•^oo"* 
 
 ,-N 7*. 
 
 .^^ 
 

 ,-.v <u. 
 
 ■"-* <■ •>>. c!* 
 
 
 
 ^^^. 
 
 •x^' 
 
 
 
 ...^^ 
 
 \ 
 
 
 
 1 ^ f 
 
 n? 
 
 0^ 
 
 
 
 ^^^ 
 
 '""--. 
 
 
 
 x^- 
 
 > -^• 
 
 \0 p^ 
 
 •?/•,"' 
 
 
 .\^^ 
 
 ■'b 
 
 
 
 ^^■■ 
 
 XN^^~ 
 
 '-^A V^ 
 
 c-0~ 
 
 
 
 X. .c^^' 
 
 
 X^^ "^ 
 
 
 X^" 
 
 ,\ r. 
 
 
 '>- >:^' 
 
 .^^ 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 >..^^ 
 
 <-i^ 
 
 
 
 
 i^ 
 
^^ 
 
 j.r 
 
i 
 
\^'-". ...♦«;^JiJ*is?«i*«i»5s*yrt-'w:«wuH^a!n 
 
 '4i 
 
STORY OF THE WAR. 
 
 PICTORIAL HISTORY 
 
 OP 
 
 THE GREAT CIVIL WAR: 
 
 EMBRACING 
 
 FULL AND AUTHENTIC ACCOUNTS 
 
 BATTLES BY LAND AND SEA, 
 
 WITH 
 
 Graphic Descriptions of Heroic Deeds Achieved by Armies and Individuals; 
 
 Narratives of Personal Adventure ; Thrilling Incidents ; Daring 
 
 Exploits ; Wonderful Escapes ; Life in Camp, Field and 
 
 Hospital ; Adventures of Blockade Life, etc. 
 
 CONTAINING 
 
 GAr^BPULLY PI^BPAI^BD BIOGr^APHIES 
 
 OF- 
 
 the . Leading Qenerals and J\[aval eommanders. 
 
 John Laird Vv^ilson, 
 
 Special Correspondent of the New York Herald. 
 
 EMBELLISHED WITH NUMEROUS FINE STEEL-PLATE ENGRAVINGS OF BATTLE- 
 bCENES. AMD WITH PORTRAITS OF LEADING GENERALS. 
 
e^ 
 
 u^ 
 
 VJI-^ 
 
 Copyright, lS7u, by John Laird Wilson, 
 
 Copyright, 1881, by .1 R, Jomes. 
 
 
^ ^ ^ 
 
 /o 
 
 DEDICATION 
 
 To our brave and heroic countrymen who in the fierce struggle of 
 our Great Civil War battled in the cause of patriotism, whether 
 they marched under the Stars and Stripes or followed the ensigns 
 of the "Lost Cause;" whether they wore the Blue or the Gray; and 
 who still survive to enjoy honors from their admiring countrymen; 
 
 To the memory of those who sleeping on battle-field or in cemetery 
 await the trumpet sound of the great resurrection; 
 
 To Grant of the North, to Lee of the South — to the followers of 
 both — and to every patriotic 5on of America — who would have the 
 true story of this great fratricidal struggle chronicled by an impartial 
 hand with justice to all, extolling virtue, heroism and patriotic devotion 
 to principle wherever found, 
 
 This Volume is reverently 
 
 DEDICATED 
 
 BY THE AUTHOR 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 IN oflfering to the public a new History of the Great Civil "War, a few words oi 
 explanatiou are necessary. Of histories, general and special, relating to the 
 late struggle a number have been published, but they were nearly all written at a 
 period so close to the war that the writers were unconsciously biassed by the strong 
 feelings which they shared in common with their fellow-citizens during the occur- 
 rence of the events they relate. Time had not softened their prejudices sufficiently 
 to enable them to write with the judicial calmness necessary to the proper treat- 
 ment of such a subject. It is hoped that in the long years that have elapsed since 
 the return of peace enough has been made plain, and sufficient calmness has been 
 gained, to enable the writer to prepare a history which shall do impartial justica 
 to the struggle itself and to the actors engaged in it. 
 
 It has been my aim to present a continuous narrative covering the entire area 
 of operations, both military and naval, and free from those interruptions which in 
 general history are unavoidable. I have endeavored to carry the reader with me 
 over sea and land, wherever the sounds of war were heard, and to present to him in 
 a series of vivid and faithful pictures the events which marked the progress of the 
 great struggle. Of the movements of the hostile forces, and of the commanders 
 under whom at different times and at different places these movements were 
 made, I have expressed my opinion with great freedom, awarding praise or 
 blame as truth or justice seemed to call for the one or the other. I do not expect 
 that my judgments will find favor from all classes ak leaders, but I know that 
 they are the judgments of an unbiassed mind, solicitous for the truth and con- 
 strained only by the irresistible logic of facts. 
 
 My information I have drawn from sources too n'."nerous to be mentioued in 
 detail. Contemporary magazines and pamphlets, private letters and documents 
 of various kinds which have been kindly placed at my disposal, — all have been 
 consulted with more or less profit. In cases of doubt, where testimony was absent 
 or conflicting, I have corresponded with some of the principal leaders in the 
 
 ni 
 
iV PREFACE. 
 
 strife ; and the information thus derived from both Northern and Southern sources 
 has been to me of incalculable value. Of the results of the labors of others in 
 the same field, it is hardly necessary to say, I have taken full advantage. To the 
 exhaustive history of the war by Dr. Lossing, and to the scarcely less exhaustive, 
 but in some respects more philosophical, work of Dr. Draper, I confess myself 
 under great obligations. I have perused with profit and with pleasure Prof. Wil- 
 liam Swinton's " Decisive Battles of the War ;" and in his " Campaigns of the 
 Army of the Potomac " I have found much with which to illumine and adorn 
 these pages. Of the " History of the Civil War in America," by the Comte de 
 Paris, so far as it has advanced, I cannot speak too highly; and in the preparation 
 of some of the earlier chapters of this work I have found it a useful book of 
 reference. In terms of similar praise I desire to speak of the " Memoirs of Gen- 
 eral Sherman " and of Badeau's " Military Life of General Grant." From among 
 the many other works which I have consulted with advantage, and to which I 
 cannot refuse to admit my indebtedness, I would mention the " Rebellion Record," 
 " The Great Civil War " by Tomes and Smith, " Grant and his Campaigns " by 
 Dr. Henry Coppee, Tenney's "Military and Naval History of the Rebellion," 
 " The Battle of Gettysburg " by Samuel P. Bates, Pollard's " Lost Cause," and 
 " Chancellorsville " by Hotchkiss and Allan. 
 
 As it is, this work is now given to the public ; and if it shall be found that, 
 while doing reasonable justice to all the parties concerned, I have in any degree 
 been able to render such disastrous struggles impossible for the future, I shall feci 
 
 that the hours spent over these pages h.-^ve not been spent in vain. 
 
 J. L. W" 
 
PICTORIAL HISTORY 
 
 THE GREAT CIVIL WAR. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Ihe Aim and Object of this History.— The Causes of the War.— State Eights.- The Tariff and Slavery.— Diverge 
 ing Interests of North and South. — Effect of the Abolition of Slavery in the British Colonies on American 
 Sentiment. — Tlie Missouri Compromise. — The Fugitive Slave Bill. — Repeal of the Missouri Compromise.— 
 Formation of the Republican Party. — Kansas Struggle. — Triumph of the Anti-Slavery Party. — The Campaign 
 of 1856. — Buchanan elected President. — The Kansas-Nebraska Struggle. — Buchanan's Unfortunate Admin- 
 istration.— The Dred Scott Decision. — The John Brown Raid.— The Sale of Arms to the South.— Secession and 
 Organization of the Confederacy. — Election and Inauguration of President Lincoln. — His Address. — The Firing 
 npon Fort Sumter. 
 
 In many respects the American Civil 
 War was the most momentous struggle 
 that ever marked the history of the 
 world. Not only did it employ larger 
 armies and fleets than were ever called 
 for by other combatants; not only did 
 it exceed the immortal campaigns of 
 Frederick and Napoleon in the magni- 
 tude and brilliancy of its operations; 
 not only did its theatre comprise an 
 area larger than the whole continent of 
 Europe, embracing as many varieties of 
 climate, and presenting as many natural 
 obstacles to be overcome ; not only did it 
 inaugurate a new era and a new mode 
 of warfare, — but it also served to develop 
 the strength and resources of the coun- 
 try it was supposed to be wasting, and 
 to make plain to the world the true 
 character, the immense resources, and 
 the especial genius for war of the Amer- 
 ican people, and to offer a convincing 
 
 proof of the imperishable nature of free 
 institutions when entrusted to the keep- 
 ing of a race of men trained to under- 
 stand and value them— men willing and 
 resolved to maintain them even at the 
 cost of their lives. The magnitude and 
 grandeur of the events of this great 
 struggle give to them a picturesqueness, 
 so to speak, which must make a faithful 
 account of them deeply interesting to 
 our people. 
 
 To write the history of such a struggle 
 must be no easy task, for while lauding 
 the glory of the conqueror the virtues 
 of the vanquished must not be for- 
 gotten. In such a task passion and 
 prejudice, sectional pride and intoler- 
 ance of opposition, have no place; the 
 faithful historian must record events as 
 they occurred. Such a task we propose 
 to ourselves in the work now before us. 
 
 In the following pages it will be oui 
 
CAUSES OP THE WAE. 
 
 aim and endeavor to caiTy the reader 
 with us, as we follow the contending 
 armies and mark the progress of the 
 conflict ; to halt, from time to time, as 
 the embattled hosts confront each other, 
 listening to the roar of battle and wit- 
 nessing the wild work of war — the de- 
 vastation of fields, the desolation of 
 homes, the carnage, the slaughter, the 
 tortured agony of the wounded, and the 
 ghastly features of the dead ; to rejoice 
 with the triumphant defenders of the 
 right, without being ungenerous to the 
 erring and the vanquished ; and finally, 
 to point out the blessed results which 
 flowed out of the terrible struggle, not 
 to the United States alone, but to all 
 nations and to all peoples. 
 
 Preliminary to this, however, and in 
 order to enable the reader intelligently 
 to follow us in our descriptions of the 
 different battle scenes, it is necessary 
 to recount briefly, but clearly and im- 
 partially, the remote and proximate 
 eauses of the rebellion and the events 
 which immediately preceded the out- 
 break of hostilities. The antagonism 
 between North and South which came 
 to a head in December, 1860, in 
 the secession of South Carolina 
 from the Union was not new. It was 
 old almost as the Union itself. It had 
 its roots deep down in the nation's his- 
 tory. It might be interesting, if it lay 
 within the scope of this work, to show 
 how much of this antagonism was due 
 to race, how much was due to climate, 
 how much was due to interest, and 
 the pursuits of life. In all these par- 
 ticulars, it could be easily shown, there 
 was difference between North and 
 
 1860. 
 
 South. But to enter into these details 
 with any degree of fulness would be 
 foreign to our plan. From the very 
 commencement of our national history 
 difference of opinion prevailed as to the 
 nature of the bond which held the 
 States together. It was held by one 
 class of statesmen that the Federal 
 Union was a league or confederation 
 which might be dissolved at will by 
 any of the States. It was held by an- 
 other class of statesmen that the Fed- 
 eral Union constituted a nation, with 
 a national government, and that no 
 one State coxild secede from the Union 
 without the consent of all the others. 
 This was the radical difference out of 
 which ultimately grew the rebellion. 
 It was not until certain material ques- 
 tions arose that any serious practical 
 point was given to this difference of 
 opinion. In course of time such ques- 
 tions did arise. Chief among these 
 were those which related to the tariff 
 and to slavery. The South, which de- 
 pended on the products of the soil, de- 
 manded free trade. The North, which 
 derived its wealth from the manufac 
 tuiing industries, called for protection. 
 And while great statesmen advocated 
 these conflicting views, Congress wit- 
 nessed many a stormy scene. The ques- 
 tion, however, which was a pennanent 
 source of division, and on which agree- 
 ment was found to be impossible, was 
 that of slavery. 
 
 At the time of the formation of the 
 Union, slaveiy was more or less common 
 in all the States. It was more common 
 in the South than in the North, but it 
 existed in all the States. The invention 
 
THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE. 
 
 of the cotton-gin by Whitney, in 1793, 
 rendering, as it did, the cultivation of 
 cotton the leadino; branch of Southern 
 industry, hxrgely increased the demand 
 for slave labor. While slavery, for a 
 variety of reasons, had ceased to be a 
 source of wealth in the North, and was 
 gradually dying out, it had become a 
 source of great wealth to the Southern 
 planters and a conspicuous feature of 
 Southern life. In the year 1860, the 
 negro population of the Southern States 
 had increased to about four millions. 
 In the North, slavery had completely 
 died out, and in the States of the North- 
 west, which were now being rapidly 
 filled up with free immigrants, it never 
 found a place. Slavery was thus found 
 to be a root of bitterness. It deter- 
 mined and rendered permanent the nat- 
 ural antagonism between North and 
 South. Yeai' by year the gulf was 
 widening; and it became more and more 
 apparent that if the South were not to 
 be allowed to maintain its peculiar and 
 favorite institution, and would not be 
 permitted to secede, a gigantic civil 
 war was one of the certainties of the 
 not distant future. 
 
 The slavery question, as we have 
 said, was a cause of division from the 
 beginning of om* history. The anti- 
 slavery agitation in England, and the 
 passing of the memorable law in 1807, 
 abolishing the slave trade in the British 
 colonies, had naturally enough a pow- 
 erful influence on this side of the At- 
 lantic. It helped to determine the pur- 
 pose of the North, and it infused new 
 life into all those who were in favor of 
 abolition. It was not, however, until 
 
 about the year 1820 that the real po- 
 litical struggle began. With the famous 
 Missouri Compi'omise began that polit- 
 ical contest out of which grew the civil 
 war. It was the first of a series of 
 steps which led up to the act of seces- 
 sion and the firing on Fort Sumter. The 
 Missouii Compromise, it was supposed, 
 was a complete and satisfactory settle- 
 ment of the dispute between the North 
 and the South. It turned out to be a 
 great source of trouble. Its history is 
 as follows : Missouri formed part of the 
 Louisiana purchase. After the organ- 
 ization of the " Territory of Orleans," 
 in 1803, Missouri fonned part of the 
 "District of Louisiana." Later it took 
 the name of " Missouri Territory." The 
 State of Missouri was a part of that 
 Territory. In 1820, Missouri applied 
 to Congress for admission into the Union 
 as a State. It was proposed that the 
 application be granted only on condi- 
 tion that slavery be prohibited in the 
 new State. The pro-slavery party were 
 indignant. Both in and out of Congi-ess 
 party feeling ran high. The discussion, 
 which was conducted with great bitter- 
 nees, resulted in what was called a com- 
 pramise. It was agreed that slavery be 
 allowed in Missouri, but prohibited in 
 all the ten'itory of the United States 
 north and west of the northern bound- 
 ary of Arkansas. On these terms Mis- 
 souri entered the Union as a State. 
 The compromise, from which so much 
 was expected, settled nothing. The 
 Southern people continued to feel and 
 act as if they had been hindered in the 
 exercise of their rights. In 1850, 
 they succeeded in passing the- 
 
CAUSES OF THE WAR. 
 
 Fugitive Slave B^il , ^yhicli enabled mas- 
 ters to recover theii' slaves who might 
 have escaped to a freo State. This act 
 gave great umbrage to the North. In 
 
 1854. 
 
 1854 the South gained another 
 
 triimiph by the ivpeal of the Mis- 
 souri Compromise. Th:s act, which had 
 for its object the oi'gainzation of a ter- 
 ritorial govei'nment in Kansas and Ne- 
 braska, provided that the people of the 
 Territories should be at liberty to adopt 
 or exclude slavery, as they thought fit. 
 State Rights were thus again in the as- 
 cendant; and the Southern planters were 
 left at liberty to establish their favor- 
 ite institutions all over the Southwest. 
 At this juncture was formed the Re- 
 publican party — a party whose princi- 
 pal doctrine was opposition to the ex- 
 tension of slaveiy. The organization of 
 the Republican party made it plain to 
 all the world that the struggle between 
 the South and the North — between the 
 pro-slavery party on the one hand and 
 the anti-slavery party on the other — 
 meant war to the knife. A truce was 
 now no longer possible. 
 
 These preliminary remarks would be 
 incomplete Avithout a passing reference 
 to what is known as the Kansas struggle. 
 Kansas, like Missouri, originally formed 
 part of that immense territory which 
 went by the name of Louisiana, It will 
 be remembered by the reader that the 
 Missouri Compromise left the south- 
 western provinces open for the introduc- 
 tion of slaveiy. The repeal of that act by 
 Mr. Douglas's bill did not destroy the 
 hopes of the southern planters with re- 
 gard to Kansas. From the date of the 
 Missouri Compromise it had been the 
 
 battle-groxmd of the two contending 
 parties. Both the pro-slavery party 
 and the anti-slavery party did their 
 best to colonize it. From the East and 
 the Northwest freemen poured into the 
 new territory, and " emigrant aid soci- 
 eties" were formed in all the Free 
 States to lend the freemen a helping 
 hand. The South was not less indus- 
 trious in its efforts. " Bordei- ruffians," 
 as they were called, rushed in from the 
 neighboring State of Missouri, and a 
 reign of violence ensued almost if not 
 entirely unparalleled in the history of 
 the country. The Kansas struggle, as 
 can easily be imagined, deeply embit- 
 tered feeling on both sides, and had 
 a powerful influence in hastening the 
 " in'epressible conflict." At last, after 
 some years of weary fighting, the anti- 
 slavery party triumphed, and Kansas 
 was admitted a free State 30th Januaiy, 
 1861. While this struggle was at its 
 height, took place the presidential elec- 
 tion of 1856. It was one of the 
 keenest contests in the history of 
 the country. Mr. Fremont, the Repub- 
 lican candidate, polled a large number 
 of votes ; but the Democrats carried 
 the day, and Mr. Buchanan, a warm 
 friend of the South, came into power. 
 The election of a Democratic president 
 was more an apparent than a real gain 
 to the South. Mr. Buchanan, with all 
 his immense influence, could not hinder 
 the admission of Kansas as a free State ; 
 and the settlement of the Kansas diffi- 
 culty was justlj^ regarded as an anti- 
 slavery triumph. "The Kansas-Nebras- 
 ka struggle," as Dr. Draper well puts 
 it, " marks an epoch in the great contro- 
 
BUCHANAN'S ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 versy between the North and the South. 
 It closes the period of parliamentary or 
 congressional debate between them, and 
 introduces one of violence and open 
 war. The South clearly perceived that 
 nothing more was to be hoped for from 
 peaceful measures, and that, if it were 
 its intention to perpetuate or even to 
 protect African slavery, it could do so 
 only by force." 
 
 The history of the next four years is 
 the history of a war of opposing views 
 and conflicting aims. The South was 
 becoming more embittered, the North 
 raore resolute. The Buchanan admin- 
 istration was in fact a great misfortune 
 to the country. Of all the pul>lic men 
 of his time, he was perhaps least fitted 
 for the stern duties which devolved up- 
 on the chief of the State. Men like 
 Cromwell or Napoleon or General Jack- 
 son would have been equal to the sit- 
 uation ; but Buchanan was neither a 
 Cromwell nor a Napoleon, nor is he to 
 be mentioned in the same breath with 
 General Jackson. Admirably adapted 
 for the high position in times of peace, 
 he was altogether ime(iual to the stirring 
 times in which he found himself. A 
 strong hand would have seized the helm 
 and acted with decision. The prospect 
 of war unnerved him; he hesitated, and 
 the vessel floated to destruction. His 
 term of ofiice was marked by four great 
 events — the Dred Scott decision in 
 1857 ; the John Brown raid in the 
 fall of 1859 ; the sale of arms to 
 the South, and the organization and re- 
 tirement from the Union of the Southern 
 Confederacy. The Dred Scott decision 
 vvaw very properly regarded in the 
 
 1857. 
 
 North as the virtual establishment of 
 slavery throughout all the States of the 
 Union, and converting it from a local 
 into a national institution. According 
 to the decision given by Judge Taney 
 of the Supreme Court in this case, a 
 slave owner might carry his slaves with 
 him into any State of the Union. Some 
 of the Northern States resented this 
 decision by passing " Personal Liberty 
 Laws," declaring freedom to every 
 slave who came within their borders. 
 The bitter feelings engendered on both 
 sides by the Dred Scott affair were ag- 
 gravated by the John Brown raid. It 
 was no doubt a foolish affair, which 
 never had the approval of any large or 
 influential st ct'iDU of the Northern peo- 
 ple ; but it was felt by the South to be 
 a demonstration of Northern sentiment^ 
 and it was treated accordingly. The 
 execution of Brown and his associates 
 was no doubt justified by the law of 
 the land, but it was nevertheless a great 
 blunder. It exalted a foolish filibus- 
 tering raid into the character of a cru- 
 sade for liberty, and it transformed a 
 crazy old man into a hero and a martjr. 
 Blood had now been shed, and recon- 
 ciliation had become impossible. 
 
 In the midst of the heat and excite- 
 ment occasioned by the Dred Scott de- 
 cision and the John Brown raid, the 
 South was secretly and busily prepar 
 ing for Avar. Through the indifference 
 of the government at Washington, and 
 through the treacheiy of the secretary 
 of war, large stores of arms and am- 
 munition were transferred to the South; 
 and while the North was dreaming of 
 war only as a probability, the South 
 
10 
 
 CAUSES OP THE WAR. 
 
 1860. 
 
 was armed to the teeth. Such was the 
 condition of things North and South 
 when the time came to nominate a can- 
 didate for the presidency in the spring 
 of 1860. The people were di- 
 vided into four parties. Each 
 party had its own candidate, and each 
 candidate had his own platform. The 
 candidates were Breckenridge, of the 
 Southern Democracy; Douglas, of the 
 Northern Democracy ; Lincoln, of the 
 Republican party; and Bell, of the 
 Union Constitutional party. On the 
 platform that "there is no law for 
 slavery in the Territories, and no 
 power to enact one ; and that Congress 
 is bound to prohibit it in or exclude 
 it fi'om every Federal Territory," the 
 Republicans carried the day. The elec- 
 KoT. tion of Lincoln on the 6th of No- 
 
 *• vember, 1860, crushed the hopes 
 of the South. It was the signal for 
 secession. South Carolina was the first 
 to move. At a special convention, held 
 Dec. on the 20th of December, 1860, 
 
 20» her connection with the Union 
 was dissolved by an unanimous vote. 
 The example of South Carolina was 
 promptly followed by Mississippi, Ala- 
 bama, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana, 
 and later by Texas. As Buchanan held 
 the opinion that neither he nor Con- 
 gress had the right to coerce a State 
 into submission, nothing was done 
 to hinder the progress of seces- 
 sion. On the 4th of February, 1861, a 
 F*b« convention of the seceded States 
 
 4« was held at Montgomery, Alaba- 
 ma; and there a constitution was adopt- 
 ed and a government organized, under 
 the name of the Confederate States of 
 
 1861. 
 
 America. Jefferson Davis, late United 
 States senator from Mississippi, was 
 elected president, and Alexander H. 
 Stephens of Georgia vice-president. 
 The seceders took possession of all the 
 forts, arsenals, custom-houses, ships, 
 and all other Federal property within 
 their boundaries. In the South, iu the 
 possession of the United States there 
 remained only Fort Sumter, in Charles- 
 ton Harbor, Fort Pickens, near Pensa- 
 cola, and the forts off the southern 
 extremity of Florida. 
 
 On Mareli 4th, 1861, Abraham Lin- 
 coln was inaugurated. In his ad- Mar. 
 dress, the president declared it to *• 
 be his duty to "hold, occupy and pos- 
 sess the places and property " belong- 
 ing to the Federal government in the 
 South. This was accepted by the South- 
 ern leaders as a declaration of war. 
 Several of the southern-born officers ia 
 the United Stares army and navy, who 
 had not yet declared themselves, now 
 entered the Confederate service. With- 
 out delay, General Beauregard was 
 placed at the head of the forces, about 
 four thousand men, who were already 
 investing Fort Sumter, in Charleston 
 Harbor. Fort Sumter was held by a 
 garrison of about eighty men under 
 Major Anderson, whose name will be 
 memorable in American history. At 
 the time of the secession of South Caro 
 liua, in December, 1860, Anderson was 
 stationed at Fort Moultrie, but for 
 greater security he removed to Fort 
 Sumter. It was known that the garri- 
 son was reduced to great straits, and 
 must soon surrender, unless supplies 
 and reinforcements came from Washing- 
 
CHAELESTON HARBOK. 
 
 11 
 
 ton. It was believed that the president 
 and his advisers were disposed to with- 
 draw the garrison. Early in April, 
 however, it became known that the 
 government had decided to send a fleet 
 with supplies to Major Anderson and 
 bis garrison. Beauregard received in- 
 structions from the authorities at Mont- 
 gomery to demand the surrender of the 
 iort; and, if his demand was not com- 
 
 plied with, he was to reduce it by 
 force. On the afternoon of the Apnj 
 11th of April, 1861, the demand !»• 
 to surrender was made. Major Ander- 
 son refused to comply. Early on the 
 following morning the threat which 
 was made was carried out, and fire was 
 opened on Fort Sumter by the Confed- 
 erate land batteries. The American 
 Civil War had commenced. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Iffanrleston Harbor. — Fort Sumter. — Gardiner and Floyd. — Major Anderson. — Adjntant-General Cooper. — Evidence 
 of Conspiracy. — Transfer of Arms from Northern to Southern Arsenals. — Jefferson Davis' ' ' Little BUI. " — 
 Captain Foster's 'Workmen. — General Scott becoming alarmed. — Conspirators in the Cabinet. — Anderson 
 moves from Fort Moultrie into Fort Sumter. — Great Excitement all over the Conntrj'. — Indignation in the 
 Sonth. — Resignation of Floyd. — Action of the Secession Convention. — Castle Pinckney and Fort Moultrie 
 occupied by the Secessionists. —Seizure of the Custom House and Post-Office. — The Southern Commissioners 
 in Washington. — Their Extraordinary Demands Refused. — President Buchanan Aroused. — More Energy on 
 the part of the Government. — The Star of the West. — Preparations for Attacking Fort Sumter. — The Star of 
 the West seen in the Outer Harbor — Fired upon — Compelled to Retire. — Anderson called upon to Surrender 
 Fort Sumter. — Secession Spreading. — The Peace Conference. — Election of Lincoln. — His .Journey to Wash- 
 ington. — His Life in Danger. — His Inauguration. — His Address. — Anderson more Hopeful. — Disappointment. — 
 Lincoln ' ' Putting His Foot Down Firmly. " — The Relief Squadron. — Anderson again called upon to Surrender 
 the Fort.— His Reply. — The First Shot.— The Bombardment. —The Relief Squadron Sighted.— Hope.— The 
 Garrison Reduced to Extremities. — Red-Hot Shot. — Fort Smnter in Flames. — The Last Three Cartridges. — 
 The Flag Staff Shot Down. — The notorious Wigf all.— Wigf all's Deception Discovered. — Anderson Indignant. — 
 Surrenders on his own Terms. — Anderson and his Men safe on board the Baltic. 
 
 J860. 
 
 Before the close of 1860, public at- 
 tention was centered on Charles- 
 ton Harbor. It was here that the 
 first indications of actual war were re- 
 vealed. The harbor of Charleston is 
 one of the finest on the South Atlantic 
 seaboard. Duiing the years of peace 
 and prosperit)^, great care had been 
 taken of it by the State and Federal 
 authorities ; and when South Carolina, 
 yielding to the fierce impulses of rebel- 
 lion, took the bold step of retiiing 
 
 from the Union, it was one of the best 
 guarded harbors in the States. It had 
 the advantage of four powerful fort- 
 resses — Castle Pinckney, Fort Moul- 
 trie, Fort Johnson, and Fort Sumter. 
 Castle Pinckney was situated upon the 
 southern extremity of a tract of marshy 
 land known as Shute's Folly Island, 
 and was near the city of Charleston. 
 Fort Moultrie stood on Sullivan's Island, 
 distant from Charleston between three 
 and four miles, and not far removed 
 
i2 
 
 vOET SUMTER. 
 
 from the famous little palmetto-log fort 
 of that name, made memorable during 
 the Wai' of Independence by its heroic 
 defiance of the British fleet in 1776. 
 Fort Johnson stood on James Island, and 
 to the west of Fort Sumter. As a forti- 
 ficati' a it was of comparatively little 
 accc .nt. Fort Sumter was by far the 
 largest and most important of these 
 strongholds. Its position gave it an 
 immense advantage over all the others. 
 It was built in the middle of the en- 
 trance to the harbor piope ■; and its 
 walls of defiance towered up on the 
 southwestern edge of the ship channel. 
 Fort Sumter was about three and a half 
 miles from the city. A truncated pen- 
 tagonal in form, its walls were of solid 
 brick and concrete masonry. The island 
 on which the fort was erected rested on 
 a mud bank. The materials of which 
 the island was composed were chips of 
 granite from the quarries of New Eng- 
 land. In the conveyance of these ma- 
 terials and in the construction of the 
 island ten years were consumed, and 
 the actual cost amounted to over half 
 a million of dollars. The fort itself cost 
 another half million. The walls, which 
 were sixty feet high and from eight to 
 twelve feet thick, were pierced for three 
 tiers of guns on the north, east and west 
 sides. The two lower tiers were under 
 bomb-proof casemates. The first tier 
 was intended for forty-two-pounder 
 Paixhans, the other two were intended 
 for eight and ten-inch columbiads. 
 The full complement of guns was one 
 hundred and forty, but when the war 
 broke out there were only seventy-five 
 guns in the work. 
 
 In 1860 Colonel Gardiner was com- 
 mander in Charleston Harbor. A va- 
 riety of circumstances encouraged the 
 belief that Gardiner was in league with 
 the enemy. The strange conduct of 
 War Secretary Floyd and the cunning 
 efforts of Jefferson Davis to secure anns 
 for the South, had created a spirit of 
 watchfulness, and Gardiner having re- 
 vealed an inordinate amount of anxiety 
 to have his supply of ammunition in- 
 creased, iucuiTed the displeasure of the 
 government and was removed. The va- 
 cant place was filled without delay by 
 Major Robert Anderson, a native of Ken- 
 tucky, and an officer who had won some 
 distinction in the Mexican campaigns. 
 On the 20th November Anderson jfoy, 
 arrived and assumed the com- 20t 
 mand, his head-quarters being at Fort 
 Moultrie. It would have been strange 
 if a man of his discernment had been 
 deceived by the peculiar state of things 
 which prevailed all around him. An- 
 derson was not deceived. On the 23d 
 of November he wrote to Adju- jf^y, 
 tant-General Cooper, describing 28. 
 the situation. In that letter he uses 
 the following remarkable words : "That 
 there is," he says, "a settled determina- 
 tion to leave the Union and to obtain 
 possession of this fort is apparent to 
 all." All the forts in the harbor, he 
 assured General Cooper, were in a 
 wretched condition, Fort Moultrie par- 
 ticularly inviting attack by its weak- 
 ness. " Fort Sumter and Castle Pinck- 
 ney," he went on to say, "must be gar- 
 risoned immediately, if the government 
 determines to keep command of this 
 harbor," Major Anderson's letter to 
 
SALE OF ARMS TO THE SOUTH. 
 
 13 
 
 General Cooper, which contained much 
 more to the same effect, must ever be 
 regarded as one of the most important 
 official documents connected with the 
 early history of the Civil War. 
 
 Anderson did not know — did not 
 even suspect — that the ears to which 
 he addressed his appeals were deaf, and 
 that the heart which he hoped to touch 
 was callous, by reason of rank treason. 
 Adjutant-General Cooper, who was a 
 native of the State of New York, but 
 who had married a sister of Senator 
 Mason of Virginia, was already sold to 
 the Confederate cause. At the very 
 moment that Major Anderson was writ- 
 ing his memorable letter, Cooper was 
 making use of his position to obtain 
 and communicate valuable information 
 to the authorities at Southern head- 
 quarters. Three months later, he left 
 his office at Washington, hastened to 
 Montgomery, Alabama, and was made 
 adjutant - general of the Confederate 
 forces, then busily preparing for war. 
 Cooper, however, was not alone in his 
 iniquity. The national capital had be- 
 come a hotbed of treachery. Weak, 
 undecided, and in the last months of 
 his four years of office, the president 
 would do nothing. The people of the 
 North little imagined that the entire 
 machineiy of the government at Wash- 
 ington had been Avorked for an entire 
 year in the interests of the Southern 
 Dec. malcontents. On the 31st of De- 
 3*« cember. Senator Wilson of Mas- 
 sachusetts offered a resolution in the 
 Senate, asking the secretaiy of war to 
 furnish information concerning the dis- 
 position of ai-ms manufactured in the 
 
 1859. 
 
 national armories or purchased for the 
 use of the government during the past 
 year. Mr. Holt was now at the head 
 of the War Department, and the need- 
 ed information was not long delayed. 
 From the report submitted to the Sen- 
 ate, it appeared that as early as 
 the 29th of December, 1859, Sec- 
 retary Floyd had ordered the transfer 
 of seventy-five thousand percussion mus- 
 kets, forty thousand muskets altered 
 to percussion, and ten thousand percus- 
 sion rifles from the armory at Spring- 
 field, Massachusetts, and the arsenals at 
 Watervliet, New York, and Watertown, 
 Massachusetts, to the arsenals at Fay- 
 etteville in North Carolina, Charleston 
 in South Carolina, Augusta in Georgia, 
 Mount Vernon in Alabama, and Baton 
 Rouge in Louisiana. These arms, it 
 appeared, were distributed in the 
 spring of 1 860. Only eleven days 
 after this order had been issued by 
 Floyd, Jefferson Davis introduced into 
 the Senate a bill " to authorize the sale 
 of public arms to the several States 
 and Territories, and to regulate the ap- 
 pointment of superintendents of the 
 national armories." The i-eal object of 
 this bill was not at first or at all gen- 
 erally perceived. It was not until the 
 Senate was asked by Davis, on Feb.Vj 
 the 21st of February, to take up 21. 
 what he called " a little bill," which he 
 hoped would "excite no discussion," that 
 treachery began to be suspected. On 
 the 23d, two days afterward, Mr. peb. 
 Fessenden, senator from Maine, 23. 
 asked for some explanations on the sub- 
 ject. Davis was ready with his reply. 
 '' The secretary of war," he said, " had 
 
 I860. 
 
 t9S 
 
u 
 
 FOET SUMTER. 
 
 recommended an increase of the appro- 
 priation for arming the militia of the 
 country, and he thought it best for vol- 
 unteers to have aims made by the 
 government, so that in case of war the 
 weapons would all be uniform." Fessen- 
 den offered an amendment, but the bill 
 was cariied by a strict party vote. It 
 was smothered, however, in the House 
 of Representatives. The southerners 
 were not to be driven fiom their pur- 
 pose. An old law, bearing the date of 
 March 3d, 1825, authorized the secre- 
 tary of war to sell amis, ammunition, 
 and other military stores which were 
 no longer suitable for the public ser- 
 vice. Under cover of this law, Floyd 
 sold to States and individuals over thir- 
 ty-one thousand muskets, altered from 
 flint to percussion, for two dollars and 
 fifty cents each. On the very day Major 
 Anderson addressed the letter pre- 
 viously mentioned to Adjutant-General 
 Cooper, Floyd sold ten thousand of 
 these muskets to G. B. Lamar of Geor- 
 gia; and, some eight days before, he 
 had sold five thousand of them to the 
 State of Virginia. It was openly boast- 
 ed by a Southern newspaper that during 
 the year which preceded the outbreak 
 of hostilities, one hundred and thirty- 
 five thousand four hundred and thirty 
 muskets had been quietly transferred 
 from the northern arsenal at Springfield 
 alone to the Southern States ; and Sec- 
 retary Floyd was thanked for the fore- 
 sight he had displayed in thus disarm- 
 ing the North and equipping the South 
 for the emergency. A similar boast 
 was made by a prominent Virginian, 
 who declared that, what with the arms 
 
 distributed by the Federal government 
 to the States in preceding years and 
 those purchased by the States and by 
 private citizens, the South entered upon 
 the war with one hundred and fifty 
 thousand small arms of the most ap- 
 proved modern pattern, and the best in 
 the world. According to a statement 
 made by General Scott, Rhode Island, 
 Delaware, and Texas had not drawn, at 
 the close of 1860, their annual quota of 
 anns, and Massachusetts, Tennessee, and 
 Kentucky had drawn only in part; 
 while Virginia, South Carolina, Geor- 
 gia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Mis- 
 sissippi, and Kansas were, by order of 
 the secretary of war, supplied with 
 their quotas for 1861 in advance. For 
 some reason, possibly as a blind, partial 
 advances had also been made to Penn- 
 sylvania and Maryland. This, however, 
 did not exhaust the demands of the 
 South, nor the intentions of the secretary 
 of war. On the 20th of Decem- oec. 
 ber, 1860, Floyd ordered forty 20. 
 columbiads and four thirty-two pound- 
 ers to be sent immediately from the 
 arsenal at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, to 
 the unfinished fort on Ship Island, off 
 the coast of Mississippi ; and seventy- 
 one columbiads and seven thirty-two- 
 pounders were ordered to be sent from 
 the same arsenal to the embryo fort at 
 Galveston, which could not be ready 
 for its armament in less than five years. 
 This bold attempt was happily frus- 
 trated by the vigilance and prompt ac- 
 tion of the people of Pittsburg. Floyd 
 fcoju afterwards fled to Virginia, and the 
 order was countermanded by his suc- 
 cessor, Joseph Holt. 
 
EFFORTS AT REINFORCEMENT. 
 
 15 
 
 Such being the state of things general- 
 ly, it is not difficult to understand the 
 desperate situation in which Anderson 
 was placed. From such men as Floyd 
 and Cooper he had certainly small hope 
 of succor. The reply given to his letter 
 was worthy of men who had been work- 
 ing so zealously in the interests of the 
 South. It was contained in fewer than 
 a dozen lines, and permission was given 
 him to send a fe.w workmen to repair 
 Castle Pinckney. In the futui'e, he 
 was told, he was to be careful to ad- 
 dress all communications to the ad- 
 jutant-general's office or to the secretary 
 of war. Anderson, as we have seen, 
 had his head-quarters in Fort Moultrie. 
 It became daily more manifest that, 
 unless some unexpected aid arrived, he 
 would be entirely at the mercy of the 
 enemy. He had abundant evidence that 
 the Carolinians regarded the forts as 
 their own, and that they were making 
 vigorous preparations to get ready for 
 the attack. In a conference which he 
 had with some of the leadins: citizens 
 of Charleston, he was assured that the 
 forts "must be theirs after secession." 
 Secretary Floyd was still playing into 
 the hands of the enemy. One of his 
 latest orders to Anderson was that he 
 should deliver over " any of Captain 
 Foster's workmen, should a demand be 
 made for them." The avowed reason 
 for this order was that " they had been 
 enrolled into the service of the State." 
 The actual reason was that the conspir- 
 ators might have the benefit of the ex- 
 perience of men who thoroughly under- 
 stood the forts. Anderson felt that his 
 position was becoming daily more des- 
 
 perate. His communications to the gov- 
 ernment were frequent, and his calls 
 for help were urgent. To his entreaties 
 were now added the recommendations 
 of General Scott, who had become 
 fully alive to the perils of the situa- 
 tion. While Anderson was informing 
 the government that " Fort Sumter was 
 certain to be attacked on an early day, 
 and that if Fort Sumter was lost all 
 was lost," the commander-in-chief of 
 the army ui'ged the president to " rein- 
 force the forts ou the coasts of the 
 slave-labor States." On the 31st oct. 
 of October, he asked permission 31. 
 to admonish the commanders of south- 
 ern forts to be on their guard against 
 surprise or sudden assault. All was in 
 vain. It seemed as if nothing could 
 arouse the government to a sense of 
 the imminence of the danger. General 
 Scott's advice was unheeded ; his re- 
 quest was disregarded ; and Anderson 
 was advised to be prudent — to avoid 
 any attempt which might seem like 
 forcing hostilities, but "to hold posses- 
 sion of the forts, and, if attacked, to 
 defend himself to the last extremity." 
 Poor comfort, certainly, in the circum- 
 stances ! After long and vexatious de- 
 lays, and after a treacherous attempt 
 had been made by Floyd to weaken 
 the garrison at Fortress Monroe, under 
 the guise of strengthening the forts at 
 Charleston, the authorities began to 
 feel that the situation was critical. 
 The president, however, was weak as 
 water ; the Cabinet was full of conspir- 
 ators; and so resistance was made in 
 every conceivable way to prompt and 
 effective action. At this moment Gen- 
 
16 
 
 FORT SUMTEK. 
 
 eral Cass, who will ever be honorably 
 mentioned in American histoiy for the 
 bold stand he made at this particular 
 junctui'e, urged the president to order 
 reinforcemeDts to be sent at once, not 
 Dnly to Charleston but to other menaced 
 points. His advice was not taken, and 
 he retii'ed from the Cabinet. 
 
 During the night of December 26, 
 BeCi Anderson, with his small gam- 
 26» son, moved into Fort Sumter. Of 
 his own volition, Andei'son undertook 
 the responsibility of abandoning the 
 weaker and of occupying the strongei- 
 fort As commander of all the forts, 
 he had a perfect right to do so. It was 
 a difficult task to peifonn, but it was 
 done with skill and caution, and with 
 complete success. His first care was 
 bestowed on the women and children. 
 It was given out that they were to be 
 removed to Fort Johnson, because he 
 wished the helpless ones, with sufficient 
 food, to be in a place of safety. The 
 stratagem was successful. The t<uspi- 
 cions of the people of Charleston were 
 disarmed. Anderson's course was ap- 
 proved of as ^vise and piiident. Secret 
 instructions had been given that the 
 women and childien were not to be 
 landed at Fort Johnson, but, at a given 
 signal, to join the remainder of the gai"- 
 rison and enter Fort Sumter. The eve- 
 ning t^vilight was just passing away, 
 and the full-orbed moon had scarcely 
 taken her place as Queen of the Night 
 when the evacuation began. At the 
 proper time the signal was given, and 
 the vessels containing the women and 
 children moved away fi-om before Fort 
 
 Johnson, the entiiv 
 
 garrison 
 
 being 
 
 quickly and without any mishap landed 
 at Fort Sumter. At eight o'clock the 
 same evening, Anderson wrote to the 
 adjutant-general, " I have the honor to 
 report that I have just completed, by 
 the blessing of God, the removal to this 
 fort of all my garrison, except the sur- 
 geon, four North Carolina officers, and 
 seven men." Long, however, before 
 this letter arrived, the intelligence had 
 passed along the wires ; and while 
 dismay, indignation, wrath filled the 
 minds of all conspirators, the hearts of 
 loyal men everywhere were thrilled 
 with delight. Of course Secretaiy 
 Floyd was indignant. A telegraphic 
 message was sent to Anderson, asking 
 him to explain. The reply was prompt 
 and to the point. " The report quoted," 
 said Anderson, "is correct. I aban- 
 doned Fort Moultrie because I was cer- 
 tain that, if attacked, my men must 
 have been sacrificed, and the command 
 of the hai'bor lost. I spiked the guns 
 and destroyed the carriages, to keep 
 the guns from being turned against us. 
 If attacked, the garrison would never 
 have surrendered Avithout a fight." 
 
 Excitement now ran high. The con- 
 spirators at Charleston and at Washing 
 ton were filled with rage. Floyd de- 
 clared that " the solemn pledges of the 
 government had been violated," and 
 demanded permission of the president 
 to withdi'aw the garrison from Charles- 
 ton Harbor. The president refused, 
 and Floyd resigned. Postmaster-Gen- 
 eral Holt assumed the duties of the 
 War Office, and telegraphed to Ander- 
 son without delay that his movement 
 in transferring the ganison from Moul- 
 
EXCITEMENT IN CHARLESTON. 
 
 17 
 
 trie to Sumter was " in every way ail- 
 mirable, alike for its humanity and 
 patriotism, as for its soldiership." In 
 all parts of the loyal North, Anderson's 
 conduct was warmly and loudly ap- 
 proved ; and five days after the flag 
 had been raised over Fort Sumter, the 
 Legislature of Nebraska, two thousand 
 miles away, greeted him by telegraph 
 with a " Happy New Year." Praise 
 of Anderson was on every lip; and it is 
 not too much to say that no public ser- 
 vant ever received more spontaneous 
 pi'aise from a gi'atef ul people. 
 
 Anderson's position, from the mo- 
 ment he entered Fort Sumter with his lit- 
 tle band, was one of extreme peril. The 
 brief visit made to him at this period 
 by his heroic wife, who brought to him 
 his old and faithful servant, Peter Hart, 
 forms one of the most agreeable episodes 
 in the eai'ly history of the war. The 
 people of Charleston became wild -with 
 rage when they learned what had hap- 
 pened. The fire and smoke which they 
 saw arising from the burning mateiial 
 in Fort Moultrie, on the moining of 
 DeCi the 2 7th, was to them a mysteiy, 
 27. which was quickly dispelled by 
 the arrival of some workmen fi-om the 
 neighborhood of the abandoned fort. 
 The truth was out. Anderson was safe 
 with his ganison, including even the 
 women and children, in Fort Sumter. 
 What was to be done? The ciy for 
 immediate action was loud and genei'al. 
 Some of the more excited of the multi- 
 tude wished to be led immediately to 
 the attack of Fort Sumter. Governor 
 Pickens was at once requested by the 
 South Carolina Convention to take pos- 
 
 session of Forts Moultrie and Johnson 
 and Castle Pinckney. The order was 
 speedily given. Meanwhile the public 
 squares of Charleston wei'e filled with 
 armed men. An excited populace 
 thronged the streets. The Citadel 
 Academy, the great military school of 
 the State, opening as it did on one of 
 the squares, was made the place of ren- 
 dezvous. The government arsenal, con- 
 taining some seventy thousand stands ^^ 
 of arms and a vast amount of military 
 stores taken from Massachusetts and 
 New York, was seized in the name of 
 the State. Within three hours after the 
 old banner of the republic had been 
 raised over Fort Sumtei', two armed 
 steamers, the General Clinch and the 
 Nina, with about four hundred men on 
 board, left the city for the purpose of 
 taking possession of Castle Pinckney and 
 Fort Moultrie. One half of these, led by 
 Colonel J. J. Pettigrew, made for Castle 
 Pinckney. A landing was easily effect- 
 ed. The ganison, the commander of 
 which fled to Fort Sumter, made but 
 little resistance. On entering the fort, 
 it was found that it was worthless alike 
 for attack or defence. The guns were 
 spiked, the carriages were ruined, the 
 ammunition removed, and the flag-staff 
 laid prostrate. A palmetto flag was 
 brought from one of the steamers, and 
 Pettigrew unfui-led it over the Castle. 
 It was the first secession flaa: which 
 waved over a national fortification. The 
 remainder of the troops, about two hun- 
 dred and twenty-five in number, under 
 the command of Colonel Wilmot G. 
 DeSaussure, proceeded towards Fort 
 Moultrie. Of coiu"se there was no r©. 
 
18 
 
 PORT SUMTEK. 
 
 sistance. The sentinel, following instrac- 
 tions, surrendered the fort at once. Here 
 again the palmetto flag was raised ; but 
 as the darkness rendered it invisible, 
 the ascent of three rockets intimated 
 to the people of Charleston that the ex- 
 pedition had been a success. Ander- 
 son's position was one of peculiar deli- 
 cacy. He might have opened fire upon 
 the insurgents when they landed on 
 Sullivan's Island; and a few shots fi'om 
 the guns at Fort Sumter would have 
 been sufficient to drive DeSaussure and 
 his men out among the sand-hills. But 
 his hands were tied. He could not 
 open fire without incurring grave re- 
 sponsibilities. It was well, as the result 
 proved, that he acted as he did. On 
 the same day that Fort Moultrie was 
 seized, Anderson had the further humil- 
 iation to learn that the revenue cutter 
 William Aiken, then lying in Charles- 
 ton Hai'bor, had been surrendered to 
 the insurgents by its faithless command- 
 er, N. L. Coste. His subordinate offi- 
 cers, behaving like true men, refused to 
 follow him, and at once reported them- 
 selves for duty at "Washington. This 
 was the defection of a naval officer 
 who had been bom in the slave-labor 
 States. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 27th, Governor 
 Pickens sent a message to Anderson, 
 requiring him to leave Sumter and re- 
 turn to Moultrie. Anderson refused. 
 On the day following, he sent his post- 
 adjutant to Fort Moultrie to ascertain 
 from the commander there by what 
 authority he and armed men M-^ere in 
 that fort of the United States. The 
 answer was, " By the authority of the 
 
 sovereign State of South Carolina, and 
 by command of her government." 
 
 Governor Pickens henceforth treated 
 Anderson as a public enemy within the 
 domain of South Carolina. It was bold- 
 ly declared by the Charleston press that 
 the "holding of Fort Sumter by United 
 States troops was an invasion of South 
 Carolina." In a letter written to Adju- 
 tant-General Cooper on the 28th, Dec, 
 Anderson expressed regret at the 28. 
 course the governor had taken. "He 
 knows," he said, " how entirely the city 
 of Charleston is in my power. I can 
 cut his communication off from the sea, 
 and thereby prevent his reception of 
 supplies, and close the harbor, even at 
 night, by destroying the light-houses. 
 These things, of course, I would never 
 do, unless compelled to do so in self- 
 defence." On the same day the South 
 Carolina authorities seized the custom- 
 house and the post-office. For three 
 weary months more, until the close of 
 Buchanan's administration, Anderson 
 and his little band remained locked up 
 in Fort Sumter, not permitted to fire a 
 shot, although he knew the insurgents 
 were gathering by thousands in Charles- 
 ton, and saw daily fortifications rising 
 up around him, and other works intend- 
 ed for his destruction. So much self- 
 denial has rarely been exercised. 
 
 Durinff the interval from the close of 
 December, 1860, to the first week of 
 April, 1861, the struggle was going on; 
 but the fighting was done in Washing- 
 ton rather than in Charleston Harbor. 
 The secession contagion continued to 
 spread; a great defalcation had been 
 discovered in the Indian trust fund oi 
 
SOUTH CAEOLINA COMMISSIONERS. 
 
 1» 
 
 $830,000., and Thompson, secretary of 
 the interior, and Floyd, secretary of 
 war, were openly charged as accomplices 
 in the fraud, if not for personal advan- 
 tage, at any rate for the advancement 
 of southern interests ; but the most im- 
 portait event of that period was the 
 arrival in "Washington of the " commis- 
 Bioners " from South Carolina, Messrs. 
 Uec, Barnwell, Adams, and Orr. On 
 28" the 28th of December, 1860, they 
 addressed a formal diplomatic note to 
 the president, claiming that they were 
 authorized and empowered to treat with 
 the government of the United States 
 for the delivery of the forts, magazines, 
 light-houses, and their real estate, vnth 
 their appurtenances, in the limits of 
 South Carolina; and also for an appor- 
 tionment of the public debt, as well as 
 for a division of all other property held 
 by the government of the United States 
 as agent of the confederated States of 
 which South Carolina was recently a 
 member. In brief, they claimed to act 
 as plenipotentiaries having the right to 
 negotiate as to all measures and ar- 
 rangements proper to be made and 
 adopted in the existing relations of the 
 parties. They furnished the president 
 with a copy of the Ordinance of Seces- 
 sion. They loudly complained of Ander- 
 son's conduct in transferring his garri- 
 son from Moultrie to Sumter — an event, 
 they said, which had seriously altered 
 the condition of affairs under which 
 they came. They urged the president 
 to withdraw immediately all the na- 
 tional troops from Charleston Harbor, 
 as, under present circumstances, they 
 were "a standing menace," rendering 
 
 negotiations impossible, and threaten^ 
 ing to " bring to a bloody issue ques- 
 tions which ought to be settled with 
 temperance and judgment." The letter 
 was felt to be arrogant and insulting in 
 the last degree. The president, in his 
 reply, was firm ; but he was cau- Dec. 
 tious, perhaps, to a fault. He SO. 
 referred them to his Message for a defi- 
 nition of his policy, to the instructions 
 given to Major Anderson, to the fact 
 that the South Carolinians had al- 
 ready committed an act of war by seiz- 
 ing two forts and by supplanting the 
 old flag of the Union. "It is under all 
 these circumstances that I am urged to 
 immediately withdraw the troops from 
 the harbor of Charleston, and am in- 
 formed that without this negotiation 
 is impossible. This I cannot do; this 
 I will not do^ To this the com- 
 missioners replied by a letter 
 more arrogant and xnofe, insulting than 
 the first. It concluded as fol- jan, 
 lows : " By your course you have *• 
 probably rendered civil war inevitable. 
 Be it so. If you choose to force this 
 issue upon us, the State of South Caro- 
 lina will accept it, and, relying upon 
 Him who is the God of Justice as well 
 as Lord of Hosts, will endeavor to per- 
 form the great duty which lies before 
 her bravely and thoroughly." This let- 
 ter was returned to the " commission- 
 ers," endorsed with these words, " This 
 paper, just presented to the president, 
 is of such a character that he declines 
 to receive it." 
 
 The year 1.S61 opened gloomily on 
 the land, and perhaps New Year's Day 
 never was so dull. On the 5th of Jan- 
 
30 
 
 POET SUMTEE. 
 
 uary the "commissioners," crestfallen 
 and enraged, left Washington. War, 
 it was now felt, was all but inevitable. 
 The loyal people of the North, however, 
 began to have more faith in the govern- 
 ment. Under wiser and more patriotic 
 counsellors, the president seemed to 
 have gathered courage. It was resolved 
 to strengthen the garrisons of the forts 
 on the coasts of the slave-labor States, 
 and particularly those in the forts of 
 Charleston Harbor. With this end in 
 view, it was agi-eed to send south the 
 steam-corvette Brooklyn, which had 
 just arrived at Norfolk after a three 
 years cruise. It is said that the secre- 
 tary of the navy refused to give the 
 order, and that the president yielded. 
 Under the influence of General Scott 
 and Secretai-y Holt, the president was 
 aroused again, and orders were given 
 that the Brooklyn should be ready to 
 start at a moment's notice. The secret 
 was betrayed. Information was re- 
 ceived that the Virginians were pre- 
 pared to seize any vessel which might 
 attempt to leave Norfolk with troops. 
 It was reported at the same time that 
 the lights of the shore-beacons in 
 Charleston Harbor were extinguished, 
 and that the channel buoys had been 
 removed. The order was, in conse- 
 quence, countermanded. There was 
 treachery committed by some one. 
 General Scott and Secretary Holt con- 
 tinued to urge the president. If the 
 Brooklyn could not be sent, some other 
 means must be adopted to accomplish 
 the end in view. The Star of the West, 
 Captain John McGowan, a well-known 
 merchant steamer, was chartered by the 
 
 government and quickly laden Avith 
 supplies. To prevent suspicion, she 
 was cleared for New Orleans and Ha- 
 vana. At sundown on the 5th jan, 
 of January she left her wharf at 5i 
 New York, and when well down the 
 bay she took on board, under cover of 
 the night, four officers and two hundred 
 and fifty artillerists and marines, with 
 their arms and ammunition. At nine 
 o'clock the same evening she crossed 
 the bar at Sandy Hook, and proceeded 
 to sea. Government purposes were des- 
 tined once more to be disturbed, and 
 the fates seemed to stand in the way of 
 the mission of the Star of the West. 
 Intelligence was received from Ander- 
 son that he regarded his position as se- 
 cure, and that the insurgents had erect- 
 ed at the mouth of Chai'leston Harbor 
 powerful batteries, which made it un- 
 safe for an unarmed vessel to enter. 
 In consequence of this intelligence, the 
 order for the sailing of the Star of the 
 West was countermanded. It was too 
 late ; the vessel was well on her voy- 
 age. 
 
 Meanwhile every preparation was be- 
 ing made by the insurgents for an early 
 attack on Fort Sumter. Every able- 
 bodied man in Charleston, liable to do 
 military duty, was put under arms. 
 Fort Moultrie was strengthened. Fort 
 Johnson was garrisoned by a company 
 of the Charleston Rifles. New batteries 
 were hurried forward, commanding the 
 ship channel and bearing heavily on 
 Fort Sumter. No boat was allowed to 
 approach the wharf-head except by per- 
 mission. The city was placed under 
 military control ; lookout boats scouted 
 
THE STAR VF THE WEST. 
 
 SI 
 
 the outer harbor at night; the tele- 
 graph was placed under the strictest 
 surveillance, and Anderson for the first 
 time found himself cut off from all 
 communication with his government. 
 The news that the "commissioners" 
 had completely failed in their mission 
 had roused the people to the highest 
 pitch of furious excitement; and the 
 wildest language was used and the 
 ^vildest schemes for revenge were sug- 
 jrested and encouraged. 
 
 On the morning of the 9th of January 
 Jau. the Star of the West was seen by 
 9. the imprisoQed garrison of Fort 
 Sumter, coming over the bar and mak- 
 ing her way tow ard the fort. It was a 
 tjladsome si^'ht to Anderson and his 
 little company ; for now, as we have 
 seen. Fort Sumter was completely iso- 
 lated. Anderson, however, had no 
 means of kno^\^ng whether his appeals 
 for supplies and reinforcements had 
 reached the government, or whether 
 they had been heeded. The appear- 
 ance of this vessel inspired hope ; but 
 it was hope clouded by despair, for An- 
 derson knew well the difficulties which 
 lay in her waj^ before she could bring 
 him any relief. Having reached the bar 
 and found all the lights extinguished, 
 the Star of the West extinguished her 
 own, and lay there until the morning. 
 As the day broke she was sighted by the 
 scouting steamer General Clinch, which 
 at once burned colored litjhts as sicr- 
 nals, and ran for the innei- harbor. 
 McGowan ordered all his men below, 
 and steered after the little steamer, liop- 
 iug that the Star of the West might be 
 regarded as a mere merchant vessel. 
 
 196 
 
 It was a vain hope. The authorities at 
 Charleston were M^ell informed. The 
 name of the vessel was known, noi 
 was the object of her visit any secret. 
 Thompson, secretary of the interior, a 
 man whose character was afterward* 
 fully revealed, had telegraphed to one oi 
 his friends, " The Star of the West ia 
 coming; with reinforcements." It is said 
 that Thompson ordered another de- 
 spatch to be sent, in these words^ 
 "Blow the Star of the West out of the 
 water." This despatch was prudently 
 ■withheld. The General Clinch was 
 moving on, about two miles ahead, the 
 Star of the West following. When the 
 latter was a little short of two miles 
 from Fort Moultrie and about the same 
 distance from Fort Sumter, a masked 
 battery on Mon-is Island, from which a 
 palmetto flag was flying, opened fire; 
 and a shot came ricochetting across her 
 bow. The national flag was flying over 
 the Star of the West at the time the 
 first shot was fired. Quick as lightning 
 McGowan hoisted, in addition, a large 
 American ensign. It was no use ; these 
 emblems were no longer respected. The 
 shot from Mori-is Island fell thick and 
 fast. Several balls passed clear over 
 the steamer ; one passed between the 
 smoke-stack and the walking-beam, 
 one struck the ship just abaft the fore- 
 rigging, and stove in the planking ; and 
 "one," said the captain, "came within 
 an ace of carrying a^vay our rudder " 
 Some shots were fired from Fort Moul- 
 trie, but without producing any serious 
 damage. Duiing the few minutes this 
 firing lasted, McGowan saw moving out 
 fi'om Fort Moultrie two steam-tugs, one 
 
22 
 
 FOET SUJVTTBE. 
 
 of them with an armed schooner in 
 tow. The purpose was unmistakable. 
 McGowan perceived that his position 
 was one of imminent peril. Hemmed in 
 by the forts and about to be overhauled 
 by an armed vessel, his own unarmed, 
 there was no prospect for him, if he 
 persevered in his course, but capture or 
 destruction. After seventeen shots had 
 been fired at the Star of the West, the 
 captain steered the vessel around, put 
 to sea, and retm-ned to New York. It 
 was only seven days since she had 
 cleared from the same harbor. It was 
 in some respects an inglorious voyage ; 
 yet it caimot be said that the captain or 
 his crew were to blame. If there was 
 faidt or guilt anywhere, it lay with the 
 government. It would have certainly 
 been a nobler and more dignified poli- 
 cy to send a war vessel to reinforce 
 Fort Sumter. Such a course would no 
 doubt have been resented by the South, 
 and it might have given a different 
 shape to the "irrepressible conflict;" 
 but it might also have been better for 
 all concerned. Anderson's conduct in 
 the matter is above all reproach. He 
 was ignorant of the character of the 
 vessel when he first saw her in the har- 
 bor. He was equally ignorant of her 
 errand. When the first shot was fired 
 he took her to be a relief ship. When 
 the old ensign was raised aloft, there 
 was no longer any mysteiy. The na- 
 tional flag had been dishonored. His 
 guns were shotted; his men desired 
 him to -open fire; but his instructions 
 were peremptory — he had not been at- 
 tacked. Anderson's self-restraint and 
 long-suffering patience are to be com- 
 
 mended ; but less caution and more 
 daring, whatever might have been the 
 result othenvise, would not have es- 
 tranged from him the sjinpathy of his 
 countrymen, or lost him any of his well- 
 won laurels. 
 
 Undeniably the firing upon the Star of 
 the West was an act of war. It touched 
 every principle which was involved in 
 the assault made at a later date on Fort 
 Sumter. The national flag was wantonly 
 insulted. It was so regarded by An- 
 derson, who promptly sent a letter un- 
 der a flag of truce, borne by Lieutenant 
 Hale, asking Governor Pickens whether 
 the outrage had been committed under 
 his orders. He notified the governor 
 that if this act was not disclaimed, he 
 would regard it as a cause of war, and 
 should not, after a reasonable time was 
 allowed for the return of his messen- 
 ger, permit any vessel to pass within 
 range of his guns. He was anxious to 
 avoid, as far as was possible, the shed- 
 ding of blood ; but he asked the gov- 
 ernor to take note of his decision, for 
 the good of all concerned. Governor 
 Pickens refused to make any apology. 
 It was the act of South Carolina; and 
 he assured Anderson that any attempt 
 to reinforce Fort Sumter would be stub- 
 bornly resisted. He left him to decide 
 for himself whether he would carry out 
 his threat in regard to intercepting ves- 
 sels, and stated that he would regard 
 such action as an attempt to "impose 
 on the State the conditions of a con- 
 quered people." Anderson felt that 
 the responsibility was grave ; and, ob- 
 taining a promise from the governor 
 that his messenger would not be hiu 
 
SECESSION SPKEADING. 
 
 33 
 
 clered, he sent Lieutenant Talbot to 
 Washington, as the bearer of messages 
 in which the whole subject was sub- 
 mitted to the government. Talbot was 
 the first to caiTy north the full tidings 
 of the outrage. His report, as was to 
 have been expected, created the wildest 
 excitement in all the free-labor States. 
 Two days after the attack on the Star 
 of the West, Governor Pickens sent his 
 secretary of state, McGrath, and secre- 
 taiy of wai', Jamison, to make a formal 
 demand on Major Anderson for the im- 
 mediate surrender of Fort Sumter to 
 the authorities of South Carolina. An- 
 derson's answer was firm and decided. 
 " No," said he, " sooner than suffer such 
 humiliation, I would fire the masrazine 
 and blow fort and garrison in the air." 
 The commissioners returned to the gov- 
 ernor impressed with the conviction 
 that, only starvation or assault could 
 reduce the fortress. Preparations for 
 attack were, therefore, carried on with 
 energy. 
 
 Tlie action of Governor Pickens was 
 approved by the State Legislature, 
 which learned with pride and pleasure 
 of the successful resistance made by the 
 troops of the State to the reinforcement 
 of Fort Sumter. The newspapers howled 
 vrith delight. Said one of them, " The 
 expulsion of the Star of the West from 
 Charleston Harbor yesterday morning 
 Jan. was the opening of the ball of the 
 ••• revolution." The article referred 
 to concluded with these words, "If the 
 red seal of blood be still wanting to 
 the parchment of our liberties, and 
 blood they want, blood they shall have, 
 and blood enough to stamp it all in 
 
 red." In this trying position, shut out 
 from his friends, without hope of suc- 
 cor, and surrounded by these hostile 
 elements, we must leave Anderson for 
 a space. 
 
 It is not a part of our plan to follow 
 out and describe all the minute details 
 which occun-ed in the interval between 
 the assault on the Star of the West and 
 the fatal firing on Fort Sumter. Some 
 facts, however, it is impossible to omit 
 without disturbing the continuity of 
 the narrative. From week to week 
 public indignation was waxing fiercer 
 in the North, while in the South the 
 secession sentiment g-rew stronijer and 
 took more practical shape. Before the 
 2d day of February, six States pej,, 
 of the Union had followed the 2. 
 example of South Carolina, having 
 passed ordinances of secession and ap- 
 pointed delegates to a general conven- 
 tion : Mississippi on the 9th of January, 
 Florida on the 10th, Alabama on the 
 11th, Georgia on the 19th, Louisiana 
 on the 26th, and Texas on the 1st of 
 February. On the 4th of Feb- peb. 
 ruary, 1861, the delegates of the ^• 
 seceded States met in general Congress 
 at Montgomery, Alabama. In the pef), 
 course of a few days, a provision- S« 
 al government was formed and a Consti- 
 tution agi'eed upon, after the adoption 
 of which, the Congress proceeded at 
 once to the election of a provisional 
 president and vice-president. On the 
 18th Jefferson Da^^s of Missis- Yeh, 
 sippi was inaugui'ated president, ^^' 
 and Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia 
 vice-president of the "Confederate 
 States of America." The Confe<leracy 
 
u 
 
 FOKT SUMTER. 
 
 lost no time in seizing all the forts and 
 arsenals in their respective States. The 
 South was becoming more and more a 
 unit, and, in spite of differences of opin- 
 ion here and there, it was evident that 
 the great North, realizing its duty and 
 becoming conscious of its strength, was 
 about to lise iu its might and majesty. 
 The debates in Congress- in the early 
 weeks of the year were protracted and 
 keen; and they were conducted with 
 great ability. The atmosphere of Wash- 
 ington became too hot for the conspira- 
 tors; and they departed in great num- 
 bers to fling themselves into the South- 
 ein cause. Love of the Union lingered 
 Feb, in many hearts. On the 4th of 
 *• February, a convention known as 
 the Peace Congress or Conference assem- 
 bled in Willard's Hotel, Washington. 
 In this Congress twenty-one of the States 
 w*e represented — fourteen of the free 
 and seven of the slave-labor States. 
 It was all in vain. In spite of the 
 hopes which it created, it resulted in 
 complete failure. Such was the state of 
 things generally when a new man was 
 about to appear on the scene — a man 
 who had not hitherto figured greatly in 
 the political arena, but who will ever 
 be ]-emembered as the saviour of his 
 country and one of the world's greatest 
 heroes. 
 
 On the 14th of February, Abraham 
 Feb, Lincoln of Illinois and Hannibal 
 14' Hamlin of Maine were declared 
 duly elected president and vice-presi- 
 dent of the United States, for four 
 years commencing on the 4th of March, 
 186L 
 
 Lincoln bade farewell to his friends 
 
 and fellow-citizens in Spi'ingfield on t)ie 
 11 th, and set out for Washington, peb. 
 His progress Avas one continued *•• 
 ovation. Eveiywhere throughout his 
 long journey of many hundreds of miles, 
 in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, New York, 
 New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
 Maryland, he was gi'eeted with demon- 
 strations of the most profound I'espect. 
 During the course of his journey, he 
 was frequently called upon to address 
 the assembled multitudes. His words 
 were always well chosen, generally 
 hopeful and encouraging, but some- 
 times tinged with sadness, as if he felt 
 the terrible responsilnlity which rested 
 upon his individual shoulders. He was 
 studiously noncommittal, yet there was 
 a firmness in his utterances which left 
 the public in no doubt that he was a 
 man of strong will and decided charac- 
 ter. He was in Philadelphia on Wash- 
 ington's Birthday. In the course ppj,, 
 of a short address, speaking of --• 
 the principle of liberty embodied in the 
 Declaration it Independence, he said, 
 "If this country cannot be saved with- 
 out giving up this principle, I would 
 rather be assassinated on this spot than 
 surrender it." At Trenton, while ex- 
 pressing himself in favoi- of peace, he 
 said, "The man does not live who is 
 more in favor of peace than I am — no 
 one will do more to preserve it ; but it 
 may be necessary to put the foot down 
 firmly." The feelings entertained re. 
 garding him by the slave-holding oli- 
 garchy of the South may best be under- 
 stood from the fact that by some of 
 them it was resolved that he should 
 never reach the national capital alive. 
 
LINCOLN'S INAUGURAL ADDRESS. 
 
 25 
 
 The secret oozed out, and the conspii-a- 
 tors, for the time being, were foiled. 
 At Baltimore, it is now understood, ar- 
 rangements were made for the assassi- 
 nation of the president elect; and there 
 is every reason to believe that but for 
 the timely discovery made by Lincoln's 
 friends and their subsequent watchful- 
 ness, the ])lot might have succeeded. 
 As it was, he and his party reached 
 Washington in safety. 
 
 Mt)nday, the 4th of March, will long 
 Mar. l^e remembered in the national 
 *• capital, and, indeed, throughout 
 the length and breadth of the republic. 
 On that day Abraham Lincoln was in- 
 augurated sixteenth president of the 
 United States of America. The inau- 
 guration ceremonies were performed 
 quietly, and the day, contrary to the 
 expectations of many, passed off with- 
 out disturbance. It was known that a 
 conspiracy existed, having for its object 
 the capture of the city and the person 
 of the president, and the placing in the 
 executive chair some one devoted to 
 Southern interests ; but General Scott 
 had taken ample precautions, and the 
 project failed. The inaugural address, 
 which was impatiently awaited, gave 
 abundant satisfaction to the adherents of 
 the Union cause. It was an able and ex- 
 haustive document. The president stood 
 firm on the Constitution. The union of 
 the States he said was perpetual. It was 
 older than the Constitution. It pre- 
 ceded the Declaration of Independence 
 in 1776. It was formed, in fact, by the 
 Articles of Association in 1774. It 
 was not competent, therefore, for any 
 one State or for a niunber of States to | 
 
 retire from the Union at will. He h.eld 
 that in view of the Constitution and th< 
 laws the Union was not broken. lie 
 would take cai'e that the law should be 
 executed in all the States. He wouh; 
 avoid violence, unless it was forced up- 
 on the national authority. He would 
 not interfere with slavery in the South. 
 In accordance with the trust reposed ii. 
 him, he would feel it to be his duty to 
 " hold, occupy and possess the pi'operty 
 and places belonging to the govei'n 
 ment." Addressing his dissatisfied fel- 
 low-countrymen, he said, "We are not 
 enemies, but friends. We must not be 
 enemies. Though j^assion may have 
 strained, it must not break our bond? 
 of affection. The mystic cords of mem- 
 ory, stretching from every battle-field 
 and patriot grave to every living heart 
 and hearthstone all over this broad land, 
 will yet swell the chorus of the L^nion, 
 when again touched, as surely they will 
 be, by the better angels of our nature." 
 These are thoughts that breathe, words 
 that burn. There was a man now at 
 the helm of the shiji of state. 
 
 Anderson could not long be left un- 
 heeded now. The attention of the pres- 
 ident and his cabinet was first called to 
 the condition of public affairs. Matters 
 had come to a wretched pass. The 
 treasury was empty, and had to be at- 
 tended to. The army and navy were 
 found to be cdmpai-atively useless. 
 There were but sixteen thousand men 
 in all and these were mostly in tne 
 West. Sixteen forts had fallen into 
 the hands of the Confederates. Of the 
 southern forts, f)nly Fortress Monroe, 
 Forts Jefferson, Taylor, and Pickens 
 
26 
 
 iOitr HLiviTjiiv 
 
 remained to the government. Fort 
 Sumter, of com-se, was not yet lost; 
 but for government use it was not now 
 available. 
 
 On the day of inaugiu'ation a letter 
 was received from Anderson, of a j-ather 
 discouraging kind. He could not see 
 how any effective assistance could be 
 rendered him by a force of less than 
 " twenty thousand good, well-disci]ilined 
 men." This letter was laid before the 
 president and his cabinet on the follow- 
 ing day. The government was not in 
 a position to send any such aid — all the 
 more that it was wanted at once or not 
 at all. It was suggested that Ander- 
 son should be advised to make terms 
 with the enemy and pi'ovide for his 
 own safety and for that of the garrison. 
 The president was urged to adopt this 
 course, for the sake of peace ; and for a 
 time it was the hope and belief of the 
 South that this would be liis final 
 conclusion. Better counsels pi'evailed. 
 Gustavus G. Fox had suggested a feasi- 
 ble plan for the relief of Fort Sumter. 
 He urged the president to take imme- 
 diate action, as any attempt to succor 
 Anderson must be made before the 
 middle of April. At last the president 
 did "put down his foot firmly." Fox 
 was sent for ; preparations, in spite of 
 some ofiicial hindrances, were hurried 
 April forward, and on the 9th April 
 *• he sailed with two hundred re- 
 cruits in the steamer Baltic, commanded 
 by Captain Fletcher. The relief squad- 
 ron consisted of the Baltic, the United 
 States sloops -of -war Powhatan, Paw- 
 nee, and Pocahontas, with the cutter 
 Hairiet Lane, the tugs Yankee, Uncle 
 
 Ben, and Fi'eeborn. The order was to 
 rendezvous off Charleston. The expe- 
 dition might have had better luck if it 
 had been sent at an earlier day. As it 
 was, some of the vessels came to grief. 
 Only the Baltic, the Pawnee, and the 
 Harriet Lane succeeded in reaching th« 
 place of meeting. 
 
 Events had taken place in Charleston 
 Harbor before the arrival of the relief 
 ships which had not been calculated upon 
 by the government at Washington. As 
 soon as it became known that an attempt 
 was to be made to sustain Major Ander- 
 son and his garrison, all counuunication 
 between the people and the fort was at 
 once stopped. On the arrival of the Fed- 
 eral messenofer, announcing the intelli- 
 gence, Beauiegai'd telegraphed to the 
 ConfederiTte secretary of war, Leroy P. 
 Walker. "An authorized messenger," 
 wrote Beauregai'd, " has just informed 
 Governor Pickens and myself that provis- 
 ions will be sent to Fort Sumter peace- 
 ably, or otherwise by force." The sec- 
 retary's reply was to the effect that if 
 Beauregard had no doubt of the author- 
 ized character of the agent, to demand 
 the surrender of Fort Sumter, and in 
 case of I'efusal to proceed to reduce it. 
 " The demand will be made to-morrow 
 at twelve o'clock," M^as Beauregard's 
 answer. On the 11th of April, Aprji 
 about two o'clock in the Jiiter- *•• 
 noon, Beauregard sent Colonel James 
 Chesnut, Colonel Chisholm, and Captain 
 Stephen D. Lee, with a letter to Ander- 
 son, demanding the surrender of the 
 fort. Anderson was not taken by sur- 
 prise. He had been expecting some 
 such demand. In his reply to iJeaure- 
 
PREPARING TO OPEN FIRE. 
 
 27 
 
 gard, which he handed to the aids, he 
 said that " his sense of honor and his 
 obligations to his government would 
 not allo\v him to comply." To the gen- 
 tlemen themselves, however, he made 
 no secret of the fact that the condition 
 of his supplies was such that he could 
 only hold out a few days more. These 
 latter words were immediately commu- 
 nicated by Beauregard to Walker, who 
 without delay telegraphed back to 
 Beauregard that if Anderson would 
 state the time when he would evacuate, 
 and if he would agree meanwhile not 
 to use his guns against them, unless 
 theirs were used against Fort Sumter, 
 they would wait, and thus the useless 
 effusion of blood would be avoided. 
 To this prcposal, which was conveyed 
 to him by Roger A. Pryor and the 
 three gentl'jmen above named, Ander- 
 son agreed, stipulating that he would 
 leave tlie fort by noon of the 15th, 
 should he not before that time "receive 
 contrary iastructions from his govern- 
 ment or additional supplies." 
 
 Here \it it be remembered that An- 
 derson had no knowledge of Avhat his 
 government had been doing for him 
 tor some days. That they intended 
 to send him assistance and supplies 
 he Avas sure; but as the authorities 
 at Charleston had prevented his spe- 
 cial messenger, Talbot, who had been 
 to ^'ashington, from returning to the 
 fort, he knew nothing of the mission of 
 Fox oi of the fact that a squadron had 
 sailed to his assistance. In this respect 
 his adversaries had the advantage. Of 
 the sailing of the squadron intended to 
 ' elJ <ve Anderson they were fully aware, 
 
 and its appearance in Charleston waters 
 had been awaited with considerable 
 anxiety. On the evening of the 11th, 
 and even before the aids left with the 
 message to Anderson, the Harriet Lane 
 and the Pawnee had been sighted by 
 scouts outside the harbor, and Beaure- 
 e:ard had been notified of the fact. His 
 aids were therefore invested with dis- 
 cretionary authority. If not satisfied 
 with Anderson's reply, they were to act 
 as they thought fit. Before leaving the 
 fort, and after a few minutes' consulta- 
 tion, they addressed a note to Anderson, 
 saying, " By authority of Brigadier- 
 General Beauregard, commanding the 
 provisional forces of the Confederate 
 States, we have the honor to notify you 
 that he will open the fire of his bat- 
 teries on Fort Sumter in an hour from 
 this time." This note is dated April 
 12,0.20 A.M. They immediately April 
 left the fort. Anderson accepted '2. 
 the situation. The flag was raised, the 
 postern was closed, the sentinels were 
 Avithdrawn, and the men were ordered 
 not to leave the bomb-proofs until they 
 received further instructions. 
 
 It was known in Charleston on the 
 evenincr of the 11th that the bombard- 
 ment was about to begin. From an 
 early hour, therefore, the streets A\^ere 
 crowded ; and what with the roll of 
 the drum, the marching of armed men^ 
 the tramp of horses and the I'umbling 
 of wagons, the utmost excitement })i'e- 
 vailed. All was still within Fort 
 Sumter. The passing minutes of that 
 hour were counted one by one. At 
 twenty minutes past three o'clock, pre- 
 cisely one hour from the receipt of the 
 
ss 
 
 FORT SUMTER. 
 
 last letter by Andorson, the dull boom- 
 ing of a gun Avas heard on Jami's Island, 
 and from a signal battery there a shell 
 came ■\vhizzina; throuirh the darkness 
 and exploded over Fiirt Sumter. It 
 y\ as the signal gun. Immediately there- 
 liter, from all the batteries around, a 
 deadly iire was opened. Full thirty 
 heavy guns and mortars opened their 
 throats at once. The extent of the en- 
 emy's tire greatly surprised the gari'i- 
 son. The most destructive Avork was 
 being done by a battery on Sullivan's 
 I-land, of which formerly they had no 
 knowledge. Tiiis battery had been 
 masked by brushwood and other mate- 
 rials. It was constructed with great 
 skill, and heavily mounted, showing sev- 
 uteeu mortars throwing ten-inch shells, 
 and thirty-three heavy cannons, most 
 ^f which were columbiads. The firing 
 rvas maintained with vigor; and the 
 shots from some of those powei-ful guns 
 struck the walls of Fort Sumter with a 
 "terriHc crash,'' as the defenders said, 
 some of the shells bui-sting inside the 
 fort. For two houi-s this firing contin- 
 ued, Fort Sumter remaining silent as 
 the grave. At half-past six the men 
 were summoned to breaktast, A\luch 
 they ate "leisurely and calmly," as if 
 undisturbed by the terrible uprom- 
 iU-ound them. 
 
 It was now broad daylight. Break- 
 fast over, Andei-son arranged the officere 
 and men, about eighty in all, into three 
 reliefs. The first was \mder the com- 
 mand of Captain Doubleday, the second 
 was under Sursreon Crawford, and the 
 third under Lieutenant Snyder. The 
 ^.jsurison labored imder many serious 
 
 disadvantages. They had plenty of 
 powder, but few carti'idges. They had 
 ho scales for -weighing the powder, and 
 only some six needles for sewing cail- 
 ridge bags. They Avere also without 
 instruments for sighting the guns. The 
 first gun Avas fired at seven o'clock in 
 the morning, by Captain Doubleday. Il 
 Avas folloAved immediately by a genera) 
 firing from the fort on all the principal 
 attackiuiT batteries. For four hours the 
 firing Avas kept up so vigorously by 
 Fort Sumter that the enemy for a time 
 suspected that it had been reinforced 
 during the night. The fire told Avith 
 effect on Fort Moultrie, the embrasures 
 of Avhich Avere considerably damaged. 
 On the battery on Cumming's Point, 
 Avhich seemed invulnerable, it had little 
 eft'ect, the shot and shell t^lanciuLr hai-m- 
 lessly off. 
 
 As the hours rolled on, the filing ol 
 the assailants Avas becomin<r more effect- 
 ive. Their guns Avere under complete 
 control. Every shot told. The Avails 
 and parapets of Fort Sumter began to 
 grive evidence of their destructive Avork. 
 It seemed to be the purpose of the ene- 
 my to destroy the barbette guns. ^Vith 
 this end in vieAV, they poured their 
 heaviest fu-e on the parapet of the fort. 
 A large portion of the parapet Avas car- 
 ried aAvay; several of the heavy guns 
 Avere dismounted or otherAvise disabled, 
 and .the garrison Avas thus limited to 
 the use of the two loAver tiers of guns, 
 Avhich Avere protected by casemates. 
 About the same moment it Avas discoA*- 
 ered that the barracks Avere on fire. 
 It Avas noAA' about noon. Surgeon Craw- 
 ford, Avho hud volimteered to ascend 
 
NO HOPE. 
 
 29 
 
 the parapet for the purpose of making 
 observations, and who had succeeded, 
 in spite of the tempest of shot and shell 
 which raged around him, on returning 
 below reported, to the delight of the 
 now almost despairing garrison, that 
 through the fog and blinding rain he 
 saw two vessels, bearing the dear old 
 flag. It was part of Fox's relief squad- 
 ron. Thj Pawnee, ten guns, the Har- 
 riet Lane, five guns, and the transport 
 Baltic, were lying outside the bar. 
 They could not cross. The buoys had 
 been removed, and ships laden with 
 stones hiid. been sunk in the channel. 
 The vessels dipped their flags V)y way 
 of greeting; but Sumter could not re- 
 spond. Its ensign was still flying, but 
 it was entangled in the halyards, which 
 had been cut l^y the enemy's shot. In 
 the afternoon the enemy's fire had been 
 (Particularly severe; shot came rattling 
 into the embrasures ; and severe injuries 
 were inflicted by flying splinters of ma- 
 sonry. The shells bursting in rapid 
 succession against all parts of tlie fort, 
 scattered the loosened brick and stone 
 in every direction, broke the windows, 
 and set fire to the woodwork. The men 
 in the fort worked with a will. The 
 day, however, had told sadly on their 
 strength. Their firing had become less 
 rapid. Their cartridges were now well- 
 nigh exhausted; and before sunset it 
 had been found necessary to abandon all 
 the guns but six. When darkness came 
 on, Anderson ordered the port-holes to 
 be closed. Some of the men were per- 
 mitted to rest while others watched. 
 So ended the first day of the war. 
 The storm, which had lasted all daj-. 
 
 continued throughout the night. The 
 firing of the insurgents was maintained 
 at intervals, until the morning. Every 
 fifteen minutes the little garrison cooped 
 up in Fort Sumter heard another shot 
 or shell rattling against their shattered 
 ■walls. It was a weary night for An- 
 derson and his men. But there Avas no 
 murmur, no complaint. The provisions 
 were all but exhausted. In a few hours 
 more the last parcel of rice would be 
 cooked, and nothing would be left for 
 the garrison but salt pork. The relief 
 ships were outside the bar ; but the 
 storm made it impossible for them to 
 complete their mission of mercy. 
 
 The sun of Saturday morning rofe in 
 splendor. The storm had ceased Aprij 
 before the early dawn. The bora- l^t 
 bardment was resumed with tremen- 
 dous energy. It seemed to be the pur- 
 pose of the assailants to force matters 
 to an early conclusion. Red-hot shot 
 was now freely used. On Friday the 
 buildings in the fort had Ijeen on fire 
 four times. Four times the flames had 
 been extinguished. Now the barj'acks 
 and the oflficers' quarters were again on 
 fire. The situation of Anderson had 
 become desperate. Yet he clung to the 
 skirts of hope with undying tenacity. 
 There Avas provision to last for three 
 days, and for three days more he was 
 anxious to hold out. With the excep- 
 tion of the magazine, the buildings 
 were left to their fate. No attempt 
 was made to extinguish the flames. The 
 red-hot shot which the enemy were 
 pouring in upon them made such efforts 
 useless. The conflagration spread rap- 
 idly. It was feared that the magazine 
 
 107 
 
FORT SUMTER. 
 
 might explode, and its doors were 
 locked. The main gate took fire and 
 was soon destroyed ; and the sally-port 
 was now open to the besiegers. The 
 heat had become intolerable ; and the 
 clouds of smoke were suffocating. The 
 crashing of the shot, the bursting of 
 the shells, the falling of walls, and the 
 roaring of the flames were terrific, and 
 made, says an eye-witness, "a pande- 
 monium of the fort." The garrison 
 was now reduced to its last three cart- 
 ridges. Still no thought of surrender. 
 The flag still waved. Eight times its 
 staff had been hit by the enemy's shot, 
 without serious injuiy. At twenty min- 
 utes before one o'clock it was hit again, 
 and this time with success. "The flag 
 is down — it has been shot away," was 
 the cry, when Lieutenant Hall rushed 
 out and snatched it from the glowing 
 embers, before it could take fire. Car- 
 ried immediately by Lieutenant Snyder 
 to the ramparts, he handed it to Sergeant 
 Hart, who, springing upon the sand- 
 bags, and with the assistance of one 
 Lyman, a mason from Baltimore, plant- 
 ed again the broken staff, and left the 
 soiled banner flying proudly and defi- 
 antly, in spite of the shot and shell 
 which fell like hail around. 
 
 Soon after the flag had fallen, and 
 towards the close of the day, a man 
 presented himself at one of the embra- 
 sures of the fort, with a white handker- 
 chief tied to the point of his sword. Pri- 
 vate Thompson of the fort was the first 
 to whom he addressed himself. " I am 
 General "Wigfall," he said, "and I want 
 to see Major Anderson. For God's 
 sake," he added, as Thompson left him 
 
 to find his commander, " let me in. I 
 can't stand it out here in the firing." 
 On being admitted, he met Captain J. 
 G. Foster, Lieutenant J. C. Davis, Sur- 
 geon J. W. Crawford, and Lieutenant 
 B. K. Meade. " I am General Wigfall," 
 he repeated, under great excitement; 
 " I come from General Beauregard, who 
 wants to stop this bloodshed. You are 
 on fire, and your flag is down; let us 
 stop this firing." "Our flag is not 
 down," was the reply. " It is yet flying 
 from the ramparts." 'Well, I want to 
 stop this," he said ; and holding out his 
 sword and handkerchief to one of the 
 officers, he added, " will you hoist this?" 
 "No, sir," was the answer. "Will any 
 of you hold this out of the embrasure?" 
 he asked. Receiving no reply, he asked, 
 " May I hold it, then ? " "If you wish." 
 Springing into the embrasure, he waved 
 the white flag several times. The firing 
 did not abate ; and Wigfall, frightened 
 out of his wits by a shot which struck 
 near him, abandoned his position. The 
 handkerchief was taken up and waved 
 out of the port-hole by Corporal Bring- 
 hurst ; but he, too, finding that no heed 
 was paid to it, sprang from the peril- 
 ous ]:03t. Addressing Lieutenant Davis, 
 Wigfall said, "If you will show a 
 white flag from your ramparts, they 
 will cease firing." "It shall be done," 
 said Davis, " if your object is to hold a 
 conference with Major Anderson." At 
 this point Anderson appeared. " I 
 come from General Beauregard, who 
 wishes to stop this, sir." "Well, sir,'' 
 said Anderson, eyeing Wigfall keenly. 
 " You have defended your flag nobly, 
 sir," continued Wigfall. "You have 
 
FALL OF SUMTER. 
 
 3] 
 
 done all that can be done, sir. Your 
 fort is on fire. Let us stop this. On 
 what terms will 3^ou evacuate the fort, 
 sir?" " My terms arc already known 
 to General Beauregi>,rd," replied the 
 Major. "Instead oi noon on the 15th, 
 [ will go now." '■ I understand you to 
 Bay," said Wigf*i!i, ''that you will evac- 
 uate the fort 'jow, sir, xipon the terms 
 proposed the o*her day." "Yes, sir, 
 on thofe terras only." Then said Wig- 
 fall, " I understand the fort is to be 
 ours." "Yes, sir," said Anderson, "on 
 those conditions only." "Very well," 
 said Wigfall, " I will return to General 
 Beaurescard. " Believins: that Wiojfall 
 Was telling the truth, Anderson caused 
 a white flag to be hoisted over the fort. 
 The Major was not undeceived until a 
 little before two o'clock, when Colonels 
 Chesnut, Pryor, Miles, and Lee arrived 
 at Fort Sumter, with instructions from 
 their chief to ascertain the meaning of 
 the white flag. When they stated the ob- 
 ject of their mission, Anderson observed 
 that there was somethinfr wroner. There 
 was confusion on both sides. Wigfall, 
 it appeared, had not seen Beauregard 
 in two days. He had no instructions 
 from him. He had acted on his own 
 responsibility. Having been on Morris 
 Island, he had, by false misrepresenta- 
 tions, obtained leave from the command- 
 er there, to visit the beleaguered fort. 
 Anderson, fired wdth indignation, at 
 the deception played upon him, threat- 
 ened to haul down the white flag;. 
 "That wliite flag," he said, "shall come 
 down immediately." He was entreated, 
 however, to leave matters as they were, 
 to put in writing what Wigfall had 
 
 said, and to wait till they saw Beaure 
 gard. This he consented to do; and 
 the firing ceased. Several deputations 
 waited upon Andei-son during the 
 course of the afternoon, to obtain, if 
 possible, better terms. He was not to 
 be moved. At last, between seven and 
 eight o'clock, Major D. R. Jones, ac- 
 companied by Colonels Miles and Pryor 
 and Captain Hartstene, ai'rived at the 
 fort and announced that Beauregard 
 had accepted Anderson's terms. The 
 garrison was to be allowed to dejiart, 
 with company arms and property, -wdth 
 all private property, and with the privi- 
 lege of saluting and retaining their flag. 
 Thus ended the bombardment of Fort 
 Sumter. 
 
 One of the most extraordinary cir- 
 cumstances connected with this remark- 
 able siege was that not a single man had 
 lost his life either at Fort Sumter or in 
 the ranks of the Confederates. It de- 
 serves to be remembered, too, that the 
 fort had been evacuated, not surren- 
 dered. Anderson retained the flag, and 
 exactly four years afterwards, as Major- 
 General in the armies of the United 
 States, raised the same old tattered flag 
 over tlie fortress, then a heap of ruins. 
 
 On Sunday morning, the Isabel came 
 down from Charleston and an- April 
 chored near Fort Sumter. The *■*• 
 steamer Clinch lay alongside the wharf, 
 to convey Anderson and his men to the 
 larger vessel. An unfortunate circum- 
 stance occurred at tlie last moment. 
 The baggage had all been put on bo.ard 
 the Clinch. Of the soldiers who were 
 .still inside the fort, a number were de- 
 tailed to salute the flag of the United 
 
33 
 
 BULL ETTir. 
 
 States. At the firing of the fifteenth 
 gun, a premature explosion took place, 
 killing one man, seriously wounding an- 
 other, and inflicting upon other two inju- 
 ries moj'e or less dangerous. They were 
 the first casualties of any moment from 
 
 the beginning of the conflict. On Mon- 
 day Anderson and his men were trans- 
 ferred to the Baltic and sailed for jvprji 
 New York, where they were des- *5. 
 tined to receive the plaudits and the hon 
 ors of a delighted and grateful people 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 i'he Fall of Fort Sumter the First Link in a Chain of Great Events. — War now a Necessity. — The Gnef and Rage 
 of the North, — Lincoln's Proclamation. — Congress Summoned to Meet. — Secession Sentiments finding Expres- 
 sion. — The probable Theatre of War. — Conspiracy to Seize Washington. — Confederate Troops on the March. — 
 Manassas Junction. — Arlington Heights. — What the President could see from the White House. — Military 
 Movements. — Delay. — The Impatience of the People of the North. — "On to Richmond." — Genei'al Irwin 
 McDowell. — The two Armies. — General Joseph E. Johnston. — General Beauregard. — CentrevUle. — The On- 
 ward Movement. — Tyler's Mistake. — McDowell's Delay. — The Three Months' Term of Service Expiring. — 
 The Battle Ground. — The Relative Strength of the two Armies. — McDowell's Plan.— Sunday Morning. — The 
 Battle Begun. — The Fii-st Hour of the Fight. — The Confederates Driven Back. — McDowell's Mistake. — " Stone- 
 wall" Jackson. — The Tide of Battle Turned. — Noon. — The Second Phase of the Battle. — The Confederate 
 Position. — The Rising Ground near the Henry House. — Terrific Struggle for the Plateau. — Ellsworth's 
 Zouaves. — The Seventy-Ninth and Sixty-Ninth Regiments. — Death of Colonel Cameron. — The Critical Mo- 
 ment. — Arrival of Kirby Smith. — Panic among the National Trooi3.s. — The Battle Lost. — A Rout. — Terrible 
 Losses. — Reflections. — The 'Victory Complete, but the Battle not Decisive. — Effects of the Battle North and 
 South.— The President's Call for Half a Million of Men. — McDowell Superseded by McClellan. 
 
 1861. 
 
 It is useless now to discuss the ques- 
 tion whether Fort Sumter could 
 or could not have been reinfoi'ced. 
 Our experience to-day is very different 
 to what it was when the relief ships 
 anchored in the outer harbor; and the 
 presumption is that if the attempt at 
 reinforcement had to be made now, it 
 would be made with more daring and 
 perhaps with complete success. 
 
 As it was, the fall of Fort Sumter 
 constituted the first link in a chain of 
 great events which culminated in one 
 i)f the most gigantic revolutions in mod- 
 *>i'n times. Its immediate effect was to 
 
 make an end of all possibility of com- 
 promise. War was now a necessity. 
 There was but one arbiter possible ; 
 and that was the sword. In the South 
 the intelligence was received with a 
 wild yell of delight. In the North, the 
 news produced generally a feeling of 
 sadness. Momentarily there was si- 
 lence — not the silence of despair, but 
 that silence which comes from surpri.se, 
 from vexation, from an overburdened 
 heart. Soon, however, the strong man 
 recovei'ed himself ; and from the con- 
 fines of the British provinces to the 
 waters of the broad Ohio there arose 
 
SECESSION SPREADING. 
 
 33 
 
 that hearty cheer — a cheer which can 
 only come from Anglo-Saxon throats 
 and from men devoted to trath, to riglit, 
 to liberty — a cheer deep-toned and firm, 
 full of hope and full of confidence. 
 Hencefoi'th the division was complete. 
 Minor differences among the population 
 on either side were overlooked ; and 
 the waters of the Ohio rolled between 
 two powerful confederations, united and 
 prepared for battle. 
 
 On Sunday, the 14th day of April, 
 April tli6 garrison of Fort Sumter low- 
 
 'i- ered their flag and marched out 
 of the work. On the day following, 
 April President Lincoln issued a pro- 
 
 '5' clamatiou calling for seventy-five 
 thousand men to serve for three months. 
 At the same time, in consideration of 
 the gravit}' of the situation, he sum- 
 moned an extra session of Congress — 
 senators and representatives being in- 
 structed " to assemble at their respect- 
 ive chambers in Washington City, at 
 noon on Thursday, the 4th day of July 
 next ensuing, then and there to con- 
 sider and determine such measures, as 
 in their wisdom the public safety might 
 seem to demand." Tlie authorities at 
 Moutgomeiy were equally active. A 
 fall was made fos thirty-five thousand 
 .'tdditional troops ; and the call was re- 
 sponded to Avith alaci-ity and enthusi- 
 asm. Up until the date of the bora- 
 Itardment of Fort Sumter, the Southern 
 Confederac}'- consisted only of the seven 
 cotton St.<ites. The other eight slave 
 States— Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, 
 North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, 
 Missouri nnd Arkansas, embracing the 
 '-argi'r lialf of the population of the 
 
 South, had stood aloof from the seces- 
 sion movement. Their sympathies were 
 illy concealed ; but they had resolved 
 not to declare themselves until circum- 
 stances rendered a decision necessary. 
 The proclamation of President Lincoln 
 left them no choice. Being still in the 
 Union, these several States were called 
 upon to furnish their proportion of 
 troops. From almost all of them came 
 replies of the most defiant kind. Mary- 
 land and Delaware were less pronounced 
 than some of the others. Secession went 
 on apace. Virginia openly joined the 
 Confederacy on the 17th of April, two 
 days after the proclamation ; she was 
 followed by Arkansas on the 6th of 
 May; by North Carolina on May the 
 20th ; and by Tennessee on the 8th of 
 June. Li the remaining slave States — 
 Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky and Mis- 
 souri — sentiment was divided; and al- 
 though the contest was protracted and 
 keen, it was found possible to retain them 
 in the Union. The cause of the South 
 was immensely strengthened by the ad- 
 hesion of the above-mentioned States; 
 and Virginia was justly regarded as a 
 great acquisition. As soon as that State 
 withdrew from the Union, Richmond 
 was made the head-quarters of the 
 Confederate government. In the loyal 
 States of the North the proclamation 
 of President Lincoln was hailed with 
 rapturous enthusiasm ; from the pulpit, 
 from the platform, and through the press 
 burning words went forth to the people ; 
 and, Avithin a few days, the militia of 
 the different States were out in force, 
 and large bodies nf men were converg- 
 ing towards the national capital. 
 
34 
 
 BULL KUN. 
 
 It soon 'became manifest that Virginia 
 in the east, and the border States, Ken- 
 tucky and Missouri in the west, would 
 be the principal theatre of the war. 
 Towards those States a general move- 
 ment was made by the forces of both 
 North and South. From the moment 
 that Virginia joined the Southern Con- 
 federacy, and that Kichmond became the 
 rival capital, it was seen and felt that 
 the war struggle in the first instance at 
 least, would be limited to a compara- 
 tively narrow area. The fall of Fort 
 Sumter inspired the South with, per- 
 haps, a little too much confidence, " No 
 man," said Walker, the Confederate war 
 secretary, " can foretell the events of the 
 war now inaugurated ; but this, I will 
 venture to predict that the Confederate 
 flag will, before the 1 st of May, float over 
 the dome of the capitol at Washing- 
 ton." AValker was not ignorant of the 
 fact that a conspiracy existed having 
 for its object the capture of Washing- 
 ton, the seizure of the government ofii- 
 cers, and the inauguration of a provis- 
 ional government, in the interests of 
 the South. Of the existence of some 
 such conspiracy there can be no doubt. 
 Southern men, supposed to be in the 
 secret, have since confessed that if 
 Washington could not be held, after it 
 fell into their hands, the intention was 
 to fire it, destroy the national archives 
 and leave the city a mass of I'uins. 
 "If Maryland secedes," said Alexander 
 H. Stephens, " the District of Columbia 
 falls to her by reversionary right, as 
 Sumter fell to South Carolina." The 
 designs of the Confederates on Wash- 
 ington while they determined the move- 
 
 ment of Southern forces, gave zeal 
 and energy to the North. To protect 
 Washington became the great primary 
 object of the North. Manassas Junc- 
 tion, a point on the railroad between 
 Washington and Richmond, where a 
 branch comes in from the Shenandoah 
 Valley, was singled out as the rendez- 
 v^ous for the South ; and thither their 
 troops were hurried forward with all 
 possible rapidity. Manassas Junction 
 is only thirty miles from Washington ; 
 and it was doubtless selected, because 
 it threatened Washington, rather than 
 because it might cover Richmond. It 
 was a daring movement on the part of 
 the South. If they were able to make 
 their position good at Manassas, their 
 next move would have been to occupy 
 Arlington Heights, which overlook and 
 command the national capital. Arling- 
 ton Heights secured, it was not unnatu- 
 ral for them to conclude that Washing- 
 ton might be in their hands, before the. 
 4th of July, wlien Congress was sum- 
 moned to meet. It was a splendid 
 vision — it can hardly be called a 
 dream; had it been realized, the Civil 
 War, if not prematurely brought to a 
 close, would certainly have rolled on in 
 other channels, and the condition of the 
 United States to-day would have been 
 different. 
 
 While the South was b asy, the North 
 was not idle. After not a little difii- 
 culty and some bloodshed, the loyal 
 forces found themselves in considerable 
 strength in Washington. Maryland had 
 foolishly interfered with the passage of 
 the loyal troops through her territory. 
 It was a bad blunder : but force and 
 
"ON" TO RICHMOND." 
 
 33 
 
 persuasion ultimately prevailed, and 
 the right of way was resumed, not 
 again to be called in question. Towards 
 the end of May, a large army, under 
 General Scott, was assembled in and 
 around the capital. Notwithstanding 
 all that had happened, Lincoln was ex- 
 tremely unwilling to invade the South. 
 Delay, however, had been perilous in 
 the extreme. From the window of his 
 chamber in the White House, the pres- 
 ident could see, on the other side of the 
 Fotomac, the waving folds of the South- 
 ern flag ; and with the aid of his field- 
 glass, he might observe the Confederate 
 engineers at work. By night their 
 camp-fires lit up with a lurid light the 
 southern sky. A forward movement 
 was resolved upon. On the 23d of May, 
 5Iay fi strong column, under the com- 
 23. mand of General McDowell, was 
 thrown across the Potomac, and Ar-' 
 lington Heights and the town of Alex- 
 andria were occupied. Before the end 
 of the month. General Butler, with a 
 body of twelve thousand men, held pos- 
 session of Forti-ess Monroe; General 
 Pattei'son, with another column, was 
 posted near Harper's Ferry ; while Gen- 
 eral G. B. McClellan, with another pow- 
 erful body, had crossed the Ohio River 
 and taken a strong position in Western 
 Virginia. The main body of the Con- 
 federates was stationed at Manassas 
 Junction, and was under the command 
 of General Beauregard. General Ma- 
 gi'uder held General Butler in check on 
 the Peninsula. General J. E. Johnston 
 confronted Patterson in the valley of 
 the Shenandoah. Another strong force 
 waa posted in the high lands of West 
 
 Virginia, prepared to meet any aggres- 
 sive movement on the part of the Union 
 soldiers. 
 
 Such was the state of affairs in 
 June and the early days of July, 1861. 
 McClellan's West Virginia campaign — 
 including the battle at Philippi, June 
 3d, the later action at Rich Mountain, 
 July 11th, and the subsequent encoun- 
 ters at Carrack's Ford and at Beverly — 
 all-important as they weie, must be re- 
 garded as forming part of the prelude 
 to the first great battle which was soon 
 to be fought. The same may be said of 
 General Butler's less successful effort 
 at Big Bethel, June 10th. Patterson 
 was still idly confronting Johnston in 
 the Shenandoah Valley. 
 
 Public impatience, at length, reached 
 a climax. The new regiments were 
 coming in slowly ; and the term for 
 which the three months' troops had 
 been called out would expire about 
 the end of July. The people felt that 
 if something was not done at once, the 
 Confederates, having opposed to them 
 only raw and undisciplined recruits, 
 would have all things their own way. 
 The soldiers themselves were disgusted 
 with their life of inaction. The cry 
 became general, "On to Richmond"; 
 and it was echoed as loudly by the men 
 in the field as by the public. 
 
 Arrangements had been made to 
 make a forward movement on the 8th 
 day of July ; but it was deemed unsafe 
 to break up the camp before the 15th. 
 General Scott, the commander-in-chief, 
 in consequence of age and infirmity, 
 did not feel himself equal to the task of 
 taking command in the field. For this 
 
36 
 
 BULL KUN. 
 
 highly responsible position, he select- 
 ed Brigadier-General Irwin McDowell. 
 McDowell was a native of Ohio, a 
 graduate of West Point ; he had seen 
 service in Mexico under General Wool, 
 and had acquired the reputation of be- 
 ing an excellent soldier. He had al- 
 ready been placed at the head of the 
 Union forces in Virginia, and as we 
 have seen had made himself master 
 of Arlington Heights, where were his 
 head-quai'ters. 
 
 The forces on the one side a:.d on 
 the other were disposed as follows. 
 The main body of the Northern army, 
 under McDowell, numbering about for- 
 ty-five thousand men, lay in front of 
 Washington, its back upon the Poto- 
 mac, and extended from Alexandria to 
 the Chain Bridge. At Martinsburg, 
 toward the northwest, and beyond the 
 Blue Ridge, with its back also on the 
 Potomac, there was the army of General 
 Patterson, numl^ering some eighteen 
 thousand men. The position was strong. 
 The three bridges which span the Poto- 
 mac at Washington City were well 
 guarded by batteries and earthworks. 
 The fortifications on Arlington Heights 
 covered all the positions which com- 
 manded Washington and Geoi-getown. 
 The Confederate forces, numbei'ingsome 
 twenty thousand, and under the com- 
 mand of Beauregard, already familiar 
 to the reader as the commander-in-chief 
 in Charleston Harlior, were strongly 
 posted at Manassas Junction — a place 
 of great natui'al sti'ength, and made al- 
 most impregnable by the Confederate 
 engineers. Manassas is situated about 
 half-way between the eastern spur of 
 
 the Blue Ridge and the Potomac below 
 Alexandria ; and it had the advantage 
 of being connected by railroad with 
 Richmond and the valley of the Shenan- 
 doah. Regarding Manassas as their 
 centre, the right swung out and rested on 
 the Potomac, below Alexandi'ia, hold- 
 ing the forts which blockaded the rivei'. 
 Their left consisting of some eight 
 thousand men under Joseph E. John- 
 ston, lay at Winchester, confronting the 
 Federal army under Patterson. Such 
 were the relative positions of the rival 
 armies on the eve of the battle of Bull 
 Run, or as the Southerners prefer to 
 name it, the battle of Manassas. In 
 point of numerical strength, the advan- 
 tage most certainly lay with the North ; 
 but the South had chosen a splendid 
 position and made admirable use of its 
 natural advantages. 
 
 On the 15th of July McDowell re- 
 ceived instructions to advance and juiy 
 attack the Confederate position *5. 
 at Manassas Junction. It deserves to 
 be remarked here that Patterson, who, 
 as we have seen, was stationed at Mar- 
 tinsburg, received strict orders not to 
 abandon his position, but to hold the 
 Confederates imder Johnston in his grip, 
 and to prevent them by every possible 
 means from coming to the aid of Beau- 
 regai'd at Manassas. This was part 
 of the battle-plan ; and although, aw 
 we shall see presently, it led to dif 
 astrous results, it was at once well 
 conceived and well-intended. On th« 
 16th the forward movement be- juij 
 gan. Leaving some fifteen thou- '6. 
 sand men to guard the seat of govei'n- 
 ment, McDowell, at the head of some 
 
TYLER'S MISTAKE. 
 
 3"? 
 
 thirty thousand men, arranged in four 
 divisions, and commanded respectively 
 by Brigadier-General Taylor, Colonels 
 Hunter, Heintzelman and Miles, ad- 
 vanced towards Fairfax Court House. 
 This place was about ten miles distant 
 and was known to be in the possession 
 of the Confederate forces. The army 
 moved in four columns — Tyler with 
 the right wing taking the Georgetown 
 road ; Hunter with the centre taking 
 the Leesburg and Centreville road ; 
 Heintzelman with one portion of the 
 left taking the Little River turnpike, 
 and Miles with the remaining portion 
 of the left proceeding along the old 
 Bi'addock road, which, as it passes 
 through Fairfax Court House and Cen- 
 treville, becomes the Warrenton turn- 
 pike. The movement was made in good 
 order, and with complete success. It 
 was a success, however, coupled with 
 disappointment ; for at Fairfax Court 
 House, where they expected to find the 
 enemy in strength and ready to offer 
 battle, they found on./ a deserted camp 
 and an almost ruined village. The 
 Confedei'ates, hearing of their approach, 
 had retired hastily but in good order 
 through Centreville to Bull Run, a 
 stream flowing in front of their position 
 at Manassas Junction. The national 
 forces were naturally enough elated with 
 easy victory. Some little excesses were 
 indulged in ; but they were promptly 
 rebuked and they were not repeated. 
 
 On hearing that the enemy had evac- 
 nated Centreville, McDowell's first in- 
 tention was to make a vigorous demon- 
 Btration on their front with a view of 
 turning their right. On a closer exam- 
 
 198 
 
 ination of the situation, he saw that 
 this course was beset with some peril. 
 He deemed it expedient, therefore, to 
 change his plan, and resolved to turn, 
 if possible, the Confederate left, and 
 seize the railroad in their rear. While 
 thus engaged, McDowell's plans were 
 well-nigh frustrated by the rash enthu- 
 siasm of one of his subordinates. About 
 noon of the 18th, General Tyler, july 
 believing that he could, without l^- 
 much difficulty, march directly on Man- 
 assas, moved down from Centreville 
 towards Blackburn's Ford. He took 
 with him Richardson's Brigade, a squad- 
 ron of cavalry and Ayres' battery, 
 Sherman's brigade being held in re- 
 serve. Beauregard, who had been well 
 advised of all that was taking place, 
 was there in position and ready to re- 
 ceive him. The ground was thickly 
 wooded ; and the opposing forces were 
 concealed from each other's view. Open- 
 ing an artillery fire on the forest in 
 front, Tyler soon perceived the glitter- 
 ing points of the bayonets of the ene- 
 my ; and a rattling discharge of artillery 
 and musketry taught him the danger of 
 his position. The affair was brief ; but 
 it was bloody. In vain Tyler attempted 
 to dislodge the enemy. In vain he push- 
 ed forward his regiments. In vain he 
 brought up Sherman's brigade. After 
 an hour's ineffectual efforts he was com- 
 pelled to retire. The skirmish at Black- 
 burn's Ford, called by the Confederates 
 the battle of Bull Run, was justly 
 claimed by them as a victory. The 
 Nationals lost about one hundred men : 
 the Confederate loss was about twenty. 
 The losses, it is true, were not great; 
 
«8 
 
 BTTLL RUN. 
 
 but the lesson was emphatic. It nat- 
 urally enough emboldened the South; 
 while it taught the military politicians 
 and enthusiasts of the North that the 
 putting down of the rebellion was not 
 to be a mere holiday exercise. 
 
 McDowell felt the necessity for im- 
 mediate and vio-orous action. The situ- 
 ation had become critical. Every hour 
 was increasingly pi'ecious. In a few 
 days more, he knew he would lose the 
 flower of his army. The three months' 
 term of service for which the first call 
 of volunteers was made, had all but ex- 
 pired. In his own report the General 
 says, " In the next few days, day by 
 day, I shall have lost ten thousand of 
 the best armed, drilled, officered and 
 disciplined troops in the army." The 
 Confederate army meanwhile was stead- 
 ily increasing in numbers. Adhering 
 to his plan to turn the Confederate 
 left, he concentrated his forces at and 
 around Centrevdle, and made instant 
 preparations for an attack. In addition 
 to a force of five thousand men within 
 call, he had around him and ready for 
 immediate action some twenty-eight or 
 thirty thousand men, Avith forty-nine 
 guns. On the lOtli a reconnoissance 
 July ^^^ made ; and it was intended 
 19« to make tlie attack on the follow- 
 ing day. His supplies, however, came 
 late ; and another day was lost. The 
 July 20th was Saturday. On the eve- 
 20. ning of that day McDowell's ar- 
 my began to melt away. The term of 
 service of the Fourth Pennsylvania and 
 Varian's Batteiy of the New York 
 Eighth having expii'ed, those troops 
 could not be induced to remain; and 
 
 the historian must regretfully chronic] 
 the fact that on the following morning 
 they "moved to the rear to the sound 
 of the enemy's cannon." 
 
 At this stage it is necessary for the 
 reader to form something like a clear 
 and accurate conception of the ground 
 on which the impending conflict was to 
 take place. Bull Run, it is to be re- 
 membered, flows from the northwest to 
 the southeast. Dm-ing a part of its 
 course, it is equidistant about three 
 miles from Centreville and Manassas 
 Junction, the head-quarters respectively 
 of the Union and Confederate armies. 
 There are three roads running out of 
 Centreville, which cross the stream at 
 different points. There is the Warren- 
 ton tui'npike which crosses by the Stone 
 Bridge. There is another road which 
 crosses at Blackburn's Foi-d. There is 
 a third road further to the south, which 
 crosses at Union Mills Ford. These 
 are the three principal fords; and in 
 the order in which we have named 
 them, they mark consecutively the Con- 
 federate left, centre and right. In ad- 
 dition to these are Sudley's Spring 
 Ford about two miles to the northeast 
 of the Stone Bridge, Red Hill Foi'd, 
 between the Stone Bridge and Sudley's 
 Spring, and McLean's Ford, between 
 Blackburn's and Union Mills. Cub 
 Run, a branch of Bull Run, and flow- 
 ing from north to south, is another 
 feature of the landscape which deserves 
 to be noted. Along the line of Bull 
 Run, over a distance of eight miles, the 
 Confederates were posted as follows, 
 There were six brigades — Ewell's ai 
 Union Mills Ford; Jones' at McLean'^ 
 
READY FOR BATTLE. 
 
 39 
 
 Ford ; Longstreet's at Blackburn's Ford ; 
 Bonham's at Mitchell's Ford; Cocke's 
 at Ball's Ford ; and Evans' at the Stone 
 Bridge. The brigades of Holmes and 
 Early were held in reserve in the rear 
 of the right, as were those of Jackson 
 and Bee on the left. The total strength 
 of the Confederate army was about 
 twenty-two thousand men. In numeri- 
 cal strength, it was inferior to the army 
 under McDowell ; but in the strength 
 of their position and their thorough 
 knowledge of the ground the Confede- 
 rates had immeasurably the advantage. 
 We have seen already that Patterson 
 was stationed in the valley of the Shen- 
 andoah, and that it was his special busi- 
 ness to hold Johnston at Winchester 
 and prevent him from joining Beaure- 
 gard at Manassas. When McDowell 
 advanced to Fairfax Court House on 
 the 17th, information of the fact was 
 conveyed to the Confederate War De- 
 partment ; and Johnston was immediate- 
 ly telegraphed to join the army of the 
 Potomac -^Nnth all his forces. The de- 
 spatch was received on the 18th in the 
 morning ; and by noon of the 20th, hav- 
 ing eluded Pattei'son, Johnston reached 
 Manassas Junction, with six thousand 
 men. He had marched unmolested 
 through Ashby's Gap to Piedmont ; and 
 thence by railroad he hurried forward 
 his infantry to Manassas, leaving the 
 cavali-y and artillery to pursue their 
 journey as before. The arrival of John- 
 ston was an immense gain to the Con- 
 federates. Being senior officer, he im- 
 mediately took command of the aiToy, 
 without interfering in the least, how- 
 ever, with Beauregard's plans. The 
 
 Confederates were now as eager to join 
 battle as were the Unionists, because 
 they feared that unless they struck at 
 once, Patterson, discovering that John- 
 ston had outgeneralled him and made 
 good his escape, would hurry forward 
 and reinforce McDowell. It was a 
 groundless fear, as the residt proved ; 
 l:)ut it was surely most natural in the 
 circumstances. 
 
 McDowell's plan, as Ave have seen, 
 was to tui'n the Confederate left, drive 
 them from the Stone Bridge and from 
 the Warrenton turnpike, and so make 
 himself master of the Manassas Grap 
 railroad in their rear. By this means, he 
 hoped to prevent the junction of the 
 forces of Johnston and Beauregard. 
 He did not know that through the 
 blundering of Patterson the junction 
 had already been effected. To can-y 
 out his plans, Tyler was instructed to 
 move along the Warrenton turnpike 
 and open fire on the Confederate left 
 at Stone Bridge. Hunter and Heintzel- 
 man were to follow him for a certain 
 distance, then to make a detour north- 
 ward, crossing Bull Run near Sudley's 
 Spring, and fall upon the flank and rear 
 of the Confederates, when already under 
 fire from Tyler's men. Miles with Rich- 
 ardson's brigade attached, was to I'emain 
 at Centreville and guard the position. 
 The movement was to commence at 
 half-past two o'clock on the morning of 
 Sunday, the 21st. By midnight every- 
 thing was in readiness. The night had 
 been more than oi'dinarily beautiful. 
 The surrounding country was in al] 
 the glory of midsummer. Innumerable 
 camp-fires shed a strange light on the 
 
»0 
 
 BULL RUN. 
 
 dense foliage of the neighboring forests. 
 The air was fresh, and not a breath 
 rustled the lightest leaf. The moon 
 was full ; and from the blue vault of 
 the cloudless heavens it diffused over 
 the scene below a soft, mellow light. 
 As night wore into early morn, and the 
 summer sun began to gild tlie summits 
 of the distant hills, Natuiv, beautiful in 
 her brightest robes, seemed all-uncon- 
 scious of the terrific straggle which was 
 to disturb the stillness of that Sabbath 
 day. 
 
 The onward march of the three divis- 
 ions from Centi-eville, was, as we have 
 seen, to begin at half-past two o'clock 
 on Sunday morning. It was calculated 
 by McDo^vell that, if his orders were 
 faithfully carried out, Tyler woidd 
 reach the Stone Bridge about four, that 
 Hunter and Heintzelman having accom- 
 plished their semicii'cular detour, would 
 be at the appointed spot about six, and 
 that when Tyler had fairly engaged 
 the attention of the enemy in front, the 
 other two divisions should unexjDectedly 
 make a vigorous attack on his flank and 
 rear. That demon of delay ■which had 
 prevented him reaching Centreville un- 
 til the 18th, a day later than he had 
 intended, and \vhich hindered him from 
 offering battle on the 2()th, was again 
 fatal to McDowell's plans. It was six 
 or a little later ^\■hen T3-ler reached 
 the Stone Bridge; and it was nearly 
 four hours later, tbe hot July sun be- 
 ing already high in the heavens, when 
 Hunter and Heintzelman arrived at 
 their destination. McDowell, who was 
 ill, had followed in a carriage; ]»ut im- 
 patient of the ruinous delay, he mounted 
 
 his horse, and, followed by a few at- 
 tendants, M^as the first on the battle 
 ground. Before the battle began, he 
 saw that his plans had been frustrated. 
 The discharge of a shell from a thirty- 
 pounder Pairott gun, which fell among 
 a band of Confederates, seen in a jniy 
 meadow below Bull Run, and 21. 
 scattered their ranks, was the signal foi- 
 battle. Although other shells were 
 fired in quick succession, the Confede- 
 rates were slow to reply. McDowell 
 dreaded that an attack was contem- 
 plated on his left, further down the 
 stream. He therefore held in reserve 
 one of Heintzelman's brigades (How- 
 ard's), in case, as he said, "he should 
 have to send any ti'oops back to rein- 
 force Miles' division." Colonel Evans, 
 who, with a very small force, held the 
 Stone Bridge for the Confederates, nat- 
 urally enough believed at first that the 
 attack made in fi'tmt by the force under 
 Tyler was the real one. He ^vas soon, 
 however, undeceived. As early as half- 
 past nine, he was made aware that a 
 lai'ge force of the enemy was passing 
 through the Avoods on his left and tow- 
 ards his rear. By ten o'clock, the ad- 
 vance brigade of Hunter's column, com- 
 manded by Burnside, had reached the 
 open fields. In the interval, however, 
 he had found time to send foi- reinforce- 
 ments, to wheel around, making an en- 
 tire change of front, and to post himself 
 in a first class position to receive the 
 enemy. His right rested in a long 
 and narrow grove in front of Young's 
 Blanch — a petty tributary of Bull Run ; 
 his centre crossed the Sudley road to 
 the north of the Warrenton turnpike ; 
 
A FURIOtrS STRUGGLE 
 
 4i. 
 
 and bis left was concealed among the 
 outhouses, sheds, haystacks and fences 
 of a neighboring farm. Tlie position 
 was somewhat elevated, enabling him 
 to pour a destructive fire of artillery 
 and musketry on the forces of the ene- 
 my, as soon as they emerged from the 
 woods, and while yet distant many hun- 
 dred yards. 
 
 The appearance of the head of Burn- 
 side's column at the edge of the wood 
 ivas the signal for the opening of the 
 Confederate fire. It was sharp and 
 severe, and well fitted to produce con- 
 fusion among comparatively raw re- 
 cruits, as yet but little experienced to 
 the severities and sudden surprises of 
 the battle field. But the men under 
 Burnside were full of purpose ; and 
 having enjoyed half-an-hour's rest at 
 the ford, where they filled their can- 
 teens with water, they Avere well re- 
 freshed. Not waiting to form proper 
 line of order, they sharply responded. 
 The Second Rhode Island, under Colonel 
 John Slocum, was. the first under fire. 
 Burnside M^as not slow in getting his 
 troops in hand ; while Porter's brigade, 
 (juickl}' emerging from the wood, form- 
 ed on his right, Griflin's battery also 
 getting into position and replying with 
 effect to the Confederate artilleiy. The 
 Ijattle was now fairly begun. Evans 
 was already sorely pressed, when he 
 received some welcome assistance. Gen- 
 eral Bee, Avho was next in what had 
 now become his rear, with detachments 
 of his men and Burton's Georgia bri- 
 gade, and ca]-i-}ing with him six guns 
 of Imboden and Richardson, rushed 
 down the slope towards the turn])ike. 
 
 It was a critical moment for the National 
 troops. Burnside, realizing the situa- 
 tion, called for help. Sykes' battalion 
 was promptly huriied forward from 
 Porter on the right. The national line 
 was thereby greatly strengthened. The 
 battle I'aged fiei'cely, the Confederate 
 artillery, particularly from its superior 
 position, telling with deadly effect oh 
 the Union ranks. Colonel Hunter fell, 
 severely wounded, and had to be carried 
 fi'om the field. Colonel Slocum was 
 mortally wounded; and his major, Sul- 
 livan Ballou, had his horse killed luider 
 him, and his leg badly crushed by a 
 cannon ball. The battle had lasted an 
 houi" ; and the result was still doubtful, 
 when Porter, having ai-rived on the 
 scene, poured a heavy fire on Evans' 
 left, making his whole column waver 
 and bend. Almost at the same moment, 
 Sherman's brigade of Tyler's division, 
 which had been ordered forward, suc- 
 cessfully crossed the ford just above 
 the Stone Biidsje, and added its strensrth 
 to the Union forces. Hunter's success, 
 howevei', was ali'eady assured ; the Con- 
 federates were in retreat ; and Sherman 
 was ordered, his troops being still fresh, 
 "to join in the pursuit of the enemy, 
 who was falling back towards the Sud- 
 ley's Spring road." The first part of 
 McDowell's plan had been carried out 
 with success. He had turned the ene- 
 mj-'s left ; he had forced him from the 
 Warrenton turnpike ; he had uncovered 
 the Stone Bridge ; he had pressed the 
 opposing lines at least a mily and a 
 half, and had occupied the vacated 
 ground. 
 
 At this stage occurred McDowell's 
 
 I 
 
t2 
 
 BULL RUN. 
 
 mistake — a mistake which, with the 
 light we now enjoy, we can afford to 
 call fatal. The left wing of the Con- 
 federates had been turned and broken, 
 and was now in full retreat. We have 
 already given a general view of the 
 ground on which the opposing forces 
 were encamped ; and we have already, 
 in a passing Avay, referred to Young's 
 Branch. At this point, it will be well 
 for the reader to form an accurate con- 
 ception of Young's Branch or Creek and 
 the plateau on which the final struggle 
 took place. Young's Branch flows fi'om 
 the west in a valley which forms a curve 
 concave to the south, and joins Bull 
 Run a short distance below the Stone 
 Bridge. It was down the northern 
 slope of this valley that the national 
 troops had descended. It was up the 
 southern slope that the Confederates 
 were being driven. On the summit of 
 this southern slope, and about the 
 height of a hundred feet, there is a 
 piece of table land or plateau, oblong 
 in form, a mile in length from northeast 
 to southwest and about half-a-mile in 
 width. On the eastern and southern 
 brows of this plateau, there is a pine 
 forest; Avhile to the west there is a 
 broad belt of oaks through which runs 
 the Sudley road. On the plateau there 
 Ye three houses — Robinson's to the 
 . vfth, Henry's to the southwest of Rob- 
 inson's, and Lewis's or the "Portico," 
 as it was called, still further to the 
 south. Across the Warreuton turnpike 
 and up towards this plateau, the defeat- 
 ed Confederates rushed ; and by the aid 
 of Colonel Hampton's splendid legion, 
 tvhich had come from Richmond too 
 
 late to take part in the furious struggle, 
 the retreat was conducted in good or- 
 der. Up towards the plateau McDowell 
 pursued his flying antagonists. When 
 Bee's discomfited troops reached the 
 summit of the slope, there stood a full 
 brigade, solid, strong and immovable^ 
 in line, and ready for battle. It was 
 the brigade of General T. J. Jackson 
 who had just arrived and taken a posi- 
 tion behind Bee. "They are beating 
 us back," exclaimed Bee. " Well, sir,''* 
 said Jackson, with the utmost coolness, 
 "we Avill give them the bayonet." Bee 
 rallied his men. " Form ! fonn ! " he 
 cried. "There's Jackson, standing like 
 a stone wall." The words were electric. 
 " Stonewall Jackson," shouted the sol- 
 diers. The name which was yet to be 
 a watchword and a rallying cry on many 
 a bloody batthi field, was from that 
 moment immortal. The circumstance 
 turned the tide of battle. In the opin- 
 ion of many, if McDowell, instead of 
 pursuing the Confederates up to the 
 hill forest, had moved direct for Manas- 
 sas Junction, the day Avould have been 
 decided and the victory his. This oi 
 course implies that the effect of " Stone- 
 wall " .lackson's stubborn I'esistance 
 checked the tide of victory M'hich had 
 ali'eady set in in McDowell's favor, and 
 gave the Confederates the opportimity 
 which they needed. We incline to this 
 view of the case ; but we are unwilling 
 to forget that we judge the situation 
 with a larger knowledge than McDowell 
 at the time possessed. He was ignor- 
 ant of the position of General Jackson ; 
 and even if he had known that such a 
 force under such a man stood firm and 
 
THE SECOKD PHASE OF THE BATTLE. 
 
 iS 
 
 fresh on the heights, he might have 
 doubted whether a routed army could 
 be so easily checked and forced to turn 
 around and face the pursuing foe. 
 
 It was noon. The heat had become 
 intense. Clouds of dust and smoke 
 filled the air and blinded the assailants 
 as they rushed up the sloping hillside. 
 Johnston and Beauregard, alarmed by 
 the heavy firing, and by the intelligence 
 Avhich they had received of the success- 
 ful movements of the national troops, 
 ordered Generals Holmes, Early and 
 Ewell to hurry forward with their 
 troops in the direction of the sound of 
 the battle, while they themselves gal- 
 loped from their position, four miles 
 distant, to the plateau. They found 
 upon it a force of seven thousand men, 
 with fourteen guns ; but they were well 
 sheltered in a dense thicket of pines. 
 The battle was all but lost ; the situa- 
 tion was desperate ; but the brigades 
 of Holmes and Early and Ewell and 
 Bonham, with the batteries of Pendle- 
 ton and Alburtis, would soon be on 
 hand. Johnston rallied the shattered 
 regiments on the right ; Beauregard 
 those on the left. This done and some- 
 thing like order restored, Beauregard 
 took command of the field, and John- 
 ston retii'ed and established his head- 
 quarters at the house of Mr. Lewis, 
 called "The Portico," from which he 
 had a full view of the entire field of 
 t-iattle, and where he could exercise a 
 general supervision. When the battle 
 entered upon its second phase and the 
 struggle began for the possession of the 
 plateau, the Confederate strength was 
 increased to ten thousand men and 
 
 twenty-two guns. It was discovered 
 that at the lower fords nothing was in- 
 tended by the enemy. Every available 
 man was, therefore, hurried foi-ward to 
 the "focus of the fight." 
 
 On the national side, the most vigor- 
 ous measures were adopted to make the 
 attack a success. It was felt that the 
 Confederates had an immense advant- 
 age in the position which they occupied. 
 To drive them from that position was 
 the task now on hand. The attackinir 
 force consisted of five briijades. Porter 
 being in command on the right, Frank- 
 lin and Wilcox in the centre, and Sher- 
 man and Keyes on the left. Howard's 
 brigade was upon the Run. Burnside's 
 brigade, whose ammunition had been 
 exhausted in the morning battle, had 
 been withdrawn into a wood for the 
 purpose of being supplied, and had not 
 yet returned to the scene of action. 
 Schenck was on hand and ready to cross 
 the bridge. With the attacking force 
 were Griffin's, Rickett's and Arnold's 
 batteries, and a body of cavalry tinder 
 Major Palmer. The entire strength 
 was thirteen thousand men and sixteen 
 guns. Eighteen thousand men still re- 
 mained on the west side of Bull Run. 
 The five brigades, the batteries and the 
 cavalry moved boldly and steadily up 
 the slope south of the Warrenton turn- 
 pike, McDowell being present in per- 
 son, with Heintzelman, who acted as 
 his chief lieutenant on the field. They 
 were exposed to a raking fire from the 
 Confederate batteries. Onward, how 
 ever, they pressed ; and having out- 
 flanked the enemy, they were soon in 
 possession of the western edge of the 
 
44 
 
 BULL RTTIV 
 
 plateau. A little to the southeast of 
 the Henry house, to which we have al- 
 ready made reference, there was a swell 
 of rising ground which, it was seen, at 
 once, commanded the field of action. It 
 was the key of the position. Whoever 
 held it had command of the entire pla- 
 teau. Orders were given to Rickett's 
 and Griffin's batteries to advance and 
 plant themselves upon it. The bat- 
 teries were supported by the Eleventh 
 New York, the Twenty-seventh New 
 York, Fifth and Eleventh Massachu- 
 setts, the Second Minnesota, and Cor- 
 coran's Sixty-ninth. The attack was 
 bravely made. The artillery, with the 
 New York Eleventh (Ellsworth's Fire 
 Zouaves), who were in immediate sup- 
 port of the batteries, in the face of a 
 terrific cannonade moved gallantly for- 
 ward. All of a sudden, an Alabama 
 regiment emerged from behind a clump 
 of pines, and poured a deadly fire on 
 their flank. This surprise was all the 
 more demoralizing that the attacking 
 reginient was mistaken at first for one 
 of their own. When staggering under 
 this deluge of fire in front and on flank, 
 two companies of Stuart's Black Horse 
 Cavalry rushed furiously upon their 
 rear. The regiment was ruined. The 
 batteries, the horses of which had been 
 killed, were in utmost peril. Other 
 regiments were sent forward, but in 
 vain. Three times were tlie batteries 
 overrun by Confederates; and three 
 times were the troops of the enemy re- 
 pulsed and the batteries reclaimed. 
 While this struggle was raging with al- 
 ternate success and defeat on the right, 
 an attempt was also being made by 
 
 McDowell's left to carry the plateau. 
 The fighting in this direction had been 
 equally severe. Sherman had been or 
 dered to charge the batteries of the 
 Confederates with his entire brigade, 
 and sweep them from the hill. In the 
 encounter the riflemen of Quimby's 
 Thirteenth New York, the Seventy- 
 ninth (Scotch) New York, and the Sixty- 
 ninth (Irish) New York, especially dis- 
 tinguished themselves. The gallant 
 Cameron of the Seventy-ninth was 
 killed when, for the third time, he led 
 his brave Higlilandera to the charge. 
 Corcoran, of the Sixty-ninth, had his 
 horse shot under him, and was made 
 prisoner. Keyes had little better suc- 
 cess on the extreme left. He had forced 
 his way up the slope, and reached the 
 Robinson house ; but the fire from the 
 enemy's batteries was so severe that he 
 was compelled to retire. 
 
 The critical moment had arrived. The 
 slaughter had been terrible on both 
 sides. The Union advance had been 
 checked; but the Confederate strength 
 was well-nigh exhausted. Several of 
 _ their best officers were killed, and not a 
 few were disabled. Bee and Baxter had 
 fallen in the heat of the fight, near the 
 Henry house. Hampton and Jackson 
 had been wounded. Beauregard had his 
 horse shot under him. McDowell liad 
 still two brigades fresh, l)esides Burn- 
 side's, in reserve. It was now three 
 o'clock, and there was no appearance 
 of Early and his three fresh regiments. 
 The order had been sent him at eleven, 
 but by some mishap it had not reached 
 him till two " Oh, for four regiments," 
 cried Johnston to Colonel Cocke. His 
 
Alk INGLORIOm ROITI 
 
 45 
 
 wish was soon to be gratified. The 
 mistake made by Patterson in allowing 
 Johnston's army to escape from Win- 
 chester is now to be revealed. A cloud 
 of dust \\a3 seen in the direction of 
 Manassas Gap. Johnston's first fear 
 was that it might be Patterson ; but 
 no ; it was the remainder of his own 
 army, Elzey's brigade, led by Kirby 
 Smith. They were about three thousand 
 strong. Hearing the sound of battle, 
 they had stopped the cars before they 
 reached the Junction. Hurrying np 
 at the supreme moment, they struck 
 the National right full on its flank. The 
 fate of the day was decided. The bat- 
 tle was won. The cross fire of the 
 newly arrived troops was irresistible. 
 The cry went up from the National 
 ranks, " Here's Johnston from the Val- 
 ley." In a moment the battle was ended. 
 There was no more fight in the Union 
 men. Helter skelter they ran down the 
 plateau. It was not a repulse. It was 
 a rout. Never was victory more com- 
 plete. Never was rout more disgrace- 
 ful. In vain did McDowell tiy to rally 
 his men. They would not, they could 
 not, hear. At Cub Run the rout be- 
 came a panic. Arms and all encum- 
 brances were flung away. Everything 
 was left on the field. Soldiers, citizens 
 and camp followers rushed to Centre- 
 ville and thence on to Washington, there 
 to describe to the astonished and bewil- 
 dered multitude another than the holi- 
 day scene which some of them had 
 gone forth to witness. At night Jeffer- 
 son Davis, who had witnessed the great- 
 er part of the fight, telegraphed to his 
 Congress, "Night has closed upon a 
 
 199 
 
 hard fought field. Our forces were vic- 
 torious. The enemy was routed, and 
 fled precipitately, abandoning a larg« 
 amount of arms, ammunition, knapsacks 
 and baggage. The gi'ound was strewed 
 for miles with those killed, and the 
 farm houses around were filled with 
 
 wounded Our force was fifteen 
 
 thousand; that of the enemy estimated 
 at thirty thousand." The report did 
 not speak the truth ; but it bespoke the 
 triumph of the situation — the pride and 
 spirit of the man. 
 
 The loss on the part of the Confede- 
 rates was 378 killed, 1489 wounded. 
 The national loss was 481 killed, 1011 
 wounded, and 1460 piisoners. 
 
 Not one of all the battles of the war 
 has been so variously, and in some in- 
 stances so unjustly, commented on ai 
 Bull Run. It is not our business ir 
 these pages to combat or endorse the 
 opinions which have been expressed. 
 There are, however, some things which, 
 in justice to the one side and the other, 
 must be said. It is not to be denied 
 that on both sides there was dif^played 
 much bravery and not a little skill. 
 Never, perhaps, before, in the whole 
 history of the world, was such fighting 
 done by comparatively raw and inexpe- 
 rienced men. On the part v>f the South, 
 the battle was skillfully fought and fair- 
 ly won. In a better cause, Beauregard 
 and Johnston would have covei'ed them- 
 selves with glory. On the part of the 
 North, there was certainly bad manage- 
 ment. Some serious blunders were 
 made. General Scott blundered by the 
 disposition he made of his forces. He 
 had eighty thousand men at his dis- 
 
-«6 
 
 MiJNUK -BATTLEiS. » 
 
 posal ; he had divided them into three 
 paiis, and had foolishly allowed one of 
 these parts to be flung unsustained on 
 the enemy. Patterson blimdered when 
 he allowed Johnston to escape from 
 him at Winchester. He blundered still 
 more when he remained idle in his po- 
 sition after he discovered that the ene- 
 my had escaped. Patterson has since 
 endeavored to explain ; but, in spite of 
 all explanation, he wiU forever remain 
 accused before the bar of history of 
 culpable inaction. McDowell blundered 
 by not taking pains to make himself 
 master of the topographical features of 
 the ground before he commenced his 
 march from before Washington. He 
 blundered on three different occasions 
 ^»y losing time. He blundered most of 
 ill in not bringing his three fresh bri- 
 gades into action before the arrival of 
 Kirby Smith. Even at the last critical 
 moment, the appearance of so many 
 
 fresh troops might have prevented the 
 rout, and nailed victory to the Union 
 standards. The retreat was unusually 
 well conducted ; but this was due large- 
 ly to the fact that the Confederates were 
 too exhausted and too fearful to con- 
 tinue the pursuit. The battle of Bull 
 Run, decisive as it was, settled nothing. 
 The South gained the victory, but they 
 failed in their purpose. Washington 
 was more safe than before. The South 
 was jubilant. The North was humbled ; 
 but it was also more determined than 
 ever to prosecute the war. It was evi- 
 dent to all that a protracted struggle 
 was before the country. Both sides 
 began to raise and organize armies on 
 a gigantic scale. President Lincoln 
 called for half a million of men. 
 General McDowell was removed; and 
 General George B. McClellan was 
 placed in command of the army around 
 Washington. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Importance of some of the Minor Battles. — Where they were Fought. — The Border States. — Armed Neutrality. — 
 Lincoln's Message. — Maryland and Delaware. — Virginia, the Focus of the Rebellion. — Occupation of Harper's 
 Ferry. — The Capture of Komney. — Beverley. — Cari'ack's Ford. — Change of Commanders. — McClellan. — His 
 Past Career. — Rosecrans. — Floyd. — Camifex Ferry. — Drainsville. — Ball's Bluff. — A Butchery. — Death of 
 Colonel Baker. — Fremont in Missouri. — Dug Springs.- — Lyon. — Sigel. — Lyon Wounded. — Colonel Mitchell 
 KiUed. — Battle of Wilson's Creek. — Capitulation of Lexington. — Halleck Supersedes Fremont. — Kentucky. — 
 Governor Magoffin. — Kentucky in favor of the Union. — Lincoln's Reply to Magoffin. — The Yoimg Men of 
 Kentucky. — The Older Men. — Kentucky Forced into Secession. — General Polk. — Fort Columbus. — Polk's 
 Invasion of Kentucky. — Grant in Command at Cairo. — Grant's Determination, — His Proclamation. — Battle of 
 Belmont. — The Attack. — Terrible Fire from Fort Columbus. — The Victory of the Nationals. — The License of 
 the Soldiers. — The Victors Compelled to Retreat. — Showers of Bullets. — The Retreat Successfully Made. — 
 The Confederates Claim the Victory. — It Might Have Been Different. — General Grant Learns a Lesson. 
 
 The year 1861, subsequent to the 
 battle of Bull Run, was not mark- 
 ed by any great or decisive bat- 
 tle. There were, however, numerous 
 
 l!$61. 
 
 engagements of a minor character, each 
 of which was attended with conse- 
 quences of greater or less importance, 
 and all of which tended to fan into 
 
ARMED NEUTRALITY. 
 
 4? 
 
 more furious flame that growing war 
 sentiment which was soon to find devel- 
 opment on a more gigantic scale. These 
 engagements can hardly be said to have 
 been the result of any general plan, or 
 to have formed essential links in the 
 chain of events which were soon to cul- 
 minate in what may be called the great 
 campaigns. But because of the hero- 
 ism with which they were illustrated, 
 and the examples of self-sacrifice which 
 they called forth, as well as for the in- 
 fluence which they exerted in their sev- 
 eral sections, they cannot, in a work 
 like this, be passed over in silence. 
 
 These minor battles occurred princi- 
 pally in the border States, Kentucky, 
 Missouri, and Virginia. We have seen 
 already that the five border States, in- 
 cluding, in addition to those just men- 
 tioned, Maryland and Delaware, were 
 eagerly coveted by both North and 
 South. It was evident from the first 
 that in those States the great struggle 
 for supremacy should take place. With 
 the border States secured, and bearing 
 the principal burden of the war, it was 
 the hope of the Southern leaders that 
 the cotton crop might be raised without 
 molestation. It might still be possible 
 for the National government to establish 
 a blockade by sea and by river; but 
 England needed cotton ; and the South 
 counted with confidence alike on Eng- 
 lish sympathy and on English necessity. 
 
 Situated midway between the rival in- 
 fluences of North and South, and placed 
 necessarily in the very front of the 
 conflict, it was very natural that among 
 the inhabitants of those States there 
 should be great division of sentiment. 
 
 Every effort was made by the Southern 
 leaders to excite the slaveholding inter- 
 est, by making it appear that the North 
 had at last entered upon a crusade 
 against slavery, and that the Republican 
 party, now in power at Washington, 
 were bent upon the most tyrannical 
 measures. The National government 
 was just as anxious that the border 
 States should remain steadfast in their 
 loyalty. How to deal with slavery was 
 the great difficulty which lay in the way 
 of the North. To pronounce against 
 slavery, it was felt, would be to fling 
 the entire slaveholdins; interest into the 
 arms of the Confederacy. All through 
 the summer of 18(il every precaution 
 was taken to avoid giving offence to 
 the slaveholding interest. As the sit- 
 uation became more pressing, different 
 views began to be entertained and ex- 
 pressed by those in power. General 
 McClellan, who was in command in 
 Northeastern Virginia, declared it to be 
 his purpose not only not to interfere 
 with the slaves, but to crush with a 
 hand of iron any attempt made by 
 them at insurrection. General Butler, 
 on the other hand, who was in command 
 at Fortress Monroe, decided, on the same 
 day, to regard them as " contraband " 
 of war. Armed neutrality found favor 
 with not a few ; but President Lincoln, 
 in his message to Congress at its extra 
 session in July, clearly pointed out that 
 armed neutrality would be more a gain 
 to the South than to the North. " In 
 the Border States, so called, in fact, the 
 Middle States," he said, "there are 
 those who favor a policy which they 
 call ' armed neutrality ' ; that is, an arm^ 
 
48 
 
 MINO^ BATTLEt 
 
 ing of these States to prevent the Union 
 forces passing one way or the disunion 
 the other, over their soil. This would 
 be disunion completed. Figuratively 
 speaking, it would be building an im- 
 passable wall along the line of separa- 
 tion — and yet not quite an impassable 
 one, for under the guise of neutrality, it 
 Avould tie the hands of Union men, and 
 freely pass supplies from among them 
 to the insurrectionists, which could not 
 be done if they were open enemies. At 
 a stroke, it would take all trouble off 
 the hands of secession, except only what 
 proceeds from the internal blockade. 
 It would do for the disunionists that 
 which of all things they most desire — 
 feed them well, and give them disunion 
 without a struggle of their own. It 
 recognizes no fidelity to the Constitu- 
 tion, no obligation to maintain the 
 Union." 
 
 The geographical positions of Mary- 
 land and Delaware, as well as their 
 special interests, prevented them mak- 
 ing any very strong demonstration of 
 Southern sympathy. Delaware was too 
 weak and too thoroughly hemmed in to 
 be allowed to think either of secession 
 or of neutrality ; and General Butler's 
 vigorous eiforts, at the commencement 
 of the war, had effectually secured 
 Maryland to the Union. It was quite 
 otherwise with Virginia, Missouri and 
 Kentucky. 
 
 Virginia, as we have seen, and as had 
 been evident from the first, had become 
 the focus of the rebellion. The Rich- 
 mond authorities had seized Harper's 
 Ferry, immediately upon the passage of 
 the ordinance of secession. Occupying 
 
 it with as large a force as the)?^ could 
 spare for the purpose, they held the line 
 of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and 
 thus cut off all communication be- 
 tween Western Virginia and Washing- 
 ton along that line. No movement was 
 made by the National government until 
 the ordinance of secession had been rat- 
 ified, the general feeling at Washington 
 being that every care should be taken 
 to do nothing which was capable of 
 being interpreted as interference with 
 the Border States. 
 
 Immediately after the ratification of 
 the ordinance, General George B. Mc- 
 Clellan, to whom had been as- May 
 signed the command of the De- *1' 
 partment of the Ohio, including West- 
 ern Virginia, was ordered to cross the 
 Ohio and advance along the line of the 
 Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, as far a^ 
 Harper's Ferry. Having issued ad- 
 dresses to the people and to his soldiers, 
 in one of which he denounced " the in- 
 famous attempt of the traitorous con- 
 spiracy dignified by this name of the 
 Southern Confedei'aey," he moved for- 
 ward and occupied Parkersburg, the 
 terminus of the railroad on the Ohio 
 River. There was a Confederate force 
 at Grafton Junction, not far distant. 
 There was another Confederate force of 
 12,000 men at Romney. In addition to 
 these. General Joseph E. Johnston, at 
 the head of a large army, lay at Har- 
 per's Ferry. 
 
 The force at Grafton was under the 
 command of General G. A. Porterfield. 
 On the appearance of McClellar at Par- 
 kersburg, Porterfield issued an address 
 in which he called on the people to arise 
 
CARRACK'S FORD. 
 
 4« 
 
 aii'l resist the intruders, who, coming 
 from other States, sought to rule over 
 thi^ni. McClellan having ordered an 
 advance to Philippi, Purterfield vpas 
 pressed back, first to Beverley and then 
 to Huttonsville, where he was joined 
 by Governor Wise, who came up with 
 large reinforcements and assumed com- 
 mand. In this engagement at Philippi, 
 Colonel Kelly, who performed deeds of 
 great valor, was severely wounded. 
 
 In the meantime an encounter took 
 place at Romney, which shed some little 
 glory ou the National arms. Early in 
 June General Patterson, who was in 
 command of the Department of Penn- 
 sylvania, was making preparations for 
 an attack ou Maryland Heights, which 
 overlook and command Harper's Ferry. 
 Colonel Lewis Wallace had been di- 
 rected to join Patterson. As he drew 
 near the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 
 June Wallace learned that the Confed- 
 *7» erates were assembled in some 
 strength at Romney. In twenty-four 
 hours Wallace had accomplished a 
 march of eighty-seven miles, forty-six 
 of which were on foot. Coming up with 
 the Confederates at Romney, some se- 
 vere fighting took place. The Confed- 
 erates were driven from the place ; and 
 Johnston was so alarmed that he evacu- 
 ated Hai-jier's Ferry, having first burned 
 the railroad across the Potomac, spiked 
 the guns he could not carry ofF, and 
 obstructed in every possible way the 
 railroad and the canal. W hatever glory 
 resulted from the captui-e of Romney 
 nnist be set down to the credit of 
 Colonel Lewis Wallace. It was he who 
 conceived and carried out the enterprize. 
 
 The evacuation of Harper's Ferry, if 
 not directly caused by it, was at least 
 an almost immediate and perhaps neces- 
 sary consequence. 
 
 McClellau's forces were still at Graf- 
 ton. His army, since his encounter 
 with Porterfield, had been greatly in- 
 creased ; and by the 4th of July he had 
 under him twenty thousand men. Por- 
 tei-field had been superseded by General 
 Gai'uett, an officer who had won dis- 
 tinction in the Mexican war. The Con- 
 federates were afraid that MeClellau 
 might make an effort to push his way 
 through some of the mountain passes 
 which lead into the Shenandoah Valley, 
 and so effect a junction with Patterson. 
 Garnett was ordered so to dispose of 
 his forces as to guard the mountain 
 gaps and make this junction impossible. 
 Garnett, with the main body of his ar- 
 my, had taken a position at Laurel Hill, 
 near Beverley. A detachment im- jQiy 
 der Colonel Pea;ram was stationed 7. 
 at Rich Mountain. McClellan saw that 
 his forces greatly oiitnumbered those of 
 the enemy, and concluded to take action 
 at once. On the 11th of July, jujy 
 therefore, Rosecrans, with eight- H* 
 een hundred men, fell upon the detach- 
 ment, which was about nine hundred 
 strong. Pegram was put to flight, and 
 lost nearly half of his men. McClellan 
 now came up with his main army. 
 Garnett, who liad been joined by some 
 remnants of Pegi'am's force, ofFei'ed re- 
 sistance ; but his rear being exposed to 
 Rosecrans, he was speedily compelled 
 to abandon his camp and his cannon 
 and fall back towards Beverley. Mc- 
 Clellan, however, had reached that place 
 
50 
 
 MINOR BATTLES. 
 
 before him ; and Garnett turned his 
 face from the foe and made a precipi- 
 tate flight toward the north. Pegram, 
 cut off from all support and reduced to 
 great extremities, having been two days 
 without food, surrendered with six hun- 
 dred of his men. Garnett was pursued 
 and overtaken by General Morris at 
 Carrack's Ford. Here the Confederates 
 were brought to bay. Turning upon 
 their pursuers, they offered a spirited 
 resistance. It was impossible, however, 
 to withstand the onward rush and the 
 overwhelming numbers of the triumph- 
 ant Nationals. General Garnett, who 
 fought like a true hero, was shot through 
 the heart while vainly attempting to 
 rally his men. When the general fell, 
 the Confederates broke and fled. The 
 pursuit was continued for two miles, 
 when the exhausted troops were re- 
 called. 
 
 Before proceeding with oiu' narrative, 
 it is necessary to notice certain changes 
 which took place in the principal com- 
 mands of the army. General George B. 
 McClellan, in his campaign in Western 
 Virginia, had been singularly successful. 
 Hitherto he had been the most fortunate 
 or the most skilfid of all the generals 
 of the North. After the battle of Bull 
 Run, there was a universal desire that 
 he should take the place of McDowell 
 and reorganize the shattered army 
 which was principally depended upon 
 for the protection of the capital. On the 
 July 25th of July McClellan took com- 
 25. mand of the Departments of 
 Washington and of Northeastei'n Vir- 
 ginia, his head-quarters being at Wash- 
 ington City. At the time of his ap- 
 
 pointment to this high position McClel- 
 lan was only thirty-five years of age. 
 He was born in Philadelphia in 1826. 
 At the age of sixteen he entered the 
 Academy at West Point, where, among 
 others who rose to distinction on both 
 sides during the war, he had for fellow 
 students " Stonewall " Jackson and A. 
 P. Hill. After four years' study at 
 West Point, he graduated as second- 
 lieutenant of engineers. Before the 
 close of the Mexican wai he had won his 
 captaincy. His Manual for the Army, 
 and his Introduction to the Bayonet 
 Exercise, published a few years after- 
 wards, and while stationed at West 
 Point as director of field labors and in- 
 structor of infantry, gave proof at once 
 of his military skill and of his devotion 
 to his profession. Having filled various 
 military ppsitions under the govern- 
 ment, he was appointed in 1855 one of 
 the United States Military Commission- 
 ers to the Crimea. His report, which 
 contained some sharp criticisms on the 
 operations before Sevastopol, was gen- 
 erally well received, and showed that 
 he had studied the art of war to no 
 small advantage. Some years before 
 the war broke out he had I'esigned his 
 commission, and occupied himself with 
 the management of railroads. He had 
 been three years vice-president of the 
 Illinois Central; and at the beginning 
 of the year 1861 he was general super- 
 intendent of the Ohio and Mississippi. 
 The war furnished hira the opportunity 
 for which he had been longing. His 
 successful career in Western Virginia 
 fully justified his promotion in July;^ 
 and his appointment a little later, on 
 
CAKNIFEX FERRY. 
 
 51 
 
 the occasion of the resignation of Gen- 
 eral Scott, as commander-in-chief of the 
 armies of tlie United States, was hailed 
 with universal satisfaction. 
 
 After the encounter at Carrack's 
 Ford, McClellan in his despatch to the 
 government was able to make the proud 
 boast : " We have completely annihi- 
 lated the enemy in Western Virginia. 
 Our loss is about 13 killed and not 
 more than 40 wounded, while the en- 
 emy's loss is not far from 200 killed ; 
 and the number of prisoners we have 
 taken will amount to at least 1000. 
 We have captured seven of the enemy's 
 guns in all." There was still, however, 
 some hard work to be done before the 
 campaign was completed. On the ap- 
 pointment of General McClellan to the 
 command of the Federal forces on the 
 Potomac, General Rosecrans succeeded 
 him and took charge of the troops 
 which had done so well in Western Vir- 
 ginia. Rosecrans was a graduate of 
 West Point ; and for four years, from 
 1843 to 1847, he had filled some of the 
 most important chairs at that institu- 
 tion. At the outbreak of the war he 
 was engaged in business; but he lost 
 no time in volunteering his services ; 
 and to his skill and energy not a little 
 of the success which had attended the 
 array of Western Virginia was due. 
 
 General J. B. Floyd, formerly secre- 
 tary of war under Buchanan's adminis- 
 tration, had, since the death of Garnett, 
 who was killed at Carrack's Ford, as- 
 sumed the command of the Confederate 
 forces. A plan of campaign had been 
 agreed upon at Richmond ; and it was 
 confidently expected that the Confede- 
 
 rates would be able not only to drive 
 the Federals out of Western Virginia, 
 ])ut to" menace both Pennsylvania and 
 Ohio. Floyd was to sweep down the 
 Kanawha Valley and force Cox of Ohio 
 beyond the border, while General Rob- 
 ert E. Lee, who now appears for the 
 first time prominently on the scene, was 
 to scatter the Union army under Rose- 
 crans. The plan was Lee's ; and it has 
 been admitted by the most competent 
 strategists that the rules of war, as 
 shown by the finished drawings, never 
 found more perfect illustration. The 
 scheme, however, was not to succeed, 
 Floyd, who, as we have seen, had taken 
 the command of the Confederate forces 
 in Virginia after the death of Garnett, 
 moved forward with a view to carry 
 out the part of the plan assigned to 
 him. He relied with confidence on be- 
 ing joined by Wise before he encoun- 
 tered the Federals in any foi-ce. He 
 had encountered Tyler, and having han- 
 dled him somewhat severely, scattered 
 his forces. He had hoped to gain the 
 rear of Cox, and inflict upon him simi- 
 lar punishment. But Rosecrans was 
 hurrying forward. Over the western 
 spurs of the Alleghanies, through the 
 ravines and up the rugged hillsides, he 
 had, with almost incredible rapidity, 
 led his little band. At noon on Ang. 
 the 9th of August he had reached 9» 
 the summit of Powell Mountain, which 
 looks down upon one of the most beau- 
 tiful scenes of that lovely region. It 
 was no time, however, to halt and 
 admire the beauties of nature. The 
 two armies sighted each other. \ag. 
 On the following day, about three •*• 
 
63 
 
 MINUR BATTLES, 
 
 o'clock in the afternoon, the firing com- 
 menced. For nearly four hours the bat- 
 tle ra.ged, both sides performing deeds 
 of great valor. The Federal forces suf- 
 fered severely at the commencement of 
 the conflict. Colonel Lytle of the Ohio 
 Tenth was wounded in the leg and 
 had his horse shot nnder him. Colonel 
 Ijowe of the Ohio Twelfth, while hurry- 
 ing forward his regiment, was shot 
 through the head and killed instantly, 
 Floyd, however, was outmmibered ; and 
 Wise failing to come to his support, he 
 was unable to do more than hold his 
 gi'ound. At twilight, when McCook's 
 German brigade, although exposed to 
 a terrific fire, seemed on the point of 
 carrying the Confederate batteries, Rose- 
 crans, fearful for the safety of his men, 
 ordered a recall. The onward move- 
 ment was thus checked in mid-career. 
 It was the intention of Rosecrans to re- 
 sume the attack on the following morn- 
 Auffi "ig- When the morning dawned 
 i'» the enemy was gone, Floyd hav- 
 ing retired and taken a strong position 
 on Big Sewell Mountain, some thirty 
 miles distant from the battle field. But 
 for the caution of Rosecrans the pre- 
 vious evening, the Confederates might 
 have been completely I'outed. As it 
 was, the battle at Carnifex Ferry was 
 a substantial victory to the Federal 
 arms. 
 
 Lee was not more successful in carry- 
 ing out his part of the plan. At a 
 critical moment, when the enemy, 25,000 
 strong, had entrenched themselves at 
 Big Sewell and called it " Camp Defi- 
 ance," and were threatening an aggres- 
 sive movement, Rosecrans contrived to 
 
 effect a retreat and was not pursued. 
 After some other uuimpoj-tant engage- 
 ments, winter intervened and the cam- 
 paign was ended. Lee was recalled and 
 sent to take charge of the coast defenses 
 of South Carolina; Wise was ordered to 
 report at Richmond, and Floyd was 
 sent to the West. This campaign added 
 fresh lustre to McClellan's name, who, 
 although he was not personally in com- 
 mand at Carnifex Ferry, nor indeed 
 since the encounter at Carrack's Ford, 
 was supposed to be giving a general 
 direction. It was temporarily greatly 
 discouraging to the Confederates, who 
 har. expected much from General Lee. 
 Later in the year a serious disaster 
 befell the National forces at Ball's Bluff. 
 The Nationals and Confederates were 
 confronting each other on opposite sides 
 of the Potomac between Washington 
 and Harper's Ferry. A slight skirmish 
 had occurred at the latter place on the 
 8th of October. On that occasion Oct. 
 the Nationals, imder Colonel John ^' 
 W. Geary, gained a decided advantage. 
 About the middle of the month. Gen- 
 eral McClellan, deeming it desirable to 
 ascertain the Confederate strength in 
 the neighborhood of Drainsville, caused 
 a reconnoisance to be made by General 
 McCall. From Major-General Banks, 
 whose troops held the river on the 
 Maryland side, from Darnestown to 
 Williamsport, McClellan received a 
 despatch saying that the enemy had 
 moved away from Leesburg, the capital 
 of Loudon County, Virginia, On the 
 strength of Banks' despatch, McClellan 
 notified General Stone, who was at 
 Poolesville. of the movement of McCall, 
 
iiiipiiipiiipl^^ 
 
 
 « ' '' flMll 
 
 
 !!i»^^^^ 
 
 J.* I 
 
 J, I 
 
 OS 
 
 <: 
 
 h 
 
 < 
 
 X 
 
 o 
 
 o 
 « 
 u 
 
 2 
 
 O 
 
 H 
 
 S 
 M 
 O. 
 X 
 
 en 
 
 Q 
 
 Z 
 OS 
 
 D 
 
PICKETS ON DUTY. 
 
illl|i|Mtol«l!l!3'y!li«aMli!l9l]lttlilJilBll|::IIIM^^^ 
 
IVAT£KS SOAf SC 
 
 CHARLESTON HARBOH AND ITS APPROACHES, SHOWING FORTS SITVITER AND 
 WAGNER, JAMES ISLAND. Etc., Etc. 
 
MAP ILLUSTKAfING THE CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGNS. 
 
DIAGBAM 1. 
 
 wiTrps-sonnr I 
 
 ■ DIAGRAMS SHOWING THE POSITIONS OF THE ARMIES AT THE BATTLE OF 
 
 CHICKAMAUGA. 
 
DIAGRAM SHOWING POSITIONS DURING THE SECOND AND THIRD DAYS 
 
, ii liilliRliiiM " 
 
 ^^^ liiv.M m WV-^ v^:rf:AA\\ ^ \ . ,\\ \\-. 
 
MAP SHOWING VICKSBl'?G AND ITS APPROACHES. 
 
BALiL'S BLUFF. 
 
 53 
 
 iiid suggested that while keeping " a 
 iTood lookout on Leesburg, a slight de- 
 monstration on his part might have the 
 elTect of moving the enemy." Both 
 McCall and Stone acted promptly and 
 Oct. ^s deeired. Ou the night of the 
 20. 20th Stone telegraphed to the 
 chief that he had made a feint of cross- 
 ing the river during the afternoon, at 
 two places, and that he had sent out a 
 reconnoitering party toward Leesburg, 
 adding, " I have means of crossing one 
 hundred and twenty-five men once in 
 ten minutes, at each of two points." 
 This despatch brought no reply. 
 
 In obedience to instructions from 
 Stone, Colonel Devins, in two flat-boats 
 from the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, 
 carried over to Harrison's Island four 
 companies of his Massachusetts Fif- 
 teenth. One company was on the island 
 already. A reserve of about three thou- 
 ■jand men. including what was called 
 the First California Regiment, imder 
 Colonel E. D. Baker, was held in read- 
 iness to co-operate, should any difficulty 
 arise. After landing his troops, Devins 
 sent a detachment to the Virginia shore 
 to make an exploration towards Lees- 
 burg. A scouting party of about twenty 
 men, inider Captain Philbrlck, having 
 ascended the steep bank on the Virginia 
 side opposite the island, and known as 
 Ball's Bluff, believed they saw a small 
 canij) of Confederates, about a mile 
 from Leesl turg. This being made known 
 to Stone, he ordered Devins to land on 
 Ball's Bluff, and proceed at dawn to 
 surprise the camp. The order was 
 promptly executed. He set out about 
 midnight. By daylight his men had 
 
 all worked their way up the wet and 
 slippery sides of the bluff, and stood on 
 the summit. Without delay, he ad- 
 vanced towards Leesburg, in the direc- 
 tion of the supposed camp ; but no 
 trace of the foe could be seen ; what' 
 seemed a camp in the distance was only 
 an illusion due to certain openings iu 
 the woods. Here Devins halted his men 
 and sent to Stone for orders. 
 
 Meanwhile Devins' movements had 
 been carefully watched by the Confed- 
 erates, who, under Evans, lay in consid- 
 erable force ou Goose Creek. It was 
 not long until the National troops began 
 to have glimpses of the Confederate 
 cavalry and riflemen. Perceiving that 
 the enemy were gathering around him, 
 Devins, after a slight skirmish, fell 
 back towards the bluff, and halted his 
 men in an open field surrounded by 
 woods. Here he i-eceived orders to re- 
 main, Stone promising, at the same time, 
 to hurry forward reinforcements. About 
 noon a fiei'ce attack was made upon 
 Devins' little band (about six hundred 
 and fifty men) Ity the Confederates under 
 Colonels Jenifer and Hunton. Pressed 
 by the cavalry in front and by the infant- 
 ry on the left, Devins was com])elled to 
 fall back towards the edge of the bluff. 
 He rutired about sixty paces, and took 
 a position about half a mile in front of 
 Colonel Lee, who had advanced and 
 occupied Harrison's Island and the 
 heights after the departure of Devius 
 in the morning. Meanwhile Baker, 
 who had been ordered forward to rein- 
 force Devins, if he judged such a course 
 desirable, otherwise to Avithdraw alJ 
 the troops to the Maryland shore, had 
 
54 
 
 MINOR BATTLES. 
 
 arrived on the scene. In circumstances 
 of almost unparalleled difficulty, he had 
 succeeded in getting his men across the 
 river. At a glance he saw that he had 
 no choice. It was too late to attempt 
 to withdraw the troops Outranking 
 Devins, he immediately took command, 
 and assumed the responsibility of carry- 
 ing on the fight. He had reason to 
 believe that McCall was close at hand ; 
 and he naturally enough concluded that 
 on hearing the sound of musketry he 
 would hurry to the scene of action. 
 He did not know that McCall, having 
 been ordered to withdraw his troops 
 from Drainsville, was already on his 
 way back to his camp near the Chain 
 Bridge, and that General Smith, who, 
 with one of McCall's divisions, was 
 within supporting distance, was without 
 any special instructions. Getting his 
 men into battle order. Baker put forth 
 almost superhuman efforts to resist the 
 attack of the enemy. But the ground 
 was unfavorable, and the opposing 
 force was strong. About three o'clock 
 in the afternoon the firing became gen- 
 eral. Bramhall and French had scarcely 
 got their guns into position when they 
 were both wounded and carried from 
 the field. Shortly afterwards a greater 
 calamity followed. Baker, who seemed 
 everywhere present, encouraging the 
 men by word and deed, fell dead upon 
 the field, pierced by many bullets. The 
 battle had lasted two hours. On the 
 death of Baker, first Lee, then Coggs- 
 well, his superior, took the control of 
 afPairs. The situation had become des- 
 pei'ate ; and there M^as no sign of rein- 
 forcements. Presised on flank and front 
 
 with an OTerwhelming force, and with 
 the deep waters of the turbulent river 
 in their rear, Coggswell resolved to 
 move to the left and cut his way through 
 to Edwards' Ferry. At this moment, 
 and just as the movement was about to 
 be made, the Tammany Regiment, mis- 
 taking a Confederate ofiicer for a Na- 
 tional one, made a rush in the direction 
 indicated by his signs. Thrown out of 
 position, a decimating fire was poured 
 upon the whole column by the Thir- 
 teenth Mississippi. Coggswell's plan 
 was now impossible. The enemy was 
 closing in upon them at every poin'.,. 
 A retreat was now ordered to Harri- 
 son's Island and thence across to the 
 Maryland shore. The retreat soon be- 
 came a rout. The Confederates pressed 
 forward, and driving the Nationals be- 
 fore them with bayonet and bullet, they 
 quickly took possession of the heights. 
 Down the slippery sides of the bluff 
 the Nationals rushed in the wildest con- 
 fusion ; and while the struggling mass, 
 crowding to the water's edge, sought 
 for boats in vain, some of them plunging 
 into the water and attempting to swim 
 to the island, others floating on logs, 
 the enemy continued to pour down up- 
 on them the most destructive fire. It 
 was no longer a battle. It was a butch- 
 ery. Of the National troops at least 
 300 were killed; and more than 700 
 were wounded or made prisoners. At 
 least one-half of Coggswell's command, 
 including himself and Colonel Lee, fell 
 into the enemy's hands. Colonel Devins 
 escaped on horseback and swam across 
 the river. Ball's Bluff can only be 
 regarded in the light of a tempoiajy 
 
WILSON'S CEEEK. 
 
 » 
 
 naiisfortime. It did not seriously affect 
 the future of the war. The mishap 
 was brought al)Out partly by the rash- 
 ness of General Stone and partly by 
 the imperfect arrangements made by 
 Genei'al McClellan. It was a misfor- 
 tune, however, redeemed by the bravery 
 exhibited by the National troops. The 
 army of the Potomac did much on that 
 sad day to wipe out the disgrace in- 
 curred by the battle of Bull Run. By 
 the death of General Baker the Union 
 cause lost one of its ablest men — a 
 man as brave in the field as he was 
 skilful at the bar and powerful in the 
 Senate. 
 
 While these events were taking place 
 in Virginia, thei'e was some severe fight- 
 ing going on in Missouri. The Confed- 
 erates had put forth their best eiforts 
 to secure the State. When the battle 
 of Bull Run was fought. General Lyon, 
 who had succeeded General Harney in 
 the chief command of the National forces 
 in the West, was lyiiig at Springfield 
 waiting for reinforcements. Meanwhile 
 General John C. Freraont, who had 
 been prominently before the people as 
 the Republican candidate for the presi- 
 dency in 1856, in obedience to a popu- 
 lar call, had been appointed to the com- 
 July mand of the Western Department. 
 *• Great things were expected from 
 Fremont. It was the general belief that 
 those qualities which he had revealed 
 as an explorer would stand him in good 
 stead on the battle field. Whether 
 from incapacity or from radical differ- 
 ence of opinion between himself and 
 the government at Washington, Fre- 
 mont proved a failure. The high hopes 
 
 which had been formed of him were 
 not to be fulfilled. Towards the close 
 of July, Lyon, dreading that if he 
 should wait longer he would soon be 
 overwhelmed by the Confederate troops 
 which were pouring over the southern 
 frontier of Missouri, resolved to strike 
 at once ^vith the forces at his disposal. 
 He had not more than five thousand 
 five hundred men. The enemy num- 
 bered at least twelve thousand. On 
 the 1st of August a skirmish oc- j\u<r, 
 curred at Dug Springs. Lyon !• 
 gained some slight advantage ; but he 
 found it impossible to hinder the junc- 
 tion of the two columns of the enemy. 
 Retreat in the circumstances would 
 have been attended with great peril. 
 He therefore resolved to resume the 
 offensive. Audacity he thought might 
 compensate for the want of numbers. 
 Ordering Colonel Sigel, with 1200 men 
 and six guns, to gain the enemy's real 
 by the right, he was ready by the earlj 
 dawn to strike the meditated blow, 
 Sigel was at the appointed place ii 
 time. It was the 10th of August. \na^ 
 At five o'clock in the morning the '^" 
 line of battle was formed. The forward 
 movement was towards the extreme 
 northern point of the Confederate camp. 
 The first onset was terrific. The Con- 
 federates' pickets were driven in ; and 
 Totten's battery being hurried forward, 
 the enemy yielded and were driven by 
 Lyon's infantry to the adjoining heights. 
 No such hand to hand fighting had oc- 
 curred since the commencement of the 
 war. But the enemy had the advantag's 
 in numbers. Lyon behaved admirably. 
 He was twice wounded, and his horse 
 
56 
 
 MINOR BATTLjiS. 
 
 was shot under him. Colonel Mitchell 
 of the Second Kansas was killed when 
 leading his men to the charge. As 
 Mitchell fell, the cry was raised by his 
 troops, " Who shall lead us now ? " "I 
 will lead you. Come on, brave men," 
 said the wounded and bleeding Lyon. 
 A few moments aftenvards he was shot 
 through the heart. The battle contin- 
 ued to rage, Major Sturgis having 
 taken command. Meanwhile Sigel's 
 brigade had been overwhelmed. He 
 had lost five of his guns and more than 
 one-half of his men. Like a rock in mid- 
 ocean the Union men stood tirm, the 
 Confederate forces dashing against them 
 in vain. At one moment, it seemed as 
 if the line would break. But Dubois' 
 battery dashed forward from the rear, 
 and poured a destructive volley into the 
 Confederate right wing. The entire 
 line was thrown into confusion ; and in 
 broken masses they fell back to the 
 shelter of the wood. At the same 
 time their wagon train was seen to 
 be on fire. It was now eleven o'clock. 
 The battle had lasted nearly six hours. 
 A retreat was ordered to Springfield, 
 about nine miles distant. Tlie ene- 
 iiy did not pursue. On the follow- 
 ing morning at three o'clock the en- 
 tire army under General Sigel retreat- 
 ed to Rolla, one hundred and twenty- 
 five miles distant, in a government train. 
 The battle of Wilson's Creek, as this 
 fight was called, is claimed as a Confed- 
 erate victory. It would be more cor- 
 rect to call it a di'awn battle. The Na- 
 tionals lost 223 killed, 721 wounded, 
 292 missing. The Confederate loss was 
 correspondingly great. 
 
 The capitulation of Lexington, after a 
 seige of eight days by General g^p. 
 Sterling Price, followed close up.- 20. 
 on the battle of Wilson's Creek; and 
 Fremont, partly because he failed to 
 come to the aid of Colonel Mulligan and 
 his heroic gari'ison at Lexington, and 
 partly for other reasons, was relieved 
 from his command. General H. jjot. 
 W. Halleck arrived at St. Louis, 18. 
 and took charge of the Western Depart- 
 ment on the 18th of November. 
 
 Kentucky, as may readily be im- 
 agined, was eagerly coveted by the Con- 
 federacy. The slaveholJing interests 
 were large ; and it was necessary for 
 the welfare of the secession movement 
 that they should be protected. The oc- 
 cupation of this State was in fact con- 
 sidei'ed a military necessity. From the 
 first, however, Kentucky had manifested 
 great un\^'illingness to sever itself from 
 the Union. But the gov<;rnor, Magoffin, 
 who had been elected ais a Democrat in 
 1859, was a retl-hot se«*essionist. To 
 President Lincoln's call for troops he 
 had rudely responded, i-efusing to fur 
 nish the quota required of the State. 
 On two successive occasions — on Janu- 
 ary 18th and on April 28th, 1861— he 
 summoned an extra session of the Legis- 
 lature for the purpose of calling a State 
 Convention. On both occasions the 
 Legislature refused to call a Convention 
 or in any way comply with his wishes ; 
 on the latter occasion going so far as to 
 resist his demand for three millions of 
 dollars for the purpose of arming the 
 State, and even amending the militia 
 laws so as to require the State Guard 
 to take an oath of allegiance to the 
 
KENTUCKY AND MAGOFFIN. 
 
 6t 
 
 Union. At a meeting held in Louisville 
 April 18th, immediately after the cap- 
 ture of Fort Sumter, it was resolved 
 that Kentucky Avas in sympathy with 
 those who have an interest in the pro- 
 tection of slavery, but that she acknowl- 
 edges her fealty to the United States, 
 until its government becomes regardless 
 of her rights in slave property. The 
 loyal sentiments of Kentucky were still 
 furt'ier manifested at the election of del- 
 egates to the Peace Convention (May 
 4th). On this last occasion Kentucky 
 gave a Union majority of fifty thousand 
 votes. 
 
 Kentucky, it is thus seen, had by 
 large majorities, and on repeated occa- 
 sions, declared her xinwillingness to join 
 in the secession movement ; but Gov- 
 ernor Magoffin, being in perfect sympa- 
 thy with the rebel cause, was the willing 
 and useful instrument in the hands of 
 the Confederate leaders. In a letter to 
 Aug. President Lincoln, dated August 
 '9. 19th, he declared that the people 
 of his State earnestly desired to avoid 
 any war entanglements, that they had 
 been guilty of no rebellion, and that 
 therefore the National troops now en- 
 camped oa their soil ought at once to 
 be removed. In his reply, the president, 
 after reminding him that the troops 
 complained of were all Kentuckians, 
 said, " I most cordially sympathize with 
 your Excellency in the wish to preserve 
 the peace of my own native State, Ken- 
 tucky ; but it is with regret I search 
 for and cannot find in your not very 
 short letter any declaration or intima- 
 tion that you entertain any desire for 
 the preservation of the Federal Union" 
 
 On the 3d of September, in a message 
 to the Legislature, the governor Sep, 
 again complained of the aggres- ^' 
 sions of the North, and declared it to 
 be his opinion that Kentucky would 
 never renounce her sympathy with her 
 aggrieved sister States of the South. 
 The Legislature was not to be moved. 
 They resolved that the neutrality of 
 Kentucky had been violated by the 
 Confederate forces, requested the gov- 
 ernor to call out the militia to expel 
 them, and at the same time invoked the 
 United States to grant aid and assist- 
 ance. These resolutions the governor 
 had the hardihood to veto ; but the 
 Legislature returned to the charge, and 
 passed them over his veto by large and 
 overwhelming majorities. 
 
 The young men of the State had most 
 of them, yielding to the enthusiasm of 
 the moment, adopted the cause of seces- 
 sion ; but the older men, the fathers of 
 the State, true to the principles of their 
 youth, and wisely fearful of the risks 
 of rebellion, remained faithful i) the 
 Union. Crittenden, the United Hates 
 senator from Kentucky, who had persist- 
 ed so devotedly in his well-meant effort 
 to avert civil war by conciliation and 
 compromise, now that he despaired of 
 peace, did not hesitate to take a firm 
 stand for the Union. By this action his 
 house was divided. One of his sons had 
 taken up arms in behalf of the Southern 
 Confederacy, a cause which his father 
 proclaimed to be unholy, and its pro- 
 moters deserving of the severest punish- 
 ment. Prentiss, too, the veteran editor 
 of the Louisville Journal, while man- 
 fully serving his country with all the 
 
58 
 
 MINOR BATTLES. 
 
 power of his vigorous pen, was foi-ced 
 into a conflict with his own child, who 
 fought in the ranks of the Confederates. 
 These are but two illustrations of the 
 effects of the unhappy civil struggle in 
 Kentucky, where it had not only de- 
 ifitroyed political harmony, but domestic 
 concord. "Thousands of other exam- 
 ples," wrote one who was deeply grieved 
 by the state of things around him, 
 " might be readily gathered in the Bor- 
 der States. Those at the extreme North 
 and South, though they may be suffer- 
 ing from the ordinary evils of war, have 
 no conception of its horrors as waged in 
 Kentucky and Missouri." 
 
 As if impatient of further delay, the 
 Confederates resolved to disregard the 
 sentiments of the people of Kentucky, 
 and take a firm footing in the State. If 
 they could not use it as a bulwark, they 
 were resolved to use it as a battle field. 
 It had always been the favorite plan of 
 the Confederate General Pillow to seize 
 Columbus, a commanding position about 
 twenty miles below the mouth of the 
 Ohio, and so fortify it as to make it 
 command the Mississippi, and blockade 
 that river completely. The position 
 was all the more advantageous that 
 from Columbus to Bowling Green there 
 was a railroad connection. General 
 Polk, who had formerly been a bishop 
 of the Protestant Episcopal Church, but 
 who had exchanged his ecclesiastical 
 restments for those of the soldier, and 
 abandoned the crosier for the sword, 
 resolved to carry out this plan. In his 
 first general •rder he showed that, al- 
 though he had temporarily retired from 
 the sacred oflice, he had not forgotten 
 
 how to use his spiritual weapons. " The 
 invasion of the South," lie said, "by the 
 Federal armies has brought with it a 
 contempt for constitutional liberty, and 
 the withering influences of the infidelity 
 of New England and of Germany com- 
 bined." Polk had previously been as- 
 signed to the command of a department 
 which extended from the mouth of the 
 Arkansas uoilhward on both sides of 
 the Mississippi. On the 4th of sep. 
 September he advanced and seized *• 
 Hickman and Columbus. A pretense 
 of opposition was made by the C.:>nfed- 
 erate secretary of war. Walker, who 
 ordered Polk to withdraw his troops 
 from Kentucky ; but from Jefferson 
 Davis, whom Polk had notified of the 
 movement, a telegram was received say- 
 ing, "The necessity justifies the act." 
 On the same day that Polk invaded 
 Kentucky on the west, General Zollikof. 
 fer entered it on the east, on the ground 
 that the step was necessary for the safe- 
 ty of Tennessee. In a brief space of 
 time Polk was successful in converting 
 Columbus into an almost impregnable 
 fortress, having got into ])Osition not 
 fewer than one hundred and twent}' 
 heavy guns, and having gathered around 
 him from 25,000 to 30,000 men. At 
 this time Anderson, of Fort Sumter re- 
 nown, was in command of the army of 
 the Cumberland. General William T. 
 Sherman was Anderson's lieutenant. 
 It was the earnest desire and hope of 
 the loyal people of Kentucky that An- 
 derson would promptly come to their 
 aid and drive out the invader. Neither 
 Anderson nor Sherman came up to tlie 
 requirements of the situation. Ander- 
 
BELMONT. 
 
 59 
 
 «on fell sick ; and the command devolved 
 upon Sherman, who brought upon him- 
 self some ridicule by declaring that it 
 would require an army of two hundred 
 thousand men to expel the Confederates 
 from Kentucky. An attempt at relief 
 was to come from another source. 
 
 As soon as it became known that 
 General Polk had invaded Kentucky 
 with the ti'oops of anothei' State, General 
 Ulysses S. Grant, then in command of 
 the district around Cairo, made up his 
 mind to disregai'd the delusive neutral- 
 ity which had been so long maintained, 
 and to take possession of Paducah, a 
 town situated at the junction of the 
 Ohio and Tennessee rivers, and some 
 forty-seven miles east of Cairo. The 
 strong position which the enemy had 
 taken at Columbus and Hickman on 
 the Mississippi, and the advance of 
 troops from Tennessee into other parts 
 of Kentucky, had rendered the posses- 
 sion of Paducah absolutely necessary 
 for the protection of Cairo. In his pro- 
 clamation. Grant said he had come sole- 
 ly for the purpose of defending the 
 State from the aggressions of the Con- 
 federate troops and to protect the rights 
 of all citizens. If, however, it should 
 be manifest tbat tbey were aljle them- 
 selves to maintain the authority of the 
 government, he promised to withdraw 
 the forces under his conunand. The 
 foresight and promptitude exhibited by 
 Grant in making himself master of Pa- 
 ducah were characteristic of the man. 
 The same qualities were destined to se- 
 cure him victory on many a battle field, 
 and to carry him afterwards to the high- 
 est position in the land. In obedience 
 
 to instructions from General Fremont 
 to make some co-operative movements, 
 Grant, who had already greatly strength- 
 ened Paducah by erecting fortifications, 
 had thrown a pontoon bridge across 
 the Ohio, half a mile below the town, 
 had seized and occupied Smith Bend, 
 and had thus cut the Confederates off 
 from two important sources of supply, 
 resolved to threaten Columbus by at- 
 tacking Belmont, a small village and 
 landing place on the Missouri side of 
 the river and directly opposite Colum- 
 bus. He had learned that the Confed- 
 erate General Price was receiving rein- 
 forcements from Polk; and he hoped 
 that, by making himself master of Bel- 
 mont, he would break up the connection 
 between them. Having arranged some 
 side movements for the purpose of dis- 
 tracting the attention of Polk, Grant, 
 with about three thousand troops, in 
 four steam transports, and having for 
 convoy the two wooden gunboats Tyler 
 and Lexington, commanded respectively 
 by Captains Walke and Stemble, sailed 
 down the Mississippi from Cairo on 
 the evening of November 6. At iVor, 
 Island No. 1, eleven miles above <>• 
 Columbus, they halted for the night. 
 There Grant learned that Polk was 
 sending ti'oops across to cut off Oglesby, 
 whom, in compliance with Fremont's 
 request, he had previously sent off to 
 assist Carlin in driving Thompson into 
 Arkansas. At an early hour on the 
 following morning he landed his jfo^j 
 forces at Hunter's Point, on the ?• 
 Missouri side of the river, and about 
 three miles above Belmont. A battalioi» 
 was left to guard the transports. Tbi' 
 
60 
 
 MINOR BATTLES. 
 
 remainder advanced and formed in line 
 about two miles above the village. The 
 gunboats meanwhile moved down and 
 opened fire on the Confederate batteries 
 on the Iron Banks. The centre of the 
 attacking colunni was under Colonel 
 Fouke, the right under Colonel Buford, 
 the left under Colonel Logan. It was 
 evident that Polk had been taken by 
 siu'prise. General Smith, whom Grant 
 had sent ahead the day before, was 
 threatening him at Mayfield, in his rear, 
 and he had been making his prepara- 
 tioris to resist an attack in that direction. 
 DoUins and Delano's cavalry were or- 
 dered forward to scour the woods. It 
 was not long before they encountered 
 the enemy, in considerable force. About 
 a mile and a half from the enemy's camp 
 the line of battle was formed. Behind 
 an abatis of felled trees which smTound- 
 ed the camp lay the Thirteenth Arkan- 
 sas and Ninth Tennessee. There was 
 also opposite Gi'ant's left a battery of 
 seven guns, commanded by Colonel 
 Beltzhoover. This battei-y was pro- 
 tected by Colonel Wright's Tennessee 
 regiment. In the face of a destructive 
 fire, on the National forces rushed. 
 Meanwhile the batteries of Columbus 
 had shifted the heavy fire from the gun- 
 boats to the advancing line. The guns, 
 however, were not in range, and as yet 
 they did no harm. Nothing daunted, 
 Grant pressed forward his men. In 
 spite of the galling fire, onward they 
 moved, charging over the fallen timber, 
 capturing the battery and driving the 
 enemy back across the low ground to- 
 wards the river, and compelling some 
 of them to take to their boats. In a 
 
 brief space of time the heavy guns at 
 Columbus were got into range, and 
 the deadly bullets crashed through the 
 woods, over and among the advancing 
 and triumphant Federals. A second 
 and a thii'd time was the retreating foe 
 overtaken ; and although reinforced and 
 disposed to resist to the last, they were 
 ultimately routed, some of them seeking 
 shelter behind buildings near the river, 
 some in the woods above the camp, and 
 others imder cover of the batteries at 
 Columbus. It was a complete victory. 
 The National troops gave themselves 
 up to the wildest excitement. As yet 
 discipline in the army was loose. In 
 the face of Polk's batteries, three cheers 
 were given for the Union ; and while 
 some of the soldiers were delivering 
 stump speeches, others were rifling the 
 baggage or supplying themselves with 
 the arms which the discomfited rebels 
 had thrown down in their flight. 
 
 Although the victory was complete, 
 the place was untenable, commanded 
 as it Avas by the heavy guns of Colum- 
 bus. While these were brought to l)ear 
 upon the National troops in the midst 
 of their wild abandonment, Polk or- 
 dered General Cheatham to cross the 
 river above with his regiments, for the 
 purpose of cutting Grant off from his 
 flotilla. At the same time he himself 
 crossed with two regiments to take part 
 in the pursuit. I'ive thousand fresh 
 men were thus at hand to hinder or 
 harass the retreat. Grant, however, was 
 equal to the situation. Getting his men 
 in order, he pressed forward to the 
 lauding place. Wliile compelled to cut 
 his way through the ranks of the ene- 
 
GEANT'S LESSON. 
 
 61 
 
 my, be "was exposed to a raking five 
 ii'om the Confederate batteries on the 
 Iron Banks. The fighting was terrific. 
 After severe suffering, the landing place 
 was reached; and under cover of the 
 gunboats, which had come up, and which 
 kept the enemy at bay, the embarkation 
 was completed. By five o'clock in the 
 afternoon, the flotilla, with the entire 
 force on board, was on its way back to 
 Cairo. Grant carried with him, in ad- 
 dition to all his own men, two of Beltz- 
 hoover's heavy guns. The estimated 
 National loss was 480 men in killed, 
 wounded and missing. That of the ene- 
 my was 642. The Confederates claimed 
 
 the victory at Belmont, and exulted 
 accordingly. " Accept for yourself," 
 wrote Jefferson Davis to General Polk, 
 "and the officers and men imder your 
 commar;d, my sincere thanks for the 
 glorious contribution you have just 
 made to our common cause." Belmont 
 was nevertheless abandoned as untena- 
 ble the day after the battle. It is no 
 disparagement to the men who fought 
 on the Confederate side to say that if 
 the opposing forces had been equal,' 
 the result might have been different. 
 Belmont taught General Grant a lesson 
 which he never afterwards forgot — ^the 
 value of numbers. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 jjioekade of the Southern Ports.— Naval and Coast Operations. —General Butler.— Big Bethel and Little Bethel. — 
 Death of Winthrop and Greble.— Butler Believed of his Command. — General John E. Wool. — The Hatteras 
 Expedition. — Butler and Stringham in Command. —Forts Hatteras and Clark. — Landing the Troops. — The Bom- 
 bardment.— The Monticello Aground.— The Nationals in Fort Clark. — The Mistake. —The Second Day.— Decep- 
 tion on the part of the Confederates.— The Bomb-Proof.— The White Flag.— The Forts Occupied by the Nation- 
 als.— Great Joy in the North. — Colonel Hawkins Closing up the Passages to the Sound. — Roanoke Island. — The 
 Scheme of the Ocracoke. — Chicamaeomico. — The Steamtug Fanny. — Capture of the Fanny by the Confede- 
 rates. — The Failure of the Expedition to Chicamaeomico. — The Confederates Land on Hatteras Island. — Brown's 
 Ketreat. — The Confederates Driven from Hatteras Island. — Gulf of Mexico. — Fort Pickens. — "Billy" Wilson 
 and His Zouaves. —Warrington Navy Yard. — Burning of the Dry Dock. — Burning of the Juda. — Battle of Santa 
 Kosa. — "Death to Wilson. " — The Confederates Defeated. — "Billy" Wilson's Letter. — Fort McRae. — General 
 Braxton Bragg. — Fort Pickens Opens Fire on Bragg's Works. — Two Daj's' Bombardment. — The Mouths of 
 the Mississippi. — The Southwest Pass. — The Boast of HoUins. — The Manassas. — Her Attack on the Rich- 
 mond. — What She Might Have Done. — The Port Royal Expedition. — General T. W. Sherman. — Samuel F. 
 Dupont. — Departure of the Fleet from Hampton Roads. — A Magnificent Spectacle. — Sealed Orders. — The 
 Storm.— The Fleet Dispersed. — Saved from the Perils of the Deep. — Place of Destination Known. — The 
 Confederates Forewarned. — Port Royal. — Forts Walker and Beauregard. — Preparations for the Attack. — The 
 Flan.— The Attack.— The Forts Abandoned.— A Great Victory. — Negro Misrule.— Bay of St. Helena.— Warsaw 
 Sound. — The Union Flag floating over Georgia. — Port Royal Ferry. — Naval and Laud Expedition to Port Royal 
 Ferry. — Heavy Cannonading by the Gunboats. — The Fort Abandoned. — The Seventy-Ninth Highlanders.- - 
 The Eighth Michigan. —A Flag of Truce. —Sunset. —The End of the First Day.— The Enemy Reappears in 
 the Morning.— The Gunboats Rake the Woods.— The Battle Ended.— The Coast Expeditions so far Successful 
 
 Almost immediately after the inau- 
 guration of President Lincoln, the 
 attention of the government was 
 
 directed to the necessity of blockading 
 the southern ports. A proclamation 
 was accordingly issued, announcing that 
 
 aoi 
 
62 
 
 NAVAL AND COAST OPEKATIONS. 
 
 an insurrection had broken out in South 
 Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, 
 Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, that 
 in those States the revenue dues could 
 no longer be collected, that the persons 
 combined in this insun-ection had threat- 
 ened to grant letters of marque against 
 the commerce of the United States, and 
 that therefore the ports of the aforesaid 
 States were forthwith blockaded. A 
 April little later, on the 27th of April, 
 27' another proclamation was issued ; 
 and the ports of Virginia and North 
 Cai'olina were included. This was fol- 
 lowed on the part of the South by the 
 authorization of privateers. The at- 
 tempt to effect a blockade on the part 
 of the North, and the authorization of 
 privateers on the part of the South, 
 necessarily gave birth to land and naval 
 encounters of greater or lesser impoi"t- 
 ance. In a history of the Battles of 
 the Civil War, these cannot be omitted 
 vpithout marring the completeness of 
 the work. It will, therefore, be our ob- 
 ject in this chapter to group together a 
 few of the more important of these na- 
 val and coast opei-ations. 
 
 Attention is first called to the coast 
 of North Cai'olina. At the commence- 
 ment of the war, General Butler made 
 himself conspicuous by his vigorous 
 conduct in suppressing the Baltimore 
 riots, and by so establishing order in 
 Maryland that that State never again 
 wavered in its loyalty to the government 
 at Washington. Butler's conduct of 
 affairs at Baltimore, successful as it was, 
 did not meet the approval of General 
 Scott. It could hardly have been other- 
 wise. General Scott had spent a long 
 
 lifetime in camp and field. He was a 
 strict disciplinarian, and, from natural 
 instinct as from training and lifelong 
 habit, a man of order. General Butler 
 had purpose and will ; but he was to- 
 tally without military experience ; and it 
 was of all things the most natuial that, 
 judged by the high standard of such a 
 man as General Scott, he should be 
 found wanting. Butler was or- jfay 
 dered to take command at Fort- 22. 
 ress Monroe. Soon after his arrival 
 there, he found himself at the head of 
 twelve thousand troops. Magruder lay 
 in front of him at Yorktown, having 
 outposts at Big Bethel and Little Bethel, 
 with a force amounting in all to not 
 more than eight thousand. With the 
 exception of the fortress, the entire pen- 
 insula was in the hands of the Confed- 
 erates. Butler being considerably rein- 
 forced, resolved to extend the area of 
 his authority. He had but little difficul- 
 ty in making himself master of Hampton 
 and Newport News. His subse- May 
 queut efforts against Little Bethel 27. 
 and Big Bethel were less fortunate. 
 Little acquainted with the ground — lit- 
 tle acquainted, indeed, with the art of 
 war, and influenced by the counsels of 
 men who were less experienced than 
 himself, he fell into a series of blunders, 
 the veiy reverse of creditable to the 
 National army. There was no lack of 
 heroism on the part of the troops ; but 
 the management was wretched. In 
 Major Theodore Winthrop and in June 
 Lieutenant Greble, both of whom ^^' 
 were killed, the North lost two promis- 
 ing young officers ; but Big Bethel and 
 Little Bethel will be remembered ii' 
 
HATTERAS INLET. 
 
 63 
 
 connection with National disaster and 
 National disgrace. It was an ill-fated 
 expedition ; and it was visited with the 
 worst of all kinds of punishment — con- 
 demnation by the whole people. 
 
 Butler was relieved of his command, 
 Major-General John E. Wool having 
 been appointed to take his place. 
 Butler had no duty assigned to him. 
 Wool, as generous as he was far-seeing, 
 gave him command of all the volunteer 
 troops outside the fortress. Butler 
 again found his opportunity. Informa- 
 tion had, some short time before, been 
 conveyed to Commodore Stringham, 
 then commanding at Hampton Roads, 
 that Hatteras Inlet was being freely 
 used by English blockade runners, 
 which were supplying the Confederates 
 with arms, ammunition, and clothing. 
 Stringham communicated the fact to 
 Butler ; and Butler reported to Wash- 
 ,ington, suggesting that land and naval 
 forces should be sent to capture the 
 forts at the inlet, and close up the pass- 
 age. The suggestion was acted upon ; 
 and a squadron of vessels, on which 
 were to be conveyed some nine hundred 
 men, noAV lying in Hampton Roads, 
 was got in immediate readiness. To 
 General Butler was assigned the com- 
 mand of the troops. Commodore String- 
 ham took command of the squadron. 
 
 Silas H. Stringham was born at New- 
 burg, New York, in the year 1796. 
 His first naval service was as midship- 
 man, on board the frigate President, 
 Commodore Rodgers, in ISOf). In 1830 
 he commanded on the West India sta- 
 tion. From 1835 to 1837 he held a 
 command in the Mediterranean. He 
 
 subsequently commanded the Porpoise, 
 the Independent, and the Ohio. When 
 the Mexican war broke out, he was in 
 command at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. 
 He again took charge of the Ohio ; and 
 in the successful bombardment of Vera 
 Cruz and in the capture of the Castle 
 of San Juan d'Ulloa, it was he who led 
 the squadron. From 1852 to 1855 he 
 was in command of the Mediterranean 
 squadron. From the time of his return 
 to the commencement of the war, he 
 was in charge of the Charlestown Navy 
 Yard, Massachusetts. He left that post 
 to take chief command of the naval 
 force blockading the hostile States. 
 While on this service, he was called to 
 take charge of the first naval expedi- 
 tion. Stringham, it will thus be seen, 
 was a man of large experience ; and it 
 was everywhere felt that the expedition 
 was safe in his hands. 
 
 Butler took passage by the Minne- 
 sota. His troops were on the transports 
 George Peabody and Adelaide. In addi- 
 tion to these vessels there were the Paw- 
 nee, Monti cello, and Hamet Lane. The 
 frigate Cumberland also was ordered to 
 join the squadron. On the afternoon 
 of Tuesday, August 27th, the jvujr^, 
 ships were brought to anchor, 27. 
 about eighteen miles from the cape ; 
 and preparations were made for land- 
 ing the troops early on the following 
 morning. On the west end of Hat- 
 teras Island, and commanding the in- 
 let, were two forts, named respectively 
 Hatteras and Clark. It was an'anged 
 that the troops should land a short dis- 
 tance up the beach, so as to be able to 
 attack the forts in the reai', while the 
 
a 
 
 navai. and coast operations. 
 
 vessels should advance and assail them 
 in front. Breakfast was served at four 
 o'clock. The Cumberland, a sailing 
 vessel, was taken in tow by the Wabash 
 and dragged to her position. Both 
 vessels opened fire about a quarter to 
 ten o'clock. The flag-ship Minnesota 
 shortly afterwards passed inside the 
 other two and joined in the fight. Latei', 
 the Susquehanna, which had also joined 
 the expedition, came up and opened 
 fire. Great difliculty was experienced 
 in landing the troops. The breakers 
 were high and beating heavily. The 
 boats were dashed against the beach 
 with great violence ; and one of them, 
 belonging to the Pawnee, was actual- 
 ly capsized. Fortunately no one was 
 drowned. About three hundred men 
 succeeded in effecting a landing, under 
 cover of the guns of the Monticello and 
 Hari'iet Lane. After four hours con- 
 tinuous work, the firing ceased on both 
 sides. The flags of the forts were taken 
 down. It was believed by the Nation- 
 als that both works were about to be 
 surrendered. The Monticello moved 
 cautiously into the inlet, followed by 
 the Harriet Lane. As they entered, 
 fire was immediately opened by Fort 
 Hatteras; and it fell heavily on the 
 Monticello. The other vessels, the Min- 
 nesota, Susquehanna, and Pawnee now 
 reopened fire. The contest was contin- 
 ued until half-past six o'clock, when the 
 whole squadron, with the exception of 
 the Harriet Lane and the Pawnee, was 
 withdrawn for the night. During the 
 fight the Monticello unhappily ran 
 aground ; and although she kept up a 
 most vigorous fii'e on Fort Hatteras, dis- 
 
 charging fifty-five shells in fifty minutes, 
 it seemed for a time as if she could not 
 escape destruction. At the close of the 
 day's struggle she got off, and floated 
 out of range of the guns. She had re- 
 ceived seven eight-inch shot in her 
 hull. The damage done, however, was 
 not serious ; nor had she sustained the 
 loss of a single man. Meanwhile some 
 of the troops who had got on shore had 
 had a singular experience. When the 
 forts ceased firing, and the flasjs were 
 taken down, they discovered that Fort 
 Clark was abandoned, the men having 
 fled to Fort Hatteras. Taking posses- 
 sion of the abandoned fort, they raised 
 over it the Union flag. Seeing the 
 flag again raised, but unable to recog- 
 nize it as their own, the war ships re- 
 opened fire upon Fort Clark, and the 
 National troops were compelled to re- 
 tire to the landing. There they spent 
 the night as best they were able. In 
 the morning they did some good service 
 by turning their rifled howitzer, which 
 they had managed to carry with them, 
 on some Confederate steamers which 
 were lying off in the bay, compelling 
 them to retire, and thus preventing 
 any other than signal communications 
 with Fort Hatteras. They were again 
 placed in peril by the firing of the 
 Pawnee ; and it was not until the white 
 flag was hoisted that they were perfect- 
 ly safe. 
 
 In the morning the ships resumed 
 the bombardment. An eleven- ^ug. 
 inch shell was flung from the 2®- 
 Susquehanna. Her example was fol- 
 lowed by the Minnesota and the Wa- 
 bash. The guns were admirably man- 
 
BC 
 
 ■ R'cf bi/CCESS. 
 
 65 
 
 aged; and it Avas yeen that e/ery shell 
 was falling and exploding inside Fort 
 Hatteras. The Hai'i'iet Lane ancl the 
 Cumberland came up a little later, and, 
 taking pai't in the fight, greatly added 
 to the severity of the fire. For a time 
 the Confederates continued to resist 
 Avith great spirit. Once again they at- 
 tempted to deceive by hauling doAvn 
 the flag. This time, however, the Na- 
 tionals were not to be caught. The fir- 
 ing fi-om the ships continued, the shell 
 falling thick and fast within the fort, 
 and working terrible destruction. The 
 garrison, unable any longer to endure 
 the tremendous punishment they were 
 receiving, had taken refuge inside the 
 bomb-proof. Here, however, they were 
 not long to be safe. An eleven-inch 
 shell found its way through the ventila- 
 tor and exploded in the midst of them. 
 This was the determining shot of the 
 day. Resistance now was no longer pos- 
 sil)le. The Avdiite flag Avas raised and 
 the firing ceased. General Butler, on 
 board the tug Fanny, landed at the fort 
 and demanded au unconditional surren- 
 der. To this the Confederate command- 
 er. Commodore Banon, objected, and 
 Butler yielded so far as to agree that 
 the ofiicers a)id men should be treated 
 as prisoners of wai-. A treaty Avas 
 signed by Cnmmodoi'e Stringham and 
 Genei'al Butler on the one hand and by 
 Commodore Bairoii, Colonel Martin, 
 and Major Andrews on the other; and 
 the Union flag floated once more over 
 the forts conimamling Hatteras Inlet. 
 Although the filing had been severe, 
 there was little loss of lifc^. The loss 
 *vas all on the s'uU^ of tlic Confederates. 
 
 On the National side, according to Gen- 
 eral Butler's report, not a man Avas 
 killed or injured. 
 
 The result of the Hatteras expedition 
 Avas a great triumph for the North. All 
 over that section the intelligence was 
 received with transports of delight. It 
 had, as was natural, a correspondingly 
 depressing influence on the South. It 
 was a gain to General Butler. He had 
 redeemed his reputation, or rather he 
 had made it. His instructions Avere to 
 destroy the forts and not to hold them. 
 Convinced that the forts should be held, 
 he hurried to AVashington, and explain- 
 ed his views to the government in per- 
 son. The forts were held ; and Butler 
 was commissioned by the secretary of 
 AA'ar to go to NeAV England and "raise, 
 arm, uniform, and e(£uip a volunteer 
 force for the Avar." 
 
 It Avas confidently expected that the 
 success of the Hatteras expedition 
 AA-ould enable the Nationals to seize 
 and hold the Avhole coast of North Car- 
 olina Avashed by the waters of Pamlico 
 and Albemarle Sounds. This expecta- 
 tion was not to be realized. On Butler's 
 departure for Washington Colonel Hav/- 
 kins Avas left in charge of the post at 
 Hatteras. He h^d Avith him a portion 
 of the Ninth Ncav York, a Zouave regi- 
 ment. In September he Avas joined by 
 Colonel Brown and the Twentieth Indi- 
 ana regiment. Hawkins held the island 
 of Hatteras and guarded the inlet. He 
 proceeded to close uj) the passages from 
 the sea to the tAvo sounds. Attention 
 Avas first given to Ocracoke Inlet, a few 
 miles down the coast from Hatteras. 
 Lieutenant J. T. Maxwell was sent 
 
66 
 
 NAVAL AND COAST OPERATIONS. 
 
 thither, ■s\ith a detachment of marines 
 and soldiers, on board the tugboat 
 Fanny. An earthwork called Fort 
 Ocracoke and the older Fort Morgan 
 had been abandoned. Maxwell de- 
 stroyed the forts and returned. 
 
 Another expedition, to which even 
 Sep. greater importance was attached, 
 29' was sent up the island to a ham- 
 let named Chicamacomico. It had be- 
 come known that the Confederates had 
 taken possession of Roanoke Island with 
 three thousand men, and it was believed 
 that their intention was to land on Hat- 
 teras and make an attempt to recover 
 what they had lost. Colonel Brown, 
 with his Twentieth Indiana, was ordered 
 to Chicamacomico to hold the enemy in 
 check. The regiment, which was land- 
 ed in small boats, was destitute of eve- 
 r}'thing except a small quantity of pro- 
 visions. All the supplies, camp equip- 
 age, and intrenching implements had 
 been put ou board the steamtug Fanny. 
 This vessel was detained at the forts a 
 day beyond the appointed time. She 
 Oct, did not sail before the 1st of Oc- 
 •• tober. On the evening of that 
 day she appeared off the point; and 
 when she was about to land her stores, 
 three gunboats hove in sight and opened 
 fire iipon her. The Fanny had time 
 lu'ither to land her stores nor to make 
 !ier escape. One boat only, with ten 
 persons on board, had put off for land. 
 These ten escaped. All the others, to 
 the number of thirty-one, including sol- 
 diers and sailors, together with the tug- 
 boat and its precious freight, the latter 
 equal in value to one hundred and fifty 
 ^i'ousand dollars, fell into the hands of 
 
 the Confederates. The enterprise was 
 completely defeated. Encouraged by 
 this success, the enemy grew more 
 bold ; and on the 4th of October oct. 
 a squadron of six steamers, hav- ^« 
 ing on board over two thousand men, 
 appeared off Chicamacomico. Shells 
 were immediately flung into the Nation- 
 al camp ; and under cover of the fire, 
 two bodies of men were landed, one 
 above and one below the encampment, 
 the object evidently being to surround 
 the regiment and cut off its retreat. 
 Brown succeeded in eluding the vigi- 
 lance of the enemy and carried off his 
 men ; but it was not until he had reach- 
 ed the lighthouse at Cape Hatteras, 
 after having marched twenty-eight miles 
 and experienced great privation, that 
 he felt himself perfectly safe. It was 
 not without good reason that the Con- 
 federates boasted loudly of this victory. 
 It was a real victory, and was, besides, 
 a positive gain. It enabled them to 
 hold on to Roanoke Island — a posses- 
 sion which, so long as they held it, gave 
 them control of Loggerhead and Oregon 
 Inlets, and thus neutralized to a large 
 extent the victory won by Stringham 
 and Butler. They were not, however, 
 long permitted to remain on the island 
 of Hatteras. Under the heavy firing of 
 the Monticello and Susquehanna, they 
 were soon compelled to take to their 
 boats and fly for their lives. The great 
 mistake committed in this expedition 
 was in allowing the steamtug Fanny to 
 sail without a pro}>er convoy. Skilful 
 manafrement should have made such a 
 disaster impossible. 
 
 Movement.^ of this description were 
 
SANTA ROSA. 
 
 67 
 
 not confined to the. coast of North Caro- 
 lina. Events quite as thrilling were 
 taking place in the neighborhood of 
 Fort Pickens, on the waters of the gulf 
 of Mexico. That place had narrowly 
 escaped being seized by the Pensacola 
 insurgents in the spring ; and the island 
 of Santa Rosa, on which Fort Pickens 
 is built, had since June been guarded 
 by the New York Sixth, known as Wil- 
 son's Zouaves. Besides these troops 
 there was a small blockading squadi-ou, 
 with a garrison in the fort. Colonel 
 " Billy " Wilson was somewhat of a 
 character. His regiment, which had 
 been raised almost entirely in New 
 York, was composed of men who were 
 never indisposed to a little riotous sport, 
 and who knew nothing of feai-. For 
 some months life was rather tame at 
 Santa Rosa. Wilson and his men had, 
 /however, contrived to make themselves 
 specially obnoxious to the Confederates 
 on the mainland. Descents on the coast 
 were frequently threatened ; and the 
 Confederate supply boats were al- 
 ways in danger. It was not till the 
 Sep. night of the 2d of September that 
 
 2« anythhig of a serious nature oc- 
 curred. On that night a party from 
 Fort Pickens, under Lieutenant Shepley, 
 crossed over and burned the dry dock 
 at the navy yard at Warrington. On 
 Sep. the night of the 13th the experi- 
 
 '3« ment was repeated. At the head 
 of about one hundred men. Lieutenant 
 John H. Russel, of Commodore Mer- 
 win's flag-ship Colorado, reached the 
 navy yard; and before morning had 
 boarded a large schooner called the 
 Juda, then being fitted out as a pri- 
 
 vateer, had spiked a ten-inch colum- 
 biad with which she was armed, and 
 bmTied the vessel to the water's edge. 
 With the help of muffled oars, they 
 managed to reach the ship, accomplish 
 tlieir purpose, and get out of the reach 
 of danger before the Confederates were 
 aware of what had happened. 
 
 Naturally enough, these repeated acts 
 of daring and of violence roused the 
 Confederates to a high pitch of excite- 
 ment and of indignation. Such doings 
 were no longer to be tolerated. The 
 Nationals must be driven from Santa 
 Rosa. Wilson's troops especially must 
 be captured or destroyed. With this 
 end in view, General Anderson, assisted 
 by General Ruggles, gathered together 
 about fifteen hundred men, mostly vol- 
 unteers for this si^ecial service, from th(i 
 various camps in the neighborhood of 
 Pensacola. Embarking this force on 
 the night of October 8th, on sev- oct. 
 eral steamers, Anderson landed '^' 
 next morning at Deer Point, Santa Rosa 
 Island, some four or five miles to the 
 east of the Zouave encampment. Ar- 
 ranging his force into three divisions, 
 he marched immediately upon the camp. 
 The jiickets were driven in; and the 
 Zouaves, little dreaming of their danger, 
 found themselves beset by their furious 
 antagonists. "Death to Wilson," "No 
 quarter " — such were the cries which 
 intimated too plainly the near presence 
 and the deadly purpose of the Confed- 
 erates. The night was unusually dark. 
 The Zouaves, however, were not found 
 wanting. Offering a stout resistance, 
 and contesting the ground as they re- 
 tired, they fell back in good order, 
 
68 
 
 NAVAL AXD COAST OPERITIONS. 
 
 under covl'v <>f the two batteries Lincoln 
 iUKl Totten, situated on either side of 
 the island, and about four hundred 
 yards from Fort Pickens. Here they 
 wei-e met by reinforcements from Foi't 
 Pickens^two companies under Major 
 Yogdes and other two under Major 
 Arnold; and the combined force turned 
 and charged upon the Confederates. The 
 latter, meanwhile, had been rifling the 
 camp and setting fire to the tents and the 
 ban-acks. Not suspecting the sudden re- 
 turn of the Nationals, Anderson's men 
 were somewhat disorganized. It was 
 their turn now to be taken by surprise. 
 in the wildest confusion they rushed 
 towards the boats, the Nationals pursu- 
 ing and pouring volley upon volley into 
 their disordered ranks. While embark- 
 ing and making sail they suffered se- 
 verely, one of their launches, loaded 
 with men, being so riddled with bullets 
 that it sank. The Confederates, it was 
 estimated, lost l>y this affair about one 
 hundred and fifty men. The National 
 loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, 
 amounted to sixty-four men. Among 
 the prisoners carried off was Major 
 Vogdes. In a chai'acteristic letter, sent to 
 General Arthur of New York, " Billy " 
 Wilson says, "They are exhibiting my 
 head and hair in Pensacola. The i-e- 
 ward is already claimed ; also, an old 
 flag which I nailed to a flagstaff on the 
 Fourth of July, which has been left 
 there ever since ; nothing left, however, 
 but the stars. The ladies have cut it 
 up in pieces, and have it pinned on 
 their bosoms as a trophy. Every one 
 in Pensacola has my sword and uniform. 
 I must have had a large quantity of 
 
 hair, plenty of swords and iniiforms. 
 They say if I Avas to be taken alive, 1 
 was to be put in a cage and exhibited.' 
 Such was the battle of Santa Rosa. 
 
 During the course of the next month 
 Colonel Harvey Brown, who had charge 
 of the gai'rison at Fort Pickens, acting 
 in conjunction with flag-oflacer McKean, 
 who was in command of the little block- 
 ading squadron in the neighborhood, 
 opened fire upon the Confederate works 
 which lined the shore from the navy 
 yard tii Fort McRae. After a bom- 
 bardment of two days, November x^y. 
 22-2?), the firing ceased, but not 22. 
 until the village of Warrington was 
 biu'ned. Fort McRae practically silenced, 
 and great damage done to the navy 
 yard. The Confederate fortifications on 
 the mainland surrounding the harbor 
 of Pensacola and in front of Fort Pick- 
 ens were in charge of General Braxton 
 Bragg. 
 
 Still following along the coast in a 
 westerly direction, we come to the 
 mouths of the Mississippi. Here, late in 
 the year 1861, occurred one of the most 
 memorable, if not one of the most im- 
 portant, of those coast engagements to 
 which in this chapter we have been con- 
 fining our attention. On the 1 2th Oct. 
 of October the following despatch 12. 
 startled alike North and South : 
 
 •' FoKT Jacksost, October 12, 1861. 
 " Last night I attacked the blockaders 
 with my little fleet. I succeeded, after 
 a very shoi't struggle, in driving them 
 all aorround on the Southwest Pass bar, 
 except the Preble, which I sunk. I 
 captiu-ed a prize from them, and after 
 
HOLLINS' BOAST. 
 
 69 
 
 they Avere fast in the mud, I ]»eppered 
 thera well. There were no casualties 
 on GUI' side. It was a complete suc- 
 cess, HOLLINS." 
 
 What were the facts in this case? 
 The Confederates had extempoiized a 
 flotilla, consisting of a steam-ram called 
 the Manassas, mounted with one sixty- 
 foui'-pounder DaLlgren ; the steamer 
 Calhoun, with one twenty-four-pounder 
 Dahlgren ; the steamer Ivy, with an 
 eight-inch thirty-two-pounder, ritled ; 
 the steamer Jackson, with two eight- 
 inch columbiads and a twenty-four- 
 pounder, ritled ; and the cutter Pickens, 
 with an eight-inch columbiad and four 
 twenty-four-pound carronade.s. The Ma- 
 nassas was originally the steamer Enoch 
 Train, but had been completely recon- 
 structed. In her new form she had a pe- 
 culiar "ram "-like shape, and altogether 
 had a formidable appearance. She was 
 douV)le planked all over Avith wood of 
 six feet in thickness. Her bow extended 
 to a length of nine feet, and was made 
 of the thickest and the strongest oak. 
 The whole surface of the vessel was 
 covered with iron plates two inches 
 thick. Her hull rose above the water 
 only about two feet and a quarter ; and 
 her deck was covered in with a slantintr 
 roof of heavy wood covered with iron 
 plates. Below the water-mark, and pro- 
 jecting from her bow, was an iron prow 
 or borer, as thick as a man's arm, in- 
 tended to pierce and sink any vessel 
 she might choose to strike. She was 
 one of the first of the ironclads ; and to 
 the only ships which the National gov- 
 ernment could as yet oppose to her, she 
 
 X03 
 
 was most undoubtedly a dangerous an- 
 tagonist. 
 
 This flotilla was put under the com- 
 mand of Captain Hollins, an officer of 
 immense pretension, })ut one who was 
 remembered chiefly in connection with 
 an exploit at San Juan, where he had 
 indulged his vanity and passion for au- 
 thority by burning an unoffending town. 
 The blockade fleet on which Hollins 
 intended to operate was composed of 
 the war steamer Richmond, fourteen 
 guns ; of the Vincennes, a sloop-of-war, 
 twenty-one guns ; of the Preble, another 
 sloop-of-war, sixteen guns ; and of the 
 Water-Witch and Nightingale, both 
 small steamers of one gun eacli. Hollins 
 chose a dark night for his experiment. 
 The Manassas was close to the Richmond 
 before she was discovered ; and by the 
 time the watch could give the alarm, 
 her iron prow struck tlie Richmond 
 "abreast the port fore-channels," tear- 
 ing a coal schooner that was alongside 
 from her fastenings, and penetrating 
 the ship's side, making a hole about 
 Ave inches in circumference and about 
 two feet below the water-line. The 
 ]'am drew ofF, and falling aft, made an 
 attempt to strike with her prow the 
 Richmond's sterQ. The attempt was 
 unsuccessful. Meanwhile, as the mon- 
 ster passed, the Richmond gave it a 
 volley from the port battery. The 
 other sloops had been notifled of the 
 appearance of the Manassas; and hav- 
 ing slipped their cables, they ran down 
 to the Pass, the Richmond covering their 
 retreat. At about eight o'clock in the 
 morning, the other vessels being inside, 
 the Richmond and Vincennes grounded 
 
70 
 
 NAVAL AND COAST OPERATIONS. 
 
 while attempting to pass the bar. There 
 they were bombarded by the Manassas ; 
 and fire rafts were sent down to burn 
 them. The fire rafts proved perfectly 
 harmless; and at ten o'clock the Con- 
 federate commodore withdrew, ran up 
 to Fort Jackson, and sent news of his 
 splendid victory to Richmond. After 
 a fashion, Hollins had no doubt won a 
 victory ; but he had done little damage 
 to the National ships. A coal schooner 
 had been bruised ; a boat had been 
 sunk ; and Captain Pope's gig had been 
 staved in. That was all. It was not 
 wonderful, therefore, that when the 
 true facts of the case became known, 
 Hollins' famous exploit was made the 
 subject of much merriment and ridicule. 
 The Manassas, at this date, was by far 
 the most powerful and efficient ship of 
 war in North American waters; and, 
 in capable hands, she might have anni- 
 hilated the small blockading squadron, 
 cleared the gulf, and swept the coast 
 from Florida to Maine. As it was, she 
 did little harm and some good. She 
 taught the government at Washing- 
 ton that other than wooden walls were 
 now necessary, and that if the battle 
 was to be fought at sea with any hope 
 of success, ironclad must be confronted 
 by ironclad, if not of equal tonnage, at 
 least of equal power for resistance and 
 attack. 
 
 Later, in the fall, Hampton Roads 
 presented a spectacle not unlike, but in 
 some respects more imposing than, that 
 witnessed towards the close of August, 
 when Butler and Stringham set sail for 
 Hatteras. It was also a land and naval 
 annament, but on a grander scale, and 
 
 was fitted out for the purpose of mak- 
 ing a descent on the borders of lower 
 South Carolina. The land force of the 
 expedition had been assembled at An- 
 napolis, in Maryland. It was about 
 fifteen thousand strong, and was placed 
 in charge of Brigadier-General T. W. 
 Sherman. The fleet, which consisted of 
 some seventy-seven vessels in all, in- 
 cluding fourteen gunboats, thirty-four 
 steamers, and twenty-six sailing vessels, 
 was placed under the command of Com- 
 modore S. F. Dupont. 
 
 The commanders to whom this expe- 
 dition was entrusted were well chosen. 
 
 Thomas W. Sherman, not to be con- 
 founded with W. T. SheiTQan, was a 
 native of Rhode Island. He graduated 
 at West Point in 1836, taking a high 
 place in his class, and was appointed 
 second lieutenant in the Third U. S. 
 Aitillery in July of the same year. In 
 1837 he was promoted to a first lieuten- 
 ancy; and on May 28th, 1846, on the 
 outbreak of the Mexican war, he was 
 made captain. For his gallant conduct 
 at Buena Vista, February 23d, 1847, 
 he was brevetted major. On the form- 
 ation of the Fifth Artillery, he was ap- 
 pointed lieutenant-colonel, and in this 
 capacity took part in the battle of Bull 
 Ran. He was advanced to the rank of 
 brigadier-general May 17th, 1861. 
 
 Commodore Samuel F. Dupont waa 
 born at Bergen Point, New Jersey, in 
 1803. His father, a Frenchman, as the 
 name indicates, came to the United 
 States in 1799. The Delaware Mills, 
 where is manufactured the famous 
 "Dupont powder," were founded by 
 an uncle ; and the works still remain in 
 
"THE GREAT ARMADA." 
 
 n 
 
 the possession of the family. Young 
 Diipont entered the United States navy 
 December 19th, 1815, having received 
 from President Madison his warrant as 
 a midshipman. His fii'st cruise was in 
 the Franklin. When the Mexican war 
 broke out, he was in command of the 
 frigate Congress, but was transferred to 
 the Cyane. It was he who transported 
 Colonel Fremont, with his band of trap- 
 pers and Indians, to San Diego, the 
 Cyane bei»ig the first United States 
 man-of-w»r to enter that harbor. After 
 liis return from the Pacific, he was em- 
 ployed in various ways and in different 
 capacities, his high character, his knowl- 
 edge of his profession, his powers of 
 oi'ganization, and his business habits 
 always revealing themselves and justi- 
 fying the confidence reposed in him. 
 In 1857 he sailed for China in the Min- 
 nesota ; in 1860 he was placed in charge 
 of the navy yard at Philadelphia ; and 
 now, at the close of 1861, we find him 
 at the head of this great naval expedi- 
 tion. 
 
 The fleet, with the troops on board, 
 sailed out of Hampton Eoads and pro- 
 Oct. ceeded to sea on the morning of 
 29. the 29th of Octobei-. Never did 
 any such expedition leave port under 
 auspices, to outward appearances, more 
 favorable. The sun rose and shone with 
 unusual splendor, revealing the rich 
 robes with which, in the late fall, na- 
 ture ill those regions clothes herself. 
 From an early hour the rampai'ts at 
 Fortress Monroe were crowded with sol- 
 diers; hearty hurrahs gi-eeted each vessel 
 as it took its position ; while the military 
 bands on the transports, striking up a 
 
 succession of favorite tunes, intensified 
 the general excitement and inspired all 
 with hope. Sherman's troops were di- 
 vided into three brigades, and were com- 
 manded respectively by Generals Egbert 
 L. Viele, Isaac I. Stevens, and Horatio 
 G. Wright, each of the commanders, 
 like Sherman himself, being a graduate 
 of West Point Military Academy. The 
 flag-ship Wabash led the way, the others 
 following in three parallel lines, and 
 from the vast space which they covered, 
 as well as fi"om the order which they 
 preserved, presenting a most magnificent 
 spectacle. The weather continued good 
 all day. It was a glorious night. The 
 next day was all that could be wished. 
 The vessels were still in the same order 
 in which they started. On the second 
 night it was still calm. There was no 
 moon ; but the stars shining bright and 
 clear, looked down upon a scene of 
 rare and matchless beauty. With such 
 weather dawned the morning of the 
 third day ; and so clear was the atmos- 
 phere and so uniniflHed the water, that 
 a passenger on the Atlantic was able to 
 count no fewer than thirty-eight of the 
 vessels of the fleet. 
 
 The objective point of the expedition 
 had been studiously concealed from the 
 public ; and it was unknown to the mas- 
 ters and men of the different ships. It 
 was known only to the govei'nment and 
 to those in immediate command. To 
 provide against mishap, however, sealed 
 orders were on board every vessel. The 
 great object of this secrecy was to ena- 
 ble them to strike the intended point 
 by surprise, and to accomplish their 
 mission before the Confederates should 
 
NAVAL Ai\D COAST OPERATIONS. 
 
 h 
 
 have time to make preparations for 
 their arrival. Such a course had been 
 deemed advisable ; as recent experi- 
 ence had shown that, from the number 
 and efficiency of Southern spies, male 
 and female, in the National cajiital, the 
 plans of government were known to 
 the authorities at Richmond before they 
 were known to the public at Washing- 
 ton. It even seemed as if the Richmond 
 spy had found his way into the very 
 council chamber of the president and 
 his ministers. The precaution unfor- 
 tunately was doomed to fail of its pur- 
 pose ; but the failure itself disclosed 
 the wisdom and foresight with which 
 all the arrangements had been made. 
 
 Toward the evening of the third day 
 heavy clouds gathered and darkened 
 the face of the sky, the wind began to 
 rise, and everything indicated a coming 
 storm. Come it did, and quickly ; and 
 such a storm as has seldom raged along 
 the southern coast. It literally scat- 
 tered the ileet to the winds; and for a 
 time it was feared that the '• Great Ar- 
 mada," as it was fondly but somewhat 
 ominously called, had been completely 
 Nov. desti-oyed. On the morning of 
 2» the 2d of November only one 
 vessel could be seen from the deck of 
 the Wabash. The first intelligence of 
 the disaster reached the North through 
 Southern sources, and, of course, was 
 highly colored. The South was jubilant. 
 The North, it w^as said, was Gp])osing it- 
 self to fate. The elements were fighting 
 in the interests of the Southern cause. 
 "The stars in their courses fought 
 against Sisera. The winds of heaven 
 Were now fighting foi- th.' good cause of 
 
 Southern independence. Let the De])0 
 rahs of the South sing a song of deliv- 
 erance." Such w^as the highly-wrought 
 style in which Southern enthusiasm 
 found expression. Affairs, however, 
 were not quite so desperate as they 
 seemed. The fleet, although dispersed, 
 was not I'uined. In the isolated state in 
 which the different vessels found them- 
 selves, the sealed orders were opened ; 
 and it was found that Port Royal was the 
 place of rendezvous. On Sunday morn- 
 ing, the 3d of Novembei', the stoi'ni be- 
 gan to abate ; and the scattered vessels 
 one by wne gathered around the flag- 
 ship. On the following morning, jjov^ 
 as early as eight o'clock, the Wa- *• 
 bash anchored off Port Royal, accom- 
 panied by twenty-five vessels, and being 
 rapidly joined by the rest of the fleet. 
 It was found that, during that fearful 
 storm, some of the war-ships were saved 
 by throwing their heavy guns over- 
 board, that four transports Aveut down, 
 but that, hapi)ily, not more than a dozen 
 persons lost their lives. 
 
 Saved from the perils of the deep, 
 they were now to encounter perils of a 
 different but not less alarming kind. 
 The Confederates had done their best 
 to niakt^ the navigation of the coast dif- 
 ficult, if not impossible. All the light- 
 houses were destroyed ; and all the 
 l)eacons and buoys had been removed. 
 Scientific skill, however, soon overcame 
 these difficulties ; and with the help of 
 Commander Charles H. Davis, the chief 
 of staff, and Mr. Boutelle of the Coast 
 Survey, the entrance to Poi't Royal 
 Sound was found, and so marked ofl 
 with Inioys that Dupont was able tc 
 
fORT ROYAL. 
 
 73 
 
 enter with his fleet. He was told that 
 he could count with confidence on eight- 
 een feet of water. The movement com- 
 menced shortly after three o'clock ; and 
 hy twilight all the vessels, which had 
 arrived, were, with the exception of 
 the Wabash, over the bar and anchored 
 in the roadstead of Port Royal. Other 
 difficulties, however, had to be encoun- 
 tered. The Confederates, in conse- 
 quence of the mishap which had be- 
 fallen the fleet, had had ample time, 
 after they became aware of the destina- 
 tion of the expedition, to strengthen 
 the works in the neighborhood of Port 
 Royal, and otherwise to prepare them- 
 selves for a vigorous and stubborn re- 
 sistance. The time had not been lost. 
 On the right of the entrance, on St. 
 Philip's Island, at what is called Bay 
 Point, stood Fort Beauregard. This 
 was an earthwork; but it was carefully 
 built, and mounted some twenty guns, 
 several of them heavy rifles. It had an 
 outwork, toward the sea, mounting five 
 guns. On the left, on Hilton Head, 
 stood Fort Walker. This was a regular 
 work, with bastions and curtains. Built 
 upon a bluff eight feet high, and mount- 
 ing twenty-three guns, with an outwork 
 on the sea front having a rifled gun. 
 Fort Walker commanded not only 
 Port Royal entrance, but the approach 
 to the town of Beaufort by the Beau- 
 fort River. Of the two works, it was 
 by far the moi'e formidable. When 
 che expedition arrived, Fort Walker 
 was manned by some six hundred and 
 twenty men, and was in charge of Gen- 
 eral T. F. Drayton, a rich land-owner 
 of the neighborhood. At Camp Look- 
 
 out, about six miles from Fort Walker, 
 was a small body of Scriven's guer- 
 rillas, which was ultimately increased 
 in strength to the number of nearly 
 two thousand men. There were over 
 six hundred men at Bay Point, under 
 Colonel R. G. M. Dunovant. C»f this 
 force one hundred and forty-nine gaiTi' 
 soned Fort Beauregard, under the com- 
 mand of Captain Stephen Elliott, jr., of 
 Beaufort. Two miles further up, at 
 the junction of the Beaufort and Broad 
 Rivers, there was a fleet of five ov six 
 gunboats, under Commodore Josiah Tat- 
 nall, a veteran of the w^ar of 1812. 
 
 A reconuoisance of the Confederate 
 works was made on the 5th by the ]Vof 
 Ottawa, supported by the Curlew, 5» 
 Seneca, and Smith, when it was ascei-- 
 tained that of the two forts. Fort Walkei 
 was greatly the more powerful. The 
 Wabash, which had been unable to cross 
 with the other vessels, was now safely 
 over the bar, and everything was ready 
 for a movement against the enemy and 
 his works. " The order of battle," to 
 quote froniDupont's report, "comprised 
 a main squadron, ranged in a line ahead 
 and a flanking squadron, which was to 
 be thrown off on the northern section 
 of the harbor, to engage the enemy's 
 flotilla, and prevent them taking the 
 rear ships of the main line, when it 
 I turned to the southward, or cutting off 
 a disabled vessel." If this plan could 
 be ■carried out, it would be impossible 
 for Tatnall with his gunboats to hindev 
 or in any way annoy the main body 
 while carrying out instructions. " The 
 plan of attack," to quote from the same 
 authority, " was to pass up midway be- 
 
■u 
 
 NAVAL AND COAST OPERATIOISI S. 
 
 tween Forts Walker and Beauregard, 
 receiving and returning the fire of both, 
 to a distance about two and a half miles 
 north of the latter. At that point, the 
 line was to turn to the south around by 
 the west and close in with Fort Walker, 
 encountering it on its weakest flank, 
 and at the same time enfilading in near- 
 ly a direct line its two water faces." 
 " When abreast of the fort, the engine 
 was to be slowed, and the movement 
 reduced to only as much as Avould be 
 just sufficient to overcome the tide, to 
 preserve the order of battle, by passing 
 the batteries in slow succession, and to 
 avoid becoming a fixed mark for the 
 enemy's fire. On reaching the extrem- 
 ity of Hilton Head, the line was to 
 turn to the north by the east, and pass- 
 ing to the northward, to engage Fort 
 Walker with the port battery nearer 
 than when first on the eame course. 
 These evolutions were to be repeated." 
 The ships were to pass the forts at eight 
 hundred yards when moving to the 
 south for the first time, but when mak- 
 ing the second circuit they were to sight 
 their guns for five hundred and fifty 
 yards. This arrangement would make 
 it next to impossible for the guns of 
 the fort to strike the vessels. The latter 
 would be in motion ; and they would be 
 three hundred yai'ds nearer than when 
 they passed at first. 
 
 The captains were summoned on 
 board the Wabash and received their 
 'Nov. instructions. It was the 7th of 
 ?• NovemV)er. At eight o'clock the 
 signal was made to get under way. 
 At nine o'clock the signal was made 
 for "close order." At about half-past 
 
 nine the action was commenced, the 
 first shot being fired from Fort Walker. 
 The Wabash responded promptly. The 
 Susquehanna quickly followed. The 
 first prescribed turn having been made, 
 the signal Avas given at a quarter past 
 ten for "closer action." The Wabash 
 came up, and passed Fort Walker at 
 the distance, when abreast, of eight 
 hundred yards. The Susquehanna and 
 the others followed. A second time 
 was the elliptical movement performed, 
 the ships this time passing the fort and 
 firing at a distance of less than six hun- 
 dred yards. About this time, half -past 
 eleven, the enemy's flag was shot away. 
 Meanwhile good and effective work was 
 being done by some of the smaller ves- 
 sels, which had taken their stations at 
 the enfilading point. It was evident 
 that the garrison was becoming exhaust- 
 ed. The firing was ali'eady feeble, from 
 few guns, and at long intervals. After 
 the third circuit, "the enemy had en- 
 tirely ceased to reply, and the battle 
 was ended." At a quarter past one 
 P. M. the Ottawa signalled that the 
 fort was abandoned. It was discovered 
 a little later in the day that Fort Beau- 
 regard, whose guns had been silent for 
 some time, was also abandoned. At 
 twenty minutes past two o'clock. Cap- 
 tain John Rodgers, who had been sent 
 on shore with a flag of truce, hoisted 
 the Union flag over the abandoned work. 
 At sunrise on the following morning 
 the old flag was raised also over Fort 
 Beauregard. The National loss during 
 the engagement was thirty-one, of whom 
 eight were killed. The Confederates 
 reported a loss of fifty in all^of whom 
 
PORT ROYAL FERRY. 
 
 75 
 
 ten were killed. No life was lost in 
 Fort Beauregard. Both forts were form- 
 ally taken possession of, Fort Walker 
 on the day of the battle by General 
 Wright's brigade, Foi't Beauregard on 
 the morning of the 8th by the brigade 
 of General Stevens. The great object 
 of the expedition had thus been accom- 
 plished. 
 
 It was of all things most natural that 
 there should be great joy and rejoicing 
 in the North. Over the soil of South 
 Carolina, which was the first State to 
 raise the standard of rebellion, the 
 Union flacr was ao-ain floatinof. It was 
 just as natural that the loss of Port 
 Royal should have been felt to be an 
 irreparable blow by the South. The 
 feeling was universal that an important 
 step had been taken on the part of the 
 Nationals towards the recovery of the 
 entire southern coast. 
 
 General Sherman was not slow to 
 take advantage of his victory. Hilton 
 Head was greatly strengthened, and 
 made a depot for supplies. An im- 
 mense wharf was constructed; build- 
 ings of various kinds were midtiplied ; 
 and Hilton Head and Port Royal Island 
 soon became great centres of life and 
 industry. Beaufort, a delightful little 
 town on Port Royal Island, and the fa- 
 vorite summer reti-eat of the aristocracy 
 of South Carolina, where some of them 
 had built luxurious homes, hid from 
 view by vine-covered verandahs, em- 
 bosomed in groves of orange and lemon, 
 and surrounded on all sides by the gor- 
 geous plants and rich fruitage of the 
 tropics, was entirely abandoned by the 
 white population. For a few days 
 
 Beaufort was entirely at the mercy of 
 the negroes, who, in the homes of their 
 former masters, gave themselves up to 
 all manner of licentiousness, indulging 
 in scenes of wildest revelry and waste- 
 fulness. Beaufort was soon occupied 
 by the National troops; and military 
 order was substituted for barbarous li- 
 cense. Meanwhile Dupont had sent his 
 vessels in various directions, up the riv- 
 ers, among the islands, and along the 
 coast. Everywhere, it was found, the 
 whites had fled, the slaves who had re- 
 fused to accompany them remaining 
 behind and occupying the plantations 
 and houses. Expeditions were sent 
 north towards the bay of St. Helena 
 and south towards Warsaw Sound. 
 Both were completely successful. The 
 Confederates in truth having disappear- 
 ed, there was no one to offer resistance. 
 Both positions were of great strategic 
 value, in view of future operations. 
 The possession of the bay of St. Helena 
 secured the command of large rivers 
 communicating with the interior of 
 South Carolina, as well as an excellent 
 harbor — a harbor almost equal to that 
 of Charleston itself. The possession of 
 Warsaw Inlet and Sound secured the 
 command of an enti'ance to the Savan- 
 nah River, with a passage little inferior 
 to that of Tybee, a little more to the 
 north. Some days later, on the jfov, 
 25th, Big Tybee Island was also 25. 
 seized ; and Dupont was able to write 
 to the secretary of war : " The fl;ig of 
 the United States is flying over the ter- 
 ritory of the State of Georgia." Al] 
 along the coast, from Warsaw Sound, 
 below the mouth of the Savannah, 
 
76 
 
 NAVAL AND COAST OPERATIONS. 
 
 northward as far as the North Edisto 
 River, the National authority was su- 
 preme. With ])ut two exceptions, every 
 fort on the islands throughout that re- 
 gion had been abandoned. Forts Pu- 
 laski and Jackson, the one on Cockspur 
 Jsland, at the mouth of the entrance, 
 the other on the mainland of Georgia 
 and above the other approaches from 
 the sea, still remained in the hands of 
 the Confederates, and eflfectually guard- 
 ed the I'iver and city of Savannah. 
 
 At one place only did the Confede- 
 rates make a stand in defence of the 
 islands off the coast of South Carolina 
 and Georgia. It was known that they 
 had a fortified camp at Port Royal 
 FeiTy, on the Coosaw, and that they 
 had collected a force there, under Gen- 
 erals Gregg and Pope, some eight thou- 
 sand strong. It was evidently their 
 intention to shut up the Nationals in 
 Port Royal Island — at least so to shut 
 them up as to prevent them crossing to 
 the mainland in the direction of Savan- 
 nah. To this end they had placed ob- 
 structions in the Coosaw River and the 
 other streams and creeks which sep- 
 arate the island from the mainland, 
 and erected batteries at Seabrook, at 
 Boyd's Creek, at Port Royal Ferry, 
 and at other commanding positions. 
 Dupont had already made an unsuc- 
 cessful attempt to reach the Savannah 
 River by way of Augustine Creek, 
 in the rear of Fort Pulaski. This 
 accomplished, he might have been able 
 to cut off all communication with the 
 tort, and take possession of the city 
 of Savannah. The Confederates, how- 
 ever, had been on their guard ; and the 
 
 expedition failed. It Avas felt to be 
 necessary to break up the fortified ca ap 
 at Port Royal Ferry ; and with this t nd 
 in view a joint land and naval force, vm- 
 der Brigadier-General Stevens and Com- 
 mander C. R. P. Rodgers was organized. 
 The troops under Stevens consisted of 
 Colonel Frazier's Forty-Seventh !»n(l 
 Colonel Perry's Forty-Eighth New Yoik 
 regiments; the Seventy-Ninth New 
 York Highlanders, Major Morrison ; the 
 Fiftieth Pennsylvania, Colonel Crist; 
 the Eighth Michigan, Colonel Fenton; 
 and the One Hundredth Pennsylvania 
 (Roundheads), Colonel Leasure ; in all 
 about five thousand men. The naval 
 force assembled at Beaufort, and was 
 composed of the Ottawa, Seneca, Pem- 
 bina, and Hale, with the ferryboat Helen 
 and four boats belonging to the Wa- 
 bash, each of these last carrying a V2 
 pound howitzer. 
 
 The expedition moved on the evening 
 of the 31st of December. The pec. 
 greater portion of this fleet went S'- 
 up the Broad River, on the west side of 
 Port Royal Island, their purpose being 
 to approach the ferry by Whale Creek. 
 The land forces made their way to a 
 point where the Brick- Yard Creek, a 
 continuation of the Beaufort River, 
 unites with the Coosaw. There Com- 
 mander Rodgers met Stevens with 
 launches ; and the troops were embark- 
 ed. It was the first morning of the 
 new year 1862. Some of the troops 
 landed at Haywood's plantation, and 
 the remainder at Adams' plantation, the 
 next landing. A forward march against 
 the Confederates was at once begun. 
 The Eighth Michigan were thrown out 
 
A FLAG OF TRUCE. 
 
 V 
 
 as skirmishers, the gunboats opening a 
 liHsk fire into the woods in their front. 
 The Seventy-Ninth New York (High- 
 landers) were in front of the main body. 
 They were now near the ferry, when a 
 concealed battery opened upon them 
 with grape and cannister. The brunt 
 of this fire was borne by the Highland- 
 ers and the Eighth Michigan. The Fif- 
 tieth Pennsylvania rushed forward to 
 iheir sup])ort. The boats, coming up 
 one after the other, brought so heavy 
 a fire to bear on the works that they 
 were soon abandoned. Immediately 
 after the Ottawa was anchored the ferry 
 was opened ; and the Pennsylvania 
 Roundheads passed over and took pos- 
 session of the abandoned fort. At four 
 o'clock they were joined by General 
 Stevens with the advance guard. About 
 this time the Confederates appeared in 
 force and in line of battle on the Na- 
 tional right. The Ottawa and the Pem- 
 l)ina were ordered to move a short dis- 
 tance down the river, where they opened 
 fire with their 11-inch and Parrott gims, 
 Hinging their shells into the midst of 
 the Confederates, driving them through 
 the woods and clearing the National 
 liank. It was now sunset. There was 
 a pause in the battle. 
 
 A messenger from the Confederates 
 appeared at one of the outposts, bearing 
 a flag of ti'ucQ, and asking permission 
 
 203 
 
 to carry off their dead and wounded. 
 At this moment the gunboats reopened 
 fire ; and before General Stevens' mes- 
 senger could convey his I'eply, granting 
 one hour to carry oif the wounded, the 
 officer ^vho brought the flag of triiee had 
 galloped off. The enemy reappeared 
 in the morning, when the gunboats 
 Ottawa, Seneca, Pembina, Helen, and 
 Hale all opened fire, flinging shot and 
 shell into the woods. It was, however, 
 but of short duration. At forty minutes 
 past nine o'clock the troops, having 
 demolished the works and fired some 
 houses in the neighborhood, began to 
 recross the ferry. The Confederates 
 made no further demonstration. By 
 noon the troops were all over ; and the 
 field guns, at the request of General 
 Stevens, were landed for the purpose 
 of covering the rear of the returning 
 column. So ended the attack on Port 
 Royal Ferry. General vStevens lost 
 nine men. Major Watson of the Eighth 
 Michigan was mortally woundec. 
 
 So far these coast expeditions had 
 been successful. The Nationals were 
 masters of Ilatteras Inlet ; and on the 
 southern borders of South Carolina 
 and the northern borders of Georgia 
 the Confederates had been driven 
 from every stronghold, with the two 
 exceptions. Fort Jackson and Fort Pu- 
 laski. 
 
FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Vhe Beginniiig of 18G2.— State of Public Feeling.— The Army of the Potomac a Splendid Toy.— McClellsaVi 
 Reasons for Delay. — Kesignation of General Scott. — The War Office. — Stanton succeeds Cameron. — New Life 
 in the Government. — The Army Ordered to Move. — The Protection of Washington. — The West. — Halleck and 
 Buell. — Sidney Johnston. — Mill Spring. — ZoUikoffer Killed. — General Thomas. — The Confederate Line of 
 Defense. — Halleck's Plan of Attack. — Where to Strike. — The Army at Cairo. — General Grant in Command. — 
 Port Henry. — Foote and His Flotilla. — The Army in Motion. — A Thunder-Storm. — Fire Opened upon the 
 Fort by the Gunboats. — Tilghman Lowers His Flag. — Fort Henry Occupied by the Nationals. — The Union 
 Flag Floats again over the Soil of Tennessee. — The Fall of Fort Henry a damaging Blow to the South. — Joy 
 m the North. — Fort Donelson. — Its Position. — Its Strength. — General Albert Sidney Johnston. — Pillow, 
 Floyd, and Buckner. — The March on Donelson. — Foote's Flotilla on the Cumberland. — Fire Opened upon the 
 Fort.— The Nationals Repulsed. —The Night of the Thirteenth of February. — Two separate Attacks and Two 
 Failures. — The Confederates full of Confidence. — Sally of the Garrison. — McClemand vigorously Attacked. — 
 The Nationals Forced Back. — General Lewis Wallace makes a determined Stand. — A Lull. — Grant Arrives. — A 
 general Attack ordered. — The Confederates Driven Back within their Entrenchments. — Lost Ground Re- 
 claimed. — A Fearful Night. — Humanity of Wallace. — Floyd and Pillow make their Escape. — Buckner Proposes 
 to Surrender. — Grant's Terms. — " Unconditional and Immediate Surrender." — Buckner Indignant. — Fall of 
 Donelson. — A Great Victory and Great Rejoicing. 
 
 The year 1862 opened rather gloom- 
 ily. The campaigns of the pre- 
 vious year had not been particu- 
 larly encouraging to the Northern cause. 
 At Washington there was much excite- 
 ment, not a little activity, but no re- 
 joicing. The aimy of the Potomac had 
 been reconstructed and put in splendid 
 condition. Never was army more thor- 
 oughly drilled or more perfectly equip- 
 ped for battle. It retlected the highest 
 credit on General McClellan, and gave 
 abundant evidence that, whatever might 
 be his qualities on the field of actual 
 warfare, he had as a military organizer 
 few, if any, equals among the command- 
 ers of his time. But armies are not 
 intended to be splendid toys, magnifi- 
 cent playthings. When the army of 
 the Potomac was brought up to a fight- 
 ing condition, no haste was made to 
 
 turn it to account. The enemy, who 
 had mightily increased his strength, was* 
 all but knocking at the gates of the 
 capital ; but the general-in-chief seemed 
 to have no other use for his well trained 
 and gorgeously equipped army than to 
 exhibit its skill in evolution, to the daily 
 delight of the people of Washington. 
 The toy was splendid ; McClellan seem- 
 ed unwilling to mar its beauty. It was 
 not all at once that these thoughts 
 entered the minds of even the more 
 thoughtful and reflective of the people 
 of the North. For a time they approved 
 and applauded. As the army of the 
 Potomac grew in beauty and in strength, 
 it was as much a source of delight and 
 hope to them as it was evidently a pride 
 to its .commander. Hope deferred, how- 
 ever, maketh the heart sick. Delay 
 gave birth to impatience. Before the 
 
EDWIN M. STANTON. 
 
 19 
 
 end of October the previous year, the 
 army under the immediate care of 
 McClellan had reached a strength of 
 i>early one hundred and twenty thou- 
 sand men. It was his opinion that the 
 advance upon Manassas should not be 
 postponed beyond the 25th of Novem- 
 ber ; and it was his desire that, as far 
 as was possible, all the other armies 
 should make sacrifices, so as to add to 
 the actual strength under his command. 
 In the interval, on the 31st of October, 
 he was made commander-in-chief, on 
 the resignation of General Scott. With 
 the change in his position there came a 
 change in his views. Up until this 
 time he had undervalued the importance 
 of possible effort in the West. Now he 
 wished to make a simultaneous move- 
 ment in East Tennessee and Virginia, 
 and capture Nashville contemporane- 
 ously with Richmond. In order to 
 bring up the armies of the West to the 
 same high standard with the army of 
 the Potomac, further delay was neces- 
 sary. So the month of November rolled 
 past, the weather having been fine and 
 the roads in excellent condition for mil- 
 itary movements ; and to the impatient 
 millions scattered over the Northern 
 States, who hourly expected to hear of 
 a dashing movement and a brilliant 
 victor}^, no other message came but 
 the same wearisome iteration, "All 
 quiet on the Potomac." Impatience at 
 last reached its height. "When will 
 McClellan move?" "What does he 
 mean to do ? " These and such like ques- 
 tions were in every mouth; and by 
 many the opinion began to be enter- 
 tained that the commander-in-chief 
 
 either had no plan or was afraid to 
 move. 
 
 Such was the state of things in the 
 opening weeks of the second year of the 
 war. In the second week of January 
 an important change was made in the 
 War Office. On the 13th Mr. jan. 
 Edwin M. Stanton took the place ^^' 
 of Mr. Secretary Cameron, who was 
 offered the position of Minister to Russia. 
 The change was not intended in any way 
 to reflect on Secretary Cameron. On 
 the contrary, it v/as his own desire, as 
 well as the desire of the other members 
 of the government, that the position, 
 which was onerous and exacting in the 
 extreme, should be filled l)y some man 
 who to more than ordinary intellectual 
 ability and force of character added 
 great powers of endurance. Of all the 
 available men at that moment, as the 
 result proved, Stanton was the man iu 
 whom those qualities were most united. 
 He had ali-eady made himself conspicu- 
 ous, during the administration of Bu- 
 chanan, by exposing and defeating the 
 schemes of the conspirators who plotted 
 the seizure of Washington. It was 
 said of Stanton by some of his jealous 
 rivals that he was a man of only one 
 idea. The remark, though otherwise 
 intended, actually conveyed a compli- 
 ment. The times preeminently required 
 concentration of thought and purpose ; 
 and if Stanton was a man of one idea, 
 his idea was the preservation of the 
 Union — the grandeur and immortality 
 of the Republic. Stanton was one of 
 those whose patience was completely 
 exhausted by the inactivity of McClel- 
 lan. It was at his suggestion that the 
 
8(1 
 
 POiti'S HENEY AND DONELSON. 
 
 president issued the order that on the 
 2 2d of February a general forward move- 
 ment of tlie land and naval forces of the 
 Union should take place ; that "especial- 
 ly the army at or about Fortress Monroe, 
 the army of the Potomac, the army of 
 Western Virginia, the army near Mum- 
 fordsville, Kentucky, the army and flo- 
 tilla near Cairo, and the naval force in 
 the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move 
 on that day ; that all other forces, both 
 land and naval, vs^ith their respective 
 commanders, obey . existing orders for 
 the time, and be ready to obey addi- 
 tional orders when duly given ; that 
 the heads of departments, and especially 
 the secretaries of war and the navy, 
 with all their subordinates, and iiie gen- 
 erals-in-chief, with all other command- 
 ers and subordinates of land and naval 
 forces, will severally be held to their 
 strict and full responsibilities for the 
 prompt execution of this order." A 
 special order, which in some particulars 
 was afterwards modified, was issued on 
 Jau. the Slst of January, to the effect 
 ^*' " that all the disposable force of 
 the anny of the Potomac, after provid- 
 ing safely for the defense of Washing- 
 ton, be formed into an expedition for 
 the immediate object of seizing upon 
 the railroad southwestward of what is 
 known as Manassas Junction ; all de- 
 tails to l)e in tlie discretion of the com- 
 mander-in-chief, and the expedition to 
 move before or on the 2 2d day of Feb- 
 ruaiy next." These orders were too 
 plain to be misconstrued. If they did 
 not imply mistrust of McClellan, they 
 certainly contained a rebuke. His dila- 
 tory conduct had not only disappointed 
 
 — it had disgusted all ranks and classes 
 of the people. 
 
 The war, in what might be called 
 systematic form, was now about to be- 
 gin. Hitherto the forces had been scat- 
 tered, and the battles fruitless of result 
 as they had been Avithout plan or pur- 
 pose. Now there was a recognized 
 central authority, tliere was a general 
 plan, and arrangements were made for 
 concerted action. A variety of circum- 
 stances had made it evident as well as 
 necessary that the first battles of 1862 
 should be fought in the West. General 
 Halleck, as we have seen already, was 
 now in command in Missouri, and Gen- 
 eral Buell had charge of the Department 
 of the Ohio. The Confederates, under 
 Albert Sidney Johnston, held a strong 
 defensive line running from the Missis- 
 sippi River eastward to the Cumberland 
 Mountains. The left was at Columbus 
 on the Mississippi. Forts Henry and 
 Donelson guarded the Cumberland and 
 Tennessee Rivers. An intrenched camp 
 at Bowling Green, with a considerable 
 army, covered the great railroad lines 
 southward to Nashville. The right 
 flank was held by a force posted at Mill 
 Spring, Kentucky. General H?,lleck, 
 who had divided his large command into 
 districts, had assigned to General Grant 
 the District of Cairo, which ircluded . 
 Paducah, in Kentucky. General Buell ' 
 who had a large force iinder bjm, ar 
 ranged it into four grand divisions, 
 himself, with a portion of his troops, . j 
 threatening Bowling Green, and Genera! ' 
 George H. Thomas, one of hia subordi- 
 nates, threatening the Confederate force 
 at Mill Spring. A glance at the ma^ 
 
MILL SPRING. 
 
 81 
 
 will show that on the part of the Con- 
 federates these positions were singu- 
 larly well chosen. If they could hold 
 this line, the great cotton-producing 
 States would be comparatively safe ; 
 and while the sinews of war would thus 
 be provided for another year, they 
 would be the more easily able to con- 
 centrate their strength against the army 
 which threatened them in the east. 
 
 Early in the month of January, Gen- 
 ei'al Thomas came into collision with 
 the Confederate forces stationed at Mill 
 Spring. The battle lasted the greater 
 Jan. P'^^rt of Sunday, the 18th, and was 
 •8i fought with great spirit on both 
 sides. Early in the fight the Confede- i 
 rate General Zollikoffer was killed, and 
 before the close of the day the National ' 
 arms were completely victorious, the 
 Confederates being driven from their 
 position and compelled to retreat to- 
 wards their camp in the wildest confu- 
 sion. In the struggle the Nationals lost 
 two hundred and forty-seven men, of 
 whom thirty-nine were killed, the re- 
 mainder wounded ; the Confederates 
 lost three hundred and forty-nine, of 
 whom one hundred and ninety-two were 
 killed, sixty-two wounded, and the re- ; 
 mainder made prisoners. As the spoils | 
 of ^^ctory, General Thomas captured 
 and carried with him twelve pieces of 
 artillery, with their caissons packed, | 
 two army forges, one battery wagon, a 
 large quantity of arms and ammunition, 
 over a thousand horses and nuiles, to- 
 gether with wagons, commissary stores, 
 intrenching tools, and a considerable 
 amount of camp equipage. It was felt 
 to be a damaging blow by the South, 
 
 as it broke their line in Kentucky and 
 opened a door of deliverance for East 
 Tennessee. It was hailed as a great 
 victory by the North, and called forth 
 a spirited proclamation from the secre- 
 tary of war, who declared it to be the 
 purpose of the war " to pursue and 
 destroy a rebellious enemy, and to de- 
 liver the country from danger." "In 
 the prompt and spirited movements 
 and daring at Mill Spring," he said, 
 "the nation will realize its hopes. It 
 will also delight to honor its brave 
 soldiers." 
 
 In ZollikofPer the Confederates lost 
 one of their ablest generals. Of Swiss 
 origin, he was born in North Carolina 
 in 1812. At an early age he emigrated 
 to Tennessee, where he worked as a 
 printer and afterwards became an ed- 
 itor. In 1834 he edited and published 
 the Columbian Obsa-ver; and from 1835 
 to 1837 he held the proiltable place of 
 state printer of Tennessee. In 1842 he 
 had editorial charge of the Nashville 
 Bamier ; and thi-ough the influence of 
 that partisan journal he succeeded in ob- 
 taining several political ofiices. At the 
 beginning of the secession movement in 
 Tennessee, Zollikoffer was opposed to 
 it ; but he was finally induced to yield ; 
 and on joining the array he was ap^ 
 pointed a brigadier-general. He had 
 only joined the secession force at Mill 
 Spring a few hours before the battle. 
 The chief in command was General 
 Crittenden ; but the attack at Mill 
 Spring has generally been attributed 
 to Zollikoffer, who was a man of great 
 energy and courage. 
 
82 
 
 FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 
 
 General George H. Thomas, wlio on 
 that day at Mill Spring first chained 
 vdctory to the Union standard, and be- 
 gan that series of brilliant and substan- 
 tial achievements with which his name 
 is associated, was a man of another 
 mould. A Virginian by birth, he was 
 educated at West Point, and in 1841 
 was appointed a lieutenant of artillery. 
 During the Mexican war he rose to the 
 rank of major. In 1850 he accepted 
 the position of teacher of artillery and 
 cavalry at West Point. At the begin- 
 ning of the war, Thomas, who held the 
 rank of major of the Second Cavalry, 
 was promoted to the lieutenant-colonel- 
 cy of his regiment, and a little later he 
 became coloneL On the 17th of August, 
 1861, he was made brigadier-general; 
 and after having served under Generals 
 AWerson and Sherman, he was appoint- 
 ed by General Buell to the command 
 of the Tenth Division. 
 
 It will be observed that the battle of 
 Mill Spring was fought and won before 
 the date of the president's general order 
 for the forward movement of all the ar- 
 mies ; and there can be little doubt that 
 the spirited conduct of the National 
 troops on that occasion gave the spur to 
 that impatience of further delay which 
 President Lincoln shared with the rest of 
 the Northern people. The president was 
 not more anxious for immediate action 
 than were the officers in the field and 
 the rank and file under their care. We 
 have seen that the victory at Mill 
 Spring broke the Confederate right, 
 and by opening a door of deliverance 
 for East Tennessee, prepared the way 
 for the aggressive and successful efforts 
 
 which were to follow. The Confede- 
 rate line, however, remained strong and 
 intact from Bowling Green to Colum- 
 bus. The ground was also well guarded 
 from Bowling Green to Nashville, fur- 
 ther to the south. At Bowling Green 
 there was an intrenched camp. Fort 
 Henry, on the east bank of the Tennes- 
 see, and Fort Donelson, on the west 
 bank of the Cumberland, were bastioned 
 earthworks, about twelve miles apart 
 and connected by a well constructed 
 road. There were redoubts on Island 
 No. 10, in the Mississippi River; and 
 Columbus, which was still in charge of 
 General Polk, had been so strengthened 
 as to be proudly spbken of as the Gib- 
 raltar of America. To defend this line 
 the Confederate commander had under 
 him at least 60,000 men. The forcing 
 of this line by the National armies had 
 become a necessity, if any serious effort 
 was to be made to bring the South back 
 to its allegiance. The question was 
 how to strike and where. Various plans 
 had ali'eady been suggested ; but there 
 is some difference of opinion as to who 
 is entitled to credit for the plan which 
 was ultimately adopted, and which 
 proved completely successful. It is 
 known that General Buell had suggest 
 ed some such plan as that adopted, ic 
 a communication made to General Hai- 
 leck eaily in the month of January, 
 1862. It is also known that about the 
 same time or shortly afterwards, Gene- 
 ral Grant, without any knowledge of 
 what Buell had done, wrote to Halleck 
 and asked permission to carry out the 
 plan which was afterwards accomplish- 
 ed. It is recorded that one eveninar 
 
THE FLOTILLA AND AKMY IN MOTION. 
 
 83 
 
 late in December, 1861, Generals Hal- 
 leck, Sherman, and Cullum were to- 
 gether at the Planters' Hotel in St. 
 Louis, when the conversation turned up- 
 on the proper line of invasion. "Where 
 is their line ? " asked Halleck. " Why, 
 from Bowling Green to Columbus," re- 
 plied Sherman. "Well, then, where 
 is the true point of attack ? " " Natu- 
 rally the centre." "Then let us see in 
 what direction it should be made." A 
 map was at hand. With a blue pencil 
 Halleck drew a line from Bowling 
 Green to Columbus, past Forts Donel- 
 son and Henry. He drew another line 
 perpendicular to its centre. The latter 
 line coincided nearly with the Tennessee 
 River. "There," said Halleck, "that 
 is the true line of attack." After all, 
 it was the natural and obvious course 
 to follow ; and it is more than probable 
 that to the minds of each of these men, 
 educated in military tactics and expe- 
 rienced in military affairs, the same 
 plan at the same time was independently 
 suggested. One thing is absolutely 
 certain regarding this matter : Grant 
 had written his second letter to Hal- 
 leck, urging the propriety of his allow- 
 ing him to proceed at once by land and 
 water against Fort Henry, to take and 
 hold it as a base for other operations, 
 before the order of the 30th came au- 
 thorizing the desired movement. 
 
 It has already been shown that the 
 Confederate line stretched from Bow- 
 ling Green to Columbus, and that the 
 strength of the entire force holding the 
 line was about sixty thousand men. 
 The Confederate general in command 
 ^as Albert Sidney Johnston, one of 
 
 the oldest and most experienced officers 
 on the American continent. The garri- 
 son of Fort Henry, which was 2734 
 strong, was under the immediate charge 
 of General Tilghman. The armament 
 of the fort consisted of seventeen guns. 
 Johnston's headquarters were at Bow- 
 ling Green, where he was confronted 
 and held in check by General Buell, 
 an able officer, who held the chief 
 command of the army of the Cumber- 
 land. 
 
 Immediately on receiving permission 
 from Halleck to proceed with his pro- 
 posed plan, Grant made arrangements 
 for the attack on Fort Henry. He had 
 at his disposal some seventeen thousand 
 men. It was arranged that flag-officer 
 Foote, with a flotilla of seven gunboats, 
 should move along the Ohio, steer up 
 the Tennessee, and open the attack, 
 while Grant, on the land side, should 
 render what assistance was necessary 
 and cut off all retreat. On Mon- peb, 
 day, the 2d of February, Foote 2. 
 left Cairo, and on the morning of Tues- 
 day he was a few miles below Fort 
 Henry. Grant, in the meantime, with 
 the divisions of McClernand and C. F. 
 Smith, had embarked in transports 
 which were convoyed by the flotilla. 
 These landed a few miles below the 
 fort ; and Foote proceeded up the river, 
 having orders from Grant to move slow- 
 ly and shell the woods, in order to dis- 
 cover whether there were any concealed 
 batteries. On the morning of the peb 
 6th it was understood that every *• 
 thins: was in readiness for the a'ca^k. 
 which was to be made simultaneously 
 on land and water. A heavy thunder 
 
84 
 
 FOKTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 
 
 stjrm had raged the previous night; 
 and, as a consequence, the roads were 
 heavy and the streams so svi^ollen that 
 bridges had to be built for the passage 
 'vf the artillery. The land forces, thus 
 
 neountering unlooked-for obstacles, 
 ivere considerably delayed. Shortly 
 after 12 o'clock Foote opened fire upon 
 the fort. Beginning at a thousand yards 
 distance, he gradually ran his vessels to 
 within six hundred yards of the enemy. 
 The firing for a time was vigorously 
 returned ; but Foote pressed forward 
 with irresistible bravery, and his men 
 worked with a will and as if they meant 
 to win. It was evident to Tilghman 
 from the fii'st that it was next to impos- 
 sible for him to hold the fort. He nev- 
 ertheless exerted himself to the utmost, 
 encouraging his men alike by word and 
 example, going so far as to work one of 
 the guns himself. A series of accidents, 
 meanwhile, occuiTed inside the fort. 
 A rifled 24-pounder burst, killing and 
 wounding a number of the men. A 
 42-pounder burst prematurely, and kill- 
 ed three of the gunners. In a short 
 time the well-directed fire from the 
 gunboats had dismounted seven of the 
 guns and made them useless ; the flag- 
 staff also was shot away. The garrison 
 became completely demoralized. It was 
 in vain that Tilghman attempted to 
 ^•eplace the exhausted gunners. The 
 
 |i-oops in the camp outside the fort 
 made good their escape, some by the 
 Dover road, leading to Fort Donelson, 
 others on Ijoard a steamer which was 
 lying a little above Fort Henry. Foote 
 had promised to reduce the fort Avitliin 
 an hour. When he made that promise 
 
 he counted on assistance from the forces 
 on the land side. Without any aucn 
 aid — for the land forces had not yet 
 arrived on the scene — he made good 
 his word ; for the hour had scarcely 
 expired when the white flag was raised. 
 There was no unnecessary delay. The 
 main body of his troops having made 
 good their escape, Tilghman, with his 
 staff and some sixty artillerists, surren- 
 dered to the victorious Foote. In killed 
 and wounded the Confederate loss was 
 twenty-one men. The only serious dam- 
 age sustained by the fleet in the river 
 was on board the ironclad Essex. A 
 shot from the enemy had penetrated her 
 boiler ; and some twenty-nine ofiicers 
 and men, including Commander Porter, 
 were seriously scalded. 
 
 The capture of Fort Henry was felt 
 by the South to be a damaging blow ; 
 and it led to bitter murmuring and 
 even loud complaints against the author- 
 ities at Richmond. It was justly re- 
 garded by the North as a victory of 
 great importance. It was full of in- 
 struction, inasmuch as it proved the 
 value of gunboats on the narrow rivers 
 of the West, especially when acting in 
 conjunction with land forces. It in- 
 spired hope, inasmuch as it reclaimed 
 lost territory and restored the old flag. 
 " Fort Henry is ours ! " said Halleck in 
 his despatch to McClelian. "The flag 
 of the Union is re-established on the 
 soil of Tennessee. It will never be re- 
 moved." Foote Avas formally thanked 
 by the secretary of the navy. " The 
 country," he was told, '' appreciates 
 your gallant deeds, and this Depart- 
 ment desires to convey to you and your 
 
A COUNCIL OF WAR 
 
 85 
 
 brave associates its profound thanks for 
 the service you have rendered." 
 
 After the fall of Fort Henry, prepara- 
 tions were made foi- an attack on Fort 
 Donelsou with as little delay as possi- 
 ble. General Halleck felt it to be his 
 duty to do his utmost to strengthen the 
 army under Grant's command ; and ac- 
 cordingly reinforcements Avere hurried 
 forward from Buell's army, from St. 
 Louis, Halleck's headquarters, from 
 Cincinnati, and from Kansas. 
 
 Fort Donelson, as has already been 
 stated, was distant from Fort Henry 
 about twelve miles, and was situated 
 near the town of Dover, on the west 
 bank of the Cumljerland, on a platform 
 of elevated ground, which at its hi<fhest 
 point rises from the river about one 
 hundred feet. It was about forty miJas 
 above the point where the Cumboi-land, 
 after draining the highlands of south- 
 eastern Kentucky and northeastern 
 Tennessee, empties its waters into the 
 Ohio. The entire work covered one 
 hundred acres. The country around 
 was I'ugged and heavily wooded. Nat- 
 ui'ally a sti'ong position, everything 
 had been done which art and science 
 could accomplish to make it impregna- 
 ble. On the water side it was especially 
 strong, the battei'ies being admirably 
 planted and well mounted. Including 
 the light artilleiy, there were in the 
 fort at the moment of the attack not 
 fewer than ninety-five pieces. With 
 the men who had made good their 
 escape thither from Fort Heniy, the 
 strength of the gai'rison amounted to 
 twenty-one thousand men. All aiouud 
 ♦ he Avorks on the Luid sid", abatis had 
 
 :i04 
 
 been formed by felling timber and half 
 chopping off the smaller trees. 
 
 As soon as it became e\adent that 
 Fort Donelson was likely to be attacked, 
 Johnston exerted himself to the utmost 
 to make the position invulnerable. Re- 
 inforcements were hurned forward from 
 Bowling Green ; the work was pushed 
 day and night ; and a fortified line two 
 and a half miles in length, enclosing 
 the town of Dover, was drawn along 
 the high ground, which commanded the 
 avenues of approach. Gideon J. Pillo\f 
 arrived witk his command on the peb 
 10th and took control. Simeon '*• 
 B. Buckner, at the head of the rein- 
 forcements from Bowling Green, arrive(? 
 on the 11th. On the 13th John B, 
 Floyd, who had fled from Virginia with 
 his followers, in obedience to orders re-- 
 ceived from Johnston, appeared upon 
 the scene, and, outranking Pillow, took 
 the chief command. 
 
