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INTRODUCTION 
 
 STUDY OF HISTORY 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2011 with funding from 
 The Library of Congress 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/introductiontostOOIang 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 TO THE 
 
 STUDY OF HISTORY 
 
 CH.^V. LANGLOIS 6? CH. SEIGNOBOS 
 
 OF THE SORBONNE 
 
 Translated by G. G. BERRY 
 With a Preface by F. YORK POWELL 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY 
 

 Xo iwpi&ce lost copy 
 
 PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN 
 
r 
 
 X 
 
 TO THE READER 
 
 It is a pleasure to recommend this useful and well- 
 written little book to English readers. It will both 
 interest and help. There are, for instance, a few 
 pages devoted to the question of evidence that will 
 be an aid to every one desirous of getting at the 
 truth respecting any series of facts, as well as to the 
 student of history. No one can read it without find- 
 ing out that to the historian history is not merely a 
 pretty but rather difficult branch of literature, and 
 that a history book is not necessarily good if it 
 appears to the literary critic ' readable and interest- 
 ing,' nor bad because it seems to him ' hard or heavy 
 reading.' The literary critic, in fact, is beginning to 
 find out that he reads a history as he might read a 
 treatise on mathematics or linguistics, at his peril, 
 and that he is no judge of its value or lack of value. 
 Only the expert can judge that. It will probably 
 surprise some people to find that in the opinion of 
 our authors (who agree with Mr. Morse Stephens 
 and with the majority of scholars here) the formation 
 and expression of ethical judgments, the approval 
 or condemnation of Caius Julius Caesar, or of Caesar 
 Borgia, is not a thing within the historian's province. 
 His business is to find out what can be known about 
 the characters and situations with which he is en- 
 
To the Reader 
 
 gaged, to put what he can ascertain before his readers 
 in a clear form, and lastly to consider and attempt to 
 ascertain what scientific use can be made of these 
 facts he has ascertained. Ethic on its didactic side 
 is outside his business altogether. In fact MM. 
 Langlois and Seignobos write for those " who propose 
 to deal with documents [especially written docu- 
 ments] with a view to preparing or accomplishing 
 historic work in a scientific way." They have the 
 temerity to view history as a scientific pursuit, and 
 they are endeavouring to explain to the student who 
 intends to pursue this branch of anthropologic science 
 the best and safest methods of observation open to 
 him, hence they modestly term their little book " an 
 essay on the method of historic sciences." They are 
 bold enough to look forward to a day, as not far 
 distant, when a sensible or honest man will no more 
 dare to write history unscientifically than he would 
 to-day be willing to waste his time and that of 
 others on observing the heavens unscientifically, 
 and registering as trustworthy his unchecked and 
 untimed observations. 
 
 Whether we like it or not, history has got to be 
 scientifically studied, and it is not a question of style 
 but of accuracy, of fulness of observation, and cor- 
 rectness of reasoning, that is before the student. 
 Huxley and Darwin and Clifford have shown that 
 a book may be good science and yet good reading. 
 Truth has not always been found repulsive although 
 she was not bedizened with rhetorical adornments; 
 indeed, the very pursuit of her has long been recog- 
 nised as arduous but extremely fascinating. Toute 
 
 vi 
 
To the Reader 
 
 trouvaille, as our authors aptly remark, procure une 
 jouissance. 
 
 It will be a positive gain to have the road cleared of 
 a mass of rubbish, that has hindered the advance of 
 knowledge. History must be worked at in a scientific 
 spirit, as biology or chemistry is worked at. As M. 
 Seignobos says, " On ne s'arrete plus guere aujourd'hui 
 a discuter, sous sa forme theologique la th^orie de la 
 Providence dans l'Histoire. Mais la tendence a expli- 
 quer les faits historiques par les causes transcendantes 
 persiste dans des theories plus modernes ou la meta- 
 physique se deguise sous des formes scientifiques." 
 We should certainly get rid in time of those curious 
 Hegelianisms " under which in lay disguise lurks the 
 old theologic theory of final causes " ; or the pseudo- 
 patriotic supposition of the " historic mission (Beruf) 
 attributed to certain people or persons." The study 
 of historic facts does not even make for the popular 
 newspaper theory of the continuous and necessary 
 progress of humanity, it shows only "partial and 
 intermittent advances, and gives us no reason to 
 attribute them to a permanent cause inherent in 
 collective humanity rather than to a series of local 
 accidents." But the historian's path is still like that 
 of Bunyan's hero, bordered by pitfalls and haunted 
 by hobgoblins, though certain of his giant adversaries 
 are crippled and one or two slain. He has also his 
 own faults to master, or at least to check, as MM. 
 Langlois and Seignobos not infrequently hint, e.g. 
 " Nearly all beginners have a .vexatious tendency to 
 go off into superfluous digressions, heaping up re- 
 flexion and information that have no bearing on the 
 
 vii 
 
To the Reader 
 
 main subject. They will recognise, if they think over 
 it, that the causes of this leaning are bad taste, a kind 
 of naive vanity, sometimes a disordered mind." Again : 
 " The faults of historic works intended for the general 
 public . . . are the results of the insufficient prepara- 
 tion of the bad literary training of the popularisers." 
 What an admirable criticism there is too of that 
 peculiarly German shortcoming (one not, however, 
 unknown elsewhere), which results in men "whose 
 learning is ample, whose monographs destined for 
 scholars are highly praiseworthy, showing themselves 
 capable, when they write for the public, of sinning 
 heavily against scientific methods," so that, in their 
 determination to stir their public, " they who are so 
 scrupulous and particular when it is a question of 
 dealing with minutiae, abandon themselves like the 
 mass of mankind to their natural inclinations when 
 they come to set forth general questions. They take 
 sides, they blame, they praise, they colour, they em- 
 bellish, they allow themselves to take account of 
 personal, patriotic, ethical, or metaphysical considera- 
 tions. Above all, they apply themselves with what 
 talent has fallen to their lot to the task of creating 
 a work of art, and, so applying themselves, those of 
 them who lack talent become ridiculous, and the 
 talent of those who possess it is spoilt by their 
 anxiety for effect." 
 
 On the other hand, while the student is rejoicing 
 at the smart raps bestowed upon the Teutonic offender, 
 he is warned against the error of thinking that " pro- 
 vided he can make himself understood, the historian 
 has the right to use a faulty, low, careless, or clogged 
 
 viii 
 
To the Reader 
 
 style. . . . Seeing the extreme complexity of the 
 phenomena he must endeavour to describe, he has 
 not the privilege of writing badly. But he ought 
 always to write well, and not to bedizen his prose 
 with extra finery once a week." 
 
 Of course much that is said in this book has been 
 said before, but I do not know any book wherein the 
 student of history will find such an organised collec- 
 tion of practical and helpful instructions. There are 
 several points on which one is unable to find one- 
 self in agreement with MM. Langlois and Seignobos, 
 but these occur mainly where they are dealing with 
 theory ; as far as practical work goes, one finds one- 
 self in almost perfect concurrence with them. That 
 they know little of the way in which history is taught 
 and studied in England or Canada or the United 
 States is not at all an hindrance to the use of their 
 book. The student may enjoy the pleasure of making 
 his own examples out of English books to the rules 
 they lay down. He may compare their cautions against 
 false reasoning and instances of fallacy with those set 
 forth in that excellent and concise essay of Bentham's, 
 which is apparently unknown to them. He will 
 not fail to see that we in England have much to 
 learn in this subject of history from the French. 
 The French archives are not so fine as ours, but 
 they take care to preserve their local and pro- 
 vincial documents, as well as their national ,and 
 central records ; they give their archivists a regular 
 training, they calendar and make accessible all 
 that time and fate have spared of pre-revolutionary 
 documents. We have not got farther than the pro- 
 
 ix 
 
To the Reader 
 
 vision of a fine central Record Office furnished with 
 very inadequate means for calendaring the masses of 
 documents already stored and monthly accumulating 
 there, though we have lately set up at Oxford, Cam- 
 bridge, and London the regular courses of palaeo- 
 graphy, diplomatic, and bibliography, that constitute 
 the preliminary training of the archivist or historical 
 researcher. We want more: we must have county 
 archives, kept by trained archivists. We must have 
 more trained archivists at the disposal of the Deputy 
 Keeper of the Rolls, we must have such means as 
 the Biblioteque de I'Jficole des Chartes for full reports 
 of special and minute investigations and discoveries, 
 for hand-lists and the like, before we can be con- 
 sidered as doing as much for history as the heavily 
 taxed French nation does cheerfully, and with a sound 
 confidence that the money it spends wisely in science 
 is in the truest sense money saved. 
 
 For those interested in the teaching of history, 
 this book is one of the most suggestive helps that 
 has yet appeared; With a blackboard, a text (such 
 as are now cheap), or a text-book (such as Stubbs 
 or Prothero or Gardiner), an atlas, and access to a 
 decent public library and an average local museum, 
 the teacher who has mastered its intent should never 
 be at a loss for an interesting catechetical lecture 
 or exposition to a class, whether of adults or of 
 younger folk. 
 
 Not the least practical part of the work of MM. 
 Langlois and Seignobos has been the consideration 
 they have given to such every-day issues as the 
 teacher is constantly called upon to face. History 
 
To the Reader 
 
 cannot safely be neglected in schools, though it is by 
 no means necessary that the Universities should turn 
 out large bodies of trained historians. It is possible 
 indeed that the serious study of history might gain 
 were there fewer external inducements at the Univer- 
 sities to lead to the popularity of the History Schools. 
 But in this very popularity there lies a great op- 
 portunity for concerted efforts, not only to better 
 the processes of study, but also to clear off the 
 vast arrears of classification and examination of the 
 erroneous historic material at our disposition in this 
 country. 
 
 The historian has been (as our authors hint) too 
 much the ally of the politician ; he has used his 
 knowledge as material for preaching democracy in 
 the United States, absolutism in Prussia, Orleanist 
 opposition in France, and so on (English readers will 
 easily recall examples from their own countrymen's 
 work) : in the century to come he will have to ally 
 himself with the students of physical science, with 
 whose methods his own have so much in common. 
 It is not patriotism, nor religion, nor art, but the 
 attainment of truth that is and must be the historian's 
 single aim. 
 
 But it is also to be borne in mind that history is 
 an excellent instrument of culture, for, as. our authors 
 point out, " the practice and method of historic in- 
 vestigation is a pursuit extremely healthful for the 
 mind, freeing it from the disease of ^credulity," and 
 fortifying it in other ways as a discipline, though 
 precisely how to best use history for this purpose is 
 still in some ways uncertain, and after all it is a 
 
 xi 
 
To the Reader 
 
 matter which concerns Psedagogic and Ethic more 
 than the student of history, though it is plain that 
 MM. Langlois and Seignobos have not neglected to 
 consider it. 
 
 One can hardly help thinking, too, that, in schools 
 and places where the young are trained, something 
 might be gained by treating such books as Plutarch's 
 Lives not as history (for which they were never in- 
 tended) but as text-books of ethic, as examples of 
 conduct, public or private. The historian very pro- 
 perly furnishes the ethical student with material, 
 though it is not right to reckon the ethical student's 
 judgment upon the historian's facts as history in any 
 sense. It is not an historian's question, for instance, 
 whether Napoleon was right or wrong in his conduct 
 at Jaffa, or Nelson in his behaviour at Naples ; that 
 is a matter for the student of ethic or the religious 
 dogmatist to decide : all that the historian has to do 
 is to get what conclusion he can out of the conflict of 
 evidence, and to decide whether Napoleon or Nelson 
 actually did that of which their enemies accused them, 
 or, if he cannot arrive at fact, to state probability, 
 and the reasons that incline him to lean to the 
 affirmative or negative. 
 
 As to the possibility of a " philosophy of history," 
 a real one, not the mockeries that have long been 
 discredited by scientific students, the reader will find 
 some pregnant remarks here in the epilogue and the 
 chapters that precede it. There is an absence of un- 
 reasonable optimism in our authors' views. "It is 
 probable that hereditary differences have contributed 
 to determine events ; so that in part historic evolution 
 
 xii 
 
To the Reader 
 
 is produced by physiological and anthropologic causes. 
 But history furnishes no trustworthy process by which 
 it may be possible to determine the action of those 
 hereditary differences between man and man," i.e. 
 she starts with races 'endowed' each with peculi- 
 arities that make them ' disposed to act ' somewhat 
 differently under similar pressure. " History is only 
 able to grasp the conditions of their existence." And 
 what M. Seignobos calls the final problem — Is evolu- 
 tion 'produced merely by changed conditions ? — must 
 according to him remain insoluble by the legitimate 
 processes of history. The student may accept or 
 reject this view as his notions of evidence prompt 
 him to do. M. Seignobos has at all events laid down 
 a basis for discussion in sufficiently clear terms. 
 
 As to the composition of the joint Work we are 
 told that M. Seignobos has been especially con- 
 cerned with the chapters that touch theory, and M. 
 Langlois with those that deal with practice. Both 
 authors have already proved their competence — M. 
 Seignobos' labours on Modern History have been 
 widely appreciated, while M. Langlois' "Hand-book 
 of Historic Bibliography " is already a standard text- 
 book, and bids fair to remain so. We are grateful to 
 both of them for the pains they have taken to be 
 clear and definite, and for their determination to 
 shirk none of the difficulties that have met them. 
 They have produced a hand-book that students will 
 use and value in proportion to their use of it, a book 
 that will save much muddle of thought and much 
 loss of time, a book written in the right spirit to 
 inspire its readers. We are not bound to agree with 
 
 xiii 
 
To the Reader 
 
 all M. Seignobos' dogmas, and can hardly accept, for 
 instance, M. Langlois' apology for the brutal methods 
 of controversy that are an evil legacy from the theo- 
 logian and the grammarian, and are apt to darken 
 truth and to cripple the powers of those who engage 
 in them. For though it is possible that the secondary 
 effect of these barbarous scuffles may sometimes have 
 been salutary in deterring impostors from 'taking 
 up ' history, I am not aware of any positive examples 
 to justify this opinion. There is this, however, to be 
 said, that fully conscious of their own fallibility, M. 
 Langlois and his excellent collaborator have supplied 
 in their canons of criticism and maxims the best 
 corrections of any mistakes into which they may 
 have fallen by the way. Is not the House of Fame, 
 as the poet tells us, a more wonderful and quaintly 
 wrought habitation than Domus Dedali itself ? And 
 may not honest historians be pardoned if they are 
 sometimes confused for a brief moment by the never- 
 ending noise and marvellous motion of that deceptive 
 mint and treasury, and fatigued by the continual 
 trial and examination of the material that issues 
 therefrom? The student will, at least, learn from 
 MM. Langlois and Seignobos to have no mercy on his 
 own shortcomings, to spare no pains, to grudge no 
 expenditure of time or energy in the investigation of 
 a carefully chosen and important historical problem, 
 to aim at doing the bit of work in hand so thoroughly 
 that it will not need to be done again. 
 
 It would be unjust to omit here to mention Dr. 
 Bernheim's "Exposition of Historic Method," or 
 Lekrbuch der historischen Methode, so justly praised 
 
 xiv 
 
To the Reader 
 
 and used by our authors, but I believe that as an 
 introduction to the subject, intended for the use of 
 English or North American students, this little volume 
 will be found the handier and more practical work. 
 Of its value to English workers I can speak from 
 experience, and I know many teachers to whom it 
 will be welcome in its present form. 
 
 It would have been easy to * adapt ' this book by 
 altering its examples, by modifying its excellent plan, 
 by cutting here and carving there to the supposed 
 convenience of an imaginary public, but the better 
 part has been chosen of giving English readers this 
 manual precisely as it appeared in French. And 
 surely one would rather read what M. Langlois, an 
 experienced teacher and a tried scholar, thought on a 
 moot point, than be presented with the views of some 
 English ' adaptor ' who had read his book, as to what 
 he would have said had he been an Englishman 
 lecturing to English students. That the present 
 translator has taken much pains to faithfully report 
 his authors, I know (though I have not compared 
 English and French throughout every page), so that 
 I can commend his honest work to the reader as I 
 have already commended the excellent matter that 
 he has been concerned in preparing for a wider public 
 than the French original could command. 
 
 F. YORK POWELL. 
 Oriel College, Oxford, July 1898. 
 
 xv 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 To the Reader v 
 
 AUTHORS 1 PREFACE 
 
 What this work is not meant to be — Works on the Philosophy 
 
 of History ....-.;.... I 
 
 What it is meant to be 2 
 
 Existing works on Historical Methods — JDroysen, Freeman, 
 
 Daunou, &c. . -. . , . . . . . 3 
 
 Reasons why the study of method is useful .... 7 
 Bernheim's Lehrbuch-^-ln what way it leaves room for another 
 
 book 10 
 
 Need of warning to students • . .11 
 
 The general public . . . . .. . . - . .13 
 
 Distribution of the work between the two authors . . .13 
 
 BOOK I 
 
 PRELIMINARY STUDIES 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE SEARCH FOR DOCUMENTS 
 
 Documents : their nature, use, necessity 17 
 
 Utility of Heuristic, or the art of discovering documents . 18 
 The difficulties of Heuristic — Ancient times— H. H. Bancroft 
 
 — State of things at the Renaissance 19 
 
 xvii b 
 
Contents 
 
 PAOE 
 
 Growth of libraries — Collectors — Effects of revolutionary 
 confiscation in promoting the concentration and the 
 accessibility of documents 20 
 
 Possible future progress — Need for the cataloguing and index- 
 ing of documents . . . . . . .27 
 
 Students and bibliographical knowledge — Effect of present 
 
 conditions in deterring men from historical work . . 32 
 
 The remedies — Official cataloguing of libraries — Activity of 
 
 learned societies — of governments . . . 34 
 
 Different kinds of bibliographical works needed by students . 37 
 
 Different degrees of difficulty of Heuristic in different parts of 
 History— to be kept in view when choosing a subject of 
 research 38 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 AUXILIARY SCIENCES 
 
 Documents are raw material, and need a preliminary elabora- 
 tion . . . . 42 
 
 Obsolete views on the historian's apprenticeship — Mably, 
 
 Daunou 43 
 
 Commonplace and exaggeration on this subject — Freeman — 
 
 Various futilities 45 
 
 The scientific conception of the historian's apprenticeship — 
 
 Palaeography — Epigraphy — Philology — Diplomatic . . 48 
 
 History of Literature — Archaeology . . . . ; 5 1 
 
 Criticism of phrase " auxiliary sciences " — The subjects not all 
 
 sciences— None of them auxiliary to the whole of History . 52 
 
 This scientific conception is of recent growth — The Ecole des 
 Chartes — Modern manuals of Palaeography, Epigraphy, 
 &c. — List of the chief of them 55 
 
 XVlll 
 
Contents 
 BOOK II 
 
 ANALYTICAL OPERATIONS 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 GENERAL CONDITIONS OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE 
 
 TA.OK 
 
 Direct and indirect knowledge of facts 63 
 
 History not a science of direct observation— Its data obtained 
 
 by chains of reasoning 64 
 
 Twofold division of Historical Criticism: External, investigat- 
 ing the transmission and origin of documents and the 
 statements in them ; Internal, dealing with the content 
 of the statements and their probability .... 66 
 
 Complexity of Historical Criticism 67 
 
 Necessity of Criticism — The human mind naturally uncritical 6S 
 
 SECTION I.— EXTERNAL CRITICISM 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 TEXTUAL CRITICISM 
 
 Errors in the reproduction of documents : their frequency 
 under the most favourable conditions — Mistakes of 
 copyists— " Sound" and "corrupt " texts . . . 71 
 
 Necessity of emendation — The method subject to fixed rules 73 
 
 Methods of textual criticism : (a) original preserved ; (&)- a 
 single copy preserved, conjectural emendation ; (c) several 
 copies preserved, comparison of errors, families of manu- 
 scripts m 75 
 
 Different degrees of difficulty of textual criticism : its results 
 negative — The " emendation game " — What still remains 
 to be done 83 
 
 xix 
 
Contents 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 CRITICAL INVESTIGATION OF AUTHORSHIP 
 
 PAG* 
 
 Natural tendency to accept indications of authorship — 
 Examples of false attributions — Necessity of verification 
 — Application of internal criticism . . . ' . .87 
 
 Interpolations and continuations — Evidence of style . . 92 
 
 Plagiarism and borrowings by authors from each other— The 
 
 filiation of statements — The investigation of sources . 93 
 
 Importance of investigations of authorship — The extreme of 
 
 distrust to be avoided — Criticism only a means to an end 98 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 CRITICAL CLASSIFICATION OF SOURCES 
 
 Importance of classification — The first impulse wrong — The 
 note-book system not the best — Nor the ledger-system — 
 Nor the (< system" of trusting the memory . . .101 
 
 The system of slips the best — Its drawbacks — Means of 
 obviating them — The advantage of good "private librarian- 
 ship" 103 
 
 Methods of work vary according to the object aimed at — The 
 compiling of Regesta or of a Corpus — Classification by 
 time, place, species, and form 105 
 
 Chronological arrangement to be used when possible — Geogra- 
 phical arrangement best for inscriptions — When these 
 fail, alphabetical order of " incipit " — Logical order useful 
 for some special purposes — Not for a Corpus or for Regesta 107 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 CRITICAL SCHOLARSHIP AND SCHOLARS 
 
 Different opinions on the importance and dignity of external 
 criticism — It is justified by its necessity — But is only 
 preliminary to the higher part of historical work . . 1 1 
 XX 
 
Contents 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Distinction between " historians " and " critical scholars " [Fr. 
 " trudits"]— Expediency, within limits, of the division of 
 labour in this respect — The exceptional skill acquired by 
 specialists — Difference of work the corollary of difference 
 of natural aptitudes 115 
 
 The natural aptitudes required for external criticism — Fond- 
 ness for the work, which is distasteful to the creative 
 genius — The puzzle-solving instinct — Accuracy and its 
 opposite — " Froude's Disease " — Patience, order, persever- 
 ance 121 
 
 The mental defects produced by devotion to external criticism 
 — Its paralysing effect on the over-scrupulous — Hyper- 
 criticism — Dilettantism 128 
 
 The " organisation of scientific labour " 135 
 
 The harshness of judgment attributed to scholars, not always 
 rightly — Much of it a proper jealousy for historic truth — 
 Bad work nowadays soon detected 136 
 
 SECTION II.— INTERNAL CRITICISM 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 INTERPRETATIVE CRITICISM; (HERMENEUTIc) 
 
 Internal criticism deals with the mental operations which 
 begin with the observation of a fact and end with the 
 writing of words in a document — It is divided into two 
 stages : the first concerned with what the author meant, 
 the second with the value of his statements . . .141 
 
 Necessity of separating the two operations— Danger of reading 
 
 opinions into a text 143 
 
 The analysis of documents — The method of slips — Complete- 
 ness necessary 145 
 
 Necessity of linguistic study — General knowledge of a language 
 not enough — Particular variety of a language as used at a 
 given time, in' a given country, by a given author — The 
 rule of context 146 
 
 Different degrees of difficulty in interpretation . . . 149 
 
 xxi 
 
Contents 
 
 PAOK 
 
 Oblique senses : allegory, metaphor, &c. — How to detect them 
 — Former tendency to find symbolism everywhere — 
 Modern tendency to find allusion everywhere . . 15 1 
 
 Results of interpretation — Subjective inquiries . . . 153 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE NEGATIVE INTERNAL CRITICISM OP THE GOOD FAITH 
 AND ACCURACY OF AUTHORS 
 
 Natural tendency to trust documents— Criticism originally due 
 to contradictions — The rule of methodical doubt— Defec- 
 tive modes of criticism 155 
 
 Documents to be analysed, and the irreducible elements 
 
 criticised separately 159 
 
 The "accent of sincerity" — No trust to be placed in impres- 
 sions produced by the form of statements . . .161 
 
 Criticism examines the conditions affecting ( 1 ) the composition 
 of the document as a whole ; (2) the making of each par- 
 ticular statement — In both cases using a previously made 
 list of possible reasons for distrust or confidence . .162 
 
 Reasons for doubting good faith: (1) the author's interest; 
 (2) the force of circumstances, official reports; (3) sym- 
 pathy and antipathy ; (4) vanity; (5) deference to public 
 opinion ; (6) literary distortion 166 
 
 Reasons for doubting accuracy : (1 ) the author a bad observer, 
 hallucinations, illusions, prejudices ; (2) the author not 
 well situated for observing ; (3) negligence and indiffer- 
 ence ; (4) fact not of nature to be directly observed . .172 
 
 Cases where the author is not the original observer of the 
 fact — Tradition, written and oral — Legend — Anecdotes — 
 Anonymous statements 177 
 
 Special reasons without which anonymous statements are not 
 to be accepted: (1) falsehood improbable because (a) the 
 fact is opposed to interest or vanity of author, (J) the fact 
 was generally known, (c) the fact was indifferent to the 
 author;; (2) error improbable because the fact was too big 
 to mistake ; (3) the fact seemed improbable or unintel- 
 ligible to the author . . . . . . . .185 
 
 How critical operations are shortened in practice . . .189 
 
 xxii 
 
Contents 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE DETERMINATION OF PARTICULAR PACTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The conceptions of authors, whether well or ill founded, are 
 the subject-matter of certain studies — They necessarily 
 contain elements of truth, which, under certain restric- 
 tions, may sometimes be inferred from them . . . 191 
 
 The statements of authors, taken singly, do not rise above 
 probability — The only sure results of criticism are negative 
 — To establish facts it is necessary to compare different 
 statements 194 
 
 Contradictions between statements, real and apparent . . 198 
 
 Agreement of statements — Necessity of proving them to be 
 independent — Perfect agreement not so conclusive as 
 occasional coincidence — Cases where different observa- 
 tions of the same fact are not independent — General facts 
 the easiest to prove . 199 
 
 Different facts, each imperfectly proved, corroborate each 
 
 other when they harmonise 204 
 
 Disagreement between documents and other sources of know- 
 ledge—Improbable statements — Miracles — When science 
 and history conflict, history should give way . . . 205 
 
 BOOK III 
 
 SYNTHETIC OPERATIONS 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 GENERAL CONDITIONS OF HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION 
 
 The materials of Historical Construction are isolated facts, 
 of very different kinds, of very different degrees of 
 generality, each belonging to a? definite time and place, 
 of different degrees of certainty 211 
 
 Subjectivity of History . . . . . . . 214 
 
 xxiii 
 
Contents 
 
 The facts learnt from documents relate to (i) living beings 
 and material objects ; (2) actions, individual and collec- 
 tive ; (3) motives and conceptions 217 
 
 The facts of the past must be imagined on the model of those 
 of the present — Danger of error especially in regard to 
 mental facts 219 
 
 Some of the conditions of human life are permanent — The 
 study of these provides a framework into which details 
 taken from documents are to be fitted — For this purpose 
 systematic lists of questions are to be used, drawn up 
 beforehand, and relating to the universal conditions of life 224 
 
 Outline of Historical Construction — The division of labour — 
 Historians must use the works of their colleagues and 
 predecessors, but not without critical precautions . . 228 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 THE GROUPING OF FACTS 
 
 Historical facts may be classified and arranged either accord- 
 ing to their time and place, or according to their nature — 
 Scheme for the logical classification of general historical 
 facts 232 
 
 The selection of facts for treatment — The history of civilisation 
 
 and " battle-history " — Both needed 236 
 
 The determination of groups of men — Precautions to be 
 
 observed — The notion of " race " 238 
 
 The study of institutions — Danger of being misled by meta- 
 phors—The questions which should be asked . . .241 
 
 Evolutions : operations involved in the study of them — The 
 place of particular facts (events) in evolution — Important 
 and unimportant facts 244 
 
 Periods — How they should be defined . . . . . 249 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 CONSTRUCTIVE REASONING 
 
 Incompleteness of the facts yielded by documents — Cautions 
 
 to be observed in filling up the gaps by reasoning . . 252 
 xxiv 
 
Contents 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The argument from silence — When admissible . . . 254 
 Positive reasoning based on documents — The general principles 
 employed must enter into details, and the particular 
 facts to which they are applied must not be taken in 
 isolation 256 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE CONSTRUCTION OF GENERAL FORMULAE 
 
 History, like every science, needs formulae by which the facts 
 
 acquired may be condensed into manageable form . . 262 
 
 Descriptive formulae — Should retain characteristic features — 
 
 Should be as concrete as possible 264 
 
 Formulae describing general facts— How constructed — Con- 
 ventional forms and realities — Mode of formulating an 
 evolution 266 
 
 Formulae describing unique facts — Principle of choice — 
 "Character" of persons — Precautions in formulating 
 them — Formulae describing events 270 
 
 Quantitative formulae — Operations by which they may be 
 obtained : measurement, enumeration, valuation, sampling, 
 generalisation — Precautions to be observed in generalising 274 
 
 Formulae expressing relations — General conclusions — Estima- 
 tion of the extent and value of the knowledge acquired — 
 Imperfection of data not to be forgotten in construction 279 
 
 Groups and their classification 282 
 
 The "solidarity" of social phenomena — Necessity of studying 
 causes — Metaphysical hypothesis — Providence — Concep- 
 tion of events as "rational" — The Hegelian "ideas"— 
 The historical " mission "— The theory of the general 
 progress of humanity 285 
 
 The conception of society as an organism — The comparative 
 method — Statistics — Causes cannot be investigated 
 directly, as in other sciences — Causation as exhibited in 
 the sequence of particular events 288 
 
 The study of the causes of social evolution must look beyond 
 abstractions to the concrete, acting and thinking men — 
 The place of hereditary characteristics in determining 
 
 evolution 292 
 
 XXV 
 
Contents 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 EXPOSITION 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Former conceptions of history-writing — The ancient and 
 mediaeval ideal — The "history of civilisation" — The 
 modern historical " manual " — The romantic ideal at the 
 beginning of the century — History regarded as a branch 
 of literature up to 1850 296 
 
 The modern scientific ideal — Monographs — Right choice of 
 subject — References — Chronological order — Unambiguous 
 titles — Economy of erudition ...... 303 
 
 General works — A. meant for students and specialists-VWorks 
 of reference or "repertories" and scientific manuals of 
 special branches of history — Their form and style — 
 Collaboration in their production — Scientific general 
 histories 307 
 
 B. Works intended for the public — The best kind of populari- 
 sation — The inferior kind — Specialists who lower their 
 standard when they write for the public— The literary 
 style suitable for history 311 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 Summary description of the methods of history— The future 
 
 of history 316 
 
 The utility of history — Not directly applicable to present con- 
 ditions — Affords an explanation of the present — Helps 
 (and is helped by) the social sciences — A means of intel- 
 lectual culture 319 
 
 APPENDIX I 
 
 THE SECONDARY TEACHING OF HISTORY IN FRANCE 
 
 Late introduction of history as a subject of secondary instruc- 
 tion — Defective methods employed up to the end of the 
 
 Second Empire 325 
 
 xxvi 
 
Contents 
 
 The reform movement — Questions involved relating to general 
 organisation — Choice of subjects — Order of teaching- 
 Methods of instruction — These questions to be answered 
 in the way that will make history most useful as a means 
 of social culture 328 
 
 Material aids — Engravings — Books — Methods of teaching . 332 
 
 APPENDIX II 
 
 THE HIGHER TEACHING OF HISTORY IN PRANCE 
 
 The different institutions — The College de France — The 
 Faculties of Letters — The Ecole Normale— The Ecole des 
 Chartes — The Ecole pratique des hautes Etudes . . 335 
 
 Reform of the Faculties — Preparation for degrees — The 
 Examination question — Principles on which it is to be 
 solved — The Dipldme d'itudes supirieures .... 340 
 
 Influence of the movement on the other institutions — Co- 
 operation of the institutions 345 
 
 INDEX OF PROPER NAMES . . . . , .347 
 
 XXV11 
 
AUTHORS' PREFACE 
 
 The title of this work is clear. However, it is 
 necessary to state succinctly both what our inten- 
 tion has, and what it has not been ; for under this 
 same title, " Introduction to the Study of History," 
 very different books have already been published. 
 
 It has not been our intention to give, as Mr. 
 W. B. Boyce 1 has done, a summary of universal 
 history for the use of beginners and readers of 
 scanty leisure. 
 
 Nor has it been our intention to add a new item 
 to the abundant literature of what is ordinarily called 
 the " Philosophy of History." Thinkers, for the most 
 part not professed historians, have made history the 
 subject of their meditations ; they have sought for 
 its " analogies " and its " laws." Some have supposed 
 themselves to have discovered " the laws which have 
 governed the development of humanity," and thus 
 to have "raised history to the rank of a positive 
 science." 2 These vast abstract constructions inspire 
 with an invincible a priori mistrust, not the general 
 public only, but superior minds as well. Fustel de 
 Coulanges, as his latest biographer tells us, was severe 
 
 1 W. B, Boyce, "Introduction to the Study of History, Civil, 
 Ecclesiastical, and Literary," London, 1894, 8vo. 
 
 2 For example, P. J. B. Bachez, in his Introduction a la science de 
 Vhistoire, Paris, 1842, 2 vols, 8vo. 
 
 A 
 
Authors' Preface 
 
 on the Philosophy of History ; these systems were as 
 repugnant to him as metaphysics to the positivists. 
 Rightly or wrongly (without doubt wrongly), the 
 Philosophy of History, not having been cultivated ex- 
 clusively by well-informed, cautious men of vigorous 
 and sound judgment, has fallen into disrepute. The 
 reader will be reassured — or disappointed, as the 
 case may be — to learn that this subject will find no 
 place in the present work. 1 
 
 We propose to examine the conditions and the 
 methods, to indicate the character and the limits, 
 of historical knowledge. How do we ascertain, in 
 respect of the past, what part of it it is possible, 
 what part of it it is important, to know ? What is a 
 document ? How are documents to be treated with a 
 view to historical work ? What are historical facts ? 
 How are they to be grouped to make history ? Who- 
 ever occupies himself with history performs, more or 
 less unconsciously, complicated operations of criti- 
 cism and construction, of analysis and synthesis. But 
 beginners, and the majority of those who have never 
 reflected on the principles of historical methodology, 
 
 1 The history of the attempts which have been made to under- 
 stand and explain philosophically the history of humanity has been 
 undertaken, as is well known, by Robert Flint. Mr. Flint has 
 already given the history of the Philosophy of History in French- 
 speaking countries : "Historical Philosophy in France and French 
 Belgium and Switzerland," Edinburgh and London, 1893, 8vo. It is 
 the first volume of the expanded re-edition of his " History of the 
 Philosophy of History in Europe," published twenty-five years ago. 
 Compare the retrospective (or historical) part of the work of N. 
 Marselli, La scienza della storia, i., Torino, 1873. 
 
 The most important original work which has appeared in France 
 since the publication of the analytical reportory of R. Flint is that 
 of P. Lacombe, De Vkistoire conside're'e comme science, Paris, 1894, 
 8vo. Cf. Revue Critique, 1895, *• P- I 3 2 « 
 
 2 
 
Authors' Preface 
 
 make use, in the performance of these operations, 
 of instinctive methods which, not being, in general, 
 rational methods, do not usually lead to scientific 
 truth. It is, therefore, useful to make known and 
 logically justify the theory of the truly rational 
 methods — a theory which is now settled in some 
 parts, though still incomplete in some points of 
 capital importance. 
 
 The present "Introduction to the Study of History" 
 is thus intended, not as a summary of ascertained facts 
 or a system of general ideas on universal history, but 
 as an essay on the method of the historical sciences. 
 
 We proceed to state the reasons why we have 
 thought such a work opportune, and to explain the 
 spirit in which we have undertaken to write it. 
 
 The books which treat of the methodology of the 
 historical sciences are scarcely less numerous, and 
 at the same time not in much better favour, than 
 the books on the Philosophy of History. Specialists 
 despise them. A widespread opinion is expressed 
 in the words attributed to a certain scholar : " You 
 wish to write a book on philology; you will do 
 much better to produce a book with some good 
 philology in it. When I am asked to define philo- 
 logy, I always answer that it is what I work at." 1 
 Again, in reference to J. G. Droysen's Precis of 
 the Science of History, a certain critic expressed an 
 opinion which was meant to be, and was, a common- 
 place : " Generally speaking, treatises of this kind 
 
 1 Bevue Critique d'histoire et de UtUwturc, 1892, i. p. 164. 
 
 3 
 
Authors' Preface 
 
 are of necessity both obscure and useless : obscure, 
 because there is nothing more vague than their 
 object; useless, because it is possible to be an 
 historian without troubling oneself about the prin- 
 ciples of historical methodology which they claim 
 to exhibit." * The arguments used by these de- 
 spisers of methodology are strong enough in all 
 appearance. They reduce to the following. As 
 a matter of fact, there are men who manifestly 
 follow good methods, and are universally recognised 
 as scholars or historians of the first order, without 
 having ever studied the principles of method ; con- 
 versely, it does not appear that those who have 
 written on historical method from the logical point 
 of view have in consequence attained any marked 
 superiority as scholars or historians : some, indeed, 
 have been known for their incompetence or medio- 
 crity in these capacities. In this there is nothing 
 that need surprise us. Who would think of post- 
 poning original research in chemistry, mathematics, 
 the sciences proper, until he had studied the methods 
 employed in those sciences ? Historical criticism ! 
 Yes, but the best way to learn it is to apply it; 
 practice teaches all that is wanted. 2 Take, too, the 
 
 1 Revue Critique d'histoire et de UtUrature, 1888, ii. p. 295. Cf. Le 
 Moyen Age, x. (1897), p. 91 : "These books [treatises on historical 
 method] are seldom read by those to whom they might be useful, 
 amateurs who devote their leisure to historical research ; and as 
 to professed scholars, it is from their masters' lessons that they 
 have learnt to know and handle the tools of their trade, leaving 
 out of consideration the fact that the method of history is the 
 same as that of the other sciences of observation, the gist of which 
 can be stated in a few words. 
 
 2 In accordance with the principle that historical method can 
 only be taught by example, L. Mariani has given the humorous 
 
 4 
 
Authors' Preface 
 
 extant works on historical method, even the most 
 recent of them, those of J. G. Droysen, E. A. 
 Freeman, A. Tardif, U. Chevalier, and others; the 
 utmost diligence will extract from them nothing in 
 the way of clear ideas beyond the most obvious and 
 commonplace truisms. 1 
 
 We willingly recognise that this manner of think- 
 ing is not entirely wrong. The great majority of 
 works on the method of pursuing historical inves- 
 tigations and of writing history — what is called 
 Historic in Germany and England — are superficial, 
 insipid, unreadable, sometimes ridiculous. 2 To begin 
 
 title Corso pratico di metodologia delta storia to a dissertation on a 
 detail in the history of Fermo. See the A rchivio delta Societa 
 romana di storia patria, xiii. {1890), p. 211. 
 
 1 See an account of Freeman's work, u The Methods of Historical 
 Study," in the Revue Critique, 1887, i. p. 376. This work, says the 
 critic, is empty and commonplace. We learn from it "that history 
 is not so easy a study as many fondly imagine, that it has points of 
 contact with all the sciences, and that the historian truly worthy 
 of the name ought to know everything; that historical certitude is 
 unattainable, and that, in order to make the nearest approach to 
 it, it is necessary to have constant recourse to the original sources ; 
 that it is necessary to know and use the best modern historians, 
 but never to take their word for gospel. That is all." -He con- 
 cludes : Freeman " without a doubt taught historical method far 
 better by example than he ever succeeded in doing by precept." 
 
 Compare Bouvard et Pecuchct, by G. Flaubert. Here we have two 
 simpletons who, among other projects, propose to write history. 
 In order to help them, one of their friends sends them (p. 156) 
 "rules of criticism taken from the Cours of Daunou," such as : "It 
 is no proof to appeal to rumour and common opinion ; the witnesses 
 cannot appear. Reject impossibilities : Pausanias was shown the 
 stone swallowed by Saturn. Keep in mind the skill of forgers, the 
 interest of apologists and calumniators." Daunou's work contains 
 a number of truisms quite as obvious, and still more comic than 
 the above. 
 
 2 Flint (ibid. p. 15) congratulates himself on not having to study 
 the literature of Historic, for "a very large portion of it is so trivial 
 and superficial that it can hardly ever have been of use even to persons 
 
 5 
 
Authors' Preface 
 
 with, those prior to the nineteenth century, a full 
 analysis of which is given by P. C. F. Daunou in 
 the seventh volume of his Cours d'ttudes histo- 
 riqucs, 1 are nearly all of them mere treatises on 
 rhetoric, in which the rhetoric is antiquated, and 
 the problems discussed are the oddest imaginable. 2 
 Daunou makes merry over them, but he himself 
 has shown good sense and nothing more in his 
 monumental work, which at the present time seems 
 little better, and certainly not more useful, than the 
 earlier treatises. 3 As to the modern ones, it is true 
 
 of the humblest capacity, and may certainly now be safely confined 
 to kindly oblivion." Nevertheless, Flint has given in his book a 
 summary list of the principal works of this kind published in 
 French-speaking countries from the earliest times. A more general 
 and complete account (though still a summary one) of the literature 
 of this subject in all countries is furnished by the Lehrbuch der 
 historischen Methode of E. Bernheim (Leipzig, 1894, 8vo), pp. 143 
 sqq. Flint (who was acquainted with several works unknown to 
 Bernheim) stops at 1893, Bernheim at 1894. Since 1889 the 
 Jahresberichte der Gesckichtswissenschaft have contained a periodical 
 account of recent works on historical methodology. 
 
 1 This seventh volume was published in 1844. But Daunou's 
 celebrated Cours was delivered at the College de France in the 
 years 1819-30. 
 
 2 The Italians of the Renaissance (Mylseus, Francesco Patrizzi, 
 and others), and after them the writers of the last two centuries, 
 ask what is the relation of history to dialectic and rhetoric ; to 
 how many laws the historical branch of literature is subject ; 
 whether it is right for the historian to relate treasons, acts of 
 cowardice, crimes, disorders ; whether history is entitled to use 
 any style other than the sublime ; and so on. The only books on 
 Historic, published before the nineteenth century, which give evi- 
 dence of any original effort to attack the real difficulties, are those 
 of Lenglet de Fresnoy (Me'thode pour etudier Vhistoire, Paris, 1713), 
 and of J. M. Chladenius (AUgemeinc Geschichtsioissenschaft, Leipzig, 
 1752). The work of Chladenius has been noticed by Bernheim 
 (ibid. p. 166). 
 
 3 He has not always shown even good sense, for, in the Cours 
 d'ttudes historiques (vii. p. 105), where he treats of a work, De 
 
 6 
 
Authors' Preface 
 
 that not all have been able to escape the two dangers 
 to which works of this character are exposed — that 
 of being obscure on the one hand, or commonplace 
 on the other. J. G. Droysen's Grundriss der Historik 
 is heavy, pedantic, and confused beyond all imagina- 
 tion. 1 Freeman, Tardif, and Chevalier tell us nothing 
 but what is elementary and obvious. Their followers 
 may still be observed discussing at interminable 
 length idle questions, such as : whether history is 
 a science or an art ; what are the duties of history ; 
 what is the use of history; and so on. On the 
 other hand, there is incontestable truth in the re- 
 mark that nearly all the specialists and historians 
 of to-day are, as far as method goes, self-taught, 
 with no training except what they have gained by 
 practice, or by imitating and associating with the 
 older masters of the craft. 
 
 But though many works on the principles of method 
 justify the distrust with which such works are gene- 
 rally regarded, and though most professed historians 
 have been able, apparently with no ill results, to 
 dispense with reflection upon historical method, it 
 would, in our opinion, be a strained inference to 
 conclude that specialists and historians (especially 
 
 Vhistoire, published in 1670 by Pere Le Moyne, a feeble production, 
 to say the least, bearing evident traces of senility, he expresses 
 himself as follows : " I cannot adopt all the maxims and precepts 
 contained in this treatise ; but I believe that, after that of Lucian, 
 it is the best we have yet seen, and I greatly doubt whether any of 
 those whose acquaintance we have still to make has risen to the 
 same height of philosophy and originality." Pere H. Che'rot has 
 given a sounder estimate of the treatise Be Vhistoire in his Etude 
 sur la vie et les ceuvres du P. Le Moyne (Paris, 1887, 8vo), pp. 406 sqq. 
 1 Bernheim declares, however (ibid. p. 177), that this little work 
 is, in his opinion, the only one which stands at the present level of 
 science. 
 
Authors' Preface 
 
 those of the future) have no need to make themselves 
 acquainted with the processes of historical work. 
 The literature of methodology is, in fact, not without 
 its value : gradually there has been formed a treasury 
 of subtle observations and precise rules, suggested 
 by experience, which are something more than mere 
 common sense. 1 And, admitting the existence of 
 those who, without having ever learnt to reason, 
 always reason well, by a gift of nature, it would be 
 easy to set against these exceptions innumerable 
 cases in which ignorance of logic, the Use of irra- 
 tional methods, want of reflection on the conditions 
 of historical analysis and synthesis, have robbed the 
 work of specialists and historians of much of its 
 value. 
 
 The truth is, that, of all branches of study, his- 
 tory is without a doubt the one in which it is most 
 necessary for students to have a clear consciousness 
 of the methods they use. The reason is, that. in 
 history instinctive methods are, as we cannot too 
 often repeat, irrational methods ; some preparation 
 is therefore required to counteract the first impulse. 
 Besides, the rational methods of obtaining historical 
 knowledge differ so widely from the methods of all 
 other sciences, that some perception of their distinc- 
 tive features is necessary to avoid the temptation of 
 applying to history the methods of those sciences 
 which have already been systematised. This explains 
 why mathematicians and chemists can, more easily 
 than historians, dispense with an " introduction " to 
 
 1 Flint says very well (ibid. p. 15) : "The course of Historic has 
 been, on the whole, one of advance from commonplace reflection 
 on history towards a philosophical comprehension of the conditions 
 and processes on which the formation of historical science depends. 
 
 8 
 
Authors' Preface 
 
 their subject. There is no need to insist at greater 
 length on the utility of historical methodology, for 
 there is evidently nothing very serious in the attacks 
 which have been made on it. But it behoves us to 
 explain the reasons which have led to the composi- 
 tion of the present work. For the last fifty years a 
 great number of intelligent and open-minded men 
 have meditated on the methods of the historical 
 sciences. Naturally we find among them many his- 
 torians, university professors, whose position enables 
 them to understand better than others the intellec- 
 tual needs of the young ; but at the same time 
 professed logicians, and even novelists. In this 
 connection, Fustel de Coulanges left a tradition 
 behind him at the University of Paris. " He en- 
 deavoured," we are told, 1 " to reduce the rules of 
 method to very precise formulae . . . ; in his view 
 no task was more urgent than that of teaching 
 students how to attain truth." Among these men, 
 some, like Renan, 2 have been content to insert 
 scattered observations in their general works or 
 their occasional writings ; 3 others, as Fustel de 
 
 1 By P. Guiraud, in the Revue des Deux Mondes, March 1896, 
 
 P. 75- 
 
 2 Renan has said some of the truest and best things that have 
 ever been said on the historical sciences in L'Avenir de la science 
 (Paris, 1890, 8vo), written in 1848. 
 
 3 Some of the most ingenious, some of the most logical, and 
 some of the most widely applicable observations, on the method 
 of the historical sciences, have so far appeared, not in books on 
 methodology, but in the reviews — of which the Revue Critique 
 d'histoire et de UtUrature is the type — devoted to the criticism of 
 new works of history and erudition. It is a very useful exercise to 
 run through the file of the Revue Critique, founded, at Paris, in 
 1867, "to enforce respect for method, to execute justice upon bad 
 books, to check misdirected and superfluous work. " 
 
 9 
 
Authors' Preface 
 
 Coulanges, Freeman, Droysen, Laurence, Stubbs, De 
 Smedt, Von Pflugk-Harttung, and so on, have taken 
 the trouble to express their thoughts on the subject 
 in special treatises. There are many books, "in- 
 augural lectures," " academic orations," and review- 
 articles, published in all countries, but especially in 
 France, Germany, England, the United States, and 
 Italy, both on the whole subject of methodology and 
 on the different parts of it. It will occur to the 
 reader that it would be a far from useless labour 
 to collect and arrange the observations which are 
 scattered, and, one might say, lost, in these numerous 
 books and minor writings. But it is^ too late to 
 undertake this pleasant task; it has been recently 
 performed, and in the most painstaking manner. 
 Professor Ernst Bernheim, of the University of 
 Greifswald, has worked through nearly all the 
 modern works on historical method, and the fruit 
 of his labours is an arrangement under appropriate 
 headings, most of them invented by himself, of a 
 great number of reflections and selected references. 
 His Lehrbuch der historischen Methode l (Leipzig, 1 894, 
 8vo) condenses, in the manner of German Lehrbucher, 
 the special literature of the subject of which it 
 treats. It is not our intention to do over again 
 what has already been done so well. But we are 
 of opinion that even after this laborious and well- 
 planned compilation something still remains to be 
 said. In the first place, Professor Bernheim deals 
 largely with metaphysical problems which we con- 
 sider devoid of interest ; while, conversely, he entirely 
 ignores certain considerations which appear to us to 
 
 1 The first edition of the Lehrbuch is dated 1889. 
 10 
 
Authors' Preface 
 
 be, both theoretically and practically, of the greatest 
 importance. In the second place, the teaching of 
 the Lehrbuch is sound enough, but lacks vigour and 
 originality. Lastly, the Lehrbuch is not addressed to 
 the general public ; both the language in which it is 
 written and the form in which it is composed render 
 it inaccessible to the great majority of French 
 readers. This is enough to justify our undertak- 
 ing to write a book of our own, instead of simply 
 recommending the book of Professor Bernheim. 1 
 
 II 
 
 This "Introduction to the Study of History" does 
 not claim, like the Lehrhtch der historischen Methode, 
 to be a treatise on historical methodology. 2 It is a 
 sketch in outline. We undertook its composition, 
 at the beginning of the scholastic year 1896-97, in 
 order that the new students at the Sorbonne might 
 be warned what the study of history is and ought 
 to be. 
 
 Long experience has taught us the necessity of 
 such warnings. The greater part of those who enter 
 upon a career of historical study do so, as a matter 
 of fact, without knowing why, without having ever 
 asked themselves whether they are fitted for his- 
 torical work, of the true nature of which they are 
 
 1 The best work that has hitherto been published (in French) on 
 historical method is a pamphlet by MM. Ch. and V. Mortet, La 
 Science de Vhistoire (Paris, 1894, 8vo), 88 pp., extracted from vol. xx. 
 of the Grande Encyclopedic 
 
 2 One of us, M. Seignobos, proposes to publish later on a com- 
 plete treatise of Historical Methodology, if there appears to be a 
 public for this class of work. 
 
 II 
 
Authors' Preface 
 
 often ignorant. Generally their motives for choosing 
 an historical career are of the most futile character. 
 One has been successful in history at college ; l 
 another feels himself drawn towards the past by the 
 same kind of romantic attraction which, we are told, 
 determined the vocation of Augustin Thierry ; some 
 are misled by the fancy that history is a compara- 
 tively easy subject, It is certainly important that 
 these irrational votaries should be enlightened and 
 put to the test as soon as possible. 
 
 Having given a course of lectures, to novices, by 
 way of " Introduction to the Study of History," we 
 thought that, with a little revision, these lectures 
 might be made useful to others besides novices. 
 Scholars and professed historians will doubtless 
 have nothing to learn from this work ; but if they 
 should find in it a stimulus to personal reflection, 
 on the craft which some of them practise in a 
 mechanical fashion, that would be something gained. 
 
 1 It cannot be too often stated that the study of history, as it is 
 prosecuted at school, does not presuppose the same aptitudes as 
 the same study when prosecuted at the university or in after life. 
 Julien Havet, who afterwards devoted himself to the (critical) 
 study of history, found history wearisome at school. " I believe," 
 says M. L. Havet, " that the teaching of history [in schools] is not 
 organised in such a manner as to provide sufficient nourishment 
 for the scientific spirit. ... Of all the studies comprised in our 
 school curricula, history is the only one in which the pupil is not 
 being continually called upon to verify something. When he is 
 learning Latin or German, every sentence in a translation requires 
 him to verify a dozen different rules. In the various branches of 
 mathematics the results are never divorced from their proofs ; the 
 problems, too, compel the pupil to think through the whole for 
 himself. Where are the problems in history, and what schoolboy is 
 ever trained to gain by independent effort an insight into the inter- 
 connection of events?" {BibliotMque de VEcole des chartes, 1896, 
 p. 84). 
 
 12 
 
Authors' Preface 
 
 As for the public, which reads the works of histo- 
 rians, is it not desirable that it should know how 
 these works are produced, in order to be able to 
 judge them better ? 
 
 We do not, therefore, like Professor Bernheim, 
 write exclusively for present and future specialists, 
 but also for the public interested in history. We 
 thus lay ourselves under an obligation to be as 
 concise, as clear, and as little technical as ' possible. 
 But to be concise and clear on subjects of this kind 
 often means to appear superficial. Commonplace 
 on the one hand, obscurity on the other : these, as 
 we have already seen, are the evils between' which 
 we have the sorry privilege of choosing. We admit 
 the difficulty. But we do not think it insurmount- 
 able, and our endeavour has been to say what we 
 had to say in the clearest possible manner. 
 
 The first half of the book has been written by 
 M. Langlois, the second by M. Seignobos; but the 
 two collaborators have constantly aided, consulted, 
 and checked each other. 1 
 
 Paris, August 1897. 
 
 1 M. Langlois wrote Book I., Book II. as far as Chapter VI., the 
 second Appendix, and this Preface ; M. Seignobos the end of 
 Book II., Book III., and the first Appendix. Chapter I. in the 
 second book, Chapter V. of the third book, and the Conclusion, 
 were written in common. 
 
 13 
 
BOOK I 
 
 PRELIMINARY STUDIES 
 
 !5 
 
INTRODUCTION TO 
 THE STUDY OF HISTORY 
 
 BOOK I 
 
 PRELIMINARY STUDIES 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE SEARCH FOR DOCUMENTS (HEURISTIC) 
 
 The historian works with documents. Documents 
 are the traces which have been left by the thoughts 
 and actions of men of former times. Of these 
 thoughts and actions, however, very few leave any 
 visible traces, and these traces, when there are any, 
 are seldom durable ; an accident is enough to efface 
 them. Now every thought and every action that 
 has left no visible traces, or none but what have 
 since disappeared, is lost for history ; is as though it 
 had never been. For want of documents the history 
 of immense periods in the past of humanity is des- 
 tined to remain for ever unknown. For there is no 
 substitute for documents : no documents, no history. 
 In order to draw legitimate inferences from a 
 document to the fact of which it is the trace, numerous 
 precautions are requisite which will be indicated in 
 
 17 B 
 
Preliminary Studies 
 
 the sequel. But it is clear that, prior to any critical 
 examination or interpretation of -documents, the 
 question presents itself whether there are any docu- 
 ments at all, how many there are, and where they are. 
 If I undertake to deal with a point of history, 1 of what- 
 ever nature, my first step will be to ascertain the place 
 or places where the documents necessary for its treat- 
 ment, if any such exist, are to be found. The search 
 for and the collection of documents is thus a part, 
 logically the first and most important part, of the his- 
 torian's craft. In Germany it has received the conve- 
 nient, because short, name of JTeuristik. Is there any 
 need to prove the capital importance of Heuristic ? 
 Assuredly not. It is obvious that if it is neglected, 
 if the student does not, before he sets to work on a 
 point of history, place himself in a position to com- 
 mand all accessible sources of information, his risk 
 (no small one at the best) of working upon insuffi- 
 cient data is quite unnecessarily increased : works of 
 erudition or history constructed in accordance with 
 the rules of the most exact method have been vitiated, 
 or even rendered worthless, by the accidental circum- 
 stance that the author was unacquainted with the 
 documents by which those which he had within 
 reach, and with which he was content, might have 
 been illustrated, supplemented, or discredited. The 
 scholars and historians of to-day, standing, as they 
 
 1 In practice one does not as a rule resolve to treat a point of 
 history before knowing whether there are or are not documents in 
 existence which enable it to be studied. On the contrary, it is the 
 accidental discovery of a document which suggests the idea of 
 thoroughly elucidating the point of history to which it relates, and 
 thus leads to the collection, for this purpose, of other documents of 
 the same class. 
 
 18 
 
The Search for Documents 
 
 do, in other respects on an equality with their pre- 
 decessors of the last few centuries, are only enabled 
 to surpass them by their possession of more abun- 
 dant means of information. 1 Heuristic is, in fact, 
 easier to-day than it used to be, although the honest 
 Wagner has still good grounds for saying : 
 
 " Wie scliwer sind nicht die Mittel zu erwerben, 
 Durch die man zu den Quellen steigt ! " 2 
 
 Let us endeavour to explain why the collection of 
 documents, once so laborious, is still no easy matter, 
 in spite of the progress made in the last century ; 
 and how this essential operation may, in the course 
 of continued progress, be still further simplified. 
 
 I. Those who first endeavoured to write history 
 from the sources found themselves in an embarrassing 
 situation. Were the events they proposed to relate 
 recent, so that all the witnesses of them were not yet 
 dead ? They had the resource of interviewing the 
 witnesses who survived. Thucydides, Froissart, and 
 many others have followed this procedure. When 
 Mr. H. H. Bancroft,* the historian of the Pacific Coast 
 of California, resolved to collect materials for the 
 history of events many of the actors in which were 
 still alive, he mobilised a whole army of reporters 
 charged to extract conversations from them. 3 But 
 
 1 It is pitiable to see how the best of the early scholars struggled 
 bravely, but vainly, to solve problems which would not even 
 have existed for them if their collections had not been so incom- 
 plete. This lack of material was a disadvantage for which the 
 most brilliant ingenuity could not compensate. 
 
 2 " How hard it is to gain the means whereby we mount to the 
 sources" (Goethe, Faust, i. 3). 
 
 3 See C. V. Langlois, H. H. Bancroft et Cic, in the Revue univer- 
 sitaire, 1894, i. p. 233. 
 
 19 
 
Preliminary Studies 
 
 when the events to be related were ancient, so that no 
 man then living could have witnessed them, and no 
 account of them had been preserved by oral tradi- 
 tion, what then ? Nothing was left but to collect 
 documents of every kind, principally written ones, 
 relating to the distant past which was to be studied. 
 This was a difficult task at a time when libraries 
 were rare, archives secret, and documents scattered. 
 About the year i860, Mr. Bancroft, in California, 
 was in a situation analogous to that of the earlier 
 researchers in our part of the world. His plan was 
 as follows : He was rich ; he cleared the market of 
 all documents, printed or manuscript ; he negotiated 
 with financially embarrassed families and corporations 
 for the purchase of their archives, or the permission 
 to have them copied by his paid agents. This done, 
 he housed his collection in premises built for the 
 purpose, and classified it. Theoretically there could 
 not be a more rational procedure. But this rapid, 
 American method has only once been employed with 
 sufficient resources and sufficient consistency to ensure 
 its success ; at any other time, and in any other 
 place, it would have been out of the question. No- 
 where else have the circumstances been so favour- 
 able for it. 
 
 At the epoch of the Renaissance the documents 
 of ancient and modern history were scattered in in- 
 numerable private libraries and in innumerable depo- 
 sitories of archives, almost all of them inaccessible, 
 not to mention those which lay hidden beneath the 
 soil, their very existence as yet unsuspected. It was 
 at that time a physical impossibility to procure a 
 list of all the documents serving for the elucidation 
 
 20 
 
The Search for Documents 
 
 of a question (for example, a list of all the manu- 
 scripts still preserved of an ancient work) ; and if, 
 by a miracle, such a list was to be had, it was another 
 impossibility to consult all these documents except 
 at the cost of journeys, expenses, and negotiations 
 without end. Consequences easy to foresee did, as 
 a matter of fact, ensue. ^ Firstly, the difficulties of 
 Heuristic being insurmountable, the earliest scholars 
 and historians — employing, as they did, not all the 
 documents, nor the best documents, but those docu- 
 ments on which they could lay their hands — were 
 nearly always ill-informed ; and their works are now 
 without interest except so far as they are founded on 
 documents which have since been lost. Secondly, 
 the first scholars and historians to be relatively well- 
 informed were those who, in virtue of their profes- 
 sion, had access to rich storehouses of documents — 
 librarians, keepers of archives, monks, magistrates, 
 whose order or whose corporation possessed libraries 
 or archives of considerable extent. 1 
 
 It is true that collectors soon arose who, by money 
 payments, or by more questionable expedients, such 
 as theft, formed, with more or less regard for the 
 interests of scientific study, " cabinets " of collec- 
 tions of original documents, and of copies. But these 
 
 1 The earlier scholars were conscious of the unfavourable cbar- 
 acter of the conditions under which they worked. They suffered 
 keenly from the insufficiency of the instruments of research and 
 the means of comparison. Most of them made great efforts to 
 obtain information. Hence these voluminous correspondences be- 
 tween scholars of the last few centuries, of which our libraries pre- 
 serve so many precious fragments, and these accounts of scientific 
 searches, of journeys undertaken for the discovery of historical 
 documents, which, under the name of Iter {Iter Italicum, Iter Oer- 
 manicum, &c. ), were formerly fashionable. 
 
 21 
 
Preliminary Studies 
 
 European collectors, of whom there has been a great 
 number since the fifteenth century, differ very notice- 
 ably from Mr. Bancroft. The Californian, in fact, 
 only collected documents relating to a particular 
 subject (the history of certain Pacific states), and his 
 ambition was to make his collection complete ; most 
 European collectors have acquired waifs and strays 
 and fragments of every description, forming, when 
 combined, totals which appear insignificant by the 
 side of the huge mass of historical documents which 
 existed at the time. Besides, it was not, in general, 
 with any purpose of making them generally accessible 
 that collectors like Peiresc, Gaignieres, Clair ambau It, 
 Colbert, and many others, withdrew from circulation 
 documents which were in danger of being lost ; they 
 were content (and it was creditable to do as much 
 as this) to share them, more or less freely, with their 
 friends. But collectors (and their heirs) are fickle 
 people, and sometimes eccentric in their notions. 
 Certainly it is better that documents should be pre- 
 served in private collections, than that they should 
 be entirely unprotected and absolutely inaccessible 
 to the scientific worker ; but in order that Heuristic 
 should be made really easier, the first condition is 
 that all collections of documents should be public. 1 
 
 1 We may remark, in passing, a delusion which is childish enough 
 but very natural, and very common among collectors : they all tend 
 to exaggerate the intrinsic value of the documents they possess, 
 simply because they themselves are the possessors. Documents 
 have been published with a sumptuous array of commentaries by 
 persons who had accidentally acquired them, and who would, quite 
 rightly, have attached no importance to them if they had met with 
 them in public collections. This is, we may add, merely a manifesta- 
 tion, in a somewhat crude form, of a general tendency against which 
 it is always necessary to guard : a man readily exaggerates the 
 
 22 
 
The Search for Documents 
 
 Now the finest private collections of documents — 
 libraries and museums combined — were naturally, in 
 the Europe of the Renaissance, those possessed by 
 kings. And "while other private collections were 
 often dispersed upon the death of their founders, 
 these, on the contrary, never ceased to grow; they 
 were enriched, indeed, by the wreckage of all the 
 others. The Cabinet des manuscrits de France, for 
 example, formed by the French kings, and by them 
 thrown open to the public, had, at the end of the 
 eighteenth century, absorbed the best part of the 
 collections which had been the personal work of the 
 amateurs and scholars of the two preceding centuries. 1 
 Similarly in other countries. The concentration of a 
 great number of historical documents in vast public 
 (or semi-public) establishments was the fortunate 
 result of this spontaneous evolution. 
 
 The arbitrary proceedings of the Revolution were 
 still more favourable, and still more effective in 
 securing the amelioration of the material conditions 
 of historical research. The Revolution of 1789 in 
 France, analogous movements in other countries, led 
 to the violent confiscation, for the profit of the state 
 (that is, of everybody), of a host of private archives 
 and collections — the archives, libraries, and museums 
 of the crown, the archives and libraries of monas- 
 teries and suppressed corporations, and so on. In 
 
 importance of the documents he possesses, the documents he has 
 discovered, the texts he has edited, the ^persons and the questions 
 he has studied. 
 
 1 See L. Delisle, Le Cabinet des manuscrits de la Bibliotheque nation- 
 ale, Paris, 1868-81, 3 vols. 4to. The histories of ancient depositories 
 of documents, which have been recently published in considerable 
 number, have been modelled on this admirable work. 
 
 23 
 
Preliminary Studies 
 
 France, in 1790, the Constituent Assembly thus 
 placed the state in possession of a great number of 
 depositories of historical documents, previously scat- 
 tered, and guarded more or less jealously from the 
 curiosity of scholars ; these treasures have since 
 been divided among four different national insti- 
 tutions. The same phenomenon has been more 
 recently observed, on a smaller scale, in Germany, 
 Spain, and Italy. 
 
 The confiscations of the revolutionary period, as 
 well as the collections of the period which preceded 
 it, have both been productive of serious damage. 
 The collector is, or rather often was, a barbarian 
 who did not hesitate, when he saw a chance of 
 adding to his collection of specimens and rare 
 remains, to mutilate monuments, to dissect manu- 
 scripts, to break up whole archives, in order to 
 possess himself of the fragments. On this score 
 many acts of vandalism were perpetrated before the 
 Revolution. Naturally, the revolutionary procedure 
 of confiscation and transference was also productive 
 of lamentable consequences ; besides the destruction 
 which was the result of negligence and that which 
 was due to the mere pleasure of destroying, the 
 unfortunate idea arose that collections might be 
 systematically weeded, those documents only to be 
 preserved which were " interesting " or " useful," the 
 rest to be got rid of. The task of weeding was 
 entrusted to well-meaning but incompetent and 
 overworked men, who were thus led to commit 
 irreparable havoc in our ancient archives. At the 
 present day there are workers engaged in the task, 
 one requiring an extraordinary amount of time, 
 
 24 
 
The Search for Documents 
 
 patience, and care, of restoring 1 the dismembered 
 collections, and replacing the fragments which were 
 then isolated in so brutal a manner by these zealous 
 but unreflecting manipulators of historical docu- 
 ments. It must be recognised, moreover, that the 
 mutilations due to revolutionary activity and the 
 pre-revolutionary collectors are insignificant in com- 
 parison with those which are the result of accident 
 and the destructive work of time. But had they 
 been ten times as serious, they would have been 
 amply compensated by two advantages of the first 
 importance, on which we cannot lay too much stress : 
 (i) the concentration, in a relatively small number 
 of depositories, of documents which were formerly 
 scattered, and, as it were, lost, in a hundred different 
 places; (2) the opening of these depositories to the 
 public. The remnant of historical documents which 
 has survived the destructive effects of accident and 
 vandalism is now at last safely housed, classified, 
 made accessible, and treated as public property. 
 
 Ancient historical documents are now, as we have 
 seen, collected and preserved chiefly in those public 
 institutions which are called archives, libraries, and 
 museums. It is true that this does not apply to all 
 existing documents ; in spite of the unceasing acqui- 
 sitions by purchase and gift which archives, libraries, 
 and museums all over the world have been making 
 every year for a 9 long time past, there still exist 
 private collections, dealers who supply them, and 
 documents in circulation. But the exceptions, which 
 in this case are negligeable, do not affect the general 
 rule. Besides, all the ancient documents which, in 
 limited quantity, still range at large, are destined 
 
 25 
 
Preliminary Studies 
 
 sooner or later to find their way into the state in- 
 stitutions, whose doors are always open to let in, 
 but never to let out. 1 
 
 It is to be desired, as a matter of principle, that 
 the depositories of documents (archives, libraries, 
 and museums) should not be too numerous ; and we 
 have pointed out that, fortunately, they are now 
 beyond comparison less numerous than they were 
 a hundred years ago. Could not the centralisation 
 of documents, with its evident advantages for re- 
 searchers, be carried still further ? Are there not 
 still collections of documents of which it would be 
 hard to justify the separate existence ? Perhaps ; 2 
 but the problem of the centralisation of documents 
 is no longer urgent, now that the processes of re- 
 
 1 Many of the ancient documents still in circulation are the pro- 
 ceeds of ancient thefts from state institutions. The precautions 
 now taken against a recurrence of such depredations are stringent, 
 and, in nearly every instance, as effective as could be desired. 
 
