contained in " The Advancement." 
 This will appear by taking one specimen from 
 each subject into which the work is divided : — viz. 
 from 
 
 / History, relating to the Memory. 
 
 «? Poetry, relating to the Imagination. And 
 
 C Philosophy, relating to the Understanding. 
 
 * For William Washington, and are to be sold at his shop 
 in St. Dunstan's Church Yard. 1629. 
 
 t Oxford. Printed by J. L., printer to the University, for 
 Thoma3 Huggins, 1633, with permission of B. Fisher. 
 
 X What was the cause of this omission % — Were not the 
 praises of Elizabeth acceptable to James ? 
 
PREFACE. Xlll 
 
 In the treatise De Augmentis, Natural History is 
 divided — 
 
 Of Nature in Course. 
 
 Of Nature Erring. 
 
 Of Arts. 
 
 si. As to the subject : J % 
 
 | u 
 
 v. 2 As to the use : 5 J ■ 
 
 .2 As to the use: O- Narrative. 
 
 t-2. Inductive, 
 
 But the division, as to the use, #c. is not con- 
 tained in the Advancement. 
 
 Under Poetry— -The fable of Pan, of Perseus, 
 &c. which are not in the Advancement, will be 
 found in the treatise De Augmentis. 
 
 Under Philosophy. — Speaking on the advance- 
 ment of universal justice or the laws of laws, he says, 
 " I propose, if God give me leave, having begun a 
 " work of this nature in aphorisms, to propound it 
 " hereafter, noting it in the meantime for deficient." 
 
 In the treatise De Augmentis, considerable pro- 
 gress is made in this projected work, in forty-seven 
 distinct axioms, of which one is subjoined as a 
 specimen : 
 
 " Antequam vero ad corpus ipsum legum parti- 
 " cularium deveniamus ; perstringemus paucis vir- 
 iC tutes et dignitates legum in genere. Lex bona 
 M censeri possit quae sit intimatione certa, prsecepto 
 " justa, executione commoda ; cum forma politic, 
 " congrua, et generans virtutem in subditis." 
 
 The difference between the Advancement of 
 Learning and the treatise De Augmentis, is stated 
 by Lord Bacon himself, in a letter to the Bishop of 
 Winchester, in which he says, " And for that my 
 
XIV PREFACE. 
 
 " book of Advancement of Learning, I have thought 
 " good to procure a translation into the general lan- 
 " guage, not without great and ample additions, and 
 " enrichment thereof ; especially in the second book, 
 " which handleth the partition of science, in such 
 " sort, as 1 hold it, may serve in lieu of the first 
 " part of the Instauration, and acquit my promise in 
 " that part." 
 
 And Mallet in his edition of the Advancement, 
 published in the year 1808, says, " Accordingly in 
 " 1693 came out the " De Augmentis Scientiarum," 
 " being a Latin Version of these two books, much 
 " enlarged ; in which he was assisted by Mr. George 
 " Herbert, and the famous Philosopher of Malmes- 
 " bury.* It consists of nine books: the first is nearly 
 " a literal translation of the first book of this work ; 
 " the other eight, divided into 46 chapters, comprise 
 " the second book : but great additions are made 
 " throughout, especially to the subjects of Rhetoric, 
 " Laws, and Government/* 
 
 The present edition is corrected from the first 
 edition of 1605, and with the hope of making it 
 more acceptable to the public, an Analysis of the 
 whole work with a table of contents is prefixed, 
 and a copious index is annexed. 
 
 * See Tennison's Baconiana, and the Life of Hobbes. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Page 
 The Excellence of Learning and the merit of disse- 
 minating it . . .5 
 Objections to learning . .6 
 Objections which divines make to learning . 9 
 Objections which politicians make to learning . 14 
 Objections to learning from the errors of learned 
 
 men . . . .25 
 
 Distempers of learning . . 38 
 
 Peccant humours of learning . . . 52 
 
 Advantages of learning . . -.61 
 
 Divine proofs . • .61 
 
 Human proofs • . . 71 
 
 What has been done for the advancement of learning, 
 
 and what omitted • . .106 
 
 Places of learning . .107 
 
 Books of learning . . . 108 
 
 Persons of the learned . . 108 
 
 Division of Learning . . . 119 
 
 1. History relating to the memory . .119 
 
 2. Poetry relating to the imagination . 119 
 
 3. Philosophy relating to reason . .119 
 
 History. 
 
 Natural history considered as to the subject . 120 
 
 Natural history considered as to its use . I2l 
 
 Civil history . . . .125 
 
 Ecclesiastical history . . .138 
 
 Poesy. . . 143 
 
 Division of poetry . . .143 
 
 Philosophy. 
 
 Primitive or general philosophy . 141 
 
 Particular philosophy . . 1 48 
 
 Natural religion • . . 15 J 
 
XVI CONTENTS. 
 
 Page 
 
 Natural philosophy . . . 155 
 
 Speculative natural philosophy . . 157 
 
 Physic . . .160 
 
 Metaphysic . . .162 
 
 Operative natural philosophy . 172 
 
 Human philosophy, or the knowledge of man . 181 
 Man as an individual, or the philosophy of 
 
 humanity . . . 182 
 
 The body . . .187 
 
 The mind . . . .202 
 
 Of the Understanding. 
 
 Invention in arts . . . 209 
 
 Invention in sciences . .213 
 
 Literate experience . . . 217 
 Novum Organum . , 
 
 Invention of argument . .217 
 
 Judgment . . .221 
 
 Memory . . . .230 
 
 Tradition . . . .233 
 
 Organ of speech . . . 235 
 
 Method of speech . . .238 
 
 The illustration of speech . . 247 
 
 Of the Will ... . 260 
 
 The image of good . . 263 
 
 Public and private good . . %65 
 
 The culture of the mind . . 284 
 
 Man in Society . . • 306 
 
 Conversation . . • 307 
 
 Negociation . . . 309 
 
 The knowledge of scattered occasions . 311 
 
 Knowledge of the advancement of life . 320 
 
 Wisdom of government . . 353 
 Of universal justice, or the fountains of law. 355 
 
 Of Revealed Religion . . . 359 
 
o 
 
 53 
 
 I— t 
 
 < 
 33° 
 
 o 
 
 SB 
 <! 
 
 !> 
 Q 
 
 <1 
 
 THE E 
 
 AND 
 
 LEARI 
 
 < 
 
 2. 
 
 WHAll 
 
 FOR 
 
 WHAl 
 
 r 
 
 Natural. 1 
 
 Civil. 125. 
 
 Ecclesiastical 
 
 Memorials. 
 
 Epistles. 
 
 Apothegms. 
 
 C 1. General 
 
 I 2. Particula tive ' 
 
 S 1 ' 
 
 157. < 
 
 (. 2. 
 
 ive. 
 
 s: 
 
 Physics. 161. 
 
 Metaphysics. 162. J Mathemat 
 
 Experiment 
 Philosophic 
 Magical. 
 
 Division. 
 
 U 
 
 j 1. Calendar ol 
 2. Appendices. < ^. Calendar ol 
 
 OF MAN. 181. 
 
XVI CONTENTS. 
 
 Page 
 
 Natural philosophy . . . 155 
 
 Speculative natural philosophy . • 157 
 
 Physic . . .160 
 
 Metaphysic . . .162 
 
 Operative natural philosophy . 172 
 
 Human philosophy, or the knowledge of man . 181 
 Man as an individual, or the philosophy of 
 
 humanity . . .182 
 
 The body . . .187 
 
 The mind . . . .202 
 
 Of the Understanding. 
 
 Invention in arts . . .209 
 
 Invention in sciences . .213 
 
 Literate experience . . .217 
 Novum Organum . , 
 
 Invention of argument . .217 
 
 Judgment . . .221 
 
 Memory . . . .230 
 
 Tradition . . . .233 
 
 Organ of speech . . . 235 
 
 Method of speech . . .238 
 
 The illustration of speech . . 247 
 
 Of the Will ... . 260 
 
 The image of good . • 263 
 
 Public and private good . . %65 
 
 The culture of the mind . . 284 
 
 Man in Society . . • 306 
 
 Conversation . . • 307 
 
 Negotiation . . . 309 
 
 The knowledge of scattered occasions . 311 
 
 Knowledge of the advancement of life . 320 
 
 Wisdom of government . . 353 
 Of universal justice, or the fountains of law. 355 
 
 Of Revealed Religion . . . 359 
 
. THE EXCELLENCE OF , 
 
 AND OF DISSEMINATING 
 LEARNING. (5.) 
 
 TO LEARNING. 
 
 WHAT HAS BEEN DONE 
 FOR LEARNING, AND 
 WHAT LEFT UNDONE. 
 
 U. ADVANTAGES OF LEARNING. 61. j J| Hu^^roofe. "i. 
 
 Ep™U™ S ' 
 
 Apothegms. 
 
 . 1 2. History of marvels. 1! 
 J.3. History of arts. 121. 
 
 1 s! Perfect hSory. ' J 
 
 fl. History of the church. 1 
 ? 2, History of prophecy. IS 
 
 fl. Nar 
 
 >2. Hep; 
 
 ■ i.3. Par E 
 
 C 1. General philosophy. : 
 C 2. Particular philosophy. 
 
 NATURAL RELIGION. 1*2. 
 NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. 15' 
 
 . Physics. 161. 
 Metaphysics. 16: 
 
 ^ 5. Appendices 
 
 HUMAN PHILOSOPHY, OR KNOWLEDGE OF MAN. 1 
 
U: 
 
 LITERATE EXPERIENCE. 207. 
 NOVUM ORGANUM. 
 
 217. 
 
 r, 230. 
 
 y. 231. 
 
 { 1. literary. 
 
 ( 2. Philosophical. 
 
 he ART CRITICAL. 
 
 he ART OF INSTRUCTION 
 
 170. 
 
 al. 172. 
 al. 172. 
 L73. 
 
 invention 
 * discoveri 
 
 1*- 
 
OF 
 
 THE PROFICIENCE 
 
 AND ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, 
 
 HUMAN AND DIVINE. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 TO THE KING. 
 
 There were, under the law, excellent king, both 
 daily sacrifices, and freewill offerings; the one pro- 
 ceeding upon ordinary observance, the other upon a 
 devout cheerfulness: in like manner there belong- 
 eth to kings from their servants both tribute of duty, 
 and presents of affection. In the former of these I 
 hope I shall not live to be wanting, according to my 
 most humble duty, and the good pleasure of your 
 majesty's employments: for the latter, I thought it 
 more respective to make choice of some oblation, 
 which might rather refer to the propriety and ex- 
 cellency of your individual person, than to the busi- 
 ness of your crown and state. 
 
 Wherefore, representing your majesty many 
 times unto my mind, and beholding you not with 
 the inquisitive eye of presumption, to discover that 
 
MAN AS AN INDIVIDUAL. : 
 
 The UNDIVIDED so 
 
 .2. The DIVIDED state of mai 
 
 3 M 2. MAN Ii 
 
 Of CONVERSATION. 306. 
 Of NEGOCIATION. 309. 
 Of GOVERNMENT. S53. 
 
 Impression. ^ 
 ody. |* 
 
 { 
 
 1. HEALTH. 18 
 BEAUTY. 20 
 
 STJtl'.\C'J If. 
 
 .2. The MIND. 202. 
 
 The WILL. 260. 
 
 INVENTION. 
 
 The UNDERSTANDING. « 
 
 '. JUDGMENT. 22]. ' 6 
 
 MEMORY. 230. /?■ Helps of memory. Si 
 I 2. Nature of memory. 2, 
 lar. 236. I * - 
 
 \4. TRADITION., 
 
 2. Rhetoric. : 
 
 3. Appendices. 
 
 fl. The 1 
 12. The C 
 
OF 
 
 THE PROFICIENCE 
 
 AND ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, 
 
 HUMAN AND DIVINE. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 TO THE KING. 
 
 There were, under the law, excellent king, both 
 daily sacrifices, and freewill offerings; the one pro- 
 ceeding upon ordinary observance, the other upon a 
 devout cheerfulness: in like manner there belong- 
 eth to kings from their servants both tribute of duty, 
 and presents of affection. In the former of these I 
 hope I shall not live to be wanting, according to my 
 most humble duty, and the good pleasure of your 
 majesty's employments: for the latter, I thought it 
 more respective to make choice of some oblation, 
 which might rather refer to the propriety and ex- 
 cellency of your individual person, than to the busi- 
 ness of your crown and state. 
 
 Wherefore, representing your majesty many 
 times unto my mind, and beholding you not with 
 the inquisitive eye of presumption, to discover that 
 
OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 which the Scripture telleth me is inscrutable, but 
 with the observant eye of duty and admiration; 
 leaving aside the other parts of your virtue and 
 fortune, I have been touched, yea, and possessed 
 with an extreme wonder at those your virtues and 
 faculties, which the philosophers call intellectual; 
 the largeness of your capacity, the faithfulness of 
 your memory, the swiftness of your apprehension, the 
 penetration of your judgment, and the facility and 
 order of your elocution: and I have often thought, 
 that of all the persons living that I have known, 
 your majesty were the best instance to make a man 
 of Plato's opinion, that all knowledge is but remem- 
 brance, and that the mind of man by nature know- 
 eth all things, and hath but her own native and ori- 
 ginal notions (which by the strangeness and darkness 
 of this tabernacle of the body are sequestered) again 
 revived and restored : such a light of nature I have 
 observed in your majesty, and such a readiness to take 
 flame, and blaze from the least occasion presented, 
 or the least spark of another's knowledge delivered. 
 And as the Scripture saith of the wisest king, " That 
 his heart was as the sands of the sea;" which though 
 it be one of the largest bodies, yet it consisteth of 
 the smallest and finest portions; so hath God given 
 your majesty a composition of understanding admi- 
 rable, being able to compass and comprehend the 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 
 
 greatest matters, and nevertheless to touch and ap- 
 prehend the least; whereas it should seem an im- 
 possibility in nature, for the same instrument to 
 make itself fit for great and small works. And 
 for your gift of speech, I call to mind what Cor- 
 nelius Tacitus saith of Augustus Csesar; "Augusto 
 profluens, et quoe principem deceret, eloquentia 
 fuit." (His eloquence was fluent, and worthy of a 
 prince.) For, if we note it well, speech that is uttered 
 with labour and difficulty, or speech that savoureth 
 of the affectation of art and precepts, or speech 
 that is framed after the imitation of some pattern of 
 eloquence, though never so excellent ; all this has 
 somewhat servile, and holding of the subject. But 
 your majesty's manner of speech is indeed prince- 
 like, flowing as from a fountain, and yet streaming 
 and branching itself into nature's order, full of 
 facility and felicity, imitating none, and inimitable 
 by any. And as in your civil estate there appeareth 
 to be an emulation and contention of your majesty's 
 virtue with your fortune; a virtuous disposition with 
 a fortunate regiment; a virtuous expectation, when 
 time was, of your greater fortune, with a prosperous 
 possession thereof in the due time; a virtuous obser- 
 vation of the laws of marriage, with most blessed 
 and happy fruit of marriage; a virtuous and most 
 Christian desire of peace, with a fortunate inclination 
 
OF THE PROF1CIENCE AND 
 
 in your neighbour princes thereunto : so likewise, in 
 these intellectual matters, there seemeth to be no 
 less contention between the excellency of your ma- 
 jesty's gifts of nature, and the universality and per- 
 fection of your learning. For I am well assured 
 that this which I shall say is no amplification at all, 
 but a positive and measured truth; which is, that 
 there hath not been since Christ's time any king or 
 temporal monarch, which has been so learned in all 
 literature and erudition, divine and human. For 
 let a man seriously and diligently revolve and peruse 
 the succession of the emperors of Rome; of which 
 Csesar the dictator, who lived some years before 
 Christ, and Marcus Antoninus, were the best 
 learned; and so descend to the emperors of Grsecia, 
 or of the West ; and then to the lines of France, 
 Spain, England, Scotland, and the rest, and he shall 
 find this judgment is truly made. For it seemeth 
 much in a king, if, by the compendious extractions 
 of other men's wits and labours, he can take hold of 
 any superficial ornaments and shews of learning; or 
 if he countenance and prefer learning and learned 
 men : but to drink indeed of the true fountains of 
 learning, nay, to have such a fountain of learning in 
 himself, in a king, and in a king born, is almost a 
 miracle. And the more, because there is met in your 
 majesty a rare conjunction, as well of divine and 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 
 
 sacred literature, as of profane and human ; so as 
 your majesty standeth invested of that triplicity, 
 which in great veneration was ascribed to the an- 
 cient Hermes; the power and fortune of a king, the 
 knowledge and illumination of a priest, and the 
 learning and universality of a philosopher. This 
 propriety, inherent and individual attribute in your 
 majesty, deserve th to be expressed not only in the 
 fame and admiration of the present time, nor in the 
 history or tradition of the ages succeeding ; but also 
 in some solid work, fixed memorial, and immortal 
 monument, bearing a character or signature both 
 of the power of a king, and the difference and per- 
 fection of such a king. 
 
 Therefore I did conclude with myself, that I could 
 not make unto your majesty a better oblation, than 
 of some treatise tending to that end, whereof the 
 sum will consist of these two parts; the former, 
 concerning the excellency of learning and know- 
 ledge, and the excellency of the merit and true 
 glory in the augmentation and propagation thereof : 
 the latter, what the particular acts and works are, 
 which have been embraced and undertaken for the 
 advancement of learning ; and again, what defects 
 and undervalues I find in such particular acts : to 
 the end, that though I cannot positively or affirma- 
 tively advise your majesty, or propound unto you 
 
Or THE PR0FIC1ENCE AND 
 
 framed particulars ; yet I may excite your princely 
 cogitations to visit the excellent treasure of your 
 own mind, and thence to extract particulars for this 
 purpose, agreeably to your magnanimity and wis- 
 dom. 
 
 LEARNING, HOW DISCREDITED. 
 
 In the entrance to the former of these, to clear the 
 way, and, as it were, to make silence, to have the 
 true testimonies concerning the dignity of learning 
 to be better heard, without the interruption of tacit 
 objections ; I think good to deliver it from the dis- 
 credits and disgraces which it hath received, all 
 from ignorance, but ignorance severally disguised ; 
 appearing sometimes in the zeal and jealousy of 
 divines, sometimes in the severity and arrogancy of 
 politicians, and sometimes in the errors and imper- 
 fections of learned men themselves. 
 
 I hear the former sort say, that knowledge is of 
 those things which are to be accepted of with great 
 limitation and caution ; that the aspiring to over- 
 much knowledge, was the original temptation and 
 sin, whereupon ensued the fall of man ; that know- 
 ledge hath in it somewhat of the serpent, and there- 
 fore where it entereth into a man it makes him 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 
 
 swell ; " Scientia inflat :" (Knowledge puffeth up) ; 
 that Solomon gives a censure, " That there is no 
 end of making books, and that much reading is 
 a weariness of the flesh ;" and again in another 
 place, " That in spacious knowledge there is much 
 contestation, and that he that increases knowledge 
 increaseth anxiety ;" that St. Paul gives a caveat, 
 " That we be not spoiled through vain philosophy;" 
 that experience demonstrates how learned men have 
 been arch-heretics, how learned times have been in- 
 clined to atheism, and how the contemplation of 
 second causes doth derogate from our dependance 
 upon God, who is the first cause. 
 
 To discover then the ignorance and error of 
 this opinion, and the misunderstanding in the 
 grounds thereof, it may well appear these men do 
 not observe or consider, that it was not the pure 
 knowledge of nature and universality, a knowledge 
 by the light whereof man did give names unto 
 other creatures in Paradise, as they were brought 
 before him, according unto their proprieties, which 
 gave occasion to the fall; but it was the proud 
 knowledge of good and evil, with an intent in man 
 to give law unto himself, and to depend no more 
 upon God's commandments, which was the form of 
 the temptation. Neither is it any quantity of know- 
 ledge, how great soever, that can make the mind 
 
OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 of man to swell ; for nothing can fill, much less 
 extend the soul of man, but God, and the con- 
 templation of God ; and therefore Solomon, speak- 
 ing of the two principal senses of inquisition, the 
 eye and the ear, affirmeth that the eye is never 
 satisfied with seeing, nor the ear with hearing ; and 
 if there be no fulness, then is the continent greater 
 than the content : so of knowledge itself, and the 
 mind of man, whereto the senses are but reporters, 
 he defmeth likewise in these words, placed after 
 that calendar or ephemerides, which he maketh of 
 the diversities of times and seasons for all actions 
 and purposes ; and concludeth thus : " God hath 
 made all things beautiful, or decent, in the true 
 return of their seasons : Also he hath placed the 
 world in man's heart, yet cannot man find out the 
 work which God worketh from the beginning to 
 the end :" declaring, not obscurely, that God hath 
 framed the mind of man as a mirror, or glass, capa- 
 ble of the image of the universal world, and joyful 
 to receive the impression thereof, as the eye joyeth 
 to receive light ; and not only delighted in behold- 
 ing the variety of things, and vicissitude of times, but 
 raised also to find out and discern the ordinances 
 and decrees, which throughout all those changes 
 are infallibly observed. And although he doth in- 
 sinuate, that the supreme or summary law of nature, 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 
 
 which he calleth, " The work which God worketh 
 from the beginning to the end, is not possible to be 
 found out by man ;" yet that doth not derogate 
 from the capacity of the mind, but may be referred 
 to the impediments, as of shortness of life, ill 
 conjunction of labours, ill tradition of knowledge 
 over from hand to hand, and many other incon- 
 veniences, whereunto the condition of man is sub- 
 ject. For that nothing parcel of the world is 
 denied to man's inquiry and invention, he doth in 
 another place rule over, when he saith, " The spirit 
 of man is as the lamp of God, wherewith he 
 searcheth the inwardness of all secrets." If then 
 such be the capacity and receipt of the mind of man, 
 it is manifest, that there is no danger at all in the 
 proportion or quantity of knowledge, how large 
 soever, lest it should make it swell or out-compass 
 itself; no, but it is merely the quality of knowledge, 
 which, be it in quantity more or less, if it be taken 
 without the true corrective thereof, hath in it some 
 nature of venom or malignity, and some effects of 
 that venom, which is ventosity or swelling. This 
 corrective spice, the mixture whereof maketh know- 
 ledge so sovereign, is charity, which the apostle 
 immediately addeth to the former clause ; for so he 
 saith, " knowledge puffeth up, but charity buildeth 
 up ;" not unlike unto that which he delivereth 
 
10 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 in another place : " If I spake, saith he, with the 
 tongues of men and angels, and had not charity, it 
 were but as a tinkling cymbal ;" not but that it is an 
 excellent thing to speak with the tongues of men 
 and angels, but because, if it be severed from 
 charity, and not referred to the good of men and 
 mankind, it hath rather a sounding and unworthy 
 glory, than a meriting and substantial virtue. And 
 as for that censure of Solomon, concerning the 
 excess of writing and reading books, and the 
 anxiety of spirit which redoundeth from know- 
 ledge ; and that admonition of St. Paul, " That we 
 be not seduced by vain philosophy;" let those 
 places be rightly understood, and they do indeed 
 excellently set forth the true bounds and limitations, 
 whereby human knowledge is confined and circum- 
 scribed ; and yet without any such contracting or 
 coarctation, but that it may comprehend all the 
 universal nature of things ; for these limitations are 
 three : the first, that we do not so place our felicity 
 in knowledge, as to forget our mortality. The 
 second, that we make application of our knowledge, 
 to give ourselves repose and contentment, and 
 not distaste or repining. The third, that we do not 
 presume by the contemplation of nature to attain to 
 the mysteries of God. For as touching the first of 
 these, Solomon doth excellently expound himself in 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 11 
 
 another place of the same book, where he saith ; 
 " I saw well that knowledge recedeth as far from 
 ignorance, as light doth from darkness ; and that 
 the wise man's eyes keep watch in his head, whereas 
 the fool roundeth about in darkness : but withal I 
 learned, that the same mortality involveth them 
 both." And for the second, certain it is, there 
 is no vexation or anxiety of mind which resulteth 
 from knowledge, otherwise than merely by acci- 
 dent ; for all knowledge, and wonder (which is the 
 seed of knowledge) is an impression of pleasure 
 in itself: but when men fall to framing conclusions 
 out of their knowledge, applying it to their particu- 
 lar, and ministering to themselves thereby weak 
 fears, or vast desires, there groweth that careful- 
 ness and trouble of mind which is spoken of: for 
 then knowledge is no more " Lumen siccum," 
 (A dry, clear light) whereof Heraclitus the profound 
 said, " Lumen siccum optima anima ;" (A dry 
 clear light formeth the best souls) but it becometh 
 " Lumen madidum, or maceratum," (A watery light) 
 being steeped and infused in the humours of the 
 affections. And as for the third point, it deserveth 
 to be a little stood upon, and not to be lightly 
 passed over : for if any man shall think by view and 
 inquiry into these sensible and material things 
 to attain that light, whereby he may reveal unto 
 
12 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 himself the nature or will of God, then indeed is he 
 spoiled by vain philosophy : for the contemplation of 
 God's creatures and works produceth (having regard 
 to the works and creatures themselves) knowledge ; 
 but having regard to God, no perfect knowledge, 
 but wonder, which is broken knowledge. And 
 therefore it was most aptly said by one of Plato's 
 school, — " That the sense of man carrieth a resem- 
 blance with the sun, which, as we see, openeth and 
 revealeth all the terrestrial globe ; but then again it 
 obscureth and concealeth the stars and celestial 
 globe : so doth the sense discover natural things, 
 but it darkeneth and shutteth up divine/' And 
 hence it is true, that it hath proceeded, that divers 
 great learned men have been heretical, whilst they 
 have sought to fly up to the secrets of the Deity by 
 the waxen wings of the senses. And as for the con- 
 ceit that too much knowledge should incline a man 
 to atheism, and that the ignorance of second 
 causes should make a more devout dependence 
 upon God who is the first cause ; First, it is good to 
 ask the question which Job asked of his friends : 
 " Will you lie for God, as one man will do for 
 another, to gratify him ?" For certain it is, that God 
 worketh nothing in nature but by second causes ; 
 and if they would have it otherwise believed, it 
 is mere imposture, as it were in favour towards 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 13 
 
 God ; and nothing else but to offer to the Author of 
 truth the unclean sacrifice of a lie. But farther, it is 
 an assured truth, and a conclusion of experience, 
 that a little or superficial knowledge of philosophy 
 may incline the mind of man to atheism, but a 
 farther proceeding therein doth bring the mind back 
 again, to religion ; for in the entrance of philosophy, 
 when the second causes, which are next unto the 
 senses, do offer themselves to the mind of man, if it 
 dwell and stay there, it may induce some oblivion of 
 the highest cause; but when a man passeth on 
 farther, and seeth the dependence of causes, and 
 the works of Providence ; then, according to the 
 allegory of the poets, he will easily believe that the 
 highest link of nature's chain must needs be tied to 
 the foot of Jupiter's chair. To conclude therefore : 
 let no man, upon a weak conceit of sobriety, or an 
 ill-applied moderation, think or maintain, that a 
 man can search too far, or be too well studied in 
 the book of God's word, or in the book of God's 
 works ; divinity or philosophy ; but rather let men 
 endeavour an endless progress, or proficience in 
 both ; only let men beware that they apply both to 
 charity, and not to swelling; to use, and not to 
 ostentation ; and again, that they do not unwisely 
 mingle or confound these learnings together. 
 
 And as for the disgraces which learning re- 
 
14 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 ceiveth from politicians, they be of this nature ; 
 that learning doth soften men's minds, and makes 
 them more unapt for the honour and exercise of 
 arms ; that it doth mar and pervert men's disposi- 
 tions for matter of government and policy, in mak- 
 ing them too curious and irresolute by variety of 
 reading, or too peremptory or positive by strictness 
 of rules and axioms, or too immoderate and over- 
 weening by reason of the greatness of examples, 
 or too incompatible and differing from the times, 
 by reason of the dissimilitude of examples; or 
 at least, that it doth divert men's travails from ac- 
 tion and business, and bringeth them to a love of 
 leisure and privateness ; and that it doth bring into 
 states a relaxation of discipline, whilst every man 
 is more ready to argue, than to obey and execute. 
 Out of this conceit, Cato, surnamed the Censor, 
 one of the wisest men indeed that ever lived, when 
 Carneades the philosopher came in embassage to 
 Rome, and that the young men of Rome began to 
 flock about him, being allured with the sweetness 
 and majesty of his eloquence and learning, gave 
 counsel in open senate, that they should give him 
 his dispatch with all speed, lest he should infect 
 and inchant the minds and affections of the youth, 
 and at unawares bring in an alteration of the man- 
 ners and customs of the state. Out of the same 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 15 
 
 conceit, or humour, did Virgil, turning his pen to 
 the advantage of his country, and the disadvantage 
 of his own profession, make a kind of separation 
 between policy and government, and between arts and 
 sciences, in the verses so much renowned, attribut- 
 ing and challenging the one to the Romans, and 
 yielding the other to the Grecians; " Tu regere 
 imperio populos, Romane, memento, Hse tibi erunt 
 artes, etc/' (Thou knowest how to rule the nations, 
 oh Rome; but thine are the arts, oh Greece, &c.) 
 So likewise we see that Anytus, the accuser of So- 
 crates, laid it as an article of charge and accusation 
 against him, that he did, with the variety and power 
 of his discourses and disputations, withdraw young 
 men from due reverence to the laws and customs 
 of their country ; and that he did profess a danger- 
 ous and pernicious science, which was, to make the 
 worse matter seem the better, and to suppress truth 
 by force of eloquence and speech. 
 
 But these, and the like imputations, have rather 
 a countenance of gravity, than any ground of justice : 
 for experience doth warrant, that both in persons 
 and in times, there hath been a meeting and con- 
 currence in learning and arms, flourishing and ex- 
 celling in the same men and the same ages. For, 
 as for men, there cannot be a better, nor the like, 
 instance, as of that pair, Alexander the Great and 
 
16 OF THE PR0FIC1ENCE AND 
 
 Julius Csesar the dictator; whereof the one was 
 Aristotle's scholar in philosophy, and the other was 
 Cicero's rival in eloquence: or if any man had 
 rather call for scholars that were great generals, 
 than generals that were great scholars, let him take 
 Epaminondas the Theban, or Xenophon the Athe- 
 nian; whereof the one was the first that abated 
 the power of Sparta, and the other was the first 
 that made way to the overthrow of the monarchy 
 of Persia. And this concurrence is yet more 
 visible in times than in persons, by how much an 
 age is a greater object than a man. For both in 
 JEgypt, Assyria, Persia, Grsecia, and Rome, the 
 same times that are most renowned for arms, are 
 likewise most admired for learning; so that the 
 greatest authors and philosophers, and Jhe greatest 
 captains and governors, have lived in the same 
 ages. Neither can it otherwise be: for as, in man, 
 the ripeness of strength of the body and mind 
 cometh much about an age, save that the strength 
 of the body cometh somewhat the more early; so in 
 states, arms and learning, whereof the one corre- 
 sponded to the body, the other to the soul of man, 
 have a concurrence or near sequence in times. 
 
 And for matter of policy and government, that 
 learning should rather hurt, than enable thereunto, 
 is a thing very improbable : we see it is accounted 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 17 
 
 an error to commit a natural body to empiric phy- 
 sicians, which commonly have a few pleasing re- 
 cipes, whereupon they are confident and adven- 
 turous, but know neither the causes of diseases, nor 
 the complexions of patients, nor peril of accidents, 
 nor the true method of cures : we see it is a like 
 error to rely upon advocates or lawyers, which are 
 only men of practice, and not grounded in their 
 books, who are many times easily surprised, when 
 matter falleth out besides their experience, to the 
 prejudice of the causes they handle : so, by like 
 reason, it cannot be but a matter of doubtful conse- 
 quence, if states be managed by empiric statesmen, 
 not well mingled with men grounded in learning. 
 But contrariwise, it is almost without instance con- 
 tradictory, that ever any government was disastrous 
 that was in the hands of learned governors^ For 
 howsoever it hath been ordinary with politic men to 
 extenuate and disable learned men by the names of 
 pedants ; yet in the records of time it appeareth, in 
 many particulars, that the governments of princes in 
 minority (notwithstanding the infinite disadvantage 
 of that kind of state) have nevertheless excelled the 
 government of princes of mature age, even for that 
 reasqn which they seek to traduce, which is, that by 
 that occasion the state hath been in the hands of 
 pedants : for so was the state of Rome for the 
 
 c 
 
IS OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 first five years, which are so much magnified, during 
 the minority of Nero, in the hands of Seneca, a 
 pedant : so it was again, for ten years space or 
 more, during the minority of Gordianus the younger, 
 with great applause and contentation in the hands of 
 Misitheus, a pedant : so was it before that, in the 
 minority of Alexander Severus, in like happiness, in 
 hands not much unlike, by reason of the rule of the 
 women, who were aided by the teachers and pre- 
 ceptors. Nay, let a man look into the government 
 of the bishops of Rome, as by name, into the 
 government o\ Pius Quintus, and Sextus Quintus, in 
 our times, who were both at their entrance esteemed 
 but as pedantical friars, and he shall find that such 
 popes do greater things, and proceed upon truer 
 principles of state, than those which have ascended 
 to the papacy from an education and breeding in 
 affairs of state and courts of princes ; for although 
 men bred in learning are perhaps to seek in points of 
 convenience, and accommodating for the present, 
 which the Italians call " ragioni di stato" (reasons of 
 state), whereof the same Pius Quintus could not hear 
 spoken with patience, terming them inventions 
 against religion and the moral virtues ; yet on the 
 other side, to recompense that, they are perfect 
 in those same plain grounds of religion, justice, 
 honour, and moral virtue, which if they be well and 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 19 
 
 watchfully pursued, there will be seldom use of those 
 other, no more than of physic in a sound or well- 
 dieted body. Neither can the experience of one 
 man's life furnish examples and precedents for the 
 events of one man's life : for, as it happeneth some- 
 times that the grandchild, or other descendant, re- 
 sembleth the ancestor more than the son ; so many 
 times occurrences of present times may sort better 
 with ancient examples, than with those of the latter 
 or immediate times : and lastly, the wit of one man 
 can no more countervail learning, than one man's 
 means can hold way with a common purse. 
 
 And as for those particular seducements, or in- 
 dispositions of the mind for policy and government, 
 which learning is pretended to insinuate ; if it be 
 granted that any such thing be, it must be remem- 
 bered withal, that learning ministereth in every oi 
 them greater strength of medicine or remedy, than it 
 ofTereth cause of indisposition or infirmity ; for if, by 
 a secret operation, it make men perplexed and irre- 
 solute, on the other side, by plain precept, it teacheth 
 them when and upon what ground to resolve ; yea, 
 and how to carry things in suspense without pre- 
 judice, till they resolve ; if it make men positive and 
 regular, it teacheth them what things are in their 
 nature demonstrative, and what are conjectural ; 
 and as well the use of distinctions and exceptions as 
 
tyf) OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 the latitude of principles and rules. If it misleads 
 by disproportion, or dissimilitude of examples, it 
 teacheth men the force of circumstances, the errors 
 of comparisons, and all the cautions of application ; 
 so that in all these it doth rectify more effectually 
 than it can pervert. And these medicines it con- 
 veyeth into men's minds much more forcibly by the 
 quickness and penetration of examples. For let a 
 man look into the errors of Clement the seventh, 
 so livelily described by Guicciardine, who served 
 under him, or into the errors of Cicero, painted out 
 by his own pencil in his epistles to Atticus, and 
 he will fly apace from being irresolute. Let him 
 look into the errors of Phocion, and he will beware 
 how he be obstinate or inflexible. Let him but 
 read the fable of Ixion, and it will hold him from 
 being vaporous or imaginative; Let him look into 
 the errors of Cato the second, and he will never 
 be one of the Antipodes, to tread opposite to the 
 present world. 
 
 And for the conceit, that learning should dispose 
 men to leisure and privateness, and make men 
 slothful ; it were a strange thing if that, which 
 accustometh the mind to a perpetual motion and 
 agitation, should induce slothfulness ; whereas con- 
 trariwise it may be truly affirmed, that no kind of 
 men love business for itself, but those that are 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 21 
 
 learned ; for other persons love it for profit, as an 
 hireling, that loves the work for the wages ; or for 
 honour, as because it beareth them up in the 
 eyes of men, and refresheth their reputations, which 
 otherwise would wear ; or because it putteth them 
 in mind of their fortune, and giveth them occa- 
 sion to pleasure and displeasure ; or because it exer- 
 ciseth some faculty wherein they take pride, and so 
 entertaineth them in good humour and pleasing con- 
 ceits towards themselves ; or because it advanceth 
 any other their ends. So that, as it is said of un- 
 true valours, that some men's valours are in the eyes 
 of them that look on ; so such men's industries are in 
 the eyes of others, or at least in regard of their own 
 designments : only learned men love business, as an 
 action according to nature, as agreeable to health of 
 mind, as exercise is to that health of body, taking 
 pleasure in the action itself, and not in the purchase : 
 so that of all men they are the most indefatigable? 
 if it be towards any business that can hold or 
 detain their mind. 
 
 And if any man be laborious in reading and 
 study, and yet idle in business and action, it groweth 
 from some weakness of body, or softness of spirit ; 
 such as Seneca speaketh of: " Quidam tarn sunt 
 umbratiles, ut putent in turbido esse quicquid in luce 
 est" (some are so fond of the shade and retirement, 
 
22 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 as to consider whatsoever is in the light troublesome) ; 
 and not of learning : well may it be, that such a 
 point of a man's nature may make him give himself 
 to learning, but it is not learning that breedeth 
 any such point in his nature. 
 
 And that learning should take up too much 
 time or leisure : I answer ; the most active or busy 
 man that hath been or can be, hath, no question, 
 many vacant times of leisure, while he expecteth 
 the tides and returns of business (except he be 
 either tedious and of no despatch, or lightly and un- 
 worthily ambitious to meddle in things that may be 
 better done by others :) and then the question is but, 
 how those spaces and times of leisure shall be filled 
 and spent ; whether in pleasures or in studies ; as 
 was well answered by Demosthenes to his adversary 
 iEschines, that was a man given to pleasure, and 
 told him, that his orations did smell of the lamp : 
 " Indeed/' said Demosthenes, " there is a great 
 difference between the things that you and I do by 
 lamp-light." So as no man need doubt that learning 
 will expulse business ; but rather it will keep and 
 defend the possession of the mind against idleness 
 and pleasure, which otherwise at unawares may 
 enter, to the prejudice of both. 
 
 Again, for that other conceit, that learning should 
 undermine the reverence of laws and government, 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 23 
 
 it is assuredly a mere depravation and calumny, 
 without all shadow of truth. For to say, that a 
 blind custom of obedience should be a surer obliga- 
 tion than duty taught and understood ; it is to 
 affirm, that a blind man may tread surer by a guide 
 than a seeing man can by a light. And it is without 
 all controversy, that learning doth make the minds of 
 men gentle, generous, maniable and pliant to govern- 
 ment; whereas ignorance makes them churlish, 
 thwarting, and mutinous : and the evidence of time 
 doth clear this assertion, considering that the most 
 barbarous, rude, and unlearned times have been most 
 subject to tumults, seditions, and changes. 
 
 And as to the judgment of Cato the Censor, he 
 was well punished for his blasphemy against learn- 
 ing, in the same kind wherein he offended ; for 
 when he was past threescore years old, he was 
 taken with an extreme desire to go to school again, 
 and to learn the Greek tongue, to the end to peruse 
 the Greek authors ; which doth well demonstrate, 
 that his former censure of the Grecian learning was 
 rather an affected gravity, than according to the 
 inward sense of his own opinion. And as for Vir- 
 gil's verses, though it pleased him to brave the world 
 in taking to the Romans the art of empire, and 
 leaving to others the arts of subjects ; yet so 
 much is manifest, that the Romans never ascended 
 
24 OF THE PROFlCIENCJi A^D 
 
 to that height of empire, till the time they had 
 ascended to the height of other arts. For in the 
 time of the two first Coesars, which had the art of 
 government in greatest perfection, there lived the best 
 poet, Virgilius Maro ; the best historiographer, Titus 
 Livius ; the best antiquary, Marcus Varro ; and 
 the best, or second orator, Marcus Cicero, that to 
 the memory of man are known. As for the accusa- 
 tion of Socrates, the time must be remembered when 
 it was prosecuted ; which was under the thirty 
 tyrants, the most base, bloody, and envious persons 
 that have governed ; which revolution of state was 
 no sooner over, but Socrates,, whom they had made 
 a person criminal, was made a person heretical, and 
 his memory accumulate with honours divine and 
 human; and those discourses of his, which were 
 then termed corrupting of manners, were after 
 acknowledged for sovereign medicines of the mind 
 and manners, and so have been received ever since 
 till this day. Let this therefore serve for answer to 
 politicians, which, in their humorous severity, or 
 in their feigned gravity, have presumed to throw 
 imputations upon learning ; which redargution, 
 nevertheless, (save that we know not whether our 
 labours may extend to other ages) were not needful 
 for the present, in regard of the love and reverence 
 towards learning, which the example and coun- 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 25 
 
 tenance of two so learned princes, queen Elizabeth, 
 and your majesty, being as Castor and Pollux, 
 " lucida sidera," stars of excellent light and most 
 benign influence, hath wrought in all men of 
 place and authority in our nation. 
 
 Now therefore we come to that third sort of dis- 
 credit or diminution of credit, that groweth unto 
 learning from learned men themselves, which com- 
 monly cleaveth fastest : it is either from their fortune, 
 or from their manners, or from the nature of their 
 studies. For the first, it is not in their power; and 
 the second is accidental; the third only is proper to 
 be handled: but because we are not in hand with 
 true measure, but with popular estimation and con- 
 ceit, it is not amiss to speak somewhat of the two 
 former. The derogations therefore, which grow to 
 learning from the fortune or condition of learned 
 men, are either in respect of scarcity of means, or 
 in respect of privateness of life, and meanness of 
 employments. 
 
 Concerning want, and that it is the case of learned 
 men usually to begin w T ith little, and not to grow 
 rich so fast as other men, by reason they convert not 
 their labours chiefly to lucre and increase : it were 
 good to leave the common place in commendation of 
 poverty to some friar to handle, to whom much was 
 attributed by Machiavel in this point; when he said, 
 
C Z6 OY THE PROEICXENCE AND 
 
 " That the kingdom of the clergy had been long 
 before at an end, if the reputation and reverence 
 towards the poverty of friars had not borne out the 
 scandal of the superfluities and excesses of bishops 
 and prelates." So a man might say, that the felicity 
 and delicacy of princes and great persons had long 
 since turned to rudeness and barbarism, if the po- 
 verty of learning had not kept up civility and honour 
 of life : but without any such advantages, it is worthy 
 the observation, what a reverend and honoured thing 
 poverty of fortune was, for some ages, in the Roman 
 state, which nevertheless was a state without para- 
 doxes : for we see what Titus Livius saith in his in- 
 troduction: " Coeterum aut me amor negotii suscepti 
 fallit, aut nulla unquam respublica nee major, nee 
 sanctior, nee bonis exemplis ditior fuit ; nee in quam 
 tarn serse avaritia luxuriaque immigraverint ; nee 
 ubi tantus ac tarn diu paupertati ac parsimonise 
 honos fuerit." (For the rest, either my partiality for 
 my undertaking deceives me, or never was there a 
 state more powerful, more religious, nor more fruitful 
 of good examples ; nor in which avarice and luxury 
 were of slower growth ; nor in which poverty and 
 frugality were so much and so long honoured.) We 
 see likewise, after that the state of Rome was not 
 itself, but did degenerate, how that person, that took 
 upon him to be counsellor to Julius Csesar after his 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 
 
 victory, where to begin his restoration of the state, 
 maketh it of all points the most summary to take 
 away the estimation of wealth: " Verum hsec, et 
 omnia mala pariter cum honore pecuniag desinent : 
 si neque magistratus, neque alia vulgo cupienda, 
 venalia erunt." (But this, and every other evil will 
 decrease, as the estimation of riches decreases, if 
 neither the magistrate, nor the people be corrupt.) 
 To conclude this point, as it was truly said, that 
 " rubor est virtutis color" (a blush is the color of 
 virtue), though sometimes it comes from vice; so it 
 may be fitly said that " paupertas est virtutis for- 
 tuna" (poverty is the fortune of virtue); though 
 sometimes it may proceed from misgovernment and 
 accident. Surely Solomon hath pronounced it both 
 in censure, " Qui festinat ad divitias non eritinsons" 
 (whoso hasteth to get riches shall not be guiltless) ; 
 and in precept; " Buy the truth, and sell it not;" 
 and so of wisdom and knowledge ; judging that 
 means were to be spent upon learning, and not learn- 
 ing to be applied to means. And as for the private - 
 ness, or obscureness (as it may be in vulgar estima- 
 tion accounted) of life of contemplative men; it is a 
 theme so common, to extol a private life not taxed 
 with sensuality and sloth, in comparison and to the 
 disadvantage of a civil life, for safety, liberty, plea- 
 sure, and dignity, or at least freedom from indignity, 
 
28 OF THE PR01ICIENCE AND 
 
 as no man handleth it, but handleth it well: such a 
 consonancy it hath to men's conceits in the express- 
 ing, and to men's consents in the allowing. This 
 only I will add, that learned men forgotten in states, 
 and not living in the eyes of men, are like the 
 images of Cassius and Brutus in the funeral of 
 Junia; of which not being represented, as many 
 others were, Tacitus saith, " Eo ipso prsefulgebant, 
 quod non visebantur" (they shone the most, that 
 were not present.) 
 
 And for meanness of employment, that which is 
 most traduced to contempt is that the government of 
 youth is commonly allotted to them ; which age, be- 
 cause it is the age of least authority, it is transferred 
 to the disesteeming of those employments wherein 
 youth is conversant, and which are conversant about 
 youth, But how unjust this traducement is (if you 
 will reduce things from popularity of opinion to mea- 
 sure of reason) may appear in that, we see men are 
 more curious what they put into a new vessel, than 
 into a vessel seasoned ; and what mould they lay 
 about a young plant, than about a plant corroborate ; 
 so as the weakest terms and times of all things use to 
 have the best applications and helps. And will you 
 hearken to the Hebrew Rabbins? " Your young men 
 shall see visions, and your old men shall dream 
 dreams:" say they, youth is the worthier age, for 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 29 
 
 that visions are nearer apparitions of God than 
 dreams. And let it be noted, that howsoever the 
 condition of life of pedants hath been scorned upon 
 theatres, as the ape of tyranny; and that the modern 
 looseness or negligence hath taken no due regard to 
 the choice of school-masters and tutors; yet the an- 
 cient wisdom of the best times did always make a 
 just complaint, that states were too busy with their 
 laws, and too negligent in point of education : which 
 excellent part of ancient discipline hath been in 
 some sort revived of late times by the colleges of the 
 Jesuits ; of whom, although in -regard of their su- 
 perstition I may say, " quo meliores, eo deteriores ;" 
 (by how much the better, so much the worse); yet 
 in regard of this, and some other points concerning 
 human learning and moral matters, I may say, as 
 Agesilaus said to his enemy Pharnabazus, " talis 
 quum sis, utinam noster esses" (such as thou art, I 
 would that ours were). And thus much touching the 
 discredits drawn from the fortunes of learned men. 
 
 As touching the manners of learned men, it is a 
 thing personal and individual: and no doubt there 
 be amongst them, as in other professions, of all 
 temperatures: but yet so as it is not without truth, 
 which is said, that " abeunt studia in mores," studies 
 have an influence and operation upon the manners of 
 those that are conversant in them. 
 
30 OF THE PI10FIC1ENCE AND 
 
 But upon an attentive and indifferent review, I 
 for my part cannot find any disgrace to learning 
 can proceed from the manners of learned men not 
 inherent to them as they are learned; except it be 
 a fault (which was the supposed fault of Demosthe- 
 nes, Cicero, Cato the second, Seneca, and many 
 more) that, because the times they read of are com- 
 monly better than the times they live in, and the 
 duties taught better than the duties practised, they 
 contend sometimes too far to bring things to per- 
 fection, and to reduce the corruption of manners to 
 honesty of precepts, or examples of too great height. 
 And yet hereof they have caveats enough in their 
 own walks. For Solon, when he was asked whe- 
 ther he had given his citizens the best laws, answered 
 wisely, " Yea, of such as they would receive :" and 
 Plato, finding that his own heart could not agree with 
 the corrupt manners of his country, refused to bear 
 place or office; saying, " That a man's country was 
 to be used as his parents were, that is, with humble 
 persuasions, and not with contestations. " And 
 Coesar's counsellor put in the same caveat, " Non 
 ad vetera instituta revocans quae jampridem corrup- 
 ts moribus ludibrio sunt" (not to restore such ancient 
 customs, as by the corruption of manners have been 
 become ridiculous) : and Cicero noteth this error 
 directly in Cato the second, when he writes to his 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 31 
 
 friend Atticus; u Cato optime sentit, sed nocet in- 
 terdum reipublicse ; loquitur enim tanquam in repub- 
 lica Platonis, non tanquam in fgece Romuli" (Cato 
 discerned well, but sometimes to the injury of the re- 
 public; for he spoke rather as if in the republic of 
 Plato, than in Rome). And the same Cicero doth 
 excuse and expound the philosophers for going too 
 far, and being too exact in their prescripts, when he 
 saith, " Isti ipsi prseceptores virtutis et magistri, 
 videntur fines officiorum paulo longius quam natura 
 vellet protulisse, ut cum ad ultimum animo conten- 
 dissemus, ibi tamen, ubi oportet, consisteremus" 
 (In this the teachers and masters of virtue them- 
 selves perceive that the intents of moral duties 
 may be pushed further than nature will permit, as 
 when the soul is overstrained to persist in that 
 which is right) : and yet himself might have said, 
 " Monitis sum minor ipse meis" (I might be myself 
 reproved for the same) ; for it was his own fault, 
 though not in so extreme a degree. 
 
 Another fault likewise much of this kind hath 
 been incident to learned men ; which is, that they 
 have esteemed the preservation, good and honour of 
 their countries or masters before their own fortunes 
 or safeties. For so saith Demosthenes unto the 
 Athenians : " If it please you to note it, my 
 counsels unto you are not such wherebv 1 should 
 
3 C 2 OF THE FROFICIENCE AND 
 
 grow great amongst you, and you become little 
 amongst the Grecians: but they be of that na- 
 ture, as they are sometimes not good for me to 
 give, but are always good for you to follow." And 
 so Seneca, after he had consecrated that Quin- 
 quennium Neronis to the eternal glory of learned 
 governors, held on his honest and loyal course of 
 good and free counsel, after his master grew ex- 
 tremely corrupt in his government. Neither can 
 this point otherwise be ; for learning endueth men's 
 minds with a true sense of the frailty of their per- 
 sons, the casualty of their fortunes, and the dignity 
 of their soul and vocation : so that it is impossible 
 for them to esteem that any greatness of their own 
 fortune can be a true or worthy end of their being 
 and ordainment ; and therefore are desirous to give 
 their account to God, and so likewise to their 
 masters under God (as kings and the states that 
 they serve) in these words ; " Ecce tibi lucrefeci" 
 (I did this to your profit), and not " Ecce mihi 
 hicrefeci" (I did this to my profit) : whereas the 
 corrupter sort of mere politicians, that have not 
 their thoughts established by learning in the love 
 and apprehension of duty, nor ever look abroad into 
 universality, do refer all things to themselves, and 
 thrust themselves into the centre of the world, as if 
 all lines should meet in them and their fortunes ; 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 33 
 
 never caring, in all tempests, what becomes of the 
 ship of state, so they may save themselves in the 
 cockboat of their own fortune : whereas men that 
 feel the weight of duty, and know the limits of self- 
 love, use to make good their places and duties, 
 though with peril ; and if they stand in seditious 
 and violent alterations, it is rather the reverence 
 which many times both adverse parties do give 
 to honesty, than any versatile advantage of their 
 own carriage. But for this point of tender sense, 
 and fast obligation of duty, which learning doth 
 endue the mind withal, howsoever fortune may tax 
 it, and many in the depth of their corrupt principles 
 may despise it, yet it will receive an open allowance, 
 and therefore needs the less disproof or excu- 
 sation. 
 
 Another fault incident commonly to learned 
 men, which may be more probably defended than 
 truly denied, is, that they fail sometimes in applying 
 themselves to particular persons: which want of 
 exact application ariseth from two causes ; the one, 
 because the largeness of their mind can hardly 
 confine itself to dwell in the exquisite observation 
 or examination of the nature and customs of one 
 person : for it is a speech for a lover, and not for a 
 wise man: " Satis magnum alter alteri theatrum 
 sumus." (One and one other are sufficient for the 
 
 I) 
 
34 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 largest stage). Nevertheless I shall yield, that he 
 that cannot contract the sight of his mind, as well 
 as disperse and dilate it, wanteth a great faculty. 
 But there is a second cause, which is no inability, 
 but a rejection upon choice and judgment ; for 
 the honest and just bounds of observation, by one 
 person upon another, extend no farther but to un- 
 derstand him sufficiently, whereby not to give him 
 offence, or whereby to be able to give him faithful 
 counsel, or whereby to stand upon reasonable guard 
 and caution in respect of a man's self: but to be 
 speculative into another man, to the end to know how 
 to work him or wind him or govern him, proceedeth 
 from a heart that is double and cloven, and not 
 entire and ingenuous ; which as in friendship it is 
 want of integrity, so towards princes or superiors is 
 want of duty. For the custom of the Levant, which 
 is, that subjects do forbear to gaze or fix their eyes 
 upon princes, is in the outward ceremony barbarous, 
 but the moral is good : for. men ought not by cun- 
 ning and bent observations to pierce and penetrate 
 into the hearts of kings, which the Scripture hath 
 declared to be inscrutable. 
 
 There is yet another fault (with which I will con- 
 clude this part) which is often noted in learned men, 
 that they do many times fail to observe decency 
 and discretion in their behaviour and carriage, and 
 
ADVANCEMENT 01- LEARNING. 35 
 
 commit errors in small and ordinary points of action, 
 so as the vulgar sort of capacities do make a 
 judgment of them in greater matters by that which 
 they find wanting in them in smaller. But this con- 
 sequence doth often deceive men. for which I do 
 refer them over to that which was said by Themis- 
 tocles, arrogantly and uncivilly being applied to 
 himself out of his own mouth ; but, being applied to 
 the general state of this question, pertinently and 
 justly ; when, being invited to touch a lute, he 
 said, " he could not fiddle, but he could make a 
 small town a great state/' So, no doubt, many may 
 be well seen in the passages of government and 
 policy, which are to seek in little and punctual oc- 
 casions. I refer them also to that which Plato said 
 of his master Socrates, whom he compared to the 
 gallypots of apothecaries, which on the outside had 
 apes and owls and antiques, but contained within 
 sovereign and precious liquors and confections ; 
 acknowledging that to an external report he was 
 not without superficial levities and deformities, but 
 was inwardly replenished with excellent virtues and 
 powers. And so much touching the point of man- 
 ners of learned men. 
 
 But in the mean time I have no purpose to give 
 allowance to some conditions and courses base and 
 unworthy, wherein divers professors of learning have 
 
36 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 wronged themselves, and gone too far ; such as 
 were those trencher philosophers, which in the 
 later age of the Roman state were usually in the 
 houses of great persons, being little better than 
 solemn parasites ; of which kind, Lucian maketh a 
 merry description of the philosopher that the great 
 lady took to ride with her in her coach, and would 
 needs have him carry her little dog, which he 
 doing officiously and yet uncomely, the page scoffed, 
 and said, " That he doubted, the philosopher of a 
 Stoic would turn to be a Cynic." But above all 
 the rest, the gross and palpable flattery, whereunto 
 many not unlearned have abased and abused their 
 wits and pens, turning, as Du Bartas saith, Hecuba 
 into Helena, and Faustina into Lucretia, hath most 
 diminished the price and estimation of learning. 
 Neither is the modern dedication of books and 
 writings, as to patrons, to be commended : for that 
 books, such as are worthy the name of books, ought 
 to have no patrons but truth and reason. And the 
 ancient custom was to dedicate them only to private 
 and equal friends, or to intitle the books with their 
 names ; or if to kings and great persons, it was 
 to some such as the argument of the book was 
 fit and proper for : but these and the like courses 
 may deserve rather reprehension than defence. 
 
 Not that I can tax or condemn the morigeration 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 37 
 
 or application of learned men to men in fortune. 
 For the answer was good that Diogenes made to 
 one that asked him in mockery, " How it came to 
 pass that philosophers were the followers of rich 
 men, and not rich men of philosophers ?" He 
 answered soberly, and yet sharply, " Because the 
 one sort knew what they had need of, and the other 
 did not." And of the like nature was the answer 
 which Aristippus made, when having a petition 
 to Dionysius, and no ear given to him, he fell down 
 at his feet ; whereupon Dionysius staid, and gave 
 him the hearing, and granted it ; and afterward 
 some person, tender on the behalf of philosophy, 
 reproved Aristippus, that he would offer the profes- 
 sion of philosophy such an indignity, as for a private 
 suit to fall at a tyrant's feet : but he answered, " It 
 was not his fault, but it was the fault of Dionysius 
 that he had his ears in his feet." Neither was it 
 accounted weakness, but discretion in him that 
 would not dispute his best with Adrianus Caesar : 
 excusing himself, " That it was reason to yield to 
 him that commanded thirty legions." These and 
 the like applications, and stooping to points of 
 necessity and convenience, cannot be disallowed ; 
 for though they may have some outward baseness, 
 yet in a judgment truly made, they are to be ac- 
 
38 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 counted submissions to the occasion, and not to the 
 person. 
 
 Nov/ I proceed to those errors and vanities 
 which have intervened amongst the studies them- 
 selves of the learned, which is that which is princi- 
 pal and proper to the present argument; wherein 
 my purpose is not to make a justification of the 
 errors, but, by a censure and separation of the errors, 
 to make a justification of that which is good and 
 sound, and to deliver that from the aspersion of the 
 other. For we see, that it is the manner of men to 
 scandalize and deprave that which retaineth the 
 state and virtue, by taking advantage upon that 
 which is corrupt and degenerate : as the heathens 
 in the primitive church used to blemish and taint 
 the Christians with the faults and corruptions of 
 heretics. But nevertheless I have no meaning at 
 this time to make any exact animadversion of the 
 errors and impediments in matters of learning, 
 which are more secret and remote from vulgar 
 opinion, but only to speak unto such as do fall 
 under or near unto a popular observation. 
 
 There be therefore chiefly three vanities in 
 studies, whereby learning hath been most traduced. 
 For those things we do esteem vain, which are 
 either false or frivolous, those which either have no 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 39 
 
 truth, or no use : and those persons we esteem vain, 
 which are either credulous or curious; and curiosity 
 is either in matter or words : so that in reason, as 
 well as in experience, there fall out to be these three 
 distempers, as I may term them, of learning; the 
 first, fantastical learning; the second, contentious 
 learning; and the last, delicate learning; vain ima- 
 ginations, vain altercations, and vain affectations ; 
 and with the last I will begin. 
 
 Martin Luther, conducted no doubt by an 
 higher Providence, but in discourse of reason, find- 
 ing what a province he had undertaken against the 
 bishop of Rome and the degenerate traditions of 
 the church, and finding his own solitude, being no 
 ways aided by the opinions of his own time, was 
 enforced to awake all antiquity, and to call former 
 times to his succour, to make a party against the 
 present time. So that the ancient authors, both in 
 divinity and in humanity, which had long time slept 
 in libraries, began generally to be read and revolved. 
 This by consequence did draw on a necessity of a 
 more exquisite travail in the languages original, 
 wherein those authors did write, for the better un- 
 derstanding of those authors, and the better advan- 
 tage of pressing and applying their words. And 
 thereof grew again a delight in their manner of 
 style and phrase, and an admiration of that kind of 
 
40 OF THE PR0FICIENCE AND 
 
 writing ; which was much furthered and precipitated 
 by the enmity and opposition that the propounders 
 of those primitive, but seeming new opinions, had 
 against the schoolmen; who were generally of the 
 contrary part, and whose writings were altogether 
 in a differing style and form, taking liberty to 
 coin and frame new terms of art to express their 
 own sense, and to avoid circuit of speech, without 
 regard to the pureness, pleasantness, and, as I 
 may call it, lawfulness of the phrase or word. 
 And again, because the great labour then was 
 with the people, (of whom the Pharisees were 
 wont to say, " Execrabilis ista turba, quae non 
 novit legem") (this accursed multitude who know 
 not the law), for the winning and persuading of 
 them, there grew of necessity in chief price and 
 request eloquence and variety of discourse, as the 
 fittest and forciblest access into the capacity of 
 the vulgar sort; so that these four causes con- 
 curring, the admiration of ancient authors, the 
 hate of the schoolmen, the exact study of lan- 
 guages, and the efficacy of preaching, did bring in 
 an affectionate study of eloquence and " copia" 
 (fluency) of speech, which then began to flourish. 
 This grew speedily to an excess ; for men began to 
 hunt more after words than matter; and more after 
 the choiceness of the phrase, and the round and 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 41 
 
 clean composition of the sentence, and the sweet 
 falling of the clauses, and the varying and illustra- 
 tion of their works with tropes and figures, than 
 after the weight of matter, worth of subject, sound- 
 ness of argument, life of invention, or depth of 
 judgment. Then grew T the flowing and watery vein 
 of Osorius, the Portugal bishop, to be in price. 
 Then did Sturmius spend such infinite and curious 
 pains upon Cicero the orator, and Hermogenes the 
 rhetorician, besides his own books of periods, and 
 imitation, and the like. Then did Car of Cam- 
 bridge, and Ascham, with their lectures and writings, 
 almost deify Cicero and Demosthenes, and allure 
 all young men, that were studious, unto that delicate 
 and polished kind of learning. Then did Erasmus 
 take occasion to make the scoffing echo; " Decern 
 annos consumpsi in legendo Cicerone" (ten years 
 I have consumed in reading Cicero): and the echo 
 answered in Greek, v Oe, " Asine" (an ass). Then 
 grew the learning of the schoolmen to be utterly de- 
 spised as barbarous. In sum, the whole inclination 
 and bent of those times was rather towards " copia" 
 (fluency) than weight. 
 
 Here therefore is the first distemper of learning, 
 when men study words, and not matter : whereof 
 though I have represented an example of late times, 
 yet it hath been, and will be " secundum majus et 
 
4 C Z OF THE PROFICIENCE A1SID 
 
 minus" (either more or less) in all time. And how 
 is it possible but this should have an operation to 
 discredit learning, even with vulgar capacities, 
 when they see learned men's works like the first 
 letter of a patent or limned book ; which though it 
 hath large flourishes, yet it is but a letter? It seems 
 to me that Pygmalion's frenzy is a good emblem or 
 portraiture of this vanity : for words are but the 
 images of matter; and except they have life of 
 reason and invention, to fall in love with them is 
 all one as to fall in love with a picture. 
 
 But yet, notwithstanding, it is a thing not has- 
 tily to be condemned, to clothe and adorn the ob- 
 scurity, even of philosophy itself, with sensible and 
 plausible elocution; for hereof we have great ex- 
 amples in Xenophon, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and 
 of Plato also in some degree ; and hereof like- 
 wise there is great use: for surely, to the severe 
 inquisition of truth, and the deep progress into 
 philosophy, it is some hinderance; because it is too 
 early satisfactory to the mind of man, and quench - 
 eth the desire of farther search, before we come 
 to a just period : but then if a man be to have any 
 use of such knowledge in civil occasions, of confer- 
 ence, counsel, persuasion, discourse, or the like; 
 then shall he find it prepared to his hands in those 
 authors which write in that manner. But the 
 
ADVANCEMENT OE LEARNING. 43 
 
 excess of this is so justly contemptible, that as 
 Hercules, when he saw the image of Adonis, 
 Venus 7 minion, in a temple, said in disdain, " Nil 
 sacri es" (thou art not divine); so there is none of 
 Hercules' followers in learning, that is, the more 
 severe and laborious sort of inquirers into truth, but 
 will despise those delicacies and affectations, as 
 indeed capable of no divineness. And thus much 
 of the first disease or distemper of learning". 
 