 Meanwhile Grant was not idle. On 
 the evening of the day which witnessed 
 the capture of Fort Henry, a flotilla 
 under Lieutenant Phelps sailed up the 
 Tennessee River, for the purpose of 
 ascertaining the condition of the banks 
 in the upper waters. The reconnoisance 
 was completely successful. It was found 
 that there was no Teal hindrance to a 
 southward movement. Tlie country 
 was comparatively unprotected ; and 
 the people seemed impatient to be de 
 livered from the dreadfid tyranny luider 
 which they were groaning. On Feb. 
 the nth a council of war was *•• 
 held ; and the question Avas put, " Shall 
 we mai'ch on Donelson, oi- sliall we wait 
 for further reinforcements '{ " The de- 
 
86 
 
 FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 
 
 cision was in favor of immediate action. 
 Foote was Inisy getting ready with his 
 gunboats; and the delay hitherto was 
 mainly on that account. It was all-im- 
 portant that the gunboats should parti- 
 cipate in the attack ; but it was felt that 
 every hour was adding to the enemy's 
 strength. At the head of fifteen thou- 
 Feb. sand men, on Wednesday, the 
 12. 12th, Grant moved from Fort 
 Henry upon Donelson. The foremost 
 brigade advanced by the telegraph road ; 
 che others moved by the road which 
 leads to Dover. For the month of Feb- 
 ruaiy, the day was beautiful. The atmos- 
 phere Avas warm and balmy, like a day in 
 spring. In their march over the hilly 
 country, the advancing troops experi- 
 enced but little difficulty. Before sun- 
 down Grant was before the fort; and 
 what remained of daylight he spent 
 in bringing his troops into position. 
 During the night there was little idle- 
 iiess. Batteries were posted, and the 
 line of battle was fomied. Meanwhile 
 Foote Avas moving up the Cumberland 
 with his gunboats, convoying transports 
 which Avere to constitute LeAvis Wal- 
 lace's Third Division. It was Grant's 
 intention, should the gunboats arriA^e, 
 to begin the attack in the morning. 
 McClernand's Division, consisting of 
 the four brigades of Oglesby, Wallace, 
 Mc Arthur, and Morrison, was posted 
 on the right. C. F. Smith's Division, 
 composed of the brigades of Cook, Lan- 
 man, and M. L. Smith, Avas posted on 
 the left. LeAvis Wallace's Division, so 
 soon as it arrived, was to take its j)osi- 
 tion in the centre. The line extended 
 some four miles, the right sweeping 
 
 round almost to Dover, the left resting 
 on Hickman's Creek, Avhere, at the 
 house of a Mrs. Crisp, Gi-ant established 
 his headquarters. 
 
 Moi'ning daAvned, but there was no 
 sign of the gunboats. Grant was peb. 
 unwilling to hazard a general en- *3' 
 gagement until the expected forces ar- 
 rived. Early in the forenoon, hoAvever, 
 a cannonade was opened ; and some 
 lively work Avas done by Berge's sharp- 
 shooters, Avho, concealed behind the 
 trees, picked oif not a feAV of the Con- 
 federate gunners. About noon an at- 
 tempt was made to efFect a lodgment 
 upon the Confederate intrenchments. 
 McClernand ordered Colonel Wallace 
 to capture a formidable battery, knoAvn 
 as the Middle Eedoubt. The troops 
 employed for this purpose were Illi- 
 nois regiments — the Seventeenth, Major 
 Smith ; the Forty - Eighth, Colonel 
 Hayn ; and the Forty-Ninth, Colonel 
 Morrison, McAllister's battery covering 
 them. Hayn, being the senior colonel, 
 took command of the attacking party. 
 The attack Avas made in the most spirited 
 manner. But the enemy Avas strongly 
 posted ; and although the National 
 troops behaved with the utmost gal- 
 lantry in the presence of overAvhelming 
 numbers and under a most galling tire, 
 they Avere ultimately repidsed. An 
 equally unsuccessful effort was made on 
 the left by a portion of Lanman's bri- 
 gade. In both cases the National loss 
 Avas heaAy. When the darkness came on, 
 the troops, not a little dispirited, had 
 fallen back to the groimd occupied by 
 them in the morning. 
 
 The night of the 13th presented & 
 
ARRIVAL OF REINFORCEMENTS. 
 
 87 
 
 striking contrast to the beautiful spring- 
 like morniuo:. The afternoon had be- 
 c-ome chilly ; and towards evening rain 
 fell in torrents. The rain was succeed- 
 ed by sleet and snow ; and at midnight 
 a severe frost set in, the mercuiy falling 
 to ten degrees below zero. The be- 
 sieging force was without tents; and 
 many of the soldiers were not even pro- 
 vided with blankets. Fires were not 
 permitted, as they would prove marks 
 for the enemy's guns. Scantily supplied 
 with food, and with the pitiful cries of 
 the AV'ounded callins: for v/ater I'esound- 
 ing in their ears, they were compelled 
 to spend the weary hours, resting ou 
 their arms. It was one of those sad 
 nights, often, alas ! repeated before the 
 war reached its close. 
 
 The morning of the 14th dawned 
 Feb. "with apparently brightening pros- 
 j '4« pects for the Federal arms. Fully 
 realizing the peril of the situation and 
 the necessity of using every available 
 man, Grant had, at the close of the con- 
 test the night previous, sent a courier 
 to General LeAV-is Wallace, who had 
 been left behind with a small garrison 
 at Fort Heniy, commanding him to 
 hasten, at once to the scene of action. 
 Wallace, with his garrison, which con- 
 sisted of the Eleventh Indiana, the 
 Eighth Missouri, and Company A, Chi- 
 cago Artillery, in chai'ge of a battery, 
 was ready by the Itreak of da}-. After 
 such a night, the ground was not in the 
 best condition for the movement of in- 
 fantry and artilleiy ; but the men were 
 in excellent spirits ; and in spite of the 
 drifting frost which blew in their faces, 
 they made good time, Wallace being 
 
 able to report at Grant's headquarters 
 before the hour of noon. On their arrival 
 Lewis Wallace's little band found the 
 Union soldiers in high hope and expecta- 
 tion. During the course of the night 
 Foote, vpith the gunboats and trans- 
 ports, the latter bringing the Third or 
 Wallace's Division, about ten thousand 
 strong, had arrived. Their landing had 
 been safely efFected ; they were already 
 around Grant's headquarters ; and when 
 Wallace appeared on the scene he was 
 immediately placed in command and 
 took his position in the centre, with 
 Smith on the left and McClernand ou 
 the right. By this fresh accession of 
 strength, Grant was enabled to com- 
 plete the investment of the fort and its 
 outworks ; and for the first time since 
 he commenced to grapple with the ene- 
 my, he had the advantage of superior 
 numbers. Supplies having arrived in 
 abundance, rations were liberally sup- 
 plied to the half-famished men, and 
 preparations were made for a general 
 assault. 
 
 The experience of the previous day 
 had been such that, even with largely 
 increased foi'ces, General Grant was un- 
 willing to make any rash attack from 
 the land side. The fort was powerfully 
 mounted ; and without the aid of earth- 
 works and trenches, an attack made 
 from the land side, whether upon a par-' 
 ticular point or on the entire enemy's 
 works, however it might result finally, 
 could not fail to be attended by an enor- 
 mous sacrifice of life. Grant's instruc- 
 tions to his generals were that they 
 should preserve the line of investment 
 intact, being ready to repel any attempt 
 
88 
 
 FOETS HENRY AND DONELSON. 
 
 which the enemy might make, either in 
 the way of assault or escape. 
 
 The gunboats had done so well at 
 Fort Henry that perhaps too much was 
 expected of them at Fort Donelson. At 
 all events, it was airanged that the gun- 
 boats should have the honor of opening 
 the assault. At three o'clock in the 
 afternoon Foote moved forward with 
 four ironclads and two wooden boats. 
 In addition to these, there was the gun- 
 boat Carondelet, Commander Walke, 
 which had anived two days before. 
 The armored vessels moved in front. 
 While yet a mile and a half distant, 
 the gunboats opened fire, the batteries 
 on the fort remaining perfectly silent. 
 It was not the silence of a helpless, par- 
 alyzed foe : it was the silence of con- 
 scious strength — of a determined and 
 deadly purpose. Onward the little fleet 
 moved, still belching forth destruction, 
 but meeting with no response. Sud- 
 denly, however, when within four hun- 
 dred yards of the batteries, a plunging 
 fire was opened upon it by twenty heav^' 
 guns, placed high on the hillside, the 
 shot falling with dreadful precision and 
 effect In face of this terrific fire, Foote 
 pressed closer and closer. The well- 
 directed fire of the gunboats had silenced 
 the upper battery of four guns. The 
 fighting, however, was not equal. The 
 columbiad and 32-pound rifle now told 
 with fatal effect on the ironclads ; while 
 the shot and shell from the ships fell 
 powerless on the heavy sand-banks 
 which protected the enemy's guns. A 
 heavy shot had cut away the iiidder- 
 chains of the Louisville, and she di-ifted 
 helplessly down the current. The flag- 
 
 ship St. Loius was soon in a similar 
 plight, Commodore Foote himself being 
 wounded. The other two armored ves- 
 sels had suffered severely; a heavy rifled 
 cannon having burst on board the Car- 
 ondelet. The battle had lasted one 
 hour and a half. It was useless to pro- 
 long the struggle. Orders were given 
 to with<lraw ; and as the flotilla moved 
 back down the river, it received some 
 severe parting blows from the shore 
 batteries, some of the fugitives from 
 which had I'eturned and resumed their 
 guns. It was another failure. The 
 strength of the place had not been pro])- 
 erly gauged. What was practicable and 
 easy at Fort Henry was impossible at 
 Fort Donelson. In the attack the Na- 
 tionals lost fifty-four men in killed and 
 wounded. The Confederates lost not u 
 man, nor were their batteries in any wa}' 
 injured. Fifty-nine shots had struck thi^ 
 St. Louis ; thirty-five the Louisville ; 
 thirty-five the Carondelet, and twenty- 
 one the Pittsburg. 
 
 Two daj-s had now been wasted ; and 
 two experiments in the way of attack 
 had been made, with signal want of 
 success. All had been done on the river 
 side which could be done with the 
 means now at Grant's command. Any 
 fresh attempt made on the land side 
 was certainly as perilous as ever ; nay, 
 it seemed to involve even greater risks, 
 for the Union commander could no 
 longer count with confidence on the 
 gunboats, which he had hoped would 
 greatly aid him in the accomplishment 
 of his diflicult task. The original plan 
 had failed. A new plan had become 
 necessary. It was accordingly arranged 
 
ATTACK ON THE NATIONAL EIGHT. 
 
 89 
 
 in a conference between Grant and 
 Foote, on the evening of Friday, that 
 the Commodore should return to Caij-o, 
 repairand augment his fleet, and return 
 with a naval force adequate to the re- 
 quirements of the situation. Grant re- 
 solved meanwhile to go on perfecting 
 his line of investment, so strengthening 
 his weak points as to shut the Confede- 
 rates effectually within their intrench- 
 ments, and so cutting off their supplies 
 as possibly to starve or frighten them 
 into a surrender. 
 
 While the Union commanders were 
 thus deploring their ill fortune and 
 making arrangements for future and 
 more effective operations, events had 
 taken a peculiar turn inside the Confed- 
 erate lines. Floyd, the commander-in- 
 chief, was not in the least elated by the 
 effective resistance which he had been 
 able to offer to McClernand's attack on 
 the 1 3th, or by the defeat of the gun- 
 boats on the 14th. He felt that, in 
 spite of his strength, he was effectually 
 hemmed in. There was not a point 
 within the intrenchments which might 
 not be reached by the enemy's artillery 
 fiom the boats on the river or from the 
 batteries on land. It would be easy, 
 by passing a column above him on the 
 river, to cut off at once his only source 
 of supply and his only means of egress. 
 Moreover, he had seen that day a fleet 
 of transports arrive, bringing a power- 
 ful addition to the ranks of the enemy ; 
 and he knew that the whole available 
 Union force in the Western States could 
 be speedily concentrated against Fort 
 Donelson. It was Floyd's opinion that 
 the fort could not be held with a gar- 
 
 rison of less than fifty thousand men. 
 At a council of war, held on the evening 
 of the 14th, it was unanimously resolved 
 to abandon the place, force a way past 
 Grant's right, and pass into the open 
 country around Nashville. 
 
 From the position enclosed within 
 the Confederate lines two roads led to 
 wards Nashville — the Wynn's Ferry 
 road, running fi'om Dover through 
 Charlotte ; and the other an obscure 
 and at best an undesirable road, cross- 
 ing the flats of the Cumberland. The 
 latter road was submerged by the over- 
 flow of the river. There remained, 
 therefore, but the one way of escape, if 
 escape was to be attempted, and that 
 was the Wynn's Ferry road. But this 
 road was effectually covered by McCler- 
 nand's Division, the right wing of the 
 Union army. What was the Confede- 
 rate plan of attack ? Pillow's Division, 
 which formed the Confederate left, was 
 to make a vigorous attack upon the 
 Union right flank ; and Buckner's Di- 
 vision, drawn from the right, a few men 
 being left in the intrenchments to main- 
 tain an appeai'ance, was to strike at the 
 same time the right flank of the Union 
 centre, which rested upon the Wynn's 
 Ferry road. It was hoped that if Pil- 
 low's attack should prove successful, 
 McClernand's Division, the Union right, 
 would be foi'ced back upon Wallace's 
 Division, the Union centre, and that 
 Buckner, striking the divided masses in 
 flank, would roll both divisions back in 
 confusion on that of Smith, the Union 
 left. In such a case, the Wynn's Feciy 
 road would be effectually opened as a 
 way of escape, and possibly Grant's 
 
90 
 
 FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 
 
 forces might be routed and driven to 
 tbeir ti-ansports. It M^as a daring and 
 well-conceived plan ; and, as we shall 
 by and by see, so far as it was faithfully 
 executed, it was a complete success. 
 
 On the morning of Saturday, the 
 Feb. loth, at the early hour of five 
 *3« o'clock. Pillow's column, eight 
 thousand sti'ong, accompanied by For- 
 rest's cavalry, thirty heavy guns, and a 
 full complement of artillery, was al- 
 ready in motion. Pillow w^as resolved, 
 as he said in his high-sounding style, 
 " to roll the enemy in full i-etreat over 
 upon General Buckner," and then, by 
 an attack in flank and rear, to " cut up 
 the enemy and put him completely to 
 rout." He went to his work with a 
 will, and as if he meant to make his 
 purpose good. McClernand was well 
 })osted to resist the assailants ; but, al- 
 though this point has been disputed, 
 there can be no reasonable doubt that 
 he was taken by surprise. His division 
 was arranged in three brigades — McAr- 
 thur's on the right, Oglesby's in the 
 centre, W. H. L. Wallace's on the left. 
 Pillow's onslaught was swift and furi- 
 ous. It fell mainly upon the two right 
 l»rigades, McArthur's and Oglesby's. 
 The Confederate line covered the front 
 of these brigades, and extended some 
 distance beyond the right flank. In the 
 struggle which ensued, there M^as no 
 lack of heroism on either side. At a 
 critical moment, timely and effective 
 assistance was rendered by the sister bri- 
 gade of W. H. L. Wallace, Colonel John 
 A. Logan, at the head of his brave regi- 
 ment, the Thirty-First Illinois, exerting 
 liimself by word and deed to sustain 
 
 and cheer the men. In such a strug- 
 gle, however, enthusiasm is V)ut a sor- 
 ry compensation for lack of numliers. 
 The soldiers did their best. Inch by 
 inch the ground was contested. Over- 
 powered, however, and outflanketl, the 
 two brigades were turned and forced 
 from their position. Meanwhile Buck- 
 ner, who had moved his troops over 
 from the extreme Confederate right, 
 formed them in front of McClernand's 
 left brigade, Colonel W. H., Wallace. 
 It will thus be seen that the whole 
 hostile mass — the entire concentrated 
 strength of the Confederate army-;— was 
 pressing upon McClernand's Division, 
 the right wiiig of the Union army. The 
 left brigade soon followed the example 
 of the other two — it fell back from ite 
 position ; and by nine o'clock the entire 
 position occupied in the 1/eginning of 
 the contest by the right Aving of the 
 National army was in the possession of 
 the Confederates. The Wynn's Ferry 
 road was open. 
 
 The tide was still in favor of the 
 Confederates. So far they had boldly 
 carried out their plan, and successfully 
 accomplished their purpose. The Na- 
 tional ai'niy Avas, indeed, at this partic- 
 ular moment in a A'ery critical condition. 
 The situation was all the more alarming 
 that the general-in-chief, who had not 
 been jjresent all the morning, was not 
 yet on the field. At 2 A. M. he had 
 gone on board a gunboat to hold a con- 
 sultation with Commodore Foote, Avho, 
 it will be remembered, was wounded in 
 the struggle the day previous. It is 
 more than possible that if Grant had 
 been on the field from the commence- 
 
GKANT ON THE FIELD. 
 
 91 
 
 ment of the contest, McClernand would 
 have been able to hold his ground. In 
 the absence of the general-in-chief there 
 was no officer, during all those preg- 
 nant hours, who could assume the right 
 to combine and direct the entire forces 
 in the field. The division next to 
 McClernand was that of Lewis Wallace. 
 When Wallace fii'st heard the firing, 
 he concluded that McClernand had re- 
 sumed the attack. At about 8 A. M. 
 he received a message from McClernand 
 asking assistance. Not knowing Avhat 
 to do, he sent the message to headquar- 
 ters; but General Grant was still ab- 
 sent. Later he received another mes- 
 sage from McClernand, disclosing the 
 fact that his men were being pressed 
 back by overwhelming numbers. There- 
 upon Wallace detached two brigades, 
 and sent them under Colonel Cruft. 
 Cruft, ho\\'evei', Avas in some way misled 
 too far to the right, and l)eing forced 
 to fight his way, he arrived only in time 
 to share the fate of the whole rie:ht 
 wing. Seeing flocks of fugitives crowd- 
 ing up ill the rear of his own line, Wal- 
 lace promptly put in motion his remain- 
 ing brigade under Colonel Thayer. Tlie 
 column had marched V>ut a short dis- 
 tance when McClernand's brigades were 
 met, retiring to the left — retiring in 
 good ordei' and slowly, complaining of 
 many things, but complaining most of 
 ftll that their ammunition was exhausted. 
 The brave fellows seemed to feel as if 
 they had no right to be in that position. 
 The enemy was following but slowly. 
 Wallace had time to deploy his brigade 
 on the crest of a hill which crossed the 
 line along which the enemy was moving 
 
 towards the left. Here he presented a 
 firm front at right angles to his former 
 front, and behind him the defeated 
 troops of the right wing rallied and re- 
 formed. In this position they awaited 
 the approach of Pillow and Bucknen 
 Mortified with the defeat of the morn 
 ing, the troops of tlie right wing had 
 no sooner filled their cartridges than 
 they took their places and were ready 
 for action. When, therefore, the Con- 
 federates advanced and began to ascend 
 the crest, so terrific was the fii-e that 
 they reelt,i and staggered and broke, 
 falling back in wild confusion. A sec- 
 ond time they attempted to charge; 
 but the second repulse was more disas- 
 trous than the first. The men could 
 not again be brought into line. Some of 
 them fled precipitately to their works ; 
 the remainder were brought to a stand 
 on the ground occupied by the National 
 right wing in the early morning. 
 
 Grant had now appeared on the field 
 It ^vas about noon when the Cohfede 
 rates were driven back to their trenches 
 The battle had lulled; but ever}i:hin'; 
 was yet in confusion. The chief must 
 have bitterly regretted the fact of his 
 own absence from the scene of action in 
 the early part of the day. But it was no 
 time now for idle and worthless lament- 
 ation. It was action that was needed — 
 prompt, decided, vigorous action. Grant 
 was not slow to come to a conclusion, 
 although it is simply absurd to say that 
 in this instance he made up his mind 
 at once. About three o'clock in the 
 afternoon he called McClernand and 
 Wallace aside for consultation. They 
 were all on horseback. Grant held in 
 
92 
 
 FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. 
 
 his hand some despatches, to which now 
 and then he nervously turned his eyes. 
 His face was flushed and revealed high 
 excitement He was evidently swayed 
 by strong emotions. He said something 
 about the necessity of falling back and 
 intrenching — about waiting for rein- 
 forcements and Foote's new flotilla It 
 was suggested by one of the other two 
 that in consequence of McClernand's 
 defeat the road to Clarksville was un- 
 covered, and that the enemy might es- 
 cape if he chose. Whether Grant had 
 merely been sounding the opinions of 
 his subordinates, or whether new light 
 at the moment dawned upon him, we 
 know not ; but all of a sudden he gave 
 orders that the right wing should re- 
 take the ground which it had lost in 
 the morning, and that the left wing, 
 under Smith, should make a simultane- 
 ous attack on the Confederate right. 
 General Grant has since given us his 
 own reason for the course which he I'e- 
 solved to pursue. " On riding upon the 
 field," he says, " I saw that either side 
 was ready to give way if the other 
 showed a bold front. I took the oppor- 
 tunity, and ordered an advance of the 
 whole line." 
 
 The orders were promptly executed. 
 Wallace took charge of the troops which 
 had been engaged and which had suf- 
 fered so much in the morning and early 
 part of the day, and whose duty it was 
 to resume lost ground. The ground 
 was rough and badly blocked with 
 wood. There were, besides, bloody 
 memorials of the morning's struggle. 
 The Nationals, however, pressed on, 
 the Confederates vigorously resisting. 
 
 For more than an hour the conflict raged 
 fiercely, and the result seemed doubtful. 
 Ultimately, however, the Confederates 
 yielded to the fierce energy of their as- 
 sailants, and were compelled to retire 
 within their own intrenchments. In the 
 hour of victory almost complete, when 
 within one hundred and fifty yards 
 of the enemy's works, Wallace was 
 astonished by an order from the gen- 
 eral-in-chief, commanding him to halt 
 and retire his troops, as a new plan 
 of operations had been arranged for 
 the morrow. He felt satisfied that 
 Grant M^as ignorant of the success 
 which had attended his movement. 
 Darkness, however, was at hand. He 
 contented himself, therefore, with hold- 
 ing the ground he had taken, and dis- 
 obeyed orders only to the extent of bi- 
 vouacking on the field of victory. Smith 
 was equally successful in his attack on 
 the Confederate right. Buckner, who 
 in abandoning the left made it the easy 
 prey of Wallace, arrived too late at his 
 old position on the right to save it from 
 the dashing energy of Smith. In spite 
 of all that he could do, the Confederates 
 were forced from their intrenchments 
 and driven inside the work. 
 
 All along the line, the gi'ound lost in 
 the morning had been reclaimed. Nay, 
 more : — On both the left and the right 
 the enemy had found it necessary to 
 abandon his oavu chosen gi'ound and to 
 retire more and more under the workj. 
 of the fort. When darkness fell. Grant 
 had reason to feel satisfied. He had by 
 his single will converted a day of dis- 
 aster into a day of triumpli. The fruit 
 of victory was not yet in his hands, but 
 
THE SURRENDER 
 
 93 
 
 it was ripe and ready to fall. So ended 
 the third day at Fort Donelson. 
 
 The niijht which followed was one of 
 the saddest yet experienced in the his- 
 tory of the war. The cold was intense, 
 the thermometer indicating more than 
 twenty degrees below the freezing 
 point. The ice-covered branches of the 
 trees swayed and crackled in the night 
 breeze. Camp life had not yet become 
 a luxury. There were no tents, and 
 even the blanket had not become a 
 necessary part of the soldier's equipage. 
 General Grant found a sleeping-place in 
 a negro hut. General Smith lay down 
 on the frozen ground. The soldier 
 slept as he best might, leaning on his 
 musket or resting on his knapsack. 
 Four thousand brave Americans lay 
 scattered over the battle field, many of 
 them dead, some of them freezing to 
 death, the feeble but piteous cries of 
 the latter filling the weary hours with 
 woe. It is in scenes such as these that 
 true humanity stands forth conspicuous 
 and commands universal admiration. 
 With such a background, goodness, 
 pure, true, and unselfish, shines as if 
 with a heavenly light. General Lewis 
 Wallace, to his honor be it said, with 
 many of his men, who, filled with his 
 spirit and fired by his example, worked 
 far into the morning hours, ministering 
 to the wounded on both sides, and with 
 kindly hands burying the dead. 
 
 Grant had made all necessaiy arrange- 
 ments for resuming the attack al()ng the 
 whole line on the following (Sunday) 
 moming. Such attack, however, was 
 not to be necessary. A council of war 
 was held at Pillow's headquarters, late 
 
 on Saturday night. Floyd, Pillow, 
 Buckner, and their staff -officers were all 
 present. Some bad temper was reveal- 
 ed ; and on many points there was dif- 
 ference of opinion. On one point they 
 were agreed — that another sortie would 
 be absolutely disastrous. Buckner did 
 not believe that he could hold his posi- 
 tion half an hour after daylight. In his 
 judgment there was no escape from a 
 suiTender. Floyd and Pillow were 
 equally of opinion that the situation 
 w^as desperate, and that there was noth= 
 ing for them but immediate capitulation. 
 The one absorbing question with Floyd 
 and Pillow was "How shall we es- 
 cape ? " Floyd knew what he had done, 
 and he trembled to fall into the hands 
 of the enemy. " You know," he said, 
 "the position in which I stand." Pil- 
 low seemed to feel himself in a similar 
 plight, although he perhaps somewhat 
 overestimated his individual importance. 
 It was ultimately agreed that Buckner 
 should assume the command, and that 
 Floyd and Pillow should be allowed 
 to make their escape, Floyd taking with 
 him his Virginia brigade. Floyd sur- 
 rendered the command. Pillow, who 
 was next in rank, said "I pass it." 
 Buckner called for writing materials 
 and a bugler; and Floyd and Pillow 
 hastened off to save their precious lives. 
 Pillow crossed the river in a scow. Floyu 
 and his men went on board a steamer 
 at the wharf, and steered off amid the 
 curses and hisses of their former com- 
 panions in arms. It was a shameful 
 transaction ; but Buckner's conduct was 
 honorable throughout. Floyd had now 
 appeared in his true character. 
 
 MS 
 
34 
 
 POETS HENRY AND DONELSON. 
 
 When on the morning of -Sunday, the 
 Feb, 16 th of February, the light broke 
 '*• along the lines, there was no con- 
 9'iction more general among the Nation- 
 al soldiers than that the stirring scenes 
 of the previous day were about to be re- 
 peated, and repeated, perhaps, in more 
 aggravated and bloody form ; nor was 
 there disposition anywhere to shirk the 
 ordeal. Suddenly, however, the clear 
 notes of the bugle were heard soimding 
 a parley ; and as the gray dawn passed 
 away before the brighter light of the 
 ; pening day, a white flag was seen wav- 
 . ng over the fort. It was a token of a 
 willingness to surrender. We can read- 
 ily imagine that the altered situation 
 was gladly welcomed by all. A letter 
 was received by Grant from Buckner, 
 asking for the appointment of commis- 
 sioners to settle upon terms of capitula- 
 tion, and suggesting an armistice till 
 noon. To this Grant returned his char- 
 acteristic reply, "No terms other than 
 an unconditional surrender can be ac- 
 cepted. I propose to move immediately 
 on your works." Buckner regarded 
 these terms as " ungenerous and unchiv- 
 aJric"; but he was nevertheless obliged 
 to accept them. The old flag was im- 
 mediately raised ; and the stars and 
 stripes floated over the stronghold of 
 the Cumberland. About 15,000 pris- 
 
 oners, 17,600 small arms, and 65 guns 
 constituted the prize which fell into the 
 hands of the National commander. His 
 losses were 2041, of whom 425 were 
 killed. Grant paid a high compliment 
 to his soldiers. He told them that " for 
 four successive nights, without shelter 
 during the most inclement weather 
 known in this latitude, they had faced 
 an enemy in large force, and in a posi- 
 tion chosen by himself, and had com- 
 pelled him to surrender without condi- 
 tions, the victory achieved being not 
 only great in the effect it must have in 
 breaking down the rebellion, but also 
 in this, that it had secured the greatest 
 number of prisoners of war ever taken 
 in any battle on this continent." 
 
 The investment of Donelson had been 
 followed by the evacuation of Bowling 
 Green ; its fall was followed by the 
 abandonment of Nashville. This, how- 
 ever, was not all. Polk found it neces- 
 sary to evacuate Columbus and fall back 
 on Island No. 10. The so-called Gib- 
 raltar of the West was forthwith occu- 
 pied by National troops. The Southern 
 line of defense was completely broken 
 down. General Gi'ant had nobly accom- 
 plished the task which he had under- 
 taken. Henceforward he was regarded 
 as one of the strongest nillars of the 
 National cause. 
 
ISLAND No. 10 SURRENDEES. 
 
 95 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 tie Effects of the Fall of D(jnelscm. — Johnston's Mistake. — The Enemy's Centre Broken. — Evacuation of Colum- 
 bus. — Island No. 10 and New Madrid. — Surrender of Island No. 10. — Vexation of the South. — National 
 Victories in the West. —Popularity of Grant. — The Importance of Corinth. — Grant Preparing to Advance.^ 
 Grant Removed from Command. — C. F. Smith put in Charge of the Army. — Halleck Gives His Reasons. — 
 Grant's Answer. — Movement up the Tennessee. — Crump's Landing. — The Gunboats. — Sherman in Advance. — 
 Pittsburg Landing. — The Confederates at Corinth. — Description of the Ground at Pittsburg Landing. — Shiloh 
 Church. — The Illness of General Smith. — General Grant again in Charge. — Disposition of the National 
 Troops. — The Confederates. — How Disposed. — Their Plans and Prospects. — General Beauregard. — Arrival of 
 Johnston. — Buell Ordered to Join Grant. — Johnston's Proclamation. — The Confederates Moving Forward.— 
 Grant's Plans Well Laid, but the Troops Scattered. — The Morning of the Sixth of April. — The Nationals 
 Attacked. — A Tremendous On.slaught. — Grant not on the Field. — His Arrival. — Sherman's Bravery. — Sherman 
 and Prentiss Driven from their Ground. — The Battle Doubtful. — The Confederates Gaining Ground. — The 
 Ammunition Train. — Four Division Camps Plundered. — Three Divisions Routed. — W. H. L. Wallace Comes 
 to the Rescue. — Wallace Mortally Wounded. — The Situation Desperate. — Neither Lewis Wallace nor Buell yet 
 on the Field. — Driven to a Corner of the Field. — Will Grant Surrender? — Both Armies Exhausted. — Johnston 
 Wounded and Carried from the Field. — A Lull in the Fight. — Beauregard in Command. — The Ravine. — The 
 Battery on the Crest of the Hill.— The Gunboats. —The Terrible Struggle.— The Slaughter.— A Valley ot 
 Death. — End of the First Day. — The Second Day. — The Battle Resumed. — Wallace and Buell now on the 
 Field. — Beauregard Attempts to Turn the National Left.- An Artillery Duel. — The Confederates Pressed 
 Back. — The Nationals Gaining Ground all along the Line_. — A Cheer of Victory. — The Battle Ended.— Re, 
 flections. — Unexampled Bravery on Both Sides. — Magnanimity of General Grant. 
 
 1862. 
 
 The fall of Fort Donelson, as we 
 mentioned at the close of the last 
 chapter, completely brokt; up that 
 line of defense stretching from Bo-wliiig 
 Green to Columbus — a line of defense 
 ■which the Confederates fondly imag- 
 ined to be invulnerable. It carried the 
 whole Union fi'ont forward two hun- 
 dred miles. It had the immediate effect 
 of driving the insurgents completely out 
 of Kentucky. It thi'ew them back into 
 the centre of Tennessee, and brought 
 the capital of that State under Union 
 authority. It practically unbound both 
 the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers 
 — an immense gain to the Union com- 
 manders, as they fully appreciated the 
 great advantage of gunboats on those 
 inland rivers. 
 
 There can now be no doubt in any 
 mind at all familiar with the subject, 
 that the Union victories at Forts Henry 
 and Donelson were rendered compar- 
 atively easy by the bad management 
 of the Confederate commander-in-chief. 
 Had Ofeneral Johnston, in place of at- 
 taching so much importance to the pro- 
 tection of the two forts ou the Tennes- 
 see and the Cumberland respectively, 
 concentrated his various armies and 
 forced either Grant or Buell or both to 
 risk the chances of battle in the open 
 ground, the result might have been very 
 different. Johnston saw this iiimself 
 when it was too late ; and in a remark- 
 able letter addressed from Murfiees- 
 boro' to Jeffei'son Davis, he saitl, "If J 
 join this corps to the forces of Generai 
 
9tf 
 
 SHILOH. 
 
 Beauregard, then those who are now 
 declaiming against me will be without 
 an argument." 
 
 Bowling Green had been evacuated 
 before Fort Donelson fell ; for, believ^- 
 ing it to be untenable, Johnston had 
 moved on towards the south. Nash\nlle 
 was thrown into a perfect panic by the 
 report of the capture of Donelson ; and 
 as Johnston had declared that he fought 
 for that city while endeavoring to save 
 this fort on the Cumberland, the capital 
 of Tennessee fell an easy prey to the 
 troops of General Buell. Six days after 
 Mar. the capture of Nashville, General 
 i' Halleck telegraphed to General 
 McClellan from St. Louis, " Columbus, 
 tlie Gibraltar of the West, is ours, and 
 Kentucky is free. Thanks to the bril- 
 liant strategy of the campaign by which 
 the enemy's centre was pierced at Fo'rts 
 Henry and Donelson, his wings isolated 
 from each other and turned, compelling 
 thus the evacuation of his stronghold 
 of Bowling Green first, and now Colum- 
 bus." Driven from all these strong- 
 iiolds, it became necessary for the Con- 
 federates to select some defensive posi- 
 tion further to the south. In obedience 
 to instructions from Richmond, Polk 
 fell back some miles, still clinging to 
 the shores of the Mississippi, and estab- 
 lished himself at Island No. 10 and at 
 New Madrid. These places, although 
 fortified with gi-eat strength. Island No. 
 10 particularly, having had the special 
 attention of General Beauregard, and 
 l>eing deemed the most impregnable of 
 all the posts on the Mississippi, the 
 Confederates were compelled in succes- 
 sion to evacuate. The attack on Island 
 
 No. 10 reflected the highest credit ou 
 the skill of the Union commanders and 
 on the bravery of the Union troops. 
 It was not until a canal had been cut 
 across Donaldson's Point, between Isl- 
 and No. 8 and New Madrid, that the 
 Nationals had any hope of dislodging 
 the enemy. The canal was twelve miles 
 long and fifty feet wide ; and nineteen 
 days Avere consumed in cutting it from 
 point to point and making it navigable 
 for the largest of the gunboats. Com- 
 mander Foote reported to his govern- 
 ment that Island No. 10 was " harder 
 to conquer than Columbus, its shores 
 being lined with forts, each fort com- 
 mandino; the one above it." Beaureo;ard 
 telegraphed to Richmond that the Na- 
 tional guns had "thrown three thousand 
 shells and burned fifty tons of gunpow- 
 der," his batteries being uninjured and 
 only one man killed. The canal made 
 a complete change in the situation. 
 New Madrid had been evacuated on 
 the 12th of March; and on the jvprii 
 8th of April, four days after the 8. 
 completion of the canal, Island No. 10 
 had ceased to be a Confederate strong- 
 hold. The defenders of the batteries 
 had fled in confusion; but they were 
 pursued by Pope and compelled to sur- 
 render. The garrison on the island, 
 learning what had taken place and be- 
 lieving the situation to be hopeless, sent 
 a flag of truce to Commander Foote, 
 offering to surrender. The immediate 
 fruits of victojy were some seven thou- 
 sand prisoners, including three gene- 
 rals and two hundred and seventy 
 field and company officers, one hundred 
 heavy siege guns, twenty-four pieces of 
 
J^EA KIDGE. 
 
 d? 
 
 field artillery, a large quantity of am- 
 munition, several thousand stands of 
 i^raall arms, ^^^ith tents, horses, and wag- 
 ons innumerable. " No single battle 
 field has yet afForded to the North such 
 visible fruits of victory as have been 
 gathered at Island No. 10." Such was 
 the language used by the high officials 
 at Richmond. The Mississippi was now 
 open as far south as Fort Pillow. 
 
 While these events were follo\^'ing 
 each other in rapid succession in Middle 
 Tennessee and Western Kentucky, suc- 
 cesses of a scarcely less substantial kind 
 were attending the National arms in 
 Arkansas, in the grand movement, con- 
 ducted by Curtis, Sigel, and others, 
 down the Mississippi valley toward the 
 gulf. Early in February the Confede- 
 rate General Price had been compelled 
 to retreat from Missouri into Arkansas. 
 Feb. Oi the 18th of that month he was 
 
 •8. closely followed by the Nationals 
 under General Samuel R. Curtis of 
 Iowa. On the same day, joy was created 
 throughout the Union by a telegram 
 sent by General Halleck to General 
 McClellan. " The flag of the Union," 
 said Halleck, " is floating in Arkansas. 
 
 . . . The army of the Southwest is do- 
 ing its duty nobly." Curtis foresaw, 
 however, that he was certain soon to be 
 taken at a disadvantage, as the Confed- 
 erates, in retreating, had really been 
 falling l)ack upon reinforcements. He 
 therefore took post upon Sugar Creek. 
 His entire force consisted of twelve thou- 
 sand five hundred men, with forty-nine 
 guns. The enemy, under General Earl 
 Van Dorn, a dashhijr Confederate officer, 
 
 Was at le:ist twenty t! ^usnild strong. On 
 
 the morning of the 7th of March Mar. 
 the two armies came into collision. ?• 
 Thei-e had been much previous manoeu- 
 vreing ; and in consequence of a skilful 
 and successful flank movement made by 
 VanDorn, Curtis was compelled, almo.'?t 
 at the last moment, to change his front. 
 When the struggle began, the First and 
 Second Divisions, under Sigel and As- 
 both, were on the left, the Third, under 
 Davis, was in the centre, and Carr's 
 Fourth Division formed the right. The 
 line extended between three and four 
 miles, fi'ora Sugar Creek to Elkhorq 
 Tavern. On the opposite side of a r&- 
 vine called Cross Timber Hollow, the 
 Confederate line was stretched out be- 
 fore them, with Price on the right, 
 Mcintosh in the centre, and McCulloch 
 on the left. The attack fell heavily 
 upon Carr's Division, which during the 
 course of the day was driven back near- 
 ly a mile, but was not disorganized. 
 An attempt was made by McCulloch, 
 by a movement of his force to the left, 
 to join VanDorn and Price in their at- 
 tack on Cui'tis' rio;ht. To arrest this 
 movement, Sigel pushed foi-ward three 
 pieces of artillery, with a body of cav- 
 alry to protect and support them. The 
 cavalry were immediately overwhelmed 
 and the guns captured. Davis huiTied 
 to the assistance of Sigel ; a desperate 
 struggle followed, victory oscillating 
 like a pendulum, the Nationals and 
 Confederates recoiling and recovering 
 alternately; ultimately, however, the 
 Confederate right was broken and rout- 
 ed, and among those left on the field 
 were Generals McCulloch and Mcintosh, 
 mortally wounded. At the close of the 
 
SHILOH. 
 
 fighting on the 7th, Price was on the 
 Fayetteville road, in Curtis' rear. Vau- 
 Doi'n had his headquarters at Elkhorn 
 Tavern. On the right the National ar- 
 my had been defeated ; it was cut off 
 from its line of communication ; its pro- 
 visions were all but exhausted. The 
 Confederates, however, had been de- 
 feated on their right, and nearly driven 
 from the field. During the night the 
 Confederates united their forces on the 
 ground held by their left Aving. A 
 change was also effected in the National 
 line, Davis taking the right, Carr the 
 centre, and Sigel the left. At sunrise 
 the battle was resumed, Sigel opening 
 a heavy cannonade, and advancing 
 round the enemy's right, Davis at the 
 same time turning the enemy's left. It 
 was a daring and skilful movement, and 
 had all the effects of a surprise. All 
 at once the Confederates found them- 
 selves exposed to a destructive cross 
 fire. They made a brave i-esistance, but 
 in two hours, such was the precision 
 and rapidity of Sigel's gunners, they 
 were in full retreat through the defiles 
 of Cross Timber Hollow. Thus ended 
 what is known as the battle of Pea 
 Hidge. In the two days the Nationals 
 lost over thirteen hundred men. The 
 Confederate loss must have been great- 
 er. This battle had no direct connec- 
 tion with the movements more immedi- 
 ately under consideration. It did not 
 result from the fall of Forts Henry and 
 Donelson. It did not in any way affect 
 the impending struggle at Pittsburg 
 Landing. But inasmuch as the move- 
 ments of the army under Curtis were 
 part of Halleck's general plan, as that 
 
 plan contemplated quite as much th« 
 opening of the Mississippi fi-om Cairo 
 to the gulf as the driving of the enemy 
 out of Kentucky and Tennessee, and as 
 the battle of Pea Ridge was noted for 
 skill on the part of the officers and 
 bi'avery on the part of the men, it hae 
 been deemed wise, the more especially 
 as it occurred simultaneously with the 
 events now under review, to give it a 
 place in these pages, which are intended 
 to be preliminary to the most gigantic 
 effort yet made on either side since the 
 commencement of the war. 
 
 After the fall of Donels(m, it was 
 only natural that General Grant should, 
 for a time at least, become the popular 
 favorite. All over the Union his praises 
 were liberally sounded; and by not a few 
 who had acquired an insight into his 
 character he was hailed already as the 
 coming man. His sjjhere of action had 
 been greatly enlarged. General Halleck, 
 as if to mark his appreciation of Grant's 
 noble services, had assigned him to the 
 command of the new District of West 
 Tennessee, a command wliich extended 
 from Cairo to the northern borders of 
 Mississippi, and embraced the entire 
 country between the Mississippi and 
 Cumberland Rivers. Ireneral Grant 
 took immediate steps to turn to account 
 the victories which he had won, and 
 to press the enemy still further to the 
 south. He established his headquarters 
 at Fort Henry, where General Lewis 
 Wallace was in command. We have 
 seen already that Foote's flotilla was 
 withdrawn from the Cumberland, that 
 part of it had gone up the Tennessee 
 River, and that Foote himself, with a 
 
GRANT REMOVED FROM COMMAND. 
 
 99 
 
 powerfiil naval armament, had gone 
 down the Mississippi for the purpose 
 of co-operating with the land troops 
 against Columbus, Hickman, Island No. 
 10, and New Madrid. 
 
 It seems to have been the conviction 
 of all the Union commanders — of Hal- 
 leck, of Buell, of Grant — that a lodg- 
 ment should be made at or near Corinth 
 in Northern Mississippi. The posses- 
 sion of Corinth or Florence or Tuscum- 
 bia, but particularly Corinth, would 
 give the National forces control of the 
 Memphis and Charleston Railroad, the 
 key to the great railway comnumica- 
 tions between the Mississippi and the 
 East, as well as the border slave States 
 and the GuLf of Mexico. It would fa- 
 cilitate the capture of Memphis, because 
 it would place it more completely at 
 the mercy of the troops now moving 
 down the Mississippi ; and it would 
 render effective assistance to General 
 Curtis, who, as Ave have seen, was at 
 this moment carrying on important op- 
 erations in Arkansas. While adopting 
 vigorous measures for the purpose of 
 giving effect to the general plan. Grant 
 had the mortification to receive an order 
 from Halleck, instructing him to turn 
 over his command to General C. F. 
 Smith, and to remain himself at Fort 
 Henry. 
 
 In such circumstances such an order 
 must have been humiliating in the last 
 legree to General Grant ; and it is not 
 surprising that, stung to the quick as 
 he must have been, he shoidd have 
 asked to be entirely relieved from duty. 
 As a general rule, it is unwise to attach 
 too much importance to individuals in 
 
 a great national contest. No one man 
 is absolutely indispensable. It is unde- 
 niable, however, that the retirement of 
 General Grant at this particular junc- 
 ture might have materially affected the 
 future history of the great national 
 struggle now fairly begun, and already 
 bearing upon it somewhat of the impress 
 of his character and genius. The story 
 of this short-lived difficulty is easily 
 told. Complying with a request for an 
 interview, Grant had on the 27th of 
 February gone on a visit to Buell, up 
 the Cumberland to Nashville. In the 
 meantime Halleck had ordered him to 
 ascend the Tennessee, then in full flood, 
 and establish himself on the Memphis 
 and Charleston Railroad at or near 
 Corinth. On the 1st of March, jjar. 
 Halleck ordered him to fall back *• 
 from the Cumberland to the Tennessee, 
 with the view of caii-ying out the orders 
 previously given. It was supposed at 
 this moment that the Confederates had 
 retreated to Chattanooga. Sherman 
 meanwhile received orders to seize all 
 steamboats passing Paducah, and to send 
 them up the Tennessee for the trans- 
 portation of Grant's army. On hearing 
 that Grant had gone up the Cumberland, 
 Halleck telegraphed to him : " Why 
 don't you obey my orders ? Why don't 
 you answer my letters ? Turn over the 
 command of the Tennessee expedition 
 to General C. F. Smith, and remain 
 yourself at Fort Henry." At the same 
 time Halleck wrote complainingly to 
 McClellan at Washington, saying he 
 could get no reports from Grant, whose 
 troops were demoralized by their vic- 
 tory. To Grant himself Halleck wrote. 
 
103 
 
 SHILOH. 
 
 and a still wider gap of about two and a 
 half miles between his centre and his 
 left. Hurlbut's Division was put in 
 line on the left of the main Corinth 
 road, and Smith's own division, under 
 General W. H. L. Wallace, was on 
 Hurlbut's right. Lewis Wallace's Di- 
 vision was detached and stationed at 
 Crump's Landing, to observe any move- 
 ments which might be made by the 
 Confederates at Purdy, and to cover 
 the river commimications between Pitts- 
 burg Lauding and Savannah. McCler- 
 nand'a Division was about a mile in 
 front of W. H. L. Wallace, with that 
 of Prentiss to his right. These two di- 
 visions — that of McClernand and that 
 of Prentiss — formed the real line of 
 battle. The entire force was about 
 thirty-three thousand men. In estimat- 
 ing the possilile strength of the Union 
 army, the aid whicli might come from 
 Buell must be taken into account. This 
 general, after repeated solicitations that 
 he might be permitted to abandon 
 Nashville, cross Tennessee and join his 
 forces to those of Grant, wdth a view to 
 counteract the Confederate concentra- 
 tion at Corinth, had at last obtained 
 Halleck's consent. The ai-my of the 
 Ohio, which numbered some forty thou- 
 safld men, was therefore already on its 
 mar. march ; and by the 20th of March 
 20. it had reached Columbia. The 
 roads were bad and the weather stormy 
 in the extreme ; but it was not um-eas- 
 onable to conclude that Buell would be 
 able to accomplish the distance in time. 
 Should this large increase of strength 
 arrive before tlie commencement of hos- 
 tilities. Grant could have but small 
 
 reason for any misgivings as to the issue 
 of the contest. 
 
 Let us now glance at the position of 
 the Confederates, and consider their 
 plans and their prospects. When the 
 first line of the Confederate defense had 
 been swept away by the capture of Fort 
 Donelson, Johnston retired first of all 
 to Murfreesboro' ; but the great object 
 aimed at both by him and Beauregard 
 was to concentrate the Confederate 
 forces and establish a second line of 
 defense on the Memphis and Charleston 
 Railroad. Concentration had for some 
 time past been the favorite idea of 
 Beauregard. If his advice had been 
 taken in time, Donelson might not yet 
 have fallen. Beauregard selected Co- 
 rinth as the most desirable point for 
 concentrating the scattered forces of the 
 Confederacy. Here the two great rail- 
 roads which connect the Gulf of Mexico 
 and the Mississippi with the Atlantic 
 Ocean form a junction. It is the key 
 of the railroad system of Mississippi. 
 Orders were issued to the commanders 
 of all the outlying positions ; and Beau- 
 regard was soon joined by Bragg from 
 Pensacola, by Polk from the Mississippi, 
 Johnston also coming up with his en- 
 tire army from Murfreesboro'. Corinth, 
 therefore, became a great military camp; 
 and, in addition to its other advantages, 
 it affoi'ded complete protection to Mem^ 
 phis. In three weeks the Confederate 
 strength had risen from eleven thousand 
 to forty-five thousand men. This, how- 
 ever, was not all. VanDorn and Price, 
 whom we recently saw retiring before 
 Curtis and Sigel at Pea Ridge, were 
 known to be coming up from Arkansas 
 
THE CONFEDEEATE PLAIf. 
 
 103 
 
 with other thirty thousand men. Since 
 the commencement of the war the Con- 
 federates never found themselves in cir- 
 cumstances more favorable for striking 
 a bold and decisive blow. After the 
 junction with Johnston, that general 
 took the command, Beauregard being 
 nominally second, but remaining really 
 the soul of the movement. 
 
 It had been the intention of Halleck, 
 under whose instructions the entire 
 movement on the part of the Nationals 
 was conducted, to intervene between 
 Johnston and Beauregard. When, there- 
 fore, he heard that Johnston had dis- 
 appeared from Murfreesboro', and that 
 his object AA'as to join Beauregard at 
 Corinth, he ordered Buell to hurry for- 
 ward to the aid of Grant, and counter- 
 act as far as possible the Confederate 
 concentration. There had been un- 
 necessaiy delay, which permitted the 
 Confederate generals to unite their 
 strength ; and now the weather and 
 the roads were such that, although 
 Buell's army was at Columbia on the 
 20th, it took full seventeen days to 
 reach Pittsburg Landing, a distance of 
 only ninety miles. 
 
 To the Confederate general two c|ues- 
 tions presented themselves. Shall I 
 wait for VanDorn and Price ? or shall 
 I strike Grant at once, before Buell has 
 time to come up ? At tliis time Breck- 
 enridge, with the Confederate right, 
 ^hich consisted of eleven thousand 
 men, was stationed at Burnsville ; Har- 
 dee and Bragg, with more than twenty 
 thousand men, formed the centi-e at 
 C'Oi'inth ; and Polk and Hindman, with 
 ten thousand men, were on the left, to 
 
 the north of the Memphis and Charles- 
 ton Raili'oad. Johnston, on assuming 
 command, had issued a flaming procla- 
 mation : " You are expected," he said 
 to the soldiers, " to show yourselves 
 worthy of your valor and courage, 
 worthy of the women of the South, 
 whose noble devotion in this war has 
 never been exceeded in any time." On 
 the 3d of April, their available April 
 strength lieing forty thousand 3. 
 men, the Confederates commenced their 
 onward march. Their plan was first to 
 destroy Grant and then to fall with all 
 their M^eight on Buell. The roads were 
 in a terrible condition, and in conse- 
 quence the progress made w^as slow. It 
 was intended to attack the National ar- 
 my on the 5th; but the attack was de 
 layed in consequence of a heavy rain- 
 storm Avhich fell in the afternoon. They 
 were the less unwilling to delay the 
 attack that information had just reached 
 them that the troops from the west, 
 under VanDorn and Price, would cer 
 tainly join them the next morning. 
 That night they were distant from the 
 National pickets only about three-qnar 
 ters of a mile. Hardee was in front 
 Bragg was in a second line behind 
 Polk was behind Bragg ; and Brecken 
 ridge brought up the rear. During the 
 course of the evening a council of war 
 was held. There was a disposition to 
 wait for VanDorn and Price. But there 
 was peril in waiting. If Buell should 
 arrive, Johnston would lose his golden 
 opportunity. It was the general con- 
 viction that their forward movement 
 was unknown to Grant ; and, after a 
 consultation of some two hours, it was 
 
102 
 
 SHILOH. 
 
 and a still wider gap of aboiit two and a 
 half miles between his centre and his 
 left. Hurlbiit's Division was put in 
 line on the left of the main Corinth 
 road, and Smith's own division, under 
 General W. H. L. Wallace, was on 
 Hurlbut's right. Lewis Wallace's Di- 
 vision was detached and stationed at 
 Crump's Landing, to observe any move- 
 ments which might be made by the 
 Confederates at Purdy, and to cover 
 the river communications between Pitts- 
 burg Landing and Savannah. McCler- 
 nand's Division was about a mile in 
 fi-ont of W. H. L. Wallace, Avith that 
 of Prentiss to his right. These two di- 
 visions — that of McClernand and that 
 of Prentiss— formed the real line of 
 battle. The entire force was about 
 thirty three thousand men. In estimat- 
 ing the possible strength of the Union 
 ai'my, tlie aid which might come from 
 Buell must be taken into account. This 
 general, after repeated solicitations that 
 he might be peiTnitted to abandon 
 Nashville, cross Tennessee and join his 
 forces to those of Grant, with a view to 
 counteract the Confedei'ate concentra- 
 tion at Corinth, had at last obtained 
 Halleck's consent. The army of the 
 Ohio, which numbered some forty thou- 
 safld men, was therefore already on its 
 Mar. march ; and by the 20th of March 
 20' it had reached Columbia. The 
 roads were bad and the weather stormy 
 in the extreme ; but it was not luu'eas- 
 onable to conclude that Buell would be 
 able to accomplish the distance in time. 
 Should this large increase of strength 
 ariive before the commencement of hos- 
 tilities. Grant could have but small 
 
 i-eason for any misgivings as to the issue 
 of the contest. 
 
 Let us now glance at the position of 
 the Confederates, and consider their 
 plans and their prospects. When the 
 first line of the Confederate defense had 
 been swept away by the capture of Fort 
 Donelson, Johnston retired first of all 
 to Murfreesboro' ; but the great object 
 aimed at both by him and Beauregard 
 was to concentrate the Confederate 
 forces and establish a second line of 
 defense on the Memphis and Charleston 
 Railroad. Concentration had for some 
 time past been the favorite idea of 
 Beauregard. If his advice had been 
 taken in time, Donelson might not yet 
 have fallen. Beauregard selected Co- 
 rinth as the most desirable point for 
 concentrating the scattered forces of the 
 Confederacy. Here the two great rail- 
 roads which connect the Gulf of Mexico 
 and the Mississippi with the Atlantic 
 Ocean form a junction. It is the key 
 of the railroad system of Mississippi. 
 Orders were issued to the commanders 
 of all the outlying positions ; and Beau- 
 regard was soon joined by Bragg from 
 Pensacola, by Polk from the Mississippi, 
 Johnston also coming up with his en- 
 tire army from Murfreesboro'. Corinth, 
 therefore, became a great military camp; 
 and, in addition to its other advantages, 
 it afforded complete protection to Mem- 
 phis. In three weeks the Confederate 
 strength had risen from eleven thousand 
 to forty-five thousand men. This, how- 
 ever, was not all. VanDorn and Price, 
 whom we recently saw retiring before 
 Curtis and Sigel at Pea Ridge, were 
 known to be coming \ip from Ai'kansas 
 
THE CONFEDERATE PLAlSr. 
 
 103 
 
 with other thirty thousand men. Since 
 the commencement of the war the Con- 
 federates never found themselves in cir- 
 cumstances more favorable for striking 
 a bold and decisive blow. After the 
 junction with Johnston, that general 
 took the command, Beauregard being 
 nominally second, but remaining really 
 the soul of the movement. 
 
 It had been the intention of Halleck, 
 under whose instructions the entire 
 movement on the part of the Nationals 
 was conducted, to intervene between 
 Johnston and Beam-egard. "When, there- 
 fore, he heard that Johnston had dis- 
 appeared from Murfreesboro', and that 
 his object was to join Beauregard at 
 Corinth, he ordered Buell to hurry for- 
 ward to the aid of Grant, and counter- 
 act as far as possible the Confederate 
 concentration. There had been un- 
 necessary delay, which permitted the 
 Confederate generals to unite their 
 strength ; and now the weather and 
 the roads were such that, although 
 Buell's army was at Columbia on the 
 20th, it took full seventeen days to 
 reach Pittsburg Landing, a distance of 
 only ninety miles. 
 
 To the Confederate general two ques- 
 tions presented themselves. Shall I 
 wait for VanDorn and Price ? or shall 
 I strike Grant at once, before Buell has 
 time to come up ? At this time Breck- 
 enridge, with the Confederate right, 
 which consisted of eleven thousand 
 men, was stationed at Burnsville ; Har- 
 dee and Bragg, with more than twenty 
 thousand men, formed the centre at 
 Coiinth ; and Polk and Hindman, with 
 ten thousand men, were on the left, to 
 
 the north of the Memphis and Charles- 
 ton Raib-oad. Johnston, on assuming 
 command, had issued a flaming procla- 
 mation; "You are expected," he said 
 to the soldiei's, "to show yourselves 
 worthy of your valor and courage, 
 worthy of the women of the South, 
 whose noble devotion in this war has 
 never been exceeded in any time." On 
 the 3d of April, their available ^prj, 
 strength being forty thousand 3. 
 men, the Confederates commenced their 
 onward march. Their plan was first to 
 destroy Grant and then to fall with all 
 tlieir weight on Buell. The roads were 
 in a terrible condition, and in conse- 
 quence the progress made was slow. It 
 was intended to attack the National ar- 
 my on the .5th; but the attack was de^ 
 layed in consequence of a heavy rain- 
 storm which fell in the afternoon. They 
 were the less unwilling to delay the 
 attack that information had just reached 
 them that the troops from the west, 
 under VanDorn and Price, would cer 
 tainly join them the next morning. 
 That night they were distant from the 
 National pickets only about three-quar 
 ters of a mile. Hardee was in front 
 Bragsr was in a second line behind 
 Polk was behind Bragg ; and Brecken 
 ridge brought iip the reai-. During the 
 course of the evening a council of war 
 was lield. There was a disposition to 
 wait for VanDorn and Price. But there 
 was peril in waiting. If Buell should 
 arrive, Johnston would lose his golden 
 opportunity. It was the general con- 
 viction that their forward movement 
 was unknown to Grant; and, after a 
 consultation of some two hours, it wae 
 
104 
 
 SHILOH. 
 
 resolved to strike a blow before dawn 
 of the coming day. " Gentlemen," said 
 Beauregard at the close of the coun- 
 cil, while jjointing iu the direction of 
 Grant's army, "we sleep in the enemy's 
 camp to-morrow night." 
 
 The Confederate generals made a 
 mistake in supposing that Grant was 
 ignorant of the fact that they were 
 moving forward upon him with the 
 view of making an attack. That the 
 enemy was massed at Corinth he was 
 well aware ; but he was in the enemy's 
 country, and information was not wil- 
 lingly obtained from the people of the 
 neighborhood. That he expected to be 
 attacked is proved by the instructions 
 which he gave to his officers, particu- 
 larly to Lewis Wallace and Sherman. 
 But he had no means of knowing the 
 enemy's strength. He did not know 
 that concentration was taking place so 
 rapidly ; and a vague idea prevailed in 
 the Union camp that the force opposed 
 to them did not exceed ten thousand 
 men. Of the forward march of the en- 
 emy he could not be ignorant; for on 
 April tt^ 4th an infantry picket belong- 
 4» ing to Colonel Buekland's bri- 
 gade, having been captured, Sherman 
 took that brigade, with some cavalry, 
 and drove back the Confederate horse- 
 men some six miles from the front of 
 the camp. The firing of cannon was 
 heard in the evening. On the same day 
 Lewis Wallace reported eight regiments 
 of infantry and twelve hundred cavalry 
 at Purdy, and an equal force at Bethel. 
 It is not to be denied, however, that 
 Grant was in doubt from what direction 
 the onslaught would be made. They 
 
 might attack his main camp ; or they 
 might cross over Snake Creek to the 
 north and west of him, establishing 
 themselves on the Tennessee below and 
 forcing him to fight or cross to the east 
 side of the river. Grant had his feel- 
 ers out all around ; and, aa the result 
 proved, he did best to risk a battle on 
 the ground which had been chosen and 
 on which he stood. 
 
 The uncei'tainty which prevailed in the 
 Union camp as to the point which might 
 first have to bear the shock of battle, 
 proved an immense gain to the Confed- 
 erates. It enabled them to mass them- 
 selves in great force and fall with de- 
 structive effect on one part of the Union 
 line. So great, indeed, was the advan- 
 tage which they thus obtained that the 
 wonder is not so much that victory lean- 
 ed to their standards during the greater 
 part of the first day's fighting, but that 
 they did not succeed, in a few hours, 
 in completely sweeping the Union army 
 from the field. Their plan was to pen- 
 etrate the Union centre, divide the ar- 
 my in two and cut it up in detail. This 
 done, it would not be difficult to make 
 short, sharp work with Buell. The 
 plan was good enough ; but in their 
 calculations the Confederate generals 
 made one mistake — they did not take 
 into account the cool pluck and skill of 
 the Union commanders and the stern 
 courage and determination of the UnioH 
 men. 
 
 The night of the 5th was, as we have 
 seen, wild and stormy. The next Aprji 
 morning (Sunday) rose bright and ®' 
 clear. The recent rains, while they had 
 filled the creeks and streams, had given 
 
THE BATTLE BEGUN. 
 
 105 
 
 an air of freshness to the surrounding 
 country. The breath of spring was 
 eveiywhere. The trees were I'obed in 
 the most delicate green ; and the sweet, 
 rich voices of the morning songsters 
 filled the air with melody. In the 
 Union camp it was still unknown to- 
 wards what point the enemy might be 
 moving; but there was watchfulness 
 everywhere. Prentiss' grand guards 
 had been doubled the night before ; 
 and his pickets were out one mile and 
 a half. Sherman's troops had already 
 breakfasted, and were formed into line. 
 With the early dawn Hardee's corps, 
 which formed the first Confederate line, 
 was in motion. Quickly but silently 
 they passed across the ravine of Lick 
 Creek and the ground which separated 
 it from the outlying divisions of the 
 Union army. It was the more easy for 
 them to move noiselessly that the fallen 
 leaves, being soaked with rain, made 
 no rustling sound under the footsteps 
 of the men. The onslaught was ti-e- 
 mendous. Avalanche-like, it overcame 
 all resistance. The Union outposts were 
 driven like chaff before the wind. On 
 Hardee moved, falling heavily on Sher- 
 man's left, and then, as if rebounding 
 from that fii'in phalanx, his entire force 
 rolled with resistless and crushing weight 
 upon Prentiss' division. The fierce yells 
 of the charging regiments, the sharp, 
 shrill sounds of musketry, the booming 
 of cannon, the bursting of shells, the 
 crashing of timber, and the clouds of sul- 
 phurous smoke which filled the woods, 
 too plainly told that the battle of Shiloh 
 had begun. 
 
 When the first shots were fired, Gi-ant, 
 
 unfortunately, was not on the ground 
 He had gone down the river to Savan- 
 nah, some nine miles off, to have ap 
 interview with Buell. Soon as he heard 
 the first guns, he hastened to the scene 
 of action, xieaving a letter for Buell, 
 and ordering Nelson, who had arrived 
 with a portion of Buell's forces, to hur- 
 ry forward, he took a steamboat for 
 Pittsburg Landing. Halting at Crump's'' 
 Landing, he gave directions to Lewis 
 Wallace to follow at once, unless it 
 should turn out that the firing they 
 heard was intended to deceive and that 
 the real attack was to be made upon 
 him. In the latter event he was to de- 
 fend himself to the utmost, and to rely 
 with confidence on reinforcements being 
 sent him with the least possible delay. 
 The attack had been made at the first 
 streak of early dawn. It was eight 
 o'clock before Grant reached the field 
 of Shiloh. He saw that he had to fight 
 the combined Confederate force, and 
 vidthout the aid of Buell. What the 
 Confederate strength -was Grant could 
 only guess. We know that the com- 
 bined army was over forty thousand 
 strong. Grant had an available force of 
 thirty-three thousand men. He believed 
 he could depend upon Lewis Wallace, 
 who had five thousand more. Some se- 
 vere work, however, had already been 
 done. There was a considerable gap be- 
 tween Prentiss' right and Sherman's left 
 It was into this gap that Hardee tried to 
 force himself, his object being to out- 
 flank and turn both lines. In the begin- 
 ning of the conflict Sherman's left, as we 
 have indicated, was sorely pressed and 
 suffered terribly. But that active and 
 
106 
 
 SHILOH. 
 
 skilful general was present in the 
 thickest of the fight ; and by his cheer- 
 ing words and personal bravery, as 
 well as by the admirable manner in 
 which he handled his men, he laid that 
 day the foundation of a fame which 
 the American people will not willingly 
 let die. Hildebrand's brigade, which 
 had been driven fi'om its position by 
 •the first onset of the enemy, he tried in 
 vain to rally. While thus engaged, he 
 received a severe bullet wound in the 
 band. Nothing, however, co-ild daunt 
 his energy or induce him to relax his 
 efforts. MeClernand pushed forward a 
 portion of his troops to aid the smitten 
 Hildebrand ; and these for a time bore 
 the shock of battle. 
 
 All, however, was in vain. In poured 
 ihe Confederates in ever-increasing num- 
 bers. Bragg had come to the aid of 
 Hardee ; and Polk, with the third Con- 
 federate line, was already moving to- 
 ward Sherman's rear. By nine o'clock 
 a very large portion of Sherman's di- 
 vision was virtually out of the fight ; 
 and before ten Prentiss had been forced 
 from his ground, his camp captured and 
 plundered, his division thrown into con- 
 fusion, and he himself isolated from his 
 men. But for the pluck and skill of 
 Sherman, the battle at this stage might 
 have been lost, although it cannot be 
 said that there was any lack of bi'avery 
 on the part of any of the Union divis- 
 ions. Oificers and men everywhere vied 
 with each other in deeds of daring. But 
 Sherman showed strategy as well as 
 pluck. Feeling the pressure of the ene- 
 my and in danger of being caught in 
 the rear, he swung round upon his right 
 
 as upon a pivot, coming out at a right 
 angle and taking entirely new ground. 
 Here he took a firm position and held 
 it tenaciously for several hours, the re- 
 peated and vigorous attacks of the ene- 
 my falling upon the solid front of his 
 well arranged battalions as upon a 
 shield of shining steel. 
 
 The falling back of Sherman, while 
 it enabled him to pi'olong the contest 
 and successfully to prevent attack in 
 the I'ear, left McClernand's division^ 
 completely exposed. On this, there- 
 fore, the Confederate forces fell with 
 tremendous energy. For a time McCler- .^ 
 nand boldly and even successfully re- 
 sisted, most effective aid being rendered 
 by Dresser's powerful rifled cannon. 
 Regiment after regiment of the Confed- 
 erates rushed through the abandoned 
 camps and pressed forwai'd only to be 
 cut to pieces by the deadly rifle shot. 
 Ultimately, however, the force of over- 
 whelming numbers began to tell on 
 McClernand's lines. He was forced to 
 retire, not, however, except in the most 
 perfect order, fighting as he went, and 
 bravely contesting every inch of groimd. 
 By eleven o'clock this division was on 
 a line with Hurlbut, close to W. H. L. 
 Wallace, with Sherman to the right. 
 
 Meanwhile Stewart's brigade, of Sher 
 man's division, which was posted on 
 the extreme left of the National line, 
 about two miles from Pittsburg Land- 
 ing, on the Hamburg road, near Lake 
 Creek, where Buell was expected to 
 land, was, in consequence of the falling 
 back of the other divisions, in an ex- 
 tremely perilous position. The scream- 
 ing of a shell in its passage through the 
 
THE NATIONAL SITUATION DESPEilATE. 
 
 107 
 
 Vn'anclies of the trees overhead apprised 
 Stewart of the approach of the enemy 
 in his direction. It turned out to be a 
 column of cavalry and infantry, com- 
 posed for the most pai't of Brecken- 
 ridge's reserves. They were moving 
 along the road leading from Corinth to 
 Hamburg. Notifying W. H. L. Wallace 
 of his difficulty, and calling for aid, he 
 ealmly awaited the attack. It was fierce- 
 ly made and gallantly resisted. Wallace 
 sent McArthiu' to the aid of Stewart ; 
 but McArthur missed his way, and 
 came dii'ectly on the Confederates under 
 Withers. It was impossible for Stewart 
 to maintain his position ; l)ut so vigor- 
 ously did McArthur engage the enemy 
 that Stewart managed to avoid capture, 
 and succeeded in reaching a place of 
 comparative safety, where he restored 
 liis shattered force to something like 
 order. 
 
 The battle had raged since the early 
 morning. It was fiercest about ten 
 o'clock. There was but little intermis- 
 sion, however, until two. About ten 
 Grant visited Sherman's camp, and find- 
 ing that the supply of cartridges was 
 short, he organized a train of ammuni- 
 tion wagons to run between the camp 
 and the Landing — an arrangement beset 
 with great difficulty, in consequence of 
 the large number of fugitives who were 
 forcing their way through the narrow 
 road. By twelve o'clock noon, the Con- 
 federates had possession of the ground 
 occupied in the morning by the first 
 line of the National army; and the 
 camps of Sherman, McClernand, Pren- 
 tiss, and Stewart had been captm-ed and 
 plundered. Three of the five divisions of 
 
 that army had been completely routetL 
 The ground being entirely cleared be- 
 fore them — Prentiss' brigade, as we have 
 seen, being demolished and Stewart hav- 
 ing been compelled to retreat, McCler- 
 nand, too, and Sherman having- both 
 yielded on the right — the Confederates, 
 apparently resolved to push matters to 
 a crisis, rushed with tremendous fury 
 upon Hurlbut, who still maintained his 
 original position, and who hud Ijeen 
 joined by Prentiss and some two thou- 
 sand of his men. W. H. L. Wallace 
 flew to the aid of Hurlbut, taking with 
 him the Missouri batteries of Stone, 
 Richardson, and Webber. Hurlbut, 
 who had hitherto been in the oj)en 
 fields, now fell back into the woods 
 which lay between his camp and the 
 river, and thei-e, nobly aided by Wab 
 lace, who fought like a hero of old, 
 gallantly resisted the foe foi- several 
 weary hours. Upon this compact body 
 of National troops, Avho kne^v that if 
 they had death in front they had cer- 
 tain death in the rear, three most des- 
 perate charges were made, as if upon a 
 wall of ii'ou. In one of these encoun- 
 ters General W. H. L. Wallace fell, 
 mortally wounded. McArthur took the 
 command ; but in spite of their best 
 efForts, both he and Hurlbut were com- 
 pelled to retire a little further down 
 and towards the river. In the confu- 
 sion, Prentiss and his company getting 
 isolated, were captured, sent to the Con- 
 federate rear, and finally marched to 
 Corinth as prisoners of war. 
 
 The situation now seemed desperate. 
 It was between three and four o'clock. 
 Sherman and McClernand, all but ut 
 
108 
 
 SHILOH. 
 
 terly exhausted, and having lost many 
 of their guns, had fallen back and taken 
 a position in front of the bridge which 
 crosses Snake Creek It was over this 
 bridge that General Lewis Wallace was 
 momentarily expected to come. Grant 
 had been pressed into a corner of the bat- 
 tle field, his army at this time occupying 
 a space of not more than four hundred 
 acres on the very verge of the river. 
 As yet there were no signs of Wallace, 
 nor any exjjlanation of his delay. Buell, 
 too, had failed to come to time. Five 
 of the Union camps had been captured ; 
 and many guns and prisoners had fallen 
 into the enemy's hands. Fatigue and 
 disorder had done and were still doing 
 their teri'ible work. Cooped up in this 
 narrow corner of the field, with the tri- 
 umphant enemy in front and the dark 
 rolling waters of the Tennessee in the 
 rear — death before and death behind- — 
 what more can Grant do ? Will he sur- 
 render ? No. The word had no place 
 in his system of tactics. 
 
 The Confederates, however, were less 
 strong than they seemed. Success had 
 broken their ranks ; and the hard work 
 of the day had produced its natural 
 fruit. The men wei'e completely worn 
 out. Some of their best men had pei'- 
 ished. Generals Gladdon and Hindman 
 had been killed; and about half-past 
 two o'clock, when pressing his men to- 
 wards the Landing, and almost I'eck- 
 lessly exposing himself, Commander-in- 
 chief Johnston received a rifle bullet in 
 the leg, which proved fatal. There was 
 a lull in the fight after Johnston fell ; 
 but Beauregard assumed command ; and 
 the struggle for possession of Pittsbui-g 
 
 Landing was resumed with fresh en- 
 ergy. Beauregard felt that there was 
 no time to lose; for night and Buell 
 were coming. 
 
 The entire strength of the Confed- 
 erate army was at this stage being 
 pressed against the National left. It 
 seemed to be the object of Beauregard 
 to turn the National line or force them 
 into the river. In any case, he was de- 
 termined to seize the Landing. Hap- 
 pily, as the result proved, a deep ravine 
 lay between the Confederates and the 
 Nationals, M^ho, cooped up as they were, 
 still covered the Landing. This ravine 
 was impassable for artillery and cavaby. 
 In consequence of the heavy rains, the 
 bottom was wet and the sides slippeiy. 
 The ravine led down to the river ; and 
 at its mouth the two gunboats Tyler 
 and Lexington had taken position, their 
 connnanders having obtained permission 
 from General Grant to exercise their 
 discretion in shelling the woods and 
 sweeping the ravine. On the brow of 
 his side of the laviue General Grant 
 had hastily flung up some earthworks 
 in the form of a half-moon. To several 
 siege guns which wei-e parked there, 
 Colonel Webster, Grant's chief of staff, j 
 added a number of guns which had be- 
 longed to light batteries, now broken 
 up, and thus secured a semi-circular de- 
 fense of about fifty cannon. This hur- 
 riedly-improvised batter}^ reached round 
 nearly to the Corinth load. The wretch- 
 ed condition to which the National ar- 
 my had been reduced may be gathered 
 from the fact that it was with the ut- 
 most difliculty men could be got to 
 work the guns. The men were uxhausfc 
 
A VALLEY OF DEATH. 
 
 109 
 
 ed and demoralized. Volunteers were 
 called for ; and Dr. Cornyn, surgeon of 
 the First Missouri Artilleiy, having 
 offered his services, his example was 
 quickly followed. The Confederate 
 assault was led by Chalmers, Withers, 
 Cheatham, Ruggles, Anderson, Stuart, 
 Pond, and Stevens. It was a perilous 
 attempt, but it was bravely made. 
 Down the steeji sides of the ravine 
 they rushed, uttering their favorite and 
 familiar ciy. For a moment it seemed 
 as if all was lost, and as if Beauregard 
 was about to crown the day's work by 
 a final crushing blow. But no. It was 
 destined to be otherwise. The slippery 
 sides of the ravine, and the slush and 
 mud at the bottom, gi-eatly hindered 
 the movements of the attacking party. 
 Once in the deadly hollow, there was 
 literally no way of escape. At a signal 
 given, Wsbster's guns from their fifty 
 mouths opened fire in front ; while the 
 Tyler and Lexington, striking the Con- 
 federates on the flank, swept the ravine 
 with their eight-inch shells. It was 
 now a most unequal contest. The Con- 
 federates had fallen into a trap. Every 
 onward movement was vigorously re- 
 pulsed. The National troops began to 
 rally, and finding position, contributed 
 to the work of destruction by the un- 
 en'ing aim of their rifles. Again and 
 again and yet again did the Confede- 
 rates face the terrible fire, rushing across 
 the ravine as if they would storm the 
 batteiy in front ; but it was only to be 
 mowed down like grass or driven back 
 like sheep. The ravine was filled with 
 the wounded and the dead. So dense 
 '\ as the smoke that the entire scene was 
 
 Avrapped in almost midnight darkness — 
 a darkness relieved only by the swift- 
 recurrinw rifle flash and the cannon's 
 blaze. It was a virtual hell — a real, a 
 veritable valley of death itself. The 
 tide had turned. The crisis was past. 
 Beauregard, seeing that it was useless 
 to prolong the struggle, withdrew his 
 men. He professed himself satisfied 
 with what he had done; and, as it was 
 near nightfall, he thought he might rest 
 for the night and give the finishing 
 touch in the morning. The firing now 
 ceased, and Grant was left master of 
 the ground. Before the close of the 
 sti'uggle, Nelson, with Buell's advance, 
 had arrived on the field; and Lewis 
 Wallace, having at last found his way, 
 was coming up with his five thousand 
 men. For the National cause, the first 
 day at Shiloh had ended not inglorious- 
 ly; and with these fresh accessions of 
 strength, the prospect was bright for 
 the coming day. 
 
 The dreary hours of the night were 
 sufficiently filled with horrors. The 
 gunboats kept up an incessant cannon- 
 ade, in some places setting the woods 
 on fire. The wounded on both sides 
 vainly sought to escape from the grasp of 
 this new and terrible destroyer. Hajv 
 pily a heavy rain-storm fell upon the 
 scene of agony, and the fire was extin< 
 guished. Shortly after the firing had 
 ceased, Grant visited Sherman ; and aa 
 it was the opinion of both that the Con- 
 federates were exhausted, it was agreed 
 that the attack should be resumed early 
 in the morning. Subsequently Grant 
 visited each of the division command- 
 ers, giving the necessary instructions, 
 
 V07 
 
no 
 
 SHILOH. 
 
 and then flung himself on the wet 
 ground and snatched a few hours' rest, 
 with his head resting on the stump of 
 a tree. During the night Lewis Wal- 
 lace came up, and Buell arrived in per- 
 son. All night through, steamboats 
 kept busily plying between Savannah 
 and Pittsburg Landing, bringing up 
 the remaining divisions of Buell's army. 
 Nelson's Division was all on the field 
 l^y nine o'clock, P. M. Crittenden's 
 arrived a little later ; and by five in the 
 morning McCook's division, which was 
 the last to come up, having had to wait 
 for boats, was all safely disembarked. 
 Twenty-seven thousand men were thus 
 added to the National army. 
 
 With the early light of the morning of 
 April the 7th, which came in with a 
 7* drizzling rain, the troops were in 
 position and ready to make the attack. 
 The fresh troops were placed in line, as 
 they came upon the field, considerably 
 in advance, and upon the ground aban- 
 doned by Beauregard after the failure 
 of his last attack. Nelson was on the 
 left ; then in order, Crittenden, McCook, 
 Hurlbut, McClernand, Sherman, and 
 Lewis Wallace. Thomson, of Wallace's 
 division, with his field guns, was the 
 first to disturb the silence of the morning 
 and to awaken the echoes of the foi'est. 
 The response was vigorous ; but the 
 fresh troops of Wallace stood bravely 
 to their work. At this moment Grant 
 arrived, and ordered Wallace to press 
 forward and attack the Confederate left 
 ■ander Bragg, who, since the death of 
 Johnston, was second in command. 
 This was gallantly done, the Confede- 
 rates being compelled to abandon the 
 
 high ground, which was soon occupied 
 by Wallace's troops. Here a halt was 
 made, Wallace expecting Sherman to 
 come to his aid. 
 
 Meanwhile the two armies had come 
 into collision at the other extremities of 
 their lines. From what has been said 
 above, it Avill be seen that Buell's force, 
 which lay nearest to Pittsburg Landing, 
 composed the centre and left of Grant's 
 new line of battle. The divisions of 
 Nelson and Crittenden only were ready, 
 when Wallace's guns were heard boom- 
 ing to the right. They moved forward 
 at once. Nelson's division leading. 
 Their artillery had not yet arrived; 
 but the batteries of Mendenhall and 
 Terrill, of the regular service, were 
 placed at their disposal. Nelson had 
 moved half a mile, at least, before he 
 felt the enemy. At the first touch he 
 seemed to yield; but it was only for 
 a moment. At this point Beauregard 
 had gathered up his strength and was 
 resolved to strike a deadly blow. If he 
 could turn the National left, he might 
 still accomplish his purpose of yester- 
 day, and make himself master of the 
 Landing. His onslaught was tremen- 
 dous. For a second Nelson's troop.< 
 wavered ; but it was only for a second. 
 Mendenhall's battery was hurried into 
 action ; and the advancing Confederates 
 were driven back in confusion by a 
 tempest of grape and canister. Hazen's 
 brigade charged, captured one of Beau- 
 regard's batteries, and turned it with 
 deadly effect on the foe. Once more 
 the Confedei-ates came up, with re- 
 doubled strength, and Hazen fell back 
 before the advancing tide. Terrill's 
 
A WALL OF IKON. 
 
 Ill 
 
 battery of McCook's division was now 
 got into position. Pouring forth shell 
 from his ten-ponnders and grape and 
 canister from his brass twelves, Terrill 
 did splendid and effective woi'k. For 
 two hours tlie artillery conflict raged. 
 Crittenden was on Nelson's right, and 
 McCook was to the right of Crittenden, 
 fi'ontiug the Confederate centre. Buell 
 had taken general command of his own 
 troops. The terrible artillery duel be- 
 gan to tell on the Confederate line. 
 Nelson, becoming more daring, began 
 to move forward. Crittenden and Mc- 
 Cook advanced abreast at the same 
 time; but every inch of ground was 
 keenly contested ; and victory, now 
 leaning to one side and now to the 
 other, seemed undecided as to which to 
 award the palm. 
 
 Sherman's captured camp was still in 
 the Confederate rear ; and to this as an 
 objective point the National line kept 
 slowly but steadily advancing. Sher- 
 man and Wallace, canying out Grant's 
 instnictions to the letter, have advanced 
 under a terrible fire and have reached 
 the ridge occupied by the former on 
 Sunday morning. The little log church 
 in Shiloh has again become a conspicu- 
 ous object in the battle field. Around 
 it the tempest of battle is again to rage. 
 Beauregard, despairing of success on 
 the left, had, by countermarching his 
 troops, greatly strengthened himself in 
 front of the enemy's right. The strug- 
 gle at this point was protracted and 
 severe. Sherman and Wallace held their 
 ground ; and it soon became apparent 
 that Beauregard's strength was all but 
 exhausted. 
 
 At the same time tliat the Confede- 
 rate general had concentrated his troops 
 against the National right, he did not 
 neglect an opportunity which seemed 
 to present itself moi-e towards what 
 might be called the National centre. 
 Noticing a slight gap between Critten- 
 den and McCook, he endeavored to 
 force a passage between them. Here 
 he made his last effort — his last decided 
 stand. It was all in vain. McCook's 
 division stood like a wall of iron. The 
 Confedei'ate centre now began to yield. 
 All along the line from Nelson on the 
 left to Sherman and Wallace on the 
 right, the Nationals were pi-essing for- 
 wai-d. Everywhere the eneiuy was seen 
 retiring. " Cheer after cheer," says 
 Wallace, " rang through the woods, 
 and every man felt that the day was 
 ours." The battle of Shiloh was ended. 
 "Don't," said Beauregard to Brecken- 
 ridge, as ie ordei-ed a retreat, " don't 
 let this be converted into a rout." It 
 was now half-past five o'clock ; and the 
 wearied National troops being in no 
 mood to pursue the foe, the retreat was 
 the more easily conducted. The two 
 days' fighting had resulted in the loss 
 of over twenty thousand men — the Con- 
 federate killed and wounded amountina; 
 to more than ten tho^isand, the Nation- 
 als to nearly twelve thousand. 
 
 Cxeneral Halleck only did what was 
 right when he thanked Generals Grant 
 and Buell, " and the officers and men 
 of their respective commands, for the 
 bravery and endurance with which they 
 sustained the general attack of the ene- 
 my on the 6 th, and for the heroic man- 
 ner in which on the 7th they defeated 
 
113 
 
 SHILOH. 
 
 and routed the entire rebel army." 
 General Grant showed his magnanimity 
 when, in writing to the War Depart- 
 ment, he said, " Sherman held with raw 
 troops the key-point of the Landing. 
 It is no disparagement to any other offi- 
 cer to say that I do not believe there 
 was another division commandei" on the 
 field who had the skill and enterprise 
 to have done it. To his individual 
 efforts I am indebted for the success of 
 the battle." 
 
 Lewis Wallace was greatly blamed 
 for liis non-appearance on the field of 
 battle on the 6th. It was not difficult, 
 however, for that l)rave officer, who did 
 such effective work on the 7th, to give 
 sufficient and satisfactory explanations. 
 He had, it appeared, oljeyed his first 
 orders, which were that he should join 
 the right of the army, but not knowing 
 that it had fallen back, he had wasted 
 the whole afternoon in a fruitless march. 
 
 There has been much useless discus- 
 sion as to ho^v much Grant was indebt- 
 ed to BueJl for the victoiy at Shiloh. 
 What did happen we know. What 
 might have been we cannot tell. Some 
 of the facts of the case are plain, and 
 admit of no double interj^retation. Dur- 
 ing the greater part of Sunday, the Con- 
 federates marched triumphantly from 
 point to point. The Nationals were 
 driven back entirely from their original 
 gi'ound; five of their division camps 
 were overrun and captured ; and Grant, 
 with his whole army, was pressed into 
 a corner of tlie field. The situation 
 was desperate. One blow more, and it 
 seemed as if Beauregard would reap a 
 glorious victory. Of all this there can 
 
 be no doubt. It is as little to be denied, 
 however, that at the last moment Grant 
 snatched victory from his triumphant 
 rival. The advancing Confederates were 
 not only successfully resisted, but driv- 
 en back in confusion and compelled to 
 give up the struggle. All this Grant 
 accomjjlished before any effective assist- 
 ance ari'ived from Buell. It would 
 simply be absurd to deny that the ar- 
 rival of reinforcements, which, includ- 
 ing Wallace's division, amounted in all 
 to twenty-seven thousand men, made 
 victory on the following day compara- 
 tively more easy. But we are not at 
 liberty to say that, without the aid of 
 Buell, Grant might not have accom- 
 plished his purpose and di'iven the ene- 
 my from the field. We simply cannot 
 tell. We know that both Grant and 
 Buell did their best, and that their best 
 was needed. From earliest dawn till 
 half-past five in the afternoon the battle 
 raged without intermission. It was no 
 easily won victory ; and if praise is 
 due to the Union commanders, justice 
 compels us to be equally generous to 
 General Beauregard. If for the moment 
 we could forget the cause, and think 
 only of the skill and heroism displayed, 
 we should say that on those two days 
 he covered himself with glory. In Beau- 
 regard the Union commanders found a 
 foeman worthy of their steel. He was 
 by far the ablest general who had yet 
 appeared in the Confederate ranks. 
 
 There is one other point on which it is 
 necessary to make a. remark before clos- 
 ing this chapter. It is to be borne in 
 mind that Grant was not responsible 
 either for the selection of the battle 
 
THE THIRD LINE OP DEFENSE. 
 
 113 
 
 ground or for the disposition of the 
 ti'oops. Whatever praise or blame re- 
 sulted from the one or the other was due 
 to General C. F. Smith. When Grant 
 was restored to the chief command of the 
 array of the Tennessee, it was only a few 
 days before the commencement of the 
 fight ; and any attempt to make radical 
 changes in the arrangements, carried 
 out, -iS these must have been, in the pre- 
 seucMi of a vigilant and powerful enemy, 
 
 would have been perilous in the ex- 
 treme. If the battle of the 6th had 
 ended differently, General Grant might 
 have been justified in making some com- 
 plaint as to the circumstances in which 
 he found the enemy on resuming com* 
 mand. As it is, his mouth has been 
 shut. He has shown himself a true 
 man by nobly respecting the memory 
 of General Smith — a capable command- 
 er and a brave man. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 ''be Confederate Lines of Defense. — The Second Line all but Abandoned. — Beauregard's Retreat to Corinth. — 
 First-rate Strategy. —Beauregard Strengthening His Position. — Position and Importance of Corinth. — Mitchell 
 •t Shelby ville and Hiintsville. — Stevenson, Decatxir, and Tuscumbia. — Mitchell's Address to His Soldiers. — 
 Mitchell Promoted to the Rank of Major-General. — Sherman at Bear Creek. — The Memphis and Charleston 
 Railroad. — Halleck at Corinth. — Grant Second in Command. — Halleck's Complaint against Grant. — Halleck 
 too Cautious. — The Position of the two Armies. — The Confederates in High Hopes. — The National Army 
 Resolved to Win. — The Composition of the National Army. — The Nationals Move Forward. — Marmaduke's 
 Retreat. — Farmington Reoocupied. — Russell's House. — The Nationals Win and Hold the Position. — The 
 National Ar-my in Line. — Beauregard's Delay. — Corinth Evacuated. — The Retreat equal to a Victory. — The 
 Pursuit. — Beauregard at Tupelo. — The Pursuit Abandoned. — The National Army in Corinth. — Repairing the 
 Railroads. — BueU sent to Chattanooga. — Halleck the Rising Man. — Beauregard had Reason to be Satisfied. — 
 A good General, but given to Extravagance of Language. — Remarks upon Shiloh and Corinth. — Their Import- 
 ance. — Remarks on some of the Principal Generals. — Beauregard, Halleck, Grant, and Sherman. 
 
 The victory at Shiloh broke down 
 the second line of Confederate de- 
 fense, as the fall of Donelson had 
 broken down the first. In view of the 
 general plan of the campaign — which 
 was to drive the enemy out of the val- 
 ley of the Mis.sissij)])!, and to" reopen 
 that river to the gulf — it will be seen 
 that the National forces were steadily 
 marching on toward the full accomplish- 
 ment of their purpose. The first line 
 of defense stretched from Columbus on 
 thw west, through Fort Henry, Fort 
 
 Donelson and Nashville, including Bow> 
 ling Green and Mill Spring, and east- 
 ward toward the Alleghanies. That 
 line broken, the Confederates had no 
 choice but fall back on the line formed 
 by the Memphis and Charleston Rail- 
 road. There was still a tliird line on 
 which it was possible for them to retire 
 and make a resolute if not successful 
 resistance. Of this third line the stra- 
 tegic points were Vicksburg, Jackson, 
 Meridian, and Selma. From all the 
 points of the second line, with the ex- 
 
114 
 
 CORINTH. 
 
 ceptions of Corintli and Fort Pillow, the 
 enemy had been forcibly driven or had 
 voluntarily retired. Fort Pillow was 
 now useless, and was soon abandoned. 
 All over the North and throughout the 
 \rmj and navy there were enthusiastic 
 demonstrations of joy and gratitude ; 
 and the action of the government at 
 Washington was in perfect harmony 
 with the sentiments of the people when 
 it recommended a general thanksgiving 
 for the victories gained at Pea Ridge, 
 at New Madrid, at Island No. 10, and 
 at Shiloh. 
 
 After his defeat on the 7th of April, 
 April Beauregard retired, and, as we 
 7» have seen already, in good order, 
 to Corinth, The retreat was conducted 
 in circumstances of great inconvenience 
 and hardship ; and the successful man- 
 ner in which it was accomplished Avill 
 •^ver be regarded by impartial judges as 
 
 ?/iumph of military genius on the part 
 «f the Confederate commander. The 
 principal way of escape from the field 
 was along a narrow and all but impassa- 
 ble road, some seven or eight miles in 
 length ; and all the difficulties insepara- 
 ble from the attempt to preserve order 
 in a routed army, burdened with the 
 care of wagon-loads of wounded and 
 dying men, were aggravated by a pit- 
 iless storm, which, beginning about 
 nightfall, raged with unrelenting sever- 
 ity for several houi's. It is not to be 
 wondered at that many of the wounded 
 perished by the way. The wonder 
 rather is that the losses during the re- 
 treat did not amount to several thou- 
 eanda in place of a few hundreds. The 
 retreat from Shiloh on the night of the 
 
 7th furnished a strange commentary to 
 Beauregard's boastful language, on the 
 night of the 5th ; l)ut it is not the busi 
 uess of the historian to load with abuse 
 a defeated general who narrowly es- 
 caped rea2:)ing a great and signal victory, 
 and who, in the hour of unlooked-foi 
 misfortune, proved himself equal to the 
 emergency. 
 
 Arrived at Corinth, Beauregaid lost 
 no time in making all needed jjrepara- 
 tions for Avhatever attack might be made 
 upon him. If he could hold this posi- 
 tion and successfully repel the onslaught 
 of the National troops, he might even 
 yet convert defeat into a victory, and 
 re-establish in some form his second 
 line of defense. If unable to hold Co- 
 rinth, he had no choice but fall back 
 upon his third line, thus leaving the 
 entire valley of the Mississippi, as far 
 south as Vicksburg, in the hands of his 
 enemies. While Beauregard was busy 
 strengthening his position, the Nationals 
 were making all necessary preparations 
 to advance iipon the Confederate lines. 
 Corinth, it thus became manifest, was 
 to be the point at which the arniies of 
 the North and South, each of them 
 greatly increased in numbers and efli- 
 ciency, were next to come into deadly 
 collision. A small and insignificant 
 village, and at that time unmarked on 
 common maps, Corinth owed its mili- 
 tary importance to tlie fact that it was 
 situated at the intersection of two gi-eat 
 arterial railroads — the "Mobile and 
 Ohio" and the "Memphis and Charles- 
 ton." The importance of these railroads 
 is indicated by their names. Corinth 
 was about forty miles east of the Grand 
 
HALLECK TAKES COMMAND. 
 
 lis 
 
 Junction, and some twenty odd miles 
 from the closing scenes of the last great 
 struggle. It is built upon a low and 
 clayey plain, but has for natural de- 
 fenses ridges at some distance outside. 
 The country beyond, to the banks of 
 the Tennessee, is very much broken by 
 ridges, valley streams, and marshes. 
 The approach was rendered more diffi- 
 cult from the fact that, in his retreat 
 from Pittsburg, the bridges over the 
 '.•reeks had been destroyed by Beaure- 
 gard, and the roads heavily obstructed 
 by timber. Farmmgton, on the east, 
 and College Hill, on the north, are 
 the highest points in the immediate vi- 
 cinity of Corinth ; and these were occu- 
 pied by the eneffy as the signal out- 
 posts of his vast intrenchments, encir- 
 cling the town. 
 
 As a strategic point, for the South at 
 least, Corinth had already been shorn 
 of much of its value. When Buell set 
 out from Nashville to reinforce Grant 
 at Shiloh, he sent General Mitchell 
 southward, with instructions to destroy, 
 as far as possible, the Memphis and 
 Charleston Railroad. On the 4th of 
 April Mitchell was at Shelbyville, 
 whence he hastened forward by forced 
 marches to Huntsville, taking the town 
 \pril ^^y surprise at an early hour on 
 *!• the morning of the 11th, and cap- 
 turing seventeen locomotives, more than 
 one hundred passenger cars, a large 
 amount of supplies of every kind, with 
 aljout one hundred and sixty prisoners. 
 At Huntsville the railroad lines were 
 torn up both to the east and west of tlie 
 town. From Huntsville he sent one 
 expedition eastward as far as Stevenson, 
 
 and another expedition westward as far 
 as Decatur and Tuscumbia, the oljject 
 of both expeditions being to capture 
 what could be had and to destroy the 
 railroads. On the 16th of April Mitchell 
 could say to his soldiers : " You have 
 struck blow after blow with a rapidity 
 unparalleled. Stevenson fell, sixty miles 
 to the east of Huntsville. Decatur and 
 Tuscumbia have been in like manner 
 seized and are now occupied. In three 
 days you have extended your front of 
 operations more than one hundred miles, 
 and your morning guns at Tuscumbia 
 may now 1)e heard by your comrades 
 on the battle field made glorious by 
 their victory before Corinth." Mitchell 
 had placed his army midway between 
 Corinth and Nashville, had opened com- 
 munication with Buell, and had added 
 another hundred miles of the Tennessee 
 to the free navigation of the North. It 
 was Mitchell's intention to move east- 
 ward as far as Chattanooga, to destroy 
 the railroads there, especially that lead- 
 ing to Atlanta, and to burn the foun- 
 dries and machine shops at Rome. This, 
 however, he was unable to accomplish 
 without reinforcements; and as these 
 were not to be had, he was compelled 
 to retire before the superior strength of 
 General Kirby Smith. Mitchell, how 
 ever, had already done great things, 
 and shown what might have been ac- 
 complished if his spirit had been shared 
 by some of his superiors. Under date 
 of May 1st, writing to the secretary of 
 war, he could say : " The campaign is 
 ended, and I now occupy Huntsville in 
 perfect security ; while all of Alabama 
 north of the Tennessee River floats no 
 
ll'j 
 
 COEINTH. 
 
 flag but that of the Union." It was 
 not without good reason that Mitchell 
 was commissioned a major-general of 
 volunteers. The importance of Corinth 
 had been fully recognized by Halleck 
 and Grant as well as by Buell and 
 Mitchell. A few days after the battle 
 of Shiloh, General Sherman, with some 
 fresh ti'oops from Buell's army, moved 
 up the Tennessee to the mouth of Bear 
 Creek, and there destroyed the railroad 
 bridge which spans the river at that 
 place. It will thus be seen that before 
 the struggle, suspended on the field of 
 Shiloh, was resumed in the immediate 
 neighborhood of Corinth the Memphis 
 and Charleston Railroad, broken in 
 many places, had ceased to be useful 
 as a line of communication between the 
 Mississippi and the Atlantic States. In 
 proportion as Corinth became a railroad 
 centre in name only and not in reality, 
 so did it lose its value as a strategical 
 point in the estimation of the Confede- 
 rate general. A proper appreciation of 
 this fact will help the reader to under- 
 stand the issue of the siege. 
 
 As soon as the battle of Shiloh had 
 been fought and won, Halleck made up 
 his mind that the occupation of Corinth 
 was the next necessary step in the on- 
 ward movement against the enemy. On 
 the 9th of April he left St. Louis for the 
 April scene of action. On '.he 12th he 
 12. ai'rived at Pittsburg Landing and 
 took command in person of the " Grand 
 Army of the Tennessee"; for such now 
 was its style and title. Grant was 
 placed second in command, without any 
 real duty. The manner in which he 
 had fought the battle of Shiloh was not 
 
 satisfactory to his chief ; and the great- 
 est captain in the Northern army, as 
 the result proved, was compelled for a 
 second time to submit to uncalled-for 
 humiliation. Grant bore his punish- 
 ment — for punishment it was — with the 
 best grace possible. Halleck, as if on 
 second thoughts, did what he could to 
 reassure him, informing him that no 
 censure was intended, and that his 
 strangely anomalous position was that 
 which was due to his rank. Halleck's 
 objection to Grant's conduct in the late 
 contest was that he had not shown suf- 
 ficient caution — that he had erred, in 
 fact, in not throwing iip whatever forti- 
 fications were possible in the circum- 
 stances between himself and the enemy. 
 As if to justify his complaint, and to 
 show what should have been done at 
 Shiloh, Halleck moved forward with a 
 caution which became painful, intrench- , 
 ing himself at every step. Blame now' 
 fell upon him in turn. He was cau- 
 tious overmuch. It was tauntingly said 
 that it took him six weeks to march 
 fifteen miles ; and there are not a few 
 who, to this day, incline to the opinion 
 that Halleck's excessive care robbed 
 the National forces of the proper fruit 
 of the victory at Shiloh. 
 
 Let us see now what were the rela- 
 tive positions of the two armies. The 
 Confederate defenses were very strong ; 
 and considering their strength, it was 
 not wholly without reason that Halleck 
 advanced with cautious and well-guard- 
 ed steps. In one continuous line, and 
 occupying the brow of the first lidge 
 outside of the town, the intrenchmeuts 
 extended over fifteen miles. All the 
 
FARMIAGTON AND RUSSEL'S HOUSE. 
 
 117 
 
 roads and bridges which could facilitate 
 the approach of the National troops had 
 been destroyed. On the east there was 
 a ravine, and Philip's Creek in front. 
 On the north there was a heavy abatis, 
 with a cleared space in front. At every 
 road-crossing, along their exterior lines 
 there were either strong redoubts or bat- 
 teries with massive epaulments. Beau- 
 regard was nothing if not an engineer ; 
 and it is not at all unreasonal^le to con- 
 clude that in throwing up those power- 
 ful works around Corinth, he bore in 
 mind that he was about to test the skill 
 of an engineer like himself and a fellow 
 West-Pointer. 
 
 The Confederate army concentrated 
 at Corinth was composed of first class 
 elements. There were the " soldiers of 
 Shiloh," the army which had fought 
 at Pittsburg Landing; those of "Elk- 
 horn," the combined army of VanDorn 
 and Price, from Arkansas and Missouri ; 
 and the forces under General Lovell, 
 which had evacuated New Orleans 
 Avhen, on the 28th of April, the gun- 
 boats appeared before it. In addition 
 to these, a large militia force had been 
 hastily sent forward from Alabama, Mis- 
 sissippi, and Louisiana. Bragg, as second 
 in rank, had command of the "Army of 
 tlie Mississippi." The old oi'ganization 
 f)f the coi'j)s — under Hardee, Bragg, 
 Breckenridge, and Polk — was retained. 
 Breckenridge commanded the reserve, 
 and VanDorn the reinforcements. The 
 whole foice was about sixty-five thou- 
 sand men, most of them the best troops 
 in the Confederacy. The retreat from 
 Shiloh had discouraged, no doubt, but 
 it !.ad not damped the hopes of the au- 
 goa 
 
 thorities at Richmond ; neither had the 
 Confederate soldiers lost their spirit. 
 High hopes, therefore, were entertained 
 that the efforts about to be put forth at 
 Corinth would turn the tide of battle 
 and cloud, if not efface, the memory of 
 Pittsburg Landing. 
 
 Confronting this large and well-ap- 
 pointed army, the very flower of the 
 Confederacy, and resolved to expel it 
 from its stronghold and to capture it, if 
 possible, General Halleck had under 
 him over one hundred thousand men, 
 not all of them experienced, but all of 
 them imbued with the spirit which is 
 inseparable from a righteous cause, and 
 determined once again to chain victory 
 to their standards. There were three 
 armies — the army of the Tennessee, ori- 
 ginally Grant's, now confided to General 
 George H. Thomas, and containing the 
 divisions of Hurlbut, Sherman, Smith,' 
 and Davies ; the army of the Ohio, com- 
 manded by Don Carlos Buell, and com- 
 posed of the divisions of McCook, T. J. 
 Wood, Nelson, and Crittenden ; the 
 army of the Mississippi, General John 
 Pope, oi'iginally containing three divis- 
 ions, and reinforced by one division from 
 General Curtis. Thomas formed the 
 right wing, Buell the centre, and Pope 
 the left. Grant, being in orders second 
 in command, had a general supervision 
 of the right wing, under Thomas, and 
 the reserves of McClernand and Wal- 
 lace's divisions, commanded by McCler- 
 nand. 
 
 On the 23d of April General Halleck 
 commenced a caiitious forward April 
 movement. On the 3d of May 23. 
 his advance under General Sherman, 
 
118 
 
 CORINTH. 
 
 was in the vicinity of Monterey, within 
 six or seven miles of Beauregard's lines. 
 May On the same day, Pope sent 
 3» Paine's division to reconnoitre, 
 and, if possible, occupy Farmington, 
 one of the most important outposts of 
 the enemy. Mar ma duke, who had un- 
 der him some fom* thousand five hun- 
 dred men, made but little resistance. 
 On the contrary, he retired rapidly to 
 Corinth, leaving his camp with all 
 its supplies, and only thirty dead. At 
 the time it seemed as though his orders 
 had been to withdraw, but the subse- 
 quent efforts of the Confederates to re- 
 cover Farmington prove that this could 
 not have been so. An artillery recon- 
 noissance, well supported by cavalry, as 
 far as Glendale, on the Memphis and 
 Charleston Raih'oad, Avas successful in 
 destroying the track and breaking up 
 two important trestle-bridges. In the 
 meantime. General Wallace had sent out 
 General Morgan L. Smith, with three 
 battalions of cavalry and a brigade of 
 infantry, upon the Mobile and Ohio 
 Railroad. They met and fought the 
 Confederates in a wood, destroying a 
 bi'idge and the track not far from Pur- 
 dy, and thus cut off Beauregard from 
 Jackson, Tennessee, whence supplies and 
 reinforcements were expected. Hal- 
 leck's scheme Avas working well; the 
 National troops were gradually ap- 
 proaching in front, and at the same 
 time cutting and I'ecutting the comniu- 
 oications on both flanks. 
 
 Pope M'as not to be allowed to hold 
 the position which he had so easily won. 
 He had miscalculated the enemy's vigi- 
 lance, and underestimated the value 
 
 which they attached to Farmington. 
 Generals Paine and Palmer, who were 
 left in charge, had under them only £ 
 single brigade. On the 9th of jfay 
 May the Confederates, some twen- *• 
 ty thousand strong, fell upon this ad. 
 vanced brigade with terrific force. It 
 resisted the attack for several hours, 
 but at length fell back, because it was 
 believed that General Halleck did not 
 desire, by supporting it, to bring on a 
 general engagement. The front attack of 
 the enemy was conducted by VanDorn, 
 while Price had been ordered early in 
 the day to make a detour to the left, 
 and get into the rear of these isolated 
 troops. Either he was too late, or 
 VanDorn too early. The combination 
 was a failure ; they did not capture any 
 portion of Pope's army, although they 
 occupied Farmington, and found a small 
 quantity of baggage there. Eight days 
 afterwards Pope reoccupied the post 
 with his whole force. 
 
 On the 17th, and while the army was 
 imjiatient to be led to the attack, jjay 
 there was a lively fight for the *'• 
 capture of what was called Rnssel's 
 house, an important eminence command- 
 ing the junction of the roads three 
 hundred yards beyond, and only a mile 
 and a quarter from the outer intrench- 
 ments of the enemy. The project was 
 Sherman's. General Harlbut sent for- 
 ward two regiments and a battei'y 
 under General Denver and General 
 M. L. Smith. The attack was success- 
 ful; and the position, which was one 
 of great natural strength, was imme- 
 diately fortified and occupied by 9 
 large force. 
 
BEAUREGAED RETREATS. 
 
 119 
 
 Gradually the National lines began 
 to di'aw nearer the Confederate out- 
 works, Halleck cautiously fortifying his 
 May position as he advanced. On the 
 2'* 21 st of May the National army was 
 fairly in line three miles from Corinth, 
 \\nth detached works in front, corre- 
 sponding with the general direction of 
 May those of the enemy. On the 28th, 
 28. still drawing closer and closer, it 
 was within thirteen hundred yards of 
 the enemy's outer line. Heavy siege 
 guns Avere now in position ; and recon- 
 noisances in great force were being 
 made on both flank and centre. On the 
 May 29th Pope di-ove them fi'om their 
 29« advance batteries, and Sherman 
 planted heavy guns within a thousand 
 yards of Beauregard's left. It was not 
 possible now that the end could be 
 long delayed. Beauregard's position 
 was such that his delay in making a 
 vigorous attack was simply inexplicable. 
 He had allowed the National troops, 
 comparatively unmolested, to get within 
 easy fighting distance of his lines, and 
 to establish themselves behind fortifica- 
 tions quite as strong as his own. He 
 had allowed himself to be completely 
 isolated from all possible sources of as- 
 sistance. His railroad communications 
 had been cut north, south, east, and 
 west. It was General Halleck's confi- 
 dent belief on the night of the 29th 
 that Beauregard would ofPer battle in 
 the morning. The battle might be san- 
 guinary, but he was confident of success; 
 for he knew he had a superior force, and 
 that retreat would be impossible, as all 
 the railroad communications had been 
 cut. He did not know that retreat had 
 
 already been accomplished. In the early 
 morning the skirmishers sought the foe 
 in vain. Suddenlj^ the earth was shaken 
 as if by an earthquake; and dense clouds i 
 of smoke rolled up over Corinth. The 
 enemy was gone. Beauregard had fled. 
 For days ahead he had been sending on 
 his sick and his most valuable stores 
 towards Mobile. Some twenty four 
 hours before, a part of his effective 
 force and nearly all his ordnance had 
 been moved off in the same direction. 
 The rear-guard had left for the south 
 and west the nic^ht before. Some 
 wretched creatures had willingly or 
 Tuiwillingly been left behind to fire the 
 town. So ended the siege of Corinth. 
 After all his labor and patience, Hal- 
 leck reaped a bloodless ])ut compara- 
 tively barren victory. Beauregard was 
 compelled to retire ; but he had the 
 proud satisfaction of having saved his 
 army and all his munitions of war. His 
 retreat was in some respects equal to a 
 victory. 
 
 No time was lost in following up the 
 retreating foe. At seven o'clock on the 
 morning of the 30th, Pope's ad- May 
 vance drove the small rear-guard ^^' 
 of the Confederate cavalry through the 
 town ; while the brave Gordon Gran- 
 ger, setting out with a brigade and a 
 battery on the Boonesville road from 
 Farmington at noon, pushed the flying 
 foe through the former place, and keep- 
 ing up the pursuit, crossed Twenty-mile 
 Ci-eek the following day, the main army 
 being close upon his heels. On June 
 the 10th of June the pursuit end- *®' 
 ed, the National advance having reached 
 Baldwin and Gumtown, and still on the 
 
120 
 
 CORINTH. 
 
 railroad. Beauregard had established 
 himself at Tupelo, a few miles below, 
 where the railroad is crossed by Old 
 Tom Creek, an affluent of the Tombig- 
 .bee. Halleck, thinking that he had 
 risked enough, and fearing for the safe- 
 ty of his communications, ordered a 
 halt ; and so the biief campaign of Co- 
 rinth was brought to an end. 
 
 The National army returned to Co- 
 rinth, where it remained making busy 
 preparations for a new movement. The 
 watei's of the Tennessee were already 
 low ; and as for months to come they 
 would become lower and lower, and 
 therefore useless as a means of com- 
 munication, the I'ailroad was repaired 
 and put in good condition as far as 
 Columbus. General Buell, with the 
 army of the Ohio, was sent on the 10th 
 of June to Chattanooga, while General 
 Grant, with the army of the Tennessee, 
 held possession of the new strategic 
 line of railroad between Memphis and 
 luka. Halleck had already accom- 
 plished much ; and at Washington, as 
 we shall soon have occasion to see, he 
 was regarded as the rising man. Much 
 as he had done, he might have done 
 more. We have ah-eady expressed the 
 02)inion that a little more dash and dar- 
 ing, and a little less caution, when he 
 took command in person after the battle I 
 of Shiloh, might have resulted in the 
 complete defeat if not capture of Beau- 
 regard's army, before that general was 
 able to surround himself with fortifica- 
 tions at Corinth. As it was, the fate of 
 the great States of Kentucky and Ten- 
 nessee had to all appearance been de- 
 cided ; and the entire northwest of the 
 
 Confederacy, a vast space of many thou- 
 sand square miles, had been wrenched 
 away. The plan, the execution of 
 which commenced with the attack on 
 Fort Henry, had worked adniii-ably; 
 and although some hai'd fighting had 
 yet to be done before the enemy was 
 completely driven out of the valley of 
 the Mississippi, and before the Father 
 of Waters was open through to the sea, 
 the Noi'th had reason so far to be well 
 satisfied with Halleck's services and 
 success. 
 
 Beaui'egard had much less reason to 
 feel satisfied with the position in which 
 he found himself. He had no doubt 
 done his best. If he had not made at 
 Corinth so bold and vigorous a stand as 
 was expected by friend and foe alike, 
 it was because he correctly measured 
 his strength, and took in the true value 
 of his position. If he had been better 
 supported by the authorities at Rich- 
 mond, the results might have been dif- 
 ferent. Most unquestionably he showed 
 greater wisdom in retreating as he did, 
 than he would have done by risking a 
 battle in the later days of the siege. 
 His forces had not been sufiiciently in- 
 creased ; and Coi'inth had been rendered 
 not only worthless but dangerous by 
 the destruction of the railroads. For 
 some time he had been ill ; and at Tu- 
 pelo he took the liberty of retiring to 
 Bladdon Springs, about twelve miles 
 distant, for the purpose of recuperating, 
 leaving General Bragg in command, 
 with instructions to put the army in 
 condition to take the field on his return. 
 On hearing this, Davis became wild 
 with rage, telegraphed Bragg to assume 
 
BEAUEEGARD, GRANT, AND SHERMAN. 
 
 i-4. 
 
 perinauent command, and declared that 
 nothing could ever induce him again to 
 entrust the army to Beauregard. It was 
 not long until Davis had sufficient rea- 
 son to alter his determination. While 
 saying this much for Beauregard, we 
 cannot at all hold him excusable for 
 the grossly exaggerated and sometimes 
 false reports which he was in the habit 
 of sending to his government. He 
 claimed a " great and glorious victory " 
 when he had been defeated and driven 
 from Shiloh. He declared Corinth to 
 be the "strategic point of that cam- 
 paign," and assured his government 
 that he was able to hold it; and yet 
 from Tupelo, whither he had found it 
 necessary to retreat, he could write that 
 he had " accomplished his purposes and 
 ends." Human nature often reveals 
 such inconsistencies ; and this weakness, 
 on the part of the Confederate com- 
 mander, stands out in stiiking contrast 
 with other and unmistakably great qual- 
 ities which the man possessed. This 
 particular weakness is and must ever 
 remain a source of regret to all who, 
 from any cause, learned to admire the 
 better part of one of the greatest gene- 
 rals pi"oduced on either side during the 
 civil conflict. 
 
 It would not be easy to overestimate 
 the importance of Shiloh and Corinth 
 on the general character of the struggle. 
 Taken together, they constituted a turn- 
 ing point in the progress of events. In 
 retiring from Corinth, the enemy aban- 
 doned his second line of defense. As 
 he must now fall back upon his third 
 line, it was manifest to all that the next 
 great struggle would be around Vicks- 
 
 burg. In consequence of events which 
 will be detailed in a future chapter, 
 this was now the one remaining strong- 
 hold of tbe Confederates on the line of 
 the Mississippi. Vicksburg captured, 
 the great river would again be open to 
 the sea. The capture of Vicksburg — 
 this was the purpose which now filled 
 the minds of Halleck and Grant, and to 
 this end all their energies Avere hence- 
 forth directed. Extensive preparations 
 must be made, and some hard work 
 must be done, before the next great 
 struggle ; but Vicksburg became the 
 objective point of all the efforts of the 
 army of the Tennessee. 
 
 At the close of this chapter, it can 
 hardly be deemed out of place to notice 
 the influence of Shiloh and Corinth on 
 the fortunes of some of the principal 
 actors. Among the Confederates, Beau- 
 regard was the man principally affected. 
 He had the greatest opportunity He 
 sustained the greatest loss. The effect 
 of Shiloh and Corinth was undou'otedly 
 injurious ; but it was not lasting. Beau- 
 regard suffered the less that neither at 
 Shiloh nor at Corinth did any rival of 
 equal capacity come to the front. On 
 the National side three men shared 
 largely of the favors of fortune — Hal- 
 leck, Grant, and Sherman. Halleck 
 reaped a glory Avhich was scarcely all 
 his own. Grant, in spite of a treat- 
 ment which must be pronounced un- 
 just, not only preserved his reputation, 
 but secured the opportunity of making 
 himself what he soon aftei-wards was 
 recognized to be, the leading represent- 
 ative on the field of the Northern cause. 
 Sherman, in the one battle and in thw 
 
122 
 
 COAST OPERATIONS IN 1863. 
 
 other, surpassed himself in deeds of 
 skill and daring, and earned his right 
 and title to a place in the front rank 
 
 of the great military men whom the 
 war was gradually developing — a plac^ 
 which he never afterwards lost. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 The Thir<3 Great ExpatUtion. — Burnside and Goldsborough. — Departure of the Fleet from Hampton Eoads. — Ter- 
 rific Storm. — Disaster to the Fleet. — Hatteras Inlet. — Roanoke Island. — Fort Barton. — The Bombardment. — 
 The Confederatft Flotilla. — Landing of the National Troops. — The Battle of Roanoke. — National Victory. — The 
 Confederates Discouraged. — Albemarle Sound. — Elizabeth City Captured. — Edentown. — The Dismal Swamp 
 Canal. — Winton. —Plymouth. — Burnside and Goldsborough's joint Address to the People of North Carolina. — 
 Governor Clark's Counter-Proclamation. — New Berne. — Expedition against. — Landing Troops at Slocum's 
 Creek. — Disposition of the Forces. — The Battle of New Berne. — Severe Fighting. — The Confederate Right 
 Driven in.^A Panic. — The Retreat of the Confederates. — Capture of New Berne. — Buruside's Order. — His 
 Report.— Compliment to McClellan. — Expedition against Fort Macon. — Preparations for Bombardment. — 
 Arrival of Burnside. — CaU for Surrender. — The Bombardment. — Splendid Work. — Description of the Fight. — 
 The Fort Surrenders. — Beaufort. — Reno at South Mills. — Burnside's Good Fortune. — He is Summoned to 
 Washington. — The Savannah Blockade. — Dawfuskie Island. — Jones' Island. — Big Tybee. — Fort Pulaski. — 
 Preparations for the Bombardment. — Commander Dupont. — General Quincy A. Gillmore. — The Erection 
 of Batteries on Venus Point and on Long Island. — The Siege Batteries on Big Tybee. — Colonel Olmstead 
 called upon to Surrender. — General Hunter Supersedes Sherman. — The Opening of the Fire on the Fort. — 
 The Walls of the Fort Honeycombed. — The 'White Flag. — The Surrender. — The Blockade of Savannah Com- 
 plete. — Along the Florida Coast. — Commander Dupont and General Wright. — Fort Clinch. — Femandina.— 
 Brunswick. — Jacksonville. — Fort Marion and St. Augustine. -^Pensacola. — Forts McRae and' Barrancas. — On 
 the Gulf and along the Atlantic Seaboard, the National Power Supreme. — New Orleans Expedition. 
 
 In a previous chapter of this work 
 
 we have described the character 
 i862a 
 
 and traced the progress of two 
 
 great naval and military expeditions, 
 both of them fitted out in Hampton 
 Roads, and both of them sent forth for 
 the pui'pose of rendering more effective 
 the blockade of the southern ports. 
 One of these was under the command 
 of General Butler and Commodore 
 Stringham, and was successful in driv- 
 ing the Confederates from Harrison's 
 Inlet, and in retaining possession of the 
 inlet and of the island of the same 
 name. The other, which was fitted out 
 somewhat later and on a larger scale. 
 
 was entrusted to the care of General T. 
 W. Sherman and Commodore Dupont 
 We have seen how, after a severe stonn, 
 that expedition succeeded in reaching 
 Port Royal, capturing Foi'ts Walker 
 and Beauregard and taking possession 
 of Warsaw Sound to the south and Big 
 Tybee to the north, thus driving the 
 Confederates from eveiy stronghold on 
 the southern shores of South Carolina, 
 and on the northern shores of Georgia, 
 with the exceptions of Fort Pulaski, at 
 the mouth of the Savannah, and Fort 
 Jackson, further up the river. 
 
 In the beginning of 1862 another ex- 
 pedition was fitted out on a grand scale, 
 
THE THIRD GREAT EXPEDITION. 
 
 123 
 
 and was intended not only to operate 
 on the southern coast, but to advance 
 into the interior and act in conjunction 
 with the Federal armies. This expedi- 
 tion was put in charge of General Am- 
 brose Everett Burnside and Flag-officer 
 Louis M. Goldsborough. The military 
 force, like that of Butler, had been 
 gathered at Annapolis. It was com- 
 posed of fifteen regiments and a battal- 
 ion of infantry, a battery of artillery, 
 and a large number of gunners capable 
 of serving either on land or sea. The 
 whole force was divided into three Ijri- 
 gades, which were commanded respect- 
 ively by Generals John G. Foster, Jesse 
 L. Reno, and John G. Parke. The fleet 
 comprised over one hundred steam and 
 sailing vessels, consisting of gunboats, 
 transports, and tugs. It was divided 
 into two columns for active service, in- 
 trusted respectively to the care of Com- 
 manders S. G. Hazard and Stephen H. 
 Rowan. The troops to be conveyed in 
 these vessels numbered in all about six- 
 teen thousand. 
 
 The commanders were well chosen; 
 and there coidd be no reason to doubt 
 that, so far as their ability and fidelity 
 were concerned, the expedition would 
 not fail of success. General Burnside 
 was born at Liberty, Union County, 
 Indiana, on the 2.3d of May, 1824. In 
 1842, at the age of nineteen, he entered 
 the Military Academy at West Point, 
 and graduated in 1847, when he became 
 a second-lieutenant in the United States 
 Artillery. He served under General 
 Patterson in Mexico, where he remained 
 till the end of the war. In August, 
 1849, he distinguished himself in a skir- 
 
 mish with the Apaches at Los Vegas; 
 and for his gallantry on that occasion 
 he was promoted to a first-lieutenancy. 
 He was one of the commissioners ap- 
 pointed to settle the boundary line be- 
 tween Mexico and the United States; 
 and in 1851 he performed, aa the bearer 
 of despatches from Colonel Graham to 
 President Fillmore, the marvellous feat 
 of riding on horseback, in seventeen 
 days, over a space of one thousand two 
 hundred miles, through a country beset 
 with hostile Indians. Burnside, like 
 many others of the military men of that 
 day, grew tired of a life of inactivity ; 
 and in 1853 he resigned his commission 
 in the army. For some yeai's he was 
 engaged in I'ailroad management. He 
 was a trained child of the republic; 
 and when the war broke out, he was 
 naturally expected to give his country 
 the benefit of his training and experi- 
 ence. Appointed by Governor Sprague 
 to the conunand of the First Rhode 
 Island Volunteers, he responded to the 
 call of duty, and marched with his reg- 
 iment to Washington. His conduct at 
 Bull Run won for him the highest 
 praise both from the government and 
 from the people. No fitter man could 
 have been found for the leadership of 
 such an expedition. Flag-officer Golds 
 borough was a man of equal worth and 
 of even greater experience. He had 
 been in the navy since 1812. He had 
 been at sea for eighteen years ; had been 
 on duty on shore for twelve years; and 
 for some eighteen years he had been 
 without active employment, when he 
 was appointed to tlie command of the 
 frigate Congress. From the Congreaa 
 
134 
 
 COAST OPERATIONS IN 1863. 
 
 lie was transferred to the Minnesota, 
 taking command of one-half of the At- 
 lantic blockading squadron. Goldsbor- 
 oiigh had been for some time stationed 
 in Hampton Roads, when he was in- 
 structed to take charge of the fleet in 
 the third joint military and naval expe- 
 dition. It is thus seen that the com- 
 mand of the expedition was placed in 
 thoroughly competent hands. 
 
 On the 11th of January, after two 
 Jan, months' preparation, mth the 
 *'• troops all on board the transports, 
 the magnificent fleet sailed out of Hamp- 
 ton Roads, and proceeded to sea. It 
 Was Sunday; and the scene witnessed 
 in the neighborhood of Fortress Monroe 
 was much tke same as that which had 
 been witnessed in October of the pi-e- 
 vious year, on the occasion of the de- 
 parture of the expedition under Sher- 
 man and Dupont. As in the former 
 case, the destination of the fleet was 
 kept a profound secret. The instruc- 
 tions, which had been given to General 
 Burnside on the 7th of January, were 
 that he should unite with Flag-officer 
 Goldsborough, in command of the fleet 
 at Fortress Monroe, and 2:)roceed to Cap- 
 ture New Berne, seize the Weldon Rail- 
 road, and reduce Fort Macon. It was 
 not, however, deenied advisable that 
 these instructions should have the effect 
 of putting the Confederates on their 
 guard ; and hence care was taken that 
 the objective point of the expedition 
 should be known only to the govern- 
 ment and to the two commanders. The 
 secret was well kept ; but the govern- 
 ment at Richmond was not ignorant of 
 the necessities of the situation or of the 
 
 general policy in favor with the authori- 
 ties at Washington. With characteristic 
 shrewdness the Confederates divined 
 the direction of the intended blow, and 
 were not wholly unprepared for it when 
 it fell. The public had not had tim« 
 to forget the terrific storm which scat- 
 tered Dupont's fleet in the first days of 
 November; and, considering the season 
 of the year, there were many fears and 
 some forebodings of evil. The fears, as 
 the result proved, were not groundless. 
 The forebodings were too literally real- 
 ized. No great difficulty was experi- 
 enced until the vessels were off the 
 stormy Hatteras. The advance had 
 reached the stiller waters of the inlet, 
 when, on Monday night, a dreadful 
 storm broke out, striking the vessels in 
 the rear with terrific fury. Four trans- 
 ports, a gunboat, and a floating battery 
 were wrecked. Among these the fine 
 steamer City of Ne\v York, with four 
 hundred barrels of gunpowder, one 
 thousand five hundred rifles, eight hun- 
 dred shells, and other stores and sup- 
 plies, valued in all at about a quarter 
 of a million dollars, went down in sight 
 of the shore. Some of the vessels, which 
 had been purchased in New York, were 
 evidently unfit for such service; and 
 the opinion was very generally enter- 
 tained that the ship merchants of that 
 city had taken advantage of the necessi- 
 ties of the government to dispose of 
 worthless stock. Happily, in the first 
 instance at least, no human lives were 
 lost. On the 14th, however, a Jan. 
 party went ashore from one of **• 
 the transports, yet outside ; the boat, 
 on returning, was capsized, and three of 
 
ROANOKE ISLAND. 
 
 1^5 
 
 the party were drowned. These were 
 Colonel J. W. Allen of Burlington, New 
 Jersey, commander of the Ninth Regi- 
 ment from that State; Surgeon F. S. 
 Waller ; and the mate of the transport. 
 Grreat difficulty was experienced in get- 
 ting the vessels tkrough the inlet, as 
 the weather continued boisterous, and 
 the vessels crowded each other and ob- 
 structed progress. It was the end of 
 January before all the vessels were 
 through the inlet ; and it was not until 
 Peb. the 7th of February that the reor- 
 y^ ganized expedition, having moved 
 forward over the still waters of Pam- 
 lico, had reached the entrance to Croa- 
 tan Sound. 
 
 It can readily be imagined of what 
 advantage the storm proved to the Con- 
 federates. It did seem once more as if 
 the winds of heaven were enlisted on 
 their side and fighting their battles. 
 Information leaked out through the 
 neAvspapers ; and what with their own 
 knowledge of the coast and the general 
 purpose of the government at Washing- 
 ton, they had no gi-eat difficulty in ar- 
 riving at the conclusion that Roanoke 
 Island, which lay behind Bodies' Island 
 and between Pamlico and Albemarle 
 Sounds, and about thirty miles from 
 Hatteras Inlet, was to be the first point 
 of attack. The island, which was well 
 fortified and gairisoned, completely pro- 
 tected the entii'e northeastera coast of 
 North Carolina from invasion by sea; 
 .and it effectually guarded the rear ap- 
 proaches to Norfolk and Portsmouth in 
 Virginia. It was scarcely second in im- 
 portance to Fortress Mom-oe. The isl- 
 and and its vicinity were now under 
 
 the command of Biigadier-General H. 
 A. Wise. In consequence of the illness 
 of Wise, Colonel H. M. Shaw, of the 
 Eighth North Carolina Regiment, was 
 performing the duties of commander-in- 
 chief on the island. He had under him 
 his own regiment; the Thirty-First 
 North Carolina Volunteers, Colonel J. 
 V. Jordan ; three companies of the Sev- 
 enteenth North Carolina, Major G. H. 
 Hill ; and four hundred and fifty men,; 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson. On all 
 the prominent points of the shores of 
 Roanoke, batteries had been erected 
 commanding Croatan Sound on the one 
 side and Pamlico Sound on the other. 
 On the narrowest part of the island, 
 between Shallowbag Bay and Croatan 
 Sound, there was an intrenched camp 
 with a strong redoubt, extending across 
 the road which traversed the middle of 
 the island. All these fortifications wei'e 
 well mounted and well manned. In 
 addition to those on the island, there 
 were powerful batteries on the main- 
 land, commanding the channels of Croa- 
 tan Sound. This, however, was not all. 
 The principal channel of Croatan Sound 
 was blocked with sunken vessels ; and 
 the entire waters at Pork Point, from the 
 island to the mainland, were filled with 
 stakes and other obsti'uctions. Above 
 th^se, and towards Albemarle Sound, 
 was a flotilla of email gunboats, eight 
 in number and carrying eleven guns, 
 under the command of Lieutenant W. 
 F. Lynch, now charged with the defense 
 of the coast of North Carolina. 
 
 As early as the 5th of Februaiy Com- 
 modore Goldsborough had made y^)^ 
 a reconnoissance with thirty of his 5« 
 
UQ 
 
 COAST OPERATIONS IN 1862. 
 
 gunboats towards Croatan Sound ; and 
 Feb. on the 7th he began to move on 
 '• the forts on either side. The 
 morning of that day was dull and un- 
 promising ; but later the sun burst forth 
 in splendor; and Groldsborough, at 
 about ten o'clock, hoisted the signal, 
 " This day om- country expects every 
 man to do his duty." The gunboats 
 advanced in three columns. The first 
 was led by the Stars and Stripes, Lieu- 
 tenant Worden; the second by the 
 Louisiana, Commander Alexander Mur- 
 ray ; and the third by the Hetzel, Lieu- 
 tenant H. R. Davenport. Goldsborough 
 was on board the Southfield, which he 
 made his flag-ship, and was accompa- 
 nied by the gunboat Underwriter. At 
 eleven o'clock, a bombardment was 
 opened on Fort Barton, on Pork Point ; 
 and within thirty minutes afterwards 
 the battle had become general. The 
 Confederate gunboats took part in the 
 fight; but they were soon driven be- 
 yond the range of the National guns; 
 and the Curlew, their largest steamer, 
 was so badly damaged that she began 
 to sink, and was saved by being beached 
 under the guns of Fort Forrest on the 
 mainland. The fleet thus put out of 
 the way, Goldsborough concentrated 
 his fire on Fort Barton, at a range of 
 about three-quarters of a mile, as close 
 as the depth of water would permit him 
 to advance. Soon the flagstaff of the 
 fort was shot away ; the barracks were 
 set on fire ; and the entire works began 
 to fall to pieces, under the weight of 
 the shot and the terrific explosions of 
 the shells. 
 
 The transports were now brought 
 
 forward ; and preparations were made 
 for landing the troops at Ashby'a Har- 
 bor, on Roanoke Island, about two 
 miles below Fort Barton. The Confed- 
 erates had anticipated this movement; 
 and a force of two thousand men, with 
 a battery of three pieces, lay concealed 
 in the woods in front of the landing. 
 In the meantime the Confederate flotilla 
 returned to the attack. A shower, of 
 shot and shell from the National gun- 
 boats quickly cleared the woods ; and, 
 after an houi-'s vigorous firing on both 
 sides, the Confederate flotilla again re- 
 tired. About midnight the troops were 
 got on shore. The landing, however, 
 had been accomplished in circumstances 
 of more than ordinary difficulty. The 
 night was extremely cold; there was a 
 heavy rain-storm ; and to add to the dis- 
 comforts of the situation, such was the 
 shallowness of the water that the boats 
 could not effect a landing, and the men 
 were compelled to wade waist-deep, for 
 a quarter of a mile. Early on the peb, 
 morning of the 8th the troops, 8. 
 about eleven thousand in number, who 
 had spent the dark hours as best they 
 could without any shelter, were moved 
 forward to attack the enemy's intrench- 
 ments in the interior of the island. The 
 advancing column was under the com- 
 mand of General Fostei", the next in 
 rank to General Bui-nside, who remained 
 at the landing. The main body fol- 
 lowed, and was led by Generals Reno 
 and Parke. About eight o'clock Foster 
 reached the enemy's position. Their 
 ground was well chosen. On either 
 side was a morass. A narrow causeway 
 was the only approach to their works; 
 
THE ZOUAVES. 
 
 «7 
 
 and this they had protected by an earth- 
 work mounting three guns. Inside the 
 intrenchments there were some three 
 thousand troops, under command of 
 Colonel Shaw. Foster had brought 
 from the naval launches some six or 
 eight boat-howitzers. These were un- 
 der the immediate command of Mid- 
 shipman B. F. Porter. Foster contin- 
 ued to press forward ; but the ground 
 being swampy and bordered with woods, 
 the march was conducted slowly and 
 with great caution. With musketry 
 and cannon the battle was begun on 
 both sides. The Twenty-Fifth Massa- 
 chusetts, Colonel Upton, supported by 
 the Twenty-Third Massachusetts, Col- 
 onel Kurtz, were the fii'st engaged. 
 These were soon joined by the Twenty- 
 Seventh Massachiisetts, Colonel Lee, 
 and the Tenth Connecticut, Colonel 
 Russell. The battle now raged fiercely, 
 the Confederates firmly holding their 
 ground and making a most gallant de- 
 fense. Reno, with the Twenty-First 
 Massachusetts, Colonel Maggi, the Fif- 
 ty-First New York, Colonel Ferrero, 
 the Fifty-First Pennsylvania, Colonel 
 Harti-anft, and the Ninth New Jersey, 
 now came up to the aid of Foster. 
 Pushing through the tangled swamps, 
 he took a position on Foster's right. 
 While Reno thus advanced to the right, 
 Parke, with the Fourth Rhode Island, 
 Colonel Rodman, the first battalion 
 Fifth Rhode Island, the Eighth Con- 
 necticut, and Ninth New York, the last 
 under Colonel Hawkins, pressed to- 
 wards the left. At this moment the fight- 
 ing was terrific, both sides performing 
 deeda of gi'eat valor ; while among the 
 
 Nationals, Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
 New York, New Jersey, and Pennsyl- 
 vania, each emulous of all the others, 
 strove for the prize of the day. Not- 
 withstanding the immensely superior 
 numbei's by which they were attacked, 
 the Confederates stubbornly held their 
 ground. The Nationals, who had suf- 
 fered severely from the Confederate 
 fire, now began to experience a scarcity 
 of ammunition. It was evident to Gen- 
 eral Foster that a bold stroke must be 
 made vigorously and at once. The maia 
 battery which commanded the causeway 
 must be silenced. A bayonet charge 
 was resolved upon. Major E. A. Kim- 
 ball of Hawkins' Ninth New York 
 (Zouaves) volunteered to lead the at- 
 tack. " You are the man," said Foster; 
 "the Ninth is the regiment; and this 
 is the moment. Zouaves, storm the 
 battery ! Forward ! " With a leap and 
 a yell, they went bounding across the 
 causeway. " Make way for the red- 
 caps! " resounded on every side; while 
 the cry of " Zou ! Zou ! " rent the air. 
 It was the work of a moment. The 
 Zouaves rushed into the battery, fol- 
 lowed closely by the Tenth Connecticut, 
 the Fifty-First New York, and the 
 Twenty-First Massachusetts. The col- 
 ors of the Fifty-First and the State flag 
 of Massachusetts, planted on the cap^ 
 tured battery, revealed the rapidity of 
 the attack and the completeness of the 
 victory. The Confederates, after the 
 first shot, abandoned their guns and 
 fled to the northern part of the island. 
 Reno, with the Twenty-First Massachu- 
 setts and Ninth New York, started off 
 in vigorous pursuit. Foster, having 
 
m 
 
 COAST OPEKATIONS IN 1862. 
 
 re-formed his men, quickly followed. 
 Hawkins, with his Zouaves, hui'ried to- 
 ward Shallowbag Bay, where, it was 
 understood, the Confederates had a two- 
 gun battery. After a chase of some five 
 or six miles, Foster was met by a flag of 
 truce in the hands of Colonel Pool, of the 
 Eighth North Carolina, who bore a mes- 
 sage from Colonel Shaw, the command- 
 ant of the island, asking on what terms 
 capitulation would be granted. There 
 was but one answer possible. " Uncon- 
 ditional and immediate surrender," was 
 Foster's prompt reply. Two thousand 
 men laid down their arms and became 
 prisoners of war. Among them was 
 Colonel Shaw. Meanwhile Reno, who 
 had turned toward Weir's Point, forced 
 the surrender of some eight hundi-ed, 
 who, with Colonel Jordan at their head, 
 were vainly attempting to escape from 
 the island ; while Hawkins found easy 
 possession of the battery at Shallowbag 
 Bay, and captured some two hundred 
 who were seeking a chance to escape to 
 Nag's Head on the mainland. 
 
 "While success was thus attending the 
 land forces, Goldsborough was making 
 good use of his gunboats. He had re- 
 newed his fire on Fort Barton, at Pork 
 Point. Towards the close of the day, 
 and in order to complete the conquest 
 of the island, Foster sent a detachment 
 to capture the fort. The guns were al- 
 ready silenced ; it was found that the 
 garrison had I'etired ; and shortly after 
 four o'clock, Goldsborough, on seeing 
 the National colors floating over the 
 stronghold, signalled to his fleet, " The 
 fort is ours." About the same time the 
 Confederate steamer Curlew, which had 
 
 been beached under the guns at Red- 
 stone Point, was blown up ; and the 
 barracks at that place were set on fire. 
 The Confederate flotilla retired into the- 
 M^aters of Albemarle Sound ; and what 
 is known as the battle of Roanoke was 
 ended. 
 
 From Fort Barton, where he took up 
 his headquarters, General Burnside sent 
 a report of the day's proceedings to 
 Washington. He had captured six 
 forts, forty guns, most of them of 
 large calibre, three of them being 100- 
 pounders, and about three thousand 
 prisoners. With a magnanimity which 
 is characteristic of true greatness, he 
 gave all the credit of the victoiy to 
 Generals Foster, Reno, and Parke. In 
 fitting terms he lamented the deaths of 
 Colonel Charles S. Russell and Lieuten- 
 ant-Colonel Vigeur de Monteuil, both 
 of whom fell when gallantly leading 
 the attack in the centre of the island. 
 His entire loss was fifty killed and two 
 hundred and twenty-two wounded. The 
 'Confederate loss was much less, as they 
 fought for the most part under breast- 
 works. According to Pollard, there 
 were twenty-three killed, fifty-eight 
 wounded, and sixty-two missing. 
 
 The capture of Roanoke was justly 
 regarded by the South as a damaging 
 blow to their cause. Pamlico Sound was 
 now completely wrenched from their 
 grasp ; Albemarle Sound must soon 
 share a similar fate ; and then nearly 
 the entu-e seaboard of Virginia and the 
 better part of that of North Carolina 
 would be in the hands of the Nationals. 
 This, however, was not all. Roanoke 
 Island was indissolubly associated with 
 
ELIZABETH CITY 
 
 129 
 
 the early history of America. North 
 Carolina was proud to own it. It was 
 the scene of Sir Walter Raleigh's colo- 
 nizing experiment in 1585; and it was 
 here that the first attempt was made to 
 establish a titled and privileged aris- 
 tocracy in the New World. After two 
 imsuccessful attempts at colonization, 
 Manteo, a native chief, was, by com- 
 mand of Raleigh, and with the apjiroval 
 of Queen Elizabeth, made Lord of Ro- 
 anoke. The loss of the island implied 
 the dismemberment of one of the oldest 
 and proudest of the Southern States. 
 The people of the South veiy properly 
 complained that Roanoke was not bet- 
 ter fortified, and that the island should 
 have been allowed to fall so easily a 
 prey to the enemy. General Huger, 
 who had charge of that department, 
 with his headquarters at Norfolk, and 
 Secretary of War Benjamin, were both 
 greatly blamed. Although the battle 
 of Roanoke was won by the Nationals 
 with comparative ease, and although 
 I here was no great loss of life on either 
 side, few of the battles of the war were 
 conducted, on the one side or the othei', 
 with more ability or with greater deter- 
 mination. The Nationals were vastly 
 superior in numbers; and for this reason 
 llie issue, from the commencement of 
 the contest, was not doubtful. 
 
 The Confederate flotilla had crossed 
 feb. Albemarle Sound, and had sailed 
 9- up the Pasquotank River as fai' 
 AS Elizabeth City, in the neighborhood 
 of the Great Dismal Swamp. Elizabeth 
 City is the capital of Pasquotank Coun- 
 ty, Nortli Carolina. It is situated on 
 the right bank of the Pasquotank River, 
 
 about thirty miles from its mouth. It is 
 a post town, and contains a court-house, 
 jail, and several churches. Vessels 
 drawng seven feet of water can come 
 up close to the city with the greatest 
 ease. It has a water communication 
 with Norfolk by means of the Pasquo- 
 tank River and the Dismal Swamp 
 Canal. Into these waters the Nationals 
 resolved to follow; and Goldsborough, 
 the day after the capture of Roan- 
 oke, detailed some fourteen vessels, 
 under Commander Rowan, for that pur- 
 pose. Rowan had some difficulty in get- 
 ting his fleet past the sunken vessels, 
 piles, and other obstructions in Croatan 
 Sound ; but on the morning of the peb. 
 10th he had so far accomplished '®» 
 his purpose as to have his entire fleet in 
 the harbor of Elizabeth City. There 
 he found the Confederate fleet, consist- 
 ing of seven steamers and a schooner 
 ai-med with two 32-pounders. A four- 
 gun battery had been planted on shore. 
 There was also one heavy gun in the 
 town, in fi'ont. The entire arrangement 
 was in charge of Commander Lj^nch. 
 Rowan lost no time in getting his ves- 
 sels in ordej'; and about nine o'clock 
 he opened fire upon the enemy's fleet 
 and also upon the batteries. The fight 
 was of short diu'ation. The Confederate 
 vessels Avere run aground. The one 
 gun was silenced ; so also were the bat- 
 teries. The vessels were set on fire and 
 abandoned. The fight had l.'fsted only 
 forty minutes. Lynch fled, and waa 
 not again heard of during the war, until 
 he reappeared at Smithfield, on the oc- 
 casion of the capture of Fort Fislier, in 
 18G5. In his report of the engagement, 
 
130 
 
 COAST OPERATIONS IN 1862, 
 
 Rowan said that he had destroyed or 
 captured the entire naval force of the 
 enemy, that he had silenced and de- 
 stroyed his batteries, and that the only 
 vessel saved was the Ellis, whose cap- 
 tain, J. M. Cook, was wounded and a 
 prisoner. His own loss was "two or 
 three killed and some wounded." Eliz- 
 abeth City was promptly taken posses- 
 sion of, but not before a most barbarous 
 attempt had been made by the retreat- 
 ing Confederates to destroy it by fire. 
 Happily the flames were got under; 
 and the lives of many helpless Avomen 
 and children were saved. 
 
 Burnside did not allow himself to 
 rest upon his laurels. The advantages 
 gained, to be made secure, required that 
 the Confederates be rendered powerless 
 for evil all along the coast of North 
 Carolina. The capture of Elizabeth 
 City was followed by similar move- 
 ments into the harbors and bays which 
 branch off Albemarle Sound. The first 
 movement Avas towards Edentown, a 
 flourishing little place at the head of 
 '.he bay of the same name, near the 
 western end of the sound. It is a post 
 town, a port of entry, and the capital 
 of Chowan County. Edentown was 
 Feb. settled as far back as 1716. On 
 '-• the day after the capture of Eliza- 
 lieth, Lieutenant A. Maury, with part of 
 Rowan's fleet, took possession of Eden- 
 town, the Confederates offering no re- 
 sistance. A body of flying artillery, as 
 soon as they saw the gunboats, made a 
 precipitate retreat, without firing a shot. 
 Maury found a schooner on the stocks, 
 and some cannon, which he destroyed, 
 and passed on, capturing other vessels 
 
 in the sound. Next day (February 13), 
 Lieutenant Jeffers, with a portion peb. 
 of the fleet, proceeded to the '3« 
 mouth of the Chesapeake and Albe- 
 marle Canal — the canal whicli traverses 
 the Great Dismal Swamp, connecting 
 the Pasquotank with the Elizabeth 
 River. It was the intention of the 
 Nationals to destroy the canal ; but 
 when Jeffers arrived, he found that this 
 work had ali'eady been accomplished by 
 the Confederates themselves. He saw 
 two small steamers and three schooners 
 about a mile and a quarter up the canal. 
 Some pickets stationed near the en- 
 trance fii-ed their muskets as a signal; 
 and what seemed a large body of men 
 got under cover close by the vessels. 
 At about a hundred yards from the 
 mouth of the canal the National gun- 
 boats grounded. The "Whitehead was 
 ordered to open fire with her nine-inch 
 guns. After thi'ee shells had been flung 
 at them, the Confederate troops fled 
 precipitately, and the vessels moved 
 further up the canal. On landing, Jef- 
 fers found that a schooner had been 
 sunk about fifty yards from the canal's 
 mouth, and that, to prevent it changing 
 its position, it was well supported by 
 piles, logs, and other material. A largfj 
 dredging machine had been left behind. 
 This, after destroying its machinery, 
 the Nationals sank diagonally across 
 the canal, thus effectually blocking the 
 way for even the smallest vessel. Still 
 another movement of a similar kind was 
 made before Burnside girt himself foi 
 the heavier work which had to be pebi 
 accomplished further to the south. I^' 
 On the 19th the combined fleet set out 
 
NEW BERNE. 
 
 131 
 
 from Edentown on a reconnoisance. One 
 portion of the fleet sailed up the Chowan 
 River as far as Winton, while another 
 portion proceeded up the Roanoke to 
 Plymouth. At neither place was any 
 attempt made to land ; but as in both 
 cases they were fired upon from the 
 laud, the gunboats responded with 
 shells; and Winton was partially and 
 Plymouth almost com^iletely destroyed. 
 In a joint address to the people of 
 North Carolina, Burnside and Golds- 
 borough stated the object of their mis- 
 sion, and rejielled the unfounded charges 
 made against them by the Confederate 
 leaders. After assuring them that they 
 were Christians like themselves, and 
 that they realized the obligations which 
 that sacred name implied, they thus 
 concluded, " We invite you, in the name 
 of the constitution, and in that of virtu- 
 ous loyalty and civilization, to separate 
 yourselves at once from these malign 
 influences, to return to your allegiance, 
 and not compel us to resort further to 
 the force under our control. The gov- 
 ernment asks only that its authority 
 may be recognized ; and we repeat, in 
 no manner or way does it desire to in- 
 terfere with your laws, constitutionally 
 established, your institutions of any 
 kind whatever, your property of any 
 sort, or your usages in any respect." 
 This document was signed by both com- 
 Feb, manders, and bore date February 
 
 I**' 18, 1862. Such a proclamation 
 xiaturally enough alarmed and irritated 
 the Confederate leaders ; and on the 
 
 Peb. 2 2d a violent counter-proclama- 
 
 22. tion was issued by Henry T. 
 
 Clark, the governor of North Carolina. 
 
 The tone of Governor Clark's proclama- 
 tion was as bellicose as that of Burnside 
 and Goldsborough was peaceful. It 
 denounced the expedition as an attempt 
 to deprive the inhabitants of their most 
 sacred rights. It proclaimed the war 
 as waged by the North to be one ol 
 subjugation — " a war forced upon us in 
 Avrong, and prosecuted without right and 
 in a spirit of vengeful wickedness, with- 
 out a parallel in the history of warfare 
 among civilized nations." It was a war 
 of "avarice and ambitiou." "I call," 
 said the governor, " upon the brave and 
 patriotic men of our State to volunteer 
 from the mountains to the sea." Such 
 were the sentiments which, at this stage 
 of the Avai', prevailed respectively in the 
 North and in the South. It was useless 
 to cry " Peace " ; for there was none, and 
 there was to be none for three weaiy and 
 sadly eventful years. 
 
 New Berne was the next place singled 
 out for attack. For that purpose all 
 necessary preparations were made. Ro- 
 anoke Island was now the basis of ope- 
 rations. There the troops concentrated ; 
 and there the scattered vessels of the 
 fleet congregated. As Goldsborough 
 had been ordered back to Hampton 
 Roads, the naval portion of the new 
 expedition was entrusted to the care of 
 Commodore Rowan. On the 11th Mar. 
 of March, after taking on board !'• 
 some fifteen thousand troops. Rowan, 
 with Burnside on board, rendezvoused 
 at Hatteras Inlet. Early the following 
 morning the entire fleet, including the 
 transports, sailed from the inlet, mak- 
 ing for Slocum's Creek, about twelve 
 miles above which, on the Neuse Rivei'. 
 
13% 
 
 COAST OPERATIONS IN 1862. 
 
 where it is joiued by the Trent, stands 
 the to^vn of New Berne. 
 
 New Berne is a small township, the 
 capital of Craven County. It contained 
 at that time about six thousand inhab- 
 itants. It had a good harbor, leading 
 to the Atlantic Ocean, through Ocracoke 
 Inlet ; and as it was connected with the 
 great commercial centres by railroad, it 
 did a good business both by land and 
 sea. It was very justly regarded by 
 the North as a point of considerable 
 strategic importance. 
 
 Early on the morning of the 1 3th, the 
 Marl entire force having arrived the 
 *5« night previous, the troops began 
 to land off Slocum's Creek, under cover 
 of the gunboats. The landing was ef- 
 fected " with the greatest enthusiasm 
 on the part of the troops," wrote Bum- 
 side in his report. "Many, too impa- 
 tient for the boats, leaped into the water 
 and waded waist-deep to the shore, and 
 then, after a toilsome march through the 
 mud, the head of the column marched 
 within a mile and a half of the enemy's 
 stronghold, at eight P. M., a distance of 
 *^welve miles from the point of landing, 
 where we bivouacked for the night, the 
 rear of the column coming up with the 
 boat howitzers about three o'clock next 
 morning, the detention being caused by 
 the shocking condition of the roads, 
 consequent upon the heavy rain that 
 had fallen during that day and the 
 whole of the night, the men often wad- 
 ing knee-deep in mud, and requiring a 
 rt^hole regiment to drag the eight pieces 
 which had been landed from the navy 
 and our own vessels." The gunboats 
 moved up the river abreast of the army, 
 
 the flag-ship Delaware leading the way. 
 The main body of the Confederates was 
 under the command of General Branch, 
 and consisted of eight regiments of in- 
 fantry, five hundred cavalry, and three 
 batteries of field artillery of six guns 
 each. These were posted within a line of 
 intrenchments, extending from near the 
 river across the railroad and turnpike, 
 of more than a mile in length. On their 
 left they were protected by Fort Thomp- 
 son, which was armed with thirteen 
 heavy guns. This work commanded, 
 also, the channel of the river. On the 
 light there was a long succession of 
 rifle-pits, curvettes and i-edans terminat- 
 ing in a two-o^un redoubt. These works 
 were a little over four miles from the 
 town of New Berne. Burnside marched 
 his army in three divisions. General 
 Foster, with the first brigade, marched 
 along the main county I'oad, to attack 
 Fort Thompson and the Confederate 
 left. General Reno, with the second 
 brigade, followed more upon tlie line 
 of railroad, with the view of striking 
 the Confederate right. General Parke, 
 with the third brigade, followed in such 
 a manner that he might be able to at- 
 tack in front or sujiport either or both 
 brigades, as circumstances might re- 
 quire. 
 
 About seven o'clock, on the morning 
 of the 14th, the skirmishers of the Mar, 
 National army came into contact !*• 
 with the Confederate outposts. Gen- 
 eral Burnside rode to the front with his 
 staff. Scarcely had he appeared in view 
 of the enemy's breastwork, when a shell 
 fell within a few feet of himself and 
 party, splashing them with mud, but, 
 
NEW BERNE. 
 
 133 
 
 as it did not explode, doing no further 
 damage. The regiments were quickly 
 in their respective positions. General 
 Foster arranged his brigade in line of 
 battle along the fringe of the woods, 
 skirting the edge of the field before the 
 breastwork. The Twenty-Fourth Mas- 
 sachusetts, Colonel Stevenson, was on 
 the extreme right. The Twenty-Fifth 
 Massachusetts, Colonel Upton, was 
 next, with its left resting on the road. 
 Next to this again was the Twenty- 
 Ninth Massachusetts, Colonel Lee, with 
 its right resting on the road. The 
 Twenty-third Massachusetts was on the 
 extreme left of the brigade, with the 
 Tenth Connecticut in reserve. The 
 National artillery had only partially 
 arrived on the battle-ground ; and con- 
 sequently there were only a few pieces 
 with which to oppose the numerous and 
 powerful guns of the enemy. On the 
 extreme right of Foster's position was 
 McCook's battery of boat howitzers, 
 manned by Lieutenants McCook, Ham- 
 mond, Daniels, and Tillotson, with ma- 
 rines and a detachment of the Union 
 Coast Guard. In the centre, and near 
 the road, was a 12-pounder steel gun 
 from the Cossack, manned by Captain 
 Bennett and twenty of his ship's crew. 
 On the left was Captain Dayton's bat- 
 tery, from the transport Highlander. 
 The second brigade, under General 
 Reno, and the third brigade, under 
 General Parke, maintained the positions 
 as^^igned to them in the line of march, 
 as above described. 
 
 It was about eight o'clock when the 
 V)attle was fairly begun. Foster's bri- 
 gade was the first to feel the effect of 
 
 the enemy's fire. After the first shot 
 the Confederates ran their flag defiantly 
 lip over the ramparts; and from the 
 many mouths of their powerful guns 
 they poured forth a perfect storm of 
 round-shot, grape, canister, and shell, 
 Their infantry, which were stationed in 
 front of the works, and extended the 
 entire length between the river and the 
 railroad, kept up a brisk and steady 
 fire of musketry. The fight from the 
 commencement was severe. It was not 
 long until several of the regiments lost 
 some of their principal officers. At the 
 place where the Confederate intrench- 
 raents crossed the railroad, the struggle, 
 for a time, was terrific. For nearly 
 four hours the brigade of Foster bore 
 the brunt of the battle, the regiments 
 one and all covering themselves with 
 glory. General Parke, with his third 
 brigade, following out the instructions 
 of Burnside, had been supporting Fos- 
 ter. It was now evident that the latter 
 could hold his ground against the ene- 
 my; and Parke, still carrying out jhe 
 original arrangement, withdrew his 
 troops and moved to the support of 
 Reno, who, with his brigade, was suc- 
 cessfully cariying out his flank move- 
 ment against the Confederate right. It 
 deserves to be noted here that General 
 Reno experienced unexpected difficulty 
 in carrying out his part of the plan of 
 attack. It was not known that the line 
 of intrenchments extended beyond the 
 railroad, at least to any distance. When, 
 therefore, the National troops attempted 
 to get to the rear of the enemy, they dis- 
 covered not merely all but impassable 
 swamps, but redoubts and rifle-pits 
 
 »io 
 
134 
 
 COAST OPERATIONS IN 1862. 
 
 which temporarily checked their pro- 
 gress. Happily, an attack on the right 
 had not been suspected by the Confede- 
 rates, their whole strength being centred 
 on the left wing. As soon, however, as 
 they discovered what was going on an 
 ,the right, they hurried forward a suffi- 
 <'ient number of men to reinforce the 
 Jedoubts and to defend the rifle-pits, 
 a-lter he had been joined by Parke, 
 ^eno resolved to make a bold advance 
 on the enemy's works. The Twenty- 
 First Massachusetts, Colonel Clarke, 
 was ordered to charge. With the speed 
 of lightning they rushed forward, and 
 were soon inside the intrenchments. 
 They had taken possession of the guns 
 and were actually attempting to turn 
 them against the enemy, when, the Con- 
 federates being reinforced, they were 
 driven back, with the loss oi some of 
 their men, who were made prisoners. 
 The repulse, however, was but moment- 
 ary. Re-forming, and being joined by 
 the New York Fifty-First, the Fourth 
 Rhode Island, and the Ninth New Jer- 
 sey, with the Fifth Rhode Island in re- 
 serve, they returned to the assault ; and 
 after a terrible hand-to-hand fight, in 
 which victory trembled in the balance, 
 the works remained in the hands of the 
 Nationals, the Confederates being com- 
 pletely routed and chased at the point 
 of the bayonet back out of sight. In 
 the fierce struggle over the ramparts, the 
 Twenty-First Massachusetts especially 
 distinguished themselves ; and in making 
 the victory complete, gallant service was 
 rendered by the Fifth Rhode Island and 
 the Eighth and Eleventh Connecticut. 
 While this struggle was going on, Reno 
 
 was greatly annoyed by another batterj 
 which was doing most destructive work. 
 Calling up his reserve regiment, the 
 Fifty- First Pennsylvania, Colonel Hart 
 ranft, he ordered it to charge. The or- 
 ders were promptly obeyed, and the 
 work was gallantly done. Meanwhile 
 the cheering on the National left had 
 attracted the attention of Foster on the 
 right. It was impossible for him any 
 longer to restrain his men. Cotning out 
 from their position along the edge of 
 the woods, they dashed across the fields 
 and assailed the enemy at the very muz- 
 zles of their guns. It was a perilous 
 movement. It might have resulted in 
 terrible slaughter. But the retreat on 
 their right flank had created a panic in 
 the Confederate ranks. There was no 
 more fight in them. Leaving their guns 
 unspiked, their caissons and their unex- 
 pended ammunition, with a number of 
 horses, they fled ingloriously towards 
 the Trent. Foster pursued ; but when 
 he reached the verge of the river, the 
 enemy had crossed and burned both the 
 railroad and turnpike bridges in their 
 rear. Such was what is known as the 
 battle of New Bei'ne. The captin-e of 
 the town of that name followed as a 
 matter of course. 
 
 The National squadron had taken an 
 active part in the contest, and contrib- 
 uted not a little towards securing the 
 victory. It lent effective aid in driving 
 the Confederates out of Fort Thompson 
 and the other batteries on the shoi'e. 
 These being evacuated, and the National 
 flag left floating over them, the gun- 
 boats passed the obstructions in the 
 river and moved up toward the town. 
 
FORT MACON. 
 
 135 
 
 On tlieir arrival they found that it had 
 been fired in no fewer than seven places 
 by the fleeing Confederates, and that it 
 was almost completely deserted. On 
 the day of the battle the teiTor-stricken 
 inhabitants had fled by the thousand. 
 General Foster's brigade was taken over 
 to the city wharves by some of Rowan's 
 gunboats. General Burnside established 
 his headquarters at the fine old mansion 
 of the Stanley family, in the suburbs 
 Mar. of the town. On the following 
 '5t day he issued an order appointing 
 General Foster military governor of the 
 place, and ordered that the churches be 
 opened on Sunday, the Kith, in order 
 that the chaplains of the difi^erent regi- 
 ments might hold divine service therein. 
 The bells were to ring as usual. On 
 the same day he issued an oi'der con- 
 gratulating his troops on their "bril- 
 liant and hard- won victory," and di- 
 recting every regiment to place the name 
 of New Berne on its banner. In his 
 report he gave General McClellan the 
 credit of planning the expedition. " I 
 have endeavored," he said, " to carry 
 out the very minute instructions given 
 me l)y him before leaving Annapolis, 
 and thus far events have been singu- 
 larly coincident with his anticij^ations." 
 In a work in which McClellan's conduct 
 is fairly and candidly criticised, it gives 
 us pleasure to be able to record this 
 ti'ibute to his genius. 
 
 By this victory the Nationals not only 
 captured New Berne, and secured all 
 the advantages which the possession of 
 such a place implied, but eight batteiues, 
 mounting forty-six heavy guns, three 
 batteries of light artillery, twd a large 
 
 amount of stores of all kinds. Burn- 
 side's loss was ninety-one killed and 
 four hundred and sixty-six wounded. 
 The Confederate loss, according to their 
 own statement, was ninety-four killed, 
 one hundred and one wounded, and 
 four hundred and thirteen missing. Ita 
 moral effect on both sides was gi-eat. 
 It cheered the hearts of the Northern 
 people. It greatly discouraged the 
 South. 
 
 Burnside's next movement was against 
 Fort Macon. This was an old fortress 
 of the United States. It had be^n 
 seized by the authorities of North Caro- 
 lina at the commencement of the war. 
 It stands on a long ridge of sand, called 
 Bogue Island, and is separated from 
 the mainland by Bogue Sound, which 
 is navigable for vessels of light ton. 
 nage. On the side of Beaufort harlior, 
 at the terminus of the railway from Ne\^ 
 Berne, is Morehead City. On the op 
 posite or northern side of the harboi' in 
 Beaufort, the capital of Carteret County, 
 an old and pleasant town, and, as al 
 ready described, a favorite summer re 
 treat for the aristocracy of North Caro- 
 lina. Fort Macon commanded the har- 
 bor of Beaufort; and as the Confede- 
 rates had been making free use of the 
 harbor in introducing contraband goods 
 by means of foreign vessels, it was 
 deemed necessary, in oixier to the effi- 
 ciency of the blockade, that that sti 'ig- 
 hold should be reduced. 
 
 Immediately after the capture of IS !W 
 Berne, Burnside made all necessary ar- 
 rangements for the reduction of the 
 fort. He placed the expedition in 
 charge of General Parke, General Reno 
 
136 
 
 COAST OPERATIONS IN 1862. 
 
 havins: been sent to make some further 
 demonstrations in the rear of Norfolk. 
 Mar. Nine days after the fall of New 
 
 2't» Berne, Parke having been con- 
 veyed, with his troops, by water to 
 Slocum's Creek, and having marched 
 thence acioss the country, proceeded to 
 Mar. invest Morehead City. On the 
 
 25. 25th of March, a detachment com- 
 posed of the Fourth Rhode Island and 
 the Eighth Connecticut entered Beau- 
 fort without opposition. A flag was 
 gent to Fort Macon, demanding its sur- 
 render. The place was in charge of 
 Colonel Moses T. White, a nephew of 
 Jefferson Davis. White declared that 
 he would not yield until he had eaten 
 his last biscuit and slain his last horse. 
 Parke made immediate and vigorous 
 preparations to take the fort by storm. 
 A reconnoisance was made in force on 
 Ipril the 11th of April; and suitable 
 
 *J» points Avere selected for jslanting 
 siege guns. The garrison was closely 
 watched, as it was feared that in their 
 desperation they might make a fierce 
 sortie. Ordnance and ordnance stores 
 were brought over on rafts fi'om Caro- 
 lina City ; and batteries were construct- 
 ed behind sand hills on Bogue Spit. 
 Gunboats liad been provided; and it was 
 arranged that they should co-operate 
 with the batteries on the island. There 
 were three batteries. The fii'st was 
 under Lieutenant Flagler of the New 
 York Third Artillery. It was fourteen 
 hundred yai'ds from the fort, was well 
 covered by a large sand hill, and mount- 
 ed four ten-inch mortars. The second 
 was under Captain Lewis J. Morris of 
 the Fu-st Regular Artillery. It was 
 
 about two hundred yards in advance of 
 the first, and mounted three long thirty- 
 pound Parrott guns. The third was in 
 charge of Lieutenant Prouty of the 
 Third New York Artillery. It was 
 one hundred yards nearer the fort than 
 the second, and mounted four eight-inch 
 mortars. Communications between the 
 batteries were established by cutting 
 trenches in the sand and skirting the hil- 
 locks. To guard against any sortie which 
 the garrison might be tempted to make,* 
 sharpshooters were posted in rifle-pits on 
 both flanks and in front. The gunboats 
 which were to take part in the attack 
 were the Daylight (flag-ship), Commanti- 
 er Lockwood ; the State of Georgia, 
 Commander Armstrong; the Chi])pewa, 
 Lieutenant Bryson ; and the barque 
 Gemsbok, Lieutenant Cavendish, 
 
 When the arrangements were com- 
 pleted, Burnside came doAvn from New 
 Berne. On the 24th, under a flag April 
 of truce, he had an interview with 24. 
 Colonel White, and summoned him to 
 surrender. White peremptorily refused, 
 declaring that he had been placed in 
 command of the fort, and that he would 
 defend it to the extent of his abil- April 
 ity. On the morning of the 25th, 25. 
 at six o'clock, Burnside ordered the 
 gunboats within range of the fort. Or- 
 ders were then given for both gunboats 
 and batteries to open fire. For half an 
 hour no response came from the fort. 
 Suddenly, howevei', thei'e were a series 
 of flashes, a succession of loud reports, 
 and the deadly missiles fell thick and 
 fast among the gunboats and close by 
 the batteries. From that time till four 
 o'clock in the afternoon the firing c<ju- 
 
FORT PULASKI. 
 
 13? 
 
 tinued on both sides without iutermis- 
 ision. For a time it was wild and inef- 
 fective ; but gradually the range on 
 either side was attained with increasing 
 accuracy ; and the shot and shell began 
 to strike more frequently in the near 
 neighborhood of the hostile positions. 
 By midday the effect of the fire from 
 the batteries was distinctly visible on 
 the fort. The gunboats, after the first 
 hour and a half, were withdrawn, a 
 southwest wind disturbing the waters 
 and making it difficult for them to ma- 
 noeuvre \vith ease and accuracy. During 
 the course of the day there was some 
 splendid work done by the National 
 gunners, Lieutenant Prouty, with his 
 eight-inch mortar battery, particularly 
 distinguishing himself by the accuracy 
 of his aim. An eye-witness tells us 
 that the scene was grandest about two 
 o'clock. " A flash and a puff of smoke 
 
 betokened a dischar 
 
 -ge; 
 
 an interval 
 
 elapsed, which terminated with the re- 
 port of the piece ; then came the sonor- 
 ous hum of the shell as it flew through 
 the air; another puff of smoke, soon 
 followed by a second report, and the 
 deadly missile had exploded." Shortly 
 after four o'clock a white flag was dis- 
 played on the fort ; and the firing ceas- 
 ed. Before ten o'clock next morning 
 Fort Macon was in the possession of 
 the National forces, and General Burn- 
 side had the double gratification of see- 
 ing the old banner of the republic and 
 the new colors of his own Fifth Rhode 
 Islanders, just presented them by the 
 women of Providence, unfurled over its 
 battered walls. 
 
 Burnside had, indeed, much to be 
 
 proud of. For the present, at least, he 
 seemed to lee a favorite child of fortune. 
 Since the day he left Annapolis every- 
 thing had gone well with him. He had 
 restored thf^ supremacy of the Union 
 in Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds, and 
 in their adjoining creeks and bays ; 
 he had captured New Berne, and, by 
 the I'eduction of Fort Macon, he had 
 destroyed the Confederate power in the 
 harbor of Beaufort. Good luck seemed 
 to attend his generals as well as him- 
 self; for while Parke was nailing vic- 
 tory to the National standard at Bogue 
 Island, Reno, equally sucoessful, had 
 won a splendid victory over the Con- 
 federates at South Mills, near Camden 
 Court House. The occupation of the 
 different places from Beaufort and New 
 Berne in the south to Wiuton and Ply- 
 mouth and Washington, at the head of 
 the Pamlico River, in the north, greatly 
 scattered Burnside's troops, and made 
 it impossible for him, unless reinforced, 
 to make any further aggressive efforts. 
 In the present condition of things at 
 Washington, reinforcement for such a 
 purpose was out of the question. Mc- 
 Clellan, who had been compelled to 
 fall l)ack from before Richmond, was 
 lying Mt Harrison's Landing ; and such 
 men as Burnside were needed nearer 
 headquarters. He was summoned to 
 Fortress Monroe, with all the forces he 
 could collect, on July 17th. General 
 Foster was left in command of the de^ 
 partment. 
 
 In a previous chapter we have given 
 an account of the expedition under 
 General T. W. Sherman and Commodoi-e 
 Dupont. At fii'st this expedition wa» 
 
J8 
 
 COAST OPEKATIONS IN 1862. 
 
 attended Avith great success. With the 
 exception of two forts — Foirt Pulaski, 
 at the mouth of the Savannah River, 
 and Fort Jackson, up the river and near 
 the town of Savannah — the entire coast 
 from Warsaw Sound below the Savan- 
 nah River to the North Edisto, well up 
 towards Charleston, was, at the close of 
 18G1, under the control of the National 
 forces. At the same time, this expedi- 
 tion did not fulfill its high promise. 
 In place of moving against the enemy 
 in the interior, and making a bold effort 
 to captiu'e Savannah and Charleston, 
 Sherman remained in his encampments 
 in the neighborhood of Port Royal, 
 busying himself with the construction 
 of iutrenchments, as if defense had been 
 the main object of the expedition. It is 
 l)ut just, however, to say in vindication 
 of Greneral Sherman that he had not 
 been instructed to press his advantages, 
 and that, with the forces at his com- 
 mand, he was not in a position to attack, 
 with any great hope of success, either 
 Savannah or Chai-leston. Still, the 
 panic which followed the fall of Port 
 Royal and the victory at Port Royal 
 FeiTy was such that more daring meas- 
 ures might have been crowned with 
 greater victories. 
 
 Dupont had made several unsuccess- 
 ful attempts to reach Savannah by way 
 of Warsaw Sound, and by means of the 
 creeks which al)ound in that region. 
 He had at last succeeded in getting 
 possession of Dawfuskie Island, which, 
 in its southeastern extremity, commands 
 the entrance to the Savannah River. 
 Here he had stationed some gunboats, 
 with a detachment of troops. It was 
 
 felt, however, that the one thing to be 
 done was the reduction of Fort Pulaski. 
 How was this to be accomplished ? It 
 was, as we have had occasion to remark, 
 in a previous chapter, one of the strong- 
 est works on the Atlantic seaboard. 
 Its peculiar position made bombard- 
 ment extremely difficult. It was the 
 opinion of General Quincy A. Gillmore, 
 General Sherman's chief engineer, that 
 the place could be successfully attacked 
 by batteries of rifled guns and mortars 
 placed oh Big Tybee Island, which lies 
 to the southeast of Cockspur, on which 
 the fort stood, and on the opposite side 
 of the narrow channel. It was also his 
 opinion that very effective aid might 
 be given from a battery on Venus Point, 
 on Jones' Island, two miles from Cock- 
 spur in the opposite direction. Big 
 Tybee Island, as we have already seen, 
 was occupied by the Nationals towards 
 the close of 1861. The question now 
 was, how to get to Venus Point, on 
 Jones' Island, the entire entrance being 
 so completely commanded by the guns 
 of the fort. Information was given by 
 some negroes to the effect that there 
 was a channel which connected Cali- 
 bogue Sound with the Savannah River. 
 The information was found to be cor- 
 rect, the two being connected by an 
 artificial channel, some two hundred 
 yards in length, called Wall's Cut. 
 This channel had been obstructed by 
 three rows of piles and by a sunken 
 brig. At high tide, however, the 
 water rose above these obstructions 
 some ten feet. The reconnoitring par- 
 ty had, therefore, no difficulty in get 
 ting over. Aixangements wei'e imnie 
 
THE SURRENDER. 
 
 139 
 
 diately made for the removal of these 
 obstructions. 
 
 It was also ascertained that the Sa- 
 vannah River might be reached by way 
 of' Warsaw Sound, Wilmington Nar- 
 rows, and St. Augustine's Creek, al- 
 though the creek was greatly obstruct- 
 ed. Means of access to the Savannah 
 River, in the rear of Fort Pulaski, hav- 
 ing thus been discovered, Sherman pro- 
 ceeded at once to construct batteries on 
 all the available points. A body of 
 men under the immediate command of 
 General Viele succeeded in reaching 
 Jones' Island by way of Wall's Cut, and 
 there, on Venus Point, they built an 
 earthwork, mounting it with heavy 
 guns, and giving it the name of Battery 
 Vulcan. Jones' Island is a mere marsh ; 
 and the guns, which were three tons 
 each, had to be brought across its entire 
 width. It was a labor of extreme dif- 
 ficulty. The weather was stormy ; and 
 the nights were dark. Not unfrequently 
 did the men work waist-deep in the 
 slushy morass ; and it was no uncommon 
 thing for the guns to slip off the rough 
 corduroy road and sink deep in the 
 mire. In spite of all difficulties, how- 
 ever, the work was completed at Venus 
 Feb. Point, on the 11th of February, 
 '1' It was found that this single bat- 
 tery did not completely command the 
 Savannah River. Two other batteries 
 were therefore erected — one on the 
 northeast extremity of Long Island, 
 and another on flats at the north of 
 Mud River. These batteries so com- 
 manded the' Savannah as to completely 
 cut off all communications between Sa- 
 vannah City and Fort Pulaski The 
 
 Confederate gunboats also found it con- 
 venient to remain at a distance. As 
 early as the 2 2d of February, peb, 
 when these works were all com- 22. 
 pleted. Fort Pulaski was in a condition 
 of absolute blockade. 
 
 The next thing to be done was the 
 erection of siege batteries on the north- 
 west face of Big Tybee Island, opposite 
 the fort. Tybee Island, like all the 
 ground in the neighborhood, is a huge 
 marsh. Its soil, where not actually un- 
 der water, is a species of mud jelly. 
 All the difficulties experienced on Jones 
 Island were experienced here in an ag- 
 gravated form. The guns, which were 
 all heavy— eight and ten-inch colum- 
 biads, ten and thirteen-inch mortars, 
 and rifles of large calibre — had to be 
 di'agged two miles over such ground. 
 Difficulties, however, did not hinder the 
 progress of the work. On the 9th jprji 
 of April General Gillmore, who 9. 
 was in command, had completed his 
 preparations. Eleven batteries, mount- 
 ing in all some thirty-six guns, were in 
 readiness to open fire on the fort; and 
 on that day the commanding general 
 gave minute instructions as to the work- 
 ing of the guns, and notified his troops 
 that, if the garrison did not in the mean- 
 time surrender, he should open fire at 
 daybreak the following day. 
 
 General Hunter had succeeded Gen- 
 eral Sherman in command of the depart- 
 ment. On the evening of the 8th he 
 arrived at Tybee. On the morning of 
 the 10th, at sunrise. Lieutenant April 
 J. H. Wilson was sent to the fort **• 
 with a message from the general-in- 
 chief to the commander of the garrison. 
 
140 
 
 COAST OPERATIONS IN" 1862. 
 
 1 
 
 Colonel Charles H. Olmstead, calling 
 upon him to surrender. The answer 
 was as prompt as it was brief. "1 am 
 here," said the colonel, " to defend this 
 fort, not to surrender it." At a quarter 
 past eight o'clock the batteries opened 
 fire. Fort Pulaski, as we have already 
 said, had the reputation of being one of 
 the strongest forts on the Atlantic coast. 
 It was well mounted ; and its walls 
 were seven and a half feet thick. The 
 National batteries were planted at dif- 
 ferent distances — the nearest being 
 about a mile from the fort, the most 
 distant about two miles. Three min- 
 utes after the first shot was fired by 
 the Nationals, the Confederates replied 
 from a ten-inch barbette gun. The fir- 
 ing then became general; and for the 
 remainder of the day it was maintained 
 with great spirit on both sides. The 
 day was not far advanced when it be- 
 came manifest that the masonry of the 
 fort could not long resist the terrible 
 pounding of the batteries. Long before 
 night came on, the rifles had honey- 
 combed the walls, the sho^ at sixteen 
 hundred and fifty yards, the distance 
 of the nearest rifle-battery, penetrating 
 the walls to a depth, of from twenty to 
 twenty-six inches ; and the ten-inch sol- 
 id shot, which struck with less velocity, 
 fell, as an eye-witness puts it, like a 
 trip-hammer, battering to pieces the 
 damaged masonry. It was Gillmore's 
 opinion, after he had seen the efi^ect of 
 his guns, that, if he had known, he 
 might have completed his preparations 
 in one week instead of two, and con- 
 tented himself with placing his nearest 
 battery at twenty -five hundred yards. 
 
 When darkness fell, five of the guns of 
 the fortress were silenced, and the fir- 
 ing generally had become feeble. All 
 night long four of Gillmore's guns fii-ed 
 at intervals of fifteen or twenty min- 
 utes. On the morning of the 11th, \pf\\ 
 at sunrise, the firing from the bat- "• 
 teries was commenced afresh, and con- 
 tinued with great vigor. A yawning 
 breach began to be visible in the south- 
 east angle of the fort ; y6t the garrison 
 gallantly maintained the fight until two 
 o'clock. A practicable breach had been 
 made ; and Olmstead perceived that 
 " it was impossible to hold out any 
 longer, as the rifle-shots were fast work- 
 ing their way into the magazines, and 
 as many of his guns were disabled." 
 He accordingly raised the white flag, 
 and placed himself and garrison uncon 
 ditionally at the mercy of the conqueror. 
 Forty-seven guns, a large supply of fixed 
 ammunition, forty thousand pounds of 
 powder, large quantities of commissary 
 stores, and three hundred and ninety 
 prisoners, constituted the spoils of victo- 
 ry. The Nationals had one man killed. 
 The Confederates had thiee wounded. 
 At Fort Pulaski a striking illustration 
 was given of the power and efficiency 
 of modern artillery. It had always been 
 supposed that such walls could not be 
 successfully breached at distances great- 
 er than eight hundred yards. The near- 
 est battery, as we have seen, was dis- 
 tant from the fort at least sixteen hun- 
 dred and fifty yards. 
 
 It was the general expectation at 
 Savannah that Fort Jackson would be 
 immediately attacked, and that the fort 
 and Savannah itseli would both be sur» 
 
THE NATIONAL POWER SUPREME. 
 
 141 
 
 rendered. Nothing of the kind was 
 intended. It would have been a useless 
 waste of the National forces to employ 
 them in garrisoning Fort Jackson and 
 in occupying Savannah. With Fort 
 Pulaski in their possession, the Nation- 
 als commanded the entrance to the 
 river — the blockade of Savannah was 
 complete ; and this was all that was im- 
 mediately contemplated. 
 
 While these events were progressing 
 at the mouth of the Savannah, Commo- 
 dore Dupont and General Wright were 
 making rajiid and easy conquests along 
 ihe coast of Florida. Dupont had left 
 Feb. Port Royal on the 28th of Feb- 
 
 28. ruary, with twenty armed vessels 
 and six transports, filled with troops ; 
 Mar. ^iid on the 1st of March he ar- 
 
 i' rived in St. Andrew's Sound, 
 north of Cumberland and St. Andrew's 
 Islands. As but little if any resistance 
 was offered, it is unnecessary in a work 
 of this kind to do more than note the 
 lesults of this expedition. Fort Clinch 
 ;ind the adjoining village were found 
 deserted ; and Duj)ont was able to write 
 to the secretary of the navy, "We cap- 
 tured Port Royal, but Fernandina and 
 Fort Clinch have been given to us." 
 Brunswick, the terminus of the Bruns- 
 wick and Pensacola Railroad, were 
 taken possession of with equal ease. 
 Jacksonville followed, but not until a 
 wicked attempt had been made by the 
 Confederates to destroy it by fire. Fort 
 Marion and the ancient city of St. Au- 
 gustine, a little further do^vn the coast, 
 Mar. were sun-endered to Commander 
 
 »»• C. R. P. Rodgers, on the 11th of 
 March. Pensacola was soon after aban- 
 
 doned by the Confederate General T. 
 N. Jones, who burnt whatever he could 
 at the navy yard, at the hospital, and 
 in Forts McRae and Barrancas, before 
 he retreated into the interior. On the 
 2 7th of March Dupont returned to Mar, 
 Port Royal, when he found that 27. 
 Skiddaway and Green Islands had been 
 abandoned by the Confederates, thus 
 leaving Warsaw and Ossabaw Sounds 
 and the Vernon and Wilmington Rivers 
 open to the National foi'ces. Edisto 
 Island had been captured as early feh, 
 as tlie 11th of February. Thus !'• 
 it was that on the first anniversary of 
 the attack on Fort Sumtei', the entire 
 Atlantic and Gulf coast, from Cape 
 Hatteras to Perdido Bay, excepting only 
 the harbor of Charleston and its imme- 
 diate surroundings, had been abandoned 
 by the Confederates, and that along 
 that whole line the National power was 
 supreme. 
 
 In a previous chapter we have men- 
 tioned the fact that after the ca])ture of 
 Hatteras Island, Genei'al Butler hurried 
 to Washington for the purpose of in- 
 ducing the government not to abandon 
 the conquest which he had made, but 
 to leave a certain numljer of troops on 
 the island. General Butler's advice was 
 taken, as we have seen ; and he himself 
 was commissioned by the secretary of 
 war to go to New England and "raise, 
 arm and uniform a volunteer foi'ce for 
 the war," to be composed of six regi- 
 ments. In this the general was com- 
 pletely successful. As early as Jan. 
 the 13th of January, 1862, he had 13. 
 a conference with Secretary Stanton, 
 then newly installed as war secretary ip 
 
 2il 
 
143 
 
 MEMPHIS AND NEW ORLEANS. 
 
 room of Mr. Cameron. The result of 
 this conference was a determination on 
 the part of the government to make a 
 vigorous effort to capture New Orleans, 
 and so take possession of the Lower 
 Feb. Mississippi. On the 25th of Feb- 
 25. ruary, General Butler embarked 
 at Hampton Roads, accompanied by his 
 wife, his staff, and fourteen hundred 
 troops, in the steamship Mississippi. 
 
 On the 20th of March, after a stormy 
 and penlous voyage, he reached jjap. 
 Ship Island, and commenced those 20. 
 preparations which resulted, through 
 the united efforts of himself and Com- 
 modore Farragut, in the capture of the 
 Queen City of the South. The story 
 of the capture of New Orleans, how- 
 ever, must be reserved for another 
 chapter. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 Memphis and New Orleans. — Island No. 10. — Confederate Grief. — Fort Pillow. — General Villepigue. — Jeff. 
 Thompson. — Foote and His Flotilla. — General Pope. — Hollins. — Pope Recalled to Corinth. — Foote Left Alons 
 at Fort Pillow, — Foote's Wound making Retirement Necessary. — C. H. Davis takes Command of the Flotilla.^ 
 Activity of Hollins.— The Fight Commenced.— The Boiler of the McRae Penetrated.— The White Flag.— The 
 Losses on Both Sides. — EUet and His " Ram "-Squadron. — Flight of the Confederates. — The Effect of the Fall 
 of Corinth. — The Fort Occupied by the Nationals. — Occupation of Fort Randolph. — Memphis Unprotected on 
 the North. — The Gunboats at the Levee. — The Memorable Sixth of June. — The National Fleet in Motion.—- 
 The Opening of the Fight. — The Queen of the West. — The Monarch. — The Queen and the Price. — The Fighting 
 General. — The Queen badly Injured. — The Lovell Shattered to Pieces and Sunk. — One Half-Hom-'s Work. — A 
 Grand and Impressive Scene. — The Last Hope of Memphis Perished. — Surrender of Memphis. — Memphis 
 Occupied by the Union Troops. — Fitch Appointed Provost-Marshal. — Another Obstruction. — New Orleans. — 
 The Key-Position of the Great Valley. — Naval Expedition. — David G. Farragut. — Stanton's Energy. — Farragut 
 at Ship Island. — His Instructions. — Butler and the Land Force. — Porter and His Gunboats. — All things Ready 
 for a Combined Movement. — The Difficulties. — Forts St. Philip and Jackson. — The River Chain. — The 
 Louisiana. — The Manassas. — Twiggs and Lovell^Higgins. — The Confidence of the South. — All things in 
 Readiness for an Assault. — The Plan. — Porter's Device. — The Bombardment Commenced. — Fort Jackson 
 Fires the First Shot. — Terrible Fighting. — Farragut's Resolve. — The Chain Across the River Cut. — One Thou- 
 sand Shells. — The Fleet Pas.ses the Obstructions. — Farragut on the Fore-Rigging of the Hartford. — Passing 
 the Forts. — The Ram Manassas. — The Fire-Rafts. — Bailey and Boggs. — The Varuna. — The Battle Ended.^ 
 Brief, but Desperate and Destructive. — The Evacuation of the Forts. — The Louisiana Set on Fire by Her 
 Commander. — The Intention. — The River in Flames. — New Orleans Hemmed In. — A Thunder-Storm. — Call 
 for Surrender. — The Mayor's Reply. — Landing of the Marines. — The National Flag Waving over New 
 Orleans. — Butler in Charge of the City. — Honor to the Brave. 
 
 (662. 
 
 Rightly to appreciate the actual state 
 of things in the valley of the Mis- 
 sissippi, and intelligently to fol- 
 low the events Avhich will be recorded 
 in the immediately succeeding chapters, 
 the reader must now give his attention 
 
 to certain naval operations which, in the 
 interest of the National cause, had been 
 successfully conducted on two separate 
 portions of the lower section of the 
 great western river. Memphis, as we 
 have already had occasion to remark. 
 
FORT PILLOW. 
 
 143 
 
 Bad fallen ; and General Wallace had 
 May there established his headquarters. 
 •• On the 1st of May, two days after 
 the occupation of Corinth by the Nation- 
 al troops, New Orleans had yielded to 
 the strategy and daring of Farragut; and 
 the old flag was floating over the largest 
 and in some respects most important city 
 of the Confederacy. After the capture 
 of New Orleans and the fall of Mem- 
 phis, Vicksburg was the one remaining 
 stronghold of any importance which 
 obstructed the free navigation of the 
 Mississippi from St. Louis to the sea. 
 Let us see how it came to pass that 
 both Memphis and New Orleans were 
 Wrenched from the hands of the Con- 
 federates. 
 
 In a previous chapter we have given 
 a somewhat detailed account of the op- 
 erations, by land and water, which re- 
 sulted in the capture and occupation of 
 Island No. 10. The fall of that island 
 was felt by the Confederates to be one 
 of the deadliest blows which they had 
 yet received. It was one of the strong- 
 est places on the river, richly supplied 
 with all the material of war ; and eveiy- 
 thing fell into the victors' hands. It 
 was openly confessed by the Confede- 
 rates themselves, amid much grief and 
 lamentation, that no single battle had 
 yet afforded the North such visible 
 fruits of victory as had been gathered 
 at Island No. 10. It was not, however, 
 solely on account of the number of men 
 who had been made prisoners, or be- 
 cause of the vast quantity of arms and 
 ammunition which had become the spoil 
 < )f the victorious Nationals, that the Con- 
 federates were filled with grief. They 
 
 had another cause for sorrow. Memphis, 
 the most important city on the Mississip- 
 pi between St. Louis and New Orleans, 
 was virtually left undefended. Fort 
 Pillow, it is true, remained ; but Fort 
 Pillow, strong as it was, could scarcely 
 be expected long to resist the captors 
 of Forts Henry and Donelson and Co- 
 lumbus, now flushed with success from 
 their fresh triumph at Island No. 10. 
 
 The Confederates, however, were nei- 
 ther without the means nor without the 
 spirit to offer the invaders a stubborn 
 resistance. Fort Pillow, whose M^orks 
 occupied a line of seven miles in cir- 
 cumference, was very sti'ong, and was 
 under the excellent superintendence of 
 General Villepigue, a New Orleans 
 Creole, a West-Pointer, and, as an en- 
 gineer, regarded second only to Beau- 
 regard himself. It had forty heavy 
 guns in position. There were nine gun- 
 boats under Hollins ; and Jeff. Thomp- 
 son was there with about six thousand 
 troops. 
 
 After the fall of Island No. 10, Com- 
 modore Foote lost no time in pushing 
 his way down the Mississippi. General 
 Pope followed, in transports, with his 
 army, numbering some twenty thousand 
 men. Pope arrived on the 13th April 
 of April ; and preparations were *^' 
 immediately made for an attack. Foote 
 opened fire and moved against the gun- 
 boats on the following day, :uid with 
 such vigor that Hollins found it neces- 
 sary to seek the shelter of the fort. 
 Pope had landed his troops on the 
 Arkansas shore, but so greatly was the 
 land overflowed with water that he 
 could render no assistance. On the 
 
144 
 
 MEMPHIS AND KEW ORLEANS. 
 
 17th he was recalled with his entire 
 force, to join Halleck, who was then 
 advancing on Corinth. Foote was thus 
 left to prosecute the work alone ; and 
 soon afterwards, in consequence of the 
 painfulness of the wound which he had 
 received in his ankle at Fort Donelson, 
 he was compelled to retire from active 
 duty, leaving the command in the hands 
 of Captain C. H. Davis. 
 
 HoUins, meanwhile, had not been 
 May idle; and on the 10th of May, 
 
 **• having re-formed his flotilla, he 
 came out from under the guns of the 
 fort, sweeping around Point Craighead, 
 on the Arkansas shore, with armored 
 steamers. Some of the steamers were 
 fitted with strong bows, plated with 
 iron. Davis was ready to receive him. 
 The fight was commenced by Hollins' 
 largest gunboat, the McRae, which, 
 ai'med with a strong iron prow, rushed 
 at the mortar boat No. 16. The com- 
 mander of the mortar boat, Acting- 
 Master Gregory, made a gallant fight, 
 firing his single mortar no fewer than 
 eleven times. The gunboats Cincinnati 
 and Mound City came to Gregory's as- 
 sistance, when the fighting became gen- 
 eral. The fight had lasted the better 
 part of an hour, -^vhen a shell from the 
 Boston penetrated the boiler of the 
 McRae. This was the end. Clouds of 
 eteam enveloped the ill-fated vessel, and 
 torrents of boiling water were doing 
 moie effective work among the men on 
 board than the shells from the National 
 gunboats. The flag was raised in token 
 of surrender. The National gunboats 
 were in uo condition to pursue and cap- 
 ture. Some of them were much injured, 
 
 the Cincinnati particularly, which soon 
 went to the bottom of the river. As 
 their steam power was too weak to 
 enable them to resist the powei-ful cur- 
 rent of the river, it was wisely con- 
 cluded not to grapple the disabled ves- 
 sels of the enemy, lest by so doing they 
 might be dragged iinder the guns of 
 the fort. The National loss wag four 
 men wounded. The Confederate loss 
 must have been considerably greater. 
 The damage sustained by the McRae 
 alone, through the bursting of her boil- 
 er, must have exceeded that sustained 
 by the entire National fleet. In some 
 respects it was a barren victory ; but it 
 afterwards proved more fruitful than at 
 first it seemed. 
 
 Three weeks were allowed to pass 
 without any attempt being made, on 
 either side, to renew the conflict. About 
 the beginning of June, Davis was rein- 
 forced by Colonel Charles Ellet, jr., 
 with his famous " i-am "-squadron — a 
 fleet of boats of a peculiar model, of 
 which he was the inventor. Thus 
 strengthened, Davis concluded to re- 
 peat the trial of strength. It was too 
 late. The enemy had fled. Fort Pillow 
 was deserted. Hearing of the disaster 
 which had befallen Beauregard, and of 
 his flight from Corinth, the garrison, 
 oflScers and men, were filled with alarm; 
 and having first blown up their maga- 
 zines and fired their barracks and stores, 
 they went down the river in transports, 
 accompanied by the Confederate fleet. 
 The evacuation and retreat took place 
 under cover of the night of the June 
 4th. On the following day the ^• 
 National flag floated over Fort Pillow 
 
A TERRIFIC SCENE. 
 
 145 
 
 and over Fort Randolpli. a place of 
 some sti'ength but of less iiiijjoi'tance, 
 further down the river. Believing in 
 the strength of the forts on the river 
 above and below, the authorities had not 
 thought it necessary to fortify the town 
 itself. On the northern side, Memphis 
 was now entirely unprotected. The 
 only defense that now remained was 
 the flotilla of gunboats, now lying close 
 to the levee. 
 
 The situation of Memphis on the 
 June morning of the memorable 6th 
 *»• of June was peculiar in the ex- 
 treme. The inhabitants had before 
 them a great sensation, and the al- 
 most certain expectation of a great sor- 
 row. In their immediate presence, in 
 the broad sea-like waters which rolled 
 past their city, a great naval engage- 
 ment Avas about to take place ; and the 
 result, which could hardly bring to 
 them any permanent advantage, might 
 in a few lioui's or minutes place them- 
 selves, their property, and their institu- 
 tions entirely at the mercy of the enemy. 
 At the early dawn the National fleet, 
 with th-s Cairo in advance, was moving 
 in battle order toward the levee. The 
 Confederate fleet, which, as we have 
 seen, lay there, consisted of eight ves- 
 sels. The National flf.et, it will be re- 
 membervjd, had been strengthened by 
 four ram boats under iCUet. While the 
 National boats were moving forward, 
 and only as yet vp'thin long range, the 
 Confederate Little^ ilebel hurled a rifled 
 shot at the C-Jj'O. The Cairo replied 
 with a broAiiside. Thus the conflict 
 began. For a time the battle was con- 
 fined to Jihe gunboats. Suddenly, how- 
 
 ever, two of the Confederate rams (Beau- 
 regard and Price) pushed forward and 
 joined in the fray. Ellet observed the 
 movement ; and watching for his oppor- 
 tunity, he bi'ouglit the two rams Queen 
 of the West (his flag-ship) and Monarch 
 right in fi'ont of the gunboats. He 
 made a dash at the Confederate rams, 
 the Queen being brought down toward 
 the Beauregard with ti'emendous force, 
 but missing her. Rushing at the Price, 
 the Queen struck the w'heel-house of 
 that vessel with her iron proAv, and so 
 damaged her that, to avoid sinking, she 
 was compelled to seek the opposite 
 shore. The Beauregard now turned 
 upon the Queen ; and, both vessels, 
 rushing together at full sjjeed, the lat- 
 ter received a crushing blow, which dis- 
 abled her. The Monarch, hastening to 
 the aid of the Queen, struck the Beau- 
 regard fair in the bow, causing her to 
 sink almost immediately. A white flag 
 was raised on the Beauregard ; and the 
 ram fight having ceased, the Monarch 
 towed the badly wounded Queen of the 
 West to a place of safety. Meanwhile 
 the struggle was going on between 
 the gunboats. The Confederates, being 
 hard pressed by the Nationals, were 
 steadily falling back. The fighti\ig was 
 conducted with great spirit, and the 
 destruction was terrific. The Confede- 
 rates, however, were the only sufferers. 
 The boilers on some of their boats.Avere 
 burst and the crews scalded. A fifty- 
 I)oand ball, hurled from the Benton by 
 a rifled Parrott gun, hit the Lovell 
 with such foi'ce that she was shattered 
 almost to pieces, and sunk in a few 
 minutes, in seventy-five feet of water. 
 
11 
 
 146 
 
 MEMPHIS AND NEW OELEANS. 
 
 carrying with her the greater portion of 
 her officers and crew. Such had been 
 the destructive work done in the brief 
 space of half an hour that only four 
 Confederate vessels remained • afloat — 
 tLie Thompson, the Bragg, the Sumter, 
 and the VanDorn ; but these were all 
 badly injured and nnuk^ for the shore. 
 They were all abandoned except the 
 V-^anDoni, which made good its escape 
 down the river. Not a man had been 
 killed on board the National gunboats. 
 When the bi'ief conflict was at its height 
 Ihe scene was grand and impressive in 
 a high deijree. The l)attle had been 
 witnessed by many thousands of the in- 
 habitants of Memphis. The firing of 
 the first gun had roused them from their 
 slumbers; and anxious multitudes soon 
 lined the shores and crowded the roofs 
 of the houses. The dense smoke, which 
 gathered cloud-like around the ships, 
 concealed from view much of the actual 
 fighting; but the wild war of jarring 
 sounds — the booming of cannon, the 
 rattling of musketry, the bursting of 
 shells, the explosion of boilers, the 
 crashing of timbei's as the rams rushed 
 together in fierce embrace — all attested 
 the severity of the conflict Avhicli was 
 raging behind. When the cloud of 
 smoke arose and the wreck was re- 
 vealed, the last hope of Memphis had 
 perished. 
 
 There was no further resistance To 
 the request of Commodore Davis that 
 he surrender the city, the mayor politely 
 replied that he had no means of defense, 
 and that the city was in his hands. 
 Jeff. Thompson, who had command of 
 the city, and who had witnessed the 
 
 fight, when lie found that the fleet wa* 
 defeated, beat an immediate retreat. The 
 old Union flag was hoisted on the public 
 l)uildings ; and Mempliis was taken pos- 
 session of by the National troops. Col- 
 onel Fitch, of the Forty-Ninth Indiana, 
 being appointed pi-ovost-marshal. The 
 I'eader n(>\v knows ho\\' it came to pass 
 that Memphis had been ^vi'enched from 
 the Confederates, and how it Avas that 
 General Lewis "Wallace, of Gi-ant's ar- 
 my, entered and occupied that city with- 
 out encountei'ing any resistance. The 
 fall of Memphis left the Mississippi 
 comparatively unobstructed as fai- down 
 as Vicksburg. 
 
 Let us now give our attention to what 
 liad happened on the same watei'S to 
 the south of Vicksburg and nearer to 
 the sea. Very early in the histoiy of 
 the war the attention of the National 
 government Iiail been directed to New 
 Orleans; and it was felt that so long 
 as the city remained in the possession 
 of the Confederates there could l)e no 
 free navigation of the Mississippi. It 
 was the key-position ; and whoever was 
 strong enough to hold that position was 
 master of the great valley. In the au- 
 tumn of IHGl it was resolved not to 
 wait until the military combinations 
 had forced a jjassage down the river, 
 l)ut to send a naval expedition, which, 
 fitted out in the Athuitic ports, should 
 move up from tlie gulf. The command 
 of this expedition was assigned to Cap- 
 tain David G. Farragut, a Tennessean 
 by birth, and an officer who had seen 
 service and done gootl work both in the 
 Mexican campaign and in the naval 
 operations of 1812. It was not, how- 
 
READY FOR ATTACK. 
 
 147 
 
 ever, until early in 18(52 that this expe- 
 dition showed any feigns of vitality. By 
 that time Stanton had succeeded Came- 
 ron as head of the War Department ; 
 and the energy of the new chief was 
 making itself everywhere felt. 
 
 On the 2d of February Farragut 
 Feb. sailed from Hampton Roads in the 
 2> armed steamer Hartford. Having 
 heen detained by sickness at Key West, 
 he did not reach Ship Island, his point 
 Feb. of destination, until the 20th of 
 20. the same month. Farragut's in- 
 etructions were of the most positive 
 kind. He was to proceed with all ])os- 
 sible despatch to the Grulf of Mexico, 
 and assume command of the western 
 gulf scjuadron, relieving Flag -officer 
 McKean. The gulf squadron, wliich 
 was employed in enforcing the block- 
 ade, was to be considerably strength- 
 ened; and in addition, there was to 
 be attached to the squadron a power- 
 ful bomb flotilla, under Connnander 
 David Portei'. With these mortar ves- 
 sels, as soon as they were ready, and 
 with such othei's as might be spared 
 fi'om the blockade, he was to reduce 
 the defenses which guarded the ai> 
 proaches to New Orleans, take posses- 
 sion of that city, under the guns of the 
 squadron, and hold it until troops should 
 be sent to his aid. K the expedition 
 from Cairo should not yet have got 
 down the river so far, he was to push a 
 strong force up the stream past the city, 
 and destroy tlic defenses in tlie rear. 
 Thus instructed, and having lu'cn pro- 
 vided with plans of the pi-iiicipal works 
 on the lower Mississippi^ Farragut set 
 about the accomplishment of his task. 
 
 Arrangements had been made to back 
 up the efforts of the fleet by a powerful 
 land force. An army of eighteen thou- 
 sand men was furnished and placed 
 undei- the command of Major-General 
 Butler. Farragut, we have seen, ar- 
 rived at Ship Island on the 20th of 
 February. On the 25th of the peb, 
 same month. General Butler, his 25. 
 ti'oops on l)oard five transports, sailed 
 from Hampton Roads. Porter's fleet 
 of mortar boats, which were to rendez- 
 vous at Key West, arrived in due time. 
 It was a formidable flec^t. Fitted up in 
 the Brooklyn Navy Yard, it liad for 
 months been the su])ject of not a little 
 speculation ; and it was generally ex- 
 pected that with such instruments Por- 
 ter and Farragut would be able to do 
 some effective work. There were in all 
 twenty-one vessels, of from two hun- 
 dred to three hundred tons each, of 
 great strength, and constructed so as to 
 draw as little water as possil)le. They 
 were armed with moi'turs eight and a 
 half tons in weigiit, and capable of 
 throwing a 15-incli shell. Each vessel 
 carried also a 82-pounder rifled caimon. 
 Before tlie middle of Apiil the fleet 
 was in perfect order; Butlei', too, had 
 arrived ; and all necessaiy pi'ej)ai'ations 
 had been made for a combined move- 
 ment against the enemy. 
 
 Strons: as the National forces now 
 undoubtedly were, Farragut had a task 
 on hand fitted to unnerve the strongest 
 arm and to appal the stoutest heart. 
 New Orleans was well fortified ; and the 
 numerous narrow and, in some places, 
 shallow outlets by which the Missis- 
 sippi seeks the sea, make its approaches 
 
i48 
 
 MEMPHIS AND NEW ORLEANS. 
 
 exceedingly perilous to ships of heavy 
 tonnage. These outlets are five in num- 
 ber, and are named respectively Pass ^ 
 I'Outre, Northeast Pass, Southeast Pass, 
 South Pass, and Southwest Pass. At 
 a bend about thirty miles up the river 
 there were two powerful forts — one on 
 the right or south bank, Fort Jackson, 
 and the other on the left or north bank, 
 Fort St. Philip. These barred the ap- 
 proach to the city from the gulf ; and 
 the Confederates had armed them with 
 one hundi-ed and twenty-six guns of 
 long range and large calibre. At this 
 point a large chain, sustained upon eight 
 hulks, was stretched across the river. 
 Close to Fort Jackson there was a for- 
 midable water-battery; and under the 
 gims of the forts there was a fleet of 
 thirteen gunboats, a powerful ironclad 
 floating batteiy, called the Louisiana, 
 carrying sixteen guns, and the steam- 
 ram Manassas. In addition to all these 
 tremendous war appliances, there were 
 numerous rafts and fire-ships. Further 
 up the river and to the southwest of the 
 town, on the bayous and lakes, there 
 were elaborate and powerful works, 
 which Beauregard had greatly strength- 
 ened. In and around the city of New 
 Orleans there was a force of at least 
 ten thousand men. General Twiggs, of 
 somewhat questionable reputation as a 
 soldier, had been entrusted by the Con- 
 federates with the defense of the city. 
 His position, by this time, however, 
 had been assumed by Mansfield Lovell, 
 formerly a politician and otfice-holder 
 in New York. Lovell had for his as- 
 sistant General Ruggles, a man of abil- 
 ity and energy. The general command 
 
 of the river defenses was entrusted to 
 General J. K. Duncan, another New 
 York oflice-holder. Forts Jackson and 
 St. Pliilip being under the immediate 
 command of Lieutenant-Colonel Ed- 
 ward Higgins. Lovell had made appli- 
 cation to the governor of the State for 
 ten thousand men ; but such had been 
 the drain upon the army by the neces- 
 sities of the Border States that not 
 more than three thousand could be 
 spared him as a reinforcement. As it 
 was, however, it was not wholly with- 
 out reason that the Confederate strength 
 around New Orleans was believed by 
 some to be sufficient to " beat off any 
 navy in the world." "Our only fear," 
 said one of the New Orleans journals, 
 " is that the Northern invaders may not 
 appear. We have made such exten- 
 sive preparations to receive them th.it it 
 were vexatious if their invincible ar- 
 mada escapes the fate we have in store 
 for it." 
 
 On the 8th of April the National 
 fleet, consisting of four sloops-of- April 
 war, seventeen gunboats, twenty- 8t 
 one mortar schooners, and t^vo sailing 
 vessels, but having no ironclads, had 
 been, with great labor, carried over the 
 bar. The Brooklyn had been dragged 
 through the mud of the Southwest Pass. 
 At the shalloAvest part, the water was 
 barely fifteen feet deep, the mud having 
 greatly increased in the channel since 
 the commencement of the blockade 
 By the ITth all things were in jvpril 
 readiness for an attack. Not only '7« 
 were the two fleets now fully in thu 
 river : Butler, with his troops, was at 
 the Southwest Pass, immediately below. 
 
THE "CHAIN" CUT. 
 
 149 
 
 ready to take what action might be ne- 
 cessary. A fire-raft, which came sailing 
 down the river, gave the Nationals an 
 idea of the species of tactics the enemy 
 April ■^'^'is disposed to adopt. On the 
 
 '8. following day the movement be- 
 gan in earnest. According to the plan 
 agreed upon at Washington, and which 
 formed part of the instructions given to 
 Farragut, Porter was to attemj)t to re- 
 duce the forts by his mortars, and if he 
 failed, Farragut was to inin past them 
 with his heavy vessels. In the event 
 of the latter course being attended with 
 success, Butler was to land his troops 
 in the rear of St. Philip and carry it by 
 assault. 
 
 The south bank of the river for sev- 
 eral miles below Fort Jackson was 
 thickly wooded. At some distance be- 
 low the bend, and in order to enable 
 the guns of the fort to sweep the river 
 and prevent the vessels from ascending, 
 a large opening was cut through the 
 wood. It was impossible, however, to 
 rob the Nationals of all the advan- 
 tages which the trees afforded. XJnder 
 covei' of the woods, fourteen of the 
 mortar boats, their masts and rigging 
 being clothed with leafy boughs, to 
 make them indistinguishable from trees, 
 moved up the river and were moored 
 at desirable points without being dis- 
 covered. The remainder of Porter's 
 boats were on the other side of the 
 river; but as it was found that they 
 were within the range of the guns of 
 the forts, they too were brought, on the 
 morning of the second day, under cover 
 of the woods. Early on the morning 
 
 ȣ the 18th the bombardment com- 
 
 menced. The first shot was fired from 
 Foi't Jackson. Porter was ready co re- 
 ply ; the mortar vessels opened fire im- 
 mediately ; and the effect was terrific. 
 From a position on board the Harriet 
 Lane, Porter watched the effect of the 
 shells, and directed their range accord- 
 ingly. In Fort Jackson the barracks 
 were set on fire soon after the bom- 
 bardment opened. The guns were fre- 
 quently silenced, the men being terror- 
 stiicken by the shells which were ex- 
 ploding all around them. It was ob- 
 served that the shells were bursting in 
 the air, in consequence of the badness 
 of the fuses. The fuses were, therefore, 
 put in full length, to delay the explo- 
 sion. The change had the desired ef- 
 fect. The shells, penetrating the earth 
 eighteen or twenty feet, and then ex- 
 ploding, tearing up the ground and 
 scattering it all around, had the effect 
 of a constantly repeating earthquake. 
 The firing fi'om the forts, in spite of all 
 this, was kept tip with gi-eat energy, 
 shot and shell coming crashing through 
 the woods and tearing up the trees by 
 the roots. During the first twenty-four 
 hours fifteen hundred bombs must have 
 been flung by Porter's mortars, the en- 
 emy replying with equal spirit ; and 
 for six weary days and nights this ter- 
 rible work went on. " No such continued 
 and heavy fighting had been witnessed 
 since the days of Nelson. At the dis- 
 tance of thirty miles from the scene of 
 action, window panes were broken by 
 the concussion ; and fish, stunned by 
 the dreadful ex])losions, were floating 
 about on the surface of the watei'. 
 On the third day of the bombard- 
 
 912 
 
150 
 
 MEMPHIS AND NEW ORLEANS. 
 
 ment, Farragut, seeing tliat no decisive 
 results were likely to be attained unless 
 bolder measures were adopted, called a 
 council and announced his determina- 
 tion to cut the barricade, ran the gaunt- 
 let of the forts, and pass up to the city 
 of New Orleans in spite of their guns. 
 Butler was at hand, with at least ten 
 thousand troops, ready to land and as- 
 sist in the capture of the forts, all his 
 transports, with the exception of the 
 Great Republic, having entered the 
 Mississippi on the 18th. If this move- 
 ment was to be carried out, the first 
 thing to be done was to remove the 
 obstructions from the river. On the 
 April Jiight of the 20th, therefore, un- 
 20. der cover of the darkness, a fierce 
 north Avind blowing at the time. Com- 
 mander Bell, with the Pinola and Itaska, 
 supported by the Iroquois, Kennebec, 
 and Winona, ran up to the boom. The 
 Pinola attempted, but unsuccessfully, 
 to blow up one of the hulks, by means 
 of a petard. The Itaska was lashed to 
 the hulk adjoining. A rocket thrown 
 up from Fort Jackson revealed her pres- 
 ence, and a heavy fire was immediately 
 opened upon her from the fortress. 
 Nothing daunted, the men kept at their 
 work ; and by means of cold-chisels, 
 hammers, sledges, and saws, the chain 
 was cut. The river being in full flood, 
 the powerful current swung around 
 both hulk and gunboat, the latter being 
 grounded in the mud in shallow water. 
 The Pinola came promptly to the res- 
 cue, and, after some difliculty, succeeded 
 in carrying her consort back in safety 
 to the fleet. Some two hours after- 
 wards a fire-raft came blazing down the 
 
 stream. It was caught, however, in 
 time, and rendered harmless. Mean- 
 time the firing never ceases, either on 
 board the mortar boats or in the forts ; 
 and night after night those blazing fire- 
 rafts are let loose on their errands of 
 destruction. There were no signs aa 
 yet that the forts Avould surrender. 
 One thousand shells at least .had burst 
 within Fort Jackson ; twenty-five thou- 
 sand had been hurled against it; yet 
 General Duncan could say : " God is 
 certainly protecting us. We are still 
 cheerful, and have an abiding faith in 
 our ultimate success." 
 
 The arrangements for the onward 
 movement up the river were now com- 
 pleted. The chain was broken ; and 
 Farragut Avas ready. On the April 
 night of the 23d the Itaska, Avhich 23. 
 had run up to the boom, signalled that 
 all was right — that the channel was 
 clear, with the exception of the hulks, 
 which, with care, might be easily passed. 
 The fleet had been arranged in three 
 divisions, under Farragut, Captain Bell, 
 and Gaptain Theodoras Bailey. Six 
 gunboats were to engage the water- 
 battery below Fort Jackson, but were 
 not to proceed further. Farragut had 
 charge of the first division, which con- 
 sisted of the tkree large ships, the Hart- 
 ford (flag-ship), the Richmond, and the 
 Brooklyn. This division was to keep 
 to the right bank of the river and fight 
 Fort Jackson. The second division was 
 under Bailey, and Avas composed of the 
 Pensacola, Mississippi, Oneida, Varu- 
 na, Katahdin, Kineo, Wissahickon, and 
 Portsmouth. This diAnsion was to keep 
 to the left bank and fight Fort St. Phil'© 
 
THE "MANASSAS." 
 
 151 
 
 The third division, which comprised 
 the Scioto, Winona, Iroquois, Pinola, 
 Itaaka, and Kennebec, and was under 
 Bell, who was ordered to press on neg- 
 lectful of the forts, and attack the Con- 
 federate fleet above. At one o'clock on 
 April the morning of the 24:th all hands 
 24, were called, hammocks stowed, 
 and everything put in readiness to weigh 
 anchor at two o'clock. The night was 
 dark, and a heavy fog rested upon the 
 river. 
 
 At two o'clock precisely, two red 
 lights were hung out. They were the 
 signal for going into action. In less 
 than an hour, the whole fleet was un- 
 der way. There was an ominous si- 
 lence at the forts, as if they were fully 
 aware of what was going on, and were 
 preparing to give the fleet a warm re- 
 ception. Meanwhile Porter's boats had 
 opened a terrific fire, literally filling the 
 air with shells, and making night hid- 
 eous with their noise. As if redoubling 
 their efl^orts, the men kept up the firing 
 with unceasing vigor until Farragut's 
 vessels were all fairly in the heat of 
 the conflict. The waning crescent of 
 the moon revealed itself just as Far- 
 ragut, struggling with the fierce current, 
 safely passed the broken chain, itu pale 
 light blending strangely with the fierce 
 glare of the hissing shell& As the ves- 
 sels under his care slowly but steadily 
 approached Fort Jackson, Farragut, 
 from the fore-rigging of the Hartford, 
 eagerly watched, with the help of his 
 night-glass, the movements of Bailey 
 and Bell. When within a little over a 
 mile of Fort Jackson, the guns of both 
 forts opened upon him with great force 
 
 and with singular precision of aim. 
 Farragut was in no haste to reply, al- 
 though the Hartford was hit several 
 times. Drawing closer and closer, and 
 waiting fully fifteen minutes after the 
 first volley had been aimed at him, he 
 began vnth two heavy guns which he 
 had mounted on the forecastle ; and 
 then, when within half a mile of Foii 
 Jackson, and having that work fairly 
 within I'ange, he sheered around and 
 poured forth such broadsides of grape 
 and canister that no living thing could 
 stand before them. The men were 
 driven from the barbette guns, and the 
 "wildest confusion prevailed. The firing 
 from the casemates continued ; and the 
 conflict raged with tremendous fury. 
 The Richmond, which had successfully 
 passed the barricade, soon came up and 
 took part in the fight. The Brooklyn 
 had been less fortunate. In passing 
 through the opening made by the 
 breaking of the chain, she became eu' 
 tangled with one of the hulks; and 
 while in this position she was exposed 
 at once to the fire of the forts and to 
 attacks from the Confederate ii'onclads. 
 Scarcely was the Brooklyn extricated 
 from this peril when the iron ram Ma- 
 nassas came down upon her with great 
 fury, firing from the trap-door a heavy 
 bolt at the Brooklyn's steam drum. 
 Happily the shot lodged in some sand 
 bags and did no harm. The next mo- 
 ment the ram butted into the ship'>^ 
 starboard ; but the impetus was iasufli- 
 cient to make any impression on the 
 Brooklyn, whose sides were bound 
 round and round with chain armor. 
 As the Manassas glided away and wa« 
 
152 
 
 MEMPHIS AND NEW ORLEANS. 
 
 lost in the darkness, and while still 
 under the fii'e of Fort Jackson, the 
 Brooklyn encountered another steamer. 
 The struggle with this one was short 
 and sharp. One hearty broadside, at 
 the distance of fifty or sixty yards, and 
 the strange vessel was no more. The 
 Brooklyn was then abreast of Fort St. 
 Philip, and her guns were within easy 
 range. "I had the satisfaction," said 
 Captain Craven, in his report, " of com- 
 pletely silencing that work before I left 
 it, my men in the tops witnessing, in 
 the flashes of the bursting shrapnel, the 
 enemy running like sheep for more com- 
 fortable quarters." 
 
 Farragut, meanwhile, was having 
 enough to do on board the Hartford. 
 While engaged with the forts, a huge 
 fire-raft was pushed against him by the 
 Manassas. In attempting to avoid the 
 blazing raft, the Hartford ran aground ; 
 and in a moment, the incendiary having 
 come crashing alongside of her, the ship 
 was in flames on the port side and half- 
 way up to the main and mizzen-tops. 
 While the flames raged, the Hartford did 
 jot discontinue her cannonading. " All 
 the time," says Farragut, "we were pour- 
 ing shells into the forts, and they into 
 us, and now and then a rebel steamer 
 would get under our fire and receive 
 our salutation of a broadside." The 
 flames were soon extinguished ; and the 
 Hartford, being released, sailed up the 
 stream. Half an hour more and Farra- 
 gut had successfully passed through the 
 fiery stoi'm, having done his work ef- 
 fectually as he moved along. 
 
 Bailey, \^^th his second division, had 
 had, if possible, even a harder experi- 
 
 ence ; but his success was scarcely less 
 marked. In crossing the river obstmc- 
 tions he encountered the fire of both 
 forts ; and scarcely had he passed 
 through, when, owing to the great 
 speed of the Cayuga, he found himself 
 ahead of his fiiends and alone in the 
 midst of the Confederate fleet. His 
 situation was one of extreme peril. 
 The Manassas, the floating battery Lou- 
 isiana, and at least sixteen other armed 
 vessels, all turned upon him ; and his 
 vessel seemed doomed. The swiftness 
 of the ship came to his aid ; and he 
 handled her with exquisite skill. While 
 completely successful in so keeping out 
 of the way of the Confederate ironclads 
 that they could neither butt nor board 
 him, he so used his guns that he com- 
 pelled three of them to surrender before 
 any aid came to him. Meanwhile the 
 Varuna, Captain Boggs, and the Oneida, 
 Captain Lee, came up and engaged the 
 enemy. The Cayuga had been hit forty- 
 two times, and was so damaged that 
 Bailey deemed it prudent to retii'e. 
 The Varuna was the next object of at- 
 tack. Boggs found himself, all at once, 
 after passing the forts, as he said in his 
 report, " amid a nest of rebel steamers." 
 The brave captain did not hesitate as 
 to what he should do. Rushino: at once 
 into the midst of them, he "worked 
 both his sides, loaded with grape," pro- 
 ducing terrible havoc among the Con- 
 federate ships, which were strangely 
 overcrowded. "An explosion, terrific 
 yells, a careen, and that fellow is done 
 for." Such is the language of an eye- 
 witness. And so the fearful work goes 
 on, until the Varuna has sunk, one after 
 
PAST THE FORTS. 
 
 153 
 
 another, six of the enemy's vessels. 
 Meanwhile she was badly hurt herself. 
 The heavy shot of the ironclads had 
 told on her rigging and on her timbers. 
 One raking discharge from one of them 
 had killed four and wounded nine of 
 her men. Four times she had been 
 butted by the powerful rams of her an- 
 tagonists. The last time she was struck, 
 her side was crushed in ; but before the 
 ram could get out of her way, she put 
 through her unarmored stern five 8-inch 
 shells " that settled her, and she went 
 ashore in flames." In fifteen minutes 
 after she was struck the Varuna went 
 to the bottom ; but in the interval she 
 had settled her antagonist. It was no- 
 ble fighting, conducted in the true spirit 
 of the sea kings of ancient times. 
 
 The Moore was the last vessel which 
 the Varuna had to encounter. Badly 
 disabled as the Varuna was, Boggs 
 kept up the fight, with his vessel 
 aground and her bow tied to the trees. 
 It was not until" the water was up over 
 the gun-trucks that the captain gave 
 his attention to the saving of his men. 
 Happily all the survivors, including the 
 wounded, were got out and saved be- 
 fore the vessel went down. At the last 
 moment the Oneida, Captain Lee, came 
 up to the aid of the sinking Varuna. 
 Boggs "waved him on" after the 
 Moore, which was in flames but trying 
 to get away. In a little while the 
 Moore was suiTendered to the Oneida 
 by the second oflicer, the captain hav- 
 ing fled, after setting the vessel on fire. 
 But for her timely capture, fifty of her 
 men, maimed and wounded, must have 
 perished in the flames. 
 
 Bell had been less fortunate than 
 either Farragut or Bailey in bringing 
 his ships into action and accomplishing 
 the task assigned him. The Scioto, 
 Iroquois, and Pinola passed the foi'ts; 
 but the Itaska, being disabled, drifted 
 down the river. The Winona recoiled 
 from the terrible fire which had proved 
 fatal to her companion. The Kennebec 
 got entangled in attempting to pass the 
 obstructions, and finally, having lost 
 her way in the darkness, returned to 
 her moorings. 
 
 The fight was now ended. It had 
 been as brief as it had been desperate. 
 It was little more than an hour and a 
 half since the fleet had left its mooi'- 
 ings; and in that brief space of time 
 all that it was intended to do had been 
 successfully accomplished. The forts 
 had been passed and the Confederate 
 navy was destroyed. The ironclad Ma- 
 nassas, from which such great things 
 were expected, shared the fate of the 
 smaller vessels. Commander Porter's 
 description of the last moments of this 
 naval monster are well deserving of I'e- 
 production. We have seen that he kept 
 up a continuous fire from the mortar 
 boats while Farragut was pressing ou 
 his way. " It was reported to me," he 
 says, "that the celebrated ram Manas- 
 sas was coming out to attack us, and 
 sure enough, there she was, apparently 
 steaming along shore, ready to pounce 
 upon the defenseless mortar vessels ; 
 but I soon discovered that she could 
 harm no one again. She was beginning 
 to emit smoke from her ports or holes ; 
 she Avas on fire and sinking. Her pipes 
 were twisted and riddled with she*; 
 
154 
 
 MEMPHIS AND NEW ORLEANS. 
 
 her Lull was cut up. She had evidently 
 been used ujj by the squadron as she 
 passed along. I tried to save her as a 
 curiosity by getting a hawser around 
 her and securing her to the bank; but 
 just after doing so, she faintly exploded. 
 Her only gun went off, and, emitting 
 flames from her bow-port, like some 
 huge animal she gave a plunge and dis- 
 appeared mider the water." The de- 
 scription of the closing scenes of the 
 fontest, from the same pen, is equally 
 graphic. After the Manassas had gone 
 down, there " came a steamer on fire ; 
 after her, two others, burning and float- 
 ing down the stream. Fires seemed to 
 be raging all along the 'up livei',' and 
 we supposed that our squadron was 
 burning and destroying the vessels as 
 they passed along. The sight of this 
 night attack was awfully grand. The 
 river was lit up by rafts filled with 
 pine knots; and the ships seemed to 
 be literally fighting among flames and 
 smoke." 
 
 The Cayuga, Captain Bailey's flag- 
 ship, had, as we have seen, when re- 
 lieved by the Varuna and the Oneida, 
 and after having been struck at least 
 forty-two times, and consequently been 
 considerably damaged, sailed up the 
 river. It was the advance boat. It had 
 not sailed far when Bailey discovered 
 the camp of the famous Chalmette regi- 
 ment. On the approach of the Cayuga, 
 the regiment attempted to effect its es- 
 cape. Bailey opened fii'e ; a volley of 
 canister was sufficient to compel a halt, 
 which was soon followed by an uncon- 
 ditional suri'ender. By this time Bailey 
 was joined by Farragut; and the Nar 
 
 tional fleet, consisting of thirteen ves- 
 sels, was ready to steam up to New 
 Orleans. On reaching the quarantine 
 ground, Farragut concluded to halt for 
 the night, and to move on the city on 
 the following morning. 
 
 Let us see what was taking place in 
 the rear of the National fleet. Farragut 
 had passed the forts, but he had not 
 silenced them. Where was Porter, with 
 his moi'tar boats ; and what was General 
 Butler doing with his soldiers? We 
 shall see. Butler, with his staff, had 
 witnessed from the deck of the Saxon 
 the contest between the fleet and the 
 forts. Half an hour after he had 
 reached the quarantine, Farragut sent 
 Captain Boggs in a smallboat, through 
 the bayous, with despatches for Butler 
 and Porter. Butler had already joined 
 his transports. With the least delay 
 possible they were moved to Sable 
 Island, whence the troops were, with 
 very considerable difliculty, conveyed 
 in smallboats and landed successfully a 
 short distance above Fort St. Philip, 
 and under cover of the guns of the Mis- 
 sissippi and Kineo. A portion of them 
 Avere sent across the river, to be i-eady 
 to take possession of Fort Jackson. 
 Meanwhile Porter, who had remained 
 behind the fleet, had not been idle. On 
 Fort Jackson particularly he had kept 
 up an incessant fire ; ■ the shells from his 
 mortars giving terrible annoyance to 
 the enemy, although not producing any 
 visible impression on the works. On 
 the 26th he sent a flag of truce, April 
 demanding its surrender, stating 26. 
 that he had information of the capture 
 of New Orleans. Colonel Higgins, who 
 
FARRAGUT AT NEW ORLEANS. 
 
 155 
 
 had command of the forts, refused to 
 surrender, stating that he had no in- 
 formation of the fall of New Orleans, 
 and that until he had such information, 
 from what he should consider a reliable 
 source, the thoui^ht of surrender was 
 not for a moment to be entertained. 
 Meantime it began to be known to the 
 soldiei's that Butler was in the rear of 
 Fort St. Philip ; and in spite of the en- 
 couraging words of General Duncan, 
 the commander of the coast defenses, 
 then in Fort Jackson, that they were as 
 capable of repelling the enemy to-day 
 as they were before the bombardment, 
 the garrison began to mutiny. Spiking 
 their guns, some of them sallied out and 
 sui'rendered to Butler's pickets, stating 
 that they had been impressed and com- 
 pelled to fight against their will. It 
 was now evident to the Confederate 
 officers that it was useless to prolong 
 the struggle; and Colonel Higgins, feel- 
 ing that he had done his best, accepted 
 Porter's not ungenerous terms. While 
 the treaty was being signed on board the 
 Harriet Lane, the huge battery, the Lou- 
 isiana, was set on fire by its commander, 
 and let loose in the strong current of the 
 river, with all its guns shotted. It was 
 the evident intention of its officers to 
 destroy by this means Porter's fleet of 
 mortar boats. Their calculation proved 
 a failure. The monster blew up when 
 abreast of Fort St. Philip, a flying frag- 
 ment killing one of its garrison. It 
 was a barbarous proceeding ; and it was 
 with great propj'iety that Mitchell and 
 his subordinates were sent close pris- 
 oners to the North. The treaty of sur- 
 render being completed, the forts were 
 
 turned over by Porter to General 
 Phelps. It was found that the works 
 were comparatively uninjured. The 
 actual number of the Confederate killed 
 and wounded has never been correctly 
 given. The whole number of prisoners 
 surrendered, including those of the 
 Chalmette regiment and the men from 
 the gunboats, amounted to nearly one 
 thousand. 
 
 On the morning of the 25th, Farragut 
 proceeded up the river with nine April 
 
 vessels. Owing to the slowness of 
 
 25. 
 
 some of the boats, and to a want of 
 knowledge of the river, it was 10.30 
 A. M. before the fleet had reached what 
 is called the English Turn. " All the 
 morning," says Farragut in his official 
 report, " I had seen abundant evidence 
 of the panic which had seized the people 
 in New Orleans. Cotton-loaded ships on 
 fire came floating down, and working in- 
 struments of every kind, such as are used' 
 in shipyards. The destruction of prop- 
 erty was awful. The levee in New 
 Orleans was one scene of desolation. 
 Ships, steamers, cotton, coal were all in 
 one common blaze, and our ingenuity 
 was much taxed to avoid the floating 
 conflagration." On his way up, and 
 when about three miles from the city, 
 fire was opened upon him by the Chal- 
 mette batteries, one being on each side 
 of the river ; but the vessels were now 
 well together, and a few vigorous and 
 well directed broadsides soon silenced 
 the guns and scattered the men in all 
 directions. New Orleans was now ut- 
 terly defenseless ; and the water in the 
 river was so high that a gunboat could 
 easily be taken up as far as Renner'3 
 
156 
 
 MEMPHIS AND NEW ORLEANS. 
 
 plantation, ten miles above the city, 
 and thus, by commanding the narrow 
 neck of land across which the railroad 
 passes, and which connects the river 
 and the swamp, completely enclose the 
 city, shutting off all means of egress 
 and every source of supply. In the cir- 
 cumstances, and seeing that he had no 
 hope of saving the city, Lovell, with 
 the sanction of the municipal authori- 
 ties, who were anxious to avoid the hor- 
 I'ors of a bombardment, sent off his mu- 
 nitions and a large portion of his troops, 
 and, having disbanded the rest, turned 
 the city over to the mayor. 
 
 At one o'clock, on the afternoon of 
 the 25th, and in the midst of a fierce 
 thunder-storm, Farragut anchored his 
 squadron off New Orleans. The excite- 
 ment was tremendous. The inhabitants, 
 who believed that the defenses of the 
 city were invulnerable, gave way to 
 the most frantic rage, invoked venge- 
 ance on Higgins and Lovell, and de- 
 manded that the city be given to the 
 flames rather than surrendered. On 
 board the National ships the sailors 
 were wild with delight. They had 
 seen the end of their mission ; they had 
 nobly and successfully done their work ; 
 and cheer after cheer went sounding 
 from the ships to the shore. Fairagut 
 sent Bailey to the city authorities, with 
 a flag, demanding the immediate sur- 
 render of the city, and informing them 
 that no flag but that of the United 
 States would be allowed to float in 
 presence of the fleet. The mayor, John 
 T. Monroe, in a foolish letter, refused 
 to surrender or take down the Confede- 
 rate flag, declaring that the city was 
 
 defenseless, that he was no military 
 man, and knew neither how to com- 
 mand an army nor to surrender an un- 
 protected place; that there was not a 
 man in the city whose heart would not 
 be palsied by the mere thought o£ 
 hoisting any flag but the flag of their 
 adoption; and that he would seek in 
 vain for " so wretched and desperate a 
 renegade as Avould dare to profane with 
 his hand the sacred emblem of our as- 
 pirations." In the meantime a party 
 had landed from the Pensacola and 
 hoisted the National flag over the gov- 
 ernment mint ; but it was quickly torn 
 down and dragged in derision through 
 the streets. A gambler named Mum- 
 ford, who was chiefly responsible for 
 this rash act, afterwards paid the pen- 
 alty with his life. Farragut, patient as 
 he was, and merciful as he wished to 
 be, was not to be hindered in the dis- . 
 charge of his duty by the querulous 
 protestations of the mayor. He notified 
 the mayor to remove the women and 
 chikb'en from the city within forty-eight 
 hours, as he had no desire that the in- 
 nocent and the helpless should suffer, 
 in the event of a bombardment. An- 
 other letter, more ridiculous than the 
 former, came back from the mayor. 
 " Do your woret, but don't speak about 
 humanity. If the Confederate flag must 
 be taken down, and the National flag 
 raised, the work must be done by other 
 hands than ours." Such was the bur- 
 den of the mayor's I'eply. Farragut, 
 having learned of the surrender of the 
 forts below, and knowing that General 
 Butler would soon be on hand and 
 ready to take possession, felt that, not 
 
BUTLER IN caAacrn 
 
 157 
 
 ivithstanding the irritating conduct of 
 Mayor Monroe, lie could afford to act 
 with caution and patience. Next day 
 April Captain Bell landed with a hun- 
 
 26" dred marines; and the National 
 flag was raised over the mint and the 
 custom-house. To these no violence 
 was offered. The people had become 
 aware of the fact that Butler was com- 
 ing up the river with his transports. 
 April Oil the 30th, Farragut informed 
 
 30. the city authorities that he should 
 hold no more intercourse with them, 
 and that as soon as General Butler 
 arrived he should turn over the charge 
 May of the city to him. On the 1st 
 
 '• of May, General Butler, with his 
 transports, bearing two thousand armed 
 men, appeared off the levee in front 
 of New Orleans. On the afternoon of 
 the same day the debarkation took 
 place, and New Orleans was formally 
 occupied by United States troops. Be- 
 fore the middle of the month. Baton 
 Rouge and Natchez had also been occu- 
 pied ; and the Mississippi was free both 
 above and below Vicksburg. The cap- 
 ture of New Orleans, which was accom- 
 plished at the small sacrifice of 40 killed 
 and 177 wounded, was justly regarded 
 as one of the greatest victories yet 
 achieved by the North. The people 
 were jubilant ; and President Lincoln, 
 in a cheerful proclamation, and as if to 
 give the world assurance of the com- 
 pleteness of the National victories, de- 
 Jane clared the termination, on June 
 
 *• lat, of the blockade of the ports 
 
 of Beaufort, of Port Royal, and of New 
 Orleans. It was justly felt to be a heavy 
 loss to the South. " It annihilated us in 
 Louisiana," says Pollard, "diminished 
 our resources and supplies by the loss 
 of one of the greatest grain and cattle 
 countries within the limits of the Con- 
 federacy ; gave to the enemy the Missis- 
 sippi River, with all its means of naviga- 
 tion, for a base of operations, and finally 
 led by plain and irresistible conclusion 
 to our virtual abandonment of the great 
 and fruitful valley of the Mississippi." 
 We have thus answered the questions 
 which we put to ourselves at the com- 
 mencement of this chapter. We have 
 told the stoiy of the occupation of 
 Memphis and the story of the capture of 
 New Orleans, and have explained why it 
 w us that at the date of the Confederate 
 retreat from Corinth and its occuj)ation 
 by General Halleck and the National 
 foi'ces, Vicksburg alone remained to ob- 
 struct the free navigation of the waters 
 of the Mississippi. We leave General 
 Butler in possession of New Orleans; 
 but the consideration of his adminstra- 
 tion of the affairs of that city forjus no 
 essential part of the plan of this work. 
 The naval operations which resulted in 
 the occupation of Memphis on the oa& 
 hand and the capture of New Orleans 
 on the other, were in the highest degiV'^ 
 creditable to the officers of the Nortl 
 Farragut covered himself with glory, 
 so did Bailey; so did Boggs; but where 
 all did so well, it is invidiour Uj singh 
 out and bestow special praise 
 
 )fIS 
 
158 
 
 lUKA AND CORINTH. 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 Dui Army of the West. — The Army Inactive. — Halleck made Commander-in-Chief. — Buell Sent to Chattmioogi. • ■ 
 The Army of the West Weakened. — Grant in Command. — Pope Sent' to Virginia. — Rosecranz takes Poperi 
 place under Grant. — The Position of the Army of the AVest. — Price and VanDom. — The Confederate Army 
 Preparing to Strike. — Grant's Caution. — The Object of the Confederates. — luka. — Amistrong's Raids. — Colonel 
 Murphy in Command at luka. — Price at luka. — Grant Watchful and Ready. — Time Precious. — Generals Ord 
 and Ross. — Rosecranz's Army in Motion. — The Confederates Well Posted. — The Battle-Ground at luka. — 
 The Battle Begun.— The Battery of the Eleventh Ohio. —Fearful Fighting.— Colonel Eddy Killed.— The 
 Battery Captured. — Ord Deceived. — Too Late on the Field. — A. Great Misfortune. — Defeat and Retreat of 
 the Confederates. — Corinth. — Preparations for another Fight. — The Old Battle-Ground. — The Place Greatly 
 Strengthened. — Major Prime. — Chewalla Road. — Beginning of the Fight. — Terrific Onslaught of the Confed* 
 rates. — The First Day a Victory for the Confederates. — The Confederates Reinforced. — Resolved to Capture 
 Corinth. — The Confederates Open Fire. — A Deceptive Movement. — The Movement Defeated. — The Confede- 
 rates Come Up in Force. — Great Bravery and Great Slaughter. — A Temporary Panic among the Nationals. — 
 Fort Powell Captured. — At Rosecranz's Headquarters. — Are they to Win? — Victory turned into Defeat. — The 
 Confederate Right Driven Back to the Woods. — The Confederate Left. — Their Advance on the National Works. — 
 A Terrible Reception. — " Gorgeous Pyrotechnics. " — A Murderous Fire. — The Confederates Fall Back. — Another 
 Attack.— The Battle Ended.— A National Triumph.— The Pursuit.— The Battle of the Hatchie.— The Confede. 
 rates Defeated. — Hurlbut and Ord. — Ord Wounded. — Pursuit Discontinued. — Promotion of Rosecranz. — Hi£ 
 Order of the Twenty-Fourth of October. — The First Praise Due to Grant. — Grant's Command Enlarged. 
 
 1842. 
 
 Before proceeding to call the read- 
 er's attention to the important 
 events which were already taking 
 place on the Atlantic coast, we have 
 deemed it ad-visable, for the sake of 
 unity, to remain a little longer with 
 the army of the West, and to describe 
 somewhat in detail the operations of 
 that army, and the Avork generally 
 which had to be done after the capture 
 of Corinth and before Genei'al Gi-ant 
 was in a fit condition to march upon 
 Vicksbiu'g. 
 
 Corinth was evacuated on the 30th 
 May of May, and on the same day was 
 3®' occupied by the National troops. 
 "From a variety of causes, the concpier- 
 ors of Shiloh remained comparatively 
 inactive from June to September. Hal- 
 leck remained in command until the 
 
 1 1th of August, when he was summoned 
 to AVashington, and by general Ang. 
 orders from the War Department J'« 
 assigned to the command of " the whole 
 land forces of the United States, as 
 general-in-chief." During that time he 
 employed hira.self in strengthening the 
 fortifications of Corinth and repairing 
 the raib'oads betAveen that place and 
 Columbus. General Buell was detached 
 on the 10th of June, and sent to jnne 
 C'hattanooga to oppose Bragg ; '*• 
 for the Confederates, encouraged by 
 the success A\'hich had attended their 
 arms in the East, Avere making super 
 hmnan efforts, not only with the view 
 of marching upon Washington, but foi 
 the purpose, also, of I'ecovering Avhat 
 they had lost in Tennessee and Ken- 
 tucky. Should Bragg succeed in moving 
 
GEANT'S PLAN. 
 
 259 
 
 along the west flank of the Cumberland 
 Mountains and in cajituring Louisville, 
 he would undo all that Halleck had 
 done in his southward march along 
 the Tennessee. In order to strengthen 
 Buell, and so enable him to counter- 
 check Bragg, the Shiloh army was 
 robbed of some of its ablest and most 
 experienced soldiers. On the departure 
 of Halleck for "Washington, General 
 Grant succeeded to the chief command 
 of his old army ; but, from the causes 
 above mentioned, its ranks were consid- 
 erably thinned. 
 
 When Grant assumed the command. 
 General Pope hatl been ordered to Vir- 
 ginia, and General Rosecranz had taken 
 chai-ge of that leader's forces under 
 Grant. Rosecranz's division was known 
 as the army of the Mississippi, and was 
 charged with the occupation of Northern 
 Mississippi and Alabama, in the vicin- 
 ity of Corinth and eastward to Tus- 
 cumbia. The entire army under Grant 
 was stationed fi"om Memphis to Bridge- 
 port, Tennessee, along the Memphis and 
 Charleston Railroad. His headquar- 
 ters were at Jackson, Tennessee, where 
 the Central Mississippi Railroad unites 
 with the Mobile and Ohio. In conse- 
 quence of the low water of the Tennes- 
 see, it was necessary for him to hold 
 the railroads from Corinth and Bolivar 
 north to Columbus. 
 
 In Grant's immediate front lay the 
 Confederates, in considerable force, un- 
 der Pi'ice and VanDorn. B(;coming 
 aware of the fact that Grant's army 
 had been greatly weakened by the 
 transfer of troops to Buell, these officers 
 moved their armies toward the Ten- 
 
 nessee River at the beginning of Sep' 
 tember. Of this forward movement 
 General Grant was fully aware; but 
 with a caution which was fully justified 
 by the result, he refrained fi'om any 
 precipitate action, his attention being 
 mainly devoted to ascertain the plans 
 of his opponents. It was evidently the 
 object of the Confederate generals to 
 get possession of Corinth, the key to 
 the military jiossession of Tennessee. 
 This in their hands, they could render 
 effective aid to Bragg ; they might even 
 resume possession of their lost territory, 
 and bring Kentucky and Tennessee 
 once more within the limits of the Con- 
 federacy. There can be little doubt 
 that Bragg expected Price and VanDorn 
 to follow him ; and there is every reason 
 to believe that these two officers felt 
 confident of their ability to measure 
 swords with Grant and Rosecranz. 
 Thej^ hoped, however, that Grant would 
 be tempted to abandon Corinth ; in this 
 showing that they shared the feeling 
 which was commonly entertained at 
 Richmond, that Bragg's march on Lou- 
 isville would compel the National com- 
 mander to release his hold on the Mis- 
 sissippi. They did not know their man. 
 Grant's character, in fact, Avas not yet 
 fully understood. 
 
 Of the appi'oach of the enemy, and 
 of two unsuccessful raids made by a 
 cavalry force under General Aimstrong, 
 Grant duly informed Rosecranz, who 
 was at the time at Tuscumbia. Rose- 
 cranz hastened to luka, a sweet village 
 on the Memphis and Charleston Rail- 
 road, in Tishamingo County, Missis- 
 sippi, noted for its mineral springs and 
 
160 
 
 ItTKA AND CORINTH. 
 
 the beauty of its suiToundings. At 
 luka there was collected a large amount 
 of stores. Leaving the place in charge 
 of Colonel R. C. Murphy, of the Eighth 
 Wisconsin, with orders to remove the 
 property to Corinth or destroy it, Rose- 
 cranz hurried westward, with Stanley's 
 division, to Clear Creek, some seven 
 miles east of Corinth, and there en- 
 Sep, camped. On the 1st of Septem- 
 '• ber, Price, with twelve thousand 
 men, reached Jacinto, when the small 
 National force stationed there retired 
 and fled to Corinth. Tuscumbia and 
 luka were in like manner abandoned ; 
 and Price, unresisted, established his 
 lu'.adquarters at the latter place, taking 
 ])()ssession of the National property 
 which Murphy had failed to destroy. 
 
 The time had now come for Grant to 
 act. He had watched the movements 
 of the enemy with great earnestness. 
 He had now divined their meaning. 
 He had also found his ojiportunity. 
 What the Confederate leaders intended 
 was now clear. Price wished so to en- 
 gage the attention of Grant as to tempt 
 him to draw his forces out of Corinth. 
 VanDorn, meanwhile, was to be ready 
 to spring upon the abandoned or poorly 
 garrisoned stronghold, and secure it 
 for the Confederacy. From his scouts 
 Grant had learned that VanDorn could 
 not reach Corinth for at least four days. 
 Price, as we have seen, had established 
 his headquarters at luka ; and VanDorn 
 was at Holly Springs. There was time, 
 therefore, to punish Price, and to be 
 back at Corinth ready to give Van- 
 Dorn a warm reception. But the time 
 was precious. Not an hour was to be 
 
 lost. Every second delayed was a pos- 
 itive gain to the enemy. The instruo- 
 tions were promptly given. General 
 Ord was directed to move on the left 
 of the railroad, through Burns ville, to 
 luka, taking care, of course, to leave 
 garrisons at Corinth and other points 
 that required protection. General Ross 
 was ordered by telegraph to come at 
 full speed from Bolivar on the same 
 route, and, leaving a small rearguard at 
 Burnsville, to join Ord with three thou- 
 sand four hundred men. This force, 
 six thousand five hundred in all, was to 
 attack Price from the north. Rosecranz 
 was ordered to send one division of 
 Stanley's, with Mizner's cavalry, by 
 way of Jacinto, to strike the enemy's 
 flank, while Hamilton should move 
 round by the Fulton road, to cut off his 
 southward retreat or turn it into a rout. 
 The force under Rosecranz amounted to 
 nine thousand. This, with the three 
 thousand under Ord and the three thou- 
 sand four hundred under Ross, made 
 the army of Grant in the field larger, 
 by three thousand, than that of Price. 
 The choice of position made by the 
 Confederates more than compensated 
 for the difference in actual strength. 
 The combined movement of the Na- 
 tional troops began at four o'clock in 
 the morning of the 18th of Sep- sjp, 
 tember. That night, after having J8. 
 marched through a terrible rain-storm, 
 the troops of Rosecranz bivouacked at 
 Jacinto, about twenty miles south of 
 luka. 
 
 On the following morning they push- 
 ed on in light marching order to- Sep. 
 ward luka, with Mizner's cavalry. 
 
 19. 
 
DEFEAT OF PKICE. 
 
 161 
 
 At Barnett's Corners they encountered 
 some Confederate outjiosts, driving them 
 in, after a sharp skirmish. Early in the 
 afternoon, when about two miles from 
 luka, Hamilton's division, while mov- 
 ing cautiously and expecting every mo- 
 ment to hear the gans of Ord, came 
 suddenly upon the enemy, in strong 
 force and well posted on the side of a 
 hill which flanked a deep ravine. Ham- 
 ilton immediately formed line of battle. 
 The ground was so broken, so tangled 
 with thickets, so interlaced with creeks 
 and ravines, that it was impossible to 
 bring the troops into action in large 
 bodies. The men formed themselves 
 wherever the ground Avould permit 
 them. The line was thus broken at 
 frequent intervals ; and the fighting 
 seemed to be done by a number of 
 small armies. The fighting, however, 
 was severe. After much exertion, and 
 in spite of a most destructive fire of 
 grape, canister and shell from the ene- 
 emy's guns, the Eleventh Ohio battery 
 was put in position on the crest of the 
 hill. This battery was supported by 
 the Fifth Iowa, Colonel Matthias, and 
 the Twenty-Sixth Missouri, Colonel 
 Boomer; and commanding the road in 
 front, it did excellent and effective 
 work. Colonel Eddy, with the Forty- 
 Eighth Indiana, was holding ground a 
 little in front of the battery, where the 
 fighting was most fierce, and where the 
 Confederates were led by General Piice 
 in person ; and although assistance was 
 given him by the Fourth Minnesota, 
 Captain LeGro, and by the Sixteenth 
 Iowa, Colonel Chambers, he was diiven 
 again and again back upon the baltery. 
 
 Around the battery of the Eleventh 
 Ohio, the battle raged most fiercely. 
 Three or four times the guns of this 
 battery were taken and retaken. The 
 commander of the battery. Lieutenant 
 Sears, did noble work. At length Cob 
 onel Eddy fell mortally wounded ; and 
 his regiment being hurled back in dis- 
 order, the guns — every horse having 
 been killed, seventy-two of the men and 
 nearly all the oflicers either killed or 
 wounded — were seized and carried ofF 
 by the Confederates. While this strug- 
 gle lasted, Stanley's division came up; 
 but such was the nature of the ground 
 that only the Eleventh Missouri could 
 be pushed to the front. This regiment 
 I'endered most effective assistance, and 
 helped to drive the Confederates back 
 into the ravine. The fight lasted until 
 nightfall ; and, the Confederates having 
 been compelled to take shelter in the 
 hollow toward the village, darkness fell 
 upon the combatants and made an end 
 of the carnage. 
 
 The reader will observe that Ord waa 
 not present to take any part in the con- 
 test. Why was this ? He had, it seems, 
 spent the greater part of the day watch- 
 ing the movements of a Confederate 
 force which appeared to be advancing in 
 the direction of Corinth. This proving 
 to be only a feint, he hastened to Burns- 
 ville, where he found Ross waiting with 
 his three thousand men. Grant ordered 
 him forward, with five thousand men, 
 with directions to halt within four miles 
 of luka until he should hear Rosecranz's 
 guns. A high north wind, which blew 
 all the afternoon, prevented him from 
 bearing the sound of the cannon. It 
 
162 
 
 lUKA AND CORINTH. 
 
 was not until next morning that he heard 
 the expected signal; but it was too 
 late. When he reached luka, the en- 
 emy had disappeared. As illustrative 
 of the difficulties of the situation, it de- 
 serves to be noted that, at half-past ten 
 o'clock on the night of the 19th, Rose- 
 cranz sent a dispatch to General Grant, 
 stating that he had been engaged for 
 several hours, and had lost three pieces 
 of artillery, and requesting the assist- 
 ance and co-operation of the troops un- 
 der Ord. This dispatch should have 
 been in Grant's hands within two hours. 
 It did not reach him until thirty-five 
 minutes past eight the next morning. 
 Mortified by the delay, and dreading 
 the possible result, Grant wrote to Ord 
 in the most urgent language. " Rose- 
 cranz," he said, " may find his hands 
 full. Huriy up your troops — all possi- 
 ble." Happily, the character of Ord 
 was well known, and there was no rea- 
 son to suspect his bravery or his willing- 
 ness to take part in the fight. 
 
 The Fulton road had not been cov- 
 ered, as Grant had ordered, and Price 
 was able during the night to make good 
 his escape. As soon as his flight was 
 known, a pursuit was made ; but Price 
 had too much the start to be overtaken. 
 Although Grant had reason to sympa- 
 thize with Rosecranz, in consequence of 
 the nonappearance of Ord, he was ill 
 satisfied with the result of the fight. 
 He had counted on the destruction or 
 capture of Price's army. As it was, 
 luka was a victory, and his plan had 
 been amply justified. Price lost one of 
 his best generals, Little, who was killed. 
 At least a thousand of his men were 
 
 made prisoners; the number of his killed 
 •and wounded was large ; and he was 
 unable to caiTy with him the captured 
 guns. The National loss was about 
 seven hundi-ed and thirty men killed 
 and wounded. On the 22d Grant sep« 
 withdrew his forces and returned 22. 
 to Corinth to prepare for the reception 
 of VanDorn. 
 
 Corinth again comes prominently into 
 the foreground. In May it was the 
 theatre of great and stirring events 
 which commanded the attention of both 
 continents; and now, in October, it is 
 to be the theatre of events even more 
 momentous and greatly more enduring 
 in their results. Price joined VanDorn 
 at Ripley; and, little daunted at the 
 failure of their plan to get hold of Co- 
 rinth by stratagem, they made up their 
 minds to take it by force. It was known 
 that VanDorn was already approaching 
 from the west ; but it was not known 
 what point he might first attack. It 
 might be Jackson ; it might be Bolivar ; 
 it might be Corinth — the latter most 
 like])^ Grant took all needful precau- 
 tion to make his different points of 
 strength secure, knowing that it would 
 not be difficult to concentrate, once the 
 enemy was encountered and his pur- 
 pose fully understood. Rosecranz was 
 marched back through Jacinto to Co. 
 rinth, which he reached on the sepi 
 2Gth. Ord was stationed at Boli- 26. 
 var; and Grant returned to his head- 
 quarters at Jackson. General Hurlbut 
 was thrown out with his division to- 
 wards Pocahontas. The united Con- 
 federate forces moved northward to 
 Pocahontas, striking tLe Memphis and 
 
THE FIRST DAY AT CORINTH. 
 
 163 
 
 Charleston Rjiilroad about halfway be- 
 tween Corinth and Grand Junction. 
 There they met the troops of Mansfield 
 Lovell, whose acquaintance, the reader 
 will remember, we made in the last 
 chapter, when describing the capture 
 of New Orleans. Thus strengthened, 
 the Confederate army numbered about 
 twenty-two thousand men, and was un- 
 der the immediate command of General 
 VanDorn, who ranked both Price and 
 Oct. Lovell. On the night of the 2d 
 2' of October, the united forces bi- 
 vouacked at Chewalla, ten miles from 
 Corinth. Early on the morning of the 
 Oct. «^d, the Confederates came up in 
 ^' force ; and Rosecranz had no lon- 
 ger any reason to doubt that the object- 
 ive point aimed at by VanDorn was 
 Corinth. Rosecranz disposed of his 
 troops accordingly. Hamilton he placed 
 on the right, Davis in the centre, and 
 McKean on the left; while Colonel 
 Oliver, with three regiments and a sec- 
 tion of artillery, was stationed on the 
 Chewalla road, beyond the old works 
 of Beauregard. Mizner's cavalry was 
 disposed in every direction around the 
 town, watching the roads at Burnsville, 
 Boneyard, Kossuth, and also in the 
 front. On the Confederate side, the 
 left, under Price, was on the Mobile 
 and Ohio Railroad, to the north of Co- 
 rinth. VanDorn had charge of the 
 centre, a little more to the west, on the 
 Chewalla road ; and the right was held 
 by Lovell. It was evident that the 
 attack was to be made upon the north- 
 west side of Corinth — the point which 
 VanDorn had been led to understand 
 was tlie most vulnerable. He did not 
 
 know that this defect in the original 
 fortifications of Beauregard had been 
 completely obviated, Grant having caus- 
 ed to be constructed here four powerful 
 redoubts. Corinth, in truth, was a very 
 different place in these first days of 
 October to what it was when Beaure- 
 gard abandoned it in May. 
 
 When the National forces, after the 
 retreat of Beauregard, entered Co- 
 rinth, the defenses, which had been con-t 
 structed by the Confederate chief, were 
 found to extend fifteen miles. To de- 
 fend so extended a line would have 
 required an enormous army. To obvi- 
 ate this difficulty, and in order to make 
 the place defensible by a much smaller 
 force. General Halleok had constructed 
 an inner line of defenses. Grant, how- 
 ever, was not satisfied with these. Ma- 
 jor F. E. Prime, the chief engineer of 
 General Grant, under his direction, 
 threw uj) a line of batteries on the north 
 front, far inside of Halleck's line, and 
 close to the town of Corinth, ha^^ng an 
 enfilading fire upon the Bolivar and 
 Chewalla roads, and a sweeping cross- 
 fire upon all assailable parts of the en- 
 tii-e fi'ont. On the extreme right were 
 the old works of Beauregard; and from 
 that point the chain of forts reached 
 to the extreme left. On succeeding to 
 the command of all the forces in the 
 District of West Tennessee and North- 
 ern Mississippi, Grant examined the de- 
 fenses of Corinth, which were then be- 
 ing constructed under the superintend- 
 ence of General Cullum, and expressed 
 the opinion to Genei-al Halleck that 
 they would be appropriate if there w&s 
 an army of one hundred thousand men 
 
164 
 
 lUiA AND CORINTH. 
 
 to defend them, but that they were of 
 too great extent for the force at his dis- 
 posal. Immediately upon General Hal- 
 leck's departure for "Washington, Prime's 
 works were pushed forward -wath ener- 
 gy, and by the 25th of September, when 
 Rosecranz took command, they were 
 nearly completed. To Major Prime, 
 under General Grant's orders, belongs 
 the credit of laying out and construct- 
 ing the fortifications against which the 
 enemy was now about to hurl his masses 
 with impetuous but unavailing valor. 
 
 The first pressure of the Confederates 
 was felt by Colonel Oliver, who, as we 
 have seen, was somewhat in advance on 
 the Che walla road. It was the van- 
 guard of the Confederate army, under 
 Mansfield Lovell. Lovell pushes his 
 men forward with such energy that 
 Oliver finds his position one of consid- 
 erable difficulty. Hard pressed, he is 
 joined by General McArthur, who in 
 turn finds himself overmatched and in 
 danger of being outflanked. McAr- 
 thur is strengthened by four regiments 
 from McKean's division. In spite of 
 this assistance, McArthur is pushed 
 back, as Oliver had been before him. 
 The battle now becomes general. Davis 
 is hard pressed; and, an interval ap- 
 pearing between him and McArthur, 
 the Confederates make a desperate rush 
 to fill up the gap. The onslaught was 
 ti'emendous. Davis, to save his flank, 
 was compelled to retire a thousand 
 yards, and in so doing lost two guns. 
 It was evident that the Confederates 
 were in earnest, and that they meant 
 to capture Corinth. New dispositions 
 were therefore made of the National 
 
 troops, bringing them nearer the town. 
 These were being carried out when the 
 darkness ended the conflict. The strug- 
 gle had been severe ; and not a few 
 brave men on the National side had 
 fallen. General Oglesby was severely 
 wounded ; and General Hackelman was 
 killed. It was not without reason +Kat 
 VanDorn was jubilant. He had pressed 
 the National army back with compara 
 tive ease. When night fell, he had en- 
 veloped Rosecranz's front. If he tele- 
 graphed to Richmond, announcing a 
 victory, he was only stating what was 
 a fact. Perhaps he was too jubilant, 
 and too confident that Corinth ^vould 
 be his before the rising of the sun on 
 the following morning; but this was 
 because he was ignorant of the strength 
 of the works behind which the National 
 forces were able to entrench themselves. 
 By the break of day on the morning 
 of the 4th of October, the battle octt 
 was resumed. The Confederate *• 
 line was closed up to ^vithin a thousand 
 yards of the outer works which guarded 
 the town. The night had not been 
 spent by them in slumber ; for it was 
 observed that they liad thrown up sev- 
 ei-al batteries in front of the National 
 line. Besides VanDorn, Price, and 
 Lovell, there were present on the Con- 
 federate side Generals Villepigue, Rust, 
 Maury and L. Hebert; and the troops 
 were of the best possible material. The 
 Nationals had been equally on the alert. 
 All the batteries around the town were 
 well manned ; and a new one, called 
 Fort Richardson, and mounting five 
 guns, had been constructed by the sap 
 pers and miners during the dark hours 
 
TEMPESTS OF IRON. 
 
 169 
 
 of the night. The ground which lay 
 between the combatants was of a varied, 
 irregular character. Hill and swampy- 
 land alternated; and the whole was 
 covered by forest trees and brushwood. 
 On the north and west there were fields 
 interspersing the woods ; in front of 
 the i-ight centre, a swamp ; and in front 
 of the left centre,- impracticable hills. 
 The National left, held by Stanley's di- 
 vision, was protected by Battery Rob- 
 inett on the left and Battery Williams 
 on the right. The centre was on a 
 slight lidge, just north of the houses of 
 Corinth, and consisted of Davies' divis- 
 ion, slightly retired, with sharp-shooters 
 in front, and having Battery Powell on 
 the right. Hamilton's division was on 
 the right, Avith Dillon's batteiy, ad- 
 vanced beyond Davies, and having two 
 regiments in rear of his left. 
 
 The first shot was fired from one of 
 the newly erected Confederate batte- 
 ries, the one most in advance, and dis- 
 tant only from Battery Robinett some 
 two hundred yards. This was the open- 
 ing of the fight. The shells fell in the 
 streets of Corinth, producing the wild- 
 est consternation amonij the inhabitants. 
 For a time this batteiy was unanswered. 
 It was not until daylight when Captain 
 Williams, of Battery Williams, opened 
 his 2()-pounder Parrott guns upon it, 
 silencing it in three minutes. Clearly 
 it was the intention of the Confederate 
 commander to attract the attention of 
 tlie Nationals by tliis cannonading ; and, 
 by keeping them employed in this di- 
 rection, to give Lovell an opportunity 
 to storm the works on their left. The 
 silencing of this advanced battery ne- 
 
 cessitated a change of plan. There was, 
 however, no delay. Shortly after nine 
 o'clock. Price came down on Rosecranz's 
 centre with tremendous force. Moving 
 in heavy masses, and marching rapidly 
 along the Bolivar road, tlie Confederates 
 came up in wedge-like form, and fell 
 fiercely upon Davies and Fort PowelL 
 Never was advancing column more 
 warmly received. The road was swept 
 by a direct, cross and enfilading fii-e. 
 As the column advanced, it was literal- 
 ly torn through and through. At each 
 successive volley, huge gaps appeared 
 in the ranks. The men were mowed 
 down like grass. There had been no 
 such destruction of human life since the 
 commencement of the war. It put into 
 the shade the massacre at Ball's Bluff 
 and the Valley of the Shadow of Death 
 at Pittsbiu'g Landing. Undismayed by 
 this storm of grape and canister, which 
 covered the ground with the bodies of 
 their comi'ades, the Confederates pressed 
 gallantly on. An eye-witness of thia 
 attack has told us that they " came up 
 bending their necks downward, and 
 with th^ir faces averted, like men striv- 
 ing to protect themselves against a 
 driving storm of hail." Are they to 
 win the day ? Davies' division yields ; 
 and there is a temporary panic. On- 
 ward push the brave Confederates, 
 They capture Fort Powell ; and, in 
 spite of the guns of Fort Richardson, 
 they penetrate to the public square and 
 make themselves masters of tlie head- 
 quarters of Rosecranz. In a better 
 cause, such bravery ought to have been 
 rewarded with victory. As it was, the 
 triumph was short-lived, Rosecranz, see- 
 
1«6 
 
 lUKA AND COEINTH. 
 
 ing the panic which had seized Davies' 
 men, ruslied into the midst of the wa- 
 vering battalions ; and, what with en- 
 treaty and threats and the flat of his 
 sabre, he succeeded in restoring order. 
 " The ragged head of the column " 
 which had forced its way into the town, 
 was assailed by a section of Immel's 
 batteiy, supported by the Tenth Ohio 
 and the Fifth Minnesota, and driven to- 
 ward the forest. Fort Powell was re- 
 taken by a splendid charge of the Fifty- 
 Sixth Illinois. Meanwhile, the guns of 
 Hamilton, who had fallen back with 
 Davies, being in full command of the 
 avenues of. advance and retreat, were 
 spreading death and destruction in the 
 Confedei'ate ranks. What for a mo- 
 ment seemed a victory was now con- 
 verted into a rout. Price's men Avere 
 driven back at all points. In the wild- 
 est confusion, they fled to the shelter of 
 the woods, the victorious Nationals 
 closely pursuing. Price's attack thus 
 jiroved a complete failure. 
 
 The attack on the left was conducted 
 by VanDorn in person. It was intended 
 that the attack on the right and that on 
 the left should be made at the same 
 moment. VanDorn, however, was de- 
 layed by the difliculties of the grotmd; 
 and Price had been engaged some twen- 
 ty minutes before he was able to bring 
 his men into action. Arranging his 
 regiments in four columns, and placing 
 his heavy artillery in the rear, VanDorn 
 marched forward under the fire of the 
 guns of the two forts, Robinett and 
 Williams. From the moment they came 
 in sight, they were mowed and torn and 
 shattered by grape and shell and canis- 
 
 ter. On, however, they moved, with 
 an audacity which compelled the ad- 
 miration of the National troops. Now 
 were witnessed those " gorgeous pyro- 
 technics," of which Rosecranz speaks in 
 his official despatch, and the description 
 of which he leaves "to pens dipped in 
 poetic ink." Never in the history of 
 warlike movements was there exhibited 
 cooler determination or greater bravery 
 on the part of the rank and file. On 
 they move, in spite of the tempest of 
 iron. It seems as if nothing will hinder 
 them. They are now within fifty yards 
 of Fort Robinett. Suddenly the Ohio 
 brigade, which has been lying flat, rises 
 at a signal and pours so murderous n 
 fire upon the advancing columns that 
 they stagger, break, and fall back into 
 the woods. The battle, however, is not 
 yet ended. The Confederates re-fonn ; 
 and again, as if convinced that a more 
 daiing effort will give them the victory, 
 they come up gallantly to the charge, 
 led by Colonel Rogers, of the Second 
 Texas. This time they succeed in reach- 
 ing the ditch. Rogers, revolver in hand, 
 has leaped the ditch and scaled the par- 
 apet. At this moment the Ohio bri- 
 gade, again springing up, pours its mur- 
 derous volleys upon the assailants. The 
 efPect was terrific. Rogers, with five 
 equally brave companions, falls inside 
 the fort. The word " charge " is given 
 by the National biigade commander. 
 Taken up and repeated by the men, 
 it rings loud above the din of battle ; 
 and the Eleventh Missouri and the 
 Twenty-Seventh Ohio rush bounding 
 over the parapet, and, after a severe 
 hand to hand fight with the assailants. 
 
BATTLE OP THE HATCHIS. 
 
 167 
 
 chase "their broken fragments back to 
 the woods.'' By noon the battle was 
 ended. It was, beyond all question, 
 one of the bloodiest contests since the 
 commencement of the war. On both 
 sides the greatest bravery was exhib- 
 ited ; and although the Nationals were 
 victorious, they had little cause to dis- 
 esteem the prowess of their opponents. 
 On the morning of the 5th, the men 
 Oct. having been allowed to rest for 
 5> the night, the pursuit of the Con- 
 federate army was begun. It was con- 
 tinued for forty miles by the infantry, 
 and for sixty miles by the cavalry. 
 During the coiu-se of that day, a severe 
 engagement took place between a body 
 of the Nationals and a detachment of 
 Confederates who had been sent to 
 guard the crossing of the Hatchie. In 
 this engagement, which is known as the 
 battle of the Hatchie, the Confederates 
 had a largely superior force ; but they 
 were broken in spirit, battle-worn and 
 weary, and made, in consequence, but 
 a poor resistance. Driven back across 
 the river toward Corinth, they were 
 compelled to make a wide circuit, and 
 recross the Hatchie at Crum's Mill, six 
 miles above. In their retreat they left 
 behind them two guns ; and three hun- 
 dred of their men were made prisoners. 
 The glory of this \actory must be di- 
 vided between Hurlbut and Ord, who 
 in succession held the chief command. 
 In the course of the sti-uggle Ord 
 was severely wounded, and Hurlbut 
 resumed the command, which he had 
 relinquished in the early part of the 
 day, on the arrival of his superit)r. At 
 Ripley, whither the great body of the 
 
 National army had pursued the retreat- 
 ing Confederates, the pursuit was dis- 
 continued. Grant deemino; it advisable 
 not to advance further for the present. 
 Eosecranz was j ustly proud of the vic- 
 tory which he had Avon ; and it was 
 only a just reward for the services 
 which he had rendered at luka and Co- 
 rinth, when, a few days after his return, 
 he was promoted to the chief command 
 of the army of the Ohio, now called the 
 army of the Cumberland, thus super- 
 seding Buell. In an order issued to 
 his troops on the 24tli of Octo- oct, 
 ber, Rosecranz said : " The enemy 24. 
 numbered, according to their own au- 
 thorities, nearly 40,000 men — almost 
 double your own numbers. You fought 
 them in the position we desired on the 
 3d, punishing them teixibly; and on 
 the 4th, in three hours after the infantry 
 entered into action, they were beaten. 
 You killed and buried one thousand 
 four hundred and twenty-four officers 
 and men. Their wounded, at the usual 
 rate, must exceed five thousand. You 
 took two thousand two hundred and 
 sixty-eight prisoners, among whom were 
 one hundred and thirty-seven field offi- 
 cers, captains, and subalterns, represent- 
 ing fifty-three regiments of infantry, 
 sixteen regiments of cavalry, thirteen ^^ 
 batteries of artillery, and seven battal- 
 ions, making sixty-nine regiments, thir- 
 teen batteries, seven l)attalions, besides 
 several companies. You captured three 
 thousand three hinidred and fifty stand 
 of small arms, fourteen stand of coloi-s, 
 two pieces of artillery, and a large quan- 
 tity of equipments. You pursued hia 
 retreating columns forty miles in iofce 
 
IS8 
 
 lUKA AND COEINTH. 
 
 with infantry, and sixty miles with cav- 
 alry. " 
 
 The entire National loss, including, 
 of course, luka and Corinth, was 315 
 killed, 1812 wounded, and 232 prison- 
 ers and missing. 
 
 General Grant, although he had some 
 reason to complain that the array of 
 VanDorn had not been completely de- 
 stroyed, had just cause to be gratified 
 with these fresh successes. His plans 
 had worked admii'ably. His calcula- 
 tions had been perfect. It was a piece 
 of great daring, and, in other hands, 
 would have implied tremendous risks, 
 to march first on luka to whip Price, 
 and then to find time to return to Co- 
 rinth to demolish VanDorn. His suc- 
 cess must have strengthened his faith 
 in his own judgment. It certainly con- 
 vinced the authorities at Washington 
 and the people at large that in Grant 
 the National cause had found a defender 
 whose ability was equal to his daring, 
 au' I whose judgment was thoroughly to 
 hi trusted. His abilities did not find 
 full scope, nor did he get credit for 
 what he actually accomplished, so long 
 as TIalleck held the chief command. 
 Now that he was free to act on his own 
 responsibility, the true character of the 
 man revealed itself ; and it began to be 
 •een that it was to General Grant, more 
 
 than to any other man, that the nation 
 was indebted for that series of brilliant 
 victories which, begun at Forts Henry 
 and Donelson, had swept the Confede- 
 rates out of Kentuck)' and Tennessee. 
 Too much praise can hardly be bestowed 
 on General Rosecranz; nor can it be 
 denied that Ord did well according to 
 his limited opportunity. Price and Van- 
 Dorn revealed all the qualities of brave 
 and dashing generalship ; but there was 
 a visible absence from the management 
 of the Confederate troops of that cool 
 and calculating head which du'ected the 
 movements of the Nationals. 
 
