E 467 .1 .f138 H9 Copy 1 ADDRESS W Maj. Gen. A. A. Humphreys ¥ft^ Mii'^ OF THE LATE ^ ^ \) J • United States Army, MADE AT The Meade Memorial Meeting OF ¥l)e Citi^ei^^ of ?liilkdelpl:(ik, jSfoveii\feei' 1§, 1§T3. WASHINGTON, D. C. GIBSON BROTHERS, PRINTERS. 1872. ADDRESS Maj. Gen. A. A. Humphreys ON or THE LATE jp. |r«. |f ^iic |ordott padc, United States Army, MADE AT The Meade Memorial Meeting Ylie Citi^^eiv^ of 'Pl|ilaeleLpliik, Xoven-\bef 18, 1§72. WASHINGTON, D. C. GIBSON BROTHERS, PRINTERS. 1872. t-^'con \ /■ V ADDRESS. Felhnii-Citlzens of Philadelphia : As the friend and associate of the soldier whose loss the army and the nation deplore, I have been asked to address you concerning his military services. It is fitting that this duty should be devolved on me, for undoubtedly I was more intimatel}^ associated witli him during the time he commanded the Fifth Corps and the Army of the Potomac tlian any other ofhcer. Besides, I have known him ever sinc3 his entran33 into the service, then an intelligent, a polished, and witty young officer, on duty with the troops in Florida. My second recollection of him is as an engineer, engaged under Captain Talcott, of the Corps of Engineers, upon an elaborate survey and investigation at the mouths of tlie Mis- sissippi River, in which the facts elicited by some original ex- periments of his led me, many years after, to a series of inves- tigations which developed the law governing the formation of the bars and shoals at the moutli of that river, from which most important consequences have followed for the improve- ment of navigation and the increase of commerce. We next find Meade engaged in the survey of the northeast boundary line between the United States and Great Britain ; then, in river and harbor improvements ; and in the Mexican war we see him as an officer of Engineers on the staff of Gen- eral Taylor and of General Soott, distinguished for skill and intrepidity; subsequently he was occupied with light-house construction, and during the four years preceding the civil war liad charge of the geodetic survey of the great lakes, in his conduct of which he added largely to liis scientific and en- gineering reputation. T have referred to these varied occupations because they gave the training which fitted him for the great part he was soon to fill. In tliem he learned to plan carefully in advance, and to execute promptly and thoroughly; here he acquired the habit of (piick and accurate observation, and l)ecaine fer- tile in expedients to meet unlooked-for exigencies. Early in the civil war we find him a Brigadier-General of Volunteers, commanding a brigade in the Pennsylvania Re- serve Corps, M'hich constituted a division in the Army of the Potomac, and taking an active part in the battles of Gaines' Mill and Glenchile, in the last days of June, 18f)2, being se- verely wounded in the latter. Returning to the field as soon as the condition of his wound would permit, he was assigned to the command of a division, and distinguished himself in the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, being placed in command of Hooker's Corps when that officer was wounded and taken from the field. For these services he was promoted to the rank of Major-General of Yolunteers in November of 18G2. As a Division Comnuinder he was impetuous in attack ; and at Fredericksburi!; broke throu2:h the ri«'ht of Lee's line, and penetrated far to its rear, but was overborne by numl)ers, and forced back with heavy loss. Quickly following this con- spicuous service, he was, in the latter part of December, 1862, promoted to the command of the Fifth Army Corps, and at Chancellorville his sagacious advice and soldierly bearing made so profound an impression upon the commander of the Army of the Potomac, that, in asking some two months later to be relieved from its charge, he designated General ]\[eade as his successor. On tlie morning of tlie 28th of June, 180;>, when in the vicinity of Frederick, J\[d., with the Fifth Corps, General Meade was placed by the President in command of the Army of the Potomac, which at that time was not far from Fre Army of tlie Potomac. On the night of the 29tli June, Lee learned that the Army of the Potomac had crossed the Potomac, and had advanced as far as Frederick ; he also learned that its connnand had changed hands. His order for movement on Harrisburo; was at once changed, and Longstreet, Hill, and Ewell were ordered to concentrate at Gettysburg, a small town 25 miles from Cluunbersburg, and some 10 miles east of