 The second, which followeth, is in nature worse 
 than the former : for as substance of matter is 
 better than beauty of words, so, contrariwise, vain 
 matter is worse than vain words ; wherein it seem- 
 eth the reprehension of St. Paul was not only proper 
 for those times, but prophetical for the times follow- 
 ing; and not only respective to divinity, but exten- 
 sive to all knowledge: " Devita profanas vocum 
 novitates, et oppositiones falsi nominis scientioe (avoid 
 new and profane words, and the contradictions of 
 false science). For he assigneth two marks and 
 badges of suspected and falsified science: the one, 
 the novelty and strangeness of terms ; the other, 
 the strictness of positions, which of necessity doth 
 induce oppositions, and so questions and alterca- 
 tions. Surely, like as many substances in nature, 
 which are solid, do putrify and corrupt into worms ; 
 so it is the property of p^ood and sound knowledge; 
 
4 4 Oy THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 to putrify and dissolve into a number of subtle, idle, 
 unwholesome, and, as I may term them, vermiculate 
 questions, which have indeed a kind of quickness, 
 and life of spirit, but no soundness of matter, or 
 goodness of quality. This kind of degenerate 
 learning did chiefly reign amongst the schoolmen; 
 who having sharp and strong wits, and abundance 
 of leisure, and small variety of reading, (but their 
 wits being shut up in the cells of a few authors, 
 chiefly Aristotle their dictator, as their persons 
 were shut up in the cells of monasteries and col- 
 leges,) and knowing little history, either of nature 
 or time, did, out of no great quantity of matter, 
 and infinite agitation of wit, spin out unto us those 
 laborious webs of learning, which are extant in 
 their books. For the wit and mind of man, if it 
 work upon matter, which is the contemplation of 
 the creatures of God, worketh according to the 
 stuff, and is limited thereby: but if it work upon 
 itself, as the spider worketh his web, then it is 
 endless, and brings forth indeed cobwebs of learn- 
 ing, admirable for the fineness of thread and work, 
 but of no substance or profit. 
 
 The same unprofitable subtilty or curiosity is of 
 two sorts; either in the subject itself that they 
 handle, when it is a fruitless speculation or contro- 
 versy, whereof there are no small number both in 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 45 
 
 divinity and philosophy ; or in the manner or 
 method of handling of a knowledge, which amongst 
 them was this; upon every particular position or asser- 
 tion to frame objections, and to those objections, so- 
 lutions ; which solutions were for the most part not 
 confutations, but distinctions : whereas indeed the 
 strength of all sciences is, as the strength of the old 
 man's faggot, in the band. For the harmony of a 
 science, supporting each part the other, is and ought 
 to be the true and brief confutation and suppression 
 of all the smaller sort of objections. But, on the 
 other side, if you take out every axiom, as the sticks of 
 the faggot, one by one, you may quarrel with them, 
 and bend them, and break them at your pleasure : 
 so that, as was said of Seneca, " Verborum minutiis 
 rerum frangit pondera" (the weight of his words 
 crusheth small things) ; so a man may truly say of 
 the schoolmen, " Quoestionum minutiis scientiarum 
 frangunt soliditatem" (minute disputations destroy 
 the solidity of science). For were it not better for a 
 man in a fair room to set up one great light, or 
 branching candlestick of lights, than to go about 
 with a small watch candle into every corner ? And 
 such is their method, that rests not so much upon 
 evidence of truth proved by arguments, authorities, 
 similitudes, examples, as upon particular confuta- 
 tions and solutions of every scruple, cavillation. and 
 
46 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 objection ; breeding for the most part one ques- 
 tion, as fast as it solveth another ; even as in the 
 former resemblance, when you carry the light into 
 one corner, you darken the rest : so that the fable 
 and fiction of Scylla seemeth to be a lively image 
 of this kind of philosophy or knowledge; who was 
 transformed into a comely virgin for the upper 
 parts ; but then " Candida succinctam latrantibus 
 inguina monstris" (beneath her girdle all were 
 howling monsters) : so the generalities of the school- 
 men are for a while good and proportionable ; but 
 then, when you descend into their distinctions and 
 decisions, instead of a fruitful womb, for the use and 
 benefit of man's life, they end in monstrous alterca- 
 tions and barking questions. So as it is not possi- 
 ble but this quality of knowledge must fall under 
 popular contempt, the people being apt to contemn 
 truth upon occasion of controversies and alterca- 
 tions, and to think they are all out of their way 
 which never meet : and when they see such digla- 
 diation about subtilties, and matters of no use or 
 moment, they easily fall upon that judgment of 
 Dionysius of Syracuse, " Verba ista sunt senum 
 otiosorum" (these are the words of idle old men). 
 
 Notwithstanding, certain it is that if those school- 
 men, to their great thirst of truth and unwearied 
 travail of wit, had joined variety and universality of 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 47 
 
 reading and contemplation, they had proved ex- 
 cellent lights, to the great advancement of all 
 learning and knowledge ; but as they are, they are 
 great undertakers indeed, and fierce with dark 
 keeping: but as in the inquiry of the divine truth, 
 their pride inclined to leave the oracle of God's 
 word, and to vanish in the mixture of their own in- 
 ventions ; so in the inquisition of nature, they ever 
 left the oracle of God's works, and adored the 
 deceiving and deformed images, which the unequal 
 mirror of their own minds, or a few received authors 
 or principles, did represent unto them. And thus 
 much for the second disease of learning. 
 
 For the third vice or disease of learning, which 
 concerneth deceit or untruth, it is of all the rest the 
 foulest ; as that which doth destroy the essential 
 form of knowledge, which is nothing but a repre- 
 sentation of truth ; for the truth of being and the 
 truth of knowing are one, differing no more than 
 the direct beam and the beam reflected. This 
 vice therefore brancheth itself into .two sorts ; de- 
 light in deceiving, and ?ptness to be deceived ; 
 imposture and credulity; which, although they 
 appear to be of a diverse nature, the one seeming 
 to proceed of cunning, and the other of simplicity, 
 yet certainly they do for the most part concur: for, 
 as the verse noteth, 
 
48 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 " Percontatorum fugito, nam garrulus idem est/' 
 (Flee from the inquisitive man, for he is a prattler) : 
 An inquisitive man is a prattler : so upon the like 
 reason, a credulous man is a deceiver : as we see 
 it in fame, that he that will easily believe rumours, 
 will as easily augment rumours, and add somewhat 
 to them of his own; which Tacitus wisely noteth, 
 when he saith, " Fingunt simul creduntque" (they 
 invent as they believe) : so great an affinity hath 
 fiction and belief. 
 
 This facility of credit, and accepting or admit- 
 ting things weakly authorized or warranted, is of 
 two kinds, according to the subject : for it is either 
 a belief of history, or, as the lawyers speak, matter of 
 fact; or else of matter of art and opinion. As to 
 the former, we see the experience and inconveni- 
 ence of this error in ecclesiastical history ; which 
 hath too easily received and registered reports and 
 narrations of miracles wrought by martyrs, hermits, 
 or monks of the desert, and other holy men, and 
 their relics, shrines, chapels, and images : which 
 though they had a passage for a time, by the igno- 
 rance of the people, the superstitious simplicity of 
 some, and the politic toleration of others holding 
 them but as divine poesies ; yet after a period of 
 time, when the mist began to clear up, they grew 
 to be esteemed but as old wives' fables, impostures of 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 49 
 
 the clergy, illusions of spirits, and badges of antichrist, 
 to the great scandal and detriment of religion. 
 
 So in natural history, we see there hath not 
 been that choice and judgment used as ought to 
 have been ; as may appear in the writings of 
 Plinius, Cardanus, Albertus, and divers of the Ara- 
 bians, being fraught with much fabulous matter, 
 a great part not only untried, but notoriously untrue, 
 to the great derogation of the credit of natural phi- 
 losophy with the grave and sober kind of wits : 
 wherein the wisdom and integrity of Aristotle is 
 worthy to be observed, that, having made so di- 
 ligent and exquisite a history of living creatures, 
 hath mingled it sparingly with any vain or feigned 
 matter : and yet, on the other side, hath cast all 
 prodigious narrations, which he thought worthy the 
 recording, into one book : excellently discerning 
 that matter of manifest truth, (such, whereupon 
 observations and rule were to be built,) was not to 
 be mingled or weakened with matter of doubtful 
 credit ; and yet again, that rarities and reports that 
 seem incredible are not to be suppressed or denied 
 to the memory of men. 
 
 And as for the facility of credit which is yielded 
 to arts and opinions, it is likewise of two kinds ; 
 either when too much belief is attributed to the arts 
 themselves, or to certain authors in any art. The 
 
50 OF THE FROFICIENCE AND 
 
 sciences themselves, which have had better intelli- 
 gence and confederacy with the imagination of man 
 than with his reason, are three in number ; astro- 
 logy, natural magic, and alchemy ; of which sci- 
 ences, nevertheless, the ends or pretences are noble. 
 For astrology pretendeth to discover that corres- 
 pondence or concatenation, which is between the 
 superior globe and the inferior : natural magic pre- 
 tendeth to call and reduce natural philosophy from 
 variety of speculations to the magnitude of works : 
 and alchemy pretendeth to make separation of all 
 the unlike parts of bodies, which in mixtures of 
 nature are incorporate. But the derivations and 
 prosecutions to these ends, both in the theories and 
 in the practices, are full of error and vanity ; which 
 the great professors themselves have sought to veil 
 over and conceal by enigmatical writings, and 
 referring themselves to auricular traditions and such 
 other devices, to save the credit of impostors : and 
 yet surely to alchemy this right is due, that it may be 
 compared to the husbandman whereof iEsop makes 
 the fable ; that, when he died, told his sons, that he 
 had left unto them gold buried under ground in his 
 vineyard ; and they digged over all the ground, and 
 gold they found none; but by reason of their 
 stirring and digging the mould about the roots of 
 their vines, they had a great vintage the year follow- 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 51 
 
 ing : so assuredly the search and stir to make gold 
 hath brought to light a great number of good and 
 fruitful inventions and experiments, as well for the 
 disclosing of nature, as for the use of man's life. 
 
 And as to the overmuch credit that hath been 
 given unto authors in sciences, in making them dic- 
 tators, that their words should stand; and not consuls, 
 to give advice ; the damage is infinite that sciences 
 have received thereby, as the principal cause that 
 hath kept them low, at a stay, without growth or 
 advancement. For hence it hath come, that in arts 
 mechanical the first deviser comes shortest, and time 
 addeth and perfecteth : but in sciences the first 
 author goeth farthest, and time loseth and cor- 
 rupteth. So, we see, artillery, sailing, printing, and 
 the like, were grossly managed at the first, and by 
 time accommodated and refined : but contrariwise, 
 the philosophies and sciences of Aristotle, Plato, 
 Democritus, Hippocrates, Euclides, Archimedes, of 
 most vigour at the first, are by time degenerate and 
 imbased ; whereof the reason is no other, but that 
 in the former many wits and industries have con- 
 tributed in one ; and in the latter many wits and 
 industries have been spent about the wit of some 
 one, whom many times they have rather depraved 
 than illustrated. For as water will not ascend higher 
 than the level of the first spring-head from whence 
 
OF THE PHOFICIENCE AND 
 
 it descendeth, so knowledge derived from Aristotle, 
 and exempted from liberty of examination, will not 
 rise again higher than the knowledge of Aristotle. 
 And therefore, although the position be good, 
 " Oportet discentem credere" (to learn, we ought 
 to believe); yet it must be coupled with this, 
 " Oportet edoctum judicare" (to judge, we ought to 
 be instructed) ; for disciples do owe unto masters 
 only a temporary belief, and a suspension of their 
 own judgment till they be fully instructed, and not 
 an absolute resignation, or perpetual captivity: and 
 therefore, to conclude this point, I will say no 
 more, but so let great authors have their due, as 
 time, which is the author of authors, be not de- 
 prived of his due, which is, farther and farther to 
 discover truth. 
 
 Thus have I gone over these three diseases of 
 learning ; besides the which, there are some other 
 rather peccant humours than formed diseases ; which 
 nevertheless are not so secret and intrinsic, but that 
 they fall under a popular observation and traduce- 
 ment, and therefore are not to be passed over. 
 
 The first of these is the extreme affecting of 
 two extremities; the one antiquity, the other no- 
 velty : wherein it seemeth the children of time do 
 take after the nature and malice of the father. For 
 as he devoureth his children, so one of them seeketh 
 
ADVANCEMENT 01 LEARNING. 53 
 
 to devour and suppress the other ; while antiquity 
 envieth there should be new additions, and novelty 
 cannot be content to add, but it must deface : 
 surely, the advice of the prophet is the true direction 
 in this matter, " State super vias antiquas, et videte 
 qusenam sit via recta et bona, et ambulate in ea" 
 (Stand thou upon the ancient ways, and see which is 
 the right and good path, and go thou therein). 
 Antiquity deserveth that reverence, that men should 
 make a stand thereupon, and discover what is the 
 best way ; but when the discovery is well taken, then 
 to make progression. And to speak truly, " Anti- 
 quitas sseculi juventus mundi" (the ancient times 
 were the infancy of the world). These times are the 
 ancient times, when the world is ancient, and not 
 ihose which we account ancient " ordine retrogrado" 
 (in a retrograde order), by a computation backward 
 from ourselves. 
 
 Another error, induced by the former, is a 
 distrust that any thing should be now to be found 
 out, w T hich the world should have missed and passed 
 over so long time ; as if the same objection were to 
 be made to time, that Lucian maketh to Jupiter and 
 other the heathen gods ; of which he wondereth that 
 they begot so many children in old time, and begot 
 none in his time ; and asketh whether they were 
 become septuagenarv, or whether the law Papia, 
 
54 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 made against old men's marriages, had restrained 
 them. So it seemeth men doubt lest time is become 
 past children and generation ; wherein, contrari- 
 wise, we see commonly the levity and incon- 
 stancy of men's judgments, which, till a matter be 
 done, wonder that it can be done ; and, as soon as it 
 is done, wonder again that it was no sooner done : as 
 we see in the expedition of Alexander into Asia, 
 which at first was prejudged as a vast and impossible 
 enterprise : and yet afterwards it pleaseth Livy to 
 make no more of it than this ; " Nil aliud quam 
 bene ausus est vana contemnere" (it were idle to 
 despise that which has been well executed) : and the 
 same happened to Columbus in the western navi- 
 gation. But in intellectual matters it is much more 
 common ; as may be seen in most of the propo- 
 sitions of Euclid : which till they be demonstrated, 
 they seem strange to our assent ; but being de- 
 monstrated, our mind accepteth of them by a kind 
 of relation, as the lawyers speak, as if we had 
 known them before. 
 
 Another error, that hath also some affinity with 
 the former, is a conceit that of former opinions 
 or sects, after variety and examination, the best hath 
 still prevailed, and suppressed the rest : so as, if a 
 man should begin the labour of a new search, 
 he were but like to light upon somewhat formerly 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 55 
 
 rejected, and by rejection brought into oblivion : as 
 if the multitude, or the wisest, for the multitude's 
 sake, were not ready to give passage rather to that 
 which is popular and superficial, than to that which 
 is substantial and profound : for the truth is, that 
 time seemeth to be of the nature of a river or stream, 
 which carrieth down to us that which is light 
 and blown up, and sinketh and drowneth that 
 which is weighty and solid. 
 
 Another error, of a diverse nature from all the 
 former, is the over early and peremptory reduction of 
 knowledge into arts and methods ; from which time 
 commonly sciences receive small or no augmentation. 
 But as young men, when they knit and shape per- 
 fectly, do seldom grow to a farther stature ; so know- 
 ledge, while it is in aphorisms and observations, it is 
 in growth ; but when it once is comprehended in exact 
 methods, it may perchance be farther polished and 
 illustrated, and accommodated for use and practice ; 
 but it increaseth no more in bulk and substance. 
 
 Another error which doth succeed that which 
 we last mentioned, is, that after the distribution 
 of particular arts and sciences, men have abandoned 
 universality, or " philosophia prima'' (the chief phi- 
 losophy) ; which cannot but cease and stop all pro- 
 gression. For no perfect discovery can be made 
 upon a flat or level : neither is it possible to discover 
 
56 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 the more remote and deeper parts of any science, if 
 you stand but upon the level of the same science, 
 and ascend not to a higher science. 
 
 Another error hath proceeded from too great a 
 reverence, and a kind of adoration of the mind and 
 understanding of man ; by means whereof, men 
 have withdrawn themselves too much from the con- 
 templation of nature, and the observations of ex- 
 perience, and have tumbled up and down in their own 
 reason and conceits. Upon these intellectualists, 
 which are, notwithstanding, commonly taken for the 
 most sublime and divine philosophers, Heraclitus 
 gave a just censure, saying, " Men sought truth in 
 their own little worlds, and not in the great and 
 common world ;" for they disdain to spell, and so by 
 degrees to read in the volume of God's works ; and 
 contrariwise, by continual meditation and agitation 
 of wit, do urge and as it were invocate their own 
 spirits to divine, and give oracles unto them, where- 
 by they are deservedly deluded. 
 
 Another error that hath some connexion with 
 this latter, is, that men have used to infect their me- 
 ditations, opinions, and doctrines, with some con- 
 ceits which they have most admired, or some 
 sciences which they have most applied; and given 
 all things else a tincture according to them, utterly 
 untrue and improper. So hath Plato intermingled 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. o? 
 
 his philosophy with theology, and Aristotle with 
 logic; and the second school of Plato, Proclus and 
 the rest, with the mathematics. For these were 
 the arts which had a kind of primogeniture with 
 them severally. So have the alchemists made a 
 philosophy out of a few experiments of the furnace; 
 and Gilbertus, our countryman, hath made a philo- 
 sophy out of the observations of a loadstone. So 
 Cicero, when, reciting the several opinions of the 
 nature of the soul, he found a musician that held 
 the soul was but a harmony, saith pleasantly, " Hie 
 ab arte sua non recessit" (he could not depart 
 from his art, &c). But of these conceits Aristotle 
 speaketh seriously and wisely, when he saith, " Qui 
 respiciunt ad pauca de facili pronunciant" (those 
 easily decide who regard but few things). 
 
 Another error is an impatience of doubt, and 
 haste to assertion without due and mature suspen- 
 sion of judgment. For the two ways of contem- 
 plation are not unlike the two ways of action, com- 
 monly spoken of by the ancients ; the one plain and 
 smooth in the beginning, and in the end impassable ; 
 the other rough and troublesome in the entrance, 
 but after a while fair and even : so it is in contempla- 
 tion; if a man will begin with certainties, he shall 
 end in doubts; but if he will be content to begin 
 with doubts, he shall end in certainties. 
 
58 OF THE PR0F1CIENCE AND 
 
 Another error is in the manner of the tradition 
 and delivery of knowledge, which is foV the most 
 part magisterial and peremptory, and not ingenuous 
 and faithful ; in a sort as may be soonest believed, 
 and not easiliest examined. It is true, that in com- 
 pendious treatises for practice, that form is not to 
 be disallowed. But in the true handling of know- 
 ledge, men ought not to fall, either, on the one side, 
 into the vein of Veileius the Epicurean : " Nil tarn 
 metuens, quam ne dubitare aliqua de re videretur" 
 (to doubt nothing which he sees) : nor, on the other 
 side, into Socrates' ironical doubting of all things ; 
 but to propound things sincerely, with more or less 
 asseveration, as they stand in a man's own judgment 
 proved more or less. 
 
 Other errors there are in the scope that men 
 propound to themselves, whereunto they bend their 
 endeavours; for whereas the more constant and 
 devoted kind of professors of any science ought to 
 propound to themselves to make some additions to 
 their science, they convert their labours to aspire to 
 certain second prizes : as to be a profound inter- 
 preter or commentator ; to be a sharp champion 
 or defender; to be a methodical compounder or 
 abridger ; and so the patrimony of knowledge cometh 
 to be sometimes improved, but seldom augmented. 
 
 But the greatest error of all the rest, is the mis- 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 59 
 
 taking or misplacing of the last or farthest end of 
 knowledge : for men have entered into a desire of 
 learning and knowledge, sometimes upon a natural 
 curiosity, and inquisitive appetite ; sometimes to en- 
 tertain their minds with variety and delight; some- 
 times for ornament and reputation; and sometimes 
 to enable them to victory of wit and contradiction ; 
 and most times for lucre and profession ; and seldom 
 sincerely to give a true account of their gift of 
 reason, to the benefit and use of men : as if there 
 were sought in knowledge a couch, whereupon to 
 rest a searching and restless spirit; or a terrace, for 
 a wandering and variable mind to walk up and 
 down with a fair prospect; or a tower of state, for 
 a proud mind to raise itself upon : or a fort or 
 commanding ground, for strife and contention; or a 
 shop, for profit or sale ; and not a rich storehouse, 
 for the glory of the Creator, and the relief of man's 
 estate. Eut this is that which will indeed dignify 
 and exalt knowledge, if contemplation and action 
 may be more nearly and straitly conjoined and 
 united together than they have been ; a conjunc- 
 tion like unto that of the two highest planets, 
 Saturn, the planet of rest and contemplation, and 
 Jupiter, the planet of civil society and action: how- 
 beit, I do not mean, when I speak of use and 
 action, that end before-mentioned of the applying of 
 
60 OF THE PROEICIENCE AND 
 
 knowledge to lucre and profession ; for I am not 
 ignorant how much that diverteth and interrupteth 
 the prosecution and advancement of knowledge, 
 like unto the golden ball thrown before Atalanta, 
 which while she goeth aside and stoopeth to take 
 up, the race is hindered ; 
 
 " Declinat cursus, aurumque volubile tollit," 
 (She left the course, and seized the rolling gold). 
 
 Neither is my meaning, as was spoken of So- 
 crates, to call philosophy down from heaven to con- 
 verse upon the earth; that is, to leave natural phi- 
 losophy aside, and to apply knowledge only to 
 manners and policy. But as both heaven and 
 earth do conspire and contribute to the use and be- 
 nefit of man; so the end ought to be, from both 
 philosophies to separate and reject vain speculations, 
 and whatsoever is empty and void, and to preserve 
 and augment whatsoever is solid and fruitful : that 
 knowledge may not be, as a courtesan, for pleasure 
 and vanity only, or as a bond-woman, to acquire 
 and gain to her master's use ; but as a spouse, for 
 generation, fruit, and comfort. 
 
 Thus have I described and opened, as by a kind 
 of dissection, those peccant humours, the principal 
 of them, which have not only given impediment to 
 the proficience of learning, but have given also oc- 
 casion to the traducement thereof: wherein if I 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 61 
 
 have been too plain, it must be remembered, " Fi- 
 delia vulnera amantis, sed dolosa oscula malignantis" 
 (sincere are the reproofs of love, but treacherous the 
 kiss of malignity). 
 
 This, I think, I have gained, that I ought to 
 be the better believed in that which I shall say per- 
 taining to commendation; because I have proceeded 
 so freely in that which concerneth censure. And 
 yet T have no purpose to enter into a laudative of 
 learning, or to make a hymn to the muses ; though 
 I am of opinion that it is long since their rites were 
 duly celebrated : but my intent is, without varnish 
 or amplification, justly to weigh the dignity of know- 
 ledge in the balance with other things, to take the 
 true value thereof by testimonies and arguments 
 divine and human. 
 
 First, therefore, let us seek the dignity of know- 
 ledge in the archetype or first platform, which is in 
 the attributes and acts of God, as far as they are re- 
 vealed to man, and may be observed with sobrietv ; 
 wherein we may not seek it by the name of learning ; 
 for all learning is knowledge acquired, and all know- 
 ledge in God is original: and therefore we must 
 look for it by another name, that of wisdom or sapi- 
 ence, as the Scriptures call it. 
 
 It is so then, that in the work of the creation 
 we see a double emanation of virtue from God; the 
 
62 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 one referring more properly to power, the other to 
 wisdom : the one expressed in making the subsist- 
 ence of the matter, and the other in disposing the 
 beauty of the form. This being supposed, it is to 
 be observed, that, for any thing which appeareth in 
 the history of the creation, the confused mass and 
 matter of heaven and earth was made in a moment ; 
 and the order and disposition of that chaos or mass 
 was the work of six days ; such a note of difference 
 it pleased God to put upon the works of power, and 
 the worsk of wisdom : wherewith concurreth, that 
 in the former it is not set down that God said, " Let 
 there be heaven and earth, " as it is set down of the 
 works following ; but actually, that God made heaven 
 and earth : the one carrying the style of a manu- 
 facture, and the other of a law, decree, or council. 
 
 To proceed to that which is next in order, from 
 God to spirits. We find, as far as credit is to be 
 given to the celestial hierarchy of that supposed 
 Dionysius the senator of Athens, the first place or 
 degree is given to the angels of love, which are 
 termed Seraphim; the second to the angels of light, 
 which are termed Cherubim; and the third, and so 
 following places, to thrones, principalities, and the 
 rest, which are all angels of power and ministry; 
 so as the angels of knowledge and illumination are 
 placed before the angels of office and domination. 
 
ADVAN CEMENT OF LEARNING. 63 
 
 To descend from spirits and intellectual forms to 
 sensible and material forms; we read the first 
 form that was created was light, which hath a rela- 
 tion and correspondence in nature and corporal 
 things to knowledge in spirits and incorporal thi 
 
 So in the distribution of days, we see, the day 
 wherein God did rest, and contemplate his own 
 works, was blessed above all the days wherein he 
 did effect and accomplish them. 
 
 After the creation was finished, it is set down 
 unto us, that man was placed in the garden to work 
 therein; which work, so appointed to him, could 
 be no other than work of contemplation; that is, 
 when the end of work is but for exercise and ex- 
 periment, not for necessity; for there being then no 
 reluctation of the creature, nor sweat of the brow, 
 man's employment must of consequence have been 
 matter of delight in the experiment, and not matter 
 of labour for the use. Again, the first acts which 
 man performed in Paradise consisted of the two 
 summary parts of knowledge; the view of creatures, 
 and the imposition of names. As for the knowledge 
 which induced the fall, it was, as was touched 
 before, not the natural knowledge of creatures, bur 
 the moral knowledge of good and evil; wherein the 
 supposition wa>. that God's commandments or pro- 
 hibitions were not the originals of srood and evil. 
 
64 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 but that they had other beginnings, which man as- 
 pired to know ; to the end to make a total defection 
 from God, and to depend wholly upon himself. 
 
 To pass on: in the first event or occurrence 
 after the fall of man, we see, (as the Scriptures have 
 infinite mysteries, not violating at all the truth of 
 the story or letter,) an image of the two estates, the 
 contemplative state and the active state, figured in 
 the two persons of Abel and Cain, and in the two 
 simplest and most primitive trades of life ; that of 
 the shepherd, (who, by reason of his leisure, rest in 
 a place, and living in view of heaven, is a lively 
 image of a contemplative life,) and that of the 
 husbandman : where we see again the favour and 
 election of God went to the shepherd, and not to 
 the tiller of the ground. 
 
 So in the age before the flood, the holy records, 
 within those few memorials which are there entered 
 and registered, have vouchsafed to mention and 
 honour the name of the inventors and authors of 
 music and works in metal. In the age after the flood, 
 the first great judgment of God upon the ambition 
 of man was the confusion of tongues ; whereby the 
 open trade and intercourse of learning and know- 
 ledge was chiefly imbarred. 
 
 To descend to Moses the lawgiver, and God's 
 first pen : he is adorned by the Scriptures with this 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 
 
 addition and commendation, that he was " seen in 
 all the learning of the Egyptians ;" which nation, 
 we know, was one of the most ancient schools of the 
 world : for so Plato brings in the Egyptian priest 
 saying unto Solon : " You Grecians are ever chil- 
 dren ; you have no knowledge of antiquity, nor an- 
 tiquity of knowledge." Take a view of the ceremo- 
 nial law of Moses ; you shall find, besides the pre- 
 figuration of Christ, the badge or difference of the 
 people of God, the exercise and impression of obe- 
 dience, and other divine uses and fruits thereof, that 
 some of the most learned Rabbins have travelled 
 profitably and profoundly to observe, some of them 
 a natural, some of them a moral sense, or a reduc- 
 tion of many of the ceremonies and ordinances. As 
 in the law of the leprosy, where it is said, " If the 
 whiteness have overspread the flesh, the patient may 
 pass abroad for clean ; but if there be any whole 
 flesh remaining, he is to be shut up for unclean;" 
 one of them noteth a principle of nature, that pu- 
 trefaction is more contagious before maturity than 
 after: and another noteth a position of moral philo- 
 sophy, that men abandoned to vice, do not so much 
 corrupt manners, as those that are half-good and 
 half-evil. So in this, and very many other places in 
 that law, there is to be found, besides the theological 
 sense, much aspersion of philosophy, 
 
 F 
 
66 01' THE FRGFIC1ENCE AND 
 
 So likewise in that excellent book of Job, if it 
 be revolved with diligence, it will be found pregnant 
 and swelling with natural philosophy; as for exam- 
 ple, cosmography, and the roundness of the world : 
 " Qui extendit aquilonem super vacuum, et appendit 
 terram super nihilum" (who stretcheth out the north 
 over the empty place, and hangeth the earth upon 
 nothing); wherein the pensileness of the earth, the 
 pole of the north, and the finiteness or convexity of 
 heaven are manifestly touched: so again, matter of 
 astronomy; " Spiritus ejus ornavit coelos, et obste- 
 tricante manu ejus eductus est Coluber tortuosus" 
 (by his spirit he hath garnished the heavens, his 
 hand hath formed the crooked serpent). And in 
 another place ; " Nunquid conjungere valebis mi- 
 cantes Stellas Pleiadas, aut gyrum Arcturi poteris 
 dissipare" (canst thou unite the bright Pleiades, or 
 dissolve the circle of Orion)? Where the fixing of the 
 stars, ever standing at equal distance, is with great 
 elegancy noted. And in another place, u Qui facit 
 Arcturum, et Oriona, et Hyadas, et interiora Austri" 
 (who made Arcturus, and Orion, and the Hyadis, and 
 the secrets of the south) ; where again he takes know- 
 ledge of the depression of the southern pole, calling 
 it the secrets of the south, because the southern 
 stars were in that climate unseen. Matter of gene- 
 ration ; " Annon sicut lac mulsisti me, et sicut ca- 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 67 
 
 seum coagulasti me, &c." (hast thou not poured me 
 out as milk, and curdled me as cheese?) Matter of 
 minerals ; " Habet argentum venarum suarum prin- 
 cipia : et auro locus est in quo conflatur, ferrum de 
 terra tollitur, et lapis solutus calore in oes vertitur" 
 (surely there is a vein for the silver, and a place for 
 gold where they fine it ; and iron is taken out of the 
 earth, and brass is molten out of the stone) : and so 
 forwards in that chapter. 
 
 So likewise in the person of Solomon the king, 
 we see the gift or endowment of wisdom and learn- 
 ing, both in Solomon's petition, and in God's assent 
 thereunto, preferred before all other terrene and tem- 
 poral felicity. By virtue of which grant or donative 
 of God, Solomon became enabled, not only to write 
 those excellent parables, or aphorisms concerning 
 divine and moral philosophy ; but also to compile a 
 natural history of all verdure, from the cedar upon 
 the mountain to the moss upon the wall, (which is 
 but a rudiment between putrefaction and an herb,) 
 and also of all things that breathe or move. Nay, 
 the same Solomon the king, although he excelled 
 in the glory of treasure and magnificient buildings, 
 of shipping and navigation, of service and attend- 
 ance, of fame and renown, and the like, yet he 
 maketh no claim to any of those glories, but only to 
 the glory of inquisition of truth ; for so he saith ex- 
 
68 CF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 
 pressly, " The glory of God is to conceal a thing, 
 but the glory of the king is to find it out;" as if, ac- 
 cording to the innocent play of children, the Divine 
 Majesty took delight to hide his works, to the end 
 to have them found out ; and as if kings could not 
 obtain a greater honour than to be God's playfellows 
 in that game ; considering the great commandment 
 of wits and means, whereby nothing needeth to be 
 hidden from them. 
 
 Neither did the dispensation of God vary in the 
 times after our Saviour came into the world ; for 
 our Saviour himself did first shew his power to 
 subdue ignorance, by his conference with the priests 
 and doctors of the law, before he shewed his power 
 to subdue nature by his miracles. And the coming 
 of the Holy Spirit was chiefly figured and expressed 
 in the similitude and gift of tongues, which are but 
 " vehicula scientise" (the vehicles of science). 
 
 So in the election of those instruments, which 
 it pleased God to use for the plantation of the faith, 
 notwithstanding that at the first he did employ 
 persons altogether unlearned, otherwise than by 
 inspiration, more evidently to declare his immediate 
 working, and to abase all human wisdom or know- 
 ledge ; yet, nevertheless, that counsel of his was 
 no sooner performed, but in the next vicissitude and 
 succession, he did send his divine truth into the 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 69 
 
 World, waited on with other learnings, as with ser- 
 vants or handmaids: for so we see St. Paul, who 
 was only learned amongst the apostles, had his pen 
 most used in the Scriptures of the New Testament. 
 
 So again, we find that many of the ancient 
 bishops and fathers of the church were excellently 
 read, and studied in all the learning of the heathen ; 
 insomuch, that the edict of the emperor Julianus, 
 whereby it was interdicted unto Christians to be ad- 
 mitted into schools, lectures, or exercises of learnings 
 was esteemed and accounted a more pernicious engine 
 and machination against the Christian faith, than were 
 all the sanguinary prosecutions of his predecessors ; 
 neither could the emulation and jealousy of Gregory 
 the First of that name, bishop of Rome, ever obtain 
 the opinion of piety or devotion; but contrariwise 
 received the censure of humour, malignity, and pusil- 
 lanimity, even amongst holy men; in that he designed 
 to obliterate and extinguish the memory of heathen 
 antiquity and authors. But contrariwise, it was the 
 Christian church, which, amidst the inundations of 
 the Scythians on the one side from the north-west, 
 and the Saracens from the east, did preserve, in the 
 sacred lap and bosom thereof, the precious relics 
 even of heathen learning, which otherwise had been 
 extinguished, as if no such thing had ever been. 
 
 And we see before our eyes, that in the age of 
 
70 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 ourselves and our fathers, when it pleased God to 
 call the church of Rome to account for their dege- 
 nerate manners and ceremonies, and sundry doc- 
 trines obnoxious, and framed to uphold the same 
 abuses; at one and the same time it was ordained 
 by the Divine Providence, that there should attend 
 withal a renovation, and new spring of all other 
 knowledges: and, on the other side, we see the 
 Jesuits, (who partly in themselves, and partly by 
 the emulation and provocation of their example, 
 have much quickened and strengthened the state of 
 learning,) we see, I say, what notable service and 
 reparation they have done to the Roman see. 
 
 Wherefore, to conclude this part, let it be ob- 
 served, that there be two principal duties and ser- 
 vices, besides ornament and illustration, which phi- 
 losophy and human learning do perform to faith 
 and religion. The one, because they are an effec- 
 tual inducement to the exaltation of the glory of 
 God. For as the Psalms and other Scriptures do 
 often invite us to consider and magnify the great 
 and wonderful works of God ; so if we should rest 
 only in the contemplation of the exterior of them, 
 as they first offer themselves to our senses, we 
 should do a like injury unto the majesty of God, as 
 if we should judge or construe of the store of some 
 excellent jeweller, by that only which is set out to- 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 71 
 
 ward the street in his shop. The other, because 
 they minister a singular help and preservative against 
 unbelief and error : for our Saviour saith, " You 
 err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of 
 God ; " laying before us two books or volumes to 
 study, if we will be secured from error ; first, the 
 Scriptures, revealing the will of God ; and then the 
 creatures expressing his power : whereof the latter 
 is a key unto the former: not only opening our un- 
 derstanding to conceive the true sense of the Scrip- 
 tures, by the general notions of reason and rules of 
 speech ; but chiefly opening our belief, in drawing 
 us into a due meditation of the omnipotency of God, 
 which is chiefly signed and engraven upon his works. 
 Thus much therefore for divine testimony and evi- 
 dence, concerning the true dignity and value of 
 learning 
 
 As for human proofs, it is so large a field, as, in 
 a discourse of this nature and brevity, it is fit rather 
 to use choice of those things which we shall produce, 
 than to embrace the variety of them. First, there- 
 fore, in the degrees of human honor amongst the 
 heathen, it was the highest to obtain to a veneration 
 and adoration as a God. This unto the Christians 
 is as the forbidden fruit. But we speak now sepa- 
 rately of human testimony ; according to which, that 
 which the Grecians call " apotheosis/' and the Latins, 
 
01 THE PR0EICIENCE AND 
 
 " relatio inter divos" (admission among the gods), 
 was the supreme honour which man could attribute 
 unto man : especially when it was given, not by a 
 formal decree or act of state, as it was used among 
 the Roman emperors, but by an inward assent and 
 belief. Which honour, being so high, had also a 
 degree or middle term: for there were reckoned, 
 above human honors, honors heroical and divine : 
 in the attribution and distribution of which honors, 
 we see, antiquity made this difference : that whereas 
 founders and uniters of states and cities, lawgivers, 
 extirpers of tyrants, fathers of the people, and other 
 eminent persons in civil merit, were honored but 
 with the titles of worthies or demi-gods ; such as 
 were Hercules, Theseus, Minos, Romulus, and the 
 like: on the other side, such as were inventors and 
 authors of new arts, endowments, and commodities 
 towards man's life, were ever consecrated amongst 
 the gods themselves : as were Ceres, Bacchus, Mer- 
 curius, Apollo, and others; and justly: for the 
 merit of the former is confined within the circle of 
 an age or a nation; and is like fruitful showers, 
 which though they be profitable and good, yet serve 
 but for that season, and for a latitude of ground 
 where they fall ; but the other is indeed like the 
 benefits of heaven, which are permanent and uni- 
 versal. The former, again, is mixed with strife and 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 
 
 perturbation ; but the latter hath the true character 
 of divine presence, coming " in aura leni" (calmly), 
 without noise or agitation. 
 
 Neither is certainly that other merit of learning* 
 in repressing the inconveniencies which grow from 
 man to man, much inferior to the former, of reliev- 
 ing the necessities which arise from nature ; which 
 merit was livelily set forth by the ancients in that 
 feigned relation of Orpheus's theatre, where all 
 beasts and birds assembled, and, forgetting their 
 several appetites, some of prey, some of game, some 
 of quarrel, stood all sociably together listening to 
 the airs and accords of the harp ; the sound whereof 
 no sooner ceased, or was drowned by some louder 
 noise, but every beast returned to his own nature : 
 wherein is aptly described the nature and condition 
 of men, who are full of savage and unreclaimed desires 
 of profit, of lust, of revenge ; which as long as they 
 give ear to precepts, to laws, to religion, sweetly 
 touched with eloquence and persuasion of books, of 
 sermons, of harangues, so long is society and peace 
 maintained ; but if these instruments be silent, 
 or that sedition and tumult make them not audible, 
 all things dissolve into anarchy and confusion. 
 
 But this appeareth more manifestly, when kings 
 themselves, or persons of authority under them, 
 OX other governors in commonwealths and popular 
 
74 OF THE PR0FIC1ENCE AND 
 
 estates, are endued with learning. For although he 
 might be thought partial to his own profession, that 
 said, " Then should people and estates be happy, 
 when either kings were philosophers, or philosophers 
 kings ;" yet so much is verified by experience, that 
 under learned princes and governors there have 
 been ever the best times : for howsoever kings may 
 have their imperfections in their passions and 
 customs ; yet if they be illuminated by learning, 
 they have those notions of religion, policy, and 
 morality, which do preserve them, and refrain them 
 from all ruinous and peremptory errors and excesses ; 
 whispering evermore in their ears, when counsellors 
 and servants stand mute and silent. And senators 
 or counsellors likewise, which be learned, do proceed 
 upon more safe and substantial principles, than 
 counsellors which are only men of experience ; the 
 one sort keeping dangers afar off, whereas the other 
 discover them not till they come near hand, and 
 then trust to the agility of their wit to ward off 
 or avoid them. 
 
 Which felicity of times under learned princes, 
 (to keep still the law of brevity, by using the most 
 eminent and selected examples), doth best appear 
 in the age which passed from the death of Domitian 
 the emperor until the reign of Commodus ; compre- 
 hending a succession of six princes, all learned, or 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 75 
 
 singular favourers and advancers of learning ; which 
 age, for temporal respects, was the most happy and 
 flourishing that ever the Roman empire, which then 
 was a model of the world, enjoyed : a matter 
 revealed and prefigured unto Domitian in a dream, 
 the night before he was slain ; for he thought there 
 was grown behind upon his shoulders a neck and a 
 head of gold : which came accordingly to pass 
 in those golden times which succeeded ; of which 
 princes we will make some commemoration : wherein 
 although the matter will be vulgar, and may be 
 thought fitter for a declamation than agreeable to a 
 treatise enfolded as this is, yet because it is per- 
 tinent to the point in hand, " neque semper arcum 
 tendit Apollo" (neither doth Apollo always bend his 
 bow), and to name them only were too naked and 
 cursory, I will not omit it altogether. 
 
 The first was Nerva ; the excellent temper of 
 whose government is by a glance in Cornelius 
 Tacitus touched to the life : " Postquam divus 
 Nerva res olim insociabiles miscuisset, imperium et 
 libertatem" (under Nerva things till then incom- 
 patible were united, imperial power and liberty). 
 And in token of his learning, the last act of his 
 short reign, left to memory, was a missive to his 
 adopted son Trajan, proceeding upon some inward 
 
76 01- THE PROFICI-ENCE AND 
 
 discontent at the ingratitude of the times, compre- 
 hended in a verse of Homer's : 
 " Telis, Phoebe, tuis lacrymas ulciscere nostras/' 
 (Thy darts, O Phoebus, will revenge our tears). 
 Trajan, who succeeded, was for his person not 
 learned : but if we will hearken to the speech of our 
 Saviour, that saith, " He that receiveth a prophet in 
 the name of a prophet, shall have a prophet's 
 reward," he deserveth to be placed amongst the most 
 learned princes ; for there was not a greater ad- 
 mirer of learning, or benefactor of learning ; a 
 founder of famous libraries, a perpetual advancer of 
 learned men to office, and a familiar converser with 
 learned professors and precepters, who were noted to 
 have then most credit in court. On the other side, 
 how much Trajan's virtue and government was 
 admired and renowned, surely no testimony of grave 
 and faithful history doth more lively set forth, than 
 that legend tale of Gregorius Magnus, bishop of 
 Rome, who was noted for the extreme envy he bore 
 towards all heathen excellency : and yet he is re- 
 ported, out of the love and estimation of Trajan's 
 moral virtues, to have made unto God passionate 
 and fervent prayers for the delivery of his soul out of 
 hell : and to have obtained it, with a caveat that he 
 should make no more such petitions. In this 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 
 
 prince's time also, the persecutions against the 
 Christians received intermission, upon the certificate 
 of Plinius Secundus, a man of excellent learning, 
 and by Trajan advanced. 
 
 Adrian, his successor, was the most curious man 
 that lived, and the most universal inquirer ; insomuch 
 as it was noted for an error in his mind, that he 
 desired to comprehend all things, and not to reserve 
 himself for the worthiest things; falling into the 
 like humour that was long before noted in Philip of 
 Macedon ; who, when he would needs over-rule and 
 put down an excellent musician, in an argument 
 touching music, was well answered by him again, 
 " God forbid, Sir," saith he, " that your fortune 
 should be so bad, as to know these things better 
 than I." It pleased God likewise to use the curiosity 
 of this emperor as an inducement to the peace of his 
 church in those days. For having Christ in venera- 
 tion, not as a God or Saviour, but as a wonder or 
 novelty; and having his picture in his gallery, 
 matched it with Appollonius, with whom, in his vain 
 imagination, he thought he had some conformity ; yet 
 it served the turn to allay the bitter hatred of those 
 times against the christian name, so as the church 
 had peace during his time. And for his govern- 
 ment civil, although he did not attain to that of 
 Trajan's in the glory of arms, or perfection of justice. 
 
78 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 yet in deserving of the weal of the subject he did ex- 
 ceed him. For Trajan erected many famous monu- 
 ments and buildings ; insomuch as Constantine the 
 Great in emulation was wont to call him " Parieta- 
 ria," (wall-flower,) because his name was upon so 
 many walls : but his buildings and works were more 
 of glory and triumph than use and necessity. But 
 Adrian spent his whole reign, which was peaceable, 
 in a perambulation or survey of the Roman empire ; 
 giving order, and making assignation where he 
 went, for re-edifying of cities, towns, and forts 
 decayed, and for cutting of rivers and streams, and 
 for making bridges and passages, and for policying 
 of cities and commonalties with new ordinances and 
 constitutions, and granting new franchises and in- 
 corporations ; so that his whole time was a very 
 restoration of all the lapses and decays of former 
 times. 
 
 Antoninus Pius, who succeeded him, was a 
 prince excellently learned* and had the patient and 
 subtle wit of a schoolman ; insomuch as in common 
 speech, which leaves no virtue untaxed, he was 
 called " cymini sector" (a carver, or a divider of 
 cumin seed), which is one of the least seeds ; such a 
 patience he had and settled spirit, to enter into the 
 least and most exact differences of causes, a fruit 
 no doubt of the exceeding tranquillity and serenity 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 79 
 
 of his mind; which being noways charged or in- 
 cumbered, either with fears, remorses, or scruples, 
 but having been noted for a man of the purest good- 
 ness, without all fiction or affectation, that hath 
 reigned or lived, made his mind continually present 
 and entire He likewise approached a degree nearer 
 unto Christianity, and became, as Agrippa said unto 
 St. Paul, " half a Christian ;" holding their religion 
 and law in good opinion, and not only ceasing per- 
 secution, but giving way to the advancement of 
 Christians. 
 
 There succeeded him the first " divi fratres," 
 the two adoptive brethren, Lucius CommodusVerus, 
 (son to iElius Verus, who delighted much in the 
 softer kind of learning, and was wont to call the 
 poet Martial his Virgil,) and Marcus Aurelius An- 
 toninus ; whereof the latter, who obscured his col- 
 league and survived him long, was named the philo- 
 sopher : who as he excelled all the rest in learning, 
 so he excelled them likewise in perfection of all 
 royal virtues ; insomuch as J alianus the emperor, in 
 his book intitled " Caesares," being as a pasquin or 
 satire to deride all his predecessors, feigned that they 
 were all invited to a banquet of the gods, and Sile- 
 nus the Jester sat at the nether end of the table, 
 and bestowed a scoff on every one as they came in ; 
 but when Marcus Philosophus came in, Silenus was 
 
SO OF THE PR0F1CIENCE AND 
 
 gravelled, and out of countenance, not knowing where 
 to carp at him, save at the last he gave a glance 
 at his patience towards his wife. And the virtue of 
 this prince, continued with that of his predecessor, 
 made the name of Antoninus so sacred in the world, 
 that though it were extremely dishonoured in Corn- 
 modus, Caracalla, and Heliogabalus, who all bore 
 the name, yet when Alexander Severus refused the 
 name, because he was a stranger to the family, the 
 Senate with one acclamation said, " Quo modo 
 Augustus, sic et Antoninus" (as Augustus, so Anto- 
 ninus). In such renown and veneration was the 
 name of these two princes in those days, that they 
 would have had it as a perpetual addition in all the 
 emperor's styles. In this emperor's times also the 
 church for the most part was in peace; so as in 
 this sequence of six princes we do see the blessed 
 effects of learning in sovereignty, painted forth in 
 the greatest table of the world 
 
 But for a tablet, or picture of smaller volume, 
 not presuming to speak of your majesty that liveth, 
 in my judgment the most excellent is that of queen 
 Elizabeth, your immediate predecessor in this part 
 of Britain; a princess that, if Plutarch were now 
 alive to write lives by parallels, would trouble him, 
 I think, to find for her a parallel amongst women. 
 This lady was endued with learning in her sex sin- 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 81 
 
 gular, and rare even amongst masculine princes; 
 whether we speak of learning, language, or of 
 science, modern or ancient, divinity or humanity: 
 and unto the very last year of her life she accus- 
 tomed to appoint set hours for reading; scarcely 
 any young student in any university more daily, or 
 more duly. As for her government, I assure myself, 
 I shall not exceed, if I do affirm that this part of 
 the island never had forty-five years of better times ; 
 and yet not through the calmness of the season, but 
 through the wisdom of her regimen. 
 
 For if there be considered of the one side, the 
 truth of religion established; the constant peace 
 and security; the good administration of justice; 
 the temperate use of the prerogative, not slackened, 
 nor much strained; the flourishing state of learning, 
 sortable to so excellent a patroness; the convenient 
 estate of wealth and means, both of crown and sub- 
 ject ; the habit of obedience, and the moderation of 
 discontents : and there be considered, on the other 
 side, the differences of religion, the troubles of 
 neighbour countries, the ambition of Spain, and op- 
 position of Rome ; and then, that she was solitary, 
 and of herself: these things, I say, considered, as 
 I could not have chosen an instance so recent and 
 so proper, so, I suppose, I could not have chosen 
 
 G 
 
82 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 one more remarkable or eminent to the purpose now 
 in hand, which is concerning the conjunction of 
 learning in the prince with felicity in the people. 
 
 Neither hath learning an influence and operation 
 only upon civil merit and moral virtue, and the arts 
 or temperature of peace and peaceable government ; 
 but likewise it hath no less power and efficacy in 
 enablement towards martial and military virtue and 
 prowess ; as may be notably represented in the ex- 
 amples of Alexander the Great, and Csesar the 
 Dictator, mentioned before, but now in fit place to 
 be resumed ; of whose virtues and acts in war there 
 needs no note or recital, having been the wonders 
 of time in that kind : but of their affections towards 
 learning, and perfections in learning, it is pertinent 
 to say somewhat- 
 Alexander was bred and taught under Aristotle 
 the great philosopher, who dedicated divers of his 
 books of philosophy unto him : he was attended 
 with Callisthenes and divers other learned persons, 
 that followed him in camp, throughout his journeys 
 and conquests. What price and estimation he had 
 learning in doth notably appear in these three par- 
 ticulars: first, in the envy he used to express that 
 he bore towards Achilles, in this, that he had so 
 good a trumpet of his praises as Homer's verses : 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 83 
 
 secondly, in the judgment or solution he gave touch- 
 ing that precious cabinet of Darius, which was 
 found amongst his jewels; whereof question was 
 made what thing was worthy to be put into it, and 
 he gave his opinion for Homer's works: thirdly, in 
 his letter to Aristotle, after he had set forth his 
 books of nature, wherein he expostulateth with him 
 for publishing the secrets or mysteries of philoso- 
 phy ; and gave him to understand that himself es- 
 teemed it more to excel other men in learning and 
 knowledge, than in power and empire. And what 
 use he had of learning doth appear, or rather shine, 
 in all his speeches and answers, being full of science 
 and use of science, and that in all variety. 
 
 And here again it may seem a thing scholastical, 
 and somewhat idle, to recite things that every man 
 knoweth ; but yet, since the argument I handle 
 leadeth me thereunto, I am glad that men shall 
 perceive I am as willing to flatter, if they will so call 
 it, an Alexander, or a Caesar, or an Antoninus, that 
 are dead many hundred years since, as any that 
 now liveth: for it is the displaying the glory of 
 learning in sovereignty that I propound to myself, 
 and not an humour of declaiming in any man's 
 praises. Observe then the speech he used of 
 Diogenes, and see if it tend not to the true state of 
 
84 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 one of the greatest questions of moral philosophy ; 
 whether the enjoying of outward things, or the con- 
 temning of them, be the greatest happiness : for 
 when he saw Diogenes so perfectly contented with 
 so little, he said to those that mocked at his condi- 
 tion ; " Were I not Alexander, I would wish to be 
 Diogenes." But Seneca inverteth it, and saith; 
 " Plus erat, quod hie nollet accipere, quam quod 
 ille posset dare" (there were more things which 
 Diogenes would have refused, than there were, 
 which Alexander could have given or enjoyed). 
 
 Observe again that speech which was usual with 
 him, " That he felt his mortality chiefly in two 
 things, sleep and lust ;" and see if it were not a 
 speech extracted out of the depth of natural philo- 
 sophy, and liker to have come out of the mouth 
 of Aristotle, or Democritus, than from Alexander. 
 
 See again that speech of humanity and poesy ; 
 when upon the bleeding of his wounds, he called 
 unto him one of his flatterers, that was wont to 
 ascribe to him divine honor, and said, " Look, this 
 is very blood ; this is not such liquor as Homer 
 speaketh of, which ran from Venus' hand, when it 
 was pierced by Diomedes." 
 
 See likewise his readiness in reprehension of 
 logic, in the speech he used to Cassander, upon a 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 85 
 
 complaint that was made against his father Anti- 
 pater : for when Alexander happened to say, " Do 
 you think these men would have come from so far 
 to complain, except they had just cause of grief?" 
 And Cassander answered, " Yea, that was the 
 matter, because they thought they should not be 
 disproved." Said Alexander laughing : " See the 
 subtilties of Aristotle, to take a matter both ways, 
 ' pro et contra/ " &c. 
 
 But note again how well he could use the same 
 art, which he reprehended, to serve his own humour ; 
 when bearing a secret grudge to Callisthenes, 
 because he was against the new ceremony of his 
 adoration, feasting one night where the same 
 Callisthenes was at the table, it was moved by some 
 after supper, for entertainment sake, that Callis- 
 thenes, who was an eloquent man, might speak of 
 some theme or purpose, at his own choice : which 
 Callisthenes did ; choosing the praise of the Mace- 
 donian nation for his discourse, and performing 
 the same with so good manner, as the hearers were 
 much ravished : whereupon Alexander, nothing 
 pleased, said, " It was easy to be eloquent upon 
 so good a subject. But/' saith he, " turn your 
 Style, and let us hear what you can say against us:" 
 which Callisthenes presently undertook, and did 
 
86 OF THE PROi'ICIENCE AND 
 
 with that sting and life, that Alexander interrupted 
 him, and said, " The goodness of the cause made 
 him eloquent before, and despite made him eloquent 
 then again." 
 
 Consider farther, for tropes of rhetoric, that 
 excellent use of a metaphor or translation, where- 
 with he taxed Antipater, who was an imperious and 
 tyrannous governor : for when one of Antipater's 
 friends commended him to Alexander for his mo- 
 deration } that he did not degenerate, as his other 
 lieutenants did, into the Persian pride in use of 
 purple, but kept the ancient habit of Macedon, 
 of black : " True," saith Alexander, " but Anti- 
 pater is all purple within." Or that other, when 
 Parmenio came to him in the plain of Arbela, and 
 shewed him the innumerable multitude of his 
 enemies, especially as they appeared by the infinite 
 number of lights, as it had been a new firmament of 
 stars, and thereupon advised him to assail them 
 by night: whereupon he answered, " That he 
 would not steal the victory." 
 
 For matter of policy, weigh that significant 
 distinction, so much in all ages embraced, that 
 he made between his two friends, Hephsestion and 
 Craterus, when he said, " That the one loved 
 Alexander, and the other loved the king :" describing 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 87 
 
 the principal difference of princes' best servants, 
 that some in affection love their person, and others 
 in duty love their crown. 
 
 Weigh also that excellent taxation of an error, 
 ordinary with counsellors of princes, that they 
 counsel their masters according to the model of 
 their own mind and fortune, and not of their 
 masters ; when, upon Darius's great offers, Parmenio 
 had said, " Surely I would accept these offers, were 
 I as Alexander ;" saith Alexander, " So would I, 
 were I as Parmenio. " 
 
 Lastly, weigh that quick and acute reply, which 
 he made when he gave so large gifts to his friends 
 and servants, and was asked what he did reserve for 
 himself, and he answered, " Hope :" weigh, I say, 
 whether he had not cast up his account right, 
 because hope must be the portion of all that 
 resolve upon great enterprises. For this was Csesar's 
 portion when he went first into Gaul, his estate 
 being then utterly overthrown with largesses. And 
 this was likewise the portion of that noble prince, 
 howsoever transported with ambition, Henry duke of 
 Guise, of whom it was usually said, that he was the 
 greatest usurer in France, because he had turned all 
 his estate into obligations. 
 
 To conclude therefore : as certain critics are 
 used to say hyperbolically, " That if all science! 
 
88 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 were lost, they might be found in Virgil;" so 
 certainly this may be said truly, there are the prints 
 and footsteps of all learning in those few speeches 
 which are reported of this prince : the admiration of 
 whom, when I consider him not as Alexander the 
 Great, but as Aristotle's scholar, hath carried me 
 too far. 
 
 As for Julius Csesar, the excellency of his 
 learning needeth not to be argued from his education, 
 or his company, or his speeches ; but in a farther 
 degree doth declare itself in his writings and 
 works ; whereof some are extant and permanent, 
 and some unfortunately perished. For, first, we 
 see, there is left unto us that excellent history of his 
 own wars, which he intitled only a commentary, 
 wherein all succeeding times have admired the solid 
 weight of matter, and the real passages and lively 
 images of actions and persons, expressed in the 
 greatest propriety of words and perspicuity of narra- 
 tion that ever was ; which that it was not the effect 
 of a natural gift, but of learning and precept, is 
 well witnessed by that work of his, intitled, " De 
 Analogia," (of Analogy), being a grammatical philo- 
 sophy, wherein he did labour to make this same 
 " vox ad placitum" (speech at pleasure) to become 
 " vox ad licitum" (regulated speech), and to reduce 
 custom of speech to congruity of speech ; and took, 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. SO 
 
 as it were, the picture of words from the life of 
 reason. 
 
 So we receive from him, as a monument both of 
 his power and learning, the then reformed computa- 
 tion of the year ; well expressing, that he took it to 
 be as great a glory to himself to observe and know 
 the law of the heavens, as to give law to men upon 
 the earth. 
 
 So likewise in that book of his, " Anti-Cato," it 
 may easily appear that he did aspire as well to 
 victory of wit as victory of war ; undertaking therein 
 a conflict against the greatest champion with the 
 pen that then lived, Cicero the orator. 
 
 So again in his book of " Apophthegms,'' which 
 he collected, we see that he esteemed it more honor 
 to make himself but a pair of tables, to take the 
 wise and pithy words of others, than to have every 
 word of his own to be made an apophthegm or 
 an oracle ; as vain princes, by custom of flattery, 
 pretend to do. And yet if I should enumerate 
 divers of his speeches, as I did those of Alexander, 
 they are truly such as Solomon noteth, when he 
 saith, " Verba sapientum tanquam aculei, et tanquam 
 clavi in altum denxi" (the words of the wise are 
 as a sharp needle, and as a nail piercing to the 
 quick) : whereof, I will only recite three, not so do- 
 
90 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 lectable for elegancy, but admirable for vigour and 
 efficacy. 
 
 As, first, it is reason he be thought a master 
 of words, that could with one word appease a 
 mutiny in his army, which was thus : The Romans, 
 when their generals did speak to their army, did 
 use the word u Milites" (soldiers), but when the 
 magistrates spake to the people, they did use the 
 word " Quirites" (people). The soldiers were in 
 tumult, and seditiously prayed to be cashiered ; not 
 that they so meant, but by expostulation thereof to 
 draw Csesar to other conditions ; wherein he being 
 resolute not to give way, after some silence, he 
 began his speech, " Ego, Quirites" (I, O people) : 
 which did admit them already cashiered ; where- 
 with they were so surprised, crossed, and confused, 
 as they would not suffer him to go on in his speech, 
 but relinquished their demands, and made it their 
 suit to be again called by the name of " Milites. " 
 
 The second speech was thus : Csesar did ex- 
 tremely affect the name of king ; and some were set 
 on, as he passed by, in popular acclamation to 
 salute him king ; whereupon, finding the cry weak 
 and poor, he put it off thus, in a kind of jest, as if 
 they had mistaken his surname ; " Non rex sum, 
 sed Caesar" (I am not king, but Csesar) ; a speech, 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 91 
 
 that if it be searched, the life and fulness of it can 
 scarce be expressed : for, first, it was a refusal of 
 the name, but yet not serious : again, it did signify 
 an infinite confidence and magnanimity, as if he 
 presumed Csesar was the greater title ; as by his 
 worthiness it is come to pass till this day : but 
 chiefly it was a speech of great allurement toward 
 his own purpose ; as if the state did strive with him 
 but for a name, whereof mean families were vested ; 
 for Rex was a surname with the Romans, as well as 
 King is with us. 
 
 The last speech which I will mention, was used 
 to Metellus ; when Caesar, after war declared, did 
 possess himself of the city of Rome ; at which time 
 entering into the inner treasury to take the money 
 there accumulated, Metellus, being tribune, forbade 
 him : whereto Caesar said, " That if he did not 
 desist, he would lay him dead in the place. " And 
 presently taking himself up, he added, " Adolescens, 
 durius est mihi hoc dicere quam facere" (young 
 man, it is harder for me to speak it, than to do it). 
 A speech compounded of the greatest terror and 
 greatest clemency that could proceed out of the 
 mouth of man. 
 
 But to return, and conclude with him : it is 
 evident, himself knew well his own perfection in 
 learning, and took it upon him ; as appeared when. 
 
92 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 upon occasion that some spake what a strange reso- 
 lution it was in Lucius Sylla to resign his dictature ; 
 he scoffing at him, to his own advantage, answered, 
 " That Sylla could not skill of letters, and therefore 
 knew not how to dictate." 
 
 And here it were fit to leave this point, touching 
 the concurrence of military virtue and learning, for 
 what example would come with any grace after 
 those two of Alexander and Csesar ? were it not in 
 regard of the rareness of circumstance, that I find 
 in one particular, as that which did so suddenly 
 pass from extreme scorn to extreme wonder ; and it 
 is of Xenophon the philosopher, who went from 
 Socrates' school into Asia, in the expedition of 
 Cyrus the younger, against king Artaxerxes. This 
 Xenophon at that time was very young, and never 
 had seen the wars before ; neither had any command 
 in the army, but only followed the war as a volun- 
 tary, for the love and conversation of Proxenus his 
 friend. He was present when Falinus came in 
 message from the great king to the Grecians, after 
 that Cyrus was slain in the field, and they a handful 
 of men left to themselves in the midst of the king's 
 territories, cut off from their country by many navi- 
 gable rivers, and many hundred miles. The message 
 imported, that they should deliver up their arms, 
 and submit themselves to the king's mercy To 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 93 
 
 which message before answer was made, divers of 
 the army conferred familiarly with Falinus : and 
 amongst the rest Xenophon happened to say, 
 " Why, Falinus, we have now but these two things 
 left, our arms and our virtue ! and if we yield up 
 our arms, how shall we make use of our virtue ?" 
 Whereto Falinus, smiling on him, said, " If I be 
 not deceived, young gentleman, you are an Athenian, 
 and, I believe, you study philosophy, and it is 
 pretty that you say ; but you are much abused, if 
 you think your virtue can withstand the king's 
 power/' Here w T as the scorn : the wonder followed ; 
 which was, that this young scholar, or philosopher, 
 after all the captains were murdered in parley by 
 treason, conducted those ten thousand foot, through 
 the heart of all the king's high countries, from 
 Babylon to Grsecia in safety, in despite of all the 
 king's forces, to the astonishment of the w r orld, and 
 the encouragement of the Grecians in time succeed- 
 ing to make invasion upon the kings of Persia ; as 
 was after purposed by Jason the Thessalian, at- 
 tempted by Agesilaus the Spartan, and achieved 
 by Alexander the Macedonian, all upon the ground 
 of the act of that young scholar. 
 
 To proceed now from imperial and military 
 virtue to moral and private virtue : first, it is an 
 assured truth, which is contained in the verses: 
 
94 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 u Scilicet ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes, 
 Emollit mores, nee sinit esse feros." 
 It taketh away the wildness and barbarism and 
 fierceness of men's minds : but indeed the accent 
 had need be upon " fideliter : M for a little superficial 
 learning doth rather work a contrary effect. It 
 taketh away all levity, temerity, and insolency, 
 by copious suggestion of all doubts and difficulties, 
 and acquainting the mind to balance reasons on 
 both sides, and to turn back the first offers and con- 
 ceits of the mind, and to accept of nothing but 
 examined and tried. It taketh away vain admiration 
 of any thing, which is the root of all weakness : for 
 all things are admired, either because they are new, 
 or because they are great. For novelty, no man 
 that wadeth in learning or contemplation throughly, 
 but will find that printed in his heart " Nil novi 
 super terrain" (there is nothing new upon the earth). 
 Neither can any man marvel at the play of puppets, 
 that goeth behind the curtain, and adviseth well of 
 the motion. And for magnitude, as Alexander the 
 Great, after that he was used to great armies, and 
 the great conquests of the spacious provinces in 
 Asia, when he received letters out of Greece, of 
 some fights and services there, which were com- 
 monly for a passage or a fort or some walled town at 
 the most, he said, " It seemed to him, that he was 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 93 
 
 advertised of the battle of the frogs and the mice, 
 that the old tales went of." So certainly, if a man 
 meditate upon the universal frame of nature, the 
 earth with men upon it, the divineness of souls 
 excepted, will not seem much other than an ant- 
 hill, whereas some ants carry corn, and some carry 
 their young, and some go empty, and all to-and- 
 fro a little heap of dust. It taketh away or miti- 
 gateth fear of death, or adverse fortune ; which is 
 one of the greatest impediments of virtue, and im- 
 perfections of manners. For if a man's mind be 
 deeply seasoned with the consideration of the mor- 
 tality and corruptible nature of things, he will easily 
 concur with Epictetus, who went forth one day 
 and saw a woman weeping for her pitcher of earth 
 that was broken ; and went forth the next day, and 
 saw a woman weeping for her son that was dead ; 
 and thereupon said, u Heri vidi fragilem frangi, 
 hodie vidi mortalem mori" (yesterday I saw the 
 brittle broken — to-day I saw the mortal dead). 
 And therefore Virgil did excellently and profoundly 
 couple the knowledge of cause and the conquest 
 of all fears together, as u concomitantia" (con- 
 comitants). 
 
 l> Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas, 
 Quique metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum 
 Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari'* 
 
96 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 (Happy the man, whose vigorous soul can pierce 
 Through the formation of this universe ! 
 Who nobly dares despise, with soul sedate, 
 The din of Acheron, and vulgar fears, and fate). 
 It were too long to go over the particular 
 remedies which learning doth minister to all the 
 diseases of the mind ; sometimes purging the ill- 
 humours, sometimes opening the obstructions, some- 
 times helping digestion, sometimes increasing ap- 
 petite, sometimes healing the wounds and exulcera- 
 tions thereof, and the like ; and therefore I will 
 conclude with that which hath " rationem to this" (the 
 greater reason of all), which is, that it disposeth the 
 constitution of the mind not to be fixed or settled in 
 the defects thereof, but still to be capable and sus- 
 ceptible of growth and reformation. For the un- 
 learned man knows not what it is to descend into 
 himself, or to call himself to account ; nor the 
 pleasure of that " suavissima vita, indies sentire se 
 fieri meliorem" (that most pleasant life, to feel 
 himself daily growing better). The good parts he 
 hath he will learn to shew to the full, and use them 
 dexterously, but not much to increase them : the 
 faults he hath he will learn how to hide and colour 
 them, but not much to amend them : like an ill 
 mower, that mows on still, and never whets his 
 scythe. Whereas with the learned man it fares 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 97 
 
 otherwise, that he doth ever intermix the correction 
 and amendment of his mind with the use and em- 
 ployment thereof. Nay farther, in general and 
 in sum, certain it is that " Veritas" (truth) and 
 " bonitas" (goodness) differ but as the seal and the 
 print : for truth prints goodness ; and they be the 
 clouds of error which descend in the storms of 
 passions and perturbations. 
 