 By a general order of the 16th of 
 October, the department of which Q^t, 
 General Grant had command was I^ 
 largely extended and named the Depart- 
 ment of the Tennessee, with the head- 
 quarters at Jackson. The Confederates 
 having been again repulsed, and the 
 com'se so far cleared, Gi'ant began to 
 make vigorous preparations for the car- 
 lying out of the original intention of the 
 campaign inaugurated at Donelson, but 
 Ijrought into temporary abeyance by 
 the abstraction of so many of his troops. 
 Vicksbui'g I'emained the chief obstacle 
 to the free navigation of the Missis- 
 sippi; and to the reduction of Vicks- 
 burg all the energies of Grant were 
 now directed- 
 
KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE. 
 
 169 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 rhe Army of the Ohio. — Buell Sent to Chattanooga. — Vicksbnrg. — Delay in Marching on. — The Reason. — Con. 
 federate Boldness. — The Invasion of Maryland and Kentucky. — General Bragg. — Kirby Smith. — Cumlierlancl 
 Gap. — Smith's Eaid through Kentucky. ^Excitement in Ohio. — The Importance of Chattanooga. — The Kaca 
 for Chattanooga. — Bragg Wins. — Bragg's Army. — Buell Follows Bragg. — Intercepted Despatches. — Buell 
 First at Louisville. — Reinforcements from Grant.— Buell 's Blunder. ^Relieved of His Command. — The Order 
 Recalled. — Bragg's Proclamation. — The Confederate Committee on Foreign Affairs. — A Bribe to the North- 
 west. — Attempt to Inaugurate a Confederate Government in Kentucky. — A Political Failure but a Successful 
 Raid. — Bragg's Retreat with His Booty. ^BueU Pursues. — Concentration at Perryville. — Scarcity of Water.— 
 Preparing for Battle. — Bragg Preparing to Retreat. — He Resolves to give Battle. —The Battle of Perryville 
 Commenced. — Severe Fighting. — Colonel McCook Sorely Pressed. — Reinforced. — The Confederates Pressed 
 Back into the Woods. — Major-General McCook Comes Up. — He Takes Position. — Advance of Rousseau. — 
 Chaplin's Creek. — A Commanding Position. — General McCook Surprised. — A Terrific Blow Dealt by the Con- 
 federates. — Death of Jackson. — The Nationals Driven Back. — Terrill Mortally Wounded. — Rousseau also Falls 
 Back. — Mitchell and Sheridan. — Sheridan's Opportunity. — Terrific Slaughter. — Reinforcements Wanted. — 
 Crittenden Ordered Forward. — The Battle of Perryville Ended. — Retreat of Bragg. — Bragg and Buell both 
 Blamed. — Buell Removed. — Rosecranz takes His Place. — His Promptitude. — Preparations for another Strug- 
 gle. — Murfreesboro'. — Rejoicings at Bragg's Headquarters. — Bragg Over-Confident. — Trying to Annoy Grant. — 
 Rosecianz Moves Southward. — The Battle-Ground. — Stone River.- The Two Armies in Position. — Bragg's 
 Army the Stronger. — Rosecranz's Plan of Attack.- Bragg's Plan. — The Battle Begun. — A Terrific Onslaught. — 
 A Temporary Defeat. — Plan of Battle Changed. — Critical Position of Sheridan. — Terrible Loss of Life. — 
 Sheridan Exhausted. ^Negley and Thomas. — The Battle all but Lost. — Hazen and His Brigade. — Rosecranz's 
 new Arrangements Completed — A Tempest of "Double-Shotted Iron Fire." — The Tide of Battle Turned. — 
 Stubbornness of the Confederates. — Rosecranz in the Front. — ' ' Forward Now. " — Darkness. — A Drawn Battle. — • 
 Burying the Dead. — The Battle Resumed on the Third of January. — The Confederates Driven Back. — Terriblt 
 Havoc. — Rosecranz in Murfreesboro'. — A Great National Victory. — Rosecranz Complimented. 
 
 On the lOtli of June, as we have seen 
 in a previous chapter, General 
 Buell, at the head of his old army 
 — the army of the Ohio — was ordered 
 by General Halleek to move towards 
 Cha'ttanooga. This was almost imme- 
 diately after the retirement of Beaure- 
 gard fi'om Corinth and the oceupation 
 of the same by the National troops. 
 
 What was it that rendered necessary 
 this breaking up of the army of the 
 West at this particular junctiu'e ? In a 
 space of time which hardly justified the 
 result, that army had marched from 
 Henry to Donelson, from Donelson to 
 Shiloh, from Shiloh to Corinth, had 
 
 opened the Mississippi as far south a? 
 Memphis, and had swept the Confede 
 rates out of Kentucky and Tennessee. 
 Farragut had already pushed his way 
 beyond New Orleans ; and that city 
 had been restored to the Union. At 
 the time that the victorious army was 
 divided, and Buell with his forces was 
 sent towards Chattanooga, it seemed to 
 be the plain duty of Halleek to nioT« 
 southward and capture Vicksburg, the 
 one remaining barrier of any conse- 
 quence to the free and unrestricted navi. 
 gation of the great river from St Louis 
 to the sea. Moreover, the capture of 
 Vicksburg formed part of that grand 
 
170 
 
 PERRYVILLE AND MURFRBESBORO'. 
 
 plan which was inaugurated at Fort? 
 Henry and Donelson. There must have 
 been good and substantial reasons why 
 this plan was not followed out — why 
 what seemed a plain duty was not per- 
 formed. What were those reasons ? 
 
 To answer this question, it will be 
 Qecessary for us to take a brief retro- 
 spect of the situation. It deserves here 
 to be noted that the successes of Hal- 
 leck, Grant and Buell in the West had 
 been more than counterbalanced by the 
 victories of the Confederates in the 
 East. The government at Richmond had 
 made tremendous efforts to strengthen 
 their armies ; and conscription had suc- 
 cessfully accomplished their purpose. 
 McClellan, as we shall see more fully 
 in the next chapter, had been driven 
 back from Richmond ; and his peninsu- 
 lar campaign had totally failed. Noth- 
 ing daunted by the succession of defeats 
 sustained in the West, it was resolved 
 by the Confederate authorities to give 
 effect to the clamor of the South, " to 
 carry war into the enemy's country, 
 and relieve us from its intolerable bur- 
 dens." With this end in view, Lee was 
 directed to move into Maryland ; and 
 Bragg, who had succeeded Beauregard 
 in command, was ordered into Ken- 
 tucky. It was believed that these slave- 
 holding States would be easily reelaim- 
 ?d, and that from them it would be 
 ■iasj to invade the North, and wring 
 peace from it in one or other of the 
 nrreat cities. Of Lee and his movements 
 we shall have occasion to treat in a sub- 
 sequent chapter. Our attention for the 
 present must be given to Bragg, and to 
 the events which wei'e taking place, 
 
 or were about to take place, in Ken- 
 tucky. 
 
 The southward movement of the Na- 
 tional forces, and their concentration for 
 a time at Shiloh and Corinth, had left 
 Kentucky and Tennessee to a large ex- 
 tent unprotected. Taking advantage of 
 this, Morgan, Forrest, and other guerilla 
 chiefs, had overrun those States, produc- 
 ing terror and dismay among the inhab- 
 itants and working tenible destructior ,. 
 The successful raids by those band . '■ 
 greatly encouraged the Confederates in 
 their determination to make bold and ag- 
 gressive efforts in the North ; and Gene- 
 ral Kirby Smith, an officer who, the read- 
 er will remember, played an imjjortant 
 part at the first battle of Bull Run, con- 
 trived to unite those iri'egular bands, 
 and make use of their experience in fur- 
 thering the plans of the Confederate 
 government. At the head of these men, 
 as the advanced guard of Bi'agg's army, 
 this general marched thiough Rogers' 
 and Big Creek Gaps of the Cumberland 
 Mountains into Kentucky. At Rich- 
 mond, in this State, he encountered a 
 body of Unionists under the command 
 of Major-Geueral Nelson, and defeated 
 them, two thousand of the Union troops 
 being captured and two hundred killed 
 and wounded. Among the latter was 
 General Nelson himself. After their 
 success at Richmond, they found little 
 opposition at Lexington, at Frankfort, 
 at Shelbyville, at Paris, and at Cynthi- 
 ana. It was not long until they were, 
 on the banks of the Ohio. The people 
 of that State became wild with excite- 
 ment; and the citizens of Cincinnati 
 made vii):orous efforts to be in readiness 
 
CHATTANOOGA. 
 
 171 
 
 for the daring invader. When within 
 one day's march of the city, Kirby Smith, 
 Sep. on the 12th of September, fell 
 
 '■^' back on Frantfort and Lexina- 
 ton. Later, liaving been reinforced by 
 troops from South^\'estern Virginia, un- 
 der Humphrey Marshall, he manoeuvred 
 so as to accom])lisn his original purpose, 
 which was to effect a junction with 
 Bragg. 
 
 Chattanooga, the citadel of the moun- 
 tain fastness of Tennessee, and the jyoint 
 iVappui for operations towards Atlanta, 
 was justly regarded by Halleck as a 
 strategic point of the first importance. 
 Chattanooga held by a strong National 
 force, it would be impossible for the 
 Confederates to make any very effective 
 inroad into Kentucky. But the import- 
 ance of Chattanooga for certain pur- 
 poses was as Avell known to Bragg as 
 it was to Buell. It was the object of 
 the Nationals to possess themselves of 
 Chattanooga, and so prevent such in- 
 vasion. It was the object of the Con- 
 federates to enter Kentucky in force 
 before Chattanooga was in the hands of 
 their enemies. Hence Chattanoofca was 
 so far the objective point of both com- 
 manders. The National commander de- 
 sired to take advantage of the concen- 
 tration of the Confederate forces on the 
 Mississippi line by seizing Chattanooga; 
 the Confederate commander desired to 
 take advantage of the concentration of 
 National forces on the same line by an 
 June advance towards the Ohio. On 
 
 "• the 1 1 til of June Buell commenced 
 his march from Coi'inth. Following the 
 route prescribed by Halleck, which 
 was the direct route through North 
 
 Alabama, by way of the Memphis 
 and Charleston Railroad, the divisions 
 moved forward in close succession by 
 marches of fourteen miles a day. The 
 distance from Corinth to Chattanooga 
 by this railroad is two hundred miles. 
 When joined by Mitchell, whom he had 
 left behind him to guard Middle Ten- 
 nessee, and General Morgan, who had 
 seized Cumberland Gap, Buell had un- 
 der him some forty thousand men. Cau- 
 tiously and carefully providing for all 
 contingencies by the way, he had by 
 the end of July thrown forward two 
 divisions, under McCook and Critten- 
 den, to Battle Creek, some twenty-five 
 miles from Chattanooga; and all pre- 
 j^arations for an advance on the latter 
 place were complete. 
 
 Bragg, however, had reached Cha*-- 
 tanooga in person on the 28th of jg!« 
 July ; his troops wei'e ali-eady 2S, 
 well in hand ; and, what with the so- 
 called army of East Tennessee, number- 
 ing thirteen thousand men, and which, 
 under the command of Kirby Smith, 
 covered his right at Knoxville, he could 
 count on an effective force, for immedi- 
 ate use, of fifty thousand men. Bragg's 
 army was organized in three corps — 
 one under Kirby Smith, as we have 
 seen, at Knoxville, and the two others, 
 under Hardee aijd Polk, at Chatta- 
 nooga. With the two latter, Bragg 
 moved northward, directing his nuurli 
 towards the Louisville and Nashville 
 Railroad. Forestalled in the occupation 
 of Chattanooga, Buell was dependent 
 upon Louisville foi- supplies, and hence 
 had to guard nearly three hundred miles 
 of railroad. As Bragg inarched north- 
 
172 
 
 PEREYVILLE AND MURFREESBORO' 
 
 ward, he had no choice but execute a 
 parallel march and fall back upon Nash- 
 ville. Bragg, who had struck the rail- 
 road at Mumfordsville, moved thence 
 to Fi'ankfort, whei-e he was joined by 
 Smith. Buell had by this time dis- 
 covered, thi'ougli some intercepted de- 
 spatches, that their true object was 
 Louisville, and not Nashville, as their 
 movements seemed to indicate. Leav- 
 ing a garrison at the latter place, he 
 hurried on to Louisville, which he 
 Sep, reached on the 2.5th of Septem- 
 2''»' ber. Bragg's movements had been 
 slow. It had taken him six weeks to 
 march from Chattanooga to Frankfort. 
 Slow, however, as his march had been, 
 he would certainly have been first at 
 Louisville, had it not been for a burnt 
 bridge near Bardstown, which obstruct- 
 ed his progress and caused considerable 
 letention. As it was, Louisville was 
 secure. The arrival of Buell was an 
 immense relief to the panic-stricken cit- 
 izens, who had become aware of the 
 near approach of the Confederates. 
 
 At Louisville Buell received large 
 reinforcements. Some of these were in 
 the shape of new levies ; but not a few 
 of them were veterans, sent up the Mis- 
 sissippi and the Ohio from the army of 
 Grant. His entire force, after he had 
 been joined by General Nelson, was 
 estimated at about one hundred thou- 
 sand men. The National force thus 
 greatly outnumbered the Confederate 
 force, which, including that of Kirby 
 Smith, did not exceed sixty-five thou- 
 sand men. Buell had conducted the 
 retrograde movement from the Tennes- 
 see to the Ohio with marked ability; 
 
 he was entitled to no little praise for 
 anticipating Bragg at Louisville ; but 
 he had made a grand mistake in not 
 being first at Chattanooga. He had 
 allowed the enemy to invade Kentucky 
 by not being forward in time at that 
 strategic point ; and considering the ir- 
 j'itable mood in which the Northern 
 mind was at the moment, it is not won- 
 derful that the cry of incapacity was 
 loudly raised, and a demand made for 
 his recall. This feeling being yielded to, 
 Buell, just as he had got his army in 
 order and was about to march from 
 Louisville against the Confederates, re- 
 ceived from Washington an order reliev- 
 ing him of his command, and appointing 
 General G. H. Thomas to act in his 
 stead. Thomas, who had the highest 
 respect for the military talent of Buell, 
 refused to supersede him. At Thomas's 
 urgent request, the order was revoked 
 and Buell remained in command. 
 
 Bragg, meanwhile, had commenced 
 to carry out his instructions in regard 
 to the organization of Kentucky on 
 Confederate principles. On the gep, 
 18th of September he issued a i^' 
 proclamation from Glasgow, declaiinj: 
 that the Confederate army had come its 
 the liberators of Kentuckians "from tlic 
 tyranny of a despotic ruler, and not as 
 conquerors or despoilers." " Your gal- 
 lant Buckner," he said, "leads; Mar- 
 shall is on the right; while Breckin- 
 ridge, dear to us as you, is advancing 
 with Kentucky's radiant sons to receive 
 the honor and applause due to their 
 heroism." He told them that he must 
 have supplies for his army, but that they 
 would be fairly paid for. " Kentuck 
 
CONFEDERATE CONCILIATION. 
 
 !;» 
 
 ians," he concluded, " we have come 
 with joyful hopes. Let us not depart 
 in sorrow, as we shall if we find you 
 wedded in your choice to your present 
 lot. If you prefer Federal rule, show 
 it by your frowns, and we shall retire 
 whence we came. If you choose rather 
 to come within the folds of oiu' brother- 
 hood, then cheer us by the smiles of 
 your women, and lend your willing 
 hands to secure yourselves in your her- 
 itage of liberty. "Women of Kentucky ! 
 your persecutions and heroic bearing 
 have reached our ears. Banish hence- 
 forth forever from your minds the fear 
 of loathsome prisons or insulting visit- 
 ations. Let your enthusiasm have free 
 rein. Buckle on the armor of your kin- 
 di'ed, your husbands, sons and brothers, 
 and scoff to shame him who would prove 
 recreant in his duty to you, his country, 
 and his God." Bragg was giving ex- 
 pression to sentiments then common at 
 Richmond. It was evidently his opin- 
 ion that the dominant feeling was in 
 favor of the South, and that the Ken- 
 tuckians would gladly welcome his ap- 
 pearance as that of a friend and lib- 
 erator. It would be absurd to deny 
 that there were among these people 
 many who s}^npathized warmly with 
 the Southern cause. But they were not 
 the majority, nor were they as a rule 
 tlie better class of citizens. Kentucky 
 had fairly and squarely cast in her lot 
 with the North, and she was not to be 
 shaken in her purpose or tempted from 
 the path of duty. At this juncture 
 the Confederates, elated wath their suc- 
 cesses in the East, began to indulge in 
 the wildest day tbeams. It was not 
 
 Kentucky or Tennessee alone that 
 would gladly join and make common 
 cause with the South. Why sliould 
 not the Northwestern States do the 
 same? Duty and interest alike pointed 
 them in that direction. On the same 
 day that Bragg issued his proclamation, 
 the Committee on Foreign Affaii-s made 
 a repoi't to the Confederate Congress 
 with respect to the propriety of a pro- 
 clamation with a view to influence the 
 States of the Northwest. In the free 
 navigation of the Mississippi and its 
 tributaries, the Northwest and the 
 South had a common interest. As a 
 reward for the alliance of these North- 
 western States, the Hichmond authori- 
 ties were willing to cede the free navi- 
 gation of the Mississippi and to open 
 to them the markets of the South. The 
 NorthAvest, however, equally with Ken- 
 tucky and Tennessee, had decided upon 
 their course of duty, and had such a 
 proclamation been issued, the sturdy 
 men of the West might have been 
 justified in reminding their generous 
 friends that the oAvnership of the Mis- 
 sissippi and its tributaries was no longer 
 an open question. Still further, in car. 
 rying out the instructions he had re- 
 ceived, Bragg, while with Kirby Oct. 
 Smith, at Frankfoi-t, inaugurated !• 
 on the 4th of Octobei', a provisional 
 governor of the State of Kentucky. 
 
 The Confederate commander, howev. 
 er, had made good use of his time and 
 opportunities for other purposes as 
 well. His guerrillas and foraging par- 
 ties had scoured the country round and 
 round, and had carried off thousands of 
 hogs and cattle, with bacon and bread 
 
i:4: 
 
 PERRYVILLE AND MURFREESBORO'. 
 
 stuffs of every kind. In every town the 
 shops and stores were forced open, and 
 whatever was wanted Avas taken and 
 paid for in worthless Confederate mo- 
 ney. A little later than this, when the 
 Confederates were driven out of the 
 State, the boast was made by the Rich- 
 mond newspapers that " the wagon train 
 of supplies brought out of Kentucky 
 by Kirby Smith was forty miles long. 
 It brought a million yards of jeans, 
 with a large amount of clothing, boots 
 and shoes, and two hundred wagon- 
 loads of bacon, six thousand barrels of 
 pork, fifteen hundred mules and horses, 
 eight thousand beeves, and a large lot 
 of smne." It ought to be added here 
 that his tender feelings towards the un- 
 fortunate Kentuckians did not prevent 
 him from enforcing the Confederate 
 conscription act wherever his influence 
 extended, and thus largely increasing 
 the effective strength of his army. 
 
 Anticipated in the occupation of Lou- 
 isville, and feeling convinced that he Avas 
 already defeated in the main purpose of 
 his campaign, Bragg prepared to retreat 
 and to protect the large booty which 
 he had collected. It was certainly the 
 next most important thing for him to 
 do in the premises. He moved back- 
 ward with great deliberation, his object 
 being to cover his supply trains until 
 they got a good start toward Tennessee. 
 QcU On the 1st of October, Buell, his 
 '• army reinforced and reorganized, 
 moved out of Louisville in pursuit of 
 his antagonist. His army was arranged 
 in three corps, commanded respectively 
 by Generals Gilbert, Crittenden, and 
 McCook. General George H. Thomas, 
 
 who was Buell's second in command, 
 had charge of the right wing. It was 
 known that Bragg was at Bardstown. 
 Towards Bardstown, therefore, Buell 
 directed his divisions. Crittenden, who 
 was in immediate command of the right, 
 marched by way of Shepherdsville. The 
 left moved in a line nearer to Frankfort. 
 The other columns, marching by differ- 
 ent I'outes, fell respectively into the 
 roads leading from Mt. Washington, 
 Fail-field and Bloomfield to Bardstown. 
 Arrived at Bardstown, it AA'as found 
 that Bragg had retired some eight hours 
 before, and that he had moved in a di- 
 rection which suggested that he would 
 probably concentrate at Harrodsbui'g. 
 After leaving Bardstown, Buell learned 
 that the force of Kii'by Smith had 
 crossed to the west side of the Kentucky- 
 River, and that the enemy was moving 
 to concentrate either at Harrodsburg or 
 Perryville. The centre, under Gilbert, 
 was accordingly ordered to march on 
 PeiTyville, where it arrived late on the 
 afternoon of the 7th, finding the Oct. 
 Confederates apparently assem- ?• 
 bled in strength, BuelJ^ and his staff 
 moved with this corps. " The advanced 
 guard," General Buell tells us in h'.s 
 report, " under Captain Gay, consisting 
 of cavalry and artillery, supported to- 
 wards evening by two regiments of in- 
 fantry, pressed successfully upon the 
 enemy's rearguard to within two miles 
 of the town, against a somewhat stu1)- 
 born opj^osition." The National army 
 had suffered greatly, for the three pre- 
 vious days, from the scarcity of water. 
 In the bed of Doctor's Creek, a tribu- 
 tary of Chaplin River, about two and a 
 
JACKSON KILLED. 
 
 m 
 
 half miles from Perryvilk-, some pools 
 of water were found ; and the thirty- 
 sixth brigade, from General Sheridan's 
 division, iinder Colonel D. McCook, 
 was ordered to seize and hold a com- 
 manding position which covered these 
 pools. The order was promptly exe- 
 cuted ; and a supply of bad water, al- 
 though the best that could be had, was 
 obtained for the wants of the army. 
 Determined to offer battle early on the 
 following morning, Buell sent orders to 
 General McCook and General Critten- 
 den to march at three o'clock in the 
 morning, so as to close up on his right 
 and left, and, if possible, surround the 
 foe. 
 
 McCook did not receive his orders 
 antil half-past two o'clock, and he 
 marched at five. Crittenden, failing to 
 find water, had gone off his path some 
 six or seven miles ; and he was late, 
 in consequence, several hours. Bragg 
 had already seen the peril of his posi- 
 tion, and had commenced to retreat. 
 Perceiving, however, that the centre 
 onder Gilbert and McCook had out- 
 marched Crittenden, he resolved to give 
 battle at once. It was, at least, worth 
 making the effort. If he could defeat 
 Gilbert and McCook before the arrival 
 of Crittenden, he might be able either 
 to make good his retreat in the interval, 
 or failing that, he could fall upon him 
 in tui'n. Bi'agg's army was arranged in 
 five divisions — two under Hardee, and 
 one each under Anderson, Cheatham, 
 and Buckner — the whole being under 
 the immediate command of Major-Gen- 
 eral Polk. Smith had already retreated 
 further to the west, carrying with him 
 
 the "provisional government," in the 
 person of Governor Hawes. 
 
 Early in the morning of the 8th, the 
 fight, which had been interrupted Oct, 
 by the darkness of the night pre- **• 
 ceding, was resumed. Colonel McCook. 
 as we have seen, had taken a position 
 on a height which commanded Doctor's 
 Creek ; and this secured a supply of 
 water, such as it was, for the National 
 army. At the break of day an attempt 
 was made to draw Colonel McCook 
 from his position. For a time he had 
 to bear the whole weight of the Con- 
 federate attack alone. When being: 
 somewhat pressed, the Second Missouri, 
 a regiment which did memorable service 
 at Pea Ridge, with the Fifteenth Mis- 
 souri as a support, came to his aid, and 
 the Confederates were compelled to re- 
 tire into the woods. WJiile retirino- 
 they were heavily smitten on the flank 
 by the Second Minnesota battery. 
 
 Buell, who, as we have seen, was with 
 the central corps, under the immediate 
 charge of General Gilbert, dreaded an 
 attack on that body, all the more so 
 that neither McCook nor Crittenden 
 had yet arrived. The engagement with 
 Colonel MeCook's brigade at Doctor's 
 Creek had, to all appearance, sufficiently 
 engaged the attention of the Confede- 
 rate chief ; and between ten and eleven 
 o'clock, when Colonel McCoctk had re- 
 pelled the enemy and fii'ndy established 
 himself, the first corps, under Major- 
 General McCook, came up on the Max- 
 ville road. After the arrival of thin 
 corps, no formidable attack was appre- 
 hended. McCook was ordered to get 
 promptly into position on the left o! 
 
176 
 
 PERRYVILLE AND MURFREESRORO'. 
 
 tlie centre coips, and to make a recon- 
 noissance to his front and left. The 
 reconnoissance was still being continued 
 by Captain Gay toward his front and 
 right, and shai-]) firing with artillery 
 was going on. 
 
 The head of McCook's column reached 
 the point des<iguated shortly after ten 
 o'clock. It Avas about tlu'ee and a half 
 miles from Perryville, his line being 
 abreast of Gilbert's corps. Only two 
 of McCook's three divisions — those, 
 namely, of Rousseau and Jackson — 
 were present, that of Sill having been 
 sent toward Frankfort. Rousseau ad- 
 vanced with his cavaliy, and secured his 
 ground, and the batteries of Loomis and 
 Simonson were placed in commanding 
 positions. General Jackson's two bri- 
 gades were stationed on high ground to 
 the right of the Maxville and Peny ville 
 Toad, and his instructions were to hold 
 them there in column so that they might 
 be easily moved in whatever direction 
 the occasion might require. McCook 
 was- under orders to report to General 
 Buell in person. Having made these 
 dispositions, he rode off to Buell's head- 
 quarters. He was not long absent ; 
 but v^hen he returned he found that the 
 Confederates had put in position three 
 batteries, and that an ineffectual artil- 
 leiy duel was going on between them 
 and the batteries of Loomis and Simon- 
 son. Seeing no infantiy near, he gave 
 instructions to the commanders of these 
 last mentioned batteries to discontinue 
 filing and to husband their ammunition. 
 Water was extremely scarce, and his 
 men were suffering terribly in conse- 
 quence. Following out instructions re- 
 
 ceived fpom Buell, McCook proceeded 
 to make a reconnoissance toward Chap- 
 lin's Creek. Here he found high com- 
 manding gi'ound, altogether a better po- 
 sition, and not far from the river. Hav- 
 ing sent for Generals Jackson and 
 Terrill, he showed them the water, 
 marked their line of battle, and ordered ] 
 a battery to be posted on this line, with 
 strong suppoi-ts. Terrill at the same 
 time received instructions to advance a 
 body of skirmishers cautiously down 
 the slope of the hill to the water, as 
 soon as his line was formed. Not ap- 
 prehending any immediate danger at 
 this point. General McCook now moved 
 toward the right of his line. At this 
 very moment the Confederate force was 
 moving stealthily upon him. Cheat- 
 ham's division had stolen up to Jack- 
 son's left, which was under the imme- 
 diate command of General Terrill, and 
 which consisted chiefly of raw ti'oops. 
 McCook had scarcely completed his 
 general arrangements, when the enemy 
 fell upon him like a thunderbolt. The 
 Confederate general had made himself 
 familiar with the position of his antago- 
 nist. McCook's right rested firmly on 
 Gilbert's left ; but his left was compara- 
 tively weak and altogether unprotected. 
 It was on the left, therefore, that the 
 Confederates fell with the greatest fury. 
 Their charge was terrific ; and their 
 horrid yells filled the air. At the first 
 volley Jackson was killed, a bullet or 
 a fragment of a shell having hit him 
 in the breast. Terrill, who showed 
 great bravery, did everything that man 
 could do to steady his troops ; but, de- 
 moralized by the fall of Jackson, and 
 
CHAPLIN'S HILLS. 
 
 177 
 
 being vastly outnumbered, they broke 
 and fled in the wildest confusion. Ter- 
 rill himself fell mortally wounded. He 
 died the same evening. McCook's left 
 was thus driven back, and the Confede- 
 rates fell with equal fury on Rousseau's 
 division. Starkweather's brigade, aided 
 by the batteries of Bush and Stone, 
 made a gallant resistance, and held the 
 enemy at bay for nearly thi'ee hours. 
 It was found impossible, however, to 
 repel the fierce and determined attack. 
 Bush's battery had lost thirty- five 
 horses ; the ammunition of both infant- 
 ry and artillery was all but exhausted ; 
 and Rousseau's left was compelled to 
 fall back. On the Confederates pi'essed, 
 Rousseau's centre and right, commanded 
 respectively by Colonels L. A. Harris 
 and W. H. Lytle, yielding in succession. 
 [n the struggle, Lytle was seriously 
 wounded, and, believing his wound to 
 be mortal, refused to allow himself to 
 be carried from the field. Gilbert's 
 left flank was now exposed, and Bragg 
 was leading the attack in person. The 
 situation had become critical in the ex- 
 treme. The position here was held by 
 R. P. Mitchell and Philip H. Sheridan. 
 Sheridan had now a chance to show the 
 metal of which he was made. He held 
 the key of the National position, and 
 he knew it. If he must relinquish the 
 position, it will not be without a strug- 
 gle. He had been more or less engaged 
 all the foi'enoon, and had just repelled 
 an assault on his front. Turning his 
 guns upon the victorious Confederates, 
 who had just thrown back Rousseau's 
 right, he opened upon them a most ter- 
 rific fire, which checked their advance ; 
 
 and while fighting valiantly and hold« 
 ing the enemy back, he was joined by 
 Carlin's brigade, which Mitchell pushed 
 forward to the support of his right. 
 This force, charging at the double quick, 
 broke the line of the Confederates and 
 drove them back through Perry ville, 
 capturing two caissons, fifteen wagonn 
 of ammunition, with the guard, which 
 consisted of three officers and omi 
 hundred and thirty-eight men. Mean 
 while Colonel Gooding, who had been 
 sent to the aid of McCook, liad for over 
 two hours been fighting with great per- 
 sistence against a superior force. He 
 lost one third of his men ; and his horse 
 having been shot under him, he was 
 made prisoner. It was about four 
 o'clock in the afternoon before General 
 Buell became aware that a sevei'e Ijattle 
 had been raging for hours. The fact 
 was made known to him by General 
 McCook's aide-de-camp, who came to 
 him with a request for reinforcements. 
 These were pi-omptly sent. Orders 
 were also sent to General Crittenden 
 to huriy forward, and with all expedi- 
 tion possible, to seud one division to 
 strengthen the centre, and " to move 
 Avith the rest of his corps energetically 
 against the enemy's left flank." Such, 
 however, was the distance from one 
 flank of the amiy to the other — six 
 miles — that before the orders could be 
 delivered, and action taken, night came 
 on and terminated the battle. Such 
 was the battle of Perryville, or, as it is 
 sometimes called, Chaplin's Hills. 
 
 All the necessary arrangements were 
 made for resuming the contest early on 
 the following morning. It was Buell's 
 
178 
 
 PERRYVILLE AND MURFREESBORO'. 
 
 expectation that the Confederate gen- 
 eral would endeavor to hold his posi- 
 tion. Orders, in consequ :!nce, were 
 given to the commanders of corps to be 
 prepai'ed to attack at daylight. Gilbert 
 and Crittenden were to move forward 
 at six o'clock and attack the Confed- 
 erates^ on their front and also on theii' 
 left flank. In obedience to orders these 
 commanders moved early in the morn- 
 ing; but Bragg, with his entire army, 
 had fled. They retired first to Har- 
 rodsburg, where they were joined by 
 Kirby Smith and General Withers; 
 thence they hurried to Camp Dick Rob- 
 inson ; and from Camp Dick Robinson 
 they hastened back to Chattanooga 
 through Cumberland Gap. The retreat 
 was conducted by General Polk, covered 
 by the cavaliy of Wheeler. At Har- 
 rodsburg they left behind them about 
 twelve hundred sick and wounded. 
 Buell pursued as far as London, and 
 then returned. During the pursuit the 
 Confederates were compelled to aban- 
 don at various points as much as twenty- 
 five thousand barrels of pork. The 
 Confederate loss in this engagement 
 must have amounted to 2500. Buell's 
 loss was 916 killed, 2943 wounded, 489 
 missing, and 10 guns. Eight of the 
 captured guns were left behind. 
 
 The Confederates had been driven 
 out of Kentucky ; Init they had re- 
 treated with scarcely any loss, and they 
 had carried off immense booty. The 
 main body of the National army, under 
 General Thomas, was moved towards 
 Nashville. Buell went to Louisville. 
 He had shown but little generalship 
 in this campaign. His movements had 
 
 been singularly and inexplicably slow. 
 If he had been afraid or unwilling to 
 fight, he could hardly have acted other- 
 wise. He blundered, fiist of all, when 
 he allowed Bragg to reach Chattanooga 
 before him. He blundered again when, 
 having reached Louisville before his an- 
 tagonist, and been reinforced, he did 
 not strike the Confederates at once, and 
 before Kirby Smith had time to retire 
 with his booty. He blundered in his 
 ari-angements at Perry ville, where he 
 ought to have cut Bragg's army to 
 pieces. He blundered worst of all 
 when, after Perryville, he allowed the 
 enemy to escape. It is not wonderful 
 that his conduct gave great dissatisfac- 
 tion at Washington, and that he was 
 supplanted by General Rosecrauz, who 
 had covered himself with so much glory 
 at luka and Corinth. Rosecranz took 
 command on the oUth of October ; ©ct. 
 and the army of the Ohio became, ^®' 
 from that date, the army of the Cum- 
 berland. 
 
 The Confederate government was as 
 little satisfied with Bragg, as the gov- 
 ernment at Washington was with Buell. 
 His expedition had been a failure. He 
 had, in reality, accomplished nothing. 
 He had collected some valuable booty, 
 it is true ; Ijut that was a small result 
 from a campaign from which such gieat 
 things were so confidently expected. 
 He had gained no brilliant victory. He 
 had failed to make any impression on 
 the Northwest ; and but few Kentuck- 
 ians had voluntarily joined his army. 
 On the contrary, his seizure of their 
 property had done more to alienate the 
 people of Kentucky from the Confed«- 
 
CHRISTMAS REJOICINGS. 
 
 179 
 
 rate cause than anything which had 
 hitherto happened. Bragg was not re- 
 moved from his command, but he was 
 ordered, almost as soon as he reached 
 Chattanooga, to return and move again 
 to the north. 
 
 On assuming the command of the 
 army of the Cumberland, known also 
 as the fourteenth army corps, Rose- 
 cranz found that the task he had under- 
 taken, while it involved serious respon- 
 sibilities, was beset with difficulties of 
 no ordinary kind. The army was in a 
 dilapidated condition. Its ranks had 
 been thinned. The men had to be 
 clothed and supplied with all the neces; 
 saries for another campaign. This, 
 however, was not all. The railroad 
 between Louisville and Nashville was 
 badly injured, and could not be used 
 for transport ; and, as was the case on 
 the occasion of Bragg's former march 
 northward, the country was overrun by 
 Confederate raiders, who, well mounted, 
 »pread everywhere terror among the 
 inhabitants, and otherwise worked infi- 
 nite inconvenience. Rosecranz knew 
 well the temper of the government and 
 the people. Both were impatient to 
 see his army in motion. Nothing could 
 justify delay. Out of the war levy of 
 six hundred thousand men called out 
 by the government, he received rein- 
 forcements ; and the work of reorganiz- 
 Octt ation went rapidly on. It was on 
 50. the 30th of October he assumed 
 the command; and on the 7th of No- 
 NoTt vember the advance corps of his 
 '• army was at Nashville, one hun- 
 dred and eighty-three miles distant. 
 Nashville, which had been held by 
 
 General Negley, and which for a time 
 had been in great peril, had been re- 
 lieved ; and here Rosecranz established 
 his headquarters. The work on the 
 raib'oad was carried on with great ener- 
 gy ; and by the 26th of November iVof„ 
 the connection Avas complete and 26. 
 the cars were running. From this date 
 on to the 26th of December, Rosecranz 
 tells us, " every effort was Vjent to com- 
 plete the clotliing of the army, to pro- 
 vide it AA-ith ammunition, and replenish 
 the depot at Nashville with needful 
 supplies, to insure us against want from 
 the longest possible detention likely to 
 occur by the breaking of the Louisville 
 and Nashville Railroad ; and to insure 
 this work, the road was guarded by a 
 heavy force posted at Grallatin." All 
 this looked like business. It revealed a 
 man of energy and activity, and pre- 
 sented Rosecranz in striking contrast 
 with Buell. 
 
 Bragg evidently expected that Rose- 
 cranz would take up his winter quarters 
 at Nashville ; and so he prepared his 
 own winter quarters at Murfreesboro'. 
 Possibly he hoped, as Rosecranz sug- 
 gests, to make them at Nashville before 
 the winter was ended. It was about 
 the season of Christmas ; and there was 
 evidently a feeling of security in the 
 ranks of the Confederates. The Con- 
 federate president, Jefferson Davis, was 
 on a visit to Bragg at his private resi- 
 dence in the fine mansion of Major 
 Manning. The occasion v/as celebrat- 
 ed with much festivity and rejoicing. 
 There was a famous wedding. Mor- 
 gan, the guerrilla chief, was married to 
 the daughter of Mr. Charles Ready, 
 
180 
 
 PEKRYVILLE AND MUEFREESBORO'. 
 
 who had been a member of Congress 
 in 1853. Davis was at the wedding. 
 Most of the principal army officers were 
 present. The ceremony was performed 
 by General Polk, who put on the cas- 
 sock for the occasion ; and the merry 
 party found a means of increasing their 
 pleasure by dancing upon a floor car- 
 peted with American flags. 
 
 During the time that Rosecranz was 
 completing his arrangements, there oc- 
 curred certain minor engagements, such 
 as that at Lavergne and that at Harts- 
 ville, but on these we cannot afford to 
 dwell. They were but preliminaries to 
 the great struggle which was now im- 
 pending. Bragg, over-confident, had 
 sent a large cavalry force into West 
 Tennessee to annoy Grant, and another 
 lai'ge force into Kentucky to break up 
 the raib'oad. Evidently he had not 
 foi'med a proper judgment on the man 
 who was eagerly watching his every 
 movement. In the absence of these 
 forces, and now that he had abundant 
 supplies in Nashville, the National com- 
 mander deemed the moment opportune 
 to make a dash ou his antagonist. Ear- 
 Dec, ly in the morning of the 26th of 
 26. December, and amid a heavy, 
 chilling rain, the National army began 
 it? southward march. The Confederate 
 outposts yielded as it advanced. It 
 was not possible for them, so vigorous 
 was the pressure of the National ad- 
 vance, to destroy the bridges on the 
 Jeffeison and Mui'freesboro' turnpikes. 
 Dec. On the 30th, Bragg, finding he 
 3^« was about to be attacked, had 
 concentrated his army some two miles 
 'n front of Murf reesboro'. Stone River, 
 
 which rises in the high lands south of 
 Murfreesboro', flows towards the north- 
 west, and passes that town about a 
 mile to the west. A few miles above 
 Nashville, it empties itself into the 
 Cumberland. Bragg's army, some six- 
 ty-two thousand strong, was arranged 
 in the following order. Four divisions 
 — those of Withers, Cheatham, Cle- 
 burne, and McCown — were on the west 
 side of the river, the line running slight- 
 ly in a southwesterly direction. One 
 division — that of Breckinridge — was on 
 the east side of the river, and there held 
 the approaches to the town. The Na- 
 tional army, forty-three thousand strong, 
 was arranged in a line as nearly as pos- 
 sible parallel to that of Bragg, the en- 
 tire force being on the west side of the 
 river. The line extended between three 
 and four miles. Crittenden was on the 
 left, with three divisions — those of 
 Wood, VanCleve, and Palmer. Thomas 
 was in the centre, with two divisions- ~ 
 those of Negley and Rousseau, the latter 
 in reserve. McCook was on the right, 
 with three divisions — those of Sheridan, 
 Davis, and Johnson. The left wing 
 touched the river; the right stretched 
 a little beyond the Franklin road. Such 
 was the disposition of the rival forces 
 on the morning of the last day of the 
 year 1862. 
 
 It was the intention of Rosecranz to 
 attack with his left ; and consequently 
 he had concentrated two-thirds of his 
 force on that wing. His plan was to 
 throw his left and centre hurriedly on 
 Breckinridge at daybreak, to drive him 
 from his position, to wheel rapidly 
 round and strike the Confederates in 
 
THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK. 
 
 181 
 
 front and flauk, and pressing through 
 Murfreesboro' to cut off their line of 
 retreat, and so destroy their army in 
 detail. The plan was bold and daring, 
 and well fitted to inspire sanguine hopes. 
 On the east side of the river are com- 
 manding heights. These taken posses- 
 sion of and covered with artillery, the 
 Nationals would be able to strike in re- 
 verse the works fronting the centre of 
 their line ; and it was expected that the 
 artillery fire would so shake the Con- 
 federates that the rest of the plan would 
 be easy of execution. While Thomas 
 and Palmerwere to open with skirmish- 
 ing, and so engage the attention of the 
 Confederate centre and left towards the 
 river, VanCleve and Wood, of Critten- 
 den's division, were to cross the river 
 further to the north, fall upon Breckin- 
 ridge, and cany out the plan as pro- 
 posed. The necessity to cross the river 
 was the one disadvantage which Rose- 
 cranz liad to contend with. Meanwhile 
 McCook, whose divisions, as we have 
 seen, were on the right, was to maintain 
 Ills position and hold the hostile left in 
 rheck. 
 
 Singularly enough, Bragg had also 
 resolved to take the offensive ; and he, 
 too, meant to deal the first effective 
 blow with his strong left arm. There 
 was thus on both sides a similar inten- 
 tion and a not dissimilar disposition of 
 force. Both were strongest on the left 
 wing; and, as a natural consequence, 
 each was weakest at the point of attack. 
 It was Biagg's plan to rest on Polk's 
 right, as on a pivot, and, by a constant 
 wheeliniT of his whole line towards the 
 light, to force the National right and 
 
 centre back upon Stone River, and so 
 make himself master of the turnpike 
 and the railroad to Nashville, their 
 lines of communication in the rear. 
 The plan was not less daring — not less 
 striking — than that of Rosecranz. It 
 was evident that two capable generals 
 were confronting each other, that each 
 had found in the other a foeman worthy 
 of his steel, and that each was mak- 
 ing the best of his position and of the 
 means at his command. On the night 
 of the 30th both armies lay on their 
 arms. 
 
 On the following morning, before sun- 
 rise — a mild and pleasant morn- Dec, 
 ing for the season of the year — 31. 
 the National movement began. Van- 
 Cleve's division took the lead, as di- 
 rected. Two of his briirades had made 
 the passage in safety and without any 
 interruption. Wood, with his division, 
 was ready to follow. While thus cross- 
 ing the stream with haste and high 
 hopes, and w-hile the movement was 
 making satisfactory progress, suddenly 
 there bui'st forth the roar of battle on 
 the far-off right, and so violent was the 
 shock that it was felt by the moving 
 column on the extreme left. Emerging 
 from a thick fog which had settled over 
 the ground, his troops massed in ovei- 
 whelming force, Bragg had fallen furi- 
 ously upon Johnson's division, which 
 was on the extreme National right ; and 
 so unexpected was the attack that two 
 of its batteries were captured before a 
 gun could be fired. It was a decisive 
 blow. It came down like the crash of 
 a thunderbolt. Johnson's division was 
 instantly swept away. One of his bri* 
 
 916 
 
183 
 
 PERBYVILLE AND MURFREESBORO'. 
 
 gade commanders, Kirk, was severely 
 wounded ; another, Willick, had his 
 horse killed under him, and was made 
 
 prisoner ; 
 
 and 
 
 a large 
 
 number of his 
 
 men were surrounded and made prison- 
 ers. Davis, whose division stood next, 
 was assailed in front and on his uncov- 
 ered flank. The shock was irresistible. 
 Spite of his bravery, he, too, was com- 
 pelled to give way, with the loss of 
 many guns. Sheridan's division was 
 next to that of Davis, and still to the 
 right. On this the victorious Confede- 
 rates fell with accumulated power, and 
 with an energy and purpose increased 
 and intensified with success. And now 
 came the opportunity for a man who 
 had in him the true military instinct. 
 All was lost, if Sheridan could not 
 prolong the resistance. But Sheridan 
 again, as he had done before at Periy- 
 ville, proved himself equal to the emer- 
 gency and rose to the grandeur of the 
 occasion. 
 
 Rosecranz had been slow to abandon 
 his plan or stop his aggressive move- 
 ment. It was not until he had received 
 a second message from McCook that he 
 comprehended the gravity of the situa- 
 tion. To the first call for help by that 
 general, he returned for answer that he 
 was to dispose his troops to the best 
 advantage and hold his ground obsti- 
 nately. "Tell him," said Rosecranz, 
 " to contest every inch of the ground. 
 If he holds them, we will swing into 
 Murfreesboro' with our left and cut 
 them off." The second message, which 
 informed him that the right wing was 
 being driven, " a fact which was becom- 
 ing apparent by the rapid movement of 
 
 the noise of battle toward the north," 
 opened the eyes of the commander-in- 
 chief ; and while General Thomas was 
 ordered to despatch Rousseau into the 
 cedar brakes to the right and rear of 
 Sheridan, and General Crittenden was 
 ordered to suspend the movement acrossi 
 the river by VanCleve and Wood, Rose- 
 cranz began to feel and confess that his 
 forward movement on the foe was al- 
 ready paralyzed, and that a change of 
 plan was necessary. If he would save 
 his right and defend his communica- 
 tions, he must withdraw his left — he 
 must, in fact, establish a new line. 
 Whether he could do this, depended 
 much on Sheridan. 
 
 Sheridan's position had become criti 
 cal in the extreme. So, in truth, had 
 that of the whole National army ; for, 
 if Sheridan had given way easily, the 
 Confederates would have pressed up- 
 on both flank and rear, driven it to- 
 ward the river and cut it off from its 
 lines of commimication. In consequence 
 of the defeat and overthrow of Johnson 
 and Davis, Sheridan's division was com- 
 pletely uncovered on his right flank, 
 and absolutely unprotected in front. 
 On his front, therefore, he was attacked 
 by the Confederate division of Withers, 
 and on his right the victorioiis bands of 
 McCown and Cleburne, flushed with 
 success, rushed with tremendous fury. 
 The fii'st onslaught was made by With- 
 ers. The approach was made over an 
 open cotton field. Sheridan had three 
 batteries advantageously posted along 
 his line ; and as the Confederates came 
 forward in column closed in mass seve- 
 ral regiments deep, they were received 
 
"HERE'S ALL THAT IS LEFT" 
 
 188 
 
 with a destructive fire. Severe as was 
 this fire, it was powerless to check the 
 torward march of the foe. On, steadily 
 on, came the mighty mass, until within 
 fifty yards of the edge of the timber in 
 which lay Sheridan's troops. Springing 
 to their feet, the infantry poured such 
 a shower of bullets in the faces of the 
 Confederates that they were compelled 
 to halt. Volley succeeded volley in ever- 
 increasing power and degitructiveness. 
 It was a very tempest of iron. The 
 Confederates wavered, broke, and fled. 
 Sheridan's men charged and drove them 
 across the open field and behind their 
 intrenchments. The tide of battle had 
 now turned. It was not, however, with- 
 out great loss that this partial victory 
 was won. The young and chivali-ous 
 Sill, one of the most promising officers 
 in the National army, was killed while 
 leading the charge. By this time the 
 divisions of McCown and Cleburne 
 were on Sheridan's right ; and outflank- 
 ing him, exposed him to attack in the 
 rear. Sheridan was entitled to retire, 
 on the ground that his flank was unpro- 
 tected. But he did better. Retiring 
 his right and reserve brigades, and 
 charging with the left into the woods, 
 he caused the Confederates to recoil, 
 and thus found time to swdng around so 
 as to bring his line perpendicular to its 
 former direction. He now faced south 
 instead of east, and his line ran parallel 
 to the Wilkinson turnpike. He was 
 now in a better position to withstand his 
 opponents. But he was opposed by 
 mighty odds ; and the divisions which 
 had driven Johnson and Davis from the 
 field overlapped his right by nearly 
 
 their whole length. It was not possible 
 for Sheridan to repel them ; but he 
 could hold them in check. To reach 
 the Nashville road, they must put Sher* 
 idan out of the way ; but to do this 
 implied hard fighting and time ; and 
 time was salvation. Doubling in to« 
 wards their right, the Confederates 
 rushed upon him with all their might. 
 But it was all to little purpose. His 
 troops and his batteries gathered around 
 him ; there he stood like a rock in mid- 
 ocean against which the tempestuous 
 billows surge and foam and spend their 
 fury in vain. An hour had now been 
 saved. The Confederates crowded 
 around him in increasing numbers. A 
 change of front was again necessary. 
 Pivoting, so to speak, on the right flank 
 of Negley's division, he wheeled round 
 his line so as to face the west, and 
 planted his batteries on the salient of 
 his front. In his new position he cov- 
 ered Negley's rear, and with that com- 
 mander he was now forming a wedge- 
 shaped mass. Here again he was sav- 
 agely assailed. The full weight of the 
 four divisions of Hai'dee and Polk was 
 hurled against him and Negley. Thrice 
 they came forward with impetuous fury, 
 and thrice were they received with 
 a fire so biting and so merciless that 
 they staggered and fell back. Another 
 hour had been gained — another precious 
 hour for Rosecranz. But Sheridan had 
 done his utmost. His ammunition was 
 spent ; and there were no means of ob- 
 taining a fresh supply, as, in the dis- 
 comfiture of the right, the ammunition 
 train had fallen into the hands of the 
 enemy. Nor was this all. Sill, Roberlm 
 
1S4 
 
 PERRYVTLLE AND MURFREESBORO', 
 
 Shaeifer, his three brigade commanders, 
 had been killed. Even he now must 
 fall back. But he must do so in a man- 
 ner worthy of the glorious resistance 
 he has been able to make; and, if he 
 has not powder, he ha* steel. Covered, 
 therefore, with the bayonets of his re- 
 serve, he retired unconquered out of 
 the cedar thicket toward the Nashville 
 road. It was eleven o'clock when he 
 went out of the fight. He had lost 
 1630 men; but with their heroic lives 
 he had won three hours for Rosecranz, 
 and turned the fortunes of the day. 
 " Here's all that is left," he said sadly 
 as he joined his chief. 
 
 After the retirement of Sheridan, the 
 brunt of the battle fell upon Thomas. 
 His command was chiefly in and near 
 the cedar brakes. He had done his 
 best, as we have seen, through Negley's 
 division, to sustain Sheridan. Negley 
 was now exposed to the attacks of the 
 Confederates both in flank and rear. 
 Rousseau, at the head of Thomas' other 
 division, was sent to the front to the 
 assistance of Negley. The Confede- 
 rates, however, continued to press fur- 
 ther to the National rear ; and by and 
 by, having reached a commanding posi- 
 tion, they poured a concentrating cross- 
 fire on those two divisions. It waa im- 
 possible longer to resist the fury and 
 concentrated strength of the enemy. 
 Thomas, therefore, withdrew his troops 
 from the cedar woods and formed his 
 line between them and the Nashville 
 turnpike. It was a perilous operation, 
 and was attended with great loss of life, 
 one brigade alone — that of Lieuten- 
 ant-Colonel Shepherd — losing twenty- 
 
 two officers and five hundred and two 
 men in killed and wounded. In his 
 new position Thomas held his ground 
 fii'mly. It seemed, however, as if thft 
 battle was lost. The right wing of the 
 National army was gone. The centre 
 had been dreadfully cut up and driven 
 from the field. All now depended on 
 the left. 
 
 While these events were taking place 
 on his right and centre, Rosecranss was 
 not idle. The stubborn resistance ot 
 fered by Sheridan and the two divisions 
 of Thomas had given him time to make 
 good use of his left wing, and to re- 
 form his line of battle. We have seen 
 that the National right had not only 
 been turned, but driven oif the field. 
 We have seen that a similar fate had 
 befallen the National centre. In their 
 victorious march, therefore, describing, 
 so to speak, a circle drawn to the right, 
 the Confederates were moving steadily 
 on to what would have been the rear 
 of the National left, if the dispositions 
 of the early morning had remained im- 
 changed. It was the possibility of such 
 a calamity that lent such importance to 
 the heroic endurance of Sheridan and 
 Negley and Rousseau and the men un- 
 der their commands. It was this possi- 
 bility which gave such value to those 
 precious three hours which, so to speak, 
 had been arrested in their course. When 
 the victorious Confederates had borne 
 down all opposition, and reached the 
 National left, Rosecranz had all but 
 completed his new formation. On a 
 commanding knoll which overlooks the 
 plain west of the Murfreesboro' road, 
 he had massed his batteries, somewba* 
 
HAZEN'S BRIGADE. 
 
 185 
 
 hirei the fashion of Napoleon at Auster- 
 litz. With this as a point d'appui, he 
 was fi_»i'ming his new line, which was to 
 face no longer to the west, as in the 
 original disposition of the troops, bat 
 to the southwest, with the Nashville 
 turnpike in its rear. His object, of 
 course, was to bring his army into such 
 a position that he should be able to pre- 
 sent his front to tlie enemy. It requires 
 but little knowledge of the military art 
 to understand how difficult, how peril- 
 ous even, it is for an army in such cir- 
 cumstances (o pass from one formation 
 to another. While the chanoje is being; 
 made, it is necessarily disjointed and 
 helpless. At the last moment it seemed 
 as if the experiment of forming a ne\v 
 line might fail. Palmer's division held 
 the right of the National left wing. 
 After Sheridan had been compelled to 
 retire, and when Thomas's two divisions 
 under Negley and Rousseau had been 
 driven through the cedar w^oods, the 
 Confederates fell upon Palmer like an 
 avalanche. His two right brigades were 
 swept a^vay at once. If his left brigade 
 could not prolong the resistance, Rose- 
 cranz would be struck before his new 
 line was completed ; and the day would 
 in all probability be lost. But this 
 brave brigade, with the gallant Colonel 
 W. B. Hazen at its head, was equal to 
 tiie emergency. The role of Sheridan 
 was repeated. Once and again and yet 
 again the foe came down upon this bri- 
 gade with all its force, every time doing 
 tremendous damage, but eveiy time re- 
 pulsed with teirible loss. Some twelve 
 hundred men thus kept thousands at 
 bay until Rosecranz, having adjusted 
 
 his new front, was ready for the Con- 
 federate charge. It is no disparagement 
 to any of the other division or brigade 
 commanders, or to the men whom they 
 led, to say that to Hazen and his brigade 
 must be freely accorded the honor of 
 having saved the day. It was not, 
 however, without a great sacrifice ; for 
 nearly one half of the brigade had per- 
 ished. 
 
 The struggle, however, was not yet 
 ended. Bragg's entire army, with the 
 exception of a portion of the division of 
 Breckinridge, which was on the other 
 side of the river, having issued from the 
 cedar thickets which they had won, was 
 advancing over the plain in one magnifi- 
 cent column. Victory seemed to be in 
 theu- shout, and triumph in their firm 
 and steady footsteps. It was a glorious 
 sight, but it lasted only for a moment. 
 Rosecranz was fully prepared. There 
 WRS the loud roar of artillery and the 
 sharp rattling sound of musketry all 
 alongf the National line. It was a tem- 
 pest of "double-shotted iron fire." It 
 was " a sirocco of lead." Deep lanes 
 wei-e cut in the Confederate ranks. The 
 slaughter was terrible. Again and 
 again the attempt was made to face 
 the desolating storm of bullets ; but in 
 vain. Blinded by the sulphurous smoke 
 which, like a cloud-wall, rose up be- 
 tween them and Rosecranz's line, and 
 exposed to a fire which was increasing 
 in rapidity and becoming more deadly 
 in its aim, the troops of Bragg, so re- 
 cently so triumphant, staggered, broke 
 and fell back in confusion to the shelter 
 of the woods. 
 
 Compelled to abandon all further 
 
PERRYVILLE AND MITEF^ESBORO'. 
 
 attempts on the new and powerful front 
 of hia adversary, Bragg determined to 
 make another attack on the left. With 
 this end in view, he brought up the di- 
 yision of Breckinridge, which, as we 
 have seen already, was during the fore- 
 ipoon on the east side of Stone River, 
 and consequently not as yet in the fight. 
 This force was seven thousand strong. 
 The salient point of the National left 
 was still held by the brave Hazen. His 
 command, which had been so terribly 
 cut up, was well supported now both 
 on the right and left. About four 
 o'clock in the afternoon the Confede- 
 rates came down upon this point with 
 tremendous energy. The attack, howev- 
 er, was gallantly received and repelled. 
 Rosecranz, when the fight was keenest, 
 appeared on the scene, and hastened to 
 animate the men by his voice and pres- 
 ence. Dashing across the field of fire, 
 a shell grazed his person and carried off 
 the head of his chief of staff. Colonel 
 Garasche, who was riding at his side. 
 But it was no time for idle grief. 
 Rushing to the front, he had words of 
 advice and good cheer for the soldiers. 
 " Men," said he, " do you wish to know 
 how to be safe ? Shoot low. Give them 
 ft blizzard at their shins ! Do you wish 
 to know how to be safest of all ? Give 
 them a blizzard, and then charge with 
 cold steel ! Forward, now, and show 
 (vhat you are made of ! " The encour- 
 Mging words were, of course, obeyed 
 with a will. The first attack being re- 
 pePed, Breckinridge brought his second 
 line Into action. The result was the 
 same. It broke to the rear, at the first 
 volley. This was the last «ncounter of 
 
 the day. The sun had gone down; 
 and the two rival hosts, sick of the 
 bloodshed and weary of the toil, rested 
 on their arms. It was the last day of 
 the year 18G2. The night was unusu- 
 ally beautiful. The stars shone bright 
 in an almost cloudless sky. The silvery 
 moon shed her pale beams over the 
 cedar bi"ake, where were many sad 
 relics of the day's struggle — thousands 
 of brave men, stretched in the cold em- 
 brace of death, thousands more wound- 
 ed and helpless, piercing the night air: 
 with their cries of agony. There were, 
 no doubt, many thoughts of home — 
 pleasant memories and bitter recollec- 
 tions of days that were gone ; but 
 among those wounded men and those 
 thousands of warriors who, on both 
 sides, were fighting for what they be- 
 lieved to be the right, there were few 
 of those joys which usually belong to a 
 New Year's morning. 
 
 The battle of the 31st of Decembei 
 was, however, only a drawn battle. 
 The National troops still held the orig- 
 inal ground on their left ; and their new 
 position was strong. From all the other 
 points, however, they had been driven 
 back. Neither general had been able 
 to carry out his original jjlan. Nothing 
 was decided. Everything must depend 
 on a subsequent effort. On New 
 Year's day, the two armies stood 
 looking at each other, and biit little was 
 done in the way of fighting. Both, Jan. 
 however, were busy making pre- !• 
 parations for a fresh test of strength 
 Some slight fighting took place in the 
 afternoon; but it led to no result. 
 There is good reason for believing that 
 
BEAGG'S RETREAT. 
 
 187 
 
 Bragg thought the National army would 
 retreat; but in this he was mistaken. 
 Retreat was not as yet any part of Rose- 
 iaH. cranz's plan. On the morning of 
 2« the 2d, Friday, the Confederates 
 opened four batteries on the National 
 centre ; but these were soon silenced. 
 A similar demonstration was made a 
 little more to the National right, with 
 .a like result. About three o'clock in 
 the afternoon a spirited attack was 
 made by Breckinridge. The position 
 was held by VanCleve's division, which 
 showed a want of steadiness, and yield- 
 ed to the force of the enemy. Critten- 
 den came to his rescue, and posted his 
 batteries in an advantageous position 
 on the west side of the river, while two 
 brigades of Negley's division were or- 
 dered up. " The firing was terrific, 
 and the havoc fearful. The enemy re- 
 treated more rapidly than he had ad- 
 vanced. In forty minutes they had lost 
 two thousand men." There was a re- 
 treat and a pursuit. But it was now 
 after dark, aiid rain was falling heavily. 
 The pursuit, therefore, was discontin- 
 ued. As it was, the Confederates had 
 been foiled in all their efforts, and the 
 Nationals had gained some points of 
 Jan. advantage. On the morning of 
 3. the 3d it was still raining heav- 
 ily, ar(\ nothing was attempted on 
 eithf T side. During the course of the 
 day there was some skirmishing and 
 ' picket-firing all along the lines ; Ijut 
 there was no serious effort, and but 
 I little change made in the relative iiosi- 
 I Jan. tioDS of the two armies. On the 
 \ *• morning of the 4th, Sunday, it 
 . was found that Biagg had retreated 
 
 with his entire army during the pre- 
 vious night. He had left behind him 
 about two thousand of his sick and 
 wounded, with attendant surgeons, in 
 his hospitals. Nothing was done oa 
 that day; but on Monday morn- jai^ 
 iug Thomas entered Murfreesboro' *• 
 and drove the Confederate cavalry some 
 seven miles towards Manchester. On 
 the same day Rosecranz established his 
 headquarters in the village. Such was 
 the end of the famous battle in the 
 cedar brakes at Stone River — a battle 
 in which were put hars de combat nearly 
 thirty thousand men. The Confede- 
 rates had lost over 14,000 and the Na- 
 tionals over 15,000 men. More than 
 one-third of the National artillery and 
 a large portion of its train had been 
 captured. Undecisive as had been the 
 terrible struggle — one of the greatest 
 in the war — it had at least determined' 
 this — that the Confederates could not 
 break through the line of investment 
 between the Cumberland Mountains 
 and the Free States. Two desperate 
 attempts had been made ; but both had 
 failed. 
 
 The result of the battle of Murfrees- 
 boro' filled the National heart with joy. 
 It was natural that it should be so. 
 On the first day Rosecranz was all but 
 defeated, when he turned the tide of 
 victory, saved his army, and compelled 
 his antagonist to leave the field. If he 
 had not completely accomplished his 
 purpose — if the possession of Middle 
 Tennessee would still have to be con- 
 tested — the presumption now was that 
 in the next struggle that important 
 question would be settled in favor of 
 
188 
 
 PERRYVILLE AND MURFREESBORO'. 
 
 the North. This, however, was not all. 
 The victory, partial as it was, was sin- 
 gularly opportune. The summer cam- 
 paign had been, all over, the reverse of 
 favorable to the National arms. The 
 Confederates, both in the east and west, 
 had been daringly aggressive; and the 
 successes which had attended and re- 
 warded their efforts pained and dis- 
 couraged the people of the North. 
 Grant, after luka and Corinth, had sus- 
 tained a series of checks in his onward 
 movement towards Vicksburg; and the 
 disastrous battle of Fredericksburg, 
 which was fought on the 13th of De- 
 cember, had produced a shock from 
 which neither the government nor the 
 people had wholly recovered. Light 
 seemed to break in upon the darkness 
 when the tidings of Murfreesboro' were 
 flashed across the land. There was a 
 general who knew how to handle his 
 <!roops. There were men who knew 
 how to follow and obey. By their 
 joint efforts they had snatched victory 
 out of defeat. It was the grateful and 
 delighted sentiments of an entire people 
 which President Lincoln telegraphed 
 to Eosecranz, "God bless you and all 
 of you ; please tender to all, and iiccept 
 for yourself, the nation's gratitude for 
 your and their skill, endurance, and 
 dauntless courage." The words of the 
 general-in-chief were equally expressive 
 of the feeling of the Northern people. 
 " The victory," he said in greeting Rose- 
 cranz, " was well-earned, and one of the 
 most brilliant of the war. You and 
 
 your brave men have won the gratitude 
 of the army and the admiration of the 
 world." 
 
 A new element of strength was now 
 added to the army of the Cumberland in 
 the person of Brigadier-General James 
 A. Garfield, who was appointed to suc- 
 ceed Colonel Garesch^ as chief of staff 
 to General Rosecranz. General Garfield 
 had seen hard service in other depart- 1 
 nients, and to his natural abilities added ' 
 the experience of a tried veteran. He 
 proved of great service to General Rose- 
 cranz, especially in softening the bitter- 
 ness of the quarrel between his chief and 
 the War Department, accomplishing 
 more by his calm good sense than the 
 fiery energy of the hero of Murfreesboro' 
 could secure. 
 
 During the time that the Confede- 
 rates under Bragg were engaging the 
 whole attention and all the available 
 forces of Rosecranz, the superior cavalry 
 of the South were scouring Tennessee 
 and Kentucky, plundering the inhabit- 
 ants and destroying the railroads. Of 
 these marauding bands, the principal 
 were under the lead of Forrest and Mor- 
 gan. By and by they were compelled 
 to desist ; and attention began to centre 
 again on Chattanooga, near which, it 
 was evident, another trial of arms must 
 take place. Of this, however, we shall 
 have occasion to treat in a subsequent 
 chapter. Our attention, meanwhile, 
 must be directed to certain important 
 events which had already happened on 
 the Atlantic border. 
 
WASHINGTON AND RICHMOND. 
 
 189 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 51xe Armies of the West. — What They Have Done. — The Eastern Campaign.— The Object of the Eastern Cam- 
 paign. — Too Much Importance Attached to Kichmond. — General Scott. — The Army of the Potomac. — McClellan 
 Commander-in-Chief. — His Delay. — The Nation Impatient. — President Lincoln Urgent. — A Council of Gen- 
 erals. — McCleUans Secresy. — Had He a Plan ? — War Order No. 1. — Edwin M. Stanton. —McClellan's Plan. — 
 New Army Arrangements. — Three Great Departments. — The West Under Halleck. — The Mountain Department 
 Under Fremont. — The East Under McCleUan. — Manassas Evacuated. — McClellan's Promenade. —Quaker Guns. 
 — The Office of Commander-in-Chief Abolished. — The Movement to the Peninsula Begim. — The Capital not 
 SufBciently Defended. — McDowell's Command Detached and Detained. — McCleUan Complains. — Lincoln Re- 
 monstrates. — Before Yorktown. — Magruder. — The Nationals Brought to a Halt. — The Folly of Manassas 
 Bepeated. — McClellan Asks for More Troops. — Franklin's Division Sent to His Aid. — The Firing Com- 
 menced. — Charge of the Vermont Brigade. — Compelled to Fall Back. — Another Charge. — The First Assault 
 on the Confederate Position Fails. — The Twenty-Sixth. — Another Assault. — A Redoubt Carried and De- 
 stroyed. — Another Pause. — The Third of May. — All Things are Heady. — Further Delay. — Confederate Retreat. 
 — Magnider's Statement. — McClellan's Great Mistake. — The Goverrmient Disappointed. — National Indigna- 
 tion. — McClellan's Excuses. — Lincoln's Letter. — The Story of Manassas Repeated. 
 
 1861. 
 
 For reasons already given, we have 
 lingered a whole year with the 
 armies of the West. We have 
 followed Grant and his victorious le- 
 gions from Cairo to Corinth, and seen 
 them driving the Confederates before 
 them, until Kentucky and Tennessee 
 were secured to the Union, and un- 
 til Vicksburg and Port Hudson alone 
 barred the free navigation of the Missis- 
 sippi. We have seen a National flotilla 
 under Foote and Davis driving the en- 
 emy from stronghold after stronghold 
 on the great river until the National flag 
 was again floating over the city of Mem- 
 phis. We have followed Farragut and 
 his fleet from the gulf to New Orleans, 
 and seen that most important of south- 
 em cities wrenched from the grasp of 
 the rebellious Confederacy. We have 
 followed Buell from Corinth to Chatta- 
 nooga, and from Chattanooga to Louis- 
 ville. We have returned 'with him on 
 his backward march, and seen him suc- 
 
 cessfully resist and even force the re- 
 treat of the Confederates at Perryville. 
 We have followed the same army under 
 its new leader, Rosecranz, and witnessed 
 the bloody and well-contested, though 
 indecisive, battle of Murfreesboro' — a 
 battle in which, although neither side 
 could justly claim the victory, the Na- 
 tionals not only held their ground, but 
 again compelled their antagonists to re- 
 tire before them. 
 
 During that time, important opera- 
 tions had been going on in the East. It 
 becomes a necessity, therefore, for us 
 now to leave the valley of the Missis- 
 sippi and return to the Atlantic border. 
 The object of the western campaign, 
 which was the opening of the Missis- 
 sippi River, was in a fair way of being 
 accomplished. The object of the east- 
 ern or peninsular campaign was the 
 capture of Richmond. It will be our 
 business, in the chapters which imme- 
 diately follow, to ascertain how this 
 
 •J17 
 
190 
 
 YORKTOWN. 
 
 campaign had been conducted, and with 
 what success. 
 
 There are certain vexed questions re- 
 garding the management of the East- 
 em forces — questions the discussion of 
 which has led to a large amount of ill- 
 feeling without producing any satisfac- 
 tory result. Into these questions we 
 will not enter further than is necessary 
 for the elucidation of our subject. It is 
 quite --possible that General McClellan 
 attached too much importance to the 
 capture of Richmond. There can be 
 no doubt, we think, that the strength 
 of the Confederacy lay rather in the 
 strength of its armies than in the pos- 
 session of any particular locality, city, 
 or stronghold. The capture of Wash- 
 ington by the Confederates in the early 
 stages of the war might have proved 
 fatal to the Union cause. But it would 
 be absurd to say that Richmond was to 
 the South all that Washington was to 
 the North and to the National cause 
 generally. The capture of Washington, 
 the seat of the National government, 
 and where were treasured all the Na- 
 tional archives, would certainly have 
 been followed by the recognition of the 
 Confederacy by foreign governments, 
 which might have been very disastrous 
 to the National cause. It might have 
 had another result equally bad, perhaps 
 worse. The holders of the capital might 
 have been regarded as the rightful 
 rulei-s of the republic ; and been enabled 
 to impose their own terms on the nation, 
 and so not only resist, but throw back 
 the revolution for an indefinite period. 
 Even in a sectional point of view no 
 such importance could attach to Rich- 
 
 mond. It was tlie most influential toM'n 
 in the Confederacy ; that was all. The 
 Confedei'ate government could have 
 been carried on in any other town ; and 
 the strength of the Confederacy would 
 still have consisted in tlie strength of 
 the army. The correctness oi this prin- 
 ciple was abundantly proved in the 
 latej" stages of the war. Charleston fell 
 by the march of Sherman ; Richmond i 
 yielded to the persistent operations of ' 
 Grant ; but neither the one geneial nor 
 the other cared to enter the city which | 
 he had conquered. In the estimation 
 of each the extermination of the ai'my 
 was moi'c important than the occupation 
 of the city. 
 
 It had, however, been decided, or 
 T-ather it was taken for granted, that 
 the capture of Richmond was a matter 
 of primary importance. The question, 
 therefore, was how it could be most 
 easily and effectively accomplished. 
 One thing, it Avas obvious from the out- 
 set^ must not be overlooked in any plan 
 which might be adopted. Washington 
 must not, in any case, be left unpro- 
 tected. This condition complied with 
 and a plan agreed upon, it was abso- 
 lutely necessary that action be taken at 
 once. General McClellan, as we have 
 seen, was appointed to the command of 
 the army of the Potomac in July, 1861. 
 On the 1st of November, on the ivov. 
 resignation of General Scott, he '• 
 was promoted to the chief command of 
 the armies of the United States. No 
 general, for the time being, so com- 
 pletely commanded the confidence of 
 the government and the people. He 
 was by far the most popular and most 
 
McCLELLAN'S INACTION. 
 
 191 
 
 trusted man in the army. Although 
 commander-in-chief, he still remained 
 at tlie head of the amiy of the Potomac. 
 At the date of his elevation, that army 
 had an effective strength of one hun- 
 dred and thirty-four thousand two hun- 
 dred and eighty-five men, with some 
 three hundred guns. On the 1st of 
 February the aggregate strength of 
 the army had risen to two hundred 
 and twenty-two thousand one hundred 
 and ninety-six, thei'e being present for 
 duty over one hundred and ninety thou- 
 sand men. The Confederate force in 
 fj'ont of him at Manassas, where they 
 had remained since the battle of Bull 
 Run, did not exceed fifty-five thousand. 
 In regard to drill and equipment, no finer 
 army than that under McClellan was 
 ever held in readiness for battle. Abso- 
 r lutely trusted by the government, and 
 permitted to mature his plans in secret, 
 it was confidently expected that with 
 such an army he would make such a 
 dii,sh upon his antagonist as would force 
 the war to a hurried conclusion. 
 
 For reasons Ijest kntjwn to himself, 
 McClellan was in no haste to put his 
 army in motion. There was no end of 
 parades — no end of magnificent manceu- 
 vi'eiiig — which for a time delighted and 
 astonished the people of Washington. 
 Autumn was allowed to pass by, and 
 the winter of 1861; and yet nothing 
 was done. An excuse for delay wafl 
 always at hand. It was too hot, or it 
 was too cold. The foliage on the trees 
 was as yet too thick, or the roads were 
 too heavy for rapi<l and successful mili- 
 tary operations. The people began to 
 iiianifest impatience. News of the suc- 
 
 cess of the army of the West began to 
 arrive ; and the conduct of Halleck and 
 Grant was contrasted with the persist- 
 ent inaction of McClellan. The daily 
 exhibitions of the army of the Potomac 
 no longer pleased — they disgusted the 
 populace. " On to Richmond," became 
 the popular and imperious cry. Through 
 the pniss, from the platform iind from 
 the pulpit, the words rang out over the 
 length and breadth of the North, finding 
 a response in every loyal heart. There 
 were many who did not hesitate to af- 
 firm that McClellan was at heart in sym- 
 pathy \vith the rebellion. The govern- 
 ment caught the contagion, and all the 
 more readily that the president had 
 for some time been dissatisfied with 
 McClellan. He saw that the heart of 
 the nation was sinking. Expenses had 
 been frightful, and there had been no 
 result. The treasury was all but ex- 
 hausted ; and there was the danger of 
 the loss of public credit. He could 
 obtain no satisfactory explanation from 
 the commander-in-chief. There were 
 signs of disaffection in the ranks; and 
 the subordinate officers were impatient 
 and sick of their life of inaction. They 
 were there to protect theii' coimtry and 
 to repel the foe ; but they had been 
 compelled to spend precious months in 
 daily repetition erf a meaningless show. 
 In these circumstances the president 
 summoned Generals McDowell and 
 Franklin to a conference with himself 
 and his cabinet. To them he frankly 
 revealed his distress. " If something is 
 not soon done," he said, "the bottom 
 will be out of the whole affaii- ; and if 
 General McClellan does not want to xtm 
 
i93 
 
 YOKKTOWN. 
 
 tte army, I would like to borrow it, pro- 
 vided I can see how it could be made 
 to do something." He had been to the 
 house of the commander-in-chief; but 
 he had not been admitted to his pre- 
 sence. It was necessary that he should 
 talk to somebody ; and therefore he 
 had sent for them, to learn, if possi- 
 ble, whether there was any probability 
 of an early movement of the army. 
 McDowell was in favor of immediate 
 action. He would advance with a heavy 
 force on the front and flanks of the Con- 
 federates at Manassas. He believed 
 that their numbers were greatly exag- 
 gerated, and that it would not be diffi- 
 cult to make an end of the disgraceful 
 blockade, and drive the besieging army 
 back upon Richmond. Franklin, who 
 was somewhat in the confidence of Mc- 
 Clellan, and knew at least part of his 
 plan, was in favor of something being 
 done at once ; but he approved of a 
 movement upon Richmond by way of 
 the lower Chesapeake and the Virginia 
 peninsula. There were further confer- 
 ences, McDowell and Franklin mean- 
 while consulting with other prominent 
 army officials. The result was that these 
 two generals agreed as to the necessity 
 of moving directly on Manassas; and 
 they recommended such a movement. 
 At this stage, however, the cabinet was 
 somewhat divided; and it was agreed 
 to hold another conference, and to ask 
 (reneral McClellan to be present and 
 give his own views on the question. 
 The meeting was held accordingly ; 
 Greneral McClellan appeared, but took 
 no part in the discussion. He showed 
 signs of being offended. To McDowell, 
 
 who apologized for the position in 
 which himself and Franklin were 
 placed, he said haughtily that they 
 could have any opinion they pleased. 
 When asked by the president "what 
 and when anything could be done," his 
 answer was " that the case was so plain 
 that a blind man could see it." To the 
 question of the secretary of the treasury 
 as to where and how he proposed to 
 use the army, he gave for answer only 
 that "the movements in Kentucky were 
 to precede any from Washington." At 
 the same time he expressed his willing- 
 ness to develop his plans, if he was 
 ordered to do so, although he said it 
 was his conviction that always, in mili- 
 tary matters, the fewer who knew the 
 plans to be carried out the better. 
 
 A few days aftei'wards his plan, 
 which was to abandon his present base 
 and proceed towards Richmond by way 
 of the lower Chesapeake, was laid be- 
 fore the president. The president liked 
 it not. It implied further delay. It 
 would, besides, be a tedious opei-ation ; 
 and, so far as he could see, it promised 
 little. Determined to be done with this 
 do-nothing policy, the president, 
 on the 27th of January, issued his 
 famous War Order No. 1, in which he 
 directed the 2 2d of February fol- jan. 
 lowing "to be the day for a gen- 27, 
 eral movement of the land and naval 
 forces of the United States against the 
 insurgent forces." Four days after- 
 wards a special order was issued to 
 McClellan, directing hiui to form all 
 the disposable force of the army of the 
 Potomac, after providing for the safety 
 of Washington, into an expedition fuj 
 
MANASSAS EVACUATED. 
 
 193 
 
 the immediate object of seizing and oc- 
 cupying a point on the railroad south- 
 east of Manassas Junction, the details 
 of the movement to be left to the dis- 
 cretion of the commander-in-chief. This 
 dispatch on the part of the president has 
 generally been attributed to the energy 
 and firmness of Edwin M. Stanton, who 
 had, a few weeks before, succeeded 
 Cameron as secretary of war. Against 
 this order McClellan remonstrated. 
 This led to a correspondence between 
 him and the president, each advocating 
 his own plan in preference to that of 
 the other. The result was that the 
 whole question was submitted to a 
 council of twelve officers, McClellan's 
 plan being approved of by eight out of 
 the twelve. The president, of course, 
 acquiesced ; and on the same day orders 
 were issued from the War Department 
 for the procuring of transports for the 
 troops and the other necessaries of war. 
 Mar. On the 8th of March the presi- 
 8« dent issued a general order, direct- 
 ing the army of the Potomac to be divid- 
 ed into four corps, to be commanded re- 
 spectively by Generals McDowell, Sum- 
 ner, Heintzelman, and Keyes. A fifth 
 corps, formed from his own and General 
 Shields' division, was under the com- 
 mand of General Banks. The command 
 of the National troops in the valley of 
 the Mississippi and westward of the 
 longitude of Knoxville in Tennessee, 
 was assigned to General Halleck ; and 
 a Mountain Department, covering the 
 region between McClellan and Halleck, 
 was created and placed under the com- 
 mand of General Fremont. The com- 
 manders of departments were instructed 
 
 to report directly to the secretary of 
 war, and not, as fonnerly, through the 
 commander-in-chief. This order gave 
 great offense to McClellan. Later on 
 the same day, another order directed 
 that no change should be made in the 
 base of operations without leaving a 
 competent force for the protection of 
 Washington ; that not more than fifty 
 thousand troops should be moved to- 
 ward the scene of intended operations 
 until the navigation of the Potomac 
 should be "freed from the enemy's bat- 
 teries and other obstructions " ; that the 
 new movement on Chesapeake Bay 
 should begin as early as the 18th of 
 March, and that the general-in-chief 
 should "be responsible that it moves 
 so early as that day " ; and that " the 
 army and navy co-operate in an im- 
 mediate effort to capture the enemy's 
 batteries upon the Potomac, betweea 
 Washington and the Chesapeake Bay." 
 On learning that McClellan was about 
 to move, Johnston (March 9th) jiar. 
 evacuated Manassas, and hastened ^' 
 towards Richmond, carrying eveiything 
 with him. It was a timely and masterly 
 retreat, and evinced that ability for 
 which Johnston has obtained credit 
 alike from friend and foe, and which 
 stamped him as one of the greatest 
 commanders developed on either side 
 during the progress of the war. jiar. 
 On the ensuing morning McClel- *®* 
 Ian made a "promenade," as it has 
 been called, to the deserted position, 
 when his soldiers were mortified to 
 witness the miserable earthworks and 
 Quaker guns — logs of wood shaped like 
 cannon — by which an army little more 
 
194 
 
 YORKTOWN. 
 
 than one-fourth their own, had kept 
 them 80 long at bay. Undoubtedly this 
 discovery irritated the president greatly, 
 and went far to shake his faith in the 
 ability or honesty of the general-in- 
 chief. It is not wonderful, therefore, 
 Mar. that on the day on which McClel- 
 
 !•• Ian returned from the "prome- 
 nade," he should have been relieved, 
 V)y a special order from the president, 
 of all the military departments except 
 that of the Potomac. The reason as- 
 signed for this change was that the 
 campaign on which the army of the Po- 
 tomac was about to enter would require 
 all the resources and all the attention 
 of its commander. It is impossible, how- 
 ever, not to perceive in each of these 
 successive orders a manifestation of dis- 
 trust—an increasing want of confidence 
 in the commander-in-chief. 
 
 The movement which had been agreed 
 upon was carried out with all prompti- 
 tude. There was no unnecessary de- 
 lay. There were chartered one hundred 
 and thirteen steamers, one hundred 
 and eighty-eight schooners, eighty-eight 
 barges; and by means of these there 
 were transported, in thirty-seven days, 
 to Fortress Monroe, one hundred and 
 twenty-one thousand troops, fourteen 
 thousand five hundred and ninety-two 
 cattle, eleven hundred and fifty wag- 
 ons, forty-four batteries, seventy-four 
 ambulances, as well as a vast quantity 
 of equipage. McClellan left Washing- 
 April ton on the 1st of April. On the 
 
 !• same day he sent to the adjutant- 
 general a detailed statement of the 
 number and disposition of the forces 
 which he had left behind. The number 
 
 of men left for the avowed purpose of 
 protecting the capital was about sev- 
 enty-three thousand. These, however, 
 were so disposed that not more than 
 twenty thousand, and they but imper- 
 fectly organized, were all that were left 
 for the defense of Washington and Man- 
 assas Junction. The president was indig- 
 nant ; and General McDowell's corps 
 was detached from McClellan's com- 
 mand and detained at the capital. Mc- 
 Clellan complained and delayed action. 
 In a letter written by him at the time to 
 McClellan, Lincoln explained and fully 
 justified the course which he had been 
 forced to adopt. In the same letter, 
 Lincoln forcibly reminded him that in- 
 action was no longer to be tolerated. 
 " It is indispensable to 3/01/," he wrote, 
 " that you strike a blow. / am power- 
 less to help this." * * " The country 
 will not fail to note," he added, "is now 
 noting, that the present hesitation to 
 move upon an intrenched camp is but 
 the story of Manassas repeated." He 
 wrote him, he assured him, in the ut- 
 most kindness ; but his last words were 
 " You must act." 
 
 McClellan did not pay much atten- 
 tion to the injunction. He seemed to 
 feel that he was distrusted ; and his 
 hesitation to strike a blow that might 
 be ineffectual, almost implied distrust 
 in himself. When McClellan's army 
 fairly landed on the peninsula, there 
 ought to have been no hesitation. A 
 bold and vigorous blow promptly dealt 
 could scarcely have failed to drive 
 the enemy before him ; it would cer- 
 tainly have redeemed his reputation for 
 bravery. The Confederates under Gen- 
 
LEE'S MILLS. 
 
 193 
 
 eral Magruder did not exceed in number 
 eleven thousand men. At the time 
 of his landing, this was the only force 
 opposed to him on the peninsula; and 
 he was aware of the possibility of Ma- 
 gi-uder being reinforced by Johnston. 
 This force was so divided by the neces- 
 sity of placing fixed gan'isons at York- 
 town, on Grloucester Point, and on Mul- 
 beiTy Island, on the James River, that 
 the line in front of McClellan's great 
 army, and stretching thirteen miles 
 from Yorktown across the peninsula, 
 did not consist of more than five or six 
 thousand men. On this point authori- 
 ties differ, but the largest estimate does 
 not give Magruder for this line more 
 than eight thousand. Magruder's own 
 claim was that, exclusive of the garri- 
 sons above named, he had only five 
 thousand men. The National army 
 April began to move forward from Fort- 
 s' ress Monroe on the 3d of April. 
 McClellan's avowed object was to drive 
 or capture Magruder's anny before it 
 could be reinforced by Johnston. The 
 Nationals moved steadily but slowly in 
 two columns, the one column by the 
 old Yorktown road, the other along the 
 Warwick road. These columns were 
 commanded respectively by Generals 
 Heintzelman and Keyes, Heintzelman 
 being on the right and Keyes on the 
 April Isft. On the afternoon of the 
 5i 5th, the advance of each column 
 was compelled to halt by Magruder's 
 fortified lines — the right near Yorktown 
 on the York River, and the left near 
 Winn's Mill on the Warwick River. 
 What did McClellan now do i Did he 
 remember and seek to repair the blun- 
 
 der he made at Manassas? Did he 
 remember the kindly but withal sting- 
 ing words of the president, " It is indis- 
 pensable to you that you strike a blow." 
 "You must act"? Not at all. The same 
 demon of delay had taken hold of him. 
 The folly of Manassas was repeated, if 
 possible, in more aggravated form. In 
 place of acting at once, he commenced 
 the tedious operations of a regular siege, 
 casting up intrenchments and otherwise 
 acting like a field oflieer of the middle 
 ages, rather than a skilled and practical 
 general of modern times. Meantime he 
 wrote complaining letters to Washing- 
 ton, declaring it to be his conviction 
 that he would have to fight all the 
 available troops of the Confederates 
 not far from his present position. " Do 
 not force me to do so," he said, " with 
 diminished numbers; but, whatever 
 your decision may be, I will leave noth- 
 ing undone to obtain success." At 
 McClellan's urgent request, Franklin's 
 division of McDowell's corps was sent 
 to his aid. Towards the end of April 
 the National forces in front of York- 
 town amounted to close upon one hun- 
 dred and forty thousand men; and of 
 these, one hundred and twelve thousand 
 were ready for duty. In addition to 
 these, McClellan could count on the 
 co-operation and aid of Wool's force, 
 which was at Fortress Monroe. 
 
 It was surely of all things the most 
 natural that the government and people 
 should expect that some prompt and 
 effective work would be done with an 
 army so large and so splendidly equij> 
 ped. McClellan left Fortress Monroe, as 
 we have seen, on the 3d of April. In- 
 
196 
 
 YORKTOWN. 
 
 stead of hastening forward and making 
 a dash on the Confederate position, he 
 occupied his time in throwing up earth- 
 works and advantageously placing his 
 April guns. It was the 16th before 
 '*• any serious encounter took place. 
 There had been cannonading on both 
 sides, and some skirmishing ; but as yet 
 BO regular encounter. On the day just 
 mentioned, McClellan discovered that 
 the Confederates were streng'thenin"' 
 their works at Lee's Mills, on a stream- 
 let of the Warwick River. On these 
 he oi'dei-ed fire to be opened. Captain 
 Mott, with the New York battery, took 
 a position on the left of the enemy's 
 works ; Captain Bartlett, with the 
 Rhode Island Battery B, placed him- 
 self on the right; the Third Vermont 
 regiment, acting as skirmishers, were 
 thi'own out in front, while a force of 
 some strength was posted in the rear 
 as a reserve. About eight o'clock in 
 the morning the iirst section of Mott's 
 battery, consisting of two ten-pounder 
 Parrott guns, moved forward to within a 
 thousand yards of the Confederate work, 
 and took post under cover of a Avood on 
 the Warwick road. Fire was immedi- 
 ately opened. The Confederates made 
 a brisk response ; and such was the ac- 
 curacy of their aim that three of Mott's 
 men were killed and four wounded. 
 Mott brought vip the remainder of his 
 guns; and the cannonading which en- 
 siled was kept up on both sides for 
 two hours, when the Confederates were 
 driven back. At this stage General 
 Smith, who had charge of the Vermont 
 brigade, attempted to throw a force 
 across the stream, with a view to take 
 
 the defensel* hj assault. It was now 
 about three in the afternoon. Colonel 
 Hyde took charge of the storming par- 
 ty, which consisted of four companies, 
 D, E, F, and K, of the Third Vermont 
 regiment. These companies Avere fresh, 
 not having taken any part in the en- 
 gagement of the morning ; and to cover 
 them as they advanced, four batteries 
 of light artillery, coimuanded respect- 
 ively by Ayres, Mott, Kennedy, and 
 Wheeler were placed on advantageous 
 ground. As the batteries opened a con- 
 certed fire on the fort, throwing shot, 
 shell and spherical case into it, in rapid 
 succession, the four companies dashed 
 forward, plunged into the water, which 
 in some places reached to their arm-pits, 
 and made for the work. While the 
 men were still in the water, a terrific 
 fire was opened upon them by a body 
 of Confederates who had hitherto lain 
 low and concealed themselves. On 
 pushed the brave little band ; and in 
 spite of their soaked condition, and, 
 what was still worse, their wet cart- 
 ridge-boxes, they reached the fort and 
 drove their antagonists out of the rifle- 
 pit. Here they held their position for 
 nearly half an hour. Strange to say, 
 while thousands of men were close at 
 hand, reinforcements failed to reach 
 them in time. Observing the advance 
 of two or three fresh Confederate regi- 
 ments, the brave little battalion had no 
 choice but fall back and reci'oss the 
 river. In crossing and recrossing, they 
 sustained very considerable loss. 
 
 As soon as the remnant of these com- 
 panies had returned within their own 
 lines, the National batteries, which for 
 
THE BOMBARDMENT. 
 
 19? 
 
 a time had been silent, again opened 
 fire. Orders were given to the Sixtli 
 Vermont regiment to resume the at- 
 tack, and storm the work by the left 
 ilaiik. Colonel Lord, at the head of his 
 bi-ave soldiers, dashed into the stream. 
 Seven companies followed. The ad- 
 vance had reached within three rods 
 of the breastwork, when, being in three 
 feet of water, they were fired upon by 
 a long line of rifles which were popped 
 above the parapets. A running fire 
 from at least one thousand small ai'ms 
 kept pouring upon the Nationals as 
 they pressed on to the fort. "While the 
 breastwork was lit up by a continuous 
 sheet of flame, the National batteries 
 kept up a steady fire, the shot and shell 
 falling thick and fast inside the work. 
 The Nationals were fighting at a great 
 disadvantage ; but they kept their 
 ground and used their rifles with great 
 effect, taking off their men as they 
 raised their heads from time to time 
 above the parapet. For a time the 
 battle raged with great fuiy ; and the 
 scene was grand and imposing in the 
 extreme. The Confederates continued 
 to increase in strength at the point of 
 attack ; and as it was impossible, in the 
 cii'cumstances, to make any effective 
 use of the bayonet. Lord ordered a 
 retreat, carrying his wounded with him. 
 In this struggle the National loss was 
 .'55 killed, 1'20 wounded, and 9 miss- 
 ing. Captain Mott, on whose battery 
 the Confederates had concentrated their 
 fire, had three men killed and seven 
 wounded. Of his horses, seven were 
 disabled. The Confederate loss was 
 also considerable, Colonel McKinney, 
 
 of the Fifteenth North Carolina Regi- 
 ment, which bore the chief part in the 
 fray, having been killed. 
 
 After this ineffectual assault on the 
 Confederate battery, ten days were al- 
 lowed to elapse befoi-e any event of 
 consequence occurred. General McClel- 
 lan meanwhile busied himself in the 
 perfecting of his siege arrangements. 
 The Merrimac, of which we shall 
 have something to say in our next 
 chapter, gave him some uneasiness, 
 and compelled him to be fearful for 
 his gunboats. On the 26th of April 
 April, the monotony of the siege 26t 
 was varied by a spirited attack which 
 was made on a Confederate redoubt. 
 This work stood in front of a wood near 
 the Yorktown road, and was somewhat 
 in advance of the main defenses. Sur- 
 rounded by a ditch six feet deep, with 
 a strong parapet, it was manned by two 
 companies of infantry, but with no ai* 
 tillery. It was resolved to take this 
 redoubt, and ascertain the nature of the 
 works behind. Five Massachusetts com- 
 panies were detailed for the purpose. 
 Three of these companies were from 
 the First regiment, and were under 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Wells. Two were 
 from the Eleventh regiment, and were 
 under Major Tripp. The attack was 
 well planned. One company was sent 
 out to skirmish on the left, in the corn- 
 field, with instructions to prevent a 
 flank movement of the enemy ; another 
 company was held in reserve toward the 
 right, near a ravine ; while a third com* 
 pany, under Captain Carroll, made the 
 assault. The assaulting party rushed 
 across the cornfield at double-c^uick. 
 
198 
 
 TORKTOWN. 
 
 rfiaking straight for the Confederate i-e- 
 douht. A Avarm reception awaited 
 them. As soon as they came in view, 
 the Confederate infantry opened fire, 
 and used their rifles to some purpose. 
 Nothing daunted, the Massachusetts 
 men pushed forward. Not one of them 
 fired a shot until they were within a 
 few yards of the ditch. Then halting, 
 they let fly a full volley into the faces 
 of their antagonists. On again they 
 rushed, clearing the ditch and mounting 
 the parapet. The Confederates fled be- 
 fore them, and the redoubt was cap- 
 tured. A working party came up with 
 spades and shovels, and the work was 
 soon demolished. Thirteen Confede- 
 rates were made prisoners. On the side 
 of the Nationals there were three men 
 killed and thirteen wounded. 
 
 There was another pause. Nothing 
 further was done in the way of direct 
 April hostilities until the 30th. That 
 
 ^« day, General McClellan having ad- 
 vanced his parallels, got one of his 
 large batteries in position and opened 
 fire on the Confederate works, at the 
 distance of two miles. The first shot was 
 fired from battery No. 1, at the mouth 
 of Wormsley's Creek. It was aimed at 
 the Confederate shipping, and it suc- 
 ceeded in scattering the vessels. The 
 guns were now directed against the 
 works at Yorktown and Gloucester. 
 The Confederates replied with their 
 large pivot gun, a rifled sixty-eight 
 pounder, which was mounted on the 
 heights of Yorktown. For some hours, 
 the firing on both sides was maintained 
 with great spirit. No result, however, 
 
 was visible. During the night the Con- 
 
 federates-continued to fling shot and 
 shell on McClellan's advanced parallels, I 
 where the men were at work. Next 
 morning they tried their columbiad, 
 which was well posted on the heights, 
 firing it with great rapidity ; but after 
 the twenty- third discharge, " it went 
 into a thousand pieces, tearing up the 
 parapet, and making havoc with the 
 crowd who wei'e collected &round it 
 at the time." This was the only gun 
 which seemed capable of competing 
 with McClellan's heavy siege batteries. 
 The National batteries maintained a 
 continuous fire. Saturday ari'ived. May 
 the 3d day of May. Before the *• 
 close of that day everything was in 
 readiness for opening the bombard- 
 ment — the huge siege batteries being 
 all in position. Still McClellan is in 
 no haste. To-morrow (Sunday) is to 
 be given to sacred rest ; and on Mon- 
 day tlie guns are to be opened all along 
 the line. The general is confident of 
 success, and believes in a triumphant 
 victory. On that same Saturday night, 
 the Confederates evacuated Yorktown 
 and Gloucester, carrying with them 
 their sick, their hospital stores, their 
 ammunition, and their camp equipage, 
 and moved toward Williamsburg. So 
 quietly and so skilfully was the I'etreat 
 accomplished, that it was not until 
 next morning the fact was known to 
 the Nationals. McClellan on the Maj 
 morning of the 4th telegraphed ^' 
 to the Secretary of War that he was in 
 possession of the abandoned fortress, and 
 added, with an air of mightiness which 
 ill became him in the circumstances. 
 " No time shall be lost. I shall push 
 
LAME EXCUSES. 
 
 19fi 
 
 the enemy to the wall." Such was 
 the end of the siege of Yorktown — an 
 end almost as disgraceful, all things con- 
 sidered, as would have been a defeat. 
 When the National troops entered 
 the abandoned fortifications, they found 
 fifty-two guns spiked, and some stores ; 
 but such surely was a poor trophy for 
 so great an array, and especially after 
 such magnificent and costly prepa- 
 rations for a successful siege. It was 
 McClellan over aiijain — all show and no 
 work. The National army left Fortress 
 Monroe, as M'e have seen, on the 3d of 
 April. On the afternoon of the 5th, 
 the advance of both columns halted in 
 front of Magruder's fortifications. For 
 nearly one month, therefore, McClellan 
 with more than one hundred thousand 
 men, and well supplied with all the ne- 
 cessaries of war, lay before Yoi-ktown. 
 Doing what? Preparing for a great 
 siege — when there was to be no siege. 
 Constructing extensive and costly lines 
 of defense — which were never needed. 
 General Mas-ruder's account of McClel- 
 lan's conduct reads like a caricature; 
 but we know nothing of those four 
 weeks before Yorktown, which does 
 not justify us in saying that Magruder's 
 account is the simple truth. " To my 
 utter surprise," says that general, "he 
 (McClellan) pennitted day after day to 
 elapse without an assault. In a few 
 days the object of his delay became ap- 
 parent. In every direction in front 
 ^f our lines, through the intervening 
 woods and in the open fields, earth- 
 works began to appear." Had McClel- 
 lan moved on Yorktown and Gloucester 
 %t once, in place of halting for a whole 
 
 four weeks, these places most trndoubt^ 
 edly would have yielded to the first 
 attack, and the waste of time, of labor, 
 of money, of human life even, in that 
 inhospitable region, would have been 
 avoided. "With five thousand men," 
 adds Magnider, " inclusive of the garri- 
 sons, we had stopped and held in check 
 over one hundred thousand of the ene- 
 my." Difference of opinion has existed 
 as to the actual strength of the Confed- 
 erates in and around Yoi'ktown. The 
 presumption is that when McClellan 
 arrived and felt Magruder's outer lines 
 in front of Yorktown, the Confederate 
 force did not exceed five thousand men, 
 exclusive of the garrisons. It is now 
 known that both Lee and Johnston 
 were opposed to holding the peninsula, 
 their reasons being that in the event of 
 the York and James rivers falling into 
 the possession of the Nationals, as 
 seemed probable, the Confederate army, 
 on both flanks, would be exposed to the 
 National gunboats. They had no doubt 
 that McClellan would capture York- 
 town. Johnston visited and inspected 
 the works at Yorktown soon after 
 McClellan's amval; and what he saw 
 confirmed him in this opinion. His de- 
 sire was to concentrate all his forces 
 near Richmond and offer there a deci- 
 sive battle. These counsels, however, 
 were overruled ; and it was decided to 
 hold the peninsida, if possible, until 
 the fortifications at Norfolk shoidd be 
 dismantled and the naval establishment 
 at that place destroyed. In these cir- 
 cumstances, and when it was known 
 that McClellan, instead of pressing for- 
 ward, was intrenching himself reiar 
 
«00 
 
 YORKTOWN. 
 
 forcements were sent down fi'om Rich- 
 mond; and, later, Johnston went to 
 Yorktown and took command in per- 
 son. Hence we find Magruder, in the 
 same report from M'hich we have already 
 quoted, saying : " Reinforcements be- 
 gan to pour in, and each hour the army 
 of the Peninsula grew stronger and 
 stronger, until anxiety passed from my 
 mind as to tlie result of an attack upon 
 us." The conclusion, therefore, seems 
 inevitable — that McClellan lost his 
 golden opportunity when he failed to 
 make an attack on Magruder immedi- 
 ately on his arrival at Yorktown, and 
 that in place of the barren victory which 
 he reaped after a month's waiting, toil 
 and teri'ible sacrifice, he might have 
 won a fruitful victory by striking a 
 blow at once with energy and determi- 
 nation. 
 
 A feeling began again to prevail all 
 over the North, as soon as the details of 
 the siege were made public, that nothing 
 was to be expected from McClellan. 
 Of course his friends still clung to him 
 tenaciously ; but the eai-nest people of 
 the North, who were bent on putting 
 down the rebellion and jireserving the 
 Union intact, began to feel that, if the 
 great task was to be accomplished, it 
 must be by other hands than those of 
 the brilliant but hesitating chief of the 
 army of the Potomac. McClellan was 
 not ignorant that the siege of Yorktown 
 was a blunder, and that it was generally 
 BO regarded. He had, of course, some- 
 thing to say in his own defence. It 
 was impossible, he said, to ascertain 
 the exact strength of the enemy; and 
 there were many indications that they 
 
 were behind the works in great force. 
 It was his business to find out the facts, 
 just as it was his misfoi'tune to be oat- 
 generalled. Some of his excuses were 
 very lame. Franklin's division had 
 been promptly sent him when asked 
 for. Yet in his report he said that the 
 non-arrival of that division was the 
 cause of his failure to attack Yorktowa, 
 and that the same cause "made rap'd 
 and brilliant operations impossible. '\ 
 The simple truth is that when Frank -^ 
 lin's division arrived, McClellan de- 
 clared that he was not ready ; and, 
 waiting for orders, these troops were 
 detained on the river, in transports, for 
 a whole fortnight. It was his intention, 
 he said in his report, to turn Yorktown 
 by an attack on Gloucester; and this 
 attack was not made because Franklin's 
 division was not forward. What Mc- 
 Clellan's intention really was, it is diffi- 
 cult to know. It does seem as if he was 
 undecided, feeling afraid to attack in 
 front and not daring to attack in flank. 
 It certainly redounds to the credit of 
 the Confederates that they were better 
 posted regarding his movements than 
 he was regarding theirs. The siege 
 of Yorktown was no improvement on 
 McClellan's past record. It was the 
 first tardy step in a series of tardy 
 movements which distinguished his pe- j 
 uinsular campaign. Before the end of 
 that disastrous campaign was reached, 
 the storm of battle had done much to 
 thin the ranks of his army ; but delay 
 led to disease ; and disease proved more 
 destructive than the bidlets of the ene- 
 my. The view taken by President Lin- 
 coln, in his letter to McClellan dated 
 
PKOrilETlC WORDS. 
 
 'Ml 
 
 April 9th, 1862, was sustained in every 
 particular. In that letter the president 
 says : " You will do me the justice to 
 remember I always insisted that going 
 down the bay in search of a field, in- 
 stead of fighting at or near Manassas, 
 was only shifting and not sunnounting 
 a difiiculty — that we should find the 
 
 same enemy and the same or equal in- 
 trenchments at either place. The coun- 
 try will not fail to note — is now noting 
 — that the present hesitation to move 
 upon an intrenched enemy is but the 
 story of Manassas repeated." Read 
 now, in the light of what took place, 
 these words were really prophetic. 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 The Importance of War Vessels on the Rivers and Gulfs. — The Merrimac. — Her original bnild. — ^Reconstructed.— 
 A Powerful Lnstriuaent of Destruction. ^Confederate Cunning. — The Merrimac in her new Form said to be a 
 Failure. — A Strange Sight. — The Merrimac at Hampton Roads. — The National Fleet Attacked. — The Cumber- 
 land and Congress. — The Merrimac Shot-Proof. — The Cumberland Laid Open. — Terrific Filing. — The Cumber, 
 land Goes Do«ti. — One Huudi-ed Sick and Wounded. — The Patrick Henry. — The Congress Attacked.— 
 Heavy Loss of Life. — The Congress on Fire. — Newport News. — The Flag of the Congress Hauled Down. — Red 
 Hot Shot. — Her Magazine Catches Fire. ^Two Hours' Work. — The Roanoke and the Minne.sota. — Hurrying to the 
 Scene of Action. — The Minnesota Grounded. — The Merrimac unable to Approach. — The Guns of the Minnesota 
 Skilfully Handled. — A Cheerless Prospect. — The Danger to New York. — Fortress Monroe. — What General 
 Wool said. — Relief at Hand. — The Monitor. — Ericsson. — Description of the Monitor. — The great Purpose for 
 which it was Built. — A Novelty. — The Success of the Experiment Doubted. — Prophets of EvO. — The Launch. — 
 The Trial Trip. — A Fearful Storm. — Terrific Experience of the Crew. — Lieutenant John L. Wordeu in Com- 
 mand. — What Spies had Done. — What Might Have Been. — Rejoicing at Norfolk. — The Nationals Downcast. — 
 A Night to be Remembered. — The Congress Explodes. — Sunday Morning. — Wreck and Ruin all aronnd. — 
 Reappearance of the Merrimac. — Worden Ready. — The Object of the Confederate Commander. — The 
 Monitor alongside of the Merrimac. — A Contrast.— David and Goliath. — " Pebbles thrown by a Child." — A 
 Battle of Mailed Giants. — The Merrimac Agroimd. —The Monitor Moving and Hitting like a Skilled Pugilist. — 
 The Merrimac shows Signs of Punishment. — Turns off and Renews the Attack on the Minnesota. — A Warm Re- 
 ception. — A Tremendoiis Shot. — The Monitor again Comes to the Relief. — The Merrimac a Second Time 
 Grounded. — The Merrimac Retreats. — The Monitor Pursues. — A Fierce Encounter. — Canister Shot Compara- 
 tively Harmless. — The Merrimac Badly Punished. — Sagging at the Stern. — The Last and Most Effective Shot 
 of the Merrimac. — Worden Wounded and Felled to the Ground. — The Merrimac Sheers Off. — The Battle 
 Ended. — Worden 's Life Despaired Of. — "Did We Save the Minnesota?" — Saved. — A Great Victory. — Re- 
 joicings in the North. — The "Little Wonder." — Pilgi-image to Hampton Roads. — Profound Interest Abroad.-— 
 Lessons Read to the Nations. — Superiority of Turrets. — Honors to the Brave. — Ericsson Cougratidated.-— 
 The Importance of the Victory. — Reflections. 
 
 In tracing the history of the great 
 western campaign, we have seen 
 how important was the part which 
 was played by gunboats on the Tennes- 
 see and Oliio rivers. It was natiu'ally 
 to be expected that war vessels, suitably 
 constructed, would J)lay an equally im- 
 
 portant pai"t in the bays and rivers more 
 to the east, and which connect them- 
 selves with the waters of the Atlantic. 
 One of the great events of the early 
 part of 1802 was the appearance in 
 Hampton Roads of the powerful iron- 
 clad man-of-war Menimac. which had 
 
fcOSS 
 
 THE MEKEIMAC AND THE MONITOR. 
 
 l)een recon^itructecl by the Confederate 
 g<)\ ernment and named Virginia. When 
 the Norfolk N:ivy Yard was abandoned 
 by the Nationals, this vessel was scut- 
 tled and sunk. In her original form 
 she was a powerful steam frigate of 
 forty guns ; and she had cost the gov- 
 ernment, for building and furnishing 
 her, a sum not less than a million and 
 a quarter dollars. The Confederates 
 found little difficulty in raising her ; 
 and the hull being in perfect condition, 
 a substantial basis existed for the con- 
 struction of a gigantic and dangerous 
 vessel. A plan was furnished by Lieu- 
 tenant John M. Brooke, formerly of the 
 National navy ; and, reconstructed after 
 the fashion of the shot-proof raft which 
 had been used \a Charleston harbor, 
 she became one of the strongest and 
 most destructive engines of war which 
 had ever been sc/en floating on any wa- 
 ters. When properly cut down, she 
 was covered with an iron roof project- 
 ing into the water. At or below the 
 water line the mail extended the oppo- 
 site way, so that a shot striking above 
 the water mark would glance upward, 
 and below the water mark would glance 
 downward. She was simply a broadside 
 ironclad with sloj^ing armor. Her great 
 bulk enabled her to carry a formidable 
 batter};-. She was armed with a power- 
 ful steel beak, and carried eleven guns, 
 with a one hundred-pound rifled Arms- 
 trong at each end. Such a monster might 
 well be a terror as well as a surprise. 
 It was known that the vessel was un- 
 dergoing reconstruction, and that it was 
 intended to make her a terrible engine 
 of war; but strange rumors were circu- 
 
 lated to her disadvantage by the Con- 
 federate authorities; and it is probable 
 that, until she was seen at Hampton 
 Roads, she was somewhat despised by 
 the oflicers of the National navy. The 
 Southern newspapers artfully circulated 
 that " the Merrimac was a failure " ; and, 
 the wish being father to the thought, 
 the statement was too readily believed. 
 About noon, on Saturday, the 8 th of 
 March, observers at Fortress Mon- jjjar. 
 roe saw a strange object, " looking 8. 
 like a submerged house, with the roof 
 only above water," moving down 
 the Elizabeth River toward Hampton 
 Roads. It was the dreadful Mernmac; 
 and she was under the command of 
 Franklin Buchanan, an officer who had 
 abandoned the National navy. Two 
 smaller armed steamboats accompanied 
 her. Almost immediately after their 
 appearance, two other Confederate gun- 
 boats came down from Richmond and 
 took positions in the James River, a lit- 
 tle above Newport News. Signal guns 
 were at once fired from the Union bat- 
 teries and by the ships Cumberland and 
 Congress, lying off and blockading the 
 James River, to give warning to the rest 
 of the National fleet. Accompanied by 
 the two smaller vessels the Merrimac 
 moved steadily on' towards the Cumber- 
 land and Congress. The Congress, a 
 sailing frigate, was commanded by Lieu- 
 tenant Joseph B. Smith. The sloop of 
 war, Cumberland, 24 guns and 376 men, 
 was commanded temporarily by Lieu- 
 tenant George Mon-is. Pursuing the 
 Congress, and giving and receiving a 
 broadside, the Merrimac made straight 
 for the Cumberland. This vessel had 
 
THE CUMBBBLAND SUNK. 
 
 303 
 
 been placed across the channel so as to 
 bring her broadside to bear on her 
 antagonist; and as the Merrimac ap- 
 proaclied she opened upon the monster 
 and jjoured forth a rapid fire. It was 
 no use. The heavy shot from the nine 
 and ten inch guns of the Cumberland 
 glanced from her rival's shield of iron, 
 "like so many peas." The Merrimac 
 seemed stunned for an instant by the 
 weight of the shot; but she quickly 
 recovered; and having increased her 
 speed, she rushed against the Cumber- 
 land, striking her with her steel prow 
 about amidships, and " literally laying 
 her open." Before striking the Cumber- 
 land, the Merrimac had received some 
 seven or eight broadsides ; but they pro- 
 duced no impression on. her invulner- 
 able coat of mail. As she struck, she 
 opened her ports and poured in on the 
 unfortunate Cumberland, now rapidly 
 filling with water, a most destructive 
 fire. The Cumberland fought well; 
 but the combat was unequal. Buchanan 
 gradually drew off the Merrimac ; and 
 again opening his ports, he rushed 
 against his disabled antagonist, this 
 time completely crushing in her side. 
 It was now all over with the Cumber- 
 land. Giving a parting fire to the 
 monster which was retiring from the 
 ruin it had wrought, with apparent in- 
 difference, Morris ordered his men to 
 jump overboard and save themselves. 
 This was quickly done ; and in a few 
 minutes afterwards, the vessel went 
 down in fifty-four feet of water, carry- 
 ing with her about one hundred of 
 dead, sick and wounded, who could not 
 be moved. The topmast of the Cum- 
 
 berland remained partially above the 
 water, with her flag flying from its peak. 
 It was now nearly four o'clock in the 
 afternoon. Having finished the Cum- 
 berland, the Merrimac now turned her 
 attention to the sailing frigate Congress. 
 We have seen that just as the Merri- 
 mac appeared by the way of the Eliza- 
 beth River, two other vessels came down 
 the James, as if by a preconcerted ar- 
 rangement. These vessels were the 
 Yorktown and the Jamestown, or, as the 
 latter was now called, Patrick Henry. 
 While the Merrimac was engaged with 
 the Cumberland, the Yorktown and 
 the Jamestown, which had successfully 
 passed the National batteries at New- 
 port News, had tackled the Congress. 
 Until the Cumberland went down, the 
 Congress made a gallant and success- 
 ful resistance. With the help of the 
 Zouave, she then managed to run 
 agroimd under cover of the strong bat- 
 teries just named. There she was be- 
 yond reach of the Merrimac's prow, 
 but she was not beyond the range of 
 her guns. As soon, therefore, as that 
 vessel came up, she opened fire upon 
 the unfortunate Congress, which could 
 not reply with her stern guns, one of 
 which was soon dismounted by the 
 Merrimac's shot, and the other had the 
 muzzle knocked off. Lieutenant Smith, 
 Acting-Master Mooi-e, and Pilot Wil- 
 liam Rhodes, with nearly half the crew, 
 were killed or wounded. The Merri- 
 mac moved backward and forward slow- 
 ly, firing at a range of less than a 
 hundred yards. The Congress now 
 took fire in several places. Further 
 resistance would have been worse tha* 
 
204 
 
 THE MERRIMaC and THE MONITOR. 
 
 foolishness ; and so Lieutenant Prender- 
 gast hauled down the flag. A tug 
 came alongside to haul her off ; but the 
 batteries on shore drove off the tug; 
 and the Merrimac, despite the white 
 flag which was flying over her in token 
 of surrender, again opened fire upon 
 the battered and helpless vessel. Later 
 in the day, the Merrimac returned and 
 set the Congress on fire by red-hot shot. 
 About midnight the fire caught her 
 magazine; and she exploded with a 
 tremendous noise. Those of her crew 
 which survived the first attack had 
 meanwhile made good their escape. 
 About one half of the whole, 218 out 
 of 434, responded to the call of their 
 names next morning at Newport News. 
 In little more than two hours the Merri- 
 mac had destroyed two of the best ships 
 in the National service ; and Buchanan, 
 her commander, had the satisfaction — 
 if satisfaction it was — of killing or 
 drowning more than three hundred of 
 his old comrades. 
 
 When the Merrimac first made her 
 appearance in the early part of the day, 
 the flag-ship of the National squadron, 
 the Roanoke, Captain John Marston, 
 and the steam frigate Minnesota, Cap- 
 tain VanBrunt, were lying at Fortress 
 Monroe, several miles distant. These 
 were at once signalled to hurry forward 
 to the assistance of the Cumberland, 
 the Congress, and the other vessels now 
 so sorely menaced. It was not possible 
 for them to be forward in time to 
 render any effective aid. Flag-oflicer 
 Marston had responded to the signal as 
 quickly as possible. His own ship was 
 disabled in its machinery; but, with 
 
 the help of two tugs, he set out for the 
 scene of action. The Minnesota was 
 ordered to hasten in the same direction. 
 When passing Sewall's Point, the Min- 
 nesota came within range of a Confede- 
 rate battery there, and had her main- 
 mast crippled. This, however, was not 
 the only misfortune which she was des- 
 tined to experience; she drew twenty- 
 three feet of water; and although it 
 was known that the water was danger- 
 ously shallow, it was thought that, the 
 bottom being soft, it would be possible 
 to push her through. It was a mis- 
 take. When within about a mile and 
 a half of Nevrport News, the vessel 
 grounded and stuck fast. While in 
 this helpless condition, the Merrimac 
 having destroyed the Cumberland, and 
 having retired after her first attack 
 on the Congress, came down upon her. 
 Fortunately it was not possible for 
 the Merrimac to get within a mile of 
 her intended victim, her own heavy 
 draught preventing a nearer approach. 
 At this distance an ineffective fii'e was 
 opened by both vessels. Some of the 
 smaller anned steamboats ventured 
 nearer, and with their rifled guns killed 
 and wounded several men on board the 
 Minnesota. Some of these, however, 
 paid dearly for their rashness; foi', 
 grounded as she was, her guns were 
 ably handled,' and with great rapidity. 
 It was now seven o'clock; and count- 
 ing, no doubt, on an easy victory on 
 the morrow, the Merrimac, with her 
 companion ships, retired behind Sew- 
 all's Point. The Minnesota still lay 
 fast in the mud ; and although during 
 the night several attempts were made 
 
EELIEF CAME. 
 
 S0» 
 
 to get her off, it was found impossible 
 to move her. The Roanoke and the St. 
 Lawrence, on their way to the scene of 
 conflict, had both got aground ; but 
 with the rising tide they were relieved, 
 and moved down the Roads. It was 
 Saturday night (March 8), and, when 
 the sun went down, the prospect for the 
 following morning was the reverse of 
 cheering to the National commanders. 
 There could be no doubt that the Mer- 
 rimac would renew the battle in the 
 m<^rning. In such a case, the result, 
 unless some unexpected aid arrived, 
 would be disastrous in the extreme. 
 The Minnesota would be the first victim ; 
 and, helpless as she was, her destruction 
 was certain. If any of the other vessels 
 were spared, they would surely endeavor 
 ix) make their escape. The harbor of 
 Hampton Roads would be lost. The 
 Merrimac would be fi'ee to prosecute 
 her work of destruction. Fortress Mon 
 roe would be in danger ; and who could 
 say that the harbor of New York was 
 safe, while such a monster was afloat ? 
 General Wool, commander of Fortress 
 Monroe, telegraphed to Washington 
 that the capture of the Minnesota was 
 all but certain, and that " it was thought 
 the Merrimac, Jamestown, and York- 
 town would pass the fort to-night." It 
 was the opinion of that officer that if 
 the Merrimac, instead of passing on, at- 
 tacked the foj'tress, it would not be 
 possible to hold the place for more than 
 a few daya 
 
 Happily relief was at hand. At nine 
 o'clock that night, the Monitor, Erics- 
 son's new iron-clad turret ship, ai-rived 
 •^t Fortress Monroe fi'om New York. 
 
 This vessel, which was a dwarf beside 
 the Merrimac, and which was of novel 
 form and appearance, had been built 
 at Green Point, Long Island, New York, 
 under the direction of its inventor, 
 Captain John Ericsson — a Swede by 
 birth, but who had been a resi 
 dent of the United States for twenty 
 years. Ericsson had already won dis- 
 tinction as a practical scientist in 
 Sweden and in England ; and in 1842, 
 having come to the United States, ho 
 built for the government, the U. S. 
 Steamer Princeton, the first screw-pro- 
 peller in the world. The Monitor was 
 one of three vessels — the other two 
 were the Galena and the New Ironsides 
 — which were constructed to meet the 
 emergency, and by special requirement 
 of the government. Ericsson's plan waa 
 to secure the greatest possible power, 
 both for attack and resistance, with the 
 least possible exposure of surface. The 
 hull of tlie Monitor admirably met all 
 those requirements. It was buoyant, 
 yet it was almost entirely under water. 
 It presented to the enemy a target 
 which was wonderfully small, but 
 which because of the concentration of 
 iron and timber was absolutely im- 
 pregnable — proof against the heaviest 
 artillery of the day. Concentration was 
 Ericsson's object in the construction of 
 the hull, so far as defence or resistance 
 was concerned. He followed the same 
 plan in regard to the offensive part o£ 
 the ship. In the centre of his raft-like 
 vessel, he fixed a revolving cylindei^ 
 of wrought-iron, of sufficient diameter 
 to allow of two heavy guns, and just 
 high enough to give the gunners stand- 
 
 319 
 
ao6 
 
 THE MEERIMAC AND THE MONITOR. 
 
 ing room. When finished, the total 
 length of the Monitor was 172 feet. 
 This covered the armor and what is 
 called the " overhang." The length 
 of the hull proper was 124 feet. Her 
 total beam over armor and backing was 
 41^ feet — the beam of the hull proper 
 being .34 feet. Her depth was 11 feet; 
 her draught 10 feet. The diameter of 
 the turret inside was 20 feet; the 
 height was 9 feet; the thickness, 8 
 inches, there being 5 inches of wrought- 
 iron and 3 feet of oak. The total 
 weight, with everything on board, was 
 nine hundred tons. As an engine of 
 -^var, the Monitor was in the strictest 
 sense of the word a novelty. Nothing 
 of the kind had ever before existed. 
 Not unnaturally, therefore, very differ- 
 ent opinions prevailed as to the fitness 
 of the vessel for the purposes contem- 
 plated. Had the Monitor gone to 
 the bottom as she slid from the 
 stocks at Greenpoint, she would only 
 have fulfilled the predictions and justi- 
 fied the expectations of many prominent 
 scientific men who were present when 
 ?he was launched. The strange-looking 
 little ship, as we shall presently see, 
 was to have a different and more glori- 
 ous future. 
 
 According to the terms of the con- 
 tract the Monitor was not to be accepted 
 by the government until her sea-going 
 powers were tested and until she had 
 made trial of her strength with the 
 heaviest guns of the enemy. This, 
 therefore, was her trial trip ; and never, 
 perhaps, in the history of any ship of 
 war was a trial trip more severely tested 
 or more completely successful. Lieuten- 
 
 ant John L. Worden was in command. 
 On her way from New York the 
 weather was extremely rough. For 
 three days the Monitor battled with the 
 storm ; but more than once victory was 
 doubtful. The sea rolled over her decks, 
 the turret alone being above the water. 
 At one time the tiller-rope was thrown 
 off the wheel, and the situation was 
 really critical. The draft pipe was 
 choked by the pouring down of the 
 water; and but for the ventilation 
 obtained through the turret, the men 
 would have been suffocated. More 
 than once during the voyage the fires 
 were extinguished. After such a voy- 
 age the crew, as was to be expected, 
 were completely exhausted. We have 
 seen that the Monitor reached Fortress 
 Monroe at 9 o'clock, on the evening of 
 Saturday, the 8th of March. But for 
 this storm the Monitor might have been 
 up in time to prevent the disaster of the 
 previous day ; for it is now known that 
 the Confederates, informed by spies of 
 the forwardness of the Monitor, had 
 made almost superhuman efforts to have 
 the work on the Merrimac finished, so 
 as to give her an opportunity of destroy- 
 ing the National fleet at Hampton Roads 
 before her great rival could appear on 
 the scene. As it was, Lieutenant Worden 
 lost no time after his arrival at Fortress 
 Monroe. Within a few minutes he had 
 reported to the flag ofiicer in the Roads, 
 received orders and sailed to join the 
 disabled fleet. Soon after mid- Mar. 
 night, on the morning of the 9th, *• 
 he anchored his little vessel alongside 
 the Minnesota. 
 
 Never did relief arrive more oppor- 
 
THE MINNESOTA. 
 
 Vfi 
 
 tunely. It was a night to be remem- 
 bered—that of the 8th of March, 1862, 
 at Hampton Roads. The Confederates 
 were flushed with success. The Na- 
 tionals were downcast, as well they 
 might be, but by no means desperate. 
 Norfolk was illuminated ; and the Con- 
 federate officers and sailors were rejoic- 
 ing and carousing with her grateful 
 eitizens. On the one side, there was 
 the certain conviction that to-mon'ow 
 would bring with it an easy victory. 
 Oi^ the other side there was a sullen 
 determination to resist to the last, and 
 a dim, ill-defined hope that some effec- 
 tive aid was to be expected fi-om the 
 strange little vessel which had just 
 arrived. As the night wore on, the 
 waters and the adjacent coast were brill- 
 iantly lit up by the flames of the burn- 
 ing Congress ; and ever and anon, at 
 irregular intervals, a shotted gun would 
 boom over the dull waters and startle 
 the quiet air, as the spreading flames 
 ignited its charge. The ship had been 
 burning for ten hours, when, about one 
 o'clock, the fire having reached the 
 magazine, she blew up with a temfic 
 aoise, filling the air and strewing the 
 waters far and wide with masses of 
 burnino; timber. 
 
 Sunday morning broke beautiful and 
 clear. The Congress had disappeai'ed ; 
 but the masts and yards of the Cumber- 
 land projected above the water, and her 
 ensign was flying in its accustomed 
 place. As sad evidences of the sudden- 
 ness of her destruction, the dead bodies 
 of her brave defenders floated in large 
 numbers around the ship. Before the 
 sun had fully revealed himself, and paled 
 
 by his brighter light the lurid flames 
 of the burning fragments of the Con- 
 gress, the Merrimac was seen coming 
 down from Sewall's Point. Evidently 
 she was bent on completing the work 
 of the previous day. The drums of 
 the Merrimac beat to quarters. Word- 
 en was ready. Taking his position 
 at the peep-hole of the pilot-house of 
 the Monitor, he gave orders for an im- 
 mediate attack. The Merrimac made 
 direct for the Minnesota ; and from the 
 course she took it was apparently the 
 intention of her commander to capture 
 that vessel, if possible, and carry her 
 back as a prize to Norfolk, where hun- 
 dreds of people lined the shores, await- 
 ing his triumphant return. As she 
 approached, the stern guns of the Min- 
 nesota opened upon her, but to little 
 purpose ; for the stacks and sloping 
 sides of the huge monster had beeu 
 smeared with tallow, and the shot, 
 heavy as it was, glanced harmlessly off. 
 Meanwhile, the little Monitor, to the 
 astonishment of all who were privileged 
 to witness the sight, ran out from under 
 the Minnesota's quarter and placed her- 
 self alongside of the Merrimac, com- 
 pletely covering the Minnesota ' ' as far 
 as was possible with her diminutive 
 dimensions*" The contrast was striking. 
 It was more — i* was almost ridiculous. 
 David and Goliath ! It seemed as if 
 the Merrimac had but to move upon 
 the insignificant, almost invisible thing, 
 touch it with her iron prow, and make 
 an end of it forever. But it was not 
 so. This other giant had found more 
 than a match in this other stripling. 
 The Merrimac let fly a broadside ; and 
 
idfs 
 
 THE MERRIMAC AND THE MONITOR. 
 
 the tuiTet of the Monitor began to 
 revolve. Both vessels, as we have 
 shown already, were heavily armed. 
 The Merrlmac had on each side two 72- 
 inch rifles aud four 9-inch Dahlgrens. 
 The Monitor had in her turret two 11- 
 inch guns, each capable of flinging a 
 shot of 168 pounds. The turret kept 
 revolving ; but the ponderous shot of 
 thfe iVTonitor rattled in vain against the 
 mail-clad sides of the Merrimac. Broad- 
 side followed broadside in rapid suc- 
 cession ; but the heavy metal discharged 
 by the guns of the Merrimac made no 
 impression on the wrought-iron citadel 
 of the Monitor. Unlike as were the two 
 ships, it was really a battle of giants. 
 "Gun after gun," says Captain Van 
 Brunt of the Minnesota, " was tired by 
 the Monitor, which was returned with 
 whole broadsides from the rebels, with 
 no more effect apparently than so many 
 pebble-stones thrown by a child * * * 
 clearly establishing the fact that wooden 
 vessels cannot contend with iron-clad 
 ones ; for never before was anything 
 like it di'eamed of by the greatest en- 
 thusiasts in maritime warfare." After 
 the first vigorous onset there was some 
 manoeuvring for positions, the Monitor 
 seeking the port holes of the Merrimac, 
 the latter all the while pouring her 
 heavy shot on the invulnerable turret 
 of her plucky little antagonist. One 
 bolt from a rifle-gun struck the turret 
 squarely, and penetrated the iron. "It 
 then broke short off and left its head 
 sticking in." Five times the Memmac 
 attempted to run the Monitor down ; 
 but, on each occasion, she received, at 
 the distance of a few feet, the heavy 
 
 shot of the 11-inch guns. In one of 
 these encounters, the Meirimac got 
 aground, and the Monitor, being light 
 of draught, steamed easily around, mov- 
 ing and hitting like a skilled pugilist, 
 her lightning-like fire striking her an- 
 tagonist at every vulnerable point. 
 The Merrimac began to show signs of 
 punishment. Her armor plate was 
 bending and starting under the heavy 
 blows. 
 
 As if despairing of accomplishing any- 
 thing definite or satisfactory with the 
 Monitor, the Merrimac turned away 
 from her agile and rather dangerous 
 antagonist and renewed her attack on 
 the Minnesota. Van Brunt, as he him- 
 self tells us, was on his guard, and gave 
 the monster a warm reception. He 
 opened upon her all his broadside guns, 
 with a ten-inch pivot gun besides. So 
 terrific was the broadside that "it was 
 enough," to quote Van Brunt's lan- 
 guage, " to blow out of the water any 
 timber built ship in the world." It 
 produced, however, but very little ef- 
 fect. The Merrimac gave a hearty re- 
 sponse. From her rifled bow gun she 
 flung one of her terrible shells, which 
 went crashing through the side of the 
 Minnesota, exploding on its way two 
 charges of powder, and finally bursting 
 in the boatswain's apartments, tearing 
 four rooms into one and setting the 
 ship on fire. Another shell burst the 
 boiler of the tugboat Dragon, which 
 lay alongside the Minnesota. During 
 the encounter, which was brief, the 
 guns of the Minnesota had hit the Mer- 
 rimac at least fifty times, producing 
 little or no impression. 
 
A DECIDED VICTORY. 
 
 206 
 
 A second time the Monitor comes to 
 the aid of the Minnesota. The Merri- 
 mac finds it necessary to change her po- 
 sition, and in doing so, again gets 
 grounded. The Minnesota asrain finds 
 her opportunity; and her heavy guns 
 are opened on her sti-anded foe. The 
 broadsides are now telling on the thick 
 armor-plates of the Merriniac. Catesby 
 Jones, who was in command, Buchanan 
 having been wounded the previous day, 
 evidently regarded his situation as criti- 
 cal ; and, accordingly, as soon as he got 
 the Merrimac afloat, he turned her prow 
 toward Norfolk. The Monitor gave 
 chase. Irritated by the pertinacity of 
 the little ship, the Merrimac turned 
 round on her pursuer and rushed upon 
 her at full speed, as if resolved to run 
 her down. It was a vain attempt, al- 
 though, judging from the appearance of 
 things, it was by no means either un- 
 natural or unwise. The huge beak of 
 the Memmac grated on the deck of the 
 Monitor and Avas wrenched. Such a 
 blow had sent the Cumberland down 
 on the Saturday. Such a blow, had 
 it been possible to deal it, would 
 doubtless have proved equally fatal to 
 the Minnesota, or indeed to any Avooden 
 ship afloat. It left the Monitor un- 
 injured. The little vessel glided nim- 
 bly out from under her antagonist ; and 
 in doing so, the two ships being almost 
 in actual contact, she opened iipon her 
 with one of her heavy turret guns, strik- 
 ing her with a force which seemed to 
 crush in her armor. Quick as lightning 
 the concentrated shot of the Memmac 
 rattled against the turret and pilot- 
 bouse of the Monitor. The encoun-ter 
 
 was terrific; but the armor of both 
 vessels was shot-proof, and for the first 
 time in naval warfare, heavy and well- 
 directed cannon were found to be com- 
 paratively worthless. At this stage 
 the Monitor hauled off for the purpose 
 of hoisting more shot into her tun-et. 
 Catesby Jones, imagining that he had 
 silenced his small but formidable an- 
 tagonist, made another move toward 
 the Minnesota. Before he had time to 
 open fire, the Monitor was steaming 
 up towards him. He changed his course 
 at once ; and it was now noticeable that 
 the Merrimac was sagging at her stern. 
 A well directed shot from the Monitor 
 had hit the Merrimac at the junction 
 of the casemate with the ship's side, 
 and caused a leak. Another shot 
 about the same moment had penetrated 
 the boiler of one of the Merrimac's 
 tenders, enveloping her in steam, and 
 scalding a large number of her crew. 
 Latterly the Monitor had been firing 
 low, and every shot told with greater 
 or less effect. The Monitor, however, 
 was not to be allowed to escape unin- 
 jured. The last shot fired by the Mer- 
 rimac was the most effective. It struck 
 the pilot-house of the Monitor opposite 
 the peep-hole through which Worden 
 at that moment was looking. It cut 
 the iron plank in two, inflicted a severe 
 wound on Worden, and knocked him 
 senseless to the floor, Lieutenant Green, 
 who commanded the guns, and Chief- 
 Engineer Steiners, who worked the tur- 
 ret, being at the same moment stunned 
 and stupefied, but not severely injured. 
 Green and Steiners recovered quickly 
 enough to keep the gunners at work; 
 
no 
 
 THE MEREIMAC AND THE MONITOH. 
 
 but "Worden did not for some time re- 
 cover consciousness. When he did so, 
 his first question was, " Did we save 
 the Minnesota ? " 
 
 The battle was now ended. The 
 Meri-imac steered at once for Norfolk. 
 The Monitor soon afterwards steered for 
 Fortress Monroe, the severe mishap 
 which had befallen her commander pre- 
 venting her fi'om following up her vic- 
 tory, and forcing the battle to a 
 surrender. Worden was really badly 
 injured. His face was much disfigured, 
 and he was completely blind. Removed 
 to the city of Washington, his life for 
 a time was despaired of ; but he revived ; 
 and, as we shall see hereafter, he ren- 
 dered his country further good service 
 before the war was ended. As soon as 
 the Merrimac retired, the Minnesota 
 was got afloat by thi-owing some of her 
 hea^^ guns overboard. She was saved. 
 The battle which began as early as eight 
 o'clock in the morning was waged with 
 great ferocity until after midday. The 
 little Monitor did noble work and won 
 a most decided victory. 
 
 During the two days the Minnesota 
 had fii-ed 247 solid shot, 282 shells, and 
 more than ten tons of powder. While 
 struggling with the Merrimac, the Mon- 
 itor fired 41 shots, and was struck 22 
 times. The only serious injury done 
 to the Monitor was the shattering of 
 her pilot-house. The Merrimac suffered 
 considerably. On board two men were 
 killed and some nineteen wounded. 
 She had lost her iron prow, her star- 
 board anchor and all her boats. Her 
 armor was badly damaged ; her steam- 
 pipe and smoke-stack were riddled ; 
 
 the muzzles of two of her gims were 
 shot away ; the wood work at one of 
 her ports was so exposed that it took 
 fire at every discharge ; and the water 
 was rushing in upon her through one of 
 the openings made by the shot of the 
 Monitor. 
 
 No battle by land or sea, during the 
 whole war, created more excitement or 
 evoked more enthusiasm than the battle 
 at Hampton Roads. At the close of the 
 first day, victory was clearly on the side 
 of the South. In proportion to the joy 
 that prevailed throughout the Confed- 
 erate States — and the joy was great — 
 there was depression of feeling in the 
 North. At the close of the second day 
 the situation was reversed. There was 
 depression of feeling in the South — all 
 the greater because of the previous joy. 
 The hearts of the Confederates, in truth, 
 sank within them. But there were 
 great rejoicings in the North. Cheers 
 and congratulations rose up on all sides. 
 The glad intelligence of the success of 
 the Monitor was flashed from State to 
 State and from city to city ; and from 
 the Cabinet, from Congress, from State 
 Legislatures, from Town Councils, from 
 Chambers of Commerce, from Boards of 
 Trade, from public bodies of all kinds, as 
 well as from special meetings of the peo- 
 ple, thanks and praise were pom-ed out up- 
 on the Monitor, upon her inventor, upon 
 her brave commander, and upon all the 
 officers and men who took part in the 
 heroic struggle and helped to bring 
 about the glorious result. The rejoicing 
 was universal ; and the praise was aa 
 unstinted as the gratitude was genuine 
 and profound. Hampton Roads became 
 
THE LESSON. 
 
 211 
 
 immortal ; and the little Monitor ac- 
 quired a I'eputation such as was never 
 befoi'e enjoyed by any ship of war. 
 Pili:!;rimai>:es were organized and under- 
 taken to visit the scene of the conflict 
 and the victory; and all ranks and classes 
 of the peoi^le, from the President down- 
 ward, rushed to see the " little wonder " 
 — the strange vessel which had done 
 such effective work. The excitement 
 was not confined to this country alone. 
 The success of the Monitor created a 
 profound interest throughout the civil- 
 ized world, and nowhere more than in the 
 Bntish Isles. It was felt and confessed 
 not only that sea-girt nations must in 
 future depend for protection on other 
 than wooden walls, but that a new and 
 terrible engine of war had been con- 
 structed. The battle at Hampton Roads 
 had read the world a lesson. It pro- 
 claimed the superiority of such a vessel 
 as the Merrimac with her sloping sides 
 and inclined armor to the ordinary 
 iron-clad. It also proclaimed the fact 
 that inclined armor was inferior to a 
 turret. The nations then busy with the 
 reconstruction of their ships for war pur- 
 poses, and spending millions upon mill- 
 ions upon new models, felt it necessary 
 to pause, to read the lesson Avhich came 
 from Hampton Roads, and to reflect. 
 
 It would not be easy to overestimate 
 the importance of these two days' fight- 
 ing on the general conduct of the war. 
 The result was a heavy blow to the 
 Confederates : it was a clear gain to the 
 National cause. There was, no doubt, 
 just cause for regret that the Merrimac 
 was allowed to escape, and that she was 
 not hotly pursued and compelled to 
 
 surrender. There can be no doubt now 
 that the Monitor was quite equal to 
 such a task. It was developed in an 
 investigation after the battle that the 
 Monitor had on board wrought-iron 
 shot, each weighing 184 pounds; but 
 this shot was not used as the capacity 
 and strength of the 11-inch Dahlgren 
 guns were as yet imperfectly known. 
 In answer to a question put by the War 
 Committee, as to why the battle was 
 not more promptly decided against the 
 Merrimac, Mr. Newton, the Chief En- 
 gineer of the Monitor, said : " It was 
 due to the fact that the power and 
 endurance of the 11-inch Dahlgren guns, 
 with which the Monitor was armed, 
 were not known at the time of the 
 battle; hence the commander would 
 scarcely have been justified in increas- 
 ing the charge of powder above that 
 authorized in the Ordnance Manual. 
 Subsequent experience developed the 
 important fact that these guns could be 
 fired with thirty pounds of common 
 powder, with solid shot. If this had 
 been known at the time of the action, 
 I am cleai-ly of opinion that from the 
 close quarters at which Lieutenant 
 Worden fought his vessel, the enemy 
 would have been forced to surrendei"." 
 According to the same witness, if a 15- 
 inch gun could possiV)ly have been 
 mounted in the turret, the action would 
 have been short and decisive. Mr. 
 Newton did not doubt that but for the 
 injuiy received by Lieutenant Worden 
 that officer would have pursued and 
 " badgered " the Merrimac to surrender. 
 These reasons, it must be admitted, aie 
 sufficiently satisfactory. If they do not 
 
212 
 
 THE MEREIMAC AND THE MOXITOR. 
 
 remove all cause of regret that the Merri- 
 mac made her escape, they at least com- 
 pletely exonerate the National command- 
 ers. Worden was irresponsible; and 
 his subordinates, judging from the expe- 
 rience they had had that Sunday fore- 
 noon, thought it best to content them- 
 selves with what they had actually ac- 
 complished. If they missed a prize, 
 posterity will not judge them harshly. 
 As it was, the Nationals had won a 
 great victory, and had just reason to 
 be well pleased. Had the Meirimac 
 been permitted to proceed unchecked 
 in her work of destruction, the result 
 could not but have been most disastrous 
 to all tlie best interests of the North. 
 It might have seriously affected the en- 
 tire future of the war, and led to re- 
 sults very different to what were de- 
 sired and to what were ultimately 
 achieved. But for the timely arrival 
 of the Monitor, the Minnesota would 
 have shared the fate of the Cumbei'land 
 and the Congress ; the entire Union 
 fleet would have been destroyed or cap- 
 tured ; the splendid harbor of Hampton 
 Roads would have been left in the un- 
 disputed possession of the Confederates ; 
 Fortress Moni'oe ^vould have been im- 
 perilled, and its fall would have been 
 only a question of days. Such a loss, 
 in itself considered, would have been 
 great. But it would have been greater 
 still in the consequences which must 
 necessarily have resulted. The pos- 
 session of Hampton Roads, implying 
 of course the possession of Fortress 
 Monioe, Avould have given the Con- 
 federates absolute control of the James 
 and York rivers, and by consequeno*> 
 
 would have upset all McClellan's plans, 
 and brought his projected campaign 
 against Richmond to premature and in- 
 glorious defeat. This, however, would 
 not have been all. The possession of 
 these waters by the Confederates would 
 have made secure, as it would have 
 given them the command of, the Pen- 
 insula, and made impossible any attack 
 by way of the James River. Worse 
 even than this was possible. What 
 would have hindered the Menimac 
 from running up Chesapeake Bay and 
 steaming up the Potomac, to the terror 
 of the National Capitol ? Or supposing 
 she had put to sea, what was there to 
 prevent her making her way to the 
 harbor of New York, dealing de- 
 struction among the shipping, and lay 
 ing under contribution the chief com 
 mercial city of the Union ? There were 
 other possibilities equally if not even 
 more alarming. One other we deem it 
 proper to mention. The expulsion of the 
 National fleet from Hampton Roads, 
 coupled as it would have been with the 
 fall of Fortress Monroe, would have 
 encouraged foreign governments in what 
 they would have been pleased to call 
 the interests of peace, to grant recog- 
 nition and even support to the Con- 
 federacy. In the spring of 1862 the 
 Confederates were not without bright, 
 and, as they thought, cheering pros- 
 pects ; if they were not absolutely 
 commanding confidence abroad, they 
 were at least inspiring hope ; and such 
 success as that which we have indicated, 
 would have been quite suflBcieut to 
 make ill-concealed foreign sympathy 
 .^siune an active form. 
 
MAI' SHOWING THE CITY OF MOBILE AND ITS DEFENCES. 
 
I 
 
MAT OF NORTHERN VIRC.INIA, SHOWING FREDERICKSBURG, CHANCELLOES- 
 VILLE, SPOTTSYLVANIA, THE WILDERNESS, Etc., Etc. 
 
,ii 
 
 
 ^c-|^f^T ; 
 
dSOOO DWYNSVIlLB 
 ^^Z£SS-sou sc. y V^, — v.^^ \\ _y~\ 
 
 MAP SHOWiNG THE POSITIONS OF THE ARMIES NEAR PETERSBURG, VA. 
 
> 
 
 MAP SHOWING THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY, THE SCENE OF SEVEBAi 
 IMPORTANT CAMPAIGNS. 
 
CAVALRY CHARGE 
 
r 
 
 ^N 
 
 DIAGRAMS SHOWING THE POSITIONS OF THE ARMIES AT THE BATTLE OF 
 MURFREESBORO- OB STONE RIVER. 
 
MAP OF THE COUNTRY BETWEEN MURFREESBORO" AND CHATTANOOGA, 
 
 TENNESSEE. 
 
i:^ 
 
 V'7^.;5!l|i1f!^ 11''/'/ 
 
 ■^ 
 
 V 
 
 ■'!ii 
 
 m' 111 i If. r 'J 
 
 lUili 
 
 •iiW 
 
SCALE or M/LCS 
 
 MAP SHOWING THE ENTRANCES TO CAPE FEAR RIVER AND THE APPROACHES 
 TO WILMINGTON, N. C. 
 
THE ADVANCE. 
 
 213 
 
 It wii» a matter of some importance 
 to the Uuion that all these evils were 
 averted. It was something of gi'eater 
 importance still, that the Nationals had 
 for the time being, at least, established 
 their superiority in naval warfare, had 
 effectually secured possession of one of 
 the largest and most valuable land- 
 locked bays on the Continent, with all 
 the connected rivers of the Peninsula, 
 and had rendered necessary the aban- 
 donment of Norfolk. Now that the en- 
 emy had been driven from all the neigh- 
 boring waters, McClellan had a fair 
 opportunity to carry out his projected 
 plans on the Peninsula, with a view 
 to the capture of Richmond. This 
 happy state of things had been brought 
 
 about mainly by the Monitor. It was 
 not without good reason that Chief-En- 
 gineer Steiner, on the day the battle had 
 been fought, vsTote to Ericsson in the fol- 
 lowing terms: " I congratulate you upon 
 your great success. Thousands have this 
 day blessed you. I have heard whole 
 crowds cheer you. Every man feels 
 that you have saved this place to the 
 nation, by furnishing us with the means 
 to whip an iron-clad frigate, that was, 
 until our arrival, having it all her own 
 way with our most powerful vosaels." 
 The Merrimac was blowu up by 
 the Confederates May 11th, ?tnd, to- 
 wards the close of the year, 'jhe Mon- 
 itor foundered in a storm off Cape 
 Hatteras. 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 F-ollowing up the Foe. — The Confederate Works at WilUamsbnrg. — Fort Magruder. — Winn's Mill Road. — Hooker 
 and Kearney. — Couch and Casey. —Sumner in Command. — General Stoneman. — The 4th of May. — A Fearful 
 Night. — Hooker Engages the Foe. — The Confederates Well Prepared. — Severe Fighting. — Fort Magruder 
 SUeuced. — Arrival of Longstreet. — A Cruel Piece of Deception. — Blaisdell's Men. — Private Doherty. — The 
 Seventeenth New York. — Bravery of Hooker. — The Pluck and Endurance of His Men. — An Unequal Struggle. — 
 Kearney Comes Up. — General Hancock. — General Birney. — A Gallant Charge. — Hancock's Advance. — Hancock 
 Driven Back. — Falls Back in Good Order. — A Halt. — "Gentlemen, Charge!" — Retreat of tSae Confederates. — 
 The Key of the Position. — The Heroes of Williamsburg. — An Unsatisfactory Fight. — The Great Bravery of the 
 Troops. — Bad Generalship. — It Ought to Have Been Different. — Want of Unity. — McClellan's Mistake. — Sumner 
 not the Right Man in the Right Place. — ^Why was McClellan Absent ? — Franklin's Expedition. — The Prince do 
 Joinville. — McClellan on the Field. — His Appearance. — Enthusiasm of the Troops. — " That Little Matter. "— 
 "Bivouac in Front of Williamsburg." — Other Battles to Fight. — More Delay. — What a Bold Stroke Might Have 
 Accomplished. — Promises Fair but Fruitless. — Lincoln's Prophetic Words. — The Story of Manassas Repeate*/ 
 —Would not Strike a Blow. 
 
 /S62. 
 
 After the evacuation of Yorktown, 
 McClellan gave orders that the 
 enemy should be followed up. 
 The Confederates moved towards Will- 
 iamsburg, where, some months before, 
 
 they had constructed a line of strong 
 works, some thii-teen in number, on the 
 rolling but elevated ground on which 
 that city stands. These works were 
 two miles in front of Williamsburg, at 
 
 »90 
 
214 
 
 WILLIAMSBURG. 
 
 the narrowest part of the Peninsula. The 
 line stretched from a deep ravine, near 
 the James River on the right, to Queen's 
 Creek, near the York River on the left. 
 The principal work was Fort Magi'uder, 
 close to the junction of the Yorktown 
 and "Winn's Mill Road. This was an 
 earth-work, with bastioned front. Its 
 crest measured nearly half a mile. It 
 was heavily aiTQed and surrounded by a 
 ditch. The others were redoubts not 
 unlike those which were thrown up 
 around Washington City. These works 
 the Confederates placed under a strong 
 guard for the purpose of holding the 
 pui'suers in check, while the main body 
 pressed on so as to place the Chicka- 
 hominy between them and the Na- 
 tionals. 
 
 The pursuing army was headed by 
 General Stonemau, with his cavaliy and 
 horse artillery. Stoneman was followed 
 along the Yorktown Road by the divi- 
 sions of Generals Joseph Hooker and 
 Philip Kearney, of Heintzelman's corps, 
 and along the Winn's Mill Road by the 
 divisions of Generals W. F. Smith, 
 Darius N. Couch and Silas Casey, of 
 Keyes' corps. The commands of Rich- 
 ardson, of Sedgwick, and of Fitz John 
 Porter were left at Yorktown, with 
 instructions to hold themselves in readi- 
 ness to advance as a supporting force, if 
 required, or, if deemed more important, 
 to follow and co-operate with Franklin's 
 division, which was to move up the York 
 River to West Point, and take posses- 
 sion of the terminus of the Richmond 
 and York River Railroad. General 
 Edwin V. Sumner, McClellan's second 
 in command, was intrusted with the 
 
 immediate direction of the pursuit. Mc 
 Clellan himself remained at Yorktown 
 for the purpose of completing the 
 arrangements necessaiy for the depart- 
 ure of Franklin up the York River. 
 
 General Stoneman, who moved some 
 miles ahead of the rest of the army, 
 touched the Confederate lines in the 
 neighborhood of Fort Magruder. Ex- 
 posed to the guns of the fort, and fiercely 
 attacked by the Confederate cavalry, h» 
 was compelled to fall back. Meanwhile, 
 Hooker and Smith's divisions, the latter 
 ahead, were pressing forward with all 
 haste on the Yorktown Road. On be- 
 ing informed of Stoneman's repulse, 
 Hooker, feeling the necessity of despatch, 
 obtained leave from General Heintzel- 
 man to thi-ow his division on the Hamp- 
 ton or Warwick roads. Having Smith 
 no longer in front, he was able to move 
 with greater ease and rapidity. Sumner, 
 having hurried forward with Smith's 
 division, reached the place where Stone- 
 man was halting about five o'clock in 
 the afternoon. By midnight. Hooker, 
 who had made the best possible use of 
 his time, had his men in position on 
 Smith's left. Here the troops rested 
 on their arms until the morning. Maj 
 The 4th of May, 1862, is one of *• 
 the memorable Sundays of the war. It 
 had i-ained all day, and the roads were 
 almost impassable. At night the rain 
 continued. " That was a fearful night," 
 wrote one who was present with the 
 army ; " and that was a strange, eventful 
 bivouac. The i-oads being in a dread- 
 fully muddy condition, the troops had 
 had a difficult march ; and then, at night, 
 without shelter from the rain, which wa» 
 
CEUEL DECEPTION. 
 
 315 
 
 falling fast, without food or nourish- 
 ment, thej all, officers and soldiers, 
 reposed that Sabbath night, as best they 
 could, on the wet ground and among 
 the forest trees." The position of the 
 army, as, in these circumstances, it 
 sought rest for the night, was as follows : 
 General Hooker's division lay in front 
 of the centre of the Confederate works ; 
 Smith's division and Stoneman's cavalry 
 and artillery lay to the right. The 
 divisions of -Kearney and Couch had 
 halted in the rear. 
 
 At break of day on the 5th, Hooker 
 May was up and in motion. Before the 
 5« church clocks had struck six, he 
 was in full view of the works which the 
 Confederates had thrown up for defense ; 
 and the towers and spires of Williams- 
 burg were cleaT'ly revealed across the 
 open level plains. For well nigh a mile 
 in front, the gi'ound was obstructed by 
 trees which had been felled for the pur- 
 pose ; and wherever the ground was open 
 it was dotted with rifle-pits. Hooker 
 lost no time in moving upon the foe. He 
 knew that there were thirty thousand 
 men within supporting distance, and 
 that the bulk of the army of the Poto- 
 mac was within four hours' march. At 
 half-past seven o'clock, he directed Gen- 
 eral Grover, with his brigade, to make 
 the attack. The First Massachusetts, the 
 Second New Hampshire, the Eleventh 
 Massachusetts and Twenty-Sixth Penn- 
 sylvania regiments were deployed in 
 front, to the left of the Hampton Road, 
 as skirmishers, with orders to pick 
 off the Confederate sharpshooters and 
 artillerists, Avhile Captain Weber, with 
 his battery, was pushed into the open 
 
 field, until they were within seven 
 hundred yards of Fort Magi-uder. The 
 Confederates were not found unpre- 
 pared. Before the disposition of the 
 National troops was completed, the 
 guns of the fort and of one of the ad- 
 joining redoubts opened a heavy fire, 
 killing two of Weber's officers and 
 several of his men, and forcing the 
 battery to fall back. The battery, 
 however, was quickly re-manned by 
 some volunteers from Osbom's ; and the 
 guns were soon in position and respond- 
 ing to the fire of the enemy. Bram- 
 hall's New York battery came up 
 opportunely and took a position to the 
 right of Weber's. The two batteries 
 were supported by the Fifth New Jersey 
 regiment ; and while the batteries 
 poured forth their shot and shell with 
 terrible rapidity and with deadly aim, 
 the rifle bullets of the infantry did 
 scarcely less effective work. Within 
 an hour and a half the Confederate 
 troops which had appeared on the plain 
 were dis])ersed, and the guns of their 
 works apj)arently silenced. 
 
 The battle, however, was as yet only 
 beginning. The Confederates, at the 
 veiy moment victory seemed secured by 
 the Nationals, began to appear in great 
 force. We have already seen that the 
 main body of the Confederate army had 
 left Williamsburg, and was on its way 
 towards Richmond before Hooker came 
 up. It was only, therefore, with the rear- 
 guard of the retreating army, and with 
 the troops which had been left behind 
 to man the fort and the redoubts, that 
 the Nationals had as yet been engaged. 
 After Hooker had sent out his skirm- 
 
216 
 
 WILLIAMSBURG. 
 
 ishers, and the National batteries had 
 opened fire, Johnston began to perceive 
 that the pressure of the pursuers was 
 much greater than he had been led to 
 Buspect from the ordinarily dilatory 
 movements of McClellan. Longstreet's 
 division had already passed through 
 Williamsbui'g. It was ordered back by 
 Johnston to give its suppoi't to the rear- 
 guard. It was this division which now 
 appeared on the scene of conflict, and 
 gave new life to the struggle. Long- 
 street's men were fresh and full of 
 vigor ; and when they fell in force upon 
 Patterson's New Jersey brigade, which 
 had been engaged all the morning, it 
 was felt that the contest was unequal. 
 Hooker, therefore, sent to Patterson's 
 assistance Brigadier-General Grover, 
 with the First Massachusetts and two 
 regiments of the Excelsior brigade, the 
 Twentieth and Seventy-Second New 
 York. At the same time the Eleventh 
 Pennsylvania and Twenty-Sixth Massa- 
 chusetts came up to the Yorktown 
 Road ; and Colonel Blaisdell, who com- 
 manded them, was ordered to clear the 
 road and form a connectioa with Heint- 
 zelman's coi-ps. 
 
 Blaisdell promptly put the order in 
 fexecution. His men marched steadily 
 forward until they were within fifty 
 yards of the enemy ; and here occurred 
 one of those cruel pieces of deception 
 to which the Confederates on more than 
 one occasion resorted. " Don't fire on 
 your friends," shouted a Confederate 
 ofticer, displaying a white flag. Blais- 
 dell ordered his men to cease firing; 
 and Private Doherty advanced to take 
 the flag. "Now, give it them," ex- 
 
 claimed the same treacherous voice ; and 
 on Blaisdell's men, thus thrown off 
 their guard, the Confederates opened a 
 destructive fire. Several of them w<ere 
 killed. Among them was poor Doherty, 
 who, however, had managed, before he 
 fell, to put a bullet through the head of 
 the wretched traitor who had lured him 
 to his death. Blaisdell's men did good 
 and effective work, maintaining the 
 struggle until their ammunition was 
 exhausted. They were relieved by the 
 Seventy-Second New York. This regi- 
 ment, after an unsuccessful attack on a 
 battery to the left, and having been 
 exposed to a raking fire from the ene- 
 my's guns, was compelled to give place 
 to the Seventieth New York, Colonel 
 Dwight. As this regiment came foi-- 
 ward, it was supposed by the Confede- 
 rates to be one of their own. The 
 Confederate colonel displaying his own 
 flag, asked for a similar display on the 
 part of the Seventieth. Dwight un- 
 furled the "stars and stripes." It was 
 the signal for a Confederate volley, 
 which, of course, was promptly re- 
 sponded to, and with energy and effect. 
 The Seventieth fought like heroes ; and 
 although pressed by greatly superior 
 numbers, they held their ground till 
 their cartridge boxes were empty. 
 After a severe and unequal struggle, in 
 which twenty-two of the thirty-threa 
 commissioned officers of the regiment 
 were killed or wounded, Colonel 
 Dwight, himself wounded, was made 
 prisoner, with several of his men. The 
 battle was now raging furiously all 
 along the line ; the Confederates were 
 continually being reinforced, Pickett 
 
HOOKER'S BRAVERY. 
 
 217 
 
 and Gholson, and Pryor and others, 
 having hurried back from the direction 
 of the Chickahominy ; and the increas- 
 ing strength of Johnston's amiy was 
 steadily concentrating on Hooker's left. 
 The situation was becoming critical. 
 The Confederates had three times 
 charged the National centre ; they had 
 made a bold dash from Fort Magruder, 
 and captured five of Weber's guns ; 
 they had worn out some of the best 
 National regiments, and thinned sevei-al 
 of the National brigades ; but Hooker, 
 still unaided against the superior and 
 rapidly increasing strength of his an- 
 tagonist, tenaciously held his ground. 
 
 As early as half-past eleven o'clock. 
 Hooker sent a despatch to the assistant- 
 adjutant-general of General Heintzel- 
 man, to whose corps his division be- 
 longed. In that despatch he said : " I 
 have had a hard contest all the morning, 
 but do not despair of success. My men 
 are all at work, but a great deal exhaust- 
 ed. It is reported to me that my com- 
 munication with you by the Yorktown 
 Road is clear of the enemy. Batteries, 
 cavalry and infantry can take part by 
 the side of mine and whip the enemy." 
 Later in the day, and again and again, he 
 addressed appeals for help to Sumner, 
 but in vain. One o'clock, two o'clock, 
 three o'clock struck, and still no help 
 came, with the exception of Peck's bri- 
 gade, of Couch's division, which arrived 
 early in the afternoon, and was posted 
 on his right, where it helped to repel 
 several Confederate attacks. Later in 
 the day two more of Couch's brigades 
 came up; but as Hooker's men were 
 eompletely exhausted, and their ammu- 
 
 nition failing, it was too late to enable 
 him to make any vigorous aggressive 
 eifort. Between four and five in the 
 afternoon. General Philip Kearney, with 
 his division, appeared on the scene of 
 action, and, with characteristic energy, 
 pressed to the front. Hooker, with his 
 thinned ranks and worn-out men, with- 
 drew from the fight and rested as a 
 reserve. He had lost in the battle one 
 thousand seven hundred men. We do 
 not much wonder that Hooker was in- 
 dignant that his morning efforts were not 
 more effectively backed by the strength 
 of the other divisions of the army, and 
 that he was allowed, after victory had 
 become impossible to him and his brave 
 soldiers, to fight so long unaided against 
 such fearful odds. " History," he after- 
 wards wrote, "will not be believed, 
 when it is told that the noble ofiicers 
 and men of my division were permitted 
 to caiTy on this unequal struggle from 
 morning until night, unaided, in the 
 presence of more than 30,000 of their 
 comrades, with arms in their hands ; 
 nevertheless, it i^true." Of this, how- 
 ever, more anon. 
 
 Kearney, as we have just said, pressed 
 to the front. General Beriy, whose 
 brigade of Kearney's division, followed 
 by Thomson's batteries, was the first to 
 ari-ive on the ground, was immediately 
 put into action. The brigade consisted 
 of the Fifth Michigan, the Thirty- 
 Seventh New York, and the Second 
 Michigan. The Fifth Michigan was 
 filed off into the woods to the left of 
 the Hampton Road, and was supported 
 by the Thirty-Seventh New York. A 
 charge was ordered on the left ; and tht 
 
318 
 
 WILLIAMSBURG. 
 
 regiments just named "advanced in 
 splendid style, driving the enemy be- 
 fore them, away from the fallen timber, 
 and out of the rifle-pits beyond." In 
 this charge the Fifth Michigan suffered 
 severely, Colonel Terry and nearly all 
 his subordinate officers being wounded ; 
 but they stoutly held the ground which 
 they had so gallantly won. The Con- 
 fedei'ates were now making vigorous 
 and determined eiforts on the National 
 centre. They had captured some of 
 Bramhall's guns ; and they seemed re- 
 solved to silence and capture the whole 
 battery. To check these efforts, a bat- 
 tery in charge of Captain Smith was 
 planted, en echelon, on a rising knoll, to 
 the right of the road. At the same 
 time, two companies of the Second Mich- 
 igan were ordered to charge on the 
 enemy's skirmishers who were throng- 
 ing about the coveted guns. The charge 
 was gallantly made ; and what ^\^th the 
 effective fire from Smith's battery, the 
 Confederates were driven back. Gen- 
 eral Birney, who, with two regiments 
 of his brigade — the Thirty-Eiglith New 
 York and the Fortieth New York — had 
 been deployed on the right to relieve 
 Hancock's weary men, now came for- 
 ward. The Confederates had resumed 
 firing from their forts ; and they were 
 again pressing forward with their troops. 
 Colonel Ward, with two companies of 
 the Thirty-Eighth New York, made a 
 brilliant dash down the road, taking 
 the rifle-pits by the flank. The charge 
 was completely successful; and the 
 Confederates were driven from their po- 
 sition. Encouraged by Colonel Wai'd's 
 success, Kearney ordered a portion of 
 
 the Fortieth New York to sustain him 
 in another charge to the Confederate 
 rear. This detachment was led by 
 Captain Mindel, Birney's chief of staff. 
 The charge was gallantly made, and was 
 even more effective than the preceding. 
 The Confederates fell back ; and there 
 was no more firing either from the 
 rifle-pits or by the artillery. The rear- 
 brigade of Kearney's division, under 
 General Jameson, now reached this por- 
 tion of the field ; a second line was at 
 once formed ; and arrangements were 
 made for further vigorous efforts. But 
 darkness fell upon the scene ; and the 
 wearied soldiers, seeking repose, stretch- 
 ed themselves on the rain-soaked and 
 blood-stained battle field. 
 
 While these events were taking place 
 on the National left, events of equal 
 importance were occurring on the ex- 
 treme right. At an early hour in the 
 day, fears were entertained that the 
 Confederates might make a dangerous 
 movement in that direction; and in 
 obedience to orders from Sumner, the 
 general in command. General Smith 
 sent Hancock, with about twenty-five 
 hundred men, to hold the enemy in 
 check, and, if possible, to make a flank 
 movement upon the works. Hancock's 
 command consisted partly of his own 
 and partly of Davidson's brigade. For 
 the special duty assigned him, Hancock 
 selected from his own brigade the Fifth 
 Wisconsin, the Forty-Ninth Pennsylva- 
 nia, and the Sixth Maine, and, from 
 Davidson's brigade, the Seventh Maine 
 and Thirty-Ninth New York volunteers. 
 These were accompanied by the batteries 
 of Crowen and Wheeler. One of the 
 
HANCOCK'S SPLENDID CHARGE. 
 
 219 
 
 redoubts which had been throwu up by 
 Magruder, and which was near to the 
 extreme Confederate left, was discov- 
 ered to be unoccupied. Its existence, it 
 appears, had been unknown to Johnston 
 and his officers. The redoubt occupied 
 a conspicuous and important position. 
 It stood upon a high bank, looking 
 down upon a ravine, and commanded a 
 dam on what is called Cut Dam Creek, 
 a. small tributary of Queen's Creek, and 
 was about a mile and a half eastward of 
 the Yorktown Road. Having crossed 
 this creek, Hancock experienced no 
 difficulty in taking possession of the re- 
 doubt. Another redoubt, about twelve 
 hundred yards in advance, was found to 
 be unoccupied. This, also, was taken 
 possession of. Between the redoubts 
 now occupied by Hancock's men and 
 Fort Magruder there were other two 
 redoubts ; but these were manned by 
 Confederate forces, more or less strong. 
 A few shells were flung at these re- 
 doubts, and a brisk fire was opened upon 
 them at the same time by some sharp- 
 shooters ; and they, too, were soon 
 deserted. General Hancock had ac- 
 complished^ without the least difficulty, 
 more, perhaps, than he had expected to 
 accomplish by severe and protracted 
 fighting. But the evil genius of that 
 ill-stari'ed day would not allow him to 
 reap the full rewards of victory. He 
 had not around him a sufficient number 
 of men to warrant his occupation of the 
 two desei'ted redoubts. There was no 
 lack of men in the immediate neighbor- 
 hood; but they were neither at hand 
 nor in hand. It was Hooker's experience 
 ^ver again. He could make no further 
 
 aggressive efforts without reinforce- 
 ments. Meantime, Johnston discovered 
 the blunder he had made in not making 
 himself familiar with the ground. He 
 ought to have known of the existence 
 of these redoubts. They were all-im' 
 portant ; for they were in the flank and 
 rear of his line of defense. Unless 
 speedily reclaimed, his line would be 
 not only menaced in its integi'ity, but 
 practically broken. By all means, the 
 Nationals must be driven from this 
 position. Such was the necessity which 
 Johnston felt laid upon him. With 
 this end in view, he gave instructions to 
 General Hill to send a force of sufficient 
 strength to expel Hancock from the 
 redoubts and drive him back upon his 
 own lines. The task was assigned to 
 General Jubal Early, with a force of 
 Virginia and North Carolina troops. 
 Hancock, meanwhile, had been earnestly 
 calling for reinforcements. It was all 
 in vain. Sumner had been unable to 
 send assistance to Hooker because of 
 the number of men he had placed 
 under Hancock ; and now he professes 
 himself unable to succor and strengthen 
 Hancock from a fear that he might 
 thereby weaken his centre, and so place 
 his whole army in peril. In place of re- 
 ceiving reinforcements, Hancock was or. 
 dered to abandon the redoubts and fal] 
 back upon his original position. It was a 
 painful order to execute ; but he had no 
 choice. With the small number of men 
 at his command, it was impossible for 
 him to retain the position he had taken 
 in face of the overwhelmingly superior 
 numbers of the enemy. If, however, 
 he must fall back, he will fall back in 
 
220 
 
 WILLIAMSBTJRG. 
 
 good order, contesting every inch of 
 ground and saving his command. About 
 five o'clock in the afternoon, he saw the 
 two redoubts nearest Fort Magruder 
 reoccupied by the Confederates. Their 
 forward movement was fairly begun. 
 In the most perfect order, and keeping 
 his ranks in line, Hancock drew back 
 his brigade. Retiring regiment by reg- 
 iment, and carrying his artillery back 
 piece by piece, maintaining, meanwhile, 
 a vigorous fire upon the advancing foe, 
 he reached the crest of a ridge not far 
 from the dam above mentioned. There 
 he halted, and forming his men in line 
 of battle, he calmly ' awaited Early's 
 approach. On came the Confederates 
 in great force, firing as they advanced, 
 shouting and yelling " Bull Run," 
 " Ball's Bluff," and other offensive ex- 
 pi'essions. They had reached vrithin 
 thirty paces of his line, when Hancock, 
 with as much politeness as bravery, ex- 
 claimed, " Gentlemen, charge !" With 
 enthusiastic cheers, his gallant soldiers 
 dashed down the slope. The attack 
 was irresistible. The Confederates 
 broke and fled at the first touch of the 
 bayonet. The Nationals, halting, fired 
 some ten or a dozen volleys into the 
 broken ranks. When the smoke cleared 
 off, some five hundred of Early's men 
 were found dead or wounded on the 
 field. The remainder were in full re- 
 treat towards the Confederate lines. 
 The battle of Williamsburg was now 
 practically ended. Hancock had won 
 no great victory ; he had not dared to 
 follow the retreating foe ; but he had 
 secured the key of the position. Here 
 be remained, waiting for reinforcements ; 
 
 but when these were forwarded to him 
 by special orders from McClellan him- 
 self, who had now arrived on the field, 
 they were no longer necessary. The 
 battle had ceased all along the line. 
 
 There were other struggles during 
 the day, one particularly late in the 
 afternoon, a little to the right of the 
 Confederate works, on the Yorktown 
 Road Here, in the open space. Peck's 
 brigade encountered the Confederates 
 in force ; and after severe fighting they 
 were compelled to fall back, Generals 
 Kleim and Devens, with their respect- 
 ive brigades, of Casey's division, coming 
 to their relief. The two great features 
 of the day's contest were the heroic 
 resistance of Hooker on the left and the 
 splendid charge made by Hancock on 
 the extreme right. Hooker and Han- 
 cock, and after them Kearney — these 
 were the men who won the laurels at 
 Williamsburg.* 
 
 •Joseph Hooker was born In 1819, in Hadley, Massa- 
 chusetts. He was appointed a cadet at West Point in 
 1833. He took part in the Mexican war, serving in the 
 same regiment with "Stonewall" Jackson, and becom- 
 ing aide-de-canjp to Brigadier-General Hamer. In 1848, 
 having passed through the various grades, he was pro- 
 moted to a full colonelcy, and entered the Adjutant- 
 General's Department at Washington. In 1858 he 
 resigned, went to California, and combined the duties of 
 feirmer with those of railroad constructor. He super- 
 intended the building of the National road. When the 
 war broke out in 1861, he returned and was present as a 
 spectator at the battle of Bull Run. Soon afterwards wo 
 find him appointed Lieutenant-Colonel of a new regiment 
 of regulars. Later he was made Brigadier-General of 
 volunteers. His first active duties were in Maryland 
 and Eastern Virginia. He made himself useful in help- 
 ing to clear the Potomac of the Confederate blockading 
 batteries. When McClellan moved to the Peninsula, 
 Hooker's brigade was added to the command, and he 
 himself placed at the head of a division. At Williams- 
 burg, as we have seen, be estabUshed his reputation as 
 one of the first soldiers of the republic. His name will 
 frequently again appear in these annals. 
 
THE RETBEAT. 
 
 831 
 
 According to the official reports, the 
 May National loss on Monday, May 
 5« 5th, was 456 killed, 1411 wound- 
 ed, and about 500 missing. The loss 
 sustained by the Confederates was not 
 quite so great ; but, including killed, 
 wounded and missing, it could scarcely 
 have been under one thousand men. 
 Hooker's division suffered most severe- 
 ly of all, the loss being in the propor- 
 tion of one to six — a proportion of loss 
 equal to that of the allied armies at 
 Alma, one of the bloodiest battles of 
 which history has preserved any record. 
 
 On the night after the battle, the 
 
 Winfield Scott Hancock, a direct descendant of John 
 Hancock who signed the Declaration of Independence, 
 was bom in Pennsylvania about 1824. He entered 
 West Point in 1840, and graduated in 1844, receiving 
 his commission of Second Lieutenant. One of his class- 
 fellows at West Point was General Pleasonton. He 
 served in the Mexican War, and was promoted for his 
 gallantry. At the outbreak of the war he held the post 
 •f Assistant-Quartermaster-General. In 1861 he was 
 appointed a Brigadier-General of volunteers. In this 
 capacity he was attached to the army of the Potomac. 
 We have seen what services he rendered before York- 
 town and at Williamsburg. His gallant charge at the 
 close of that day will be remembered wilh pride so long 
 as the history of the Civil War is read. Hancock's name 
 ■will appear in many subsequent struggles. 
 
 " When General Kearney's troops were being brought 
 into action, they met the lengthened files of General 
 Hooker's wounded being carried to the rear. The 
 shrieks of the lacerated and bleeding soldiers, who had 
 been fighting so long and so well, pierced the air ; and 
 this, joined to the mud and rain, and the exhaustion of 
 those who had come several miles with so much speed, 
 was not calculated to produce a favorable impression on 
 them as they were going into action. General Heintzel- 
 man, however, ordered several of the bands to strike up 
 national and martial airs ; and when the strains of the 
 familial tunes reached the ears of the wounded, as they 
 were being carried from the field, three cheers mingled 
 with those of the soldiers who were just rushing into 
 battle. The effect, too, was great on the other side ; 
 for some of the prisoners state that when they heard 
 the bands strike up the Star-Spangled Banner, and 
 heard our soldiers cheer, they knew that the victory 
 irould be ours." — Gorrespondent N. T. Herald. 
 
 mil 
 
 soldiers of the National army rested on 
 their arms on the ground where they 
 fought during the day, some of them 
 in front of the Confederate works, and 
 not a few of them in close proximity 
 to the bodies of their dead or wounded 
 companions in arms. It was uncertain 
 as yet what would be required of them 
 on the following day. The Confede- 
 rates still held their position ; and there 
 was no good reason for believing that 
 they would not renew the fight in the 
 morning. Shortly after midnight it 
 was rumored that the works were be- 
 ing evacuated, and that according to 
 appearances a retreat would be effect- 
 ed during the night. When morning 
 dawned, what was report was found to 
 be a fact. The defenses were aban- 
 doned ; and in their march to new 
 ground beyond the Chickahominy, the 
 Confederates were leaving behind them 
 the town of Williamsburg. Fort Ma- 
 gruder and the redoubts were speedily 
 occupied by the Nationals ; and the 
 Confederate i-ear-guard had not yet left 
 the city on the one side when General 
 Jameson entered it on the other. Will- 
 iamsburg was found to be deserted. 
 
 Of all the battles fought during the 
 continuance of the war, none was more 
 unsatisfactory, so far as the North was 
 concerned, than the battle of Williams- 
 burg. It was not that there was any 
 lack of bravery on the part of the men. 
 It was not that there was a want of 
 pluck or skill on the part of those 
 by whom they were immediately led. 
 On the contrary, never was more 
 heroism displayed than that exhibited 
 by Hooker and the men of his divisiou 
 
232 
 
 WILLIAMSBURG. 
 
 as, during tlie weary hours of that day, ' 
 they resisted, unaided, the vastly su- \ 
 perior foi'ces of the Confederates ; and 
 certainly there never was a more gal- 
 lant charge than that made by Hancock 
 and his little band down the ridge by 
 the dam at Queen's Creek. Nor is it 
 possible to speak in terms of too high 
 commendation of the conduct of Kear- 
 ney and his men when, after coming to 
 the relief of Hooker, they charged the 
 Confederates in front and flank and 
 rear, driving them from their defenses, 
 out of the redoubts, out of the rifle- 
 pits, and out of the open ground, away 
 into the woods beyond. From the 
 actual work done by those commanders, 
 and by the men who followed their 
 lead, it is clear that the secret of the 
 bungling inefficiency of that day on the 
 outskirts of Williamsburg lay not with 
 the army, properly so called, nor with 
 the division leaders, but with those 
 who were in supreme control. How 
 Hooker could be left so long unaided, 
 while whole divisions, not yet engaged 
 or even menaced, were within easy 
 distance, we confess we seek in vain 
 for a satisfactory explanation. And 
 why Hancock, after he had successfully 
 captured the redoubts on the extreme 
 right, should have been Ordered to fall 
 back, is to us beset "wath the same 
 difficulties. 
 
 The success which attended Kearney 
 in his repeated aggressive efforts, and 
 the comparative ease with which Han- 
 cock forced a retreat, show that the foe 
 was much less redoubtable than was 
 imagined ; and there can be no doubt 
 that, if timely and sufficient aid had 
 
 been sent to the one and the other, the 
 battle would have been less endui'ing, 
 and the victory more complete. The 
 retreat of the Confederates from Will- 
 iamsburg this second time ought to have 
 been impossible. Their works, includ- 
 ing Fort Magruder, ought to have been 
 cleared, and the Confederate rear-guard 
 captured or destroyed, before Long- 
 street could have had time to return 
 to the aid of his comrades. In that 
 case, the battle of Williamsburg would 
 have been unnecessary. A little more 
 energy on the part of the Nationals, 
 with greater unity of action and com- 
 munity of purpose, and Johnston would 
 have found it impossible to do what he 
 actually accomplished even after the 
 battle of Willianisbm-g — to place the 
 Chickahominy and its fever-breedhig 
 borders between himself and his op- 
 ponents. A common purpose and 
 unity of action were sadly and visibly 
 wanting throughout the whole contest. 
 How differently things were managed 
 at Shiloh, and, later, at luka and Cor- 
 inth ! How different at Perry ville and 
 Mm'freesboro ! 
 
 We have said that the secret of the 
 mismanagement was to be sought not 
 among the men, not among the sub- 
 ordinate officers or generals of divi- 
 sions, but in higher places. McClellan, 
 it must be admitted, made a mistake in 
 placing Sumner in chief command of 
 the pursuing army. General Sumner 
 was imdoubtedly a brave and capable 
 commander, as he showed subsequently 
 at Antietam and at Fredericksburg; 
 but it has been known in all time that 
 men capable of great effort and great 
 
^THAT LITTLE MATTER." 
 
 223 
 
 enterprise, when acting in a secondary 
 capacity, are not necessarily possessed 
 of those qualities which enable them 
 to force success, when acting on their 
 own responsibility. Many first-rate 
 corps commanders and generals of 
 divisions have proved but soriy com- 
 manders-in-chief. Our own Civil War, 
 on the one side and the other, revealed 
 many such ; and it is no serious charge 
 to make against General Sumner to 
 say that, in the battle before Williams- 
 burg, he did not prove himself to be 
 possessed of those higher qualities — 
 that eagle eye for the situation, that 
 promptitude in sending assistance to the 
 weak and menaced points, that power 
 of holding the army in hand and 
 utilizing all its strength towards the 
 Jesired result — which are absolutely 
 essential in a general-in-chief on the 
 field of battle. It apjjears that Mc- 
 Clellan had some hesitation about the 
 appointment. His first intention, we 
 understand, was to appoint Heintzel- 
 man. Heintzelman might have been a 
 better appointment ; but he might not ; 
 and what we do know for certain is 
 that Sumner was a failure. This, how- 
 ever, brings us to the real source of 
 trouble — the principal cause of com- 
 plaint. 
 
 Why was not McClellan present in 
 person? Why was it necessary for 
 him to delegate, on such an occasion, 
 powers and responsibilities so import- 
 ant ? He had wasted a month before 
 Yorktown laboriously constructing ex- 
 tensive and costly siege works. In 
 spite of his vast preparations and cost^ 
 ly care, the enemy had escaped from 
 
 his grasp before his works were finish- 
 ed, or, at least, before they were turned 
 to any practical account. It would 
 surely not have been unnatiu-al for 
 him, yielding to feelings of mortifica- 
 tion and disappointment, which most 
 men would have felt in the circum- 
 stances, to seize the opportunity so 
 unexpectedly oifered to follow the 
 retreating hosts of the enemy, and to 
 smite them hip and thigh before they 
 had time to cross the Chickahominy. 
 But McClellan did not so feel — did not 
 so judge — did not so act. What did 
 he do? He sent five divisions of his 
 army, under Sumner, to pursue the 
 Confederates. Retaining three divi- 
 sions with him, he remained at York- 
 town, ostensibly for the purpose of 
 superintending the arrangements neces- 
 sary for the transport of Franklin's 
 di\"ision up the York River. It would 
 not do to belittle Franklin's expedition. 
 It was, no doubt, all-important that 
 West Point and the Richmond and 
 York River Railway Terminus should 
 be in the hands of the Nationals. 
 That, however, is not the question. 
 The question rather is, whether the 
 general-in-chief was more needed at 
 Yorktown or at the head of the army 
 of pursuers. The mere statement of 
 the actual facts of the case is the best 
 answer which can be given to the 
 question. While McClellan, with three 
 divisions of his army, besides that of 
 Franklin, was idling at Yorktown, 
 Hooker was maintaining an unequal 
 struggle, his men being cut to pieces 
 in the very "presence of thirty thou- 
 sand of their comrades," and Hancock, 
 
224 
 
 WILLIAMSBURG. 
 
 after having won a substantial victory, 
 was compelled to relinquish his prize 
 and fall back, for the want of support 
 which existed on the very skirts of the 
 battle field in the shape of whole di- 
 visions. Such was the wretched man- 
 agement of the forces sent in pursuit 
 that, when the battle was ended, the 
 divisions of Smith and Couch and Casey 
 had scarcely been called upon to act. 
 
 It was near the close of the battle 
 before McClellan appeared on the field. 
 It was too late for him to contribute 
 iu any appreciable way to the result 
 of the struggle. He gave orders to 
 Smith, when made aware of Hancock's 
 position, to forward reinforcements at 
 once ; but Hancock had accomplished 
 his task before the reinforcements 
 arrived. The circumstances which 
 brought McClellan to the field re- 
 dound but little to his credit. General 
 Sprague and the Prince de Joinville, 
 during the confusion which prevailed 
 in front in consequence of the absence 
 of a skilful directing hand, rode in 
 haste to Yorktown, and urged the 
 general to hasten at once to the scene 
 of action. The answer was as cold as 
 it was curt. "I suppose those in front 
 can attend to that little matter." Ulti- 
 mately, however, he was induced to 
 mount his horse and hasten forward. 
 It was about two o'clock when he 
 started from Yorktown. It was five 
 o'clock when he approached the field of 
 action ; Kearney on the left and Han- 
 cock on the right were just about to 
 deal those final blows which deter- 
 mined the issue of the contest; and 
 the sounds of battle, as well as the 
 
 evidences of hard work which were 
 visible as he drew near the front, 
 convinced him that the day's struggle 
 had been something far other than a 
 " skirmish with the rebel rear-guard." 
 His appearance on the field was the 
 occasion of the wildest demonstration 
 of applause. Regiment after regiment, 
 as he was recognized, tendered him a 
 welcome, than which none more hearty 
 was ever given to the great Napo- 
 leon himself. Mounted on a splendid 
 charger, which he gracefully rode, and 
 dressed in a plain blue coat and glaze- 
 covered cap, himself and horse literally 
 covered with mud, his whole appear- 
 ance was admirably suited to the situ- 
 ation. It was, no doubt, the opinion 
 of many of those brave men, who were 
 willing to be led against the enemy, 
 that if the general had been present, 
 the day's struggle would have had a 
 different and more noble ending. The 
 enthusiasm with which he was greeted 
 ought to have been felt by him as a 
 severe rebuke for his absence; for it 
 testified to the existence on the part of 
 his troops of a warm and deep-rooted 
 affection, which he had but poorly 
 rewarded. 
 
 When the battle was ended, McClel- 
 lan countermanded the order which he 
 gave to Sedgwick and Richardson on 
 leaving Yorktown ; and instead of ad- 
 vancing, with their divisions, to the 
 fi-ont, they were directed to accompany 
 Franklin to "West Point. From " Biv- 
 ouac, in front of Williamsburg," he 
 telegraphed to the War Department 
 that the Confederates were before him 
 in great force, that they were probably 
 
PKOPHETIC WORDS. 
 
 2*6 
 
 in point of numbers stronger than him- 
 self, and in all likelihood well-entrench- 
 ed. In the same message, he said he 
 would "run the risk of holding them 
 in check there." On the following day 
 he telegraphed to the secretary of war 
 the particulars of the previous day's 
 struggle. He estimated his loss at two 
 thousand two hundred and twenty- 
 eight, of whom four hundred and fifty- 
 six were killed and fourteen hundred 
 wounded. He indicated no desii'e for 
 a rapid forward movement. The last 
 words of the despatch were, "We have 
 other battles to fight before reaching 
 Richmond." It was not difficult to 
 make such a prediction, especially as 
 his dilatory movements were multi- 
 plying the opportunities of the Con- 
 federates, and enabling them so to 
 concentrate their forces and so to en- 
 trench themselves as to make their 
 position almost invulnerable. It is 
 
 only fifty miles from Williamsburg to 
 Richmond. A bold and well-directed 
 dash against the Confederate Capitol, 
 and the fall of Richmond might have 
 been antedated nearly three years. The 
 battle was fought on May 5th. j^ay 
 It was not until the 8th that the 8i 
 march was resumed ; and when it was 
 resumed, it was conducted in a manner 
 so dilatory that it may justly be char- 
 acterized as suicidal. Eleven days 
 were consumed in accomplishing what 
 might have been done in three. It ia 
 not wonderful that the people became 
 impatient because of the slow execu- 
 tion of their desire and will, and 
 weary of promises always fair but 
 always fruitless. The words of Presi- 
 dent Lincoln were now seen to be more 
 and more prophetic. After Williams- 
 burg, as before Yorktown, it was "the 
 story of Manassas repeated." McClel- 
 lan would not "strike a blow." 
 
226 
 
 FAIE OAKS, 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 Wedt Poinl. — ^York Eiver. — Franklin's Command. — The Gunboats. — West Point Occupied. — Norfolk. — Grenertt 
 Wool. — Lincoln, Stanton and Chase at Fortress Monroe. — Se wall's Point. — Colonel T. J. Cram. — Ocean View. 
 — Surrender of Norfolk. — General Huger. — The Gunboats on the James Eiver. — Ward's Bluff. — The James 
 and York Rivers Both Open. — McClellan's Position Advantageous. — William and Mary College. — The Na- 
 tional Advance after William.sburg. — Bad Eoads. — The Pamunkey River. — TuustaD's Station. — The Chicka- 
 hominy. — Bottom Bridge. — The Railroad Bridge. — Gaines' Mills. — New Bridge. — Hanover Court House. — 
 Mechanicsville. — Peake's Station. — Cool Arbor. — Ashland. — 'Vigorous Encounter Near Hanover Court House. 
 — A National Victory.— The 80th of May.— The Williamsburg Road.— The Battle Ground.— Fair Oaks and 
 Seven Pines. — McClellan's Headquarters. — New Bridge. — General Casey. — General Keyes. — White Oak 
 Swamp: — The Position of the Two Armies. — The Army of the Potomac. — Time Lost. — A Critical Position. — 
 A Heavy Eaia Storm. — Johnston's Opportunities. — The Confederates March to the Attack. — The Attack. 
 The National Advance Driven In. — The Battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines Begun. — Casey's Division Fights 
 Bravely, but Hard Pressed. — Compelled to Fall Back. — A Furious Charge. — The Battle Raging. — The Rail 
 Fence. — General Rains. — The Nationals Fall Back upon the Second Line. — General Couch. — Couch Not 
 ■Unprepared. — Heintzelman Comes 'Dp and Takes Command. — Berry and Jameson. — Birney. — Heintzelman 
 Sorely Pressed. — Couch's Command Severed. — The Entire Left Wing of the National Army in Peril. 
 — Couch Forms a Double Line of Battle. — Heintzelman 's Promptitude. — MoCleUan and Sumner Warned. 
 — The Chickahominy Flooded. — The Grapevine Bridge. — Sumner Moves to the Assistance of the Right 
 Wing. — A Critical Moment. — Sumner on the Scene. — A Timely Arrival. — A Tremendous Volley. — Morgan, 
 of Sedgwick's Division. — Abercrombie in DiflBcnlty. — Johnston Woimded. — Still the Battle Rages. — An At- 
 tempt to Outflank Sumner's Right. — Night and Rest. — The Second Day. — The Order of Battle. — The 
 Battle Resumed. — Hooker.- — Richardson. — Stoneman. — French. — Howard. — Meagher. — Roger A. Pryor. — 
 Mahone Comes to the Aid of Pryor. —Meagher Ordered Up. — Barriers of Bristling Steel. ^General Howard 
 Wounded. — Th« Confederates Fall Back. — The Firing Ceases. — McClellan's Purpose. — Fatal Delay. — Hooker 
 Looking into Richmond. — Hooker Rebuked and Recalled. — Heavy Losses on Both Sides. —No Glory to 
 McClellan. 
 
 On the evening of the day ■wMcli 
 vpitnessed the battle of Williams- 
 burg, McClellan countermanded 
 the orders -which he had given to 
 Franklin, Sedgwick and Richardson. It 
 was HO longer aecessaiy that they 
 should advance towards the front. 
 Franklin received instructions to pro- 
 ceed to West Point, at the head of the 
 York River; and Sedgwick, Richard- 
 son and Fitz John Porter were to bear 
 him company. During the night the 
 transports reached their destination ; 
 '^ay and early on th* morning of May 
 *" 6th. NewtoD'b brigade landed 
 
 and took position on an open plain, 
 on the right bank of the Pamunkey, 
 one of the principal affluents of the 
 York River. Within twenty-four hours 
 Franklin's whole division had encamp- 
 ed, the gunboats had taken possession 
 of West Point, and the National flag 
 was floating over the little village. 
 The other divisions were also promptly 
 on hand. 
 
 During the night of the 7th, the 
 Confederate pickets ventured to May 
 draw near the National encamp- ?. 
 ment, and a guard belonging to the 
 latter was shot. Franklin was thus 
 
'r 
 
 SEWALL'S POIlSrT. 
 
 227 
 
 admonished that the enemy was not 
 far off; and preparations were made 
 for a possible engagement on the fol- 
 lowing morning. At early dawn, 
 'skinnishers were thrown out towards 
 the edge of the woods; and the whole 
 force was drawn up on the plains, 
 ready to welcome the foe, should he 
 make his appearance. As the Con- 
 federates seemed in no haste to show 
 themselves, the National troops were 
 recalled to breakfast ; the Thirty- 
 Second New York, and the Ninety- 
 Fifth and Ninety-Sixth Pennsylvania 
 regiments being left as an advanced 
 guard near the skirts of the woods 
 which, with the exception of the side to- 
 wards the river, completely surrounded 
 the plain. It was not long until the 
 Confederates began to show themselves 
 more openly and in greater strength. 
 On the west side of the river, there 
 appeared a considerable force; but a 
 vigorous fire having been opened upon 
 them by the gunboats, they were 
 compelled to retire. No time was 
 now lost in landing the troops from 
 the transports ; and by nine o'clock in 
 the morning General Dana had got 
 his brigade ashore. The Confederate 
 scouts were now becoming trouble- 
 some ; and the Sixteenth, Thirty-First 
 and Thirty-Second New York, and the 
 Ninety-Fifth and Ninety-Sixth Penn- 
 sylvania were ordered to enter and 
 clear the woods. The scouts retired at 
 their approach ; but the Nationals soon 
 found themselves opposed by large 
 bodies of the retreating army; and, 
 as these were advantageously posted, 
 and well supplied with artilleiy, it 
 
 was feared that the above-named regi- 
 ments might be ovei"whelmed. They 
 were therefore withdrawn. Mean- 
 while, the Second United States 
 battery, under Captain Arnold, and 
 the First Massachusetts battery were 
 ordered into position, the former on 
 the right and the latter on the left ; 
 and so vigorous was the fire of shell, 
 that the Confederates were driven from 
 their shelter in the woods and forced, 
 
 toward the river, where they came full 
 under the fire of the gunboats. They 
 had now no choice but to retire. In this 
 encounter, the Nationals lost one hun- 
 dred and ninety-four men — the Thirty- 
 First and Thirty-Second New York 
 having suffered most severely. The 
 Confederate loss was not so great. The 
 Nationals, however, had made them- 
 selves masters of the position ; and 
 secured the head of the York River as 
 a base of supplies for the army of the 
 Potomac. 
 
 While Franklin was establishing 
 himself at West Point, and while Mc- 
 Clellan was slowly pressing forward 
 with a view of establishing a com- 
 munication between the main body of 
 the army and the divisions at the head 
 of the York River, events of the ut- 
 most importance were taking place at 
 Norfolk, far to the rear of the National 
 army. From the time McClellan had 
 decided to march to Richmond by way 
 of the Peninsula, General Wool, who 
 commanded at Fortress Monroe, saw 
 the great advantages which would 
 result from the possession of the 
 James River. As a highway for the 
 supplies of the army, it would be in- 
 
228 
 
 FA IE OAKS. 
 
 valuable. It would be all the more so 
 if the York River was also wrenched 
 from Confederate control. Influenced 
 by these views, he had urged the gov- 
 ernment to allow him to attempt the 
 capture of Norfolk, and so break up 
 the blockade of the James. It was not 
 until the evacuation of Yorktown, and 
 until he had renewed his request, that 
 his suggestions were regarded with 
 any degree of favor. The views of 
 General Wool so impressed the gov- 
 ernment, that a visit was made to 
 Fortress Monroe by President Lincoln^ 
 and Secretaries Chase and Stanton. 
 The shore was carefully reconnoitred ; 
 and Lincoln, though he saw some dif- 
 ficulties in the way of effecting a 
 landing, in consequence of the shal- 
 lowness of the water, warmly encour- 
 aged the plan — overcoming objections 
 by vigorous and practical suggestions, 
 which showed that on the battle-field, 
 as in the council chamber, he was 
 capable of winning distinction. The 
 order was given on the 8th of May 
 (Hay for an immediate attempt to be 
 ^' made on Sewall's Point and a 
 march on Norfolk. An-angements were 
 •uade with Commodore Goldsborough ; 
 j.nd a large number of troops were 
 embarked on transports then lying in 
 Hampton Roads. Goldsborough moved 
 towards Sewall's Point, and opened fire 
 apon the batteries ; but the batteries 
 on the Point replied with such spirit, 
 ftnd the Meriimac having come to their 
 ftid, the National vessels withdrew, and 
 the troops were disembarked. 
 
 On the following day, General Wool, 
 with Colonel T. J. Cram and Secretaiy 
 
 Chase, made a reconnoissance along th« 
 shore, when it was decided to laud five 
 thousand troops at a place called Ocean 
 View. A successful landing made at 
 this point would enable the Nationals 
 to strike Sewall's Point in the rear, 
 and would open up a direct road to 
 Norfolk. The troops were again em- 
 barked ; and while a bombardment 
 was kept up on the Point from the Rip 
 Raps, with the intention of convincing 
 the Confederates that the purpose still 
 was to move direct on Sewall's Point, 
 a landing was successfully made at 
 Ocean View. Before dawn on may 
 the 10th, Captain Davis' com- 10* 
 pany, of Richardson's light artillery, 
 followed by the Twentieth New York 
 regiment, was safe on shore. General 
 Weber pushed on with the advance) 
 but no opposition was oflFered, the Con- 
 federates having already abandoned the 
 position. About 8 o'clock in the morn- 
 ing, General Wool, accompanied by 
 the president and by the two secretaries 
 above named, together with Generals 
 Mansfield and Viele, arrived on the 
 scene, and took command in person. 
 The infantry were now pushed on to- 
 wards Turner's Creek ; but the bridge 
 had been set on fire by the Confede* 
 rates ; and a circuitous route to reach 
 Norfolk was rendered necessaiy. There 
 was now a general advance ordered ; 
 and at five o'clock in the afternoon, the 
 lines of the Confederate intrenched 
 camp were reached. Twenty-nine can- 
 non were found in position, but there 
 were no troops. On marched the Na- 
 tionals; and just as they were about 
 to enter the city, the mayor, preceded 
 
ASCENT OP THE JAMES RIVER. 
 
 329 
 
 by a flag of truce, and accompanied 
 by several members of the Common 
 Council, came out to meet them with 
 a proposal of surrender. Huger, it 
 iappears, who had charge of the city, 
 had orders not to attempt to hold the 
 city against any serious demonstration 
 of National troops ; and when he was 
 informed of the landing of General 
 Wool at Ocean View, he turned over 
 the city of Norfolk to Mayor Lamb, 
 and fled, with his troops, towards 
 Richmond. Having received the sur- 
 render, General Wool issued an order 
 from the City Hall, informing the in- 
 habitants of what had taken place, 
 appointing General Egbert Viele mili- 
 tary governor, and directing that all 
 peaceful citizens should be protected 
 in the free use and exercise of their 
 lawful rights and privileges. About 
 midnight General Wool, who rode 
 back to Ocean View, had crossed to 
 Fortress Monroe with the pleasing 
 intelligence that Norfolk had fallen. 
 The president and Secretary Stanton 
 were there to receive him. 
 
 The Confederate commander, Huger, 
 had evidently resolved to leave as 
 little behind him as possible. The 
 Navy Yard and works at Portsmouth 
 ' were found to be on fire ; and al- 
 though every effort was made to save 
 the place, the fire gained the mastery, 
 and ships, gunboats, workshops and 
 machinery of various kinds were all 
 destroyed. On the morning of the 
 May 11th, the Merrimac, which, on 
 !*• <ihe retirement of the Confede- 
 rates, \ad had a slow match applied 
 to he magazine, exploded with a tre- 
 
 mendous noise, the huge monster being 
 blown into a thousand fragments. All 
 the defenses in and about the city, and 
 all the formidable works on the Eliza- 
 beth River and on the borders of 
 Chesapeake Bay, including Sewall's 
 Point and Craney Island, were aban 
 doned ; and about two hundred cannon, 
 with a large quantity of ammunition, 
 were left as spoil for the victors. The 
 destruction of the Merrimac, judged 
 from a Confederate standpoint, seems 
 to have been a great blunder; and it 
 was so judged at the time. It was 
 natural and proper enough for them, 
 in the cii'cumstances, to destroy the 
 Navy Yard, and to put out of the 
 way everything which should add to 
 the strength of their enemy ; but the 
 Merrimac was practically invulnerable ; 
 and she might have been retained and 
 used by the Confederates much to the 
 inconvenience of the Nationals. As it 
 was, the James River was free for the 
 passage of the gunboats ; and without 
 delay, and experiencing but little dif- 
 ficulty, they were pushed forward, day 
 by day, until they were brought to a 
 halt at Ward's Bluff. At this point, 
 the river was too narrow and the Con- 
 federate works too strong for the gun- 
 boats to pass. A bold and vigorous 
 attempt was made on the 15th, May 
 on which day they had worked '5. 
 their way so far up the windings of the 
 stream; but it was adjudged to be 
 "impossible to reduce such works ex- 
 cept with the aid of a land force," and 
 the vessels were withdrawn. Up to 
 this point the river was open ; and 
 McClellan, in his advance up the 
 
 »a» 
 
230 
 
 FAIE OAKS. 
 
 Peninsula and towards Richmond, had 
 now the full advantage of both the 
 James and the York. 
 
 "We have followed Franklin, with his 
 own division and those of Sedgwick, 
 Richardson and Fitz John Porter, up 
 from Yoi'ktown, along the York, to 
 West Point. We have recounted the 
 details of the encounter which they 
 had with the Confederates shortly after 
 their landing at what was called Brick 
 House Point. We have also described 
 the surrender of Norfolk, the explosion 
 of the Merrimac, the abandonment of 
 the forts on the Elizabeth and on the 
 borders of the Chesapeake, and the 
 other events which left the James 
 River, like the York, in the possession 
 of the Nationals. These two episodes 
 form a natural, as they are a neces- 
 sary, introduction to the battle of 
 •'Fair Oaks," or "Seven Pines," as it 
 is sometimes called. McClellan now 
 found himself in a really advanta- 
 geous position. Had events resulted 
 in perfect conformity with his own 
 desires and interests, they could hai'dly 
 have been other than they were. Free 
 from all danger of attack in the rear, 
 and having complete command of both 
 great waterways, he had only to think 
 of the foe in his front. Let us now 
 return to the main army, which we 
 left under the personal command of 
 McClellan. 
 
 Having made provision for his sick 
 and wounded in the halls of the ven- 
 erable college of William and Mary, 
 he began to move forward on the 8th of 
 jHajr May, the third day after the bat- 
 s' tie of Williamsburg. Stoneman 
 
 was sent in advance to open a com- 
 munication with Franklin and the 
 other divisions which had accompanied 
 or followed him up the York River. 
 The roads were in a wretched con- 
 dition ; and the march was conducted 
 in circumstances of more than ordinary 
 difficulty. It was one of the most 
 beautiful and fertile portions of Vir- 
 ginia; but the retreating army had 
 spared no pains to injure the roads 
 and to multiply obstructions. On the 
 15th, McClellan had advanced jiay 
 to the neighborhood of White '5. 
 House, at the head of the navigation 
 of the Pamunkey, and some eighteen 
 miles from Richmond. On the May 
 18th, he had reached Tunstall's 18' 
 Station, on the Richmond and York 
 River Railroad ; and on the 22d, May 
 he establislied his headquarters 22. 
 at Cool Arbor, not far from the Chick- 
 ahominy, and between eight and nine 
 miles from Richmond. His advanced 
 light troops had already reached Bot- 
 tom Bridge, on the Chickahominy, at 
 the crossing of the New Kent Road. 
 In their retreat, the Confederates had 
 turned the bridge, but had left the 
 point uncovered. Casey's division, of 
 Keyes' corps, was soon across the river ; 
 and the heights on the Richmond side 
 were occupied. He was followed close 
 by Heintzelman. Pressed by Stone- 
 man, the Confederates had also re- 
 treated across the I'ailroad bridge 
 which passes over the Chickahominy, 
 a little to the north of Bottom Bridge 
 — destroying it as they crossed. Stone- 
 man halted and took a position at 
 Gaines' Mills, whence active and sue- 
 
HANOVEK COURT HOUSE. 
 
 231 
 
 oessful reconnoissances were made, a 
 number of the Confederate scouts and 
 advance troops, after some skirmishing, 
 being driven from their posts at New 
 Bridge. 
 
 "While thus feeling his way, and get- 
 ting his army into position, McClellan 
 detached Fitz John Porter from the 
 main body, which was still on the left 
 of the Chickahominy, on an expedition 
 to Hanover Court House. His object 
 was to disperse the forces of the Con- 
 federates concentrated at that point, 
 and to cut off their railroad com- 
 munications between Richmond and 
 Fredericksburg. It was hoped, also, 
 that he might facilitate the advance 
 of McDowell's corps, whose approach 
 McClellan anxiously awaited ; but 
 operations in the Shenandoah A^alley, 
 hereafter to be described, made Mc- 
 Dowell's advance in this direction 
 impossible. This detachment moved, 
 by way of Mechanicsville, early on 
 ]nay the morning of the 27th. Gen- 
 27» era! Emory led the advance, with 
 the Fifth and Sixth Regular Cavalry 
 and Benson's horse battery, supported 
 by Morell's division, composed of the 
 brigades of Martindale, Butterfield and 
 McQuade, with Berdan's sharpshoot- 
 ers and three batteries under Captain 
 Griffin. Warren, with his provisional 
 brigade, moved towards the same point 
 by another road. The rain had fallen 
 heavily during the early hours of the 
 morning; and the roads, in conse- 
 quence, were in a fearful condition. 
 The troops, however, bore bravely up. 
 When about six miles from Hanover 
 Court House, the mounted pickets of 
 
 the Confederates came into view, but 
 they speedily disappeared. The Na- 
 tionals kept moving on until they were 
 within about two miles of the Court 
 House, when they were brought to 
 halt by a heavy fire of artillery and 
 musketiT. The Twenty-Fifth New 
 York suffered severely; two of their 
 comj^anies were cut off and captured ; 
 and they were compelled to fall back. 
 Meanwhile, the batteries were hurried 
 forward; and the main body of the 
 Nationals rushed to the aid of the 
 advance. After holding the ground 
 obstinately for two hours, the Con- 
 federates were foi-ced to retire, one 
 of their guns being captured by the 
 Seventeenth New York. They were 
 vigorously pursued for some distance 
 by the brigades of Butterfield and 
 McQuade. Martindale's brigade was 
 pushed forward to Peake's Station, on 
 the Virginia Central Raili-oad, while 
 Porter himself, Avith the rest- of his 
 force, advanced towards Hanover Court 
 House. On his way to the railroad, 
 Martindale encountered a Confederate 
 force, and drove it towards Ashland. 
 In the encounter, one of his mounted 
 men was shot by a concealed foe ; 1 )ut 
 this was the only casualty. Having 
 destroyed a portion of the i-ailroad, 
 buraed the bridge, and cut the tele- 
 graph wires, Martindale was on his 
 way back to join the main body, when 
 the Confederates, who had been rein- 
 forced by fresh troops from Richmond, 
 and had contrived secretly to regain 
 the cover of the woods, fell upon him 
 with tremendous fury. His men fought 
 like true heroes, boldly maintaining 
 
>,32 
 
 FAIR OAKS. 
 
 ^heir ground for nearly an hour, in 
 /he face of superior numbers, when 
 General Porter, who had reached the 
 Court House, came back to their relief. 
 Meanwhile, the brigades of Butterfield 
 and McQuade, who had gone in pur- 
 suit of the Confederates, arrived on the 
 scene. So, also, did that of Warren, 
 which had been delayed in repairing 
 bridges. Porter was therefore able to 
 meet his antagonist on equal terms. 
 Planting his artillery to the right and 
 left, and filling up the centre with his 
 infantiy, he advanced and poured into 
 the woods a diagonal fire of musketry 
 and shell. This terrible work was 
 kept up from five o'clock till dusk, 
 when the Confederates retired — cling- 
 ing, however, so close to the woods 
 that they could not be pursued with 
 any marked success. Bivouacking on 
 the field he had won, Porter made 
 prepai'ations for a I'enewal of the at- 
 tack in the morning. When morning 
 dawned, it was found that the Con- 
 federates had disappeared. Porter, 
 however, had reason to be satisfied. 
 The object of his expedition had been 
 Attained, so far as that was now possi- 
 ble. He had occupied Hanover Court 
 
 House; and he had destroyed the 
 track and bridges of the Virginia 
 Central Railroad. In these various 
 encounters the Confederates suffered 
 heavily. In killed and wounded and 
 absent, their loss could not have been 
 less than one thousand. The National 
 loss was between three hundred and 
 jUay fifty and four hundred. On the 
 
 29« 29th, Porter returned to his 
 original camp on the Chickahominy. 
 
 The 30th of May arrived; and al 
 though the two great armies lay within 
 easy distance of each other, no very seri- 
 ous effort had been attempted on either 
 side. The position of the National 
 anny was peculiar, and somewhat beset 
 with peril. The ground occupied by 
 the two rival armies has been compared 
 not unaptly to the letter V. It might 
 mth equal propriety be described aa 
 bearing a general resemblance to an 
 acute-angled triaugle, of which the 
 point, or apex, was at Bottom Bridge, 
 and the two larger sides were formed 
 respectively by the Chickahominy and 
 Williamsburg Road. The Chicka- 
 hominy forms a line Avhich runs from 
 Bottom Bridge towards the southwest. 
 The Williamsburg Road forms a line 
 Avhich, from the same point, runs al- 
 most due west. A little to the north 
 of Bottom Bridge, the York River 
 Railroad crosses the Chickahominy and 
 runs towards Richmond in a line very 
 neai'ly parallel with the Williamsburg* 
 Road. Inside of this angle, but 
 towards Richmond, and with full com- 
 mand of the country in the rear, lay 
 the Confederate army. All the bridges 
 in the neighborhood, it will be remem- 
 bered, were destroyed by the Confede- 
 rates before the Nationals came up. 
 Outside of the angle, and along the 
 left or northeast bank of the Chicka- 
 hominy, was ranged the great bulk of 
 the National army. Here, at Cool 
 Arbor, near New Bridge, were the 
 headquarters of General McClellan. 
 Here, too, a little further down the 
 stream, were Franklin, Fitz John 
 Porter and others. And here, too^ 
 
THE CHICKAHOMINY. 
 
 233 
 
 was General Sumner, further on still, 
 towards the point of the angle, at 
 Bottom Bridge. Bottom Bridge hav- 
 ing been repaired, Keyes' corps, as we 
 jlay have seen, crossed the river on or 
 24 about the morning of the 24th. 
 He was followed by Heintzelman, who 
 took up ground in his rear. Casey's 
 division of the corps advanced as far 
 as Fair Oaks Station, on the York 
 River Railroad, where he took posi- 
 tion, his line stretching from a point 
 a little to the north of the railroad, 
 southward as far as the Williamsburg 
 Road. The ground was bounded on 
 the left and front by dense woods. 
 The edges of these woods were cut 
 down to form abatis, in order to ob- 
 struct the enemy. A line of earth- 
 works was also thrown up, consisting 
 of a redoubt and some rifle-pits. Be- 
 hind these Casey posted his troops — 
 his first biigade on the right, his second 
 in the centre, his third on the left, his 
 picket-guards oeing pushed forward 
 into the woods in front. About half 
 a mile to the rear of Casey, at a place 
 called Seven Pines, Couch was simi- 
 larly posted, his line lying across the 
 Williamsburg turnpike, and stretching 
 from a point slightly to the south of 
 that road, northward towards the York 
 River Railroad. His right was thus 
 slightly in the rear of Fair Oaks 
 Station. In fi-ont of him the Williams- 
 burg Road is intersected by a circu- 
 itous highway, called the " Nine Mile 
 Road." Kearney's division, of Heint- 
 zelman's corps, was further in the rear, 
 on the York River Railroad, and in 
 the neighborhood of Savage's Station. 
 
 Hooker, with his division, also of 
 Heintzelman's corps, was guarding 
 the approaches to White Oak Swamp, 
 which lay to the south of the Will- 
 iamsburg Road, and stretched east- 
 ward as far as the Chickahominy. 
 
 Such was the position of the National 
 army on the eve of the famous battle of 
 Fair Oaks. We have already said that 
 the position was one beset with con- 
 siderable peril. One of the wings of 
 that army, as we have shown, was on 
 the right and the other was on the 
 left side of the river. The right wing, 
 which consisted of five divisions and 
 the reserves, lay on the outside of the 
 angle, on the side formed by the 
 Chickahominy. The left wing, con- 
 sisting of four divisions, lay, oi echelon, 
 along the line of the York River Rail- 
 road. From the extreme point of one 
 wing to that of the other, by way of 
 Bottom Bridge, which was the only 
 available connection, was a distance of 
 more than twelve miles, although by 
 an air line the two wings were not 
 at any point very far apai't. It is 
 manifest at a glance that McClellan, 
 by allowing himself to drift into the 
 position, gave the Confederates an 
 immense advantage. Until he should 
 succeed in throwing up new bridges 
 across the Chickahominy — and there 
 was DO evidence that such work was 
 going on — it naturally enough seemed 
 to the Confederates a possibility to 
 strike the National left, drive it into 
 the river or swamp, or both, and per- 
 haps annihilate it before any assistance 
 could be rendered by the right. This 
 was the plan of action decided upon 
 
834 
 
 FAIR OAKS. 
 
 by the Confederate leader; and the 
 delay of McClellan gave Johnston his 
 opportunity. On the 24th, at the head 
 of the advance, Keyes had crossed 
 Bottom Bridge. It veas now the 
 30th. Six days of comparative in- 
 action had thus been allowed to 
 elapse; and the National general-in- 
 chief seemed as yet in no haste to 
 adopt the initiative. He had told his 
 troops, when giving instructions in re- 
 May gard to the crossing of the river on 
 25i the 25th, to "go prepared for bat- 
 tle at a moment's notice." He had, a 
 day or two later, appealed to the pride 
 of his soldiers, and reminded them 
 " that the ai'my of the Potomac had 
 never yet been checked." Still, he 
 seemed unwilling to strike the first 
 blow, and so force the fight. This 
 delay was all the more reprehensible, 
 that the waters of the Chickahominy 
 were already somewhat swollen, and 
 the marshy ground around considerably 
 flooded. A heavy rain storm, which 
 might fall at any moment, would so 
 flood the ground as to increase the 
 peril which would attend the retreat 
 of the National left, and would so 
 swell the river as to make communica- 
 tion between the two wings impossible. 
 On this occasion, at least, the Fates 
 seemed to be on the side of the Con- 
 May federates. On the night of the 
 ^®' 30th of May, there was a terrific 
 rain storm in and arovmd Richmond. 
 It is described as resembling a tropical 
 deluge. All the lower lands were 
 flooded ; and the Chickahominy over- 
 flowed its banks and washed away 
 many of the bridges by which it was 
 
 spanned. Johnston's opportunity had 
 come. He was not slow to see it. 
 Everything was in readiness, and action 
 was taken at once. Longstreet was 
 ordered to go out by the Williamsburg 
 Road, with his own and D. H. Hill's 
 division — Hill, with his division, to 
 attack the Nationals in front; General 
 Huger was ordered to move down the 
 Charles City Road, and strike them on 
 the left; while General G. W. Smith 
 was directed to follow the New Bridge 
 Road towards the "Old Tavern," and 
 then, by the Nine Mile Road, move 
 towards their right at Fair Oaks. It 
 was intended that all these troops 
 should move simultaneously at dawn 
 on the morning of the 31st; but May 
 so heavy were the roads, in 31, 
 consequence of the extraordinary rain- 
 fall, that it was ten o'clock before 
 Hill's division began to move. Gen- 
 eral Casey was not ignorant of the 
 responsible and perilous position whicL 
 he occupied. He knew that an attack 
 was meditated ; and he had every 
 reason to believe that the first blow 
 would fall upon his division. He had 
 been busy all the morning making his 
 ground secure. About eleven o'clock 
 he was made aware that the Confede- 
 rates were advancing in gi'eat force. 
 He ordered his men to take to their 
 arms. Almost as he gave orders, 
 two shells came hissing along, too 
 unmistakably announcing that the 
 Confederates were close at hand. The 
 spades and the axes with which the men 
 had been working were speedily ex- 
 changed for the weapons of war. It 
 was not too soon. Shortly before ona 
 
REPULSE OF GENERAL CASEY. 
 
 235 
 
 o'clock, the strength of the enemy and 
 the violence of the attack were soon 
 revealed by the appearance of the 
 panic-stricken pickets of the National 
 advance, who had been driven in. The 
 One Hundred and Third Pennsylvania 
 was sent forward to aid in resisting the 
 attack. It was of no avail. At the 
 fii'st volley, two hundred men of this 
 I'egimeut were struck down. The re- 
 mainder turned back and fled in a 
 panic, exclaiming that they had been 
 " cut to pieces." Casey's entire divi- 
 sion was now got into line. Colonel 
 Bailey, Casey's chief of artillery, soon 
 had his batteries in action. Spratt's 
 battery was posted in a field to the 
 right of the road, near the edge of a 
 wood, through which the Confederates 
 were advancing. Regan's battery was 
 stationed to the left of Spratt's. The 
 batteries were supported by a power- 
 ful body of infantry, under General 
 Naglee, consisting of the One Hun- 
 dredth New York, the Eleventh Maine, 
 the One Hundred and Fourth Penn- 
 sylvania and the Ninety-Third New 
 York. Bates' battery, under Lieu- 
 tenjfut Hart, was in the unfinished 
 redoubt. Wessel's brigade was in 
 the rifle-pits Palmer's was held be- 
 hir 1 as a reserve. The batteries 
 op-?ned a vi^rous fiie and were well 
 served. The infantry fought bravely, 
 firing with great spirit, and contest- 
 ing every inch of ground ; but they 
 were compelled to fall back towards the 
 riile-pits. The batteries, however, con- 
 kinued their fire, and succeeded for a 
 time in holding the enemy at bay. 
 Casey now began to perceive that the 
 
 Confederates were gaining on his flanks. 
 His artillery was in peril. With a 
 view to prevent so great a disaster, he 
 ordered a bayonet charge. This was 
 gallantly performed by the regiments 
 above named, in immediate charge of 
 General Naglee. With a tremendous 
 yell, the National troops sprang for' 
 ward, and drove the enemy back to 
 the adjacent woods. Here, however, 
 they were assailed by a most niurder^ 
 ous musket fire; and the Confederates 
 rushed upon them, from the cover of 
 the woods, in overwhelming numbers. 
 The battle ivas now raging furiously. 
 Spratt's battery, which had long resist- 
 ed the Confederate advance at a rail- 
 fence, and had driven them back asain 
 and again, was under the necessity of 
 falling back for the want of amnmni- 
 tion. Regan's battery held out for a 
 little while longer. It was now about 
 three o'clock; and the conflict had 
 been fierce since before one. About 
 this time, General Rains forced his 
 way to the rear of the redoubt ; and 
 multitudes of Confederates appeared 
 at the rifle-pits. Casey, unable any 
 longer to offer anything like effective 
 resistance, ordered his troops to fall 
 back upon the second line, in possession 
 of Couch. The retreat Was well con- 
 ducted. The Confederates halted not, 
 but pressed vigorously forward. Two 
 of Spratt's guns fell into their hands, 
 but happily they had been spiked ; 
 the cannon in the redoubt were seized 
 by General Rhodes and turned upon 
 the fugitives; yet, in spite of the odds 
 which were arrayed against them, and 
 the terrific fire to which, in their 
 
236 
 
 PAIR OAKS. 
 
 retreat, they were exposed, Casey's 
 men carried off with them, and brought 
 safe to the second line, thi'ee fourths of 
 their guns. 
 
 Couch was not unprepared for the 
 stern duties which now devolved upon 
 him. Several of hia regiments had 
 been ordered forward to Casey's relief 
 by his corps commander, General 
 Keyes. Four of these regiments — the 
 Fifty-Fifth New York, the Twenty- 
 Third, Sixty-First and Ninety-Third 
 Pennsylvania — had been in the thick 
 of the fight, when it raged most vio- 
 lently, and had been severely punished. 
 These regiments, with the Seventh 
 Massachusetts and Sixty-Second New 
 York, which had been sent after them, 
 were all pressed back again towards 
 the right of the second line, which, it 
 will be remembered, rested on the 
 York River Railroad, not far in the 
 rear of Fair Oaks Station. Couch's 
 division, which, as we have already 
 seen, lay across the Williamsburg 
 Road, and reached northward to the 
 York River Railroad, had its right 
 considerably advanced, and presented 
 to the approaching enemy an oblique 
 front, nearly parallel to the Nine Mile 
 Road. Rifle-pits were well arranged 
 all along the line ; and the batteries of 
 Flood jind Brady and Miller, with 
 batteiy 0, of the First Pennsylvania 
 artillery, were skilfully and advanta- 
 geously posted. 
 
 Heintzelman, whose corps lay con- 
 siderably in the rear, had been notified 
 by Keyes of the perilous position in 
 which Casey's division was placed, and 
 urged to send forward reinforcements, 
 
 was huriying forward with all possible 
 speed. Shortly after four o'clock, 
 Heintzelman appeared on the field; 
 and, as he outranked Keyes, he as- 
 sumed the command. About the same 
 time, Kearney, of Heintzelman's corps, 
 came up with two of his brigades — 
 those of Berry and Jameson. Hia 
 other brigade, that of Birney, was also 
 on its way. There was a pause in the 
 fight, after the Confederates occupied 
 the ground from which they had 
 driven Casey's division. It was brief, 
 however; for before it was yet half- 
 past four o'clock, they bore down with 
 tremendous energy upon Couch's line ; 
 and from its oblique character, having 
 its right advanced, they came first in 
 collision with the Twenty-Third Penn- 
 sylvania. The attack was gallantly 
 met by that regiment. Reserving their 
 fire until the Confederates were close 
 upon them, they opened with deadly 
 effect ; and wliile their opponents 
 reeled and staggered, thi^y charged 
 them with tlie bayonet, and drove 
 them back. The Twenty-Tliii'd paid 
 , dearly for their temerity. Advancing 
 too far, they exposed themselves to 
 the fire of the enemy's artillery, and 
 were driven back, in their turn, in dis- 
 order, and with great loss. Colonel 
 Niele, having retained his colors, rallied 
 some one hundred of his men, fell 
 back on the First Long Island, and 
 re-formed. The struggle noAv became 
 general on the right. Effort after 
 effort was made to but little purpose. 
 The First Long Island soon shared the 
 fate of the Twenty-Third Pennsylvania. 
 The Fifty-Seventh and Sixty-Thii'<I 
 
SUMNER TAKES COMMAND. 
 
 237 
 
 Pennsylvania were also compelled, in 
 their turn, to yield to the pressure of 
 the foe. The Tenth Massachusetts, 
 after having been surrounded and 
 broken, re-foimed and moved to the 
 right ; but it was to little purpose. 
 Heintzelmau was not pi-oving himself 
 a match for Johnston, who was present 
 with his army, and directing its every 
 movement. All along the line on the 
 right, in the centre and on the left, the 
 Confederates were victorious. Couch's 
 command Avas severed ; the general 
 himself, with a portion of his forces, 
 was compelled to cross the railroad to 
 the north, while the body of his divi- 
 sion was driven back in the direction of 
 the Williamsburg Road ; and Kearney 
 was pressed towards the borders of the 
 flooded White Oak Swamp. The day 
 was advancing ; and as night drew on, 
 the prospect was the reverse of cheer- 
 ing for Heintzelman and Keyes. De- 
 struction seemed to rest on the entire 
 left wing of the National army. 
 
 In his extremity, and not knovdng 
 which way retreat was possible, Couch 
 formed two lines of battle — one toward 
 the railroad, with a section of Brady's 
 battery, supported by the Seventh 
 Massachusetts ; another toward the 
 wood to the west, with the other sec- 
 tion of the batter}^, supported by the 
 Anderson Zouaves, with the Thirty- 
 First Pennsylvania and the First Chas- 
 seurs. Tliis latter line was formed on 
 the edge of the wood, under cover of 
 a rail-fence. 
 
 The situation had become perilous 
 in the extreme. Happily, at this criti- 
 cal moment, and when most needed, 
 a»3 
 
 relief came. Heintzelman, when made 
 aware of Casey's perilous position, lost 
 no time in conveying the information 
 to Generals McClellan and Sumner. 
 McClellan was at New Bridge, at the 
 extreme point of the National right 
 wing. Sumner was nearer the extrem- 
 ity of the angle, in the neighborhood 
 of the railroad bridge. Both were, as 
 the reader has already been given to 
 understand, on the further side of the 
 now flooded Chickahorainy. Sumner, 
 foi-tunately, had been seeing dangers 
 ahead ; and without any special in- 
 structions from his chief, he had, May 
 as early as the 25th, commenced 25. 
 to constmct a bridge across the stream, 
 in front of his position. The Iwidge 
 was completed on the evening of ji^y 
 the 30th. It was known after- 3^« 
 waids as the Grape Vine Bridge. It 
 was slender ; but it saved the army of 
 the Potomac. As soon as the newH 
 reached McClellan of the danger which 
 threatened his left wing, he ordered 
 Sumner to be ready to move at a 
 moment's warning. Sumner was ready, 
 when, at two o'clock the order reached 
 him to cross the stream at once. The 
 passage was difficult ; but by caution 
 and care it was successfully accom- 
 plished. Sedgwick, with his division, 
 crossed first, dragging with them a 
 batteiy of twenty-four Napoleon guns. 
 Richai-dson followed — Sumner last. At 
 the moment when Couch and Heintzel- 
 man were separated, Sumner appeared 
 on the field and assumed the command 
 No change was made in Sumner's dis- 
 positions. Sedgwick formed in line of 
 battle at the edge of the wood, neai 
 
238 
 
 FAIR OAKS. 
 
 Fail' Oaks, with the First Minnesota 
 on his right flank. The Confederates 
 began to press on as if they meant to 
 rush victoriously to Bottom Bridge. 
 The Napoleon guns opened fire ; and 
 a stoiTU of canister mowed do-\vn theii' 
 ranks and made them recoil. The 
 Confederates made one more attempt 
 to advance ; and as they came to the 
 edge of the wood, they delivered a 
 most effective volley at the Anderson 
 Zouaves. Colonel Riker was killed, and 
 the Zouaves broke and ran. Speedily 
 rallied, they resumed their position. 
 Just as the fatal volley was delivered 
 by the Confederates, three regiments 
 — the Thirty-First Pennsylvania, the 
 First Chasseurs and the First Minne- 
 sota — which were lying on their faces 
 in front of the battery, sprang up, and 
 poured their deadly fii-e into the very 
 faces of the enemy. In front of that 
 line the Confederates Jay in heaps. 
 Brigadier-General A. Davis was among 
 the killed; and Brigadier-General Pet- 
 tigrew, who was wounded and had 
 his horse killed under him, was taken 
 prisoner. 
 
 Morgan, of Sedgwick's division, had 
 mean^vhile been sent to the relief of 
 Abercrombie, who had been maintain- 
 ing a protracted and unequal struggle 
 on the extreme right. Morgan, in his 
 turn, needed help; and the gallant 
 (jeneral Burns, with the Sixty-Nintli 
 and Seventy-Second Pennsylvania, was 
 sent to his support, while Sedgwick 
 himself advanced for the same purpose, 
 taking with him two other Pennsylva- 
 Dia regiments- — the Seventy-First and 
 i'ae One Hundred and Sixth. At this 
 
 time the fighting was severe. It re- 
 quired all the nerve of Sedgwick and 
 of Burns to keep the men at their 
 work. The Confederates, resolved to 
 win, seemed fearless of punishment. 
 Again and again they attempted to 
 advance, and as often were fearful 
 lanes made in their compact ranks by 
 the murderous fii'e of canister which 
 was poured from the National battery. 
 It was now sunset; and about this 
 time General Johnston was wounded. 
 The command devolved upon General 
 Smith, who assumed its duties. The 
 loss of their chief did not damp the 
 purpose of the Confederates or lessen 
 their energy. As darkness came on, 
 a determined attempt was made to out- 
 flank Sumner's light. Sumner ordered 
 a bayonet charge by five regiments. 
 The charge was gallantly made, and was 
 completely successful. The Confede- 
 rate line was broken and thrown int(3 
 confusion. It was now eight o'clock ; 
 darkness was falling upon the scene; 
 and the weary combatants on both 
 sides, resting on their arms, fell asleep 
 on the ground where so many of their 
 comrades lay in the cold embrace May 
 of death. Such was the famous 3 It 
 battle at Fair Oaks, May 31st, 1862. 
 
 On the following morning (Sunday, 
 June 1st), both armies wer^ ready Jnne 
 to resume the contest. The Na; !• 
 tional army had been largely reinforced 
 dui'ing the night by troops from the 
 other side of the Chickahominy. Mc- 
 Clellan was himself on the field and 
 made the disposition for the day; but 
 with that habitual regaid which he 
 had for the Sabbath, he seemed uu' 
 
-rHE BATTLE ENDED. 
 
 23& 
 
 willing to provoke battle. Sickles' 
 New York brigade was posted on the 
 left, and stretched across the Williams- 
 burg turnpike, with Patterson and his 
 New Jersey brigade on his right. 
 Both were of Hooker's division and of 
 Heintzelman's corps. To the light of 
 Patterson, and slightly in advance, was 
 Richardson's division, of Stoneman's 
 corps. Sedgwick's division, also of 
 Stoneman's corps, and also slightly in 
 advance, was on Richardson's light. 
 The two last were so placed along the 
 line of railroad that they lay almost at 
 right angles to the brigades of Sickles 
 and Patterson. Couch held the posi- 
 tion which he had reclaimed the day 
 before, and was supported by Sedgwick. 
 Birney was also on the railroad, but 
 more to the rear. The National line, 
 it will thus be seen, formed a sort of 
 triangle. Inside of the tiiang;le were 
 the Confederates, who occupied sub- 
 stantially the ground which they had 
 wrenched from the Nationals on the 
 previous day. The main body of the 
 Confederates faced the main body of 
 the Nationals along the line of railroad. 
 The Nationals were on tlie north of 
 this line; the Confederates were on 
 the south. 
 
 McClellan, as we have said, was 
 slow to provoke battle ; but his dispo- 
 sitions were made, and he was ready 
 for the attack which he had reason to 
 expect the Confederates would make. 
 He had not long to wait. With the 
 first streak of early dawn, the Con- 
 federates were in motion. It was evi- 
 dent that they were nothing daunted 
 by the experience of the previous day, 
 
 and that they meant to complete what 
 they doubtless regarded as their un- 
 finished task. The Nationals were up 
 and ready, when the Confederates fell 
 upon Richardson's division with tre- 
 mendous fury. It was a cavalry attack; 
 and it was as warmly received aa it 
 was vigorously given. The cavalry 
 were driven back upon their lines by a 
 well-directed fire of artillery. It was, 
 however, only for a moment ; for they 
 returned in greater force, M'ell sus- 
 tained by companies of infantiy. The 
 battle soon extended along the M'hole 
 line. French's, Howard's and Meagher's 
 biigades were the first to engage the 
 foe who was so resolute on battle. 
 To protect an open field on his right 
 front, Richardson had advantageously 
 posted a battery of 1 0-pound er rifle 
 Parrott guns, under Captain Hazard; 
 and directly in front of his line he 
 had placed the brigade of General 
 French and a regiment of the brigade 
 of General O. O. Howard. The re- 
 maining regiments of Howard's brigade 
 formed a second line ; and the Irish 
 brigade of Thomas F. Meagher, with 
 eighteen pieces of artillery, formed the 
 third. It was evidently the intention 
 of the Confederates, in attacking Rich' 
 aixlson, to cut the National line in two; 
 and, by forcing their way between, to 
 destroy the army in detail. If such 
 was their pui"pose, they had sadly mis- 
 calculated the strength and spirit of 
 the National troops. General Rogei 
 A. Pryor, whose acquaintance, the 
 reader will remember, ^ve first made in 
 Charleston Harbor, came up with a 
 part of Huger's division, which had 
 
340 
 
 PAIR OAKS. 
 
 taken no part in Saturday's battle, and 
 fell heavily upon French. Howard 
 rushed forward to the support of 
 Fi-ench. The fighting was severe ; and 
 under the vigorous assaults and well- 
 directed fire of the Confederates, the 
 National troops more than once waver- 
 ed, but were quickly rallied by their 
 oiBcers. General Howard made him- 
 self conspicuous at the head of his men, 
 and did much to cheer and sustain 
 them, both by word and deed. Ma- 
 houe now came up to the aid of Pryor; 
 and Meagher, who had been impatient 
 to join the fray, was ordered to the 
 front. He fell upon the enemy with 
 great vigor. For three hours the 
 battle raged with great fierceness. The 
 Confederates began to yield to the 
 bold and impetuous attacks of the 
 Nationals on the right. They had no 
 better fortune on the left ; for in that 
 direction they became engaged with 
 two brigades of Hooker's division — 
 Patterson's New Jersey and Sickles' 
 New York; and, after sustaining a 
 severe fire from those brigades, they 
 were driven back at the point of the 
 bayonet. All along the line, wherever 
 they attempted to penetrate, they found 
 barriers of bristling steel and hearts of 
 iron. It was in vain to make any 
 further attempt to drive the Nation- 
 als l>ack into the swollen waters of 
 the Chickahominy and the adjoining 
 swamps, or to force a way to Bottom 
 Bridge. It was now nine o'clock ; 
 and at this early hour, the Confede- 
 rates, as if convinced of the fruitless- 
 ness of further efforts, fell back, and 
 the firing ceased. The battle was not 
 
 renewed. "Towards the close of the 
 struggle. General Howard received 
 those wounds which cost him his right 
 arm. He did not, however, leave the 
 field. Binding his shattered limb in 
 his handkerchief, he remained at his 
 post till the battle was ended. 
 
 Although they had failed in their 
 second day's efforts, the Confederates 
 did not abandon the ground which they 
 had taken from Casey on Saturday. 
 On this ground they remained during 
 the whole of Monday, and some of 
 them over Monday night. It was 
 General McClellan's purpose to pursue 
 them on the third day and regain what 
 had been lost. With this end in view, 
 he had made all necessary arrange- 
 ments to ofi"er them battle. His line 
 was drawn up, skirmishers were sent 
 in advance, the artillery was posted, 
 and the army began to move foi'ward. 
 It was all unnecessary work. Delay 
 had given the Confederates suflScient 
 time to move back their camp equi- 
 pages and munitions of war to their 
 lines at Richmond. This being suc- 
 cessfully accomplished, they themselves 
 followed. When McClellan advanced 
 there was no enemy to encounter. Fair 
 Oaks and Seven Pines were reoccupied 
 by the National troops; and the two 
 armies resumed substantially their for- 
 mer positions. Hooker, having been or- 
 dered forward by Heintzelman, with a 
 reconnoitering party towai'd Richmond, 
 advanced within four miles of the Con- 
 federate capital. On hearing of his 
 temerity, McClellan ordered him back. 
 These are the words McClellan used: 
 " General Hooker will return from hi* 
 
THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. 
 
 241 
 
 brilliant reconnoissance ; we cannot af- 
 ford to lose his division." Hooker re- 
 turned to Casey's camp, where, at the 
 house of one George Turner, McClel- 
 lan had established his headquarters. 
 While McClellan busied himself again 
 at his favorite work of throwing up 
 entrenchments and constructing fortifi- 
 cations, Hooker, yielding to the gentler 
 impulses of a soldier's nature, occupied 
 his hours of enforced inactivity in the 
 establishment of an hospital near Fair 
 Oaks Station. 
 
 In the two days' fighting at Fair 
 Oaks and Seven Pines, both armies 
 sustained heavy losses. It has been 
 estimated that the loss on either side 
 must have amounted to near seven 
 thousand men — a heavy loss, when it is 
 considered that in neither the one army 
 
 nor the other were there more than fif- 
 teen thousand engaged. Attempts have 
 been made to give the actual figures; 
 but they cannot be regarded as reliable. 
 The battle of Fair Oaks does not re- 
 dound to the credit of General McClel- 
 lan. It cannot be said that he wa3 
 successful in his choice of battle 
 ground or in the original disposition 
 of his troops. He was neglectful iu 
 the matter of bridges. His long delay 
 before the battle gave the enemy an 
 opportunity; he ought to have placed 
 more men at Sumner's disposal, and 
 most certainly he ought not to have 
 been absent from the first day's fight. 
 His delay, after the battle, in pressing 
 on toward Richmond has been severely 
 condemned by competent military au- 
 thorities. 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 rhe Old FoVioy ot Delay. — McClellan 's Army Still Inactive. — The Shenandoah Valley. — Jackson and Lander.— 
 Blooming Gap. — Death of Lander. — General Banks at Harper's Ferry. — General Shields. — Battle of Kems- 
 town. — Shields Wounded. — Conducting the Battle from his Bed. — Tyler's Splendid Charge. — The "Stone- 
 wall Brigade." — Jackson's Defeat. — General Banks in Pursuit. — Shields the Hero of the Fight at Kernstown. 
 — Sketch of Shields. — Jackson Joined by Ewell. — Shields Detached from Banks and Sent to Join McDowell. 
 — Banks Greatly Weakened Thereby. — Jackson Strikes Fremont. — Banks' Retreat. — Jackson and EweU in 
 Pursuit. — Attack on Front Eoyal. — Kenly Overpowered. — Banks Continues his Retreat from Strasburg. — 
 Overtaken by Ewell at Winchester. — Battle of Winchester. — Banks Compelled to Fall Back. — He Reaches 
 the Potomac Opposite WiUiamsport. — An Almost Unparalleled March. — Safe Across the River. — Jackson's 
 Mistake. — Consternation at Washington. — McDowell's Recall. — Fremont and Shields. — Jackson's Retreat from 
 Harper's Ferry. — Ewell's Demonstrations. — His Retreat. — The Race up the Shenandoah. — Jackson Eludes his 
 Pursuers. — Bums the Bridges in his Rear.— Reaches Harrisonburg. — Followed Close by Fremont. — A Vigorous 
 Encounter. — General Ashby Killed. — Capture of Colonel Wyndham. —Battle of Cross Keys. — EweU Holds his 
 Ground. — Port Republic. — Jackson Across the Bridge. — Arrival of Shields' Advance. ^Ewell Joins Jackson. 
 —The Nationals Driven Back. — The Burning of the Bridge. — Jackson's Success. — 'What He Had Done.— 
 Sketch of Jackson. — Reflections. — The Mistake of the Government. 
 
 The battle of Fair Oaks was fought 
 on the last day of May and the 
 fii'st day of June. For three 
 
 IS62. 
 
 weeks the army of the Potomac lay 
 quietly along the line of the Chicka- 
 hominy — McClellan, pursuing his old 
 
m 
 
 JACKSOX'S CAMPATCtK. 
 
 policy of delay, and occupying the 
 thoughts of his men by throwing up 
 fortifications and otherwise strengthen- 
 ing his position. The three weeks' 
 delay proved fatal, as we shall soon 
 see, to the Peninsular campaign — a 
 campaign begun in splendor and pro- 
 mise, but, having signally failed of its- 
 purpose, destined to end in gloom and 
 disaster. 
 
 In order, however, to an intelligent 
 appreciation of what may be called the 
 second period of the Peninsular cam- 
 paign, it is necessary for the reader to 
 carry with him a knowledge of the 
 events which, at this date, were in 
 progress in the Shenandoah V^alley and 
 the adjacent regions on both sides of 
 the Blue Ridge. While, therefore, 
 McClellan waits for propitious weather, 
 and for the advent of McDowell on 
 the line of the Chickahominy and on 
 the malarious borders of White Oak 
 Swamp, let us follow the movements of 
 the National armies a little further to 
 the noi'th and west, and witness their 
 vain endeavors to check the ti'iumphal 
 progress of the Confederate general, 
 " Stonewall " Jackson. In a previous 
 chapter it has been shown that, when 
 it was finally agreed that McClellan 
 was to proceed to Richmond by way 
 of the Peninsula, every precaution was 
 taken for the protection of Washington. 
 Early in January, General Lander, of 
 ■ General Banks' corps, was placed in 
 ; command of a force whose primary 
 duty it was to protect the Baltimore 
 and Ohio Railroad. Floyd and Wise 
 and Lee had each of them been com- 
 pelled to retire from that neighbor- 
 
 hood ; and " Stonewall " Jackson, in 
 whom Lander found a skilful and ener- 
 getic opponent, was endeavoring to 
 recover the ground which they had 
 lost, and make himself master, if pos- 
 sible, of the Shenandoah Valley. With 
 a comparatively small force, not ex- 
 ceeding fom' thousand men. Lander 
 executed a series of brilliant move- 
 ments in presence of the enemy ; and, 
 on the night of February 14th, peb. 
 he made a dash, at the head of !*• 
 some four hundred horsemen, and, 
 surprising Jackson at Blooming Gap, 
 captured seventeen of his commissioned 
 officers and about sixty of his rank 
 and file, and compelled him to retire. 
 Lander died soon after, from the effects 
 of a wound which he had received in 
 October of the previous year, a few 
 days after the battle of Ball's Bluff, 
 in a skirmish at Edwaid's Ferry. In 
 Lander, the country lost a brave sol- 
 dier, a capable general, and a truly 
 loyal citizen. The troops commanded 
 by Lander were placed under General 
 Shields, another aide officer, who had 
 already earned for himself a name by 
 his services in Mexico. 
 
 Early in February, General Banks, 
 to whom had been assigned the duty 
 of covering the line of the Potomac 
 and Washington City, sent Colonel 
 Geary forward with a force to occupy 
 Harper's Ferry. This task was easily 
 accomplished ; and towards the end of 
 the month, General Banks arrived and 
 took command in person, occupying, 
 with his troops, all the higher ground 
 near the ferry, as well as Charleston 
 and Leesburg. Jackson, after his en- 
 
BATTLE OF KEKNSTOWN. 
 
 245 
 
 counter with Lander, had retired to 
 Winchester, where he was lying, with 
 liis division of some eight thousand 
 men, when, early in March, Johnston 
 evacuated Manassas. On the 11th of 
 Mar. March, two days later, Jackson 
 '*• also retired, moving further up 
 the Shenandoah Valley, and keeping 
 himself in easy communication with 
 Johnston. He halted at Mount Jack- 
 son, some forty miles above Winches- 
 ter. Thither Shields pursued him; 
 but finding Jackson well posted, and 
 believing him to be too strong to 
 warrant an attack, he fell back on 
 Winchester for the double purpose of 
 securing a place of safety, and of 
 decoying Jackson from his position. 
 After a march of thirty^ miles, which 
 was accomplished in one day, Shields 
 posted his division in a secluded place, 
 about two miles from Winchester, on 
 the Martinsburg Road, and about half 
 a mile north of the village of Kerns- 
 town. While the division under 
 Shields was so occupied^ General 
 Banks, following out the arrangements 
 agreed upon at Fairfax Court House, 
 ]xit the rest of his corps in motion 
 towards Centreville, from which the 
 Confederates had retired on Mai'ch 
 nth. In his backward march to- 
 wards Winchester, Shields was fol- 
 lowed closely by Ashby's cavalry. 
 Mar. C)n the 22d, about five o'clock 
 22. in the afternoon, Ashby's hors». 
 men attacked and di-ove in Shields' 
 pickets. Shields was well posted, and 
 had under him a force of about 6000 
 infantry, 750 cavalry and 24 guns. By 
 order of General Banks, who was on 
 
 the ground, Shields pushed forward 
 one brigade and two batteries of artil- 
 lery; but the movement was so con< 
 ducted that the enemy could only see 
 a small portion of that force. While 
 directing one of the batteries to its 
 position, Shields was hit by the frag- 
 ment of a shell, which fractured his 
 arm above the elbow, bruised his 
 shoulder and injured his side. Badly 
 injured as he was, he was yet able to 
 attend to his duty, so far as to make 
 dispositions for the ensuing days. 
 Under cover of the night, he pushed 
 forward Kimball's brigade, nearly 
 three miles on the Strasbura; Road. 
 To support this brigade, if attacked, 
 Daum's artillery was placed in a strong 
 position. In the rear of Kimball's, 
 and vpithin supporting distance of it, 
 covering all the approaches to the 
 town, was placed Sullivan's brigade, 
 which, with Broadhead's cavalry, was 
 held in reserve. In that order the 
 troops rested for the night. Early on 
 the following morning a recon- ]^iap, 
 noissance was made. There was 23. 
 no evidence of the presence in front 
 of any Confederate force, except Ash- 
 by's cavalry. In the belief that such 
 was the fact, and taking it for granted 
 that Jackson would not be daring 
 enough to attack Shields, Banks, in 
 obedience to a summons from head- 
 quarters, left at ten A. M. fgr Wash- 
 ington, 
 
 Shields was soon undeceived; and 
 General Banks had only reached Har- 
 per's Feriy, on his way to Washington, 
 when he heard the sounds of battle, 
 and promptly retraced his steps. At 
 
244 
 
 JACKSON'S CAMPAIGN. 
 
 the time the reconnoissance was made, 
 and when the National scouts could 
 see nothing but Ashby's cavalry, Jack- 
 son's whole army was posted in battle 
 order, with artillery on each flank, 
 about half a mile south of Kernstown, 
 and completely under cover of the 
 woods. Shortly after eleven o'clock, 
 the Confederate cannon opened fire upon 
 Kimball. Sullivan's brigade was or- 
 dered forward to his support ; and the 
 fire of artillery on both sides became 
 heavy, although as yet ineffective, 
 because of the distance. Jackson 
 seemed resolved to force the fighting. 
 Pushing forward more guns to his 
 right, and advancing to theu- support 
 a considerable force of infantiy and 
 cavalry, he made a vigorous effort, as 
 If he wished to enfilade and turn the 
 National left. At this moment, an 
 active body of skirmishers, imder Col- 
 onel Carrol, consisting of his own regi- 
 ment — the Eighth Ohio — and three 
 companies of the Sixty-Seventh Ohio, 
 were thrown forward on both sides of 
 the valley road, to check the enemy's 
 advance. These skirmishers were ad- 
 mirably supported by four pieces of 
 artillery, under Captain Jenks, and 
 also by Sullivan's gallant brigade. 
 At every point the Confederates were 
 repulsed; and Jackson, as if despair- 
 ing of any success against the National 
 left, massed his forces, and flung him- 
 self wdth great energy on the right. 
 The movement was skilfully made, 
 and very narrowly missed success. So 
 fierce was the onslaught that Daum's 
 batteries, although worked with skill 
 and energy, were powerless to offer 
 
 any effective resistance. On rushed 
 the Confederates, as if nothing coulc' 
 check them ; and for a time it seemed 
 as if they were about to snatch the 
 prize of victory. Shields, who was 
 unable to be present on the field, was 
 actually conducting the battle from 
 his bed. Having been informed by a 
 messenger from Kimball of the state 
 of affairs, he saw at once that his 
 army was in danger, and that not a 
 moment was to be lost. He gave 
 orders that all the disposable infantry 
 should be immediately thrown forward 
 on the right, and that thus massed, they 
 should fall with all their might on 
 Jackson's batteries, capture them, then 
 turn his left flank and hui'l it back 
 on his centre. Kimball entrusted this 
 movement to Colonel Tyler. It was 
 admirably executed, the gallant Tyler 
 and his splendid brigade marching 
 f orwai'd with " alacrity and enthusiastic 
 joy to the performance of the most 
 perilous duty of the day." The Con- 
 federate skirmishers yielded to the at- 
 tack, and fell back to the main body, 
 strongly posted on high ground, and 
 behind a high and solid stone fence. 
 Here the struggle became desperate, 
 and, for a time, doubtful. Tyler's bri- 
 gade was soon joined by the Fifth 
 and Sixty-Second Ohio and Thirteenth 
 Indiana, of Sullivan's brigade, and 
 the Fourteenth Indiana, Eighty-Fourth 
 Pennsylvania, and several companies of 
 the Eighth and Sixty-Seventh Ohio, of 
 Kimball's brigade. This united force, 
 with cheers and yells, which rose high 
 above the roar of battle, rushed upon 
 the Confederates; and in spite of a 
 
THE PURSUIT. 
 
 245 
 
 most lieroic resistance, which was too 
 well attested by the heaps of slain on 
 the field, Jackson's men were driven 
 Qack through the woods. Resting 
 Tipon the reserve, an attempt was 
 again made, chiefly by the famous 
 "Stonewall laigade," to retrieve the 
 fortunes of the day ; but it was of no 
 avail. Nothing could resist the on- 
 ward rush of the now triumphant 
 Nationals, as they rent the air with 
 their cheers, and poured forth theii' 
 murderous volleys. This last attempt 
 at resistance was but of brief dura- 
 tion. The Confederates again broke ; 
 and this time they fled in disordei- 
 from the field, leaving, in addition to 
 the multitude of killed and wounded, 
 three hundred prisoners, two guns, 
 four caissons, and a thousand stand of 
 •small arms. "Night alone," said the 
 gallant Shields, in his gi-aphic and 
 lionest report, "saved them from total 
 destruction." The Nationals rested 
 on the battle field. 
 
 On the following morning, in obedi- 
 Mar. ^'1^6 to orders from General 
 24« Shields, the pursuit was com- 
 menced, the National artillery opening 
 fire upon the rear-guard of the retreat- 
 ing foe. General Banks, when he halt- 
 "d at Harper's Ferry, ordered back 
 Williams, with his whole division, 
 rije general himself lost no time in 
 returning to Winchester ; and having 
 made a hasty visit to General Shields, 
 lie assum-jd command of the forces in 
 p;:rsuit of the enemy. The pursuit was 
 ccatinued as far as Mount Jackson. 
 It was there abandoned, in consequence 
 of the utter exhaustion of the troops. 
 
 This victory at Kernstown was due 
 largely, no doubt, to the bravery of 
 the rank and file of the National army 
 and to the skill and intrepidity of 
 its officers. It is doubtful, however, 
 whether even such an army, in pres- 
 ence of such a foe, could have nailed 
 victory to its standard, without the 
 clear head, the firm, decisive will and 
 the prompt action of General Shields. 
 No more skilful generalship than that 
 displayed by General Shields on thi? 
 occasion was exhibited during the eo 
 tire progress of the war.* 
 
 Although Jackson had been defeated, 
 and held for a time in check, it was no 
 part of the plan of the Confederates 
 to abandon the Shenandoah Valley. 
 They knew that so long as they were 
 able to threaten Washington by main- 
 taining a large force in the valley, 
 they would embarrass the movements 
 of McClellan in the Peninsula. It was 
 not possible for Jackson to make any 
 aggressive efforts, or even to maintain 
 his position, if he was not considerably 
 
 * General James Shields, the hero of Kernstown, was 
 bom in 1810, in the county of Tyrone, Ireland. In 
 1820, when at the age of sixteen, he emigrated to the 
 United States. In 1832, he settled in Uliuois, where he 
 devoted himself to the profession of law. After hav- 
 ing filled several offices, he became a judge of the 
 Supreme Court. In 184."), he was appointed by Presi- 
 dent Polk, commissioner of the General Land Office, and 
 removed to Washington. After serving in the Mexican 
 War with distinction, he was elected United States Sen- 
 ator from Illinois. He was living in Minnesota when 
 that Territory was admitted a State of the Union, and 
 was chosen United States Senator. When the war 
 broke out, he had been for some years in California, 
 living in comparative retirement. Congress made him 
 a brigadier-general, with a commission bearing date 
 August 19, 1801. General Shields has always been a 
 pronounced Democrat ; but his politics have never 
 tempted him to entertain views injurious to the tmity 
 and integrity of the Natioaal government. 
 
 3S4 
 
246 
 
 JACKSON'fcs CAMPAIGN. 
 
 reinforced. Accordingly, while he was 
 lying at a point between the South 
 Fork of the Shenandoah and Sv^aft 
 Run Gap, after his retreat from Win- 
 chester, he was joined by the divi- 
 sion of General R. S. Ewell, and 
 also two brigades under Edward J. 
 Johnston. The entire force under 
 Jackson was thus increased to about 
 15,000 men. They were surely all 
 needed ; for he was confronting three 
 National armies — that of Fremont on 
 his left ; that of Banks in front, and 
 that of McDowell on his right. Fre- 
 mont, it will be remembered, had 
 charge of what was called the Moun- 
 tain department ; Banks had charge of 
 the Shenandoah department; and Mc- 
 Dowell had charge of the newly- 
 created department of the Rappahan- 
 nock. Towards the end of April, 
 when Jackson was about to commence 
 offensive operations, Fremont, in obedi- 
 ence to orders given by the presi- 
 dent, had come down to Franklin, in 
 Pendleton County, near the mountains 
 west of HaiTisonburg, and had taken 
 a position there with 15,000 men; 
 General Banks was at Strasburg, in 
 the valley, with about 16,000 men; 
 and General McDowell was at Fred- 
 ericksburg with 30,000 men. About 
 the time Jackson began to move. 
 Shields' division was detached from 
 Banks' command and given to Mc- 
 Dowell, who, as Washington was no 
 longer menaced by Johnston, was on 
 his march to McClellan, now at the 
 head of some 41,000 men, with 100 
 guns. Such was the disposition and 
 such the strength of the National 
 
 forces in Virginia in the first weeks 
 of May. Banks, it will be observed, 
 after Shields' division had been trans- 
 ferred to McDowell, had not under 
 him more than 6000 men. 
 
 Jackson's great object was to pre- 
 vent either McDowell or Fremont 
 from forming a junction with Banks. 
 Learning that Fremont was pressing 
 on to join Banks at Harrisonburg, 
 Jackson left Ewell to watch Banks, 
 and advanced to meet Fremont. 
 Coming up with his advance at Mc- 
 Dowell, some thirty-six miles west of 
 Staunton, a vigorous encounter took 
 place. Both armies suffered severely, 
 but the Nationals were compelled to 
 retire. Jackson followed them up as 
 far as Franklin, when, hearing from 
 Ewell that Banks was evidently prepar- 
 ing to make his escape from Harrison' 
 burg, he hastened back to McDowell, 
 recrossed the Shenandoah Mountains, 
 rested for a little at Lebanon Sulphur 
 Springs, and then pressed forward, 
 with the view of falling upon Banks. 
 Meanwhile, Banks had fled to Stras- 
 burg, pursued by Ewell. Jackson 
 posted on to New Market, where he 
 joined Ewell. The united forces 
 moved up the Luray Valley, between 
 the Massanutten Mountains and the 
 Blue Ridge, towards Front Royal, 
 their object being to cut off Banks' 
 I'etreat in that direction, and thus to 
 prevent him joining McDowell by way 
 of Manassas Gap. By this movement, 
 Jackson accomplished a double object ; 
 he created a panic in Washington and, 
 indeed, throughout the whole North; 
 and he fell with overwhelming force 
 
KETEEAT OF BANKS. 
 
 247 
 
 on Colonel Kenly and the little gam- 
 eon at Front Royal. Kenly made a 
 spirited resistance ; but he was com- 
 pletely overpowered, and, after being 
 wounded, he himself and 700 of his 
 men, with a section of rifled 10- 
 pounders and his entire supply train, 
 fell into the hands of the victorious 
 Confederates. This affair happened 
 May on the 23d of May. Banks was 
 23i still at Strasburg, when, on the 
 evening of that day, he heard of the 
 disaster at Front Royal. Alarm fol- 
 lowed vexation when he learned that 
 Jackson, at the head of 20,000 men, 
 was moving rapidly toward Winches- 
 ter. With his reduced force, it was 
 vain to think of offering resistance to 
 an army so greatly superior in num- 
 bers. As he could not hope to win, 
 his plain duty was to try to save his 
 men and his war material. Early in 
 May the morning of the 24th, Banks, 
 2^» resolved to lose no time in put- 
 ting distance between himself and his 
 pursuers, hastened down the valley. 
 By a forced march, he gained Winches- 
 ter by midnight. The retreat was 
 conducted in a masterly manner, and in 
 circumstances of very great difiiculty. 
 Banks, however, had little time to rest 
 his weary troops. Ewell was ali'eady 
 at his heels ; and Jackson was pressing 
 forward in overwhelming strength, not 
 far in the rear of Ewell. The Con- 
 federate advance bivouacked within 
 a mile and a half of Winchester. It 
 was evidently their expectation that 
 the next day would witness the cap- 
 ture or destruction of their opponents. 
 Banks, as we have seen, had only . 
 
 about 6000 men, with ten Parrott guns 
 and a battery of six-pounder smooth 
 bore cannon, with which to resist the 
 pursuer and protect the valley. The 
 Confederate force had been consider- 
 ably strengthened, and must have 
 numbered, all told, over 20,000 men. 
 It was not possible to continue the 
 retreat without showing front to the 
 pursuers. 
 
 By daylight on the 25th both 
 armies were in battle order; May 
 and the fight opened furiously 25. 
 in front of Winchester. Banks' left 
 was commanded by Colonel Donnelly, 
 and his right by Colonel Gordon, 
 while the troops in the centre were 
 well protected by stone fences. Ewell 
 made a bold endeavor to turn the Na- 
 tional right, and to shut Banks off 
 from Harper's Ferry. The National 
 soldiers, realizing their danger, fought 
 with great bravery, and for some tive 
 hours held the Confederates in check. 
 Jackson's whole force was now seen 
 to be moving forward. Banks, wise- 
 ly concluding that further resistance 
 might prove his ruin, issued orders 
 for a retreat. He had abeady, in an- 
 ticipation of such an emergency, sent 
 his trains on to the Potomac. Under 
 a most destructive fire, the troops 
 formed into three parallel columns, and 
 moved in the direction of Martins- 
 burg, each column being protected by 
 an efficient rear-guard. In passing 
 through Winchester, they were sub- 
 jected to insults and violence, the 
 women pouring upon them hot water 
 from the windows and flinging other 
 missiles. In the course of the after- 
 
348 
 
 JACKSON'S CAMPAIGN. 
 
 loon Banks reached Martipgburg, hav- 
 ing accomplished a march of twenty- 
 two miles. There he rested his foot- 
 sore and battle-worn troops for two 
 and a half hours. At the end of that 
 time the march was resumed ; the 
 other twelve miles of the journey were 
 accomplished ; and by sundown of the 
 same day Banks, with his worn-out 
 but not yet disorganized men, stood 
 on the banks of the Potomac, directly 
 opposite W^lliamsport. Forty-eight 
 hours had just elapsed since the news 
 had reached them of the disaster of 
 Front Royal. It was a march of fifty- 
 three miles, thirty-five of which were 
 perfox-med in one day. "The scene at 
 the river," says General Banks, in his 
 graphic repoi't of that retreat, " when 
 the rear-guard arrived, was of the most 
 animating and exciting description. A 
 thousand camp fires were burning on 
 the hill-side, a thousand carriages of 
 every desciiption were crowded upon 
 the banks, and the broad river rolled 
 between the exhausted troops and 
 their coveted rest." 
 
 Some difficulty was experienced in 
 getting across the river. The ferry 
 was occxipied by the ammunition trains 
 — the ford by the wagons. The cav- 
 alry was secure in its own power of 
 crossing. But the infantry had to 
 content themselves with some boats 
 which belonged to the pontoon train, 
 and which had been brought along 
 from Strasburg. With an ingenuous- 
 ness which does no discredit to his 
 well-tried soldierly qualities. General 
 Banks tells us that "there never were 
 more grateful hearts in the same num- 
 
 ber of raeti than when, at mid- May 
 day on the 26th, we stood on 26t 
 the opposite shore." In killed and 
 wounded. Banks' loss was about 200. 
 Two guns, more than 9000 small arms, 
 and some 3000 prisoners constituted 
 Jackson's prize. 
 
 It would be unfair to refuse to Gen- 
 eral Banks the highest praise for the 
 orderly and successful manner in which 
 he conducted this retreat from Stras- 
 burg to the Potomac. At the same 
 time it is undeniable that, if Jackson 
 had pursued with the same vigor with 
 which Banks conducted his retreat, 
 the result might have been very dit 
 ferent. Jackson halted his infantry 
 not far from Winchester; and George 
 H. Stewart, who was sent after the 
 fugitives, discontinued the pursuit at 
 Martinsburg. In the latter part of his 
 retreat, therefore. Banks' danger was 
 more in seeming than in reality; for 
 Jackson, by giving up the pursuit, had 
 flung away his opportunity. Superior 
 numbers gave Jackson the victory ; 
 but fortune smiled upon Banks, and 
 enabled him to save his army. The 
 National government had reason to 
 honor Banks for saving his men and 
 his ammunition trains. The Confede- 
 rate government had reason to blame 
 Jackson for not completing his victory 
 by the annihilation of his antagonist. 
 
 The I'eappearance of Jackson in the 
 valley of the Shenandoah, followed as 
 that was by the attack on Front Royal 
 and the retreat and pursuit from Stras 
 bui'g, naturally enough produced not 
 a little consternation in Washington. 
 We have seen that Genei'al Shields 
 
THE CONFEDERATE RETREAT. 
 
 349 
 
 formerly of Banks' corps, had been 
 ordered to join the army of McDowell, 
 takmg with him his 11,000 men. We 
 have also seen that thus reinforced, 
 and with an army 41,000 strong, Mc- 
 Dowell was under instructions to move 
 toward Richmond on the 2(5th, for the 
 purpose of co-operating with McClel- 
 lan. Before McDowell began to move 
 toward Richmond, tidings of what had 
 happened in the Shenandoah Valley 
 had, of course, reached Washington. 
 The government was alarmed ; the 
 National capital was considered to be 
 in peril ; and McDowell, in place of 
 being allowed to carry out the orders 
 received eai'lier on the same day, and 
 proceed to aid McClellan before Rich- 
 mond, was instructed to push 20,000 
 men into the valley by way of Ma- 
 nassas Gap, the object being to intercept 
 Jackson, if he should attempt to re- 
 treat. At the same time instructions 
 were sent to Fremont by telegi-aph, 
 commanding him to hasten, with his 
 army, over the Shenandoah Mountain 
 to Harrisonburg, the object being the 
 same. It was hoped that both armies 
 might efFect a junction at Strasburg, 
 and that they might do so in sufficient 
 time to head off Jackson. Fremont 
 lost no time in complying with the 
 instructions which he had received; 
 but, having taken a more northerly 
 road across the mountain to Sti-asburg, 
 June ^6 ^^^ ^'^^ reach that place 
 *• till the evening of the 1st of 
 June. Jackson had passed through the 
 town a few hours before. McDowell 
 was equally prompt, although, in let- 
 ters addressed both to the president 
 
 and to the secretary of war, he ex- 
 pressed his regret, in a dignified and 
 soldierly manner, that it should have 
 been necessary to countermand his 
 orders and compel him to fall back. 
 Shields' division was pushed forward 
 in advance. On the morning of June 
 the 2d of June, Shields' cavalry, 2. 
 under General Bayard, reached Stras- 
 burg — too late also to accomplish their 
 intended purpose^ 
 
 In the meantime, the excitement 
 and anxiety of the government were 
 finding other channels of expressioa 
 Alarming despatches were sent to the 
 governors of the different States. They 
 were informed that the enemy in great 
 force was marching on Washington' 
 and they were exhorted to organize, 
 and forward immediately, all the militi* 
 and volunteer force in their respective 
 States. On the same day on which 
 these despatches were forwarded, the 
 president took militaiy possession of 
 all the railroads in the United States, 
 ordering their ofiicers and servants to 
 hold themselves in readiness for the 
 transportation of troops and n:unitiona 
 of wai' to the exclusion of all other 
 business. It was evident that the 
 government was really alanned; but 
 it was plain also that it knew its duty, 
 and that it meant to perform it. 
 
 Jackson had advanced, after the re- 
 tirement of Banks, as far as Harper's 
 FeiTy. There he became aware of the 
 orders which had been given to Mc- 
 Dowell and Fremont. He felt that 
 he was in danger. If these generals 
 should succeed in forming a junction 
 at Strasburg before he reaches ths-t 
 
260 
 
 JACKSON'S CAMPAIGlSr. 
 
 place, it will be necessary for him to 
 offer battle to their combined forces ; 
 and the result, as he fears, will not 
 he favorable. He deemed it wise to 
 beat a hasty retreat. Leaving Ewell 
 as a reai'-guard, he moved back fi'om 
 Harper's Ferry on the night of the 
 29th of May. On the following night, 
 May and with a view to create a 
 3®' false impression, Ewell kept up 
 a heavy cannonading, and otherwise 
 acted as if a severe contest was going 
 on. The night was favorable for his 
 purpose. It was "intensely dark; the 
 hills around were alive with signal 
 lights ; the rain descended in torrents ; 
 vivid flashes of lightning illuminated, 
 at intervals, the green and magnificent 
 scenery, while the crash of the thunder, 
 echoing among the mountains, threw 
 into comparative insignificance the roar 
 of the artilleiy." When the sun rose 
 May on the morning of the 31st, there 
 31. were no traces of any Confede- 
 rates in the neighborhood of Harper's 
 Ferry. Ewell was already far ad- 
 vanced on his way to rejoin Jackson. 
 It was a race, as if for sweet life, 
 both with Jackson and with Ewell. 
 In order to overtake Jackson, whom 
 he rejoined at Middletown, Ewell 
 marched in one day thirty-four miles. 
 The race up the Shenandoah Valley 
 was now fairly begun ; and the retreat 
 of Jackson in the one direction was 
 (|uite as hasty as that of Banks had 
 been in the other. Jackson, in fact, 
 had exhibited even more celerity 
 in retreat than he had done in pur- 
 suit. 
 
 We have ah-eady mentioned that 
 
 when FreSnont reached Strasburg on 
 the 1st of June, Jackson had passed 
 through the town some hours before, 
 and that the van-guard of Shields' di- 
 vision, which had been detached by 
 McDowell, did not arrive at Strasburg 
 until a day later. A vigorous effort 
 was now made by both of those offi- 
 cers to intercept Jackson further to 
 the south. Shields moved vigorously 
 along the South Fork of the Shenan- 
 doah, between the Massanutten and 
 Blue Ridge Mountains, while Fremont, 
 somewhat in his rear, and leaning on 
 the North Fork, marched along the 
 great turnpike to Harrisonburg. The 
 mountain streams which flow into the 
 Shenandoah were all swollen with the 
 heavy rains — so swollen as to make 
 it perilous in most places to attempt 
 to ford them. Jackson, who was 
 also on the South Fork, took the 
 precaution of desti'oying the biidges 
 as he passed, and, by means of his 
 cavaliy, of breaking down or burn- 
 ing all those in the opening-s of the 
 Massanutten range. By so doing, he 
 greatly retarded the advance of his 
 pursuers. On the 5th of June, jnne 
 and after making the most vigor- 5. 
 ous efforts all along his line of march, 
 he reached Harrisonburg. Jackson 
 now saw that his one hope of safety 
 was to cross the swollen Shenandoah 
 at Port Republic, where there was a 
 strong bridge. He would thus put the 
 liver between himself and Fremont. 
 He would do more. It was all-im- 
 portant that Shields, who was near at 
 hand, on the east side of the river, 
 should not be allowed to cross and 
 
BATTLE AT CROSS KEYS. 
 
 251 
 
 form a juuction with the other National 
 army. He would make this junction 
 impossible. With these ends in view, 
 and after allowing his wearied soldiers 
 a bi'ief period of repose, Jackson be- 
 gan to move from Harrisonburg — his 
 line of march being towards the river, 
 in a southeasterly direction, by way of 
 Staunton. Fremont's advance entered 
 Harrisonburg shortly after Jackson left 
 it. They were not allowed to halt. 
 Pushing on after the retreating army, 
 a body of cavalry, imder Colonel Percy 
 Wyndham, came upon its rear-guard 
 about two miles from Harrisonburg. 
 The Confederate rear was covered l)y 
 General Turner Ashby's cavalry. With 
 the speed of lightning, Ashby turned 
 upon the Nationals and smote them 
 with great severity. Wyndham was 
 captured, together with some sixty- 
 three of his men. At this critical 
 moment, Bayard and Cluseret humed 
 forward cavalry and infantry. Among 
 those engaged were Kane's Bucktail 
 Rifles. Ashby, feeling himself hard 
 pressed, called for an infantry support. 
 General Stewart rushed to his aid. 
 Severe fighting ensued. Kane's rifle- 
 men, after performing deeds of great 
 valor, were driven back with a loss 
 of fifty-five men. Kane himself was 
 wounded and made prisoner. During 
 the brief encounter, in which both 
 sides sustained heavy losses, General 
 Ashby was killed. His horse had 
 been shot under him ; and he was dis- 
 mounted when the fatal bullet entered 
 his body. General Ashby was one of 
 the most brilliant generals developed 
 on either side during the war. His 
 
 death at this crisis was a great loss to 
 the Confederate cause.* 
 
 Jackson continued his march toward 
 the Shenandoah with the view of at- 
 tempting a passage at Port Republic. 
 In the meantime he had left Ewell,( 
 with the three brigades of Elzy, 
 Trimble and Stewart, well posted at a 
 place called Cross Keys, near Union 
 Church, about seven miles from Harri- 
 sonburg, and about five miles from the 
 river. Ewell's force was about 5000 
 strong, and occupied a ridge which 
 crossed the road near the church. 
 There were on either side dense woods 
 which protected his flanks. Trimble 
 was a little in advance, in the centre ; 
 Stewart was on the right ; and Elzy 
 on the left. On Sunday morn- jnm 
 ing, the 8th of June, as early as 8. 
 six o'clock, Fremont marched out of 
 Harrisonburg ; and by nine o'clock 
 he had his army arranged in order of 
 battle. Schenck was on the right; 
 Milroy in the centre ; and Stahl on the 
 left. Between Milroy and Schenck was 
 Cluseret's brigade, composed of the 
 Sixtieth Ohio and the Eighth Virginia, 
 supported by the Garibaldi guard, of 
 Blenker's division. Bohlen's brigade 
 supported Stahl ; and the remainder of 
 Blenker's division was held as a re- 
 
 * Brigadier-General Turner Ashby was a middle-sized 
 man, handsomely built, and very active. He was a dark- 
 complexioned man — had dark eyes and tine features, 
 and was distinguished by rather a benevolent counte- 
 nance. He was a man of much piety. Although not a 
 soldier by profession, he soon gave proof that he was 
 possessed of all those qualities which secure distinction 
 and success on the field of battle. He was a splendid 
 horseman ; and he had done good service to the cause 
 which he had represented in many a hard-fought battle. 
 He had been promoted to the rank of brigadier-geno' 
 ral only three weeks before his death. 
 