the Blue Ridge, from which roads radiated in all directions. Meade states that he passed the 28th June in ascertaining the strength and position of the different Corps of the army, and in bringing up the cavalry from the rear. He also care- fully inquired into the strength and position of the enemy, so far as known. He further states that his predecessor left camp in a few hours after lie was relieved, and tliat lie did not receive. from liiin any intimation of a plan of operations, or imy views upon the situation ; that he was not aware that General Hooker had anj, but was waiting further exigencies of the occasion to govern him, just as he (Meade) did subse- (piently. On the morning of the 29tli Meade put his army in motion for Harrisburg, expecting to compel the enemy to turn and mset him in battle. We have seen that Lee, on the eve- ning of that day, prepared to do so. On the evening of the 30tli the several Corps of the Army of the Potomac were on the roads leading to Gettysburg, from the east round to the south, and at distances from the town varying from ten to fifteen miles, excepting the Sixth Corps, which was more than thirty miles off. Buford, with his divis- ion of cavalry, was in Gettysburg. On that same night Meade learned from Buford that the heads of Lee's columns were moving on the roads leadirig to Gettysburg, and were proliably nearer than his to Gettysburg. Being entirely ignorant of the character of the ground about Gettysburg, he at once prepared a precautionary order of instructions to the Corps Commanders, not to be executed unless specially ordered at a subsequent time in a certain con- tingency, explaining the routes which the several Corps should follow to concentrate in a good position on Pipe Clay Creek, some three miles in rear of his headquarters at Taneytown. (Taneytowu, it may be remai'ked, is about 18 miles south of Gettysburg.) These instructions stated, " developments may cause the Commanding General to assume the offensive from his present positions." Not many hours after the issuing of these instruc- tions, new' developments did cause him to change his plans, but these instructions evince that foresight which proves his capacity to command an army. In similar circumstances, the agreement between Wellington and Bliicher to concentrate their two armies — nearly double the numbers of Napoleon — far to the rear in the vicinity of Waterloo, has been esteemed 8 it [)i-ui)f of their great abilit3\ On the evening of the 30th, Reynolds, with the First and Eleventh Corps, was ordered to move on the morning of the 1st of July from Emmettsl)urg to Gettysburg, and to report whether that site afforded a good field of battle. The Third Corps was to be in Emraettsburg on tlie morning of the 1st, and in fact reached there before all the Eleventh Corps had left it. About noon of the 80th, I was requested by General Meade to examine tlie ground in the vicinity of Emmettsburg upon the arrival tliere of the Third Corps, the second division of which I commanded, and ascertain whether it afforded a good position for Ijattle. The importance of the general position of Emmettsburg is derived from the fact that a piked road leads to it through the mountains from the Chambersburg valley, (along Mhicli part of Lee's force might move,) and that good branch roads lead to it along the foot of the mountains from the Cashtown pass. I have mentioned these two facts concerning Heynolds and my- self to show that Meade was active in learning; all that could l)e ascertained of the several positions where he nn'ght fight to advantage, as well as in moving towards Lee, and bringing the different parts of the Army of the Potomac within sup- porting distance of each other. That army consisted of about 70,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 300 guns. The Army of Northern Virginia consisted of about 85,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry, and a due proportion of artillery. We all know how, on the morning of the 1st of July, Rey- nolds encountered Hill two or three miles west of Gettysburg, and was killed early in the day ; how Ewell arrived on the ground soon after ; and how tlie First and Eleventh Corps were forced l)ack to the position on which the fighting of the 2d and 3d of July took jdace. AVe know, too, that as soon as Meade learned what had occurred, the Third, Twclftli and other Corps were hurried u]) to the scene. Hancock, who was with Meade at Taneytown at the time, was dispatclied to take command of the advance, and lie reported