 As to modern (printed) documents, the rule of legal deposit 
 [compulsory presentation of copies to specified libraries], which 
 has now been adopted by nearly all civilised countries, guarantees 
 their preservation in public institutions. 
 
 2 It is known that Napoleon I. entertained the chimerical design 
 of concentrating at Paris the archives of the whole of Europe, and 
 that, for a beginning, he conveyed to that city the archives of the 
 Vatican, the Holy Roman Empire, the crown of Castile, and others, 
 which later on the French were compelled to restore. Confiscation 
 is now out of the question. But the ancient archives of the notaries 
 might be centralised everywhere, as in some countries they are 
 already, in public institutions. It is not easy to explain why at 
 Paris the departments of Foreign Affairs, of War, and of Marine 
 preserve ancient papers whose natural place would be at the 
 Archives Nationales. A great many more anomalies of this kind 
 might be mentioned, which in certain cases impede, where they do 
 not altogether preclude, research ; for the small collections, whose 
 existence is not required, are precisely those whose regulations are 
 the most oppressive. 
 
 26 
 
The Search for Documents 
 
 production have been perfected, especially as the 
 inconveniences arising from a multitude of deposi- 
 tories are met by the expedient, now in general use, 
 of allowing the documents to travel : it is now 
 possible for the student to consult, without expense, 
 in the public library of the city where he resides, 
 documents belonging, say, to the libraries of St. 
 Petersburg, Brussels, and Florence ; we now rarely 
 meet with institutions like the Archives Nationales 
 at Paris, the British Museum at London, and the 
 Mejanes Library at Aix-en-Provence, whose statutes 
 absolutely prohibit all lending-out of their contents. 1 
 
 II. It being granted that the majority of historical 
 documents are now preserved in public institutions 
 (archives, libraries, and museums), Heuristic would 
 be very easy if only good descriptive catalogues 
 had been drawn up of all the existing collections 
 of documents, if these catalogues were furnished 
 with indexes, or if general repertories (alphabetical, 
 systematic, &c.) had been made relating to them; 
 lastly, if there were some place where it was pos- 
 sible to consult the complete collection of all these 
 catalogues and their indexes. But Heuristic is still 
 difficult, because these conditions are, unfortunately, 
 still very far from being adequately realised. 
 
 1 The international exchange of documents is worked in Europe 
 (without charge to the public) by the agency of the various Foreign 
 Offices. Besides this, most of the great institutions have agreements 
 with each other for mutual loans ; this system is as sure and some- 
 times more rapid in its operation than the diplomatic system. The 
 question of lending original documents for use outside the institu- 
 tion where they are preserved has of late years been frequently 
 mooted at congresses of historians and librarians. The results so 
 far obtained are eminently satisfactory. 
 
 2 7 
 
Preliminary Studies 
 
 Firstly, there are depositories of documents 
 (archives, libraries, and museums) whose contents 
 have never been even partially catalogued, so that 
 no one knows what is in them. The depositories of 
 which we possess complete descriptive catalogues are 
 rare ; there are many collections preserved in cele- 
 brated institutions which have only been catalogued 
 in part, and the bulk of which still remains to be 
 described. 1 In the second place, what a variety there 
 is among existing catalogues ! There are some old 
 ones which do not now correspond to the present 
 classification of documents, and which cannot be 
 used without reference- tables ; there are new ones 
 which are equally based on obsolete systems, too 
 detailed or too summary ; some are printed, others 
 in manuscript, on registers or slips ; some are care- 
 fully executed and clear, many are scamped, in- 
 adequate, and provisional. Taking printed catalogues 
 alone, it requires a whole apprenticeship to learn to 
 distinguish, in this enormous mass of confusion, 
 between what is trustworthy and what is not; in 
 other words, to make any use of them at all. Lastly, 
 where are the existing catalogues to be consulted ? 
 Most of the great libraries only possess incomplete 
 collections of them ; there is no general guide to 
 them anywhere. 
 
 This is a deplorable state of things. In fact, the 
 documents contained in uncatalogued depositories 
 
 1 These are sometimes large collections of formidable bulk ; it is 
 more natural to undertake the cataloguing of small accumulations 
 which demand less labour. It is for the same reason that many 
 insignificant but short cartulrries have been published, while 
 several cantularies of the highest importance, being voluminous, 
 have still to be edited. 
 
 28 
 
The Search for Documents 
 
 and collections are practically non-existent for re- 
 searchers who have no leisure to work through the 
 whole of their contents for themselves. We have 
 said before : no documents, no history. But to 
 have no good descriptive catalogues of collections 
 of documents means, in practice, to be unable to 
 ascertain the existence of documents otherwise than 
 by chance. We infer that the progress of history 
 depends in great measure on the progress of the 
 general catalogue of historical documents which is 
 still fragmentary and imperfect. On this point 
 there is general agreement. Pere Bernard de 
 Montfaucon considered his Bihliotheca bibliothecarum 
 manuscriptarum nova, a collection of library cata- 
 logues, as " the most useful and most interesting 
 work he had produced in his whole life." 1 " In the 
 present state of science," wrote Renan in 1848, 2 
 " nothing is wanted more urgently than a critical 
 catalogue of the manuscripts in the different libraries 
 ... a humble task to all appearance ; . . . and 
 yet the researches of scholars are hampered and in- 
 complete pending its definitive completion." " We 
 should have better books on our ancient literature," 
 says M. P. Meyer, 3 " if the predecessors of M. Delisle 
 [in his capacity of administrator of the Bibliotheque 
 Nationale at Paris] had applied themselves with 
 equal ardour and diligence to the cataloguing of the 
 treasures committed to their care." 
 
 It will be well to indicate briefly the causes and 
 state the exact consequences of a state of things 
 
 1 See his autobibliography, published by E. de Broglie, Bernard 
 de Montfaucon ct les Bernardins, ii. (Paris, 1891, 8vo), p. 323. 
 
 2 E. Renan, UAvenir de la science, p. 217. 
 
 3 Romania, xxi. (1892), p. 625. 
 
 29 
 
Preliminary Studies 
 
 which has been deplored as long as scholars have 
 existed, and which is improving, though slowly. " I 
 assure you," said Renan, 1 " that the few hundred 
 thousand francs a Minister of Public Instruction 
 might apply to the purpose [of preparing catalogues] 
 would be better employed than three-quarters of 
 the sum now devoted to literature." It is rare to 
 find a minister, in France or elsewhere, convinced of 
 this truth, and resolute enough to act accordingly. 
 Besides, it has not always been true that, in order 
 to obtain good catalogues, it is sufficient, as well as 
 necessary, to make a pecuniary sacrifice : it is only 
 recently that the best methods of describing docu- 
 ments have been authoritatively fixed ; the task of 
 recruiting competent workers — no great difficulty 
 nowadays — would have been neither easy nor free 
 from anxiety at an epoch when competent workers 
 were rarer than they are now. So much for the 
 material obstacles — want of money and want of men. 
 A cause of another kind has not been without its 
 influence. The functionaries charged with the 
 administration of depositories of documents have 
 not always displayed the zeal which they now 
 display for making their collections accessible by 
 means of accurate catalogues. To prepare a cata- 
 logue (in the exact and at the same time summary 
 form which is now used) is a laborious task, a task 
 without joy and without reward. It has often 
 happened that such a functionary, living, in virtue 
 of his office, in the midst of documents which he is 
 at liberty to consult at any moment, and placed in 
 a much more favourable position than the general 
 
 1 In the passage quoted above. 
 30 
 
The Search for Documents 
 
 public for utilising the collection without the aid of 
 a catalogue, and making discoveries in the process, 
 has preferred to work for himself rather than for 
 others, and made the tedious construction of a 
 catalogue a secondary matter compared with his 
 personal researches. 
 
 Who are the persons that in our own day have 
 discovered, published, and annotated the greatest 
 number of documents ? The functionaries attached 
 to the depositories of documents. Without a doubt 
 this circumstance has retarded the progress of the 
 general catalogue of historical documents. The situa- 
 tion has been this: the persons who were the best 
 able to dispense with catalogues were precisely the 
 persons whose duty it was to make them. 
 
 The imperfection of descriptive catalogues has con- 
 sequences which deserve our attention. On the one 
 hand, we can never be sure that we have exhausted 
 all the sources of information ; who knows what may 
 be held in reserve by the uncatalogued collections? 1 
 
 1 Mr. H. H. Bancroft, in his Memoirs,entitled " Literary Industries " 
 (New York, 1891, i6mo), analyses with sufficient minuteness some 
 practical consequences of the imperfection of the methods of re- 
 search. He considers the case of an industrious writer proposing 
 to write the history of California. He easily procures a few books, 
 reads them, takes notes ; these books refer him to others, which he 
 consults in the public libraries of the city where he resides. Several 
 years are passed in this manner, at the end of which he perceives 
 that he has not a tenth part of the resources in his hands ; he 
 travels, maintains correspondences, but, finally despairing of exhaust- 
 ing the subject, he comforts his conscience and pride with the 
 reflection that he has done much, and that many of the works he 
 has not seen, like many of those he has, are probably of very slight 
 historic value. As to newspapers and the myriads of United States 
 government reports, all of them containing facts bearing on Cali- 
 fornian history ; being a sane man, he has never dreamed of 
 searching them from beginning to end : he has turned over a few 
 
 31 
 
Preliminary Studies 
 
 On the other hand, in order to obtain the maximum 
 amount of information, it is necessary to be thoroughly 
 acquainted with the resources furnished by the exist- 
 ing literature of Heuristic, and to devote a great deal 
 of time to preliminary researches. In point of fact, 
 every one who proposes to collect documents for the 
 treatment of a point of history begins by consulting 
 indexes and catalogues. 1 Novices set about this im- 
 portant operation so slowly, with so little skill, and 
 with so much effort, as to move more experienced 
 workers to mirth or pity, according to their dis- 
 position. Those who find amusement in watching 
 novices stumble and strain and waste their time in 
 the labyrinth of catalogues, neglecting those which 
 are valuable, and thoroughly exploring those which 
 are useless, remember that they also have passed 
 
 of them, that is all ; he knows that each of these fields of research 
 would afford a labour of several years, and that all of them would 
 fill the better part of his life with drudgery. As for oral testimony 
 and manuscripts, he will gather a few unpublished anecdotes in 
 chance conversations ; he will obtain access to a few family papers ; 
 all this will appear in his book as notes and authorities. Now and 
 again he will get hold of a few documentary curiosities among the 
 state archives, but as it would take fifteen years to master the 
 whole collection, he will naturally be content to glean a little here 
 and there. Then he begins to write. He does not feel called upon 
 to inform the public that he has not seen all the documents ; on 
 the contrary, he makes the most of what he has been able to pro- 
 cure in the course of twenty-five years of industrious research. 
 
 1 Some dispense with personal search by invoking the assistance 
 of the functionaries charged with the administration of depositories 
 of documents ; the indispensable search is, in these cases, con- 
 ducted by the functionaries instead of by the public. Cf. Bouvard 
 ct Pecuchct, p. 158. Bouvard and Pecuchet resolve to write the 
 life of the Duke of Angouleme ; for this purpose "they determined 
 to spend several days at the municipal library of Caen to make 
 researches. The librarian placed general histories and pamphlets 
 at their disposal. ..." 
 
 32 
 
The Search for Documents 
 
 through similar experiences: let every one have his 
 turn. Those who observe with regret this waste of 
 time and strength consider that, while inevitable up 
 to a certain point, it serves no good purpose ; they 
 ask whether something might not be done to miti- 
 gate the severity of this apprenticeship to Heuristic, 
 which at one time cost them so dear. Besides, is 
 not research, in the present condition of its material 
 aids, difficult enough whatever the experience of 
 the researcher ? There are scholars and historians 
 who devote the best part of their powers to material 
 searches. Certain branches of historical work, re- 
 lating chiefly to mediseval and modern subjects (the 
 documents of ancient history are fewer, have been 
 more studied, and are better catalogued than the 
 others), imply not merely the assiduous use of 
 catalogues, not* all furnished with indexes, but also 
 the personal inspection of the whole contents of 
 immense collections which are either badly cata- 
 logued or not catalogued at all. Experience proves 
 beyond a doubt that the prospect of these long 
 searches, which must be performed before the more 
 intellectual part of the work can be begun, has 
 deterred, and continues to deter, men of excellent 
 abilities from undertaking historical work. They 
 are, in fact, confronted with a dilemma : either they 
 must work on a supply of documents which is in 
 all probability incomplete, or they must spend 
 themselves in unlimited searches, often fruitless, the 
 results of which seldom appear worth the time they 
 have cost. It goes against the grain to spend a 
 great part of one's life in turning over catalogues 
 without indexes, or in passing under review, one 
 
 33 c 
 
Preliminary Studies 
 
 after another, all the items which go to form 
 accumulations of uncatalogued miscellanea, in order 
 to obtain information (positive or negative) which 
 might have been obtained easily and instantane- 
 ously if the collections had been catalogued and 
 if the catalogues had been indexed. The most 
 serious consequence of the present imperfection 
 of the material aids to Heuristic is the discourage- 
 ment which is sure to be felt by many able men 
 who know their worth, and have some sense of the 
 due proportion of effort and reward. 1 
 
 If it lay in the nature of things that the search 
 for historical documents, in public depositories, 
 must necessarily be as laborious as it still is, we 
 might resign ourselves to the inconvenience : no 
 one thinks of regretting the inevitable expenditure 
 of time and labour which is demanded by archaeo- 
 logical research, whatever the results may prove to 
 be. But the imperfection of the modern instru- 
 ments of Heuristic is quite unnecessary. The state 
 of things which existed for some centuries has now 
 been reformed indifferently; there is no valid reason 
 why it should not some day be reformed altogether. 
 We are thus led, after treating of the causes and 
 the effects, to say a few words about the remedies. 
 
 The instruments of Heuristic are being con- 
 tinually perfected, before our eyes, in two ways. 
 Every year witnesses an increase in the number 
 of descriptive catalogues of archives, libraries, and 
 museums, prepared by the functionaries attached to 
 these institutions. In addition to this, powerful 
 
 1 These considerations have already been presented and deve- 
 loped in the Revue universitairc, 1894, i. p. 321 sqq. 
 
 34 
 
The Search for Documents 
 
 learned societies employ experts to pass from one 
 depository to another cataloguing the documents 
 there, in order to pick out all the documents of a 
 particular class, or relating to a special subject: thus 
 the society of Bollandists caused a general catalogue 
 of hagiographical documents to be prepared by its 
 emissaries, and the Imperial Academy of Vienna 
 catalogued in a similar manner the monuments of 
 patristic literature. The society of the Monumenta 
 Germanice Historica has for a long time been con- 
 ducting vast searches of the same kind ; and it was 
 by the same process of exploring the museums and 
 libraries of the whole of Europe that the construc- 
 tion of the Corpus Iiiscriptionum Latinarum was 
 lately rendered possible. Lastly, several govern- 
 ments have taken the initiative in sending abroad 
 persons charged to catalogue, on their behalf, docu- 
 ments in which they are interested : thus England, 
 the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United States, 
 and other governments, grant regular subsidies to 
 agents of theirs occupied in cataloguing and tran- 
 scribing, in the great depositories of Europe, the 
 documents which relate to the history of England, 
 the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United States, 
 and the rest. 1 With what rapidity and with what 
 
 1 It is well known that, since the opening of the Papal Archives, 
 several governments and learned societies have established In- 
 stitutes at Rome, the members of which are, for the most part, 
 occupied in cataloguing and making known the documents of these 
 archives, in co-operation with the functionaries of the Vatican. 
 The French School at Rome, the Austrian Institute, the Prussian 
 Institute, the Polish Mission, the Institute of the " Goerresgesell- 
 schaft," Belgian, Danish, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, and other 
 scholars, have performed, and are performing, cataloguing work of 
 considerable extent in the archives of the Vatican. 
 
 35 
 
Preliminary Studies 
 
 perfection these useful labours can be conducted, 
 provided that a competent staff, suitably directed, 
 can be had as well as the money to pay it, is 
 shown by the history of the general catalogue of the 
 manuscripts in the public libraries of France. This 
 excellent descriptive catalogue was begun in 1885, 
 and now, in 1897, it extends to nearly fifty volumes, 
 and will soon be completed. The Corpus Inscrip- 
 tionum Latinarum will have been produced in less 
 than fifty years. The results obtained by the 
 Bollandists and the Imperial Academy of Vienna 
 are not less conclusive. Assuredly nothing is now 
 lacking, except funds, to secure the speedy en- 
 dowment of historical study with the indispensable 
 instruments of research. The methods employed 
 in the construction of these instruments are now 
 permanently fixed, and it is an easy matter to 
 recruit a trained staff. Such a staff must evidently 
 be largely composed of keepers of archives and 
 professional librarians, but it would also contain 
 unattached workers with a decided vocation for 
 the construction of catalogues and indexes. Such 
 workers are more numerous than one would at 
 first be inclined to think. Not that cataloguing 
 is easy : it requires patience, the most scrupulous 
 attention, and the most varied learning ; but many 
 minds are attracted by tasks which, like this, are at 
 once determinate, capable of being definitely com- 
 pleted, and of manifest utility. In the large and 
 heterogeneous family of those who labour to pro- 
 mote the progress of historical study, the makers 
 of descriptive catalogues and indexes form a section 
 to themselves. When they devote themselves ex- 
 
 36 
 
The Search for Documents 
 
 clusively to their art they acquire by practice, as 
 one might expect, a high degree of dexterity. 
 
 While waiting for the fact to be clearly recognised 
 that the time is opportune for pushing vigorously in 
 every country the construction of a general catalogue 
 of historical documents, we may indicate a palliative : 
 it is important that scholars and historians, especially 
 novices, should be accurately informed of the state 
 of the instruments of research which are at their 
 disposal, and be regularly apprised of any improve- 
 ments that from time to time may be made in 
 them. Experience and accident have been for a 
 long time trusted to supply this information; but 
 empirical knowledge, besides being costly, as we 
 have already pointed out, is almost always imper- 
 fect. Recently the task has been undertaken of 
 constructing catalogues of catalogues — critical and 
 systematic lists of all the catalogues in existence. 
 There can be no doubt that few bibliographical 
 enterprises have possessed, in so great a degree, the 
 character of general utility. 
 
 But scholars and historians often need, in respect 
 of documents, information not usually supplied by 
 descriptive catalogues ; they wish, for example, to 
 know whether such and such a document is known 
 or not, whether it has already been critically dealt 
 with, annotated, or utilised. 1 This information can 
 only be found in the works of former scholars and 
 
 1 Catalogues of documents sometimes, but not always, mention 
 the fact that such and such a document has been edited, dealt with 
 critically, utilised. The generally received rule is that the compiler 
 mentions circumstances of this kind when he is aware of them, . 
 without imposing on himself the enormous task of ascertaining the 
 truth on this head in every instance where he is ignorant of it. 
 
 37 
 
Preliminary Studies 
 
 historians. In order to become acquainted with 
 these works, recourse must be had to those " biblio- 
 graphical repertories," properly so called, of all kinds, 
 compiled from very different points of view, which 
 have already been published. Among the indis- 
 pensable instruments of Heuristic must thus be 
 reckoned bibliographical repertories of historical 
 literature, as well as repertories of catalogues of 
 original documents. 
 
 To supply the classified list of all those repertories 
 (repertories of catalogues, bibliographical repertories, 
 properly so called), together with other appropriate 
 information, in order to save students from mistakes 
 and waste of time, is the object of what we are at 
 liberty to call the " science of repertories," or " his- 
 torical bibliography." Professor Bernheim has pub- 
 lished a preliminary sketch 1 of it, which we have 
 endeavoured to expand. 2 The expanded sketch bears 
 date April 1896: numerous additions, not to speak 
 of revision, would already be necessary, for the biblio- 
 graphical apparatus of the historical sciences is being 
 renewed, at the present time, with astonishing rapidity. 
 A book on the repertories for the use of scholars 
 and historians is, as a general rule, out of date the 
 day after it has been completed. 
 
 III. The knowledge of repertories is useful to all; 
 the preliminary search for documents is laborious to 
 all; but not in the same degree. Certain parts of 
 history, which have been long cultivated, now enjoy 
 
 1 E. Bernheim, Lehrbuch tier historischcn Methode, 2nd ed., pp. 
 196-202. 
 
 2 C. V. Langlois, Manuel de Bibliographie historique : I. Instru- 
 ments libliographiques, Paris, 1896, i6mo. 
 
 38 
 
The Search for Documents 
 
 the advantage of having all their documents described, 
 collected, and classified in large publications devoted 
 to the purpose, so that, in dealing with these sub- 
 jects, the historian can do all that need be done at 
 his desk. The study of local history does not gene- 
 rally require more than local search. Some important 
 monographs are based on a small number of docu- 
 ments, all belonging to the same collection, and of 
 such a nature that it would be superfluous to look 
 for others elsewhere. On the other hand, a humble 
 piece of work, such as a modest edition of a text of 
 which the ancient copies are not rare, and are to be 
 found scattered in several libraries of Europe, may 
 have involved inquiries, negotiations, and journeys 
 without end. Since the majority of the documents 
 of mediaeval and modern history are still unedited, 
 or badly edited, it may be laid down as a general 
 principle that, in order to write a really new chapter 
 of mediseval or modern history, it is necessary to 
 have long haunted the great depositories of original 
 documents, and to have, if we may use the expres- 
 sion, worried their catalogues. 
 
 It is thus incumbent on every one to choose the 
 subject of his labours with the greatest care, instead 
 of leaving it to be determined by pure chance. 
 There are some subjects which, in the present state 
 of the instruments of research, cannot be treated 
 except at the cost of enormous searches in which 
 life and intellect are consumed without profit. 
 These subjects are not necessarily more interesting 
 than others, and some day, perhaps to-morrow, im- 
 provements in the aids to research will make them 
 easily manageable. It is necessary for the student 
 
 39 
 
Preliminary Studies 
 
 consciously and deliberately to make his choice 
 between different historical subjects depend on the 
 existence or non-existence of particular catalogues 
 of documents and bibliographical repertories; on 
 his relative inclination for desk work on the one 
 hand, and the labour of exploring depositories on 
 the other ; even on the facilities he has for making 
 use of particular collections. " Is it possible to do 
 work in the provinces ? " Renan asked at the con- 
 gress of learned societies at the Sorbonne in 1889; 
 and gave a very good answer to his own question : 
 " At least half one's scientific work can be done at 
 one's, own desk. . . . Take comparative philology, 
 for example : with an initial outlay of some thou- 
 sands of francs, and subscriptions to three or four 
 special publications, a student would command all 
 the tools of his trade. . . . The same applies to 
 universal philosophy. . . . Many branches of study 
 can thus be prosecuted quite privately, and in 
 the closest retirement." l Doubtless, but there are 
 "rarities, specialities, researches which require the 
 aid of powerful machinery." One half of historical 
 work may now be done in private, with limited 
 resources, but only half; the other half still pre- 
 supposes the employment of such resources, in the 
 way of repertories and documents, as can only be 
 found in the great centres of study; often, indeed, 
 it is necessary to visit several of these centres in 
 succession. In short, the case stands with history 
 riluch as it does with geography : in respect of some 
 portions of the globe, we possess documents pub- 
 lished in manageable form sufficiently complete and 
 
 1 E. Renan, Feuilles detaches (Paris, 1892, 8vo), pp. 96 sqq. 
 40 
 
The Search for Documents 
 
 sufficiently well classified to enable us to reason 
 about them to good purpose without leaving our 
 fireside; while in the case of an unexplored or 
 badly explored region, the slightest monograph 
 implies a considerable expenditure of time and 
 physical strength. It is dangerous to choose a 
 subject of study, as many do, without having first 
 realised the nature and extent of the preliminary 
 researches which it demands; there are instances 
 of men struggling for years with such researches, 
 who might have been occupied to better advantage 
 in work of another character. As precautions 
 against this danger, which is the more formidable 
 to novices the more active and zealous they are, an 
 examination of the present conditions of Heuristic 
 in general, and positive notions of Historical Biblio- 
 graphy, are certainly to be warmly recommended. 
 
 4i 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 "AUXILIARY SCIENCES" 
 
 Let us suppose that the preliminary searches, 
 treated of in the preceding chapter, have been 
 made methodically and successfully; the greater 
 part, if not the whole, of the documents bearing on 
 a given subject have been discovered and made 
 available. Of two things one : either these docu- 
 ments have been already subjected to critical 
 elaboration, or they are in the condition of raw 
 material ; this is a point which must be settled by 
 " bibliographical " researches, which also, as we have 
 already observed, form part of the inquiries which 
 precede the logical part of the work. In the first 
 case, where the documents have already gone 
 through a process of elaboration, it is necessary to 
 be in a position to verify the accuracy of the critical 
 work ; in the second case, where the documents are 
 still raw material, the student must do the critical 
 work himself. In both cases certain antecedent 
 and auxiliary knowledge of a positive kind, Vor- 
 und Hillfskenntnisse, as they are called, are every 
 whit as indispensable as the habit of accurate rea- 
 soning ; for if, in the course of critical work, it is 
 possible to go wrong through reasoning badly, it is 
 also possible to go wrong out of pure ignorance. 
 
 42 
 
" Auxiliary Sciences " 
 
 The profession of a scholar or historian is, moreover, 
 similar in this respect to all other professions ; it is 
 impossible to follow it without possessing a certain 
 equipment of technical notions, whose absence neither 
 natural aptitude nor even method can make good. 
 In what, then, does the technical npprenticeship of 
 the scholar or the historian consist ? Or, to employ 
 language which, though inappropriate, as we shall 
 endeavour to show, is in more common use : what, 
 in addition to the knowledge of repertories, are the 
 " auxiliary sciences " of history ? 
 ^ Daunou, in his Gours d'dtudes historiqves, 1 has 
 proposecf a question of the same kind. " What 
 studies," says he, " will the intending historian need 
 to have gone through, what kinds of knowledge ought 
 he to have acquired, in order to begin writing a work 
 with any hope of success ? " Before him, Mably, in 
 his Traits de Vttude de Vhistoire, had also recognised 
 that " there are preparatory studies with which no 
 historian can dispense." But on this subject Mably 
 and Daunou entertained views which nowadays seem 
 singular enough. It is instructive to mark the exact 
 distance which separates their point of view from 
 ours. " First of all," said Mably, " study the law of 
 nature, public law, moral and political science." 
 Daunou, a man of great judgment, permanent secre- 
 tary to the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles- 
 Lettres, writing about 1820, divides the studies 
 which, in his opinion, constitute "the apprentice- 
 ship of the historian," into three classes — literary, 
 philosophical, historical. On the " literary ' studies 
 he expatiates at great length : to begin with, the 
 
 1 vii. p. 228 sqq. 
 
 43 
 
Preliminary Studies 
 
 historian must " have read with attention the great 
 models." Which great models ? Daunou " does not 
 hesitate " to place in the front rank " the master- 
 pieces of epic poetry ; " for " it is the poets who have 
 created the art of narrative, and whoever has not 
 learnt it from them cannot have more than an im- 
 perfect knowledge of it." He further recommends 
 the reading of modern novels ; " they will teach the 
 method of giving an artistic pose to persons and 
 events, of distributing details, of skilfully carrying 
 on the thread of the narrative, of interrupting it, 
 of resuming it, of sustaining the attention and pro- 
 voking the curiosity of the reader." Finally, good 
 historical works should be read : " Herodotus, Thucy- 
 dides, Xenophon, Polybius, and Plutarch among the 
 Greeks ; Caesar, Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus among 
 the Latins; and among the moderns, Macchiavelli, 
 Guicciardini, Giannone, Hume, Robertson, Gibbon, 
 the Cardinal de Retz, Vertot, Voltaire, Raynal, and 
 Rulhiere. Not that I would exclude the others, but 
 these will suffice to provide all the styles which are 
 suitable for history ; for a great diversity of form is 
 to be met with in the works of these writers." In the 
 second place come philosophical studies ; a thorough 
 mastery of " ideology, morals, and politics " is re- 
 quired. " As to the works from which knowledge 
 of this kind is to be obtained, Daguesseau has in- 
 stanced Aristotle, Cicero, Grotius : I should add the 
 best ancient and modern moralists, treatises on poli- 
 tical economy published since the middle of the last 
 century, the writings on political science in general, 
 and on its details and application, of Macchiavelli, 
 Bod in, Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Mably, and the 
 
 44 
 
"Auxiliary Sciences" 
 
 most enlightened of their disciples and commenta- 
 tors." In the third place, before writing history, 
 " it is evidently necessary to know it." " A writer 
 will not give the world new information on a subject 
 like this unless he begins by making himself master 
 of what is already known of it." The future historian 
 has alreadjr made the acquaintance of the best his- 
 torical works, and studied them as models of style ; 
 " it will be to his advantage to read them a second 
 time, but endeavouring more particularly to grasp 
 all the facts which they contain, and to let them 
 make so deep an impression on his mind that they 
 may be permanently fixed in his memory." 
 
 These are the "positive" notions which, eighty 
 years ago, were considered indispensable to the 
 general historian. At the same time there was a 
 confused idea that " in order to acquire a profound 
 knowledge of' particular subjects " there were yet 
 other useful branches of study. "The subjects of 
 which historians treat," says Daunou, " the details 
 which they occasionally light upon, require very 
 extensive and varied attainments." He goes on to 
 particularise, observe in what terms : " very often a 
 knowledge of several languages, sometimes too some 
 notion of physics and mathematics." And he adds : 
 " On these subjects, however, the general education 
 which we may assume to be common to all men of 
 letters is sufficient for the writer who devotes himself 
 to historical composition. . . ." 
 
 All the authors who, like Daunou, have attempted 
 to enumerate the preliminary attainments, as well 
 as the moral or intellectual aptitudes, necessary for 
 " writing history," have either fallen into common- 
 
 45 
 
Preliminary Studies 
 
 place or pitched their requirements ridiculously high. 
 According to Freeman, the historian ought to know 
 everything — philosophy, law, finance, ethnography, 
 geography, anthropology, natural science, and what 
 not ; is not an historian, in point of fact, likely 
 enough in the course of his study of the past to 
 meet with questions of philosophy, law, finance, and 
 the rest of the series ? And if financial science, for 
 example, is necessary to a writer who treats of con- 
 temporary finance, is it less so to the writer who 
 claims to express an opinion on the financial questions 
 of the past ? " The historian," Freeman declares, 
 " may have incidentally to deal with any subject 
 whatever, and the more branches of knowledge he 
 is master of, the better prepared he is for his own 
 work." True, all branches of human knowledge are 
 not equally useful ; some of them are only service- 
 able on rare occasions, and accidentally : " We could 
 hardly make it even a counsel of perfection to the 
 historian to make himself an accomplished chemist, 
 on the chance of an occasion in which chemistry 
 might be of use to him in his study ; " but other 
 special subjects are more closely related to history : 
 " for example, geology and a whole group of sciences 
 which have a close connection with geology . . . The 
 historian will clearly do his own regular work better 
 for being master of them . . ." * The question has 
 
 1 E. A. Freeman, The Methods of Historical Study (Loudon, 1885, 
 8vo), p. 45. 
 
 In France geography has lona; been regarded as a science closely 
 related to history. An Agregation, which combines history and 
 geography, exists at the present day, and in the lycees history and 
 geography arc taught by the same professors. Many people persist 
 in asserting the legitimacy of this combination, and even take 
 
 46 
 
"Auxiliary Sciences" 
 
 also been asked whether "history is one of those 
 studies anciently called umbratiles, for which all that 
 is wanted is a quiet mind and habits of industry," or 
 whether it is a good thing for the historian to have 
 mingled in the turmoil of active life, and to have 
 helped to make the history of his own time before 
 sitting down to write that of the past. Indeed, what 
 questions have not been asked ? Floods of ink have 
 been poured out over these uninteresting and un- 
 answerable questions, the long and fruitless debating 
 of which has done not a little to discredit works on 
 methodology. Our opinion is that nothing relevant 
 can be added to the dictates of mere common sense 
 on the subject of the apprenticeship to the "art of 
 writing history," unless perhaps that this apprentice- 
 ship should consist, above everything, in the study, 
 hitherto so generally neglected, of the principles of 
 historical method. 
 
 Besides, it is not the "literary historian," the 
 moralising and quill-driving "historians," as con- 
 ceived by Daunou and his school, that we have 
 had in view; we are here only concerned with 
 
 umbrage when it is proposed to separate two branches of knowledge 
 united, as they say, by many essential connecting links. But it 
 would be hard to find any good reason, or any facts of experience, 
 to prove that a professor of history, or an historian, is so much the 
 better the more he knows of geology, oceanography, climatology, 
 and the whole group of geographical sciences. In fact, it is with 
 some impatience, and to no immediate advantage, that students of 
 history work through the courses of geography which their curricula 
 force upon them; and those students who have a real taste for 
 geography would be very glad to throw history overboard. The 
 artificial union of history with geography dates back, in France, to 
 an epoch when geography was an ill-defined and ill-arranged subject, 
 regarded by all as a negligeable branch of study. It is a relic of 
 antiquity that we ought to get rid of at once. 
 
 47 
 
Preliminary Studies 
 
 those scholars and historians who intend to deal 
 with documents in order to facilitate or actually 
 perform the scientific work of history. These stand 
 in need of a technical apprenticeship. What meaning 
 are we to attach to this term ? 
 
 Let us suppose we have before us a written docu- 
 ment. What use can we make of it if we cannot 
 read it ? Up to the time of Francois Champollion, 
 Egyptian documents, being written in hieroglyphics, 
 were, without metaphor, a dead-letter. It will be 
 readily admitted that in order to deal with ancient 
 Assyrian history it is necessary to have learnt to 
 decipher cuneiform inscriptions. Similarly, whoever 
 desires to do original work from the sources, in 
 ancient or mediaeval history, will, if he is prudent, 
 learn to decipher inscriptions and manuscripts. 
 We thus see why Greek and Latin epigraphy and 
 mediaeval palaeography — that is, the sum of the 
 various kinds of knowledge required for the deci- 
 phering of ancient and mediaeval manuscripts and 
 inscriptions — are considered as " auxiliary sciences " 
 to history, or rather, the historical study of antiquity 
 and the middle ages. It is evident that mediaeval 
 Latin palaeography forms part of the necessary 
 outfit of the mediae valist, just as the palaeography 
 of hieroglyphics is essential to the Egyptologist. 
 There is, however, a difference to be observed. 
 No one will ever think of devoting himself to 
 Egyptology without having first studied the appro- 
 priate palaeography. On the other hand, it is not 
 very rare for a man to undertake the study of local 
 documents of the middle ages without having learnt 
 to date their forms approximately, and to decipher 
 
 4 8 
 
" Auxiliary Sciences " 
 
 their abbreviations correctly. The resemblance which 
 most mediaeval writing bears to modern writing is 
 sufficiently close to foster the illusion that ingenuity 
 and practice will be enough to carry him through. 
 This illusion is dangerous. Scholars who have 
 received no regular palaaographical initiation can 
 almost always be recognised by the gross errors which 
 they commit from time to time in deciphering — 
 errors which are sometimes enough to completely 
 ruin the subsequent operations of criticism and 
 interpretation. As for the self-taught experts who 
 acquire their skill by dint of practice, the orthodox 
 palaBographic initiation which they have missed 
 would at least have saved them much groping in 
 the dark, long hours of labour, and many a dis- 
 appointment. 
 
 Suppose a document has been deciphered. How 
 is it to be turned to account, unless it be first 
 understood ? Inscriptions in Etruscan and the 
 ancient language of Cambodia have been read, but 
 no one understands them. As long as this is the 
 case they must remain useless. It is clear that 
 in order to deal with Greek history it is necessary 
 to consult documents in the Greek language, and 
 therefore necessary to know Greek. Kank truism, 
 the reader will say. Yes, but many proceed as if 
 it had never occurred to them. Young students 
 attack ancient history with only a superficial tincture 
 of Greek and Latin. Many who have never studied 
 mediaeval French and Latin think they know them 
 because they understand classical Latin and modern 
 French, and they attempt the interpretation of texts 
 whose literal meaning escapes them, or appears to 
 
 49 d 
 
Preliminary Studies 
 
 be obscure when in reality perfectly plain. Innu- 
 merable historical errors owe their origin to false 
 or inexact interpretations of quite straightforward 
 texts, perpetrated by men who were insufficiently 
 acquainted with the grammar, the vocabulary, or 
 the niceties of ancient languages. Solid philological 
 study ought logically to precede historical research 
 in every instance where the documents to be 
 employed are not to be had in a modern lan- 
 guage, and in a form in which they can be easily 
 understood. 
 
 Suppose a document is intelligible. It would not 
 be legitimate to take it into consideration without 
 having verified its authenticity, if its authenticity 
 has not been already settled beyond a doubt. Now 
 in order to verify the authenticity or ascertain the 
 origin of a document two things are required — reason- 
 ing power and knowledge. In other words, it is 
 necessary to reason from certain positive data which 
 represent the condensed results of previous research, 
 which cannot be improvised, and must, therefore, be 
 learnt. To distinguish a genuine from a spurious 
 charter would, in fact, be often an impossible task 
 for the best trained logician, if he were unacquainted 
 with the practice of such and such a chancery, at 
 such and such a date, or with the features common 
 to all the admittedly genuine charters of a particular 
 class. He would be obliged to do what the first 
 scholars did — ascertain for himself, by the comparison 
 of a great number of similar documents, what features 
 distinguish the admittedly genuine documents from 
 the others, before allowing himself to pronounce judg- 
 ment in any special instance. Will not his task be 
 
 5o 
 
" Auxiliary Sciences " 
 
 enormously simplified if there is in existence a body 
 of doctrine, a treasury of accumulated observations, 
 a system of results obtained by workers who have 
 already made, repeated, and checked the minute com- 
 parisons he would otherwise have been obliged to 
 make for himself ? This body of doctrines, observa- 
 tions, and results, calculated to assist the criticism 
 of diplomas and charters, does exist; it is called 
 Diplomatic. We shall, therefore, assign to Diplomatic, 
 along with Epigraphy, Palaeography, and Philology, 
 the character of a subject auxiliary to historical 
 research. 
 
 Epigraphy and Paleography, Philology, and Diplo- 
 matic with its adjuncts (technical Chronology and 
 Sphragistic) are not the only subjects of study 
 which subserve historical research. It would be 
 extremely injudicious to undertake to deal critically 
 with literary documents on which no critical work 
 has as yet been done without making oneself familiar 
 with the results obtained by those who have already 
 dealt critically with documents of the same class: 
 the sum of these results forms a department to 
 itself, which has a name — the History of Literature. 1 
 The critical treatment of illustrative documents, 
 such as the productions of architecture, sculpture, 
 and painting, objects of all kinds (arms, dress, utensils, 
 coins, medals, armorial bearings, and so forth), pre- 
 supposes a thorough acquaintance with the rules and 
 observations which constitute Archaeology properly so 
 
 1 " Historiography " is a branch of the " History of Literature ; " 
 it is the sum of the results obtained by the critics who have 
 hitherto studied ancient historical writings, such as annals, me- 
 moirs, chronicles, biographies, and so forth. 
 
 51 
 
Preliminary Studies 
 
 called and its detached branches — Numismatic and 
 Heraldry. 
 
 We are now in a position to examine to some 
 purpose the hazy notion expressed by the phrase, 
 " the sciences auxiliary to history." We also read 
 of " ancillary sciences," and, in French, " sciences 
 satellites." None of these expressions is really satis- 
 factory. 
 
 First of all, the so-called " auxiliary sciences " are 
 not all of them sciences. Diplomatic, for example, 
 and the History of Literature are only systematised 
 accumulations of facts, acquired by criticism, which 
 are of a nature to facilitate the application of critical 
 methods to documents hitherto untouched. On the 
 other hand, Philology is an organised science, and 
 has its own laws. 
 
 In the second place, among the branches of know- 
 ledge auxiliary — properly speaking, not to history, 
 but to historical research — we must distinguish be- 
 tween those which every worker in the field ought 
 to master, and those in respect of which he needs 
 only to know where to look when he has occasion 
 to make use of them ; between knowledge which 
 ought to become part of a man's self, and informa- 
 tion which he may be content to possess only in 
 potentiality. A medievalist should know how to 
 read and understand medieval texts ; he would gain 
 no advantage by accumulating in his memory the 
 mass of particular facts pertaining to the History 
 of Literature and Diplomatic which are to be found, 
 in their proper place, in well-constructed works of 
 reference. 
 
 Lastly, there are no branches of knowledge which 
 52 
 
" Auxiliary Sciences " 
 
 are auxiliary to History (or even historical research) 
 in general — that is, which are useful to all students 
 irrespectively of the particular part of history on 
 which they are engaged. 1 It appears, then, that 
 there is no general answer possible to the question 
 raised at the beginning of this chapter : in what 
 should the technical apprenticeship of the scholar 
 or historian consist ? In what does it consist ? 
 That depends. It depends on the part of history 
 he proposes to study. A knowledge of paleo- 
 graphy is quite useless for the purpose of investi- 
 
 1 This is only true under reservation ; there is an instrument of 
 research which is indispensable to all historians, to all students, 
 whatever be the subject of their special study. History, moreover, 
 is here in the same situation as the majority of the other sciences : 
 all who prosecute original research, of whatever kind, need to 
 know several living languages, those of countries where men think 
 and work, of countries which, from the point of view of science, 
 stand in the forefront of contemporary civilisation. 
 
 In our days the cultivation of the sciences is not confined to* any 
 single country, or even to Europe. It is international. All pro- 
 blems, the same problems, are being studied everywhere simul- 
 taneously. It is difficult to-day, and to-morrow it will be impossible, 
 to find a subject which can be treated without taking cognisance 
 of works in a foreign language. Henceforth, for ancient history, 
 Greek and Roman, a knowledge of German will be as imperative as 
 a knowledge of Greek and Latin. Questions of strictly local history 
 are the only ones still accessible to those who do not possess the 
 key to foreign literatures. The great problems are beyond their 
 reach, for the wretched and ridiculous reason that works on these 
 problems in any language but their own are sealed books to them. 
 
 Total ignorance of the languages which have hitherto been the 
 ordinary vehicles of science (German, English, French, Italian) is 
 a disease which age renders incurable. It would not be exacting 
 too much to require every candidate for a scientific profession to 
 be at least trilinguis — that is, to be able to understand, fairly easily, 
 two languages besides his mother-tongue. This is a requirement 
 to which scholars were not subject formerly, when Latin was still 
 the common language of learned men, but which the conditions of 
 
 53 
 
Preliminary Studies 
 
 gating the history of the French Revolution, and a 
 knowledge of Greek is equally useless for the treat- 
 ment of a question in mediaeval French history. 1 
 But we may go so far as to say that the preliminary 
 outfit of every one who wishes to do original work in 
 history should consist (in addition to the " common 
 education," that is, general culture, of which Daunou 
 writes) in the knowledge calculated to aid in the 
 
 modern scientific work will henceforth cause to press with increas- 
 ing weight upon the scholars of every country.* 
 
 The French scholars who are unable to read German and English 
 are thereby placed in a position of permanent inferiority as com- 
 pared with their better ins meted colleagues in France and abroad ; 
 whatever their merit, they are condemned to work with insufficient 
 means of information, to work badly. They know it. They do 
 their best to hide their infirmity, as something to be ashamed of, 
 except when they make a cynical parade of it and boast of it ; but 
 this boasting, as we can easily see, is only shame showing itself in 
 a different way. Too much stress cannot be laid upon the fact 
 that a practical knowledge of foreign languages is auxiliary in the 
 first degree to all historical work, as indeed it is to scientific work 
 in general. 
 
 1 When the "auxiliary sciences" were first inserted in the curri- 
 cula of French universities, it was observed that some students 
 whose special subject was the French Revolution, and who had no 
 interest whatever in the middle ages, took up palaeography as an 
 "auxiliary science," and that some students of geography, who 
 were in no way interested in antiquity, took up epigraphy. Evi- 
 dently they had failed to understand that the study of the " auxi- 
 liary sciences " is recommended, not as an end in itself, but 
 because it is of practical utility to those who devote themselves 
 to certain special subjects. See the Revue universitaire, 1895, "• 
 p. 123. 
 
 * Perhaps a day will come when it will be necessary to know the 
 most important Slavonic language ; there are already scholars who 
 are setting themselves to learn Russian. The idea of restoring 
 Latin to its old position of universal language is chimerical. See 
 the file of the Phoenix, seu nuntius latinus universalis (London, 
 1 89 1, 4to). 
 
 54 
 
"Auxiliary Sciences" 
 
 discovery, the understanding, and the criticism of 
 documents. The exact nature of this knowledge 
 varies from case to case according as the student 
 specialises in one or another part of universal 
 history. The technical apprenticeship is relatively 
 short and easy for those who occupy themselves 
 with modern or contemporary history, long and 
 laborious for those who occupy themselves with 
 ancient and inediseval history. 
 
 This reform of the historian's technical apprentice- 
 ship, which consists in substituting the acquisition 
 of positive knowledge, truly auxiliary to historical 
 research, for the study of the " great models," lite- 
 rary and philosophical, is of quite recent date. In 
 France, for the greater part of the present century, 
 students of history received none but a literary 
 education, after Daunou's pattern. Almost all of 
 them were contented with such a preparation, and 
 did not look beyond it; some few perceived and 
 regretted, when it was too late for a remedy, the 
 insufficiency of their early training; with a few 
 illustrious exceptions, the best of them never rose 
 to be more than distinguished men of letters, in- 
 capable of scientific work. There was at that time 
 no organisation for teaching the " auxiliary sciences " 
 and the technique of research except in the case of 
 French mediaeval history, and that in a special school, 
 the Nicole des chartes. This simple fact, moreover, 
 secured for this school during a period of fifty years 
 a marked superiority over all the other French (or 
 even foreign) institutions of higher education; ex- 
 cellent workers were there trained who contributed 
 many new results, while elsewhere people were idly 
 
 55 
 
Preliminary Studies 
 
 discussing problems. 1 To-day it is still at the ficole 
 des chartes that the medievalist has the opportunity 
 of going through his technical apprenticeship in the 
 best and most complete manner, thanks to the com- 
 bined and progressive three-years courses of Romance 
 philology, palaeography, archaeology, historiography, 
 and mediaeval law. But the " auxiliary sciences " are 
 now taught everywhere more or less adequately ; they 
 have been introduced into' the university curricula. 
 On the other hand, students' handbooks of epigraphy, 
 palaeography, diplomatic, and so forth, have multi- 
 plied during the last twenty-five years. Twenty-five 
 years ago it would have been vain to look for a 
 good book which should supply the want of oral in- 
 struction on these subjects ; since the establishment 
 of professorships " manuals " have appeared 2 which 
 
 1 On this point note the opinions of T. von Sickel and J. Havet, 
 quoted in the Bibliotheque de V Ecole des chartes, 1896, p. 87. In 
 1854 the Austrian Institute "fur osterreichische Geschichtsfor- 
 schung " was organised on the model of the French Ecole des chartes. 
 Another institution of the same type has lately been created in the 
 " Istituto di studi superiori " at Florence. "We are accustomed," 
 we read in England, " to hear the complaint that there is not in this 
 country any institution resembling the Ecole des chartes " {Quar- 
 terly Review, July 1896, p. 122). 
 
 2 This is a suitable place to enumerate the principal "manuals" 
 published in the last twenty-five years. But a list of them, ending 
 at 1894, will be found in Bernheim's Lehrbuch, pp. 206 sqq. We will 
 only refer to the great "manuals" of "Philology" (in the com- 
 prehensive sense of the German "Philologie," which includes the 
 history of language and literature, epigraphy, palaeography, and 
 all that pertains to textual criticism) now in course of publication : 
 the Orundriss der indo-arischen Philologie und AltertumsJcunde, edited 
 by G. Biihler ; the Orundriss der iranischen Philologie, edited by W. 
 Geiger and E. Kuhn ; the Handbuch der classischen Alterbumswis- 
 senschaft, edited .by I. von Miiller ; the Grundriss der gcrmanischen 
 Philologie, edited by H. Paul, the second edition of which began to 
 appear in 1896 ; the Grundriss der romanischen Philologie, edited 
 
 56 
 
" Auxiliary Sciences " 
 
 would almost make them superfluous were it not 
 that oral instruction, based on practical exercises, 
 has here an exceptional value. Whether a student 
 does or does not enjoy the advantage of a regular 
 drilling in an institution for higher education, he has 
 henceforth no excuse for remaining in ignorance of 
 those things which he ought to know before entering 
 upon historical work. There is, in fact, less of this 
 kind of neglect than there used to be. On this 
 head, the success of the above-mentioned " manuals," 
 with their rapid succession of editions, is very 
 significant. 1 
 
 Here, then, we have the future historian armed 
 with the preliminary knowledge, the neglect of which 
 would have condemned him to powerlessness or to 
 continual mistakes. We suppose him protected from 
 the errors without number which have their origin 
 in an imperfect knowledge of the writing and the 
 language of documents, in ignorance of previous work 
 and the results obtained by textual criticism ; he has 
 an irreproachable cognitio cogniti et cognoscmdi. A 
 very optimistic supposition, by the way, as we are 
 bound to admit. We know but too well that to have 
 gone through a regular course of " auxiliary sciences," 
 or to have read attentively the best treatises on 
 
 by G. Grober. In these vast repertories there will be found, along 
 with a short presentment of the subject, complete bibliographical 
 references, direct as well as indirect. 
 
 1 The French "manuals" of MM. Prou (Palaeography), Giry 
 (Diplomatic), Cagnat (Latin Epigraphy), and others, have diffused 
 among the public the idea and knowledge of the auxiliary subjects 
 of study. New editions have enabled, and will enable, them to be 
 kept up to date — a very necessary operation, for most of these sub- 
 jects, though now settled in the main, are being enriched and made 
 more precise every day. Cf. supr^ p. 38. 
 
 57 
 
Preliminary Studies 
 
 bibliography, palaeography, philology, and so on, or 
 even to have acquired some personal experience by 
 practical exercises, is not enough to ensure that a 
 man shall always be well informed, still less to make 
 him infallible. In the first place, those who have 
 for a long time studied documents of a given class 
 or of a given period possess, in regard to these, 
 incommunicable knowledge in virtue of which they 
 are able to deal better than others with new docu- 
 ments which they may meet with of the same class 
 or period ; nothing can replace the "special erudition " 
 which is the specialist's reward for hard work. 1 And 
 secondly, specialists themselves make mistakes : 
 palaeographers must be perpetually on their guard 
 not to decipher falsely; is there a philologist who 
 has not some faults of construing on his conscience ? 
 Scholars usually well informed have printed as un- 
 edited texts which had already been published, and 
 have neglected documents it was their business to 
 know. Scholars spend their lives in incessantly 
 perfecting their " auxiliary " knowledge, which they 
 rightly regard as never perfect. But all this does 
 
 1 What exactly are we to understand by this "incommunicable 
 knowledge," of which we speak ? When a specialist is very 
 familiar with the documents of a given class or period, associations 
 of ideas are formed in his brain ; and when he examines a new 
 document of the same class or species, analogies suddenly dawn 
 upon him which would escape any one of less experience, however 
 well furnished he might be with the most perfect repertories. The 
 fact is, that not all the peculiarities of documents can be isolated ; 
 there are some which cannot be classified under any intelligible 
 head, and which, therefore, cannot be found in any tabulated list. 
 But the human memory, when it is good, retains the impression of 
 these peculiarities, and even a faint and distant stimulus suffices 
 to revive the apprehension of them. 
 
 58 
 
" Auxiliary Sciences " 
 
 not prevent us from maintaining our hypothesis. 
 Only let it be understood that in practice we do 
 not postpone work upon documents till we shall 
 have gained a serene and absolute mastery over 
 all the " auxiliary branches of knowledge : " we 
 should never dare to begin. 
 
 It remains to know how to treat documents 
 supposing one has successfully passed through the 
 preliminary apprenticeship. 
 
 59 
 
BOOK II 
 
 ANALYTICAL OPERATIONS 
 
BOOK II 
 
 ANALYTICAL OPERATIONS 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 GENERAL CONDITIONS OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE 
 
 We have already stated that history is studied from 
 documents, and that documents are the traces of 
 past events. 1 This is the place to indicate the 
 consequences involved in this statement and this 
 definition. 
 
 Events can be empirically known in two ways 
 only: by direct observation while they are in pro- 
 gress ; and indirectly, by the study of the traces 
 which they leave behind them. Take an earth- 
 quake, for example. I have a direct knowledge of 
 it if I am present when the phenomenon occurs; 
 an indirect knowledge if, without having been thus 
 present, I observe its physical effects (crevices, 
 ruins), or if, after these effects have disappeared, 
 I read a description written by some one who has 
 himself witnessed the phenomenon or its effects. 
 Now, the peculiarity of "historical facts" 2 is this, 
 
 1 Supra, p. 17. 
 
 2 This expression, which frequently occurs, needs explanation. 
 It is not to be taken to apply to a species of facts. There are no 
 
 63 
 
Analytical Opeeations 
 
 that they are only known indirectly by the help 
 of their traces. Historical knowledge is essentially 
 indirect knowledge. The methods of historical 
 science ought, therefore, to be radically different 
 from those of the direct sciences; that is to say, 
 of all the other sciences, except geology, which are 
 founded on direct observation. Historical science, 
 whatever may be said, 1 is not a science of observa- 
 tion at all. 
 
 The facts of the past are only known to us by the 
 traces of them which have been preserved. These 
 traces, it is true, are directly observed by the his- 
 torian, but, after that, he has nothing more to 
 observe ; what remains is the work of reasoning, 
 in which he endeavours to infer, with the greatest 
 possible exactness, the facts from the traces. . The 
 document is his starting-point, the fact his goal. 2 
 Between this starting-point and this goal he has 
 to pass through a complicated series of inferences, 
 closely interwoven with each other, in which there 
 are innumerable chances of error ; while the least 
 error, whether committed at the beginning, middle, 
 or end of the work, may vitiate all his conclusions. 
 
 historical facts in the sense in which we speak of chemical facts. 
 The same fact is or is not historical according to the manner in 
 which it is known. It is only the mode of acquiring knowledge 
 that is historical. A sitting of the Senate is a fact of direct 
 observation for one who takes part in it ; it becomes historical 
 for the man who reads about it in a report. The eruption of 
 Vesuvius in the time of Pliny is a geological fact which is known 
 historically. The historical character is not in the facts, but in the 
 manner of knowing them. 
 
 1 Fustel de Coulanges has said it. Cf. supra, p. 4, note 1. 
 
 2 In the sciences of observation it is the fact itself, observed 
 directly, which is the starting-point. 
 
 64 
 
General Conditions of Historical Knowledge 
 
 The " historical," or indirect, method is thus ob- 
 viously inferior to the method of direct observation ; 
 but historians have no choice : it is the only method 
 of arriving at past facts, and we shall see later on 1 
 how, in spite of these disadvantages, it is possible 
 for this method to lead to scientific knowledge. 
 
 The detailed analysis of the reasonings which lead 
 from the inspection of documents to the knowledge 
 of facts is one of the chief parts of Historical 
 Methodology. It is the domain of criticism. The 
 seven following chapters will be devoted to it. 
 We shall endeavour, first of all, to give a very 
 summary sketch of the general lines and main 
 divisions of the subject. 
 
 I. We may distinguish two species of documents. 
 Sometimes the past event has left a material trace 
 (a monument, a fabricated article). Sometimes, and 
 more commonly, the trace is of the psychological 
 order — a written description or narrative. The first 
 case is much simpler than the second. For there 
 is a fixed relation between certain physical appear- 
 ances and the causes which produced them ; and 
 this relation, governed by physical laws, is known 
 to us. 2 But a psychological trace, on the other 
 hand, is purely symbolic: it is not the fact itself; 
 it is not even the immediate impression made by 
 the fact upon the witness's mind, but only a con- 
 ventional symbol of that impression. Written 
 documents, then, are not, as material documents 
 
 1 Infra, ch. vii. 
 
 2 We shall not treat specially of the criticism of material docu- 
 ments (objects, monuments, &c.) where it differs from the criticism 
 of written documents. 
 
 65 E 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 are, valuable by themselves ; they are only valuable 
 as signs of psychological operations, which are often 
 complicated and hard to unravel. The immense 
 majority of the documents which furnish the 
 historian with starting-points for his reasonings 
 are nothing else than traces of psychological opera- 
 tions. 
 
 This granted, in order to conclude from a written 
 document to the fact which was its remote cause 
 — that is, in order to ascertain the relation which 
 connects the document with the fact — it is necessary 
 to reproduce the whole series of intermediate causes 
 which have given rise to the document. It is 
 necessary to revive in imagination the whole of 
 that series of acts performed by the author of 
 the document which begins with the fact observed 
 by him and ends with the manuscript (or printed 
 volume), in order to arrive at the original event. 
 Such is the aim and such the process of critical 
 analysis. 1 
 
 First of all we observe the document. Is it now 
 in the same state as when it was produced ? Has 
 it deteriorated since ? We endeavour to find out 
 how it was made in order to restore it, if need 
 be, to its original form, and to ascertain its origin. 
 The first group of preliminary investigations, bear- 
 ing upon the writing, the language, the form, the 
 source, constitutes the special domain of External 
 Criticism, or critical scholarship. Next comes 
 Internal Criticism : it endeavours, by the help of 
 
 1 For the details and the logical justification of this method see 
 Seignobos, Les Conditions psychologiques de la connaissance en histoire, 
 in the Revue philosophique, 1887, ii. pp. 1, 168. 
 
 66 
 
Geneeal Conditions of Historical Knowledge 
 
 analogies mostly borrowed from general psychology, 
 to reproduce the mental states through which the 
 author of the document passed. Knowing what 
 the author of the document has said, we ask (i) 
 What did he mean ? (2) Did he believe what 
 he said ? (3) Was he justified in believing what- 
 ever he did believe ? This last step brings the 
 document to a point where it resembles the data 
 of the objective sciences : it becomes an observa- 
 tion; it only remains , to treat it by the methods 
 of the objective sciences. Every document is valu- 
 able precisely to the extent to which, by the study 
 of its origin, it has been reduced to a well-made 
 observation. 
 
 II. Two conclusions may be drawn from what we 
 have just said : the extreme complexity and the 
 absolute necessity of Historical Criticism. 
 
 Compared with other students the historian is in 
 a very disagreeable situation. It is not merely that 
 he cannot, as the chemist does, observe his facts 
 directly ; it very rarely happens that the documents 
 which he is obliged to use represent precise observa- 
 tions. He has at his disposal none of those systematic 
 records of observations which, in the established 
 sciences, can and do replace direct observation. He 
 is in the situation of a chemist who should know a 
 series of experiments only from the report of his 
 laboratory-boy. The historian is compelled to turn 
 to account rough and ready reports, such as no man 
 of science would be content with. 1 All the more 
 
 1 The most favourable case, that in which the document has 
 been drawn up by what is called an ocular " witness," is still far 
 short of the ideal required for scientific knowledge. The notion 
 
 67 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 necessary are the precautions to be taken in utilising 
 these documents, the only materials of historical 
 science. It is evidently most important to elimi- 
 nate those which are worthless, and to ascertain 
 the amount of correct observation represented by 
 those which are left. 
 
 All the more necessary, too, are cautions on this 
 subject, because the natural inclination of the human 
 mind is to take no precautions at all, and to treat 
 these matters, which really demand the utmost 
 obtainable precision, with careless laxity. It is true 
 that every one admits the utility of criticism in 
 theory; but this is just one of those principles 
 which are more easily admitted than put into 
 practice. Many centuries and whole eras of brilliant 
 civilisation had to pass away before the first dawn 
 of criticism was visible among the most intellectual 
 peoples in the world. Neither the orientals nor the 
 middle ages ever formed a definite conception of it. 1 
 Up to our own day there have been enlightened 
 men who, in employing documents for the purpose 
 of writing history, have neglected the most elemen- 
 tary precautions, and unconsciously assumed false 
 
 of witness has been borrowed from the procedure of the law-courts ; 
 reduced to scientific terms, it becomes that of an observer. A testi- 
 mony is an observation. But, in point of fact, historical testimony 
 differs materially from scientific observation. The observer pro- 
 ceeds by fixed rules, and clothes his report in language of rigorous 
 precision. On the other hand, the "witness "observes without 
 method, and reports in unprecise language ; it is not known whether 
 he has taken the necessary precautions. It is an essential attribute 
 of historical documents that they come before us as the result of 
 work which has been done without method and without guarantee. 
 1 See B. Lasch, Das Erwachen und die Entwickelung der historischen 
 Kritik im Mittdcdtcr (Breslau, 1887, 8vo). 
 
 68 
 
General Conditions of Historical Knowledge 
 
 generalisations. Even now most young students 
 would, if left to themselves, fall into the old errors. 
 For criticism is antagonistic to the normal bent of 
 the mind. The spontaneous tendency of man is to 
 yield assent to affirmations, and to reproduce them, 
 without even clearly distinguishing them from the 
 results of his own observation. In everyday life do 
 we not accept indiscriminately, without any kind of 
 verification, hearsay reports, anonymous and un- 
 guaranteed statements, "documents" of indifferent 
 or inferior authority ? It takes a special reason to 
 induce us to take the trouble to examine into the 
 origin and value of a document on the history of 
 yesterday ; otherwise, if there is no outrageous im- 
 probability in it, and as long as it is not contradicted, 
 we swallow it whole, we pin our faith to it, we hawk 
 it about, and, if need be, embellish it in the process. 
 Every candid man must admit that it requires 
 a violent effort to shake off ignavia critica, that 
 common form of intellectual sloth, that this effort 
 must be continually repeated, and is often accom- 
 panied by real pain. 
 
 The natural instinct of a man in the water is to 
 do precisely that which will infallibly cause him to 
 be drowned; learning to swim means acquiring the 
 habit of suppressing spontaneous movements and 
 performing others instead. Similarly, criticism is 
 not a natural habit ; it must be inculcated, and only 
 becomes organic by dint of continued practice. 
 
 Historical work is, then, pre-eminently critical ; 
 whoever enters upon it without having first been 
 put on his guard against his instinct is sure to be 
 drowned in it. In order to appreciate the danger it 
 
 6 9 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 is well to examine one's conscience and analyse the 
 causes of that ignavia which must be fought against 
 till it is replaced by a critical attitude of mind. 1 It 
 is also very salutary to familiarise oneself with the 
 principles of historical method, and to analyse the 
 theory of them, one by one, as we propose to do 
 in the present volume. " History, like every other 
 study, is chiefly subject to errors of fact arising from 
 inattention, but it is more exposed than any other 
 study to errors due to that mental confusion which 
 produces incomplete analyses and fallacious reason- 
 ings. . . . Historians would advance fewer affirma- 
 tions without proof if they had to analyse each one 
 of their affirmations ; they would commit themselves 
 to fewer false principles if they made it a rule to 
 formulate all their principles ; they would be guilty 
 of fewer fallacies if they were obliged to set out all 
 their arguments in logical form." 2 
 
 1 Natural credulity is deeply rooted in indolence. It is easier to 
 believe than to discuss, to admit than to criticise, to accumulate 
 documents than to weigh them. It is also pleasanter; he who 
 criticises documents must sacrifice some of them, and such a 
 sacrifice seems a dead loss to the man who has discovered or 
 acquired the document. 
 
 2 Revue philosophique, I.e., p. 178. 
 
 70 
 
SECTION I.— EXTERNAL CRITICISM 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 TEXTUAL CRITICISM 
 
 Let us suppose that an author of our own day has 
 written a book: he sends his manuscript to the 
 printer ; with his own hand he corrects the proofs, 
 and marks them " Press." A book which is printed 
 under these conditions comes into our hands in what 
 is, for a document, a very good condition. Whoever 
 the author may be, and whatever his sentiments and 
 intentions, we can be certain — and this is the only 
 point that concerns us at present — that we have 
 before us a fairly accurate reproduction of the text 
 which he wrote. We are obliged to say " fairly 
 accurate," for if the author has corrected his proofs 
 badly, or if the printers have not paid proper atten- 
 tion to his corrections, the reproduction of the original 
 text is imperfect, even in this specially favourable 
 case. Printers not unfrequently make a man say 
 something which he never meant to say, and which 
 he does not notice till too late. 
 
 Sometimes it is required to reproduce a work the 
 author of which is dead, and the autograph manu- 
 script of which cannot be sent to the printer. This 
 was the case with the Mdmoires d'outre-tombe of 
 
 7i 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 Chateaubriand, for example ; it is of daily occurrence 
 in regard to the familiar correspondence of well- 
 known persons which is printed in haste to satisfy 
 the curiosity of the public, and of which the original 
 manuscript is very fragile. First the text is copied ; 
 it is then set up by the compositor from the copy, 
 which comes to the same thing as copying it again ; 
 this second copy is lastly, or ought to be, collated 
 (in the proofs) with the first copy, or, better still, 
 with the original, by some one who takes the place 
 of the deceased author. The guarantees of accuracy 
 are fewer in this case than in the first ; for between 
 the original and the ultimate reproduction there is 
 one intermediary the more (the manuscript copy), 
 and it may be that the original is hard for anybody 
 but the author to decipher. And, in fact, the text 
 of memoirs and posthumous correspondence is often 
 disfigured by errors of transcription and punctuation 
 occurring in editions which at first sight give the 
 impression of having been carefully executed. 1 
 
 Turning now to ancient documents, let us ask in 
 what^ state they have been preserved. In nearly 
 every case the originals have been lost, and we have 
 nothing but copies. Have these copies been made 
 directly from the originals ? No ; they are copies 
 of copies. The scribes who executed them were not 
 by any means all of them capable and conscientious 
 
 1 A member of the SociiU des humanistes franqais (founded at 
 Paris in 1894) amused himself by pointing out, in. the Bulletin of 
 this society, certain errors amenable to verbal criticism which 
 occur in various editions of posthumous works, especially the 
 Mtmoires d'outre-tombe. He showed that it is possible to remove 
 obscurities in the most modern documents by the same methods 
 which are used in restoring ancient texts. 
 
 72 
 
Textual Criticism 
 
 men; they often transcribed texts which they did 
 not understand at all, or which they understood 
 incorrectly, and it was not always the fashion, as it 
 was in the time of the Carlovingian Renaissance, to 
 compare the copies with the originals. 1 
 
 If our printed books, after the successive revisions 
 of author and printers reader, are still but imperfect 
 reproductions, it is only to be expected that ancient 
 documents, copied and recopied as they have been 
 for centuries with very little care, and exposed at 
 every fresh transcription to new risk of alteration, 
 should have reached us full of inaccuracies. 
 
 There is thus an obvious precaution to be taken. 
 Before using a document we must find out whether 
 its text is " sound" — that is, in as close agreement as 
 possible with the original manuscript of the author ; 
 and when the text is " corrupt " we must emend 
 it. In using a text which has been corrupted in 
 transmission, we run the risk of attributing to the 
 author what really comes from the copyists. There 
 are actual cases of theories which were based on 
 passages falsified in transmission, and which collapsed 
 as soon as the true readings were discovered or re- 
 stored. Printers' errors and mistakes in copying are 
 not always innocuous or merely diverting ; they are 
 sometimes insidious and capable of misleading the 
 reader. 2 
 
 One would naturally suppose that historians of 
 
 1 On the habits of the mediaeval copyists, by whose intermediate 
 agency most of the literary works of antiquity have come down to 
 us, see the notices collected by W. Wattenbach, Das Schriftwesen 
 im Mittelalter, 3rd ed. (Berlin, 1896, 8vo). 
 
 2 See, for example, the Coquilles lexicographiques which have been 
 collected by A. Thomas, in Romania, xx. (1891), pp. 464 sqq. 
 