353 
 
 JACKSOITS CAMPAIGJJ. 
 
 serve. The Nationals moved to the 
 attack up the rising ground under a 
 tremendous fii'e. By eleven o'clock 
 the battle had become general. The 
 fighting was particularly severe in the 
 centre, vphere, in spite of the terrific 
 fire of the Confederates, Milroy and 
 Schenck were gaining ground. For 
 hours the battle raged with great fury, 
 Milroy and Stahl suffering most severe- 
 ly. The Eighth New York alone had 
 sixty -five killed. On the Confederate 
 side, Trimble, who was the most ex- 
 posed, had suffered the heaviest loss. 
 For a time vict(n'y seemed doubtful. 
 After having been driven back, the 
 Nationals again pressed forward ; and 
 Milroy had already penetrated Ewell's 
 centre, and forced his way up almost 
 to his guns. It was now four o'clock ; 
 and Stahl's troops, at the supreme 
 moment when Fremont seemed on the 
 point of grasping victory, giving way, 
 the order was given to fall back along 
 the whole line. 
 
 Thus ended the battle of Cross Keys 
 —one of the best-contested, and, con- 
 sidering the numbers engaged, severest 
 struggles since the war commenced. 
 It was fought wath great bravery on 
 both sides ; and if victory remained 
 with the Confederates, it was because 
 of the excellency of the position which 
 they occupied, rather than because of 
 the greater endurance of their troops, 
 or the superior skill of their command- 
 ers. On both sides the loss was heavy, 
 "t was particularly severe among the 
 National ofiaoers. General Stahl had 
 five killed and seventeen wounded. 
 The Pennsylvania Bucktails lost all 
 
 their oflieers — commissioned and non- 
 commissioned. 
 
 Both armies slept on the ground 
 M'iiich they occupied in the morning 
 before the battle commenced. Ewell 
 was pi-epared to resume the con- jnn^ 
 fiict on the morning of the 9th ; ®' 
 but being called to aid Jackson at 
 Port Republic, he began to move, as 
 soon as day broke, towards the Shen- 
 andoah — Fremont following in battle 
 order. Shields' advance, under Colonel 
 Carroll, reached Port Republic on the 
 8th of June. There he found some of 
 Jackson's cavalry guard; and falling 
 upon them with great force, he drove 
 them out of the town and took posses- 
 sion of the bridge. His true policy at 
 that moment would have been to burn 
 the bridge; for by that means he 
 might have ruined Jackson, by making 
 it impossible for Ewell to come to his 
 aid. This, however, he neglected to 
 do, believing, perhaps, that he could 
 liold it, and that it might still be use- 
 ful in enabling the two National armies 
 to form a junction. While waiting 
 for the arrival of his infantry, he was 
 joined by General E. B. Tyler, who 
 took command. After assuming com- 
 mand, Tyler was unwilling to act 
 until he had received instructions from 
 Shields. Ewell, meanwhile, had man- 
 aged to escape from Fremont, had 
 brought his troops across the liver, and 
 had so strengthened Jackson that the 
 Confederate had no reason any longer 
 to fear his enemy. Discovering that an 
 attempt was being made by the Con- 
 federates in great strength to outflank 
 his left, Tyler made a vigorous show 
 

 .j^ 
 
 W.''^' 
 
 
 GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS 
 
PORT REPUBLIC. 
 
 ssat 
 
 of resistance. Counteracting the flank- 
 ing movement by employing liis whole 
 force, Tyler drove back into the woods 
 about 8000 Confederates. The battle 
 raged for some time with great sever- 
 ity. It was impossible, however, for 
 Tyler to maintain the struggle against 
 the fearful odds which were now ar- 
 rayed against him. Fremont, when 
 he heard the sounds of battle and saw 
 the clouds of smoke, had hastened 
 towards Port Republic. When he 
 reached the bridge he found it in 
 flames, the water too deep to be 
 forded, and the enemy safe beyond his 
 reach. Tyler had no choice but to order 
 a retreat, which, covered by Carroll and 
 his cavalry, was conducted in good order. 
 The Confederates pursued the retreat- 
 ing forces some five miles, the " boys 
 preserving their places in the I'anks, 
 and fighting every inch of the way." 
 
 Port Republic added another laurel 
 to the victorious wreath which en- 
 circled the brow of General Jackson. 
 His campaign in the Shenandoah Val- 
 ley had been conducted with wonder- 
 ful skill and with great success. He 
 had not won, it is true, any great vic- 
 tory, but he certainly enjoyed its fruits. 
 He had, by the pursuit of Banks, al- 
 most threatened the National capital. 
 By his rapidity and dexterity of move- 
 ment he had baffled all the skill of 
 three major-generals. At the last mo- 
 ment, when he seemed to be shut in 
 between two forces, he paralyzed Fre- 
 mont with one blow and Shields with 
 another, and finally, by the destruction 
 of the bridge, made their junction im- 
 possible. This, however, was not all. 
 
 He had diverted large- reinforcements 
 from McClellan, and, while he had 
 given that general a cause for indulg- 
 ing in his "masterly inactivity," he 
 had otherwise neutralized the influence 
 of 60,000 men. He had taught the 
 National government that it would 
 never again be saf/ /hile the war 
 lasted, to leave Washington unpro- 
 tected. That lesson, taught at that 
 time, was equal to the adding of many 
 thousands of men to the Confederate 
 armies. 
 
 This chapter would be incomplete 
 without a brief sketch of the man who 
 is really its hero.* 
 
 The National government was un- 
 doubtedly primarily to blame for the 
 
 * Thomas Jefferson Jackson was born in Western 
 Virginia, in January, 1824. His family was respect- 
 able ; but in his boyhood he received only a limited edu- 
 cation. At the age of nineteen, he entered, as student, 
 the military academy of West Point, where, in spite ol 
 his homely dress and uncouth manners, he distanced 
 many of his competitors, taking a prominent place in 
 several of his classes. He served in the Mexican War 
 as an artillery officer under Magruder, and acquired the 
 reputation of being a good gunner. Toward the close 
 of that war he was bre vetted a major. He afterwards 
 held for ten years the chair of chemistry at the military 
 academy of Virginia, at Lexington. On the death of 
 his first wife he visited Europe ; and during his stay in 
 England, he took great delight in visiting the cathe- 
 drals, York Minster being his special favorite. When 
 the Civil War broke out, he had married a lady of a 
 Northern family ; and it is said he was for some short 
 time in doubt as to what course he should follow. He 
 had, in 18.52, resigned his rank in the army. Ultimate- 
 ly he offered his sword to his native State, and received 
 a commission. It was he who turned the tide of affairs 
 at Bull Run, and secured the victory for the Confede- 
 rates. His exploits in the Shenandoah Valley speak for 
 themselves. Jackson's life was destined to be brief; 
 but, as we shall see while this history progresses, he 
 filled it with noble deeds, and left behind him a name 
 which the world wiU not willingly let die. "Stonewall" 
 Jackson will ever be the symbol of a chivalry equal to 
 that of a Bayard, and of a piety equal to that of a saint. 
 In his life, he commanded the love and confidence ol 
 his men. In his death, he was mourned by the world. 
 
 xas 
 
SB4 
 
 JACKSON'S CAMPAIGN. 
 
 humiliation brought upon the Northern 
 armies by Jackson's raid. The action 
 at Winchester showed what could be 
 done, even against such a man, with a 
 force of reasonable strength. It was 
 the weakening of Shields, by the re- 
 moval of so many troops to Centre- 
 ville, which provoked the battle of 
 Winchester. In the presence of so 
 watchful an antagonist as Jackson, the 
 lesson ought not to have been lost. 
 When, therefore, the government de- 
 tached Shields from Banks, and sent 
 him, with his division, to swell the 
 army of McDowell, leaving Banks with 
 only some 6000 men, a grave blunder 
 was committed. It was not possible 
 for Jackson to resist the temptation 
 which was thus offered. But for that 
 temptation, Jackson certainly would 
 •not at that time have ventured to at- 
 tack Banks ; and probably the famous 
 race thi'ough the Shenandoah Valley 
 would never have taken place. This, 
 however, was not all. The blunder 
 committed by the government had an- 
 other result. It hindered the very 
 purpose for which Shields had been 
 detached from Banks — it prevented 
 McDowell from joining McClellan be- 
 fore Richmond. It is not wonderful 
 that McDowell, when commanded to 
 fall back and take part with Banks 
 and Fremont in the interception of 
 Jackson, should have done so reluctant- 
 ly, exclaiming, with a heavy heart, as 
 
 he repeated the order : " It is a crush- 
 ing blow to us all." It was unfortu- 
 nate that Shields and Fremont did not 
 meet at Strasburg ; and the latter gen- 
 eral, though assuming a responsibility 
 which success would have justified, un- 
 doubtedly made a mistake in not tak 
 ing the route across the mountains 
 which he was ordered to take. If 
 he had taken the appointed route, he 
 might have intercepted Jackson ; but 
 he might not, for the mountain roads 
 were in a wretched condition, in con- 
 sequence of the heavy rains, which 
 had soaked the soil and swollen the 
 streams. As it was, Jackson had 
 passed through Strasburg only a few 
 hours before he arrived. Supposing 
 Fremont had been up in time to meet 
 the retreating army, it is by no means 
 certain that he could have hindered 
 Jackson's onward march. Shields did 
 not arrive at Strasburg till the follow- 
 ing day; and it is by no means im- 
 probable, judging from what actually 
 did happen, that Jackson, in the 
 interval, could have found time to 
 punish Fremont and proceed on his 
 journey. Fremont and Shields no 
 doubt did their best; and if they 
 were outrun, and finally defeated, they 
 had the satisfaction of knowing that 
 the task had been accomplis^ied by a 
 general who was without a superior, 
 either in the armies of the South o* 
 in the armies of the North. 
 
ON THE CHICKAHOMINY. 
 
 253 
 
 CHAPTEK XVIII. 
 
 Th* Army of the Potomac. — A Critical Period. — McClellan Still on the Chickahominy. — Masterly Inactiyity. 
 — Quiet Siege of Richmond. — Stuart's Raid. — A Confederate Council of War. — McCleUan's Difficulty. — 
 Fight or Retreat. — He Might Have Fought and Won. — Retreat to the Jame-s River Resolved Upon. — The 
 Confederates Move on Mechanicsville. — The Nationals Well Posted at Beaver Dam Creek. — The Confede- 
 rate Attack at Mechanicsville. — Night Closes the Straggle. — The Result a National Victory. — McCIeUan 
 Hastens his Retreat — The Second Day. — The Nationals Still Well Posted. — The Brave Confederates. — • 
 "Thundering Hurrahs." — Repeated, but Vain Attempts. — Porter Calls for Help. — Slocum Sent to his Aid. 
 —Porter Again Calls for Help. — Butterfield Sorely Pressed. — St. George Cooke. — A Pause. — The Nationals 
 Falling Back to the River. — Arrival of Meagher and French. — The Day Saved. — White Oak Swamp. — The 
 Confederates Deceived. — White House Evacuated. — The Pursuit. — McCleUan's Despatch. — Savage's Station. 
 .^Fair Oaks Abandoned. — Battle of Savage's Station. — McClellan at Malvern HiUs. — The Battle at 'White 
 Oak Swamp Bridge. — The Confederates in High Hopes. — Grand Massing of Troops. — Jackson at White 
 Oak Swamp Bridge. — Frazier's Farm. — Willis's Road. — Battle of Glendale. — Determined Fighting on Both 
 Sides. — Arrival of Hooker and Kearney. — A DrawTi Battle. — Meade Wounded and McCall Captured. — Inci- 
 dents of the Two Battles. — White Oak Swamp and Glendale. — The Retreat Continued. — Malvern Hills. — A 
 Strong Position. — The Hills Covered with Artillery and Infantry. — Lee's Plan. — Hill's Opinion. — A Bold 
 Attack and a Fearful Cannonade. — The Confederates Repulsed. — A Lull in the Fight. — The Attack Re- 
 newed. — The Quivering Hills. — Terrible Slaughter. — Hand-to-Hand Fighting. — The Nationals Hold Their 
 Position. — A Fearful Night. — The Retreat Continued. — Vexation of the National Officers. — Fitz John Porter. 
 — Philip Kearney. — The Circumstances Depressing. — McCleUan's Address t« his Soldiers. — Address of Jeffer- 
 son Davis to the Army of Virginia. — Committee of Congress. — Heavy Loss of Men. — Poor Results. — 
 McCleUan and Lincoln. — McCleUan and Halleck. — Correspondence. — Reluctance of MeCleUan to Leave 
 Harrison's Landing. — His Demand for More Troops. — End of the Peninsular Expedition. — Reflections. 
 
 1862. 
 
 We have now arrived at the most 
 critical, if not the most perilous, 
 period in the entire histoiy o£ 
 the war. Since the disastrous battle of 
 Bull Run, the National armies had ex- 
 perienced no very serious reverse. On 
 the contraiy, in many a hard-contested 
 fight, and on many a blood-stained 
 battle field, victory had rewarded the 
 bravery and crowned the efforts of the 
 Union troops. In the West they had 
 marched in triumph fi-oin Cairo to the 
 iK-ighborhood of Vicksburg; and such 
 names as Heniy and Donelson, and 
 Bhiloh and Corinth, and Perryville 
 and Murfreesboro had become separate 
 sources of National pride. Along the 
 
 coast and on the inland waters, they 
 had been even more successful than 
 they had been on land; and it 'was 
 with feelings of equal pride they 
 could reflect that the entire seaboard, 
 both of the Atlantic and of the Gu)f, 
 had been restored to Federal authority. 
 It was only in the Peninsula and 
 over the army of the Potomac that 
 the cloud of darkness hovered. Here 
 alone fortune seemed to be chary of 
 her favors. 
 
 The siege of Yorktown, the battle of 
 Williamsburg and the battle of Fair 
 Oaks had shed but little lustre on the 
 Federal arms. The anny of the Poto- 
 mac — so imposing in its strength, so 
 
256 
 
 McOLELLAN'S RETKEAT. 
 
 splendid in its equipment, so perfect 
 in its training, the pride of its chief, 
 the hope of the nation — had not yet 
 given any earnest of the fulfillment 
 of its high promise. We have fol- 
 lowed it from Manassas to Yorktown, 
 from Yorktown to Williamsburg, from 
 Williamsburg to the swamps of the 
 Chickahomiuy ; and, although we have 
 no reason to blame either officers or 
 men for lack of bravery, we have seen 
 precious time wasted, blunder after 
 blunder committed, and opportunity 
 after opportunity flung to the winds 
 of heaven, A month had elapsed 
 since the battle of Fair Oaks, and Mc- 
 Clellan was still lying inactive along 
 the line of the Chickahomiuy. While 
 he waited for reinforcements, and oc- 
 cupied himself and his men in the 
 construction of bridges and battei'ies, 
 the enemy was multiplying his own 
 forces, and mightily increasing the dif- 
 ficulties of the National commander. 
 Had McClellan moved on Richmond 
 immediately after the battle of Fair 
 Oaks, the presumption is that he 
 would have won an easy victory. As 
 it was, he gave General Jackson 
 abundant time, after his brilliant cam- 
 paign in the valley, to come up and, 
 with his army of 35,000 men, to 
 join General Lee, who had succeeded 
 General Joseph E. Johnston in the 
 supreme command. This, howevei', 
 was not all. Time was given the gov- 
 ei'nment at Richmond to reap the full 
 benefit of the new Conscription Act, 
 and to huriy forward, at the same 
 time, detachments from the West. Mc- 
 Clellan's army had no doubt suffered 
 
 since it first landed on the Peninsula. 
 The ranks of the regiments had been 
 thinned. Some had died in battle; 
 and not a few had perished from the 
 malarioiis fevers of the swamps. De- 
 tachments, too, had been left respective 
 ly at Yorktown and at Williamsburg. 
 But he had been joined by five regi' 
 ments from Baltimore ; General Wool's 
 disposable force at Fortress Monroe 
 was at his call; McCall's division, of 
 McDowell's corps, had already arrived 
 from Fredericksburg ; and if McDowell 
 himself, with the remainder of his 
 army, had been prevented from coming 
 to his Aid, McClellan had the less rea- 
 son to complain that his own dilatory 
 conduct had given Stonewall Jackson 
 the opportunity of teaching the Fede- 
 ral authorities the propriety of securely 
 guarding the National capital. A vail 
 of mysteiy hangs over some of the 
 doings of this period ; and it may l)e 
 that there are some things which will 
 yet find a fuller explanation ; but in the 
 meantime, with all the light we now 
 enjoy, the evidence seems conclusive 
 that McClellan sacrificed his chances 
 by his habitual caution, or rather bj' 
 his incorrigible habit of delay. 
 
 The National army was stronglj- 
 fortified on the Chickahomiuy. The 
 left wing was on the south of that 
 stream, between White Oak Swamp 
 and New Bridge. The roads tow!ird>i 
 Richmond were commanded by heaw 
 guns. The right wing was north of 
 the Chickahomiuy, and extended be- 
 yond Mechanicsville. Several solid 
 bridges had been thrown over thf 
 stream, thereby bi'inging the two' 
 
HANOVER COURT HOUSE. 
 
 257 
 
 wings into easier communication. The 
 one fault of McClellan's arrangement 
 was that his line was too long, and, 
 consequently, greatly attenuated. The 
 Confedei'ates were not slow to dis- 
 cover this weakness of their adversary. 
 June On the 13th of June, General J. 
 
 *3« E. B. Stuart, with some 1500 cav- 
 alry and four pieces of horse artillery, 
 made a bold dash on the National 
 right, and, after some severe fight- 
 ing at Hanover Court House, swept 
 around the entire army, working terri- 
 ble destniction, and capturing 165 
 prisoners and 260 mules and horses. 
 After resting three hours at Talleys- 
 ville, he returned next morning to 
 Richmond, unopposed. This audacious 
 movement of Stuart actually created 
 great commotion in the army of the 
 Potomac. For some days more all 
 was quiet on the Chickahominy. On 
 June the 25th of June the army, then 
 
 25i numbering 115,000 men present 
 for duty, heard with delight that they 
 were to be led out of the pestilential 
 swamps. On that day a forward 
 movement was made by Heintzelman's 
 corps, Math a part of Keyes' and 
 Sumner's, on the Williamsburg Road. 
 At a place called Oak Grove the 
 enemy was encountered in considerable 
 strength, when a severe fight ensued, 
 the Nationals losing some 516 men in 
 killed and wounded. The coveted 
 point was gained, but it was not to be 
 turned to nuich account. On that very 
 night the uuwelcome tidings arrived 
 that Stonewall Jackson was at Han- 
 Jnne over Coui't House. On the fol- 
 
 2ft« lowing uiuiuing the advance was 
 
 recalled ; and for the army of the Po- 
 tomac there was something else to do 
 than to march in triumph to the Con- 
 federate capital. 
 
 On the same day on which the above, 
 mentioned encounter took place, jnne 
 a Confederate council of war was 25. 
 held, and it was resolved that, as the 
 Confederate lines around the city were 
 now completed, the greater portion of 
 the army might now be spared for a 
 forward movement on the National line. 
 Jackson was to cross to the north of 
 the Chickahominy, and move on the 
 right flank of the National army ; and 
 in the event of McDowell remaining 
 inactive at Fredericksburg, a general 
 and simultaneous attack was to be 
 made along McClellan's whole line. 
 The National army was now in a peril- 
 ous position. It was evident that the 
 object was to cut McClellan ofp from 
 his communications with the York 
 River. He must either retreat or give 
 battle out of his intrench ments. Mc- 
 Clellan had now to resolve what he 
 would do. There was no time for de- 
 lay. His decision was quickly taken. 
 The bridge which he had thrown across 
 the Chickahominy gave him the oppor- 
 tunity of throwing over either wing to 
 the assistance of the other. He might 
 concentrate on the north side or the 
 south side, as he thought fit. But if 
 he concentrated on the north bank, it 
 implied an abandonment of the idea of 
 capturing Richmond, and exposed him 
 to the risk of an unsupported retreat 
 to Yorktown. If he concentrated on 
 the south bank, he lost his communica- 
 tions with White House, and he would' 
 
258 
 
 McCLELLAN'S RETREAT. 
 
 have to execute the perilous operation 
 of changing his base by a flank move- 
 ment. It was seventeen miles from 
 Fair Oaks to James River, and there 
 was only one road — a road which was 
 exposed to many others radiating from 
 Richmou'd. The southern movement 
 had this one advantage: that since the 
 destruction of the Memmac, the James 
 River Avas open, and some transports 
 had already found their way to City 
 Point. The movement to James River 
 ivas determined upon ; and arrange- 
 ments for a letreat were made at once. 
 Happily, the only bridges in possession 
 of the Confederates were about ten 
 miles above, at Mechanicsville As 
 the Confederates must needs go round 
 by that way, time would be gained by 
 the Nationals to make good their re- 
 treat to Harrison's Landing, where 
 they would come under the shelter of 
 the gunboats. Military writers have 
 expressed the opinion that a more 
 daring general might, by a judicious 
 concentration of his troops on the 
 south side of the Chickahominy, have 
 marched in triumph to Richmond. It 
 is true that the Confederate capital 
 was left comparatively unprotected ; 
 and it is undeniable that the bravery 
 of the troops and the skill of the 
 officers, from the commander-in-chief 
 downward, as displayed in the retreat, 
 encourage the belief that if the at- 
 tempt had been made, it might have 
 resulted in complete success. Such a 
 course, however, necessarily implied 
 a great risk. Defeat was not impossi- 
 ble ; and defeat in such circumstances 
 would have been ruinous to the Na- 
 
 tional army. True to his instincts, 
 faithful to the character which he had 
 already established, McClellan chose, 
 as might have been predicted, the less 
 hazardous course. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 26th began 
 that series of engagements which jud« 
 culminated in retreat — a retreat 26. 
 which, whether regard be had to the 
 protracted character of the struggle, 
 the severity of the fighting, or the skill 
 with which it was conducted, must 
 be considered one of the most memo- 
 rable in history. Shortly after two 
 o'clock on that day, the Confederate 
 general, A. P. Hill, crossed to the 
 north side of the Chickahominy and 
 moved on Mechanicsville. The right 
 wing of McClellan's army which, as 
 we have seen, stretched beyond Me' 
 chanicsville, was under the command 
 of General Fitz John Porter, and con- 
 sisted of the divisions of Morell, Sykes 
 and McCall. McClellan had long be- 
 fore seen and recognized the strategic 
 importance of Beaver Dam Creek, near 
 Mechanicsville. The place was natu- 
 rally strong ; and its strength had been 
 increased by some rifle-pits and abatis. 
 Here were posted McCall's Pennsylva- 
 nia reserves, 8500 strong, with five 
 batteries. The batteries were so dis- 
 posed as to command the stream and 
 the open fields beyond, through which 
 the Confederates must approach. In 
 the face of a heavy fire from the bat- 
 teries and from the infantr}^, Hill's 
 brigades, followed by those of Long- 
 street, advanced to the attack. They 
 fell with tremendous force upon Mc- 
 Call's division. Marking but little im 
 
MECHANICSVILLE. 
 
 259 
 
 pression at first, they massed and fell 
 successively on his right and on his 
 left, doing terrible damage ; but it was 
 all of no avail. The Nationals stood 
 firm. McCall, receiving some effective 
 aid from Martindale and Grifiin, of the 
 division of Morell, and his orders be- 
 ing admirably carried out by Generals 
 Reynolds and Seymour, repelled the 
 enemy at every point. From their 
 superior position, the National gims did 
 terrible execution. The battle lasted 
 until nine o'clock, when the Confede- 
 rates were driven back with a loss of 
 1500 men. The National loss was 
 trifling ; and, at the close of the fight, 
 McClellan's men were in full posses- 
 sion of eveiy point of the battle field. 
 The fight of the 26th is known as the 
 battle of Mechanicsville. 
 
 McClellan had won the battle of Me- 
 chanicsville ; but he felt, even more 
 than before, the necessity of making 
 a hurried retreat to the James River. 
 Jackson had at last come up. He had 
 already crossed Beaver Dam Creek ; 
 and he was moving down towards the 
 National right. McClellan could no 
 longer doubt that it was Lee's inten- 
 tion to cut him off from his communi- 
 cations at the White House. Retreat, 
 in his judgment, must be commenced 
 at once ; and, in his own words, " to 
 that end, from the evening of the 26th, 
 every energy of the army was bent." 
 Quarter-master Ingalls was ordered to 
 forwai'd the stores and munitions of war 
 to Savage's Station, to burn what he 
 could not remove, and to do his utmost 
 to have supplies sent up the James. 
 Having sent his wounded also to Sa- 
 
 vage's Station, he prepared to cross 
 the Chickahominy with his right wing. 
 for the flight. Diu'ing the night most 
 of the heavy guns and wagons wer« 
 thrown across the rivei, and shortlj 
 before dawn the troops were skilfullv 
 withdrawn to a strong position near 
 Gaines' Mills, between Cool Ai-bor and 
 the Chickahominy. There, in the form 
 of an arc of a circle, the left resting 
 on the Chickahominy, the right to 
 wards Cool Arbor, and covering the 
 two bridges — Woodbury's and Alex- 
 ander's — the Fifth corps on the jnne 
 morning of the 27th awaited the 27. 
 attack. Some of the siege guns were 
 yet in position there ; and those which 
 had been taken over the stream were 
 planted so as to cover the approaches 
 to the bridges. Morell's division was 
 on the left; and Sykes' division of 
 Regulars and Duryea's Zouaves were 
 on the right, extending towards Cool 
 Arbor. The extreme point of the 
 right wing, which rested on a swamp 
 on the Cool Arbor Road, was held 
 by Batteiy I, Fifth United States ar- 
 tillery. Captain J. H. Weed. Mean- 
 while, Stoneman had been sent to the 
 White House with a column of cavalry, 
 to evacuate the depot and to destroy 
 there what could not be used. 
 
 About noon the Confederates were 
 discovered approaching in force, under 
 A. P. Hill; and soon the artillery 
 opened a heavy fire. Sykes was the 
 first to feel the severity of the ene- 
 my's attack ; but he rose upon them 
 in his might and hurled them back in 
 confusion, and with heavy loss. Long- 
 street now came forward to the relief 
 
260 
 
 McCLELLAN'S RETREAT. 
 
 of Hill. His first intention was to 
 make a feint on Porter's left ; but the 
 situation was too serious ; and he was 
 compelled to make a real attack, or do 
 nothing at all. He resolved, therefore, 
 to carry the heights on which the 
 Nationals were posted; and while he 
 was preparing to do so, Jackson and 
 D. H. Hill arrived and took positions. 
 The order was now given for the whole 
 Confederate line to advance, except 
 the right wing under Magruder, which 
 was confronting McClellan on the right 
 bank of the Chickahominy. The brave 
 masses rushed, with "thundering hur- 
 rahs," upon the musketry of Porter's 
 troops ; and whole ranks went down 
 under the terrible fire. After a tre- 
 mendous struggle, in which the Con- 
 federates vainly attempted to get pos- 
 session of the rising ground on which 
 the Nationals were posted, the former 
 began to give way. They were al- 
 ready falling back in disorder. At 
 this critical juncture, General Cobb 
 appeared on the field with his legion, 
 together with the Fourteenth Virginia 
 and the Nineteenth North Carolina, and 
 vainly attempted to renew the fight. 
 His legion was sent rolling back in 
 liroken fragments from the charge ; 
 and the Nineteenth North Carolina 
 lost eight standard bearers, with most 
 of their ofiicers killed or wounded. 
 
 At two o'clock, Porter, feeling the 
 pressure which was brought to bear 
 upon him, sent to McClellan for rein- 
 forcements. McClellan, dreading the 
 army under Magruder in his immediate 
 front, could only spare Slocum's divi- 
 sion, of Franklin's corps. He did not 
 
 know that Magruder had not more 
 than 25,000 to oppose to his (JOjOOC 
 all of whom were well entrenche( 
 Slocum arrived about half-past thret. 
 Avhen the battle was raging most fierce 
 ly. Porter's force now amounted to 
 35,000 men. For hours afterwards the 
 fighting was desperate, and the issue 
 doubtful. The Confederates continued 
 to hurl brigade after brigade against 
 the National line ; but they came up, 
 one after another, only to be broken 
 like the angry waves on the rock- 
 bound shore. Later in the day Porter 
 again sent for i-einforcements ; and the 
 brigades of French and Meaghei', of 
 Richardson's division, were sent to his 
 aid. They arrived just in time. Jack- 
 son, with tlie divisions of Longstreet 
 and Whiting, had fallen with terrific 
 energy on the National left. With 
 fierce yells they crossed the interven- 
 ing swamp, and rushed up to the very 
 muzzles of Porter's guns. Cut dowB 
 like grass before the scythe, the surviv- 
 oi's nevertheless still pressed forward 
 ovei- the dead bodies of their comrades. 
 It seemed as if nothing could check their 
 advance. Butterfi eld's gallant brigade, 
 which had been repelling the heaviest 
 attacks of the Confederates for moie 
 than an hour without any assistance, 
 was no longer able to resist those furi- 
 ous onsets. Sorely pressed, it yielded, 
 and fell back to the woods. By this 
 movement, the batteries of Allen, 
 Weedon, Hart and Edwards were left 
 exposed. In spite of a most heroic re- 
 sistance, they, too, were forced to fall 
 back, with the loss of several guns. 
 At five o'clock. Porter reported hia 
 
UAINES' MILL. 
 
 2C.I 
 
 position as critical. His opponents 
 had now double his strength. At this 
 supreme moment an untoward circum- 
 stance aggravated the difficulties of his 
 position. Poiter was calling up all his 
 reserved artilleiy — about eighty guns 
 in all — and was effectually covering 
 the retreat of his infantry, when Gen- 
 eral St. George Cooke, acting Avithout 
 orders, attacked the Confederates on 
 their flank with his cavalry, repulsing 
 them in great disorder. His horses, 
 terrified by the roar of two hundred 
 guns and the shrill, sharp sounds of 
 thousands of muskets, rushed back 
 through the Union batteries, giving 
 the impression that it was an attack 
 of Confederate cavalry, and producing 
 all the effects of a panic. But for this 
 unhappy circumstance, Porter might 
 have been able to hold the field and 
 get all his guns across the river. As 
 it was, his entii'e force was pressing 
 towards the bridges, the Confederates, 
 in great force, close upon their heels. 
 It had almost become a rout. At this 
 extreme moment, when all seemed lost, 
 the brigades of French and Meagher, 
 Avho had crossed from the other side, 
 came rushing up from the bridges and 
 dashed to the front. Wild hurrahs 
 i-ent the air as they appeared on the 
 field. The retreating Nationals halted 
 and re-formed. The Confederates, see- 
 ing fresh troops, and ignorant of their 
 number, paused, and rested on the 
 field they had won. It was now after 
 sunset; and darkness soon fell upon 
 the scene of carnage. Such was the 
 battle of Gaines' Mill. Prodigies of 
 valor were performed by both armies. 
 
 Weed's battery, above referred to, was 
 under fire for eight and a half hours ; 
 and it was only when some of the 
 guns were disabled, and when pressed 
 by the overwhelming masses of the 
 enemy, that the position was abaU" 
 doned. On both sides the losses were 
 heavy. The Confederate loss must 
 have been great; for in Jackson's corps 
 alone there were 589 killed and 2671 
 wounded. McClellan's loss was 9000 
 men and twenty-two guns. 
 
 Although he had suffered severely, 
 and been driven from his position. 
 Porter had yet won a substantial vic- 
 tory. He had accomj^lished the great 
 purpose for which he fought:. He was 
 still master of the position in front 
 of the bridges. During the night, he 
 carried his thinned and exhausted recfi- 
 ments across the Chickahominy, and 
 destroyed the bridges in his rear. It 
 was found impossible to care for the 
 dead and the seriously wounded ; and 
 a few guns and some pnsoners were 
 left behind. McClellan applied his 
 whole energies more and more towards 
 the successful accomplishment of his 
 retreat. Flight, not fight, was now 
 his fixed purpose. General Keyes was 
 ordered forward to take possession of 
 the road across the White Oak Swamp, 
 and of all communicatory approaches. 
 By noon of the 28th Keyes was jnm 
 in the position prescribed. Dur- 28. 
 ing the day Porter and McCall, with 
 their shattered bands, took positions 
 on the roads leading from Richmond to 
 White Oak Swamp and Long Bridge. 
 Sumner and Heintzelman, with Smith's 
 division, of Franklin's corps, formed 
 
S63 
 
 McCLELLAN'S RETKEAT. 
 
 an interior line, guarding the Rieli- 
 mond roads. Slocum's division was 
 left as a reserve at Savage's Station. 
 "While the troops were in this posi- 
 tion, 5000 wagons, a siege train, a 
 herd of 2500 oxen and vast quantities 
 of material were successfully moved 
 across the swamp, on the way towards 
 the James River. 
 
 It was not until the afternoon of the 
 28th that the Confederates fully under- 
 stood the situation. They had sup- 
 posed, from the manner in which the 
 ground had been vacated, that McClel- 
 lan had been cut off from his line of 
 retreat ; and the capture or destruction 
 of the entire National army was re- 
 garded as certain. The Confederates 
 were wild with delight. The day was 
 spent in burying the dead and caring 
 for the wounded. A demonstration 
 was made towards White House, where 
 it was expected immense stores of all 
 kinds would be found. But Stoneman 
 and Emory had already done their 
 work, and proceeded by way of York- 
 town to rejoin the army on the James 
 River. In place, therefore, of finding 
 rich and abundant supplies at White 
 House, the Confederates found nothing 
 but blackened ruins. What the Na- 
 tionals had not been able to carry off, 
 they had committed to the flames. 
 When the state of things at White 
 House was reported to General Lee, he 
 at once comprehended the situation. 
 McClellan, he knew, was on his way 
 to the James River, to form a junction 
 with the fleet. Singularly enough, it 
 does not appear that the plan of re- 
 treat conceived and carried out by 
 
 McClellan had, up to that moment, 
 entered the minds of the Confederate 
 leaders. When it became known to 
 them, they did not dream of the pos- 
 sibility of its success. It was their 
 decided conviction that, as he had been 
 driven from all his strongholds on the 
 north side of the Chickahominy, and 
 been cut off from all communications 
 with White House, his base of sup- 
 plies, the Chickahominy in his rear 
 and the divisions of Magruder, Long- 
 street and Huger in his front, it would 
 be impossible for the National com- 
 mander to save his army. AiTange- 
 ments were made at once for a vigorous 
 pursuit. 
 
 McClellan, not unnaturally, was 
 greatly elated by the success which 
 had so far attended the retreat. His 
 despatch to the secretary of war, bear- 
 ing date June 28th, was boastful and 
 extravagant. He truly declared that 
 no one need blush for the aimy of the 
 Potomac. It was a little absurd, how- 
 ever, for him to say, considering the 
 many opportunities he had flung away, 
 that with 10,000 additional men he 
 could take Richmond to-morrow ; and 
 surely his better sense had deserted 
 him when he allowed himself to write 
 to the secretary of war: "If I save this 
 ai'my now, I tell you plainly that I 
 owe no thanks to you or to any other 
 person in Washington. You have done 
 your best to sacrifice this army." 
 
 McClellan had spent the whole of 
 the 28th at Savage's Station, superin- 
 tending the retreat, and so disposing 
 his troops as effectually to block the 
 way of his pursuers. Early on the 
 
SAVAGE'S STATION. 
 
 263 
 
 June morning of tlie 29tli, he caused 
 29< to be destroyed all that could 
 not be carried away from the camps. 
 A complete railroad train, locomotive, 
 tender and cars, which had been left 
 on the track, the cars filled with sup- 
 plies and shells, was turned loose, and 
 went rolling headlong over the broken 
 bridge into the Chickahominy. The 
 train had been set on fire at starting ; 
 and, as car after car went crashing 
 over the broken bridge, the shells 
 bursting in rapid succession, added 
 grandeur to the work of destruction. 
 This done, the general-in-chief moved 
 across the White Oak Swamp towards 
 the front of his retreating columns. 
 About the same hour that McClellan 
 left Savage's Station, Lee commenced 
 his pursuit. In the race, McClellan 
 had the advantage of twenty-four hours. 
 Magruder and Huger, who, as we have 
 seen, were posted south of the Chick- 
 ahominy and in front of the works at 
 Fair Oaks, were ordered to push along 
 the Williamsburg and Charles City 
 Roads; Longstreet and Hill were to 
 cross the Chickahominy at New Bridge; 
 and Jackson was to cross at the Grape 
 Vine Bridge, and sweep down the 
 right bank of the river. Provision was 
 thus made to intercept the retreating 
 army if possible ; and, in any case, to 
 fall with great force on both flanks, 
 and on the rear. Magruder, as he 
 moved along the Williamsburg Turn- 
 pike, found that the works at Fair Oaks 
 had been abandoned. Sumner and 
 Heintzelman, with Smith's division, of 
 Franklin's corps, had fallen back to- 
 ward Savage's Station. Made aware 
 
 of the approach of Magnider, Sumner 
 prepared to offer resistance. The di' 
 visions of Richardson and Sedgwick 
 were formed on the right of the rail- 
 road — Sedgwick's right touching Heint- 
 zelman's left. Magruder fell with 
 great fury on Sedgwick as early as 
 nine o'clock, but he was compelled to 
 fall back. Unfortunately at this stage 
 Heintzelman, giving way to some mis- 
 apprehension of the orders given him, 
 moved towards White Oak Swamp, 
 and crossed the bridge, thus leaving a 
 gap of some three-quarters of a mile 
 between Sumner an-d Smith. Magru- 
 der saw his opportunity; and, aftei 
 some manoeuvreing, rushed upon the 
 Nationals with tremendous violence. 
 The brigades of Generals Burns, Brooke 
 and Hancock were soon engaged. The 
 New York Sixty-Ninth came to their 
 aid; while splendid sei-vice was ren- 
 dered by the batteries of Pettit, Osborn 
 and Bramhall, who promptly took 
 part in the action. Magruder was thus 
 kept at bay, the National troops hold- 
 ing their gi'ound until darkness fell 
 upon the scene and made an end of the 
 battle. Magruder had counted wdth 
 confidence on being joined by Jackson, 
 but that officer had been too long de^ 
 layed in rebuilding Grape Vine Bridge, 
 During the night Sumner, leaving be- 
 hind him in the hospitals some 2500 
 sick and wounded, moved towards 
 White Oak Swamp ; and before sun- 
 rise on the following morning, the Na- 
 tional troops had passed over White 
 Oak Bridge, and the bridge had been 
 destroyed. Over this one bridge had 
 passed almost the entire army of the 
 
364 
 
 McCLELLAN'S RETREAT. 
 
 Potomac, with all its trains and herds 
 of cattle. By its destruction, a fresh 
 obstacle was placed in the way of the 
 pursuing army. The fight of the 29th 
 is known as the battle of Savage's 
 Station. The one sad feature of the 
 day was the leaving behind so many 
 sick and wounded. It was one of those 
 terrible necessities which bring out into 
 striking relief the horrors of war. 
 
 On Monday morning, the 30th of 
 June June, McClellan had reached 
 SO* Malvern Hills. This is " an ele- 
 vated plateau, cleared of timber, about 
 a mile and a half long by three-fourths 
 of a mile wide, with several converg- 
 ing roads running over it. In front 
 $.Ye numerous defensible ravines, the 
 ground sloping gradually toward the 
 north and east to the woodland, giv- 
 ing clear ranges for the artillery in 
 those directions. Towards the north- 
 west, the plateau falls off more abrupt- 
 ly to a ravine which extends to James 
 River. From the position of the ene- 
 my, his most obvious lines of attack 
 were from the direction of Richmond 
 and White Oak Swamp, and would 
 almost of necessity strike the Na- 
 tional army on its left wing." This 
 place McClellan regarded as the key to 
 his contemplated new position. Here, 
 therefore, in the mansion house of the 
 estate, he established his headquarters ; 
 and here he resolved to mass his troops 
 (ind collect his artillery. He lost no 
 time in establishing communication 
 between the army and the gunboats, 
 which were in charge of Commodore 
 Rodgers. Meanwhile a large part of 
 the army, having emerged from White 
 
 Oak Swamp, were beginning to appear 
 on tlie high, open ground of Malvern 
 Hills, the van reaching as far forward 
 as Turkey Bend. It was not, however, 
 without a severe struggle that this 
 position had been gained. The morn- 
 ing of the iJOth was exceedingly hot; 
 but there was to be no rest for the 
 weai-y and foot-sore men on either 
 side. The retreating army must con- 
 tinue its retreat : the pursuing army 
 must continue its pursuit. Generals 
 Sumner and Franklin were left to act 
 as a rear-guard, and to hold the pas< 
 sage of White Oak Swamp Bridge. 
 General Heintzelman, with the divi- 
 sions of Hooker, Kearney, Sedgwick 
 and McCall, took a position at the point 
 of intersection of the roads which lead 
 from Richmond, called Charles City 
 Cross Roads. The Confederates re- 
 sumed the advance the following morn- 
 ing. Generals D. H. Hill, Whitney 
 and Ewell, with their divisions, un- 
 der command of Jackson, had crossed 
 the Chickahominy by the Grape Vine 
 Bridge, and followed the retreating 
 Nationals by the Williamsburg Road 
 and Savage's Station. Generals Long- 
 street and A. P. Hill had crossed at 
 New Bridge, and, having moved around 
 the head of the swamp, made a rapid 
 march down the Central Road, in the 
 hope of being able to strike McCleL 
 lan's flank. Meanwhile, Magruder and 
 Huger had been marching on a pai-allel 
 line with Longstreet along the New 
 Market Road. The Confederates wei'e 
 in high hopes that they would be able 
 to penetrate McClellan's line ; and to 
 make matters absolutely certain, a bri- 
 
WHITE OAK SWAMP AND GLENDALE. 
 
 265 
 
 gade had been ordered to come across 
 the James River from Fort Daj'ling. 
 It was expected that at least 80,000 
 Confederates would be brought into 
 action ; and Jefferson Davis had come 
 on from Richmond to witness the cap- 
 ture or destruction of the army of the 
 Potomac. About noon Jackson came 
 up to White Oak Swamp and found 
 the bridge destroyed. Sumner and 
 Franklin weie there in force. A fierce 
 artillery fight commenced at once. It 
 lasted during the entire day, the Con- 
 federates massing their forces and put- 
 ting forth almost superhuman efforts 
 to force a passage. * It was found to 
 be impossible, however, to make any 
 headway against the batteries of Ayres 
 and Hazard. During the struggle 
 Hazard was mortally wounded, and 
 his force was so cut up that his bat- 
 tery had to be withdrawn. Ayres 
 continued the fire without intermission 
 until night closed upon the scene. The 
 Confederates failed in their purpose 
 to force a passage across the swamp. 
 During the night the Nationals retired, 
 leaving on the ground some 350 sick 
 and wounded, and several disabl^wi 
 guns. 
 
 While the contest was raging at the 
 broken bridge, and the Confederates 
 were prevented from crossing or making 
 any attempt at reconstruction, another 
 and even more fearful battle was raging 
 in another direction, although at no great 
 distance. Later on the same day, about 
 four o'clock in the afternoon, Longstreet 
 and A. P. Hill, who had been waiting 
 for Magruder and Huger, fell upon 
 Heintzelman and his forces at the point 
 
 where the Long Bridge Road intersects 
 the Quaker or Willis Road, not far 
 from Willis Church. There were two 
 farms in the immediate neighborhood, 
 one called Frazier's and the other called 
 Nelson's, both of which have given 
 names to the battle. The Nationals 
 were strongly posted, their heavy guns 
 particularly being in good position. 
 Longstreet having been called away, 
 the Confederate command devolved 
 upon A. P. Hill. It seemed to be 
 Hill's intention to drive the Nationals 
 before him by the first onslaught. 
 Massing his forces, therefore, on he 
 came, as if with the speed of the 
 whirlwind and the force of the ava- 
 lanche. He had not properly reckoned 
 regarding his foe. A terrific shower 
 of ai'tillery and musketry decimated 
 his ranks and threw his troops into 
 disorder. The crushing blow dealt by 
 the Confederates fell most heavily 
 upon McCall. His division — the Peun 
 sylvania Reserves — originally 10,000 
 strong, had been reduced since he 
 reached the Pamunkey to 6000. But 
 the men were in excellent trim, and 
 full of spirit. Colonel Simmons, with 
 the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth 
 Reserves, rushed upon the Confederates, 
 when reeling and broken under the,, 
 terrific fire, driving them back to the 
 woods and making 200 of them pris- 
 onei's. Lee hurried forward reinforce- 
 ments; and the victorious Nationals 
 were driven back to their original 
 ground with terriWe slaughter, Sim- 
 mons himself being mortally wounded. 
 For two hours more the battle raged, 
 victoiy yielding now to the one side 
 
266 
 
 McCLELLAN'S RETREAT. 
 
 1 
 
 and now to the other. It seemed to 
 be the determined purpose of the Con- 
 federates to break the National line 
 and to capture its batteries. At one 
 time Cooper's battery in the centre 
 was captured. By a dashing effort it 
 was retaken, together with the stand- 
 ard of an Ahibama regiment. At a 
 critical moment Meagher rushed for- 
 ward with his Irish brigade ; and such 
 was the fuiy of the onset that the 
 Confederates were driven back again 
 to the woods. One of the most brill- 
 iant charges of the day was made by 
 the Fifty-Fifth and Sixtieth Yii-ginia. 
 They captured Randall's battery, and 
 drove back in confusion the supporting 
 regiments. Determined to reca2:)ture 
 it, McCall and Meade rallied their in- 
 fantry. A terrific and protracted hand- 
 to-hand fight ensued ; and, although 
 the reserves were repulsed, they car- 
 ried back with them the recaptured 
 guus. The darkness was setting in. 
 Dui'ing the fierce struggle, the officers 
 had recklessly exposed themselves. 
 Meade was severely wounded, and a 
 Jittle later McCall was captured. Sey- 
 mour assumed command, and the bat- 
 tle continued. The sounds of battle 
 had attracted the attention of Hooker 
 and Kearney ; and as night was clos- 
 ing upon the scene, their divisions 
 arrived upon the field. They were 
 soon joined by the First New Jersey 
 brigade. Some of the lost ground was 
 immediately reclaimed. Joyful shouts 
 arose from the National ranks. The 
 Confederates, worn out and perplexed 
 }iy this fresh accession of strength on 
 the part of the Nationals, retired to the 
 
 shelter of the woods. It was not an- 
 other victory to either side; but it 
 was another great battle ; and to the 
 Nationals it was equal to a victory, 
 for it was a successful resistance. On 
 this day, as the reader now knows, 
 there were two separate fights. The 
 one is best known as the battle of 
 White Oak Swamp ; the other as the 
 battle of Glendale. The latter is 
 known also as the battle of Frazier's 
 Farm. 
 
 In no previous battle of the war, 
 perhaps, was the martial spirit so keen- 
 ly and so bitterly developed as on this 
 day, and particularly at the battle of 
 Glendale. The wounding of Meade 
 and the capture of McCall give evi- 
 dence of the feeling on the National 
 side. On the 30th of June, the real 
 sentiment of the rank and file of the 
 Nationals was several times revealed 
 by the loud and universal cry, " On to 
 Richmond." On the Confederate side 
 there was equal determination and more 
 bitterness. It was no uncommon thing 
 on that day for cavalry officers to leap 
 from their saddles and lead to the 
 charge infantry regiments who had lost 
 their commanders. At one time Gen- 
 eral Hill, when the Confederates were 
 in full retreat, seized the standard of 
 the Fourth North Carolina, a regiment 
 which he had formerly commanded, 
 and shouted to the retreating soldiers : 
 " If you will not follow, I will perish 
 alone." "Lead on. Hill: head your 
 old North Carolina boys !" rang over 
 the field, while fifty officers dashed to 
 his side. The result was that the Con- 
 federates halted and turned, and the 
 
MALVERN HILLS. 
 
 267 
 
 pursuit was checked. Major Peyton 
 had a son who had both his legs shat- 
 tered. He called to his father for help. 
 " When we have beaten the enemy, 
 then I will help you. 1 have other 
 sons to lead to glory. Forward." 
 Such was the answer. In a few sec- 
 onds more the father was dead. Such 
 incidents might easily be multiplied on 
 both sides ; but these are sufficient to 
 show the intensity of feeling which 
 influenced both armies at this particu- 
 lar juncture. Of McCall's division, 
 nearly one-fourth had been killed or 
 wounded ; and General Pryor tells us 
 that he crossed the Chickahominy with 
 1400 men, and that in the fights that 
 followed he suffered a loss of 859 
 killed and wounded, and eleven miss- 
 ing. 
 
 It was the confident expectation of 
 the Confederates that the battle would 
 be resumed next day. In this, however, 
 they were doomed to disappointment. 
 During the darkness the retreat was 
 July continued ; and on the morning 
 !• of the 1st of July, the army of 
 the Potomac was again a unit, and 
 strongly posted— infantry, cavalry and 
 artillery — on the high gi'ounds of Mal- 
 vern Hills, the James River in view, 
 and its communication with that river 
 secured. The character of that ground 
 has been already described. The posi- 
 tion was naturally strong, and Mc- 
 Clellan had arrayed his forces with 
 admirable skill. Both flanks of the 
 army rested on James River, under 
 protection of the gunboats. The ar- 
 rangement of the troops from left to 
 right was thus: Porter, Heintaelman, 
 
 Sumner, Franklin, Keyes. The ap- 
 proaches to the position were com- 
 manded by about seventy guns, several 
 of them heavy siege cannon. " There 
 were crouching cannon waiting for 
 the enemy, and ready to defend all 
 the approaches. Sheltered by fences, 
 ditches, ravines, were swarms of in- 
 fantry. There were horsemen pictur- 
 esquely careering over the noon-tide 
 and sun-scarred field. Tier after tier of 
 batteries were grimly visible upon the 
 slope which rose in the form of an am- 
 phitheatre. With a fan-shaped sheet 
 of fire, they could sweep the incline — a 
 sort of natural glacis — up which the 
 assailants must advance. A crown of 
 cannon was on the brow of the hill. 
 The first line of batteries could only 
 be reached by traversing an open space 
 of from three to four hundred yards, 
 exposed to grape and canister from 
 the artillery, and musketry from the 
 infantry. If that were earned, another 
 and still another more difficult re- 
 mained in the rear." Such was the 
 position, and such were the forces 
 against which Lee was now to direct 
 all his strength. It was not without 
 reason that, when the attack was about 
 to be made, Hill expressed to Lee 
 his strong disapproval. Lee, however, 
 had made up his mind to take the 
 position by storm; and he gave his 
 orders accordingly. 
 
 The Confederate chief had massed 
 his troops on the right; and he so 
 posted his artillery as to be able to 
 bring upon the National batteries a 
 concentrated fire. It was his belief 
 that by this means he would silence 
 
268 
 
 McCLELLAN'S EETREAT. 
 
 the guns of McClellan; and he had 
 given orders that, whenever the expect- 
 ed result was produced, Armistead's 
 brigade, of Huger's division, should 
 advance with a shout and capture the 
 battery immediately before it. This 
 shout was to be the signal for a gen- 
 eral advance with fixed bayonets to 
 " drive the invaders into the James." 
 Lee found more difficulty in carrying 
 out his plan than he had anticipated. 
 The day was far advanced before the 
 first gun was fired. Between three and 
 four o'clock a heavy artillery fire was 
 opened upon Couch, of Keyes' division, 
 and Kearney, of Heintzelman's. A 
 little later D. H. Hill, believing that 
 he heard the preconcerted signal for a 
 general advance, made a vigorous rush 
 towards Couch's front. Instead of being 
 supported by one hundred guns, as he 
 had expected, only a single battery was 
 ordered up — that of Moorman ; and it 
 was knocked to pieces in a few min- 
 utes. One or two others shared the 
 same fate — that of being beat in detail. 
 Hill was di'iven back in confusion to 
 the woods near the Quaker Road. On 
 his retreating, the National right ad- 
 vanced several hundred yards and took 
 a stronger position. Magruder, mean- 
 while, had made a fuiious attack on 
 Porter, who commanded on the Na- 
 tional left. Two brigades of McLaws' 
 division, charging through a dense 
 wood, rushed up to the very muzzles 
 of Porter's guns. Attacks equally 
 furious were made a little further to 
 the right, and also on the centre. It 
 was to no purpose. The attacking col- 
 umns, one and all, shared the same 
 
 fate. They were driven back in con- 
 fusion, and with heavy loss. Nothing 
 could withstand the terrific fire of the 
 National batteries. Malvern Hills lit- 
 erally blazed, as if one sheet of solid 
 flame; and the guns, which crowned 
 every rising knoll, from their many 
 mouths belched forth shot and shell 
 which fell in showers on the bewil- 
 dered masses who from time to time 
 pressed forward, only to be torn to 
 pieces, or to be driven back in wildest 
 confusion. There was a lull in the 
 battle. The fighting ceased for a time, 
 the Confederates having all fallen back 
 and taken shelter in the pine forest. 
 Lee, however, was not to be driven 
 from his purpose. He had made up 
 his mind that Malvern Hills must be 
 taken by storm ; and no matter what 
 the cost, no matter how great the sacri- 
 fice, the attempt must be repeated. 
 He spent the interval in re-forming his 
 battalions ; and at about six o'clock he 
 opened a general artillery fire on the 
 right and left of the National j.osition, 
 his infantry rushing from their cover- 
 ing at the double-quick, sweeping over 
 the undulating fields and boldly up the 
 hill in the direction of the "oatteries. 
 As they advanced, their raiiks were 
 torn and ploughed by musketry as 
 well as by the heavy guns. Brigade 
 after brigade was cut up and driven 
 back; but their places were speedily 
 filled, with a like result. As the even- 
 ing advanced, the fighting became at 
 once more general and more severe. 
 The batteries on the hill redoubled their 
 fire, the Confederates replying with 
 equal boldness. The gunboats on the 
 
. ' AL dTONEWALL" JACKSON 
 
 THE FAMOUS CONFEDERATE COMMANDER 
 
AN OPPORTUNITY LOST. 
 
 269 
 
 river now began to fling shot and shell, 
 which fell with deadly effect on the 
 Confederate masses. For two hours 
 the hills absolutely shook under the 
 fierce cannonade. It was not until 
 nine o'clock that the attempt to cap- 
 ture the National position was aban- 
 doned, and that the firing ceased. In 
 his report of the engagement at Mal- 
 vern Hills, General McClellan gives a 
 gi-aphic picture of the struggle when it 
 was most fierce. " Brigade after bri- 
 gade," he says, " formed under cover 
 of the woods, started at a run to cross 
 the open space and charge our bat- 
 teries, but the heavy fire of our guns, 
 ■with the cool and steady volleys of our 
 Infantry, in every case sent them reel- 
 ing back to shelter, and covered the 
 ground with their dead and wounded. 
 In several instances our infantry with- 
 held their fire until the attacking col- 
 umns — which rushed through the storm 
 of canister and shell from our artillery — 
 had reached within a few yards of our 
 lines. They then poured in a single 
 volley, and dashed forward with the 
 bayonet, capturing prisoners and colors, 
 and driving the routed columns in con- 
 fusion from the field." Such was the 
 battle of Malvern Hills. It was, al- 
 though not in any sense decisive, one 
 of the bloodiest and most fiercely con- 
 tested battles of the war. 
 
 The night that followed was dark 
 ind stormy. The rain fell in absolute 
 orrents. During such a night the 
 Bufferings of the wounded must have 
 been fearful. The wearied Confede- 
 rates sought a brief repose on the rain- 
 soaked and blood-stained soil, some of 
 
 them lying within one hundred yards 
 of the National batteries. 
 
 When the morning of the 2d of July 
 dawned, and the half-slept Con- Jniy 
 federates began to open their 2. 
 eyes, they discovered with some amaze- 
 ment that the Nationals were gone, 
 and that Malvern Hills, the scene the 
 evening before of so much tempestuous 
 life — their heights crowned with frown- 
 ing cannon, brilliant with gay uniforms, 
 and refulgent with thousands of bay- 
 onets, which caught on their glittering 
 points the rays of the setting sun — were 
 deserted and silent as the grave. In 
 the Confederate camp all was dire con- 
 fusion. The following picture is by 
 one of their own generals : " The next 
 morning, by dawn," he says, "I went 
 oif to ask for orders, when I found the 
 whole army in the utmost disorder. 
 Thousands of straggling men were ask- 
 ing every passer-by for their regiments; 
 ambulances, wagons and artillery ob- 
 structing every road, and all together 
 in a drenching rain presenting a scene 
 of the most woful and heart-rending: 
 confusion." It is not wonderful, when 
 these things are known to us, that 
 many competent critics have ques- 
 tioned the propriety of McClellan's 
 conduct in continuing the retreat. The 
 words, "On to Richmond," if uttered 
 by him, would have been gladly obeyed 
 by most of his oflScers, and by thou- 
 sands of his men. This perpetual 
 fighting, with no result but further 
 retreat, was breaking the spirits of his' 
 soldiers. Such an order on the morn- 
 ing of the 2d would have filled them 
 with newness of life ; and even at the 
 
 SX7 
 
370 
 
 McCLELLAN'S RETREAT. 
 
 last, worn and weary as they were, 
 they might have marched in triumph 
 to the Confederate capital. McClellan 
 thought otherwise ; and he otherwise 
 ordered. 
 
 It is hardly possible to conceive of 
 bircumstances more depressing, than 
 those in which McClellan's army 
 was placed on the night of the 1st 
 of July, 1862. For six days they 
 had been struggling with a powerful 
 foe, each successive fight being fol- 
 lowed by a fresh retreat. During 
 thi'ee days it had been continuous 
 fighting and marching. The men had 
 had no rest. . Foot-sore and battle- 
 worn, they were not to be allowed even 
 on this night even an hour's repose. 
 The roar of the conflict had not ceased 
 more than two hours, when orders 
 were given to resume the retreat. The 
 night, as we have said, was dark, and 
 the storm I'aged fiercely. We cannot 
 wonder that the order gave general 
 dissatisfaction. Some of them openly 
 and loudly protested. Fitz John Porter 
 was indignant ; and his faith in his 
 chief was at least temporarily shaken. 
 Phil. Kearney was more plain-spoken 
 than most of his brother-oflScers. " I, 
 Philip Kearney," he said, "an old sol- 
 dier, enter my solemn protest against 
 this order for a retreat. We ought, 
 instead of retreating, to follow up the 
 enemy, and take Richmond ; and in 
 full view of all the responsibilities of 
 such a declaration, I say to you all, 
 such an order can only be prompted 
 by cowardice or treason." The order, 
 July however, was obeyed ; and by 
 
 !• midnight the utterly exhausted 
 
 soldiers were groping their way along 
 a road which is described as desperate. 
 There was only a narrow pass along 
 which the army could retreat. The mud 
 was ankle deep all over the ground. 
 It was only seven miles to Harrison's 
 Landing ; and yet such was the nature of 
 the road and the condition of the ground, 
 that it was not till the middle jniy 
 of the next day that the landing 2. 
 was reached. It was the evening of the 
 3d before the wagons were all for- jniy 
 ward and in their places. The Con- ^« 
 federates, after a fourth attempt at pur- 
 suit, turned their backs on the National 
 army and on they moved to Richmond. 
 On the 4th of July General Mc- jniy 
 Clellan issued the following ad- *• 
 dress to his army : 
 
 " Soldiers of the army of thb 
 Potomac — Your achievements of the 
 past ten days have illustrated the valor 
 and endurance of the American soldier. 
 Attacked by superior forces, and with- 
 out hopes of reinforcements, you have 
 succeeded in changing your base of 
 operations by a flank movement, always 
 regarded as the most hazardous of mil- 
 itary operations. You have saved all 
 your guns, except a few lost in battle. 
 Upon your march you have been as- 
 sailed, day after day, with desperate 
 fury, by men of the same race and 
 nation, skilfully massed and led. Un- 
 der every disadvantage of number, and 
 necessarily of position also, you have 
 in every conflict beaten back your foes 
 with enormous slaughter. Your con- 
 duct ranks you among the celebrated 
 armies of history. None wiU now ques- 
 tion what each of you may always, with 
 
NATIONAL DISAPPOINTMENT. 
 
 271 
 
 pride, say : ' I belonged to the army of 
 the Potomac' You have reached this 
 new base complete in organization and 
 unimpaired in spirit. The enemy may at 
 any time attack you— we are prepared 
 to meet them. I have personally es- 
 tablished your lines. Let them come, 
 and we will convert their repulse into 
 a final defeat. 
 
 " Your government is strengthening 
 you with the resources of a great people. 
 On this, our nation's birthday, we de- 
 clare to our foes, who are rebels against 
 the best interests of mankind, that this 
 army shall enter the capital of the so- 
 called Confederacy; that our National 
 constitution shall prevail, and that the 
 Union, which can alone insure internal 
 peace and external security to each 
 State, must and shall be preserved, cost 
 Vhat it may in time, treasure and blood. 
 " Geo. B. McClellan, 
 "Major-General Commanding." 
 
 On the 5th, President Davis issued 
 July the following address to the 
 5» army in Eastern Virginia : 
 
 " Soldiers — I congratulate you on 
 the series of brilliant victories which, 
 under the favor of Divine Providence, 
 you have lately won, and, as the presi- 
 dent of the Confederate States, do 
 heartily tender to you the thanks of 
 the country, whose just cause you have 
 so skilfully and heroically served. Ten 
 days ago an invading army, vastly 
 superior to you in numbers and the 
 material of war, closely beleaguered 
 your capital and vauntingly proclaimed 
 its speedy conquest; you marched to 
 attack the enemy in his intrenchments ; 
 with well-dii*ected movements and 
 
 death-defying valor, you charged upon 
 him in his strong positions, drove him 
 from field to field over a distance of 
 more than thirty-five miles, and, despite 
 his reinforcements, compelled him to 
 seek sjifety under the cover of his gun- 
 boats, where he now lies cowering 
 before the army so lately derided and 
 threatened with entire subjugation. 
 The fortitude with which you have 
 borne toil and privation, the gallantry 
 with which you have entered into each 
 successive battle, must have been wit- 
 nessed to be fully appreciated ; but a 
 grateful people will not fail to recog- 
 nize you, and to bear you in loved re- 
 membrance. Well may it be said of 
 you that you have 'done enough for 
 glory ' ; but duty to a suffering country 
 and to the cause of constitutional lib- 
 erty, claims from you yet further effort. 
 Let it be your pride to relax in nothing 
 which can promote your futui-e effi- 
 ciency; your one great object being to 
 drive the invader from your soil, and, 
 carrying your standards beyond the 
 outer boundaries of the Confederacy, 
 to wring from an unscrupulous foe the 
 recognition of your birthright, com' 
 rounity and independence. 
 
 "Jefferson Davis." 
 Cheeiy and hopeful as were General 
 McClellan's words, the complete failure 
 of the Peninsular expedition filled the 
 nation with sorrow. There was gen- 
 eral gloom ; and but for the successes 
 which had attended the armies in the 
 "West, the situation would have been 
 desperate enough. The Confederates, 
 of course, were jubilant; and there 
 were many who thought that they had 
 
272 
 
 McCLELLAN'S RETREAT. 
 
 good reason for their joy. In his re- 
 port, General Lee said: "The siege of 
 Richmond was raised, and the object 
 of a campaign which had been prose- 
 cuted after months of preparations, at 
 an enormous expenditure of men and 
 money, completely finistrated. More 
 than ten thousand prisoners, including 
 officers of rank, fifty-two pieces of 
 artilleiy and upwards of thirty-five 
 thousand stand of small arms, were 
 captured. The stores and supplies, of 
 every description, which fell into our 
 hands were great in amount and value, 
 but small in comparison with those 
 destroyed by the enemy. His losses 
 in battle exceeded our own, as attested 
 by the thousands of dead and woimded 
 left on every field, which his subse- 
 quent inaction shows in what condition 
 the survivors reached the protection to 
 which they fl^ed." Boastful and offen- 
 sive as this report was felt to be at the 
 time, it was nevertheless admitted to 
 be a not distant approximation to the 
 truth. The committee of Congress on 
 the conduct of the war gave in a re- 
 port which was not altogether favor- 
 able to McClellan. "The retreat of 
 the army from Malvern to Harrison's 
 Bar," it declared, "was very precipi- 
 tate. The troops, upon their arrival 
 there, were huddled together in great 
 confiision, the entire army being col- 
 lected within a space of about three 
 miles along the river. No orders were 
 •iven the first day for occupying the 
 .ieights which commanded the position, 
 nor were the troops so placed as to be 
 able to resist an attack in force by the 
 enemy, and nothing but a heavy rain, 
 
 thereby preventing the enemy from 
 bringing up their artillery, saved the 
 army from destruction." There had 
 been sent to the Peninsula from first 
 to last about 160,000 men. On the 3d 
 of July, when this army had reached 
 Harrison's Landing and was under the 
 protection of the gunboats, McClellan 
 telegraphed to the president that he 
 had not "over 50,000 left vdth their 
 colors." The actual number, however, 
 was about 86,000, as was found on close 
 inspection, when President Lincoln, on 
 July the 7th, made a visit to McClellan's 
 headquarters. These figures speak vol- 
 umes. So large a sacrifice of human 
 life ought to have produced greater 
 and more beneficial results. 
 
 This chapter would be incomplett 
 without a reference to the correspond- 
 ence which took place between General 
 McClellan and the government, in re- 
 gard to his future movements and the 
 use to be made of his army. On the 
 morning of the day on which was 
 fought the battle of Malvern jnne 
 Hills, McClellan telegraphed to 30. 
 "Washington for fresh troops, adding 
 that it might be necessary for him to 
 fall back to the river. The president 
 promptly replied that he had no men 
 to send, but that if he had a million 
 at his disposal, it would be impossible 
 to forward them in time to meet the 
 emergency, urging him at the same 
 time to save his army, even if he should 
 be compelled to fall back to Fort- 
 ress Monroe. The president added : 
 " We still have strength enough in the 
 country, and will bring it out." jnij 
 On the following day McClellan *• 
 
DEMAND FOR MORE TROOPS. 
 
 213 
 
 «l«^ for 50,000 troops, when he had 
 for i*vply that the demand could not be 
 complied with, as 15,000 more men 
 were needed to defend the National 
 oapital. If he was not strong enough 
 to take Richmond, the president did 
 not ask him to attempt an impossi- 
 bility. Strange to say, in spite of all 
 jnly this, McClellan made a demand 
 
 3. on the 3d for 100,000 men— 
 a demand which he repeated on the 
 Jnly 4th, that he might, as he said, 
 
 *• '' take Richmond and the re- 
 bellion." It was at this time, too, 
 that he wrote that foolish letter which 
 is destined to be remembeied against 
 him, offering the president political 
 advice, particularly in the matter of 
 slavery. 
 
 McClellan could not bear the idea of 
 being overruled in his plans — if Rich- 
 mond was to be captured, he must 
 have the gloiy ; nor could he for one 
 moment find a place for the thought 
 that he should cease to be the chief of 
 July the army of the Potomac. On 
 
 23. the 23d of July, General Halleck, 
 having resigned his command of the 
 army of the West, assumed the duties 
 of general-in-chief of the entire army 
 of the United States. The first thing 
 to which his attention was called, was 
 the condition of the army of the Po- 
 tomac Halleck, without delay, visited 
 Harrison's Landing. Lincoln had been 
 there on the 7th. McClellan was thus 
 receiving sufficient attention. Halleck 
 found McClellan bent on moving to 
 Richmond, but impenous in his de- 
 mands for more troops. To accomplish 
 his purpose, he would lequire at least 
 
 50,000 additional troops. So large 
 a number, Halleck assured him, was 
 altogether out of tlie question. He 
 was not authorized to promise more 
 than 20,000, and to let him have 
 even that number implied the '.veak- 
 ening of other places. McClellan took 
 the night to consider the matter. In 
 the morning he had come to the 
 conclusion that he would make an at- 
 tempt on Richmond Math the ad- 
 ditional 20,000. With this under- 
 standing Halleck left for "Washington. 
 Almost immediately after his arrival 
 there, he received from McClellan a 
 telegram, stating that he could not 
 imdertake a movement upon Richmond 
 with any hope of success, unless he 
 was reinforced to the extent of 35,000 
 men. So large a body of men was not 
 at the moment disposable. It was re- 
 solved, therefore, to withdraw the 
 army of the Potomac to some position 
 where it could imite ^vith that of Gen- 
 eral Pope, and cover Washington at 
 the same time that it operated against 
 the enemy. On the 30th of July, juiy 
 McClellan received instructions 30. 
 to send away his sick as quickly as 
 possible, and to prepare for a movement 
 of his troops. On the 3d of Au- \ng, 
 gust he was oi'dered by telegraph 3. 
 to withdi-aw his entire army to Acquia 
 Creek. This he most reluctantly 
 proceeded to do. On the 4th \ug, 
 he wrote to Halleck, protesting *• 
 against the withdi'awal of his army. 
 The telegram of the coramander-in-chiol 
 had given him great pain. The with- 
 drawal of the aiTny to Acquia CreeK 
 could not but prove disastrous. It waij 
 
«T4 
 
 McCLELLAN'S RETREAT. 
 
 removing the army further from Rich- 
 mond, and from a base of operations 
 which had all the advantage of the co- 
 operation of the gunboats on the river. 
 It would prove demoralizing to the 
 army — both men and officers ; it would 
 have a depressing effect upon the peo- 
 ple; and it would have a powerful 
 influence in inducing foreign govern- 
 ments to recognize the independent 
 sovereignty of the Southern Confede- 
 racy. By implication he denied that 
 the government was unable to send 
 him reinforcements. " I point you," 
 he said, "to General Burnside's force, 
 to that of General Pope — not necessary 
 to maintain a strict defense in front of 
 Washington and Harper's Ferry; to 
 those portions of the amiy of theWest — 
 not required for a strict defense there. 
 Here, directly in front of the army, is 
 the heart of the rebellion. It is here 
 that all our resources should be col- 
 lected to strike the blow which will 
 determine the fate of this nation. All 
 points of secondary importance else- 
 where should be abandoned, and every 
 available man brought here. A decided 
 victory here, and the military strength 
 of the rebellion is cnished. It matters 
 not what reverses we may meet with 
 elsewhere — here is the true defense of 
 Washington ; it is here, on the bank of 
 the James River, that the fate of the 
 Union should be decided." There 
 were both truth and eloquence in Mc- 
 Clellan's words ; but coming from him 
 at this particular juncture, they were 
 powerless and without effect. They 
 failed to convince Halleck. They 
 equally failed to make any change in 
 
 the purpose of the government. Hal- 
 leck's reply was vigorous. It left un- 
 heeded none of the points which Mc- 
 Clellan had raised. He differed from 
 McClellan entirely as to the value of 
 his position, at least in the circum- 
 stances in which the National anny, as , 
 a whole, found itself. He made a y 
 strong point of the fact that he found, 
 on his arrival at Washington, the orig- li 
 inal army of the Potomac split into ' 
 two parts, with the entire force of the 
 enemy directly between them. It was 
 desirable — it was necessary- — that they 
 be again united; and, as this union 
 could not be effected on the banks of 
 the James, it must be attempted in the 
 neighborhood of Fredericksburg. The 
 question of demoralization was easily 
 disposed of. "Your change of front," 
 said Halleck, "from your extreme light 
 at Hanover Com't House to your pres- 
 ent position was over thirty miles, but 
 I have not heard that it demoralized 
 your troops, notwithstanding the severe 
 losses they sustained in effecting it." 
 He referred with effect to McClellan's 
 fickleness of purpose, now demanding 
 50,000 men, now 20,000, and then dis- 
 covering that nothing could be done 
 without an addition of at least 35,000. 
 He I'eminded him also of the dangerous 
 character of the climate on the James 
 River — a climate fatal to whites in the 
 months of August and September. He 
 finally assured him that no change 
 could be made in the orders issued, 
 and that the wishes of the govern- 
 ment must be carried out. Hal- ^uj, 
 leek's letter was written on the ^* 
 6th of August. It was not until the 
 
DTEXOTTSABLE DELAYS. 
 
 STCi 
 
 Lag. 14th that the evacuation of Har- 
 '^» rison's Landing commenced. Mc- 
 Clellan left himself on the 23d, and 
 Aug. arrived at Acquia Creek on the, 
 23. day following. 
 
 Thus ended the ill-starred Peninsular 
 'expedition. From first to last it had 
 been unfortunate. Whatever the cause, 
 that magnificent army which had been 
 organized with so much pomp and 
 pageantry at Washington, and from 
 which so great things were expected, 
 had virtually exhausted itself and cc- 
 complished nothing. No finer soldiers 
 ever went to give battle to an enemy. 
 But they were allowed to sicken in the 
 trenches at Yorktown, and to perish 
 by thousands in the woods and swamps 
 of the blood-stained Chickahominy. 
 Once only during the campaign was 
 the government, in our judgment, to 
 blame. It might have given an entire- 
 ly new feature to the campaign if, on 
 the eve of the battle of Mechanicsville, 
 McDowell had been ordered to make 
 a demonstration along the Richmond 
 Road. Such a demonstration, as we 
 have already had occasion to observe, 
 was dreaded by Lee,* as it would have 
 rendered entirely impracticable the 
 flank movement of General Jackson. 
 In the circumstances, however, and 
 after the experience it had had, the 
 
 * (leueral Robert Edmund Lee, to whom belongs 
 the chief glory of this campaign, and who had already 
 proved himself one of the greatest commanders devel- 
 oped by the war on either side, was son of General Henry 
 Lee, and was bom in Washington, in 1808. Graduating 
 at West Point, he entered the array in 1829 ; rising to 
 the rank of captain in 1838 ; major in 1846 ; and lieu- 
 tenant-colonel in 1847. He was promoted to the post 
 of anperintendent of the West Point Military Academy 
 in 1852. In 1854, he accompanied General George B. 
 MoGlellan on the commission sent hf the United States 
 
 government was not without abundant 
 reason for the justification of its con- 
 duct. It trembled for the safety of 
 Washington, and it called McDowell 
 to its protection. McClellan, however, 
 was to blame throughout. We have 
 no desire to repeat what we said when 
 treating of Yorktown and of Williams- 
 burg and of Fair Oaks, and what we 
 said over again at the conunencement 
 of this chapter. The ai-my of the Po- 
 tomac, as one has well put it, was 
 without a presiding genius — a control- 
 ling mind. The delays, which proved 
 ruinous, were absolutely inexcusable. 
 It would be ungenerous to say that Mc- 
 Clellan was wanting in bravery, or that 
 he lacked the higher qualities essentia] 
 in a great commander. But it is noto- 
 rious that he lingered at Yorktown 
 when he had no enemy to oppose hia 
 advance, that he was not present till 
 tlie battle of Williamsburg was fought 
 and won, that he was not present at 
 all at the battle of Fair Oaks, that 
 when the great battle was fought at 
 Gaines' Mill he was on the south side 
 of the Chickahominy, that he was not 
 present at White Oak Swamp or ax 
 Glendale, and that Avhen Malvern Hills 
 were shaking as if to their foundations 
 with the thunder of cannon, he was safe 
 on board the gunboats on James River. 
 
 Government to the seat of war in the Crimea. On the 
 25th of April, 1861, he re.signed his commission in the 
 United States army, and offered his sword to his native 
 State of Virginia. During that summer, he conducted 
 the military operations in the mountain regions of Vir- 
 ginia. Returning to Richmond, he was occupied till 
 June, 1862, with the general disposition and equipment 
 of the Confederate forces. When Johnston was wound- 
 ed at Fair Oaks, Lee assumed command of the army, 
 and pressed McClellan from point to point, until he took 
 his final ^tand at Malvern Hills and Harrison's Lauding 
 
2U 
 
 POPE AND LEE IN VIBGDJiA. 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 fhe Aimy of Virginia. — Pope in Oomnjand.— Fremont Eesigns. — Bumside Ordered to Alexandria. — Pope's In- 
 stmotions.— Pope Opposed to MoClellan's Retreat. — Pope's Address to his Soldiers.— He Asks to be Re- 
 lieved of his Command.— McClellan at Acquia Creek.— The Plans of the Confederates.— Pope s Orders.— 
 Measures of Retaliation by the Confederates.— A Call for Militia.— The Unpopular Orders Modified.— Th« 
 Confederates at the Rappahannock. — Pope's Army Begins to Move. — Position of the Nationals. —Pope at 
 Culpepper Court House.— Banks at Cedar Mountain. —The Confederates Approaching.— Battle of Cedar 
 Mountain.— Banks Begins the Attack.— Pope on the Ground.— A Severe Encounter.— Banks Driven Back- 
 American Obsttuacy. — The Losses on Both Sides.— The Confederates Fall Back.— Intercepted Letters.— 
 Lee's Plan.— Pope Reinforced.— A Retreat Ordered.— The Retreat Successfully Conducted. —No Rest foi 
 the Wearied Army. — The Confederates at the Heels of the Nationals. —Across the Rappahannock.— Fight- 
 ing at the Bridges and the Fords.— Stuart's Raid.— The Nationals Humiliated. — Character of the Retreat— 
 The Object of the Confederates.— Pope's Danger.- McClellan's Delay.— Wairenton Evacuated.— Pope's Dis- 
 position of his Troops. — Jackson Across the Rappahannock.— Jackson Through Thoroughfare Gap. — At 
 Bristow Station. — Captureof Manassas Junction. — Pope's Communication Intercepted. — Activity of Jackson. — 
 Both Armies in Critical Circumstances. — Pope Prepares to Strike Jackson Before the Arrival of Long- 
 street. Movement Toward Gainesville. —An Encounter at Bristow Station. — Hooker Successful. — Retreat 
 
 of Ewell. — Jackson Evacuates Manassas. — Delays Again. — Porter at Bristow Station. — His Troops Need 
 
 jieat. Merritt at Warrenton Junction. —McClellan's Officers Lukewarm. — Pope at Manassas. — Jackson's 
 
 iatreat by Way of CentrevUle. — The Pursuit. —Kearney at Centre vUle. — Bull Run. — The Old Battle- 
 Ground.— Jackson Pressing Toward Thoroughfare Gap.— King's Division.— Gallantry of Gibbons and 
 Doubleday.— A Severe Encounter. —Ewell Loses a Leg.— King Holds his Ground.— Ricketts' Division at 
 Thoroughfare Gap.— Arrival of Longstreet. — Ricketts' Division Driven Back.— King Falls Back. — The Sitn>^ 
 ition Changed.— A New Disposition of the Nationals. — Battle of Groveton or Gainesville. — The Confede- 
 ates Well Posted. — Arrival of Pope. — Severe Fighting in the Morning. —Pause in the Battle. — Pope Waits 
 for Reinforcements. — Battle Resumed. — Terrific Fighting. — The Confederate Left Doubled Back on th« 
 Centre. — The Nationals Hold the Ground. — Remarks on the Battle. —Porter Blamed. — The National Army 
 Exhausted. — Ammunition Scarce. — Pope Calls for Supplies. — McClellan's Reply. — Pope Resumes the At- 
 tack. Porter Arrives. — A Tempest of Shot and Shell. — Porter Driven Back.— A Severe Attack on the Na- 
 tional Left. — The Nationals Forced Back.— Pope Retu-es Across Bull Run. — Destruction of the Stone 
 Bridge. — The Nationals at CentreviUe. — Reports of Lee and Pope. — Preparations for Another Engage- 
 ment. — Excitement in Washington. — Lee's Purpose. — The First of September. — Battle of Chantilly.— A 
 Severe Thunder Storm. — Bravery of Stevens and Kearney. — Death of Stevens. — Death of Kearney. — Tha 
 Gallant Seventy-Ninth. — The Brave Bimey. — Kearney's Body Sent to Pope's Headquarters.— The Losses 
 During the Campaign. — Difficult Creek. — The National Army Ordered Inside the Fortifications at Washing- 
 ton. — Resignation of Pope. — Disappearance of the Army of Virginia. — Restoration of the Army of the By 
 tomac. — Reappointment of McClellan. — Vindication of Pope. 
 
 1862. 
 
 At the time McClellan was continu- 
 ing his disastrous reti'eat towards 
 Harrison's Landing, important 
 events were taking place in the nearer 
 neighborhood of the National capital; 
 and public interest and expectation 
 were both excited by the active and 
 "rigorous measures of General Pope, 
 
 who had been called from the West 
 and placed in command of the army of 
 Virginia. As early as the 27th jqik 
 of June, 1862, the following or- 27. 
 der had been issued by the president 
 " I. The forces under Major-Generals 
 Fremont, Banks and McDowell, includ 
 ing the troops no^v under Brigadier 
 
GENERAL JOHN POPE. 
 
 277 
 
 G-eneral Sturgis, at Washington, shall 
 be consolidated and form one army, to 
 be called the army of Virginia. 
 
 "II. The command of the army of 
 Virginia is specially assigned to Major- 
 Greneral John Pope, as commanding 
 general. 
 
 " The troops of the Mountain Depart- 
 ment, heretofore under command of 
 General Fremont, shall constitute the 
 First army corps, under the command 
 of General Fremont. 
 
 "The troops of the Shenandoah De- 
 partment, now under General Banks, 
 shall constitute the Second army corps, 
 and be commanded by him. 
 
 "The troops under the command of 
 General McDowell, except those within 
 the fortifications and the city of Wash- 
 ington, shall form the Third army corps, 
 and be under his command." 
 
 Major-General Pope, who now comes 
 prominently to the front, had, as the 
 reader already knows, won some dis- 
 tinction in the West. He was a native 
 of Illinois, having been born at Kas- 
 kaskia, in that State, in March, 1823. 
 His father was Judge Pope, of Illinois. 
 Having received a liberal education, 
 the younger Pope entered West Point 
 in 1838. He graduated with Rose- 
 cranz in 1842, and in August, 1846, 
 joined the army, under General Taylor, 
 in Mexico. From the close of the 
 Mexican War up until 1861, he was 
 engaged chiefly in surveying expedi- 
 tions. When the Civil War broke out, 
 he held only the rank of captain. He 
 was soon, however, appointed briga- 
 dier-general of volunteers. In De- 
 cember of 1861, he was despatched by 
 
 General Halleck into central and west- 
 ern Missouri, then being harassed by 
 Confederate raiders. In this mission 
 Pope was completely successful. Sub- 
 sequently, in March, 1862, he was 
 appointed major-general of volunteers, 
 and soon afterwards captured New 
 Madrid and Island No. 10. He took 
 part, also, in the siege of Corinth, and 
 followed up the retreating Confede- 
 rates. 
 
 The consolidation of these various 
 forces into one command was favorably 
 regarded by the public. It was be- 
 lieved that the combination would con- 
 duce alike to strength and usefulness. 
 The new aiTangemeut did not prove 
 agreeable to General Fremont, as Pope 
 had been his junior in Missouri. It 
 was Fremont's opinion that the effect 
 of the appointment of Pope to the su- 
 preme command, while he himself re- 
 mained in a subordinate jjosition, would 
 be greatly to reduce his rank and con- 
 sideration in the service ; and conse- 
 quently he asked to be relieved from 
 command. He was relieved according- 
 ly; and his corps was given first to 
 General King, and then to General 
 Sigel. In addition to these three corps, 
 a small and unorganized force, under 
 Brigadier-General Sturgis, was posted 
 in the neighborhood of Alexandria; 
 and thither, also, Burnside, who had 
 arrived at Newport News from Roan- 
 oke, was ordered to proceed with his 
 troops. The disposable movable forces 
 consisted of the three corps first namedj 
 — that of Sigel ; that of Banks ; and. 
 that of McDowell ;— about 40,000 in all. 
 The cavalry numbered about 5000; 
 
 99a 
 
278 
 
 POPE AND LEB IN VIRGINIA. 
 
 but the horses were in wretched con- 
 dition, and the men were poorly pro- 
 vided with amis. These forces were 
 scattered over a wide surface, and along 
 a line which extended fi'om Fredericks- 
 burg to Winchester and Harper's Ferry, 
 in the Shenandoah Valley ; and General 
 Pope was charged with the three-fold 
 duty of covering the National capital, 
 of guarding the valley entrance to Mary- 
 land, in the rear of Washington, and of 
 menacing Richmond from the North, 
 as a diversion in favor of McClellan. 
 
 Pope assumed command on the 28th 
 June of June, Colonel George D. Rug- 
 28« gles being his chief of staff. 
 Having disposed of his troops as he 
 best could, for the purpose of carrying 
 out the wishes of the government, he 
 was prepared to move toward Rich- 
 mond with the view of aiding McClel- 
 lan when began that series of battles 
 which preceded and attended the re- 
 treat of the army of the Potomac from 
 the Chickahominy to Harrison's Land- 
 ing. It was Pope's intention to ad- 
 vance by way of Charlottesville upon 
 the James River, above Richmond, 
 compelling Lee to detach a part of his 
 army from the front of Richmond, and 
 thus enabling McClellan to complete 
 his movement successfully. McClel- 
 lan's retreat changed the entire plan of 
 the campaign. A cabinet council was 
 called; and Pope was summoned be- 
 fore it. Pope was seriously opposed to 
 McClellan's retreat; and strongly urged 
 its impolicy upon the president and the 
 secretary of war. He offered to march 
 from Fredericksburg upon Richmond 
 direct with his whole force, insisting 
 
 only on one condition — that peremptory 
 orders should be sent to McClellan, and 
 such measures taken in advance, that it 
 would not be possible for him to evade, 
 on any pretext, making a vigorous at- 
 tack upon the enemy with his whole 
 army the moment he heard that Pope 
 was engaged. This proposal of Pope, 
 was the more honorable that it implied 
 a very considerable risk : it would have 
 placed Lee between the two National 
 annies, and given him the opportunity 
 of striking each in turn, with the pos- 
 sibility of destroying both. After Mc- 
 Clellan arrived at Harrison's Landing, 
 Pope clung to his conviction that it 
 would be impolitic for him to abandon 
 the Peninsula, and wrote to him a per- 
 sonal note, offering every assistance in 
 his power, and inviting a free exchange 
 of opinions. To this letter McClellan 
 returned a chilling reply. On jniy 
 the 14th of July, when about •*• 
 to commence active operations. Pope 
 issued to his soldiers an address which 
 revealed something like vanity, with 
 not a little irritation of feeling — an ad- 
 dress which could not have been other- 
 wise conceived and expressed if the 
 object had been to embitter sentiment 
 already known to exist, and to di- 
 vide the discordant sympathies of the 
 army of the Potomac and the army of 
 Virginia. " By special assignment of 
 the president," said Pope, " I have as- 
 sumed command of this army. I have 
 spent two weeks in learning your 
 whereabouts, your condition and your 
 wants, in preparing you for active oper- 
 ation's, and in placing you in positions 
 from which you can act promptly and 
 
POPE'S ADDRESS. 
 
 279 
 
 to the purpose. These labors are near- 
 ly completed, and I am about to join 
 you in the field. Let us understand 
 each other. I have come to you from 
 the West, where we have always seen 
 the backs of our enemies — from an army 
 whose business it has been to seek the 
 adversary, and beat him when found ; 
 whose policy has been attack, and not 
 defense. In but one instance has the 
 enemy been able to place oiu* "Western 
 armies in a defensive attitude. I pre- 
 sume I have been called here to pursue 
 the same system, and to lead you 
 against the enemy. It is my purpose 
 to do so, and that speedily. I am sure 
 you long for an opportunity to win the 
 distinction you are capable of achiev- 
 ing ; that opportunity I shall endeavor 
 to give you. In the meantime I desire 
 you to dismiss certain phrases I am 
 sorry to find much in vogue amongst 
 you. I hear constantly of taking strong 
 positions, and holding them — of Knes of 
 retreat and bases of supplies. Let us 
 discard such ideas. The strongest po- 
 sition a soldier should desire to occupy 
 is one from which he can most easily 
 advance against the enemy. Let us 
 study the probable line of retreat of 
 our opponents, and leave our own 
 to take care of itself. Let us look 
 before us, and not behind. Success 
 and glory are in the advance — disaster 
 and shame lurk in the rear. Let us 
 act on this understanding, and it is safe 
 to predict that your bannera shall be 
 inscribed with many a glorious deed, 
 and that your names will be dear to 
 your countrymen forever." Such lan- 
 guage was certainly not fitted to en- 
 
 courage good feeling and unity of 
 purpose. It is painful to have to al- 
 lude to these personal differences ; but 
 it is useless to make any attempt to 
 conceal the fact that these same differ- 
 ences had much to do with the disas- 
 ters which had befallen, and which 
 were soon again to befall, the National 
 arms — disasters which foi' a time threat- 
 ened the ruin of the Union cause. 
 These difficulties showed the govern- 
 ment the necessity for a commander-in- 
 chief of all the forces of the Union ; 
 and on the 23d of July General jnjy 
 Halleck, having resigned his com- 23. 
 mand of the army of the West, as- 
 simied, in obedience to an order from 
 the president, the duties of this high and 
 responsible position. Pope, foreseeing 
 the inconveniencies, not to say injuries 
 to the Union cause, which must inevita- 
 bly result from the inharmonious action 
 already manifest on the part of the dif- 
 ferent generals, asked to be relieved from 
 his command in Virginia and returned 
 to the Western country. His request, 
 however, was not complied with. In 
 such circumstances began Pope's cam- 
 paign in northeastern Virginia — grovmd 
 made memorable by the first battle of 
 Bull Run, and, more recently, by the 
 successful raid of General Jackson 
 and by the comparatively unsuccessful 
 efforts of Banks, Fremont and Shields. 
 We have seen in a previous chaptei 
 that the withdrawal of McClellan's 
 army was definitely decided upon at 
 Wii-sliington. It had become a neces- 
 sity. On the 14th of August, Aas;. 
 therefore, that army began to **• 
 move towards Acquia Creek, with a 
 
mo 
 
 POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. 
 
 view to reinforce General Pope, and 
 to act under his command. It was 
 Pope's object, therefore, so to act that, 
 while he would cover Washington and 
 assure the safety of the Shenandoah 
 Valley, he would also facilitate the 
 4ng, movements of McClellan. On 
 23. the 23d McClellan himself left 
 ftie landing ; and on the following day 
 iie reached Acquia Creek. 
 
 It is not much to be wondered at 
 that the Confederate government had 
 found great encouragement from the 
 failure of the Peninsular campaign, and 
 had, in consequence, resolved to aban- 
 don the merely defensive attitude 
 with which hitherto they had for the 
 most part contented themselves, and 
 to push forward upon the foe, striking 
 him boldly in his own territory. The 
 conscription had proved singularly suc- 
 cessful; their armies had been largely 
 increased ; and victory had wonderfully 
 improved the spirits of their men. 
 Conscious of strength and full of high 
 hopes, the Richmond authorities made 
 up their minds that the time had come 
 for the adoption of vigorous, aggressive, 
 measures. It was resolved that Bragg 
 should push his way through Kentucky, 
 and capture Louis\nlle and Cincinnati, 
 while Lee should make a rush through 
 ihe Shenandoah Valley, cross Maryland, 
 and make himself master of Philadel- 
 phia in the hope that, by two simultane- 
 ous movements, both of them proving 
 eminently successful, they would be 
 ftble to compel the government at 
 Washington to come to terms. In a 
 previous chapter, when treating of some 
 vf the important operations in the 
 
 West, we have shown what success at 
 tended the sortie of General Bragg. 
 We have now to consider the success 
 which attended that of General Lee. 
 As soon as it became known at Rich- 
 mond that an attempt was about to be 
 made to unite the forces of McClellan 
 to the command of Pope, it was de- 
 termined to act at once, and to make a 
 bold attempt to force a way to Wash- 
 ington before the junction of the two 
 armies could be effected. The exploit 
 of Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley 
 was to be repeated on a grander scale. 
 There was much high-sounding talk at 
 the time. All that was predicted was 
 not destined to be fulfilled ; but for a 
 time matters looked black enough for the 
 Nationals ; and the Confederates were 
 not wholly without reason for the hopes 
 which they indulged and for the lan- 
 guage which they used. There were at 
 least 150,000 fighting men centred at 
 and around Richmond. With the ex- 
 ception of a strong corps of observation, 
 all these were at once to be precipitated 
 upon Maryland. 
 
 At this stage of our narrative, and 
 while the armies of Lee and the armies 
 of Pope are preparing to rush into 
 deadly collision — the fii'st resolute for 
 attack, the second resolute for resist- 
 ance — it is necessary to pause and di- 
 rect the attention of the reader to 
 certain measui'es which had been adopt- 
 ed for the more successful prosecution of 
 the war — measures which at this very 
 moment were largely occupying the 
 public mind. We refer to the orders of 
 General Pope, dated July 18th, 1862, 
 and the orders of the War Department, 
 
SEVERE MEASURES. 
 
 iSl 
 
 bearing date August 4th, August 8th 
 and August 11th. On the 18th of 
 July Pope issued the following orders : 
 
 '■ Headquarters of the Army of Virginia, ) 
 Washinqton, July 18, 1862. ) 
 
 " General Orders, No. 5. 
 
 " Hereafter, as far as practicable, the 
 troops of this command will subsist 
 upon the country in which their oper- 
 ations ai'e carried on. In all cases, sup- 
 plies for this purpose will be taken by 
 the officers to whose department they 
 properly belong, under the orders of 
 the commanding officer of the troops 
 for whose use they are intended. Vouch- 
 ers will be given to the o^vners, 
 stating on their face that they will be 
 payable at the conclusion of the war 
 upon sufficient testimony being fur- 
 nished that such owners have been 
 loyal citizens of the United States since 
 the date of the vouchers. 
 
 " Whenever it is known that supplies 
 can be furnished in any district of the 
 country where the troops are to operate, 
 the use of trains for carrying subsist- 
 ence will be dispensed with as far as 
 possible, 
 
 "By command of 
 
 " Majoe-Gejoiral Pope. 
 "Geo. D. Ruggles, 
 
 " Col. A. A.-G. and Chief of Staff." 
 
 " Headquarters of thb Armt of Virginia, j 
 Washington, July 18, 1862. j 
 
 "General Orders, No. 6. 
 
 " Hereafter, in any operations of the 
 cavalry forces in this command no sup- 
 ply or baggage trains of any descrip- 
 tion will be used, unless so stated 
 especially in the order for the move- 
 ment. Two days' cooked rations will 
 
 be carried on the persons of the men ; 
 and all villages and neighborhoods 
 through which they pass will be laid 
 under contribution in the manner speci- 
 fied by General Orders, No. 5, cmTent 
 series, fi-om these headquarters, for the 
 subsistence of men and horses. 
 
 " Movements of cavalry must always 
 be made with celerity, and no delay in 
 such movements will be excused here- 
 after on any pretext. 
 
 " Whenever the order for the moye> 
 ment of any portion of the army ema- 
 nates from these headquarters, the time 
 of marching, and that to be consumed 
 in the execution of the duty, will be 
 specifically designated, and no de- 
 parture therefrom will be pemiitted to 
 pass unnoticed without the gravest and 
 most conclusive reasons. 
 
 " Commanding officers will be held re- 
 sponsible for strict and prompt compli- 
 ance with every provision of this order. 
 " By command of 
 
 " Major-Genebal Pope. 
 " Geo. D. Ruggles, 
 
 " Col. A. A.-G. and Chief of Staff." 
 
 On the same day was issued another 
 order, declaring that the inhabitants 
 along the lines of railroads and tele- 
 graphs and the routes of travel would 
 be held responsible for any injury done 
 to track, line or road, or for any at. 
 tacks on trains or stragglers by bauds 
 of guerrillas in their neighborhood. In 
 cases of damage to I'oads, the citizens 
 within five miles would be turned out 
 in mass to repair the damage. If a 
 soldier or legitimate follower of the 
 army was fired upon from any house, 
 the same should be razed to the ground 
 
282 
 
 POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. 
 
 By another order, all disloyal citizens 
 within the lines of the army or within 
 the reach of its I'espective officers, were 
 to be an-ested at once. Those taking 
 the oath of allegiance, and giving suffi- 
 cient security for its observance, were 
 to be allowed to remain ; all others 
 were to be conducted to the South, be- 
 yond the extreme pickets, and if again 
 found anywhere within the lines, were 
 to be treated as spies, and subjected to 
 the extreme rigor of military law. These 
 orders of General Pope were followed 
 by the pillaging of private property, 
 and by insults to females, to a degree 
 unknown heretofore during the war. 
 
 The Confederate government, by 
 way of retaliation, issued an order de- 
 claring that General Pope and the 
 commissioned officers serving under 
 him were "not entitled to be con- 
 sidered as soldiers, and therefore not 
 entitled to the benefit of cartel for the 
 parole of future prisoners of war. Or- 
 dered, further, that in the event of 
 the capture of Major-General Pope, or 
 any commissioned officers serving under 
 him, the captive so taken shall be held 
 in close confinement so long as the 
 orders aforesaid shall continue in force 
 and unrepealed by the competent mili- 
 tary authority of the United States, 
 and that in the event of the murder of 
 an unarmed citizen or inhabitant of this 
 Confederacy, by virtue or under pre- 
 tense of the order hereinbefore recited, 
 it shall be the duty of the commanding 
 general of the forces of this Confede- 
 racy to cause immediately to be hung, 
 out of commissioned officers, prisoners 
 as aforesaid, a number equal to that of 
 
 our own citizens thus murdered by the 
 enemy." It was manifest from the 
 orders of General Pope that he meant 
 to conduct the war on very different 
 principles from those which had guided 
 General McClellan. The action taken 
 by the Confederate government showed, 
 on the other hand, that through them 
 Pope had added bitterness to the con- 
 test. Pope's orders were afterwards 
 considerably modified. 
 
 After the failure of the Peninsular 
 campaign became fully apparent, and 
 McClellan had commenced his retreat, 
 the government at Washington natural- 
 ly enough felt the danger to which the 
 countiy was in consequence exposed, 
 and proceeded to do their utmost to 
 provide against the emergency. A call 
 had just been made for 300,000 volun- 
 teers. It was now deemed necessary to 
 call upon the several States to furnish 
 an equal number of militia, to serve for 
 nine months. It was found extremely 
 difficult to raise by voluntary enlist- 
 ment as many as 600,000 men. Great 
 efforts were therefore made to arouse 
 the enthusiasm of the people. Burning 
 words went forth from pulpit and plat- 
 form ; and the press lent the weight of 
 its mighty influence to the advancement 
 of the common cause. Liberal bounties 
 were offered by the government; and 
 large sums of money were contributed 
 from private sources for the purpose of 
 promoting enlistment. All these efforts, 
 however, were found to be insufficient ; 
 and the president at last found Agg, 
 himself under the necessity of *• 
 having recourse to a draft. The fol- 
 lowing orders were, therefore, issued: 
 
GENERAL ORDERS. 
 
 283 
 
 " War Department, i 
 
 Washington, August 4, 1862. f 
 
 "Oedeked, First— That a draft of 
 300,000 militia be imi^iediately called 
 into the service of the United States, 
 to serve for nine months, unless sooner 
 discharged. The secretary of war will 
 assign the quotas to the States, and 
 establish regulations for the draft. 
 
 ^'Second — That if any State shall not, 
 by the 15th of August, furnish the 
 quota of the additional 300,000 volun- 
 teers authorized by law, the deficiency 
 of volunteers in that State will also be 
 made up by a special draft from the 
 militia. The secretary of war will 
 establish regulations for this purpose. 
 
 " Third — Regulations will be pre- 
 pared by the War Department, and 
 presented to the president, with the 
 object of securing the promotion of 
 officers of the army and volunteers for 
 meritorious and distinguished services, 
 and of preventing the nomination and 
 appointment in the military service of 
 incompetent or unworthy officers. The 
 regulations will also provide for ridding 
 the service of such incompetent persons 
 as now hold commissions. 
 
 "By order of the president. 
 " Edwin M. Stanton, 
 
 "Secretary of War." 
 
 These orders were submitted to with 
 a reasonably good grace, considering 
 the natural repugnance of the Ameri- 
 can citizen to compulsory military ser- 
 vice. Subsequent orders, however, 
 \iijnr, dated the 8th of August, and 
 ^' seriously interfering with the 
 principles involved in the writ of 
 holjcas corpus — orders, for example, 
 
 authorizing the arrest and imprison- 
 ment of any person or persons who 
 should by act, speech or writing dis- 
 courage volunteer enlistments, or who 
 should aid and comfort the enemy, or 
 who should be discovered in any other 
 disloyal practice ; authorizing, also, the 
 arrest and imprisonment of any person 
 or persons who should attempt to leave 
 the United States, and thus seek to 
 avoid military duty — these raised a 
 pei'fect tempest of excitement. They 
 placed the foreigner resident on these 
 shores under great inconveniences ; and 
 they forbade the American citizen, \vho 
 was liable to be drafted, to go out of 
 the country or even to absent himself 
 from his State or county. It was found 
 to be impossible to cany out these 
 orders according to the strict letter; 
 and, consequently, another order from 
 the War Department, dated the Aug, 
 11th of August — some daj^s after J*- 
 the fighting between Pope and Lee had 
 fairly commenced — took the edge off 
 their offensiveness, by advising the ex- 
 ercise of great caution and sound judg- 
 ment in carrying them into execution. 
 The difficulty was thus got over; and 
 the manifestations of patriotism on the 
 part of the people were such as to teach 
 the government that such measures 
 were as unnecessary as they were un- 
 wise 
 
 The reader is now in a position in 
 which he can comprehend the state of 
 things North and South at this critical 
 moment in the history of the war. 
 With a knowledge of these details, he 
 will be able the more easily to enter 
 into the feelings of the rival armies 
 
S84 
 
 POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. 
 
 which now confronted each other and 
 were ready to rush into deadly strife, 
 as well as to appreciate the special ad- 
 vantages which belonged to each. It 
 is important, also, for the reader to re- 
 member that, at this particular junc- 
 ture, McClellan had not yet left Harri- 
 son's Landing. 
 
 Early in the month of August the 
 divisions of Ewell, Hill and Jackson 
 were hurried forward to the Rapi- 
 dan River, which is the south fork 
 of the Rappahannock. General Pope 
 made immediate preparations to meet 
 the enemy, and to hinder his ad- 
 vance. Hitherto he had been giv- 
 ing his instructions from Washington, 
 the capital of Rappahannock County. 
 General Rufus King had been ordered 
 to send forward detachments of cavalry, 
 and break up, if possible, the Virginia 
 Central Railroad. In this mission King 
 had been successful ; and the road was 
 broken up in several places. General 
 Banks had been instructed to move 
 forward and take post where the turn- 
 pike from Sperryville to Culpepper 
 crosses Hazel River. Previous to this, 
 Banks had been instructed to send 
 General Hatch, with some 2000 of his 
 best mounted men, to proceed from 
 Madison Court House around the west 
 side of the Blue Ridge, and make a 
 descent upon Gordonsville and destroy 
 the railroad leading to Richmond, and 
 then to push forward to Charlottesville 
 and break up the railroad between 
 that place and Lynchburg. Hatch 
 was despatched accordingly. But both 
 movements failed. Hatch was dis- 
 graced; and the cavalry of General 
 
 Banks was placed in charge of Genera] 
 J«»hn Buford. McDowell had been 
 ordered fi'om Waterloo Bridge to Cul- 
 pepper Court House ; and General 
 Sigel was already encamped at Sperry- 
 ville, some twenty miles from Cul- 
 pepper. On the 7th of August, \^g. 
 Pope himself tells us, all the in- '• 
 fantry and artillery forces of the orig- 
 inal army of Virginia were assembled 
 along the turnpike from Sperry\aUe 
 to Culpepper, and numbered about 
 28,000 men. The cavalry were well 
 arranged, both for observation and de- 
 fense. Buford, with five regiments, 
 was posted at Madison Court House, 
 with his pickets stretching along the 
 line of the Rapidan from Barnett's 
 Ford to the Blue Ridge. Sigel, ac- 
 cording to instructions, had posted a 
 biigade of infantry and a battery of 
 artillery at the point where the road 
 from Madison Court House to Sperry- 
 ville crosses the Robertson River. 
 These were intended as a support for 
 Buford. Bayanl, with four regiments 
 of cavalry, was posted near Rapidan 
 Station, at the point where the Orange 
 and Alexandria Road crosses the Rapi- 
 dan, his pickets extending as far east 
 as Racoon Ford, and connecting with 
 Buford at Barnett's Ford. There was 
 a signal station on the siunmit of 
 Thoroughfare Mountain, commanding a 
 view of the entire country as far south 
 as Orange Court House. Having com- 
 mand of this station, Pope could count 
 with confidence on being informed of 
 the first appearance of the enemy, as 
 well as of the direction of his move- 
 ments. Burnside and his troops, of 
 
CEDAR MOUNTAIN. 
 
 389 
 
 Irhich no account is here taken, were 
 ieft in charge of Fredericksburg. The 
 two main points of Pope's line of de- 
 fense were thus Fredericksburg and 
 Culpepper Court House. Culpepper 
 is about seventy miles from Washing- 
 ton. The route crosses the Long Bridge 
 at Washington, thence through Alex- 
 andria, Fairfax, Manassas and Warren- 
 ton. It is equally distant from Rich- 
 mond. Fredericksburg is connected 
 with Washington by steamboat naviga- 
 tion on the Potomac to Acquia Creek, 
 thence, by railroad, fifteen miles to 
 Fredericksburg, which is sixty miles by 
 railroad from Richmond. 
 
 On the morning of the 8th of Au- 
 iog. g'lst, after having inspected the 
 
 8t different corps, and seen and 
 given orders to the different generals, 
 Pope arrived in person at Culpepper. 
 Here he found that his orders had 
 been attended to, and that all things 
 were in a satisfactory condition. Craw- 
 ford's brigade, of General Banks' corps, 
 had already arrived. So, too, had 
 Ricketts' division, of General McDow- 
 ell's corps. At an early hour he had 
 learned from General Bayard, who was 
 slowly falling back towards Culpepper, 
 that the enemy was approaching. The 
 same information came from General 
 Buford, who was stationed more to the 
 west. It was impossible during the 
 whole of the 8th to decide whether 
 the intended movement of the enemy 
 was in the direction of Culpepper or 
 Madison Court House. As he had 
 been specially instructed to preserve 
 his communication with the Rappahan- 
 nock at Fredericksburg, he regulated 
 ftt* 
 
 his movements with that end in view. 
 Early in the day he pushed forward 
 Crawford's brigade in the direction of 
 Cedai" or Slaughter Mountain, to the 
 support of Bayard, who was falling 
 back in that dii-ection. Meanwhile he 
 concentrated his forces, bringing them 
 closer together in the neighborhood of 
 Culpepper. Banks was summoned to 
 that place from Hazel River. Sigel 
 was ordered to hurry forward from 
 Sperryville. Banks arrived in good 
 time; but Sigel, from some cause, 
 blundered as to the road he should 
 take, and was by that means prevented 
 from coming up until late in the after- 
 noon of the following day. On the 
 morning of the 9th ^ Pope ordered \ag. 
 General Banks, with the remain- ^' 
 der of his corps, to advance towards 
 Cedar Mountain — a sugar-loaf eminence 
 about seven miles south of Culpepper, 
 and about two miles west of the Orange 
 and Alexandria Railroad. Banks was 
 to join Crawford, who was stationed in 
 the rear of Bayard, and to take com- 
 mand of all the forces present. He had. 
 special instructions to check the ad- 
 vance of the enemy and to ascertain his 
 strength, as well as, if possible, to dis- 
 cover his immediate purpose. 
 
 The Confederates had, meanwhile, 
 been pressing forward in very consider- 
 able strength ; and before Banks ai- 
 rived, Jackson had taken possession ol 
 Cedar Mountain, and, from that com 
 manding eminence, had taken in the 
 entire view and made himself acquaint- 
 ed with the position and strength of 
 the National army. Ewell was thrown 
 forward with his division ; and care 
 
POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. 
 
 was taken to conceal the troops as 
 much as possible under the cover of the 
 woods. Early's brigade, of EwelFs 
 division, was posted on the road lead- 
 ing from Culpepper. The other divi- 
 sions took position on the western slope 
 of the moimtain, and planted batteries 
 on every available spot. Some of the 
 batteries were as high as a hundred feet 
 above the common level of the ground. 
 Foul- guns were advanced to the front ; 
 and these, with some of the more ele- 
 vated batteries, opened fire upon Craw- 
 ford's batteries. Simultaneously with 
 the opening of this fire on Crawford, 
 General Winder, with a portion of 
 Jackson's corps, moved out towards 
 the left, carefully keeping under cover. 
 A little later in the day. Hill came up 
 with his division ; and when about five 
 o'clock they began to throw out skirm- 
 ishers, the Confederates, strongly post- 
 ed, numbered about 20,000 veterans. 
 
 It was about five o'clock in the after- 
 noon when General Banks advanced to 
 the attack. Up to that hour he did 
 not believe that the enemy were in 
 sufficient force to make any vigorous 
 demonstration ; and he so reported to 
 General Pope. The battle at once be- 
 came general ; it began to rage more 
 fiercely after six o'clock ; and from 
 that time till darkness came on the 
 fighting was furious and incessant. 
 About seven o'clock Pope himself 
 came on the field, bringing with him 
 Ricketts' division. On his arrival on 
 the ground, Pope saw at once that 
 Banks' right wing was too much ex- 
 tended. Directing Banks to draw in 
 his right wing and mass it upon his 
 
 centre, he pushed forward Ricketts' 
 division to occupy the ground thus 
 vacated. As Banks retired his men 
 with great caution, the Confederates 
 pi'essed close upon them and began to 
 emerge from the woods. The battenes i 
 of Ricketts' division opened upon them 
 a tremendous fire, and compelled them 
 to fall back under cover. Night now 
 fell upon the scene ; and the close, and, 
 in some cases, hand-to-liaud fighting 
 ceased ; but the artillery firing was 
 kept up until near midnight. General 
 Sigel did not arrive in time to take any 
 active part in the fight ; but his ap- 
 pearance helped to give courage against 
 the possibilities of the coming day. 
 General Banks held the ground he 
 took early in the morning. His mis- 
 take, if he made any, was that he ad- 
 vanced against a foe whose strength he 
 had no means of knowing. He had 
 been driven back one mile from the 
 spot where the fighting commenced. 
 Such was the battle of Cedar Mountain, 
 or, as it is named by the Confederates, 
 Cedar Run. Not on so large a scale, 
 or so protracted as some of the battles 
 which we have described, it was yet 
 one of the bloodiest and most keenly 
 contested. "I have witnessed," writes 
 one who was present, " many battles 
 during the war; but I have seen none 
 where the tenacious obstinacy of the 
 American character was so fully dis- 
 played." It was a fight of one against 
 two. The Nationals were in the mi- 
 nority ; but it can hardly be said that 
 they were robbed of the honors of the 
 day. The loss on both sides was very 
 heavy. General Banks corps was so 
 
THE BETREAT. 
 
 287 
 
 cut up as to be reduced at least one- 
 half. Brigadier-Generals Geary, Augur 
 and Carroll were badly wounded, and 
 Brigadier-General Prince was captured. 
 Pope estimated Lis entire loss at 1800 
 men. The confederate loss was heavy, 
 and included some of the best officers. 
 
 The 10th was Sunday. At day- 
 Aug. break the Confederates fell back 
 •Oi about two miles. The National 
 pickets advanced and occupied the 
 ground. During the remainder of the 
 jlng, day the army rested. The day 
 11* following was spent in burying 
 the dead ; and on the same night the 
 enemy disappeared, leaving his dead 
 unburied, and his wounded to the 
 mercy of the Nationals. 
 
 On the 16th a party of Confederate 
 Aug. cavali-y were surprised and cap- 
 iat tured at Louisa Court House. 
 On their persons were found some im- 
 portant letters, one of them being an 
 autograph letter from Lee, intimating 
 that he was moving the main body of 
 his army, by forced marches, to attack 
 General Pope before a junction could 
 be formed between him and the army 
 of the Potomac. This information hav- 
 ing been sent to Washington, Pope 
 received instructions from the com- 
 mander-in-chief not to cross the Rapi- 
 dan, but to fall back and take post 
 Ijehind the north fork of the Rappa- 
 hannock, where reinforcements could 
 be more easily sent him. This move- 
 jVng, ment was commenced on the 
 '8« 18th. On the following day Lee, 
 with a large force, crossed the Rapidan. 
 Meanwhile Pope had been consider- 
 ably reinforced. He had been joined 
 
 by 8000 of Burnside's soldiers, under 
 General Reno ; by ten regiments, under 
 General Stevens, which had just re- 
 turned from Port Royal ; and by Gen- 
 eral King, with some regiments from 
 McDowell's corps. He was also author- 
 ized to call the main portion of General 
 Cox's forces from Western Virginia. 
 With the greater portion of these forces 
 already on hand — about forty regi- 
 ments in all — the retreat began. Gen- 
 eral Sigel led the advance ; General 
 Reno had charge of the left ; and Gen- 
 eral McDowell, suppoi'ted by General 
 Banks, occupied the centre. In this 
 order the retreat was commenced on 
 the night of the 18th of August. The 
 night was dark and cold for the season 
 of the year. The usual camp fires 
 were extinguished, and all unnecessary 
 noise was avoided. Considering the 
 immense train of wagons in advance of 
 the troops, the progress made during 
 the night was marvellous. On the 
 morning of Tuesday the 19th a j^ng. 
 large portion of the army had '9' 
 passed through Culpepper. The sight 
 presented by the moving masses of in- 
 fantry, cavalry and artillery, together 
 with the multitudes of white-covered 
 wagons winding slowly up the distant 
 hills, was imposing in the extreme, and 
 one which it rarely falls to the lot of 
 even military men to witness. It was 
 unfortunate for the countiy, however, 
 that two such spectacles should have 
 been witnessed by the same men within 
 80 limited a period. By noon on the 
 19th the advance had reached the one 
 bridge — the railroad bridge at the Rap- 
 pahannock Station — ovei- wliich f' t; 
 
288 
 
 POPE AND LEE IN VTKGINIA. 
 
 entire army must pass. All day long, 
 and all night through, this great army, 
 with all its encumbrances, continued to 
 pass over the bridge ; and by one 
 Aug. o'clock on the 20th, the mighty 
 20t moving mass was, if not absolute- 
 ly safe, at least on the other side of the 
 North Fork. They were not a moment 
 too soon across; for the Confederates 
 were already in great force at their 
 heels. Bayard, who had charge of the 
 rear, had been skiiTaishing with their 
 advance since he had passed Cedar 
 Mountain. At the last moment the 
 Confederate cavalry made a vigorous 
 charge on the National rear; a few 
 men were killed ; but the complete 
 success of the retreat was not hindered. 
 It was with good i-eason that Pope was 
 proud of the manner in which the re- 
 treat had been conducted. 
 
 After an effort so exhaustive, it might 
 be expected that the army would need 
 rest. But there was to be no rest : 
 the toil must be severe and continuous 
 for days and weeks to come. Pope 
 posted his army along the line of the 
 Rappahannock, so as to guard the rail- 
 road bridge and all the fords. On the 
 j\Hg. morning of the 21st, the Confede- 
 21t rates were forward in full iorce ; 
 and a series of attempts at different 
 places were made to cross the river. 
 There were, in consequence, a number 
 of fierce artillery duels. But the 
 bridge and all the fords were well 
 guarded ; and every attempt at forcing 
 a passage completely failed. These 
 attempts were repeated, and heavy 
 artillery firing was maintained at the 
 different fords on the 23d and 24th, 
 
 but with no special results. Ou j^ng, 
 the 23d Ricketts destroyed by fii-e 23. 
 the bridge at the Rappahannock. Lee 
 now resolved on a flank movement ; and, 
 with this end in view, he advanced 
 about twelve miles further up the river, 
 and made a bold attempt to cross at 
 Waterloo Bridge. This attempt was i 
 also resisted ; but it was only par- » 
 tially defeated. Meanwhile, General 
 Stuart, at the head of a body of Con- 
 federate cavalry, had succeeded in 
 crossing the river, and, having made a 
 bold dash on Catlett's Station, on the 
 Orange and Alexandria Railroad, some 
 thirty-five miles from Washington and 
 some thirteen miles in the rear of the 
 Rappahannock Station, where he ran- 
 sacked Pope's army trains, seized his 
 baggage, with the property of his staff 
 ofiicers, captured more than two hun- 
 dred horses, and destroyed much that 
 he could not carry away, then found 
 his way back again to the Confederate 
 lines with all his booty, encountering 
 during the entire raid almost no oppo- 
 sition. This raid of Stuart was ex- 
 tremely discouraging to the people of 
 the North, and to the government at 
 Washington. It was not less dis- 
 couraging to the National army, and to 
 Pope himself. It revealed to the world 
 what Pope and many of his officers 
 well knew — that but little was accom- 
 plished when, after his retreat from 
 Cedar Mountain, he had put the Rap- 
 pahannock between his own army and 
 that of General Lee. It showed that 
 Washington, unless some manifestation 
 of strength was quickly made, was 
 again at the mercy of the Confederacy, 
 
REINFORCEMENTS. 
 
 289 
 
 and that General Lee was not ignorant 
 of the way by which he might pass 
 through Maryland and dictate terms of 
 peace in the city of Brotherly Love. 
 
 The retreat across the Rappahannock 
 waS) in fact, partly a temporary expedi- 
 ent and partly a military necessity. It 
 was a military necessity because Pope, 
 with the forces at his command, could 
 not continue the struggle so far from 
 his base of supplies, and against such 
 fearful odds. It was a temporary ex- 
 pedient because it was believed that, 
 by putting the Rappahannock Vjetween 
 the two opposing armies, Lee would be 
 so hindered in his operations that he 
 would be unable to stiike with his su- 
 perior numbers before the proposed 
 junction had been eifected between the 
 army of the Potomac and the army of 
 Virginia. Pope was not ignorant of 
 the danger to which he was exposed 
 from an attack on his right flank, un- 
 less he were speedily reinforced — a 
 danger greatly aggravated oy the fact 
 that he was bound by strict orders to 
 preserve intact his communication with 
 Fredericksbui'g. 
 
 Pope had now become fully alive to 
 the danger of his position. Convinced 
 that the main body of Lee's army was 
 being moved further up the river, where 
 there was little difficulty in crossing, 
 and that the object was to turn his 
 right, get in his rear, and cut oif his 
 supplies from Washington, he tele- 
 graphed again and again that, if not 
 reinforced, he would be compelled to 
 retreat; that, with the enemy moving 
 in force to his right, it was impossible 
 for him to offer effective resistance 
 
 without abandoning Fredericksburg. 
 He was assured that if he could only 
 hold on two days longer, he would be 
 so reinforced that he would be able te 
 resume the offensive. Day after day 
 from the 21st of August were these as- 
 surances repeated. On the 25th, ^qg, 
 of the 30,000 or 40,000 men 25. 
 promised him, only 7000 had yet got 
 forward so far as Warrenton Junction. 
 It was out of the question to think 
 of waiting any longer. The situation 
 was pregnant with peril. Delay one 
 day more might be attended with 
 the most disastrous consequences. Ar- 
 rangements were, in consequence, made 
 for immediate retreat. Breaking up 
 his camp at Warrenton and Warrenton 
 Junction, Pope began to march rapidly 
 back in three columns. General Heint- 
 zelman, from McClellan's army, had 
 arrived; but he was without wagons, 
 without artillery, without even horses 
 for the general and field officers, with- 
 out provisions, and with only forty 
 I'ounds of ammunition to the man. 
 Porter, too, had an-ived at Bealston 
 with a portion of his division. His 
 men were fresh, but poorly provided 
 either with provisions or with ammuni- 
 tion. Sturgis and Cox were hourly 
 expected at Wairenton Junction — the 
 former with 10,000, the latter with 
 7000 men. Franklin, too, was on his 
 way with 10,000 more. Before the 
 arrival of Heintzelman, Pope estimated 
 his entire force at about 40,000. The 
 Confederate force amounted to at least 
 80,000. On evacuating WaxTenton, 
 Pope resolved to offer the enemy battle 
 in the neighborhood of Gainesville, th« 
 
290 
 
 POPE AND LEE IN VIKGINIA. 
 
 first station to the west of Manassas 
 Junction, on what is called the Gap 
 Eailroad. With this end in view, he 
 disposed his forces, sending McDowell, 
 with his own coi-ps and that of Sigel, 
 by the turnpike toward Gainesville, 
 Reno toward Sudley Springs, and 
 Heintzelman toward Greenwich, assign- 
 ing at the same time suitable positions 
 to the expected reinforcements as they 
 should come up. Porter was to push 
 forward and join Reno ; Franklin was 
 to push forward with all possible speed 
 to Gainesville ; and Haupt, who com- 
 manded at Manassas Junction, was 
 authorized to retain one of the strong- 
 est divisions that should arrive, for the 
 protection of the works, and to push 
 forward its cavaliy to Thoroughfare 
 Gap. General Sturgis, also, received 
 instructions to post strong guards along 
 the railroad from Manassas Junction to 
 Catlett's Station, and to superintend 
 them in person. Pope's command, in- 
 cluding all these expected reinforce- 
 ments, now amounted to 60,000 men. 
 
 While Pope's forces are moving 
 steadily to the positions assigned them, 
 the Confederates are not idle. Jack- 
 son has crossed the Rappahannock at 
 Hmon's Mill, four miles above Water- 
 /)o Bridge, has rested his men for the 
 night at Salem ; and before to-morrow 
 at noon he will have crossed the Bull 
 Run Ridge, at Thoroughfare Gap, and 
 forced his way to Gainesville. In 
 point of fact he reached Gainesville 
 when the day was yet young, and was 
 joined by Stuart, with two cavalry bri- 
 gades ; and before midnight, while he 
 was destroying Bristow Station, where 
 
 he had arrived a little after sundown, 
 Stuart, in obedience to his instructions, 
 had surprised the post at Manassaa 
 Junction, captured 300 men, eight guns, 
 stores in large quantity, and nuich pub- 
 lic property. Intelligence of what had 
 happened at the Junction reached Col- 
 onel Scammon, at Union Mills, on Bull 
 Run, who was stationed there with the, 
 Eleventh and Twelfth Ohio, of General 
 Cox's division. Scammon hasted to the 
 Junction ; a severe skirmish en- jug, 
 sued at dawn on the 27th ; but 27. 
 he was driven back and compelled to 
 retreat toward Alexandria. Brigadier- 
 General Taylor, with the Second, Third 
 and Fom-th New Jersey Infantry, hur- 
 ried from Alexandria by railroad to the 
 assistance of Scammon ; but these, too, 
 were soon routed ; and in the brief 
 conflict Taylor lost a leg. It is quite 
 manifest that Pope had not counted on 
 the appearance of the enemy on the 
 eastern side of Thoroughfare Gap so 
 early, and in so great numbers. Jack- 
 son had, in reality, effected a surprise. 
 It is true that Pope's report says: " The 
 movement of General Jackson in the 
 direction of Thoroughfare Gap, while 
 the main body of the enemy confronted 
 me at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo 
 Bridge, was well known to me, but I 
 had relied confidently on the forces 
 which I had been assured would be 
 sent from Alexandria, and one strong 
 division of which I had ordered to take 
 post on the works at Manassas Jimc» 
 tion. I was entirely under the belief 
 that these would be there, and it waa 
 not until I found my communication 
 intercepted that I was undeceived. I 
 
BRISTOW STATION. 
 
 991 
 
 knew that this movement was no raid, 
 and that it was made by not less than 
 25,000 men." It is also true, however, 
 that when Jackson was reposing at 
 Salem, between Thoroughfare and Ma- 
 nassas Gaps, Pope sent word to Mc- 
 Dowell at WaiTenton that he believed 
 "the whole force of the enemy had 
 marched for the Shenandoah Valley by 
 way of Luray and Front Royal." Banks, 
 it would seem, was of the same opinion, 
 ^o thoroughly ignorant were the Na- 
 tionals of the whereabouts of Jackson 
 that, when he was already at Bristow 
 Station, a train of cars came up and, of 
 course, was captured — a train on which 
 a short time before Hooker and his 
 division had passed for Warrenton. 
 
 On the 27th of August, the army of 
 Pope and the army of Lee were both 
 in critical circumstances. Pope was cut 
 off from his supplies and reinforcements. 
 This was serious enough in the presence 
 of such a general as Jackson, and in 
 view of the speedy arrival of Longstreet 
 and Lee. On the other hand, however. 
 Pope had a splendid opportunity — an 
 opportunity which, if it could be seized 
 and acted upon in time, might prove 
 the ruin not only of Jackson, but of 
 the whole Confederate army. If he 
 could block Thoroughfare Gap, and 
 thus prevent the passage of Longstreet, 
 he might fall with overwhelming force 
 upon Jackson. Pope saw his opportu- 
 nity, and began to turn it to account. 
 The instructions already given in re- 
 gard to Gainesville were repeated and 
 emphasized. He ordered McDowell, 
 with Sigel and Reynolds, to hasten to 
 Gainesville that night, and there inter- 
 
 cept Longstreet at the head of Lee's 
 main column. Reno was to hurry for- 
 ward to Greenwich with his corps and 
 with Kearney's division, of Heintzei- 
 man, to report to and assist McDowell, 
 if necessary. Porter was to remain at 
 Warrenton Station until the arrival of 
 Banks, who was marching to that place 
 from Fayetteville. So soon as he was 
 relieved, he was to push forward to 
 Gainesville. Pope himself, with Hook- 
 er's division, of Heintzelman's corps — 
 a division which had now become 
 famous, and which could always be 
 relied upon — proceeded along the rail- 
 road to Manassas Junction. McDowell 
 reached his destination without the 
 necessity of fighting. Hooker had 
 been less fortunate. On approaching 
 Bristow Station, somewhat late in the 
 afternoon, he came into contact with 
 Ewell. It was the advance of the same 
 force, a portion of which had attacked 
 Scammon and Taylor in the forenoon. 
 A vigorous action ensued, with a loss 
 to each of about 300 men. Ewell was 
 driven from the field with the loss of 
 all his camp equipage ; but he succeed- 
 ed in destroying the bridge and railroad 
 track, and thus hindered pursuit. He 
 hastened to join Jackson at Manassas. 
 When this action commenced, Hooker 
 had only forty rounds of ammunition 
 to each man. When it ended, the forty 
 had been reduced to four. Pope was 
 put in high spirits by the success of 
 Hooker. He believed that, by a vigor- 
 ous effort on the morning of the 28th, 
 he might "bag the whole crowd" at 
 Manassaa Junction. Jackson was al- 
 ready, after the defeat of Ewell, in « 
 
POPE a:nd lee in vieginia. 
 
 tight place. There were but two 
 routes by which he could retreat — 
 the one through Gainesville and the 
 other through Centreville. Retreat by 
 Gainesville was impossible; for Mc- 
 Dowell was there with a force equal, 
 if not superior, to his own. He must, 
 therefore, retreat through Centreville, 
 or mass his forces and attack Pope, 
 with the view of turning the National 
 right at Bristow Station. Jackson chose 
 the former course, and proceeded to 
 retire through Centreville. Meanwhile, 
 in consequence of the exhausted con- 
 dition of Hooker's troops, and knowing 
 that they were without ammunition, 
 Pope had sent special orders to Porter 
 on the evening of the 27th, instructing 
 him to move forward at one o'clock in 
 the morning, and to report at Bristow 
 by daylight. In the event of Banks 
 not having yet arrived, he was to leave 
 him some instructions in detail. This 
 order was not obeyed. If Jackson had 
 not retired — if, on the contrary, he 
 had massed his men and offered fight — 
 the consequences might have been dis- 
 Aug. astrous. At three o'clock on the 
 28. morning of the 28th Jackson, 
 believing himself to be in danger, 
 evacuated Manassas, and sought to 
 effect a junction with Lee by way of 
 Centreville. As it was. Pope i-esolved 
 to pursue the retreating foe with all 
 the foi'ces at his command. 
 
 McDowell had been ordered on the 
 evening of the 27th to push forward, 
 at the very earliest dawn, from Gaines- 
 ville toward Manassas Junction. He 
 was to rest his right on Manassas Gap 
 Railroad, and throw his left to the 
 
 west. Reno had orders to march at 
 the same hour from Greenwich, also 
 upon Manassas; and Kearney was to 
 march upon Bristow Kearney was 
 promptly on hand, and, with Hooker 
 following, was pushed forward to Ma- 
 nassas in pursuit of Ewell. Sigel, with 
 McDowell's advance, was not forward 
 until three hours after the time ap- 
 pointed. Porter did not arrive at 
 Bristow Station until after ten o'clock, 
 when, instead of being willing and 
 anxious to push forward, he asked 
 pel-mission to halt and rest his men. 
 Sykes' division, of Porter's corps, had 
 spent the whole day of the 27th, from 
 ten o'clock in the morning until day- 
 light of the 28th, in camp at Wairen- 
 ton Junction. Merritt's division, of 
 the same corps, arrived at Warrenton 
 Junction later on the day of the 27th, 
 and also remained there during the 
 whole of the night. It was Pope's 
 opinion that Porter's troops were the 
 freshest in the whole army. It is, it 
 must be confessed, exceedingly difficult 
 for the impartial mind to take in all the 
 facts, even at this early stage of the 
 campaign, and yet resist the conviction 
 that, in the service of Pope, some of 
 McClellan's officers were not only want- 
 ing in enthusiasm, but haK- hearted, 
 lukewarm, indifferent. Either that, or 
 the demon of delay, which held their 
 former master in bondage, had extend- 
 ed its baleful influence to them. Pope 
 an-ived at Manassas Junction about 
 noon of the 28th, shortly after Jackson 
 in person had left. He immediately 
 pushed forward Hooker, Kearney and 
 Reno upon Centreville McDowell, 
 
WARRENTON TURNPIKE. 
 
 298 
 
 also, was ordered to recall that portion 
 of his foi'ce which had moved in the 
 direction of Manassas Junction, and to 
 march with his whole strength towards 
 Centreville. McDowell had, unfortu- 
 nately, sent Ricketts' division toward 
 Thoroughfare Gap. For this new move- 
 ment it was not, therefore, available. 
 Instructions were sent to Porter to take 
 post at Manassas Junction. 
 
 Late in the afternoon of the 28th, 
 Kearney came up with the rear-guard 
 of Jackson's retreating columns, and 
 drove them out of Centreville, one por- 
 tion of the Confederates falling back 
 by the Suilley Springs Road, the other 
 portion by the Wari-enton Turnpike, 
 toward Gainesville. Kearney remained 
 in occupation of Centreville. The Con- 
 federates destroyed the bridges over 
 the streams as they passed. The 
 ground which the pursued and the 
 pursuei's were now treading was that 
 made famous by the first great battle 
 of the war. They were passing over 
 Bull Run. In spite of the eager anx- 
 iety of the moment and the all-absorb- 
 ing interest of the situation, stimng 
 memories must have been awakened in 
 the minds of the rank and file, as well 
 as of the officers, of both armies. After 
 more than a year's incessant fighting, 
 the two great representative armies of 
 the divided nation were again in bloody 
 conflict on the same battle field, about 
 to attempt to settle the question whether 
 freedom should or should not be the 
 inalienable birthright of all the child- 
 ren of the Republic. The Confede- 
 rates had their faces turned toward 
 Thoroughfare Gap, where they knew 
 
 »30 
 
 Longstreet was coming to their aid. 
 Suddenly Jackson's advance came into 
 contact, on the Warrenton Turnpike, 
 with King's division, of McDowell's 
 coi'ps, which was pressing vigorously 
 forward to intercept the retreat. It 
 was about six o'clock in the evening. 
 The struggle which ensued was severe 
 and sanguinary, and was terminated 
 only by the darkness. In this action 
 noble work was done by the brigades 
 of Gibbon and Doubleday, both of 
 the gallant commanders covering them- 
 selves with glory. The Confederate 
 general, Taliaferro, was badly wound- 
 ed ; and Ewell, who was in the thick 
 of the fight, lost a leg. 
 
 Made aware of this engagement 
 that evening about ten o'clock. Pope 
 concluded that he had caught Jackson 
 in a trap, and that if King, McDowell 
 with his other divisions sustaining him, 
 could hold out till the morning, he 
 would be able so to concentrate his 
 forces as to crush and destroy the Con- 
 federate army before Longstreet could 
 arrive with the expected relief. Mc- 
 Dowell and King were accordingly 
 urged to hold on, at all hazards, and 
 by no means to allow Jackson to pass 
 to the west through Thoroughfare Gap, 
 Pope assuring them that by daylight 
 the entire National forces would be 
 forward both from Centreville and Ma- 
 nassas, and that the enemy must be 
 crushed between them. Kearney was 
 ordered to move cautiously, after mid- 
 night, from Centreville along the War- 
 renton Turnpike, to keep close to the 
 enemy's lines, resting his left on the 
 Warrenton Turnpike, and throwing his 
 
294 
 
 POPE AND LEE IN VIKGINIA. 
 
 right well to the north, and, at daylight, 
 to assault him vigorously with his right 
 advance. Reno and Hooker, he was 
 told, would join him shortly after dawn. 
 Pope's instructions to Kearney were 
 even more than usually particular, be- 
 cause he dreaded lest Jackson should 
 make an attempt to retreat to the north 
 in the direction of Leesburg. Porter, 
 who was supposed to be at Manassas 
 Junction, was ordered to move upon 
 Centreville at the earliest dawn. On 
 the night of the 28th, therefore, Mc- 
 Dowell, Sigel and Reynolds, whose 
 united strength was 25,000 men, were 
 immediately west of Jackson, and be- 
 tween him and Thoroughfare Gap. On 
 the following morning, as soon as it 
 was light. Porter's corps and Heintzel- 
 man, with Kearney, Hooker and Reno, 
 were simultaneously to fall upon him 
 from the east. Such was the dispo- 
 sition Pope had made of his forces ; 
 and it M^as his conviction that Long- 
 street was, as yet, so far off that he 
 would be able to defeat Jackson before 
 the former could come to his aid. 
 
 Longstreet, however, was fully aware 
 of the perilous situation of his compan- 
 ion in arms; and, by forced marches, 
 made with almost incredible activity, 
 he had, on the evening of the 28th, 
 reached Thoroughfare Gap. There he 
 encountered Ricketts' division, of Mc- 
 Dowell's corps ; and, after some sharp 
 fighting, drove it back in the direction 
 of Manassas Junction. The gap was, 
 therefore, left undefended, and Long- 
 street was able to pass through without 
 further hindrance. Prior to this, on dis- 
 covering that Thoroughfare Gap was 
 
 well guarded, he had sent a portion of 
 his troops up to Hopeville Gap, a little 
 further to the north, about three miles 
 above White Plains. Through both 
 these gaps, therefore, Lee's men were 
 nishing to the assistance of JacksonV 
 This, however, was not the only calam. 
 ity which, at this critical moment, oc- 
 cun-ed to thwart Pope's designs. Angt 
 Early on the morning of the 29th, 29. 
 before daybreak, the National com- 
 mander, greatly to his mortification, 
 learned that King, unable to resist the 
 pressure brought to bear upon him bj 
 Jackson, had fallen back in the same 
 du-ection with Ricketts. A new dispo- 
 sition of his forces was, therefore, neces- 
 sary. Pope lost no time in endeav 
 oring to meet the emergency. Sigel, 
 supported by Reynolds, was ordered 
 to advance from Groveton and at- 
 tack Jackson in the wooded heights 
 close by, while the remainder of the 
 forces were being got well in hand. 
 Quickly thereafter Heintzelman, with 
 the divisions of Hooker and Kearney, 
 was pushed forward from Centreville 
 toward Gainesville. Reno was to fol- 
 low. Their instructions were to strike 
 promptly, and with all their weight. 
 Porter, with his own corps and the di« 
 vision of King, was ordered to move 
 from Manassas toward the same place. 
 Porter's instructions were to strike 
 Jackson's flank at the point where the 
 Warrenton Turnpike is intersected by 
 the road from Manassas Junction to 
 Gainesville, to turn it, and then fall 
 heavily upon his rear. 
 
 Pope's instructions, with one excep- 
 tion, were well carried out. Sigel, with 
 
GAINESVILLE. 
 
 295 
 
 the division of Carl Schm-z ou his 
 right, that of Scheuck on his left, and 
 the division of Milroy in the centre, 
 about five o'clock on the morning of 
 the 29th, fell heavily on the Confede- 
 rates, a mile or two east of Groveton. 
 They were soon joined by Hooker an J 
 
 , Kearney. The battle became fiirioiu 
 all at once. Jackson, feeling the 
 weight of the onset, fell back some dis- 
 tance ; but he was so closely pressed, 
 that he was compelled to halt and 
 make the best defense possible. Ac- 
 cordingly he took up a position \vith 
 his left on Sudley Spiiugs, his right a 
 little to the south of the Warrenton 
 Turnpike, his line being covered by an 
 old lailioad grade which leads from 
 Gainesville in the direction of Lees- 
 burg. His batteries were numerous ; 
 and some of them were of hea^^ cali- 
 bre. They were for the most part 
 behind lidges in the open ground on 
 both sides of the turnpike. His troops, 
 too, wei'e well sheltered in dense woods 
 behind the railroad ernVjankment. It 
 was about noon when Pope appeared 
 on the field. He had hurried forward 
 from Centreville with all possible de- 
 spatch. He ft)und both amiies much 
 cut up ])}' the sharp action in which 
 they had been engaged since daj'light. 
 Heintzelman Avas on the right of the 
 line, in front of Sudley Springs Road. 
 Sigel Avas on Heintzelman's left, with 
 his line extended a short distance south 
 
 [ of the WaiTenton Turnpike, Schenck's 
 division occupying the high ground to 
 the left of that road. Rej-nolds was on 
 the extreme left. Reno's corps had 
 reached the field, and some of his regi- 
 
 ments had already been pushed into 
 action. Four regiments of this c>-Tps, 
 however, were held in reserve in the 
 real- of the centre. Heintzelman in- 
 formed Pope that his line was weak, 
 and that two of his divisions — those of 
 Schurz and Stelnwehr — were so cut irp 
 that they ought to be drawn back from 
 the front. To this Pope could not con- 
 sent, but he cheei'ed him with the in- 
 formation that McDowell and Port< r 
 were both on the road to Gainesville, 
 and would soon be in position to fall 
 upon Jackson's riglit flank, and prob- 
 ably also ou his I'eai'. Riding along 
 the whole front of his line, he cheered 
 the different commanders liy the same 
 comlV>rting assurance. From twelve 
 until four o'clock, the skirmishing was 
 frequent and severe, but the fighting 
 was neither genei'al nor continuous. 
 About two o'clock, fii-ing was heard 
 in the du-ection of Jackson's right; 
 and Pope naturally sup})osed that Mc- 
 Dowell and Port-er had reached their 
 position. The filing, however, was not 
 long continued. Soon afterwards, he 
 learned that McDowell Avas advancing 
 by the Sudley Springs Road, and that 
 he would piobably be up in two hours. 
 As }et thei'e was no information regard- 
 ing Porter. At half-past foui' o'clock 
 Pope, utterly imjiatient, sent him per- '■ 
 emptory orders to push forward at once 
 into action on the enemy's right, and, 
 if possil)le, turn his rear. He at the 
 same time stated to him genei'ally the 
 condition of things on the field. After 
 allowinij Avhat he thouoht a sufficient 
 time for the execution of these oi-dera 
 by Porter, and knowing that McDowell 
 
396 
 
 POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. 
 
 was close cat hand, the order was given 
 to Hemtzelman and Reno to make 
 the attack in front. It was half-past 
 five o'clock. The order was promptly 
 obeyed, and with a will. Never was 
 onslaught more vigorous or more gal- 
 lantly made. They fell upon the ene- 
 my with the swiftness of lightning and 
 with the force of an avalanche. Jack- 
 son's men could not resist the fury of 
 the onset. Fighting bravely, and con- 
 testing every inch of ground, they were 
 yet steadily pressed back into the 
 woods. On both sides the fighting 
 was desperate and gallant. Regiment 
 vied with regiment, and soldier with 
 soldier. Nor did the officers spare 
 themselves. Everywhere they were 
 seen in the front, in the thickest of 
 the fight, urging the contest by voice 
 and gesture. Hooker and Kearney, of 
 Heintzelman's corps, justified the con- 
 fidence reposed in them, and established 
 on a fii'mer basis their well-won fame. 
 One of the most brilliant efforts of tlie 
 day was made by Grover's brigade, of 
 Hooker's division. In the fury of the 
 first onset this brigade penetrated, by a 
 bayonet charge, first one, then another 
 of Jackson's lines, and was well up 
 to the third line before it could be 
 checked. After a severe hand-to-hand 
 struggle, it got possession of the rail- 
 way embankment on the Confederate 
 left, Init not until it had sacrificed 
 thirty per cent, of its strength. Hook- 
 er's other brigades gallantly joined in 
 the sti-uggle. Meanwhile, Kearney had 
 ttruck Jackson's left at the point occu- 
 pied by A. r Hill ; and, by the joint 
 ■efforts of the two divisions, Jackson's 
 
 left was doubled back upou his centre, 
 and the railway entrenchment was se. 
 cured. While Heintzelman was thus 
 pressing back the enemy's extreme left, 
 Reno was firmly holding his positioa 
 more to the centre ; and after an hour 
 and a half from the first onset, this 
 portion of the Confederate army was 
 driven off the original battle ground — 
 the dead and wounded being left in 
 the hands of the Nationals. 
 
 It was now sunset. McDowell had 
 arrived on the field. His corps was 
 pushed to the front along the Warrentou 
 Turnpike, his instructions being to fall 
 upon the enemy who was retreating to- 
 wards the turnpike from Sudley Springs. 
 With this end in view, King's division, 
 of McDowell's corps, advanced beyond 
 the general line of the Nationals. The 
 advance of the main body of the enemy, 
 under Longstreet, had begun to reach 
 the field. With these King came into 
 contact about three quaiters of a mile 
 in front of the line of battle. Some 
 severe fighting ensued, but neither 
 gained upon the other. With this 
 advance of Longstreet, Kearney, who 
 had pressed back the Confederate left 
 toward the Warrenton Turnpike, also 
 came into collision. Kearney was com- 
 pelled to fall back with the loss of a 
 gun, four flags, and 100 men made 
 prisoners. Porter now came up, and 
 made a disposition for attack; but it 
 was too late. Darkness fell upon the 
 scene ; and the battle of Groveton, or, 
 as it is more generally called, the battle 
 of Gainesville, was ended. On the 
 whole, it was a victory for Pope ; for 
 he had driven the enemy back fi-om his 
 
POKTEK BLAMED. 
 
 297 
 
 original position; and almost the en- 
 tire battle field was occupied by the 
 National troops. The loss on either 
 side was about 7000 men. Both armies 
 slept that night on their arms, near the 
 old battle ground of Bull Run. 
 
 Judged from a National standpoint, 
 the battle of the 29th of August, at 
 Gainesville, must be jjronounced in the 
 last degree unsatisfactory. There was 
 no lack of bravery on the part of the 
 men. In the conflict, both bravery and 
 ability were displayed by the oflicers, 
 higher and lower. But somehow there 
 was a want of harmony on the part of 
 the higher oflicials. Either there was 
 a defect in the orders, or time was 
 badly kept. The result certainly might 
 have been different if McDowell and 
 Porter had come up at an earlier hour. 
 Those precious hours — from noon to 
 half -past five — during which Pope 
 waited to hear from those two gen- 
 erals, saved Jackson's army, and ruined 
 the National prospect. They allowed 
 Longstreet to come up and unite with 
 Jackson, thus making the Confederate 
 army greatly superior to that of Pope. 
 The battle, it is true, was not lost ; but 
 it was indecisive. It settled nothing. 
 It was abeady manifest that Pope 
 must retreat, and that Lee would be 
 able to cany out his purpose of driving 
 the Nationals inside of the fortifica- 
 tions at Washington, of passing across 
 through Maryland, and of entering 
 Pennsylvania. In his report, Pope 
 greatly blamed Porter. " I do not 
 hesitate to say," he says, " that if he 
 had dischai-ged his duty, as became a 
 soldier under the circumstances, and 
 
 had made a vigorous attack on the ene- 
 my, as he was expected and directed 
 to do, at any time up to eight o'clock 
 that night, we should have utterly 
 crushed and captured the larger por- 
 tion of Jackson's force before he could 
 have been by any possibility suflficient- 
 ly reinforced to have made an effective 
 resistance." Porter says he did not 
 receive the order until it was dusk, and 
 that he had not time to come up. The 
 evidence is, no doubt, conflicting. In 
 our judgment, the balance of the evi- 
 dence is against Porter ; and we do not 
 see how, when subsequently he was 
 tried on the charges preferred against 
 him by Pope, found guilty, and dis- 
 missed the service, the verdict or the 
 punishment could have been other than 
 they were. His dilatory conduct, as 
 we have seen, had become painfully 
 conspicuous, even before the battle of 
 Gainesville. His particular defense — 
 that it was dusk on the evening of the 
 29th, when he received the order— is 
 weak in view of all the facts of the 
 case. On the afternoon of the 28th, he 
 was ordered to move from Manassas to 
 Centreville at the earliest dawn, Pope 
 assuring him that a battle would un- 
 doubtedly be fought on the following 
 morning. Early on the morning of the 
 29th, on hearing of the withdrawal 
 of Ricketts and King, and the con 
 sequent opening of Thoroughfare Gap, 
 and before Porter had time to leave 
 Manassas Junction, he was ordered to 
 move forward from that place by the 
 direct road to Gainesville. The order 
 was repeated in the most urgent man- 
 ner at half-past four o'clock, on tho 
 
298 
 
 POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. 
 
 afternoon of the 29th. His explana- 
 tion, ev^en if it covers the last order, 
 does not certainly touch the other two. 
 His apologists have endeavored to vin- 
 dicate him, by saying that nearly the 
 whole of Longstreet's corps had been 
 directly in front of him for several 
 hours when Pope's last order reached 
 him. This, we think, creates diffi- 
 culties, rather than removes them. It 
 is not claimed that Porter was engaged 
 with any portion of Longstreet's corps — 
 only that this coi'ps was lying in front 
 of him. If Longstreet was so early on 
 the ground, it is natural to conclude 
 that he would have heard the sounds 
 of battle in the forenoon, and, instead 
 of moving so far to the south, would 
 have moved in the direction whence 
 these sounds came. It is notorious, 
 too, that although after twelve o'clock 
 there was a lengthened pause in the 
 fight, there were between that hour and 
 four in the afternoon frequent skirni- 
 ishes — skirmishes no doubt noisy and 
 demonstrative enough to indicate to 
 Longstreet where he was most needed. 
 And is it conceivable that Longstreet 
 could have been for several hours so 
 far on the eastern side of Thoroughfare 
 Gap, and Jackson not have known it ? 
 How, in fact, on the supposition that 
 Longstreet was already in force on the 
 field, are we to account for the prac- 
 tical suspension of hostilities which 
 existed from twelve noon until half- 
 past five o'clock, when Heintzelman 
 and Reno resumed the attack ? 
 
 After the battle of the 29th, Pope's 
 army was in no fit condition to resume 
 the straggle Math fresh and vastly 
 
 superior forces. For the last fortnight 
 his men had been continually marching 
 or fighting. There had been positively 
 no rest. The cavalry and artillery had 
 been ten days in harness ; and the 
 entire army had been two days with- 
 out food. On the 28th, Pope had tele- 
 graphed to the commander-in-chief to 
 have rations and forage sent forward 
 from Alexandria with all despatch. 
 Halleck communicated with McClellan, 
 who was then at Alexandria, ordering s- 
 him to send the needed supplies at 
 once. On the morning of the \ng, 
 30th, the day after the first bat- 30. 
 tie, about daylight. Pope received from 
 McClellan a letter, dated at eight 
 o'clock, P. M., on the 29th, stating that 
 " I'ations and forage would be loaded 
 into the available wagons " as soon as 
 he would send a cavalry escort to bring 
 out the triiins. It is not wonderful 
 that Pope should thus express himself 
 in his report: "I do not see," he says, 
 " what service cavaliy could have ren- 
 dered in guarding railroad trains. It 
 was not imtil I received this letter that 
 I began to feel discouraged and nearly 
 hopeless of any successful issue to the op- 
 erations with which I was charged." On 
 the 30th, Pope jnade a request for more 
 anmiunition — a reque.st which, strange 
 to say, had to go the same round ; and the 
 answer which was given by McClellan 
 was, " I know nothing of the calibres 
 of Pope's artillery." There is one other 
 story, which strikingly illustrates the 
 want of harmony among some of the 
 leading National commanders at this 
 critical juncture. On the afternoon 
 of the 29th, at the time Pope was 
 
MANASSAS. 
 
 299 
 
 heroically engaged with Jackson, and 
 dreading the arrival of Longstreet, Mc- 
 Clellan, in a communication to the 
 government, suggested that one of the 
 best things to do in the circumstances 
 would be "to leave Pope to get out of 
 his scrape, and at once use all our 
 means to make the capital perfectly 
 safe," An}i;hing more heartless than 
 this suggestion could hardly be con- 
 ceived. It is said that when President 
 Lincoln bad read the despatch which 
 contained it, he fell back horror- 
 stricken in his chair. It is not won- 
 derful that Pope's campaign pioved a 
 failure. The wonder rather is that the 
 National cause, whose representatives 
 on the field were so divided in sympa- 
 thy, did not utterly perish. 
 
 In these circumstances, on the morn- 
 ing of the 30th, Pope found himself in 
 presence of the enemy. Lee's forces 
 had been coming up in great numbers 
 during the night and early morning 
 from the direction of Thoroughfare 
 Grap. By noon the Confederates great- 
 ly outnumbered the Nationals. To 
 confront the mighty and rapidly in- 
 creasing forces of Lee, Pope had not 
 more than 40,000 men ; and many of 
 them were comparatively useless from 
 fatigue and want of food. It seemed 
 to him, however, that he had no choice 
 but fight. He could hardly hope to 
 win ; but he " detennined to give bat- 
 tle to the enemy, and at least to lay on 
 •uch blows as would cripple him as 
 much as possible, and delay as long as 
 practicable any further advance toward 
 the capital." Pope felt the necessity 
 of immediate and vigorous action ; for 
 
 every moment of delay was increasing 
 the odds against him. It was his in- 
 tention to attack the Confederate left ; 
 and he had made his disposition ac- 
 cordingly. It soon became apparent, 
 however, that the Confederate general 
 was massing his troops on his right, as 
 fast as they arrived on the field, and 
 that his purpose was to fall back, and, 
 if possible, turn the National left. It 
 would appear as if, for a moment, Pope 
 had been deceived hj the movement of 
 the Confederates towards their own 
 right. In the moment of exultation, 
 he telegraphed to Washington that the 
 Confederate's were " retreating to the 
 mountains." He quickly, however, 
 discovered his mistake, and arranged 
 his troops as he best could to meet the 
 requirements of the situation. Mc- 
 Dowell was ordered forward with three 
 corps, Porter's in advance, along the 
 Warrenton Turnpike; and Ricketts' 
 division, which had been sent to the 
 right, was brought back and posted on 
 the left of the National line. As Porter 
 moved forward, his advance was re- 
 ceived by a perfect tempest of shot, 
 shell and bullet, which came fi'om the 
 wooded eminence near Groveton, where 
 the Confederates were swarming in 
 thousands. Porter's men, unable to 
 face this terrific storm, reeled, stag 
 gered, and fell back. At the same 
 moment almost, the Confederates fell 
 with tiemendous force on the National 
 left. Recognizing the fact that the 
 main attack was to be made in this 
 direction, McDowell ordered Reynolds 
 from Porter's left to the assistance of 
 Schenck and Milroy, on whose divisions 
 
300 
 
 POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. 
 
 the blow was about to fall. This 
 movement was attended with consider- 
 able peril, as it exposed Porter's key- 
 point; but, with singular presence of 
 gaind, and with great promptitude of 
 action, Colonel G. K. Warren, seeing 
 the danger, pushed forward his little 
 brigade of a thousand men and occu- 
 pied the vacant place. Had he waited 
 for orders, the National line might 
 have been cut in two. The battle was 
 already raging furiously on the Na- 
 tional left, Schenck, Milroy and Reyn- 
 olds, in spite of superior numbers, 
 offering a gallant and stubborn resist- 
 ance. Porter's men were rallied and 
 brought to a halt as they were retiring 
 to the rear ; and as soon as order was 
 restored among them, they were pushed 
 forward to the suppoi't of the left, 
 where they rendered splendid service, 
 Warren's little band of Volunteers 
 and Buchanan's brigade of Regulars 
 particularly distinguishing themselves. 
 Ricketts' division had also gone to 
 the assistance of Schenck, Milroy and 
 Reynolds, and had greatly strengthened 
 them, both on their left and in their 
 rear. Towers, of Ricketts' division, 
 who went to the support of Reynolds, 
 and led his brigade in person, made 
 himself conspicuous alike by his skill 
 and by his daring. Such was the con- 
 duct of this brigade that it drew forth 
 enthusiastic and repeated cheers. " Its 
 example," says Pope, "was of great 
 service, and infused new spirit into all 
 the troops who witnessed their intrepid 
 conduct." For a time it seemed as if 
 the Nationals might carry the day. In 
 Bpite of all his strength and the pertina- 
 
 city of his attack, Jackson's advanced 
 line was being steadily pushed back. 
 It was not until five o'clock that the 
 tide began to turn. About that hour 
 the battle commenced to rage more 
 furiously than before. LongstreeX had 
 found a commanding position on Jack- 
 son's riglit; and with four batteries 
 he poured a most destructive fire 
 upon the National troops. Line after 
 line was cut down by the raking 
 fii'e, like grass by the scythe of thj 
 mower. The slaughter on both bides 
 was terrific. Late in the afternoon, 
 Reno's corps was withdrawn from its 
 position on the right centre and thrown 
 into the action on the left. This corps, 
 coming up as the tide of battle began 
 to turn, behaved with great gallantry. 
 For hours this mutual slaughter con- 
 tinued, the Confederates showing their 
 superior strength by falling heavily on 
 the National right as well as upon the 
 left, the latter presenting a bold and 
 determined fi'ont, gallantly contesting 
 every inch of ground, but gradually 
 vieldinc: to the fiei'ce onsets and tre- 
 mendous pressure of thu foe. The 
 contest ended only when darkness fell 
 upon the scene. The losses on both 
 sides had been very severe. The Na- 
 j tional left had been pushed back well 
 nigh three quarters of a mile ; but its 
 ]-anks were unbroken, and it still held 
 I the Warrenton Turnpike. The Na- 
 1 tional right, on which the pressure had 
 been less heavy, still held its ground. 
 Pope had now no choice but fall back 
 upon Washington. Happily he had 
 been able to hold command of the 
 turnpike in his rear. At about six 
 
THE KETREAT. 
 
 301 
 
 I'clock in the evening, he had acci- 
 dentally learned that Franklin was 
 approaching Centre ville, about four 
 miles to the east of that place, and 
 that Sumner was about four miles in 
 the rear of Fi'ankliu. To Centreville 
 he resolved to fall back. At eight 
 o'clock, he accordingly issued an order 
 to the effect that the whole anny 
 should withdraw during the night 
 across Bull Run, and take position on 
 the heights of Centreville. The retreat 
 was conducted for the most part by 
 way of the Stone Bridge. When the 
 passage was completed, the bridge was 
 destroyed. The night was excessively 
 dark ; and Lee did not pursue. When 
 4ng, daylight broke on the morning of 
 3'» the 31st, Bull Run once more di- 
 vided the two great armies. The engage- 
 ment of the 30th is sometimes spoken 
 of as the second battle of Bull Run.* 
 
 On the morning of the 31st, the en- 
 tire Union army, under General Pope, 
 was at or near Centreville, with the 
 exception of two brigades, about 4000 
 strong, which had been sent on to Fair- 
 fax Station to guard the train and the 
 
 • In his report of the second day's fighting in the 
 neighborhood of Gainesville and Groveton, General 
 Lee says : " The enemy, being reinforced, renewed the 
 attack on the afternoon of the 30th, when a general 
 advance of both wings of the army was ordered, and 
 after a fierce combat, which raged until after nine 
 o'clock, he was completely defeated, and driven beyond 
 Bull Kun. The darkness of the night, his destruction 
 of the Stone Bridge after crossing, and the uncertainty 
 of the fords, stopped the pursuit. " 
 
 The following is Pope's account of the doings of the 
 30th: "The enemy's heavy reinforcements," he says, 
 " having reached him on Friday afternoon and night, 
 he began to mass on hLs right for the purpose of crush- 
 ing our left, and occupying the road to Centreville in 
 our reeir. His heaviest assault was made about five 
 ''dock in the forenoon, when, after oveTwheluiing Fitz 
 
 depot. Generals Franklin and Sumner 
 had arrived ; and General Banks, after 
 destroying a large amount of property 
 which he could not bring with him, 
 was pressing forward from Bristow 
 Station. On tlie following day Burn- 
 side evacuated Fredericksburg ; and 
 Falmouth Station, with all the bridges, 
 was destroyed by fire. Acquia Creek 
 was soon also deserted. The Nationals 
 from all points were pressed back to- 
 wards Washington. The strength of 
 the aiTny, as reported by the different 
 corps commanders, was as follows : Mc- 
 Dowell's corps, 10,000 ; Sigel's corps, 
 about 7000 ; Heintzelman's, 6000 ; Re- 
 no's, 6000; Banks', 5000; Sumner's, 
 11,000; Franklin's, 8000. Large num- 
 bers had straggled from the ranks; 
 and many had been left on the battle 
 field. The retreat of Pope behind 
 Bull Run created the wildest excite- 
 ment throughout the North. It was 
 matter of universal regret and hmnili- 
 ation that so many of the wounded 
 brave should be left on the battle 
 field to the tender mercy of the Con- 
 federates, and so near the National 
 
 John Porter, and driving his forces back in the centre 
 and left, mass after mass of his forces was pushed 
 against our left. A terrible contest, with great slaugh- 
 ter, was canied on for several hours, our men behaving 
 with firmness and gallantry, under the immediate com- 
 mand of General McDowell. When night closed, our 
 left had been forced back about half a mUe, but still 
 remained firm and unshaken, while our right held its 
 ground. General Franklin, with his corps, arrived aftei 
 dark at Centreville, six mUes in our rear, while Sumner 
 was four miles behind Franklin. I could have brought 
 up three corps in the morning in time to renew the 
 action, but starvation stared both men and horses in 
 the face ; and, broken and exhausted as they were, 
 they were in no condition to bear hunger also. I 
 accordingly retired to Centreville that night in per- 
 fect order." 
 
302 
 
 POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. 
 
 capital. An invitation was issued by 
 the War Department, calling on citizens 
 to go out to the battle field and assist 
 in taking care of the wounded. On 
 the afternoon of the 30th, the streets 
 of Washington were crowded with 
 people and conveyances loaded with 
 blankets and baskets and rolls of lint, 
 all pressing forward to the scene of 
 distress. In some respects the move- 
 ment was ill-advised ; for very few of 
 those who went out were allowed to 
 get near the wounded, and some were 
 made prisoners by the Confederates. 
 On the following morning the invita- 
 tion was recalled. At the same time, 
 the movement thus begun at Washing- 
 ton, although not immediately of any 
 practical value, produced good and 
 wholesome fruit. The example set by 
 the capital was imitated by Boston, by 
 Philadelphia, by New York, and by 
 all the cities of the North ; and from 
 that day until the close of the war, 
 the wounded soldier became more and 
 more the object of the nation's care. 
 It is only just to remark that, while 
 General Lee would not consent to a 
 truce or a suspension of military opera- 
 tions, he interposed no obstacles to the 
 removal of the wounded. 
 
 The 31st was Sunday. On that day 
 the Confederate army began to move 
 forward. It was evident to Pope, from 
 the direction in which the enemy was 
 moving, that it was Lee's intention to 
 fall with force on his right flank. At 
 an early hour in the morning Jackson, 
 taking with him his own and Ewell's 
 divisions, crossed Bull Run at Sudley 
 Springs, and pushed towards the Little 
 
 River Turnpike. His object clearly 
 was to cut the rear of Pope in the 
 direction of Fairfax Court House. 
 Pope, not unprepared for some such 
 movement, disposed his forces so as to 
 meet the requirements of the situation. 
 Changing his entire front, and flinging 
 his right wing back to the heights of 
 Germautown, he occupied, on the sept, 
 morning of the 1st of September, '• 
 when the Confederates came up, an 
 entirely new position. Pope had no 
 intention to strike the enemy until the 
 morning of the 2d ; but Lee's purpose 
 became so developed by the afternoon 
 of the Ist, that he resolved to hazard a 
 battle between the Little River Turn- 
 pike and the road from Centreville to 
 Fairfax Court House. Hooker was 
 ordered forward to the latter place, to 
 assemble the troops there and to move 
 towards Germantown. McDowell was 
 directed to take a position on the War- 
 renton Turnpike, about two miles west 
 of Fairfax. He was to connect with 
 Hooker by his right. Reno was pushed 
 forward to the north of the turnpike, 
 in the direction of Chantilly, about 
 two and a half miles east of Centre- 
 ville. Heintzelman was posted in the 
 rear of Reno; Franklin was on Mc- 
 Dowell's left and rear ; Sumner was on 
 the left of Heintzelman ; while Sigel 
 and Porter had orders to unite with 
 Sumner's right. Banks, who had 
 charge of the wagon trains, was to 
 come by the old Braddock Road into 
 the Alexandria Turnpike, in rear of 
 Fairfax Court House. Just before 
 sunset, Hooker and Reno came simul- 
 taneously in contact with the enemy'? 
 
CHANTILLY. 
 
 SOB 
 
 advance — the one on the Little River 
 Turnpike, close by Germantown, the 
 other a little more to the west, near 
 Chantilly. The day was in the last 
 degree unfavorable for wailike oper- 
 ations. The wind was cold, and a 
 drenching rain was falling. But neither 
 wind nor rain could now deter the com- 
 batants. The battle became furious 
 all at once. After it had raged for 
 nearly an hour, the Confederates con- 
 centrated on Reno's left, and fell 
 heavily on his second division, which 
 was commanded by General Isaac I. 
 Btevens, of Port Royal Ferry fame. 
 Hooker, McDowell and Kearney, of 
 Heintzelman's, rushed to Reno's assist- 
 ance. At this point the battle was 
 raging with ti'emendous fury, when 
 General Stevens, who had ordered a 
 charge, and was leading it in person, 
 was shot dead. When their general 
 fell, this division fell back in disorder. 
 The remainder of Reno's force were 
 showing signs of confusion, when Kear- 
 ney, descrying the danger, advanced 
 with his division, and, sending Birney's 
 biigade to the front, boldly renewed 
 the action. A thunderstorm, which 
 had for some time been raging, had 
 now reached its height. It was dan- 
 gerous to expose the ammunition ; but 
 Kearney, personally regardless of con- 
 sequences, brought forward a battery 
 and put it in position himself. It was 
 the last heroic act of a l)rave life. Dark- 
 ness was now setting in. As if anxious 
 to know the character of the ground, 
 he pushed forward to reconnoitre ; and 
 having inadvertently passed beyond 
 th6 line of his own pickets, and ap- 
 
 proached too close to those of the 
 enemy, a Confederate bullet laid him 
 low. As soon as he was miased, the 
 gallant Birney assumed command oi 
 the division ; and by means of a bay- 
 onet charge of his own brigade, com. 
 posed of the First, Thirty-Eighth and 
 Fortieth New York, and led by Col- 
 onel Egan, he drove the Confederates 
 back for a consideiable distance, and 
 held the field for the night. The dark 
 hours were spent in burying the dead. 
 Such was the battle of Chantilly — the 
 last battle of Pope's unfortunate cam- 
 paign. It was a battle by no means 
 inglorious to the National arms; but, 
 like all the other battles of the cam- 
 paign, it was fruitless of good. It was 
 the last of a series of disasters. 
 
 In the battle of Chantilly many 
 precious lives were lost. Kearney and 
 Stevens left behind them vacant places 
 which could not be easily filled. In 
 the charge in which he fell, shot 
 through the head, Stevens led the attack 
 in person at the head of the brave Sev- 
 enty-Ninth (Highlanders) New York, 
 bearing with him the colors of that 
 regiment, which had fallen from the 
 hands of a wounded sergeant. The 
 army had no braver ofiicer. Kearney 
 had already won great distinction and 
 become a popular favorite. He was one 
 of the few men on whom the hopes of 
 the North were centred. He had 
 often been tried : he had never been 
 found wanting. '' Words," said Pope, 
 "cannot express my sense of the zeal, 
 the gallantry, and the sympathy of that 
 most earnest and accomplished soldier, 
 Major-General Kearney. He died as 
 
J04 
 
 POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. 
 
 he would have wished to die, and as 
 became his heioic character." Kearney 
 was well known to General Lee ; and 
 next morning the Confederate com- 
 mander sent the body of the unfortu- 
 nate general, with a flag of truce, to the 
 headquarters of Pope. Kearney's body 
 was conveyed to New York, where it 
 was deposited in the family vault in 
 the quiet church-yard of old Trinity. 
 The same terrific encounter in which 
 Kearney and Stevens lost their lives, 
 proved fatal, also, to Major Tilden, of 
 the Thirty-Eighth New York — a brave 
 soldier and a gallant and skilful officer. 
 Pope's losses, since the commence- 
 ment of the campaign, were about 
 30,000 men, 30 guns, 20,000 small 
 arms, and vast quantities of supplies 
 and war material. Lee must have lost 
 at least 15,000 men. On the morning 
 Septt <^f the 2d of September, Pope's 
 army was massed behind Difficult 
 Germantown, Flint 
 Hill and Fairfax. It was a strong 
 position ; but, exhausted with continu- 
 ous marching and fighting for three 
 weary weeks, broken and demoral- 
 ized, it would have been cruel, as well 
 as impolitic, to prolong the contest. 
 About noon of that day, therefore, 
 orders were given by General-in-Chief 
 Halleck for the army of Virginia to 
 fall back vnthin the defenses of Wash- 
 ington. McClellan had the proud sat- 
 isfaction of seeing the fortifications on 
 which he had spent so much time, labor 
 and care — works of which he was per- 
 sonally so proud, but which had been 
 made the subject of so much ridicule — 
 •A last protecting the National capital, 
 
 2. 
 
 Creek, between 
 
 and shielding a National army. At his 
 own request. Pope was relieved from 
 the command, and allowed to return to 
 the West. The army of Virginia dis- 
 appeared as a separate and distinct 
 oi'ganization, and was merged in the 
 army of the Potomac; and, in compli-" 
 ance with the wisLes of a large body 
 of the people, as well as Math the 
 wishes of his surviving officers and 
 men, by whom he was greatly beloved, 
 General McClellan was placed in com- 
 mand of all the troops entrusted with 
 the defense of Washington. 
 
 It would not be difficult for the mill 
 tary critic to point out professional mis- 
 takes in Pope's campaign. It is possible 
 that he might have done better with 
 the forces at his command. It is ungen- 
 erous, however, to judge him harshly, 
 in view of the disappointments he was 
 from first to last called upon to endure. 
 He was certainly most unfortunate; 
 but his misfortunes M'ere not always of 
 his own creating. It was natural, 
 after the high expectations which had 
 been formed, fii'st of the army of the 
 Potomac, and then of the army of Vir- 
 ginia, and after the disastrous failure 
 of both, that popular indignation should 
 have been aroused, and that Pope 
 should come in for a share of that abuse 
 at the beginning of September, which 
 was heaped upon McClellan at the be- 
 ginning of August. To this day Poj^f 
 has not received justice. We have al- 
 ready called the reader's attention to 
 the feelings of jealousy and dislike 
 which McClellan entertained towards 
 Pope, to the want of sympathy between 
 McClellan's officers and the commander 
 
POLE'S COMPLAINT. 
 
 «« 
 
 ill the field, to McClellan's "Leave 
 Pope to get out of his scrape," and his 
 " I know nothing of the calibres of 
 Pope's artillery," to the failure of the 
 army of the Potomac to join Pope in 
 time, to the dilatory conduct of most 
 of McClellan's officers, and to the posi- 
 tive refusal of some of them to obey 
 orders ; and having done so once, it is 
 unnecessary again to enter into details. 
 The charges made by Pope have not 
 yet been refuted. Where they have 
 been brought to the test, they have 
 been sustained, rather than disproved. 
 "The small fraction of 20,500 men," 
 Bays Pope, "was all of the 91,000 
 veteran troops from Harrison's Land- 
 ing who ever drew trigger under my 
 command, or in any way took part in 
 this campaign. Some of the corps," he 
 goes on to say, "moved with becom- 
 ing activity, but the delays of others 
 
 The battle of Chantilly will be remembered in con- 
 nection with the loss of Generals Kearney and Stevens. 
 
 Philip Keaknet was bom in New York. June 2d, 
 1815. In 1837 he was commissioned second lieutenant 
 in the First Dragooas. Shortly afterwards he was sent 
 to Europe by the government to study and report upon 
 French military tactics. For a time he pursued his studies 
 in the military school at Saumur. He went thence to 
 Algeria, joined the Finst Chasseurs d'Afrique, and, for his 
 services, received the Cross of the Legion of Honor. He 
 returned to his home in 1840. During the Mexican War 
 he was brevetted major for gallant conduct at Contreras 
 and Churubusco ; and, in a charge at the San Antonio 
 Gate, he lost his left arm. In 1841, having resigned his 
 position in the army, he went again to Europe, with 
 the view of resuming his military studies. When the 
 Italian War broke out, in 1859, Kearney took a position 
 <ju the staff of General Maurier, and was present at the 
 liattles of Magenta and Solferino, receiving for his 
 Mrvicea, a second time, the Cross of the Legion of 
 Honor. On the outbreak of the Civil War, he hurried 
 home, and offered his sword to his country. His sub- 
 sequent career was rendered famous by his actions in 
 the engagements at Williamsburg, at Fair Oaks, at 
 Frazier's Farm, and at ChantiUy, where he met his un- 
 timely death. 
 
 were neither creditable nor excusable." 
 Most of the troops actually engaged in 
 these battles fought with great bravery, 
 but some of them could not be brought 
 into action at all. Many thousands 
 straggled away from their commands ; 
 and it is said that not a few voluntarily 
 surrendered to the enemy, so as to be 
 paroled prisoners of war. These are 
 serious charges ; and until they are dis- 
 proved the presumption must remain 
 that the judgment of history will coin- 
 cide with that which Pope himself has 
 pronounced — that " the complete over- 
 throw of Lee's army, or, at least, the 
 entire frustration of his movement 
 towards the Potomac, was defeated 
 by the failure of the army of the 
 Potomac to effect a junction in time 
 with the army of Virginia on the line 
 of the Rappahannock, or even so far 
 back as the line of Bull Run." 
 
 Isaac Ihoalls Stevens was bom in Andover, Mass., 
 m 1817, and graduated at West Point in 1839. As an 
 engineer, he had few equals in the service. When the 
 Mexican War broke out, he was employed in the 
 fortifications of the New England Coast. During the 
 Mexican War he served on the staff of General Scott 
 who pronounced him "the most promising officer of 
 hia age." In the organization of Washington Territory 
 he took an active part, first in the capacity of gover- 
 nor, and later as delegate to Congress. A sincere 
 friend of President Buchanan, he was yet opposed to 
 the policy he pursued towards the South; and, when 
 the war broke out, he hurried from the Territory, and 
 offered his sword to his country. Appointed colonel 
 of the Seventy-ninth New York Highlanders after the 
 death of Cameron, he was soon afterwards com- 
 missioned brigadier-general of volunteers. He accom- 
 panied Gen. Thos. W. Sherman to Port Koyal in th( 
 fall of 18C1. Having been transferred to North Caro- 
 Una, we soon find him in Virginia, in the corps of 
 General Reno ; and, as major-general, he figured 
 prominently iu Pope's famous but unfortunate cam- 
 paign. At Centreville, where he was shot through 
 the head by a Minie ball, he was leading a charge, 
 and bearing aloft the colors of hia favorite Seventy 
 ninth. 
 
106 
 
 ANTIETAM. 
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 
 SMte of Feeling in the North. — The Army of the Potomac and the Army of Virginia. — Lee's Opportnnity.-i 
 His Plan. — Invasion of Maryland. — His Address to the People of Maryland. — Disappointment. — Excitement 
 in Pennsylvania and in Maryland. — High Hopes of the South. — MoCleUan's Army in Motion. — Lee's 
 Order. — Lnportant Discovery. — Lee's Blunder. — McClellan Hurries Forward. — Catootin Range. — The Catoe- 
 tin Valley. — Turner's Gap. — Crampton Gap. — Harper's Ferry. — McClellan's Advice Regarding it. — D. S. 
 Miles. — Thomas H. Ford. — Jackson at Harper's Ferry. — McLaws and Walker. —Ford Falls Back. — Maryland 
 Heights Captured.— Miles' Difficulty.— McClellan's Advice.- The White Flag.— Death of Miles.- The Capit- 
 Illation. — A Disgraceful Affair. — The Committee of Investigation. — The Two Armies Come Into Collision. — 
 D. H. Hill Retires up the Mountain. — Turner's Gap. — The Battle of South Mountain Begim. — Hooker on 
 the Right— Reno on the Left. — Longstreat Arrives and Takes Command of the Confederates. — National 
 ■Victory. — Death of Reno. — Franklin at Crampton's Gap. — Howell Cobb. — A Three Hours' Fight. — The Na- 
 tionals Victorious. — Lee's Purpose Accomplished. — A Great Risk. — Lee Falls Back. — Antietam Creek. — 
 Sharpsburg. — The Heights. — The Battle Ground. — The Potomac. — The Shepherdstown Ford. — Lee's Po- 
 sition. — His Reasons for Offering Battle. — McClellan Advances. — His Line of Battle. — Time Lost. — Lee 
 Reinforced. — Arrival of "Stonewall" Jackson. — The Confederate Line. — The Three Stone Bridges. — 
 McClellan's Plan of Attack.— Lee Strongly Posted.— The Dunker Church.— The Woods.— The Open 
 Ground. — The Battle Area. — Hooker Advances by Bridge No. 1. — The Battle of Antietam Begun. — The 
 Darkness. — The Battle Resumed. — The Confederates Driven Back. — A Fearful Struggle. — Hartsuff Wound- 
 ed. — Terrible Slaughter. — Mansfield Comes Up. — A Pandemonium. — Mansfield Killed. — Hooker Sorely 
 Pressed, but Hopeful. — The Key of the Position. — Hooker's Reckless Daring. — The Air Alive with Bul- 
 lets. — Hooker Shot in the Foot. — Sumner Arrives and Takes Command. — General Sedgwick Advances.-- 
 French and Richardson. — Sedgwick Wounded. — Struggle at the Dunker Church. — The Nationals Again 
 Driven Back. —Arrival of Franklin. — Irwin's Brigade, of Smith's Division. — Gallant Efforts. — The Maine 
 and Vermont Regiments. — Havoc. — A Ghastly Spectacle. — Sumner's Bravery. — Fighting on Sumner's 
 Left. — Gallant Movement of Meagher. — Colonel Cross. — The "Fighting" Fifth New Hampshire. — The 
 Confederates Driven Back. — Death of Richardson. — Meagher Wounded — The National Right at Last Vic- 
 torious. — Porter and Burnside. — Bumside Ordered to Attack. — His Delay. — The Attack Successfully Made.— 
 Burnside's Blunder. — Arrival of A. P. Hill. — Burnside Driven Back to the Bridge. — Darkness. — The Battle 
 Ended. — Heavy Losses on Both Sides. — A National Victory. — Lee's Plan had Failed.— The Battle Ought to 
 Have Been More Decisive. — The Comte de Paris. — McClellan's Mistakes. — The Morale of Lis Men. — Bum. 
 side to Blame. — McClellan Vindicated. — Reinforcements. — The 18th of September. — The Battle Field. — A 
 Sad Picture.— The 19th. — Preparations for an Advance. — Lee's Retreat. — Porter in Pursuit. — The Pursuit 
 Feeble and Ineffective. Lincoln Visits the Army. — McClellan's Inactivity . —The Government Impatient.— 
 Stuart's Raid. — The People Indignant. — The 1st of October. — The Army iu Motion. — McClellan Removed 
 from Command. — The Proclamation of Emancipation. — The President's Purpose. —Secretary Seward. 
 
 1862. 
 
 In the first week of September, 1862, 
 the state of affairs at Washington 
 ■was not encouraging. A shadow 
 of gloom seemed to rest on the National 
 cause. There were many men loyal and 
 true to the Union — men who, for its 
 preservation, had given their best, their 
 means, their strength, the fruit of their 
 bodies, everything which they held most 
 
 dear — who had come to the conduction 
 that the war which had now extended 
 over the better part of two years, and, 
 to outward appearance, accomplished 
 nothing, should be abandoned. If the 
 South could not be subdued, it was 
 us'eless, they thought, to prolong the 
 contest. If they could not live together 
 in the same household, surely there wa» 
 
« MY MARYLAND." 
 
 30Y 
 
 no reason why North and South should 
 not get along as neighbors. 
 
 These sentiments prevailed exten- 
 (flvely throughout the North ; and it is 
 not wonderful that they should have 
 prevailed. Within a few weeks the 
 hopes of the people had twice been 
 raised to the highest point, only to be 
 iiewarded with the bitterest disappoint- 
 ment. The army of the Potomac, in 
 many respects one of the finest armies 
 the world had ever vntnessed, had not 
 only failed of its purpose, but had prac- 
 tically ceased to exist as a separate 
 organization. The army of Virginia had 
 similarly inspired hope, and similarly 
 failed. After well-nigh two years of 
 costly and bloody warfare, the enemy 
 was literally knocking at the gates of 
 the capital. Two months before, the 
 army of the Potomac was lying in 
 strength before Richmond ; one month 
 before, the army of Virginia promised 
 to do what the army of the Potomac 
 had failed to accomplish ; but now, 
 after having been driven, inch by inch, 
 from the soil of Virginia, all that re- 
 mained of those two magnificent armies 
 •was sheltered behind the fortifications 
 at Washington. 
 
 Widely as these sentiments prevailed, 
 they were not by any means universal ; 
 nor did they represent the pith and 
 backbone of the North. There were 
 still men who were willing to fight; 
 there were still sources of revenue 
 which had been left untouched; and 
 while money could be had, and men 
 could be found, the Union cause was 
 not to be regarded as desperate. 
 
 The withdrawal of the army of Pope 
 
 left the field clear for the Confederates 
 Lee had a choice of two courses. H« 
 might assault the fortifications of Wash- 
 ington, or cross the Potomac and enter 
 into Maryland. The fii'st course was 
 not to be thought of. It would con- 
 sume too much time, and, besides, there 
 was but small hope of success. The 
 invasion of Maryland promised richer 
 results. It was known that in that State 
 there were many who, at heart, were 
 deeply in sympathy with the Southern 
 cause. It was believed by many in the 
 South that Maryland was held in the 
 Union by sheer force, and that the 
 appearance of Confederate troops on 
 her soil would be the signal for a gen- 
 eral uprising of the people. "Mary- 
 land ! my Maiyland ! " was the burden 
 of one of the most beautiful lyrics of 
 the time ; it was supposed to express 
 the sentiments of the entire South — ■ 
 Maryland included ; and nowhere was 
 that song more rapturously sung than 
 at the firesides of Virginia. Lee con- 
 fidently expected that he would be 
 warmly received by the people of Mary- 
 land, and that once firmly established 
 in that State, he would be able to at- 
 tack Washington in the rear, and pos- 
 sibly invade Pennsylvania. In any 
 case, such a movement could not fail to 
 be productive of good fruit. It would 
 demonstrate to the governments of 
 Europe the inherent strength of the 
 Confederacy ; and, if it did not compel 
 recognition, it would, at least, command 
 sympathy and encouragement. 
 
 On the 2d of September, D. H. Hill 
 came up with his fresh divisions sept, 
 from Richmond. He was imme- 2. 
 
308 
 
 ANTIETAM. 
 
 diately sent forward as a vanguard to 
 Leesburg. Between the 4th and the 
 Sept. 5th, the entire Confederate anny 
 5' had crossed the Potomac by the 
 fords, in the neighborhood of what is 
 called Point of Rocks, and encamped 
 near the city of Frederick, on the Mono- 
 cacy River. The Confederate general 
 lost no time in bringing to a test the 
 sentiments of the Marylanders. On 
 the 8th of September he issued the 
 following address : 
 
 " Headquarters Armt of Northern Virginia, | 
 Near Frederick, September 8, 1862. ) 
 
 " To THE People of Maeyland : 
 
 " It is right that you should know 
 the purpose that has brought the army 
 under my command within the limits 
 of your State, so far as that purpose 
 concerns yourselves. 
 
 " The people of the Confederate 
 States have long watched with the 
 deepest sympathy the wrongs and out- 
 ragss that have been inflicted upon the 
 citizens of a Commonwealth allied to 
 the States of the South by the strong- 
 est social, political and commercial ties, 
 and reduced to the condition of a con- 
 quered province. 
 
 " Under the pretense of supporting 
 the Constitution, but in violation of its 
 most valuable provisions, your citizens 
 have been arrested and imprisoned, 
 upon no chai'ge, and contrary to all the 
 forms of law. 
 
 "A faithful and manly protest against 
 this outrage, made by a venerable and 
 illustrious Marylander, to whom, in his 
 better days, no citizen appealed for 
 right in vain, was treated with scorn 
 and contempt. 
 
 " The government of your chief city 
 has been usurped by armed strangers ; 
 your legislature has been dissolved by 
 the unlawful arrest of its members; 
 freedom of the press and of speech has 
 been suppressed ; words have been de- 
 clared offenses by an ai-bitrary decree 
 of the Federal executive ; and citizens 
 ordered to be tried by military com- 
 missions for what they may dare to 
 speak. 
 
 " Believing that the people of Mary^ 
 land possess a spirit too lofty to submit 
 to such a government, the people of the 
 South have long wished to aid you in 
 throwing off this foreign yoke, to en- 
 able you again to enjoy the inalienable 
 rights of freemen, and restore the in- 
 dependence and sovereignty of your 
 State. 
 
 " In obedience to this wish, our army 
 has come among you, and is prepared 
 to assist you with the power of its arms 
 in regaining the rights of which you 
 have been so unjustly despoiled. 
 
 "This, citizens of Maryland, ia our 
 mission, so far as you are concerned. 
 No restraint upon your free-will is 
 intended, no intimidation will be 
 allowed, within the limits of this aiTny 
 at least. Marylanders shall once more 
 enjoy their ancient freedom of thought 
 and speech. We know no enemies 
 among you, and will protect all of you 
 in every opinion. 
 
 " It is for you to decide your destinyj 
 freely and without restraint. This armj 
 will respect your choice, whatever i' 
 may be ; and, while the Southern pea 
 pie will rejoice to welcome you to your 
 natural position among them, they wiU 
 
EXCITEMENT IN PENNSYLVANIA. 
 
 309 
 
 only welcome you when you come of 
 your own free will. 
 
 "R. E. Lee, 
 " General Commanding." 
 Lee had counted too confidently on 
 Maryland sympathy. His expectations 
 were not realized. His address, which 
 was well conceived and carefully ex- 
 pressed, fell flat on the people. A few 
 Southern sympathizers joined his ranks ; 
 but he soon discovered that his recruits 
 were few in comparison with the num- 
 bers who took advantage of the circum- 
 stances in which they found themselves, 
 to reclaim that liberty of which, by the 
 conscription, they had been deprived. 
 Maryland, in fact, was lukewarm ; and 
 Lee WIS too sharp not to see that the 
 invasion of Pennsylvania would not be 
 free from peiil, with a doubtful or 
 hostile State in his rear. His appear- 
 ance in Maryland, however, naturally 
 enough created the wildest excitement 
 in Pennsylvania. In York and Adams 
 counties, and in the valleys of the Sus- 
 quehanna and the Cumberland, the peo- 
 ple were seized with a panic; but it 
 was not the panic which comes of fear 
 or cowardice. The fai-mers and vil- 
 lagers T'jalized their difficulty, and pre- 
 pared to meet it. Sending away their 
 wives and children, and removing their 
 cattle to regions where they would be 
 'ess at the mercy of the enemy, they 
 themselves hastened to take up arms. 
 In many of the townships of the State 
 the stores were closed, bells were nmg, 
 guns were fired, public meetings were 
 held, and citizens assembled in large 
 masses to drill. Governor Curtin issued 
 wa order, calling upon all the able-bodied 
 
 men of Pennsylvania to organize im- 
 mediately for the defense of the State, 
 and to be ready for marching orders 
 upon an hour's notice. On the Sept. 
 nth, he issued a call for 50,000 iJ' 
 of the freemen of the State to enter 
 immediate service, in order to repel the 
 imminent danger of invasion. On the 
 same day he ti-ansmitted the following 
 despatch to the mayor of Philadelphia : 
 " We have," he said, " reliable informa- 
 tion this evening that the rebel gen- 
 erals have moved their entire army 
 from Frederick to Cumberland Valley, 
 and theu' destination is now Harrisburg 
 and Philadelphia. We need every 
 available man immediately. Stir up 
 your population to-night. Form them 
 into companies, and send us 20,000 to- 
 morrow. No time can be lost in mass- 
 ing a force on the Susquehanna to de- 
 fend the State and your city. Arouse 
 every man possible, and send him here." 
 The governor of Maryland followed a 
 similar course. To these appeals the 
 people made hearty response. Penn- 
 sylvania acted nobly. The excitement 
 produced by the governor's words knew 
 no bounds. Seventy-five thousand men 
 were soon converging from all parts of 
 the State to Harrisburg. Volunteers 
 came pouring in from the adjacent States; 
 and in a brief space both Harrisburg 
 and Washington were overflowing with 
 troops. The Confederates M^ere still in 
 high spirits ; and some of them openly 
 expressed their belief that in a few days 
 they would be able to dictate terms of 
 peace in the city of Philadelphia. The 
 same old hall which had witnessed the 
 signing of the Declaration of Inde- 
 
 »3« 
 
310 
 
 AWTIBTAM. 
 
 pendence of the United States was to 
 witness the signing of a treaty ac- 
 knowledging the independence of the 
 South. General Lee had already ar- 
 rived at a different conclusion ; but 
 these sentiments were largely shared 
 by the rank and file of the Confederate 
 army. 
 
 We have already seen McClellan 
 placed at the head of the reconstructed 
 army of the Potomac, or rather, as it 
 was now called, the army of Northern 
 Virginia. McClellan had always been 
 a great favorite with the men, from 
 the officers down to the common sol- 
 dier. His reappearance among them 
 was hailed with enthusiasm. The army 
 was in a wretched condition. It was 
 not slow, however, to assume something 
 like order. The absentees, in great 
 numbers, rallied to theu- standards ; 
 discipline recovered its sway ; and the 
 shapeless, disorganized mass became 
 once again the army of the Potomac. 
 As soon as it became known that Gen- 
 eral Lee had crossed into Maryland, 
 McClellan was ordered to follow him 
 with all the troops not needed for the 
 Sept. defense of Washington. On the 
 
 3. following day, he set his troops 
 in motion; and on the 7th, leaving 
 Sept. General Banks in command at 
 
 '• the National capital, he hastened 
 to the field, and made his headquarters 
 that night with the Sixth corps at 
 Rockville. His army, comprising his 
 own old forces and those of Pope and 
 Burnside, numbered over 87,000 effect- 
 ive men. On the morning of the 10th 
 Sept. McClellan was at Damascus ; and 
 
 12. on the 12th, his army having 
 
 marched by five parallel roads, he hac 
 reached Fi-ederick. The first move- 
 ments of McClellan were conducted! 
 with a view to command all the lower 
 fords of the Potomac, thus giving 
 Lee the choice of meeting him in bat 
 tie, or of retiring before him and 
 crossing the river further up, with the 
 view of retreating through the Shen- 
 andoah Valley. Great caution was 
 necessary, as the real intentions of Lee 
 were not known. Happily, however, 
 a copy of his order of march, issued 
 on the 9th, was found at Fred- sepl. 
 erick on the 13th. The follow- 13* 
 ing is the order : 
 
 " Headquabteks Arht of Northbrn { 
 ViRoiNiA, Sept. 9, 1862. J 
 
 '' Special Order, No. 119. 
 
 " in. The army will resume its march 
 to-morrow, taking the Hagerstown Road. 
 General Jackson's command will forrs 
 the advance, and, after passing Middle 
 ton with such portion as he may select, 
 take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross 
 the Potomac at the most convenient 
 point, and, by Friday morning, take pos- 
 session of the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
 road, capture such of the enemy as may 
 be at Martinsburg, and intercept such 
 as may attempt to escape from Harper's 
 Ferry. 
 
 "IV. General Longstreet's command 
 will pursue the main road as far as 
 Boonsboro', where it will halt with re- 
 serve, supply and baggage trains of the 
 army. 
 
 "V. General McLaws, with his own 
 division and that of General R. H. An- 
 derson, will follow General Longstreet ; 
 on reaching Middleton, will take the 
 
taiE'S PLAN DISOOVEEED. 
 
 8» 
 
 route to Harper's Ferry, and, by Friday 
 morning, possess himself of the Marj'- 
 land Heights, and endeavor to capture 
 the enemy at Harper's Ferry and vi- 
 cinity. 
 
 "VI. General Walker, with his divi- 
 sion, after accomplishing the object in 
 which he is now engaged, will cross the 
 Potomac at Check's Ford, ascend its 
 right bank to Lovettsville, take posses- 
 sion of Loudon Heights, if practicable, 
 by Friday morning, keep the ford on 
 his left, and the road between the end 
 of the mountain and the Potomac on his 
 right. He will, as far as practicable, 
 co-operate with General McLaws and 
 General Jackson in intercepting the re- 
 treat of the enemy. 
 
 "VII. General D. H. Hill's division 
 will form the rear-guard of the army, 
 pursuing the road taken by the main 
 body. The reserve artillery, ordnance, 
 and supply trains will precede General 
 Hill. 
 
 "VIII. General Stuart will detach a 
 squadron of cavaliy to accompany the 
 conunands of Generals Longstreet, Jack- 
 son and McLaws, and, with the main 
 body of the cavalry, will cover the 
 route of the army, and bring up all 
 stragglers that may have been left be- 
 hind. 
 
 "IX. The commands of Generals 
 Jackson, McLaws and Walker, after 
 accomplishing the objects for which 
 they have been detached, will join the 
 main body of the army at Boonsboro' 
 or Hagerstown. 
 
 "X. Each regiment on the march, 
 will habitually carry its axes in the 
 regimental ordnance wagons for use of 
 
 the men at their encampments to pro 
 cure wood, &c. 
 
 " By command of 
 
 " General R. E. Lee. 
 
 " R. H. Chilton, A.-A.-General, 
 " For Maj.-Gen. D. H. Hill, Comd'g, Division." 
 
 The secret which this document r»^ 
 vealed was of priceless value to Mo 
 Clellan. It was evident that Lee had 
 no intention to leave Maryland until 
 necessity compelled him. His object, 
 as he himself afterwards put it, was 
 "to move the army into Western Mary- 
 land, establish our communications with 
 Richmond through the valley of the 
 Shenandoah, and, by threatening Penn- 
 sylvania, induce the enemy to follow, 
 and di-aw him back from his base. 
 Now, it had been supposed that the 
 advance upon Frederick would lead to 
 the evacuation of Martinsburg and 
 Harper's Ferry, thus opening the line 
 of communication through the valley. 
 But this not ha^^ng occiirred, it became 
 necessary to dislodge the enemy from 
 these positions, before concentrating the 
 army west of the mountains. To ac- 
 complish this with the least delay, Gen- 
 eral Jackson was directed to proceed 
 with his command to Martinsburg, and, 
 after driving the enemy from that place, 
 to move down the south side of the 
 Potomac upon Harper's Ferry. Gen- 
 eral McLaws, with his own and R. H. 
 Anderson's divisions, was ordered to 
 besiege Maryland Heights, on the north 
 side of the Potomac, opposite Harper'^ 
 Ferry, and Brigadier-General Walker 
 to take possession of Loudon Heights, 
 on the east side of the Shenandoah, 
 where it unites with the Potomac. 
 
m 
 
 ANTIETAM. 
 
 These several commands were directed, 
 after reducing Harper's Ferry and clear- 
 ing the valley of the enemy, to jom 
 the rest of the army at Boonsboro' or 
 Hagerstown." 
 
 Lee's plan was undoubtedly bold, 
 [t cannot, however, be called mse. He 
 was far away from his supplies; and 
 }et he was cutting his army into two 
 parts, and placing between those pai-ts 
 a river which was liable to be made 
 impassable in a few hours by a heavy 
 rain. In addition to all this, he was 
 closely pursued by an enemy M^ho was 
 considerably superior in numbers. It 
 is difficult to acquit Lee of the charge 
 of having, at this particular ciisis, com- 
 mitted a grave blunder. He has him- 
 self tried to explain what seemed a 
 gross violation of the fundamental prin- 
 ciples of military tactics. "The advance 
 of the Federal army," he says, "was so 
 slow, at the time we left Frederick, as 
 to justify the belief that the reduction 
 of Harper's Ferry would be accom- 
 plished, and our troops concentrated 
 before they would be called to meet it. 
 In that event, it was not intended to 
 oppose its passage through the South 
 Mountain, as it was desired to engage 
 it as far from its base as possible." Lee 
 was evidently judging McClellan by his 
 experience in the Peninsula. On this 
 occasion, however, the National com- 
 mander had made good use of his time. 
 The discovery of Lee's purpose had led 
 Sept. to both vigor and promptitude of 
 **• action; and on the 14th, the 
 Confederates were startled to perceive 
 the Nationals, in great force, coming 
 streaming down the western sides of 
 
 the Catoctin Hills. Such an apparition 
 was all the more alarming that the 
 operations at Harper's Feriy had not 
 yet been crowned with success; and 
 that, if the National forces should pene- 
 trate the South Mountain, they would 
 find themselves in Pleasant Valley, di- 
 rectly in the rear of McLaws, who, from 
 the side of the Maryland Heights, was 
 co-operating with Jackson in the reduc- 
 tion of Harper's Ferry. This was not 
 a state of things which Lee could have 
 any special desire to see brought about. 
 It could hardly fail to prove destructive 
 of his whole plan of campaign. 
 
 The Catoctin range is a continuation 
 of the Blue Ridge. On the south, it 
 terminates in Maryland at the Point of 
 Rocks. On the north, it unites at the 
 Pennsylvania State line with the South 
 Mountain range which, trending to the 
 southwest, slopes down to the Potomac 
 at Knoxville, about four miles to the 
 east of Harper's Fe.'Ty. Between these 
 two ranges nestles the most beautiful 
 valley in Maryland — the valley of Ca- 
 toctin. In the centre of the valley, 
 and about ten miles from Frederick, is 
 the village of Middletown. Few vil- 
 lages in the whole world are more high-" 
 ly favored for situation than the village 
 of Middletown. At this season of the 
 year Nature, clad in her rich, autumnal 
 robes, presents in this region unusual 
 attractions. To prevent any possibility 
 of disaster resulting fi'om the unfortu- 
 nate division of his army, Lee made 
 such disposition of his forces as would 
 cover the siege of Harper's Ferry. He 
 had fallen back upon South Mountain, 
 which runniim north, as it does fron? 
 
HARPER'S FERRY. 
 
 313 
 
 the ferrj', forms a sort of natural cur- 
 tain and furnishes an excellent line of 
 defense. This line can only be pene- 
 trated by Turner's Gap, in front of 
 Middletown, and by Crampton's Gap, 
 some five miles further to the south. 
 Master of these natural passes, Lee 
 could hold back the Union anny with 
 one hand, while with the other he was 
 securing the rich prize of Harper's 
 Ferry. Here, therefore, he posted his 
 troops. Meanwhile, the Nationals, 
 whom we have just seen streaming 
 down the western slopes of the Catoc- 
 tins, were moving in two columns across 
 the valley — the right and centre — to- 
 wards Tui-ner's Gap, Burnside leading 
 the way ; and the left, composed of 
 Franklin's corps, towards Crampton's 
 Gap, more to the south. 
 
 While the forces of North and South 
 are thus nearing each other at South 
 Mountain, and while a great battle is 
 hourly becoming more imminent, let us 
 see what is taking place in the immediate 
 neighborhood of Harper's Ferry. This 
 place is highly favored by nature, the 
 entire hollow being commanded by the 
 three mountains, named, respectively, 
 Bolivar, Maryland and Loudon Heights. 
 A large amount of artillery and stores 
 had been collected at Harper's Ferry 
 by the Federal government. In the 
 event of its being found necessary to 
 evacuate the ferry, it would be neces- 
 sary to destroy all the stores and other 
 property, or leave them to the enemy. 
 It was McClellan's opinion, when he 
 started to follow Lee into Maryland, 
 that Harper's Ferry could not be held. 
 He therefoie advised its evacuation. 
 
 and the employment of its garrison in 
 co-operation with his army. Foiu* days 
 later he repeated the same advice to 
 Halleck. But Halleck was unwilling 
 to make so great a sacrifice. He re- 
 solved, therefore, to hold the position 
 until McClellan should be able to re- 
 lieve it, or until communication would 
 be open, so that it could be evacuated 
 in safety. The place had been, since 
 the 15th of August, in charge of T). S. 
 Miles, who had been sent thither by 
 General Wool, with special instructions 
 to fortify Maryland Heights — the key 
 of the position. Miles had been singu- 
 larly remiss in the discharge of his duty. 
 He had done nothing to strengthen the 
 position. On tlie 5th of September, 
 Colonel Thomas H. Ford was placed 
 by Miles in command of the heights. 
 Ford saw the danger to which the Na< 
 tionals were exposed from the unpro 
 tected nature of the position. Ho 
 therefore called for reinforcements, and 
 for intrenching tools. The reinforce- 
 ments came, but not the tools. With a 
 few borrowed axes and other imple- 
 ments, Ford went to work, and was 
 successful in constnicting a slight breast- 
 work of trees near the crest of the hill. 
 This was finished the very day that 
 Jackson appeared with his advance. 
 Miles had fortified Bolivar Heights 
 behind the town ; but these are com- 
 manded by both Loudon and Maryland 
 Heights. The garrison at Harper's 
 Ferry had been increased to about 
 13,000 men by the arrival of General 
 Julius White with the garrison from 
 Martinsburg. At noon of the 13th, 
 Jackson was in full force in the rear of 
 
014 
 
 ANTEETAM. 
 
 Harper's Ferry, and at once put him- 
 self in communication with Walker and 
 McLaws. Walker was already in pos- 
 session of Loudon Heights; and Mc- 
 Laws was exerting himself to the 
 utmost to get hold of the Maryland 
 Heights on the other side of the Po- 
 tomac. The summits of these diflFerent 
 mountains are wathin cannon shot of 
 each other. Ford had been attacked 
 on the 12th, but had managed to hold 
 his gi'ound. On the 1 3th again, early 
 in the day, he had repelled a fierce as- 
 sault ; but later on the same day, the 
 attack was resumed by Kershaw, and 
 the Nationals were driven back in some 
 confusion. At two o'clock next morn- 
 ing Ford, hopeless of aid from Miles, 
 spiked his guns, and, under cover of the 
 darkness, retired to Harper's Ferry. 
 All now depended upon Miles. Could 
 he hold out till McClellan should be 
 able to send him aid ? It was a difficult 
 and dangerous task. But with the 
 forces at his command, and considering 
 the advantages of the position, it was 
 not by any means impossible of ac- 
 complishment. Early on the 14th, Har- 
 per's Ferry was completely invested, 
 the Confederates being in command of 
 both Loudon and Maryland Heights. 
 At the foot of the latter. General Wright 
 was well posted vvdth artillery; and 
 McLaws, who had pushed forward to 
 the Potomac, at Sandy Hook, was bar- 
 ring all way of escape down the river. 
 In the afternoon an artillery fire was 
 opened. On the same day a message 
 came from McClellan to Miles, saying, 
 " Hold on to the last extremity, and, if 
 possible, reoccupy Maryland Heights 
 
 with your whole force. The Catoctin 
 Valley is in our possession, and you 
 can safely cross the river at Berlin." 
 This Miles could not or would not do. 
 At nine o'clock that night he allowed 
 his cavaby, 2000 strong, under Col 
 onel Davis, to depart. When morning 
 dawned, it was found that Bolivar 
 Heights were also in the hands of the 
 Confederates. With the early light, 
 no fewer than nine batteries opened 
 fire upon the now comparatively help 
 less garrison. Miles could not prolong 
 the resistance. He soon hoisted a 
 white flag ; but as it was not perceived 
 by the Confederates, the firing con- 
 tinued for some thirty or forty minutes 
 afterwards. During this time Miles 
 was mortally wounded by the fragment 
 of a shell. The duty of sun-endering 
 devolved upon General White. Eleven 
 thousand five hundred and eighty-three 
 men were made prisoners of war ; and 
 73 guns, 13,000 small arms, 200 wagons, 
 and large quantities of supplies fell 
 into the hands of the Confederates. 
 The officers were allowed to go on 
 parole with their side arms and private 
 property. The private soldiers were 
 peiTiiitted to take everything with them 
 except their equipments and guns. The 
 surrender of Harper's Ferry was felt 
 to be a disgrace to the National arms. 
 Later in the year it was made the sub- 
 ject of examination by a Court of In- 
 quiry at Washington. The evidence 
 produced was of the most damning 
 kind. Ford and other officers were dis- 
 missed from the ai-my of the United 
 States ; and a lasting stigma was affixed 
 to the name and memory of Miles, who 
 
SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 
 
 8U 
 
 was declared to have exhibited "an 
 incapacity amounting almost to imbe- 
 cility." 
 
 Let us now see what was taking 
 place a little further to the northeast. 
 We left the National army under Mc- 
 Clellan marching across the beautiful 
 valley through which, as seen from the 
 neighboring heights, runs, like a silver 
 thread, the little river Catoctin. They 
 were moving towards the two passes 
 which lead through the South Moun- 
 tain — Turner's Gap and Crampton's 
 Gap — both of which the Confederates 
 had carefully guarded, and each of 
 which they were resolved to defend to 
 the very uttermost. McClellan knew 
 that the garrison at Harper's Ferry was 
 reduced to great straits ; and being eager 
 to afford relief, he pressed foi'ward 
 with unwonted speed. On the morn- 
 ing of Sunday, the 14th of September, 
 the two rival armies came into collision 
 at a bridge which traverses the Catoc- 
 tin about half a mile west of Middle- 
 town, and where the Confederates had 
 posted some artillery. Finding it im- 
 possible to resist the heavy and resolute 
 pressure of the Nationals, D. H. Hill, 
 who was in command, fell back, retiring 
 further up the mountain, and posting 
 his men on the three roads which lead 
 through Turner's Gap. In addition to 
 the main road, there are two country 
 roads — one to the right and one to the 
 left. All these approaches were well 
 guarded by artillery. Cox's Kanawha 
 division, of Reno's corps of Burnside's 
 column, moved along the road to the 
 left or south of the gap. They soon 
 discovered that the Confederates occu- 
 
 pied the crest in their front in great 
 force. Reno immediately ordered an 
 advance, promising the support of his 
 whole corps. Cox was promptly sup- 
 ported by Wilcox, Rodman and Stur- 
 gis. At this point, the battle now 
 began to rage with great fierceness, the 
 Nationals not only holding their own, 
 but gradually pressing the enemy back- 
 ward, and gaining a foothold on the 
 crest. Between two and three o'clock. 
 Hooker's corps, of Burnside's column, 
 moved along the road to the right, his 
 object being to crush the Confederate 
 left at the higher crest. Meade pressed 
 toward the eminence on the one side of 
 this road ; and Patrick, supported by 
 Doubleday and Phelps, was pressing 
 toward the eminence on the other side. 
 Duryee advanced to the assistance of 
 Meade with his fine brigade, of Rick- 
 etts' division, arriving just in time to 
 witness the close of the contest. About 
 four o'clock, when the battle had 
 reached a climax, Longstreet came up 
 from Hagerstown with reinforcements ; 
 and, as he outranked Hill, he assumed 
 the command. While victory was 
 crowning the efforts of Reno on the 
 left, and those of Hooker on the right, 
 Burnside, somewhat late in the after- 
 noon, pushed Gibbon's brigade forward 
 on the main road which leads along 
 through the gap. This brigade, com- 
 ing into contact with the Confederate 
 centre, encountered a stubborn resist- 
 ance ; but they pressed on, fighting 
 bravely, and steadily gaining ground. 
 At nine o'clock, when they had all but 
 reached the summit of the pass, their 
 ammunition failed them ; but the vie- 
 
816 
 
 ANTIETAM. 
 
 tory was secure ; and they were soon 
 afterwards relieved. When the contest 
 closed, the Nationals had carried the 
 mountain sides on the right and left 
 of the gap ; and the main road or 
 turnpike was also in their hands. Such 
 was the battle of South Mountain. It 
 was a decided victory for the National 
 rnns. It was not won, however, with- 
 out very considerable loss — a loss in 
 liiDed and wounded amounting to 2325 
 men. Among the kilied was General 
 iieno — one of the bravest of the brave — 
 a soldier who had done much during 
 the dark hours of advereity to sustain 
 the sinking spiiit of the North. 
 
 Simultaneously with this struggle at 
 Turner's Gap, the Nationals, under 
 Franklin, were making a bold effort to 
 Secure possession of Crampton's Gap, 
 some six miles further to the south. 
 The position was held by Howell Cobb, 
 who, the reader will remember, was 
 secretary of the treasury under Bu- 
 chanan. Cobb had under him three of 
 McLaws' brigades. Franklin, follow- 
 ing out McClellan's instructions, ap- 
 peared at Barkittsville, in front of the 
 pass, at noon on the 14th, with a fine 
 body of men from New York, New 
 Jersey and Pennsylvania. He found 
 the Confederates well posted behind 
 stone-wall defenses. Forming his line 
 of battle with Slocum's division on the 
 right of the road running through the 
 gap, and with Smith's on the left, he 
 advanced upon Cobb, steadily driving 
 him back from his defenses up the 
 slope ; and after an action which lasted 
 some three hours, he gained the crest 
 of the hilL The Confederates fled 
 
 down the western side of the mountain, 
 leaving 400 prisoners, three regimental 
 colors, two pieces of artillery and 3000 
 stand of amis. Franklin was now only 
 six miles from Harper's Ferry. He 
 was in a position to go to the assistance 
 of Miles. But, as the reader has al- 
 ready learned, it was too late. In this 
 engagement, Franklin lost 115 killed 
 and 418 wounded and missing. In the 
 two engagements, the Nationals had 
 actually come off victorious ; but Lee 
 had accomplished his purpose-~he had 
 secm'ed time for Jackson to complete 
 the enterprise at Harper's Ferry. 
 
 Maryland Heights and Harper's 
 Ferry, with its stores, were m the 
 hands of the Confederates. In one 
 sense it was a great prize which Lee 
 had won. It was a prize, however, 
 more in seeming than reality. To gain 
 it he had divided his army into two 
 parts, in presence of united and power- 
 ful forces, and had thereby exposed 
 himself to the terrible risk of being cut 
 up in detail. This danger was im- 
 minent on the 14th, when Harper's 
 Ferry was still engaging Jackson's at- 
 tention, and employing all his strength. 
 It was still imminent on the morn- Sepj, 
 ing of the 15th, when Franklin, *5. 
 having forced his way through Cramp- 
 ton's Gap, appeared, like a spectre, in 
 Pleasant Vallej Jackson had hurried 
 off that morning from Harper's Ferry, 
 leaving A. P. Hill to carry out the ar- 
 rangements rendered necessary by the 
 surrender ; but some time must elapse 
 before Lee could count on Jackson's 
 presence with any number of his troopa, 
 The Confederate commander lost no 
 
GEN P. H SHERIDAN 
 
GENERAL GEORGE A. CUSTER 
 
 FAMOUS CAVALRY COMMANDER, ASSOCIATED WITH GENERAL SHERIDAN IN THE PURSUIT AND 
 
 CAPTURE OF GENERAL LEE'S ARMY ; AFTERWARD CELESRiTED INDIAN 
 
 FIGHTER; KILLED BY THE INDIANS, JUNE 25, 1876 
 
THE BATTLE GROUND. 
 
 317 
 
 time in making the necessary disposi- 
 tion of his forces. Withdrawing from 
 South Mountain, he crossed Pleasant 
 Valley, and took position on the slop- 
 ing ground to the west of Antietam 
 Creek, in the vicinity of Sharpsburg. 
 Sept. On the 16th, the larger portion of 
 *6' the Confederate forces left Har- 
 per's Ferry in great haste, crossed the 
 pontoon bridge into Maryland, and, by 
 forced marches, succeeded in joining 
 Lee at Antietam in time for the great 
 battle of the 17th. Jackson, who, as 
 has been mentioned, left on the 15th, 
 rejoined Lee on the 16th. McLaws 
 had abandoned the Maryland Heights 
 when he became aware of the near 
 presence of Franklin. Walker at the 
 same time abandoned Loudon Heights. 
 These last reached Lee by way of Shep- 
 herdstown, about nine o'clock on the 
 morning of the 17th. On the night of 
 the 16th, the Confederates were well 
 posted on the heights near Sharpsburg. 
 A few words here, descriptive of the 
 ground on which two great armies were 
 about to come into deadly collision, 
 will enable the reader to understand 
 more clearly the battle picture which 
 follows. As the traveler, after reach- 
 ing the summit of South Mountain, be- 
 gins to descend the western slope, there 
 bursts upon his view one of the love- 
 liest landscapes in the United States — 
 a scene quite as attractive as the valley 
 of the Catoctin which he has just left 
 behind. In the distance, some eight or 
 twelve miles in front of him, rolls 
 lazily along on its tortuous bed the 
 dark current of the Potomac. On this 
 side of the Potomac, and from six to 
 
 eight miles from the mountain passea 
 runs the drowsy stream called Antietam 
 Creek. This creek, which, flowing al- 
 most due south and falling into the 
 Potomac some eight miles above Har- 
 per's Ferry, forms with that river a 
 sort of irregular acute angle. Between 
 these two streams there is an enclosed 
 space which, of course, widens consider- 
 ably towards the north, but which, at 
 this point now particularly claiming 
 attention is from two to three miles 
 broad, and about seven or eight miles 
 long. From the western margin of the 
 Antietam the ground rises until it be- 
 comes a bold crest, the entire slope 
 being covered by woods and cultivated 
 fields ; it then falls back to the Po- 
 tomac in rugged and broken outlines of 
 rock. Almost in the centre of this 
 space, and just behind the ridge to the 
 west, nestles the town of Sharpsburg; 
 and behind Sharpsburg, a little to the 
 south, is the Shepherdstown Ford across 
 the Potomac. 
 
 Such was the position which the 
 Confederate general had chosen, and on 
 which he proposed to await the attack 
 of McClellan. The creek was in his 
 front; the Potomac was in his rear; 
 and behind and near the middle of his 
 line was the little town of Sharpsburg, 
 about a mile from the creek. The 
 position unquestionably offered several 
 advantages ; but it is always dangerous 
 to hazaid — what in the circumstances 
 this could not but be — a great and pos- 
 sibly decisive battle, with a river in the 
 rear. The truth is, Lee's original plan 
 had failed. He was no longer offensive, 
 but defensive. His great object, from 
 
 ».?3 
 
318 
 
 ANTIETAM. 
 
 the failure at South Mountain, had 
 been to gain time for the concentration 
 of his troops. This, however, he could 
 have accomplished with equal ease on 
 the other side of the Potomac. Why, 
 then, did he remain on the Maryland 
 side ? The answer is simple. He could 
 not have recrossed the Potomac without 
 covering himself with odium — without 
 making his expedition to a certain ex- 
 tent ridiculous. He had marched North 
 with a great flourish of trumpets; his 
 plans and purposes had become known ; 
 it was absolutely necessary, in short, 
 that in a fair fight he should test the 
 skill and strength of his antagonist; 
 and judging from the past, he was not 
 without reason to hope that victory 
 might crown his effort. If defeated, 
 he might still be able to make good his 
 retreat across the Potomac. If success- 
 ful, he might yet march in triumph to 
 Baltimore and Washington. 
 
 On the morning of the 15th, the Na- 
 tional army had defiled from the South 
 Mountain, and moved in long, shining 
 columns athwart the valley. By the 
 evening of that day, the advance had 
 arrived at Antietam Creek ; and the 
 enemy was discovered well posted be- 
 hind the crest of the opposite slope. 
 There was some slight skirmishing 
 with cavahy ; but neither of the com- 
 manders was quite willing to open the 
 fight. Lee, while actually waiting for 
 the arrival of reinforcements from Har- 
 per's Ferry, made such a show of 
 Btrength as imposed upon McClellan. 
 The National forces were not well for- 
 ward, when darkness set in. There 
 had been on the part of some of the 
 
 commands unnecessary delay — a delay 
 but for which McClellan might have 
 been able to attack Lee vpith success 
 on the afternoon of the 15th. During 
 the morning of the 16th, the whole 
 of the National army arrived, with the< 
 exception of Franklin's command, which 
 was still in Pleasant Valley. By that 
 time, however, Lee was equally pre- 
 pared for battle; for Jackson had al- 
 ready arrived, and with him almost the 
 entire Confederate strength from Har- 
 per's Ferry. 
 
 On the morning of the 16th, there 
 was some artillery filing; but it did 
 not seem to indicate that either side 
 was yet fully ready for the fight. Both 
 armies, however, were busy making 
 preparations for the attack which could 
 not now be long delayed. The Con- 
 federates were so arranged that Long- 
 street was on the right, with his right 
 flank resting on a curve of the Antie- 
 tam, D. H. Hill being on his left, and 
 one of Longstreet's divisions, com- 
 manded by Hood, being on the left 
 of Hill. In a general manner their 
 line stood north and south ; but Hood's 
 division made an angle with the rest, 
 and, facing northward, stood across the 
 Hagerstown Road. The object of this 
 arrangement was to oppose any flank 
 movement which might be made in 
 that direction. Close to that point, and 
 in the rear of Hood, Jackson's exhaust- 
 ed troops, which had just arrived from 
 Harper's Ferry, were posted in reserve, 
 his line stretching from the Hagerstown 
 Road toward the Potomac, and pro^ 
 tected by Stuart, with cavalry and 
 artillery. Walker was posted on Long- 
 
THE DUNKEE CHURCH. 
 
 319 
 
 wreet'a right with two brigades, near 
 what was called Sbaveley's Farm. Lee 
 had his headquarters iu a tent on the 
 hill where the National cemetery now is. 
 McClellan's forces, on the morning of 
 'that day, were posted along the eastern 
 bank of the Antietam. Hooker's^ corps 
 was placed on the extreme right. Next 
 to him was Sumner, with his corps. 
 Porter was placed in the centre, and 
 Burnside on the left. Mansfield was 
 stationed in the rear of Hooker. Frank- 
 lin had not yet come up from Pleasant 
 Valley. General McClellan's head- 
 quarters were at the fine brick mansion 
 of Philip Pry, on the east side of the 
 Antietam, and about two miles north- 
 east of Sharpsburg. From this point 
 he had a commanding view of the en- 
 tire line of battle. In front of the Na- 
 tional line were three stone bridges. 
 These bridges have been described as 
 No9. 1, 2 and 3. No. 1 was in front of 
 the National right, near which were 
 stationed Hooker, Sumner and Mans- 
 field. No. 2 was in front of Porter, 
 who commanded the National centre. 
 No. 3 was opposite Burnside, who had 
 charge of the National left. Near 
 biidge 1 was a ford, which was turned 
 to good account during the progress of 
 th'i fight. McClellan's plan was to at- 
 tack the enemy's left with the corps of 
 Hooker and Mansfield, supported by 
 S^imner's, and, if necessary, by Frank- 
 lin's; and, as soon as matters looked 
 favorable in that direction, to move the 
 loi-ps of Burnside against the enemy's 
 extreme right, upon the ridge running 
 to the south and rear of Sharpsburg, 
 and, having carried that position, to 
 
 press along the crest toward his left. 
 Whenever either of these flank move- 
 ments should be successful, he proposed 
 to advance the centre with all the 
 forces then disposable. 
 
 We have already referred to the 
 careful disposition which Lee had made 
 of his troops on his own left, on and 
 around the Hagerstown Road. On the 
 west side of that road, about a mile 
 from Sharpsburg, and about half a mile 
 from the rear of the Confederate left, 
 there was a small meeting-house, known 
 as the Dunker Church. This church was 
 enveloped in woods. In the immediate 
 neighborhood of the church there was 
 an open, cultivated area, extending from 
 the noi'th, for the most part skii-ted 
 vnth woods, but part of which was 
 travei'sed by the Hagerstown Road. 
 In the woods near the church were 
 numerous ledges of limestone, which 
 afford-ed an excellent cover for troops. 
 It was here, among these limestone 
 ledges, where Jackson had posted his 
 men. The middle part of this open 
 ground was a cornfield. A portion of 
 it toward the east had been recently 
 ploughed. It was in the woods, near 
 the chui'ch, and in that open ground, 
 that the battle of Antietam most fierce- 
 ly raged and was principally fought. 
 This was the focus of the fight. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 16th, about 
 two P. M., General McClellan began to 
 put his plans into operation. General 
 Hooker, ever ready and always equal 
 to the situation, with his corps, consist- 
 ing of Ricketts', Meade's and Double- 
 day's divisions, in prompt obedience to 
 orders, crossed the Antietam at bridge 
 
^20 
 
 ANTIETAM, 
 
 No. 1, and by the adjoining ford. Gen- 
 eral Mansfield was to follow Hooker 
 during the night, and to be in a posi- 
 tion to render him assistance by day- 
 break. Sumner was to follow in the 
 same direction in the morning. Hooker, 
 encoimtering no opposition in crossing 
 the river, advanced in a southward di- 
 rection, and came to the eastern edge 
 of what we have desci'ibed as the battle 
 ai'ea. As he approached the house of 
 a Mr. D. Miller, his advance — Meade's 
 Pennsylvania Reserves — came into con- 
 tact with a portion of the enemy's left. 
 The contest thus begun was sharp and 
 severe, and lasted until dark, when the 
 Confederates fell back. Hooker's men 
 rested that night on their arms on the 
 ground they had won. Mansfield's 
 corps, consisting of the divisions of 
 Williams and Green, were also success- 
 ful in crossing the Antietam ; and upon 
 the farm of Poifenberger, about a mile 
 in Hooker's rear, they bivouacked till 
 dawn. 
 
 Hooker, impatient to resume the 
 8epl. attack, was ready and in action 
 *7. by the first streak of early day. 
 The Pennsylvania Reserves were again 
 the first to be engaged. Soon, how- 
 ever, the whole of his corps were in 
 deadly conflict with the enemy, Jackson 
 being in conunand. Hooker advanced, 
 with Doubleday on his right, Meade on 
 his left, and Ricketta in the centre. 
 Such was the vigor of the onslaught, 
 and so effective was the assistance ren- 
 dered by the batteries on the east side of 
 the Antietam, that Jackson's brigades, 
 terribly cut up, were driven across the 
 cornfield, in the open ground, over the 
 
 Hagerstown Road, and into the woods 
 beyond the Dunker Church, where were 
 their reserves. Eager to accomplish his 
 purpose, and to obtain possession of 
 the woods beyond, Hooker now pushed 
 forward his left and centre. At this 
 point, where the ground rises to some- 
 what of an elevation, they were met 
 by a murderous fire. The broken bat- 
 talions were re-formed ; and Jackson 
 brought forth his reserves. A fearful 
 struggle ensued. At short range, and 
 in the open ground, and with the ardor 
 of desperation, they plied their deadly 
 work. It was a fight in which there 
 was no desire for quai'ter — no wish to 
 save or be saved. Two great com- 
 manders were pitted against each other; 
 and the men were animated by the 
 spirit of their chiefs. In his extremity. 
 Hooker called on Doubleday for aid', 
 and a brigade under Hartsuff was for- 
 warded at the double-quick. This bri- 
 gade was tenibly punished in pushing 
 its way across the cornfield. It offei'ed 
 a gallant resistance; but it could not 
 turn the tide of battle. In the brief 
 struggle of half an hour Hartsuff fell, 
 severely wounded. The opposing forces 
 were literally torn to shreds. In his 
 official report of this fierce encounter. 
 General Jackson says: "The carnage 
 on both sides was terrific. At an 
 early hour. General Starke, command- 
 ing the Stonewall division, was killed ; 
 Colonel Douglas, commanding Law- 
 ton's brigade, was also killed. Gen- 
 eral Lawton, commanding division, and 
 Colonel Walker, commanding brigade, 
 were severely wounded. More than 
 half the brigades of Lawton and Hays 
 
THE AlB ALIVE WITH BULLETS. 
 
 321 
 
 were either killed or wounded, and 
 more than a third of Trimble's. All 
 the regimental commanders in those 
 brigades, except two, were either killed 
 or wounded. Thinned in their ranks, 
 and their ammunition exhausted," it 
 was necessary to withdraw the shattered 
 regiments to the rear, when "Hood's di- 
 vision, of Longstreet's command, took 
 their place." Hooker's corps had simi- 
 larly suffered. Indeed, General Sum- 
 ner, who arrived on the field a little 
 later, testified that when he came up 
 he " saw nothing of Hooker's corps 
 at all." 
 
 It was now half-past seven o'clock. 
 Mansfield had just come up to the sup- 
 port of Hooker. He had pushed his 
 way to the Hageratown Road. At that 
 moment the battle din was fearful. 
 What with the yells of the Confede- 
 rates, the ringing cheers of the Na- 
 tionals, the sharp, penetrating fire of 
 musketry, the loud booming of can- 
 non, and the ghastly procession of the 
 wounded as they came out fi'om the 
 thick of the fight, it seemed a very pan- 
 demonium. But it was no time for idle 
 moralizing. While attempting to de- 
 ploy his corps — the divisions of Will- 
 iams and Green — Mansfield was fiercely 
 set upon by the division of D. H. Hill, 
 which had just come out of the woods 
 at the Danker Chuich. In the struggle 
 which ensued, and in which his corps 
 were di-iven back to the woods, brave 
 old Mansfield was killed. His com- 
 mand devolved on General Williams, 
 who left his division to the care of 
 General Crawford, one of his brigade 
 commanders. Hooker, nothing daunted 
 
 by his terrible losses, was still hopeful 
 of success. Ricketts was unable to ad- 
 vance ; but he assured the general that 
 he could hold his ground. Doubleday 
 had succeeded in silencing a battery 
 which for half an hour had been pour- 
 ing enfilading fire on Hooker's central 
 line. Near the Dunker Church was 
 a wood-'crowned elevation, which was 
 really the key of the position. This 
 Hooker determined to take. With this 
 end in view, he ordered forward two of 
 the Mansfield brigades — Crawford and 
 Gordon — Hooker himself advancing to 
 the front, and recklessly exposing him- 
 self to the enemy's bullets, which fell 
 in showers around him. For a time he 
 moved about on foot, examining the 
 gi'ound in his front, and seeking a 
 favorable site for a battery. As he 
 remounted on a piece of rising ground, 
 the air was literally alive with bullets. 
 He was scarcely in the saddle when 
 three men were shot by his side, and 
 when he himself was shot in the foot. 
 Suffering dreadfully from the wound, 
 and sitting unsteadily in his saddle, he 
 turned and fixed his eyes on the coveted 
 position. " There is a regiment to the 
 right," said he; "order it forward. 
 Crawford and Gordon are coming up; 
 tell them to carry these works, and hold 
 them, and it is our fight." On exam- 
 ination, it was found that the bullet 
 had completely passed through his foot. 
 Soon afterwards he was carried off the 
 field to McClellan's headiiuarters at 
 Pry's, but not until he felt satisfied 
 that he had won the field, so fai- as it 
 was the duty or in the power of the 
 National right to win it. In carrying 
 
332 
 
 ANTIETAM. 
 
 out the orders given them, Crawford 
 and Gordon were fairly successful. 
 They had reached the woods, and were 
 holding them against heavy odds. 
 
 It was onl)^ nine o'clock. It seemed 
 as if the battle had been raging for the 
 gi'eater part of a day. Just as Hooker 
 was leaving the field, Sumner arrived 
 and assuD^ed commandw Discovering at 
 once the dangerous position held by 
 the two Mansfield brigades, Sumner 
 ordered Sedgwick, whose division was 
 in advance, to move forward to their 
 support. It was a hazardous operation. 
 It was necessary to cross the cornfield ; 
 and if the enemy's line was complete, 
 he was in immediate danger of being 
 flanked. Simultaneously, with the ad- 
 vance of Sedgwick, French and Rich- 
 ardson, who had also arrived on the 
 fifld, moved down upon the foe a little 
 more to the left, Sedgwick suffered 
 terribly ; but the Nationals, having 
 again pressed across the open and now 
 blood-stained area, were holding the 
 ground around the Dunker Church. It 
 seemed for a moment as if victory had 
 pronounced in their favor. But no. 
 The backward and forward struggle 
 must be repeated. The blood-stained 
 field must be crossed and recrossed. 
 McLaws and Walker, who had arrived 
 with their troops from Harper's Ferry, 
 were moved at once to Jackson's sup- 
 port, with Early on their left. Posted 
 behind the rocky bulwarks, they await- 
 ed the approach of the Nationals ; and, 
 as they drew near, they leaped from 
 their hiding-places and fell upon them 
 with tremendous fury, forcing them 
 from the Dunker Woods, and driving 
 
 them across the cornfield, and into the 
 woods beyond. At this moment, affairs 
 looked sufficiently gloomy for the Na- 
 tional right. Sumner's headquarters 
 were now in the narrow field where 
 Hooker in the morning had begun the 
 fight. Sedgwick, who had been thre6 
 times wounded, was at last obliged 
 to leave the field. Dana, Crawford 
 and other officers had been wounded. 
 What remained of Hooker's troops 
 were terribly exhausted; and theii' 
 general was off the field. Mansfield 
 was gone; and what remained of his 
 troops were in little better condition 
 than those of Hooker. It was Sum- 
 ner's conviction that further aggressive 
 effort without reinforcements was im- 
 possible. He might hold his own ; but 
 he could do no more. The Confede- 
 rates at this stage did not seem to be 
 in any better plight than their antago* 
 nists. They had suffered terribly from 
 the National artillery; and as the] 
 were exposed in their advanced position 
 to the batteries of Doubleday, who 
 held his place on the right with in- 
 flexible tenacity, they fell back to 
 their original ground near the Dunker 
 Church. Some of them, however, 
 were still engaged ; nor was there 
 any evidence that they were unwill- 
 ing to continue the fight. 
 
 It was now shortly after midday. 
 Franklin, who had left Crampton's Pass 
 in the morning about six o'clock, had 
 just amved on the field. It was Mc- 
 Clellan's intention to retain that corps 
 on the east side of the Antietam, to be 
 ready to operate on either flank or on 
 the centre, as circumstaacea might re- 
 
ARRIVAL OF FRANKLIN. 
 
 333 
 
 quire. The terrible condition of the 
 National right, however, left the gen- 
 eral-in-chief no choice. McClellan had 
 been an anxious spectator of the fight 
 all the morning and forenoon. He 
 knew how critical was the situation in 
 which Sumner found himself. Franklin 
 was, therefore, ordered at once to his 
 assistance. He made no delay. Hast- 
 ening forward, he reached the point of 
 danger not a moment too soon. An 
 attack was being made on battery 
 A, Fourth United States Artillery, 
 commanded by Lieutenant Thomas. 
 Smith's division led the column, fol- 
 lowed by Slocum's. Smith received 
 general instructions to retake the ground 
 on which the battle had all day long 
 raged so fiercely. Slocum was ordered 
 to move more to the centre. The or- 
 ders were promptly executed. Smith's 
 men were soon in the thick of the fight. 
 Batteiy A was immediately relieved by 
 Hancock's brigade ; and, as he observed 
 that the enemy was still disposed to 
 advance. Smith ordered up his third 
 brigade, commanded by Colonel Irwin. 
 Passing through Thomas's battery, this 
 brigade rushed upon the foe with in- 
 trepid energy, and with a violence 
 which was irresistible ; and by a series 
 of gallant charges, made in the face of 
 a most destructive fire, which ploughed 
 through their ranks, the men cheering 
 as they advanced on the run, they 
 drove the Confederates across the open 
 field, and beyond the Hagerstown 
 Road, compelling them to seek shelter 
 in the woods to the west of the Dunker 
 Church. On this day of brilliant effort 
 and heroic self-sacrifice, nothing was 
 
 more brilliant, more heroic or more full 
 of self-sacrifice than this last and crown- 
 ing effort of Smith's division, of Frank- 
 lin's corps. The grandest work was 
 done by the Maine and Vermont regi- 
 ments. They literally covered them- 
 selves with glory. It was only fifteen 
 minutes from the time the order was 
 given, when the field was reclaimed, 
 and the work was done. "The field 
 and its ghastly harvest," says an eye- 
 witness, "which the reaper had gath- 
 ered in those fatal hours, remained 
 finally with the Nationals. Four times 
 it had been lost and won. The dead 
 are strewn so thickly that, as you ride 
 over it, you cannot guide your horse's 
 steps too carefully. Pale and bloody 
 faces are everywhere upturned. They 
 are sad and terrible ; but there is noth- 
 ing which makes one's heart beat so 
 quickly as the imploring looks of some 
 sorely- wounded men, who beckon weari- 
 ly for help which you cannot stay to 
 give." 
 
 The arrival of Franklin on the field 
 was singularly opportune. A few 
 minutes later, the Confederates might 
 have penetrated the National line be- 
 tween the division of Sedgwick and 
 that of French. Such a result would 
 have been disastrous in the extreme. 
 His efforts had been attended with so 
 much success, that he felt emboldened 
 to assaiilt the woods near the Dunker 
 Church, where the Confederate left had 
 again sought shelter — a position wbicli 
 had been vainly assaulted by botli 
 Hooker and Sumner. Franklin had 
 given the order; but Sumner having 
 come up, it was c<^untermanded. 1( 
 
su 
 
 ANTIETAM. 
 
 was Slocum's brigade that was to make 
 the intended assault. Franklin, confi- 
 dent of success, was anxious that it 
 should be made; but Sumner, "the 
 old bull of the woods," as they called 
 him at Fair Oaks, who was as stubborn 
 as he was brave, and as cautious as he 
 was daring, could not be persuaded to 
 give his consent. Franklin's was the 
 only remaining coi-ps available for at- 
 tack. In the meditated assault on the 
 enemy, strongly posted on ground 
 which hitherto had proved impregna- 
 ble, a repulse was at least possible ; 
 and a repulse, in Sumner's judgment, 
 would peril the safety of the whole 
 army. Sumner's caution at this crisis 
 of the fight was the more entitled to 
 respect that that day he proved himself 
 to be the bravest of the brave. He 
 was ever at the post of danger, and 
 where the battle raged most fiercely. 
 Mounted on his spirited chai'ger, and 
 careering through the woods, his head 
 bare, his white hair streaming in the 
 wind, the fire of battle in his eye, he 
 seemed the very impersonation of the 
 god of war. Few that saw him that 
 day in the thick of the fight believed he 
 could leave the field alive. But the 
 bullets fell mercifully around the brave 
 old warrior. 
 
 While these events were taking place 
 on Sumner's right, severe fighting was 
 going on also on his left. French and 
 Richardson had not been idle. The for- 
 mer, with the brigades of Weber, Kim- 
 ball and Morris, pushed on where the 
 Confederate general, D. H. Hill, was 
 posted in considerable strength. Weber 
 led the advance, while hotly engaged 
 
 with the enemy. French received orders 
 to press on with the utmost vigor, and 
 make a diversion in favor of the I'ight. 
 The Confederates were pressed back 
 towards a hollow or sunken road in 
 much disorder. At this point, Rich- 
 ardson came up, with the brigades of 
 Meagher, Caldwell and Brooks, and 
 took position on the left of French. 
 Meagher fought his way to the crest of 
 a hill which overlooked the Confede- 
 rate position. The battle now raged 
 furiously. A vigorous effort was made 
 by the Confederates, who at this 
 time were reinforced by about 4000 
 men under R. H. Anderson, to obtain 
 possession of a piece of rising ground 
 on the left of the National right Aviug, 
 with the view of turning that flank. 
 The ground, however, after what might 
 be called a fighting race, was seized and 
 held by Colonel Cross and his famous 
 "fighting" Fifth New Hampshire. 
 Cross was speedily joined by the 
 Eighty-First Pennsylvania; and the 
 Confederates were driven back, leaving 
 behind them the colors of the Fourth 
 North Carolina. An effort was made 
 at the same time to push towards and 
 flank the National right. It was made 
 with great energy and stubbornness 
 Resisted, however, by French and by 
 Richardson, the Confederates were 
 brought to a standstill, and finally 
 driven back to Dr. Piper's house, near 
 the Shaipsburg Road. There they came 
 to a halt, and made an obstinate attack. 
 Richardson now brought up his artil- 
 lery. It was at this moment, and 
 while directing one of the batteries, that 
 this brave oflScer was felled to the 
 
"TATTERED FRAGMENTS." 
 
 325 
 
 earth by a cannon ball. General Han- 
 cock immediately took command ; and, 
 by a desperate charge, he drove the 
 Confederates from Dr. Piper's house, 
 and pressed them so closely that it was 
 only by the merest chance that Lee s 
 line was not completely severed. A 
 vigorous and more general effort at 
 this moment might have given a new 
 aspect to the entii-e struggle, and even 
 crowned the day with a decisive vic- 
 tory. As it was, the Nationals held 
 the ground on the right and toward the 
 centre when darkness fell. In this 
 closing struggle, General Meagher, who 
 performed deeds of valor, was wounded 
 and carried from the field. 
 
 Thus far our attention has been di- 
 rected exclusively to the operations on 
 the National right. This has been un- 
 avoidable. It was by his right wing 
 McClellan intended to fight the battle 
 of Antietara ; and it was by that wing 
 the battle was really fought. It was 
 not the general's intention, however, 
 that either the centre or the left, or 
 both, should be mere armed spectators 
 of the scene. The reader will remem- 
 ber that General Fitz John Porter, who 
 had command of the National centre, 
 occupied a position on the east of Antie- 
 tam, commanding bridge No. 2. The 
 left wing, it will also be remembered, 
 was under General Burnside, and held 
 a position also on the east side of 
 the creek, commanding bridge No. 3. 
 While this murderous work was going 
 on to the right of the National line, 
 what was being done by the centre and 
 left ? Let us see. 
 
 McClellan deemed the position held 
 
 by Porter of the utmost importance; 
 and, consequently, it was not until the 
 afternoon was somewhat advanced that 
 he could be induced to take any steps 
 which should have the effect of weak- 
 ening his centre. Hooker had been' 
 taken from the field wounded; his 
 corps had been cut to pieces. Mansfield 
 had fallen in battle; and there remained 
 but tattered fragments of his once 
 splendid regiments. Sumner was still 
 giving directions in the field ; but his 
 own corps had shared the fate of 
 those of Hooker and Mansfield. It was 
 "towards the middle of the afternoon," 
 McClellan tells us, that, discovering 
 the desperate state of things on his 
 right, he detached two of Porter's bri- 
 gades, and sent them to Sumner's assist- 
 ance. About the same time he caused 
 six battalions, of Sykes' regulars, to be 
 thrown across bridge No. 2, in order to 
 attack and drive away the Confederate 
 sharpshooters, who were giving great 
 annoyance to Pleasonton's horse bat- 
 teries, which were stationed a little in 
 advance of the bridge. At the same 
 time, also, he detached Warren's bri- 
 gade from the same corps, and sent 
 them to hold a position on the right 
 and rear of Burnside. In consequence 
 of these repeated withdrawals of troops 
 Porter's corps was, at one time during 
 the day, reduced to fewer than 4000 
 men. 
 
 And what was taking place on the 
 left ? It was McClellan's design, as has 
 been indicated, to support his right by 
 making an attack on the enemy with 
 his left. With this end in view, Burn- 
 side's corps, on the evening of the IGth, 
 
 !i34 
 
826 
 
 ANTIETAM. 
 
 was moved into position near the bridge. 
 On tliat day McClellan visited Buraside, 
 and, after pointing out the proper dis- 
 position to be made of his troops, in- 
 formed him that he would probably 
 be required to make an attack on the 
 enemy's right on the following morning. 
 He was instructed, also, to make care- 
 ful reconnoissances. Burnside's corps 
 consisted of the divisions of Generals 
 Cox, Wilcox, Rodman and Sturgis. Col- 
 onel Brooks' brigade, of Cox's divi- 
 sion, was on the right; Sturgis' divi- 
 sion was immediately in the rear; while 
 Rodman's division, with Scammon's 
 brigade, of Cox's division, in support, 
 was stationed on the left. The division 
 of Wilcox was held in reserve. On the 
 night of the 16th the corps bivouarcked 
 in position. At eight o'clock on the 
 morning of the 17th, McClellan sent 
 instructions to Burnside to force the 
 lower stone bridge, to gain possession 
 of the heights beyond, and to advance 
 along their crest upon Sharpsburg and 
 its rear. The position was held by 
 Toombs' brigade, supported by sharp- 
 shooters and batteries, under the com- 
 mand of D. R. Jones. Burnside was 
 singularly tardy in carrying out the 
 instructions given him. It is to be ad- 
 mitted that the task imposed upon him 
 was one of more than ordinary diffi- 
 culty. The approaches to the bridge 
 partook of the character of a defile, 
 which was completely commanded by 
 the Confederate batteries. Burnside 
 made repeated attempts ; but they were 
 feeble, and without effect. He was 
 evidently impressed with the idea that, 
 however important it might be to cap- 
 
 ture the bridge and the heights beyond, 
 the risk to be run was too great. Again 
 and again imperative orders were sent 
 to him to push forward his troops with- 
 out delay, and, if necessary, to carry 
 the bridge at the point of the bayonet. 
 It was not until about one o'clock, 
 when Colonel Sackett had been sent to 
 Burnside with instructions to remain 
 and see the order executed, that a 
 really vigorous effort was made. The 
 Fifty-First New York and the Fifty- 
 First Pennsylvania charged with tre- 
 mendous energy, driving the Confede- 
 rates from the bridge, and back to the 
 heights in their rear. Other troops fol- 
 lowed, and the position was secured. 
 Unhappily, however, Burnside did not 
 pursue the advantage thus gained. In 
 getting his troops and batteries across 
 the bridge, and putting them in order, 
 he wasted two precious hours — the 
 most precious hours of the day ; for, as 
 we now know, Longstreet had so ex- 
 hausted his strength by sending rein- 
 forcements to the Confederate left, that 
 he had only some two thousand men 
 with whom to oppose Burnside's ad- 
 vance. It is impossiljle not to admire 
 the skill with which, on this and other 
 occasions, the Confederate generals con- 
 trived to make an imposing and de- 
 ceptive show of their forces, when they 
 were I'eally weak and in distress. At 
 three o'clock, Burnside was in the same 
 position. McClellan, becoming impa- 
 tient, sent Colonel Key to him, with 
 the most urgent entreaties to push on 
 without a moment's delay. The move- 
 ment, he assured him, was vital to suc- 
 cess. It was no time to halt or hesitate 
 
THE BATTLE ENDED. 
 
 321 
 
 because of the value of life. "With a 
 consideratecess which seems strange to 
 those accustomed to the stern military 
 orders of older nations, McClellan again 
 sends Key to Burnside, telling him 
 that if, on experiment, he finds that he 
 Ciinnot flank or stoi-m the battery, and 
 carry the heights, he is to inform him, 
 so that he may be able to recall the 
 troops. The advance is now resumed ; 
 the attack is gallantly made ; the guns 
 are abandoned by the fleeing Confede- 
 rates ; the heights are carried ; and the 
 victorious Nationals, in considerable 
 force, are already at the outskii'ts of 
 Sharpsbufg. At this supreme moment, 
 when victory seems at last about to 
 crown the labors and sacrifices of the 
 day, the Nationals are brought to a 
 standstill. A new army appears to 
 have arisen out of the gi'ound. It is 
 A. P. Hill, who, with his division, has 
 just come up from Harper's Ferry. 
 Getting his men into order on the brow 
 of a ridge to the left, he falls heavily 
 on Burnside's troops, as they press 
 eagerly forward, apparently with vic- 
 toiy in their grasp. The blow is all 
 the more stunning that it is unexpected. 
 Under cover of a tremendous fii'e of 
 artillery, the Confederates charge upon 
 Burnside's left flank. The National 
 troops offer a stubborn resistance. But 
 they cannot hold their ground. Step 
 hy step they are forced back to the 
 bridge over the Antietam, where they 
 are protected by the batteries on the 
 other side of the creek. Here Burnside 
 had instractions to make a determined 
 stand. It was unnecessary, as the Con- 
 federates did not venture to pursre. In 
 
 this last struggle there was a heavy 
 loss of life. The Confederate general, 
 Branch, was killed ; and General Rod- 
 man was mortally wounded. The last 
 shot was fired as night spread her 
 mantle of gloom over that field of blood 
 and agony. The battle of Antietam 
 was ended. It was not the most de- 
 cisive, but it was the bloodiest battle 
 since the commencement of the Civil 
 Wai. On that narrow piece of ground 
 lay dead, or bleeding to death, twenty 
 thousand men, their comrades so com- 
 pletely outworn by continuous march- 
 ing and fighting, without sleep and 
 without food, that they could not give 
 burial to the one or succor to the other 
 The National loss in this battle wa.1 
 2010 killed, 941G wounded, and 104? 
 missing; a total of 12, 4G9. Lee's lossefi 
 were correspondingly heavy. About 
 2700 were buried by McClellan. His 
 wounded numbered about 7000, not in 
 eluding those which had fallen Into the 
 hands of the Nationals. In that single 
 day his army must have been reduced 
 by at least 10,000 men. Lee himself 
 acknowledged that, in the different en- 
 gagements at Crampton's Gap, Tur- 
 ner's Gaj^, Harper's Ferry and Antietam, 
 he sustained a loss of 1567 killed, and 
 8724 wounded. Most undoubtedly 
 Lee, from some cause or other, under- 
 estimated his loss. It does not appear 
 possible to get at the exact figures; 
 but it is not an overestimate to say that 
 Lee's loss, during his brief campaign in 
 Maryland, was from 25,000 to 30,000 
 men. Although Antietam could not 
 1)6 called a National victory, it was un- 
 questionably a gain to the Nationn] 
 
126 
 
 ANTIETAM. 
 
 cause ; and McClellan was hardly to be 
 blamed if he felt some self-satisfaction 
 in being able to say that "thirteen 
 guns, thirty-nine colors, upwards of 
 15,000 stand of small arms, and more 
 than 6000 piisoners are the trophies 
 which attest the success of our arms 
 in the battles of South Mountain, 
 Crampton's Gap and Antietam," and 
 fhat " not a single gun or color was lost 
 by iur army during these battles." 
 Lep '^.ould, no doubt, boast that he had 
 not been defeated, although he had 
 fought with inferior numbers, and that 
 McClellan did not AJ^enture to resume 
 the battle on the following day; but 
 he had lost ground along the whole 
 line, and his army was so broken down 
 that a retreat to Virginia was now an 
 absolute necessity. His whole plan of 
 campaign had failed. It is fair, here, 
 to ask the reader to bear in mind that 
 Lee, although repeatedly reinforced, 
 was not able to bring into the field on 
 that day more than 40,000 or 45,000 
 men ; whereas, McClellan's effective 
 strength was over 87,000. 
 
 It would not be difiicult to show that 
 gi'eater results ought to have been 
 achieved by the noble army of the Po- 
 tomac. The discipline was defective. 
 The generalship was not good. The 
 commanding mind which gives unity of 
 purpose and unity of movement to a 
 |;reat army was wanting. McClellan 
 repeated his characteristic blunder. In 
 place of combining his forces, and at- 
 tacking with an overwhelming mass, 
 he used them too much in driblets, and 
 worked too much in detail. In his 
 history of the Civil War, the Comte de 
 
 I'aris very clearly puts the merits and 
 demerits of the fight. "The error,'" 
 he says, "which Lee expiated by this 
 great defeat is evident. This error 
 was in dividing his army for the pur 
 pose of capturing Harper's Ferry in the 
 presence of McClellan, and in counting 
 too much upon the tardiness of his ad- 
 versary. If he had not made sue! a 
 division of his forces, he would have, 
 had the choice either to fight a decisive 
 battle under much more favorable cir- 
 cumstances, upon the steep acclivities 
 of South Mountain, or of continuing 
 the campaign on the upper Potomac 
 with all his troops. The mistakes of 
 his enemies repaired to some extent 
 those committed by himself. Through 
 the disgraceful capitulation of Miles, 
 the slow movements of Franklin on the 
 14th and 15th, and the delays which 
 prevented McClellan from attackmg 
 him on the 16th, he was enabled on the 
 17th to mass all his troops on the field 
 of battle. The issue of the contest, 
 however, would probably have been 
 different if A. P. Hill, instead of arriv- 
 ing at three o'clock in the afternoon, 
 had been able to take part in the strug- 
 gle early in the morning, and add his 
 efforts to those which kept the Federal 
 right so long in check. There were, 
 however, many other causes which pre- 
 vented McClellan from achieving a 
 more complete victory, and taking ad- 
 vantage of the opportunity to strike an 
 irreparable blow at Lee. The first is to 
 be found in the moral condition of his 
 troops. The army which had been en- 
 trusted to him was partly composed of 
 the van(j_uished soldiers of Man;issa-, 
 
A WISE DISCKETION. 
 
 329 
 
 and the remainder consisted of soldiers 
 who had been only one or two weeks 
 in the serxace, who had never marched, 
 never been under fire, and knew neither 
 their commanders nor their comrades. 
 They fought with great bravery; but 
 ihey could not be expected to perform 
 what Lee easily obtained from his men. 
 Their ranks had not that cohesion 
 which enables a commander to follow 
 up a first success without inten-uption. 
 The Union generals may be censured 
 for having divided their efforts on the 
 right in successive attacks, and thereby 
 impaired their effectiveness. The corps 
 of Hooker, Mansfield and Sumner — in 
 all from 40,000 to 44,000 men— instead 
 of being brought into action one after 
 the other for the space of four hours, 
 might have been united so as together 
 to strike the Confederate left, which 
 they would, no doubt, have crushed. 
 McClellan and several of his lieuten- 
 ants, as w^e have said, had also overrated 
 the number of their adversaries — an 
 error which had the effect of keeping 
 back Franklin and Porter, whose co- 
 operation at the close of the battle 
 would have been decisive. Finally 
 Burnside, by his long inaction, upset 
 all McClellan's plans, enabled Lee to 
 mass all his forces on his left, and thus 
 deprived the Federals of the pi-incipal 
 advantages which a more energetic 
 action on his part would certainly have 
 secured." These are sensible words; 
 and they justify the tone which per- 
 vades this naiTative. 
 
 McClellan himself tells us that the 
 night of the 17th brought with it grave 
 responsibilities. The question was seri- 
 
 ously revolved in his own mind, and 
 discussed with his generals, "whether 
 to renew the attack on the 18th or to 
 defer it, even Math the risk of the ene- 
 my's retirement." Some of the gen- 
 erals, Fj'anklin among the rest, urged 
 immediate action. Others again, Sum- 
 ner included, opposed such a course. 
 McClellan concluded to wait a day, to 
 give his army rest, and to prepare for 
 the renewal of the battle on the 19th. 
 For this McClellan has been greatly 
 blamed by many. We cannot join ^vith 
 them. Discretion is, sometimes at least, 
 the better part of valor. McClellan, 
 we think, showed a wdse discretion. It 
 may be true that, if he had resumed the 
 attack on the morning of the 18th, he 
 could easily have captured or ruined 
 Lee's army. It ought not to be forgot-, 
 ten, however, that we judge the situa- 
 tion now with a fuller knowledge than 
 McClellan then possessed. There were 
 certainly grave reaaona why he should 
 act with cautioh. As he himself has 
 said : " At that moment — V irginia lost, 
 Washington menaced, Maiyland invad- 
 ed — the National cause could afford no 
 risks of defeat. One battle lost, and 
 all would have been lost." During the 
 course of the 18th, he was joined by 
 14,000 fresh troops, under Couch and 
 Humphrey. Thus strengthened, he felt 
 that he could strike the enemy on the 
 following morning with assured hope 
 of victory. Meanwhile, the 18th was 
 spent in collecting the dispersed, giving 
 rest to the fatigued, removing the 
 wounded, burying the dead, and the 
 necessary preparations for a renewal of 
 the battle. 
 
«30 
 
 ANTIETAM. 
 
 The ISth of September, 1862, will 
 Sept. iict soon be forgotten by any who 
 18. spent that day on the battle field 
 of Antietam. Sad duties had to be 
 periormed ; and sad sights had to be 
 witnessed. In battle histories, it is too 
 much the habit to confine the reader's 
 attention to. the stirring scenes of actual 
 conflict — too little the habit to linger 
 with him in the battle's rear, and wit- 
 Sess the scenes of woe. _ Yet it is on 
 the blood-soaked field, when the din of 
 battle has ceased, among the dead and 
 the wounded, that the true lesson is to 
 b8 learned. Happil}', a picture cf the 
 field of Antietam after the battle has 
 been preserved to us by a competent 
 eye-witness. " My route," says Captain 
 Noyes, " carried me over the late battle 
 field, and I spent much of the afternoon, 
 in company with a friend, in visiting 
 some of the most severely-contested 
 points, to be awe-struck, sickened, al- 
 most benumbed with its sights of hoiTor. 
 Within this space of little more than a 
 mile square — this spot once beautiful 
 with handsome residences and well- 
 cultivated farms, isolated, hedged in 
 with verdure, sacred to quiet, calm con- 
 tent — the hottest fiiiy of man's hottest 
 wrath had expended itself, burning 
 residences and well-filled barns, plough- 
 ing fields of ripened grain with artillery, 
 scattering everywhere through corn- 
 field, wood and valley the most awful 
 illustrations of war. Not a building 
 ftbout us which was not deserted by its 
 occupants, and rent and torn by shot 
 and shell ; not a field which had not 
 witnessed the fierce and bloody en- 
 counter of armed and desperate men. 
 
 Passing through the cornfield, -with the 
 dead lying all through its aisles, out 
 into an uncultivated field, I saw bodies, 
 attired mainly in gray, lying in ranks so 
 regular that Death, the Reaper, must 
 have mowed them down in swaths. 
 Our burying parties were already busi- 
 ly engaged, and had put away to rest 
 many of our own men ; still here, as 
 everywhere, I saw them scattered over 
 the field. The ground was strewn with 
 muskets, knapsacks, cartridge-boxes and 
 articles of clothing; the carcasses of 
 horses, and thousands of shot and shell. 
 And so it was on the other side of the 
 turnpike — nay, in the turnpike itself. 
 Ride where we may, through cornfield 
 wood or ravine, and our ride will be 
 among the dead, until the heart grows 
 sick and faint with hoiTor. Just in 
 front of these hay-stacks, where our 
 general and his staff paused for a while 
 during the heat of the battle, was the 
 only pleasing picture on this battle 
 field — a fine horse struck with death. 
 At the instant when cut down by his 
 wound, he was attempting to I'ise from 
 the ground. His head was half lifted ; 
 his neck proudly arched ; every muscle 
 seemed replete with animal life. The 
 wound which killed him was wholly- 
 concealed from view, so that I had tu 
 ride close up before 1 could believe 
 him dead. He was the admired of 
 every passer-by. Two weeks after- 
 ward, I found myself pausing to gaze 
 upon him, and always with the -wish 
 that some sculptor would immortalize 
 in stone this magnificent animal, in the 
 exact pose of his death-hour. One 
 would like to see something from a 
 
LEE'S iJETKBAT. 
 
 331 
 
 battle field not wholly terrible. One 
 more scene in thia battle picture, and 
 our ride may end. It is a narrow 
 country lane, hollowed out somewhat 
 between the fields, partially shaded, 
 and now literally crowded with the 
 Confederate dead. Here they stood in 
 line of battle, and here, in the length 
 of five hundred feet, I counted more 
 than two hundred of their dead in 
 every attitude conceivable — some piled 
 in groups of four or six ; some gi-asping 
 their muskets, as if in the act of dis- 
 charging them ; some, evidently oifi- 
 cers, killed while encouraging their 
 men ; some lying in the position of 
 calm repose, all black and swollen, and 
 ghastly with wounds. This battalion 
 of the dead filled the lane with horror. 
 As we rode beside it — we could not 
 ride in it — I saw the field all about me 
 black with corpses ; and I was told 
 that the cornfield beyond was equally 
 crowded. It was a place to see once, 
 to glance at, and then to ride hurriedly 
 away; for strong-hearted as was then 
 my mood, I had gazed upon as much 
 horror as I was able to bear." Such is 
 war, when stripped of the pomp and the 
 splendor and the show, and seen in its 
 naked reality. 
 
 On the morning of the 19th, accord- 
 Sept, log to instructions given the day 
 •^. before, preparations were made 
 for an advance. The cavalry were sent 
 forward to reconnoitre the ground. 
 What has happened ? Mounted mes- 
 sengers return at full speed to McClel- 
 lan's headquarters. There is no longer 
 any enemy in front. Taking advantage 
 of the darkness of the night, Lee had 
 
 taken his entire army across the Po- 
 tomac by the Shepherdstown Ford, and 
 escaped, unmolested, into Virginia. He 
 had left eight batteries, under Pendle- 
 ton, on the river bluffs, for the purpose 
 of checking the pursuit. This, then, 
 was the end of all that blood and sac- 
 rifice. Justified, as McClellan was, in 
 resting on the 18th, it must be regard- 
 ed, from a National point of view, as 
 a great misfortune that Lee should 
 have been able, without let or hin- 
 drance, to cross the Potomac, carrying 
 - with him his entire army, with all the 
 supplies, material and impedimenta of 
 war generally. It is no matter of won- 
 der if many a soldier's heart sank 
 within him, when he learned that the 
 enemy had escaped. Good generalship 
 was again on the side of the Confede- 
 rates. An attempt at pursuit was made 
 by a portion of Porter's corps; but it 
 was a feeble attempt, and tended to 
 reveal the indecision and \vant of pur- 
 pose on the part of the National com- 
 mander. Porter's men, under General 
 Griflin, captured fom- of the enemy's 
 guns ; but on the morning of the gept. 
 20th, when making a reconnois- 20. 
 sance in force, and when about a mile 
 from the ford, they were surprised by 
 A. P. Hill, who lay in ambush, and 
 driven back into and across the i-iver 
 in great disorder, with the loss of 200 
 men made prisoners. The Confederates 
 held the river for the remainder of that 
 day. On the 21st, Lee moved Sept. 
 leisurely toward Martinsburg, de- 21. 
 stroying, as he moved along, the Balti- 
 more and Ohio Railroad. Stuart lin- 
 gered behind to make a show of numbers 
 
S3;J 
 
 ANTIETAM. 
 
 and strength ; and on the same day that 
 Lee marched to Martinsburg, he was 
 daring enough to recross the river at 
 Williamsport. He was met by Couch, 
 who compelled him to make a precipi- 
 tate retreat Two days later, Mary- 
 land Heights were retaken by the Na- 
 tionals ; Harper's Ferry was reoccupied, 
 and in charge of General Sumner ; and 
 pontoon bridges were thrown across 
 both the Potomac and the Shenandoah 
 Rivers. The Maryland campaign was 
 ended. The great battle of Antietam 
 had been fought; blood and treasure 
 had been liberally spent on both sides ; 
 yet both armies had substantially re- 
 sumed the positions which they occupied 
 some three Aveeks before.* 
 
 McClellan's besetting sin again be- 
 came a source of disquietude to the coun- 
 try and the government. There was 
 an earnest and general desire that he 
 
 * The battle of Antietam, it is but jnst to notice, had 
 a most important effect in determining the promulga- 
 tion of the war policy which the National government 
 had at this time under consideration. President Lin- 
 coln himself tells the story. "It had got to be," said 
 he, "midsummer, 1862. Things had gone on from 
 bad to worse, until I felt that we had reached the end 
 of our rope on the plan of operations we were pursu- 
 ing : that we had about played our last card, and most 
 ehange our tactics, or lose the game. I now deter- 
 mined upon the emancipation policy ; and without 
 consulting with, or the knowledge of, the cabinet, I 
 prepared the original draft of the proclamation, and, 
 after much anxious thought, called a cabinet meeting 
 on the subject. This was the last of July or the first 
 part of the month of August, 1862. This cabinet 
 meeting took place, I think, upon a Saturday. • • * 
 Nothing was offered that I had not already fully antici- 
 pated and settled in my mind, until Secretary Seward 
 ^poke. He said in substance: 'Mr. President, I ap- 
 prove of the proclamation, but I question the expedi- 
 ency of its issue at this jimcture. The depression of 
 the public mind, consequent upon our repeated reverses, 
 is so great that I fear the effect of so important a step. 
 It may be viewed as the last measure of an exhausted 
 GjOTemjneut— aery for help; the government atretohing i 
 
 should pui'sue Lee, and force matters 
 to a crisis before the winter should 
 set in. Lincoln visited the army oet. 
 on the 1st of October, and re- '• 
 mained with it several days. His en- 
 treaties were urgent that McClellan 
 should advance. The general was full 
 of promises; but his wants were many. 
 He needed reinforcements, horses, cloth- 
 ing, shoes, supplies of all kinds. Lee had 
 moved to Winchester. His army was 
 in a wretched condition. McClellan's 
 army had increased to 150,000 strong. 
 Yet day follows day, and nothing is 
 done. On the 6th of October, Hal- 
 leek telegraphed to the general: "The 
 president directs that you cross the 
 Potomac, and give battle to the ene- 
 my, or drive him South. Your army 
 must move now, while the roads are, 
 good." On the 10th, General J. E. B. 
 Stuart made a raid into Pennsylvania. 
 
 forth its hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretch- 
 ing forth her hands to the government.' His idea," 
 said the president, ' ' was that it would be considered 
 our last shriek on the retreat. ' Now, ' continued Mr- 
 Seward, ' while I approve the measure, I suggest, sir, 
 that you postpone its issue, uutil you can give it to the 
 country supported by military success, instead of issu- 
 ing it, as would be the case now, upon the greatest dis- 
 asters of the war.'" Mr. Lincoln continued: "The 
 wisdom of the view of the secretary of state struck me 
 with great force. The result was that I put the draft 
 of the proclamation aside, waiting for a victory. Well, 
 the next news we had was of Pope's disaster at Bull 
 Kun. Things looked darker than ever. Finally came 
 the week of the battle of Antietam. I determined to 
 wait no longer. The news came, I think, on Wednes- 
 day, that the advantage was on our side. I was then/ 
 staying at the Soldiers' Home. Here I finished writing! 
 the second draft of the proclamation ; came up on, 
 Saturday; called the cabinet together to hear it,- 
 and it was published the following Monday. I made 
 
 A SOLEMN vow BEFOBE GoD THAT, IP GeNEBAL LeE 
 WAS DBITEN BAOX PBOM MaBYIiAIJD, I WOITLD OBOWN 
 THE BEBUIiT BZ THE DEOLABATION OF FBEEOOU TO 
 
 THE SLAVES." — Oarpenttr't Six Month* in the WhiU 
 Motu*. 
 
STUAKT'S RAID. 
 
 338 
 
 Capturing Chambersburg in that State, 
 he destroyed a large quantity of sup- 
 plies, burning machine shops, trains of 
 cars, and other property; and then, 
 having made a complete circuit around 
 McClellan's army, he re-entered Vir- 
 ginia by crossing the Potomac below 
 him. This raid of Stuart roused public 
 indignation to its highest pitch. It 
 was regarded as an open insult to 
 the National army; and it was felt 
 that the Confederates had made good 
 their boast, by carrying war into the 
 free States. Still McClellan remained 
 inactive. There was no forward move- 
 ment. Again, on the 21st, Halleck 
 telegraphed : "The president does not 
 
 expect impossibilities, but he is very 
 anxious that all this good weather 
 should not be wasted in inactivity." 
 McClellan could not move before the 
 1st of November. Then he did move ; 
 but it was too lata On the 7th of that 
 •month there was a heavy snow-storm. 
 It was a sure sign that winter was at 
 hand- Lincoln's patience was at last 
 exhausted — his forbearance had given 
 way; he had already taken action; 
 and on the night of that day, while at 
 Rectortown, on his southward march 
 towards Gordonsville, McClellan re- 
 ceived instructions to turn over the 
 command of the army to General Bum 
 side. 
 
 gst 
 
334 
 
 FREDEEICKSBUEG. 
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 j^n^yinMti and the National Government. — Bad Blood. — Blame on Both Sides. — MoClellan's Love for the Annj 
 of the Potomac. — The Army Again on the March. — McClellan'g Plan. — A Storm. — McClellan's K^nioval. — 
 Bumsiato iu Command. — Reconstruction of the Army. — Bumside's Order. — His Pl»u. — MoCleUan's Plan 
 Abandons J. — On to Fredericksburg. — Halleck and Meigs. — The Pontoon Difficulty. — Who Were to Blame ?— 
 Fahnontn. — Fredericksburg. — Stafford Heights. — Marye's Heights. — Description of the Country. — Topogra- 
 phy of the. Position. — Acquia Creek. — Sumner at Falmouth. — The River Impassable. — No Pontoons. — 
 An Unfortnijtite Delay. — Lee's Activity. — Position of the Confederate Army. — Marye's Heights Impreg- 
 nable. — Arrival of the Pontoons. — Precious Time liost.^Five Bridges. — The Morning of the 11th.— The 
 Confederate Bhurpshooters and the Pontouiers. — Three Unsuccessful Attempts to Construct the Bridges. — 
 A Cannonade. — I'he Sharpshooters Dislodged. — The Bridges Completed. — The National Army Across the 
 Rappahannock.— Preparations for Battle. — Both Armies in Line. — A Glance at Lee's Position. — The Dis- 
 position of his f'»oops. — Bumside's Position. — His Plan of Attack. — The Night of the 12th. — Bumside 
 Changes his Mind. — His Delay in Giving Orders. — His Order to Franklin. — Franklin Perplexed, but Obe- 
 dient. — The Attack on the Left. — The Gallantry of Meade and his Pennsylvaniaus. — Gibbon and Double- 
 day. — An Artillery Duoi.^Meade Penetrates the First Confederate Line. — His Difficulty. — A Terrific Strug- 
 gle. — Fearful Slaughter — Meade Driven Back. — Arrival of Birney. — The Confederate Lin« Closed. — Miracles 
 of Valor. — Bad Management. — The Attack on the Right. — General Sumner Advances. — French and Han- 
 cock. — Slarye's Hill. — rhe Plank Road. — The Stone Wall. — Bravery of the National Troops. — Terrifio 
 Slaughter. — The Jaws of L^iath. — French's and Hancock's Divisions Cut to Pieces. — The Confederate Po- 
 Bition Impregnable. — Bumsia* Orders Hooker to Advance. — Hooker Remonstrates. — Bumside Obstinate. — 
 "That Crest Must be Taken To-Night." — Useless Slaughter. — Hooker's Own Account. — The Darkness.^ 
 The Battle of Fredericksburg Ended. — A Confederate Victory. — Bumside's Blunders. — He Alone Responsi- 
 ble. — Retreats Across the River Preparations for Another Attack. — Disaffection and Distrust. — The Pro- 
 posed Attack Countermanded. — Jtrumside Offers to Resign. — The Resignation Not Accepted. — Change of 
 Plan.— Another Attack About to be 'Jiade.— A Fearful Storm.— The Elements.— The "Mud March."— The 
 Enterprise Abandoned. — The Army tJaek in the Old Camps. — Public Indignation. — Burnside Dissatisfied 
 with his Subordinates. — Relieved of Command. — Franklin Removed. — Sumner Relieved. — Hooker in Com- 
 mand. 
 
 i8(S2. 
 