 From moral virtue let us pass on to matter of 
 power and commandment, and consider whether in 
 right reason there be any comparable with that, 
 wherewith knowledge investeth and crowneth man's 
 nature. We see the dignity of the commandment 
 is according to the dignity of the commanded : 
 to have commandment over beasts, as herdmen have, 
 is a thing contemptible ; to have commandment over 
 children, as schoolmasters have, is a matter of small 
 honor ; to have commandment over galley-slaves is 
 a disparagement rather than an honor. Neither 
 is the commandment of tyrants much better, over 
 people which have put off the generosity of their 
 minds : and therefore it was ever holden, that 
 honors in free monarchies and commonwealths had a 
 sweetness more than in tyrannies, because the com- 
 mandment extendeth more over the wills of men, 
 and not only over their deeds and services. And 
 therefore, when Virgil puttcth himself forth to 
 
 li 
 
9S OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 attribute to Augustus Csesar the best of human 
 honors, he doth it in these words : 
 
 " victorque volentes 
 Per populos dat jura, viamque affectat Olympo" 
 (To all the willing world new laws decrees ; 
 And ardent presses on, th' Olympic heights to seize). 
 But yet the commandment of knowledge is higher 
 than the commandment over the will ; for it is a 
 commandment over the reason, belief, and under- 
 standing of man, which is the highest part of the 
 mind, and giveth law to the will itself: for there 
 is no power on earth which setteth up a throne or 
 chair of state in the spirits and souls of men, and 
 in their cogitations, imaginations, opinions, and 
 beliefs, but knowledge and learning. And there- 
 fore we see the detestable and extreme pleasure 
 that arch-heretics, and false prophets, and impostors 
 are transported with, when they once find in them- 
 selves that they have a superiority in the faith and 
 conscience of men ; so great, as, if they have once 
 tasted of it, it is seldom seen that any torture or 
 persecution can make them relinquish or abandon 
 it. But as this is that which the author of the " Reve- 
 lation" calleth the depth or profoundness " of 
 Satan ;" so by argument of contraries, the just and 
 lawful sovereignty over men's understanding, by 
 force of truth rightly interpreted, is that which 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, 99 
 
 approacheth nearest to the similitude of the divine 
 rule. 
 
 As for fortune and advancement, the beneficence 
 of learning is not so confined to give fortune only to 
 states and commonwealths, as it doth not likewise 
 give fortune to particular persons. For it was well 
 noted long ago, that Homer hath given more men 
 their livings, than either Sylla, or Csesar, or Augus- 
 tus ever did, notwithstanding their great largesses 
 and donatives, and distributions of lands to so many 
 legions ; and no doubt it is hard to say, whether 
 arms or learning have advanced greater numbers. 
 And in case of sovereignty we see, that if arms 
 or descent have carried away the kingdom, yet 
 learning hath carried the priesthood, which ever 
 hath been in some competition with empire. 
 
 Again, for the pleasure and delight of know- 
 ledge and learning, it far surpasseth all other in 
 nature : for, shall the pleasures of the affections 
 so exceed the senses, as much as the obtaining 
 of desire or victory exceed eth a song or a dinner ; 
 and must not, of consequence, the pleasures of the 
 intellect or understanding exceed the pleasures of 
 the affections ? We see in all other pleasures there 
 is satiety, and after they be used, their verdure 
 departeth ; which sheweth well they be but deceits 
 of pleasure, and not pleasures: and that it was the 
 
100 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 novelty which pleased, and not the quality : and 
 therefore we see that voluptuous men turn friars, 
 and ambitious princes turn melancholy. But of 
 knowledge there is no satiety, but satisfaction and 
 appetite are perpetually interchangeable ; and there- 
 fore appeareth to be good in itself simply, without 
 fallacy or accident. Neither is that pleasure of 
 small efficacy and contentment to the mind of man, 
 which the poet Lucretius describeth elegantly, 
 "' Suave mari magno, turban tibus sequora ventis," &c. 
 " It is a view of delight,'* saith he, " to stand or 
 walk upon the shore side, and to see a ship tossed 
 with tempest upon the sea ; or to be in a fortified 
 tower, and to see two battles join upon a plain ; 
 but it is a pleasure incomparable, for the mind of man 
 to be settled, landed, and fortified in the certainty 
 of truth ; and from thence to descry and behold the 
 errors, perturbations, labours, and wanderings up 
 and down of other men." 
 
 Lastly ; leaving the vulgar arguments, that by 
 learning man excelleth man in that wherein man 
 excelleth beasts ; that by learning man ascendeth 
 to the heavens and their motions, where in body he 
 cannot come, and the like : let us conclude with the 
 dignity and excellency of knowledge and learning 
 in that whereunto man's nature doth most aspire, 
 which is, immortality or continuance : for to this 
 
ADVANCEMLNT 01 LEARNING. 101 
 
 tendeth generation, and raising of houses and 
 families ; to this buildings, foundations, and monu- 
 ments ; to this tendeth the desire of memory, fame 
 and celebration, and in effect the strength of all 
 other human desires. We see then how far the 
 monuments of wit and learning are more durable 
 than the monuments of power, or of the hands. 
 For have not the verses of Homer continued twenty- 
 five hundred years, or more, without the loss of a 
 syllable or letter ; during which time, infinite 
 palaces, temples, castles, cities, have been decayed 
 and demolished ? It is not possible to have the true 
 pictures or statues of Cyrus, Alexander, Csesar ; 
 no, nor of the kings or great personages of much 
 later years ; for the originals cannot last, and the 
 copies cannot but lose of the life and truth. But 
 the images of men's wits and knowledges remain in 
 books, exempted from the wrong of time, and 
 capable of perpetual renovation. Neither are they 
 fitly to be called images, because they generate still, 
 and cast their seeds in the minds of others, pro- 
 voking and causing infinite actions and opinions in 
 succeeding ages : so that, if the invention of the 
 ship was thought so noble, which carrieth riches and 
 commodities from place to place, and consociateth the 
 most remote regions in participation of their fruits; 
 how much more are letters to be magnified, which, 
 
102 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 as ships, pass through the vast seas of time, and 
 make ages so distant to participate of the wisdom, 
 illuminations, and inventions, the one of the other ? 
 Nay farther, we see, some of the philosophers which 
 were least divine, and most immersed in the senses, 
 and denied generally the immortality of the soul ; 
 yet came to this point, that whatsoever motions the 
 spirit of man could act and perform without the 
 organs of the body, they thought, might remain 
 after death, which were only those of the under- 
 standing, and not of the affections; so immortal 
 and incorruptible a thing did knowledge seem unto 
 them to be. But we, that know by divine revela- 
 tion, that not only the understanding but the affec- 
 tions purified, not only the spirit but the body 
 changed, shall be advanced to immortality, do dis- 
 claim these rudiments of the senses. But it must 
 be remembered both in this last point, and so it 
 may likewise be needful in other places, that in pro- 
 bation of the dignity of knowledge or learning, I 
 did in the beginning separate divine testimony from 
 human, which method I have pursued, and so 
 handled them both apart. 
 
 Nevertheless, I do not pretend, and I know it 
 will be impossible for me, by any pleading of mine, 
 to reverse the judgment, either of iEsop's cock, that 
 preferred the barleycorn before the gem; or of 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 103 
 
 Midas, that being chosen judge between Apollo pre-' 
 
 sident of the Muses, and Pan god of the flocks, 
 
 judged for plenty; or of Paris, that judged for 
 
 beauty and love against wisdom and power; or of 
 
 Agrippina, "occidatmatrem, modo imperet" (let him 
 
 kill his mother, so he may reign), that preferred 
 
 empire with condition never so detestable ; or of 
 
 Ulysses, " qui vetulam prsetulit immortalitati" (who 
 
 preferred an old woman to immortality), being a 
 
 figure of those which prefer custom and habit before 
 
 all excellency ; or of a number of the like popular 
 
 judgments. For these things continue as they 
 
 have been : but so will that also continue whereupon 
 
 learning hath ever relied, and which faileth not : 
 
 « justificata est Sapientia a filiis suis" (Wisdom is 
 
 justified of her children). 
 
OF 
 THE PROFICIENCE 
 AND ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, 
 DIVINE AND HUMAN. 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 TO THE KING. 
 
 It might seem to have more convenience, though it 
 come often otherwise to pass, excellent king, that 
 those, which are fruitful in their generations, and 
 have in themselves the foresight of immortality in 
 their descendants, should likewise be more careful of 
 the good estate of future times, unto which they 
 know they must transmit and commend over their 
 dearest pledges. Queen Elizabeth was a sojourner 
 in the world, in respect of her unmarried life, and 
 was a blessing to her own times ; and yet so as the 
 impression of her good government, besides her 
 happy memory, is not without some effect which 
 doth survive her. But to your majesty, whom God 
 bath already blessed with so much royal issue, 
 worthy to continue and represent you for ever ; and 
 whose youthful and fruitful bed doth yet promise 
 
106 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 many the like renovations ; it is proper and agree- 
 able to be conversant, not only in the transitory parts 
 of good government, but in those acts also which are 
 in their nature permanent and perpetual : amongst 
 the which, if affection do not transport me, there is 
 not any more worthy than the farther endowment of 
 the world with sound and fruitful knowledge. For 
 why should a few received authors stand up like 
 Hercules's columns, beyond which there should be 
 no sailing or discovering, since we have so bright 
 and benign a star as your majesty, to conduct and 
 prosper us ? To return therefore where we left, 
 it remaineth to consider of what kind those acts 
 are, which have been undertaken and performed by 
 kings and others for the increase and advancement 
 of learning : wherein I purpose to speak actively 
 without digressing or dilating. 
 
 Let this ground therefore be laid, that all works 
 are overcome by amplitude of reward, by soundness 
 of direction, and by the conjunction of labours. 
 The first multiplieth endeavour, the second pre- 
 venteth error, and the third supplieth the frailty of 
 man ; but the principal of these is direction : for 
 " claudus in via antevertit cursorem extra viam" 
 (the lame in the right course outstrips the swift 
 who has left the way) ; and Solomon excellently 
 setteth it down, " If the iron be not sharp, it 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 107 
 
 requireth more strength ; but wisdom is that which 
 prevaileth :" signifying that the invention or election 
 of the mean is more effectual than any inforcement or 
 accumulation of endeavours. This I am induced to 
 speak, for that (not derogating from the noble in- 
 tention of any that have been deservers towards the 
 
 e of learning) I do observe, nevertheless, that 
 their works and acts are rather matters of magni- 
 ficence and memory, than of progression and pro- 
 ricience ; and tend rather to augment the mass 
 of learning in the multitude of learned men, than to 
 rectify or raise the sciences themselves. 
 
 The works or acts of merit towards learning are 
 conversant about three objects : the places of 
 learning, the books of learning, and the persons 
 of the learned. For as water, whether it be the 
 dew of heaven, or the springs of the earth, doth 
 scatter and lose itself in the ground, except it be 
 collected into some receptacle, where it may by 
 •i n ion comfort and sustain itself, (and for that cause 
 the industry of man hath made and framed spring- 
 heads, conduits, cisterns, and pools, which men have 
 
 istomed likewise to beautify and adorn with 
 ishments of magnificence and state, as well 
 
 of use and m i • ssity) so this excellent liquor 
 
 ;no w ledge, whether it descend from divine in- 
 spiration, or spring from human sense, uould soon 
 
108 Or THE PROIICIENCE AND 
 
 perish and vanish to oblivion, if it were not preserved 
 in books, traditions, conferences, and places ap- 
 pointed, as universities, colleges, and schools, for 
 the receipt and comforting of the same. 
 
 The works which concern the seats and places of 
 learning are four ; foundations and buildings, en- 
 dowments with revenues, endowments with fran- 
 chises and privileges, institutions and ordinances for 
 government; all tending to quietness and private- 
 ness of life, and discharge of cares and troubles ; 
 much like the stations which Virgil prescribeth for 
 the hiving of bees : 
 
 " Principio sedes apibus statioque petenda, 
 
 Quo neque sit ventis aditus," &c. 
 
 (First, for your bees a sheltered station find, 
 
 Impervious to the gusts of rushing wind). 
 
 The works touching books are two ; first libra- 
 ries, which are as the shrines where all the relics of 
 the ancient saints, full of true virtue, and that 
 without delusion or imposture, are preserved and 
 reposed : secondly, new editions of authors, with 
 more correct impressions, more faithful translations, 
 more profitable glosses, more diligent annotations, 
 and the like. 
 
 The works pertaining to the persons of learned 
 men, besides the advancement and countenancing of 
 them in general, are two : the reward and designa- 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 109 
 
 tion of readers in sciences already extant and 
 invented ; and the reward and designation of writers 
 and inquirers concerning any parts of learning not 
 sufficiently laboured and prosecuted. 
 
 These are summarily the works and acts, where- 
 in the merits of many excellent princes and other 
 worthy personages have been conversant. As for 
 any particular commemorations, I call to mind what 
 Cicero said, when he gave general thanks ; " Diffi- 
 cile non aliquem, ingratum quenquam prseterire" 
 (it would be difficult to name all, and ungrateful 
 to omit one). Let us rather, according to the Scrip- 
 tures, look unto that part of the race which is before 
 us, than look back to that which is already attained. 
 
 First, therefore, amongst so many great founda- 
 tions of colleges in Europe, I find strange that they 
 are all dedicated to professions, and none left free 
 to arts and sciences at large. For if men judge 
 that learning should be referred to action, they 
 judge well ; but in this they fall into the error 
 described in the ancient fable, in which the other 
 parts of the body did suppose the stomach had been 
 idle, because it neither performed the office of mo- 
 tion, as the limbs do, nor of sense, as the head 
 doth ; but yet, notwithstanding, it is the stomach 
 that digesteth and distributeth to all the rest: so if 
 any man think philosophy and universality to be 
 
110 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 idle studies, he doth not consider that all profes- 
 sions are from thence served and supplied. And 
 this I take to be a great cause that hath hindered the 
 progression of learning, because these fundamental 
 knowledges have been studied but in passage. For 
 if you will have a tree bear more fruit than it hath 
 used to do, it is not any thing you can do to the 
 boughs, but it is the stirring of the earth, and 
 putting new mould about the roots, that must work 
 it. Neither is it to be forgotten, that this dedicating 
 of foundations and donations to professory learning 
 hath not only had a malign aspect and influence 
 upon the growth of sciences, but hath also been pre- 
 judicial to states and governments. For hence it pro- 
 ceedeth that princes find a solitude in regard of able 
 men to serve them in causes of state, because there 
 is no education collegiate which is free ; where such 
 as were so disposed might give themselves to histo- 
 ries, modern languages, books of policy and civil 
 discourse, and other the like enablements unto 
 service of state. 
 
 And because founders of colleges do plant, and 
 founders of lectures do water, it followeth well in order 
 to speak of the defect which is in public lectures ; 
 namely, in the smallness and meanness of the salary 
 or reward which in most places is assigned unto 
 them ; whether they be lectures of arts, or of pro- 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. Ill 
 
 fessions. For it is necessary to the progression 
 of sciences that readers be of the most able and suf- 
 ficient men, as those which are ordained for gene- 
 rating and propagating of sciences, and not for 
 transitory use. This cannot be, except their condi- 
 tion and endowment be such as may content the 
 ablest man to appropriate his whole labour, and 
 continue his whole age in that function and at- 
 tendance ; and therefore must have a proportion 
 answerable to that mediocrity or competency of 
 advancement, which may be expected from a 
 profession or the practice of a profession. So as, 
 if you will have sciences flourish, you must observe 
 David's military law, which was, " That those which 
 staid with the " carriage should have equal part 
 with those which were in the action ;" else will the 
 carriages be ill attended. So readers in sciences 
 are indeed the guardians of the stores and provi- 
 sions of sciences, whence men in active courses 
 are furnished, and therefore ought to have equal 
 entertainment with them ; otherwise if the fathers 
 in sciences be of the weakest sort, or be ill- 
 maintained, 
 
 " Et patrum invalidi referent jejunia nati" 
 (From feeble fathers spring imbecile sons). 
 Another defect I note, wherein I shall need some 
 alchemist to help me, who call upon men to Bell 
 
ll c 2 01' THE PROJETCIENCE AND 
 
 their books, and to build furnaces, quitting and for- 
 saking Minerva and the Muses as barren virgins, 
 and relying upon Vulcan. But certain it is, that 
 unto the deep, fruitful, and operative study of many 
 sciences, especially natural philosophy and physic, 
 books be not the only instrumentals ; wherein also 
 the beneficence of men hath not been altogether 
 wanting : for we see spheres, globes, astrolabes, 
 maps, and the like, have been provided as appurte- 
 nances to astronomy and cosmography, as well as 
 books ; we see likewise that some places instituted 
 for physic have annexed the commodity of gardens 
 for simples of all sorts, and do likewise command 
 the use of dead bodies for anatomies. But these do 
 respect but a few things. In general, there will 
 hardly be any main ^proficience in the disclosing 
 of nature, except there be some allowance for ex- 
 penses about experimer ; whether they be experi- 
 ments appertaining to Vulcanus or Daedalus, furnace 
 or engine, or any other kind; and therefore as 
 secretaries and spials of princes and states bring in 
 bills for intelligence, so you must allow the spials 
 and intelligencers of nature to bring in their bills, 
 else you shall be ill advertised. 
 
 And if Alexander made such a liberal assigna- 
 tion to Aristotle of treasure for the allowance of 
 hunters, fowlers, fishers, and the like, that he 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 113 
 
 might compile an history of nature, much better do 
 they deserve it that travail in arts of nature. 
 
 Another defect which I note, as an intermission 
 or neglect, in those which are governors in universi- 
 ties, of consultation; and in princes or superior 
 persons, of visitation : to enter into account and 
 consideration, whether the readings, exercises, and 
 other customs appertaining unto learning, anciently 
 begun, and since continued, be well instituted or no; 
 and thereupon to ground an amendment or reforma- 
 tion in that which shall be found inconvenient. 
 For it is one of your majesty's own most wise and 
 princely maxims, " That in all usages and pre- 
 cedents, the times be considered wherein they first 
 began ; which, if they were weak or ignorant, it dero- 
 gateth from the authority of the usage, and leaveth 
 it for suspect. " And therefore inasmuch as most 
 of the usages and orders of the universities were 
 derived from more obsctl. times, it is the more 
 requisite they be re-examined. In this kind I will 
 give an instance or two, for. example sake, of things 
 that are the most obvious and familiar : the one is a 
 matter, which though it be ancient and general, yet 
 I hold it to be an error ; which is, that scholars in 
 universities come too soon and too unripe to logic 
 and rhetoric, arts fitter for graduates than children 
 and novices : for these two, rightly taken, are the 
 
 i 
 
114 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 gravest of sciences, being the arts of arts ; the one 
 for judgment, the other for ornament ; and they be 
 the rules and directions how to set forth and dispose 
 matter ; and therefore for minds empty and un- 
 fraught with matter, and which have not gathered 
 that which Cicero calleth " sylva" and " supellex/ 
 stuff and variety, to begin with those arts, (as if one 
 should learn to weigh, or to measure, or to paint the 
 wind), doth work but this effect, that the wisdom of 
 those arts, which is great and universal, is almost 
 made contemptible, and is degenerate into childish 
 sophistry and ridiculous affectation. And farther, 
 the untimely learning of them hath drawn on, by 
 consequence, the superficial and unprofitable teach- 
 ing and writing of them, as fittest indeed to the ca- 
 pacity of children. Another is a lack I find in the 
 exercises used in the universities, which do make too 
 great a divorce between invention and memory ; for 
 their speeches are either premeditate, " in verbis 
 conceptis" (in set words), where nothing is left to 
 invention ; or merely extemporal, where little is left 
 to memory; whereas in life and action there is 
 least use of either of these, but rather of intermix- 
 tures of premeditation and invention, notes and 
 memory ; so as the exercise fitteth not the practice, 
 nor the image the life : and it is ever a true rule in 
 exercises, that they be framed as near as may be to 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 115 
 
 the life of practice, for otherwise they do pervert 
 the motions and faculties of the mind, and not 
 prepare them. The truth whereof is not obscure, 
 when scholars come to the practices of professions, 
 or other actions of civil life ; which when they 
 set into, this want is soon found by themselves, and 
 sooner by others. But this part, touching the 
 amendment of the institutions and orders of universi- 
 ties, I will conclude with the clause of Caesar's letter 
 to Oppius and Balbus, " Hoc quemadmodum fieri 
 possit, nonnulla mihi in mentem veniunt, et multa 
 reperiri possunt ; de iis rebus rogo vos ut cogita- 
 tionem suscipiatis" (how these things may be done, 
 somewhat comes into my mind, and more may be 
 discovered : I pray you to take these things into 
 your consideration). 
 
 Another defect, which I note, ascendeth a little 
 higher than the preceding ; for as the proficience of 
 learning consisteth much in the orders and institu- 
 tions of universities in the same states and kingdoms, 
 so it would be yet more advanced, if there were 
 more mutual intelligence between the universities of 
 Europe than now there is. We see there be many 
 orders and foundations, which though they be di- 
 vided under several sovereignties and territories, yet 
 they take themselves to have a kind of contract, fra- 
 ternity, and correspondence one with the other, inso- 
 
1 16* O F T li E P HO F 1 C I E N C E A N D 
 
 much as they have provincials and generals. And 
 surely, as nature createth brotherhood in families, 
 and arts mechanical contract brotherhoods in com- 
 monalties, and the anointment of God superinduceth 
 a brotherhood in kings and bishops ; so in like 
 manner there cannot but be a fraternity in learning 
 and illumination, relating to that fraternity which is 
 attributed to God, who is called the Father of illu- 
 minations or lights. 
 
 The last defect which I will note is, that there 
 hath not been, or very rarely been, any public de- 
 signation of writers or inquirers concerning such 
 parts of knowledge as may appear not to have been 
 already sufficiently laboured or undertaken; unto 
 which point it is an inducement to enter into a view 
 and examination what parts of learning have been 
 prosecuted, and what omitted: for the opinion of 
 plenty is amongst the causes of want, and the great 
 quantity of books maketh a shew rather of super- 
 fluity than lack ; which surcharge, nevertheless, 
 is not to be remedied by making no more books, 
 but by making more good books, which, as the 
 serpent of Moses, might devour the serpents of the 
 enchanters. 
 
 The removing of all the defects formerly enu- 
 merated, except the last, and of the active part also 
 of the last, (which is the designation of writers), are. 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 117 
 
 " opera basilica" (princely works) ; towards which 
 the endeavours of a private man may be but as 
 an image in a crossway, that may point at the way, 
 but cannot go it : but the inducing part of the 
 latter, which is the survey of learning, may be set 
 forward by private travel. Wherefore I will now 
 attempt to make a general and faithful perambula- 
 tion of learning, with an inquiry what parts thereof 
 lie fresh and waste, and not improved and converted 
 by the industry of man ; to the end that such a plot, 
 made and recorded to memory, may both minister 
 light to any public designation, and also serve to 
 excite voluntary endeavours : wherein, nevertheless, 
 my purpose is at this time to note only omissions 
 and deficiencies, and not to make any redargution of 
 errors, or incomplete prosecutions ; for it is one 
 thing to set forth what ground lieth unmanured, and 
 another thing to correct ill husbandry in that which 
 is manured. 
 
 In the handling and undertaking of which work 
 1 am not ignorant what it is that I do now move 
 and attempt, nor insensible of mine own weakness 
 to sustain my purpose ; but my hope is that, if my 
 extreme love to learning carry me too far, I may 
 obtain the excuse of affection; for that " it is not 
 granted to man to love and to be wise." But, I 
 know well, I can use no other liberty of judgment 
 
US OF THE PRQITICIENCE AND 
 
 than I must leave to others ; and 1, for my part, 
 shall be indifferently glad either to perform myself, 
 or accept from another, that duty of humanity; 
 " Nam qui erranti comiter monstrat viam," &c. (for 
 it is courteous to direct those that err). I do 
 foresee, likewise, that of those things which I shall 
 enter and register as deficiencies and omissions, 
 many will conceive and censure that some of them 
 are already done and extant ; others to be but curio- 
 sities, and things of no great use ; and others to be 
 of too great difficulty, and almost impossibility to be 
 compassed and effected : but for the two first, I 
 refer myself to the particulars ; for the last, touch- 
 ing impossibility, I take it those things are to be 
 held possible which may be done by some person' 
 though not by every one ; and which may be done 
 by many, though not by any one ; and which may 
 be done in succession of ages, though not within 
 the hourglass of one man's life ; and which may be 
 done by public designation, though not by private 
 endeavour. 
 
 But, notwithstanding, if any man will take to 
 himself rather that of Solomon, " Dicit piger, Leo 
 est in via" (the sluggard saith, there is a lion in the 
 way), than that of Virgil, " Possunt, quia posse 
 videntur" (they are able, because they seem to 
 be able) ; I shall be content that my labours be 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 119 
 
 esteemed but as the better sort of wishes ; for as it 
 asketh some knowledge to demand a question not 
 impertinent, so it requireth some sense to make 
 a wish not absurd. 
 
 The parts of human learning have reference 
 to the three parts of Man's Understanding, which is 
 the seat of learning : History to his Memory, Poesy 
 to his Imagination, and Philosophy to his Reason. 
 Divine learning receiveth the same distribution ; for 
 the spirit of man is the same, though the revelation 
 of oracle and sense be diverse : so as theology con- 
 sisteth also of history of the church ; of parables, 
 which is divine poesy ; and of holy doctrine or 
 precept : for as for that part which seemeth super- 
 numerary, which is prophecy, it is but divine his- 
 tory ; which hath that prerogative over human, 
 as the narration may be before the fact as well 
 as after. 
 
 History is " Natural, Civil, Ecclesiastical, and 
 Literary ;" whereof the three first I allow as extant, 
 the fourth I note as deficient. For no man hath 
 propounded to himself the general state of learning 
 to be described and represented from age to age, as 
 many have done the works of nature, and the state 
 civil and ecclesiastical ; without which the history 
 of the world seemeth to me to be as the statue of 
 Polyphemus with his eye out; that part being 
 
V20 OF THE PROF1CIENCE AND 
 
 wanting which doth most shew the spirit and life of 
 the person : and yet I am not ignorant that in 
 divers particular sciences, as of the jurisconsults) 
 the mathematicians, the rhetoricians, the philoso- 
 pherSj there are set down some small memorials of 
 the schools, authors, and books ; and so likewise 
 some barren relations touching the invention of arts 
 or usages. 
 
 But a just story of learning, containing the anti- 
 quities and originals of knowledges and their sects, 
 their inventions, their traditions, their diverse ad- 
 ministrations and managings, their flourishings, their 
 oppositions, decays, depressions, oblivions, removes, 
 with the causes and occasions of them, and all 
 other events concerning learning, throughout the 
 ages of the world, I may truly affirm to be wanting. 
 
 The use and end of which work I do not so 
 much design for curiosity, or satisfaction of those 
 that are the lovers of learning, but chiefly for a 
 more serious and grave purpose ; which is this, in 
 few words, that it will make learned men wise in the 
 use and administration of learning. For it is not 
 St. Augustine's nor St. Ambrose's works that will 
 make so wise a divine as ecclesiastical history tho- 
 roughly read and observed ; and the same reason 
 is of learning. 
 
 History of " Nature" is of three sorts ; of nature 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 121 
 
 in course, of nature erring or varying, and of na- 
 ture altered or wrought ; that is, history of crea- 
 tures, history of marvels, and history of arts. 
 
 The first of these, no doubt, is extant, and that 
 in good perfection ; the two latter are handled so 
 weakly and unprofitably, as I am moved to note 
 them as deficient. 
 
 For I find no sufficient or competent collection 
 of the works of nature which have a digression 
 and deflexion from the ordinary course of genera- 
 tions, productions, and motions ; whether they be 
 singularities of place and region, or the strange 
 events of time and chance, or the effects of yet un- 
 known properties, or the instances of exception to 
 general kinds : it is true, I find a number of books 
 of fabulous experiments and secrets, and frivolous 
 impostures for pleasure and strangeness ; but a 
 substantial and severe collection of the heteroclites 
 or irregulars of nature, well examined and de- 
 scribed, I find not, especially not with due rejec- 
 tion of fables and popular errors: for as things 
 now are, if an untruth in nature be once on foot, 
 what by reason of the neglect of examination, and 
 countenance of antiquity, and what by reason of 
 the use of opinion in similitudes and ornaments of 
 speech, it is never called down. 
 
 The use of this work, honoured with a prece- 
 
l c Z2 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 dent in Aristotle, is nothing less than to give con- 
 tentment to the appetite of curious and vain wits, 
 as the manner of mirabilaries is to do; but for 
 two reasons, both of great weight ; the one, to cor- 
 rect the partiality of axioms and opinions, which 
 are commonly framed only upon common and fa- 
 miliar examples ; the other, because from the 
 wonders of nature is the nearest intelligence and 
 passage towards the wonders of art : for it is no 
 more but by following, and as it were hounding 
 nature in her wanderings, to be able to lead her 
 afterwards to the same place again. 
 
 Neither am I of opinion, in this history of 
 marvels, that superstitious narrations of sorceries, 
 witchcrafts, dreams, divinations, and the like, where 
 there is an assurance and clear evidence of the 
 fact, be altogether excluded. For it is not yet 
 known in what cases and how far effects attributed 
 to superstition do participate of natural causes : 
 and therefore howsoever the practice of such 
 things is to be condemned, yet from the specula- 
 tion and consideration of them light may be taken, 
 not only for the discerning of the offences, but for 
 the farther disclosing of nature. Neither ought a 
 man to make scruple of entering into these things 
 for inquisition of truth, as your majesty hath shewed 
 in your own example ; who with the two clear eyes 
 
ADVANCEMENT O* LEARNING. I £3 
 
 of religion and natural philosophy have looked 
 deeply and wisely into these shadows, and yet 
 proved yourself to be of the nature of the sun, 
 which passeth through pollutions, and itself remains 
 as pure as before. 
 
 But this I hold fit, that these narrations, which 
 have mixture with superstition, be sorted by them- 
 selves, and not be mingled with the narrations 
 which are merely and sincerely natural. 
 
 But as for the narrations touching the prodigies 
 and miracles of religions, they are either not true, 
 or not natural ; and therefore impertinent for the 
 story of nature. 
 
 For history of nature wrought or mechanical, I 
 find some collections made of agriculture, and like- 
 wise of manual arts ; but commonly with a rejection 
 of experiments familiar and vulgar. 
 
 For it is esteemed a kind of dishonour unto 
 learning to descend to inquiry or meditation upon 
 matters mechanical, except they be such as may be 
 thought secrets, rarities, and special subtilties ; 
 which humour of vain and supercilious arrogancy is 
 justly derided in Plato ; where he brings in Hippias, 
 a vaunting sophist, disputing with Socrates, a true 
 and unfeigned inquisitor of truth ; where the sub- 
 ject being touching beauty, Socrates, after his 
 wandering manner of inductions, put first an exam- 
 
124 OF THE PROFICIIiNCE AND 
 
 pie of a fair virgin, and then of a fair horse, and 
 then of a fair pot well glazed, whereat Hippias was 
 offended ; and said, " More than for courtesy's sake, 
 he did think much to dispute with any that did 
 allege such base and sordid instances :" whereunto 
 Socrates answered, " You have reason, and it be- 
 comes you well, being a man so trim in your 
 vestments," &c. and so goeth on in irony. 
 
 But the truth is, they be not the highest in- 
 stances that give the securest information ; as may 
 be well expressed in the tale so common of the phi- 
 losopher, that while he gazed upwards to the stars 
 fell into the water ; for if he had looked down he 
 might have seen the stars in the water, but looking 
 aloft he could not see the water in the stars. So it 
 cometh often to pass, that mean and small things 
 discover great, better than great can discover the 
 small ; and therefore Aristotle noteth well, " that 
 the nature of every thing is best seen in its smallest 
 portions." And for that cause he inquireth the 
 nature of a commonwealth, first in a family, and the 
 simple conjugations of man and wife, parent and 
 child, master and servant, which are in every cot- 
 tage. Even so likewise the nature of this great city 
 of the world, and the policy thereof, must be first 
 sought in mean concordances and small portions. 
 So we see how that secret of nature, of the turning 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 125 
 
 of iron touched with the loadstone towards the 
 north, was found out in needles of iron, not in bars 
 of iron. 
 
 But if my judgment be of any weight, the use of 
 History Mechanical is of all others the most radical 
 and fundamental towards natural philosophy ; such 
 natural philosophy as shall not vanish in the fume of 
 subtile, sublime, or delectable speculation, but such 
 as shall be operative to the endowment and benefit 
 of man's life : for it will not only minister and 
 suggest for the present many ingenious practices in 
 all trades, by a connexion and transferring of the 
 observations of one art to the use of another, when 
 the experiences of several mysteries shall fall under 
 the consideration of one man's mind ; but farther, it 
 will give a more true and real illumination con- 
 cerning causes and axioms than is hitherto at- 
 tained. 
 
 For like as a man's disposition is never well 
 known till he be crossed, nor Proteus ever changed 
 shapes till he was straitened and held fast ; so the 
 passages and variations of nature cannot appear so 
 fully in the liberty of nature, as in the trials and 
 vexations of art. 
 
 For " Civil History," it is of three kinds ; not 
 unfitly to be compared with the three kinds of pic- 
 tures or images: for of pictures or images, we see, 
 
126 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 some are unfinished, some are perfect, and some are 
 defaced. So of histories we may find three kinds, 
 Memorials, Perfect Histories, and Antiquities; for 
 memorials are history unfinished, or the first or 
 rough draughts of history ; and antiquities are 
 history defaced, or some remnants of history which 
 have casually escaped the shipwreck of time. 
 
 " Memorials/' or preparatory history, are of two 
 sorts ; whereof the one may be termed Commenta- 
 ries, and the other Registers. Commentaries are 
 they which set down a continuance of the naked 
 events and actions, without the motives or designs, 
 the counsels, the speeches, the pretexts, the occa- 
 sions and other passages of action : for this is the 
 true nature of a Commentary ; though Csesar, in 
 modesty mixed with greatness, did for his pleasure 
 apply the name of a Commentary to the best history 
 of the world. Registers are collections of public 
 acts, as decrees of council, judicial proceedings, de- 
 clarations and letters of state, orations and the like, 
 without a perfect continuance or contexture of the- 
 thread of the narration. 
 
 " Antiquities, or remnants of history, are, as 
 was said, u tanquam tabula naufragii" (as it were, 
 planks from wrecks) ; when industrious persons, by 
 an exact and scrupulous diligence and observation, 
 out of monuments, names, words, proverbs, tradi- 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. YZ~ 
 
 tions, private records and evidences, fragments of 
 stories, passages of books that concern not story, 
 and the like, do save and recover somewhat from the 
 deluge of time. 
 
 In these kinds of imperfect histories I do assign 
 no deficience, for they are " tanquam imperfecte 
 mista" (as an imperfect mixture) ; and therefore any 
 deficience in them is but their nature. 
 
 As for the corruptions and moths of history, 
 which are Epitomes, the use of them deserveth to be 
 banished, as all men of sound judgment have con- 
 fessed ; as those that have fretted and corroded the 
 sound bodies of many excellent histories, and 
 wrought them into base and unprofitable dregs. 
 
 History, which may be called Just and Perfect 
 History, is of three kinds, according to the object 
 which it propoundeth, or pretendeth to represent : 
 for it either representeth a time, or a person, or an 
 action. The first we call Chronicles, the second 
 Lives, and the third Narrations or Relations. 
 
 Of these, although the first be the most com- 
 plete and absolute kind of history, and hath most 
 estimation and glory, yet the second excelleth it in 
 profit and use, and the third in verity and sincerity : 
 for history of times representeth the magnitude 
 of actions, -and the public faces and deportments of 
 
VZti OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 persons, and passeth over in silence the smaller 
 passages and motions of men and matters. 
 
 But such being the workmanship of God, as he 
 doth hang the greatest weight upon the smallest 
 wires, " maxima e minimis suspendens" (suspending 
 great things from small), it comes therefore to pass, 
 that such histories do rather set forth the pomp 
 of business than the true and inward resorts thereof. 
 But Lives, if they be well written, propounding 
 to themselves a person to represent, in whom actions 
 both greater and smaller, public and private, have 
 a commixture, must of necessity contain a more 
 true, native, and lively representation. So again 
 narrations and relations of actions, as the War 
 of Peloponnesus, the Expedition of Cyrus Minor, 
 the Conspiracy of Catiline, cannot but be more 
 purely and exactly true than histories of times, 
 because they may choose an argument comprehensi- 
 ble within the notice and instructions of the writer : 
 whereas he that undertaketh the story of a time, 
 especially of any length, cannot but meet with 
 many blanks and spaces which he must be forced to 
 fill up out of his own wit and conjecture. 
 
 For the History of Times, I mean of Civil his- 
 tory, the providence of God hath made the distri- 
 bution : for it hath pleased God to ordain and 
 
ADVANCEMENT OE LEARNING. 129 
 
 illustrate two exemplar states of the world for arms, 
 learning, moral virtue, policy, and laws ; the state 
 of Greecia, and the state of Rome ; the histories 
 whereof, occupying the middle part of time, have, 
 more ancient to them, histories which may by one 
 common name be termed the Antiquities of the 
 world ; and after them, histories which may be like- 
 wise called by the name of Modern History. 
 
 Now to speak of the deficiencies. As to the 
 heathen antiquities of the world, it is in vain to note 
 them for deficient : deficient they are no doubt, con- 
 sisting most of fables and fragments ; but the de- 
 ficience cannot be holpen ; for antiquity is like fame, 
 " caput inter nubila condit" (she hides her head 
 among the clouds), her head is muffled from our 
 sight. For the history of the exemplar states, it is 
 extant in good perfection. Not but I could wish 
 there were a perfect course of history for Grsecia 
 from Theseus to Philopoemen, (what time the affairs 
 of Grsecia were drowned and extinguished in the 
 affairs of Rome ;) and for Rome from Romulus to 
 Justinianus, who may be truly said to be " ultimus 
 Romanorum" (the last of the Romans). In which 
 sequences of story the text of Thucydides and Xeno- 
 phon in the one, and the text of Livius, Polybius, 
 Sallustius, Csesar, Appianus, Tacitus, Herodianus 
 in the other, to be kept entire without any diminu- 
 
 K 
 
330 OF THE FROFICIENCE AND 
 
 tion at all, and only to be supplied and continued. 
 But this is matter of magnificence, rather to be com- 
 mended than required : and we speak now of parts 
 of learning supplemental, and not of supereroga- 
 tion. 
 
 But for modern Histories, whereof there are 
 some few very worthy, but the greater part beneath 
 mediocrity, (leaving the care of foreign stories to 
 foreign states, because I will not be u curiosus in 
 aliena republica") (inquisitive concerning other 
 states), I cannot fail to represent to your majesty 
 the unworthiness of the history of England in the 
 main continuance thereof, and the partiality and 
 obliquity of that of Scotland in the latest and largest 
 author that I have seen : supposing that it would be 
 honour for your majesty, and a work very memora- 
 ble, if this island of Great Britain, as it is now 
 joined in monarchy for the ages to come, so were 
 joined in one history for the times passed ; after the 
 manner of the sacred history, which draweth down 
 the story of the ten tribes and of the two tribes, as 
 twins, together. And if it shall seem that the great- 
 ness of this work may make it less exactly per- 
 formed, there is an excellent period of a much smaller 
 compass of time, as to the story of England ; that is 
 to say, from the uniting of the roses to the uniting 
 of the kingdoms ; a portion of time, wherein, to my 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 131 
 
 understanding-, there hath been the rarest varieties 
 that in like number of successions of any hereditary 
 monarchy hath been known : for it beginneth with 
 the mixed adoption of a crown by arms and title > 
 an entry by battle, an establishment by marriage ; 
 and therefore times answerable, like waters after a 
 tempest, full of working and swelling, though with- 
 out extremity of storm ; but well passed through by 
 the wisdom of the pilot, being one of the most suf- 
 ficient kings of all the number. Then followeth the 
 reign of a king, whose actions, howsoever conducted? 
 had much intermixture with the affairs of Europe 
 balancing and inclining them variably; in whose 
 time also began that great alteration in the state 
 ecclesiastical, an action which seldom cometh upon 
 the stage. Then the reign of a minor : then an 
 offer of an usurpation, though it was but as " fe- 
 bris ephemera" (the fever of a day): then the reign 
 of a queen matched with a foreigner : then of a 
 queen that lived solitary and unmarried, and yet 
 her government so masculine as it had greater im- 
 pression and operation upon the states abroad than 
 it any ways received from thence. And now last, 
 this most happy and glorious event, that this island 
 of Britain, divided from all the world, should be 
 united in itself: and that oracle of rest, eriven to 
 " Antiquam exquirite matrem" (Search out 
 
132 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 thy ancient mother), should now be performed and 
 fulfilled upon the nations of England and Scotland, 
 being now reunited in the ancient mother name of 
 Britain, as a full period of all instability and pere- 
 grinations : so that as it cometh to pass in massive 
 bodies, that they have certain trepidations and wa- 
 verings before they fix and settle ; so it seemeth that 
 by the providence of God this monarchy, before it 
 was to settle in your majesty and your generations, 
 (in which, I hope, it is now established for ever,) it 
 had these prelusive changes and varieties. 
 
 For " Lives," I do find strange that these times 
 have so little esteemed the virtues of the times, as 
 that the writing of lives should be no more frequent. 
 For although there be not many sovereign princes 
 or absolute commanders, and . that states are most 
 collected into monarchies, yet are there many worthy 
 personages that deserve better than dispersed report 
 or barren eulogies. For herein the invention of one 
 of the late poets is proper, and doth well enrich the 
 ancient fiction : for he feigneth that at the end of 
 the thread or web of every man's life there was a 
 little medal containing the person's name, and that 
 Time waited upon the shears; and as soon as the thread 
 was cut, caught the medals, and carried them to the 
 river of Lethe ; and about the bank there were many 
 birds flying up and down, that would get the medals 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 133 
 
 and carry them in their beak a little while, and then 
 let them fall into the river : only there were a few 
 swans, which if they got a name, would carry it to 
 a temple where it was consecrated. 
 
 And although many men, more mortal in their 
 affections than in their bodies, do esteem desire of 
 name and memory but as a vanity and ventosity, 
 " Animi nil magnse laudis egentes" 
 (Souls that no hopes of future praise inflame, 
 Cold and insensible to glorious fame) ; 
 which opinion cometh from the root, " non prius 
 laudes contempsimus, quam laudanda facere desivi- 
 mus" (we do not despise praise till we have ceased 
 to do praiseworthy actions) ; yet that will not alter 
 Solomon's judgment, " Memoria justi cum laudibus, 
 at impiorum nomen putrescet" (The memory of the 
 just shall be praised ; but the name of the wicked 
 shall stink) : the one flourisheth, the other either 
 consumeth to present oblivion, or turneth to an ill 
 odour. 
 
 And therefore in that s'tyle or addition, which is 
 and hath been long well received and brought in 
 use, " felicis memorise, pise memorise, bonse memo- 
 rise" (of happy memory, of pious memory, of good 
 memory), we do acknowledge that which Cicero 
 saith, borrowing it from Demosthenes, that " bona 
 fama propria possessio defunctorum" (a good name 
 
134 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 is the proper possession of the dead) ; which pos- 
 session I cannot but note that in our times it lieth 
 much waste, and that therein there is a deficience. 
 
 For " Narrations and Relations'' of particular 
 actions, there were also to be wished a greater dili- 
 gence therein ; for there is no great action but hath 
 some good pen which attends it. 
 
 And because it is an ability not common to write 
 a good history, as may well appear by the small 
 number of them ; yet if particularity of actions me- 
 morable were but tolerably reported as they pass, 
 the compiling of a complete history of times might 
 be the better expected, when a writer should arise 
 that were fit for it : for the collection of such rela- 
 tions might be as a nursery garden, whereby to plant 
 a fair and stately garden, when time should serve. 
 
 There is yet another portion of history which 
 Cornelius Tacitus maketh, which is not to be for- 
 gotten, especially with that application which he ac- 
 coupleth it withal, " Annals and Journals :" appro- 
 priating to the former matters of state, and to the 
 latter acts and accidents of a meaner nature. For 
 giving but a touch of certain magnificent buildings, 
 he addeth, " Cum ex dignitate populi Romani reper- 
 tum sit, res illustres annalibus, talia diurnis urbis 
 actis mandare" (As the dignity of the Roman people 
 requires, that illustrious actions should be recorded 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 135 
 
 in annals, such inferior matters in the journals of 
 the city). So as there is a kind of contemplative 
 heraldry, as well as civil. And as nothing doth 
 derogate from the dignity of a state more than con- 
 fusion of degrees ; so it doth not a little embase the 
 authority of an history, to intermingle matters of 
 triumph, or matters of ceremony, or matters of no- 
 velty, with matters of state. But the use of a jour- 
 nal hath not only been in the history of time, but 
 likewise in the history of persons, and chiefly of 
 actions ; for princes in ancient time had, upon point 
 of honour and policy both, journals kept of what 
 passed day by day : for we see the Chronicle which 
 was read before Ahasuerus, when he could not take 
 rest, contained matter of affairs indeed, but such as 
 had passed in his own time, and very lately before : 
 but the journal of Alexander's house expressed 
 every small particularity, even concerning his person 
 and court ; and it is yet an use well received in en- 
 terprises memorable, as expeditions of war, naviga- 
 tions, and the like, to keep diaries of that which 
 passeth continually. 
 
 I cannot likewise be ignorant of a form of writ- 
 ing which some grave and wise men have used, con- 
 taining a scattered history of those actions which 
 they have thought worthy of memory, with politic 
 discourse and observation thereupon; not incor- 
 
136 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 porated into the history, but separately, and as the 
 more principal in their intention ; which kind of 
 ruminated history I think more fit to place amongst 
 books of policy, whereof we shall hereafter speak, 
 than amongst books of history : for it is the true 
 office of history to represent the events themselves 
 together with the counsels, and to leave the ob- 
 servations and conclusions thereupon to the liberty 
 and faculty of every man's judgment; but mix- 
 tures are things irregular, whereof no man can 
 define. 
 
 So also is there another kind of history mani- 
 foldly mixed, and that is History of Cosmography ; 
 being compounded of natural history, in respect of 
 the regions themselves ; of history civil, in respect 
 of the habitations, regimens, and manners of the 
 people ; and the mathematics, in respect of the cli- 
 mates and configurations towards the heavens : 
 which part of learning of all others, in this latter 
 time, hath obtained most proficience. For it may be 
 truly affirmed to the honour of these times, and in 
 a virtuous emulation with antiquity, that this great 
 building of the world had never thorough lights 
 made in it, till the age of us and our fathers : for 
 although they had knowledge of the antipodes, 
 " Nosque ubi primus equis oriens afflavit anhelis, 
 Iliic sera rubens accendit lumina Vesper" 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 137 
 
 (And when to us the orient car succeeds, 
 And o'er our climes has breath'd its panting steeds, 
 There ruddy Vesper, kindling up the sky, 
 Casts o'er the glowing realms his evening eye) : 
 yet that might be by demonstration, and not in fact ; 
 and if by travel, it requireth the voyage but of half 
 the globe. But to circle the earth, as the heavenly 
 bodies do, was not done nor enterprised till these latter 
 times : and therefore these times may justly bear in 
 their word, not only " plus ultra" (farther), in prece- 
 dence of the ancient " non ultra" (no farther),and " im- 
 itabile fulmen" (imitable thunder) in precedence of the 
 ancient " non imitabile fulmen" (inimitable thunder), 
 •" Demens qui nimbos et non imitabile fulmen," &c. 
 (Who mock'd with empty sounds and mimic rays, 
 Heav'n's awful thunder and the lightning's blaze); 
 but likewise " imitabile coelum" (imitable heaven) ; 
 in respect of the many memorable voyages, after the 
 manner of heaven, about the globe of the earth. 
 
 And this proficience in navigation and discoveries 
 may plant also an expectation of the farther pro- 
 ficience and augmentation of all sciences ; because 
 it may seem they are ordained by God to be coevals, 
 that is, to meet one age. For so the prophet Da- 
 niel, speaking of the latter times, foretelleth, " Plu- 
 rimi pertransibunt, et multiplex erit scientia" (Many 
 shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be in- 
 
138 6V THE PROFICIENCE A^D 
 
 creased) ; as if the openness and thorough passage 
 of the world and the increase of knowledge were 
 appointed to be in the same ages, as we see it is 
 already performed in great part; the learning of 
 these latter times not much giving place to the for- 
 mer two periods or returns of learning, the one of 
 the Grecians, the other of the Romans. 
 
 History ecclesiastical receiveth the same divi- 
 sions with history civil : but farther, in the pro- 
 priety thereof, may be divided into the History of 
 the church, by a general name ; History of pro- 
 phecy; and History of providence. 
 
 The first describeth the times of the " militant 
 church," whether it be fluctuant, as the ark of Noah ; 
 or moveable, as the ark in the wilderness ; or at rest, 
 as the ark in the temple ; that is, the state of the 
 church in persecution, in remove, and in peace. This 
 part I ought in no sort to note as deficient, only 1 
 would that the virtue and sincerity of it were accord- 
 ing to the mass and quantity. But I am not now in 
 hand with censures, but with omissions. 
 
 The second, which is history of " prophecy/' 
 consisteth of two relatives, the prophecy, and the 
 accomplishment ; and therefore the nature of such a 
 work ought to be, that every prophecy of the scrip- 
 ture be sorted with the event fulfilling the same? 
 throughout the ages of the world ; both for the better 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 139 
 
 confirmation of faith, and for the better illumination 
 of the church touching those parts of prophecies 
 which are yet unfulfilled : allowing nevertheless 
 that latitude which is agreeable and familiar unto 
 divine prophecies ; being of the nature of their 
 author, with whom a thousand years are but as one 
 day ; and therefore are not fulfilled punctually 
 at once, but have springing and germinant accom- 
 plishment throughout many ages; though the height 
 or fulness of them may refer to some one age. 
 
 This is a work which I find deficient ; but is to 
 be done with wisdom, sobriety, and reverence, or 
 not at all. 
 
 The third, which is history of " providence," 
 containeth that excellent correspondence which is 
 between God's revealed will and his secret will : 
 which though it be so obscure, as for the most part 
 it is not legible to the natural man ; no, nor many 
 times to those who behold it from the tabernacle ; 
 yet at some times it pleaseth God, for our better 
 establishment, and the confuting of those which are 
 as without God in the world, to write it in such text 
 and capital letters, that as the prophet saith, " he 
 that runneth by may read it;" that is, mere sensual 
 persons, which hasten by God's judgments and 
 never bend or fix their cogitations upon them, are 
 nevertheless in their passage and race urged to 
 
140 OF THE PltOFICIENCE AND 
 
 discern it. Such are the notable events and exam- 
 ples of God's judgments, chastisements, deliver- 
 ances, and blessings ; and this is a work which hath 
 passed through the labours of many, and therefore I 
 cannot present as omitted. 
 
 There are also other parts of learning which are 
 Appendices to history : for all the exterior proceed- 
 ings of man consist of words and deeds ; whereof 
 history doth properly receive and retain in memory 
 the deeds ; and if words, yet but as inducements and 
 passages to deeds : so are there other books and 
 writings, which are appropriated to the custody and 
 receipt of words only ; which likewise are of three 
 sorts; Orations, Letters, and brief Speeches or 
 Sayings. 
 
 Orations are pleadings, speeches of counsel, 
 laudatives, invectives, apologies, reprehensions, ora- 
 tions of formality or ceremony, and the like. 
 
 Letters are according to all the variety of occa- 
 sions, advertisements, advices, directions, propo- 
 sitions, petitions, commendatory, expostulatory, 
 satisfactory; of compliment, of pleasure, of dis- 
 course, and all other passages of action. And 
 such as are written from wise men, are of all the 
 words of man, in my judgment, the best ; for they 
 are more natural than orations and public speeches, 
 and more advised than conferences or present 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 141 
 
 speeches. So again letters of affairs from such as 
 manage them, or are privy to them, are of all others 
 the best instructions for history, and to a diligent 
 reader the best histories in themselves. 
 
 For Apophthegms, it is a great loss of that book 
 of Coesar's ; for as his history, and those few letters 
 of his which we have, and those apophthegms which 
 were of his own, excel all men's else, so I suppose 
 would his collection of apophthegms have done ; for 
 as for those which are collected by others, either I 
 have no taste in such matters, or else their choice 
 hath not been happy. But upon these three kinds 
 of writings I do not insist, because I have no defi- 
 ciencies to propound concerning them. 
 
 Thus much therefore concerning history; which 
 is that part of learning which answereth to one of 
 the cells, domiciles, or offices of the mind of man; 
 which is that of the memory. 
 
 Poesy is a part of learning in measure of words 
 for the most part restrained, but in all other points 
 extremely licensed, and doth truly refer to the imagi- 
 nation ; which, being not tied to the laws of matter, 
 may at pleasure join that which nature hath severed, 
 and sever that which nature hath joined ; and so 
 make unlawful matches and divorces of things ; 
 " Pictoribus atque poetis, &c." (Painters and poets, 
 <^c.) It is taken in two senses, in respect of words, 
 
142 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 or matter ; in the first sense it is but a character of 
 style, and belongeth to arts of speech, and is not 
 pertinent for the present : in the latter, it is, as hath 
 been said, one of the principal portions of learning, 
 and is nothing else but feigned history, which may 
 be styled as well in prose as in verse. 
 
 The use of this feigned history hath been to 
 give some shadow of satisfaction to the mind of 
 man in those points wherein the nature of things 
 doth deny it, the world being in proportion inferior 
 to the soul ; by reason whereof there is, agreeable 
 to the spirit of man, a more ample greatness, a 
 more exact goodness, and a more absolute variety, 
 than can be found in the nature of things. There- 
 fore, because the acts or events of true history have 
 not that magnitude which satisfieth the mind of 
 man, poesy feigneth acts and events greater and 
 more heroical: because true history propoundeth the 
 successes and issues of actions not so agreeable to 
 the merits of virtue and vice, therefore poesy feigns 
 them more just in retribution, and more according 
 to revealed providence: because true history repre- 
 sented actions and events more ordinary, and less 
 interchanged, therefore poesy endueth them with 
 more rareness, and more unexpected and alternative 
 variations : so as it appeareth poesy serveth and con- 
 ifcrreth to magnanimity, morality, and to delectation. 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 143 
 
 And therefore it was ever thought to have some par- 
 ticipation of divineness, because it doth raise and 
 erect the mind, by submitting the shews of things 
 to the desires of the mind ; whereas reason doth 
 buckle and bow the mind unto the nature of things. 
 
 And we see, that by these insinuations and con- 
 gruities with man's nature and pleasure, joined also 
 with the agreement and consort it hath with music, 
 it hath had access and estimation in rude times and 
 barbarous regions, where other learning stood ex- 
 cluded. 
 
 The division of poesy, which is aptest in the 
 propriety thereof, (besides those divisions which are 
 common unto it with history, as feigned chronicles, 
 feigned lives, and the appendices of history, as 
 feigned epistles, feigned orations, and the rest) is 
 into Poesy Narrative, Representative, and Allusive. 
 
 The Narrative is a mere imitation of history, 
 with the excesses before remembered ; choosing for 
 subject commonly wars and love, rarely state, and 
 sometimes pleasure or mirth. 
 
 Representative is as a visible history ; and is an 
 image of actions as if they were present, as history is 
 of actions in nature as they are, that is past. 
 
 Allusive or parabolical is a narration applied only 
 to express some special purpose or conceit: which 
 
144 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 latter kind of parabolical wisdom was much more in 
 use in the ancient times, as by the fables of iEsop, 
 and the brief sentences of the Seven, and the use of 
 hieroglyphics, may appear. And the cause was, for 
 that it was then of necessity to express any point of 
 reason, which was more sharp or subtile than the 
 vulgar, in that manner; because, men in those times 
 wanted both variety of examples and subtilty of con- 
 ceit : and as hieroglyphics were before letters, so pa- 
 rables were before arguments. And nevertheless 
 now, and at all times, they do retain much life and 
 vigour; because reason cannot be so sensible, nor 
 examples so fit. 
 
 But there remaineth yet another use of poesy pa- 
 rabolical, opposite to that which we last mentioned: 
 for that tendeth to demonstrate and illustrate that 
 which is taught or delivered, and this other to retire 
 and obscure it: that is, when the secrets and mys- 
 teries of religion, policy, or philosophy, are involved 
 in fables or parables. 
 
 Of this in divine poesy we see the use is autho- 
 rized. In heathen poesy we see the exposition of 
 fables doth fall out sometimes with great felicity ; as 
 in the fable that the giants being overthrown in their 
 war against the gods, the Earth their mother in re- 
 venge thereof brought forth Fame : 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 145 
 
 " Illam Terra parens, ira irritata deorum, 
 Extremam,ut perhibent, Coeo Enceladoque sororem 
 Progenuit." 
 
 (Whom, in her wrath toheav'n, the teeming Earth 
 Produc'd the last of her gigantic birth :) 
 expounded, that when Princes and monarches 
 have suppressed actual and open rebels, then the 
 malignity of people, which is the mother of rebel- 
 lion, doth bring forth libels and slanders, and tax- 
 ations of the state, which is of the same kind with 
 rebellion, but more feminine. So in the fable, that 
 the rest of the gods having conspired to bind Jupiter, 
 Pallas called Briareus with his hundred hands to 
 his aid; expounded, that monarchies need not fear 
 any curbing of their absoluteness by mighty subjects, 
 as long as by wisdom they keep the hearts of the 
 people, who will be sure to come in on their side. 
 So in the fable, that Achilles was brought up under 
 Chiron the Centaur, who was part a man and part 
 a beast; expounded ingeniously, but corruptly by 
 Machiavel, that it belongeth to the education and 
 discipline of princes to know as well how to play 
 the part of the lion in violence, and the fox in guile, 
 as of the man in virtue and justice. 
 
 Nevertheless, in many the like encounters, I do 
 rather think that the fable was first, and the expo- 
 sition devised, than that the moral was first, and 
 
 i 
 
146 OF THE PROFICIENCE ASD 
 
 thereupon the fable framed. For I find it was an 
 ancient vanity in Chrysippus, that troubled himself 
 with great contention to fasten the assertions of the 
 Stoics upon fictions of the ancient poets ; but yet 
 that all the fables and fictions of the poets were but 
 pleasure and not figure, I interpose no opinion. 
 
 Surely of those poets which are now extant, 
 even Homer himself, notwithstanding he was made 
 a kind of Scripture by the later schools of the 
 Grecians, yet I should without any difficulty pro- 
 nounce that his fables had no such inwardness in 
 his own meaning; but what they might have upon 
 a more original tradition, is not easy to affirm ; for 
 he was not the inventor of many of them. 
 
 In this third part of learning, which is poesy, I 
 can report no deficience. For being as a plant that 
 cometh of the lust of the earth, without a formal 
 seed, it hath sprung up and spread abroad more 
 than any other kind: but to ascribe unto it that 
 which is due, for the expressing of affections, pas- 
 sions, corruptions, and customs, we are beholding to 
 poets more than to philosophers' works; and for 
 wit and eloquence, not much less than to orators' 
 harangues. But it is not good to stay too long in 
 the theatre. Let us now pass on to the judicial place 
 or palace of the mind, which we are to approach 
 arid view with more reverence and attention. 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. M? 
 
 The knowledge of man is as the waters, some 
 descending from above, and some springing from 
 beneath; the one informed by the light of nature, 
 the other inspired by divine revelation. 
 
 The light of nature consisteth in the notions of 
 the mind and the reports of the senses : for as for 
 knowledge which man received) by teaching, it is 
 cumulative and not original; as in a water that, 
 besides his own spring-head, is fed with other 
 springs and streams. So then, according to these 
 two differing illuminations or originals, knowledge 
 is first of all divided into Divinity and Philosophy. 
 
 In Philosophy, the contemplations of man do 
 either penetrate unto God,— or are circumferred to 
 nature, — or are reflected or reverted upon himself. 
 Out of which several inquiries there do arise three 
 knowledges, Divine philosophy, Natural philosophy, 
 and Human philosophy or Humanity. For all 
 things are marked and stamped with this triple cha- 
 racter, of the power of God, the difference of nature, 
 and the use of man. 
 
 But because the distributions and partitions of 
 knowledge are not like several lines that meet in 
 one angle, and so touch but in a point; but are like 
 branches of a tree, that meet in a stem, which hath 
 a dimension and quantity of entireness and continu- 
 ance, before it come to discontinue and break itself 
 
148 Or THE FROllCIENCE AND 
 
 into arms and boughs ; therefore it is good, before 
 we enter into the former distribution, to erect and 
 constitute one universal science, by the name of 
 " Philosophia prima," primitive or summary philo- 
 sophy, as the main and common way, before we 
 come where the ways part and divide themselves; 
 which science whether I should report as deficient 
 or no, I stand doubtful. 
 
 For I find a certain rhapsody of natural theology, 
 and of divers parts of logic; and of that part 
 of natural philosophy which concerneth the princi- 
 ples ; and of that other part of natural philosophy 
 which concerneth the soul or spirit; all these strangely 
 commixed and confused: but being examined, it 
 seemeth to me rather a depredation of other sciences, 
 advanced and exalted unto some height of terms, 
 than any thing solid or substantive of itself. 
 
 Nevertheless I cannot be ignorant of the dis- 
 tinction which is current, that the same things are 
 handled but in several respects. As for example, 
 that logic considereth of many things as they are in 
 notion, and this philosophy as they are in nature; 
 the one in appearance, the other in existence: but 
 I find this difference better made than pursued. 
 For if they had considered quantity, similitude, 
 diversity, and the rest of those external characters 
 of things, as philosophers, and in nature, their in- 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 149 
 
 quiries must of force have been of a far other kind 
 than they are. 
 
 For doth any of them, in handling quantity, 
 speak of the force of union, how and how far it 
 multiplieth virtue ? Doth any give the reason, why 
 some things in nature are so common, and in so 
 great mass, and others so rare, and in so small 
 quantity ? Doth any, in handling similitude and 
 diversity, assign the cause why iron should not 
 move to iron, which is more like, but move to the 
 loadstone, which is less like ? Why in all diversities 
 of things there should be certain participles in na- 
 ture, which are almost ambiguous to which kind 
 they should be referred ? But there is a mere and 
 deep silence touching the nature and operation 
 of those common adjuncts of things, as in nature; 
 and only a resuming and repeating of the force and 
 use of them in speech or argument. 
 
 Therefore, because in a writing of this nature I 
 avoid all stibtilty, my meaning touching this original 
 or universal philosophy is thus, in a plain and gross 
 description by negative : " That it be a receptacle 
 for all such profitable observations and axioms as 
 fall not within the compass of any of the special 
 parts of philosophy or sciences, but are more com- 
 mon and of a higher stage." 
 