at al)out half- past five tliat the position was sufficiently good, when Meade 9 set the remainder of the army in motion for tlie Held, and arrived upon the ground at midnight. All the army was con- C3ntrated there by one o'clock next day. One of Meade's first directions to his Chief-of-Staff, Butter- field, upon reaching there, was to learn everything about the roads leading to and from Gettysburg, so as to be prepared for any event that might occur — a very proper direction to give. All the Army of Northern Virginia was concentrated at Gettysburg during the night, except Pickett's division of Longstreet's Cor])S, which did not arrive until the morning of the 3d. Lee explains at some length why he attacked next day. Clearly, his true policy was to abstain from attack ; to move in concentrated formation as rapidly as practicable toward the objective of his campaign; to trench every position he occu- pied. The country, every step of the way to Philadelphia, is full of strong positions. Tlie exigencies of the case would have forced the Army of the Potomac to attack him. With nearly equal numbers, with rifled arms, and the trenches that may be thrown up in half-an-hour, or even less, the chances are all against the attacking force. But here, at Gettysburg, we had no trenches, except for a short distance on the right, on Gulp's hill and vicinity. In reality, the governing cause of Lee's attack was the success of the Army of Northern Vir- ginia at Chancellorville. The disposition Meade made of his troops was the best the ground and circumstances permitted. The features of the l)attle-field are so well known that I shall not stop to desci'ibe them. You all know how the battle on the second day went on, and that the hardest fighting of the three days of battle took place on it. Lee attacked our left with Longstreet's Corps and part of Hill's, under the cover of woods, which concealed their approach, and a long-continued, desperate struggle en- sued, lasting from half-past four until seven o'clock, in which we lost the advanced part of the ground we liad taken up ; but the main position remained intact. 10 Oil the third day Lee resumed the attack with Pickett's di- vision of Longstreet's Corps (which luid arrived tliat morning) and Heth's division of Hill's Corps, supported hy two divis- ions wliich did not largely p:irt:('i[):ite in the struggle. The advance of the leading divisions was made over clear, (tpen ground, and was preceded Ijy a heavy tire from 115 guns. The gallant manner in which tliis adv:iiu'3 was made, under the powerful lire of our artillery and infantry, extorted tlie admiration of those against whom it was directed. But through the excellent dispositions of Meade, ahly seconded hy his com- manders, and the skill and courage of our officers and men, all the attacking force that reached our lines l)ecame our prisoners, as well as a considerable portion of tlie supports ing divisions, and tlie tliird day terminated in a victory for us, and the demolition of all the Confederate plans. Tmmediately upon the repulse, Meade ordered an advance from the left, which went forward, liut the day was too far spent for any important result to be gained. Longstreet and Hill ardently wished for a return attack upon their lines. Lee's losses were 18,003 killel and wounded and 13,000 missing, a large part of the latter l)3iiig our prisoners, making a total loss of 31,000. Our losses were 10,500 killed and wounded and 0,000 missing, chiefl}" prisoners captured tlie tirst day, making a total loss of not less than 23,000. The Army of Northern A'^irginia never recovered from tin's blow, but its morale remained good. Sixty tliousand strong, it began to retreat in good order on the night of the J-th. Our experience has shown that one army can draw otf tVoiii another in the night without its l>:'ing discovered. Learning on the morning of the 5th that it had withdrawn, Meade sent tlie Sixth Corps and the c.ivali-y to follow it to the inomitain passes, through which Sedgwick found it would not be ])racti- cable to ])iirsue with any chance of success, owini»; to the fa- cility with which they could be defended with a small force. l\[eade, therefore, moved in ])iirsuit by the Boonsborough pass, the lirst practicable route through the mountains south of 11 those taken hy Lee, and on the 12th of July came up with him near WiUiamsport, on the Potomac Kiver. Here Lee oc- cupied a strong position, liis right resting on the river at Falling Waters, and his left resting on it at WiUiamsport, thus