 73 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 repute would always make it a rule to procure 
 " sound " texts, properly emended and restored, of 
 the texts they have to consult. That is a mistake. 
 For a long time historians simply used the texts 
 which they had within easy reach, without verifying 
 their accuracy. And, what is more, the very scholars 
 whose business it is to edit texts did not discover 
 the art of restoring them all at once ; not so very 
 long ago, documents were commonly edited from the 
 first copies, good or bad, that came to hand, com- 
 bined and corrected at random. Editions of ancient 
 texts are nowadays mostly " critical ; " but it is not 
 yet thirty years since the publication of the first 
 " critical editions " of the great works of the middle 
 ages, and the critical text of some ancient classics 
 (Pausanias, for example) has still to be constructed. 
 
 Not all historical documents have as yet been 
 published in a form calculated to give historians the 
 security they need, and some historians still act as 
 if they had not realised that an unsettled text, as 
 such, requires cautious handling. Still, considerable 
 progress has been made. From the experience 
 accumulated by several generations of scholars there 
 has been evolved a recognised method of purifying 
 and restoring texts. No part of historical method 
 has a more solid foundation, or is more generally 
 known. It is clearly explained in several works of 
 popular philology. 1 For this reason we shall here 
 be content to give a general view of its essential 
 principles, and to indicate its results. 
 
 1 See E. Bernheim, Lehrbuch der historischen Methode, 2nd ed., pp. 
 341-54. Also consult F. Blass, in the Handbuch der klassischcn 
 Altertumswissenschqft, edited by I. von Muller, I., 2nd ed. (1892), pp. 
 
 74 
 
Textual Criticism 
 
 I. We will suppose a document has not been 
 edited in conformity with critical rules. How are 
 we to proceed in order to construct the best possible 
 text ? Three cases present themselves. 
 
 (a) The most simple case is that in which we pos- 
 sess the original, the author's autograph itself. There 
 is then nothing to do but to reproduce the text 
 of it with absolute fidelity. 1 Theoretically nothing 
 can be easier ; in practice this elementary operation 
 demands a sustained attention of which not every 
 one is capable. If any one doubts it, let him try 
 Copyists who never make mistakes and never allow 
 their attention to be distracted are rare even amous: 
 scholars. 
 
 (b) Second case. The original has been lost ; only 
 
 249-89 (with a detailed bibliography) ; A. Tobler, in the Grundriss 
 der romanischen Philologie, I. (1888), pp. 253-63; H. Paul, in the 
 Grundriss der germanischen Philologie, I., 2nd ed. (1896), pp. 184-96. 
 
 In French read the section Critique des textes, in Minerva, Intro- 
 duction a Vitude des classiques scolaires grecs et latins, by J. Gow and 
 S. Reinach (Paris, 1890, i6mo), pp. 50-65. 
 
 The work of J. Taylor, " History of the Transmission of Ancient 
 Books to Modern Times" (Liverpool, 1889, i6mo), is of no value. 
 
 1 This rule is not absolute. The editor is generally accorded the 
 right of unifying the spelling of an autograph document — provided 
 that he informs the public of the fact — wherever, as in most modern 
 documents, the orthographical vagaries of the author possess no 
 philological interest. See the Instructions pour la publication des 
 textes historiques, in the Bulletin de la Commission royale d'kistoire de 
 Belgique, 5th series, vi. (1896) ; and the Grundsdtze fur die Herausgube 
 von ActenstilcTcen zur neueren Geschichte, laboriously discussed by the 
 second and third Congresses of German historians, in 1894 and 1895, 
 in the Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Geschichtswisscnschaft, xi. p. 200, xii. 
 p. 364. The last Congresses of Italian historians, held at Genoa 
 (1893) an ^ at Rome (1895), have also debated this question, but 
 without result. What are the liberties which it is legitimate to 
 take in reproducing autograph texts ? The question is more diffi- 
 cult than is imagined by those who are not professionally concerned 
 with it. 
 
 75 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 a single copy of it is known. It is necessary to be 
 cautious, for the probability is that this copy con- 
 tains errors. 
 
 Texts degenerate in accordance with certain laws. 
 A great deal of pains has been taken to discover and 
 classify the causes and the ordinary forms of the 
 differences which are observed between originals and 
 copies; and hence rules have been deduced which 
 may be applied to the conjectural restoration of 
 those passages in a unique copy of a lost original 
 which are certainly corrupt (because unintelligible), 
 or are so in all probability. 
 
 Alterations of an original occurring in a copy — 
 " traditional variants," as they are called — are due 
 either to fraud or to error. Some copyists have 
 deliberately modified or suppressed passages. 1 Nearly 
 all copyists have committed errors of judgment or 
 accidental errors. Errors of judgment when half- 
 educated and not wholly intelligent copyists have 
 thought it their duty to correct passages and words 
 in the original which they could not understand. 2 
 Accidental errors when they misread while copying, 
 or misheard while writing from dictation, or when 
 they involuntarily made slips of the pen. 
 
 Modifications arising from fraud or errors of judg- 
 ment are often very difficult to rectify, or even to 
 discover. Some accidental errors (the omission of 
 several lines, for example) are irreparable in the 
 
 1 Interpolations will be treated of in chapter iii. p. 92. 
 
 2 The scribes of the Carlovingian Renaissance and of the 
 Renaissance proper of the fifteenth century endeavoured to furnish 
 intelligible texts. They therefore corrected everything they did 
 not understand. Several ancient works have been in this manner 
 irretrievably ruined. 
 
 76 
 
Textual Criticism 
 
 case we are considering, that of a unique copy. But 
 most accidental errors can be detected by any one 
 who knows the ordinary forms : confusions of sense, 
 letters, and words, transpositions of words, letters, 
 and syllables, dittography (unmeaning repetition of 
 letters or syllables), haplography (syllables or words 
 written once only where they should have been 
 written twice), false divisions between words, badly 
 punctuated sentences, and other mistakes of the 
 same kind. Errors of these various types have been 
 made by the scribes of every country and every age, 
 irrespectively of the handwriting and language of the 
 originals. But some confusions of letters occur fre- 
 quently in copies of uncial originals, and others in 
 copies of minuscule originals. Confusions of sense 
 and of words are explained by analogies of vocabulary 
 or pronunciation, which naturally vary from language 
 to language and from epoch to epoch. The general 
 theory of conjectural emendation reduces to the sketch 
 we have just given ; there is no general apprentice- 
 ship to the art. What a man learns is not to restore 
 any text that may be put before him, but Greek 
 texts, Latin texts, French texts, and so on, as the 
 case may be; for the conjectural emendation of a 
 text presupposes, besides general notions on the 
 processes by which texts degenerate, a profound 
 knowledge of (i) a special language; (2) a special 
 handwriting ; (3) the confusions (of sense , letters, and 
 words) ivhich were habitual to those who copied texts of 
 that language written in that style of handwriting. To 
 aid in the apprenticeship to the conjectural emenda- 
 tion of Greek and Latin texts, tabulated lists (alpha- 
 betical and systematic) of various readings, frequent 
 
 77 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 confusions, and probable corrections, have been drawn 
 up. 1 It is true that they cannot take the place of 
 practical work, done under the guidance of experts, 
 but they are of very great use to the experts 
 themselves. 2 
 
 It would be easy to give a list of happy emen- 
 dations. The most satisfactory are those whose 
 correctness is obvious palseographically, as is the 
 case with the classical emendation by Madvig of 
 the text of Seneca's Letters (89, 4). The old read- 
 ing was : " Philosophia unde dicta sit, apparet ; ipso 
 enim nomine fatetur. Quidam et sapientiam ita 
 quidam finierunt, ut dicerent divinorum et huruan- 
 orum sapientiam . . ." — which does not make sense. 
 It used to be supposed that words had dropped 
 out between ita and quidam, Madvig pictured to 
 himself the text of the lost archetype, which was 
 written in capitals, and in which, as was usual 
 before the eighth century, the words were not 
 separated (scriptio continue/,), nor the sentences punc- 
 tuated ; he asked himself whether the copyist, with 
 such an archetype before him, had not divided 
 the words at random, and he had no difficulty 
 
 1 The principal of these are, for the classical languages, besides 
 the above-mentioned work of Blass (supra, p. 74, note), the Adver- 
 saria critica of Madvig (Copenhagen, 1871-74, 3 vols. 8vo). For 
 Greek, the celebrated Commentatio palaographica of F. J. Bast, pub- 
 lished as an appendix to an edition of the grammarian Gregory 
 of Corinth (Leipzig, 181 1, 8vo), and the Variaz lectiones of Cobet 
 (Leiden, 1873, 8vo). For Latin, H. Hagen, Gradus ad criticcn 
 (Leipzig, 1879, 8vo), and W. M. Lindsay, "An Introduction to Latin 
 Textual Emendation based on the Text of Plautus " (London, 1896, 
 i6mo). A contributor to the Bulletin de la Societe des humanistes 
 francais has expressed, in this publication, a wish that a similar 
 collection might be compiled for modern French. 
 
 2 Cf. Revue Critique, 1895, ii. p. 358. 
 
 78 
 
Textual Criticism 
 
 in reading : " . . . ipso enim nomine fatetur quid 
 amet. Sapientiam ita quidam finierunt . . ." Blass, 
 Reinach, and Lindsay, in the works referred to in 
 the note, mention several other masterly and elegant 
 emendations. Nor have the Hellenists and Latinists 
 any monopoly ; equally brilliant emendations might 
 be culled from the works of Orientalists, Romancists, 
 and Germanists, now that texts of Oriental, Romance, 
 and Germanic languages have been subjected to 
 verbal criticism. We have already stated that 
 scholarly corrections are possible even in the text 
 of quite modern documents, reproduced typographi- 
 cally under the most favourable conditions. 
 
 Perhaps no one, in our day, has equalled Madvig 
 in the art of conjectural emendation. But Madvig 
 himself had no high opinion of the work of modern 
 scholarship. He thought that the humanists of 
 the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were, in 
 this respect, better trained than modern scholars. 
 The conjectural emendation of Greek and Latin 
 texts is, in fact, a branch of sport success in which 
 is proportionate not only to a man's ingenuity and 
 palseographical instinct, but also to the corrrectness, 
 rapidity, and delicacy of his appreciation of the 
 niceties of the classical languages. Now, the early 
 scholars were undoubtedly too bold, but they were 
 more intimately familiar with the classical languages 
 than our modern scholars are. 
 
 However that may be, there can be no doubt 
 that numerous texts which have been preserved, in 
 corrupt form, in unique copies, have resisted, and 
 will continue to resist, the efforts of criticism. Very 
 often criticism ascertains the fact of the text having 
 
 79 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 been altered, states what the sense requires, and 
 then prudently stops, every trace of the original 
 reading having been obscured by a confused tangle 
 of successive corrections and errors which it is 
 hopeless to attempt to unravel. The scholars who 
 devote themselves to the fascinating pursuit of con- 
 jectural criticism are liable, in their ardour, to 
 suspect perfectly innocent readings, and, in desperate 
 passages, to propose adventurous hypotheses. They 
 are well aware of this, and therefore make it a rule 
 to draw a very clear distinction, in their editions, 
 between readings found in manuscripts and their 
 own restorations of the text. 
 
 (c) Third case. We possess several copies, which 
 differ from, each other, of a document whose original 
 is lost. Here modern scholars have a marked 
 advantage over their predecessors: besides being 
 better informed, they set about the comparison of 
 copies more methodically. The object is, as in 
 the preceding case, to reconstruct the archetype as 
 exactly as possible. 
 
 The scholars of earlier days had to struggle, as 
 novices have to struggle now, in a case of this kind, 
 against a very natural and a very reprehensible 
 impulse — to use the first copy that comes to hand, 
 whatever its character may happen to be. The 
 second impulse is not much better — to use the 
 oldest copy out of several of different date. In 
 theory, and very often in practice, the relative age 
 of the copies is of no importance ; a sixteenth- 
 century manuscript which reproduces a good lost 
 copy of the eleventh century is much more valu- 
 able than a faulty and retouched copy made in the 
 
 80 
 
Textual Criticism 
 
 twelfth or thirteenth century. The third impulse 
 is still far from being good ; it is to count the 
 attested readings and decide by the majority. Sup- 
 pose there are twenty copies of a text ; the reading 
 A is attested eighteen times, the reading B twice. 
 To make this a reason for choosing A is to make the 
 gratuitous assumption that all the manuscripts have 
 the same authority. This is an error of judgment ; 
 for if seventeen of the eighteen manuscripts which 
 give the reading A have been copied from the 
 eighteenth, the reading A is in reality attested only 
 once ; and the only question is whether it is intrinsi- 
 cally better or worse than the reading B. 
 
 It has been recognised that the only rational pro- 
 cedure is to begin by determining in what relation 
 the copies stand to each other. For this purpose 
 we adopt as our starting-point the incontrovertible 
 axiom that all the copies which contain the same 
 mistakes in the same passages must have been either 
 copied from each other or all derived from a copy 
 containing those mistakes. It is inconceivable that 
 several copyists, independently reproducing an original 
 free from errors, should all introduce exactly the 
 same errors ; identity of errors attests community of 
 origin. We shall cast aside without scruple all the 
 copies derived from a single manuscript which has 
 been preserved. Evidently they can have no value 
 beyond what is possessed by their common source ; 
 if they differ from it, it can only be in virtue of new 
 errors; it would be waste of time to study their 
 variations. Having eliminated these, we have before 
 us none but independent copies, which have been 
 made directly from the archetype, or secondary 
 
 81 F 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 copies whose source (a copy taken directly from the 
 archetype) has been lost. In order to group the 
 secondary copies into families, each of which shall 
 represent what is substantially the same tradition, 
 we again have recourse fro the comparison of errors. 
 By this method we can generally draw up without 
 too much trouble a complete genealogical table 
 (stemma codicum) of the preserved copies, which will 
 bring out very clearly their relative importance. 
 This is not the place to discuss the difficult cases 
 where, in consequence of too great a number of inter- 
 mediaries having been lost, or from ancient copyists 
 having arbitrarily blended the texts of different tradi- 
 tions, the operation becomes extremely laborious or 
 impracticable. Besides, in these extreme cases there 
 is no new method involved : the comparison of corre- 
 sponding passages is a powerful instrument, but it is 
 the only one which criticism has at its disposal for 
 this task. 
 
 When the genealogical tree of the manuscripts 
 has been drawn up, we endeavour to restore the text 
 of the archetype by comparing the different tradi- 
 tions. If these agree and give a satisfactory text, 
 there is no difficulty. If they differ, we decide be- 
 tween them. If they accidentally agree in giving 
 a defective text, we have recourse to conjectural 
 emendation, as if there were only one copy. 
 
 It is, theoretically, much more advantageous to 
 have several independent copies of a lost original 
 than to have only one, for the mere mechanical com- 
 parison of the different readings is often enough 
 to remove obscurities which the uncertain light of 
 conjectural criticism would never have illuminated. 
 
 82 
 
Textual Criticism 
 
 However, an abim dance of manuscripts is an em- 
 barrassment rather than a help when the work of 
 grouping them has been left undone or done badly ; 
 nothing can be more unsatisfactory than the arbitrary 
 and hybrid restorations which are founded on copies 
 whose relations to each other and to the archetype 
 have not been ascertained beforehand. On the other 
 hand, the application of rational methods requires, in 
 some cases, a formidable expenditure of time and 
 labour. Some works are preserved in hundreds of 
 copies all differing from each other ; sometimes 
 (as in the case of the Gospels) the variants of a 
 text of quite moderate extent are to be counted 
 by thousands ; several years of assiduous labour are 
 necessary for the preparation of a critical edition of 
 some mediaeval romances. And after all this labour, 
 all these collations and comparisons, can we be sure 
 that the text of the romance is sensibly better than 
 it would have been if there had been only two 
 or three manuscripts to work upon ? No. Some 
 critical editions, owing to the apparent wealth of 
 material applicable to the work, demand a mechanical 
 effort which is altogether out of proportion to the 
 positive results which are its reward. 
 
 " Critical editions " founded on several copies of a 
 lost original ought to supply the public with the means 
 of verifying the " stemma codicum " which the editor 
 has drawn up, and should give the rejected variants in 
 the notes. By this means competent readers are, at 
 the worst, put in possession, if not of the best possible 
 text, at least of the materials for constructing it. 1 
 
 1 Quite recently our scholars used to neglect this elementary 
 precaution, in order, as they said, to avoid an " air of pedantry." 
 
 83 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 II. The results of textual criticism — a kind of 
 cleaning and mending — are purely negative. By the 
 aid of conjecture, or by the aid of conjecture and 
 comparison combined, we are enabled to construct, 
 not necessarily a good text, but the best text pos- 
 sible, of documents whose original is lost. What 
 we thus effect is the elimination of corrupt and 
 adventitious readings likely to cause error, and the 
 recognition of suspected passages as such. But it is 
 obvious that no new information is supplied by this 
 process. The text of a document which has been 
 restored at the cost of infinite pains is not worth 
 more than that of a document whose original has 
 been preserved; on the contrary, it is worth less. 
 If the autograph manuscript of the iEneid had not 
 been destroyed, centuries of collation and conjecture 
 would have been saved, and the text of the iEneid 
 would have been better than it is. This is intended 
 for those who excel at the " emendation game," 1 
 who are in consequence fond of it, and would really 
 be sorry to have no occasion to play it. 
 
 III. There will, however, be abundant scope for 
 textual criticism as long as we do not possess the 
 
 M. B. Haureau has published, in his Notices et extraits de quelques 
 manuscrits latins de la Bibliotheque nationale (vi. p. 310), a piece of 
 rhythmic verse, "De presbytero et logico." "It is not unedited," 
 says he ; " Thomas Wright has already published it. . . . But this 
 edition is very defective ; the text is occasionally quite unintelligible. 
 We have, therefore, considerably amended it, making use, for this 
 purpose, of two copies, which, it must be conceded, are neither 
 of them faultless. . . ." The edition follows, with no variants. 
 Verification is impossible. 
 
 1 " Textual emendation too often misses the mark through want 
 of knowledge of what may be called the rides of the game" (W. M. 
 Lindsay, p. v. in the work referred to above). 
 
 84 
 
Textual Criticism 
 
 exact text of every historical document. In the 
 present state of science few labours are more useful 
 than those which bring new texts to light or im- 
 prove texts already known. It is a real service to 
 the study of history to publish unedited or badly 
 edited texts in a manner conformable to the rules 
 of criticism. In every country learned societies 
 without number are devoting the greater part of 
 their resources and activity to this important work. 
 But the immense number of the texts to be criti- 
 cised, 1 and the minute care required by the opera- 
 tions of verbal criticism, 2 prevent the work of 
 
 1 It has often been asked whether all texts are worth the trouble 
 of "establishing" and publishing them. "Among our ancient 
 texts," says M. J. Bddier, referring to French mediaeval literature, 
 " which ought we to publish ? Every one. But, it will be asked, 
 are we not already staggering under the weight of documents ? 
 . . . The following is the reason why publication should be ex- 
 haustive. As long as we are confronted by this mass of sealed and 
 mysterious manuscripts, they will appeal to us as if they contained 
 the answer to every riddle ; every candid mind will be hampered 
 by them in its flights of induction. It is desirable to publish them, 
 if only to get rid of them and to be able, for the future, to work 
 as if they did not exist. . . ." (Revue des Deux Mondes, February 
 15, 1894, p. 910). All documents ought to be catalogued, as we 
 have already pointed out (p. 31), in order that researchers may be 
 relieved of the fear that there may be documents, useful for their 
 purposes, of which they know nothing. But in every case where 
 a summary analysis of a document can give a sufficient idea of its 
 contents, and its form is of no special interest, there is nothing 
 gained by publishing it in extenso. We need not overburden our- 
 selves. Every document will be analysed some day, but many 
 documents will never be published. 
 
 2 Editors of texts often render their task still longer and more 
 difficult than it need be by undertaking the additional duty of 
 commentators, under the pretext of explaining the text. It would 
 be to their advantage to spare themselves this labour, and to dis- 
 pense with all annotation which does not belong to the "apparatus 
 criticus " proper. See, on this point, T. Lindner, Ueber die Heraus- 
 
 85 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 publication and restoration from advancing at any 
 but a slow pace. Before all the texts which are of 
 interest for mediaeval and modern history shall have 
 been edited or re-edited secundum artem, a long 
 period must elapse, even supposing that the rela- 
 tively rapid pace of the last few years should be 
 still further accelerated. 1 
 
 gabe von geschichtlichen Quellen, in the Mitiheilungcn dcs Instituts ficr 
 bsterreicJiische Geschichtsforschung, xvi., 1 895, pp. 501 sqq. 
 
 1 To realise this it is enough to compare what has hitherto been 
 done by the most active societies, such as the Society of the Monu- 
 menta Germanise historica and the Istituto storlco italiano, with what 
 still remains for them to do. The greater part of the most ancient 
 documents and the hardest to restore, which have long taxed the 
 ingenuity of scholars, have now been placed in a relatively satis- 
 factory condition. But an immense amount of mechanical work 
 has still to be done. 
 
 86 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 CRITICAL INVESTIGATION OF AUTHORSHIP 
 
 It would be absurd to look for information about a 
 fact in the papers of some one who knew nothing, 
 and could know nothing, about it. The first ques- 
 tions, then, which we ask when we are confronted 
 with a document is : Where does it come from ? 
 who is the author of it ? what is its date ? A 
 document in respect of which we necessarily are in 
 total ignorance of the author, the place, and the 
 date is good for nothing. 
 
 This truth, which seems elementary, has only 
 been adequately recognised in our own day. Such 
 is the natural aicpicria of man, that those who were 
 the first to make a habit of inquiring into the 
 authorship of documents prided themselves, and 
 justly, on the advance, they had made. 
 
 Most modern documents contain a precise indica- 
 tion of their authorship : in our days, books, news- 
 paper articles, official papers, and even private 
 writings, are, in general, dated and signed. Many 
 ancient documents, on the other hand, are anony- 
 mous, without date, and have no sufficient indication 
 of their place of origin. 
 
 The spontaneous tendency of the human mind is 
 to place confidence in the indications of author- 
 ship, when there are any. On the cover and in the 
 
 8 7 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 preface of the Chdtiments, Victor Hugo is named as 
 the author ; therefore Victor Hugo is the author of 
 the Chdtiments. In such and such a picture gallery 
 we see an unsigned picture whose frame has been 
 furnished by the management with a tablet bearing 
 the name of Leonardo da Vinci ; therefore Leonardo 
 da Vinci painted this picture. A poem with the 
 title Philomena is found under the name of Saint 
 Bonaventura in M. Clement's Extraits des pontes 
 chre'tiens, in most editions of Saint Bonaventura's 
 " works," and in a great number of mediaeval manu- 
 scripts ; therefore Philomena was written by Saint 
 Bonaventura, and "we may gather thence much 
 precious knowledge of the very soul " of this holy 
 man. 1 Vrain-Lucas offered to M. Chasles auto- 
 graphs of Vercingetorix, Cleopatra, and Saint Mary 
 Magdalene, duly signed, and with the nourishes 
 complete : 2 here, thought M. Chasles, are auto- 
 graphs of Vercingetorix, Cleopatra, and Saint Mary 
 Magdalene. This is one of the most universal, and 
 at the same time indestructible, forms of public 
 credulity. 
 
 Experience and reflection have shown the neces- 
 sity of methodically checking these instinctive 
 impulses of confiding trust. The autographs of 
 Vercingetorix, Cleopatra, and Mary Magdalene had 
 been manufactured by Vrain-Lucas. The Philomena, 
 attributed by mediaeval scribes now to Saint Bona- 
 ventura, now to Louis of Granada, now to John 
 Hoveden, now to John Peckham, is perhaps by none 
 
 1 R. de Gourmont, Le Latin mystique (Paris, 1891, 8vo), p. 258. 
 
 2 See these alleged autographs in the Bibliotheque nationale, 
 nouv. acq. fr., No. 709. 
 
 88 
 
Critical Investigation of Authorship 
 
 of these authors, and certainly not by the first- 
 named. Paintings in which there is not the least 
 gleam of talent have, in the most celebrated galleries 
 of Italy, been tricked out, without the least shadow 
 of proof, with the glorious name of Leonardo. On 
 the other hand, it is perfectly true that Victor Hugo 
 is the author of the Chdtiments. The conclusion is, 
 that the most precise indications of authorship are 
 never sufficient by themselves. They only afford a 
 presumption, strong or weak — very strong, in general, 
 where modern documents are concerned, often very 
 weak in the case of ancient documents. False 
 indications of authorship exist, some foisted upon 
 insignificant works in order to enhance their value, 
 some appended to works of merit in order to serve 
 the reputation of a particular person, or to mystify 
 posterity; and there are a hundred other motives 
 which may easily be imagined, and of which a 
 list has been drawn up: 1 the " pseudepigraphic " 
 literature of antiquity and the middle ages is enor- 
 mous. There are, in addition, documents which are 
 forged from beginning to end; the forgers have 
 naturally furnished them with very precise indica- 
 tions of their alleged authorship. Verification is 
 therefore necessary. But how is it to be had ? 
 When the apparent authorship of a document is 
 suspected, we use for its verification the same 
 method which serves to fix, as far as possible, the 
 origin of documents which are furnished with no 
 indications at all on this head. As the procedure 
 
 1 F. Blass has enumerated the chief of these motives with refer- 
 ence to the pseudepigraphic literature of antiquity (pp. 269 sqq. in 
 the work already quoted). 
 
 89 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 is the same in both cases, it is not necessary to dis- 
 tinguish further between them. 
 
 I. The chief instrument used in the investigation 
 of authorship is the internal analysis of the docu- 
 ment under consideration, performed with a view to 
 bring out any indications it may contain of a nature 
 to supply information about the author, and the 
 time and place in which he lived. 
 
 First of all we examine the handwriting of the 
 document. Saint Bonaventura was born in 1221 ; 
 if poems attributed to him are contained in manu- 
 scripts executed in the eleventh century, we have in 
 this circumstance an excellent proof that the attri- 
 bution is ill-founded : no document of which there 
 exists a copy in eleventh-century handwriting can 
 be posterior in date to the eleventh century. Then 
 we examine the language. It is known that certain 
 forms have only been used in certain places and at 
 certain dates. Most forgers have betrayed them- 
 selves by ignorance of facts of this kind ; they let 
 slip modern words or phrases. It has been possible 
 to establish the fact that certain Phoenician inscrip- 
 tions, found in South America, were earlier than a 
 certain German dissertation on a point of Phoenician 
 syntax. In the case of official instruments we 
 examine the formulae. If a document which pur- 
 ports to be a Merovingian charter does not exhibit 
 the ordinary formulae of genuine Merovingian 
 charters it must be spurious. Lastly, we note all 
 the positive data which occur in the document — 
 the facts which are mentioned or alluded to. When 
 these facts are otherwise known, from sources which 
 a forger could not have had at his disposal, the 
 
 90 
 
Critical Investigation of Authorship 
 
 bona fides of the document is established, and the 
 date fixed approximately between the most recent 
 event of which the author shows knowledge, and 
 the next following event which he does not mention 
 but would have done if he had known of it. Argu- 
 ments may also be founded on the circumstance 
 that particular facts are mentioned with approval, or 
 particular opinions expressed, and help us to make 
 a conjectural estimate of the status, the environ- 
 ment, and the character of the author. 
 
 When the internal analysis of a document is care- 
 fully performed, it generally gives us a tolerably 
 accurate notion of its authorship. By means of a 
 methodical comparison, instituted between the various 
 elements of the documents analysed and the cor- 
 responding elements of similar documents whose 
 authorship was known with certainty, the detection 
 of many a forgery * has been rendered possible, and 
 additional information acquired about the circum- 
 stances under which most genuine documents have 
 been produced. 
 
 The results obtained by internal analysis are sup- 
 plemented and verified by collecting all the external 
 evidence relative to the document under criticism 
 which can be found scattered over the documents 
 of the same or later epochs — quotations, biographical 
 details about the author, and so on. Sometimes 
 
 1 E. Bernheim (Lehrbuch, pp. 243 sqq.) gives a somewhat lengthy- 
 list of spurious documents, now recognised as such. Here it will 
 be enough to recall a few famous hoaxes : Sarchoniathon, Clotilde 
 de Surville, Ossian. Since the publication of Bernheim's book 
 several celebrated documents, hitherto exempt from suspicion, have 
 been struck off the list of authorities. See especially A. Piaget, 
 La Chronique des chanoines de Neuchdtel (Neuchatel, 1896, 8vo). 
 
 91 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 there is a significant absence of any such informa- 
 tion : the fact that an alleged Merovingian charter 
 has not been quoted by anybody before the seven- 
 teenth century, and has only been seen by a seven- 
 teenth-century scholar who has been convicted of 
 fraud, suggests the thought that it is modern. 
 
 II. Hitherto we have considered only the simplest 
 case, in which the document under examination is 
 the work of a single author. But many documents 
 have, at different times, received additions which it 
 is important to distinguish from the original text, in 
 order that we may not attribute to X, the author 
 of the text, what really belongs to Y or Z, his 
 unforeseen collaborators. 1 There are two kinds of 
 additions — interpolations and continuations. To in- 
 terpolate is to insert into the text words or sen- 
 tences which were not in the author's manuscript. 2 
 Usually interpolations are accidental, due to the 
 negligence of the copyist, and explicable as the 
 introduction into the text of interlinear glosses or 
 marginal notes; but there are cases where some 
 one has deliberately added to (or substituted for) 
 the author's text words or sentences out of his own 
 head, for the sake of completeness, ornament, or 
 emphasis. If we had before us the manuscript in 
 which the deliberate interpolation was made, the 
 appearance of the added matter and the traces of 
 erasure would make the case clear at once. But 
 the first interpolated copy has nearly always been 
 
 1 When the modifications of the primitive text are the work of 
 the author himself, they are " alterations." Internal analysis, and 
 the comparison of different editions, bring them to light. 
 
 2 See F. Blass, ibid., pp. 254 sqq. 
 
 92 
 
Critical Investigation of Authorship 
 
 lost, and in the copies derived from it every trace of 
 addition or substitution has disappeared. There is 
 no need to define " continuations." It is well known 
 that many chronicles of the middle ages have been 
 " continued " by various writers, none of whom took 
 the trouble to indicate where his own work began 
 or ended. 
 
 Sometimes interpolations and continuations can 
 be very readily distinguished in the course of the 
 operations for restoring a text of which there are 
 several copies, when it so happens that some of these 
 copies reproduce the primitive text as it was before 
 any addition was made to it. But if all the copies 
 are founded on previous copies which already con- 
 tained the interpolations or continuations, recourse 
 must be had to internal analysis. Is the style 
 uniform throughout the document ? Does the book 
 breathe one and the same spirit from cover to cover ? 
 Are there no contradictions, no gaps in the sequence 
 of ideas ? In practice, when the continuators or in- 
 terpolators have been men of well-marked personality 
 and decided views, analysis will separate the original 
 from the additions as cleanly as a pair of scissors. 
 When the whole is written in a level, colourless style, 
 the lines of division are not so easy to see ; it is then 
 better to confess the fact than to multiply hypotheses. 
 
 III. The critical investigation of authorship is 
 not finished as soon as a document has been 
 accurately or approximately localised in space and 
 time, and as much information as possible obtained 
 about the author or authors. 1 Here is a book : we 
 
 1 As a rule it matters little whether the name of the author has 
 or lias not been discovered. We read, however, in the Histoire 
 
 93 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 wish to ascertain the origin of the information con- 
 tained in it, that is, to be in a position to appreciate 
 its value ; is it enough to know that it was written 
 in 1890, at Paris, by So-and-so? Perhaps So-and-so 
 copied slavishly, without mentioning the fact, an 
 earlier work, written in 1850. The responsible 
 guarantor of the borrowed parts is not So-and-so, 
 but the author of 1850. Plagiarism, it is true, is 
 now rare, forbidden by the law, and considered dis- 
 honourable ; formerly it was common, tolerated, and 
 unpunished. Many historical documents, with every 
 appearance of originality, are nothing but unavowed 
 repetitions of earlier documents, and historians occa- 
 sionally experience, in this connection, remarkable 
 disillusions. Certain passages in Eginhard, a ninth- 
 century chronicler, are borrowed from Suetonius: 
 they have nothing to do with the history of the 
 ninth century; how if the fact had not been dis- 
 covered ? An' event is attested three times, by three 
 chroniclers; but these three attestations, which agree 
 so admirably, are really only one if it is ascertained 
 that two of the three chroniclers copied the third, 
 or that the three parallel accounts have been drawn 
 from one and the same source. Pontifical letters 
 and Imperial charters of the middle ages contain 
 eloquent passages which must not be taken seriously ; 
 they are part of the official style, and were copied 
 word for word from chancery formularies. 
 
 It belongs to the investigation of authorship to 
 
 litleraire de la France (xxvi. p. 388) : " We have ignored anonymous 
 sermons : writings of this facile character are of no importance for 
 literary history when their authors are unknown." Are they of 
 any more importance when we know the authors' names ? 
 
 94 
 
Critical Investigation of Authorship 
 
 discover, as far as possible, the sources utilised by 
 the authors of documents. 
 
 The problem thus presented to us has some 
 resemblance to that of the restoration of texts of 
 which we have already spoken. In both cases we 
 proceed on the assumption that identical readings 
 have a common source : a number of different scribes, 
 in transcribing a text, will not make exactly the 
 same mistakes in exactly the same places; a number 
 of different writers, relating the same facts, will not 
 have viewed them from exactly the same stand- 
 point, nor will they say the same things in exactly 
 the same language. The great complexity of his- 
 torical events makes it extremely improbable that 
 two independent observers should narrate them in 
 the same manner. We endeavour to group the 
 documents into families in the same way as we 
 make families of manuscripts. Similarly, we are 
 enabled in the result to draw up genealogical tables. 
 The examiners who correct the compositions of can- 
 didates for the bachelor's degree sometimes notice 
 that the papers of two candidates who sat next 
 each other bear a family likeness. If they have a 
 mind to find out which is derived from the other, 
 they have no difficulty in doing so, in spite of the 
 petty artifices (slight modifications, expansions, ab- 
 stracts, additions, suppressions, transpositions) which 
 the plagiarist multiplies in order to throw suspicion 
 off the scent. The two guilty ones are sufficiently 
 betrayed by their common errors ; the more culpable 
 of the two is detected by the slips he will have 
 made, and especially by the errors in his own 
 papers which are due to peculiarities in those of 
 
 95 
 
Analytical Opekations 
 
 his accommodating friend. Similarly when two 
 ancient documents are in question : when the 
 author of one has copied directly from the other, 
 the filiation is generally easy to establish ; the pla- 
 giarist, whether he abridges or expands, nearly always 
 betrays himself sooner or later. 1 
 
 When there are three documents in a family 
 their mutual relationships are sometimes harder to 
 specify. Let A, B, and C be the documents. 
 Suppose A is the common source : perhaps B and 
 C copied it independently ; perhaps C only knew 
 A through the medium of B, or B knew it only 
 through C. If B and C have abridged the common 
 source in different ways, they are evidently inde- 
 pendent. When B depends on C, or vice versa, 
 we have the simplest case, treated in the preceding 
 paragraph. But suppose the author of C combined 
 A and B, while B had already used A : the genealogy 
 begins to get complicated. It is more complicated 
 still when there are four, five, or more documents 
 in a family, for the number of possible combina- 
 tions increases with great rapidity. However, if too 
 many intermediate links have not been lost, criti- 
 cism succeeds in disentangling the relationships by 
 persistent and ingenious applications of the method 
 of repeated comparisons. Modern scholars (Krusch, 
 for example, who has made a speciality of Mero- 
 vingian hagiography) have recently constructed, by 
 
 1 In very favourable cases the examination of the plagiarist's 
 mistakes has made it possible to determine even this style of 
 handwriting, the size, and the manner of arrangement of the 
 manuscript source. The deductions of the investigation of sources, 
 like those of textual criticism, are sometimes supported by obvious 
 palseographical considerations. 
 
 96 
 
Critical Investigation of Authorship 
 
 the use of this method, precise genealogies of the 
 utmost solidity. 1 The results of the critical in- 
 vestigation of authorship, as applied to the filiation 
 of documents, are of two kinds. Firstly, lost docu- 
 ments are reconstructed. Suppose two chroniclers, 
 B and C, have used, each in his own way, a common 
 source X, which has now disappeared. We may 
 form an idea of X by piecing together the fragments 
 of it which occur imbedded in B and C, just as we 
 form an idea of a lost manuscript by comparing the 
 partial copies of it which have been preserved. On 
 the other hand, criticism destroys the authority of a 
 host of " authentic " documents — that is, documents 
 which no one suspects of having been falsified — by 
 showing that they are derivative, that they are worth 
 whatever their sources may be worth, and that, when 
 •they embellish their sources with imaginary details 
 and rhetorical flourishes, they are worth just nothing 
 at all. In Germany and England editors of docu- 
 ments have introduced the excellent system of 
 printing borrowed passages in small characters, and 
 original passages whose source is unknown in larger 
 characters. Thanks to this system it is possible to 
 see at a glance that celebrated chronicles, which are 
 often (very wrongly) quoted, are mere compilations, 
 of no value in themselves : thus the Flores historiarum 
 of the self-styled Matthew of Westminster, perhaps 
 the most popular of the English mediseval chronicles, 
 
 1 The investigations of Julien Havet {Questions me'rovingiennes, 
 Paris, 1896, 8vo) are regarded as models. Very difficult problems 
 are there solved with faultless elegance. It is also well worth 
 while to read the memoirs in which M. L. Delisle has discussed 
 questions of origin. It is in the treatment of these questions that 
 the most accomplished scholars win their triumphs. 
 
 97 g 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 are almost entirely taken from original works by 
 Wendover and Matthew of Paris. 1 
 
 IV. The critical investigation of authorship saves 
 historians from huge blunders. Its results are 
 striking. By eliminating spurious documents, by 
 detecting false ascriptions, by determining the con- 
 ditions of production of documents which had been 
 defaced by time, and by connecting them with their 
 sources, 2 it has rendered services of such magnitude 
 that to-day it is regarded as having a special right 
 to the name of " criticism." It is usual to say of an 
 historian that he " fails in criticism " when he neglects 
 to distinguish between documents, when he never 
 mistrusts traditional ascriptions, and when he accepts, 
 as if afraid to lose a single one, all the pieces of 
 information, ancient or modern, good or bad, which 
 come to him, from whatever quarter. 3 
 
 This view is perfectly just. We must not, how- 
 ever, be satisfied with this form of criticism, and we 
 must not abuse it. 
 
 1 See the edition of H. R. Luard (vol. i., London, 1890, 8vo) in 
 the Rerum Britannicarum medii cevi scriptores. Matthew of West- 
 minster's Flores historiarum figure in the Roman " Index," because 
 of the passages borrowed from the Chronica majora of Matthew of 
 Paris, while the Chronica majora themselves have escaped censure. 
 
 2 It would be instructive to draw up a list of the celebrated his- 
 torical works, such as Augustin Thierry's Histoire de la Conquete de 
 V Angleterre par les Normands, whose authority has been completely 
 destroyed after the authorship of their sources has been studied. 
 Nothing amuses the gallery more than to see an historian convicted 
 of having built a theory on falsified documents. Nothing is more 
 calculated to cover an historian with confusion than to find that he 
 has fallen into the error of treating seriously documents which are 
 no documents at all. 
 
 3 One of the crudest (and commonest) forms of "uncritical 
 method " is that which consists in employing as if they were docu- 
 ments, and placing on the same footing as documents, the utterances 
 
 98 
 
Critical Investigation of Authorship 
 
 We must not abuse it. The extreme ot distrust, 
 in these matters, is almost as mischievous as the 
 extreme of credulity. Pere Hardouin, who attributed 
 the works of Vergil and Horace to mediaeval monks, 
 was every whit as ridiculous as the victim of Vrain- 
 Lucas. It is an abuse of the methods of this species 
 of criticism to apply them, as has been done, indis- 
 criminately, for the mere pleasure of it. The 
 bunglers who have used this species of criticism to 
 brand as spurious perfectly genuine documents, such 
 as the writings of Hroswitha, the Ligurinus, and the 
 bull Unam Sanctam, 1 or to establish imaginary 
 filiations between certain annals, on the strength 
 of superficial indications, would have discredited 
 criticism before now if that had been possible. It 
 is praiseworthy, certainly, to react against those 
 who never raise a doubt about the authorship of a 
 document ; but it is carrying the reaction too far to 
 take an exclusive interest in periods of history which 
 depend on documents of uncertain authorship. The 
 only reason why the documents of modern and con- 
 temporary history are found less interesting than 
 those 6f antiquity and the early middle ages, is that 
 the identity which nearly always obtains between 
 their apparent and their real authorship leaves no 
 room for those knotty problems of attribution in 
 which the virtuosi of criticism are accustomed to dis- 
 play their skill. 2 
 
 of modern authors on the subject of documents. Novices do not 
 make a sufficient distinction, in the works of modern authors, 
 between what is added to the original source and what is taken 
 from it. 
 
 * See a list of examples in Bernheim's Handbuch, pp. 283, 289. 
 
 2 It is because it is necessary to subject documents of mediaeval 
 
 99 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 Nor must we be content with it. The critical 
 investigation of authorship, like textual criticism, is 
 preparatory, and its results negative. Its final aim 
 and crowning achievement is to get rid of documents 
 which are not documents, and which would have 
 misled us ; that is all. " It teaches us not to use bad 
 documents ; it does not teach us how to turn good 
 ones to account." * It is not the whole of " historical 
 criticism ; " it is only one stone in the edifice. 2 
 
 and ancient history to the most searching criticism in respect of 
 authorship that the study of antiquity and the middle ages passes 
 for more " scientific " than that of modern times. The truth is, that 
 it is merely hampered by more preliminary difficulties. 
 
 1 Revue philosophique, 1887, ii. p. 170. 
 
 2 The theory of the critical investigation of authorship is now 
 settled, ne varietur ; it is given in detail in Bernheim's Lehrbuch, 
 pp. 242-340. For this reason we have had no scruple in dismissing 
 it with a short sketch. In French, the introduction of M. G. Monod 
 to his Etudes critiques sur les sources de Vkistoire me'rovingienne 
 (Paris, 1872, 8vo) contains elementary considerations on the subject. 
 Cf. Revue Critique, 1873, *• P« 3°§- 
 
 IOO 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 CRITICAL CLASSIFICATION OF SOURCES 
 
 By the help of the preceding operations the docu- 
 ments, all the documents, let us suppose, of a given 
 class, or relating to a given subject, have been found. 
 We know where they are ; the text of each has been 
 restored, if necessary, and each has been critically 
 examined in respect of authorship. We know where 
 they have come from. It remains to combine and 
 classify the materials thus verified. This is the 
 last of the operations which may be called prepa- 
 ratory to the work of higher (or internal) criticism 
 and construction. 
 
 Whoever studies a point of history is obliged, 
 first of all, to classify his sources. To arrange, in a 
 rational and convenient manner, the verified mate- 
 rials before making use of them, is an apparently 
 humble, but really very important, part of the his- 
 torian's profession. Those who have learnt how 
 to do it possess, on that account alone, a marked 
 advantage : they give themselves less trouble, and 
 they obtain better results ; the others waste their 
 time and labour ; they are smothered sometimes 
 under the disorderly mass of notes, extracts, copies, 
 scraps, which they themselves have accumulated. 
 Who was it spoke of those busy people who spend 
 their lives lifting building-stones without knowing 
 
 IOI 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 where to place them, raising as they do so clouds 
 of blinding dust ? 
 
 I. Here, again, we have to confess that the first, 
 the natural impulse, is not the right one. The 
 first impulse of most men who have to utilise a 
 number of texts is to make notes from them, one 
 after another, in the order in which they study 
 them. Many of the early scholars (whose papers 
 we possess) worked on this system, and so do most 
 beginners who are not warned beforehand ; the latter 
 keep, as the former kept, notebooks, which they fill 
 continuously and progressively with notes on the 
 texts they are interested in. This method is utterly 
 wrong. The materials collected must be classified 
 sooner or later ; otherwise it would be necessary, 
 when occasion arose, to deal separately with the 
 materials bearing on a given point, to read right 
 through the whole series of notebooks, and this 
 laborious process would have to be repeated every 
 time a new detail was wanted. If this method 
 seems attractive at first, it is because it appears to 
 save time. But this is false economy; the ulti- 
 mate result is, an enormous addition to the labour 
 of search, and great difficulty in combining the 
 materials. 
 
 Others, well understanding the advantages of 
 systematic classification, have proposed to fit their 
 materials, as fast as collected, into their appropriate 
 places in a prearranged scheme. For this purpose 
 they use notebooks of which every page has first 
 been provided with a heading. Thus all the entries 
 of the same kind are close to one another. This 
 system leaves something to be desired; for addi- 
 
 102 
 
Critical Classification of Sources 
 
 tions will not always fit without inconvenience into 
 their proper place ; and the scheme of classification, 
 once adopted, is rigid, and can only be modified 
 with difficulty. Many librarians used to draw up 
 their catalogues on this plan, which is now uni- 
 versally condemned. 
 
 There is a still more barbarous method, which 
 need not receive more than passing mention. This 
 is simply to register documents in the memory 
 without taking written notes. This method has 
 been used. Historians endowed with excellent 
 memories, and lazy to boot, have indulged this 
 whim, with the result that their quotations and 
 references are mostly inexact. The human memory 
 is a delicate piece of registering apparatus, but it is 
 so little an instrument of precision that such pre- 
 sumption is inexcusable. 
 
 Every one admits nowadays that it is advisable to 
 collect materials on separate cards or slips of paper. 
 The notes from each document are entered upon a 
 loose leaf furnished with the precisest possible in- 
 dications of origin. The advantages of this artifice 
 are obvious : the detachability of the slips enables 
 us to group them at will in a host of different com- 
 binations ; if necessary, to change their places : it is 
 easy to bring texts of the same kind together, and 
 to incorporate additions, as they are acquired, in the 
 interior of the groups to which they belong. As for 
 documents which are interesting from several points 
 of view, and which ought to appear in several groups, 
 it is sufficient to enter them several times over on 
 different slips ; or they may be represented, as often 
 as may be required, on reference-slips. Moreover, 
 
 103 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 the method of slips is the only one mechanically 
 possible for the purpose of forming, classifying, and 
 utilising a collection of documents of any great 
 extent. Statisticians, financiers, and men of letters 
 who observe, have now discovered this as well as 
 scholars. 
 
 The method of slips is not without its drawbacks. 
 Each slip ought to be furnished with precise refer- 
 ences to the source from which its contents have 
 been derived ; consequently, if a document has been 
 analysed upon fifty different slips, the same refer- 
 ences must be repeated fifty times. Hence a slight 
 increase in the amount of writing to be done. It 
 is certainly on account of this trivial complication 
 that some obstinately cling to the inferior notebook 
 system. Again, in virtue of their very detachability, 
 the slips, or loose leaves, are liable to go astray ; and 
 when a slip is lost how is it to be replaced ? To 
 begin with, its disappearance is not perceived, and, 
 if it were, the only remedy would be to go right 
 through all the work already done from beginning 
 to end. But the truth is, experience has suggested 
 a variety of very simple precautions, which we need 
 not here explain in detail, by which the draAvbacks 
 of the system are reduced to a minimum. It is 
 recommended to use slips of uniform size and tough 
 material, and to arrange them at the earliest oppor- 
 tunity in covers or drawers or otherwise. Every 
 one is free to form his own habits in these matters. 
 But it is well to realise beforehand that these 
 habits, according as they are more or less rational 
 and practical, have a direct influence on the results 
 of scientific work. Renan speaks of " these points 
 
 104 
 
Critical Classification of Sources 
 
 of private librarianship which make up the half of 
 scientific work." x This is not too strong. One 
 scholar will owe a good part of his well-deserved 
 reputation to his method of collecting, while another 
 will be, so to speak, paralysed by his clumsiness in 
 that particular. 2 
 
 After having collected the documents, whether 
 copied in extenso or abridged, on slips or loose leaves, 
 we classify them. On what scheme ? In what order ? 
 Clearly different cases must be treated differently, 
 and it would not be reasonable to lay down precise 
 formulae to govern them. all. However, we may give 
 a few general considerations. 
 
 II. We distinguish between the historian who 
 classifies verified documents for the purposes of 
 historical work, and the scholar who compiles 
 " Regesta" By the words " Regesta " and " Corpus " 
 we understand methodically classified collections of 
 historical documents. In a " Corpus " documents 
 are reproduced in extenso ; in " Regesta " they are 
 analysed and described. 
 
 The use of these compilations is to assist re- 
 searchers in collecting documents. Scholars set 
 themselves to perform, once for all, tasks of search 
 and classification from which, thanks to them, the 
 public will henceforth be free. 
 
 Documents may be grouped according to their 
 
 1 Renan, Feuilles ditacMes, p. 103. 
 
 2 It would be very interesting to have information on the methods 
 of work of the great scholars, particularly those who undertook 
 long tasks of collection and classification. Some information of 
 this kind is to be found in their papers, and occasionally in their 
 correspondence. On the methods of Du Cange, see L. Feugere, Etude 
 sur la vie et les ouvrages de Du Cange (Paris, 1858, 8vo), pp. 62 sqq. 
 
 105 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 date, according to their place of origin, according to 
 their contents, according to their form. 1 Here we 
 have the four categories of time, place, species, and 
 form; by superposing, then, we obtain divisions of 
 smaller extent. We may undertake, for example, to 
 make a group of all the documents having a given 
 form, of a given country, and lying between two 
 given dates (French royal charters of the reign 
 of Philip Augustus) ; or of all the documents of a 
 given form (Latin inscriptions) ; or of a given species 
 (Latin hymns) ; of a given epoch (antiquity, the 
 middle ages). We may recall, by way of illustra- 
 tion, the existence of a Corpus Inscriptionum Grse- 
 carum, of a Corpus Inscriptionum Zatinarum, of a 
 Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, the 
 Regesta Imperii of J. F. Bohmer and his continuators, 
 the Regesta Pontificum Romanorum of P. Jaffe and 
 A. Potthast. 
 
 Whatever the division chosen, there are two 
 
 1 See J. G. Droysen, Grundriss cler Hitiorik, p. 19 : " Critical 
 classification does not exclusively adopt the chronological point 
 of view. . . . The more varied the points of view which criticism 
 uses to group materials, the more solid are the results yielded by 
 converging lines of inquiry." 
 
 The system has now been abandoned of grouping documents in a 
 Corpus or in regesta, as was done formerly, because they have the 
 common characteristic of being unedited, or possibly for the exactly 
 opposite reason. At one time the compilers of Analecta, Reliquioz 
 manuscriptorum, "treasuries of anecdota," spicilegia, and so on, used 
 to publish all the documents of a certain class which had the com- 
 mon feature of being unedited and of appearing interesting to them ; 
 on the other hand, Georgisch {Regesta Chronologico-diplomatica), Bre- 
 quigny {Table chronologique des dipldmes, chartes et actes imprimis 
 concemant Vhistoire de France), Wauters {Table chronologique des 
 chartes et dipldmes imprimis concemant Vhistoire de Belgique), have 
 grouped together all the documents of a certain species which had 
 the common character of having been printed. 
 
 I06 
 
Critical Classification of Sources 
 
 alternatives : either the documents to be placed in 
 this division are dated or they are not. 
 
 If they are dated, as is the case, for example, 
 with the charters issued from the chancery of a 
 prince, care will have been taken to place at the 
 head of each slip the date (expressed in modern 
 reckoning) of the document entered upon it. No- 
 thing is then easier than to group in chronological 
 order all the slips, that is, all the documents, which 
 have been collected. The rule is to use chrono- 
 logical classification whenever possible. There is 
 only one difficulty, and that is of a practical order. 
 Even in the most favourable circumstances some 
 of the documents will have accidentally lost their 
 dates ; these dates the compiler is bound to restore, 
 or at least to attempt to restore; long and patient 
 research is necessary for the purpose. 
 
 If the documents are not dated, a choice must 
 be made between the alphabetical, the geographical, 
 and the systematic order. The history of the Corpus 
 of Latin inscriptions bears witness to the difficulty 
 of this choice. "The arrangement according to 
 date was impossible, seeing that most of the inscrip- 
 tions are not dated. From the time of Smetius it 
 was usual to divide them into classes, that is, a 
 distinction was made, resting solely on the contents 
 of the inscription, and having no regard to their 
 place of origin, between religious, sepulchral, mili- 
 tary, and poetical inscriptions, those which have 
 a public character, and those which only concern 
 private persons, and so on. Boeckh, although he 
 had preferred the geographical arrangement for his 
 Corpus Inscriptionum Grsecarum, was of opinion that 
 
 107 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 the arrangement by subjects, which had been hitherto 
 employed, was the only possible one for a Latin 
 Corpus. . . ." [Even those who, in France, proposed 
 the geographical arrangement] " wished to make an 
 exception of texts relating to the general history of 
 a country, certainly, at any rate, in the case of the 
 Empire; in 1 845 Zumpt defended a very complicated 
 eclectic system of this kind. In 1847 Mommsen 
 still rejected the geographical arrangement except 
 for municipal inscriptions, and in 1852, when he 
 published the Inscriptions of the Kingdom of Naples, 
 he had not entirely changed his opinion. It was 
 only on being charged by the Academy of Berlin 
 with the publication of the Corpus Inscriptionum 
 Latinarum, that, grown wise by experience, he re- 
 jected even the exceptions proposed by Egger in 
 the case of the general history of a province, and 
 thought it his duty to keep to the geographical 
 arrangement pure and simple." x And yet, consider- 
 ing the nature of epigraphic documents, the arrange- 
 ment according to place was the only rational one. 
 This has been amply demonstrated for more than 
 fifty years ; but collectors of inscriptions did not 
 come to an agreement on the subject till after two 
 centuries of tentative efforts in different directions. 
 For two centuries collections of Latin inscriptions 
 have been made without any perception of the fact 
 that "to group inscriptions according to their sub- 
 jects is much the same thing as to publish an 
 edition of Cicero in which his speeches, treatises, 
 and letters should be cut up and the fragments 
 
 1 J. P. Waltzing, Recueil g4n4ral des inscriptions latines (Louvain, 
 1892, 8vo), p. 41. 
 
 108 
 
Critical Classification of Sources 
 
 arranged according to their subject-matter ; " that 
 " epigraphic monuments belonging to the same 
 territory mutually explain each other when placed 
 side by side ; " and, lastly, that " while it is all but 
 impossible to range in order of subject-matter a 
 hundred thousand inscriptions nearly all of which 
 belong to several categories ; on the other hand, 
 each monument has but one place, and a very 
 definite place, in the geographical order." 1 
 
 The alphabetical arrangement is very convenient 
 when the chronological and geographical arrange- 
 ments are unsuitable. There are documents, such 
 as the sermons, the hymns, and the secular songs 
 of the middle ages, which are not precisely dated 
 or localised. They are arranged in the alphabetical 
 order of their incipit — that is, the words with which 
 they begin. 2 
 
 The systematic order, or arrangement by sub- 
 jects, is not to be recommended for the compilation 
 of a Corpus or of regesta. It is always arbitrary, and 
 
 1 Ibid. When the geographical order is adopted, a difficulty 
 arises from the fact that the origin of certain documents is un- 
 known ; many inscriptions preserved in museums have been brought 
 there no one knows whence. The difficulty is analogous to that 
 which results, for chronological regesta, from documents without 
 date. 
 
 2 Here the only difficulty arises in the case of documents whose 
 incipit has been lost. In the eighteenth century Siguier devoted 
 a great part of his life to the construction of a catalogue, in the 
 alphabetical order of the incipit, of the Latin inscriptions, to the 
 number of 50,000, which had at that time been published : he 
 searched through some twelve thousand works. This vast compila- 
 tion has remained unpublished and useless. Before undertaking 
 work of such magnitude it is well to make sure that it is on a 
 rational plan, and that the labour — the hard and thankless labour — 
 will not be wasted. 
 
 109 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 leads to inevitable repetition and confusion. Be- 
 sides, given collections arranged in chronological, 
 geographical, or alphabetical order, nothing more 
 than the addition of a good table of contents is 
 needed to make them available for all the purposes 
 which would be served by a systematic arrange- 
 ment. One of the chief rules of the art of Corpus 
 and 7'egesta-mak.mg, that great art which has been 
 carried to such perfection in the second half of the 
 nineteenth century, 1 is to provide these collections, 
 whatever the grouping adopted, with a variety of 
 tables and indexes of a kind to facilitate the use 
 of them : incipit tables in chronological regesta which 
 lend themselves to such treatment, indexes of names 
 and dates in regesta arranged by order of incipit, and 
 so on. 
 
 Corpus and regesta-m.Sik.eYS collect and classify for 
 the use of others documents in which, at any rate 
 in all of which, they have no direct interest, and 
 are absorbed in this labour. Ordinary workers, on 
 the other hand, only collect and classify materials 
 useful for their individual studies. Hence certain 
 differences arise. For example, the arrangement by 
 subjects, on a predetermined system, which is so 
 little to be recommended for great collections, often 
 provides those who are composing monographs on 
 their own account with a scheme of classification 
 preferable to any other. But it will always be well 
 to cultivate the mechanical habits of which pro- 
 fessional compilers have learnt the value by experi- 
 ence : to write at the head of every slip its date, 
 
 1 See G. Waitz, Ueber die Herausgabe und Bearbeitung von Begesten, 
 in the Historische Zeitschrift, xl. (1878), pp. 280-95. 
 
 IIO 
 
Ckitical Classification of Sources 
 
 if there is occasion for it, and a heading 1 in any 
 case ; to multiply cross-references and indices ; to 
 keep a record, on a separate set of slips, of all the 
 sources utilised, in order to avoid the danger of 
 having to work a second time through materials 
 already dealt with. The regular observance of these 
 maxims goes a great way towards making scientific 
 historical work easier and more solid. The posses- 
 sion of a well- arranged, though incomplete, collection 
 of slips has enabled M. B. Haureau to exhibit to 
 the end of his life an undeniable mastery over the 
 very special class of historical problems which he 
 studied. 2 
 
 1 In the absence of a predetermined logical order, and when the 
 chronological order is not suitable, it is sometimes an advantage to 
 provisionally group the documents (that is, the slips) in the alpha- 
 betical order of the words chosen as headings (ScMagworter). This 
 is what is called the " dictionary system." 
 
 2 See Langlois, Manuel de bibliographie historiquc, i. p. 88. 
 
 Ill 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 CRITICAL SCHOLARSHIP AND SCHOLARS 
 
 The sum of the operations described in the pre- 
 ceding chapters (restoration of texts, investigation 
 of authorship, collection and classification of verified 
 documents) constitutes the vast domain of external 
 criticism, or critical scholarship. 
 
 The public at large, with its vulgar and super- 
 ficial standards, has nothing but disdain for the 
 whole of critical scholarship. Some of its votaries, 
 on the other hand, are inclined to exalt it unduly. 
 But there is a happy medium between these extremes 
 of over-appreciation and contempt. 
 
 The crude opinion of those who pity and despise 
 the minute analysis of external criticism hardly 
 deserves refutation. There is only one argument 
 for the legitimacy and honourable character of 
 the obscure labours of erudition, but it is a de- 
 cisive argument: it rests on their indispensability. 
 No erudition, no history. " Non sunt contemnenda 
 quasi parva" says St. Jerome, u sine quibus magna 
 const are non possunt." 1 
 
 On the other hand, scholars by profession, in their 
 zeal to justify their pride in their work, are not con- 
 
 1 This argument is easy to develop, and often has been, recently 
 by M. J. Bddier, in the Revue des Deux Mondes, February 15, 1894, 
 pp. 932 sqq. 
 
 There are some who willingly admit that the labours of erudition 
 112 
 
Critical Scholarship and Scholars 
 
 tent with maintaining its necessity; they allow them- 
 selves to be carried away into an exaggeration of its 
 merit and importance. It has been said that the 
 sure methods of external criticism have raised 
 history to the dignity of a science, " of an exact 
 science ; " that critical investigations of authorship 
 "enable us, better than any other study, to gain 
 a profound insight into past ages;" that the habit 
 of criticising texts refines or even confers the 
 " historical sense." It has been tacitly assumed 
 that external criticism is the whole of historical 
 criticism, and that beyond the purgation, emenda- 
 tion, and classification of documents there is nothing 
 left to do. This illusion, common enough among 
 specialists, is too crude to need express refutation; 
 the fact is, that it is the psychological criticism 
 which deals with interpretation and examines into 
 the good faith and accuracy of authors that has, 
 better than any other study, enabled us to gain a pro- 
 found insight into past ages, not external criticism. 1 
 An historian who should be fortunate enough to 
 find all the documents bearing on his studies 
 already edited correctly, classified, and critically 
 
 are useful, but ask impatiently whether " the editing of a text " or 
 "the deciphering of a Gothic parchment" is "the supreme effort 
 of the human mind," and whether the intellectual ability implied 
 by the practice of external criticism does or does not justify " all 
 the fuss made over those who possess it." On this question, 
 obviously devoid of importance, a controversy was held between 
 M. Brunetiere, who recommended scholars to be modest, and M. 
 Boucherie, who insisted on their reasons for being proud, in the 
 pages of the Revue des langucs romanes, 1880, vols. i. and ii. 
 
 1 There have been men who were critics of the first water where 
 external criticism alone was concerned, but who never rose to 
 the conception of higher criticism, or to a true understanding 
 of history. 
 
 113 H 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 examined as to authorship, would be in just as 
 good a position to use thern for writing history 
 as if he had performed all the preliminary opera- 
 tions himself. It is quite possible, whatever may 
 be said, to have the historical sense in full measure 
 without having ever, both literally and figuratively, 
 wiped away the dust from original documents — that 
 is, without having discovered and restored them for 
 oneself. We need not interpret in the Jewish or 
 etymological sense the dictum of Renan : " I do not 
 think it possible for any one to acquire a clear 
 notion of history, its limits, and the amount of 
 confidence to be placed in the different categories 
 of historical investigation, unless he is in the habit 
 of handling original documents." l This is to be 
 understood as simply referring to the habit of 
 going direct to the sources, and treating definite 
 problems. 2 Without doubt a day will come when 
 ail the documents relating to the history of classical 
 antiquity shall have been edited and treated criti- 
 cally. There will then be no more room, in this 
 department of study, for textual criticism or the 
 investigation of sources ; but, for all that, the condi- 
 tions for the treatment of general ancient history, 
 or special parts of it, will be then eminently favour- 
 able. External criticism, as we cannot too often 
 repeat, is entirely preparatory; it is a means, not 
 an end ; the ideal state of things would be that 
 it should have been already sufficiently practised 
 
 1 Renan, Essais de morale et de critique, p. 36. 
 
 2 " If it were only for the sake of the severe mental discipline, 
 I should not think very highly of the philosopher who had not, at 
 least once in his life, worked at the elucidation of some special 
 point " (L'Avenir de la science, p. 136). 
 
 II 4 
 
Critical Scholarship and Scholars 
 
 that we might dispense with it for the future ; it 
 is only a temporary necessity. Theoretically, not 
 only is it unnecessary for those who wish to make 
 historical syntheses to do for themselves the pre- 
 paratory work on the materials which they use, 
 but we have a right to ask, as has been often 
 asked, whether there is any advantage in their 
 doing it. 1 Would it not be preferable that workers 
 in the field of history should specialise ? On the 
 one class — the specialists — would devolve the ab- 
 sorbing tasks of external or erudite criticism; the 
 others, relieved of the weight of these tasks, would 
 have greater liberty to devote themselves to the 
 work of higher criticism, of combination and con- 
 struction. Such was the opinion of Mark Pattison, 
 who said, History cannot he written from manuscripts, 
 which is as much as to say : " It is impossible for 
 a man to write history from documents which he 
 is obliged to put for himself into a condition in 
 which they can be used." 
 
 Formerly the professions of " critical scholar " 
 and " historian " were, in fact, clearly distinguished. 
 The " historians " cultivated the empty and pompous 
 species of literature which then was known as " his- 
 tory," without considering themselves bound to keep 
 in touch with the work of the scholars. The latter, 
 for their part, determined by their critical researches 
 the conditions under which history must be written, 
 but were at no pains to write it themselves. Content 
 to collect, emend, and classify historical documents, 
 
 1 On the question whether it is necessary for every one to do 
 "all the preliminary grubbing for himself," cf. J. M. Robertson, 
 "Buckle and His Critics" (London, 1895, 8vo), p. 299. 
 
 115 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 they took no interest in history, and understood the 
 past no better than did the mass of their contem- 
 poraries. The scholars acted as though erudition 
 were an end in itself, and the historians as if they 
 had been able to reconstruct vanished realities by 
 the mere force of reflection and ingenuity applied to 
 the inferior documents, which were common pro- 
 perty. So complete a divorce between erudition 
 and history seems to-day almost inexplicable, and 
 it was in truth mischievous enough. We need not 
 say that the present advocates of the division of 
 labour in history have nothing of the kind in view. 
 It is admittedly necessary that close relations should 
 obtain between the world of historians and that of 
 critical scholars, for the work of the latter has no 
 reason for existence beyond its utility to the former. 
 All that is meant is, that certain analytical and all 
 synthetic operations are not necessarily better per- 
 formed when they are performed by the same 
 person ; that though the characters of historian and 
 scholar may be combined, there is nothing illegi- 
 timate in their separation; and that perhaps this 
 separation is desirable in theory, as, in practice, it is 
 often a necessity. 
 
 In practice, what happens is as follows. What- 
 ever part of history a man undertakes to study, 
 there are only three possible cases. In the first the 
 sources have already been emended and classified; 
 in the second the preliminary work on the sources, 
 which has been only partially done, or not at all, 
 offers no great difficulty; in the third the sources 
 are in a very bad state, and require a great deal 
 of labour to fit them for use. We may observe, in 
 
 116 
 
Critical Scholarship and Scholars 
 
 passing, that there is naturally no proportion be- 
 tween the intrinsic importance of the subject and 
 the amount of preliminary work which must be 
 done before it can be treated : there are some sub- 
 jects of the highest interest, for example the history 
 of the origin and early development of Christianity, 
 which could not be properly attacked till after the 
 completion of investigations which occupied several 
 generations of scholars; but the material criticism 
 of the sources of the history of the French Revolu- 
 tion, another subject of the first rank, gave much 
 less trouble ; and there are comparatively unimpor- 
 tant problems in mediaeval history which will not 
 be solved till after an immense amount of external 
 criticism shall have been performed. 
 
 In the two first cases the expediency of a division 
 of labour does not come in question. But take the 
 third case. A man of ability discovers that the 
 documents which are necessary for the treatment 
 of a point of history are in a very bad condition ; 
 they are scattered, corrupt, and untrustworthy. He 
 must take his choice ; either he must abandon the 
 subject, having no taste for the mechanical opera- 
 tions which he knows to be necessary, but which, 
 as he foresees, would absorb the whole of his energy ; 
 or else he resolves to enter upon the preparatory 
 critical work, without concealing from himself that 
 in all probability he will never have time to utilise 
 the materials he has verified, and that he will there- 
 fore be working for those who will come after him. 
 If he adopts the second alternative he becomes a 
 critical scholar by profession, as it were in spite of 
 himself. A priori, it is true, there is nothing to 
 
 117 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 prevent those who make great collections of texts 
 and publish critical editions from using their own 
 compilations and editions for the writing of history ; 
 and we see, as a matter of fact, that several men 
 have divided themselves between the preparatory 
 tasks of external criticism and the more exalted 
 labours of historical construction: it is enough to 
 mention the names of Waitz, Mommsen, and 
 Haur^au. But this combination is very rare, for 
 several reasons. The first is the shortness of life ; 
 there are catalogues, editions, regesta on a great scale, 
 the construction of which entails so much mecha- 
 nical labour as to exhaust the strength of the most 
 zealous worker. The second is the fact that, for 
 many persons, the tasks of critical scholarship are 
 not without their charm ; nearly every one finds 
 in them a singular satisfaction in the long run ; 
 and some have confined themselves to these tasks 
 who might, strictly speaking, have aspired to higher 
 things. 
 