 The battle Df Aatietam was fought 
 on the 1 7th of September. It 
 ^as zi<^ until the beautiful month 
 of October was all but passed that any 
 active, forward movement was made by 
 the army of the Potomac. It is not 
 necessary to dwell at aay length on 
 the causes of this extraordinary and, 
 as the result proved, unfortunate de- 
 lay. It is prcbaljle that the exact 
 truth concerning this matter will never 
 be known. It is certain that much 
 precious tirti? -vas wasted in useless cor- 
 
 respondence between the National com 
 mander and the authorities at Washing- 
 ton. Bad blood most unquestionably 
 existed ; and the ill-concealed jealousies 
 and enmities of individuals contributed 
 not a little to increase that burden of 
 sorrow and suffering under which the 
 people were already groaning. We 
 are not disposed to entirely acquit Mc- 
 Clellan. But we are as little disposed 
 to acquit the National government. 
 The foi'mer was, no doubt, too exacting 
 in his demands for supplies and rein 
 
McCLELLAN'S LOVE FOR HIS ARMY. 
 
 336 
 
 foicements. Poorly equipped as his 
 army was at this period, it was not for 
 a moment to be put in comparison in 
 this respect with the army of Lee, 
 whose men were shoeless and half-naked. 
 Nor was there any good reason for in- 
 sisting that the reinforcements and sup- 
 plies should be forwarded at once, and 
 before the onward movement com- 
 menced ; for surely they could be sent 
 after him. On the other hand there 
 was, on the part of the Washington 
 officials, a too manifest disposition to 
 dictate, to disregard the demands and 
 to ignore the wishes of the commander 
 in the field. There was, in fact, a 
 mutual distrust, which had grown into 
 dislike. There was blame on both 
 sides. McClellan was self-willed ; and 
 the authorities were officious. It might 
 have been better for McClellan's fame 
 to-day if, when at this stage, he found 
 that he could not get on amicably with 
 the War Department, he had resigned 
 his position. It was known that he 
 was deeply attached to the ai'my of the 
 Potomac, and that he was proud to be 
 its chief. It had grown up under his 
 own eye ; it had reached maturity and 
 attained perfection under his own watch- 
 ful care. His Gallic legions were not 
 more dear to Caesar; the grand army 
 of the empire was not more dear to 
 Napoleon, than was the army of the 
 Potomac to McClellan. His resigna- 
 tion would have fallen like a thunder- 
 clap on the ai-my and on the people. 
 It would have disarmed suspicion 
 wherever suspicion existed ; and it 
 would have proclaimed to all the world 
 that his motives were pure and noble, 
 
 and his actions disinterested. As it 
 was, patriotism or ambition impelled him 
 in a diflPerent course. 
 
 On the 6th of October, instructions 
 were received from Washington to ocl« 
 the effect that McClellan should *• 
 move at once. He was to cross the 
 Potomac and give battle to the enemy, 
 or di-ive him South. " Your army must 
 now move, while the roads are good.' 
 It was the 26th, when the first od- 
 movement was made in obedience 26. 
 to this order; and it was not until the 
 2d of November that McClellan was 
 able to announce that his whole army 
 was once more in Virginia, prepared to 
 move southward on the east side of the 
 Blue Ridge, instead of pursuing Lee up 
 the Shenandoah Valley, on the western 
 side of those mountains. By the 4th 
 the National army, reinforced by the 
 divisions of Generals Sigel and Sickles 
 from Washington, were in possession 
 of the entire region east of the Blue 
 Ridge, with several of the passes 
 through the mountains, from Hai-per's 
 Ferry to Paris. On the 6th, Mc- pjov. 
 Clellan's headquarters were at <•• 
 Rectortown, near Front Royal. The 
 Confederates, meanwhile, were steadily 
 falling back. The spectacle, at this 
 time presented, was that of two great 
 armies moving in parallel lines, the 
 mountain chain of the Blue Ridge be- 
 tween them, the objective point in both 
 cases being the same. It was a race 
 for Richmond. Everything depended 
 on despatch. The race was eagerly 
 watched. Would not McClellan, with 
 his superior force and ample supplies, 
 outrun his opponent, and, by gaining 
 
336 
 
 FREDERICKSBURG. 
 
 his front, strike him there and also on 
 the flank, through the gaps in the hills ? 
 Such was the question put by many. 
 As usual, Lee was too quick for his 
 opponent. Anticipating some such 
 movement, he had hurried Longstreet 
 forward ; and on the very day that Mc- 
 Clellan's army crossed the Potomac, 
 that general, having pushed his way 
 over the Blue Ridge, was at Culpepper 
 Court House, and ready to resist the 
 advance of the Nationals on the Con- 
 federate capital. There was still an 
 opportunity for McClellan. By a rapid 
 and vigorous movement, he might cut 
 Lee's army in two, and destroy it in 
 detail. But there was distrust of Mc- 
 Clellan at Washington ; and at this 
 critical moment it was determined to 
 displace him. On the 5th of Novem- 
 ber, an order was issued from the Wai- 
 Department, relieving him of the com- 
 mand of the army of the Potomac, and 
 appointing General Bui'nside in his 
 place — McClellan being required to re- 
 port himself at Trenton, New Jersey. 
 This order vpas placed in the hands of 
 General Buckingham. On the night 
 of the 7th, during a heavy snow-storm, 
 when General Burnside happened to 
 be in McClellan's tent at Rectortown, 
 Buckingham arrived, and placed the 
 despatch in McClellan's hands. After 
 reading it, and without betraying any 
 emotion, he handed it to Burnside, 
 simply remarking, "Burnside, you com- 
 mand the army." The news was as 
 unwelcome to Burnside as it was to Mc- 
 Clellan. The position had been offered 
 him twice before; but Burnside, hav- 
 ing, as we have seen in a previous 
 
 chapter, a high opinion of McClellan's 
 ability, being a warm, personal friend, 
 and being, besides, distrustful of him- 
 self, had, in both instances, modestly 
 declined the proffered honor. He had 
 not changed his mind. It was not 
 until the 10th, after having received 
 peremptory orders from Washington, 
 and being warmly encouraged by his 
 friends, that he consented to assume 
 the responsibilities of general-in-chief 
 of the army of the Potomac. "I'll 
 try," he said, evidently intimating that 
 he had a secret distrust of his own 
 fitness for so responsible a position. In 
 view of the actual situation, and with- 
 out having any regard to the disasters 
 which so speedily followed, the removal 
 of General McClellan, at this particulai" 
 juncture, must be pronounced unfort^i- 
 nate and ill-timed. He ought to have 
 been removed at an earlier date, or not 
 until he had had another opportunity 
 of measuring his strength with his an- 
 tagonist. 
 
 McClellan made immediate prepara- 
 tions for departure. He took leave of 
 his troops in the following words : 
 
 " Headquarters op the Army of the Potomac, I 
 Camp near Rectortown, Va., Nov. 1, 1862. j 
 
 " Officers and Soujiersof the Arht of the Potomac : 
 
 "An order of the president devolves 
 upon Major-General Burnside the com- 
 mand of this army. In parting from 
 you, I cannot express the love and grati 
 tude I bear to you. As an army, you 
 have grown up in my care. In you I 
 have never found doubt or coldness. 
 The battles you have fought under my 
 command will probably live in our na- 
 tion's history. The glory you hava 
 
BURNSIDE IN COMMAND. 
 
 337 
 
 »chieved over mutual perils and fa- 
 tigues ; the graves of our comrades 
 fallen in battle and by disease; the 
 \)roken forms of those whom wounds 
 md sickness have disabled — the strong- 
 sst associations which can exist among 
 men unite us by an indissoluble tie. 
 We shall ever be comrades in support- 
 ing the Constitution of our country and 
 the nationality of its people. 
 "Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 "Major-General U. S. A." 
 On Monday, the 9 th, General McClel- 
 j^ov. ^^^ visited the different camps, 
 9i reviewed the troops, and took a 
 final leave of officers and men. The 
 leave-taking showed that, whatever his 
 defects of character, or whatever were 
 the blunders he committed, he had not 
 lost the respect and confidence of his 
 men. As the general, " mounted upon 
 a fill" horse, attended by a retinue of 
 fine-looking military men, riding rapid- 
 ly through the ranks, gracefully recog- 
 nized and bade a farewell to the army, 
 the cries and demonstrations of the 
 men were beyond bounds — wild, impas- 
 sioned, and unrestrained. Disregai'ding 
 all military forms, they rushed from 
 their ranks and thronged around him, 
 with the bitterest complaints against 
 those who had removed from command 
 their beloved leader." On the next 
 day he withdrew, taking the cars to 
 WaiTenton. On reaching the junction, 
 a salute was fired. The troops assem- 
 bled at that point actually broke their 
 ranks, through their eagerness to see 
 him and to obtain a few parting words. 
 While on the platform, he said, "I 
 wish you to stand by General Burnside, 
 
 as you have stood by me, and all will 
 be well. Good-bye." At Bristow Sta- 
 tion and at Manassas Junction, the same 
 scenes were repeated ; and the cheering 
 was loud and enthusiastic. 
 
 On assuming the duties of general- 
 in-chief, Burnside issued the following 
 order : 
 
 " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, ) 
 iVoc. 10, 1862. j 
 
 "In accordance with General Orders 
 No. 182, issued by the president of the* 
 United States, I hereby assume com- 
 mand of the army of the Potomac. 
 Patriotism, and the exercise of my every 
 energy in the direction of this army, 
 aided by the full and hearty co-opera- 
 tion of its officers and men, will, I hope, 
 under the blessing of God, insure its 
 success. 
 
 " Having been a sharer of the priva> 
 tions, and a witness of the bravery oj 
 the old army of the Potomac in th« 
 Maryland campaign, and fully identi 
 fied with them in their feelings of re 
 spect and esteem for General McClel 
 Ian, entertained through a long a^i 
 most fi-iendly association with him, I 
 feel that it is not as a stranger I assniiie 
 command. 
 
 "To the ninth army corps, solon.^ and 
 intimately associated with me, I need 
 say nothing. Our histories are identi- 
 cal. With diffidence for myadf, but 
 with a proud confidence in the 'unswerv- 
 ing loyalty and deterniiriatJon of the 
 gallant army now entrusted to my care, 
 I accept its control, with tha steadfast as- 
 surance that the just cause must prevail. 
 "A. E. Burnside, 
 "Major-General Commanding." 
 
 / 
 
d38 
 
 FREDBKICKSBURG. 
 
 Biirnside did not make any attempt 
 to carry out McClellan's plan of attack, 
 which was, oy a rapid march upon Gor- 
 donsville, to interpose between Lee's 
 divided forces and beat them in detail. 
 The truth is, the opportunity for doing 
 this was already lost. With consent of 
 Halleck, who made a visit to the army, 
 he adopted a new plan of operations. 
 The capture of Richmond, I'ather than 
 the destruction of Lee's army, was now 
 to be his objective. Some precious 
 time was wasted in reorganizing the 
 army. It was now 120,000 strong. 
 In place of the old airangement of 
 corps with subordinate divisions. Burn- 
 side divided his entire force into three 
 grand divisions, each consisting of two 
 coi-ps. The right was placed under the 
 command of General Sumner, the left 
 under General Franklin, and the centre 
 under General Hooker, while a large 
 body of reserve was commanded by 
 General Sigel. Burnside had his head- 
 •juarters at Warrenton. The National 
 plan of attack, as stated by Burnside 
 himself, was to concentrate the army 
 in the neighborhood of Warrenton, to 
 make a movement across the Rappahan- 
 nock as a feint, with a view to divert 
 the attention of the enemy, and leading 
 him to believe that an attack was 
 about to be made in the direction of 
 Gordons\'ille, and then to move the 
 whole army rapidly to Fredericksburg, 
 on the southern side of the Rappahan- 
 nock. 
 
 Such being the general plan, the 
 mouth of Acquia Creek, where it emp- 
 ties into the Potomac, was established 
 as the basis of supplies. Piers and 
 
 roads were constructed ; and immense 
 quantities of stoi'es were sent thither 
 to meet the wants of so large a body 
 of men. The bridges across the Rap- 
 pahannock, in the neighborhood of 
 Fredericksbui'g, had all been destroyed; 
 and, in canying out the proposed plan, 
 it would be necessary to throw pontoon 
 bridges across at various points. In 
 connection with this matter, there was 
 some sad bungling — bungling which, if 
 it did not lead to the defeat of the Na- 
 tional army, at least gave the Confede- 
 rates time to discover Burnside's plan, 
 and to prepare to meet him on his own 
 chosen ground. This whole affair is so 
 mixed up that it is difficult, if not im- 
 possible, to get at the exact truth. It 
 does appear that when Commander-in- 
 Chief Halleck and Quartermaster-Gen 
 era! Meigs were at Warrenton, Burn- 
 side expressed to them the necessity foi 
 having the pontoon material sent on 
 from Washington without delay. It 
 was understood that Halleck and Meigs 
 sent the necessary instructions to Wash- 
 ington regarding the pontoons. It is 
 certain that General Burnside felt satis- 
 fied that this matter had been attended 
 to, and that the instructions would be 
 faithfully and promptly carried out. It 
 is stated on reliable authority that Gen- 
 eral Woodbury, who commanded the 
 engineer brigade which had charge of 
 the pontoon equipage, received no in- 
 structions as to the time it was required 
 to be at Acquia Creek, or the part 
 it was to play in the campaign ; that he 
 called upon General Halleck on the 
 14th, telling him that, if the date of 
 the arrival of the pontoons was to coin- 
 
FATAL DELAY. 
 
 339 
 
 cide with the arrival of the army at 
 Fredericksburg, the departure of the 
 latter from Warreaton should be de- 
 layed for at least five days ; and that 
 Halleck, while not yet giving any posi- 
 tive instractions regarding the trans- 
 port of the pontoon equipage, not only 
 refused to grant the delay, but even 
 neglected to communicate Woodbury's 
 remarks to Burnside. It was a badly 
 managed business, and led to lament- 
 able results, as the reader will soon 
 perceive ; and, while Burnside cannot 
 be held wholly guiltless, the evidence 
 lays the burden of blame on Halleck 
 and Meigs. 
 
 On the 14th of November, orders 
 "Nov. were given for the march from 
 J 4' Warrenton to Falmouth. Sum- 
 ner, who was the fli*st to start, set out 
 on the morning of the 15th, and arrived 
 at Falmouth on the 17th. This village 
 is situated on the left or northern bank 
 of the Rappahannock. At this point, 
 the river meets a line of steep hills, and 
 describing an angle, changes its course 
 from east to southeast. The hills on 
 the right bank, known by the name of 
 Marye's Heights, recede from the river 
 a little above the angle, and then de- 
 scend gradually towards a small plain, 
 on which, and close to the river's edge, 
 stands the town of Fredericksburg, a 
 little below Falmouth. The hills on the 
 Falmouth side command the south bank 
 and much of the distance — a mile and a 
 half — toward the frowning hills beyond. 
 But these heights equally command the 
 intermediate plain, and are beyond the 
 reach of guns planted on the north side 
 of the river. When Sumner arrived at 
 
 Falmouth, he discovered that on the op- 
 posite bank of the river there were only 
 one battery and a few detachments of 
 infantry and cavalry. He had but little 
 difficulty in silencing the battery. Fred 
 ericksburg, in fact, was at his mercy 
 and he might with ease have taken pes 
 session of Marye's Heights — the kej 
 of the position. The pontoons had noj 
 yet arrived ; but the water in the Rap- 
 pahannock was low, and the fords^ al- 
 though not free from difficulty and dan- 
 ger, were not impassable. Sunmer was 
 willing and even anxious to make the 
 attempt ; but he was positively forbid- 
 den to cross the river until the arrival 
 of the other troops. "I think," said 
 Sumner in his testimony, " that I could 
 have taken that city, and heights on 
 the other side of it, at any time within 
 three days after my arrival here [Fal- 
 mouth], if the pontoons had been here; 
 foi I do not think there was much force 
 of the enemy here up to that time." 
 Sumner was thus compelled to remain 
 inactive. Burnside, with Franklin's 
 grand division, reached Falmouth jfov. 
 on the 19th. Hooker, on the **• 
 same day, arrived at the village of Har- 
 wood ; and, yielding to the same im- 
 pulses which controlled Sumner, he 
 expressed a desire to his chief to cioss 
 the river above Fredericksburg, and 
 occupy Marye's Heights. But the same 
 reasons which hindered Sumner's action, 
 hindered that of Hooker. There were 
 no pontoons; and by this time heavy 
 rains had swollen the river, making the 
 fords impassable. 
 
 While the National army was thus 
 compelled to remain comparatively in- 
 
uo 
 
 FREDERICKSBURG. 
 
 active on the northern side, what was 
 taking place at Fredeiicksburg and the 
 iieights beyond ? The movement of 
 Sumner on the 15th had been quickly- 
 reported to Lee. He had also been in- 
 formed of the arrival of several trans- 
 ports at Acquia Creek. He was not 
 slow to divine the meaning of the move- 
 ments of his antagonist. The feeble 
 demonstrations made at Culpepper 
 could not deceive him. Fi'edericks- 
 burg, he saw at a glance, was the objec- 
 tive point. Towards Fredericksburg, 
 therefore, he directed his attention. 
 Longstreet's corps had been at Culpep- 
 per since the 3d. Lee ordered them to 
 strike their camp, and started with 
 them for Fredericksburg. On his ar- 
 rival, he found McLaws in quiet posses- 
 sion of the heights commanding the 
 town ; and while the Nationals were 
 5till baiTed by the impassable river, he 
 proceeded with all haste to take full 
 advantage of his splendid position. On 
 Not; ^^^ 22d, Buraside and his divi- 
 22. sion commanders had the mortifi- 
 cation to see the opposite heights — the 
 object of their ambition, the vantage 
 ground on which they had set their 
 hearts — crowned with the enemy's bat- 
 teries, and bristling with the enemy's 
 steel. It was a humiliating sight. Jack- 
 son was summoned from Orange Court 
 House on the 26th. It was not until 
 the 28th or 29th that he rejoined Lee. 
 Up until that date Bumside's opportu- 
 nity lasted. If he could have crossed 
 the river, he might have whipped Lee, 
 and taken possession of Marye's Heights 
 before the arinval of Jackson. But the 
 opportunity could not be taken advan- 
 
 tage of. The pontoon equipages were 
 not forward until the 25th ; and it was 
 the 10th of December before all things 
 were ready for throwing the bridges 
 across the nver. The hills behind 
 Fredericksburg had by this time been 
 rendered impregnable. It was a fatal 
 delay — the most fatal since the com- 
 mencement of the war. 
 
 Burnside had not, however, been 
 wholly idle. The Confederates, as has 
 been stated, had destroyed the railroad 
 between Fredericksburg and Acquia 
 Creek. The bridges were all broken 
 down or burned; and the- track in 
 many places was torn up. The Na- 
 tional engineers had succeeded in re- 
 storing the bridges — one of these, built 
 under the superintendence of Colonel 
 Haupt over the Potomac Creek, being 
 four hundred feet in length and one 
 hundred feet above the water, com- 
 manding especial attention ; and the 
 line was put in good working order. 
 Arrangements had been made to cross 
 the river at Skinker's Neck, twelve 
 miles below Falmouth, with the view 
 of turning the Confederate right; but 
 the ever-vigilant Lee discovered the 
 movement in time to show himself 
 fully prepared. Burnside was check- 
 mated, and the enterprise was aban- 
 doned. As early as the 21st of Novem- 
 ber, Sumner had made a call on the 
 mayor of Fredericksburg to surrender ^ 
 that town ; but the reply was promptly 
 made that, while it would not be used 
 for offensive purposes against the Na- 
 tional army, any attempt to occupy it 
 would be stubbornly resisted. The re- 
 sult of this correspondence was that the 
 
THE PONTOONS. 
 
 341 
 
 ^habitants, dreading a bombardment, 
 for the most part left the city, Barks- 
 dale's sharpshooters distiibuting them- 
 selves behind the deserted buildings 
 ^ear the river. Meanwhile, Lee's army, 
 some 80,000 strong, had been vpell 
 brought forward; and at the end of 
 November, it l^y in a semicircle around 
 Fredericksburg, each wing resting on 
 the river- -its right at Port Royal, be- 
 low the city, and its left a short dis- 
 tanc<? above it. His engineers had 
 co"3structed in the rear of the city two 
 'ines of fortifications, one mile apart; 
 And the range of hills to his left were 
 also well fortified. 
 
 In the meantime the pontoons had 
 Dec. arrived ; and Bui'nside, on the 
 '®' evening of the 10th, made the 
 necessary arrangements to have the 
 bridges thrown across early on the fol- 
 lowing morning. About four o'clock on 
 the cold, raw morning of the 11th of De- 
 cember, and amid a dense fog, the work 
 was commenced. Five bridges were to 
 be constructed — three immediately in 
 front of Fredericksburg, and the other 
 two a couple of miles below. The two 
 lower bridges were to be used by 
 Franklin ; those in front of the town 
 by Sunmer and Hooker. The topogra- 
 phy of the river shores, as we have 
 already indicated, offered facilities for 
 carrying out the enterprise. Stafford 
 Heights, on the Falmouth side, and on 
 which the Nationals were encamped, 
 were close to the margin of the river, 
 which at this point is about three 
 hundred yards wide. These heights 
 were crowned with twenty-nine power- 
 fill batteries, numbering 147 guns. 
 236 
 
 Lee's batteries, on the othei hand, 
 were from three fourths of a mile to a 
 mile and a half from the banks. But 
 for the sharpshooters, who had found 
 secure lodgment behind the stone waUa 
 of the river street of the town, there 
 would have been but little difficulty ex- 
 perienced in throwing across the pon- 
 toons. The National anny was posted 
 along the north bank of the Rappahan- 
 nock — Hooker and Sumner in front of 
 Fredericksburg, Sumner more to the 
 right ; Franklin about two miles below. 
 Burnside had his headquarters at the 
 house of a Mi- Phillips, on the high 
 ground, about a mile from the river; 
 and from that commanding position, he 
 had a full view of the whole field of 
 operations. On the; morning of Dec, 
 the 11th, as we have seen, before !*• 
 day-break, the work was commenced. 
 For a time it went quietly on, the 
 workmen being covered by the Fifty- 
 Seventh and Sixty-Sixth New York, 
 of Zook's biigade, of Hancock's divi- 
 sion. The bridges below Fredericks- 
 burg were constructed without much 
 hindi-ance; but those in front of the 
 town were now exposed to the Con- 
 federate sharpshooters. One of these 
 latter bridges was well-nigh completedj 
 when the Confederates discovered what 
 was going on. Two signal guns were 
 fii-ed ; and from behind the walls along 
 the banks of the river, and from the 
 windows of the houses, a galling fire 
 of musketry was opened upon the pon- 
 toniers, who were compelled to desist 
 and fall back to the shelter of the hills. 
 The woi'k was resumed about six 
 o'clock. The Confederate fire became 
 
S43 
 
 FREDERICKSBURG. 
 
 more seveie, the bullets falling like 
 hail among the brave poutoniers. It 
 was impossible to continue the work. 
 Again it was necessary to fall back 
 to the shelter of the hills which ran 
 parallel with the river. Burnside now 
 became impatient. The sharpshooters 
 must be silenced and driven from their 
 hiding-places. Orders were given that 
 the batteries on Stafford Heights should 
 open fire on the town, and batter it 
 down, if necessary. The response was 
 prompt and tenific. More than a hun- 
 dred guns opened their angry mouths 
 at once. Fifty rounds were fired be- 
 fore the cannonade ceased. The shot 
 told on the buildings, battering many 
 of them down, and setting some of 
 them on fire. Another .attempt was 
 now made, under cover of this fire, 
 to finish the bridges ; but the sharp- 
 shooters, strange to say, were still 
 on the river's bank, and concealed be- 
 hind the stone walls. A third time 
 were the pontoniers compelled to fall 
 back. The sharpshooters must be dis- 
 lodged. Volunteers were called for; 
 when the Seventh Michigan, and Nine- 
 teenth and Twentieth Massachusetts, 
 of Howard's division, offered theii" ser- 
 vices. They were quickly conveyed 
 across the stream; and in a brief space 
 of time the Mississippian sharpshooters 
 were driven from their shelter, and 
 nearly 100 of them made prisoners. 
 The bridges were soon completed. 
 
 As soon as the bridges were in a fit 
 state to be used, Sumner's gi-and divi- 
 sion, and a portion of Hooker's, were 
 over before dark at the upper bridges ; 
 Franklin's grand division crossed at the 
 
 lower. The movement was re- Dee, 
 sumed on the morning of the '2. 
 12th ; and on the evening of that day, 
 the greater portion of the National 
 army was on the south side of the Rap- 
 pahannock, and in full possession of 
 Fredericksbui'g. During the afternoon, 
 fii'e was opened on the town by the Con- 
 federate batteries on the heights near- 
 est the town. The Nationals made a 
 bnsk response, and the firing was dis- 
 continued. It was Lee's purpose to 
 tempt the Nationals to attack him on 
 the heights, where he knew he was all 
 but impregnable. Had he given them 
 more annoyance in the city, as he could 
 easily have done, this purpose might 
 have failed. A full revelation of his 
 strength might have led to the recross- 
 ins: of the river. Lee succeeded in his 
 plan. Burnside made immediate ar- 
 rangements for an assault on the Con- 
 federate position. 
 
 We have already endeavored to give 
 the reader a general idea of the ground 
 on which the struggle was about to 
 take place. We have seen that the 
 town of Fredericksburg lay on a stretch 
 of level ground on the south bank of 
 the Rapjjahannock, and that, at the dis- 
 tance of half a mile or a little more in 
 rear of the town, the ground begins to 
 rise in sharp slopes, until it forms a 
 sort of table land, with two ridges, the 
 more remote ridge being the higher of 
 the two. These heights were generally 
 known by the name of Marye's Heights, 
 although special names were given to. 
 particular prominences. The heights, 
 which are from three quarters of a mile 
 to a mile and a half in the rear ( f 
 
READY T'OR THE ATTAOK. 
 
 345 
 
 Fi-edericksburg, and which completely 
 command the town, had been rendered 
 impregnable. A little to the south of 
 Marye's Heights there is another, but 
 more in'egular, range of hills, running 
 for some distance due south, then 
 trending to the southeast, in the direc- 
 tion of the Massaponax, when they fol- 
 low the line of that stream to the Rap- 
 pahanock. On these hills there were 
 some strong natural positions, particu- 
 lai-ly what was afterwards called Lee's 
 Hill, at tlie northern extremity; Pros- 
 pect Hill, at the extreme south ; and 
 Bernard's Cabin, not far from the centre. 
 The ground in the rear of this in'egu- 
 lar range was well wooded, thus afford- 
 ing good shelter for the troops which 
 
 might be in possession. 
 
 Along 
 
 the 
 
 front of this ridge ran the Fredericks- 
 burg and Potomac Railroad. In conse- 
 quence of the recession of the hills 
 towards the middle of the ransre, the 
 plain, which extends from Fredericks- 
 bm-g to the Massaponax, and from the 
 base of the hills to the Rappahannock, 
 acquires considerable dimensions. In 
 addition to the railroad just mentioned, 
 there runs through the entire length 
 of this plain the old Richmond Road. 
 Every available spot on this range of 
 hills, as on Marye's Heights, although 
 the batteries were not so crowded, was 
 covered with cannon. Distributed along 
 this line, and guarding every approach, 
 was Lee's army of 80,000 men, with 
 ,300 pieces of artilleiy. Jackson was 
 on the right; Longstreet on the left; 
 Stuart, Avith cavalry and artillery, on 
 the plain on the extreme right. In his 
 rear Lee had cut a new road, by means 
 
 of which he was able, without making 
 a long detour throiigh a bad country, 
 to connect both wings of his army. 
 The National army was lying on the 
 southwest side of the Rappahannock, 
 in the same position in which the divi- 
 sions had crossed — Sumner and Hooker 
 at the town of Fredericksburg, and 
 Franklin about two miles below. Such 
 were the relative positions of the two 
 armies on the night of the 12th and the 
 morning of the 13th. Burnside's army, 
 which was over 120,000 strong, out- 
 numbered that of Lee ; but Lee had 
 the advantage of position. His army, 
 which was stretched out in a sort of 
 semicircle, not only commanded the 
 open space in front — it flanked it. 
 
 Everything was now ready for the 
 attack. The Confederates, however, 
 were not less prepared than the Na- 
 tionals. Jackson had arrived on the 
 field ; and Longstreet had been enabled 
 to close his lines on tne left. On the 
 afternoon of the 12th, A. P. Hill had 
 relieved Hood, and taken position along 
 the margin of the woods, on the Con- 
 federate right, from Hamilton's Crossing 
 to Bernard's Cabin. Hood lay on the 
 heights, between Deep Run and Hazel 
 Run. Pickett was stationed at the foot 
 of the hills, near the centre, between 
 Hazel Run and the Telegraph Road. 
 McLaws was on the heights, to the left 
 of Pickett; and Anderson's division, 
 which was fiu^her to the left, rested 
 on the I'iver. The important point was 
 Marye's Hill, the southernmost promi-* 
 nence of Marye's Heights, which com- 
 manded the Plank Road. This posi- 
 tion, which was strongly fortified and 
 
Hi 
 
 FREDERICKSBURG. 
 
 well mounted with guns, was placed 
 under the immediate care of General 
 Ransom. At the foot of the hill, on a 
 road which was protected on the town 
 side by a gray stone wall, were sta- 
 tioned Cobb's brigade and the Twenty- 
 Fourth North Carolina, The redoubts 
 on the crest of Marye's Hill were held 
 by the Washington (New Orleans) ar- 
 tillery, under Colonel Walton. On the 
 evening of the 12th, Burnside convened 
 his officers, and submitted to thera his 
 plan of attack for the next morning. 
 His purpose was to push forward his 
 entire force which had crossed the 
 river, and, by sudden and simultaneous 
 attacks made along the whole line, to 
 penetrate the Confederate ranks, and 
 seize the fortified heights. The work 
 was to be done by Franklin on the left 
 and Sumner on the right. Hooker's 
 grand division was to be held in re- 
 serve, so as to be ready for any emerg- 
 ency. After consultation, it was agreed 
 that the main attack should be made 
 'ipon the enemy's right ; and to enable 
 Franklin to do his part of the work 
 .vith effect, his command was strength- 
 ened by the addition of two of Hooker's 
 best divisions, making his whole force 
 about 55,000 men. It was understood 
 that Franklin would make the attack 
 at daM^n ; but he was to receive positive 
 instructions from the commanding-gen- 
 eraV before midnight, Sumner's attack, 
 which was to be made more to the 
 right of the Confederate position, in the 
 neighborhood of Marye'^? Hill, was to 
 be conditioned somewhat on the success 
 which might attend Franklin's, but it 
 was to be made almost immediately 
 
 after. Such was the general understand- 
 ing on the night of the 12th. Franklin 
 waited anxiously for his orders. Mid- 
 night came and went ; but there was 
 no message from Burnside. 
 
 It was not until near six o'clock next 
 morning that Burnside issued his Oee. 
 orders to his three gi-and divi- l^' 
 sion commanders; and it was nearly 
 eight o'clock before Franklin knew 
 what was expected of him. As Frank- 
 lin was greatly, but very unjustly, 
 blamed for his conduct at Fredericks- 
 burg, it is well that the reader should 
 be put in a position to judge for him- 
 self. Bumside's order to Franklin read 
 as follows : " General Hardie will carry 
 this despatch to you, and remain with 
 you during the day. The general com- 
 manding directs that you keep your tvhok 
 command in position for a rapid move 
 ment down the old Richmond Road, and 
 you will send out at once a division, at 
 least, to pass below Sraithfleld, to seize, 
 if possible, the heights near Captain 
 Hamilton's, on this side of the Massa- 
 ponax, taking care to keep it well sup- 
 ported, and its line of retreat open. 
 He has ordered another column of a 
 division, or more, to be moved fi'om 
 General Sumner's command up the 
 Plank Road to its intersection of the 
 Telegraph Road, where they will di- 
 vide with a view to seizing the heights 
 on both these roads. Holding these 
 heights, with the heights near Captain 
 Hamilton's, will, I hope, compel the 
 enemy to evacuate the whole ridge be 
 tween these points. He makes these 
 moves by columns distant from each 
 other, with a view of avoiding the poa- 
 
THE ATTACK ON THE LEFT. 
 
 345 
 
 Bibility of a collision of our own forces, 
 which might occur in a general move- 
 ment during the fog. Two of General 
 Hooker's divisions are in your rear, at 
 the bridges, and will remain as sup- 
 ports. Copies of instructions to Gen- 
 erals Sumner and Hooker will be sent 
 to you by an orderly very soon. You 
 will keep your whole command in readi- 
 ness to move at once, as soon as the fog 
 lifts. The watchword which, if pos- 
 sible, should be given to every com- 
 pany, will be 'Scott.'" The order was 
 signed by J. G. Parke, Chief of Staff. 
 
 Such were the instructions brought 
 to Franklin on the morning of the 13th. 
 They were not the instructions expect- 
 ed, and for which preparations had 
 already been made. The new plan 
 differed entirely from that agreed upon 
 the night before. Puzzled and per- 
 plexed as Franklin was by this change 
 of mind on the part of his chief, he had 
 no choice but obey. It deserves to be 
 borne in mind that Hardie, who brought 
 the instructions, remained with Frank- 
 lin, and was in constant communication 
 with Burnside during the day The 
 general-commanding was, therefore, kept 
 well informed of all that was going on, 
 on his left. For the orders given to 
 Sumner to attack at a time when Frank- 
 lin was not yet seriously engaged, for 
 all the subsequent orders of that day, 
 and for the general plan of the battle, 
 Burnside was wholly responsible. It 
 is evident from this order that Burnside 
 had concluded, at the last moment, not 
 to make a vigorous assault with his 
 entire strength both on the left and 
 right of the enemy's position, but, in | 
 
 the first instance at least, to make, 
 simultaneously, two partial and tenta- 
 tive efforts — one on the right and one 
 on the left. Franklin made immediate 
 preparations to carry out the order. 
 Believing that he was to hold his com- 
 mand in readiness for a I'apid move- 
 ment on the old Richmond Road, and 
 that he was to send out only an armed 
 reconnoissance, vnth a single di\nsion, 
 he ordered Reynolds to take Meade's 
 division, and attack the point indicat- 
 ed. Meade's division was accordingly 
 thrown forward. The other two divi- 
 sions of the same corps — those of Gib- 
 bon and of Doubleday — were ordered to 
 support Meade, the one on his right, the 
 other on his left, but somewhat in the 
 rear. Meade had under him about 
 5000 men; Doubleday had about th«. 
 same number ; and Gibbon had nearly 
 6000. Reynolds' disposable force was 
 therefore, about 16,000 men. A heavj 
 fog lay over the valley. So dense was 
 it that neither army could be seen hy 
 the other. The Confederates, however, 
 could distinctly hear the words of com 
 mand given by the National officers 
 As the ground was exceedingly broke*, 
 and irregular, the advance wafe conduct 
 ed under great difficulty, .ft was nov( 
 nearly ten o'clock. The fog began tc 
 clear off; and the columns of Meade 
 which were well advanced beyond tht 
 road, came full into view of the Con 
 federates. At this moment, Meade was 
 assailed by a ten-ible stonn of bullets 
 at near range. He had come close 
 upon Stuart's hoi-se artilleiy, which 
 were posted along the road, on ths 
 open ground, to the Coufederut* right 
 
846 
 
 FBEDEK1CK.SBUKG. 
 
 Meade was now compelled to halt. For 
 half an hour the battle raged fiercely. 
 At the end of that time Doubleday 
 came up to his relief. Doubleday de- 
 ployed his men in front of Stuart ; and 
 Meade continued his advance. At this 
 moment Doubleday was facing towards 
 the left, while Meade was pressing to- 
 wards the railroad which, at this point, 
 skirts the edge of the wooded heights. 
 Meade's progress was uninterrupted. 
 All was quiet on the heights and in 
 the woods beyond. Not a sign of the 
 foe was visible. The National ai'tillery 
 poured shell into the woods occupied 
 by the division of A. P. Hill ; but 
 there was no response. Jackson was 
 evidently reserving his fire until his 
 antagonist came fully under his guns. 
 Eveiything now depended upon dash 
 and daring. Meade urged forward his 
 men. On rushed the brave Pennsyl- 
 vanians — troops which had covered 
 themselves with glory at Beaver Dam 
 and on the blood-stained field of Glen- 
 dale. They rapidly approached the 
 position occupied by Walker's artillery 
 at Prospect Hill. Suddenly these guns 
 open fire ; the twelve guns at the Con- 
 federate left centre open fire at the 
 same moment; and Meade finds himself 
 alone, in the open space, exposed to the 
 fire of two concentric batteries, the pro- 
 jectiles actually crossing each other in 
 his ranks. The situation is perilous. 
 There is a halt ; and an attempt is made 
 to silence the enemy's guns. Gibbon 
 deploys to the right of Meade. Birney, 
 with his division, of Stoneman's corps, 
 is hurried forward to the relief of both. 
 After a fearful artillery duel, the Con- 
 
 federate fire from the batteries on 
 Prospect Hill, and those more to their 
 left centre in front of the raib'oad, is 
 considerably slackened. A decided ad- 
 vantage has been gained by the Na- 
 tionals. 
 
 Reynolds now gives Meade the signal 
 for attack. Though the ground is co^er- 
 ed with dead and wounded, there is no 
 time to halt and consider. On rush the 
 Pennsylvanians — on in the face of the 
 most destructive fire of shell and canis- 
 ter. The Confederate general, Brock- 
 enborough, is compelled to fall back. 
 A powerful battery is silenced, and 
 hurried to the rear. Rushing bravely 
 on, Meade soon finds himself across the 
 railroad, over the crest of the hill, with 
 his advance, under Sinclair, as far as 
 the new military road, which Lee had 
 constructed for the purpose of uniting 
 the ^vings of his array. The first line 
 of the Confederates had been pierced. 
 On the military road, the victorious 
 Nationals come into contact with Gregg 
 and his South Carolina veterans. Un- 
 prepared for so vigorous an attack, and 
 mistaking Meade's men for Confederate 
 soldiers, Gregg forbids his own men 
 to fire. In a moment he is undeceived. 
 There is a terrific discharge of mus- 
 ketry. Orr's rifles, the most exposed 
 regiment of the Confederate line, is al- 
 most annihilated ; and Gregg himself 
 has fallen, mortally wounded. 
 
 It is a critical moment. If Meade is 
 well sustained, he may succeed in pene- 
 trating the second line of the enemy — 
 thus cutting the Confederate army in 
 two. In such a case, Burnside's first 
 object will have been accomplished; 
 
MEADE REPULSED. 
 
 84'} 
 
 and victory, it is not improbable, may 
 crown his efforts. Bat Meade has 
 been brave almost overmuch ; he is far 
 in advance of his supports; and his 
 brave Pennsylvanlans are utterly ex- 
 hausted. No help is within reach. 
 Doubleday is on the Richmond Road ; 
 Gibbon has allowed himself to be 
 stopped at the left of HilFs line, near 
 the railroad ; and Birney still lingers in 
 the rear. Franklin's headquarters are 
 far distant ivom the scene of action : 
 and being desirous to cany out the in- 
 structions he has received, he is fearful 
 to engage the greater portion of his 
 forces. Left thus to himself, Meade is 
 imable to make good the advantage he 
 has gained. The Confederates, having 
 re-formed, fall upon his wearied troops 
 in front with great weight, and with 
 tremendous fury. It was already a 
 most unequal combat. While thus at- 
 tacked in front, and while his men were 
 reeling and staggering under the vigor- 
 ous onslaughts of the rapidly multiply- 
 ing Confederates, Early came dashing 
 up, with Ewell's division, and struck 
 Meade's flank as if with a thunderbolt. 
 Resistance was no longer possible. The 
 Nationals were driven back over the 
 railroad in confusion, and with great 
 loss, the Confederates pursuing, with 
 loud yells, and flinging themselves on 
 the guns which covered the retreat. 
 Birney came forward in time to save 
 Meade from destruction. The Confede- 
 rates were forced back into the woods, 
 with the loss of 500 men in killed and 
 wounded. Birney, however, could not 
 reopen the breach in the Confederate 
 line. Meade could render no assist- 
 
 ance ; Gibbon's men had suffered terri- 
 bly, and he himself had been wounded; 
 while Smith, Avho had been advanced 
 more to the right, was too far removed 
 to render any efiicient aid. At two 
 o'clock Reynolds held the railroad ; but 
 he was not strong enough to make any 
 attempt upon the woods. All that 
 Meade had won was lost — hopelessly 
 lost ; and yet Franklin had under him 
 some 30,000 men who had never been 
 engaged. Never, during the world's 
 history, was there displayed more gal- 
 lantry; but never was gallantry dis 
 played to so little piirpose. Meade 
 performed miracles of valor; and the 
 future hero of Gettysburg was already 
 revealed. Franklin, overfaithful, and 
 too rigidly obedient to rule, lost his op- 
 portunity — an opportunity which rare- 
 ly falls to the lot of a division com- 
 mander, and which was never to be 
 his again. In strictly adliering to his 
 orders, he did that which was right; 
 but a little more willingness to incur 
 risk, and to share responsibility, might 
 have made him the hero of Fredericks- 
 burg, and the future captain of the 
 Northern hosts. 
 
 Let us now see what was taking place 
 on the right. While the thick fog was 
 still resting heavily on the valley, Sum- 
 ner's forces were already moving to- 
 wards the artillery-crowned heights in 
 the rear of the city. Marye's Heights 
 we have already described. There were 
 three prominences, all of which were 
 well mounted with cannon — Marye's 
 Hill to the south, and commanding the 
 Plank Road; Cemetery Hill towards 
 the centre; and Stansbury Hill further 
 
848 
 
 FREDERICKSBURG. 
 
 to the north. Burnside's plan, it will 
 be remembered, was to throw upon the 
 Plank Road and Telegraph Road a col- 
 umn of equal strength with that which 
 was to make the attack on the left, his 
 expectation being that he would thus 
 make himself master of the entire I'ange 
 of hills, those on his right as well as 
 those on his left. Of Sumner's grand 
 division, Couch's corps (the Second) 
 occupied the town of Fredericksburg; 
 and Wilcox's (the Ninth) occupied the 
 interval between Couch and Franklin. 
 Couch was to have the honor of making 
 the first attack. It was now nearing 
 the noontide. The mist had just cleared 
 off the valley. Burnside, who was still 
 at the Phillips House, on the northern 
 side of the river, and who had reserved 
 to himself the direction of the battle 
 on his right, gave the signal for attack; 
 and Fi*ench's division, of Couch's corps, 
 composed of the brigades of Kimball, 
 Anderson and Palmer, was seen to 
 emerge fi-om Fredericksburg into the 
 open plain. The Confederate batteries 
 on Marye's Hill had already opened 
 fire upon the town. As French's col- 
 umns advanced, the Confederate guns 
 on the heights were lowered ; and the 
 shot and shell fell thick and fast into 
 his serried ranks. French's division 
 was followed at some little distance by 
 that ol Hancock; and Howard's divi- 
 sion was held in reserve. An attempt 
 was made by the National artillery on 
 Stafford Heights to silence the batteries 
 on Marye's Hill ; but the distance was 
 so great that the shot fell short, and 
 threatened to do more damage to friend 
 than foe. The firing on the part of the 
 
 National artillery on the northern side 
 of the river was, therefore, discontin- 
 ued. So terrific was the fire from 
 Marye's Hill that Couch's field-piecej 
 could not be advanced. On, however^ 
 rushed the brave Nationals — French iu 
 front, Hancock following close behind. 
 It was a rush into the jaws of death. 
 Longstreet has told us that the gaps 
 made by the artillery could be seen 
 half a mile away. French's soldiers 
 had approached within fifty paces of 
 the stone wall at the base of Marye's 
 Hill. As they rushed forwai'd, they 
 were received with a murderous volley. 
 The first line was reduced to a handful 
 of men. The two brigades which fol- 
 lowed were brought to a standstill; 
 and, after a single discharge, they re- 
 tii'ed, leaving nearly one half of their 
 comrades on the ground. Hancock was 
 now in the front; and, being joined by 
 such portions of French's command as 
 had not been broken and disorganized, 
 he rushed towards the stone wall. It 
 was a terrific struggle Bullet, ball 
 and shell, like a tempest of iron, mowed 
 down his ranks, while the triumphant 
 Confederates, safe behind their strong 
 bulwark, shouted and yelled in fierce 
 delight. Again and again did Meagher 
 dash his gallant Irishmen against the 
 stone wall. As often, torn and bleed- 
 ing and reduced in numbers, were 
 they driven back. Fifteen minutes had 
 elapsed since Hancock advanced to the 
 front. His division, like that of Fi'encL 
 had been cut to pieces. Of 5600 vet- 
 erans whom he led into action, he had 
 lost over 2000, of whom 156 were offi- 
 cers. The slaughter was terrible. 
 
HOOKER'S ATTACK. 
 
 34» 
 
 Hancock in turn was compelled to 
 fall back ; but the battle was not dis- 
 continued. Howard hurried forward 
 to lend what aid he could on Hancock's 
 right. Sturgis and Getty crossed Hazel 
 Run, with two brigades, and endeav- 
 ored to divert the attention of the ene- 
 my by an attack on the right of his 
 position. It was all in vain. These 
 attempts only increased the number of 
 victims. They did not in any material 
 way affect the enemy. It was now 
 about half-past one. On the left, 
 Meade had just been driven out of the 
 Hamilton Wood, and back over the 
 railroad. Burnside's plan had failed. 
 The two independent attacks had been 
 made ; they had been sustained with 
 great vigor, and with indomitable pluck; 
 but they had only revealed the strength 
 of the enemy's position. It was time 
 to desist. To prolong the struggle was 
 useless. It was worse than useless — it 
 was mtirder. 
 
 Such, however, was not the opinion 
 of Burnside. Orders were sent to 
 Franklin to renew the assault, and this 
 time with all his forces, the avowed 
 object being so to engage the enemy's 
 attention as to facilitate a new attack 
 on the right. Hooker, at the same 
 time, was ordered forward to repeat 
 the attack where French and Hancock 
 had vainly sacrificed their splendid di- 
 visions. The experience of that morn- 
 ing had irritated, not enlightened, the 
 general in command. Burnside, in fact, 
 was ignorant of the situation. He was 
 still at the Phillips House. He saw the 
 battle only from afar ; and he had but 
 a dim notion of the strength of the 
 
 enemy's position, and of the temble 
 sacrifices which he himself had uselessly 
 made. His eye was fixed on Marye'a 
 Hill — alternately girt with flame, and 
 wreathed with smoke. He knew the 
 importance of the position ; but he 
 forgot, for the time, the deadly havoc 
 which that incessant and well-directed 
 fire was producing among his troops. 
 Striding up and down the terrace, proof 
 against all advice, and as if lost to all 
 reason, he kept repeating, mechanically, 
 "That crest must be carried to-night." 
 No one has ever had the hardihood 
 to accuse Hooker of cowardice. Dur- 
 ing the peninsular campaign at Will- 
 iamsburg, and in all the subsequent bat- 
 tles before Richmond, in almost every 
 one of which he performed a brilliant 
 part, he had acquired the name of 
 " Fighting Joe." Hooker did not hesi- 
 tate to obey the orders he had received 
 from his chief. Taking with him the 
 divisions of Sykes and Humphreys, of 
 Butterfield's corps, he advanced to the 
 attack. As soon, however, as he saw 
 the positions he was ordered to take, 
 and heard from their own lips the ex- 
 perience of French and Hancock, he 
 became convinced that the attempt 
 was vain, and sent an aide-de-camp to 
 the general-in-chief for a counter-or- 
 der. Burnside, however, was inflexible. 
 "That crest must be carried to-night." 
 Hooker, unwilling to fling away the 
 lives of his brave men, hurried across 
 the river, and saw his chief in person. 
 It was all in vain. Burnside would listen 
 to no advice. The only answer which 
 Hooker could get from him was, "That 
 height must be carried this evening." 
 
850 
 
 FREDERICKSBURG. 
 
 An hour and a half had thus been 
 lost. On the National left, the fighting 
 had not been resumed with any degree 
 of vigor. Franklin's forces were scat- 
 tered over an extended line. It would 
 be dangerous to leave any one point 
 undefended. Even if it were safe to 
 concentrate, it would be night before it 
 could be accomplished ; and to make 
 any fresh attack with a portion of his 
 forces would only be useless slaughter. 
 About three o'clock, the Confederates 
 made a vigorous attack on the left of 
 Howe's division, which was posted 
 along the railroad. The attack was 
 speedily repulsed, one of the Con- 
 federate regiments — the Fifty-Seventh 
 North Carolina— being almost annihi- 
 lated. With this exception, the fight- 
 ing was virtually ended on the National 
 left, when Birney came to the relief 
 of Meade, and reclaimed the railroad. 
 Musketry firing was kept up along the 
 whole line ; but there was no engage- 
 ment. 
 
 It was now four o'clock. The brief 
 December daylight would soon be suc- 
 ceeded by the dense December dark- 
 ness. Hooker had returned to the field. 
 Burnside's orders were positive. The 
 attack must be made at once. How the 
 attack was made, and with what suc- 
 cess. Hooker has told us himself. " I 
 proceeded," he says, " against the bar- 
 rier as I would against a fortification, 
 and endeavored to breach a hole sufii- 
 ciently large for a ' forlorn hope ' to 
 enter. Before that, the attack along 
 the line, it seemed to me, had been too 
 general — not sufficiently concentrated. 
 I had two batteries posted on the left of 
 
 the road, within four hundred yards of 
 the position upon which the attack was 
 to be made, and I had other parts of 
 batteries posted on the right of the 
 road, at the distance of five hundred or 
 six hundred yards. 1 had all these 
 batteries playing with great vigor until 
 sunset upon that point, but with no 
 apparent effect upon the rebels or upon 
 their works. During the last part of 
 the cannonading, I had given dii'ections 
 to General Humphrey's division to form 
 under the shelter, which a small hill 
 afforded, in column for assault. When 
 the fire of the artillery ceased, I gave 
 directions for the enemy's works to be 
 assaulted. General Humphrey's men 
 took off their knapsacks, overcoats and 
 haversacks. They were ordered to 
 make the assault with empty muskets, 
 for there was no time then to load and 
 fire. When the word was given, the 
 men moved forward with great impetu- 
 osity. They I'an and hurrahed, and I 
 was encoui'aged by the great good feel- 
 ing that pervaded them. The head of 
 General Humphrey's column advanced 
 to perhaps within fifteen or twenty yards 
 of the stone wall, which was the ad- 
 vanced position held by the rebels, and 
 then they were thrown back as quickly 
 as tliey had advanced. Probably the 
 whole of the advance, and the retiring, 
 did not occupy fifteen minutes. They 
 left behind, as was reported to me, 
 1760 of their number, out of 4000." It 
 was now twilight. Hooker, to use his 
 own words, having lost "about as many 
 men as he was ordered to sacrifice," 
 gave the signal for retreat. Darkness 
 came and prevented a further useless 
 
DEFEAT. 
 
 351 
 
 Bacrifice of life. A few hours more of 
 daylight, and Jackson might have fallen 
 upon Franklin with tremendous energy. 
 It is hardly possible that he could have 
 won ; but the attack must have resulted 
 m a heavy loss of life. The battle of 
 Fredericksburg was ended. To the 
 National cause, it was one of the most 
 disastrous battles of the war. To the 
 Confederate cause, it was a great tri- 
 umph ; but the triumph was more in 
 <?eemiug than in reality, for Lee, either 
 from inability or from fear, failed to 
 turn it to account. 
 
 According to the reports of the divi- 
 sion commanders, the National loss was 
 over 13,000. Franklin had lost 4(379. 
 Sumner had lost 5494, and Hooker's 
 loss was 3548. The killed numbered 
 1152; the wounded 9101; and there 
 were 3234 missing. The Confederate 
 loss did not exceed one half of these 
 enormous figures. 
 
 The battle of Fredericksburg must 
 ever be regarded as one huge blunder, so 
 far as Burnside is concerned. For the 
 battle gi'ound chosen he, and he alone, 
 was responsible. The plan he followed 
 was not McClellan's plan ; it was not 
 the plan approved and recommended 
 by the authorities at Washington ; it 
 was his own. He might have done 
 better by pursuing Lee towards the 
 Rapidan, than by occupying the heights 
 of Falmouth. He gave the enemy his 
 opportunity ; and circumstances enabled 
 the enemy to seize it. The pontoon 
 mismanagement was the second grand 
 blunder. It was the opinion of Burn- 
 side himself, and all his subordinates, 
 that if the pontoons had arrived in time 
 
 to allow him to transfer his army to 
 the south side of the Rappahannock, 
 before Lee had time to concentrate his 
 forces and fortify the heights, the battle 
 of Fredericksburg might never have 
 been fought, or, if fought, the result 
 would have been entirely different. 
 For the pontoon mismanagement Burn- 
 side was not M'holly responsible ; but it 
 was his lousiness more than that of any 
 other. On the prompt arrival of the 
 pontoons everything depended ; yet he 
 treated this as a secondary matter, and 
 left it entirely for some days in the 
 hands of Halleck and Meigs, who 
 regarded themselves as iri'espousible. 
 The non-arrival of the pontoons in time 
 gave the Confederates the full advan- 
 tage of a splendid position, and brought 
 about the necessity that if a battle were 
 to be fought at all on the chosen 
 ground, it must be fought by tlie Na- 
 tionals at a terrible disadvantaue. It 
 would have been better far, however 
 humiliating for the moment it might 
 have seemed, if Burnside, after he knew 
 that the heights on the opposite side 
 of the river were all but, if not abso- 
 lutely, impregnable, had entirely aban- 
 doned his plan, and sought to meet the 
 foe by a different course. Having de- 
 cided to make the attack, he ought to 
 have done it differently. His plan on 
 the evening of the 12 th was better than 
 that on the morning of the I3th. He 
 had changed his mind in the interval ; 
 but he had changed it for the worse. A 
 general attack was hazardous. A partial 
 attack was folly. The temporaiy suc- 
 cess of Meade sliowed what might have 
 been done if he bad massed his troops 
 
852 
 
 FBEDEBICKSBUEG. 
 
 on his left, and encouraged Franklin to 
 put forth his entire strength in one 
 bold, dashing effort. He blundered 
 again when he ordered Sumner to ad- 
 vance before he knew what success 
 bad attended Franklin on the left. He 
 dnned against reason and common-sense 
 when he forced Hooker to make the 
 final attack. History will say that the 
 aiTny of the Potomac — one of the finest 
 armies the world has ever known — was 
 literally slaughtered through the in- 
 competency of its chief. 
 
 The 1 4th was Sunday. It had been 
 Deci Bui'nside's intention to renew the 
 
 *4. attack in the morning. He found 
 it impossible, however, to overcome the 
 opposition of his chief officer^j who re- 
 garded the enemy's lines as impreg- 
 nable; and the order which had already 
 been given was countermanded. Dur- 
 ing that day, and the next, the Na- 
 tional army lay on the Fredericksburg 
 side of the RappatiannocK ; but on 
 neither side was any evidence given of 
 a disposition to attack. 
 
 During the night of the 15th, Burnside 
 Dec. quietly withdrew his entire army, 
 
 *5i with his guns, to the Falmouth side 
 of the river ; the pontoon bridges were 
 also taken up ; and Lee was permitted 
 to enter and occupy Fredericksburg. 
 It was not to be wondered at that Lee 
 took advantage of the circumstance, to 
 boast of a great victoiy. On the 16th, 
 Dec. Burnside M'rote to Halleck, the 
 
 ifi* commander-in-chief, that the army 
 was withdrawn to the Falmouth side of 
 the river, because he felt that the posi- 
 tion in front could not be carried, and 
 }>ecau8e it was a military necessity 
 
 either to attack or retire. A repulse, 
 he said, would have been disastrous. 
 The army was withdi-awn at night 
 without the knowledge of the enemy, 
 and without loss either of property or 
 men. 
 
 Burnside was still hopeful that he 
 might be able to redeem the disaster 
 which had befallen the National army. 
 He had another plan ready. He pro- 
 posed to make an immediate advance 
 on Richmond. His plan was ta make 
 a feint above Fredericksburg, And to 
 cross with the main body of the army 
 about six miles below. Twenty-five 
 thousand cavalry, with four guns, were 
 to cross at Kelley's Ford, push towards 
 the Rapidan, destroy the railroad tracks 
 and bridges in the rear of Lee's army, 
 destroy, also, the locks on the James 
 River Canal, traverse Virginia, raiding 
 as they advanced, and finally join the 
 National garrison, then under Peck at 
 Suffolk. Such was Burnside's plan. 
 Unhappily for him and his plan, how- 
 ever, there was dissatisfaction among 
 his subordinate oflScers. The bad man- 
 agement at Fredericksburg had pro- 
 duced a feeling of general distrust ; and 
 this distrust found free and full expres. 
 sion at Washington. Representations 
 had been made to the president by 
 Franklin and Smith, showing the utter 
 folly and uselessness of any further 
 attempts to cross the Rappahannock. 
 They could only, they said, result in 
 disaster. At the same time, two other 
 generals — Newton and Cochrane — who 
 happened to be in Washington, fully 
 convinced the president of the bad tem- 
 per which prevailed in the army of the 
 
THE ''MUD MAIiUH." 
 
 858 
 
 Potomac — a temper which did not jus- 
 tify any further movement for the pres- 
 ent. 
 
 A fortnight had now elapsed since 
 the battle of Fredericksburg. On the 
 [)ec 30th of December, Bumside ^fA 
 ^' completed his preparations for the 
 onward movement ; his cavalry were al- 
 ready at Kelley's Ford, and his infantry 
 were ready to start The whole move- 
 ment was suddenly stopped by an order 
 from the president. Burnside hastened 
 to Washington to demand an explana- 
 tion. From the commander-in-chief uud 
 the secretary of war he could learn 
 nothing. Ignorant of the cause them- 
 selves, they could not explain. The 
 president, however, did not conceal his 
 reasons for acting as he had done. 
 Complaints against the general had 
 been made by several prominent officers 
 La the wmy. The complaints of these 
 men were such that the president could 
 ttot afford to ignore them. It was no- 
 torious that bad feeling existed among 
 the officers and men; and while such 
 was the state of things, he did not feel 
 justified in sanctioning a forward move- 
 ment. Bui'nside tendered his resigna- 
 tion; but this the president, having 
 perfect faith in his loyalty and patriot- 
 ism, refused to accept. The president 
 desu'ed him to remain in command of 
 the army, but he was not to renew the 
 campaign without his knowledge and 
 consent All these things led to delay. 
 Much precious time was wasted; and 
 what was even more to be lamented, 
 the secret of Bumside's plans had leaked 
 out, and Lee was no longer ignorant 
 of the iateutions of bis antagonist 
 
 Burnside changed his plan. He now 
 proposed to cross the Rappahan- 
 nock above Fredericksburg, at 
 Banks' and United States Fords, hop- 
 ing to flank the enemy, and to force a 
 battle. Permission was given him by 
 the president to renew the campaign. 
 It was now the 20th of January, jan, 
 1863. Franklin and Hooker were 20. 
 at Banks' Ford, At that point the river 
 is not passable in winter time. The 
 pontoons, however, had been brought 
 up ; and preparations were being made 
 for throwing bridges across the swollen 
 waters. 1; seemed, for the moment, as 
 if fortune were smiling on Bumside. 
 Some demonstrations made at a point a 
 little further down had been attended 
 with complete success. The weather, 
 too, was good; and the roads were 
 in excellent condition. On the night 
 of the 20th, all these hopes were di» 
 sipated- A fearful storm of wind, 
 snow, sleet and rain came on, such as is 
 seldom seen in that region; it contin- 
 ued all night; and when morning 
 dawned, the entire country was con- 
 verted into a huge quagmire. The 
 troops were for some hours hopelessly 
 mired. They could neither retreat nor 
 advance. Lee had already become 
 aware of Bumside's intention to cross 
 the river, and was at the point of dan- 
 ger, ready to meet him. Burnside waa 
 not unwilling even yet to cross the 
 river, and offer the enemy battla II 
 was found impossible, however, to con- 
 struct the bridges. The greater the 
 effort made by men and horses to push 
 forward the vehicles containing the 
 boats, the more hopelessly did they 
 
3S4 
 
 FEEDERICKGjJUEG. 
 
 sink in the soft, paste-like mud, with 
 which the roads were covered. The 
 rain continued during the whole of the 
 21st. It was still raining on the morn- 
 ing of the 22d. The three days' ra- 
 tions, with which the men had been 
 
 f Aim- 
 
 'supplied, were all but exhausted. The 
 game was already lost; and the Con- 
 federates could again make the boast 
 that the elements fought in their favor. 
 Jan, On the 23d, the army of the 
 23» Potomac was in its former en- 
 campments, and in winter quai-tera 
 What was known at the time as the 
 "Mud March" was ended. 
 
 At this crisis, the public mind was 
 filled with indignation and sorrow. 
 Not a little blame was attached to the 
 president and his cabinet. The com- 
 mander-in-chief was not held guiltless. 
 The revelations made through the court 
 of inquuy in the case of General Mc- 
 Dowell, and the court martial on Gen- 
 eral Porter, had convinced the public 
 that the government had intermeddled 
 too much with the plans of the militaiy 
 leaders. Burnside had done much to 
 Bave the president and his cabinet by 
 publishing a letter, in which he assumed 
 the entire responsibility of the plan, 
 and the conduct of the attack on Fred- 
 ericksbm-g. Some of the old feeling, 
 however, still remained. At this time, 
 Burnside became ill-satisfied with his 
 generals ; and, irritated and discouraged 
 by this latest failure, and by the ad- 
 verse criticisms which were freely made 
 both by men and officers, he resolved 
 to rid the army of the f omenters of dis- 
 
 cord. Among the officers aimed at 
 were Generals Hooker, Brooks, New- 
 ton and Cochrane, whom he wished to 
 be dismissed from the service of the 
 United States ; and Generals Franklin, 
 Smith, Sturgis and Ferrers, with Col 
 onel Taylor, whom he wished to be 
 deprived of their respective commands. 
 Hurrying to Washington, he asked the 
 president to sign the order which he 
 had already prepared. Of course the 
 president refused. To have signed such 
 an order would have ruined the army. 
 It would have depiived it of some of 
 its trusted and most competent leaders. 
 Burnside then tendered his resignation 
 of the command of the army of the Po- 
 tomac, and also of his rank of major- 
 general. He was relieved of command 
 at his own request, but he retained hij 
 rank in the army. The same ordei 
 which relieved Burnside, also relieveii 
 Franklin and Sumner. Franklin, some- 
 what unjustly, we think, had come 
 under suspicion; and Sumner, who waa 
 broken down by age and infirmity, was 
 relieved at his own request. Hooker 
 was now the senior general of the army 
 of the Potomac. He had shared its for- 
 tunes from the first. By his courage, 
 skill and promptitude, he had won not 
 a little renown. To him, therefore, was 
 now assigned the dangerous honor ol 
 being its chief. The appointment waa 
 generally ajiproved; and Hooker waa 
 well received by both ofticers and men. 
 How the army fared under his com* 
 mand will form the subject of auothei 
 chapter. 
 
BATESVILLE. 
 
 S05 
 
 CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 Ouefrilla Mo-veiaenta in the West. — General Curtis at BatesvUle. — Moving Eastward. — At Jaoksonport — N» 
 tioual Gunboats. — White River.— St. Charles. ^Clarendon. — Encounter with General Rust. — Condition of 
 the National Army. — Sad Disappointment. — What was to be Done? — The March to Helena. — At Helena. — 
 Arkansas and Missouri Unprotected. — General J. M. Schofleld in Command in Missouri. —Attacks of the 
 GuerriDas. — Political Feuds in Missouri. — Lincoln Complains. — Guerrilla Leaders. — Porter, Poindexter and 
 Cobb. — General McNeil. — McNeil Attacked by Porter and Cobb. — Colonel Merrill. — Newark Captured. — 
 Battle of Kirksville. — Poindexter Caught in a Trap. — Defeat of Cobb. — National Supremacy Restored North 
 of the Missouri. — Capture of the Garrison at Independence. — Battle of Cross Roads. — Defeat of Foster. — 
 Coffee's Retreat. — The Guerrillas in Arkansas. — Rains, Parsons, Cooper and McBride. — Hindman in Com- 
 mand of the Guerrillas. — The Ozark Mountains. — Schofleld Takes the Field in Person. — The "Army of 
 the Frontier." — Sarcoxie. — Blunt and Totten. — Fort Wayne. — The Confederates Attacked. — Fayetteville. — 
 Boston Mountains. — Hindman Preparing to Attack the Nationals. — Cane Hill. — Illness of Schofleld. — Blunt 
 in Command. — Blunt About to be Attacked. — Herron Sent For. — Prairie Grove. — Battle of Prairie Grove. — 
 Terrible Fighting. — Herron in Peril. — Arrival of Blunt. — The Confeaerates Defeated. — Hindman 's Mistakes. — 
 Blunts Ride to Van Buren. — The Guerrillas in Texas. — The Loyalty of the Texans. — The Texan Martyrs. — 
 Among the Indians. — Tale-Quah. — Forts Davis and Gibson. — The Indian Encampments. — Colonel Phillipps. — 
 Phillipps Attacked by Taylor. — Bayou Barnard. — Taylor Killed. — Attack by the Indians on New Ulm and 
 the Agencies. — Horrible Butchery. — Swift Punishment. — Peace Established on the Frontier of Minnesota. 
 
 1862. 
 
 Towards the close of 1862, there 
 were some engagements, in the 
 western country, beyond the Mis- 
 sissippi, and east of the Rocky Moun- 
 tains — engagements which, although not 
 of first-class importance, or directly con- 
 nected with any of the great, leading 
 military movements, cannot, in a work 
 of this kind, be passed over in silence. 
 After the battle of Pea Ridge, described 
 in a previous chapter, the Confederate 
 general. Van Dorn, who, as we have 
 seen, made a skilful and successful re- 
 treat, moved with the greater portion 
 of his army down the Arkansas River 
 as far as Little Rock, marched in an 
 eastward direction, crossed the Missis- 
 sippi at Helena, and joined the army of 
 Beauregard almost in time to take part 
 in the battle of Shiloh. General Curtis 
 made no haste to pursue. On the field 
 
 of victory he rested his men ; and then, 
 finding no foe in that part of Arkansas, 
 he descended from the highlands into 
 the vast plains below, and, moving in a 
 southeasterly direction, reached, on the 
 8th of May, Batesville, a large vOlage 
 on the White River. Here he expected 
 to find gunboats and supplies in charge 
 of Colonel Fitch. But the siege of 
 Corinth had not yet ended; and, in 
 consequence, the White River and its 
 tributaries were not yet open to the 
 Federal flotilla. Curtis, not a little 
 disappointed, remained at Batesville 
 until the 24th of June, depending foi 
 his supplies by wagon trains from Rolla, 
 far up in Missouri, and thus very much 
 at the mercy of the guerrilla bands 
 which infested the country. After the 
 evacuation of Corinth, and the capture 
 of Memphis, the Arkansas waters werp 
 
sse 
 
 THE GUERKILLAS. 
 
 open to navigation ; and several Federal 
 gunboats proceeded up the White River. 
 Juiie Oq the 25th of June, Curtis, 
 
 25» learning that the gunboats were 
 coming up the river, started for Jack- 
 sonport. Here he was joined by Gen- 
 eral C. C. Washburne, with the Third 
 Wisconsin cavalry, which had come 
 down from Springfield, Missouri, with- 
 out encountering any opposition. The 
 gunboats, however, had not yet made 
 their appearance. They had been de- 
 tained further down the river, by an 
 encounter with some Confederate bat- 
 teries near St. Charles; and, although 
 these works had been carried, the gun- 
 boats had been so damaged that they 
 were unable to proceed further up. To 
 add to their difficulties, the water in 
 the river had become very low. Still 
 hopeful that, if he could reach the gun- 
 boats, he might be able to tui-n them 
 to some account in a joint movement 
 against Little Rock, Curtis, with his 
 whole army, pressed on towards Claren- 
 don. He was the more anxious to 
 reach the gunboats, that he knew they 
 were accompanied by a brigade of in- 
 fantry from Indiana. It was a wretch- 
 ed country through which they had to 
 pass — a low, swampy region, intersected 
 by canals or bayous, covered with cane- 
 brakes, and inhabited by a white popu- 
 lation, who were entirely in sympathy 
 July with the Southern cause. On the 
 
 J'' 7th of July, while still in this 
 inhospitable region, the advance (Thir- 
 ty-Third Illinois) under Colonel A. P. 
 Hovey, was attacked by some 1500 
 Texan cavalry, under General Albert 
 Rust. Hovey was soon joined by Wood, 
 
 who came up with the First Indiana 
 cavalry and two howitzers, when a vig- 
 orous charge was made, and Rust was 
 compelled to beat a hasty retreat, leav- 
 ing 1 10 of his men dead ou the field. 
 The National loss was 8 killed and 45 
 wounded. The march was continued 
 to Clarendon; but, on reaching that 
 place, it was found that the gunboats 
 had departed some twenty-four hours 
 before. 
 
 It was a sad disappointment. Cm-tis' 
 condition was a thousand times worse 
 than it had been before. It would 
 have been better far for him to have 
 remained at Pea Ridge or at Batesville. 
 He had not only made a long and fa- 
 tiguing march : he had lost all the ad- 
 vantages of these positions, without ob- 
 taining any compensation. What ^vaa 
 now to be done ? Retrace his steps ? 
 That was not to be thought of. Remain 
 where he was? That would be suici- 
 dal ; for the region was unhealthful, 
 and he was without food, witliout 
 ammunition, without supplies of any 
 kind, and without the means of com- 
 municating with any base of operations. 
 There was but one course open to 
 him, and that was to reach the waters 
 of the Mississippi as quickly as possi- 
 ble. It was an ungrateful task, con- 
 sidering the exhausted condition of his 
 men. But there was no choice. No 
 delay was permitted. It was sixty-five 
 miles to Helena, the nearest point of 
 any importance. WashBurne, with all 
 the cavalry, numbering some 2500 
 horses, and with five howitzers, set out 
 at once. Although he had to make the 
 roads as he advanced, bridging the bay- 
 
DIVISION OF SENTIMENT. 
 
 3157 
 
 ous, and cutting his way through the 
 tangled and almost impenetrable copse, 
 Helena was reached in twenty-four 
 hours. Curtis followed, with the in- 
 fantry, taking Avith him a few Arkansas 
 volunteers and a large number of ne- 
 groes, and, proceeding by long marches, 
 July arrived at the same place on the 
 13. 12th and 13th of July. At He- 
 lena, Curtis found his much-needed sup- 
 plies; but for the remainder of the 
 summer he was fastened to the Missis- 
 sippi, having no other duty to perform 
 than that of guarding its western banks, 
 and thus covering the right of the Na- 
 tional army, which was operating on 
 the other side. 
 
 The retirement of Curtis to the Mis- 
 sissippi left Arkansas very much un- 
 cared for. The result was that large 
 guerrilla bands were organized in that 
 State and the neighboring State of Mis- 
 souri. They gradually united and as- 
 sumed the proportions of a formidable 
 ^army. In April, 1862, Missouri was 
 in charge of General J. M. Schofield, 
 an officer of decided ability, who had 
 served on the staff of the lamented 
 Lyon. All the militia of the State, 
 numbering some 14,000 men, and large- 
 ly composed of cavalry, were assigned 
 to his command. To this was attached 
 a volunteer force of considerable 
 strength, and drawn from almost all 
 sections of the State. In June, at the 
 request of Curtis, Missouri was created 
 into a separate military district; and 
 Schofield was placed in command. 
 About this time the guerrilla bands 
 began to be a terrible source of annoy- 
 ance. Every device was resorted to 
 
 by the Confederates to organize armed 
 opposition in the State. Whole Mis^ 
 souri regiments, including officers and 
 men, were furloughed; they returned 
 to their homes in citizens' clothes, carry- 
 ing with them secret instructions to 
 recruit and organize bands in all direc 
 tions, and then, at a given signal, to 
 meet in the heart of the State, and de- 
 stroy the militia enrolled under the 
 Federal flag. Schofield, however, was 
 vigilant, active and energetic, and 
 spared no efforts to overcome these 
 cunning devices of the foe. Fresh ap- 
 peals were made to the militia and to 
 the volunteers ; and, on the 22d of June, 
 he issued an order holding all rebels 
 and rebel sympathizers responsible in 
 their property, and, if need be, in their 
 persons, for damages thereafter com- 
 mitted by guerrillas or marauding par- 
 ties. His appeals to the militia and 
 the volunteers were only partially suc- 
 cessful ; and his order did not produce 
 the effect which he probably expected. 
 At the close of July he had on his roll 
 50,000 men, of whom 20,000 were 
 ready for effective service; but the 
 failure of the campaign against Rich 
 mond greatly encouraged the rebel 
 spirit, and rendered his position one of 
 extreme difficulty. The people of Mis- 
 souri were greatly divided in sentiment 
 as to the political issues before the 
 country. Emancipation found favor 
 with one party : it was bitterly op< 
 posed by another. Such were the 
 wranglings and contentions that Lin- 
 coln, on one occasion, -wrote to tliem 
 in bitter complaint. " It is painful to 
 me," he said, "that you in Missouri 
 
858 
 
 THE GUERRILLAS. 
 
 cannot or will not settle your factional 
 quarrels among yourselves. I have 
 been tormented ^vith them beyond en- 
 durance for months, by both sides. 
 Neither side pays the least respect to 
 my appeals to your reason." 
 
 Schofield's amiy of militia and volun- 
 teers was distributed over the State in 
 six divisions, under competent officers. 
 Towards the end of July, the guerrillas 
 began to reveal their strength and their 
 purpose. The northeastern division of 
 the State, above the Missouri River, 
 and bordering on the Mississippi, was 
 under the command of Colonel McNeil. 
 This was the principal theatre of oper- 
 ations. Here the guerrilla bands Avere 
 strong, and under the leadership of such 
 men as Porter, Poindexter and Cobb. 
 July On the 28th of July, Porter and 
 
 28. Cobb came into contact with a 
 portion of McNeil's command, under 
 Colonel Menill. In this encounter, 
 Merrill revealed those rare qualities 
 which mark a first-class cavalry officer. 
 Porter and Cobb were compelled to re- 
 treat. Three days afterwards, Porter 
 captured Newark and two companies 
 of National troops. Merrill renewed 
 the pursuit, which lasted for twelve 
 days, ultimately coming up with the 
 lug. Confederates on the 6th of Au- 
 
 ®' gust, at Kirksville, in Adair 
 County. Hei-e a desperate fight en- 
 sued. McNeil's entire force at this 
 point did not exceed 1000 men, all 
 mounted, with six guns. Porter had 
 under him at least 2500 men of all 
 aims. Porter, however, was defeated, 
 with a loss of 180 killed, about 500 
 ■wounded, and several wagon loads of 
 
 arms. McNeil's loss was 28 killed and 
 60 wounded. Porter's power was com 
 pletely broken. Poindexter's gang, 
 meanwhile, had increased to at least 
 1200 men. Early in August, Colonel 
 Guitar, with 600 men, and two pieces* 
 of artillery, went in pursuit of the guer- 
 rilla captain, and fell upon him while 
 crossing the Chariton River, on the ^ng, 
 nightof the 10th. Poindexter was '^' 
 caught in a trap. A large number of his 
 men fell a prey to the bullets and sabres 
 of the Nationals ; not a few were driven 
 into the river and drowned. A consid- 
 erable quantity of his supplies was cap 
 tured. With what remained of his 
 band, Poindexter hastened north to 
 effect a junction with Porter ; but, com- 
 ing into contact with Ben Loan, he was 
 forced back again upon Guitar. He 
 was thus caught between two fires. His 
 men fled for their lives, and he himself 
 was made prisoner. Cobb soon after- 
 wards shared the fate of his brother 
 bandits ; and to the north of the Mis- 
 souri River, the National supremacy' 
 was restored. In his report., Schofield 
 tells us that, from the 1st of April to 
 the 20th of September, there were more 
 than one hundred engagements. The 
 National loss was 3000. The loss on 
 the other side was not less than 10,000 
 men. Some terrible stories are told, 
 illustrative of the vengeful spirit vidth 
 which, on both sides, this guerrilla war- 
 fare was conducted. It is quite possi- 
 ble that the stories are exaggerated 
 reports of the facts in the case; but 
 there can be no doubt that the cold- 
 blooded murder of Colonel McCullough. 
 the day after Kirksville, and what 
 
 I 
 
COFFEE AND HUGHES. 
 
 353 
 
 were called the Palmyra massacres, 
 threw a dark cloud over the name of 
 McNeil, and damaged the reputation of 
 a loyal and patriotic soldier. 
 
 The guerrilla bands to the south of 
 the Missouri River were scarcely less 
 aggressive than their brethren further 
 north. These bands, having been or- 
 ganized under a chief of the name of 
 Hughes, when they heard of the out- 
 break in the north, resolved to take the 
 initiative, and, if possible, open com- 
 munication with their friends across the 
 Aug. river. On the 11th of August 
 J*' Hughes, with about 1000 com- 
 batants, surprised the garrison at Inde- 
 pendence. He encovintered some severe 
 opposition from them inside the garri- 
 son ; but he had no great difficulty in 
 making himself master of the place. 
 About the same time the Confederate 
 general. Coffee, who had moved from 
 the interior of Arkansas with 1500 
 horse, was pushing on rapidly for the 
 purpose of forming a junction with 
 Hughes. A combinatijon of National 
 troops was formed to prevent this junc- 
 tion. Coffee, as he moved north, was 
 being pressed by 1200 cavalry sent by 
 Brown. General Blunt, commanding 
 on the west of Kansas, detached some 
 troops for the same purpose. General 
 Totten was ordered by Schofield to 
 attack Hughes at once, before he could 
 be joined by Coffee. Unhappily, Tot- 
 ten's forces were divided ; 800 horse 
 and two guns, commanded by Major 
 Foster, being at Lexington, on the Mis- 
 souri, east of Independence, and 1500 
 men, under Colonel Warren, being at 
 Clinton, more to the southeast. Both 
 
 had started for Independence. Foster, 
 who had the shorter journey io make, 
 encountered the enemy at the Cross 
 Roads, called Lone Jack, on the Auw, 
 15th of August. Coffee and 15, 
 Hughes had formed a junction; and 
 their united forces amounted to 4000 
 or 5000 men. Foster's band was de- 
 feated, and driven back to Lexington. 
 In the struggle, Foster himself was 
 wounded. At this moment Coffee, 
 who was free in his movements, would 
 not have shown bad generalship, if he 
 had crossed the river and joined his 
 fi'iends, who were waiting for him on 
 the other side; :3ut he was so pressed 
 in his rear, that he deemed it best tc 
 make a detour and find his way, a£ 
 quickly as possible, back into Arkan 
 sas. Blunt was already upon his heels ; 
 but Cofl'ee, who knew the country 
 thoroughly, and whose men were well 
 trained in that kind of warfare, con- 
 trived to make his escape. 
 
 Robbed of their sti-ength, if not com- 
 pletely driven out of Missouri, the 
 guerrillas were still powerful in Ar- 
 kansas ; nor was it any part of their 
 plan that their adversaries should re- 
 main masters in Missouri. At the be- 
 ginning of September, the united Con- 
 federate forces in Arkansas amounted 
 to nearly 50,000 men. They were 
 under the command of General T. C. 
 Hindman, who was assisted l)y Gen- 
 erals Rains, Parsons, Cooper, Mc-Bride 
 and others. Hindman had been a mem- 
 ber of Congress ; but he had warmly 
 espoused the Confederate cause, and 
 gone into the war with all the bitterness 
 of a partisan. Under tlie plea of .tix13 
 
360 
 
 THE GUERRILLAS. 
 
 tary necessity, he had arrogated to him- 
 self excessive powers in the State, exer- 
 cising au arbitrary authority, and allow- 
 ing his soldiers a license in the last 
 degree offensive to all peaceful citizens. 
 Living on the country wherever he hap- 
 pened to be, and rigidly enforcing the 
 conscription law, he was enabled to 
 gather together and to maintain a large 
 body of men. Hiudman was complete- 
 ly master of Arkansas. Indeed, there 
 were no Federal soldiers in that State 
 to dispute his authority. Nestling in 
 the recesses of the Ozark Mountains, 
 among which the battle of Pea R'dge 
 had been fought, he could sweep the 
 rast and fertile plains which lay around 
 him on every side, and carry off what- 
 ever he thought his army needed. In 
 one thing only was that army found 
 wanting. It was well provisioned, but 
 poorly supplied with ai-ms. This was 
 the less an inconvenience that there was 
 Qo foe against which the arms could be 
 used. So much was this the case that 
 General J. Johnston, who had just been 
 placed in command of the armies of the 
 West, added his solicitations to those 
 of General Randolph, that the forces 
 under Hindman should be turned to 
 some account, by being sent across the 
 Mississippi to strengthen the forces 
 under Pemberton. Davis, however, 
 would not give his consent. Randolph, 
 in consequence, retired from the Con- 
 federate cabinet, and Hindman de- 
 termined to make a fresh invasion of 
 file State of Missouri. His forces were 
 di Tided as follows: Rains, with 6000 
 infantry, occupied the heights in the 
 ueighborcood of Pea Ridge; Cooper, 
 
 with 7000 horse and some artillery, had 
 advanced into the valley of Neosho, as 
 far as Newtonia, thus menacing the 
 National troops, who were stationed 
 at Springfield ; while another body 
 of 4000 men, massed on the White 
 River, seemed to be making ready for 
 a march on Rolla, the most important 
 of the National depots in the Western 
 country. 
 
 Schofield now resolved to take the 
 field in person, and, if possible, strike 
 the enemy before he was in a fit condi- 
 tion to take the offensive. He had 
 shortly before, on the 26th of Septem- 
 ber, been appointed to the command of 
 what was called the " army of the fron- 
 tier," General Curtis having superseded 
 him by taking command of the depart- 
 ment. Steele was put in command of 
 the forces which remained stationary at 
 Helena. The army under Schofield has 
 been variously estimated at from 12,000 
 to 15,000 men, of whom about 8000 
 were available for active operations. 
 There were about 5000 cavalry and 
 some sixteen pieces of artillery, with a 
 complement of men and horses. The 
 largest portion of this aimy was at 
 Springfield ; two brigades, all mounted, 
 were at Sarcoxie; and General Blunt 
 was known to be coming up from Kan- 
 sas. Schofield took up his line of 
 march for Sarcoxie with 6000 men, leav 
 ing some 5000 to guard Springfield and 
 his long line of communication with St. 
 Louis. On the 30th, a reconnois- gepJ. 
 sauce was made in the direction 30. 
 of Newtonia by some of the troops 
 which were already at Sarcoxie. Com- 
 ing into contact with Cooper's cavalry, 
 
COOPEK AND RAINS DEFEATED. 
 
 361 
 
 they were, after a lively engagement, 
 driven back to their encampments. On 
 the 1st or 2d of October, the troops, 
 which had left Springfield, arrived in 
 the neighborhood of Sarcoxie, and, form- 
 ing a division under General Totten, 
 were joined by those commanded by 
 Blunt. On the following day, the en- 
 tii'e National army set out for Newtonia. 
 Blunt and Totten approached at differ- 
 ent points. The Confederates evident- 
 ly were taken by surprise ; and Rains 
 and Cooper, who had not been able to 
 form a junction, both took to flight, the 
 one towards Huntsville, the other to- 
 wards Maysville. Schofield marched 
 Oct. steadily onward ; and, on the 
 "• 17th of October, he was on the 
 old battle ground of Pea Ridge. The 
 Confederates, as we have seen, were 
 divided. Cooper evidently intended to 
 take possession of Maysville, and cut 
 off communication with Fort Scott. 
 Rains, with the main body of the troops, 
 covered by about 3000 cavalry, was 
 still moving in the direction of Hunts- 
 ville. Blunt, with two brigades, went 
 off in pursuit of Cooper; while Scho- 
 field, with the main array, pushed over 
 the White River Mountains, in the 
 track of Rains. 
 
 Blunt, who did not allow his m€ n to 
 halt by the way, reached the outskirts 
 Oct. of Maysville before daylight on 
 22. the morning of the 22d of Octo- 
 ber. He felt satisfied that the enemy 
 could not be far off. Disguising him- 
 self, and entering into conversation 
 with some of the villagers, he soon dis- 
 covered that Coo])er was encamped on 
 yrairie ground in the \ncinity of an old 
 
 military post, called Fort Wayne. As 
 soon as day broke. Blunt, although his 
 men were not all forward, resolved to 
 make the attack. It was important to 
 sti'ike a blow before his presence was 
 discovered by the enemy. His van- 
 guard, therefore, dismounted and com- 
 menced firing. The Confederates were 
 quite unprepared for the attack; and, 
 before they thorougnly understood 
 their position, the main body of Blunt's 
 troops came up at a gallop from Mays- 
 ville, and deployed on the pi'aii'ie. A 
 few shells were flung into the encamp- 
 ment, and then the whole line advanced. 
 The Confederates, making but little re- 
 sistance, fled precipitately towards Fort 
 Gibson in the Indian Territory, leaving 
 their four guns behind them. There 
 was but little loss of life on the part of 
 the Confederates; and the Nationals 
 had only three men disabled. 
 
 Schofield had been not less successful 
 in his pursuit of Rains. The enemy had 
 escaped from Huntsville, and sought 
 shelter once more in the neighborhood 
 of the Ozark Mountains. It was evi- 
 dently Hiadman's intention to avoid 
 battle until his troops were collected 
 in greater force. Returning to a posi- 
 tion not far from Pea Ridge, Schofield 
 learned that some 3000 or 4000 cavalry 
 were encamped on White River, about 
 eight miles from Fayetteville. Totten 
 was ordered to advance and attacl< 
 them in front, while Francis J. Herron 
 was instructed to proceed imniediatel} 
 with about 1000 cavalry, and strike 
 them in the rear. Heri'on was the first 
 to reach the enemy. On the morn- oct, 
 ing of the 28th of October, after 2«« 
 
362 
 
 THE GUERRILLAS. 
 
 a rapid night march, he found him- 
 self close upon the encampment. With- 
 out waiting for the arrival of the in- 
 fantry, he fell upon the foe with the 
 rapidity of lightning. The surprise 
 was complete ; and such was the vigor 
 of the onslaught that the Confederates 
 fled to the mountains, leaving every- 
 thing behind them. 
 
 Comparative quiet reigned in those 
 regions for neaily a month. On the 
 26th of November, however, it became 
 known to Schofield that Hindman had 
 made up his mind to resume the offen- 
 sive. The Confederate general, Mar- 
 maduke, had arrived at Cane Hill with 
 7000 or 8000 men ; and it was natural 
 to conclude that Hindman was about to 
 follow. Schofield, who had for some 
 time previous to this been in poor 
 health, deemed it necessary to resign 
 bis command. General Blunt imme- 
 diately accepted the responsibilities of 
 the situation. He set out at once in 
 quest of the enemy. So rapid were 
 his movements that, on the morning of 
 Nov. the 28th, he found himself in 
 28. presence of his antagonist. Blunt 
 had advanced with .5000 men and 
 thirty pieces of artillery. He had 
 taken with him provisions for four 
 days. In one day he had marched 
 twenty-seven miles. Only some 200 
 men were forward when he encoun- 
 tered resistance. The main body, how- 
 ever, soon came up, when Marmaduke 
 fell back upon his reserves on the Bos- 
 ton Mountains, and took a good position 
 on the heights. Blunt now assailed 
 him with his entire strength ; and a 
 vigorous charge having been made by 
 
 the Second Kansas Cavalry, the Third 
 Cherokee Indians, and the Eleventh 
 Kansas Infantry, the Confederates were 
 driven back, but not in disorder, in the 
 direction of Van Buren. Blunt re- 
 turned and took up a position at Cane 
 Hill. In this engagement, which is 
 known as the battle of Boston Moun- 
 tains, the Nationals had four killed, and 
 36 wounded. The Confederate loss 
 was 75 killed. The number of wound- 
 ed was not reported. 
 
 Hindman was not disposed to give 
 the Nationals any rest. He seemed re- 
 solved to recover his State. In order 
 to do this, it was necessary to give a 
 crushing blow to Blunt. Hindman, no 
 doubt, was encouraged in this determin- 
 ation by the knowledge that Schofield, 
 who had been his great terror, was no 
 longer in command. He might also 
 have been emboldened in his j)uri3ose 
 by the fact that the National army was 
 divided into two parts, at that time far 
 from each other. Blunt, with the fii'st 
 division, composed of three brigades, 
 numbering about 6000 or 7000 men, 
 was at Cane Hill and the village 
 called Rhea's Mills, on the Fayetteville 
 Road. Herron, with the remainder of 
 the army, comprising 6000 infantiy, 
 8000 horse, and 20 guns, was at Wil- 
 son's Creek, many miles away. On the 
 1st of December, Hindman, who pee, 
 had been hastening to Marma- •• 
 duke's relief, crossed the Arkansas River 
 at Van Buren with 9000 infantry and 
 3000 cavalry; and the two forces were 
 united at a point some fifteen miles 
 further up. Made aware of this fact. 
 Blunt sent to Herron, requesting him 
 
PRAIRIE GROVE. 
 
 363 
 
 to hurry to his assistance. That excel- 
 lent officer lost no time in coming to the 
 relief of his chief. His cavalry he hur- 
 ried forward under Colonel Wicker- 
 sham, while he himself advanced with 
 the main army. Fayetteville was reached 
 0ec. '^'1 tli6 morning of the 7th. He 
 '• had marched all night. Resting 
 his men for an hour, he pushed on in 
 the direction of Cane Hill. He had 
 advanced to within ten or eleven miles 
 of that place, when he met a portion of 
 his own cavalry, despatched by him in 
 advance, fleeing from the enemy. They 
 had been attacked and broken by Mar- 
 maduke's horsemen, flerron was in a 
 position of very considerable danger. 
 The Confederate general had been ap- 
 prised of the approach of Herron ; and 
 his purpose was, if possible, to inter- 
 pose between him and Blunt. He had 
 left a few troops, with a field battery, 
 in a strong position on the Cane Hill 
 Road, at the culminating point of the 
 pass of the Boston Mountains, his ob- 
 ject being to mask his movement and 
 detain Blunt. With the rest of his 
 army, he had moved along the Fayette- 
 ville Road. This was the condition of 
 things when, about eight o'clock, Her- 
 ron's advance, consisting of two regi- 
 ments of cavalry, was met and driven 
 back by Marmaduke. The retreating 
 cavalry were brought to a halt by the 
 second division, which was under Gen- 
 eral Totten, the Confederate attack 
 being not only resisted but repelled. 
 Herron, at this moment, had a good po- 
 sition ; and he might have been able, if 
 he had known the actual state of things, 
 to make a bold, defensive stand. But he 
 
 was ignorant of his real danger, and in- 
 tent only on the relief of Blunt. He, 
 therefore, pressed forward, driving the 
 Confederates back over Illinois Creek, 
 on the heights beyond which the Con- 
 federate army was posted. 
 
 The ground on which Herron now 
 found himself was known by the name 
 of Prairie Grove. It was an extensive, 
 natui'al clearing in the midst of woods 
 and thickets, with which the surround- 
 ing hills were covered. The ground 
 was irregular; thei'e were also some 
 clumps of trees; and, here and there, 
 cultivated patches had taken the place 
 of the tall grasses, with which the 
 prairie generally was covered. On its 
 eastern extremity, this open ground was 
 watered by the creek above mentioned. 
 It was traversed, also, by two roads- 
 one leading from Fayetteville to Cane 
 Hill, and passing at Rhea's Mills ; an- 
 other leading from Van Buren, and 
 crossing a ford at Illinois Creek, near 
 the church of Prairie Grove. Beyond 
 this stream, and about three-quarters of 
 a mile to the east, the Van Buren Road 
 ascends a hill which is well covered 
 with woods. On these heights, so soon 
 as he became aware of the approach of 
 Herron, Hindraan had taken position 
 with all his array. 
 
 Hindman's troops were well concealed 
 in the woods. Herron did not know, 
 and he had no means of discovering, 
 the actual strength of the enemy in his 
 front. On these heights, hidden by the 
 trees, but admirably posted for defense, 
 was an army of some 20,000 men, well 
 supplied with cavalry and artillery. 
 Herron had found it necessary to leave 
 
364 
 
 THE GUERRILLAS. 
 
 certain detachments behind him. His 
 entire available force, therefore, did 
 not exceed 5000 men ; and these were 
 not yet all on the ground. It was, so 
 far as numbers were concerned, destined 
 to be a most unequal contest. Had 
 Herron been aware of the facts, he 
 might well have hesitated, before ven- 
 turing upon an attack. In this case, 
 however, as not unfrequently happens, 
 pluck and daring, guided by a clear 
 head and steady nerve, fully compen- 
 sated for lack of numbers. Herron had 
 not heard from Blunt since the 2d, 
 when he received instructions to come 
 to his aid. Blunt was aware of the 
 difficulties w^hich lay in Herron's way ; 
 but such was the activity of Marraa- 
 duke's skirmishers, that he found it 
 impossible to open communications with 
 his lieutenant, or send to him any words 
 of warning. Blunt, in fact, had for 
 some days been misled by the tactics of 
 his antagonist. He was under the im- 
 pression that he had been skirmishing 
 with the advance of Hindman's main 
 army, when, in truth, Hindman, having 
 turned his left, was making for his 
 trains, and actually interposing between 
 him and Herron. It was not until the 
 arrival of Wickersham, with his four 
 cavalry regiments, that Blunt became 
 fully alive to the true character of the 
 situation. 
 
 As soon as his third division came 
 up, Herron resolved to assume the of- 
 fensive. It was yet early morning. An 
 attempt was made to force the passage 
 of the ford near the church, a light bat- 
 tery having been sent forward to feel 
 the foe. The attempt was unsuccess- 
 
 ful, the battery being driven baclv, 
 Another attempt was made about a 
 mile and a half farther down the creek. 
 Murphy's battery was successfully trans- 
 ported to the other side of the creek; 
 and, as soon as it was got into position, 
 it opened fire upon the flank of the 
 enemy. The attack from tliis quarter 
 had all the effect of a surprise. It not 
 only engaged the attention of the Con- 
 federate officers — it created the impres- 
 sion that the National troops were more 
 numerous than they actually were. 
 Herron did not lose his opportunity. 
 Three batteries, accompanied by three 
 full regiments, were pushed across the 
 ford in his front ; and about ten o'clock 
 the whole of the National artillery 
 were pouring grape-shot and canister on 
 the Confederate positions. The result 
 was soon visible. Within sixty miu' 
 utes most of the Confederate guns 
 were silenced. The Nationals contin- 
 ued to advance, the artillery belching 
 forth destruction until they were with- 
 in a hundred yards of the ridge. It 
 was now evident that Hindman, whose 
 force had already suffered severelj-, 
 was massing his men on the right with 
 a view to crush the National left. 
 This movement was supported by a 
 powerful battery in front. This battery 
 must be captured. The perilous task 
 was assigned to the Nineteenth Iowa, 
 and the Twentieth Wisconsin. The 
 task was speedily accomplished. It 
 was the work of only a few minutes. 
 The summit of the hill was reached; 
 the enemy was driven back ; and the 
 guns were seized. It was impossible, 
 however, for those gallant regiments to 
 
PRAIRIE GROVE. 
 
 365 
 
 hold the position which they had so 
 nobly won. The Confederates rallied 
 and returned to the charge. Largely 
 outnumbered, the two National regi- 
 ments were compelled to fall back, and 
 the battery was again in possession of 
 the enemy. The Confederates contrived 
 to press forward ; and, gathering cour- 
 age as they advanced, they made a bold 
 dash towards the National guns. It 
 was a vain effort. Their ranks were 
 ploughed by grape-shot ; they were 
 torn in pieces by canister. It was a 
 rush to destruction. They soon fell 
 back, leaving the ground covered with 
 the dead and wounded. At this criti- 
 cal moment, and seeing the determina- 
 tion with which Hindman was menacing 
 his left, Herron summoned up two 
 fresh regiments — the Twenty-Sixth In- 
 diana and the Thirty-Seventh Illinois — 
 and hurled them against the enemy's 
 risrht. This fresh attack was, in the 
 first instance, completely successful. 
 Colonel Houston, who was in charge, 
 led his men forward right gallantlj^ 
 The Confederate battery was again cap- 
 tured ; but, as in the fomier case, so in 
 this, the National regiments were out- 
 numbered, and compelled to fall back. 
 It was now half-past two. The bat- 
 tle had raged fiercely since eleven. 
 Herron's men had all been put under 
 fire. Further aggressive effort, on his 
 part, was out of the question. It was 
 doubtful whether he could much longer 
 hold the ground he occupied ; for the 
 Confederates had evidently begiui to 
 feel their strength, and to realize the 
 value of superior numbers. Fortu- 
 nately, just at this time, the noise of 
 
 ■^39 
 
 heavy guns was heard on the extremo 
 right ; and some stray shot fell in the 
 midst of the National skirmishers. It 
 was Blunt. He had arrived on the 
 field just in time. The news quickly 
 spread along the lines, reviving the 
 sinking spii'its of the Union soldiers. 
 Hindman was in the act of massing his 
 forces, for the purpose of flanking Her- 
 ron's right wing. While thus engaged, 
 he came into contact with the heads of 
 Blunt's advancing columns. The bat- 
 tle was thus renewed with tremendous 
 energy. Blunt pushed forward three 
 batteries, which soon drove the Con- 
 federates back into the woods. While 
 the cavalry was crossing his right, he 
 pushed forward Colonel Weir, with a 
 heavy force, to the woods, where the 
 Confederates were forming for the atr 
 tack. Weir accomplished his task with 
 skill and energy. The Confederates 
 were driven from their shelter, and 
 their onward movement was completely 
 arrested. During the struggle, an at- 
 tempt was made by the Confederates 
 to capture the batteries of Robb and 
 Hopkins. The assailants, however, were 
 severely punished for their temerity. 
 Another attack, in which the Confed- 
 erate general. Stein, of Missouri, fell, 
 was successfully repelled by Lieutenant 
 Tenney and liis six ten-pounder Par- 
 rotts. After the arrival of Blunt, his 
 own lines and those of Herron were 
 speedily joined ; and a daring attempt 
 made V)y the Confederates, to penetrate 
 between Herron's second and third di- 
 vision, was completely frustrated by 
 the stubborn resistance of Dye's bri- 
 gade. Musketry-fire and cannonading 
 
J66 
 
 THE GUEKEILLAS. 
 
 continued until dark; but the Confed- 
 erates did not renew the attack, nor 
 did the Nationals retire from the posi- 
 tion they had won. Night ended the 
 conflict. The National troops slept on 
 iheir arms, in the expectation that the 
 battle would be resumed in the morn- 
 ing. When morning dawned, the Con- 
 federates were in full flight along the 
 Van Buren Road. The Nationals, how- 
 ever, were in no condition to pursue. 
 Such was the famous and bloody battle 
 of Praiiie Grove. The estimated Na- 
 tional loss in this day's fighting was 
 1148 men, of whom 167 were killed, 
 798 wounded, and 183 made prisoners 
 — but of the total, 953 belonged to 
 Herron's foi'ce. 
 
 If Hindman had been more daring, 
 the battle at Prairie Grove might have 
 resulted very differently. He had two 
 good opportunities, both of which he 
 recklessly flung away. He might have 
 crushed Blunt on the 4th or 5th, on 
 both of which days he had him alone 
 in his fi'ont ; and a more dashing effort 
 might have led to the discomfiture of 
 Herron, when he met him alone on the 
 borders of Illinois Creek. 
 
 After the battle of Prairie Grove, 
 the "army of the frontier" remained 
 quiet in the Ozark Mountains. As 
 late as the 28th of December Blunt, 
 having been informed that Hindman 
 was collecting troops and preparing 
 for another attack, made a rapid march 
 with some light cavalry and artillery, 
 as far as the borders of the Arkansas, 
 taking possession of Van Buren with- 
 out any opposition, burning several 
 steamers, destroying the Confederate 
 
 depots, and then returning to the main 
 army, which had gone into winter 
 quarters. At the close of 1862, quiet 
 reigned both in Missouri and Arkansas, 
 Missouri had been completely relieved, 
 and at least one half of Arkansas had 
 been occupied. 
 
 These guerrilla bands were not con- 
 fined to Missouri and Arkansas alone, 
 nor indeed to Kentucky and Tennessee, 
 where we have already found them. 
 They were scattered in large numbers 
 over Texas — the extreme southwestern 
 State of the Republic. In the western 
 part of that State there were but few 
 slaveholders. There was, therefore, 
 but little sympathy with the Southern 
 cause. The people, who were truly 
 loyal and devoted to the Union, were 
 at once feared and hated by the guer 
 rilla bands which infested the country, 
 and whose acts were characterized by 
 great wastefulness and horrible bru- 
 tality. As they were far removed from 
 the National armies, and but little lia- 
 ble to be called to account, they seemed 
 to deem it their privilege to indulge in 
 all kinds of excess, and to riot in the 
 destruction of life and property. Early 
 in the summer of 1862, after the Con- 
 federates had been defeated and driven 
 out of Tennessee, I'exas was placed 
 by the Richmond government under 
 martial law, and a rigid and merciless 
 conscription was enforced. The State 
 was overrun by guerrilla bands, whose 
 lawlessness knew no bounds. They 
 robbed and murdered at will ; and 
 other crimes of th" most heinous and 
 shocking character have been laid to 
 their charge. Some of the loyalists at- 
 
THE TEXAN MARTYRS. 
 
 361 
 
 tempted to escape into Mexico. Of 
 these, many were captured and mur- 
 dered ; and the boast was proudly made 
 by the San Antonio Herald, that their 
 bones were bleaching on the soil of 
 every county, from Red River to the 
 Rio Grande ; and in the counties of 
 Wise and Denton, their bodies were 
 suspended by scores from the "black 
 jacks." On the night of the 9th of 
 A'lgust, 1862, a company of young 
 Germans, about sixty in all, and be- 
 longing to the best families in Western 
 Texas, who were on their way to New 
 Orleans, by way of Mexico, in order to 
 join the Union army, had reached the 
 Nueces River, about forty miles from 
 the Rio Grande. They '.ay encamped 
 on the edge of a cedar brake ; their 
 movements had been conducted with 
 great seci-ecy; and they were hopeful 
 that they might escape the vigilance of 
 the guen'illas. By treachery or othei-- 
 wise, their character and their where- 
 abouts became known to the freeboot- 
 ers; and Duff, the guerrilla chief in 
 those parts, sent one hundred men to 
 ■surprise and destroy them. Early on 
 the morning of the 8th, one of the 
 party, who happened to be up and 
 about, was captured. As he refused 
 >/) lead the gang to the exact spot 
 where his companions were still sleep- 
 ing, he was immediately hanged. The 
 guerrillas found out the encampment, 
 and at night fell upon the young men 
 in their sleep. A terrible hand-to-hand 
 fight ensued. Not less than two-thirds 
 of the brave young Unionists perished, 
 some of them having been cruelly put 
 to death after they were wounded and 
 
 helpless. Only a few of them escaped 
 to tell the horrid tale. One of the 
 butchers afterwards boasted that he 
 killed several of the wounded with his 
 own hands. In the performance of this 
 brutal work he emptied two revolvers. 
 Such was his own confession. His 
 name will be infamous forever. It was 
 Lieutenant Lily. Three years after- 
 wards, a monument was erected ovei 
 all that could be collected of the re 
 mains of the Texan martyrs. 6 
 
 The Western territory, during the 
 year 1862, experienced not a little dis- 
 turbance fi'om the peculiar combina- 
 tions and conflicts of the Indian tribes. 
 The withdrawal of the volunteers 
 raised in Northern Missouri, and in the 
 young States of Iowa and Minnesota, 
 had left some portions of the country 
 on the western slope of the Rocky 
 Mountains very much at the mercy of 
 the indigenous race. The Indians had 
 wrongs to right, revenges to gratify, 
 both as regarded their white conquerors 
 and the rival native tribes; and, in the 
 absence of the ti-oops of the regular 
 army, they believed they had found 
 their opportunity. In the circumstances, 
 it was natural that they should make 
 some efforts to multiply the scalps with 
 which they delighted to adorn their 
 wigwams. Some of those tribes, more- 
 over, had been induced to take sides in 
 the great struggle. On both sides, con- 
 siderable armies had been raised. They 
 were generally commanded by whites, 
 and were, for the most part, employed 
 in guarding the frontier. The frontier 
 was designated by several posts which, 
 before the war, had served as provision 
 
 / 
 
368 
 
 THE GUERRILLAS. 
 
 depots. All those to the south of Kan- 
 sas had beeu abandoned by the Na- 
 tionals. These posts, separated from 
 each other by vast intervals, and placed 
 en echdon through the vast region then 
 known as Indian Territory, were di- 
 vided among several tribes, the most 
 powerful of which were the Creeks and 
 the Cherokees. The latter tribe had 
 experienced somewhat of the benefits 
 of civilization. Scattered over the rich 
 prairie, which extends from Pea Ridge 
 to the borders of the Neosho, vpere to 
 be seen not a few Cherokee villages, 
 surrounded and adorned by patches of 
 cultivated land. The principal chief of 
 this tribe was John Ross, who resided 
 in a beautiful villa at Park Hill, on the 
 Fayetteville Road. The chief town or 
 capital of this tribe was called Tah-le- 
 Quali, a place which though not yet old, 
 was giving some evidence of premature 
 decay. The Cherokees were no great 
 favorites w^ith their more war-like neigh- 
 bors, who were located a little more to 
 the south and west. As a rule, the 
 semi-civilized Indian is despised by his 
 rougher and ruder brethern, who ad- 
 here to their primitive modes of life. 
 Such was the feeling entertained to- 
 wards the Cherokees by the other 
 Indian tribes all along the borders of 
 the Arkansas. The war-like ardor of 
 these latter was stimulated by Southern 
 emissaries ; and in the neighborhood of 
 Foi't Davis — a new fort built by the 
 Confederates — and also at Fort Gibson 
 ' — an old fort near the village of the same 
 name — quite a little army of redskins 
 had assembled. Oflicered by white men, 
 they undertook to conquer the whole 
 
 Indian Temtory, and even threatened 
 the invasion of Arkansas and Missouri. 
 In the absence of the regular army, 
 this whole region depended for protec- 
 tion on three regiments of Indians, all 
 mounted, and officered by white men of 
 the National army. It was not long 
 before these National officers became 
 aware of the hostile intentions of the 
 rival tribes enlisted in the interest of 
 the South. It was resolved to make 
 an immediate attack — to surprise and 
 disperse them, before they could have 
 time to carry out their meditated pur- 
 pose. With this end in view. Colonel 
 Phillipps, with 1200 mounted men and 
 two field pieces, was detached, and sent 
 forward in the direction of the enemy. 
 We have already seen that the hostile 
 Indians were congregated in strength 
 in and about the village of Gibson. 
 They, too, consisted of three mounted 
 regiments, and were under the com- 
 mand of Colonel Taylor. Phillipps di- 
 vided his forces into two columns of 
 equal strength. The one column, under 
 Major Forman, was to cross the Neosho, 
 and descend the right bank of the 
 river: the other column, under Phillipps 
 himself, was to march towards Gibson, 
 through Park Hill and Tah-le-Quah. 
 It was Phillipps' intention to advance 
 and surprise the enemy on the morning 
 of July, the 24th. Taylor, however, 
 was not to be so easily caught. He 
 had been apprised of the intended 
 movement, and had made preparations 
 accordingly. Sending forward some 
 300 men to meet and delay the ad- 
 vance of Forman, he advanced himself 
 with about 800 men to meet Phillipps. 
 
THE INDIANS. 
 
 369 
 
 July On the 28th, about two o'clock 
 28. iu the afternoon, Taylor came 
 into contact with the National advance, 
 between Gibson and Tah-le-Quah ; and 
 falling upon them with tremendous 
 fury, he drove them back in confu- 
 sion. Their retreat, however, was soon 
 arrested by the main body, which had 
 found time to deploy, dismount, and 
 occupy a strong position along the 
 edge of a wood. As Taylor's Indians 
 were rushing forward in the full tri- 
 umph of victory, they were received by 
 a murderous fire, the Nationals, with 
 fierce yells, rushing out upon them, and 
 driving them back in disorder. On a 
 ridge which commanded the little val- 
 ley of Bayou Barnard, they rallied and 
 renewed the attack. It was, however, 
 only for an instant. After the first 
 fire, they fell back again and dispersed. 
 In this last encounter, Colonel Taylor 
 was killed. His body and the body of 
 two Choctaw captains were found on 
 the field. Phillipps crossed the Neosho 
 and joined Forman ; but the detach- 
 ment of Indians which Taylor had sent 
 against the latter, contrived to escape, 
 and succeeded in making its way to 
 the south of the Arkansas. 
 
 On the 19th of August, a savage at- 
 \nfr, tack was made by the Sioux on 
 J9» two Indian agencies and on the 
 village of New Ulm, not far from 
 Fort Ridgely, on the Minnesota River. 
 At the agencies, all the employes were 
 massacred ; and at the village, over 100 
 women and children were ruthlessly 
 put to death. After their bloody work, 
 the Indians retired to their camp, near 
 Yellow Medicine Creek. It was abso- 
 
 lutely necessary, for the safety of the set- 
 tiers, that so hori'ible an outrage should 
 be promptly and adequately avenged. 
 Colonel Sibley was entrusted with 
 this duty. On the 19th of Sep- Sep. 
 tember, taking with him about I** 
 1000 men in all, composed of detach- 
 ments from the Third, Sixth and Sev- 
 enth regiments of Minnesota, with some 
 militia, Sibley proceeded from Fort 
 Ridgely towards the Indian encamp- 
 ment. As soon as it became known 
 that he was approaching, Little Crow, 
 the chief of the tribe, called a council 
 of war, and advised that an attack 
 should be made on the National camps 
 at night. His counsel was not ap- 
 proved of by the Sioux warriors; and 
 it was agreed that, to give proof of 
 their courage, they should fight the 
 white men openly in the broad light of 
 day. On the 23d of September, ggp, 
 they approached the National en- 23. 
 campment from two different points; 
 and rushing forward in their usual man- 
 ner, uttering savage yells, they made a 
 vigorous attack. The Nationals prompt- 
 ly put themselves in line to receive them. 
 For two hours the battle raged, the In- 
 dians trying to break their ranks in 
 front, to turn their right, and to strike 
 them in the rear. It was all in vain. 
 The Nationals were more numerous, and 
 their artillery enabled them to keep the 
 Indians at a distance. Peace was thus 
 established on the frontier of Minnesota, 
 Before the close of 1862, all those guer- 
 rilla bands, both whites and redskins, 
 were broken and dispersed ; and between 
 the Mississippi and the Rocky Moun 
 tains, the National power was supreme. 
 
3?6 
 
 CHICKASAW. 
 
 CHAPTER XXIII. 
 
 9f*«i Oorinth — Grant's Army. — The Great Western Plan. — The Mississippi. — Grant's Inaction. — The Eeason.-^ 
 Vicksbarg. — Farrae;ut at Vicksburg. — Williams and the Canal. — Reinforcements for Grant. — Grant's Army in 
 Motion. — The Confederate Position. — John C. Pemberton. — The YaUabusha and Tallahatchie. — The Yazoo.^ 
 Grant at La Grange. — Feeling his Way. — McPherson at Lamar, — VVashburne and Hovey. — Grant at Holly 
 Springs and Oxford. — Sherman at College HUl. — Grant's New Plan. — The Expedition to the Yazoo. — Sher- 
 man and Porter. — Grant to Move Against Pemberton. — McClemand's Intrigue. — Holly Springs. — Van Doru's 
 £aid. — Holly Springs Captured. — Murphy's Cowardice. — Forrest's Raid. — Grant's Supplies Cut Off. — His Re- 
 treat. — Failure of his Plan. — Murphy Dismissed the Army. — Grant at La Grange and Grand Junction. — Sherman 
 and Porter on their Way Down the Mississippi. — Friar's Point. — Lincoln's Weakness. — McClemand's Appoint- 
 ment. — Sherman and Porter at the Mouth of the Yazoo. — Disposition of the Troops. — The Plan of Attack. — 
 The Disembarkation. — The Ground. — Vicksburg. — Walnut Hills. — Haines' Bluff. — Chickasaw Bayou. — The 
 Slough. — Dangerous Battle Ground. — The Preparations of the Confederates. — The Nationals Prepared for the 
 Attack. — Barfield's Plantation. — Movements of General • Steele. — General Frank P. Blair. — The Morning of 
 the 29th of November. — The Attack. — The Reception. — Blair and Thayer. — Their Bravery. — Morgan's Failure.— 
 Inactivity of Stuart and A. J. Smith. — Morgan L. Smith Wounded. — A Critical Moment. — Blair, Thayer 
 and De Comcy Compelled to Fall Back. — The Sixth Missouri. — "Shoot Higher." — "Shoot Lower." — A 
 Complete Failure. — Morgan to Blame. — Sherman Mortified. — A Flag of Truce. — Burying the Dead. — A Sad 
 Sight. — Another Attack Resolved Upon. — The Fog. — The New Enterprise Abandoned. — End of the Second 
 Campaign Against Vicksburg. — Disappointment in the North. — Rejoicing in the South. — Reflections. — 
 Sherman's Mistake. — Blair the Hero of Chickasaw Bayou. — Back at the Month of the Yazoo. — Arrival of 
 McClemand. — Sherman Superseded. — His NobUity of Conduct. — Army Corps. — McClemand's General Order 
 No. 1. — Sherman's Order. — Arkansas Post. — The New Expedition. — Up the Mississippi. — At the Mouth of 
 the White River — The " Cut-Off." — The Arkansas River. — Notrib's Farm. — Fort Hindman. — The Ground.^ 
 Strength of the Fortress. — The Garrison. — Landing of the Troops. — A Detour. — Porter and his Gunboats.^ 
 The Morning of the 11th of December — The Signal for Attack. — A Terrific Cannonade. — Sherman on the 
 Right.— Morgan on the Left.— A Hard Struggle. —The Edge of the Woods.— The Guns of the Fort 
 Silenced. — Steele's Men Performing Prodigies of Valor. — Morgan's Advance Interrupted by the Ravine. — 
 Bravery of Burbridge. — The Surrender. — The Prize of Victory. — Sherman Dissatisfied, but Patiently 
 Submissive. — McClemand's Report. — Petty Jealousy. — Sherman's Memoirs. — Porter's Report. — Grant's In- 
 fluence. — The Day After the Battle. — Burial of the Dead. — The Transportation of Prisoners. — Little Rock. — 
 Another Joint Expedition. — Des Arc and Duval's Bluff Captured. — Fort Hindman Dismantled and Blown 
 Up. — On the Way Down the Arkansas. — The Army and the Flotilla at Napoleon. — Instructions from Grant. ^ 
 Back at Milliken's Bend. — Estimate of the Whole Expedition. 
 
 Attee the battle of Coriutli, which 
 was fought oa the 4th of Octo- 
 ber, the army, under General 
 Grant, fell back to the position which 
 it formerly occupied, and remained in 
 comparative inacti'vity until the begin- 
 nius: of November. It was stationed 
 from Memphis to Bridgeport, Tennes- 
 see, along the Memphis and Charleston 
 Railroad. Its strong points were Mem- 
 phis, Grand Junction and Corinth. The 
 
 army was arranged in four divisions. 
 General Sherman, with the first divi- 
 sion, was at Memphis; General Hurl- 
 but, with the second, was at Jackson; 
 General C. S. Hamilton, with the third, 
 was at Corinth ; and General T. A. 
 Davies, with the foiu'th, was at Colum- 
 bus. Grant's headquarters were at 
 Jackson, Tennessee, a point in the West 
 where the Central Mississippi Railroad 
 unites with the Mobile and Ohio. That 
 
FAERAGUT AND WILLIAMS. 
 
 371 
 
 general had not abandoned the plan 
 which was inaugurated at Henry and 
 Donelson. His whole soul was bent on 
 the capture of Vicksburg. A variety 
 of circumstances, however, had necessi- 
 tated delay. The removal of Halleck 
 to Washington had devolved upon him 
 the entire care of the Department of 
 the Tennessee — a department which 
 included, in addition to Cairo, Forts 
 Henry and Donelson, the whole of 
 Northern Mississippi, and those por- 
 tions of Tennessee and Kentucky west 
 of the Tennessee River. This, how- 
 ever, was not the only or even the 
 most important reason. The army 
 which had fought and won at Shiloh, 
 at Corinth and at luka, had been great- 
 ly weakened, a large proportion of its 
 strength having been sent to Kentucky 
 to resist the invasion of Bragg. It was 
 necessary, therefore, for Grant, while 
 perfecting his plans and rearranging 
 his troops, to wait for reinforcements. 
 As soon as the reinforcements arrived, 
 he was ready to move. 
 
 The reader has already been made 
 familiar with the general plan to be 
 pursued in the opening of the Missis- 
 sippi ; and he has learned that a con- 
 siderable portion of that plan had been 
 successfully carried out. The National 
 gunboats had swept the Mississippi, 
 from Cairo to Memphis ; and, between 
 those two points, every Confederate 
 stronghold had been deserted or de- 
 stroyed. Farragut, with a portion of his 
 fleet, had pushed his way up to Vicks- 
 burg, after the capture of New Orleans. 
 He was accompanied by General F. 
 Williams, with an infantry force of 
 
 four regiments. While Farragut bom- 
 barded the city, Williams was cutting 
 a canal, with the view of divertino- the 
 waters of the Mississippi from their 
 proper channel, thus leaving Vicksburg 
 high and dry on all sides. The siege 
 lasted some seventy days. It was all 
 to no purpose. Farragut, who failed 
 to make any serious impression on the 
 Confederate works, began to fear for 
 his own safety. The canal, also, proved 
 a complete failure. The fleet and the 
 land force both found it necessary t<7 
 retire ; and Vicksburg remained to ob- 
 struct the navigation of the great river. 
 
 On the 4th of November, Grant 
 began to move. He transferred j^qv, 
 his headquarters from Jackson to 4. 
 La Grange, some few miles to the west 
 of Grand Junction. He soon discovered 
 that the Confederates, under General 
 John C. Pemberton, a Pennsylvanian, 
 who had superseded Van Dorn, were 
 in considerable strength immediately in 
 his front. Pemberton, in fact, had taken 
 a strong position behind two lines of 
 defenses, the outer being the Yalla- 
 busha, and the inner being the Talla- 
 hatchie — two streams which, after their 
 junction, form the Fazoo River. Both 
 of these streams cross the Mississippi 
 Central Railroad, between Grand Junc- 
 tion and Grenada. The banks of the 
 Tallahatchie were strongly fortified. 
 Grant's first intention was to offer 
 Pemberton battle, defeat him, and force 
 his way to Vicksburg. 
 
 On the 8th, he sent out McPhersow 
 with 10,000 infantry and 1500 ^'ot. 
 cavalry, with instructions to drive 8. 
 from Lamar a body of Confederate* 
 
Bf2 
 
 <:!HICKASAW. 
 
 who were holding the railroad. Mc- 
 Pherson accomplished his task in the 
 most effectual manner, the Confederates 
 having been driven back as far as Holly 
 Springs. 
 
 About the 17th of November, Grant 
 eummoned Sherman to meet him at 
 Columbus ; and at the interview which 
 there took place, the views of the two 
 generals were freely exchanged, Grant 
 explaining to Sherman his plan, and 
 giving him his orders. It was at Sher- 
 man's suggestion that a portion of 
 Curtis' army, which, as we have seen 
 in a previous chapter, was stationed at 
 Helena, should be brought over to 
 Delta, with a view to co-operate with 
 Grant in his general movement towards 
 Vicksburg. These troops which, in 
 the absence of General Curtis, who was 
 at St. Paul, being under the temporary 
 command of General Frederick Steele, 
 were promptly at the place appointed, 
 on the eastern banks of the Mississippi. 
 They numbered some 7000 men, and 
 were under the joint command of Gen- 
 erals A. P. Hovey and C. C. Wash- 
 burne. Oi'dered to scour the country 
 to the south and east, in the rear of the 
 Confederate army, to destroy the rail- 
 roads and bridges, so as to cut off sup- 
 plies, and generally to prepare the way 
 for Grant's advance, they accomplished 
 their task in the most effectual manner, 
 and then returned to the Mississippi. 
 Pemberton, on discovering that the rail- 
 roads were badly damaged, and that 
 the rolling-stock was destroyed, Grant 
 meanwhile pressing on his front, deemed 
 it prudent to fall back on Grenada, 
 
 On the 1st of December, Grant was 
 
 at Holly Springs. On the 5th, he was 
 at Oxford, where he established his 
 headquarters. It now became a serious 
 question with General Grant, how far 
 he was wise in allowing himself to be 
 tempted to advance into the enemy's 
 country. The State of Mississippi was 
 but sparsely peopled; and he had no 
 means of knowing whether its resources 
 were equal to the wants of a large 
 army, possibly cut off from its base of 
 supplies. Had he known what he 
 knew afterwards, the caution would 
 have been unnecessary ; and he would 
 doubtless have continued hia onward 
 march. 
 
 On the 5th of December^ Sherman 
 on his way to join Grant, and 0ec. 
 bringing with him from Memphis 5- 
 some 16,000 men, arrived at College 
 Hill, about ten miles from Oxford, 
 whence he reported to his chief. On 
 the 8th, he received from Grant a let- 
 ter, requesting his immediate presence 
 at Oxford, and enclosing a message 
 from Halleck to Grant, authorizing the 
 latter to prosecute the new plan he had 
 just submitted to him, to move his 
 troops as he thought best, to retain till 
 further orders all Curtis' troops now in 
 his department, to telegraph to General 
 Allen, in St. Louis, for all the steam- 
 boats he might need, and to ask Porter 
 to co-operate with his gunboats. On 
 his arrival at Oxford, Sherman found 
 Grant surrounded by his staff. The 
 new plan was discussed and approved. 
 It will be seen that Grant had made up 
 his mind that, for the safety of his men 
 as well as for the final success of the 
 expedition, it was necessary to take 
 
o 
 a 
 
 •s. 
 
TORTBAITS fSY SOME OF THE GENERALS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
PORTKAITS OF PROMINENT UNION GENERALS. 
 
PORTRAITS OF SHERMAN AND SOME OF HIS COMMANDERS. 
 
PORTRAITS OF UNION CAVALRY COMMANDERS. 
 
PORTRAITS OF PROMINENT UNION GENERALS. 
 
■\VS8SKX3s-S5SW3RS. 
 
 PORTRAITS OF PROMINENT UNION GENERALS. 
 
PORTRAITS OF THF PPiwr-ir., t ^ 
 
 iHE PRINCIPAL NAVAL COMMANDER^' 
 
 DURING THE WA9 
 
PORTRAITS OF PROMINENT UNION GENERALS- 
 
PORTRAITS OF UNION CAVALRY COMMANDERS. 
 
POETRAITS OF PKOMINENT UNION GENERALS. 
 
POETEAITS OF PROMINENT CONFEDERATE GENERAIS. 
 

 PORTRAITS OF PROMINENT CONFEDERATE GENERALS. 
 
POKTEAITS OF SOME OF THE LEADERS OF THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY. 
 
DISASTER AT HOLLY SPRINGS. 
 
 373 
 
 full advantage ot the river communica- 
 tion with Vicksburg. It was agreed 
 that a large force on transports should 
 proceed down the Mississippi, under 
 convoy of Porter's gunboats, that on 
 reaching the mouth of the Yazoo, they 
 should open up that water line, and, by 
 a joint attack of the land and naval 
 forces, attempt to capture Vicksburg in 
 the rear. Grant, meanwhile, was to 
 press forward towards Jackson, which 
 is only some forty-six miles to the 
 west of Vicksburg, offering Pemberton 
 battle, and following him up close in 
 the event of his retreat, in the hope of 
 finding Sherman on the Yazoo with 
 supplies, or in possession of Vicksburg. 
 Happily, Grant had been left com- 
 plete control of the whole movement, 
 Halleck having offered no special ad- 
 vice, and imposed no conditions. He 
 could move at will, and he could place 
 in prominent command the men of his 
 own choice. Sherman, who commanded 
 the right wing of Gi'ant's army, was 
 appointed to the command of the river 
 expedition, and received his instruc- 
 tions. Grant had the greater pleasure 
 m appointing Sherman to this com- 
 mand that McClernand, who had great 
 influence with the president, was known 
 to be intriguing for an independent 
 command on the Mississippi. Sherman 
 was, therefore, ordered to take com- 
 mand of the forces at Memphis, and 
 those also at Helena and Delta, under 
 General Steele, to descend the river 
 by transports, with the gunljoat fleet 
 as a convoy, commanded by Admiral 
 Porter, and to attack Vicksburg by the 
 -'9th of November, McClernand was 
 
 »40 
 
 to take the forces at Cairo, and to pro- 
 ceed to Vicksburg, so as to be in 
 time to lend Sherman effective aid as 
 soon as he made the attack. Grant 
 himself, as we have said, was to move 
 rapidly on the Confederates to the 
 north and east of Vicksburg, to follow 
 them if they should retreat towards the 
 city, and to take part with Sherman, if 
 necessary, in the reduction of the place. 
 It was a well-conceived plan. Its suc- 
 cess, however, depended on the prompt 
 and faithful execution of all its parts. 
 Grant knew that it was unsafe to trust 
 for supplies solely to the enemy's coun- 
 try. He had therefore, repaired the 
 Central Mississippi Railroad as far aa 
 Oxford, where, for the present, he had 
 established his headquarters ; and Holly 
 Springs, which was entrusted to the 
 care of Colonel R. C. Murphy, was re- 
 tained as a grand depot and hospital. 
 
 Let us see how this plan was carried 
 out. Grant had taken great care that 
 no misfortune should befall him in his 
 rear. He had left small but adequate 
 garrisons at Columbus, at Humboldt, 
 Trenton, Jackson, Bolivar, Corinth, 
 Holly Springs, Coldwater, Davis' Mills 
 and Middlebury. He had taken par- 
 ticular care of Holly Springs ; for 
 he knew that the treasures at that 
 place presented a powerful temptation 
 to Van Dorn. On the night of the 
 I9th, he warned Murphy of his danger, 
 and informed him that he had sent 4000 
 men to enable him to rej^el any attack 
 which might be made upon him. Mur- 
 phy, it would seem, paid little heed to 
 the instructions given him. He made 
 no extra preparations to resist the enemj. 
 
iU 
 
 CHICKASAW. 
 
 On the morning of the 20th, at day- 
 Dec break, Van Dorn, executing a 
 20» briUlant cavalry operation, rushed 
 upon the place with tremendous fury. 
 Murphy offered no resistance. The 
 Second Illinois, however, refused to 
 Biirrender, and gallantly fought their 
 way out, with a loss of only seven men. 
 Murphy, with the rest of his men, ac- 
 cepted a paiole. Van Dorn seized all 
 the property, valued at over $1,500,000, 
 taking with him what he could cany, 
 and destroying the remainder. He set 
 fire to the buildings, not even sparing 
 the hospital, which was filled with sick 
 and wounded soldiers. This was the 
 second time that Murphy had been 
 guilty of such conduct. He did the 
 same thing at luka. General Grant 
 was wild with rage. It was his opinion 
 that with " all the cotton, public stores 
 and substantial buildings about the 
 depot," Murphy ought to have been 
 able to keep the assailants at bay until 
 relief arrived. It was only four hours 
 after the catastrophe, when the 4000 
 men sent to his aid arrived on the spot. 
 Grant was particularly incensed at Mur- 
 phy for accepting a parole for himself 
 and his men. A cartel had been agreed 
 to by the rival commanders ; and it had 
 been stipulated that each party should 
 take care of his own prisoners. If 
 Murphy had refused parole for himself 
 and men, Van Dorn would have been 
 "compelled to release them uncon- 
 ditionally, or to have abandoned all 
 further aggressive movements for the 
 time being." In a severe oi'der, on the 
 9th of January, General Grant dis- 
 '"lissed Murphy from the army, the 
 
 order to take effect "from December 
 20th, the date of his cowardly and dis- 
 graceful conduct." 
 
 The disaster at Holly Springs was 
 ruinous to Grant's plan. It robbed him 
 of supplies, which, it was intended, 
 should sustain the army for several 
 weeks. To replace them, it would be 
 necessary to put in operation all the 
 capacity and force of the Columbus 
 Railroad ; but this railroad had been 
 destroyed, and weeks would be ex- 
 hausted before it could be put in work- 
 ing order. Ignorant of the resources 
 of the country, and not knowing 
 whether, in the event of his pressing 
 forward, he should find Sherman in the 
 vicinity of Vicksburg, he deemed it his 
 duty to fall back. He immediately re- 
 crossed the Tallahatchie. Having no 
 other means of subsisting his army, he 
 made requisitions on the inhabitants as 
 he moved along. On the 23d of De- 
 cember, he was at Holly Springs, now 
 a scene of wreck and ruin ; and a few 
 days later, he re-entered La Grange 
 and Grand Junction, where he was once 
 more in communication with Corinth 
 and Memphis. Pemberton made no at- 
 tempt to pursue. On the contrary, 
 taking advantage of the retreat of his 
 antagonist, he withdrew the greater 
 portion of his forces from Grenada, and 
 concentrated towards Vicksburg. 
 
 On the same day that Van Dorn 
 made his raid on Holly Springs, an at- 
 tack was made by a Confederate forct 
 on Davis' Mills, a little further to the 
 north. In the neighborhood of Jack- 
 son, Tennessee, a vital point in Grant's 
 line of communications, an attack w^e 
 
THE J-OINT EXPEDITION. 
 
 67S 
 
 made by a body of cavalry under For- 
 rest, on the 19th. The telegraph wii-es 
 were cut, and the railroad was destroyed. 
 On the following day Forrest presented 
 himself before Humboldt and Trenton. 
 These and other stations along the rail- 
 road, such as Dyer's, Rutherford and 
 Kenton, fell an easy prey to the enemy. 
 It seemed to be the purpose of the 
 Confederates to destroy every railroad 
 bridge from Columbus to Corinth, and 
 thus to cut Grant off from all his com- 
 munications and supplies. So far, they 
 had carried out their purpose with 
 determination, and with not a little 
 success. Never was campaign opened 
 under apparently happier auspices. 
 The rich bud of promise, however, was 
 cruelly blasted. 
 
 Grant's plan of the campaign had 
 failed. Meanwhile, what of Sherman ? 
 On the 20th, the very day on which 
 Van Dorn and Forrest struck the blow 
 which compelled Grant to fall back 
 and abandon his part of the joint un- 
 dertaking, Sherman took his departure 
 fi'om Memphis. Taking with him over 
 20,000 troops in transports, he left, as 
 a guard to the city, a strong force of 
 infantry and cavalry, and the siege 
 guns in position, with a complement of 
 gunners. On the following day, at 
 Friar's Point, he was joined by Admi- 
 ral Porter, in his flag-ship Black Hawk, 
 with the Marmora, Captain Getty, and 
 the Conestoga, Captain Selfridge, which 
 were to act as a convoy. The remain- 
 der of Porter's fleet were at the mouth 
 of the Yazoo. On the same evening, 
 the 21st, the troops at Helena embark- 
 ed in transports, and came to Friar's 
 
 Point. Sherman's force was now at 
 least 30,000 strong. All the an-ange- 
 ments were completed; and the joint 
 expedition was moving down the river 
 the following morning. 
 
 Sherman got away just in time to se- 
 cure for himself the glory or dishonor 
 of the expedition. Had he lingered a 
 day longer, he woiJd have been super, 
 seded in his command by General 
 McClernand. It is a strange story, 
 and one which, for tiie sake of all the 
 parties concerned, it would be well if 
 the world could forget. We will not 
 enter into details. It has already been 
 stated that General McClernai?d was a 
 warm personal friend of President Lin 
 coin, and that he was ambitious of ai. 
 independent command on the Missis 
 sippi. It is not necessary to say thai 
 Sherman was a man according to Grant's 
 own heart. Since that great day at 
 Shiloh, theii- fates had been linked to- 
 gether, and they had been to each other 
 like David and Jonathan. Sherman 
 was also a great favorite with Halleck, 
 the commander-in-chief at Washing- 
 ton. But for the personal wishes of 
 Grant and Halleck, both of whom 
 knew well that Sherman was the man 
 for the position, McClernand would 
 have been appointed by Lincoln in the 
 first instance to 'the command of the 
 I'iver expedition. 
 
 McClernand, however, was not to be 
 put off ; and Lincoln, who was always 
 unwilling to disoblige a friend, was 
 weak enough to yield to his entreaties. 
 On the 18th of December, an order fioni 
 the president reached Grant, directing 
 him to divide all his forces into four 
 
576 
 
 CHICKASAW. 
 
 army corps, to assign one corps to 
 McClernand, and to place him at the 
 head of the troops destined for the 
 attack upon Vicksburg. Grant could 
 hardlj' fail to see in this order a blow 
 aimed at himself. It was a most awk- 
 ward circumstance, and reflected little 
 credit on the wisdom and good sense of 
 the president. Good and great as he 
 was, Lincoln was not without his weak- 
 nesses. He was vain enough to imagine 
 that he knew quite as much as his gen- 
 erals in the field ; and he was disposed 
 to deal with military officers, as he was 
 in the habit of dealing with politicians. 
 It is not much to be wondered at if 
 Grant was staggered by this order, and 
 if he was slow to put it in execution. 
 It was not difficult for him to find an ex- 
 cuse. He was in the midst of his pre- 
 parations for an onward march. The 
 reconstruction of his army, according 
 to the instructions received, occupied 
 him the whole of the 19th. The disaster 
 at Holly Springs, compelling a back- 
 ward movement, occurred on the 20th ; 
 and the raids of Forrest on the same 
 day deprived him of the use of the 
 telegraph. As it was, Sherman had 
 proceeded down the river before any 
 counter-instructions reached Memphis. 
 If Sherman had any reason to fear a 
 counter-order, his haste to get ready 
 and his prompt departure but revealed 
 the soldierly spirit and true character 
 of the man. As the result proved, it 
 was well for Sherman, well for General 
 Grant, and well for the nation at large, 
 that Lincoln's order did not take effect 
 before the 20th of December. 
 
 On Christmas Day, the expedition 
 
 Deci 
 25. 
 
 under Sherman and Porter had 
 reached Milliken's Bend, when 
 Sherman detached Burbridge's brigade, 
 of A. J. Smith's di^■^sion, to break up 
 the i-ailroad leading ft-om Vicksburg to 
 Shreveport, Louisiana. Leaving A. J. 
 Smith's division to await the arrival, 
 the remaining divisions proceeded, on 
 the 26th, to the mouth of the Yazoo, 
 and up that river to Johnson's planta- 
 tion, some thirteen miles, and there dis- 
 embarked. The disembarkation was 
 conducted without any opposition, 
 Steele's division landed furthest up the 
 river, above what is called Chickasaw 
 Bayou ; Morgan's division a little lower 
 down, at the house of Johnson, which 
 had been burned by the gunboats on a 
 
 former occasion ; M 
 
 oi-gan 
 
 L. Smith's 
 
 division below that of Morgan ; and 
 A. J. Smith's, which arrived next night, 
 below that of M. L. Smith. The 
 groimd on which Sherman now found 
 himself presented obstacles of which 
 formerly he had but a very imperfect 
 conception. 
 
 Vicksburg is built on a range of 
 bluffs, known as the Walnut Hills. 
 These hills, which take their rise a lit- 
 tle below the city, extend for the most 
 part in a northeasterly direction, ter- 
 minating in Haines' Bluff, a distance 
 of some thirteen or fourteen miles. The 
 configuration of these hills has been 
 compared to the ridge at Inkerman, to 
 which, it is said, they bear, in some par- 
 ticulars, a striking resemblance. Their 
 average height is about two hundred 
 feet. Where the Mississippi touches 
 their base at Vicksburg, and for some 
 miles both above and below, they are 
 
THE YAZOO. 
 
 377 
 
 precipitous. Along their entire length, 
 indeed, from Vicksbui-g to Haines' Bluff, 
 their face is very abrupt, and cut up by 
 numerous valleys and ravines. The 
 only approach to the city by land, from 
 up the river, is by climbing their al- 
 most perpendicular front. The ground 
 beyond is high, broken, and somewhat 
 rolling, gradually descending to the 
 Big Black River. The Yazoo, which 
 skirts the ridge at Haines' Bluff, about 
 nine miles above Vicksburg by the 
 road, along the foot of the bluffs, flows 
 in a southwestern direction, and before 
 discharging its waters into the Missis- 
 sippi, crosses an old arm of the river, 
 which now forms a semicii'cular lake. 
 
 The Yazoo evidently, in times gone 
 by, clung to the foot of the hills ; and 
 traces of its former whereabouts are to 
 be seen in the numerous bayous and 
 channels by which the intervening 
 ground is cut up. One of these bayous 
 puts off from the Yazoo, about one 
 third of the distance below Haines' 
 Bluff, running at right angles with the 
 river until it approaches the bluffs, 
 when it turns and follows their base 
 until it empties itself into the Missis- 
 sippi. It is called Chickasaw Bayou. 
 Between the bayou and the hills there 
 was an irregular strip of land, on which 
 the trees had been filled to form an 
 abatis. It was dotted also with rifle- 
 pits. Rifle-trenches abounded, too, 
 along the front of the bluffs ; and the 
 heights above were crowned with bat- 
 teries. About a mile to the northeast 
 of the bayou, and parallel with it, there 
 is a deep slough, which makes a sharp 
 turn as it approaches the bluffs, and 
 
 enters Chickasaw Bayou at the point 
 where the latter is checked in its course, 
 and turns to flow along the base of the 
 hills. There was thus a fortified Hne 
 some twelve or thirteen miles in la^igth 
 formed of abatis and rifle-pits, with an 
 impassable ditch in front, and terminat- 
 ing in the powerful fixed batteries a< 
 Haines' Bluff, on the one hand, and it 
 the heavy batteries and field works 
 above Vicksburg, on the other. The 
 land lying between the Yazoo and the 
 Chickasaw was not only low and 
 swampy : it was, except in one or two 
 places, where there were plantations, 
 densely wooded. The distance from 
 Johnson's Landing to the Chickasaw 
 was about six miles. Such was the 
 ground over which Sherman proposed 
 to march his men. Such were the ob- 
 stacles to be overcome before he could 
 enter Vicksburg. To the National com- 
 mander, however, and to his ofiicers, 
 these obstacles were, as yet, but imper- 
 fectly known. 
 
 General Shennan's army was organ- 
 ized in four divisions. The first divi 
 sion, comprising three brigades, wast 
 under Brigadier-General George "W. 
 Morgan; second division, three brl 
 gades, under Brigadier-General Morgan 
 L. Smith ; third division, three brigades, 
 under Brigadier-General A. J. Smith; 
 fourth division, four brigades, undei 
 Brigadier-General Frederick Steele. 
 The brigade commanders of the fourtlj 
 division were Generals Frank P. Blair^ 
 John M. Thayer, 0. E. Hovey, an(j 
 Colonel Hassendurbel. According to 
 Sherman's plan of attack, General 
 Steele was to hold the extreme left, 
 
S78 
 
 CHICKASAW. 
 
 General Morgan the left centre, Gen- 
 eral M. L. Smith the right centre, and 
 General A. J. Smith the extreme right. 
 As the latter general had not yet ar- 
 rived from Milliken's Bend, where we 
 left him waiting for Burbridge, Gen- 
 eral Frank P. Blair, with his brigade, 
 was detached from Steele's division, and 
 placed on Morgan's right. The object 
 of this arrangement was to distract the 
 enemy's attention, leading him to ex- 
 pect an attack at a number of different 
 points. Instructions, however, had been 
 given to each of the commanders to 
 converge toward the point of attack, at 
 or near Barfield's plantation. There it 
 had been discovered the bayou could 
 be crossed at two points — at a sand 
 bar, and at a narrow levee. 
 
 On the 27th, the army began to 
 Pec. move. General Steele, who had 
 27' been ordered to take position on 
 the further side of the slough above 
 this bayou, experienced great difficulty 
 in landing his troops. So soft and 
 slushy was the ground, and so dense 
 was the brushwood, that he found it 
 necessary to construct roads for moving 
 his wagons and artillery. When night 
 came he had only advanced some two 
 miles from the shore. During the 
 ^eater portion of next day he pushed 
 forward his command; but he was com- 
 pelled to report to Sherman that he 
 found it physically impossible to reach 
 the bluifs from his position, and that 
 to persist in the attempt, would inevit- 
 ably lead to the ruin of his troops, and 
 the loss of his field equipage. He was, 
 therefore, ordered to leave some of his 
 troops behind him as a show of force, 
 
 to hasten to the west side of the Chick- 
 asaw Bayou, and take a position on 
 Morgan's left. On the 27th, Blair 
 moved slowly towards the bluffs, his 
 desire being to give Steele time to 
 come into position on the left. He 
 succeeded in silencing one of the ene- 
 my's batteries at the point where he 
 expected Steele would be able to join 
 him, and held his ground. 
 
 On the 28th, the various divisions 
 pressed forward; and the Na- Dec. 
 tional troops were in full posses- 28. 
 sion on the Yazoo side of the bayou, 
 with one bridge thrown across, and 
 with two bridges partially constructed. 
 Duj'ing the course of the day, while re- 
 counoitering. General M. L. Smith was 
 severely wounded in the hip, and com- 
 pelled to retire to his steamboat. His 
 command devolved on General Stuart ; 
 bat Sherman, feeling convinced that 
 A. J. Smith could accomplish nothing 
 on the extreme right, because of the 
 heavy fire of the forts immediately in 
 his front, ordered him to leave Bur- 
 bridge in position at tliat point, and to 
 come up with a portion of his forces 
 to the point selected for crossing the 
 bayou, and entinisted liim with the 
 execution of the task. Such was the 
 state of things on the night of the 
 28th. General Morgan was in position 
 on the west or rather southwest side of 
 the Chickasaw; General Blair was a 
 little to his right, near the angle of the 
 bayou ; General M. L. Smith's division, 
 under General Stuart, was on the right 
 centre; General A. J. Smith's, which 
 was further to the right, had taken posi- 
 tion near the place where the bayou 
 
THE ATTACK. 
 
 879 
 
 was to be crossed; and General Steele 
 was moving up on the left, to act as a 
 reserve to Morgan. 
 
 On the morning of the 29th, all 
 Dec, things were in readiness for the 
 29» attack. It was Shennan's object, 
 as he himself has told us, to make a 
 lodgment on the foot-hills and bluffs 
 abreast of his position, while diver- 
 sions were being made by the navy at 
 Haines' Bluff, and by the first division, 
 directly towards Vicksburg. We have 
 already mentioned that there were two 
 crossings — one in front of Morgan, and 
 another a little furthei* to the south- 
 west, in front of M. L. Smith. An 
 attempt was made by A. J. Smith to 
 thi'ow a light-flyiug bridge over the 
 bayou, more to the right. On the ex- 
 treme left, a little above the angle of 
 the Chickasaw, near the house of Mrs. 
 Lake, Blair's men had succeeded in 
 constructing a bridge, but not without 
 great difficulty, and with very consider- 
 able loss. Sherman expected great 
 things from General Morgan, who, as 
 we have seen, commanded the first di- 
 vision, and was to lead the attack in 
 person. Sherman pointed out to him 
 the place where he could pass the 
 bayou, and received for answer : " Gen- 
 eral, in ten minutes after you give the 
 signal, I'll be on those hills." His po- 
 sition was one of considerable difficulty. 
 The crossing was narrow ; and immedi- 
 ately opposite, at the base of the hills, 
 there was a Confederate battery, sup- 
 (ported by infantry, posted on the spurs 
 of the hills in the rear. This was the 
 real point of attack; but to distract the 
 attention of the enemy, Shei'mau's in- 
 
 structions were that the initial move- 
 ments should be made at the flanks. 
 
 It was about noon before the signal 
 was given for a general forward move- 
 ment across the bayou and towards the 
 enemy's position. A heavy artillery 
 fii'e was opened all along the National 
 line. It recalled the memory of luka 
 and Corinth. The Confederate batteries 
 made a prompt reply, and were soon 
 followed by the infantry, which opened 
 a perfect tempest of lead on the ad- 
 vance ranks of Morgan and A. J. Smith. 
 In the midst of this fierce storm of can- 
 non-shot and musketiy, De Courcy's 
 brigade, of Morgan's division, succeeded 
 in crossing the bayou; but so terrific 
 was the fire that they took to cover be- 
 hind the bank, and could not be moved 
 forward. General Blair, meanwhile, 
 had crossed the bayou by the bridge 
 above the angle, and had reached the 
 slough, the bottom of which was quick- 
 sand, and the banks of which were cov- 
 ered with felled trees. With great 
 difficulty, and not until his ranks were 
 thrown into some disorder, was the 
 crossing of the slough accomplished. 
 This done, it was necessary, before 
 reaching the enemy's works, to traverse 
 a sloping plateau, raked by a direct 
 and enfilading fire from heavy artillery, 
 and swept by a storm of bullets from 
 the rifle-pits. Nothing daunted, Blair 
 and his brave brigade — his own and 
 his officers' horses having been left be- 
 hind, some of them floundering in the 
 mire and vainly seeking a foothold in 
 the quicksand — went bounding acrocs 
 the plateau. Rushing upon the rifle- 
 pits, they captured the first line and 
 
880 
 
 CHICKASAW. 
 
 then the second, and made a desperate 
 effort to gain the crest of the hill on 
 which the batteries were planted. 
 
 Colonel Thayer, of Steele's division, 
 had followed Blair, with his brigade, 
 over the same bridge. Entering the 
 4xhdtis at the same point, he turned 
 iomewhat to the right, and emerged 
 upon the plateau almost simultaneously 
 with Blair, and about two hundred 
 yards to his right. Unfortunately, 
 however, Thayer found that he was fol- 
 lowed by only one regiment ; his second 
 regiment, after his movement had com- 
 menced, having been ordered to the 
 support of Morgan, and the other two 
 regiments having followed this one by 
 mistake. It was a sad blunder, and 
 one which contributed not a little to 
 the disaster of the day. Thayer dis- 
 covered the mistake before he had faii'- 
 ly brought his troops into action ; but 
 he was too brave a man to halt or 
 hesitate in the circumstances On he 
 pushed to the right of Blair, and I'en- 
 dered effective aid in the capture of the 
 second line of rifle-pits. Leaving his 
 regiment to hold the position it had 
 won, he hurried, back, with Blair's con- 
 sent, to obtain reinforcements. It was 
 a trying interval. The moments seemed 
 hours. " It was a struggle," as has 
 been well said, "between three thou- 
 sand in the open ground below and ten 
 thousand behind entrenchments above." 
 The hill sides bristled with bayonets 
 and blazed with the fire of musketry, 
 while, from the angry mouths of huge 
 cannon^ destruction was poured foiih 
 upon the shattered and rapidly thinning 
 ranks of the assailants. Blair, impa- 
 
 tient for the return of Thayer, rushed 
 back himself to persuade the advance 
 of more troops. It was all in vain. 
 Both Thayer and himself failed in 
 obtaining reinforcements. No help 
 reached them; no diversion was made' 
 in their favor. They had no choice but 
 to order a retreat. Blair and Thayer 
 fell back, with, a loss of at least one 
 third of their men; and De Courcy, 
 who had been attacked on the flank by 
 the Seventeenth and Twenty-Sixth Lou- 
 isiana, lost four flags, 332 men made 
 prisoners, and about 500 small arms. 
 
 The attack was a complete failure. 
 Somehow, the signal for attack was im- 
 perfectly understood. Either that, or 
 it was not heard at all on the right. 
 Two divisions had remained immovable, 
 while a handful of men were being 
 crushed in a desperate attempt on the 
 left. A. J. Smith had done nothing. 
 Stuart had managed to push across one 
 regiment — the Sixth Missouri— which 
 had orders to undermine the bluff. The 
 position of those men was one which 
 severely tried then- faith and patience. 
 They were exposed to the vertical fire 
 of the Confederate sharpshooters who 
 occupied the ridge ; and a battalion of 
 the Thirteenth Regulars, who were 
 stationed opposite, and who attempted 
 to protect them from the Confederate 
 fire, proved eq^ually dangerous with the 
 enemy above. " Shoot higher !" shouted 
 the Nationals below the bluff. "Shoot 
 lower!" cried the Confederates. After 
 dai'k, this regiment was brouo;ht back 
 over the bayou. The remainder of 
 Steele's division did not get up in time 
 to be of any assistance to Blair. Mor- 
 
SAD SCENES. 
 
 3&1 
 
 gau failed to make good his promise. 
 He did not even obey his orders. Gen- 
 eral Sherman was particularly severe on 
 Morgan. To him, and to his conduct, 
 he attributed the failare of the attack. 
 " This attack failed," he has since told 
 us in his memoirs, " and I have always 
 felt that it was due to the failure of Gen- 
 eral G. W. Morgan to obey his orders, 
 or to fulfil his promises made in person. 
 Had he used with skill and boldness 
 one of his brigades, in addition to that 
 of Blair, he could have made a lodg- 
 ment on the bluff, which would have 
 opened the door for our whole force to 
 follow." 
 
 Sherman was naturally mortified at 
 the " lame and impotent conclusion " 
 of a movement which, he had fondly 
 and confidently believed, would result 
 in a great and decisive victory. Baffled, 
 and even humiliated, he was not dis- 
 mayed. He resolved to make another 
 attack; and arrangements were made 
 to push forward General Hovey to the 
 position from which Blair had been 
 driven ; Morgan's division, with the 
 brigades of Blair and Thayer, to follow 
 and support. For some reason it was 
 not done ; and next morning it was 
 found to be impossible, because of the 
 increased strength of the Confederates 
 at the menaced point. Firing was con- 
 tinued on both sides during Tuesday ; 
 Dec. and on Wednesday, the 31st, a 
 31« flag of truce was sent in ; and the 
 dead were buried, and the wounded 
 cared for. An eye-witness has given 
 us a sad picture of the battle field on 
 that day of burial. "All across the 
 plain, scattered among the abatis, and 
 
 hid away in little entanglements of 
 bogs, or tufts of bushes, they lay, Con- 
 federates and Federals side by side, 
 showing how the battle had rolled and 
 surged with the alternate charges of 
 either party. But the saddest sight of 
 all was that of the unfortunate wound- 
 ed who had lain through all these weary 
 hours, since the battle, uncared for, 
 many of them, because the nature of 
 their wounds prevented them from 
 moving; others were held fast by a 
 little knot of corpses which chance had 
 thrown upon them; and still others, 
 perhaps not wounded at all at first, 
 but being caught beneath the horses 
 they rode, as they fell, were pinned to 
 the earth. The frantic appeals for 
 water, for food, or other succor, of such 
 of these miserable victims of war as 
 could speak at all, were most heart- 
 rending." 
 
 Sherman was still dissatisfied, and 
 resolved to make another attack. After 
 consulting with Admiral Porter, it was 
 agreed that a combined naval and land 
 assault should be made on Haines' 
 Bluff, the key of the Confederate posi- 
 tion. Porter was to proceed up the 
 Yazoo with his gunboats, and open fire 
 on the blufPs, while General Steele was 
 to land his division out of range of the 
 enemy's guns, then to push forward 
 and take the position by storm. The 
 attack was to be made during the dark 
 hours. By two o'clock on the morn- 
 ing of Thursday, the 1st of Jan- 
 uaiy, the necessary arrangements 
 were completed. A heavy fog, how- 
 ever, had enveloped the entire district; 
 and so dense was it that Porter found it 
 
 1863. 
 
 X41 
 
382 
 
 CHICKASAW. 
 
 impossible to steer the boats. It was 
 utterly out of the question to make 
 any further efforts. On the night of 
 the 29th December, there had been a 
 tremendous rain-storm ; all the low 
 ground was flooded ; and the men who 
 had been bivouacking for five successive 
 days in those wretched swamps, with- 
 out fire, were suffering cruelly fi'om 
 Jan, damp and cold. On the 2d of 
 2« January, Sherman placed his 
 troops on board the transports ; and 
 the fleet sailed dowm to the mouth of 
 the Yazoo. Thus ended, somewhat in- 
 gloriously, the second campaign against 
 Vicksburg. Shennan had accomplished 
 nothing. He had, however, made great 
 sacrifices ; his loss in killed and wound- 
 ed and prisoners amounting to nearly 
 2000 men. Such was the battle of 
 Chickasaw Bayou, or, as it is sometimes 
 but less correctly named, the battle of 
 Haines' Bluff. 
 
 It was a sad disappointment to the 
 people of the North; and Sherman, 
 from whom great things were expected, 
 came in for a large share of abuse. 
 Several of the correspondents on the 
 spot, ignorant of some of the causes of 
 the failure, and not knowing as yet 
 the fate which had befallen Grant, were 
 unnecessarily severe in their condemna- 
 tion of Sherman. That he meant well, 
 that he was resolved to win, and that 
 his plan was well-conceived, there can 
 be no doubt. But somehow the execu- 
 tion was not equal to the conception. 
 There was some mistake in giving 
 the signal; and the real assault was 
 made by only 3000 men. If Blair had 
 been sustained in his attack, as he 
 
 ought to have been sustained, the Na- 
 tional army would most undoubtedly 
 have effected a lodgment on the 
 heights; and, although hard fighting 
 must have followed with doubtful suc- 
 cess, it is not at all impossible that 
 Sherman might have reaped all the 
 glory due to the capture of Vicksburg. 
 Blair will be remembered as the hero 
 of Chickasaw Bayou. He fought like 
 a warrior of old, face to face and hand 
 to hand with the foe. After Blair, 
 praise is due to Thayer, who gallantly 
 sustained his companion in arms. The 
 battle ground, no doubt, had much to 
 do with the defeat. To any one of 
 less daring than Sherman, familiar 
 with the district, and well-informed as 
 to the strength of the enemy's position, 
 the undertaking might have seemed 
 impracticable from the outset ; and it is 
 questionable whether even he, had he 
 possessed a fuller knowledge of the 
 difiiculties which beset him, would 
 have imperilled his fame and risked 
 the lives of his soldiers in a task so 
 apparently hopeless. It was doubtless 
 a mistake not to have more thoroughly 
 and oflicially reeonnoitered the ground 
 before choosing it as the field of action. 
 After all, however, it was an experi- 
 ment which might have been successful ; 
 and it was not the only unsuccessful 
 experiment which was made before 
 Vicksburg was captured. As it was, 
 everything might have been well, if 
 Grant had been able to carry out his 
 part of the plan. The retreat of the 
 latter from Oxford, leaving, as it did, 
 Pemberton free to concentrate hi? 
 troops for the defense of Vicksbm-g, 
 
McCLERNAND IN COMMAND. 
 
 3S3 
 
 iargely diminished Sherman's chances 
 >f success. 
 
 The Confederates were jubilant after 
 this first victory. It was undoubtedly 
 ft great triumph. General Pemberton, 
 not without reason, felt proud that he 
 had baffled Grant in person, compelling 
 him to retreat, and that he had tem- 
 porarily, at least, saved Vicksburg by 
 the defeat of the greatest of Grant's 
 lieutenants. These z'ejoicings in the 
 South were not unmixed with sorrow. 
 The more thoughtful of the Confed- 
 erates knew that defeat only intensi- 
 fied the purpose of the North. Vicks- 
 burg had not yet fallen ; but Vicksburg, 
 they felt, was doomed. 
 
 We left the transports and the fleet 
 on their way down the Yazoo. At the 
 mouth of that river, General McCler- 
 nand was waiting ^vith orders fi-om the 
 War Department to take command of 
 the entire expedition. That general, 
 it will be remembered, was appointed 
 to this command by the direct influence 
 of President Lincoln. It was a severe 
 blow to Sherman, who felt it keenly. 
 It was some consolation, however, to 
 him to know that the appointment — 
 which had been made weeks ahead, 
 and which had no connection with the 
 recent disaster — was not intended as a 
 disgrace. With a modesty which be- 
 came a man of his high spirit, he ac- 
 cepted the situation, and explained to 
 McClernand what had been done, ac- 
 cepting the entire responsibility of the 
 failure. Referring to the trains of cars 
 which could be heard coming in to 
 Vicksburg almost every hour, and the 
 fresh troops seen on the bluffs, he gave 
 
 it as his opinion that Pemberton's army 
 must have been pressed back, and that 
 Grant must be at hand. He then 
 learned, for the first time, what had 
 befallen Grant ; McClernand stating 
 that Grant was not coming at all, that 
 the depot at Holly Springs had been 
 captured by Van Dorn, that Grant had 
 fallen back from Coffeeville and Ox- 
 ford to Holly Springs and La Grange, 
 and that when he passed down, Quim- 
 by's division, of Grant's army, was ac- 
 tually at Memphis for stores. By 
 common consent, all further attempts 
 against Vicksburg, for the present, 
 were abandoned ; and the entire force 
 left the Yazoo, and retired to Milli- 
 ken's Bend on the Mississippi. 
 
 On the 4th of January, McClernand 
 issued his General Order No. 1, assum- 
 ing command of what was to be called 
 the army of the Mississippi, and, fol- 
 lowing the plan which had been agreed 
 upon at Washington, and which had 
 been adopted in the armies of the East, 
 dividing his forces into two corps. 
 The first was to be commanded by 
 General Morgan, and was to be com- 
 posed of his own and A. J. Smith's 
 divisions ; and the second, to consist of 
 Steele's and Stuart's divisions, was to 
 be commanded by General Sherman. 
 The rest of the army of the Tennessee 
 was similarly divided, General Hurl- 
 but being placed in command of one 
 corps, and General McPherson in com- 
 mand of the other. The supreme com- 
 mand of these four corps was retained 
 by General Grant, On the same day, 
 General Sherman issued the following 
 order : 
 
384 
 
 UUICKASAW. 
 
 *' Headquarters Right Wing Abmt of Tennessee 
 Steamer Forest Queen, Milliken's Bend, 
 January 4, 1863. 
 
 " Pursuant to the terms of Greneral 
 Order No. 1, made this day by General 
 McClernand, the title of our army ceases 
 to exist, and constitutes in the future 
 the army of the Mississippi, composed 
 of two 'army corps'; one to be com- 
 manded by General G. W. Morgan, and 
 the other by myself. In relinquishing 
 the command of the army of the Ten- 
 nessee, and restricting my authority to 
 my own corps, I desire to express to all 
 commandei's, to soldiers and officers re- 
 cently operating before Vicksbui'g, aiy 
 hearty thanks for the zeal, alacrity, and 
 courage manifested by them on all oc- 
 casions. We failed in accomplishing 
 one great purpose of our movement — 
 the capture of Vicksburg ; but we were 
 part of a whole. Ours was but part of 
 a combined movement in which others 
 were to assist. We were on time; un- 
 foreseen contingencies must have de- 
 layed the others. We have destroyed 
 the Shreveport Road, we have attacked 
 the defenses of Vicksburg, and pushed 
 the attack as far as prudence would jus- 
 tify ; and, having found it too strong for 
 our single column, we have drawn off in 
 good order and good spirits, ready for 
 any new move. A new commander is 
 now here to lead you. He is chosen by 
 the president of the United States, who 
 is charged by the Constitution to main- 
 tain and defend it, and he has the un- 
 doubted right to select his own agents. 
 I know that all good officers and sol- 
 diers will give him the same hearty 
 support and cheerful obedience they 
 
 have hitherto given me. There are 
 honors enough in reserve for all, and 
 woi'k enough, too. Let each do his ap- 
 propriate part, and our nation must, in 
 the end, emerge from the dire conflict 
 purified and ennobled by the fires which 
 now test its strength and purity. All 
 officers of the general staff not attached 
 to my person will hereafter repoi"t in 
 person and by letter to Major-General 
 McClernand, commanding the army of 
 the Mississippi, on board the steamer 
 Tigress at our rendezvous at Haines' 
 Landing and at Montgomery Point. 
 
 "By order of 
 "Major-General W. T. Sherman. 
 "J. H. Hammond, 
 "Assistant-Adjutant General." 
 
 Before the arrival of McClernand, 
 Sherman and Porter had agreed upon a 
 plan for the reduction of Fort Hind- 
 man, or, as it was called, Arkansas Post. 
 About forty or forty-five miles from the 
 mouth of the Arkansas, there is a piece 
 of elevated ground, the first high land 
 on the banks of the river, after leaving 
 the Mississippi. At this point, the 
 river makes a sharp bend. Here the 
 French had a trading post and a settle- 
 ment as far back as 1685. The Con- 
 federates had taken advantage of the 
 place to erect some fortifications, the 
 principal work being named Fort Hind- 
 man, after the famous guerrilla chief. 
 Behind these works, they kept several 
 steamboats, which were wont to sweep 
 down the river and intercept supplies. 
 Sherman had experienced some incon- 
 venience from the existence of this 
 stronghold. He had left Memphis in 
 such haste that he had not been able tu 
 
WHITE RIVEE. 
 
 38A 
 
 take with him a sufficient supply of 
 ammunition for his guns. The Blue 
 Wing, a small steamer carrying a mail, 
 towing some coal barges, and having 
 with her the necessary supplies, had 
 been sent after him. This boat had 
 been poimced upon at the mouth of the 
 Arkansas, captured, and, with all her 
 supplies, taken up to Fort Hindman. It 
 was Sherman's conviction, from the 
 moment he learned of the fate of the 
 Blue Wing, that before any operation 
 could be successfully conducted against 
 Vicksburg by way of the Mississippi, 
 it would be necessary to reduce Fort 
 Hindman, and make an end of the Ar- 
 kansas pirates. Sherman communicated 
 his purpose to McClernand, and asked 
 permission to go up the Arkansas, and 
 clear out the post. McClernand, who 
 had not as yet, so far as appearances 
 indicated, formed any plan of his own, 
 went with Sherman on board the Black 
 Hawk to consult with Porter. Porter, 
 who had the highest esteem for Sher- 
 man, not only approved of the enter- 
 prise, but expressed a desire to go up 
 the river himself, in place of trusting 
 the expedition to any of his subordi- 
 nates. It was Sherman's expectation 
 that he would be sent, with his own 
 coi-ps, alone on this business ; but Mc- 
 Clernand concluded to go himself, and 
 to take with him his whole force. 
 
 The troops, which had not yet dis- 
 embarked from the transports, were 
 ordered to remain on board. Sher- 
 man's corps was in two divisions. The 
 first, which consisted of three brigades, 
 commanded respectively by Blair, 
 Hovey and Thayer, was uudrr Bi'iga- 
 
 dier-General Frederick Steele. The 
 second, which consisted of two bri- 
 gades, commanded by Colonels G. A. 
 Smith and T. Kilby Smith, was under 
 Brigadier-General Stuart. The trans- 
 ports with the troops on board, con- 
 voyed by the gun boats, of which 
 three were iron-clads, proceeded up the 
 Mississippi. The force under McCler- 
 nand amounted to some 26,000 or 
 27,000 men, comprising 40 regiments 
 of infantry, 10 batteries with several 
 guns of heavy calibre, and about 
 1500 horse. On the 8th of January, 
 the expedition was at the mouth of the 
 White River. This river, which is one 
 of the principal streams in Arkansas, 
 rises a few miles east of Fayetteville, 
 flows northeast into Missouri, then re- 
 turns into Arkansas, and, pursuing a 
 southeasterly course, enters the Missis- 
 sippi about fifteen miles above the 
 mouth of the Arkansas River. It is 
 navigable by steamboats for about 
 three hundred and fifty miles. About 
 fifteen miles from its mouth, there is a 
 channel or " cut-oif," through which it 
 discharges a portion of its waters into 
 the Arkansas. If, as sometimes hap- 
 pens, the Arkansas should be higher 
 than the White River, the state of 
 things is reversed, and the waters of 
 the Arkansas * seek the Mississippi 
 through the channel of the White 
 River. The "cut-off" at this season 
 of the year is always well filled and 
 easily navigable. On the morning of 
 the 9th, the expedition having jan, 
 ascended the White River, had *. 
 reached the mouth of the "cnt-off." 
 There was no delay in making the 
 
386 
 
 CHICKASAW. 
 
 passage through to the Arkansas, a dis- 
 tance of about eight miles. Steaming 
 up the Arkansas, the boats reached 
 Notrib's Farm, about four miles below 
 Fort Hindman, shortly after four o'clock 
 in the afternoon. Here they halted ; 
 and during the night the artillery and 
 wagons were got on shore, the troops 
 disembarking in the morning. Arkan- 
 sas Post is on the north side or left 
 bank of the Arkansas, at a point where 
 the river makes a sharp elbow, by 
 flowing north, then east, then again ab- 
 ruptly to the south. The principal 
 work, as we have said, was Fort Hind- 
 man. Its guns commanded the river, 
 as it stretched to the east, and, after it 
 bent toward the south. This fort was 
 a regular square bastioned work, one 
 hundred yards each exterior side, with 
 a deep ditch about fifteen feet wide, 
 and a parapet eighteen feet high. It was 
 armed with twelve guns, two of which 
 were eight-inch, and one nine-inch. 
 The garrison, which numbered only 
 .5000 men, was under the command of 
 General T. J. Chiirchill, who was under 
 the direction of General T. H. Holmes, 
 then commanding at Little Rock. 
 Churchill had received instructions to 
 "hold on until help should arrive or 
 all were dead." 
 
 The disparity of forces was great. 
 It was 2G,000 or 27,000 against 5000. 
 The strong position held by the Con- 
 federates, however, did much to com- 
 pensate for inferiority of numbers. 
 The fort itself was strong ; and its ap- 
 proaches were of the most diiBcult de- 
 scription. Fronting on the river, it 
 was protected on the west by a bayou, 
 
 on the east by a swamp which did not 
 quite reach the edge of the water. 
 Between the fort and the swamp, there 
 was a ravine which stretched down to 
 the river; and the front of this ravine 
 was well fortified. The position had 
 thus to be approached through the ele- 
 vated ground which lay between the 
 bayou and the swamp. The encamp- 
 ments of the Confederates were estab- 
 lished in front of the fort, in the centre 
 of the plateau dotted with clumps of 
 trees. There was an outer line of en- 
 trenchments which stretched across the 
 entire ground. 
 
 On the 10th, the army was kept 
 busy endeavoring to get a posi- jan, 
 tion in rear of the fort, Sher- Io- 
 nian on the right and Morgan on the 
 left. Some mistakes were made, in con- 
 sequence of a want of knowledge of 
 the ground. In the afternoon, and 
 while the land forces were still seeking 
 position. Porter was making good use 
 of his flotilla. As he moved up the 
 river, he shelled the rifle-pits along the 
 levee, and drove the Confederates in- 
 side the fort. When about four hun- 
 dred yards from Fort Hindman, he 
 brought into action his three iron-cl ids — 
 the Baron de Kalb, the Louisville and 
 the Cincinnati; and for half an hour 
 the firing was kept up, the guns of the 
 fort replying vigorously. 
 
 On the morning of the 11th McCler- 
 nand, who had his quarters still Jan. 
 on board the Tigress, had come ''• 
 up and taken a position in the woods 
 to the rear. Early in the forenoon, he 
 sent a message to Shenuan, asking him 
 wh)' the attack was not begun. It had 
 
FORT HINDMAN CAPTURED. 
 
 387 
 
 been understood beforehand that the 
 opening of fire by the gunboats on the 
 fort should be the signal for a general 
 attack. Sherman, therefore, replied 
 that all was ready ; that he was within 
 five or six hundred yards of the enemy's 
 works; that the next movement must 
 be a direct assault along the whole line ; 
 and that he was waiting to hear from 
 the gunboats. Half an hour or there- 
 about afterwards was heard the clear, 
 ringing sound of the navy guns, the 
 firing becoming louder and more rapid 
 as they neared the fort. The National 
 field pieces opened fire along the whole 
 line. The thunder was terrific. The 
 Confederates, most of whom were Texan 
 volunteers, made a gallant resistance. 
 A regiment of cavalry, abandoning their 
 horses, fought on foot, and rendered, 
 for a time, effective service in resisting 
 the advance of the Nationals. It was 
 impossible for them to resist the fierce 
 onset made by overwhelming numbers. 
 Sherman pressed forward on the nght, 
 Morgan on the left, each driving the 
 Confederates back, and gradually ob- 
 taining possession of the wooded ground 
 in front of the newly-erected parapet, 
 but not without considerable loss. The 
 Confederate firing was heavy ; but the 
 National soldiers took advantage of the 
 clumps of trees, and felled logs to shield 
 themselves from the storm of bullets. 
 Gradually the edge of the woods was 
 reached; the ground was clear; and 
 there was nothing to protect them from 
 the decimating fire of the enemy. 
 
 Meanwhile, the gunboats were pour- 
 ing a mui'derous fire upon the fort, and 
 sweeping the adjoining gi-ound above 
 
 and below with grape and shrapnelL 
 Porter had brought into action not only 
 the iron-clads, but the ram Monarch, 
 Commander EUet, and even the fi-ailer 
 vessels, as he tells us, that amid the 
 clouds of smoke they might "do the 
 best they could." It was not long until 
 the effects of this terrific firing began 
 to be visible. All the adjoining ground 
 was cleared of the foe; neai'ly all the 
 artilleiy horses in the fort were killed ; 
 and one by one the guns were being 
 silenced. Shortly after three o'clock, 
 the firing from the fort altogethei 
 ceased. The cannonading, however, 
 was kept up by the gunboats. Porter, 
 who had taken a regiment on board, 
 was proceeding vsdth the Black Hawk 
 to attempt a landing, and to take pos 
 session, when a white flag was raised i» 
 token of surrender. He immediately 
 ordered the firing to cease. 
 
 We left the troops in the clearing at 
 the edge of the woods, fully exposed to 
 the enemy's fire from the parapet out- 
 side the fort. This line had three sec- 
 tions of field guns; and they were 
 handled, according to the testimony of 
 Shennan himself, with great skill and 
 energy. Hovey was wounded ; Thayer 
 had his horse shot under him ; and so 
 thick and fast was the round-shot fall- 
 ing about Sherman and his staff, that 
 they felt it necessary to scatter, Sher- 
 man himself dismounting. Morgan, at 
 this crisis, unfortunately found himself 
 in front of the ravine, beyond which it 
 was impossible to pass. Sherman was 
 now well engaged on the right; and 
 Morgan, finding himself thus hindered, 
 sent a few regiments to his aid. The 
 
388 
 
 CHICKASAW. 
 
 burden of the fight, as at Chickasaw, 
 had fallen on the brigades which now 
 composed the division of General Steele. 
 Blair and Thayer and Hovey performed 
 prodigies of valor. 
 
 On the right, the Confederate bat- 
 teries had been all but silenced. Mor- 
 gan's men, on the left, had done splen- 
 did work before they were brought to 
 a standstill at the ravine. A. J. Smith's 
 brigades had pressed the Confederates 
 back, step by step, until they were 
 within two hundred yards of the fort. 
 Burbridge expressly distinguished him- 
 self. But for the ravine, an attempt 
 would have been made by the One 
 Hundred and Twentieth Ohio to scale, 
 and carry by assault, the eastern side of 
 the fort. Almost at this moment, how- 
 ever, Sherman, as his attention was 
 arrested by the flags of the gunboats 
 visible above the parapet of Fort Hind- 
 man, saw a man jiimp on the nearer 
 parapet at the point where entered the 
 road which divided the peninsula. 
 "Cease firing!" he ordered; and the 
 words were passed along the line with 
 amazing rapidity. The firing soon 
 ceased. In a few seconds the fort was 
 invaded on every side by the National 
 troops. Colonel Dayton was ordered 
 forward to the place where was hung 
 out the large white flag; and as soon 
 as his horse was seen on the parapet, 
 Sherman advanced with his staff. It 
 appeared afterwards that the white flag 
 was hung out without even the knowl- 
 gdge of Churchill. It made little dif- 
 ference. The battle had really been 
 won on the land as well as on the river 
 side of the fort. The surrender was 
 
 subsequently made in due form — Col- 
 onel Dunniugton, the commander of the 
 fort, sui-rendering to Admiral Porter, 
 and Colonel Churchill surrendering to 
 the military authorities. The National 
 loss in killed, wounded and missing 
 amounted to 977 men. On the Con- 
 federate side there were only 60 killed 
 and 80 wounded. Five thousand sol- 
 diers, with their officers, made prison- 
 ers, and all the property of the place, 
 including some seventeen guns, consti- 
 tuted the prize of victory. General 
 Burbridge was singled out for the 
 honor of planting the National stand- 
 ard on Fort Hindman. Such was the 
 battle of Arkansas Post. 
 
 General Sherman was dissatisfied 
 with the arrangements made by Gen- 
 eral McClernand immediately after the 
 surrender. The post of honor — the oc- 
 cupation of Fort Hindman — was given 
 to A. J. Smith, of Morgan's division, 
 Sherman being ordered to hold the 
 lines outside, and go on securing the 
 prisoners and stores. McClernand's 
 reason for so doing was that he did not 
 wish to interfere with the actual state 
 of facts — the status quo at the time of 
 surrender. It is undeniable that it was 
 Sherman's plan throughout; that his 
 corps bore the burden of the fight ; that, 
 after the surrender, his troops were in 
 possession of two of the three brigades 
 which constituted the opposing force; 
 and that he was in possession of all the 
 gi'ound outside the "fort proper." Mc- 
 Clernand was proud of his success, and 
 manifested not a little vanity. His 
 star, he said, was ever in the ascendant. 
 In his memoirs, Sherman tells us that 
 
JEALOtJSY. 
 
 380 
 
 McClernand was extremely jealous of 
 the navy, and that, in his report, he ig- 
 nored altogether the action of Porter's 
 fleet. This was the less to be regretted 
 that Porter told his own story in a very 
 handsome and eifective way. It is only 
 simple truth to say that the battle was 
 fought and won by the fleet before the 
 land troops had any certainty of success. 
 There was, in f»ct, a feeling of jealousy 
 among the commanders — a feeling which 
 was not wholly to disappear until the 
 arrival of Grant, in whose presence, and 
 under the influence of whose more com- 
 manding genius, jealousy and selfish- 
 ness gave place to a spirit of honorable 
 rivalry and dutiful obedience. 
 
 The day after the battle was devoted 
 to burying the dead. The prisoners 
 were all collected and sent to St. Louis. 
 The victory at Arkansas Post opened 
 the way for a successful expedition to 
 Little Rock, the capital of the State of 
 Arkansas. Shennan expressed a desire 
 to be sent on this expedition. McCler- 
 nand, however, did not deem it advis- 
 able. A combined expedition, was, 
 therefore, sent up the White River, as 
 
 far as St. Charles, Des Arc and Duval's 
 Bluff, under General Gorman and 
 Lieutenant-Commanding J. G. Walker. 
 The expedition was completely success- 
 ful. Meanwhile, the works at Fort 
 Hindman were dismantled and blown 
 up ; and, on the 13th, the troops were 
 re-embarked, and proceeded down the 
 Arkansas to Napoleon. There, instruc- 
 tions were received from General Grant, 
 who ordered McClernand to take the 
 entire expedition down the river to 
 Milliken's Bend, and await his arrival. 
 This place was reached on the 21st of 
 January. 
 
 lu itself, the movement against Ar- 
 kansas Post was a small affair; it was 
 so regarded by General Grant ; it ought 
 to have been successfully accomplished 
 by one corps, and by a portion of the 
 fleet — instead of the combined strength 
 of both — and that was Sherman's idea ; 
 but resulting, as it did, in victory, 
 it served the double purpose of em- 
 ploying troops which would otherwise 
 have been idle, and of cheering the 
 hearts of a peopl*i who were som© 
 what despondent 
 
 a4a 
 
390 
 
 VICKSBFRG. 
 
 CHAPTEK XXIV. 
 
 The Proclamation of Emancipation. — Divided Sentiments. — A Turning Point in History. — The Cry of the 
 Slave. — Prayers Heard and Answered. — Colored Troops. — "Vicksburg Must Be Taken." — Grant at Young's 
 Point. — The Walnut Hills. —The Yazoo. — Haines' Bluff. — An Apparently Impregnable City. — How to Get to 
 the East of the Mississippi. — Five Different Schemes. — The Williams Canal Experiment. — Almost a Suc- 
 cess. — A Failure.— A Bold and Daring Experiment. — The Flood. — Roundabout Bayou. — Another Failure. — ■ 
 — Lake Providence. — Moon Lake. — The Y'allabusha. — The Tallahatchie. — Greenwood. — Fort Pemberton. — 
 Another Failure. — Steele's Bayou. — Admiral Porter. — Failure Again. — A Five-Fold Failure. — Grant Disap- 
 pointed, but Not Discouraged — Sherman's Opinion. — Grant's Resolve. — The New Movement Commenced. — 
 New Carthage. — A Tedious and Difficult March. — The Fleet. — Passing the Batteries. — A Midnight Scene. — 
 Grierson's Raid. — The Importance of Cavalry. — A Brilliant Exploit. — Grand Gulf. — The Gunboats Open Fire. — 
 The Place too Strong. — Rodney. — Bruuisburg. — A Landing Effected. — A Useful Diversion. — Sherman at 
 Haines' Bluff. — Safe on the East Side. — Grant's Self -Reliance. — Port Gibson. — The Battle. — The Confederates 
 Fall Back. — Hankinaon's Ferry. — "The City of an Hundred HiUs. " — Bayou Pierre. — Big Black. — The Natural 
 Barriers. — Reconnoitering Parties. — Raymond. — A Tremendous Rush for the Guns. — A National Victory. — 
 Johnston at Jackson. — His Instructions to Pemberton. — Jackson Evacuated. — An Easy Victory. — Torrents of 
 Rain. — The Three Generals, Grant, McPherson and Sherman. — Grant Now Marches Against Pemberton. — 
 Edward's Station the Point of Rendezvous. — Champion Hills. — A Strong Position. — Pemberton Prepares for 
 Battle. — Arrival of the National Advance. — The Battle of Champion Hills Begun. — Hovey Sorely Pressed. — 
 Reinforced. —Logan's Success. — The Battle Won After a Terrible Struggle. — McClemand too Late. — McCler- 
 nand and Osterhaus Ordered in Pursuit. — The Big Black River. — The Railway Bridge. — A Successful Re- 
 treat. — Preparations for Assault. —Lawler's Discovery. —The Assault Made. — A Terrible Struggle. — Heavy 
 Loss of Life. — The Burning of the Bridges. — The Bridges Reconstructed. — On to Vicksburg. — Porter on 
 the Yazoo. — Sherman at Haines' Bluff. — The Fall of Vicksburg Secured. — Preparing to Make the Assault. — 
 Pemberton's Situation. — The Assault of the ]9th of May. — A Failure. — The Assault of the 22d. — Grant's 
 Reasons for Avoiding Further Delay. — Terrible Fighting. — The "Works too Strong, Naturally and Arti 
 ficially, to be Taken by Assault." — McClemand's Mistake. — Sergeant Griffiths. — X Useless Slaughter. — The 
 Troops Recalled. — The Troops Complimented. — The Bravery of the Defenders. — A Confederate Picture. — 
 McClernand's Congratulatory Order. — His Removal from the Command of the Thirteenth Corps. — The 
 Appointment of Ord. — Grant Resolves to Take the Place by a Regular Siege. — Reinforcements. — The In- 
 vestment Completed. — Siege Operations Commenced. — Pemberton's Situation Becoming Desperate. — Hia 
 Complaints. — The Want of Cavalry. — What Johnston Proposed. — Johnston Preparing to Attack the Na- 
 tional Rear. — Pemberton's Vacillation. — Distress of the Garrison. — The Mining Operations Well Advanced. — 
 The25thof June.— The First Mine Fired. —The Storming Columns.— The Assault on Fort HiU.— A Terrific 
 Cannonade. — A Repulse. — The 1st of July. — The Destruction of the Redan. — An Intercepted Letter. — 
 Promised Aid to Pemberton. — Grant's Instructions to Sherman. — The 3d of July. — The White Flag. — General 
 Bowen and Colonel Montgomery. — A Letter from Pemberton. — He Asks for an Armistice and the Appoint- 
 ment of Commissiocfirs. — Grant Refuses. — "Unconditional Surrender." — The Interview Between Grant and 
 Pemberton. — An Imposing Scene. — Under the Old Oak, in View of Both Armies. — A Striking Contrast. — Can't 
 Agree. — Consideration on the Part of Grant. — Terms in Writing.— The Agreement. — The Surrender. — The 
 Fourth of July. — Light at Last. — A Great Day for the National Cause. — A National Triumph.— A Great Triumph 
 lor Grant. — The First Soldier of the Republic. — The Results of the Campaign. — Pursuit of Johnston.-"- 
 Evacuation of Jackson. — Johnston, the "Hero of Retreats." — The End of a Great and Glorious Campaign. 
 
 1863. 
 
 The opening of the year 1863 -was 
 made memorable by the Procla- 
 mation of Emancipation. It 'was 
 
 by slo'w degrees that Abraham Lincoln 
 rose to the full dignity of his mission^ 
 and arrived at the conclusion that the 
 
THE OEY OF THE OPPRESSED. 
 
 391 
 
 will of God, as well as the rights of 
 man and the preservation of the Union, 
 called for the immediate and unquali- 
 fied abolition of slavery. What to do 
 with the slaves of the South had, in- 
 deed, been a vexed question since the 
 commencement of the war. It was a 
 fruitful source of controversy in the 
 cabinet ; and it puzzled alike the legis- 
 lators in Congress and the generals in 
 the field. Among the last named, par- 
 ticularly from whom direct action was 
 frequently demanded, the greatest di- 
 versity of sentiment prevailed. Butler 
 /ooked upon the slaves as contraband. 
 In his own department, Fremont gave 
 them liberty. McClellan would put 
 them down "with an iron hand." Pat- 
 terson would repress all servile insur- 
 rections. Mansfield would allow them 
 no harbor in his camps. Halleck would 
 drive them out of his lines. Burnside 
 would not interfere with slavery. Cam- 
 eron would not sui'render any that 
 might chance to come within the army 
 lines. Dix was unwilling to interfere 
 between the slave and his master. 
 Wool was willing to give them employ- 
 ment, and to regulate their pay and al- 
 lowances. Hooker and Buell actually 
 went so far as to authorize slave-owners 
 to search tbe National camps for fugi- 
 tives, and to carry them off. Lincoln 
 complained of the conduct of Fremont ; 
 and he issued a counter-order when 
 Hunter, at Hilton Head, proclaimed 
 the slaves in his department free. 
 
 It is not necessary to trace the suc- 
 cessive steps by which, ultimately, eraan- 
 cipation was reached. Reference has 
 already V)een made, in these pages^ to 
 
 the history of the proclamation itself. 
 It was the work of Lincoln's own hand; 
 and, in its every sentence, it bears the 
 impress of his genius. Evidently it 
 took shape during the unfortunate cam- 
 paign of General Pope in Virginia — a 
 campaign, the disastrous results of 
 which were all the more severely felt 
 that it followed so close upon McClel- 
 lan's retreat from the peninsula. But 
 for the advice of Secretary Seward, the 
 proclamation would have been pub- 
 lished while the nation was yet smart- 
 ing under defeat, while Pope and his 
 shattered legions were sheltered behind 
 the fortifications at Washington, and 
 while Lee had marched in triumph into 
 Maryland. It was wisely concluded to 
 wait until the first returning sunshine 
 of victory should rest on the National 
 cause. The opportunity arrived after 
 the battle of Antietam, and when Lee, 
 on the night of the 19th of September, 
 1862, retired into Virginia. Thiee 
 days after that date, on the 2 2d of Sep- 
 tember, Lincoln — remembering the vow 
 he had made before God, that, if Gen 
 eral Lee were driven back from Mary 
 land, he would crown the result by a 
 declaration of freedom to the slaves — is- 
 sued that famous proclamation which 
 marked a turning-point, not only in the 
 history of the United States, but ip 
 the history of the world. 
 
 In one of the finest passages of his 
 excellent history of the Civil War, Dr. 
 Draper, when describing the condition 
 of the negroes, and the hopes which the 
 proclamation inspired in their" breasts, 
 says : " From the rivers of Virginia to 
 the Mexican confines of the Republic 
 
S92 
 
 VICKSBURG. 
 
 arose a mournful wail : ' How long, O 
 Lord, how long!' It came from the 
 weary laborer, leaning on his hoe in the 
 cotton field under the noontide sun ; it 
 came through the moaning midnight 
 forests, solemn and clear above their 
 multitudinous inarticulate sounds; it 
 came from children torn from their 
 parents, from wives and husbands part- 
 ed at the auction block, from mothers 
 in despair, from strong men fainting 
 under the lash, from the aged, whose 
 heads were fi'osted by time. In their 
 quaint prayers, the Africans talk to 
 God as a man talks face to face with 
 his friend. Slavery had made Him 
 their friend. By the flickering fires of 
 their cabins, they stealthily spelt out 
 the Bible, to see what He had promised 
 to them. It was their dreadful lot that 
 had caused JefFei'son, himself a slave- 
 owner, to expostulate solemnly with his 
 countrymen, and to deprecate the wrath 
 of God. For who shall escape when, 
 from the hand of Eternal Justice, her 
 scales have dropped as useless; when 
 from her brow the bandage has been 
 raised, that her imcovered and angry 
 eyes may gaze upon unutterable wrong; 
 when her uplifted arm, quivering with 
 indignation, is ready to strike a blow 
 that shall make a whole continent 
 tremble !" 
 
 On the evening of the last day of the 
 year 1862, these poor, down-trodden 
 ones, wherever they could gather to- 
 gether—in their humble meeting-houses, 
 in their lowlier cabins, or in the lone 
 woods — ^met in solemn assembly, and 
 lifted their eyes and their hearts to 
 heaven, calling upon Almighty God to 
 
 strengthen the hands of Abraham Lin- 
 coln on the coming day. When that 
 day arrived, the purpose which had 
 been declared in Septenlber, was made 
 good; and the stain of slavery was 
 wiped out from the escutcheon of the 
 Republic. 
 
 The emancipation proclamation did 
 not give satisfaction to all. It greatly 
 enraged, as a matter of course, the 
 Southern leaders ; and there were many 
 in the North who, although they had 
 no sympathy with the Southern Con- 
 federacy, regarded the abolition of 
 slavery as an interference with the 
 rights of property, and a violation of 
 one of the fundamental principles of 
 the constitution. Immediate and un- 
 qualified abolition may not have been 
 an unmixed good; but it was a neces- 
 sity — a necessity growing out of the 
 war. It was a weapon which the North 
 had a perfect right to use in putting 
 down the rebellion ; and not to have 
 used it would have implied both weak- 
 ness and foUy. Slavery, besides, lay 
 at the very root of the evil out of 
 which, cancer-like, the war arose ; and, 
 if it was "the paramount object" of the 
 North " to save the Union, and not to 
 save or to destroy slavery," it was to 
 preserve the institution of slavery that 
 the war was undertaken and continued 
 by the South. It was not a rash act, 
 done in hot haste, the offspring of re- 
 venge or despair. It was the i-esult of 
 much anxious and prayerful thought, 
 the ripe fruit of calm, patient and pro- 
 tracted study. It was the noblest act 
 of Lincoln's brief and chequered but 
 withal noble life. 
 
EMANCIPATION. 
 
 393 
 
 One of the immediate results of this 
 proclamation of emancipation was the 
 organization of colored troops. Towards 
 the close of 1863, there were some fifty 
 thousand colored men in actual ser- 
 vice ; and this number was tripled be- 
 fore the close of 1864. It was not, 
 however, for some time to come that 
 their influence on the field began to be 
 felt. During the year 1863, although 
 colored troops, as we shall see, took 
 part at the siege of Port Hudson, and 
 in other engagements, their effect was 
 comparatively unimportant. The intro- 
 duction of colored men into the army 
 was regarded by many in the light of 
 a fi'esh revolution. It gave birth in 
 some quarters to a perfect howl of dis- 
 satisfaction ; several of the newspapers 
 went beyond all bounds in their fierce 
 denunciation of the government; and 
 the swords of some prominent generals 
 relaxed in their grasp. General Grant, 
 not troubling himself with politics, but 
 regarding himself simply as the servant 
 of the Republic, heartily approved of 
 the emancipation policy, and enforced 
 the measures of the government. " It 
 is expected," he said, " that all com- 
 manders will especially exert them- 
 selves in cai'rying out the policy of the 
 administration, not only in organizing 
 colored troops, and rendering them efii- 
 cient, but also in removing prejudices 
 against them." 
 
 The situation was now ripe for the 
 vigorous prosecution of the siege of 
 Vicksburg. Sherman's non-success at 
 Chickasaw had not dismayed Grant, 
 while the comparatively unimportant 
 victory at Arkansas Post had greatly 
 
 cheered the people. The popular cry 
 was "On to Vicksburg!" and Grant's 
 emphatic dictum was " Vicksburg must 
 be taken." The army under General 
 Grant had been greatly reinforced ; and 
 the general feeling was that if the 
 "Queen City of the Bluff" was to be 
 reduced, it was to be done by the hero 
 of Donelson and Shiloh, of luka and 
 Corinth. 
 
 As we stated at the close of the last 
 chapter. Grant was to meet McClernand 
 and Porter, with the fleet and trans- 
 ports, at Milliken's Bend. On the 18th 
 of January, that meeting took jan, 
 place. There was a general con- I8« 
 sultation ; and the views of the general- 
 in-chief, and of all the leading officers, 
 were freely exchanged. After con- 
 sultation, Grant made arrangements for 
 future movements, and gave some spe- 
 cial instructions. McClernand and Sher- 
 man made immediate preparations to 
 go down the Mississippi to Youmg's 
 Point; and Grant, without delay, re- 
 turned to Memphis, in order to hasten 
 the transportation of his trooj)s to the 
 neighborhood of Vicksburg. McCler- 
 nand, it will be remembered, assumed 
 command of what was named the 
 army of the Mississippi, after the bat- 
 tle of the Chickasaw, by virtue of 3 
 confidential order from the War De- 
 partment. In this capacity, however, 
 he was subject to orders from General 
 Grant, who was at the head of the de- 
 partment of the Tennessee. At the 
 time of which we write, all things were 
 changed. By an order (No. 210) of De- 
 cember 18th, 1862, from the War De^ 
 partment, the Western armies had be«'^ 
 
S94 
 
 VICKSBURG. 
 
 grouped into five corps, viz. : the Thir- 
 teenth, Major-General McClernand ; the 
 Fourteenth, Major-General George H. 
 Thomas, in Middle Tennessee ; the Fif- 
 teenth, Major-General "W. T. Sherman ; 
 the Sixteenth, Major-General Hurlbut, 
 at Memphis; and the Seventeenth, 
 Major-General McPherson, back of 
 Memphis. This entire force was placed 
 "\nder the control of General Grant. 
 jfeb. On the 2d of February, the 
 ^» greater number of the troops in- 
 tended to be used in the operations 
 Against Vicksburg having already 
 reached their destination. Grant arrived 
 at Young's Point, and took command. 
 
 Now that General Grant was on the 
 spot, the question which he had to set- 
 tle was — How could Vicksburg be 
 most easily and effectually approached ? 
 The National army was lying on the 
 west side of the Mississippi. Vicks- 
 burg stood on the Walnut Hills, high 
 and impregnable gi'ound on the oppo- 
 site shore. The city must be ap- 
 proached by way of the river. To 
 give any effect to the siege, troops 
 must be landed either above or below 
 the city. To land troops above the 
 city, implied steaming up the Yazoo and 
 passing the formidable batteries at 
 Haines' Bluff, which completely com- 
 manded that river. This, as the latest 
 attempt had proved, was in the last de- 
 gree dangerous, if not absolutely im- 
 possible. It could only succeed by a 
 sacrifice of life which would be but im- 
 perfectly lewarded by the result. To 
 land troops below the city, implied 
 steaming down the Mississippi and pass- 
 ing the Vicksburg defenses throughout 
 
 their entire length. This seemed even 
 a more perilous undertaking than the 
 other. How were these obstacles to be 
 overcome? That was the question 
 which General Grant had now to an- 
 swer. Five different solutions were 
 suggested. There were, first, the Will- 
 iams' Canal ; second, the route from 
 Milliken's Bend ; third, the Lake Provi- 
 dence route; fourth, the Yazoo Pass; 
 and fifth, the route by Steele's Bayou. 
 Let us consider these in the order in 
 which we have named them. 
 
 A glance at the map will show the 
 reader what was meant by the canal, 
 and how practicable at first it seemed. 
 In front of Vicksburg the Mississippi 
 makes a sharp bend, forming the penin- 
 sula on which stands the town of De 
 Soto. A canal cut across this tongue 
 of land, giving a more direct passage 
 to the current of the river, would leave 
 Vicksburg without any water de- 
 fenses — the place would, for all mili- 
 tary pui'poses, be neutralized. It will 
 be remembered that, in the summer of 
 1862, General Williams, who came up 
 the river with Farragut, undertook to 
 cut such a canal, and, for that purpose, 
 gathered some twelve hundred negroes 
 from the plantations in the immediate 
 neighborhood. It has already been 
 nan-ated how, from an error committed 
 in the location of its mouth, the canal 
 proved a failure. The waters stub- 
 bornly refused to leave thei^ ancient 
 channel. This canal or " cut-off," which 
 was one mile in length, was located 
 across the peninsula, at right angles, 
 about six miles below Vicksburg. 
 Grant perc*>Wed that if it could effect* 
 
EXPERIMENTS. 
 
 890 
 
 ively be turned to account, it would 
 not only isolate Vicksburg, but make a 
 channel for the transportation of troops 
 and supplies to the south of the city. 
 To the completion of this work, he 
 gave much of his personal attention, as 
 Boon as he returned from Memphis. 
 
 Meantime, the work had been prose- 
 cated with great vigor by McClemand 
 and Sherman. The men continued to 
 work day and night; and, to secure 
 their protection, good use was made of 
 Porter's fleet, strengthened now by the 
 addition of several armed vessels, such 
 as the Chillicothe, Indianola, Lafayette, 
 Eastport and others. It was a bold 
 and daring experiment to attempt to 
 divert the course of a great river like 
 the Mississippi — all the more so that 
 the former attempt, undertaken in more 
 favorable circumstances, had proved a 
 complete failure. But it was not an 
 impossible task ; and, in the circum- 
 stances, nothing but the absolutely im- 
 possible was to be left untried. The 
 work progressed favorably. The camps 
 were on the west side of the canal ; and 
 the earth was thrown up on that side 
 as a sort of levee. During February, 
 the river continued to rise. By the 
 end of the month, it had risen to a 
 great height ; and the work was carried 
 on with very great difficulty, McCler- 
 nand's corps being removed to higher 
 ground at Milliken's Bend. Sherman 
 remained at Young's Point, and con- 
 tinued to direct operations at the canal. 
 For days the waters, rolling past in 
 their fury, and ever rising higher and 
 higher, had been thi'eatening instant 
 and sweeping destruction to the entire 
 
 scheme. It was now the 8th of March. 
 The barrier at the mouth of the ''cut" 
 could no longer resist the pressure of 
 the great river. Suddenly, this barrier 
 gave way; and the waters rushing 
 through, swept all before them, filling 
 the cut, submerging thousands of im- 
 plements, and di'iving the soldiers to 
 the levee. The canal experiment was 
 a second time a failure. It was not to 
 be tried again. General Grant was no 
 doubt disappointed; but he was not 
 discouraged. 
 
 There were a series of bayous con 
 necting Milliken's Bend with the Ten- 
 sas River, which again connects with 
 the Mississippi, at New Carthage, some 
 distance below Vicksburg. The prin- 
 cipal of these bayous was that of 
 Roundabout or Roundaway, which at 
 one of its extremities unites with the 
 Tensas. In this case, canal-cutting 
 was less necessary than dredging. It- 
 so happened that some dredge boats 
 were on hand; and with these boats, 
 Captain F. E. Prime and Colonel Gr. G. 
 Pride, went earnestly to work. In a 
 short time, a clear passage was eflPected ; 
 and some vessels of light tonnage were 
 able to pass through. The Mississippi, 
 however, began to fall in April; and 
 as the roads between Milliken's Bend 
 and New Carthage became more ser- 
 viceable, this water-way was of com- 
 paratively little value. It was, in fact, 
 another useless experiment. 
 
 General Grant's attention was not 
 devoted exclusively to any one of those 
 possible avenues by which Vicksburg 
 might be approached. His object was 
 to discover a route which should be at 
 
STUART'S RAID. 
 
 33« 
 
 Capturing Chambersburg in tbat State, 
 he destroyed a large quantity of sup- 
 plies, burning machine shops, trains of 
 cars, and other property; and then, 
 having made a complete circuit around 
 McClellan's army, he re-entered Vir- 
 ginia by crossing the Potomac below 
 him. This raid of Stuart roused public 
 indignation to its highest pitch. It 
 was regarded as an open insult to 
 the National army; and it was felt 
 that the Confederates had made good 
 their boast, by carrying war into the 
 free Statea. Still McClellan remained 
 inactive. There was no forward move- 
 ment. Again, on the 2l8t, Halleck 
 telegraphed ; "The president does not 
 
 erpect impossibilities, but he is very 
 anxious that all this good weather 
 should not be wasted in inactivity." 
 McClellan could not move before the 
 1st of November. Then he did move ; 
 but it was too lata On the 7th of that 
 •month there was a heavy snow-storm. 
 It was a sure sign that winter was at 
 hand. Lincoln's patience was at last 
 exhausted — his forbearance had given 
 way ; he had already taken action ; 
 and on the night of that day, while at 
 Rectortown, on his southward march 
 towards Gordonsville, McClellan re- 
 ceived instructions to turn over the 
 command of the army to General Bum 
 side. 
 
 »8S 
 
398 
 
 VICKSBUBG. 
 
 waa hopeless with the force at his con?- 
 mand, retired by the way he came. On 
 his way, he was met by General Quim- 
 by, of McPherson's corps, with some 
 'troops, when another attack was medi- 
 Mar. tated; but on the 23d of March, 
 23. the whole expedition was ordered 
 to return to the Mississippi, General 
 Grant having made up his mind to con- 
 centrate his ai'my at Milliken's Bend. 
 
 This does not exhaust the experi- 
 ments which were made in order to 
 obtain a suitable route by which the 
 National army could be moved so as to 
 attack Vicksburg on the land side. 
 While those other experiments were 
 being made Admiral Porter had been 
 unv/eariedly active. Before it was 
 known what success might attend the 
 expedition by way of Yazoo Pass and 
 the Tallahatchie, Porter had reconnoi- 
 tered another route, by which he hoped 
 the Yazoo might be reached, and a de- 
 scent made above the batteries on 
 Haines' Bluff. Seven miles above the 
 mouth of the Yazoo, what has been 
 called Steele's Bayou empties into that 
 river. Having discovered that about 
 thirty miles up Steele's Bayou there 
 was a passage through Black Bayou to 
 Deer Creek, about six miles distant, 
 and learning from some negroes that 
 Deer Creek could be navigated to Roll- 
 ing Fork, and thence down the Big 
 Sunflower into the Yazoo, Porter noti- 
 fied Grant of the possibilities of this 
 water-way. Grant saw at once that if 
 such a route could be turned to practi- 
 cal account, it would place Greenwood 
 between two bodies of his forces, and 
 compel the abandonment of Fort Pem- 
 
 berton. This was not all. Some thirty 
 of the enemy's steamboats, which had 
 sought refuge in those inland waters, 
 would fall into his hands. 
 
 The expedition was promptly ap- 
 proved of; and five gunboats, several 
 transports, and one of Sherman's divi- 
 sions, were ordered to attempt the new 
 passage. This was the most intricate 
 and difficult of all the routes yet at- 
 tempted. Grant had accompanied Por- 
 ter part of the way, and experienced 
 some of the difficulties, before Sherman 
 was ordered to take with him his pioneer 
 corps or a regiment of first-class men, 
 and, with the steamers Diligence and 
 Silver Wave, proceed up the bayou to 
 the assistance of Porter. In Black 
 Bayou, and in Deer Creek, the most 
 formidable obstacles Avere encountered. 
 The passages were blocked by over- 
 hanging trees, which had to be cut down 
 before the boats could pass. The dark- 
 ness of the moonless night was rendered 
 all the more intense by the deep gloom 
 of the surrounding forests. Rain fell 
 incessantly. In some cases heavy trees, 
 which had been felled, lay across the 
 streams. At last, before Porter had ac- 
 complished the passage of Deer Creek, 
 the Confederates, who had evidently 
 anticipated the movement, were encoun- 
 tered in great force ; and it became peril- 
 ous for the men to show themselves on 
 the gunboats or on the transports. It 
 was found impossible to advance. 
 
 This expedition, like all the others, 
 had to be abandoned ; and it was dis- 
 covered to be no easy matter to effect a 
 retreat. "The expedition," says Gen- 
 eral Grant, " failed, probably, more from 
 
DISAPPOINTMENTS. 
 
 39S 
 
 Want of knowledge as to what would 
 be required to open this route, than 
 from any impracticability in the naviga- 
 tion of the streams and bayous through 
 which it was proposed to pass. The 
 want of this knowledge led the expedi- 
 tion on, and difficailties were encoun- 
 tered, and then it would become neces- 
 sary to send back to Young's Point for 
 the means of removing them. This 
 gave the enemy time to move forces to 
 eifectually checkmate further progress ; 
 and the expedition was withdrawn 
 when within a few hundred yards of 
 free and open navigation to the Yazoo." 
 It seemed as if Vicksburg were des- 
 tined to sit secure on her throne of 
 hills, in proud defiance of all the skill, 
 ingenuity and force of the National 
 government. Farragut and Williams 
 had done their best, but had failed. 
 Sherman and Porter had put forth their 
 noblest efforts, but to no purpose. And 
 now a five-fold failure had been experi- 
 enced by Grant himself. Disappointed 
 he must have been ; but he was not 
 discouraged. Disappointment but gave 
 force to his determination ; his repeated 
 failures but gave him a firmer grasp of 
 the difficulties which he had to over- 
 come ; and out of the darkness, in which 
 he saw but dimly, he was gradually 
 working his way to a clearer light, and 
 to a fuller comprehension of the situa- 
 tion. "At that veiy stage," as Swinton 
 well puts it, "when an intellect of less 
 determined fibre would have been re- 
 signing itself to a seemingly implacable 
 fortune. Grant, overleaping fate and 
 failure, rose to the height of that au- 
 dacious conception, on which, at length. 
 
 he vaulted into Vicksburg." A Na- 
 poleon might not have wasted time in 
 so many fruitless experiments ; but Na- 
 poleon himself could not more resolute- 
 ly have resisted fate — could not more 
 imperiously have resumed operations 
 which were destined to chain victory to 
 his standard. 
 
 It was now evident that all hope of 
 diverting the Mississippi from its chan- 
 nel must be abandoned, and that prac- 
 tical access to the east bank of the 
 Yazoo, in the rear of Vicksburg, was 
 not to be obtained by any of the passes. 
 What was now to be done ? General 
 Grant alone could answer that question. 
 It was the opinion of some. General 
 Sherman included, that the movement 
 so auspiciously begun, but so premature- 
 ly brought to grief, at the close of the 
 previous year, should be resumed. Ac- 
 cording to this plan, it would have been 
 necessaiy for the main army to return 
 up the Mississippi, and, after landing, 
 to make an inland march towards Vicks- 
 burg, on the eastern side of that river ; 
 while the gunboats and a minor land 
 force would have remained behind to 
 threaten Vicksburg on its river front. 
 
 The position of Grant at this stage, 
 so far as appearances went, was not 
 better than it was when he commenced 
 his retreat from Oxford, after the dis- 
 aster at Holly Springs ; and there can 
 be no doubt that he already regretted 
 that retreat. We know that he has 
 since confessed that if the army had 
 had, in December, 1862, the experience 
 which it afterwards acquired, he would 
 have marched on from Oxford, as at 
 first contemplated, and trusted to the 
 
400 
 
 VICKSBUEQ. 
 
 country along his line of march and 
 around Vicksburg for support. A back- 
 ward march, however, at this time, if 
 any other movement promising equal 
 success were possible, would have been 
 in the last degree injudicious. It would 
 have given temporary encouragement, 
 at least, to the Confederates It would 
 have lent emphasis to the howl of dis- 
 content, already loud all over the North. 
 It would — it could not but — have been 
 humiliating to General Grant. Happi- 
 ly, another movement was possible, al- 
 though it was beset at the outset with 
 gi-ave and serious difficulties. 
 
 Grant, whose headquarters were at 
 Milliken's Bend, and whose army was 
 well gathered around him, resolved to 
 attack Vicksburg from the south ; and, 
 in order to give effect to this resolution, 
 he proceeded to make all the necessary 
 arrangements. It was a bold experi- 
 ment — bolder than any yet attempted. 
 It implied gi-eat risks. It implied the 
 mo\ang of the whole army across the 
 Mississippi. But this could not be 
 done at any point within range of the 
 guns of the enemy's works, or without 
 the aid of the gunboats and transports 
 which were lying above the city. The 
 troops would, therefore, have to march 
 at least thirty or forty miles, probably 
 a greater distance, over the worst pos- 
 sible country, at the worst possible sea- 
 son of the year; and the gunboats and 
 transports would have to run the gaunt- 
 let of the long line of batteries which 
 completely commanded the river at 
 Vicksburg. These difficulties overcome, 
 it implied the transportation of the 
 troops across the river, in the face of 
 
 all the opposition of a powerful and 
 vigilant enemy. Nor was this all. It 
 implied the complete abandonment of 
 his former base of communications, with- 
 out having secured another in advance. 
 Such was the movement which General 
 Grant determined to make. Let u^ 
 now see how it was put in execution. 
 
 On the 29th of March the movemeni 
 was commenced. On that day, jjai., 
 General McClernand, with the 29. 
 Thirteenth army corps, moved from Mil- 
 liken's Bend across the peninsula which 
 the river heie makes towards New Car- 
 thage. McPherson was to follow with 
 the Seventeenth army corps as soon as 
 supplies of food, ammunition and other 
 stores could be forwarded. Shermaa 
 with the Fifteenth army corps, was to 
 bring up the rear. The roads were exe- 
 crable. The march was, in consequence, 
 made with the utmost difficulty, and 
 much time was consumed. Roads had to 
 be made and repaired; boats and bridges 
 had to be extemporized ; and, as there 
 was danger that the rising flood might 
 burst its barriers and sweep all before 
 it, some twenty miles of levee had to 
 be carefully guarded both day and 
 night. At last, McClernand 's advance 
 reached Smith's Plantation, about two 
 miles from New Carthage, when it was 
 found that the levee of the Bayou Vidal 
 had given way in several places, and 
 that the town and immediate neighbor- 
 hood were suiTOunded by water. New 
 Carthage, in fact, had become an island. 
 Attempts were made to reach the town 
 by boats. This, however, proved to be 
 too tedious a process ; and, a circuitous 
 road being discovered, the march was 
 
PASSING THE BATTERIES. 
 
 401 
 
 resumed around Bayou Vidal to a point 
 some twelve miles further to the south. 
 The distance travelled from Milliken's 
 Bend was about thirty-five miles. It 
 was a most laborious and tedious 
 march. 
 
 In the meantime, preparations were 
 being pushed forward for running the 
 transports and gunboats past the heavy 
 batteries at Vicksburg. These batteries 
 extended eight miles along the river. 
 April On the night of the 16th of April, 
 •6' the attempt was made by seven 
 irou-clads, one unarmed gunboat, and 
 three transports, the vulnerable parts 
 of which, above the water, were all 
 well protected with hay and cotton. 
 It was arranged that the gunboats 
 should pass down in single file, with 
 intervals between of a few hundred 
 yards, and that when th,ey opened their 
 broadsides upon the batteries, the 
 transports, under cover of the smoke, 
 should endeavor to pass unseen. It 
 was a starlit night ; but there was a 
 haze on the river which dimmed the 
 lights on the Vicksburg heights. The | 
 Benton led the way. It seemed as if 
 the city was wrapped in sleep, and as 
 if the fleet would pass undetected. 
 But no. " At just a quarter before 
 eleven o'clock," an eye-witness tells us, 
 " two bright, sharp lines of flame flashed 
 through the darkness, at the extreme j 
 right of the Vicksburg batteries; and 
 in an instant the whole length of the 
 line of the bluffs was ablaze with fire." 
 The gunboats, which had just rounded 
 the point and lay squarely before the 
 city, opened their broadsides at once. 
 The firing was terrific. In an hour and 
 
 a half the Vicksburg batteries were 
 passed. 
 
 The batteries of Warrenton, a little 
 further down the river, had still to be 
 encountered. As these were approached, 
 the fleet took the initiative, and so 
 continuous and effective was the fire, 
 that the enemy made but a feeble re- 
 sponse. The work was now done, and 
 done effectively. The gunboats were 
 comparatively uninjured. Of the three 
 transports, the Forest Queen, which 
 was in the advance, received one shot 
 in her hull and another in her steam- 
 drum, and was instantly disabled. 
 Taken in tow by a gunboat, she was 
 earned down the river without further 
 damage. The Henry Clay, which was 
 next, having been hit by a shell, waife 
 soon a blazing mass, and beyond all 
 hope of being saved. The Silver Wave 
 had passed through the fiery ordeal un- 
 scathed. On board the gunboats, one 
 man was killed and two men wounded. 
 Not a man was injured on board the 
 transports. The affair had been suo 
 ceesful beyond all expectation. Em- 
 boldened by what had happened. Grant 
 had other six transports prepared and 
 sent down the river on the night of tho 
 22d of April. One of them, the Louis- 
 iana, which was sti'uck below water- 
 maik, was sunk. The other five were 
 all more or less injured, but they were 
 soon repaired, and ready for use again. 
 
 Simultaneously with these move- 
 ments, a magnificent cavalry exploit 
 was being performed by Colonel Ben- 
 jamin H. Grierson. Grant was anxious 
 to ascertain the strength of the Con- 
 federacy, and to find out by a practical 
 
103 
 
 VIOKSBTTEG. 
 
 test what resistance it could make to 
 an invading force well organized and 
 well equipped. He wished to do 
 more: he wished to cut off the Con- 
 federate forces who were protecting 
 Vicksburg fi-om their base of supplies 
 and their lines of communication. Col- 
 onel Grierson was a dashing but able 
 and skilful cavalry officer ; and to him 
 was entrusted this somewhat hazardous 
 April task. On the morning of the 
 *'• 17th of April, while the National 
 troops were still busy seeking a route by 
 which to attack Vicksburg from above, 
 Grrierson, taking with him his own regi- 
 ment, the Sixth Illinois, the Seventh Ill- 
 inois, and the Second Iowa, some 1700 
 horsemen in all, and a battery of artille- 
 fy, started from La Grange, Tennessee, 
 and proceeded on his southward march, 
 in the rear of the Confederate forces. 
 These mounted men, now breaking up 
 into detached parties, and diverging in 
 different directions, and now reuniting, 
 swept the country like a tornado, break- 
 ing up railroad tracks, cutting the tele- 
 graph wires, and burning bridges, 
 depots, cars, manufactories, magazines 
 and stores of every kind. The work 
 was not pei-formed without some hard 
 erperience. On the fith day after their 
 departure from La Grange, Grierson's 
 men rode eight miles through a swamp 
 in which the water was from three to 
 fom- feet deep, losing twenty of their 
 horses. Much of the country through 
 which they passed was utterly desti- 
 tute of forage and provisions; and it 
 was rarely that they could obtain more 
 than one meal a day. In less than six- 
 teen days they had travelled over six 
 
 hundred miles. During the last thirty 
 hours they had accomplished at least 
 eighty miles, fought the enemy four 
 times, swum the Comite River and de- 
 stroyed a Confederate camp. 
 
 At noon, on the 2d day of May, 
 they entered Baton Rouge, amid May 
 the plaudits of Banks' men, horses 2. 
 and men half-famished, and some three 
 fourths of the latter more than half- 
 asleep in their saddles. During the 
 expedition, they had killed and wound- 
 ed one hundred of the enemy, captured 
 and paroled five hundred prisoners, 
 many of them officers, destroyed be- 
 tween fifty and sixty miles of railroad 
 and telegraph, captured and destroyed 
 over three thousand stand of aims, and 
 seized and carried with them over a 
 thousand horses and mules. It was 
 not without reason that General Grant 
 pronounced this one of the most brill- 
 iant exploits of the war, and one 
 which would be handed down in his- 
 toiy as an example to be imitated. 
 Grierson had demonstrated the rotten- 
 ness of the Confederacy. It was a 
 "shell," and nothing more. 
 
 We left General Grant, with the two 
 army corps — McClemand's in advance, 
 McPherson's following close behind— at 
 a point some few miles below New 
 Carthage. Under Grant's own superin- 
 tendence, the necessary preparations 
 were being hurried forward for the 
 transportation of his troops from the 
 west to the east side of the Mississippi. 
 It was his intention to cross the river 
 from this point, and to attempt a land- 
 ing at Grand Gulf. It was found, 
 however, that his means of transports^ 
 
BRUINSBURG. 
 
 403 
 
 tion were insufficient; and he deemed 
 it necessary to extend his line of move- 
 ment as far south as Hard Times, mak- 
 ing tbi' ciKiie distance from Milliken's 
 Bend some seventy or seventy-five 
 miles. On the 29th March, all things 
 were in readiness. McClernand's troops 
 were all forward; and MePherson's 
 were well on their waj'. Sherman, as 
 we have seen, was left behind to bring 
 up the rear. As many of the Thirteenth 
 corps (McClernand's) as could be put 
 on board the transports and barges, 
 were embarked, and moved to the front 
 of Grand Gulf. This was a strong for- 
 tified position on the east bank of the 
 Mississippi, below the mouth of the 
 Big Black River — the last of the forti- 
 fications which guarded the approach to 
 Vicksburg from the south. Grant's 
 plan was to silence the batteries by the 
 gunboats, and, under cover of the fire, 
 to land the troops, and carry the place 
 by storm. At eight o'clock in the 
 morning. Porter moved his fleet towards 
 the enemy's works, and opened a tre- 
 mendous fire. The response was quick 
 and hearty. For five hours and a half 
 the firing on both sides continued. At 
 the end of that time the lower batteries 
 were silenced ; but the upper ones could 
 not be reached. 
 
 From a tugboat on the river. General 
 Grant contemplated the scene. " Many 
 times," he tells us, "it seemed to me 
 that the gunboats were within pistol 
 shot of the enemy's batteries. It soon 
 became evident that the guns of the 
 enemy were too elevated and their for- 
 tifications too strong to be taken from 
 the water side. The whole range of 
 
 hills on that side were known to be 
 lined with rifle-pits. Besides, the field' 
 artillery could be moved to any position 
 where it might be useful, in case of 
 an attempt at landing." He wisely 
 concluded, therefore, to discontinue the 
 firing, and to abandon the attempt to 
 effect a landing at Grand Gulf. Porter 
 was ordered to run past the batteries, 
 with the gunboats and transports, as he 
 had done at Vicksburg and Warrenton, 
 and move down to a point opposite 
 Rodney, where the river might be 
 crossed with less difficulty. At six 
 o'clock that evening, accordingly. Porter 
 renewed the attack ; and, under cover 
 of the fire, the transports passed with- 
 out injury. In the doiible effort thus 
 made, three of the gunboats sustained 
 some damage ; but they were soon re- 
 paired. Porter had 24 men killed and 
 56 wounded. 
 
 During the course of the night, infor- 
 mation was obtained from a negro who 
 had been selling home-made beer at 
 Grand Gulf, that there was a good road 
 from Bruinsburg to Port Gibson, on the 
 Bayou Pierre, in the rear of Grand 
 Gulf. Bruinsbiu'g lies between Grand 
 Gulf and Rodney. At Bruinsbui'g, ac- 
 cordingly. General Grant resolved to 
 effect a landing. At daylight, on j^^f, 
 the morning of the 30th, the gun- 30. 
 boats and transports were again in mo- 
 tion. The landing was effected with- 
 out any great inconvenience. McCler- 
 nand's corps (the Thirteenth) was fer 
 ried across first. MePherson's (the 
 Fourteenth), which had arrived from 
 Lake Providence, followed. Without 
 delay, both corps, having been supplied 
 
404 
 
 VICKSBURG. 
 
 with rations for three days, were on 
 T;heir way to Port Gibson. 
 
 The east side of the Mississippi, be- 
 low y icksburg, had at last been reached 
 with comparative ease. The crossing 
 might have been attended with greater 
 difficulty, but for the use which was 
 made of Sherman and his corps. While 
 waiting for orders to follow the other 
 two corps, Sherman received from 
 Grant a letter, couched in very friendly 
 terms, requesting him, while McCler- 
 nand and McPherson were attempting 
 to cross the river below, "to make a 
 demonstration on Haines' Bluff, and to 
 make all the show possible." He did 
 not like, he said, to order him to do it, 
 because it might be reported at the 
 North as another failure. Sherman an- 
 swered that he would do as required, 
 without any regard to public clamor at 
 a distance ; and he did it most eflfec- 
 tually. On the 29th, at an early hour 
 in the morning, he embarked ten regi- 
 ments, of Blair's division, on ten steam- 
 ers, and, preceded by several irou-clads 
 and gunboats, he ascended the Yazoo, 
 and lay for the night at the mouth of 
 Chickasaw Bayou. Towards evening, 
 he caused the troops to disembark in 
 full view of the enemy, although, as he 
 has himself told us, he "knew full well 
 that there was no road across the sub- 
 merged field that lay between the river 
 and the bluff." 
 
 This movement had the desired ef- 
 fect. Pemberton had just sent off a 
 large force to assist General Bowen to 
 resist the threatened attack on the 
 river below. Seeing this movement in 
 his front, and di-eading an immediate 
 
 assault in great force, he recalled his 
 men, and ordered them to take position 
 at Haines' Bluff. The feint resulted 
 advantageously in a double sense. It 
 withdrew opposition from the point at 
 which the troops were to be pushed 
 across the river ; and the marching and 
 counter-marching so fatigued Pember- 
 ton's troops, that they were unfit for 
 serious work when the real encounter 
 took place. For two days, Sherman 
 preserved this threatening attitude. As 
 the other two corps had crossed the 
 river seventy-five miles below, and 
 gained a firm footing on the " high pla- 
 teau in rear of Vicksburg," further de- 
 monstration in the direction of Haines' 
 Bluff was unnecessary. Sherman was 
 accordingly ordered to hasten forward 
 and join the main army. 
 
 It had been General Grant's inten- 
 tion, up to the time of his crossing the 
 Mississippi, to collect all his forces at 
 Grand Gulf, to get on hand a good 
 supply of provisions and ordnance 
 stores, and, in the meantime, to detach 
 an army corps to co-operate with Gen- 
 eral Banks against Port Hudson, in the 
 hope that thereby he might be able to 
 effect a junction of the two armies. A 
 letter from General Banks informed 
 him that it would be impossible for 
 him to return to Baton Rouge before 
 the 10th of May, but that by the re- 
 duction of Port Hudson, he would be 
 able to join him with 12,000 men. 
 About the same time, information 
 reached him that troops were expected 
 at Jackson from the Southern cities, 
 with General Beauregard in command. 
 Grant wisely concluded that delay un 
 
PORT GIBSON. 
 
 40b 
 
 der the ciicumstances was dangerous- 
 all the more so that on the 10th of May, 
 with the addition of 12,000 men, his 
 strength relatively would not be so 
 great as it now was. He resolved, 
 therefore, to act at once. This decisive 
 step was taken on his own responsi- 
 bility. He did not consult the authori- 
 ties at Washington ; for he knew that 
 he would encounter opposition alike 
 from Lincoln and from Halleck, both 
 of whom were in favor of his effecting 
 a union v^nth Banks. 
 
 As soon as the troops had been 
 landed on the other side of the river, 
 the onward movement was commenced. 
 May On the morning of the 1st of 
 l- May, about two o'clock, when 
 some eight miles from Bruinsburg, the 
 advance, under McClernand, came into 
 contact with the enemy. The Confede- 
 rates retired ; and no attempt at pursuit 
 was made imtil daylight. Early in the 
 morning, General Grant rode forw£J'd, 
 with his staff, and found McClernand 
 engaged with a strong force of the 
 enemy, about four miles from Port 
 Gibson. At this point the road forked 
 off in two opposite du-ections, both 
 branches, however, leading to Port 
 Gibson. These roads which, for the 
 most pait, ran ali>'jg narrow ridges, 
 were flanked on either side by deep 
 and impenetrable ravines. The Con- 
 federates had taken position on both 
 roads. It was a position which offered 
 peculiar advantages to the resisting 
 party, as in falling back, they necessa- 
 rily divided the pursuing forces. It was 
 held by General Bowen, with not more 
 than 6000 men. McClei-nand's troops 
 
 were divided so as to suit the require- 
 ments of the ground. The divisions of 
 Hovey, Carr and Smith were on the 
 right; the division of Osterhaus was 
 on the left. McClernand advanced 
 with the three divisions. The Confed- 
 erates offered a stubborn resistance, 
 contesting point after point with great 
 bravery. The National forces on the 
 right made steady advances on the 
 enemy, driving him from position to 
 position ; but Osterhaus on the left was 
 making no impression on his stubborn 
 antagonist. On the anival of Logan's 
 division, of McPherson's corps. Grant 
 sent one brigade to the assistance of 
 McClernand and another to the assist- 
 ance of Osterhaus. Effective resistance 
 was no longer possible. At both points 
 the Confederates gave way, but fell back 
 in good order towards Port Gibson. 
 Night closing in, the Nationals halted, 
 and rested on their arms in the expecta- 
 tion of renewing the conflict in the morn- 
 ing. When morning came, it was found 
 that the Confederates had abandoned 
 Port Gibson, had crossed both forks of 
 the Bayou PieiTe, and burned the bridges 
 in their rear. In this engagement, the 
 Confederates sustained a heavy loss. 
 The Nationals captured three guns, 
 four flags and 580 prisoners. Their 
 loss was 130 killed and 780 woimded. 
 This encounter is generally spoken of 
 as the battle of Port Gibson. 
 
 No time was lost in the reconstruo 
 tion of the bridges; and on the jfay 
 3d of May, the Confederates were S» 
 pui-sued as far as Hankinson's Ferry. 
 On the same day, Grant ha\ang discov- 
 ered that Grand Gulf had been evao 
 
 li44 
 
400 
 
 VICKSBUEG. 
 
 uated, resolved to transfer his base of 
 supplies from Bruinsburg to that place. 
 At Hankinson's Ferry, he halted his 
 forces, and waited for wagons and sup- 
 plies, as well as for the arrival of Sher- 
 May man. On the 7th of May, that 
 ''• general succeeded in carrying 
 across the river nis entire command, 
 with the exception of Blair's division, 
 which Avas left at Milliken's Bend to 
 protect the depots there, until relieved 
 by troops from Memphis. On the same 
 day, General Grant gave orders for a 
 general forward movement of the whole 
 army. 
 
 In a previous chapter, we endeavored 
 to present a clear and intelligible view 
 of Vicksburg, as looked at from the 
 river side. Built on one side of a sharp 
 bend in the river, on a high line of 
 blufFs, which extend some fifteen miles 
 from Haines' Bluff, touching the Yazoo 
 on the north to a point below Warren- 
 ton on the south, the heights being for- 
 tified throughout their entu-e length, 
 and the ground on the triangle in front 
 of the Northern defenses being all but 
 impassable, it is no abuse of language 
 to say that on the rivei- front Vicks- 
 burg was impregnable. We have al- 
 ready seen how all the attempts on that 
 side had failed. We have now to look 
 at Vicksburg from a different stand- 
 point. Another and formidable effort 
 was about to be made to reduce the "city 
 of an hundred hills "; but this time the 
 attack was to be made on the land side — 
 not from the river. It is but truth to 
 say that, at the time of Grant's ap- 
 proach, the obstacles to be encountered 
 and overcome on the land side were, in 
 
 many respects, as great as those on the 
 side of the river. There was first the 
 Bayou Pierre, vsdth its steep banks, 
 forming an outer line. Then came the 
 Big Black, with its tributaries, Big 
 Sandy, Five Mile, Fourteen Mile and 
 Baker's Creeks. This, however, was 
 not all. The roads were narrow, and 
 not unfrequently, as we have just seen, 
 flanked on both sides by deep ravines. 
 The whole country was broken and ir- 
 regular, presenting serious obstacles to 
 an invading army. Nearer the city, 
 the surrounding heights were crowned 
 with fortifications — bastioned forts, re- 
 doubts, redans, detached batteries with- 
 out number, and countless lines of con- 
 necting rifle-pits. It was not without 
 reason that the South was proud of 
 Vicksburg. After Richmond, it wa3 
 the strongest place within the limits of 
 the Confederate States. Such was the 
 place which Grant had resolved to cap- 
 ture. Such were the obstacles which 
 lay in the way of the accomplishment 
 of his purpose. 
 
 It was General Graat's design to se- 
 cure his rear by a rapid march on Jack- 
 son, the capital of the State of Missis- 
 sippi, to destroy the public property 
 there, to break up the railroad which 
 connects that capital with Vicksburg, 
 and then to concentrate his fot-ces. 
 around the doomed city. In order the 
 more effectually to accomplish his pur- 
 pose, he deemed it prudent to distract 
 the attention of the enemy, and to con- 
 ceal, as far as possible, his real inten- 
 tion. Reconnoitering parties to the 
 west side of the Big Black felt their 
 way, unmolested, to within six miles of 
 
RAYMOND. 
 
 40T 
 
 Warrenton. The main body of the army 
 advanced by two parallel roads on the 
 southeast bank of the same river — Mc- 
 Pherson on the road to the left; Mc- 
 Clernand on the ridge road, a little 
 more to the right; Sherman, vehose 
 corps was divided, following on both 
 roads. On the 11th, and while these 
 movements were being cairied out. 
 Grant telegraphed to General Halleck 
 that he would communicate no more 
 with Grand Gulf, and that several 
 weeks might elapse before he would 
 ao;ain hear from him. That night Mc- 
 demand's corps was on and near the 
 Baldwin's Ferry Road ; Sherman's corps 
 was at and beyond Auburn ; and Mc- 
 Pherson, with his corps, was eight 
 miles to the right, a little in advanc«» of 
 Utica, in the direction of Raymond. 
 
 On the morning of the 12th, Sherman 
 Blay and McClernand crossed Fourteen 
 •2. Mile Creek, the former at Dillon's 
 Plantation, the latter a little further to 
 the west. At both crossings the enemy 
 was encountered, and there was severe 
 skirmishing. Grant had been with 
 Sherman from the time the latter ar- 
 rived at Auburn. McPherson, who, as 
 we have seen, was moving northward 
 some seven or eight miles to the west, 
 when ^vithin two or three miles of Ray- 
 mond, encountered the Confederates in 
 much greater force. Two brigades of 
 the enemy, some six thousand strong, 
 under Generals Gregg and Walker, the 
 former being in command, were well 
 posted near Farnden's Creek. The 
 troops were for the most part concealed 
 in the thickly-wooded and irregular 
 ground which bordered the streajn 
 
 Two powerful batteries, planted on an 
 eminence, commanded the two roads by 
 which the Nationals were approaching. 
 Logan, who was in the advance, was 
 the first to feel the weight of the ene- 
 my's arm. His second brigade, which 
 advanced to the edge of the woods, 
 called forth a vigorous and well-direct- 
 ed volley. De Golyer's artillery was 
 ordered forward, when for the first 
 time the Confederates opened their bat- 
 teries. The firing was kept up with 
 great vigor on both sides. Finding it 
 impossible to silence the National ar- 
 tillery, the Confederates made a tre- 
 mendous rush for the guns. The Na- 
 tional gunners stuck to their posts. 
 They were not to be intimidated. 
 Waiting till the Confederates were 
 fairly within range, they opened upon 
 them a well-directed fire of shot and 
 shell. The Confederates, their ranks 
 torn in pieces by exploding shells, halt- 
 ed, broke, and retired in confusion be- 
 yond the creek. There, however, they 
 rallied, and re-formed. McPherson fol- 
 lowed them lip, and ordered a fresh at- 
 tack on their new position. This time 
 the movement was led by the bi-igade 
 of General Dennis. The struggle at 
 this point was protracted and severe, 
 the Twentieth Ohio, the Twentieth 
 Illinois and the Twenty-Third Indiana 
 being badly cut up. Offering a most 
 stubborn resistance, the Confederates, 
 although compelled to yield some of 
 their ground, still maintained an un- 
 broken front. Roused to the highest 
 pitch of excitement, the Eighth Illinois, 
 Colonel Sturgis, at the supreme moment 
 of the fight, rushed with tremendous 
 
«og 
 
 VICKSBURG. 
 
 fury, and with fixed bayonets, on this 
 unbroken and apparently in\4ncible 
 phalanx. The attack was irresistible. 
 The Confederate line broke in frag- 
 ments, and, in disordered masses, fled 
 from the creek. Such was the battle of 
 Raymond. It lasted three hours. The 
 Confederate loss in this engagement 
 was 103 killed and 720 wounded. 
 The National loss was 69 killed, 341 
 wounded and 32 missing. The battle 
 of Raymond added to the already 
 great reputation of McPherson, and to 
 Logan's growing fame. 
 
 McClemand and Sherman had been 
 ordered to move towards the Vicks- 
 burg and Jackson Railroad by parallel 
 roads, the former in the direction of 
 Edwai'd's Station, the latter to a point 
 between Edward's Station and Bolton. 
 This order was countermanded, and 
 both were ordered to march towards 
 Raymond. This change had been ren- 
 dered necessary by the battle which 
 had just been fought, the defeated 
 Confederates having retreated in the 
 direction of Jackson, where it was 
 known General Joe Johnston was 
 hourly expected, with large reinforce- 
 ments. General Grant resolved to 
 make sure of Raymond, so ais to have 
 no enemy in his rear. Determined to 
 anticipate Johnston, and to prevent by 
 all possible means a junction between 
 him and Pemberton, Grant hurried for- 
 May ward his troops. On the 13th, 
 •3' McPherson pushed on towards 
 Clinton, entering the town unopposed 
 about two o'clock in the afternoon, and 
 immediately destroyed a section of the 
 railroad, thus cutting off supplies from 
 
 Vicksburg. This was a victory in it- 
 self. Losing no time, McPherson has- 
 tened towards Jackson. Sherman was 
 marching to the same point by the di- 
 rect road from Raymond. McCler- 
 nand, meanwhile, was taking a position 
 near Raymond. 
 
 Johnston had arrived at Jackson on 
 the 13th. There he found the brigades 
 of Gregg and Walker which, on the 
 preceding day had fallen back before 
 McPherson from Raymond. He knew 
 that Grant was approaching; and re- 
 cognizing the militaiy genius mani- 
 fested in the conception of the cam- 
 paign, as well as impressed by the 
 terrible energy with which it was being 
 executed, he felt convinced that he had 
 to deal with a formidable antagonist. 
 He, therefore, ordered Pemberton to 
 move up to Clinton, in rear of the Na- 
 tional force, which he imagined to be 
 only a detachment. He was to move 
 that night. " To beat such a detach- 
 ment," he said, " would be of immense 
 value. The troops could here co-ope- 
 rate. All the strength you can quickly 
 assemble should be brought. Time is 
 all-important." It was sound advice. 
 It indicated a course which Pemberton 
 ought to have followed at an earlier 
 date. There was a bare probability, 
 however, that if Johnston's advice had 
 been taken, the movements of General 
 Grant might have been seriously em- 
 barrassed. Pemberton, who held posi- 
 tion at Edward's Station, might at 
 least have been able to effect a junction 
 with Johnston. What did he do ? He 
 called a council of war. It was the 
 opinion of the majority of the officers 
 
JACKSON. 
 
 409 
 
 that Joanston's order should be obeyed. 
 It was the opinion of not a few of them 
 that, in place of following out Johnston's 
 instructions, a movement should be made 
 to cut off Grant's supplies from the 
 Mississippi — a very unnecessary move- 
 ment, as Grant had, five days before 
 this time, notified the government that 
 he "would communicate no more with 
 Grand Gulf." "My own views," says 
 Pemberton, "were expressed as un- 
 favoi'able to any movement which 
 would remove me from my base, which 
 was and is Vicksburg. I did not, how- 
 ever, see fit to place my own judgment 
 and opinions so far in opposition as to 
 prevent the movement altogether ; but 
 believing the only possibility of success 
 to be in the plan proposed, of cutting 
 off the enemy's supplies, I directed all 
 my disposable force — say seventeen 
 thousand five hundred — toward Ray- 
 mond." On the morning of the 14th, 
 therefore, when Johnston was momen- 
 tarily expecting the arrival of the Na- 
 tionals, his expected reinforcements not 
 having come up, he was depending en- 
 tirely on the two brigades of Walker 
 and Gregj;. McPherson moved on Jack- 
 son by the Clinton Road. Sheraian 
 advanced by the road which leads from 
 Raymond. Both encountered some 
 slight opposition ; and both entered the 
 place at the same time. It was an easy 
 victory. The Confederates made good 
 their retreat, moving northward, in the 
 direction of Canton. It was found that 
 the State and city officials had fled, 
 carrying with them the State papers 
 and funds. Seventeen guns had been 
 Hptured; but the commissary and 
 
 quartermaster's stores were in flames. 
 Grant entered the city with Sherman';? 
 head of column. His soldiers patrolled 
 the streets, and brought the prisoner? 
 to the State House. In the hotel, in 
 front of the State House, the three 
 generals met, when arrangements were 
 made for the immediate future of the 
 campaign. During the night of the 
 1 3th and the morning of the 14th, up 
 until noon, the rain fell in torrents; 
 but the rank and file of the army oi 
 the West were inured to the hardships 
 of a soldier's life; and, while excellent 
 work was done and the most perfecl 
 order preserved, there was neither mup 
 mur nor complaint. 
 
 On the morning of the 14th, General 
 Grant learned that Johnston had jjiaj 
 ordered Pemberton to move im- ^^' 
 mediately out of Vicksburg, cross the 
 Big Black, and fall upon the National 
 rear. Grant saw at once what was 
 meant, and he gave his corps command- 
 ers to understand that " time was all- 
 important." All his and their energies 
 must now be bent to prevent the junc- 
 tion of the Confederate forces. Action 
 was taken at once. Pemberton must 
 receive the lesson which had just been 
 given to Johnston. Orders were given 
 for a concentration of the entire Na- 
 tional army in the direction of Edward's 
 Station. McClernand was ordered to 
 gather together his scattered divisions, 
 and move towards Bolton. Blair, with 
 his division, was detached from Sher- 
 man's corps, and ordered to move in 
 the same direction. Similar instruc- 
 tions were given to McPherson. Sher- 
 man, with the bulk of his troops, was 
 
4iO 
 
 VICKSBUEG. 
 
 ordered to remain for the present at 
 Jackson, the special duty assigned him 
 being the destruction of the railroads, 
 bridges, factories, woi'kshops, arsenals, 
 and everything which might be of any 
 value or service to the enemy. This 
 duty was faithfully performed, and 
 with a rapidity and completeness 
 which characterized all the doings of 
 that great soldier. Bolton was favor- 
 ably situated for the conveyance of the 
 troops. It was a convenient point from 
 which to move on Edward's Station. 
 jjay On the morning of the loth the 
 *5i movement began. Grant had 
 been particularly careful that there 
 should be no mistake ; and, as McCler- 
 nand was at some distance from his 
 headquarters, he sent Lieutenant-Colo- 
 nel Wilson, of his staff, to explain to 
 him the situation, and to urge imme- 
 diate action. Grant himself hastened 
 to the front. 
 
 Meanwhile, what was Pemberton do- 
 ing ? He had received a despatch from 
 Johnston on the 14th, "suggesting, not 
 ordering," as he afterwards said, a com- 
 bined attack on McPherson at Clinton. 
 It was not until the next morning that 
 he began to move towards Raymond. 
 He did not know that his chief had fled 
 from Jackson, and that Grant, with the 
 bulk of his army, was making forced 
 marches westward. He had been de- 
 layed for some hours in passing a 
 branch of Bakei's Creek, which was 
 greatly swollen by the heavy rains. 
 He had, therefore, only reached Cham- 
 pion Hills, a strong place, some four or 
 five miles from Baker's Creek, when he 
 rec^ved a note from Johnston, directing 
 
 him to move northward, so that they 
 might be able to unite their forces. 
 Pemberton halted, sent back his wagon 
 trains to the Big Black, and was pre- 
 paring to follow, when he learned that 
 Grant was close at hand. It was too 
 late to return. It was perilous to ad- 
 vance. He, therefore, took position, 
 and remained to fight. The ground 
 was well adapted for offering resistance. 
 To the left of the road, as it approaches 
 Vicksburg, there was a high, undulat- 
 ing hill, covered by a dense forest and 
 undergrowth. To the right, the timber 
 extended a little way down the hill, 
 and then opened into cultivated fields, 
 and a valley which stretched out for a 
 considerable distance. On the right, 
 the slope was gentle. Pemberton had 
 posted his army right across the road, 
 his left wing resting on a height where 
 the road made a sharp turn to the left. 
 General W. W. Loring commanded his 
 ]'ight ; General John Bowen his centre ; 
 and General Carter L. Stevenson his 
 left. 
 
 It was the morning of the 16th of 
 May. Grant was already at the may 
 front. There he found Hovey, of 16» 
 McClernaud's corps, getting into line, 
 and nearly ready for battle- Hovey, 
 who had moved iip the road, occupied 
 the centre ; McPherson, with two of his 
 divisions, was stationed on the right ; 
 and Smith and Blair were to take pasi- 
 tion on the left. The enemy was not 
 only well posted : he was strong in 
 numbei's. Grant, unwilling to run any 
 unnecessaiy risks, forbade an attack un- 
 til the arrival of McClernand, who was 
 coming up with four divisions. Mes- 
 
CHAMPION HILLS. 
 
 411 
 
 sages were sent to McClemand, urging 
 him forward with all possible haste. 
 In vain did Grant listen for the sound 
 of McClemand's guns. Every minute 
 made it more difficult to postpone the 
 conflict. The troops were already in 
 close contact. Hovey's advance was 
 developing the enemy's skiriuishing 
 line. The firing became more and more 
 rapid ; and by eleven o'clock the battle 
 had fairly begun. Hovey's division 
 was soon fully engaged. This division, 
 indeed, which was composed of Ohio, 
 Indiana and Wisconsin troops, bore 
 the brunt of the battle. General Mc- 
 Ginnis gallantly led the attack. A 
 vigorous charge w^as made upon two 
 Confederate batteries, which were post- 
 ed upon a ridge; and one of them was 
 captured. The battle raged with gi'eat 
 fury for an hour and a half. Pember- 
 ton, however, continued to mass his men 
 in the centre and towards the National 
 right; and Hovey's troops, pressed by 
 superior numbers, unable to hold their 
 pcjsition or to retain possession of the 
 captured guns, reluctantly fell back 
 nearly half a mile. Hovey called for 
 help. Help could not be given without 
 weakening McPherson on the right; but 
 help could not be refused, except at the 
 risk of losing the fight. 
 
 Knowingthat McClernand would soon 
 be up, and having no fear of the result, 
 Grant sent first one and then another 
 brigade, of Croker's division, of McPher- 
 son's corps, to the aid of Hovey, who 
 gallantly renewed the conflict. Mean- 
 while, Logan's division was operating 
 with great effect on the enemy's left 
 and rear. When Hovey called for 
 
 more troops, Logan rode up to General 
 Grant, and told him that if Hovey 
 could make another dash at the ene- 
 my, he could come up where he then 
 was, and capture the greater part of 
 the opposing army. Grant rode for 
 ward, and cheered the troops who had 
 been so gallantly engaged, urging them 
 again to the attack, and explaining the 
 position of Logan's division. Logan 
 continued to press heavily on Pember- 
 ton's left. General C. L. Stevenson, 
 Hovey holding his ground in the cen- 
 tre. About five o'clock in the after- 
 noon, Stevenson's line, which for some 
 time had been yielding under Logan's 
 pressure, broke, and fell back in dis- 
 order. The battle was lost. Loring, 
 who commanded on the Confederate 
 right, had already left the field, leaving 
 his cannon behind him. When his left 
 gave out, Pemberton's heart sank within 
 him ; and he ordered a retreat of his 
 whole army. McClernand, with Carr's 
 division, followed by that of Osterhaus, 
 arrived on the field only in time to 
 pursue the retreating foe. The battle 
 of Champion Hills was fought and won 
 by Hovey's division, of McClernand's 
 corps, and by Logan's and Quimby's, 
 commanded by Croker, of McPher- 
 son's corps. It was a bloody and 
 most unequal strife, the Nationals from 
 the outset being greatly outnumbered. 
 The National loss amounted to nearly 
 2500, of whom some 430 were killed. 
 The loss sustained by the Confederates 
 must have been even more severe ; for 
 in addition to killed and wounded, 
 2000 were made prisoners 
 
 After the battle was ended, it was 
 
412 
 
 VICKSBURG. 
 
 discovered that the Vicksburg Road, 
 after following the ridge in a southerly 
 direction for about a mile, turns almost 
 to the west, across the valley in which 
 Logan was operating. One of Logan's 
 brigades had nearly reached this road. 
 Consciously or unconsciously to himself, 
 Logan's manoeuvre was thus threatening 
 the Confederate rear and the capture of 
 the gi'eater portion of Pemberton's army. 
 There is no evidence that the existence 
 of this road was known to Grant, or any 
 of his commanders, at the commence- 
 ment of or during the contest. Its ex- 
 istence was, of course, known to the 
 Confederates. This circumstance goes 
 far to explain the panic which seized 
 Loring on the right, and Stevenson on 
 the left, and which at last demoralized 
 the centre, making flight a necessity. 
 The non-arrival of McClernand in time 
 was unfortunate, and threatened to be 
 dangerous; and, most undoubtedly, if 
 the result had been different, he would 
 have been called to account. General 
 Grant evidently felt the delicacy of Mc- 
 Clernand's position, and the necessity 
 for some explanation of his conduct; 
 and it redounds to his credit that, in his 
 I'eport, he takes some pains and goes 
 somewhat out of his way to throw over 
 his lieutenant the mantle of his protec- 
 tion. "The delay," he says, "in the 
 advance of the troops immediately with 
 McClernand was caused, no doubt, by 
 the enemy presenting a front of artillery 
 and infantry where it was impossible, 
 from the nature of the ground and the 
 density of the forest, to discover his 
 numbers." 
 
 If any blame was attachable to Mc- 
 
 Clernand for his delay in coming up on 
 the 1 6th, he nobly atoned for it by his 
 conduct of the pursuit on the day fol- 
 lowing. The pursuit, as we have seen, 
 was commenced on the afternoon of the 
 16th. It was continued until after 
 dai-k, with great loss to the Confede- 
 rates. A train of cars, loaded with a 
 large quantity of commissary and ord- 
 nance stores, fell into the hands of the 
 pursuers; and the 'Confederates them- 
 selves destroyed much valuable proper- 
 ty, which they found it impossible to 
 carry with them. McClernand biv- 
 ouacked for the night on the hill which 
 overlooks Edward's Station. It was 
 Saturday night. On Sunday morning 
 the pursuit was resumed ; but it was not 
 long continued. The Nationals were 
 soon brought to a standstill by the strong 
 works which the Confederates had con- 
 structed on both sides of the Big Black, 
 in the neighborhood of the Railroad 
 Bridge. On the west side, the bluffs 
 extend to the water's edge. On the 
 eastern side, there is an open, cultivated 
 plain, nearly a mile in width, surround- 
 ed by a bayou of stagnant water, from 
 two to three feet in depth, and from 
 ten to twenty in width, reaching from 
 the river above the railroad to the river 
 below. Following the line of this 
 bayou, which served as a ditch in front, 
 was a well-constructed line of rifle-pita. 
 Behind the defenses on the eastern side 
 of the river were the brigades of Green, 
 Villepigue and Cockrell. A little above 
 the Railroad Bridge, was a passage-way 
 for troops, constructed of steamboat 
 hulks. On the western side which, as we 
 have said, was steep, the bluffs running 
 
THE BIG BLACK. 
 
 ilH 
 
 down to the water's edge, there were 
 strong fortifications, mounted with 
 heavy guns. Such was the new posi- 
 tion which obstructed the triumphant 
 Nationals in their onward march to 
 Vicksburg. Of the pursuing party, 
 Carr's division occupied the extreme 
 advance. Of this division, Lawler com- 
 manded the ri2;ht bris-ade. After seve- 
 I'al hours ineffectual skirmishing, Lawler 
 discovered that, by mo\nng under cover 
 of the river bank, he could gain a point 
 from which a successful assault might 
 be made. It was a hazardous opera- 
 tion, because of the level ground over 
 which a portion of the troops would 
 have to pass without cover, and because 
 of the ditch in front of the works. 
 Lawler gave the order ; the charge was 
 gallantly made ; and in spite of the 
 obstacles which lay in their way, and 
 the tempest of 'bullets which decimated 
 their ranks, the brave fellows, whose 
 comrades were falling at every step by 
 their side, nobly and successfully ac- 
 complished their task. Not a shot did 
 they fire until they had crossed the 
 ditch ; then they poured forth one 
 simultaneous and terrific volley, and, 
 rushing forward without reloading, they 
 carried the works at the point of the 
 bayonet. Almost the entire garrison, 
 and seventeen pieces of artillery, several 
 thousand stand of arms, and a large 
 quantity of commissary stores, were the 
 trophies of this daring and brilliant 
 exploit. Only a few of the ganison, 
 some 1500 strong, had found their way 
 across the river, when the Confederates 
 on the western bank set fire to both 
 bridges — th" railroad bridge and the 
 
 bridge of boats — thus shutting off their 
 comrades from all means of escape, and 
 checking the progress of the National 
 troops. It was a cruel measure, and 
 as the result proved, a useless piece of 
 incendiarism ; but such things are not 
 unlawful in war. Such was the battle 
 of the Bio; Black. It briofhtened the 
 fame of McClernand ; but Lawler, and 
 his brave brigade, carried off the honors 
 of the day. In the engagement, Oster- 
 haus was wounded. 
 
 With as little delay as possible, float- 
 ing bridges were thrown across the river. 
 On the afternoon of the 17th, McCler- 
 nand came up ; and all the neces- May 
 sary preparations were completed "'• 
 for continuing the pursuit. On the 
 folloAving morning his corps, and that 
 of McPherson, which had also arrived, 
 crossed to the western side of the Big 
 Black. After the battle of Champion 
 Hills, Sherman had been ordered to 
 advance to Bridgeport, some miles to 
 the north of the railroad bridge. By 
 crossing the river at that point, it was 
 expected he would be able effectually 
 to fall on the enemy's flank, in the 
 event of his making a stand at the 
 bridge on the western shore. On the 
 17th, Sherman had reached his destina- 
 tion, and been joined by Grant. Sher- 
 man had with him a pontoon train, the 
 only one with the army. On the even- 
 ing oi that day, the bridge having 
 been thrown across, the troops began 
 the passage. After dark, the scene 
 was lit up with fires of pitch-pine. 
 Grant and Sherman having crossed, 
 seated themselves on a log, and, by the 
 light of the blazing pine fires, wi*- 
 
 M« 
 
114 
 
 VICKSBURG. 
 
 nessed the passage of the Fifteenth 
 corps, Sherman's own. Having made 
 known his purpose, and explained his 
 plans for the morrow, Grant returned 
 through the forest to his headquarters 
 in the cane-brake. Next day Shei'- 
 man, in his onward march to Vicks- 
 burg, and when about three and a half 
 miles from the city, turned to the 
 right, in the direction of the Yazoo and 
 the northern extremity of the Walnut 
 Hills. That night, Haines' Bluff was' 
 in his possession ; and he had opened 
 communication with Admiral Porter 
 on the Yazoo. Porter, who left his 
 iron-clads below Vicksburg, had entered 
 the Yazoo on the 16th, to be ready 
 to co-operate with the army. On the 
 18th he heard, in the rear of Vicks- 
 burg, the sound of cannon ; and soon 
 afterwards, by the use of his glass, he 
 discovered Sherman's division on the 
 left of Snyder's Bluff, and knew that 
 the Confederates at that place had 
 been cut off from joining the forces in 
 the city. With the view of opening 
 communication with the army, he des- 
 patched, up the Yazoo, the De Kalb, 
 the Choctaw, the Romeo and the For- 
 est Rose, under Lieutenant-Commander 
 Breeze. The task was easily accom- 
 plished. Menaced by the land forces 
 on the adjoining heights, the Confed- 
 erates made a precipitate retreat, leav- 
 ing everything behind them — stores of 
 all kinds, guns, gun-carriages, ammu- 
 nition, tents, and an admirably con- 
 structed camp. The Yazoo was now 
 open. A base of supplies had thus 
 been secured for the National army; 
 Mid if Vicksburg could not be taken 
 
 by assault. Grant could afford to wait, 
 and force submission by the slower 
 process of a siege. 
 
 It was a proud satisfaction to both 
 Porter and Sherman, to find themselves 
 masters of this important position at 
 last. The woiks at Haines' Bluff had 
 been abandoned on the 17th. They 
 were found to have been very strong, 
 " Such a network of forts," says Porter, 
 "I never saw." Writing to M. L. 
 Smith, some time afterwards, Sherman 
 says, " As soon as we had fixed things 
 in Jackson, I made good time in reach- 
 ing the very point above Vicksburg 
 that we had worked so hard and thank- 
 lessly for last Januaiy. It has fulfilled 
 all my expectations, and we now have 
 high and commanding ground, and haul 
 all our stores from our old landing, at 
 Chickasaw Bayou. The very roads 
 made by the enemy, which enabled him 
 to mass his troops so promptly before 
 us, are now ours, and answer an ad- 
 mirable purpose. I ride often to the 
 very hill from which all our movements 
 were telegi'aphed, and enjoy an inter- 
 nal satisfaction that, after five months' 
 patient labor and fighting, I can now 
 reciprocate the compliment. We are 
 close upon the enemy; our artillery 
 reaches every part of the city, which, I 
 am told, has become like a prairie-dog 
 callage, all burrowed in the earth." 
 At this stage. Grant must have felt 
 well-satisfied. He had now marched 
 two hundred miles since he crossed 
 the river at Bruinsburg, had fought 
 four battles, had taken ninety guns, 
 had captured six thousand prisoners 
 had cut off Pembertar's retreat; and 
 
THE FIRST ASSAULT. 
 
 415 
 
 he knew that Vicksburg was already 
 May ill his grasp. On the 19th, the in- 
 **• vestment of Vicksl)ui'g was com- 
 pleted. Porter commanded the city 
 from the river, cutting off all communi- 
 cations on that side. McPherson took 
 position at the front, when Sherman 
 turned off to the right. McClernand 
 came up the Jackson Road to Mount 
 Alban's, and then turned to the left to 
 get to the Baldwin Road. Sherman 
 was thus on the right ; McPherson in 
 the centre ; and McClernand on the left. 
 The situation now looked gloomy 
 enough for Pemberton. He had locked 
 himself in a cage with his own hands. 
 He had done it delibei'ately, and against 
 the advice of his chief. Vicksburcr had 
 ceased to be of any value as a strategic 
 point from the moment that the National 
 troops crossed the river below the city. 
 After the battle at Port Gibson, it was 
 patent to all reflecting minds that the 
 capture of Vicksburg was merely a 
 question of time. The city was doomed. 
 Pemberton refused to open his eyes to 
 facts ; and, in place of saving his army 
 and making it his chief business to 
 effect a junction with Johnston, he 
 cluug to Vicksburg with what seemed 
 the tenacity of despair, rather than the 
 tenacity of hope. He had received a 
 letter from Johnston, written on the 
 17th. "If Haines' Bluff," said John- 
 ston in that despatch, " be untenable, 
 Vicksburg is of no value ; it cannot be 
 held. If you are invested in it, you 
 must ultimately surrender. Instead of 
 losing both troops and place, you must, 
 if possible, save the troops. If not too 
 late, evacuate Vicksbui-g and its de- 
 
 pendencies forthwith, and march north- 
 east." It was too late. Pemberton 
 had been blind to his duty in a higher 
 sense than he understood it ; he had 
 lost his opportimity, whether he knew 
 it or not; and he must now reap the 
 fruit of his folly. As escape was now 
 impossible, and as he was not yet in a 
 mood to surrender, he must needs do 
 as he best can with his shattered and 
 dispirited forces. His position, as we 
 have shown already, was one of great 
 strength. His line of works was ex- 
 tensive, but it was protected by one 
 hundred and two guns; and, as there 
 were Avithin the lines from twenty-five 
 to thirty thousand men, the forts were 
 well manned. In the arrangerDtnt of 
 his troops, he placed Brigadier-Genera; 
 Stevenson in command on the right, 
 Major-General Forney in the centre, 
 and Major-General Martin L. Smith on 
 the extreme left. 
 
 On the 19th, Grant, believing that 
 the Confederate troops were demoral- 
 ized by the repeated defeats sustained 
 outside of Vicksburg, ordered a gen- 
 eral assault to be made at two o'clock 
 in the afternoon. This attack was 
 made mainly by Sherman's corps on 
 the right, Blair's division taking the 
 lead, followed by Tuttle's as a support. 
 There were two forts which guarded 
 the entrance to the city by tlie old 
 ; Jackson Road — Fort Hill to the right 
 and Fort Beauregard to the left. The 
 attack was directed a2;ainst the former 
 of those works. It was gallantly made, 
 the Thirteenth regulars, tlie Eighty- 
 Third Indiana, and the One Hundred 
 and Twenty-Seventh Illinois, winning 
 
416 
 
 VICKSBUEG. 
 
 special distinction. It was a perilous 
 operation, rendered all the more so by 
 the rugged character of the ground, 
 intersected by deep chasms and covered 
 by felled trees, -which, with the remain- 
 ing stumps, made a powerful abatis. 
 The ground was really almost impassa- 
 ble. Sherman's men reached the para- 
 pet, but they could not cross over. At 
 dark they were recalled. But little 
 fighting was done by the other two 
 army corps. The result of the attempt 
 on the 19th was that the Nationals along 
 the whole line drew nearer the Con- 
 federate works, and secured more ad- 
 vantageous positions. A Confederate 
 writer gives the folio-wing account of 
 that day's fighting : 
 
 " On Tuesday, the enemy made their 
 first assault on the line of Avorks held 
 by Brigadier-General Shoup's brigade 
 of Louisianians. They marched up in 
 one solid column, our men withholding 
 theii" fire until the enemy had ap- 
 proached within thii-t}' yards of the 
 lines, when they opened a terrific vol- 
 ley of musketry. The enemy wavered 
 a moment, and then marched forward. 
 They were again met by another vol- 
 ley, when they broke and fled under 
 cover of the hills. This was the onlj' 
 attempt made on that day to force our 
 lines, and the attempt was evidently 
 made more with the intention of ' feel- 
 ing' our lines than with any serious 
 idea of storming them." 
 
 Two days were allowed to pass with- 
 out any further attempt being made 
 against the enemy's works. Grant, 
 however, was not idle; nor was any 
 idleness permitted in the National lines. 
 
 Supplies were hurried forward from 
 the Yazoo ; rations were served to the 
 men ; roads were constructed ; and can- 
 non were planted on every available 
 spot which offered any advantage. On 
 the 21st, Grant was ready to make 
 another assault. He has himself given us 
 the reasons which induced him to make 
 this second attempt without further 
 delay. It was his belief that an assault 
 made from the position which he had 
 now gained would be attended with 
 success. He knew that Johnston was 
 at Canton, -with the forces taken from 
 Jackson, that he was continually re- 
 ceiving reinforcements, and that it was 
 his intention to make an attack on his 
 rear, A\'ith the view of relieving Pem- 
 berton. His own forces, not exceeding 
 at the time 30,000 men, did not justify 
 him in courting any such attack from a 
 general of Johnston's skill and expe- 
 rience. Possessed of Vicksburg, he 
 would be able to tiu-n upon Johnston, 
 drive him from the State, and make 
 himself master of the entire territory 
 west of the Tombigbee, before the 
 season for campaigning was over. Nor 
 was this all. A successful assault, by 
 enabling him to secure all this country, 
 would render it unnecessaiy for the gov- 
 ernment to send him reinforcements 
 which were needed elsewhere. In ad- 
 dition to all this, the troops were impa- 
 tient to be led to the attack, and 
 detested trench-work, because they be- 
 lieved it to be unnecessary. Such were 
 his reasons; and even in view of the 
 failure of the attack and the terrible 
 loss of life which it entailed, they mu?t 
 be admitted to be satisfactory. 
 
THE SECOND ASSAULT. 
 
 ill 
 
 On the 21st, Grant's arrangements 
 Vere completed ; and ordei's were given 
 for an assault along his whole line, at 
 ten o'clock on the following morning. 
 That there might be no blundering or 
 irregularity in the movement, he or- i 
 dered all his corps commanders to set 
 their watches by his. On the morning 
 May of the 22d, promptly at the hour 
 22. designated, the three army corps 
 simultaneously advanced to the assault. 
 Grant had taken a commanding posi- 
 tion near the centre, from which he 
 could see all McPherson's corps, a 
 part of Sherman's and a portion also of 
 McClernaud's Meanwhile, Admiral 
 Porter, according to instructions re- 
 ceived from General Grant, had opened 
 a heavy fire from his mortars and gun- 
 boats, on the water and hill batteries. 
 On both the one side and the other, 
 the enemy's works were found to be 
 invulnerable. "The works," said Por- 
 ter, " are stronger than any of us 
 dreamed of." Sherman, whose advance, 
 as on the 19th, was led by Blair's divi- 
 sion, encountered a vigorous resistance 
 from the brigades of Baldwin and 
 Shoup, of the division of General 
 Smith ; Hurlbut's brigade, of Forney's 
 division, met the attack ir^ the centre; 
 while on the National left, McClernand, 
 putting forth his whole strength, made 
 but little impression on the stubborn 
 brigades of Moore and Lee, of the di- 
 vision of General Stevenson, who, as 
 we have mentioned, commanded on the 
 Confederate right. The assault was 
 gallantly made by each of the three 
 corps. It was not all at once that the 
 Confederates revealed themselves. Con- 
 
 cealed behind the parapets, they waited 
 until their assailants were close to the 
 works ; and then springing, as if from 
 the bosom of the earth, they poured 
 their destructive fire on the advancing 
 columns, literally mowing down the 
 first line. In spite of this withering 
 fire, a portion of the commands of each 
 succeeded in planting the National flag 
 on the outer slopes of the enemy's bas- 
 tions. For two hours the battle raged 
 with great fierceness. No real advan- 
 tage, however, was being gained by 
 the assailants at any point. Under 
 cover of their guns, the Nationals made 
 repeated attempts to carry the works in 
 their front. It was all in vain. No 
 permanent lodgment could be secured. 
 The experience of the three different 
 corps, and along the entire line, was 
 veiy much the same. In one instance, 
 only, was an entrance effected into any 
 of the Confederate works ; but it was 
 only a brief triumph, and proved to be 
 barren of good results. In the first 
 fierce onset made by the brigades of 
 Lawler and Landrum, of McClernand's 
 corps, upon the fortifications to the 
 southeast of the city, Sergeant Grifiiths, 
 a youth of eighteen years, with eleven 
 privates of the Twenty-First Iowa Vol- 
 unteers, rushed across the ditch, up the 
 slope, over the bastion, and leaped 
 into one of the redoubts. The privates 
 were all prostrated inside the work 
 GriflSths, however, contrived to escape, he 
 being the only one of the number lefk 
 alive. McClernand's men succeeded in 
 planting their colors on the bastion of 
 this redoubt, and on the bastion of 
 another stroii"; earth-work in their 
 
418 
 
 VICKSBURG. 
 
 front ; but Griffiths' was tte only case 
 of actual occupation. 
 
 It was now about twelve o'clock. 
 Grant, but little satisfied with the suc- 
 cess of the undertaking, and, having 
 left his horse in a place of safety in the 
 real*, came up on foot to Sherman's 
 headquarters. Sherman pointed out to 
 him the Confederate works, and admit- 
 ted that his assault had failed. Grant, 
 whose position had given him a full 
 view of the National centre and also of 
 the right of the National left, admitted 
 that it was about the same with both 
 McPherson and McClernand. At this 
 moment, a messenger arrived from Mc- 
 Clernand, bearing a despatch to Grant, 
 "stating positively and unequivocally 
 that he was in possession of, and still 
 held, two of the enemy's forts, and that 
 the American flag was waving over 
 them," requesting, at the same time, 
 that Sherman and McPherson should 
 be ordered to make a diversion in his 
 favor. This was the second despatch 
 which General Grant had received from 
 McClernand to the same effect. He 
 doubted its accuracy. He did not be- 
 lieve it to be a faithful presentation of 
 the facts of the case. He had just left 
 a commanding position where he had a 
 full view of tlie works referred to, and 
 he had witnessed no signs of successful 
 attack or occupation. His first impulse 
 was to disregard the message altogether. 
 But he was reminded by Sherman that 
 the note was official. With great re- 
 luctance, Grant consented to give orders 
 for a renewal of the attack. He or- 
 dered Quimby's division, of McPher- 
 son's corps, to the aid of McClernand, 
 
 and authorized that general to call ti. 
 his assistance also the division of Mc 
 x^irthur, of the same corps. At three 
 o'clock, the general-in'-chief having re- 
 sumed his position, with McPherson in 
 the centre, the attack was renewed with 
 great vigor. This other assault was 
 but a repetition of the former — deter- 
 mined, bloody, but unsuccessful. It 
 resulted in the useless slaughter of 
 3000 men, including many veteran sol- 
 diers, who could ill be spared, and not 
 a few first-class officers. Genei'al Grant 
 bitterly regretted yielding to McCler- 
 nand's importunate calls for assistance. 
 It was, in fact, a great blunder. Mc- 
 Clernand was either greatly deceived 
 as to the value of the position occupied 
 by his troops, or his better reason was 
 overpowered by an extreme desire to 
 connect his name in some prominent 
 way with the capture of "Vicksburg. 
 It was no doubt unfortunate that Mc- 
 Arthur Avas so far distant when he re- 
 ceived Grant's orders, and that Quimby, 
 who had been hurried to McCleruand's 
 relief, did not arrive until twilight. It 
 is doubtful, however, whether any as- 
 sistance which might have been sent Mc- 
 Clernand could have altered the situa- 
 tion. It does not appear that he had 
 gained any real advantage. Subsequent 
 revelations justified the doubts which 
 General Grant expressed as to the cor- 
 rectness of McClernand's statement ; and 
 General Sherman has told us that " in- 
 stead of having taken any single point of 
 the rebel main parapet, McClernand had 
 only taken one or two small outlying 
 lunettes, open to the rear, where hia 
 men were at the mercy of the enemy, 
 
ANOTHEK FAILURE. 
 
 419 
 
 behind the main parapet," most of his 
 men, in fact, being thus actually cap- 
 tured. As it was, the fighting con- 
 tinued until dark. During the whole 
 day, Porter's mortars kept up an in- 
 cessant fire on the city, greatly adding 
 to the horrors of the imprisoned inhab- 
 itants. It was, however, a useless 
 stniggle. The diversion requested by 
 McClernand had been promptly and 
 vigorously mude ; but wiiile it had in- 
 creased the mortality list of the Na- 
 tional troop^i full fifty per cent., it had 
 brought a1x)ut no compensating advan- 
 tages. A])out eight o'clock in the even- 
 ing, therefore, the troops were recalled 
 from the more advanced positions, 
 pickets being left to hold the ground 
 which had been won. 
 
 In his report. General Grant paid a 
 n^eU-merited compliment to his men. 
 "The assault of this day," he said, 
 "proved the quality of the soldiers of 
 this army. Without entire success, and 
 with a heavy loss, there was no mur- 
 muring or complaining, no falling back, 
 or other evidence of demoralization." 
 It is but just to say that the gallantry 
 exhibited by the assailants was equalled 
 by the bravery of the troops defending 
 the works, and by the heroic self-en- 
 durance of the unfoi'tuuate people who 
 were shut up inside the city. Every 
 part of Vicksburg was within range 
 of the Federal guns — of Porter's mor- 
 tars as of the attacking batteries. The 
 scene presented is described by those 
 who were inside the fortifications as 
 having been sublime and terrific in the 
 extreme, and requiring the " pen of the 
 poet " to do it justice. The following 
 
 report is from a Confederate source. 
 While doing substantial justice to the 
 National troops, it gives us an inside 
 view of the day's fighting : 
 
 "On the morning of the 22d, the 
 enemy opened a terrific fire with their 
 Parrott guns, and continued it till 
 about eleven o'clock, when the bom- 
 bardment ceased, and heavy columns of 
 the enemy could be seen forming in line 
 of battle. Our forces were all ready 
 for them, and eager for their advance. 
 At about a quarter to twelve, the col- 
 umn of the Federal army advanced all 
 along the lines in splendid order, and, 
 with a loud cheer, dashed up to the 
 works. They were gallantly responded 
 to by our brave boys, and the first 
 charge repulsed. On the extreme right 
 of our lines, the nature of the ground 
 prevented the enemy from making any 
 heavy attack ; but on the right of the 
 centre, the centre and the left of the 
 centre, the assault was desperately made 
 and gallantly met. But once did 'our 
 lines break, and that was in Lee's bri- 
 gade The enemy gained a temporary 
 footing on the rifle-pits, but Lee quickly 
 rallied his men, and, after a desperate 
 hand-to-hand fight, drove them out and 
 reoccupied the lines. The engagement 
 at this point, and at the right of the 
 line, held by Brigadier-General L. Her- 
 bert, was of a terrible nature, the Fed- 
 erals having thrown their best troopa 
 on these works. Five times did they 
 charge, and each time were repulsed. 
 The last charge on the right of Brig- 
 adier-General Herbert's lines was made 
 by an Irish regiment (the Seventeenth 
 Wisconsin), carrying the green flag of 
 
430 
 
 VICKSBURG. 
 