enclosing his crossing-places. This position, naturally strong, was well entrenched, with artillery j udiciously posted. Careful reconnoissancGS failed to ascsrtain a suitable point of attack ; hut notwithstanding, Meade ordered a reconnoissance in force, supported b}^ the whole army, at daylight on the mornino- of the Ittth. On the night of the 13th, Lee recrossed the Po- tomac. There was a great deal of clamor because Meade had not pressed Lee more vigorously in pursuit, and had not captui'ed his army at WiUiamsport. Let us see what means Meade had to accomplish all this. The return of the Army of the Potomac on the 5th July showed present for duty, 5-1,000 in- fantry and artillery, and 7,000 cavalry — in all, 61,000 men — just about the same force that Lee had ; and Lee's army was not demoralized, nor was it more fatigued or suffering than the Army of the Potomac ; the only material reinforcement Meade received before coming up with Lee at WiUiamsport was a division of 0,000 men under French. Had he assaulted he would have been repulsed with heavy loss, and without inflicting any matei'ial injury on the enemy. Let me (compare a little the battle of Getty si )urg and the movements immediately following it with a certain great bat- tle in Europe, to which, in some respects, it bears a resem- blance. This comparison will, I think, aflford means of appre- ciating properly the real merits of Meade and his army bet- ter than anj'thing else I can say. I refer to the battle of Waterloo ; a splendidly -fought Itattle on both sides. Extend- ing over a line only two or three miles long, it was all witliin view from many points; the greater part of the lighting was comprised within the limited space of six or seven hundred yards square, and in that space at the close of the battle lay manv thousands killed and wounded. 12 Wellington had posted liis army in a good position on the crest of a long slope of open ground. He had there 50,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry, and H,000 artillery, (156 guns;) in all, r.8,00(> men. Napoleon had drawn n\) his force ready for an attack on an opposite crest about a mile distant, the ravine between being equally distant from the two. His force consisted of 50,000 infantry, 16,000 cavalry, and 7,000 artillerj' (246 guns ;) in all, 7;^,000 men. But of this force, he was obliged to keep over 12,000 men posted on his extreme right, to meet the expected advance (A' the Prussian army, wliich b?g.in to come U[> from tlie direction of Wavre soon after 12 o'clock. At Wavre, about ten or twelve miles to the French riglit, Grouchy, witli some 32,000 men and 100 guns, was attacking one of the four Prussian corps left there to detain him. The remainder of the Prussian army under Bliicher, 52,000 strong, with 100 guns, was hastening as fast as the soft roads would permit, from an early hour in tlie morning, toward the Frencli riglit, to carry out the plan agreed upon with Wellington. Na- poleon, too, looked for Grouchy to arrive from the same di- rection. You will perceive that Napoleon was dealing with nearly double his own force. Napoleon's attacks on Wellington, li\-e in munl)er, began at half-past eleven o'clock, and continued at intervals until half- past seven in the evening. At half-past four the Prussians were up in fore?, and attacked the French right heavily and continuously, with increasing force, until the close of the battle. The last attack of Napoleon was made with great impetu- osity upon the whole of Wellington's line, the two forces being not more than sixty yards apart. Failing of success, the French rapidly withdrew, and Wellington says, seeing that thev withdrew in some confusion, lie advanced his whole line, but tlK'V moved no further than the positions that had been occupied by the French army, and from whieh its attacks had been made. There they halted for the night. The Fi-ench riii'ht also drew off, followed in ])ursuit by the Pi-ussians, who continued to press the French army all night. 