 Is it a good thing in itself that some workers 
 should, voluntarily or not, confine themselves to 
 the researches of critical scholarship ? Yes, without 
 a doubt. In the study of history, the results of the 
 division of labour are the same as in the industrial 
 arts, and highly satisfactory — more abundant, more 
 successful, better regulated production. Critics who 
 have been long habituated to the restoration of texts 
 restore them with incomparable dexterity and sure- 
 ness ; those who devote themselves exclusively to 
 investigations of authorship and sources have in- 
 tuitions which would not occur to others less versed 
 in this difficult and highly specialised branch ; those 
 
 118 
 
Critical Scholarship and Scholars 
 
 who have spent their lives in the construction of 
 catalogues and the compilation of regesta construct 
 and compile them more easily, more quickly, and 
 better than the man in the street. Thus, not only 
 is there no special reason for requiring every " his- 
 torian" to be at the same time an active worker 
 in the field of critical scholarship, but even those 
 scholars who are engaged in the operations of ex- 
 ternal criticism come under different categories. 
 Similarly, in a stoneyard there is no point in the 
 architect being at the same time a workman, nor 
 have all the workmen the same functions. Although 
 most critical scholars have not rigorously specialised 
 so far, and although they vary their pleasures by 
 voluntarily executing different kinds of critical work, 
 it would be easy to name some who are specialists 
 in descriptive catalogues and indexes (archivists, 
 librarians, and the like), others who are more parti- 
 cularly " critics " (purifiers, restorers, and editors of 
 texts), and others who are pre-eminently compilers 
 of regesta. " The moment it is admitted that erudi- 
 tion is only valuable for the sake of its results, it 
 becomes impossible to carry the division of scientific 
 labour too far ; " * and the progress of the historical 
 sciences corresponds to the narrower and narrower 
 specialisation of the workers. It was possible, not 
 very long ago, for the same man to devote himself 
 successively to all the operations of historical in- 
 quiry, but that was because he appealed to a not 
 very exacting public : nowadays we require of those 
 who criticise documents a minute accuracy and an 
 absolute perfection which presuppose real professional 
 
 1 Renan, UAvenir de la science, p. 230. 
 IIO 
 
Analytical Opeeations 
 
 skill. The historical sciences have now reached a 
 stage in their evolution at which the main lines 
 have been traced, the great discoveries made, and 
 nothing remains but a more precise treatment of 
 details. We feel instinctively that any further 
 advance must be by dint of investigations of such 
 extent, and analyses of such depth, as none but 
 specialists are capable of. 
 
 But the best justification of the division of workers 
 into " scholars " and " historians " (and of the distri- 
 bution of the former among the various branches of 
 external criticism) is to be found in the fact that 
 different persons have a natural vocation for dif- 
 ferent tasks. One of the chief justifications of the 
 institution of higher historical teaching is, in our 
 opinion, the opportunity afforded the teachers (pre- 
 sumably men of experience) of discerning in the 
 students, in the course of their university career, 
 either the germ of a vocation for critical scholar- 
 ship, or fundamental unfitness for critical work, 
 as the case may be. 1 Criticus non fit, sed nascitur. 
 For one who is not endowed by nature with certain 
 aptitudes, a career of technical erudition has nothing 
 but disappointments in store : the greatest service 
 that can be rendered to young men hesitating 
 whether to adopt such a career or not is to warn 
 them of the fact. Those who hitherto have devoted 
 themselves to the preparatory tasks of criticism have 
 either chosen them in preference to others because 
 
 1 A university professor is in a very good position for discouraging 
 and encouraging vocations ; but "it is by personal effort that the 
 goal (critical skill) must be attained by the students, as Waitz well 
 said in an academic oration ; the teacher's part in this work is 
 small . . ." (Revue Critique, 1874, ii. p. 232). 
 
 I20 
 
Ceitical Scholarship and Scholars 
 
 they had a taste for them, or else have submitted to 
 them because they knew they were necessary ; those 
 who engaged in them by choice have less merit, from 
 the ethical point of view, than those who submitted 
 to them, but, for all that, they have mostly obtained 
 better results, because they have worked, not as a 
 matter of duty, but joyfully and whole-heartedly. 
 It is important that every one should realise the 
 situation, and, in his own as well as the general 
 interest, embrace the special work which suits him 
 best. 
 
 We now propose to examine the natural aptitudes 
 which fit, and the truly prohibitory defects which 
 disqualify, for the labours of external criticism. We 
 shall, then, devote a few words to the effects pro- 
 duced on the character by professional habituation 
 to the labours of critical scholarship. 
 
 The chief condition of success in these labours is 
 to like them. Those who are exceptionally gifted 
 as poets or thinkers — that is, those who are endowed 
 with creative power — have much difficulty in adapt- 
 ing themselves to the technical drudgery of prepara- 
 tory criticism: they are far from despising it; on 
 the contrary, they hold it in honour, if they are 
 clear-sighted ; but they shrink from devoting them- 
 selves to it, for fear of using a razor, as is said, 
 to cut stones. "I have no mind," wro*3 Leibnitz 
 to Basnage, who had exhorted him to compile an 
 immense Corpus of unpublished and printed docu- 
 ments relating to the history of the law of nations ; 
 " I have no mind to turn transcriber. . . . Does it not 
 occur to you that the advice you give me resembles 
 that of a man who should wish to marry his friend 
 
 121 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 to a shrew ? For to engage a man in a lifelong 
 work is much the same as to find him a wife." 1 
 And Renan, speaking of those immense preliminary 
 labours " which have rendered possible the researches 
 of the higher criticism " and attempts at historical 
 construction, says : " The man who, with livelier 
 intellectual needs [than those of the men who per- 
 formed these labours], should now accomplish such 
 an act of abnegation, would be a hero. . . ." 2 Al- 
 though Renan directed the publication of the Corpus 
 Inscri-ptionum Semiticaribm, and Leibnitz was the 
 editor of the Scrijotorcs rerum Brunsvicensium, neither 
 Leibnitz, nor Renan, nor their peers have, fortunately, 
 had the heroism to sacrifice their higher faculties to 
 purely critical learning. 
 
 Outside the class of superior men (and the in- 
 finitely more numerous class of those who wrongly 
 think themselves such), nearly every one, as we have 
 already said, finds in the long run a kind of satisfac- 
 tion in the minutiae of preparatory criticism. The 
 reason is, that the practice of this criticism appeals 
 to and develops two very widespread tastes — the 
 taste for collecting and the taste for puzzles. The 
 pleasure of collecting is one which is felt not by 
 children only, but by adults as well, no matter 
 whether the collection be one of various readings 
 or of postage-stamps. The deciphering of rebuses, 
 the solution of small problems of strictly definite 
 scope, are occupations which attract many able 
 minds. Every find brings pleasure, and in the 
 
 1 Quoted by Fr. X. von Wegele, Geschichte der deutschen Historio- 
 graphie (Munchen, 1 885, 8vo), p. 653. 
 
 2 Renan, ibid., p. 125. 
 
 122 
 
Critical Scholarship and Scholars 
 
 field of erudition there are innumerable finds — some 
 lying exposed and obvious, some guarded by all but 
 impenetrable barriers — to reward both those who do 
 and those who do not delight in surmounting diffi- 
 culties. All the scholars of any distinction have 
 possessed in an eminent degree the instincts of the 
 collector and the puzzle-solver, and some of them 
 have been quite conscious of the fact. " The more 
 difficulties we encountered in our chosen path," says 
 M. Haur^au, " the more the enterprise pleased us. 
 This species of labour, which is called bibliography 
 [investigations of authorship, principally from the 
 point of view of pseudepigraphy], could not aspire 
 to the homage of the public, but it has a great 
 attraction for those who devote themselves to it. 
 Yes, it is doubtless a humble study, but how many 
 others are there which so often compensate the 
 trouble they give by affording us opportunity to 
 cry Eureka." 1 Julien Havet, when he was " already 
 known to the learned men of Europe," used to 
 divert himself "by apparently frivolous amuse- 
 ments, such as guessing square words or decipher- 
 ing cryptograms." 2 Profound instincts, and, for all 
 the childish or ridiculous perversions which they 
 may exhibit in certain individuals, of the highest 
 utility ! After all, these are forms, the most rudi- 
 mentary forms, of the scientific spirit. Those who 
 are devoid of them have no place in the world of 
 
 1 B. Haureau, Notices et extraits de quelques manuscrits latins de la 
 Bibliotldque nationals, i. (Paris, 1890, 8vo), p. v. 
 
 2 Bibliotheque de V Ecole des chartes, 1896, p. 88. Compare analogous 
 traits in the interesting intellectual biography of the Hellenist, 
 palaeographer, and bibliographer, Charles Graux, by E. Lavisse 
 (Questions d'enseignement national, Paris, 1885, j8mo, pp. 265 sqq.). 
 
 123 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 critical scholarship. But those who aspire to be 
 critical scholars will always be numerous; for the 
 labours of interpretation, construction, and exposi- 
 tion require the rarest gifts : all those whom chance 
 has thrown into the study of history, who desire to 
 do useful work in that department, but are wanting 
 in psychological tact, or find composition irksome, 
 will always allow themselves to be fascinated by the 
 simple and calm pleasures of the preliminary tasks. 
 
 But in order to succeed in critical labours it is 
 not enough to like them. It is necessary to pos- 
 sess qualifications " for which zeal is no substitute." 
 What qualifications ? Those who have asked this 
 question have answered vaguely : " Qualifications of 
 the moral rather than the intellectual order, patience, 
 intellectual honesty. . . ." Is it not possible to be 
 more precise ? 
 
 There are young students with no a priori repug- 
 nance for the labours of external criticism, who 
 perhaps are even disposed to like them, who yet 
 are — experience has shown it — totally incapable of 
 performing them. There would be nothing perplex- 
 ing in this if these persons were intellectually feeble ; 
 this incapacity would then be but one manifestation 
 of their general weakness ; nor yet if they had gone 
 through no technical apprenticeship. But we are 
 concerned with men of education and intelligence, 
 sometimes of exceptional ability, who do not labour 
 under the above disadvantages. These are the people 
 of whom we hear : " He works badly, he has the 
 genius of inaccuracy." Their catalogues, their edi- 
 tions, their regesta, their monographs swarm with 
 imperfections, and never inspire confidence; try as 
 
 124 
 
Critical Scholarship and Scholars 
 
 they may, they never attain, I do not say abso- 
 lute accuracy, but any decent degree of accuracy. 
 They are subject to " chronic inaccuracy," a 
 disease of which the English historian Froude is a 
 typical and celebrated case. Froude was a gifted 
 writer, but destined never to advance any statement 
 that was not disfigured by error ; it has been said 
 of him that he was constitutionally inaccurate. For 
 example, he had visited the city of Adelaide in 
 Australia : " We saw," says he, " below us, in a basin 
 with a river winding through it, a city of 1 5 0,000 
 inhabitants, none of whom has ever known or will 
 ever know one moment's anxiety as to the recurring 
 regularity of his three meals a day." Thus Froude, 
 now for the facts : Adelaide is built on an eminence ; 
 no river runs through it ; when Froude visited it the 
 population did not exceed 75,000, and it was suffer- 
 ing from a famine at the time. And more of the 
 same kind. 1 Froude was perfectly aware of the 
 utility of criticism, and he was even one of the first 
 in England to base the study of history on that of 
 original documents, as well unpublished as published ; 
 but his mental conformation rendered him altogether 
 unfit for the emendation of texts; indeed, he mur- 
 dered them, unintentionally, whenever he touched 
 them. Just as Daltonism (an affection of the organs 
 of sight which prevents a man from distinguishing 
 correctly between red and green signals) incapacitates 
 for employment on a railway, so chronic inaccuracy, 
 or " Froude's Disease " (a malady not very difficult to 
 diagnose) ought to be regarded as incompatible with 
 the professional practice of critical scholarship. 
 
 1 See H. A. L. Fisher in the Fortnightly Review, Dec. 1894, p. 815. 
 
 i"<5 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 Froude's Disease does not appear to have ever 
 been studied by the psychologists, nor, indeed, is it 
 to be considered as a separate pathological entity. 
 Every one makes mistakes " out of carelessness," 
 " through inadvertence," and in many other ways. 
 What is abnormal is to make many mistakes, to be 
 always making them, in spite of the most persever- 
 ing efforts to be exact. Probably this phenomenon 
 is connected with weakness of the attention and 
 excessive activity of the involuntary (or subcon- 
 scious) imagination which the will of the patient, 
 lacking strength and stability, is unable sufficiently 
 to control. The involuntary imagination intrudes 
 upon intellectual operations only to vitiate them ; its 
 part is to fill up the gaps of memory by conjecture, 
 to magnify and attenuate realities, and to confuse 
 them with the products of pure invention. Most 
 children distort everything by inexactitude of this 
 kind, and it is only after a hard struggle that they 
 ever attain to a scrupulous accuracy — that is, learn 
 to master their imagination. Many men remain 
 children, in this respect, the whole of their lives. 
 
 But, let the psychological causes of Froude's 
 Disease be what they may, another point claims our 
 attention. The man of the sanest and best-balanced 
 mind is liable to bungle the simplest kinds of critical 
 work if he does not allow them the necessary time. 
 In these matters precipitancy is the source of in- 
 numerable errors. It is rightly said that patience 
 is the cardinal virtue of the scholar. Do not work 
 too fast, act as if there were always something to be 
 gained by waiting, leave work undone rather than 
 spoil it: these are maxims easy enough to pro- 
 
 126 
 
Critical Scholarship and Scholars 
 
 nounce, but not to be followed in practice by any 
 but persons of calm temperament. There are ner- 
 vous, excitable persons, who are always in a hurry 
 to get to the end, always seeking variety in their 
 occupations, and always anxious to dazzle and 
 astonish : these may possibly find honourable em- 
 ployment in other careers; but if they embrace 
 erudition, they are doomed to pile up a mass of 
 provisional work, which is likely to do more harm 
 than good, and is sure in the long run to cause them 
 many a vexation. The true scholar is cool, reserved, 
 circumspect. In the midst of the turmoil of life, 
 which flows past him like a torrent, he never hurries. 
 Why should he hurry ? The important thing is, 
 that the work he does should be solid, definitive, 
 imperishable. Better " spend weeks polishing a 
 masterpiece of a score of pages" in order to con- 
 vince two or three among the scholars of Europe 
 that a particular charter is spurious, or take ten 
 years to construct the best possible text of. a cor- 
 rupt document, than give to the press in the same 
 interval volumes of moderately accurate anccdota 
 which future scholars will some day have to put 
 through the mill again from beginning to end. 
 
 Whatever special branch of critical scholarship a 
 man may choose, he ought to be gifted with prudence, 
 an exceptionally powerful attention and will, and, 
 moreover, to combine a speculative turn of mind with 
 complete disinterestedness and little taste for action ; 
 for he must make up his mind to work for distant 
 and uncertain results, and, in nearly every case, for 
 the benefit of others. For textual criticism and the 
 investigation of sources, it is, moreover, very useful 
 
 127 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 to have the puzzle-solving instinct — that is, a nimble, 
 ingenious mind, fertile in hypotheses, prompt to seize 
 and even to guess the relations of things. For tasks 
 of description and compilation (the preparation of 
 inventories and catalogues, corpus and regesta-m.Sik.mg) 
 it is absolutely necessary to possess the collector's 
 instinct, together with an exceptional appetite for 
 Avork, and the qualities of order, industry, and perse- 
 verance. 1 These are the aptitudes required. The 
 labours of external criticism are so distasteful to 
 those who lack these aptitudes, and the results 
 obtained are, in their case, so small in comparison 
 with the time expended, that it is impossible for a 
 man to make too sure of his vocation before entering 
 upon a career of critical scholarship. It is pitiful to 
 see those who, for want of a wise word spoken in 
 due season, lose their way and vainly exhaust them- 
 selves in such a career, especially when they have 
 good reason for believing that they might have 
 employed their talents to better advantage in other 
 directions. 2 
 
 II. As critical and preparatory tasks are remark- 
 ably well suited to the temperament of a very large 
 
 1 Most of those who have a vocation for critical scholarship 
 possess both the power of solving problems and the taste for 
 collecting. It is, however, easy to divide them into two categories 
 according as they show a marked preference for textual criticism 
 and investigation of authorship on the one hand, or for the more 
 absorbing and less intellectual labours of collection on the other. 
 J. Havet, a past-master in the study of erudite problems, always 
 declined to undertake a general collection of Merovingian royal 
 charters, a work which his admirers expected from him. In this 
 connection he readily admitted his "want of taste for feats of 
 endurance" {Bibliotheque de Vficole des chartes, 1896, p. 222). 
 
 2 It is common to hear the opposite of this maintained, namely, 
 that the labours of critical scholarship (external criticism) have this 
 
 128 
 
Critical Scholarship and Scholars 
 
 number of Germans, and as the activity of German 
 erudition during the present century has been enor- 
 mous, it is to Germany that we must go for the best 
 cases of those mental deformations which are pro- 
 duced, in the long run, by the habitual practice 
 of external criticism. Hardly a year passes but 
 complaints are heard, in and about the German 
 universities, of the ill effects produced on scholars 
 by the tasks of criticism. 
 
 In 1 890, Herr Philippi, as Rector of the University 
 of Giessen, forcibly deplored the chasm which, as he 
 said, is opening between preparatory criticism and 
 general culture : textual criticism loses itself in 
 insignificant minutiae ; scholars collate for the mere 
 pleasure of collating ; infinite precautions are em- 
 ployed in the restoration of worthless documents ; 
 it is thus evident that " more importance is attached 
 to the materials of study than to its intellectual 
 results." The Rector of Giessen sees in the diffuse 
 style of German scholars and in the bitterness of 
 their polemical writings an effect of the habit they 
 have contracted of " excessive preoccupation with 
 little things." 1 In the same year the same note 
 
 advantage over other labours in the field of history that they are 
 within the range of average ability, and that the most moderate 
 intellects, after a suitable preliminary drilling, may be usefully 
 employed in them. It is quite true that men with no elevation of 
 soul or power of thought can make themselves useful in the field of 
 criticism, but then they must have special qualities. The mistake 
 is to think that with good will and a special drilling every one 
 without exception can be fitted for the operations of external 
 criticism. Among tho.-e who are incapable of these operations, as 
 well as among those who are fitted for them, there are both men of 
 sense and blockheads. 
 
 1 A. Philippi, Einige Bemerlungen ilber den philologischen Unter- 
 richt, Giessen, 1890, 4to. Cf. Revue Critique, 1892, i. p. 25. 
 
 129 I 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 was sounded, at the University of Bale, by Herr J. v. 
 Pflugk-Harttung. " The highest branches of historical 
 science are despised," says this author in his Geschichts- 
 betrachtungen 1 : " all that is valued is microscopic 
 observations and absolute accuracy in unimportant 
 details. The criticism of texts and sources has 
 become a branch of sport : the least breach of the 
 rules of the game is considered unpardonable, while 
 conformity to them is enough to assure the approval 
 of connoisseurs, irrespectively of the intrinsic value 
 of the results obtained. Scholars are mostly male- 
 volent and discourteous towards each other; they 
 make molehills and call them mountains; their 
 vanity is as comic as that of the citizen of Frankfort 
 who used complacently to observe, '■ All that you can 
 see through yonder archway is Frankfort territory.' " 2 
 We, for our part, are inclined to draw a distinction 
 between three professional risks to which scholars 
 are subject : dilettantism, hypercriticism, and loss of 
 the power to work. 
 
 To take the last first : the habit of critical analysis 
 has a relaxing and paralysing action on certain 
 intelligences. Men, of naturally timid dispositions, 
 discover that whatever pains they take with their 
 critical work, their editing or classifying of docu- 
 ments, they are \ery apt to make slight mistakes, 
 and these slight mistakes, as a result of their critical 
 education, fill them with horror and dread. To 
 discover blunders in their signed work when the 
 time for correction is past, causes them acute suffer- 
 ing. They reach at length a state of morbid anxiety 
 
 1 J. von Pflugk-Harttung, Geschichtsbetrachtungen, Gotha, 1890, 8vo 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 21. 
 
 130 
 
Critical Scholarship and Scholars 
 
 and scrupulosity which prevents them from doing 
 anything at all, for fear of possible imperfections. 
 The examen rigorosum to which they are continually 
 subj ecting themselves brings them to a standstill. 
 They give the same measure to the productions of 
 others, and in the end they see in historical works 
 nothing but the authorities and the notes, the appa- 
 ratus criticus, and in the apparatus criticus they see 
 nothing but the faults in it which require correction. 
 Hyper criticism. — The excess of criticism, just as 
 much as the crudest ignorance, leads to error. It 
 consists in the application of critical canons to cases 
 outside their jurisdiction. It is related to criticism 
 as logic- chopping is to logic. There are persons 
 who scent enigmas everywhere, even where there 
 are none. They take perfectly clear texts and sub- 
 tilise on them till they make them doubtful, under 
 the pretext of freeing them from imaginary corrup- 
 tions. They discover traces of forgery in authentic 
 documents. A strange state of mind S By constantly 
 guarding against the instinct of credulity they come 
 to suspect everything. 1 It is to be observed that 
 in proportion as the criticism of texts and sources 
 makes positive progress, the danger of hypercriticism 
 increases. When all the sources of history have 
 been properly criticised (for certain parts of ancient 
 history this is no distant prospect), good sense will 
 call a halt. But scholars will refuse to halt ; they 
 will refine, as they do already on the best established 
 texts, and those who refine will inevitably fall into 
 hypercriticism. " The peculiarity of the study of 
 history and its auxiliary philological sciences," says 
 
 1 Cf. supra, p. 99. 
 
 J 3i 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 Renan, " is that as soon as they have attained their 
 relative perfection they begin to destroy themselves." * 
 Hypercriticisrn is the cause of this. 
 
 Dilettantism. — Scholars by profession and voca- 
 tion have a tendency to treat the external criti- 
 cism of documents as a game of skill, difficult, but 
 deriving an interest, much as chess does, from the 
 very complication of its rules. Some of them are 
 indifferent to the larger questions — to history itself, 
 in fact. They criticise for the sake of criticism, 
 and, in their view, the elegance of the method of 
 investigation is much more important than the 
 results, whatever they may be. These virtuosi are 
 not concerned to connect their labours with some 
 general idea — to criticise systematically, for example, 
 all the documents relating to a question, in order to 
 understand it ; they criticise indiscriminately texts 
 relating to all manner of subjects, on the one con- 
 dition of being sufficiently corrupt. Armed with 
 their critical skill, they range over the whole of 
 the domain of history, and stop wherever a knotty 
 problem invites their services ; this problem solved, 
 or at least discussed, they go elsewhere to look for 
 others. They leave behind them no coherent work, 
 but a heterogeneous collection of memoirs on every 
 conceivable subject, which resembles, as Carlyle 
 says, a curiosity shop or an archipelago of small 
 islands. 
 
 Dilettanti defend their dilettantism by sufficiently 
 plausible arguments. To begin with, say they, 
 everything is important ; in history there is no 
 document which has not its value : " No scientific 
 
 1 Renan, L'Avenir de la science, p. xiv. 
 132 
 
Critical Scholarship and Scholars 
 
 work is barren, no truth is without its use for 
 science . . . ; in history there is no such thing as 
 a trivial subject ; " consequently, "it is not the 
 nature of the subject which makes work valuable, 
 but the method employed." 1 The important thing 
 in history is not " the ideas one accumulates ; it is 
 the mental gymnastics, the intellectual training — in 
 short, the scientific spirit." Even supposing that 
 there are degrees of importance among the data of 
 history, no one has a right to maintain a priori 
 that a document is " useless." What, pray, is the 
 criterion of utility in these matters ? How many 
 documents are there not which, after being long 
 despised, have been suddenly placed in the fore- 
 ground by a change of standpoint or by new dis- 
 coveries ? " All exclusion is rash ; there is no 
 research which it is possible to brand beforehand 
 as necessarily sterile. That which has no value in 
 itself may become valuable as a necessary means." 
 Perhaps a day may come when, science being in 
 a sense complete, indifferent documents and facts 
 may be safely thrown overboard ; but we are not at 
 present in a position to distinguish the superfluous 
 from the necessary, and in all probability the line 
 of demarcation will never be easy to trace. This 
 justifies the most special researches and the most 
 futile in all appearance. And, if it come to the 
 worst, what does it matter if there is a certain 
 amount of work wasted ? " It is a law in science, 
 as in all human effort," and indeed in all the opera- 
 tions of nature, " to work in broad outlines, with a 
 wide margin of what is superfluous." 
 
 1 Revue historique, lxiii. (1897), p. 320. 
 133 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 We shall not undertake to refute these argu- 
 ments to the full extent in which this is possible. 
 Besides, Renan, who has put the case for both sides 
 of the question with equal vigour, definitively closed 
 the debate in the following words : " It may be said 
 that some researches are useless in the sense of 
 taking up time which would have been better spent 
 on more serious questions. . . . Although it is not 
 necessary for an artisan to have a complete know- 
 ledge of the work he is employed to execute, it is 
 still to be desired that those who devote themselves 
 to special labours should have some notion of the 
 more general considerations which alone give value 
 to their researches. If all the industrious workers 
 to whom modern science owes its progress had had 
 a philosophical comprehension of what they were 
 doing, how much precious time would have been 
 saved ! ... It is deeply to be regretted that there 
 should be such an immense waste of human effort, 
 merely for want of guidance, and a clear conscious- 
 ness of the end to be pursued." * 
 
 Dilettantism is incompatible with a certain eleva- 
 tion of mind, and with a certain degree of " moral 
 perfection," but not with technical proficiency. 
 Some of the most accomplished critics merely make 
 a trade of their skill, and have never reflected on 
 the ends to which their art is a means. It would, 
 however, be wrong to infer that science itself has 
 nothing to fear from dilettantism. The dilettanti 
 
 1 Renan, ibid., pp. 122, 243. The same thought has been more 
 than once expressed, in different language, by E. Lavisse, in his 
 addresses to the students of Paris (Questions d'enseiguement national, 
 pp. 14, 86, &c). 
 
 134 
 
Critical Scholarship and Scholars 
 
 of criticism who work as fancy or curiosity bids 
 them, who are attracted to problems not by their 
 intrinsic importance, but by their difficulty, do not 
 supply historians (those whose work it is to combine 
 materials and use them for the main purposes of 
 history) with the materials of which the latter have 
 the most pressing need, but with others which might 
 have waited. If the activity of specialists in external 
 criticism were exclusively directed to questions whose 
 solution is important, and if it were regulated and 
 guided from above, it would be more fruitful. 
 
 The idea of providing against the dangers of 
 dilettantism by a rational "organisation of labour" 
 is already ancient. Fifty years ago it was common 
 to hear people talking of " supervision," of " con- 
 centrating scattered forces ; " dreams were rife of 
 " vast workshops " organised on the model of those 
 of modern industry, in which the preparatory labours 
 of critical scholarship were to be performed on a 
 great scale, in the interests of science. In nearly 
 all countries, in fact, governments (through the 
 medium of historical committees and commissions), 
 academies, and learned societies have endeavoured 
 in our day, much as monastic congregations did of 
 old, to group professed scholars for the purposes of 
 vast collective enterprises, and to co-ordinate their 
 efforts. But this banding of specialists in external 
 criticism for the service and under the supervi- 
 sion of competent men presents great mechanical 
 difficulties. The problem of the " organisation of 
 scientific labour " is still the order of the day. 1 
 
 1 One of us (M. Langlois) poposes to give elsewhere a detailed 
 account of all that has been done in the last three hundred years, 
 
 135 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 III. Scholars are often censured for pride and 
 excessive harshness in the judgments which they 
 pass on the labours of their colleagues; and these 
 faults, as we have seen, are often attributed to their 
 excessive "preoccupation with little things," espe- 
 cially by persons whose attempts have been severely 
 judged. In reality there do exist modest and 
 kindly scholars : it is a question of character : pro- 
 fessional "preoccupation with little things" is not 
 enough to change natural disposition in this respect. 
 " Ce bon monsieur Du Cange," as the Benedictines 
 said, was modest to excess. "Nothing more is 
 required," says he, in speaking of his labours, "but 
 eyes and fingers in order to do as much and more ; " 
 he never blamed any one, on principle. " If I study 
 it is for the pleasure of studying, and not to give 
 pain to any one else, any more than to myself." 1 
 It is, however, true that most scholars have no com- 
 punction in exposing each other's mistakes, and 
 that their austere zeal sometimes finds expression 
 in harsh and overbearing language. Barring the 
 harshness they are quite right. Like physicians, 
 chemists, and other members of learned and scien- 
 tific professions, they have a keen appreciation of 
 the value of scientific truth, and it is for this 
 reason that they make a point of calling offenders 
 
 but especially in the nineteenth century, for the organisation of 
 historical work in the principal countries of the world. Some 
 information has already been collected on this subject by J. 
 Franklin Jameson, "The Expenditures of Foreign Governments in 
 behalf of History," in the "Annual Report of the American His- 
 torical Association for 1891," pp. 38-61. 
 
 1 L. Feugere, tltude sur la vie et les ouvrages de Du Cange, pp. 
 
 55, 58. 
 
 136 
 
Critical Scholarship and Scholars 
 
 to account. They are thus enabled to bar the door 
 against the tribe of incapables and charlatans who 
 once infested their profession. 
 
 Among the youths who propose to devote them- 
 selves to the study of history there are some in 
 whom the commercial spirit and vulgar ambition are 
 stronger than the love of science. These are apt to 
 say to themselves : " Historical work, if it is to be 
 done according to the rules of method, requires an 
 infinite amount of labour and caution. But do we 
 not see historical writings whose authors have more 
 or less seriously violated the rules ? Are these 
 authors thought any the less of on this account ? Is 
 it always the most conscientious writer who enjoys 
 the highest consideration ? Cannot tact supply the 
 place of knowledge ? " If tact really could supply the 
 place of knowledge, then, as it is easier to do bad 
 work than good, and as the important thing with 
 these people is success, they might be tempted to 
 conclude that it does not matter how badly they 
 work as long as they succeed. Why should not 
 things go in these matters as they do in life, where 
 it is not necessarily the best men that get on best ? 
 Well, it is due to the pitiless severity of the critics 
 that calculations of this kind would be as disastrous 
 as they are despicable. 
 
 Towards the end of the Second Empire there was 
 in France no enlightened public opinion on the sub- 
 ject of historical work. Bad books of historical 
 erudition were published with impunity, and some- 
 times even procured undeserved rewards for their 
 authors. It was then that the founders of the Revue 
 Critique- d'histoire et delitUrature undertook to combat 
 
 137 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 a state of things which they rightly deemed demo- 
 ralising. With this object they administered public 
 chastisement to those scholars who showed lack of 
 conscience or method, in a manner calculated to 
 disgust them with erudition for ever. They per- 
 formed sundry notable executions, not for the pleasure 
 of it, but with the firm resolve to establish a censor- 
 ship and a wholesome dread of justice, in the domain 
 of historical study. Bad workers henceforth received 
 no quarter, and though the Revue did not exert any 
 great influence on the public at large, its police- 
 operations covered a wide enough radius to impress 
 most of those concerned with the necessity of sincerity 
 and respect for method. During the last twenty- 
 five years the impulse thus given has spread beyond 
 all expectation. 
 
 It is now a matter of great difficulty to impose on 
 the world of scholars, in matters connected with their 
 studies, or at least to keep up the deception for any 
 length of time. In the case of the historical sciences, 
 as well as the sciences proper, it is now too late to 
 found a new error or to discredit an old truth. It 
 may be a few months, possibly a few years, before 
 a bungled experiment in chemistry or a scamped 
 edition is recognised as such; but inexact results, 
 though temporarily accepted under reserve, are always 
 sooner or later, and generally very soon, discovered, 
 denounced, and eliminated. The theory of the 
 operations of external criticism is now so well estab- 
 lished, the number of specialists thoroughly versed 
 in them is now so great in every country, that, 
 with rare exceptions, descriptive catalogues of docu- 
 ments, editions, regesta, monographs, are scrutinised, 
 
 138 
 
Critical Scholarship and Scholars 
 
 dissected, and judged as soon as they appear. It is 
 well to be warned. It will for the future be the 
 height of imprudence to risk publishing a work of 
 erudition without having first done everything pos- 
 sible to make it unassailable ; otherwise it will im- 
 mediately, or after brief delay, be attacked and 
 demolished. Not knowing this, certain well-meaning 
 persons still show themselves, from time to time, 
 simple enough to enter the lists of critical scholar- 
 ship insufficiently prepared ; they are filled with a 
 desire to be useful, and are apparently convinced 
 that here, as in politics and elsewhere, it is possible 
 to work by extemporised and approximate methods 
 without any " special knowledge." They are sorry 
 afterwards. The knowing ones do not take the risk ; 
 the tasks of critical scholarship have no seductions 
 for them, for they are aware that the labour is great 
 and the glory moderate, and that the field is en- 
 grossed by clever specialists not too well disposed 
 towards intruders. They see plainly there is no 
 room for them here. The blunt uncompromising 
 honesty of the scholars thus delivers them from un- 
 desirable company of a kind which the " historians " 
 proper have still occasionally to put up with. 
 
 Bad workers, in fact, on the hunt for a public 
 less closely critical than the scholars, are very ready 
 to take refuge in historical exposition. The rules of 
 method are here less obvious, or, rather, not so well 
 known. While the criticism of texts and sources 
 has been placed on a scientific basis, historical syn- 
 thesis is still performed haphazard. Mental con- 
 fusion, ignorance, negligence — faults which stand 
 out so clearly in works of critical scholarship — may 
 
 139 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 in historical works be disguised up to a certain point 
 by literary artifices, and the public at large, which is 
 not well educated in this respect, is not shocked. 1 
 In short, there is still, in this department, a cer- 
 tain chance of impunity. This chance, however, is 
 diminishing, and a day will come, before so very long, 
 when the superficial writers who make incorrect syn- 
 theses will be treated with as little consideration 
 as is now received by those who show themselves 
 unscrupulous or unskilful in the technique of pre- 
 paratory criticism. The works of the most cele- 
 brated historians of the nineteenth century, those 
 who died but yesterday, Augustin Thierry, Ranke, 
 Fustel de Coulanges, Taine, and others, are already 
 battered and riddled with criticism. The faults of 
 their methods have already been seen, denned, and 
 condemned. 
 
 Those who are insensible to other considerations 
 ought to be moved to honesty in historical work by 
 the reflection that the time is now past, or nearly so, 
 when it was possible to do bad work without having 
 to suffer for it. 
 
 1 Even the specialists in external criticism themselves, when they 
 do not take the line of despising all synthesis a priori, are almost 
 as easily dazzled as anybody else by incorrect syntheses, by a show 
 of "general ideas," or by literary artifices, in spite of their clear- 
 sightedness where works of critical scholarship are concerned. 
 
 140 
 
SECTION II.— INTERNAL CRITICISM 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 INTERPEETATIVE CRITICISM (HERMENEUTIC) 
 
 I. When a zoologist describes the form and situation 
 of a muscle, when a physiologist gives the curve of 
 a movement, we are able to accept their results 
 without reserve, because we know by what method, 
 by what instruments, by what system of notation 
 they have obtained them. 1 But when Tacitus says 
 of the Germans, Arva per annos mutant, we do not 
 know beforehand whether he took the right method 
 to inform himself, nor even in what sense he used 
 the words arva and mutant ; to ascertain this a pre- 
 liminary operation is required. 2 This operation is 
 internal criticism. 
 
 The object of criticism is to discover what, in a 
 document may be accepted as true. Now the docu- 
 ment is only the final result of a long series of 
 operations, on the details of which the author gives 
 
 1 The sciences of observation do, however, need a species of 
 criticism. We do not accept without verification results obtained 
 by anybody, but only results obtained by those who know how to 
 work. But this criticism is made once for all, and applies to the 
 author, not to his works ; historical criticism, on the contrary, is 
 obliged to deal separately with every part of a document. 
 
 2 Cf. supra, book ii. chap. i. p. 67. 
 
 I 4 I 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 us no information. He had to observe or collect 
 facts, to frame sentences, to write down words ; and 
 these operations, which are perfectly distinct one 
 from another, may not all have been performed 
 with the same accuracy. It is therefore necessary 
 to analyse the product of the author's labour in 
 order to distinguish which operations have been 
 incorrectly performed, and reject their results . 
 Analysis is thus necessary to criticism ; all criticism 
 begins with analysis. 
 
 In order to be logically complete, the analysis 
 ought to reconstruct all the operations which the 
 author must have performed, and to examine them 
 one by one, to see whether each has been performed 
 correctly. It would be necessary to pass in review 
 all the successive acts by which the document was 
 produced, from the moment when the author ob- 
 served the fact which is its subject up to the move- 
 ments of his hand by which he traced the letters of 
 the document ; or, rather, it would be necessary to 
 proceed in the opposite direction, step by step, from 
 the movements of the hand back to the observation. 
 This method would be so long and so tedious that 
 no one would ever have the time or the patience 
 to apply it. 
 
 Internal criticism is not, like external criticism, 
 an instrument used for the mere pleasure of using 
 it ; * it yields no immediate satisfaction, because it 
 does not definitively solve any problem. It is only 
 applied because it is necessary, and its use is re- 
 stricted to a bare minimum. The most exacting 
 historian is satisfied with an abridged method which 
 
 1 Cf. supra, p. 122. 
 I 4 2 
 
Interpretative Criticism 
 
 concentrates all the operations into two groups : ( i ) 
 the analysis of the contents of the document, and 
 the positive interpretative criticism which is neces- 
 sary for ascertaining what the author meant ; (2) 
 the analysis of the conditions under which the 
 document was produced, and its negative criticism, 
 necessary for the verification of the author's state- 
 ments. This twofold division of the labour of 
 criticism is, moreover, only employed by a select 
 few. The natural tendency, even of historians who 
 work methodically, is to read the text with the 
 object of extracting information directly from it, 
 without any thought of first ascertaining what 
 exactly was in the author's mind. 1 This procedure 
 is excusable at most in the case of nineteenth-century 
 documents, written by men whose language and 
 mode of thought are familiar to us, and then only 
 when there is not more than one possible inter- 
 pretation. It becomes dangerous as soon as the 
 author's habits of language or thought begin to 
 differ from those of the historian who reads him, 
 or when the meaning of the text is not obvious 
 and indisputable. Whoever, in reading a text, is 
 not exclusively occupied with the effort to under- 
 stand it, is sure to read impressions of his own 
 into it; he is struck by phrases or words in the 
 document which correspond to his own ideas, or 
 agree with his own a priori notion of the facts ; 
 unconsciously he detaches these phrases or words, 
 
 1 Taine appears to have proceeded thus in vol. ii., La Revolution, 
 of hig Origines de la France conUmporaine^ He had made extracts 
 from unpublished documents and inserted a great number of them 
 in his work, but it would seem that he did not first methodically 
 analyse them in order to determine their meaning. 
 
 143 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 and forms out of them an imaginary text which he 
 puts in the place of the real text of the author. 1 
 
 1 Fustel de Coulanges explains very clearly the danger of this 
 method: "Some students begin by forming an opinion . . . and 
 it is not till afterwards that they begin to read the texts. They 
 run a great risk of not understanding them at all, or of understand- 
 ing them wrongly. What happens is that a kind of tacit contest 
 goes on between the text and the preconceived opinions of the 
 reader ; the mind refuses to grasp what is contrary to its idea, and 
 the issue of the contest commonly is, not that the mind surrenders 
 to the evidence of the text, but that the text yields, bends, and 
 accommodates itself to the preconceived opinion. . . . To bring one's 
 personal ideas into the study of texts is the subjective method. 
 A man thinks he is contemplating an object, and it is his own idea 
 that he is contemplating. He thinks he is observing a fact, and 
 the fact at once assumes the colour and the significance his mind 
 wishes it to have. He thinks he is reading a text, and the words 
 of the text take a particular meaning to suit a ready-made opinion. 
 It is this subjective method which has done most harm to the 
 history of the Merovingian epoch. ... To read the texts was not 
 enough ; what was required was to read them before forming any 
 convictions . . ." (Monarchic franque, p. 31). For the same reason 
 Fustel de Coulanges deprecated the reading of one document in 
 the light of another ; he protested against the custom of explaining 
 the Germania of Tacitus by the barbaric laws. In the Revue des 
 questions historiques, 1897, vol. i., a lesson on method, De V analyse 
 des textes historiques, is given apropos of a commentary by M. 
 Monod on Gregory of Tours : " The historian ought to begin his 
 work with an exact analysis of each document. ... The analysis 
 of a text . . . consists in determining the sense of each word, and 
 eliciting the true meaning of the writer. . . . Instead of searching 
 for the sense of each of the historian's words, and for the thought 
 he has expressed in them, he [M. Monod] comments on each sen- 
 tence in the light of what is found in Tacitus or the Salic law. . . . 
 We should understand what analysis really is. Many talk about 
 it, few use it. . . . The use of analysis is, by an attentive study 
 of every detail, to elicit from a text all that is in it ; not to intro- 
 duce into the text what is not there." 
 
 After reading this excellent advice it will be instructive to read 
 M. Monod's reply (in the Revue historique) ; it will be seen that 
 Fustel de Coulanges himself did not always practise the method 
 he recommended. 
 
 I44 
 
Interpretative Criticism 
 
 II. Here, as always in. history, method consists 
 in repressing the first impulse. It is necessary to 
 be penetrated by the principle, sufficiently obvious 
 but often forgotten, that a document only contains 
 the ideas of the man who wrote it, and to make 
 it a rule to begin by understanding the text by 
 itself, before asking what can be extracted from it 
 for the purposes of history. We thus arrive at this 
 general rule of method : the study of every docu- 
 ment should begin with an analysis of its contents, 
 made with the sole aim of determining the real 
 meaning of the author. 
 
 This analysis is a preliminary operation, distinct 
 and independent. Experience here, as in the tasks 
 of critical scholarship, 1 has decided in favour of the 
 system of slips. Each slip will contain the analysis 
 of a document, of a separate part of a document, 
 or of an episode in a narrative ; the analysis ought 
 to indicate not only the general sense of the text, 
 but also, as far as possible, the object and views of 
 the author. It will be well to reproduce verbally 
 any expressions which may seem characteristic of 
 the author's thought. Sometimes it will be enough 
 to have analysed the text mentally : it is not always 
 necessary to put down in black and white the whole 
 contents of a document ; in such cases we simply 
 enter the points of which we intend to make use. 
 But against the ever-present danger of substituting 
 one's personal impressions for the text there is only 
 one real safeguard ; it should be made an invariable 
 rule never on any account to make an extract from 
 a document, or a partial analysis of it, without 
 
 1 Cf. supra, p. 103. 
 
 145 K 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 having first made a comprehensive analysis x of it 
 mentally, if not on paper. 
 
 To analyse a document is to discern and isolate 
 all the ideas expressed by the author. Analysis 
 thus reduces to interpretative criticism. 
 
 Interpretation passes through two stages ; the first 
 is concerned with the literal, the second with the 
 real meaning. 
 
 III. The determination of the literal meaning of 
 a document is a linguistic operation; accordingly, 
 Philology (in the narrow sense) has been reckoned 
 among the auxiliary sciences of history. To under- 
 stand a text it is first necessary to know the lan- 
 guage. But a general knowledge of the language is 
 not enough. In order to interpret Gregory of Tours, 
 it is not enough to know Latin in a general way ; it 
 is necessary to add a special study of the particular 
 kind of Latin written by Gregory of Tours. 
 
 The natural tendency is to attribute the same 
 meaning to the same word wherever it occurs. We 
 instinctively treat a language as if it were a fixed 
 system of signs. Fixity, indeed, is a characteristic 
 of the signs which have been expressly invented for 
 scientific use, such as algebraical notation or the 
 nomenclature of chemistry. Here every expression 
 has a single precise meaning, which is absolute and 
 invariable ; it expresses an accurately analysed and 
 defined idea, only one such idea, and that always the 
 same in whatever context the expression may occur, 
 
 1 The work of analysis may be entrusted to a second person ; 
 this is what happens in the case of regesta and catalogues of 
 records ; if the analysis has been correctly performed by the com- 
 piler of regesta, there is no need to do it over again. 
 
 I46 
 
Interpretative Criticism 
 
 and by whatever author it may be used. But ordi- 
 nary language, in which documents are written, 
 fluctuates : each word expresses a complex and ill- 
 defined idea; its meanings are manifold, relative, 
 and variable ; the same word may stand for several 
 different things, and is used in different senses by 
 the same author according to the context ; lastly, 
 the meaning of a word varies from author to author, 
 and is modified in the course of time. Vel, which 
 in classical Latin only has the meanings or and even, 
 means and in certain epochs of the middle ages ; 
 suffragium, which is classical Latin for suffrage, takes 
 in mediaeval Latin the sense of help. We have, then, 
 to learn to resist the instinct which leads us to ex- 
 plain all the expressions of a text by their classical 
 or ordinary meanings. The grammatical interpre- 
 tation, based on the general rules of the language, 
 must be supplemented by an historical interpreta- 
 tion founded on an examination of the particular 
 case. 
 
 The method consists in determining the special 
 meaning of the words in the document ; it rests on 
 a few very simple principles. 
 
 (i) Language changes by continuous evolution. 
 Each epoch has a language of its own, which must 
 be treated as a separate system of signs. In order 
 to understand a document Ave must know the lan- 
 guage of the time — that is, the meanings of words and 
 forms of expression in use at the time when the text 
 was written. The meaning of a word is to be deter- 
 mined by bringing together the passages where it is 
 employed : it will generally be found that in one or 
 other of these the remainder of the sentence leaves 
 
 H7 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 no doubt as to the meaning of the word in ques- 
 tion. 1 Information of this kind is given in historical 
 dictionaries, such as the Thesaurus Linguae Latinm ; 
 or the glossaries of Du Cange. In these compila- 
 tions the article devoted to each word is a collection 
 of the passages in which the word occurs, accom- 
 panied by indications of authorship which fix the 
 epoch. 
 
 When the author wrote in a dead language which 
 he had learnt out of books — this is the case with 
 the Latin texts of the earlier middle ages— we must 
 be on our guard against words used in an arbitrary 
 sense, or selected for the sake of elegance : for 
 example, consul (count, earl), capite census (censitary), 
 agellus (grand domain). 
 
 (2) Linguistic usage may vary from one region 
 to another ; we have, then, to know the language of 
 the country where the document was written — that is, 
 the peculiar meanings current in the country. 
 
 (3) Each author has his own manner of writing; 
 we have, then, to study the language of the author, 
 the peculiar senses in which he used words. 2 This 
 purpose is served by lexicons to a single author, as 
 Meusel's Lexicon Ccesarianum, in which are brought 
 
 1 Practical examples of this procedure will be found in Deloche, 
 La Truslis et Vantrustion royal (Paris, 1873, 8vo), and, above all, in 
 E'ustel de Coulanges. See especially the study of the words marca 
 (Recherches sur quelques problemcs dliistoire, pp. 322-56), mallus (ibid., 
 372-402), alien {U Alien et le domaine rural, pp. 149-70), portio (ibid., 
 pp. 239-52). 
 
 2 The theory and an example of this procedure will be found 
 in Fustel de Coulanges, Recherches sur quelques problimes d'histoire 
 (pp. 189-289), with reference to the statements of Tacitus about 
 the Germans. See especially pp. 263-89, the discussion of the 
 celebrated passage on the German mode of culture. 
 
 I48 
 
Interpretative Criticism 
 
 together all the passages in which the author used 
 each word. 
 
 (4) An expression changes its meaning according 
 to the passage in which it occurs ; we must there- 
 fore interpret each word and sentence not as if it 
 stood isolated, but with an eye to the general sense 
 of the context. This is the rule of context, 1 a funda- 
 mental rule of interpretation. Its meaning is that, 
 before making use of a phrase taken from a text, 
 we must have read the text in its entirety ; it pro- 
 hibits the stuffing of a modern work with quota- 
 tions — that is, shreds of phrases torn from passages 
 without regard to the special sense given to them 
 by the context. 2 
 
 These rules, if rigorously applied, would con- 
 stitute an exact method of interpretation which 
 would hardly leave any chance of error, but would 
 require an enormous expenditure of time. What 
 an immense amount of labour would be necessary 
 if, in the case of each word, we had to determine by 
 a special operation its meaning in the language of 
 
 1 Fustel de Coulanges formulates it thus : " It is never safe to 
 separate two words from their context ; this is just the way to 
 mistake their meaning" {Monarchic franque, p. 228, note 1). 
 
 2 This is how Fustel de Coulanges condemns this practice : " I 
 am not speaking of pretenders to learning who quote second-hand, 
 and at most take the trouble to verify whether the phrase they have 
 seen quoted really occurs in the passage indicated. To verify 
 quotations is one thing and to read texts quite another, and the 
 two often lead to opposite results " [Revue des questions historiques, 
 1887, vol. i.). See also (L'Alleu et le domaine rural, pp. 171-98) the 
 lesson given to M. Giasson on the theory of the community of land : 
 forty-five quotations are studied in the light of their context, with 
 the object of proving that none of them bears the meaning M. Gias- 
 son attributed to it. We may also compare the reply : Giasson, 
 Les ConiiMinaux et le domaine rural a Vlpoque franque, Paris, 1890. 
 
 I49 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 the time, of the country, of the author, and in the 
 context ! Yet this is the labour demanded by a 
 well-made translation : in the case of some ancient 
 works of great literary value it has been submitted 
 to ; for the mass of historical documents we content 
 ourselves, in practice, with an abridged method. 
 
 All words are not equally subject to variations 
 of meaning; most of them keep a fairly uniform 
 meaning in all authors and in all periods. We 
 may therefore be satisfied to study specially those 
 expressions which, from their nature, are liable to 
 take different meanings : first, ready-made expres- 
 sions which, being fixed, do not follow the evolution 
 of the words of which they are composed ; secondly, 
 and chiefly, words denoting things which are in their 
 nature subject to evolution ; classes of men (miles, 
 colonics, servus); institutions (conventus, justitia, judex); 
 usages (alien, hdntfice, tlectiori) ; feelings, common 
 objects. In the case of all words of such classes 
 it would be imprudent to assume a fixed meaning ; 
 it is an absolutely necessary precaution to ascertain 
 what is the sense in which they are used in the text 
 to be interpreted. " These studies of words," said 
 Fustel de Coulanges, "have a great importance in 
 historical science. A badly interpreted term may 
 be the source of serious error." l And, in fact, simply 
 by a methodical application of interpretative criti- 
 cism to a hundred words or so, he succeeded in 
 revolutionising the study of the Merovingian epoch. 
 
 1 All that is original in Fustel de Coulanges rests on his inter- 
 pretative criticism ; he never did personally any work in external 
 criticism, and his critical examination of authors' good faith and 
 accuracy was hampered by a respect for the statements of ancient 
 authors which amounted to credulity. 
 
 150 
 
Interpretative Criticism 
 
 IV. When we have analysed the document and 
 determined the literal meaning of its phrases, we 
 cannot even yet be sure that we have reached the 
 real thoughts of the author. It is possible that he 
 may have used some expressions in an oblique sense ; 
 there are several kinds of cases where this occurs : 
 allegory and symbolism, jests and hoaxes, allusion 
 and implication, even the ordinary figures of speech, 
 metaphor, hyperbole, litotes. 1 In all these cases it 
 is necessary to pierce through the literal meaning 
 to the real meaning, which the author has purposely 
 disguised under an inexact form. 
 
 Logically the problem is very embarrassing : there 
 is no fixed external criterion by which we can make 
 sure of detecting an oblique sense ; in the case of 
 the hoax, which in the present century has become 
 a branch of literature, it is an essential part of the 
 author's plan to leave no indication which would 
 betray the jest. In practice we may be morally 
 certain that an author is not using an oblique sense 
 wherever his prime object is to be understood ; we 
 are therefore not likely to meet with difficulties of 
 this kind in official documents, in charters, and in 
 historical narratives. In all these cases the general 
 form of the document permits us to assume that it 
 is written in the literal sense of the words. 
 
 On the other hand, we must be prepared for 
 
 1 A parallel difficulty occurs in the interpretation of illustra- 
 tive monuments ; the representations are not always to be taken 
 literally. In the Behistun monument Darius tramples the van- 
 quished chiefs under foot : this is a metaphor. Mediaeval miniatures 
 show us persons lying in bed with crowns on their heads : this is to 
 symbolise their royal rank ; the painter did not mean that they wore 
 their crowns to sleep in. 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 oblique senses when the author had other interests 
 than that of being understood, or when he wrote 
 for a public which could understand his allusions 
 and read between the lines, or when his readers, 
 in virtue of a religious or literary initiation, might 
 be expected to understand his symbolisms and 
 figures of speech. This is the case with religious 
 texts, private letters, and all those literary works 
 which form so large a part of the documents on 
 antiquity. Thus the art of recognising and deter- 
 mining hidden meanings in texts has always occu- 
 pied a large space in the theory of hermeneutic 1 
 (which is Greek for interpretative criticism), and 
 in the exegesis of the sacred texts and of classical 
 authors. 
 
 The different modes of introducing an oblique 
 sense behind the literal sense are too varied, and 
 depend too much on special circumstances, for it 
 to be possible to reduce the art of detecting them 
 to definite rules. Only one general principle can 
 be laid down, and that is, that when the literal 
 sense is absurd, incoherent, or obscure, or in con- 
 tradiction with the ideas of the author or the facts 
 known to him, then we ought to presume an oblique 
 sense. 
 
 In order to determine this sense, the procedure 
 is the same as for studying the language of an 
 author : we compare the passages in which the 
 expressions occur in which we suspect an oblique 
 sense, and look to see whether there is not one 
 
 1 A. Boeckh, in the Encyclopaedic und Methodoloyie der philolo- 
 gischen Wissenschaften, second edition (1886), has given a theory of 
 hermeneutic to which Bernheim has been content to refer. 
 
 152 
 
Interpretative Criticism 
 
 where the meaning may be guessed from the eon- 
 text. A celebrated instance of this procedure is the 
 discovery of the allegorical meaning of the Beast in 
 the Apocalypse. But as there is no certain method 
 of solving these problems, we never have a right to 
 say we have discovered all the hidden meanings or 
 seized all the allusions contained in a text ; and 
 even when we think we have found the sense, we 
 shall do well to draw no inferences from a necessarily 
 conjectural interpretation. 
 
 On the other hand, it is necessary to guard against 
 the temptation to look for allegorical meanings every- 
 where, as the neo-Platonists did in Plato's works and 
 the Swedenborgians in the Bible. This attack of 
 hyper-hermeneutic is now over, but we are not yet 
 safe from the analogous tendency to look for allusions 
 everywhere. Investigations of this kind are always 
 conjectural, and are better calculated to natter the 
 vanity of the interpreter than to furnish results of 
 which history can make use. 
 
 V. When we have at length reached the real 
 sense of the text, the operation of positive analysis 
 is concluded. Its result is to make us acquainted 
 with the author's conceptions, the images he had 
 in his mind, the general notions in terms of which 
 he represented the world to himself. This informa- 
 tion belongs to a Yery important branch of know- 
 ledge, out of which is constituted a whole group ol 
 historical sciences: 1 the history of the illustrative 
 arts and of literature, the history of science, the 
 
 1 The method of extracting information on external facts from 
 a writer's conceptions forms part of the theory of constructive 
 reasoning. See book iii. 
 
 153 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 history of philosophical and moral doctrine, mythology 
 and the history of dogmas (wrongly called religious 
 beliefs, because here we are studying official doctrines 
 without inquiring whether they are believed), the 
 history of law, the history of official institutions (so 
 far as we do not inquire how they were applied in 
 practice), the assemblage of popular legends, tradi- 
 tions, opinions, conceptions (inexactly called beliefs) 
 which are comprised under the name of folk-lore. 
 
 All these studies need only the external criticism 
 which investigates authorship and origin and inter- 
 pretative criticism ; they require one degree less 
 elaboration than the history of objective facts, and 
 accordingly they have been earlier established on a 
 methodical basis. 
 
 154 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE NEGATIVE INTERNAL CRITICISM OF THE GOOD 
 FAITH AND ACCURACY OF AUTHORS 
 
 I. Analysis and positive interpretative criticism 
 only penetrate as far as the inward workings of the 
 mind of the author of a document, and only help us 
 to know his ideas. They give no direct information 
 about external facts. Even when the author was 
 able to observe them, his text only indicates how he 
 wished to represent them, not how he really saw 
 them, still less how they really happened. What 
 an author expresses is not always what he believed, 
 for he may have lied ; what he believed is not neces- 
 sarily what happened, for he may have been mistaken. 
 These propositions are obvious. And yet a first and 
 natural impulse leads us to accept as true every 
 statement contained in a document, which is equi- 
 valent to assuming that no author ever lied or was 
 deceived; and this spontaneous credulity seems to 
 possess a high degree of vitality, for it persists in 
 spite of the innumerable instances of error and men- 
 dacity which daily experience brings before us. 
 
 Reflection has been forced on historians in the 
 course of their work by the circumstance of their 
 finding documents which contradicted each other ; 
 in such cases they have been obliged to doubt, and, 
 
 l 5S 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 after examination, to admit the existence of error or 
 mendacity ; thus negative criticism has appeared as 
 a practical necessity for the purpose of eliminating 
 statements which are obviously false or erroneous. 
 But the instinct of confidence is so indestructible 
 that it has hitherto prevented even those profession- 
 ally concerned from systematising the internal criti- 
 cism cf statements in the same way as the external 
 criticism which deals with the origin of documents 
 has been systematised. Historians, in their works, 
 and even theoretical writers on historical method, 1 
 have been satisfied with common notions and vague 
 formulae in striking contrast with the precise ter- 
 minology of the critical investigation of sources. 
 They are content to examine whether the author 
 was roughly contemporary with the events, whether 
 he was an ocular witness, whether he was sincere and 
 well-informed, whether he knew the truth and desired 
 to tell it, or even — summing up the whole question 
 in a single formula — whether he was trustworthy. 
 
 This superficial criticism is certainly better than 
 no criticism at all, and has sufficed to give those 
 who have applied it the consciousness of incontest- 
 able superiority. But it is only a halfway-house 
 between common credulity and scientific method. 
 Here, as in every science, the starting-point must be 
 methodical doubt. 2 All that has not been proved 
 must be temporarily regarded as doubtful ; no pro- 
 
 1 For example, Pere de Smedt, Tardif, Droysen, and even 
 Bernheim. 
 
 2 Descartes, who came at a time when history still consisted in 
 the reproduction of pre-existing narratives, did not see how to 
 apply methodical doubt to the subject ; he therefore refused to 
 allow it a place among the sciences. 
 
 156 
 
Negative Internal Criticism 
 
 position is to be affirmed unless reasons can be 
 adduced in favour of its truth. Applied to the 
 statements contained in documents, methodical doubt 
 becomes methodical distrust. 
 
 The historian ought to distrust a priori every 
 statement of an author, for he cannot be sure that 
 it is not mendacious or mistaken. At the best it 
 affords a presumption. For the historian to adopt 
 it and affirm it afresh on his own account implies 
 that he regards it as a scientific truth. To take 
 this decisive step is what he has no right to do 
 without good reasons. But the human mind is so 
 constituted that this step is often taken unconsciously 
 (cf. book ii. chap. i.). Against this dangerous ten- 
 dency criticism has only one means of defence. We 
 must not postpone doubt till it is forced upon us by 
 conflicting statements in documents ; we must begin 
 by doubting. We must never forget the interval 
 which separates a statement made by any author 
 whatsoever from a scientifically established truth, 
 so that we may continually keep in mind the 
 responsibility which we assume when we reproduce 
 a statement. 
 
 Even after we have accepted the principle and 
 resolved to apply this unnatural distrust in practice, 
 we tend instinctively to free ourselves from it as 
 soon as possible. The natural impulse is to perform 
 the criticism of the whole of an author, or at least 
 of the whole of a document, in the lump ; to divide 
 authorities into two categories, the sheep on the 
 right, the goats on the left ; on the one side trust- 
 worthy authors and good documents, on the other 
 suspected authors and bad documents. Having thus 
 
 *57 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 exhausted our powers of distrust, we proceed to 
 reproduce without discussion all the statements con- 
 tained in the "good document." We consent to 
 distrust suspected authors such as Suidas or Aimo, 
 but we affirm as established truth everything that 
 has been said by Thucydides or Gregory of Tours. 1 
 We apply to authors that judicial procedure which 
 divides witnesses into admissible and inadmissible : 
 having once accepted a witness, we feel ourselves 
 bound to admit all his testimony ; we dare not doubt 
 any of his statements without a special reason. In- 
 stinctively we take sides with the author on whom 
 we have bestowed our approval, and we go so far as 
 to say, as in the law courts, that the burden of proof 
 rests with those who reject valid testimony. 2 
 
 1 Fustel de Coulanges himself did not rise above this kind of 
 timidity. With reference to a speech attributed to Clovis by 
 Gregory of Tours, he says : " Doubtless we are unable to affirm that 
 these words were ever pronounced. But, all the same, we ought not 
 to affirm, in contradiction to Gregory of Tours, that they were not. 
 . . . The wisest course is to accept Gregory's text " (Monarchic 
 franque, p. 66). The wisest, or rather the only scientific course, is 
 to admit that we know nothing about the words of Clovis, for 
 Gregory himself had no knowledge of them. 
 
 2 Quite recently, E. Meyer, one of the most critically expert his- 
 torians of antiquity, has in his work, Die Entstehung des Judenthums 
 (Halle, 1896, 8vo), revived this strange juridical argument in favour 
 of the narrative of Nehemiah. M. Bouche-Leclercq, in a remarkable 
 study on "The Reign of Seleucus II. (Callinicus) and Historical 
 Criticism " (Revue des Universitis du Midi, April-June 1897), seems, by 
 way of reaction against the hypercriticism of Niebuhr and Droysen, 
 to incline towards an analogous theory : " Historical criticism, if it 
 is not to degenerate into agnosticism — which would be suicidal — or 
 into individual caprice, must place a certain amount of trust in 
 testimony which it cannot verify, as long as it is not flatly contra- 
 dicted by other testimony of equal value." M. Bouche-Leclercq is 
 right as against the historian who, " after having discredited all his 
 witnesses, claims to put himself in their place, and sees with their 
 
 158 
 
Negative Internal Criticism 
 
 The confusion is still further increased by the use 
 of the word authentic, borrowed from judicial lan- 
 guage. It has reference to the origin only, not to 
 the contents ; to say that a document is authentic is 
 merely to say that its origin is certain, not that its 
 contents are free from error. But authenticity 
 inspires a degree of respect which disposes us to 
 accept the contents without discussion. To doubt 
 the statements of an authentic document would 
 seem presumptuous, or at least we think ourselves 
 bound to wait for overwhelming proof before we 
 impeach the testimony of the author. 
 
 II. These natural instincts must be methodically 
 resisted. A document (still more a literary work) 
 is not all of a piece ; it is composed of a great 
 number of independent statements, any one of which 
 may be intentionally or unintentionally false, while 
 the others are bond fide and accurate, or conversely, 
 since each statement is the outcome of a mental 
 operation which may have been incorrectly per- 
 formed, while others were performed correctly. It is 
 not, therefore, enough to examine a document as a 
 whole; each of the statements in it must be examined 
 separately ; criticism is impossible without analysis. 
 
 Thus internal criticism conducts us to two general 
 rules. 
 
 (i) A scientific truth is not established by testi- 
 mony. In order to affirm a proposition we must 
 
 eyes something quite different from what they themselves saw." 
 But when the " testimony " is insufficient to give us the scientific 
 knowledge of a fact, the only correct attitude is " agnosticisni," 
 that is, a confession of ignorance ; we have no right to shirk this 
 confession because chance has permitted the destruction of the 
 documents which might have contradicted the testimony. 
 
 l S9 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 have special reasons for believing it true. It may 
 happen in certain cases that an authors statement 
 is a sufficient reason for belief; but we cannot know 
 that beforehand. The rule, then, will be to examine 
 each separate statement in order to make sure 
 whether it is of a nature to constitute a sufficient 
 reason for belief. 
 
 (2) The criticism of a document is not to be per- 
 formed en bloc. The rule will be to analyse the 
 document into its elements, in order to isolate the 
 different statements of which it is composed and 
 to examine each of them separately. Sometimes a 
 single sentence contains several statements ; they 
 must be separated and criticised one by one. In a 
 sale, for example, we distinguish the date, the place, 
 the vendor, the purchaser, the object, the price, and 
 each one of the conditions. 
 
 In practice, criticism and analysis are performed 
 simultaneously, and, except in the case of texts in 
 a difficult language, may proceed 'pari passu with 
 interpretative analysis and criticism. As soon as 
 we understand a phrase we analyse it and criticise 
 each of its elements. 
 
 It thus appears that logically criticism comprises 
 an enormous number of operations. In describing 
 them, with all the details necessary for the under- 
 standing of their mechanism and the reasons for 
 their employment, we are likely to give the impres- 
 sion of a procedure too slow to be practicable. Such 
 an impression is inevitably produced by every verbal 
 description of a complicated process. Compare the 
 time occupied in describing a movement in fenc- 
 ing with that required to execute it ; compare the 
 
 160 
 
Negative Internal Criticism 
 
 tedium of the grammar and dictionary with the 
 rapidity of reading. Like every practical art, criti- 
 cism consists in the habit of performing certain acts. 
 In the period of apprenticeship, before the habit is 
 acquired, we are obliged to think of each act separ- 
 ately before performing it, and to analyse the move- 
 ments ; accordingly we perform them all slowly and 
 with difficulty ; but the habit once acquired, the acts, 
 which have now become instinctive and unconscious, 
 are performed with ease and rapidity. The reader 
 must therefore not be uneasy about the slowness of 
 the critical processes ; he will see later on how they 
 are abridged in practice. 
 
 III. The problem of criticism may be stated as 
 follows. Given a statement made by a man of 
 whose mental operations we have no experience, and 
 the value of the statement depending exclusively on 
 the manner in which these operations were per- 
 formed ; to ascertain whether these operations were 
 performed correctly. The mere statement of the 
 problem shows that we cannot hope for any direct 
 or definitive solution of it ; we lack the essential 
 datum, namely, the manner in which the author 
 performed the mental operations concerned. Criti- 
 cism therefore does not advance beyond indirect and 
 provisional solutions, and does no more than furnish 
 data which require a final elaboration. 
 
 A natural instinct leads us to judge of the value 
 of statements by their form. We think we can tell 
 at a glance whether an author is sincere or a narra- 
 tive accurate. We seek for what is called "the 
 accent of sincerity," or " an impression of truth." 
 This impression is almost irresistible, but it is none 
 
 161 L 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 the less an illusion. There is no external criterion 
 either of good faith or of accuracy. " The accent of 
 sincerity " is the appearance of conviction ; an orator, 
 an actor, an habitual liar will put more of it into his 
 lies than an undecided man into his statement of 
 what he believes to be the truth. Energy of affirma- 
 tion does not always mean strength of conviction, 
 but sometimes only cleverness or effrontery. 1 Simi- 
 larly, abundance and precision of detail, though they 
 produce a vivid impression on unexperienced readers, 
 do not guarantee the accuracy of the facts ; 2 they 
 give us no information about anything but the 
 imagination of the author when he is sincere, or his 
 impudence when he is the reverse. We are apt to 
 say of a circumstantial narrative : " Things of this 
 kind are not invented." They are not invented, but 
 they are very easy to transfer from one person, 
 country, or time to another. There is thus no ex- 
 ternal characteristic of a document which can relieve 
 us of the obligation to criticise it. 
 
 The value of an author's statement depends solely 
 on the conditions under which he performed certain 
 mental operations. Criticism has no other resource 
 
 1 The "Memoirs. of Cardinal de Retz" furnish a conclusive in- 
 stance : the anecdote of the ghosts met by Retz and Turenne. 
 A. Feillet, who edited Retz in the Collection des Grands itcrivains de 
 la France, has shown (vol. i. p. 192) that this story, so vividly nar- 
 rated, is false from beginning to end. 
 