 Erin. They came at a double quick up 
 the hill, each man in the fiont rank fur- 
 nished with ladders to reach the works. 
 Three times they essayed to plant their 
 ladders, but were prevented by the 
 obstinate resistance offered by the con- 
 solidated Twenty-First and Twenty- 
 Third Louisiana regiments. At the 
 third charge, they came within ten yards 
 of the line ; but two volleys of buckshot 
 from the shot-guns of our forces com- 
 pelled them to make a precipitate re- 
 treat from the front of our works. At 
 about two o'clock they made their 
 last charge, and were again repulsed, 
 when they retired, and did not at- 
 tempt any further demonstration that 
 day." 
 
 The Confederates not imnaturally ex- 
 aggerated the National loss, by putting 
 it down at from 8000 to 10,000 men. 
 They admitted a loss of 1000 in killed 
 and wounded. 
 
 The difficulty between McClernand 
 Mid the general-in-chief was not to be 
 easily removed. Grant naturally felt 
 pore because of the useless waste of life 
 which McClernand had brought about. 
 This, however, might have been got 
 over, had not McClernand, in a congrat- 
 nlatory order addressed to his troops, 
 >!jnd first published in St. Louis, re- 
 ilected on General Grant and the dis- 
 position which he made of his troops, 
 »nd attributed his own failure to a 
 Want of support which, he asserted, 
 could have been given him. On the 
 15th of June, Grant deemed it pru- 
 dent, for the sake of preserving disci- 
 pline in his army, to remove Mc- 
 Clernand from the command of the 
 
 Thirteenth corps. The command was 
 given to Major-General Old. 
 
 After the failure of the 22d of May, 
 Grant, already convinced that the po- 
 sition of the enemy was too strong, 
 " both naturally and artificially " to be 
 taken by direct assault, determined 
 upon a regular siege. The troops now 
 at his command were not sufficient, ab- 
 solutely to complete the investment — ■ 
 such was the extent of the enemy's 
 works. He sent, therefore, to West 
 Tennessee for all the troops which 
 could be spared. Reinforcements were 
 ordered also from West Vu-ginia, Ken- 
 tucky and Missouri. Lanman's division, 
 and four regiments from Memphis, with 
 the divisions of Generals Smith and 
 Kimball, of the Sixteenth corps, soon 
 anived, and were placed under the 
 command of General C. C. Washburn. 
 On the 11th of June, General Herron 
 arrived, with his division, from the de- 
 partment of the Missouri ; and on the 
 14th came General Parke, with two 
 divisions of the Ninth army coips. The 
 National force was thus increased to 
 some 70,000 men, in sixteen divisions. 
 The investment was now made abso- 
 lute. Parke's corps and the divisions 
 of Smith and Kimball were sent to 
 Haines' Bluff. In front of the works 
 which protected the city, Sherman was 
 posted to the light ; McPherson's corps 
 came next, and extended so as to guard 
 the railroad ; Ord's corps lay to the left 
 of McPherson's ; the investment in that 
 direction being completed by the divi- 
 sions of Herron and Lanman which, 
 stretching across Stout's Bayou, touched 
 the bluffs on the river. The ground 
 
THE Bo.MJAR1)j1ENT. 
 
 431 
 
 was, in a high degree, favorable to a 
 besieging army. Springs of excellent 
 water abounded in the ravines ; and the 
 sheltering woods protected the troops 
 from the rays of the hot summer sun. 
 On the river side, Porter had made 
 ample preparations; and throughout 
 the siege, as he had already done in 
 the different assaults, he continued to 
 render very effective assistance. In 
 addition to gunboats, which were sta- 
 tioned both above and below fhe city, 
 he had six 13-inch mortars, and two 
 200-pound Parrott guns mounted on 
 rafts. 
 
 Siege operations were commenced at 
 once, and were conducted with great 
 vigor. Along the entire front, forts, 
 batteries and rifle-pits were rapidly con- 
 structed ; and the irregularities of the 
 ground admitted of the construction of 
 covered roads, by which the men could 
 move from point to point without 
 being exposed to the fire of the sharp- 
 shooters behind the Confederate works. 
 Up until the 25th of May, the firing on 
 the city was made only during the day. 
 After that date, it was continued both 
 day and night. Porter opened fire on 
 ^laj the 26th, and on his part there 
 26» was no interruption until the 
 surrender. It was estimated that 
 as many as 6000 mortar-shells were 
 dung into the city eveiy twenty-four 
 hours, and that, in the same space 
 nf time, not fewer than 4000 shells 
 'vere flung from the land batteries in 
 the rear. 
 
 It was not long until Pemberton 
 was in a sufficiently sorrowful plight. 
 His relations with Johnston were the 
 
 reverse of agreeable ; and he had been 
 wonied by delusive hopes held out by 
 the authorities at Richmond. To the 
 one and the other, however, he was 
 bound to look for succor. There was 
 no other source of relief. He com- 
 plained bitterly of the want of cavalry. 
 With a sufiicient force of mounted men, 
 he might have been able to protect his 
 communications — he would certainly 
 have been able to watch, if not to 
 thwart, the movements of Grierson, 
 who gave him so much annoyance. He 
 might even have prevented Grant from 
 reaching Jackson. As it was, he had 
 to submit to great inconvenience, and 
 not a little mortification. One of his 
 greatest sorrows was that he had found 
 it impossible — such was the rapidity 
 of Grant's advance — to withdraw his 
 heavy guns from Grand Gulf. This, 
 however, was not all. He had, for 
 some reasons, lost the confidence of his 
 troops ; and he was no longer a favor- 
 ite with the people of Vicksburg. 
 There were, in addition, troubles of a 
 more pressing and immediate character. 
 His ammunition which, since the com- 
 mencement of the siege, he had been 
 using with the utmost economy, was 
 well-nigh exhausted. Provisions, also, 
 were scarce. For the first five days of 
 the siege, full rations were allowed to 
 the troops; but, afterwards, the daily 
 allowance was gradually reduced to 
 four ounces of flour, four ounces of 
 bacon, one and a half ounce of rice, 
 two ounces of peas, and three ounces 
 of sugar — fourteen and a half ounces 
 of food in all. Add to all this the 
 small number of men, and the conse- 
 
 M« 
 
422 
 
 VICKSBUEG. 
 
 ijuent heavy duties which, day and 
 night, devolved upon them, and an 
 idea may be formed of Pemberton's 
 position. 
 
 Pemberton's hope of relief was now 
 centred in Johnston. The latter was 
 not without reason for being angry 
 with his lieutenant; but it was his 
 duty to do all that lay within the 
 reach of his ability to extricate the be- 
 leaguered garrison. It was no longer 
 possible to save the city ; but something 
 might be attempted to save Pember- 
 ton's soldiers. Pemberton had written 
 to Johnston in despair. On the 14th, 
 Johnston sent word to Pemberton that 
 he would make an attempt to come to 
 his relief, suggested that while he made 
 an attack on Grant's line at a given 
 point, an attack should be made simul- 
 taneously on the same point from within 
 the lines, and requested that Pember- 
 ton should designate the point of attack 
 somewhere north of the railroad. The 
 desires of Pemberton and the purposes 
 of Johnston were no secret to the Na- 
 tional commander. Haines' Bluff was 
 carefully guarded ; so, also, was the 
 entire peninsula on the river side of the 
 city ; Porter's boats were keeping watch 
 above and below ; and vigilant recon- 
 noissances were being made in the 
 neighborhood of Milliken's Bend. It 
 was from the land side, however, that 
 an attack was most to be dreaded. It 
 was well known that Johnston was col- 
 lecting troops on the line of the Big 
 Black, that his army was rapidly in- 
 creasing in numbers, that his deficien- 
 cies in artillery, in ammunition for all 
 arms, and in means of transport, were 
 
 gradually being supplied, and that his 
 object was to attack the National army 
 in the rear, with a view to the relief of 
 Pemberton. Happily Grant, had now 
 a sufficient number of troops to enable 
 him to hold Pemberton with the one 
 hand, and to strike, if necessary, John- 
 ston with the other. Parke's corps, 
 which was stationed at Haines' Bluff 
 with one division of each of three corps 
 cfarmee investing Vicksburg, was placed 
 under the command of General Sher- 
 man, who was ordered to watch John- 
 ston, and counteract any movement he 
 might make in the direction of Vicks- 
 burg. It was General Grant's inten- 
 tion, as he wrote to General Parke on 
 the 27th of June, "to whip Johnston 
 fifteen miles off." Sherman faced 
 about, his line extending from Haines' 
 Bluff eastward to the railroad crossing 
 of the Big Black, where Osterhaus 
 held a strong position. It was Sher- 
 man's conviction that if Johnston 
 should cross the Big Black, it would 
 not be difficult, from the nature 
 of the country, to hold him in check, 
 until a concentration could be effect- 
 ed. Johnston did not venture to 
 make any attempt to pen:^trate Sher- 
 man's line, nor did he cross the Big 
 Black. 
 
 It was now towards the end of June 
 Pemberton's situation was well-nigh 
 desperate. In his agony, his mind va- 
 cillated from one resolution to another. 
 The one day he writes to Johnston, 
 suggesting that if he could divert the 
 attention of the assailants by attacking 
 them to the north of the city, he might 
 succeed in making his escape by break- 
 
THE FIRST MINE EXPLODED. 
 
 43o 
 
 ing the investing lines to the south, 
 and by forcing his way across the Big 
 Black, at Hankinson's Ferry. The next 
 day, as if despairing of the success of 
 his plan, he thinks it might be better 
 to abandon Vicksburg, and to propose 
 to Grant that he allow all the troops 
 to j^ass out " with their arms and equi- 
 page." Success would have been as 
 little likely to result from the one 
 course as from the other. Meanwhile, 
 famine was doing its terrible work. 
 After the thirty-fifth day of the siege, 
 mule meat had become the common 
 fare of all alike ; and even dog's meat 
 was in request for the table. Bean- 
 meal was made into bread, and corn- 
 meal into coifee. "In these straits," 
 says a Confederate officei", " the garri- 
 son dragged on the weary length of 
 one day after another, under a scorch- 
 ing sun, the stench from the unburied 
 corpses all around alone causing the 
 strongest -minded, firmest -nerved to 
 grow impatient for the day of deliver- 
 ance." 
 
 In the last week of June, the mining 
 operations which were being carried on 
 in front of McPherson's line, and under 
 his immediate direction, were well ad- 
 Jsne vanced. On the 25th, between 
 25« four and five o'clock in the after- 
 noon, the first mine was fired. The 
 explosion was fearful. The air was 
 filled to the height of one hundred feet 
 with earth, broken timber, and the 
 shattered fragments of gabions, stock- 
 ades and gun-carriages A great breach 
 was made, a part of the face of Fort 
 Hill having been thrown down. Two 
 columns of stonning parties, consisting 
 
 each of 100 picked men, taken respec- 
 tively fi"om the Forty-Fifth Illinois and 
 from the Twenty-Third Indiana, were 
 held in readiness to make the assault. 
 As soon as the breach was made, in 
 rushed the brave fellows, in their shirt- 
 sleeves, and carrying nothing with them 
 save their muskets and their cartridge- 
 boxes. A fearful struggle ensued, the 
 Confederates offering a most stubborn 
 resistance. Supports were pressed for- 
 ward ; and ultimately, amid wild cheers, 
 heard amid the roaring din of battle, 
 the flag of the Forty-Fifth was planted 
 on the summit of Fort Hill. As soon 
 as the storming columns entered the 
 breach, the batteries opened fire along 
 the whole line. Porter following the 
 example with his gunboats and mortars 
 on the river fi'ont. It was one of the 
 most terrific cannonades heard during 
 the whole war. While shot and shell 
 were falling thick and fast upon the 
 Confederate works and upon the doomed 
 city, " the classic thunders of the Roman 
 poet were being realized across the 
 whole heavens, and from pole to pole." 
 Nobly as was this assault on Fort Hill, 
 and proud as was the tempoi'ary tri- 
 umph, it ended in a repulse. On the 
 28th, there was another mine explo- 
 sion, which did farther damage to Fort 
 Hill. On the 1st of July, a mine 
 was sprung to the right of the Jack- 
 son Road. The result was the com- 
 plete demolition of the redan situated 
 at that point, the living burial ol 
 nine men who were counter-mining, 
 and the killing and wounding of a 
 large number who were manning the 
 works 
 
^S4 
 
 VICKSBUfiG. 
 
 On the 1st of July, Johnston had 
 jHly taken position between Browns- 
 *• ville and the Big Black, having 
 with him from 30,000 to 40,000 men, 
 with all the necessary munition of war. 
 With as little delay as possible, he sent 
 A note to Pemberton, informing him that 
 a diversion would be made on or about 
 the 7th, to enable him to cut his way 
 out. This message, which was inter- 
 cepted by General Ewing, fell into the 
 hands of General Grant. The latter 
 had already made up his mind as to 
 what he should do. He had deter- 
 mined to make aii assault on Vicksburg 
 on the morning of the 6th, and, if the 
 assault should prove successful, to move 
 Sherman with all possible haste, and 
 with all the forces that could be spared, 
 against Johnston. All needful prepa- 
 rations for the final assault were com- 
 pleted. Further delay might prove as 
 dangerous as it was unnecessary. Sher- 
 man was notified of his intention, and 
 ordered to hold himself in readiness. 
 Grant was confirmed in his purpose by 
 intercepted documents, which informed 
 him of the wretched condition to which 
 the city and garrison had been reduced. 
 The assault, however, was not to be 
 necessary. In addition to all the other 
 misfortunes of the situation, 6000 sick 
 and wounded crowded the hospitals of 
 Vicksburg; and the number was daily 
 increasing. Convinced that Grant was 
 about to make a final and fatal assault, 
 despairing of any aid from Johnston, 
 and knowing how helpless be was to 
 offei' either a vigorous or protracted re- 
 sistance, Pemberton's heart sunk within 
 iim, and he determined to surrender. 
 
 On the 3d of July, about eight 
 o'clock in the morning, a white jniy 
 flag was seen displayed on the '• 
 parapet in front of the division of Gen- 
 eral A. J. Smith, of Ord's (late Mc- 
 Clernand's) corps. An officer having 
 been sent forward to learn its meaning, 
 it was found that General Bowen, com- 
 mander of one of the Confederate di- 
 visions, and Colonel Montgomery, of 
 Pemberton's staff, were the bearers of 
 a message to General Grant. Having 
 been blind-folded, these officei's were 
 led to the headquarters of General 
 Smith, to await the reply of the Na- 
 tional commander. It must have been 
 a proud moment in the life of General 
 Grant, when the sealed message was 
 put into his hands. After more than 
 seven months of planning, hard fight-, 
 ing and weary waiting, his great task 
 was on the point of accomplishment. 
 But the bystander looked on those firm 
 features in vain for any sign of unusual 
 emotion. At that moment, when weaker 
 men would have given way, the con- 
 queror gave proof that, if he knew how 
 to subdue great armies, he knew also 
 how to restrain himself. The message 
 proved to be a proposal from the Con- 
 federate commander for an armistice. 
 during a time not specified, and for the 
 appointment, on each side, of three com- 
 missioners, whose duty it should be to 
 arrange terms for the capitulation of 
 Vicksburg. " I make this proposition," 
 said Pemberton, "to save the further 
 effusion of blood, which must otherwise 
 be shed to a frightful extent, feeling my- 
 self fully able to maintain my position 
 a yet indefinite period." Grant's reply 
 
THE SURRENDEK. 
 
 425 
 
 was characteristic. "The effusion of 
 blood, which you propose stopping by 
 this course, can be ended at any time 
 you may choose, by an unconditional 
 surrender of the city and garrison. 
 Men who have shown so much endu- 
 rance and courage, as those now in 
 Vicksburg, will always challenge the 
 respect of an adversary, and, I can 
 assure you, will be treated with all 
 the respect due to them as prisoners of 
 wai". I do not favor the proposition 
 of appointing commissioners to arrange 
 tenns of capitulation, because I have 
 no other terms than those indicated 
 above." Declining to see General 
 Bowen, General Grant expressed a 
 willingness, if it were so desired, to 
 meet General Pemberton, any time that 
 'vfternoon, between the lines, in Mc- 
 pherson's front. Three o'clock was 
 appointed. At that hour the meeting 
 was held. Grant was accompanied by 
 Generals McPherson, Ord, Logan and 
 A.. J. Smith. Pemberton was attended 
 by General Bowen and Colonel Mont- 
 gomeiy. After shaking hands, and in- 
 troducing the officers, the two chiefs 
 retired, and sat down on the grass be- 
 neath the shade of an old oak tree. 
 The position was on the soiithern slope 
 of Fort Hill, and in full view of thou- 
 sands of the opposing armies. The oak 
 tree has disappeared ; but a handsome 
 monument now commemorates the event. 
 Pemberton renewed his proposition for 
 the appointment of commissioners. This 
 was the course followed at Vera Cruz, 
 at the surrender of which, he said, he 
 was present. Grant was not to be 
 moved fi-om his pm-pose. He had no 
 
 terms to offer but "unconditional surren- 
 der," and he would consent to no other. 
 Pemberton thought the terms unrea- 
 sonable. He would never submit to 
 them — never, while he had a man left — 
 he would fight, rather. Unable to re* 
 strain himself, he was showing signs 
 of great irritation. " Then, sir," said 
 Grant, coolly puffing his cigar, "you 
 can continue the defense. My army 
 has never been in a better condition 
 for the prosecution of the siege." Pem- 
 berton had much to say in regard to 
 details. Finding it impossible to come 
 to an agreement, Grant, with an evident 
 desire not to wound unnecessarily the 
 feelings of his baffled and defeated oppo- 
 nent, brought the interview to a close 
 by promising to send his ultimatum in 
 wiiting. It was finally agreed that the en- 
 tire garrison — officers and men — should 
 be paroled not to take up arms against 
 the United States until exchanged by 
 proper authority; that the officers should 
 be allowed their side-arms and private 
 baggage, and the field, staff and cavalry 
 officers one horse each; that the rank 
 and file be allowed all their clothing, 
 but no other property ; that they should 
 take rations from their own stores suffi- 
 cient to last them until beyond the Na- 
 tional lines; that they should be allowed 
 to take with them the necessary cooking 
 utensils for preparing their food; and 
 that they should have thirty wagons 
 for the transport of such articles as 
 could not well be carried. The same 
 conditions were to be granted to all 
 sick and wounded officers and privates 
 as soon aa they should be able to 
 travel. 
 
t26 
 
 VXC^KSBUKQ 
 
 The next day was the Fourth of : 
 July July — a day sacred to American 
 *• liberty. On the morning of that 
 day, white flags weve displayed along 
 the whole length of the Confederate 
 works, in token of surrender. In the 
 afternoon, General Grant, accompanied 
 by General McPherson, with their 
 staffs, entered the city in triumph. 
 Pemberton was greatly blamed for sur- 
 rendering the city on the 4th. It was I 
 a lame excuse to say that, knowing the 
 vanity of his enemies, he hoped to 
 obtain better terms by giving theiu an 
 opportunity to triumph on that day. 
 The Fourth of July, 1863, was indeed 
 a proud day for the friends of the 
 Union. On that same day, victoiy, 
 which smiled so propitiously at Vicks- 
 burg, crowned the National arms at 
 Gettysburg. The star of the Union 
 was again in the ascendant; and the 
 hearts of a dispiiited people were once 
 more filled with joy. The fall of Vicks- 
 burg was a great triumph to the nation. 
 It settled the question of the free navi- 
 gation of the Mississippi, and it deter- 
 mined the fate of the rebellion. It was 
 a gi'eat triumph for General Grant, be- 
 cause it stamped him as the first soldier 
 of the Republic. His praises were in 
 eveiy mouth ; and the country rang mth 
 applause. Congratulatory letters came 
 to him from all quarters; but those 
 most prized were from Commander-in- 
 Chief Halleck and from President Liu- 
 eoln, both of whom, it was known, had 
 had at one time doubts as to the wis- 
 dom shown in his movements. Halleck 
 was lavish of praise ; and Lincoln con- 
 eluded his noble letter by saying, "I 
 
 now wish to make the personal acknow- 
 ledgment that you were right and I was 
 wrong." * 
 
 The I'esult of the campaign, as summed 
 up by Grant himself, was " the de- 
 feat of the enemy in five battles out- 
 side of Vicksburg; the occupation of 
 Jackson, Mississippi, and the capture 
 of Vicksburg, its garrison and muni- 
 tions of war; a loss to the enemy of 
 37,000 prisoners, among whom were 
 fifteen general officers ; at least 10,000 
 killed and wounded, and among the 
 killed Generals Tracy, Tilghman, and 
 Green; and hundreds, perhaps thou- 
 sands, of stragglers who can never be 
 collected and recognized. Arms and 
 munitions of war for an army of 60,000 
 men have fallen into our hands, be- 
 sides a large amount of other public 
 property, consisting of railroads, loco- 
 
 * General Grant, like all other men who have risen to 
 fame and fortune, has had his detractors. His own 
 grand career which, from first to last, needs no com- 
 mentary, is his best advocate. In this connection, 
 however, we cannot refrain from reproducing one 
 paragraph from the elegantly written and thoughtful 
 Memoirs of General Sherman. In his chapter on 
 Vicksburg, General Sherman says : "The campaign of 
 Vicksburg, in its conception and execution, belonged 
 exclusively to General Grant, not only in the great 
 whole, but in the thousands of its details. I still retain 
 many of his letters and notes, all in his own hand- 
 writing, prescribing the routes of march for divisions 
 and detachments, specifying even the amount of food 
 and tools to be carried along. Many persons gave his 
 adjutant-general, Rawlins, the credit for these things, 
 but they were in error ; for no commanding general ol 
 an army ever gave more of his personal attention to 
 details, or wrote so many of his own orders, reports and 
 letters, as General Grant. His success at Vicksburg 
 justly gave him great fame at home and abroad. The 
 president conferred on him the rank of major-general 
 in the regular army, the highest grade then existing by 
 law : and General McPherson and I shared in his suc- 
 cess by receiving similar commissions as brigadier- 
 generals in the regular army." — Sherman't Memoirt, 
 vol. 1, page 334. 
 
RETREAT OE JOHNSTON. 
 
 427 
 
 motives, cars, steamboats, cotton, <fcc. ; 
 and much was destroyed to prevent our 
 capturing it." His own losses he ad- 
 mitted to be 8573, of whom 943 were 
 killed." He owed much to Generals 
 Shennan, McPherson, Logan and Ad- 
 miral Porter, all of whose services were 
 handsomely acknowledged. 
 
 One of the immediate results of the 
 occupation of Vicksburg was the fall of 
 Port Hudson ; but of this we shall have 
 to speak more in detail in the next 
 chapter. Grant's immediate attention, 
 after placing McPherson in charge of 
 Vicksburg, ^vas given to Johnston. As 
 soon as that general heard of the sur- 
 render, he fell back to Jackson. Sher- 
 man was already in pursuit, with an 
 army of 50,000 men; and Grant was 
 resolved that Johnston should not 
 escape. On the 8th, the National 
 army, under Sherman, had reached the 
 neighborhood of Clinton. The weather 
 was extremely hot, and the water 
 scarce. All the ponds were filled with 
 dead animals, which Johnston on his 
 march had driven in and shot. On the 
 10th, Sherman was before Jackson ; 
 and the Confederates had been driven 
 in behind the intrenchments. On the 
 11th, pressing close in, the Nationals 
 shelled the town from every direction. 
 It unfortunately happened that Lan- 
 man's brigade, on this occasion, got too 
 close, and was roughly handled, some 
 250 men being killed and wounded, 
 and as many captured. Lanman, who 
 had the reputation of being a brave 
 and capable officer, was greatly blamed 
 {or his rashness or his folly, and at the 
 
 request of Ord, his corps commander, 
 was relieved of his command. In spite 
 of the excessive heat, Sherman was 
 pressing the siege day and night, and 
 preparing for a vigorous and final as- 
 sault, when, on the morning of the 
 17th, the place was found to l^e July 
 evacuated — Johnston thus once •'• 
 more vindicating his reputation as a 
 " hero of retreats." * Steele's division 
 pursued as far as Brandon, a distance 
 of fourteen miles ; but as Johnston was 
 found to be safely off, with his whole 
 army, the pursuit was not continued. 
 On the 27th of July, Sherman was 
 back in his old position between Haines' 
 Bluff and the Big Black, indulging the 
 hope that botk himself and his troops 
 would enjoy rest for the remainder 
 of the sunmier. Thus ended one of 
 the greatest, and, in many respects,; 
 most important campaigns of the Civil 
 War. 
 
 * The town of Jackson suffered terribly from these 
 repeated occupations and evacuations. Situated on the 
 right bank of the Pearl River, and adorned with many 
 magnificent public buildings, such as the capitol, the 
 penitentiary, the governor's house, the asylum for the 
 deaf, dumb and insane, as well as with many handsome 
 residences — the entire place being tastefully laid out 
 and beautified by trim gardens— Jackson was one of 
 the most elegant towns of the South. It had suffered 
 much from the first occupation by the National troops. 
 The Confederate soldiers, under Johnston, showed little 
 respect either to the beauty of the situation or to the 
 value of the property. The Nationals, in this last occu- 
 pation, showed even less. The soldiers, for a time, 
 were allowed to give themselves up to license. Some 
 of the finest buildings and most useful public works 
 were burned to the ground. Houses were ransacked ■ 
 pianos and other articles of furniture were demolished 
 libraries were torn to pieces and trampled in the dust ; 
 pictures were pierced with bayonets; and daring all 
 hours of the night the place wa8 illumined by burning 
 buildings. Such conduct, too common in war, wat hap- 
 pily exceptional in the great American conflict. 
 
^i8 
 
 PORT HUDfeON. 
 
 CHAPTER XXV. 
 
 E^ect of the Surrender of Vicksburg. — The Mississippi. — "Unvexed to the Sea." — The Department of the 
 Gulf. — General Butler. — Minor Engagements. — The Confederate Earn, Arkansa.s.— Farragut and Williams. — 
 The Yazoo. — Bombardment of Donaldsonville. — Baton Kouge. — Van Dom and Breckenridge. — Battle of 
 Baton Rouge. — WiUiams Killed. — The Confederates Fall Back and Retreat. — The Arkansas Again. — 
 Porter in Search of Her. — The Arkansas Exploded. — La Fourehe. — Expedition under Weitzel. — The 
 Confederates under McPheeters Defeated. — La Fourehe Reclaimed. — General Banks at New Orleans. — 
 His Expedition. — How he was Received by Butler. — The Nineteenth Army Corps. — The General Instruc- 
 tions Given to Banks. — The Departure of Butler. — Galveston. — Commodore Renshaw. — The Forty- 
 Second Massachusetts. — Colonel Burrill. — General Magnider. ^Virginia Point. — Magruder's Fleet. — De- 
 scription of Galveston. — The Confederate Attack. — Sibley's Brigade. — Fighting on Land and Water. — The 
 Massachusetts Men Make a Bold Resistance. — The Bayou City and Neptune Fall Upon the Harriet Lane. — 
 A Rush Together. — The Neptune Sunk. — The Bayou City iu Danger. — She Rushes for the Harriet Lane. — 
 The Two Vessels Become Entangled. — Commander Wainright Refuses to Surrender. — Wainright Killed 
 while Defending Himself. — The Harriet Lane Captured. — The Westfield Aground. — Demand for Surrender. — 
 Refusal. — She is Prematurely Blown Up. — Terrible Destruction of Life. — Renshaw Involved iu the Common 
 Ruin. — Several Other Vessels Captured. — The Troops Surrender. — The Sabine River. — The Morning Light 
 and Velocity. — Capture of Sabine Pass. — The National Vessels Driven to Sea and Captured. — The Sugar 
 Districts of Louisiana. — -The Red River Country. —The Bayou Teche. — The J. A. Cotton. — Brashear City . ^ 
 Weitzel and McKean Buchanan on the Teche. — Carney's Bridge. — Torpedoes and Batteries. — Buchanan 
 Killed. — A National Victory. — The Return to Brashear City. — A Joint Expedition to Port Hudson. — An At- 
 tempt to Run the Batteries. — An Awful Scene. — Another Louisiana Expedition. — Fort Bisland. — The Con- 
 federates Again Retreat.- — General Dick Taylor. — A Successful Expedition. —Success of General Augur. — 
 Farragut. — The Hartford and the Albatross. — At Grand Gulf — .\t Warrenton. — \t the Williams Canal. — 
 In Communication with Grant and Porter. — Reinforcements and Supplies. — Destruction of the Lancas- 
 ter. — Going Down the River Again. — Farragut on the Red River. — Xt Gjrlou's Landing. — A Severe En- 
 gagement. — The Mary T. and the Grand Duke. — Heavy Firing. — The Albalrcss Injured. — The Confede- 
 rate Vessels Badly Punished. — Banks Again on the Mississippi. — At Bayou Sara. — Concentration of his 
 Forces. ^Preparations for Investing Port Hudson. — Joined by Sherman and Augur. — Port Hudson Plains. — 
 Description of Port Hudson. — The Strength of the Place. — The First Assault. — A Tremendous Fire. — The 
 Great Bravery of the Troops. — Temporary and Partial Success. — The Troops Withdrawn. — Negro Soldiers. — 
 Complimented and Praised by General Banks. — Disappointed, but not Disheartened. — Preparing ft)r a 
 Regular Siege. — Digging Trenches. — The Hot June Sun. — General Gardner in a Sad Plight. — The nth of 
 June. — The Second Assault. — Another Failure.— The 14th of June. — Gardner Called Upon to Surrender. — 
 He Refuses. — Another Assault. — Tremendous Fighting, both on the Right and Left. — Another Failure. — A 
 Regular Siege the Only Hope. — Mining and Counter-mining. — The Heroic Garrison. — The Confederates 
 Again in Louisiana. — Capture of Brashear City. —Banks' Misfortune. — The 7th of July. — News of the Fall 
 of Vicksburg. — Rejoicing in the National Ranks. — G-ardner in Despair. — A Council of War. — Pro- 
 posals for Surrender. — Honorable Terms. — The Surrender. — The Spoils of Victory. — The Hero of Port 
 Hudson. 
 
 Thbee days after the surrender and 
 occupation of Vicksburg, a cor- 
 respondence ■was opened between 
 Major-General Gardner audMajor-Gen- 
 eral Banks, v^^ith a view to the surren- 
 render of Port Hudson. On learning 
 
 that Vicksburg had fallen, Gardner 
 feeling convinced that further resist 
 ance was useless?, and that he had de- 
 fended the city as long as duty required 
 him, expressed a willingness to surren- 
 der the stronghold in his charge. Cod*- 
 
THE ARKANSAS. 
 
 429 
 
 missioners having been appointed on 
 both sides, and the terms of capitula- 
 tion having been drawn up, the surren- 
 jnly der was formally made on the 8th 
 
 8' of July, General Banks and the 
 National troops entering and occupying 
 the place on the following day. Port 
 Hudson fell because Vieksbui'g fell ; and 
 the fall of the one, as of the other, vp-as 
 due to the persistent, patient, persever- 
 ing genius of General Grant. On one 
 occasion General Sherman said, " The 
 possession of the Mississippi River is 
 the possession of America." It was his 
 opinion that if the Confederates had 
 been able to hold, with a grip sufficient- 
 ly strong, the lower portion of that great 
 river, the Union could not have been 
 restored. This opinion was shared by 
 General Grant and by the best minds 
 in the North. It was this opinion— 
 this deejj-rooted conviction — that gave 
 importance to the capture of Vicks- 
 burg; for so long as the Confederates 
 held that stronghold, they were, to all 
 intents and purposes, masters of the 
 waters of the lower Mississippi, and 
 that river was comparatively useless. 
 With Vicksburg fell Port Hudson ; the 
 great object aimed at by the Western 
 armies was accomplished ; the back- 
 bone of the Confederacy was broken ; 
 and the Mississippi, as President Lin- 
 coln expressed it, rolled " unvexed to 
 the sea." 
 
 The fall of Port Huds<jn, however, 
 formed the climax of a lengthened se- 
 
 les of detailed operations, not necessa- 
 rily connected with Vicksburg. Some 
 of these operations were of greater, 
 some of them of lesser, importance ; but 
 
 »47 
 
 they had all of them a common bearing, 
 and were conducted, for the most part, 
 under the direction of one controlling: 
 mind. In the present chapter, there- 
 fore, we shall endeavor to group these 
 operations together, describe them in 
 detail, and, as far as possible, present 
 them as a connected whole. 
 
 In a previous chapter we have de- 
 scribed at length the operations 
 which resulted in the capture of 
 New Orleans. In that chapter, it was 
 incidentally stated that Baton Rouge 
 and Natchez speedily shared the fate 
 of the Queen City of the South. Pre- 
 vious to the recall of General Butler 
 from the command of the Department 
 of the Gulf, there occurred a few 
 engagements of a minor character, 
 each of which is entitled to a passing 
 notice— all the more so that the reader 
 will thus be enabled the more easily 
 and tlie more clearly to understand 
 what follows. No account of the bat- 
 tles of the Civil War could be rea-arded 
 as complete, if it omitted all reference 
 to the Confederate " ram " Arkansas. 
 After the first unsuccessful attempt, 
 made upon Vicksburg by Farragut and 
 Williams, and when the National ves- 
 sels, with comparatively little harm, 
 had been run up past the city, Farragut 
 was made aware that a Confederate 
 steam-ram, of immense dimensions and 
 of enonnous power, was lying in the 
 Yazoo. This vessel, it appeared, had 
 been commenced at Memphis ; but two 
 days before the evacuation of Fort Pil- 
 low, she had been towed down the 
 river to a place of safety, in order to be 
 finished. She was now completed, and 
 
430 
 
 PORT HUDSON. 
 
 ready for action, her engines, which 
 were low pressure, possessing an aggre- 
 gate strength of 900 horse-power. This 
 was the Arkansas. Farragiit lost no 
 time in offerins: the monster battle. 
 July On the 15th July, 1862, the gun- 
 15. boats Caroudelet and Tyler, and 
 Ellet's ram. Queen of the "West, were 
 sent to reconnoitre her position. They 
 had sailed about six miles up the Yazoo, 
 when they found themselves in the 
 presence of their powerful antagonist. 
 The fire was opened at once, on both 
 sides. After a sharp encounter, the 
 National boats were compelled to re- 
 tire, the Arkansas making her way 
 down the Yazoo into the Mississippi, 
 and taking shelter under the batteries 
 at "Vicksburg. In this encounter the 
 Carondelet was badly injured, having 
 lost 14 men in killed and wounded. On 
 board the Arkansas there were 20 killed 
 and wounded. The idea of further de- 
 monstration being made against Vicks- 
 burg for the present having been 
 abandoned, Farragut ran past the bat- 
 teries again. Another attack was made 
 July on the Arkansas on the 22d, this 
 22. time by the Essex, Captain W. 
 D. Porter, and Ellet's Queen of the 
 West. It was unsuccessful ; and, as 
 the river was now falling rapidly, the 
 fleet was ordei'ed to return to New 
 Orleans. 
 
 The progress down the river was aiver- 
 sified by some lively incidents. When 
 passing Donaldsonville, fire was opened 
 upon the fleet by a band of gueiTillas. 
 Having: warned the inhabitants of his 
 intention, Farragut bombarded the vil- 
 lage, setting it on fire. The place was 
 
 afterwards occupied by National troops, 
 and named Fort Butler. Amved at 
 Baton Rouge, General Williams and 
 the land force disembarked, with the 
 view of permanently occupying the 
 place. Reinforcements were sent to 
 Williams; and Fan-agut held himself 
 in readiness to give what assistance 
 might be necessary. Van Dorn, not 
 ignorant of the intentions of the Na- 
 tional commanders, and aware that 
 the troops were suffering much from 
 sickness, was prepared to offer them 
 battle. General J. C. Breckenridge was 
 sent towards the city with 500 men; 
 and the Arkansas was ordered down 
 the river to take part in the fight. A 
 severe battle ensued on the 5 th of ^ng, 
 August, and lasted for the better 5- 
 part of two hours. Williams' ti'oops, 
 although attacked by greatly superior 
 forces, offered a stubborn resistance. 
 During the struggle, the Twenty-First 
 Indiana won great distinction. Discov- 
 ering that it had lost all its field-officers, 
 General Williams placed himself at its 
 head, exclaiming, "Boys! your field- 
 officers are all gone. I will lead you." 
 Loud cheers greeted his words. Scarce- 
 ly, however, had he spoken, when he fell 
 to the ground dead, pierced by a bullet- 
 wound in the breast. He had just 
 ordered the line to fall back. Colonel 
 T. W. Cahill, of the Ninth Connecticut, 
 taking the command, the movement was 
 conducted in good order. The battle, 
 however, was now ended ; for the Con- 
 federates also fell back, and then re- 
 treated. The National loss was 90 
 killed and 250 wounded. The Confed- 
 erate loss was considerably greater, the 
 
ARRIVAL OF BANKS. 
 
 431 
 
 Nation''»ls cTaimiug that they them- 
 selves buried 300 of the enemy's 
 dead. The Arkansas did not arrive 
 in time to take part in the conflict. In 
 coming down the river, her machinery 
 got disabled, and she became unman- 
 ageable. 
 
 On the following moi'ning, the 6th 
 of August, Porter, who had done some 
 good service at Baton Rouge, in repell- 
 ing the enemy, was waiting in readi- 
 ness for the appearance of the "rebel 
 ram." Impatient of her delay, he set 
 out in search of her with his gunboat, 
 the Essex, accompanied by the Cayuga 
 and Sumter. The huge monster was 
 discovered on the river, about four 
 miles above She was really helpless. 
 When within half a mile of her, and 
 about 10 A. M., Porter opened fire. 
 After an action of about twenty min- 
 utes, she was discovered to be ablaze. 
 She was then headed to the river bank; 
 and, about noon, she exploded with a 
 tremendous noise, being literally shat- 
 tered into fragments. Such was the 
 end of the famous iron-clad which was 
 to " drive the Yankees from New Or- 
 leans," and which was as much a terror 
 to the inhabitants on the banks of the 
 lower Mississippi, as it was the hope of 
 the Confederate government* 
 
 In the early part of October, detach- 
 ments of the fleet were emploj-ed t(^ 
 advantage against the defenses of th( 
 harbor and city of Galveston and on 
 
 • Difference of opinion exists as to the origin of the firo 
 which destroyed the Arkansas. It was claimed by Porler 
 that he set her on fire by an incendiary shell of his own 
 invention. It was claimed by the officers and crew, all 
 of whom escaped, that they set her on fire when she 
 became nnmanitgeable. 
 
 the Sabine River; and both Galveston 
 and Sabine Pass were occupied. 
 
 Later in the month of October, an 
 effort was made to " re-possess " the 
 rich district of La Fourche, on the west 
 side of the Mississippi. On the 27th, at 
 Labadieville, a sharp encounter oct. 
 took place between the Nationals^ 27. 
 under General Weitzel, and the Confed- 
 erates, under McPheeteis. The Confed- 
 erates were driven back, and pursued 
 about four miles. Weitzel captured 268 1 
 prisoners and one j^iece of artillery. His 
 loss was 18 killed and 74 wounded. 
 The result of this engagement was the 
 recovery of two congi-essional districts, 
 each of which, in December, sent repre- 
 sentatives to Washington. 
 
 General Banks had been appointed 
 to the command of the Department of 
 the Gulf late in the autumn. He did 
 not ariive in New Oi'leans until the 
 14th of December. Banks sailed from 
 the North at the head of an expedition 
 consisting of 26 steam vessels and 25 
 sailing vessels, and carrying with him a 
 military force of about 10,000 men. 
 The destination of the expedition was, 
 for obvious reasons, kept a secret. The 
 secret was well kept, although, by the 
 time the fleet set sail, it began to 
 l)e whispered about that its destination 
 was the coast of Texas. Ou his arrival 
 at New Orleans, Banks was received 
 by Butler in the most courteous man- 
 ner. Banks immediately took command 
 of the department; and what, with the 
 17,000 well-trained troops — some of 
 them colored — handed over to him by 
 Butler, and the 10,000 which he had 
 brought with him from the North, hu 
 
«32 
 
 PORT HUDSON. 
 
 found himself at the head of an anned 
 force of 30,000 men. This force was 
 designated the Nineteenth army corps. 
 It was expected thai;, with these troops, 
 Banks would co-operate with Grant 
 generally in the opening of the Missis- 
 sippi — that he would attempt the de- 
 struction or capture of Port Hudson, 
 take possession of the Red River region, 
 expel the Confederates from Louisiana, 
 and restore the National authority in 
 Tex<as. 
 
 On his arrival in New Orleans, Banks 
 discovered that matters were not in so 
 hopeful a condition as they seemed at 
 ft distance. Grant had met with re- 
 verses on his way to Vicksburg, and 
 had deemed it prudent to fall back. 
 Sherman was meeting with but little 
 Buccess at Chickasaw Bayou. He re- 
 occupied Baton Rouge with a force of 
 10,000 men, under General Cuvier; 
 but such was the strength of the enemy 
 in and around Poit Hudson, that the 
 advance on that place was for the pres- 
 ent delayed. We have seen already 
 that the Nationals had resumed posses- 
 sion of Galveston, and also of the Sa- 
 bine Pass — both of them positions of 
 first-class importance. In the posses- 
 sion of these, however, they were not 
 to be allowed long to remain. At the 
 close of December, and at the request 
 of Commodore Renshaw, who was in 
 charge of Galveston, Banks sent to that 
 place, from New Orleans, three com- 
 panies of the Forty-Second Massachu- 
 setts Volunteers, under Colonel Burrill. 
 Pec, When they landed and encamped 
 28. on the 28th, the gunboats West- 
 neld, Clifton, Harriet Lane, Owasco, 
 
 Corypheus and Sachem, were lying in 
 front of the town. At this time Gen- 
 eral Magruder, who had distinguished 
 himself in the Peninsula by his skilful 
 resistance of McClellan, was in com- 
 mand in that department, Magruder 
 seems to have had a high opinion of the 
 courtesy and good-nature of Renshaw. 
 At Virginia Point, opposite Galveston, 
 he spent a whole night, with some 80 
 men, inspecting the defenses. Renshaw 
 was made aware of the fact — was 
 Avarned even — that an attack was con- 
 templated ; but he made no prepara- 
 tions. Meantime, Magruder, who had 
 collected from the adjoining rivers all 
 the available troops in the neighbor- 
 hood, with four steamboats, on which 
 he had put guns, and which he had for- 
 tified with cotton bales, proceeded to- 
 wards Galveston, with the view of mak- 
 ing an attack on Renshaw at dawn on 
 the morning of the 1st of January, 1863. 
 The island on which Galveston is 
 built is a sand bank, some thirty 
 miles long and two wide. It is 
 connected Avith the main-land by a 
 wooden bridge, two miles long, over 
 which runs the Galveston and Houston 
 Railroad. It was bi-ight moon- jau. 
 light, shortly after midnight, !• 
 when Magruder crossed the bridge on 
 a train of cars, cariying with him his 
 troops and field-pieces. He had actual- 
 ly reached a point within two squares 
 of the camp of the Massachusetts sol- 
 diers, and had planted his cannon so as 
 to bear upon Renshaw's gunboats. 
 His steamboats were now seen in the 
 bay. The moon had gone down; it 
 was now about four o'clock ; and, under 
 
THE WESTFIELD BLOWN UP. 
 
 433 
 
 cover of the darkness, a storming party, 
 500 strong, and a battalion of sharp- 
 shooters, fell with great fury on the 
 Massachusetts troops, the Confederate 
 cannon, at the same time, opening fire 
 on the gunboats. The Massachusetts 
 men were found not wholly unprepared. 
 Posted behind a breast-work, which 
 they had constructed with the torn-up 
 planking of the wharf, they offered a 
 gallant resistance, and ultimately, not- 
 withstanding their inferiority of num- 
 bers, succeeded in repulsing the storm- 
 ing party, and silencing the guns. But 
 the enemy was not to be so easily de- 
 feated. The Confederate steamers now 
 arrived on the scene. They were well 
 manned by a portion of Sibley's bri- 
 gade. Two of these steamers — the 
 Bayou City and Neptune — rushed at 
 once upon the Harriet Lane, the troops 
 on board the two former sweeping 
 the deck of the latter with a perfect 
 storm of bullets. The Han'iet Lane 
 ran into the Bayou City, carrying off 
 her wheel-guard, but doing little other 
 damage. The Neptune then ran in 
 upon the Harriet Lane, and so damaged 
 herself that she was compelled to fall 
 back to the flats, where she sank 
 almost immediately. A sixty-eight 
 pounder, the only gun on board the 
 Bayou City, had burst, and it seemed as 
 if she, too, must go down. But no. 
 Making another rush for the Harriet 
 Lane — and this time her bow penetrating 
 the wheel of her rival — the two ves- 
 sels became entangled. Sibley's sol- 
 diers, dischai'ging volleys of musketry 
 on the gunners, began to swarm on 
 board the Hariiet Lane. Li the brief 
 
 struggle which ensued. Commander 
 Wainright, who refused to surrender, 
 was killed, while bravely defending 
 himself with his revolver. Lieutenant- 
 Commander Lee was also mortally 
 wounded. The Westfield had even a 
 sadder fate than the Harriet Lane. 
 She had gone out to meet the Confede- 
 rate steamers in Bolivar Channel, and 
 had run aground at high tide. The 
 Clinton, Lieutenant-Commander Law, 
 hastened to her relief. Scarcely had 
 the Clinton arrived when Renshaw, 
 hearing the sound of arms, and know- 
 ing that the attack had begun, ordered 
 Law to return. Having returned, he 
 opened fire upon the batteries at Fort 
 Point; but as the Ovvasco had ground- 
 ed in the attempt to reach the Harriet 
 Lane, he did not venture further. 
 About sunrise messengers, bearing a 
 flag of truce, ariived, demanding a sur- 
 render. Law, refusing to take upon 
 himself the responsibility, was allowed 
 time to communicate with Renshaw, on 
 board the Westfield. Renshaw would 
 not smrender. He gave orders that 
 the National vessels and troops should 
 make their escape, if possible. As the 
 Westfield was hopelessly grounded, he 
 proposed to blow her up, and, with his 
 oflacers and crew, make his escape to 
 two of the transports. The match, un- 
 fortunately, was applied too soon ; and, 
 before they had time to escape, Ren- 
 shaw himself, Lieutenant Zimmerman, 
 Engineer Green and about a dozen of 
 the crew were involved in the common 
 destniction. They all perished; and 
 nearly as many men, who were in the 
 Commodore's gig, close to the Westfield, 
 
434 
 
 POET HUDSOlT. 
 
 shared the same fate. Law, making 
 the Owasco his flagship, escaped with 
 what remained of the fleet to New Or- 
 leans. The Harriet Lane and two coal 
 barks, the Cavallo and Elias Pike, were 
 left in the hands of the enemy. The 
 troops had no choice but surrender. 
 This affair at Galveston was hailed as 
 a great victory by the South. It was 
 claimed by Magruder that the blockade 
 of that port was raised, and that " the 
 Harbor of Galveston was open for trade 
 to all friendly nations." It proved, 
 however, but a barren victory ; for be- 
 fore the Harriet Lane could get to sea 
 in her new capacity as a Confederate 
 pirate, Farragut had re-established the 
 blockade. 
 
 Emboldened by their success at Gal- 
 veston, the Confederates resolved to 
 make a similar attempt on Sabine Pass. 
 The occupation of this place by the 
 Nationals was a great inconvenience to 
 the Southern authorities. The Sabine 
 River, which the pass commands, is 
 the boundary line between Louisi- 
 ana and Texas, and is conveniently 
 situated for the foreign trade through 
 Mexico and the West Indies. It was, 
 therefore, of great utility to them in 
 exporting cotton and importing muni- 
 tions of war and other supplies. The 
 pass, since its occupation by the Na- 
 tionals in October, had been blockaded 
 by two gunboats, the Morning Light 
 and Velocity. The Morning Light was 
 well armed, carrying a formidable bat- 
 tery of nine guns — one of them a thirty- 
 pound pivot-rifled gun ; the other eight, 
 thirty-two pounders. The Velocity car- 
 ried one small howitzer. The Confed- 
 
 erates fitted out four vessels, protec+.ed 
 by cotton bales, after the manner of 
 the vessels which were employed in 
 the capture of the Harriet Lane. Thr 
 largest of the fleet — a steamer — carried 
 two eighteen-pounders ; another, a long 
 thirty-two pounder ; and the others, 
 one gun each. On the morn- jan, 
 ing of the 21st of January, the 21. 
 weather being favorable, they pushed 
 down the Sabine, drove the National 
 vessels out to sea; where, being pur- 
 sued by the John Bell and the Uncle 
 Ben, they were captured, with their 
 guns, prisoners and a large amount 
 of stores. The soil of Texas was once 
 more completely in the hands of the 
 Confederates. 
 
 General Banks had, meanwhile, been 
 giving his attention to the rich sugar 
 districts of Louisiana, to the west of 
 the Mississippi. This was the more 
 necessary that, if the Confederates were 
 allowed to concentrate in any strength 
 in that region, they would be able to 
 give him trouble on his flank and rear, 
 and seriously to menace New Orleans. 
 Already, as we have seen, a portion of 
 that territory had been overrun by the 
 National troops ; but there were por- 
 tions more particularly in the direction 
 of the Red River, into which they had 
 not yet penetrated, and the inhabitants 
 were, for the most part disloyal. It is 
 a peculiar country, badly adapted for 
 the movement of large bodies of men 
 and artillery — much better adapted, in 
 fact, for defense than for attack. There 
 are large and productive plantations; 
 there are also extensive forests, and 
 the entire country is intersected with 
 
CARNEY'S BRIDGE. 
 
 435 
 
 lagoons, biiyoufe . jd impassable swamps. 
 The wateis abound wiv. dligators; and 
 the intervening ground, which is for 
 the most part soft and slushy, is dark- 
 ened by huge cypress trees, which 
 spread their umbrageous foliage all 
 around. At that particular season, in 
 consequence of the overflow of the 
 Mississippi and its tributaries, the dis- 
 trict was half submerged in water. In 
 .iddition to those natural difficulties, 
 obstructions had been placed in the 
 streams ; and, at points favorable for 
 defense, fortifications had been con- 
 structed. 
 
 About eighty miles west of New 
 Oi leans, at a point where the waters of 
 the great Bayou Teche meet those of 
 the Atchafitlaya, stands Brashear City. 
 This city is connected with New Or- 
 1 ans by a single raili'oad. On the 
 1 3che, it was known, there was an 
 a med steamer, called the J. A. Cotton. 
 At different parts on the Teche, and 
 al.30 on the Atchafalaya, there were 
 stronii: earth-works. Banks resolved 
 to draw the Confederates from their 
 strono'holds in the Deie;hborhood of 
 Brashear City. An expedition for tliat 
 purpose was organized, and placed under 
 the direction of General Weitzel and 
 Commodore McKean Buchanan. About 
 the 11th of January, Weitzel was at 
 Brashear City. There he placed his 
 infantry on the gunboats, his cavalry 
 and artillery being sent forwai'd by 
 land. At Carney's Bridge, just above 
 Pattersonville, they were brought to 
 a halt by the demolished structure, 
 against which lay a sunken steamboat, 
 WJen with brick. Immediately above 
 
 was the formidable steamer, Cotton; 
 and on each side of the bayou there 
 were powerful batteries, defended, as it 
 turned out, by about 1100 men. 
 
 On the morning of the 15th, Buchanan 
 opened fire on the enemy's posi- jau. 
 tion. The Confederates responded '5. 
 sharply, both from the Cotton and from 
 the batteries. The engagement had not 
 lasted long when a torpedo exploded 
 below the gunboat, Kinsman, lifting her 
 stei-n, but not doing serious damage. 
 Heedless of the warning, Buchanan 
 passed on in the Calhoun, in the face of 
 a fierce cannonade. He was standing 
 on the bow of the boat, with his spy- 
 glass in his hand. A spent ball from a 
 rifle-pit hit his chief engineer on the 
 thigh, "Ah, you've got it," he said. 
 The next moment he fell dead, a bullet 
 having penetrated his head. By this 
 time the Eighth Vermont, having 
 reached the Confederate rear, was cleai'- 
 ing the rifle-pits, while the batteries of 
 the Fourth Maine and Sixth Massa 
 chusetts, supported by Fitch's sharp 
 shooters and the One Hundred and 
 Sixteenth New York, had flanked the 
 defenses on the south side of the bayou 
 The Cotton, which was now exposed to 
 an enfilading fire, was soon compelled 
 to retreat. So, also, were the land 
 forces, the latter leaving forty of theii 
 number prisoners. The Cotton more 
 than once retui-ned to the fight, every 
 time to be terribly punished ; and, on 
 the morning of the Kith, she was seen 
 floating on the bayou, deserted and in 
 flames. It was a swift, sharp, bitter 
 fiffht. The monster vessel having been 
 destroyed, it was deemed unnecessary to 
 
436 
 
 PORT E^r^jON. 
 
 proceed further. Including Buchanan, 
 whose death was a great calamity, for 
 he was a brave and deserving officer, 
 and had sacrificed much by clinging to 
 the National cause, there were 7 killed 
 and 27 wounded. On the night of the 
 15th — the dead and wounded having 
 been placed on a raft — the expedition 
 sailed back to Brashear City under the 
 pale light of a January moon. 
 
 The forces were now concentrated at 
 Baton Rouge. It was resolved to make 
 a joint land and naval movement in the 
 direction of Port Hudson. Farragut de- 
 termined, if he could not do more, that 
 he would at least attempt to recover pos- 
 session of the river from that point to 
 Vicksburg. He, therefore, assembled 
 his tleet at Prophet's Island, a few miles 
 below Port Hudson ; and, on the same 
 day. Banks sent forward 12,000 men 
 to engage the attention of the enemy, 
 while the perilous attempt at running 
 the batteries should again be made. It 
 Mar. ^^^ iiow the 13th of March. 
 13« Some little progress was made. 
 The pickets were driven in ; and fire 
 was opened on the Confederate works 
 by the gimboats and the mortars. It 
 was Farragut's intention to run the 
 gauntlet of the batteries next morning. 
 The night, however, seemed favorable 
 for an attack. It was exceedingly 
 dark ; and he was now perfectly fa- 
 miliar with the channel. The fleet con- 
 sisted of the frigates Hartford, Missis- 
 sippi, Richmond and Monongahela, the 
 gunboats Albatross, Genessee, Kineo, 
 Essex and Sachem, with six mortar 
 schooners. The vessels moved in the 
 following order : the Hartford, Cap- 
 
 tain Palmer, Farragut on board, with 
 the gunboat Albatross lashed to her 
 side ; the Richmond ; the Genessee ; 
 the Monongahela ; the Kineo ; the Mis- 
 sissippi. As they moved along through 
 the deep darkness, the mortars kept up 
 their fire. The darkness, however, was 
 not dense enough to put the Confede- 
 rates off their guard, or to make them 
 foi'getful of their duty. 
 
 As the vessels approached the fort, 
 the batteries suddenly opened fire, and 
 immense bonfires were kindled on the 
 hill-sides, lighting up the whole scene. 
 The bonfires gave a brilliant but local 
 light, which was hemmed in, so to 
 speak, by the surrounding darkness, 
 while what seemed meteors bursting 
 now from the batteries on the blufPs, 
 and now from the vessels on the river, 
 created a pandemonium -like picture 
 more horrible than the onlooker, in his 
 most imaginative moods, ever before 
 conceived. The batteries being high, 
 the Confederates had all the advantage. 
 It was a most unequal stiniggle. The 
 fleet, however, kept moving on, vainly 
 replying to the deadly fire, which 
 poured like hail from the heights on 
 their right. Grape, canister, shrapnel, 
 shot, and the scarcely less destructive 
 bullets of sharpshooters, swept murder- 
 ously over the decks of the vessels as 
 they drew nearer and nearer the bluffs 
 For an hour and a half the terrific can- 
 nonade continued. What had happened 
 in that space of time was known only 
 on board the separate vessels. 
 
 About one o'clock the firing ceased. 
 Only the Hartford and the Albatross 
 had passed the batteries. Most of the 
 
CAPTUEE OF OPELOUSAS. 
 
 437 
 
 other vessels had suffered severely. 
 The Richmond received a shot in her 
 steam-drum, and was compelled to fall 
 back and anchor. The captain of the 
 Monongahela was seriously injured; 
 that vessel, also, fell back and anchored. 
 The Kineo had her rudder-post shot 
 through ; her propeller was made foul 
 by a hawser ; she, too, floated down and 
 anchored. The Mississippi had the 
 worst fate of all. Grounding at a point 
 where she was exposed to the fire of 
 three batteries, she was terribly pun- 
 ished. For a time, however, she kept 
 up a niost vigorous fire, replying shot 
 for shot to every one that struck her. 
 As it was found impossible to relieve 
 her, it was resolved to abandon her to 
 her fate. Her guns, in consequence, were 
 spiked ; she was set on fire ; and what 
 remained of the ofiicers and crew found 
 safety on the shore opposite the bat- 
 teries. It was believed that many 
 jumped overboard and were made pris- 
 oners. Of 133 officers and men, 29 were 
 found to be missing. A little later, and 
 after she had drifted off and floated a 
 short distance down the river, she ex- 
 ploded, and went to the bottom, with 
 her fine armament of twenty-one heavy 
 guns and two howitzers. The fleet, 
 with the exception of the two vessels 
 which had passed the batteries, fell 
 back to Baton Rouge, and there found 
 slaelter. It was another failure ; but 
 neither Farragut above nor Banks be- 
 low had given up their purpose regard- 
 ing Port Hudson. 
 
 The Louisiana region west of the 
 Mississippi again commands our atten- 
 tion. Again there was a concentration 
 
 of forces at Brashear City, General 
 Banks commanding in person. Ifc was 
 the Teche expedition over again, but 
 on a grander scale. When General 
 Weitzel i-eturned to Brashear City, 
 after the expedition in January, the 
 Confederates resumed their old position 
 in the neighborhood of the Teche. It 
 was resolved to drive them effectually 
 out of this rich and productive district. 
 On the 10th of April, General April 
 "Weitzel, who had been lying at ^^' 
 Brashear City, crossed over to Ber- 
 wick, on the opposite side of the bayou. 
 The landing was not disputed ; but it 
 was discovered that the enemy, in con- 
 siderable strength, was not far distant. 
 General Richard Taylor, it was known, 
 was in command. On the next day-— 
 Saturday — the infantry advanced a short 
 distance. 
 
 On Sunday, the 12th, General Emory 
 crossed, with his division. A further 
 advance was made, the enemy resisting, 
 but not obstinately. General Emory 
 slowly moved back to the shelter of 
 the works above Pattersonville. On 
 the same day on which Emory crossed 
 the Teche, General Grover, with his 
 division on transports, accompanied by 
 four gunboats — the Clifton, Calhoun, 
 Arizona and Estrella — moved up the 
 Atchafalaya into Lake Chatimacha to- 
 wards Irish Bend, his object being to 
 fall upon the rear of the Confederates 
 and cut off their retreat, in the event 
 of their being driven from their posi- 
 tion at Fort Bisland. It was difficult 
 to effect a landing ; and some time, in 
 consequence, was lost. Grover was 
 vigorously attacked ; but he succeeded 
 
 »4« 
 
438 
 
 POET HUDSON. 
 
 in repelling the assailants, who fell back 
 into the woods. This success of Grover 
 weakened the confidence of the enemy 
 in front of General Banks, who was 
 Bome eleven miles distant. The entire 
 Confederate force, therefore, retreated 
 towards Opelousas, making a stand at 
 Vermilion Bayou. In their retreat, 
 they burned several steamboats at 
 Franklin, and destroyed the bridges in 
 their rear. So rapid was the pursuit 
 made by Weitzel's brigade, supported 
 by a portion of Emory's division, under 
 Colonel Ingrahara, that Taylor, finding 
 it impossible to carry them with him, 
 destroyed, at New Iberia, five trans- 
 ports laden with commissary stores and 
 ammunition, and an iron-clad which 
 was in course of construction. On the 
 17th, Emory came up vrith Taylor at 
 Vermilion Bayou. The contest was 
 brief, but sharp, Taylor again retiring, 
 and burning the bridges behind him. 
 The night of the 17th and the follow- 
 ing day were spent in rebuilding the 
 bridges. 
 
 On the 19th the march was resumed, 
 and continued to the vicinity of Grand 
 Coteau; and, on the 20th, General 
 Banks entered Opelousas in triumph. 
 On the same day on which Banks en- 
 tered Opelousas, Lieutenant-Command- 
 ing A. P. Cooke captured Butte k la 
 Rose, with its garrison of 60 men, 2 
 heavy guns, and a large quantity of 
 ammunition. The way was thus opened 
 through the Atchafalaya to the Red 
 River ; and the Arizona, having passed 
 through, reached Admiral Farragut, 
 above Port Hudson, on the 2d of May. 
 
 Banks '•ontinued to push forward to 
 
 Alexandria, Taylor still retreating be- 
 fore him. On the 6th of May, his ad- 
 vance, under General William Dwight, 
 entered Alexandria ; but Admiral Por- 
 ter, who had ascended the Red River 
 with a fleet of gunboats, had arrived 
 some hours before him and taken posses- 
 sion of the place. Weitzel pursued Tay- 
 lor as far as Grand Ecore, when the chase 
 was discontinued. The expedition had 
 been completely successful ; and Banks, 
 on the 7th of May, wrote to Washington, 
 saying: "We have destroyed the ene- 
 my's army and navy, and made their re- 
 organization impossible by destroying or 
 removing the material. We hold the 
 key of the position. Among the evi- 
 dences of victory are 2000 prisoners, 2 
 transports and 20 guns taken, and 3 
 gunboats and 8 transports destroyed." 
 
 While Banks had been thus engaged, 
 the division of General T. W. Sherman, 
 which had been quartered at New Or- 
 leans, had not been idle or inactive. 
 At Tickfaw Station, near Lake Pont- 
 chartrain, a large quantity of cotton, 
 lumber, corn and bacon had been cap- 
 tured ; a large tannery, a car-shop, the 
 Tangipaho Bridge and other valuable 
 property had been destroyed ; and four 
 schooners, with cargoes of contraband 
 goods, had been burned on the lake. 
 A detachment from the force, under 
 General Augur, who had returned to 
 Baton Rouge, had encountered and 
 routed a body of the enemy on the rail- 
 road, between Port Hudson and Clin- 
 ton. About this same time, Grierson, 
 to whose successful raid reference has 
 already been made, captured, near Port 
 Hudson, some 300 head of cattle. The 
 
GORDON'S LANDING. 
 
 439 
 
 ground was thus cleared of the enemy 
 on both sides of the great river; and 
 Banks was left at liberty to concentrate 
 his troops, with a view to the fresh at- 
 tack on Port Hudson. 
 
 We left Admiral Fan-agnt as he 
 passed the batteries at Port Hudson 
 with his now veteran flag-ship, the 
 Hartford, and the gunboat Albatross. 
 Before halting finally with Banks at 
 Port Hudson, let us follow Farragut, 
 and take note of his experiences until 
 the commencement of the siege. The 
 Hartford and the Albatross, having 
 passed the batteries, proceeded up the 
 river. They encountered little or no 
 opposition until they reached Grand 
 Guli. Here, however, they were rough- 
 ly treated, both vessels being more or 
 less injured. The Hartford was struck 
 fourteen times ; and three of her men 
 were killed. In passing Warrenton, 
 they experienced a similar fate, the 
 Confederate batteries at that point 
 opening upon them a heavy cannonade. 
 It was not possible, however, to hinder 
 Farragut from moving upward. On 
 Mar. the 26th of March, he anchored 
 2*' below Vicksburg, at the mouth 
 of the Williams Canal, to which refer- 
 ence has frequently been made in the 
 preceding chapter. Here he opened 
 communications with General Grant 
 and Admiral Porter. The latter, yield- 
 ing to his call for reinforcements and 
 supplies, sent him two rams — the Lan- 
 caster and the Switzerland — together 
 with several flat-boats, laden with coal. 
 The Lancaster was destroyed while at- 
 tempting to pass the batteries at Vicks- 
 burg, The Switzerland was disabled ; 
 
 but, being rescued by the Albatross, she 
 was towed down to a safe positioa 
 The gunboats floated past without dam- 
 age. The Switzerland was speedily 
 repaired; and the three vessels pro- 
 ceeded on their downward course. On 
 the 30th of March, the fleet witnessed 
 the destruction of the Confederate 
 steamer Vicksburg, as already described. 
 Warrenton was again passed on the 
 morning of the 31st of March ; and, on 
 the night of the same day, the three 
 vessels, after some fifteen minutes' bit- 
 ter experience from the batteries at 
 Grand Gulf, had anchored below that 
 place. 
 
 On the following day they weighed 
 anchor, and proceeded to the iprji 
 mouth of the Red River. Over !• 
 the mouth of the river and the adjoin- 
 ing country, Farragut kept a vigilant 
 guard. It was not deemed safe to 
 make any further attempt to pass the 
 batteries at Port Hudson. It was as 
 little desirable to repeat the fruitless 
 efforts which had been made in the di- 
 rection of Vicksburg, especially with 
 the heavier vessels. Farrasfut was 
 thus in some danger of falling a victim 
 to the enemy. The Switzerland had 
 returned and joined the fleet of Ad 
 miral Porter, who was now co-operatin£; 
 with General Grant against Vicksburg. 
 Towards the end of April, Fan-agut, 
 who had sailed on an expedition up the 
 Red River, had a severe engagement 
 with the enemy. He had taken witb 
 him, in addition to the Albatross, the 
 Esti-ella and the Arizona. At Gordon's 
 Landing, he encountered two Confede- 
 rate vessels — the Mary T. and the 
 
440 
 
 POBT HUDSON. 
 
 Grand Duke. The Estrella and the 
 Arizona were somewhat in the rear, as 
 they had been ordered not to advance. 
 The Albatross moved up to within four 
 hundred yards of the Mary T. At this 
 point, she was stopped by obstructions 
 in the river. A vigorous fight, how- 
 ever, now began, the Gi-and Duke com- 
 ing to the aid of her consort. The firing 
 of the Confederate vessels told with 
 terrible effect from the very commence- 
 ment of the contest. The pilot-house 
 of the Albatross was demolished. One 
 of the pilots was killed outright ; and 
 the other lost his hand. The rigging 
 was badly damaged ; and the main-mast 
 was cut in two. A ball passed through 
 her hull; and her machinery was par- 
 tially disabled. The Confederate ves- 
 sels were more severely punished. The 
 first broadside from the Albatross car- 
 ried away the steam-connection pipe of 
 the Mary T., at the same time killing 
 and wounding some 30 persons. The 
 Grand Duke was so severely punished 
 that she steamed oif up the stream, 
 under cover of the woods. While Far- 
 ragut, who had fallen back, was con- 
 sulting with Captain Cook as to the 
 practicability of capturing the now dis- 
 abled Mary T., the Grand Duke came 
 back and towed away her cnppled com- 
 panion. The fight lasted about forty 
 minutes. The Albatross had lost some 
 seven men in killed and wounded. The 
 Confederate loss on each vessel was 
 understood to be much greater. After 
 this, Farragut was comparatively inac- 
 tive until the first assault was made on 
 Port Hudson. 
 
 Banks, as we have seen, had swept the 
 
 entire country, on both sides of the great 
 river, from New Orleans to a point be- 
 yond the mouth of the Red River. Hav- 
 ing returned to the Mississippi, he lost no 
 time in pushing his army across to Bayou 
 
 Sara. The landing was effected on 
 
 May 
 21. 
 
 the 21st of May. On the follow 
 ing day, he was joined by Brigadier-Gen- 
 eral Sherman and Major-General Augur, 
 the latter of whom, on the 22d of May, 
 and while taking position, had a severe 
 encounter, on Port Hudson Plains, with 
 a portion of the enemy's force. On the 
 25th, the Confederates were compelled 
 to abandon their first line of works. 
 On the 27th, all the necessary prepara- 
 tions having been made, a general as- 
 sault was ordered. 
 
 Port Hudson, originally a place of 
 comparatively little importance and of 
 no great strength, had lieen strongly for- 
 tified, and converted into an almost im- 
 pregnable fortress. It stood on the 
 east side of the Mississippi, on a bend 
 of the river, about twenty-two miles 
 above Baton Rouge and one hundred 
 and forty-seven above New Orleans. 
 Approaching the place by water from 
 the south, the front batteries were on a 
 bold bluff, about forty feet above high 
 water mark. From this point, three 
 series of batteries extended along the 
 heights above the town to a point on 
 Thompson's Creek, making a continuous 
 line about three and a half miles long. 
 Beyond Thompson's Creek there is an 
 impassable marsh, which forms a natural 
 defense. From the lower battery there 
 stretched out, in semicircular form, a 
 line of land fortifications, which termi- 
 nated at Thompson's Creek. The place 
 
THE ASSAULT. 
 
 441 
 
 was strong by nature ; and everything 
 which art and science could accomplish 
 had been done to make it impregnable. 
 But for the fall of Vicksburg, the pre- 
 sumption is that it could not have been 
 reduced, except by a formal siege. The 
 guns on the works were of heavy cali- 
 bre ; and there were numerous light bat- 
 teries, which could be removed to any 
 part of the line. The place was under 
 the command of General Frank Gardner. 
 "When the order for the assault was 
 May given, fire had already, for some 
 27» days, been opened on the place 
 from the river. Farragut, with the 
 Hartford and Albatross, and one or two 
 gunboats, were above Port Hudson. 
 Commander C. H. B. Caldwell, with 
 the Mouongahela, Richmond, Essex 
 and Genessee, was below. The filing 
 from the land batteries commenced 
 about six o'clock on the mornings of 
 the 27th, and continued all day. At 
 about ten o'clock, and while the bat- 
 teries were vigorously at work pour- 
 ing shot and shell into the place, an 
 attack was made on the right of Banks 
 by Weitzel, Grover and Paine. It "was 
 long past noon when Augur, in the 
 centre, and Sherman got fairly to work. 
 For hours the battle raged with great 
 fury. The batteries on the land, and 
 the batteries on the river, kept up a most 
 destructive fire, while the brave soldiers 
 rushed forward over the broken ground, 
 over abatis, the Confederate shot and 
 shell sweeping the entire space like a 
 very besom of destruction. Never was 
 more bravery exhibited by any troops. 
 The fight was most severe on the right. 
 Three desperate charges were made. 
 
 They pushed their way across Big 
 Sandy Creek; and, by four o'clock, 
 they had driven the enemy through the 
 woods, and forced their way up to the 
 very edge of the works. The attack 
 was made with equal bravery in the 
 centre and on the left ; and, by sunset, 
 the Confederates, who made a gallani 
 resistance, were at every point com' 
 pelled to seek shelter behind their fop 
 tifications. The right continued to hold 
 the position which it had won in front 
 of the parapet ; but the left, being ex- 
 posed to a flank fire, withdrew to the 
 cover of a belt of woods close at hand. 
 In the evening the troops were with- 
 drawn. It was a bold effort, daringly 
 and bravely made ; but it proved a dis- 
 astrous failure. The National loss was 
 293 killed and 1549 wounded. Oa th* 
 Confederate side, the killed and wound- 
 ed did not exceed 300. 
 
 The employment of negro soldiers 
 was a feature of this engagement. It 
 was the first time that they had been 
 emp'ioyed in any great numbers. The 
 bravery which they exhibited, their 
 patience and endurance under fire, com- 
 manded alike the admiration of their 
 white companions -in -arms and the 
 praises of their commanders. In his 
 report. General Banks makes special 
 mention of the manner in which they 
 conducted themselves. "The position 
 occupied by these troops" (the First 
 and Second Louisiana), says that com- 
 mander, "was one of importance, and 
 called for the utmost steadiness and 
 bravery in those to whom it was con- 
 fided. It gives me pleasure to report 
 that they answered every expectation. 
 
442 
 
 PORT HUDSON. 
 
 In many respects their conduct wa8 
 heroic. No troops could be more de- 
 termined or more daring. They made, 
 during the day, three charges upon the 
 batteries of the enemy, suffering very 
 heavy losses, and holding their position 
 at nightfall with the other troops on 
 the right of oui- line. The highest com- 
 mendation is bestowed upon them by 
 all the officers in command on the right. 
 Whatever doubt may have existed 
 heretofore as to the efficiency of organi- 
 lations of this character, the histoiy of 
 this day proves conclusively to those 
 who were in condition to observe the 
 conduct of these regiments, that the 
 government will find in this class of 
 troops effective supporters and de- 
 fenders. The severe test to which they 
 were subjected, and the determined 
 manner in which they encountered the 
 enemy, leaves upon my mind no doubt 
 of their ultimate success. They require 
 only good officers, commands of limited 
 numbers, and careful discipline, to 
 make them excellent soldiers." 
 
 Banks must have been disappointed ; 
 but he was not disheartened. He had 
 no need to be. The stone walls and 
 earth-works, and the powerful and well- 
 manned batteries of the enemy were, a 
 few miles further up the river, baffling 
 the skill and trying the patience of a 
 greater soldier than he. The day after 
 the assault was occupied in burying the 
 dead. It became more and more ap- 
 parent that the place might prove too 
 strong for the forces at his command, 
 and that he might have to depend on a 
 regular siege for its final reduction. 
 With this probability before him, he 
 
 set his men to work. Under the hot 
 June sun, the men worked with a will, 
 digging trenches, throwing up earth- 
 works, and undermining the enemy's 
 fortifications. They were daily and 
 hourly exposed to the heavy guns, and 
 to the sharpshooters behind the works. 
 On both sides, the firing was kept up 
 with but little intermission. The shot 
 and , shell from the gunboats on the 
 river, as well as from the batteries on 
 land, allowed the garrison no repose. 
 It was the same thing day and night. 
 Gardner's position was daily becoming 
 more critical. His provisions were 
 growing scarce ; his medical stores were 
 all but exhausted ; and, what was 
 worse, he had but small hope of de- 
 liverance. In his case, as in the case 
 of Pemberton, everything depended 
 upon Johnston. Even if uuable to re- 
 lieve Vicksburg, he might succeed in 
 sweeping around Grant's rear, and give 
 Banks a surprise at any moment. This 
 was his strongest consolation. Banks 
 was scarcely in a better plight. His 
 army was small. Around Port Hudson, 
 he had not more than 12,000 effective 
 men. The Confederate cavalry were 
 concentrating in his rear. General Tay- 
 lor was collecting troops, with a view 
 to fresh efforts of aggression in the ad- 
 joining regions of Louisiana. He, too, 
 had his thoughts about Johnston; but 
 what was Gardner's hope was Banks' 
 fear. 
 
 It was in the last degree desirable, 
 so far as the National commander was 
 concerned, that Port Hudson be re- 
 duced with as little delay as possible. 
 Another assault, therefore, was planned 
 
THE SECOND ASSAULT. 
 
 i43 
 
 The men had done good work in 
 ti-enching and throwing up works since 
 the last attack. On the llth of June, 
 Jnne ^Q attempt was made to establish 
 
 n. a new line within easy attacking 
 distance of the Confederate works. If 
 this line could be established, all the 
 dangers of a movement over a broad 
 intervening space would be avoided. 
 At three o'clock in the morning, under 
 cover of a heavy fire of artillery, the 
 National troops advanced. They had 
 made their way through the abatis, 
 when the garrison came out in force. 
 A fierce struggle ensued. The Na- 
 tionals not only held their ground for 
 a time, but forced some of the Confed- 
 erates back behind the fortifications. 
 The attempt was gallantly made, but it 
 was fiercely repelled. Lieutenant Stan- 
 ton Allyn, a brave young officer from 
 Connecticut, alone reached the parapet ; 
 but both he and his men were driven 
 back over the abatis, with a heavy loss 
 in killed, wounded and prisoners 
 
 This partial attempt, although a fail- 
 ure, did not prevent Banks from making 
 a general assault along the whole line 
 three days afterwards. He had made 
 up his mind to take the place by storm, 
 if it were at all possible, and had taken 
 some pains to rearrange his troops, 
 which at this time lay for the most part 
 in two lines — a right and a left, but no 
 centre. Joined together, they made a 
 right angle. Grover's division, on the 
 upper side of Port Hudson, extended 
 over three miles from the mouth of 
 Thompson's Creek into the interior of 
 the country. Augur's division, from a 
 point within supporting distance of 
 
 Grover, extended some three miles to- 
 wards the river below Port Hudson. 
 At its extreme point near the river 
 this line was within hailing distance of 
 the fleet. The enemy was well posted, 
 and not unprepared for the advance of 
 those bright lines of glittering steel 
 which, stretching out on either side of 
 them, met in their front. The defenses 
 of the enemy formed a right angle, 
 both lines of which extended to the 
 river, and enclosed a sharp bend. In 
 front of the earth- works, which seemed 
 covered with gleaming bayonets, there 
 was a deep ditch nearly twelve feet in 
 width ; and within short range, enfi- 
 lading breast-works commanded every 
 approach. The point of attack was the 
 extreme northeasterly angle of the Con- 
 federate position. The attack was to 
 be made by Grover and "Weitzel. Gen- 
 ei'ala Augur and Dwight were instruct- 
 ed to make a feint or a real attack on 
 the enemy's right, as circumstances 
 might determine. When the final dis- 
 position was made, General Gardner 
 was entreated to surrender, and thus 
 prevent the effusion of blood which 
 must necessanly follow the attack. 
 The shot and shell were already spread- 
 ing death and destruction all around 
 him ; but Gardner, like Pemberton, 
 hoping against hope, and still more 
 than half believing that Johnston might 
 come, refused to yield. 
 
 It was now early dawn, on the morn« 
 ing of the 14th of June. The jnn^ 
 onward movement had already *'*• 
 commenced. There was the same deaf- 
 ening roar of artillery as on the occasion 
 of the first attack. The Confederate 
 
944: 
 
 POET HUDSON. 
 
 works literally blazed, while the boom- 
 ing of the National land batteries was 
 echoed back by the thunders from the 
 river. Two regiments of sharpshooters 
 — the Seventy-Fifth New York and the 
 Twelfth Connecticut — were pushed for- 
 ward in advance. These were to creep 
 up and lie on the exterior slope of the 
 breast- works. Another regiment fol- 
 lowed, each man, in addition to his mus- 
 ket, cariying a five-pound hand grenade, 
 which he was to throw over the para- 
 pet. Still another regiment followed, 
 carrying sand-bags full of cotton, which 
 were to be used in filling the ditch in 
 front of the breast- works. These, again, 
 were followed by Weitzel's brigade, 
 with the brigades of Kimball and Mor- 
 gan, in support. In conjunction with 
 these, and to the left, moved the old 
 division of General Emory, under Geu- 
 eral Paine, forming a separate column. 
 Both parties were under the command 
 of General Grover, who planned the 
 attack. It was expected that Weltzel 
 would succeed in effecting a lodgment 
 in the Confederate works, and thus pre- 
 pare the way for the action of Paine's 
 column. The advance, as we have said, 
 was made about dawn. The troops 
 moved along a covered way, until they 
 were within three hundred yards of 
 the enemy's position. At this point, 
 the ground was extremely irregular, 
 broken into deep hollows, and covered 
 with tangled brushwood and creeping 
 ,vines. On this almost impassable 
 ground, and in full front of the ene- 
 my's guns, the advance was met by 
 the Confederates, who, advised of the 
 intended attack, were massed in great 
 
 force, and offered a most determined 
 resistance. 
 
 On, however, the Nationals moved, 
 some of the skirmishers actually reach- 
 ing the ditch, where they were terribly 
 punished, being exposed to an enfilad- 
 ing fire. The hand grenades were 
 found to be a curse to their bearers ; 
 for they were at once caught up by the 
 besieged, and hurled back to explode 
 in the ranks of the assailants. The 
 assaulting column was not deterred by 
 what was happening to the skirmishers 
 in front. The men pushed boldly for- 
 ward, in the face of a tremendous fire, 
 making a series of vigorous assaults ; 
 but all in vain. The point of attack 
 was too strong. It could not be taken. 
 Meanwhile, Generals Augur ^nd Dwight 
 had not been idle on the right. But 
 their efforts were attended with no bet- 
 ter success. The Confederates fought 
 at all the points attacked with skill 
 and determination. At eleven o'clock, 
 the Nationals had been repulsed along 
 the whole line. The firing ceased; 
 and the Confederates remained mas- 
 ters of the situation. In this assault, 
 Banks lost 700 mer. General Paine, 
 whose division had done most of the 
 hard fighting, had been wounded. 
 The Nationals had gained one advan- 
 tage. They had established themselyes 
 in strong positions, and on ground con- 
 siderably nearer the Confederate works. 
 Dwight had carried a hill which com- 
 manded the " citadel "; and, from the 
 advantage thus gained, he was enabled 
 within a few days to advance and se- 
 cure a strong position within ten yards 
 of the Confedei'ate line. 
 
CONFEDERATE RAIDS. 
 
 446 
 
 After these repeated failures, the 
 conviction was forced upon Banks that 
 the place could be reduced only by a 
 regular siege. Mining operations were 
 carried on with great energy ; and the 
 firing was not intermitted either by the 
 land batteries or by the vessels in the 
 river. Steadily, day after day, the in- 
 vesting lines were pushed closer upon 
 the doomed city ; and the sufferings of 
 the garrison, already reduced to the 
 necessity of living upon mule-meat, and 
 even upon rats, were greatly aggravated 
 by the continuous explosion of shells. 
 Thus day followed day, nothing occur- 
 ring to relieve the wearisome monotony. 
 A huge mine has been all but com- 
 pleted ; and, in a few days more, un- 
 less the place is surrendered, thirty 
 barrels of gunpowder will be exploded 
 under the citadel. Gardner's spirit 
 now begins to sink within him. It was 
 useless any longer to look to Johnston 
 for relief. Such was the condition of 
 things towards the end of June. The 
 heroic little garrison had manifested 
 the utmost bravery, and had endured 
 privation without murmur or complaint. 
 
 While General Banks, his troops be- 
 ing all concentrated at Port Hudson, 
 was giving his undivided attention to 
 the conduct of the siege, the Confede- 
 lates, mainly under the direction of 
 General Dick Taylor, reappeared in 
 force on the western bank of the Mis- 
 sissippi. They overran the Teche and 
 Attakapas regions, from which they had 
 Ijeen so recently driven by the National 
 troops. They seemed specially bent on 
 gaining possession of the New Orleans 
 and Opelousas Railroad. Opelousas 
 
 »4» 
 
 was soon reoccupied ; a successful raid 
 was made upon Plaquemine ; and, press- 
 ing southward, the Confederates, before 
 the end of June, had made themselves 
 masters of Brashear City. At the last- 
 mentioned place, the raiders were re- 
 warded with immense booty, including 
 commissaiy, medical and other stores, to 
 the value of several millions of dollars, 
 with an indefinite number of horses, 
 mules, flags, tents, small arms and siege 
 guns. The capture of Brashear City 
 was esteemed in the South as almost 
 an equivalent for the loss of Vicksburg. 
 Having made good their position on the 
 western bank of the river, their sharp- 
 shooters proved a fruitful source of an- 
 noyance to the Nationals. Massing 
 themselves now at one point and now 
 at another, so as to evade the fire of the 
 gunboats, they rendered transportation 
 next to impossible. 
 
 On the 28th of June, an attempt was 
 made upon Donaldsonville. This jnne 
 place had been garrisoned by Gen- 28t 
 eral Banks ; and what with the resist- 
 ance the garrison was able to make, 
 and the spirited aid rendered by the gun- 
 boats, the attack proved a failure. The 
 Confederates had not yet abandoned all 
 hope of regaining possession of New 
 Orleans. If they could obtain control 
 of its land approaches, it was impossible 
 to predict what might be accomplished 
 by the many friends of secession still in 
 the city. Their main object, however, 
 in all these movements, was to distract 
 the attention of General Banks, to divide 
 his forces, and so aid the beleaguered 
 garrison at Port Hudson. It was Banks' 
 misfortune, that the force at his com- 
 
446 
 
 POET HUDSON. 
 
 mand was too small for the demands 
 which were made upon it. He could not, 
 at one and the same time, successfully 
 protect the vast ten-itory committed to 
 his care from the incursions of the 
 'enemy, and effectively carry on the siege 
 of Port Hudson. After the surrender 
 of Vicksburg, Grant sent some troops 
 to his assistance ; but they were the less 
 necessary, that the fall of Vicksburg 
 sealed the fate of Port Hudson, and en- 
 abled Banks to operate his troops in 
 other directions. 
 
 It was near the 7th of July. Loud 
 jniy cheering, and other joyous demon- 
 T' strations made along the National 
 line, reached the ears of the besieged. 
 These were accompanied by thunders of 
 artillery, which sounded like salutes, 
 from the gunboats and the batteries. 
 The meaning could hai'dly be mistaken ; 
 but doubt was not permitted ; for the 
 Confederates on the outer works could 
 distinctly hear the words, as they were 
 joyously repeated by the advanced pick- 
 ets of the besiegers — " Vicksburg has 
 surrendered ! " The intelligence was im- 
 mediately conmiunicated to General 
 Gardner. He was not yet reduced to 
 absolute despair. The garrison was not 
 murmuring. The mule-meat and the 
 fricasseed rats were still quieting, if not 
 satisfying, the cravings of nature. He 
 could, if he chose, hold out a few days 
 longer. But would it be wise ? In this 
 state of mind, Gardner summoned a 
 council of war on the night of the 7th. 
 There were present General Beale, Col- 
 onels Steadman, Miles, Lyle and Shelby, 
 and Lieutenant Marshal S. Smith. It 
 was the unanimous opinion of the officers 
 
 that further resistance would be vain. 
 A correspondence was, in consequence, 
 immediately opened with General Banks. 
 Gardner, in his first letter, referred to 
 the rumor regarding the surrender of 
 Vicksburg, asked whether the rumor 
 were true, and expressed a desire that if 
 it were true, Banks would consent to a 
 suspension of hostilities, with a view to 
 arranging terms of surrender. On being 
 assui'ed of the fact that Vicksburg had 
 fallen, but that there would be no cessa- 
 tion of hostilities for the purposes indi- 
 cated, Gardner again wrote, requesting 
 the appointment of a commission of three 
 officers, to meet a similar commission ap- 
 pointed by himself, that they might agree 
 upon and draw up the terms of surren- 
 der. For this purpose he asked a cessa- 
 tion of hostilities. These terms were 
 complied with. A committee of three 
 were appointed on either side ; and in- 
 structions were given by both command- 
 ers, to the effect that hostilities should 
 cease until further orders. 
 
 Honorable terms were granted to 
 the vanquished ; and, on the 9th juiy 
 of July, General Andrews, Chief *. 
 of Staff of General Banks, with Colonel 
 Berge leading his column, followed by 
 two picked regiments from each divi- 
 sion, with the batteries of Holcomb and 
 Bowie and the gunners of the naval 
 battery, entered the works. The Na- 
 tional troops were then drawn up in two 
 lines, with their officers in front. The 
 Confederates, their backs to the river, 
 were drawn up in line, with their offi- 
 cers in front, on the opposite side of the 
 road. General Gardner then advanced 
 and offered to surrender his sword, with 
 
THE SUEEENDER. 
 
 447 
 
 Port Hudson. He was politely re- 
 quested to retain his sword, in consider- 
 ation of the respect which his braver}^ 
 commanded in the breasts of his rivals. 
 He then said : " General, I will now 
 formally surrender my command to 
 you, and for that purpose will give the 
 order to ground arms." With the post 
 thus suri-endered, there fell into the 
 hands of the Nationals, 6233 prisoners, 
 51 guns, 2 steamers, 4400 pounds of 
 cannon powder, 5000 small arms, and 
 150,000 rounds of ammunition. The 
 Jittle hamlet of Port Hudson, originally 
 consisting of a small church and a few 
 houses was completely in ruins. After 
 the surrender, Farragut moved dovpn 
 the river, arriving in time to receive 
 the cordial greetings of the victorious 
 and exultant troops, and to take part in 
 the general rejoicing. So ended the 
 protracted struggle for the possession 
 of Port Hudson. 
 
 This chapter on Port Hudson, and 
 connected engagements, is so intimately 
 related to the chapter on Vicksburg, 
 that to enlarge on the i Jiportance of the 
 fall of Post Hudson, would only be a 
 useless repetition of what has already 
 been said. It was impossible for the 
 Confederates to hold out in Port Hud- 
 son, after Vicksburg had surrendered. 
 
 If Vicksburg had not surrendered at 
 the time it did, Gardner might have 
 held out for a few days, but he could 
 not have held out long. Nothing but 
 the appearance of a powerful force in 
 the rear of Banks could have tempted 
 Gardner to make a sortie. Of the ap- 
 pearance of such a force there was but 
 little hope ; and, even if such a diver- 
 sion had been made, it is questionable 
 whether, in the exhausted condition of 
 the garrison, a sortie would have been 
 attempted, or, if attempted, would not 
 have resulted in complete and disastrous 
 failure. Looked at in the light we 
 now enjoy, the glcry attending the cap- 
 ture of Port Hudson, waa eclipsed by 
 the greater glory of Vicksburg. This 
 much, in addition to what has been said 
 in this chapter already, it is only fair to 
 say in vindication of General Banks 
 and the brave officers and men who 
 fought under him. He would have 
 done better if he had had a stronger 
 force at his command, and less territory 
 to protect. As it was, Banks reduced 
 a fortress second only in importance to 
 that of Vicksburg ; and, by the con- 
 spicuous service which he rendered his 
 country, the hero of Port Hudson shared 
 the favors which were then being poured 
 out BO lavishly on Meade and Grant. 
 
«48 
 
 CHAJ!fCELLOESVILLB. 
 
 CHAPTER XXVI. 
 
 Ihe West and the East. — After Fredericksburg. — Changes in the Army of the East.— General Hooker. — Hie 
 Past Career. — His Personal Appearance. — Hooker's Address to the Army. — The Emancipation Proclama- 
 tion. — Its Effect on the Army. — Rearrangement of the Army. — The Position of General Lee. — Condition 
 of his Army. — Description of the Ground. — Hooker Preparing to Attack. — His Plan of Battle. — The Na- 
 tional Army in Motion. — The Crossing of the Rappahannock. — The Crossing of the Kapidan. — At 
 Chancellorsville. — The Position Described. — Sedgwick's Operations Below Fredericksburg. — A Successful 
 Feint. — Hooker's Plan 'Working Admirably. — Hooker Advances Towards Fredericksburg. — The Three 
 Eoads. — Sykes Compelled to Fight his 'Way. — The Advance Successful. — A Splendid Position 'Won. — 
 Fortune Smiling on Hooker and the National Army. — Hooker's First but Fatal Blunder. — The Plan of 
 Battle Changed.— On the Defensive. — The Line of Battle. — The Confederate Lines. — Jackson Pushed To- 
 wards Chancellorsville. — Disposition of the Confederate Troops. — Lee's Description of the National Posi- 
 tion. — Jackson's Plan. — A Bold Experiment. — Jackson's Movement to the National Eight. — Hooker in 
 Ignorance of Jackson's Plan. — The Confederate Column Seen at the Furnace. — Advance of Sickles. — Cap- 
 ture of the Twenty-Third Georgia Regiment. — An Attempt to Intercept the Confederate Train. — Jackson 
 oa the Plank Road and the Turnpike. — Ready to Strike. — The Unsuspecting Nationals. — Startled 
 Game. — A Mighty Cheer. — A Panic. — The National Right Demolished. — The Battle of Bull Run Re- 
 peated. — Advance of Bimey and Best. — Jackson Checked. — Sickles Recalled from the Furnace. — Hazel 
 Grove. — Crutchfield 'Wounded. — A Midnight Battle. — " Stonewall " Jackson Mortally 'Wounded. — Hia 
 Death. — A. P. HUl Takes Command, and is 'Wounded. — The Command Devolves upon Stuart. — Hooker's 
 Mistake. — Sedgwick ordered to Advance. — Hooker Takes a New Position. — The Battle Resumed. — Sickles 
 Ordered to Abandon the Key-Position of the Field. — "Charge, and Remember Jackson." — Tempest of 
 Lead. — The Nationals Driven Back. — Lee Pressing on Slocum and Hancock. — The Confederate Line 
 'United. — The National Line Melts Away. — 0|ianceUorsvilIe House Abandoned. — Hooker Stunned and 
 Stupefied by a Cannon Ball. — A Lull in the Fight. — The New Position. — Lee About to Strike a Decisive 
 Blow. — His Arm Arrested.— News of the Advance of Sedgwick. — The Occupation of Fredericksburg. — Tlie 
 Storming of the Heights. — Marye's Hill. — The Plank Road. — The Famous Stone 'Wall. — Magnificent At- 
 tack on Marye's Hill. — The Shout of Victory. — The National Flag on Marye's Hill. — Howe at Hazel Run. — 
 He Captures Lee's Hill. — Sedgwick in Ful» Possession of the Heights. — Sedgwick's Advance. — The Con- 
 federate Forces Divided. — Lee's Dilemma. — Estimate of Lee. — He Resolves to Intercept the Advance of 
 Sedgwick. — 'Wilcox on the Plank Koad. — Salem Church. — McLaws Arrives with Three Brigades, and 
 Takes Command. — The Battle of Salem Church. — Newton's Advance. — Bravery of Bartlett. — The Nationals 
 Carry the Crest. — A Temporary Triumph. — The Nationals Driven Back. — A Bloody Rep^jlse. — Lee Re- 
 solved to Crush Sedgwick, and then Fall Back on Hooker. — McLaws Reinforced. — Lee at Salem. — The 
 Confederate Attack Renewed. — The Fighting Severe. — Sedgwick Crosses the River.— Lee Hurries Back to 
 Attack Hooker. — A Fearful Rainstorm. — Hooker Resolves to Retreat. — Crosses the River at Midnight. — 
 Disappointment of Lee. — Stoneman and his Cavalry. — A Profitless Raid. — The National Army in its Old 
 Encampment at Falmouth. — A Boastful Address. — General Lee to his Army. — Stanton's Despatch. — The 
 Draft Proclamation. 
 
 While -we have been gi'ving our at- 
 tention to the military and naval 
 movements of the West and South- 
 ■west — to that series o£ events 'which cul- 
 minated in the fall of Vicksburg, and 
 to that other series of events ■which 
 culminated in the fall of Port Hudson — 
 movements of equal importance, taking 
 
 place in the East, have been pressing 
 themselves upon our notice. In two 
 great battles — that of Chancellorsville, 
 and that of Gettysburg — the National 
 army of the Potomac and the Confede- 
 rate army of Virginia had met and 
 tested each other's skill and strength. 
 The former resulted in a great National 
 
GENERAL JOSEPH HOOKEE. 
 
 44» 
 
 disaster: the latter was a National 
 triumph. The former inspired the Con- 
 fedei'ates with hope and confidence, 
 and led them to the adoption of daring- 
 ly aggressive measures: the latter, oc- 
 curring as it did simultaneously with 
 the final struggle and triumph at Vicks- 
 burg, and being followed so closely by 
 the fall of Port Hudson, swelled the 
 National heart with joy and gratitude, 
 and, by contributing with the other vic- 
 tories just named to the establishment 
 of fresh confidence and to the creation 
 of fresh resolves, gave a new phase to 
 the general contest. 
 
 In the present chapter, we propose to 
 give an account of the great but ill- 
 managed and disastrous battle of Chan- 
 cellorsville. In a previous chapter, we 
 have related the causes which brought 
 about the removals of Genera] s Burn- 
 side, Franklin and Sumner from the 
 army of the Potomac, and the placing 
 of General Joseph Hooker in the su- 
 preme command.'-' The elevation of 
 Hooker may have given offense to some 
 of his brother-officers; but it was on 
 the whole, so far as the army was con- 
 concerned, a popular and acceptable ap- 
 pointment. Outside the army, opinion- 
 was divided. There were many who 
 
 • BuBNSiDii; was appointed to the command of the 
 Department of the Ohio. Franklin was ordered south, 
 'M take command of a corps under Banks in Louisiana. 
 Sumner was assigned to the command of the Depart- 
 ment of Missouri, then threatened with fresh trouble 
 by the guerrillas. While preparing to set out for his 
 more distant command, he was taken ill at the house of 
 his Ron-iu-law, in Syracuse, N. Y. He died, after a 
 few days' illness, on the 2l8t of March, 1811:!. General 
 Sumuer had j ust completed his sixty-seventh year. He 
 died universally regretted. In him the country lost 
 one of its best citizens, and the army on e of its bravest 
 noldiers. 
 
 regarded the elevation of Hooker to the 
 chief command of the army of th« 
 Potomac with extreme satisfaction. 
 Since the commencement of the Penin- 
 sular campaign, he had been promi. 
 nently identified with that mmy. He 
 greatly distinguished himself at the 
 battle of "Williamsburg ; and, from that 
 day to the end of the campaign, he waa 
 ever ready with his well- trained and 
 devoted division, to perfoi'm any duty, 
 to run any risk, to make any sacrifice. 
 At the battle of Antietam, where he 
 literally covered himself with glory, he 
 proved himseif to be the bravest of the 
 brave. He was one of the few of Mc- 
 Clellan's generals, who gave to Pope a 
 willing and honest obedience dui'iug 
 his campaign against Lee in- Virginia. 
 When the army of the Potomac again 
 changed its leader, he did not withold 
 his allegiance from Burnside, although 
 he was not without reasons for being 
 dissatisfied with this appointment ; and 
 at the battle of Fredericksburg, \vliere 
 he commanded the centre, he yielded to 
 duty against his better judgment, and, 
 in obedience to orders, attempted the 
 performance of a perilous and an impos- 
 sible task. In his case, from first to 
 last, personal feeling was not allowed 
 to interfere with the discharge of public 
 duty. His fine appearance and his 
 agreeable manners, which made him a 
 great favorite with his own men, recom- 
 mended him to all with whom he waa 
 brought into contact. Tall, erect, mus- 
 cular, but not heavily -built ; liglit of 
 complexion, with a fresh, ruddy coun- 
 tenance; fine, clean-cut, intellectual fea- 
 tures, lit up l)y large, cleai', niild }'et 
 
iSO 
 
 CHANCELLOESVILLE. 
 
 expressive eyes; a lofty forehead, his 
 hair brown, but tinged with gray; quick 
 and decided in all his movements -such 
 at that time was General Joseph 
 Hooker. In figure and in bearing he 
 had few if any equals among the officers 
 of the army. It was hoped that 
 under such a leader the amiy of the 
 Potomac would yet prove itself worthy 
 of the care which had been bestowed 
 upon it, and justify the expectations 
 which it had raised in the hearts of 
 the Northern people. There were not 
 a few, however, who regarded the ap- 
 pointment of Hooker with doubt and 
 misgiving. His bravery, which had 
 been put to the test on many a battle- 
 field, Avas not to be called in question ; 
 his ability as a corps or division com- 
 mander had been abundantly estab- 
 lished; but the qualities which had 
 served him in good stead and canied 
 him to victor^', in a secondary capacity, 
 might not be sufficient for him as com- 
 mander-in-chief. The skilful lieutenant 
 has oftentimes been found helpless when 
 left alone. " He was my right ai-m," 
 said Napoleon of Murat, " but without 
 me he was nothing. In battle, he was, 
 perhaps, the bravest man in the world ; 
 left to himself, he was an imbecile 
 without jodgment." Of Ney, he said : 
 'He was the bravest of men; there 
 terminate all his faculties." The army 
 of the Potomac had already furnished 
 two examples of conspicuous failure. 
 Might not Hooker, like Pope and Bum- 
 side, be found wanting? It had cer- 
 tainly yet to be proved whether he 
 were possessed of the higher qualities 
 requisite in a general-in-chief. The 
 
 broad conception, with the power t^o 
 combine and utilize the forces at his 
 command ; the comprehensive grasp, with 
 minute attention to detail; the quick 
 eye and the clear head to perceive and 
 know where relief is needed or where 
 a deadly blow may be struck ; the light- 
 ning-like promptitude of action which' 
 always implies self-reliance and the full 
 courage of conviction — these were the 
 qualities needed in the man who would 
 lead to victory the army of the Potomac ; 
 and if there were some who doubted 
 whether these were all united in General 
 Hooker, it was not because they under- 
 estimated his abilities or disesteemed 
 his past career, but because he had not 
 been tested in this lofty and exacting 
 sphere of duty. 
 
 General Hooker's elevation command 
 ed the greater attention, that he had 
 been open-mouthed regarding the errors, 
 real or supposed, of his predecessors. 
 His estimate of his own abilities was 
 undoubtedly high. When questioned 
 by the Congressional Committee as to 
 the cause of the failure of the Peninsu- 
 lar campaign, he answered : " I do not 
 hesitate to say that it is to be attributed 
 to the want of generalship on the part 
 of our commander." It was his opinion 
 — and he did not disguise it — that 
 there were several occasions during 
 that campaign, on which, if he had 
 been at liberty to act, he could have 
 taken Richmond. His views were 
 expressed with equal fi'eedom, and 
 were of similar import, after the battle 
 of Fredericksburg. If, therefore, he 
 was about to be judged by a high 
 standard, it was a standaj'd which he. 
 
ADDRESS TO THE ARMY. 
 
 461 
 
 himself, had been mainly instrumental 
 in setting up. 
 
 Hooker assumed command on the 
 Jan. 26th of January. On the same 
 26. day he issued an address to the 
 army. " The undersigned," he said, 
 " assumes command of the army of the 
 Potomac. He enters upon the dis- 
 charge of the duties, imposed by the 
 trust, with a just appreciation of their 
 responsibility. Since the formation of 
 this army he has been identified with 
 its history ; he has shared with you its 
 glories and reverses, with no other de- 
 sire than that these relations might re- 
 main unchanged until its destiny should 
 be accomplished. In the record of 
 your achievements there is much to 
 be proud of, and, vrith the blessing of 
 God, we will contribute something to 
 the renown of our arms and the success 
 of our cause, "'o secure these ends, 
 your commander wiU require the cheer- 
 ful and zealous co-operation of every 
 officer and soldier in the army. In 
 equipment, intelligence and valor the 
 enemy is our inferior. Let us never 
 hesitate to give him battle whenever 
 we can find him. The undersigned only 
 gives expression to the feelings of this 
 army when he conveys to our late com- 
 mander, Major General Burnside, the 
 most cordial good wishes for his future. 
 "Joseph Hooker." 
 
 When Hooker took command, the 
 army of the Potomac was in a dread- 
 fully demoralized condition. It still 
 lay at Falmouth, and occupied Stafford 
 Heights. The emancipation proclama- 
 tion had produced a bad effect among 
 the officers, many of them openly de- 
 
 claring that had they known what was 
 to be done in the matter of slavery, 
 they would never have joined the army. 
 There was, besides, a lingering affection 
 for McClellan, both on the part of offi- 
 cers and men ; and neither the one nor 
 the other could forgive Hooker for his 
 statement that the Peninsular campaign 
 had failed on account of bad general- 
 ship. The demoralization, which set in 
 immediately after the battle of Fred- 
 ericksburg, was increased greatly by 
 what was called Burnside's "Mud " cam- 
 paign. Desertions to the number of 
 200 men were occurring daily. Aa 
 many as 2922 commissioned officers, 
 and 81,964 men were reported absent. 
 This was not all. In the spring, 40,000 
 men, who would have completed theii 
 term, would be at liberty to go home. 
 Hooker set himself busily to the work 
 of reconstruction. The division system 
 was abolished ; and the army was di- 
 vided into seven corps. The First 
 corps was commanded by Reynolds; 
 the Second by Couch ; the Third by 
 Sickles ; the Fifth by Meade ; the Sixth 
 by Sedgwick; the Eleventh by How- 
 ard; the Twelfth by Slocum. The 
 cavalry, which consisted of four di- 
 visions, commanded respectively by 
 Pleasonton, Buford, AveriU and Gregg, 
 was consolidated into one corps, under 
 Stoneman. The anny of the Potomac 
 needed rest; and, for three months, it 
 lay Inactive in winter-quarters at Fal- 
 mouth. Hooker, however, was not 
 idle. Desertions were checked; the 
 ranks were gradually filled up by the 
 return of absentees ; the discipline was 
 improved; and, by the end of April, 
 
^2 
 
 CHANOELLOESVILLE. 
 
 the army was in a state of high effi- 
 ciency. The infantry and artillery 
 amounted to 123,000 men; there were 
 13,000 cavalry and 400 guns. "All 
 were actuated," said Hooker, "by feel- 
 ings of confidence and devotion to the 
 cause, and I felt that it was a living 
 army, and one well worthy of the Re- 
 public." 
 
 In front of Hooker, on the south 
 side of the Rappahannock, and occupy- 
 ing the now famous heights in the rear 
 of Fi'edericksburg, lay the army of 
 General Lee, 62,000 strong. This army 
 which, after the battle of the 13th of 
 December, needed rest quite as much 
 as the army of the Potomac, had also, 
 during the winter months, been brought 
 up to a high state of efficiency. Such 
 was the effect of the Conscription Act, 
 now fairly in operation, that, in three 
 months, Jackson's coi-ps increased fi'om 
 25,000 to 33,000 muskets. Fredericks- 
 burg, and the country in the immediate 
 neighborhood, has been fully described 
 in a previous chapter. It will be re- 
 membered that the hills to the rear of 
 that city rise at some little distance 
 from the river, leaving not exactly a 
 plain but open and comparatively level 
 ground between. Above Fredericks- 
 burg, and opposite Falmouth, the ridge 
 approaches close to the river ; but from 
 that point, the distance between the 
 river and the heights gradually widens, 
 nntil, about four or five miles below the 
 town, the open ground is about a mile 
 and a half wide. The Confederates, as 
 we have said, occupied the heights, 
 their line extending from Banks' Ford on 
 the left, to Port Royal on the right — a 
 
 distance of twenty-five miles. Their 
 cavalry extended to the left as far back 
 as Buckley's Ford, on the Upper Rap- 
 pahannock, and scoured the countrji as 
 far south as the Pamunkey River. 
 During the winter, General Lee had 
 exerted himself to the utmost to make 
 his position secure. He extended and 
 strengthened the fortifications in the 
 rear of Fredericksburg, and constructed 
 a system of elaborate works along his 
 whole front. Inside of these lines, he 
 might have bidden defiance to an army 
 twice or three times the strength of his 
 own. Such was the nature of the 
 works, and such was the arrangement 
 of his troops, that he could concentrate 
 with the utmost rapidity, and, with a 
 powerful force, resist an attack at any 
 point. From this position, however, he 
 had only two main lines of retreat — 
 one towards Richmond by I'allroad, and 
 the other towards^ Gordonsville. 
 
 It was now near the efld of April. 
 As it was vain to attempt any du'ect 
 attack in his position at Fredericksbiu'g, 
 Hooker resolved upon a bold experi- 
 ment, the object of which was to com- 
 pel Lee to come out of his intrench- 
 ments and accept the gage of battle in 
 the open ground. He was the more 
 encouraged to adopt this cour-e, without 
 further delay, that Longstreet had been 
 detached, with several of his divisions, 
 to the south of the James River. Some 
 feigned movements were made as early 
 as the 21st of April; but it was not 
 until the. 27th, that the real onward 
 movement began. Hooker's purpose 
 was to effect the complete destruction 
 of the Confederate army. With this 
 
CROSSING THE RIVER. 
 
 453 
 
 end in view, he ordered Sedgwick to 
 make a pretense of reversing Burnside's 
 plan of attack, by crossing tlie river be- 
 low Fredericksburg and making there 
 a vigorous demonstration. He him- 
 self proposed to move, with the larger 
 portion of the army, to his own right, 
 and to push his forces by a circuitous 
 route across the Rappahannock and the 
 Rapidan, to drive off or capture the 
 guards at the forts, and then wheeling 
 round on his left, as on a pivot, so as to 
 face eastward, to march towards the 
 river. It was his hope that he would 
 thus be able to emerge from the ■wil- 
 derness before the Confederates were 
 aware of his approach, and, by dealing 
 them a deadly blow on their left flank, 
 compel them to face abgut and offer 
 battle. Fully confident that his plan 
 would be successfully carried out, and 
 in order to make Lee's retreat to Rich- 
 mond impossible, he had already de- 
 tached all the cavalry under Stoneman, 
 with the exception only of 1000 men 
 left in charge of Pleasonton, with in- 
 structions to destroy all the bridges 
 and tear up all the railroads in the 
 Confederate rear. The plan was excel- 
 lent; and, as we shall see, it was in 
 the first instance at least admirably 
 executed. 
 
 It will be observed by referring to 
 the map, that about three miles above 
 FrtMiericksburg in a straight line, or 
 about five following the river, is a 
 crossing called Banks' Ford. Some 
 seven or eight miles further up, and at 
 no great distance from the confluence 
 of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, 
 or, as they were wont to be named. 
 
 north and south forks, is another cross- 
 ing, known as United States Ford. 
 Following up the Rappahannock, oi 
 north fork, we come to Kelley's Ford, 
 about twenty-seven miles from Fred- 
 ericksburg. Following up the Rapidan, 
 or south fork, we come first to Ely's 
 Ford, and then, at some little distance, 
 Germania Ford. As Kelley's Ford is 
 several miles above the confluence of 
 the two streams, it was necessary for 
 the troops who crossed the Rapj^ahan- 
 nock at that point to cross also the 
 Rapidan, either at Ely's or Germania 
 Ford, before they could reach their point 
 of destination. All these fords, but 
 particularly those on the line of the 
 Rappahannock, were strongly guarded 
 by Confederate troops ; and the water 
 in the river, as it generally is at this 
 season, was high. 
 
 On tlie 27th, Monday, the weather 
 M'as favorable, and the movement April 
 commenced. The turning column 27. 
 consisted of the Fifth corps. General 
 Meade; the Eleventh corps, General 
 Howard ; and the Twelfth corps, Gen- 
 eral Slocum. On Tuesday, the 28th, 
 they reached Kelley's Ford. During 
 the night and following morning all 
 the troops were safely pushed across. 
 The infantry was moved in two col- 
 umns — the Eleventh and Twelfth to- 
 wards Germania, and the Fifth towards 
 Ely's Ford, on the Rapidan. At both 
 fords the Confederate pickets were 
 driven off without difficulty. At Ger- 
 mania, 150 pioneers were attempting 
 to build the bridge which Stoneman 
 had destroyed some days before. All 
 of these were captured. The troopa 
 
 MO 
 
4U 
 
 CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 were in the best of spirits. Impatient 
 to reach the opposite shore, large num- 
 bers of them plunged into the flood, 
 wading to the arm-pits, their clothes 
 and their cartridge-boxes carried high 
 on the points of their bayonets. Bon- 
 fires blazed during the darkness ; and, at 
 both fords, all were safely got across. 
 Once on the south side of the Rapidan, 
 the united columns moved eastwardly 
 towards United States Ford, driving 
 off the Confederate guards. This ford 
 being thus uncovered. General Couch, 
 who, with a portion of the Second 
 corps, had, since Tuesday, been lying 
 on the other side, waiting for his oppor- 
 tunity, crossed the Rappahannock on a 
 pontoon bridge. The combined forces 
 April then moved southward, and on 
 
 ^^< Thursday night took position at 
 Chancellorsville. On the evening of 
 the same day, General Hooker, who had 
 superintended the crossing of Couch's 
 troops, arrived at Chancellorsville ; and, 
 at a large and substantial brick house, 
 with out-buildings — the only house in 
 the near neighborhood, and formerly 
 an inn — he established his headquarters. 
 The position thus secured offered 
 many advantages. Around the house 
 was an open, cultivated space; and im- 
 mediately in front was a little stream 
 which flowed into the Rappahannock. 
 It was about eleven miles from Fred- 
 ericksburg, and was connected there- 
 with by three main roads — the plank- 
 road on the right, the river road on the 
 left, and the turnpike between them. 
 It communicated also with Orange 
 Court House, and with Gordonsville, by 
 a road through the wilderness. 
 
 "While Hooker had been carrying out 
 his plan, and apparently with complete 
 success on his right, Sedgwick had not 
 been inactive on his left. This general, 
 it will be remembered, was left behind 
 at Falmouth, with the First, Third and 
 Sixth corps, comprising some 30,000 
 effective men. His special instructions 
 were that he should, at the time ap- 
 pointed, throw a portion of his troops 
 across the river below Fredericksburg, 
 and, by making a vigorous demonstra- 
 tion, create the impression that the plan 
 of Biu-nside was about to be repeated. 
 On Monday, the 27th, the First corps, 
 General Reynolds, the Third, General 
 Sickles, and the Sixth, in immediate 
 charge of Sedgwick himself, moved from 
 their camps, and took a position down 
 the river, about ten miles below Fred- 
 ericksburg. Pontoons were thrown 
 across at three points ; and, on the morn- 
 ing of the 29th, troops were pushed 
 over, and such demonstrations were 
 made as seemed to imply that the real 
 attack was to be made in that direction. 
 So far as Generals Hooker, Sedgwick, 
 or any of the National commanders 
 could judge, the feint made by the left 
 had been completely successful. The 
 plan of the commanding general had, 
 lip to a certain point at least, worked 
 admirably. All the upper foi'ds of the 
 Rappahannock were in his hands ; and 
 he had massed a powerful army at 
 Chancellorsville. Further demonstra- 
 tions being considered unnecessary, for 
 the present, on the part of the left, 
 Sedgwick was instructed to remain at 
 Falmouth and assist developments on 
 the right. Sickles, meanwhile, was de^ 
 
A FATAL BLUNDER. 
 
 465 
 
 tached, and ordered to cross with the 
 Tliird corps, at United States Ford, and 
 join Hooker at Chancellorsville. Rey- 
 nolds, in due time, was to follow. 
 Sickles arrived at Chancellorsville on 
 the morning of the 1st of May. It 
 was not wonderful that, at this stage, 
 Hooker should have felt elated, or that 
 hia men should have been confident of 
 victory. It might have been wiser, 
 however, if such feelings had been less 
 boisterously expressed. On the 30th 
 of April, Hooker issued a general order. 
 "It is with heartfelt satisfaction," he 
 said, "that the commanding general 
 announces to the army, that the opera- 
 tions of the last three days have de- 
 termined that our enemy must either 
 ingloriously fly, or come out from behind 
 his defenses and give us battle on our 
 own ground, where certain destruction 
 awaits him. The operations of the 
 Fifth, Eleventh and Twelfth coips have 
 been a succession of splendid achieve- 
 ments." Hooker seemed to feel that 
 the prize was in his grasp. In the 
 hearing of some of his officers and cer- 
 tain gentlemen connected with the 
 press, who were present at his head- 
 quarters, he exclaimed: "The rebel 
 army is now the legitimate property of 
 the army of the Potomac. They may 
 as well pack up their haversacks and 
 make for Richmond, and I shall be after 
 them."* Hooker really had reason to 
 be proud. His plan, as we have said, 
 had worked well. Up to this point, it 
 could hardly have worked better ; and 
 
 •The -words were spoken in the hearing of Mr. William 
 Swinton, who was present on the occasion. — Campaigns 
 •fth4 Army of the Potomac, p. 275. 
 
 it is not at all improbable that if the 
 head which conceived it, and which had 
 so far given it development, had re- 
 mained cool and steady throughout^ 
 his magniloquent language would have 
 been abundantly justified. Lee's po- 
 sition was the reverse of enviable. In 
 his front there was a well-trained, well- 
 equipped army of 70,000 men ; in hia 
 rear there was a bi-oad river, guarded 
 by another army of 30,000 men ; while 
 his retreat was cut off by 12,000 cav- 
 alry. Everything, however, now de- 
 pended upon steadiness of purpose and 
 rapidity of movement. 
 
 Gratified as Hooker was with the 
 success which had attended his move- 
 ments hitherto, he knew that he had 
 only entered on the threshold of his 
 great undertaking. He resolved, there- 
 fore, to turn his success to account, and 
 to press his advantage. On Friday, 
 May 1st, having arranged his May 
 troops in three columns, he !• 
 pushed them eastward towards Fred- 
 ericksburg, by the three pi-Incipal roads 
 already mentioned. His object Avas to 
 get out of the wilderness into the clear, 
 open country beyond, where there was 
 free fighting room, and where artillery 
 and cavalry could be easily and effect- 
 ively handled. The left, composed of 
 two divisions of Meade's coi-ps — those 
 of Griffin and Humphreys — advanced by 
 the river road; the centre, Sykes' di- 
 vision, also of Meade, supported by Han- 
 cock, advanced by the turnpike ; while 
 Slocum's coi'ps on the right inarched 
 along the plank road. The left marched 
 along the river road for five miles, and 
 came in sight of Banks' Ford mthout 
 
456 
 
 CHANCELL0R8VILLE. 
 
 encounteriug any opposition. The cen- 
 tre had moved along the turnpike for 
 about a mile to the east of Chancellors- 
 ville, when it encountered the enemy 
 in some force. Vigorous firing was 
 kept up on both sides for some hours ; 
 but Sykes pressed forward his gallant 
 little band, and, the foe falling back, 
 he reached the place assigned him early 
 in the afternoon. The right moved to 
 its destined point without difficulty, and 
 without meeting any resistance. It 
 would be difficult to overestimate the im- 
 portance of the advanced position thus 
 gained bj' these different bodies of men. 
 It was an elevated ridge, beyond the 
 bounds of the wilderness, completely 
 protecting Chancellorsville, and com- 
 manding the clear, open country in rear 
 of the Fredericksbuig Heights. On 
 the left it uncovered Banks' Ford. 
 Artillery could be planted advanta- 
 geously on the face of the I'idge ; Avhile 
 the clear open ground in front was ad- 
 mirably adapted for the use of artillery. 
 This, however, was not all. It short- 
 ened by twelve miles the communica- 
 tion between the main force at Chan- 
 cellorsville and that under Sedgwick 
 at Falmouth, and below Fredericksburg. 
 It was surely natural to expect that such 
 a position would be seized, and held 
 at any cost, and that to this vantage- 
 ground Hooker would push forward his 
 whole army. It was not to be so. 
 Fortune was smiling on the National 
 commander; but, strange to relate, with 
 a perversity which is almost unexam- 
 pled, he turned his back upon the favor- 
 "Dg goddess, when she was about to con- 
 l^r upon him her richest rewards. 
 
 Victory seemed to be within his grasp; 
 but he flung away all that he had won, 
 and his splendid opportunity besides. 
 In spite of the earnest remonstrances of 
 his officers, he ordered the columns to 
 fall back to Chancellorsville, where he 
 resolved to take position, and await 
 the attack of the enemy. His original 
 plan was abandoned at once. It waa 
 Hooker's first blunder in this campaign; 
 but it was fatal. 
 
 Hooker now gathered his forces 
 around him at Chancellorsville, threw 
 up intrenchments, and prepared to re- 
 ceive, not to make an attack. The tide 
 of battle was thus, by a fatal infelicity, 
 turned before the battle was com- 
 menced. It was only two days since 
 the proud words were uttered ; yet the 
 boastful National commander was al- 
 ready on the defensive. The ground 
 selected was by no means so well 
 adapted, either for attack or defense, as 
 the ground which he had abandoned. 
 It was commanded by high grounds, and 
 surrounded on all sides by the forest. 
 In this new position, however, the dis- 
 position of the troops was not unskil- 
 fully made. Not knowing from what 
 direction the blow might come, and I'e- 
 solved to preserve his communications 
 Avith the river. Hooker arranged his 
 forces in a form which, for the benefit 
 of the reader has been compared not 
 inaptly to the letter U. The limbs of 
 the U pointed towards the Rappahan- 
 nock, the one side facing to the east, 
 and the other to the west. The eastern 
 side was held by Meade and one di- 
 vision of Couch; the centre was held 
 by Slocum and one division of Sickles; 
 
THE RIVAL ARMIES IN POSITION. 
 
 457 
 
 and the right by Howard, Every effort 
 was made to strengthen the front by 
 rifle-pits and abatis. Howard, who 
 little dreamed of an attack on his side, 
 took too little pains to prevent a sur- 
 prise. Two divisions of the Second 
 and two divisions of the Third corps 
 were held in reserve. Pleasonton, with 
 his cavalry, was also on the right. Such 
 was the position of the National army 
 on the night of Friday, the 1st of 
 May. 
 
 Let us now see what the Confede- 
 rates were doing in the interval since 
 the National troops began to move on 
 the 27th April. It has been claimed 
 by Southern writers that Lee was aware 
 of Hooker's movements and plans, if 
 not from the commencement, at least 
 from a much earlier date than is com- 
 monly believed. There can be no 
 doubt, we think, that up until the 
 29th, he was disposed to believe that 
 the real attack was to be made from 
 Falmouth and by the lower Rappahan- 
 nock. The feeble efforts made by 
 Sedgwick on the morning of that day, 
 and his subsequent inactivity, must 
 have filled Lee's mind with doubt, if it 
 did not convince him that the threat- 
 ened movement from that quarter was 
 intended only as a feint. We know 
 that, on the afternoon of the 29th, he 
 received from Stuart definite informa- 
 tion of the fact that heavy columns of 
 Nationals had crossed the upper Rappa- 
 hannock, and that they were marching 
 towards Germania and Ely's fords. 
 Anderson, who was hm-ried forward to 
 Chancellorsville, occupied that place on 
 the night of the 29th. Learning that 
 
 the National troops had crossed the 
 Rapidan in great force, he withdrew 
 on the following morning. On the 
 morning of the 30th, Jackson's corps 
 was still in line of battle at Hamilton's 
 Ci'ossing, his left extending for upwards 
 of a mile towards the northwest, his 
 right resting on the Rappahannock, at 
 the mouth of Massaponax Creek. Mc- 
 Laws' division, of Longstreet, was still 
 in its camp, his line extending from 
 Fredericksburg some two or three miles 
 up the river. Barksdale's brigade oc- 
 cupied the town. Pendleton's I'eserve 
 artillery was under orders to take posi- 
 tion at Massaponax Church. Stuart, 
 with Fitz Lee's brigade of cavalry, 
 having crossed the Racoon Ford during 
 the night, was moving to harrass the 
 National advance. There was another 
 strong Confederate brigade at Culpep- 
 per, in Stoneman's front. Anderson had 
 taken up a line perpendicular to th^ 
 plank and turnpike roads, near theii 
 junction vnth the old Mine Road. At 
 midnight, McLaws was ordered to movfl 
 liis division, with the exception ol 
 Barksdale's brigade, in the direction of 
 Anderson, and take position on hie 
 right. Jackson was ordered to move 
 at daylight, on the Ist of May, with 
 three of his divisions, in the same di- 
 rection, and to take command of the 
 field. Early was left to defend the 
 works from Hamilton's Crossing to 
 Fredericksburg. The force under his 
 command for this purpose, as stated by 
 a Confederate authorit}', consisted of 
 his own command, Barksdale's brigade, 
 of McLaws', Andrew's battalion of ar- 
 tillery', and a part of the reserve artillery 
 
C58 
 
 CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 under General Pendleton, and amounted 
 to 8500 muskets and 30 guns. From the 
 resistance which Franklin experienced, 
 as we shall see by and by, the pre- 
 sumption is that this force was much 
 stronger. McLaws reached Anderson 
 by the early dawn. Jackson came up 
 at eight o'clock, and ordered a general 
 advance. It thus happened that both 
 armies were in motion at the same time, 
 but in opposite directions. Jackson 
 was moving towards Chancellorsville ; 
 Hooker was moving his army towards 
 Fredericksburg ; and each was prepared 
 to offer the other battle. This advance 
 movement of Jackson explains the re- 
 sistance which the National centre ex- 
 perienced on the old turnpike road, on 
 Friday, the 1st of May. 
 
 On the night of the 1st, General Lee 
 had come to the conclusion that the 
 National position was too strong to be 
 taken in front. " The enemy," he said 
 in his report, " had assumed a position 
 of great natural strength, surrounded 
 on all sides by a dense forest, filled with 
 a tangled undergrowth, in the midst of 
 which breast-works of logs had been 
 constructed, with trees felled in front, 
 BO as to form an almost impenetrable 
 abatis. His artillery swept the few 
 narrow roads by which the position 
 could be approached from the front, 
 and commanded the adjacent woods." 
 What was to be done? Was an at- 
 tack more practicable on the National 
 right? The ground was reconnoitered. 
 Hooker's line was reported to be vul- 
 nerable in that direction. The next 
 question was whether there existed a 
 practicable route by which, with speed 
 
 and secrecy, the movement could be 
 accomplished. This question also was 
 satisfactorily answered. If a route did 
 not exist, a route could be made. 
 Seated on cracker-boxes, the Confede- 
 rate leaders consulted as to what should 
 be done. Jackson was familiar with 
 the locality. With a map before him, 
 he described the ground, suggested that 
 a circuitous march of fifteen miles be 
 made towards the extreme right of the 
 National army, and proposed to strike a 
 deadly blow, before the opposing hosts 
 should be aware of his presence. It 
 was a bold experiment ; but it was just 
 the kind of experiment which Jackson 
 delighted to make. If it succeeded, he 
 would certainly produce a panic in 
 Hooker's army — he might even seize 
 his communications with United States 
 Ford, on which the National commander 
 relied in case of retreat. " With what 
 force will you attempt this ?" asked 
 General Lee. " With my whole corps 
 present," replied Jackson. " What, in 
 that case, would be left to resist an ad- 
 vance of the enemy towards Fredericks- 
 burg?" Lee again asked. "The divi- 
 sions of Anderson and McLaws," was 
 the prompt and confident answer. It 
 was a most audacious plan, and in open 
 violation of the first principles of the 
 military art. As things were, the Con- 
 federate commander was confronted by 
 superior numbera. With 42,000 mus- 
 kets, he was in the presence of 60,000 
 or 70,000. Lee reflected for a moment. 
 His army was already divided in two. 
 If he consented, his army would be cut 
 up into three parts. And then, what 
 if Jackson failed ? It would be ruin-' 
 
LEE AND JACKSOK IN COUNCIL. 
 
 458 
 
 hopeless, irretrievable ruin. But Lee 
 had faith in his brave and adventurous 
 lieutenant. He gave his consent; and 
 orders for the march were immediately 
 given. 
 
 On Saturday morning, Jackson, with 
 May some 22,000 men, set out on his 
 2. perilous expedition. He moved 
 with great secrecy and with a speed 
 almost incredible, considering the nature 
 of the ground he had to traverse. Stu- 
 art's cavalry was employed to conceal 
 his column from view, and to distract 
 the attention of the National troops. 
 Lee, too, made frequent demonstrations, 
 so as to engage attention in front. 
 Hooker, however, was not without warn- 
 ing, nor was he wholly without sus- 
 picion. On Friday night, the Confede- 
 rates were obsei'ved cutting a road past 
 tlie National picket lines on the right. 
 On Saturday morning, trains and ambu- 
 lances were seen passing over a hill in 
 Sickles' front. When informed of the 
 movement of Jackson, Hooker sent 
 orders to the officers commanding on the 
 right, to be on their guard against ah 
 advance of the enemy on their flank, and 
 directed them to strengthen that por- 
 tion of their line to meet such an emerg- 
 ency. Birney reported to Sickles that 
 he saw, in the direction of what was 
 called the Furnace, a Confederate col- 
 umn, as it marched down the hill and 
 crossed Lewis' Creek. Sickles went 
 forward in person, and satisfied himself 
 of the truth of the report. He saw 
 the trains of artillery wagons and am- 
 bulances which followed in Jackson's 
 rear; but he concluded that the Con- 
 federates were in full retreat. A bat- 
 
 tery was pushed forward, and the mov- 
 ing column was shelled at a distance. 
 As it soon disappeared, it was believed 
 that the movement, whether of attack 
 or retreat, had been abandoned. It 
 soon again reappeared ; and Sickles was 
 ordered to push forward two divisions 
 to develop the sti'ength or the intentions 
 of the enemy. This force, which con- 
 sisted of the divisions of Birney and 
 Whipple, with Barlow's brigade, of 
 Howard's corps, soon came up with the 
 enemy. A sharp skirmish ensued ; and, 
 by the aid of Randolph's battery, some 
 400 men, including several officers of 
 the Twenty-thii'd Georgia regiment, 
 were captured. Information received 
 from the prisoners removed all doubt 
 as to the character or purpose of the 
 mysterious column. It was Stonewall 
 Jackson's corps; its redoubtable chief 
 was at its head ; and it was moving, 
 with hostile intent, to the flank and rear 
 of the National right. It was no time 
 now for trifling. Jackson, it was evi- 
 dent, meant business. Sickles, there- 
 fore, pressed forward with fresh energy, 
 and with the view of intercepting the 
 train in Jackson's rear. Williams, who 
 was ordered to co-operate, advanced at 
 the same time with his division, of Slo- 
 cum's corps, and commenced a vigorous 
 flank movement on Jackson's right. It 
 was believed, for a moment, that the 
 Confederate general would be caught 
 in his own trap — that, if not captured, 
 he would be compelled to retreat. It 
 was a mistaken belief. A Confederate 
 battalion of artillery, under Colonel 
 Thompson Brown, happened to be close 
 at hand. Brown got his guns into po- 
 
460 
 
 CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 eition, and supported them by such 
 companies of infantry as could be got 
 together. Meantime, Archer, with his 
 own and Thomas' brigade, of A. P. 
 Hill's division, hearing of the capture 
 of the Georgia regiment, fell back to 
 the menaced point. By these means, 
 Sickles was held in check, and Jackson's 
 train was enabled to pass on. What was 
 more important still to the Confederates, 
 time was gained. Jackson was now 
 beyond reach. While this skirmishing 
 was going on, on his flank and rear, he 
 was pushing forward through the tan- 
 gled wilderness with incredible speed. 
 Obstacles seemed to disappear as he 
 advanced. Where there was no open- 
 ing in the woods, a passage was soon 
 created, the sturdy foi-est trees yielding 
 to the vigorous blows of his hardy 
 pioneers. When Sickles, who, after 
 the Confederates retired, held possession 
 of the road in the neighborhood of the 
 Furnace, was preparing to follow up 
 Jackson and strike him in the rear, the 
 Confederate chieftain, having reached 
 his chosen ground, was about to burst 
 like a whirlwind on his unsuspecting 
 foe. 
 
 After passing the Furnace, and 
 plunging into the forest, Jackson, being 
 under complete cover of the woods, 
 pursued his way unmolested. As he 
 moved around, he was continually feel- 
 ing the National lines. On reaching 
 the plank road, he halted for a time, 
 and, from a commanding eminence, sur- 
 veyed the position and works of his 
 antagonist. Fitz Lee's cavalry, sup- 
 ported by Paxton's brigade of infantry. 
 Was ordered forward on the plank road. 
 
 Jackson himself, with the mass of his 
 command, pushed on through the jungle 
 to the old turnpike. He was now near 
 the outskirts of the National encamp- 
 ment. Secrecy had become more im- 
 portant than ever. The knowledge ^f hia 
 whereabouts, on the part of the National 
 commanders, before he was fully pre- 
 pared to strike the decisive blow, might, 
 at the last moment, mar all his plans. 
 Orders were, therefore, given in a low 
 tone; the firing of guns was forbid- 
 den; no cheering was allowed as the 
 general passed by ; and the well-trained 
 battalions, disciplined almost to perfec- 
 tion, moved along slowly, silently, and 
 with cat-like caution. Arrived at the 
 turnpike, he turned to the right, and 
 moved along that road to some distance 
 in the direction of Chancellorsville. 
 Here he arranged his troops in three 
 lines of battle, perpendicular to the 
 turnpike, and extending about one mile 
 on either side. Rodes, with his own 
 brigade and that of Iverson on the left, 
 and those of Doles and Colquitt on the 
 right, occupied the first line. Colston, 
 who commanded Trimble's division, 
 with his own brigade and those of 
 NichoUs and Jones, took position two 
 hundred yards in the rear of Rodes. 
 A. P. Hill's division, as it came up, 
 was formed into the third line. Two 
 pieces of Stuart's ai-tillery moved along 
 the turnpike with the first line. The 
 second and third line was to support 
 the first when necessary, without wait- 
 ing for specific instructions. 
 
 It was now after five o'clock. Let 
 us look within the National lines. 
 Hooker was still at his headquarters at 
 
DOWDALL'S TAVEEN. 
 
 461 
 
 Chancellorsville ; and, although watch- 
 ful of his whole line, he had a special 
 care of his front and the side looking 
 towards Fredericksburg. In this latter 
 direction, as we have seen, Meade and 
 Couch kept guard — Sickles and a por- 
 tion of Slocum's troops were at the 
 Furnace, preparing to follow Jackson. 
 The right of the National army was 
 protected by the Eleventh corps. Gen- 
 eral Howard, one of the bravest officers 
 in the National army. The outworks 
 at this point ran parallel to the plank 
 and turnpike roads, and faced to the 
 south. Steinwehr was on the left, 
 Schurz in the centre, and Devens on the 
 right. Devens' position was near Tal- 
 ley's House. It was now near six 
 o'clock. All fear of danger, for the 
 day, had been abandoned. Their arms 
 were stacked, and the men were cook- 
 ing or eating their evening meal. All 
 of a sudden there is a commotion in the 
 woods. Startled game, as if disturbed 
 in their quiet retreats, appear in large 
 numbers, and rush to and fro in wild 
 bewilderment. Deer leap over the 
 works, and dash through the National 
 lines into the woods beyond. Jackson 
 has given the signal to advance ; and 
 these scared creatures of the wood, 
 frightened by the presence of man, and 
 running they know not whither, are but 
 an emblem of what is soon to be wit- 
 nessed, on a far grander scale, on the 
 right wing of the great and invincible 
 army of the Potomac. A second more, 
 and the bugles are heard. Then a 
 mighty cheer, followed by a terrific vol- 
 ley, the deadly missiles coming crashing 
 through the trees, and falling like hail 
 »si 
 
 among the unarmed and unsuspecting 
 Unionists, and it is known that " Stone- 
 wall " Jackson is upon them. It is an 
 instant panic. The high and com- 
 manding ground at Talley's is at once 
 abandoned, Devens' men fleeing pre- 
 cipitately and in the wildest confusion, 
 many of them without having picked 
 up their muskets. Schurz's men behave 
 even worse — joining in the rout with- 
 out even waiting for the attack. In 
 vain does the brave Devens, a second 
 time wounded, in vain does the heroic 
 Howard, galloping among the broken 
 columns, urging them by voice and ges- 
 ture, and waving, banner-like, his empty 
 sleeve, attempt to rally the fugitives, 
 and turn them against their pursuers. 
 Once and again a regiment is halted, 
 but it is only to be torn to pieces by 
 the merciless fire of the on-rushing and 
 now triumphant Confederates. Sud- 
 denly, however, a halt is made on the 
 part of both pursuers and pursued. 
 The works at Melzi Chancellor's or Dow- 
 dall's Tavern, on Howard's extreme 
 left, have been reached. Into these 
 works Steinwehr has thrown Bush- 
 beck's brigade, his other brigades being 
 absent with Sickles. Bushbeck has 
 been joined by some of Schurz's regi- 
 ments, which have been rallied and 
 brought to order. At this point a gal- 
 lant resistance is made. The Confed- 
 erates are held in check, but it is only 
 for a brief period. Jackson, impatient 
 of resistance, pushes forward his le- 
 gions. Rodes, who has been held at 
 bay, is speedily joined by Colston ; and 
 their united divisions, already flushed 
 with success, and uttering their ac- 
 
46% 
 
 OHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 customed yell, rush bounding into the 
 works, shivering to pieces the last solid 
 remnant of Howard's splendid corps. 
 The rout of the I'ight wing was now 
 complete. All semblance of organiza- 
 tion was gone. Heedless of the dead 
 and dying who lay crowded on the 
 turnpike and in the adjoining woods, 
 and flinging from them their muskets, 
 tftieir knapsacks, and every other en- 
 cumbrance, the routed troops rushed 
 pell-mell towards Chancellors\nlle. Ar- 
 tillery, wagons, ambulances, pack-mules 
 and cattle, all inextricably commingled, 
 were being hurried along in the same 
 direction. It was a sce-ne of the wildest 
 confusion. No such scene had been 
 witnessed since the first battle of Bull 
 Run. 
 
 It was now seven o'clock, one brief 
 hour since the attack commenced, and 
 darkness was coming on. The situation 
 was critical in the extreme. Jackson 
 was in full possession of the breast- 
 works, and within half a mile of Hook- 
 er's headquarters. It was necessary for 
 the National commander to form a new 
 line of battle. This, however, was a 
 task of peculiar difficulty. Lee was 
 pi-essing Hooker hard, both on his left 
 and centre; and the tornado-like rush 
 of the retreating hosts had all the effect 
 of an invading army. Hooker, on hear- 
 ing of the disaster to Howard, sent for- 
 ward the choicest division of the army 
 — a division which he himself had 
 created, and which he had often led to 
 victory, and now under the command 
 of General Beny. The batteries of 
 this division, under Captain Best, posted 
 on a ridge across the turnpike, having 
 
 opened a most murderous fire, checked 
 the Confederate advance. At this point 
 the battle raged fiercely. Sickles was 
 recalled from the Furnace, where he had 
 been joined by Pleasonton, with 1000 
 cavaliy, his instructions being that he 
 should attack Jackson in flank. He at 
 once hurried forward Pleasonton and 
 Bimey. Pleasonton, with two of his 
 regiments and his battery, arrived at 
 Hazel Grove — where Sickles had been 
 compelled to leave a portion of his 
 artillery — just as Howard's corps was 
 hurrying past in full retreat. Compre- 
 hending the situation at a glance, he 
 hurled the Eighth Pennsylvania on the 
 pursuing columns. The regiment waa 
 overwhelmed, and its commander in- 
 stantly killed. Disastrous as the charge 
 was to the regiment, it nevertheless 
 accomplished its object. The Confede- 
 rate onrush Avas temporai'ily checked. 
 In a few minutes, what with his own 
 battery of horse artillery, some guns 
 belonging to the routed corps, and those 
 which Sickles had left behind him, he 
 had thirty pieces in position. A heavy 
 cannonade was opened by Colonel 
 Crutchfield, from the Confederate bat- 
 teries on the plank road, his object be- 
 ing to prevent the National troops from 
 reforming. Pleasonton replied with 
 tremendous energy ; and as often as the 
 Confederates came up to the charge, 
 their ranks were decimated by his 
 double-shotted guns. During this en- 
 counter, General Crutchfield was wound- 
 ed, and some of his guns were silenced. 
 It was now night. The daylight had 
 sped, but it was not dark ; for the moon 
 was bright and full. There was no 
 
MIDNIGHT FIGHTING. 
 
 463 
 
 dkposition on either side to discontinue 
 the contest. It was absolutely neces- 
 sary that Hooker should, before morn- 
 ing, re-connect his broken lines, and re- 
 establish his communications. It was 
 necessary, in fact, that he should take 
 a new position. Jackson, on the other 
 hand, felt the importance, if not neces- 
 sity, of pushing the advantage he had 
 won. The relative positions of both 
 armies was much the same as at night- 
 fall. Lee continued to claim a large 
 amount of Hooker's attention on the 
 left. Jackson held the advanced posi- 
 tions he had won on the old turnpike 
 and plank roads. Berry kept the 
 ground he had taken towards the close 
 of the eveninfy's contest. His artillery, 
 under Best, crowned the crest at the 
 western end of the clearing around 
 Chancellorsville. Birney had come up 
 and taken position on the left. Ward's 
 brigade, of his division, was ordered to 
 be ready to make an attack on the 
 enemy's lines at 11 o'clock. Meanwhile 
 Jackson was impatiently awaiting the 
 arrival of A. P. Hill, to replace the 
 divisions of Rodes and Colton, which, 
 after the severe work of the afternoon, 
 and because of the thick and tangled 
 woods in which much of the fighti.ig 
 was done, had fallen into confusion. 
 At the appointed time. Best opened a 
 tremendous fire on the Confederate 
 lines, and Ward's men rushed to the 
 charge with terrific fury. It w;is again 
 and again repeated. In one of these 
 charges, a portion of the artillery lost 
 by General Howard, was gallantly re- 
 taken. This almost midnight attack has 
 been described as presenting one of the 
 
 grandest and most soul-rousing scenes 
 of the war. " The moon," says an eye- 
 witness, " shone bright, and the foe 
 could be seen at good musket range. 
 The air was very still, and the roar and 
 reverberation of the musketry and ar- 
 tillery exceeded all conception. Mal- 
 vern Hills was a skirmish compared to 
 this, except in the degree of slaughter." 
 The attack was completely successful, 
 the Confederates having been driven 
 back half a mile. The battle ceased ; 
 but there was little repose in either 
 camp during that anxious night. 
 
 At the very commencement of the 
 night attack, a terrible calamity befell 
 the Confederate army. General "Stone- 
 wall" Jackson, the author of that day's 
 splendid achievement, in many respects 
 the greatest soldier of the Confederacy, 
 fell mortally wounded. While waiting 
 for Hill, and just before the batteries of 
 Best opened fire and Ward made his 
 attack, he rode forward to reconnoitre 
 the ground. He was accompanied by 
 a portion of his staff, couriers and other 
 officers. On setting out, he gave posi- 
 tive orders to his troops not to fire un- 
 less cavalry approached from the direc- 
 tion of the enemy. He advanced to a 
 considerable distance beyond his own 
 pickets. When near what was called ■ 
 the Van Weii; House, some one re- 
 marked to him, " General, you should 
 not expose yourself so much." "There 
 is no danger," he said. "Go back and 
 tell General Hill to press on." When 
 returning, and, as he approached his own 
 lines, he and his escort, mistaken for Fed- 
 eral cavalry, were received with a vollej' 
 of musketry. Several of the party fell. 
 
*u 
 
 CHANCELLOESVILLB. 
 
 some of them killed, others of them 
 severely wounded. Tnrning aside, the 
 party entered a thicket, still moving 
 towards the Confederate lines. A mo- 
 ment more, and being still mistaken 
 for Federal cavalry, they were again 
 fired upon, and at a distance of not 
 more than thirty or forty yards. Jack- 
 son received three balls, one in the 
 right hand, and two in the left arm, 
 one of which shattered the bone two 
 inches below the shoulder, and severed 
 the artery. Half of his escort, includ- 
 ing Captain Boswell, of his staff, were 
 killed or wounded. His fi'is'htened 
 horse iTished towards the National lines. 
 Quickly recovering himself, he managed, 
 with his bleeding hand, to rein it up 
 and turn it into the plank road. Cap- 
 tain Wilbourn, of his staff, now rushed 
 to his aid. Bleeding and fainting, the 
 general was taken from his horse, car- 
 ried to the road side and laid under a 
 tree. It was at this moment the guns 
 of Best opened fire ; and the National 
 troops, coming up in great force, 
 charged over Jackson's body. The Na- 
 tionals again falling back, he was 
 placed upon a litter ; but Berry's guns 
 were now sweeping the road ; and, one 
 of the litter-bearers being shot down, 
 the wounded general fell to the ground, 
 receiving a severe contusion on his right 
 side. As the firing continued, the 
 whole party lay flat on the ground, till 
 the storm of grape and canister was 
 turned in another direction. He was 
 soon afterwards conveyed safely to the 
 hospital in the rear. It was found 
 necessary to amputate the arm. Jack- 
 son died on Sunday, the 10th of May. 
 
 He lived to see the fruit of this day's 
 work. His death was a great blow to 
 the Confederate cause. It was equal 
 to a National victory. General Stone- 
 wall Jackson will live in histoiy as the 
 hero of Chancellorsville.* 
 
 Hill came to the front just as Jackson 
 was wounded, and prepared to assume 
 the command. Scarcely, however, had 
 he issued his first instructions, when he 
 too was disabled, having received a 
 severe contusion from a piece of shell. 
 General J. E. B. Stuart was the oflScer 
 next in rank ; but he had moved off in 
 the direction of Ely's Ford, his inten- 
 
 • In an ably-written paragraph, which is evidently 
 intended to be eulogistic of General Stonewall Jackson, 
 Swinton, yielding to a spirit of detraction, which 
 is too common a characteristic of Northern writers, 
 makes some remarks which are scarcely just to the 
 Confederate soldier. He speaks of Jackson as "devoid 
 of high mental parts, and destitute of that power of 
 planning and combination, and of that calm, broad, 
 military intellect which distinguished General Lee." 
 He has just described him as " essentially an executive 
 officer. " Without referring to General Jackson s entire 
 military career, we have no hesitation in saying that 
 such remarks were singiilarly inapplicable to the man, 
 after the first day's fighting at ChanceUorsvUle. The 
 Chancellorsville plan of battle was Jackson's through- 
 out. It was his conception : and it was he who gave 
 it development, and determined its success. It is 
 not too much to say that but for the death of 
 Jackson, the National army might have been cap. 
 tured or cut to pieces. It would certainly have been 
 placed in great peril. Such was Jackson's own opinion. 
 " If I had not been wounded," he said, " I would have 
 cut the enemy off from the road to United States Ford ; 
 we would have had them entirely surrounded ; and 
 they would have been obliged to surrender or cut theii 
 way out — they had no other alternative. " Nor do w« 
 think it fair to characterize Jackson as a " fanatic in 
 religion." The word "fanatic" has come to have an 
 offensive meaning. In the sense in which it is now 
 generally used, it certainly cannot be applied to Jack- 
 son. In the sense in which Jackson was a fanatic, so 
 was Ohver Cromwell ; so, too, in a milder sense, was 
 George Washington. Thus applied, the epithet is not 
 opprobrious ; but, in this latter sense, it is now rarely 
 used. He was certainly a religious enthusiast; but k 
 fanatic, in the offensive sense, he was not. 
 
JACKSON MORTALLY WOUNDED. 
 
 465 
 
 tion being to seize that place and occupy 
 it. Such was part of General Jackson's 
 plan. In the circumstances, and until 
 the arrival of Stuart, who was at once 
 recalled, the comnaand of the Confede- 
 rate left devolved upon Brigadier-Gen- 
 eral Rodes. It was a trying moment. 
 Jackson had fallen, mortally wounded ; 
 Hill had been disabled ; and Stuart 
 was some miles distant. This, how- 
 ever, was not all. Berry was repeating 
 his tremendous assaults ; and his artil- 
 lery, under the dii-ection of Best, was 
 maintaining a fierce cannonade. It is not 
 wonderful that Bodes should have hes- 
 itated to make any attack or run any 
 aerious risk until the morning. In this 
 view of the case Stuart, on his arrival, 
 concurred. It had the approval, also, of 
 Hill who, although disabled and placed 
 on a litter, had not been removed from 
 the field. Stuart sent a messenger to 
 Jackson, asking for instructions. Jack- 
 son was so feeble and suifering so much, 
 that he could only give for answer: 
 '' Tell General Stuai't that he must use 
 Lis own judgment." The night was 
 spent by the new commander and his 
 staff in visiting the different parts of his 
 line, in locating his troops, and in making 
 the other necessary arrangements for 
 the coming day. 
 
 It had already become apparent to 
 the different oiBcers of the National 
 army — it must have been apparent to 
 General Hooker himself — that a great 
 blunder had been committed on the 
 Thursday, when no effort was made to 
 bring up the three corps under Sedg- 
 wick at Fredericksburg, so as to make 
 the army a unit, and that, if possible, a 
 
 still greater blunder was coiumitted on 
 the Friday, when the entire right wing, 
 having advanced towards Fredericks- 
 burg by three different roads, and hav- 
 ing gained advantageous positions in 
 the clear, open country beyond the 
 woods, was compelled by the mere will 
 of its chief to fall back, and wait for 
 the onset of the enemy in the tangled 
 jungles of the wilderness. These blun- 
 ders—one or other or both— had brought 
 about all the soitows of Saturday; 
 and superior as were thef Nationals in 
 numbers, and excellent as was the spirit 
 of the troops, it was a doubtful ques- 
 tion with many whether greater sorrows 
 were not in store for thein. The dis- 
 cipline of the army, however, was well 
 preserved. Hooker, showing no indeci- 
 sion, adopted his course with firmness, 
 and after the disasters of the afternoon 
 and evening made his arrangements for 
 the morrow. On the eveninsr of that 
 day, Reynolds, with his corps of some 
 17,000 men, having come up from before 
 Fredej-icksburg and crossed the United 
 States Ford, joined the forces immediate- 
 ly under Hooker, and by their presence 
 more than compensated for the losses 
 sustained by the Eleventh corj^s. Sedg- 
 wick was still below Fredericksburg 
 with his own entire corps, which num- 
 bered some 24,000 men. Late on Sat- 
 urday night. Hooker sent instructions 
 to Sedgwick to put himself in motion 
 immediately, to occupy Fredericksburg, 
 to seize the heights in the rear, to gain 
 the plank road leading thence to Chan- 
 cellorsville, and to move out, fighting 
 his way, as best he might, with the view 
 of joining the main body by daylighi 
 
«6« 
 
 CHANCELLOKJSVILLE. 
 
 on Sunday morning. It was, beyond 
 all questioij, of the utmost importance, 
 that Sedgwick should be able to accom. 
 plish the task thus assigned him. The 
 best results might naturally enough be 
 expected to flow from it. But it was an 
 almost impossible task. Hooker made 
 little account of the more than possible 
 difficulties to be encountered in seizins: 
 the heights in the rear of Fredericks- 
 burg — difficulties of which he himself 
 had had so bitter an experience in 
 the Burnside campaign. It would have 
 been more wise, if the order had been 
 given at an earlier hour, or on an earlier 
 day. It was not unwise to give it now ; 
 but most certainly it was the duty of 
 the general-in-chief to think of the 
 obstacles which might hinder the pro- 
 gress of his lieutenant, and by every 
 conceivable means to facilitate his ad- 
 vance. 
 
 During the night, the National com- 
 mander succeeded in rean-anging his 
 lines, and taking a new position. His 
 new line resembled somewhat the letter 
 V, or rather a triangle slightly prolonged 
 at the apex, the left leg being consider- 
 ably larger than the right, and both ex- 
 tremities reaching close to the river, thus 
 covering United States Ford. His lines 
 were conti-acted, as compared with those 
 of the previous day, and he had drawn 
 nearer the river. He held possession 
 of the heights between Melzi Chancel- 
 lor's and Fairview, including Hazel 
 Grove — an eminence which commanded 
 the apex, and the holding of which was 
 essential to the safety of the new posi- 
 tion. Reynolds was on the extreme 
 right, at the upper end of the left limb 
 
 of the triangle. Meade's forces came 
 next; then those of Sickles, command- 
 ing the line on the left of the apex; 
 then those of Slocum on the right of the 
 apex ; and then, connecting with Slocum, 
 but more to the north on the right limb 
 of the triangle, came Howard's corps, 
 which, with mai'vellous rapidity, had 
 been brought together, and restored to 
 something like order. On the left limb 
 of the triangle, the National forces were 
 heavily massed. In the centi-e of the 
 triangle or V, and almost behind Meade, 
 was stationed Couch, that he might be 
 able to act in either direction, as occasion 
 might require, Reynolds and Meade 
 were some distance on the north of the 
 turnpike. Sickles covered the road; 
 Berry, with Whipple in his rear, being 
 on the north side ; and Birney, with 
 Williams, of Slocum's corps, in his rear. 
 Slocum, with his other division, that of 
 Geary, guarded the apex. Hancock's 
 division of Couch was on Slocum's left, 
 and stretched out towards Howard. 
 Sickles' artilleiy, under Best, was massed 
 on the ridge in the centre of the open 
 ground, all the guns pointing west, so 
 as to command the approaches to the 
 turnpike. Hooker had 60,000 infantry 
 immediately available at Chancellors- 
 ville. The combined forces of Lee and 
 Jackson were far short of that num- 
 ber, not much exceeding 40,000 men. 
 Hooker had, besides, the prospect of 
 being joined by Sedgwick, whose corps, 
 some 24,000 strong, was ecj^ual to a 
 large army. Sedgwick was only tea 
 miles distant. He had, it is true, 
 some difficulties in his way ; but these 
 might be overcome. Tt' Sedgwick 
 
THE CONFEDERATE BATTLE-CRY. 
 
 467 
 
 should come up in time, might not 
 Hooker yet be able to destroy first the 
 Confederate right, and then fall back 
 with all his force and deal a deadly 
 blow to the Confederate left ? If such 
 is to be the result, the National com- 
 mander must exhibit at once more skill 
 and nerve than he has revealed since the 
 fighting commenced. 
 
 The Confederate commander had 
 been equally active during the night. 
 He had drawn up his men in three lines 
 of battle. Hill's division was in ad- 
 vance. Its different brigades were ar- 
 ranged across the road in the following 
 order : Archer's, McGowan's, and Lane's 
 were on the right of the road ; Pender's 
 and Thomas's were on the left. Hill's 
 brigade was in reserve, supporting Lane 
 and Pender; Archer and McGowan 
 were thrown back, somewhat obliquely, 
 so as to confront Sickles. The rest of 
 the line was perpendicular to the road. 
 Colston's division formed the second 
 line, and that of Rodesthe third. The 
 ridge, occupied by the right of the corps, 
 was covered by artillery. Such was 
 the disposition of the left wing of the 
 Confederate army, on the morning of 
 May Sunday, the 3d of May. Lee, 
 ^ meanwhile, had concluded to ef- 
 fect a junction, if at all possible, of his 
 right and left mngs; and instructions 
 were given to Stuart, McLaws and An- 
 derson, that they should direct their 
 movements accordingly. It will be re- 
 membered that Sickles held a command- 
 ing position at Hazel Grove Tt was 
 the key-point of the battle ground, and 
 advantageous, not only because it com- 
 manded the enemy's flank, but because 
 
 if occupied by the enemy, it would 
 imperil the safety of Slocum's entire 
 line. Sickles, who was naturally proud 
 of the position, had been at great 
 pains to strengthen and turn it to the 
 best account. It was not, therefore, 
 without mingled surprise and pain that 
 he received orders from Hooker, before 
 daylight on Sunday morning, to the 
 effect that the ground, the holding of 
 which he deemed of so much importance, 
 should be immediately abandoned. It 
 was another of those inexplicable blun- 
 ders which Hooker had been making 
 since the moment he first felt the pres- 
 sure of his antagonist. Quick as light- 
 ning, and with the earliest dawn, Stuart 
 saw the advantage which the blundering 
 mismanagement of his opponent had 
 given him, and immediately occupied 
 the abandoned position. In so doing, he 
 became engaged with Sickles' rear. The 
 crest, however, was seized ; thirty pieces 
 of artillery were got into position ; and 
 a heavy fire was opened at once ou the 
 open ground around Chancellorsville 
 House. The battle of the 3d of May 
 was begun. In a few seconds, it was 
 raging along the whole line. " Charge, 
 and remember Jackson ! " was the Con- 
 federate battle-cry ; and never was 
 battle-cry more effective in evoking mili- 
 tary enthusiasm. With a fury which 
 seemed to be blind, with an energy 
 which was irresistible, and with a pur- 
 pose and determination which death 
 only could restrain, on came the brave 
 Confederates. Jackson was not with 
 them ; but, it was evident, his spirit 
 was there. Brave as they were, how- 
 ever, they were about to encounter foe- 
 
468 
 
 CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 men worthy of their steel — men who 
 feared no foe, who knew how to resist 
 and how to attack. Sickles was on 
 hand with his well-trained and war- 
 hardened veterans — Berry on the right, 
 Birney on the left, Whipple and Will- 
 iams supporting — ready to receive the 
 onslaught. Best's forty pieces of artil- 
 lery were all pointed to the road along 
 which the attacking column was ap- 
 proaching. As the Confederates came 
 forward, they were received with a 
 perfect tempest of lead, which burst 
 upon them, tornado-like, from the firm 
 lines of Berry and Birney, and also, 
 from Whipple and Williams, who had 
 already been pushed to the front. 
 Reckless of this tempest of lead, and 
 reckless, also, of the more destruct- 
 ive tempest, of grape and canister, which 
 bursts upon them from the batteries on 
 the hill, the column still advances. It 
 is cut up and gashed, as if "pierced, 
 scarred, ploughed by invisible light- 
 ning." Companies, whole regiments 
 even, seem to melt away ; but still they 
 come. No such bravery, in assault, has 
 been exhibited by the Confederates 
 since the famous battle of Corinth, when 
 they advanced against the storm of 
 bullets " with faces averted, like men 
 striving to protect themselves from a 
 driving storm of hail." Will nothing 
 check their forward rush ? Berry and 
 Birney, now massing their troops, rush 
 upon them with the weight and impetus 
 of an avalanche. The shock is terrific. 
 Like waves driven by contraiy winds, 
 the opposing hosts, dash and roil against 
 each other, but dash and roll apparently 
 in vain. Neither prevails * neither 
 
 yields. It seems an endless, wasteful 
 struggle. Now the Nationals fall back ; 
 and it seems as if the Confederates are 
 about to win the victoiy. It is only, 
 however, for a moment. The Nationals 
 charge again ; the batteries pour forth 
 their destructive fire ; and Jackson's men, 
 their ranks literally torn to pieces, their 
 dead and wounded lying in groups on 
 the field, are driven back to their original 
 position. Again there is a Confederate 
 charge; again a terrific shock and stub- 
 born resistance ; again victory oscillates, 
 yielding now to the one side, and now 
 to the other ; and so the battle rages 
 until about eight o'clock, when Stuart, 
 putting forth all his disposable strength 
 on that point, drives the Nationals 
 back and back, and captures the works 
 in Sickles' front. 
 
 The struggle, however, is not yet 
 abandoned. The Confederates have 
 undoubtedly gained an important ad- 
 vantage. They have pressed the Na- 
 tionals back from their first line of 
 works. It is, in a qualified sense, a Con- 
 federate victory. But Sickles, if dis- 
 couraged, is not yet dismayed. He has 
 already sent for reinforcements. If 
 these should arrive in time, he may jet 
 turn the tide of battle. He, therefore, 
 boldly holds his ground. The battle 
 rages again with tremendous fury. The 
 works are repeatedly taken and retaken. 
 The Confederates, becoming more con 
 fident, press upon the National columns 
 with increasing energy. As it has be- 
 come dangerous or impossible to make 
 any very effective use of the National 
 artillery in his front, Sickles is com- 
 pelled to depend on the resisting power 
 
LEE'S TWO WINGS UNITED. 
 
 466 
 
 of the bayonet. As yet, no response is 
 made to his repeated calls for assistance. 
 In obedience to orders from headquar- 
 ters, French has sent out some regi- 
 ments, under Carroll ; but these, instead 
 of moving to the aid of Sickles, have 
 moved to the south of Meade, and 
 struck the enemy's flank. These regi- 
 ments are quickly repulsed ; and Stuart, 
 again massing his troops, falls upon 
 Sickles with his entire weight and 
 with undivided strength. Sickles had 
 done his utmost. He had used his 
 men wisely ; and they had nobly re- 
 sponded to his every call. Berry's 
 division, formerly Hooker's own, had 
 sustained its high character. The men 
 fought like heroes of the olden time. 
 The same was true, also, of Birney's 
 division. But they were confronted 
 by a body of men who, for discipline, 
 dash and endurance, were perhaps 
 never surpassed in the whole history 
 of war; and they were overpowered 
 by superior numbers. And so it came 
 to pass that while the corps of Rey- 
 nolds and Meade and Howard, number- 
 ing together some 40,000 men, were 
 doing nothing, Sickles, after having re- 
 sisted for hours the persistent attacks of 
 Jackson's battalions, and after having 
 held at bay, successively, his first, his 
 second and his third lines, was com- 
 pelled, at last, to fall back in the di- 
 rection of Chancellorsville, only, how- 
 ever, to offer a fresh resistance under 
 cover of the guns at Fairview. 
 
 While these things wei'e taking 
 place on Hooker's right, the Confed- 
 erates were not idle on his front, or 
 at the apex of the triangle. Slocura, 
 
 as we have seen, was holding the apex 
 on the eastern side, with Geary's di- 
 vision, Hancock, of Couch's, being on 
 his left. On this point, Lee, from an 
 early hour, had been directing all his 
 disposable strength. We have already 
 mentioned that instructions had been 
 sent to Anderson and McLaws to direct 
 their movements so as to form a junc- 
 tion with Stuart's right, and thus unite 
 the Confederate line. The Confederate 
 guns at Hazel Grove had made Slocum's 
 position almost untenable from the com- 
 mencement of the fight in the early 
 morning. Anderson, having been 
 pushed along the plank road, which 
 connects Chancellorsville with Freder- 
 icksburg, fell with tremendous weight 
 on Slocum. McLaws, moving in a 
 dii'ection a little further north, pressed 
 heavily upon Hancock. After repeated 
 attacks and repeated failures, McLaws 
 not only found it impossible to make 
 any impression on Hancock, but was 
 handsomely repulsed. Anderson's ef- 
 fort was attended wdth better success. 
 Pressing with great stubbornness on 
 Slocum at the point of the triangle, he 
 contrived to throw around hie left, and 
 thus, by a thin line, to form a junction 
 with Stuart. The object, so ardently 
 desired by Lee, was at last effected. 
 His army, which had been divided 
 since the morning of the 2d, was again 
 united. His two wings thus brought 
 together, Lee bore in upon the Nationals 
 with his whole line. Sickles and Slo- 
 cum Avere f oiced back ; and the National 
 line seemed to melt away, Hancock 
 alone holding his position, and resisting, 
 with great firmness and determination. 
 
 »S!i 
 
470 
 
 CHANCELLORSVILLB. 
 
 the fierce and persistent onslaughts of 
 the already triumphant Confederates. 
 Hooker ordered the troops to fall back 
 upon Chancellorsville ; and hei'e again, 
 at the angle of the woods, the battle for 
 a time raged with great fury, the artil- 
 niery on both sides doing terrible execu- 
 tion. The Chancellorsville House, which 
 was still General Hooker's headquarters 
 was now discovered to be on fii-e, and 
 had to be abandoned. The National 
 line, in this new position, began to 
 waver ; and the Confederates, already 
 flushed with success, seeing their oppor- 
 tunity, made a tremendous dash, and, 
 springing forward with wild yells, 
 captured Chancellorsville, with a con- 
 siderable number of prisoners. It was 
 now a few minutes past ten o'clock. 
 The battle had lasted, almost without 
 intermission, for more than five hours. 
 The Nationals, although pressed vigor- 
 ously by the tiiumphant Confederates, 
 whose gims were sweeping the open 
 ground around Chancellorsville, fell 
 back in good order, and took a new 
 and well-fortified position about a mile 
 nearer the river. The new line waa 
 still in the form of a triangle, or V, but 
 shorter and somewhat flatter than be- 
 fore. The apex was at Bullock's House. 
 The left limb extended along the Ely's 
 Ford road, towards the mouth of Hunt- 
 ing Run. The right extended along 
 Mineral Spring road, towards what is 
 known as Scott's Dam. Thus ended the 
 second great battle at Chancellorsville, 
 fought on the 3d of May, 1863. 
 Among the many brave men who per- 
 ished that day was General Berry. 
 At an early stage of the contest, a 
 
 severe misfortune befell the National 
 aiTuy. While the conflict was at its 
 height. General Hooker was standing 
 on the balcony of the ChancellorsviUe 
 House, leaning against one of the pillars. 
 The pillar was struck by a cannon-ball ; 
 and the general was thrown down by 
 the violence of the concussion. He was 
 stunned and stupefied, and rendered 
 incapable of command. This misfortune 
 goes far to explain some of the mys- 
 teries of that mysterious day, when 
 Sickles and French and Slocimi were 
 struggling against the superior numbers 
 of the enemy, and vainly calling for 
 reinforcements, while 40,000 men, com- 
 posing the corps of Reynolds and Meade 
 and Howard, were doing nothing. 
 Hooker was still insensible, and unfit 
 for duty. The responsibilities of gen- 
 eral-in-chief, at this supreme crisis, and 
 in these peculiar circumstances, devolved 
 upon General Couch, who, from some 
 as yet unexplained cause, did not prove 
 himself equal to the requirements of 
 the situation. Had these 40,000 men, 
 who were unused, and, therefore, useless 
 in the fight, been hurled against the foe 
 at the different points of attack, there 
 can be no reasonable doubt that thp 
 tide of victoiy would have rolled in an 
 opposite direction. The Nationals, in 
 such a case, would certainly have fully 
 engaged Lee's attention, and occupied 
 his army. The plank road would have 
 been preserved ; and Sedgwick, if his 
 arrival at the point of destination must 
 still have been a little late, would at 
 least have been able to march compara- 
 tively unmolested from Fredericksburg 
 to Chancellorsville. The mystery of 
 
HOOKER STUNNED. 
 
 471 
 
 Chancellorsville will, perhaps, never be 
 explained. It is certainly but little 
 likely to be explained during the lives 
 of the principal actors in the great and 
 traffic drama. The accident which be- 
 fell Hooker was undoubtedly a misfor- 
 tune to the National army. It explains 
 much ; but it does not explain all. 
 
 Sunday, the 3d of May, was yet young. 
 Sacred as was this day, and severe as 
 had been the work already accomplished, 
 there was no disposition to rest on 
 either side. Hooker, now partially re- 
 covered, busied himself in strengthen- 
 ing his line, and preparing for another 
 attack, as well as securing his lines of 
 communication with the United States 
 and Ely's Fords, in the event of further 
 retreat being judged necessary. Howard 
 and Slocum were stationed on his left ; 
 Meade and Reynolds were on the right ; 
 and, at Bullock's House — a commanding 
 plateau, the vertex and key of the pos- 
 sition — Sickles and Couch were massed 
 with a large number of pieces of artil- 
 lery. 
 
 Lee had not been less active. He had 
 already displayed his army on the pla- 
 teau at Chancellorsville. The scattered 
 regiments, brigades and divisions which 
 had been broken in the confusion of 
 battle, were again brought together. 
 A line of battle was formed along the 
 plank road to the west of Chancellors- 
 ville, and extending down the old turn- 
 pike, to the east of that place. Rodes, 
 with his right on Chancellorsville, ex- 
 tended up the plank road. On his left 
 was Pender, with half of the division 
 of A. P. Hill. To the east of Chan- 
 cellorsville was Colston, with Ander- 
 
 son and McLaws in order, on his 
 right. 
 
 There was quiet on the battle field, 
 but everything indicated preparation 
 and readiness for a resumption of the 
 fight. While the armies were in this ex- 
 pectant condition, a fire broke out in the 
 forest, on the north side of the plank 
 road, where the battle had raged in the 
 morning. In consequence of the dry- 
 ness of the leaves and the brushwood, 
 it spread with great rapidity. The 
 wood was filled with the dead and 
 wounded of both armies ; the wounded 
 were most the objects of anxiety and 
 care; but it was found impossible to 
 remove them in time to save them from 
 the flames. The smoke arising from 
 the burning material had a strange, 
 offensive odor. It was a sad sight. It 
 revealed the demon of war in one of 
 his most horrid aspects. In spite of 
 all this, however, Lee, resolved to push 
 his advantage, was hurrying forward 
 his preparations for a fresh attack on 
 the National army behind its rear line 
 of works. His troops and artillery 
 were ordered into position, and recon- 
 noissances were made of the National 
 line. It was evidently Lee's intention 
 to strike at Hooker a deadly blow be- 
 fore Sedgwick could have time to come 
 up from Fredericksburg. If he could 
 drive Hooker from behind his new line 
 of fortifications, force him towards the 
 river, he might, in the confusion which 
 must result from any attempt at crossing, 
 succeed in capturing or destroying the 
 greater portion of the National army. 
 Success was not to attend him from such 
 calculations. His arrangements were 
 
472 
 
 CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 all but completed ; his arm was, so to 
 speak, uplifted and ready to strike, 
 when the blow was arrested, and his 
 piu'pose changed by a despatch, which 
 informed him of the capture of Marye's 
 Hill, and of the advance of Sedgwick. 
 
 Leaving the ai-my of Hooker and the 
 army of Lee in the positions Avhich we 
 have described, let us now turn our at- 
 tention to certain important movements 
 which have been made, or which are just 
 about to be made, in the immediate neigh- 
 boihood of Fredericksburg. In an ear- 
 lier part of this chapter, we have shown 
 how, and for what purpose, Sedgwick 
 was left behind at Falmouth, with his 
 own coi-ps— the Sixth — and also with the 
 First and Third. We have seen how, 
 after the demonstration successfully 
 made on the 29th of April, the Third 
 corps, imder Sickles, advanced by the 
 north bank of the river, crossed at 
 United States Ford, and joined Hooker 
 at ChancelloT'sville. We have seen how 
 the First corps, under Reynolds, follow- 
 ing the same path, joined the main army 
 on the night of the 2d of May. We 
 have also seen how, on the same night 
 after the fatal surprise by Jackson, 
 Sedgwick, who had already crossed the 
 Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, 
 was ordered to put his troops in motion 
 immediately, to occupy Fredericksburg, 
 by Gibbon's division, of Couch, which 
 had been left behind at Falmouth, to 
 seize the heights in the rear of the city, 
 to gain the plank road leading to Chan- 
 cellorsville, to move along that road 
 towards the main body of Hooker's 
 army, and to be at the place assigned 
 by daylight the following morning. It 
 
 remains to be seen how this order was 
 executed. 
 
 It was past eleven o'clock, on the 
 night of Saturday, the 2d, when the 
 order Avas received. The officers and 
 men had already gone to sleep; and it 
 was midnis'ht before the instructions 
 to advance were fully communicated. 
 Sedgwick was lying on the south bank 
 of the I'iver, about three miles below 
 Fredericksburg. Without delay, he 
 put his corps in motion by the flank, 
 proceeding towards the town. It was 
 a critical march. On the right was the 
 river, about a mile distant ; on the left 
 was the range of heights on which the 
 watch-fii'es of the enemy could be dis- 
 tinctly seen. The column was long, 
 and exposed along its whole flank 
 to the enemy on the heights. It 
 was moonlight; but a heavy fog had 
 settled over the low ground and the 
 river. Newton led the advance ; and 
 his instructions were that, in the event 
 of any attack being made, the regiments 
 attacked should face the hills and 
 charge without further instructions. 
 The head of the column had advanced 
 but a short distance, when it encoun- 
 tered the Confederate pickets. There 
 was some slow marching, and some little 
 delay was experienced ; but the Confede- 
 rates fell back. On the outskirts of the " 
 town, on the banks of a small creek, the 
 Confederate skirmishers were again 
 encountered; but they were driven 
 back without much diflaculty. The 
 column was now within a short distance 
 of Marye's Heights. At two o'clock, 
 General Warren arrived from Hooker's 
 headquarters, his object being to hasten 
 
ATTACK ON MARYE'S HILL. 
 
 473 
 
 forward the movement. It was near 
 dawn when the head of the column 
 entej'ed Fredericksburg. Here Sedg- 
 wick was joined by Gibbon, with his 
 division of the Second corps. 
 
 We have already mentioned what 
 provision Jackson made for the protec- 
 tion of Fredericksburg and the heights, 
 when he set out to meet Hooker at 
 Chancellorsville. He left behind him 
 Early's division of four brigades, with 
 Barksdale's brigade, of McLaws' divi- 
 sion. Barksdale was charged with the 
 protection of the heights immediately in 
 the rear of the town, including Marye's 
 Hill and the stone wall, made famous 
 by the Burnside campaign. His bri- 
 gade consisted of some 1400 men. It 
 was disposed as follows : seven compa- 
 nies of the Twenty-First Mississippi 
 were posted between the Marye House 
 and the plank road ; the three remaining 
 companies of the Twenty-First were 
 posted on the telegraph road, at the 
 foot of Marye's Hill; his other two 
 regiments were on the hills further to 
 the light. Batteries were set up at Lee's 
 Hill, and at the Harrison House ; while 
 four pieces of General Pendleton's 
 artillery were stationed at the Marye 
 House, two on the right and two on the 
 left. As soon as Early was made aware 
 of Sedgwick's movement, he sent Hays' 
 brigade to reinforce Barksdale. The 
 Confederates, it is manifest from the 
 small number of troops left at this point, 
 had perfect confidence in their ability 
 to hold the heights. 
 
 As soon as the opening dawn per- 
 mitted it, Sedgwick moved forward 
 (our regiments from the town in the 
 
 direction of the heights. As they ad- 
 vanced stealthily over the ground, so 
 sadly memorable, not a sound disturbed 
 the death-like stillness of that dull, dark 
 Sabbath morning. The stillness, how- 
 ever, is not to be of long duration. A 
 few paces moi-e, and the regiments will 
 have reached the fatal stone wall. Sud- 
 denly, and simultaneously, light flashes 
 from the summit of the hill and from 
 the rifle-pits at the base. The Con- 
 federates have opened upon them with 
 both artillery and musketry. The regi- 
 ments fall back under cover of the fog, 
 but not without considerable loss. This 
 attempt having failed, Sedgwick now 
 resolved to turn the Confederate posi- 
 tion. Howe was ordered to advance 
 on the left of Hazel Run, and to attack 
 the Confederate right, while Gibbon 
 was ordered to move up the river and 
 make a vigorous attack on the Confede- 
 rate left. Howe found his progress 
 barred by the strength of the works in 
 his front ; and the stream deterred him 
 from moving to the right and attacking 
 in flank the works at Marye's Hill. 
 Gibbon, who attempted to carry out 
 Sedgwick's instructions on the extreme 
 right, had no better success. Having 
 advanced by the river road, he found 
 the canal impassable ; and the vigorous 
 fire which was opened upon him from 
 Taylor's Hill, where Wilcox, who had 
 hurried up from Banks' Ford, had 
 planted two pieces of artillery, com- 
 pelled his men to seek shelter in t^'^ 
 cuts of the road. These experimentb 
 were so far unsuccessful ; and yet it 
 would be unjust to pronounce them 
 failures; for it is oftentimes only by 
 
474 
 
 CHANCE LLO IIS VILLE. 
 
 such experiments that a knowledge of 
 what it is right to do can be arrived at. 
 It was by such experiments that Gen- 
 eral Grant was, at last, to make himself 
 master of Vicksbtirg. Benefiting by the 
 experience thus acquired, and knowing 
 at least what could not be done, Sedg- 
 wick felt that he was left no alternative 
 but to make a powerful, concentrated 
 effort, and take the works by storm. 
 
 It was now near ten o'clock. Precious 
 time had unavoidably been lost. If 
 this work was to be done, it must be 
 done without further delay. Newton 
 was ordered to send forward two storm- 
 ing columns against Marye's Hill and 
 the adjoining works. Howe, who was 
 more to the left, was oi'dered to repeat 
 his attack up Hazel Run, on the second 
 line of heights. Newton's right-hand 
 column was composed of the Sixty-First 
 Pennsylvania, and Forty-Third New 
 York, supported by the Sixty-Seventh 
 New York and the Eighty-Second Penn- 
 sylvania, and was commanded by Colonel 
 Spear, of the Sixty-First Pennsylvania. 
 His left was composed of the Seventh 
 Massachusetts, and Thirty-Ninth New 
 York, and was commanded by Colonel 
 Johns, of the Seventh Massachusetts. 
 Th«8« columns moved up the plank 
 road, and to the right. Colonel Bum- 
 ham, with four regiments, at the same 
 time moved to the left of the plank 
 road, and directly against the rifle-pits 
 at the base of Marye's Hill. The Na- 
 tional columns meet with but Kttle re- 
 sistance, until they are within three 
 hundred yards of the Confederate works. 
 At this point, the guns on the hill pour 
 from their murderous throats a tre- 
 
 mendous shower of canister. Nothing 
 dismayed, the columns push on, until 
 within close musket range. Here the 
 Confederate infantry, rising from behind 
 the stone wall, open uj^on them, a ter- 
 rific fire. The Nationals reel and stag 
 ger, and threaten to break. Quickly i 
 rallied, they rush again to the attack. ' 
 The stoiTQ of lead abates not. The 
 volleys are swifter and more sure. 
 Nothing, however, can damp the cour- 
 age, check the enthusiasm, or arrest the 
 progress of these heroic men. Right, 
 left and centre, each emulous of the 
 other, nerved by the same purpose, and 
 inspired by the same hope, press eagerly 
 forward. Spear falls ; but Shaler is at 
 hand. The right is rallied ; and the 
 attack is resumed. Johns is wounded ; 
 but Colonel Walsh, of the Thirty-Ninth 
 New York, takes the brave fellows in 
 charge ; and the left, in the rivalry and 
 onward rush, resumes and maintains its 
 proud position. The supporting column 
 vies with the other two ; and Burnham, 
 of the Sixth Maine, performs deeds of 
 daring, which command at once admij 
 ation and envy. It is a race for a prize ; 
 and the prize is on the summit of the 
 hill. The stone wall has been cleared ; 
 the rifle-pits have been seized and 
 silenced; but the artillery ou the hill 
 still thundei's and belches forth its mur- 
 derous shell and canister. Ploughed 
 through and through, and torn to pieces, 
 their comrades falling in dozens by their 
 side, these gallant fellows rush fearlessly 
 on. There is a lull in the thunderstorm 
 of artillery. There is a loud-resound- 
 ing cheer. It is the shout of victory. 
 The race is run; the task is accom 
 
MAKYE'S HILLi CAPTURED. 
 
 475 
 
 plished; and the Union flag waves 
 proudly on tlie crest of Marye's Hill. 
 
 While Newton has been carrying 
 the National standard to victory in the 
 centre, success not dissimilar has been 
 attending Howe on the left. When 
 pressing forward on the left of Hazel 
 Run, he was vigorously confronted by 
 the Confederate skirmishers, who were 
 intrenched in rifle-pits behind the em- 
 bankment of the Richmond, Fredericks- 
 bars: and Potomac Railroad. Lee's 
 Hill and the adjacent heights, which 
 constituted Howe's objective point, 
 were occupied by the Confederate ar- 
 tillery, and by their main line of infan- 
 try. Howe advanced with two col- 
 umns — six regiments composing that 
 on the right, three that on the left. 
 There was a third column, which moved 
 still further to the left, and which was 
 instructed to strike the Confederate 
 position in the rear, and then co-operate 
 with the others when they should have 
 carried the woi'ks in front. Three reg- 
 iments of the principal column to the 
 right, getting separated from the others, 
 crossed the Run, and took part in the 
 attack on Marye's Hill. The remain- 
 der pushed forward, and soon obtained 
 a firm footing on Lee's Hill. Here, for 
 a time, the struggle was vigorously 
 maintained. After the capture of 
 Marye's Hill, Lee's Hill and the ad- 
 joining heights were no longer tenable. 
 The Confederates, therefore, abandoned 
 the works, and fell back by the tele- 
 graph road. In addition to the actual 
 gain of the position, five guns and a 
 considerable number of prisoners re- 
 warded this brilliant feat of arms. 
 
 Early hurried up from Hamilton's 
 Ci'ossing, and the pursuit of the retreat- 
 ino: Confederates was discontinued ; but 
 the entire range of hills in the rear, 
 and to the south oi Fredericksburg, 
 was in Sedgwick's possession. 
 
 It was as yet only eleven o'clock. 
 In this brief struggle, there had been a 
 fearful loss of life. In the space of 
 ten minutes, when the conflict raged 
 most fiercely at the base of Marye's 
 Hill, nearly 1000 men were killed or 
 wounded. The Confederates suffered as 
 severely, as they bravely fought. The 
 rifle-pits were full of dead and dying 
 men, who fell, many of them, in a hand- 
 to-hand struggle. In addition to the 
 loss of the rank and file, the Nationals 
 lost some of their ablest officers, 
 among whom was the gallant Colonel 
 Spear, and Majors Bassett, Faxon and 
 Haycock. But the saci'ifice had not 
 been made in vain. The heights had 
 been carried ; the Confederate forces 
 were divided ; and the plank road 
 which led direct to Chancellorsville 
 was open. Sedgwick was now free to 
 advance to the assistance of Hooker. 
 He did not know that the latter had 
 ali-eady been driven behind his last line 
 of intrenchments. 
 
 It was this alarming state of things 
 which was reported to Lee when, elated 
 with success, he was about to strike a 
 final blow at Chancellorsville. Lee 
 found himself in a most critical situa- 
 tion. There were several courses open 
 to him ; but every one of them was be 
 set with difiiculty. He might carry out 
 his original purpose, and fall on Hooker 
 with all his might, cripple or destroy 
 
476 
 
 CHANOELliOESVILLB. 
 
 him, and then give his attention to 
 Sedgwick ; but in that case, he would 
 expose himself to the risk of being at- 
 ^ tacked by Sedgwick in flank and rear. 
 [ He might fall back towards Fredericks- 
 ; burg, meet and demolish Sedgwick, and 
 [ being relieved from all danger in this 
 direction, face about and press matters 
 to a final issue with Hooker; but in 
 that case, he would be exposing him- 
 self to a similar and even greater risk ; 
 for Hooker might sally forth from his 
 intrenchments and fall with crushing 
 effect on his rear. He might remain in 
 his present position, defer his meditated 
 attack on Hooker, detach a suflicient 
 number to check or destroy Sedgwick, 
 leaving events themselves to determine 
 in which direction the first crushing 
 blow should be dealt ; but in that case, 
 he would run the risk of being com- 
 pelled to fight two battles at once, if in- 
 deed, he was not caught as in a vice, 
 between two powerful armies. The 
 last course, perilous as it was, was the 
 one he adopted. It was a course justi- 
 fied by the highest principles of the 
 military art, and sanctioned by some of 
 the greatest examples of the past. 
 Never over-bold, Lee had an advantage 
 over most of the generals, either in the 
 Confederate or National armies, in cool- 
 ness of head and clearness of vision. 
 He had, also, great steadiness of pur- 
 pose. In some of these qualities he was 
 approached by McClellan ; but the un- 
 questionably great talents of that gen- 
 eral were ruined by his excess of caution. 
 In all that made Lee a great general, 
 he was equalled only by Grant ; but 
 Grant surpassed him in self-reliance, in 
 
 strength of will, in deep intensity of 
 purpose, and in a certain bull-dog tena- 
 city of grip. In the present instance, as 
 the result proved, Lee's judgment stood 
 him in good stead. He had wisely 
 measured Hooker. He believed that 
 with a reasonable show of force, he 
 could keep him behind his intrench- 
 ments. Without delay, therefore, he 
 detached McLaws, with his own three 
 brigades — those of WofFord, Semmes 
 and Kershaw — together with Mahone's 
 brigade, of Anderson's division, with 
 instructions to advance towards Fred- 
 ericksburg, to co-operate with Wilcox 
 and Barksdale, and the other troops 
 under Early, with a view to the inter- 
 ception or destruction of Sedgwick. 
 
 After the capture of the heights, 
 Sedgwick pursued the retreating Con- 
 federates about two miles along the tele- 
 graph road; but at that point. Early, 
 who had come up from Hamilton's 
 Crossing, halted the commands of Barks- 
 dale and Hays, and reinforced them 
 with three regiments of Gordon's bri- 
 gade. Sedgwick had no motive in 
 pushing along the telegraph road. His 
 destination was Chancellorsville. He, 
 therefore, discontinued the pursuit, and 
 turned towards the plank road. He 
 had advanced but a little way when he 
 found the Confederates in some strength 
 on the ridge, which stretches along 
 the road from Guest's to Stansbury. 
 It was Wilcox's brigade. W^ilcox, it 
 will be remembered, was at Taylor's 
 Hill, when the attempt was made by 
 Gibbon to cross the canal and turn the 
 Confederate left. Hays was at Stans- 
 bury's Hill. When the combined attack 
 
THE TOLLGATB. 
 
 477 
 
 was made on Marye's Hill and to the 
 left, they had been ordered to come up, 
 but they had not had time ; and so 
 rapid was the advance of Sedgwick, 
 that they found themselves — Wilcox 
 with his whole brigade, and Haya 
 with a portion of his — cut off from 
 the main body of the Confederates, and 
 left on the north side of the plank road. 
 Hays, by retreating parallel to the 
 road, succeeded in getting round the 
 head of the National advance, and re- 
 joining Early. Wilcox remained be- 
 hind ; and, yielding to the instincts of 
 a true soldier, as well as resolved to 
 make the best use possible of the means 
 at his disposal, drew up his brigade in 
 line on the ridge above referred to, and 
 placed in position foiu* pieces of artil- 
 lery. Sedgwick was now advancing 
 slowly, and with great caution. Wil- 
 cox, for a time, offered a spirited resist- 
 ance, and greatly annoyed the National 
 advance. The Nationals coming up in 
 greater force, Wilcox, fearing lest he 
 should be surrounded, fell back to the 
 river road, about half a mile in rear of 
 Taylor's House. Sedgwick was still ad- 
 vancing with slow and cautious steps. 
 Taking courage from the leisurely move- 
 ment of the National troops, and deter- 
 mined to retai'd their progress as much 
 as possible, Wilcox again pushed for- 
 ward his brigade, with the artilleiy, 
 this time taking position in the neigh- 
 borhood of Salem Church, some five 
 miles distant from Fredericksburg. The 
 heights in the vicinity of the church, 
 extending on both sides of the road, 
 and about two hundred and fifty yards 
 to the east, were thickly wooded. Be- 
 
 yond the wood, and on slightly lower 
 ground, there were cleared fields spread- 
 ing out on both sides of the road, and 
 reaching as far as and beyond the toll- 
 gate, which was distant from the church 
 about one thousand yards. Advancing 
 his troops to the toll-gate, and placing 
 two rifled pieces on the road, Wilcox 
 awaited the approach of Sedgwick. He 
 had not long to wait ; for Collins and 
 the cavalry skirmishers came up almost 
 immediately. The artillery on both 
 sides opened fire at once. Meanwhile, 
 McLaws, who had come up with his 
 three brigades, was taking position on 
 the high ground in the rear of Wilcox, 
 and to the right and left. Aa soon as 
 McLaws came up, he ordered Wilcox 
 to fall back on Salem Church. 
 
 It was now four o'clock. The Con- 
 federates were well posted. The ground 
 was high, and, as we have seen, well 
 wooded. McLaws had drawn up his 
 line of battle perpendicular to the road. 
 Mahone was on his extreme left, then 
 Semmes, then Wilcox — who, having 
 fallen back, crossed the road, having 
 three regiments on the right or south 
 of it, and two on the left — and then 
 Kershaw. Wofford came up later, and 
 took position on Kershaw's right. The 
 artillery was so disposed as to command 
 the road, and to cover both flanks. On 
 the road, in the front of his centre, 
 Wilcox had four guns. Troops were 
 posted in the church, and also in the 
 school-house, some sixty yards in ad- 
 vance. Scarcely had these arrange- 
 ments been completed, when the Na- 
 tionals came up in force. Sedgwick 
 threw forward Brooks' division, which 
 
 »Ba 
 
476 
 
 CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 had moved up the road and on both 
 sides of it. Brooks was followed by 
 Newton, in support. Bartlett's brigade 
 was on the National left, and the First 
 New Jersey on the right. Getting his 
 guns into position at the toll-gate, 
 Sedgwick opened a terrific fire, shell- 
 ing the woods to the right and to the 
 left. The Confederate artillery for 
 some minutes replied with great spirit. 
 Gradually, however, the fire slackens; 
 and the skirmishers fall back, first to the 
 wood and then to their line of battle. 
 The Nationals, having passed on to the 
 edge of the road, uttered a loud and 
 triumphant cheer, and then rushed for- 
 ward to the charge. When within 
 about eighty yards of the opposing 
 line, the Confederates, who had re- 
 served their fire, opened upon them a 
 tremendous volley. The efFect was 
 dreadful. The National line wavered, 
 but it was only for a moment. Bartlett 
 dashed forward ; and, in a second, the 
 school-house was surrounded, and the 
 garrison captured. A few minutes more, 
 and he has fallen with crushing weight 
 on the line in the rear, and nearly de- 
 molished a whole regiment. The Con- 
 federates waver and bi-eak, yielding the 
 ground to the advancing and triumph- 
 ant Natioaals. The crest has been won. 
 At this point, however, the tide of vic- 
 tory turned. Wilcox had still in re- 
 serve the Ninth Alabama regiment. 
 At this supreme moment, when all 
 seemed lost, he hurled this regiment 
 upon the advancing Nationals. Firing 
 at close quarters, the Alabamians 
 charged with great fury. The shock 
 was irresistible. The Nationals yield- 
 
 ed, and fell back in terror. In vain did 
 Bartlett strive to hold the advantage 
 he had won. At this point the strug- 
 gle was most fierce. Sedgwick hurried 
 forward his second line ; but it was to 
 little purpose. The fury of the Con- 
 federate onset, the weight of the pres- 
 sure, was irresistible. Step by step the 
 Nationals were driven back — back be- 
 hind the school-house, which was recap- 
 tured and reoccupied by the Confed- 
 erates — back through the open fields, in 
 which it was found impossible to make 
 a fresh stand — back to the toll-gate, 
 where the retreating columns wei-e 
 sheltered, and the enemy's advance Avas 
 checked by the well-directed fire of 
 Tompkins' batteries. It was now night ; 
 and neither the one side nor the other 
 seemed anxious to prolong the contest. 
 Sedgwick had not been defeated ; but 
 he had met with a bloody repulse. 
 
 Sunday, the 3d of May, in spite of 
 the ray of promise revealed on the 
 heights of Fredericksburg, was a day 
 of disaster to the National cause. All 
 the plans of the morning had been 
 frustrated. Lee, in place of being 
 crushed between the two wings of the 
 National army, had whipped first the 
 one and then the other ; and while 
 Hooker, with his splendid army, was 
 shut up, prisoner-like, behind his own 
 intrenchments, Sedgwick was being 
 effectually hindered from coming to his 
 relief. 
 
 On Monday, the 4th, the opposing ar- 
 mies found themselves in a pecu- May 
 liar plight. The final upshot of *• 
 the campaign was revealing itself more 
 and more clearly. But it could not be 
 
SALEM CHUECH. 
 
 479 
 
 eaid that on either side the danger was 
 past; nor could it be predicted with 
 confidence which should win the vic- 
 tory. Lee, so far, had been successful 
 in wooing or forcing the favors of for- 
 Imne. But his hands were full. Hooker \ 
 was evincing no signs of a disposition 
 to resume the offensive, and was, to all 
 appearance, contented to remain inac- 
 tive behind his lines at Chancellors- 
 ville; but he had under him a mighty 
 army, whole divisions of which had 
 taken no part in the contest. Sedg- 
 wick had been checked ; but his num- 
 bers were considerably greater than 
 those by which he was opposed ; and 
 any attempt made by Lee to strengthen 
 his right wing would necessarily weaken 
 his left, already too weak to resist a 
 vigorous sortie, if Hooker should make 
 up his mind to rush from behind his 
 iutrenchments, Lee, however, was not 
 slow to decide. His final success seemed 
 to him to depend on his first crushing 
 Sedgwick, or driving him across the 
 Rappahannock, and then falling back 
 with his whole weight and dealing a 
 decisive blow on Hooker. Early was, 
 therefoi'e, ordered up from below Fred- 
 ericksburg, with instructions to retake 
 the heights in the rear of the town, 
 and to press on against Sedgwick's 
 right. At the same time, leaving three 
 of Jaclison's divisions to hold Hooker 
 ill check, Lee pushed forward the 
 three remaining brigades of Anderson 
 in the direction of Salem Church. Thus 
 stiengthened, the Confederate force 
 in front of Sedgwick amounted to 
 23,000 men. The rival forces in 
 this direction were now about equal. 
 
 Anderson was to take position on 
 McLaAvs' right, with the view of forming 
 a connection with Early. Lee went for- 
 ward in person to direct operations. 
 
 On Monday morning, Sedgwick found 
 himself confronted by McLaws, and 
 threatened in the rear by Early. The 
 latter had experienced little difficulty 
 in recapturing the heights. Sedgwick, 
 although not j'et aware of the approach 
 of Anderson and Lee in person, tele- 
 graphed to General Hooker that lai-ge 
 masses of the enemy were moving from 
 his right to his left, and asking whether 
 the main army could support him. The 
 answer was that no support must be 
 expected. Sedgwick, cut off from Fred- 
 ericksburg by the advance of Early, 
 formed his line so as to cover Banks' 
 Ford and the pontoon bridge near 
 that point. Howe was upon his left; 
 Brooks was upon the right of Howe, 
 and at right angles to him on the plank 
 road ; and Newton Avas on the right of 
 the line, perpendicular to the road, 
 much as he had been the previous 
 evening. It was noon before Anderson 
 arrived at Salem Church, Preparations 
 for the attack were not completed until 
 about six o'clock, although there had 
 been skinnishing, both on the National 
 right and left, from an early hour. 
 Sedgwick, perceiving that he was about 
 to be attacked both in front and rear, 
 had notified Hooker that his position 
 was untenable, and that the bridges 
 might be sacrificed, and had received 
 for answer that he must not cross the 
 river "unless compelled to do so." At 
 the appointed time — it was close upon 
 six o'clock — the signal was gi^en, 
 
480 
 
 CHANCELLOKSVILLE. 
 
 and tte Confederates moved to the at 
 tack alonsj the whole line. It was 
 made with great impetuosity. The Na- 
 tionals resisted with great stubborn- 
 ness ; but they were compelled to fall 
 back towards the river, Sedgwick still 
 holding possession of Banks' Ford. 
 The fighting was severe, both armies 
 suffering terribly. Darkness ensued; 
 and the nature of the country was such 
 that the Confederates were prevented 
 from following up their advantage, 
 tinder cover of the night, having re- 
 ceived permission to withdraw, Sedg- 
 wick recrossed the river at Banks' Ford 
 with his whole force.* The last bri- 
 gade had crossed before day-break. In 
 the three engagements — the storming 
 of the heights, the battle of Sunday, 
 and the battle of Monday — Sedgwick 
 had lost 5000 men. 
 
 It was, no doubt, a great misfortune 
 
 • At one o'clock, A. M., on the 5th, in reply to a des- 
 patch sent to Hooker at 11.45 on the night of the 4th, 
 General Butterfield wrote to Sedgwick to "withdraw 
 under cover. " The movement to recross was at once 
 commenced, and by five o'clock on the following morn- 
 ing, the troops were all on the other side, and the 
 bridges taken np. When the last brigade was crossing, 
 an order was received from Hooker countermanding 
 the withdrawal. This latter order was based on a 
 despatch of Sedgwick, sent in the afternoon, stating 
 that he could hold a position south of the Bappahan- 
 nock — a despatch which reached Hooker subsequent to 
 the one which called forth the permission to withdraw. 
 We subjoin the last order and the reply. 
 
 "■May 5, 1863—1.20 A. M. 
 " Genebax Sedgwick : 
 
 "Yours received one A. M., saying that you should 
 hold position. Order to withdraw countermanded. 
 Acknowledge both. 
 
 "Joseph Hooeeb, 
 "Major-General Commanding." 
 To this Sedgwick replied, at 5 A. M. : 
 " The bridges at Banks' Ford are swung, and in pro- 
 cess of being taken up. The troops are much exhaust- 
 ed. The despatch contermanding my movement over 
 the Tiver was received after the troops had crossed." 
 
 that Sedgwick did not succeed in formr 
 ing a junction with Hooker. That he 
 did his best to accomplish this object, 
 no impartial mind, in view of all the 
 facts, can i-efuse to admit. It is greatly 
 to be regretted that General Hooker, in 
 his testimony before the Committee of 
 Congress on the conduct of the war, 
 should have so far forgotten himself as 
 attribute his defeat at Chaucellorsville 
 to the failure of Sedgwick to join him 
 on Sunday morning. The I'eader of 
 these pages, unless we greatly mistake, 
 must have come to another and very 
 different conclusion ; and we do not 
 see how the cruel and most unjust charge 
 of Hooker can ever be endorsed by the 
 impartial historian. "In my judgment," 
 says Hooker, " General Sedgwick did 
 not obey the spirit of my order, and 
 made no sufficient effort to obey it. 
 His movement was delayed so long that 
 the enemy discovered his intentions; 
 and when that was done, he was neces- 
 sarily delayed in the further execution 
 of the order." It is unnecessary to re- 
 peat what we have already said, believ- 
 ing, as we do, that our narrative is suf- 
 ficient disproof of these assertions. We 
 agree with Swinton — whose observa- 
 tions, at the close of his account of the 
 battle of Chancellorsville, reveal the 
 keen sense of the military critic, and 
 whose arguments are unanswerable — in 
 pronouncing this statement of Hooker 
 to be " a cruel charge to l)ring against 
 a commander, now beyond the reach 
 of detraction ; whose brilliant exploit 
 in carrying the Fredeiicksburg Heights, 
 and his subsequent fortitude in a try- 
 ing situation, shine out as the one r« 
 
EETEEAT ACROSS THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 
 
 481 
 
 Ueving brightness, amid the gloom of 
 that hapless battle." 
 
 It was felt by both parties that the 
 struggle and defeat of Sedgwick on 
 Monday had decided the contest. Some 
 of the National generals were willing, 
 and even anxious, to make another ef- 
 fort. All fight, however, seemed to 
 have passed out of Hooker ; and he re- 
 solved to retire his troops to the north 
 bank of the river. Preparations for 
 May this movement were begun on the 
 5' morning of Tuesday, May 5th. 
 The engineers were ordered to prepare 
 a new line near the river, so as to cover 
 the crossing. The roads and bridges 
 were, in consequence, repaired ; and an 
 interior line of works was constructed 
 from Scott's Dam to the mouth of 
 Hunting Run, on the Rapidan, a dis- 
 tance of three miles. Lee, eager to 
 push the advantage he had gained, and 
 impatient to deal a deadly blow before 
 his antagonist should have time to es- 
 cape, left Early's division and Barks- 
 dale's brigade to guard the river from 
 Banks' Ford to Fredericksburg and the 
 crossings below, and ordered Anderson 
 and McLaws to hurry back to Chancel- 
 lorsville. Early in the afternoon, a vio- 
 lent rain-storm broke out. It continued 
 during the remainder of the day, 
 deluging the spongy soil, swelling the 
 streams to ovei-flow, and covering, the 
 low flats with water. It was late, 
 in consequence, when the Confederate 
 troops had reached their destination at 
 Ohancellorsville. As the storm con- 
 tinued to rage, nothing could be done 
 till the following morning. The ele- 
 ments on this occasion, while they de- 
 
 layed the Confederates, and made an 
 attack impossible on the National posi' 
 tion, were scarcely less unkind to the 
 Nationals. The river was rising rapid- 
 ly, and the bridges were in peril. The 
 National generals were divided as to 
 the course which should be pursued. 
 Some of them were in favor of an ad- 
 vance. Others deemed it more prudent 
 to withdraw. The attempt was made. 
 Straw and branches were laid on the 
 bridges, to deaden the noise of the 
 trains, which were sent over first. The 
 trains having been safely transported, 
 the troops followed in order; and so, 
 during a night in which nature seemed 
 strangely in sympathy with the situa- 
 tion, fretting and fuming^ and as if 
 scowling upon defeat, the great army 
 of the Potomac, which was to put the 
 enemy to inglorious flight, found itself, 
 after a feeble campaign of six days, in-^ 
 gloriously transported to the northern 
 banks of the Rappahannock, In the 
 morning, when Lee advanced to attack, 
 he found that his enemy was gone. 
 
 The losses in the battle of Chancel, 
 lorsville were heavy. The Confederate 
 loss, according to General Lee, amount- 
 ed to 13,000, of whom 1581 were killed, 
 8700 wounded, and nearly 3000 prison- 
 ers. Hooker's loss was 1 7, 1 9 7, of whom 
 5000 were unwounded prisoners. He 
 had lost, also, 14 pieces of artillery and 
 20,000 stand of arms. 
 
 It will be remembered that it was 
 Hooker's intention that the cavalry 
 force of his army should play an im- 
 portant pai-t in this campaign. We 
 mentioned in the eailier portion of this 
 chapter that the entire cavalry force of 
 
482 
 
 OHANOELLORSVILLE. 
 
 the army of the Potomac had been or- 
 ganized in four divisions, making one 
 distinct and separate corps, under the 
 command of General Stoneman. His 
 four division officers were Pleasonton, 
 Buford, Averill and Gregg. The corps 
 numbered from 10,000 to 13,000 sabres. 
 Neither at Chancellorsville nor at Fred- 
 ericksburg nor at Salem have we seen 
 much of this branch of Hooker's army. 
 Some account of the operations of 
 this corps is necessary, to complete 
 the story of the Chancellorsville cam- 
 paign. 
 
 As early as the 12th of April, Stone- 
 man went forth on his expedition, the 
 principal object of which was to de- 
 stroy the railroads, bridges and other 
 means of communication in Lee's rear, 
 and so cut him ofp from Richmond. 
 fle rode up the Rappahannock, and 
 attempted to effect a crossing. On the 
 14th, he had succeeded in throwing 
 over one division ; but a violent storm 
 coming on, and the low grounds becom- 
 ing flooded, the division was recalled, 
 the horses taking to the water, and 
 bravely swimming to the opposite bank. 
 As the weather did not improve, and 
 the upper Rappahannock was still 
 flooded, Stoneman remained inactive 
 until the general advance movement of 
 the whole army was commenced on 
 the 27th. On the 28th, he crossed the 
 Rappahannock at Kelley's Ford, at the 
 same time with the main body. On 
 the following day, he crossed at Mor- 
 ton's Ford and at Racoon Ford. In 
 the meantime, by order of General 
 Hooker, Stoneman had divided his 
 troops into two columns. One coliunn, 
 
 which consisted of about 4000 men, 
 under General Averill, was ordered to 
 move on the Orange and Alexandria 
 Railroad, the main body, under Stone- 
 man in person, being charged with the 
 destruction of the Richmond and Fred- 
 ericksburg Railroad. Averill encoun- 
 tered a cavalry force, under W. H. F. 
 Lee, on the 1st of May, near Rapidan 
 Station. Lee, after burning the bridge 
 over the river, retired to Gordonsville. 
 Averill moved to the north along the 
 railroad as far as Culpepper, dispersing 
 some Confederate troops who were 
 there assembled, and destroying a large 
 quantity of the enemy's stores. On the 
 2d, he was recalled, and ordered to 
 join Hooker at Chancellorsville. At 
 10.30 that night he reached Ely's Ford. 
 Later the same night, he was sur- 
 prised by the Confederate cavalry ; and 
 it is more than probable that he would 
 have suffered severely, had it not been 
 that the fall of Jackson and the acci- 
 dent which befell Hill almost imme- 
 diately afterwards, compelled Stuart to 
 return with all haste, and take com- 
 mand of the Confederate troops near 
 Chancelloi'sville. Finding it difficult, 
 or, as he thought, impossible, from the 
 character of the country, to opei-ate 
 cavalry on the Confederate left, he re- 
 mained inactive in camp, taking no 
 part in the engagements of Sunday, 
 the 3d of May. Hooker, on account 
 of this, displaced him, and turned over 
 his command to Genei-al Pleasonton. 
 
 It was the 3d of May before Stone- 
 man reached Louisa Court House, and 
 before the important line of communi- 
 cation by the Richmond aud Fred- 
 
CAVALEY MOVEMENTS. 
 
 488 
 
 ericksburg Railroad was struck. The 
 troops were divided into six bodies, 
 and, having received special instruc- 
 tions, were sent out in all directions. 
 Colonel Wyndham, with his party, 
 proceeded to Columbia, on the James 
 River. Here the river is crossed by 
 the Lynchburg and Richmond Canal. 
 An attempt was made to destroy the 
 aqueduct. It was not successful; but 
 the canal was greatly damaged, and 
 much pxiblic property destroyed. Pitz- 
 Lee, hearing of what was being done in 
 that direction, made a rush towards 
 Columbia. Wyndham retired down the 
 river, and then, changing his course, re- 
 joined Stoneman at Thompson's Cross- 
 Roads at ten o'clock the same night. 
 Colcaiel Kilpatrick, who was ordered 
 to move in the direction of the Chicka- 
 hominy, having travelled all day and 
 all night Sunday, reached Hungary 
 Station, on the Fredericksburg Rail- 
 road, at daylight on Monday. At this 
 point, he destroyed the depots and tore 
 up the railroads. Crossing to Brook 
 Turnpike, he advanced to within two 
 miles of Richmond. He then moved 
 to Meadow Bridge, where the Central 
 Railroad crosses the Chickahominy. 
 Having destroyed this bridge, and an 
 engine which he intercepted, he crossed 
 the Pamunkey at Harristown, to avoid 
 pursuit. On the 7th, after having 
 crossed the Mattapony, and having 
 raided through Essex and the neighbor- 
 ing counties, he reached Gloucester 
 Point, having encountered by the way 
 but little opposition. Colonel Davis, 
 who was sent down the South Anna, 
 struck the Fredericksburg Railroad at 
 
 Ashland on Sunday evening. He first 
 captured an ambulance, filled with the 
 wounded from Chancellorsville. Hav- 
 ing destroyed the engines and torn up 
 a portion of the railroad, he pushed on 
 towards Hanover Court House, on the 
 Central Railroad. Here he burned the 
 depot and tore up the rails. At Tun- 
 stall's, near the White House, he en- 
 countered a small body of infantry, 
 with some artillery, and fell back upon 
 Gloucester Point, reaching it without 
 much further difficulty. Colonel Gregg 
 destroyed the bridge across the South 
 Anna, on the road from Columbia to 
 Spottsylvania ; thence he moved east, 
 and destroyed the road to Beaver Dam 
 Station. On Tuesday, the 5th, the 
 whole command, except Davis and Kil- 
 patrick, was concentrated at Yancey- 
 ville, on the South Anna; and, on the 
 evening of that day, the retrogade 
 movement commenced. On the 8th, 
 the whole force recrossed Kelley's Ford, 
 on the Rappahannock. 
 
 This raid must be pronounced a fail- 
 ure. No doubt it did much damage to 
 Confederate property ; and it must have 
 struck terror into the hearts of the 
 peaceful inhabitants. But it failed of 
 its object. It did not seriously inter- 
 fere with General Lee's operations. It 
 did not affect his commissariat to any 
 appreciable extent. It did not cut him 
 off for any length of time from his 
 communications with Richmond ; for in 
 three or four days the railroad was re- 
 paired and in excellent running order, 
 and navigation on the canal was resumed. 
 This was all that was accomplished by 
 that splendid army of mounted troops- 
 
484 
 
 CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 in appearance one of the most magnifi- 
 cent bodies of cavalry that ever went 
 forth to battle. Employed as they 
 were, they contributed nothing towards 
 the possible success of the campaign; 
 they won no glory, for they found no 
 foe; and, when General Hooker most 
 needed them, they were not available. 
 
 On "Wednesday, the 6th of May, the 
 army of the Potomac — with the excep- 
 JHay tion of the cavalry, which, as we 
 *• have seen, did not cross the river 
 till two days later — resumed its old 
 quarters at Falmouth. On that day — 
 and with a bad taste which was only 
 in keeping with his blundering con- 
 duct since the moment he first felt the 
 enemy, in the advance towards the open 
 ground in the rear of the heights at 
 Fredericksburg — Hooker issued the fol- 
 lowing address to his army : 
 
 " Headqcabte83 Army ok the Potomac, ) 
 May 6, 1863. j" 
 
 " The major-general commanding ten- 
 ders to this army his congratulations 
 on its achievements of the last seven 
 days, [f it has not accomplished all 
 that was expected, the reasons are well 
 known to the army. It is suflicient to 
 say, they were of a character not to be 
 foreseen or prevented by human sagacity 
 or resource. 
 
 "In withdrawing from the south 
 bank of the Rappahannock, before de- 
 livering a general battle to our adver- 
 saries, the army has given renewed 
 evidence of its confidence in itself, and 
 its fidelity to the principles it repre- 
 sents. On fighting at a disadvantage, 
 we would have been recreant to our 
 trust, to ourselves, our cause, and our 
 
 country. Profoiindly loyal, and con- 
 scious of its strength, the army of the 
 Potomac will give or decline battle 
 whenever its interest or honor may de- 
 mand. It will also be the guai-dian of 
 its own history and its own arm. By 
 your celerity and secrecy of movement, 
 our advance and passage of the rivers 
 was undisputed; and, on our with- 
 drawal, not a rebel ventured to follow. 
 
 "The events of last week may swell 
 with pride the heart of every officer 
 and soldier of this army. We have 
 added new lustre to its formei' renown. 
 We have made long marches, crossed 
 rivers, surprised the enemy in his en- 
 trenchments, and, wherever we have 
 fought, have inflicted heavier blows 
 than we have received. We have taken 
 from the enemy 5000 prisoners; 15 
 colors; captured and brought off 7 
 pieces of artillery ; placed hors de com- 
 bat 18,000 of his chosen troops, de- 
 stroyed his depots, filled with vast 
 amounts of stores; deranged his com- 
 munications ; captured prisoners within 
 the fortifications of his capital, and 
 filled his country with fear and con- 
 sternation. We have no other regret 
 than that caused by the loss of our 
 brave companions, and in this we are 
 consoled by the conviction that they 
 have fallen in the holiest cause ever 
 submitted to the arbitrament of battle. 
 " By command of 
 
 "Major-General Hooker. 
 
 " S. Williams, 
 
 "Assistant Adjutant-General." 
 
 General Lee, who had certainly more 
 reason to use boastful language, is- 
 sued an address to his soldiers on the 
 
LEE'S ADDRESS TO HIS ARMY. 
 
 485 
 
 7tli ; but he writes with a dignity and 
 modesty becoming the occasion. 
 
 ' Hbadquarters Army op Northern Virginia 
 May 7, 1863. 
 
 1 
 
 " With heartfelt gratification, the 
 general commanding expresses to the 
 army his sense of the heroic conduct 
 displayed by officers and men, during 
 the arduous operations in which they 
 have just been engaged. 
 
 " Under trying vicissitudes of heat 
 and storm, you attacked the enemy, 
 strongly entrenched in the depths of a 
 tangled wilderness, and again on the 
 hills of Fredericksburg, fifteen miles 
 distant, and, by the valor that has 
 triumphed on so many fields, forced 
 him once more to seek safety beyond 
 the Rappahannock. While this glori- 
 ous victory entitles you to the praise 
 and gratitude of the nation, we are es- 
 pecially called upon to return our grate- 
 ful thanks to the only Giver of vic- 
 tory, for the signal deliverance He has 
 wrought. It is, therefore, earnestly 
 recommended that the troops unite, 
 on Sunday next, in ascribing to the 
 Lord of Hosts the glory due His name. 
 Let us not forget, in our rejoicings, 
 the brave soldiers who have fallen in 
 defense of their country; and, while 
 we mourn their loss, let us resolve to 
 emulate their noble example. The 
 army and the country alike lament the 
 absence, for a time, of one to whose 
 bravery, energy and skill they are so 
 much indebted for success. 
 
 " The following letter from the pres- 
 ident of the Confederate States, is 
 communicated to the army as an ex- 
 
 pression of his appreciation of its 
 success : 
 
 * I have received your despatch, and rever- 
 ently unite with you in giving praise to God 
 for the success with which He has crowned 
 our arms. 
 
 ' Irj the name of the people, I offer my cor- 
 dial thanks to yourself, and the troops under 
 your command, for this addition to the unpre- 
 cedented series of great victories which yom 
 army has achieved. 
 
 'The universal rejoicing produced by this 
 happy result will be mingled with a general 
 regret for the good and the brave who are 
 numbered among the killed and wounded.' 
 
 "R. E. Lee, General." 
 
 On the 8th, the following des- 
 patch was sent by the secretary of 
 war to the governors of the Northern 
 
 States : 
 
 "Washington, May 8, 1863. 
 
 "The president and general-in-chief 
 have just returned from the army of 
 the Potomac, The principal opera- 
 tions of General Hooker failed, but 
 there has been no serious disaster to 
 the organization and efficiency of the 
 army. It is now occupying its former 
 position on the Rappahannock, having 
 recrossed the river without any loss in 
 the movement. Not more than one 
 third of General Hooker's force was en- 
 gaged. General Stoneman's operations 
 have been a brilliant success. Part of 
 his force advanced to within two miles 
 of Richmond, and the enemy's communi- 
 cations have been cut in eveiy direction. 
 The army of the Potomac will speedily 
 resume offensive operations. 
 "E. M. Stanton, 
 
 "Secretary of War.'* 
 
 JM4 
 
t86 
 
 OHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 On the same day, President Lincoln 
 issued the famous proclamation, an- 
 nouncing his intention to enforce the 
 law of enrolment and draft, which had 
 been passed by Congress at its previous 
 session. All able-bodied male citizens, 
 and persons of foreign birth, who, al- 
 though not yet citizens, had declared 
 their intention to become such, were 
 proclaimed to constitute the National 
 forces, and to be liable to perform mili- 
 tary duty in the service of the United 
 States, when called out by the presi- 
 dent for that purpose. It was evident 
 that, if the Confederates had acquired 
 fresh courage and fresh hope from 
 this Ktest triumph, the government at 
 WashiiXgton had become more resolved 
 
 Oekzbal Geoboe Hibam Bebet. — This brave and 
 talented oiEcer was killed, as has been mentioned in the 
 text, during the second day's fighting at Chancellorsville. 
 It was hia division, formerly Hooker's own, which, on 
 the first day, saved the National army from destruction. 
 The situation was already desperate when Hooker or- 
 dered forward this choice division. ' ' Go in, general, " 
 said Hooker; "throw yonr men into the breach; don't 
 fire a shot — they can't see you — but charge home with the 
 bayonet. " Never was a charge more nobly made or more 
 gallantly snstained. For three hours, almost alone, this 
 division resisted, and even repelled, the fierce onslaughts 
 of the already triumphant enemy. On the ground 
 which he had won, Berry resumed the battle early the 
 following morning. Determined to drive the Confed- 
 erates back, he thrust his brigades forward, making 
 (everal successful charges. In one of these, while at 
 the head of his men, and cheering them on, he was in- 
 Itantly killed. Berry was a native of Bockland, Maine, 
 Vhere he was bom on the 27th of August, 1824. Bred 
 ~ >'iwpant«r, h* nibaeqiMntly davoted Hmolf to aavi- 
 
 than ever to put down the rebellion 
 and to restore the Union. The spirit 
 which prevailed at Washington was 
 the same spirit which, except among 
 certain classes who had never been in 
 favor of the war, pervaded and ani- 
 mated the whole people. 
 
 Such, then, is the story of the great 
 but, to the National forces, disastrous 
 battle of Chancellorsville — a battle in 
 which, as has been well said, " the 
 rank and file had been foiled without 
 being fought, and caused to retreat 
 without the consciousness of having 
 been beaten." After the battle, Gen- 
 eral Hooker's reputation suffered an 
 eclipse from which it has not yet 
 fuPv recovered. 
 
 gation. Later, he cultivated a taste for military affaitB, 
 and was the originator of the Rockland Guard — a vol- 
 unteer company which, before the war, had attained a 
 high state of efficiency. He was several times elected 
 to the State legislature by hia fellow-townsmen, and 
 was once mayor of Eockland. 'WTien the war broke 
 out, he entered the volunteer service as colonel of tha 
 Fourth Maine regiment. He fought at Bull Run. He 
 was raised to the rank of brigadier-general in April, 
 1SG2. He was in the peninsula with McClellan, and, 
 as commander of the Third brigade of the Third divi- 
 sion, of Heintzelman's corps, took part in most of the 
 engagements. He followed the fortunes of Pope in 
 ■Virginia, and those of Bumside at Fredericksburg. 
 At the latter battle, he greatly distinguished himself. 
 In March, 1803, his nomination as major-general ol 
 volunteers was confirmed by the Senate ; and he was 
 placed in command of the Second division of the Third 
 army corps, then under Sickles. In this capacity he 
 fought at Chancellorsville. Berry was greatly ]ament«(i 
 by the armjr and by the nation at larca. 
 
GETTYSBURa 
 
 48*< 
 
 CHAPTER XXVII. 
 
 Dftrk Days. — After Chancellorsville. — The Army of Lee and the Sontheru People. — High Hopes. — The Inya- 
 gion Mania. — Hooker Watchful. — Lee's Army in Motion. — Longstreet at Culpepper. — A. P. Hill at Fred- 
 ericksburg. — Hooker and Sedgwick Deceived. — Pleasonton Kecounoitres. — The Discovery. — Both Armies 
 Moving North. — Hooker Protects Washington. — At Fairfax and Manassas. — The Confederates at Winches- 
 ter. — Milroy Abandons the Place. — A Blunder. —BerryviUe and Martinsburg. — Harper's Ferry. — The Valley 
 Cleared of National Troops. — Hooker's Mistake. — Too Much Advice. — Excitement in the North. — Maryland 
 and Pennsylvania Aroused. — Confederate Raids.— Chambersburg Open to the Invader. — Hooker No Longe 
 Doubtful. — Crosses the Potomac at Harper's Ferry. — At Frederick. — Hooker Removed. — Meade in Com- 
 mand. — Sketch of Meade. — Modest, but Firm. ^His Request. — Lee Moving on Harrisburg. — Stuart's De- 
 tour. — Lee's Ignorance of the Whereabouts of the National Army. — The Cumberland Valley. — Lee's Dis- 
 covery. — His Change of Purpose. — Moving Towards Gettysburg. —Meade's Purpose. — Gettysburg. — Its 
 Position and Surroundings. — Buford at Gettysburg. — The Battle Begun.— Arrival of Reynolds. — The Iron 
 Brigade. — Reynolds Killed. — Doubleday in Command. — Arrival of Howard. — Cemetery Ridge Occupied. — 
 The Tide Turns. — EweU on the Field.— The Stonewall Brigade. — Howard's Mistake. — The Nationals Driven 
 Back. — Terrific Fighting. — ^ Arrival of Hancock. — Buford, the Good Angel of Gettysburg. — The Nationals 
 Again in Position. — The Confederate Skirmishers Recalled. — End of the Fir.st Day's Fighting. —Meade 
 Coming up from Taneytown. — The Whole Army Moving towards Gettysburg. — Arrivals of the Different 
 Corps. — Disposition of the Troops. — The Confederate Prospect. — The Relative Strength of the Two 
 Annies. — Lee's Original Intention. — Necessity. — One Opportunity Lost. — The Morning of the 2d of July. — 
 A Peaceful Scene. — Lee's Order of Battle. — Waiting for the Attack. — Sickles' Mistaken Position. — The 
 Round Tops. — Longstreet's Fierce Attack on the National Left. — Severe Fighting. — Hood's Texans. — Gen- 
 eral Warren on Hand. — Terrible Slaughter. — Little Round Top Secured. — Birney's Left. — The Salient. — 
 Peach Orchard. — Terrible Pressure. — The Orchard Captured. — Birney's New Position. — Birney's Brigades. — 
 Caldwell's Division. — The Battle Boils and Bubbles. — The Nationals Again Driven Back. — The Confederate 
 Advance Checked. — Crawford's Splendid Charge. ^Humphrey's Peculiar Position. — His Successful Retreat. — 
 Hancock to the Rescue. — The National Position in Danger. — Slaughtered Heaps. — The Ridge Secured. — 
 The National Right Weakened. — The Confederate Attack on the Left a Failure. — Ewell's Attack on the 
 National Right. — The Bravery of Greene. — Cemetery Hill.^The Ravine. — Benner's Hill. — A Tremendous 
 Onset. — A Terrible Reception. — Culp's Hill — Johnston's Attack. — Seizure of the Vacant Breast- Works. — 
 The Darkness. — The Breast- Works Held. — End of the Second Day's Fight.^Heavy Losses on Both Sides. — 
 Lee Not Dissatisfied. — Meade Still Confident. — The Troops Restored to the National Right. — Ewell's At- 
 tack Resumed. — General Geary on Hand. — A Terrible Morning's Fighting. — The Confederates Driven 
 Back. — The Position on the National Right Secured. — A Lull in the Fight. — Arrival of the Cavalry. — Lee 
 Preparing for Another and Final Attack. — A Terrific Cannonade. — The Advancing Columns. —Mowed Down 
 by the National Artillery. — Pickett's Brave Virginians. — Stannard's Brave Vermonters. — Caught on Flank. — 
 In Front of Hancock. — A Terrific Musketry Fire. — Pettigrew's Lines Broken and Routed. ^Pickett's Men 
 Stand Firm. — A Tremendous Charge. — The National Line Penetrated. — Doubleday 's Men to the Rescue. — 
 The Lines Re-formed. — The Confederates Repulsed. — Havoc and Victory. — Wilcox's Vain Attempt. — Cav- 
 alry Charges on the Left and Right. — Driven Back at all Points. — The Battle Ended Lincoln's An- 
 nouncement of the Victory. — Lee's Disappointment. — Imboden and Lee. — "We Must Return to Virginia."— 
 Burying the Dead. — The Retreat. — The Pursuit. — Williamaport.— Crossing the Potomac. — On to the R»pi- 
 dan. — ^End of the Campaign. — Reflections. 
 
 The months of May and June, 1863, 
 will be remembered as a period 
 of great darkness in the histoi-y 
 of the Civil War. The year, so far. 
 
 IMS. 
 
 had been marked by n(i great National 
 triumph. On- the contrary, reverse had 
 followed reverse in rapid and alarming 
 succession, until it seemed as if the laat 
 
(88 
 
 GETTYSBURG. 
 
 ray of hope were about to be extin- 
 guished, and until the hearts of many 
 brave men were failing them for fear. 
 Galveston, which had been restored to 
 the Union at the close of 1862, was 
 again in the hands of the Confederates ; 
 Beauregard, at Charleston Harbor, was 
 successfully resisting all the skill and 
 energy of Dupont ; Rosecranz, who had 
 accomplished nothing since the famous 
 encounter at Murfreesboro, was effec- 
 tually held in check by Bragg at Chat- 
 tanooga; Banks was vainly courting 
 victory on the lower Mississippi ; Vicks- 
 burg had not yet yielded to the stub- 
 born pertinacity of General Grant ; and 
 in two great battles — at Fredericksburg 
 and at Chancellorsville — the army of 
 the Potomac had sustained inglorious 
 defeat. It was of all things most 
 natural that, in such circumstances, 
 there should be soiTow in the North, 
 and contrasted joy and hope in the 
 South. 
 
 The state of things which existed 
 after the battle of Chancellorsville was 
 not unlike that which supervened upon 
 the defeat of Pope, in August of the 
 previous yeai'. Now, as then, it seemed 
 as if fortune were smiling on the South, 
 and as if a favorable opportunity had 
 arisen for abandoning the defensive, 
 and stiiking a final and decisive blow. 
 The Confederate troops were in excel- 
 lent spirits ; and General Lee was not 
 to be blamed if he shared their feelings. 
 In two great buttles, although con- 
 fronted by superior numbers, they had 
 come off victorious, and inflicted terri- 
 ble punishment on the National forces. 
 If victory was so easily won on their 
 
 own territory, might not similar success 
 attend them on the territory of theii 
 enemy ? They had twice over repelled 
 an invading army, which was supposed 
 to be invincible : were they not justi- 
 fied in playing the part of invaders in 
 turn ? The morale of Lee's army could 
 never again be higher. If, therefore, 
 a bold and vigorous effort were not 
 made now, the opportunity might be 
 lost forever. It was well known to 
 General Lee, and to the authorities at 
 Richmond, that Hooker's army had 
 been largely reduced, because of the 
 extensive out-mustering of short-term 
 troops. Lee's army, on the other hand, 
 had gained in strength. Longstreet 
 had come up from the south of the 
 James, where he had been operating at 
 the time of the battle of Chancellors- 
 ville ; and a rigidly enforced conscrip- 
 tion had brought up the total of the array 
 to over 70,000 men. The resources of 
 arbitrary power had been exhausted to 
 clothe, equip and otherwise put the 
 army in a condition to undertake what 
 some were sanguine enough to hope 
 might prove a successful and final cam- 
 paign. The army of Northern Virginia 
 had never before been so well provided 
 with all the essentials of war. It was, in 
 the words of Longstreet, " in condition to 
 undertake anything." If there was de- 
 ficiency anywhere, it was in the commis- 
 sariat; but this was the less an inconven- 
 ience that, in the rich gi'anaries of Penn- 
 sylvania, which awaited their approach, 
 there was enough and to spare. In ad- 
 dition to these various reasons, which 
 prompted the Southern leaders to im- 
 mediate and vigorous action, there was 
 
THE ARMIES IN MOTION. 
 
 489 
 
 unquestionably this other : there was 
 the inspiring hope that a successful 
 campaign in the free States of the 
 North would take fiom foieign govern- 
 ments their last excuse for refusing 
 to recognize the independence of the 
 Confederation. By the end of May, 
 Lee's army, leorgauized into three sepa- 
 rate army corps, commanded respective- 
 ly by Longstreet, Hill and Ewell, was 
 ready to launch forth on what seemed a 
 promising but in reality, as the result 
 proved, an ill-starred expedition. 
 
 The two armies, since the battle of 
 Chaucellorsville — the one paralyzed, and 
 unable to strike, the other in seeming 
 idleness, and apparently without plan 
 or purpose — lay encamped on the op- 
 posite sides of the Rappahannock. 
 Hooker was at Falmouth, his left ex- 
 tending several miles down the river. 
 Lee, on the south and west of the river, 
 occupied that line of impregnable earth- 
 works which, from one extreme to the 
 other, dotted the country for thirty 
 miles. On neither side had any de- 
 monstration been made. Behind this 
 mask of idleness, there was real ac- 
 tivity in the Confederate ranks. Lee 
 was busy perfecting his arrangements 
 for his projected movement toward the 
 North. Hooker was ignorant of the 
 plans of his antagonist; but he was 
 watchful and not unprepared to act, as 
 icon as the movements of the enemy 
 should reveal his purpose. 
 
 It was now the 3d of June. On that 
 June ^^J) Lee began to move his troops, 
 3« McLaws' and Hood's divisions, 
 of Longstreet's corps, being pushed for- 
 ward in the direction of Culpepper 
 
 Court House. On the 4th and 5th, 
 Ewell's corps was marched in the name 
 direction. In order to disguise his 
 movement, and to keep the National 
 commander off his guard, Lee left the 
 corps of A. 1/. Hill to occupy the lines 
 of Fredericksburg. It was not possible, 
 however, that so gigantic a movement, 
 as that which Lee contemplated, could 
 be conducted for any length of time in 
 secrecy. Discovering signs of more 
 than ordinary activity in the camp of 
 the enemy, and suspecting its cause. 
 Hooker sent instructions to Sedg- jnne 
 ■vvick, on the 6th, to throw a por- 6i 
 tiou of his troops aci'oss the Rappahan- 
 nock at Franklin's Crossing, and make 
 a close reconnoissance of the enemy's 
 position. The reconnoissance was made 
 accordingly. Hill held his position 
 with such tenacity, and made such a 
 display of strength, that Sedgwick and 
 Hooker were, for the time, deceived. 
 It was the con' ction of both that, 
 whatever might be Lee's immediate 
 purpose, the Confederate forces had 
 not, as yet, in any veiy large numbers, 
 been removed from their old encamp- 
 ments. It soon became manifest, how- 
 ever, that Lee was bent on a movement 
 to the North. On Tuesday, the jnne 
 9th, General Pleasonton, taking 9. 
 with him two divisions of cavalry, 
 under Buford and Gregg, with two 
 picked brigades of infantry, under Rus- 
 pel and Ames, crossed the Rappahan- 
 nock at Kelley's and Beverley's Fords, 
 his intention being to move by converg- 
 ing roads on Culpepper. It was Known 
 that Stuart was already at Culpepper ; 
 and it was Hooker's expectation thalj 
 
«90 
 
 GETTYSBtJRa. 
 
 by sending his whole cavalry corps for- 
 ward, he might succeed in breaking up 
 Stuart's camp. Stuart, meanwhile, had 
 moved on from Culpepper to Brandy 
 Station, his object being to form the 
 advance, and to cover the flank of the 
 main movement. Having crossed at 
 Beverley's Ford, Buford came imme- 
 diately into contact with a Confederate 
 brigade, under General Jones. This 
 brigade he drove back for a couple of 
 miles, when he found himself checked 
 by the brigades of W. H. F. Lee and 
 Wade Hampton, who had come to the 
 support of their companion in arms. 
 At this point, some severe fighting en- 
 sued. Meanwhile, Gregg had crossed 
 at Kelley's Ford ; and, having pushed 
 on toward Brandy Station, he was 
 about to fall with effect on Stuart's 
 rear. Stuart was compelled to draw 
 ofif from Buford's fiont, so as to face 
 this new foe. Getting into position, 
 Stuart fell with tremendous force upon 
 Gregg. A spirited contest at once took 
 place for the possession of the heights. 
 For a time, the battle raged with great 
 fierceness. It was one of the very few 
 genuine cavalry engagements during 
 the whole war, and possessed additional 
 interest from the fact that it was be- 
 tween the entire mounted force of both 
 armies. Gregg carried the heights; 
 but finding that the other column was 
 dot able to come up and form a junction 
 with him, he fell back toward his right 
 and rear, and united with Buford. 
 Pleasonton then retired his whole com- 
 mand across the Rappahannock, but 
 not until he had discovered, through 
 captured correspondence, that Lee was 
 
 present in foi'ce at Culpepper, and thai 
 the object of the Confederate leaders 
 was the invasion of the North. In this 
 engagement, the loss on each side was 
 about 600. Among the wounded on 
 the Confederate side was W. H. F. Lee. 
 There was now no longer any doubt 
 as to the intention of the enemy. His 
 object was invasion. It was still un- 
 certain, however, whether Lee meant 
 to move on Washington or to push his 
 way into Maryland and Pennsylvania. 
 It was known that the Confederates 
 felt sore because of the raids of Grier- 
 son in Mississippi, and of Davis and 
 Kilpatrick in Virginia ; and threats had 
 been made against both the States 
 above named. At the same time, 
 Washington would be a rich prize to 
 the Confederates; and it was not im- 
 probable that an attempt would be made 
 to capture the National capital. Hook- 
 er's first move was to throw his army 
 along the line of the Rappahannock, 
 his right being advanced so as to cover 
 the fords of that river. While Hooker 
 was thus occupied, Lee had actually 
 turned his right, and thrown the head 
 of a column into the Shenandoah Val- 
 ley. Hill was left in his old position 
 at Fredericksburg ; Longstreet remained 
 lit Culpepper; while Ewell, on the 
 10th, was pushed forward to the west 
 and north. Striking the Blue Ridge, 
 he moved along the eastern side of that 
 range until he reached Chester's Gap. 
 Passing through the gap, he crosse(i 
 the Shenandoah at Front Royal. Burst- 
 ing into the valley, he advanced by 
 forced marches toward Winchester, at 
 which piHce he arrived on the evening 
 
MILROY'S DISASTROUS RETREAT 
 
 491 
 
 June of the 13th, having accomplished 
 *3' the distance from Culpepper, 
 some seventy miles, in three days. 
 
 While Ewell was making this rush 
 towards "Winchester, Hooker was still 
 guart'irg the fords of the Rappahan- 
 noct. It was not until the 13th that 
 he y~fl,s made aware of the march which 
 his mtagonist had stolen upon him. 
 The intelligence fell upon him like a 
 thui derbolt. Abandoning his camp 
 on the Rappahannock, he fell back to- 
 wards Washington, taking positions 
 wh'ch would enable him, if necessary, 
 to defend the capital, while at the 
 san^e time he could watch the develop- 
 ment of Lee's plan of operations. On 
 the 15th and 16th, he had fallen back 
 as far as Fairfax and Manassas. Here, 
 for some days, he remained. As soon 
 as Hill, who had been left behind at 
 Fredericksburg, observed the disappear- 
 ance of the Union army, he marched 
 towards Culpepper, where Longstreet 
 still held position. Jenkins, with his 
 cavalry brigade, was ordered forward 
 to Winchester to co-operate with Ewell. 
 Imboden, M^th his troops, was sent out 
 in the direction of Roraney, his instruc- 
 tions being to cover Winchester, and 
 to prevent reinforcements amving by 
 the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. 
 Ewell had detached Rodes' division to 
 Berryville, with the view of cutting 
 off communications between Winches- 
 ter and the Potomac. General Milroy, 
 then in command at Winchester, had 
 under him a force of 7000 men, with 
 three pieces of field-artillery, and six 
 siege pieces in a fort. Milroy held out 
 against the vigorous and persistent at- 
 
 tacks of the rapidly increasing forces of 
 the enemy during the 13th and June 
 14th, repelling some of the as-*^»*4. 
 saults with great spirit ; but, on the 
 niglit of the 14th, discovering that the 
 whole corps of Ewell and of Long 
 street were at hand, he attempted to 
 retreat. It was too late. He was al- 
 most surrounded. Only a small por- 
 tion of his troops managed to effect 
 their escape, some finding their way tc 
 Harper's Ferry, and some to Pennsyl- 
 vania. His losses were 4000 taken 
 prisoners, 29 guns, 277 wagons and 400 
 horses. General Milroy was severely 
 taken to task by some for his conduct 
 at Winchester: he was vindicated by 
 others. President Lincoln, pronouncing 
 on the evidence laid before him by the 
 judge -advocate -general, declared that 
 neither Milroy nor Schenck, his imme- 
 diate superior, and between whom the 
 blame must be divided, were seriously 
 to blame, and that a court-martial was 
 not necessary in the case. The mistake 
 was in not abandoning the place at an 
 earlier day. It is doubtful Avhether 
 Milroy could have held out until succor 
 reached him ; but certainly defeat and 
 surrender could not have been more 
 disastrous than was the retreat. 
 
 Berryville and Martinsburg, at the 
 same time, yielded to the attacks of 
 General Rodes; and the garrison at 
 Harper's Ferry withdrew to Maryland 
 Heights. The valley was thus cleared 
 of National troops. 
 
 Judged from a high military stand- 
 point, General Hooker's line of action, 
 after he was made aware of the surprise 
 at Winchester, is open to severe criti- 
 
402 
 
 GETTYSBURG. 
 
 cism. It was clearly the duty required 
 by the situation to interpose between 
 Hill at Fredericksburg and Longstreet 
 at Culpepper. A blow vigorously dealt 
 ought to have resulted in the capture 
 or destruction of Hill. Even if neither 
 of these results followed, the presump- 
 tion is that such a movement would 
 have brought Lee back to the assistance 
 of his lieutenant, and so made an end 
 of the invasion. It is only just to 
 Hooker to say that, if we are to judge 
 from the correspondence which took 
 place between him and Halleck and 
 President Lincoln, a short time before 
 Lee began his Northern movement, the 
 course which Hooker did adopt was 
 opposed to his own better judgment. 
 The course which we have indicated as 
 the right course to follow in the circum- 
 stances was the course which he actual- 
 ly suggested, in the event of Lee moving 
 as he did. It was condemned by Hal- 
 leck, and, in the most emphatic and 
 characteristic manner, discouraged by 
 Lincoln. " If Lee," said the president, 
 " should leave a rear force at Freder- 
 icksburg, tempting you to fall upon it, 
 he would fight you in entrenchments, 
 and have you at disadvantage ; and so, 
 man for man, worst you at that point, 
 while his main force would, in some 
 way, be getting an advantage of you 
 northward. In a word, I would not 
 take any risk of being entangled upon 
 the river, like an ox jumped half over a 
 fence^ and liable to l)e torn by dogs front 
 and rear^ without a fair chance to gore 
 one way or to kick the others * 
 
 * Despatch from Freaidaut Liaooln to General 
 Hooker, June 5th. 
 
 The disaster at Winchester, and th» 
 appearance of Confederate troops on 
 their borders, created the wildest excite- 
 ment in Maryland and Pennsylvania, 
 The excitement was shared, in fact, by 
 the whole of the Northern States. Ap- 
 peals to the people were published by 
 the governors of Maryland and Pennsyl- 
 vania ; and, on the 15th of June, june 
 a proclamation was issued by the *5. 
 president, calling for 120,000 militia. 
 Pennsylvania was to furnish 50,000 ; 
 Ohio, 30,000 ; Maryland, 10,000 ; West 
 Virginia, 10,000 ; New York, 20,000. 
 These calls were promptly and heartily 
 responded to. Meanwhile, lively scenes 
 were being witnessed in the larger 
 towns, threatened by the invading 
 troops. Of some of those scenes stir- 
 ring descriptions have been preserved. 
 The 16th, in Harrisburg, is thus jnne 
 described by an eye-witness : '*• 
 " The morning broke," he tells us, " up- 
 on a populace all astir, who had been 
 called out of bed l>y the ' beat of the 
 alarming drum,' the blast of the bugle, 
 and the clanging of bells. The streets 
 were lively with men, who were either 
 returning from a night's work on the 
 fortifications, or going over to relieve 
 those who were toiling there. As the 
 sun rose higher, the excitement gath- 
 ered head. All along the streets were 
 omnibuses, wagons and wheelbarrows 
 taking in trunks and valuables, and 
 rushing them down to the depot, to be 
 shipped out of rebel range. The stores, 
 the female seminaries and almost every 
 private residence were busy all of the 
 forenoon in swelling the mountain of 
 freight that lay at the depot. Every 
 
THREATENED INVASION. 
 
 493 
 
 horse was impressed into service, and 
 every porter groaned beneath his 
 weight of responsibilities. The scene 
 at noon at the depots was indescrib- 
 able, if not disgraceful. A sweltering 
 mass of humanity thronged the plat- 
 form, all furious to escape from the 
 doomed city. At the bridge, and across 
 the river, the scene was equally excit- 
 ing. All through the day a steady 
 stream of people, on foot and in wagons, 
 young and old, black and white, was 
 pouring across it from the Cumberland 
 Valley, bearing along with it house- 
 hold gods and all manner of goods and 
 stock. Endless trains, laden with floui', 
 grain and merchandise, hourly emerged 
 from the valley, and thundered across 
 the bridge and through the city. Miles 
 of retreating baggage wagons, filled 
 with calves and sheep tied together, 
 and great, old-fashioned furnace wagons, 
 loaded with tons of trunks and boxes, 
 defiled in continuous procession down 
 the pike and across the river, raising a 
 dust that marked the outline of the 
 road as far as the eye could see." 
 
 Pittsburg, on the 19 th, presented a 
 Jane scene of great activity. " Work 
 19. on the city defenses is still pro- 
 gressing vigorously, and some of the 
 more important works are now ready 
 to receive the guns. The number of 
 men employed on the fortifications yes- 
 terday was 4605. The works are on 
 Herron's Hill, on Harrison's Hill, on 
 Mount Washington, on Squirrel Hill, 
 and on Negley's Hill. Theie are up- 
 ward of 5000 men in the trenches to- 
 day; and, with such a large working 
 force, it cannot take many days to finish 
 
 the works now in hand. General Ber- 
 nard,with a competent staff of engineers, 
 was engaged in laying out new worka 
 yesterday on the outer side of the Alle- 
 ghany, so as to render the city secure 
 against an advance x'rom that direction. 
 Works have also been laid out near Tur- 
 tle Creek and other impoi'tant points." 
 
 In Baltimore, similar preparations 
 were made for the approach of the inva- 
 ders. " The work of erecting barricadeg 
 progressed rapidly on Friday and Satur- 
 day, and, on Sunday morning, the entire 
 circle of the city was completed, and 
 ready for military occupation at any 
 moment that the scouts should an- 
 nounce the approach of the enemy. 
 The erection of lines of entrenchments 
 and fortifications on all the approaches 
 to the city have also progressed rapidly. 
 On Saturday, about 1000 colored men 
 were gathered by the police from dif- 
 ferent sections of the city, causing much 
 excitement among that portion of our 
 population, as they were marched out 
 to the different locations for the defen- 
 sive works. At night another force was 
 secured, to relieve those who had been 
 at work throughout the day, and an- 
 other relief gang was provided on Sun- 
 day morning and evening, so that rapid 
 progress has been made, and the works 
 are now ready for immediate use." 
 
 While Hooker remained at Fairfax 
 and Manassas, there were occasional 
 cavalry skirmishes in the neighbor- 
 hood of Ashby Gap. In some of these* 
 the fighting was severe ; in all of them 
 the National troops distinguished them- 
 selves for dash and daring, not '>nly 
 holding their own, but driving the 
 
 XJU 
 
494 
 
 GETTYSBURG. 
 
 enemy before them. These encounters, 
 however, exercised no perceptible influ- 
 ence ou the campaign. Lee was not hin- 
 dered from posting himself in strength 
 in the Shenandoah Valley, where he 
 was ready to meet Hooker, if he should 
 deem it prudent to attack him, and 
 where also he could send foraging par- 
 ties into Maryland and Pennsylvania. 
 Jenkins' troopers had already pene- 
 trated as far as Chambersburg, and 
 ravaged the country for miles around, 
 frightening the peaceful inhabitants, 
 and carrying off much booty, particu- 
 larly in cattle and horses. On the 
 Jane 22d, Hill and Longstreet having 
 
 22. come up and relieved him in the 
 valley, Ewell, at the head of the in- 
 vading columns, passed into Maryland, 
 Imboden moving to the west, and 
 breaking up the lines of communication 
 by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad 
 and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. 
 The whole region of Western Pennsyl- 
 vania, up to the Susquehanna, was 
 now open to the invaders. On the 
 24th and the 25th, Longstreet and 
 Hill followed Ewell. The objective 
 point of the Confederates was Cham- 
 Jnne bersburg. On the 26th, the entire 
 
 26« Confederate army had crossed at 
 Williamsport and Shepherdstown. On 
 the same day, Hooker, no longer in 
 doubt as to Lee's plan, led his army 
 across the Potomac at Edward's Ferry, 
 and moved towards Frederick. This, 
 as we shall see, was a wise and politic 
 movement on the part of the National 
 commander. It led to the happiest 
 results, although Hooker himself was 
 not to reap the glory. 
 
 At this conjuncture there occurred an 
 unlooked-for circumstance, which jnne 
 might have had a most disastrous* 27. 
 effect on the campaign and on the 
 prospects of the North. On the 27tK, 
 when Hooker had marched upon Fred 
 erick, and when it became manifest 
 that a great battle was imminent, the 
 public were astounded by the intelli- 
 gence that General Hooker had resigned 
 the command of the army of the Poto- 
 mac, and that the important and some- 
 what perilous trust had been committed 
 to General Meade. What was it that 
 brought about this sudden, unexpected, 
 and, to all appearance, untimely change ? 
 The story can be briefly told. At the 
 time Lee began his movement north- 
 ward, the National forces in the east 
 were divided into several separate and 
 independent commands. General Heint- 
 zelman commanded the department of 
 Washington, with a force of 36,000 
 men ; General Schcnck had charge of 
 the middle department, including the 
 garrisons at Harper's Ferry, Winches- 
 ter, and other contiguous places; and 
 General Dix, with a considerable force, 
 lay idle on the peninsula. Hooker, 
 who had expressed a strong desire that 
 the troops of Heintzelman and Schenck 
 should be placed under his control, had 
 at length so far overcome the scruples 
 of Commander-in-Chief Halleck, that he 
 obtained a reluctant consent. Hooker 
 had sent General Slocum to Harper's 
 Ferry, with the understanding that he 
 should be joined by the 10,000 or 
 11,000 troops stationed there under 
 French, and that the united force 
 should make a demonstration on Lee'e 
 
RESIGNATION OF HOOKER. 
 
 49» 
 
 rear by a movement up the Cumberland 
 Valley. Such an arrangement implied 
 the evacuation of Harper's Ferry, but 
 to this Halleck would not consent. It 
 was in vain that Hooker reasoned, 
 showing that the place was compara- 
 tively of no importance, that it com- 
 manded no ford of the Potomac, that 
 the removal of the troops would not 
 affect the fortifications, that it was 
 without public stores, and that there 
 was only a very small likelihood that 
 the enemy would think of taking pos- 
 session. He was met by the reply, 
 "Maryland Heights have always been 
 regarded as an important point to be 
 held by us, and much expense and 
 labor incurred in fortifying them. I 
 cannot approve their abandonment, ex- 
 cept in case of absolute necessity." 
 Hooker requested to be relieved from 
 the command of the army. His request 
 was at once complied with. Hooker 
 has been severely blamed for deserting 
 his post at this critical juncture. It 
 was a perilous experiment to change 
 the commander-in-the-field, on the eve 
 of what, it was evident, must prove 
 a great and decisive battle. It does 
 seem, on the surface, as if Hooker al- 
 lowed personal considerations to tri- 
 umph over what he ought to have 
 regarded as the welfare of the nation. 
 But, undoubtedly, Hooker had other 
 reasons for the course he took than 
 that which he openly assigned. His 
 relations with the government had not 
 been cordial from the first. His claims, 
 after the removal of McClellan, had 
 been passed over in favor of Burnside ; 
 and when, after the battle of Fred- 
 
 ericksburg, it was found impossible 
 longer to ignore him, the command of 
 the army of the Potomac was grudg- 
 ingly given him. He had scarcely en- 
 tered upon his duties, when the presi- 
 dent wrote him, informing him of 
 strange charges which were rumored 
 against him, such as ambition to play 
 the role of dictator, reminding him 
 that the most effective method of se- 
 curing the gratification of desires so 
 ambitious was to overthrow the insur- 
 gents, and make an end of the rebel- 
 lion, and assuring him that, if he allowed 
 disaster to befall the army of the Po- 
 tomac, he would never be at the head 
 of the American or any other govern- 
 ment. Hooker's relations with the 
 government were not improved by his 
 failure at Chancellorsville. On the 
 14th of May, Lincoln wrote him: "I 
 must tell you that I have some fearful 
 intimations that some of your corps 
 and division commanders are not giving 
 you their entii'e confidence. This would 
 be ruinous, if true." These things being 
 known, it is not much to be wondered at 
 either that, in the circumstances. Hooker 
 should have resigned, or that his resig- 
 nation should have been so promptly 
 accepted. On the morning of the jnne 
 28th of June, an order arrived from 28t 
 Washington, transferring the command 
 of the army to Major-General Meade, of 
 the Fifth army corps. On the same day 
 appeared the two following orders : 
 
 " Headquarters Army of thp Potomac, ) 
 Frederick, Md., June 28, 18G3. ) 
 
 "In conformity with the orders of 
 the War Depaitment, dated June 27th, 
 1863, I relinquish the command of the 
 
496 
 
 GETTYSBURG. 
 
 army of the Potomac. It is transferred 
 to Major-General George G. Meade, a 
 brave and accomplished officer, who 
 has nobly earned the confidence and 
 esteem of the army on many a well- 
 fought field. Impressed with the be- 
 lief that my usefulness as the com- 
 mander of the army of the Potomac is 
 impaired, I part from it, yet not ■with- 
 out the deepest emotion. The sorrow 
 of parting with the comrades of so 
 many battles is relieved by the convic- 
 tion that the courage and devotion of 
 this army will never cease nor fail ; 
 that it will yield to my successor, as 
 it has to me, a willing and hearty 
 support. With the earnest prayer 
 that the ti'iumph of its arms may 
 bring successes w^orthy of it and the 
 nation, I bid it farewell. 
 
 " Joseph Hooker, 
 
 "Major-General." 
 
 " Headquarters Army op the Potomac, ) 
 June 28. 1863. j 
 
 "By direction of the president of 
 the United States, I hereby assume 
 command of the army of the Potomac. 
 As a soldier, in obeying this order — an 
 order totally unexpected and unsolicit- 
 ed — I have no promises or pledges to 
 make. The country looks to this army 
 to relieve it from the devastation and 
 disgrace of a hostile invasion. What- 
 ever fatigues and sacrifices we may be 
 called upon to undergo, let us have in 
 view constantly the magnitude of the 
 interests involved, and let each man de- 
 termine to do his duty, leaving to an 
 all-controlling Providence the decision 
 of the contest. It is with just diffidence 
 that I relieve, in the command of this 
 
 army, an eminent and accomplished 
 soldier, whose name must ever appear 
 conspicuous in the history of its achieve- 
 ments ; but I rely upon the hearty sup 
 port of my companions in arms to assist 
 me in the discharge of the duties of the 
 important trust which has been confided 
 to me. Geoeoe G. Meade, 
 
 " Major-General Commanding." 
 
 The change produced some surprise 
 in the army; but the appointment of 
 General Meade was generally well 
 received. The report of the change 
 soon extended to the several corps, 
 and their commanders hastened to bid 
 farewell to General Hooker. By three 
 o'clock, a large number of officers had 
 assembled, and, soon after, the gen- 
 eral appeared in the avenue before his 
 tent. Some time was spent in social 
 intercourse, and, to the last, all formali- 
 ties were dispensed with. The parting 
 was painful to every one, particularly to 
 those who had become endeared to the 
 general by old associations. General 
 Hooker was deeply grieved. He had 
 been identified with the army of the 
 Potomac, he said, since its organization, 
 and had hoped to continue with it to 
 the end. It was the best army of the 
 country, worthy of the confidence of 
 the nation, and could not fail of success 
 in the apj^roaching struggle. He spoke 
 of his successor as a glorious soldier, 
 and urged all to give him their earnest 
 support. 
 
 Major-General George G. Meade, to 
 whom the destinies of the army of the 
 Potomac were now entrusted, was born 
 in Spain, in 1815, his parents residing, 
 at the time of his birth, in Barcelona 
 
GENERAL MEADE IN COMMAND. 
 
 497 
 
 He graduated at "West Point, June 30th, 
 1835, and entered the regular army of 
 the United States as second lieutenant 
 of artillery. In 1836 he resigned his 
 commission, and lived in retirement for 
 six years. On the 19th of May, 1842, 
 he resumed his connection with the 
 army, and took part in the Mexican 
 War, winning special distinction in the 
 battles of Palo Alto and Monterey. 
 When the call was made by the pre- 
 sident for ,oOO,000 volunteers, and 
 ■IcCall's division was organized at 
 Tcnallytown, Meade was appointed to 
 rhe command of the second bris-ade. 
 A.t Mechanicsville, at Gaines' Mill, at 
 Charles City Cross Roads, at the second 
 battle of Bull Run, at South Mountain, 
 at Antietam, at Fredericksburg, and at 
 Chancellorsville, General Meade had 
 given evidence of soldierly abilities of 
 the very highest order; and the manner 
 in which he conducted the retreat from 
 Chancellorsville marked him out as the 
 probable future commander of the army 
 of the Potomac. 
 
 The appointment of General Meade to 
 the chief command of the army of the 
 Potomac, a surprise to many, was per- 
 haps the gi'eatesfc surprise to General 
 Meade himself. He had been disgusted 
 with the conduct of Hooker at Chancel- 
 lorsville ; and his conviction of Hooker's 
 incapacity, as revealed in that campaign, 
 lie had had the courage frankly to ex- 
 press. It was known to some that 
 Meade's conduct at Chancellorsville had 
 attracted the attention of the president, 
 and commanded his admiration. " I tell 
 you," said Lincoln a few days after 
 the Chancellorsville retreat, "I think a 
 
 great deal of that fine fellow, Meade." 
 It is doubtful, however, whether Meade 
 was aware that he stood so high in the 
 good graces of the president. One 
 thing is certain. He knew that he had 
 given ofFense to Hooker; and when, 
 on the night of the 27th, he was awak- 
 ened from sleep in his tent, by the mes- 
 senger from Washington, his first ques- 
 tion was whether he had come with an 
 order for his arrest. General Hardie 
 evaded the question, told him to strike 
 a light, and then put in his hand a 
 paper, which he found appointed him 
 to the command of the army of the Po- 
 tomac, with almost absolute power to 
 conduct the war according to his own 
 judgment. Meade was not what might 
 be called a popular ofiicer, but yet he 
 was held in high esteem by all his com- 
 rades in arms. Some forty-eight years of 
 age, taU and sliie in person, long vis- 
 aged ana tnougntiul, ne bad tlie aspect 
 of a scholar rather than that of a sol 
 dier. He was an excellent tactician, 
 and imbued with sound military ideas. 
 The well-known character of the man, 
 and his Ion? and intimate connection 
 with the army of the Potomac, secured 
 for him the confidence of both officers 
 and men. They knew that in his case, 
 at least, performance would be equal 
 to promise. 
 
 To Meade was granted a large amount 
 of authority — much larger than had 
 been enjoyed by Hooker. The presi- 
 dent waived in his favor all the powers 
 of the Executive and the Constitution. 
 Meade, in fact, was untrammelled. But 
 he made a wise and cautious use of the 
 power entrusted to him. He made an 
 
<d8 
 
 GETTYSBURG. 
 
 few changes as possible, and only those 
 which were absolutely necessary. He 
 retained the officers who had formed 
 General Hooker's military family — 
 General Butterfield, chief of staff; Gen- 
 eral Warren, chief of engineers ; Gen- 
 eral Hunt, chief of artillery ; and Gen- 
 eral Williams, adjutant-general. His 
 desij'e was to understand and give 
 effect to the plans and purposes of his 
 late chief. In his telegram, accepting 
 the chief command of the army of the 
 Potomac, he said: " Totally unexpect- 
 ed as it has been, and in ignorance of 
 the exact condition of the troops, and 
 position of the enemy, I can only now 
 say that, it appears to me I must 
 move towards the Susquehanna, keep- 
 ing Washington and Baltimore well 
 covered, and, if the enemy is checked 
 in his attempt to cross the Susquehanna, 
 or, if he turns towards Baltimore, 
 to give him battle. I would say that 
 I trust every available man that can be 
 spared will be sent to me, as, from all 
 accounts, the enemy is in strong force." 
 In response to this request, the garri- 
 son at Harper's Ferry was placed at 
 his disposal; so, also, was the entire 
 force of militia, under Couch, at Har- 
 i-isburg; and, in addition, such forces 
 as could be spared from West Virginia, 
 Baltimore, Washington and Fortress 
 Monroe, with the returning troops from 
 North Carolina, M'ere hurried to his 
 Buppoj't. Sykes was placed in com- 
 mand of the Fifth corps, which had 
 been Meade's ; Hancock had charge of 
 the Second, since the assignment of 
 Couch to the department of the Sus- 
 quehanna; Reynolds commanded the 
 
 First ; Sickles the Third ; Sedgwick the 
 Sixth ; Howard the Eleventh ; Slocum 
 the Twelfth. The entire effective force 
 was about 100,000 men. 
 
 The opposing armies, at this time, 
 were nearly equal in point of numbers. 
 Lee's force, as it passed through Hagers- 
 town, was estimated at 97,000, with 
 280 guns. This, however, did not in- 
 clude the strong cavalry force which, 
 as we shall see, was moving by a route 
 different from that followed by the 
 main army. When General Meade 
 took the place of General Hooker, the 
 army of the Potomac was lying at 
 Frederick. General Lee had his head- 
 quarters at Chambersburg, with the 
 corps of Longstreet and Hill. Ewell 
 had advanced as far as York and Car- 
 lisle. On the 27th, Lee issued the fol- 
 lowing order to his army : 
 
 " Hkadquaktebs Army of Northern Virginia. ) 
 Chambersburg, Pa., June 27, 1863. j 
 
 "The commanding general has ob- 
 served, with marked satisfaction, the 
 conduct of the troops on the march, 
 and confidently anticipates results com- 
 mensurate with the high spirit they 
 have manifested. No troops could 
 have displayed greater fortitude, or 
 better performed the arduous marches 
 of the past ten days. Their conduct, 
 in other respects, has, with few excep, 
 tions, been in keeping with their charac 
 ter as soldiers, and entitles them to 
 approbation and praise. 
 
 "There have, however, been instances 
 of forgetfulness, on the part of some, 
 that they have in keeping the yet 
 unsullied reputation of the army, and 
 that the duties exacted of us by civili- 
 
MEADE ADVANCES NORTHWABD. 
 
 499 
 
 sation and Christianity are not less ob- 
 ligatory in the country of the enemy 
 than in our own. 
 
 " The commanding general considers 
 that no greater disgrace could befall 
 the army, and through it our whole 
 people, than the perpetration of the 
 barbarous outrages upon the innocent 
 and defenseless, and the wanton de- 
 struction of private property that have 
 marked the course of the enemy in our 
 own country. Such proceedings not 
 only disgrace the perpetrators, and all 
 connected with them, but are subver- 
 sive of the discipline and efficiency of 
 the army, and destructive of the ends 
 of our present movement. It must be 
 remembered that we make wai" only 
 upon armed men, and that we cannot 
 take vengeance for the wrongs our peo- 
 ple have sufPered, without lowering 
 ourselves in the eyes of all whose ab- 
 horrence has been excited by the atroci- 
 ties of our enemy, and offending against 
 Him to whom vengeance belongeth, 
 without whose favor and support our 
 efforts must all prove in vain. 
 
 "The commanding general, therefore, 
 earnestly exhorts the troops to abstain, 
 with most scrupulous care, from un- 
 necessary or wanton injuiy to private 
 property ; and he enjoins upon all offi- 
 cers to arrest and bring to summary 
 punishment all who shall in any way 
 offend against the orders on this subject. 
 "R. E. Lee, General." 
 
 The actual conduct of the Confed- 
 erates was in striking contrast with the 
 spirit of these instructions. They were 
 living on the country, making requisi- 
 tions on the farmers and tradesmen, 
 
 and exacting ransoms from the towns. 
 The severity of these exactions may be 
 illustrated by one example. On the 28th 
 of June, the little town of York alone 
 was ordered to furnish 165 barrels ot 
 flour, or 28,000 pounds of baked bread; 
 3500 pounds of sugar; 1650 pounds 
 of coffee; 300 gallons of molasses ; 1200 
 pounds of salt; 32,000 pounds of fresh 
 beef, or 21,000 pounds of bacon or 
 pork; 2000 pairs of shoes or boots; 
 1000 pairs of socks; 1000 felt hats, 
 and $100,000 in money. Such was the 
 comfort which the invasion brought to 
 Maryland and Pennsylvania. 
 
 On the morning of the 29th, Meade 
 put his army in motion. Giving june 
 up the idea of moving to the 29. 
 west of the South Mountain, he took a 
 course due north, ascending the course 
 of the Monocacy towards the Susque- 
 hanna. The army moved in three col- 
 unms, covering, as it advanced, the 
 lines of approach to Baltimore and 
 Washington. The First and Eleventh 
 corps were directed on Emmettsburg; 
 the Third and Twelfth on Taneytown ; 
 the Second on Frizzleburg; the Fifth 
 to Union; and the Sixth to Windsor. 
 On the evening of the 29th, the Na- 
 tional army was in position — its left at 
 Emmettsburg and its right at Windsor. 
 
 The same day on which Meade put 
 his army in motion, General Lee had 
 completed all the necessary preparations 
 for an advance on Harrisburg. On that 
 day, however, he learned for the first 
 time, by means of a scout, that the Na- 
 tional army, having crossed the Poto- 
 mac, was advancing northward, and 
 that the head of the column had reached 
 
500 
 
 GETTYSBURG. 
 
 the South Mountain. Lee's ignorance 
 of the whereabouts of the National 
 army is explained by the fact that 
 Stuart, on whom he depended for in- 
 formation, had been left behind to 
 guard the passes of the mountains, and 
 to obstruct, as much as possible, the 
 progress of the enemy. In the event 
 of the Nationals succeeding in crossing 
 the Potomac, his instructions were to 
 follow, crossing the river to the east or 
 west of the Blue Ridge, as he deemed 
 the more convenient, and take position 
 on the Confederate right. Unable to 
 hinder the Nationals from crossing the 
 river, and anxious to execute the re- 
 maining portion of his instructions, 
 Stuart was compelled to make a wide 
 detour to the east by way of Fairfax 
 Court House. When, on the evening 
 of the 27th, he reached the Potomac at 
 the mouth of Seneca Creek, he found 
 the river greatly swollen by recent 
 rains ; and it was only by tremendous 
 exertions he gained the Maryland shore. 
 He then leai-ned that the Nationals, 
 having crossed the day before, were on 
 their way to Frederick. The National 
 army thus lay between him and Lee ; 
 and he was compelled to march north- 
 ward, through Westminster, to Han- 
 over, in Pennsylvania, where he arrived 
 on the 30th of June. It was Hooker's 
 misfortune to fight without his cavab'y, 
 at Chancellorsville. A similar misfor- 
 tune had now befallen Lee. Without 
 those eyes of the army, he had been 
 moving about in ignorance of the where- 
 abouts of his antagonist. 
 
 The Intelligence of the near approach 
 of the National army fell upon Lee 
 
 like a thunderbolt. Dreading an irrup- 
 tion of the National forces into the 
 Cumberland Valley, and foreseeing the 
 peril which thus threatened his com- 
 munications, Lee resolved to concen- 
 trate on the east side of South Moun- 
 tain, and prevent, if possible, the fur- 
 ther progress of the oppo&ing army. 
 The movement on Harrisburg was, 
 in consequence, countermanded. Long- 
 street and Hill were directed to proceed 
 from Chambersburg, defiling through 
 the South Mountain range towards 
 Gettysburg ; and Ewell was ordered to 
 countermarch from York and Carlisle, 
 on the same point. 
 
 On the 30th, Meade was still ignor- 
 ant of the change of purpose on jaae 
 the part of Lee. It was his be- ^^' 
 lief that the Confederates were pressing 
 northward to the Susquehanna. He 
 had little doubt, however, that a col- 
 lision was imminent. On that day, he 
 pushed his right forward to Manches- 
 ter, his left still remaining at Emmetts- 
 burg, where three coips — the Fii'st, 
 Eleventh and Third — weie under or- 
 ders of Major-Greneral Reynolds. Re- 
 alizing the gravity of the situation, he 
 issued to the army the following order : 
 
 HEADQnARTERS ArMY OF THE PoTOKAC, ) 
 
 June 30, IB63. J 
 
 "The commanding genei'al requests 
 that, previous to the engagement soon 
 expected with the enemy, corps and all 
 other commanding officers address their 
 troops, explaining to them the immense 
 issue involved in the struggle. The 
 enemy is on our soil. The whole coun« 
 try looks anxiously to this army to de- 
 liver it from the presence of the foe. 
 
THE BAlThB GROUKD. 
 
 511 
 
 <-mr failure to do so will leave us no 
 such ^velcome as the swelling of mill- 
 ions of hearts with pride and joy at 
 our success would give to every soldier 
 of the army. Homes, firesides and do- 
 mestic altars are involved. The army 
 has fought well heretofore. It is be- 
 lieved that it will fight more desperate- 
 ly and bravely than ever, if it is ad- 
 dressed in fitting terms. Corps and 
 other commanders are authorized to 
 order the instant death of any soldier 
 who fails to do his duty at this hour. 
 
 " By command of 
 
 " Major-General Meade. 
 
 "S. Williams, 
 
 "Assistant Adjutant-General." 
 
 It was not until the night of the 
 30th that Meade became satisfied that 
 Lee was concentrating his forces on the 
 east side of South Mountain. He at 
 once proceeded to select a position on 
 which he might make a rapid concen- 
 tration of his troops, and so receive 
 battle on advantageous terms. The 
 general line of Pipe Creek seemed to 
 offer the advantage sought ; but its 
 final adoption was left to be determined 
 by the necessities which might arise. 
 Orders were issued for an inttnediate 
 advance of the different corps. The 
 Sixth corps, Sedgwick's, forming the 
 right wing of the army, Avas ordered 
 to Manchester, in rear of Pipe Creek ; 
 headquarters and Second corps, Han- 
 cock's, were directed to Taneytown ; the 
 Twelfth C01-J1S, Slocum's, and the Fifth 
 corps, Sykes', forming the centre, were 
 to move on Two Taverns and Hanover ; 
 and the left wing, consisting of the 
 Fii-st, Reynolds', Third, Sickles', and 
 
 S56 
 
 Eleventh, Howard's, all under Genera 
 Reynolds, was ordered to GettysVjurg 
 The movement of the left wing was in- 
 tended only as a mask, behind which 
 the army could take position at Pipe 
 Creek. It was not the intention of 
 either Lee or Meade to make Gettys- 
 burg the battle field ; but, unconscious- 
 ly to both, a collision was becoming 
 more and more inevitable in the im- 
 mediate neighborhood. 
 