 Now that there are many of that kind, need not 
 
150 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 to be doubted. For example ; is not the rule, " Si 
 insequalibus sequalia addas, omnia erunt insequalia" 
 (if to unequals you add equals, all will be unequal), 
 an axiom as well of justice as of the mathematics ? 
 And is there not a true coincidence between com- 
 mutative and distributive justice, and arithmetical 
 and geometrical proportion ? Is not that other rule, 
 " Quse in eodem tertio conveniunt, et inter se con- 
 veniunt" (things which are equal to a third thing, 
 are equal to one another), a rule taken from the ma- 
 thematics, but so potent in logic as all syllogisms 
 are built upon it? Is not the observation, " Omnfa 
 mutantur, nil interit" (all things are changed, 
 nothing perishes), a contemplation, in philosophy 
 thus, that the quantum of nature is eternal ? in 
 natural theology thus, that it requireth the same 
 omnipotence to make somewhat nothing, which at 
 the first made nothing somewhat ? according to the 
 Scripture, " Didici quod omnia opera, quse fecit 
 Deus, perseverent in perpetuum ; non possumus eis 
 quicquam addere nee auferre" (I know that, whatso- 
 ever God doeth, it shall be for ever : nothing can be 
 put to it, nor any thing taken from it) 
 
 Is not the ground, which Machiavel wisely and 
 largely discourseth concerning governments, that 
 the way to establish and preserve them, is to reduce 
 them " ad principia" (to first principles), a rule in 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 15] 
 
 religion and nature, as well as in civil administra- 
 ion ? Was not the Persian magic a reduction or 
 correspondence of the principles and architectures 
 of nature to the rules and policy of governments ? 
 Is not the precept of a musician, to fall from a dis- 
 cord or harsh accord upon a concord or sweet 
 accord, alike true in affection ? Is not the trope 
 of music, to avoid or slide from the close or cadence, 
 common with the trope of rhetoric, of deceiving ex- 
 pectation ? Is not the delight of the quavering upon 
 a stop in music, the same with the playing of light 
 upon the water? 
 
 " Splendet tremulo sub lumine pontus :" 
 (The silver splendours tremble o'er the tides). 
 Are not the organs of the senses of one kind with 
 the organs of reflection, the eye with a glass, 
 the ear with a cave or strait determined and 
 bounded? Neither are these only similitudes, as 
 men of narrow observation may conceive them to be, 
 but the same footsteps of nature, treading or print- 
 ing upon several subjects or matters. 
 
 This science therefore, as I understand it, I may 
 
 justly report as deficient; for I see sometimes the 
 
 profounder sort of wits, in handling some particular 
 
 argument, will now and then draw a bucket of 
 
 r out of this well for their present use ; but the 
 
152 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 spring-head thereof seemeth to me not to have been 
 visited ; being of so excellent use, both for the 
 disclosing of nature, and the abridgement of art. 
 
 This science being therefore first placed as a 
 common parent, like unto Berecynthia, which had 
 so much heavenly issue, 
 
 " Omnes ccelicolas, omnes super alta tenentes :" 
 
 (A shining train, who fill the blest abodes) : 
 we may return to the former distribution of the three 
 philosophies, divine, natural, and human. 
 
 And as concerning Divine Philosophy or Natural 
 Theology, it is that knowledge or rudiment of know- 
 ledge concerning God, which may be obtained by 
 the contemplation of his creatures ; which know- 
 ledge may be truly termed divine in respect of the 
 object, and natural in respect of the light. 
 
 The bounds of this knowledge are, that it suffic- 
 eth to convince atheism, but not to inform religion : 
 and therefore there was never miracle wrought by 
 God to convert an atheist, because the light of na- 
 ture might have led him to confess a God : but mi- 
 racles have been wrought to convert idolaters and the 
 superstitious, because no light of nature extendeth 
 to declare the will and true worship of God. 
 
 For as all works do shew forth the power and 
 skill of the workman, and not his image ; so it is of 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 153 
 
 the works of God, which do shew the omnipotency 
 and wisdom of the maker, but not his image : and 
 therefore therein the heathen opinion differeth from 
 the sacred truth ; for they supposed the world to be 
 the image of God, and man to be an extract or com- 
 pendious image of the world ; but the Scriptures 
 never vouchsafe to attribute to the world that honor, 
 as to be the image of God, but only the work of his 
 hands ; neither do they speak of any other image of 
 God, but man : wherefore by the contemplation of 
 nature to induce and inforce the acknowledgement 
 of God, and to demonstrate his power, providence, 
 and goodness, is an excellent argument, and hath 
 been excellently handled by divers. 
 
 But on the other side, out of the contemplation 
 of nature, or ground of human knowledges, to 
 induce any verity or persuasion concerning the 
 points of faith, is in my judgment not safe : " Da 
 fidei quse fidei sunt" (give to faith the things which 
 belong to faith). For the heathens themselves con- 
 clude as much in that excellent and divine fable of 
 the golden chain : " That men and gods were not 
 able to draw Jupiter down to the earth ; but con- 
 trariwise, Jupiter was able to draw them up to 
 heaven." 
 
 So as we ought not to attempt to draw down or 
 submit the mysteries of God to our reason ; but. 
 
154 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 contrariwise to raise and advance our reason to the 
 divine truth. So as in this part of knowledge, 
 touching divine philosophy, I am so far from noting 
 any deflcience, as I rather note an excess ; where- 
 unto I have digressed, because of the extreme preju- 
 dice which both religion and philosophy have received 
 and may receive, by being commixed together ; as 
 that which undoubtedly will make an heretical reli- 
 gion, and an imaginary and fabulous philosophy. 
 
 Otherwise it is of the nature of angels and 
 spirits, which is an appendix of theology, both 
 divine and natural, and is neither inscrutable nor 
 interdicted ; for although the Scripture saith, " Le 
 no man deceive you in sublime discourse touching 
 the worship of angels, pressing into that he knoweth 
 not," &c. yet, notwithstanding, if you observe well 
 that precept, it may appear thereby that there be 
 two things only forbidden, adoration of them, and 
 opinion fantastical of them ; either to extol them 
 farther than appertaineth to the degree of a creature, 
 or to extol a man's knowledge of them farther than 
 he hath ground. But the sober and grounded inquiry, 
 which may arise out of the passages of holy Scrip- 
 tures, or out of the gradations of nature, is not 
 restrained. So of degenerate and revolted spirits, 
 the conversing with them or the employment of 
 them is prohibited, much more any veneration to- 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 155 
 
 wards them : but the contemplation or science of 
 their nature, their power, their illusions, either by 
 Scripture or reason, is a part of spiritual wisdom. 
 For so the apostle saith, " We are not ignorant of 
 his stratagems." And it is no more unlawful to 
 inquire the nature of evil spirits, than to inquire 
 the force of poisons in nature, or the nature 
 of sin and vice in morality. But this part 
 touching angels and spirits, I cannot note as de- 
 ficient, for many have occupied themselves in it ; 
 I may rather challenge it, in many of the writers 
 thereof, as fabulous and fantastical. 
 
 Leaving therefore divine philosophy or natural 
 theology (not divinity or inspired theology, which 
 we reserve for the last of all, as the haven and 
 sabbath of all man's contemplations) we will now 
 proceed to Natural Philosophy. 
 
 If then it be true that Democritus said, " That 
 the truth of nature lieth hid in certain deep mines 
 and caves ;" and if it be true likewise that the 
 alchemists do so much inculcate, that Vulcan is 
 a second nature, and imitateth that dexterously and 
 compendiously, which nature worketh by ambages 
 and length of time; it were good to divide natural 
 philosophy into the mine and the furnace; and to 
 make two professions or occupations of natural phi- 
 losophers, some to be pioneers, and some smiths; 
 
156 OF THE PROEICIENCE AND 
 
 some to dig, and some to refine and hammer : and 
 surely I do best allow of a division of that kind,, 
 though in more familiar and scholastical terms ; 
 namely, that these be the two parts of natural philo- 
 sophy, — the inquisition of causes, and the produc- 
 tion of effects ; speculative, and operative ; natural 
 science, and natural prudence. 
 
 For as in civil matters there is a wisdom of dis- 
 course, and a wisdom of direction ; so is it in na- 
 tural. And here I will make a request, that for the 
 latter, or at least for a part thereof, I may revive and 
 redintegrate the misapplied and abused name of 
 Natural Magic ; which, in the true sense, is but na- 
 tural wisdom, or natural prudence ; taken according 
 to the ancient acceptation, purged from vanity and 
 superstition. 
 
 Now although it be true, and I know it well, 
 that there is an intercourse between causes and 
 effects, so as both these knowledges, speculative 
 and operative, have a great connection between 
 themselves ; yet because all true and fruitful natural 
 philosophy hath a double scale or ladder, ascendent 
 and descendent; ascending from experiments to the 
 invention of causes, and descending from causes to 
 the invention of new experiments ; therefore I judge 
 it most requisite that these two parts be severally 
 considered and handled. 
 
ADVANCEMENT OE LEARNING. 15/ 
 
 Natural Science or Theory is divided into Physic 
 and Metaphysic : wherein I desire it may be con- 
 ceived that I use the word metaphysic in a differing 
 sense from that that is received: and in like manner, 
 I doubt not but it will easily appear to men of judg- 
 ment, that in this and other particulars, wheresoever 
 my conception and notion may differ from the an- 
 cient, yet I am studious to keep the ancient terms. 
 
 For hoping well to deliver myself from mistaking, 
 by the order and perspicuous expressing of that I 
 do propound; I am otherwise zealous and affection- 
 ate to recede as little from antiquity, either in 
 terms or opinions, as may stand with truth and the 
 proficience of knowledge. 
 
 And herein I cannot a little marvel at the philo- 
 sopher Aristotle, that did proceed in such a spirit of 
 difference and contradiction towards all antiquity : 
 undertaking not only to frame new words of science 
 at pleasure, but to confound and extinguish all 
 ancient wisdom : insomuch as he never nameth or 
 mentioneth an ancient author or opinion, but to con- 
 fute and reprove ; wherein for glory, and drawing 
 followers and disciples, he took the right course. 
 
 For certainly there cometh to pass, and hath 
 place in human truth, that which was noted and 
 pronounced in the highest truth: " Veni in nomine 
 Patris, nee recipitis me; si quis venerit in nomine 
 
158 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 suo, eum recipietis" (I am come in my Father's 
 name, and ye receive me not; if another shall come 
 in his own name, him ye will receive). But in this 
 divine aphorism, (considering to whom it was ap- 
 plied, namely to Antichrist, the highest deceiver,) 
 we may discern well that the coming in a man's 
 own name, without regard of antiquity or paternity, 
 is no good sign of truth, although it be joined with 
 the fortune and success of an " Eum recipietis" 
 (Him ye will receive). 
 
 But for this excellent person Aristotle, I will 
 think of him that he learned that humour of his 
 scholar, with whom, it seemeth, he did emulate; the 
 one to conquer all opinions, as the other to conquer 
 all nations : wherein nevertheless, it may be, he may 
 at some men's hands, that are of a bitter disposition, 
 get a like title as his scholar did : 
 
 " Felix terrarum prsedo, non utile mundo 
 
 Editus exemplum, &c." 
 
 (Of earth the lucky highwayman he gave 
 
 To men a dire example,) 
 So, 
 
 " Felix doctrinee proedo :" 
 
 (The lucky highwayman of learning.) 
 
 But to me, on the other side, that do desire as much 
 
 as lieth in my pen to ground a sociable intercourse 
 
 between antiquity and proficience, it seemeth best to 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 159 
 
 keep way with antiquity " usque ad aras" (as far as 
 the altars); and therefore to retain the ancient terms, 
 though I sometimes alter the uses and definitions : 
 according to the moderate proceeding in civil go- 
 vernment; where although there be some alteration, 
 yet that holdeth which Tacitus wisely noteth, 
 ; eadem magistratuum vocabula" (the names of 
 offices are the same). 
 
 To return therefore to the use and acceptation 
 of the term Metaphysic, as I do now understand 
 the word; it appeareth, by that which hath been 
 already said, that I intend " philosophia prima/' 
 Summary Philosophy, and Metaphysic, which here- 
 tofore have been confounded as one, to be two 
 distinct things. For, the one I have made as a 
 parent or common ancestor to all knowledge; and 
 the other I have now brought in as a branch or de- 
 scendent of natural science. It appeareth likewise 
 that I have assigned to Summary Philosophy the 
 common principles and axioms which are promis- 
 cuous and indifferent to several sciences: I have 
 assigned unto it likewise the inquiry touching the 
 operation of the relative and adventitious characters 
 of essences, as quantity, similitude, diversity, possi- 
 bility, and the rest; with this distinction and pro- 
 vision ; that they be handled as they have efficacy 
 in nature, and not logically. It appeareth likewise, 
 
160 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 that Natural Theology, which heretofore hath been 
 handled confusedly with Metaphysic, I have inclosed 
 and bounded by itself. 
 
 It is therefore now a question what is left re- 
 maining for Metaphysic ; wherein I may without 
 prejudice preserve thus much of the conceit of an- 
 tiquity, that physic should contemplate that which 
 is inherent in matter, and therefore transitory ; and 
 metaphysic that which is abstracted and fixed. 
 
 And again, that physic should handle that which 
 supposeth in nature only a being and moving ; and 
 metaphysic should handle that which supposeth 
 farther in nature a reason, understanding, and plat- 
 form. But the difference, perspicuously expressed, 
 is most familiar and sensible. 
 
 For as we divided natural philosophy in general 
 into the inquiry of causes, and productions of 
 effects ; so that part which concerneth the inquiry of 
 causes we do subdivide according to the received 
 and sound division of causes ; the one part, which is 
 physic, inquireth and handleth the material and 
 efficient causes ; and the other, which is meta- 
 physic, handleth the formal and final causes. 
 
 Physic, taking it according to the derivation, 
 and not according to our idiom for medicine ? 
 is situate in a middle term or distance between na- 
 tural history and metaphysic. For natural his- 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 161 
 
 tory describeth the variety of things ; physic, the 
 causes, but variable or respective causes ; and meta- 
 physic, the fixed and constant causes. 
 
 " Limus ut hie durescit, et heec ut cera liquescit, 
 
 Uno eodemque igni :" 
 
 (As this same fire melts wax and hardens clay.) 
 Fire is the cause of induration, but respective to 
 clay; fire is the cause of colliquation, but respective 
 to wax; but fire is no constant cause either of indu- 
 ration or colliquation : so then the physical causes 
 are but the efficient and the matter. 
 
 Physic hath three parts ; whereof two respect 
 nature united or collected, the third contemplateth 
 nature diffused or distributed. 
 
 Nature is collected either into one entire total, 
 or else into the same principles or seeds. So as the 
 first doctrine is touching the contexture or configu- 
 ration of things, as " de mundo, de universitate 
 rerum" (of the world, of the universe of things). 
 
 The second is the doctrine concerning the prin- 
 ciples or originals of things. 
 
 The third is the doctrine concerning all variety 
 and particularity of things ; whether it be of the 
 differing substances, or their differing qualities and 
 natures; whereof there needeth no enumeration, this 
 part being but as a gloss, or paraphrase, that at- 
 tendeth upon the text of natural history. 
 
 M 
 
162 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 Of these three I cannot report any as deficient. 
 In what truth or perfection they are handled, I make 
 not now any judgment: but they are parts of know- 
 ledge not deserted by the labour of man. 
 
 For Metaphysic, we have assigned unto it the 
 inquiry of formal and final causes; which assigna- 
 tion, as to the former of them, may seem to be nu- 
 gatory and void ; because of the received and inve- 
 terate opinion, that the inquisition of man is not 
 competent to find out essential forms or true differ- 
 ences : of which opinion we will take this hold, 
 that the invention of forms is of all other parts of 
 knowledge the worthiest to be sought, if it be pos- 
 sible to be found. 
 
 As for the possibility, they are ill discoverers 
 that think there is no land, when they can see 
 nothing but sea. 
 
 But it is manifest that Plato, in his opinion of 
 ideas, as one that had a wit of elevation situate as 
 upon a cliff, did descry, " That forms were the true 
 object of knowledge ;" but lost the real fruit of his 
 opinion, by considering of forms as absolutely ab- 
 stracted from matter, and not confined and deter- 
 mined by matter ; and so turning his opinion upon 
 theology, wherewith all his natural philosophy is 
 infected. 
 
 But if any man shall keep a continual watchful 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 163 
 
 and severe eye upon action, operation, and the use 
 of knowledge, he may advise and take notice what 
 are the forms, the disclosures whereof are fruitful 
 and important to the state of man. For as to the 
 forms of substances, man only except, of whom it is 
 said, " Formavit hominem de limo terrse, et spiravit 
 in faciem ejus spiraculum vitae" (He formed man of 
 the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nos- 
 trils the breath of life,) and not as of all other crea- 
 tures, " Producant aquse, producat terra'' (Let the 
 waters bring forth, let the earth bring forth) ; the 
 forms of substances, I say, as they are now by com- 
 pounding and transplanting multiplied, are so per- 
 plexed, as they are not to be inquired; no more than 
 it were either possible or to purpose to seek in 
 gross the forms of those sounds which make words, 
 which by composition and transposition of letters 
 are infinite. 
 
 But, on the other side, to inquire the form of 
 those sounds or voices which make simple letters, is 
 easily comprehensible ; and being known, induceth 
 and manifesteth the forms of all words, which consist 
 and are compounded of them. In the same manner 
 to inquire the form of a lion, of an oak, of gold; nay, 
 of water, of air, is a vain pursuit: but to inquire the 
 forms of sense, of voluntary motion, of vegetation, 
 of colours, of gravity and levity, of density, of 
 tenuity, of heat, of cold, and all other natures and 
 
164 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 qualities, which, like an alphabet, are not many, 
 and of which the essences, upheld by matter, of all 
 creatures do consist ; to inquire, I say, the true 
 forms of these, is that part of metaphysic which we 
 now define of. 
 
 Not but that physic doth make inquiry, and take 
 consideration of the same natures : but how ? Only 
 as to the material and efficient causes of them, and 
 not as to the forms. For example ; if the cause of 
 whiteness in snow or froth be inquired, and it be 
 rendered thus, that the subtile intermixture of air 
 and water is the cause, it is well rendered ; but 
 nevertheless, is this the form of whiteness? No; but 
 it is the efficient, which is ever but " vehiculum 
 formse" (the vehicle of the form). 
 
 This part of metaphysic I do not find laboured 
 and performed; whereat I marvel not: because I 
 hold it not possible to be invented by that course of 
 invention which hath been used; in legard that 
 men, which is the root of all error, have made too 
 untimely a departure and too remote a recess from 
 particulars. 
 
 But the use of this part of metaphysic, which I 
 report as deficient, is of the rest the most excel- 
 lent in two respects: the one, because it is the 
 duty and virtue of all knowledge to abridge the 
 infinity of individual experience, as much as the 
 conception of truth will permit, and to remedy the 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 1G5 
 
 complaint of " vita brevis, ars longa" (life is short, 
 art long); which is performed by uniting the notions 
 and conceptions of sciences: for knowledges are as 
 pyramids, whereof history is the basis. So of Na- 
 tural Philosophy, the basis is natural history ; the 
 stage next the basis is physic ; the stage next the 
 vertical point is metaphysic. As for the vertical 
 point, " Opus quod operatur Deus a principio usque 
 ad finem" (the work wrought by God from the be- 
 ginning to the end), the summary law of nature, we 
 know not whether man's inquiry can attain unto it. 
 But these three be the true stages of knowledge, and 
 are to them that are depraved no better than the 
 giants' hills : 
 
 " Ter sunt conati imponere Pelio Ossam, 
 Scilicet, atque Ossge frondosum involvere Olym- 
 
 pum :" 
 (Ossa on Pelion thrice t'uplift they strove, 
 And high o'er nodding Ossa roll above 
 Olympus shagg'd with woods.) 
 But to those which refer all things to the glory of 
 God, they are as the three acclamations, " Sancte 
 sancte, sancte ;" holy in the description or dilatation 
 of his works ; holy in the connection or concatenation 
 of them; and holy in the union of them in a per- 
 petual and uniform law. 
 
 And therefore the speculation was excellent m 
 
166 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 Parmenides and Plato, although but a speculation 
 in them, that all things by scale did ascend to unity. 
 So then always that knowledge is worthiest, which is 
 charged with least multiplicity ; which appeareth to 
 be Metaphysic; as that which considereth the sim- 
 ple forms or differences of things, which are few in 
 number, and the degrees and co-ordinations whereof 
 make all this variety. 
 
 The second respect, which valueth and com- 
 mendeth this part of metaphysic, is that it doth en- 
 franchise the power of man unto the greatest liberty 
 and possibility of works and effects. For physic 
 carrieth men in narrow and restrained ways, subject 
 to many accidents of impediments, imitating the or- 
 dinary flexuous courses of nature; but " latos undi- 
 que sunt sapientibus viss" (to the wise the ways are 
 broad): to sapience, which was anciently defined to 
 be " rerum divinarum et humanarum scientia" (the 
 knowledge of things divine and human), there is 
 ever choice of means : for physical causes give light 
 to new invention " in simili materia" (in like mat- 
 ter). But whosoever knoweth any form, knoweth 
 the utmost possibility of superinducing that nature 
 upon any variety of matter ; and so is less restrained 
 in operation, either to the basis of the matter, or the 
 condition of the efficient: which kind of knowledge 
 Solomon likewise, though in a more divine sense, 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 167 
 
 elegantly describeth : " Non arctabuntur gressus 
 tui, et currens non habebis ofFendiculum" (when 
 thou goest. thy steps shall not be straitened ; and 
 when thou runnest, thou shalt not stumble). The 
 ways of sapience are not much liable either to par- 
 ticularity or chance. 
 
 The second part of Metaphysic is the inquiry of 
 final causes, which I am moved to report not as 
 omitted, but as misplaced ; and yet if it were but a 
 fault in order, I would not speak of it : for order is 
 matter of illustration, but pertaineth not to the sub- 
 stance of sciences. But this misplacing hath caused 
 a deficience, or at least a great improficience in the 
 sciences themselves. For the handling of final 
 causes, mixed with the rest in physical inquiries, 
 hath intercepted the severe and diligent inquiry of 
 all real and physical causes, and given men the 
 occasion to stay upon these satisfactory and specious 
 causes, to the great arrest and prejudice of farther 
 discovery. 
 
 For this I find done not only by Plato, who ever 
 anchoreth upon that shore, but by Aristotle, Galen, 
 and others, which do usually likewise fall upon these 
 flats of discoursing causes. For to say that the hairs 
 of the eye-lids are for a quickset and fence about the 
 sight ; or that the firmness of the skins and hides of 
 living creatures is to defend them from the extu 
 
168 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 ties of heat or cold ; or that the bones are for the 
 columns or beams, whereupon the frame of the 
 bodies of living creatures is built ; or that the leaves 
 of the trees are for the protecting of the fruit ; or 
 that the clouds are for the watering of the earth ; or 
 that the solidness of the earth is for the station and 
 mansion of living creatures, and the like, is well in- 
 quired and collected in metaphysic ; but in physic 
 they are impertinent. Nay, they are indeed but re- 
 moras and hinderances to stay and slug the ship 
 from farther sailing ; and have brought this to pass, 
 that the search of the physical causes hath been ne- 
 glected, and passed in silence. 
 
 And therefore the natural philosophy of Demo- 
 critus and some others, (who did not suppose a 
 mind or reason in the frame of things, but attributed 
 the form thereof, able to maintain itself, to infinite 
 essays or proofs of nature, which they term fortune,) 
 seemeth to me, as far as I can judge by the recital 
 and fragments which remain unto us, in particulari- 
 ties of physical causes, more real and better inquired 
 than that of Aristotle and Plato ; whereof both in- 
 termingled final causes, the one as a part of theology, 
 and the other as a part of logic, which were the 
 favourite studies respectively of both those persons. 
 Not because those final causes are not true, and 
 worthy to be inquired, being kept within their own 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 16*9 
 
 province ; but because their excursions into the 
 limits of physical causes hath bred a vastness and 
 solitude in that track. For otherwise, keeping 
 their precincts and borders, men are extremely 
 deceived if they think there is an enmity or repug- 
 nancy at all between them. For the cause rendered, 
 that the hairs about the eye-lids are for the safe- 
 guard of the sight, doth not impugn the cause ren- 
 dered, that pilosity is incident to orifices of mois- 
 ture ; " Muscosi fontes, &c." (mossy fountains, &c.) 
 Nor the cause rendered, that the firmness of hides is 
 for the armour of the body against extremities 
 of heat and cold, doth not impugn the cause ren- 
 dered, that contraction of pores is incident to the 
 outwardest parts, in regard of their adjacence to 
 foreign or unlike bodies ; and so of the rest : both 
 causes being true and compatible, the one declaring 
 an intention, the other a consequence only. 
 
 Neither doth this call in question, or derogate 
 from divine providence, but highly confirms and ex- 
 alts it. For as in civil actions he is the greater and 
 deeper politician, that can make other men the 
 instruments of his will and ends, and yet never ac- 
 quaint them with his purpose, so as they shall doit, 
 and yet not know what they do, than he that 
 imparteth Ins meaning to those he employeth ; so is 
 the wisdom of God more admirable, when nature 
 
170 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 intendeth one thing, and providence draweth forth 
 another, than if he had communicated to particular 
 creatures and motions the characters and impres- 
 sions of his providence. And thus much for meta- 
 physic; the latter part whereof I allow as extant, 
 but wish it confined to its proper place. 
 
 Nevertheless there remaineth yet another part 
 of natural philosophy, which is commonly made a 
 principal part, and holdeth rank with physic special 
 and metaphysic, which is Mathematic ; but I 
 think it more agreeable to the nature of things, and 
 to the light of order, to place it as a branch of me- 
 taphysic : for the subject of it being quantity, (not 
 quantity indefinite, which is but a relative, and 
 belongeth to " philosophia prima" (the first philoso- 
 phy), as hath been said, but quantity determined or 
 proportionable), it appeareth to be one of the essen- 
 tial forms of things ; as that that is causative in nature 
 of a number of effects ; insomuch as we see, in the 
 schools both of Democritus and of Pythagoras, that 
 the one did ascribe figure to the first seeds of 
 things, and the other did suppose numbers to be 
 the principles and originals of things : and it is true 
 also, that of all other forms, as we understand 
 forms, it is the most abstracted and separable from 
 matter, and therefore most proper to metaphysic ; 
 which hath likewise been the cause why it hath 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 171 
 
 been better laboured and inquired than any of 
 the other forms, which are more immersed in 
 matter. 
 
 For it being the nature of the mind of man, to 
 the extreme prejudice of knowledge, to delight in 
 the spacious liberty of generalities, as in a cham- 
 pain region, and not in the inclosures of par- 
 ticularity ; the mathematics of all other knowledge 
 were the goodliest fields to satisfy that appetite. 
 
 But for the placing of this science, it is not 
 much material ; only we have endeavoured, in these 
 our partitions, to observe a kind of perspective, that 
 one part may cast light upon another. 
 
 The Mathematics are either pure or mixed. To 
 the pure mathematics are those sciences belonging 
 which handle quantity determinate, merely severed 
 from any axioms of natural philosophy ; and these 
 are two ; Geometry and Arithmetic ; the one handl- 
 ing quantity continued, and the other dissevered. 
 
 Mixed hath for subject some axioms or parts of 
 natural philosophy, and considereth quantity deter- 
 mined, as it is auxiliary and incident unto them. 
 
 For many parts of nature can neither be in- 
 vented with sufficient subtilty, nor demonstrated 
 with sufficient perspicuity, nor accommodated unto 
 use with sufficient dexterity, without the aid and 
 rvening of the mathematics: of which sort art 
 
172 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 spective, music, astronomy, cosmography, architec- 
 ture, enginery, and divers others. 
 
 In the mathematics I can report no deficience, 
 except it be that men do not sufficiently understand 
 the excellent use of the pure mathematics, in that 
 they do remedy and cure many defects in the 
 wit and faculties intellectual. For, if the wit be too 
 dull, they sharpen it ; if too wandering, they fix it ; 
 if too inherent in the sense, they abstract it. So 
 that as tennis is a game of no use in itself, but 
 of great use in respect it maketh a quick eye and a 
 body ready to put itself into all postures ; so in the 
 mathematics, that use which is collateral and inter- 
 venient is no less worthy than that which is princi- 
 pal and intended. 
 
 And as for the mixed mathematics, I may only 
 make this prediction, that there cannot fail to be more 
 kinds of them, as nature grows further disclosed. 
 
 Thus much of natural science, or the part of 
 nature speculative. 
 
 For Natural Prudence, or the part operative 
 of natural philosophy, we will divide it into three 
 parts, experimental, philosophical, and magical ; 
 which three parts active have a correspondence and 
 analogy with the three parts speculative, natural 
 history, physic, and metaphysic : for many opera- 
 tions have been invented, sometimes by a casual in- 
 
ADVANCEMENT 0E LEARNING. 173 
 
 cidence and occurrence, sometimes by a purposed 
 experiment ; and of those which have been found by 
 an intentional experiment, some have been found 
 out by varying or extending the same experiment, 
 some by transferring and compounding divers experi- 
 ments the one into the other, which kind of inven- 
 tion an empiric may manage. 
 
 Again, by the knowledge of physical causes 
 there cannot fail to follow many indications and de- 
 signations of new particulars, if men in their specu- 
 lation will keep one eye upon use and practice. 
 But these are but coastings along the shore, " pre- 
 mendo littus iniquum" (keeping too close to the 
 dangerous coast) : for, it seemeth to me, there can 
 hardly be discovered any radical or fundamental 
 alterations and innovations in nature, either by the 
 fortune and essays of experiments, or by the light 
 and direction of physical causes. 
 
 If therefore we have reported metaphysic defi- 
 cient, it must follow that we do the like of natural 
 magic, which hath relation thereunto. For as for 
 the natural magic whereof now there is mention in 
 books, containing certain credulous and supersti- 
 tious conceits and observations of sympathies, and 
 antipathies, and hidden properties, and some frivo- 
 lous experiments, strange rather by disguisement 
 than in themselves ; it is as far differing in truth of 
 
174 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 nature from such a knowledge as we require, as the 
 story of king Arthur of Britain, or Hugh of Bour- 
 deaux, differs from Csesar's Commentaries in truth 
 of story. For it is manifest that Csesar did greater 
 things " de vero" (in reality) than those imaginary 
 heroes were feigned to do; but he did them not in 
 that fabulous manner. Of this kind of learning the 
 fable of Ixion was a figure, who designed to enjoy 
 Juno, the goddess of power; and instead of her had 
 copulation with a cloud, of which mixture were be- 
 gotten centaurs and chimeras. 
 
 So whosoever shall entertain high and vaporous 
 imaginations, instead of a laborious and sober in- 
 quiry of truth, shall beget hopes and beliefs of 
 strange and impossible shapes. And therefore we 
 may note in these sciences which hold so much of 
 imagination and belief, as this degenerate natural 
 magic, alchemy, astrology, and the like, that in their 
 propositions the description of the means is ever 
 more monstrous than the pretence or end. 
 
 For it is a thing more probable, that he that 
 knoweth well the natures of weight, of colour, of 
 pliant and fragile in respect of the hammer, of vola- 
 tile and fixed in respect of the fire, and the rest, 
 may superinduce upon some metal the nature and 
 form of gold by such mechanic as belongeth to the 
 production of the natures afore rehearsed, than that 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 175 
 
 some grains of the medicine projected should in a 
 few moments of time turn a sea of quicksilver or 
 other material into gold: so it is more probable, 
 that he that knoweth the nature of arefaction, the 
 nature of assimilation of nourishment to the thing 
 nourished, the manner of increase and clearing of 
 spirits, the manner of the depredations which spirits 
 make upon the humours and solid parts, shall by 
 ambages of diets, bathings, anointings, medicines, 
 motions, and the like, prolong life, or restore some 
 degree of youth or vivacity, than that it can be done 
 with the use of a few drops or scruples of a liquor 
 or receipt. To conclude therefore, the true natural 
 magic, which is that great liberty and latitude of 
 operation which dependeth upon the knowledge of 
 forms, I may report deficient, as the relative thereof 
 is. 
 
 To which part, if we be serious, and incline not 
 to vanities and plausible discourse, besides the de- 
 riving and deducing the operations themselves from 
 metaphysic, there are pertinent two points of much 
 purpose, the one by way of preparation, the other 
 by way of caution : the first is, that there be made 
 a calendar, resembling an inventory of the estate of 
 man, containing all the inventions, being the works 
 or fruits of nature or art, which are now extant, and 
 whereof man is already possessed; out of which 
 
176 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 doth naturally result a note, what things are yet 
 held impossible, or not invented : which calendar 
 will be the more artificial and serviceable, if to 
 every reputed impossibility you add what thing is 
 extant which cometh the nearest in degree to that 
 impossibility; to the end that by these optatives and 
 potentials man's inquiry may be the more awake in 
 deducing direction of works from the speculation of 
 causes : and secondly, that those experiments be not 
 only esteemed which have an immediate and pre- 
 sent use, but those principally which are of most 
 universal consequence for invention of other experi- 
 ments, and those which give most light to the in- 
 vention of causes; for the invention of the mariner's 
 needle, which giveth the direction, is of no less be- 
 nefit for navigation than the invention of the sails, 
 which give the motion. 
 
 Thus have I passed through natural philosophy, 
 and the deficiences thereof ; wherein if I have dif- 
 fered from the ancient and received doctrines, and 
 thereby shall move contradiction, — for my part, as 
 I affect not to dissent, so I purpose not to contend. 
 If it be truth, 
 
 " Non canimus surdis, respondent omnia sylvae :" 
 (Not to the deaf our notes in vain we sing, 
 Each wood shall with responsive echoes ring.) 
 The voice of nature will consent, whether the voice 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 17' 
 
 of man do or no. And as Alexander Borgia was 
 wont to say of the expedition of the French for 
 Naples, that they came with chalk in their hands to 
 mark up their lodgings, and not with weapons 
 to fight : so I like better that entry of truth which 
 cometh peaceably, with chalk to mark up those minds 
 which are capable to lodge and harbour it, than that 
 which cometh with pugnacity and contention. 
 
 But there remaineth a division of natural philo- 
 sophy according to the report of the inquiry, and 
 nothing concerning the matter or subject; and that 
 is positive and considerative ; when the inquiry 
 reporteth either an assertion or a doubt. These 
 doubts or " non liquets" are of two sorts, particular 
 and total. For the first, we see a good example 
 thereof in Aristotle's Problems, which deserved to 
 have had a better continuance ; but so neverthe- 
 less, as there is one point whereof warning is to be 
 given and taken. The registering of doubts hath 
 two excellent uses : the one, that it saveth philoso- 
 phy from errors and falshoods, when that which is 
 not fully appearing is not collected into assertion, 
 whereby error might draw error, but reserved in 
 doubt : the other, that the entry of doubts is as so 
 many suckers or spunges to draw use of knowledge ; 
 insomuch as that which, if doubts had not preceded, 
 
 N 
 
178 OF THE PItOi'lCIENCE AND 
 
 a man should never have advised, but passed it over 
 without note, by the suggestion and solicitation of 
 doubts is made to be attended and applied. But 
 both these commodities do scarcely countervail an 
 inconvenience which will intrude itself, if it be not 
 debarred ; which is, that when a doubt is once 
 received, men labor rather how to keep it a doubt 
 still, than how to solve it, and accordingly bend 
 their wits. Of this we see the familiar example in 
 lawyers and scholars, both which, if they have once 
 admitted a doubt, it goeth ever after authorised for a 
 doubt. But that use of wit and knowledge is 
 to be allowed, which laboreth to make doubtful 
 things certain, and not those which labor to make 
 certain things doubtful. Therefore these calendars 
 of doubts I commend as excellent things ; so that 
 there be this caution used, that when they be 
 thoroughly sifted and brought to resolution, they be 
 from thenceforth omitted, discarded, and not con- 
 tinued to cherish and encourage men in doubting. 
 To which calendar of doubts or problems, I advise 
 be annexed another calendar, as much or more 
 material, which is a calendar of popular errors ; I 
 mean chiefly in natural history, such as pass in 
 speech and conceit, and are nevertheless apparently 
 detected and convicted of untruth ; that man's know- 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 179 
 
 ledge be not weakened nor imbased by such dross 
 and vanity. 
 
 As for the doubts or " non liquets" general or 
 in total, I understand those differences of opinions 
 touching the principles of nature, and the funda- 
 mental points of the same, which have caused 
 the diversity of sects, schools, and philosophies, as 
 that of Empedocles, Pythagoras, Democritus, Par- 
 menides, and the rest. For although Aristotle, as 
 though he had been of the race of the Ottomans, 
 thought he could not reign, except the first thing he 
 did he killed all his brethren ; yet to those that 
 seek truth and not magistrality, it cannot but seem 
 a matter of great profit, to see before them the 
 several opinions touching the foundations of nature ; 
 not for any exact truth that can be expected in those 
 theories : for as the same phenomena in astronomy 
 are satisfied by the received astronomy of the 
 diurnal motion, and the proper motions of the 
 planets, with their eccentrics and epicyles, and like- 
 wise by the theory of Copernicus, who supposed the 
 earth to move, and the calculations are indifferently 
 agreeable to both ; so the ordinary face and view of 
 experience is many times satisfied by several theories 
 and philosophies ; whereas to find the real truth re- 
 (juireth another manner of severity and attention. 
 For as Aristotle saith, that children at the first will 
 
181) OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 call every woman mother, but afterward they come 
 to distinguish according to truth ; so experience, if 
 it be in childhood, will call every philosophy mother, 
 but when it cometh to ripeness, it will discern the 
 true mother. 
 
 So as in the mean time it is good to see the 
 several glosses and opinions upon nature, whereof it 
 may be every one in some one point hath seen 
 clearer than his fellows ; therefore I wish some col- 
 lection to be made painfully and understanding!^ 
 " de antiquis philosophhs" (of the ancient philoso- 
 phies), out of all the possible light which remaineth 
 to us of them : which kind of work 1 find deficient. 
 But here I must give warning, that it be done 
 distinctly and severally, the philosophies of every one 
 throughout by themselves, and not by titles packed 
 and faggotted up together, as hath been done by 
 Plutarch. For it is the harmony of a philosophy in 
 itself which giveth it light and credence ; whereas if 
 it be singled and broken, it will seem more foreign 
 and dissonant. For as when I read in Tacitus the 
 actions of Nero or Claudius, with circumstances 
 of times, inducements, and occasions, I find them 
 not so strange ; but when I read them in Suetonius 
 Tranquillus, gathered into titles and bundles, and 
 not in order of time, they seem more monstrous and 
 incredible: so is it of any philosophy reported 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. l&l 
 
 entire, and dismembered by articles. Neither do I 
 exclude opinions of latter times to be likewise repre- 
 sented in this calendar of sects of philosophy, as that 
 of Theophrastus Paracelsus, eloquently reduced into 
 an harmony by the pen of Severinus the Dane ; and 
 that of Tilesius, and his scholar Donius, being as 
 a pastoral philosophy, full of sense, but of no great 
 depth ; and that of Fracastorius, who, though he 
 pretended not to make any new philosophy, yet did 
 use the absoluteness of his own sense upon the old ; 
 and that of Gilbertus our countryman, who revived, 
 with some alterations and demonstrations, the 
 opinions of Xenophanes ; and any other worthy 
 to be admitted. 
 
 Thus have we now dealt with two of the three 
 beams of man's knowledge, that is " Radius directus" 
 (the direct ray), which is referred to nature ; " Ra- 
 dius refractus" (the refracted ray), which is referred 
 to God, and cannot report truly because of the 
 inequality of the medium : there resteth " Radius 
 reflexus" (the reflected ray), whereby man be- 
 holdeth and contemplateth himself. 
 
 We come therefore now to that knowledge 
 whereunto the ancient oracle directeth us, which is 
 the knowledge of ourselves ; which deserveth the 
 more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth 
 us more nearly. This knowledge, as it is the end 
 
182 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 and term of natural philosophy in the intention 
 of man, so notwithstanding, it is but a portion of na- 
 tural philosophy in the continent of nature : and 
 generally let this be a rule, that all partitions of 
 knowledges be accepted rather for lines and veins, 
 than for sections and separations ; and that the con- 
 tinuance and entireness of knowledge be preserved. 
 For the contrary hereof hath made particular sciences 
 to become barren, shallow, and erroneous, while 
 they have not been nourished and maintained from 
 the common fountain. So we see Cicero the orator 
 complained of Socrates and his school, that he was 
 the first that separated philosophy and rhetoric ; 
 whereupon rhetoric became an empty and verbal 
 art. So we may see that the opinion of Copernicus 
 touching the rotation of the earth, which astronomy 
 itself cannot correct, because it is not repugnant to 
 any of the phenomena, yet natural philosophy may 
 correct. So we see also that the science of me- 
 dicine, if it be destituted and forsaken by natural 
 philosophy, it is not much better than an empirical 
 practice. 
 
 With this reservation therefore we proceed to 
 Human Philosophy, or Humanity, which hath two 
 parts : the one considereth man segregate, or de- 
 stributively ; the other congregate, or in society. So 
 as human philosophy is either simple and particular. 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 183 
 
 or conjugate and civil. Humanity particular con- 
 sisteth of the same parts whereof man consisteth, that 
 is, of knowledges which respect the body, and of 
 knowledges that respect the mind; but before we 
 distribute so far, it is good to constitute. For 1 do 
 take the consideration in general, and at large, 
 of human nature to be fit to be emancipated and 
 made a knowledge by itself : not so much in regard 
 of those delightful and elegant discourses which have 
 been made of the dignity of man, of his miseries, 
 of his state and life, and the like adjuncts of his 
 common and undivided nature ; but chiefly in re- 
 gard of the knowledge concerning the sympathies 
 and concordances between the mind and body, 
 which being mixed cannot be properly assigned to 
 the sciences of either. 
 
 This knowledge hath two branches : for as 
 all leagues and amities consist of mutual intelli- 
 gence and mutual offices, so this league of mind 
 and body hath these two parts ; how the one dis- 
 closeth the other, and how the one worketh upon 
 the other; Discovery, and Impression. 
 
 The former of these hath begotten two arts, both 
 of prediction or prenotion ; whereof the one is ho- 
 nored with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the other 
 of Hippocrates. And although they have of later 
 tune been used to be coupled with superstitious and 
 
184 OF THE FROEICIENCE AND 
 
 fantastical arts ; yet being purged and restored to 
 their true state, they have both of them a solid 
 ground in nature, and a profitable use in life. The 
 first is physiognomy, which discovereth the dispo- 
 sition of the mind by the lineaments of the body : 
 the second is the exposition of natural dreams, 
 which discovereth the state of the body by the ima- 
 ginations of the mind. In the former of these I note 
 a deficience. For Aristotle hath very ingeniously and 
 diligently handled the features of the body, but not 
 the gestures of the body, which aie no less com- 
 prehensible by art, and of greater use and advan- 
 tage. For the lineaments of the body do disclose 
 the disposition and inclination of the mind in general; 
 but the motions of the countenance and parts do not 
 only so, but do farther disclose the present humor 
 and state of the mind and will. For as your ma- 
 jesty saith most aply and elegantly, " As the tongue 
 speaketh to the ear, so the gesture speaketh to the 
 eye." And therefore a number of subtle persons, 
 whose eyes do dwell upon the faces and fashions of 
 men, do well know the advantage of this observa- 
 tion, as being most part of their ability; neither can 
 it be denied, but that it is a great discovery of dis- 
 simulations, and a great direction in business. 
 
 The latter branch, touching impression, hath not 
 been collected into art, but hath been handled dis- 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. I8. e 
 
 persedly; but it hath the same relation or anti- 
 strophe that the former hath. For the consideration 
 is double : " Either how, and how far the humours 
 and affects of the body do alter or work upon the 
 mind ; or again, How and how far the passions or 
 apprehensions of the mind do alter or work upon 
 the body." The former of these hath been inquired 
 and considered as a part and appendix of medicine, 
 but much more as a part of religion or superstition. 
 For the physician prescribeth cures of the mind in 
 phrensies and melancholy passions ; and pretendeth 
 also to exhibit medicines to exhilarate the mind y 
 to confirm the courage, to clarify the wits, to corro- 
 borate the memory, and the like: but the scruples 
 and superstitions of diet and other regimen of the 
 body, in the sect of the Pythagoreans, in the heresy 
 of the Manicheans, and in the law of Mahomet, do 
 exceed. So likewise the ordinances in the ceremo- 
 nial law, interdicting the eating of the blood and fat, 
 distinguishing between beasts clean and unclean 
 for meat, are many and strict. Nay the faith itself, 
 being clear and serene from all clouds of ceremony, 
 yet retaineth the use of fastings, abstinences, and 
 other macerations and humiliations of the body, as 
 things real, and not figurative. The root and life of 
 all which prescripts is, besides the ceremony, the 
 consideration of that dependency which the affec- 
 
186 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 tions of the mind are submitted unto upon the state 
 and disposition of the body. And if any man of 
 weak judgment do conceive that this suffering of the 
 mind from the body doth either question the immor- 
 tality, or derogate from the sovereignty of the soul ; 
 he may be taught in easy instances, that the infant 
 in the mother's womb is compatible with the mother, 
 and yet separable; and the most absolute monarch 
 is sometimes led by his servants, and yet without 
 subjection. As for the reciprocal knowledge, which 
 is the operation of the conceits and passions of the 
 mind upon the body, we see all wise physi- 
 cians, in the prescriptions of their regimens to 
 their patients, do ever consider " accidentia ani- 
 mi" (the accidents of the mind) as of great 
 force to further or hinder remedies or recoveries; 
 and more specially it is an inquiry of great depth 
 and worth concerning imagination, how and how far 
 it altereth the body proper of the imaginant. For 
 although it hath a manifest power to hurt, it follow- 
 eth not it hath the same degree of power to help ; 
 no more than a man can conclude, that because 
 there be pestilent airs, able suddenly to kill a man 
 in health, therefore there should be sovereign airs, 
 able suddenly to cure a man in sickness. But the 
 inquisition of this part is of great use, though it 
 needeth, as Socrates said, " a Delian diver," being 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 1ST 
 
 difficult and profound. But unto all this know- 
 ledge " de communi vinculo" (of the common bond), 
 of the concordances between the mind ajad the 
 body, that part of inquiry is most necessary, which 
 considereth of the seats and domiciles which the 
 several faculties of the mind do take and occupate 
 in the organs of the body ; which knowledge hath 
 been attempted, and is controverted, and deserveth 
 to be much better inquired. For the opinion of 
 Plato, who placed the understanding in the brain, 
 animosity (which he did unfitly call anger, having a 
 greater mixture with pride) in the heart, and concu- 
 piscence or sensuality in the liver, deserveth not to 
 be despised, but much less to be allowed. So then 
 we have constituted, as in our own wish and advice, 
 the inquiry touching human nature entire, as a 
 just portion of knowledge to be handled apart. 
 
 The knowledge that concerneth man's body 
 is divided as the good of man's body is divided, 
 unto which it referreth. The good of man's body 
 is of four kinds, health, beauty, strength, and 
 pleasure : so the knowledges are medicine, or art of 
 cure ; art of decoration, which is called cosmetic ; 
 art of activity, which is called athletic ; and art 
 voluptuary, which Tacitus truly calleth " eruditus 
 luxus" (learned luxury). This subject of man's body 
 
188 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 is of all other things in nature most susceptible of 
 remedy; but then that remedy is most susceptible of 
 error. For the same subtilty of the subject doth 
 cause large possibility and easy failing ; and there- 
 fore the inquiry ought to be the more exact. 
 
 To speak therefore of medicine, and to resume 
 that we have said, ascending a little higher: the an- 
 cient opinion that man was microcosmus, an abstract 
 or model of the world, hath been fantastically 
 strained by Paracelsus and the alchemists, as if 
 there were to be found in man's body certain corre- 
 spondences and parallels, v/hich should have respect 
 to all varieties of things, as stars, planets, minerals, 
 which are extant in the great world. But thus much 
 is evidently true, that of all substances which nature 
 hath produced, man's body is the most extremely 
 compounded: for we see herbs and plants are 
 nourished by earth and water ; beasts for the most 
 part by herbs and fruits ; man by the flesh of beasts, 
 birds, fishes, herbs, grains, fruits, water, and the 
 manifold alterations, dressings, and preparations of 
 these several bodies, before they come to be his food 
 and aliment. Add hereunto, that beasts have a 
 more simple order of life, and less change of affec- 
 tions to work upon their bodies : whereas man in his 
 mansion, sleep, exercise, passions, hath infinite vari- 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 189 
 
 ations ; and it cannot be denied but that the body 
 of man of all other things is of the most compounded 
 mass. The soul on the other side is the simplest of 
 substances, as is well expressed: 
 
 " Purumque reliquit 
 iEthereum sensum atque aura'i simplicis ignem :" 
 (When the celestial fire, divinely bright, 
 Breaks forth victorious in her native light.) 
 So that it is no marvel though the soul so placed 
 enjoy no rest, if that principle be true, that " Motus 
 rerum est rapidus extra locum, placidus in loco" 
 (the motion of things is rapid beyond place, gentle 
 in place). But to the purpose: this variable com- 
 position of man's body hath made it as an instru- 
 ment easy to distemper; and therefore the poets did 
 well to conjoin music and medicine in Apollo; be- 
 cause the office of medicine is but to tune this curious 
 harp of man's body, and to reduce it to harmony. 
 
 So then the subject being so variable, hath made 
 the art by consequence more conjectural ; and art 
 being conjectural, hath made so much the more 
 place to be left for imposture. For almost all other 
 arts and sciences are judged by acts or master- 
 pieces, as I may term them, and not by the successes 
 and events. The lawyer is judged by the virtue 
 of his pleading, and not by issue of the cause. 
 The master of the ship is judged by the directing 
 
190 OF THE PItOFlCIENCE AttD 
 
 his course aright, and not by the fortune of the 
 voyage. But the physician, and perhaps the poli- 
 tician, hath no particular acts demonstrative of his 
 ability, but is judged most by the event ; which is 
 ever but as it is taken : for who can tell, if a patient 
 die or recover, or if a state be preserved or ruined, 
 whether it be art or accident ? And therefore many 
 times the impostor is prized, and the man of virtue 
 taxed. Nay, we see the weakness and credulity of 
 men is such, as they will often prefer a mountebank 
 or witch before a learned physician. And therefore 
 the poets were clear-sighted in discerning this ex- 
 treme folly, when they made iEsculapius and Circe 
 brother and sister, both children of the sun, as in 
 the verses; Mn. vii. 772. 
 
 " Ipse repertorem medicinse talis et artis 
 Fulmine Phoebigenam Stygias detrusit ad undas:" 
 (But Jove incens'd — 
 
 Great Phoebus' son, the godlike artist, hurl'd, 
 Transfixt with thunder, to the nether world.) 
 And again, iEn. vii. 11. 
 
 " Dives inaccessos ubi Solis filia lucos, &c." 
 (Circe, fair daughter of the god of day,) 
 A dangerous shore, &c. 
 For in all times, in the opinion of the multi- 
 tude, witches and old" women and impostors have 
 had a competition with physicians. And what 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. I 91 
 
 followeth ? Even this, that physicians say to them- 
 selves, as Solomon expresseth it upon an higher 
 occasion ; " If it befal to me as befalleth to the fools, 
 why should I labour to be more wise ?" And there- 
 fore I cannot much blame physicians, that they use 
 commonly to intend some other art or practice, 
 which they fancy more than their profession. For 
 you shall have of them, antiquaries, poets, hu- 
 manists, statesmen, merchants, divines, and in every 
 of these better seen than in their profession ; and no 
 doubt upon this ground, that they find that medio- 
 crity and excellency in their art maketh no difference 
 in profit or reputation towards their fortune ; for the 
 weakness of patients, and sweetness of life, and 
 nature of hope, maketh men depend upon phy- 
 sicians with all their defects. 
 
 But, nevertheless, these things which we have 
 spoken of, are courses begotten between a little 
 occasion, and a great deal of sloth and default; for 
 if we will excite and awake our observation, we shall 
 see in familiar instances what a predominant faculty 
 the subtilty of spirit hath over the variety of matter 
 or form. Nothing more variable than faces and 
 countenances ; yet men can bear in memory the infi- 
 nite distinctions of them ; nay, a painter with a few 
 shells of colours, and the benefit of his eye, and habit 
 of his imagination, can imitate them all that ever 
 
192 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 have been, are, or may be, if they were brought 
 before him. Nothing more variable than voices ; 
 yet men can likewise discern them personally ; nay, 
 you shall have a buffoon, or pantomimus, will ex- 
 press as many as he pleaseth. Nothing more 
 variable than the differing sounds of words ; yet men 
 have found the way to reduce them to a few simple 
 letters. So that it is not the insufficiency or incapa- 
 city of man's mind, but it is the remote standing or 
 placing thereof, that breedeth these mazes and in- 
 comprehensions : for as the sense afar off is full of 
 mistaking, but is exact at hand ; so it is of the un- 
 derstanding : the remedy whereof is, not to quicken 
 or strengthen the organ, but to go nearer to the ob- 
 ject; and therefore there is no doubt but if the 
 physicians will learn and use the true approaches 
 and avenues of nature, they may assume as much 
 as the poet saith : 
 
 " Et quoniam variant morbi, variabimus artes ; 
 Mille mali species, mille salutis erunt :" 
 (Our varying art to pains relief assures : 
 A thousand ills shall claim a thousand cures.) 
 Which that they should do, the nobleness of their 
 art doth deserve ; well shadowed by the poets, 
 in that they made iEsculapius to be the son of the 
 Sun, the one being the fountain of life, the other as 
 the second stream : but infinitely more honoured 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 193 
 
 by the example of our Saviour, who made the body of 
 man the object of his miracles, as the soul was the 
 object of his doctrine. For we read not that ever he 
 vouchsafed to do any miracle about honour or 
 money, except that one for giving tribute to Csesar, 
 but only about the preserving, sustaining, and heal- 
 ing the body of man. 
 
 Medicine is a science which hath been, as we 
 have said, more professed than laboured, and yet 
 more laboured than advanced ; the labour having 
 been, in my judgment, rather in circle than in pro- 
 gression. For I find much iteration, but small ad- 
 dition. It considereth the causes of diseases, with 
 the occasions or impulsions; the diseases them- 
 selves, with the accidents ; and the cures, with the 
 preservations. The deficiences which I think good 
 to note, being a few of many, and those such as are 
 of a more open and manifest nature, I will enu- 
 merate, and not place. 
 
 The first is the discontinuance of the ancient 
 and serious diligence of Hippocrates, which used 
 to set down a narrative of the special cases of his 
 patients, and how they proceeded, and how they 
 were judged by recovery or death. Therefore having 
 an example proper in the father of the art, I shall 
 not need to allege an example foreign, of the wis- 
 dom of the lawyers, who are careful to report new 
 
194 0F THE PRQFICIENCE AND 
 
 cases and decisions, for the direction of future judg- 
 ments. This continuance of Medicinal History I 
 find deficient ; which I understand neither to be so 
 infinite as to extend to every common case, nor so 
 reserved as to admit none but wonders : for many 
 things are new in the manner, which are not new 
 in the kind ; and if men will intend to observe, they 
 shall find much worthy to observe. 
 
 In the inquiry which is made by anatomy I find 
 much deficience : for they inquire of the parts, and 
 their substances, figures, and collocations ; but they 
 inquire not of the diversities of the parts, the secre- 
 cies of the passages, and the seats or nestlings of 
 the humours, nor much of the footsteps and impres- 
 sions of diseases : the reason of which omissions 
 I suppose to be, because the first inquiry may be 
 satisfied in the view of one or a few anatomies ; but 
 the latter, being comparative and casual, must arise 
 from the view of many. And as to the diversity of 
 parts, there is no doubt but the facture or framing 
 of the inward parts is as full of difference as the out- 
 ward, and in that is the cause continent of many dis- 
 eases ; which not being observed, they quarrel many 
 times with the humours, which are not in fault; 
 the fault being in the very frame and mechanic 
 of the part, which cannot be removed by medicine 
 alterative, but must be accommodated and palliated 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 195 
 
 by diets and medicines familiar. And for the 
 passages and pores, it is true which was anciently 
 noted, that the more subtile of them appear not in 
 anatomies, because they are shut and latent in dead 
 bodies, though they be open and manifest in live : 
 which being supposed, though the inhumanity of 
 " anatomia vivorum" (the dissection of living sub- 
 jects) was by Celsus justly reproved ; yet in regard 
 of the great use of this observation, the inquiry 
 needed not by him so slightly to have been relin- 
 quished altogether, or referred to the casual prac- 
 tices of surgery ; but might have been well diverted 
 upon the dissection of beasts alive, which, notwith- 
 standing the dissimilitude of their parts, may suffi- 
 ciently satisfy this inquiry. And for the humours, 
 they are commonly passed over in anatomies as pur- 
 gaments ; whereas it is most necessary to observe, 
 what cavities, nests, and receptacles the humours do 
 find in the parts, with the differing kind of the 
 humour so lodged and received. And as for the 
 footsteps of diseases, and their devastations of the 
 inward parts, imposthumations, exulcerations, dis- 
 continuations, putrefactions, consumptions, contrac- 
 tions, extensions, convulsions, dislocations, obstruc- 
 tions, repletions, together with all preternatural sub- 
 staaces, as stones, carnosities, excrescences, worms, 
 and the like: they ought to have been exacth 
 
196 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 observed by multitude of anatomies, and the contri- 
 bution of men's several experiences, and carefully 
 set down, both historically, according* to the ap- 
 pearances, and artificially, with a reference to the 
 diseases and symptoms which resulted from them, 
 in case where the anatomy is of a defunct patient ; 
 whereas now, upon opening of bodies, they are 
 passed over slightly and in silence. 
 
 In the inquiry of diseases, they do abandon the 
 cures of many, some as in their nature incurable, 
 and others as past the period of cure ; so that Sylla 
 and the triumvirs never proscribed so many men to 
 die, as they do by their ignorant edicts ; whereof 
 numbers do escape with less difficulty than they did 
 in the Roman proscriptions. Therefore I will not 
 doubt to note as a deficience, that they inquire not 
 the perfect cures of many diseases, or extremities of 
 diseases ; but, pronouncing them incurable, do 
 enact a law of neglect, and exempt ignorance from 
 discredit. 
 
 Nay farther, I esteem it the office of a physician 
 not only to restore health, but to mitigate pain and 
 dolors ; and not only when such mitigation may 
 conduce to recovery, but when it may serve to make 
 a fair and easy passage : for it is no small felicity 
 which Augustus Csesar was wont to wish to himself, 
 that same " euthanasia" (easy death), and which was 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARN 1>. G. 197 
 
 specially noted in the death of Antoninus Pius, 
 whose death was after the fashion and semblance of 
 a kindly and pleasant sleep. So it is written of 
 Epicurus, that after his disease was judged de- 
 sperate, he drowned his stomach and senses with a 
 large draught and ingurgitation of wine ; whereupon 
 the epigram was made, " Hinc Stygias ebrius hausit 
 aquas" (hence he drank the Stygian waters in a 
 state of ebriety) ; he was not sober enough to taste 
 any bitterness of the Stygian water. But the phy- 
 sicians, contrariwise, do make a kind of scruple and 
 religion to stay with the patient after the disease is 
 deplored ; whereas, in my judgment, they ought both 
 to inquire the skill, and to give the attendances, for 
 the facilitating and assuaging of the pains and 
 agonies of death. 
 
 In the consideration of the cures of diseases, 
 I find a deficience in the receipts of propriety, 
 respecting the particular cures of diseases : for the 
 physicians have frustrated the fruit of tradition and 
 experience by their magistralities, in adding, and 
 taking out, and changing " quid pro quo" (one thing 
 for another), in their receipts, at their pleasures; 
 commanding so over the medicine, as the medicine 
 cannot command over the disease: for except it be 
 treacle and mithridatum, and of late diascordium, 
 and a few more, they tie themselves to no rec< 
 
198 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 severely and religiously : for as to the confections of 
 sale which are in the shops, they are for readiness, 
 and not for propriety ; for they are upon general 
 intentions of purging, opening, comforting, altering, 
 and not much appropriate to particular diseases : 
 and this is the cause why empirics and old women 
 are more happy many times in their cures than 
 learned physicians, because they are more religious 
 in holding their medicines. Therefore here is the 
 deficience which I find, that physicians have not, 
 partly out of their own practice, partly out of the 
 constant probations reported in books, and partly 
 out of the traditions of empirics, set down and deli- 
 vered over certain experimental medicines for the 
 cure of particular diseases, besides their own con- 
 jectural and magistral descriptions. For as they 
 were the men of the best composition in the state of 
 Rome, which either being consuls inclined to the 
 people, or being tribunes inclined to the senate ; so 
 jn the matter we now handle, they be the best 
 physicians, which being learned incline to the tra- 
 ditions of experience, or being empirics incline to 
 the methods of learning. 
 
 In preparation of medicines, I do find strange, 
 especially considering how mineral medicines have 
 been extolled, and that they are safer for the out- 
 ward than inward parts, that no man hath sought to 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 199 
 
 make an imitation by art of natural baths and medi- 
 cinable fountains ; which nevertheless are confessed 
 to receive their virtues from minerals : and not 
 so only, but discerned and distinguished from what 
 particular mineral they receive tincture, as sulphur, 
 vitriol, steel, or the like ; which nature, if it may be 
 reduced to compositions of art, both the variety of 
 them will be increased, and the temper of them will 
 be more commanded , 
 
 But lest I grow to be more particular than 
 is agreeable either to my intention or to proportion, 
 I will conclude this part with the note of one de- 
 ficience more, which seemeth to me of greatest con- 
 sequence ; which is, that the prescripts in use are too 
 compendious to attain their end : for, to my under- 
 standing, it is a vain and flattering opinion to think 
 any medicine can be so sovereign or so happv, 
 as that the receipt or use of it can work any great 
 effect upon the body of man. It were a strange 
 speech, which, spoken, or spoken oft, should re- 
 claim a man from a vice to which he were by na- 
 ture subject : it is order, pursuit, sequence, and in- 
 terchange of application, which is mighty in nature . 
 which, although it require more exact knowledge in 
 prescribing, and more precise obedience in observ- 
 ing, yet is recompensed with the magnitude of 
 effects. And although a man would think, In ,lu 
 
200 OF THE PROFIC1ENCE AND 
 
 daily visitations of the physicians, that there were a 
 pursuance in the cure ; yet let a man look into their 
 prescripts and ministrations, and he shall find them 
 but inconstancies and every day's devices, without 
 any settled providence or project. Not that every 
 scrupulous or superstitious prescript is effectual, no 
 more than every straight way is the way to heaven ; 
 but the truth of the direction must precede severity 
 of observance. 
 
 For Cosmetic, it hath parts civil, and parts effe- 
 minate: for cleanness of body was ever esteemed to 
 proceed from a due reverence to God, to society, 
 and to ourselves. As for artificial decoration, it is 
 well worthy of the denciences which it hath ; being 
 neither fine enough to deceive, nor handsome to use, 
 nor wholesome to please. 
 
 For Athletic, I take the subject of it largely, 
 that is to say, for any point of ability whereunto 
 the body of man may be brought, whether it be of 
 activity, or of patience; whereof activity hath two 
 parts, strength and swiftness; and patience like- 
 , wise hath two parts, hardness against wants and 
 extremities, and indurance of pain or torment; 
 whereof we see the practices in tumblers, in savages, 
 and in those that suffer punishment : nay, if there 
 be any other faculty which falls not within any of 
 the former divisions, as in those that dive, that 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 201 
 
 obtain a strange power of containing respiration, and 
 the like, I refer it to this part. Of these things the 
 practices are known, but the philosophy that con- 
 cerneth them is not much inquired; the rather, I 
 think, because they are supposed to be obtained, 
 either by an aptness of nature, which cannot be 
 taught, or only by continual custom, which is soon 
 prescribed; which though it be not true, yet I for- 
 bear to note any deficiences: for the Olympian 
 games are down long since, and the mediocrity of 
 these things is for use ; as for the excellency of 
 them, it serveth for the most part but for mercenary 
 ostentation. 
 
 For arts of pleasure sensual, the chief deficience 
 in tnem is of laws to repress them. For as it hath 
 been well observed, that the arts which flourish in 
 times while virtue is in growth, are military; and 
 while virtue is in state, are liberal ; and while virtue- 
 is in declination, are voluptuary ; so I doubt that 
 this age of the world is somewhat upon the descent 
 of the wheel. With arts voluptuary I couple practices 
 joculary ; for the deceiving of the senses is one of 
 the pleasures of the senses. As for games of recre- 
 ation, I hold them to belong to civil life and educa- 
 tion. And thus much of that particular human 
 philosophy which concerns the bodv, which is but 
 the tabernacle of the mind. 
 
C 2Q C Z OF THE PHOFICIENCE AND 
 
 For Human Knowledge which concerns the 
 Mind, it hath two parts ; the one that inquireth of 
 the substance or nature of the soul or mind, the 
 other that inquireth of the faculties or functions 
 thereof. 
 
 Unto the first of these, the considerations of the 
 original of the soul, whether it be native or adven- 
 tive, and how far it is exempted from laws of matter, 
 and of the immortality thereof, and many other 
 points, do appertain : which have been not more la- 
 boriously inquired than variously reported; so as 
 the travail therein taken seemeth to have been rather 
 in a maze than in a way. But although I am of 
 opinion that this knowledge may be more really and 
 soundly inquired, even in nature, than it hath been ; 
 yet I hold that in the end it must be bounded by 
 religion, or else it will be subject to deceit and delu- 
 sion : for as the substance of the soul in the creation 
 was not extracted out of the mass of heaven and 
 earth by the benediction of a " producat" (let it 
 bring forth), but was immediately inspired from 
 God : so it is not possible that it should be, other- 
 wise than by accident, subject to the laws of heaven 
 and earth, which are the subject of philosophy ; 
 and therefore the true knowledge of the nature and 
 state of the soul, must come by the same inspiration 
 that gave the substance. Unto this part of know- 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 203 
 
 ledge touching the soul there be two appendices ; 
 which, as they have been handled, have rather va- 
 poured forth fables than kindled truth ; divination 
 and fascination. 
 