 2 A good example of the fascination exerted by a circumstantial 
 narrative is the legend respecting the origin of the League of the 
 three primitive Swiss cantons (Gessler and the Griitli conspirators), 
 which was fabricated by Tschudi in the sixteenth century, became 
 classical on the production of Schiller's "William Tell," and has 
 only been extirpated with the greatest difficulty. (See Rilliet, 
 Origines de la Confederation Suisse, Geneva, 1869, 8vo.) 
 
 l62 
 
Negative Internal Criticism 
 
 than the examination of these conditions. But it is 
 not a case of reconstructing all of them ; it is enough 
 to answer a single question : did the author perform 
 these operations correctly or not ? The question 
 may be approached on two sides. 
 
 (i) The critical investigation of authorship has 
 often taught us the general conditions under which 
 the author operated. It is probable that some of 
 these influenced each one of the operations. We 
 ought therefore to begin by studying the informa- 
 tion we possess about the author and the com- 
 position of the document, taking particular pains 
 to look in the habits, sentiments, and personal 
 situation of the author, or in the circumstances in 
 which he composed, for all the reasons which could 
 have existed for incorrectness on the one hand, or 
 exceptional accuracy on the other. In order to 
 perceive these reasons it is necessary to be on the 
 lookout for them beforehand. The only method, 
 therefore, is to draw up a general set of questions 
 having reference to the possible causes of in- 
 accuracy. We shall then apply it to the general 
 conditions under which the document was com- 
 posed, in order to discover those causes which may 
 have rendered the author's mental operations in- 
 correct and vitiated the results. But all that we 
 shall thus obtain — even in the exceptionally favour- 
 able cases in which the conditions of origin are well 
 known — will be general indications, which will be 
 insufficient for the purposes of criticism, for criticism 
 must always deal with each separate statement. 
 
 (2) The criticism of particular statements is con- 
 fined to the use of a single method, which, by a 
 
 163 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 curious paradox, is the study of the universal 
 conditions under which documents are composed. 
 The information which is not furnished by the 
 general study of the author may be sought for by 
 a consideration of the necessary processes of the 
 human mind ; for, since these are universal, they 
 must appear in each particular case. We know 
 what are the cases in which men in general are 
 inclined to alter or distort facts. What we have 
 to do in the case of each statement is to examine 
 whether it was made under such circumstances as 
 to lead us to suspect, from our knowledge of the 
 habits of normal humanity, that the operations 
 implied in the making of it were incorrectly per- 
 formed. The practical procedure will be to draw 
 up a set of questions relating to the habitual 
 causes of inaccuracy. 
 
 The whole of criticism thus reduces to the draw- 
 ing up and answering of two sets of questions : 
 one for the purpose of bringing before our minds 
 those general conditions affecting the composition 
 of the document, from which we may deduce general 
 motives for distrust or confidence ; the other for 
 the purpose of realising the special conditions of 
 each statement, from which special motives may 
 be drawn for distrust or confidence. These two 
 sets of questions ought to be drawn up before- 
 hand in such a form as may enable us to examine 
 methodically both the document in general and 
 each statement in particular ; and as they are the 
 same for all documents, it is useful to formulate 
 them once for all. 
 
 IV. The critical process comprises two series of 
 164 
 
Negative Internal Criticism 
 
 questions, which correspond to the two series of 
 operations by which the document was produced. 
 All that interpretative criticism tells us is what the 
 author meant ; it remains to determine ( i ) what he 
 really believed, for he may not have been sincere ; 
 (2) what he really knew, for he may have been 
 mistaken. We may therefore distinguish a critical 
 examination of the author s good faith, by which we 
 seek to determine whether the author of the docu- 
 ment lied or not, and a critical examination of his 
 accuracy, by which we seek to determine whether he 
 was or was not mistaken. 
 
 In practice we rarely need to know what an 
 author believed, unless we are making a special 
 study of his character. We have no direct interest 
 in the author ; he is merely the medium through 
 which we reach the external facts he reports. The 
 aim of criticism is to determine whether the author 
 has reported the facts correctly. If he has given 
 inexact information, it is indifferent whether he did 
 so intentionally or not ; to draw a distinction would 
 complicate matters unnecessarily. There is thus 
 little occasion to make a separate examination of an 
 author's good faith, and we may shorten our labours 
 by including in a single set of questions all the 
 causes which lead , to misstatement. But for the 
 sake of clearness it will be well to discuss the ques- 
 tions to be asked in two separate series. 
 
 The questions in the first series will help us 
 to inquire whether we have any reason to distrust 
 the sincerity of a statement. We ask whether the 
 author was in any of those situations which normally 
 incline a man to be insincere. We must ask what 
 
 165 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 these situations are, both as affecting the general com- 
 position of a document, and as affecting each par- 
 ticular statement. Experience supplies the answer. 
 Every violation of truth, small or great, is due to a wish 
 on the part of the author to produce a particular 
 impression upon the reader. Our set of questions 
 thus reduces to a list of the motives which may, 
 in the general case, lead an author to violate truth. 
 The following are the most important cases : — 
 
 (i) The author seeks to gain a practical advan- 
 tage for himself; he wishes to deceive the reader of 
 the document, in order to persuade him to an action, 
 or to dissuade him from it ; he knowingly gives 
 false information : we then say the author has an 
 interest in deceiving. This is the case with most 
 official documents. Even in documents which have 
 not been composed for a practical purpose, every 
 interested statement has a chance of being men- 
 dacious. In order to determine which statements 
 are to be suspected, we are to ask what can have 
 been the general aim of the author in writing the 
 document as a whole ; and again, what can have 
 been his particular purpose in making each of the 
 separate statements which compose the document. 
 But there are two natural tendencies to be resisted. 
 The first is, to ask what interest the author could 
 have had in lying, meaning what interest should 
 we have had in his place ; we must ask instead what 
 interest can he have thought he had in lying, and 
 we must look for the answer in his tastes and ideals. 
 The other tendency is to take sole account of the 
 individual interest of the author; we ought, how- 
 ever, to remember that the author may have given 
 
 166 
 
Negative Internal Criticism 
 
 false information in order to serve a collective in- 
 terest. This is one of the difficulties of criticism. 
 An author is a member at one and the same time 
 of several different groups, a family, a province, a 
 country, a religious denomination, a political party, 
 a class in society, whose interests often conflict ; we 
 have to discover the group in which he took most 
 interest, and for which he worked. 
 
 (2) The author was placed in a situation which 
 compelled him to violate truth. This happens 
 whenever he has to draw up a document in con- 
 formity with rule or custom, while the actual cir- 
 cumstances are in some point or other in conflict 
 with rule or custom ; he is then obliged to state 
 that the conditions were normal, and thus make 
 a false declaration in respect of all the irregularities. 
 In nearly every report of proceedings there is some 
 slight deviation from truth as to the day, the hour, 
 the place, the number or the names of those 
 present. Most of us have observed, if not taken 
 part in, some of these petty fictions. But we are 
 too apt to forget them when we come to criticise 
 documents relating to the past. The authentic char- 
 acter of the documents contributes to the illusion ; 
 we instinctively make authentic a synonym of sincere. 
 The rigid rules which govern the composition of 
 every authentic document seem to guarantee sin- 
 cerity ; they are, on the contrary, an incentive to 
 falsify, not the main facts, but the accessory circum- 
 stances. From the fact of a person having signed a 
 report we may infer that he agreed to it, but not 
 that he was actually present at the time when the 
 report mentions him as having been present. 
 
 167 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 (3) The author viewed with sympathy or anti- 
 pathy a group of men (nation, party, denomination, 
 province, city, family), or an assemblage of doctrines 
 or institutions (religion, school of philosophy, poli- 
 tical theory), and was led to distort facts in such a 
 manner as to represent his friends in a favourable 
 and his opponents in an unfavourable light. These 
 are instances of a general bias which affects all the 
 statements of an author, and they are so obvious 
 that the ancients perceived them and gave them 
 names {stadium and odium) ; from ancient times it 
 has been a literary commonplace for historians to 
 protest that they have steered clear of both. 
 
 (4) The author was induced by private or collec- 
 tive vanity to violate truth for the purpose of 
 exalting himself or his group. He made such 
 statements as he thought likely to give the reader 
 the impression that he and his possessed qualities 
 deserving of esteem. We have therefore to inquire 
 whether a given statement may not be influenced 
 by vanity. But we must take care not to represent 
 the author's vanity to ourselves as being exactly 
 like our own vanity or that of our contemporaries. 
 Different people are vain for different reasons ; we 
 must inquire what was our author's particular 
 vanity ; he may have lied in order to attribute to 
 himself or his friends actions which we should con- 
 sider dishonourable. Charles IX. falsely boasted of 
 having organised the Massacre of St. Bartholomew. 
 There is, however, a kind of vanity which is universal, 
 and that is, the desire to appear to be a person of 
 exalted rank playing an important part in affairs. 
 We must, therefore, always distrust a statement 
 
 168 
 
Negative Internal Criticism 
 
 which attributes to the author or his group a high 
 place in the world. 1 
 
 (5) The author desired to please the public, or at 
 least to avoid shocking it. He has expressed senti- 
 ments and ideas in harmony with the morality or the 
 fashion of his public ; he has distorted facts in order 
 to adapt them to the passions and prejudices of his 
 time, even those which he did not share. The 
 purest types of this kind of falsehood are found 
 in ceremonial forms, official formulae, declarations 
 prescribed by etiquette, set speeches, polite phrases. 
 The statements which come under this head are so 
 open to suspicion that we are unable to derive from 
 them any information about the facts stated. We 
 are all aware of this so far as relates to the contem- 
 porary formulae of which we see instances every day, 
 but we often forget it in the criticism of documents, 
 especially those belonging to an age from which 
 few documents have come down to us. No one 
 would think of looking for the real sentiments 
 of a man in the assurances of respect with which 
 he ends his letters.. But people believed for a 
 long time in the humility of certain ecclesiastical 
 dignitaries of the middle ages, because, on the 
 day of their election, they began by refusing an 
 office of which they declared themselves un- 
 worthy, till at last comparison showed that this 
 refusal was a mere conventional form. And there 
 are still scholars who, like the Benedictines of the 
 eighteenth century, look in the chancery- formulae 
 
 1 Striking examples of falsehoods due to vanity are to be found 
 in abundance in the Economies royales of Sully and the Memoires of 
 Retz. 
 
 169 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 of a prince for information as to his piety or his 
 liberality. 1 
 
 In order to recognise these conventional declara- 
 tions there are two lines of general study to be 
 pursued : the one is directed to the author, and 
 seeks to discover what was the public he addressed, 
 for in one and the same country there are usually 
 several different publics, each of which has its own 
 code of morals or propriety; the other is directed 
 towards the public, and seeks to determine its 
 morals or its manners. 
 
 (6) The author endeavoured to please the public 
 by literary artifices.. He distorted facts in order 
 to embellish them according to his own aesthetic 
 notions. We have therefore to look for the ideal of 
 the author or of his time, in order to be on our guard 
 against passages distorted to suit that ideal. But 
 without special study we may calculate on the 
 common kinds of literary distortion. Rhetorical 
 distortion consists in attributing to persons noble 
 attitudes, acts, sentiments, and, above all, words: 
 this is a natural tendency in young boys who are 
 beginning to practise the art of composition, and in 
 writers still in a semi-barbarous stage ; it is the 
 common defect of the mediaeval chroniclers. 2 Epic 
 
 1 Fustel de Coulanges himself went to the formulae of the inscrip- 
 tions in honour of the emperors for a proof that the peoples liked 
 the imperial regime. "If we read the inscriptions, the sentiment 
 which they exhibit is always one of satisfaction and gratitude. . . . 
 See the collection of Orelli, the most frequent expressions are . . ." 
 And the enumeration of the titles of respect given to the emperors 
 ends with this strange aphorism : " It would show ignorance of 
 human nature to see nothing but flattery in all this." There is not 
 even flattery here ; there is nothing but formulae. 
 
 2 Suger, in his life of Louis VI., is a model of this type. 
 
 I70 
 
Negative Internal Criticism 
 
 distortion embellishes the narrative by adding pic- 
 turesque details, speeches delivered by the persons 
 concerned, numbers, sometimes names of persons ; 
 it is dangerous, because the precision of the details 
 produces an illusive appearance of truth. 1 Dramatic 
 distortion consists in grouping the facts in such a 
 way as to enhance the dramatic effect by concen- 
 trating facts, which in reality were separate, upon a 
 single moment, a single person, or a single group. 
 Writing of this kind is what we call " truer than the 
 truth." It is the most dangerous form of distortion, 
 the form employed by artistic historians, by Hero- 
 dotus, Tacitus, the Italians of the Renaissance. 
 Lyrical distortion exaggerates the intensity of the 
 sentiments and the emotions of the author and his 
 friends : we should remember this when we attempt 
 to reconstruct " the psychology " of a person. 
 
 Literary distortion does not much affect archives 
 (though instances of it are found in most charters of 
 the eleventh century) ; but it profoundly modifies all 
 literary texts, including the narratives of historians. 
 Now, the natural tendency is to trust writers more 
 readily when they 'have talent, and to admit state- 
 ments with less difficulty when they are presented 
 in good literary form. Criticism must counteract 
 this tendency by the application of the paradoxical 
 rule, that the more interesting a statement is from 
 the artistic point of view, 2 the more it ought to be 
 suspected. We must distrust every narrative which 
 
 1 The Ohronicon Helveticum of Tschudi is a striking instance. 
 
 2 Aristophanes and Demosthenes are two striking examples of 
 the power great writers have of paralysing critics and obscuring 
 facts. Not till the close of the nineteenth century has any one 
 ventured to recognise frankly their lack of good faith. 
 
 171 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 is very picturesque or very dramatic, in which the 
 personages assume noble attitudes or manifest great 
 intensity of feeling. 
 
 This first series -of questions will yield the pro- 
 visional result of enabling us to note the statements 
 which have a chance of being mendacious. 
 
 Y. The second series of questions will be of use 
 in determining whether there is any reason to dis- 
 trust the accuracy of a statement. Was the author 
 in one of those situations which cause a man to 
 make mistakes ? As in dealing with good faith, we 
 must look for these conditions both as affecting the 
 document as a whole, and as affecting each of the 
 particular statements in it. 
 
 The practice of the established sciences teaches 
 us the conditions of an exact knowledge of facts. 
 There is only one scientific procedure for gaining 
 knowledge of a fact, namely, observation ; every state- 
 ment, therefore, must rest, directly or indirectly, 
 upon an observation, and this observation must have 
 been made correctly. 
 
 The set of questions by the aid of which we 
 investigate the probabilities of error may be drawn 
 up in the light of experience, which brings before 
 us the most common cases of error. 
 
 (i) The author was in a situation to observe the 
 fact, and supposed he really had observed it ; he 
 was, however, prevented from doing so by some 
 interior force of which he was unconscious, an 
 hallucination, an illusion, or a mere prejudice. It 
 would be useless, as well as impossible, to determine 
 which of these agencies was at work ; it is enough 
 to ascertain whether the author had a tendency to 
 
 172 
 
Negative Internal Criticism 
 
 observe badly. It is scarcely possible in the case 
 of a particular statement to recognise that it was 
 the result of an hallucination or an illusion. At 
 the most we may learn, either from information 
 derived from other sources or by comparison, that 
 an author had a general propensity to this kind of 
 error. 
 
 There is a better chance of recognising whether a 
 statement was due to prejudice. In the life or the 
 works of an author we may find the traces of his 
 dominant prejudices. With reference to each of his 
 particular statements, we ought to ask whether it is 
 not the result of a preconceived idea of the author 
 on a class of men or a kind of facts. This inquiry 
 partly coincides with the search for motives of false- 
 hood : interest, vanity, sympathy, and antipathy give 
 rise to prejudices which alter the truth in the same 
 manner as wilful falsehood. We therefore employ 
 the questions already formulated for the purpose of 
 testing good faith. But there is one to be added. 
 In putting forward a statement has the author been 
 led to distort it unconsciously by the circumstance 
 that he was answering a question ? This is the case 
 of all statements obtained by interrogating witnesses. 
 Even apart from the cases where the person interro- 
 gated seeks to please the proposer of the question by 
 giving an answer which he thinks will be agreeable 
 to him, every question suggests its own answer, or 
 at least its form, and this form is dictated before- 
 hand by some one unacquainted with the facts. It 
 is therefore necessary to apply a special criticism to 
 every statement obtained by interrogation ; we must 
 ask what was the question put, and what were the 
 
 i-73 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 preconceptions to which it may have given rise in 
 the mind of the person interrogated. 
 
 (2) The author was badly situated for observing. 
 The practice of the sciences teaches us what are 
 the conditions for correct observation. The observer 
 ought to be placed where he can see correctly, and 
 should have no practical interest, no desire to obtain 
 a particular result, no preconceived idea about the 
 result. He ou^ht to record the observation im- 
 mediately, in a precise system of notation ; he ought 
 to give a precise indication of his method. These 
 conditions, which are insisted on in the sciences of 
 observation, are never completely fulfilled by the 
 authors of documents. 
 
 It would be useless, therefore, to ask whether 
 there have been chances of inaccuracy ; there always 
 have been, and it is just this that distinguishes a 
 document from an observation. It only remains to 
 look for the obvious causes of error in the conditions 
 of observation : to inquire whether the observer was 
 in a place where he could not see or hear well, as 
 would be the case, for example, with a subordinate 
 who should presume to narrate the secret delibera- 
 tions of a council of dignitaries ; whether his atten- 
 tion was greatly distracted by the necessity for action, 
 as it would be on the field of battle, for example; 
 whether he was inattentive because the facts had 
 little interest for him ; whether he lacked the 
 special experience or general intelligence necessary 
 for understanding the facts; whether he analysed 
 his impressions badly, or confused different events. 
 Above all, we must ask when he ivrote down what he 
 saw or heard. This is the most important point : 
 
 *74 
 
Negative Internal Criticism 
 
 the only exact observation is the one which is re- 
 corded immediately it is made ; such is the constant 
 procedure in the established sciences ; an impression 
 committed to writing later on is only a recollection, 
 liable to be confused in the memory with other 
 recollections. Memoirs written several years after 
 the facts, often at the very end of the author's 
 career, have introduced innumerable errors into his- 
 tory. It must be made a rule to treat memoirs with 
 special distrust, as second-hand documents, in spite of 
 their appearance of being contemporary testimony. 
 
 (3) The author states facts which he could have 
 observed, but to which he did not take the trouble 
 to attend. From idleness or negligence he reported 
 details which he has merely inferred, or even imagined 
 at random, and which turn out to be false. This is 
 a common source of error, though it does not readily 
 occur to one, and is to be suspected wherever the 
 author was obliged to procure information in which 
 he took little interest, in order to fill up a blank form. 
 Of this kind are answers to questions put by an 
 authority (it is enough to observe how most official 
 inquiries are conducted in our own day), and detailed 
 accounts of ceremonies or public functions. There 
 is too strong a temptation to write the account from 
 the programme, or in agreement with the usual order 
 of the proceedings. How many accounts of meetings 
 of all kinds have been published by reporters who were 
 not present at them ! Similar efforts of imagina- 
 tion are suspected — sometimes, it is thought, clearly 
 recognised — in the writings of medineval chroniclers. 1 
 
 1 For example, the account of the election of Otto I. in the Qeata 
 Ottonis of Wittekind. 
 
 175 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 The rule, then, will be to distrust all narratives 
 conforming too closely to a set formula. 
 
 (4) The fact stated is of such a nature that it 
 could not have been learnt by observation alone. 
 It may be a hidden fact — a private secret, for ex- 
 ample. It may be a fact relating to a collectivity, 
 and applying to an extensive area or a long period 
 of time ; for example, the common act of a whole 
 army, a custom common to a whole people or a whole 
 age, a statistical total obtained by the addition of 
 numerous items. It may be a comprehensive judg- 
 ment on the character of a man, a group, a custom, 
 an event. Here we have to do with propositions 
 derived from observations by synthesis or inference : 
 the author can only have arrived at them indirectly ; 
 he began with data furnished by observation, and 
 elaborated them by the logical processes of abstraction, 
 generalisation, reasoning, calculation. Two questions 
 arise. Does it appear that the author had sufficient 
 data to work upon ? Was he accurate, or the reverse, 
 in his use of the data he had ? 
 
 On the probable inaccuracies of an author, general 
 indications may be obtained from an examination of 
 his writings. This examination will show us how 
 he worked : whether he was capable of abstraction, 
 reasoning, generalisation, and what were the mis- 
 takes he was in the habit of making. In order to 
 determine the value of the data, we must criticise 
 each statement separately; we must imagine the 
 conditions under which the author observed, and 
 ask ourselves whether he was able to procure the 
 necessary data for his statement. This is an in- 
 dispensable precaution in dealing with large totals 
 
 176 
 
Negative Internal Criticism 
 
 in statistics and descriptions of popular usages ; for 
 it is possible that the author may have obtained the 
 total he gives by a process of conjectural valuation 
 (this is the ordinary practice in stating the number 
 of combatants or killed in a battle), or by combining 
 subsidiary totals, all of which were not accurate ; it 
 is possible that he may have extended to a whole 
 people, a whole country, a whole period, that which 
 was true only of a small group known to him. 1 
 
 VI. These two first series of questions bearing on 
 the good faith and the accuracy of the statements 
 in the document are based on the supposition that 
 the author has observed the fact himself, This is a 
 feature common to all reports of observations in the 
 established sciences. But in history there is so 
 great a dearth of direct observations, of even moderate 
 value, that we are obliged to turn to account docu- 
 ments which every other science would reject. 2 
 Take any narrative at random, even if it be the 
 work of a contemporary, it will be found that the 
 facts observed by the author are never more than a 
 part of the whole number. In nearly every docu- 
 ment the majority of the statements do not come 
 from the author at first hand, but are reproductions 
 of the statements of others. Even where a general 
 relates a battle in which he commanded, he does 
 not communicate his own observations, but those of 
 
 1 For example, the statistics on the population, the commerce, 
 and the wealth of European countries given by the Venetian 
 ambassadors of the sixteenth century, and the descriptions of the 
 usages of the Germans in the Germania of Tacitus. 
 
 2 It would be interesting to examine how much of Roman or 
 Merovingian history would be left if we rejected all documents 
 but those which represent direct observation. 
 
 177 M 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 his officers; his narrative is in a large measure a 
 " second-hand document." 1 
 
 In order to criticise a second-hand statement it is 
 no longer enough to examine the conditions under 
 which the author of the document worked : this 
 author is, in such a case, a mere agent of trans- 
 mission ; the true author is the person who supplied 
 him the information. The critic, therefore, must 
 change his ground, and ask whether the informant 
 observed and reported correctly ; and if he too had 
 the information from some one else (the commonest 
 case), the chase must be pursued from one inter- 
 mediary to another, till the person is found who 
 first launched the statement on its career, and with 
 regard to him the question must be asked : Was he 
 an accurate observer ? 
 
 Logically such a search is not inconceivable; 
 ancient collections of Arab traditions give lists of 
 their successive guarantors. But, in practice, lack of 
 documents nearly always prevents us from getting 
 as far as the observer of a fact ; the observation 
 remains anonymous. A general question then pre- 
 sents itself: How are we to criticise an anonymous 
 statement ? It is not only " anonymous documents " 
 
 1 It will be seen why we have not separately defined and studied 
 "first-hand documents." The question has not been raised in the 
 proper manner in historical practice. The distinction ought to 
 apply to statements, not to documents. It is not the document 
 which comes to us at first, second, or third hand; it is the state- 
 ment. What is called a "first-hand document" is nearly always 
 composed in part of second-hand statements about facts of which 
 the author had no personal knowledge. The name " second-hand 
 document 1 ' is given to those which, like the work of Livy, contain 
 nothing first-hand ; but the distinction is too crude to serve as a 
 guide in the critical examination of statements. 
 
 178. 
 
Negative Internal Criticism 
 
 with which we are concerned, where the composition 
 as a whole is the work of an unknown author ; even 
 when the author is known, this question arises with 
 respect to each statement of his drawn from an 
 unknown source. 
 
 Criticism works by reproducing the conditions 
 under which an author wrote, and has hardly any- 
 thing to take hold of where a statement is anony- 
 mous. The only method left is to examine the 
 general conditions of the document. We may in- 
 quire whether there is any feature common to all 
 the statements of a document indicating that they 
 all proceed from persons having the same prejudices 
 or passions: in this case the tradition followed by 
 the author is biassed ; the tradition followed by 
 Herodotus has both an Athenian bias and a 
 Delphic bias. In respect of each fact derived from 
 such a tradition we must ask whether it has not 
 been distorted by the interest, the vanity, or the 
 prejudices of the group concerned. We may even 
 ignore the author, and ask whether there was any- 
 thing likely to make for or against correct observa- 
 tion, common to all the men of the time and 
 country in which the observation must have been 
 made : for example, what means of information, and 
 what prejudices, had the Greeks of Herodotus' time 
 with respect to the Scythians. 
 
 The most useful of all these general inquiries has 
 reference to that mode of transmitting anonymous 
 statements which is called tradition. No second- 
 hand statement has any value except in so far as it 
 reproduces its source ; every addition is an alteration, 
 and ought to be eliminated. Similarly, all the inter- 
 
 x 79 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 mediary sources are valueless except as copies of the 
 original statement founded directly on observation. 
 The critic needs to know whether this transmission 
 from hand to hand has preserved or distorted the 
 original statement ; above all, whether the tradition 
 embodied in the document was written or oral. 
 Writing fixes a statement, and ensures its being 
 transmitted faithfully ; when a statement is com- 
 municated orally, the impression in the mind of the 
 hearer is apt to be modified by confusion with other 
 impressions ; in passing from one intermediary to 
 another the statement is modified at every step, 1 
 and as these modifications arise from different 
 causes, there is no possibility of measuring or cor- 
 recting them. 
 
 Oral tradition is by its nature a process of con- 
 tinual alteration ; hence in the established sciences 
 only written transmission is accepted. Historians 
 have no avowable motive for proceeding differently, 
 at any rate when it is a case of establishing a parti- 
 cular fact. We must therefore search documents 
 for statements derived from oral tradition in order 
 that we may suspect them. We rarely have direct 
 information as to statements being thus derived ; 
 authors who borrow from oral tradition are not 
 anxious to proclaim the fact. 2 There is thus only 
 
 1 There is much less modification where the oral tradition assumes 
 a regular or striking form, as is the case with verses, maxims, 
 proverbs. 
 
 2 Sometimes the form of the phrase tells its own tale, when, in 
 the midst of a detailed narrative, obviously of legendary origin, we 
 come across a curt, dry entry in annalistic style, obviously copied 
 from a written document. That is what we find in Livv (see Nitzsch, 
 Die romische Annulistih, Leipzig, 1873, 8vo), and in Gregory of Tours 
 (see Loebell, Grcgor von Tours, Leipzig, 1868, 8vo). 
 
 l80 
 
Negative Internal Criticism 
 
 an indirect method, and that is to ascertain that 
 written transmission was impossible ; we may then be 
 sure that the fact reached the author only by oral 
 tradition. We have therefore to ask the question : 
 In this period and in this group of men was it custo- 
 mary to commit to writing facts of this kind ? If 
 the answer is negative, the fact considered rests on 
 oral tradition alone. 
 
 The most striking form of oral tradition is legend. 
 It arises among groups of men with whom the spoken 
 word is the only means of transmission, in barbarous 
 societies, or in classes of little culture, such as pea- 
 sants or soldiers. In this case it is the whole group 
 of facts which is transmitted orally and assumes the 
 legendary form. There is a legendary period in the 
 early history of every people : in Greece, at Rome, 
 among the Germanic and Slavonic races, the most 
 ancient memories of the people form a stratum of 
 legend. In periods of civilisation popular legends 
 continue to exist in reference to events which strike 
 the imagination of the people. 1 Legend is exclusively 
 oral tradition. 
 
 When a people has emerged from the legendary 
 period and begun to commit its history to writing, 
 oral tradition does not come to an end, but only 
 applies to a narrower sphere ; it is now restricted to 
 
 1 The events which strike the popular imagination and are trans- 
 mitted by legend are not generally those which seem to us the most 
 important. The heroes of the chansons de gestes are hardly known 
 historically. The Breton epic songs relate, not to the great histo- 
 rical events, as Villemarque's collection led people to believe, but to 
 obscure local episodes. The same holds of the Scandinavian sagas ; 
 for the most part they relate to quarrels among the villagers of 
 Iceland or the Orkneys. 
 
 181 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 facts which are not registered, whether because they 
 are by their nature secret, or because no one takes 
 the trouble to record them, such as private actions, 
 words, the details of events. Thus arise anecdotes, 
 which have been named " the legends of civilised 
 society." Like legends they have their origin in 
 confused recollections, allusions, mistaken interpreta- 
 tions, imaginings of all kinds which fasten upon 
 particular persons and events. 
 
 Legends and anecdotes are at bottom mere 
 popular beliefs, arbitrarily attached to historical 
 personages ; they belong to folk-lore, not to history. 1 
 We must therefore guard against the temptation to 
 treat legend as an alloy of accurate facts and errors 
 out of which it is possible by analysis to extract 
 grains of historical truth. A legend is a conglome- 
 rate in which there may be some grains of truth, 
 and which may even be capable of being analysed 
 into its elements; but there is no means of dis- 
 tinguishing the elements taken from reality from 
 those which are the work of imagination. To 
 use Niebuhr's expression, a legend is "a mirage 
 produced by an invisible object according to an 
 unknown law of refraction." 
 
 The crudest analytical procedure consists in 
 rejecting those details in the legendary narrative 
 which appear impossible, miraculous, contradictory, 
 or absurd, and retaining the rational residue as his- 
 torical. This is how the Protestant rationalists of 
 the eighteenth century treated biblical narratives. 
 
 1 The theory of legend is one of the most advanced parts of 
 criticism. Bernheim (in his Lehrbuch, pp. 380-90) gives a good 
 summary and a bibliography of it. 
 
 182 
 
Negative Internal Criticism 
 
 One might as well amputate the marvellous part of 
 a fairy tale, suppress Puss in Boots, and keep the 
 Marquis of Carabas as an historical character. A 
 more refined but r "ss dangerous method is to 
 compare different legends in order to deduce their 
 common historical basis. Grote 1 has shown, with 
 reference to Greek tradition, that it is impossible to 
 extract any trustworthy information from legend by 
 any process whatever. 2 We must make up our 
 minds to treat legend as a product of imagination; 
 we may look in it for a people's conceptions, not for 
 the external facts in that people's history. The rule 
 will be to reject every statement of legendary origin ; 
 nor does this apply only to narratives in legendary 
 form : a narrative which has an historical appear- 
 ance, but is founded on the data of legend, the 
 opening chapters of Thucydides for example, ought 
 equally to be discarded. 
 
 In the case of written transmission it remains to 
 inquire whether the author reproduced his source 
 without altering it. This inquiry forms part of the 
 critical investigation of the sources, 3 so far as it can 
 be pursued by a comparison of texts. But when the 
 source has disappeared we are reduced to internal 
 criticism. We ask, first of all, whether the author 
 can have had exact information, otherwise his state- 
 
 1 " History of Greece," vols. i. and ii. Compare Renan, Histoire 
 du peuple d Israel, vol. i. (Paris, 1887, 8vo), Introduction. 
 
 2 And yet Niebuhr made use of the Roman legends to construct 
 a theory, which it was afterwards necessary to demolish, of the 
 struggle between the patricians and the plebeians ; and Curtius, 
 twenty years after Grote, looked for historical facts in the Greek 
 legends. 
 
 3 See supra, pp. 93 sqq. 
 
 183 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 ineiit is valueless. We next put to ourselves the 
 general question : Was the author in the habit of 
 altering his sources, and in what manner ? And in 
 regard to each separate second-hand statement we 
 ask whether it has the appearance of being an exact 
 reproduction or an arrangement. We judge by the 
 form : when we meet with a passage whose style is 
 out of harmony with the main body of the com- 
 position, we have before us a fragment of an earlier 
 document; the more servile the reproduction the 
 more valuable is the passage, for it can contain no 
 exact information beyond what was already in the 
 source. 
 
 VII. In spite of all these investigations, criticism 
 never succeeds in determining the parentage of all 
 the statements to the extent of finding out who it 
 was that observed, or even recorded, each fact. In 
 most cases the inquiry ends in leaving the state- 
 ment anonymous. 
 
 We are thus confronted with a fact, observed we 
 know not by whom nor how, recorded we know not 
 when nor how. No other science accepts facts 
 which come in such a condition, without possibi- 
 lity of verification, subject to incalculable chances 
 of error. But history can turn them to account, 
 because it does not, like the other sciences, need a 
 supply of facts which are difficult to ascertain. 
 
 The notion of a fact, when we come to examine 
 it precisely, reduces to an affirmative judgment 
 having reference to external reality. The operations 
 by which we arrive at such a judgment are more 
 or less difficult, and the risk of error is greater 
 or smaller according to the nature of the realities 
 
 184 
 
Negative Internal Criticism 
 
 investigated and the degree of precision with which 
 we wish to formulate them. Chemistry and biology 
 need to discern facts of a delicate order, rapid move- 
 ments, transient states, and to measure them in 
 exact figures. History can work with facts of a 
 much coarser kind, spread over a large extent of 
 space or time, such as the existence of a custom, 
 of a man, of a group, even of a people ; and these 
 facts may be roughly expressed in vague words 
 conveying no idea of accurate measurement. With 
 such easily observed facts as these to deal with, 
 history can afford to be much less exacting with 
 regard to the conditions of observation. The im- 
 perfection of the means of information is compen- 
 sated by a natural faculty of being satisfied with 
 information which can easily be obtained. 
 
 Documents supply little else besides ill-verified 
 facts, subject to many risks of falsehood or error. 
 But there are some facts in respect of which it is 
 very difficult to lie or be mistaken. The last series 
 of questions which the critic should ask is intended 
 to distinguish, in the mass of alleged facts, those 
 which by their nature are little subject to the risk 
 of alteration, and which are therefore very probably 
 correct. We know what, in general, are the classes 
 of facts which enjoy this privilege; we are thus 
 enabled to draw up a list of questions for general 
 use, and in applying them to any particular case we 
 ask whether the fact in question comes under any 
 of the heads specified in advance. 
 
 (i) The fact is of a nature to render falsehood 
 improbable. A man lies in order to produce an 
 impression, and has no motive to lie in a case 
 
 i8 5 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 where he believes that the false impression would 
 be of no use, or that the falsehood would be in- 
 effectual. In order to determine whether the author 
 was in such a situation there are several questions 
 to be asked. 
 
 (a) Is the fact stated manifestly prejudicial to the 
 effect which the author wished to produce ? Does 
 it run counter to the interest, the vanity, the senti- 
 ments, the literary tastes of the author and his 
 group ; or to the opinions which he made a point 
 of not offending ? In such a case there is a pro- 
 bability of good faith. But in the application of 
 this criterion there is danger; it has often been 
 wrongly used, and in two ways. One of these is 
 to take for a confession what was meant for a boast, 
 as the declaration of Charles IX. that he was re- 
 sponsible for the Massacre of St. Bartholomew. Or 
 again, we trust without examination an Athenian 
 who speaks ill of the Athenians, or a Protestant 
 who accuses other Protestants. But it is quite 
 possible the author's notions of his interest or 
 honour were very different from ours ; 2 or he may 
 have wished to calumniate fellow-citizens who did 
 not belong to his own party, or co-religionists who 
 did not belong to his own sect. This criterion 
 must therefore be restricted to cases where we 
 know exactly what effect he wished to produce, and 
 in what group he was mainly interested. 
 
 (b) Was the fact stated so obviously known to the 
 public that the author, even if tempted to falsehood, 
 would have been restrained by the certainty of being 
 detected ? This is the case with facts which are 
 
 1 Of. supra, p. 1 66. 
 
 186 
 
Negative Internal Criticism 
 
 easy to verify, which are not remote in point of time 
 or space, which apply to a wide area or a long period, 
 especially if the public had any interest in verifying 
 them. But the fear of detection is only an intermittent 
 check, opposed by interest whenever the author has 
 any motive for deceiving. It acts unequally on 
 different minds — strongly on men of culture and 
 self-control who understand their public, feebly in 
 barbarous ages and on passionate men. 1 This 
 criterion, therefore, is to be restricted to cases where 
 we know what idea the author had of his readers, 
 and whether he was, dispassionate enough to keep 
 them in mind. 
 
 (c) Was the fact stated indifferent to the author, 
 so that he had no temptation to misrepresent it ? 
 This is the case with facts of a general kind, usages, 
 institutions, objects, persons, which the author men- 
 tions incidentally. A narrative, even a false one, 
 cannot be composed exclusively of falsehoods; the 
 author must localise his facts, and needs to surround 
 them with a framework of truth. The facts which 
 form this framework had no interest for him; at 
 that time every one knew them. But for us they 
 are instructive, and we can depend on them, for 
 the author had no intention of deceiving us. 
 
 (2) The fact was of a kind to render error 
 improbable. Numerous as the chances of error 
 are, still there are facts so " big " it is hard to 
 be mistaken about them. We have, then, to ask 
 
 1 It is often said, " The author would not have dared to write this 
 if it had not been true." This argument does not apply to societies 
 in a low state of civilisation. Louis VIII. dared to write that John 
 Lackland had been condemned by the verdict of his peers. 
 
 187 
 
Analytical Opekations 
 
 whether the alleged fact was easy to ascertain : 
 (a) Did it cover a long period of time, so that it 
 must have been frequently observed ? Take, for 
 example, the case of a monument, a man, a custom, 
 an event which was in progress for a considerable 
 time, (b) Did it cover a wide area, so that many 
 people observed it ? — as, for example, a battle, a 
 war, a custom common to a whole people. (c) Is 
 it expressed in such general terms that superficial 
 observation was enough to discover it ? — as the 
 mere existence of a man, a city, a people, a custom. 
 Facts of this large and general kind make up the 
 bulk of historical knowledge. 
 
 (3) The fact was of such a nature that it would 
 not have been stated unless it was true. A man 
 does not declare that he has seen, something con- 
 trary to his expectations and habits of mind unless 
 observation has compelled him to admit it. A fact 
 which seems very improbable to the man who relates 
 it has a good chance of being true. We have, then, 
 to ask whether the fact stated was in contradiction 
 with the author's opinions, whether it is a phenomenon 
 of a kind unknown to him, an action or a custom 
 which seems unintelligible to him; whether it is a 
 saying whose import transcends his intelligence, such 
 as the sayings of Christ reported in the Gospels, or 
 the answers made by Joan of Arc to questions put 
 to her in the course of her trial. But we must guard 
 against judging of the author's ideas by our own 
 standards : when men who are accustomed to believe 
 in the marvellous speak of monsters, of miracles, of 
 wizards, there is nothing in these to contradict their 
 expectations, and the criterion does not apply. 
 
 188 
 
Negative Internal Criticism 
 
 VIII. We have at last reached the end of this 
 description of the critical operations ; its length is due 
 to the necessity of describing successively operations 
 which are performed simultaneously. We will now 
 consider how these methods are applied in practice. 
 
 If the text be one whose interpretation is debat- 
 able, the examination is divided into two stages : the 
 first comprises the reading of the text with a view 
 to the determination of the meaning, wichout at- 
 tempting to draw any information from it ; the second 
 comprises the critical study of the facts contained in 
 the document. In the case of documents whose 
 meaning is clear, we may begin the critical examina- 
 tion on the first reading, reserving for separate study 
 any individual passages of doubtful meaning. 
 
 We begin by collecting the general information we 
 possess about the document and the author, with the 
 special purpose of discovering the conditions which 
 may have influenced the production of the docu- 
 ment — the epoch, the place, the purpose, the cir- 
 cumstances of its composition ; the author's social 
 status, country, party, sect, family, interests, passions, 
 prejudices, linguistic habits, methods of work, means 
 of information, culture, abilities, and mental defects; 
 the nature of the facts and the mode of their trans- 
 mission. Information on all these points is supplied 
 by the preparatory critical investigation of author- 
 ship and sources. We now combine the different 
 heads, mentally applying the set of general critical 
 questions ; this should be done at the outset, and 
 the results impressed on the memory, for they will 
 need to be present to the mind during the remainder 
 of the operations. 
 
 189 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 Thus prepared, we attack the document. As we 
 read we mentally analyse it, destroying all the 
 author's combinations, discarding all his literary 
 devices, in order to arrive .at the facts, which we 
 formulate in simple and precise language. We thus 
 free ourselves from the deference imposed by artistic 
 form, and from all submission to the author's ideas 
 — an emancipation without which criticism is im- 
 possible. 
 
 •The document thus analysed resolves into a long 
 series of the author's conceptions and statements as 
 to facts. 
 
 With regard to each statement, we ask ourselves 
 whether there is a probability of their being false or 
 erroneous, or whether, on the other hand, there are 
 exceptional chances in favour of good faith and 
 accuracy, working through the list of critical ques- 
 tions prepared for particular cases. This list of 
 questions must be always present to the mind. At 
 first it may seem cumbersome, perhaps pedantic ; 
 but as it will be applied more than a hundred times 
 in each page of the document, it will in the end 
 be used unconsciously. As we read a text, all 
 the reasons for distrust or confidence will occur to 
 the mind simultaneously, combined into a single 
 impression. 
 
 Analysis and critical questioning will then have 
 become a matter of instinct, and we shall have 
 acquired for ever that methodically analytical, dis- 
 trustful, not too respectful turn of mind which is 
 often mystically called " the critical sense," but 
 which is nothing else than an unconscious habit of 
 criticism. 
 
 190 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE DETERMINATION OF PARTICULAR FACTS 
 
 Critical analysis yields in the result a number of 
 conceptions and statements, accompanied by com- 
 ments on the probability of the facts stated being 
 accurate. It remains to examine how we can 
 deduce from these materials those particular his- 
 torical facts which are to form the basis of scientific 
 knowledge. Conceptions and statements are two 
 different kinds of results, and must be treated by 
 different methods. 
 
 I. Every conception which is expressed in writing 
 or by any illustrative representation is 'in itself a 
 definite, unimpeachable fact. That which is ex- 
 pressed must have first been present in the mind 
 of some one— if not in that of the author, who may 
 have reproduced a formula he did not understand 
 then m the mind of the man who originated the 
 formula. The existence of a conception may be 
 learnt from a single instance and proved from a 
 single document. Analysis and interpretation are 
 thus sufficient for the purpose of drawing up the 
 complete list of those facts which form the basis of 
 the history of the arts, the sciences, or of doctrines. 1 
 1 See above, p. 153. Similarly, the particular facts which com- 
 
 lw ^Ir^ ?u f T 8 ^a^P^ Hustle science) are 
 directly established by the analysis of the document 
 
 191 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 It is the task of external criticism to localise these 
 facts by determining the epoch, the country, the 
 author of each conception. The duration, geo- 
 graphical distribution, origin, and filiation of con- 
 ceptions belong to historical synthesis. Internal 
 criticism has nothing to do here ; the fact is taken 
 directly from the document. 
 
 We may advance a step farther. In themselves 
 conceptions are nothing but facts in psychology ; 
 but imagination does not create its objects, it takes 
 the elements of them from reality. Descriptions of 
 imaginary facts are constructed out of the real facts 
 which the author has observed in his experience. 
 These elements of knowledge, the raw material of 
 the imaginary description, may be sought for and 
 isolated. In dealing with periods and with classes 
 of facts for which documents are rare — antiquity, for 
 example, and the usages of private life — the attempt 
 has been made to lay under contribution works of 
 literature, epic poems, novels, plays. 1 The method 
 is legitimate, but only within the limits of certain 
 restrictions which one is very apt to forget. 
 
 (i) It does not apply to social facts of a psy- 
 chological order, the moral or artistic standards 
 of a society ; the moral and sesthetic conceptions 
 in a document give at most the individual stan- 
 dards of the author ; we have no right to conclude 
 from these to the morals or the aesthetic tastes 
 of the age. We must at least wait till we have 
 
 1 Primitive Greece has been studied in the Homeric poems. 
 Mediaeval private life has been reconstructed principally from the 
 chansons de gestes. (See C. V. Langlois, Lcs Traditions sur Vhistoire de 
 la societe francaise au vwyen dye d'apres lcs sources litteraires, in the 
 Revue historique, March- April, 1897.) 
 
 192 
 
The Determination of Particular Facts 
 
 compared several different authors of the same 
 period. 
 
 (2) Descriptions even of physical facts and objects 
 may be products of the author's imagination. It 
 is only the elements of them which we know to be 
 certainly real ; all that we can assert is the separate 
 existence of the irreducible elements, form, material, 
 colour, number. When the poet speaks of golden 
 gates or silver bucklers, we cannot infer that golden 
 gates and silver bucklers ever existed in reality; 
 nothing is certain beyond the separate existence 
 of gates, bucklers, gold, and silver. The analysis 
 must therefore be carried to the point of distin- 
 guishing those elements which the author must 
 necessarily have taken from experience : objects, 
 their purpose, ordinary actions. 
 
 (3) The conception of an object or an action 
 proves that it existed, but not that it was common ; 
 the object or action may have been unique, or re- 
 stricted to a very small circle; poets and novelists 
 are fond of taking their models from an exceptional 
 world. 
 
 (4) The facts yielded by this method are not 
 localised in space or time ; the author may have 
 taken them from a time or country not his own. 
 
 All these restrictions may be summarised as fol- 
 lows ; before drawing any inference from a work 
 of literature as to the state of the society in which 
 the author lived, we should ask ourselves what 
 would be the worth of a similar inference as to con- 
 temporary manners drawn from a modern novel. 
 
 With the facts yielded by conceptions we may join 
 those indifferent facts of an obvious and elementary 
 
 193 N 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 character which the author has stated almost with- 
 out thinking. Logically we have no right to call 
 them certain, for we do sometimes meet with men 
 who make mistakes about obvious and elementary 
 facts, and others who lie even on indifferent matters. 
 But such cases are so rare that there is not much 
 danger in admitting as certain facts of this kind 
 which are supported by a single document, and this 
 is how we deal, in practice, with periods of which 
 little is known. The institutions of the Gauls and 
 Germans are described from the unique texts of 
 Cresar and Tacitus. Facts so easy to discover are 
 forced upon the authors of descriptions much as 
 realities are forced upon poets. 
 
 II. On the other hand, a statement in a document 
 as to an objective fact is never enough to establish 
 that fact. The chances of falsehood or error are 
 so many, the conditions which gave rise to the 
 statement are so little known, that we cannot be 
 sure that none of these chances has taken effect. 
 The critical examination provides no definitive solu- 
 tion ; it is indispensable if we are to avoid error, 
 but it is insufficient to conduct us to truth. 
 
 Criticism can prove no fact ; it only yields proba- 
 bilities. Its end and result is to decompose docu- 
 ments into statements, each labelled with an estimate 
 of its value — worthless statement, statement open 
 to suspicion (strong or weak), statement probably 
 (or, very probably) true, statement of unknown 
 value. 
 
 Of all these different kinds of results one only is 
 definitive — the statement of an author who can have had 
 no information on the fact he states is null and void ; 
 194 
 
The Determination of Particular Facts 
 
 it is to be rejected as we reject an apocryphal docu- 
 ment. 1 But criticism here merely destroys illusory 
 sources of information ; it supplies nothing certain to 
 take their place. The only sure results of criticism 
 are negative. All the positive results are subject to 
 doubt ; they reduce to propositions of the form : 
 " There are chances for or against the truth of such 
 and such a statement." Chances only. A statement 
 open to suspicion may turn out to be true , a state- 
 ment whose truth is probable may, after all, be false. 
 Instances occur continually, and we are never suffi- 
 ciently well acquainted with the conditions under 
 which the observation was made to know whether 
 it was made ill or well. 
 
 In order to obtain a definitive result we require a 
 final operation. After passing through the ordeal of 
 criticism, statements present themselves as probable 
 or improbable. But even the most probable of them, 
 taken by themselves, remain mere probabilities : to 
 pass from them to categorical propositions in scien- 
 tific form is a step we have no right to take; a 
 proposition in a science is an assertion not open 
 to debate, and that is what the statements we have 
 before us are not. It is a principle common to all 
 sciences of observation not to base a scientific con- 
 clusion on a single observation ; the fact must have 
 been corroborated by several independent observa- 
 tions before it is affirmed categorically. History, 
 
 1 Most historians refrain from rejecting a legend till its falsity 
 has been proved, and if by chance no document has been pre- 
 served to contradict it, they adopt it provisionally. This is how 
 the first five centuries of Rome are still dealt with. This method, 
 unfortunately still too general, helps to prevent history from being 
 established as a science. 
 
 l 95 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 with its imperfect modes of acquiring information, has 
 less right than any other science to claim exemp- 
 tion from this principle. An historical statement 
 is, in the most favourable case, but an indifferently 
 made observation, and needs other observations to 
 corroborate it. 
 
 It is by combining observations that every science 
 is built up : a scientific fact is a centre on which 
 several different observations converge. 1 Each obser- 
 vation is subject to chances of error which cannot 
 be entirely eliminated; but if several observations 
 agree, this can hardly be in virtue of a common error : 
 the more probable explanation of the agreement is 
 that the observers have all seen the same reality 
 and have all described it correctly. Errors are per- 
 sonal and tend to diverge ; it is the correct observa- 
 tions that agree. 
 
 Applied to history, this principle leads to a last 
 series of operations, intermediate between purely 
 analytical criticism and the synthetic operations — 
 the comparison of statements. 
 
 We begin by classifying the results yielded by 
 critical analysis in such a way as to bring together 
 those statements which relate to the same fact. The 
 operation is facilitated mechanically by the method 
 of slips. Either each statement has been entered 
 on a separate slip, or else a single slip has been 
 assigned for each fact, and the different statements 
 relating to it entered upon the slip as met with in 
 
 1 For the logical justification of this principle in history see C. 
 Seignobos, Revue Philosophique, July- August 1887. Complete scien- 
 tific certitude is only produced by an agreement between observa- 
 tions made on different methods; it is to be found at the junction 
 of two different paths of research. 
 
 I96 
 
The Determination of Particular Facts 
 
 the course of reading. By bringing the statements 
 together we learn the extent of our information on 
 the fact; the definitive conclusion depends on the 
 relation between the statements. We have, then, to 
 study separately the different cases which may occur. 
 I. Most frequently, except in contemporary his- 
 tory, the documents only supply a single statement 
 on a given fact. In such a case all the other sciences 
 follow an invariable rule : an isolated observation is 
 not admitted into science ; it is quoted (with the 
 observer's name), but no conclusions are drawn from 
 it. Historians have no avowable motive for pro- 
 ceeding otherwise. When a fact is supported by no 
 more than the statement of a single man, however 
 honest he may be, historians ought not to assert it, 
 but to do as men of science do — give the reference 
 (Thucydides states, Caesar says that . . . ) ; this is 
 all they have a right to affirm. In reality they all 
 retain the habit of stating facts, as was done in the 
 middle ages, on the authority of Thucydides or of 
 Caesar ; many are simple enough to do so in express 
 terms. Thus, allowing themselves to be guided by 
 natural credulity, unchecked by science, historians 
 end by admitting, on the insufficient presumption 
 afforded by a unique document, any statement which 
 does not happen to be contradicted by another docu- 
 ment. Hence the absurd consequence that history 
 is more positive, and seems better established in 
 regard to those little known periods which are re- 
 presented by a single writer than in regard to facts 
 known from thousands of documents which con- 
 tradict each other. The wars of the Medes known 
 to Herodotus alone, the adventures of Fredegonda 
 
 197 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 related by none but Gregory of Tours, are less sub- 
 ject to discussion than the events of the French Re- 
 volution, which have been described by hundreds 
 of contemporaries. This is a discreditable state of 
 things which cannot be ended except by a revolution 
 in the minds of historians. 
 
 IV. When we have several statements relating to 
 the same fact, they may contradict each other or 
 they may agree. In order to be certain that they 
 really do contradict each other, we have to make 
 sure that they do actually relate to the same fact. 
 Two apparently contradictory statements may be 
 merely parallel ; they may not relate exactly to the 
 same moment, the same place, the same persons, 
 the same episodes of an event, and they may be 
 both correct. 1 We must not, however, infer that 
 they confirm each other ; each comes under the 
 category of unique statements. 
 
 If the contradiction is real, at least one of the 
 statements is false. In such cases it is a natural 
 tendency to seek to reconcile them by a compro- 
 mise — to split the difference. This peace-making 
 spirit is the reverse of scientific. A says two and 
 two make four ; B says they make five. We are 
 not to conclude that two and two make four and 
 a half; we must examine and see which is right. 
 This examination is the work of criticism. Of two 
 contradictory statements, it nearly always happens 
 that one is open to suspicion ; this should be re- 
 jected if the competing statement has been judged 
 very probably true. If both are open to suspicion, 
 
 1 This case is studied and a good example given by Bernheim. 
 Lehrbuch, p. 421. 
 
 I98 
 
The Determination of Particular Facts 
 
 we abstain from drawing any conclusion. We do 
 the same if several statements open to suspicion 
 agree together as against a single statement which 
 is not suspected. 1 
 
 V. When several statements agree, it is still 
 necessary to resist the natural tendency to believe 
 that the fact has been demonstrated. The first 
 impulse is to count each document as one source of 
 information. We are well aware in matters of every- 
 day life that men are apt to copy each other, that 
 a single narrative often serves the turn of several nar- 
 rators, that several newspapers sometimes happen to 
 publish the same correspondence, that several re- 
 porters sometimes agree to let one of their number do 
 the work for all. We have, in such a case, several 
 documents, several statements — have we the same 
 number of observations ? Obviously not. When 
 one statement reproduces another, it does not con- 
 stitute a new observation, and even if an observation 
 were to be reproduced by a hundred different authors, 
 these hundred copies would amount to no more than 
 one observation. To count them as a hundred would 
 be the same thing as to count a hundred printed 
 copies of the same book as a hundred different 
 documents. But the respect paid to "historical 
 documents " is sometimes stronger than obvious 
 truth. The same statement occurring in several 
 different documents by different authors has an illu- 
 
 1 It is hardly necessary to enter a caution against the childish 
 method of counting the documents on each side of a question and 
 deciding by the majority. The statement of a single author who 
 was acquainted with a fact is evidently worth more than a hundred 
 statements made by persons who knew nothing about it. The rule 
 has been formulated long ago : Ne numcrcntur, scd pondercntur. 
 
 199 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 sory appearance of multiplicity; an identical fact 
 related in ten different documents at once gives 
 the impression of being established by ten agreeing 
 observations. This impression is to be distrusted. 
 An agreement is only conclusive when the agreeing 
 statements represent observations which are inde- 
 pendent of each other. Before we draw any con- 
 clusion from an agreement we must examine whether 
 it is an agreement between independent observations. 
 Two operations are thus required. 
 
 (i) We begin by inquiring whether the state- 
 ments are independent, or are reproductions of one 
 and the same observation. This inquiry is partly 
 the work of that part of external criticism which 
 deals with the investigation of sources; 1 but that 
 investigation only touches the relations between 
 written documents, and stops short when it has 
 determined which passages of an author are bor- 
 rowed from other authors. Borrowed passages are 
 to be rejected without discussion. But the same 
 work remains to be done in reference to statements 
 which were not committed to writing. We have to 
 compare the statements which relate to the same 
 fact, in order to find out whether they proceeded 
 originally from different observers, or at least from 
 different observations. 
 
 The principle is analogous to that employed in 
 the investigation of sources. The details of a social 
 fact are so manifold, and there are so many different 
 ways of looking at the same fact, that two inde- 
 pendent observers cannot possibly give completely 
 coincident accounts ; if two statements present the 
 
 1 Cf. supra, p. 94. 
 200 
 
The Determination of Particular Facts 
 
 same details in the same order, they must be derived 
 from a common observation; different observations 
 are bound to diverge somewhere. We may often 
 apply an a priori principle : if the fact was of such a 
 nature that it could only be observed or reported by 
 a single observer, then all the accounts of it must 
 be derived from a single observation. These prin- 
 ciples 1 enable us to recognise many cases of different 
 observations, and still more numerous cases of obser- 
 vations being reproduced. 
 
 There remains a great number of doubtful cases. 
 The natural tendency is to treat them as if they 
 were cases of independent observation. But the 
 scientific procedure would be the exact reverse of 
 this : as long as the statements are not proved to be 
 independent we have no right to assume that their 
 agreement is conclusive. 
 
 It is only after we have determined the relations 
 between the different statements that we can begin 
 to count them and examine into their agreement. 
 Here again we have to distrust the first impulse; 
 the kind of agreement which is really conclusive 
 is not, as one would naturally imagine, a perfect 
 similarity between two narratives, but an occasional 
 coincidence between two narratives which only par- 
 tially resemble each other. The natural tendency 
 is to think that the closer the agreement is, the 
 greater is its demonstrative power ; we ought, on 
 the contrary, to adopt as a rule the paradox that 
 
 1 It is hardly possible to study here the special difficulties which 
 arise in the application of these principles, as when the author, 
 wishing to conceal his indebtedness, has introduced deviations in 
 order to put his readers off the scent, or when the author has com- 
 bined statements taken from different documents. 
 20I 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 an agreement proves more when it is confined to a 
 small number of circumstances, It is at such points 
 of coincidence between diverging statements that 
 we are to look for scientifically established historical 
 facts. 
 
 (2) Before drawing any conclusions it remains to 
 make sure whether the different observations of the 
 same fact are entirely independent ; for it is possible 
 that one may have influenced another to such a 
 degree that their agreement is inconclusive. We 
 have to guard against the following cases : : — 
 
 (a) The different observations have been made by 
 the same author, who has recorded them either in 
 the same or in different documents ; special reasons 
 must then be had before it can be assumed that the 
 author really made the observation afresh, and did 
 not content himself with merely repeating a single 
 observation. 
 
 (b) There were several observers, but they com- 
 missioned one of their number to write a single 
 document. We have to ascertain whether the docu- 
 ment merely gives the statements of the writer, or 
 whether the other observers checked his work. 
 
 (c) Several observers recorded their observations 
 in different documents, but under similar conditions. 
 We must apply the list of critical questions in order 
 to ascertain whether they were not all subject to the 
 same influences, predisposing to falsehood or error; 
 whether, for example, they had a common interest, 
 a common vanity, or common prejudices. 
 
 The only observations which are certainly inde- 
 pendent are those which are contained in different 
 documents, written by different authors, who be- 
 202 
 
The Determination of Particular Facts 
 
 longed to different groups, and worked under dif- 
 ferent conditions. Cases of perfectly conclusive 
 agreement are thus rare, except in reference to 
 modern periods. 
 
 The possibility of proving an historical fact de- 
 pends on the number of independent documents 
 relating to it which have been preserved, and the 
 preservation of the documents is a matter of chance ; 
 this explains the share which chance has in the 
 formation of historical science. 
 
 The facts which it is possible to establish are 
 chiefly those which cover a large extent of space or 
 time (sometimes called general facts), customs, doc- 
 trines, institutions, great events ; they were easier to 
 observe than the others, and are now easier to prove. 
 Historical method is not, however, essentially power- 
 less to establish facts of short duration and limited 
 extent (those which are called particular facts), such 
 as a saying, a momentary act. It is enough that 
 several persons should have been present when the 
 fact occurred, that they should have recorded it, 
 and that their writings should have come down to 
 us. We know what were the words which Luther 
 uttered at the Diet of Worms ; we know that he 
 did not say what tradition puts in his mouth. This 
 concurrence of favourable conditions becomes more 
 and more frequent with the organisation of news- 
 papers, of shorthand writers, and of depositories of 
 documents. 
 
 In the case of antiquity and the middle ages 
 historical knowledge is limited ,to general facts by 
 the scarcity of documents. In dealing with con- 
 temporary history it is possible to include more and 
 
 203 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 more particular facts. The general public supposes 
 the opposite of this ; it is suspicious about contem- 
 porary facts, with reference to which it sees contra- 
 dictory narratives circulating, and believes without 
 hesitation ancient facts, which it does not see con- 
 tradicted anywhere. Its confidence is at its greatest 
 in respect of that history which we have not the 
 means of knowing, and its scepticism increases with 
 the means of knowledge. 
 
 VI. Agreement between documents leads to conclu- 
 sions which are not all of them definitive. In order 
 to complete and rectify our conclusions we have 
 still to study the harmony of the facts. 
 
 Several facts which, taken in isolation, are only 
 imperfectly proved, may confirm each other in such 
 a manner as to produce a collective certainty. The 
 facts which the documents present in isolation have 
 sometimes been in reality sufficiently near each other 
 to be connected. Of this kind are the successive 
 actions of the same man or of the same group 
 of men, the habits of the same group at different 
 epochs separated by short intervals, or of similar 
 groups at the same epoch. It is no doubt possible 
 that one of several analogous facts may be true 
 and another false ; the certainty of the first does not 
 justify the categorical assertion of the second. . But 
 yet the harmony of several such facts, each proved 
 imperfectly, yields a kind of certainty ; the facts do 
 not, in the strict sense of the word, prove, but they 
 confirm 1 each other. The doubt which attached to 
 each one of them disappears ; we obtain that species 
 
 1 Here we merely indicate the principle of the method of con- 
 firmation ; its applications would require a very lengthy study. 
 204 
 
The Determination of Particular Facts 
 
 of certainty which is produced by the interconnec- 
 tion of facts. Thus the comparison of conclusions 
 which are separately doubtful yields a whole which 
 is morally certain. In an itinerary of a sovereign, 
 the days and the places confirm each other when 
 they harmonise so as to form a coherent whole. 
 An institution or a popular usage is established by 
 the harmony of accounts, each of which is no more 
 than probable, relating to different times and places. 
 
 This method is a difficult one to apply. The 
 notion of harmony is a much vaguer one than that 
 of agreement. We cannot assign any precise general 
 rules for distinguishing facts which are sufficiently 
 connected to form . a whole, the harmony of whose 
 parts would be conclusive ; nor can we determine 
 beforehand the duration and extent of that which 
 may be taken to form a whole. Facts separated by 
 half a century of time and a hundred leagues of 
 space may confirm each other in such a way as to 
 establish a popular usage (for example, among the 
 ancient Germans) ; but they would prove nothing if 
 they were taken from a heterogeneous society subject 
 to rapid evolution (take, for example, French society 
 in 1750, and again in 1800, in Alsace and in 
 Provence). Here we have to study the relation 
 between the facts. This brings us to the beginnings 
 of historical construction ; here is the transition 
 from analytical to synthetic operations. 
 
 VII. But it remains to consider cases of discord- 
 ance between facts established by documents and 
 other facts established by other methods. It happens 
 sometimes that a fact obtained as an historical con- 
 clusion is in contradiction with a body of known 
 
 205 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 historical facts, or with the sum of our knowledge of 
 humanity founded on direct observation, or with a 
 scientific law established by the regular method of 
 an established science. In the first two cases the 
 fact is only in conflict with history, psychology, or 
 sociology, all imperfectly established sciences; we 
 then simply call the fact improbable. If it is in 
 conflict with a true science it becomes a miracle. 
 What are we to do with an improbable or miracu- 
 lous fact ? Are we to admit it after examination of 
 the documents, or are we to pass on and shelve the 
 question ? 
 
 Improbability is not a scientific notion ; it varies 
 with the individual. Each person finds improbable 
 what he is not accustomed to see : a peasant would 
 think the telephone much more improbable than a 
 ghost ; a king of Siam refused to believe in the 
 existence of ice. It is important to know who 
 precisely it is to whom the fact appears to be im- 
 probable. Is it to the mass who have no scientific 
 culture ? For these, science is more improbable 
 than miracle, physiology than spiritualism ; their 
 notions of improbability are worthless. Is it to 
 the man who possesses scientific culture ? If so, we 
 have to deal with that which seems improbable to 
 a scientific mind, and it would be more accurate to 
 say that the fact is contrary to the results of science 
 — that there is disagreement between the direct 
 observations of men of science and the indirect 
 testimony of the documents. 
 
 How is this conflict to be decided ? The question 
 has no great practical interest ; nearly all the docu- 
 ments which relate miraculous facts are already open 
 206 
 
The Determination of Particular Facts 
 
 to suspicion on other grounds, and would be dis- 
 carded by a sound criticism. But the question of 
 miracles has raised such passions that it may be 
 well to indicate how it affects the historian. 1 
 
 The general tendency to believe in the marvellous 
 has filled with miraculous facts the documents of 
 nearly every people. Historically the existence of 
 the devil is much better proved than that of Pisis- 
 tratus : there has not been preserved a single word of 
 a contemporary of Pisistratus saying that he has seen 
 him ; thousands of " ocular witnesses " declare they 
 have seen the devil ; few historical facts have been 
 established by so great a number of independent 
 testimonies. However, we do not hesitate to reject 
 the devil and to accept Pisistratus. For the existence 
 of the devil would be irreconcilable with the laws of 
 all the established sciences. 
 
 For the historian the solution of the problem is 
 obvious. 2 The observations whose results are con- 
 tained in historical documents are never of equal 
 value with those of contemporary scientists ; we have 
 already shown why. The indirect method of history 
 is always inferior to the direct methods of the sciences 
 of observation. If its results do not harmonise with 
 
 1 Pere de Srnedt has devoted to this question a part of his 
 Principes de la critique histoire (Paris, 1887, i2mo). 
 
 2 The solution of the question is different in the case of the 
 sciences of direct observation, especially the biological sciences. 
 Science knows nothing of the possible and the impossible ; it only 
 recognises facts which have been correctly or incorrectly observed : 
 facts which had been declared impossible, as the existence of 
 aerolites, have been discovered to be genuine. The very notion of 
 a miracle is metaphysical ; it implies a conception of the universe 
 as a whole which transcends the limits of observation. (See Wallace, 
 "Miracles and Modern Spiritualism.") 
 
 207 
 
Analytical Operations 
 
 theirs, it is history which must give way ; historical 
 science, with its imperfect means of information, 
 cannot claim to check, contradict, or correct the 
 results of other sciences, but must rather use their 
 results to correct its own. The progress of the 
 direct sciences sometimes modifies the results of 
 historical interpretation ; a fact established by direct 
 observation aids in the comprehension and criticism 
 of documents. Cases of stigmata and nervous anaes- 
 thesia which have been scientifically observed have 
 led to the admission as true of historical narratives 
 of analogous facts, as in the case of the stigmata of 
 certain saints and the possessed nuns of Loudun. 
 But history cannot aid the progress of the direct 
 sciences. It is kept at a distance from reality by 
 its indirect means of information, and must accept 
 the laws that are established by those sciences which 
 come into immediate contact with reality. In order 
 to reject one of these laws new direct observations 
 are necessary. Such revolutions are possible, but 
 they must be brought about from within. History 
 has no power to take the initiative in them. 
 
 The solution is not so clear in the case of facts 
 which do not harmonise with a body of historical 
 knowledge or with the sciences, still in the embryonic 
 stage, which deal with man. It depends on the 
 opinion we form as to the value of such knowledge. 
 We can at least lay down the practical rule that in 
 order to contradict history, psychology, or sociology, 
 we must have very strong documents, and this is a 
 case which hardly ever occurs. 
 
 208 
 
BOOK III 
 
 SYNTHETIC OPERATIONS 
 
 209 
 
BOOK III 
 
 SYNTHETIC OPERATIONS 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 GENERAL CONDITIONS OF HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION 
 
 The criticism of documents only yields isolated facts. 
 In order to organise them into a body of science it is 
 necessary to perform a series of synthetic operations. 
 The study of these processes of historical construction 
 forms the second half of Methodology. 
 
 The mode of construction cannot be regulated by 
 the ideal plan of the science we desire to construct ; 
 it depends on the materials we have at our disposal. 
 It would be chimerical to formulate a scheme which 
 the materials would not allow us to carry out ; it 
 would be like proposing to construct an Eiffel tower 
 with building-stones. The fundamental defect of 
 philosophies of history is that they forget this prac- 
 tical necessity. 
 