13 In this battle, the losses were, in Wellington's anny, 10,000 killed and wonnded ; in Bliicher's, 6,000 killed and wounded : the French losses have been stated at 18,500 killed and wonn- ded, and 7,000 jjrisoners. The French wounded, and a large portion of their artillery, the horses being killed, were left upon the field. The Prus- sians captured an immense booty — the trains, camp equipage, and nearly all the remaining artillery which was abandoned on the route. Recollect that this battle was fought, and all the operations l)rec3ding and following it were conducted, in a perfectly open, gently undulating country ; that tlie French were obliged to recross tlie i-iver 8aml)re on their frontier, some twenty-live miles from Waterloo, yet the prisoners captured l>y the Prus- sians in this pursuit amounted to only 6,000 ; the whole num- ber of French prisoners taken being stated at 7,000. Further, Grouchy did not hear of the battle until the next day, when Blucher and Wellington were between him and the river Sambre, the French frontier, yet he retreated into France without any loss. I tliink this, taken with what has been previously said, is sufficient to dispose of tlie question why Meade did not <'ap- ture Lee's army. After a careful examination of tlie subject, so far as I am capable of forming an opinion, I am led to the conclusion that Meade, at Gettysburg, liad a more difficult task tluin Welling- ton at Waterloo, and performed it equally well, although he liad no Blucher to turn the scale in his favor. A word or two more. Wellington, for his services in Por- tugal and Spain, had been raised through every grade of tlie British peerage to its highest rank, and Parliament had voted him large sums of money to enable him to live in a manner t'orrespondi ng to his position. For Waterloo, there was no additional rank in the peerage to give him, but Parliament voted him £200,000, about a million of dollars. The whole sum thus bestowed amouted to nearly four millions of dollars. 14 What remaining lionors or marks of esteem there were left in the hands of the sovereig-ns of Europe to (h'stril)nte, lie was decorated with. Meade, who was a Major in the Corps of Engineers, was promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General in tlie Regnlai- Arniy, and was gratified at this mark of approval. lie had to hear many unjust criticisms on his conduct of the hattle, and condemnation for not ca))turing the whole of Lee's army. But time etiaci's all such attempted hiemishes as these, and I helieve Meade always felt satisfied that history would do him justice. After crossing the Potonxac, Lee was disposed to rennnn near Winchester, among the fertile products of the valley of Virginia; but a well-directed thrust hy Meade, through Ma- nassas Gap, sent Lee rapidly out of the Valle}' and across the Ilap[)ahannock. On this river tin Army of the Potomac was ordered from Washington to rest, and several detachments were nuide from it to the city of New York, to North Carolimi, and elsewhere. In September, Meade having ascertained that Longstreet's Corps had been sent to Bragg, on the Tennessee River, (ex- c.'pting Pickett's division, which was recruiting south of the -Tames,) moved forward, and Lee fell back behind the Rapi- dan — a more defensible river than the upper Rappahannock. At this time the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were detached from the Army of the Potomac and sent to Chattanooga, and the two opposing armies on the Rapidan were reduced to about equal nundjers. Early in October, Meade was contemplating a movement upon Lee by our right flank, and on the morning of the 9th rode to Cedar Mountain to have a better look at the country in tlie direction of a certain mountain pass, when he discov- ered that Lee was making some movement on our right ; and at the same moment intelligence from the pickets and signal- stations began to jxiui- in, but the nature of the movement could not be ascertained with certaintv until Lee had concen- 15 trated his wliole army in the rear and ri^dit of Meade, threat- ening to intercept and l)reak np his lines of coinnmnication. The Army of the Potomac was at once set in motion, and directed toward Warrenton, witli tlic intention of attacking Lee while in the act of crossing the Rappahannock, with every cliance of a snccessful issue. But when the movement was half througli one of Meade's commanders brou'dit him wron^ mtormation of the movements, position, and apparent ol)ject of Lee; while from another commander, who should have furnished the most important information of all, he received none whatever. In this manner he was misled, a part of his army was placed in a critical condition, and the opportunity ot attacking Lee was lost. There followed a series of manoeu- vres by the two armies, during which the brilliant combats of Bristoe Station and Rappahannock Bridge took place, the movement ending in Lee's recrossing the Rapidan. After the war, Lee acknowledged to Meade that his scheme had been frustrated in this operation ; that he had been