 Divination hath been anciently and fitly divided 
 into artificial and natural ; Avhereof artificial is, when 
 the mind maketh a prediction by argument, con- 
 cluding upon signs and tokens ; natural is, when the 
 mind hath a presention by an internal power, 
 without the inducement of a sign, Artificial is of 
 two sorts; either when the argument is coupled with 
 a derivation of causes, which is rational; or when 
 it is only grounded upon a coincidence of the effect, 
 which is experimental : whereof the latter for the 
 most part is superstitious : such as were the heathen 
 observations upon the inspection of sacrifices, the 
 flights of birds, the swarming of bees ; and such as 
 was the Chaldean astrology, and the like. For 
 artificial divination, the several kinds thereof are 
 distributed amongst particular knowledges. The 
 astronomer hath his predictions, as of conjunctions, 
 aspects, eclipses, and the like. The physician hath 
 his predictions of death, of recovery, of the accidents 
 and issues of diseases. The politician hath his pre- 
 dictions ; " O urbem venalem, et cito perituram, si 
 emptorem invenerit" (O venal city, which will soon 
 come to ruin if it should find a purchaser)! whfcl 
 
£04 01" TIJE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 stayed not long to be performed, in Sylla first, and 
 after in Csesar. So as these predictions are now im- 
 pertinent, and to be referred over. But the divi- 
 nation which springeth from the internal nature of 
 the soul, is that which we now speak of; which hath 
 been made to be of two sorts, primitive and by in- 
 fluxion. Primitive is grounded upon the supposi- 
 tion, that the mind, when it is withdrawn and col- 
 lected into itself, and not diffused into the organs of 
 the body, hath some extent and latitude of preno- 
 tion; which therefore appeareth most in sleep, in 
 extasies, and near death, and more rarely in waking 
 apprehensions; and is induced and furthered by 
 those abstinences and observances which make the 
 mind most to consist in itself: by influxion, is 
 grounded upon the conceit that the mind, as a 
 mirror or glass, should take illumination, from the 
 foreknowledge of God and spirits ; unto which the 
 same regimen doth likewise conduce. For the re- 
 tiring of the mind within itself, is the state which is 
 most susceptible of divine influxions ; save that it is 
 accompanied in this case with a fervency and ele- 
 vation, which the ancients noted by fury, and not 
 with a repose and quiet, as it is in the other. 
 
 Fascination is the power and act of imagination, 
 intensive upon other bodies than the body of the 
 imaginant ; for of that we spake in the proper place : 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. ^Ob 
 
 wherein the school of Paracelsus, and the disciples 
 of pretended natural magic, have been so intem- 
 perate, as they have exalted the power of the 
 imagination to be much one with the power of 
 miracle-working faith ; others, that draw nearer 
 to probability, calling to their view the secret pas- 
 sages of things, and specially of the contagion 
 that passeth from body to body, do conceive it 
 should likewise be agreeable to nature, that there 
 should be some transmissions and operations from 
 spirit to spirit, without the mediation of the senses ; 
 whence the conceits have grown, now almost made 
 civil, of the mastering spirit, and the force of confi- 
 dence, and the like. Incident unto this is the 
 inquiry how to raise and fortify the imagination : for 
 if the imagination fortified have power, then it is 
 material to know how to fortify and exalt it. And 
 herein comes in crookedly and dangerously a pallia- 
 tion of a great part of ceremonial magic. For it maybe 
 pretended that ceremonies, characters, and charms, 
 do work, not by any tacit or sacramental contract with 
 evil spirits, but serve only to strengthen the imagin- 
 ation of him that useth it ; as images are said by the 
 Roman church to fix the cogitations, and raise the 
 devotions of them that pray before them. But 
 for mine own judgment, if it be admitted that ima- 
 gination hath power, and that ceremonies fortify 
 
206 OF THE PROl'ICIENCE AND 
 
 imagination, and that they be used sincerely and 
 intentionally for that purpose ; yet I should hold 
 them unlawful, as opposing to that first edict which 
 God gave unto man, " In sudore vultus comedes 
 panem tuum" (in the sweat of thy face shalt thou 
 eat bread). For they propound those noble effects, 
 which God hath set forth unto man to be bought at 
 the price of labour, to be attained by a few easy and 
 slothful observances. Deflciences in these know- 
 ledges I will report none, other than the general de- 
 flcience, that it is not known how much of them is 
 verity, and how much vanity. 
 
 The knowledge which respecteth the faculties of 
 the mind of man is of two kinds ; the one respecting 
 his understanding and reason, and the other his will, 
 appetite, and affection ; whereof the former produceth 
 direction or decree, the latter action or execution. It 
 is true that the imagination is an agent, or " nun- 
 cius" (messenger), in both provinces, both the judi- 
 cial and the ministerial. For sense sendeth over to 
 imagination before reason have judged : and reason 
 sendeth over to imagination before the decree can be 
 acted ; for imagination ever precedeth voluntary 
 motion. Saving that this Janus of imagination hath 
 differing faces ; for the face towards reason hath the 
 print of truth, but the face towards action hath the 
 print of good ; which nevertheless are faces, 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 2(>7 
 
 " Quales decet esse sororum :" 
 (Such as the faces of sisters should be). 
 Neither is the imagination simply and only a mes- 
 senger ; but is invested with, or at leastwise usurpeth 
 no small authority in itself, besides the duty of the 
 message. For it was well said by Aristotle, " That 
 the mind hath over the body that commandment, 
 which the lord hath over a bondman ; but that reason 
 hath over the imagination that commandment which 
 a magistrate hath over a free citizen ;" who may 
 come also to rule in his turn. For we see that, 
 in matters of faith and religion, we raise our ima- 
 gination above our reason ; which is the cause why 
 religion sought ever access to the mind by simili- 
 tudes, types, parables, visions, dreams. And 
 again, in all persuasions that are wrought by 
 eloquence, and other impressions of like nature, 
 which do paint and disguise the true appearance of 
 things, the chief recommendation unto reason is 
 from the imagination. Nevertheless, because I find 
 not any science that doth properly or fitly pertain to 
 the imagination, I see no cause to alter the former 
 division. For as for poesy, it is rather a pleasure or 
 play of imagination, than a work or duty thereof. 
 And if it be a work, we speak not now of such parts 
 of learning as the imagination produceth, but of 
 such sciences as handle and consider of the ima- 
 
c 203 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 gination ; no more than we shall speak now of such 
 knowledges as reason produceth, for that extendeth 
 to all philosophy, but of such knowledges as do 
 handle and inquire of the faculty of reason : so as 
 poesy had its true place. As for the power of 
 the imagination in nature, and the manner of fortify- 
 ing the same, we have mentioned it in the doctrine 
 " De anuria" (of the soul), whereunto most fitly it 
 belongeth. And lastly, for imaginative or insinuative 
 reason, which is the subject of rhetoric, we think it 
 best to refer it to the arts of reason. So therefore 
 we content ourselves with the former division, that 
 Human Philosophy, which respecteth the faculties of 
 the mind of man, hath two parts, Rational and 
 Moral. 
 
 The part of Human Philosophy which is Ra- 
 tional, is of all knowledges, to the most wits, the least 
 delightful, and seemeth but a net of subtilty and 
 spinosity. For as it was truly said, that knowledge is 
 " pabulum animi" (the food of the mind) ; so in the 
 nature of men's appetite to this food, most men are 
 of the taste and stomach of the Israelites in the 
 desert, that would fain have returned " ad ollas car- 
 mum" (to the flesh pots), and were weary of manna ; 
 which, though it were celestial, yet seemed less nu- 
 tritive and comfortable. So generally men taste 
 well knowledges that are drenched in flesh and 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 209 
 
 blood, civil history, morality, policy, about the which 
 men's affections, praises, fortunes, do turn and 
 are conversant ; but this same " lumen siccum" 
 (dry light) doth parch and offend most men's 
 watery and soft natures. But, to speak truly of 
 things as they are in worth, rational knowledges are 
 the keys of all other arts ; for as Aristotle saith 
 aptly and elegantly, " That the hand is the instru- 
 ment of instruments, and the mind is the form of 
 forms ;" so these be truly said to be the art of arts : 
 neither do they only direct, but likewise confirm and 
 strengthen ; even as the habit of shooting doth not 
 only enable to shoot a nearer shoot, but also to draw 
 a stronger bow. 
 
 The arts intellectual are four in number ; divided 
 according to the ends whereunto they are referred : 
 for man's labour is to invent that which is sought or 
 propounded ; or to judge that which is invented ; or 
 to retain that which is judged ; or to deliver over that 
 which is retained. So as the arts must be four ; art 
 of inquiry or invention; art of examination or judg- 
 ment ; art of custody or memory ; and art of elocu- 
 tion or tradition. 
 
 Invention is of two kinds, much differing ; the 
 one, of arts and sciences ; and the other, of speech 
 and arguments. The former of these I do report 
 deficient; which seemeth to me to be such a defi- 
 
 p 
 
210 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 cience as if, in the making of an inventory touching 
 the state of a defunct, it should be set down, that 
 there is no ready money. For as money will fetch 
 all other commodities, so this knowledge is that 
 which should purchase all the rest. And like as the 
 West-Indies had never been discovered, if the use of 
 the mariner's needle had not been first discovered, 
 though the one be vast regions, and the other a 
 small motion; so it cannot be found strange if 
 sciences be no farther discovered, if the art itself of 
 invention and discovery hath been passed over. 
 
 That this part of knowledge is wanting, to my 
 judgment standeth plainly confessed : for first, logic 
 doth not pretend to invent sciences, or the axioms of 
 sciences, but passeth it over with a " cuique in sua 
 arte credendum" (every man is to be trusted in his 
 own art). And Celsus acknowledged it gravely, 
 speaking of the empirical and dogmatical sects of 
 physicians, " That medicines and cures were first 
 found out, and then after the reasons and causes 
 were discoursed ; and not the causes first found 
 out, and by light from them the medicines and 
 cures discovered/' And Plato, in his Thesetetus, 
 noteth well, " That particulars are infinite, and the 
 higher generalities give no sufficient direction ; and 
 that the pith of all sciences, which maketh the 
 axtsman differ from the inexpert, is in the middle 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 211 
 
 propositions, which in every particular knowledge 
 are taken from tradition and experience." And 
 therefore we see, that they which discourse of the 
 inventions and originals of things, refer them rather 
 to chance than to art, and rather to beasts, birds, 
 fishes, serpents, than to men. 
 
 " Dictamnum genetrix Cretsea carpit ab Ida, 
 Puberibus caulem foliis et flore comantem 
 Purpureo : non ilia feris incognita capris 
 Gramina, cum tergo volucres hsesere sagittse :" 
 (A branch of sov'reign dittany she bore, 
 From Ida gathered on the Cretan shore. 
 Luxuriant leaves the taper stalk array ; 
 The stalk in flow'rs, the flow'rs in purple gay. 
 The goats when pierc'd at distance by the dart, 
 Apply the med'cine to the wounded part). 
 So that it was no marvel, the manner of antiquity 
 being to consecrate inventors, that the ^Egyptians 
 had so few human idols in their temples, but 
 almost all brute. 
 
 " Omnigenumque Deum monstra, et latrator 
 
 Anubis, 
 Contra Neptunum, et Venerem, contraque Mi- 
 
 nervam, &c." 
 (Against great Neptune, in his strength array'd 
 And beauteous Venus, and the blue-ey'd maid, 
 Engage the dog Anubis, on the floods, 
 And the lewd herd of ^Egypt's monster gods). 
 
212 , OF THE PROiaCIENCE AND 
 
 And if you like better the tradition of the Grecians, 
 and ascribe the first inventions to men ; yet you will 
 rather believe that Prometheus first struck the 
 flints, and marvelled at the spark, than that when he 
 first struck the flints he expected the spark : and 
 therefore we see the West-Indian Prometheus had 
 no intelligence with the European, because of the 
 rareness with them of flint, that gave the first occa- 
 sion. So as it should seem, that hitherto men are 
 rather beholden to a wild goat for surgery, or to a 
 nightingale for music, or to the ibis for some part of 
 physic, or to the pot-lid that flew open for artillery, 
 or generally to chance, or any thing else, than to 
 logic, for the invention of arts and sciences. Neither 
 is the form of invention which Virgil describeth 
 much other : 
 
 " Ut varias usus meditando extunderet artes 
 
 Paulatim :" 
 
 (That studious want might useful arts contrive). 
 For if you observe the words well, it is no other 
 method than that which brute beasts are capable of, 
 and do put in use ; which is a perpetual intending 
 or practising some one thing, urged and imposed by 
 an absolute necessity of conservation of being : for 
 so Cicero saith very truly, " Usus uni rei deditus et 
 naturam et artem ssepe vincit" (practice applied 
 to one object often outstrips nature and art). And 
 therefore if it be said of men, 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 9A3 
 
 " Labor omnia vincit 
 Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egestas :" 
 (What cannot ceaseless toil, and pressing need !) 
 it is likewise said of beasts, " Quis psittaco docuit 
 suum xa/pe" (who taught the parrot to say Good 
 morrow ?) Who taught the raven in a drought to 
 throw pebbles into an hollow tree, where she espied 
 water, that the water might rise so as she might 
 come to it? Who taught the bee to sail through 
 such a vast sea of air, and to find the way from a 
 field in flower, a great way off, to her hive ? Who 
 taught the ant to bite every grain of corn that she 
 burieth in her hill, lest it should take root and 
 grow ? Add then the word " extundere" (to hammer 
 out), which importeth the extreme difficulty, and 
 the word " paulatim" (by degrees), which importeth 
 the extreme slowness, and we are where we were, 
 even amongst the ^Egyptians' gods; there being 
 little left to the faculty of reason, and nothing to 
 the duty of art, for matter of invention, 
 
 Secondly, the induction which the logicians 
 speak of, and which seemeth familiar with Plato, 
 (whereby the principles of sciences maybe pretended 
 to be invented, and so the middle propositions by 
 derivation from the principles ;) their form of induc- 
 tion, I say, is utterly vicious and incompetent : 
 wherein their error is the fouler, because it is the 
 
C Z\4 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 duty of art to perfect and exalt nature ; but they 
 contrariwise have wronged, abused, and traduced 
 nature. For he that shall attentively observe how 
 tjhe mind doth gather this excellent dew of know- 
 ledge, like unto that which the poet speaketh of, 
 u Aerei mellis ccelestia dona" (the heavenly gift of 
 aerial honey), distilling and contriving it out of par- 
 ticulars natural and artificial, as the flowers of the 
 field and garden, shall find that the mind of herself 
 by nature doth manage and act an induction much 
 better than they describe it. For to conclude upon 
 an enumeration of particulars, without instance con- 
 tradictory, is no conclusion, but a conjecture ; for 
 who can assure, in many subjects, upon those parti- 
 culars which appear of a side, that there are not on 
 the contrary side which appear not? As if 
 Samuel should have rested upon those sons of Jesse 
 which were brought before him, and failed of David, 
 which was in the field* And this form, to say 
 truth, is so gross, as it had not been possible for 
 wits so subtile as have managed these things to 
 have offered it to the world, but that they hasted to 
 their theories and dogmaticals, and were imperious 
 and scornful toward particulars ; which their manner 
 was to use but as " lictores and viatores," for Ser- 
 jeants and whifrlers, " ad summovendam turbam" (to 
 drive away the crowd), to make way and make room 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 21C 
 
 for their opinions, rather than in their true use and 
 service. Certainly it is a thing may touch a man 
 with a religious wonder, to see how the footsteps of 
 seducement are the very same in divine and human 
 truth : for as in divine truth man cannot endure to 
 become as a child ; so in human, they reputed the 
 attending the inductions whereof we speak, as if it 
 were a second infancy or childhood. 
 
 Thirdly, allow some principles or axioms were 
 rightly induced, yet nevertheless certain it is that 
 middle propositions cannot be deduced from them 
 in subject of nature by syllogism, that is, by touch 
 and reduction of them to principles in a middle term. 
 It is true that in sciences popular, as moralities, 
 laws, and the like, yea and divinity (because it 
 pleaseth God to apply himself to the capacity of the 
 simplest), that form may have use ; and in natural 
 philosophy likewise, by way of argument or satisfac- 
 tory reason, " Quse assensum parit, operis effoeta 
 est" (what produces assent, has accomplished its 
 object) : but the subtilty of nature and operations 
 will not be inchained in those bonds : for arguments 
 consist of propositions, and propositions of words ; 
 and words are but the current tokens or marks of 
 popular notions of things ; which notions, if they be 
 grossly and variably collected out of particulars, it 
 is not the laborious examination either of cons< 
 
216 OF THE PI10FIC1ENCE AND 
 
 quences of arguments, or of the truth of proposi- 
 tions, that can ever correct that error, being, as the 
 physicians speak, in the first digestion : and there- 
 fore it was not without cause, that so many excellent 
 philosophers became sceptics and academics, and 
 denied any certainty of knowledge or comprehen- 
 sion ; and held opinion, that the knowledge of man 
 extended only to appearances and probabilities. It 
 is true that in Socrates it was supposed to be but a 
 form of irony, " Scientiam dissimulando simulavit" 
 (he made pretensions to knowledge by dissembling 
 it) ; for he used to disable his knowledge, to the 
 end to enhance his knowledge; like the humour 
 of Tiberius in his beginnings, that would reign, 
 but would not acknov/ledge so much : and in 
 the later Academy, which Cicero embraced, this 
 opinion also of " acatalepsia" (incomprehensible- 
 ness), I doubt, was not held sincerely : for that all 
 those which excelled in " copia" (abundance) of 
 speech seem to have chosen that sect, as that which 
 was fittest to give glory to their eloquence and vari- 
 able discourses ; being rather like progresses of 
 pleasure, than journeys to an end. But assuredly 
 many scattered in both Academies did hold it in 
 subtilty and integrity : but here was their chief 
 error ; they charged the deceit upon the senses ; 
 which in my judgment, notwithstanding all their ca- 
 
ADVANCEMENT CF LEARNING. ( 2 I ' 
 
 villations, are very sufficient to certify and report 
 truth, though not always immediately, yet by com- 
 parison, by help of instrument, and by producing 
 and urging such things as are too subtile for the 
 sense to some effect comprehensible by the sense, 
 and other like assistance. But they ought to have 
 charged the deceit upon the weakness of the intel- 
 lectual powers, and upon the manner of collecting 
 and concluding upon the reports of the senses. 
 This I speak, not to disable the mind of man, but to 
 stir it up to seek help : for no man, be he never so 
 cunning or practised, can make a straight line or 
 perfect circle by steadiness of hand, which may 
 be easily done by help of a ruler or compass. 
 
 This part of invention, concerning the invention 
 of sciences, I purpose, if God give me leave, here- 
 after to propound, having digested it into two parts ; 
 whereof the one 1 term " experientia literata" 
 (learned experience), and the other, " interpretatio 
 naturse" (the interpretation of nature) : the former 
 being but a degree and rudiment of the latter. But 
 I will not dwell too long, nor speak too much upon 
 a promise. 
 
 The invention of speech or argument is not pro- 
 perly an invention ; for to invent is to discover that 
 we know not, and not to recover or resummon that 
 which we already know: and the use of this inven- 
 
 ** 
 
218 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 tion is no other but, out of the knowledge whereof 
 our mind is already possessed, to draw forth or call 
 before us that which may be pertinent to the 
 purpose which we take into our consideration. So 
 as, to speak truly, it is no invention, but remem- 
 brance or suggestion, with an application ; which is 
 the cause why the schools do place it after judg- 
 ment, as subsequent and not precedent. Neverthe- 
 less, because we do account it a chace, as well of deer 
 in an inclosed park, as in a forest at large, and that 
 it hath already obtained the name, let it be called 
 invention ; so as it be perceived and discerned, that 
 the scope and end of this invention is readiness and 
 present use of our knowledge, and not addition 
 or amplification thereof. 
 
 To procure this ready use of knowledge there 
 are two courses, preparation and suggestion. The 
 former of these seemeth scarcely a part of know- 
 ledge, consisting rather of diligence than of any ar- 
 tificial erudition. And herein Aristotle wittily, but 
 hurtfully, doth deride the sophists near his time, 
 saying, " They did as if one that professed the art 
 of shoe-making should not teach how to make up a 
 shoe, but only exhibit in a readiness a number of 
 shoes of all fashions and sizes." But yet a man 
 might reply, that if a shoemaker should have no 
 shoes in his shop, but only work as he is bespoken, 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 219 
 
 he should be weakly customed. But our Saviour, 
 speaking of divine knowledge, saith, that the king- 
 dom of heaven is like a good householder, that 
 bringeth forth new and old store : and we see the 
 ancient writers of rhetoric do give it in precept, 
 that pleaders should have the places, whereof they 
 have most continual use, ready handled in all the 
 variety that may be ; as that, to speak for the literal 
 interpretation of the law against equity, and con- 
 trary ; and to speak for presumptions and inferences 
 against testimony, and contrary. And Cicero him- 
 self, being broken unto it by great experience, deli- 
 vereth it plainly, that whatsoever a man shall have 
 occasion to speak of, if he will take the pains, he 
 may have it in effect premeditate, and handled " in 
 thesi" (in a thesis, or general argument) ; so that 
 when he cometh to a particular, he shall have 
 nothing to do, but to add names, and times, and 
 places, and such other circumstances of individuals. 
 We see likewise the exact diligence of Demos- 
 thenes ; who, in regard of the great force that the 
 entrance and access into causes hath to make a 
 good impression, had ready framed a number of 
 prefaces for orations and speeches. All which 
 authorities and precedents may overweigh Aristotle's 
 opinion, that would have us change a rich wardrobe 
 for a pair of shears* 
 
220 OF THE PROEICIENCE AND 
 
 But the nature of the collection of this provision 
 or preparatory store, though it be common both 
 to logic and rhetoric, yet having made an entry 
 of it here, where it came first to be spoken of, I 
 think fit to refer over the farther handling of it to 
 rhetoric. 
 
 The other part of invention, which I term sug- 
 gestion, doth assign and direct us to certain marks 
 or places, which may excite our mind to return and 
 produce such knowledge as it hath formerly col- 
 lected, to the end we may make use thereof. Neither 
 is this use, truly taken, only to furnish argument to 
 dispute probably with others, but likewise to minister 
 unto our judgment to conclude aright within our- 
 selves. Neither may these places serve only to 
 prompt our invention, but also to direct our inquiry. 
 For a faculty of wise interrogating is half a know- 
 ledge. For as Plato saith, " Whosoever seeketh, 
 knoweth that which he seeketh for in a general 
 notion ; else how shall he know it when he hath 
 found it ?" And therefore the larger your anticipa- 
 tion is, the more direct and compendious is your 
 search. But the same places which will help us 
 what to produce of that which we know already, 
 will also help us, if a man of experience were before 
 us, what questions to ask ; or, if we have books and 
 authors to instruct us, v/hat points to search and 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 221 
 
 resolve : so as I cannot report that this part of 
 invention, which is that which the schools call 
 topics, is deficient. 
 
 Nevertheless topics are of two sorts, general and 
 special. The general we have spoken to ; but the 
 particular hath been touched by some, but rejected 
 generally as inartificial and variable. But leaving 
 the humour which hath reigned too much in the 
 schools, which is, to be vainly subtile in a few things 
 which are within their command, and to reject the 
 rest; I do receive particular topics, (that is, places or 
 directions of invention and inquiry in every particu- 
 lar knowledge,) as things of great use, being mix- 
 tures of logic with the matter of sciences : for in 
 these it holdeth, " Ars inveniendi adolescit cum in- 
 ventis" (the art of inventing gains strength by inven- 
 tions) ; for as in going of a way, we do not only 
 gain that part of the way which is passed, but 
 we gain the better sight of that part of the way 
 which remaineth ; so every degree of proceeding in a 
 science giveth a. light to that which followeth ; 
 which light if we strengthen, by drawing it forth 
 into questions or places of inquiry, we do greatly 
 advance our pursuit. 
 
 Now we pass unto the arts of judgment, which 
 handle the natures of proofs and demonstrations ; 
 which as to induction hath a coincidence with inven- 
 
222 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 tion : for in all inductions, whether in good or 
 vicious form, the same action of the mind which 
 inventeth, judge th ; all one as in the sense : but 
 otherwise it is in proof by syllogism ; for the proof 
 being not immediate, but by mean, the invention of 
 the mean is one thing, and the judgment of the 
 consequence is another ; the one exciting only, the 
 other examining. Therefore, for the real and 
 exact form of judgment, we refer ourselves to 
 that which we have spoken of interpretation of 
 nature. 
 
 For the other judgment by syllogism, as it is 
 a thing most agreeable to the mind of man, so it 
 hath been vehemently and excellently laboured ; for 
 the nature of man doth extremely covet to have 
 somewhat in his understanding fixed and immove- 
 able, and as a rest and support of the mind. And 
 therefore as Aristotle endeavoureth to prove, that in 
 all motion there is some point quiescent; and as he 
 elegantly expoundeth the ancient fable of Atlas, 
 that stood fixed, and bore up the heaven from fall- 
 ing, to be meant of the poles or axle-tree of heaven, 
 whereupon the conversion is accomplished ; so 
 assuredly men have a desire to have an Atlas or 
 axle-tree within, to keep them from fluctuation, 
 which is like to a perpetual peril of falling ; there- 
 fore men did hasten to set down some principles 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 223 
 
 about which the variety of their disputations might 
 turn. 
 
 So then this art of judgment is but the reduc- 
 tion of propositions to principles in a middle term : 
 the principles to be agreed by all, and exempted 
 from argument ; the middle term to be elected at the 
 liberty of every man's invention ; the reduction to 
 be of two kinds, direct and inverted ; the one, when 
 the proposition is reduced to the principle, which 
 they term a probation ostensive ; the other, when 
 the contradictory of the proposition is reduced to 
 the contradictory of the principle, which is that 
 which they call " per incommodum," or pressing an 
 absurdity ; the number of middle terms to be as 
 the proposition standeth degrees more or less re- 
 moved from the principle. 
 
 But this art hath two several methods of doc- 
 trine, the one by way of direction, the other by way 
 of caution : the former frameth and setteth down a 
 true form of consequence, by the variations and de- 
 flections from which errors and inconsequences may 
 be exactly judged: toward the composition and struc- 
 ture of which form, it is incident to handle the parts 
 thereof, which are propositions, and the parts of 
 propositions, which are simple words : and this 
 is that part of logic which is comprehended in 
 the analytics. 
 
224 OF THE PROEICIENCE AND 
 
 The second method of doctrine was introduced 
 for expedite use and assurance sake ; discovering 
 the more subtile forms of sophisms and illaqueations 
 with their redargutions, which is that which is 
 termed elenches. For although in the more gross 
 sorts of fallacies it happeneth, as Seneca maketh 
 the comparison well, as in juggling feats, which 
 though we know not how they are done, yet we 
 know well it is not as it seemeth to be ; yet the 
 more subtile sort of them doth not only put a man 
 beside his answer, but doth many times abuse his 
 judgment. 
 
 This part concerning elenches is excellently 
 handled by Aristotle in precept, but more excellently 
 by Plato in example, not only in the persons of the 
 sophists, but even in Socrates himself; who pro- 
 fessing to affirm nothing, but to infirm that which 
 was affirmed by another, hath exactly expressed all 
 the forms of objection, fallacy, and redargution. 
 And although we have said that the use of this 
 doctrine is for redargution ; yet it is manifest, 
 the degenerate and corrupt use is for caption and 
 contradiction, which passeth for a great faculty, 
 and no doubt is of very great advantage : though 
 the difference be good which was made between 
 orators and sophisters, that the one is as the 
 greyhound, which hath his advantage in the rape, 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. '225 
 
 and the other as the hare, which hath her advan- 
 tage in the turn, so as it is the advantage of the 
 weaker creature. 
 
 But yet farther, this doctrine of elenches hath 
 a more ample latitude and extent than is perceived ; 
 namely, unto divers parts of knowledge ; whereof 
 some are laboured and others omitted. For first, I 
 conceive, though it may seem at first somewhat 
 strange, that that part which is variably referred, 
 sometimes to logic, sometimes to metaphysic, touch- 
 ing the common adjuncts of essences, is but an 
 elench ; for the great sophism of all sophisms being 
 equivocation or ambiguity of words and phrase, (espe- 
 cially of such words as are most general, and inter- 
 vene in every inquiry,) it seemeth to me that the 
 true and fruitful use, leaving vain subtilties and 
 speculations, of the inquiry of majority, minority, 
 priority, posteriority, identity, diversity, possibility, 
 act, totality, parts, existence, privation, and the 
 like, are but wise cautions against ambiguities of 
 ipeech. So again, the distribution of things into 
 certain tribes, which we call categories or predi- 
 cts, are but cautions against the confusion of 
 definitions and divisions. 
 
 Secondly, there is a seducement that worketh 
 
 'lie strength of the impression, and not by the 
 
 subtilty of the illaqueation ; not so much perplexing 
 
 Q 
 
226 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 the reason, as overruling it by power of the ima- 
 gination. But this part I think more proper to 
 handle when I shall speak of rhetoric. 
 
 But lastly, there is yet a much more important 
 and profound kind of fallacies in the mind of man, 
 which I find not observed or inquired at all, and 
 think good to place here, as that which of all 
 others appertaineth most to rectify judgment : the 
 force whereof is such, as it doth not dazzle or snare 
 the understanding in some particulars, but doth 
 more generally and inwardly infect and corrupt the 
 state thereof. For the mind of man is far from the 
 nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the 
 beams of things should reflect according to their 
 true incidence ; nay, it is rather like an inchanted 
 glass, full of superstition and imposture, if it be not 
 delivered and reduced. For this purpose, let us 
 consider the false appearances that are imposed 
 upon us by the general nature of the mind, be- 
 holding them in an example or two ; as first, in that 
 instance which is the root of all superstition, 
 namely, That to the nature of the mind of all men it 
 is consonant for the affirmative or active to affect 
 more than the negative or privative : so that a few 
 times hitting, or presence, countervails oft-times 
 failing, or absence; as was well answered by 
 Diagoras to him that shewed him in Neptune's 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 227 
 
 temple the great number of pictures of such as had 
 escaped shipwreck, and had paid their vows to Nep- 
 tune, saying, " Advise now, you that think it folly to 
 invocate Neptune in tempest :" " Yea, but," saith Dia- 
 goras, " where are they painted that are drowned ?" 
 Let us behold it in another instance, namely, That 
 the spirit of man, being of an equal and uniform 
 substance, doth usually suppose and feign in nature 
 a greater equality and uniformity than is in truth. 
 Hence it cometh, that the mathematicians cannot 
 satisfy themselves, except they reduce the motions 
 of the celestial bodies to perfect circles, rejecting 
 spiral lines, and labouring to be discharged of 
 eccentrics. Hence it cometh, that whereas there 
 are many things in nature, as it were "monodica, sui 
 juris" (uniques, of a nature peculiar to them- 
 selves); yet the cogitations of man do feign unto 
 them relatives, parallels, and conjugates, whereas 
 no such thing is ; as they have feigned an element 
 of fire, to keep square with earth, water, and air, 
 and the like : nay, it is not credible, till it be 
 opened, what a number of fictions and fancies the 
 similitude of human actions and arts, together with 
 the making of man " communis mensura" (the com- 
 mon measure), have brought into natural philoso- 
 phy ; not much better than the heresy of the A 11- 
 th ropomorphites, bred in the cells of o-ross and 
 
r 2 c 28 OF THE PROF1CIKNCE AND 
 
 solitary monks, and the opinion of Epicurus, an- 
 swerable to the same in heathenism, who supposed 
 the gods to be of human shape. And therefore 
 Velleius the Epicurean needed not to have asked, 
 why God should have adorned the heavens with 
 stars, as if he had been an iEdilis, one that should 
 have set forth some magnificent shews or plays. 
 For if that great Work-master had been of an human 
 disposition, he would have cast the stars into some 
 pleasant and beautiful works and orders, like the 
 frets in the roofs of houses ; whereas one can scarce 
 find a posture in square, or triangle, or straight line, 
 amongst such an infinite number ; so differing an 
 harmony there is between the spirit of man and the 
 spirit of nature. 
 
 Let us consider again the false appearances 
 imposed upon us by every man's own individual 
 nature and custom, in that feigned supposition that 
 Plato maketh of the cave ; for certainly if a child 
 were continued in a grot or cave under the earth 
 until maturity of age, and came suddenly abroad, he 
 would have strange and absurd imaginations. So in 
 like manner, although our persons live in the view of 
 heaven, yet our spirits are included in the caves of 
 our own complexions and customs, which minister 
 unto us infinite errors and vain opinions, if they be 
 iiot recalled to examination. But hereof we have 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 299 
 
 given many examples in one of the errors, or peccant 
 humours, which we ran briefly over in our first 
 book. 
 
 And lastly, let us consider the false appearances 
 that are imposed upon us by words, which are 
 framed and applied according to the conceit and 
 capacities of the vulgar sort : and although we think 
 we govern our words, and prescribe it w r ell " Lo- 
 quendum ut vulgus, sentiendum ut sapientes" (speak 
 with the vulgar, think with the wise) ; yet certain it 
 is that words, as a Tartar's bow, do shoot back 
 upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily 
 entangle and pervert the judgment; so as it is 
 almost necessary, in all controversies and disputa- 
 tions, to imitate the wisdom of the mathematicians, 
 in setting down in the very beginning the definitions 
 of our words and terms, that others may know 
 how we accept and understand them, and whether 
 they concur with us or no. For it cometh to pass, 
 for want of this, that we are sure to end there 
 where we ought to have begun, which is, in ques- 
 tions and differences about words. To conclude 
 therefore, it must be confessed that it is not pos- 
 sible to divorce ourselves from these fallacies and 
 false appearances, because they are inseparable 
 from our nature and condition of life ; so yet 
 nevertheless the caution of them, (for all elenches, 
 
230 OF THE PR0E1CIEJSICE AND 
 
 as was said, are but cautions,) doth extremely 
 import the true conduct of human judgment. The 
 particular elenches or cautions against these three 
 false appearances, I find altogether deficient. 
 
 There remaineth one part of judgment of great 
 excellency, which to mine understanding is so 
 slightly touched, as I may report that also deficient ; 
 which is the application of the differing kinds of 
 proofs to the differing kinds of subjects : for there 
 being but four kinds of demonstrations, that is, 
 by the immediate consent of the mind or sense, 
 by induction, by syllogism, and by congruity, 
 (which is that which Aristotle calleth demonstration 
 in orb or circle, and not " a notioribus" (from things 
 more known ;) every of these hath certain subjects in 
 the matter of sciences, in which respectively they 
 have chiefest use ; and certain others, from which 
 respectively they ought to be excluded : and the ri- 
 gour and curiosity in requiring the more severe proofs 
 in some things, and chiefly the facility in contenting 
 ourselves with the more remiss proofs in others, 
 hath been amongst the greatest causes of detriment 
 and hindrance to knowledge. The distributions 
 and assignations of demonstrations, according to 
 the analogy of sciences, I note as deficient. 
 
 The custody or retaining of knowledge is either 
 in writing or memory ; whereof writing hath two 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 231 
 
 parts, the nature of the character, and the order of 
 the entry : for the art of characters, or other visible 
 notes of words or things, it hath nearest conjugation 
 with grammar ; and therefore I refer it to the due 
 place : for the disposition and collocation of that 
 knowledge which we preserve in writing, it con- 
 sisteth in a good digest of common-places ; wherein 
 I am not ignorant of the prejudice imputed to 
 the use of common-place books, as causing a retar- 
 dation of reading, and some sloth or relaxation 
 of memory. But because it is but a counterfeit thing 
 in knowledges to be forward and pregnant, except 
 a man be deep and full ; I hold the entry of com- 
 mon-places to be a matter of great use and essence 
 in studying, as that which assureth " copia" (plenty) 
 of invention, and contracteth judgment to a strength. 
 But this is true, that of the methods of common- 
 places that I have seen, there is none of anv 
 sufficient worth ; all of them carrying merely the 
 face of a school, and not of a world ; and referring 
 to vulgar matters and pedantical divisions, without 
 all life, or respect to action. 
 
 For the other principal part of the custody of 
 knowledge, which is memory, I find that faculty in 
 my judgment weakly inquired of. An art there is 
 extant of it ; but it seemeth to me that there are 
 better precepts than that art, and better practices of 
 
23% Of THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 that art, than those received. It is certain the art, as 
 it is, may be raised to points of ostentation prodi- 
 gious : but in use, as it is now managed, it is 
 barren, (not burdensome, nor dangerous to natural 
 memory, as is imagined, but barren,) that is, not 
 dexterous to be applied to the serious use of bu- 
 siness and occasions. And therefore I make no 
 more estimation of repeating a great number of 
 names or words upon once hearing, or the pouring 
 forth of a number of verses or rhimes ex tempore, 
 or the making of a satirical simile of every thing, or 
 the turning of every thing to a jest, or the falsifying 
 or contradicting of every thing by cavil, or the like, 
 (whereof in the faculties of the mind there is great 
 u copia" (plenty), and such as by device and prac- 
 tice may be exalted to an extreme degree of 
 wonder,) than I do of the tricks of tumblers, funam- 
 buloes, baladines ; the one being the same in the 
 mind that the other is in the body, matters of 
 strangeness without worthiness. 
 
 This art of memory is but built upon two inten- 
 tions; the one prenotion, the other emblem. Pre- 
 notion dischargeth the indefinite seeking of that we 
 would remember, and directeth us to seek in a 
 narrow compass, that is, somewhat that hath con- 
 fruity with our place of memory. Emblem re- 
 duceth conceits intellectual to images sensible, 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 
 
 which strike the memory more ; out of which ax- 
 ioms may be drawn much better practice than that 
 in use ; and besides which axioms, there are divers 
 more touching help of memory, not inferior to 
 them. But I did in the beginning distinguish, not 
 to report those things deficient, which are but onlv 
 ill managed. 
 
 There remaineth the fourth kind of rational know- 
 ledge, which is transitive, concerning the expressing 
 or transferring our knowledge to others ; which I 
 will term by the general name of tradition or de- 
 livery. Tradition hath three parts : the first con- 
 cerning the organ of tradition ; the second concern - 
 ing the method of tradition; and the third concern- 
 ing the illustration of tradition. 
 
 For the organ of tradition, it is either speech or 
 writing: for Aristotle saith well, " Words are the 
 images of cogitations, and letters are the images of 
 words;" but yet it is not of necessity that cogitations 
 be expressed by the medium of words. For what- 
 soever is capable of sufficient differences, and those 
 perceptible by the sense, is in nature competent to 
 express cogitations. And therefore we see in the 
 commerce of barbarous people, that understand not 
 one another's language, and in the practice of divers 
 that are dumb and deaf, that men's minds are 
 "\ pressed in gestures, though not exactly, yet to 
 
234 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 serve the turn. And we understand farther, that it 
 is the use of China, and the kingdoms of the high 
 Levant, to write in characters real, which express 
 neither letters nor words in gross, but things or 
 notions ; insomuch as countries and provinces, 
 which understand not one another's language, can 
 nevertheless read one another's writings, because 
 the characters are accepted more generally than the 
 languages do extend; and therefore they have a 
 vast multitude of characters, as many, I suppose, 
 as radical words. 
 
 These notes of cogitations are of two sorts; the 
 one when the note hath some similitude or congruity 
 with the notion; the other " ad placitum" (by 
 agreement), having force only by contract or accep- 
 tation. Of the former sort are hieroglyphics and 
 gestures. For as to hieroglyphics, things of ancient 
 use, and embraced chiefly by the ^Egyptians, one of 
 the most ancient nations, they are but as continued 
 impresses and emblems. And as for gestures, they 
 are as transitory hieroglyphics, and are to hiero- 
 glyphics as words spoken are to words written, in 
 that they abide not ; but they have evermore, as well 
 as the other, an affinity with the things signified : 
 as Periander, being consulted with how to preserve 
 a tyranny newly usurped, bid the messenger attend 
 and report what he saw him do; and went into his 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 235 
 
 garden and topped all the highest flowers : signifying, 
 that it consisted in the cutting off and keeping low 
 of the nobility and grandees. " Ad placitum" 
 (notes by agreement), are the characters real before 
 mentioned, and words: although some have been 
 willing by curious inquiry, or rather by apt feigning, 
 to have derived imposition of names from reason 
 and intendment; a speculation elegant, and, by 
 reason it searcheth into antiquity, reverent; but 
 sparingly mixed with truth, and of small fruit. This 
 portion of knowledge, touching the notes of things, 
 and cogitations in general, I find not inquired, but 
 deficient. And although it may seem of no great 
 use, considering that words and writings by letters 
 do far excel all the other ways ; yet because this 
 part concerneth, as it were, the mint of knowledge, 
 (for words are the tokens current and accepted for 
 conceits, as moneys are for values, and that it is 
 fit men be not ignorant that moneys may be of ano- 
 ther kind than gold and silver,) I thought good to 
 propound it to better inquiry. 
 
 Concerning speech and words, the consideration 
 of them hath produced the science of Grammar : 
 for man still striveth to reintegrate himself in those 
 benedictions, from which by his fault he hath been 
 deprived ; and as he hath striven against the first 
 general curse by the invention of all other arts, so 
 
C 2S6 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 hath he sought to come forth of the second general 
 curse, which was the confusion of tongues, by the 
 art of grammar : whereof the use in a mother tongue 
 is small, in a foreign tongue more ; but most in such 
 foreign tongues as have ceased to be vulgar tongues, 
 and are turned only to learned tongues. The duty 
 of it is of two natures ; the one popular, which is 
 for the speedy and perfect attaining languages, as 
 well for intercourse of speech as for understanding 
 of authors ; the other philosophical, examining the 
 power and nature of words, as they are the footsteps 
 and prints of reason : which kind of analogy be- 
 tween words and reason is handled " sparsim," 
 brokenly, though not intirely ; and therefore I cannot 
 report it deficient, though I think it very worthy 
 to be reduced into a science by itself. 
 
 Unto grammar also belongeth, as an appendix, 
 the consideration of the accidents of words ; which 
 are measure, sound, and elevation or accent, and 
 the sweetness and harshness of them ; whence hath 
 issued some curious observations in rhetoric, but 
 chiefly poesy, as we consider it, in respect of the 
 verse, and not of the argument: wherein though 
 men in learned tongues do tie themselves to the 
 ancient measures, yet in modern languages it seem- 
 eth to me as free to make new measures of verses as 
 of dances ; for a dance is a measured pace, as a 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 
 
 
 verse is a measured speech. In these things the 
 sense is better judge than the art; 
 
 " Coense fercula nostrse 
 Mallem convivis quam placuisse cocis:" 
 (In dressing dinners, with more care I look 
 To please my friendly guests than please a cook.) 
 And of the servile expressing antiquity in an unlike 
 and an unfit subject, it is well said, "Quod tempore 
 antiquum videtur, id incongruitate est maxime no- 
 vum" (what in point of time seems ancient, by its 
 incongruity becomes quite new). 
 
 For ciphers, they are commonly in letters or 
 alphabets, but may be in words. The kinds of 
 ciphers, besides the simple ciphers, with changes, 
 and intermixtures of nulls and non-significants, are 
 many, according to the nature or rule of the infold- 
 ing : wheel-ciphers, key-ciphers, doubles, &c. But 
 the virtues of them, whereby they are to be pre- 
 ferred, are three; that they be not laborious to 
 write and read ; that they be impossible to decipher; 
 and, in some cases, that they be without suspicion. 
 The highest degree whereof is to write " omnia per 
 omnia" (all by all) ; which is undoubtedly possible, 
 with a proportion quintuple at most of the writing in- 
 foldingtothe writing infolded, and no other restraint 
 whatsoever. This art of ciphering, hath for relative 
 an art of deciphering, by supposition unprofitable, 
 
238 Or THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 but, as things are, of great use. For suppose that 
 ciphers were well managed, there be multitudes of 
 them which exclude the decipherer. But in regard 
 of the rawness and unskilfulness of the hands 
 through which they pass, the greatest matters are 
 many times carried in the weakest ciphers. 
 
 In the enumeration of these private and retired 
 arts, it may be thought 1 seek to make a great 
 muster-roll of sciences, naming them for shew and 
 ostentation, and to little other purpose. But let 
 those which are skilful in them judge whether I 
 bring them in only for appearance, Or whether in 
 that which I speak of them, though in few marks 
 there be not some seed of proficience. And this 
 must be remembered, that as there be many of great 
 account in their countries and provinces, which, 
 when they come up to the seat of the estate, are but 
 of mean rank, and scarcely regarded : so these arts, 
 being here placed with the principal and supreme 
 sciences, seem petty things ; yet to such as have 
 chosen them to spend their labours and studies in 
 them, they seem great matters. 
 
 For the method of tradition, I see it hath moved 
 a controversy in our time. But as in civil business, 
 if there be a meeting, and men fall at words, there is 
 commonly an end of the matter for that time, and 
 no proceeding at all ; so in learning, where there 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 239 
 
 is much controversy, there is many times little in- 
 quiry. For this part of knowledge of method seem- 
 eth to me so weakly inquired, as I shall report it 
 deficient. 
 
 Method hath been placed, and that not amiss, 
 in logic, as a part of judgment: for as the doctrine 
 of syllogisms comprehendeth the rules of judgment 
 upon that which is invented, so the doctrine of 
 method containeth the rules of judgment upon that 
 which is to be delivered ; for judgment precedeth 
 delivery, as it followeth invention. Neither is the 
 method or the nature of the tradition material only 
 to the use of knowledge, but likewise to the pro- 
 gression of knowledge: for since the labour and 
 life of one man cannot attain to perfection of know- 
 ledge, the wisdom of the tradition is that which in- 
 spireth the felicity of continuance and proceeding. 
 And therefore the most real diversity of method, is 
 of method referred to use, and method referred to 
 progression ; wdiereof the one may be termed ma- 
 gistral, and the other of probation. 
 
 The latter whereof seemeth to be " via deserta 
 et interclusa" (a desert and impassable way). For 
 as knowledges are now delivered, there is a kind of 
 contract of error between the deliverer and the re- 
 ceiver: for he that delivereth knowledge, desireth 
 to deliver it in such form as may be best believed, 
 
240 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 and not as may be best examined; and he that re- 
 ceiveth knowledge, desireth rather present satis- 
 faction, than expectant inquiry ; and so rather not 
 to doubt, than not to err : glory making the author 
 not to lay open his weakness, and sloth making the 
 disciple not to know his strength. 
 
 But knowledge, that is delivered as a thread to 
 be spun on, ought to be delivered and intimated, if 
 it were possible, in the same method wherein it was 
 invented; and so is it possible of knowledge in- 
 duced. But in this same anticipated and pre- 
 vented knowledge, no man knoweth how he came to 
 the knowledge which he hath obtained. But yet 
 nevertheless, " secundum majus et minus ,, (accord- 
 ing to greater and less,) a man may revisit and 
 descend unto the foundations of his knowledge and 
 consent; and so transplant it into another, as it 
 grew in his own mind. For it is in knowledges as it 
 is in plants : if you mean to use the plant, it 
 is no matter for the roots ; but if you mean to 
 remove it to grow, then it is more assured to rest 
 upon roots than slips : so the delivery of know- 
 ledges, as it is now used, is as of fair bodies of trees 
 without the roots ; good for the carpenter, but not 
 for the planter. But if you will have sciences 
 grow, it is less matter for the shaft or body of the tree, 
 so you look well to the taking up of the roots : of 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 241 
 
 which kind of delivery the method of the ma- 
 thematics, in that subject, hath some shadow ; but 
 generally I see it neither put in ure nor put in in- 
 quisition, and therefore note it for deficient. 
 
 Another diversity of method there is, which hath 
 some affinity with the former, used in some cases by 
 the discretion of the ancients, but disgraced since 
 by the impostures of many vain persons, who have 
 made it as a false light for their counterfeit mer- 
 chandises ; and that is, enigmatical and disclosed. 
 The pretence whereof is, to remove the vulgar capa- 
 cities from being admitted to the secrets of know- 
 ledges, and to reserve them to selected auditors, or 
 wits of such sharpness as can pierce the veil, 
 
 Another diversity of method, whereof the conse- 
 quence is great, is the delivery of knowledge in 
 aphorisms, or in methods ; wherein we may observe, 
 that it hath been too much taken into custom, out of 
 a few axioms or observations upon any subject, 
 to make a solemn and formal art, filling it with some 
 discourses, and illustrating it with examples, and 
 digesting it into a sensible method : but the writing 
 in aphorisms hath many excellent virtues, whereto 
 the writing in method doth not approach. 
 
 For first, it trieth the writer, whether he be super- 
 ficial or solid: for aphorisms, except they should be 
 ridiculous, cannot be made but of the pith and 
 
c Z4 l Z OF THE PROFIC1ENCE AND 
 
 heart of sciences ; for discourse of illustration is cut 
 off; recitals of examples are cut off; discourse of 
 connection and order is cut off; descriptions of 
 practice are cut off; so there remaineth nothing to 
 fill the aphorisms but some good quantity of ob- 
 servation : and therefore no man can suffice, nor in 
 reason will attempt to write aphorisms, but he that 
 is sound and grounded. But in methods, 
 
 " Tantum series juncturaque pollet, 
 Tan turn de medio sumptis accedit honoris :" 
 (Thus method and connection much avail, 
 And greatly ornament a common tale;) 
 as a man shall make a great shew of an art, which ? 
 if it were disjointed, would come to little. Se- 
 condly, methods are more fit to win consent or 
 belief, but less fit to point to action ; for they carry 
 a kind of demonstration in orb or circle, one part 
 illuminating another, and therefore satisfy : but 
 particulars, being dispersed, do best agree with dis- 
 persed directions. And lastly, aphorisms, repre- 
 senting a knowledge broken, do invite men to 
 inquire farther ; whereas methods, carrying the 
 shew of a total, do secure men, as if they were 
 at farthest. 
 
 Another diversity of method, which is likewise 
 of great weight, is the handling of knowledge by 
 assertions and their proofs, or by questions and 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 943 
 
 their determinations ; the latter kind whereof, if it 
 be immoderately followed, is as prejudicial to the 
 proceeding of learning, as it is to the proceeding of 
 an army to go about to besiege every little fort 
 or hold. For if the field be kept, and the sum 
 of the enterprise pursued, those smaller things will 
 come in of themselves : indeed a man would not 
 leave some important place with an enemy at his 
 back. In like manner, the use of confutation in the 
 delivery of sciences ought to be very sparing ; and 
 to serve to remove strong preoccupations and pre- 
 judgments, and not to minister and excite disputa- 
 tions and doubts. 
 
 Another diversity of method is, according to the 
 subject or matter which is handled; for there is 
 a great difference in the delivery of mathema- 
 tics, which are the most abstracted of knowledges, 
 and policy, which is the most immersed : and how- 
 soever contention hath been moved, touching an 
 uniformity of method in multiformity of matter ; yet 
 we see how that opinion, besides the weakness of it, 
 hath been of ill desert towards learning, as that 
 which taketh the way to reduce learning to certain 
 empty and barren generalities ; being but the very 
 husks and shells of sciences, all the kernel being 
 forced out and expulsed with the torture and press 
 of the method : and therefore as T did allow well of 
 
244 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 particular topics for invention, so I do allow like- 
 wise of particular methods of tradition. 
 
 Another diversity of judgment in the delivery 
 and teaching of knowledge is, according unto the 
 light and presuppositions of that which is delivered ; 
 for that knowledge which is new, and foreign from 
 opinions received, is to be delivered in another form 
 than that that is agreeable and familiar ; and there- 
 fore Aristotle, when he thinks to tax Democritus, 
 doth in truth commend him, where he saith, " If we 
 shall indeed dispute, and not follow after simili- 
 tudes," &e. For those whose conceits are seated 
 in popular opinions, need only but to prove or 
 dispute : but those whose conceits are beyond po- 
 pular opinions, have a double labour; the one to 
 make themselves conceived, and the other to prove 
 and demonstrate : so that it is of necessity with 
 them to have recourse to similitudes and transla- 
 tions to express themselves. And therefore in the 
 infancy of learning, and in rude times, when those 
 conceits which are now trivial were then new, 
 the world was full of parables and similitudes ; for 
 else would men either have passed over without 
 mark, or else rejected for paradoxes, that which was 
 offered, before they had understood or judged. So 
 in divine learning, we see how frequent parables 
 and tropes are : for it is a rule, " That whatsoever 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 245 
 
 science is not consonant to presuppositions, must 
 
 pray in aid of similitudes." 
 
 There be also other diversities of methods, vul- 
 gar and received : as that of resolution or analysis, 
 of constitution or systasis, of concealment or cryptic, 
 &c. which I do allow well of, though I have stood 
 upon those which are least handled and observed. 
 All which I have remembered to this purpose, 
 because I would erect and constitute one general 
 inquiry, which seems to me deficient, touching the 
 wisdom of tradition. 
 
 But unto this part of knowledge, concerning 
 methods, doth farther belong not only to the archi- 
 tecture of the whole frame of a work, but also the 
 several beams and columns thereof; not as to their 
 stuff, but as to their quantity and figure : and there- 
 fore method considereth not only the disposition 
 of the argument or subject, but likewise the proposi- 
 tions ; not as to their truth or matter, but as to their 
 limitation and manner. For herein Ramus merited 
 better a great deal in reviving the good rules of pro- 
 positions, KaOohav TpShw y.ctrcc sojto$,&c. (on the whole 
 first of all. &c) than he did in introducing the 
 canker of epitomes; and yet, (as it is the condi- 
 tion of human things that, according to the ancient 
 fables, " The most precious things have the most 
 pernicious keepers;") it was so. 'hat the attempt of 
 
246 OF THE PROFIC1ENCE AND 
 
 the one made him fall upon the other. For he had 
 need be well conducted that should design to make 
 axioms convertible, if he make them not withal 
 circular, and " non promovent," or incurring into 
 themselves : but yet the intention was excellent. 
 
 The other considerations of method, concerning 
 propositions, are chiefly touching the utmost propo- 
 sitions, which limit the dimensions of sciences ; for 
 every knowledge may be fitly said, besides the pro- 
 fundity, (which is the truth and substance of it, that 
 makes it solid,) to have a longitude and a latitude ; 
 accounting the latitude towards other sciences, and 
 the longitude towards action ; that is, from the 
 greatest generality to the most particular precept : 
 the one giveth rule how far one knowledge ought 
 to intermeddle within the province of another, 
 which is the rule they call KaOavro (by itself) ; the 
 other giveth rule unto what degree of particularity a 
 knowledge should descend : which latter I find 
 passed over in silence, being in my judgment the 
 more material ; for certainly there must be somewhat 
 left to practice ; but how much is worthy the in- 
 quiry. We see remote and superficial generalities 
 do but offer knowledge to scorn of practical men ; 
 and are no more aiding to practice, than an Qrtelius's 
 universal map is to direct the way between London 
 and York. The better sort of rules have been 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 247 
 
 not unfitly compared to glasses of steel unpolished, 
 where you may see the images of things, but first 
 they must be filed : so the rules will help, if they be 
 laboured and polished by practice. But how chrys- 
 talline they may be made at the first, and how far 
 forth they may be polished aforehand, is the ques- 
 tion ; the inquiry whereof seemeth to me deficient. 
 
 There hath been also laboured and put in prac- 
 tice a method, which is not a lawful method, but a 
 method of imposture ; which is, to deliver know- 
 ledges in such manner, as men may speedily come to 
 make a shew of learning who have it not : such was 
 the travail of Raymundus Lullius, in making that art 
 which bears his name ; not unlike to some books of 
 typocosmy, which have been made since ; being 
 nothing but a mass of words of all arts, to give men 
 countenance, that those which use the terms might 
 be thought to understand the art ; which collections 
 are much like a fripper's or broker's shop, that hath 
 ends of every thing, but nothing of worth. 
 
 Now we descend to that part which concerneth the 
 illustration of tradition, comprehended in that science 
 which we call Rhetoric, or art of eloquence ; a science 
 excellent, and excellently well laboured. For al- 
 though in true value it is inferior to wisdom, (as it 
 is said by God to Moses, when he disabled himselt' 
 for want of this faculty, Aaron shall be thy speaker, 
 
248 01 THE PR0FICIENCE AND 
 
 and thou shalt be to him as God ;) yet with people it 
 is the more mighty : for so Solomon saith, " Sapiens 
 corde appellabitur prudens, sed dulcis eloquio majora 
 reperiet" (the wise in heart shall be called prudent; 
 but the sweetness of the lips increaseth learning ;) 
 signifying, that profoundness of wisdom will help a 
 man to a name or admiration, but that it is elo- 
 quence that prevaileth in an active life. And as 
 to the labouring of it, the emulation of' Aristotle 
 with the rhetoricians of his time, and the expe- 
 rience of Cicero, hath made them in their works of 
 rhetorics exceed themselves, Again, the excellency 
 of examples of eloquence in the orations of De- 
 mosthenes and Cicero, added to the perfection of 
 the precepts of eloquence, hath doubled the progres- 
 sion in this art : and therefore the deflciences which 
 I shall note will rather be in some collections, which 
 may as handmaids attend the art, than in the rules 
 or use of the art itself. 
 
 Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little about 
 the roots of this science, as we have done of the rest ; 
 the duty and office of rhetoric is, to apply reason to 
 imagination for the better moving of the will. For 
 we see reason is disturbed in the administration 
 thereof by three means ; by illaqueation or sophism, 
 which pertains to logic ; by imagination or impres- 
 sion, which pertains to rhetoric ; and by passion or 
 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. <24f> 
 
 affection, which pertains to morality. And as in 
 negotiation with others, men are wrought by cun- 
 ning, by importunity, and by vehemency ; so in this 
 negotiation within ourselves, men are undermined by 
 inconsequences, solicited and importuned by impres- 
 sions or observations, and transported by passions. 
 Neither is the nature of man so unfortunately built, as 
 that those powers and arts should have force to dis- 
 turb reason, and not to establish and advance it : 
 for the end of logic is, to teach a form of argument 
 to secure reason, and not to intrap it : the end of 
 morality is to procure the affections to obey reason, 
 and not to invade it : the end of rhetoric is, to fill 
 the imagination to second reason, and not to op- 
 press it : for these abuses of arts come in but " ex 
 obliquo," for caution. 
 
 And therefore it was great injustice in Plato, 
 though springing out of a just hatred of the rheto- 
 ricians of his time, to esteem of rhetoric but as a 
 voluptuary art, resembling it to cookery, that did 
 mar wholesome meats, and help unwholesome by 
 variety of sauces to the pleasure of the taste. For 
 we see that speech is much more conversant in 
 adorning that which is good, than in colouring that 
 which is evil; for there is no man but speaketh 
 more honestly than he can do or think: and it was 
 excellently noted by Thucydides in Cleon, that 
 
250 Or THE PROEICIENCE AND 
 
 because he used to hold on the bad side in causes of 
 estate, therefore he was ever inveighing against elo- 
 quence and good speech, knowing that no man can 
 speak fair of courses sordid and base. And there- 
 fore as Plato said elegantly, " That Virtue, if she 
 could be seen, would move great love and affection ;" 
 so seeing that she cannot be shewed to the sense by 
 corporal shape, the next degree is to shew her to 
 the imagination in lively representation: for to shew 
 her to reason only in subtilty of argument, was a 
 thing ever derided in Chrysippus and many of the 
 Stoics ; who thought to thrust virtue upon men by 
 sharp disputations and conclusions, which have no 
 sympathy with the will of man. 
 
 Again, if the affections in themselves were 
 pliant and obedient to reason, it were true, there 
 would be no great use of persuasions and insinuations 
 to the will, more than of naked proposition and 
 proofs : but in regard of the continual mutinies and 
 seditions of the affections : 
 
 " Video meliora, proboque ; 
 Deteriora sequor :" 
 
 (I see the right, and I approve it too ; 
 
 I hate the wrong, and yet the wrong pursue :) 
 reason would become captive and servile, if elo- 
 quence of persuasions did not practise and win the 
 imagination from the affections part, and contract 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 251 
 
 a confederacy between the reason and imagination 
 against the affections ; for the affections themselves 
 carry ever an appetite to good, as reason doth. The 
 difference is, that the affection beholdeth merely the 
 present, reason beholdeth the future and sum of 
 time. And therefore the present filling the imagi- 
 nation more, reason is commonly vanquished ; but 
 after that force of eloquence and persuasion hath 
 made things future and remote appear as present, then 
 upon the revolt of the imagination reason prevaileth. 
 We conclude, therefore, that rhetoric can be no 
 more charged with the colouring of the worse part, 
 than logic with sophistry, or morality with vice. For 
 we know the doctrines of contraries are the same, 
 though the use be opposite. It appeareth also that 
 logic differeth from rhetoric, not only as the fist 
 from the palm, the one close, the other at large ; 
 but much more in this, that logic handleth reason 
 exact, and in truth; and rhetoric handleth it as it is 
 planted in popular opinions and manners. And 
 therefore Aristotle doth wisely place rhetoric as be- 
 tween logic on the one side, and moral or civil know- 
 ledge on the other, as participating of both : for the 
 proofs and demonstrations of logic are towards all 
 men indifferent and the same ; but the proofs and 
 persuasions of rhetoric ou^ht to differ according to 
 the auditors: 
 
252 OF THE PROIICIENCE AND 
 
 " Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas Arion:" 
 (Orpheus in groves, Arion midst the waves.) 
 Which application, in perfection of idea, ought to 
 extend so far, that if a man should speak of the 
 same thing to several persons, he should speak to 
 them all respectively, and several ways : though this 
 politic part of eloquence in private speech it is easy 
 for the greatest orators to want ; whilst by the ob- 
 serving their well-graced forms of speech, they lose 
 the volubility of application : and therefore it shall 
 not be amiss to recommend this to better [inquiry, 
 not being curious whether we place it here, or in 
 that part which concerneth policy. 
 
 Now therefore will I descend to the deficiences, 
 which, as I said, are but attendances : and first, I 
 do not find the wisdom and diligence of Aristotle 
 well pursued, who began to make a collection of the 
 popular signs and colours of good and evil, both 
 simple and comparative, which are as the sophisms 
 of rhetoric, as I touched before. For example : 
 
 SOPHISMA. 
 
 " Quod laudatur, bonum : quod vituperatur, 
 malum" 
 
 (That which is praised is good : that which is 
 found fault with is bad). 
 
 REDARGUTIO. 
 
 u Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces. 
 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 253 
 
 Malum est, malum est, inquit emptor : sed cum 
 
 recesserit, turn gloriabitur :" 
 (My wares are excellent, the seller cries, 
 And with bold face extols them to the skies. 
 They're naught, exclaims the buyer ; but having 
 
 got them, 
 Brags of their worth, and says, How cheap I 
 bought them !) 
 The defects in the labour of Aristotle are three : 
 one, that there be but a few of many ; another, that 
 their elenches are not annexed ; and the third, that 
 he conceived but a part of the use of them : for their 
 use is not only in probation, but much more in im- 
 pression. For many forms are equal in signification, 
 which are differing in impression ; as the difference 
 is great in the piercing of that which is sharp and 
 that which is flat, though the strength of the per- 
 cussion be the same : for there is no man but will 
 be a little more raised by hearing it said, " Your 
 enemies will be glad of this :" 
 
 "Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridse :" 
 (This Ithacus and Atreus' sons much wish): 
 than by hearing it said only, " This is evil for you." 
 Secondly, I do resume also that which I men- 
 tioned before, touching provision or preparatory 
 store, for the furniture of speech and readiness of 
 invention, which appeareth to be of two sorts; the 
 
c 254 OF THE PROF1CIENCE AND 
 
 one in resemblance to a shop of pieces unmade up, 
 the other to a shop of things ready made up ; both 
 to be applied to that which is frequent and most in 
 request : the former of these I will call antitheta, 
 and the latter formulae. 
 
 Antitheta are theses argued " pro et contra" 
 (for and against) ; wherein men may be more large 
 and laborious : but, in such as are able to do it, to 
 avoid prolixity of entry, I wish the seeds of the 
 several arguments to be cast up into some brief and 
 acute sentences, not to be cited, but to be as skains 
 or bottoms of thread, to be unwinded at large when 
 they come to be used; supplying authorities and 
 examples by reference. 
 
 PRO VERBIS LEGIS. 
 
 " Non est interpretatio, sed divinatio, quae recedit 
 
 a litera : 
 Cum receditur a litera, judex transit in legisla- 
 
 torem:" 
 (Departing from the letter is not expounding, but 
 guessing : when a judge departs from the letter of 
 the law, he usurps the office of a legislator.) 
 
 PRO SENTENTIA LEGIS. 
 
 " Ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus qui 
 interpretatur singula:" 
 
 From the words taken together such a sense 
 must be elicited as will give a meaning to each word. 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 255 
 
 Formulse are but decent and apt passages or 
 conveyances of speech, which may serve indifferently 
 for differing subjects ; as of preface, conclusion, di- 
 gression, transition, excusation, &c. For as in build- 
 ings, there is great pleasure and use in the well- 
 casting of the stair-cases, entries, doors, windows, 
 and the like ; so in speech, the conveniences and 
 passages are of special ornament and effect. 
 
 A CONCLUSION IN A DELIBERATIVE. 
 
 " So may we redeem the faults passed, and pre- 
 vent the inconveniences future." 
 
 There remain two appendices touching the tra- 
 dition of knowledge, the one critical, the other 
 pedantical. For all knowledge is either delivered by 
 teachers, or attained by men's proper endeavours : 
 and therefore as the principal part of tradition of 
 knowledge concerneth chiefly writing of books, so 
 the relative part thereof concerneth reading of 
 books : whereunto appertain incidently these consi- 
 derations. The first is concerning the true correc- 
 tion and edition of authors ; wherein nevertheless 
 rash diligence hath done great prejudice. For these 
 critics have often presumed, that that which they 
 understand not is false set down : as the priest that, 
 where he found it written of St. Paul, " Demissus 
 est per sportam" (he was let down by a basket), 
 mended his book, and made it " Demissus est per 
 
356 OF THE PKOFICIENCE AND 
 
 portam" (he was let down by a gate); because 
 sporta was an hard word, and out of his reading : 
 and surely their errors, though they be not so pal- 
 pable and ridiculous, are yet of the same kind. And 
 therefore, as it hath been wisely noted, the most cor- 
 rected copies are commonly the least correct. 
 
 The second is concerning the exposition and ex- 
 plication of authors, which resteth in annotations 
 and commentaries ; wherein it is over usual to blanch 
 the obscure places, and discourse upon the plain. 
 
 The third is concerning the times, which in 
 many cases give great light to true interpretations. 
 
 The fourth is concerning some brief censure and 
 judgment of the authors ; that men thereby may 
 make some election unto themselves what books to 
 read 
 
 And the fifth is concerning the syntax and dis- 
 position of studies ; that men may know in what 
 order or pursuit to read. 
 
 For pedantical knowledge, it containeth that 
 difference of tradition which is proper for youth ; 
 whereunto appertain divers considerations of great 
 fruit. 
 
 As first, the timing and seasoning of knowledges ; 
 as with what to initiate them, and from what for a 
 time to refrain them. 
 
 Secondly, the consideration where to begin with 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 25/ 
 
 the easiest, and so proceed to the more difficult ; 
 and in what courses to press the more difficult, and 
 then to turn them to the more easy : for it is one 
 method to practise swimming with bladders, and 
 another to practise dancing with heavy shoes. 
 
 A third is, the application of learning according 
 unto the propriety of the wits; for there is no defect 
 to the faculties intellectual, but seemeth to have a 
 proper cure contained in some studies : as for ex- 
 ample, if a child be bird-witted, that is, hath not 
 the faculty of attention, the mathematics giveth a 
 remedy thereunto ; for in them, if the wit be caught 
 away but a moment, one is to begin anew. And as 
 sciences have a propriety towards faculties for cure 
 and help, so faculties or powers have a sympathy 
 towards sciences for excellency or speedy profiting ; 
 an d therefore it is an inquiry of great wisdom, what 
 kinds of wits and natures are most apt and proper 
 for what sciences. . 
 
 Fourthly, the ordering of exercises is matter of 
 great consequence to hurt or help : for, as is well 
 observed by Cicero, men in exercising their faculties, 
 if they be not well advised, do exercise their faults, 
 and get ill habits as well as good ; so there is a great 
 judgment to be had in the continuance and inter- 
 mission of exercises. It were too long to particula- 
 rize a number of other considerations of this nature ; 
 
258 OF THE PHOFICIENCE AiND 
 
 things but of mean appearance, but of singular effi- 
 cacy. For as the wronging or cherishing of seeds or 
 young plants is that that is most important to their 
 thriving; (and as it was noted that the first six kings, 
 being in truth as tutors of the state of Rome in the 
 infancy thereof, was the principal cause of the im- 
 mense greatness of that state which followed;) so 
 the culture and manurance of minds in youth hath 
 such a forcible, though unseen, operation, as hardly 
 any length of time or contention of labour can coun- 
 tervail it afterwards. And it is not amiss to observe 
 also, how small and mean faculties gotten by educa- 
 tion, yet when they fall into great men or great 
 matters, do work great and important effects; 
 whereof we see a notable example in Tacitus of two 
 stage players, Percennius and Vibulenus, who by 
 their faculty of playing put the Pannonian armies 
 into an extreme tumult and combustion : for there 
 arising a mutiny amongst them upon the death of 
 Augustus Csesar, Blsesus the lieutenant had com- 
 mitted some of the mutineers, which were suddenly 
 rescued; whereupon Vibulenus got to be heard 
 speak, which he did in this manner : — " These poor 
 innocent wretches, appointed to cruel death, you 
 have restored to behold the light: but who shall 
 restore my brother to me, or life unto my brother, 
 that was sent hither in message from the legions of 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 259 
 
 Germany, to treat of the common cause ? and he 
 hath murdered him this last night by some of his 
 fencers and ruffians, that he hath about him for his 
 executioners upon soldiers. Answer, Blsesus, what 
 is done with his body? The mortalest enemies do 
 not deny burial. When I have performed my last 
 duties to the corpse with kisses, with tears, com- 
 mand me to be slain beside him; so that these my 
 fellows, for our good meaning, and our true hearts 
 to the legions, may have leave to bury us." With 
 which speech he put the army into an infinite fury 
 and uproar : whereas truth was he had no brother, 
 neither was there any such matter ; but he played it 
 merely as if he had been upon the stage. 
 
 But to return : we are now come to a period of 
 rational knowledges; wherein if I have made the 
 divisions other than those that are received, yet 
 would I not be thought to disallow all those divisions 
 which I do not use: for there is a double necessity 
 imposed upon me of altering the divisions. The one, 
 because it differeth in end and purpose, to sort 
 together those things which are next in nature, 
 and those things which are next in use: for if a 
 secretary of state should sort his papers, it is like in 
 his study or general cabinet he would sort together 
 things of a nature, as treaties, instructions, &c. 
 but in his boxes or particular cabinet he would sort 
 
c 26l) OF THE PROFICIENCE AMD 
 
 together those that he were like to use together, 
 though of several natures; so in this general ca- 
 binet of knowledge it was necessary for rne to follow 
 the divisions of the nature of things; whereas if my- 
 self had been to handle any particular knowledge, I 
 would have respected the divisions fittest for use. 
 The other, because the bringing in of the deficiences 
 did by consequence alter the partitions of the rest: 
 for let the knowledge extant, for demonstration sake, 
 be fifteen; let the knowledge with the deficiences 
 be twenty ; the parts of fifteen are not the parts of 
 twenty ; for the parts c-f fifteen are three and five ; 
 the parts of twenty are two, four, five, and ten : so as 
 these things are without contradiction, and could 
 not otherwise be. 
 
 We proceed now to that knowledge which con- 
 sidered of the Appetite and Will of Man ; whereof 
 Solomon saith, "Ante omnia, fili, custodi cor tuum; 
 nam incle procedunt actiones vitse" (My son, keep 
 thy heart with all diligence ; for out of it are the 
 issues of life). In the handling of this science, those 
 which have written seem to me to have done as if a 
 man, that professeth to teach to write, did only ex- 
 hibit fair copies of alphabets and letters joined, 
 without giving any precepts or directions for the 
 carriage of the hand and framing of the letters : so 
 
 I 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 961 
 
 have they made good and fair exemplars and copies, 
 carrying the draughts and portraitures of good, 
 virtue, duty, felicity; propounding them well de- 
 scribed as the true objects and scopes of man's will 
 and desires; but how to attain these excellent 
 marks, and how to frame and subdue the will of man 
 to become true and conformable to these pursuits, 
 they pass it over altogether, or slightly and unpro- 
 fitably : for it is not the disputing, that moral virtues 
 are in the mind of man by habit and not by nature, 
 or the distinguishing that generous spirits are won 
 by doctrines and persuasions, and the vulgar sort 
 by reward and punishment, and the like scattered 
 glances and touches, that can excuse the absence of 
 this part. 
 
 The reason of this omission I suppose to be that 
 hidden rock whereupon both this and many other 
 barks of knowledge have been cast away; which is, 
 that men have despised to be conversant in ordinary 
 and common matters, (the judicious direction 
 whereof nevertheless is the wisest doctrine, for life 
 consisteth not in novelties or subtilities,) but contra- 
 riwise they have compounded sciences chiefly of a 
 certain resplendent or lustrous mass of matter, 
 chosen to give glory either to the subtilty of dispu- 
 tations, or to the eloquence of discourses. But 
 Seneca giveth an excellent check to eloquence ; 
 
262 . OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 " Nocet illis eloquentia, quibus non rerum cupidi- 
 tatem facit, sed sui" (Eloquence does harm to those 
 in whom it begets a fondness, not of knowledge, but 
 of itself). Doctrine should be such as should make 
 men in love with their lesson, and not with the 
 teacher ; being directed to the auditor's benefit, and 
 not to the author's commendation : and therefore 
 those are of the right kind, which may be con- 
 cluded as Demosthenes concludes his counsel, 
 u Quae si feceritis, non oratorem duntaxat in prse- 
 sentia laudabitis, sed vosmetipsos etiam non ita 
 multo post statu rerum vestrarum meliore" (If you 
 follow this plan, you may not at present praise the 
 orator ; but you will hereafter applaud yourselves, 
 when you find your affairs benefited by it). Nei- 
 ther needed men of so excellent parts to have de- 
 spaired of a fortune, which the poet Virgil pro- 
 mised himself, and indeed obtained, who got as 
 much glory of eloquence, wit, and learning in the 
 expressing of the observations of husbandry, as of 
 the heroical acts of JEneas : — 
 
 " Nee sum animi dubius, verbis ea vincere magnum 
 Quam sit, et angustishunc addere rebus honorem." 
 
 Georg. iii. 289. 
 (Nor slight, to grace so mean a theme, the toil, 
 And beautify with flow'rs a barren soil.) 
 And surely, if the purpose be in good earnest, 
 
ADVANCEMENT 01 LEARNING. 2^3 
 
 not to write at leisure that which men may read at 
 leisure, but really to instruct and suborn action and 
 active life, these Georgics of the mind, concerning 
 the husbandry and tillage thereof, are no less 
 worthy than the heroical descriptions of virtue, duty, 
 and felicity. Wherefore the main and primitive divi- 
 sion of moral knowledge seemeth to be into the 
 Exemplar or Platform of Good, and the Regiment 
 or Culture of the Mind ; the one describing the na- 
 ture of good, the other prescribing rules how to 
 subdue, apply, and accommodate the will of man 
 thereunto. 
 
 The doctrine touching the Platform or Nature of 
 Good considereth it either simple or compared ; 
 either the kinds of good, or the degrees of good : in 
 the latter whereof those infinite disputations which 
 were touching the supreme degree thereof, which 
 they term felicity, beatitude, or the highest good, 
 the doctrines concerning which were as the heathen 
 divinity, are by the Christian faith discharged. And 
 as Aristotle saith, " That young men may be happy, 
 but not otherwise but by hope;" so we must all ac- 
 knowledge our minority, and embrace the felicity 
 which is by hope of the future world. 
 
 Freed therefore and delivered from this doctrine of 
 the philosophers' heaven, whereby they feigned 
 an higher elevation of man's nature than was, (for 
 
264 OF THE PROFICIE^CE AND 
 
 we see in what an height of stile Seneca writeth, 
 " Vere magnum, habere fragilitatem hominis, secu- 
 ritatem Dei/' (It is truly great to have the frailty of a 
 mortal and the security of a God,) we may with 
 more sobriety and truth receive the rest of their 
 inquiries and labours ; wherein for the nature of good 
 positive or simple, they have set it down excellently, 
 in describing the forms of virtue and duty, with their 
 situations and postures ; in distributing them into 
 their kinds, parts, provinces, actions, and administra- 
 tions, and the like : nay farther, they have com- 
 mended them to man's nature and spirit, with great 
 quickness of argument and beauty of persuasions ; 
 yea, and fortified and intrenched them, as much as 
 discourse can do, against corrupt and popular 
 opinions. Again, for the degrees and comparative 
 nature of good, they have also excellently handled it 
 in their triplicity of good, in the comparison between 
 a contemplative and an active life, in the distinction 
 between virtue with reluctation and virtue secured, 
 in their encounters between honesty and profit, in 
 their balancing of virtue with virtue, and the like ; 
 so as this part deserveth to be reported for ex- 
 cellently laboured. 
 
 Notwithstanding, if before they had come to the 
 popular and received notions of virtue and vice, 
 pleasure and pain, and the rest, they had stayed 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 265 
 
 a little longer upon the inquiry concerning the roots 
 of good and evil, and the strings of those roots, they 
 had given, in my opinion, a great light to that which 
 followed ; and especially if they had consulted with 
 nature, they had made their doctrines less prolix 
 and more profound : which being by them in part 
 omitted, and in part handled with much confusion, 
 we will endeavour to resume and open in a more 
 clear manner. 
 
 There is formed in every thing a double nature 
 of good : the one, as every thing is a total or 
 substantive in itself; the other, as it is apart or mem- 
 ber of a greater body ; whereof the latter is in 
 degree the greater and the worthier, because it tend- 
 eth to the conservation of a more general form. 
 Therefore we see the iron in particular sympathy 
 moveth to the loadstone ; but yet if it exceed a 
 certain quantity, it forsaketh the affection to the 
 loadstone, and like a good patriot moveth to the 
 earth, which is the region and country of massy 
 bodies : so may we go forward, and see that water 
 and massy bodies move to the centre of the earth ; 
 but rather than to suffer a divulsion in the con- 
 tinuance of nature, they will move upwards from the 
 centre of the earth, forsaking their duty to the earth in 
 regard of their duty to the world. This double nature 
 of good, and the comparative thereof, is much more 
 
266 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 engraven upon man, if he degenerate not; unto whom 
 the conservation of duty to the public ought to be 
 much more precious than the conservation of life 
 and being : according to that memorable speech of 
 Pompeius Magnus, when being in commission of 
 purveyance for a famine at Rome, and being dis- 
 suaded with great vehemency and instance by his 
 friends about him, that he should not hazard himself 
 to sea in an extremity of weather, he said only to 
 them " Necesse est ut earn, non ut vivam" (It is 
 necessary that I should set sail, but not necessary 
 that I should live). But it may be truly affirmed 
 that there was never any philosophy, religion, or 
 other discipline, which did so plainly and highly 
 exalt the good which is communicative, and depress 
 the good which is private and particular, as the holy 
 faith ; well declaring, that it was the same God that 
 gave the Christian law to men, who gave those laws 
 of nature to inanimate creatures that we spake of 
 before : for we read that the elected saints of God 
 have wished themselves anathematized and razed 
 out of the book of life, in an ecstasy of charity and 
 infinite feeling of communion. 
 
 This being set down and strongly planted, doth 
 judge and determine most of the controversies where- 
 in moral philosophy is conversant. For first, it 
 decideth the question touching the preferment of 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 267 
 
 
 the contemplative or active life, and decideth it 
 against Aristotle. For all the reasons which he 
 bringeth for the contemplative are private, and re- 
 specting the pleasure and dignity of a man's self, in 
 which respects, no question, the contemplative life 
 hath the pre-eminence : not much unlike to that 
 comparison, which Pythagoras made for the gracing 
 and magnifying of philosophy and contemplation ; 
 who being asked what he was, answered, " That if 
 Hiero were ever at the Olympian games, he knew 
 the manner, that some came to try their fortune for 
 the prizes, and some came as merchants to utter 
 their commodities, and some came to make good 
 cheer and meet their friends, and some came to 
 look on ; and that he was one of them that came to 
 look on." But men must know, that in this theatre 
 of man's life it is reserved only for God and angels 
 to be lookers on : neither could the like question 
 ever have been received in the church (notwithstand- 
 ing their " Pretiosa in oculis Domini mors sanc- 
 torum ejus" (precious in the sight of the Lord is the 
 death of his saints), by which place they would 
 exalt their civil death and regular professions), but 
 upon this defence, that the monastical life is not 
 simply contemplative, but performeth the duty 
 either of incessant prayers and supplications, which 
 hath been truly esteemed as an office in the (lunch. 
 
268 OF THE PROEICIENCE AND 
 
 or else of writing or taking instructions for writing 
 concerning the law of God, as Moses did when he 
 abode so long in the mount. And so we see Enoch 
 the seventh from Adam, who was the first contem- 
 plative, and walked with God, yet did also endow 
 the church with prophecy, which St. Jude citeth. 
 But for contemplation which should be finished 
 in itself, without casting beams upon society, as- 
 suredly divinity knoweth it not. 
 
 It decideth also the controversies between Zeno 
 and Socrates, and their schools and successions, 
 on the one side, who placed felicity in virtue simply 
 or attended, the actions and exercises whereof do 
 chiefly embrace and concern society ; and on the 
 other side, the Cyrenaics and Epicureans, who 
 placed it in pleasure, and made virtue, (as it is used 
 in some comedies of errors, wherein the mistress 
 and the maid change habits,) to be but as a servant, 
 without which pleasure cannot be served and at- 
 tended, and the reformed school of the Epicureans, 
 which placed it in serenity of mind and freedom 
 from perturbation, (as if they would have deposed 
 Jupiter again, and restored Saturn and the first 
 age, when there was no summer nor winter, spring 
 nor autumn, but all after one air and season,) and 
 Herillus, who placed felicity in extinguishment of 
 the disputes of the mind, making no fixed nature of 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. L 26D 
 
 good and evil, esteeming things according to the 
 clearness of the desires, or the reluctation ; which 
 opinion was revived in the heresy of the Anabaptists, 
 measuring things according to the motions of the 
 spirit, and the constancy or wavering of belief: all 
 which are manifest to tend to private repose and 
 contentment, and not to point of society. 
 
 It censureth also the philosophy of Epictetus, 
 which presupposeth that felicity must be placed in 
 those things which are in our power, lest we be 
 liable to fortune and disturbance : as if it were not a 
 thing much more happy to fail in good and virtuous 
 ends for the public, than to obtain all that we can 
 wish to ourselves in our proper fortune; as Gonsalvo 
 said to his soldiers, shewing them Naples, and 
 protesting, " He had rather die one foot forwards, 
 than to have his life secured for long by one foot of 
 retreat." Whereunto the wisdom of that heavenly 
 leader hath signed, who hath affirmed that a good 
 conscience is a continual feast; shewing plainly that 
 the conscience of good intentions, howsoever suc- 
 ceeding, is a more continual joy to nature, than 
 all the provision which can be made for security 
 and repose. 
 
 It censureth likewise that abuse of philosophy, 
 which grew general about the time of Epictetus, in 
 converting it into an occupation or profession ; as if 
 
270 OF THE PR0FIC1ENCE AND 
 
 the purpose had been, not to resist and extinguish per- 
 turbations, but to fly and avoid the causes of them, 
 and to shape a particular kind and course of life to 
 that end ; introducing such an health of mind, 
 as was that health of body of which Aristotle 
 speaketh of Herodicus, who did nothing all his life 
 long but intend his health : whereas if men refer 
 themselves to duties of society, as that health of 
 body is best, which is ablest to endure all alterations 
 and extremities ; so likewise that health of mind 
 is most proper, which can go through the greatest 
 temptations and perturbations. So as Diogenes's 
 opinion is to be accepted, who commended not 
 them which abstained, but them which sustained, 
 and could refrain their mind " in prsecipitio" (when 
 rushing headlong), and could give unto the mind, as 
 is used in horsemanship, the shortest stop or turn. 
 
 Lastly, it censureth the tenderness and want of 
 application in some of the most ancient and reverend 
 philosophers and philosophical men, that did retire 
 too easily from civil business, for avoiding of indig- 
 nities and perturbations : whereas the resolution of 
 men truly moral ought to be such as the same 
 Gonsalvo said the honour of a soldier should be, 
 " e tela crassiore" (of a coarser texture), and not 
 so fine as that every thing should catch in it and 
 endanger it. 
 
ADVANCEMENT OE LEARNING. ( 2/'l 
 
 To resume private or particular good, it falleth 
 mto the division of good active and passive : for this 
 difference of good, not unlike to that which amongst 
 the Romans was expressed in the familiar or house- 
 hold terms of Promus and Condus, is formed also 
 in all things, and is best disclosed in the two several 
 appetites in creatures ; the one to preserve or con- 
 tinue themselves, and the other to dilate or multiply 
 themselves ; whereof the latter seemeth to be the 
 worthier : for in nature the heavens, which are more 
 worthy, are the agent; and the earth, which 
 is the less worthy, is the patient. In the pleasures 
 of living creatures, that of generation is greater than 
 that of food : in divine doctrine, " Beatius est dare 
 quam accipere" (it is more blessed to give than to 
 receive) : and in life, there is no man's spirit so soft, 
 but esteemeth the effecting of somewhat that he 
 hath fixed in his desire , more than sensuality. 
 Which priority of the active good, is much upheld 
 by the consideration of our estate to be mortal and 
 exposed to fortune : for if we might have a perpe- 
 tuity and certainty in our pleasures, the state of 
 them would advance their price ; but when we see 
 it is but " Magni sestimamus mori tardius" (we 
 think it a great matter to live long), and " Ne 
 glorieris de crastino, nescis partum diei" (boast not of 
 to-morrow, for you know not what a clay may bring 
 
27^ OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 forth), it maketh us to desire to have somewhat se- 
 cured and exempted from time, which are only our 
 deeds and works ; as it is said " Opera eorum 
 sequuntur eos" (their works follow them). The pre- 
 eminence likewise of this active good is upheld by 
 the affection which is natural in man towards 
 variety and proceeding; which in the pleasures of 
 the sense, which is the principal part of passive 
 good, can have no great latitude : " Cogita quamdiu 
 eadem feceris; cibus, somnus, ludus per hunc cir- 
 culum curritur ; mori velle non tantum fortis, aut 
 miser, aut prudens, sed etiam fastidiosus potest" 
 (reflect how long you repeat the same dull pleasures : 
 food, sleep, amusement recur in uniform succes- 
 sion : death may be willingly encountered not only 
 by the brave, the unhappy, or the wise, but also by 
 the fastidious). But in enterprises, pursuits, and 
 purposes of life, there is much variety ; whereof men 
 are sensible with pleasure in their inceptions, pro- 
 gressions, recoils, reintegrations, approaches and 
 attainings to their ends: so as it was well said, 
 " Vita sine proposito languida et vaga est" (life 
 without a fixed object is dull and unsteady). Neither 
 hath this active good any identity with the good 
 of society, though in some case it hath an in- 
 cidence into it : for although it do many times 
 bring forth acts of beneficence, yet it is with 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. '273 
 
 a respect private to a man's own power, glory, 
 amplification, continuance ; as appeareth plainly, 
 when it findeth a contrary subject. For that gigan- 
 tine state of mind which possesseth the troublers of 
 the world, (such as was Lucius Sylla, and infinite 
 other in smaller model, who would have all men 
 happy or unhappy as they were their friends or ene- 
 mies, and would give form to the world, according 
 to their own humours, which is the true theomachy,) 
 pretendeth and aspireth to active good, though it 
 recedeth farthest from good of society, which we 
 have determined to be the greater. 
 
 To resume passive good, it receiveth a subdivi- 
 sion of conservative and perfective. For let us take 
 a brief review of that which we have said : we have 
 spoken first of the good of society, the intention 
 whereof embraceth the form of human nature, 
 whereof we are members and portions, and not our 
 own proper and individual form : we have spoken of 
 active good, and supposed it as a part of private and 
 particular good : and rightly, for there is impressed 
 upon all things a triple desire or appetite proceeding 
 from love to themselves ; one of preserving and con- 
 tinuing their form ; another of advancing and per- 
 fecting their form ; and a third of multiplying and 
 extending their form upon other things ; whereof 
 the multiplying, or signature of it upon other things, 
 
 T 
 
274 Or THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 is that which we handled by the name of active 
 good. So as there remaineth the conserving of it, 
 and perfecting or raising of it ; which latter is the 
 highest degree of passive good. For to preserve in 
 state is the less, to preserve with advancement is the 
 greater. So in man,- — 
 
 " Igneus est ollis vigor, et coelestis origo." 
 (They have an etherial essence, a heavenly origin.) 
 His approach or assumption to divine or angelical 
 nature is the perfection of his form ; the error or 
 false imitation of which good is that which is the 
 tempest of human life ; while man, upon the in- 
 stinct of an advancement formal and essential, 
 is carried to seek an advancement local. For as 
 those which are sick, and find no remedy, do tumble 
 up and down and change place, as if by a remove 
 local they could obtain a remove internal; so is it 
 with men in ambition, when failing of the means to 
 exalt their nature, they are in a perpetual estuation 
 to exalt their place. So then passive good is, as 
 was said, either conservative or perfective. 
 
 To resume the good of conservation or comfort, 
 which consisteth in the fruition of that which is 
 agreeable to our natures; it seemeth to be the most 
 pure and natural of pleasures, but yet the softest and 
 the lowest. And this also receiveth a difference, 
 which hath neither been well judged of, nor well in- 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. c 275 
 
 quired : for the good of fruition or contentment is 
 placed either in the sincereness of the fruition, or in 
 the quickness and vigour of it; the one superinduced 
 by equality, the other by vicissitude ; the one having 
 less mixture of evil, the other more impression of 
 good. Whether of these is the greater good, is a 
 question controverted ; but whether man's nature may 
 not be capable of both, is a question not inquired. 
 
 The former question being debated between 
 Socrates and a sophist, Socrates placing felicity in an 
 equal and constant peace of mind, and the sophist 
 in much desiring and much enjoying, they fell from 
 argument to ill words : the sophist saying that So- 
 crates's felicity was the felicity of a block or stone ; 
 and Socrates saying that the sophist's felicity was 
 the felicity of one that had the itch, who did 
 nothing but itch and scratch. And both these 
 opinions do not want their supports. For the opinion 
 of Socrates is much upheld by the general con- 
 sent even of the Epicures themselves, that virtue 
 beareth a great part in felicity ; and if so, certain 
 it is, that virtue hath more use in clearing per- 
 turbations than in compassing desires. The so- 
 phist's opinion is much favoured by the assertion 
 we last spake of, that good of advancement is 
 greater than good of simple preservation ; because 
 I every obtaining a desire hath a shew of advance- 
 
276 OF THE PROI'ICIENCE AND 
 
 merit, as motion though in a circle hath a shew of 
 progression. 
 
 But the second question, decided the true way, 
 maketh the former superfluous. For can it be 
 doubted, but that there are some who take more 
 pleasure in enjoying pleasures than some other, 
 and yet nevertheless are less troubled with the loss 
 or leaving of them ? so as this same, " Non uti ut 
 non appetas, non appetere ut non metuas, sunt animi 
 pusilli et diffidentis" (not to use that you may not 
 desire, and not to desire that you may not fear 
 losing, are tokens of a little and weak mind). And 
 it seemeth to me, that most of the doctrines of the 
 philosophers are more fearful and cautionary than 
 the nature of things requireth. So have they increased 
 the fear of death in offering to cure it : for when 
 they would have a man's whole life to be but a dis- 
 cipline or preparation to die, they must needs make 
 men think that it is a terrible enemy, against whom 
 there is no end of preparing. Better saith the poet : 
 
 " Qui finem vitse extremum inter munera ponat 
 
 Naturae :" 
 
 (Who accounts the end of life one of the gifts of 
 nature.) 
 So have they sought to make men's minds too 
 uniform and harmonical, by not breaking them suffi- 
 ciently to contrary motions: the reason whereof 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 
 
 I suppose to be, because they themselves were men 
 dedicated to a private, free, and unapplied course of 
 life. For as we see, upon the lute or like instrument, 
 a ground, though it be sweet and have shew of many 
 changes, yet breaketh not the hand to such strange 
 and hard stops and passages, as a set song or volun- 
 tary ; much after the same manner was the diversity 
 between a philosophical and a civil life. And there- 
 fore men are to imitate the wisdom of jewellers ; 
 who, if there be a grain, or a cloud, or an ice which 
 may be ground forth without taking too much of the 
 stone, they help it ; but if it should lessen and abate 
 the stone too much, they will not meddle with it : so 
 ought men so to procure serenity, as they destroy not 
 magnanimity. 
 
 Having, therefore, deduced the good of man, 
 which is private and particular, as far as seemeth 
 fit ; we will now return to that good of man which 
 respecteth and beholdeth society, which we may 
 term duty ; because the term of duty is more proper 
 to a mind well framed and disposed towards others, 
 as the term of virtue is applied to a mind well 
 formed and composed in itself: though neither can 
 a man understand virtue without some relation to 
 society, nor duty without an inward disposition. 
 This part may seem at first to pertain to science 
 civil and politic : but not if it be well observed ; for 
 
OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 it concemeth the regimen and government of every 
 man over himself, and not over others. And as in 
 architecture the direction of the framing the posts, 
 beams, and other parts of building, is not the same 
 with the manner of joining them and erecting the 
 building ; and in mechanicals, the direction how to 
 frame an instrument or engine, is not the same with 
 the manner of setting it on work and employing it, 
 (and yet nevertheless in expressing of the one you 
 incidently express the aptness towards the other ;) 
 so the doctrine of conjugation of men in society 
 differeth from that of their conformity thereunto. 
 
 This part of duty is subdivided into two parts ; 
 the common duty of every man, as a man or mem- 
 ber of a state ; the other, the respective or special 
 duty of every man, in his profession, vocation, and 
 place. The first of these is extant and well laboured, 
 as hath been said. The second likewise I may 
 report rather dispersed than deficient ; which man- 
 ner of dispersed writing in this kind of argument I 
 acknowledge to be best: for who can take upon him 
 to write of the proper duty, virtue, challenge, and 
 right of every several vocation, profession, and 
 place? For although sometimes a looker on may 
 see more than a gamester, and there be a proverb 
 more arrogant than sound, " That the vale best dis- 
 covered the hill;" yet there is small doubt but that 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. '279 
 
 men can write best, and most really and materially, 
 in their own professions ; and that the writing of 
 speculative men of active matter, for the most part? 
 doth seem to men of experience, as Phormio's argu- 
 ment of the wars seemed to Hannibal, to be but 
 dreams and dotage. Only there is one vice which 
 accompanieth them that write in their own profes- 
 sions, that they magnify them in excess. But gene- 
 rally it were to be wished, as that which would 
 make learning indeed solid and fruitful, that active 
 men would or could become writers. 
 
 In which kind I cannot but mention, " honoris 
 causa," your majesty's excellent book touching the 
 duty of a king : a work richly compounded of divinity, 
 morality, and policy, with great aspersion of all other 
 arts ; and being, in mine opinion, one of the most 
 sound and healthful writings that I have read ; not 
 distempered in the heat of invention, nor in the 
 coldness of negligence ; not sick of business, as 
 those are who lose themselves in their order, nor of 
 convulsions, as those which cramp in matters imper- 
 tinent ; not savouring of perfumes and paintings, as 
 those do who seek to please the reader more than 
 nature beareth ; and chiefly well disposed in the 
 spirits thereof, being agreeable to truth and apt for 
 action ; and far removed from that natural infirmity, 
 whereunto I noted those that write in their own 
 
280 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 professions to be subject, which is, that they exalt it 
 above measure: for your majesty hath truly de- 
 scribed, not a king of Assyria or Persia in their ex- 
 tern glory, but a Moses or a David, pastors of their 
 people. Neither can I ever lose out of my remem- 
 brance, what I heard your majesty in the same 
 sacred spirit of government deliver in a great cause 
 of judicature, which was, " That kings ruled by 
 lieir laws, as God did by the laws of nature; and 
 ought as rarely to put in use their supreme pre- 
 rogative, as God doth his power of working mira- 
 cles." And yet notwithstanding, in your book of a 
 free monarchy, you do well to give men to under- 
 stand, that you know the plenitude of the power and 
 right of a king, as well as the circle of his office 
 and duty. Thus have I presumed to allege this 
 excellent writing of your majesty, as a prime or excel- 
 lent example of tractates concerning special and 
 respective duties ; wherein I should have said as 
 much, if it had been written a thousand years since : 
 neither am I moved with certain courtly decencies, 
 Avhich esteem it flattery to praise in presence : no, 
 it is flattery to praise in absence, that is, when either 
 the virtue is absent, or the occasion is absent ; and so 
 the praise is not natural, but forced, either in truth or 
 in time. But let Cicero be read in his oration pro 
 Marcello, which is nothing but an excellent table of 
 
 
ADVANCEMENT OE LEARNING. 28 1 
 
 Caesar's virtue, and made to his face ; besides the 
 example of many other excellent persons, wiser a 
 great deal than such observers ; and we will never 
 doubt, upon a full occasion, to give just praises 
 to present or absent. 
 
 But to return: there belongeth farther to the 
 handling of this part, touching the duties of profes- 
 sions and vocations, a relative or opposite, touching 
 the frauds, cautels, impostures, and vices of every 
 profession, which hath been likewise handled : but 
 how ? rather in a satire and cynically, than seriously 
 and wisely ; for men have rather sought by wit to 
 deride and traduce much of that which is good in 
 professions, than with judgment to discover and 
 sever that which is corrupt. For, as Solomon 
 saith, he that cometh to seek after knowledge with a 
 mind to scorn and censure, shall be sure to find 
 matter for his humour, but no matter for his instruc- 
 tion : " Quserenti derisori scientiam ipsa se abscon- 
 dit; sed studioso fit obviam" (a scorner seeketh 
 wisdom, and findeth it not : but knowledge is easy 
 unto him that understandeth). But the managing of 
 this argument with integrity and truth, which I note 
 as deficient, seemeth to me to be one of the best for- 
 tifications for honesty and virtue that can be planted. 
 For, as the fable goeth of the basilisk, that if he 
 you first, you die for it; but if you sec him first, he 
 
282 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 dieth : so is it with deceits and evil arts ; which, 
 if they be first espied, lose their life ; but if they 
 prevent, they endanger. So that we are much 
 beholden to Machiavel and others, that write what 
 men do, and not what they ought to do. For it is 
 not possible to join serpentine wisdom with the 
 columbine innocency, except men know exactly 
 all the conditions of the serpent ; his baseness 
 and going upon his belly, his volubility and lubricity, 
 his envy and sting, and the rest ; that is, all forms 
 and natures of evil : for without this, virtue lieth 
 open and unfenced. Nay, an honest man can do no 
 good upon those that are wicked, to reclaim them, 
 without the help of the knowledge of evil. For men 
 of corrupted minds presuppose that honesty groweth 
 out of simplicity of manners, and believing of 
 preachers, schoolmasters, and men's exterior lan- 
 guage : so as, except you can make them perceive 
 that you know the utmost reaches of their own 
 corrupt opinions, they despise all morality ; ■ " Non 
 recipit stultus verba prudentioe, nisi ea dixeris quae 
 versantur in corde ejus" (a fool heareth not the 
 words of wisdom, unless thou speak that which is in 
 his heart). 
 
 Unto this part, touching respective duty, doth also 
 appertain the duties between husband and wife, 
 parent and child, master and servant : so likewise 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 283 
 
 the laws of friendship and gratitude, the civil bond 
 of companies, colleges, and politic bodies, of neigh- 
 bourhood, and all other proportionate duties ; not as 
 they are parts of government and society, but as to 
 the framing of the mind of particular persons. 
 
 The knowledge concerning good respecting so- 
 ciety doth handle it also, not simply alone, but com- 
 paratively; whereunto belongeth the weighing of 
 duties between person and person, case and case, 
 particular and public : as we see in the proceeding 
 of Lucius Brutus against his own sons, which w T as 
 so much extolled ; yet what was said ? 
 
 " Infelix, utcunque ferent ea fata minores :" 
 (Unhappy, in whatever light posterity may view 
 this act). 
 So the case was doubtful, and had opinion on both 
 sides, Again, we see when M. Brutus and Cassius 
 invited to a supper certain whose opinions they 
 meant to feel, whether they were fit to be made 
 their associates, and cast forth the question touching 
 the killing of a tyrant being an usurper, they were 
 divided in opinion ; some holding that servitude was 
 the extreme of evils, and others that tyranny was 
 better than a civil war : and a number of the like 
 cases there are of comparative duty ; amongst which 
 that of all others is the most frequent, where the 
 question is of a great deal of good to ensm- of ;i 
 
284 OF THE PR0F1C1ENCE AND 
 
 small injustice, which Jason of Thessalia determined 
 against the truth : " Aliqua sunt injuste facienda, 
 ut multa juste fieri possint" (Some things are to be 
 done unjustly, that many things may be done 
 justly). But the reply is good, " Auctorem prse- 
 sentis justitise habes, sponsorem futurse non habes" 
 (You have the author of the present justice, but you 
 have not the surety of the future). Men must 
 pursue things which are just in present, and leave 
 the future to the divine Providence. So then we 
 pass on from this general part touching the exemplar 
 and description of good. 
 
 Now therefore that we have spoken of this fruit 
 of life, it remain eth to speak of the husbandry that 
 belongeth thereunto ; without which part the former 
 seemeth to be no better than a fair image, or statua, 
 which is beautiful to contemplate, but is without 
 life and motion : whereunto Aristotle himself sub- 
 scribed in these words : " Necesse est scilicet de 
 virtute dicere, et quid sit, et ex quibus gignatur. 
 Inutile enim fere fuerit virtutem quidem nosse, acqui- 
 rendse autem ejus modos et vias ignorare : non enim 
 de virtute tantum, qua specie sit, quserendum est, 
 sed et quomodo sui copiam faciat : utrumque enim 
 volumus, et rem ipsam nosse, et ejus compotes fieri: 
 hoc autem ex voto non succedet, nisi sciamus et ex 
 quibus et quomodo" (With regard to virtue, we 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 285 
 
 ought to ascertain both in what it consists, and how 
 it is produced. It is of little use to know virtue, 
 but to be ignorant of the means of acquiring it : we 
 must not only investigate its nature, but find out 
 the way to obtain it : both are necessary, the know- 
 ledge of it, and the acquisition ; and this latter 
 cannot be accomplished unless we know both whence 
 and how). In such full words and with such itera- 
 tion doth he inculcate this part. So saith Cicero in 
 great commendation of Cato the second, that he 
 had applied himself to philosophy, " non ita dis- 
 putandi causa, sed ita vivendi" (not so much for 
 the purpose of disputation, as of regulating his life 
 by its precepts). And although the neglect of our 
 times, wherein few men do hold any consultations 
 touching the reformation of their life, (as Seneca 
 excellently saith) " De partibus vitse quisque de- 
 liberat, de summa nemo" (all deliberate about smaller 
 duties, but no one as to the general conduct of life,) 
 may make this part seem superfluous ; yet I must 
 conclude with that aphorism of Hippocrates, " Qui 
 gravi morbo correpti dolores non sentiunt, iis mens 
 segrotat" (persons who in a severe disease feel no 
 pain, labour under an unhappy insensibility of 
 mind) ; they need medicine, not only to assuage the 
 disease, but to awake the sense. 
 
 And if it be said, that the cure of men's minds 
 
^86* OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 belongeth to sacred divinity, it is most true : but yet 
 moral philosophy may be preferred unto her as a 
 wise servant and humble handmaid. For as the 
 Psalm saith, that the eyes of the handmaid look 
 perpetually towards the mistress, and yet no doubt 
 many things are left to the discretion of the hand- 
 maid, to discern of the mistress's will ; so ought 
 moral philosophy to give a constant attention to the 
 doctrines of divinity, and yet so as it may yield of 
 herself, within due limits, many sound and profit- 
 able directions. 
 
 This part therefore, because of the excellency 
 thereof, I cannot but find exceeding strange that it 
 is not reduced to written inquiry ; the rather, be- 
 cause it consisteth of much matter, wherein both 
 speech and action is often conversant ; and such 
 wherein the common talk of men, (which is rare, 
 but yet cometh sometimes to pass,) is wiser than 
 their books. It is reasonable therefore that we pro- 
 pound it in the more particularity, both for the 
 worthiness, and because we may acquit ourselves 
 for reporting it deficient ; which seemeth almost in- 
 credible, and is otherwise conceived and presupposed 
 by those themselves that have written. We will 
 therefore enumerate some heads or points thereof, 
 that it may appear the better what it is, and whether 
 it be extant. 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 2S7 
 
 First, therefore, in this, as in all things which 
 are practical, we ought to cast up our account, what 
 is in our power, and what not; for the one may be 
 dealt with by way of alteration, but the other by 
 way of application only. The husbandman cannot 
 command, neither the nature of the earth, nor the 
 seasons of the weather ; no more can the physician 
 the constitution of the patient, nor the variety of 
 accidents : so in the culture and cure of the mind 
 of man, two things are without our command ; points 
 of nature, and points of fortune : for to the basis of 
 the one, and the conditions of the other, our work is 
 limited and tied. In these things therefore, it is 
 left unto us to proceed by application. 
 
 " Vincenda est omnis fortuna ferendo:" 
 (All fortune is to be overcome by patience :) 
 and so likewise, 
 
 " Vincenda est omnis natura ferendo :" 
 (All nature is to be overcome by patience.) 
 But when that we speak of suffering, we do not 
 speak of a dull and neglected suffering, but of a 
 wise and industrious suffering, which draweth and 
 contriveth use and advantage out of that which 
 seemeth adverse and contrary; which is that pro- 
 perly which we call accommodating or applying 
 Now the wisdom of application resteth principally 
 in the exact and distinct knowledge of the precedent 
 state or disposition, unto which we do apply ; foi 
 
288 Or THE PROEICIENCE AND 
 
 cannot fit a garment, except we first take measure 
 of the body. 
 
 So then the first article of this knowledge is, to 
 set down sound and true distributions and descrip- 
 tions of the several characters and tempers of men's 
 natures and dispositions ; especially having regard 
 to those differences which are most radical in being 
 the fountains and causes of the rest, or most fre- 
 quent in concurrence or commixture ; wherein it is 
 not the handling of a few of them in passage, the 
 better to describe the mediocrities of virtues, that 
 can satisfy this intention. For if it deserve to be 
 considered, " that there are minds which are pro- 
 portioned to great matters, and others to small/' 
 (which Aristotle handleth, or ought to have handled, 
 by the name of magnanimity;) doth it not deserve as 
 well to be considered, " that there are minds pro- 
 portioned to intend many matters, and others to 
 few V y So that some can divide themselves ; others 
 can perchance do exactly well, but it must be but 
 in few things at once : and so there cometh to be a 
 narrowness of mind, as well as a pusillanimity. 
 And again, " that some minds are proportioned to 
 that which may be dispatched at once, or within a 
 short return of time ; others to that which begins 
 afar off, and is to be won with length of pur- 
 suit :" 
 
 " Jam turn tenditque fovetque :" 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 289 
 
 (Even then began to destine and cherish,) 
 So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity. 
 which is commonly also ascribed to God as a mag- 
 nanimity. So farther deserved it to be considered 
 by Aristotle; " that there is a disposition in con- 
 versation, (supposing it in things which do in no 
 sort touch or concern a man's self,) to soothe and 
 please ; and a disposition contrary to contradict and 
 cross :" and deserveth it not much better to be con- 
 sidered, " that there is a disposition, not in con- 
 versation or talk, but in matter of more serious 
 nature, (and supposing it still in things merely in- 
 different,) to take pleasure in the good of another ; 
 and a disposition contrariwise, to take distaste at 
 the good of another V which is that properly which 
 we call good-nature or ill-nature, benignity or ma- 
 lignity : and therefore I cannot sufficiently marvel 
 that this part of knowledge, touching the several 
 characters of natures and dispositions, should be 
 omitted both in morality and policy, considering it 
 is of so great ministry and suppeditation to them 
 both. A man shall find in the traditions of astro- 
 logy some pretty and apt divisions of men's natures, 
 according to the predominances of the planets ; 
 lovers of quiet, lovers of action, lovers of victory, 
 lovers of honour, lovers of pleasure, lovers of arts, 
 lovers of change, and so forth. A man shall rind 
 
 u 
 
C Z90 OF THE FltOilCIENCE AND 
 
 in the wisest sort of these relations which the Ita- 
 lians make touching conclaves, the natures of the 
 several cardinals handsomely and lively painted 
 forth : a man shall meet with, in every day's con- 
 ference, the denominations of sensitive, dry, formal, 
 real, humourous, certain, " huomo di prima impres- 
 sione, huomo di ultima impressione" (a man of the 
 first impression, a man of the last impression), and 
 the like : and yet nevertheless this kind of observa- 
 tions wandereth in words, but is not fixed in inquiry. 
 For the distinctions are found, many of them, but 
 we conclude no precepts upon them : wherein our 
 fault is the greater, because both history, poesy, and 
 daily experience are as goodly fields where these 
 observations grow ; whereof we make a few posies to 
 hold in our hands, but no man bringeth them to the 
 confectionary, that receipts might be made of them 
 for the use of life. 
 
 Of much like kind are those impressions of 
 nature, which are imposed upon the mind by the 
 sex, by the age, by the region, by health and sick- 
 ness, by beauty and deformity, and the like, which 
 are inherent, and not external ; and again, those 
 which are caused by external fortune; as sove- 
 reignty, nobility, obscure birth, riches, want, magis- 
 tracy, privateness, prosperity, adversity, constant 
 fortune, variable fortune, rising " per sal turn" (sud- 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 291 
 
 denly), " per gradus" (gradually), and the like. 
 And therefore we see that Plautus maketh it a 
 wonder to see an old man beneficent, " benignitas 
 hujus ut adolescentuli est" (he has this beneficence 
 as being a young man). St. Paul conclucleth, that 
 severity of discipline was to be used to the Cretans, 
 " Increpa eos dure" (rebuke them sharply), upon the 
 disposition of their country, " Cretenses semper 
 mendaces, malse bestiee, ventres pigri" (the Cretans 
 are alway liars, evil beasts, slow bellies). Sallust 
 noteth, that it is usual with kings to desire contra- 
 dictories : " Sed plerumque regise voluntates, ut 
 vehementes sunt, sic mobiles, ssepeque ipsse sibi 
 adversae" (but for the most part the minds of princes, 
 as they are impetuous, so are they changeable, and 
 often self-contradictory). Tacitus observeth how 
 rarely raising of the fortune mendeth the disposition : 
 " Solus Vespasianus mutatus in melius" (Vespasian 
 alone was changed for the better by elevation to 
 power). Pindarus maketh an observation, that 
 great and sudden fortune for the most part defeateth 
 men " Qui magnam felicitatem concoquere non, 
 possunt" (who cannot digest great good fortune). 
 So the Psalm sheweth it is more easy to keep a 
 measure in the enjoying of fortune, than in the 
 increase of fortune : " Divitiae si affluant, nolih eoi 
 apponere" (if riches increase, set not your heart 
 
292 OF THE PROEKHENCE AND 
 
 upon them). These observations, and the like, I 
 deny not but are touched a little by Aristotle, as in 
 passage, in his Rhetorics, and are handled in some 
 scattered discourses : but they were never incorpor- 
 ated into moral philosophy, to which they do es- 
 sentially appertain ; as the knowledge of the diver- 
 sity of grounds and moulds doth to agriculture, and 
 the knowledge of the diversity of complexions and 
 constitutions doth to the physician; except we mean 
 to follow the indiscretion of empirics, which minister 
 the same medicines to all patients. 
 
 Another article of this knowledge is the inquiry 
 touching the affections : for as in medicining of the 
 body, it is in order first to know the divers com- 
 plexions and constitutions; secondly, the diseases; 
 and lastly, the cures : so in medicining of the mind, 
 after knowledge of the divers characters of men's 
 natures, it folio weth, in order, to know the diseases 
 and infirmities of the mind, which are no other than 
 the perturbations and distempers of the affections 
 For as the ancient politicians in popular states were 
 wont to compare the people to the sea, and the 
 orators to the winds ; because as the sea would of 
 itself be calm and quiet, if the winds did not move 
 and trouble it ; so the people would be peaceable 
 and tractable, if the seditious orators did not set 
 them in working and agitation : so it may be fitly 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 293 
 
 said, that the mind in the nature thereof would 
 be temperate and stayed, if the affections, as 
 winds, did not put it into tumult and perturbation. 
 
 And here again I find strange, as before, that 
 Aristotle should have written divers volumes of 
 Ethics, and never handled the affections, which is the 
 principal subject thereof; and yet in his Rhetorics, 
 where they are considered but collaterally, and in a 
 second degree, as they may be moved by speech, he 
 findeth place for them, and handleth them well 
 for the quantity ; but where their true place is, he 
 pretermitteth them. For it is not his disputations 
 about pleasure and pain that can satisfy this inquiry, 
 no more than he that should generally handle the 
 nature of light, can be said to handle the nature 
 of colours ; for pleasure and pain are to the particu- 
 lar affections, as light is to particular colours. 
 Better travails, I suppose, had the Stoics taken in 
 this argument, as far as I can gather by that which 
 we have at second hand. But yet, it is like, it was 
 after their manner, rather in subtilty of definitions, 
 (which, in a subject of this nature, are but curiosi- 
 ties,) than in active and ample descriptions and ob- 
 servations. So likewise I find some particular 
 writings of an elegant nature, touching some of the 
 affections; as of anger, of comfort upon adverse 
 accidents, of tenderness of countenance, and other. 
 
294 01' THE PR0FICIENCE AND 
 
 But the poets and writers of histories are the 
 best doctors of this knowledge ; where we may find 
 painted forth with great life, how affections are 
 kindled and incited ; and how pacified and re- 
 frained ; and how again contained from act and 
 farther degree ; how they disclose themselves ; how 
 they work ; how they vary ; how they gather and 
 fortify ; how they are inwrapped one within another ; 
 and how they do fight and encounter one with 
 another ; and other the like particularities : amongst 
 the which this last is of special use in moral and 
 civil matters ; how, I say, to set affection against 
 affection, and to master one by another ; even as we 
 use to hunt beast with beast, and fly bird with bird, 
 which otherwise perhaps Ave could not so easily 
 recover : upon which foundation is erected that ex- 
 cellent use of " premium" (reward) and " poena" 
 (punishment), whereby civil states consist ; employ- 
 ing the predominant affections of fear and hope, for 
 the suppressing and bridling the rest. For as in 
 the government of states it is sometimes necessary to 
 bridle one faction with another, so it is in the 
 government within. 
 
 Now come we to those points which are within 
 our own command, and have force and operation 
 upon the mind, to affect the will and appetite, and 
 to alter manners : wherein they ought to have 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 995 
 
 handled custom, exercise, habit, education, exam- 
 ple, imitation, emulation, company, friends, praise, 
 reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books, studies : 
 these as they have determinate use in moralities, 
 from these the mind sufTereth ; and of these are such 
 receipts and regimens compounded and described, as 
 may serve to recover or preserve the health and 
 good estate of the mind, as far as pertaineth to 
 human medicine : of which number we will insist 
 upon some one or two, as an example of the rest. 
 because it were too long to prosecute all ; and there- 
 fore we do resume custom and habit to speak of. 
 
 The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me a negligent 
 opinion, that of those things which consist by nature, 
 nothing can be changed bv custom ; using for ex- 
 ample, that if a stone be thrown ten thousand times 
 up, it will not learn to ascend; and that by often 
 seeing or hearing, we do not learn to see or hear the 
 better. For though this principle be true in things 
 wherein nature is peremptory, (the reason whereof 
 we cannot now stand to discuss,) yet it is otherwise in 
 things wherein nature admitteth a latitude. For he 
 might see that a strait glove will come more easily 
 on with use ; and that a wand will by use bend other- 
 wise than it grew ; and that by use of the voice we 
 speak louder and stronger ; and that by use of 
 enduring heat or cold, we endure it the better, and 
 
296 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 the like : which latter sort have a nearer resem- 
 blance unto that subject of manners he handleth? 
 than those instances which he allegeth. But 
 allowing his conclusion, that virtues and vices con- 
 sist in habit, he ought so much the more to have 
 taught the manner of superinducing that habit : 
 for there be many precepts of the wise ordering the 
 exercises of the mind, as there is of ordering the 
 exercises of the body ; whereof we will recite a 
 few. 
 
 The first shall be, that we beware we take not at 
 the first either too high a strain, or too weak : for if 
 too high, in a diffident nature you discourage ; in a 
 confident nature you breed an opinion of facility, 
 and so a sloth ; and in all natures you breed a 
 farther expectation them can hold out, and so an in- 
 satisfaction in the end : if too weak, of the other 
 side, you may not look to perform and overcome 
 any great task. 
 
 Another precept is, to practise all things chiefly 
 at two several times, the one when the mind is best 
 disposed, the other when it is worst disposed ; that 
 by the one you may gain a great step, by the other 
 you may work out the knots and stonds of the mind, 
 and make the middle times the more easy and 
 pleasant. 
 
 Another precept is that which Aristotle men- 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 297 
 
 tioneth by the way, which is, to bear ever towards 
 the contrary extreme of that whereunto we are by 
 nature inclined : like unto the rowing against the 
 stream, or making a wand straight by bending him 
 contrary to his natural crookedness. 
 
 Another precept is, that the mind is brought to 
 any thing better, and with more sweetness and hap- 
 piness, if that whereunto you pretend be not first in 
 the intention, but " tanquam aliud agendo" (as 
 it were, in doing something else), because of the 
 natural hatred of the mind against necessity and 
 constraint. Many other axioms there are touching 
 the managing of exercise and custom ; which, being 
 so conducted, doth prove indeed another nature; 
 but being governed by chance, doth commonly 
 prove but an ape of nature, and bringeth forth that 
 which is lame and counterfeit. 
 
 So if we should handle books and studies, and 
 what influence and operation they have upon man- 
 ners, are there not divers precepts of great caution 
 and direction appertaining thereunto ? Did not one 
 of the fathers in great indignation call poesy " vinum 
 dsemonum" (the wine of devils), because it increaseth 
 temptations, perturbations, and vain opinions ? Is 
 not the opinion of Aristotle worthy to be regarded, 
 wherein he saith, " That young men are no fit 
 auditors of moral philosophy, because they are not 
 
c 298 0E THE PR0EICIEISCE AND 
 
 settled from the boiling heat of their affections, nor 
 attempered with time and experience ?" And doth it 
 not hereof come, that those excellent books and 
 discourses of the ancient writers, (whereby they have 
 persuaded unto virtue most effectually, by repre- 
 senting her in state and majesty, and popular 
 opinions against virtue in their parasites' coats, fit to 
 be scorned and derided,) are of so little effect 
 towards honesty of life, because they are not read 
 and revolved by men in their mature and settled 
 years, but confined almost to boys and beginners ? 
 But is it not true also, that much less young men 
 are fit auditors of matters of policy, till they have 
 been thoroughly seasoned in religion and morality ; 
 lest their judgments be corrupted, and made apt to 
 think that there are no true differences of things, but 
 according to utility and fortune, as the verse de- 
 scribes it, 
 
 " Prosperum et felix scelus virtus vocatur :" 
 (A fortunate and successful crime is called virtue :) 
 and again, 
 
 u Ille crucem pretium sceleris tulit, hie diadema :" 
 (One by his villainy brings himself to a shameful 
 death, another obtains a crown :) 
 which the poets do speak satirically, and in indigna- 
 tion on virtue's behalf; but books of policy do 
 speak it seriously and positively : for it so pleaseth 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 299 
 
 Machiavel to say, that if Csesar had been over- 
 thrown, he would have been more odious than ever 
 was Catiline ;" as if there had been no difference, 
 but in fortune, between a very fury of lust and 
 blood, and the most excellent spirit (his ambition 
 reserved) of the world ? Again, is there not a caution 
 likewise to be given of the doctrines of moralities 
 themselves, (some kinds of them,) lest they make men 
 too precise, arrogant, incompatible ; as Cicero saith 
 of Cato, " In Marco Catone hsee bona quae videmus 
 divina et egregia, ipsius scitote esse propria ; quae 
 nonnunquam requirimus, ea sunt omnia non a natura, 
 sed a magistro" (those divine and excellent qualities 
 which we admire in Marcus Cato, were properly his 
 own : the defects which we observe in him arose, not 
 from nature, but from his preceptor) ? Many other 
 axioms and advices there are touching ihose pro- 
 prieties and effects, which studies do infuse and 
 instil into manners. And so likewise is there touch- 
 ing the use of all those other points, of company, 
 fame, laws, and the rest, which we recited in the 
 beginning in the doctrine of morality. 
 
 But there is a kind of culture of the mind that 
 seemeth yet more accurate and elaborate than the 
 rest, and is built upon this ground ; that the minds 
 of all men are sometimes in a state more perfect, and 
 at other times in a state more depraved. The purpose 
 
300 OJ?" THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 therefore of this practice is, to fix and cherish the 
 good hours of the mind, and to obliterate and take 
 forth the evil. The fixing of the good hath been 
 practised by two means, vows or constant resolu- 
 tions, and observances or exercises ; which are not to 
 be regarded so much in themselves, as because they 
 keep the mind in continual obedience. The obli- 
 teration of the evil hath been practised by two means, 
 some kind of redemption or expiation of that which 
 is past, and an inception or account u de novo," for 
 the time to come. But this part seemeth sacred 
 and religious, and justly ; for all good moral 
 philosophy, as was said, is but an handmaid to 
 religion. 
 
 Wherefore we will conclude with that last point, 
 which is of all other means the most compendious 
 and summary, and again, the most noble and effec- 
 tual to the reducing of the mind unto virtue and 
 good estate ; which is, the electing and propounding 
 unto a man's self good and virtuous ends of his life, 
 such as may be in a reasonable sort within his com- 
 pass to attain. For if these two things be sup- 
 posed, that a man set before him honest and good 
 ends, and again, that he be resolute, constant, and 
 true unto them ; it will follow that he shall mould 
 himself into all virtue at once. And this is indeed 
 like the work of nature ; whereas the other course is 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 301 
 
 like the work of the hand. For as when a carver 
 makes an image, he shapes only that part where- 
 upon he worketh, (as if he be upon the face, that 
 part which shall be the body is but a rude stone 
 still, till such time as he comes to it ;) but, contrari- 
 wise, when nature makes a flower or living creature, 
 she formeth rudiments of all the parts at one time : 
 so in obtaining virtue by habit, while a man prac- 
 tiseth temperance, he doth not profit much to forti- 
 tude, nor the like; but when he dedicateth and 
 applieth himself to good ends, look, what virtue 
 soever the pursuit and passage towards those ends 
 doth commend unto him, he is invested of a prece- 
 dent disposition to conform himself thereunto. 
 Which state of mind Aristotle doth excellently 
 express himself, that it ought not to be called vir- 
 tuous, but divine : his words are these : " Immani- 
 tati autem consentaneum est opponere earn, quae 
 supra humanitatem est, heroicam sive divinam virtu- 
 tem" (it is a wild fancy to aim at that heroic or 
 divine virtue which is above the reach of huma- 
 nity) : and a little after, " Nam ut feree neque vitium 
 neque virtus est, sic neque Dei : sed hie quidem 
 status altius quiddam virtute est, ille aliud quiddam 
 a vitio" (for as a brute beast has neither vice nor 
 virtue, so neither has the Deity ; but the state of the 
 latter is something higher than virtue ; of the former, 
 
302 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 it is something different from vice). And therefore 
 we may see what celsitude of honour Plinius Secun- 
 dus attribute th to Trajan in his funeral oration ; 
 where he said, " that men needed to make no other 
 prayers to the gods, but that they would continue as 
 good lords to them as Trajan had been ;" as if he 
 had not been only an imitation of divine nature, 
 but a pattern of it. But these be heathen and pro- 
 fane passages, having but a shadow of that divine 
 state of mind, which religion and the holy faith doth 
 conduct men unto, by imprinting upon their souls 
 charity, which is excellently called the bond of per- 
 fection, because it comprehendeth and fasteneth all 
 virtues together. And as it is elegantly said by 
 Menander of vain love, which is but a false imita- 
 tion of divine love, " Amor melior sophista loevo ad 
 humanam vitam" (Love is better than a left-handed 
 sophist for the direction of human life), that love 
 teacheth a man to carry himself better than the 
 sophist or preceptor ; which he calleth left-handed, 
 because, with all his rules and precepts, he cannot 
 form a man so dexterously, nor with that facility 
 to prize himself and govern himself, as love 
 can do : so certainly, if a man's mind be truly in- 
 flamed with charity, it doth work him suddenly into 
 greater perfection than all the doctrine of morality 
 can do, which is but a sophist in comparison of the 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 303 
 
 other. Nay farther, as Xenophon observed truly, 
 that all other affections, though they raise the mind, 
 yet they do it by distorting and uncomeliness of 
 ecstasies or excesses ; but only love doth exalt the 
 mind, and nevertheless at the same instant doth 
 settle and compose it : so in all other excellencies, 
 though they advance nature, yet they are subject to 
 excess ; only charity admitteth no excess. For 
 so we see, by aspiring to be like God in power, 
 the angels transgressed and fell ; " Ascend am, 
 et ero similis Altissimo" (I will ascend, and be like 
 the Most High) : by aspiring to be like God in 
 knowledge, man transgressed and fell ; " Eritis 
 sicut Dii, scientes bonum et malum" (ye shall be as 
 Gods, knowing good and evil) : but by aspiring to a 
 similitude of God in goodness or love, neither man 
 nor angel ever transgressed, or shall transgress. 
 For unto that imitation we are called : " Diligite 
 inimicos vestros, benefacite eis qui oderunt vos, et 
 orate pro persequentibus et calumniantibus vos ; ut 
 sitis filii Patris vestri qui in coelis est, qui solem 
 suum oriri facit super bonos et malos, et pluit super 
 justos et injustos" (Love your enemies, do good to 
 them that hate you, and pray for them which de- 
 spitefully use you and persecute you ; that ye may 
 be the children of your Father which is in heaven : 
 for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the 
 
3(H OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the 
 unjust). So in the first platform of the divine 
 nature itself, the heathen religion speaketh thus, 
 " Optimus Maximus" (the Best and Greatest) : and 
 the sacred Scriptures thus, " Misericordia ejus super 
 omnia opera ejus" (His mercy is over all his works). 
 Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral 
 knowledge, concerning the culture and regimen of 
 the mind ; wherein if any man, considering the parts 
 thereof which I have enumerated, do judge that my 
 labour is but to collect into an art or science that 
 which hath been pretermitted by others, as matter 
 of common sense and experience, he judgeth well. 
 But as Philocrates sported with Demosthenes, " You 
 may not marvel, Athenians, that Demosthenes and 
 I do differ ; for he drinketh water, and I drink 
 wine :" and like as we read of an ancient parable 
 of the two gates of sleep, 
 
 " Sunt geminse somni portee : quarum altera fertur 
 Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris : 
 Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto, 
 Sed falsa ad ccelum mittunt insomnia manes :" 
 (Two gates the silent courts -of sleep adorn, 
 That of pale ivory, this of lucid horn : 
 Through this, true visions take their airy way ; 
 Through that, false phantoms mount the realms 
 of day) : 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 305 
 
 so if we put on sobriety and attention, we shall find 
 it a sure maxim in knowledge, that the more plea- 
 sant liquor of wine is the more vaporous, and the 
 braver gate of ivory sendeth forth the falser dreams. 
 But we have now concluded that general part 
 of human philosophy, which contemplateth man 
 segregate, and as he consisteth of body and 
 spirit. Wherein we may farther note, that there 
 seemeth to be a relation or conformity between 
 the good of the mind and the good of the body. 
 For as we divided the good of the body into 
 health, beauty, strength, and pleasure ; so the good 
 of the mind, inquired in rational and moral know- 
 ledges, tendeth to this, to make the mind sound, 
 and without perturbation ; beautiful, and graced with 
 decency ; and strong and agile for all duties of life. 
 These three, as in the body, so in the mind, seldom 
 meet, and commonly sever. For it is easy to ob- 
 serve, that many have strength of wit and courage ; 
 but have neither health from perturbations, nor any 
 beauty or decency in their doings : some again have 
 an elegancy and fineness of carriage; which have 
 neither soundness of honesty, nor substance of suffi- 
 ciency : and some again have honest and reformed 
 minds ; that can neither become themselves, nor 
 manage business. And sometimes two of them 
 meet, and rarely all three. As for pleasure, \\< 
 
 x 
 
306* OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 have likewise determined that the mind ought not 
 to be reduced to stupidity, but to retain pleasure ; 
 confined rather in the subject of it, than in the 
 strength and vigour of it, 
 
 Civil Knowledge is conversant about a subject 
 which of all others is most immersed in matter, and 
 hardliest reduced to axiom. Nevertheless, as Cato 
 the censor said, " that the Romans were like sheep, 
 for that a man might better drive a flock of them, 
 than one of them ; for in a flock, if you could get 
 but some few to go right, the rest would follow ;" 
 so in that respect moral philosophy is more difficile 
 than policy. Again, moral philosophy propoundeth 
 to itself the framing of internal goodness; but civil 
 knowledge requireth only an external goodness ; for 
 that as to society sufficeth. And therefore it cometh 
 oft to pass that there be evil times in good govern- 
 ments : for so we find in the holy story, when the 
 kings were good, yet it is added, " Sed adhuc 
 populus non direxerat cor suum ad Dominum Deum 
 patrum suorum" (For as yet the people had not 
 prepared their hearts unto the God of their fathers). 
 Again, states, as great engines, - move slowly, and 
 are not so soon put out of frame : for as in Egypt 
 the seven good years sustained the seven bad ; so 
 governments, for a time well grounded, do bear out 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 307 
 
 errors following : but the resolution of particular 
 persons is more suddenly subverted. These respects 
 do somewhat qualify the extreme difficulty of civil 
 knowledge. 
 