 I. Let us begin by considering the materials of 
 history. What is their form and their nature? How 
 do they differ from the materials of other sciences? 
 
 Historical facts are derived from the critical ana- 
 lysis of documents. They issue from this process 
 in the form to which analysis has reduced them, 
 
 211 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 chopped small into individual statements ; for a 
 single sentence contains several statements: we have 
 often accepted some and rejected others ; each of 
 these statements represents a fact. 
 
 Historical facts have the common characteristic of 
 having been taken from documents ; but they differ 
 greatly among themselves. 
 
 (i) They represent phenomena of very different 
 nature. From the same document we derive facts 
 bearing on handwriting, language, style, doctrines, 
 customs, events. The Mesha inscription furnishes 
 facts bearing on Moabite handwriting and language, 
 the belief in the god Chemosh, the practices belong- 
 ing to his cult, the war between the Moabites and 
 Israel. Thus the facts reach us pell-mell, without 
 distinction of nature. This mixture of heterogeneous 
 facts is one of the characteristics which differentiate 
 history from the other sciences. The sciences of 
 direct observation choose the facts to be studied, 
 and systematically limit themselves to the observa- 
 tion of facts of a single species. The documentary 
 sciences receive the facts, already observed, at the 
 hands of authors of documents, who supply them in 
 disorder. For the purpose of remedying this dis- 
 order it is necessary to sort the facts and group 
 them by species. But, for the purpose of sorting 
 them, it is necessary to know precisely what it is 
 that constitutes a species of historical facts ; in order 
 to group them we need a principle of classification 
 applicable to them. But on these two questions 
 of capital importance historians have not as yet 
 succeeded in formulating precise rules. 
 
 (2) Historical facts present themselves in very 
 212 
 
Conditions of Historical Construction 
 
 different degrees of generality, from the highly 
 general facts which apply to a whole people and 
 which lasted for centuries (institutions, customs, 
 beliefs), down to the most transient actions of a 
 single man (a word, a movement). Here again 
 history differs from the sciences of direct observa- 
 tion, which regularly start from particular facts and 
 labour methodically to condense them into general 
 facts. In order to form groups the facts must be 
 reduced to a common degree of generality, which 
 makes it necessary to inquire to what degree of 
 generality we can and ought to reduce the different 
 species of facts. And this is what historians do not 
 agree about among themselves. 
 
 (3) Historical facts are localised; each belongs 
 to a given time and a given country. If we sup- 
 press the time and place to which they belong, they 
 lose their historical character; they now contribute 
 only to the knowledge of universal humanity, as is 
 the case with facts of folk-lore whose origin is un- 
 known. This necessity of localisation is also foreign 
 to the general sciences; it is confined to the descrip- 
 tive sciences, which deal with the geographical dis- 
 tribution and with the evolution of phenomena. It 
 obliges the historian to study separately the facts 
 belonging to different countries and different epochs. 
 
 (4) The facts which have been extracted from 
 documents by critical analysis present themselves 
 accompanied by a critical estimate of their proba- 
 bility. 1 In every case where we have not reached 
 complete certainty, whenever the fact is merely 
 probable — still more when it is open to suspicion — 
 
 1 See above, p. 194. 
 213 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 criticism supplies the fact to the historian accom- 
 panied by a label which he has no right to remove, 
 and which prevents the fact from being definitively- 
 admitted into the science. Even those facts which, 
 after comparison with others, end by being estab- 
 lished, are subject to temporary exclusion, like the 
 clinical cases which accumulate in the medical re- 
 views before they are considered sufficiently proved 
 to be received as scientific facts. 
 
 Historical construction has thus to be performed 
 with an incoherent mass of minute facts, with detail- 
 knowledge reduced as it were to a powder. It must 
 utilise a heterogeneous medley of materials, relating 
 to different subjects and places, differing in their 
 degree of generality and certainty. No method of 
 classifying them is provided by the practice of his- 
 torians ; history, which began by being a form of 
 literature, has remained the least methodical of the 
 sciences. 
 
 IT. In every science the next step after observing 
 the facts is to formulate a series of questions accord- 
 ing to some methodical system ; l every science is 
 composed of the answers to such a series of ques- 
 tions. In all the sciences of direct observation, even 
 if the questions to be answered have not been put 
 down in advance, the facts which are observed 
 suggest questions, and require them to be formulated 
 precisely. But historians have no discipline of this 
 kind ; many of them are accustomed to imitate 
 artists, and do not even think of asking themselves 
 what they are looking for. They take from their 
 
 1 In the experimental sciences an hypothesis is a form of question 
 accompanied by a provisional answer. 
 
 2I 4 
 
Conditions of Historical Construction 
 
 documents those parts which strike them, often for 
 purely personal reasons, and reproduce them, chang- 
 ing the language and adding any miscellaneous re- 
 flections which come into their minds. 
 
 If history is not to be lost in the confusion of its 
 materials, it must be made a rule to proceed here, 
 as in the other sciences, by way of question and 
 answer. 1 But how are the questions to be chosen 
 in a science so different from the others ? This 
 is the fundamental problem of method. The only 
 way to solve it is to begin by determining the 
 essential characteristic of historical facts by which 
 they are differentiated from the facts of the other 
 sciences. 
 
 The sciences of direct observation deal with 
 realities, taken in their entirety. The science which 
 borders most closely on history in respect of its 
 subject-matter, descriptive zoology, proceeds by the 
 examination of a real and complete animal. This 
 animal is first observed, as a whole, by actual vision; 
 it is then dissected into its parts ; this dissection is 
 analysis in the original sense of the word (avaXvew, 
 to break up into parts). It is then possible to put 
 the parts together again in such a way as to exhibit 
 the structure of the whole ; this is real synthesis. 
 It is possible to watch the real movements which 
 are the functions of the organs in such a way as 
 to observe the mutual actions and reactions of the 
 different parts of the organism. It is possible to 
 
 1 Fustel de Coulanges saw the necessitv of this. In the preface 
 to his Rechcrches sur quelques problemes d'histoire (Paris, 1885, 8vo) 
 he announces his intention of presenting his researches "in the 
 form which all my works have, that is, in the form of questions 
 which I ask myself, and on which I endeavour to throw light." 
 
 215 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 compare real wholes and see what are the parts 
 in which they resemble each other, so as to be 
 able to classify them according to real points of 
 resemblance. The science is a body of objective 
 knowledge founded on real analysis, synthesis, and 
 comparison; actual sight of the things studied 
 guides the scientific researcher and dictates the 
 questions he is to ask himself. 
 
 In history there is nothing like this. One is 
 apt to say that history is the " vision " of past 
 events, and that it proceeds by '" analysis " : these 
 are two metaphors, dangerous if we suffer ourselves 
 to be misled by them. 1 ' In history we see nothing 
 real except paper with writing on it — and some- 
 times monuments or the products of art or industry. 
 The historian has nothing before him which he can 
 analyse physically, nothing which he can destroy 
 and reconstruct. "Historical analysis" is no more 
 real than is the vision of historical facts; it is 
 an abstract process, a purely intellectual operation. 
 The analysis of a document consists in a mental 
 search for the items of information it contains, with 
 the object of criticising them one by one. The 
 analysis of a fact consists in the process of dis- 
 tinguishing mentally between its different details (the 
 various episodes of an event, the characteristics of 
 
 1 Fustel de Coulanges himself seems to have been misled by 
 them : " History is a science ; it does not imagine, it only sees " 
 (Monarchic franque, p. i). "History, like every science, consists 
 in a process of discerning facts, analysing them, comparing them, 
 and noting their connections. . . . The historian . . . seeks facts 
 and attains them by the minute observation of texts, as the 
 chemist finds his in the course of experiments conducted with 
 minute precision" (Ibid., p. 39). 
 
 2l6 
 
Conditions of Historical Construction 
 
 an institution), with the object of paying special 
 attention to each detail in turn; that is what is 
 called examining the different " aspects " of a fact, — 
 another metaphor. The human mind is vague by 
 nature, and spontaneously revives only vague collec- 
 tive impressions ; to impart clearness to these it is 
 necessary to ask what individual impressions go to 
 form a given collective impression, in order that 
 precision may be attained by a successive considera- 
 tion of them. This is an indispensable operation, 
 but we must not exaggerate its scope. It is not 
 an objective method which yields a knowledge of 
 real objects; it is only a subjective method which 
 aims at detecting those abstract elements which 
 compose our impressions. 1 From the very nature 
 of its materials history is necessarily a subjective 
 science. It would be illegitimate to extend to this 
 intellectual analysis of subjective impressions the 
 rules which govern the real analysis of real objects. 
 
 History, then, must guard against the temptation 
 to imitate the method of the biological sciences. 
 Historical facts are so different from the facts of 
 the other sciences that their study requires a 
 different method. 
 
 III. Documents, the sole source of historical know- 
 ledge, give information on three categories of facts : 
 
 (i) Living beings and material objects. Docu- 
 ments make us acquainted with the existence of 
 human beings, physical conditions, products of art 
 and industry. In all -these cases physical facts 
 
 1 The subjective character of history has been brought out into 
 strong relief by the philosopher G. Simmel, Die Probleme der 
 Oeschichtsphilosophie (Leipzig, 1892, 8vo). 
 
 217 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 have been brought before the author by physical 
 perception. But we have before us nothing but 
 intellectual phenomena, facts seen " through the 
 author's imagination," or, to speak accurately, mental 
 images representative of the author's impressions — 
 images which we form on the analogy of the images 
 which were in his mind. The Temple at Jerusalem 
 was a material object which men saw, but we cannot 
 see it now ; all we can now do is to form a mental 
 image of it, analogous to that which existed in the 
 minds of those who saw and described it. 
 
 (2) Actions of men. Documents relate the 
 actions (and words) of men of former times. Here, 
 too, are physical facts which were known to the 
 authors by sight and hearing, but which are now 
 for us no more than the author's recollections, sub- 
 jective images which are reproduced in our minds. 
 When Caesar was stabbed the dagger-thrusts were 
 seen, the words of the murderers were heard ; 
 we have nothing but mental images. Actions and 
 words all have this characteristic, that each was 
 the action or the word of an individual ; the 
 imagination can only represent to itself individual 
 acts, copied from those which are brought before 
 us by direct physical observation. As these are 
 the actions of men living in a society, most of 
 them are performed simultaneously by several in- 
 dividuals, or are directed to some common end. 
 These are collective acts ; but, in the imagination 
 as in direct observation, they always reduce to a 
 sum of individual actions. The "social fact," as 
 recognised by certain sociologists, is a philosophical 
 construction, not an historical fact. 
 
 218 
 
Conditions of Historical Construction 
 
 (3) Motives and conceptions. Human actions 
 do not contain their own cause within themselves ; 
 they have motives. This vague word denotes both 
 the stimulus which occasions the performance of 
 an action, and the representation of the action which 
 is in the mind of a man at the moment when 
 he performs it. We can imagine motives only as 
 existing in a man's mind, and in the form of vague 
 interior representations, analogous to those which 
 we have of our own inward states ; we can express 
 them only by words, generally metaphorical. Here 
 we have psychic facts, generally called feelings and 
 ideas. Documents exhibit three kinds of such facts : 
 (a) motives and conceptions in the authors 5 minds 
 and expressed by them ; (b) motives and ideas attri- 
 buted by the authors to contemporaries of theirs 
 whose actions they have seen ; (c) motives which we 
 ourselves may suppose to have influenced the actions 
 related in the documents, and which we represent 
 to ourselves on the model of our own motives. , 
 
 Physical facts, human actions (both individual and 
 collective), psychic facts — these form the objects of 
 historical knowledge ; they are none of them observed 
 directly, they are all imagined. Historians — nearly 
 all of them unconsciously and under the impression 
 that they are observing realities — are occupied solely 
 with images. 
 
 IV. How, then, is it possible to imagine facts 
 without their being wholly imaginary ? The facts, 
 as they exist in the historian's mind, are necessarily 
 subjective ; that is one of the reasons given for re- 
 fusing to recognise history as a science. But sub- 
 jective is not a synonym of unreal. A recollection 
 
 219 
 
Synthetic Opeeations 
 
 is only an image ; but it is not therefore a chimera, 
 it is the representation of a vanished reality. It 
 is true that the historian who works with docu- 
 ments has no personal recollections of which he can 
 make direct use; but he forms mental images on 
 the model of his own recollections. He assumes 
 that realities (objects, actions, motives), which have 
 now disappeared, but were formerly observed by the 
 authors of the documents, resembled the realities of 
 his own day which he has himself seen and which 
 he retains in his memory. This is the postulate of 
 all the documentary sciences. If former humanity 
 did not resemble the humanity of to-day, documents 
 would be unintelligible. Starting from this assumed 
 resemblance, the historian forms a mental repre- 
 sentation of the bygone facts of history similar to 
 his own recollection of the facts he has witnessed. 
 
 This operation, which is performed unconsciously, 
 is one of the principal sources of error in history. 
 The things of the past which are to be pictured in 
 imagination were not wholly similar to the things 
 of the present which we have seen ; we have never 
 seen a man like Caesar or Clovis, and we have never 
 experienced the same mental states as they. In 
 the established sciences it is equally true that one 
 man will work on facts which another has observed, 
 and which he must therefore represent to himself 
 by analogy; but these facts are defined by precise 
 terms which indicate what invariable elements ought 
 to appear, in the image. Even in physiology the 
 notions which occur are sufficiently clear and fixed 
 for the same word to evoke in the minds of all 
 naturalists similar images of an organ or a move- 
 
 220 
 
Conditions of Historical Construction 
 
 ment. The reason is that each notion which has 
 a name has been formed by a method of observa- 
 tion and abstraction in the course of which all the 
 characteristics which belong to the notion have been 
 precisely determined and described. 
 
 But in proportion as a body of knowledge is 
 more nearly concerned with the invisible facts of 
 the mind, its notions become more confused and its 
 language less precise. Even the most ordinary facts 
 of human life, social conditions, actions, motives, 
 feelings, can only be expressed by vague terms (king, 
 warrior, to fight, to elect). In the case of more com- 
 plex phenomena, language is so indefinite that there 
 is no agreement even as to the essential elements of 
 the phenomena. What are we to understand by a 
 tribe, an army, an industry, a market, a revolution ? 
 Here history shares the vagueness common to all 
 the sciences of humanity, psychological or social. 
 But its indirect method of representation by mental 
 images renders this vagueness still more dangerous. 
 The historical images in our minds ought, then, to 
 reproduce at least the essential features of the 
 images which were in the minds of the direct 
 observers of past facts ; but the terms in which 
 they expressed their mental images never tell us 
 exactly what these essential elements were. 
 
 Facts which we did not see, described in language 
 which does not permit us to represent them in our 
 minds with exactness, form the data of history. The 
 historian, however, is obliged to picture the facts 
 in his imagination, and he should make it his con- 
 stant endeavour to construct his mental images out 
 of none but correct elements, so that he may imagine 
 
 221 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 the facts as he would have seen them if he had 
 been able to observe them personally. 1 But the 
 formation of a mental image requires more elements 
 than the documents supply, Let any one endeavour 
 to form a mental representation of a battle or a 
 ceremony out of the data of a narrative, however 
 detailed ; he will see how many features he is com- 
 pelled to add, This necessity becomes physically 
 perceptible in attempts to restore monuments in 
 accordance with descriptions (for example, the 
 Temple at Jerusalem), in pictures which claim to 
 be representations of historical scenes, in the draw- 
 ings of illustrated newspapers. 
 
 Every historical image contains a large part of 
 fancy. The historian cannot get rid of it, but he 
 can take stock of the real elements which enter 
 into his images and confine his constructions to 
 these ; they are the elements which he has derived 
 from the documents. If, in order to understand 
 the battle between Csesar and Ariovistus, he finds 
 it necessary to make a mental picture of the two 
 opposing armies, he will be careful to draw no 
 conclusions from the general aspect under which 
 he imagines them ; he will base his reasonings 
 exclusively on the real details furnished by the 
 documents. 
 
 V. The problem of historical method may be 
 finally stated as follows. Out of the different 
 elements we find in documents we form mental 
 images. Some of these, relating entirely to physical 
 
 1 This has been eloquently put by Carlyle and Michelet. It is 
 also the substance of the famous expression of Ranke : " I wish 
 to state how that really was " (wie es cigentlich gewesen). 
 
 222 
 
Conditions of Histoeical Construction 
 
 objects, are furnished to us by illustrative monu- 
 ments, and they directly represent some of the 
 physical aspects of the things of the past. Most 
 of them, however, including all the images we form 
 of psychic facts, are constructed on the model either 
 of ancient representations, or, more frequently, of 
 the facts we have observed in our own experience. 
 Now, the things of the past were only partially 
 similar to the things of the present, and it is pre- 
 cisely the points of difference which make history 
 interesting. How are we to represent to ourselves 
 these elements of difference for which we have no 
 model ? We have never seen a company of men 
 resembling the Frankish warriors, and we have 
 never personally experienced the feelings which 
 Clovis had when settiDg out to fight against the 
 Visigoths. How are we to make our imagination 
 of facts of this kind harmonise with the reality ? 
 
 Practically, what happens is as follows. Imme- 
 diately on the reading of a sentence in a document 
 an image is formed in our minds by a spontaneous 
 operation beyond our control. This image is based 
 on a superficial analogy, and is, as a rule, grossly 
 inaccurate. Any one who searches his memory may 
 recall the absurd manner in which he first repre- 
 sented to himself the persons and scenes of the past. 
 It is the task of history to rectify these images 
 gradually, by eliminating the false elements one by 
 one, and replacing them by true ones. We have 
 seen red-haired people, bucklers, and Frankish battle- 
 axes (or at least drawings of these objects) ; we bring 
 these elements together, in order to correct our 
 first mental image of the Frankish warriors. The 
 
 223 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 historical image thus ends by becoming a combination 
 of features borrowed from different experiences. 
 
 It is not enough to represent to oneself isolated 
 persons, objects, and actions. Men and their actions 
 form part of a whole, of a society and of a process of 
 evolution. It is, therefore, further necessary to re- 
 present to oneself the relations between different 
 men and different actions (nations, governments, 
 laws, wars). 
 
 But in order to imagine relations it is necessary 
 to have a conception of collectivities or wholes, and 
 the documents only give isolated elements. Here 
 again the historian is obliged to use a subjective 
 method. He imagines a society or a process of 
 evolution, and in this imaginary framework he dis- 
 poses the elements furnished by the documents. 
 Thus, whereas biological classification is guided by 
 the objective observation of physical units, historical 
 classification can only be effected upon subjective 
 units existing in the imagination. 
 
 The realities of the past are things which we do 
 not observe, and which we can only know in virtue 
 of their resemblance to the realities of the present. 
 In order to realise the conditions under which past 
 events happened, we must observe the humanity of 
 to-day, and look for the conditions under which 
 analogous events happen now. History thus be- 
 comes an application of the descriptive sciences 
 which deal with humanity, descriptive psychology, 
 sociology or social science ; but all these sciences are 
 still but imperfectly established, and their defects 
 retard the establishment of a science of history. 
 
 Some of the conditions of human life are, how- 
 224 
 
Conditions of Historical Construction 
 
 ever, so necessary and so obvious that the most 
 superficial observation is enough to establish them. 
 These are the conditions common to all humanity; 
 they have their origin either in the physiological 
 organisation which determines the material needs of 
 men, or in the psychological organisation which de- 
 termines their habits in matters of conduct. These 
 conditions can therefore be provided for by the use 
 of a set of general questions applicable to all the 
 cases that may occur. It is with historical construc- 
 tion as with historical criticism — the impossibility of 
 direct observation compels the use of prearranged 
 sets of questions. 
 
 The human actions which form the subject-matter 
 of history differ from age to age and from country 
 to country, just as men and societies have differed 
 from each other ; and, indeed, it is the special aim 
 of history to study these differences. If men had 
 always had the same form of government or spoken 
 the same language, there would be no occasion to 
 write the history of forms of government or the 
 history of languages. But these differences are 
 comprised within limits imposed by the general 
 conditions of human life ; they are but varieties of 
 certain modes of being and doing which are com- 
 mon to the whole of humanity, or at least to the 
 great majority of men. We cannot know a priori 
 what was the mode of government or the language 
 of an historical people ; it is the business of history 
 to tell us. But that a given people had a language 
 and had a form of government is something which 
 we are entitled to assume, before examination, in 
 every possible case. 
 
 225 p 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 By drawing up the list of the fundamental pheno- 
 mena which we may expect to find in the life of 
 every individual and every people, we shall have 
 suggested to us a set of general questions which 
 will be summary, but still sufficient to enable us 
 to arrange the bulk of historical facts in a certain 
 number of natural groups, each of which will form a 
 special branch of histoiy. This scheme of general 
 classification will supply the scaffolding of historical 
 construction. 
 
 The set of general questions will only apply to 
 phenomena of constant occurrence : it cannot anti- 
 cipate the thousands of local or accidental events 
 which enter into the life of an individual or a nation ; 
 it will, therefore, not contain all the questions which 
 the historian must answer before he can give a com- 
 plete picture of the past. The detailed study of the 
 facts will require the use of lists of questions entering 
 more into detail, and differing according to the nature 
 of the events, the men, or the societies studied. In 
 order to frame these lists, we begin by setting down 
 those questions or matters of detail which are sug- 
 gested by the mere reading of the documents; but 
 for the purpose of arranging these questions, often 
 indeed for the purpose of making the list complete, 
 recourse must be had to the systematic a priori 
 method. Among the classes of facts, the persons, 
 and the societies with which we are well acquainted 
 (either from direct observation or from history), we 
 look for those which resemble the facts, the persons, 
 or the societies which we wish to study. By analysing 
 the scheme of arrangement used in the scientific 
 treatment of these familiar cases we shall learn what 
 
 226 
 
Conditions of Historical Construction 
 
 questions ought to be asked in reference to the 
 analogous cases which we propose to investigate. Of 
 course the model must be chosen intelligently; we 
 must not apply to a barbarous society a list of ques- 
 tions framed on the study of a civilised nation, and 
 ask with regard to a feudal domain what agents 
 corresponded to each of our ministers of state — as 
 Boutaric did in his study of the administration of 
 Alphonse of Poitiers. 
 
 This method of drawing up lists of questions 
 which bases all historical construction on an a priori 
 procedure, would be objectionable if history really 
 were a science of observation ; and perhaps some 
 will think it compares very unfavourably with the 
 a posteriori methods of the natural sciences. But its 
 justification is simple : it is the only method which 
 it is possible to employ, and the only method which, 
 as a matter of fact, ever has been employed. The 
 moment an historian attempts to put in order the 
 facts contained in documents, he constructs out of 
 the knowledge he has (or thinks he has) of human 
 affairs a scheme of arrangement which is the equi- 
 valent of a list of questions — unless, perhaps, he 
 adopts a scheme which one of his predecessors has 
 constructed in a similar manner. But when this 
 Avork has been performed unconsciously, the scheme 
 of arrangement remains incomplete and confused. 
 Thus it is not a case of deciding whether to work 
 with or without an a priori set of questions — we 
 must work with such a set in any case — the choice 
 merely lies between the unconscious use of an in- 
 complete and confused set of questions and the * 
 conscious use of a precise and complete set. 
 
 227 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 VI. We can now sketch the plan of historical con- 
 struction in a way which will determine the series of 
 synthetic operations necessary to raise the edifice. 
 
 The critical analysis of the documents has sup- 
 plied the materials — historical facts still in a state 
 of dispersion. We begin by imagining these facts 
 on the model of what we suppose to be the analo- 
 gous facts of the present ; by combining elements 
 taken from reality at different points, we endea- 
 vour to form a mental image which shall resemble 
 as nearly as possible that which would have been 
 produced by direct observation of the past event. 
 This is the first operation, inseparable in practice 
 from the reading of the documents. Considering 
 that it will be enough to have indicated its nature 
 here, 1 we have refrained from devoting a special 
 chapter to it. 
 
 The facts having been thus imagined, we group 
 them according to schemes of classification devised 
 on the model of a body of facts which we have 
 observed directly, and which we suppose analogous 
 to the body of past facts under consideration. This 
 is the second operation; it is performed by the aid 
 of systematic questions, and its result is to divide the 
 mass of historical facts into homogeneous portions 
 which we afterwards form into groups until the entire 
 history of the past has been systematically arranged 
 according to a general scheme. 
 
 When we have arranged in this scheme the facts 
 taken from the documents, there remain gaps whose 
 extent is always considerable, and is enormous for 
 those parts of history in regard to which documents 
 
 1 Cf. pp. 219-23. 
 
 228 
 
Conditions of Historical Construction 
 
 are scanty. We endeavour to fill some of these gaps 
 by reasoning based on the facts which are known. This 
 is (or should be) the third operation ; it increases the 
 sum of historical knowledge by an application of logic. 
 
 We still possess nothing but a mass of facts placed 
 side by side in a scheme of classification. We have 
 to condense them into formula?, in order to deduce 
 their general characteristics and their relation to 
 each other. This is the fourth operation; it leads 
 to the final conclusions of history, and crowns the 
 work of historical construction from the scientific 
 point of view. 
 
 But as historical knowledge, which is by nature 
 complex and unwieldy, is exceptionally difficult to 
 communicate, we still have to look for the methods 
 of expounding historical results in appropriate form. 
 
 VII. This series of operations, easy to conceive 
 in the mind, has never been more than imperfectly 
 performed. It is beset by material difficulties which 
 theories of methodology do not take into account, 
 but which it would be better to face, with the 
 purpose of discovering whether they are after all 
 insurmountable. 
 
 The operations of history are so numerous, from 
 the first discovery of the document to the final for- 
 mula of the conclusion, they require such minute 
 precautions, so great a variety of natural gifts and 
 acquired habits, that there is no man who can 
 perform by himself all the work on any one point. 
 History is less able than any other science to dispense 
 with the division of labour ; but there is no other 
 science in which labour is so imperfectly divided. 
 We find specialists in critical scholarship writing 
 
 229 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 general histories in which they let their imagination 
 guide them in the work of construction ; 1 and, on the 
 other hand, there are constructive historians who use 
 for their work materials whose value they have not 
 tested. 2 The reason is that the division of labour 
 implies a common understanding among the workers, 
 and in history no such understanding exists. Except 
 in the preparatory operations of external criticism, 
 each worker follows the guidance of his own private 
 inspiration ; he is at no pains to work on the same 
 lines as the others, nor does he pay any regard to 
 the whole of which his own work is to form a part. 
 Thus no historian can feel perfectly safe in adopting 
 the results of another's work, as may be done in the 
 established sciences, for he does not know whether 
 these results have been obtained by trustworthy 
 methods. The most scrupulous go so far as to admit 
 nothing until they have done the work on the docu- 
 ments over again for themselves. This was the 
 attitude adopted by Fustel de Coulanges. It is 
 barely possible to satisfy this exacting standard in 
 the case of little-known periods, the documents re- 
 lating to which are confined to a few volumes ; and 
 yet some have gone so far as to maintain the dogma 
 that no historian should ever work at second hand. 3 
 This, indeed, is what an historian is compelled to 
 do when the documents are too numerous for him 
 
 1 Curtius in his "History of Greece," Mommsen in his "History 
 of Rome " (before the Empire), Lamprecht in his "History of 
 Germany." 
 
 2 It will be enough to mention Augustin Thierry, Michelet, and 
 Carlyle. 
 
 3 See P. Guiraud, Fustel dc Coulanges (Paris, 1896, i2mo), p. 164, 
 for some very judicious observations on this subject. 
 
 23O 
 
Conditions of Historical Construction 
 
 to be able to read them all ; but he does not say so, 
 to avoid scandal. 
 
 It would be better to acknowledge the truth 
 frankly. So complex a science as history, where 
 facts must ordinarily be accumulated by the million 
 before it is possible to formulate conclusions, cannot 
 be built up on this principle of continually beginning 
 afresh. Historical construction is not work that 
 can be done with documents, any more than history 
 can be " written from manuscripts," and for the same 
 reason — the shortness of time. In order that science 
 may advance it is necessary to combine the results 
 of thousands of detail-researches. 
 
 But how are we to proceed in view of the fact 
 that most researches have been conducted upon 
 methods which, if not defective, are at least open to 
 suspicion ? Universal confidence would lead to error 
 as surely as universal distrust would make progress 
 impossible. One useful rule, at any rate,may be 
 stated, as follows : The works of historians should be 
 read with the same critical precautions which are 
 observed in the reading of documents. A natural 
 instinct impels us to look principally for the con- 
 clusions, and to accept them as so much established 
 truth ; we ought, on the contrary, to be continually 
 applying analysis, we ought to look for the facts, the 
 proofs, the fragments of documents — in short, the 
 materials. We shall be doing the author's work 
 over again, but we shall do it very much faster than 
 he did, for that which takes up time is the collec- 
 tion and combination of the materials ; and we shall 
 accept no conclusions but those we consider to have 
 been proved. 
 
 231 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 THE GROUPING OF FACTS 
 
 I. The prime necessity for the historian, when con- 
 fronted with the chaos of historical facts, is to limit 
 the field of his researches. In the ocean of universal 
 history what facts is he to choose for collection ? 
 Secondly, in the mass of facts so chosen he will 
 have to distinguish between different groups and 
 make subdivisions. Lastly, within each of these 
 subdivisions he will have to arrange the facts one 
 by one. Thus all historical construction should 
 begin with the search for a principle to guide in the 
 selection, the grouping, and the arrangement of facts. 
 This principle may be sought either in the external 
 conditions of the facts or in their intrinsic nature. 
 
 The simplest and easiest mode of classification 
 is that which is founded on external conditions. 
 Every historical fact belongs to a definite time and 
 a definite place, and relates to a definite man or 
 group of men : a convenient basis is thus afforded 
 for the division and arrangement of facts. We 
 have the history of a period, of a country, of a 
 nation, of a man (biography) ; the ancient historians 
 and those of the Renaissance used no other type. 
 Within this general scheme the subdivisions are 
 formed on the same principle, and facts are arranged 
 in chronological and geographical order, or accord- 
 
 232 
 
The Grouping of Facts 
 
 ing to the groups to which they relate. As to the 
 selection of facts to be arranged in this scheme, for 
 a long time it was made on no fixed principle ; his- 
 torians followed their individual fancy, and chose 
 from among the facts relating to a given period, 
 country, or nation all that they deemed interesting 
 or curious. Livy and Tacitus mingle accounts of 
 floods, epidemics, and the birth of monsters with 
 their narratives of wars and revolutions. 
 
 Classification of facts by their intrinsic nature 
 was introduced very late, and has made way but 
 slowly and imperfectly. It took its rise outside 
 the domain of history, in certain branches of study 
 dealing with special human phenomena— language, 
 literature, art, law, political economy, religion ; studies 
 which began by being dogmatic, but gradually as- 
 sumed an historical character. The principle of this 
 mode of classification is to select and group together 
 those facts which relate to the same species of 
 actions ; each of these groups becomes the subject- 
 matter of a special branch of history. The totality 
 of facts thus comes to be arranged in compartments 
 which may be constructed a 'priori by the study of 
 the totality of human activities ; these correspond 
 to the set of general questions of which we have 
 spoken in the preceding chapter. 
 
 In the following table we have attempted to 
 provide a general scheme for the classification 1 of 
 
 1 The classification of M. Lacombe (Be I'histoire considere'e comme 
 science, chap, vi.), founded on the motives of actions and the wants 
 they are intended to satisfy, is very judicious from the philoso- 
 phical point of view, but does not meet the practical needs of 
 historians ; it rests on abstract psychological categories (economic, 
 reproductive, sympathetic, ambitious, &c), and ends by classing 
 
 233 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 historical facts, founded on the nature of the condi- 
 tions and of the manifestations of activity. 
 
 I. Material Conditions, (i) Study of the body: A. 
 Anthropology (ethnology), anatomy, and physiology, ano- 
 malies and pathological peculiarities. B. Demography 
 (number, sex, age, births, deaths, diseases). (2) Study of 
 the environment: A. Natural geographical environment 
 (orographic configuration, climate, water, soil, flora, and 
 fauna). B. Artificial environment, forestry (cultivation, 
 buildings, roads, implements, &c). 
 
 II. Intellectual Habits (not obligatory). (1) Language 
 (vocabulary, syntax, phonetics, semasiology). Handwriting. 
 (2) Arts: A. Plastic arts (conditions of production, con- 
 ceptions, methods, works). B. Arts of expression, music, 
 dance, literature. (3) Sciences (conditions of production, 
 methods, results). (4) Philosophy and Morals (conceptions, 
 precepts, actual practice). (5) Religion (beliefs, practices). 1 
 
 III. Material Customs (not obligatory). (1) Material 
 life : A. Food (materials, modes of preparing, stimulants). 
 B. Clothes and personal adornment. C. Dwellings and 
 furniture. (2) Private life: A.< Employment of time 
 (toilette, care of the person, meals). B. Social ceremonies 
 (funerals and marriages, festivals, etiquette). 0. Amuse- 
 ments (modes of exercise and hunting, games and spectacles, 
 social meetings, travelling). 
 
 IV. Economic Customs, (i) Production : A. Agriculture 
 and stock-breeding. B. Exploitation of minerals. (2) Trans- 
 formation, Transport awl industries : 2 technical processes, 
 division of labour, means of communication. (3) Commerce: 
 
 together very different species of phenomena (military institutions 
 along with economics). 
 
 1 Ecclesiastical institutions form part of the government ; in 
 German manuals of antiquities they are found among institutions, 
 while religion is classed with the arts. 
 
 2 Modes of transport, which are often put under commerce, form 
 a species of industry. 
 
 234 
 
The Grouping of Facts 
 
 exchange and sale, credit. (4) Distribution : system of 
 property, transmission, contracts, profit-sharing. 
 
 V. Social Institutions, (i) The family : A. Constitution, 
 authority, condition of women and children. B. Economic 
 organisation.! Family property, succession. (2) Education 
 and instruction (aim, methods, personnel). (3) Social classes 
 (principle of division, rules regulating intercourse)., 
 
 VI. Public Institutions (obligatory). (1) Political 
 institutions : A. Sovereign (personnel, procedure). B. Admin- 
 istration, services (war, justice, finance, &c). G. Elected 
 authorities, assemblies, electoral bodies (powers, procedure). 
 (2) Ecclesiastical institutions (the same divisions). (3) 
 International institutions: A. Diplomacy. B. War (usages 
 of war and military arts). C. Private law and commerce. 
 
 This grouping of facts according to their nature is 
 combined with the system of grouping by time and 
 place ; we thus obtain chronological, geographical, or 
 national sections in each branch. The history of a 
 species of activity (language, painting, government) 
 subdivides into the history of periods, countries, and 
 nations (history of the ancient Greek language, his- 
 tory of the government of France in the nineteenth 
 century). 
 
 The same principles aid in determining the order 
 in which the facts are to be arranged. The neces- 
 sity of presenting facts one after another obliges us 
 to adopt some methodical rule of succession. We 
 may describe successively either all the facts which 
 relate to a given place, or those which relate to a 
 given country, or all the facts of a given species. 
 All historical matter can be distributed in three 
 different kinds of order : chronological order, geogra- 
 
 1 Property is an institution of mixed character, being at once 
 economic, social, and political. 
 
 23S 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 pliical order, that kind of order which is governed 
 by the nature of actions and is generally called 
 logical order. It is impossible to use any of these 
 orders exclusively : in every chronological exposition 
 there necessarily occur geographical or logical cross- 
 divisions, transitions from one country to another, or 
 from one species of facts to a different species, and 
 conversely. But it is always necessary to decide 
 which shall be the main order into which the others 
 enter as subdivisions. 
 
 It is a delicate matter to choose between these 
 three orders ; our choice will be decided by different 
 reasons according to the subject, and according to 
 the public for whom we are working. That is to 
 say, it will depend on the method of exposition ; it 
 would take up too much space to give the theory of it. 
 
 II. When we come to the selection of historical 
 facts for classification and arrangement, a question 
 is raised which has been disputed with considerable 
 warmth. 
 
 Every human action is by its nature an individual 
 transient phenomenon which is confined to a definite 
 time and a definite place. Strictly speaking, every 
 fact is unique. But every action of a man resembles 
 other actions of the same man, or of other mem 1 3rs 
 of the same group, and often to so great a degree 
 that the whole group of actions receives a common 
 name, in which their individuality is lost. These 
 groups of similar actions, which the human mind is 
 irresistibly impelled to form, are called habits, usages, 
 institutions. These are merely constructions of the 
 mind, but they are imposed so forcibly on our in- 
 tellect that many of them must be recognised and 
 
 236 
 
The Grouping of Facts 
 
 constantly employed ; habits are collective facts, 
 possessing extension in time and space. Historical 
 facts may therefore be considered under two different 
 aspects: we may regard either the individual, par- 
 ticular, and transient elements in them, or we may 
 look for what is collective, general, and durable. 
 According to the first conception, history is a con- 
 tinuous narrative of the incidents which have hap- 
 pened among men in the past ; according to the 
 second, it is the picture of the successive habits of 
 humanity. 
 
 On this subject there has been a contest, especially 
 in Germany, between the partisans of the history of 
 civilisation (Kulturgeschichte) 1 and the historians who 
 remain faithful to ancient tradition; in France we 
 have had the struggle between the history of insti- 
 tutions, manners, and ideas, and political history, 
 contemptuously nicknamed " battle-history " by its 
 opponents. 
 
 This opposition is explained by the difference 
 between the documents which the workers on either 
 side were accustomed to deal with. The historians, 
 principally occupied with political history, read of 
 individual and transient acts of rulers in which it 
 was difficult to detect any common feature. In 
 the special histories, on the contrary (except that of 
 literature), the documents exhibit none but general 
 facts, a linguistic form, a religious rite, a rule of law; 
 an effort of imagination is required to picture the 
 man who pronounced the word, who performed the 
 rite, or who applied the rule in practice. 
 
 1 For the history and biography of this movement see Bernheim, 
 Lehrbuch, pp. 45-55. 
 
 237 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 There is no need to take sides in this controversy. 
 Historical construction in its completeness implies 
 the study of facts under both aspects. The repre- 
 sentation of men's habits of thought, life, i*nd action 
 is obviously an important part of history. And yet, 
 supposing we had brought together all the acts of 
 all individuals for the purpose of extracting what 
 is common to them, there would still remain a 
 residue which we should have no right to reject, for 
 it is the distinctively historical element — the cir- 
 cumstance that a particular action was the action of 
 a given man, or group of men, at a given moment. 
 In a scheme of classification which should only 
 recognise the general facts of political life there 
 would be no place for the victory of Pharsalia or 
 the taking of the Bastille — accidental and transient 
 facts, but without which the history of Roman and 
 French institutions would be unintelligible. 
 
 History is thus obliged to combine with the study 
 of general facts the study of certain particular facts. 
 It has a mixed character, fluctuating between a 
 science of generalities and a narrative of adventures. 
 The difficulty of classing this hybrid under one of 
 the categories of human thought has often been 
 expressed by the childish question : Is history a 
 science or an art ? 
 
 III. The general table given above may be used 
 for the determination of all the species of habits 
 (usages or institutions) of which the history may be 
 written. But before applying this general scheme 
 to the study of any particular group of habits, lan- 
 guage, religion, private usages, or political institu- 
 tions, there is always a preliminary question to be 
 
 238 
 
The Grouping of Facts 
 
 answered : Whose were the habits we are about to 
 study ? They Avere common to a great number of 
 individuals ; and a collection of individuals with the 
 same habits is what we call a group. The first con- 
 dition, then, for the study of a habit is the deter- 
 mination of the group which has practised it. At 
 this point we must beware of the first impulse ; it 
 leads to a negligence which may ruin the whole of 
 our historical construction. 
 
 The natural tendency is to conceive the human 
 group on the model of the zoological species — as a 
 body of men who all resemble each other. We take 
 a group united by a very obvious common char- 
 acteristic, a nation united by a common official 
 government (Romans, English, French), a people 
 speaking the same language (Greeks, ancient Ger- 
 mans), and we proceed as if all the members of this 
 group resembled each other at every point and had 
 the same usages. 
 
 As a matter of fact, no real group, not even a 
 centralised society, is a homogeneous whole. For a 
 great part of human activity — language, art, science, 
 religion, economic interests — the group is constantly 
 fluctuating. What are we to understand by the 
 group of those who speak Greek, the Christian 
 group, the group of modern science ? And even 
 those groups to which some precision is given by 
 an official organisation, States and Churches, are 
 but superficial unities composed of heterogeneous 
 elements. The English nation comprises Welsh, 
 Scotch, and Irish ; the Catholic dhurch is composed 
 of adherents scattered over the whole world, and 
 differing in everything but religion. There is no 
 
 239 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 group whose members have the same habits in 
 every respect. The same man is at the same time 
 a member of several groups, and in each group he 
 has companions who differ from those he has in the 
 others. A French Canadian belongs to the British 
 Empire, the Catholic Church, the group of French- 
 speaking people. Thus the different groups overlap 
 each other in a way that makes it impossible to 
 divide humanity into sharply distinct societies exist- 
 ing side by side. 
 
 In historical documents we find the contemporary 
 names of groups, many of them resting on mere 
 superficial resemblances. It must be made a rule 
 not to adopt popular notions of this kind without 
 criticising them. We must accurately determine 
 the nature and extent of the group, asking : Of what 
 men was it composed ? What bond united them ? 
 What habits had they in common ? In what 
 species of activity did they differ ? Not till after 
 such criticism shall we be able to tell what are the 
 habits in respect of which the group in question 
 may be used as a basis of study. In order to study 
 intellectual habits (language, religion, art, science) 
 we shall not take a political unit, the nation, but 
 the group consisting of those who shared the habit 
 in question. In order to study economic facts we 
 shall choose a group united by a common economic 
 interest ; we shall reserve the political group for 
 the study of social and political facts, and we shall 
 discard race 1 altogether. 
 
 1 It is no longer necessary to demonstrate the nullity of the 
 notion of race. It used to be applied to vague groups, formed by 
 a nation or a language ; for race as understood by historians (Greek, 
 
 24O 
 
The Grouping of Facts 
 
 Even in those points in which a group is homo- 
 geneous it is not entirely so ; it is divided into sub- 
 groups, the members of which differ in secondary 
 habits ; a language is divided into dialects, a re- 
 ligion into sects, a nation into provinces. Con- 
 versely, one group resembles other groups in a way 
 that justifies its being regarded as contiguous with 
 them ; in a general classification we may recognise 
 " families " of languages, arts, and peoples. We 
 have, then, to ask : How was a given group sub- 
 divided ? Of what larger group did it form a 
 part? 
 
 It then becomes possible to study methodically 
 a given habit, or even the totality of the habits 
 belonging to a given time and place, by following 
 the table given above. The operation presents no 
 difficulties of method in the case of those species 
 of facts which appear as individual and voluntary 
 habits — language, art, sciences, conceptions, private 
 usages ; here it is enough to ascertain in what each 
 habit consisted. It is merely necessary to distin- 
 guish carefully between those who originated or 
 maintained habits (artists, the learned, philosophers, 
 introducers of fashions) and the mass who accepted 
 them. 
 
 But when we come to social or political habits 
 (what we call institutions), we meet with new 
 conditions which produce an inevitable illusion. 
 
 Roman, Germanic, Celtic, Slavonic races) has nothing but the 
 name in common with race in the anthropological sense — that is, 
 a group of men possessing the same hereditary characteristics. It 
 has been reduced to an absurdity by the abuse Taine made of it. A 
 very good criticism of it will be found in Lacombe (ibid., chap, xviii.), 
 and in Robertson ("The Saxon and the Celt," London, 1897, 8vo), 
 
 24I Q 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 The members of the same social or political group 
 do not merely habitually perform similar actions ; 
 they influence each other by reciprocal actions, they 
 command, coerce, pay each other. Habits here take 
 the form of relations between the different members ; 
 when they are of old standing, formulated in official 
 rules, imposed by a visible authority, maintained 
 by a special set of persons, they occupy so impor- 
 tant a place in life, that, to the persons under their 
 influence, they appear as external realities. The 
 men, too, who specialise in an occupation or a 
 function which becomes the dominating habit of 
 their lives, appear as grouped in distinct categories 
 (classes, corporations, churches, governments); and 
 these categories are taken for real existences, or 
 at least for organs of various functions in a real 
 existence, namely, society. We follow the analogy 
 of an animal's body so far as to describe the 
 " structure " and the " functions " of a society, even 
 its " anatomy " and " physiology." These are pure 
 metaphors. By the structure of a society we mean 
 the rules and the customs by which occupations 
 and enjoyments are distributed among its members; 
 by its functions we mean the habitual actions by 
 which each man enters into relations with the 
 others. It may be convenient to use these terms, 
 but it should be remembered that the underlying 
 reality is composed entirely of habits and customs. 
 
 The study of institutions, however, obliges us 
 to ask special questions about persons and their 
 functions. In respect of social and economic in- 
 stitutions we have to ask what was the principle 
 of the division of labour and of the division into 
 
 242 
 
The Grouping of Facts 
 
 classes, what were the professions and classes, how 
 were they recruited, what were the relations between 
 the members of the different professions and classes. 
 In respect of political institutions, which are sanc- 
 tioned by obligatory rules and a visible authority, 
 two new series of questions arise. ( I ) Who were the 
 persons invested with authority ? When authority 
 is divided we have to study the division of func- 
 tions, to analyse the personnel of government into its 
 different groups (supreme and subordinate, central 
 and local), and to distinguish each of the special 
 bodies. In respect of each class of men concerned 
 in the government we shall ask : How were they 
 recruited ? What was their official authority ? What 
 were their real powers ? (2) What were the official 
 rules ? What was their form (custom, orders, law, 
 precedent) ? What was their content (rules of law) ? 
 What was the mode of application (procedure) ? 
 And, above all, how did the rules differ from the 
 practice (abuse of power, exploitation, conflicts be- 
 tween executive agents, non-observance of rules) ? 
 
 After the determination of all the facts which 
 constitute a society, it remains to find the place 
 Avhich this society occupies among the total number 
 of the societies contemporary with it. Here we 
 enter upon the study of international institutions, 
 intellectual, economic, and political (diplomacy and 
 the usages of war) ; the same questions apply as 
 in the study of political institutions. A study 
 should also be made of the habits common to 
 several societies, and of those relations which do 
 not assume an official form. This is one of the 
 least advanced parts of historical construction 
 
 243 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 IV. The outcome of all this labour is a tabulated 
 view of human life at a given moment ; it gives us 
 the knowledge of a state of society (in German, 
 Zustand). But history is not limited to the study 
 of simultaneous facts, taken in a state of rest, to 
 what we may call the statics of society. It also 
 studies the states of society at different moments, 
 and discovers the differences between these states. 
 The habits of men and the material conditions 
 under which they live change from epoch to epoch ; 
 even when they appear to be constant they do not 
 remain unaltered in every respect. There is there- 
 fore occasion to investigate these changes ; thus 
 arises the study of successive facts. 
 
 Of these changes the most interesting for the 
 work of historical construction are those which tend 
 in a common direction, 1 so that in virtue of a series of 
 gradual differentiations a usage or a state of society is 
 transformed into a different usage or state, or, to speak 
 without metaphor, cases where the men of a given 
 period practise a habit very different from that of 
 their predecessors without any abrupt change having 
 taken place. This is evolution. 
 
 Evolution occurs in all human habits. In order 
 to investigate it, therefore, it is enough to turn once 
 more to the series of questions which we used in 
 constructing a tabulated view of society. In respect 
 of each of the facts, conditions, usages, persons in- 
 vested with authority, official rules, the question is to 
 be asked : What was the evolution of this fact ? 
 
 1 There is no general agreement on the proper place in history of 
 retrograde changes, of those oscillations which bring things back 
 to the point from which they started. 
 
 244 
 
The Grouping of Facts 
 
 This study will involve several operations : ( i ) 
 the determination of the fact whose evolution is to 
 be studied ; (2) the fixing of the duration of the 
 time during which the evolution took place (the 
 period should be so chosen that while the transfor- 
 mation is obvious, there yet remains a connecting 
 link between the initial and the final condition); (3) 
 the establishing of the different stages of the evolu- 
 tion ; (4) the investigation of the means by which it 
 was brought about. 
 
 V. A series, even a complete series, of all the states 
 of all societies and of all their evolutions would not 
 be enough to exhaust the subject-matter of history. 
 There remains a number of unique facts which we 
 cannot pass over, because they explain the origin 
 of certain states of society, and form the starting- 
 points of evolutions. How could we study the in- 
 stitutions or the evolution of France if we ignored 
 the conquest of Gaul by Caesar and the invasion of 
 the Barbarians ? 
 
 This necessity of studying unique facts has caused 
 it to be said that history cannot be a science, for 
 every science has for its object that which is general. 
 History is here in the same situation as cosmography, 
 geology, the science of animal species : it is not the 
 abstract knowledge of the general relations between 
 facts, it is a study which aims at explaining reality. 
 Now, reality exists but once. There has been but 
 a single evolution of the world, of animal life, of 
 humanity. In each of these evolutions the succes- 
 sive facts have not been the product of abstract laws, 
 but of the concurrence, at each moment, of several 
 circumstances of different nature. This concurrence, 
 
 2 45 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 sometimes called chance, has produced a series of 
 accidents which have determined the particular 
 course taken by evolution. 1 Evolution can only 
 be understood by the study of these accidents ; 
 history is here on the same footing as geology or 
 paleontology. 
 
 Thus scientific history may go back to the acci- 
 dents, or events, which traditional history collected 
 for literary reasons, because they struck the imagina- 
 tion, and employ them for the study of evolution. 
 We may thus look for the facts which have influenced 
 the evolution of each one of the habits of humanity. 
 Each event will be arranged under its date in the 
 evolution which it is supposed to have influenced. 
 It will then suffice to bring together the events of 
 every kind, and to arrange them in chronological 
 and geographical order, to have a representation of 
 historical evolution as a whole. 
 
 Then, over and above the special histories in 
 which the facts are arranged under purely abstract 
 categories (art, religion, private life, political insti- 
 tutions), we shall have constructed a concrete general 
 history, which will connect together the various 
 special histories by exhibiting the main stream 
 of evolution which has dominated all the special 
 evolutions. None of the species of facts which 
 we study apart (religion, art, law, constitutions) 
 forms a closed world within which evolution takes 
 place in obedience to a kind of internal impulse, as 
 specialists are prone to imagine. The evolution of 
 
 1 The theory of chance as affecting history has been expounded in 
 a masterly manner by M. Cournot, Considerations sur la marche cles 
 idies et des dv&nements dans les temps modernes (Paris, 1872, 2 vols. 8vo). 
 
 246 
 
The Grouping of Facts 
 
 a usage or of an institution (language, religion, 
 church, state) is only a metaphor; a usage is an 
 abstraction, abstractions do not evolve; it is only 
 existences that evolve, in the strict sense of the 
 word. 1 When a change takes place in a usage, 
 this means that the men who practise it have 
 changed. Now, men are not built in water-tight 
 compartments (religious, juridical, economic) within 
 which phenomena can occur in isolation; an event 
 which modifies the condition of a man changes his 
 habits in a great variety of respects. The invasion 
 of the Barbarians influenced alike language, private 
 life, and political institutions. We cannot, there- 
 fore, understand evolution by confining ourselves to 
 a special branch of history ; the specialist, even for 
 the purpose of writing the complete history of his 
 own branch, must look beyond the confines of his 
 own subject into the field of general events. It is 
 the merit of Taine to have asserted, with reference 
 to English literature, that literary evolution depends, 
 not on literary events, but on facts of a general 
 character. 
 
 The general history of individual facts was de- 
 veloped before the special histories. It contains 
 the residue of facts which have .not found a place 
 in the special histories, and has been reduced in 
 extent by the formation and detachment of special 
 branches. As general facts are principally of a 
 
 1 Lamprecht, in a long article, Was ist Kulturgeschichte, published 
 in the Deutsche Zeitschrift fiir Geschichtswissenschafi, New Series, 
 vol. i., 1896, has attempted to base the history of civilisation on 
 the theory of a collective soul of society producing " social-psychic" 
 phenomena common to the whole society, and differing from period 
 to period. This is a metaphysical hypothesis. 
 
 247 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 political nature, and as it is more difficult to orga- 
 nise these into a special branch, general history has 
 in practice been confounded with political history 
 (Staatengeschichte)} Thus political historians have 
 been led to make themselves the champions of 
 general history, and to retain in their constructions 
 all the general facts (migrations of peoples, religious 
 reforms, inventions, and discoveries) necessary for 
 the understanding of political evolution. 
 
 In order to construct general history it is neces- 
 sary to look for all the facts which, because they 
 have produced changes, can explain either the 
 state of a society or one of its evolutions. We 
 must search for them among all classes of facts, 
 displacements of population, artistic, scientific, re- 
 ligious, technical innovations, changes in the per- 
 sonnel of government, revolutions, wars, discoveries 
 of countries. 
 
 That which is important is that the fact should 
 have had a decisive influence. We must therefore 
 resist the natural temptation to divide facts into 
 great and small. It goes against the grain to admit 
 that great effects may have had small causes, that 
 Cleopatra's nose may have made a difference to the 
 Roman Empire. .This repugnance is of a metaphy- 
 sical order; it springs from a preconceived opinion 
 on the government of the world. In all the sciences 
 which deal with an evolution we find individual facts 
 which serve as starting-points for series of vast trans- 
 formations. A drove of horses brought by the Spanish 
 
 1 The expression national history, introduced in the interests 
 of patriotism, denotes the same thing. The history of the nation 
 means practically the history of the State. 
 
 248 
 
The Grouping of Facts 
 
 has stocked the whole of South America. In a flood 
 a branch of a tree may dam a current and transform 
 the aspect of a valley. 
 
 In human evolution we meet with great transfor- 
 mations which have no intelligible cause beyond an 
 individual accident. 1 In the sixteenth century Eng- 
 land changed its religion three times on the death 
 of a sovereign (Henry VIIL, Edward VI., Mary). 
 Importance is not to be measured by the initial fact, 
 but by the facts which resulted from it. We must 
 not, therefore, deny a priori the action of individuals 
 and discard individual facts. We must examine 
 whether a given individual was in a position to 
 make his influence strongly felt. There are two 
 cases in which we may assume that he was : ( i ) 
 when his action served as an example to a mass 
 of men and created a tradition, a case frequent 
 in art, science, religion, and technical matters; (2) 
 when he had power to issue commands and direct 
 the actions of a mass of men, as is the case with 
 the heads of a state, an army, or a church.. The 
 episodes in a man's life may thus become important 
 facts. 
 
 Accordingly, in the scheme of historical classifi- 
 cation a place should be assigned for persons and 
 events. 
 
 VI. In every study of successive facts it is 
 necessary to provide a number of halting-places, 
 to distinguish beginnings and ends, in order that 
 chronological divisions may be made in the enor- 
 mous mass of facts. These divisions are periods; 
 the use of them is as old as history. We need 
 
 1 See Cournot, ibid., i. p. iv. 
 249 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 them, not only in general history, but in the special 
 branches of history as well, whenever we study an 
 extent of time long enough for an evolution to be 
 sensible. It is by means of events that we fix 
 their limits. 
 
 In the special branches of history, after having 
 decided what changes of habits are to be considered 
 as reaching deepest, we adopt them as marking dates 
 in the evolution ; we then inquire what event pro- 
 duced them. The event which led to the formation 
 or the change of a habit becomes the beginning or 
 the end of a period. Sometimes these boundary 
 events are of the same species as the facts whose 
 evolution we are studying — literary facts in the his- 
 tory of literature, political facts in political history. 
 But more often they belong to a different species, 
 and the special historian is obliged to borrow them 
 from general history. 
 
 In general history the periods should be divided 
 according to the evolution of several species of phe- 
 nomena; we look for events which mark an epoch 
 simultaneously in several branches (the Invasion of 
 the Barbarians, the Reformation, the French Revo- 
 lution). We may thus construct periods which are 
 common to several branches of evolution, whose 
 beginning and whose end are each marked by a 
 single event. It is thus that the traditional division 
 of universal history into periods has been effected. 
 The sub-periods are obtained by the same process, 
 by taking for limits events which have produced 
 consequences of secondary importance. 
 
 The periods which are thus constructed according 
 to the events are of unequal duration. We must 
 
 250 
 
The Grouping of Facts 
 
 not be troubled by this want of symmetry ; a period 
 ought not to be a fixed number of years, but the 
 time occupied by a distinct phase of evolution. 
 Now, evolution is not a regular movement ; some- 
 times a long series of years passes without notable 
 change, then come moments of rapid transformation. 
 On this difference Saint-Simon has founded a dis- 
 tinction between organic periods (of slow change) and 
 critical periods (of rapid change). 
 
 251 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 CONSTRUCTIVE REASONING 
 
 I. The historical facts supplied by documents are 
 never enough to fill all the blanks in such schemes 
 of classification and arrangement as we have been 
 considering. There are many questions to which 
 no direct answer is given by the documents ; many 
 features are lacking without which the complete 
 picture of the various states of society, of evolutions 
 and events, cannot be given. We are irresistibly 
 impelled to endeavour to fill up these gaps. 
 
 In the sciences of direct observation, when a fact 
 is missing from a series, it is sought for by a new 
 observation. In history, where we have not this 
 resource, we seek to extend our knowledge by the 
 help of reasoning. Starting from facts known to 
 us from the documents, we endeavour to reach new 
 facts by inference. If the reasoning be correct, this 
 method of acquiring knowledge is legitimate. 
 
 But experience shows that of all the methods of 
 acquiring historical knowledge, reasoning is the most 
 difficult to employ correctly, and the one which has 
 introduced the most serious errors. It should not 
 be used without the safeguard of a number of pre- 
 cautions calculated to keep the danger continually 
 before the mind. 
 
 (i) Reasoning should never be combined with 
 252 
 
Constructive Reasoning 
 
 the analysis of a document. The reader who allows 
 himself to introduce into a text what the author 
 has not expressly put there ends by making him say 
 what he never intended to say. 1 
 
 (2) Facts obtained by the direct examination of 
 documents should never be confused, with the results 
 obtained by reasoning. When we state a fact known 
 to us by reasoning only, we must not allow it to be 
 supposed that we have found it in the documents ; 
 we must disclose the method by which we have 
 obtained it. 
 
 (3) Unconscious reasoning must never be allowed; 
 there are too many chances of error. It will be 
 enough to make a point of putting every argument 
 into logical form ; in the case of bad reasoning the 
 major premiss is generally monstrous to an appalling 
 degree. 
 
 (4) If the reasoning leaves the least doubt, no 
 attempt must be made to draw a conclusion ; the 
 point treated must be left in the conjectural stage, 
 clearly distinguished from the definitively established 
 results. 
 
 (5) It is not permissible to return to a conjec- 
 ture and endeavour to transform it into a certainty. 
 Here the first impression is most likely to be right. 
 By reflection upon a conjecture we familiarise 
 ourselves with it, and end by thinking it better 
 established ; while the truth is, we are merely more 
 accustomed to it. This is a frequent mishap with 
 those who devote themselves to long meditation on 
 a small number of texts. 
 
 There are two ways of employing reasoning, one 
 
 1 We have already (p. 143) treated of this fault of method. 
 253 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 negative, the other positive ; we shall examine them 
 separately. 
 
 II. The negative mode of reasoning, called also 
 the " argument from silence," is based on the absence 
 of indications with regard to a fact. 1 From the cir- 
 cumstance of the fact not being mentioned in any 
 document it is inferred that there was no such fact ; 
 the argument is applied to all kinds of subjects, 
 usages of every description, evolutions, events. It 
 rests on a feeling which in ordinary life is expressed 
 by saying : " If it were true, we should have heard 
 of it ; " it implies a general proposition which may 
 be formulated thus : " If an alleged event really had 
 occurred, there would be some document in existence 
 in which it would be referred to." 
 
 In order that such reasoning should be justified 
 it would be necessary that every fact should have 
 been observed and recorded in writing, and that all 
 the records should have been preserved. Now, the 
 greater part of the documents which have been 
 written have been lost, and the greater part of the 
 events Avhich happen are not recorded in writing. 
 In the majority of cases the argument would be 
 invalid. It must therefore be restricted to the cases 
 where the conditions implied in it have been fulfilled. 
 
 (i) It is necessary not only that there should be 
 now no documents in existence which mention the 
 fact in question, but that there should never have 
 been any. If the documents are lost we can conclude 
 
 1 The discussion of this argument, which was formerly much 
 used in religious history, was a favourite subject with the earlier 
 writers who treated of methodology, and still occupies a consider- 
 able space in the rrincipes de In critique historique of Pere de Smedt. 
 
 2 54 
 
Constructive Reasoning 
 
 nothing. The argument from silence ought, there- 
 fore, to be employed the more rarely the greater the 
 number of documents that have been lost ; it is of 
 much less use in ancient history than in dealing 
 with the nineteenth century. Some, desiring to free 
 themselves from this restriction, are tempted to 
 assume that the lost documents contained nothing 
 interesting ; if they were lost, say they, the reason 
 was that they were not worth preserving. But the 
 truth is, every manuscript is at the mercy of the 
 least accident ; its preservation or destruction is a 
 matter of pure chance. 
 
 (2) The fact must have been of such a kind that 
 it could not fail to be observed and recorded. Be- 
 cause a fact has not been recorded it does not follow 
 that it has not been observed. Any one who is 
 concerned in an organisation for the collection of a 
 particular species of facts knows how much com- 
 moner those facts are than people think, and how 
 many cases pass unnoticed or without leaving any 
 written trace. It is so with earthquakes, cases of 
 hydrophobia, whales stranded on the shore. Besides, 
 many facts, even those which are well known to 
 those who are contemporary with them, are not re- 4 
 corded, because the official authorities prevent their 
 publication ; this is what happens to the secret acts 
 of governments and the complaints of the lower 
 classes. This silence, which proves nothing, greatly 
 impresses unreflecting historians ; it is the origin 
 of the widespread sophism of the "good old times." 
 No document relates any abuse of power by officials 
 or any complaints made by peasants ; therefore, 
 everything was regular and nobody was suffering. 
 
 255 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 Before we argue from silence we should ask : Might 
 not this fact have failed to be recorded in any of 
 the documents we possess ? That which is conclu- 
 sive is not the absence of any document on a given 
 fact, but silence as to the fact in a document in 
 which it would naturally be mentioned. 
 
 The negative argument is thus limited to a few 
 clearly denned cases, (i) The author of the docu- 
 ment in which the fact is not mentioned had the 
 intention of systematically recording all the facts of 
 the same class, and must have been acquainted with 
 all of them. (Tacitus sought to enumerate the 
 peoples of Germany ; the Notitia dignitatum men- 
 tioned all the provinces of the Empire ; the absence 
 from these lists of a people or a province proves 
 that it did not then exist.) (2) The fact, if it was 
 such, must have affected the author's imagination 
 so forcibly as necessarily to enter into his concep- 
 tions. (If there had been regular assemblies of the 
 Frankish people, Gregory of Tours could not have 
 conceived and described the life of the Frankish 
 kings without mentioning them.) 
 
 III. The positive mode of reasoning begins with 
 a fact established by the documents, and infers some 
 other fact which the documents do not mention. 
 It is an application of the fundamental principle 
 of history, the analogy between present and past 
 humanity. In the present we observe that the 
 facts of humanity are connected together. Given 
 one fact, another fact accompanies it, either because 
 the first is the cause of the second, or because the 
 second is the cause of the first, or because both are 
 effects of a common cause. We assume that in the 
 
 256 
 
Constructive Reasoning 
 
 past similar facts were connected in a similar 
 manner, and this assumption is corroborated by the 
 direct study of the past in the documents. From 
 a given fact, therefore, which we find in the past, 
 we may infer the existence of the other facts which 
 were connected with it. 
 
 This reasoning applies to facts of all kinds, usages, 
 transformations, individual incidents. We may 
 begin with any known fact and endeavour to infer 
 unknown facts from it. Now the facts of humanity, 
 having a common centre, man, are all connected 
 together, not merely facts of the same class, but 
 facts belonging to the most widely different classes. 
 There are connections, not merely between the dif- 
 ferent facts relating to art, to religion, to manners, 
 to politics, but between the facts of religion on the 
 one hand and the facts of art, of politics, and of 
 manners on the other; thus from a fact of one 
 species we may infer facts of all the other species. 
 
 To examine those connections between facts on 
 which reasonings may be founded would mean tabu- 
 lating all the known relations between the facts of 
 humanity, that is, giving a full account of all the 
 empirical laws of social life. Such a labour would 
 provide matter for a whole book. 1 Here we shall 
 content ourselves with indicating the general rules 
 governing this kind of reasoning, and the precautions 
 to be taken against the most common errors. 
 
 The argument rests on two propositions: one is 
 general, and is derived from experience of human 
 
 1 This is what Montesquieu attempted in his Esprit des Lois. In 
 a course of lectures at the Sorbonne, I have endeavoured to give a 
 sketch of such a comprehensive account. — [Oh. S.j 
 
 257 B 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 affairs; the other is particular, and is derived from 
 the documents. In practice, we begin with the 
 particular proposition, the historical fact : Salamis 
 bears a Phoenician name. We then look for a 
 general proposition : the language of the name of 
 a city is the language of the people which founded 
 it. And we conclude : Salamis, bearing a Phoenician 
 name, was founded by the Phoenicians. 
 
 In order that the conclusion may be certain, two 
 conditions are neeessar}'. 
 
 (i) The general proposition must be accurately 
 true ; the two facts which it declares to be connected 
 must be connected in such a way that the one is 
 never found without the other. If this condition 
 were completely satisfied we should have a law, in 
 the scientific sense of the word ; but in dealing with 
 the facts of humanity — apart from those physical con- 
 ditions whose laws are established by the regular 
 sciences — we can only work with empirical laws 
 obtained by rough determinations of general facts 
 which are not analysed in such a manner as to educe 
 their true causes. These empirical laws are approxi- 
 mately true only when they relate to a numerous 
 body of facts, for we can never quite know how far 
 each is necessary to produce the result. The pro- 
 position relating to the language of the name of a 
 city does not go enough into detail to be always 
 true. Petersburg is a German name, Syracuse in 
 America bears a Greek name. Other conditions must 
 be fulfilled before we can be sure that the name is 
 connected with the nationality of the founders. We 
 should, therefore, only employ such propositions as 
 go into detail. 
 
 258 
 
Constructive Reasoning 
 
 (2) In order to employ a general proposition 
 which goes into detail, we must have a detailed 
 knowledge of the particular fact ; for it is not till 
 after this fact has been established that we look for 
 an empirical general law on which to found an argu- 
 ment. We shall begin, then, by studying the parti- 
 cular conditions of the case (the situation of Salamis, 
 the habits of the Greeks and Phoenicians) ; we shall 
 not work on a single detail, but on an assemblage of 
 details. 
 
 Thus, in historical reasoning it is necessary to have 
 (1) an accurate general proposition; (2) a detailed 
 knowledge of a past fact. It is bad workmanship 
 to assume a false general proposition — to suppose, 
 for example, as Augustin Thierry did, that every 
 aristocracy had its origin in a conquest. It is 
 bad workmanship, again, to found an argument 
 on an isolated detail (the name of a city). The 
 nature of these errors indicates the precautions to 
 be taken. 
 
 (1) The spontaneous tendency is to take as a 
 basis of reasoning those " common-sense truths " 
 which form nearly the whole of our knowledge of 
 social life. Now, the greater part of these are to 
 some extent false, for the science of social life is 
 still imperfect. And the chief danger in them lies 
 in the circumstance that we use them unconsciously. 
 The safest precaution will be always to formulate the 
 supposed law on which we propose to base an argu- 
 ment. In every instance where such and such a 
 fact occurs, it is certain that such and such another 
 fact occurs also. If this proposition is obviously 
 false, we shall at once see it to be so ; if it is too 
 
 259 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 general, we shall inquire what new conditions may 
 be introduced to make it accurate. 
 