 The little town of Gettysburg, which 
 was soon to Ije rendered immortal as 
 the theatre not only of the greatest 
 battle of the Civil War, but of one of 
 the greatest battles of modern times, is 
 about ten miles east of the South 
 Mountain range. The topographical 
 features of the neighborhood are pe- 
 culiar, presenting a series of ridges 
 which, for the most part, run parallel 
 with South Mountain, and give to the 
 landscape a rolling and diversified 
 character. Some of the streams flow 
 to the northeast, and empty themselves 
 into the Susquehanna ; others flow 
 southward, and find an outlet into the 
 Potomac, The town is built at the 
 ba.se of one of the ridges, and is the 
 centre from which radiate a large 
 number of roads. There is the Cham^ 
 bersburg road, leading to the north 
 west ; the Carlisle road to the north , 
 the Han'isburg road to the northeast 
 the Baltimore road to the southeast; 
 and others, which lead in the direction 
 of the Potomac to the southwest. To 
 the immediate south of Gettysburg, 
 and extending some four or five miles, 
 is a ridge which bears a close resem- 
 blance to a fish-hook. The point of ihn 
 
£02 
 
 aETTYSBUEO. 
 
 hook is known as "Wolfs Hill ; the 
 barb is known as Gulp's Hill; while 
 the stem — a succession of ridges — end- 
 ing in Little Round Top and Round 
 Top, bears the general name of Ceme- 
 tery Ridge. Little Round Top is about 
 two hundred and eighty feet high. 
 Round Top, which shoots up from the 
 former, reaches a height of some four 
 hundred feet. These two elevations 
 constitute the military keys of Ceme- 
 tery Ridge. At their base runs a 
 marshy stream, called Plum Run. Be- 
 tween Wolf's and Culp's Hills flows 
 what is called Rock Creek. The nearer 
 part of the bend, which fronts the town, 
 had been used as a Cemetery — hence 
 the generic name of the ridge. The 
 broken character of the ground, abound- 
 ing with rocky ledges and covered with 
 huge boulders, make it a sort of natural 
 fortification. It is an admirable posi- 
 tion for defensive operations. On the 
 west side, the ground falls off into a 
 cultivated valley, which it commands, 
 and then gradually rises until, nearly a 
 mile distant, it foraas another and a 
 parallel crest, called Seminary Ridge — 
 from a theological school which crowns 
 one of its heights and forms a conspic- 
 uous feature of the landscape. This 
 ridge is covered with oaks, and is local- 
 ly known as Oak Ridge. In the valley 
 between Seminary and Cemetery Ridges 
 is the Emmettsburg road. Such was 
 the ground on which, for three consec- 
 utive days, the contending hosts of 
 North and South were about to strive, 
 in bloody and merciless contest, for the 
 mastery of the Republic. 
 
 On the morning of Wednesday, the 
 
 Jnly 
 I. 
 
 Ist of July, General Buford, who 
 had been occupying Gettysburg 
 for the two days previous, passed through 
 the town with his cavalry, and, advanc- 
 ing beyond Seminary Ridge to the next 
 ridge, more to the west, about two 
 miles distant, took position on the near 
 side of Willoughby Run. His line was 
 drawn up across the Charabersburg 
 road, along which Longstreet and Hill 
 were advancing. It was about nine 
 o'clock. All of a sudden, he found 
 himself in collision with the leading 
 division of Hill, under Heth. It was 
 the commencement of the battle of 
 Gettysburg. Knowing that Reynolds, 
 who had bivouacked the night before 
 at Marsh Creek, only four miles off, 
 was within striking distance, Buford 
 resolved to hold the Confederates in 
 check until the arrival of his chief. It 
 was a perilous undertaking; but by 
 skilful deployments, he accomplished 
 his task. He had fallen back some- 
 what; but his ranks were unbroken, 
 and his men were offering a spirited 
 resistance when, at about ten o'clock, 
 Reynolds arrived with Wadsworth's 
 division. Reynolds had no instructions 
 to bring on a battle ; but the necessi- 
 ties of the situation supplied the place 
 of instructions. Buford was sorely 
 pressed, and he must support him. 
 Swinton suggests that, probably, his 
 fine military eye took in at a glance 
 the features of the rocky ridge of Get- 
 tysburg as an eminent vantage ground 
 for a defensive battle, and that his ob- 
 ject in bringing on the battle was to 
 hold the enemy in check beyond the 
 town, and thus give the armv time tr 
 
DEATH OF REYNOLDS. 
 
 508 
 
 concentrate on the fastness of hills. 
 'Phis, of course, is mere conjecture ; and 
 whether he had such thoughts, and 
 was influenced by such motives, we 
 shall never know. But for his own 
 untimely loss, there would be little 
 cause for regiet that he acted as he did. 
 Wadsworth's troops were immediately 
 deployed; and Reynolds sent instruc- 
 tions to Howard to advance as prompt- 
 ly as possible. Wadsworth was ordered 
 to place his only battery — that of Hall 
 — in position by the side of the road 
 leading to Cashtown. Cutler's brigade 
 was thrown into position on the right, 
 while Doubleday, who had just come 
 up with the van of the infantry, was 
 ordered to move Meredith's Iron Bri- 
 gade, as it was called, to the left of the 
 road, into a piece of wooded ground 
 which skirted Willoughby Run. De- 
 termined to bring matters to an imme- 
 diate issue, Reynolds, with animating 
 words, gave the regiments in the skirt 
 of the woods the command to charge. 
 The order was being gallantly obeyed, 
 when, shot through the neck, he fell 
 mortally wounded, dying before he 
 could be removed from the field. The 
 command now devolved on Doubleday. 
 There was no pause in the battle. The 
 Iron Brigade fell with tremendous force 
 on the flank of Archer's brigade, which 
 was pushing its way across Willough- 
 by Run, capturing Archer himself and 
 several hundreds of his men. While 
 these events were taking place, there 
 was desperate fighting on the right. 
 Hall's battery, left for a time unsup- 
 ported, was in imminent danger of being 
 raptured, when the Fourteenth Brook- 
 
 lyn and the Ninety-Fifth New York, 
 joined by the Sixth Wisconsin, having 
 made a change of front, charged to the 
 relief of the guns. Such was the im- 
 petuosity of the onset that Davis' two 
 Mississippi regiments were driven for 
 shelter into the cut of an unfinished 
 raih'oad, surrounded, and captured with 
 their battle-flags. So far, success had 
 been with the Nationals. 
 
 The tide of battle was destined soon 
 to turn. Reinforcements, in increasing 
 numbers, were coming up and joining 
 both of the contending parties. The 
 Nationals were strengthened by the 
 arrival of the two remaining divisions 
 of the First corps, under Rowley and 
 Robinson, the former having taken 
 command of Doubleday's men. Robin- 
 son's division remained for a time in 
 reserve on Seminary Ridge ; but the 
 other division was pushed forward at 
 once to the assistance of the sorely 
 pressed left. These fresh troops were 
 in excellent spirits. One of the brigades 
 of Rowley's division, commanded by 
 Colonel Roy Stone, having been as- 
 signed to a position dangerously ex- 
 posed to the fire of the enemy's artil- 
 lery, Stone remarked to his men, " We 
 have come here to stay." The saying 
 was promptly taken up. "We have 
 come here to stay !" resounded through- 
 out the ranks. The words were too truly 
 prophetic ; for a very large number of 
 the brave fellows never left the ground. 
 The battle continued to rage with great 
 fierceness, the Nationals still firmly 
 maintaining th eir posi tiou. Meanwhile, 
 Hill was reinforced by another division, 
 under General Pender. It was now 
 
«U4 
 
 GETTYSBURG. 
 
 past noon. The sun had been blazing 
 Bince early morning. The heat was in- 
 tense. About one o'clock, General 
 Howard arrived on the battle ground, 
 and took command of the field. He 
 had brought with him the divisions of 
 Bchuiz and Barlow, the former now 
 commanded by Schimmelpfenig, Schurz 
 being in charge of the corps. These 
 divisions Howard posted to the right 
 of the First corps, and in such a manner 
 as to prolong the general lines and 
 cover the approaches to Gettysbui-g from 
 the north and northwest. The other 
 division, under Von Steinwehr — an 
 experienced and skilful officer, who 
 had been bred in the service of Prussia, 
 and who had done good work on that 
 fatal first day at Chancellorsville, when 
 Jackson fell on Howard's corps with 
 the force of an avalanche — he had left 
 as a reserve on Cemetery Ridge. It 
 was a wise and prudent step, as the 
 result proved, and was taken, it is un- 
 derstood, in obedience to the instruc- 
 tions of Reynolds. 
 
 It was now about two o'clock. 
 Howard had had little more than time 
 to get his men in position, when the 
 spectator on Cemetery Hill might have 
 seen a long, gray line, serpent-like, 
 creeping down the pike, and near the 
 railroad on the northeast side of the 
 town. They were " Stonewall " Jack- 
 son's men — led now by General Ewell, 
 Jackson's most trusted and loved lieu- 
 tenant — who were hui'rjdng from York 
 and Carlisle to decide the issues of 
 that day. Their march seems to 
 quicken as they approa^'h the battle- 
 ground. Before tlnee o'clock, they 
 
 have come up from the York road, de- 
 bouched into the woods, and, with 
 their old, wild battle-yell, fallen with 
 crushing effect on Howard's right. 
 Early's division, of Ewell, was thrown 
 upon the right face of the Eleventh, 
 commanded by Barlow. Rodes' divi- 
 sion, of the same corps, moved further 
 round and formed a connection with the 
 left of the corps of General Hill. There 
 was a commanding height, called Oak 
 Hill, opposite the National line, where 
 the left of the Eleventh and the right 
 of the First corps approached each 
 other, but did not meet. With the eye 
 of a skilful general, Rodes perceived 
 that this was the key-point of the field, 
 and seized it immediately. The Elev- 
 enth, confronted by their old antagon- 
 ists, seemed resolved to redeem the 
 honor lost at Chancellorsville. They 
 fought with the utmost braveiy. But 
 the battle had now become unequal — it 
 was 50,000 men against 21,000; and 
 Howard had fallen into an error not 
 uncommon during the war. He had 
 attempted to cover too much. It was 
 impossible for his extended line, atten 
 uated almost to feebleness, to resist the 
 persistent attacks and now overwhelm- 
 ing numbers of the enemy. From his 
 high vantage ground, where he had 
 planted ai'tillery, Rodes poured an ob- 
 lique and destructive fire on the left of 
 the Eleventh. A general advance was 
 ordered about three o'clock, Rodes, 
 having massed his infantry, came sweep, 
 ing down through the opening of tha 
 National line in his front, breaking 
 and cramping the left of the Eleventh, 
 and turning and forcing back the right 
 
THE FIRST DAY-SEMINARY RIDGE. 
 
 5&3 
 
 of the First. Early, at the same mo- 
 ment, fell with equal energy on the right 
 of the Eleventh. The gallant Barlow 
 made a stubborn resistance near the 
 almshouse ; but, in the midst of the 
 struggle at this point, he was wound- 
 ed, and fell helpless into the hands of 
 the enemy. Schimmelpfenig was also 
 taken prisoner, but he subsequently 
 contrived to escape and rejoin his regi- 
 ment. The National right was thus 
 driven back in confusion into Gettys- 
 burg. The troops on the right of the 
 First, or National left, were in a simi- 
 lar plight. They, too, were driven into 
 the town, where they became entangled 
 with Howard's corps. Ewell pursued 
 the disordered mass into and through 
 the sti-eets of Gettysburg, capturing 
 Bome five thousand prisoners and occu- 
 pying the place. 
 
 Such was the state of things on the 
 National right, and on the right of the 
 National left, at a comparatively early 
 hour in the afternoon of July 1st. 
 How was it on the extreme left of the 
 National line ? These troops had been 
 under fire from the commencement of 
 the fight — some of them for five, some 
 for six hours. At the same moment 
 that Ewell, with the two divisions of 
 Rodes and Early, came thundering 
 down upon the Eleventh, A. P. Hill, 
 strengthened by Ewell, renewed the 
 attack upon the heroic and not yet 
 completely exhausted First. Robinson 
 and Doubleday and Wadsworth did 
 their best to keep their men in position, 
 and to hold the enemy at bay ; but 
 they, too, began to feel themselves 
 weak under the fierce and persistent 
 
 pressure of superior numbers. "We 
 have come to stay," was still the watch- 
 word and battle-cry of many of the 
 men. They were willing to wait and 
 fight to the bitter end. But when it 
 became known that the right of their 
 corps had been turned, and that the 
 Eleventh had been routed, the convic- 
 tion of danger in their present position 
 was forced upon them. It was with 
 a stubborn reluctance they began to 
 retire, and not until they had suffered 
 most severely. They had saved and 
 moved to the rear all their artillery, 
 with the exception of one piece, and 
 all their ambulances, before they let go 
 their hold on Seminary Ridge. When 
 they fell back behind the town, they 
 did so in something like order. Double- 
 day handled his men during this crisis 
 with marvellous ability. In managing 
 affairs on the National left, he had re- 
 ceived little or no assistance from 
 Howard, whose attention was engrossed 
 from the first with his own corps and 
 the general state of things on his right. 
 The fighting, as we have seen, was 
 severe on the left during the whole day. 
 There were special moments, howevei", 
 when the firing was terrific. Some of 
 the men had been through all the great 
 battles of the East. They had been in 
 the Peninsula, and under fii'e at Mal- 
 vei-n Hills ; with Pope, and under fire 
 at Cedar Mountain, at Manassas, and 
 at Centreville; with Burnside, and 
 under fire at Fredericksburg; with 
 Hooker, and under fire at Chancellors- 
 ville ; and they gave it as their opinion 
 that the firing of that day was the most 
 terrific they had ever experienced. In 
 
506 
 
 GETTYSBURG. 
 
 one brigade alone — that of Cutler — in 
 the biief space of twenty minutes, 
 every staff-officer had his horse shot 
 under him. Some of them lost two, 
 some three horses. In thirty minutes, 
 not a horse was left to the general or 
 his stafF, but one, and that one was 
 wounded. 
 
 The remnants of the two shattered 
 corps, reduced to one half of their 
 original strength, found a refuge and a 
 resting-place on Cemetery Hill. The 
 wisdom of leaving Steinwehr behind to 
 strengthen and fortify the position was 
 now apparent to all. Steinwehr had 
 made excellent use of his time. His 
 guns were admirably posted, so as to 
 guard the approaches to the heights ; 
 and behind every ledge of rock, every 
 stone wall, every building, there was a 
 living barrier — an abatis of bayonets. 
 When the disordered masses were 
 pouring through Gettysburg and to- 
 wards the ridge, Hancock had arrived 
 on the ground. Meade was still at 
 Taneytown, some thirteen miles distant. 
 So soon as he was made aware of the 
 battle, and of the death of Reynolds, 
 be sent Hancock forward to take com- 
 mand. He was to use his own judg- 
 ment as to whether the forces should 
 be retained at Gettysburg, or retire to 
 the line of Pipe Creek. If he found 
 the ground advantageous, he was so to 
 advise the commander, and the troops 
 would be ordered up at once. HuiTy- 
 ing forward in an ambulance, and 
 8tud)ang the map by the way, Hancock 
 arrived on the field at about half-past 
 three o'clock. " I found," he says, 
 "that practically the fight was over. 
 
 The rear of our column, with the ene- 
 my, was then coming through the town 
 of Gettysburg. General Howard was 
 on Cemetery Hill, and there had evi- 
 dently been an attempt on his part ^iq 
 stop and form some troops there.' 
 Hancock was a great favorite with the 
 rank and file of the army of the Po- 
 tomac. His fine personal presence, 
 and the magnetism of his manner, did 
 much towards restoring the confidence 
 of the men and reestablishing order. 
 There was a nucleus of order in Stein- 
 wehr's division, and in the cavalry of 
 Buford, which having been deployed 
 in the plain to the left of the town, 
 and in front of the ridge, presented a 
 bold and firm front. Buford has been 
 described as the good 'angel of Gettys- 
 burg. He certainly performed heroic 
 services on the morning of that first 
 day, and also at this supreme moment, 
 when weakness or hesitation would 
 have been ruin. Never were cavalry 
 more superbly handled. Never did 
 mounted men more heartily or more 
 effectively obey the behests of their 
 chief. As the routed Nationals came 
 up, Hancock quickly formed them into 
 line. He was soon able to present 
 what seemed a formidable front to the 
 enemy. The National anny, however, 
 was really in great peril. The day 
 was yet young ; several hours had to 
 elapse before sunset. If Lee had made 
 a vigorous attack with all the forces at 
 his command, it is scarcely possible 
 that Hancock could have offered an 
 effective resistance. To his surprise, 
 and, no doubt, to his delight, the Con- 
 federate skirmishers, who were already 
 
THE SECOND DAY— READY FOR BATTLE. 
 
 60» 
 
 breasting the hill, were recalled; and 
 thus ended the first day's fighting at 
 Gettysburg. General Lee made a mis- 
 take in not pressing the advantage he 
 had won. But he acted up to the best 
 of his knowledge. "The attack was 
 not made that afternoon," he tells us, 
 "because the enemy's force was un- 
 known, and because it was considered 
 advisable to await the arrival of the 
 rest of our troops." It was a fatal 
 pause — fatal to the hopes of Lee him- 
 self, and to the plans and purposes of 
 the Confederate rulers. 
 
 Hancock lost no time in reporting to 
 Meade. Soon after arriving, he sent a 
 message informing him that he could 
 hold the ground till dark. Shortly 
 after five o'clock, he sent the following 
 despatch : " When I arrived here, an 
 hour since, I found that our troops had 
 given up the front of Gettysburg and 
 the town. We have now taken up a 
 position in the cemetery, which cannot 
 well be taken ; it is a position, how- 
 ever, easily turned. Slocum is now 
 coming on the ground, and is taking 
 position on the right. But we have, 
 as yet, no troops on the left, the Third 
 corps not having yet reported ; but I 
 suppose that it is marching up. If so, 
 his flank march will, in a degree, pro- 
 tect our left flank. In the meantime. 
 Gibbon [who had been left in com- 
 mand of the Second] had better march 
 so as to take position on our right or 
 left to our rear, as may be necessary, 
 in some commanding position. * '•' "' 
 The battle is quiet now. I think we 
 shall be all right until night. I have 
 sent all the trains back. When nijilit 
 
 comes on, it can be told better what 
 had best be done. I think we can re- 
 tire ; if not, we can fight here, as the 
 ground appears not unfavorable, with 
 good troops." Having completed his 
 dispositions, and having turned over 
 the command to Slocum, who out- 
 ranked him, and who had just arrived, 
 he went back to Taneytown to see 
 Meade personally. Meade had already 
 made up his mind ; and he set his army 
 in motion at once. 
 
 The Twelfth corps, Slocum's, which 
 had been urgently summoned by Gen- 
 eral Howard during the afternoon, and 
 which had been pushed forward with 
 as little delay as possible, arrived be- 
 fore six o'clock. It was immediately 
 put into position. The Third corps, 
 Sickles', which had also been sum- 
 moned up by Howard, arrived some of 
 them that night at sunset, and the re- 
 mainder during the night and follow- 
 ing morning. The Second corps, Han- 
 cock's, which had only to travel from 
 Taneytown, a distance of thirteen miles, 
 came up shortly after midnight. The 
 Fifth corps, Sykes', was at Union 
 Mills, twenty-three miles distant, when 
 the order was given , but it was on the 
 ground at an early hour in the mom- 
 ing. The Sixth, Sedgwick's, was at 
 Manchester, thirty-two miles distant. 
 It was known that its commander 
 would hurry forward with all possible 
 despatch'; and it was confidently ex- 
 pected that he would reach the field 
 in time to take part in the fight of the 
 following day. Meade, himself, as 
 soon as he had received Hancock's rep- 
 icsentations, broke up his headquarters 
 
608 
 
 GETTYSBUBG. 
 
 at Taneytown, sent his trains to West- 
 minster, and hastened to Gettysburg, 
 which he reached at one o'clock on 
 the morning of the 2d. Soon after 
 he arrived on the ground, he fixed 
 his headquarters at a little frame 
 house on the Taneytown road, in 
 rear of and to the south of Zeigler's 
 Grove. It was sheltered from infantry 
 fire by a swell in the ground; but 
 there was nothing to prevent it from 
 becoming a target for the enemy's 
 artillery. 
 
 With the earliest light Meade was 
 July up, inspecting the ground, and 
 2« making arrangements for the dis- 
 position of his troops. Some of the corps 
 were already in position. The others 
 were placed as they came up. The Elev- 
 enth retained its position on Cemetery 
 Hill, and was supported by Robinson's 
 and Doubleday's di\'isions, of the First, 
 now commanded by General Newton. 
 On the extreme right was the Twelfth, 
 Avhich, with the division of Wadsworth, 
 also of the First, held Gulp's Hill. 
 The Second and Third were ordered to 
 occupy the continuation of Cemetery 
 Ridge, to the left of the Eleventh. 
 The Fifth was held in reserve. When 
 Sedgwick came up, he was to be placed 
 on the extreme left, behind the Round 
 Tops The order, from right to left, 
 was, therefore, as follows : Slocum, 
 Newton, Howard, Hancock, Sickles. 
 The entire army was concentrated on 
 an area of about three square miles. 
 The reserve forces were within thii'ty 
 minutes' march of any part of the line. 
 Batteries were posted along the crest ; 
 and rock-ledges, improvised earth-works 
 
 and stone walls in the rear gave shelter 
 to the soldiers. 
 
 On the morning of Thursday, the 
 Confederate prospect was not quite so 
 bright as it had been the night before. 
 True, Longstreet had arrived; but it 
 was manifest at a glance that the Na- 
 tional army had been largely reinforced, 
 that it occupied a position of foi'mid- 
 able strength, and that to attempt to 
 dislodge it meant a tremendous expen- 
 diture of force, as well as a fearful sac- 
 rifice of life. At early dawn, Lee, 
 Longstreet and Hill were in eager con- 
 sultation on Seminary Ridge. The 
 summits of the ridge were covered with 
 oak and pine trees ; so, also, was its 
 western slope, thus affording excelleot 
 concealment for the troops. Along this 
 ridge, and round to the east of Gettys- 
 burg, in the form of a vast crescent, 
 over five miles in length, its concavity 
 facing the National line, the Confede- 
 rate army was arranged. The eastern 
 slope was dotted thickly with artilleiy, 
 which looked frowningly over the in- 
 tervening valley. Longstreet was on 
 the right, Hill in the centre, and Ewell 
 on the left. Between Ewell and Hill 
 there was a gap of neai'ly a mile. The 
 army was about 80,000 strong, numer- 
 ically equal to that on the opposite 
 heights, even if Sedgwick should get 
 up in time. Lee's one inconvenience 
 was the extent of his line, and the con- 
 sequent difficulty of communication. 
 Meade had the advantage of compact- 
 ness ; and communication was easy. 
 
 It was evident already that the at- 
 tack, if there was to be an attack, 
 would come from the Confederates 
 
LEE'S MISTAKE. 
 
 560 
 
 Meade's position was merely defensive. 
 It was for this purpose, and this pur- 
 pose alone, that Cemetery Ridge had 
 been occupied and strengthened. It 
 was no part of his intention at this par- 
 ticular juncture to initiate aggressive 
 measures. It had not been the oriojinal 
 intention of Lee to fight so far from his 
 base, unless attacked by the enemy ; but 
 it had become difficult, next to impos- 
 sible, to withdraw his troops now that 
 they had come into actual contact with 
 the National army, and tasted somewhat 
 of the sweets of victory. It may well be 
 doubted whether, if an order had been 
 given for retreat, his men, elated as 
 they were with past successes, and 
 flushed as they were with the fresh 
 triumphs of yesterday, would have 
 calmly submitted. General Lee was 
 not ignorant of the difficulty and dan- 
 ger of assaulting a powerful foe behind 
 entrenched lines, and in so command- 
 ing a position as that now occupied by 
 the National army. Still, as he him- 
 self tells us, a battle had become, in a 
 measure, unavoidable; and, "encouraged 
 by the successful issue of the engage- 
 ment of the previous day, and in view 
 of the valuable results which would 
 ensue from the defeat of the army of 
 General Meade, it was tliought advis- 
 able to renew the attack." The Con- 
 federate commander, however, made 
 one mistake when he paused, on the 
 eve of victory, on the afternoon of the 
 Ist, He made another mistake when 
 he delayed his attack on the morning 
 and forenoon of the 2d. A vigorous 
 assault made on the afternoon of Wed- 
 uesday, or even on the early hours of 
 
 ^7 
 
 Thursday, could scarcely have failed 
 of success. Bent on invasion as he 
 was, he flung away his opportunities. 
 By delaying as he did, he gave the 
 National forces not only time to come 
 up and concentrate in strong positions 
 in his front, but time to enjoy, after 
 the fatigues of their march, some hours 
 of refreshing rest. 
 
 It was still, however, early morning. 
 The Confederate generals had not yet 
 completed their plans. Meade was un- 
 certain on what part of his line the 
 first blow would be dealt, but he was 
 guarding every point with scrupulous 
 care. All was calm and still. There 
 was a balmy sweetness in the summer 
 air; music in the woods; beauty in 
 the landscape. As the eye of the spec- 
 tator on the heights fell upon the val- 
 ley below, it was attracted by bloom- 
 ing orchards, by smiling fields, already 
 growing yellow with rich crops of 
 ripening grain, by contented cattle 
 grazing at will on the meadow, or lazily 
 resting in the shade. Nature seemed 
 all-unconscious of the terrible tempest 
 of human wrath which was about to 
 burst forth, and which was so soon to 
 convert those scenes of peace and hap- 
 piness into scenes of tumult and horror, 
 to fill the air with the sounds of de- 
 struction and the shrieks of agony, to 
 cover the valley and the hillsides vrith 
 the ghastly bodies of the slain, and to 
 deluge those fields and redden those 
 streams with blood. 
 
 It was four o'clock in the afternoon 
 before Lee had completed his arrange- 
 ments for attack. There had been 
 some lively skirmishing earlier in the 
 
olU 
 
 GETTYSBUEG. 
 
 day. In the morning, Ewell's move- 
 ments created the impression that an 
 attack was about to be made on Gulp's 
 Hill; and General Meade was disposed 
 for a time to assume the initiative at 
 that point ; but the ground being found 
 unfavorable, and the enemy not making 
 further demonstrations, the purpose was 
 abandoned. General Sedgwick arrived 
 on the field, with the Sixth corps, about 
 two o'clock, having accomplished his 
 long march with marvellous rapidity; 
 and General Meade immediately there- 
 after directed Sykes, who, with the 
 Fifth corps, had been in reserve on the 
 right, to move over and take position 
 as a reserve on the left. Meantime, 
 General Lee had decided on his plan 
 of assault. " It was determined," he 
 tells us, " to make the principal attack 
 on the enemy's left, and endeavor to 
 get a position from which it was 
 thought that our artilleiy could be 
 brought to bear with effect. Long- 
 street was directed to place the di- 
 visions of Hood and McLaws on the 
 right of Hill, partially enveloping the 
 enemy's left, which he was to drive in. 
 General Hill was ordered to threaten 
 the enemy's centre, so as to prevent re- 
 inforcements from being drawn to either 
 wing, and to co-operate with his right 
 division in Longstreet's attack ; General 
 Ewell was instructed to make a simul- 
 taneous demonstration on the enemy's 
 right, to be converted into a real attack, 
 ihould opportunity offer." 
 
 Let us now see how this plan was 
 carried out. It was Meade's intention, 
 in posting his troops, to occupy the 
 ridge continuously from Cemetery Hill 
 
 to the Round Tops. Sickles had been 
 instructed in the morning to form his 
 corps in line of battle on the left of 
 Hancock's corps ; his right flank to rest 
 on Hancock's left; and his left to ex- 
 tend to the Round Top, occupying it, 
 if practicable. At the point indicated, 
 there is a depression on the ridge ; and 
 General Sickles, believing that he would 
 be more advantageously posted an the 
 intermediate crest, about three quarters 
 of a mile in front, and along which 
 runs the Emmettsburg road, assumed 
 the responsibility of occupying that 
 position. It was not till within a few 
 minutes of four o'clock, when General 
 Meade arrived at this part of the ground 
 in person, that he discovered the peril- 
 ous position in which Sickles had placed 
 himself, his men, and, indeed, the en- 
 tire National army. Instead of connect- 
 ing with the left of Hancock, Sickles 
 had thrown his right flank forward 
 some four hundred yards in front, thus 
 leaving a gap between his right and 
 Hancock's left ; his left, instead of being 
 near the Round Top Mountain, was in 
 advance of it; and his line, instead of 
 being a prolongation of Hancock's line, 
 made an angle of about forty-five de- 
 grees with that line. Meade expressed 
 his disappointment, Sickles his regret; 
 but it was too late to make any radical 
 change. Sickles, undoubtedly, meant 
 well ; but it was a weak, exposed, and 
 otherwise faulty position. Round Top 
 was really the key of the battle ground ; 
 and it was at once uncovered and unoc- 
 cupied. Lee discovered at once the 
 blundei which had been committed. 
 In his report he says : '* In front o^ 
 
LONGSTREET'S ADVANCE. 
 
 511 
 
 General Longstreet, the enemy held a 
 position from which, if he could be 
 driven, it was thought that our army 
 could be used to advantage in assailing 
 the more elevated ground beyond, and 
 thus enable us to reach the crest of the 
 lidge." Sickles, who was thus singled 
 out as the special object of attack, was 
 to j)ay dearly for his temerity. His 
 interview with Meade had not ended; 
 the latter, in fact, was just expressing 
 hifj fear that the enemy would not per- 
 mit him to withdraw, and that there 
 was no time for any further change or 
 movement, when the Confederate bat- 
 teries opened upon the position, and 
 the action was commenced. 
 
 It was, as we have said, about four 
 o'clock in the afternoon when the signal 
 for battle was given. The sis^nal came 
 in the character of a terrific cannonade 
 from the Confederate artillery. The 
 National guns soon hurled back defi- 
 ance. The din was deafening, and the 
 air was alive with missiles of every de- 
 scription. This, however, was but the 
 prelude to more desperate work. Meade 
 did not lose his self-possession. As- 
 suring Sickles of every assistance pos- 
 sible, he hurried off to give more general 
 direction. Sickles' right, commanded 
 by Humphrey, was disposed along the 
 Emmettsburg Road. On Humphrey's 
 left the line was continued by Graham's 
 brigade, of Birney's division, as far as 
 the Peach Orchard. At this point the 
 remaining brigades of Birney's divi- 
 sion — those of De Trobriand and Ward 
 — were refused, and thrown back ob- 
 liquely towards Round Top. The sa- 
 lient or apex of the angle was Sickles' 
 
 weakest point. It was the point which 
 most invited attack, and the driving in 
 of which offei'ed the greatest advan- 
 tages. Under cover of a heavy artil- 
 lery fire, and partially concealed by th« 
 smoke, Longstreet was seen to be press- 
 ing forward with his whole corps— 
 nearly one third of the Confederate, 
 army. Batteries were quickly got into 
 position ; and Sickles was already under 
 a most murderous fire, both of artillery 
 and musketry. The Confederate flank, 
 it was observed, extended far beyond 
 the National left. As Longstreet came 
 up, with his warrior columns, defiance 
 in their eyes and destruction in their 
 firm and steady tramp, his extreme 
 right, under Hood, was seen to bend in 
 towards the National left and in the 
 direction of Little Round Top. As the 
 Confederate line draws near, it bends in 
 more and more. It is evidently Long 
 street's intention to overlap Sicklee 
 left, and to fall wath accumulated force 
 on the extremity of his line. His pur- 
 pose is quickly revealed. Rushing for- 
 ward at the double-quick, the men in 
 gi-ey fell with tremendous energy up- 
 on Ward's brigade, who held the ex- 
 tremity of the National line. Ward was 
 not unprepared. This was the point 
 which was struck first; but Hood's 
 men kept closing in along the whole 
 of Birney's front, until the battle raged 
 from the orchard to the base of Little 
 Round Top. At the orchard, and 
 along the refused line towards Little 
 Round Top, the waves of battle surged 
 and rolled for weaiy hours, victory 
 now inclining to the one side and now 
 to the other. Ward and De Trobriand 
 
61» 
 
 GETTYSBURG. 
 
 and Graham pei-formed prodigies of 
 valor; Birney, too, and even Sickles, 
 were ever at the point of danger, cheer- 
 ing the men by their words, and in- 
 citing them by their example; but no 
 amount of valor or self-sacrifice could 
 atone for the inherent weakness of the 
 position. 
 
 Little Round Top was the objective 
 point of this well-directed Confederate 
 attack. It was the prize which the 
 Confederates wished to wdn, and which 
 the Nationals wished to keep. We 
 have already described this hill, and 
 pointed out its connection with the 
 general range, on the crest of which 
 the National forces, for the most part, 
 were posted. It is a steep and rocky 
 spur of the loftier Round Top. It is 
 bald and naked, its summit and its 
 sides being cut up into ledges, and cov- 
 ered with mighty boulders. This hill 
 was destined to be the scene of one of 
 the most heroic, and, at the same time, 
 most savage encounters, during that 
 awful, yet glorious, 2d of July, at Get- 
 tysburg. While the battle was raging 
 along Birney's front, the fiery and im- 
 petuous Hood had discovered that Lit- 
 tle Round Top was not occupied, and 
 that only a thin curtain of soldiers — the 
 Ninety-Ninth Pennsylvania — hung in 
 its fi'ont. If that position were in his 
 hands, the whole army of Meade could 
 not again dislodge him. Nay, more: 
 the battle of Gettysburg would be the 
 crowning triumph of the Confederate 
 cause. Selecting his chosen band of 
 Texans, his most trusted soldiers, he 
 pointed out the black and rugged mass, 
 and sent them on theii* mission. With 
 
 the speed of lightning, they rushed for- 
 ward to give effect to the behests of 
 their chief. But they were too late. 
 The path was blocked when they 
 reached Plum Run, a stream which 
 skirts the base of the hill on its west 
 ern side. 
 
 Let us see how this came about 
 When the battle commenced, General 
 Warren, Meade's chief-engineer, after 
 having inspected Sickles' position in 
 company with the general commanding, 
 proceeded to Little Round Top, whence 
 he had a magnificent view of the whole 
 field of battle. He saw the ilrst fierce 
 onset of the enemy, and how nobly it 
 was resisted by the division of Birney. 
 But it was not that which fixed his at- 
 tention and engaged his thoughts. It 
 was the unprotected condition of Little 
 Round Top, the key of the National 
 position, and the tei-rible consequences 
 which must inevitably follow, if it 
 should fall into the hands of the Con- 
 federates. There was no time for delay. 
 The hill had been used as a signal sta- 
 tion ; and the signal-men, when they 
 beheld the onward rush of the Confed- 
 erate masses, commenced to fold their 
 flags and otherwise to prepare for re- 
 tiring. At this moment, the head of 
 Barnes' division, of Sykes' corps, was 
 approaching at the double-quick to i-e- 
 inforce Sickles. Warren assumed the 
 responsibility of detaching Vincent's 
 brigade from that division, and order- 
 ing it upon Little Round Top. Haz- 
 litt's battery, also, was immediately or- 
 dered up; and by almost superhuman 
 efforts, it was raised to the crest of th " 
 hill, and placed in position. Vincent 
 
LITTLE ROUND TOR 
 
 513 
 
 BO disposed his men around the base 
 of the hill, that the a]>proaches were 
 guarded at every point. 
 
 The arrangements were completed not 
 a moment too soon. Scarcely had Vin- 
 cent's regiments — the Sixteenth Michi- 
 gan, Lieutenant-Colonel Welch ; the 
 Forty-Fourth New York^ Colonel Rice ; 
 and the Twentieth Maine, Colonel 
 Chamberlain — taken position behind 
 the huge boulders, when, in the words 
 of one of the officers present, there was 
 hear>l " a loud, fierce, distant yell, as if 
 all pandemonium hud broken loose 
 and joined in the chorus of one grand, 
 universal war-whoop." Three lines 
 deep, at double-quick, on they came. 
 Hazlitt's battery opens upon them its 
 murderous fire ; musketry blaze forth 
 from behind every boulder; but in 
 vain. Those impetuous Texaus will 
 not be checked. On, on they come 
 in ever-increasing numbers. Assault 
 follows assault; but each time they 
 are driven back, broken, bleeding and 
 thinned, their dead and dying com- 
 rades left lying in heaps among the 
 rocks. For over half an hour the sav- 
 age contest lasted; but Vincent's men 
 stood firm ; and being joined by Weed's 
 brigade, of Ayres' division, also of the 
 Fifth corps, the Confederates were 
 di'ivt n from the slope and over the 
 rocky ledges, and the position was se- ! 
 cu)-ed. Not yet, however, ^\■as the i 
 struggle ended. Clinging to tlie rocky 
 hollow which divides the Kouud Tops, 
 they pressed forwai'd, and, although 
 received by a withering musketry fire, 
 succeeded in turning the left flank of 
 the brigade. At this stage, the fight- 
 
 ing was furious. Chamberlain's Twen- 
 tieth Maine fell upon their assailants 
 with the energy of despair, and, with 
 the butts of their muskets, clubbed 
 tljcm to death. The enemy was re- 
 pulsed, but not destroyed. They still 
 clung to the rocky hollow. Chamber- 
 lain's left flank was dangerously ex- 
 posed. He called for help, but in vain. 
 Suddenly, the enemy began to show 
 S(jnie signs of weakness; and Chamber, 
 lain, finding his opportunity, rising to 
 the dignity of the occasion, and. yield- 
 ing to the severe reciuirements of the 
 emergency, oidered his men to fix bay- 
 onets, and, sweeping like a whirlwind 
 upon the now dispirited Texaus, he 
 drove th:;-m before him iu utter rout. At 
 this opportune moment, a brigade of the 
 Pennsylvania reserves charged up the 
 hill, under the personal leadership of 
 General Crawfoid ; and the enemy, be- 
 lieving that hea\-y reinforcements had ar- 
 rived, gave up the contest. The hollow 
 ground between the Round Tops was 
 cleared of the foe. Little Round Top, the 
 key of the position, was secured. The 
 victory was complete ; but it had been 
 won at a great sacrifice. The slaughter 
 had been terrible. It recalled the mem- 
 ory of Ball's Bluff, and the valley of 
 the shadow of death, at Pittsburg 
 Landing. The dead were found piled 
 in heaps behind the rocks; and the 
 narrow valley was literally covered 
 with the mangled bodies of the dead 
 and wounded. The gallant Vincent 
 had yielded up his life. Weed, too, 
 had been killed; and Hazlilt, when 
 bending over the prostrate form of hi» 
 chief, had I'eceived his death-\vound. 
 
au 
 
 GETTYSBURa. 
 
 While this struggle was going on 
 for the i^ossession of Little Round Top, 
 there was even more severe fighting on 
 Birney's right, and at the salient in the 
 Peach Orchard. We have already seen 
 that at the same time that Hood pushed 
 his men on Birney's left, and worked 
 his way through the gap between the 
 left and the Round Top, he drew his 
 line steadily in, and pressed more 
 closely upon Birney's right, until the 
 battle raged between the Round Top 
 and the Peach Orchard. In this at- 
 tack on Birney's right, and particularly 
 on the salient at the orchard. Hood 
 was assisted by McLaws, and eight 
 regiments of Anderson's division, of 
 Hill's corps. Longstreet's great object 
 was to break Sickles' line at the salient, 
 or as it may be called, the centre, and 
 obtain possession of the orchard. The 
 onset of Hood and McLaws on Biraey's 
 front was made with gi-eat vigor; and 
 such was the pressure that Sickles was 
 compelled immediately to send for re- 
 inforcements. It was in response to 
 this call that Barnes' division, of Sykes', 
 was sent forward. Vincent's brigade 
 of this division was, as we have seen, 
 detached by General Warren, and sent 
 to hold Little Round Top. The other 
 two brigades — those of Tilton and 
 Sweitzer — hastened to the' support of 
 Birney. The struggle, at this point, 
 was fierce and terrible. The Nationals 
 made a gallant and determined fight. 
 The Confederates, however, getting 
 their guns into advanced positions, 
 were able to enfilade the National line. 
 The pressure was now iiTesistible. 
 Sickles' men fell back. The National 
 
 line was broken; and the much cov- 
 eted orchard was in possession of the 
 enemy. 
 
 Birney, still resisting fiercely, made 
 a gallant stand on a new position on 
 wooded ground adjoining the wheat 
 field, and intermediate between his last 
 front and the Round Top. De Trobri- 
 and's bi-igade, which had fought most 
 bravely since the first moment of the 
 attack, and which had offered a most 
 stubborn resistance to the advance of 
 the enemy, after the occupation of the 
 orchard, had by this time melted 
 away. The battle was now at its 
 height, and Sickles, who fearlessly ex- 
 posed himself, was wounded and car- 
 ried from the field. The command for 
 the time being devolved upon Birney. 
 In his new position, he placed Sweitzer 
 on his left and Tilton on his right 
 Here again, for a time, the battle raged 
 with great fury. Attempts were again 
 and again made to regain lost giound, 
 and to repel the enemy's advance. It 
 was all in vain. Birney's original front 
 had already been pierced ; and Barnes' 
 brigades, after some stubborn fighting, 
 had been compelled to fall back. Not 
 yet, however, was the struggle to be 
 abandoned. Hancock, made aware of 
 the distressed condition of Birney, de- 
 tached from his front Caldwell's splen- 
 did division, and sent it to his aid. 
 Arrived on the already blood-stained 
 wheat field, Caldwell pushed his men 
 into action. Cross and Kelley were in 
 advance, and were soon in the thick of 
 the fight. The Confederates, as if 
 gathering fresh strength, fell upon 
 them with destructive fury. Both 
 
THE PEACH OEOHAKD. 
 
 516 
 
 brigades were terribly punished; and 
 the gallant Cross, whose braveiy had 
 been exhibited on many a battle field, 
 was killed. Caldwell then advanced 
 his other two brigades, those of Brooke 
 and Zook. At this moment, as one has 
 put it, the " hot battle boiled and bub- 
 bled as though it were some great hell 
 caldron." Zook fell, mortally wounded, 
 as he led his men into action. Brooke 
 was more fortunate. He advanced gal- 
 lantly against the enemy, and drove 
 him from a strong position which he 
 held under cover of the woods. Cald- 
 well's troops performed deeds of valor ; 
 and, for a moment or two, it seemed as 
 if the tide of battle would be turned. 
 But no. The Confederates come rush- 
 ing forward in tremendous force, through 
 the opening made at the Peach Or- 
 chard, and, falling upon him with resist- 
 less energy, envelop his right and pen- 
 etrate almost to his rear. After losing 
 one half of his men, Caldwell, like 
 Birney and Barnes, is compelled to 
 retire. The victorious Confederates 
 now rush through the woods, fall upon 
 Sweitzer, who has joined in this last 
 attack, and hurl him before them. 
 Ayres has just come up, with two bri- 
 gades of regulars, from the Fifth corps. 
 In their onward and triumphant riish, 
 the Confederates strike his right and 
 rear, and almost completely envelop 
 him. It was only with great difficulty, 
 and after much sacrifice, that he was 
 able to fight his way back to his orig- 
 inal line of battle. Ayres was thus 
 made to share the fate of Birney, of 
 Barnes and of Caldwell. The Con- 
 federates have now reached the base of 
 
 the hill. Here they halt, and well 
 they may ; for the heights are crowned 
 by the battalions of the Fifth and Sixth 
 corps. Disorganized by their advance, 
 and suffering terribly, although for 
 the moment victorious, they hesitate 
 as to what to do. The moment is op- 
 portune for a parting blow. Crawford, 
 now on the heights with his brave 
 Pennsylvania reserves, sees his oppor- 
 tunity, and turns it to account. Steal- 
 ing down the heights, he flings his men 
 on the triumphant but now baffled foe. 
 A severe struggle ensues for the pos- 
 session of a stone wall. For a time, 
 the battle rages at this point again 
 with tremendous fury. The Confede- 
 rates, eager to hold the position, offer 
 a most stubborn resistance; but they 
 are ultimately driven back to the 
 woods, beyond the wheat field, where 
 they rest for the night. 
 
 Such was the end of the struggle, 
 which for hours raged so fiercely on 
 Sickles' left and left centre. The posi- 
 tion held by that wing at the com- 
 mencement of the contest, and which 
 had been defended by Birney with so 
 much valor, had been finally aban- 
 doned. In the original disposition of 
 Sickles' troops, as we have seen al- 
 ready, Humphrey's division, with the 
 brigade of Graham, held the right, 
 above and beyond the salient, and fac- 
 ing to the west. Humphrey's position 
 had been peculiar from the commence- 
 ment of the fight. It will be remem- 
 bered that on his right, in consequence 
 of the advanced position of the corps, 
 there was a gap of nearly half a mile 
 between him and Hancock. For 6 
 
516 
 
 6ETTYSBUEG. 
 
 time, after the action commenced on 
 the left, Humphrey was left unassailed. 
 When Birney was sorely pressed, and 
 when the combined strength of Hood 
 and McLaws was brought to bear upon 
 the salient at the Peach Orchard, Hum- 
 phrey was able to send assistance to 
 the sister brigade. The Peach Or- 
 chard had been taken ; the Confede- 
 rates had rushed through the gap in 
 the National line; Birney had fallen 
 back to the new position at the wheat 
 field, where, reinforced first by Cald- 
 well and then by Ayres, the tide of 
 battle again surged and rolled like a 
 tempest-tossed sea ; but still Humphrey 
 was unassailed. Why was this ? Let 
 us see. In the disposition of his troops, 
 as has already been noticed, General Lee 
 had so far extended his right beyond the 
 National left, that it was able to overlap 
 or outflank the latter by at least two 
 brigades. The result of this was that 
 Longstreet's left was pushed so far 
 to the right that Humphrey was con- 
 fronted not by Longstreet, but by 
 Hill. Lee's instructions to Hill were 
 that, in the first stages of the contest 
 at least, he should content himself 
 with making demonstrations against 
 the enemy's centre, so as to prevent 
 reinforcements being drawn to the as- 
 sistance of either the right wing or the 
 left. Thus it was that, while the battle 
 raged most fiercely on his left, Hum- 
 phrey remained untouched. About six 
 o'clock in the evening, and when Bir- 
 ney was about to fall back from his 
 position facing south — a position which 
 was nearly at right angles with the 
 <ii''ision on his right — Birney notified 
 
 Humphrey that Sickles had been 
 wounded, and that he was in command 
 of the corps, and requested him also 
 to fall back, so as to connect with his 
 right. This meant that Humphrey, 
 while holding on to the crest on the 
 Emmettsburg road with his right, 
 should swing back with his left, so as 
 to make change of front, and at the 
 same time keep the line intact. It 
 Avas a most difiicult operation ; but it 
 Avas performed with skill and success. 
 As the immediate result of this ma- 
 noeuvre, Humphrey's right was thrown 
 entirely out of position; and when, 
 finally, the whole left, and the troops 
 which had been sent in support, were 
 driven back, and the forces of Hood 
 and McLaws came rushing through the 
 gap thus created, liis right was fearfully 
 exposed, his own coolness and intrepid- 
 ity alone saving it from complete de- 
 struction. Hancock — who was now in 
 command of Sickles' corps, as well as 
 his own — ever watchful, and seeing the 
 exposed condition of Humphrey's right, 
 sent to its support two regiments, the 
 Fifteenth Massachusetts and the Eighty- 
 Second New York from Gibbon's di- 
 vision; and, to protect him on the 
 left, he pushed forward Willard's bri- 
 gade, of Hays' division. At the same 
 time that the triumphant Confederates, 
 having pierced Sickles' line, were fall- 
 ing heavily on the left, Hill, aVjandon- 
 ing his passive attitude, came down 
 like a thunderbolt on the right. Hum- 
 phrej' was thus caught between two 
 fires. "I was attacked," he says, "on 
 my flanks, as we}' as on my front. I 
 never have been under a hotter artil- 
 
HUMPHREY SEVERELY ATTACKED. 
 
 617 
 
 lery and musketry fire combined. I 
 may have been under a hotter musketry 
 fire. For a moment, I thought the 
 day was lost. I did not order my 
 troops to fall back rapidly because, so 
 far as I could see, the crest in my rear 
 was vacant, and I knew that when 
 troops got to moving rapidly, it was 
 exceedingly difficult to stop them just 
 (vhen you wanted to stop them. At 
 that moment, I received an order to 
 fall back to the Round Top Ridge, 
 which I did slowly, suffering a very 
 heavy loss." 
 
 Humphrey, in truth, was for some 
 time in most difficult and critical cir- 
 cumstances. His division, when left 
 alone by the retirement of Birney, 
 bore a general resemblance to the one 
 side and the two ends of a parallelo- 
 gram; and, upon both his front and 
 flanks, the enemy was rushing with 
 demon-like fury. The attacking party, 
 consisting of the brigades of Wilcox, 
 Perry and Wright, from Anderson's 
 fresh division, had not been engaged 
 in the previous struggles of the day, 
 having been held in readiness for this 
 supreme effort, when the proper time 
 should come. Humphrey was most 
 savagely attacked by Wright ; but he 
 cautiously retired his men until he 
 reached the ridge in his rear, which 
 was still, in consequence of the origi- 
 nal mistake of Sickles, imperfectly pro- 
 tected. So fierce were the attacks, and 
 so great was the pressure, that he was 
 compelled to leave behind him three 
 of his guns, the horses having been 
 killed. Back to the base of the hill 
 and up the crest he was compelled to 
 
 move, the enemy still pressing heavily 
 on liis front. Wilcox and Wright were 
 both well advanced. Ceineter}^ Ridge, 
 it will be remembered, is at this point 
 slightly depressed. It was also, as 
 we have pointed out already, in con- 
 sequence of the advanced position taken 
 by Sickles, but imperfectly defended. 
 Determined to effect a lodgment here, 
 the Confederate battalions rush up 
 the hill, past the National guns, and 
 threaten to take possession of the 
 ridge. A little more success, especial- 
 ly if well supported, and they will be 
 almost masters of the position. Their 
 apparent success, however, is to be 
 their ruin. They are now within range 
 of the musketry of the Second corps, 
 which lias concealed behind a stone 
 wall; The men of the Second rise be- 
 fore them like an apparition. The 
 stone wall seems to blaze. The Con- 
 federates, reeling and staggering under 
 the terrific volley, fall back, leaving 
 their comrades in slaughteretl heaps on 
 the blood-stained ground. 
 
 Not yet, however, was the contest 
 abandoned. The Confederates seemed 
 confident in the thought that the at- 
 tack would become general, and that 
 thus they would be able to hold their 
 advanced position. In this expectation, 
 they were doomed to disappointment. 
 Posey and Mahone, of Anderson's divi- 
 sion, did not advance. Pender's divi- 
 sion, and that of Heth to his left, re- 
 mained inactive. Perry's brigade had 
 been driven back ; but the brigades of 
 Wilcox and Wright kept their face to 
 the foe, and performed prodigies of 
 valor. But it was all in vain. The 
 
518 
 
 GETTYSBURG. 
 
 National position was momentarily 
 gaining strength. Meade had been 
 busy filling up the gap between the 
 corps of Hancock on the right and that 
 of Sykes on the left. Both those corps 
 were drawn upon largely to meet the 
 emergency. A large portion of the 
 First corps and the greater portion of 
 the Twelfth were brought over from 
 the right, to strengthen the weak and 
 menaced left. Sedgwick's troops, too, 
 although weary and footsore with the 
 long march which they had just ac- 
 complished, gladly responded to the 
 call which was made upon them, and 
 came to the front. The series of charges 
 and counter-charges, made at this part 
 of the line for the possession of the 
 ridge, gave to some of the regiments 
 and brigades splendid opportunities for 
 winning distinction. The First Min- 
 nesota, coming up at a critical and 
 most opportune moment, performed 
 gallant service, and mightily increased 
 its already rapidly rising reputation. 
 The same was true, to a greater or less 
 degree, of the Thirteenth Vermont, of 
 the One Hundred and Forty-Ninth and 
 One Hundred and Fiftieth Pennsyl- 
 vania regiments ; and Lockwood's Mary- 
 land brigade, of Ruger's division, of 
 the Twelfth corps, on that 2d day of 
 July, on the National left, covered it- 
 self with glory. The Confederates had 
 now well-nigh exhausted themselves. 
 Their losses had been heavy. Some 
 of their best and most daring officers 
 had fallen. Barksdale, the most im- 
 petuous leader of the boldest attack 
 which had been made in that direction, 
 was lying, in his death-agony, inside 
 
 the National lines. Gathering up his 
 strength for another and closing ef- 
 fort, Hancock fell upon the persistent 
 foe with tremendous energy. It was 
 all that was needed. The Confede- 
 rates were driven back, with great loss 
 and in much confusion ; and, as it was 
 now dusk, the fighting ceased. In this 
 final charge, Humphrey's little band 
 took part : and the general had the 
 satisfaction of recapturing and bringing 
 back his lost guns. Thus ended the 
 great struggle on the National left. 
 The position held by Sickles in the 
 forenoon was lost; but Little Round 
 Top had been secured, and the enemy 
 had failed to effect a lodgment on 
 Cemetery Hill. What the Confede- 
 rates had now won was but sorry com- 
 pensation for what they had lost. Be- 
 fore morning, Little Round Top will 
 be rendered all but impregnable ; and 
 what with the shattered remnants of 
 Sickles' divisions, and the divisions of 
 Doubleday and Robinson, from the 
 First corps, and a powerful detachment, 
 under Williams, from the Twelfth, a 
 new line will be formed where the or- 
 iginal line ought to have been, and the 
 National front will be closed. 
 
 Such was the issue of events on the 
 National left. Let us now turn our 
 attention to the National right. This 
 position, it will be remembered, was 
 held by Slocum, by Wadsworth's divi- 
 sion, of the First corps, and by How- 
 ard, and in the order named, Slocum 
 being on Culp's Hill, at the extreme 
 right- Opposed to these, on the Con- 
 federate left, were the forces of GeneifJ 
 Ewell. According to the order giv en 
 
GULP'S HILL. 
 
 S19 
 
 by General Lee to his corps command- 
 ers, Ewell, when Longstreet had fallen 
 on the National left, was to attack 
 " directly the high ground on the ene- 
 my's right, which had already been 
 partially fortified." For some unex- 
 plained leason, the attack was not made 
 until about six o'clock. During the 
 two hotirs which had elapsed since the 
 fighting commenced on the left, Meade, 
 discovering no signs of any aggressive 
 movement on the part of Ewell, sent 
 detachment after detachment to the as- 
 sistance of the left. The whole of the 
 Twelfth corps, with the exception of 
 
 s division. 
 
 Greene's brigade, of Gear 
 
 }■ 
 
 had thus been harried away. The re- 
 sult was that the forces on the right 
 were greatly reduced, and that the po- 
 sition was comparatively unprotected. 
 But for the nerve of Greene, this uufoi'- 
 tunate arrangement might have proved 
 ruinous to the National army, and de- 
 cided the fortunes of the day. Between 
 Cemetery Hill and Gulp's Hill, there 
 is a little ravine or depression which 
 inaiks the end of the one hill and the 
 1). ginning of the other. To the left of 
 this ravine, and extending around the 
 breast of Cemetery Hill, was Howard's 
 corps, under cover of the stone wall, 
 the summit of the hill being crowned 
 by the batteries of Wiedrich and Rick- 
 etts. To the right of the ravine, and 
 on the extreme left of Gulp's Hill, 
 guarding the ravine and the approaches 
 from the town, was Stevens' Maine 
 battery, which had done some excellent 
 work during the action of the fiist 
 day. On the right of the battery 
 was the breast-work which had been 
 
 thrown up by WadswortJ, and which, 
 being carried around the hill, was 
 taken up by Greene. Greene had re 
 fused his right and carried his breast 
 work back so as to protect his flank 
 On Benner's Hill, a little to the north- 
 east of Gulp's Hill, Ewell had planted 
 his advance batteries. 
 
 About six o'clock, the Confederate 
 guns on Benner's Hill opened a tre- 
 mendous fire. The National guns were 
 quickly got in range; and, an eye- 
 witness has told us, that in about 
 twenty minutes, the batteries on Ben- 
 ner's Hill were "knocked into pV 
 The sun was already near his setting, 
 and the fire of the Confederate guns 
 was noticeably slackening, when Ew.ell 
 pushed forward from the town the two 
 divisions of Early and Johnson — the 
 former on Cemetery, the latter on 
 Gulp's Hill. Early's columns consisted 
 of the brigades of Hays and Hoke, 
 and were headed by the famous Louisi- 
 ana Tigers. On they came in magnifi- 
 cent array. A terribln reci^ption they 
 knew awaited them; but there was 
 neither fear in their look? nor trem- 
 bling in their footsteps. "Whan within 
 eight hundred yards, Stevens opened 
 upon them with all his guns, WK'drich 
 and Ricketts speedily joining in the 
 chorus. Quickly wheeling into line, 
 they dash up the hill, a very tempest 
 of shrapnel and canister falling upon 
 them, and ploughing huge gaps in their 
 unmasked front. Fearless of the death- 
 dealing battei'ies, and heedless of the 
 cries of agony which come from com- 
 rades falling by their side, on they 
 press. They are now within musk»t 
 
020 
 
 GETTYSBUKG. 
 
 range of the stone wall. While the 
 batteries are being fired at the rate of 
 four shots a minute, Howard's men leap 
 from their concealment, and pour vol- 
 ley after volley into their already deci- 
 mated ranks. On their left, and at the 
 centre, the Confederates are beaten 
 back. Theii' right, however, pushes 
 on with a stubbornness which is heroic, 
 and with an energy which is irresist- 
 ible. With one wild leap, and utter- 
 ing their accustomed yell, they clear 
 the stone walls. Nationals and Con- 
 federates are now mixed up in inextri- 
 cable confusion. Stevens, fearful lest 
 he should be killing friend as well as 
 foe, is compelled to cease firing. Wied- 
 rich's batteiy is overrun, his supports 
 and his own men being swept away as 
 with the force of a whii"lwind. At 
 Ricketts' battery, a tremendous strug- 
 gle takes place. It is man to man — 
 hand to hand. Bayonets are crossed ; 
 guns are clubbed, emd when these fail, 
 handspikes, ranuners, stones are freely 
 used. " Death on our own State soil, 
 rather than give up the guns!"— such 
 was the cry of the brave cannoneers. 
 
 The situation really had become crit- 
 ical. Howard's men had been broken 
 and demoralized by the fierceness of 
 the onset. At this critical moment, 
 help arrived. Carroll's brigade, vol- 
 untarily sent by Hancock when he 
 heard the firing, rushed upon the scene. 
 The Confederates, surprised by this 
 fresh opposition, fell back in confusion ; 
 and Ricketts' men, again at their guns, 
 gave them a parting salute in the form 
 of double-shotted canister. Such was 
 the end of Early's grand charge, led 
 
 by the famous, and hitherto invincible, 
 Louisiana Tigers. The Tigers went 
 back bravely, 600 strong, and were 
 never aftei'wards known as a separate 
 
 organization. 
 
 While this daring and desperate, but 
 unsuccessful, efPort was being made for 
 the possession of Cemeteiy Hill, a no 
 less daring and equally desperate eifort 
 was made for the possession of Culp's 
 Hill, on the extreme right of the Na- 
 tional line. The attack was made, as 
 we have already indicated, by John- 
 son's division, of Ewell's corps, and 
 was led by the redoubtable " Stonewall 
 bi'igade." The position, as we have 
 seen, was held by Wadsworth's divi- 
 sion, of the First corps, and by Greene's 
 cue Itrigade of the Twelfth. In the 
 absence of the greater portion of the 
 Twelfth corps, the works which had 
 here been thrown up, and which were 
 of considerable strength, were peculiar- 
 ly at the mercy of a daring antagonist. 
 Sweeping across Rock Creek, which at 
 this season of the year is easily ford- 
 able, the attacking columns, fired with 
 the spirit of their fo'.mer leader, rushed 
 through the woods, wliich spread out 
 from the base of the hill and down 
 towards the creek. As yet, they have 
 encountered no resistance ; for the Na- 
 tional skirmishers, thrown out towards 
 the front, yield and fall back at the 
 first touch. They are now in full view, 
 and within musket range of the breast- 
 works, behind which Greene and Wads 
 worth are entrenched. The breast- 
 works blaze; and there is heard the 
 sharp, clear rattling, as of thousands oJ 
 musket shots. Volley succeeds volh^y 
 
CLOSE OF THE SECOND DAY'S FIGHTING. 
 
 52\ 
 
 with, amazing rapidity ; and before this 
 murderous fire, the Confederate bat- 
 talions for a moment recoil. Discov- 
 ering that the breast-works to Greene's 
 right are unoccupied, they make an- 
 other tremendous rash, and, almost 
 unresisted, gain a foothold within the 
 National lines. The burden of the 
 attack now falls upon Greene. This 
 veteran soldier had but few men ; yet 
 he had a brave heart and an enduring 
 spirit; and happily, too, he had strong- 
 ly secured his right flank by a powerful 
 earth-work. On this point, the Con- 
 federate leader concentrates his strength. 
 Assault after assault is made, but in 
 vain. Greene makes a gallant resist- 
 ance, repelling every advance of the 
 foe with tremendous loss; and Wads- 
 worth, no longer so sorely pressed on 
 his front, comes nobly to his aid. Such 
 was the state of things when darkness 
 fell upon the scene, and Ewell, happily 
 for the National army, discontinued 
 the contest. Greene still held his posi- 
 tion ; and Johnson's men occupied the 
 vacated breast-works. So ended the 
 second day's fighting at Gettysburg. 
 Both sides had suffered severely. Gen- 
 eral Meade lost 10,000 men. The 
 Confederate loss must have been much 
 greater. 
 
 General Lee was not dissatisfied 
 with the result of the day's fighting. 
 It was his belief that, from the success 
 which had attended the efforts of the 
 day, "he would ultimately be able to 
 dislodge the enemy." It was his de- 
 termination, therefore, to continue the 
 assault next day. Nor, it must be ad- 
 mitted, was General Lee without good 
 
 reason for so regarding the situation, 
 Longstreet, if he had not been com- 
 pletely successful, had driven the Na- 
 tionals before him, and occupied the 
 whole front held by Sickles and his 
 Third corps at the commencement of 
 the fight ; Ewell, having thrust his ex- 
 treme left inside the breast-works on 
 the National right, held a position from 
 which, if he was not driven, he might 
 be able to take Meade's entire line in 
 I'everse ; and although the losses ou the 
 National side could not be greater than 
 his own, they had been so heavy as to 
 wan-ant the opinion that they would 
 have a demoralizing influence on the 
 troops. On the whole, Lee was not to 
 be blamed if he arrived at the conclu- 
 sion that fortune was on his side. If 
 he had known more, he would have 
 known that the battle was lost when 
 Ewell allowed the darkness to inter- 
 rupt the fighting; for, knowing what 
 we know now, there is scarcely room 
 for doubt that, if that general had 
 pushed his advantage, he miglit have 
 played havoc with the trains, and 
 forced the whole National army into 
 an inglorious retreat. As it was, Lee's 
 inferences were more reasonable than 
 just or correct ; for the position gained 
 in front of the National left was a gain 
 more apparent than real ; and, before 
 the morning light, the front of the left 
 will be restored, and made strong and 
 secure in what Avas intended to be its 
 original position, and the troops with- 
 drawn on the previous day, unwisely 
 and at serious peril, will be massed 
 again on the exposed and almost de- 
 fenseless right. It was not, therefore. 
 
522 
 
 GETTYSBUEG. 
 
 without good reason that, while Lee 
 was counting with confidence on vic- 
 tory on the morrow, Meade and his 
 generals, in council assembled, should 
 have resolved to abide in their position, 
 and to "fight it out at Gettysburg." 
 
 During the darkness, Johnson's force, 
 which had gained a position of advan- 
 tage, held close to Gulp's Hill. His 
 numbers were largely increased; and 
 the position was strengthened. Meade, 
 however, determined to continue the 
 fight, was not idle. A large num- 
 ber of guns were got into position, 
 so as to beai' upon the point entered 
 and held by the enemy. Geary's divi- 
 sion, in obedience to orders, returned 
 to occupy the "abandoned works. When 
 moving towards them, all unsuspicious 
 of danger, the advance was suddenly 
 arrested by a volley from behind a 
 stone wall. It was not until then that 
 Geary became aware that the works 
 were in the possession of the enemy. 
 He then took position on the right of 
 Greene; and his men, disturbed only 
 by the occasional firing of skirmishers, 
 slept on their arms. Later, Williams' 
 division, of the same corps, now under 
 Buger — Williams having assumed chief 
 command — came up, and was posted 
 on the flank and rear of the enemy. 
 
 As early as three o'clock on the 
 jniy morning of the 3d, there were 
 3« signs of activity in the enemy's 
 front. It was evident that an attack 
 was intended ; and Geary, having been 
 informed by General Kane, who com- 
 manded his first brigade, of what was 
 going on, resolved to seize whatever 
 advantage might be gained by opening 
 
 the battle himself. His men were 
 aroused ; and at twenty minutes before 
 four o'clock, he gave the signal for at- 
 tack by discharging his pistol. The 
 battle at once became general. A fear- 
 ful struggle ensued. A heavy artillery 
 file was opened at once on the enemy's 
 position. But, as the ground was rug- 
 ged and broken, and also covered with 
 trees, and as every advantage was taken 
 of places of shelter and concealment, 
 the fight partook very much of the 
 character of sharpshooting on a grand 
 scale. As the battle progressed, the 
 contestants got intermingled; and it 
 became more and more difficult to use 
 the artillery. The Confederates not 
 only held their position, but charged 
 again and again, in heavy masses, on 
 the National lines, only, however, to 
 be repulsed with tremendous loss. The 
 slaughter was temble. The sun arose ; 
 the day advanced; the air became 
 clouded with dust and smoke ; the heat 
 became almost intolerable ; but still 
 the battle raged. At last there is a 
 lull in the long-continued tempest. 
 Then, suddenly, there is a fierce yell 
 from thousands of throats ; and Ewell's 
 men, having gathered up their strength 
 for a final effort, are seen rushing 
 forward vrith tremendous fury. They 
 are allowed to come within easy mus- 
 ket range, when the men in blue, 
 springing to their feet, pour in upon 
 them a deliberate volley. It was the 
 last charge on this part of the line. 
 Discomfited and discouraged, torn and 
 bleeding, their dead and wounded com- 
 panions piled in heaps on the ground 
 where they fell, the survivors drew 
 
EWELL DEFEATED. 
 
 623 
 
 back through the woods towards Rock 
 Creek, fighting, as they retired, with a 
 courage which commanded the admira- 
 tion of their foes. Shouts of victoiy 
 now filled the air. "Men," says one 
 who was present, and shared in the 
 triumph, " cheered themselves hoarse, 
 laughed, rolled themselves on the 
 ground, and threw their caps high in 
 air, while others shook hands with com- 
 rades, and thanked God that the Star 
 corps had again triumphed." Geary, 
 not uisposed to allow the Confederates 
 to re-form, as soon as this charge was 
 repelled, made a vigoi'ous counter- 
 charge ; and the enemy, yielding easily, 
 the breast-works were reoccupied, and 
 the right flank secured. Thus ended 
 the fighting on the right. 
 
 Ewell had been completely baffled 
 in his plan. He had flung away his 
 opportunity the night before; and, to 
 reclaim it, he had now done his best, and 
 failed. He could not find fault with 
 his men ; for never, even under Jack- 
 son, had they fought more bravelj'. 
 "It cannot be denied," says General 
 Kane, who, with his glorious first bri- 
 gade, of Geary's division, bore the 
 burden of that morning's fight, " that 
 they fought most courageously." But 
 they were pitted against men of equal 
 bravery, of equal detennination with 
 themselves — men who were now on 
 their own soil, and fighting for the 
 sanctity of their own homes. Never, 
 perhaps, before, since the war com- 
 menced, had the fighting been more 
 determined and severe than it was dur- 
 ing those long, dreary morning hours. 
 The ground, after the battle, red with 
 
 gore, and thickly covered with the 
 bodies of the slain, gave evidence of 
 the terrible character of the struggle. 
 The gi'ey and the blue uniforms were 
 sometimes found in one common heap. 
 Some poor fellows, after hours of suf- 
 fering, and having almost bled to 
 death, were found writhing in mortal 
 agony. The wood in which the battle 
 raged was "torn and rent with shells 
 and solid shot, and pierced with in- 
 numerable minie balls." In the follow- 
 ing summer, the trees were leafless, as 
 if the mute but stalwart giants of the 
 forest had yielded up their lives with 
 those who fell beneath their shade. 
 
 It was now shortly after ten o'clock. 
 The last sounds of battle had died 
 away. There was silence over the 
 whole battle field. It was evident, 
 however, that preparations were being 
 made inside the Confederate lines for 
 another gigantic and possibly crown- 
 ing effort. The morning sky had been 
 obscured by broken clouds. As the 
 forenoon advanced, the clouds dis- 
 persed ; and a hot July sun poured 
 down his rays with a tropical intensity. 
 Pickett's division, of Longstreet's corps, 
 which had not come up on the previ- 
 ous day, had now arrived on the field. 
 Stuart, also, after his long detour, had 
 joined Lee with his cavalry. It soon 
 began to be manifest that the point of 
 attack was to be the National left 
 centre — the depressed part of the ridge 
 immediately north of Little Round 
 Top. By noon, the guns were got 
 into position on the ridge occupied by 
 Longstreet and Hill. Meade had an 
 abundant supply of the same instru- 
 
624 
 
 GETTYSBURG. 
 
 ments of war; but, owing to the pe- 
 culiarity of the ground, he could only, 
 out of 300 guns, make use of 80, 
 against those of the enemy. About 
 one o'clock, the report of a Whitworth 
 gun was heard. It was the signal for 
 attack. Seminary Hill seemed as if 
 swept with a tongue of flame. Then 
 came the loud, thundering roar of artil- 
 lery; and 145 guns, from their angry 
 mouths poured death and destruction 
 ju the National lines. The National 
 commanders ordered their men to lie 
 flat on the earth, and to take every ad- 
 vantage of objects of protection. All 
 this M^as done ; but, notwithstanding 
 every precaution, the desti'uction of 
 life and property was terrible. Solid 
 shot, chain-shot, shrapnel, sheila, fell 
 with deadly effect inside the National 
 lines. Men and horses were dread- 
 fully cut up; caissons filled with am- 
 munition were exploded ; and gun- 
 carriages and other pieces of war ma- 
 terial were shattered to pieces. The 
 shot and shell and canister fell thick 
 and fast in and around General Meade's 
 headquarters, killing men and horses, 
 ripping up the roof and knocking away 
 the pillars of the cottage. 
 
 General Hunt, Meade's chief of ar- 
 tillery, was in no haste to reply. Wait- 
 ing until the first hostile outbreak spent 
 itself, he then ordered the batteries to 
 open fire. Instantly, the whole ridge, 
 from Cemetery Hill to the Round 
 Tops, seemed ablaze. The din was ter- 
 rific, the thunder of artillery rivalling, 
 in fierce grandeur, the most magnificent 
 displays of nature. For two hours this 
 artillery duel lasted ; and, during that 
 
 time- war was exhibitf:! in its sublimer 
 and more imposmg aspects. In hia 
 Decisive Battles of the War, Swinton 
 tells us that " as a spectacle this, the 
 grandest artillery combat that ever oc 
 curred on the continent, was magnifi- 
 cent beyond description, and realized 
 all that is grandiose in the circumstance 
 of war." A spectator in the Confede- 
 rate army says "the air was made hide- 
 ous with discordant noises. The very 
 earth shook beneath our feet; and the 
 hills and rocks seemed to reel like a 
 drunken man." 
 
 At the expiration of two hours, there 
 was 1 lull in the cannonade. Hunt, 
 dreading the possible exhaustion of his 
 ammunition, and not willing to bring 
 up loads of it from the rear, lest it 
 should be exploded, had ordered p 
 gradual slackening of the fire. The 
 Confederates were deceived. It was 
 Lee's belief that he had silenced all the 
 enemy's guns, except a few which still 
 kept firing from a clump of woods. 
 Now came the more serious business of 
 war. The fire of the Confederate guns 
 also slackened ; and the columns oi 
 attack were seen forming on the edge 
 of the woods which ci'own the summit 
 of Seminary Ridge. It was jr.st three 
 o'clock. When formed, the front was 
 about a mile in extent; and, as it 
 emerged from the woods, and began to 
 move steadily and firmly down the 
 slope of Seminary Ridge, a thrill of 
 admiration passed through the National 
 ranks. It was a splendid sight, and 
 well fitted to call forth admiration, even 
 in the breast of an enemy. The divi- 
 sions of Hood and McLaws, as we have 
 
THE THIRD DAY'S PiaHTING. 
 
 b'iS 
 
 seen, had been sorely tried in the 
 fighting of the 2d ; and it was part of 
 the arrangement of Longstreet, who 
 this day again was to play the part 
 of the aggressor, that these divisions 
 should cover his right flank, while he 
 made the attack. The fresh division 
 of Pickett, composed mostly ot veteran 
 Virginians, was, therefore, singled out, 
 and appointed to lead the van. Pick- 
 ett's men were fonned, arranged in 
 double line of battle, the brigades of 
 Kemper and Garnett being placed in 
 front, and that of Armistead slightly 
 in the rear. On Pickett's advanced 
 right was one brigade, of Hill's corps, 
 under General Wilcox, formed in col- 
 umn by battalions ; and on his left, but 
 somewhat in the rear, was Heth's divi- 
 sion, also of Hill's corps, commanded 
 by Pettigrew. The attacking force 
 numbered about 18,000 men. On came 
 the Confederates in the order which 
 we have described. The distance be- 
 tween the two lines of battle was about 
 a mile. For the attacking party, there 
 was a hill to descend and a hill to climb, 
 and a valley between. It was matter 
 of observation that, as the columns 
 advanced, the Confederate guns were 
 silent. " Why ?" was the question put 
 by the men who were rushing into the 
 jaws of death. " Why ?" said the men 
 on the heights behind. "Why?" said 
 the Nationals on the heights in front. 
 The reason was not known till after- 
 wards. It was not then known to Lee 
 himself. His ammunition was already 
 exhausted. The silence of the guns in 
 their rear did not affect the finn and 
 steaily step of the advancing columns. 
 
 It did not encourage the Nationals to 
 slacken their artillery fii-e. On came 
 Longstreet's men, in face of the wither- 
 ing tempest of bullet and canister and 
 shell which, at each successive step, deci- 
 mated their front. On, on they came; and 
 it was already a question in the National 
 ranks whether their own thin line of 
 defense could resist the fierce onset of 
 those firm and compact battalions who 
 seemed to fear no fii'e, to dread no foe. 
 The Nationals, however, were not 
 ill-prepared for the attack. Doubleday 
 was on the left, with Staunard's bri- 
 gade, of Vermont troops, well advanced 
 in a little grove on his own right, and 
 at an angle with the main line. Han- 
 cock was more to the right, with his 
 two divisions, of Gibbon and Haj^s, in 
 front. From the direction in which the 
 assaulting columns were moving, it 
 seemed for a time as if the first heavy 
 blow would fall upon Doubleday. 
 Such, however, was the severity of the 
 artillery fire from Little Round Top, 
 that they were foi'ced to bend more to 
 their own left. Still they moved on, 
 their line of march now bringing them 
 more directly in front of Hancock's 
 position. Now came the opportunity 
 for Stannard's brave Vermonters. In 
 the original line of march, the direction 
 was such that Pickett's centre would 
 have struck the grove in which Stan- 
 nard's men were sheltered. The doub- 
 ling in towards their own left carried 
 the attacking columns somewhat to the 
 north of the grove, but only so far 
 north as to leave their exposed, right 
 flank within easy range of Stannard's 
 muskets. The Vermonters were in no 
 
 v<» 
 
526 
 
 GETTYSBUKO. 
 
 haste to waste their ammunition. The 
 Confederate columns were allowed to 
 come so well forward that their right 
 flank was fully exposed. Then, at the 
 signal given, the Vermont men pour 
 forth a well-directed and most destruc- 
 tive -fire. Volley succeeds volley in 
 rapid succession ; and the now trem- 
 bling lines, already torn and tattered, 
 are under the oblique fire of eight bat- 
 teries, in charge of Major McGilvray. 
 Not a few of Pickett's men, unable to 
 endure this terrific fire, were compelled 
 to surrender. The main, body, how- 
 ever, presses on ; and, inclining still 
 more to his own left, Pickett is moving 
 straight on the divisions of Gibbon and 
 Hays. "Hold your fire, boys 5 they 
 are not near enough yet," was Gib- 
 bon's injunction, as he moved calmly 
 and composedly along the ranks. The 
 rifled guns of the National artillery, 
 having fired away all their canister, 
 were now withdrawn to await the issue 
 of the struggle between the opposing 
 infantry. The hostile lines are now 
 within two and three hundred yards of 
 the National front. Gibbon and Hays 
 simultaneously open upon the advanc- 
 ing columns a most destructive fire. 
 The response is swift and well-directed, 
 the Confederates using their muskets 
 for the first time since they began to 
 face this terrific storm of artillery and 
 musketry. All at once the battle be- 
 comes general. 
 
 The swing made by the advancing 
 columns to their own left, after the 
 terrific blow received by them from 
 Stannard, had the effect of flinging 
 Pettigrew, who commanded Heth's di- 
 
 vision, of Hill's corps, well towarda 
 Hays' right. Pettigrew's men were, 
 for the most part, North Carolina 
 troops, and were comparatively raw 
 and unused to battle. They had been 
 deceived into the belief that they 
 would meet only the Pennsylvania mili- 
 tia. They were quickly undeceived. 
 Hays' men were admirably posted. 
 His right was well advanced ; and the 
 nature of the ground was such as to 
 enable him to open a simultaneous fire 
 on Pettigrew's troops, not only with 
 his right and front, but also with 
 several lines in his rear. Woodruff's 
 battery was also in position; and the 
 destructive effects of a very tempest 
 of bullets were to be aggravated by 
 showers of grape and canister. All at 
 once, this tremendous fire tell upon the 
 already torn and decimated lines on 
 Pickett's left; and they knew they 
 were in the presence of the army of 
 the Potomac. There was no more fight 
 in them. Terror-stricken, Pettigrew's 
 men broke in utter confusion, large 
 numbers of them flinging down their 
 arms, and accepting mercy at the hands 
 of their antagonists. General Pettigrew 
 himself was wounded ; but, being able 
 to retain command, he vainly strove 
 to rally his men. Fifteen colors, and 
 2000 prisoners rewarded the skill and 
 activity with which Hays met the 
 threatened attack. 
 
 While disaster was thus befalling 
 the Confederate columns on the right 
 and left, Pickett's brave Virginians 
 were pressing forward vigorously to- 
 wards Gibbon's front, and were about 
 to fall with all their weight on Owen's 
 
THE NATIONAL LINE PENETRATED. 
 
 527 
 
 brigade, now temporarily commanded 
 by General "Webb. This brigade com- 
 prised the Sixty-Ninth Pennsylvania — 
 Owen's own — composed mostly of Irish- 
 men renowned for their gallantry in 
 the Peninsula; the Seventy- First, or- 
 iginally recruited and led by Baker, 
 who perished at Ball's Bluff, and now 
 commanded by Colonel R. Penn Smith ; 
 and the Seventy-Second, commanded 
 by Colonel Baxter. It was a veteran 
 brigade, and was now to be sorely 
 tested. General Gibbon, to allow the 
 artillery to play upon the advancing 
 column with grape-shot, had ordered 
 this brigade to fall back behind the 
 batteries. The Sixty-Ninth and the 
 Seventy-First took position behind a 
 low stone wall, with a slight breast- 
 work in front : the Seventy-Second was 
 behind the crest, some sixty paces in 
 the rear, and was so placed as to be 
 able to fire over the heads of those in 
 front. In spite of the dreadful fire of 
 artillery and musketry which was 
 mowing down their ranks, Pickett's 
 men rush bravely on. They are now 
 close to the stone wall. The two Na- 
 tional regiments in front yield and fall 
 back to the regiment in the rear. 
 Webb and his officers are at hand ; the 
 retreating regiments are quickly rallied 
 and re-formed ; and the second line is 
 held. But the Confederates have pushed 
 themselves over the breast-works, and 
 planted their battle flags on the wall. 
 The straggle now becomes fierce and 
 terrific in the extreme. It is a hand- 
 to-hand conflict, man facing man, and 
 fighting with the energy of despair. 
 The clothes of the men are actually 
 
 being burned by the powder of the ex- 
 ploding cartridges; and the National 
 cannoneers, refusing to retire, are 
 clubbed and bayoneted at their guns. 
 Pickett, however, is now left entirely 
 alone. The forces which were intended 
 to cover his left have been defeated, 
 captured or driven from the field. 
 Wilcox, whose duty it was to come up 
 and cover his right, has failed to ad- 
 vance. The right of his own division 
 has been badly cut up and destroyed. 
 Hancock, who this day revealed all 
 the qualities of a great commander in 
 actual conflict, now massed his men on 
 the point which was in danger. Hall 
 and Harrow, who had now no longer 
 an enemy in their front, were brought 
 over with their brigades to reinforce 
 the centre. The Nineteenth Massachu- 
 setts, Colonel Devereux and Mallou's 
 Forty-Second New York, both of Gate's 
 brigade, of Doubleday's division, of 
 the First corps, were moved in the 
 same direction. Stannard, at the same 
 time, moved forward two of his Ver- 
 mont regiments to strike the enemy on 
 the right flank. The situation, Han- 
 cock tells us, had now become very 
 peculiar, "The men of all the bri- 
 gades had, in some measure, lost their 
 regimental organization, but individual- 
 ly, they were firm. The ambition of 
 individual commanders to cover the 
 point penetrated by the enemy, the 
 smoke of the battle and the intensity 
 of the engagement caused this confu. 
 sion. The point, however, was covered. 
 In regular foi'mation, our line would 
 have stood four ranks deep." Pickett's 
 men were now pressed on all sides. 
 
i28 
 
 GETTYSBURG. 
 
 The colors of the different National 
 regiments were well advanced. Cheered 
 by the words, and fired by the example 
 of their officers, the men pressed brave- 
 ly forward. It is the climax of the 
 fight ; but the end is at hand. Pickett's 
 men had done their best and their ut- 
 most — they had fought like true heroes; 
 but now, utterly overpowered, and re- 
 duced to the last stage of desperation, 
 they give up the fight. Flinging their 
 arms from them, many of them raise 
 their hands in token of surrender; 
 others fall upon the ground to escape 
 the destructive fire ; the remainder 
 seek safety in flight. 
 
 In this last struggle, Gibbon's divi- 
 sion took 12 colors and 2500 prisoners. 
 So far, Hancock had captured 27 battle 
 flags and 4500 prisoners. It was a 
 magnificent trophy. The losses on both 
 sides were veiy hea\'y. The face of 
 the hill and the low ground was 
 literally covered with the dead and 
 wounded. In no previous battle had 
 the officers suffered so severely. On 
 the National side, large numbers had 
 been struck down, Generals Gibbon 
 and Hancock being among the wounded. 
 The Confederates left on the field four- 
 teen of their field-officers, only one of 
 that rank escaping unhurt ; and, of the 
 three bi-igade commanders, of Pickett's 
 division, Garnett was killed, A.rmitage 
 fell within the National lines, fatally 
 wounded, and Kemper was carried off 
 the field, dangerously hurt. 
 
 Substantially, the battle of Gettys- 
 burg was now ended. Another feeble 
 and foolish attempt, however, was made 
 on the National lines. Wilcox's com- 
 
 mand, it will be remembered, had origin- 
 ally been placed on Pickett's right, the 
 intention being that it should cover 
 that flank. Wilcox, however, failed to 
 advance, keeping to the right when 
 Pickett bent towai'ds the left. After 
 the repulse of Pickett, Wilcox ad- 
 vanced to the attack alone. In passing 
 over the plain, and when within a few 
 hundred yards of Hancock's line, he 
 was met by a tremendous fire of artil- 
 lery ; and Stannard, who was again in 
 position, fell upon his flank and rear, 
 doing terrible damage, and capturing 
 several hundred prisoners. While the 
 battle was raging in Hancock's front, 
 there was evidence that vigorous move- 
 ments were about to be initiated by 
 Ewell against the extreme National 
 right, and by Longstreet against the 
 extreme National left. The main at- 
 tack, however, was so much of a failure 
 from the commencement that neither 
 of those commanders felt justified in 
 rashly risking the lives of their men, 
 and making what might prove to be a 
 useless and costly sacrifice. Some of 
 Longsti'eet's men had remained in the 
 woods beyond the wheat fields, in front 
 of Little Round Top; but, after Pickett 
 and Wilcox had been driven back, 
 Crawd^ord charged through the woods, 
 driving the enemy in confusion before 
 him, and capturing some hundreds of 
 men, with a large quantity of arms. 
 During the day, there had been some 
 severe cavalry engagements, Kilpatrick 
 holding the enemy's horse in check on 
 the National left, and Gregg having a 
 severe but successful encounter with 
 Hampton on the right. Farnsworth, 
 
A NATIONAL VICTORY. 
 
 539 
 
 while heading a charge on the left 
 against one of Hood's brigades, sup- 
 ported by Stuart's cavalry, was killed, 
 with many of his officers. The final 
 charge, made by Gregg on the right, 
 is said to have been one of the most 
 brilliant sabre charges made during 
 the war. It had evidently been Lee's 
 intention, in the event of success crown- 
 ing his infantry attack, to make a 
 liberal use of his cavalry force, and, if 
 he found himself \inable to surround 
 and destroy the National army, at least 
 to harass its retreat. Happilj', success 
 was denied him ; and the execution of 
 this contingent purpose was rendered 
 unnecessary. 
 
 What remained of the broken and 
 shattered Confederate columns, after 
 having been driven across the lower 
 ground and terribly punished by the 
 National artillery, was at length cov- 
 ered by Wright's brigade, which had 
 been moved forward by Lee for that 
 purpose, and was thus finally brought 
 back within the lines on Seminaiy 
 Ridge. Lee did not choose to resume 
 the attack ; and Meade did not follow 
 up the victory. The armies, when 
 night came, had resumed their respec- 
 tive positions on the opposing heights. 
 Thus was fought, for three weary days, 
 and thus was ended, the famous battle of 
 Grettysburg — "the greatest in respect 
 of its proportions, and the weightiest 
 in reapect of the issues involved, of all 
 the actions waged during four years, 
 between the mighty rival armies of the 
 East." The losses alone entitle it to 
 rank with the first-class battles of his- 
 tory. The Confederate loss reached 
 
 the enormous aggregate of 36,000 men, 
 of whom .5000 were killed, and 23,000 
 wounded. The National loss was 
 23,000, of whom 2834 were killed, 
 13,733 wounded, and 6643 missing. 
 
 On the evening of the 3d, at 8.30 
 o'clock. General Meade wrote to General 
 Halleck : "The enemy opened at one 
 o'clock P. M., from about 150 guns. 
 He concentrated upon my left centre, 
 continuing without intermission for 
 about three hours, at the expiration of 
 which time he assaulted my left centre 
 twice, being, upon both occasions, 
 handsomely repulsed with severe loss 
 to him, leaving in our hands nearly 
 three thousand prisoners. Among the 
 prisoners are Major-General Armistead, 
 and many colonels and officers of lesser 
 note. The enemy left many dead upon 
 the field, and a large n umber of wound- 
 ed in our hands. The loss upon our 
 side has been considerable. Major- 
 General Hancock and Brigadier-Gen- 
 eral Gibbon were wounded. After the 
 repelling of the assault, indications 
 leading to the belief that the enemy 
 might be withdrawing, an armed recon- 
 noissance was pushed forward from the 
 left, and the enemy found to be in 
 force. At the present hour, all is quiet. 
 Brio-ades of our eavalrv have been en- 
 gaged all day on both flanks of the 
 enemy, harassing and vigorously attack- 
 ing him with great success, notwith- 
 standing they encountered superior 
 numbers, both of cavalry and artillery. 
 The army is in fine spirits." On the 
 following day, he issued an address to 
 the army of the Potomac, in which, in 
 behalf of the country, he expressed his 
 
530 
 
 GETTYSBURG. 
 
 thanks to officers and men for the 
 glorious result of the recent operations. 
 "Our enemy," he said, "superior in 
 numbers, and flushed with the pride of 
 a successful invasion, attempted to over- 
 come or destroy this army. Utterly 
 baffled and defeated, he has now with- 
 drawn from the contest. The priva- 
 tions and fatigues the army has en- 
 dured, and the heroic courage and gal- 
 lantry it has displayed, Avill be matters 
 of history, to be ever remembered Our 
 task is not yet accomplished ; and the 
 commanding general looks to the aitny 
 for greater efforts, to drive fi-om our 
 soil every vestige of the presence of 
 the invader. It is right and proper 
 that we should, on suitable occasions, 
 return our grateful thanks to the Al- 
 mighty Disposer of events that, in the 
 goodness of His providence. He has 
 thought fit to give victory to the cause 
 of the just." On the same day, the 
 following suitable announcement was 
 issued by the president : 
 
 " Washington, D. C, July 4, 1863—10 A. M. 
 
 "The president of the United States 
 announces to the country that the news 
 from the army of the Potomac, up to 
 ten o'clock P. M., of the 3d, is such as 
 to cover the army with the highest 
 honor, to promise great success to the 
 cause of the Union, and to claim the 
 condolence of all for the many gallant 
 fallen ; and that for this he especially 
 desires that on this day, * He whose 
 will, not ours, should ever be done,' 
 be eveiywhere remembered and rev- 
 erenced with the profoundest gratitude. 
 "Abraham Lincoln." 
 
 Lee's disappointment, by the complete 
 failure of his attack on the 3d, must 
 indeed have been great. His dream 
 of invasion was at an end. A second 
 time he had entered the Northern 
 States in triumph. A second time he 
 had been compelled to abandon his 
 purpose, and to fall back towards Rich- 
 mond. This time, he had confidently 
 believed that victory wa9 within his 
 grasp. After an effort so mighty and 
 so persistent, and after a failure so de- 
 cided, he could hardly hope for another 
 opportunity. One of his colonels, who 
 was present at his headquarters when, 
 on the third day, the attacking columns 
 broke and fell back in wild disorder, 
 says, speaking of Lee : " If Longstreet's 
 behavior was admirable, that of Gen- 
 eral Lee was perfectly sublime. He 
 was engaged in rallying and encourag- 
 ing the broken troops, and was riding 
 about, a little in front of the wood, 
 quite alone — his staff being engaged in 
 a similar manner, further to the rear. 
 His face, Avhich is always placid and 
 cheerful, did not show signs of the 
 slightest disappointment, care or an- 
 noyance ; and he was addressing to 
 every soldier a few words of encourage- 
 ment, such as, 'All this will come out 
 right in the end : we vdll talk it over 
 afterwards; but, meanwhile, all good 
 men must rally.' He had words of 
 kindness for the wounded, many of 
 whom, as they were carried past, took 
 off their hats and cheered him. ' We 
 cannot expect,' he said, 'always to win 
 victories.' To Wilcox, when he came 
 up with his shattered division, he said, 
 * All this has been my fault ; it is I 
 
GBlfEKAL LEJfl AFTER THE i5ATTLB. 
 
 531 
 
 w^ho have lost this battle.'" Imboden 
 has preserved for us a touching picture 
 of the general, as he saw him about one 
 o'clock on the morning of the 4th of 
 July. He had been sent for by Lee,, 
 who directed him to wait for him at his 
 own headquarters. When Lee joined 
 him, there was not even a sentinel on 
 duty, and no one of his staff was about. 
 "The moon was high in the heavens, 
 shedding a flood of silvery light, al- 
 most as bright as day, upon the scene. 
 When he approached and saw us, he 
 spoke, reined up his horse, and essayed 
 to dismount. The effort to do so be- 
 trayed so much physical exhaustion 
 that I stepped forward to assist him ; 
 but before I reached the saddle, he 
 had alighted. He threw his arm across 
 his saddle to rest himself, and, fixing 
 his eyes upon the ground, leaned in 
 silence on his equally weary horse, 
 the two forming a striking group, as 
 motionless as a statue. The moon 
 shone full upon his massive features, 
 and revealed an expression of sadness 
 I had never seen upon that fine face 
 before, in any of the vicissitudes of the 
 war through which he had passed. I 
 waited for him to speak until the silence 
 became painful and embarrassing, when, 
 to break it and change the current of 
 his thoughts, I remarked, in a sympa- 
 thetic tone, and in allusion to his great 
 fatigue : ' General, this has been a hard 
 day on you.' This attracted his atten- 
 tion. He looked up and replied, mourn- 
 fully : ' Yes, it has been a sad, sad day 
 to us,' and immediately relapsed into 
 his thoughtful mood and attitude." A 
 little later, he turned to Imboden, and, 
 
 straightening himself to his full height, 
 with energy and excitement in his 
 manner, and in a voice tremulous with 
 emotion, said : " General, I never saw 
 troo}3S behave more magnificently than 
 Pickett's division of Virginians did to- 
 day in their grand charge upon the 
 enemy. And if they had been sup- 
 ported, as they ought to have been — > 
 but, for some reason unknown to me, 
 they were not — we would have held 
 the position they so gloriously won, at 
 such a fearful loss of noble lives, and 
 the day would have been ours." After 
 a moment, he added, in a tone almost 
 of agony : " Too bad ! too bad ! ! oh, 
 too bad ! ! ! " Into the inner agonies of 
 that noble soul, at that trying moment, 
 it is not for us to penetrate. " We 
 must go back to Virginia," he soon 
 afterwards exclaimed ; and Imboden 
 received his instructions to guard the 
 trains in their backward course. 
 
 It was Lee's conviction that another 
 attack would be beset with serious 
 danger. He puts it mildly, in his re- 
 jjort, when he says : " The severe loss 
 sustained by the army, and the reduc- 
 tion of its ammunition, rendered an- 
 other attempt to dislodge the enemy 
 unadvisable." He, therefore, made im- 
 mediate preparations for a retreat. 
 Ewell was drawn back, on the morning 
 of the 4th, from the base of Gulp's Hill 
 and from Gettysburg; and a strong 
 line of works was thrown from the 
 seminary towards the northwest ; while 
 another line was formed on the right 
 flank, perpendicular with the general 
 front, and extending back as far as 
 Marsh Creek In this position, he re- 
 
532 
 
 GETTYSBURG. 
 
 mained over the 4th, burying his dead, 
 sending off the wounded, not disposed 
 to resume the aggressive, but, accord- 
 ing to good and reliable authority, not 
 unwilling to be attacked. The day 
 was similarly spent by the National 
 army. It had been Lee's intention to 
 retire his whole aimy on the night of 
 the 4th. But a severe storm had come 
 on shortly after midday ; and the rain 
 fell in torrents during the afternoon, 
 and continued far into the night. The 
 condition of the roads made a rapid 
 retreat impossible. It was not, there- 
 fore, until the forenoon of Sunday, the 
 5th, that Ewell's corps, which brought 
 up the rear, left its position near Get- 
 tysburg. After a difficult and toilsome 
 march, by the Chambersburg and Faii-- 
 field roads, through South Mountain, 
 the Confederate army reach Hagei'ston 
 on the afternoon of the 6th and the 
 morning of the 7th of July. 
 
 As soon as the Confederates had 
 abandoned their position at Gettysburg, 
 General Meade made preparations to 
 follow lip the retreat. There were two 
 courses open : he might make a du-ect 
 pursuit, pass through the South Moun- 
 tain in their i-ear, and press them down 
 the Cumberland Valley; or he might 
 make a flank movement by the east 
 side of South Mountain, defile through 
 the Boonsboro' Passes, and either head 
 off the enemy or take him in flank. 
 Sedgwick's corps, the freshest in the 
 army, was ordered to follow the enemy 
 by the Fairfield road, and harass his 
 rear. On the evening of the 6th, Sedg- 
 wick overtook the Confederates at the 
 Fairfield Pass ; but they were so strong- 
 
 ly posted that he deemed it unadvis- 
 able to attack. Meanwhile, Meade had 
 made up his mind to pursue the other 
 route; and Sedgwick was recalled. 
 General French, who since the evacua- 
 tion of Harper's Ferry had been occupy- 
 ing Frederick, was thereupon ordered 
 to seize the lower passes of South 
 Mountain in advance, and also to re- 
 possess himself of Harper's Ferry. All 
 this he did; and, in addition, by push 
 iug forward a cavalry force, he succeed- 
 ed in destroying a Confederate pontoon 
 biidge which, at that point, had beea 
 thrown across the Potomac. When 
 Lee's army reached Williamsport, the 
 river was still greatly swollen, and the 
 pontoon bridge had been destroyed. 
 On the 12th, when Meade came up 
 with his whole army, Lee had taken a 
 strong position on the Potomac, ex- 
 tending from Williamsport to Falling 
 Waters, and had thrown up entrench- 
 ments along his whole line. Meade 
 had once more an opportunity of strik- 
 ing the enemy in what seemed advan- 
 tageous circumstances. But the reasons 
 which prevailed and prevented an at- 
 tack after the battle of the 3d, pre- 
 vailed again, and prevented an attack 
 on the 12th. On the 13th, Lee's 
 engineers had succeeded in throwing 
 over another pontoon bridge ; and the 
 waters had fallen so much that, at a 
 certain point, they were fordable. By 
 the aid of the bridge and the ford, the 
 Confederate army was safely pushed 
 across to the southern side of the Po- 
 tomac. Meade crossed the river im- 
 mediately afterwards ; but Lee, still 
 refusing battle, fell back to the banks 
 
MEADE 4JfJj tICKLEIS. 
 
 533 
 
 of the Rapidan, where the opposing 
 armies took position. This was the 
 end of the Gettysburg campaign. 
 
 This campaign, from first to last, has 
 been a fruitful theme of discussion 
 among military critics. Militaiy criti- 
 cism, in any high sense, is not the pur- 
 pose of this work. Our aim, rather, is 
 to give a clear, intelligible and interest- 
 ing account of what actually took place, 
 leaving the reader to come to his own 
 conclusions. There are, however, con- 
 nected with this campaign, questions 
 which are still discussed, and some of 
 which will never be settled. These it 
 is impossible to pass over in absolute 
 silence. There is the unsettled ques- 
 tion between Meade and Sickles. It is 
 undeniable that the advanced position 
 which Sickles took on the 2d en- 
 couraged the Confederate attack on 
 that day, and very nearly ruined the 
 National prospect. It is as little to 
 be denied that Sickles, in assuming the 
 responsibility of taking such a position, 
 made a mistake. A more perfect mili- 
 tary training, a more practised military 
 eye would have made such a choice of 
 ground impossible. But Sickles was 
 not alone to blame. It was Meade's 
 business to attend not to one part of 
 his line, but to the whole of it ; and it 
 is notorious that, on his first arrival on 
 the field, his anxiety for his right made 
 him neglectful of his left. It is true 
 that he gave Sickles instructions to 
 continue the line on the ridge between 
 Hancock and the Round Tops. But 
 it is also true that Sickles notified him 
 of the peculiarity of the ground in the 
 position assigned him, and of his desire 
 
 and intention to occupy the elevated 
 ground in front. Then, again, it waa 
 only at the last moment, when the first 
 thundering discharge of the enemy's 
 artillery was about to fall upon the 
 doomed position, that Meade came to 
 inspect the ground. If Sickles erred 
 in judgment, it does seem as if Meade 
 was neglectful of duty. It is impor- 
 tant also to bear in mind that, but for 
 the accidental presence of General War- 
 ren at a most critical moment. Little 
 Round Top, the key of the National 
 position, would have been at the mercy 
 of the enemy. Meade was, no doubt, 
 justified in believing that his orders 
 would be obeyed ; but it was clearly 
 his duty to see in time that they were 
 strictly carried out. 
 
 There is the other question on which 
 so much difference of opinion exists, 
 and which probably ever will exist. 
 Meade has been blamed by many — he 
 has been justified by not a few — for his 
 excessive caution in following up the 
 victory of the 3d. It does seem, at 
 first sight, as if he ought to have pur- 
 sued his advantage at once, and made a 
 vigorous onset on the Confederate lines, 
 when they were thrown into confusion 
 by the rout of Pettigrew, Pickett and 
 Wilcox. This was the opinion of Gen- 
 eral Hancock ; and it was his belief 
 that, if Meade had advanced at once, h^ 
 would have won a great victory. It 
 was Meade's own intention to make an 
 immediate assault; and he has given 
 us his reasons why it was not done. 
 "The great length of the line," he says, 
 " and the time required to can-}- these 
 orders out to the front, and the move- 
 
931 
 
 GETTYSBURG. 
 
 ment subsequently made, before the re- 
 ports given to me of the condition of the 
 forces in the front and left, caused it to 
 be so late in the evening as to induce 
 me to abandon the assault vrhich I had 
 contemplated." Possibly, it was just 
 as well that the assault was not made. 
 Mr. Swinton tells us that, in a conver- 
 sation had with Longstreet, in regard 
 to the proposed attack, the latter said 
 to him : " I had the divisions of Hood 
 and McLaws, that had not been en- 
 gaged during the day ; I had a heavy 
 force of artillery ; and I have no doubt 
 that I should have given the Federals 
 as severe a repulse as that received by 
 Pickett." Meade was, perhaps, more 
 to blame for the manner in which he 
 conducted the' pursuit when the enemy 
 abandoned his position and fell back 
 towards the Potomac, He chose the 
 longer route for a questionable advan- 
 tage ; and his movements were so slow 
 that Lee reached the Potomac six days 
 before him. When he came up in 
 force, on the 12th, he had certainly a 
 splendid opportunity to strike his an- 
 tagonist; and it will ever partake of 
 the character of a mystery why Lee, 
 with the National army in his front, 
 was able, with so much ease and so 
 little molestation, to retire his whole 
 army across the Potomac. There was 
 a sting in what Lincoln said to Meade 
 shortly afterwards : " The fruit seemed 
 80 ripe, so ready for plucking, that it 
 was very hard to lose it." 
 
 The commanding generals on both 
 sides had causes for regret and causes 
 for joy and rejoicing. General Lee 
 made some mistakes during the three 
 
 days' fighting at Gettysburg, He at- 
 tenuated, and therefore weakened, his 
 lines by too much extension, in order 
 to cover the entire front of the National 
 position ; his assault on the 2d ought 
 to have been more concentrated, and, 
 where concentrated, more forcefully 
 sustained, or made along the whole 
 length of his line; and "the attack" 
 on Hancock's front, on the 3d, to quote 
 the words of Longstreet, "should have 
 been made with 30,000, instead of 
 15,000 men," But, if General Lee 
 had reason to regret the result at Get- 
 tysburg, he was not without reason 
 for being proud of his retreat. Gen- 
 eral Meade was in a position not whol- 
 ly dissimilar. His conduct of the pur- 
 suit reflect^.d on him but little credit. 
 The victory at Gettysburg was due 
 more, perhaps, to the intelligence, the 
 skill, the pride, the pluck of the individ- 
 ual soldier, than to the superior genius, 
 the tactical skill, or the wise ar- 
 rangements of the commander-in-chief. 
 But the ai'my of the Potomac, after a 
 series of painful and even shameful 
 reverses, had at last won a splendid 
 victory ; and to General Meade, as its 
 chief, legitimately and fairly belonged 
 the glory. 
 
 This great National victory marked a 
 turning-point in the history of the Civil 
 War. A Confederate success at Getty* 
 burg would have had a most damagi 
 ing influence on the National cause. 
 It might, as we have already hinted, 
 have had the effect of permanently di- 
 viding the Union, It would certainly 
 have greatly encouraged that growing 
 dislike of the war which was finding 
 
REYNOLDS. 
 
 5M 
 
 powerful expression in the large centres 
 of population ; and there is reason to 
 fear that it would have given foreign 
 governments a pretext for recognizing 
 the South. Meade's great victory, oc- 
 curring as it did simultaneously with 
 Grant's equally glorious victory at 
 Vicksbui'g, and followed so quickly by 
 
 AuoNO the illustrious men who perished at Gettys- 
 burg, there was no greater or more honored name than 
 that of Major-General John Fulton Reynolds. He was 
 bom in Lancaster, Pa., in 1820. He graduated at West 
 Point on the 30th of June, 1841, and, on the 23d of 
 October following, received his commission as second 
 lieutenant in the Third artUlery. He attained the rank 
 of first lieutenant in June, 1846, and served through 
 the Mexican War ; and, for his gallant and meritorious 
 conduct at Monterey and Buena Vista, was brevetted 
 captain and major. After having been engaged in 
 military service in California, and against the Indians 
 on the Pacific Coast, he was appointed aide to General 
 Wool ; and, on the 3d of March, 1855, he was promoted 
 to a captaincy in the Third artillery. In May, 1801, he 
 was appointed lieutenant-colonel of the Fourteenth U. 
 S. Infantry. On the 20th of August, 18G1, he was 
 commissioned brigadier-general of volunteers, and ap- 
 pointed to the command of the First brigade of the 
 Pennsylvania Reserve corps, then under General Mc- 
 Call. In June, 18G2, the reserves joined the army of 
 the Potomac •, and General Reynolds took part in the 
 
 the surrender of Port Hudson, turned 
 the tide of popular sentiment. The 
 Confederacy was doomed. Its com- 
 plete collapse was now merely a ques- 
 tion of time. After two years of 
 darkness and sorrow, the rainbow of 
 promise was revealed: and the Na- 
 tional heart was glad 
 
 battles of Mechanicsville and Gainet Mi\t He was 
 also engaged at Savage's Station, and at Charles City 
 Cross Roads, where he took command of the division, 
 when McCall was made prisoner. Later on the same 
 day, he himself was captured, and sent to Richmond. 
 After his release, he returned and took command of his 
 division on the 26th of September, soon afterwards tak- 
 ing command of the First army corps by virtue of seni- 
 ority of rank. He commanded this corps at the battle of 
 Fredericksburg. In January, 18Ci3, he was nominated 
 major-general of volunteers. At ChaneeUorsville, ha 
 was in the reserve, and took no active part. On the 12th 
 of June, he was appointed to the command of the right 
 wing of Hooker's army, having charge of three corps. 
 How he brought on the engagement at Gettysburg, and 
 how he came by his sudden and untimely end, has j ust 
 been shown. In General Reynolds, the National army 
 lost one of its ablest soldiers, and the Union one of it& 
 noblest defenders. But for him, the National arm} 
 might have failed to occupy Cemetery Ridge and th« 
 adjoining heights; and the non-occupation of tbo»* 
 heights mjfitht have led to defeat at Gettysburg. 
 
636 
 
 OHIOKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 
 
 CHAPTER XXVIII. 
 
 Dm Army of the Cumberland. — Bragg and Bosecranz. — Positions of the Rival Armies. — Attempt to ReobpttiM 
 Fort Donelson. — Eaid by Davis. — Spring Hill. — Thompson's Station. — Van Dom and Forrest. — Franklin. — 
 Defeat of Van Dom. — Minty's Expedition. — Streight's Expedition. — Drivers' Gap. — Duck Eiver. — The Army 
 of the Cumberland StiU Inactive. — The Government Impatient. — Chattanooga. — The National Army in Mo- 
 tion. — Rosecranz Fully Prepared. — His Plan of Battle. — Hoover's Gap.— Tullahoma. — Bragg Falls Back to 
 Bridgeport. — Bumside Ordered to Co-operate with Rosecranz. — GiUmore Defeats Pegram. — Sanders' Raid. — 
 Backner at Knoxville. — Knoxville Relieved. — Great Rejoicing. — Cumberland Gap Occupied by the Na- 
 tionals. — WUd Rumors. — Bragg and Rosecranz Preparing for Action. — Bragg Abandons Chattanooga. — 
 Victory Without a Battle. — A Grand Opportunity Lost. —Rosecranz' Mistake. — Chickamauga. — The Armies 
 Confronting Each Other. —Disposition of the Forces. — Opening of the Fight. — Thomas in Peril.— Haeen 
 Comes to the Rescue.— Fighting all Along the Line. — Close of the First Day. — The Advantage with the 
 Nationals. — The Second Day's Fighting. — A Terrific Cannonade. — Breckenridge's Fierce Onset. — Thomas 
 Calls for Help.— A Sad Mishap.— The National Centre Pierced.— The Right Driven Back.— Thomas Stands 
 Firm, like a Wall of Iron. — The Rock of Chickamauga. — General Gordon Granger. — Longstreet's Impetu- 
 ous Attacks.— Thomas Holds His Ground.— The Nationals Fall Back to Chattanooga. —Thomas the Hero 
 of Chickamauga. — Chattanooga Invested. — The National Communications Cut. — The Army of the Cumber- 
 land an Object of National Anxiety. ^Grant Summoned to Chattanooga. — Rosecranz Removed From Com- 
 mand. — Grant at Louisville. — In Command. —Instructions to Thomas. — Reinforcements. — Arrival of Hooker. — 
 Smith's Movement.— Grant at Nashville.— Brown's Ferry . —Lookout Valley.— Wauhatchie.— Severe Fight- 
 ing. — Geary's Men Performing Prodigies of Valor. —Hooker Victorious. —Commendations. — Sherman's Ap- 
 proach.— His Arrival at Bridgeport.— Grant's Plana Working Admirably. —Bragg's Mistake.- He Detaches 
 Longstreet.— Preparations for the Attack. — Disposition of the Troops. — Deception. — Bragg Supposed to be 
 About to Retreat. — Sherman at Brown's Ferry. — Grant Impatient of Delay. — Thomas Ordered to AJvanc-?.— 
 A Splendid Sight. — Orchard Knob Captured. — An Important Position Gained.— Hooker at Lookout Moun- 
 tain. — Sherman Crosses the Tennessee, and Takes Position on the North of Missionary Ridge. — Lookout 
 Creek Swollen and Impassable. — Geary's Movement to Wauhatchie. — Across the Creek.— A Heavy Mist. — 
 Geary's Success. — A Firm Foothold on the Mountain. —Lookout Mountain Abandoned by the Confede- 
 rates. — Another Point Gained.— A Battle Above the Clouds. —Chattanooga Valley Abandoned. — The Con- 
 federates Concentrate on Missionary Ridge. —The Blockade of the Tennessee Ended.— The Na«oual Lma 
 United.— Grant's Headquarters. —Preparations for the Final Blow.— The Battle Plan.— Hooker's Delay.— 
 Sherman's Advance. — Hooker on Missionary Ridge. — Great Success. — Sherman Fiercely Resisted. — Bragp 
 Concentrates on His Own Right. —Sherman Sorely Pressed. — Repeated and Persistent Attacks on Sher- 
 man's Front. — Grant Remembers Shiloh. —Hooker's Victory. — Bragg OutgeneraUed. — Thomas Ordered to 
 Advance.— The Thunderbolt Launched.— A Terrific Struggle.— The Thunder of Artillery.- Scrambling Vp 
 the Heights. — The Advancing Colors. — Fighting in Groups. — The Crest Scaled. — The Confederates Driven 
 from the HiU.— Flight of Bragg and Breckenridge.— Sherman at the Railroad Tunnel.— The Battle Htill 
 B«glng. — The Confederates Driven Back at All Points. — A Great and Glorious Victory.— Grant's Modesty. — 
 The Pursuit. — Knoxville. — Bumside Besieged. — Longstreet's Fierce Assaults. — Bumside on His l/ast bay's 
 Provisions. — A Gallant Defense. — Advance of Sherman to Knoxville. — Granger's Cavalry. — Longstreet's Last 
 Assault.— A Terrible Repulse.— Dead and Wounded Piled Up in the Ditch.— Longstreet's Retreat.— End oi 
 the Siege.— Sherman's Brave Army. — Bumside Thanks Sherman. — End of the Campaign. — Honors to Grant.— 
 Congratulations. — ^Universal Rejoicing. — Grant the National Hero. — Bragg Removed from Command —Tbs 
 Confederates Discouraged. 
 
 OuE attention must now be given to 
 
 .„„ the army of the Cumberland. In 
 
 * a previous chapter, ve*^ Have de- 
 
 scribed the famous battles of Perryvill^ 
 and Murfreesboro, in both of -vyhicb 
 engagements the Nationals were vi© 
 
FORT DONELSOWo 
 
 587 
 
 torious. On the night of the 3d of 
 January, 1863, Bragg withdrew from 
 Murfreesboro ; and Rosecranz at last 
 grasped his blood-clotted piize. The 
 army of the Cumberland, in these two 
 battles, had really covered itself with 
 glory ; and the gallantry and skill ex- 
 hibited by its brave commander had 
 drawn towards him the affections and 
 hopes of the nation. 
 
 After the occupation of Murfrees- 
 boro by Rosecranz, Bragg took a 
 strong position to the north of the 
 Duck River, his infantry extending 
 from Shelbyville to Wartrace, his cav- 
 alry stretching out on his right to Mc- 
 Minnville, and on his left to Columbia 
 and Spring Hill. He had outposts at 
 Hoover's and Liberty Gaps, about ten 
 miles from Murfreesboro. His main 
 base of supplies was at Chattanooga. 
 He had also a large depot at TuUa- 
 homa. From January until June, the 
 two armies thus confronting each other 
 lay in comparative idleness, neither 
 making any serious attempt to provoke 
 battle. 
 
 Although there had not, during those 
 six months, been any general engage- 
 ment, there had been some severe 
 skirmishing, and several important side 
 encounters. Early in February, an at- 
 tempt was made by General Wheeler, 
 Bragg's chief of artillery, with 4500 
 mounted men, to recapture Fort Donel- 
 son. The garrison was small, consist- 
 ing only of some 600 men, mostly of 
 the Eighty-Third Illinois, with a sec- 
 tion of Flood's battery, and a 32-pound 
 siege gun — the whole under the com- 
 mand of Colonel A. C. Harding. The 
 
 object of the Confederates was, by re- 
 occupying Fort Donelson, to interrupt 
 the navigation of the Cumberland, and 
 so prevent the transportation of sup- 
 plies to Nashville for the use of the 
 National army. On the 3d of pebt 
 Februarj^, a little after mid-day, a ^* 
 demand was made for the surrender oi 
 Fort Donelson and the garrison. Weak 
 in numbers, Harding was strong at 
 heart. He defied the foe, and sent a 
 small steamer down the river to sum- 
 mon to his aid some gunboats, which 
 he knew were not far off. Meanwhile, 
 Wheeler and his men had approached 
 within cannon range. Harding opened 
 upon them vrith his 32-pounder and 
 his four smaller guns. Thf fight con- 
 tinued till dark, Harding holding his 
 position, although he had lost 45 of his 
 60 artillery horses. At eight o'clock 
 in the evening came up the gunboat 
 Fair Play, Lieutenant- Commanding 
 Fitch, and opened upon the Confede- 
 rates a raking fire. Wheeler and his 
 men were dismayed ; and, as other gun 
 boats were seen coming up to take part 
 in the contest, they fled precipitately, 
 leaving behind them, dead on the fields 
 some 150 men, and about the same 
 number of prisoners. Harding lost 
 126 men, of whom 50 had been made 
 prisoners. Fort Donelson was hence- 
 forth left undisturbed. While Wheeler 
 was on the Cumberland, General J. C. 
 Davis, with two brigades of cavalry, 
 under Colonel Minty, was operating in 
 his rear. Moving westward from Mur- 
 freesboro, Davis scoured the country, 
 and, at the end of thirteen days, he re- 
 turned to camp, with 141 of Wheeler'9 
 
538 
 
 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 
 
 men as prisoners, among whom were 
 two colonels and several officers of 
 rank. 
 
 There was a period of repose. Early 
 in March, however, it became known 
 that General Van Dorn, with a large 
 mounted force, was in the vicinity of 
 Franklin. General John Colbum, who 
 was stationed at Franklin, and General 
 Sheridan, who was with the main araiy 
 at Murfreesboro, were ordered, with 
 their respective commands, to move 
 simultaneously against Van Dorn. Col- 
 Mart burn, on the 4th of March, with 
 ^« some 2700 men, some 600 of 
 whom were mounted, set out in the 
 direction of Spring Hill. He had ad- 
 vanced but a little way when he came 
 into contact with the Confederate 
 ekirmishers. These, however, were 
 easily repulsed. Colburn experienced 
 no further resistance during the remain- 
 der of that day; but, as evening ap- 
 proached, the enemy appeared in his 
 front, in very considerable force. Halt- 
 ing, and encamping for the night, Col- 
 burn resumed his forward movement 
 early next morning. Soon after start- 
 ing, he found himself attacked by a 
 vastly superior force, under Van Dorn 
 and Forrest. The Nationals made a 
 bold resistance ; but, being greatly out- 
 numbered, and his ammunition being 
 exhausted, Colburn was compelled to 
 fall back and seek safety in flight, leav- 
 ing some 1300 of his men in the hands 
 of the enemy. Sheridan, with his di- 
 vision, and some 1800 cavalry, under 
 Colonel Minty. moved first towards 
 Shelbyville and then round in the di- 
 rection of Franklin, After various 
 
 skirmishes, he encountered Van Dorn 
 and Forrest at Thompson's Sta- Mar. 
 tion, on the 14th of March. There !*• 
 was a sharp fight; but the Confede- 
 rates were ultimately driven back be- 
 hind the Duck River. Sheridan re- 
 turned to Murfreesboro, after a ten 
 days' ride, having lost only 5 men 
 killed and 5 wounded. He brought 
 with him 100 prisoners. 
 
 In the beginning of April, Van Dorn 
 again appeared in force in the neigh- 
 borhood of Franklin. General Gordon 
 Granger was in command of the Na- 
 tional troops at that station. Granger 
 had timely warning of the approach of 
 the enemy, and made every preparation 
 to give him a warm reception. Granger 
 had all but completed a new fort — which 
 afterwards bore his name — on the north- 
 ern side of the Harpeth River, and on a 
 commanding eminence about fifty feet 
 above the stream. The fort, on which 
 already were in position two siege guns 
 and two rifled cannon, completely com- 
 manded the approaches to Franklin. 
 Granger's infantry and artilleiy were 
 under the immediate command of Gen- 
 erals Baird and Gilbert. Generals 
 G. C. Smith and Stanley had charge of 
 the cavalry. Baird was posted so as 
 to guard the ford below Franklin ; 
 Gilbert was placed so as to meet an 
 attack in front ; Stanley was pushed 
 out four miles on the road towards 
 Murfreesboro ; while Smith was held 
 in reserve, to be ready, if occasion 
 should call for it, to rush to Stanley's 
 assistance. On the 10th of April, April 
 Van Dorn, with a mounted force l^* 
 of about 9000 men and two regiments 
 
RAIDING PARTIES. 
 
 5S» 
 
 of foot, came up the Columbia and 
 Levvisburg turnpikes, and fell heavily 
 on Granger's front. Granger, how- 
 ever, was ready to receive him. The 
 National troops stood firm; and the 
 guns from the new fort opened upon 
 the assailants a most destructive fire. 
 Stanley, seizing his opportunity, rushed 
 forward and struck Van Dorn a tre- 
 mendous blow on the flank. Smith's 
 troops were already in motion, to sup- 
 port Stanley; and Baird's men were 
 already across the river and taking part 
 in the fight. For a time, it seemed as 
 if the Confederates would be over- 
 whelmed, and driven ingloriously from 
 the field. In Granger's front, they 
 were completely defeated; they had 
 sustained a heavy loss in killed and 
 wounded ; and some 500 men had been 
 made prisoners. Van Dorn, however, 
 was a daring and capable officer, and 
 not easily induced to believe in defeat. 
 Gathering up his whole strength, he 
 flung himself upon Stanley, before 
 Smith had found time to come to his 
 aid; and such was the vigor and 
 weight of the onset, that Stanley was 
 compelled to fall back, thus permitting 
 Van Dorn to recover most of his cap- 
 tured men, and, at the same time, to 
 make good his escape. The Confede- 
 rate commander retired to Spring Hill, 
 with a loss of about 300 men in killed, 
 wounded and prisoners. Granger's loss 
 was comparatively trifling, amounting 
 in all to about 37 killed, wounded and 
 missing. 
 
 During the month of April, there 
 were many such skirmishes, not all of 
 equal importance, and some of them 
 
 resulting advantageously, some of them 
 disastrously to the National cause. 
 Prominent among the expeditions sent 
 out at that date was that of Colonel 
 Minty, who, starting from Murfrees- 
 boro, with a powerful force, scoured 
 the country in the direction of Mc- 
 Minnville, and destroyed a large 
 amount of property, making many 
 prisoners, and capturing large numbers 
 of mules and horses. About the mid- 
 dle of that month, an expedition, com- 
 posed of the Fifty-First Indiana, Eigh- 
 teenth Illinois, and a part of two Ohio 
 regiments — some 1800 men in all — and 
 commanded by Colonel A. D. Streight, 
 set out from Nashville, on a mission 
 from which great things were expected. 
 This force was called " an independent 
 provisional brigade," and was created 
 for "temporary purposes." Streight's 
 instructions were that he should de- 
 stroy the railroads, the stores, the 
 manufactories, in the rear of the Con- 
 federate army, and in every way 
 make retreat difficult, if not impossi- 
 ble. With his command on board 
 steamers, Streight left Nashville on the 
 11th of April. On reaching Dover, he 
 disembarked his troops, and marched 
 them across the country to Fort Henry, 
 on the Tennessee River. There he 
 waited for the boats which had gone 
 around by the Ohio. Embarking again, 
 he went up the Tennessee to Eastport, 
 where he landed ; then, moving south- 
 ward, he joined General Dodge, who 
 was moving towards Tuscumbia, on the 
 Memphis and Charleston Railroad. It 
 was not intended that he should remain 
 in conjunction with Dodge, but only 
 
MO 
 
 OHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 
 
 that he should march with him long 
 enough to create the impression that 
 his troops formed a part of that leader's 
 command, and at the proper time to 
 strike off from Tuscumbia towards 
 Russelville or Moulton. On their de- 
 parture from Nashville, Streight's men 
 were not provided with horses. It was 
 expected that they would be able to 
 pick them up by the way. "When they 
 joined Dodge, one half of the command 
 was still on foot. At Tuscumbia, the 
 joint forces encountered and defeated 
 a strong body of Confederates ; and, as 
 his men were well mounted, Streight, 
 without delay, set out for Russelville. 
 Having reached that place, he turned 
 to the east, his object being to strike 
 the important cities of Rome and At- 
 lanta, in Northern Georgia. At Rome 
 there were extensive iron-works; and 
 Atlanta was a great railroad centre. 
 Streight was not to be allowed to pro- 
 ceed on his mission unmolested. He 
 had scarcely commenced his march, 
 when he was pursued by a powerful 
 cavaliy force, under the Confederate 
 leaders, FoiTest and Roddy. The Na- 
 tionals were overtaken in the neighbor- 
 hood of Moulton, Lawrence County, 
 Alabama. At Drivers' Gap, of the 
 Sand Mountain, there was a severe en- 
 counter, which lasted the greater part 
 of a day. Then commenced a running 
 fight, which continued for four days, 
 and during which there were two severe 
 battles and several spirited skirmishes. 
 In a circuit of about one hundred miles, 
 the Nationals destroyed a large quan- 
 tity of corn, collected for the use of 
 the Confederate army, burned several 
 
 bridges and one cannon foundry, and 
 captured many animals. When about 
 fifteen miles from Rome, a detachment, 
 which had been sent forward to that 
 place, fell back on the main body ; and, 
 at the same time, the pursuers, now 
 4000 strong, under Forrest, fell with 
 great force on the National rear. His 
 ammunition being now exhausted, and 
 his men overpowered by fatigue, Streight 
 had no choice but surrender. The cap- 
 tives were sent to Libby Prison, where 
 they were held until Februar}', 1864. 
 when they effected their escape by dig- 
 ging under the foundations of the 
 building. Meanwhile, Dodge had had 
 better success. When Streight set out 
 for Rome and Atlanta, he struck off to 
 the south ; and having made a sweeping 
 raid in Northern Alabama and Missis- 
 sippi, he returned to his headquarters 
 at Corinth. 
 
 During the month of May and the 
 greater portion of June, the armies of 
 Rosecranz and Bragg remained in their 
 old positions, the former at Murfrees- 
 boro, the latter along the general line 
 of the Duck River, neither evincing any 
 signs of a disposition to attack. Ih 
 this month, there was a prevailing feel- 
 ing of disappointment, because of the 
 long-continued inaction of the army 
 of the Cumberland. In some quarters, 
 this sentiment found free and full ex- 
 pression. By his victory at Murfrees- 
 boro, Rosecranz had w^on the affections 
 and confidence of the people. What 
 he had done, it was thought, was but « 
 proof of what he could do, and an earn- 
 est of greater things yet to be accom- 
 plished by the army of the Cumber 
 
UL 
 
 W 1 L L I A \1 I . ^^L 
 
GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE 
 
THE BATTLE GEOUND. 
 
 541 
 
 land, under its skilful and accomplished 
 leader. One half year of inaction, after 
 a victory so splendid, had been suffi- 
 cient to give an entirely altered tone to 
 the sentiment of the North. Rose- 
 cranz, however, was not without good 
 reasons for his delay. His army, after 
 Murfreesboro, was in a dreadfully shat- 
 tered condition ; and when gradually, 
 through rest and reinforcements, he 
 became strong enough to justify an 
 offensive movement, he felt restrained, 
 by military considerations, from resum- 
 ing the conflict. It was the opinion of 
 Rosecranz that it would be unwise for 
 him to hazard a battle until the fate 
 of Vicksburg should have been deter- 
 mined. Considering the relative posi- 
 tions of hLs own army and that of 
 Grant, he deemed it impolitic " to risk 
 two great and decisive battles at the 
 same time." Such, however, were not 
 the views entertained at headquarters 
 at Washington. It was the opinion of 
 Halleck that the time was opportune 
 for Rosecranz to put his army in mo- 
 tion, and, by falling heavily on his 
 antagonist, driving him into Georgia, 
 and relieving East Tennessee, to pierce 
 the very heart of the Confederiicj^ 
 Orders were given accordingly. In a 
 former chapter we have pointed out the 
 importance of this natural stronghold. 
 Its strategic worth was seen and ad- 
 mitted alike by the National and 
 Confederate leaders from the com- 
 mencement of operations in the West. 
 Buell, it will be remembered, was de- 
 tached from the army of the West, 
 after the battle of Corinth, and ordered 
 by Halleck to advance and take pos- 
 
 session of Chattanooga. Bragg, how- 
 ever, was intent on the same purpose : 
 and, pushing forward with the utmost 
 rapidity, he outstripped Buell and se- 
 cured the stronghold. In spite of the 
 defeat at Perryville, and the mors 
 crushing blow received at Murfrees- 
 boro, Bragg remained master of Chat- 
 tanooga and the mountain fastnesses 
 around. The possession of the place, 
 however, had not ceased to be an object 
 of ambition with the National govern- 
 ment ; and the contest, suspended since 
 the battle of Murfreesboro, was about 
 to be resumed. 
 
 The majestic folds of the earth's 
 surface, known as the Appalachian 
 Ranges, separate the Atlantic portion 
 of the Southern States from the Mis- 
 sissippi Valley. These folds, for the 
 most part, run parallel to each other, 
 and are crossed at intervals by trans- 
 verse depressions or gaps. Such pas- 
 sages, it can readily be understood, are 
 of gi-eat commercial, political, and mili- 
 tary importance. From the region of 
 Chattanooga, the earth-folds range in a 
 southwesterly direction, the more ele- 
 vated ridges being named respectively 
 Chickamauga Hills, Pigeon Mountain, 
 Missionary Ridge, Lookout Mountain, 
 and Racoon or Sand Mountain. The 
 name Chattanooga signifies, in the Che- 
 rokee language, "Hawk's Nest." The 
 town of that name is built in one of 
 those transverse depressions, on the 
 south bank of the Tennessee River, 
 and at the mouth of Chattanooga Val- 
 ley. This valley, through which runs 
 a stream of the same name, is flanked 
 on the west by Lookout Mountain, 
 
 »02 
 
£42 
 
 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 
 
 which rises to the height of 2400 feet, 
 and on the east by Missionary Ridge, 
 eo named, because it was an early and 
 influential seat of Catholic missions 
 among the Cherokee Indians. The de- 
 pression between Missionary Ridge and 
 Pigeon Mountain is called Chickamauga 
 Valley. The two valleys, Chattanooga 
 ana Chickamauga, spring from a com- 
 mon centre, McLemore's Cove, which 
 is shut in by Lookout on the west and 
 Pigeon on the east. Such was the re- 
 gion now about to become the theatre 
 of a series of desperate and bloody 
 contests. 
 
 On the 24th of June, Rosecranz, in 
 Jane obedience to instructions from 
 24. headquarters, set his army in mo- 
 tion. He had under him some 60,000 
 effective men. General Burnside, who 
 was in Kentucky, was ordered to ad- 
 vance through the mountain passes into 
 East Tennessee, and connect his right 
 with Rosecranz's left. 
 
 Bragg's army, which consisted of 
 some 40,000 men, was strongly posted at 
 ShelbyvUlo and at Wartrace, with out- 
 posts at Hoover's and Liberty Gaps. 
 He held a strong position also at Tul- 
 iahoma. 
 
 Rosecranz was well aware of the 
 strength of Bragg's position; and it 
 was his purpose, from the outset, so to 
 manoeuvre as to tempt him to take less 
 advantageous ground. His real object 
 was to turn the Confederate right. His 
 ostensible object, as he wished it to be 
 regarded, was to fall heavily on the 
 Confederate left and centre. In the 
 midst of a rain-storm of almost unpre- 
 cedented severity, the National army 
 
 began its forward movement. The 
 right, which was under McCook, moved 
 towards Shelbyville. The centre, under 
 Thomas, moved towards Manchester. 
 The left, under Crittenden, marched in 
 the direction of McMinnville. Gen- 
 eral Gordon Granger's reserve corps 
 moved forward in support of McCook 
 and Thomas. The orders were strictly 
 obeyed and successfully executed. Sher- 
 idan's division, of McCook's command, 
 led the advance on the right. This was 
 followed, at the distance of a few miles, 
 by the divisions of Johnson and Davis. 
 While Sheridan kept moving towards 
 Shelbyville, those latter divisions turned 
 off to the left, and moved in the direc- 
 tion of Liberty Gap. Wilder, with hia 
 mounted infantry, led Thomas' advance. 
 General Reynolds followed, with the 
 remainder of the division. Wilder was 
 instructed to halt at Hoover's Gap 
 until the arrival of Reynolds. This he 
 intended to do, but finding the place 
 unoccupied, he pushed through, cap- 
 turing a wagon-train and a di'ove of 
 beeves. At the other extremity of the 
 gap he was met by the Confederates 
 in great force. He was able, however, 
 to hold the gap until the arrival of 
 Reynolds, when it was secured. In the 
 meantime, McCook had been equally 
 successful at Liberty Gap. Near the? 
 entrance, General Willich, whose bri 
 gade led the column, encountered the 
 enemy in very considerable force. At 
 the conimand of General Johnson, Wil- 
 lich fell upon the Confederates with 
 tremendous energy, driving them be 
 fore him, and capturing their tents, 
 baggage, and supplies. Johnson sent 
 
TULLAHOMA ABANDONED. 
 
 his 
 
 Colonel Baldwin forward to clear the 
 upper end of the gap. The order was 
 promptly executed ; and, after a sharp 
 encounter, the position was occupied. 
 These were important gains. But suc- 
 cess was attending Rosecranz in other 
 directions. Granger had started from 
 Triune, on the extreme right of the 
 National army, on the morning of the 
 23d, and, having pushed rapidly for- 
 ward, he reached Christiana without 
 difficulty. At that place he was joined 
 by Stanley and his cavalry. The com- 
 bined foices pressed on to Guy's Gap, 
 securing it after a struggle of about 
 two hours. The Confederates tied, but 
 were closely pursued for about seven 
 miles. About three miles from Shel- 
 byville, they halted, taking position in 
 their rifle-pits. A vigorous charge was 
 made by Stanley's horsemen. The Con- 
 federates were driven from the rifle- 
 pits, and compelled to fall back on the 
 near defenses of the town. It was now 
 six o'clock in the evening. Granger 
 came up with his infantry; Stanley 
 charged again ; and before seven o'clock 
 Shelbyville was in the possession of 
 the National troops Wheeler and his 
 troopers escaped by swimming Duck 
 River. In addition to the possession 
 of Shelbyville, three guns, a quantity 
 of corn, and 500 pnsoners rewarded 
 the daring and enterprise of Gi'anger 
 and Stanley. 
 
 Not Slow to perceive the advantages 
 Avhich lie had gained, Rosecranz pressed 
 through the mountain passes; and on 
 the 27th he had established his head- 
 quarters at Manchester. Two days 
 later, McCook and Thomas had also 
 
 arrived, with all their forces. Prepara. 
 tions were at once made to flank Tulla- 
 homa, whither Bragg had now retired. 
 Wilder was ordered to move around 
 and strike the railroad in the Confeder- 
 ate rear at Decherd, and to destroy the 
 bridge over the Elk River. Wilder 
 had little difficulty in reaching De- 
 cherd; the railroad was injured, but 
 the ]>ridge defied all his efforts and all 
 his skill. Convinced that the National 
 army was about to move upon him in 
 force, and believing that his position 
 was untenable, Bragg, on the night of 
 the 30th of June, abandoned his en- 
 trenched camp at Tullahoma, and fell 
 back to Bridgeport, Alabama. The 
 extensive works which had been con- 
 structed during a period of several 
 months, between Shelbyville, Wartrace, 
 Tullahoma and Decherd, were thus 
 abandoned, without any serious blow 
 having been struck in their defense. 
 "Thus ended," says Rosecranz in his 
 report, " the nine days' campaign, 
 which drove the enemy from two forti. 
 fled positions, and gained possession of 
 Middle Tennessee. Conducted during 
 one of the most extraoi'dinary rains 
 ever known in that country, at that 
 period of the year, and over a soil that 
 seemed almost a quicksand, our opei'a- 
 tions were retarded thirty-six hours 
 at Hoover's Gap, and sixty hours at 
 and in front of Manchester, which 
 alone prevented us tVora getting posses- 
 sion of his communications, and forcing 
 the enemy to a very disastrous battle." 
 The National loss in these various 
 operations was about 560 killed, wouu 
 ded and missing. The Confederate 
 
044 
 
 CHICK AM AUGA AKi^ (JHATTANOOGA, 
 
 loss was about 6000, large numbers of 
 these having deserted during the re- 
 treat. Bragg managed to carry with 
 him all his guns and supplies along 
 the railroad, which he destroyed as he 
 went on. He pushed on through the 
 Cumberland Mountains, crossed the 
 Tennessee River at Bndgeport, where 
 he burned the railroad bridge behind 
 him, and made his way to Chattanooga. 
 If it must be said of Bragg that he 
 showed lack of generalship in offering 
 so little resistance to the National ad- 
 vance, it must also be admitted that he 
 conducted his retreat vnth marked 
 ability and with signal success. So 
 complete was the destruction which he 
 worked, as he moved along, that it was 
 not until the 16th of August that the 
 National forces commenced to cross the 
 Cumberland Mountains. 
 
 We have already stated that General 
 Burnside, who had been assigned to 
 the command of the army of the Ohio, 
 was ordered to co-operate with the 
 army of the Cumberland. Burnside 
 assumed his new command in March. 
 He had had several small encounters 
 with the enemy before he was ordered 
 to act in conjunction with Rosecranz. 
 By one detachment, under Gillmore, he 
 had defeated the Confederate general, 
 Pegram, at Somerset, and thus pre- 
 vented a dangerous incursion into 
 Southeastern Kentucky. By another 
 detachment, under Sanders, he had 
 made a successful raid against the Con- 
 federates, in the direction of Knoxville. 
 Sanders passed through the Cumber- 
 land Mountains from Kentucky, struck 
 the East Tennessee and Georgia Rail- 
 
 road at Lenoir Station, destroyed a 
 large portion of the road which led 
 to KnoxviDe, passed round that city, 
 struck the road again at Strawberrji 
 Plain, and burned two bridges. After 
 destroying a large quantity of war ma 
 terial, Sanders made his way back to 
 Kentucky, having sustained but little 
 loss, and bringing with him three of 
 the enemy's guns, 10,000 small arms, 
 and 500 prisoners. At the time this 
 call was made upon Burnside to co- 
 operate with Rosecranz, his command 
 had been considei-ably diminished, num- 
 bering not more than 20,000 men, the 
 Ninth army corps having been de- 
 tached, some time before, to assist 
 Grant before Vicksburg. When Burn- 
 side began his march to form a conne(»- 
 tion with the army of the Cumberland. 
 General Simon B. Buckner, acting un 
 der instructions from Bragg, was in com 
 mand of about 20,000 men in East Ten 
 nessee, with his headquarters at Knox- 
 ville. Buckner might have been able, 
 had he been allowed, to interpose serious 
 obstacles to Burnside's advance. Buck- 
 ner, however, was elsewhere needed. 
 It was all-important to the Confederacy 
 that Chattanooga should not be allowed 
 to fall into the hands of the Nationals. 
 As soon, therefore, as Bragg found 
 that he was in peril, he ordered Buck- 
 ner to evacuate the valley and hasten 
 to his assistance at Chattanooga. On 
 the approach of Burnside, Buckner fled; 
 and Knoxville was occupied by the 
 National troops, after a long and fa- 
 tiguing majch, during which the Con- 
 federates offered little other resistanci 
 than that of burning the bridges ;>n 
 
BURNSIDE AT KNOXVILLE. 
 
 54ft 
 
 their rear. It was on the 3d day of 
 gep, September that Buiuside entered 
 3' Knoxville. By the citizens and 
 by the people of the neighborhood, he 
 was hailed as a great deliverer. " As 
 we neared Knoxville," says one who 
 was present, " the evidences of the in- 
 tense devotion to the Union, dwelling 
 in the hearts of the people, became 
 more and more apparent. Along the 
 entire route, especially the last ten or 
 fifteen miles, the whole population 
 seemed gathered on the roadside to 
 give welcome to the Yankees. On the 
 appearance of General Burnside on the 
 outskirts of the town, the news of his 
 arrival spread, and everybody, rich and 
 poor, the lame and the halt, rushed out 
 to greet him. It was no vulgar curi- 
 osity to see a man famous in the world's 
 history — it was the greeting of an op- 
 pressed people to their deliverer. Un- 
 covered, and at a slow pace, the general 
 rode through the streets to his head- 
 quarters. His progress was constantly 
 impeded by the rushing of men to his 
 horse's side, to seize him by the hand 
 and say, * God bless you.' On arrival 
 at headquarters, a large crowd assem- 
 bled in the yard, and were clamorous 
 for speeches. Brigadier-General S. P. 
 Carter, a native of East Tennessee, 
 came forward, and in a few words con- 
 gratulated them on their deliverance. 
 In response to repeated calls, General 
 Bxirnside then appeared, and said that 
 although his profession was arms, and 
 not speaking, yet he would take the 
 occasion to say that, from the moment 
 he took command of the department of 
 Ohio, it had been his fervent wish to 
 
 lead an army into East Tennessee to 
 their deliverance; and he took great 
 pleasure in saying that he had come 
 with means sufficient, with their assist- 
 ance, to hold the country permanently 
 and securely." The same witness tells 
 us that, when the speaking was ended, 
 the wildest enthusiasm was manifested 
 by the people. " The garrison flag of 
 the United States was flung from the 
 portico, and the crowd rushed up and 
 seized it in their hands, many of them 
 pressing it to their lips. WhUe this 
 was taking place at headquarters, the 
 troops had been waylaid all over the 
 city, and can-ied off by violence, to be 
 feasted, without money and without 
 price, on the best which the land af- 
 forded." Nor did this bounteous hos- 
 pitality find expression towards the 
 officers alone ; it extended to the rank 
 and file, all of whom, without any dis- 
 tinction, were regarded as deliverers. 
 
 At Knoxville, the Nationals took 
 possession of a large amount of Con- 
 federate property — such as locomotives, 
 cars, and machine shops. On the 4th, 
 a movement, under the immediate di- 
 rection of General Shackelford, was 
 made upon Cumberland Gap. On the 
 7th, the gap was invested ; and a call 
 was made for surrender. This, General 
 Frazier, who was in command of the 
 Confederate force at that point, refused 
 to do, believing, as he said, that he was 
 able to hold out. It was not until the 
 arrival of Buniside himself, on the 9th, 
 that Frazier would listen to any pro- 
 posals. On that day terms were agreed 
 upon; and a surrender was made uncon- 
 ditionally. The officers retained their 
 
646 
 
 OHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 
 
 side-arms. About 40 wagons, 200 mules, 
 4000 pounds of bacon, 2000 bushels of 
 wheat, a large quantity of other stores, 
 and ten pieces of artillery, were sur- 
 rendered. Some 2000 men were made 
 prisoners. Cumberland Gap was thus 
 again in the possession of the National 
 troops; and the great valley between 
 the Alleghany and the Cumberland 
 Mountains, from Cleveland to Bristol — 
 of which Knoxville may be regarded 
 as the chief city — was, for the time at 
 least, rid of armed Confederates. 
 
 Chattanooga now became the object 
 of universal attention. It was felt 
 that in that region the next great 
 etruggle for supremacy was to be made. 
 It might not be final and decisive ; but, 
 however it might result, it would be 
 certain to exercise a determining influ- 
 ence on the ultimate issue of the con- 
 test. Both amiies were the objects of 
 anxious care to their respective govern- 
 ments. The Richmond authorities, 
 trembling for the safety of the At- 
 lantic States, exerted themselves to the 
 very utmost to strengthen Bragg, so 
 that he might turn on Rosecranz and 
 deal him a crushing blow, or force him 
 towai'ds the Cumberland. Buckner, 
 as we have seen, was ordered to join 
 him. Johnson sent him a strong bri- 
 gade from Mississippi, under General 
 Walker. Polk had come up in force 
 from Alabama, Longstreet's corps, 
 detached from the army of General 
 Lee, was hurrying forward from Vir- 
 ginia. A merciless conscription was 
 enforced in Georgia and Alabama; 
 and eveiy available man was pushed 
 forward in the diiection of Chatta- 
 
 nooga, Nor was this all. In shameful 
 violation of the terms of the surrender, 
 and contrary to the usages of civilized 
 warfare, Bragg's ranks were swelled by 
 thousands of prisoners who had been 
 paroled at Vicksburg and Port Hud- 
 son. Altogether, the Confederate gen- 
 eral was able to count on an effective 
 force, under his own immediate direc- 
 tion, of fully 80,000 men. 
 
 Rosecranz was not less the object of 
 solicitude on the part of the National 
 government. It was found difficult, if 
 not impossible, to penetrate the designs 
 of the enemy. It was rumored that 
 Bragg was sending reinforcements to 
 Lee, and that prepai'atlons were being 
 made for another and more successful 
 invasion of Maryland and Pennsyl- 
 vania, This rumor received encourage- 
 ment from the slis^ht resistance which 
 had been offered, as yet, either to the 
 advance of Rosecranz or to the advance 
 of Burnside. It was soon discovered 
 that the rumor had no foundation in fact 
 Trains were heard running night and 
 day, for thirty-six hours, on the Peters- 
 burg and Richmond Railroad ; and 
 Meade was able to report that, in hia 
 judgment, Lee's anny had been re- 
 duced by the whole of Longstreet's 
 corps, and by some regiments from 
 Generals Ewell and HiU. Halleck 
 took immediate steps to reinforce 
 Rosecranz. Burnside received fresh 
 instructions to make the required con- 
 nections with the army of the Cumber- 
 land, General Hurlbut, who was at 
 Memphis, was ordered to send all his 
 available forces to Corinth and Tuscum- 
 bia, so as to be ready to check any 
 
fiOSECRANZ IN CHATTANOOGA. 
 
 647 
 
 flank movement which might be at- 
 tempted by the enemy. He was au- 
 thorized to call upon Grant or Sherman 
 for reinforcements, if such were needed. 
 A telegraphic communication was sent 
 to the commander at Vicksburg, to send 
 all his available forces to the line of 
 the Tennessee River. Instructions of 
 like import were sent to Schoileld in 
 Missouri, and to Pope in the North- 
 western Department. It was the deter- 
 mination of the National government 
 that Kentucky and Tennessee, once 
 more reclaimed, should not again fall 
 under the domination of the Confed- 
 eracy ; and now that both Vicksburg 
 and Port Hudson had fallen, .nd the 
 great armies of the West and South 
 were so far liberated, and able to lend 
 a helping hand, there seemed to be no 
 good reason why this determination, if 
 expressed with sufficient vigor, should 
 not be attended with practical and sat- 
 isfactory results. 
 
 Rosecranz reached the Tennessee on 
 the evening of the 20th of August. 
 He made arrangements at once for the 
 crossing of the river. Crittenden, with 
 the left wing, was to cross at Battle 
 Creek, and move on Chattanooga; 
 Thomas, with the centre, was to pass 
 his corps over the river — one division 
 at Caperton's Ferry, one at Battle 
 Creek, and one at Shell Mound. He 
 was to concentrate at Trenton, and 
 then to move by way of Stevens' and 
 Cooper's Gaps, through Lookout Moun- 
 tain, into McLemore's Cove. McCook 
 was to push two of his divisions across 
 at Caperton's Feriy, while his other 
 division, that of Sheridan, was to cross 
 
 at Bridgeport. He was to concentrate 
 at Winston's Gap. Bridges were thrown 
 across the river at the points indicated ; 
 and by the 8th of September, the troopa 
 had crossed and taken the position* 
 assigned them. Thomas was at Tren- 
 ton, and in possession of Stevens' and 
 Cooper's Gaps, on Lookout Mountain 
 McCook having reached Valley Headj 
 was in possession of Winston's Gap, 
 Crittenden having crossed to Wauhafr 
 chie, was communicating with Thomas' 
 right, and threatening Chattanooga by 
 the pass over the point of Lookout 
 Mountain. It was the expectation of 
 Rosecranz that these combinations would 
 have the effect of inducing Bragg to 
 abandon Chattanooga. In this expecta- 
 tion he was not to be disappointed 
 The National generals had conducted 
 their operations with great expedition 
 and with wonderful secrecy. It was 
 not until the cavalry of Rosecranz, hav- 
 ing advanced up the Will's Valley Rail- 
 road, were already at Wauhatchie, that 
 Bragg was convinced that his antago 
 nist had crossed or was crossing the 
 river ; and, supposing that he was about 
 to be flanked ou his left, he made pre- 
 parations for the abandonment of Chat- 
 tanooga. It was now the 7th o£ Sep- 
 tember. Bragg left Chattanooga on 
 the 8th, and concentrated strongly at 
 Lafayette. On the following day, gep. 
 Crittenden, from the summit of *• 
 Lookout Mountain, discovered that 
 the place was abandoned. His corps 
 quickly entered in and took possession. 
 Thus, without any fighting, was accom- 
 plished the first great object of the 
 campaign. 
 
148 
 
 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANCX)GA. 
 
 Affairs now looked hopeful in the 
 extreme for the National arms. There 
 was great joy all over the North, when 
 it became known that Chattanooga was 
 occupied. There was corresponding de- 
 pression of spirit in the South. From 
 the Confederate standpoint, the outlook 
 now seemed gloomy enough. Pember- 
 ton had quite recently sun-endered a 
 large army at Vicksburg. Gardner had 
 surrendered another army at Port Hud- 
 son. Lee had been compelled to fall 
 back from Pennsylvania, after sustain- 
 ing heavy losses. And now Bragg, 
 without striking a blow for its defense, 
 had abandoned Chattanooga. 
 
 To the army of the Cumberland there 
 had now arrived a great opportunity. 
 A concentrated effort and a well-di- 
 rected blow might be sufficient to crush, 
 or drive into helpless retreat, the Con- 
 federate army. The star of Rosecranz 
 was still in the ascendant. Nothing 
 had yet happened to tarnish the glory 
 which he had won at Mm'freesboro. It 
 was not doubted — there was no reason 
 why it should be doubted — that the 
 conqueror at Murfreesboro would add 
 to his laurels by a greater and more 
 decisive victory at Chattanooga. Let 
 us see how matters turned out. 
 
 It was the conviction of Rosecranz 
 that Bragg was in full retreat towai'ds 
 Rome. Impressed with this belief, and 
 not yet informed of the fact that Long- 
 street was rapidly coming up to swell 
 the forces of his antagonist, Rosecranz, 
 instead of concentrating his army at 
 Chattanooga, scattered them over a 
 wide surface of rough, broken country. 
 Crittenden was ordered to leave one 
 
 brigade at Chattanooga, as a garrison, 
 and to move with the rest as far as 
 Ringgold; Thomas was to march ou 
 Lafayette ; while McCook was to move 
 in the direction of Alpine and Summer 
 Creek. These movements were prompt- 
 ly made; and when, on the 12tb, ^^p, 
 it became positively known that '2t 
 Bragg was not retreating but, on the 
 contrary, concentrating in great force 
 at Lafayette, and preparing to strike a 
 decisive blow, the National army was 
 scattered over an immense space of 
 rough, broken country, the line extend- 
 ing from the east side of Chickamauga 
 Creek to Alpine — a distance of fifty- 
 seven miles from flank to flank. Rose- 
 cranz, in truth, was completely deceived 
 as to the movements and intentions of 
 his antagonist. While, on the 9tb, he 
 was giving orders for pursuit, Bragg 
 was actually preparing to assail Thomas 
 in McLemore's Cove ; and but for mis- 
 understandings among the Confederate 
 officers, the battle might have been pre- 
 cipitated, and serious detriment might 
 have resulted to the National army. 
 It is difficult to acquit Rosecranz of 
 blame in this matter. He was certainly 
 found wanting in vigilance. Before 
 attempting the hazardous experiment 
 of so extending his line, and thus ren- 
 dering himself incapable, at any one 
 point, of resisting a vigorous attack, he 
 ought, by a more thorough reconnois- 
 sance, to have been more accurately in- 
 formed of the whereabouts of the ene- 
 my. The truth seems to be that, in 
 his excessive desire to win renown by 
 capturing his foe, or driving him in 
 confusion to the gulf, the National 
 
"THE RIVEE OP DEATH." 
 
 549 
 
 commander partially lost his head. It 
 was the opinion of more than one of 
 his officers that the general-in-chief was 
 in error. As early as the 11th, a negro 
 had reported to Wood that " the bulk 
 of the rebel army, under Bragg in per- 
 son, was at Lee and Gordon's Mills." 
 Subsequent developments, according to 
 Wood, proved that report to be singu- 
 larly correct. In a letter to Thomas, 
 Negley remarks that he is "confident 
 that Rosecranz is totally misinformed 
 as to the character of the countiy, and 
 the position, force and intentions of the 
 enemy." 
 
 If Rosecranz was to blame for the 
 disposition he made of his troops, Bragg 
 was even more to blame for not seizing 
 the opportunity which Rosecranz had 
 created for him. With the forces at 
 his disposal, he might easily have 
 crushed Thomas, Crittenden and Mc- 
 Cook in rapid succession ; and, having 
 done so, he could then have moved 
 along the Cumberland, and fallen, like 
 a destroying angel, on Burnside's rear. 
 The opportunity presented to Bragg 
 was similar to that which Napoleon, 
 by protracted and skilful manoeuvring, 
 secured at Marengo. Had Bragg been a 
 Napoleon, he would have destroyed the 
 ai'my of the Cumberland. Fully alive 
 to the peril of the situation, Rosecranz 
 ordered a concentration of his forces. 
 For six days, Bragg remained compara- 
 tively inactive. W hen the six days were 
 ended, his opportunity was gone for- 
 ever ; for Rosecranz had already brought 
 his scattered forces within supporting 
 Sep, distance of each other; and on 
 »8. the night of Friday, the 18th, 
 
 the concentration was completed, and 
 the anny well in hand. 
 
 The two armies were now confronting 
 each other on the opposite banks of the 
 Chickamauga — a stream which, rising 
 at the junction of Missionary Ridge and 
 Pigeon Mountain, at the southern ex- 
 tremity of McLemore's Cove, flows in 
 a northern direction down the cove by 
 Crawfish Spring. At Lee and Gordon's 
 Mills, it reaches the Lafayette and Chat- 
 tanooga Road Further on, it joins the 
 main creek, and empties into the beau- 
 tiful Tennessee, a little above Chatta- 
 nooga. Chickamauga, in the Indian 
 tongue, means "The River of Death" — 
 a name which was soon to be literally 
 and terribly appropriate. 
 
 Rosecranz was on the west bank of the 
 stream. His right was no longer at Mc- 
 Lemore's Cove, but where his left had 
 been, at Lee and Gordon's Mills. His 
 left was near the road across from Ross- 
 ville. His reserves were in the rear of the 
 right. In this position, as vsdll be seen 
 by a reference to the map, he covered 
 Chattanooga. It was Bragg's inten- 
 tion, by a flanking movement, to inter- 
 pose between the National left and Cha^ 
 tanooga. In order, however, to deceive 
 his antagonist, he had sent Wheeler, 
 with his cavalry, to press the National 
 right. It deserves to be borne in mind, 
 at this stage, that Bragg had been great- 
 ly reinforced. Buckner had come up 
 from East Tennessee, with the rem- 
 nants of the army of the Mississippi; 
 and the advance of Longstreet's corps, 
 under Hood, was already on the fleld. 
 
 The morning of the 19th was sep< 
 bright and beautiful. A crisp, *•• 
 
 ««i 
 
550 
 
 OHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 
 
 white frost had collected on the grass, 
 but it soon disappeared, under the genial 
 heat of the September sun. Soon as the 
 morning mist was dispersed, the rival 
 hosts were ready for battle. McCook 
 was in command on the National right ; 
 Crittenden was in the centre ; Thomas 
 was on the left. During the night, 
 Bragg had contrived to push across the 
 creek some 30,000 men. His army was 
 arranged in two coi'ps, the right com- 
 manded by Polk and the left by Hood, 
 Longstreet not yet having arrived in 
 person. It was Bragg's intention to 
 strike and bring on a battle. It was 
 Thomas, however, who had the honor 
 of striking the first blow. It was now 
 about ten o'clock. Thomas, on being 
 informed by Colonel D. McCook that a 
 Confederate bfigade was on the west 
 side of the Chickamauga, and appa- 
 rently alone, and that as Reed's Bridge 
 behind them was destroyed, he thought 
 they might be easily captured. Thomas 
 ordered General Brannan to advance, 
 with his brigades, on the road to Reed's 
 Bridge, while Baii'd was to throw for- 
 ward the right of his division on the 
 road to Alexander's Bridge. It was 
 expected that, by this double move- 
 ment, the isolated brigade would be cap- 
 tured. The battle commenced at once. 
 It was soon discovered that what 
 seemed a solitary brigade was really the 
 advance of the opposing army. Brannan 
 soon became engaged with Forrest's cav- 
 alry, which was strongly supported by 
 two infantiy brigades, from Walker's 
 column. Baird, having come to the aid 
 of Brannan, the Confederates, after a 
 terrible struggle, were driven back with 
 
 great loss. Liddle's division was now 
 thrown into the fight ; and the Nation- 
 als, in their turn, were driven back, 
 losing two batteries and over 500 pris 
 oners. In this charge, Lieutenant Van 
 Pelt, who commanded one of the bat- 
 teries, died gloriously by the side of 
 his guns, resisting the enemy to the 
 last. Thomas now threw into the fight 
 the division of Reynolds; McCook 
 pushed forward ihe division of John- 
 son; and Crittenden came to the res- 
 cue, with Palmer's division, which took 
 position on Baird's right. The Nation- 
 als, thus strengthened, and outnumber- 
 ing and outflanking the Confederates, 
 fell upon them with great fury, driving 
 them back in disorder for a full mile 
 and a half, on their reserves near the 
 creek. By this charge, one of the lost 
 batteries was recovered. It was now 
 near four o'clock in the afternoon. 
 There was a lull in the battle for about 
 an hour. In the interval, Biannan and 
 Baird re-formed their shattered col- 
 umns, and took a commanding position 
 between McDaniel's House and Reed's 
 Biidge. The battle was resumed at 
 five o'clock. The divisions of Liddle 
 and Gist fell with great weight and 
 with more than ordinary fury on Rey- 
 nolds' right; and, while Thomas was 
 endeavoring to concentrate his forces, 
 they fell with equal weight and fury 
 on Johnson, Baird and Van Cleve. 
 Thomas, at this crisis, was in great 
 penl. His men were falling back in 
 the wildest confusion. At this critical 
 moment, Hazen, who covered himsell 
 with gloiy, and saved the day at Mup- 
 freesboro, came gallantly to the rescue. 
 
ORDER OF BATTLE— SECOND DAY. 
 
 551 
 
 He had been sent back to the Rossville 
 Road to take charge of a park of artil- 
 lery, consisting of four batteries, twenty- 
 one guns in all. These, it appears, had 
 been left without guards. Hazen had 
 arrived in time, not only to save the 
 guns, but to turn them to good account. 
 They were already in position, on a 
 commanding ridge, and manned with 
 such infantry supports as he could has- 
 tily collect, when the Nationals fell 
 back, closely pursued by the victorious 
 Confederates. Hazen made no haste to 
 use his guns until the pursuers were 
 within easy range. As soon, however, 
 as they came fully up, he opened upon 
 them a tremendous fire. The effect was 
 terrific. Checked in full career, and 
 torn to pieces by the merciless missiles, 
 the Confederates, leaving their com- 
 rades in slaughtered heaps on the 
 ground behind them, fell back towards 
 the creek in confusion and despair. 
 Thanks to Hazen's prompt interference, 
 the day was saved on the left. A charge 
 was made, also, by General Clebui-ne, 
 full on Johnson's front, about the hour 
 of sunset; but he failed to make any 
 impression on the National lines. 
 
 Although the fighting had been main- 
 ly on the left, the right had not re- 
 mained wholly unattacked. From an 
 early hour, there had been lively artil- 
 lery firing on both sides. While the day 
 was yet young, a vigorous attack was 
 made by three Confederate brigades, in 
 rapid succession ; and one of the Na- 
 tional batteries was captured. The as- 
 sailants, however, were in turn driven 
 back, and the guns recovered. Later 
 in the day, about three o'clock. Hood 
 
 threw two of his divisions heavily on 
 Davis, of McCook's corps. So irresist- 
 ible was the attack that Davis was 
 driven back; and his Indiana battery 
 fell into the hands of the enemy. The 
 triumph of Hood's men, however, was 
 but short-lived ; for Bradley's brigade, 
 of Sheridan's division, immediately came 
 up and joined Davis. A countercharge 
 was made, and with complete success. 
 The Confederates were driven back in 
 disorder ; a large number of them were 
 made prisoners ; and the lost battery was 
 recovered. When night came the bat- 
 tle ceased, with apparent advantage to 
 the National army. 
 
 The night was spent by both armies 
 in vigorous preparations for a renewal 
 of the conflict in the morning. As soon 
 as the engagement closed, Bragg sum- 
 moned his generals around him ; and, 
 under the light of the blazing camp- 
 fire, he gave them their instructions. 
 At midnight, Longstreet arrived in per- 
 son at headquartei's, and the remainder 
 of his troops was fast coming up. Bragg 
 divided his army, as he had done on 
 the pre\aous day, into two wings. "The 
 right, as before, . remained under the 
 command of General Polk ; but General 
 Longstreet assumed command on the 
 left. The right wing was composed 
 of Hill's corps of two divisions, under 
 Cleb'^rne and Breckenridge ; with the 
 divisio** of Cheatham, of Polk's corps, 
 and the division of W. H. T. Walker. 
 The left was composed of the divisions 
 of Stewart Preston and Johnston, of 
 Buckner's coi-ps; with Hindman's, of 
 Polk's corps ; and Benning's and Laue'h 
 and Robertson's brigades, of Hood's di 
 
K2 
 
 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 
 
 vision; and Kershaw's and Humphrey's, 
 of McLaws' division. The front line 
 of the right wing consisted of three di- 
 visions — Breckenridge's, Cleburne's, and 
 Cheatham's — which were posted from 
 right to left, in the order named. Walk- 
 er's division was in reserve. The line 
 of the left wing was composed of Stew- 
 art's, Hood's, Hindman's, and Preston's 
 divisions, from right to left, in the 
 order named. Rosecranz had also gath- 
 ered his corps commanders around him. 
 After hearing their reports, he ordered 
 General Negley, who had come down 
 from the extreme right, to report to 
 General Thomas early in the morning. 
 McCook was ordered to replace Negley's 
 troops by one of his own divisions, and 
 to close up well on Thomas. Critten- 
 den was to hold his two divisions in 
 reserve, and in the rear of the centre. 
 Thomas remained on the left, reinforced 
 by the two divisions of Johnson and 
 Palmer, with Brannan and Negley in 
 reserve. 
 
 On Sunday, the 20th of September, 
 8ep. ^^ ^^6 blood-red sun rose on the 
 20. valley of the Chickamauga, gild- 
 ing with roseate hues the summits of 
 the surrounding hills, an impenetrable 
 mist hovered low on the ground be- 
 tween the two armies ; and in the air 
 there was a breathless stillness which 
 well became the day of sacred rest, but 
 which contrasted strangely with the 
 approaching din and tumult and carnage 
 of war. It had been Bragg's intention 
 to resume the battle at earliest dawn ; 
 and instructions to that effect had been 
 given accordingly. Polk was to stiike 
 the National left ; and the attack was 
 
 to be followed up in rapid succession 
 all along the line. "The left wing," 
 says Bragg in his report, " was to await 
 the attack by the right, and take it up 
 promptly when made, and the whole 
 line was then to be pushed vigorously 
 and persistently against the enemy 
 throughout its extent.'"" Bragg was in 
 the saddle before daybreak — waiting 
 anxiously for the sound of Polk's guns. 
 But one hour and another passed ; and 
 the battle was not yet commenced. This 
 delay has been variously explained. It 
 had been arranged that Hill should 
 make the first onset ; but that general, 
 it is said, was so far in the rear at Ted- 
 ford's Ford, that Polk's order did not 
 reach him until long after sunrise. An- 
 other explanation is that, owing to a 
 want of precaution, a portion of the 
 Confederate left wing, amounting to a 
 whole division, had been formed in 
 front of Polk's line, and that if the at- 
 tack had been made at the time ap- 
 pointed, that division mu^ have been 
 slaughtered. Whatever the cause, the 
 delay was a grievous disappointment to 
 General Bragg. His indignation knew 
 no bounds, when he learned of the 
 coolness and indifference manifested by 
 Polk. Bragg's staff-officer, who had been 
 sent to ascertain the cause of the delay, 
 found Polk and his officers brilliantly 
 attired and seated at a comfortable 
 breakfast. "I have ordered Hill to 
 open the action," said Polk, "and I am 
 waiting to hear the sound of his guns. 
 Do tell General Bragg," he added, 
 with great emotion, "that my heart 
 is overflowing with anxiety for the 
 attack — overflowing with anxiety, sir." 
 
A TEEKIFIC STETTGGLE. 
 
 55S 
 
 What was a disappointment and a posi- 
 tive loss to Bragg was a gain — a 
 great gain to Rosecranz. His men had 
 been working like beavers all night 
 through. The lines had been drawn 
 closer together than on the previous 
 day. Breast-works and abatis had been 
 constructed in their front. Rosecranz, 
 however, was not fully prepared to 
 receive the onset of the enemy. His 
 troops were not sufficiently concentra- 
 ted ; and Thomas, on whom it was all 
 but certain the weight of the battle 
 would fall, not yet joined by Negley, 
 was comparatively weak. The delay 
 gave the National commander time to 
 perfect his arrangements. When the 
 fog lifted, and the enemy commenced 
 his advance, Rosecranz was ready. 
 
 It was now between nine and ten 
 o'clock. All of a sudden, the thunder 
 of artillery was heard on the extreme 
 left. With their usual tactics, the Con- 
 federates did not feel their way towards 
 the National position, but, with concen- 
 trated strength, fell with overwhelming 
 weight on the left which, as we have 
 seen, was held by Thomas. The attack 
 was made by Breckenridge's division, 
 of Hill's corps, which moved forward 
 in splendid style, in order as perfect as 
 if on dress parade, and was followed 
 closely by a magnificent battery of ar- 
 tillery. Breckenridge was accompanied 
 by Cleburne, who advanced on his left, 
 and more towards the National centre. 
 Scarcely had the onward movement of 
 the Confederates commenced, when the 
 din of battle became terrific. The shai-p 
 rattle of musketry, mingling with the 
 roar of artillery, gave intensity "to the 
 
 war thunder which echoed through the 
 forest. Breckenridge swung around so 
 as to flank Thomas' left. Cleburne 
 moved directly against the breast- works 
 in Thomas' front. As the first lines of 
 the enemy approached the works, they 
 were received by a withering fire. The 
 breast-works literally blazed. It was 
 one continuous, incessant flame, out of 
 which rushed death-dealing volleys on 
 the advancing foe. The Confederates, 
 however, seemed rather to court death 
 than to fear danger. On and up against 
 the tempest of lead and iron they 
 moved with desperate valor. Line after 
 line was mowed down, as it advanced. 
 Still, the tide rolled on. The broken 
 heads of columns were continually re- 
 formed from the ranks in the rear ; and 
 the brave Confederates, as if heedless 
 ol death, trampling on the bodies of 
 their dead or dying companions, pressed 
 on towards the breast- works. It seemed 
 as if they were determined " to quench 
 that volcano with human blood, and to 
 choke it with living victims." For a time 
 it seemed as if nothing could check their 
 advance. Cleburne was gaining ground 
 in front ; and Breckenridge was making 
 visible progress against the National 
 left. So overwhelming was the strength, 
 and so vigorous were the onsets of the 
 enemy, that Thomas was under the ne- 
 cessity of making repeated calls to Rose- 
 cranz for help. 
 
 It was now about noon. Repeat- 
 edly held in check, and sometimes even 
 diiven back, the Confederates contrived 
 again and again to re-form and renew 
 the attack. Despite the terrific fire to 
 which they were expusud, and th« awful 
 
554 
 
 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 
 
 c'arnage which they witnessed as they 
 advanced, the dark gray masses were 
 gradually closing on the National left. 
 It was Bi'as;a''s determination that that 
 wing should be turned — it was the key 
 of the pos'tion; and, to give effect to 
 that determination, Breckenridge, rein- 
 forced by division after division, exer- 
 cised all his skill, and strained to the 
 utmost all his energies. Reinforcements 
 coming up on both sides, the battle 
 raged with tremendous fury, "Victory 
 leaned now to the one side and now to 
 the other. It was doubtful with whom 
 the palm should remain. In one of 
 those fierce encounters, when Vande- 
 ver's brigade, of Brannan's division, 
 and a portion of Stanley's, of Wood's 
 division, came up and strengthened the 
 wavering line on the extreme left, 
 Breckenridge, in what seemed a mo- 
 ment of triumph, was thrown back in 
 great confusion, with the loss of Gen- 
 eral Helmond Desher, killed; General 
 D. Adams, at the same time, being se- 
 verely, and Major Graves, chief of artil- 
 lery, mortally wounded. Breckenridge 
 rallied again on a commanding ndge ; 
 and having got his guns into position, 
 and been reinforced by Walker and 
 Cheatham, as well as by Cleburne, he 
 resumed and maintained the fight with 
 the energy of despair. Thomas' left 
 showed signs of yielding ; but, aided by 
 his gallant lieutenants, he got his men 
 well together again in a new position — 
 his light on Missionary Ridge, his left 
 on an eminence by the Lafayette Road — 
 where they stood like a wall of iron. 
 
 At this supreme crisis in the progress 
 of the fight, occurred one of those mis- 
 
 haps, which are all the more liable to 
 prove disastrous, because they cannot 
 be foreseen or provided against, and 
 which, when they do occur, sometimes 
 more than neutralize all the skill of 
 the general and all the braveiy of the 
 troops. Thomas, hard pressed, was 
 still asking for reinforcements. Negley 
 had been ordered forward to his aid. 
 So, too, had Van Cleve. Rosecranz, see- 
 ing that the left centre was in peril, 
 ordered Wood to move towards the 
 left and close in upon Reynolds; Davis 
 and Sheridan were to move in the same 
 direction, so as to prevent a break in 
 the line. It so happened, however, 
 that Brannan was en echelon, slightly 
 in the rear of Reynolds' right ; and 
 Wood, in carrying out the oi'deis, as 
 he understood them, moved by Bran 
 nan's rear, so as to reach Reynolds. It 
 was a grievous, and, as it proved, irre- 
 parable blunder. A gap was thus cre- 
 ated ; quick as lightning, Longstreet, 
 with his experienced eye, discovered 
 his opportunity. With the swiftness of 
 thought, and with the fury of a thun- 
 derbolt, Hood's division was thrown 
 into the fatal opening; and, striking 
 right and left, it cut the National army 
 in two. It was in vain that Davis, of 
 McCook's corps, tried to close in and 
 resist the advance of the enemy. His 
 division was literally cut to pieces. 
 Palmer and Van Cleve, of Crittenden's 
 corps, shared a similar fate. Sheridan, 
 whose position was to the right of Davis, 
 was left alone, and, for a time, made a 
 gallant fight. Brave as he was, how- 
 ever, Sheridan could not perform im- 
 possibilities. He, too, was compelled 
 
"THE ROCK OF CHICKAMAUGA." 
 
 556 
 
 to give way. The National right and 
 centre, shattered to fragments, were 
 soon flying in wild confusion towards 
 Rossville, and onwards to Chattanooga. 
 It seemed a total rout. To some who 
 were present, it recalled the memory of 
 the first battle of Bull Run. The road 
 to Rossville and Chattanooga presented 
 a picture not unlike that which, on that 
 fatal 21st of July, was witnessed on the 
 load to Centreville and Washington. 
 The field was covered with thousands 
 of dead and dying men ; and all along 
 the line of retreat, artillery, caissons, 
 wagons, horses, mules, and a motley 
 multitude of fugitives were mingled to- 
 gether in inextricable confusion. Pow- 
 erless to resist the refluent tide, Rose- 
 cranz, Crittenden, McCoc\, and most 
 of their officers were borne backwards 
 towards Rossville. Tn front of the gap 
 in Missionary Ridge, through which 
 passes the road ^ > Rossville — Sheridan 
 and Davis having come up by the Dry 
 Valley Road — McCook rallied his shat- 
 tered corps, and presented a change of 
 front, determined, at all hazards, to re- 
 sist the further advance of the enemy. 
 Meanwhile General Garfield, chief of 
 Btaff" to Rosecranz, had ridden back, and 
 joined Thomas, to whom he rendered 
 valuable assistance during the battle. 
 
 Never, perhaps, in the history of war, 
 did more depend on the firmness of one 
 individual will, than now depended on 
 the will of General Thomas. Weak- 
 ness, or want of decision on his part, 
 it this trying crisis, would most cer- 
 tainly have brought about a terrible 
 National disaster; and Chickamauga 
 would have been remembered with 
 
 shame, regret and sorrow. Thomas, 
 however, was not found wanting. His 
 clear vision, his caution, his decisive 
 purpose, his strong will, were all to 
 find admii'able illustration. It was a 
 fortunate circumstance that there was 
 a perfect rapport between him and his 
 men, from the division and brigade-otfi- 
 cers down to the humblest soldier in 
 the ranks. Thomas could trust them ; 
 they had perfect faith and confidence in 
 him. It was not till towards the close 
 of the day's fighting, that the commander 
 of the left wing of the National army 
 was mad^ aware of the disaster which 
 had befallen the centre and right. Fully 
 alive, however, to the difficulties of his 
 own position, he was waiting anxiously 
 for the arrival of Sheridan, whose sup- 
 port had been pi'omised him, when 
 Wood came up and took position on 
 the left of Brannan. Thomas now with- 
 drew from his breast-works, and con- 
 centrated his command on a slope of 
 Missionary Ridge, his line assuming the 
 form of a crescent, the flanks resting on 
 the lower spurs of the mountain. This 
 new position was a little to the west of 
 the Rossville Road, and was well forti- 
 fied with artillery. Wood had scarcely 
 had time to arrange his troops in the 
 position assigned them, when the Con- 
 federates fell upon Thomas' line with 
 redoubled energy, Polk on his centre 
 and left, and Longstreet on his right. 
 Thomas, however, was not to be diiven 
 from his position, nor was his line to be 
 broken. Like a rock he stood, firm 
 and invincible, the forces of the enemy, 
 like surging billows, dashing themselves 
 to pieces at his feet 
 
556 
 
 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 
 
 It was now about half-past three 
 o'clock. Longstreet, impatient of resist- 
 ance, and eager for an opportunity to 
 precipitate the final issue, had discov- 
 ered an opening in the hills, on Thomas' 
 right, communicating with a gorge di- 
 rectly in his rear. Into this opening 
 he was already pouring his massive col- 
 umns. It was, indeed, a critical moment. 
 It seemed as if all were lost. Fully 
 turned in front and flank, the National 
 line was now to be attacked heavily 
 in the rear. Destruction or surrender 
 seemed to be the only alternatives. In 
 the moment of agony, relief came. Gen- 
 eral Gordon Granger, who had heard 
 the roar of artillery in the direction in 
 which he knew Thomas to be posted, 
 hurried forward from Rossville, with- 
 out orders, at the head of Steadman's di- 
 vision. As soon as he arrived on the 
 field, Thomas directed him to the point 
 of danger. Steadman was quickly on 
 the crest of the hill, with a battery of 
 six guns, and in perfect command of the 
 gorge. It was not a moment too soon. 
 Two divisions, of Longstreet's corps, 
 were pressing forward with all their 
 might They were already ascending 
 the southern slope of the ridge, and 
 only a few yards distant from the newly- 
 erected battery. Opening a well-di- 
 rected fire, and at the same time hurling 
 against them the brigades of Whitta- 
 ker and Mitchell, himself heading the 
 charge, Steadman drove the too-daring 
 Confederates down the ridge and back 
 into the gorge, with terrible slaughter. 
 Steadman had his horse killed under 
 him; and he was himself badly injured 
 by a falL But he had saved Thomas 
 
 from destruction. It was now sunset; 
 and the attack in this direction was not 
 repeated. 
 
 While this was going on in the rear, 
 Thomas was hotly engaged by the Con- 
 federates, both on front and flank. In 
 vain did Polk dash against his centre 
 and left. In vain did Longstreet hurl 
 his well-tried and war-hardened vet- 
 erans on his right. "The Rock of Chick- 
 amauga" — the name which Thomas 
 that day won — was not to be moved. 
 When night fell, and the battle was 
 ended, his line was unbroken, his posi- 
 tion unmoved. Leaving his dead and 
 wounded in the field, Thomas, in obe- 
 dience to orders from Rosecranz, who 
 was at Chattanooga, fell back to Ross- 
 ville, and took command of all the 
 forces. His ammunition was all but 
 exhausted. Bragg did not pursue. On 
 tho night of the following day, the 
 entire National army was withdrawn 
 into the defenses, in front of Chatta- 
 
 nooga. 
 
 Such was the battle of Chickamauga. 
 It was a Confederate victory; but it 
 was barren of results. Chattanooga 
 had not been recovered. The losses 
 on both sides were heavy. The Na- 
 tionals lost about 16,350 men, and 51 
 guns. The Confederate loss was about 
 18,000. Chickamauga was a battle 
 almost without a plan. It resulted to 
 the credit of neither of the generals-in- 
 chief. It made an end of General Rose- 
 cranz ; and it nearly ruined Bragg. It 
 had but one hero ; and that was Gen- 
 eral Thomas. "The Rock of Chick* 
 mauga " will live forever in Americaa 
 history. 
 
{ 
 
 
 
 l,^-_ 
 
 GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE 
 
 . •■ <<ja 
 
GRANT IN COMMAND. 
 
 55? 
 
 After the battle of Chickamanga, 
 Rosecranz proceeded to throw up forti- 
 fications around Chattanooga. In this 
 work, he found an able and efficient 
 assistant in General James St. Clair 
 Morton. Within twenty-four hours 
 after falling back from Rossville, he 
 was strongly entrenched — so strongly 
 that Bragg could not, with safety, 
 venture upou an offensive movement. 
 Bragg, in truth, was in great trouble. 
 He felt bitter disappointment because 
 the late battle had not resulted in more 
 complete success. He was dissatisfied 
 with the conduct of several of his offi- 
 cers. He had not lost the confidence of 
 Jefferson Davis ; but with the authori- 
 ties at Richmond generally, he was in 
 bad odor. He was expected by them 
 to perform impossibilities. The sug- 
 gestions offered him were as numerous 
 as they were absurd. Bragg, however, 
 had will enough to abide by his own 
 counsel, and sense enough to attempt 
 the one thing which was practicable. 
 If he could not force his way into Chat- 
 tanooga, he might at least starve the 
 army of the Cumberland into submis- 
 sion or retreat. 
 
 With this end in view, the Confed- 
 erate general drew a cordon around the 
 city, and inten'upted or cut off the va- 
 rious lines of communication. He made 
 himself master of the south bank of 
 the Tennessee, opposite Mocassin Point, 
 and then broke the line of communica- 
 tion between Chattanooga and Bridge- 
 port. He destroyed the bridge at the 
 latter place, and thus severed the com- 
 munication with Nashville, the base of 
 supplies. He had, also, entire command 
 
 of the river. Winter was rapidly ap' 
 proaching ; and heavy rains had already 
 deluged the country, making the roads 
 impassable. There was left but one 
 way by which the wagon-trains, which 
 supplied Rosecranz' army, could move ; 
 and that was a circuitous route along 
 the bottom-land of the Tennessee and 
 Sequatchie Valleys, and over the Wal- 
 dron Ridge. On this route, the supjaly- 
 trains were almost entirely at the mercy 
 of the Confederate cavalry. In one day, 
 Bragg's troopers destroyed about 300 
 wagons, and killed or captured some 
 1800 mules. It was not long until dis- 
 tress began to reveal itself in the Na- 
 tional army. The animals died in large 
 numbers from sheer starvation. Their 
 dead bodies lined the roadsides; and 
 the soldieis, unable to work their way 
 through the deep mud, used them as 
 they would have used stepping-stones. 
 It was calculated that at least 10,000 
 horses and mules had perished in sup- 
 plying half rations to the men. Such 
 a state of things, it was manifest, could 
 not long continue. 
 
 The army of the Cumberland became 
 a cause of great anxiety to the authori- 
 ties at Washington. It was felt that 
 if something were not done to relievo 
 it, and that quickly, the army ran the 
 risk of being utterly destroyed; and 
 Chattanooga and East Tennessee would 
 again be brought under Confederate 
 rule. In these circumstances, the gov- 
 ernment fell back on the conqueror of 
 Vicksburg. Gi'ant was ordered to Chat- 
 tanooga, to take sole command. He 
 was then at New Orleans, confined by 
 an injury sustained in falling from his 
 
658 
 
 CHICKAMAUGA A'.sB (JHATTANOOGA. 
 
 horse. As soon as he was able, he has- 
 tened to Indianapolis, where he met 
 Stanton, the Secretary of War, and re- 
 ceived from his hands the order ap- 
 pointing him to the command of the 
 new military division of the Mississippi, 
 comprising the three departments and 
 armies of the Ohio, the Cumberland 
 and the Tennessee. By the same order. 
 General Rosecranz was relieved of the 
 command of the department and army 
 of the Tennessee. At the request of 
 General Grant, the department of the 
 Cumberland was given to Thomas, and 
 that of the Tennessee to Sherman. On 
 Octt the 18th of October, Grant, hav- 
 18. ing arrived at Louisville, formally 
 assumed the command, and issued his 
 first order. Rosecranz, on the 19th, 
 after issuing a touching farewell ad- 
 dress to the troops, left for Cincinnati. 
 Thither, also, were ordered Generals 
 McCook and Crittenden, whose corps 
 were now consolidated into one. 
 From Louisville, Grant telegraphed to 
 Thomas, " Hold Chattanooga at all 
 hazards." " I will hold the town until 
 we starve," was the prompt and charac- 
 teristic reply. 
 
 It was not enough, however, to bring 
 Grant to Chattanooga. It was neces- 
 sary that he should have under him a 
 competent aimy. Arrangements had 
 already been made for increasing the 
 strength of the National army at Chat- 
 tanooga. As soon as it became known 
 that General Longstreet had gone to 
 Tennessee, instructions were sent to 
 Grant, and other commanders in the 
 south and west, to send Rosecranz all 
 possible assistance. Grant was yet at 
 
 New Orleans ; and as Sherman, who 
 represented him at Vicksburg, did not 
 receive the despatch until several days 
 had elapsed, there was some unavoid- 
 able delay in sending reinforcements 
 from the neighborhood of Vicksburg. 
 As early as the 27th of September, 
 Sherman, with the Fifteenth corps, in 
 obedience to orders from Grant, had 
 set out for Memphis, on his way to 
 Chattanooga. Meanwhile, fearful of 
 the constquences which must result if 
 Rosecranz should be tempted to abandon 
 his position, and attempt a retreat, the 
 government had detached the Eleventh 
 and Twelfth corps from the army of the 
 Potomac, and placing them in charge of 
 General Hooker, hurried them along by 
 rail to Chattanooga. Never before — 
 not even at Solferino and Magenta 
 — had railroads been more effectively 
 used for transporting troops and all the 
 necessary material of war, than on this 
 occasion. It was Stanton's project ; and 
 in giving it effect, he bent ui)on it all 
 the energies of his powerful mind and 
 will. His purposes wei-e admirably 
 carried out by General Meigs, the 
 quartermaster-general, and by Colonel 
 D. C. McCallum, the government super- 
 intendent of military railroads. Mc- 
 Callum, who alone was responsible for 
 the conveyance of the troops, was ably 
 assisted by W. Prescott Smith, master 
 of transportation on the Baltimore and 
 Ohio Railroad. In seven days the two 
 corps, some 23,000 strong, with artillery, 
 trains, baggage and animals, were trans- 
 ferred from the Rapidan to Stevenson, ' 
 Alabama — a distance of 1192 milea 
 Grant reached Nashville on the 
 
WAUHATCHIE. 
 
 559 
 
 Oct. 
 21. 
 
 2l8t of October. He there met and 
 had an interview with Rosecranz 
 and Hooker. On the 23d, he arrived at 
 Chattanooga. Next morning he made 
 a reconnoissance of the ground, and de- 
 termined on his plan of action. He 
 found that Rosecranz had allowed the 
 enemy to occupy all the heights around 
 his position, and that neither the river 
 nor the railroad could be used. Un- 
 less the river or the roads could be 
 opened, there was no choice but retreat ; 
 and retreat, in the present condition 
 of the army, would be certain ruin. 
 Thomas, and his chief engineer, General 
 William F. Smith, had decided upon a 
 plan by which they hoped to be able 
 to regain possession of Lookout Val- 
 ley, and to re-establish communications 
 with Bridgeport by way of Brown's 
 Ferry. Hooker, by order of Thomas, 
 had already concentrated at the latter 
 place. This plan met the hearty ap- 
 proval of General Grant, who proceed- 
 ed immediately to put it in execution. 
 Hooker was to cross the Tennessee at 
 Bridgeport, and push on by the main 
 wagon-road to Wauhatchie, in Look- 
 out Valley. Palmer, who was now 
 opposite Chattanooga, was to move 
 down the north side of the I'iver to a 
 point opposite Whiteside, where he 
 was to cross the river and hold the 
 road passed over by Hooker. W. F. 
 Smith was to go down the river from 
 Chattanooga, under cover of the dark- 
 ness, with about 4000 troops, to cross 
 at Brown's Ferry, and to seize the 
 range of hills at the mouth of Lookout 
 Valley. A pontoon bridge was to be 
 thrown over the river at Brown's Ferry, 
 
 so as to open communications between 
 Hooker and Thomas. The movements 
 of Hooker and Palmer might be made 
 in open day ; but Smith's success de- 
 pended largely on secrecy. 
 
 These movements were promptly and 
 successfully executed. On the morn- 
 ing of the 26th, Hooker crossed Oct. 
 at Bridgeport on pontoon bridges. 26. 
 He effected a landing on the south side 
 without any opposition, and pushed on 
 to Wauhatchie, which he reached on*, 
 the 28th. Palmer followed, according 
 to instructions, and took position at 
 Whiteside, in his rear. Smith's part 
 of the plan, although beset with greater 
 difficulty, because he was within reach 
 of the enemy's sharp-shooters during 
 his whole course, was carried out with 
 equal success. His force consisted of 
 about 4000 men. Of these, 1800, under 
 General Hazen, embarked on pontoon 
 boats at Chattanooga ; and during the 
 dark hours of the night of the 26th and 
 the morning of the 27th, they floated 
 noiselessly down the river, without 
 oars, passing the point of Lookout 
 Mountain, and, unnoticed by seven 
 miles of the enemy's pickets, reached 
 Brown's Ferry just about dawn. The 
 material for the consti'uction of the 
 pontoon bridge was thus at the point 
 desired. Landing without difficulty, 
 Smith drove in and scattered the Con- 
 federate pickets, and seized a low range 
 of hills, which commanded Lookout 
 Valley. A firm foothold having been 
 secured, skirmishers were thrown for- 
 ward ; and by means of felled trees, 
 which the axe-men soon laid low, an 
 impassable abatis was thrown up in 
 
560 
 
 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 
 
 front of Hazen's troops. The Confed- 
 erates, unwilling to abandon the posi- 
 tion, returned and made a fierce at- 
 tack ; but finding their efforts useless, 
 they withdrew up the valley towards 
 Chattanooga. The remainder of Smith's 
 force, some 1200 strong, under General 
 Turchin, having moved, meanwhile, 
 down the north bank of the stream, 
 across Mocassin Point, reached Brown's 
 Ferry before daylight. They were rap- 
 idly femed across ; and, by ten o'clock, 
 a pontoon bridge connected the north 
 and south banks of the Tennessee. 
 On the morning of the 28th, as has 
 been stated, Hookei-, with the Elev- 
 enth corps, Major-General Howard, 
 and Geary's division, of the Twelfth 
 corps, appeared in Lookout Valley, at 
 Wauhatchie, his left connecting vdth 
 Smith at the pontoon bridge. These 
 movements secured for the Nationals 
 the possession of the roads and the 
 river; and all fears of starvation in 
 Chattanooga were now abandoned. 
 "General Thomas' plan," said Grant, 
 in his telegram to Halleck, "for se- 
 curing the river and southside road to 
 Bridgeport, has proved eminently suc- 
 cessful. The question of supplies may 
 now be regarded as settled." 
 
 Bragg was not willing that his 
 antagonist should retain the great 
 advantage he had won, without mak- 
 ing another attempt to dislodge him. 
 Lookout "Valley, which lies between 
 Racoon and Lookout Mountains, and 
 which has an average width of about 
 two miles, is divided towards its centre 
 by a series of wood-crowned heights, 
 8ome of them rising to an elevation of 
 
 200 and 300 feet. These heights, as 
 well as the more commanding positions 
 on Racoon and Lookout Mountains, 
 were in the hands of the Confederates. 
 From these eminences, the position and 
 movements of the National army could 
 be easily seen. McLaws, of Long 
 street's corps, was on Lookout Mourt 
 tain, eagerly watching Hooker. It was 
 his determination to fall upon and 
 crush that branch of the National 
 army, so soon as he should see a favor- 
 able opportunity. On the night of the 
 28th, Geary's division, on Hooker's 
 right, was lying at Wauhatchie, How- 
 ard's corps, as has been mentioned, 
 having been thrown out in the direc- 
 tion of Brown's Ferry. McLaws, de. 
 sirous to take Geary by surprise, de- 
 scended at midnight, and with fiercs 
 energy, his men uttering wild screams 
 as they advanced, fell upon Geary's 
 pickets, driving them in. The batteries 
 on Lookout Mountain now opened fire ; 
 and while Geary's camp was furiously 
 attacked on three different sides by the 
 on-rushing Confederates, his men were 
 exposed to a very tempest of shot and 
 shell. Geary, however, was not unpre- 
 pared. Knowing that he was liable 
 to be attacked at any moment, he 
 had been holding himself in a state of 
 readiness. When, therefore, McLawa' 
 men came up, they were warmly re- 
 ceived. Full in the faces of the too 
 confident Confederates, Geary's brave 
 fellows poured a deadly fire of mus- 
 ketry. Such a reception had not been 
 expected. The advancing columns re- 
 coiled. Geary, however, was greatly 
 outnumbered,' and the battle continued. 
 
OKLAN SMITH. 
 
 561 
 
 Hooker was aroused by the boom- 
 ing of cannon and the shrill rattling 
 of musketry. He knew, from the di- 
 rection whence these sounds issued, 
 that Geary had been attacked. How- 
 ard was ordered to double-quick his 
 nearest divi^n — that of Schurz — to the 
 aid of Geary. " Forward to their re- 
 lief, boys ! " shouted Hooker, as Schurz's 
 men streamed past him through the 
 darkness. They had advanced but a 
 short distance, when, suddenly, there 
 came a blaze of musketry from the 
 hills, showing that the Confederates 
 were close at hand, as well as in force 
 in the neighborhood of Geary's posi- 
 tion. Tyndale's brigade was detached, 
 and ordered to charge the heights, 
 while Schurz, with the remainder of 
 his troops, moved on towards Geary. 
 A thin bris^ade of Steinwehr's division, 
 commanded by Colonel Orlan Smith, of 
 the Seventy-Third Ohio, now came up; 
 and it was found that the hill to the 
 rear of Schurz was occupied by the 
 enemj'. This hill Smith was ordered 
 to cany with the bayonet. The moon 
 was shining bright and clear ; but the 
 hill was precipitous, seamed with ra- 
 vines, covered with thick brushwood, 
 and rose to the height of 200 feet. It 
 was a daring — it seemed almost a fool- 
 hardy — experiment ; but the order had 
 been given, and it must be obeyed. 
 On and up the slope rushed the brave 
 fellows of the Seventy-Third Ohio and 
 of the Thirty-Third Massachusetts un- 
 til they had almost reached the rifle- 
 pits, when they were received by a 
 volley from some 2000 muskets, and 
 driven back in confusion to the foot of 
 
 the hill. There, however, they re- 
 formed; and, although now fully aware 
 of the nature of the ground and of the 
 difficulties to be encountered, those 
 noble resriments again breasted the 
 hill; and in spite of the destructive 
 volleys which tore through their ranks, 
 and the shouting and yelling and taunt- 
 ing sneers of the men on the summit, 
 they pressed on, without firing a shot, 
 towards the blazing rifle-pits, and then, 
 ■ttnth one bound, bayonet in hand, swept 
 the enemy before them. It was not 
 until the enemy was in full retreat, 
 and until shouts of victory were rend- 
 ing the midnight air, that the first vol- 
 ley was fired. It was a sort of parting 
 salute, given in a species of wild glee 
 by the Nationals, but not particularly 
 agreeable to the retreating foe, and not 
 likely soon to be forgotten by any of 
 the Confederates who survived that 
 moonlight struggle. Geary, meanwhile, 
 although contending with vastly supe- 
 rior numbers, and sometimes nearly 
 overborne, held his ground with char- 
 acteristic tenacity ; and at length, after 
 three hours' fighting, he hurled his as- 
 sailants back towards Lookout Moun- 
 tain. Thither they retired for refuge^ 
 leaving on the field 150 of their num- 
 ber dead, and in Geary's hands ovei 
 100 prisoners, with several hundred 
 small arms. It was now a little after 
 four o'clock in the morning; and the 
 battle of Wauhatchie was ended. 
 
 The charge made by Orlan Smith 
 has l)een singled out as one of the most 
 brilliant chai'ges of the war. It de- 
 lighted and astonished Hooker. " No 
 troops," he said, " ever rendered more 
 
662 
 
 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA, 
 
 brilliant service." It Avon special com- 
 mendation from so reserv^ed a man as 
 Thomas. " The bayonet charge of 
 Howard's troops," said he, in his letter 
 of congratulation to Hooker, "made 
 up the side of a steep and difficult 
 hill, over 200 feet high, completely 
 routing and driving the enemy from 
 his barricades on its top, and the re- 
 pulse, by Geary's division, of greatly 
 superior numbers, vs^ho attempted to 
 sui'prise him, will rank among the most 
 distinguished feats of arms in this war." 
 The victory at Wauhatchie secured 
 the possession of the communications 
 which Smith had opened up two days 
 before. Bi'agg's plans were defeated. 
 Soon afterwards, two little steamboats 
 were put upon the river; by means of 
 these, the raih'oad, and the other roads 
 on the south of the Tennessee, supplies 
 were conveyed to Chattanooga ; and the 
 army was saved from actual famine. 
 Fortune was smilinof a<jain on the Na- 
 tional arms ; and the star of General 
 Grant was still in the ascendant. 
 
 While these events were taking place 
 at Chattanooga, Sherman was pressing 
 forward from Memphis. He had left 
 Vicksbur'g for Memphis, on his way to 
 Chattanooga, on the 27th of September. 
 His own corps followed liim up the 
 river in steamboats. He had been pre- 
 ceded by the divisions of Osterhaus 
 and John E. Smith. Arriving at Mem- 
 phis on the 2d of October, he i-eceived 
 a letter from Halleck, instructing him 
 to move by the line of the Memphis 
 and Charleston Railroad to Athens, 
 and to report thence to Rosecranz, at 
 Chattanooga. He was to repair the 
 
 railroads as he advanced, and to de- 
 pend on his own line for supplies. On 
 his way to Corinth, on Sunday, the 
 11th, having with him, as an escort, a 
 battalion of the Thirteenth regulars, ht 
 arrived at Colliersville about noon, just 
 in time to save the Sixty-Sixth Indiana, 
 Colonel D. C. Anthony, from being 
 overwhelmed and probably destroyed 
 by a body of Confederate cavalry, some 
 3000 strong, with eight guns, under 
 the command of General Chalmers. 
 He reached Corinth that Sunday even- 
 ing. Without delay, he pushed on to 
 luka. At Tuscumbia, on the 27th, his 
 advance, under General Frank Blair, 
 came into contact with a Confederate 
 force, some 5000 strong, under General 
 S. D. Lee. The Confederate cavalry 
 were severely punished ; and Lee gave 
 no further annoyance to the troops on 
 their march. The National troops had 
 been repairing the roads, as they moved 
 along, in oljedience to instructions re 
 ceived from Halleck. On the same 
 day on which Blair chastised Lee, 
 Sheraian received a despatch from 
 Grant, urging him to discontinue his 
 work on the railroad, and hasten for- 
 ward with all possible despatch, with 
 his entire force, to Bridgeport. Hap- 
 pily, he had made arrangements with 
 Admiral Porter to have boats waiting 
 for him at Eastport. By means of 
 these, he passed his troops across the 
 Tennessee and hurried eastward, Blair 
 covering his rear, and reached Bridge- 
 port on the 14th. On the day follow- 
 ing, he joined Grant at Chattanooga; 
 and the two together reconnoitered the 
 ground, Grant explaining his proposed 
 
GEANT'S BATTLE PLAN. 
 
 563 
 
 plan of attack, so soon as the army of 
 the Tennessee was forward and ready 
 for action. 
 
 Sherman arrived at Chattanooga at 
 a most opportune moment. It seemed 
 as if the fates were working in the in- 
 terest of General Grant and the army 
 under his command. The plans of the 
 general commanding had worked to 
 perfection ; they had been admirably 
 carried out ; and they had been attend- 
 ed, so far, with complete success. And 
 now, when Sherman, his trusted right 
 arm, came up with his well-trained 
 veterans, Bragg had invited attack by 
 committing a huge and irreparable 
 blunder. It was known to the Con- 
 federate commander that Burnside, at 
 an earlier date, had general instructions 
 to push forward from Knoxville, and 
 form a connection with Rosecranz. Be- 
 lieving that if such a connection were 
 now formed, it would be fatal to his 
 prospects, and in the vain hope of cut- 
 ting his rival off, and beating him in 
 detail, he detached Longstreet from the 
 aiiny in front of Chattanooga, and or- 
 dered him to attack Burnside, and take 
 possession of Knoxville. A more fatal 
 blunder he could not have committed. 
 He could not, had such been his object, 
 have played more completely into the 
 hands of his antagonist. Grant saw 
 his opportunity ; but he resolved to 
 wait until the arrival of Sherman, so 
 as to be able to turn it to full and sat- 
 isfactory account. He was now ready. 
 
 Grant was not insensible to the peril- 
 ous position in which Burnside was 
 now placed ; nor was he indifferent to 
 his calls for help. But he knew that 
 
 Burnside would be relieved most effect- 
 ually by the plan which he himself 
 proposed to cany out — that the threat- 
 ened catastrophe at Knoxville would be 
 best averted by a decisive victory at 
 Chattanooga. Colonel Wilson, of his 
 staff, accompanied by Assistant-Secre- 
 tary of War, Charles A. Dana, was, 
 therefore, sent to Knoxville to explain 
 to Burnside the situation. He was to 
 make the best show possible in the 
 presence of the enemy, to allow him- 
 self to be besieged, but to hold Knox- 
 ville at all hazards. Grant, meanwhile, 
 hurried forward his plans, and made 
 all the necessary arrangements for the 
 attack. 
 
 The great battle of Chattanooga — by 
 far the most picturesque battle in the 
 war, and the one in which General 
 Grant most conspicuously showed that 
 he was not only the fortunate winner of 
 battles, but the possessor of military 
 abilities of the very highest and rarest 
 order of excellence — was now about to 
 be fought. Grant's plans, as we have 
 seen, were matured and ready for exe- 
 cution. It was now the middle of No- 
 vember. Sherman's corps had arrived 
 at Bridgeport on the 14th. Grant 
 made up his mind to make the general 
 attack on the 2l8t. He had discovered 
 that the north end of the Missionary 
 Ridge was imperfectly guai'ded, as 
 also, the western bank of the river, 
 from the mouth of the South Chick 
 araauga, down towards Chattanooga 
 This point invited attack. This, how 
 ever, was not all. A successful blow 
 given in that direction would make a 
 junction impossible between Bragg and 
 
964 
 
 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 
 
 Longstreet. The northern end of Mis- 
 sionary Ridge, therefore, he singled out 
 as the special point of attack. While 
 the attack should seem to be general, 
 and bearing heavily on the Confed- 
 erate left, he proposed to mass his con- 
 verging forces on the point thus indi- 
 cated. Sherman, with his own troops 
 and one of Thomas' divisions, was to 
 cross the Tennessee just below the 
 mouth of the South Chickamauga, and 
 secure the heights, as far as the rail- 
 road tunnel. Thomas was to co-operate 
 with Sherman, by concentrating his 
 troops on his own left, leaving a thin 
 line to guard t,he works on the right 
 and centre. Hooker was to assail the 
 Confederate left, and drive it from 
 Lookout Mountain. Grant was the 
 more auxious to make the attack on 
 the 21st that, on the day before, he 
 received from Bragg a letter, suggest- 
 ing the removal of non-combatants from 
 Chattanooga — a letter intended to con- 
 vey the idea that an attack on that 
 place was meditated, but which really 
 confirmed the report brought by a de- 
 serter, and confirmed Grant in the be- 
 lief that Bragg was about to retreat. 
 
 The general attack which was to be 
 made on the 21st was countermanded. 
 Sherman had experienced unexpected 
 difficulty in passing his troops across 
 Brown's Ferry, in consequence of the 
 heavy rains. The pontoon bridge at 
 last gave way. Osterhaus, whose divi- 
 sion was still on the southern side of 
 the river, and without the means of 
 crossing, was ordered to report to 
 General Hooker, with whom he re- 
 mained. Howard was, at the same 
 
 time, called to Chattanooga, and tem- 
 porarily attached to the command of 
 General Thomas. On the afternoon of 
 the 23d, the Fifteenth corps, under the 
 immediate command of General Blair, 
 having flung pontoon bridges across 
 the Tennessee at the point indicated 
 above, and also across the Chicka- 
 mauga, were advancing to their posi- 
 tion on the extreme left of the National 
 army. 
 
 Grant, now impatient of delay, and 
 determined that if Bragg really meant 
 to retire, he should not retire unin- 
 jured and in good order, had instructed 
 Thomas, on the morning of the pjoy. 
 23d, to advance and give the en- 23. 
 emy an opportunity of developing his 
 lines. The day was unusually beauti- 
 ful The men, now that they were 
 relieved from their prison-house in 
 Chattanooga, and well fed, were in 
 excellent spirits. They were dressed 
 in their best uniforms, and accompanied 
 by new bands of musia The neigh bor- 
 ing heights were crowded with specta- 
 tors. The magnificent array, the steady 
 step, the splendid uniforms, the burn- 
 ished bayonets, glittering in the clear 
 November sunlight— it was a holiday 
 picture. It seemed a dress-parade or re- 
 view, and was so I'egarded for a time by 
 the Confederates, who witnessed the 
 spectacle from the side and summit of 
 Missionary Ridge. Wood's division, of 
 Granger's corps, moved in advance on 
 the left ; Sheridan's division of the same 
 corps, being on the right. Palmer, of the 
 Fourteenth corps, supported Granger's 
 right, with Baird's division refused; 
 Johnson's division, of Palmer's, remain- 
 
OECHAED KNOB. 
 
 565 
 
 ing under arms in the entrenchments, 
 to be ready to reinforce at any point. 
 Howard's corps was formed in mass 
 behind that of Granger. As soon as 
 Thomas' men began to move forward, 
 the heavy guns of Fort Wood opened 
 upon the enemy's first position. Upon 
 the ramparts of the fort. Grant, Thomas, 
 Granger and Howard stood watching 
 the advance. It was a splendid sight. 
 On moved the mighty mass, as if it had 
 been one solid unit. Cheers were 
 heard to arise from the ranks of the 
 advancing columns. The pickets of 
 the enemy were seen to break and fly 
 in confusion before them. In spite of 
 che well-directed fire from its summit, 
 Wood had already reached the base of 
 Orchard Knob — a steep, craggy hill, 
 rising above the general level of the 
 valley, midway between the river and 
 the ridge, and about a mile from Fort 
 Wood. Without halting. Wood or- 
 dered his men to charge. It was done 
 in gallant style, the rifle-pits on the 
 summit being carried, and 200 men 
 made prisoners. A heavy battery was 
 advanced to the captured position fi'om 
 Fort Wood, and the place was held. 
 This was an important gain to the 
 Nationals. 
 
 Simultaneously with this movement 
 of General Thomas against Orchard 
 Knob, a cavalry brigade, by order of 
 General Grant, was operating on 
 Bragg's extreme right and rear. This 
 movement was scarcely less successful 
 than the other, resulting as it did in 
 the Ijurning of Tyner's Station, the cut- 
 ting of the railroad leading to Cleve- 
 \nd, the capture of 100 wagons, with 
 
 »*4 
 
 200 prisoners, and the destruction of a 
 large quantity of stores. 
 
 No other movement of any conse- 
 quence took place on the 23d. Thomas 
 held his advanced position On Or- 
 chard Knob, and the low range of hills 
 to the south, his troops entrenched 
 themselves; and every available point 
 was covered with artillery. Hooker 
 had general instructions from Grant to 
 take Lookout Mountain, to cross the 
 Cliattanooga Valley to Rossville, and 
 thence, by the Rossville Gap, to advance 
 upon Missionaiy Ridge. His immedi- 
 ate instructions were that he should 
 take a position so as at least to be 
 able to make a strong demonstration, 
 but that if he felt himself equal to the 
 task, he was not to hesitate to make 
 the attack and drive the enemy from 
 the mountain. Sherman, all night 
 through, waa pushing his troops across 
 the river. As eai'ly as daylight, on the 
 morning of the 24th, he had 8000 jjov, 
 men, with artillery and horses, 24. 
 on the south side of the Tennessee. 
 At one o'clock, P. M., the march was 
 taken up by three columns oi echelon, 
 each head of column covered by a line 
 of skirmishers, with suppoits. It was 
 a dull, drizzly day. The clouds were 
 low ; and the movements of the troops 
 could not be easily seen by the enemy. 
 At half-past three o'clock, Sherman had 
 possession of the whole northern ex- 
 tremity of Missionary Ridge, as far 
 almost as the railroad tunnel. In the 
 afternoon and during the night, he 
 thi'ew up entrenchments, and estalv- 
 lished himself in a really strong posi- 
 tion. Sherman had thus, so far, car- 
 
566 
 
 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 
 
 ried out his part of the general plan. 
 Such W6S the state of things on the 
 National left, at the close of Tuesday, 
 the 24th. 
 
 On the National right, matters were, if 
 possible, even more favorable. Hooker 
 had performed a brilliaut feat of arms 
 on Lookout Mountain. At four o'clock, 
 on the morning of the 24th, he had re- 
 ported that his troops were in position, 
 and ready to advance. Soon after- 
 wards the movement commenced. It 
 had been Hooker's intention to push his 
 men across Lookout Creek, and strike 
 the enemy in front. It was a hazard- 
 ous undertaking; for Lookout Moun- 
 tain, with its high, palisaded crest, its 
 steep, rugged slopes, its numerous rifle- 
 pits, its encircling lines of earth-works 
 and redans, was deemed by Bragg im- 
 pregnable. It so happened, however, 
 that Lookout Creek was so swollen by 
 the recent heavy rains, that it was im- 
 passable. A direct movement by the 
 main road could not be attempted until 
 temporary bridges were constructed. 
 Hooker, therefore, ordered Geary, with 
 his own division, and Whittaker's bri- 
 gade, of Cruft's division, to march to 
 Wauhatchie, to cross the creek there, 
 and move down on the right bank, 
 while he employed the remainder of 
 his forces in throwing bridges across 
 on the main road. The day was favor- 
 able for conducting such operations. 
 A heavy mist enveloped the mountain, 
 and spread itself over the adjoining 
 valleys. The attention of the enemy 
 had been drawn to the bridge-builders, 
 of whom an occasional glimpse could 
 be had, as the mist drifted with the 
 
 breeze ; but no notice had been taken 
 of Geary, who reached his appointed 
 place at Wauhatchie, unobserved. It 
 was about eight o'clock when he began 
 to cross the creek. Passing over with- 
 out molestation, he surprised and cap- 
 tured the picket-guard; and immedi- 
 ately facing to the north, he extended 
 his line on the right to the base of the 
 mountain. The Confederates, caught 
 at once on both flank and rear, offered 
 a stubborn resistance. Meanwhile, the 
 bridges were constructed; and Oster- 
 haus' division, having been brought up 
 from Brown's Ferry, the Nationals were 
 soon in gi'eat force on the right bank 
 of the creek. Under cover of the two 
 batteries — the Ohio, on Bald Hill, and 
 the New York, on the hill in the rear 
 — Hooker's men went dashing down 
 the valley, sweeping everything before 
 them, capturing the rifle-pits, and mak- 
 ing a large number of prisoners. At 
 the same time the troops to the right, 
 passing directly under the muzzles of 
 the Confederate guns, were rushvjig up 
 the rugged sides of the hill, leaping 
 over boulders and ledges of roc^, cut- 
 ting their way through the abatis, and 
 gradually forcing position after posi- 
 tion until the plateau was cleared, and 
 the retreating Confederates were seen 
 plunging themselves down the jagged 
 and precipitous face of the mountain, 
 and flying in confusion and utter rout 
 towards Chattanooga Valley. Hooker 
 had not expected to accomplish bo 
 much in the same space of time. Nay, 
 he had been unwilling that his men 
 should attempt so much. Not know- 
 ing to what extent ^he enemy miglit 
 
LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN. 
 
 567 
 
 be reinforced, and fearing disaster from 
 the rough character of the groiiud, he 
 had given directions that the men 
 should halt when they reached the 
 high ground. But aroused to the 
 highest pitch of enthusiasm, and with 
 a flying foe before them, a halt was 
 impossible. 
 
 It was now about two o'clock in the 
 afternoon ; and such was the density of 
 the mist which shrouded the mountain 
 and hung heavily over the valley, that 
 it was found necessary, temporarily at 
 least, to suspend operations. Hooker, 
 not deeming it advisable to descend 
 into the valley in pursuit, established 
 his line on the east side of the moun- 
 tain, his right resting on the palisades, 
 his left near the mouth of Chattanooga 
 Creek. The battle had literally been 
 fought above the clouds. It was not 
 until nightfall that the sky cleared, 
 and revealed to thousands, in the val- 
 ley below, the actual progress which 
 Hooker had made. As soon as it be- 
 came known that behind that veil of 
 clouds a great battle had been fought 
 and won, and that the National arms 
 bad been victorious, the soldiers gave 
 way to the wildest enthusiasm ; and 
 loud cheers for " Old Hooker " coming 
 up, resounding from the valley, were 
 echoed and re-echoed among the blood- 
 stained hills. The night which fol- 
 lowed was beautiful in the extreme. 
 The mist disappeared ; and a full moon 
 shed her mellow light over a scene of 
 matchless magnificence. It was Hook- 
 er's conviction that the enemy would 
 withdraw from the summit of the 
 mountain before daylight. In antici- 
 
 pation of such a movement, he de- 
 tached parties from several regiments, 
 with instructions to scale the palisades. 
 When morning came, the Confederates 
 were gone. In their haste, they had 
 left behind them 20,000 rations, the" 
 camp and garrison equipage of their 
 brigades, and a large quantity of other 
 war material. The Eighth Kentuck- 
 ians were the first to reach the crest; 
 and at sunrise, in the clear, crisp No- 
 vember air, amid echoing cheers from 
 the troops below, they had the honor 
 of unfurling the National banner from 
 Pulpit Rock. The importance of this 
 victory at Lookout Mountain, it is 
 hardly possible to over-estimate. It 
 enabled Grant greatly to contract his 
 line of battle, and bv so much to con- 
 centrate his strength. It made an end 
 of the blockade of the Tennessee ; and 
 from that day there was no more diffi- 
 culty about supplies for the National 
 army. 
 
 Such was the condition of things on 
 the night of the 24th and the morning 
 of the 25th of Noveriiber. The Na- 
 tional army maintained au unbroken 
 line, with open communications from 
 the north end of Lookout Mountain, 
 through Chattanooga Valley to the 
 north end of Missionary Ridge. Car- 
 lin had taken position so as to connect 
 Hooker with the centre ; and Howard^ 
 with the Eleventh corps, having been 
 moved up from the right, connected 
 the centre with Sherman. The Con- 
 federates, having abandoned Chatta- 
 nooga Valley, concentrated on Mission- 
 ary Ridge. Their line extended from 
 Tunnel Hill to Rossville. Bragg'a 
 
668 
 
 CHICKAMATJflA AND CHATTANOOGA. 
 
 right, consisting of the divisions of 
 Cleburne, Walker, Cheatham, and Ste- 
 venson, was commanded by Hardee; 
 his left was commanded by Brecken- 
 "idge, and was composed of that gen- 
 eral's own division, now under Lewis, 
 and those of Stewart and Anderson. 
 General Grant's headquarters had been 
 removed from Fort Wood to Orchard 
 Knob, or as it was also named, " Indian 
 Hill" — a commanding eminence which 
 Thomas had now strongly fortified, and 
 from which could be seen the embattled 
 hosts spread out, as in a vast amphi- 
 theatre. 
 
 The morning of the 25th rose in 
 jjov. beauty. Far almost as the eye 
 25« could reach, the sun fell upon the 
 compact lines of polished steel. In 
 front, towering up, the huge form of 
 Missionary Ridge, its precipitous sides 
 defying attack, its summit swarming 
 with armed men, and crowned with 
 artillery ; away to the right, and stand- 
 ing out clear and well-defined, the bold 
 outlines of Lookout Mountain ; Hook- 
 er's men spread out in the valley below 
 to the right, Shennan's massed in com- 
 pact phalanx above to the left, while 
 Thomas' well-trained bands, eager and 
 ready for the fray, are gathered together 
 in close array around the headquarters 
 of the chief — such was the sight which 
 met the eye of the beholder, as he stood 
 on Orchard Knob, on the morning of 
 the day which was to witness the final 
 struggle and the crowning National 
 victory at Chattanooga. It was a mag- 
 nificent spectacle, and one which it 
 rarely falls to the lot of mortals to 
 witness. 
 
 At an early hour the preparations 
 were complete. The sun had arisen, 
 however, before the bugle sounded 
 " Forward ! " Hooker had received 
 orders to move on the Confederate 
 left ; Sherman was to move against the 
 right ; while the centre, under the im- 
 mediate eye of General Grant, was to 
 advance later in the day, and wlienever 
 the developments made on either wing 
 should justify the attack. Shortly after 
 sunrise, Hooker, who has left a small 
 force on Lookout Mountain, is seen, 
 with the mass of his troops, moving 
 down the eastern slope of the moun- 
 tain, and sweeping across the valley. 
 Sherman moves at the same time on 
 the Confederate right ; and it soon be- 
 gins to be evident that Bragg, believ- 
 ing that the main attack is to be made 
 on his right, is massing his troops on 
 Sherman's front. A fiei'ce artillery 
 duel at once commenced between Or- 
 chard Knob and Missionary Ridge. 
 Hooker, pressing on towards Rossville 
 Gap, encountei'ed an unexpected obsta- 
 cle at Chattanooga Creek. -The bridge 
 had been destroyed by the Confederates 
 as they retired from the valley in the 
 early morning. It was an anfortunate 
 circumstance, necessitating as it did a 
 delay of three houis. As soon as 
 the bridge was completed, the troops 
 were pushed over. Rossville Gap was 
 quickly occupied ; and Hooker, moving 
 Osterhaus along the east side of the 
 ridge, Geary at its base, with the bat- 
 teries, on the west side, and Crvit on 
 the ridge itself, marched northward, 
 driving the enemy before him. The 
 Confederates did not yiiJd withou/ 
 
MISSIONARY RIDGE. 
 
 669 
 
 offering a stubborn resistance. It was 
 found impossible, however, to with- 
 stand the energy and dash of the Na- 
 tional troops. The skirmishers were 
 speedily driven in and pressed back 
 upon the main body. Cruft, now form- 
 ing his column in battle-line, fell with 
 all his weight on the front line of the 
 enemy, Geary and Osterhaus, on both 
 flanks, opening a murderous fire. The 
 fighting continued till sunset, when the 
 Confederates, having been driven stead- 
 ily backward from one strong position 
 to another, although they resisted nobly, 
 broke and fled in wild confusion. The 
 fugitives who sought safety by running 
 down the eastern slope, fell into the 
 hands of Osterhaus ; those who tried 
 to escape by the western slope, fell into 
 the hands of Geary ; while those who 
 retreated along the ridge ran helplessly 
 into the ranks of Johnson's division of 
 the Fourteenth corps, and were cap- 
 tured. Shortly after sunset, the victory 
 on the National right was complete. 
 Breckeuridge had proved himself no 
 match for Hooker. 
 
 Let us now see what was going on 
 towards the left and at the centre. 
 On the morning of the 25th, Sherman 
 was in the saddle before it was light. 
 During the night he had strongly en- 
 trenched his position. His order of 
 battle was similar to that of Hooker. 
 General Corse, with three of his own 
 regiments and one of Lightburn's, 
 moved forward on the crest of the hill ; 
 General Morgan L. Smith, with his 
 command, advanced along the eastern 
 base ; while Colonel Loomis, supported 
 by the two reserve brigades of General 
 
 John E. Smith, advanced along the 
 western base. The bi-isjades of Cock- 
 erell and Alexander, and a portion of 
 Lightburn's, remained behind, holding 
 the position first occupied. Almost 
 from the commencement of the forward 
 movement, the advancing columns were 
 exposed to the guns of the enemy. 
 Without experiencing any very great 
 inconvenience, Sherman's troops de- 
 scended the hill on which they had 
 been drawn up in battle order, crossed 
 the valley in their front, and rushed 
 up the opposite hill, which they seized 
 and held. At this point, it was dis- 
 covered that the ground to be traversed 
 was not so free from obstructions as 
 had been supposed. It was not a con- 
 tinuous ridge, but rather a chain of 
 hills, each well wooded and fortified. 
 This secondary crest, on which Corse 
 had obtained a foothold, was com- 
 manded by a higher hill, and thus 
 exposed to a plunging fire. Between 
 these hills was a deep gorge, through 
 which passed the railroad tunnel, and 
 in Avhich the Confederate commander 
 sheltered his masses until they could 
 be brought into, action. Corse called 
 forward his reserves, and asked for re- 
 inforcements. The ridge, however, 
 was narrow; and as the enemy, from 
 his superior position, could bring to 
 bear upon the assaulting columns a 
 destructive, enfilading fire of artillery 
 and musketry, it was not well to crowd 
 the men. A severe hand-to-hand con- 
 test ensued, and continued for more 
 than an hour. The tide of battle 
 ebbed and flowed, victory now leaning 
 to the one side and now to the other 
 
670 
 
 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 
 
 It was a desperate grapple, and the 
 loss of life was terrible. No decided 
 progress was being made on either 
 side. Corse found it impossible to 
 carry the works in his front ; the Con- 
 federates were equally unable to drive 
 him from the position he had won. 
 The columns which, under Loomis and 
 Smith, moved along the sides of the 
 ridge, encountering fewer difficulties, 
 were attended with better success. 
 Smith kept gaining ground on the left 
 spur of Missionary Ridge, while Loomis 
 on his side got abreast of the tunnel 
 and the railroad embankment. The fire 
 of the one and the other, striking the 
 Confederates on both flanks, and slight- 
 ly in rear of their front, had the effect 
 of withdrawing attention, and thus to 
 a certain extent of relieving the as- 
 saulting party on the crest of the hill. 
 
 It was now about three o'clock. 
 The battle was raging with tremen- 
 dous fury. Column after column of 
 the enemy came streaming down upon 
 Sherman's men, gun upon gun pouring 
 upon them its concentrated shot from 
 every hill and spur, as they vainly 
 struggled in the valley and attempted 
 to force their way to the further height. 
 Neither, however, was gaining any ad- 
 vantage. Almost at the crisis of the 
 fight, it seemed to the anxious watch- 
 ers at Chattanooga as if Sherman was 
 losing ground. There was, indeed, a 
 backward movement. It had seemed 
 to General J. E. Smith that Colonel 
 Wolcott, who now commanded on the 
 crest — Corse having been wounded 
 early in the day — was sorely pressed, 
 and in danger of being overpowered. 
 
 He, therefore, sent to his aid the two re- 
 serve brigades of Runion and Mathias. 
 Having crossed the intervening fields 
 and climbed the hillside, in spite of a 
 most destructive fire of artillery and 
 musketry, they effected a junction with 
 Wolcott. The ridge, however, being 
 narrow, they were forced to take posi- 
 tion on the western face of the hill, 
 where, being exposed to attack on right 
 and rear, the enemy, rushing from the 
 tunnel gorge, fell upon them in over- 
 whelming numbers, driving them down 
 the hill and back to the lower end of 
 the field. There they were re-formed; 
 and the Confederates, who had ventured 
 to pursue, were struck heavily on their 
 flank, and compelled to retire to the 
 shelter of their works on the wooded 
 hills. It was this backward movement 
 of Smith's brigades which, being seen 
 at Chattanooga, created the impression 
 that a repulse had been sustained by the 
 National left. Shei'man has taken some 
 pains to correct this false impression, 
 and informs us that the " real attack- 
 ing columns of General Corse, General 
 Loomis and General Morgan L. Smith, 
 were not repulsed," but, on the con- 
 trary, held their ground, and struggled 
 " all day persistently, stubbornly and 
 well." 
 
 Long and wearily had Sherman 
 waited for the attack in the centre 
 An occasional shot from Orchard 
 Knob, and some artillery and musket- 
 ry fire, away in the direction of Look- 
 out, were the only signs of activity in 
 the Natibnal ranks on his right. It 
 was not until shortly after three 
 o'clock, that he saw a white line of 
 
THE THUNDERBOLT HURLED. 
 
 671 
 
 smoke in front of Orchard Knob — the 
 line extending further and further to 
 the right. It was evident that some- 
 thing decisive was happening. He had 
 faith in the result ; for he knew that, 
 by his repeated and persistent attacks, 
 he had compelled Bragg to concentrate 
 lai'ge masses of his troops on his own 
 right. He had thus weakened the 
 Confederate centre, and created the 
 opportunity for Grant and Thomas. 
 
 During these hours of sore trial and 
 deep anxiety, Grant's attention was 
 quite as much directed to the left as 
 was that of Sherman to the centre. 
 Grant's headquarters, as we have seen, 
 were at Orchard Knob. He had a 
 commanding view of the entire battle- 
 ground. He knew that Biagg was 
 concentrating on his own right, and, 
 determined to penetrate the National 
 left and force his way to Chattanooga, 
 was hurling against Sherman his well- 
 disciplined legions in overwhelming 
 masses. He feared lest his trusted 
 lieutenant, sorely pressed, should be 
 yielding to impatience, because of the 
 continued inaction at the centre. But 
 it was necessary to wait for Hooker, 
 who, as has been stated, had been de- 
 layed three hours in reconstructing the 
 bridge across Chattanooga Creek. It 
 was desii'able, at least, that the Con- 
 federate left should be well engaged, 
 as well as the Confederate right, be- 
 fore the decisive blow was dealt at the 
 centre. With any other commander on 
 his left, Grant might have risked too 
 much by leaving him so long, unaided 
 or unrelieved, to struggle against the 
 strong position and the ever-increasing 
 
 numbers of the enemy. Grant, how- 
 ever, had not forgotten Shiloh, He 
 remembered how, on that day, at the 
 foot of the bridge, over Snake Creek, 
 Sherman had stood like a wall of ada- 
 mant, his men massed around him, and 
 presenting to the almost triumphant 
 foe what seemed a huge and solid 
 shield of shining steel, effectually re- 
 sisting, and ultimately turning the tide 
 of battle. What he had done then, 
 he had, on many a battle field since, 
 proved his ability and willingness to 
 do again. Grant was asking much 
 from his lieutenant; but he felt con- 
 vinced that Sherman would not be 
 found wanting. Meanwhile, he had 
 the satisfaction of perceiving that his 
 plan was working admirably. Bragg, 
 completely out-generalled, was weak- 
 ening his own centre, and preparing 
 for him his opportunity. 
 
 It was now half-past three o'clock. 
 Grant was pacing to and fro on 
 Orchard Knob. Concerned for the 
 welfare of Sherman, seeing his oppor- 
 tunity rapidly ripening, and impatient 
 to strike, yet unwilling by premature 
 action to imperil the hoped-for and 
 what seemed now the inevitable re- 
 sult, he kept turning his eyes wistfully 
 in the direction in which Hooker 
 should make his appearance. Still 
 there were no signs of his coming. 
 Hooker, as the reader knows, was suo 
 cessfully moving along the ridge and 
 driving the enemy before him. But 
 Grant was, as yet, ignorant at once of 
 the cause of his delay, and of the pro- 
 gress he had made. The opportune 
 moment, however, had come. He saw 
 
572 
 
 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 
 
 that Bragg had greatly weakened his 
 centre to support his right ; and having 
 faith that Hooker must be close at 
 hand, he gave Thomas the order to 
 advance. The thunderbolt was hurled. 
 The signal guns were fired — one — two 
 three — four — five — six ; and the divi- 
 sions of Wood, Baird, Sheridan and 
 Johnson, long since impatient of delay, 
 advanced with firm and steady step. 
 These were preceded by a double line 
 of skirmishers, drawn mostly fi'om the 
 divisions of Wood and Sheridan. The 
 orders were to carry the rifle-pits at the 
 base of the ridge, and then to re-form 
 and push their way to the summit. 
 The whole movement was conducted 
 with the regularity and precision of 
 clock-work. The skirmishers dashed 
 forward, the main body following 
 within easy supporting distance. Mis- 
 sionary Ridge all at once seems ablaze. 
 On all the forts and batteries the 
 heavy guns open fire ; and, from their 
 hollow mouths they bellow harsh 
 thunder, and vomit forth theii" missiles 
 of destruction. Full thirty guns are 
 poming shot and shell into the advanc- 
 ing columns. Nothing, however, can 
 cool the ardor or restrain the impetu- 
 osity of the National soldiers. "Roll- 
 ing on the foe," on moves this " fiery 
 mass of living valor." The picture of 
 the poet becomes here a living realitj^ 
 The brigades of Hazen and Willich are 
 already at the base of the mountain. 
 Like "bees out of a hive," to use the 
 expressive words of General Grant, 
 the gray-coated Confederates are seen 
 swarming out of the rifle-pits and rush- 
 ing J4P the hillside. Fued now with 
 
 the wildest enthusiasm, the brave Na- 
 tionals, scarcely taking time to re-form, 
 push their way up the steep and rug 
 ged sides of the mountain. They are 
 fully exposed now to a terrific fire from 
 the enemy's guns, on the heights above 
 them. Shell, canister, shrapnel, bullets 
 are falling upon them with deadly ef- 
 fect. Nothing daunted, however, on 
 they press ; and, from Orchard Knob, 
 the National colors are seen fluttering 
 higher and still higher, and gradually 
 nearing the summit. Order now be- 
 gins to disappear. The brigades, partly 
 because of the nature of the gi'ound, 
 and partly because of the severity of 
 the fire, break up into groups. There 
 is, however, neither lack of purpose, 
 nor lack of enthusiasm. Every group 
 has its flag, and, in wedge-like form, 
 each eager to be first and emulous of 
 the other, is seen pressing onward and 
 upward. It seems as if the color-bearers 
 are running a race. To plant the first 
 color on the summit appears to be the 
 ambition of every bi'igade, of eveiy 
 group, of every soldier. Now they are 
 clambering over the rugged ledges, now 
 they are seeking momentary shelter 
 in the ravines or behind the overhang- 
 ing rocks ; but they are ever, in spite 
 of the heavy guns and the murderous 
 volleys of musketry from the rifle-pits, 
 nearing the summit. 
 
 Meanwhile, the work of destruction 
 had been terrible. The color-beareis 
 had suffered fearfully. The first to 
 reach the summit was a group of men 
 from the First Ohio, and a few others 
 from other regiments, under the lead 
 of Lieutenant-Colonel Lan^jdon. Six 
 
VICTOKY. 
 
 573 
 
 color-bearers of this party had fallen, 
 when Lsngdon, waving forward his 
 men, and leaping over the crest, was 
 instai tly shot down. The breach, how- 
 ever, had been made; and the brigades 
 of Hazen and Willich were soon on 
 the rnmmit. These were quickly fol- 
 lowed by the brigades of Sheridan's di- 
 vision — Sheridan himself taking an ac- 
 tive part, and specially commanding 
 the attention of General Grant. The 
 National advance was within a few 
 hundred yards of Bragg's headquar- 
 ters. There were still despei-ate hand- 
 to-hand straggles after the Nationals 
 had reached the summit. But, as the 
 shouting victors came pouring into the 
 works, bayoneting the cannoneers at 
 their guns, the bold and resolute front 
 gave way. It was now sunset. The 
 Confederates were in full retreat, their 
 own guns turned upon them by the 
 triumphant Nationals. It was only 
 with difficulty that Bragg was able 
 to make good his escape, along with 
 Breckenridge, who by this time had 
 joined him. Missionary Ridge was now 
 occupied and held by the National 
 troops. Hooker, as we have seen, had 
 been victorious on the right ; Sherman 
 had held his gi'ound, and, after a gal- 
 lant and protracted struggle, against su- 
 perior numbers, had driven the enemy 
 from his front ; and now the brave and 
 well-trusted soldiers of the army of the 
 C'umberland had pierced and routed 
 the Confederate centre. Tlie battle of 
 Chattanooga had been fought and won. 
 It was another great victory for Gen- 
 eral Grant. Bragg was one of the 
 most trusted leaders in the Confed- 
 
 265 
 
 erate army, and a special favorite of 
 Jefferson Davis. He was defeated not 
 by superior numbers, not by superior 
 bravery, but by superior tactics. He 
 was defeated, because he was out-gen- 
 eralled. He committed his first mis. 
 take when he detached Longstreet, 
 with his command, and sent him to 
 operate against Burnside, at Knox- 
 ville. He committed his second mis- 
 take when he •\veakened his centre and 
 moved his troops to the right to ope- 
 rate against Sherman. Both were se- 
 rious blunders. It is surprising how a 
 general of Bragg's experience could 
 have committed the one or the other, 
 in the presence of such a commander 
 as Grant. The first blunder encour- 
 aged immediate action, concentration, 
 and aggressive effort against Missionary 
 Ridge. The second blundei' provoked 
 the attack on the Confederate centre, 
 which decided the battle. In the 
 glory resulting from the victory, Sher- 
 man and Hooker and Thomas were 
 fully entitled to share. Each had ac- 
 complished the task assigned him, 
 nobly and with complete success. It 
 was a victory of which the whole 
 army, from the general in command 
 down to the humblest of the rank and 
 file, had reason to be proud. "Im- 
 partial history," says Coppee, whose 
 description of Chattanooga sometimes 
 rises to the grandeur of an epic, " will 
 be just to all the acts and the actors, 
 but above them all will shine, in 
 golden characters, the name of the 
 great commander, who, upon the heels 
 of one great conquest, transformed a 
 beleaguered army of starving soldier* 
 
074 
 
 CHICKaMAUGA and CHATTANOOGA. 
 
 into fiery columns of attack, and 
 snatched an immortal victory out of 
 the jaws of disaster and anticipated 
 ruin. That man was Grant.'" The 
 modesty of the man — the utter absence 
 of vain-glory — is strikingly revealed in 
 the despatch which he sent to General 
 Halleck immediately after the battle. 
 "Although the battle lasted," he says, 
 " from early dawn till dark this even- 
 ing, I believe I am not premature in 
 announcing a complete victory over 
 Bragg. Lookout Mountain top, all the 
 rifle-pits in Chattanooga Valley, and 
 Missionary Ridge entire, have been 
 carried, and are now held by us." 
 
 The final struggle of the day was in 
 the neighborhood of the tunnel on 
 Thomas' left and in Sherman's front. 
 At that point the Confederates made a 
 most obstinate resistance. This resist- 
 ance, and the darkness which intervened, 
 prevented an immediate pursuit. Dur- 
 ing the night. Missionary Ridge blazed 
 with Union camp fires, the Confede- 
 rates having fallen back in the direction 
 of Ringgold, by way of Chickamauga 
 Station. Bragg left behind him some 
 600 prisoners, besides a large number 
 of stragglers, 40 guns, upwards of 
 7000 small arms, and a large quantity 
 , of ammunition. 
 
 I Next morning Sherman, Palmer and 
 doY, Hooker were in eager pursuit. 
 26. Sherman pushed on towards 
 Greysville, passing Chickamauga Sta- 
 tion, where he found everything in 
 flames. Palmer and Hooker advanced 
 by the Rossville road, intending to 
 strike the railroad between Greysville 
 and Ringgold. At the latter place, 
 
 Hooker came into contact with the CoH' 
 federate rear, under Cleburne, who waa 
 covering Bragg's retreat. A severe 
 encounter took place, Cleburne turning 
 and offering a most stubborn resistance, 
 The battle lasted the greater part oi 
 the day, both sides suffering severely. 
 Cleburne did not retreat imtil he had 
 inflicted on the Nationals a loss of 432 
 men, of whom 65 were killed, some 
 of them being most valuable officers. 
 The Confederates left on the field 130 
 in killed and wounded. The pursuit 
 was now discontinued, as Grant felt it 
 to be his first and most important duty to 
 relieve Burnside, who was at that time 
 closely besieged in Knoxville by the 
 Confederate forces, under Longstreet. 
 Bragg's army continued the retreat to 
 Dalton, where it established a fortified 
 camp. The Nationals fell back towards 
 Chattanooga ; and the campaign against 
 Bragg ended. 
 
 The immediate result of the victory 
 at Chattanooga was the relief of Knox- 
 ville. With a brief account of the 
 operations which took place in that 
 direction, we shall close this chapter. 
 
 Burnside, it will be remembered, 
 after having V>een relieved of the com- 
 mand of the army of the Potomac, was 
 assigned, on the 26th of March, to the 
 command of the department of the Ohio 
 ! His headquarters were at Cincinnati :. 
 and his army, about 20,000 strong, was 
 at Camp Nelson, near Richmond, Ken- 
 tucky. When Rosecranz commenced 
 his onward movement towards Chatta- 
 nooga, Burnside, who had been ordered 
 to co-operate with him, and to affect a 
 junction between his own right r,r>d 
 
KNOXVILLE. 
 
 67S 
 
 the left of Rosecranz, commenced, on 
 the 16th of August, his march for East 
 Tennessee. That district of country was 
 then held by the Confederate general, 
 Buckner, whose headquarters were at 
 Knoxville. Burnside, more intent on 
 restoring the authority of the National 
 government in East Tennessee, moved 
 in the direction of Knoxville. We 
 have already shown how Buckner re- 
 tired at his approach, and with what 
 enthusiasm Burnside and the National 
 troops were received in that town. 
 Burnside remained in Knoxville, al- 
 though repeatedly ordered to rein- 
 force Rosecranz, believing it to be 
 all-important that the place should 
 be permanently occupied by National 
 troops. 
 
 Early in November, as we have 
 seen, Bragg detached Longstreet, with 
 1 2,000 men, and a heavy body of cav- 
 alry, with instructions to move against 
 Burnside. Longstreet's march was 
 less rapid, and, in consequence, less 
 •successful than it might have been. 
 His troops were in wretched condition ; 
 and reinforcements and supplies did 
 not ari-ive as he expected. It was not 
 until the 14th of the month that he 
 was able to cross the Tennessee at 
 Hough's Ferry, six miles below Lou- 
 don. Burnside's advance, which was 
 at Loudon, fell back as far as Camp- 
 bell's Station, where, on the 16th, they 
 turned upon their pursuers. A sevei-e 
 encounter took place, Burnside holding 
 his own against superior numbers. Ul- 
 timately, howevei', he was compelled to 
 XoT. fall back within the defenses at 
 17, 18. Knoxville; and, on the 17th and 
 
 18th, he was surrounded by Long- 
 street. Attempts were made to storm 
 the beleaguered town; but Burnside 
 being vigilant, and having made excel- 
 lent arrangements for defense, these 
 attempts failed. Longstreet, already 
 fearing that Bi'agg might not be able 
 to cope successfully with his skilful 
 adversary, and knowing that in the 
 event of a Confederate defeat at Chat- 
 tanooga, Grant would hasten to the aid 
 of Burnside, pressed forward the siege 
 with the utmost vigor. On the ^ov, 
 25th, he threw a considerable 25. 
 force across the Holston. His object 
 was to seize the heights which com- 
 mand Knoxville from the south side 
 of the river. Vigorously opposed by 
 the National forces, he was not quite 
 successful. He was unably to seize 
 the desired position ; but he obtained 
 possession of a knob s, little lower 
 down, from which, at au elevation of 
 one hundred and fifty iect above the 
 level of the river, lu- had complete 
 command of Fort Sanders, some five 
 hundred yards to the north. 
 
 This advantage had just been gained, 
 to the immense delight of the Con- 
 federates, when information reached 
 L(jngstreet of the defeat of Bragg at 
 Chattanooga. It had been Longstreet's 
 hope that, if he could not take the 
 place by assault, he would reduce it 
 by famine. Relief was now at hand 
 Famine was out of the question. If 
 Knoxville was to be taken, it must be 
 taken by storm. Preparations for a 
 final efFort were accordingly hurried 
 forward. The point chosen for attack 
 was P'ort Sanders, on the noi'thwest 
 
576 
 
 CHICKAMATTUa aND CHATTANOOGA. 
 
 angle of the fortifications, and com- 
 manding an approach by the nver. 
 It was a work of great strength, the 
 ditch being ten feet deep, and the 
 pa)apet of more than ordinary height. 
 Around and in front of it, several 
 acres of thick pine timber had been 
 slashed ; and a perfect entanglement 
 of wire-work had been formed by con- 
 necting stump with stump. There 
 were, besides, numerous rifle-pits and 
 (ibatis. The fort was occupied by the 
 Seventy-Ninth New York ; the Twenty- 
 Ninth Massachusetts; two companies of 
 the Second and one of the Twentieth 
 Michigan. The armament consisted of 
 four 20-pounder Parrott guns, Lieu- 
 tenant Benjamin, Buraside's chief of 
 artillery; four light 12-pounders, com- 
 manded by Buckley ; and two 3-inch 
 guns. The assaulting party was com- 
 posed of three brigades of McLaws' 
 division, with those of Wolford, Hum- 
 phreys, Anderson and Bogart. They 
 were picked men, the flower of Long- 
 street's army. 
 
 \\\ the gray of the morning of the 
 Not, 29th, the assault was made, with 
 2*« a vigor and determination not 
 surpassed in the previous history of the 
 war. What with the fierce yells of 
 the Confederates, the rattle of mus- 
 ketry, the screaming of shells, the 
 thunder of artillery, the tumult for a 
 time was awful. The Confederates, 
 as they approached, were received with 
 a deadly fire from the batteries of the 
 fort. Nothing daunted, however, by 
 the destructive missiles which flew 
 thick and fast around them, or by the 
 sight of their fallen comi-ades, on they 
 
 pressed, through the abatis, across the 
 ditch and up the parapet, some of them 
 forcing their way through the embra 
 sures. The obstacles encountered, the 
 wire net-work particularly, made th'oi. 
 progress slow, and consequently kept 
 them long exposed to the double-shot- 
 ted guns which Feirero, the commander 
 of the fort, kept in active play. When 
 the assailants reached the parapet, their 
 ranks were greatly thinned, but their 
 spirits were not subdued. One ofiicer 
 actually reached the summit, and, plant- 
 ing upon it the flag of the Thirteenth 
 Mississippi, called for surrender. It 
 was a vain call ; for the next momen< 
 his body, pierced by a dozen bullets, 
 the flag still in his hand, was rolling 
 into the ditch. Hand grenades were 
 freely used by the defenders; and 
 they had a teri'ible effect. The as- 
 sault, gallant as it was, proved a com- 
 plete failure. It was tried a second 
 time by another column ; but the re- 
 sult was the same. The fighting was 
 discontinued. A truce was gi'anted to 
 the Confederates to carry .away their 
 wounded and to bury their dead. 
 Longstreet, still hoping against hope, 
 and unwilling to retire, maintained the 
 siege.* 
 
 Meanwhile, relief was coming from 
 Grant to Bui-nside. Why was this re- 
 
 * The ground in front of the fort was strewn with 
 the dead and wounded. In the ditch alone, were over 
 200 dead and wounded. "'In this terrible ditch," 
 says Pollard, "the dead were piled eight or ten feat 
 deep. In comparatively an instant of time, we lost 700 
 men in killed and wounded and prisoners. Never, 
 excepting at Gettysburg, was there, in the history 
 of the war, a disaster adorned with the glory of such 
 devout courage, as Longstreet's repulse at Knox jiUti ' 
 — Third Tear of the War, p. IfiS. 
 
THE SIEGE RAISED. 
 
 57? 
 
 lief so long delayed ? On the evening 
 of the 25th, as soon as success at Chat- 
 tanooga had been assured, Grant had 
 ordered General Gordon Granger to 
 start for the relief of Knoxville, with 
 his own Fourth corps, and detachments 
 from others — 20,000 in all. Granger 
 was to move with four days' rations, ar- 
 rangements having been made to send 
 after him a steamer with supplies. 
 When Grant returned from the front on 
 the 28th he found, much to his aston- 
 ishment, that Granger liad not yet got 
 ofP, and that he was preparing to 
 move "with reluctance and complaints." 
 Grant fell back upon Sherman, who 
 was ever willing and ever ready. " I 
 am inclined to think," said Grant, in 
 a letter to Sherman, "I shall have to 
 send you. In plain words, you wall 
 assume command of all the forces now 
 moving up the Tennessee." When he 
 received the letter from Grant, Sherman 
 was at Calhoun, at the railroad cross- 
 ing of the Hiawassee. If he had been 
 less of a soldier, he might easily have 
 found cause of complaint. It was only 
 seven days since he had marched his 
 troops from the west side of the Ten- 
 nessee, with only two days' rations, 
 without change of clothing, with but a 
 single blanket or coat to a man, from 
 himself to the private soldier. What 
 provisions they had were picked up by 
 the way. Murmur or complaint, how- 
 ever, with Sherman, there was none, i 
 
 i 
 
 To hear was to obey. It was enough 
 for him that 12,000 of his fellow-sol- : 
 diers were beleaguered at Knoxville, 
 eighty-four miles away, and that, if not 
 relieved ^vithia three days, they might , 
 
 be at the mercy of the enemy. With 
 his hardy and untiring veterans, Sher- 
 man was quickly on his way. The 
 roads were bad ; and, as the pontoon 
 bi-idge at Loudon had been cestroyed, 
 there was unexpected diiS-julty and 
 consequent delay. After considerable 
 progress had lieen made, the troops 
 were compelled to turn to -^he east, and 
 to trust to General Burt.side's bridge 
 ut Knoxville. A bridge was tiuug 
 across the Little Tennc-jsee, at Morgan- 
 town ; and by daybreak on the oec. 
 5th of December, the enti) •. Fif- 5. 
 teenth coi'ps was over. Meanwhile 
 the cavalry command. whi».h had moved 
 forward in advance, had reached Knox- 
 ville on the 3d of Deceuber, the very 
 day on w^hich Burnside expected his 
 supplies would give out. On the night 
 of the 5th, a messengei' from Burnside 
 arrived at Sherman's headquarters, an- 
 nouncing that Longstreet was in full 
 retreat towards Virginia, and that the 
 National cavalry were in pursuit. As 
 soon as Sherman's cavalry appeared, 
 Longstreet, discovering that his flank 
 was tui'ned, raised the siege, and re- 
 treated towai'ds^ Kussellville in the di- 
 rection of Virginia. The National 
 cavalry followed for some distance in 
 close pursuit. Thus ended the siege 
 of Knoxville. 
 
 Burnside had offered a noble resist- 
 ance, and liad retrieved some of the 
 laurels lost at Fredei'icksbiu'g. He 
 was not without obligations to Sher- 
 man ; nor was he ungiatef ul. In a 
 letter to that general, he fully acknowl- 
 edged those o})ligations, and thanked 
 both him and liis command for so 
 
378 
 
 OHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. 
 
 prompt!}' coming to his relief. " I am 
 satisfied," he said, "that your approach 
 served to raise the siege." Sherman, 
 too, had great reason to be proud of 
 himself and his command. They had 
 been constantly in motion since they 
 left the Big Black in Mississippi. For 
 long periods they had been without 
 regular rations ; and the men had 
 marched through mud and over rocks, 
 sometimes barefooted, without a mur- 
 mur and without a moment's delay. 
 After a march of over 400 miles, with- 
 out sleep for three successive nights, 
 they crossed the Tennessee, fought 
 their part in the battle of Chattanooga, 
 pursued the enemy out of Tennessee, 
 and then turned more than 120 miles 
 north, and compelled Longstreet to 
 raise the siege of Knoxville. After 
 the siege was raised, Sherman, with 
 consent of Burnside, leaving only Gran- 
 ger's command, fell back to the line of 
 the Hiawassee. 
 
 The victories at Chattanooga and 
 Knoxville produced very different 
 states of feeling in the North and 
 the South. There was great indig- 
 
 FoRT Sandees. — This place was named after Briga- 
 dier-General William P. Sanders, who received his 
 death-wound while gallantly resisting the attack made 
 on the 18th of November. Sanders was a native of 
 Kentucky, and a graduate of West Point. He had al- 
 ready made himself conspicuous by his deeds of daring, 
 and had secured the confidence both of his superior 
 officers and of the rank and file ; but, by his gallantry 
 during the famous and, to him, fatal encount«r on the 
 ISth, he won for himself imperishable renown. In his 
 General Field Orders No. 31, and bearing date Novem- 
 ber 24th, Burnside says : "In memory of the honored 
 dead, the fort in front of which he received his fatal 
 woond irill be known hereafter as Fort Sanders. " Th« 
 
 nation among the Confederates: and 
 Bragg, at his own request, was relieved 
 of his command. In the North, joy 
 beamed on every countenance, and 
 gratitude welled up and ovei-flowed 
 from every heart. At the recommen- 
 dation of the president, the people 
 assembled in their places of worship 
 and rendered thanks to Almighty God 
 "for His great advancement of the 
 National cause." Honors flowed in 
 upon Grant. He received a letter of 
 congratulation from the president. 
 Congress, on the 17th of Decem- oec 
 ber, voted him thanks, also a "'• 
 gold medal, which was to be struck 
 " with suitable emblems, devices and 
 inscriptions." In doing him honor, 
 town vied with town, city with city, 
 State with State, over the leng-th and 
 breadth of the Union. He had be- 
 come the National hero. 
 
 The Confederates neve, recovered 
 from the blow received a"^ Chattanooga. 
 The tide continued to rise and swell 
 and roll against them. It was evident 
 now to all thinking men that the end 
 was rapidly approaching. 
 
 final struggle, for the possession of this work, on the 
 29th, although comparatively on a small scale, was, »» 
 has been shown in the text, one of the fiercest In the 
 whole history of the war. The highest valor was dis- 
 played on both sides. If victory on that day carried 
 with it glory, defeat was attended with no dishonor. 
 The National troops, one and all, behaved nob'y, and 
 won special commendations from their chief ; but it is 
 no disparagement to the other troops engaged, to say 
 that the heroic defense of Fort Sanders added fresh 
 laurels to the gallant Seventy-Ninth New York High- 
 landers, who had already won distinction at Bull Bun. 
 at Port Royal Ferry, at James' Island and at Chantilly, 
 where the brave Stevens, nobly fighting, fell 
 
SECESSIONVIJjLE. 
 
 579 
 
 CHAPTER XXIX. 
 
 Operations in 1862. — T. W. Sherman and Dupont. — James' Island. — Secessionville. — Colonel Lamar.— Qunarai' 
 fevcvens. — The Gallant Seventy-Ninth. — Pocotaligo. — Battle of Secessionville. — Great Bravery ol the Higu 
 ianders and the Michiganers. — General Mitchell in Command of the Department of the South. — Mitchell 
 ville. — Death of Mitchell. — General Brannan and Mitchell's Plans. — General Hunter in Command. — Fort Mc- 
 Allister.— Three Attempts. — Destruction of the Na.shville. — A Terrific Fire. — The Fort Invulnerable. — The At- 
 tempt Abandoned. — The Case of the Princess Royal. — The Confederate Fleet. — The Mercedita and Keystone 
 State Badly Damaged. — Proclamation of Beauregard and Ingraham. — Judah P. Benjamin. — The Confederate 
 Claim. — The National Government Aroused. — Misunderstanding Between Hunter and Foster. — Preparations 
 lOr the Attack on Charleston. — The Fortifications. — Their Number and Strength. —Impregnable. — The Na 
 tional Fleet. — Advance of the Fleet. — An Ominous Silence. — Thunders of Artillery. — The WLssahickou. 
 The New Ironsides. — The Keokuk. — The Montauk and Catskill.— " The Wars of the Titans."— The Fleet 
 Overmatched. — The Keokuk Destroyed. — The Retreat. — Hunter Blamed. — " I Could do Nothing but Pray for 
 
 Ton." — Bravery of Dupont. — Fort Sumter the Great Obstacle. — "It Must be got out of the Way." Quincy 
 
 A. Gillmore. — The Atlanta. — Great Hopes. — Dupont Prepared for Her Approach. — Great Expectations of the 
 Confederates. — The Weehawken. — Captain Rodgers. — The Atlanta a Prisoner. — Gillmore's Plans. — Dahlgren 
 Succeeds Dupont. — Movements on Land and Water. — Higginson and Terry. — Fort Wagner Attacked. — Na- 
 tional Batteries on Folly Island. — Dahlgren's Monitors. — The Confederates Driven From Morris' Island.— 
 Assault on Fort Wagner. — In Vain.— Not to be Taken but by Regular Approaches. — Work Resumed.— 
 Another Assault. ^Another Failure. — The Jaws of Death. — The Beach Covered with the Dead and Dying — 
 Parallels. — Closer and Closer. — Gillmore's Preparations Completed. — Twelve Batteries. — Twenty-Eight Heavy 
 Onus and Twelve Mortars. — An Artillery Duel. — Fort Sumter Demolished. — The Fourth Parallel. — Calcium 
 Lights. — Preparations for the Final Assault on Fort Wagner. — Forts Wagner and Gregg Abandoned. — Fe >rfnl 
 Expenditure of Shot and Shell.— Attempt to Occupy Fort Sumter. — A Disastrous Enterprise. — Two Hundred 
 Men KUled, Wounded or Captured. — Operations Discontinued. — The Position Held. — Not a Victory, but a 
 Gain. — The Blockade Made Secure. 
 
 In previous chapters of this work, 
 we have described at some length 
 the more important naval and 
 coast operations which were conducted 
 in 1861, and in the earlier months of 
 1862, special attention being given to 
 the expedition under Butler and Far- 
 ragut, to that under T. W. Sherman and 
 Dupont, and to that under Burnside 
 and Goldsborough. Success more or 
 less brilliant attended them all ; and, 
 as early as the 12th of April, 1862, the 
 first anniversary of the attack on Fort 
 Sumter, the entire Atlantic and Gulf 
 coasts, from Cape Hatteras to Perdido 
 Bay, excepting only the harbor of 
 
 Charleston and its immediate surround- 
 ings, had been abandoned by the Con- 
 federates. Along that whole line, the 
 National power was supreme. 
 
 Early in 1862, Hunter had succeeded 
 T. W. Sherman in command of the 
 department of the South. Hunter 
 was bent on doing something whicli 
 might pave the way to the reduction of 
 Charleston. It would have been vain 
 for Dupont, with the fleet at his com- 
 mand, to make any direct attempt to pass 
 the forts. It was deemed advisable, 
 however, to take possession of Wad- 
 melaw Island, also John's and James" 
 Islands, and to advance on C^iarleston 
 
680 
 
 CHABLESTON IIARBOK. 
 
 May by land. On the 20th of May, 
 20» the gunboats Unadilla, Pembina 
 and Ottawa crossed the bar at the 
 mouth of the Stono River, and proceed- 
 ed up that stream as far as its junction 
 with Wappoo Creek, only a few miles 
 from Charleston. This expedition might 
 have been attended with some success 
 if the gunboats had been supported by 
 land troops. It was nearly a fortnight, 
 however, after the gunboats had reached 
 Wappoo, when a portion of the troops, 
 commanded by General Benham, ac- 
 companied by General Hunter himself, 
 landed on James' Island. It was a 
 week later when General Wright ar- 
 rived with the remainder. Simulta- 
 neously \vith these movements, General 
 Stevens made a successful raid in the 
 uirection of Pocotaligo, destroying sev- 
 eral miles of the Charleston and Savan- 
 nah Railroad. 
 
 The appearance of the gunboats at 
 Wappoo, without a supporting land 
 force, was a benefit rather than an in- 
 convenience to the Confederates. It 
 served to warn them of the intention 
 of the National commander. They 
 were already in a strong position at 
 Secessionville, a delightful little village, 
 about two miles from the Stono, almost 
 fiurounded by water, and accessible by 
 land only on its western side. At this 
 plaee, the Confederates, under Colonel 
 J. G. Lamar, taking advantage of the 
 time afforded them by the non-arrival 
 of the land forces, constructed a for- 
 midable battery. Benham, as soon as 
 he got his troops in order, resolved to 
 carry the battery by assault. It was 
 ^ ow June ; and the morning of the 
 
 11th was fixed for the attack. Lamar, 
 however, commenced offensive opera- 
 tions the evening before. Some skirm- 
 ishing followed; and the meditated 
 attack was postponed. After having 
 made a vain attempt to silence the Con- 
 federate guns by a battery which he 
 hurriedly constructed, Benham fell 
 back on his original plan of assault. 
 By this time Stevens had returned, 
 with his troops, from Pocotaligo. On 
 the morning of the 16th, Stevens, June 
 with aV)Out 3000 men, supported •*• 
 by General Wright, with about the 
 same number, advanced to the attack. 
 The Eighth Micliigan led the way, fol- 
 lowed close by the Seventy-Ninth New 
 York Highlanders. It was a perilous 
 movement. The Confederate battery 
 could only be reached by pressing 
 along a narrow strip of land. Thy 
 Confederate pickets were easily cap- 
 tured ; and it was hoped that the 
 garrison, also, might be surprised and 
 made prisonei-s. Lamar, however, was 
 watchful and well prepared. As soon 
 as the National troops began to press 
 along the narrow strip of land which 
 led to the battery, he opened upon 
 them a murderous fire of grape and 
 canister from si.x masked guns. The 
 brave Michifran men and the undaunted 
 Highlanders essayed to advance ; but, 
 j in addition to this pitiless storm of de- 
 I structive missiles in their front, they 
 { found themselves exposed to a severe 
 musketry fire on their right flank. 
 Progress was impossible. General 
 Wright's troops came uji ; and, in the 
 struggle which ensued, they took an 
 active part. It was soon discovered, 
 
THE IIIGHLAXDERS. 
 
 581 
 
 however, that the works were too 
 strong to be taken hj assault, and that 
 to prolong the struggle was only to 
 make a useless sacrifice of human life. 
 The Nationals, therefore, fell ])ack, 
 having lost in the brief encounter 
 about 600 men. Such was the battle 
 of Secessionville.* Soon afterwards 
 James' Island was abandoned by the 
 
 * In no battle during the whole war was greater 
 bravery displayed than was witnessed that morning at 
 Recessionville. A graphic picture of the affair was 
 given at the time by a correspondent of the New York 
 Herald. It was the 16th of June, and about half-past 
 two o'clock in the morning, when General Stevens 
 moved to the attack. When about four hundred yards 
 from the fort, the Confederate guns, as has been men- 
 tioned in the text, opened a tremendous fire. The at- 
 tacking column was terribly cut up, the Eighth Michi- 
 gan suffering most severely. Nothing daunted, what 
 remained of the Eighth Michigan, the Seventy-Ninth 
 New York Highlanders, the One Hundreth Pennsylva- 
 nia, the Twenty-Eighth Massachusetts, with portions of 
 the Seventh Connecticut and Forty-Sixth New York, 
 pressed forward. Captains Ely and Doyle, and Lieuten- 
 ant-Colonel Morrison, mounting the parapet of the 
 work. ' ' Here, " says the Herald correspondent, ' ' lasted 
 for a few moments the most exciting scene my pen has 
 ever attempted to describe. When the Highlanders 
 heard of the terrible slaughter of the Eighth Michigan, 
 ■*ith whom they had for many months been brigaded, 
 they could not be restrained, but advanced with the 
 utmost promptness to the support of their old com- 
 rades. Colonel Morrison, whose horse was shot early 
 in the action, led up his men on foot, shouting, ' Come 
 on, Highlanders !' and with Lieutenant Lyons, of Gen- 
 eral Steven^ staff, was the first to sc^e the walls and 
 mount the parapet of the fort. Both were wounded — 
 Colonel Morrison in the head, the bullet entering at 
 the temple and coming out behind the right ear, and 
 Lieutenant Lyons severely in the arm. Captain Doyle 
 was severely wounded ; and Captains Guild, Pratt and 
 Church were killed. It was while endeavoring to scale 
 these works that Captain Hitchcock, of the Seventh 
 Connecticut, was shot down. Nevertheless, the men 
 went up, walking unflinchingly into the jaws of death. 
 But very few escaped, and those only with garments 
 riddled with baUs. Colonel Morrison, even after he was 
 wounded, discharged the entile contents of his revol- 
 ver at the force within, and had the satisfaction of kill- 
 ing one rebel as he was endeavoring to screen himself 
 in one of the numerous ' rat-holes, ' with which the in- 
 tariot of th« JTork abounded. " 
 
 9C« 
 
 Nationals ; and, for a period, no further 
 effoi-ts were made against Charleston. 
 
 In the fall of 1862, General O. M. 
 Mitchell, who had been called to Wash- 
 ington City from Tennessee, took com- 
 mand of the depai'traent of the Soutl.,' 
 thus superseding Hunter. On the 
 16th of September he reached Hilton 
 Head, and established his headquarters 
 in the house occupied by his predeces- 
 sor. The place was swarming with 
 negroes who had escaped from their 
 owners ; and Mitchell, with his usual 
 vigor, at once took measures to make 
 the disorganized, idle crowd more com- 
 fortable and more useful. The little 
 town of Mitchellville soon gave evi- 
 dence of the taste and humanity as 
 well as the energy of the new. com- 
 mander. Mitchell was actively pre- 
 paring for a decisive campaign against 
 Charleston, when he was out short in 
 his work by an attack of yellow fever. 
 He was removed to the more healthful 
 locality of Beaufort ; but he died or 
 the 30th of October, having been in 
 his new command only some six weeks. 
 
 Late in October, an attempt was 
 made, under the direction of General 
 Brannan, to carry out one of Mitchell's 
 plans. Brannan set out wth an effec- 
 tive force of about 4500 men. His 
 final objective was Charleston. His 
 immediate purpose was to reach Poca 
 taligo, and at that place destroy the 
 Charleston and Savannah Railroad 
 Embarking at Hilton Head on gun- 
 boats and transports, he proceeded up' 
 the Broad River to the Coosawhatchie, 
 and pushed on to Pocotaligo with but 
 little difficulty. There he encountered 
 
582 
 
 CHARLESTON HARBOR. 
 
 the Confederate pickets ; and, although 
 he managed to drive them before him, 
 he was unable to prevent them from 
 burning the bridges in their rear, and 
 thus interposing serious obstacles to his 
 further advance. A heavy fire having 
 been opened upon him by General W. 
 S. Walker's artillery, which was sup- 
 ported by a powerful infantry force, 
 Brannan, taking counsel from prudence, 
 fell back to Mackay's Landing, where 
 he re-embarked for Hilton Head. This 
 expedition, which proved utterly fruit- 
 less, cost the Nationals at least 300 
 men. 
 
 On the death of Mitchell, Hunter 
 resumed command of the department 
 of the South. Charleston Harbor was 
 still the great object of attention. Its 
 continued and successful resistance to the 
 National forces was a fruitful source of 
 annoyance to the authorities at Wash- 
 ington. It was one of the original 
 cradles of the rebellion ; its precipitate 
 action had plunged the nation into all 
 the calamities of the Civil War ; and, 
 so long as it remained an integral part 
 of the Confederacy, it involved the 
 neutralization of an army of 30,000 
 men. It was of the utmost importance 
 that the forts in the harbor should be 
 reduced, and the National authority 
 restored in the city and neighborhood. 
 It was not until the spring of 1863, 
 that any vigorous operations were 
 made in the direction of Charles- 
 ton. Several attempts, however, were 
 made early, in the year, to reduce Fort 
 McAllister. This M'as a strong wor^, 
 which was constructed at Genesis 
 Point, on the Great Ogeechee River; 
 
 £863. 
 
 and, under its cover lay the steamer 
 Nashville, which was waiting to run 
 the blockade and play the part of a 
 privateer. On the morning of jan, 
 the 27th of January, in obe- 27e 
 dience to instructions from Admiral 
 Dupont, Commander Worden, of Hamp- 
 ton Roads renown, pushed up the river 
 with the monitor Montauk, supported 
 by several small gunboats, and a murtar 
 schooner, and opened fire upon the fort. 
 The work was found to be strong be- 
 yond expectation. It was a casemated 
 earth-work, with boml) proofs, and 
 mounting nine guns. Owing to obstruc 
 tions in the river, the Montauk was un 
 able to advance within effective range, 
 The guns of the fort were well handled. 
 The Montauk was struck thirteen times, 
 but received no injury. Having ex- 
 pended her shells, she retired. A 
 second attempt was made by Worden 
 on the 1st of February. On this peb. 
 occasion, the Montauk engaged ^' 
 the fort at the distance of 1400 yards. 
 Her well-directed fire did some damage 
 to the parapets of the fort. She was 
 herself struck some sixty-one times, 
 without being materially injured. fe\ 
 On the 27th of February a third 21c 
 attempt was made, and was attendeu 
 with more success. A reconnoissancu 
 having been made, it was discovered 
 that the Nashville was grounded a 
 short distance above the fort; and 
 Worden, with the Montauk, followed 
 by the Seneca, Wissahickon and Dawn, 
 moved up the river as far as the ob 
 structions would permit, and openef 
 fire upon the Nashville. His 12 anO^ 
 15-inch shells fell with destructiva 
 
FORT McAllister. 
 
 583 
 
 effect upon the doomed ship ; and in 
 less than twenty minntes she was 
 in flames. One by one her heavy 
 guns exploded with the heat ; her 
 magazine blew up; and in less than 
 an hour, the dreaded privateer was 
 almost invisible. The Montauk was 
 struck five times by the heavy shot 
 from the fort, and when beyond the 
 range of the guns a torpedo exploded 
 under her ; but she sustained compara- 
 tively little injury. In this effort, 
 •Har. Worden did not lose a man. On 
 3' the 3d of March, another and 
 even more formidable attempt was 
 made against the fort. Dupont was 
 greatly encouraged by the success 
 which had attended Worden ; and, as 
 liis fleet had been reinfoi'ced by the 
 arrival of additional iron-clads, he 
 resolved to subject their mechanical 
 appliances to the full test of active 
 service Vjefore entering upon more im- 
 portant opeiations. The expedition, 
 which consisted of four monitors and 
 seveial mortar schooners, was placed 
 under the direction of Commander 
 Drayton. The Passaic led the way, 
 with Drayton on board, being closely 
 followed by the Patapsco, Commander 
 Ammen, and by the Nahant, Com- 
 mander Downes. By means of skil- 
 ful pilotage, the Passaic was brought 
 up to within 1000 yards of the fort. It 
 was not found possible to bring the 
 other boats so near. The firing com- 
 menced shortly after eight o'clock, and 
 was continued all day and during the 
 night of the 3d. About 250 shot and 
 shell were thrown into the fort ; and 
 the fire of the foit fell heavily on the 
 
 Passaic, the other vessels being some- 
 what out of easy range. But little im- 
 pression, however, was made on cither 
 side. Drayton was making but little 
 impression on Fort McAllister ; and 
 the shot from the fort was rattling 
 harmlessly on the turret and iron-bound 
 sides of the Passaic. On the second day 
 the attack was abandoned. The Pas- 
 saic bore away with her some traces of 
 the struggle. Where she was struck 
 by the bullets of the fort, there were 
 some deep indentations, and some of 
 the bolts had been started by the vio- 
 lence of the concussion. It was Dray- 
 ton's opinion that the fort could not be 
 made untenable by any number of iron 
 clads, because the shallow water and 
 narrow space would not permit them 
 to be brought into position against it. 
 There were other operations con- 
 nected with the blockade of the 
 Southern ports, some of which were 
 of greater, some of lesser importance. 
 On the 29th of January, an En- jan. 
 glish blockade-nmner, the Prin- 29. 
 cess Royal, attempted to I'un into 
 Charleston Harbor. She had come 
 from Bennuda with a valuable cargo, 
 having on board two marine engines, 
 several rifled guns, and large quantities 
 of arms, munitions and medicines. She 
 fell an easy prey to the blockading 
 fleet. The loss of this vessel was a 
 severe blow to the Confederates. It 
 greatly enraged them ; and efforts 
 were at once made for its recapture. 
 On the morning of the 31st, the Jan. 
 rams. Palmetto State, Lieuten- 3*' 
 ant Rutledge, and Chicora, Commander 
 Tucker, ran out from Chailestoa by 
 
594 
 
 CHARLESTON HARBOR. 
 
 the maiu ship -channel, and under a 
 thick haze, surprised the blockading 
 fleet. That fleet then consisted of 
 the steamers Housatonic, Mercedita, 
 Ottawa, Unadilla, Keystone State, 
 (Quaker City, Memphis, Augusta, Stet- 
 tin and Flag. The Mercedita was the 
 first to suffer. The Palmetto State 
 ran into her with great force, at the 
 moment of contact, sending into her 
 a 7-inch shell, which made a hole 
 in her side from four to five feet 
 square, and penetrated her steam-drum. 
 Most of those on board were scalded 
 by the steam, and several were killed 
 outright. The officers and crew of the 
 Mercedita had no choice but surrender. 
 The Palmetto State then rushed upon 
 the Keystone State, which was at the 
 same time attacked by the Chicora. 
 The Keystone State made a vigorous j 
 resistance ; but when iu the act of bear- 
 ing down upon the nearest ram, with 
 the intention of striking and at the same 
 moment opening a plunging fire, she 
 was hit by a heavy shot, which passed 
 through her steam-chest. Neither the 
 Mercedita nor the Keystone State was 
 lost to the Union. The former, un- 
 aided, succeeded in making her way 
 to Port Royal ; the latter was taken 
 in tow by the Memphis, and moved 
 to the same place in a very crippled 
 condition. 
 
 It was at this time that a joint 
 proclamation was issued by General 
 Beauregard, then in charge of Charles- 
 ton-, and Flag-Offieer Ingraham, then 
 commanding the naval forces of South 
 Carolina, declaring the blockade of 
 Charleston " to be raised by a supe- 
 
 rior force of the Confederate States.' 
 Judah P. Benjamin, the Confederate 
 Secretary of State, at the same time 
 issued a circular to the foreign consuls 
 in the Confederacy, reiterating the 
 claim of Beauregard and Ingraham 
 "This," added Benjamin, "is for the 
 information of such vessels of youi 
 nation, as may choose to cany on 
 commerce with the now open port 
 of Chai-leston." 
 