completelv outmanoeuvred. Among the criticisms made on these operations, it was said : Lee uncovered Richmond by his movement — why did not Meade move on that, and swap queens ? Tlie answer to it was very ol)vious. The two queens were not of equal value. Richmond was a small town, and any other much smaller town would have furnished equally well all the conveniences required for the personnel of the Confederate government. There were no Southern towns of any consequence within seve- ral hundred miles of it. Washington was four times larger than Richmond, was the capital of the country, and had collected in it all our national archives. Near to it was the rich and l)opulous city of Baltimore, and not far off the still richer and more populous city of Philadelphia. The task of the Army of the Potomac was to cover all these cities, and carry on oftensive operations against the Army of Northern Virginia in a country intersecited with wide, deep, rapid rivers, and covered in great part with dense forests and 16 thieket^i. To do all this required u large numerical superiority on the part of the Army of tlie Potomac. But it did not pos- sess any material superiority of numbers during the time Meade conimanded it until tlie spring of 1864. Having ascertained that Evvell's half of Lee's f(.»i'ct3 was so posted that it could be surprised by a well-directed rapid move- ment across the Rapidaii by tlic Army of the Potomac, Meade in tlie latter part of Noveml)er secretly crossed the Rapidan close to Lee's right, and advanced with the Second Corps, only 8,000 strong, to tlie point of concentration close up on Ewell, at the hour named, 12 o'clock of the second day, and engaged the enemy. Tlie left wing reached its designated position in time, but the right wing, consisting of about half the arm}*, which should have united with the Second Corps at twelve o'clock, biMiame entangled in the Wilderness forest, and did not move more than three miles from the river, nor reach the point of concentration until tlio next morning. The opportu- nity for surprise was lost, and Lee had time to concentrate his army and take u]> a strong position on Mine Run, and en- trench it by the time Meade reached there. The only points of attack offering any chance of success were on Lee's right and left flank ; he occupied the inner and much shorter line of an arc, we the outer and longer line. Dispositions were made to attack iVom our right and left, the interval of four or rive miles between the two nearly equal parts of the army being thinly held with one or two divisions of infantry and ar- tillery; the most vicious disposition for battle possible, but the only one left Meade. Just as the artillery Are Avas about to cease, and the infantry on the right were about to run for- ward to the assault, an aide from the commander on the left dashed up and informed General Meade it was impossible to attack them. To liave attacked under such a condition would have resulted in disaster, for Lee, having nothing to contenubject. Before the season for active operations returned. Gen- eral Grant had been appointed Lieutenant-General, and placed in command of all the armies. He concluded to make his headquarters with tlie Army of the Potomac, Burnside's Corps, and the Army of tlie James During the winter and spring, the Army of the Potomac had been reinforced, and when the campaign opened consisted of 76,000 infantry, in three corps, commanded by Sedgwick, Hancock, and Warren, and aliout 12,000 cavalry, commanded by Sheridan, with a large artillery force, having its own guard, which, when the artillery was reduced, (about the middle of May,) was joined to one of the infantry corps. Purnside had 18 some 15,000 or 20,000 men, which united with the Army of' the Potomac early on the morning of the 6th of May, tlie sec- ond day of the battle of the Wilderness. Lee's force consisted of three corps, each about 20,000 strong, commanded by Ewell, Hill, and Longstreet, wlio ar- rived the 3d of May, and 8,000 or 10,000 cavalry, commanded by Steuart, with a due proportion of artillery. The artillery of both armies was more than could be used in that country, and wnth us was cumbersome, and tlierefore re- duced when we were near Fredericksburg. The object of the campaign was to fight Lee's army and break it to pieces. Failing in that, upon our forcing it back upon Richmond, we were to destroy all lines of supply to that city upon tlie iu)rth 1)ank of the James River ; then cross over, and, encircling the town, desti-ov all lines of