 (2) A second spontaneous impulse leads us to 
 draw consequences from isolated facts, even of the 
 slightest kind (or rather, the idea of each fact 
 awakens in us, by association, the idea of other 
 facts). This is the natural procedure in the history 
 of literature. Each circumstance in the life of an 
 author supplies material for reasoning ; we construct 
 by conjecture all the influences which could have 
 acted upon him, and we assume that they did act 
 upon him. All the branches of history which study 
 a single species of facts, isolated from every other 
 species (language, arts, private law, religion), are ex- 
 posed to the same danger, because they deal with 
 fragments of human life, not with comprehensive 
 collections of phenomena. But few conclusions are 
 firmly established except those which rest on a 
 comprehensive body of .data. We do not make a 
 diagnosis from a single symptom, but from a number 
 of concurrent symptoms. The precaution to be 
 taken will be to avoid Avorking with an isolated 
 detail or an abstract fact. We must have before 
 our minds actual men, as affected by the principal 
 conditions under which they lived. 
 
 We must be prepared to realise but rarely the 
 conditions of a certain inference ; we are too little 
 acquainted with the laws of social life, and too 
 seldom know the precise details of an historical 
 fact. Thus most of our reasonings will only afford 
 presumptions, not certainties. But it is with reason- 
 ings as with documents. 1 When several presump- 
 
 1 See p. 204. 
 260 
 
Constructive Reasoning 
 
 tions all point in the same direction they confirm 
 each other, and end by producing a legitimate 
 certitude. History fills up some of its gaps by an 
 accumulation of reasonings. Doubts remain as to 
 the Phoenician origin of various Greek cities, but 
 there is no doubt about the presence of the 
 Phoenicians in Greece. 
 
 261 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE CONSTRUCTION OF GENERAL FORMULAE 
 
 I. Suppose we had methodically arranged all the 
 historical facts established by the analysis of 
 documents, or by reasoning; we should possess a 
 system atised inventory of the whole of history, 
 and the work of construction would be complete. 
 Ought history to stop at this point ? The question 
 is warmly debated, and we cannot avoid giving 
 an answer, for it is a question with a practical 
 bearing. 
 
 Critical scholars, who are accustomed to collect 
 all the facts relating to their speciality, without 
 any personal preference, are inclined to regard a 
 complete, accurate, and objective collection of facts 
 as the prime requisite. All historical facts have 
 an equal right to a place in history ; to retain some 
 as being of greater importance, and reject the rest 
 as comparatively unimportant, would be to introduce 
 the subjective element of choice, variable according 
 to individual fancy ; history cannot sacrifice a single 
 fact. 
 
 Against this very reasonable view there is nothing 
 to be urged except a material difficulty ; this, how- 
 ever, is enough, for it is the practical motive of all 
 the sciences : we mean the impossibility of acquiring 
 or communicating complete knowledge. A body of 
 
 262 
 
The Construction of General Formula 
 
 history in which no fact was sacrificed would have 
 to contain all the actions, all the thoughts, all the 
 adventures of all men at all times. It would form 
 a total which no one could possibly make himself 
 master of, not for want of materials, but for want 
 of time. This, indeed, applies, as things are, to 
 certain voluminous collections of documents : the 
 collected reports of parliamentary debates contain 
 the whole history of the various assemblies, but to 
 learn their history from these sources would require 
 more than a lifetime. 
 
 Every science must take into consideration the 
 practical conditions of life, at least so far as it 
 claims to be a real science, a science which it is 
 possible to know. Any ideal which ends by making 
 knowledge impossible impedes the establishment of 
 the science. 
 
 Science is a saving of time and labour, effected 
 by a process which provides a rapid means of learn- 
 ing and understanding facts ; it consists in the slow 
 collection of a quantity of details and their conden- 
 sation into portable and incontrovertible formulae. 
 History, which is more encumbered with details 
 than any other science, has the choice between 
 two alternatives : to be complete and unknowable, 
 or to be knowable and incomplete. All the other 
 sciences have chosen the second alternative ; they 
 abridge and they condense, preferring to take the 
 risk of mutilating and arbitrarily combining the facts 
 to the certainty of being unable either to understand 
 or communicate them. Scholars have preferred to 
 confine themselves to the periods of ancient history, 
 where chance, which has destroyed nearly all the 
 
 263 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 sources of information, has freed them from the 
 responsibility of choosing between facts by depriving 
 them of nearly all the means of knowing them. 
 
 History, in order to constitute itself a science, 
 must elaborate the raw material of facts. It must 
 condense them into manageable form by means of 
 descriptive formulae, qualitative and quantitative. 
 It must search for those connections between facts 
 which form the ultimate conclusions of every 
 science. 
 
 II. The facts of humanity, with their complex and 
 varied character, cannot be reduced like chemical 
 facts to a few simple formulae. Like the other 
 sciences which deal with life, history needs descrip- 
 tive formulae in order to express the nature of the 
 different phenomena. 
 
 In order to be manageable, a formula must be 
 short ; in order to give an exact idea of the facts, it 
 must be precise. Now, in the knowledge of human 
 affairs, precision can only be obtained by attention 
 to characteristic details, for these alone enable us to 
 understand how one fact differed from others, and 
 what there was in it peculiar to itself. There is 
 thus a conflict between the need of brevity, which 
 leads us to look for concrete formulae, and the neces- 
 sity of being precise, which requires us to adopt 
 detailed formulae. Formulae which are too short 
 make science vague and illusory, formulae which are 
 too long encumber it and make it useless. This 
 dilemma can only be evaded by a, perpetual com- 
 promise, the principle of which is to compress the 
 facts by omitting all that is not necessary for the 
 purpose of representing them to the mind, and to 
 
 264 
 
The Construction of General Formulae 
 
 stop at the point where omission would suppress 
 some characteristic feature. 
 
 This operation, which is difficult in itself, is still 
 further complicated by the state in which the facts 
 which are to be condensed into formulae present 
 themselves. According to the nature of the docu- 
 ments from which they are derived, they come to us 
 in all the different degrees of precision : from the 
 detailed narrative which relates the smallest episodes 
 (the battle of Waterloo) down to the barest mention 
 in a couple of words (the victory of the Austrasians 
 at Testry). On different facts of the same kind we 
 possess an amount of details which is infinitely vari- 
 able according as the documents give us a complete 
 description or a mere mention. How are we to 
 organise into a common whole, items of knowledge 
 which differ so widely in point of precision ? When 
 facts are known to us from a vague word of general 
 import, we cannot reduce them to a less degree of 
 generality and a greater degree of precision ; we do 
 not know the details. If we add them conjecturally 
 we shall produce an historical novel. This is what 
 Augustin Thierry did in the case of his BAcits initro- 
 vingiens. When facts are known in detail, it is 
 always easy to reduce them to a greater degree of 
 generality by suppressing characteristic details ; this 
 is what is done by the authors of abridgements. 
 But the result of this procedure would be to reduce 
 history to a mass of vague generalities, uniform for 
 the whole of time except for the proper names 
 and the dates. It would be a dangerous method 
 of introducing symmetry, to bring all facts to a 
 common degree of generality by levelling them all 
 
 265 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 to the condition of those which are the most im- 
 perfectly known. In those cases, therefore, where 
 the documents give details, our descriptive formulae 
 should always retain the characteristic features of 
 the facts. 
 
 In order to construct these formulae we must 
 return to the set of questions which we employed 
 in grouping the facts, we must answer each question, 
 and compare the answers. We shall then combine 
 them into as condensed and as precise a formula 
 as possible, taking care to keep a fixed sense for 
 every word. This may appear to be a matter of 
 style, but what we have in view here is not merely 
 a principle of exposition, necessary for the sake of 
 being intelligible to the reader, it is a precaution 
 which the author ought to take on his own account. 
 The facts of society are of an elusive nature, and 
 for the purpose of seizing and expressing them, fixed 
 and precise language is an indispensable instrument ; 
 no historian is complete without good language. 
 
 It will be well to make the greatest possible use 
 of concrete and descriptive terms : their meaning 
 is always clear. It will be prudent to designate 
 collective groups only by collective, not by abstract 
 names (royalty, State, democracy, Reformation, Revo- 
 lution), and to avoid personifying abstractions. We 
 think we are simply using metaphors, and then we 
 are carried away by the force of the words. Cer- 
 tainly abstract terms have something very seductive 
 about them, they give a scientific appearance to a 
 proposition. But it is only an appearance, behind 
 which scholasticism is apt to be concealed ; the 
 word, having no concrete meaning, becomes a purely 
 
 266 
 
The Construction of General Formula 
 
 verbal notion (like the soporific virtue of which 
 Moliere speaks). As long as our notions on social 
 phenomena have not been reduced to truly scientific 
 formulae, the most scientific course will be to express 
 them in terms of every-day experience. 
 
 In order to construct a formula, we should know 
 beforehand what elements ought to enter into it. 
 We must here make a distinction between general 
 facts (habits and evolutions) and unique facts 
 (events). 
 
 III. General facts consist in actions which are 
 often repeated, and are common to a number of 
 men. We have to determine their character, extent, 
 and duration. 
 
 In order to formulate their character, we combine 
 all the features which constitute a fact (habit, insti- 
 tution) and distinguish it from all others. We 
 unite Under the same formula all the individual 
 cases which greatly resemble each other, by neglect- 
 ing the individual differences. 
 
 This concentration is performed without effort 
 in the case of habits which have to do with forms 
 (language, handwriting), and in the case of all 
 intellectual habits ; those who practised these habits 
 have already given them expression in formulae, 
 which we have only to collect. The same holds 
 of these institutions which are sanctioned by ex- 
 pressly formulated rules (regulations, laws, private 
 statutes). Accordingly the special branches of his- 
 tory were the first to yield methodical formulae. On 
 the other hand, these special branches do not go 
 beyond superficial and conventional facts, they do 
 not reach the real actions and thoughts of men : 
 
 267 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 in language they deal with written words, not the 
 real pronunciation ; in religion with official dogmas 
 and rites, not with the real beliefs of the mass of 
 the people ; in morals with avowed precepts, not 
 with the effective ideals ; in institutions with official 
 rules, not with the real practice. On all these 
 subjects the knowledge of conventional forms must 
 some day be supplemented by a parallel study of 
 the real habits. 
 
 It is much more difficult to embrace in a single 
 formula a habit which is composed of real actions, 
 as is the case with economic phenomena, private 
 life, politics ; for we have to find in the different 
 actions those common characteristics which consti- 
 tute the habit; or, if this work has already been 
 done in the documents, and condensed into a 
 formula (the most common case), we must criticise 
 this formula in order to make sure that it really 
 represents a homogeneous habit. 
 
 The same difficulty occurs in constructing the 
 formula for a group ; we have to describe the char- 
 acteristic common to all the members of the group 
 and to find a collective name which shall exactly 
 designate it. In documents there is no lack of 
 names of groups; but, as they have their origin 
 in usage, many of them correspond but ill to the 
 real groups ; we have to criticise these names to 
 fix their precise meaning, sometimes to correct their 
 application. 
 
 This first operation should yield formulae expres- 
 sive of the conventional and real characteristics of 
 all the habits of the different groups. 
 
 In order to fix the precise extent of a habit we 
 268 
 
The Construction of General Formula 
 
 shall seek the most distant points where it appears 
 (this will give the area of distribution), and the 
 region where it is most common (the centre). 
 Sometimes the operation takes the form of a map 
 (for example the map of the tumuli and the dolmens 
 of France). It will also be necessary to indicate 
 the groups of men who practised each habit, and 
 the sub-groups in which it was most pronounced. 
 
 The formula should also indicate the duration of 
 the habit. We shall look for the extreme cases, 
 the first and the last appearance of the form, the 
 doctrine, the usage, the institution, the group. But 
 it will not be enough to note the two isolated cases, 
 the earliest and the most recent ; we must ascertain 
 the period in which it was really active. 
 
 The formula of an evolution ought to indicate the 
 successive variations in the habit, giving in each 
 case precise limits of extent and duration. Then, by 
 comparing all the variations, it will be possible to 
 determine the general course of the evolution. The 
 general formula will indicate when and where the 
 evolution began and ended, and the nature of the 
 change which it effected. All evolutions present 
 common features which enable them to be divided 
 into stages. Every habit (usage or institution) be- 
 gins by being the spontaneous act of several indi- 
 viduals; when others imitate them it becomes a 
 usage. Similarly social functions are in the first 
 instance performed by persons who undertake them 
 spontaneously, when these persons are recognised by 
 others they acquire an official status. This is the 
 first stage ; individual initiative followed by general 
 imitation and recognition. The usage becomes tradi- 
 
 269 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 tional and is transformed into an obligatory custom 
 or rule ; the persons acquire a permanent status and 
 are invested with powers of material or moral con- 
 straint. This is the stage of tradition and authority ; 
 very often it is the last stage, and continues till the 
 society is destroyed. The usage is relaxed, the 
 rules are violated, the persons in authority cease 
 to be obeyed ; this is the stage of revolt and decom- 
 position. Finally, in certain civilised societies, the 
 rule is criticised, the persons in authority are cen- 
 sured, by the action of a part of the , subjects a 
 rational change is effected in the composition of 
 the governing body, which is subjected to super- 
 vision ; this is the stage of reform and of checks. 
 
 IV. In the case of unique facts we cannot expect 
 to bring several together under a common formula, 
 for the nature of these facts is to occur but once. 
 However, it is imperatively necessary to abridge, 
 we cannot preserve all the acts of all the members 
 of an assembly or of all the officers of a state. Many 
 individuals and many facts must be sacrificed. 
 
 How are we to choose ? Personal tastes and 
 patriotism give rise to preferences for congenial 
 characters and for local events ; but the only prin- 
 ciple of selection which can be employed by all 
 historians in common is that which is based on the 
 part played in the evolution of human affairs. We 
 ought to retain those persons and those events which 
 have visibly influenced the course of an evolution. 
 We may recognise them by our inability to describe 
 the evolution without mentioning them. The men 
 are those who have modified the state of a society 
 either by the creation or the introduction of a habit 
 
 270 
 
The Construction of General Formula 
 
 (artists, men of science, inventors, founders, apostles), 
 or as directors of a movement, heads of states, of 
 parties, of armies. The events are those which have 
 brought about changes in the habits or the state of 
 societies. 
 
 In order to construct a formula descriptive of an 
 historical person, we must take particulars from his 
 biography and his habits. From his biography we 
 shall take those facts which determined his career, 
 formed his habits, and occasioned the actions by 
 which he influenced society. These comprise physio- 
 logical conditions (physique, temperament, state of 
 health), 1 the educational influences, the social con- 
 ditions to which he was subject. The history of 
 literature has accustomed us to researches of this 
 kind. 
 
 Among the habits of a man it is necessary to 
 determine his fundamental conceptions relating to 
 the class of facts in which his influence was felt, 
 his conception of life, his knowledge, his predomi- 
 nating tastes, his habitual occupations, his principles 
 of conduct. From these details, in which there is 
 infinite variety, an impression is formed of the 
 man's " character," and the collection of these char- 
 acteristic features constitutes his " portrait," or, to 
 use a favourite phrase of the day, his " psychology." 
 This exercise, which is still held in great esteem, 
 dates from the time when history was still a branch 
 of literature ; it is doubtful whether it can ever be- 
 
 1 Michelet has discredited the study of physiological influences 
 by the abuse which he has made of it in the last part of his " His- 
 tory of France " ; it is, however, indispensable for the understanding 
 of a man's career. 
 
 27I 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 come a scientific process. There is perhaps no sure 
 method of summing up the character of a man, 
 even in his lifetime, still less when we can only 
 know him indirectly through the medium of docu- 
 ments. The controversies relative to the interpreta- 
 tion of the conduct of Alexander are a good example 
 of this uncertainty. 
 
 If, however, we take the risk of seeking a for- 
 mula to describe a character, there are two natural 
 temptations against which we must guard : ( i ) We 
 must not construct the formula out of the person's 
 assertions in regard to himself. (2) The study of 
 imaginary personages (dramas and novels) has ac- 
 customed us to seek a logical connection between 
 the various sentiments and the various acts of a 
 man; a character, in literature, is constructed logi- 
 cally. This search for coherency must not be 
 transferred to the study of real men. We are less 
 likely to do so in the case of those whom we 
 observe in their lifetime, because we see too many 
 characteristics in them which could not enter into 
 a coherent formula. But the absence of documents, 
 by suppressing those characteristics which would 
 have checked us, encourages us to arrange the very 
 small number of those which remain in the form 
 of a stage-character. This is why the great men 
 of antiquity seem to us to have been much more 
 logical than our contemporaries are. 
 
 How are we to construct a formula for an event? 
 The imperative need of simplification causes us to 
 combine under a single name an enormous mass of 
 minute facts which are perceived in the lump, and 
 between which we vaguely feel that there is a con- 
 
 272 
 
The Construction of General Formula 
 
 nection (a battle, a war, a reform). The facts which 
 are thus combined are such facts as have conduced 
 to a common result. That is how the common 
 notion of an event arises, and there is no more 
 scientific conception to put in its place. Facts, then, 
 are to be grouped according to their consequences ; 
 those which have had no visible consequences dis- 
 appear, the others are fused into a certain number of 
 aggregates which we call events. 
 
 In order to describe an event, it is necessary to 
 give precise indications (i) of its character, (2) of 
 its extent. 
 
 (1) By the character of an event we mean the 
 features which distinguish it from every other event, 
 not merely the external conditions of date and 
 place, but the manner in which it occurred, and its 
 immediate causes. The following are the items of 
 information which the formula should contain. One 
 or more men, in such and such mental states (con- 
 ceptions, motives of the action), working under such 
 and such material conditions (locality, instrument), 
 performed such and such actions, which had for 
 their result such and such a modification. For the 
 determination of the motives of the actions, the only 
 method is to compare the actions, firstly, with the 
 declarations of those who performed them ; secondly, 
 with the interpretation of those who witnessed their 
 performance. There is often a doubt remaining : 
 this is the field of party polemics; every one attri- 
 butes noble motives to the actions of his, own party 
 and discreditable motives to those of the opposite 
 party. But actions described without any indication 
 of motive would be unintelligible. 
 
 273 s 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 (2) The extension of the event will be indicated 
 both in space (the place where it happened, and the 
 region in which its immediate effects were felt) and 
 in time, the moment when its realisation began, and 
 the moment when the result was brought about. 
 
 V. Descriptive formulas relating to characters, 
 being merely qualitative, only give an abstract idea of 
 the facts ; in order to realise the place they occupied 
 in reality, quantity is necessary. It is not a matter 
 of indifference whether a given usage was practised 
 by a hundred men or by millions. 
 
 For the purpose of introducing quantity into 
 formulae we have at our disposal several methods, 
 of various degrees of imperfection, which help us 
 to attain the end in view with various degrees of 
 precision. Arranged in descending order of pre- 
 cision they are as follows : — 
 
 (1) Measurement is a perfectly scientific procedure, 
 for equal numbers represent absolutely identical 
 values. But a common unit is necessary, and that 
 can only be had for time and for physical pheno- 
 mena (lengths, surfaces, weights). Figures relating 
 to production and sums of money are the essential 
 elements in the statement of economic and financial 
 facts. But facts of the psychological order remain 
 inaccessible to measurement. 
 
 (2) Enumeration, which is the process employed 
 in statistics, 1 is applicable to all the facts which 
 
 1 On the subject of statistics, a method which is now perfected, 
 a good summary with a bibliography will be found in the Hand- 
 v'orterbuch der Staatswissenschaftcn, Jena, 1S90-94, la. 8vo. and two 
 good methodical treatises, J. von. Mayr, Theoretische Statistik and 
 Bcvolkerungsstatistik, in the collection of Marquardsen and Seydel, 
 Freiburg, 1895 an( * 1897, la. 8vo. 
 
 2 74 
 
The Construction of General Formula 
 
 have in common a definite characteristic which can 
 be made use of for counting them. The facts which 
 are thus comprehended under a single number do 
 not all belong to the same species, they may have 
 in common but a single characteristic, abstract 
 (crime, lawsuit) or conventional (workman, lodg- 
 ing) ; the figures merely indicate the number of cases 
 in which a given characteristic is met with ; they 
 do not represent a homogeneous whole. A natural 
 tendency is to confuse number with measurement, 
 and to suppose that facts are known with scientific 
 precision because it has been possible to apply 
 number to them ; this is an illusion to be guarded 
 against, we must not take the figures which give 
 the number of a population or an army for the 
 measure of its importance. 1 Still, enumeration yields 
 results which are necessary for the construction of 
 formulae relating to groups. But the operation is 
 restricted to those cases in which it is possible to 
 know all the units of a given species lying within 
 given limits, for it is performed by first ticking off, 
 then adding. Before undertaking a retrospective 
 enumeration, therefore, it will be well to make sure 
 that the documents are complete enough to exhibit 
 all the units which are to be enumerated. As to 
 figures given in documents, they are to be distrusted. 
 (3) Valuation is a kind of incomplete enumera- 
 tion applying to a portion of the field, and made on 
 the supposition that the same proportions hold good 
 through the whole of the field. It is an expedient to 
 
 1 As is dene by Boardeau {V Histoire ct les Historiens, Paris, 1888, 
 8vo), who proposes to reduce the whole of history to a series of 
 statistics. 
 
 275 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 which, in history, it is often necessary to have recourse 
 when documents are unequally abundant for the 
 different divisions of the subject. The result is open 
 to doubt, unless we are sure that the portion to 
 which enumeration was applied was exactly similar 
 to the remainder. 
 
 (4) Sampling is a process of enumeration restricted 
 to a few units taken at different points in the field 
 of investigation ; we calculate the proportion of cases 
 (say 90 per cent.) where a given characteristic occurs, 
 we assume that the same proportion holds through- 
 out, and if there are several categories we obtain the 
 proportion between them. In history this procedure 
 is applicable to facts of every kind, for the purpose 
 of determining either the proportion between the 
 different forms or usages which occur within a given 
 region or period, or the proportion which obtains, 
 within a heterogeneous group, between members 
 belonging to different classes. This procedure gives 
 us an approximate idea of the frequency of facts 
 and the proportion between the different elements 
 of a society ; it can even show what species of facts 
 are most commonly found together, and are there- 
 fore probably connected. But in order that the 
 method may be employed correctly it is necessary 
 that the samples should be representative of the 
 whole, and not of a part which might possibly be 
 exceptional in character. They should therefore be 
 chosen at very different points, and under very dif- 
 ferent conditions, in order that the exceptions may 
 compensate each other. It is not enough to take 
 them at points which are distant from each other ; 
 for example, on the different frontiers of a country, 
 
 276 
 
The Construction of General Formula 
 
 for the very circumstance of situation on a frontier 
 is an exceptional condition. Verification may be 
 had by following the methods by which anthropolo- 
 gists obtain averages. 
 
 (5) Generalisation is only an instinctive process 
 of simplification. As soon as we perceive a certain 
 characteristic in an object, we extend this charac- 
 teristic to all other objects which at all resemble it. 
 In all human concerns, where the facts are always 
 complex, we make generalisations unconsciously ; we 
 attribute to a whole people the habits of a few indi- 
 viduals, or those of the first group forming part of 
 the people which comes within our knowledge ; we 
 extend to a whole period habits which are ascertained 
 to have existed at a given moment. This is the 
 most active of all the causes of historical error, and 
 one whose influence is felt in every department, in 
 the study of usages and of institutions, even in the 
 appreciation of the morality of a people. 1 Gene- 
 ralisation rests on a vague idea that all facts which 
 are contiguous to each other, or which resemble each 
 other in some point, are similar at all points. It is 
 an unconscious and ill-performed process of sampling. 
 It may therefore be made correct by being subjected 
 to the conditions of a well-performed process of 
 sampling. We must examine the cases on which 
 we propose to found a generalisation and ask our- 
 selves, What right have we to generalise ? That is, 
 what reason have we for assuming that the charac- 
 teristic discovered in these cases will occur in the 
 remaining thousands of cases ? that the cases chosen 
 
 1 A good example will be found in Lacombe, De VHistoire Con- 
 tidirie, Comme Science, p. 146. 
 
 277 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 resemble the average ? The only valid reason would 
 be that these cases are representative of the whole. 
 We are thus brought back to the process of 
 methodical" sampling. 
 
 The right method of conducting the operation is 
 as follows : ( i ) We must fix the precise limits of 
 the field within which we intend to generalise (that 
 is, to assume the similarity of all the cases), we must 
 determine the country, the group, the class, the period 
 as to which we are to generalise. Care must be 
 taken not to make the field too large by confusing 
 a part with the whole (a Greek or Germanic people 
 with the whole Greek or Germanic race). (2) We 
 must make sure that the facts lying within the field 
 resemble each other in the points on which we wish 
 to generalise, and therefore we have to distrust those 
 vague names under which are comprehended groups 
 of very different character (Christians, French, Aryans, 
 Romans). (3) We must make sure that the facts 
 from which we propose to generalise are representa- 
 tive samples, that they really belong to the field of 
 investigation, for it does happen sometimes that men 
 or facts are taken as specimens of one group when 
 they really belong to another. Nor must they be 
 exceptional, as is to be presumed in all cases when 
 the conditions are exceptional ; authors of documents 
 tend to record by preference those facts which sur- 
 prise them, hence exceptional cases occupy in docu- 
 ments a space which is out of proportion to their 
 real number; this is one of the chief sources of 
 error. (4) The number of samples necessary to 
 support a generalisation is the greater the less 
 ground there is for supposing a resemblance between 
 
 278 
 
The Construction of General Formula 
 
 all the cases occurring within the field of investiga- 
 tion. A small number may suffice in treating of 
 points in which men tend to bear a strong resem- 
 blance to each other, either by imitation and con- 
 vention (language, rites, ceremonies), or from the 
 influence of custom and obligatory regulations (social 
 institutions, political institutions in countries where 
 the authorities are obeyed). A large number is 
 requisite for facts where individual initiative plays 
 a more important part (art, science, morality), and 
 sometimes, as in respect of private conduct, all 
 generalisation is as a rule impossible. 
 
 VI. Descriptive formulae are in no science the 
 final result of the work. It still remains to group 
 the facts in such a way as to bring out their 
 collective import, it still remains to search for their 
 mutual relations ; these are the general conclusions. 
 History, by reason of the imperfection of its mode 
 of acquiring knowledge, needs, in addition, a pre- 
 liminary operation for determining the bearing of 
 the knowledge acquired. 1 
 
 The work of criticism has supplied us with 
 
 1 We have thought it useless to discuss here the question 
 whether history ought, in accordance with the ancient tradition, 
 to fulfil yet another function, whether it ought to pass judgment 
 on men and events, that is to supplement the description of facts 
 by expressions of approbation or censure, either from the point 
 of view of a moral ideal, general or particular (the ideal of a 
 sect, a party, or a nation), or from the practical point of view, by 
 examining, as Polybius did, whether historical actions were well 
 or ill adapted to their purpose. An addition of this kind could 
 be made to any descriptive study : the naturalist might express 
 his sympathy with or his admiration for an animal, he might 
 condemn the ferocity of the tiger, and praise the devotion of the 
 hen to her chickens. But it is obvious that in history, as in every 
 other subject, judgments of this kind are foreign to science. 
 
 279 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 nothing but a number of isolated remarks on the 
 value of the knowledge which the documents have 
 permitted us to acquire. These must be combined. 
 We shall therefore take a whole group of facts 
 entered under a common heading — a particular 
 class of facts, a country, a period, an event — and 
 we shall summarise the results yielded by the 
 criticism of particular facts so as to obtain a 
 general formula. We shall have to take into con- 
 sideration: (i) the extent, (2) the value of our 
 knowledge. 
 
 (1) We shall ask ourselves what are the blanks 
 left by the documents. By working through the 
 scheme used for the grouping of facts it is easy 
 to discover what are the classes of facts on which 
 we lack information. In the case of evolution, we 
 notice which links are missing in the chain of 
 successive modifications ; in the case of events, what 
 episodes, what groups of actors are still unknown 
 to us ; what facts enter or disappear from the field 
 of our knowledge without our being able to trace 
 their beginning or end. We ought to construct, 
 mentally at any rate, a tabulated scheme of the 
 points on which we are ignorant, in order to keep 
 before our minds the distance separating the know- 
 ledge we have from a perfect knowledge. 
 
 (2) The value of our knowledge depends on the 
 value of our documents. Criticism has given us 
 indications on this point in each separate case, these 
 indications, so far as relating to a given body of 
 facts, must be summarised under a few heads. Does 
 our knowledge come originally from direct observa- 
 tion, from written tradition, or from oral tradition ? 
 
 280 
 
The Construction of General Formula 
 
 Do we possess several traditions of different bias, 
 or a single tradition? Do we possess documents 
 of different classes or of one single class ? Is our 
 information vague or precise, detailed or summary, 
 literary or positive, official or confidential ? 
 
 The natural tendency is to forget, in construc- 
 tion, the results yielded by criticism, to forget the 
 incompleteness of our knowledge and the elements 
 of doubt in it. An eager desire to increase to 
 the greatest possible extent the amount of our 
 information and the number of our conclusions 
 impels us to seek emancipation from all negative 
 restrictions, We thus run a great risk of using 
 fragmentary and suspicious sources of information 
 for the purpose of forming general impressions, just 
 as if we were in possession of a complete record. 
 It is easy to forget the existence of those facts 
 which the documents do not describe (economic 
 facts, slaves in antiquity), it is easy to exaggerate 
 the space occupied by facts which are known to 
 us (Greek art, Roman inscriptions, mediaeval monas- 
 teries). We instinctively estimate the importance 
 of facts by the number of the documents which 
 mention them. We forget the peculiar character 
 of the documents, and, when they all have a 
 common origin, we forget that they have all 
 subjected the facts to the same distortions, and 
 that their community of origin renders verifi- 
 cation impossible; we submissively reproduce the 
 bias of the tradition (Roman, orthodox, aristo- 
 cratic). 
 
 In order to resist these natural tendencies, it is 
 enough to pass in review the whole body of facts 
 
 281 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 and the whole body of tradition, before attempting 
 to draw any general conclusion. 
 
 VII. Descriptive formulae give the particular cha- 
 racter of each small group of facts. In order to 
 obtain a general conclusion, we must combine these 
 detailed results into a general formula. We must 
 not compare together isolated details or secondary 
 characteristics, 1 but groups of facts which resemble 
 each other in a whole set of characteristics. 
 
 We thus form an aggregate (of institutions, of 
 groups of men, of events). Following the method 
 indicated above, we determine its distinguishing 
 characteristics, its extent, its duration, its quantity 
 or importance. 
 
 As we form groups of greater and greater gene- 
 rality we drop, with each new degree of generality, 
 those characteristics which vary, and retain those 
 which are common to all the members of the new 
 group. We must stop at the point where nothing 
 is left except the characteristics common to the 
 whole of humanity. The result is the condensation 
 into a single formula of the general character of 
 an order of facts, of a language, a religion, an 
 art, an economic organisation, a society, a govern- 
 ment, a complex event (such as the Invasion or the 
 Reformation). 
 
 As long as these comprehensive formulae remain 
 isolated the conclusion is incomplete. And as it is 
 no longer possible to fuse them into higher gene- 
 
 1 Comparison between two facts of detail belonging to very dif- 
 ferent aggregates (for example the comparison of Abd-el-Kader with 
 Jagurtha, of Napoleon with Sforza) is a striking method of exposi- 
 tion, but not a means of reaching a scientific conclusion. 
 
 282 
 
The Construction of General Formula 
 
 ralisations, we feel the need of comparing them for 
 the purpose of classification. This classification may 
 be attempted by two methods. 
 
 ( i ) We may compare together similar categories 
 of special facts, language, religions, arts, governments, 
 taking them from the whole of humanity, and classi- 
 fying together those which most resemble each other. 
 We obtain families of languages, religions, and gov- 
 ernments, which we may again classify and arrange 
 among themselves. This is an abstract kind of clas- 
 sification ; it isolates one species of facts from all 
 the others, and thus renounces all claim to exhibit 
 causes. It has the advantage of being rapidly per- 
 formed and of yielding a technical vocabulary which 
 is useful for designating facts. 
 
 (2) We may compare real groups of real indivi- 
 duals, we may take societies which figure in history 
 and classify them according to their similarities. 
 This is a concrete classification analogous to that 
 of zoology, in which, not functions, but whole animals 
 are classified. It is true that the groups are less 
 clearly marked than in zoology; nor is there a 
 general agreement as to the characteristics in respect 
 of which we are to look for resemblances. Are we 
 to choose the economic or the political organisation 
 of the groups, or their intellectual condition ? No 
 principle of choice has as yet become obligatory. 
 
 History has not yet succeeded in establishing 
 a scientific system of comprehensive classification. 
 Possibly human groups are not sufficiently homo- 
 geneous to furnish a solid basis of comparison, and 
 not sharply enough divided to be treated as com- 
 parable units. 
 
 283 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 VIII. The study of the relations between simul- 
 taneous facts consists in a search for the connections 
 between all the facts of different species which occur 
 in a given society. We have a vague consciousness 
 that the different habits which are separated by 
 abstraction and langed under different categories 
 (art, religion, political institutions), are not isolated 
 in reality, that they have common characteristics, 
 and that they are closely enough connected for a 
 change in one of them to bring about a change in 
 another. This is a fundamental idea of the Esprit 
 des Lois of Montesquieu. This bond of connection, 
 sometimes called consensus, has received the name of 
 Zusammenhang from the German school. From this 
 conception has arisen the theory of the Volksgeist 
 (the mind of a people), a counterfeit of which has 
 within the last few years been introduced into France 
 under the name of " ame nationale." This concep- 
 tion is also at the bottom of the theory regarding 
 the soul of society which Lamprecht has expounded. 
 
 After the rejection of these mystical conceptions 
 there remains a vague but incontrovertible fact, the 
 " solidarity " which exists between the different habits 
 of one and the same people. In order to study it 
 with precision it would be necessary to analyse it, 
 and a connecting bond cannot be analysed. It is 
 thus quite natural that this part of social science 
 should have remained a refuge for mystery and 
 obscurity. 
 
 By the comparison of different societies which 
 resemble or differ from each other in a given de- 
 partment (religion or government), with the object 
 of discovering in what other departments they re- 
 
 284 
 
The Construction of General Formulas 
 
 semble or differ from each other, it is possible that 
 interesting empirical results might be obtained. But, 
 in order to explain the consensus, it is necessary to 
 work back to the facts which have produced it, the 
 common causes of the various habits. We are thus 
 obliged to undertake the investigation of causes, and 
 we enter the province of what is called philosophical 
 history, because it investigates what was formerly 
 called the philosophy of facts — that is to say, their 
 permanent relations. 
 
 IX. The necessity of rising above the simple 
 determination of facts in order to explain them by 
 their causes, a necessity which has governed the 
 development of all the sciences, has at length been 
 felt even in the study of history. Hence have arisen 
 systematic philosophies of history, and attempts to 
 discover historical laws and causes. We cannot here 
 enter into a critical examination of these attempts, 
 which the nineteenth century has produced in so 
 . great number ; we shall merely indicate what are 
 the ways in which the problem has been attacked, 
 and what obstacles have prevented a scientific solu- 
 tion from being reached. 
 
 The most natural method of explanation consists 
 in the assumption that a transcendental cause, Pro- 
 vidence, guides the whole course of events towards 
 an end which is known to God. 1 This explanation 
 can be but a metaphysical doctrine, crowning the 
 work of science ; for the distinguishing feature of 
 
 1 This system is still followed by several contemporary authors, 
 the Belgian jurist Laurent in his Etudes sur Vhistoire de I'humanite, 
 the German Rocholl, and even Flint, the English historian of the 
 philosophy of history. 
 
 285 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 scieDce is that it only studies efficient causes. The 
 historian is not called upon to investigate the first 
 cause or final causes any more than the chemist or 
 the naturalist. And, in fact, few writers on history 
 nowadays stop to discuss the theory of Providence 
 in its theological form. 
 
 But the tendency to explain historical facts by 
 transcendental causes survives in more modern 
 theories in which metaphysic is disguised under 
 scientific forms. The historians of the nineteenth 
 century have been so strongly influenced by their 
 philosophical education that most of them, some- 
 times unconsciously, introduce metaphysical formulae 
 into the construction of history. It will be enough 
 to enumerate these systems, and point out their 
 metaphysical character, so that reflecting historians 
 may be warned to distrust them. 
 
 The theory of the rational character of history 
 rests on the notion that every real historical fact is 
 at the same time " rational " — that is, in conformity 
 with an intelligible comprehensive plan ; ordinarily 
 it is tacitly assumed that every social fact has its 
 raison d'etre in the development of society — that is, 
 that it ends by turning to the advantage of society ; 
 hence the cause of every institution is sought for in 
 the social need it was originally meant to supply. 1 
 This is the fundamental idea of Hegelianism, if not 
 with Hegel, at least with the historians who have 
 been his disciples (Ranke, Mommsen, Droysen, in 
 France Cousin, Taine, and Michelet). This is a lay 
 
 1 Thus Taine, in Les origines de la France Contemporaine, explains 
 the origin of the privileges of the ancien regime by the seryices 
 formerly rendered by the privileged classes. 
 
 286 
 
The Construction of General Formula 
 
 disguise of the old theological theory of final causes 
 which assumes the existence of a Providence occu- 
 pied in guiding humanity in the direction of its 
 interests. This is a consoling, but not a scientific 
 a priori hypothesis ; for the observation of historical 
 facts does not indicate that things have always hap- 
 pened in the most rational way, or in the way most 
 advantageous to men, nor that institutions have had 
 any other cause than the interest of those who estab- 
 lished them ; the facts, indeed, point rather to the 
 opposite conclusion. 
 
 From the same metaphysical source has also 
 sprung the Hegelian theory of the ideas which are 
 successively realised in history through the medium 
 of successive peoples. This theory, which has been 
 popularised in France by Cousin and Michelet, has 
 had its day, even in Germany, but it has been re- 
 vived, especially in Germany, in the form of the 
 historical mission (Bene/) which is attributed to 
 peoples and persons. It will here be enough to 
 observe that the very metaphors of "idea" and 
 " mission " imply a transcendental anthropomorphic 
 cause. 
 
 From the same optimistic conception of a rational 
 guidance of the world is derived the theory of the 
 continuous and necessary progress of humanity. 
 Although it has been adopted by the positivists, 
 this is merely a metaphysical hypothesis. In the 
 ordinary sense of the word, " progress " is merely a 
 subjective expression denoting those changes which 
 follow the direction of our preferences. But, even 
 taking the word in the objective sense given to 
 it by Spencer (an increase in the variety and co- 
 
 287 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 ordination of social phenomena), the study of his- 
 torical facts does not point to a single universal and 
 continuous progress of humanity, it brings before 
 us a number of partial and intermittent progressive 
 movements, and it gives us no reason to attribute 
 them to a permanent cause inherent in humanity 
 as a whole rather than to a series of local accidents. 1 
 Attempts at a more scientific form of explanation 
 have had their origin in the special branches of 
 history (of languages, religion, law). By the separate 
 study of the succession of facts of a single species, 
 specialists have been enabled to ascertain the regular 
 recurrence of the same successions of facts, and these 
 results have been expressed in formulae which are 
 sometimes called laws (for example, the law of the 
 tonic accent) ; these are never more than empirical 
 laws which merely indicate successions of facts with- 
 out explaining them, for they do not reveal the 
 efficient cause. But specialists, influenced by a 
 natural metaphor, and struck by the regularity of 
 these successions, have regarded the evolution of 
 usages (of a word, a rite, a dogma, a rule of law), 
 as if it were an organic development analogous to 
 the growth of a plant; we hear of the "life of 
 words," of the " death of dogmas/' of the " growth 
 of myths." Then, in forgetfulness of the fact that 
 all these things are pure abstractions, it has been 
 tacitly assumed that there is a force inhering in the 
 word, the rite, the rule, which produces its evolution. 
 This is the theory of the development {Entwickelung) 
 of usages and institutions ; it was started in Ger- 
 
 1 A good criticism of the theory of progress will be found in 
 P. Lacombe, De Vhhtoire Considiree Comme Science. 
 
 288 
 
The Construction of General Formulae 
 
 many by the " historical " school, and has dominated 
 all the special branches of history. The history of 
 languages alone has succeeded in shaking off its 
 influence. 1 Just as usages have teen treated as if 
 they were existences possessing a separate life of 
 their own, so the succession of individuals compos- 
 ing the various bodies within a society (royalty, 
 church, senate, parliament) has been personified by 
 the attribution to it of a will, which is treated as an 
 active cause. A world of imaginary beings has thus 
 been created behind the historical facts, and has 
 replaced Providence in the explanation of them. 
 For our defence against this deceptive mythology 
 a single rule will suffice : Never seek the causes of 
 an historical fact without having first expressed it 
 concretely in terms of acting and thinking indi- 
 viduals. If abstractions are used, every metaphor 
 must be avoided which would make them play the 
 part of living beings. 
 
 By a comparison of the evolutions of the different 
 species of facts which coexist in one and the same 
 society, the " historical " school was led to the dis- 
 covery of solidarity (Zusammenhang). 2 But, before 
 attempting to discover its causes by analysis, the 
 adherents of this school assumed, the existence of a 
 permanent general cause residing in the society itself. 
 And, as it was customary to personify society, a 
 special temperament was attributed to it, the peculiar 
 genius of the nation or the race, manifesting itself. 
 
 1 See the very clear declarations of one of the principal represen- 
 tatives of linguistic science in France, V. Henry, Antinomies Unguis- 
 tiques, Paris, 1896, 8vo. 
 
 2 See above, p. 284. 
 
 289 T 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 in the different social activities and explaining their 
 solidarity. 1 This was simply an hypothesis suggested 
 by the animal world, in which each species has 
 permanent characteristics. It would have been in- 
 adequate, for in order to explain how a given society 
 comes to change its character from one epoch to 
 another (the Greeks between the seventh and the 
 fourth centuries, the English between the fifteenth 
 and the nineteenth), it would have been necessary 
 to invoke the aid of external causes. And the theory 
 is untenable, for all the societies known to history 
 are groups of men without anthropological unity and 
 without common hereditary characteristics. 
 
 In addition to these metaphysical or metaphorical 
 explanations, attempts have been made to apply to 
 the investigation of causes in history the classical 
 procedure of the natural sciences : the comparison of 
 parallel series of successive phenomena in order to 
 discover those which always appear together. The 
 "comparative method " has assumed several different 
 forms. Sometimes the subject of study has been a 
 detail of social life (a usage, an institution, a belief, 
 a rule), defined in abstract terms ; its evolutions in 
 different societies have been compared with a view 
 to determine the common evolution which is to be 
 attributed to one and the same general cause. Thus 
 have arisen comparative philology, mythology, and 
 
 1 Lamprecht, in the article quoted, p. 247, after having compared 
 the artistic, religious, and economic evolutions of mediaeval Ger- 
 many, and after having shown that they can all be divided into 
 periods of the same duration, explains the simultaneous transforma- 
 tions of the different usages and institutions of a given society by 
 the transformations of the collective "social soul." This is only 
 another form of the same hypothesis. 
 
 29O 
 
The Construction of General Formula 
 
 law. It has been proposed (in England) to give 
 precision to the comparative method by applying 
 " statistics " ; this would mean the systematic com- 
 parison of all known societies and the enumeration 
 of all the cases where two usages are found together. 
 This is the principle of Bacon's tables of agreement ; 
 it is to be feared that it will be no more fertile in 
 results. The defect of all such methods is that they 
 apply to abstract and partly arbitrary notions, some- 
 times merely to verbal resemblances, and do not 
 rest on a knowledge of the whole of the conditions 
 under which the facts occur. 
 
 We can conceive a more concrete method which, 
 instead of comparing fragments, should compare 
 wholes, that is entire societies, either the same 
 society at different stages of its evolution (England 
 in the sixteenth, and again in the nineteenth century), 
 or else the general evolution of several societies, con- 
 temporary with each other (England and France), 
 or existing at different epochs (Rome and England). 
 Such a method might be useful negatively, for the 
 purpose of ascertaining that a given fact is not the 
 necessary effect of another, since they are not always 
 found together (for example, the emancipation of 
 women and Christianity). But positive results are 
 hardly to be expected of it, for the concomitance of 
 two facts in several series does not show whether 
 one is the cause of the other, or whether both are 
 joint effects of a single cause. 
 
 The methodical investigation of the causes of a 
 fact requires an analysis of the conditions under 
 which the fact occurs, performed so as to isolate 
 the necessary condition which is its cause ; it pre- 
 
 291 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 supposes, therefore, the complete knowledge of these 
 conditions. But this is precisely what we never 
 have in history. We must therefore renounce the 
 idea of arriving at causes by direct methods such as 
 are used in the other sciences. 
 
 As a matter of fact, however, historians often do 
 employ the notion of cause, which, as we have 
 shown above, is indispensable for the purpose of 
 formulating events and constructing periods. They 
 know causes partly from the authors of documents 
 who observed the facts, partly from the . analogy of 
 the causes which we all observe at the present day. 
 The whole history of events is a chain of obviously 
 and incontrovertibly connected incidents, each one 
 of which is the determining cause of another. The 
 lance- thrust of Montgomery is the cause of the death 
 of Henry II. ; this death is the cause of the accession 
 to power of the Guises, which again is the cause of 
 the rising of the Protestants. 
 
 The observation of causes by the authors of 
 documents is limited to the interconnection of 
 the accidental facts observed by them; these are, 
 in truth, the causes which are known with the 
 greatest certainty. Thus history, unlike the other 
 sciences, is better able to ascertain the causes of 
 particular incidents than those of general transfor- 
 mations, for the work is found already done in the 
 documents. 
 
 In the investigation of the causes of general 
 facts, historical construction is reduced to the ana- 
 logy between the past and the present. What- 
 ever chance there is of finding the causes which 
 explain the evolution of past societies must lie in the 
 
 292 
 
The Construction of General Formulae 
 
 direct observation of the transformations of present 
 societies. 
 
 This is a branch of study which is not yet 
 firmly established; here we can only state the 
 principles of it. 
 
 (i) In order to ascertain the causes of the soli- 
 darity between the different habits of one and the 
 same society, it is necessary to look beyond the 
 abstract and conventional form which the facts 
 assume in language (dogma, rule, rite, institution), 
 and attend to the real concrete centres, which are 
 always thinking and acting men. Here only are 
 found together the different species of activity 
 which language separates by abstraction. Their 
 solidarity is to be sought for in some dominating 
 feature in the character or the environment of 
 the men which influences all the different mani- 
 festations of then activity. We must not expect 
 the same degrees of solidarity in all the species 
 of activity ; there will be most of it in those species 
 where each individual is in close dependence on 
 the actions of the mass (economic, social, political 
 life); there will be less of it in the intellectual 
 activities (arts, sciences), where individual initiative 
 has freer play. 1 Documents mention most habits 
 (beliefs, customs, institutions) in the lump, without 
 distinguishing individuals ; and yet, in one and the 
 same society, habits vary considerably from one 
 man to another. It is necessary to take account 
 of these differences, otherwise there is a danger of 
 
 1 The historians of literature, who began by searching for the 
 connection between the arts and the rest of social life, thus gave 
 the first place to the most difficult question. 
 
 293 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 explaining the actions of artists and men of science 
 by the beliefs and the habits of their prince or their 
 tradesmen. 
 
 (2) In order to ascertain the causes of an evolu- 
 tion, it is necessary to study the only beings which 
 can evolve — men. Every evolution has for its cause 
 a change in the material conditions or in the habits 
 of certain men. Observation shows us two kinds 
 of change. In the one case, the men remain the 
 same, but change their manner of acting or thinking, 
 either voluntarily through imitation, or by compul- 
 sion. In the other, the men who practised the old 
 usage disappear and are replaced by others who do 
 not practise it ; these may be strangers, or they may 
 be the descendants of the first set of men, but 
 educated in a different manner. This renewing of 
 the generations seems, in our day, to be the most 
 active cause of evolution. It is natural to suppose 
 that the same holds good of the past ; evolution has 
 been slower, the more exclusively each generation has 
 been formed by the imitation of its forerunners. 
 
 There is still one more question to ask. Are men 
 all alike, differing merely in the conditions under 
 which they live (education, resources, government), 
 and is evolution produced solely by changes in these 
 conditions ? Or are there groups of men with heredi- 
 tary differences, born with tendencies to different 
 activities and with aptitudes leading to different 
 evolutions, so that evolution may be the product, 
 in part at least, of the increase, the diminution, and 
 the displacement of these groups ? Taking the 
 extreme cases, the white, black, and yellow races of 
 mankind, the differences in aptitude are obvious ; no 
 
 294 
 
The Construction of General Formulae 
 
 black people has ever developed a civilisation. It is 
 thus probable that smaller hereditary differences may 
 have had their share in the determination of events. 
 If so, historical evolution would be partly produced 
 by physiological and anthropological causes. But his- 
 tory provides us with no sure means of determining 
 the action of these hereditary differences between 
 men ; it goes no further than the conditions of their 
 existence. The last question of history remains 
 insoluble by historical methods. 
 
 295 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 EXPOSITION 
 
 We have still to study a question whose practical 
 interest is obvious : What are the forms in which 
 historical works present themselves ? These forms 
 are, in fact, very numerous. Some of them are anti- 
 quated ; not all are legitimate ; the best have their 
 drawbacks. We should ask, therefore, not only what 
 are the forms in which historical works appear, but 
 also which of these represent truly rational types of 
 exposition. 
 
 By " historical works " we mean here all those 
 which are intended to communicate results obtained 
 by the labour of historical construction, whatever 
 may be the nature, the extent, and the bearing of 
 these results. The critical elaboration of docu- 
 ments, which is treated of in Book II., and which 
 is preparatory to historical construction, is naturally 
 excluded. 
 
 Historians may differ, and up to the present have 
 differed, on several essential points. They have not 
 always had, nor have they all now, the same concep- 
 tion of the end aimed at by historical work ; hence 
 arise differences in the nature of the facts chosen, 
 the manner of dividing the subject, that is, of co- 
 ordinating the facts, the manner of presenting them, 
 the manner of proving them. This would be the 
 
 296 
 
Exposition 
 
 place to indicate how " the mode of writing history " 
 has evolved from the beginning. But as the history of 
 the modes of writing history has not yet been written 
 well, 1 we shall here content ourselves with some very 
 general remarks on the period prior to the second 
 half of the nineteenth century, confining ourselves 
 to what is strictly necessary for the understanding of 
 the present situation. 
 
 I. History was first conceived as the narration 
 of memorable events. To preserve the memory 
 and propagate the knowledge of glorious deeds, or 
 of events which were of importance to a man, a 
 family, or a people; such was the aim of history 
 in the time of Thucydides and Livy. In addition, 
 history was early considered as a collection of pre- 
 cedents, and the knowledge of history as a practical 
 preparation for life, especially political life (military 
 and civil). Polybius and Plutarch wrote to instruct, 
 they claimed to give recipes for action. Hence in 
 classical antiquity the subject-matter of history 
 consisted chiefly of political incidents, wars, and 
 revolutions. The ordinary framework of historical 
 exposition (within which the facts were usually 
 arranged in chronological order) was the life of 
 
 1 For the earlier epochs, consult good histories of Greek, Kornan, 
 and mediaeval literature which contain chapters devoted to "his- 
 torians." For the modern period, consult the Introduction of M. 
 G. Monod to vol. i. of the Revue historique; the work by F. X. v. 
 Wegde, Geschichte der deutschen Histo7'iographie (1885), relates only to 
 Germany, and is mediocre. Some "Notes on History in France in 
 the Nineteenth Century " have been published by C. Jullian as an 
 Introduction to his Extraits des historiens francais da xlx e Steele (Paris, 
 1897, i2mo). The history of modern historiography has still to be 
 written. See the partial attempt by E. Bernheim, Lehrb'uck, pp. 13 
 sqq. 
 
 297 
 
Synthetic Opeeations 
 
 a person, the whole life of a people, or a particular 
 period in it ; there were in antiquity but few essays 
 in general history. As the aim of the historian was 
 to please or to instruct, or to please and instruct 
 at the same time, history was a branch of litera- 
 ture : there were not too many scruples on the score 
 of proofs ; those who worked from written docu- 
 ments took no care to distinguish the text of such 
 documents from their own text ; in reproducing 
 the narratives of their predecessors they adorned 
 them with details, and sometimes (under pretext 
 of being precise) with numbers, with speeches, with 
 reflections, and elegances. We can in a manner see 
 them at work in every instance where it is possible 
 to compare Greek and Roman historians, Ephorus 
 and Livy, for example, with their sources. 
 
 The writers of the Renaissance directly imitated 
 the ancients. For them, too, history was a literary 
 art with apologetic aims or didactic pretensions. In 
 Italy it was too often a means of gaining the favour 
 of princes, or a theme for declamations. This state 
 of affairs lasted a long time. Even in the seven- 
 teenth century we find, in Mezeray, an historian of 
 the ancient classical pattern. 
 
 However, in the historical literature of the Renais- 
 sance, two novelties claim our attention, in which 
 the mediaeval influence is incontrovertibly manifest. 
 On the one hand we see the retention of a form 
 of exposition which was unusual in antiquity, which 
 was created by the Catholic historians of the later 
 ages (Eusebius, Orosius), and which enjoyed great 
 favour in the Middle Ages, — that which, instead 
 of embracing only the history of a single man, 
 
 298 
 
Exposition 
 
 family, or people, embraces universal history. On 
 the other hand there was introduced a mechanical 
 artifice of exposition, having its origin in a practice 
 common in the mediaeval schools (the gloss), which 
 had far-reaching consequences. The custom arose 
 of adding notes to printed books of history. 1 Notes 
 have made it possible to distinguish between the 
 historical narrative and the documents which sup- 
 port it, to give references to sources, to disencumber 
 and illustrate the text. It was in collections of 
 documents, and in critical dissertations, that the 
 artifice of annotation was first employed ; thence 
 it penetrated, slowly, into historical works of other 
 classes. 
 
 A second period begins in the eighteenth century. 
 The " philosophers " then began to conceive history 
 as the study, not of events for their own sakes, but 
 of the habits of men. They were thus led to take 
 an interest, not only in facts of a political order, 
 but in the evolution of the arts, the sciences, of in- 
 dustry, and in manners. Montesquieu and Voltaire 
 personified these tendencies. The Essai sur les 
 mceurs is the first sketch, and, in some respects, the 
 masterpiece of history thus conceived. The detailed 
 narration of political and military events was still 
 regarded as the main work of history, but to this 
 it now became customary to add, generally by way 
 of supplement or appendix, a sketch of the "progress 
 of the human mind." The expression "history of 
 
 1 It would be interesting to find out what are the earliest printed 
 books furnished with notes in the modern fashion. Bibliophiles 
 whom we have consulted are unable to say, their attention never 
 having been drawn to the point. 
 
 299 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 civilisation" appears before the end of the eighteenth 
 century. At the same time German university 
 professors, especially at Gottingen, were creating, in 
 order to supply educational needs, the new form 
 of the historical " manual," a methodical collection 
 of carefully justified facts, with no literary or other 
 pretensions. Collections of historical facts, made 
 with a view to aid in the interpretation of literary 
 texts, or out of mere curiosity in regard to the 
 things of the past, had existed from ancient times ; 
 but the medleys of Athengeus and Aulus Gellius, 
 or the vaster and better arranged compilations of 
 the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, are by no 
 means to be compared with the "scientific manuals" 
 of which the German professors then gave the 
 models. These professors, moreover, contributed 
 towards the clearing up of the vague, general notion 
 which the philosophers had of " civilisation," for they 
 applied themselves to the organisation of the history 
 of languages, of literatures, of the arts, of religions, 
 of law, of economic phenomena, and so on, as so 
 many separate branches of study. Thus the domain 
 of history was greatly enlarged, and scientific, that 
 is, simple and objective, exposition began to com- 
 pete with the rhetorical or sententious, patriotic or 
 philosophical ideals of antiquity. 
 
 This competition was at first timid and obscure, 
 for the beginning of the nineteenth century was 
 marked by a literary renaissance -which renovated 
 historical literature. Under the influence of the 
 romantic movement historians sought for more vivid 
 methods of exposition than those employed by their 
 predecessors, methods better adapted to strike the 
 
 300 
 
Exposition 
 
 imagination and rouse the emotions of the public, by 
 filling the mind with poetical images of vanished 
 realities. Some endeavoured to preserve the peculiar 
 colouring of the original documents, which they 
 adapted : " Charmed with the contemporary narra- 
 tives," says Barante, " I have endeavoured to write a 
 consecutive account which should borrow from them 
 their animation and interest." This leads directly 
 to the neglect of criticism, and to the reproduction 
 of whatever is effective from the literary point of 
 view. Others declared that the facts of the past 
 ought to be recounted with all the emotions of a 
 spectator. " Thierry," says Michelet, praising him, 
 "in telling us the story of Klodowig, breathes the 
 spirit and shows the emotion of recently invaded 
 France . . ." Michelet "stated the problem of his- 
 tory as the resuscitation of integral life in the inmost 
 parts of the organism." With the romantic historians 
 the choice of subject, of plan, of the proofs, of the 
 style, is dominated by an engrossing desire to pro- 
 duce an effect — a literary, not a scientific ambition. 
 Some romantic historians have slid down this in- 
 clined plane to the level of the " historical novel." 
 We know the nature of this species of literature, 
 which flourished so vigorously from the Abbe Bar- 
 thelemy and Chateaubriand down to Merimee and 
 Ebers, and which some are now vainly attempting 
 to rejuvenate. The object is to "make the scenes 
 of the past live again " in dramatic pictures artisti- 
 cally constructed with " true " colours and details. 
 The obvious object of the method is that it does not 
 provide the reader with any means of distinguishing 
 between the elements borrowed from the documents 
 
 301 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 and the imaginary elements, not to mention the fact 
 that generally the documents used are not all of the 
 same origin, so that while the colour of each stone 
 may be " true " that of the mosaic is false. Dezobry's 
 Rome au sUch d'Auguste, Augustin Thierry's Rdcits 
 mtrovingiens, and other " pictures " produced at the 
 same epoch were constructed on the same principle, 
 and are subject to the same drawbacks as the his- 
 torical novels properly so-called. 1 
 
 We may summarise what precedes by saying that, 
 up to about 1850, history continued to be, both for 
 historians and the public, a branch of literature. An 
 excellent proof of this lies in the fact that up till 
 then historians were accustomed to publish new 
 editions of their works, at intervals of several years, 
 without making any change in them, and that the 
 public tolerated the practice. Now every scientific 
 work needs to be continually recast, revised, brought 
 up to date. Scientific workers do not claim to give 
 their works an immutable form, they do not expect 
 to be read by posterity or to achieve personal immor- 
 tality; it is enough for them if the results of their 
 researches, corrected, it may be, and possibly trans- 
 formed by subsequent researches, should be incor- 
 porated in the fund of knowledge which forms the 
 scientific heritage of mankind. No one reads Newton 
 or Lavoisier ; it is enough for their glory that their 
 labours should have contributed to the production 
 
 1 It is clear that the romantic methods which are used for the 
 purpose of obtaining effects of local colour and "revising" the 
 past, often puerile in the hands of the ablest writers, are altogether 
 intolerable when they are employed by any others. See a good 
 example (criticism of a book of M. Mourin by M. Monod) in the 
 Revue Critique, 1874, ii. pp. 163 sqq. 
 
 302 
 
Exposition 
 
 of works by which their own have been superseded, 
 and which will be, sooner or later, superseded in 
 their turn. It is only works of art that enjoy per- 
 petual youth. And the public is well aware of the 
 fact ; no one would ever think of studying natural 
 history in Buffon, whatever his opinion might be of 
 the merits of this stylist. But the same public is 
 quite ready to study history in Augustin Thierry, in 
 Macaulay, in Carlyle, in Michelet, and the books of 
 the great writers who have treated historical subjects 
 are reprinted, fifty years after the author's death, in 
 their original form, though they are manifestly no 
 longer on a level with current knowledge. It is 
 clear that, for many, form counts before matter in 
 history, and that an historical work is primarily, if 
 not exclusively, a work of art. 1 
 
 II. It is within the last fifty years that the 
 scientific forms of historical exposition have been 
 evolved and settled, in accordance with the general 
 principle that the aini of history is not to please, nor 
 to give practical maxims of conduct, nor to arouse 
 the emotions, but knowledge pure and simple. 
 
 We begin by distinguishing between (i) mono- 
 graphs and (2) works of a general character. 
 
 1 It is a commonplace, and an error all the same, to maintain 
 the exact opposite of the above, namely, that the works of critical 
 scholars live, while the works of historians grow antiquated, so that 
 scholars gain a more solid reputation than historians do : " Pere 
 Daniel is now read no longer, and Pere Anselme is always read." 
 Eut the works of scholars become antiquated too, and the fact that 
 not all the parts of the work of Pere Anselme have yet been super- 
 seded (that is why he is still read), ought not to deceive us : the 
 great majority of the works written by scholars, like those of 
 researchers in the sciences proper, are provisional and doomed to 
 oblivion. 
 
 303 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 (i) A man writes a monograph when he pro- 
 poses to elucidate a special point, a single fact, or 
 a limited body of facts, for example the whole or 
 a portion of the life of an individual, a single event 
 or a series of events between two dates lying near 
 together. The types of possible subjects of a mono- 
 graph cannot be enumerated, for the subject-matter 
 of history can be divided indefinitely, and in an 
 infinite number of ways. But all modes of division 
 are not equally judicious, and, though the reverse 
 has been maintained, there are, in history as in all 
 the sciences, subjects which it would be stupid to 
 treat in monographs, and monographs which, though 
 well executed, represent so much useless labour, 1 
 Persons of moderate ability and no great mental 
 range, devoted to what is -called " curious " learning, 
 are very ready to occupy themselves with insignificant 
 questions; 2 indeed, for the purpose of making a first 
 estimate of an historian's intellectual power, a fairly 
 good criterion may be had in the list of the mono- 
 graphs he has written. 3 It is the gift of seeing the 
 
 1 " It is in vain that those professionally concerned try to deceive 
 themselves on this point ; not everything in the past is interesting. 
 " Supposing we were to write the Life of the Duke of Angouleme," 
 says Pecuchet. "But he was an imbecile I" answers Bouvard; 
 "Never mind; personages of the second order often have an 
 enormous influence, and perhaps he was able to control the march 
 of events." — G. Flaubert, Bouvard et P6cuchet,-p. 157. 
 
 2 As persons of moderate ability have a tendency to prefer in- 
 significant subjects, there is active competition in the treatment of 
 such subjects. We often have occasion to note the simultaneous 
 appearance of several monographs on the same subject. It is not 
 rare for the subject to be altogether devoid of importance. 
 
 3 Interesting subjects for monographs are not always capable 
 of being treated : there are some which the state of the sources 
 puts out of the question. This is why beginners, even those 
 
 304 
 
Exposition 
 
 important problems, and the taste for their treat- 
 ment, as well as the power of solving them, which, 
 in all the sciences, raise men to the first rank. But 
 let us suppose the subject has been rationally chosen. 
 Every monograph, in order to be useful — that is, 
 capable of being fully turned to account — should 
 conform to three rules : ( i ) in a monograph every 
 historical fact derived from documents should only 
 be presented accompanied by a reference to the 
 documents from which it is taken, and an estimate 
 of the value of these documents; 1 (2) chronological 
 order should be followed as far as possible, because 
 this is the order in which we know that the facts 
 occurred, and by which we are guided in searching 
 for causes and effects ; (3) the title of the monograph 
 must enable its subject to be known with exacti- 
 
 who have ability, experience so much embarrassment in choosing 
 subjects for their first monographs, when they are not aided by 
 good advice or good fortune, and often lose themselves in attempt- 
 ing the impossible. It would be very severe, and very unjust, to 
 judge any one from the list of his first monographs. 
 
 1 In practice it is proper to give at the beginning a list of the 
 sources used in the whole of the monograph (with appropriate 
 bibliographical information as to the printed works, and in the 
 case of manuscripts, a mention of the nature of the documents 
 and their shelf -marks) ; besides, each special statement should be 
 accompanied by its proof : the exact text of the supporting docu- 
 ment should be quoted, if possible, so that the reader may be in a 
 position to verify the interpretation ; otherwise an analysis of it 
 should be given in a note, or, at the least, the title of the docu- 
 ment, with its shelf-mark, or with a precise indication of the place 
 where it was published. The general rule is to put the reader in a 
 position to know the exact reasons for which such and such con- 
 clusions have been adopted at each stage of the analysis. 
 
 Beginners, resembling ancient authors in this respect, naturally 
 do not observe all these rules. Frequently, instead of quoting the 
 text or the titles of documents, they refer to these by their shelf- 
 mark, or by the title of the general collection in which they are 
 printed, from which the reader can learn nothing as to the nature 
 
 305 U 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 tude : we cannot protest too strongly against those 
 incomplete or fancy titles which so unnecessarily 
 complicate bibliographical searches. A fourth rule 
 has been laid down ; it has been said " a monograph 
 is useful only when it exhausts the subject " ; but it 
 is quite legitimate to do temporary work with docu- 
 ments which one has at one's disposal, even when 
 there is reason to believe that others exist, provided 
 always that precise notice is given as to what docu- 
 ments have been employed. 
 
 Any one who has tact will see that, in a mono- 
 graph, the apparatus of demonstration, while need- 
 ing to be complete, ought to be reduced to what 
 is strictly necessary. Sobriety is imperative ; all 
 parading of erudition which might have been spared 
 without inconvenience is odious. 1 In history it often 
 happens that the best executed monographs furnish 
 no other result than the proof that knowledge is 
 impossible. It is necessary to resist the desire which 
 leads some to round off with subjective, ambitious, 
 and vague conclusions monographs which will no,t 
 
 of the text adduced. The following is another mistake of the 
 crudest kind, and yet of frequent occurrence : Beginners, and 
 persons of little experience, do not always understand why the 
 custom has been introduced of inserting footnotes ; at the bottom 
 of the pages of the books they have they see a fringe of notes ; 
 they think themselves bound to fringe their own books in the same 
 way, but their notes are adventitious and purely ornamental ; they 
 do not serve either to exhibit the proof or to enable the reader to 
 verify the statements. All these methods are inadmissible, and 
 should be vigorously denounced. 
 
 1 Almost all beginners have an unfortunate tendency to wander 
 off into superfluous digressions, to amass reflections and pieces of 
 information which have no relevance to the main subject ; they 
 would recognise, if they reflected, that the causes of this tendency 
 are bad taste, a kind of naive vanity, sometimes mental confusion. 
 
 .306 
 
Exposition 
 
 bear them. 1 The proper conclusion of a good mono- 
 graph is the balance-sheet of the results obtained by 
 it and the points left doubtful. A monograph made 
 on these principles may grow antiquated, but it will 
 not fall to pieces, and its author will never need to 
 blush for it. 
 
 (2) Works of a general character are addressed 
 either to students or to the general public. 
 
 A. General works intended principally for students 
 and specialists now appear in the form of "reper- 
 tories," " manuals," and " scientific histories." In a 
 repertory a number of verified facts belonging to a 
 given class are collected and arranged in an order 
 which makes it easy to refer to them. If the facts 
 thus collected have precise dates, chronological order 
 is adopted : thus the task has been undertaken of 
 compiling " Annals " of German history, in which 
 the summary entry of the events, arranged by 
 dates, is accompanied by the texts from which the 
 events are known, Avith accurate references to the 
 sources and the works of critics ; the collection of 
 the Jahrbiicher der deuUchen Geschichte has for its 
 object the elucidation, as far as is possible, of the 
 facts of German history, including all that is suscep- 
 tible of scientific discussion and proof, but omitting 
 all that belongs to the domain of appreciation and 
 general views. When the facts are badly dated, or 
 
 1 We meet with declarations like the following : " I have been 
 long familiar with the documents of this period and this class. I 
 have an impression that such and such conclusions, which I cannot 
 prove, are true." Of two things one : either the author can give 
 the reasons for his impression, and then we can judge them, or he 
 cannot give them, and we may assume that he has none of serious 
 value. 
 