 This knowledge hath three parts, according to 
 the three summary actions of society; which are 
 Conversation, Negotiation, and Government. For 
 man seeketh in society comfort, use, and protection : 
 and they be three wisdoms of divers natures, which 
 do often sever; wisdonr of behaviour, wisdom of 
 business, and wisdom of state. 
 
 The wisdom of Conversation ought not to be 
 over much affected, but much less despised : for it 
 hath not only an honour in itself, but an influence 
 also into business and government. The poet saith, 
 " Nee vultu destrue verba tuo :" a man may 
 destroy the force of his words with his countenance : 
 so may he of his deeds, saith Cicero, recommending 
 to his brother affability and easy access, " Nil inter- 
 est habere ostium apertum, vultum clausum :" it is 
 nothing won to admit men with an open door, and 
 to receive them with a shut and reserved counte- 
 nance. So, we see, Atticus, before the first inter- 
 view between Csesarand Cicero, the war depending, 
 did seriously advise Cicero touching the composing 
 and ordering of his countenance and gesture. And 
 if the government of the countenance be of sucl 
 
30S OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 effect, much more is that of the speech, and other 
 carriage appertaining to conversation ; the true model 
 whereof seemeth to me well expressed by Livy, 
 though not meant for this purpose : " Ne aut arro- 
 gans videar, aut obnoxius ; quorum alterum est 
 alienee libertatis obliti, alterum suse :" the sum of 
 behaviour is to retain a man's own dignity, without 
 intruding upon the liberty of others. On the other 
 side, if behaviour and outward carriage be intended 
 too much, first it may pass into affectation, and 
 then " Quid deformius quam scenam in vitam trans- 
 ferred (what is more dishonourable than to act a 
 part through life) ? But although it proceed not to 
 that extreme, yet it consumeth time, and employeth 
 the mind too much. And therefore as we use to 
 advise young students from company keeping, by 
 saying, " Amici fures temporis" (friends are the 
 thieves of time): so certainly the intending of the 
 discretion of behaviour is a great thief of meditation. 
 Again, such as are accomplished in that form of 
 urbanity please themselves in it, and seldom aspire 
 to higher virtue ; whereas those that have defect in 
 it do seek comeliness by reputation : for where re- 
 putation is, almost every thing becometh ; but where 
 that is not, it must be supplied by punctilios and 
 compliments. Again, there is no greater impedi- 
 ment of action than an over-curious observance of 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 309 
 
 decency, and the guide of decency, which is time 
 and season. For as Solomon saith, " Qui respicit 
 ad ventos, non seminat; et qui respicit ad nubes, 
 non metet" (he that observeth the wind shall not 
 sow; and he that regardeth the clouds shall not 
 reap) : a man must make his opportunity, as oft as 
 find it. To conclude ; behaviour seemeth to me as 
 a garment of the mind, and to have the conditions 
 of a garment. For it ought to be made in fashion ; 
 it ought not to be too curious ; it ought to be 
 shaped so as to set forth any good' making of the 
 mind, and hide any deformity ; and above all, it 
 ought not to be too strait, or restrained for exer- 
 cise or motion. But this part of civil knowledge 
 hath been elegantly handled, and therefore I cannot 
 report it for deficient. 
 
 The wisdom touching Negotiation or Business 
 hath not been hitherto collected into writing, to the 
 great derogation of learning, and the professors of 
 learning. For from this root springeth chiefly that 
 note or opinion, which by us is expressed in adage 
 to this effect, ' that there is no great concurrence 
 between learning and wisdom.' For of the three 
 wisdoms which we have set down to pertain to civil 
 life, for wisdom of behaviour, it is by learned men 
 for the most part despised, as an inferior to virtue, 
 and an enemy to meditation; for wisdom of govern- 
 
310 OF THE PR0FIC1ENCE AND 
 
 merit, they acquit themselves well when they are 
 called to it, but that happeneth to few; but for the 
 wisdom of business, wherein man's life is most con- 
 versant, there be no books of it, except some few 
 scattered advertisements, that have no proportion 
 to the magnitude of this subject. For if books were 
 written of this, as the other, I doubt not but learned 
 men with mean experience, would far excel men of 
 long experience without learning, and outshootthem 
 in their own bow. 
 
 Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this 
 knowledge should be so variable as it falleth not 
 under precept ; for it is much less infinite than sci- 
 ence of government, which, we see, is laboured, and 
 in some part reduced. Of this wisdom, it seemeth, 
 some of the ancient Romans, in the sagest and 
 wisest times, were professors ; for Cicero reporteth, 
 that it was then in use for senators that had name 
 and opinion for general wise men, as Coruncanius, 
 Curius, Lselius, and many others, to walk at certain 
 hours in the place, and to give audience to those 
 that would use their advice; and that the particular 
 citizens would resort unto them, and consult with 
 them of the marriage of a daughter, or of the em- 
 ploying of a son, or of a purchase or bargain, or of 
 an accusation, and every other occasion incident to 
 man's life. So as there is a wisdom of counsel and 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 311 
 
 advice even in private causes, arising out of an uni- 
 versal insight into the affairs of the world ; which is 
 used indeed upon particular causes propounded, but 
 is gathered by general observation of causes of like 
 nature. For so we see in the book which Q. Cicero 
 writeth to his brother, u De petitione consulatus" 
 (On standing candidate for the consulship), (being 
 the only book of business, that I know, written by 
 the ancients,) although it concerned a particular 
 action then on foot, yet the substance thereof con- 
 sisteth of many wise and politic axioms, which con- 
 tain not a temporary, but a perpetual direction in 
 the case of popular elections. 
 
 But chiefly we may see in those aphorisms which 
 have place among divine writings, composed by 
 Solomon the king, (of whom the Scriptures testify 
 that his heart was as the sands of the sea, encom- 
 passing the world and all worldly matters,) we see, 
 I say, not a few profound and excellent cautions, 
 precepts, positions, extending to much variety of 
 occasions ; whereupon we will stay a while, offering 
 to consideration some number of examples. 
 
 " Sed et cunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur ne 
 accommodes aurem tuam, ne forte audias servum 
 tuum maledicentem tibi" (Take no heed unto all 
 words that are spoken ; lest thou hear thy ser- 
 vant curse thee). Here is concluded the provident 
 stay of inquiry of that which we would be loth to 
 
?12 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 find : as it was judged great wisdom in Pompeius 
 Magnus that he burned Sertorius's papers unperused. 
 
 " Vir sapiens, si cum stulto contenderit, sive 
 irascatur, sive rideat, non inveniet requiem'' (A 
 wise man, if he contend with a fool, whether he be 
 angry or laugh, shall find no rest). Here is de- 
 scribed the great disadvantage which a wise man 
 hath in undertaking a lighter person than himself; 
 which is such an engagement as, whether a man 
 turn the matter to jest, or turn it to heat, or how- 
 soever he change copy, he can no ways quit him- 
 self well of it. 
 
 " Qui delicate a pueritia nutrit servum suum, 
 postea sentiet eum contumacem" (He that deli- 
 cately bringeth up his servant from a child, shall 
 have him become his son at the length). Here is sig- 
 nified, that if a man begin too high a pitch in his fa- 
 vours, it doth commonly end in unkindness and un- 
 thankfulness. 
 
 " Vidisti virum velocem in opere suo ; coram re- 
 gibus stabit, nee erit inter ignobiles" (Seest thou 
 a man diligent in his business? he shall stand before 
 kings ; he shall not stand before mean men). Here 
 is observed, that of all virtues for rising to honour 
 quickness of dispatch is the best; for superiors 
 many times love not to have those they employ too 
 deep or too sufficient, but ready and diligent. 
 
 " Vidi cunctos viventes qui ambulant sub sole, 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 313 
 
 cum adolescente secundo qui consurgit pro eo" 
 (I considered all the living which walk under the 
 sun, with the second child that shall stand up in his 
 stead). Here is expressed that which was noted by 
 Sylla first, and after him by Tiberius : " Plures ado- 
 rant solem orientem quam occidentem vel meridia- 
 num" (More people worship the sun when rising, 
 than when setting, or when at its height.) 
 
 " Si spiritus potestatem habentis ascendent su- 
 per te, locum tuum ne dimiseris ; quia curatio faciet 
 cessare peccata maxima" (If the spirit of the ruler 
 rise up against thee, leave not thy place ; for yield- 
 ing pacifleth great offences). Here caution is given, 
 that upon displeasure, retiring is of all courses the 
 unfittest ; for a man leaveth things at worst, and de- 
 priveth himself of means to make them better. 
 
 " Erat civitas parva, et pauci in ea viri ; venit 
 contra earn rex magnus, et vadavit earn, instruxitque 
 munitiones per gyrum, et perfecta est obsidio : in- 
 ventusque est in ea vir pauper et sapiens, et libera- 
 vit earn per sapientiam suam ; et nullus deinceps re- 
 cordatus est hominis illius pauperis" (There was a 
 little city, and few men within it ; and there came a 
 great king against it, and besieged it, and built 
 great bulwarks against it : now there was found in 
 it a poor wise man, and he by his wisdom delivered 
 the city ; yet no man remembered that same poor 
 
314 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 man). Here the corruption of states is set forth, 
 that esteem not virtue or merit longer than they 
 have use of it. 
 
 " Mollis responsio frangit iram" (A soft an- 
 swer turneth away wrath). Here is noted, that 
 silence or rough answer exasperateth ; but an an- 
 swer present and temperate pacifieth. 
 
 " Iter pigrorum quasi sepes spinarum ,, (The 
 way of the slothful man is as an hedge of thorns). 
 Here is lively represented how laborious sloth proveth 
 in the end ; for when things are deferred to the last 
 instant, and nothing prepared beforehand, every step 
 flndeth a brier or an impediment, which catcheth or 
 stoppeth. 
 
 " Melior est finis orationis quam principium" 
 (Better is the end of a speech than the beginning 
 thereof). Here is taxed the vanity of formal speakers, 
 that study more about prefaces and inducements, 
 than upon the conclusions and issues of speech. 
 
 " Qui cognoscit in judicio faciem, non bene fa- 
 cit ; iste et pro buccella panis deseret veritatem" (To 
 have respect of persons is not good : for, for a piece 
 of bread that man will transgress). Here is noted, 
 that a judge were better be a briber than a respecter 
 of persons ; for a corrupt judge ofTendeth not so 
 highly as a facile. 
 
 " Vir pauper calumnians pauperes similis est im- 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 315 
 
 bri vehementi, in quo paratur fames" (A poor man 
 that oppresseth the poor is like a sweeping rain 
 which leaveth no food). Here is expressed the ex- 
 tremity of necessitous extortions, figured in the an- 
 cient fable of the full and hungry horse-leech. 
 
 " Fons turbatus pede, et vena corrupta, est Jus- 
 tus cadens coram impio" (A righteous man falling 
 down before the wicked, is as a troubled fountain, 
 and a corrupt spring). Here is noted, that one ju- 
 dicial and exemplar iniquity in the face of the world, 
 doth trouble the fountains of justice more than many 
 particular injuries passed over by connivance. 
 
 " Qui subtrahit aliquid a patre et a matre, et di- 
 cit hoc non esse peccatum, particeps est homicidii" 
 (Whoso robbeth his father or his mother, and saith, 
 It is no transgression ; the same is the companion of 
 a destroyer). Here is noted, that whereas men in 
 wronging their best friends use to extenuate their 
 fault, as if they might presume or be bold upon 
 them, it doth contrariwise indeed aggravate their 
 fault, and turneth it from injury to impiety. 
 
 " Noli esse amicus homini iracundo, nee ambu- 
 lato cum homine furioso" (Make no friendship 
 with an angry man ; and with a furious man thou 
 shalt not go). Here caution is given, that in the 
 election of our friends we do principally avoid those 
 which are impatient, as those that will espouse us to 
 many factions and auarrels. 
 
316 01 THE PR0FICIENCE AND 
 
 " Qui conturbat domum suam, possidebit ven- 
 tum" (He that troubleth his own house shall in- 
 herit the wind). Here is noted, that in domestical 
 separations and breaches men do promise to them- 
 selves quieting of their mind and contentment ; but 
 still they are deceived of their expectation, and it 
 turneth to wind. 
 
 " Filius sapiens Ise threat patrem : films vero 
 stultus moestitia est matri suae" (A wise son maketh 
 a glad father ; but a foolish son is the heaviness of 
 his mother). Here is distinguished, that fathers 
 have most comfort of the good proof of their sons ; 
 but mothers have most discomfort of their ill proof, 
 because women have little discerning of virtue, but 
 of fortune. 
 
 " Qui celat delictum, quoerit amicitiam ; sed qui 
 altero sermone repetit, separat foederatos" (He that 
 covereth a transgression seeketh love ; but he that 
 repeateth a matter separate th very friends). Here 
 caution is given, that reconcilement is better man- 
 aged by an amnesty, and passing over that which 
 is past, than by apologies and excusations. 
 
 " In omni opere bono erit abundantia; ubi au- 
 tem verba sunt plurima, ibi frequenter egestas'' 
 (The works of the diligent tend only to plenteous- 
 ness ; but where there are many words there is often 
 want). Here is noted, that words and discourse 
 abound most where there is idleness and want. 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 317 
 
 " Primus in sua causa Justus; sed venit altera 
 pars, et inquirit in eum" (He that is first in his 
 own cause seemeth just ; but his neighbour cometh 
 and searcheth him out). Here is observed, that in 
 all causes the first tale possesseth much ; in such 
 sort, that the prejudice thereby wrought will be 
 hardly removed, except some abuse or falsity in the 
 information be detected. 
 
 " Verba bilinguis quasi simplicia, et ipsa perve- 
 niunt ad interiora ventris" (The words of the dou- 
 ble-tongued seem simple, and they go down into the 
 innermost parts of the belly). Here is distinguished, 
 that flattery and insinuation, which seemeth set and 
 artificial, sinketh not far; but that entereth deep 
 which hath shew of nature, liberty, and simplicity. 
 
 " Qui erudit derisorem, ipse sibi injuriam facit ; 
 et qui arguit impium, sibi maculam generat" (He 
 that reproveth a scorner getteth to himself shame ; 
 and he that rebuketh a wicked man getteth himself 
 a blot). Here caution is given how we tender re- 
 prehension to arrogant and scornful natures, whose 
 manner is to esteem it for contumely, and accord- 
 ingly to return it. 
 
 " Da sapienti occasionem, et addetur ei sapien- 
 tia" (When the wise is instructed, he receiveth 
 knowledge). Here is distinguished the wisdom 
 brought into habit, and that which is but verbal, and 
 swimming only in conceit; for the one upon oc- 
 
31S OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 casion presented is quickened and redoubled, the 
 other is amazed and confused. 
 
 ''Quomodo in aquis resplendent vultus prospi- 
 cientium, sic corda hominum manifesta sunt pru- 
 dentibus" (As countenances are reflected by wa- 
 ter, so are the hearts of men made manifest to the 
 prudent). Here the mind of a wise man is com- 
 pared to a glass, wherein the images of all diver- 
 sity of natures and customs are represented ; from 
 which representation proceedeth that application, 
 
 " Qui sapit, innumeris moribus aptus erit :" 
 (The man of wisdom is fit for great variety of man- 
 ners). 
 
 Thus have I staid somewhat longer upon these 
 sentences politic of Solomon than is agreeable to 
 the proportion of an example ; led with a desire to 
 give authority to this part of knowledge, which I 
 noted as deficient, by so excellent a precedent ; and 
 have also attended them with brief observations, 
 such as to my understanding offer no violence to 
 the sense, though I know they may be applied to a 
 more divine use : but it is allowed, even in divinity, 
 that some interpretations, yea and some writings, 
 have more of the eagle than others ; but taking them 
 as instructions for life, they might have received 
 large discourse, if I would have broken them and 
 illustrated them by deducements and examples. 
 
 Neither was this in use only with the Hebrews, 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 319 
 
 but it is generally to be found in the wisdom of the 
 more ancient times ; that as men found out any ob- 
 servation that they thought was good for life, they 
 would gather it, and express it in parable, or apho- 
 rism, or fable. But for fables, they were vicege- 
 rents and supplies where examples failed : now that 
 the times abound with history, the aim is better 
 when the mark is alive. And therefore the form of 
 writing which of all others is fittest for this va- 
 riable argument of negotiation and occasion, is that 
 which Machiavel chose wisely and aptly for govern- 
 ment ; namely, discourse upon histories or examples : 
 for knowledge drawn freshly, and in our view, out 
 of particulars, knoweth the way best to particulars 
 again ; and it hath much greater life for practice 
 when the discourse attendeth upon the example, 
 than when the example attendeth upon the dis- 
 course. For this is no point of order, as it seemeth 
 at first, but of substance : for when the example is 
 the ground, being set down in an history at large, it 
 is set down with all circumstances, which may some- 
 times control the discourse thereupon made, and 
 sometimes supply it as a very pattern for action; 
 whereas the examples alleged for the discourse's 
 sake are cited succinctly, and without particularity, 
 and carry a servile aspect toward the discourse 
 which they are brought in to make good. 
 
320 OF THE PR0FICIENCE AND 
 
 But this difference is not amiss to be remem- 
 bered, that as history of times is the best ground 
 for discourse of government, such as Machiavel 
 handleth, so history of live% is the most proper for 
 discourse of business, because it is more conversant 
 in private actions. Nay, there is a ground of dis- 
 course for this purpose fitter than them both, which 
 is discourse upon letters, such as are wise and 
 weighty, as many are of Cicero ad Atticum, and 
 others. For letters have a great and more particu- 
 lar representation of business than either chronicles 
 or lives. Thus have we spoken both of the matter 
 and form of this part of civil knowledge, touching 
 negotiation, which we note to be deficient. 
 
 But yet there is another part of this part, which 
 difFereth as much from that whereof we have spoken 
 as " sapere" (to be wise), and " sibi sapere" (to be 
 wise for one's self), the one moving as it were to the 
 circumference, the other to the centre. For there is 
 a wisdom of counsel, and again there is a wisdom of 
 pressing a man's own fortune; and they do some- 
 times meet, and often sever : for many are wise in 
 their own ways that are weak for government or 
 counsel ; like ants, which are wise creatures for them- 
 selves, but very hurtful for the garden. This wis- 
 dom the Romans did take much knowledge of: 
 46 Nam pol sapiens," saith the comical poet, " fingit 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 321 
 
 fortunam sibi" (In truth, the wise man rules for- 
 tune to his purposes) ; and it grew to an adage, " Fa- 
 ber quisque fortunse proprioe" (Every man is the 
 artificer of his own fortune) ; and Livy attribute th it 
 to Cato the first, " in hoc viro tanta vis animi et in- 
 genii inerat, ut quocunque loco natus esset, sibi ipse 
 fortunam facturus videretur" (he had. such powers 
 of mind, that, in whatever rank he had been born, 
 he would have raised himself to eminence). 
 
 This conceit or position, if it be too much de- 
 clared and professed, hath been thought a thing im- 
 politic and unlucky, as was observed in Timotheus 
 the Athenian ; who having done many great services 
 •to the estate in his government, and giving an ac- 
 count thereof to the people, as the manner was, did 
 conclude every particular with this clause, " and in 
 this fortune had no part." And it came so to pass that 
 he never prospered in any thing he took in hand 
 afterwards : for this is too high and too arrogant, sa- 
 vouring of that which Ezekiel saith of Pharaoh, 
 " Dicis, Fluvius est meus, et ego feci memet ipsum" 
 (Thou sayest, My river is mine own, and I have 
 made it for myself) ; or of that which another pro- 
 phet speaketh, that men offer sacrifices to their nets 
 and snares ; and that which the poet expresseth, 
 
 " Dextra mihi Deus, et telum, quod missile libro. 
 Nunc adsint :" 
 
322 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 (Now, now, my spear, and conquering hand, he 
 cry'd, 
 
 Mezentius owns no deity beside !) 
 for these confidences were ever unhallowed, and un- 
 blessed : and therefore those that were great politi- 
 cians indeed ever ascribed their successes to their 
 felicity, and not to their skill or virtue. For so 
 Sylla surnamed himself " Felix" (Fortunate), not 
 " Magnus" (Great) : so Csesar said to the master of 
 the ship, " Csesarem portas et fortunam ejus" (You 
 have on board Csesar and his fortune). 
 
 But yet nevertheless these positions, " Faber 
 quisque fortunse suoe : Sapiens dominabitur astris : 
 Invia virtuti nulla est via (Every man is the artificer 
 of his own fortune : A wise man can control the 
 stars : No way is impassable to courage), and the 
 like, being taken and used as spurs to industry, and 
 not as stirrups to insolency, rather for resolution 
 than for presumption or outward declaration, have 
 been ever thought sound and good; and are, no 
 question, imprinted in the greatest minds, who are 
 so sensible of this opinion, as they can scarce con- 
 tain it within : as we see in Augustus Csesar, (who 
 was rather diverse from his uncle, than inferior in 
 virtue,) how when he died, he desired his friends 
 about him to give him a Plaudite, as if he were con- 
 scious to himself that he had played his part well 
 upon the stage. 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 3*23 
 
 This part of knowledge we do report also as de- 
 ficient ; not but that it is practised too much, but it 
 hath not been reduced to writing. And therefore 
 lest it should seem to any that it is not comprehen- 
 sible by axiom, it is requisite, as we did in the former, 
 that we set down some heads or passages of it. 
 
 Wherein it may appear at the first a new and un- 
 wonted argument to teach men how to raise and 
 make their fortune ; a doctrine wherein every man 
 perchance will be ready to yield himself a disciple, 
 till he seeth difficulty : for fortune layeth as heavy 
 impositions as virtue ; and it is as hard and severe a 
 thing to be a true politician, as to be truly moral. 
 But the handling hereof concerneth learning greatly, 
 both in honour and in substance : in honour, because 
 pragmatical men may not go away with an opinion 
 that learning is like a lark, that can mount, and 
 sing, and please herself, and nothing else ; but may 
 know that she holcleth as well of the hawk, that can 
 soar aloft, and can also descend and strike upon the 
 prey: in substance, because it is the perfect law of 
 inquiry of truth, " that nothing be in the globe of 
 matter, which should not be likewise in the globe of 
 chrystal, or form;" that is, that there be not any 
 thing in being and action, which should not be 
 drawn and collected into contemplation and doctrine. 
 Neither doth learning admire or esteem of this archi- 
 
324 OF TIJE PROFICIENCE AKD 
 
 lecture of fortune, otherwise than as of an inferior 
 work : for no man's fortune can be an end worthy of 
 his being ; and many times the worthiest men do 
 abandon their fortune willingly for better respects : 
 but nevertheless fortune, as an organ of virtue and 
 merit, deserveth the consideration. 
 
 First therefore, the precept which I conceive to 
 be most summary towards the prevailing in fortune, 
 is to obtain that window which Momus did require ; 
 who seeing in the frame of man's heart such angles 
 and recesses, found fault that there was not a win- 
 dow to look into them ; that is, to procure good in- 
 formations of particulars touching persons, their na- 
 tures, their desires and ends, their customs and 
 fashions, their helps and advantages, and whereby 
 they chiefly stand ; so again their weaknesses and 
 disadvantages, and where they lie most open and 
 obnoxious; their friends, factions, and dependen- 
 cies ; and again their opposites, enviers, competitors, 
 their moods and times, " Sola viri molles aditus et 
 tempora noras (You alone know the favourable times 
 and means of getting access to his thoughts) ; their 
 principles, rules, and observations, and the like : and 
 this not only of persons, but of actions ; what are on 
 foot from time to time, and how they are conducted, 
 favoured, opposed, and how they import, and the 
 like. For the knowledge of present actions is not 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 325 
 
 only material in itself, but without it also the know- 
 ledge of persons is very erroneous : for men change 
 with the actions; and whilst they are in pursuit 
 they are one, and when they return to their nature 
 they are another. These informations of particulars, 
 touching persons and actions, are as the minor 
 propositions in every active syllogism ; for no excel- 
 lency of observations, which are as the major pro- 
 positions, can suffice to ground a conclusion, if there 
 be error and mistaking in the minors. 
 
 That this knowledge is possible, Solomon is our 
 surety ; who saith, " Consilium in corde viri tan- 
 quam aqua profunda ; sed vir prudens exhauriet 
 illud" (Counsel in the heart of man is like deep 
 water ; but a man of understanding will draw it out). 
 And although the knowledge itself falleth not under 
 precept, because it is of individuals, yet the instruc- 
 tions for the obtaining of it may. 
 
 We will begin therefore with this precept, ac- 
 cording to the ancient opinion, that the sinews of 
 wisdom are slowness of belief and distrust: that 
 more trust be given to countenances and deeds than 
 to words; and in words, rather to sudden passages 
 and surprised words than to set and purposed words. 
 Neither let that be feared which is said, " front i 
 nulla fides" (there is no dependence on the coun- 
 
326 OF THE PROIICIENCE AND 
 
 tenance) : which is meant of a general outward be- 
 haviour, and not of the private and subtile motions 
 and labours of the countenance and gesture ; which, 
 as Q. Cicero elegantly saith, is " animi janua" (the 
 gate of the mind). None more close than Tiberius, 
 and yet Tacitus saith of Gallus, " Etenim vultu 
 ofTensionem conjectaverat" (he perceived by his coun- 
 tenance that he was offended). So again, noting 
 the differing character and manner of his commend- 
 ing Germanicus and Drusus in the senate, he saith, 
 touching his fashion wherein he carried his speech 
 of Germanicus, thus ; " Magis in speciem adorna- 
 tis verbis, quam ut penitus sentire videretur" (Rather 
 in a style speciously ornamented, than expressing 
 his real sentiments): but of Drusus thus ; " Pauciori- 
 bus, sed intentior, et fida oratione" (In fewer words, 
 but more earnest and sincere) : and in another place, 
 speaking of his character of speech, when he did 
 any thing that was gracious and popular, he saith, 
 that in other things he was " velut eluctantium ver- 
 borum" (as if his words escaped from him with dif- 
 ficulty) ; but then again, " solutius vero loquebatur 
 quando subveniret" (when he conferred a kindness, 
 he spoke more freely). So that there is no such 
 artificer of dissimulation, nor no such commanded 
 countenance, " vultus jussus," that can sever from 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 32/ 
 
 a feigned tale some of these fashions, either a more 
 slight and careless fashion, or more set and formal, 
 or more tedious and wandering, or coming from a 
 man more drily and hardly. 
 
 Neither are deeds such assured pledges, as that 
 they may be trusted without a judicious considera- 
 tion of their magnitude and nature : " Fraus sibi in 
 parvis fidem proestruit, ut majore emolumento fallat" 
 (Fraud procures for itself confidence in small mat- 
 ters, that it may deceive in greater) : and the Italian 
 thinketh himself upon the point to be bought and 
 sold, when he is better used than he was wont to be, 
 without manifest cause. For small favours, they do 
 but lull men asleep, both as to caution and as to 
 industry ; and are, as Demosthenes calleth them, 
 " Alimenta socordise" (The nourishers of heedless- 
 ness). So again we see how false the nature of 
 some deeds are, in that particular which Mutianus 
 practised upon Antonius Primus, upon that hollow 
 and unfaithful reconcilement which was made be- 
 tween them ; whereupon Mutianus advanced many 
 of the friends of Antonius : " simul amicis ejus prse- 
 fecturas et tribunatus largitur" (at the same time he 
 bestows upon his friends lieutenancies -and tribune- 
 ships) : wherein, under pretence to strengthen him, he 
 did desolate him, and won from him his dependences. 
 
 As for words, though they be like waters to phy- 
 
328 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 sicians, full of flattery and uncertainty, yet they are 
 not to be despised, specially with the advantage of 
 passion and affection. For so we see Tiberius, 
 upon a stinging and incensing speech of Agrippina, 
 came a step forth of his dissimulation, when he 
 said, " You are hurt, because you do not reign ;" 
 of which Tacitus saith, " Audita haec raram occulti 
 pectoris vocem elicuere ; correptamque Greeco versu 
 admonuit, ideo lsedi, quia non regnaret" (These 
 words drew from him an unwonted disclosure of his 
 secret thoughts : he reproved her by repeating a 
 Greek verse, which intimated that she was hurt 
 because she did not reign). And therefore the poet 
 doth elegantly call passions, tortures, that urge men 
 to confess their secrets : 
 
 " Vino tortus et ira:" 
 (Tortured by wine and anger). 
 And experience sheweth, there are few men so true 
 to themselves and so settled, but that, sometimes 
 upon heat, sometimes upon bravery, sometimes upon 
 kindness, sometimes upon trouble of mind and weak- 
 ness, they open themselves ; specially if they be put 
 to it with a counter-dissimulation, according to the 
 proverb of Spain, " Di mentira, y sacaras verdad" 
 (Tell a lie, and find a truth). 
 
 As for the knowing of men, which is at second 
 hand from reports ; men's weaknesses and faults are 
 
ADVANCEMENT OE LEARNING. 329 
 
 best known from their enemies, their virtues and 
 abilities from their friends, their customs and times 
 from their servants, their conceits and opinions from 
 their familiar friends, with whom they discourse 
 most. General fame is light, and the opinions con- 
 ceived by superiors or equals are deceitful ; for to 
 such, men are more masked: " Verior fama e do- 
 mesticis emanat" (a truer report is made by domes- 
 tics'). 
 
 But the soundest disclosing and expounding of 
 men is by their natures and ends ; wherein the 
 weakest sort of men are best interpreted by their 
 natures, and the wisest by their ends. For it was 
 both pleasantly and wisely said, though I think very 
 untruly, by a nuncio of the pope, returning from a 
 certain nation where he served as liefer ; whose 
 opinion being asked touching the appointment of 
 one to go in his place, he wished that in any case 
 they did not send one that was too wise ; because 
 no very wise man would ever imagine what they in 
 that country were like to do. And certainly it is an 
 error frequent for men to shoot over, and to suppose 
 deeper ends, and more compass-reaches than are : 
 the Italian proverb being elegant, and for the most 
 part true : 
 
 u Di danari. di senno, e di fede, 
 " CV ne manco che non credi :" 
 
330 OF THE PROF ICIENCE AND 
 
 (There is commonly less money, less wisdom, and 
 less good faith, than men do account upon). 
 
 But princes, upon a far other reason, are best 
 interpreted by their natures, and private persons by 
 their ends : for princes being at the top of human 
 desires, they have for the most part no particular 
 ends whereto they aspire, by distance from which a 
 man might take measure and scale of the rest of 
 their actions and desires ; which is one fof the 
 causes that maketh their hearts more inscrutable. 
 Neither is it sufficient to inform ourselves in men's 
 ends and natures, of the variety of them only, but 
 also of the predominancy, what humour reigneth 
 most, and what end is principally sought. For so 
 we see, when Tigellinus saw himself outstripped by 
 Petronius Turpilianus in Nero's humors of pleasures, 
 " metus ejus rimatur" (he wrought upon Nero's 
 fears), whereby he broke the other's neck. 
 
 But to all this part of inquiry the most com- 
 pendious way resteth in three things : the first, to 
 have general acquaintance and inwardness with 
 those which have general acquaintance and look 
 most into the world ; and specially according to the 
 diversity of business, and the diversity of persons, to 
 have privacy and conversation with some one friend, 
 at least, which is perfect and well intelligenced in 
 every several kind. The second is, to keep a good 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 331 
 
 mediocrity in liberty of speech and secrecy : in 
 most things liberty; secrecy where it importeth : 
 for liberty of speech inviteth and provoketh liberty 
 to be used again, and so bringeth much to a man's 
 knowledge ; and secrecy, on the other side, in- 
 duceth trust and inwardness. The last is, the re- 
 ducing of a man's self to this watchful and serene 
 habit, as to make account and purpose, in every 
 conference and action, as well to observe as to act. 
 For as Epictetus would have a philosopher in every 
 particular action to say to himself, " Et hoc volo, et 
 etiam institutum servare" (I would do this, and also 
 adhere to my custom) : so a politic man in every 
 thing should say to himself, " Et hoc volo, ac 
 etiam aliquid addiscere" (I would dp this, and also 
 learn something). I have stayed the longer upon 
 this precept of obtaining good information, because 
 it is a main part by itself, which answereth to all the 
 rest. But, above all things, caution must be taken 
 that men have a good stay and hold of themselves, 
 and that this much knowing do not draw on much 
 meddling ; for nothing is more unfortunate than 
 light and rash intermeddling in many matters. So 
 that this variety of knowledge tendeth in conclusion 
 but only to this, to make a better and freer choice 
 of those actions which may concern us, and to con- 
 
332 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 duct them with the less error and the more dex- 
 terity. 
 
 The second precept concerning this knowledge 
 is, for men to take good information touching their 
 own persons, and well to understand themselves : 
 knowing that, as St. James saith, though men look 
 oft in a glass, yet they do suddenly forget them- 
 selves ; wherein as the divine glass is the word of 
 God, so the politic glass is the state of the world, 
 or times wherein we live, in the which we are to 
 behold ourselves. 
 
 For men ought to take an impartial view of their 
 own abilities and virtues ; and again of their wants 
 and impediments ; accounting these with the most, 
 and those other with the least ; and from this view 
 and examination to frame the considerations fol- 
 lowing. 
 
 First, to consider how the constitution of their 
 nature sorteth with the general state of the times ; 
 which if they find agreeable and fit, then in all 
 things to give themselves more scope and liberty ; 
 but if differing and dissonant, then in the whole 
 course of their life to be more close, retired, and 
 reserved : as we see in Tiberius, who was never seen 
 at a play, and came not into the senate in twelve of 
 his last years ; whereas Augustus Csesar lived ever 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 
 
 in men's eyes, which Tacitus observeth, " Alia 
 Tiberio morum via" (Tiberius's way of life was dif- 
 ferent). 
 
 Secondly, to consider how their nature sorteth 
 with professions and courses of life, and accordingly 
 to make election, if they be free; and, if engaged, 
 to make the departure at the first opportunity : as 
 we see was done by duke Valentine, that was de- 
 signed by his father to a sacerdotal profession, but 
 quitted it soon after in regard of his parts and in- 
 clination ; being such, nevertheless, as a man cannot 
 tell well whether they were worse for a prince or 
 for a priest. 
 
 Thirdly, to consider how they sort with those 
 whom they are like to have competitors and concur- 
 rents ; and to take that course wherein there is most 
 solitude, and themselves like to be most eminent : 
 as Julius Csesar did, who at first was an orator or 
 pleader ; but when he saw the excellency of Cicero, 
 Hortensius, Catulus, and others, for eloquence, and 
 saw there was no man of reputation for the wars 
 but Pompeius, upon whom the state was forced to 
 rely ; he forsook his course begun toward a civil and 
 popular greatness, and transferred his designs to a 
 martial greatness. 
 
 Fourthly, in the choice of their friends and de- 
 pendences, to proceed according to the composition 
 
OF THE PROJFICIENCE AND 
 
 of their own nature : as we may see in Coesar ; all 
 whose friends and followers were men active and 
 effectual, but not solemn, or of reputation. 
 
 Fifthly, to take special heed how they guide 
 themselves by examples, in thinking they can do 
 as they see others do ; whereas perhaps their natures 
 and carriages are far differing. In which error it 
 seemeth Pompey was, of whom Cicero saith, that 
 he was wont often to say, " Sylla potuit, ego non 
 potero" (Sylla could do this, and cannot I)? Wherein 
 he was much abused, the natures and proceedings 
 of himself and his example being the unlikest in 
 the world; the one being fierce, violent, and press- 
 ing the fact ; the other solemn, and full of majesty 
 and circumstance, and therefore the less effectual. 
 
 But this precept touching the politic knowledge 
 of ourselves, hath many other branches, whereupon 
 we cannot insist. 
 
 Next to the well understanding and discerning of 
 a man's self, there followeth the well opening and 
 revealing a man's self; wherein we see nothing more 
 usual than for the more able man to make the less 
 shew. For there is a great advantage in the well 
 setting forth of a man's virtues, fortunes, merits; 
 and again, in the artificial covering of a man's 
 weaknesses, defects, disgraces ; staying upon the 
 one, sliding from the other ; cherishing the one by 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 335 
 
 
 circumstances, gracing the other by exposition, and 
 the like : wherein we see what Tacitus saith of 
 Mutianus, who was the greatest politician of his 
 time, " Omnium qua? dixerat feceratque arte quadam 
 ostentator" (that he artfully blazoned the merit of 
 all he said and did) : which requireth indeed some 
 art, lest it turn tedious and arrogant ; but yet so, 
 as ostentation, though it be to the first degree of 
 vanity, seemeth to me rather a vice in manners than 
 in policy : for as it is said, " Audacter calumniare, 
 semper aliquid hseret" (Censure boldly, some of 
 the accusations will be believed); so, except it be in 
 a ridiculous degree of deformity, " Audacter te ven- 
 dita, semper aliquid hoeret" (Emblazon your own 
 merits boldly, some of your claims will be allowed). 
 For it will stick with the more ignorant and inferior 
 sort of men, though men of wisdom and rank do 
 smile at it, and despise it ; and yet the authority 
 won with many doth countervail the disdain of a few. 
 But if it be carried with decency and government, 
 as with a natural, pleasant, and ingenuous fashion; 
 or at times when it is mixed with some peril and 
 unsafety, as in military persons ; or at times when 
 others are most envied ; or with easy and careless 
 passage to it and from it, without dwelling too long, 
 or being too serious ; or with an equal freedom of 
 taxing a man's self, as well as gracing himself; 
 
336 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 or by occasion of repelling or putting down others' 
 injury or insolence ; it doth greatly add to repu- 
 tation: and surely not a few solid natures, that want 
 this ventosity, and cannot sail in the height of the 
 winds, are not without some prejudice and disad- 
 vantage by their moderation. 
 
 But for these flourishes and enhancements of 
 virtue, as they are not perchance unnecessary, so it is 
 at least necessary that virtue be not disvalued and im- 
 based under the just price ; which is done in three 
 manners: by offering and obtruding a man's self; 
 wherein men think he is rewarded, when he is ac- 
 cepted : by doing too much ; which will not give that 
 which is well done leave to settle, and in the end 
 induceth satiety : and by finding too soon the fruit of 
 a man's virtue, in commendation, applause, honour, 
 favour ; wherein if a man be pleased with a little, let 
 him hear what is truly said; " Cave ne insuetus rebus 
 majoribus videaris, si hsec te res parva sicuti magna 
 deleetat" (Beware of appearing unaccustomed to 
 great objects; which will be the case if you are 
 pleased with small matters, as if they were things 
 of moment). 
 
 But the covering of defects is of no less import- 
 ance than the valuing of good parts : which may be 
 done likewise in three manners, by caution, by 
 colour, and by confidence. Caution is, when men 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 
 
 do ingeniously and discreetly avoid to be put into 
 those things for which they are not proper : whereas, 
 contrariwise, bold and unquiet spirits will thrust 
 themselves into matters without difference, and so 
 publish and proclaim all their wants. Colour is, 
 when men make a way for themselves, to have a 
 construction made of their faults or wants, as pro- 
 ceeding from a better cause, or intended for some 
 other purpose : for of the one it is well said, " Ssepe 
 latet vitium proximitate boni" (a fault is often con- 
 cealed by being placed in the neighbourhood of a 
 good quality), and therefore whatsoever want a 
 man hath, he must see that he pretend the virtue that 
 shadoweth it ; as if he be dull, he must affect gra- 
 vity ; if a coward, mildness ; and so the rest : for the 
 second, a man must frame some probable cause why 
 he should not do his best, and why he should dis- 
 semble his abilities; and for that purpose must use to 
 dissemble those abilities which are notorious in him, 
 to give colour that his true wants are but industries 
 and dissimulations. For confidence, it is the last 
 but surest remedy ; namely, to depress and seem to 
 despise whatsoever a man cannot attain ; observing 
 the good principle of the merchants, who endeavour 
 to raise the price of their own commodities, and to 
 beat down the price of others. But there is a confi- 
 dence that passeth this other ; which is, to face out a 
 
338 Or THE PROEJLCIENCE AND 
 
 man's own defects, in seeming to conceive that he is 
 best in those things wherein he is failing ; and, 
 to help that again, to seem on the other side that 
 he hath least opinion of himself in those things 
 wherein he is best ; like as we shall see it commonly 
 in poets, that if they shew their verses, and you ex- 
 cept to any, they will say, that that line cost them 
 more labour than any of the rest ; and presently 
 will seem to disable and suspect rather some other 
 line, which they know well enough to be the best in 
 the number. But above all, in this righting and 
 helping of a man's self in his own carriage, he must 
 take heed he shew not himself dismantled, and 
 exposed to scorn and injury, by too much dulceness, 
 goodness, and facility of nature; but shew some 
 sparkles of liberty, spirit, and edge : which kind of 
 fortified carriage, with a ready rescuing of a man's 
 self from scorns, is sometimes of necessity imposed 
 upon men by somewhat in their person or fortune ; 
 but it ever succeecleth with good felicity. 
 
 Another precept of this knowledge is, by all 
 possible endeavour to frame the mind to be pliant 
 and obedient to occasion ; for nothing hindereth 
 men's fortunes so much as this ; " Idem manebat, 
 neque idem decebat" (he persevered in the same line 
 of conduct, though it was no longer suitable), men 
 are where they were, when occasions turn : and 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 339 
 
 therefore to Cato, whom Livy maketh such an 
 architect of fortune, he addeth, that he had " versa- 
 tile ingenium" (a versatile genius). And therefore 
 it cometh that these grave solemn wits, which must 
 be like themselves, and cannot make departures, 
 have more dignity than felicity. But in some it is 
 nature to be somewhat viscous and inwrapped, and 
 not easy to turn : in some it is a conceit, that is 
 almost a nature, which is, that men can hardly make 
 themselves believe that they ought to change their 
 course, when they have found good by it in former 
 experience. For Machiavel noteth wisely, how Fa- 
 bius Maximus would have been temporizing still, 
 according to his old bias, when the nature of the 
 war was altered, and required hot pursuit. In some 
 other it is want of point and penetration in their 
 judgment, that they do not discern when things 
 have a period, but come in too late after the occa- 
 sion ; as Demosthenes compareth the people of 
 Athens to country fellows, when they play in a 
 fence school, that if they have a blow, then they 
 remove their weapon to that ward, and not before. In 
 some other it is a lothness to lose labours passed, 
 and a conceit that they can bring about occasions to 
 their ply; and yet in the end, when they see no 
 other remedy, then they come to it with disadvan- 
 tage ; as Tarquinius, that gave for the third part of 
 
340 OF THE PR011CIENCE AND 
 
 Sibylla's books the treble price, when he might at 
 first have had all three for the simple. But from 
 whatsoever root or cause this restiveness of mind 
 proceedeth, it is a thing most prejudicial ; and 
 nothing is more politic than to make the wheels of 
 our mind concentric and voluble with the wheels of 
 fortune. 
 
 Another precept of this knowledge, which hath 
 some affinity with that we last spoke of, but with 
 difference, is that which is well expressed, "fatis ac- 
 cede deisque" (acquiesce in the will of the fates and 
 gods), that men do not only turn with the occasions, 
 but also run with the occasions, and not strain their 
 credit or strength to over hard or extreme points ; 
 but choose in their actions that which is most pass- 
 able : for this will preserve men from foil, not oc- 
 cupy them too much about one matter, win opinion 
 of moderation, please the most, and make a shew of 
 a perpetual felicity in all they undertake ; which 
 cannot but mightily increase reputation. 
 
 Another part of this knowledge seemeth to have 
 some repugnancy with the former two, but not as I 
 understand it ; and it is that which Demosthenes 
 uttereth in high terms ; " Et quemadmodum recep- 
 tum est, ut exercitum ducat imperator, sic et a cor- 
 datis viris res ipsse ducendse ; ut quse ipsis viclentur, 
 ea gerantur, et non ipsi eventus tantum persequi co-- 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 341 
 
 gantur" (And as it is acknowledged that the general 
 commands the army, it is equally true that a man of 
 ability commands circumstances ; so that he can ac 
 complish what he pleases, and is not merely led by 
 the course of events). For, if we observe, we shall 
 find two differing kinds of sufficiency in managing 
 of business : some can make use of occasions aptly 
 and dexterously, but plot little ; some can urge and 
 pursue their own plots well, but cannot accommo- 
 date nor take in ; either of which is very imperfect 
 without the other. 
 
 Another part of this knowledge is the observing 
 a good mediocrity in the declaring, or not declaring 
 a man's self: for although depth of secrecy, and 
 making way, " qualis est via navis in mari" (as the 
 path of a ship in the sea), (which the French calleth 
 sourdes menees, when men set things in work with- 
 out opening themselves at all,) be sometimes both 
 prosperous and admirable ; yet many times " Dissi- 
 mulatio errores parit, qui dissimulatorem ipsum illa- 
 queant" (Dissimulation gives rise to mistakes which 
 ensnare him who practises it). And therefore, we 
 see the greatest politicians have in a natural and 
 free mariner professed their desires, rather than been 
 reserved and disguised in them. For so we see that 
 Lucius Sylla made a kind of profession, " that he 
 wished all men happy or unhappy, as they stood his 
 
342 OF THE PROriCIENCE AND 
 
 friends or enemies/' So Csesar, when he went first 
 into Gaul, made no scruple to profess, " that he had 
 rather be first in a village, than second at Rome/' 
 So again, as soon as he had begun the war, we see 
 what Cicero saith of him, " Alter (meaning of Cae- 
 sar) non recusat, sed quodammodo postulat, ut, ut 
 est, sic appelletur tyrannus" (The other does not 
 refuse, but, as it were, desires, that, as he is a tyrant, 
 so he should be called one). So we may see in a 
 letter of Cicero to Atticus, that Augustus Csesar, in 
 his very entrance into affairs, when he was a darling 
 of the senate, yet in his harangues to the people 
 would swear, " Ita parentis honores consequi li- 
 ceat" (So may I obtain the honours of my father), 
 which was no less than the tyranny ; save that, to 
 help it, he would stretch forth his hand towards a 
 statue of Csesar's, that was erected in the same place : 
 whereat many men laughed, and wondered, and said, 
 Is it possible ? or, Did you ever hear the like to this ? 
 and yet thought he meant no hurt ; he did it so hand- 
 somely and ingenuously. And all these were prosper- 
 ous : whereas Pompey, who tended to the same end, 
 but in a more dark and dissembling manner, (as Taci- 
 tus saith of him, " Occultior, non melior" (more dis- 
 guised, not better), wherein Sallust concurreth, " ore 
 probo, animo inverecundo" (with a fair countenance, 
 but a shameless mind), made it his design, by infi- 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 343 
 
 nite secret engines, to cast the state into an abso- 
 lute anarchy and confusion, that the state might cast 
 itself into his arms for necessity and protection, and 
 so the sovereign power be put upon him, and he 
 never seen in it : and when he had brought it, as he 
 thought, to that point, when he Avas chosen consul 
 alone, as never any was, yet he could make no 
 great matter of it, because men understood him 
 not; but was fain, in the end, to go the beaten track 
 of getting arms into his hands, by colour of the 
 doubt of Csesar's designs : so tedious, casual, and 
 unfortunate are these deep dissimulations ; whereof, 
 it seemeth, Tacitus made this judgment, that they 
 were a cunning of an inferior form in regard of true 
 policy ; attributing the one to Augustus, the other 
 to Tiberius; where, speaking of Livia, he saith, " Et 
 cum artibus mariti simulatione filii bene composita" 
 (she made a happy conjunction of the arts of her 
 husband and the dissimulation of her son) : for 
 surely the continual habit of dissimulation is but a 
 weak and sluggish cunning, and not greatly politic. 
 Another precept of this architecture of fortune 
 is, to accustom our minds to judge of the proportion 
 or value of things, as they conduce and are material 
 to our particular ends ; and that to do substantially, 
 and not superficially. For we shall find the logical 
 part, as I may term it, of some men's minds good, 
 
344 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 but the mathematical part erroneous ; that is, they 
 can well judge of consequences, but not of pro- 
 portions and comparisons, preferring things of 
 shew and sense before things of substance and 
 effect. So some fall in love with access to princes, 
 others with popular fame and applause, supposing 
 they are things of great purchase; when in many 
 cases they are but matters of envy, peril, and impe- 
 diment. 
 
 So some measure things according to the labour 
 and difficulty, or assiduity, which are spent about 
 them ; and think, if they be ever moving, that they 
 must needs advance and proceed : as Csesar saith in a 
 despising manner of Cato the second, when he de- 
 scribeth how laborious and indefatigable he was to 
 no great purpose ; Hsec omnia magno studio age- 
 bat" (all these objects he prosecuted with great ap- 
 plication). So in most things men are ready to 
 abuse themselves in thinking the greatest means to 
 be best, when it should be the fittest. 
 
 As for the true marshalling of men's pursuits 
 towards their fortune, as they are more or less 
 material, I hold them to stand thus : first, the 
 amendment of their own minds ; for the remove of 
 the impediments of the mind will sooner clear the 
 passages of fortune, than the obtaining fortune will 
 remove the impediments of the mind. In the second 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, 345 
 
 
 place I set down wealth and means ; which I know 
 most men would have placed first, because of 
 the general use which it beareth towards all variety 
 of occasions : but that opinion I may condemn with 
 like reason as Maehiavel doth that other, that 
 moneys were the sinews of the w T ars ; whereas, saith 
 he, the true sinews of the wars are the sinews of 
 men's arms, that is. a valiant, populous, and military 
 nation : and he voucheth aptly the authority of 
 Solon, who, when Croesus shewed him his treasury of 
 gold, said to him, that if another came that had 
 better iron, he would be master of his gold. In like 
 manner it may be truly affirmed, that it is not mo- 
 neys that are the sinews of fortune, but it is the 
 sinews and steel of men's minds, wit, courage, 
 audacity, resolution, temper, industry, and the like. 
 In the third place I set down reputation, because of 
 the peremptory tides and currents it hath ; which, if 
 they be not taken in their due time, are seldom 
 recovered, it being extreme hard to play an after- 
 game of reputation. And lastly, I place honour, 
 which is more easily won by any of the other three, 
 much more by all, than any of them can be pur- 
 chased by honour. 
 
 To conclude this precept, as there is order and 
 priority in matter, so is there in time, the pr< 
 terous placing whereof is one of the commonest 
 errors ; while men fly to their ends when they 
 
346 OP THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 should intend their beginnings, and do not take 
 things in order of time as they come on, but 
 marshal them according to greatness, and not ac- 
 cording to instance ; not observing the good precept, 
 " Quod nunc instat agamus" (let us attend to the 
 present business). 
 
 Another precept of this knowledge is, not to 
 embrace any matters which do occupy too great 
 a quantity of time, but to have that sounding in a 
 man's ears, " Sed fugit interea, fugit irreparabile 
 tempus" (meanwhile time, irrecoverable time, flies 
 away) ; and that is the cause why those which take 
 their course of rising by professions of burden, 
 as lawyers, orators, painful divines, and the like, 
 are not commonly so politic for their own fortunes, 
 otherwise than in their ordinary way, because they 
 want time to learn particulars, to wait occasions, and 
 to devise plots. 
 
 Another precept of this knowledge is, to imitate 
 nature, which doth nothing in vain ; which surely a 
 man may do if he do well interlace his business, and 
 bend not his mind too much upon that which he 
 principally intendeth, For a man ought in every 
 particular action so to carry the motions of his 
 mind, and so to have one thing under another, as if 
 he cannot have that he seeketh in the best degree, 
 yet to have it in a second, or so in a third ; and if 
 he can have no part of that which he purposed, yet 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 347 
 
 to turn the use of it to somewhat else ; and if 
 he cannot make any thing of it for the present, yet 
 to make it as a seed of somewhat in time to come ; 
 and if he can contrive no effect or substance from it, 
 yet to win some good opinion by it, or the like. So 
 that he should exact an account of himself of every 
 action, to reap somewhat, and not to stand amazed 
 and confused if he fail of that he chiefly meant : for 
 nothing is more impolitic than to mind actions 
 wholly one by one ; for he that doth so loseth in- 
 finite occasions which intervene, and are many 
 times more proper and propitious for somewhat that 
 he shall need afterwards, than for that which he 
 urgeth for the present ; and therefore men must 
 be perfect in that rule, " Hsec oportet facere, et ilia 
 non omittere" (this ought to be done, and the other 
 not left undone). 
 
 Another precept of this knowledge is, not to 
 engage a man's self peremptorily in any thing, 
 though it seem not liable to accident, but ever to 
 have a window to fly out at, or a way to retire ; fol- 
 lowing the wisdom in the ancient fable of the two 
 frogs, which consulted when their plash was dry 
 whither they should go ; and the one moved to go 
 down into a pit, because it was not likely the water 
 would dry there ; but the other answered, " True. 
 but if it do, how shall we get out again V 
 
348 OF THE FROFICIENCE AND 
 
 Another precept of this knowledge is that an- 
 cient precept of Bias, construed not to any point of 
 perfldiousness, but only to caution and moderation, 
 " Et ama tanquam inimicus futurus, et odi tanquam 
 amaturus" (so love your friend as if you were here- 
 after to become his enemy, and so hate your enemy 
 as if you were hereafter to become his friend); for it. 
 utterly betrayeth all utility for men to embark them- 
 selves too far in unfortunate friendships, trouble- 
 some spleens, and childish and humorous envies or 
 emulations. 
 
 But I continue this beyond the measure of an 
 example; led, because I would not have such know- 
 ledges, which I note as deficient, to be thought things 
 imaginative or in the air, or an observation or two 
 much made of, but things of bulk and mass, where- 
 of an end is hardlier made than a beginning. It 
 must be likewise conceived, that in those points 
 which I mention and set down, they are far from 
 complete tractates of them, but only as small pieces 
 for patterns. And lastly, no man, I suppose, will 
 think that I mean fortunes are not obtained without 
 all this ado ; for I know they come tumbling into 
 some men's laps ; and a number obtain good fortunes 
 by diligence in a plain way, little intermeddling, 
 and keeping themselves from gross errors. 
 
 But as Cicero, when he setteth down an idea of 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 349 
 
 a perfect orator, doth not mean that every pleader 
 should be such ; and so likewise, when a prince or a 
 courtier hath been described by such as have handled 
 those subjects, the mould hath used to be made ac- 
 cording to the perfection of the art, and not accord- 
 ing to common practice : so I understand it, that it 
 ought to be done in the description of a politic 
 man, I mean politic for his own fortune. 
 
 But it must be remembered all this while, that 
 the precepts which we have set down are of that kind 
 which may be counted and called :" bonoe artes" 
 (good arts). As for evil arts, if a man would set down 
 for himself that principle of Machiavel, " that a 
 man seek not to attain virtue itself, but the ap- 
 pearance only thereof; because the credit of virtue 
 is a help, but the use of it is cumber :" or that other 
 of his principles, " that he presuppose, that men are 
 not fitly to be wrought otherwise but by fear ; and 
 therefore that he seek to have every man obnoxious, 
 low, and in strait," which the Italians call " seminar 
 spine" (to sow thorns) : or that other principle, con- 
 tained in the verse which Cicero citeth, " Cadant 
 amici, dummodo inimici intercidant" (let friends fall, 
 so enemies perish with them), as the Triumvirs, 
 which sold, every one to other, the lives of their 
 friends for the deaths of their enemies : or that other 
 protestation of L. Catilina, to set on fire and trouble 
 
350 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 states, to the end to fish in droumy waters, and to 
 unwrap their fortunes, u Ego, si quid in fortunis 
 meis excitatum sit incendium, id non aqua, sed 
 ruina restinguam" (if my house be set on fire, I will 
 extinguish it, not with water, but by pulling down the 
 houses of others) : or that other principle of Lysander 
 " that children are to be deceived with comfits, and 
 men with oaths :" and the like evil and corrupt posi- 
 tions, whereof, as in all things, there are more in 
 number than of the good : certainly, with these dis- 
 pensations from the laws of charity and integrity, the 
 pressing of a man's fortune may be more hasty and 
 compendious. But it is in life as it is in ways, the 
 shortest way is commonly the foulest, and surely 
 the fairer way is not much about. 
 
 But men, if they be in their own power, and do 
 bear and sustain themselves, and be not carried 
 away with a whirlwind or tempest of ambition, 
 ought, in the pursuit of their own fortune, to set 
 before their eyes not only that general map of the 
 world, that " all things are vanity and vexation of 
 spirit/' but many other more particular cards and di- 
 rections : chiefly that, — that being, without well- 
 being, is a curse, — and the greater being the greater 
 curse ; and that all virtue is most rewarded, and all 
 wickedness most punished in itself: according as the 
 poet saith excellently : 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 351 
 
 " Quse vobis, quae digna, viri, pro laudibus istis 
 Prsemia posse rear solvi ? pulcherrima primum 
 Dii moresque dabunt vestri :" 
 (Oh ! what rewards, brave youths, can be decreed, 
 What honours, equal to so great a deed ? 
 The best and fairest, all th' applauding sky, 
 And your own conscious virtue, shall supply). 
 And so of the contrary. And, secondly, they ought 
 to look up to the eternal providence and divine judg- 
 ment, which often subverteth the wisdom of evil 
 plots and imaginations, according to that Scripture, 
 " He hath conceived mischief, and shall bring forth a 
 vain thing/' And although men should refrain them- 
 selves from injury and evil arts, yet this incessant 
 and Sabbathless pursuit of a man's fortune leaveth 
 not that tribute which we owe to God of our time ; 
 who, we see, demandeth a tenth of our substance, 
 and a seventh, which is more strict, of our time: 
 and it is to small purpose to have an erected face to- 
 wards heaven, and a perpetual grovelling spirit upon 
 earth, eating dust, as doth the serpent, " Atque 
 affigit humo divinse particulam auroe" (binding down 
 to the earth the heavenly essence of the soul). And 
 if any man flatter himself that he will employ his 
 fortune well, though he should obtain it ill, as was 
 said concerning Augustus Caesar, and after of Septi- 
 mius Severn s, " that either they should never hove 
 
352 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 been born, or else they should never have died," they 
 did so much mischief in the pursuit and ascent of 
 their greatness, and so much good when they were 
 established ; yet these compensations and satisfac- 
 tions are good to be used, but never good to be 
 purposed. 
 
 And lastly, it is not amiss for men, in their race 
 towards their fortune, to cool themselves a little with 
 that conceit which is elegantly expressed by the em- 
 peror Charles the fifth, in his instructions to the 
 king his son, " that fortune hath somewhat of the 
 nature of a woman, that if she be too much wooed, 
 she is the farther off." But this last is but a remedy 
 for those whose tastes are corrupted : let men rather 
 build upon that foundation which is as a corner-stone 
 of divinity and philosophy, wherein they join close, 
 namely, that same " Primum quserite/' For divinity 
 saith, u Primum quserite regnum Dei, et ista omnia 
 adjicientur vobis" (seek first the kingdom of God, 
 and all these things shall be added unto you) : and 
 philosophy saith, " Primum quaerite bona animi, 
 csetera aut aderunt, aut non oberunt" (seek first the 
 virtues of the mind ; and other things either will 
 come, or will not be wanted). And although the 
 human foundation hath somewhat of the sands, as 
 we see in M. Brutus, when he brake forth into that 
 speech, " Te colui, virtus, ut rem ; at tu nomen 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 
 
 inane es" (O virtue, I worshipped thee as a reality ; 
 but thou art only an empty name) ; yet the divine 
 foundation is upon the rock. But this may serve for 
 a taste of that knowledge which I noted as de- 
 ficient. 
 
 Concerning Government, it is a part of knowledge 
 secret and retired, in both these respects in which 
 things are deemed secret ; for some things are secret 
 because they are hard to know, and some because 
 they are not fit to utter. We see all governments 
 are obscure and invisible : 
 
 " Totamque infusa per artus 
 Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet :" 
 (Thus, mingling with the mass, the general soul 
 Lives in the parts, and agitates the whole). 
 Such is the description of governments. We see the 
 government of God over the world is hidden, inso- 
 much as it seemeth to participate of much irregu- 
 larity and confusion : the government of the soul in 
 moving the body is inward and profound, and the pas- 
 sages thereof hardly to be reduced to demonstration. 
 Again, the wisdom of antiquity, (the shadows where- 
 of are in the poets,) in the description of torments 
 and pains, next unto the crime of rebellion, which 
 was the giants' offence, doth detest the offence of 
 futility, as in Sisyphus and Tantalus. But this was 
 
 A A 
 
354 OF THE F110IICIENCE AND 
 
 meant of particulars : nevertheless even unto the 
 general rules and discourses of policy and go- 
 vernment there is due a reverent and reserved 
 handling 
 
 But contrariwise, in the governors toward the 
 governed, all things ought, as far as the frailty of 
 man permitteth, to be manifest and revealed. For 
 so it is expressed in the Scriptures touching the 
 government of God, that this globe, which seemeth 
 to us a dark and shady body, is in the view of God as 
 crystal : " Et in conspectu sedis tanquam mare vi- 
 treum simile crystallo" (and before the throne there 
 was a sea of glass like unto crystal). So unto 
 princes and states, especially towards wise senates 
 and councils, the natures and dispositions of the 
 people, their conditions and necessities, their factions 
 and combinations, their animosities and discontents, 
 ought to be, in regard of the variety of their intelli- 
 gences, the wisdom of their observations, and the 
 height of their station where they keep sentinel, in 
 great part clear and transparent. Wherefore, con- 
 sidering that I write to a king that is a master of 
 this science, and is so well assisted, I think it decent 
 to pass over this part in silence, as willing to obtain 
 the certificate which one of the ancient philosophers 
 aspired unto; who being silent, when others contended 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 355 
 
 to make demonstration of their abilities by speech, 
 desired it might be certified for his part, " that 
 there was one that knew how to hold his peace," 
 
 Notwithstanding, for the more public part of 
 government, which is laws, I think good to note only 
 one deficiency ; which is, that all those which have 
 written of laws, have written either as philosophers or 
 as lawyers, and none as statesmen. As for the phi- 
 losphers, they make imaginary laws for imaginary 
 commonwealths ; and their discourses are as the 
 stars, which give little light, because they are so 
 high. For the lawyers, they write according to the 
 states where they live, what is received law, and not 
 what ought to be law: for the wisdom of a law- 
 maker is one, and of a lawyer is another. For there 
 are in nature certain fountains of justice, whence all 
 civil laws are derived but as streams : and like as 
 waters do take tinctures and tastes from the soils 
 through which they run, so do civil laws vary 
 according to the regions and governments where 
 they are planted, though they proceed from the 
 same fountains. Again, the wisdom of a lawmaker 
 consisteth not only in a platform of justice, but in 
 the application thereof; taking into consideration 
 by what means laws may be made certain, and 
 what are the causes and remedies of the doubtful- 
 ness and incertainty of law; by what means laws 
 
356 OE THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 may be made apt and easy to be executed, and 
 what are the impediments and remedies in the exe- 
 cution of laws ; what influence laws touching pri- 
 vate right of meum and tuum have into the public 
 state, and how they may be made apt and agree- 
 able ; how laws are to be penned and delivered, 
 whether in texts or in acts, brief or large, with 
 preambles, or without ; how they are to be pruned 
 and reformed from time to time, and what is the 
 best means to keep them from being too vast in 
 volumes, or too full of multiplicity and crossness ; 
 how they are to be expounded, when upon causes 
 emergent and judicially discussed, and when upon 
 responses and conferences touching general points 
 or questions ; how they are to be pressed, rigorously 
 or tenderly ; how they are to be mitigated by 
 equity and good conscience, and whether discre- 
 tion and strict law are to be mingled in the same 
 courts, or kept apart in several courts; again, how 
 the practice, profession, and erudition of law is to be 
 censured and governed ; and many other points 
 touching the administration, and, as I may term it, 
 animation of laws. Upon which I insist the less, 
 because I purpose, if God give me leave, (having 
 begun a work of this nature in aphorisms ,) to pro- 
 pound it hereafter, noting it in the mean time for 
 deficient. 
 
 And for your majesty's laws of England, I 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 357 
 
 could say much of their dignity, and somewhat 
 of their defect ; but they cannot but excel the civil 
 laws in fitness for the government : for the civil 
 law was " non hos qusesitum munus in usus ;" it 
 was not made for the countries which it governeth : 
 hereof I cease to speak, because I will not in- 
 termingle matter of action with matter cf general 
 learning. 
 
 Thus I have concluded this portion of learn- 
 ing touching civil knowledge ; and with civil know- 
 ledge have concluded human philosophy ; and with 
 human philosophy, philosophy in general. And 
 being now at some pause, looking back into that 
 I have passed through, this writing seemeth to 
 me, " si nunquam fallit imago," (as far as a man 
 can judge of his own work,) not much better 
 than that noise or sound which musicians make 
 while they are tuning their instruments ; which is 
 nothing pleasant to hear, but yet is a cause why the 
 music is sweeter afterwards : so have I been con- 
 tent to tune the instruments of the muses, that they 
 may play that have better hands. 
 