supply on the south side. Tlie (piestion tirst settled was, shall the movement be l)y the right flank, passing through Madison Court-IIouse and crossing the Rapidan at or above Lee's left flaid^. This was decided against, as beyond tlie Rapidan (as far as. could be learned) the roads did not admit (»f the ready move- ment <»f the dillerent corps for concentration, and if by Lee's movements he should avoid heavy lighting, he could, while maintaining his communication with his supplies at Richmond, liarass the new lines of communication and supply that must be opened for the Arni}^ of the Potomac toward the Potomac. River and Chesapeake Bay, as we advanced. The importance of this objection was shown by the necessity of sending so many thousands wounded from the Army of the Potomac by Fredericksburg, in two or three days after we began to move. The objection to moving by the left flank was that it took us through the tangled mass of woods called the Wilderness, where Lee, by prompt movement, could force us to stop and flght him, and where from the denseness of the woods and un- dergrowth, the troops acting on the defensive were unseen, while those moving to the attack could be plainly perceived. 19 It served aliiio.st us efiectiuilly as an iiitreiic-liineut tor the ariii}' acting on the defensive. The advantage of moving by the left flank consisted in keep- ing close to the Potomac River, and all lines of communica- tion and supply we should want to open from time to time, and whicli our army would eftectually cover. Accordingly it was decided to inove b}' the left. The project was to get through the Wilderness quickly, and endeavor to cut Lee's line of communication, (the Central Railroad,) somewhere between Louisa Court-House and Gor- donsville, and attack him in the comparatively open country. The moment our movement was perceived, Lee concen- trated. Ewell l)eing nearest to us, was thrust along the pike against us. Hill along the Orange C^ourt-IIouse plank-road ; Longstreet was to come up on our left flank. By simply thrusting himself against us, we were obliged to stop our movement to attack Lee ; we could not go on ; if we did, he would watch his opportunity and overwhelm some portion that was exposed. Meade knew that Lee's l)est course was to move against us and force us to attack liim in the Wilderness, as I have al- ready stated ; therefore, when, early in the morning of the sec- ond day of movement, advance parties of tlie enemy attacked our cavalry on the Orange Court-House plank-road and the advance guard thrown out on the pike, Meade apprehended that the flrst battle would be fought in the Wildei-ness. But there was no means of telling at first M'hether these small attacks were nmde simply by very advanced parties of the enemy, made for the purjiose of interrupting and delaying our marcli, or were made by the advance guards of Lee's main army. There was but one thing to do — to attack at once, clear them out of the way if we could, take prisoners, and find out wliei'e the main force of the Arni}^ was. Hancock, who moved promptly in the morning from Chancellorville on the route directed in the general order of the 3d May, was directed to halt at Todd's tavern until it could be ascertained 20 what the enemy's intentions were. They were soon disclosed. Ewell and Hill were close on ns, and were at once attacked by the Fifth Corps. Hancock was bronght back from the vicin- ity of Todd's tavern to the intersection of the Orange plank- road with the Brock road. Until he could get np, Getty's Division of the Sixth Corps was sent to that intersection, and Avas at once engaged with Ewell. The Sixth C^)i'ps Avas ])Osted on our right. Thus commeiu'cd that extraordinary sei-ies of battles of two months' duration, at the termination of which the Army of the Potomac had lost more than (>0,000 men in killed and wounded. The position of General Meade all this time was a delicate one, o\vi)ig to the near presence of an otKccr of superior rank and connnand. He acquitted himself in it in such a manner as to command the respect and esteem of General Grant, be- tween whom and himself there Avas, I believe, complete ac- cord. For his eminent services in the campaign Meade Avas made a Major-General in the Regular Army. The close of June saw the commencement of Avhat is teruu^d the siege of Richmond and Petersburg, Avhich lasted until the 1st of April, 180.5. During this long period, many opera- tions, battles, and cond>ats took place, Avith varying success. Throughout them all, the nuu-ke