 307 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 are simultaneous, alphabetical arrangement must be 
 employed ; thus we have Dictionaries ■ dictionaries 
 of institutions, biographical dictionaries, historical 
 encyclopedias, such as the Bealencyclopcedie of Pauly- 
 Wissowa. These alphabetical repertories are, in 
 theory, just as the Jahrbilcher, collections of proved 
 facts ; if, in practice, the references in them are less 
 rigorous, if the apparatus of texts supporting the 
 statements is less complete, the difference is without 
 justification. 1 Scientific manuals are also, properly 
 speaking, repertories, since they are collections in 
 which established facts are arranged in systematic 
 order, and are exhibited objectively, with their proofs, 
 and without any literary adornment. The authors 
 of these " manuals," of which the most numerous 
 and the most perfect specimens have been composed 
 in our days in the German universities, have no 
 object in view except to draw up minute inventories 
 of the acquisitions made by knowledge, in order that 
 workers may be enabled to assimilate the results of 
 criticism with greater ease and rapidity, and may 
 be furnished with starting-points for new researches. 
 Manuals of this kind now exist for most of the special 
 branches of the history of civilisation (languages, 
 literature, religion, law, Alterthilmer, and so on), for 
 the history of institutions, for the different parts of 
 
 1 This difference has a tendency to disappear. The most recent 
 alphabetical collections of historical facts (the Realencyclopcedie der 
 classischen Alterthumswissenscha/t of Pauly-Wissowa, the Diction- 
 naire des antiquites of Daremberg and Saglio, the Dictionary of 
 National Biography of Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee) are furnished 
 with a sufficiently ample apparatus. It is principally in biographical 
 dictionaries that the custom of giving no proofs tends to persist ; see 
 the Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, &c. 
 
 308 
 
Exposition 
 
 ecclesiastical history. It will suffice to mention the 
 names of Schcemann, of Marquardt and Mommsen, 
 of Gilbert, of Krumbacher, of Harnack, of M oiler. 
 These works are not marked by the dryness of the 
 majority of the primitive "manuals," which were 
 published in Germany a hundred years ago, and 
 which were little more than tables of subjects, with 
 references to the books and documents to be con- 
 sulted ; in the modern type the exposition and dis- 
 cussion are no doubt terse and compact, but yet not 
 abbreviated beyond a point at which they may be 
 tolerated, even preferred by cultivated readers. They 
 take away the taste for other books, as G. Paris very 
 well says : l " When one has feasted on these sub- 
 stantial pages, so full of facts, Avhich, with all their 
 appearance of impersonality, yet contain, and above 
 all suggest, so many thoughts, it is difficult to read 
 books, even books of distinction, in which the subject 
 is cut up symmetrically to fit in with a preconceived 
 system, is coloured by fancy, and is, so to speak, pre- 
 sented to us in disguise, books in which the author 
 continually comes between us and the spectacle 
 which he claims to make intelligible to us, but which 
 he never allows us to see." The great historical 
 " manuals," uniform with the treatises and manuals 
 of the other sciences (with the added complication 
 of authorities and proofs), ought to be, and are, con- 
 tinually improved, emended, corrected, brought up 
 to date : they are, by definition, works of science and 
 not of art. 
 
 The earliest repertories and the earliest scientific 
 " manuals " were composed by isolated individuals. 
 
 1 Revue Critique, 1874, i. p. 327. 
 
 3°9 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 But it was soon recognised that a single man cannot 
 correctly arrange, or have the proper mastery over a 
 vast collection of facts. The task has been divided. 
 Repertories are executed, in our days, by collaborators 
 in association (who are sometimes of different nation- 
 alities and write in different languages). The great 
 manuals (of I. von Midler, of G. Grober, of H. Paul, 
 and others) are collections of special treatises each 
 written by a specialist. The principle of collabora- 
 tion is excellent, but on condition (i) that the col- 
 lective work is of a nature to be resolved into great 
 independent, though co-ordinated, monographs; (2) 
 that the section entrusted to each collaborator has a 
 certain extent ; if the number of collaborators is too 
 great and the part of each too limited, the liberty 
 and the responsibility of each are diminished or 
 disappear. 
 
 Histories, intended to give a narrative of events 
 which happened but once, and to state the general 
 facts which dominate the whole course of special 
 evolutions, still have a reason for existence, even 
 after the multiplication of methodical manuals. But 
 scientific methods of exposition have been introduced 
 into them, as into monographs and manuals, and 
 that by imitation. The reform has consisted, in 
 every case, in the renunciation of literary ornaments 
 and of statements without proof. Grote produced 
 the first model of a " history " thus defined. At the 
 same time certain forms which once had a vogue 
 have now fallen into disuse : this is the case with 
 the " Universal Histories " with continuous narrative, 
 which were so much liked, for different reasons, in 
 the Middle Ages and in the eighteenth century ; in 
 
 310 
 
Exposition 
 
 the present century Schlosser and Weber in Ger- 
 many, Cantii in Italy, have produced the last speci- 
 mens of them. This type has been abandoned for 
 historical reasons, because we have ceased to regard 
 humanity as a whole, bound together by a single 
 evolution; and for practical reasons, because we 
 have recognised the impossibility of collecting so 
 overwhelming a mass of facts in a single work. The 
 Universal Histories which are still published in col- 
 laboration (the Oncken collection is the best type 
 of them), are, like the great manuals, composed of 
 independent sections, each treated by a different 
 author; they are publishers' combinations. His- 
 torians have in our days been led to adopt the 
 division by states (national histories) and by epochs. 1 
 B. There is in theory no reason why historical 
 works intended principally for the public should not 
 be conceived in the same spirit as works designed 
 for students and specialists, nor why they should 
 not be composed in the same manner, apart from 
 simplifications and omissions which readily suggest 
 themselves. And, in fact, there are in existence 
 succinct, substantial, and readable summaries, in which 
 no statement is advanced which is not tacitly sup- 
 ported by solid references, in which the acquisitions 
 
 1 The custom of appending to " histories," that is to narratives 
 of political events, summaries of the results obtained by the special 
 historians of art, literature, &c, still persists. A "History of 
 France " would not be considered complete if it did not contain 
 chapters on the history of art, literature, manners, &c, in France. 
 However, it is not the summary account of special evolutions, de- 
 scribed at second hand from the works of specialists, which is in its 
 proper place in a scientific " History " ; it is the study of those 
 general facts which have dominated the special evolutions in their 
 entirety. 
 
 3" 
 
Synthetic Opeeations 
 
 of science are precisely stated, judiciously explained, 
 their significance and value clearly brought out. The 
 French, thanks to their natural gifts of tact, dexterity, 
 and accuracy of mind, excel, as a rule, in this depart- 
 ment. There have been published in our country 
 review-articles and works of higher popularisation 
 in which the results of a number of original works 
 have been cleverly condensed, in a way that has won 
 the admiration of the very -specialists who, by their 
 heavy monographs, have rendered these works pos- 
 sible. Nothing, however, is more dangerous than 
 popularisation. As a matter of fact, most works of 
 popularisation do not conform to the modern ideal 
 of historical exposition ; we frequently find in them 
 survivals of the ancient ideal, that of antiquity, the 
 Benaissance, and the romantic school. 
 
 The explanation is easy. The defects of the 
 historical works designed for the general public — 
 defects which are sometimes enormous, and have, 
 with many able minds, discredited popular works 
 as a class — are the consequences of the insufficient 
 preparation or of the inferior literary education of 
 the " popularisers." 
 
 A populariser is excused from original research ; 
 but he ought to know everything of importance 
 that has been published on his subject, he ought 
 to be up to date, and to have thought out for 
 himself the conclusions reached by the specialists. 
 .If he has not personally made a special study of 
 the subject he proposes to treat, he must obviously 
 read it up, and the task is long. For the pro- 
 fessional populariser there is a strong temptation 
 to study superficially a few recent monographs, to 
 
 312 
 
Exposition 
 
 hastily string together or combine extracts from 
 them, and, in order to render this medley more 
 attractive, to deck it out, as far as is possible, with 
 " general ideas " and external graces. The tempta- 
 tion is all the stronger from the circumstance that 
 most specialists take no interest in works of popu- 
 larisation, that these works are, in general, lucrative, 
 and that the public at large is not in a position 
 to distinguish clearly between honest and sham 
 popularisation. In short, there are some, absurd 
 as it may seem, who do not hesitate to summarise 
 for others what they have not taken the trouble 
 to learn for themselves, and to teach that of 
 which they are ignorant. Hence, in most works 
 of historical popularisation, there inevitably appear 
 blemishes of every kind, which the well-informed 
 always note with pleasure, but with a pleasure in 
 which there is some touch of bitterness, because 
 they alone can see these faults: unacknowledged 
 borrowings, inexact references, mutilated names 
 and texts, second-hand quotations, worthless hypo- 
 theses, imprudent assertions, puerile generalisa- 
 tions, and, in the enunciation of the most false 
 or the most debatable opinions, an air of tranquil 
 anthority. 1 
 
 On the other hand, men whose information is all 
 that could be desired, whose monographs intended 
 
 1 It is hard to imagine what it is possible for the most interest- 
 ing and best established results of modern criticism to become, in 
 the hands of negligent and unskilful popularisers. The persons 
 who know most of these possibilities are those who have occasion 
 to read the improvised "compositions" of candidates in history 
 examinations : the ordinary defects of inferior popularisation are 
 here pushed sometimes to an absurd length. 
 
 3 X 3 
 
Synthetic Operations 
 
 for specialists are full of merit, sometimes show 
 themselves capable, when they write for the public, 
 of grave offences against scientific method. The 
 Germans are habitual offenders: consider Mommsen, 
 Droysen, Curtius, and Lamprecht. The reason is 
 that these authors, when they address the public, 
 wish to produce an effect upon it. Their desire to 
 make a strong impression leads them to a certain 
 relaxation of scientific rigour, and to the old re- 
 jected habits of ancient historiography. These men, 
 scrupulous and minute as they are when they are 
 engaged in establishing details, abandon themselves, 
 in their exposition of general questions, to their 
 natural impulses, like the common run of men. 
 They take sides, they censure, they extol ; they 
 colour, they embellish ; they allow themselves to 
 be influenced by personal, patriotic, moral, or meta- 
 physical considerations. And, over and above all this, 
 they apply themselves, with their several degrees 
 of talent, to the task of producing works of art ; in 
 this endeavour those who have no talent make 
 themselves ridiculous, and the talent of those who 
 have any is spoilt by their preoccupation with the 
 effect they wish to produce. 
 
 Not, let it be well understood, that " form " is 
 of no importance, or that, provided he makes him- 
 self intelligible, the historian has a right to employ 
 incorrect, vulgar, slovenly, or clumsy language. A 
 contempt for rhetoric, for paste diamonds and paper 
 flowers, does not exclude a taste for a pure and 
 strong, a terse and pregnant style. Fustel de Cou- 
 langes was a good writer, although throughout his 
 life he recommended and practised the avoidance of 
 
 3H 
 
Exposition 
 
 metaphor. On the contrary we see no harm in re- 
 peating 1 that the historian, considering the extreme 
 complexity of the phenomena he undertakes to 
 describe, is under an obligation not to write badly. 
 But he should write consistently well, and never 
 bedeck himself with finery. 
 
 1 Cf. supra, p. 266. 
 
 31s 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 I. History is only the utilisation of documents. 
 But it is a matter of chance whether documents 
 are preserved or lost. Hence the predominant part 
 played by chance in the formation of history. 
 
 The quantity of documents in existence, if not of 
 known documents, is given ; time, in spite of all the 
 precautions which are taken nowadays, is continually 
 diminishing it ; it will never increase. History has 
 at its disposal a limited stock of documents ; this 
 very circumstance limits the possible progress of 
 historical science. When all the documents are 
 known, and have gone through the operations which 
 fit them for use, the work of critical scholarship will 
 be finished. In the case of some ancient periods, 
 for which documents are rare, we can now see that 
 in a generation or two it will be time to stop. His- 
 torians will then be obliged to take refuge more and 
 more in modern periods. Thus history will not 
 foil the dream which, in the nineteenth century, 
 inspired the romantic school with so much enthu- 
 siasm for the study of history : it will not penetrate 
 the mystery of the origin of societies ; and, for want 
 of documents, the beginnings of the evolution of 
 humanity will always remain obscure. 
 
 The historian does not collect by his own obser- 
 316 
 
Conclusion 
 
 vation the materials necessary for history as is done 
 in the other sciences : he works on facts the know- 
 ledge of which has been transmitted by former 
 observers. In history knowledge is not obtained, 
 as in the other sciences, by direct methods, it is 
 indirect. History is not, as has been said, a science 
 of observation, but a science of reasoning. 
 
 In order to use facts which have been observed 
 under unknown conditions, it is necessary go apply 
 criticism to them, and criticism consists in a series 
 of reasonings by analogy. The facts as furnished 
 by criticism are isolated and scattered ; in order 
 to organise them into a structure it is necessary to 
 imagine and group them in accordance with their 
 resemblances to facts of the present day, an opera- 
 tion which also depends on the use of analogies. 
 This necessity compels history to use an exceptional 
 method. In order to frame its arguments from 
 analogy, it must always combine the knowledge of 
 the particular conditions under which the facts of 
 the past occurred with an understanding of the 
 general conditions under which the facts of humanity 
 occur. Its method is to draw up special tables of 
 the facts of an epoch in the past, and to apply to 
 them sets of questions founded on the study of the 
 present. 
 
 The operations which must necessarily be per- 
 formed in order to pass from the inspection of docu- 
 ments to the knowledge of the facts and evolutions 
 of the past are very numerous. Hence the necessity 
 of the division and organisation of labour in history. 
 It is requisite, on the one hand, that those specialists 
 who occupy themselves with the search for docu- 
 
 3 J 7 
 
Conclusion 
 
 ments, their restoration and preliminary classification, 
 should co-ordinate their efforts, in order that the 
 preparatory work of critical scholarship may be 
 finished as soon as possible, under the best conditions 
 as to accuracy and economy of labour. On the other 
 hand, authors of partial syntheses (monographs) de- 
 signed to serve as materials for more comprehensive 
 syntheses ought to agree among themselves to work 
 on a common method, in order that the results of 
 each may be used by the others without preliminary 
 investigations. Lastly, workers of experience should 
 be found to renounce personal research and devote 
 their whole time to the study of these partial syn- 
 theses, in order to combine them scientifically in 
 comprehensive works of historical construction. And 
 if the result of these labours were to bring out clear 
 and certain conclusions as to the nature and the 
 causes of social evolution, a truly scientific "philo- 
 sophy of history " would have been created, which 
 historians might acknowledge as legitimately crowning 
 historical science. 
 
 Conceivably a day may come when, thanks to the 
 organisation of labour, all existing documents will 
 have been discovered, emended, arranged, and all the 
 facts established of which the traces have not been 
 destroyed. When that day comes, history will be 
 established, but it will not be- fixed : it will continue 
 to be gradually modified in proportion as the direct 
 study of existing societies becomes more scientific 
 and permits a better understanding of social pheno- 
 mena and their evolution ; for the new ideas which 
 will doubtless be acquired on the nature, the causes, 
 and the relative importance of social facts will con- 
 
 318 
 
Conclusion 
 
 tinue to transform the ideas which will be formed of 
 the societies and events of the past. 1 
 
 II. It is an obsolete illusion to suppose that 
 history supplies information of practical utility in 
 the conduct of life (Historia magistra vitce), lessons 
 directly profitable to individuals and peoples; the 
 conditions under which human actions are per- 
 formed are rarely sufficiently similar at- two different 
 moments for the " lessons of history " to be directly 
 applicable. But it is an error to say, by way of 
 reaction, that " the distinguishing feature of history is 
 to be good for nothing." 2 It has an indirect utility. 
 
 History enables us to understand the present in 
 so far as it explains the origin of the existing state 
 of things. Here we must admit that history does 
 not offer an equal interest through the whole extent 
 of time which it covers ; there are remote genera- 
 
 1 We have spoken above of the element of subjectivity which it 
 is impossible to eliminate from historical construction, and which 
 has been misinterpreted to the extent of denying history the 
 character of a science : this element of subjectivity which troubled 
 Pe"cuchet (G. Flaubert, Bouvard et Pecuchet, p. 157) and Sylvestre 
 Bonnard (A. France, Le crime de Silvestre Bonnard, p. 310), and 
 which causes Faust to say : 
 
 " Die Zeiten der Vergangenheit 
 Sind uns ein Buch mit sieben Siegeln. 
 Was ihr den Geist der Zeiten heisst, 
 Das ist im Grand der Herren eigner Geist, 
 In dem die Zeiten sich bespiegeln." 
 
 ["Past times are to us a book with seven seals. What you call the 
 spirit of the times is at bottom your own spirit, in which the times 
 are mirrored."— Goethe, Faust, i. 3.] 
 
 2 A saying attributed to a "Sorbonne professor" by M. de la 
 Blanchere {Revue Critique, 1895, i. p. 176). Others have declaimed 
 on the theme that the knowledge of history is mischievous and 
 paralyses. See F. Nietzsche, Unzcitgemasse Betrachtungen, II. Nut- 
 zen und Nachtkeil der Historiefilr das Leben, Leipzig, 1874, 8vo. 
 
 319 
 
Conclusion 
 
 tions whose traces are no longer visible in the world 
 as it now is; for the purpose of explaining the 
 political constitution of contemporary England, for 
 example, the study of the Anglo-Saxon witangemot 
 is without value, that of the events of the eigh- 
 teenth and nineteenth centuries is all-important. 
 The evolution of the civilised societies has within 
 the last hundred years been accelerated to such a 
 degree that, for the understanding of their present 
 form, the history of these hundred years is more 
 important than that of the ten preceding centuries. 
 As an explanation of the present, history would 
 almost reduce to the study of the contemporary 
 period. 
 
 History is also indispensable for the completion 
 of the political and social sciences, which are still in 
 process of formation ; for the direct observation of 
 social phenomena (in a state of rest) is not a suffi- 
 cient foundation for these sciences — there must be 
 added a study of the development of these pheno- 
 mena in time, that is, their history. 1 This is why 
 all the sciences which deal with man (linguistic, law, 
 science of religions, political economy, and so on) 
 have in this century assumed the form of historical 
 sciences. 
 
 But the chief merit of history is that of being an 
 instrument of intellectual culture ; it is so in several 
 
 1 History and the social sciences are mutually dependent on each 
 other ; they progress in parallel lines by a continual interchange of 
 services. The social sciences furnish a knowledge of the present, 
 required by history for the purpose of making representations of 
 the facts and reasoning from documents. History gives the infor- 
 mation about evolutions which is necessary in order to understand 
 the present. 
 
 320 
 
Conclusion 
 
 ways. Firstly, the practice of the historical method 
 of investigation, of which the principles have been 
 sketched in the present volume, is very hygienic for 
 the mind, which it cures of credulity. Secondly, 
 history, by exhibiting to us a great number of differ- 
 ing societies, prepares us to understand and tolerate 
 a variety of usages ; by showing us that societies 
 have often been transformed, it familiarises us with 
 variation in social forms, and cures us of a morbid 
 dread of change. Lastly, the contemplation of past 
 evolutions, which enables us to understand how the 
 transformations of humanity are brought about by 
 changes of habits and the renewal of generations, 
 saves us from the temptation of applying biological 
 analogies (selection, struggle for existence, inherited 
 habits, and so on) to the explanation of social evolu- 
 tion, which is not produced by the operation of the 
 same causes as animal evolution. 
 
 321 
 
APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX I 
 
 THE SECONDARY TEACHING OF HISTORY 
 IN FRANCE 
 
 I. The teaching of history is a recent addition to secondary 
 education. Formerly history was taught to the sons of 
 kings and great persons, in order to give them a preparation 
 in the art of governing, according to the ancient tradition, 
 but it was a sacred science reserved for the future rulers 
 of states, a science for princes, not for subjects. The 
 secondary schools which have been organised since the 
 sixteenth century, ecclesiastical or secular, Catholic or Pro- 
 testant, did not admit history into their plan of study, 
 or only admitted it as an appendage to the study of the 
 ancient languages. This was the tradition of the Jesuits in 
 France ; it was adopted by the University of Napoleon. 
 
 History was only introduced into secondary education in 
 the nineteenth century, under the pressure of public opinion ; 
 and although it has been allotted more space in France than 
 in England, or even in Germany, it has continued to be a 
 subsidiary subject, not taught in a special class (as philosophy 
 is), nor always by a special professor, and counting for very 
 little in examinations. 
 
 Historical instruction has for a long time felt the effects 
 of the maimer in which it was introduced. The subject 
 was imposed by the authorities on teachers trained exclu- 
 sively in the study of literature, and could find no suitable 
 place in a system of classical education based on the study 
 of forms, and indifferent to the knowledge of social pheno- 
 
 325 
 
Appendix I 
 
 mena. History was taught because it was prescribed by the 
 programme; but this programme, the sole motive aud guide 
 of the instruction, was always an accident, and varied with 
 the preferences, or even the personal studies of those who 
 framed it. History formed part of the social conventions ; 
 there are, it was said, names and facts " of which it is not 
 permissible to be ignorant " ; but the things of which ignor- 
 ance was not permitted varied greatly, from the names of 
 the Merovingian kings and the battles of the Seven Years' 
 War to the Salic Law and the work of Saint Vincent de Paul. 
 The improvised staffs which, in order to carry out the 
 programme, had to furnish impromptu instruction in history, 
 had no clear idea either of the reasons for such instruction, 
 or of its place in general education, or of the technical 
 methods necessary for giving it. With this lack of tradi- 
 tion, of pedagogic preparation, and even of mechanical aids, 
 the professor of history found himself carried back to the 
 ages before printing, when the teacher had to supply the 
 pupil with all the facts which formed the subject-matter of 
 instruction, and he adopted the mediaeval procedure. Armed 
 with a note-book in which he had written down the list of 
 facts to be taught, he read it out to the pupils, sometimes 
 making a pretence of extemporising; this was the "lesson," 
 the corner-stone of historical instruction. The whole series 
 of lessons, determined by the programme, formed the 
 "course." The pupil was expected to write as he listened 
 (this was called " taking notes ") and to compose a written 
 account of what he had heard (this was the redaction). 
 But as the pupils were not taught how to take notes, nearly 
 all of them were content to write very rapidly, from the 
 professor's dictation, a rough draft, which they copied out 
 at home in the form of a redaction, without any endeavour 
 to grasp the meaning either of what they heard or what 
 they transcribed. To this mechanical labour the most 
 zealous added extracts copied from books, generally with 
 just as little reflection. 
 
 326 
 
Appendix I 
 
 In order to get the facts judged essential into the pupils' 
 heads, the professor used to make a very short version of 
 the lesson, the "summary" or "abstract," which he dictated 
 openly, and caused to be learnt by heart. Thus of the two 
 written exercises which occupied nearly the whole time of 
 the class, one (the summary) was an overt dictation, the 
 other (the redaction) an unavowed dictation. 
 
 The only means adopted to check the pupils' work was to 
 make them repeat the summary word for word, and to ques- 
 tion them on the redaction, that is to make them repeat 
 approximately the words of the professor. Of the two 
 oral exercises one was an overt, the other an unavowed 
 repetition. 
 
 It is true the pupil was given a book, the Precis d'histoire, 1 
 but this book had the same form as the professor's course, 
 and instead of serving as a basis for the oral instruction, 
 merely duplicated it, and, as a rule, duplicated it badly, for 
 it was not' intelligible to the pupil. The authors of these 
 text-books, 2 adopting the traditional methods of "abridg- 
 ments," endeavoured to accumulate the greatest possible 
 number of facts by omitting all their characteristic details 
 and summarising them in the most general, and therefore 
 vague, expressions. In the elementary books nothing was 
 left but a residue of proper names and dates connected by 
 formulae of a uniform type ; history appeared as a series of 
 wars, treaties, reforms, revolutions, which only differed in 
 the names of peoples, sovereigns, fields of battle, and in 
 the figures giving the years. 3 
 
 Such, down to the end of the Second Empire, was histori- 
 
 1 The same institution has been adopted in German-speaking coun- 
 tries under the name of Leitfaden (guiding-thread), and in English- 
 speaking countries under the name of Text-book. 
 
 2 We must make an exception of Michelet's Pr4cis de Vhistoire 
 modcrne, and do Duruy the justice to acknowledge that in his school- 
 books, even in the first editions, he has endeavoured, often successfully, 
 to make his narratives both interesting and instructive. 
 
 3 For a criticism of this method, see above, p. 265. 
 
 327 
 
Appendix I 
 
 cal instruction in all French institutions, both secular and 
 ecclesiastical — with a few exceptions, whose merit is measured 
 by their rarity, for in those days a professor of history 
 needed a more than common share of energy and initiative 
 to rise above the routine of redaction and summary. 
 
 IT. In recent times the general movement of educational 
 reform, which began in the Department and the Faculties, 
 has at last extended to secondary instruction. The professors 
 of history have been emancipated from the jealous super- 
 vision which weighed on their teaching under the govern- 
 ment of the Empire, and have taken the opportunity to 
 make trial of new methods. A system of historical peda- 
 gogy has been devised. It has been revealed with the 
 approbation of the Department in the discussions of the 
 society for the study of questions of secondary education, in 
 the Revue de Venseignement secondaire, and in the Revue 
 universitaire. It has received official sanction in the Instruc- 
 tions appended to the programme of 1890; the report on 
 history, the work of M. Lavisse, has become the charter 
 which protects the professors who favour reform in their 
 struggle against tradition. 1 
 
 Historical instruction will no doubt issue from this crisis 
 of renovation organised and provided with a rational peda- 
 gogic and technical system, such as is possessed by the older 
 branches of instruction in languages, literature, and philo- 
 sophy. But it is only to be expected that the reform should 
 be much slower than in the case of the higher instruction. 
 The personnel is much more numerous, and takes longer to 
 train or to renew; the pupils are less zealous and less in- 
 telligent ; the routine of the parents opposes to the new 
 methods a force of inertia which is unknown to the Faculties; 
 and the Baccalaureate, that general obstacle to all reform, is 
 
 1 The most complete, and probably the most accurate, account of 
 the state of the secondary teaching of history after the reforms has- 
 been given by a Spaniard, It. Altaniira, La IvuseTianza de la historia, 
 2nd edition, Madrid, 1895, 8vo. 
 
 328 
 
Appendix I 
 
 particularly mischievous in its effect on historical instruction, 
 which it reduces to a set of questions and answers. 
 
 III. It is now possible, however, to indicate what is the 
 direction in which historical instruction is likely to develop 
 in France- 1 and the questions which will need to be solved 
 for the purpose of introducing a rational technical system. 
 Here we shall endeavour to formulate these questions in a 
 methodical table. 
 
 (i) General Organisation. — What object should historical 
 instruction aim at? What services can it render to the 
 culture of the pupil 1 What influence can it have upon his 
 conduct ? What facts ought it to enable him to understand ? 
 And, consequently, what principles ought to guide the 
 choice of subjects and methods ? Ought the instruction to 
 be spread over the whole duration of the classes, or should 
 it be concentrated in a special class ? Should it be given in 
 one-hour or two-hour classes ? Should history be distributed 
 into several cycles, as in Germany, so as to cause the pupil 
 to return several times to the same subject at different 
 periods of his studies? Or should it be expounded in a 
 single continuous course, beginning with the commencement 
 of study, as in France ? Should the professor give a com- 
 plete course, or should he select a few questions and leave 
 the pupil to study the others by himself ? Should he ex- 
 pound the facts orally, or should he require the pupils to 
 learn them in the first instance from a book, so as to make 
 the course a series of explanations ? 
 
 (2) Choice of Subjects. — What proportion should be ob- 
 served between home and foreign history ? between ancient 
 and contemporary history? between the special branches of 
 history (art, religion, customs, economics) and general his- 
 
 1 We are here treating only of France. But, in order to dispel an 
 illusion of the French public, we may remark that historical pedagogy 
 is still less advanced in English-speaking countries, where the methods 
 used are still mechanical, and even in German-speaking countries, 
 where it is hampered by the conception of patriotic teaching. 
 
 329 
 
Appendix I 
 
 tory? between institutions or usages, and events 1 between 
 the evolution of material usages, intellectual history, social 
 life, political life ? between the study of particular incidents, 
 of biography, of dramatic episodes, and the study of the 
 interconnection of events and general evolutions? What 
 place should be assigned to proper names and dates ? Should 
 we profit by the opportunities afforded by legends to arouse 
 the critical spirit ? or should we avoid legends ? 
 
 (3) Order. — In what order should the subjects be at- 
 tacked 1 Should instruction begin with the most ancient 
 periods and the countries with the most ancient civilisa- 
 tions in order to follow chronological order and the order 
 of evolution? or should it begin with the periods and the 
 countries which are nearest to us so as to proceed from the 
 better known to the less known ? In the exposition of each 
 period, should the chronological, geographical, or logical 
 order be followed ? Should the teacher begin by describing 
 conditions or by narrating events? 
 
 (4) Methods of Instruction. — Should the pupil be given 
 general formulae first or particular images ? Should the 
 professor state the formulae himself or require the pupil to 
 search for them ? Should formulae be learnt by heart ? In 
 what cases ? How are images of historical facts to be pro- 
 duced in the pupils' minds ? What use is to be made of 
 engravings ? of reproductions and restorations ? of imaginary 
 scenes ? What use is to be made of narratives and descrip- 
 tions? of authors' texts? of historical novels? To what 
 extent ought words and formulae to be quoted? How are facts 
 to be localised ? What use is to be made of chronological 
 tables? of synchronical tables? of geographical sketches? 
 of statistical and graphic tables ? What is the way to make 
 comprehensible the character of events and customs? the 
 motives of actions? the conditions of customs? How are 
 the episodes of an event to be chosen? and the examples 
 of a custom ? How is the interconnection of facts and the 
 process of evolution to be made intelligible ? What use is to 
 
 330 
 
Appendix I 
 
 be made of comparison ? What style of language is to be 
 employed? To what extent should concrete, abstract, and 
 technical terms be used ? How is it to be verified that the 
 pupil has understood the terms and assimilated the facts? 
 Can exercises be organised in which the pupil may do 
 original work on the facts? What instruments of study 
 should the pupil have ? How should school-books be com- 
 piled, with a view to giving the pupil practice in original 
 work ? 
 
 For the purpose of stating and justifying the solutions of 
 all these problems, a special treatise would not be too much. x 
 Here we shall merely indicate the general principles on 
 which a tolerable agreement seems to have been now reached 
 in France. 
 
 We no longer go to history for lessons in morals, nor for 
 good examples of conduct, nor yet for dramatic or picturesque 
 scenes. We understand that for all these purposes legend 
 would be preferable to history, for it presents a chain of 
 causes and effects more in accordance with our ideas of 
 justice, more perfect and heroic characters, finer and more 
 affecting scenes. 'Nov do we seek to use history, as is done 
 in Germany, for the purpose of promoting patriotism and 
 loyalty; we feel that it would be illogical for different per- 
 sons to draw opposite conclusions from the same science 
 according to their country or party ; it would be an invitation 
 to every people to mutilate, if not to alter, history in the 
 direction of its preferences. We understand that the value 
 of every science consists in its being true, and we ask from 
 history truth and nothing more. 2 
 
 1 I have endeavoured, in a course of lectures at the Sorbonne, to do 
 a part of this work. — [Ch. S.] 
 
 2 Let it be noted, however, that to the question put to the candidates 
 for the modern Baccalaureate in July 1897, " What purpose is served 
 by the teaching of history ? " eighty per cent, of the candidates 
 answered, in effect, either because they believed it, or because they 
 thought it would please, "To promote patriotism."— [0. V. L.] 
 
 33* 
 
Appendix I 
 
 The function of history in education is perhaps not yet 
 clearly apparent to all those who teach it. But all those 
 who reflect are agreed to regard it as being principally an 
 instrument of social culture. The study of the societies 
 of the past causes the pupil to understand, by the help of 
 actual instances, what a society is ; it familiarises him with 
 the principal social phenomena and the different species of 
 usages, their variety and their resemblances. The study of 
 events and evolutions familiarises him with the idea of the 
 continual transformation which human affairs undergo, it 
 secures him against an unreasoning dread of social changes ; 
 it rectifies his notion of progress. All these acquisitions 
 render the pupil fitter for public life ; history thus appears 
 as an indispensable branch of instruction in a democratic 
 society. 
 
 The guiding principle of historical pedagogy will therefore 
 be to seek for those subjects and those methods which are 
 best calculated to exhibit social phenomena and give an 
 understanding of their evolution. Before admitting a fact 
 into the plan of instruction, it should be asked first of all 
 what educational influence it can exercise ; secondly, whether 
 there are adequate means of bringing the pupil to see and 
 understand it. Every fact should be discarded which is 
 instructive only in a low degree, or which is too complicated 
 to be understood, or in regard to which we do not possess 
 details enough to make it intelligible. 
 
 IY. To make rational instruction a reality it is not enough 
 to develop a theory of historical pedagogy. It is necessary 
 to renew the material aids and the methods. 
 
 History necessarily involves the knowledge of a great 
 number of facts. The professor of history, with no resources 
 but his voice, a blackboard, and abridgments which are 
 little better than chronological tables, is in much the same 
 situation as a professor of Latin without texts or dictionary. 
 The pupil in history needs a repertory of historical facts 
 as the Latin pupil needs a repertory of Latin words; he 
 
 332 
 
Appendix I 
 
 needs collections of facts, and the school text-books are 
 mostly collections of words. 
 
 There are two vehicles of facts, engravings and books. 
 Engravings exhibit material objects and external aspects, 
 they are useful principally for the study of material civilisa- 
 tion. It is some time since the attempt was first made in 
 Germany to put in the hands of the pupil a collection of 
 engravings arranged for the purposes of historical instruc- 
 tion. The same need has, in France, produced the Album 
 historique, which is published under the direction of M. 
 Lavisse. 
 
 The book is the chief instrument. It ought to contain 
 all the characteristic features necessary for forming mental 
 representations of the events, the motives, the habits, the 
 institutions studied ; it will consist principally in narratives 
 and descriptions, to which characteristic sayings and formulae 
 may be appended. For a long time it was endeavoured to 
 construct those books out of extracts selected from ancient 
 authors; they were compiled in the form of collections of 
 texts. 1 Experience seems to indicate that this method must 
 be abandoned ; it has a scientific appearance, it is true, but 
 is not intelligible to children. It is better to address pupils 
 in contemporary language. It is in this spirit that, pur- 
 suant to the Instructions of 1890, 2 collections of Historical 
 Headings have been compiled, of which the most important 
 has been published by the firm of Hachette. 
 
 The pupils' methods of work still bear witness to the late 
 introduction of historical teaching. In most historical classes 
 methods still prevail which only Exercise the pupils' recep- 
 tivity : the course of lectures, the summary, reading, ques- 
 tioning, the redaction, the reproduction of maps. It is as 
 
 1 This is what has been produced in Germany under the name of 
 Quellenbuch. 
 
 2 The same pedagogic theory will be found in the preface to my 
 Histoire narrative et descriptive des anciens peuples de I 'Orient, Supple- 
 ment for the use of professors, Paris, 1890, 8vo. — [Ch. S.] 
 
 333 
 
Appendix I 
 
 if a Latin pupil were to confine himself to repeating gram- 
 mar-lessons and extracts from authors, without ever doing 
 translation or composition. 
 
 In order that the teaching may make an adequate im- 
 pression, it is necessary, if not to discard all these passive 
 methods, at least to supplement them "by exercises which 
 call out the activity of the pupil. Some such exercises 
 have already been experimented with, and others might 
 be devised. 1 The pupil may be set to analyse engravings, 
 narratives, and descriptions in such a way as to bring out 
 the character of the facts : the short written or oral analysis 
 will guarantee that he has seen and understood, it will be 
 an opportunity to inculcate the habit of using only precise 
 terms. Or the pupil may be asked to furnish a drawing, 
 a geographical sketch, a synchronical table. He may be 
 required to draw up tables of comparison between different 
 societies, and tables showing the interconnection of facts. 
 
 A book is needed to supply the pupil with the materials 
 for these exercises. Thus the reform of methods is connected 
 with the reform of the instruments of work. Both reforms 
 will progress according as the professors and the public 
 perceive more clearly the part played by historical instruction 
 in social education. 
 
 1 I have treated this question in the Revue universitairc, 1896, vol. i. 
 — [Ch. S.] 
 
 33+ 
 
APPENDIX II 
 
 THE HIGHER TEACHING OF HISTORY 
 IN FRANCE 
 
 The higher teaching of history has been in a great measure 
 transformed, in our country, within the last thirty years. 
 The process has been gradual, as it ought to have been, and 
 has consisted in a succession of slight modifications. But 
 although a rational continuity has been observed in the steps 
 taken, the great number of these steps has not failed, in 
 these last days, to astonish, and even to offend, the public. 
 Public opinion, to -which appeal has been made in favour 
 of reforms, has been somewhat surprised by being appealed 
 to so often, and perhaps it is not superfluous to indicate here, 
 once more, the general significance and the inner logic of the 
 movement which we are witnessing. 
 
 I. Before the last years of the Second Empire, the higher 
 teaching of the historical sciences was organised in France 
 on no coherent system. 1 
 
 There were chairs of history in different institutions, of 
 different types : at the College de France, in the Faculties 
 of Letters, and in the "special schools," such as the Ecole 
 normale supeneure and the ffcole des chartes. 
 
 The College de France was a relic of the institutions of 
 the ancien regime. It was founded in the sixteenth century 
 
 1 On the organisation of higher education in France at this epoch 
 and on the first reforms, see the excellent work of M. L. Liard. 
 V Enseignement supdrieur en France, Paris, 1888-94, 2 vols. 8vo. 
 
 335 
 
Appendix II 
 
 in opposition to the scholastic Sorbonne, to be a refuge for 
 the new sciences, and had the glorious privilege of represent- 
 ing historically the higher speculative studies, the spirit of 
 free inquiry, and the interests of pure science. Unfortu- 
 nately, in the domain of the historical sciences, the College 
 de France had allowed its traditions to be obliterated up to 
 a certain point. The great men who taught history in this 
 illustrious institution (J. Michelet, for example), were not 
 technical experts, nor even men of learning, in the proper 
 sense of the word. The audiences which they swayed by 
 their eloquence were not composed of students of history. 
 
 The Faculties of Letters formed part of a system estab- 
 lished by the Napoleonic legislator. This legislator, in 
 creating the Faculties, by no means entertained the design 
 of encouraging scientific research. He had no great love for 
 science. The Faculties of Law, of Medicine, and so on, were 
 intended by him to be professional schools supplying society 
 with the lawyers, physicians, and so on, which it needs. 
 But three of the five Faculties were unable, from the be- 
 ginning, to perform the part allotted them, while the other 
 two, Law and Medicine, successfully performed theirs. The 
 Faculties of Catholic Theology did not train the priests 
 needed by society, because the State consented to the edu- 
 cation of the priests being conducted in the diocesan semi- 
 naries. The Faculties of Sciences and of Letters did not 
 train the professors for secondary education, the engineers, 
 and so on, needed by society, because they were here met 
 by the triumphant competition of "special schools" previ- 
 ously instituted : the Ecole normale, the Ecole polytechnique. 
 The Faculties of Catholic Theology, of Sciences, and of 
 Letters were therefore obliged to justify their existence by 
 other modes of activity. In particular, the professors of 
 history in the Faculties of Letters could not undertake the 
 instruction of the young men who were destined to teach 
 history in the lycees. Deprived of these special pupils, they 
 found themselves in a situation analogous to that of those 
 
 336 
 
Appendix II 
 
 charged with historical instruction at the College de France. 
 They too were not, as a rule, technical experts. For half a 
 century they carried on the work of higher popularisation 
 in lectures delivered to large audiences of leisured persons 
 (since much abused), who were attracted by the force, the 
 elegance, and the pleasing style of their diction. 
 
 The function of training the future teachers for secondary 
 education was reserved for the Ecole normale sup^rieure. 
 Now at this epoch it was an admitted principle that to be 
 a good secondary teacher it is necessary for a man to know, 
 and sufficient to know perfectly, the subject he is charged 
 to teach. The one is certainly necessary, but the other- is 
 not sufficient : knowledge of a different, of a higher, order 
 is no less indispensable than the regular " scholastic " equip- 
 ment. At the icole there was never any question of such 
 higher knowledge, but, in accordance with the prevailing 
 theory, preparation was made for secondary teaching simply 
 by imparting it. However, as the Ecole normale has always 
 been excellently recruited, the system in vogue has not pre- 
 vented it from numbering among its former pupils men of 
 the first order, not only as professors, thinkers, or writers, 
 but even as critical scholars. But it must be recognised 
 that they made their way for themselves, in spite of the 
 system, not thanks to it, after, not during, their pupilage, 
 and principally when they had the advantage, during a stay 
 at the French School at Athens, of the wholesome contact 
 with documents which they had not enjoyed at the Rue 
 d'Ulm. " Does it not seem strange," it has been said, " that 
 so many generations of professors should have been turned 
 out by the £cole normale incapable of utilising documents ? 
 . '. . Formerly, in short, students of history, on leaving the 
 Ecole, were not prepared either to teach history, which they 
 had learned in a great hurry, or to investigate difficult 
 questions." 1 
 
 As for the Ecole des chartes, which was founded under 
 1 E. Lavisae, Questions d'enseignement national, p. 12. 
 
 337 y 
 
Appendix II 
 
 the Restoration, it was, from a certain point of view, a 
 special school like the others, designed in theory to train 
 those useful functionaries, archivists and librarians. But 
 professional instruction was early reduced to a strict mini- 
 mum, and the Ecole des chartes was organised on a very 
 original plan, with a view to provide a rational and complete 
 apprenticeship for the young men who proposed to study 
 mediaeval French history. The pupils of the Ecole des 
 chartes did not follow any course of "mediaeval history," 
 but they learnt all that is necessary for doing work on the 
 solution of the still open questions of mediseval history. 
 Here alone, in virtue of an accidental anomaly, the subjects 
 which are preliminary and auxiliary to historical research 
 were systematically taught. We have already had occasion 
 to note the effects of this circumstance. l 
 
 This was the state of affairs when, towards the end of the 
 Second Empire, a vigorous reform movement set in. Some 
 young Frenchmen had visited Germany ; they had been struck 
 by the superiority of the German university system over the 
 Napoleonic system of Faculties and special schools. Cer- 
 tainly France, with its defective organisation, had produced 
 many men and many works, but it now began to be held 
 that "in all kinds of enterprises the least possible part 
 should be left to chance," and that " when an institution 
 proposes to train professors of history and historians, it 
 ought to supply them with the means of becoming what 
 it intends them to be." 
 
 M. V. Duruy, minister of Public Education, supported 
 the partisans of a renaissance of the higher studies. But he 
 did not think it practicable to interfere, for the purpose either 
 of remodelling, of fusing, or of suppressing them, with the 
 existing institutions, — the College de France, the Faculties 
 of Letters, the Ecole normale superieure, the Ecole des 
 chartes, all of which were consecrated by the services they 
 had rendered, and by the lustre they received from the 
 
 1 Cf. supra, p. 55. 
 
 338 
 
Appendix II 
 
 eminent men who had been, or were, connected with them. 
 He changed nothing, he added. He crowned the somewhat 
 heterogeneous edifice of existing institutions by the creation 
 of an "Ecole pratique des hautes etudes," which was estab- 
 lished at the Sorbonne in 1868. 
 
 The Ecole pratique des hautes etudes (historical and 
 philological section) was intended by those who founded it 
 to prepare young men for research of a scientific character. 
 It was not meant to be subservient to the interests of the 
 professions, and there was to be no popularisation. Students 
 were not to go there to learn the results obtained by science, 
 but, for the same purpose which takes the chemical student 
 to the laboratory, to be initiated into the technical methods 
 by which new results can be obtained. Thus the spirit of 
 the new institution was not without some analogy to that 
 of the primitive tradition of the College de France. It was 
 endeavoured to do there, for all the branches of universal 
 history and philology, what had long been done at the 
 Ecole des chartes for the limited domain of French mediaeval 
 history. 
 
 II. As long as the Faculties of Letters were satisfied to 
 be as they were (that is, without students), and as long as 
 their ambition did not go beyond their traditional functions 
 (the holding of public lectures, the conferring of degrees), 
 the organisation of the higher teaching of the historical 
 sciences in France remained in the condition which we have 
 described. When the Faculties of Letters began to seek 
 a new justification for their existence and new functions, 
 changes became inevitable. 
 
 This is not the place to explain why and how the 
 Faculties of Letters were led to desire to work more 
 actively, or rather in other ways than in the past, for the 
 promotion of the historical sciences. M. V. Duruy, in 
 inaugurating the Ecole des hautes etudes at the Sorbonne, 
 had declared that this young and vigorous plant would 
 thrust asunder the old stones ; and, without a doubt, the 
 
 339 
 
Appendix II 
 
 spectacle of the fruitful activity of the Ecole des hautes 
 etudes has contributed not a little to awaken the conscience 
 of the Faculties. On the other hand the liberality of the 
 public authorities, which have increased the personnel of the 
 Faculties, which have built palaces for them, and liberally 
 endowed them with the materials required by their work, 
 has imposed new duties on these privileged institutions. 
 
 It is about twenty-five years since the Faculties of Letters 
 began to transform themselves, and during this period their 
 progressive transformation has occasioned changes in the 
 whole fabric of the higher teaching of historical science in 
 France, which up to that time had remained unshaken, even 
 by the ingenious addition of 1868. 
 
 III. The first care of the Faculties was to provide them- 
 selves with students. This was not, to be sure, the main 
 difficulty, for the Ecole normale superieure (in which twenty 
 pupils are admitted every year, chosen from among hundreds 
 of candidates) was no longer sufficient for the recruiting of 
 the now numerous body of professors engaged in secondary 
 education. Many young men who had been candidates 
 (along with the pupils of the Ecole normale superieure) 
 for the degrees which give access to the scholastic profes- 
 sion, were thrown on their own resources. Here was an 
 assured supply of students. At the same time the military 
 laws, by attaching much-prized immunities to the title of 
 licencie es lettres, were calculated to attract to the Faculties, 
 if they prepared students for the licentiate, a large and very 
 interesting clas° of young men. Lastly, the foreigners (so 
 numerous at the Ecole des hautes etudes), who come to 
 France to complete their scientific education, and who up 
 to that time were surprised to have no opportunity of pro- 
 fiting by the Faculties, were sure to go to them as soon as 
 they found there something analogous to what they had 
 been accustomed to find in the German universities, and the 
 kind of instruction they wanted. 
 
 Before students in any great number could be taught the 
 
 340 
 
Appendix II 
 
 way to the Faculties, great efforts were necessary and several 
 years passed ; but it was after the Faculties obtained the 
 students they desired that the real problems presented 
 themselves for solution. 
 
 The great majority of the students in the Faculties of 
 Letters have been originally candidates for degrees, for 
 the licentiate, and for agregation, who entered with the 
 avowed intention of "preparing" for the licentiate and 
 for agregation. The Faculties have not been able to 
 escape the obligation of helping them in this " preparation." 
 But, twenty years ago, examinations were still conceived in 
 accordance with ancient formulae. The licentiate was an 
 attestation of advanced secondary study, a kind of " higher 
 baccalaureate " ; for the agregation in the classes of history 
 and geography (which became the real Ucsntia docendi), the 
 candidates were required to show that they " had a very good 
 knowledge of the subjects they would be charged to teach." 
 Henceforth there was a danger lest the teaching of the 
 Faculties, which must, like that of the Ecole normale 
 superieure, be preparatory for the examinations for the 
 licentiate and for agregation, should be compelled by the 
 force of circumstances to assume the same character. Note 
 that a certain emulation could not fail to arise between the 
 pupils of the icole normale and those of the Faculties in the 
 competitions for agregation. The agregation programmes 
 being what they were, this emulation seemed likely to have 
 the result of engaging the rival teachers and students more 
 and more in school work, not of a scientific kind, equally 
 devoid of dignity and real utility. 
 
 The danger was very serious. It was perceived from 
 the first by those clear-sighted promoters of the reform of 
 the Faculties, MM. A. Dumont, L. Liard, E. Lavisse. M. 
 Lavisse wrote in 1884: "To maintain that the Faculties 
 have for their chief object the preparation for examinations 
 is to substitute drill for scientific culture : this is the serious 
 grievance which able men have against the partisans of 
 
 341 
 
Appendix II 
 
 innovation. . . . The partisans of innovation reply that they 
 have seen the drawbacks of the new departure from the 
 beginning, but that they are convinced that a modification 
 of the examination-system will follow the reform of higher 
 education ; that a reconciliation will be found between 
 scientific work and the preparation for examinations; and 
 that thus the only grievance their opponents have against 
 them will fall to the ground." It is only doing justice to 
 the foremost champion of reform to acknowledge that he 
 was never tired of insisting on the weak point; and in order 
 to convince oneself that the examination question has always 
 been considered the key-stone of the problem of the organisa- 
 tion of higher education in France, it is only necessary to 
 look through the speeches and the articles entitled " Educa- 
 tion and Examinations," " Examinations and Study," " Study 
 and Examinations," &c, which M. Lavisse has collected in 
 his three volumes published at intervals of five years from 
 1885 onwards: Questions tVenseignement national, Etudes et 
 etudiants, A propos de nos ecoles. 
 
 Thus the question of the reform of the examinations 
 connected with higher education (licentiate, agregation, 
 doctorate) has been placed on the order of the day. It was 
 there in 1884; it is still there in 1897. But, during the in- 
 terval, visible progress has been made in the direction which 
 we consider the right one, and now a solution seems near. 
 
 IV. The old examination-system required candidates for 
 degrees to show that they had received an excellent secondary 
 education. As it condemned those candidates, students 
 receiving higher instruction, to exercises of the same kind 
 as those of which they had already had their fill in the 
 lycees, it was a simple matter to attack it. It was defended 
 feebly, and has been demolished. 
 
 But how was it to be replaced ? The problem was very 
 complex. Is it any wonder that it was not solved at a 
 stroke 1 
 
 First of all, it was important to come to an agreement on 
 342 
 
Appendix II 
 
 this preliminary question : What are the capacities and what 
 is the knowledge students should be required to give proof 
 of possessing 1 General knowledge 1 Technical knowledge 
 and the capacity of doing original research (as at the Ecole 
 des chartes and the Ecole des hautes etudes) 1 Pedagogic 
 capacity? It came gradually to be recognised that, con- 
 sidering the great extent and variety of the class from 
 which the students are drawn, it is necessary to draw 
 distinctions. 
 
 From candidates for the licentiate it is enough to require 
 that they should give proof of good general culture, per- 
 mitting them at the same time, if they wish, to show that 
 they have a taste for, and some experience in, original 
 research. 
 
 From the candidates for aggregation (licenlia doceuoli) who 
 have already obtained the licentiate, there will be required 
 (i) formal proof that they know, by experience, what it is 
 to study an historical problem, and that they have the 
 technical knowledge necessary for such studies; (2) proof 
 of pedagogic capacity, which is a professional necessity for 
 this class. 
 
 The students who are not candidates for anything, neither 
 for the licentiate nor for agregation, and who are simply 
 seeking to obtain scientific initiation — the old programmes 
 did not contemplate the existence of such a class of students 
 — will merely be required to prove that they have profited 
 by the tuition and the advice they have received. 
 
 This settled, a great stride has been made. For programmes, 
 as we know, regulate study. By virtue of the authority of 
 the programmes historical studies in the Faculties will now 
 have the threefold character which it is desirable that they 
 should have. General culture will not cease to be held in 
 honour. Technical exercises in criticism and research will 
 have their legitimate place. Lastly, pedagogy (theoretical 
 and practical) will not be neglected. 
 
 The difficulties begin when it is attempted to determine 
 
 343 
 
Appendix II 
 
 the tests which, in each department, are the "best, that 
 is, the most conclusive. On this subject opinions differ. 
 Though no one now contests the principles, the modes of 
 application which have hitherto been tried or suggested do 
 not meet with unanimous approval. The organisation of 
 the licentiate has been revised three times; the statute 
 relating to the agregation in history has been reformed or 
 amended five times. And this is not the end. New sim- 
 plifications are imperative. But what is the importance of 
 this instability — of which, however, complaints begin to be 
 heard l — if it is established, as we believe it is, that progress 
 towards a better state of things has been continuous through 
 all these changes, without any notable retrogression 1 
 
 There is no need to explain here in detail the different 
 transitory systems which have been put into practice. We 
 have had occasion to criticise them elsewhere. 2 Now that 
 most of what we objected to has been abolished, what is 
 the use of reviving old controversies 1 We shall not even 
 mention the points in which the present system seems to 
 us to be still capable of improvement, for there is reason to 
 hope that it will soon be modified, and in a very satisfactory 
 manner. Let it suffice to say that the Faculties now confer 
 a new diploma, the Diplome d'etudes superieures, which all 
 the students have a right to seek, but which the candidates 
 for agregation, are obliged to obtain. This diploma of higher 
 studies, analogous to that of the ifccole des hautes etudes, 
 the brevet of the Ecole des chartes, and the doctorate in 
 philosophy at the German universities, is given to those 
 students of history who, qualified by a certain academical 
 standing, have passed an examination in which the principal 
 tests are, besides questions on the ''sciences" auxiliary to 
 historical research, the composition and the defence of an 
 
 1 Revue historique, lxiii. (1897), p. 96. 
 
 3 See the Revue Internationale d'enseignernent, Feb. 1S93 > the Revue 
 universitaire, June 1892, Oct. and Nov. 1894, July 1895 > aQ d the 
 Political Science Quarterly, Sept. 1894. 
 
 344 
 
Appendix II 
 
 original monograph. Every one now recognises that "the 
 examination for the diploma of studies will yield excellent 
 fruit, if the vigilance and conscientiousness of examiners 
 maintain it at its proper value." l 
 
 V. To sum up, the attractions of preparation for degrees 
 have brought the Faculties a host of students. But, under 
 the old system of examinations for the licentiate and for 
 aggregation, preparation for degrees was a task which did not 
 harmonise very well with the work which the Faculties 
 deemed suitable for themselves, useful to their pupils, 
 and advantageous to science. The examination-system has 
 therefore been perseveringly reformed, not without difficulty, 
 into conformity with a certain ideal of what the higher 
 teaching of history ought to be. The result is that the 
 Faculties have taken rank among the institutions which 
 contribute to the positive progress of the historical sciences. 
 An enumeration of the works which have appeared under 
 their auspices during the last few years would, if necessary, 
 bear witness to the fact. 
 
 ' This evolution has already produced satisfactory results, 
 and will produce more if it goes on as well as it has begun. 
 To begin with, the transformation of historical instruction in 
 the Faculties has brought about a corresponding transforma- 
 tion at the Ecole normale superieure. The Ecole normale 
 has also, for two years, been awarding a "Dipldme aV etudes " ; 
 original researches, pedagogic exercises, and general culture 
 are encouraged there in the same degree as by the new 
 Faculties. It now differs from the Faculties only in being 
 a close institution, recruited under certain precautions; 
 practically it is a Faculty like the others, but with a small 
 number of select students. Secondly, the Ecole des 
 hautes etudes and the Ecole des chartes, both of which 
 will be installed at the end of 1819 7, in the renovated 
 
 1 Revue, historique, I.e. p. 98. I have developed elsewhere what I 
 have here contented myself with stating. See the Revue Internationale 
 de Venseignement, Nov. 1897. — [C. V. L.] 
 
 345 ' 
 
Appendix II 
 
 Sorbonne, have still their justification for existence ; for 
 many specialists are represented at the Ecole des hautes 
 etudes which are not, and doubtless never will be, repre- 
 sented in the Faculties; and, in the case of the studies 
 bearing on medieval history, the body of converging in- 
 struction given at the Ecole des chartes will always be 
 incomparable. But the old antagonism between the Ecole 
 des hautes etudes and the Ecole des chartes on the one 
 hand, and the Faculties on the other, has disappeared. All 
 these institutions, lately so dissimilar, will henceforth co- 
 operate for the purpose of carrying on a common work in 
 a common spirit. Each of these retains its name, its auto- 
 nomy, and its traditions ; but together they form a whole : 
 the historical section of an ideal University of Paris, much 
 vaster than the one which was sanctioned by the law in 
 1896. Of this " greater " University, the Ecole des chartes, 
 the £cole des hautes etudes, the Ecole normale sup^rieure, 
 and the whole body of historical instruction given by the 
 Faculty of Letters, are now practically so many independent 
 " instituts." 
 
 346 
 
INDEX OF PROPER NAMES 
 
 Abd-el-Kader, 282 
 Airao, 158 
 
 Alexander the Great, 272 
 Alphonse of Poitiers, 227 
 Altamira, R., 328 
 Anselme, Pere, 303 
 Ariovistus, 222 
 Aristophanes, 171 
 Aristotle, 44 
 Athenseus, 300 
 
 Bacon, Francis, 291 
 
 Bancroft, H. H., 19, 20, 22, 31 
 
 Barthelemy, Abb6, 301 
 
 Bast, F. J., 78 
 
 Bedier, J., 85, 112 
 
 Bernheim, E., 6, 7, IO, 13, 38, 
 
 56, 74, 91, 99, ico, 156, 182, 
 
 198, 237, 297 
 Blanchere, R. de la, 319 
 Blass, F., 74, 78, 79, 89, 92 
 Bodin, Jean, 44 
 Boeckh, A., 107, 152 
 Bohmer, J. F., 106 
 Bollandists, Society of, 35 
 Bonaventura, St., 88, 90 
 Bouche-Leclercq, A., 158 
 Boucherie, A., 113 
 Bourdeau, L., 275 
 Boutaric, E., 227 
 Boyce, W. B., I 
 Brequigny, L. G. 0. F. de, 106 
 Broglie, E. de, 29 
 
 Brugiere de Barante, A. G. P., 
 
 301 
 Brunetiere, F., 113 
 Buchez, P. J. B., I 
 Buhler, G., 56 
 
 Cesar, Julius, 44, 194, 197, 218, 
 
 220, 222, 245 
 Cagnat, R., 57 
 Cantu, C, 311 
 
 Carlyle, Thomas, 132, 230, 303 
 Chanipollion, F., 48 
 Charles IX. of France, 168, 186 
 Cbasles, M., 88 
 
 Chateaubriand, F. A. de, 72, 301 
 Chemosh, the god, 212 
 Cherot, H., 7 
 Chevalier, U., 5, 7 
 Chladenius, J. M., 6 
 Cicero, 44, 108 
 Cleopatra, 88, 248 
 Clovis, 158, 220, 223, 301 
 Cobet, C. C, 78 
 Coulanges, Fustel de, 1, 9, 10, 64, 
 
 140, 144, 148, 149, 150, 158, 
 
 170, 215, 216, 230 
 Cournot, A. A., 246, 249 
 Cousin, V., 286, 287 
 Curtius, G., 230, 314 
 
 Daniel, Pere, 303 
 Daremberg, C. V., 308 
 Darius Hystaspes, 15 1 
 
 347 
 
Index of Proper Names 
 
 Daunou, P. C. F., 5, 6, 43, 
 
 54,55 
 Delisle, L., 23, 97 
 Deloche, J. E. M., 148 
 Demosthenes, 171 
 Dezobry, C. L., 302 
 Droysen, J. G., 3, 5, 7, 10, 1 
 
 156, 158, 286, 314 
 Du Cange, C. du F., 105, 136, 
 Dumont, A., 341 
 Duruy, V., 327, 338, 339 
 
 Ebers, G., 301 
 
 Edward VI. of England, 249 
 
 Egger, E., 108 
 
 Eginhard, 94 
 
 Ephorus, 298 
 
 Eusebius, 298 
 
 Feillet, A., 162 
 Feugere, L., 105, 136 
 Fisher, H. A. L., 125 
 Flaubert, G., 5, 32, 304, 319 
 Flint, R., 2, 6, 8, 285 
 France, A., 319 
 Fredegonda, 197 
 Freeman, E. A., 5, 7, 10, 46 
 Froissart, Jean, 19 
 Froude, J. A., 125, 126 
 
 Geiger, W., 56 
 Gellius, Aulu.8,.300 
 Georgisch, P., 106 
 Giannone, Pietro, 104 
 Gibbon, E., 44 
 Gilbert, Gustav, 309 
 Giry, A., 57 
 Glasson, E., 149 
 Goethe, J. W. von, 19, 319 
 Grow, J., 75 
 Graux, C, 123 
 Gregory of Corinth, 78 
 Gregory of Tours, 144, 146, 
 180, 198, 256 
 
 47, 
 
 06, 
 148 
 
 158, 
 
 Grober, G., 57, 310 
 Grote, G., 183, 310 
 Grotius, Hugo, 44 
 Guicciardini, Francesco, 44 
 Guiraud, P., 230 
 
 Hagen, H., 78 
 
 Hardouin, Pere, 99 
 
 Harnack, A. , 309 
 
 Havet, Julien, 12, 56, 97, 123, 
 
 128 
 Havet, Louis, 12 
 Haureau, B., 84, in, 1 18, 123 
 Hegel, G. W. F., 286 
 Henry VIII. of England, 249 
 Henry II. of France, 292 
 Henry, V., 289 
 Herodotus, 44, 171, 179, 197 
 Horace, 99 
 Hoveden, John, 88 
 Hroswitha, 99 
 Hugo, Victor, 88, 89 
 Hume, D., 44 
 
 Jaffe, P., 106 
 
 Jameson, J. F., 136 
 
 Jerome, St., 112 
 
 Jesus Christ, 188 
 
 Joan of Arc, 188 
 
 John, King of England, 187 
 
 Jullian, C, 297 
 
 Krumbacher, K., 309 
 Kuhn, E., 56 
 
 Lacombe, T., 2, 233, 241, 277, 288 
 Lamprecht, K., 230, 247, 284, 290, 
 
 314 
 Langlois, Ch. V., 19, 38, ill, 135, 
 
 192, 345 
 Lasch, B,, 68 
 Laurent, F., 285 
 Lavisse, E., 134, 328, 333, 337, 
 
 34i, 342 
 
 348 
 
Index of Proper Names 
 
 Lavoisier, A. L., 302 
 
 Leibnitz, G. W., 121, 122 
 
 Lee, Sidney, 308 
 
 Le Moyne, Pere, 7 
 
 Lenglet de Fresnoy, N., 6 
 
 Leonardo da Vinci, 88, 89 
 
 Liard, L., 335, 341 
 
 Lindner, T., 81 
 
 Lindsay, W. M., 78, 79, 84 
 
 Livy, 44, 178^ 180, 233, 297, 
 
 298 
 Locke, John, 44 
 Loebell, J. W., 180 
 Lorenz, O., 10 
 Loudun, the nuns of, 208 
 Louis VIII. of France, 187 
 Louis of Granada, 88 
 Luard, H. R., 98 
 Luther, Martin, 203 . 
 
 Mably, G. B. de, 43, 44 
 
 Macaulay, Lord, 303 
 
 Macchiavelli, N., 44 
 
 Madvig, J. N., 78 
 
 Mariani, L., 4 
 
 Marquardt, J., 309 
 
 Marselli, N., 2 
 
 Mary Magdalene, St. , 88 
 
 Mary, Queen, 249 
 
 Matthew of Paris, 98 
 
 Matthew of Westminster, 97 
 
 Mayr, J. von, 274 
 
 Me'rime'e, P., 301 
 
 Mesha Inscription, the, 212 
 
 Meusel, H., 148 
 
 Meyer, E., 158 
 
 Meyer, P., 29 
 
 M^zeray, F. E. de, 298 
 
 Michelet, J., 230, 271, 286, 287, 
 
 301, 303, 327, 336 
 Moller, W., 309 
 Mommsen, T., 108, 118, 230, 286, 
 
 309, 3H 
 Monod, G., 100, 144, 297, 302 
 
 Montesquieu, C. de S., 44, 257, 
 
 284, 299 
 Montfaucon, Pere Bernard de, 29 
 Montgomery, Gabriel de, 292 
 Mortet, Ch. and V., 1 1 
 Mourin, E., 302 
 Miiller, I. von, 56, 74, 310 
 Mylaeus, 6 
 
 Napoleon I., 26, 282 
 Newton, Isaac, 302 
 Niebuhr, B. G., 158, 182 
 Nietzsche, F., 319 
 Nitzsch, C. W., 180 
 
 Oncken, W., 311 
 Orosius, 298 
 Ossian, 91 
 Otto I., 175 
 
 Paris, G., 309 
 Patrizzi, Francesco, 6 
 Pattison, Mark, 1 15 
 Paul, H., 75, 310 
 Pauly, A., 308 
 Pausanias, 74 
 Peckham, John, 88 
 Peiresc, N. F. 0. de, 22 
 j Pflugk-Harttung, J. von, 10, 130 
 Philippi, A., 129 
 Piaget, A., 91 
 Pisistratus, 207 
 Plato, 153 
 Plutarch, 44, 297 
 Polybius, 44, 279, 297 
 Potthast, A., 106 
 Prou, M., 57 
 
 Ranke, L., 140, 286 
 
 Raynal, J., 44 
 
 Reinach, S., 75, 79 
 
 Renan, E., 9, 29, 30, 40, 105, 1 14, 
 
 119, 122, 132, 134, 183 
 Retz, Cardinal de, 44, 162, 169 
 
 349 
 
Index of Pkoper Names 
 
 Rilliet, A., 162 
 Robertson, J. M., 115, 241 
 Robertson, W., 44 
 Rocholl, R., 285 
 Rousseau, J. J., 44 
 Rulhiere, C. C. de, 44 
 
 SaCxLIO, E., 30S 
 
 Saint-Simon, C. H. de, 251 
 
 Sallust, 44 
 
 Sanchoniathon, 91 
 
 Schiller, J. C. F. von, 162 
 
 Sehlosser, F. C, 31 1 
 
 Schcemann, G. F., 309 
 
 Seguier, J. F., 109 
 
 Seignobos, Ch., II, 66, 196, 257, 
 
 333. 334 
 Seneca, 78 
 
 Sforza, Ludovico, 282 
 Sickel, T. von, 56 
 Shnmel, G., 217 
 Smedt, Pere de, 10, 156, 207, 
 
 254 
 Spencer, Herbert, 287 
 Stephen, Leslie, 308 
 Stubbs, W M 10 
 Suetonius, 94 
 Suger, Abbot, 170 
 Suidas, 158 
 Sully, M., 169 
 Surville, Clotilde de, 91 
 
 Tacitus, 44, 141, 144, 171, 177, 
 
 194, 233, 256 
 Taine, H. A 140, 143, 247, 286 
 
 Tardif, A., 5, 7, 156 
 
 Taylor, J., 75 
 
 Thierry, Augustin, 98, 140, 230, 
 
 259, 265, 301, 302, 303 
 Thomas, A., J^ 
 Thucydides, 19, 44, 158, 183, 197, 
 
 297 
 Tobler, A., 75 
 Tschudi, J. H., 162, 171 
 Turenne, H. de la T. d'A., 162 
 
 Vercingetorix, 88 
 Vergil, 84, 99 
 Vertot, R. A. de, 44 
 Villeraarque", H. de, 181 
 Vincent de Paul, St., 326 
 Voltaire, F. M. A. de, 44, 299 
 Vrain-Lucas, 88 
 
 Waitz, G., 1 10, 118 
 Wallace, A. R., 207 
 Waltzing, J, P., 108 
 Wattenbach, W., 73 
 Wauters, A. C, 106 
 Weber, G., 311 
 Wegele, F. X. von, 122, 297 
 Wendover, Roger de, 98 
 Wissowa, G., 308 
 Wittekind, 175 
 Wright, T., 84 
 
 Xenophon, 44 
 
 Zumpt, A. W., 108 
 
 Printed in Great Britain by 
 Lowe and Brydone (Printers) Ltd., London.