 And surely, when I set before me the condition 
 of these times, in which learning hath made her 
 third visitation or circuit in all the qualities thereof 
 — as the excellency and vivacity of the wits of this 
 
358 OF THE PROEICIENCE AND 
 
 age ; the noble helps and lights which we have by 
 the travails of ancient writers ; the art of printing, 
 which communicateth books to men of all fortunes ; 
 the openness of the world by navigation, which 
 hath disclosed multitudes of experiments, and a 
 mass of natural history ; the leisure wherewith these 
 times abound, not employing men so generally in 
 civil business, as the states of Grsecia did, in respect 
 of their popularity, and the state of Rome, in respect 
 of the greatness of their monarchy - f the present dis- 
 position of these times at this instant to peace ; the 
 consumption of all that ever can be said in contro- 
 versies of religion, which have so much diverted 
 men from other sciences ; the perfection of your ma- 
 jesty's learning, which as a phoenix may call whole 
 vollies of wits to follow you ; and the inseparable 
 propriety of time, which is ever more and more to 
 disclose truth—-! cannot but be raised to this persua- 
 sion, that this third period of time will far surpass 
 that of the Greecian and Roman learning : only 
 if men will know their own strength, and their own 
 weakness both ; and take one from the other, light of 
 invention, and not fire of contradiction ; and esteem 
 of the inquisition of truth as of an enterprise, and 
 not as of a quality or ornament ; and employ wit and 
 magnificence to things of worth and excellency, and 
 not to things vulgar and of popular estimation. 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 359 
 
 As for my labours, if any man shall please him- 
 self or others in the reprehension of them, they 
 shall make that ancient and patient request, u Ver- 
 bera, sed audi ;" let men reprehend them, so they 
 observe and weigh them : for the appeal is lawful, 
 though it may be it shall not be needful, from the 
 first cogitations of men to their second, and from 
 the nearer times to the times farther off. Now let 
 us come to that learning, which both the former 
 times were not so blessed as to know, sacred and in- 
 spired Divinity, the sabbath and port of all men's 
 labours and peregrinations. 
 
 The prerogative of God extendeth as well to the 
 reason as to the will of man ; so that as we are to obey 
 his law, though we find a reluctation in our will, so 
 we are to believe his word, though we find a relucta- 
 tion in our reason. For if we believe only that which 
 is agreeable to our sense, we give consent to the mat- 
 ter, and not to the author ; which is no more than 
 we would do towards a suspected and discredited 
 witness : but that faith which was accounted to 
 Abraham for righteousness was of such a point as 
 whereat Sarah laughed, who therein was an image of 
 natural reason. 
 
 Howbeit, if we will truly consider it, more worthy 
 it is to believe than to know as we now know. For 
 
360 OF THE PROl'ICIENCE AND 
 
 in knowledge man's mind suffereth from sense ; but 
 in belief it suffereth from spirit, such one as it holdeth 
 for more authorised than itself, and so suffereth 
 from the worthier agent. Otherwise it is of the 
 state of man glorified ; for then faith shall cease, 
 and we shall know as we are known. 
 
 Wherefore we conclude that sacred theology, 
 (which in our idiom we call divinity,) is grounded 
 only upon the word and oracle of God, and not 
 upon the light of nature : for it is written, '* Coeli 
 enarrant gloriam Dei" (the heavens declare the 
 glory of God) ; but it is not written, " Coeli enar- 
 rant voluntatem Dei" (the heavens declare the will 
 of God) : but of that it is said, " Ad legem et 
 testimonium : si non fecerint secundum verbum istud, 
 &c." (to the law and to the testimony : if they speak 
 not according to this word, &c.) This holdeth not 
 only in those points of faith which concern the great 
 mysteries of the Deity, of the creation, of the re- 
 demption, but likewise those which concern the law 
 moral truly interpreted : Love your enemies : do 
 good to them that hate you : be like to your heavenly 
 Father, that suffereth his rain to fall upon the just 
 and unjust. To this it ought to be applauded, " Nee 
 vox hominem sonat :" it is a voice beyond the light of 
 nature. So we see the heathen poets, when they 
 fall upon a libertine passion, do still expostulate with 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 361 
 
 laws and moralities, as if they were opposite and ma- 
 lignant to nature : " Et quod natura remittit, invida 
 jura negant" (what nature grants, the laws invi- 
 diously refuse). So said Dendamis the Indian un- 
 to Alexander's messengers, " That he had heard 
 somewhat of Pythagoras, and some other of the 
 wise men of Grsecia, and that he held them for 
 excellent men : but that they had a fault, which 
 was, that they had in too great reverence and ve- 
 neration a thing called law and manners." So it 
 must be confessed, that a great part of the law moral 
 is of that perfection, whereunto the light of nature 
 cannot aspire : how then is it that man is said to 
 have, by the light and law of nature, some notions 
 and conceits of virtue and vice, justice and wrong, 
 good and evil? Thus, because the light of nature is 
 used in two several senses ; the one, that which 
 springeth from reason, sense, induction, argument, 
 according to the laws of heaven and earth ; the 
 other, that which is imprinted upon the spirit of man 
 by an inward instinct, according to the law of con- 
 science, which is a sparkle of the purity of his first 
 estate: in which latter sense only he is participant 
 of some light and discerning touching the perfection 
 of the moral law : but how ? sufficient to check the 
 vice, but not to inform the duty. So then the doc- 
 trine of religion, as well moral as mystical, is not to be 
 attained but by inspiration and revelation of God. 
 
36 ( 2 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 
 The use, notwithstanding, of reason in spiritual 
 things, and the latitude thereof, is very great and 
 general : for it is not for nothing that the apostle 
 calleth religion our reasonable service of God ; inso- 
 much as the very ceremonies and figures of the old 
 law were full of reason and signification, much more 
 than the ceremonies of idolatry and magic, that are 
 full of non-significants and surd characters. But most 
 especially the Christian Faith, as in all things, so in 
 this deserveth to be highly magnified, holding and 
 preserving the golden mediocrity in this point between 
 the law of the heathen and the law of Mahomet, which 
 have embraced the two extremes. For the religion 
 of the heathen had no constant belief or confession, 
 but left all to the liberty of argument ; and the re- 
 ligion of Mahomet, on the other side, interdicteth 
 argument altogether : the one having the very face 
 of error, and the other of imposture : whereas the 
 faith doth both admit and reject disputation with 
 difference. 
 
 The use of human reason in religion is of two 
 sorts : the former, in the conception and apprehen- 
 sion of the mysteries of God to us revealed ; the 
 other, in the inferring and deriving of doctrine and di- 
 rection thereupon. The former extendeth to the mys- 
 teries themselves ; but how ? by way of illustration, 
 and not by way of argument : the latter consisteth 
 indeed of probation and argument, In the former, 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 363 
 
 we see, God vouchsafeth to descend to our capacity, 
 in the expressing of his mysteries in such sort as 
 may be sensible unto us ; and doth graft his revela- 
 tions and holy doctrine upon the notions of our 
 reason, and applieth his inspirations to open our un- 
 derstanding, as the form of the key to the ward 
 of the lock : for the latter, there is allowed us an 
 use of reason and argument, secondary and respec- 
 tive, although not original and absolute. For after 
 the articles and principles of religion are placed and 
 exempted from examination of reason, it is then 
 permitted unto us to make derivations and inferences 
 from, and according to the analogy of them, for our 
 better direction. In nature this holdeth not ; for 
 both the principles are examinable by induction, 
 though not by a medium or syllogism ; and besides, 
 those principles or first positions have no discor- 
 dance with that reason which draweth down and 
 deduceth the inferior positions. But yet it holdeth 
 not in religion alone, but in many knowledges, both 
 of greater and smaller nature, namely, wherein there 
 are not only posita but placita; for in such there can 
 be no use of absolute reason : we see it familiarly in 
 games of wit, as chess, or the like : the draughts and 
 first laws of the game are positive, but how ? merely 
 ad placitum, and not examinable by reason ; but 
 then how to direct our play thereupon with bes 
 
364 OF THE PR0FIC1ENCE AND 
 
 vantage to win the game, is artificial and rational. 
 So in human laws, there be many grounds and maxims 
 which are placita juris, positive upon authority, and 
 not upon reason, and therefore not to be disputed : 
 but what is most just, not absolutely but relatively, 
 and according- to those maxims, that affordeth a 
 long field of disputation. Such therefore is that se- 
 condary reason, which hath place in divinity, which 
 is grounded upon the placets of God. 
 
 Here therefore I note this deficiency, that there 
 hath not been, to my understanding, sufficiently 
 inquired and handled the true limits and use of 
 reason in spiritual things, as a kind of divine dialec- 
 tic : which for that it is not done, it seemeth to 
 me a thing usual, by pretext of true conceiving 
 that which is revealed, to search and mine in to 
 that which is not revealed ; and by pretext of 
 enucleating inferences and contradictories, to ex- 
 amine that which is positive : the one sort falling 
 jnto the error of Nicodemus, demanding to have 
 things made more sensible than it pleaseth God to 
 reveal them, " Quomodo possit homo nasci cum sit 
 senex" (how can a man be born when he is old) ? 
 the other into the error of the disciples, which were 
 scandalized at a shew of contradiction, " Quid est 
 hoc quod dicit nobis ? Modicum, et non videbitis 
 me; et iterum, modicum, et videbitis me,&c." (what 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 365 
 
 is this that he saith unto us ? A little while, and ye 
 shall not see me; and again, a little while, and ye 
 shall see me, &c.) 
 
 Upon this I have insisted the more, in regard of 
 the great and blessed use thereof; for this point, 
 well laboured and denned of, would in my judgment 
 be an opiate to stay and bridle not only the vanity 
 of curious speculations, wherewith the schools labour, 
 but the fury of controversies, wherewith the church 
 laboureth. For it cannot but open men's eyes, to 
 see that many controversies do merely pertain to 
 that which is either not revealed, or positive ; and 
 that many others do grow upon weak and obscure 
 inferences or derivations : which latter sort, if men 
 would revive the blessed stile of that great doctor of 
 the Gentiles, would be carried thus, " Ego, non 
 Dominus" (I, not the Lord) ; and again, " Secundum 
 consilium meum" (according to my judgment), in 
 opinions and counsels, and not in positions and op- 
 positions. But men are now over-ready to usurp the 
 stile, " Non ego, sed Dominus" (not I, but the Lord) ; 
 and not so only, but to bind it with the thunder and 
 denunciation of curses and anathemas, to the terror 
 of those which have not sufficiently learned out of 
 Solomon, that " the causeless curses hall not come." 
 
 Divinity hath two principal parts ; the matter in- 
 formed or revealed, and the nature of the informa- 
 
366 Oh' THE PKOFICIENCE. AND 
 
 tion or revelation : and with the latter we will begin , 
 because it hath most coherence with that which we 
 have now last handled. 
 
 The nature of the information consisteth of three 
 branches \ the limits of the information, the suffi- 
 ciency of the information, and the acquiring or 
 obtaining the information. Unto the limits of the 
 information belong these considerations ; how far 
 forth particular persons continue to be inspired; 
 how far forth the church is inspired ; and how 
 far forth reason may be used : the last point 
 whereof I have noted as deficient. Unto the suffi- 
 ciency of the information belong two considerations ; 
 what points of religion are fundamental, and what 
 perfective, being matter of farther building and per- 
 fection upon one and the same foundation; and 
 again, how the gradations of light, according to the 
 dispensation of times, are material to the sufficiency 
 of belief. 
 
 Here again I may rather give it in advice, than 
 note it as deficient, that the points fundamental, and 
 the points of farther perfection only, ought to be with 
 piety and wisdom distinguished : a subject tending 
 to much like end as that I noted before ; for as that 
 other were likely to abate the number of contro- 
 versies, so this is like to abate the heat of many 
 of them. We see Moses when he saw the Israelite 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 367 
 
 and the ^Egyptian fight, he did not say, Why strive 
 you ? but drew his sword and slew the ^Egyptian : 
 but when he saw the two Israelites fight, he said, 
 You are brethren, why strive you ? If the point of 
 doctrine be an ^Egyptian, it must be slain by the 
 sword of the Spirit, and not reconciled : but if it be 
 an Israelite, though in the wrong, then, Why strive 
 you ? We see of the fundamental points, our Saviour 
 penneth the league thus, " He that is not with us, is 
 against us;" but of points not fundamental, thus, 
 " He that is not against us, is with us." So we see the 
 coat of our Saviour was entire without seam, and so is 
 the doctrine of the Scriptures in itself; but the gar- 
 ment of the church was of divers colours, and yet 
 not divided : we see the chaff may and ought to be 
 severed from the corn in the ear, but the tares may 
 not be pulled up from the corn in the field. So as 
 it is a thing of great use well to define what, and of 
 what latitude those points are, which do make men 
 merely aliens and disincorporate from the church of 
 God. 
 
 For the obtaining of the information, it resteth 
 upon the true and sound interpretation of the Scrip- 
 tures, which are the fountains of the water of life. 
 The interpretations of the Scriptures are of two 
 sorts ; methodical, and solute or at large. For this 
 divine water, which excelleth so much that of Jacob's 
 
368 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 well, is drawn forth much in the same kind as na- 
 tural water useth to be out of w r ells and fountains ; 
 either it is first forced up into a cistern, and from 
 thence fetched and derived for use ; or else it is 
 drawn and received in buckets and vessels imme- 
 diately where it springeth : the former sort whereof, 
 though it seem to be the more ready, yet in my 
 judgment is more subject to corrupt. This is that 
 method which hath exhibited unto us the scholas- 
 tical divinity ; whereby divinity hath been re- 
 duced into an art, as into a cistern, and the streams 
 of doctrine or positions fetched and derived from 
 thence. 
 
 In this men have sought three things, a summary 
 brevity, a compacted strength, and a complete per- 
 fection; whereof the two first they fail to find, and the 
 last they ought not to seek. For as to brevity, we 
 see, in all summary methods, while men purpose to 
 abridge, they give cause to dilate. For the sum or 
 abridgment by contraction becometh obscure ; the 
 obscurity requireth exposition, and the exposition is 
 deduced into large commentaries, or into common 
 places and titles, which grow to be more vast than 
 the original writings, whence the sum was at first 
 extracted. So, we see, the volumes of the school- 
 men are greater much than the first writings of the 
 fathers, whence the master of the sentences made 
 
ADVANCEMENT OE LEARNING. 369 
 
 his sum or collection. So, in like manner, the 
 volumes of the modern doctors of the civil law 
 exceed those of the ancient jurisconsults, of which 
 Tribonian compiled the digest. So as this course of 
 sums and commentaries is that which doth infallibly 
 make the body of sciences more immense in quantity, 
 and more base in substance. 
 
 And for strength, it is true that knowledges 
 reduced into exact methods have a shew of strength, 
 in that each part seemeth to support and sustain the 
 other ;> but this is more satisfactory than substan- 
 tial : like unto buildings which stand by architec- 
 ture and compaction, which are more subject to 
 ruin than those which are built more strong in their 
 several parts, though less compacted. But it is 
 plain that the more you recede from your grounds, 
 the weaker do you conclude : and as in nature, 
 the more you remove yourself from particulars, 
 the greater peril of error you do incur ; so much 
 more in divinity, the more you recede from the 
 Scriptures by inferences and consequences, the more 
 weak and dilute are your positions. 
 
 And as for perfection or completeness in divinity, 
 it is not to be sought ; which makes this course of 
 artificial divinity the more suspect. For he that 
 will reduce a knowledge into an art, will make it 
 round and uniform : but in divinity many things 
 
 B B 
 
3 JO OF THE PROFICIENCE AKD 
 
 must be left abrupt, and concluded with this : " O 
 altitudo sapientiee et scientise.Dei! quam incompre- 
 hensibilia sunt judicia ejus, et non investigabiles vise 
 ejus" (O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom 
 and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his 
 judgments,and his w r ays past finding out!) So again 
 the apostle saith " Ex parte scimus" (we know in 
 part) : and to have the form of a total, where there 
 is but matter for a part, cannot be without supplies 
 by supposition and presumption. And therefore I 
 conclude, that the true use of these sums and 
 methods hath place in institutions or introductions 
 preparatory unto knowledge ; but in them, or by 
 deducement from them, to handle the main body 
 and substance of a knowledge, is in all sciences pre- 
 judicial, and in divinity dangerous. 
 
 As to the interpretation of the Scriptures solute 
 and at large, there have been divers kinds intro- 
 duced and devised; some of them rather curious 
 and unsafe, than sober and warranted. Notwith- 
 standing ? thus much must be confessed, that the 
 Scriptures being given by inspiration, and not by 
 human reason, do differ from all other books in the 
 author; which, by consequence, doth draw on some 
 difference to be used by the expositor. For the in* 
 diter of them did know four things which no man 
 attains to know ; which are, the mysteries of the 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 3J 1 
 
 kingdom of glory, the perfection of the laws of na- 
 ture, the secrets of the heart of man, and the future 
 succession of all ages. For as to the first, it is said, 
 " He that presseth into the light, shall be oppressed of 
 the glory/' And again, " No man shall see my face 
 and live." To the second, " When he prepared the 
 heavens I was present, when by law and compass he 
 inclosed the deep." To the third, " Neither was it 
 needful that any should bear witness to him of man, 
 for he knew well what was in man." And to the 
 last, " From the beginning are known to the Lord all 
 his works." 
 
 From the former of these two have been drawn 
 certain senses and expositions of Scriptures, which 
 had need be contained within the bounds of so- 
 briety ; the one anagogical, and the other philoso- 
 phical. But as to the former, man is not to prevent, 
 his time : " Videmus nunc per speculum in senig- 
 mate, tunc autem facie ad faciem" (now we see 
 through a glass, darkly, but then face to face) : 
 wherein, nevertheless, there seemeth to be a liberty 
 granted, as far forth as the polishing of this glass, or 
 some moderate explication of this senigma. But to 
 press too far into it, cannot but cause a dissolution 
 and overthrow of the spirit of man. For in the body 
 there are three degrees of that we receive into it, 
 aliment, medicine, and poison ; whereof aliment 
 is that which the nature of man can perfectly alter 
 
3/2 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 and overcome ; medicine is that which is partly con- 
 verted by nature, and partly converteth nature; 
 and poison is that which worketh wholly upon 
 nature, without that, that nature can in any part 
 work upon it : so in the mind, whatsoever know- 
 ledge reason cannot at all work upon and convert, 
 is a mere intoxication, and endangereth a dissolution 
 of the mind and understanding. 
 
 But for the latter, it hath been extremely set on 
 foot of late time by the school of Paracelsus, and 
 some others, that have pretended to find the truth of 
 all natural philosophy in the Scriptures; scanda- 
 lizing and traducing all other philosophy as heathen- 
 ish and profane. But there is no such enmity 
 between God's word and his works ; neither do they 
 give honour to the Scriptures, as they suppose, but 
 much imbase them. For to seek heaven and earth 
 in the word of God, (whereof it is said, " heaven and 
 earth shall pass, but my word shall not pass/') is to 
 seek temporary things amongst eternal : and as to 
 seek divinity in philosophy is to seek the living 
 amongst the dead, so to seek philosophy in di- 
 vinity is to seek the dead amongst the living: 
 neither are the pots or lavers, whose place is in the 
 outward part of the temple, to be sought in the 
 holiest place of all, where the ark of the testimony 
 was seated. And again, the scope or purpose of the 
 Spirit of God is not to express matters of nature in 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 373 
 
 the Scriptures, otherwise than in passage, and for 
 application to man's capacity, and to matters moral 
 or divine. And it is a true rule, " Auctoris aliud 
 agentis parva auctoritas" (the assertion of an author 
 is of little authority when his object is to establish a 
 different point) ; for it were a strange conclusion, if 
 a man should use a similitude for ornament or illus- 
 tration sake, borrowed from nature or history ac- 
 cording to vulgar conceit, as of a basilisk, an uni- 
 corn, a centaur, a Briareus, an Hydra, or the like, 
 that therefore he must needs be thought to affirm 
 the matter thereof positively to be true. To con- 
 clude therefore, these two interpretations, the one by 
 reduction or senigmatical, the other philosophical or 
 physical, which have been received and pursued in 
 imitation of the rabbins and cabalists, are to be con- 
 fined with a " noli altum sapere, sed time" (be not 
 high-minded, but fear). 
 
 But the two latter points, known to God and 
 unknown to man, touching the secrets of the heart, 
 and the successions of time, do make a just and 
 sound difference between the manner of the exposi- 
 tion of the Scriptures and all other books. For it is 
 an excellent observation which hath been made 
 upon the answers of our Saviour Christ to many of 
 the questions which were propounded to him, how 
 that they are impertinent to the state of the ques- 
 
3/4 OF THE PROJFICIENCE AND 
 
 tion demanded ; the reason whereof is, because, not 
 being like man, which knows man's thoughts by his 
 words, but knowing man's thoughts immediately, he 
 never answered their words, but their thoughts: 
 much in the like manner it is with the Scriptures, 
 which being written to the thoughts of men, and 
 to the succession of all ages, with a foresight of all 
 heresies, contradictions, differing estates of the church, 
 yea and particularly of the elect, are not to be inter- 
 preted only according to the latitude of the proper 
 sense of place, and respectively towards that present 
 occasion whereupon the words were uttered, or 
 in precise congruity or contexture with the words 
 before or after, or in contemplation of the principal 
 scope of the place ; but have in themselves, not only 
 totally or collectively, but distributively in clauses 
 and words, infinite springs and streams of doctrine 
 to water the church in every part. And therefore as 
 the literal sense is, as it were, the main stream or 
 river ; so the moral sense chiefly, and sometimes the 
 allegorical or typical, are they whereof the church 
 hath most use : not that I wish men to be bold 
 in allegories, or indulgent or light in allusions ; but 
 that I do much condemn that interpretation of the 
 Scripture which is only after the manner as men 
 use to interpret a profane book. 
 
 In this part, touching the exposition of the 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 3f5 
 
 Scriptures, I can report no deficienee ; but by way of 
 remembrance this I will add : in perusing books 
 of divinity, I find many books of controversies, and 
 many of common places and treatises, a mass of 
 positive divinity, as it is made an art ; a number of 
 sermons and lectures, and many prolix commen- 
 taries upon the Scriptures, with harmonies and con- 
 cordances : but that form of writing in divinity, 
 which in my judgment is of all others most rich 
 and precious, is positive divinity, collected upon 
 particular texts of Scriptures in brief observations ; 
 not dilated into common places, not chasing after 
 controversies, not reduced into method of art; a 
 thing abounding in sermons, which will vanish, 
 but defective in books which will remain; and 
 a thing wherein this age excelleth. For I am per- 
 suaded, (and I may speak it with an " Absit invidia 
 verbo" (let not the assertion give offence), and no 
 ways in derogation of antiquity, but as in a good 
 emulation between the vine and the olive,) that if 
 the choice and best of those observations upon texts 
 of Scriptures, which have been made dispexsedly in 
 sermons within this your majesty's island of Br 
 by the space of these forty years and more, leming 
 out the largeness of exhortations and applica- 
 thereupon, had been set down in a continuance, it 
 had been the best work in divinity which had been 
 written since the apostles' times, 
 
OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 The matter informed by divinity is of two kinds ; 
 matter of belief and truth of opinion, and matter of 
 service and adoration; which is also judged and 
 directed by the former ; the one being as the in- 
 ternal soul of religion, and the other as the external 
 body thereof. And therefore the heathen religion was 
 not only a worship of idols, but the whole religion 
 was an idol in itself; for it had no soul, that is, no 
 certainty of belief or confession ; as a man may well 
 think, considering the chief doctors of their church 
 were the poets : and the reason was, because the 
 heathen gods were no jealous gods, but were glad 
 to be admitted into part, as they had reason. Nei- 
 ther did they respect the pureness of heart, so they 
 might have external honour and rites. 
 
 But out of these two do result and issue four 
 main branches of divinity ; faith, manners, liturgy, 
 and government* Faith containeth the doctrine of 
 the nature of God, of the attributes of God, and of 
 the works of God. The nature of God consisteth of 
 three persons in unity of Godhead. The attributes 
 of God are either common to the Deity, or respec- 
 tive to the persons. The works of God summary 
 are two, that of the creation, and that of the re- 
 demption ; and both these works, as in total they 
 appertain to the unity of the Godhead, so in their 
 parts they refer to the three persons : that of 
 the creation, in the mass of the matter, to the 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 377 
 
 Father ; in the disposition of the form, to the Son ; 
 and in the continuance and conservation of the 
 being, to the Holy Spirit : so that of the redemption, 
 in the election and counsel, to the Father ; in the 
 whole act and consummation, to the Son ; and in 
 the application, to the Holy Spirit ; for by the Holy 
 Ghost was Christ conceived in flesh, and by the 
 Holy Ghost are the elect regenerated in spirit. This 
 work likewise we consider either effectually, in the 
 elect ; or privatively, in the reprobate ; or according 
 to appearance, in the visible church. 
 
 For Manners, the doctrine thereof is contained 
 in the law, which discloseth sin. The law itself is 
 divided, according to the edition thereof, into the 
 *aw of nature, the law moral, and the law positive ; 
 and according to the stile, into negative and affirma- 
 tive, prohibitions and commandments. Sin, in the 
 matter and subject thereof, is divided according to 
 the commandments ; in the form thereof, it referreth 
 to the three persons in Deity : sins of infirmity against 
 the Father, whose more special attribute is power ; 
 sins of ignorance against the Son, whose attribute is 
 wisdom ; and sins of malice against the Holy Ghost, 
 whose attribute is grace or love. In the motions of 
 it, it either moveth to the right hand or to the left ; 
 either to blind devotion, or to profane and libertine 
 transgression ; either in imposing restraint where 
 
;•:';'.'; Or XHE'PROFICiENCE-AND 
 
 God granteth liberty, or in taking liberty where 
 God hnposeth restraint. In the degrees and pro- 
 gress of it, it divideth itself into thought, word, 
 or act. And in this part I commend much the de- 
 ducing of the law of God to cases of conscience ; for 
 that I take indeed to be a breaking, and not ex- 
 hibiting whole of the bread of life. But that which 
 quickeneth both . these doctrines of faith and man- 
 ners, is the elevation and consent of the heart ; 
 whereunto appertain books of exhortation, holy me- 
 ditation, Christian resolution, and the like. 
 
 For the Liturgy or service, it consisteth of the 
 reciprocal acts between God and man; which, on 
 the part of God, are the preaching of the word, and 
 the sacraments, which are seals to the covenant, or 
 as the visible word ; and on the part of man, invo- 
 cation of the name of God; and under the law, 
 sacrifices ; which were as visible prayers or confes- 
 sions : but now the adoration being " in spiritu et 
 veritate" (in spirit and in truth), there remaineth 
 only " vituli iabiorum" (the calves of the lips) ; 
 although the use of holy vows of thankfulness and 
 retribution maybe accounted also as sealed petitions. 
 
 And for the Government of the church, it con- 
 sisteth of the patrimony of the church, the fran- 
 chises of the church, and the offices and jurisdic- 
 tions of the church, and the laws of the church 
 
ADVANCEMENT OF LEAllNING, 37$ 
 
 directing the whole; all which have two considera- 
 tions, the one in themselves, the other how they 
 stand compatible and agreeable to the civil estate. 
 
 This matter of divinity is handled either in form 
 of instruction of truth, or in form of confutation 
 of falsehood. The declinations from religion, be- 
 sides the privative, which is atheism, and the branches 
 thereof, are three ; heresies, idolatry, and witchcraft : 
 heresies, when w T e serve the true God with a false 
 worship ; idolatry, when we worship false gods, sup- 
 posing them to be true ; and witchcraft, when we 
 adore false gods, knowing them to be wicked and 
 false : for so your majesty doth excellently well ob- 
 serve, that witchcraft is the height of idolatry. And 
 yet we see though these be true degrees, Samuel 
 teacheth us that they are ail of a nature, when there is 
 once a receding from the word of God ; for so he 
 saith, " Quasi peccatum ariolandi est repugnare, et 
 quasi scelus idololatrise nolle acquieseere" (rebellion 
 is as the sin of witchcraft, and stubbornness is as 
 iniquity and idolatry). 
 
 These things I have passed over so briefly, because 
 I can report no deficiency, concerning them : for I 
 can find no space or ground that lieth vacant and un- 
 sown in the matter of divinity ; so diligent have men 
 been, either in sowing of good seed, or in sowi 
 tares, 
 
380 OF THE PROFICIENCE AND 
 
 Thus have I made as it were a small Globe of the 
 Intellectual World, as truly and faithfully as I could 
 discover ; with a note and description of those parts 
 which seem to me not constantly occupate, or not 
 well converted by the labour of man. In which, 
 if I have in any point receded from that which is 
 commonly received, it hath been with a purpose of 
 proceeding in melius, and not in aliud; a mind of 
 amendment and proficience, and not of change and 
 difference. For I could not be true and constant 
 to the argument I handle, if I were not willing to go 
 beyond others ; but yet not more willing than to have 
 others go beyond me again : which may the better 
 appear by this, that I have propounded my opinions 
 naked and unarmed, not seeking to preoccupate the 
 liberty of men's judgments by confutations. For in 
 any thing which is well set down, I am in good 
 hope, that if the first reading move an objection, 
 the second reading will make an answer. And in 
 those things wherein I have erred, I am sure I have 
 not prejudiced the right by litigious arguments ; 
 which certainly have this contrary effect and opera- 
 tion, that they add authority to error, and destroy 
 the authority of that which is well invented: for 
 question is an honour and preferment to falsehood, 
 as on the other side it is a repulse to truth. But the 
 errors I claim and challenge to myself as my own : 
 

 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 381 
 
 the good, if any be, is due " tanquam adeps sacri- 
 ficii" (as the fat of the sacrifice), to be incensed to 
 the honour, first of the Divine Majesty, and next 
 of your majesty, to whom on earth I am most 
 bounden. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 

 .Abet, and Cain, types of contemplation and action, 
 
 Abstine et Sustine, 270. 
 
 Ability commands circumstances, 340. 
 
 Abilities and virtue, estimate of, 332, 
 
 Abridgements, defect of, 368. 
 
 Accidents, their influence upon the mind, 294. 
 
 of words, 236. 
 Active men should be authors, 279. 
 
 private good, different from good of society, 271, 272, 
 life preferable to contemplative life, 267 
 good preferable to passive good, 271. 
 Adam in paradise, 63- 
 
 his employment in paradise, viewing of creatures and 
 imposition of names, 63. 
 Address to King James, 105. 
 Adrian, his happy reign, 77. 
 Advance of knowledge upon the reformation, 70. 
 Advantages of philosophy to faith and religion, 70. 
 Affections, knowledge of, 292. 
 
 disturbance of, diseases of mind, 292. 
 examined by the Stoics, 293, 
 not investigated by Aristotle in his Ethics, 293, 
 investigated by Aristotle in his PJietoric, 293. 
 treatise of, how to be treated, 294. 
 opposition of, to each other, 294. 
 Ages of Governments, 901. 
 Alchemy, 50, 174. 
 Alchemists, errors of, 188, 
 Alexander, learned warrior, 16. 
 his education, 82. 
 Ids love of knowledge, 83. 
 his love of Homer, 83. 
 his shrewd speeches, 83. 
 his answer to Diogenes, 84. 
 his answer to Calisthenes, 85 s 
 
384 INDEX. 
 
 Alexander, his knowledge of Antipater, 86. 
 
 his distinction between love of Alexander and love 
 
 of the King, 86. 
 his answer to Parmenio, 86, 87. 
 his answer, that he had hope, 87. 
 his preference of learning to empire, 83. 
 Allowance for experiments too small in universites, 111. 
 Alphabet, 176. 
 
 Analogy between progress of man and of states, 16. 
 Analytics in logic, 233. 
 Anatomy defects of, 194. 
 
 of living bodies, 195. 
 Angels, nature of, 154. 
 Annals, 134. 
 
 Annotations and commentaries, 256. 
 Antients, consecrated inventors, 211. 
 
 incorporated virtues in fables, 319. 
 Antoninus Pius, his happy reign, 78. 
 
 Cyenini Sector, 78. 
 Antiquity, 126. 
 
 what respect due to it, 53. 
 Aphorisms of Solomon, 6T. 
 
 of Solomon, instances of, 311. 
 and methodical style, 241. 
 advantages of, 242. 
 Apostle Paul, learned, 69. 
 Apothegms, 140, 171. 
 
 of Caesar, 89. 
 Appetite, knowledge of, 260. 
 Architecture of Fortune, art of, 324. 
 Aristotle, his departure from antient terms, 157. 
 
 his censure of his predecessors, 157. 
 Arrangement, evils of, 55* 
 Art, its duty to exalt Nature, 214. 
 of memory, 232. 
 of forming habits, 296. 
 
 of self- advancement, not reduced to precept, 323. 
 of discovering the mind of others, 320. 
 Arts of Pleasure, sensual, 201. 
 
 Aspirers to elegance of manners seldom aspire to high vir- 
 tues, 308. 
 Atheism occasioned by superficial knowledge, 12. 
 Athletics, 200. 
 Astrology, 174. 
 Authors should be consuls, not dictators, 51. 
 
INDEX. 385 
 
 Bad times of mind, how obliterated, 300. 
 Badges of false science, 43. 
 Base and structure of natural philosophy, 165. 
 Basilisk, fable of, 281. 
 Being, without well-being, a curse, 350. 
 Behaviour, neglected by philosophers, 309. 
 too much attention to, 308. 
 a garment of the mind, 309. 
 Bird-witted minds, 251. 
 Biography, 1 27. 
 
 the most valuable species of history, 127. 
 deficiences of, 132. 
 relative uses of, 320. 
 Bishops, antient, learned, 69. 
 Body, action of, upon mind, 185. 
 
 disorders of, remediable, 188. 
 easily disordered, 188, 189. 
 knowledge of, 187. 
 tabernacle of mind, 201. 
 Bodily excesses, 201. 
 Books, new editions of, 255. 
 Bounds of human knowledge, 10. 
 Business loved for itself only by learned men, 20. 
 professors of, amongst reviews, 310. 
 knowledge of, reduceable to precept, 310. 
 Calendar of existing inventons, 175. 
 of existing discoveries, 175. 
 of things not invented, 176. 
 of supposed impossibilities, 176. 
 of vulgar errors, 178. 
 of sects of philosophy, 104. 
 Capacity of mind to receive knowledge, 9. 
 Care of men's minds, how it belongs to divinity, how to philo - 
 
 sophy, 286. 
 Cato, his censure of Greek, 23. 
 Causes of diversity of sects, 179. 
 Caesar, learned warrior, 16. 
 his writings, 88. 
 his shrewd speeches, 89. 
 his speech upon Milites and Quirties^ 90. 
 his noble answer to Metellus, 91, 
 his shrewd use of his name, 90. 
 Charity necessary to regulate knowledge, 9. 
 Charitable dispositions, no excess in, 303. 
 Character, knowledge of, part of morals, 292. 
 
386 INDEX. 
 
 Character, how influenced by the various accidents of life, 290. 
 
 how influenced by sex, &c, 290. 
 Characters, how influenced by studies, 299. 
 Christian church preserved in its bosom the relics of learning, 
 69. 
 at peace during Adrian's reign, 77. 
 Christianity advances public good, 266. 
 Chronicles and biography, relative uses of, 127, 320. 
 Civil history, division of, 125. 
 
 knowledge, difficulty of, 306. 
 Cleanliness of body, its importance, 200. 
 Collection of antient philosophers, how to be made, 180. 
 Colour for faults, 337. 
 Commentaries, 126. 
 Common places in Rhetoric, 253, 
 Common places for speaking, 214. 
 Common-place books, defects of, 231. 
 Common-place book for the memory, 231. 
 Common matters, importance of attention to, 261. 
 Comparative duties, 283. 
 Concurrence between learning and letters, 15. 
 
 between learned and martial times, 16. 
 Configuration, doctrine of, 161. 
 Confusion of tongues, 64. 
 
 Connection between imposture and credulity, 47. 
 between truth and falsehood, 50. 
 between cause and effect, 156. 
 between all sciences, 182. 
 between morality and divinity, 284. 
 Consciousness of good intentions, 269. 
 Contemplative men when unfit for business, 21. 
 
 life, praise of, 27. 
 Contemplation and action ought to be united, 59. 
 Cain and Abel, types of, 64. 
 relative good of, 275. 
 Contentious learning, 39, 43. 
 
 Controversy in learning not favourable to enquiry, 239. 
 Conversation, different sorts, 289. 
 
 wisdom of, 307. 
 Corrupt politicians, nature of, 32. 
 Cosmetics, art of, 250. 
 Cosmography, 136. 
 
 Countenance, how it discloses the mind, 326. 
 government of, 307. 
 more sincere than deeds, 325. 
 Craniology, 187. 
 
index. 387 
 
 Creation, dignity of knowledge as seen in, 62. 
 dignity of knowledge seen in the, 62. 
 Credulity, 47. 
 
 in acts, 49. 
 in natural history, 49. 
 in authors, 49. 
 Culture of mind, 26.3. 
 Custom, nature of, 295. 
 Declaration of self, 342. 
 Decoration of body, 200. 
 Dedication of Book 1. to King James I. 
 Dedications to books, Proper and Improper, 36= 
 Deeds, how far to be relied upon, 327. 
 Defect in universities in want of visitation, 113. 
 Defects in a country, to be treated respectfully, 30. 
 estimate of, 332. 
 concealing, 336. 
 Deficiences of medicine, 193. 
 Degrees of good, 263, 264. 
 Delicate learning, 39. 
 Delivery of knowledge, 233. 
 by words, 233. 
 by gestures, 234. 
 of knowledge like plants, 260. 
 Demonstrations, different sorts, 230. 
 
 according to the sciences to be demonstrated, 
 230. 
 Demosthenes, water drinker, 304. 
 
 and iEschines, contrast between their employ- 
 ments of vacations, 22. 
 Diet, its importance to the mind, 185. 
 Difficulties, how overcome, 106. 
 Difference between knowledge and ignorance, 11. 
 Differences of history, 1 C J9. 
 
 of history of Scotland, 130. 
 of history of England, 130. 
 Different sorts of philosophy, 147. 
 Diligence and confidence in Providence, 281. 
 Diogenes and Alexander, 83. 
 Discovery, science of, 183. 
 Discourses upon histories, best style for work on business, .319. 
 
 upon private letters, errors of, 320. 
 Diseases too soon supposed incurable, 196. 
 Disputes respecting supreme good, 263 
 Dispositions, good and bad, l 289. 
 
 in conversation, to please, C J89, 
 
388, INDEX. 
 
 Dispositions in conversation, to contradict, 289. 
 Dissimulation, nature of, 342. 
 Divine philosophy, 148, 152. 
 
 not deficient, 154. 
 Divination, its nature, 203. 
 Divinity, origin of, 147. 
 
 or philosophy, cannot be too much studied, 13. 
 the sabbath of men's labours, 359. 
 science of, 359. 
 
 grounded not upon the light of nature, 360. 
 parts of, 365. 
 Division of the present work, 5. 
 of knowledge, 119. 
 of chronicles, 128. 
 of poetry, 143. 
 
 of knowledge, like a tree, 147. 
 of natural philosophy into causes and effects, 156. 
 of sciences, nature of, 259. 
 of civil knowledge, 307. 
 Doctrine to be loved for its own sake, 262. 
 
 of man in society, differs from formation of mind 
 
 thereto, 278. 
 of religion, obtained only by revelation, 361. 
 Domitian, his happy reign, 75. 
 Doubts in natural philosophy, registering, 177. 
 calendars of, 178. 
 to be made clear, 178. 
 Dreams, 184. 
 
 Dulness of life without an object, 272, 
 Durability of learning, 10 1 . 
 Duty, 277. 
 
 of a king, 279. 
 
 of king, to rule by the laws, 280. 
 of Rhetoric, 248. 
 Duties of society, 270. 
 
 of man as member of a state, 278. 
 in professions, 278. 
 Ecclesiastical history, 138. 
 Education, importance of, 28. 
 ^Esop's husbandman, 50. 
 
 Effect of particular pursuits upon the mind, 228. 
 Elenches, doctrine of, 224. 
 
 used by Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates, 224. 
 Elizabeth, (Queen), her learning, 25. 
 
 most beautiful character of her, 80. 
 Eloquence, when injurious to the possessor, 26^. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 389 
 
 Emblem in memory, 232. 
 
 Eminence in civil merit classed by heathens amongst demi- 
 gods, 72. 
 Empiric statesmen, evils of trusting to, 17. 
 Empirics succeed from adhering to particular medicines, 198, 
 Empirical physicians, 17. 
 
 lawyers, 17. 
 Enmity, conduct in, 348. 
 Enquirers into new inventions not encouraged in universities, 
 
 116. 
 Epaminondas, learned warrior, 16, 
 Epitomies, 127. 
 
 defects of, 127. 
 Error in motive for acquiring knowledge, 58. 
 in attempting only to imitate, 58. 
 of communicating knowledge magisterially, 58. 
 not caused by incapacity of the mind, 176. 
 of Physicians, in not adhering to particular prescriptions, 
 
 197. 
 from want of attention in physicians' prescriptions, 199. 
 of attempting too much, 346. 
 Events, submission to, 340. 
 Evils of retirement from public life, 270. 
 in modes of advancing fortune, 349. 
 of, not generalizing, 55. 
 Examples, tendency of, to mislead, 334. 
 Excellence of knowledge, 5. 
 
 of knowledge of forms, 166. 
 Excess of mental harmony, 276. 
 
 bodily, 201. 
 Fables of ancients, 144, 319. 
 Faber quisque fortunae, 321, 322. 
 Faith, nature of, 360. 
 
 advantages of philosophy to, 70. 
 Falsehood, 47. 
 Fantastical learning, 39, 47. 
 Fascination, 204. 
 Fathers of the church, learned, 69. 
 Fear of death, 276. 
 Features at rest and in motion, 184. 
 Felicity of times under learned princes, 74. 
 Final and physical causes, confusion of, 169. 
 Flattery of great men by philosophers, 36, 
 Flattery, nature of, 280. 
 Forms, discovery of, 162. 
 
 why not discovered by Plato, 162. 
 
390 INDEX. 
 
 Forms, part of metaphysics, 162, 
 simple and complex, 162. 
 the true object of knowledge, 162. 
 how investigated in physics, how in metaphysics, 164. 
 invention of, most worthy part of knowledge, 162. 
 Formula in Rhetoric, 255. 
 Fortune not to be too much wooed, 351. 
 
 Sabbathless pursuit of, 351. 
 Friends, choice of, 333. 
 Friendship, laws of, 283. 
 
 conduct in, 348. 
 Fruitless speculations, 44. 
 
 modes of investigation, 45, 
 Games of recreation, 201. 
 General and minute reasoning, 45. 
 Generalization, hasty, 214. 
 Georgics of the mind, importance of, 263. 
 Good, double nature of, 265. 
 Good times of mind, how cherished, 300. 
 Good of the mind, in what it consists, 305. 
 Government, art of, 353. 
 
 error in supposing learning to be prejudicial to, 16. 
 ought to be transparent, 354. 
 to be examined with delicacy, 354. 
 Governors, dignity of, depends upon dignity of the governed, 97. 
 Governors to be candid to the governed, 354. 
 Grammar, 235. 
 
 use of, 236. 
 Gratitude, laws of, 283. 
 Habit a second nature, 297. 
 Habits formed by indulging inclination, 297. 
 
 by counteracting inclinations, 297. 
 by not attempting too much or too little, 296. 
 by acting when mind indisposed, 296. 
 Happiness, how dependant upon freedom from perturbation, 268. 
 
 how far dependant upon things in our power, 269. 
 Happy time when Roman emperors learned, 74. 
 Haste in acquiring knowledge, 57. 
 Hasty generallizing, evils of, 164. 
 Health of mind, nature of, 270. 
 
 how preserved, 295. 
 Heathens deified inventors of arts for use of life, 72. 
 Hercules's columns, 106. 
 Heresy caused by trying to fly to the heavens by waxen wings 
 
 of senses, 12. 
 Hieroglyphics, 234. 
 
INDEX. 391 
 
 Historians, doctors of affections, 294. 
 History, division of, 119. 
 
 relating to memory, 119. 
 of prophecy, of what it ought to consist, 138. 
 of church, 138. 
 of providence, 138, 139. 
 
 of England, from union of roses to union of kingdoms, 
 130. 
 Homer, Alexander's love of, 83. 
 
 Honours amongst antients, were human, her oical, and divine, 72. 
 Human nature, knowledge of, 181. 
 
 end of all our knowledge, 182. 
 Human philosophy, 147. 
 Husband and wife, duties of, 282. 
 Idols of the mind, 226. 
 of the tribe, 224. 
 of the den, 228, 
 Ignorance, churlishness of, 23, 
 Images to fix imagination, unlawful, 205. 
 Imagination exercised by realities, 174. 
 
 how it acts upon imaginant, 186. 
 how it may hurt, how help, 186. 
 power of, 205. 
 strengthening of, 205. 
 when raised above reason, 207. 
 Impatience of doubt, 57. 
 Importance of letters, 140. 
 
 of knowledge of small things, 261. 
 of ascertaining the limits of reason in divinity, 365. 
 Impossibility, the nature of, 118. 
 Imposture, 47. 
 
 Impression, science of, 183, 184. 
 Impropriety of departure from antient usages, 158. 
 Infant kings, good goverments of, 258. 
 Infecting doctrines with favourite opinions, 56. 
 Injury from mixing philosophy and divinity, 151. 
 
 to goverment, from universities being dedicated to pro- 
 fessions, 110. 
 Inspired theology, sabbath of contemplation, 156. 
 Institutions of universities should be examined, 113. 
 Intellect, weakness of, 172. 
 Intellectual defects are remediable, 257. 
 
 arts, division of, 209. 
 Intellectualists, their errors, 56. 
 
 Intercom se between antiquity and proticience to be encou- 
 raged, 158. 
 Intermission and continuance of exercises. 857\ 
 
392 INDEX. 
 
 Interpretation of fables, of antients' imagining, 146. 
 Interrogating, art of, 220. 
 Invention, art of, 209. 
 
 division of, 209. 
 
 of arts and sciences deficient, 209. 
 of argument, 217. 
 of speech, 217. 
 of speech, is memory, 218. 
 
 and memory not properly united in universities, 114. 
 Inventois of music and works in metal recorded before the 
 
 flood, 64. 
 Ixion, fable of, 174. 
 James (King) was learned, 25. 
 Jesuits, their use to the Roman See, 70. 
 Journals, 134. 
 Judgment, art of, 221. 
 
 by syllogism, 222. 
 
 in what it consists, 223. 
 Julian's interdiction against Christians gaining knowledge, 69. 
 Knowledge, see Learning. 
 
 when productive of happiness and when of misery, 
 
 in, 11 . 
 to be applied to charity, not to pride, 13. 
 softens the mind, 23. 
 dignity of, seen in the Attributes of God, and the 
 
 creation, 61, 62. 
 which caused the fall, nature of, 63. 
 and virtue, connection between, 97. 
 power of, 98. 
 insures immortality, 100. 
 from revelation, 167. 
 from light of nature, 147. 
 of man, 198. 
 
 importance of, 324. 
 relating to the mind, 202. 
 of nature of the soul, founded by religion, 202. 
 pabulum animi, 208. 
 how to be communicated, 259. 
 without love of virtue, evils of, 260. 
 of dispositions of men, deficient, 289. 
 Knowledge, of men's natures, 288. 
 
 of men's dispositions of things, 288. 
 of characters of men, deficient, 289. 
 Lamentation that schoolmen had not variety of knowledge, 46. 
 Laws, defect of 355. 
 
 of England excels civil law, 357. 
 
INDEX. 393 
 
 Lawyers not judged by success, 119. 
 
 not the best law authors, 355. 
 Law books should be written by statesmen, 355. 
 Learned kings, advantages of, 74. 
 
 princes, advantage of, 17, 18, 74. 
 men, errors in the studies of, 38. 
 
 neglected are most conspicuous, 27. 
 
 supposed not to distinguish between virtues and 
 
 dissolute times, 30. 
 supposed not to distinguish between imaginary 
 and real perfection, 30. 
 Learned statesmen, advantages of, 74. 
 Learning, its advantages to faith and religion, 70. 
 and letters, concurrence between, 15. 
 and military power, 15. 
 
 how far it causes resolution and irresolution, 19. 
 does not indispose men for government, 19. 
 how far it disposes to retirement, 20. 
 does not diminish reverence for law, 22. 
 its tendency to elevate the mind, 32. 
 represses inconveniences from man to man, 73. 
 promotes military virtue, 82. 
 takes away vain admiration, 94. 
 humanizes the' possessor, 94. 
 takes away temerity, 94. 
 takes away levity, 94. 
 takes away insolence, 94. 
 mitigates fear of death, 95. 
 general advantages of, to its possessor, 96. 
 disposes the mind to continual improvement, 96. 
 makes government more valuable, 97. 
 advances fortune, 99. 
 adaptation of mind of the pupil, 257. 
 Leprosy more contagious before maturity, 65. 
 Letters, 140. 
 Libraries, 107, 108. 
 Light of nature, 147. 
 Limits of reason in divinity, 364. 
 of divine philosophy, 152. 
 Literary history, 119. 
 
 history, deficiences in, 1J9. 
 Logical part of mind, 343. 
 Logicians' inductions, defective, 211. 
 Logic, analytics in, 223. 
 
 and rhetoric, difference between, S5l« 
 Love of uniformity, 227. 
 
394 INDEX. 
 
 Love, power of, 302, 303. 
 
 Lucius Varus, his happy reign, 79. 
 
 Magic, 205. 
 
 Magnanimity, 288. 
 
 Man, as an individual, 182. 
 
 as a member of society, 182. 
 
 should consider how his opinions accord with the times, 
 
 332. 
 should consider his professional competitors, 333. 
 should consider how his nature sorts with his profession, 
 333. 
 Manners, aspires to elegance of, seldom aspire to high virtues, 
 
 308. 
 Marcus Antoninus, his happy reign, 79. 
 Marshalling pursuits to fortune, order of, 344. 
 Master and servant, duties of, 282. 
 Masters to be recorded, 49. 
 Mathematics, 170. 
 
 part of metaphysics, 170. 
 pure and mixed, 171. 
 
 laboured from man's love of generalities, 17 1. 
 not deficient, 1 72. 
 use of, 257. 
 
 mixed, will increase with the sciences, 172. 
 Mathematical part of mind, 344. 
 
 Means should be spent on learning, not learning on means, 27. 
 Mechanical history, 123. 
 
 use of, 125. 
 Medicinal reports are defective, 193. 
 history is deficient, 194. 
 baths should be adopted, 198. 
 Medicine, art of, 176, 188. 
 
 conjectured at, 189. 
 object of, to tune the body, 189. 
 nature and science of, 193. 
 more laboured than advanced, 195. 
 Memorials, 126. 
 Memory, laws of, 230. 
 
 art of, deficient, 251. 
 erroneous modes of, 232. 
 Men's natures attempted in astrology, 289. 
 Men known by objects of their actions, 330. 
 Merit of propagating knowledge, 5. 
 Metaphysic, meaning of word, 159. 
 art of, 164. 
 its excellence, 166. 
 enquiries of, final causes, 167. 
 
395 
 
 Metaphysics, 157. 
 
 contemplate what is abstracted and fixed, 160, 
 Metaphysicians like spiders, 44. 
 Method, sorts of, 5b. See Style. 
 Microcosm, errors respecting man being, 188. 
 Military power, concurrence of learning with, 15. 
 Mind of man, erroneous study of, 56. 
 faculties of, 2' <6. 
 understanding, t06. 
 will, 206. 
 
 form of forms, 209. 
 like a bee as to knowledge, 214. 
 loves certainties, 222. 
 prefers affirmatives to negatives, 226. 
 action of, upon body, 185, 186. 
 should be pliant to occasions, 358. 
 wheels of concentric, with wheels of fortune, 340. 
 restive, evils of, 340. 
 attempting too many things, evil of, 346. 
 occupied in one pursuit, evil of, 346. 
 Minds fit for great thiugs, 288. 
 fit for small tilings, 288. 
 fit for dispatch, -88. 
 fit for delay, L ^8 $. 
 fit for many things, 2°>8. 
 fit for few things, 288. 
 in perfect and in depraved states, 299. 
 unbending, description of, 339, 
 Miracles, nature of, 152. 
 
 of our Saviour relating to health, 193. 
 Mitigating pains of death, 196. 
 Mixed history, 135. 
 
 Mode of obtaining information in divinity, 367. 
 Monsters, history of, 121. 
 
 use of a history of, 122. 
 Moralists, division of, 268. 
 Morality more difficult then politics, 306. 
 Motives of conduct, 329. 
 
 by which learned men are influenced in action, com- 
 pared with motives of others, 21. 
 Mountebanks, why preferred to regular physicians, 190. 
 Multitude prefer gross to intellectual pleasures, 102. 
 Musicians' answer to Philip, 77. 
 Music and medicine conjoined in Apollo, 189. 
 Mysteries of God not cognizable by reason. 1 53 
 
396 INDEX. 
 
 Names, notes of things, 235. 
 
 origin of, 235. 
 Narrations, defects of, 134. 
 Narrative poetry, 143. 
 
 Nature of the knowledge which caused the fall, 7. 
 of the soul, 202. 
 changed by habit, 295. 
 of men, 329. 
 imitation of, 346. 
 of information in divinity, 366. 
 Natural history mixed with fable, 49. 
 
 divison of, 120. 
 Natural magic, 50, 156. 
 
 , deficient, 173, 175. 
 Natural philosophy, 147. 
 
 in Book of Job, 66. 
 divided into mine and furnace, 155. 
 double consideration of, 156. 
 Natural prudence, 156. 
 
 division of, 172. 
 Natural science, 156, 157. 
 
 division of, 157. 
 Nerva, his happy reign, 75. 
 Novelty, her existence, 94. 
 
 opinion that there is none, 53. , 
 Nydhatia, wisdom of, 309. 
 
 Obedience by custom worse than by knowledge, 23. 
 Objections to learning, 6. 
 
 by divines, 6. 
 
 from learned men themselves, 25. 
 from fortunes of learned men, 25. 
 from learned men, being teachers, 28. 
 from the employment of learned men, 28. 
 from the manners of learned men, 30. 
 because learned men prefer the public 
 to their own good, 32. 
 Occupying too much time, 22. 
 Operative natural philosophy, 156. 
 
 Opinion that truths are preserved, and errors rejected, 54. 
 Orations, 140. 
 Order, nature of, 167. 
 of studies, 256. 
 Ordering of exercises, importance of, 257. 
 Origin of the study of words, instead of matter, 39. 
 of the dead languages, 32. 
 
INDEX. 397 
 
 Origin of things, doctrine of, 161. 
 Ornament in philosophical writing, 42. 
 
 Orpheus's story, beautiful proof of advantages of govern- 
 ment, 73. 
 Pain, indurance of, 200. 
 Parables of Solomon, 67. 
 Parabolical poetry, 143. 
 
 use of, 144. 
 
 most useful in infancy of society, 144. 
 Paracelsus, errors of, 188. 
 Parent and child, duties of, 282. 
 Passions, see Affections, 
 Passive good, 273. 
 
 conservative, 274. 
 
 perfective, the highest species, 274. 
 private good, 271. 
 Patience, 200. 
 
 Paul the Apostle, learning of, 69. 
 Peccant humours of learning, 52. 
 People happy when kings learned, 74. 
 Peremptory mode of communicating knowledge, 58. 
 Perfect history, division of, 127. 
 Philosophia prima, 55. 
 148. 
 
 nature of, 149. 
 deficient, 151. 
 parent of sciences, 152. 
 not same as metaphisics, 159. 
 Philosophers' heaven, 263. 
 
 not the best law authors, 355. 
 Philosophical grammar, 236. 
 Philosophical and civil life, 277. 
 Philosophy, origin of, 148. 
 
 relates to the understanding, 119. 
 
 of Democritus compared with Aristotle and Plato, 
 
 167. 
 rational and moral, 208. 
 made a profession, 269. 
 Physics, 157. 
 
 what is inherent or transitory in matter, contemplated 
 
 by, 160. 
 division of, 161. 
 
 contrasted with metaphysics and explained, 160. 
 Physical causes, why neglected, 168. 
 
 knowledge of, will disclose new particulars, t 7 ^- 
 Physicians judged by success, 150. 
 
398 INDEX. 
 
 Physicians, errors of, in not adhering to particular prescriptions, 
 197. 
 why they study other sciences than medicine, 191. 
 duty to mitigate pains of death, 197. 
 Physiognomy, 184. 
 
 its virtue, 326. 
 Places of learning, 107c 
 Platform of good, 263. 
 
 Plato, his error with respect to rhetoric, 249. 
 Pleasures of affections compared with intellect, 99. 
 
 of knowledge contrasted with other pleasures, 99. 
 of senses compared with intellect, 99. 
 Pleasure of enjoyment and resignation at loss, 276. 
 
 of knowledge, our greatest pleasure, 99. 
 Poesy, 141. 
 
 a play of imagination, 207. 
 vinum demonum, 297. 
 and music, powers of, 143. 
 relates to the imagination, 1 1 9. 
 as a character of style, 142. 
 not deficient, 146. 
 
 excellence of, in expressing passions, 146. 
 Poets, doctors of affections, 294. 
 Politicians, objections to learning, 13. 
 common nature of, 32. 
 use others as their instruments, 169. 
 judged by success, 190. 
 Popular grammar, 236. 
 Posthumous fame, 132. 
 Power of education, 258. 
 
 of situation upon character, 299. 
 Praise of King James, 2. 
 Precepts for formation of habits, 296. 
 Prenotion of memory, 232. 
 Preparation for speaking, 218. 
 
 errors of physicians in not adhering to, 197. 
 Princes in minority, advantages of their governments, 17. 
 Princes known by their natures, 330. 
 Principles of things, doctrine of, 161. 
 Private good, division of, 271. 
 Professions supplied from philosophy, 110. 
 Professional men apt to magnify their professions, 279. 
 should be authors, 279. 
 should know the virtues and vices of their 
 professions, 281. 
 Proofs according to the thing to be proved, 230. 
 
INDEX. 399 
 
 Prospect of improvement from navigation, 137. 
 
 Prospect of advancement of knowledge from the progress 
 
 already made, 358. 
 Public and private duty, 265. 
 Pusillanimity, 288. 
 
 Putrefaction more contagious before maturity, 65. 
 Pygmaleon's frenzy an emblem of the study of words, 42. 
 Quacks, why preferred to regular physicians, 190. 
 Quality of knowledge, importance of, 9. 
 Quantity of knowledge never injurious, 7. 
 Quarrels, conduct in, 348. 
 Radical improvements, how made, 170. 
 Rational knowledge, difficulties of, 208. 
 Reason, key of arts, 209. 
 Registers, 126. 
 Relations, 127. 
 
 the most true in history, 127, 128. 
 defects of, 136. 
 
 variety in sensual and intellectual pleasures, 272. 
 Relative merit of philosophy and statesmen, 72. 
 of philosophy and manners, 72. 
 Remote generalities, useless in practice, 246. 
 Representative poetry, 1^3. 
 Religion, advantages of philosophy to, 70. 
 obtained only by revelation, 361. 
 Reports of character, value of, 328. 
 Retreat, wisdom of securing, 347. 
 Restlessness of disappointed ambition, 274. 
 Revealing self, art of, 334. 
 Rhetoric, 247. 
 
 inferior to wisdom, 247. 
 common places in, 253. 
 error of Plato with respect to, 249. 
 deficiences of, 252. 
 Rites of Muses seldom duly celebrated, 64. 
 Roots of good and evil, ^66. 
 Rome nourished in arms and arts, 24. 
 Rules for forming habits, 296. 
 Sabbath, 63. 
 
 Salaries, of university teachers, too small, 110. 
 Saviour in the temple, his first act to shew value of knowledge, 
 
 68. 
 Sceptical and confident modes, 58. 
 Schoolmen, their spinning webs of learning, 44. 
 Sciences, what done, what omitted in, 5. 
 
 when progressive, and when not, 51. 
 
400 INDEX. 
 
 Sciences, discovery of, 183. 
 
 Seats in body of faculties of mind, 189. 
 
 Self-knowledge, 332. 
 
 Self-love, limits of, 33. 
 
 has triple desires, 273. 
 Self-preservation and multiplication, laws of nature, 271 
 Self-wisdom, 320. 
 
 Sense of man reveals the terrestrial conceals the celestial 
 globe, 12. 
 understanding, and with their relative actions, 206. 
 Senses sufficient to report truth, 217. 
 Sensual knowledge generally approved, 238* 
 Sickliness of mind, 270. 
 Sinew of wisdom is slowness of belief, 325. 
 Socrates, accusation of, 24. 
 Socratic style, 58. 
 Solomon, his censure of excess of writing, 10. 
 
 values himself solely upon his knowledge, 67. 
 Sophisters and orators, difference between, 224. 
 Soul, simple substance of, 189. 
 Speculative natural philosophy, 156. 
 
 men incompetent to write on practical matters, 279. 
 Speech, government of, 308. 
 Spirit upon spirit, its operations, 205. 
 Spirits, 62. 
 
 nature of, 154 . 
 
 evil and good propriety of considering, 155. 
 States more busy in laws than in education, 29. 
 
 not so soon disordered as individuals, 306. 
 Stooping to occasions and not to persons, ST. 
 St. Paul's admonition as to vain philosophy, 10. 
 Strength, 200. 
 
 Strength of mind in pursuit of virtue, 300. 
 Study of words and not of matter, 41. 
 Students in universities study logick too soon, 113. 
 
 rhetorick too soon, 113. 
 Style, its importance, 239. 
 
 for assent or investigation, 240. 
 concealed and open, 241. 
 by assertion or interrogation, 242. 
 according to the subject matter, 243. 
 according to new or old knowledge, 244. 
 by analysis or systasis, 245. 
 as to propositions, 245. 
 or ostentation, 247. 
 Subtlety of spirit predominant over matter, 191. 
 Suffering, vices and virtues of, 289 . 
 
INDEX. 401 
 
 Suggestions for speaking, 218, 220. 
 Superficial learning, coxcombry of, 94. 
 Superstitions, accounts of, 123. 
 Swiftness, 200. 
 
 Syllogism, its advantages and defects, 215. 
 Sympathy between mind and body, 183. 
 
 between body and mind does not degrade mind, 186. 
 between good of body and good of mind, 305. 
 Understanding, palace of the mind, 146. 
 Uniformity of style in multiformity of matter, errors of, 243. 
 Unity, ascent to, 166. 
 Universities, their use, 107. 
 
 there should be lectures on inventions in, 108. 
 there should be lectures on previous knowledge in, 
 
 108. 
 are too much dedicated to professions, 109. 
 want of intercourse between, 115. 
 Uses of poetry to revive the mind, 142. 
 
 of pure mathematics as to curing mental defects, 172. 
 Use of reason in divinity, 362. 
 
 and abuse of elenches, 224. 
 Vacations, art of employing, 22. 
 Vacuum between countenance and words, 307. 
 Value of things, estimate of, 343. 
 
 Vanity of attempting by nature to attain the mysteries of God, 
 10, 11. 
 in learning, 38. 
 of things, doctrine of, 161. 
 of sounds, 192. 
 of voices, 192. 
 of worldly pursuits, 350. 
 Variety and progress, natural, 272. 
 Vice punished in itself, 350. 
 
 avowed and concealed, relative sense of, 65. 
 Virgil, his censures of learning, 23. 
 Virtue, 277. 
 
 relates to society, 277. 
 
 description without love of, is as a shadow, 283. 
 more potent in clearing doubts than attaining ends, 875. 
 and vice consist in habit, 296. 
 different sorts of, seldom united, 305. 
 aspirers to elegance of manners, seldom aim at, 308. 
 commendation of, 336. 
 rewarded in itself, 350. 
 Virtuous poverty, 26. 
 
 ends of life, importance of, 300. 
 
 D D 
 
402 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Virtuous dispositions, power of to produce good action, 302. 
 
 Vulgar errors, calendar of, 178. 
 
 Ways, shortest the foulest, 350. 
 
 Wealth, when to be sough , 345. 
 
 Will, knowledge of, 260. i 
 
 Wisdom in Mosaic law, 65. 
 
 justified of her children, 103. 
 
 of Solomon, preferred to all his possessions, 67 . 
 
 of business, no books relative to, 310. 
 
 of counsel, 311. 
 
 rules fortune, 321. 
 
 errs in supposing wisdom in others, 329. 
 
 of a law-maker, in what it consists, 356. ■ 
 Wise interrogation, half knowledge, 220. 
 Words, defects of, 229, 
 
 how to be relied upon, 328. 
 instantaneous value of, 328, 
 sudden, more sincere than deliberate, 325. 
 Writing, all subjects proper for, 333. 
 Xenophon, learned warrior, 16. 
 
 his retreat with the ten thousand, 92. 
 
 thomas white, printer, 
 
 Johnson's court. 
 
 mdcccxxv. 
 
 

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