 Such a claim, made at such a time, 
 had a powerful effect iu rousing up 
 the government at Washington. Gen- 
 eral Hunter and Admiral Dupont re- 
 ceived instructions to make an attack 
 on Charleston without further delay; 
 and General Foster, with the greater 
 portion of the Eighteenth corps, was 
 ordered from North Carolina to the 
 assistance of the naval commander. 
 Halleck had, unfortunately, neglected 
 to write to Hunter, informing him of 
 the instructions which he had given to 
 Foster; and the result was that when 
 Foster arrived, Hunter regarded him 
 as an intrudei'. Foster, at his own re- 
 quest, was ultimately allowed to return 
 to his department, his troops remain- 
 ing as reinforcements to Hunter. While 
 these events were occurring, Dupont 
 was making vigorous preparations for 
 the attack. 
 
 It was now Sunday, the 5th day of 
 April. On the night of that April 
 day, under the light of a full ^' 
 moon, the National fleet, consisting of 
 fourteen vessels, anchored off Charles- 
 ton bar. There were seven Ericsson 
 monitors, another iron-clad, called the 
 Keokuk. coustructe<l on a new priu 
 
THE FORTS IN THE HARBOR. 
 
 585 
 
 dple, and the frigate Ii-onsides. Du- 
 pont was on board the James Adger. 
 The National fleet had 32 guns in 
 all. Such a fleet, as the result proved, 
 was totally inadequate to the task 
 which it was called upon to perform. 
 Charleston Harbor was fortified almost 
 to perfection. It was well fortified at 
 the commencement of the war, as the 
 reader has already learned ; but it had 
 now been long under the special care 
 of General Beauregard, and his genius 
 had made it, if not absolutely impreg- 
 nable, at least proof against any attack 
 which could be made against it by the 
 National forces. 
 
 The forts which guarded the harbor 
 were numerous and strong. There 
 was one on the outward extremity of 
 Sullivan's Island and guarding Maffit's 
 Channel. There was another strong 
 sand battery on the same island, 
 near the Moultrie House, called Fort 
 Beauregard. A little further to the 
 westward was Fort Moultrie; and still 
 on Sullivan's Island, but yet more to 
 the west, was a strong earth-work, 
 called Battery Bee. On the mainland, 
 at Mount Pleasant, was another strong 
 battery; and in front of Charleston, 
 about a mile from the city, was old 
 Castle Pinckney. In the channel, be- 
 tween Sullivan's and Morris' Islands, 
 stood Fort Sumter, the most formid- 
 able of all the works. On the southern 
 side of the harbor, and near the city, 
 was the Wappoo batteiy, on James' 
 Island, commanding the mouth of the 
 Ashley River. To the right of this, 
 and on the same island, was Fort John- 
 sun; and about half way between the 
 
 last-named fort and Castle Pinckney, 
 on a submerged sand bank, which was 
 called the "Middle Ground," stood 
 Fort Ripley. In addition to these, 
 there were Batteiy Gregg, on Morris' 
 Island, at what is called Cummings' 
 Point; Fort Wagner, about a mile to 
 the south, and another powerful bat 
 tery at Lighthouse Inlet. The forts 
 mounted, in all, some 300 guns. The 
 channels, too, were blocked with heavy 
 chains made of railroad iron ; a rope, 
 Ijuoyed up by empty casks, extended 
 from Fort Ripley to Fort Sumter ; and 
 the entire waters were filled with tor- 
 pedoes. Such were the contrivances 
 which barred the entrance to Charles- 
 ton Harbor in the spring of 1863. 
 
 That the harbor was well guarded, 
 Dupont was well aware; but of the 
 nature and extent of the works he 
 had no exact knowledge. On the 
 morning of the 7th of April, the Aprjj 
 fleet, well brought together, lay ^' 
 within the bar in the main channel. 
 It was noon on that day, before the 
 signal was given to weigh anchor. The 
 Weehawken, Captain John Rodgers, 
 led the way. The other monitors fol- 
 lowed in the order here given : Passaic, 
 Captain Percival Drayton ; Montauk 
 Commander John L. Worden ; Pataps. 
 CO, Commander Daniel Ammen ; New 
 Ironsides, Commandei- Thomas Turner; 
 Catskill, CoininandiT G. W. Rodgers; 
 Nantucket, Commander Donald M. 
 Fairfax; Nahant, Commander John 
 Downes ; Keokuk, Lieutenant -Com- 
 mander A. C. Rhind. The gunboats 
 were the Canandalgua, Captain J. H. 
 Green; Housatonic, Captain "VY R. Tay- 
 
686 
 
 OHAKLESTON HAKBOE. 
 
 lor; Unadilla, Lieutenant-Commander 
 S. P. Quackenbush ; Wissahickon, Lieu- 
 tenant-Commander J. G. Davis ; Huron, 
 Lieutenant-Commander G. A. Stevens. 
 It was Dupont's intention to disregard 
 the batteries on Morris' Island, to at- 
 tack the northwest face of Fort Sumter, 
 and to force his way up to the city. 
 He was as yet ignorant of the great 
 hawser, and its dreadful appendages, 
 which lay in the path he had pre- 
 scribed. The Weehawken had a raft- 
 like contrivance attached to her bows, 
 for the purpose of removing obstruc- 
 tions and exploding torpedoes. Scarce- 
 ly had the vessels commenced to move, 
 when the Weehawken, hindered in her 
 movements by the I'aft at her bow, was 
 brought to a standstill. The other 
 vessels were obstructed by the Wee- 
 hawken; and nearly an hour elapsed 
 before they were all again under way. 
 As they steered towards the entrance 
 of the inner harbor, an ominous silence 
 prevailed, not a shot being fired either 
 from the forts or from the fleet. At 
 about fifty minutes past two, just as the 
 leading vessel was becoming entangled 
 in the horrid net-work of obstructions, 
 the silence was broken ; and Fort 
 Moultrie began to thunder. A few 
 moments afterwards the batteries on 
 Sullivan's Island, Morris' Island and 
 Foit Sumter also opened fire. The 
 Weehawken, in the midst of the ob- 
 structions, could not advance ; and 
 to remain under this concentric fire 
 would be fatal. Rodgers, therefore, 
 withdrew his vessel ; and, followed by 
 the others, he attempted to pass by 
 Fort Sumter, on the southern side. 
 
 He soon found his way blocked by 
 the rows of piles which extended be- 
 tween the fort and Cummings' Point. 
 At this stage the New Ironsides, in 
 attempting to turn, was caught in the 
 tide-way, and refused to obey her rud- 
 der. The Catskill and Nantucket, who 
 were in her wake, fell foul of her; 
 and, for some fifteen minutes, they re- 
 mained in this helpless condition, ex- 
 posed to the enemy's fire. 
 
 Dupont, before he commenced the 
 action, had transferred his headquarters 
 from the James Adger to the New 
 Ironsides. Finding himself thus en- 
 tangled, and compelled to come to 
 anchor, he signalled to the other ves- 
 sels to disregard the flag-ship, and take 
 such positions as might seem best suited 
 for effective • work. This was done at 
 once ; and, shortly before four o'clock, 
 the remaining eight vessels were ranged 
 on the northeast of Fort Sumter, at 
 distances varjnng from 550 to 800 
 yards. In this position, they were 
 fully commanded by Forts Beauregard, 
 Moultrie and Sumter, Battery Bee and 
 Fort Wagner — a concentrated fire of at 
 least 76 guns. The eight iron-clads 
 could oppose to this fire not more than 
 16 guns. It seemed already a hope- 
 less struggle. The iron-clads, how- 
 ever, went resolutely to work, bring- 
 ing their fire to bear chiefly on Fort 
 Sumter. Rhind ran the little Keokuk 
 ahead of all the others, and came within 
 500 yards of the fort, hurling against 
 it her immense projectiles. The Mon- 
 tauk and Catskill were close in her 
 wake. It was impossible, however, 
 for the fleet long to maintain the un- 
 
THE ATTACK OX THE FOETS. 
 
 587 
 
 equal struggle. The forts and earth- 
 works were armed with guns of the 
 largest calibre, and of the very best 
 construction. " There was soniethinsr 
 almost pathetic," wrote an eye-wit- 
 ness, " in the spectacle of those little 
 loating circular towers, exposed to 
 ^he crushing weight of those tons of 
 metal, hurled against them with the 
 terrific force of modern pi'ojectiles, and 
 with such charges of powder as were 
 never before dreamed of in artillery 
 firing." It recalled the pictures of the 
 wars of the Titans, in the old myth- 
 doolies. 
 
 The contest lasted about forty min- 
 utes, not one of the guns having been 
 under fire for a longer period. In that 
 brief space of time, five of the iron- 
 clads were wholly or partially disabled. 
 The Keokuk, which was of a peculiar 
 construction, and had two turrets, was 
 struck ninety-nine times, nineteen shots 
 piercing her at and below the water- 
 line. Her turrets were riddled, and 
 both her guns disabled. She had only 
 been able to return three shots. This 
 vessel, which was with difficultj^ kept 
 afloat during the night by means of her 
 pumps, sank next morning. The Pas- 
 saic was struck twenty-seven times; 
 and her turret was, for a time, so 
 jamnied that it could not be turned. 
 The Nahant was also terribly pun- 
 ished, her turret being effectually 
 jammed, and her pilot-house shattered. 
 The Patapsco lost the use of her rifle- 
 gun after the fifth fire. The Nantucket 
 had her 15-inch gun permanently dis- 
 abled after the third fire. The casual- 
 ties were few. There was but one man 
 
 killed — the quartermaster of the Na- 
 hant. In all, there were 29 wounded. 
 It was the conviction of all the officers 
 that any further attempt would be 
 folly. It was Dupont's belief that if 
 the attack had been prolonged one half 
 hour, the fleet would have been dis- 
 abled, and some of them at least left in 
 the hands of the enemy. Worden was 
 of the same opinion. "Charleston," 
 he said, "cannot be taken by the naval 
 force now present." The contest was, 
 therefore, abandoned ; and, on the April 
 12th, the entire fleet, with the *2. 
 exception of the New Ironsides, which 
 anchored outside Charleston bar, re- 
 turned to Port Royal for repairs. Dur- 
 ing the brief struggle the forts, from 
 76 guns, fired 2209 times; the iron- 
 clads, from 14 guns, fired 139 times. 
 
 It was the opinion of some, at the^ 
 time, that this attack might have re^ 
 suited differently if Dupont had been 
 vigorously supported V)y Hunter with 
 a land force on Morris Island. Hunter, 
 it was thought, might have given the 
 garrisons of Battery Gregg and Pt)rt 
 Wagner occupation, while the fleet was 
 attacking Fort Sumter. It is doubtful 
 whether such a diversion would have 
 mateiially affected the result. Certain 
 it is that the land troops did nothing. 
 "I could do nothing but pray for you," 
 wrote Hunter to Dupont the day after 
 the fight, "which, believe me, I did 
 most heartily." 
 
 It had now become apparent to the 
 authorities at Washington, that it was 
 vain to attempt to force a passage to 
 Charleston so long as Fort Sumter 
 guarded the channel. The reduction 
 
588 
 
 CHARLESTOX HARBOR. 
 
 of tdst fort, therefore, became with 
 them a fixed purpose. A change was 
 made in the commanders. General Q. 
 A. Gillmore, who had distinguished 
 himself the year before by the cap- 
 ture of Foit Pulaski, replacing Gen- 
 eral Hunter, assumed command of 
 the department of the South ; and 
 Admiral Dahlgren took the place of 
 Dupont. 
 
 Before the arrival of the new com- 
 manders, Dupont had the good for- 
 tune to capture the dreaded Confede- 
 rate wari'ior ship, the Atlanta. That 
 vessel had originally been a blockade- 
 runner, bearing the name of Fingal, 
 and had been built on the Clyde. She 
 had managed to run up the Savannah 
 River, about eighteen months before, 
 with a valuable cargo, but had found 
 ft impossible again to get out to sea. 
 The Confederates had converted her 
 into a war ship, ai-ming her with a 
 thick coat of oak and pine, and cover- 
 ing her with heavy bars of iron. She 
 carried four guns of large calibre, and 
 was furnished with a powerful beak. 
 Commanded by Lieutenant A. Webb, 
 formerly of the National navy, who 
 had imder him a crew of 160 men, it 
 was believed by the Confederates that 
 the Atlanta would be a match for at 
 least any two monitors then afloat. It 
 was reported to Dupont that the alter- 
 ations on this vessel had been complet- 
 ed, and that she was about to force her 
 way out to sea. Dupont resolved to 
 watch her movements; and, with this 
 end in view, he sent the "Weehawken, 
 Captain Rodgers, and the Nahant, Com- 
 mander Downes, to Warsaw Sound. 
 
 On the morning of the 17th of jnne 
 June, the Atlanta was discovered I't 
 to be moving down the Savannah River, 
 her intention evidently being to fall, 
 with all her force, on the two moni- 
 tors. She was accompanied by two 
 wooden gunboats of Tattnall's Mos- 
 quito fleet, which were crowded with 
 jieople who had come down from Sa- 
 vannah, expecting to see their favoi'ite 
 vessel win an easy victory over the 
 "Yankee" monitors. Their expecta- 
 tions were not to be realized. The 
 Weehawken was singled out for the 
 first blow. The ram is pushing swiftly 
 forward. The Weehawken reserves her 
 fire. Rodgers himself is sighting one 
 of her heavy guns. Her powerful an- 
 tagonist is now within easy range. 
 The Weeliawken opens fire. Rodgers 
 has aimed well The first shot — a 15- 
 inch solid — has carried away the top 
 of the Atlanta's pilot-house, wounded 
 two of her pilots, and sent the vessel 
 aground. In less than fifteen minutes, 
 the Atlanta is prisoner to the Wee- 
 hawken, Rodgeis having fired only five 
 shots in all. The Atlanta was badly 
 damaged, the last shot having struck 
 her point-])lank. So terrific was the 
 impact that it bent in the iron armor, 
 shivering the twelve inches of live 
 oak and the five inches of Georgia 
 pine. The Atlanta was afterwards 
 taken to Philadelphia and exhibited. 
 
 On his arrival at Hilton Head, Gill- 
 more found that he had an available 
 force of near 18,000 men. After picket- 
 ing a line along the coast, about 250 
 miles in length, and establishing posts 
 at different points, he could still count 
 
ASSAULT ON FOKT WAGNEK. 
 
 589 
 
 on an effective force of 11,000 men, 
 mostly veterans. He had 66 guns and 
 30 mortars. Dahlgren had at his dis- 
 posal the frigate Ironsides and six 
 monitors, three of which were being 
 repaired at Port Royal With these 
 means of offensive warfare, it was re- 
 solved to renew the attempt on Fort 
 Sumter. 
 
 Gillmore proposed to seize the south- 
 ern end of Morris' Island, and, vsdth 
 the aid of the fleet, to capture Fort 
 Wagner, a strong work near the north 
 end, and afterwards Fort Gregg, which 
 was beyond. These captured, it was 
 his belief that he would be able to 
 accomplish the destruction of Fort 
 Sumter by shore batteries. His first 
 movement was to erect strong batteiies 
 on the northern end of Folly Island. 
 General Vogdes, whom he found there 
 with a considerable body of troops, 
 had already constructed, on the south 
 end of the island, a battery which 
 commanded the mouth of the Stono 
 River. The new batteries were com- 
 pleted by the beginning of July. They 
 were made of sand and marsh sod, and 
 were very strong, being embrasured 
 and rivetted, and provided with maga- 
 zines and bomb and spliutei' proofs. 
 Forty-eight heavy guns were quick- 
 ly got into position ; and each was 
 furnished with 200 rounds of ammuni- 
 tion. 
 
 It was necessary for Gillmore to dis- 
 guise, as much as possible, his real 
 intention. With this end in view, and 
 in the hope that he might be able to 
 distract the attention of the Confeder- 
 ates, he ordered General A. H. Terry 
 
 to take with him 6000 troops, to pro- 
 ceed up the Stono River, and make 
 a demonstration on James' Island. 
 Colonel Higginson was, at the same 
 time, sent up the Edisto with a body 
 of negro troops, with instructions to 
 cut the Charleston and Savannah Rail- 
 I'oad. Higginson was compelled to 
 fall back, without having accomplished 
 his purpose. Terry had better suc- 
 cess. His troops were placed on the 
 island without difficulty; and, on the 
 night of the 9th of July, 2000 juiy 
 of them, under Geuei'al Strong, •• 
 were ti'ansferred in boats down Folly 
 River, to the junction of that stream 
 with Lighthouse Inlet. At daylight 
 on the 10th, the batteries which had 
 been erected on the north end of Folly 
 Island, and Dahlgren's monitors, simul- 
 taneously opened fire on Fort Wagnei'. 
 Every shot from the 15-inch guns of 
 the monitors sent a mass of rubbish 
 into the air. Clouds of dust and smoke 
 hung over the fort. Up to this time, 
 Strong and his men had been lying 
 in concealment. After a two hours' 
 cannonade, and while the attention of 
 the Confederates was still occupied by 
 the firing from the batteries on the 
 north of Foil}' Island, and from the 
 monitors. Strong threw his men rapid- 
 ly ashore ; and, by nine o'clock in the 
 morning, he was in full possession of 
 the Confederate works on the south- 
 em end of Morris' Island, with 1 1 guns 
 and much camp equipage. The Con- 
 federates fled to Foi-t Waguei-, the 
 Nationals pursuing as far as the Beacon 
 House, where they were witliin I'ange 
 of the guns of the fort. There they 
 
 267 
 
390 
 
 CHARLESTON HARBOR. 
 
 halted, Strong resolving not to attack 
 Fort Wagner until the next day. Short- 
 July ly after daylight, on July 11th, 
 i'« the assault was gallantly made. 
 Tt seemed for a time as if success was 
 about to attend the effort. Some of 
 the brave fellows had actually reached 
 the parapet. There, however, they 
 were met by a fire so withering that 
 they were compelled to fall back. 
 
 It was now evident to the National 
 commander that Fort Wagner was not 
 to be easily taken. Gillmore commenced 
 at once to make preparations to assail 
 it by regular approaches. The island 
 was narrow ; and, while he had no 
 reason to dread any flank movements, 
 he ccnild rely on the effective co-opera- 
 July tion of the fleet. On the 16th, 
 '6' General Terry \vas vigorously 
 attacked l>y a Confederate force, under 
 General Hazard; but, being assisted 
 by the gunboats in Stono and Folly 
 Rivers, he successfully resisted and ulti- 
 mately repelled his assailants. Terry's 
 operations on James' Island were, as has 
 been mentioned, originally intended as 
 a feint. His object having been ac- 
 complished, he withdrew his troops, ac- 
 cording to previous arrangement, and 
 joined the main force on Morris' Island, 
 under Gillmore, who was about to re- 
 Jnly P<iat the attack on Fort Wagner. 
 •8i It was now the 18th of July. 
 About noon of that day, tlie batteries, 
 which Gillmore had constructed across 
 the island, opened fire u])on the fort. 
 At the same time, Dahlgren moved up 
 his monitors, and opened fire on both 
 Fort Sumter and Fort Wagner. Both 
 forts replied — the latter feebly, and only 
 
 from two guns. The garrison, fully 
 persuaded that the bombardment was 
 only a preliminary to anotlier assault 
 by troops, had taken shelter in their 
 bomb-pi'oofs. To the Nationals, i\ 
 seemed as if the garrison must be de- 
 moralized. An assault was therefore 
 resolved upon. Dai'kness was now 
 approaching; and, as the cannonade 
 ceased, there burst forth a tremendous 
 thunderstorm. Whatever might be 
 the condition of the garrison, it was 
 observed that the flag was flying over 
 the fort. The twilight was deepening, 
 and the thunderstorm still raging, when 
 the storming party commenced to move 
 forward. Strong's briijade moved fii'st, 
 and was followed by that of Putnam. 
 Strong's brigade consisted of the Fifty- 
 Fourth Massachusetts, a colored regi- 
 ment, commanded by Colonel Robert 
 G. Shaw ; the Sixth Connecticut ; the 
 Forty-Eighth New York; the Third 
 New Hampshire ; the Seven tj'-Sixth 
 Pennsylvania and the Ninth Maine. 
 The distance to be passed was about 
 1800 yards. When the head of the 
 column was within 200 yards of the 
 fort, the Confederates opened fire. 
 With undaunted courage, their com- 
 I rades falling at every step, the Nationals 
 pressed forward. They had almost 
 reached the ditch when the parapet 
 blazed with musketry. The second 
 parapet was I'eached, and the National 
 standard was planted. One second 
 more, and both standard and standard- 
 bearer had disappeared. Shaw was 
 killed; Strong was mortally wounded. 
 The brigade was torn to pieces, the 
 colored regiment being almost aunihi- 
 
"THE SWAMP ANGEL." 
 
 59-, 
 
 latod. Putnam, with the Seventh New 
 Hampshire, the Sixty-Second and Six- 
 ty-Seventh Ohio, and the One Hun- 
 dredth New York, rushed forward and 
 renewed the assault. It was a vain 
 3fFort — a rush into the jaws of death. 
 Putnam fell at the head of his troops ; 
 and nearly all his subordinates were 
 killed or wounded. The remains of the 
 shattered brigades fell back into the 
 sheltering darkness ; and the contest 
 ceased. The ocean beach was covered 
 with the dead and dying. The National 
 loss felllittle short of 1500; the Con- 
 federates did not lose in the struggle 
 more than 100 men. 
 
 Abandoning the idea of assault, Gill- 
 more pushed forward the works with 
 great energy. The first parallel was 
 opened at 1300 yards from Fort Wag- 
 ner. Soon afterwards was completed 
 the second at 600 yards. The guns of 
 this parallel were trained not only on 
 Wagner, but on Sumter and Battery- 
 Gregg. On the 9th of August, a third 
 parallel was commenced about 330 
 yards in advance of the right of the 
 second. In addition to the works on 
 the parallels, Glllmore had, after great 
 difficulty, constructed a battery on the 
 marsh, on the west of Morris' Island. 
 On this battery he had placed an 8-inch 
 rifled Parrott gun, called by the sol- 
 diers, "The Swamp Angeh" From 
 this gun, shells could be throwm into 
 Charleston, some five miles distant. 
 Beauregard, however, was better sup- 
 plied with the means of resistance than 
 Gillmore was with the means of attack. 
 He had, perhaps, double the number of 
 ■oaen, and five times as much artillery. 
 
 By this time, the firing from all the 
 Confederate works — from the batteries 
 on James' Island, from Wagner, Gregg 
 and Sumter — had become continuous 
 and severe. Gillraore's preparations, 
 however, were now completed. He 
 had in readiness 12 batteries, mounting 
 28 heavy guns, and 12 mortars, j^g^. 
 On the 17th, aided by Dahlgren's U- 
 gunboats, he opened fire upon Sumter, 
 Wagner and Gregg. Sumter was the 
 chief object, of attention. The firing 
 was renewed eveiy morning until the 
 24th. The total number of shots fired 
 against Sumter iip to that date was 
 5750, of which 1336 missed. On Auff. 
 that day, Gillmore sent a des- 24. 
 patch to Halleck, informing him of the 
 result. "Fort Sumter," he said "is, 
 to-day, a shapeless and harmless mass 
 of ruins." This was the opiniv^/n of the 
 Confederates themselves. The artil- 
 lerists were, therefore, withdrawn from 
 the M'ork ; and it was garrisoned by a 
 body of infantry. 
 
 Gillmore's attention was now given 
 to Fort Wagner. While his heavy shot 
 was battering down the walls of Fort 
 Sumter, he had been busy constructing 
 his fourth parallel. It was now com- 
 pleted ; and he was able to plant his 
 guns within 300 yards of the fort on 
 his front. About 100 yards in front 
 of him was a ridge of sand dunes, from 
 behind which the Confederate sharp 
 shooters kept up an incessant fire^ 
 greatly to the annoyance of the men 
 engaged in the advance parallel. The 
 ridge, however, was easily cleai-ed ; and 
 a fiftli p;u'allel was establisiied at it-S 
 base. At this point, the island is only 
 
BdS 
 
 CHARLESTON Hi^RBOR. 
 
 twenty-fire yards wide, and barely two 
 feet high. In rough weather, this part of 
 the island is swept by the sea. It was 
 becoming more and more difficult for 
 the men to push forward the sap, ex- 
 posed, as they were, to the converging 
 fire from Fort Wagner and to the flank 
 fire from James' Island. Gillmore had 
 become fully convinced that another 
 assault was necessary. His prepara- 
 tions were already completed. The 
 light mortars were moved to the front 
 and placed in battery ; the advanced 
 trenches were enlarged ; the rifled guns 
 in the left breaching batteries were 
 trained upon the foit ; and calcium 
 lights were prepared, for the double 
 purpose of giving aid to the cannoneers 
 and sharpshooters and of dazzling the 
 Sept. 6y6s of the enemy. At dawn, on 
 5« the 5th of September, the New 
 Ironsides, Captain Rowan, moved up 
 to within 1000 yards of the sea face of 
 the fort; and simultaneously his broad- 
 sides of eight guns, carrying 11-inch 
 shells, and the land batteries, opened 
 upon the parapet. Foi- forty-two con- 
 secutive hours the bombardment was 
 continued. In a few hours after the 
 firing commenced, the garrison aban- 
 doned their guns and took refuge in 
 the bomb-proof. The final assault was 
 to be made on the morning of the 9th. 
 All things were in readiness, when it 
 became known that the fort was evac- 
 uated. Fort Gregg, it was afterwards 
 discovered, was also abandoned. There 
 were left in Wagner eighteen guns ; 
 
 in Gregg, seven. During the two days, 
 122,300 pounds of metal in the shape 
 of shot and shell had rained upon th# 
 fort ; yet the bomb-proof was substan 
 tially uninjured. The forts were im- 
 mediately occupied by the National 
 troops ; and General Gillmore was 
 able to congratulate his men, by telling 
 them that the whole of Morris' Island 
 was in their hands, and that the city 
 and harbor of Charleston were at the 
 mercy of their artillery. 
 
 On the night of the 8th of Septem. 
 ber, an expedition of thirty boats sep. 
 was sent from the fleet to take 8. 
 possession of Fort Sumter. It ^va? 
 under the command of Commander 
 Stephens, of the Patapsco. It was a 
 disastrous enterprise. Three of the 
 boats' crews had landed. In the belief 
 that the garrison had abandoned the 
 fort, they were attempting to run up 
 the steep ruins to the parapet, when 
 they were greeted with a tremendous 
 fire. Two hundred of the assailants 
 were killed, wounded or captured. 
 In their hurried retreat, the Nationals 
 left behind them four boats and 
 three colors. Gilkuore maintained 
 and strengthened his position ; but 
 no further active efforts were made 
 against Charleston during the remain- 
 der of the year. Gillmore's work 
 had not been wholly fruitless. He 
 had not captured Charleston ; he had 
 not made himself complete master of 
 the harbor; but he had made the 
 blockade secure. 
 
SIEGE OF .SUFFOLK. 
 
 593 
 
 CHAPTER XXX. 
 
 Minor Engagements.— General John J. Peck.— Suffolk.— Defenses of Suffolk.— General Longetreet.— Little 
 Washington and New Berne. — General Foster. — Siege of Suffolk.— Vigorous Assaults.- A Gallant Defense.— 
 The Siege Discontinued.— Longstreet Retires.— What Might Have Been.— Morgan in Kentucky.— His De- 
 predations—At Green River.— At Springfield. — At Bardstown. — At Brandenburg.— Seizure of the Alice 
 Dean and McCombs. — At Corydon. — General Hobson in Pursuit. — The Alice Dean in Flames. — Burning 
 (he Wharf at Brandenburg. — General Judah. — Vandalism at Corydon and Salem. — Morgan in a Tight 
 Place. — Sweeping Around CSncinnati. — Parkersburg.— At Buffington Ford. — Morgan Hemmed In. — Eight I 
 Hundred Surrender. — Morgan Attempts to Escape with the Remainder. — Captured at New Lisbon. — Taken 
 to Columbus, Ohio. — Escape from Prison. — After Knoxville. — Bean Station. — Shacklefoid in Pursuit of 
 Longstreet. — A Vigorous Encounter. — The Nationals Fall Back. — Foster Succeeds Burnside. — The Depart 
 ment of the Gulf. — General Dick Taylor Again. — The Occupation by the Confederates of Alexandria 
 Opelousas and Fort de Russy. — Brashear City also Abandoned. — General Banks and General Grant. — Pro- 
 posal to Move on Mobile. — Movement upon Texas. — Sabine City. — General Franklin. — Lieutenant Crocker. — 
 A Dis.T.strous Failure. — Atchafalaya. — Another Movement upon Texas. — General C. C. Washburne .Attacked 
 by Taylor and Green. — Brazos, Santiago. — Brownsville. — Point Izabel. — Banks at Brownsville. — His Return 
 to New Orleans. — Arkansas and Mis.souri. — The Guerrillas. — Marmaduke Falls upon Springfield, Missouri. — 
 A Brave Resistance. — Marmaduke Falls Back. — General Brown Wounded. — Marmaduke Attacked by Colonel 
 Merrill. — His Defeat. — The Julia Roan. — Little Rock. — The Guerrilla Leaders in Council. — General Sterling 
 Price. — Genera! McNeil. — Cape Girardeau Attacked by Marmaduke. — McNeil's Gallant Defence. — Pursuit of 
 Marmaduke. — Fort Blunt. — Colonel Coffey. — Honey Springs. — Fort Smith. — Attack on Helena. — The Con- 
 federates Repulsed. — McPherson's Expedition to Canton. — Steele's Expedition to Little Rock. — At Browns- 
 ville. — Little Rock Captured. — The Massacre at Lawrence. — Attempt on the Life of General Blunt. — Major 
 Curtis killed. — Marmaduke and Sandwatie. — Progress Made. 
 
 1863. 
 
 In an earlier portion of this work we 
 found it convenient to group to- 
 gether some minor engagements 
 which, not having direct connection with 
 any of the great battles or campaigns, 
 and not of sufficient consequence to be 
 treated in separate chapters, were yet too 
 important to be altogether overlooked. 
 In order to cover some such engage- 
 ments which took place at different 
 iraes in the year 1863, that example 
 will, in this chapter, be followed. 
 
 At the close of 1862, Major-General 
 John J. Peck was in command of 9000 
 men at Suffolk. The Confederate gen- 
 orala, Pettigrew and French, with 
 
 about 15,000 men, were at the same 
 time on the line of the Blackwater, 
 threatening Peck's position. Peck 
 took such pains to construct defenses 
 for Suffolk, that the authorities at 
 Richmond believed he was preparing a 
 base of operations for a movement 
 against that city, in co-operation with 
 the army of the Potomac. Counter- 
 vailing measures, in consequence, were 
 immediately adopted. A series of for- 
 tifications were thrown up from the 
 line of the Blackwater to Fort Pow- 
 hattan, on the James River ; and 
 in February, 1863, General Long- 
 street was placed in command of ail 
 
 Feb. 
 
094 
 
 MINOR ENGAGEMENTS IN 1863. 
 
 April. 
 
 the Confederate troops in that region. 
 He had under him a force of about 
 30,000 men. The better to conceal 
 his purpose, and in order to distract 
 the attention and divide the forces of 
 the National commanders at Suffolk 
 and at Fortress Monroe, where General 
 Dix was in command, Longstreet, 
 early in April, caused it to \je 
 reported that he had gone to South 
 Carolina, while D. H. Hill was ordered 
 to attack Little Washington, and me- 
 nace New Berne. Longstreet, having 
 been informed by spies that General 
 Foster, who had succeeded Burnside in 
 command in that department, had or- 
 dered Peck to send 3000 men to oppose 
 Hill, deemed it a fitting opportunity 
 to carry out his purpose in Suffolk. 
 Peck, however, was prepared ; he had 
 penetrated Longstreet's designs, and 
 notified Foster accordingly. Having 
 been reinforced by a division under 
 General Getty, he was about to send 
 the required number of troops, when 
 he learned from General Viele, who 
 bad captured a Confederate mail at 
 Norfolk, that Hill's movement was 
 only intended as a feint. The detach- 
 ment was, therefore, detained; and 
 Admiral Lee, in obedience to orders, 
 Bent several gunboats up the Nanse- 
 mond, to co-operate with the land forces 
 in the defense of Suffolk. Longstreet 
 resolved to concentrate his strength 
 and carry the place by assault; Hill 
 was recalled from North Carolina, 
 the besiegers now numbering about 
 40,000 men. Batteries were thrown 
 up under cover of the darkness; and 
 fire was opened upon the boats in the 
 
 river. The gunboats, however, were 
 bravely liandled ; the land forces, with 
 equal gallantry, performed their part; 
 and, by the resistance thus offered, the 
 assailants, although overwhelmingly su- 
 perior in numbers, were successfully 
 held in check. For twenty-four days 
 the siege continued, deeds of great 
 daring being performed on both sides. 
 Longstreet put forth his best efforts, 
 and taxed his skill to the utmost to 
 accomplish his object ; but it was all in 
 vain. Finding it impossible to give 
 effect to his purpose, he turned his 
 back upon Peck and retreated. It was 
 now the 3d of May — the day on jiay 
 which Hooker and Lee had their ^• 
 severe battle at Chancellorsville. The 
 Confederates were pursued as far as 
 the Blackwater. Thus ended the siege 
 of Suffolk, " which had for its object 
 the recovery of the whole country 
 south of the James River, extending to 
 Albemarle Sound, in North Carolina, 
 the ports of Norfolk and Portsmouth, 
 eighty miles of new railroad iron, the 
 equipment of two roads, and the cap- 
 ture of all the United States forces 
 and property, with some thousands of 
 contrabands." It is hardly possible to 
 overestimate the great services ren- 
 dered by Peck and his brave garrison 
 at Suffolk. If the resistance had been 
 less stubborn, Longstreet might have 
 been able to rejoin Lee at Chancellors- 
 ville in time to accomplish the destruc- 
 tion of the army of the Potomac. His 
 appearance at Chancellorsville on the 
 2d or on the 3d of May would cer- 
 tainly have proved a calamity to the 
 National cause. 
 
MORGAN'S RAID. 
 
 595 
 
 No account has yet been given in 
 these pages of the famous raid 
 made by the Confederate parti- 
 san ranger, General Morgan, into the 
 States of Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio. 
 In the month of June, and before the 
 armies of Rosecranz and Bragg came 
 into collision at Chickamauga, Morgan, 
 with about 3000 mounted men and six 
 guns, pushed across the Cumberland 
 River, at Barksville, and advanced to- 
 wards Columbia. At that place, he 
 was encountered and held in check for 
 some three hours by a small body of 
 cavalry, under Captain Custer. After 
 the death of Custer, who was unfor- 
 tunately killed in the affray, the Na- 
 tionals fell back, leaving Morgan to 
 pursue his devastating march. At 
 (ireen River, Morgan came into con- 
 tact with Colonel Moore, who was at 
 the head of 200 Michiganers, and well 
 entrenched. A severe encounter en- 
 sued, the raiders being repulsed, with 
 a loss of more than 200 killed and 
 wounded. Morgan now moved in the 
 direction of Lebanon, which was held 
 by Colonel Hanson and the Twentieth 
 Kentucky. The regiment was small 
 in numbers; but Hanson, for some 
 hours, was able to make a brave resist- 
 ance. The raiders fired the town, and 
 Hanson and his men were captured. 
 Pushing on through Springfield and 
 Bardstown, Morgan's advance reached 
 jBiy Brandenburg on the 7th of July. 
 '• There he seized two steamers, 
 the Alice Dean and McCombs, and, 
 getting his men on board, proceeded 
 across the river. His force had now in- 
 creased to eleven regiments, numbering 
 
 over 4000 men, with ten pieces of artil- 
 lery, including two howitzers. After 
 burning the Alice Dean and the wharl 
 at Brandenburg, the raiders pushed on 
 towards the north, in the direction of 
 Corydon, a small place in Indiana. 
 
 Meanwhile, General Hobson, with a 
 force equal in numbers to that of 
 Morgan, was following in close pur- 
 suit. Hobson arrived in time to see 
 the blazing wreck in the stream. Mor- 
 gan had crossed on the 8th. On the 
 day following, Hobson, with his little 
 band, was on the soil of Indiana. A 
 considerable portion of General Judah's 
 division, which had been stationed in 
 Kentucky, between the Cumberland 
 and Barren Rivers, was also concen- 
 trated and put in motion for the cap- 
 ture of Morgan. 
 
 At Corydon, which he reached on 
 the 9th, he encountered some re- jniy 
 sistance from the Home Guards. *• 
 These, however, were overpowered, 
 and a wholesale system of plunder, 
 combined with vandalism and bru- 
 tality, was inaugurated. Having done 
 their work at Corydon, the raiders 
 proceeded to Salem, the capital of 
 Washington County, where they cap- 
 tured between 300 and 400 militia- 
 men, pillaged the place, destroyed the 
 railroads, and ex;icted $1000 each from 
 three mill-owners. At each town and 
 village, it is the same story — murder, 
 plunder, cruel exactions, and wholesale 
 destruction of property. The pun uera 
 were still behind ; but the pr -pie, 
 alarmed, were now rising in thei' i>wn 
 defense. At Vernon, on the 12th, Julj 
 Morgan was brought to a halt **- 
 
596 
 
 MINOR ENGAGEMENTS IN 1863. 
 
 by a povveiful body of militia, under 
 Colonel Lowe. Stealing away from 
 the presence of Lowe under cover of 
 the darkness, his men, in scattered de- 
 tachments, and plundering as they ad- 
 vanced, moved towards Harrison, where 
 they concentrated, preparatory to re- 
 turning as quickly as possible to Ken- 
 tucky. Morgan was already in a tight 
 place. Hobson was in his rear ; Judah 
 was on his flank; and thousands of 
 armed citizens were blocking every 
 way by which he might attempt a re- 
 trograde movement. Sweeping around 
 Cincinnati about a dozen miles to the 
 north, still plundering and destroying, 
 Morgan pushed on through the rich 
 counties of Southern Ohio, in the di- 
 rection of Buffingtou Ford, a short 
 distance south of Parkersburg. He 
 July reached the ford on the 18th of 
 
 ^^' July, and attempted to cross 
 under cover of an artillery fire. Next 
 morning, he found himself completely 
 hemmed in. Judah's cavalry had fallen 
 on his flank; the head of Hobson's col- 
 umn, under General Shackleford, struck 
 his rear ; and two armed vessels in the 
 river opened on his front. In this ex- 
 tremity, about 800 of the raiders sur- 
 rendered ; but the remainder, headed 
 by Morgan, attempted to cross to 
 Belleville, by swimming their horses. 
 Only about 300 managed thus to es- 
 cape. Morgan, thus foiled, fell back, 
 dt the head of a considerable force, to- 
 wards McArthur, and then pushed to 
 the northeast, in the direction of New 
 July Lisbon, where, on the 26th, being 
 
 26' closely pressed by Shackleford's 
 cavalry, he was compelled to surrender. 
 
 Morgan and several of his officei-s were 
 taken to Columbus, Ohio, where they 
 were confined in felons' cells, in the 
 penitentiary. The partisan chief, with 
 six of his ca])tains, by undermining the 
 walls of their prison, and thus opening 
 a passage into the yard, effected their 
 escape in the following November. 
 Moi'gan was spared to make another 
 famous raid, but it was to be his last. 
 We have already given an account 
 of the siege of Knoxville. It was not 
 deemed necessary at the time to follow 
 up Longstreet in his retreat from that 
 place. In this chapter, space must be 
 found for a brief reference to the 
 struggle which took place at Bean Sta- 
 tion, ji^iter his unsuccessful assault at 
 Knoxville, and the withdrawal of his 
 troops towards Virginia, he was pur- 
 sued by cavalry, under Shackleford, 
 Wolford, Graham and Foster, into Jef- 
 ferson County. At the above-named 
 station, on the Morristown and Cum- 
 berland Gap Road, Longstreet turned 
 sharply on his pursuers. It was about 
 two o'clock in the afternoon of Mon- 
 day, December 14th, when the Dec. 
 National skirmishers felt the **• 
 touch of the enemy, and were com- 
 pelled to fall back. Shackleford was 
 immediately on hand. His men, dis- 
 mounting, the horses being sent to the 
 rear, were soon got into position on 
 the further side of the road. Colvin's 
 battery was posted on a knoll, in rear 
 of the troops, and three howitzers were 
 located on a spur of the adjoining 
 mountain, to the left of the National 
 line. About four o'clock, the fighting 
 became general. The Confederates 
 
SABINE PASS. 
 
 597 
 
 fell with great force on the divisions of 
 Wolford and Foster. The enemy was 
 well provided with artillery, which was 
 splendidly served. The Nationals held 
 their ground with great firmness ; but 
 Ihey were compelled, from time to 
 time, to give way, and at nightfall, 
 when the battle ceased, they had fallen 
 back about a mile. Shackleford, who 
 was in chief command, confessed to the 
 loss of nearly 200 men. Longstreet's 
 Joss must have been greater. During 
 the struggle, an attempt was made to 
 strike Shackleford's rear, by passing a 
 force across the Holston, at Kelley's 
 Ford ; but this movement was skilfully 
 prevented by General Ferrero, who 
 took the precaution to guaid the ford 
 by a strong force under General Hum- 
 phrey. Longstreet held possession of 
 Bean Station ; but he was unable, in 
 I'onsequence of the severity of the 
 weather, to turn it to any practical ac- 
 count. He, therefore, withdrew his 
 forces to the neighborhood of Bull's 
 Gap, a point at which the Uogersville 
 )ranch joins the main road. 
 
 It was about this time that General 
 Burnside retired fi'om the command of 
 the army of the Ohio. Here, again, as 
 in North Carolina, he was succeeded 
 by General John G. Foster. After the 
 battle at Bean Station, and before the 
 close of the year, there was some 
 skirmishing between the rival forces in 
 this department. This petty warfare 
 was continued through the spring of 
 1864 ; but no event of high importance 
 occurred in this region until Morgan's 
 famous and final Kentucky raid, in 
 May of that year. 
 
 Among the minor operations, of 
 which as yet no notice has been taken, 
 mention must be made of those which 
 were conducted in the Gulf Depart- 
 ment, and in the region west of the 
 Mississippi, after the fall of Port Hud- 
 son. It will be remembered that when 
 General Banks withdrew from Alexan- 
 dria, on the Red River, and proceeded 
 to Port Hudson, he took with him the 
 greater portion of his troops, thus leav- 
 ing the entire region, from which he 
 had driven the Confederates, once again 
 at their mercy. General Dick Taylor 
 immediately reappeared. Alexandria 
 was soon reoccupied; so was Ope- 
 lousas ; and a Confederate garrison 
 took possession of Fort de Russy. 
 Taylor's followers, indeed, found but 
 little difficulty in overrunning the 
 whole country. The National outposts 
 were withdrawn into Brash ear City. 
 This, however, was soon abandoned; 
 and the way to Algiers being left open. 
 New Orleans would have been in peril 
 but for the presence of FaiTagut and 
 his fleet. After the fall of Port Hud- 
 son, Banks again directed his thoughts 
 to aggressive measures. He was visit- 
 ed by General Grant in September; 
 and it was the opinion and desire of 
 both commanders that a joint move- 
 ment should be made against Mobile — 
 the one place of importance on the 
 Southern coast then held by the Con« 
 federates. Considerations of foreign 
 policy, howevei', determined the gov- 
 ernment to take steps for the recovery 
 and reoccupation of Texas, Banks, ac- 
 cordingly, was ordered to move for th* 
 conquest of that State. He was per- 
 
 ««« 
 
sm 
 
 MINOR ENGAGEMENTS IN 1863. 
 
 mitted to use his own judgment as to 
 the course he should follow ; but it 
 was suggested that the most feasible 
 route might be found to be by the Red 
 River to Natchitoches and Shreveport 
 Believing that route to be impractica- 
 ble, at that season of the year, he de- 
 termined to secure Sabine City, at 
 the mouth of the Sabine Pass. To 
 give effect to this purpose, an expedi- 
 tion of 4000 well-disciplined troops 
 were placed under the command of 
 General Franklin. The troops were 
 to be landed a few miles below Sabine 
 Pass. Farragut detached a naval force 
 of four gunboats, iinder Lieutenant 
 Frederick Crocker, to join the expedi- 
 tion. The gunboats were the Clifton, 
 Sachem, Arizona, and Granite City. 
 The Clifton was the flag-ship. The 
 expedition proved a complete and dis- 
 astrous failure. In the forenoon of the 
 Sep. 8th of September, the gunboats 
 ^' and transports crossed the bar at 
 Sabine Pass. In the afternoon, the 
 Clifton, Sachem, and Arizona moved 
 towards the fort, the Granite City 
 being left behind to cover the landing 
 of a division of troops, when the proper 
 time should arrive. The fort mounted 
 eight heavy guns, three of which were 
 rifled. It was evident that the garri- 
 son was well prepai'ed. As the ves- 
 sels drew near, the whole eight guns 
 opened at once. The boilers of the 
 Clifton and Arizona were immediately 
 penetrated by shells; the white flags 
 were raised ; and twenty minutes after 
 the attack, the two vessels were in tow 
 of Confederate steamers. Franklin re- 
 fused to land bis troops, and, with his 
 
 transports, hastened over the bar, and 
 returned to New Orleans. He left be- 
 hind him 200 men as prisoners, 50 
 killed and wounded, 2 gunboats and 
 15 heavy-rifled guns. Franklin was 
 blamed for not landing his troops ; but 
 it is doubtful whether, in the circum- 
 stances, he could have acted more 
 wisely than he did. 
 
 Banks now concentrated his forces 
 at Atchafalaya, his intention being to 
 march directly on Shreveport. He 
 soon found, however, that the difficul- 
 ties which lay in his way were almost, 
 if not entirely, insurmountable. Aban- 
 doning the attempt, therefore, he re- 
 solved to ?ecure a lodgment in Texas, 
 by moving upon and taking possession 
 of the har)>ors on its coast. 
 
 At this time, the position of General 
 Banks was the very i-everse of com- 
 fortable. The Confederates seemed 
 irrepressible. Driven from one place, 
 they quickly reappeai'ed in another. 
 Towards the end of September, Gen- 
 eral Dick Taylor, of the Confederate 
 army, became more than usually active 
 He was still west of the Atchafalaya 
 General Green, his most efficient lieu 
 tenant, with his bushwhackers, was con- 
 stantly depredating in the neighborhood 
 of Port Hudson. It had become neces- 
 sary to make a bold effoi-t to suppress! 
 those bands of marauders. With this 
 end in view, General Hei-ron was sent 
 with a body of men to Morgansia 
 Deeming it advisable to establish an out- 
 post some miles in the interior, Herron 
 sent Colonel Lake with the Nineteenth 
 Iowa and Twenty-Sixth Indiana, also 
 6 guns and a support of 150 cavalry 
 
GRAND COTEAIT. 
 
 699 
 
 under Colonel Montgomery. The en- 
 tire force was under 1000. The exist- 
 en(3e of this post became known to 
 Sepi Grreen. On the night of the 
 30« 30th of September, he advanced 
 stealthily across an adjoining bayou, 
 surrounded and surprised the camp, 
 and captured Lake and about 400 of 
 his men. The cavalry escaped with 
 the loss of 5 men. There were 54 
 killed and wounded. 
 
 In this connection may be related 
 with propriety the xmfortunate affair 
 which happened at Grand Coteau. 
 When General Banks was about to 
 set out on his expedition to Texas, he 
 thought it proper to make a demon- 
 stration in the direction of Opelousas, 
 so as to create the impression that a 
 movement which had Alexandria or 
 Shreveport for its objective was really 
 commenced. Four divisions of the 
 army of the Gulf, consisting of two 
 divisions of the Nineteenth army corps 
 and two divisions of the Thirteenth 
 army corps, the whole under the com- 
 mand of Major-General Franklin, were 
 ordered to Opelousas. The march was 
 completed without difficulty; and the 
 army encamped at Opelousas and 
 Barre's Landing, remaining about eight 
 Oct. or ten days. On the 27th of Octo- 
 27< ber, the backward movement com- 
 menced, the First division, of the Thir- 
 teenth corps, falling back upon New 
 Iberia. On the 1st of November, the 
 other two divisions — the Third and 
 Fourth- -commanded respectively by 
 Washburne and Burbridge, fell back, 
 in obedience to orders, as far as Car- 
 rion Crow Bayou and Grand Coteau. 
 
 On the same day, the Nineteenth coi'ps 
 fell back in the same direction. Wash- 
 burne and Burbridge were ordered to 
 encamp at tlie places just mentioned, 
 while the rest of the army continued 
 to fall back. Washburne assumed su 
 preme control of the two divisions ol 
 the Thirteenth corps, who were thus 
 left to guard the rear. On the morn- 
 ing of the 3d, the Confederates jjov, 
 showed themselves in considera ^' 
 ble strength in the neighborhood of 
 Burbridge's position, which was about 
 three miles in advance of that of Mc- 
 Ginnis, with whor '^ashbimie had 
 his headquarters. 
 
 Burbridge, witi: one brigade of the 
 Fourth division, about 1200 strong, 
 with one 6-gun battery of 10-pounder 
 Parrott, and with about 500 mounted 
 infantry, under Colonel Fonda, and a 
 section of Nim's battery, was on the 
 north side of what is called Muddy 
 Bayou. McGlnnis, with the Third di- 
 vision, 3000 strong, and one battery, 
 was at Carrion Crow Bayou. The two 
 bayous run in parallel lines to the east, 
 the banks being fringed with wood. 
 The intervening ground wa3 a smooth, 
 level prairie. Bufbridge's right rear 
 rested on a" dense thicket; his left 
 stretched out about twenty rods into 
 the open ground ; the whole fronted to 
 the northwest, in the direction of Ope^ 
 lousas. Later in the day, the Confed 
 erates fell with tremendous fury on 
 Biirbridge's position, attacking him 
 with an overwhelming force in front 
 and on both flanks. The shock was 
 iri'esistible ; and for a time it seemed 
 as if the entire force would be cap 
 
rfX) 
 
 MINOR EXGAGEMENTS IN 18C3. 
 
 tured or destroyed. Washburne, who 
 had reached the front in time to see 
 the commencement of the struggle, 
 had already ordered up the Third di- 
 vision. McGinnis was ill, and unable 
 to command in person ; but his troops 
 were hurried forward, at the double- 
 quick, by Brigadier-General Cameron, 
 of the First, and Colonel Slack, of the 
 Second brigade. They did not arrive a 
 moment too soon. Burbridge's com- 
 mand had been driven entirely out of 
 the woods ; and the Confederate cav- 
 alry were charging on his left, and 
 coming down with force upon his rear. 
 As soon as it came up, the Third di- 
 vision formed in line ; and the guns, 
 already within range, poured shot and 
 shell on the almost triumphant foe, 
 ind checked his advance. 
 
 In the heat of the fight, and before 
 the arrival of the Third division, a tre- 
 mendous struggle took place for the 
 possession of Nim's battery. Exposed 
 to charge after charge of the enemy, 
 the gunners were ultimately overpow- 
 ered. An infantry regiment — the Twen- 
 ty-Third Wisconsin — was sent to their 
 eupport ; but it was soon overwhelmed 
 and compelled to surrender. One sec- 
 tion of this battery was commanded by 
 Lieutenant Marland, In spite of the 
 strength and fury of the enemy, that 
 gallant oflBcer, after an almost unparal- 
 leled display of coolness and audacity, 
 succeeded in carrying off his own sec- 
 tion of the battery. But for the 
 bravery of Marland, those guns would 
 have been lost. As it was, Burbridge, 
 although compelled to fall back, man- 
 aged to take with him every wagon 
 
 and all the guns, with the exception of 
 a 10-pounder Parrott. 
 
 As soon as McGinnis' division ca,me 
 up, Burbridge got his guns again into 
 position, and opened upon the Confed- 
 erates, now just checked in their ad- 
 vance, a raking cross-fire, which tore 
 their ranks in pieces. The tide of battle 
 was now turned. What was a pursuit, 
 became a retreat. The Confederates 
 sought shelter in the woods. Thence, 
 however, they were quickly driven, 
 the infantrj' pursuing for about a mile 
 and a half, the cavalry for about three 
 miles. The loss of life was not so great 
 as the severity of the fight might have 
 seemed to imply. The number of killed 
 was 26 ; of the wounded, 124 ; of the 
 missing, 566. The Confederate loss waa 
 about 60 killed. The wounded were 
 carried off with them in their retreat; 
 65 were made prisoners. Such was the 
 battle of Grand Coteau. It cannot be 
 called great or decisive ; but it was one 
 of the most severely contested battles 
 of the war. 
 
 The Nationals lost heavily in offi- 
 cers. Among the officers who won dis- 
 tinction that day was Captain Guppy, 
 of the Twenty-Third Wisconsin. After 
 having displayed great gallantry, he 
 was wounded and made prisoner, with 
 the greater portion of his regiment. 
 Burbridge, Guppy, Fonda and Robin- 
 son received the special commendation 
 of General Washburne. The Nation- 
 als marched back in safety to Brashear 
 City. 
 
 Meanwhile, General Banks, at the 
 head of an expedition consisting of 
 6000 troops and some war vessels, had 
 
THE GUERILLAS. 
 
 SCTi 
 
 sailed from New Orleans directly for 
 the Rio Grande. Ranks, although he 
 accompanied thtt expedition, had placed 
 in immediate command General Napo- 
 leon J. T, Dana, an accomplished and 
 skilful officer, and supposed to be well 
 acquainted with the country about to 
 be visited. This expedition was at- 
 i:ended with very considerable success. 
 But little opposition, in truth was en- 
 countered, the enemy always retreating 
 as the Nationals advanced. On the 
 2d of November, the troops debarked 
 at Brazos Santiago, and advanced in 
 the direction of Brownsville, some 
 thirty miles up the river. Point Isabel 
 was reached on the 8th. Banks having 
 established his headquarters at Browns- 
 ville, sent as many troops as he could 
 spare, fui'ther up, to seize and occupy 
 the water-passes between the Rio 
 Grande and Galveston. Some steam- 
 ers were obtained on the Rio Grande ; 
 and troops were transported to Mus- 
 tang Island, off Corpus Chiisti Bay. 
 From that port, General Ransom ad- 
 pjov. vanced to the Aransas Pass ; and, 
 '8. on the 18th of November, he car- 
 ried the place by assault, capturing 
 100 prisoners. On the same day, the 
 National troops entered and occupied 
 Corpus Christi. About the end of the 
 month. General Washburne, now in 
 command of the Thirteenth corps, 
 moved upon Pass Cavallo, at the en- 
 trance to Matagorda Bay, where there 
 was a strong fort called Esperanza, 
 garrisoned by 2000 men. The place 
 was invested ; but the Confederates 
 blew up the magazine and fled. Banks 
 had reason to be proud of the success 
 
 which attended this ex^/edition. In 
 one month he had made himself mas- 
 ter of every important position on 
 the coast between the Rio Grande and 
 Galveston, except the works at th^ 
 mouth of the Brazos, and those on 
 Galveston Island. He was anxious to 
 prosecute the work, especially towajdi 
 the «ast ; but he knew that MagruJei 
 was there in great force, and that with 
 the troops now at his disposal, it 
 would be hazardous to risk a battle 
 with an antagonist of so much daring 
 and so much skill. Had it been pos- 
 sible for him to obtain sufficient rein- 
 forcements, he might have been able 
 to sweep the territory clear of the 
 Confederate troops. As reinforcements 
 could not be found. Banks, leaving 
 Dana in command on the Rio Grande, 
 returned to New Orleans. 
 
 We have already, in an earlier chap 
 tei', recoi'ded the military events which 
 took place in Missoui'i and Arkansas in 
 1862. In the chapter devoted to the 
 guerrillas, the record is brought down 
 as far as the battle of Prairie Grove, in 
 which the Nationals were completely vie. 
 torious. It seemed for a time as if, in the 
 entire region west of the Mississippi, 
 the National authority was firmly estab- 
 lished. It was not long, however, until, 
 as has already been related, the Confede- 
 I'ates appeared in force in Texas, recap- 
 turing Galveston, and establishing their 
 authoi'ity over the entire State. Early in 
 18G3, the guerrillas again made theii 
 presence felt in Missouri and Aikansas. 
 to the great inconvenience of the loyal 
 inhabitants of thoee States, About 
 the beginning of January, Marmaduke, 
 
•02 
 
 mnon ENGACfEMEXTS IN 1863. 
 
 with some 4000 men, for the most 
 part mounted, burst suddenly out of 
 Northern Ai'kansas and fell upon 
 Springfield, JMissouri, with great fury. 
 The place was well fortified with earth- 
 works; but the National forces were 
 scattered over the country ; and it was 
 with some difficulty that Generals 
 Brown and Holland, who were in com- 
 mand there, were able to bring together 
 about 1000 militia-men to resist the 
 onslaught of the guerrilla chief. It 
 JaOi was about one o'clock, on the 
 
 ^' afternoon of the 8th, when the 
 Confederate force, some 3000 strong, 
 appeared before the town. Firing was 
 commenced at once ; and sevei-e but 
 somewhat desultory fighting was main- 
 tained during the remainder of the day. 
 The National troops, although ra\v 
 and inexperienced, fought with great 
 bravery; and, as evening approached, 
 they had comptdled the Confederates 
 to abandon one positieu after another, 
 until the latter weiv glad to retreat 
 under cover of the darkness. The 
 battle had lasted five hours. The Na- 
 tionals sustained a loss of 164 men, of 
 whom 14 were killed. General Brown 
 was severely wo aided, and lost the 
 use of his right '>>rm. Marmaduke lost 
 about 2(J0 nnii, of whom 41 were 
 killed and 80 vere left iu the town as 
 prison eis. 
 
 Marmad'^k^ now marched eastward ; 
 JttUt ^"d, »it dawn on the lOth, his 
 
 1®' advr.nce encountered the Twenty- 
 First Iowa, under Colonel Merrill. 
 After a sharp skirmish, he succeeded 
 m tiiniki;;g the National troops, and 
 pushed uu towards Huntsville. Mer- 
 
 rill, however, was there before him 
 and was reinforced by the Ninet}-- 
 Ninth Illinois, and portions of the 
 Third Iowa and the Third Missouii 
 cavalry, with a supporting battery, 
 under Lieutenant Wald Schmidt. The 
 engagement which followed on the 
 11th was sharp but brief, Marmaduke 
 being compelled to retreat, after sus- 
 taining a loss of 300 men, including a 
 brigadier-geni ral and three colonels. 
 The Nationals lost 71 men, of whom 7 
 were killed. Marmaduke was glad 
 to abandon Missouri. Moving south- 
 ward, he took position, with a portion 
 of his forces, at Batesville, Arkansas, 
 on the White River. At this point 
 he ^vas attacked, on February 4tli, Feb. 
 by the Fourth Missouri cavahy, ^• 
 under Colonel G. E. Waring, and 
 di'iven across the stream, with a con= 
 siderable loss in killed and wounded, 
 one colonel and a number of privates 
 having been made prisoners. After 
 the battle at Huntsville, a portion of 
 Marmaduke's men made their way to 
 Van Buren Cieek; and 300 of tliem 
 ■\veie captui-ed on the Julia Roan, on 
 the 28th of January. His men dis- 
 persed oi' fell into the hands of the 
 enemy. Marmaduke, greatly discour- 
 aged, I'ejtaired to the headquarters of 
 the Confederate army corps at Little 
 Rock. 
 
 During the next two months theie 
 was comj>arative quiet in those regions, 
 although the guerrilla leaders at Little 
 Rock weie busy increasing and dis- 
 ciplining their forces and preparing fo) 
 fiitur*; etTorts. The gueirilla bands, 
 duriuj^ this j)eiiod, were not, however. 
 
OAFE GIRARDEAU. 
 
 SW 
 
 wholly inactive. At this time occuri'ed 
 the Sam Gatty affair — an aifair which, 
 being characterized by great brutality, 
 "jevealed the true spirit of the guer- 
 rillas, and brought much discredit on 
 the Confederate cause. • 
 
 It was the middle of April before 
 the Confederate commanders assembled 
 at Little Rock felt emboldened to re- 
 sume active operations. Fayettevllle, 
 since the early spring, had been occu- 
 pied by some Union cavaliy and in- 
 fantry, under Colonel Harrison. On 
 Upril the 18th of April, shortly after 
 •8. sunrise, Harrison and his little 
 band were attacked by General W. 
 L. Cabell, who had come by forced 
 marches over the Boston Mountains 
 from Ozark. Although Harrison's men 
 were greatly outnumbered, they not 
 only resisted the attack, but, after six 
 hours' fighting, compelled the enemy 
 to fall back, with considerable loss, in 
 the direction from which he came. 
 Harrison had lost 71 men, of whom 4 
 were killed; but Cabell had left be- 
 hind him 55 j)risoners, 50 horses, and 
 100 shot-guns. 
 
 A little later, Marmaduke himself 
 was again in motion. With the full 
 consent and appi'oval of his superior 
 officer, Major-General Sterling Price, 
 he set out at the head of a large force 
 of infantry and cavalry, with the in- 
 tention of moving on Cape Girardeau, 
 which was at that time the depot of sup- 
 plies for a portion of General Grant's 
 army. Cape Girardeau, with its stores, 
 was in charge of General John McNiel. 
 "When Marmaduke reached Frederick- 
 ton, on the 22d, McNiel was at Bloom- 
 
 field, in Stoddard County; but hearing 
 of the presence of Marmaduke in that 
 neighborhood, and divining his object, 
 he hurried to the menaced point, and, 
 arriving at Cape Girardeau on the 23d, 
 calmly awaited the approach of the 
 guerrilla chief. Marmaduke came up 
 on the 25th, two days after the arrival 
 of McNiel. It was not without reason 
 that the Confederates counted on an 
 easy victory; for while Marmaduke 
 had under him a choice corps of 8000 
 men, known as " Price's First Corps 
 of the Trans-Mississippi Department," 
 McNiel could only muster some 1700 
 men, and these, for the most part, be- 
 longed to the militia. But McNiel, 
 who was a brave and indefatigable 
 officer, had made good use of the 
 two days of grace. A powerful force 
 was immediately transported into Illi- 
 nois; four guns, rudely mounted, were 
 placed in advantageous positions; and 
 the entire ranks were considerably 
 strengthened. On the 25th, after Apni 
 a slight skirmish, Marmaduke 25. 
 called upon McNiel to surrender, giv- 
 ing him only thirty minutes to decide 
 and I'eturn his answer. McNiel's an- 
 swer was prompt and decided. He 
 believed he was able to defend the 
 place, and he meant to do so. He 
 would not surrender. At ten o'clock 
 next morning, after a slight artillery 
 display, the call was again made for 
 ' immediate surrender. This time Mc- 
 Niel answered with his guns. After 
 five hours' fighting, during which the 
 National guns were admirably handled, 
 Marmaduke, on seeing some armed ves- 
 sels in the Mississippi coming to the 
 
604 
 
 MINOR ENGAGEMENTS IN 1863. 
 
 aid of the besieged, beat a hasty re- 
 treat across the St. Francis Rivei', and 
 humed into Arkansas, burning the 
 bridges behind him. At this time, 
 McNiel was ranked by General Van- 
 dever ; and the pursuit of Marmaduke 
 was conducted by, perhaps, overfliuch 
 caution. The Confederate loss at Cape 
 Girardeau was some GO killed and 
 about 300 wounded, many of whom 
 were left behind in the letreat. 
 
 This defeat of Manuaduke did not 
 put an end to the Confederate raids in 
 those regions. The guerrilla bands 
 seemed almost ubiquitous. On the 
 jjay 20th of May, the Confederate 
 20. colonel, Coffey, acting as briga- 
 dier-general, at the head of five regi- 
 ments, fell upon Fort Blunt, not far 
 from Fort Gibson. The attack was 
 made with great energy and determi- 
 nation. But Colonel William A. Phil- 
 lips, with his garrison of about 1200 
 men, some of them Indians, who could 
 not be relied upon, made a stubborn 
 and successful resistance. CofFey, after 
 the loss of a considerable number of 
 men, was driven back in disorder, and 
 compelled to seek safety on the other 
 side of the Arkansas River. On the 
 jnly 16th of July, a bold but unsuc- 
 **• cessful attempt was made by a 
 mixed Confederate force, composed of 
 Texans and Creek Indians, to capture 
 a train of wagons, laden with supplies 
 for Fort Blunt. The assailants were 
 repelled with loss; and the train was 
 saved. About the same time, another 
 attack was meditated on Fort Blunt. 
 General Coopei-, with a body of Con- 
 federates, some GOOO strong, was lying 
 
 at Honey Springs, behind Elk Creek, 
 and about twenty-five miles south of 
 Fort Blunt, waiting for the arrival of 
 General Cabell, with three regiment* 
 from Texas. It was Cooper's inten- 
 tion, so soon as Cabell came up, to 
 move on Fort Blunt. Happily, Gen 
 eral Blunt had been made aware of the 
 danger which threatened the post; and, 
 by forced marches, he pushed on from 
 Fort Scott, arriving at the menaced 
 point in time to save it from the 
 threatened peril. In five days he had 
 accomplished a journey of 175 miles. 
 Blunt did not wait for the attack, but 
 moved at once on Cooper's camp, Avith 
 3000 troops, infantry and cavalry, and 
 12 cannon of light calibre. He left 
 Fort Blunt at midnight on the 1 6th ; 
 and at ten o'clock next day he had, 
 with his columns, led respectively by 
 Colonels Phillips and Judson, fallen 
 heavily on Cooper. The battle lasted 
 for two hours; but Cooper, although 
 he had superior numbers, never recov- 
 ered from the suddenness and severity 
 of the attack. The Confederates were 
 completely routed. They fled, in wild 
 disorder, through the woods into the 
 open praii'ie, leaving on the field 150 
 killed, 400 wounded, with a large 
 number of prisoners, one disabled gun 
 and nearly 200 small arms. Blunt 
 lost 77 men, of whom 17 were killed. 
 When Cabell came up with his Texans, 
 3000 strong, the battle was ended. 
 Not deeming it prudent to attack the 
 victorious Nationals, he moved towards 
 the South, and disappeared beyond the 
 Canadian River. The National j re- 
 turned to Fort Blunt. After at vera) 
 
LITTLE ROCK. 
 
 60S 
 
 other skirmislies, of greater or lesser 
 importance, General Blunt descended 
 the Arkansas River, and occupied Fort 
 Smith. 
 
 At that time, the army of the fron- 
 tier, as it was called, was greatly de- 
 pleted, by furnishing reinforcements to 
 General Grant, at Vicksburg; and the 
 Confederate generals, in the Trans- 
 Mississippi Department, seized the op- 
 portunity to make an attack on He- 
 lena. The attack was made on the 
 July 4th of July, with a force of 
 ^' about 15,000 men, and was under 
 the special direction of Price and Mar- 
 maduke. It was made about daybreak, 
 and with great fury. At fii'st, the Con- 
 federates were successful in carrying a 
 small fort which formed part of the 
 outworks ; but the gunboat Tyler com- 
 ing up and opening with its heavy 
 guns, the fort was reclaimed, and the 
 assailants were driven back with a se- 
 vere loss in killed and wounded. Their 
 purpose, however, to carry the place 
 by storm was not all at once aban- 
 doned. The assault was repeated with 
 great bravery, Marmaduke's men fall- 
 ing in heavy masses on the defenses 
 of the town, attacking now the north 
 and now the south, but everywhere 
 meeting with the most stubborn resist- 
 ance, and being terribly cut up by the 
 National fire, at shoi't range, and by 
 the heavy missiles from the gunboat. 
 Foiled at every point, the Confederates 
 were compelled to fall back, having 
 sustained a loss of over 1000 men in 
 killed and wounded, and more than 
 1000 prisoners. Seeing that the Na- 
 tionals were being reinforced, they re- 
 
 S6» 
 
 two, into the 
 
 treated, after a day or 
 interior of Arkansas. 
 
 After the surrender of Vicksburg, tlie 
 pressure on General Grant's army was 
 relieved, and expeditions were sent out 
 in different directions, either to repel 
 or to check the movements of the Con- 
 federates, who were still committing 
 depredations on both sides of the Gi'eat 
 Rivei'. One of these expeditions was 
 under the care of General McPherson, 
 who, with the divisions of Logan and 
 Tuttle, pushed out in the direction 
 of Canton, where the Confederates 
 were known to be assembled in force. 
 McPherson, not having sufficient num- 
 bers at his disposal to warrant a vigoi-- 
 ous or persistent attack, deemed it 
 prudent to withdraw, and fell back to 
 Vicksburg by way of Clinton. An 
 other and more successful expedition 
 was entrusted to the care of General 
 Frederick Steele, who was sent to 
 Helena with instructions to organize a 
 body of troops, and to proceed to the 
 capture of Little Rock, the headquar- 
 ters of the guerrillas. At the begin- 
 ning of August, he had collected and 
 equipped about 6000 men ; he had also 
 secured 22 guns. He was soon joined 
 by General Davidson, who had been 
 operating in Arkansas, under the com- 
 mand of General Hurlbut, and whose 
 force consisted of about the same num 
 ber of ni'^n, with 18 guns. Davidson's 
 men were mostly mounted. The united 
 force, numbering in all some 12,000 
 men and 40 guns, set out from \ng^ 
 Helena on the 10th of August, '<•• 
 Davidson and his horsemen taking 
 the lead. The White River vas 
 
606 
 
 MINOE ENGAGEMENTS IN 1863. 
 
 crossed at Clarendon ; and a reconnois- 
 sance was made as far as Brownsville. 
 The details of this movement are nu- 
 merous; but as there was compara- 
 tively little lighting, it is unnecessary 
 to enumerate them. Mannaduke had 
 been sent out to Brownsville to offer 
 Davidson resistance. Brownsville was 
 abandoned without a battle, Marma- 
 duke falling back to Little Rock, and 
 burning the bridges in his rear. The 
 National forces were again concen- 
 trated at Brownsville, Steele having 
 been reinforced by True's brigade, sent 
 from Memphis. After a series of suc- 
 cessful encounters, and having marched 
 over a most difficult country, forcing 
 their way across rivers and bayous, the 
 Nationals reached the outer defenses 
 Sep. of Little Rock on the 10th of 
 *<>• September. The final struggle 
 was protracted and severe ; but on the 
 evening of that day the place was sur- 
 rendered to General Davidson. Much 
 of the public property had been de- 
 stroyed ; eight steamers were found 
 in flames, and beyond recovery, when 
 the National troops entered the city; 
 but the arsenal was uninjured. About 
 1000 men were made prisoners. The 
 entire National loss did not exceed 100 
 in killed, wounded and prisoners. It 
 was a campaign of which Steele had 
 just cause to be proud. Only forty 
 days had elapsed since he arrived at 
 Helena. With the capture of Little 
 Rock perished one of the most impor- 
 tant centres and nurseries of rebeldom 
 in the western country. The Confed- 
 erates ultimately fell back to Red 
 River; and the National troops, on 
 
 the 28th of October, occupied Arka- 
 delphia. 
 
 On the 20th of August, one of the 
 guerrilla leaders, named Qiian- j^ug. 
 trell, at the head of a body of 20. 
 800 men, entered the city of Lawrence, 
 Kansas, and murdered, in cold blood, 
 175 of its citizens, and destroyed by 
 fire property to the value of over 
 $2,000,000. He was pursued as soon 
 as ti'oops could be raised, and some 40 
 or 50 of his men were killed, oct^ 
 On the 12th of October, a vigoi-- 12. 
 ous encounter took place about eight 
 miles southwest of Arrow Rock, be- 
 tween the Nationals, under General 
 E. B. Brown, and a powerful band of 
 guerrillas and Indians, under Generals 
 Shelby and Coffey. The Confederates 
 were broken and routed after a sharp 
 contest, and pursued as far as the Ar- 
 kansas line. Early in this month, a 
 desperate attempt was made to murder 
 General Blunt and his staff, who were 
 marching towards Fort Scott, Kansas. 
 About 300 Confederates had dressed 
 themselves as Union soldiers, and 
 by this means surprised and captured 
 78 of the 100 men under Blunt, all of 
 whom, including Major Curtis, son of 
 General Curtis, were wounded. Blunt 
 and 15 of his men made a vigorous 
 resistance, and contrived to escape. It 
 was believed by the Confederates that 
 General Blunt was among the killed; 
 and they rejoiced accordingly. On the 
 20th of October, Blunt was relieved of 
 the command of the army of the Fron- 
 tier, General McNiel taking his place. 
 Towards the end of October, Marma 
 duke, at the head of 2000 men, marched 
 
THE INDIANS. 
 
 607 
 
 from Princeton upon Pine Bluff, a post 
 on the soutli side of the Arkansas 
 River, and about fifty miles below 
 Little Rock, then in command of Colo- 
 nel Powell Clayton. That officer was 
 not unprepared for the attack ; and 
 after a vigorous fight, which lasted 
 about five hours, Marmaduke was 
 forced to retire, having lost in the 
 struggle 150 men killed and wounded, 
 and 33 prisoners. Clayton's loss was 
 Oct. ^'', t>f whom 17 were killed. On 
 •8. the 18th of October, Quantrell 
 and the Creek chief, Sandwatie, made 
 an attack on Fort Gibson, in the In- 
 dian country. Fort Gibson was one 
 of Colonel Phillips' outposts. After 
 a contest of four hours, the assailants 
 were dispersed, and driven across the 
 Arkansas River. Peace now reigned 
 for a time between the Red and Mis- 
 souri Rivers. 
 
 In the late winter months and earl\- 
 spring of 1863, further trouble was 
 given by the Sioux Indians, under 
 Little Crow, whose bi-utalities at Yel- 
 low Medicine, at New Ulm, and at 
 Cedar City, in Minnesota, have al- 
 ready been described. The spirit of 
 those warriors Avas greatl}' broken b}' 
 the execution of tliirty of their num- 
 ber at Markato, towards the end 
 
 Note. — After the fall of Vicksbnrg, General Herron, 
 with a force of troops uumberiug TjODO, was ordered to 
 Port Hudson. He had already embarked, when the 
 news arrived announcing Banks' victory. Transfer- 
 ring his troops to lighter-draught vessels, he proceeded, 
 on the 12th of July, iu obedience to orders, up the 
 Yazoo Kiver, as far as Yazoo City, under the convoy of 
 the De Kalb and two tin-clad vessels, under the com- 
 inaud of Captain Walker. A combined attack of the 
 
 of February. It was not, however, 
 until the following summer, when 
 General Pope took command of the 
 department, that the "Sioux War" 
 was brought to a close. Vigorous- 
 ly attacked and pursued fi-om place 
 to place, the savage bands were brok- 
 en and dispersed among the wilds 
 of the eastern slopes of the Rocky 
 Mountains. Little Crow himself, 
 " the foremost huntei- and orator," 
 was finally shot near Hutchinson, in 
 Minnesota, by a Mr. Lamson. The 
 skeleton of the chief is preserved in 
 the collection of the Minnesota His- 
 torical Society. 
 
 x\t the close of the year, practical 
 progress had been made in reducing to 
 subjection the entire western country. 
 Vicksbui'g and Port Hudson liad fallen ; 
 and the Mississippi, throughout its en 
 tire length, was under the conti'ol of 
 the National government. Missouri 
 was placed beyond the danger of inva- 
 sion. The military power of the ene- 
 my was broken in Arkansas and Kansas. 
 A firm foothold had been secured iu 
 Texas. Much work had yet to be 
 done ; but it was now evident that tlie 
 end of the great stiuggle was approach- 
 ing, and that the Union was to be 
 saved. 
 
 army and navy on the enemy's works resulted in the 
 flight of the garrison. Unfortunately, the De Kalb was 
 sunk by a torpedo, opposite the city. Herron won 
 an easy victory, capturing and destroying a Confede- 
 rate vessel, formerly a gunboat, which was sheltered 
 there. Ho returned to Vicksburg on the "Jlst July, 
 bringing back with him 300 prisoners, (i heavy guns, 
 ano small arms, 800 horses and 2000 bales of Confede- 
 rate cotton. 
 
608 
 
 THE MERIDIAN EXPEDITION, 
 
 CHAPTER XXXI. 
 
 The Opening of 186+. — Promise of Success. — Much Work yet to be Done. — The Confederacy Crippled, brA 
 Not Subdued. — Three Important Strongholds. —Meridian.— Shreveport. — Mobile. — Sherman's Purpose. — 
 Delay. — After Chattanooga and Knoxville. — Preparations for the Meridian Expedition. — Instructions to 
 McPherson and Hurlbut. — Sooy Smith. — Pontotoc. — Okolona. — Sherman's Army in Motion. — The Big 
 Black. — The Positions held by the Confederates. — Polk in Command. — Stephen E. Lee. — The Pearl 
 Eiver. — Brandon. — Tallahatta. —Oktibbeha. — Meridian. — Demopolis. — A Burning Train. — An Easy Vic- 
 tory. — Terrible Destruction of Property. — "Jeff. Davis' Neckties." — Quitman. — Lauderdale Springs. — 
 Non- Arrival of Smith. — Cause of His Delay. — Struck by Forrest. — A Panic. — A Stampede. — Smith's Re- 
 treat. — CoUiersviUe. — The Negroes. — Strange Scenes. — Devastation. — Report of an Eye- Witness. — A Great 
 Work Done. — Sherman Returns to Vicksburg. — Dissatisfied with Smith. — Forrest in Favor.^The Yazoo 
 Expedition. — A Rush into Kentucky and Tennessee. — At Jackson. — Union City. — Colonel Hawkin.s.^ 
 Surrender. — Forrest Moves on Paducah. — Fort Anderson. — Bravery of Colonel S. G. Hicks. — The Confede- 
 rate General, A. P. Thompson, Killed. — Fort Pillow. — The Gari-ison. — Booth and Bradford. — Description 
 of the Fort. — A Savage Assault. — A Heroic Resistance. — Booth Killed. — Bradford in Command. — The New 
 Era. — A Flag of Truce. — A Call for Unconditional Surrender. — A Treacherous Game. — Brutal Massacre. — No 
 Quarter. — Horrible Scenes. — Report of the Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War. — Cruel 
 Treatment of Major Bradford. — Infamous Notoriety. — Buford at Columbus. — In Imitation of Forrest. — \ 
 Brutal Threat. — Forrest Retreats. — Sturgis' Order to Pursue. — Escape of Forrest. — Gum Town. — A Se- 
 vere Engagement. — Defeat of the Nationals. — General Smith in Command. — Another Expedition Against 
 Forrest. — A Series of Encounters. — Smith at the Tallahatchie. — Forrest in Memphis. — His Mission so far 
 Accomplished. — Reflections. 
 
 The year 1864 opened with promise 
 of final success to the National 
 cause. The outlook, however, 
 was not -without a shadow of gloom. 
 Richmond still engaged the attention 
 and baffled the efforts of the army 
 of the Potomac; Charleston held 
 out against the genius and energy of 
 Gillmore and Dahlgren ; Mobile and 
 Wilmington continued to invite and 
 reward the daring but unprincipled 
 enterprise of foreign traders ; and pow- 
 erful Confederate armies, zealous and 
 eager for the fight, were yet in the 
 field. But great battles, involving 
 great issues, had been won by the 
 Northern armies during the previous 
 
 year; and nothing had happened to 
 undo the results, or to pi'event the 
 Nationals from reaping the full benefit 
 of the victories at Vicksburg, at Port 
 Hudson, at Gettysburg, and at Chatta- 
 nooga. The waters of the Mississippi 
 now rolled unchecked from Cairo to 
 the Gulf, thus cutting the Confederacy 
 in twain ; Chattanooga being held by 
 the Nationals, the Richmond govern 
 ment was shut out from the valley of 
 the Mississippi, and exposed also to 
 attack in the rear; while the victory 
 at Gettysburg had effectually deli veret? 
 the Northern mind from all fear oi 
 further invasion. 
 
 On neither side, however, had thi 
 
SOUECES OF STRENGTH. 
 
 609 
 
 wai- spirit died out. In the North, 
 there was a more vio^orous determina- 
 tion than ever to force the contest to 
 an early and a final issue. In the 
 South, aUhough signs of distress were 
 apparent, there ^vas no disposition 
 to abandon the struggle. Great ar- 
 mies, as has been stated, were yet in 
 the field. There were, besides, in every 
 Confederate State, oi'ganized bodies of 
 armed men ; and the States in which 
 the National authority had been re- 
 stored were exposed to frequent and 
 dangerous incursions by those militar}' 
 freebooters. 
 
 The loss of VicksLnrg and of Port 
 Hudson had terribly fxippled the Con- 
 federacy in the west and southwest. 
 Existence, however, w.<s still possible. 
 There were several inaportant points 
 from which the means of subsistence 
 could be obtained. Of these, the most 
 impoi'tant were Meridian, Shreveport 
 and Mobile, In the present chapter, 
 we shall confine our attention to Meri- 
 dian. A glance at the map will show 
 the importance of this position. Situ- 
 ated at the intersection of the Moliile 
 and Ohio Railroad, which runs north 
 and south, and the South Mississippi, 
 which runs east and west, it was a 
 place of the highest advantage to the 
 Confederates, and greatly aided them 
 in prolonging the struggle. It was in 
 easy communication with Selnia, the 
 great iron centre of the Confedei-acy, 
 and also with Mobile, the one port, 
 besides that of Wilmington, which was 
 now open to the blockade ininners. 
 After the fall of Vioksburg, it was in- 
 tended to move a strong foicc on Meri- 
 
 dian ; but the weather being intensely 
 hot, a drought prevailing, and the men 
 already greatly exhausted, the move- 
 ment was deferred. It became impos- 
 sible when Sherman was ordered to 
 Chattanooga, to the assistance of Rose- 
 cranz. After Chattanooga, and the re- 
 lief of Burnside, at Knoxville, Sher- 
 man ^vas again in a condition to direct 
 his thoughts to Meridian. Having re- 
 turned to Mississippi, his command 
 was stationed, for a time, along the 
 line of the Memphis and Charleston 
 Railroad. Towards the end of Janu- 
 ary, he received instructions to proceed 
 to Vicksburg, and place himself at the 
 head of an expedition which should 
 move eastward from that city, and per- 
 form such service foi' the National cause 
 as circumstances might allow. 
 
 With as little delay as possible, the 
 necessary arrangements were completed,, 
 Hurlbut, whose headquarters were at 
 Memphis, was ordered to draw in all 
 public property to Cairo and Memphis, 
 to evacuate all places of minor import- 
 ance, and especially o abandon Corinth 
 and Fort PilloW. He was at the same 
 time ordered to provide two divi- 
 sions, of 5000 each, and to have them 
 ready for embai'kation not later than 
 the 25th of January. McPherson, who 
 was in command at Vicksburg, re- 
 ceived somewhat similar instructions. 
 He also was to provide two divisions^ 
 of 5000 each. General W. Sooy Smith, 
 chief of cavalry, in the division of the 
 Mississippi, was at Memphis, witli a 
 mounted force of about 2500. This force 
 was increased to about 10,000 strono; 
 by additions from Hurlbut's corps. 
 
610 
 
 THE MERIDIAN EXPEDITION. 
 
 The objective point was Meridian. 
 Smith was to move direct on that place 
 from Memphis. Hurlbut was to join 
 Sherman and MePherson atVicksburg, 
 whence the united forces should move 
 on Meridian, and there form a junction 
 with the cavalry under Smith. Meri- 
 dian was distant from Memphis 250 
 miles; from Vicksburg, 150. "What 
 Sherman proposed to accomplish by 
 this expedition, he himself tells us. 
 In a letter to General Banks, he says : 
 "I propose to avail myself of the 
 short time allowed me in this depart- 
 ment here to strike a blow at Meri- 
 dian and Deraopolis. T think I can do 
 it ; and the destruction of the railroads, 
 east and west, north and south of Me- 
 ridian, vrill close the door of rapid 
 travel and conveyance of stores from 
 the Mississippi and the Confederacy 
 east, and so make us less liable to the 
 incursions of the enemy toward the 
 Mississippi. I intend to leave Vicks- 
 burg about the 25th instant, and hope 
 to be near Meridian about February 
 8th and 10th." He requested Banks 
 to make a feint on Mobile, so as to 
 prevent the enemy at that place from 
 sending reinforcements to Meridian. 
 It was his conviction that if he were 
 not resisted by supei'ior numbers, he 
 would be able to cut off Mobile from 
 all connection with the interior, except 
 by way of the Alabama River. Suc- 
 cess at Meridian, and a similar success 
 afterwards at Shreveport would, he 
 thought, settle the main question in 
 the southwest 
 
 To give effect to the purposes thus 
 indicated, Sherman ordered Sooy Smith 
 
 to move from Memphis on or before 
 February 1st, taking with him an ef- 
 fective force of 7000 cavalry, lightly 
 equipped. He was to march on Pon- 
 totoc, Okolona and Meridian, making 
 it an object to reach Mei'idian on oi; 
 about the 10th. His instructions were 
 "to disregard all minor objects; to de- 
 stroy railroad bridges and corn not 
 wanted ; to break the enemy's com- 
 munications from Okolona to Meridian, 
 and thence eastward to Selma ; if con- 
 venient, to send to Columbus, Mis- 
 sissippi, and destroy all machinery 
 there, and the bridge across the Tom- 
 bigbee, which enabled the enemy to 
 draw resources to the east side of the 
 valley." With the understanding that 
 Smith was already on his ^vay, Sher- 
 man set out from Vicksburg, on the 
 3d of February, at the head of peb. 
 an army of about 23,000 effective 5* 
 men. A considerable proportion of this 
 force was mounted. The four divi- 
 sions of which the army was composed 
 were arranged in two columns, which 
 were commanded, the one by MePher- 
 son, the other by Hurlbut. Sherman 
 marched in the advance \\nth McPher- 
 son's column. MePherson crossed the 
 Big Black, at the railroad bridge ; Hurl 
 but crossed at Messenger's. The sol 
 diers were provided with twenty days' 
 rations. All unnecessaiy baggage was 
 left behind. No tents were taken ; and, 
 throughout the march, all, from the 
 commanding-general to the private, bi- 
 vouacked by camp-fires in the open air. 
 The weather was all that could be de- 
 sired, the days being beautiful and the 
 ! nights cool, with a slight frost. The 
 
TEREIBLB DESTEUCTION. 
 
 611 
 
 roads, fortunately, were in excellent 
 condition. 
 
 Sherman was not ignorant of the 
 position and strength of the ene- 
 my. By means of a spy, who had 
 brought from Meridian an official re- 
 port, it was learned that Polk was in 
 chief command there. Scattered all 
 over the State, there wei'e companies 
 of infantry and cavalry collecting 
 taxes and forcing conscripts. Loring 
 was at Canton with his infantry divi- 
 sion, some 7000 strong, and 18 guns. 
 French was at Brandon, with 3000 
 men and 10 guns. This force was 
 increased to 5000 men, by reinforce- 
 ments from Mobile. Forrest command- 
 ed the cavalry in the district of North 
 Mississippi ; the South cavalry district 
 was in charge of Stephen E. Lee. 
 Each of these latter commanders had 
 under him a mounted force of 4000 men. 
 Unless Polk was largely reinforced, it 
 was not unreasonable to conclude that 
 the expedition would result in com- 
 plete success. 
 
 For the first two days, Sherman was 
 allowed to march unopposed. On the 
 Feb. 5th, tlie enemy was encountered ; 
 S" and, for eighteen miles, there was 
 continual skirmishing. That night Sher- 
 man's advance reached Jackson, and 
 found that the Confederates had just 
 made a precipitate retreat. It was 
 evident that the appearance of the Na- 
 tionals had been a complete surprise. 
 A pontoon bridge across the Pearl 
 River was left comparatively unin- 
 jured The bridge having been quick- 
 ly repaired, Shennan pushed forward, 
 passing rapidly through Biaudou, and 
 
 reaching Morton on the 9th. At this 
 place, McPherson, who led the ad- 
 vance, was halted to break up and 
 destroy the railroads. Hurlbut now 
 took the lead, and kept it until he 
 reached Meridian. At Tallahatta, 
 some twenty miles from Meridian, ob- 
 structions were encountered in the 
 shape of felled timber. Suspecting 
 that the Confederates were trying to 
 gain time, in order to cover the move- 
 ment of railroad property from Meri- 
 dian, Sherman dropped his trains, leav- 
 ing them in charge of strong escorts, - 
 and hastened to the Oktibbeha. The 
 bridge was found in flames and beyond 
 recovery. With material obtained fi'om 
 an old cotton-gin close at hand, a new 
 bridge was speedily constructed; and 
 on the l-lth, at 3.30 o'clock in the peb. 
 afternoon, Meridian was entered ^^> 
 and occupied, the Confederates having 
 already retired. Polk had gone to De- 
 mopolis that morning at 10.30. One 
 entire train was found burning at the 
 depot. With this exception, all the 
 rolling-stock had been removed to 
 Mobile or Selma. It was only eleven 
 days since the expedition had left 
 Vicksburg. Meridian, as we have seen 
 already, was in the very heart of the 
 enemy's country, yet the Nationals, iii 
 their eleven days' march, encountered 
 almost no opposition. This expedition 
 did much to reveal the inherent weak- 
 ness of the Confederacy. It was a, 
 preliminary to the march to the sea'', 
 and there can be no doubt that his ex- 
 perience on this occasion encouraged 
 Sherman to undertake that later and 
 more daring enterprise. 
 
€1-2 
 
 THE MERIDIAN EXPEDITION. 
 
 As General Smith had not arrived, 
 it was not deemed prudent to pursue 
 the Confederates. Sherman's object 
 was to destroy this stronghold of the 
 Confederacy. The work of destruction 
 Was commenced at once. Ten thousand 
 men, anned with axes, sledges, crow- 
 bars and clawbars, went to work with 
 a will; and, at the end of five days. 
 Meridian, with its depots, warehouses, 
 arsenal, oiRces, hospitals, hotels, and 
 cantonments, was utterly destroyed. 
 Fire completed the terrible work of de- 
 struction. The inhabited houses alone 
 were spared. Hurlbut had charge to 
 the north and east of the town. Mc- 
 Pherson was entrusted with the south 
 and west. They did their work thor- 
 oughly. Hurlbut reported the destruc- 
 tion of 60 miles of ties and iron 
 burned and bent, one locomotive de- 
 stroyed, and 8 bridges burned. Mc- 
 Pherson reported 55 miles of railroad 
 destroyed, 53 bridges, 6075 feet of 
 trestle-work below Quitman, 19 loco- 
 motives, 28 cars and 3 steam saw-mills 
 burned or ruined. To make the work 
 of restoration more difficult, the rails, 
 in large quantities, when torn up, were 
 placed on the blazing piles of timber, 
 brought to a red-heat, and then twist- 
 ed round a tree or other object into 
 what the men playfully called " Jeif. 
 Davis' neck-ties." A twisted rail was 
 henceforth useless. In addition to the 
 destruction wrought in the town itself, 
 the railroads were ruined as far south 
 as below Quitman ; east as far as Cuba 
 Station ; north to Lauderdale Springs, 
 and west the whole way to Jackson; 
 and among the places which shared 
 
 the fate of Meridian were Jackson, 
 Enterprise, Marion, Quitman, Hills- 
 boro. Canton, Lake Station, Decatur, 
 Bolton and Lauderdale Springs. It 
 was rough work, which will not soor 
 be wholly forgiven or forgotten ; but 
 it was rendered necessary by the exi. 
 gencies of the situation ; and, rough as 
 it was, it was not a violation of the 
 principles of civilized warfare. 
 
 Sherman remained at Meridian for 
 several days, impatiently waiting for 
 Smith and his cavalry. But he waited 
 in vain. Smith, it will be remem- 
 bered, who was at the head of 7000 
 mounted troops, a brisrade of infantry, 
 and a respectable artillery force, was 
 ordered to leave Memphis on the 1st 
 of February, and so , to regulate his 
 movements as to be able to effect a 
 junction with Sherman on or about the 
 10th. Sherman did not an'ive until 
 the 14th. Smith, according to the ar- 
 rangements made, ought to have been 
 forward. Day after day passes by; 
 cavalry are sent out in all directions; 
 but tiilings of Smith or of his troops 
 are nowhere to be found. What has 
 become of this force ? Let us see. 
 Smith, it appears, had from some cause 
 delayed his departure from Memphis, 
 His second in command was Brigadier- 
 General Grierson, wlio had won so 
 much distinction by his famous raid 
 fiom La Grange to Baton Rouge in 
 the spring of the previous year. The 
 troops were gathered in from Middle 
 Tennessee and Northern Mississippi, 
 and concentrated at Colliersville, some 
 twenty -four miles east of Memphis. It 
 was not until the 11th of the month 
 
SMITH'S RETREAT. 
 
 619 
 
 that tlioy commenced their march from 
 Colliersville, a clay later than that fixed 
 for their arrival at Meridian. Pushing 
 on as rapidly as possible, they crossed 
 the Tallahatchie, at New Albany, at 
 noon, and encamped four miles south 
 of that place. Continuing their march, 
 they pressed on in the direction of 
 Okolona, passing through Pontotoc at 
 one o'clock in the afternoon of the 
 17th, and reaching Okolona on the 
 18th. On the 20th, they encountered 
 the enemy for the first time, in the 
 neighborhood of West Point. They 
 were now joined by large bodies of ne- 
 groes, who, for the first time, saw the 
 National troops. There was some hard 
 fightinsr on the 20th. It was resumed 
 on the 21st; and, on the 22d, Forrest 
 fell with tremendous force on the Na- 
 tional real' and flank at Okolona. A 
 scene of the wildest confusion fol- 
 lowed, the Second Iowa becoming panic- 
 stricken, and stampeding the whole of 
 Colonel McCrellis' brigade. Order was 
 speedily restored ; the Seventh Indiana 
 and the Second brigade i-al lying, hold- 
 ing the enemy in check, and doing 
 splendid work. As twilight approached, 
 a magnificent charge was made by the 
 Seventh Indiana, under the eye of 
 General Smith himself, driving the 
 enemy l)ack with tenible slaughter It 
 was now dark; and Smith, ignorant of 
 the strength of the enemy, and believing 
 that he was greatly outnumbered, or- 
 dere'l a retreat. The dead and wounded 
 were left on the field. The mules, pris- 
 oners and negroes were placed in the 
 advance. At ten o'clock, a halt was 
 tiade until four in the morning, when 
 
 the march was resumed. The Confed= 
 erates continued to follow. The National 
 rear was incessantly engaged, but was 
 successful in holding the enemy in check. 
 On the afternoon of the 23d, the Talla- 
 hatchie, at New Albany, was lecrossed, 
 and the bridge destroyed. Colliers 
 ville was reached on the 27th, and the 
 wearied and dispirited troops, the regi- 
 ments torn and tattered, were aijain in 
 camp. It was an unfortunate affair, 
 and resulted in the loss of at least 200 
 men. A little more bravery on the 
 part of the National troops, and the re- 
 sult must have been altogether differ- 
 ent ; for the entire force under Forrest 
 did not exceed 3000 men. As it was, 
 Smith had the satisfaction of knowing 
 that he had burned about 3000 bales 
 of cotton and over 1,000,000 bushels 
 of corn, and that he had captured over 
 100 prisoners, about 1000 mules, and 
 a large number of negroes, up to that 
 date held in bondage. 
 
 Sherman, meanwhile, had left Meri- 
 dian on the 20th, making his peb. 
 return march thi-ough Canton, 2ft. 
 north of the line of the advance. At 
 Canton, 15 locomotives were captured, 
 but the train was spared. All along 
 his line of march, crowds of fugitive 
 slaves flocked to the army for protec- 
 tion. An eye-witness has given us a 
 vivid picture of this strange scene 
 " From 4000 to 7000 slaves accompa- 
 nied the return of the expedition. I 
 defy any human being to look on the 
 scene unmoved. Old men, with the 
 frosts of seventy years upon their 
 heads ; men in the prime of manhood ; 
 youths, and children that could barely 
 
614 
 
 THE MEKIDIAN EXPEDITION. 
 
 run ; women with their babes at their 
 breasts. They came, some of them it is 
 true, with shouts and careless laughter, 
 but silent tears coursed down many a 
 2heek — tears of thankfulness for their 
 gi eat deliverance. There were faces in 
 that crowd which shone with a joy al- 
 most inspired. Smile who will, but 
 the story of the coming of the Children 
 of Israel out of the land of Egypt can 
 never recall to my mind a more pro- 
 found emotion than the remembrance 
 of that scene. When I looked upon 
 the long line of National soldiers filing 
 through roads in which our slaughtered 
 brotheis lie thicker than sheaves in a 
 harvest field, and reflected on the hor- 
 rors to which this race has been sub- 
 jected by the foes whom we are fight- 
 ing, I felt faith in a God of justice 
 renewed in my heart." From Canton, 
 the fugitive negroes were sent forward 
 in an advance train to Vicksburg. 
 Sherman had again won for himself 
 fresh laurels. He had clone a great 
 work. If he had not accomplished 
 the great object of the expedition, and, 
 by moving upon and destroying Selma, 
 by wheeling around and taking posses- 
 sion of Mobile, and thus rendering un- 
 necessary the future march to the sea, 
 he had, at least, severely punished and 
 greatly crippled the Confederacy. He 
 had destroyed 150 miles of railroad, 
 10,000 bales of cotton, 2,000,000 bush- 
 els of corn, 20 locomotives, 28 cars, 67 
 bridges and 7000 feet of trestle-work. 
 He had captured 200 prisoners, several 
 thousand horses and mules and 300 
 wagons. He had done what was still 
 more noble — he had liberated not 
 
 fewer than 8000 negroes. His owe 
 loss scarcely exceeded 1 70 men. 
 
 Sherman left the expedition in carb 
 of General Hurlbut on the 27th, p^b^ 
 and proceeded to Vicksburg, 27. 
 whence he started, on the 28th, on a 
 hurried visit to New Orleans, to confer 
 with Banks and Porter regarding the 
 projected campaign against Shreveport 
 It was not until his return from New 
 Orleans to Vicksburg that he learned 
 the result of Smith's attempt to co-ope> 
 rate with him at Meridian. He was ill- 
 satisfied with Smith's own account of the 
 affair. "His reports to me," he says, 
 " are unsatisfactory. He delayed his 
 start until the 11th, when his orders 
 were to be at Meridian on the 10th, 
 and when he knew that I was march- 
 ing from Vicksburg. The mode of hia 
 return to Memphis was not what I had 
 expected ; he had nothing to deal vrith 
 but Forrest and the militia. I hope 
 he will make these points more clear 
 to the general-in-chief." 
 
 When Sherman set out for Meridian, 
 two important diversions were made iu 
 his favor — one by Farragut against- 
 Mobile Harbor, another by a portion 
 of Porter's fleet and a body of armed 
 men, up the Yazoo. The Mobile diver- 
 sion was completely successful; for, 
 although no fighting was done, the ap- 
 pearance of the National fleet led the 
 Confederates to expect an attack, and 
 prevented them from sending reinforce- 
 ments to Polk. The expedition up the 
 Yazoo was attended with considerable 
 success. The boats, four in number — 
 Petrel, Marmora, Echange and Romeo 
 — were commanded by Lieutenant E 
 
YAZOO CITY. 
 
 ei3 
 
 K. Owen. The land troops, which con- 
 sisted of the Eleventh Illinois infantry, 
 Eighth Louisiana infantry and First 
 Mississippi cavalry — the two latter col- 
 ored — were commanded by Colonel 
 James H. Coates. This expedition 
 puslied its way as far as Fort Pember- 
 ton. After spending some days in 
 loading cotton, Coates re-embarked his 
 men ; and the vessels returned to Yazoo 
 City, with IGOO bales of cotton. Hav- 
 ing established his headquartei's here, 
 a Confederate force soon appeared 
 iu considerable strenfjth, under Ross 
 and Richardson. On the morning of 
 Jiar, t^6 5th of March, a severe en- 
 s' counter took place; and Coates' 
 headquarters were literally I'iddled 
 with shot and shell. The fiirht lasted 
 the greater pai't of the day. It raged 
 most fiercely at an earth-work, in 
 the form of a I'edoubt, about half a 
 mile from the town. Into this work 
 Coates had thrown Major McKee, with 
 three companies of his own regiment, 
 the Eleventh Illinois. "While Ross was 
 engaged with the troops in the town, 
 Richardson fell with great fuiy on Mc- 
 Kee, flinging into the redoubt shot and 
 shell with terrible precision. Richard- 
 Boa made a call for surrender, under 
 the pi'etense that all the Nationals had 
 been taken prisoners. McKee returned 
 an indignant refusal, tellinji; him "if he 
 wanted them, to come and take them." 
 Another call for surrender was made — 
 this time, in the name of God and hu- 
 manity, and coupled Avith the threat 
 th;it, iu case of refusal, the place would 
 be stormed and reduced in ten minutes. 
 The answer was the same. Riehai'dson 
 
 might come and take it McKee ex- 
 pressed his regret that he should have 
 coupled his demand with a threat, and 
 assured him that if the fight was to go 
 on with that understanding, he should 
 kill eveiy man he captured. x\t this 
 juncture, the Confederates iu the town 
 were yielding to the steady pressure of 
 the Nationals. At five o'clock in the 
 afternoon, the route became general, 
 Coates and McKee remaining masters 
 of their respective positions. It was a 
 spirited contest, and reflected the high- 
 est credit on Colonel Coates and hi^ 
 entire command. His fighting force, 
 including the negroes, scarcely exceed- 
 ed 1000 men, w^hile that of the ene- 
 my was scarcely under 2300. The 
 negroes, it was observed, fought with 
 great bravery. In this engagement^ 
 the Nationals lost 18 killed, 85 wound 
 ed and 19 missing — the larger })ropor 
 tion of the killed and M'ounded being 
 colored. 
 
 With the results of the expedition 
 up the Yazoo, Sherman was but little 
 satisfied. It was his opinion, at tlu: 
 time, that Coates would have done bet- 
 ter if he had retained the boats and 
 pushed up the river. Coates, however, 
 was best qualified how to judge. He 
 liad, by means of a I'econnoissauce, 
 made by Colonel Osband and the First 
 Missoui-i cavalry, ascertained that For 
 rest was in force in Grenada. As it was, 
 the expedition drove the guerrillas fi'oiii 
 the banks of the Mississij)pi, and, nu 
 doubt, occupied troops which otlierwisti 
 might have given Sherman annoyance. 
 
 The unsuccessful effort of General 
 Smith to reach Meridian, :ind unite KU 
 
616 
 
 THE MERIDIAN EXPEDITION. 
 
 forces with those of Shorman, redound- 
 ed somewhat to the glory of General 
 Forrest, He was not unwilling to 
 take some praise to himself; and the 
 Confederate authorities, fully aware 
 that but for him the disasters which 
 had befallen them, through the Meri- 
 dian Expedition, might have been much 
 more serious, were pleased to enlarge 
 his sphere of duty and to increase his 
 authority. Although still subordinate 
 to Stephen D. Lee, commander-in-chief 
 of the mounted men in that region, he 
 was granted a sort of roving commis- 
 sion. It was evident that a great 
 struggle was impending, and must soon 
 take, place between the opposing forces 
 in Northern Georgia. Forrest was 
 charged with the special duty of keep- 
 ing well employed the National forces 
 then on the line of the Mississippi, 
 from Vicksburg to Cairo, and so pre- 
 vent them from reinfoi'cing the army 
 opposed to Johnston. The arrange- 
 ments which were being made for the 
 Shreveport or Red River Expedition 
 had the immediate effect of withdraw- 
 ing large numbers of troops from 
 Vicksburg, and thus of weakening the 
 National line in the direction just men- 
 tioned. Forrest at once took full ad- 
 vantage of his opportunity. At the 
 head of a band of about 5000 men, all 
 imbued with his own fierce and trucu- 
 lent spirit, he made a rush up from 
 Northern Mississippi into West Ten- 
 nessee. He rested for a time at Jack- 
 son, and then pushed on towards Ken- 
 tucky. At that time, Union City, a 
 fortified place in the northwestern 
 part of Tennessee, was garrisoned by 
 
 450 of the Eleventh Tennessee caval- 
 ry, under Colonel Hawkins. Against 
 Union City, Forrest sent a detachment, 
 under Colonel Faulkner. That officer 
 appeared before the place on the 
 24th of March, and demanded jjai., 
 its surrender. Hawkins refused, 24t 
 and was attacked. He succeeded, how 
 ever, in driving the enemy back. A 
 second attack was made ; and Hawkins, 
 against the wishes of his men, surren- 
 dered the gan-isou, with about 200 
 horses and 500 small arms. A little 
 more stubborn determination on the 
 part of the National commander, and 
 Union City and the garrison might 
 have been saved ; for, at the moment 
 of surrender. General Brayman, who 
 had hurried from Cairo to Hawkins' 
 relief, was only six miles distant. 
 Hickman, on the Mississippi, after the 
 fall of Union City, fell an easy prey 
 to the Confederates. FoiTest, embold- 
 ened by success, accompanied by Bu- 
 ford and General A. P. Thompson, 
 moved directly from Jackson on Pa- 
 ducah. This latter place was then oc- 
 cupied by a force not exceeding 700 
 men, under Colonel S. G. Hicks. Made 
 aware of the approach of Forrest, 
 Hicks threw his troops into Fort An- 
 derson, in the lower suburbs of the 
 town. Having made a furious but un- 
 successful assault on the fort, Forrest 
 made a demand for its surrender, 
 threatening, in the event of refusal, to 
 cariy^ the works by storm and massacre 
 the garrison. The threat was unheed- 
 ed; and the garrison, obtaining some 
 effective assistance from the gunboats 
 Peosta and Paw-Paw, the Confederat« 
 
FORT PILLOW. 
 
 617 
 
 general was compelled to content him- 
 self with what plunder he could find. 
 Hearing of the approach of rein- 
 forcements from Cairo, he decamped 
 on the 27th, having lost, it was es- 
 timated, over 300 men killed and 
 \vomided. Among the killed was Gen- 
 eral Thompson, who was torn in pieces 
 by a shell. The National loss was 14 
 killed and 46 wounded. 
 
 Forrest's attention was next turned 
 to Fort Pillow. Hurlbut, it will be 
 remembered, was Instructed by Sher- 
 man to evacuate that post, before he 
 joined him at Vicksburg to take part 
 in the expedition to Meridian. These 
 instructions, for some reason or other, 
 were not fully carried out. The place 
 was still garrisoned by about 550 men, 
 excluding officers. Of the soldiers, 200 
 were colored, and under the immediate 
 command of Major L. F. Booth. The 
 lemainder were under the command of 
 Major AV. F. Bradford. Booth had 
 April chief command. On the morning 
 •3. of the 13th of April, Forrest ap- 
 proached the fort, drove in the pickets, 
 and commenced the assault. 
 
 The situation of the fort was pecu- 
 liar. It stood on a high bluff, which 
 descended precipitately towards the 
 river, that side being covered with 
 trees, bushes and fallen timber. Above 
 and below the fort, and extending 
 back from the river, was a ravine or 
 hollow. The ravine above the fort, 
 known as Cold Creek, was covered 
 with trees and bushes. The ravine 
 below was covered, for the most part, 
 with government buildings. The ar- 
 mament of the place consisted of 2 six- 
 
 pounder and 2 twelve-pounder howitz- 
 ers, and 2 ten-pounder Parrotts. The 
 assault was savagely made. The garri- 
 son, however, fought with great brav- 
 eiy, fiercely resisting the attempts made 
 by the Confederates to force their way 
 into the outworks. Both officers and 
 men fearlessly exposed themselves. 
 The gunboat New Ei-a, Captain Mar- 
 shall, was at hand, and attempted to 
 render the garrison some assistance; 
 but the nature of the ground enabled 
 the Confederates to elude the fire of 
 its guns. About nine o'clock, Major 
 Booth was killed. Bradford immedi- 
 ately took command ; and, having called 
 the whole force within the fort, he 
 made a gallant resistance, until it was 
 past the hour of noon. About this 
 time, to allow the guns to cool, the 
 fire of both parties slackened. The New 
 Era withdrew for a similar purpose, 
 having fired 282 rounds of shell, shrap- 
 nel and canister, which nearly ex- 
 hausted her ammunition. At this stage, 
 Forrest sent a flag of truce, with a 
 demand for unconditional suri'ender 
 Bradford asked time to consult with 
 his brother-officers and with the cap- 
 tain of the New Era. Another flac; ol 
 truce, and another demand more per- 
 emptory than before. Bradford must 
 surrender within twenty minutes or the 
 assault Avill be renewed. Bradford 
 declined, and prepared to renew the 
 struggle. It was not long until it be- 
 came apparent that Forrest had been 
 jjlaying a most treacherous and cow- 
 ardly game. During the progress oi 
 the negotiations, he had been pushing 
 his men stealthily forward into the rn- 
 
61s 
 
 THE MERIDIA]^ EXPEDITION. 
 
 vines, and, under cover of the trees 
 and bushes, securing advantageous po- 
 sitions, from which, at the word of 
 command, they couhl eflFectually spring 
 npon the fort. This shameful viola- 
 tion of one of the most sacred princi- 
 ples of civilized warfare was noticed 
 by Captain Marshall, but he refrained 
 from firing on the foe lest, in the 
 event of defeat, it should be made a 
 pretext for a ci'uel and barbarous re- 
 venge. 
 
 Pretext for brutality, it was soon 
 discovered, was not necessary. A bi'U- 
 tal massacre had already been resolved 
 upon. As soon as Bradford's answer 
 was received, the signal was given; 
 Forrest's men rushed from the posi- 
 tions which they had so treacherously 
 abtained ; and, with fierce yells, and 
 such cries as "No quarter," "Kill the 
 damned niggers," "Shoot them down," 
 they went bounding over the parapet 
 and into the fort. But little opportu- 
 nity was allowed for resistance. Panic- 
 stricken, the troops, black and white, 
 threw down their arms, madly rush- 
 ing to places of shelter, and vainly 
 and piteously calling foi- mercy. The 
 jicenes which followed were harrowing 
 beyond all description. An indiscrim- 
 inate slaughter was at once commenced. 
 N^o work of the tomahawk or scalping- 
 fcnife ever sui-passed in pure savagery 
 what then took place. No respect was 
 paid to age or sex, to white or black, 
 to soldier or civilian. It was a ruth- 
 less butchery. Some, in pure despair, 
 rushed down the steep bluif, seeking 
 shelter in vain under cover of the trees. 
 Some flunsr thenr^elves into tlie watei-. 
 
 only to become targets for the Confecj 
 ei'ate rifles. The massacre was as de- 
 liberate as it was brutal. The hospi- 
 tals were entered, and the sick and 
 wounded were either butchered where 
 they lay, or dragged out to be shot. 
 Men, in some instances, were gathered 
 together in groups, and shot down 
 where they stood. The instances of 
 special and wanton cruelty were nu- 
 merous. One poor soldier, who was 
 wounded and unable to stand, was com- 
 pelled to get to his feet, that his tor- 
 mentors might have a fair shot at him. 
 A negro boy was seen holding a horse 
 Avhich a Confedei'ate was mounting. 
 As soon as the savage was in the sad- 
 dle, the boy was shot dead for his 
 pains. The murderous work went on 
 until the darkness. It was resumed, 
 however, with the return of day. 
 
 A Committee of Congress subse- 
 quently took evidence on the affair. 
 The facts brought to light were horri- 
 ble beyond description. Men, it was 
 proved, were not only shot in cold 
 blood, and drowned, but were even 
 crucified, buried alive, nailed to the 
 floors of houses which were then set 
 on fire. " No cruelty," says the report 
 of this committee, " which the most 
 fiendish malignity could devise, was 
 omitted by these murderers. Fronr 
 300 to 400 men are known to have 
 been killed at Fort Pillow, of whom 
 at least 300 ^vei-e murdered in cold 
 blood, after the post was in possession, 
 of the rebels, and our men had thrown 
 down their arms and ceased to offer 
 resistance." ^he case of Major Brad- 
 ford deserves special mention. Ht 
 
aUM TOWN. 
 
 619 
 
 Avas being conveyed under guard to 
 Jackson, Tennessee, when he was sud- 
 denly led aside about fifty yards from 
 the line of march, and deliberately 
 murdered. After having pled in vain 
 for his life, on the ground that he had 
 made a fair and honorable fight, he 
 fell, pierced by three musket balls. 
 Bradford was a Southern man by birth. 
 He had chosen to remain loyal to the 
 Federal government. This was his one 
 offense; but it was unpardonable in 
 the eyes of Forrest and his myrmidons. 
 The moral effect of the Fort Pillow 
 massacre was highly detrimental to the 
 Southern cause. It revealed a spirit 
 which was offensive to the entire 
 Christian world ; and from that day 
 the number of Confederate sympa- 
 thizers was sensibly diminished. For- 
 rest won for himself an infamous noto- 
 riety ; and the odor of his iniquity 
 attached more or less to every member 
 of the Confederate government. 
 
 On the day after the capture of Fort 
 Pillow, Buford appeared before Co- 
 lumbus, and, imitating the example just 
 set him by Forrest, demanded an un- 
 conditional surrender. " Should you 
 surrender," he said, " the negroes now 
 in arms will be returned to their mas- 
 ters. Should I be compelled to take 
 the place by force, no quarter iviU he 
 shown negro troops whatever ^ The de- 
 mand Avas refused ; and Buford, not 
 deeming it advisable to attack, retired 
 and joined Forrest, when both made a 
 rapid retreat out of Tennessee. Gen- 
 eral Sturgis, at the head of 12,000 
 men, then at Memphis, was ordered to 
 follow in pursuit. Forrest, however. 
 
 had a good start; and by the time 
 Sturgis reached Bolivar, the Confede. 
 rate raiders had crossed Wolf River, 
 and cari'ied their plunder safely into 
 Nort.hern Tennessee. A few weeks 
 later it became known that Forrest 
 was gathering together a powerful 
 force, much larger than he had ever 
 yet commanded; and the supposition 
 was that he meditated another raid 
 into Tennessee and Kentucky. Stur- 
 gis, who had now been reinforced by 
 General A. J. Smith, who had just re- 
 turned from the Red River region, 
 was again sent after the bold and 
 dashing Confederate. The National 
 commander had under him a force of 
 9000 infantry and artillery, with some 
 3000 cavalry, under General Grierson. 
 At Gum Town, on the Mobile and 
 Ohio Railroad, Grierson, who led the 
 advance, came into contact with some 
 of FoiTest's horsemen. The Confede- 
 rates were well posted on a command- 
 ing ridge. The battle soon became 
 furious ; and Grierson notified Sturgis, 
 who, with the infantry and artillery, 
 was some six miles in the rear. 
 Sturgis hunied forward at the double- 
 quick. The day was intensely hot ; 
 and the inconveniences of the march 
 were increased by a train of about 200 
 wagons. When Sturgis came up, he 
 found that Grierson was being sorely 
 pressed ; and, without resting his men, 
 or taking time to consider the propnety 
 of a flank movement on the enemy, he 
 hurried his men into the very thick of 
 the fight. It was a rash act; and it 
 resulted most disastrously. The Con- 
 federates, flushed with success in their 
 
630 
 
 THE MERIDIAN EXPEDITION. 
 
 encounter with Grierson and his cavalry, 
 fell with tremendous fury on Sturgis' 
 infantry ; and, in a brief space, the 
 entire National force, utterly defeated, 
 and hopelessly out off from the wagon 
 train, was driven back in confusion. 
 But for the gallant resistance made by 
 the Second brigade, imder Colonel 
 Winslow, the retreat would have been 
 most disastrous. As it was, when 
 Sturgis reached Memphis, he found 
 that he had left behind 3500 men, with 
 everything in the shape of stores. 
 
 This happened in June. Early in 
 July, another expedition was sent 
 against Forrest. It was placed in 
 charge of General A. J. Smith. For- 
 rest, it was known, was in the neigh- 
 borhood of Tupelo, where he had 
 established his headquarters. It was 
 estimated that he had under him a force 
 of about 14,000 men. General Smith, 
 proceeding from Salisbury, about fifty 
 miles east of Memphis, marched in the 
 direction of Tupelo, with an estimated 
 force of 1 2,000. At Pontotoc, on the 
 July 12th of July, Smith felt the 
 
 12. presence of the enemy. A vig- 
 orous encounter having ensued, the 
 Confederates were repulsed. At Tu- 
 pelo, on the 13th, the enemy was en- 
 countered in still greater force, and 
 again repulsed, after a sharp battle. 
 On the same day, the attack Vvas re- 
 peated, the Confederates, this time, 
 being severely punished, and driven 
 from the field with heavy loss. Smith 
 now retraced his stej)s towards Mem- 
 phis, and, for the space of three weeks, 
 Aug. I'ested his men. On the 4th of 
 
 ^' August h(, again set out, at the 
 
 head of 10,000 men, and, entering Mis- 
 sissippi, he advanced as far as the Tal- 
 lahatchie. He could find no trace of 
 Forrest or of his men. The Confede- 
 rate chief, however, was not idle. In 
 the absence of Smith from Memphis, 
 he made a dash upon that city, enter- 
 ing it on the morning of the f^^g^ 
 21st, and making directly for the 2li 
 Gayoso House, where he expected to 
 find Generals Hurlbut, Washburne and 
 Buckland. He failed of his intended 
 purpose; but he made some prison- 
 ers, and earned off considerable booty. 
 It was thus that Forrest, during the 
 
 spnng 
 
 and summer of 1864, gave 
 
 occupation to the National troops 
 in those regions, and prevented rein- 
 forcements from being sent to operate 
 against Johnston's army in Northern 
 Georgia. 
 
 In this chapter, it has been our duty 
 to present war in one of its least attrac- 
 tive aspects. Of the pomp, the splendor, 
 the magnificence of the battle field we 
 have had nothing to record. We have 
 seen the war fiend rioting in destruc- 
 tiveness and savagery. We have had no 
 occasion to admire the generous impulse., 
 or to applaud the noble motive. The 
 fearful destruction of property accom- 
 plished by Sherman was well fitted to 
 aggravate the South, and to arouse the 
 spirit of revenge ; but his conduct was 
 justified by all the higher necessities of 
 war. The brutality of Forrest at Fort 
 Pillow was not only without excuse — • 
 it was in open violation of every princi- 
 ple of honor, of every high and g;ener- 
 ous motive; and the infamy of tht doed 
 must ever attach to his name. 
 
PEEPAEATIONS. 
 
 CHAPTER XXXII. 
 
 freparations for the Campaign. — Sherman and Banks. —Reasons for the Campaign.— Mistaken Opiniona.— 
 Banks and Porter.— A. J. Smith.— The Plan of Operations.— The Confederate Forces. —Banks and Frank- 
 lin.— Smith Reconnoitering.— Fort do Rusay.— A Brisk Cannonade. -The Gunboats. —Destruction of Fort 
 de Russy.- The Way to Alexandria Opened.— At Alexandria.— Porter's Letter.— Arrival of Banks.— Off for 
 Shreveport. — The Fleet at the Kapids. — Low Water. — Discouraging Circumstances. — The Fleet Above the 
 
 Rapids. — Banks at Natchitoches. — Porter at Grand Ecore. — Obstructions in the River. — The New Falls City. 
 
 The Fleet at Springfield Landing. —Unpleasant News.— Battle at Natchitoches. —General A. L. Lee in Pursuit 
 
 of the Enemy. — Crump's Hill. — Arrival of Franklin at Natchitoches. — The Enemy at Bay. — Wilson's Farm. 
 
 Patrick's Bayou. — Sabine Cross Roads.- The Confederates in Force.— Kirby Smith. —Banks at the Front and 
 Taking Personal Control. —Order of Battle.— The Battle Begim.- The Confederate Attack.— The Nationals 
 
 Driven Back. — Arrival of Franklin and Cameron. — A New Line Formed. — A Disastrous Onslaught.— A Panic. 
 
 A Rout. — "Bull Run Nothing in Comparison. " — Pleasant Grove. — Emory's Division Checks the Retreat. — An- 
 other Fierce Encounter. — The Nationals Victorious. ^The Retreat Resumed. — Pleasant Hill — Emory Again 
 Attacked. — A Fierce Onslaught. — Arrival of A. J. Smith. — The Confederates Resisted and Routed. — A Coun- 
 cil of War. — The Retreat Continued. — Banks as a General. — His Management Defective. — The Fleet on its 
 Backward Course. — The Osage Aground. — Gallantry of Kilby Smith. —General Green Killed.— The Eastport 
 Aground. — Attempts to Save Her. — Blovra Up. — The Battery at the Month of the Cane River. — The Cricket 
 Under the Fire of the Battery. — A Narrow Escape. — The Army at Cane River.— Battle of Cane River.— .\ 
 National Victory. — Battle at Clouterville. — The Army at Alexandria. — The Fleet at the Rapids. — The Red 
 River Dammed. — A Great Engineering Feat. — Exciting Scenes. — The Rapids Passed. — Honors to Colonel 
 Bailey. — The Army Reinforced. ^The Signal, Covington and City Belle Captured. — Alexandria in Flames. — 
 Departure of the Army and Fleet. — A Terror-Stricken People. — The Army and Navy at Simmsport. — Gen- 
 eral Canby in Command of the Army. — Porter Resumes his Station on the Mississippi. — The Army at New 
 Orleans. — Smith Proceeds to Memphis. — Steele's Movements in Arkansas. — Steele at Camden. — His Retreat. — 
 Battle at Jenkins Ferry. — The Nationals Victorious. — Steele's Army Safe in Little Rock. — End of an Ex- 
 pedition which was Disastrous in All its Parts. 
 
 General Banks, a.s has already been 
 
 . „ . mentioned, was making active pre- 
 1864. ,. ,' , ^ f 
 
 parations lora grand movement up 
 
 the Red River, at the time Sherman was 
 engaged on liis Meridian campaign. As 
 soon as Sherman returned from that 
 expedition, he proceeded to New Or- 
 leans, and had an interview with Banks. 
 A plan of campaign up the Red River 
 was agreed upon ; and all necessary ar- 
 rangements were comj^leted with the 
 utmost despatch. 
 
 There were many reasons why it was 
 deemed desirable by the "Washington 
 
 271 
 
 government, an4 particularly by the 
 military authorities, to obtain a firm 
 hold on the Red River, and to convert 
 Shreveport into a National stronghold. 
 The operations of the French in Mexico 
 had occasioned some disquietude in 
 Washington; and the possession of 
 Shreveport, it was thought, with the 
 necessary communications, would make 
 it more easy to re-establish the National 
 authority in Texas. It was the opin 
 ion of the president that the possession 
 of Shreveport would make it less difli- 
 cult to establish a loyal government iu 
 
622 
 
 SHREVEPORT 
 
 Louisiana. Banks, it is understood, 
 although not greatly in favor of the 
 expedition, on account of the difficulties 
 to be encountered and overcome, was 
 yet not unwilling to run the risk, be- 
 cause of the advantages which success 
 would ensure. There were immense 
 supplies of cotton in Texas. If these 
 could be secured, it would be a pecun- 
 iary benefit to the National govern- 
 ment. Halleck had long been in favor 
 of some such movement as that which 
 was about to be made. As early as 
 November, 1862, in his letter of instruc- 
 tions to Banks, he says: "Having the 
 Red Eiver in our possession, it would 
 form the best base for operations in 
 Texas." Grant, with a clearer insight 
 into the situation, never expected 
 much from the expedition, believing 
 it to be greatly more important to 
 win victories in Virginia or Georgia, 
 than in Louisiana; and Sherman, al- 
 though disposed to lend it encourage- 
 ment, was of the opinion that if it 
 could not be accomplished with the 
 utmost rapidity, say in thirty days, it 
 had better not be undertaken at all. 
 
 Shreveport, before the war, was a 
 place of considei-able importance and 
 wealth. At its port there were annu- 
 ally shipped over 40,000 bales of cot- 
 ton, besides large numbers of cattle for 
 the supply of the New Orleans market. 
 The capital of Caddo Parish, Louisiana, 
 150 miles west of Vicksburg, and 155 
 miles northwest of the mouth of the Red 
 River, as the crow flies, it is at the head 
 of navigation for large steamers, and the 
 only accessible point on the west side 
 of the river, for more than 100 miles. 
 
 By the beginning of March, the ar- 
 rangements were completed; and the 
 expedition was ready to start. Banks 
 was to move from New Orleans, by 
 railroad, to Brasheai City, and thence 
 by the Bayou Teche and Opelousas to 
 Alexandria. Admiral Porter was t 
 move from Vicksburg, with a powerfUi 
 fleet of armed steamers, and proceed to 
 the mouth of the Red River. Smith,with 
 some 10,000 of Sherman's veterans, was 
 to embark at Vicksburg, to join Porter 
 and his fleet at the mouth of the Red 
 River ; thence to proceed up the river, 
 and, after capturing Fort de Russy, to 
 form a junction with Banks, at Alex- 
 andria. It was distinctly understood 
 that General Steele, who was at Little 
 Rock with a force of some 15,000 men, 
 would co-operate in the general move- 
 ment, and form a junction with Banks 
 and Smith at or near Shreveport. 
 
 The Confederate forces, it was known, 
 were strong in that region, and favor- 
 ably posted for offering resistance to 
 an invading army. Magruder was in 
 Texas, in the neighborhood of Galves- 
 ton and Houston, with about 15,000 
 men ; Walker, with 7000 men, guarded 
 a line which stretched from Opelousas 
 to Fort de Russy; Mouton, with 6000 
 men, lay between the Black and 
 Washita Rivers, from Red River to 
 Monroe ; while Price, with about 5000 
 infantry, and from 7000 to 10,000 cav- 
 alry, occupied a line extending from 
 Monroe to Camden and Arkadelphia. 
 This entire force was under the direo- 
 tion of General Kirby Smith. After 
 leaving a sufficient number of men to 
 guard the Texan coast, and providing 
 
FORT DE RtTSSY. 
 
 61^3 
 
 for the wants of Arkansas more to the 
 north, it would not be difficult for that 
 general so to concentrate his forces as 
 to have a serviceable army of, at least, 
 30,000 men on the line of the Red 
 River, and so disposed as to be able to 
 give serious annoyance to an invading 
 army. 
 
 General Banks, in consequence of 
 other and important duties, which re- 
 quired his presence temporarily at New 
 Orleans, entrusted his part of the ex- 
 pedition to General Franklin, formerly 
 of the army of the Potomac. Frank- 
 lin had instructions to move on the 
 Mar. 7th of March, and to be at Alex- 
 
 ^' andria, if at all possible, on the 
 1 7th. It was the 13th before he was 
 able to reach the Teche region. Ad- 
 miral Porter was at the mouth of the 
 Red River on the 7th, with a fleet of 
 15 iron-clads and 4 light steamers; and 
 there, four days later, he was joined 
 by the transports, with four divisions 
 of Sherman's army, under General A. 
 J. Smith, and the marine brigade, 
 some 3000 strong, under General Al- 
 fred Ellet. On the morning of the 
 Mar. 12th, ^be entire fleet began to 
 
 12. move up the Old River, the 
 Eastport leading the way. The Old 
 River is an arm of the Red River, and 
 connects with the Atchafalaya. On 
 the same evening, the fleet anchored off 
 the ruins of Simmsport, that place hav- 
 ing been destroyed during the siege of 
 Port Hudson. Next morning, there 
 being as yet no aigns of Banks or his 
 troops, Smith di£>embarked a small force 
 for the purpose of reconnoitering. It 
 was 800U discovered that the Confede- 
 
 rates had been present in considerable 
 numbers at Simmsport, also Bayou 
 Glace and Yellow Bayou, but that 
 they had fallen back to Fort de Russy, 
 some thirty miles distant. Smith de. 
 cided to land the whole column and 
 march it overland to Fort de Russy. 
 At daybreak, on the morning of inar. 
 the 14th, the landing was effect- **• 
 ed ; and the entire column moved for- 
 ward in light marching order, Moore's 
 brigade in advance. B 
 
 Fort de Russy, situated at Gordon's 
 Landing, on the south bank of the Red 
 River, and some seventy miles from its 
 mouth, was a formidable quadrangular 
 work, with bastions and bomb-proofs, 
 covered vpith railroad iron, connected 
 with a water battery, the casemates of 
 which seemed capable of withstanding 
 the heaviest shot and shell. The ar- 
 mament, as was afterwards discovered, 
 consisted of eight heavy guns and two 
 field-pieces. 
 
 About three o'clock on the afternoon 
 of the 14th, after a harassing march, 
 during which they had frequent and 
 severe encounters with the enemy's 
 cavalry, the Nationals reached the 
 inner edge of the woods which skirt 
 the open ground in front of the fort. 
 Under cover of the woods, two batter- 
 ies were hastily thi-own up. The pres- 
 ence of the Nationals had already been 
 discovered ; and four guns on the foi-t 
 were pouring forth shot and shell on 
 their position. The batteiies soon 
 opened fire in reply. A brisk cannon- 
 ade was kept up for the space of two 
 hours, when there was a heavy f usilade, 
 and then a vigorous chai-ge, led by the 
 
«S4 
 
 SHREVEPORT. 
 
 Fifty-Eighth Illinois and the Eighth 
 Wisconsin. At this critical moment, 
 the obstructions in the river having 
 been removed, two of the gunboats — 
 the Eastport and the Neosho — came up 
 fvithin range of the fort and fired a 
 ^w shots. It was not deemed safe to 
 continue the fire from the gunboats, so 
 close now were the laud troops to the 
 fort. A few minutes later and the 
 ditch was reached ; the garrison sur- 
 rendered ; and the flag of the Union, 
 planted by the color-sergeant of the 
 Fifty-Eighth Illinois, was floating over 
 the works of Fort de Russy. The 
 Confederate loss was 250 men made 
 prisoners, ten guns, 1000 muskets, and 
 all the munitions of war. 
 
 It appeared that General Walker, 
 having left 300 men to protect the fort, 
 had retired some hours before, with 
 the expectation of meeting the National 
 troops and offering them battle. Hav- 
 ing taken a different road from that by 
 which they were approaching, be failed 
 to meet them. His presence might 
 have given a different complexion to 
 the fight ; there might have been a 
 larger loss of life ; but the final result 
 could hardly have been other than it was. 
 A small force was left in the fort, with 
 instructions to blow it up. The work 
 of destruction was hastened and com- 
 pleted by an accident on the 1 7th. 
 
 The way to Alexandria, on the Red 
 River, about 150 miles above, was 
 now open. As soon as Fort de Russy 
 bad been captured, Admiral Porter, 
 determined to obtain possession of 
 Alexandria befo>-e the arrival of the 
 fngitivea, hui'ried forwai'd his two fast- 
 
 est vessels, the Ouachita and Lexing- 
 ton, followed by the Eastport. Gen- 
 eral Smith's troops were at the same 
 time put on board the transports and 
 sent up the rivei', the remainder of 
 the fleet following. Alexandria was 
 occupied without opposition on the 
 16th, the Confederates, after burning 
 two steamboats and a considerable 
 quantity of cotton, having made their 
 escape up the river, taking with them 
 some of their own gunboats. At Alex- 
 andria were found several thousand 
 bales of cotton ; and food of every 
 kind existed in abundance. "There 
 is," said Admiral Porter, in a letter to 
 the secretary of the navy, " a surpris- 
 ing abundance of every kind of food 
 in this country, and no suffering among 
 the people, except for luxuries. It 
 would be folly to suppose they could 
 all be starved out. The only way ia 
 to take possession of this rich region, 
 hold it with a strong military and 
 naval force, and enforce the laws. 
 There are some good Union men here 
 who have suffered much. I hope the 
 day of their deliverance has come." 
 
 It has already been mentioned that 
 General Franklin had not been able to 
 leave the Teche region, with Banks' 
 column, until the 13th. On his way 
 he met with little opposition ; Mar, 
 and, on the 19th, Banks' cavalry, '^» 
 under General A, L. Lee, began to 
 pour into Alexandria. On the follow- 
 ing day, Lee was joined by General 
 Charles P. Stone, Banks' chief of staff, 
 and other members of that officer's 
 military famil3^ Banks, himself, ar- 
 rived and established his headquarters 
 
DlSCOT} RaGjCMENTS. 
 
 bZb 
 
 at Alexandria on the 24th ; but his 
 whole column, composed of the Nine- 
 teenth and a portion of the Thirteenth 
 army corps, was not fully forward until 
 the 26th. 
 
 It was the earnest desire of General 
 Banks that Porter should accompany 
 him as far as Shreveport, so that in any 
 encounter with the enemy, he should 
 have the full benefit of the gunboats. 
 Porter, although brave and ever will- 
 ing, could not be expected to perform 
 impossibilities ; and difficulties almost 
 insuperable lay in his way. Immedi- 
 ately above Alexandria there are rapids 
 in the Red River. At this time the 
 water in the river was very low — so 
 low that, in the deeper water below 
 the rapids, it was with difficulty Porter 
 could move along his heavier iron- 
 clads. By main force, the Eastport 
 was dragged over the rocks ; other ves- 
 sels followed; and, after more than a 
 week's incessant toil, one half of the 
 fleet was in the deeper waters above. 
 The hospital ship, Woodford, was 
 wrecked in the rapids. The transports 
 could not be got over; and, as they 
 were desired by McPherson at Vicks- 
 burg, they were permitted to return to 
 the Mississippi. This was a great loss 
 to General Banks. It robbed him direct- 
 ly of 3000 men, and indirectly of 3000 
 more, who were now needed to guard 
 the depot of supplies at Alexandria, and 
 the wagon-trains which conveyed the 
 supplies from vessels below to vessels 
 above the rapids. Banks, indeed, at 
 this particular juncture, had much to 
 discourage him. He had not counted 
 on any hindrances from low water in 
 
 the river. It was his belief that the 
 troops under Smith might be spared 
 from the expedition within, at least, 
 thii'ty days after their airival at Alex- 
 andria; and he had so told Sherman. 
 On the 15th of March, General Grant 
 wrote Banks, informing him that on 
 no account could the troops detached 
 from Sherman's army be allowed to 
 remain with him more than ten or 
 fifteen days longer than the time origin- 
 ally specified, and that, unless he felt 
 satisfied that the object of the expedi- 
 tion could be accomplished within that 
 period, he was to return the troops on 
 the day at first agreed upon, even if 
 the expedition should be abandoned. 
 "I had much rather," said Grant in 
 another despatch, " that the Red River 
 Expedition had never been begun, than 
 that you should be detained one day 
 beyond the 1st of May in commencing 
 the movement east of the Mississippi." 
 It had already become apparent to 
 many that the expedition was to prove 
 a failure. Banks must already have 
 had his own misgivings as to the wis- 
 dom of proceeding further up the river. 
 It was now known that it would be 
 impossible to move the heavier gun- 
 boats beyond Grand Ecore. The sup- 
 plies from that point would have to be 
 conveyed partly, at least, in wagon- 
 trains. These, of course, would have 
 to be guarded ; and to do this efFec 
 tually would imply a further dirainii- 
 tion of his already unduly diminished 
 army. Then, again, information had 
 reached him that large bodies of Con- 
 federates were airiving from Texas and 
 Arkan.sa8, and that Taylor and Price 
 
626 
 
 SHREVEPORT. 
 
 and Green were concentrating in great 
 strength in his front. It was estimated 
 that the combined forces of these gen- 
 erals amounted to 25,000 men, with over 
 70 guns. Add to all this that he had 
 heard nothing of Steele, and that he en- 
 tertained only a doubtful hope of receiv- 
 ing from him any efficient assistance. 
 Banks, however, was anxious to pro- 
 ceed, and accomplish, if possible, the 
 chief object of the expedition — the 
 capture of Shreveport. In this desire 
 he was seconded by Smith. The men 
 in both commands seemed as eager as 
 their respective chiefs to complete the 
 task they had undertaken. 
 
 Banks was now at Natchitoches. 
 April He arrived at that place on the 
 4* 4th of April, Franklin, his sec- 
 ond in command, having come up with 
 the main body of the army the day 
 before. On the 6th the march was re- 
 sumed in the dii'ection of Shreveport, 
 by the Mansfield road. A. L. Lee, 
 with the cavalry, led the advance. 
 Ransom followed with two thin divi- 
 sions, of the Thirteenth army corps. 
 Emory brought up the rear with the 
 First division, of the Nineteenth army 
 corps, and a brigade of colored troops 
 which had just come up from Port 
 Hudson. A. J. Smith, with his two 
 divisions, of the Sixteenth army corps, 
 followed two days later. Some 2500 
 of Smith's men, under T. Kilby Smith, 
 had been sent up the river on trans- 
 ports to act as a guard to the fleet. 
 Banks' available force at this time was 
 estimated to be about 20,000 or 25,000 
 men. Porter had reached Grand Ecore 
 about the same time that the army 
 
 arrived at Natchitoches. It was at 
 this place he was joined by the trans- 
 ports, some 20 in number, filled with 
 supplies, and having Smith's troops on 
 board. Porter, without delay, com- 
 pleted his aiTangements for a further 
 movement up the river. The river 
 was veiy shallow, much to his annoy- 
 ance. He had, therefore, to content 
 himself with his lighter vessels. The 
 others were left behind. On the 7th, 
 taking with him the Cricket, Fort 
 Hindman, Lexington, Osage, Neosho 
 and Chillicothe, and 20 transports, 
 with General Smith's troops on board, 
 and abundance of supplies, Portei 
 started for Shreveport. It had been 
 arranged that on the third day the 
 fleet should be opposite Springfield, 
 and should there come to anchor and 
 communicate with the army, a portion 
 of which, it was expected, would be 
 in the immediate neighborhood. 
 
 In his upward course. Porter tells 
 us, he experienced very great difficul- 
 ties. He, nevertheless, reached the 
 appointed place within an hour of the 
 time specified. At that point he met 
 his first serious obstruction. The Con- 
 federates, determined to bar the navi- 
 gation of the river, had sunk a large 
 steamer, called the New Falls City. 
 It was lying right across the current, 
 her ends resting on each bank, and her 
 hull, which was broken in the middle, 
 resting on the muddy bottom. Porter 
 had not had time to commence opera- 
 tions to remove this obstruction, when 
 a messenger arrived from Banks, bring- 
 ing the unwelcome and unexpected in- 
 telligence that the army had met witlj 
 
PORTER AT SPEINGFIELD LANDING. 
 
 627 
 
 a reverae, and at the same time order- 
 ing General Smith to return to Grand 
 Ecore with the transports and the 
 troops. It was a painful surprise to 
 ooth Porter and Smith. Porter felt 
 that a most abrupt end had come to 
 the expedition, at least for the present. 
 "We reluctantly turned back," he 
 says, " after having nearly reached the 
 object we aimed at." His own posi- 
 tion now was one of gi'eat peril and 
 of serious responsibility. 
 
 What had happened to Banks ? Let 
 us see. It has already been stated that 
 General Lee, with his cavalry, led the 
 National advance. On the 31st of 
 March, he encountered a small force of 
 the enemy at Natchitoches, and, after 
 a sharp skirmish, drove them before 
 him. He encountered the same force 
 again on the 2d of April, a few miles 
 to the west, put them to flight, and 
 maintained the pursuit as far as 
 Crump's Hill, a distance of twenty 
 miles. Lee now waited for the arrival 
 of Franklin with the main body of the 
 National army. Franklin forwarded 
 instructions to Lee to attack the enemy 
 wherever he could find him, but to be 
 careful to avoid a general engagement. 
 On the 7th — the same day on which 
 Porter left Grand Ecore — the whole 
 army being now in motion, and the 
 cavalry force being largely increased, 
 Lee skirmished with great activity and 
 energy, driving the enemy before him, 
 until he had advanced some two or 
 three miles beyond Pleasant Hill, 
 about thirty miles west-northwest of 
 Natchitoches. At this point he found 
 himself confronted by the main body 
 
 of the Confederate cavalry, some 2500 
 strong, and under the skilful and 
 daring leadership of General T. Green. 
 They were drawn up in line at the 
 edge of a wood, with open fields in 
 front. The place bore the name of 
 Wilson's Farm. Active skirmishing 
 commenced at once, and continued for 
 at least two hours, when the Confede 
 rates were driven back into the woods 
 near Patrick's Bayou, about nine miles 
 from Pleasant Hill. Here Lee halted 
 for the day. He had lost 92 men. 
 He had, however, inflicted heavy loss 
 on the enemy. 
 
 Lee was now in a somewhat critical 
 and even dangerous position. So, in- 
 deed, as the result proved, was the 
 entire National army. Lee was push- 
 ing forward too much in advance. 
 Between him and the main body were 
 the wagon trains. If attacked by a 
 force superior in strength to his own, 
 it would be difficult to fall back ; and 
 he ran the risk of being overpowered 
 before relief could reach him. This 
 was precisely the difficulty of the situa- 
 tion, and the source of all the trouble 
 which followed. Franklin had not yet 
 reached Pleasant Hill ; Banks, who 
 had been detained at Grand Ecore, 
 superintending the departure of the 
 transports, had not yet reached Frank- 
 lin's headquarters ; and A. J. Smith 
 was still far in the rear. Lee, realizing 
 his difficulty, called at once for a sup- 
 port of infantry, and asked permission 
 to leave his wagon train behind. Lan- 
 drum's brigade, of the Fourth division, 
 of the Thirteenth corps, was hurried 
 forward, Ransom following with wh-it 
 
628 
 
 BHKBVEPOET. 
 
 remained of the division. On the 
 morning of the 8th, Laudrum having 
 come up, Lee, who was accompanied 
 by four batteries — Nim's, the Chicago 
 Mercantile, the First Indiana, and Bat- 
 tery G, of the regular army — pushed 
 forward, making a liberal use of his 
 artillery. The Confederates steadily 
 tell back beyond the clearing at Sabine 
 Cross Roads, until they had reached a 
 clump of trees, about three or four 
 miles from Mansfield. At this point, 
 the Confederates were found to be 
 assembled in great force. It was now 
 manifest to all that the advance had 
 been made too rapidly. Lee hesitated 
 to attack, and so force a battle in the 
 circumstances. He was disposed to 
 wait until the main body was well for- 
 ward. He was no longer, however, 
 master of the situation. The Confed- 
 erate generals, in truth, saw that their 
 opportunity was ripening; and they 
 were already preparing to change the 
 current of battle, and to turn retreat 
 into aggressive action and victory. 
 
 Ransom had come up about noon with 
 the remainder of the Fourth division, 
 of the Thirteenth corps; and Banks 
 arrived at the front a little later. 
 Banks had already assumed entire 
 control of the field. The cavalry were 
 in the centre, Landrum was on the 
 right ; Ransom was on the left. The 
 skirmishing became gradually more uc 
 fcive. The Confederates, having ceased 
 to fall back, were already offering a 
 stubborn resistance. It was becoming 
 more and more apparent that they 
 were assembled in strength, and that 
 tbey were about to abandon the merely 
 
 defensive, and make a bold aggressive 
 effort. Banks sent orders to Franklin 
 to hurry forward the infantry, instruct- 
 ing Lee meanwhile to hold his ground 
 until the arrival of reinforcements. It 
 was now about four o'clock. The skirm- 
 ishing became more active and more 
 general ; and about half-past four, the 
 entire Confederate force, some 8000 
 foot and 12,000 horse, fell like a thun- 
 dei'bolt on the whole National line, but 
 bearing most heavily on the right flank. 
 The shock was irresistible. The Na- 
 tional troops, still fighting bravely, fell 
 back over the open space at the Cross 
 Roads to the woods in the rear. In 
 this struggle, three pieces of Nim's 
 battery were lost ; and but for the 
 bravery of Lee's cavalry, the National 
 riirht would have been turned. The 
 battle was raging furiously when 
 Franklin came up, about five o'clock, 
 with the Third division of the Thir 
 teenth corps, under General Cameron. 
 A new line was formed. It was of no 
 avail. The Confederates, resolute to 
 win — determined not to be balked uf 
 their prize — having gathered themselves 
 up for a final effort, came rushing for- 
 ward with redoubled fury. The on- 
 slaught was terrific. Cameron's linewaa 
 broken, as Ransom's had been before 
 it. The National ranks were now 
 thrown into confusion ; and large nuni 
 bers of the troops, flinging down theii 
 arms, began to rush, panic-stricken, 
 from the field. The rout soon became 
 general. The narrow road, by which 
 alone escape was possible, was quickly 
 blocked up by wagon trains, by artil- 
 lery, by footmen and horsemen, &U 
 
SABINE CROSS ROADS. 
 
 8M 
 
 mingled together in inextricable confu- 
 sion. It was such a scene as baffles all 
 description ; and it seemed as if no- 
 thing could save the National advance 
 from complete destruction. Such was 
 the state of things in the front about 
 five o'clock on the afternoon of the 8th. 
 "Bull Run," said Ransom, afterwards, 
 " was nothing in comparison." Lee lost 
 about 150 baggage wagons filled with 
 supplies. Ransom lost his guns ; and 
 about 1000 of his men were captured. 
 The National officers suffered severely. 
 Several of them were killed, among 
 whom were Colonel Webb, of the 
 Seventy-Seventh Ohio ; Colonel Vance, 
 of the Ninety-Sixth Ohio ; and Captain 
 Dickey, of Ransom's staff. Among the 
 wounded were Franklin, Ransom, and 
 Colonel Robinson, who, with his cav- 
 alry, was protecting the wagon train. 
 Such was the disastrous battle of Sa- 
 bine Cross Roads. 
 
 The day, however, was not yet 
 ended; nor was it doomed to close 
 wholly in disaster and gloom for the 
 National cause. At Pleasant Grove, 
 some three miles in the rear, the pursu- 
 ers and the pursued were both brought 
 to a halt. General Emory with his 
 splendid divisions, pressing forward, 
 had just reached Pleasant Grove, when 
 he learned of the disaster which had 
 Itaken placo in the front. With the in- 
 stincts of a true soldier, he prepared to 
 arrest the tide of retreat. Forming his 
 men in line of battle at the edge of a 
 wood, with open ground sloping down 
 to the front, he awaited the approach 
 of the triumphant foe. Making way 
 for the flying columns, and allowing 
 
 them to pass through to the rear, he 
 caused his men to reserve their fire 
 untU the pm-suers were close at hand. 
 His orders were faithfully obeyed. 
 The Confederates came up with a tre- 
 mendous rush, their ranks somewhat 
 disordered by success. Full in their 
 faces Emory's men poured, in rapid 
 succession, murderous volleys of mus- 
 ketry. Loth to yield in the hour of 
 victor}'', the Confederates endeavored 
 to press on. A fierce and sanguinary 
 struggle ensued. It was in vain, how- 
 ever, that they dashed themselves on 
 the solid front which Emory presented. 
 They were mowed down in heaps, and 
 compelled to retire. Night now fell 
 upon the scene ; and the National army 
 was saved. 
 
 In this struggle, General Dwight, 
 General McMillan, Colonel Kinsey and 
 Colonel Benedict greatly distinguished 
 themselves — the last-named officer, 
 \vith great gallantry, having resisted 
 and repelled repeated efforts made by 
 the Confederates to turn the National 
 right. 
 
 During the night. Banks retired his 
 shattered army to Pleasant Hill, some 
 fifteen miles in the rear, General Emory 
 covering the retreat. Pleasant Hill, 
 the position held by General Franklin 
 at the commencement of the fight, was 
 reached between eight and nine o'clock 
 on the following morning. Happily 
 General A. J. Smith, who had not as 
 yet taken any part in the strife, had 
 arnved the night before with a portion 
 of the Sixteenth corps. Preparations 
 were immediately made to receive an- 
 other attack. Pleasant Hill ia a clear- 
 
650 
 
 SHREVEPOET. 
 
 ing in the w'-fst of the vast pine woods 
 with whioh the adjoining country is 
 covered. It is about thirty-five miles 
 from Red River, on the road leading 
 from Natchitoches, and forms a sort 
 of plateau, which rises to a perceptible 
 height above the surrounding country. 
 Two lines of battle were formed — one 
 in front by the division of General Em- 
 ory, another behind the crest of the hill, 
 and as a reserve, by the troops of Gen- 
 eral Smith. In the first line, Dwight 
 was on the right; McMillan in the 
 centre; Benedict on the left. The 
 Twenty-Fifth New York battery was 
 placed on a knoll between the right 
 and the centre. The day was beau- 
 tiful, and reminded many of a May 
 day in the North. For the greater 
 part of the day, as the Nationals, in 
 battle array, awaited the attack of the 
 enemy, the field resembled a parade- 
 srround rather than a battle field. Noon 
 came and went ; and, although it was 
 manifest that an attack was meditated, 
 nothing but the slow shelling of the 
 woods, or a stray shot from some im- 
 petuous or impatient picket, gave any 
 indication of battle. So the day passed 
 until about four in the afternoon. 
 The skirmishing at that time became 
 more active, as well as more general. 
 There was again a lull. The storm, 
 however, was brewing. It was now 
 shortly after five o'clock. Suddenly, 
 the Confederate artillery began to 
 thunder. Under cover of this fire, the 
 gray coats came rushing forth from the 
 woods. In overwhelming numbers, and 
 marching at the double-quick, they 
 came, rolling forward in solid mass 
 
 against the whole National line. The 
 National skirmishers fell back as they 
 approached. A tremendous onslaught 
 was made on Emory's left, held, as we 
 have said, by Benedict's brigade. Bene- 
 dict was wounded in the arm ; and, a 
 few moments afterwards, he was shot 
 through the head. His men fell back, 
 fighting gallantly, and, reaching the lines 
 of General Smith, filed behind Shaw's 
 brigade. Sweitzer, with his Texan 
 cavalry, in a brave but vain endeavoJ 
 to penetrate the covering line, had his 
 regiment literally cut to pieces. 
 
 Emory, for a brief space, stood fimi 
 in the centre and on the right; but, 
 pressed at all points by overwhelming 
 numbers, he was compelled to fall 
 back to the shelter of the Sixteenth 
 corps, behind the crest of the hill. 
 The Confederates were already con- 
 cluding that they were about to win an 
 easy victory. They were in grievous 
 error. General Smith was all readiness. 
 His men were well trained to his 
 peculiar mode of warfare. He did not 
 believe in the useless waste of powder 
 and shot, or in the useless waste of 
 strength. The Confederates, flushed 
 with what seems success, have pushed 
 their way up the hill, almost to its sum- 
 mit. The muzzles of the National 
 guns are almost reached. As yet, how- 
 ever, the guns are silent. The second 
 line of Confederate troops is seen ad. 
 vancing up the hill. The opportune 
 moment has come. The signal is given. 
 There is a loud, deafening roar, mingled 
 with the sharp rattle of musketry. 
 Seven thousand rifles, and several bat 
 teries of artillery, every gun loaded tfi 
 
PLEASANT HILL. 
 
 031 
 
 the muzzle with grape and canister, 
 have- poured their deadly contents on 
 the serried ranks of the advancing foe. 
 Like a field of grain, over which a tor- 
 nado has passed, the entire Confederate 
 centre has been swept to destruction 
 Scarcely fewer than 1000 men lie dead 
 or dying on the sloping ground. The 
 word " Charge ! " is heard resounding 
 along the National lines; and 7000 
 brave men inish upon the shattered 
 ranks of the enemy. Emory's division, 
 now re-formed, joins the Sixteenth, 
 and takes part in the final struggle. 
 The struggle is brief; for, in a few 
 minutes, the entire Confederate host is 
 driven from the slope, through and be- 
 yond the woods, in broken and con- 
 f»ised masses. The pursuit was con- 
 tinued until dark. 
 
 In the final charge, General Mower, 
 distinguished throughout all this cam- 
 paign, sm-passed all his previous efforts. 
 Emory, too, the hero of Pleasant Grove, 
 proved himself worthy of the name he 
 had already won. To General A. J. 
 Smith, however, belongs the chief glory. 
 It was his veteran Sixteenth corps 
 which determined the day. It is not 
 to be forgotten that Smith handled his 
 own men in his own way. If Ransom 
 had been allowed to do the same on 
 the 8th, the result of the first day's 
 fighting might have been different. In 
 their flijjht, the Confederates left be- 
 hind all their dead and wounded, 500 
 prisoners, three battle-standards, and a 
 large number of small arms. Taylor's 
 battery, which had been lost in the 
 earlier part of the action, was recap- 
 tured. So, also, was a portion of Nira's 
 
 battery, which had been lost on the 8tQ. 
 A Parrott gun, which the Nationals 
 had lost, the previous fall, at Carrion 
 Crow, was also retaken. 
 
 It was at first intended to face again 
 to the north, and resume the march to 
 Shreveport. The idea was pleasing to 
 the rank and file. It was particularly 
 agreeable to General Smith, who was 
 dissatisfied with the manajremeut and 
 result of the campaign. Franklin, how- 
 ever, and some of the officers of the 
 Nineteenth corps, for a variety of rea- 
 sons, deemed it unwise. A council of 
 officers was held on the evening of the 
 9th, when it was agreed to fall back to 
 Grand Ecore. Banks' management of 
 the expedition, and particularly the 
 want of generalship exhibited by hin"' 
 in the first day's fighting, had lost hia 
 the confidence of his officers. As an 
 administrator or organizer in a civil 
 capacity, Banks, at that time, had few 
 equals ; but he was not at home on the 
 battle field ; nor was he possessed of 
 those qualities, or that special kind of 
 experience, which fit one for the sue 
 cessful management and control of A 
 great military movement, conducted at 
 different and possibly distant points, 
 and by detached bodies of men. His 
 military career acquired some lustre 
 from Port Hudson ; but the glory thus-' 
 acquired came to him rather as a>i acci 
 dent, incidental to his position, than a* 
 a necessity brought about by his great 
 or shining military abilities. His mili-' 
 tary position was due to his political 
 influence — an influence, however, which 
 was fairly and honestly won. He had 
 always under him officers greatly more 
 
«32 
 
 SHREVEPORT. 
 
 capable than himself; and he showed 
 his Avisdom most when he consulted 
 their opinions and followed their guid- 
 ance. The Shreveport Expedition ought 
 to have been a success. As it was, the 
 National army had lost ali'eady 18 guns, 
 small arms in large numbers, 5000 men, 
 '30 wagons and 1200 horses and mules, 
 mhA had accomplished nothing. 
 
 While arrangements are being made 
 for the backward movement, let us turn 
 our attention to the fleet and trans- 
 ports. Porter and Kilby Smith, it will 
 be remembered, had I'eached Spring- 
 field Lauding, when they were made 
 Rware of the reverses which had at- 
 tended the aiTny on the 8th at Sabine 
 Cross Roads, and that it would be 
 necessary for them to return to Grand 
 Ecore. It was no easy task which now 
 devolved on Admiral Porter. Not 
 without gi'eat difficulty had he suc- 
 ceeded in getting the vessels up over 
 ihe rapids. Greater difficulty, he had 
 t'eason to fear, would attend the return. 
 The water in the river had not risen — 
 »t had rather fallen— in the interval ; 
 and he had the certain prospect of 
 ueing seriously annoyed by the now 
 disengaged Confederates, who were 
 swarming along the banks of the river. 
 The backward movement, however, was 
 commenced at once. At a place called 
 Coushatta, the boats first came under 
 ifhe enemy's fire. The Confederate col- 
 onel, Harrison, was at that point, with 
 nearly 2000 cavalry and 4 guns. The 
 progress made by the boats was neces- 
 wnily slow. The river was narrow 
 a lid snaggy ; and, at night, it was 
 flfomed safest to halt, and w^ut for the 
 
 returning light. Harrison had no diffi- 
 culty in keeping up with the fleet. As 
 he moved down the river, his numbers 
 increased. Smith, meanwhile, was ac- 
 tive on l)oard the transports. In ordei' 
 to protect his men, he threw up barri- 
 cades with boxes, barrels, bales of hay, 
 raatti'esses, and everj^thing else he could 
 lay hold of. The water being so low, 
 the gunboats could do little execution 
 upon the high banks at short range; 
 and Smith knew that the safety of the 
 fleet depended largely on his own men. 
 On the hurricane-deck of the Emerald, 
 he mounted two Rodman guns, which 
 did excellent service. On the 12th, 
 near Pleasant Hill Landing, a fierce 
 attack was made on the rear portion 
 of the fleet. At this point, the Osage 
 lay agi'ound, a heavy transport, named 
 the Black Hawk, being alongside of her, 
 and attempting to pull her o£F. The 
 Confederates, under General Thomas 
 Green, opened with 2000 muskets. 
 The gunboats and the transjjorts re- 
 plied with promptitude and effect. 
 Smith brought his two Rodman guns 
 to bear upon the banks of the river, 
 where the enemy was massed in great 
 force. The destruction of life was 
 fearful. It seemed to be the determi- 
 nation of Green to capture this poi'tion 
 of the fleet. Again and again he 
 pushed his men to the edge of the 
 bank, till, in one of these encountei's, a 
 shot from one of the Rodman guns 
 blew ofi^ his head. The Confederates 
 again rallied, only, however, to be cut 
 and torn to pieces by the raking canis- 
 ter-shot from the gunboats and the 
 transjwrts. While this struggle was 
 
CANE ErVEE. 
 
 63S 
 
 in progress, Harrison appeared on the 
 opposite side of the river ; but so de- 
 structive was the fire which was brought 
 to bear upon him that he was compelled 
 to fall back and remain at a distance. 
 In this engagement, excellent service 
 was rendered by Lieutenant Bache, 
 with his gunboat, Lexington ; also, by 
 Lieutenant T. O. Selfridge, of the 
 Osage. Although ultimately compelled 
 to seek shelter in the casemates of the 
 Osage, too much praise cannot be given 
 to Smith's men, who, on the transport, 
 BO nobly handled the Rodman guns. 
 
 These vessels, without encountering 
 other serious difficulties, proceeded down 
 the river as far as Campti, where they 
 rejoined the advance portion of the 
 fleet, which was grounded, and exposed 
 to the enemy's fire from the banks. 
 From this point, Porter, on board the 
 Cricket, which had just narrowly es- 
 caped capture at the hands of the guer- 
 rillas, hurried down to Grand Ecore, 
 where he found Banks, who had arrived 
 with the land troops. At Porter's re- 
 quest. Banks sent a strong force up the 
 river to protect the transports and the 
 gunboats. Soon after the arrival of 
 the troops, the entire fleet began to 
 move towards Grand Ecore, which was 
 reached without further trouble. 
 
 The retreat was resumed with as lit- 
 tle delay as possible. Porter started 
 with his fleet on the 17th." Banks set 
 out with the army on the 21st. Alex- 
 andria was the next point of destina- 
 tion. Porter's difficulties now began. 
 Eight miles below Grand Ecore, the 
 Eastport, struck by a torpedo under 
 kev lK)ttom and near her bow, was 
 
 sunk. This proved a great hindrance. 
 It was not until the 21st she was got 
 afloat — the day on which Banka re- 
 commenced his backward march. Day 
 after day, for six days, the Eas'-port 
 passed through the same ordeal ; and 
 the same laborious process of hauling 
 her over the bars had to be repeated. It 
 was wearisome work, and could hardly 
 fail, were we to enter into all the details, 
 to pi'ove an equally wearisome recital. 
 On the 25th, when about sixty miles 
 below Grand Ecore, she again ground 
 ed. So much time had been wasted, 
 and so apparently inextricable she 
 seemed in her present position, that all 
 further attempts to save her were aban- 
 doned. About half-past one o'clock, on 
 the 26th of April, she was blown April 
 into fragments, having been pre- ^6. 
 viously charged with one ton of pow' 
 der and other combustibles. The East- 
 port was one of Porter's best vessels; 
 and both he and her commander, 
 Phelps, did their utmost to carry her 
 off in safety. Almost at the moment 
 appointed for the blowing up of the 
 Eastport, the Confederates made a 
 daring but unsuccessful attempt to 
 capture the Cricket. The guerrillas 
 were quickly routed. The vessels 
 which were accompanying the East- 
 port, as soon as she was blown up, 
 proceeded down the river, encountering 
 no opposition until they had reached 
 a point at the mouth of Cane River. 
 The Cricket led the way, with Admi 
 ral Porter on board, followed close by 
 the Juliet, the Champion, and the Fort 
 Hindman. As they neared the point, 
 they discovered that the OonfederateB 
 
634 
 
 SHREVEPORT. 
 
 were present in considerable strength. 
 Rounding the point, the Cricket still 
 in front, and opening with their bow- 
 guns, they found themselves exposed 
 to the fire of a powerful battery of 18 
 guns, which the Confederates had 
 quickly got into position. When the 
 Cricket came fully up, each of the 18 
 guns poured forth its deadly and de- 
 structive missile. Every shot took ef- 
 fect on the little vessel, most of them 
 penetrating through and through. The 
 shock was terrific, and the destruction 
 almost complete. One gun was dis- 
 abled. Every gunner was killed or 
 wounded. The chief engineer and one 
 of the pilots were killed at their re- 
 spective posts. In the fire-room only 
 one man escaped — all the others being 
 either killed or wounded. Strange to 
 say, Admiral Porter escaped unhurt, 
 and the machinery was comparatively 
 uninjured. Making use of some ne- 
 groes, who were on board. Porter 
 manned the guns, and ran the vessel 
 past the battery. A few miles down 
 the river, he found the Osage and the 
 Lexington engaged fighting a field-bat- 
 tery. It was his intention to take these 
 vessels back to the assistance of those 
 he had left behind ; but darkness com- 
 ing on, this was found to be impossi- 
 ble. Lieutenant Phelps brought the 
 Juliet and the Fort Hindman past the 
 battery during the evening gloom. 
 Both, however, were severely pun- 
 ished. The pumpboat. Champion, hav- 
 ing been disabled, was set on fire, and 
 left behind. "In five minutes" says 
 Porter, in his graphic report of this ac- 
 tion, "the Cricket was struck thirty- 
 
 eight times with solid shot and shell, 
 with a loss of 25 killed and wounded ; 
 the Juliet about the same, with 15 
 killed. The Fort Hindman lost 3 
 killed and 4 or 5 wounded." No fur- 
 ther interruption was experienced until 
 the fleet reached the rapids. 
 
 While Admiral Porter was thus 
 pushing his way down the river, Gen- 
 eral Banks, with the land forces, had 
 made a successful march to Alexandria. 
 His advance, under General Emory, 
 left Grand Ecore on the 22d of April. 
 General A. J. Smith followed with his 
 column, his rear being covered by a 
 command under General Kirby Smith, 
 On the first day, the National army 
 marched forty miles. It had reached 
 Cane River, on the east side of which, 
 and near a ferry, on an elevation called 
 Monet's Bluff, the Confederates, to the 
 number of 8000, with 16 guns, had 
 taken a strong position. This bluff 
 was flanked by the unfordable river on 
 one side and by an almost impassable 
 swamp on the other. It was the inten- 
 tion of General Banks to force a pas- 
 sage across the river at this place, by 
 making a vigorous attack early on the 
 morning of the 23d. It was the deter- 
 mination of the Confederates to offer a 
 stubborn resistance; and it was their 
 hope and belief that, by drawing the 
 National advance into a sharp engage- 
 ment, they would be able, with the re- 
 mainder of their forces, then not far 
 distant, to fall with destructive effect 
 on the National flank and rear. Emory, 
 however, had moved with such celerity 
 that he anticipated their plans. The 
 Confederates were not ready. Their 
 
BAILEY'S DAM. 
 
 636 
 
 pickets on the west side of the stream 
 were easily driven in; but the main 
 portion was found to be too strong to 
 be taken by direct assault. A flank 
 movement was resolved upon. Gen- 
 eral Birge, taking with him his own 
 brigade — that of Colonel Fessenden — 
 and General Cameron's division, of the 
 Thirteenth corps, crossed the river 
 three miles above the ferry, and, late in 
 the afternoon, after weary marching, 
 reached the desired position, in the 
 rear of the enemy's stronghold. Mean- 
 while, the advance of the main body of 
 the National army was moved towards 
 the Cane River, and mthin range of 
 the guns on the bluff, on the opposite 
 side. The Confederates immediately 
 opened fire ; and a spirited artillery 
 duel was maintained for some hours. 
 It had been arranged that as soon as 
 Birge commenced the assault in the 
 Confederate rear, the National reserves 
 should force the passage of the river. 
 The plan worked admii-ably. The as- 
 sault on the rear of the Confederate 
 position was made by Colonel Fessen- 
 den's brigade, the colonel leading his 
 men. It was made with great gal- 
 lantry and with signal success. When 
 darkness set in, the Confederates were 
 flying in confusion along the Fort Jes- 
 sup road ; and the bluff was occupied 
 by the Nationals. In this attack, the 
 Nationals lost about 200 men in killed 
 and wounded. Among the wounded 
 was Colonel Fessenden. On the mom- 
 April ing of the 23d, the Confederates 
 23. fell with great force on tlie rear 
 of General A. J. Smith's column, which 
 was covered by the command of Gen- 
 
 eral Kilby Smith. The last-named 
 general turned upon the enemy at 
 Clouterville, on the Cane River ; and, 
 after a three-hours' engagement, Gen- 
 eral Mower fighting with great brav- 
 ery on his right. Smith repulsed the 
 Confederates at every point, and com- 
 pelled them to withdraw. The march 
 towards Alexandria was resumed on 
 the afternoon of the following day; 
 and, on the 27th, after an absence of 
 twenty-four days. Banks and his army 
 were back in Alexandria. The back- 
 ward march from Grand Ecore was 
 successfully managed ; and while it did 
 honor to General Banks, it redounded, 
 also, to the credit of Generals Emory, 
 A. J. Smith and T. Kilby Smith, who, 
 by their skill, bravery and promptitude 
 of action, greatly added to the laurels 
 they had already won. 
 
 At Alexandria, all hopes of resum- 
 ing the Shreveport Expedition van- 
 ished. General Hunter had arrived 
 with orders from General Grant, in- 
 structing Banks to close the campaign, 
 as Sherman's troops wei'e now all 
 needed to the east of the Mississippi. 
 Those orders were final. It was im- 
 possible, however, to abandon Porter 
 and his fleet to the tender mercies of 
 the enemy. Hunter, therefore, returned 
 to Grant with a letter from Banks, ex- 
 plaining the situation, and claiming- 
 such time as might be needed to make 
 a fair effort to save the fleet. 
 
 We left Porter at the rapids, above 
 Alexandria. The water had become 
 so low that he had no hope of getting 
 his vessels over the falls. " I saw 
 nothing before me," he says, "but the 
 
636 
 
 SHREVEPOET. 
 
 destruction of the best part of the 
 MissiftBippi squadron," The difficulty, 
 howdver, had not been unforeseen ; and 
 its solution had already, for some time, 
 been engaging the attention and tax- 
 ing the genius of Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Bailey, Banks' chief engineer. It was 
 Bailey's conviction that by a system of 
 damming, which he explained to both 
 Banks and Porter, he could bring the 
 fleet safely over the rapids. Banks 
 shared in the belief of his lieutenant. 
 Porter douV)ted. Banks gave the ne- 
 oessary orders; and, on Sunday, the 
 iMay. 1st of May, Bailey went to work. 
 '• On condition that he should be 
 ulloWed the use of as many men as he 
 might deem necessary, he promised to 
 i^omplete the proposed dam within ten 
 days. It was a perilous and, appa- 
 rently, an impossible task. The falls 
 were a mile in length ; the water was 
 exceedingly low ; and, in proportion as 
 the dam approached completion, the 
 ■««rork and the workmen would be in- 
 (•reasingly at the mercy of a powerful 
 <-.urrent. Three thousand men, with 
 from two to three hundred wagons, 
 were soon busilj^ engaged. The entire 
 country around was ransacked for the 
 necessary material. The neighboring 
 steam-mills were demolished for their 
 stone and brick and wood and iion ; 
 the adjoining forests echoed with the 
 sound of the axe, and, yielding to the 
 persuasive blows of the sturdy men 
 from Maine, gave up their stalwart 
 giants of oak and pine ; the quarries 
 resounded with the stroke of the ham- 
 mer, and lent their weight and strength 
 to the daring enterprise ; wagons rum- 
 
 bled to the river; and flatboats con- 
 veyed the stone and, wood to theii 
 destined places. Bailey commenced by 
 running out from the left bank of the 
 river a ti'ee-dam made of the bodiea 
 of very large trees, brush, brick and 
 stone, cross-tied with heavy timber and 
 strengthened in every way which inge- 
 nuity could devise. This tree-dam was 
 run out about 300 feet, at which point 
 were sunk four large coal barges filled 
 with brick. From the right bank, 
 cribs, filled with stone, were built out 
 to meet the barges. At all points the 
 work went merrily on, the soldiers 
 lightening their toil by singing favor- 
 ite army songs and certain plantation 
 melodies. In eight days the dam was 
 all but completed ; and the water on 
 the upper falls had risen so high as to 
 allow the Fort Hind man, the Osage 
 and the Neosho to move down and be 
 in a state to pass through the dam. In 
 another day, it was calculated, all the 
 vessels would be got down and over the 
 falls. Early on the 9th, how- may 
 ever, when the above-named ves- *• 
 sels were about to pass through, tlie 
 pressure of the water, which had risen 
 rapidly, and was flowing at the rate of 
 nine miles an hour, swept away two of 
 the stone barges. Porter galloped to 
 the upper falls, and ordered the Lex- 
 ington to move down and endeavor to 
 pass through the gap in the dam. The 
 attempt was made. The vessel got 
 over the upper falls in safety, but not 
 a moment too soon, as the water was 
 already falling rapidly. She then made 
 foi- the opening in the dam, through 
 wliich the water was now rushing Avith 
 
PASSING THE RAPIDS. 
 
 637 
 
 tremendous fury. To the thousands 
 who lined the banks, and who looked on 
 tremblingly and in silence, it seemed a 
 foolhai'dy experiment — a certain rush 
 to destruction. The Lexington had on 
 a full head of steam, as she went bound- 
 ing down the roaring torrent. Rolling 
 spasmodically, almost like a thing of 
 life, she hung for a moment on the 
 rocks below ; and then, yielding to the 
 force of the current, she made one 
 grand leap into the lower deep waters. 
 Aloud and long-resounding cheer an- 
 nounced the success of the undertaking 
 and the delight of over twenty thou- 
 sand men. The Neosho followed; but 
 she made the passage with less success 
 than the Lexington. Her pilot became 
 frightened as she approached the abyss, 
 and shut off the steam. It was a serious 
 blunder, and well-nigh brought the 
 vessel to destruction. Her hull disap- 
 peared under the water ; and it seemed 
 as if she were lost. It was, however, 
 only for a moment. Having risen again 
 above the surface, she was caught by 
 the current, and swept over the rocks, 
 fortunately reaching the deep water 
 below with only one hole in her bot- 
 tom — a damage which was promptly 
 repaired. The Fort Hindman and the 
 Osage passed over " beautifully," Por- 
 ter tells us, and without sustaining any 
 injury. 
 
 It was not deemed safe to make the 
 experiment with the heavier vessels. 
 Bailey, meanwhile, was busy repairing 
 his dam. The soldiers, now fully con- 
 vinced that they were not working to- 
 wards an impossible end, resumed their 
 toilsome task with renewed energy. 
 
 The dam was speedily repaii-ed; and 
 the remaining six vessels — the Mound 
 City, Carondelet, Pittsburg, Ozark, 
 Louisville and Chillicothe — with two 
 tugs, passed safely through, in the 
 presence and amid the loud, hearty and 
 prolonged cheera of the entire army. 
 The success of this undertaking gave 
 Porter a new idea of the possible. 
 " Words," says he, " are inadequate to 
 express the admiration I feel for the 
 abilities of Lieutenant Colonel Bailey. 
 The highest honors the government can 
 bestow on him can never repay him for 
 the service he has rendered the coun- 
 try." The government was not un- 
 grateful. Bailey was honored by Con- 
 gress with a vote of thanks and a medal; 
 and he was promoted to the rank of 
 brigadier-general. 
 
 During the time the army remained 
 at Alexandria, waiting for the fleet, 
 it was reinforced by a large body of 
 troops, which had come up from Mata- 
 gorda Bay, under General John A. Mc- 
 Clemand. A serious misfortune, during 
 the same interval, had befallen two of 
 the vessels of the fleet — the Signal and 
 Covington — wfiich had been sent down 
 the river in advance as a convoy to 
 the transport Warner. On the 5th of 
 May, at Dunn's Bayou, about thirty 
 miles below Alexandria, they were at 
 tacked and overpowered by a strong 
 Confederate force. The Covington was 
 set on fire, and then abandoned. The 
 Signal and the transport were cap- 
 tured. It was a very unequal sti'ug- 
 irle. Of the soldiers on board the 
 tiansport, about 100 were killed, and 
 150 made prisoners. The remainder 
 
 2T» 
 
638 
 
 SHREVEPORT. 
 
 took to the shore and escaped. Not 
 long afterwards the City Belle was 
 captured, having on board 400 Ohio 
 troops. These isolated cases seem to 
 reflect on the management at head- 
 quarters. In such a country, it is the 
 first duty of the naval commander to 
 keep his vessels well together, as it is 
 the first duty of the general in the 
 field to move his men in masses. The 
 principle involved is fundamental, and 
 ought never to be departed from, ex- 
 cept in extraordinary circumstances. 
 
 On the 13th of May, Alexandria, 
 May by some unknown hands, was set 
 13. on fire. In spite of the efforts 
 of Generals Banks and Smith, a large 
 portion of the place was destroyed. 
 On the following day, the town was 
 evacuated ; and both the array and 
 navy were moving in the direction of 
 Simmsport. It was a day of great sor- 
 row in Alexandria. General Banks had 
 declared his determination that the oc- 
 cupation should be permanent. In con- 
 sequence of this assurance, the citizens 
 in large numbers had given their al- 
 legiance to the National cause. Not a 
 few of them had joined the army and 
 been sent forward to Simmsport. Know- 
 ing the fate which awaited them, the 
 women and children became frantic with 
 grief, and, terror-sticken, begged, but 
 begged in vain, to be taken on board 
 the transports and conveyed to New 
 Orleans. It was one of those sad and 
 sorrowful circumstances which are un- 
 avoidable in war. On the 16th, the 
 army and the fleet had both reached 
 Simmsport, Porter's progress having 
 been greatly facilitated by a rise in the 
 
 Mississippi, which caused a back-water 
 in the Red River. On the morning of 
 the 16th, while pressing on towards 
 Simmsport, the troops were vigorously 
 attacked by a body of the enemy at 
 Mansura. On the 20th they had crossed 
 the Atchafalaya, when General E. R. 
 S. Canby assumed command, and Banks 
 hastened on to New Orleans. In obe- 
 dience to counter-orders which had come 
 from Halleck, with consent of Grant, per- 
 mitting that portion of Sherman's troops 
 to remain in the West, A. J. Smith pro- 
 ceeded up the Mississippi, halting on 
 the way at Columbia, and dispersing a 
 body of Confederates, under Marma- 
 duke. Porter resumed his station on 
 the Mississippi ; and, in due time, the 
 remainder of the army, under General 
 Canby, reached New Orleans. Thus 
 ended the Shreveport Expedition — an 
 expedition which was conducted with- 
 out capacity or discipline, and which, 
 as we have said already, revealed the 
 lack of true military genius on the part 
 of General Banks. 
 
 This chapter would be incomplete 
 without a brief allusion to the expedi- 
 tion which was conducted under Gen- 
 eral Steele. That general, it will be 
 remembered, had been instructed to 
 move southward and co-operate with 
 Banks in the movement against Shreve- 
 port. When Banks set out on his 
 northward march, Steele was at Little 
 Rock. He left there on March Mar. 
 23d, with 12,000 infantry, and 23. 
 3000 cavalry, under Carr. Camden was 
 Steele's first objective; but he expect- 
 ed to be joined by General Thayer at 
 Arkadelphia, with about 5000 men. 
 
PRAIKIE D'ANN. 
 
 63k 
 
 At Camden, if no serious difficulty in- 
 terposed, he was to be joined by a 
 small force under General Clayton. 
 Thayer left Fort Smith on the 22d ; 
 and, about the same time, Clayton 
 marched from Pine Bluff. The roads 
 were bad; and the junction of the 
 forces according to instructions could 
 hardly be relied upon. When Steele 
 reached Arkadelphia, Thayer was not 
 forward. After waiting for the latter 
 in vain for two days, Steele pushed on 
 in the direction of Washington, with 
 the view of flanking Camden. General 
 Sterling Price, it was known, was in 
 the neighborhood, with 12,000 Con- 
 federates. After a toilsome march, 
 and being constantly harassed by the 
 cavalry under Marmaduke and Ca- 
 bell, Steele reached Prairie D'Ann on 
 April the 10th of April, where he was 
 10. joined by Thayer. Price was 
 understood to be here in great force; 
 and Steele at once resolved to offer 
 battle. By a series of dexterous move- 
 ments, which succeeded in misleading 
 Price as to the real objective of his 
 antagonist, and after some desperate 
 skirmishing, Steele wheeled around 
 and pushed his way to Camden, taking 
 possession of the place on the night of 
 the 15th, in spite of the most persistent 
 efforts of the enemy. Here he learned 
 of the disaster which had befallen Banks 
 at Sabine Cross Roads; and, feel- 
 ing convinced that the enemy, already 
 at least 25,000 strong, would soon be 
 reinforced by the army of General 
 Kirby Smith, he gave up all thoughts 
 of moving further in the direction of 
 Shreveport. His position at Camden 
 
 soon became the reverse of comfortable. 
 His supplies were intercepted ; his for- 
 aging parties were cut off; Clayton 
 could hardly be expected now to join 
 him ; and he began to fear for the 
 safety of Little Rock. In these cir- 
 cumstances, he resolved to retreat to 
 his former stronghold. On the April 
 night of the 26th, he threw 26. 
 his army across the Washita River; 
 and, at daylight on the 27th, he be- 
 gan to fall back, by way of Princeton 
 and Jenkins' Ferry, on the Sabine 
 River. The roads were in the most 
 wretched condition ; and the rain fell 
 in torrents. At Jenkins' Ferry, he was 
 attacked by an overwhelming force, led 
 by Kirby Smith in person. Steele got 
 his men quickly into position ; and the 
 battle at once became general. The 
 Confederates fell on the National lines 
 with tremendous energy. Again and 
 again they came up in full force, now 
 on the left, and now on the right, and 
 finally making a desperate effort to 
 crush the left and centre. More than 
 once the National lines yielded to the 
 tremendous pressure and fierce onsets 
 of the enemy ; but nothing could cool 
 the courage or relax the energies of 
 those brave Western regiments. Every 
 charge of the enemy was successfully 
 repelled. The battle had commenced 
 at early dawn. It was now near noon. 
 The critical moment of the fight had 
 arrived. The National left, which was 
 held by the Thirty-Third Iowa, whose 
 ammunition was exhausted, was yield- 
 ing to the pressure of the heavy masses 
 of the enemy. Four companies of the 
 Fortieth Iowa hastened to its support. 
 
Bio 
 
 MOBILE HARBOB. 
 
 formed under a terrible fire, and re- 
 stored the line. The tide of battle now 
 turned. The Confederates, not pre- 
 pared for this fresh advent of strength 
 and heroism, began to fall back. For 
 one whole hour, the Nationals pressed 
 on their front, the Confederates slowly, 
 but steadily, yielding up the ground. 
 At noon, the victory was complete ; 
 and the Nationals remained masters of 
 the field. In this fierce struggle, Steele 
 lost 700 men in killed and wounded. 
 The Confederate loss must have ex- 
 
 ceeded 3000 men, including 3 gen- 
 eral officers. Leaving a burial party 
 behind, Steele crossed the Saline River 
 and continued his retreat. He was 
 not further molested. On the 2d Mgf 
 of May, after a weaiy march, over 2. 
 a swampy country, his half-famished 
 troops, broken and dispirited, were safe 
 in Little Rock. The battle at Jenkins" 
 Ferry did credit to Steele and to his 
 brave soldiers ; but the expedition, like 
 that of which it was intended to form a 
 part, was ill-omened and disastrous. 
 
 CHAPTER XXXIII. 
 
 One of the Sources of Nourishment and Strength. — Sherman's Plan. — Farragnt Eeoonnoitres. — The Obstnio- 
 tions Visible. — Need for Caution. — The Defenses. — Forts Morgan, Gaines and Powell. — The Coufederata 
 Fleet. — The Tennessee, the Selma, the Gaines, the Morgan. — Farragut's Fleet. — Eeinf oroements. — The Mon- 
 itors. — A Consultation on Board the Hartford. — Farragut, Canby and Granger. — A Land Force Promised. — 
 Description of Mobile Harbor. — The City of Mobile. ^MobUe Point. —Dauphin Island. — Sand Island. — 
 Grant's Pass. — Swash Channel. — Middle Channel. — The Position of the Forts. — Description of the Ten- 
 nessee. — Preparations for the Attack. — Arrival of Granger with 2500 Men. — Investment of Fort Gaines. ^The 
 Fleet in Motion. — August 5th. — The Tecumseh. — The First Shot.— Fort Morgan Thunders. — The Tecumseb 
 Disappears. — Torpedoes. — The Brooklyn Pauses, and Falls Back. — A Critical Moment. — The Fleet in Dan- 
 ger. — Farragut's Decision and Promptitude. — A Perilous Position. — Fearful Broadsides. — The Hartford 
 Ahead. —Past Fort Morgan. — The Tennessee About to Strike. — Missed her Mark. — The Gunboats. — Their 
 Baking Fire. — The Metacomet in Pursuit of the Sebna. — The Selma Captured. — The Gaines and the Mor- 
 gan Under the Shelter of the Fort. — At Anchor. — Piped for Breakfast. — Keappearance of the Tennessee. — 
 Buchanan's Evident Intention. — Too Much Confidence. — Wooden Ships and Iron-Clads. — Monster Kams and 
 Monitors. — The Tennessee and the National Fleet. — Magnificent Fighting. — Hard Blows. — The Tennessee 
 Apparently Invulnerable. — A Tremendous Shot from the Manhattan. — Closing in Upon the Monster.— Ad- 
 miral Buchanan Woimded. — The Crew Demoralized. — The White Flag. — The Surrender. — Traces of Pun- 
 ishment. — Joy in the Land. — Praise of Farragut. — The American Nelson. — Two Historical Pictures. — The 
 Work not yet Completed. — The Forts Passed, but not Taken. — Fort Powell Abandoned. — Attack on Fort 
 Gaines. — The Fort Surrendered. — Investment of Fort Morgan. — Siege Batteries and Engineers from New 
 Orleans. — General Richard Arnold. — Keady for the Attack. — The Bombardment Commenced. — The Fort in 
 Flames. — Darkness. — The Firing Discontinued. — The Bombardment Resumed. — The Morning of the 23d 
 of August. — The White Flag. — Immediate and Unconditional Surrender. — General Page. — Un«oldierly Con- 
 duct. — Joy and Hope. 
 
 Although the great battle in Mobile 
 
 Harbor did not take place until 
 
 August, 1864, and, therefore, sub- 
 
 eeqnent to other naval engagements of 
 
 the very first importance, this seems 
 to be the fitting time and place to tell 
 the stoiy. It was, as we have seen, om^ 
 of the three great sources from which 
 
THE RIVAL FOECES. 
 
 641 
 
 in. the southwest, the Confederacy drew 
 nutriment and strength. The reduction 
 of Mobile had long since been con- 
 templated by the National government ; 
 and when, at the beginning of 1864, it 
 was resolved to strike at the very heart 
 of the Confederacy, by a movement up- 
 on Meridian and Selma, and also to cut 
 off all communication with Shreveport, 
 Mobile was in<;luded in the general 
 plan. If General Sooy Smith had suc- 
 ceeded in joining General Sheiinan at 
 Meridian, according to an'angement, 
 Selma, not improbably, would have 
 shared the fate of Meridian, and the 
 final struggle in Mobile Harbor would 
 have beta antedated by several months. 
 Simultaneously with the movement up- 
 on Meridian, a diversion, it will be re- 
 membered, was made in the direction 
 of Mobile. Even before that date, the 
 defenses of thai, harbor were occupying 
 Farragut's atcention. As early as the 
 20th of January, he made a personal 
 reconnoissance of Forts Morgan and 
 Gaines. The dav was fine, and the air 
 clear. Although he could not apjjroach 
 within a distance of three or four miles 
 from the forts, he could distinctly see 
 the guns and the men who stood by 
 them. He could see, also, the piles and 
 other obstructions which, running out 
 from Fort Gaines, blocked the channel, 
 leaving only a narrow passage-way im- 
 mediately in front of Fort Morgan. 
 The Admiral -was not encouraged by 
 what he saw to make any rash or im- 
 mediate attack ; but he did not the less 
 feel that the reduction of the defenses 
 in Mobile Harbor was the next task to 
 which he must devote all the energies 
 
 of his will and all the resources of hia 
 daring and fertile genius. 
 
 As soon as the army of General 
 Banks returned from the Red River 
 country, and General Canby took com 
 mand of the Western military division, 
 preparations began to be vigorously 
 made for a movement upon Mobile. 
 Farragut was not disposed to break 
 through his policy of caution, until he 
 should feel that the force at his dispo- 
 sal justified him in assuming the offen- 
 sive ; but he held his fleet in a state of 
 readiness for any emergency, and was 
 prepared to resist any aggressive move- 
 ment which might be made by the 
 enemy. He had need to be on his 
 guard. The Confederate authorities 
 had not been inattentive to the requii'e- 
 ments of the harbor. Not contented 
 with the forts, torpedoes, piles and 
 other obstructions which they had 
 placed in the channel, they had con- 
 structed several powerful iron-clads, by 
 means of which they hoped not only to 
 repel invasion, but to destroy the Na- 
 tional fleet and raise the blockade. The 
 largest of these ^vessels — the Tennessee 
 — constructed on the same principle as 
 the famous Merrimac of Hampton 
 Roads renown, appeared in the bay on 
 the 17th of March. Having been 
 brought down Dog River, she was 
 floated over the bar with camels. Re. 
 ferring to the circumstance, Fan-agut; 
 writing to the secretary of the navy 
 says : " Thus you perceive, I am in 
 hourly expectation of being attacked 
 by an almost equal number of vessels — ■ 
 iron-clad against wooden vessels — and u 
 most unequal contest it will be, as the 
 
MS 
 
 MOBILE HaKBOR. 
 
 Tennessee is represented as impervious 
 to all their experiments at Mobile ; so 
 that our only hope is to run her down, 
 which we shall certainly do all in our 
 power to accomplish , but should we 
 be unsuccessful, the panic in this part 
 of the country will be beyond all con- 
 trol. They will imagine that New 
 Orleans and Pensacola must fall." On 
 the 24th of May, he ran in shore, and, 
 getting a good view of the monster, 
 which was flying the blue flag of Ad- 
 miral Buchanan, he satisfied himself of 
 her dangerous character. 
 
 Farragut's fleet consisted of fourteen 
 wooden ships — the Brooklyn, Hai-tford, 
 Richmond, Lackawanna, Monougahela, 
 Ossipee, Oneida, Octorara, Metacomet, 
 Port Royal, Seminole, Kennebec, Itasca, 
 Galena. Fou r monitors — the Tecumseh, 
 Winnebago, Manhattan and Chickasaw 
 — were promised in addition to these ; 
 but it was not until the latter end of 
 July that these vessels arrived. As 
 soon as they reached him, Farragut felt 
 .hat if he was only adequately support- 
 ed by a land force, he might venture to 
 assume an offensive attitude. Admiral 
 Fariagut, Generals Canby and Granger 
 held a consultation on board the Hart- 
 ford. It was Farrasrut's desire that the 
 
 O 
 
 two principal forts — Fort Morgan and 
 Fort Gaines — should both be invested, 
 and that, when the attack was made 
 by the fleet, the land forces should co- 
 operate and create a diversion in their 
 favor. General Canby agreed to send 
 all the troops at his disposal. It was 
 soon discovered, however, that he could 
 not spare a suflicient number of men to 
 invest both forts; and, at Fanagut's 
 
 suggestion, it was finally resolved that 
 the troops who were under the com- 
 mand of General Gordon Granger 
 should give their attention first to 
 Fort Gaines. 
 
 A general description of the city of 
 Mobile, of the bay of the same name, 
 and of its means of defense, will enable 
 the reader to understand the events 
 about to be detailed. The city of 
 Mobile is situated at the head of the 
 bay, about thirty miles from the Gulf 
 of Mexico, and at the mouth of the 
 Alabama River. At the commencement 
 of the war, it had a population of about 
 20,000, and was the most important 
 place in Alabama. It was used for a 
 time by the Confederates as a naval 
 depot ; but latterly, fearing for its safe- 
 ty, they had the stores removed up the 
 river to Selma. Mobile Bay, which 
 is lai'ge and commodious, is well land- 
 locked, a narrow peninsula, about fif- 
 teen miles in length and terminating 
 in Mobile Point, shutting it in on the 
 east and southeast. On the west, it is 
 closed in by a chain of low sand banks 
 and by Dauphin Island, which separate 
 Mississippi Sound from the Gulf of 
 Mexico. Dauphin Island is about 
 twelve miles long from east to west, 
 narrow at its western extremity, about 
 a mile in width towards the east, and 
 having a narrow, projecting peninsula 
 towards the south, terminating in what 
 is called Pelican Point. To the nortli 
 of Little Dauphin Island, there is a 
 channel, called Grant's Pass, which con- 
 nects the bay with Mississippi Sound. 
 This channel, however, is narrow, aji<] 
 never has a depth of water over sever 
 
THE TENNESSEE. 
 
 643 
 
 feet. The mouth of the bay, there- 
 fore, is between Mobile Point and the 
 eastern extremity of Dauphin Island. 
 About three quarters of a mile to the 
 southwest of Mobile Point is Sand 
 Island, about half a mile long from 
 east to west, with an attached reef run- 
 ning west for about three miles. This 
 little island, with its chain of sand 
 banks, covers the principal mouth of 
 the harbor. The entrance from the 
 southeast, between Mobile Point and 
 Sand Island, is called Swash Channel. 
 The entrance from the southwest is 
 known as Middle Channel. 
 
 The bay was well guarded. At its 
 mouth, to the east and west, stood 
 Forts Morgan and Gaines. These were 
 old works, built by the United States 
 government, before the war, at great ex- 
 pense, and on the most approved prin- 
 ciples of modern construction. They 
 were fully garrisoned, and well supplied 
 with stores of all kinds. Fort Morgan 
 was built on the western end of Mobile 
 Point, and had an armament of 48 
 guns. Fort Gaines was built on the 
 eastern end of Dauphin Island, and 
 mounted 21 guns. Grant's Pass was 
 guarded by Fort Powell, a pentagonal 
 work without ditches, but surrounded 
 by piles which served also as a break- 
 water. Across the Swash and Middle 
 channels were placed rows of piles; 
 piles and other obstructions were mn 
 across from Fort Gaines, so as to com- 
 pel the vessels attacking to come fuUy 
 under the guns of Fort Morgan ; and 
 the channel was filled with torpedoes, 
 the location of which Farragut had no 
 means of knowing. In addition to all 
 
 this, there were three gunboats — the 
 Gaines, Selma and Morgan — and the 
 iron-clad ram, Tennessee. The gun- 
 boats were of superior construction, 
 and were well armed. The Tennessee 
 was of gigantic proportions, and of im- 
 mense strength. She was 209 feet in 
 length, 48 feet in breadth, and drew 
 14 feet of water. Her sides, 8 feet 
 thick, had a covering of two layers of 
 iron, each 2 inches thick. Her deck 
 was covered with a 2-inch iron plating. 
 Her casemates, which projected and 
 overhung so as to protect the hull, were 
 shielded with 6 inches of iron. She 
 was fitted with tower and turret ; and 
 she carried six rifles — two pivots, 7^ 
 inches bore, and four 6-inch broadsides, 
 capable of flinging projectiles weighing, 
 respectively, 110 and 95 pounds. She 
 was propelled by two powerful high 
 pressure engines. Such were the ob- 
 structions; and such were the actual 
 means of resistance which had to be 
 encountered and overcome, before the 
 harbor of Mobile could be said to be 
 restored to the National government. 
 
 A consultation, as has already been 
 stated, was held on the 8th of jniy 
 July, on board the flag-ship Hait- '*• 
 ford, by Farragut, Canby and Granger. 
 At this consultation, it was agreed 
 that Canby should send from New 
 Orleans 10,000 men, under General 
 Granger, and that the troops should 
 invest both Fort Gaines and Fort Mor- 
 gan, while the fleet was pressing intd 
 the harbor. It was subsequently found 
 that so many troops could not be 
 spared; and, about the 1st of August, 
 Granger arrived with 2500 men. It 
 
6U 
 
 MOBILE HARBOR. 
 
 was concluded, therefore, only to invest 
 Fort Gaines. Preparations were now 
 made for an immediate attack. 
 
 On the 5th of August, as early as 
 Aug. half-past five o'clock, the fleet was 
 ^' in motion. The vessels proceed- 
 ed two abreast, and were lashed together 
 in the following order : The Brooklyn, 
 with the Octorara on the port side ; the 
 Hartford vrith the Metacomet ; the Rich- 
 mond with the Port Royal ; the Lacka- 
 wanna with the Seminole ; the Monon- 
 gahela with the Kennebec; theOssipee 
 with the Itasca ; the Oneida with the 
 Galena. On the starboard side were the 
 monitors, and in order as follows : The 
 Tecumseh, Manhattan, Winnebago and 
 Chickasaw, The monitors were thus 
 between the fleet and Fort Morgan. 
 A slight wind was blowing from the 
 southwest. The Brooklyn was per- 
 mitted to take the lead, because she 
 carried four choice guns and was armed 
 with an ingenious contrivance for pick- 
 ing up torpedoes. Farragut took an 
 elevated position in the main rigging 
 of the Haitford, near the top, from 
 which he could overlook all the vessels 
 of the fleet. At 47 minutes past six 
 o'clock, when the fleet was steaming 
 steadily up the main channel, the Te- 
 cumseh fired the first shot. Almost 
 immediately afterwards, Fort Morgan 
 began to thunder. The Brooklyn re- 
 plied; and at once the action became 
 general. In a few moments more, 
 the Tecumseh, which was about 300 
 yards ahead of the Brooklyn, was 
 seen to disappear below the water, 
 carrying with her her gallant com- 
 mander, T. A. M. Craven, and nearly 
 
 all her crew.* She had struck a tor- 
 pedo, which exploded, tearing a great 
 hole in her bottom. At this critical 
 moment, when full under the guns of 
 the fort, and when suffering severely^ 
 the Brooklyn, as if appalled by what 
 had happened, paused and backed, so 
 as to move round out of the way of the 
 torpedoes. This action of the Brooklyn 
 brought the whole fleet to a standstill, 
 and, for a moment, threatened to hud- 
 dle the ships together, and bring about 
 a disaster similar to that which hap- 
 pened in Charleston Harbor, on the 
 occasion of Dupont's attack. FaiTagut, 
 however, was found equal to the emer 
 geney. Calling upon Drayton, he or- 
 dered him to push forward the Hart- 
 ford, heedless of possible consequences, 
 and gave directions for the rest of the 
 vessels to follow. The Brooklyn waa 
 soon under headway again, and follow- 
 ing the Hartford. No more torpedoes 
 exploded. A very tempest of sliot was 
 now brought to bear upon the fort by 
 the entire fleet. A light wind blew 
 
 • Captain Tunis Anousros M. Craten was a native of 
 New Hampshire. He entered the navy in June, 1829, 
 and served on different vessels till 1837, when, at hia 
 own request, he was placed on the Coast Survey. Aftei 
 having filled different commands, and done various 
 service, he was, when the war broke out, placed in 
 command of the Crusader, which was stationed at Key 
 West. In September, 1861, he was transferred from the 
 Crusader to the new screw-sloop Tuscarora, which waa 
 sent across the Atlantic to look after Confederate cruis 
 ers. Though he failed to overtake the Alabama, he yet 
 did good service in blockading the Sumter at Gibral- 
 tar, and in finally compelling the rebels to abandon 
 that vessel. Early in 1864 he was, at his own request, 
 placed in conunand of the monitor Tecumseh, an4 
 sailed in that vessel for Hampton Roads, where h« 
 joined the James River flotilla, and arrived among the 
 first at City Point. After some stay there, he wa« 
 ordered, with the Tecumseh, to join the squadron oi 
 Admiral Farragut. 
 
FIGHT WITH THE FLEET. 
 
 645 
 
 the smoke from the guns of the fleet in 
 the direction of the fort, thus blinding 
 the Confederate gunners. From the 
 time the Hartford turned to the north- 
 west to clear the middle ground, so 
 rapid and well-directed were her broad- 
 sides, that the batteries on the fort 
 were comparatively silenced. 
 
 At 10 minutes before eight o'clock, 
 when the Hartford had just passed the 
 fort, the other vessels following, Far- 
 ragut saw the Tennessee, with a full 
 head of steam on, bearing down, the 
 evident intention being to strike the 
 flag-ship. Happily, the monster missed 
 her aim. Her guns opened on the 
 Hartford as she passed ; but Farragut 
 made a vigorous response, and kept 
 moving along. The Confederate gun- 
 boats Morgan, Selma and Gaines were 
 ahead, and were greatly annoying Far- 
 ragut by a raking fire, which he was 
 unable to return. " The shots from the 
 gunboats," Drayton tells us, "were 
 delivered with great deliberation and 
 consequent effect, a single one having 
 killed ten men and wounded five." He 
 could only direct his fire on one of the 
 gunboats at a time. Irritated by this 
 persistent and destructive fire, Farragut 
 detached the Metacomet, ordering Cap- 
 tain Jouett to go off in pursuit of the 
 Selma. Jouett executed his appointed 
 task nobly, and with complete success. 
 The Confederate gunboats were each 
 armed with three powerful guns at 
 their stern. Although exposed for a 
 time to the concentrated fire of each of 
 them, Jouett gained on his antagonist ; 
 and, within an hour, he had captured 
 'he Selma, with her captain and the 
 
 entire crew, and driven the Morgan 
 and the Gaines — the latter in a crippled 
 condition — under cover of the fort. 
 When night fell, the Morgan escaped 
 and made her way to Mobile. The 
 Gaines was run ashore and burned. 
 
 It was now 45 minutes past eight 
 o'clock. The foi-ts were passed ; and, 
 the vessels having for the most part 
 been brought to anchor, the men were 
 piped to breakfast. The repast was not 
 to be long or quietly enjoyed. Farragut, 
 from his commanding position, espied 
 the Tennessee again making directly 
 for the National fleet, with a full head 
 of steam on, and making splendid time. 
 It was his opinion that whatever might 
 be her ultimate purpose, she had sin- 
 gled out the flag-ship as the first object 
 of her attention. The result proved 
 that he had rightly divined. Without 
 a moment's delay, he made preparations 
 for the reception of the monster iron- 
 clad. The monitors, and such other 
 vessels of the fleet as he thought best 
 adapted for the purpose, were imme- 
 diately ordered to attack the ram, aa 
 soon as she came forward, not only 
 with their guns, but with their " bows 
 on at full speed." Buchanan, the Con- 
 federate admiral, who was on board 
 the Tennessee, had evidently made up 
 his mind that he was more than a 
 match for the whole fleet. He had, 
 however, underestimated the power of 
 the National fleet quite as much as he 
 had overestimated the fighting qualities 
 of his own iron-clad. Of the fourteen 
 wooden vessels which constituted the 
 main portion of Farragut's fleet, three 
 of them were sloops of 2000 tons 
 
 *M 
 
646 
 
 MOBILE HARBOR. 
 
 burden, carrying heavy armaments of 
 9-inch Dahlgrens and 100-pounder 
 rifles. Even the smaller vessels were 
 heavily armed. Of the monitors, two 
 had 11-inch guns, and one — the Man- 
 hattan — was supplied with guns of 
 15-inch bore. Powerful as Buchanan's 
 vessel was, it revealed a vast amount 
 of both daring and confidence to at- 
 tack, single-handed, such a fleet as that 
 which obeyed the behests of a com- 
 mander having the skill and experience 
 of Admiral Farragut. Yet Buchanan 
 was not wholly without reason for 
 trusting his own ship and distrusting 
 the ships of the enemy. The Merri- 
 mac, it was true, had been defeated 
 by the Monitor ; but competent critics 
 had declared that the Memmac had not 
 been injured by 11 -inch shot. The 
 Atlanta, a vessel of the same class as 
 the Merrimac, had been captured ; but 
 her armor was only four inches thick ; 
 and, then, as will be shown in a sub- 
 sequent chapter, the Albemarle bad 
 already beaten off a whole fleet. If 
 he could get a fair blow at each of the 
 ships in succession, it was Buchanan's 
 opinion he might destroy the whole 
 National fleet, without himself being 
 seriously injured. Buchanan's calcula- 
 tions might have turned ouo to be 
 more correct, if the National fleet had 
 been commanded by another than Far- 
 .ragut. The merits of the respective 
 antagonists were now, however, soon 
 to be tested. 
 
 The ram was close at hand. A 
 warm reception awaited her. The 
 Monongahela, a vessel of 1400 tons, 
 carrying thirty pounds of steam, her 
 
 screw working sixty revolutions, was 
 the first to hit her. Moving in at 
 full speed, she struck the monster a 
 fair blow full in the side. The Mo- 
 nongahela punished herself more than 
 she punished her huge antagonist. She 
 lost her iron prow and her cutwater. 
 On retiring, she swung around, and 
 fired into the iron-clad her 11-inch guns. 
 The Tennessee was yet apparently un- 
 harmed. The next blo^v was struck 
 by the Lackawanna. She, too, suf- 
 fered severely. Her stern was cut 
 and crushed to the plank ends, from 
 three feet above to five feet below the 
 water's edge. The ram was still, to 
 all appearance, uninjured. The Hart- 
 ford was the next to move as'ainst the 
 apparently invulnerable iron-clad. As 
 the Tennessee shifted her helm and 
 shied, so to speak, the blow was a 
 glancing one. The Hartford, as she 
 rasped along, gave her a whole port 
 broadside of 9-inch solid shot. The 
 Tennessee did not as yet show any 
 signs of distress. The vessels were 
 now moving in a sort of circle around 
 the giant, the monitors more slowly 
 than the others, but hitting hard blows 
 as opportunity offered. The Chicka- 
 saw now got under the stern of the 
 Tennessee; and a 15-inch shot from 
 the Manhattan went tearing through 
 the iron plating and heavy wooden 
 backing of the casemate of the monster. 
 Farragut, now determined to force the 
 fighting, ordered Drayton to strike 
 again. At this moment, unhappily, the 
 Hartford and the Lackawanna came in- 
 to awkward collision, the former being 
 struck just forward of the mizzen-mast, 
 
SUERENDER OF THE TENNESSEE. 
 
 64? 
 
 and cut down to within two feet of 
 the water's edge. The two vessels 
 soon got disentangled, and were mak- 
 ing again for the Tennessee. Mean- 
 while, the Chickasaw was pounding 
 away at the monster's stern ; the Os- 
 sipee was about to deal a deadly 
 blow; and the Monougahela, as well 
 as the Lackawanna and the Hartford, 
 was bearing down upon her at full 
 speed. The end had now come. The 
 Tennessee had been sorely punished. 
 Her smoke-stack had been shot away ; 
 her steering-chains were gone ; and 
 several of her port-shutters had been so 
 jammed that they could not be opened. 
 Admiral Buchanan had been severely 
 wounded in the leg ; and the entire 
 crew had become demoralized. Further 
 resistance was felt to be vain. Before, 
 therefore, the threatened ])low could 
 be struck, the white flag was hoisted. 
 In a few moments more, the captain of 
 the Tennessee came on board the Hart- 
 ford, and surrendered his own sword 
 and that of Admiral Buchanan. Such 
 was the end of the famous naval en- 
 counter in Mobile Harbor. 
 
 This gi'eat victory had not been won 
 without some loss. Farragut had 166 
 killed and drowned. Of these, 113 
 went down in the Tecumseh. There 
 were 25 killed and 28 wounded on 
 board the Hartford. The Oneida had 
 8 killed and 30 wounded. Among the 
 latter was her commander, I. R. M. 
 Mullauy. It is a fact worthy of notice 
 that, on board the monitors, no one 
 was either killed or wounded. The 
 ships bore signs of severe punishment, 
 having suffered more severely at Mobile 
 
 than at New Orleans. A 7-inch shell 
 penetrated the boiler of the Oneida. 
 The Chickasaw received one plunging 
 shot through her deck. The turrets 
 of all the monitors were more or les» 
 injured. All the wounded of both fleets, 
 including Admiral Buchanan, were sent 
 to Peusacola. Buchanan's leg had to be 
 amputated. 
 
 The victory in Mobile Bay caused 
 great joy throughout the entire North, 
 and among all, everywhere, who wer» 
 friendly to the National cause. Far 
 ragut became the National idol. Hif^ 
 name resounded throughout the lengt^ 
 and breadth of the land. Men spoke 
 of him as the American Nelson ; and, 
 although there was a marked contrast, 
 in many particulars, between the mod- 
 est American and his brilliant English 
 prototype, the picturesque grandeur of 
 Farragut's two great battles — that at 
 New Orleans and that in Mobile Bay — 
 fully justified the comparison. Far- 
 ragut in the shrouds of the Hartford, 
 with the tempest of war raging below 
 him, is a grand historic picture, not un- 
 worthy to hang side by side with the 
 " Death of Nelson." 
 
 Farragut's work was not ended with 
 the defeat of the Confederate fleet. 
 The forts had been passed; but they 
 had not yet been taken. On the night 
 of the 5th, however, Fort Powell \n^, 
 was abandoned and blown up. »• 
 This was a positive gain to Farragut, 
 as it opened up Grant's Pass, and yu 
 relieved him of all anxiety in regard 
 to supplies. Fort Gaines and Fort 
 Morgan remained, the latter »s yet 
 comparatively uninjured. We h^'w 
 
648 
 
 MOBILE HAKBOB. 
 
 already eeen that Granger, with 2500 
 troops, proceeded to invest Fort Gaines 
 simultaneously with the advance of 
 the fleet. A battery of Rodman guns 
 had been planted on a sand hill, with- 
 in three quarters of a mile from the 
 fort. This battery was well served, 
 under the direction of Captain Classen. 
 The best gun in the fort was soon 
 disabled ; and so completely swept 
 were the works that Colonel Ander- 
 son, who was in command, could render 
 no assistance to Buchanan and his fleet. 
 On the morning of the 6th, Farragut 
 sent the Chickasaw to the assistance of 
 h»g. Granger. On the 7th, deeming 
 '• further resistance useless, Ander- 
 son made an unconditional suiTender of 
 the fort, with 800 men. The Western 
 channel was now under the control of 
 the National fleet. 
 
 Fort Morgan, the older and the 
 stronger work, still held out. Built on 
 the mainland, it had a better chance 
 than Fort Gaines of receiving supplies 
 and reinforcements. It was commanded 
 by General Richard L. Page, a Vir- 
 ginian. Page had signalled to Ander- 
 son, " Hold on " ; and, when that officer 
 surrendered, he cried, "Coward!" — a 
 slander which was echoed throughout 
 the entire Confederacy. An opportu- 
 nity was now to be given Page to 
 display his heroism. Granger's troops 
 were transferred from Dauphin Island 
 to the rear of Fort Morgan. Granger 
 Boon discovered that regular siege oper- 
 ations would be necessary. He sent, 
 therefore, to New Orleans for heavy 
 siege artillery and a body of engineers. 
 These were speedily at hand, under the 
 
 care and command of General Richard 
 Arnold. Batteries were rapidly con- 
 structed behind some sand hills, within 
 800 yards of the fort; and, by Aug, 
 the afternoon of the 20th, all 20. 
 the guns were in position. On this 
 line of batteries there were four 9-inch 
 Dahlgrens, on naval gun carnages, 
 eight 30-pounder Parrotts, and sixteen 
 mortars, of which twelve were 10- 
 iuch, and four 8-inch. Another line of 
 batteries was established about 400 
 yards nearer the fort. On the inner 
 line there were four Napoleon guns 
 and two 3-inch rifles. On the even- 
 ing of the 21st, General Granger 
 notified Farragut that he would be 
 ready to open fire next morning at 
 daylight. Farragut took position that 
 night; and, on the morning of jvug; 
 the 2 2d, at five o'clock, the bom- 22. 
 bardment commenced. It was contin- 
 ued with great vigor and accuracy 
 during the whole day. It was discov- 
 ered in the afternoon that a fii'e had 
 broken out inside the fort. At dark 
 the bombardment ceased. The flames 
 were still visible ; and it seemed as if 
 the fire was gathering strength. About 
 nine o'clock, it began to be manifest 
 that attempts were being made to gain 
 the mastery of the devouring element. 
 It was not the desire of either of the 
 National commanders that the fir« 
 should be extinguished. It was doing 
 their work. The bombardment was, 
 therefore, resumed, and maintained for 
 two hours, when it was discontinued 
 for the night. At five o'clock next 
 morning, the bombardment was again 
 re Bumed. Two hours later, an oflScei 
 
SUKRENDER OP FORT MORGAN, 
 
 §"49 
 
 with a white flag, accompanied by 
 about 40 men, carrying a boat, were 
 seen marching out at the main sally- 
 port. It was evidently their intention 
 to proceed to the flag-ship with a letter 
 from General Page. General Bailey, 
 of the land forces, advanced towards 
 them, obtained the letter, and handed 
 it to General Granger. This latter 
 officer promised to communicatte its 
 contents to the admiral, and to dic- 
 tate the terms of surrender wb^sn his 
 answer should be receivef^. Soon 
 afterwards. General Arnold and Cap- 
 tain Drayton appeared at the tort, and 
 demanded its immediate and uncondi- 
 tional surrender, with the garrison and 
 all the public property. Page wished to 
 stipulate for the removal of the sick and 
 wounded to Mobile. This, however, 
 could not be allowed. At two o'clock 
 the formal surrender was made. Out 
 from the main sally-port marched 600 
 men, and stacked arms. The National 
 flag again waved over the battered and 
 smoking walls of Fort Morgap 
 
 It was found, on entering, that the 
 fire had worked terrible destruction, 
 and no. doubt hastened the surrender. 
 Dreading an explosion of the magazine, 
 some 90,000 pounds of gunpowder had 
 been thrown into the cisterns. Page, 
 whooe conduct was severely animad- 
 verted on by Farragut, in his letter to 
 the secretary of the navy, was charged 
 with throwing his sword into a well, 
 and with spiking the guns after the 
 surrender. With the defenses of Mo- 
 bile, there were taken 104 guns and 
 1464 men. Farragiit's victory was 
 now complete. The National banner 
 floated supreme in the harbor of Mo- 
 bile ; and blockade-running in that 
 quarter was ended. The joy which 
 was occasioned by the victor _, over 
 the fleet, was increased and intensified 
 when it became known that the forts 
 had fallen ; and the conviction gath- 
 ered strength all over the land, and 
 found free and full expression, that 
 the hour of final triumph was close 
 "+. hand. 
 
u56 
 
 THE -WTLDBRNESS. 
 
 CHAPTER XXXIV. 
 
 ^t«r Oaattanooga. — Divided Cotmsels. — Grant the Popular Hero. — General Halleck. — "Like a Banlky Team.*-- 
 A Change for the Better. — Grant in Command of All the Armies. — Heavy Responsibilities. — His Flan 
 for Reducing the Confederacy. — Letters to Sherman. — Instructions to Banks. — Sherman's Command. — 
 The Army of the Potomac. — Meade Retained in Commamd. — Grant at Meade's Headquarters. — Wistar'a 
 Raid. — Kilpatrick's Raid. — Custer and Dahlgren. — Death of Dahlgren. — The Army of the Potomac Re- 
 organized. — The Corps, Division and Brigade Commanders. — Co-operative Arrangements. — Butler and Sigel. — 
 Bumside and the Ninth Corps. —Culpepper Court House. — The General Movement Begun. — The Army 
 of the Potomac in Motion. — Crossing the Rapidan. — In the Wilderness. — Lee Watchful and Ready. — Descrip- 
 tion of the WUdemess. — A Blood-Red Sun. — Old Wilderness Church. — The Four Roads. — Both Armies in 
 Motion. — The Battle Begun. —Terrific Fighting.^— Warren's Corps. — Wadsworth and Crawford — Warren 
 Falls Back. — Sedgwick and Getty. — A Lull in the Fight. — A Loud-Resounding Cheer. — Arrival of Hancock. — 
 The Battle Resumed.— A Drawn Battle.— The End of the First Day.— The Second Day.— A Great Battle 
 Imminent. — The Opposing Armies. — The Order of Battle. — The Attack. — Hancock's Tremendous Onset. — 
 An Unfortunate Halt. — Hancock Driven Back. — Longstreet Shot by His own Men. — The Battle Suspended. — 
 Fighting Begun Again. — A Fire in the Woods. — Hancock's Men Driven from Their Works. — Carroll's 
 Splendid Charge. — The Nationals Saved. — End of the Second Day. — The Rival Armies Bleeding and 
 Exhausted. — Grant's New Movement. — Spottsylvania Court House. — Alsop's Farm. — A Warm Reception. — 
 Fortune Favoring the Confederates. — An Unfortunate Day for the Nationals. — Vigorous Preparations for 
 Battle. — Death of Sedgwick. — Hancock's Advance. — Sheridan's Raid. — Yellowstone Tavern. — Death of J. E. 
 B. Stuart. — Co-operative Movements. — Butler's Movements. — Bermuda Hundred. — GUlmore and Beauregard. — 
 Kautz. — Butler Bottled Up. — Sigel's Movements. — Sigel Superseded by Hunter. — Hunter at Piedmont. — At 
 Ljmchburg. — At Meadow Bridge. — The Army of the Potomac Again in Motion. ^ — At the North Anna. — 
 Lee Again Ahead. — The Fords. — The Positions of the Different Corps. — Warren's Corps at Jericho Ford. — 
 Warren Severely Attacked on the South Side of the River. — The Confederates Repulsed — Hancock at 
 Taylor's Bridge. — Preparations to Take it by Storm — The Assault. — Capture of the Bridge. — Bumside's 
 Difficulty. — Lee's Peculiar Position. — His Projecting Centre.- — The Anna Recrossed. — Another Flank Move- 
 ment. — Across the Pamunkey. — Another Race for Richmond. — Lee again Ahead. — The New Base of 
 Supplies. — The Old Battle-Ground of the Peninsula. — A Contrast. — Both Armies Reinforced. — The Chicka- 
 hominy. — Sheridan Pushed Forward. — A Cavalry Encounter at Hawe's Store. — Hanover Court House. — 
 Tolopotomy Creek. — Shady Grove. — Lee's Position. — Movement on Cold Harbor. — Cold Harbor Secured. — 
 Torbert Sorely Pressed. — Concentrating at Cold Harbor. — Arrival of Smith from Bermuda Hundred. — Line 
 of Battle. — The Attack. — The First Confederate Line Penetrated. — The Second Line Impregnable. — A Heavy 
 National Loss, but Cold Harbor Held. — A Day of Preparations — The Second Day's Fighting. — A Shock of 
 Battle Unparalleled. — Piles of Dead and Wounded. — The Battle Brief, but Decisive — An Emphatic Protest. — 
 The American Soldier. — The Battle of Cold Harbor Ended. — Terrific Slaughter. — Coffee and Tobacco. — 
 Another Flank Movement. — Sheridan at Trevillian and Louisa Court House. — The Army in Motion. — Across 
 the Chickahominy. — On to the James. — South of the James. — The Success of the Movement. — The Campaign. — 
 The Losses. — Reflections. 
 
 The victory at Chattanooga, although 
 
 its far-reaching results were not 
 
 immediately visible, marked a 
 
 new departure in the progress of the 
 
 war. There was, as we have seen, 
 
 great joy throughout the land, when it 
 became known that Grant had not only 
 released the imprisoned and famishing 
 araiy, but that he had again plucked 
 glorious victory out of disastrous de- 
 
GRANT, LIEUTEN-ANT-GElfERAL. 
 
 661 
 
 feat, and snatched fresh laurels from 
 the ambitious grasp of one of the most 
 daiing as well as most trusted generals 
 of the Confederacy. General Grant 
 pow commanded the confidence of the 
 government : he had become, also, the 
 favorite popular hero. The crisis de- 
 manded such a man. 
 
 It had long been apparent that much 
 of the National strength had been 
 wasted, because of divided counsels 
 and disunited action. The army, as a 
 whole, had been badly managed. Gen- 
 eral Halleck was, it is true, the nomi- 
 nal head of the army. His office, how- 
 ever, was moi'e a name than a reality. 
 Military operations were directed some- 
 times by the president himself, without 
 the consent of any of his counsellors, 
 sometimes by Halleck or Stanton, with- 
 out the consent of the president, and 
 not unfrequently by the generals in 
 the field at their own volition, and on 
 their own responsibility. " The armies 
 of the East and West," to use Grant's 
 pithy language, "acted independently, 
 and without concert, like a haulky team, 
 flo iwo ever pulling together." A step 
 waj taken in the right direction, when 
 Ge neral Grant was placed at the head 
 of thri military division of the Missis- 
 ei^ypi — a command which virtually in- 
 cluded the entire west and southwest. 
 7 lie victory at Chattanooga did much 
 to justify the wisdom of the arrange- 
 ment Concentration of authority in 
 the management of the armies of the 
 Republic had become more and more a 
 necessity. Grant was already singled 
 ^ut as the man who should take the 
 reins in hand, and give unity and direc>- 
 
 tion to all the troops in the field. 
 Early in 18(54, the rank of lieutenant- 
 general was revived in his favor; jjar, 
 and, on the 9th of March, Grant, ''• 
 who had been siimmoned to Wa^iing- 
 ton, was received in the Executive 
 Chambei', and presented to the cabinet. 
 In handing him his commission. Presi- 
 dent Lincoln said : 
 
 " General Grant — The nation's apprecia- 
 tion of what yon have done, and its reliance 
 npon you for what remains to be done in the 
 existing great struggle, are now presented with 
 this commission, constituting you lieutenant- 
 general in the army of the United States. 
 With this high honor devolves upon you, 
 also, a corresponding responsibility. As the 
 country herein trusts you, so, under God, it 
 will sustain you. I scarcely need to add that, 
 with what I here speak for the nation, goes 
 my own hearty personal concurrence." 
 
 Grant's reply was as modest as it 
 was brief. He said : 
 
 " Mr. President — I accept the commission, 
 with gratitude for the high honor conferred. 
 With the aid of the noble armies that have 
 fought on so many fields for our common 
 country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to 
 disappoint your expectations. I feel the full 
 weight of the responsibilities now devolving 
 on me; and I know tliat if they are met, it 
 will be due to those a^ niej, and, above all, to 
 the favor of that Providence which leads both 
 nations and men." 
 
 On the 10th, he made a rapid visit, 
 with Meade, to the army of the Mir. 
 Potomac. On the same day, a *®» 
 special order of the president assigned 
 him to the command of all the ai-mies. 
 The next day, he hurried westward to 
 Nashville, where he had made arrange- 
 ments to meet Sherman for consuita 
 tion- 
 
THE WILDERNESa 
 
 Grant had great reason to be proud 
 of the position to which he had attained. 
 Success had attended his efforts on the 
 field of battle; and a grateful people, 
 lavish of their favors, had showered 
 upon him their choicest gifts. His, 
 however, was not a head to be easily 
 turned. Vanity or vainglory found no 
 place in his character. He bore his 
 honors meekly; and, soldier-like, he 
 thought of his companions-in-arms — 
 those who had shared with him the 
 hardships and perils of the battle field, 
 ^nd who \vere now fully entitled to 
 participate in his honors. When first 
 made aware of the intentions of the 
 government, he wrote to Sherman a 
 characteristic letter. 
 
 " Wliile I have been eminently successful in 
 the war, in at least gaining the confidence of 
 the public, no one feels more than I how 
 much of this success is due to the energy and 
 skill of those whom it has been my good for- 
 tune to have occupying subordinate positions 
 under me. There are many ofiicers to whom 
 these remarks are applicable, in a greater or 
 less degree, proportionate to their ability as 
 soldiers; but what I want is to express my 
 thanks to you and McPherson, as the men to 
 whom, above all others, I feel indebted for 
 whatever I have had of success. How far 
 your advice and assistance have been of help 
 to me, you know. How far your execution of 
 whatever has been given you to do entitles 
 you to the reward I am receiving, you cannot 
 know as well as I. I feel all the gratitude this 
 letter would express, giving it the most flatter- 
 ing construction." 
 
 In his new position, heavy responsi- 
 bilities (^"evolved on General Grant. 
 He was entrusted with the care of all 
 the armies of the Republic. It was 
 necessary for him to take into consider- 
 ation not one army only, or one section 
 
 of the country, but the entire field of . 
 actual and possible operations. The 
 theatre was large. The National navy 
 had succeeded in blockading almost 
 the entire sea-coast. There were garri- 
 sons at Plymouth, Washington and 
 New Berne, in North Carolina. Foot- 
 holds had been secured at Beaufort, 
 Folly Island, Morris' Island, Hilton 
 Head and Port Royal, in South Caro- 
 lina. The same was true of Feruan- 
 dina, St. Augustine, Key West and 
 Pensacola, in Florida. New Orleans, 
 with its river approaches, was in the 
 hands of the Nationals ; and a small 
 garrison had been established at the 
 mouth of the Rio Grande. The Mis- 
 sissippi was gamsoned at various points 
 from St. Louis to its mouth. Posts 
 were established along the entire line 
 of the Arkansas. The line of the Ten- 
 nessee and the Holston was guarded by 
 National troops ; and a small but firm 
 foothold had been secured in Georgia, 
 south of Chattanooga. Although Vir- 
 ginia was still debatable territory, the 
 Nationals were in possession of Nor- 
 folk, Fortress Monroe and some adjoin- 
 ing territory. It was necessary to 
 maintain all these garrisons, to pre- 
 serve these various footholds, to protect 
 their communications, and to provide 
 them with needed supplies. This, how- 
 ever, was not all. The Confederates 
 were yet strong in the field. Ono 
 powerful ai'my, under Lee, lay along 
 the south bank of the Rappahannock, 
 confronting the army of the Potomaa 
 Another powerful army, under Johns- 
 ton, was securely encamped at Daltoo, 
 guarding the approaches to Atlanta 
 
GRANT'S PLANS. 
 
 868 
 
 the second capital and stronghold of 
 the Confederacy. A third powerful 
 army, under Kirby Smith, held sway 
 in Texas and Southern Arkansas, In 
 Northeastern Mississippi, Forrest, with 
 a strong body of cavalry, was scouring 
 the country at will. After three years 
 of hard fighting, during which there 
 had been an almost unparalleled ex- 
 penditure of blood and treasure, such 
 was still the situation. In order to re- 
 store the Union, it was necessary to 
 crush out those armies, and so break 
 the military power of the Confederacy. 
 Such were the onerous duties and re- 
 sponsibilities which now devolved upon 
 General Grant. Success had hitherto 
 attended his movements and crowned 
 his efforts. It remained to be seen 
 whether, in his new position, he would 
 be as faithfully accompanied by the 
 smiles and favors of fortune. 
 
 Let us now see how Grant proposed 
 to accomplish these herculean labors. 
 Sherman, it is to be remembered, simul- 
 taneously with the elevation of Grant, 
 was placed in command of the military 
 division of the Mississippi, composed 
 of the departments of the Ohio, the 
 Cumberland, the Tennessee and the 
 Arkansas. General J. B. McPherson 
 was, at the same time, assigned to the 
 command of the department and army 
 of the Tennessee. General Halleck, 
 having been relieved from duty as 
 general-in-chief, was appointed chief 
 of staff at Washington, under the di- 
 rection of the secretary of war and the 
 lieutenant-general commanding. Grant, 
 as we have seen, had gone to Nashville 
 on the 11th of March, to consult with 
 
 275 
 
 Sherman. On the 17th, and juar. 
 while still with Sherman, he is- Is- 
 sued General Orders No. 1. In obedi- 
 ence to the order of the president, he 
 assumed command of the armies of the 
 United States; and his headquarters 
 were to be in the field and, until further 
 orders, with the army of the Potomac. 
 On the 19th, he left Nashville for 
 Washington, and proceeded thence, 
 with as little delay as possible, to the 
 headquarters of General Meade, at Cul- 
 pepper Court House. Steps were im. 
 mediately taken for reconstructing the 
 ariny, and getting it ready for battle. 
 Meanwhile, Grant's plans were assum- 
 ing somewhat of a definite shape. He 
 had discussed with Sherman, at Nash- 
 ville, the course which ought to be 
 pursued all over the battle area. In a 
 letter written to Sherman on April 
 4th, Grant stated his views with great 
 freedom and with considerable fulness. 
 It was his intention, if the enemy did 
 not anticipate him, to take the initia- 
 tive in the spring campaign. With this 
 end in view, he had sent a special ;'ie&- 
 senger to Banks — at that time, aa has 
 already been related, on his y/T,y to 
 Shreveport — instructing him tc finish 
 up the expedition, to send l>d,ck to 
 Sherman the men he had r,orrowed, 
 and to hurry forward prepa; ations for 
 an attack on Mobile. For ij-.msolf, he 
 had decided to stay with the army of 
 the Potomac; and he was making ready 
 to attack Lee's army wherever it might 
 be found. In a few days he would be 
 strengthened by the addition of 25,000 
 effective men, under Genera] Barn«ida 
 Co-opei'ative movements wer'~ to V ■• 
 
654 
 
 THE WILDERNESS, 
 
 conducted by General Butler and by 
 General Sigel. Butler was to be 
 joined by Gillmore, with 10,000 men 
 from the department of the South. His 
 force would thus be increased to 30,000 
 men. With W. F. Smith commanding 
 his right wing and Gillmore his left, 
 Butler was to move on Richmond, from 
 Fortress Monroe, by the south side of 
 the James River. Sigel, who had been 
 charged with the protection of West 
 Virginia and the frontiers of Pennsyl- 
 vania and Maryland, was to collect all 
 his available forces, to arrange them in 
 two columns, and to move them — one 
 from Beverley, Virginia, and the other 
 from Charlestown, on the Kanawha — 
 against the Virginia and Tennessee 
 Raihoad. Advancing from opposite 
 points, and converging towards a com- 
 mon centre, it was expected that these 
 co-opei'ative movements would distract 
 Lee's attention, and compel him to send 
 detachments from his main force to 
 protect his westward lines of supplies. 
 For Sherman, Grant had no instruc- 
 •iions other than those ah'eady given. 
 He did not propose to lay down for 
 bim a plan of campaign. He was 
 to move against Johnston's army, to 
 break it up, to advance into the ene- 
 my's country, and to inflict what dam- 
 age he could. Some ten days later, 
 writing to Sherman, Grant was more 
 explicit : 
 
 "What I now want more particularly to say 
 is that, if the two main attacks — yours and 
 the one from licre — should promise great suc- 
 cess, the enemy may, in a fit of desperation, 
 abandon one part of their line of defense and 
 throw their whole strength upon a single army, 
 believing a defeat with one viotorj to sustain 
 
 them better than a defeat all along theii 
 whole line, and hoping, too, at the same time, 
 that the army, meeting with no resistance, 
 will rest perfectly satisfied with its laurels, 
 having penetrated to a given point south, 
 thereby enabling them to throw their whole 
 force first upon one and then on the other. 
 With the majority of military commanders, 
 they might do this ; but you have had too 
 much experience, travelling light, and subsist- 
 ing upon the country, to be caught by any 
 such ruse. I hope my experience has not been 
 thrown away. My directions, then, would be, 
 if the enemy in your front shows signs of join- 
 ing Lee, follow him up to the extent of your 
 ability. I will prevent the concentration of 
 Lee upon your front, if it is in the power of 
 this army to do it." 
 
 Such was the general plan of cam- 
 paign for the armies generally for the 
 spring of 1864, It is evident, from the 
 tenor of these instructions, that Grant's 
 thoughts were becoming more and 
 more occupied with two main centres 
 of action. There was the army of Lee 
 guarding Richmond; and there was 
 the army of Johnston, who had suc- 
 ceeded Bragg, covering the approaches 
 to Atlanta. If these two armies could 
 be broken and scattered, or destroyed, 
 the Confederacy would be at an end. 
 Richmond and Atlanta, with their rival 
 armies — these were now to become the 
 absorbing centres of attraction. It 
 was part of Grant's plan that when 
 the proper hour arrived, the blow 
 should be struck simultaneously in the 
 west and in the east. Leaving Sherman 
 for the present, let us now turn our 
 faces eastward, and contemplate the 
 mighty hosts who are preparing for 
 battle on the banks of the Rapidan. 
 
 During the winter of 18G3-4, the 
 army of the Potomac and the army of 
 
WISTAE'S RAID. 
 
 655 
 
 Northern Virginia lay, the former on 
 the northern, the latter on the south- 
 ern bank of the Rapidan. Meade's 
 headquarters were at Culpepper Court 
 House, on the Orange and Alexandria 
 Railroad, about seventy -five miles 
 northwest of Richmond in a direct 
 line. Lee's headquarters were at 
 Orangfe Court House, on the same line 
 of railroad. The battle of Gettysburg 
 had been fought and won on the 3d of 
 July, 1863. On the 5th, Lee com- 
 menced his reti'eat back towards Vir- 
 ginia. The pursuit was continued as 
 far as Williamsport, where, on the 
 12th, the Confederate chief succeeded 
 in retiring his whole army across the 
 Potomac. Meade followed into Vir- 
 ginia ; and, aftpr a s n-ies of daring, 
 sometimes perilous, but withal ineffect- 
 ual manoeuvres, made on both sides, 
 the rival armies went into winter quar- 
 ters, as above indicated. 
 
 In the earlier months of the year, 
 and befoi'e the commencement of the 
 great campaign, there Avere several de- 
 sultory and unimportant movements, 
 which, although not destined to exer- 
 cise any perceptible influence on the 
 war, were yet sufficient to break up 
 the dull monotony of camp life in win- 
 ker time. 
 
 The first of these movements occurred 
 early in February, and originated with 
 General Butler, then commanding in 
 Virginia and North Carolina. Public 
 feeling was greatly excited all over the 
 North because of the cruel treatment of 
 the National pnsoners of war at Rich- 
 mend Butler resolved to make a bold 
 effort to effect the deliverance of the 
 
 prisoners. His suggestions found favor 
 at headquarters; and arrangements were 
 made by which he was to have a species 
 of co-operative aid fi-oni the army peb. 
 of the Potomac. On the 5th of 5- 
 February, General Wistar, with a coh 
 umn of cavaliy and infantry, about 
 1500 strong, set out from New Kent 
 Court House, and pushed rapidly to 
 the north. Suitable demonstration was 
 made by the array of the Potomac, 
 General Sedgwick pushing portions of 
 the army aci'oss at three different fords 
 — Ely's, Barnett's and Germania. Wis- 
 tar reached Bottom Bridge at half-past 
 two on the morning of the 6th, having 
 marched forty -seven miles in sixteen 
 and a half hours. His presence there 
 became known in Richmond, and cre- 
 ated the wildest excitement. A large 
 portion of the garrison had been with- 
 drawn to reinforce Pickett in North 
 Carolina. It was feai'ed that the city 
 might be successfully invaded, and that 
 the National prisoners would be liber- 
 ated. The alarm bells were, therefore, 
 rune, and the Home Guard assembled. 
 The raid, however, proved a failure. 
 Such were the obstructions at Bottom 
 Bridge, and so well guarded was the 
 \vhole line of the Chickahominy, that 
 Wistar found it impossible to cross the 
 stream. The attempt was finally aban- 
 doned about noon ; and the return 
 march was made to New Kent with 
 great rapidity an(l without loss. 
 
 Later in the same month, there was 
 another and more formidable move- 
 ment, similar in its origin and general 
 character, and having the same end in 
 view — the liberation of the National 
 
656 
 
 THE WILDERNESS. 
 
 prisoners in Richmond. It was spoken 
 of at the time, and afterwards, as Kil- 
 patrick's raid. The movement was 
 Peb, manifold. On the 27th, a body 
 27» of infantry, under General Sedg- 
 wick, left camp near Culpepper Court 
 House, and moved in the direction of 
 Madison Court House, some fifteen 
 miles to the southwest. The day fol- 
 lowing. General Birney advanced, with 
 a division, in the same direction. Sedg- 
 wick occupied Madison Court House 
 and the heights along Robertson's River. 
 Birney occupied James City, somewhat 
 to the west of Culpepper Court House. 
 On the 28 th, a body of cavalry, under 
 General Custer, was pushed forward in 
 the direction of Charlottesville, where 
 the railroad from Lynchburg forms a 
 junction with that of the Orange and 
 Alexandria. The capture of this place 
 would have been most damaging to 
 Lee's communications with the west. 
 In ten hours, Custer was within four 
 miles of Charlottesville, where he sur- 
 prised a camp of Stuart's cavalry, with 
 horse batteries. The camp equipage 
 was destroyed; and six caissons were 
 blown up. For the want of the neces- 
 sary material, it was found to be im- 
 possible to spike the guns. The enemy 
 rallied rapidly and in great force ; and 
 Custer found it necessary to retreat. 
 On his backward course, however, he 
 worked considerable damage, destroy- 
 ing mills and other property. Night 
 coming on, he lost his way, and was 
 compelled to bivouack in the woods. 
 Next morning, about nine o'clock, hav- 
 ing discovered his way, he found his 
 passage completely blocked by Stuart's 
 
 cavalry. He was near Stannardsville. 
 Ordering a charge, he cut his way 
 through in the most gallant manner, 
 and returned to Madison Court House, 
 without the loss of a single man, and 
 bringing with him about 50 prisoners, 
 a large number of negroes and some 
 300 horses. 
 
 General Kilpatrick, on the 28th, left 
 Culpepper, at the head of some Feb. 
 5000 or 6000 cavalry and horse 28. 
 artillery. Crossing the Rapidan at Ger- 
 mania and Ely's fords, and sweeping 
 around Lee's right flank, he reached 
 Spottsylvania Court House on the even- 
 ing of the 29th. At this point, he des- 
 patched Colonel Ulric Dahlgren, with 
 about 500 of his picked men, with in- 
 structions to move in a southwesterly 
 direction towards Frederickshall, where 
 it was known a large number of Con- 
 federate guns were stored. It wa&, 
 Kilpatrick's hope that Dahlgren, after 
 making a successful raid through Louisa 
 and Goochland counties, would be able 
 to strike Richmond on the south, while 
 he himself was entering it from the 
 north or northwest. Kilpatrick, mean^ 
 while, pushed rapidly forward, leaving 
 evidence of his desolating visit every- 
 where behind him. At Beaver Dam 
 Station, he encountered and defeated 
 the Confederates, under Bradley T. 
 Johnson. He then struck across the 
 South Anna, and cut the Fredericks- 
 burg and Richmond Railroad, at Kilby 
 Station. On the 1st of March, he was 
 close upon the Confederate capital. He 
 advanced within the first and within 
 the second lines of defense ; buf he 
 looked in vain for any signs of *;he 
 
KILPATllICK'S RAID. 
 
 Gbl 
 
 presence of Dahlgren. When within 
 half a mile of the city, he was effectual- 
 ly resisted, and compelled to fall back. 
 Seeking safety in flight, he moved in 
 the direction of Mechanicsville, the 
 enemy foEowiug in vigorous pursuit. 
 Having succeeded in crossing the Chick- 
 ahominy, he pushed towards the Pa- 
 munkey. This latter, however, he found 
 it impossible to ford. Crossing the 
 Richmond and York River Railroad, 
 he moved in the direction of White 
 House, where he met a relief party, 
 which Butler had sent up from New 
 Kent Court House. At this point the 
 pursuit ceased, the retreat being con- 
 tinued down the peninsula. Kilpatiick 
 had failed in his main purpose, and 
 he had lost 150 men; but, by the de- 
 struction of stores and railroad prop- 
 erty, and by the capture of 500 prison- 
 ers and a lai'ge number of horses, he 
 had inflicted a damaging blow on the 
 Confederacy. 
 
 What, meanwhile, had become of 
 Dahlgren ? He had faithfully, as far 
 at least as was possible, carried out 
 the instructions given him. Following 
 the prescribed route, he had reached 
 Frederickshall, and destroyed the rail- 
 road. Had he been an hour eai'lier, he 
 would have intercepted Lee, who had 
 just passed over. Pushing forward, he 
 would have been on the outskirts of 
 Richmond in sufficient time to co-oper- 
 ate with Kilpatrick, but for the treach- 
 ery of a negro guide, who led him out 
 of his way. As it was, he did not 
 reach the outer lines until late in the 
 afternoon of the 2d of March. Hurry- 
 ing down the north bank, he passed 
 
 the outer works without difficulty, and 
 was pressing forward with great energy 
 towards the inner, when the enemy fell 
 upon him with overwhelming force. 
 Observing no signs of Kilpatrick, and 
 soon learning that his attempt had 
 failed, Dahlgren deemed it prudent to 
 retrace his steps. It was his only 
 chance of safety. The situation, how- 
 evei", was desperate. The Confederate 
 militia, aroused by the unwelcome visit 
 of Kilpatrick, swarmed around him,' 
 panting for revenge. He had to fight 
 his way at eveiy turn and bend. In 
 one of his encounters he, with Major 
 Cook and about 100 men, became sep- 
 arated from the main body of his com- 
 mand. Thus isolated, he had, on the 
 night of the 3d, fought his way to the 
 Mattapony, and crossed at Dabney's 
 Ferry. Here, however, he fell into an 
 ambush, and was completely surround- 
 ed. Dahlgren and several of his com- 
 panions were killed. The remainder 
 of his little band were made prisoners. 
 The fate of this unfortunate young 
 leader created great excitement in the 
 North. He w^s the son of Admiral 
 Dahlgren ; and, although only twenty- 
 one years of age, he had given proof 
 not only of great daring, but of singu- 
 lar ability as a cavalry officer. He had 
 already lost a foot in the service of liis 
 country ; and, at the time of his death, 
 he was still suffering from the unhealed 
 wound. 
 
 These expeditions, although inspired 
 by the noblest and V)est of motives, and 
 in every sense ^praiseworthy, all proved 
 more or less abortive. Richmond was 
 not to be taken ; the jjrisoners were 
 
668 
 
 THE WILDERNESS. 
 
 not to he delivered by such means. 
 The woik, however, was now to be 
 done in a diiferent and more effective 
 style. 
 
 March was drawing to a close when 
 General Grant arrived at Culpepper 
 Court House, and established his head- 
 quarters with the army of the Potomac. 
 His first attention was given to the re- 
 organization of that army. Consoli- 
 dation had become a necessity, from 
 the reduced numbers of some of the 
 divisions. Preliminary to all other ar- 
 I'angements, Grant had wisely conclud- 
 ed to retain in chief command Major- 
 General Meade. By his victory at 
 Gettysburg, Meade had won the re- 
 spect and confidence of the army, 
 the approbation of the public, as 
 well as a world-wide renown. He had 
 .proved himself to be a skilful tactician; 
 and he had the advantage of possessing 
 a thorough knowledge of the army in 
 all its departments. Under the new 
 arrangement, he sustained to Grant the 
 same relations that the corps command- 
 ers sustained to himself. Meade and 
 Sherman stood on the same level. 
 They were Grant's first-lieutenants. 
 Grant gave his instructions to Meade, 
 who had the handling of the army and 
 the working out of all the details. 
 The arrangement proved to be agree- 
 able to both parties ; and it was, doubt- 
 less, the best possible in the circum- 
 stances. Gi'aut said, afterwards : 
 
 "Commanding all the armies, as I did, I 
 tried, as far as possible, to leave General Meade 
 in independent command of the army of the 
 Potomac. My instructions for that army were 
 all through him, and were general in their 
 nature, leaving all the details and execution 
 
 to him. The campaigns that followed proved 
 him to be the right man in the right place. 
 His commanding always in the presence of 
 an officer superior to him in rank has drawn 
 from him much of that public attention which 
 his zeal and ability entitled him to, and which 
 he would otherwise have received." 
 
 In its new form the army of the Po- 
 tomac was consolidated into three corps 
 — the Second, Fifth and Sixth — ^which 
 were commanded respectively by Han- 
 cock, Warren and Sedgwick. These 
 were men of high character and of 
 proved ability, although their excel- 
 lences were naturally not all of the 
 same kind. Major-General Winfield 
 Scott Hancock had long been a prom- 
 inent leader in the army of the Poto- 
 mac. His magnifient personal presence 
 won for him, at Williamsburg, the title 
 of " superb" ; and he was possessed of 
 those magnetic qualities which, on the 
 field of battle, attract and inspire the 
 soldier. At Gettysburg he shone like 
 a star of the first magnitude ; and, while 
 he saved the National army and con- 
 verted defeat into victory, he co/ered 
 himself with glory. I\Ia rrr-General 
 Governeur K. Warren, pla /jO in com- 
 mand of the Fifth corps, ra ^P;cer of 
 engineers, and comparativv>l^ a young 
 man, had, on several iija^rcant occa- 
 sions, revealed not '^nly dash and 
 daring, but the higher qualities of gen- 
 eralship, such as qu'^kness of percep- 
 tion of danger or of opportunity, pres- 
 ence of mind, promptitude of action, 
 and skill in combination. But for hia 
 quick discernment and prom})t and de* 
 termined action, at Littlff Round Top, 
 on the second day at Gettysburg, the 
 National left might have beet turned- 
 
REORGANIZATION. 
 
 658 
 
 and the whole army thrown into con- 
 fusion, and probably routed. His ad- 
 vancement had been rapid, but it had 
 not been beyond his deserts. The com- 
 mander of the Sixth corps was Major- 
 General John Sedgwick, of Freder- 
 icksburg renown, the man who, more 
 than any other, sustained the reputa- 
 tion of the army of the Potomac and 
 the dignity of the National cause, at 
 Chancellorsville. Sedgwick was as 
 brave as he was modest, as able as he 
 was unpretentious. The high honor 
 of commanding the army of the Poto- 
 mac he had more than once declined. 
 Such were the three men on whom 
 Meade depended for the execution of 
 his orders and the directions of the 
 genei-al-in-chief. A better choice could 
 hardly have been made. 
 
 The division commanders had been 
 chosen with equal care. Those of the 
 Second corps were respectively Barlow, 
 of the First division ; Gibbon, of the 
 Second ; Birney, of the Third ; Carr, of 
 the Fourth. Those of the Fifth corps 
 were, in the same order. Griffin, Robin- 
 son, Crawford, Wadsworth. Those of 
 the Sixth corps were Wright, Getty 
 and Prince. 
 
 The brigade commanders, also, were 
 men of known capacity and tried abili- 
 ty. They were, of the Second corps. 
 Miles, Smyth, Frank and Brooke, of 
 the First division ; Webl), Owens and 
 Carroll, of the Second; Ward and Hays, 
 of the Third ; Mott and Brewster, of 
 the Fourth. Of the Fifth corps, they 
 were Barnes, Bartlett and Ayres, of 
 the First division ; Leonard, Baxter 
 and Deunison, of the Second; McCand- 
 
 less and Fisher, of the Third; Cutler, 
 Rice and Stone, of the Fourth. Of 
 the Sixth corps, they were Torbert, 
 Upton, Burnham and Shaler, of the 
 First; Wheaton, Grant, Neill, Eustis, 
 of the Second ; Morris and Russell, of 
 the Third. 
 
 The inspectors-general were reaper 
 tively Lieutenant-Colonel C. H. Mor- 
 gan, of the Second ; Lieutenant-Colonel 
 H. C. Bankhead, of the Fifth ; Lieuten- 
 ant-Colonel M. T. McMahon, of the 
 Sixth. The chiefs of artillery, taking 
 them in the same order, were Colonel 
 J. C. Tidball, Colonel C. 8. Wainright 
 and Colonel C. H. Tompkins. The cav- 
 alry were entrusted to the able hands 
 of Major-General Philip H. Sheridan. 
 Brigadier-General Henry J. Hunt re- 
 mained in charge of the artillery. Col- 
 onel H. S. Burton being second in 
 command. The onerous duties of the 
 quartermaster's department still de- 
 volved on the able shoulders of Briga- 
 dier-General Rufus Ingalls.* 
 
 * GenebaIj Gbant's staff waa composed as follows. 
 Brigadier-General John A. KawUns, chief of staff, 
 Lieutenant-Colonel T. S. Bowers, assistant adjutant, 
 general ; Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Comstock, senior 
 aide-de-camp ; lieutenant-Colonel O. E. B. Babcock, 
 aide-de-camp ; Lieutenant-Colonel F. T. Dent, aide- 
 de-camp ; Lieutenant-Colonel Horace Porter, aido-de- 
 camp ; Lieutenant-Colonel \V. L. Duff, assistant in- 
 spector-general ; Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. Rowley, 
 secretary; Lieutenant-Colonel Ad»m Badeau, secretary; 
 Captain E. S. Parker, assistant adjutant-general ; Cap- 
 tain George K. Leet, assistant adjutant-general, in 
 charge of office at Washington ; Captain P. T. Hudson, 
 aide-de-camp ; Captain H. W. Jones, assistant quarter- 
 master, on duty at headquarters; First-Lieutenanlj 
 William Dunn, junior, Eighty-Third Indiana Volun- 
 teers, acting aide-de-camp. 
 
 General Meade's chief of staff was Major-General A. 
 A. Humphrey, a iield-officor of engineers, who, as a di- 
 vision commander, had won distinction at Gettysburg. 
 His adjutant-general was General Soth Williams, an offl- 
 «er admirably (qualified for the special duties of his poa^ 
 
660 
 
 TUB WlLDEB?j:i;SS. 
 
 Such, under its new organization, 
 was the army of the Potomac. This, 
 however, was not the only force on 
 which General Grant could rely. On 
 its way from East Tennessee, the Ninth 
 army corps, under General Bumside, 
 had rendezvoused at Annapolis, where 
 it had recruited and added a whole di- 
 vision of colored troops. On the 23d of 
 Iprll April, Burnside's troops were re- 
 23. viewed in Washington by Presi- 
 dent Lincoln, and marched at once to 
 Culpepper to join the army of the Poto- 
 mac. Burnside remained for a time in 
 separate command, receiving his orders 
 not through Meade, but directly from 
 Grant. The united strength of the four 
 corps gave Grant a movable column 
 of about 140,000 men of all arms. 
 These figures, however, did not fully 
 ^present his effective strength. There 
 "tvere, in addition, the co-operative 
 forces — those under Butler, 33,000 
 strong, and those under Sigel, some 
 20,000 strong; and Grant could count 
 with confidence on a portion, at least, 
 of the 100,000 men promised for one 
 hundred days by the governors of Ohio, 
 Indiana, Illinois and Iowa. 
 
 The army of Northern Virginia, as 
 General Lee's army was called, was 
 greatly inferior in numbers to that of 
 the Potomac. It had, for the time, 
 been much reduced by furloughs. At 
 the beginning of May, the entire force 
 at Lee's disposal — foot, horse and artil- 
 lery — did not exceed 60,000. It was 
 divided into three corps, commanded 
 respectively by Ewell, Hill and Long- 
 street. The three corps lay en echelon. 
 Kwell was on the left and somewhat in 
 
 advance, his own right resting on the 
 river ; Hill was in the centre, at Orange 
 Court House ; Longstreet was further 
 to the south, at Gordonsville. 
 
 By the end of April, General Grant's 
 arrangements were completed ; and 
 everything was in readiness for a gen- 
 eral forward movement. Sherman, 
 whose operations will be detailed in a 
 subsequent chapter, was awaiting the 
 signal to march from Chattanooga. 
 Meade was ready to march the array 
 of the Potomac across the Rapidan, his 
 instructions being to turn, if possible, 
 the Confederate right, and interpose 
 between Lee and Richmond. Butler, 
 who had been fully instructed as to 
 the part he should take in the cam- 
 paign, was ready to move up the 
 James, in the direction of City Point. 
 Sigel, having arranged his army in two 
 columns — the one under General Crook, 
 to operate on the Kanawha, the other 
 under his own care, to operate on the 
 Shenandoah — was prepared to move 
 whenever the signal should be given. 
 
 On the night of the 3d of May, the 
 army of the Potomac broke up May 
 its encampments; and, in two col- 3. 
 umns, it began to move toward the 
 Rapidan, the right from Culpepper, 
 and the left from Stevensburg. On the 
 same day, Butler moved from Fortress 
 Monroe. Sigel had already set out as 
 directed, two days before. 
 
 For the present, we shall remain 
 \\ith and follow the fortunes of the 
 army of the Potomac. The right col- 
 umn of that army, made up of the corps 
 of Warren and Sedgwick, moved in 
 the direction of Germania Ford. The 
 
ACROSS THE RAPIDAN. 
 
 66, 
 
 left, which consisted of Hancock's corps, 
 moved in the direction of Ely's Ford. 
 All during the night and the greater 
 jiart of the following day, the banks of 
 the river presented a lively scene. It 
 was such a scene as even the eye of the 
 war-hardened veteran rarely looks up- 
 on. One hundred and forty thousand 
 men, including some 10,000 cavalry, 
 rt^ith artillery in proportion, and an 
 army-train of 4000 wagons, were press- 
 ing towaids the river, or crossing the 
 biidges, or spreading themselves out in 
 huge masses on the banks beyond. Be- 
 fore night, Meade had taken his entire 
 army across the river, Warren's corps, 
 forming the advance of the right col- 
 umn, *vith Wilson's cavalry division in 
 front, reached Germania Ford at six 
 May o'clock on the morning of Thurs- 
 ■*• day, the 4th , and, as soon as the 
 bridge was laid, began the passage, 
 wliich was completed bj one o'clock. 
 Sedijwick's column followed immediate- 
 ly afterwards. Hancock, with the left 
 column, Gregg's cavalry division pre- 
 ceding, crossed at an early hour; and 
 by nine o'clock he was at Chaucellors- 
 ville, where he rested for the remainder 
 of the day. Warren, after crossing 
 the river, had pushed on to Old Wil- 
 derness Tavern, where he bivouacked. 
 Sedgwick, who was the last to cross, 
 remained for the night near the river. 
 The cavalry were well thrown out 
 towards Orange Court House, Fi'ed- 
 ericksburg and Todd's Tavern. Burn- 
 eide, with the Ninth corps, was still 
 at Culpepper Court House, where he 
 had been ordered to remain for twenty- 
 four hours', when, it was supposed. 
 
 ! the first and second columns would be 
 safely on the southern banks of the 
 Rapidan. The wagon-trains, also, for 
 the present, were left on the northern 
 banks. Such was the general posi-j 
 tion of General Grant's forces on the 
 night of the 4th and the morning of 
 the 5th, 
 
 Lee had not been ignorant of Grant's 
 movements. From the signal-station 
 on the summit of Clark's Mountain, he 
 had a wide and commanding view of 
 the entire country ; and the beacon-fires 
 which blazed throughout the night, 
 rendered conspicuous by the all-sur- 
 rounding gloom, showed that he was 
 concentrating his scattered forces, and 
 preparing for the onset of the foe. It 
 was evident that Lee had concluded 
 that it was best for him to allow Grant 
 to cross the river unopposed, and to 
 offer him battle afterwards. He might 
 have acted differently. He might have 
 allowed a portion of the opposing army 
 to pass, and then, by destroying the 
 means of passage, attempted to destroy 
 the isolated fraction. He might have 
 directly opposed the passage of the 
 river, and, by occupying advantageous 
 positions, prevented them from deploy- 
 ing. Neither of those courses, however, 
 commended themselves ; and following 
 the example which he had set at Fred- 
 ericksburg, he gave his antagonist full 
 opportunity to cross the river, to taka 
 position, and more fully to develop his 
 plans. His position behind Mine Run 
 was strong ; and for a whole winter it 
 had defied the skill of Meade, and 
 all the valor of the army of the Po- 
 tomac. Even if Grant did attempt 
 
 1(76 
 
Mi 
 
 THE WILDERNESS. 
 
 to turn his right, he could rely on his 
 well-trained legions for support; and 
 the country, with which he was thor- 
 oughly familiar, was better adapted for 
 purposes of resistance than for purposes 
 of attack. 
 
 We are now fairly in the Wilderness. 
 It is a wild and desolate region of worn- 
 out tobacco-fields, covered with scraggy 
 oaks and pines, sassafras and hazel, and 
 intersected with narrow roads and deep 
 /•avines. It is a strange battle-ground ; 
 yet it is here, amid these jungles, on 
 these narrow wood roads, and in these 
 deep ravines, that is about to be fought 
 one of the mightiest and most bloody, 
 if not most decisive, battles of the war. 
 Manifestly, Grant had not intended that 
 the battle should take place in the 
 forest. He felt proud because of the 
 success which had attended the crossing 
 of the Rapidan. It was confessedly a 
 perilous operation ; and the fact that it 
 had been accomplished " in the face of 
 an active, large, well-appointed, and 
 ably-commanded army," was well fitted 
 to relieve his mind of the most " serious 
 apprehensions." It was his hope, if 
 not his conviction, that another day's 
 march would euaVjle him to push the 
 army beyond the Wilderness, and, using 
 it as a mask, to advance rapidly on Gor- 
 donsville, and take a position between 
 Lee's army and the Confederate capital. 
 It was Grant's expectation, in fact, that 
 Lee, as soon as he was made aware of 
 the movements of the National army, 
 would fall back towards Richmond. 
 With this end in view, Sheridan was 
 instructed to move, with Gregg's and 
 Torbert's divisions^ against the Confed- 
 
 erate cavalry in the direction of Hamil' 
 ton's Crossing ; Wilson, with the Third 
 cavalry division, was to move to Craig's 
 Meeting House on the Catharpin Road, 
 and thence to send out detachments 
 along the different avenues by which 
 the enemy might approach ; Hancock, 
 with his Second corps, was to ad- 
 vance to Shady Grove Church, and 
 thence to extend his right towards the 
 Fifth corps, at Parker's Store; Wari'en, 
 with his Fifth corps, was to move to 
 Parker's Store, and to extend his right 
 towards the Old Wilderness Tavern, 
 where Sedgwick was ordered to take 
 position. 
 
 On the morning of Thursday, the 
 5th, these orders were put in ex- ^ay 
 ecution. As early as five o'clock, 5* 
 the different columns were in motion, 
 and pushing towards the positions 
 respectively assigned them. A blood- 
 red sun, as if ominous of the dread- 
 ful slaughter which was soon to fol- 
 low, was pouring his slanting beams 
 through the openings in the woods, al- 
 ready beautiful and richly clad with the 
 green robes of early summer. It soon 
 became apparent that Lee was neither 
 ignorant of the plans of his antagonist, 
 nor willing to allow him to execute 
 his purpose without offering at least a 
 stubborn resistance. From the Con- 
 federate centre at Orange Court House, 
 about twenty miles from Grant's pre- 
 scribed line of march, two roads run, 
 in a northeasterly direction, towards 
 Fredericksburg. That to the north is 
 an old turnpike ; the other is a plank- 
 road. There is another road, called the 
 Stevensburg plank road, which, run 
 
THE rOE FELT. 
 
 60;^ 
 
 ning from Culpepper Court House in 
 a southeasterly direction, crosses the 
 tui'iipike before mentioned, and termi- 
 nates in the plank road. At the junc- 
 tion of the Stevensburg plank road 
 with the turnpike is the Old Wilder- 
 ness Tavern. Five miles more to the 
 southeast, where the two plank roads 
 meet, is the Old Wilderness Church. 
 Before the Stevensburg road unites 
 with the plank road, there branches off 
 another road, called the Brock road, 
 which runs first almost due south, 
 crossing the plank road, and then more 
 to the southeast to Spottsylvania Court 
 House. The two almost parallel roads 
 running northeast from Orange Court 
 House ai'e generally spoken of as the 
 Orange t-u^^npike and the Orange 
 plank road along these two roads, 
 Lee, having already rightly divined 
 •the purpose of Grant, had pushed the 
 larger portion of his army. It was his 
 intention to strike the National army 
 in the flank, and force a battle in the 
 Wilderness. He had left behind him 
 the strong defenses of Mine Run ; but 
 he could fall back upon them, as a 
 place of refuge, in the event of disaster. 
 On the morning of the 5th, Ewell, 
 who had moved by the Orange turn- 
 pike, and Hill, who had moved by the 
 Orange plank road, were both in the 
 near neighborhood of Old Wilderness 
 Tavern ; but the Nationals knew it not. 
 Thus it happened that Warren, almost 
 as soon as he commenced his forward 
 movement, found himself in collision 
 with the enemy. 
 
 Warren's orders, it will be remem- 
 bered, were that he should resume his 
 
 march by the earliest dawn, on the 
 morning of the 5th, and that he should 
 take position at Parker's Store on the 
 Orange plank road, his right extending 
 to Old Wilderness Tavern. By way of 
 precaution, and in order to secure the 
 route for Sedgwick's corps, he threw 
 the division of Griffin out on the Orange 
 turnpike; and, taking advantage of a 
 wood road which led in a southwester- 
 ly direction towards Parker's Store, he 
 pushed forward the division of Craw- 
 ford, followed by that of Wadsworth 
 and that of Robinson, to the point in- 
 dicated. These movements were scarce- 
 ly begun when the foe was felt. All 
 of a sudden. Griffin's skirmishers on the 
 turnpike fell back; and, at the same 
 moment almost, Crawfoi-d's advance, 
 which was now near Parker's Store, 
 was surprised to see the troops in front 
 galloping back. Griffin had touched 
 Ewell; and Crawford had come into 
 contact with the van of Hill's column. 
 Further advance was deemed perilous. 
 The presci'ibed movements were, there- 
 fore, temporarily suspended. Such was 
 the condition of affairs when, about 
 eight o'clock. Grant and Meade arrived 
 at Old Wilderness Tavern. It was 
 not the opinion of either of those com- 
 manders that the Confederates were 
 present in any great force. On the 
 contrary, it was the belief of both that 
 Lee had fallen back, that he was con- 
 centrating his forces further to the 
 south, and that the troops with which 
 Griffin and Crawford had come into 
 contact were portions of the Confed- 
 erate right, which had been left as a 
 rear-guard to cover the retreat. To 
 
«ti4 
 
 THE WILDERNESS. 
 
 capture or brush away this force, and 
 to obtain possession of the defenses at 
 Mine Run, now became their object; 
 and orders were given accordingly. 
 As the strength of the Confederates 
 had been developed mainly on the 
 turnpike and in Griffin's front, it was 
 resolved to make the attack at that 
 point. Crawford was, accordingly, or- 
 dered to suspend operations on the 
 "ilank road, while Wadsworth's divi- 
 sion was disposed in line on Griffin's 
 left, with the sister division of Robin- 
 son in support. Wadsworth, having 
 ordered Mc .'andless' brigade to take 
 position oi Wadsworth's left, with- 
 drew with the remainder of his divi- 
 sion, but not without experiencing 
 some shp,' p treatment at the hands of 
 the ener-y, who followed and fired into 
 the /'.ar of his column. Meanwhile, 
 Hancock, who, as we have seen, had 
 that morning mai'ched southward from 
 Chancellorsville in the direction of 
 Shady Grove Church, and who was 
 therefore quite out of position for a 
 battle at Chancellorsville, was recalled, 
 and was ordered to unite with the 
 main body, by a movement up the 
 Brock road. 
 
 The ground on which the struggle 
 was about to begin, — a struggle greatly 
 more severe than was anticipated by 
 the National leaders — was a sort of 
 clearance in the forest. As seen from 
 Warren's headquarters, near the Old 
 Wilderness Tavern, there was a little 
 brook flowing in a northeasterly direc- 
 tion. The brook is bi'idged at the 
 turnpike, which soon afterwards rises 
 to a ridge, on the southern slope of 
 
 which is Major Lacy's house, in th« 
 midst of a lawn and green meadows. 
 Beyond, the hills were covered with 
 pines and cedars. On the right of the 
 turnpike the thicket was very dense. 
 A little more to the right was a ravine 
 which divided the forces of Griffin and 
 Ewell. On this strange battle field 
 were soon to meet, in the deadly shock 
 of battle, nearly a quarter of a million 
 of civilized troops. At noon the pre- 
 parations were completed ; and War- 
 ren, with the divisions of Giiffiu and 
 Wadsworth, advanced to the attack. 
 It was made with tremendous energy, 
 and at first with jomplete success. 
 The Confederate advance, which con- 
 sisted of Johnson's division alone, was 
 easily driven back; i.nd if the brigades 
 of Ayres and Bartlett had been nioi'e 
 vigorously suppoi-ted, EvvelFs corps 
 might have been involved in hopeless 
 disaster. As it was the Nationals, in 
 what seemed the moment of victory, 
 were speedily brought to a standstill. 
 •fohnson had V)een driven back to the 
 main body of Ewell's command. Rodes, 
 with his fresh division, rushed to the 
 rescue, when the shattered column 
 quickly re-formed. At this moment 
 the battle raged with tremendous fury. 
 It had been intended that Warren's 
 right should be sustained by Wi-ight'f 
 division, of the Sixth corps; but owing 
 to the denseness of the M'oods, and the 
 total absence of roads, Wiight was un- 
 able to get up in time. On Wari'en's ex- 
 posed flank, therefoi'e, the Confederates 
 fell with fearful enei'gy. The tide of 
 battle was now turned. Griffin's bri- 
 gades, overwhelmed by the force of the 
 
ARRIVAL OF HANCOCK. 
 
 665 
 
 enemy, were driven back with the loss of 
 two guns and several prisoners. Wads- 
 worth's division, on the left, had been 
 equally unfortunate. In striving to 
 form a connection with that of Griffin, 
 it had moved in a wrong direction, 
 completely exposing its left flank. On 
 this the Confederates opened a murder- 
 ous fire, compelling the entire division 
 to fall back in disorder. McCandless' 
 Ijrigade, of Crawford's division, which, 
 as we have seen, was stationed to the 
 left of Wadsworth, fared even worse. 
 Occupying an isolated position, and 
 exposed at all points, it offered pecu- 
 liar temptation for attack. Not slow 
 to take advantage of the opportunity, 
 the Confederates rushed upon it with 
 great fury and in overwhelming num- 
 bers. For a moment, it seemed as if 
 the entire brigade was doomed to cap- 
 ture or destruction. After severe fight- 
 ing, during which were performed 
 deeds of great valor, McCandless suc- 
 ceeded in cutting his way through, but 
 not without the loss of two whole 
 regiments. Warren, having thus lost 
 all he had gained by the first suc- 
 cessful onset, and having sacrificed at 
 least 3000 men, fell back and formed 
 a new line of battle more to the rear, 
 but still in front of the Old Wil- 
 derness Tavern, and across the turn- 
 pike. 
 
 While Warren was thus engaged in 
 the centre, Sedgwick, with the Sixth 
 corps, having come up, was ready to 
 take position on his right. Hancock, 
 however, had not had time to return, as 
 ordered, and take position on his left. 
 Some four miles east of Parker's Store, 
 
 as has already been ir.dicaled, the 
 plank road is intersected by the Brock 
 load. Hill, it will be remembered, 
 was jiressing along the plank road. 
 Hancock, by the Brock road, waf. 
 pushing forward to tlie point of inter 
 section. It was all-important that this 
 strategic point should not fall into the 
 hands of the enemy. As there was 
 danger that Hill might reach that 
 point })efore the arrival of Hancock, 
 Meade ordered Genei'al Getty, with 
 his division of the Sixth corps, to ad- 
 vance and hold the position. The order 
 was promptly obeyed. It Avas not, 
 however, a moment too soon, for Hill's 
 divisions were already well forward; 
 and Getty, long before the arrival of 
 Hancock, felt the presence and pressure 
 of the foe. In spite of the rapidly 
 increasing weight of his antagonist, 
 Getty stoutly held his position. The 
 situation, however, was becoming every 
 moment more critical. It was now- 
 near three o'clock in the afternoon. 
 There was a lull in the fight. Sud- 
 denly there was heard a loud-resound- 
 ing cheer. It came from Hancock's 
 men, who, w\th almost incredible ra- 
 pidity, were pushing through the de- 
 files of the forest. 
 
 On his arrival, Hancock took posi 
 tion along the Brock road, facing west- 
 ward. He immediately commenced to 
 thi'ow up breast-works. These, how- 
 ever, were not yet completed, when he 
 was ordered to attack with his whole 
 corps, Getty supporting the advance. 
 Birney, with his own command and 
 that of Mott, was thrown forward on 
 Getty's right and left, on both sides f ' 
 
663 
 
 THE WILDERNESS, 
 
 the plank road. A section of Ricketts' 
 l)attery, and a company of the First 
 Pennsylvania artillery, followed close 
 in the ?ear of the infantry. It soon 
 became manifest that the enemy was 
 present in great force, although such 
 was the density of the forest that nei- 
 ther army could see the other. Getty, 
 strengthened as he was by Birney and 
 Mott, was making no headway. Han- 
 cock, now pushing forward the bri- 
 gades of Carroll and Owen, of Gib- 
 bon's division, and the Irish brigade, 
 of the Second Delaware, under Colonel 
 Smythe, made, to use the language of 
 General Lee, " repeated and desperate 
 assaults "; but it was all in vain. Hill's 
 corps, which consisted of the divisions 
 of Anderson, Heth and Wilcox, all of 
 them West Point men, not only suc- 
 cessfully resisted but repelled every 
 attack. The afternoon was wearing 
 away. The battle continued to rage 
 with great fury, the tide of victory 
 inclining now to this side, now to 
 that, but remaining with neither. ^ Dur- 
 ing the heat of the fight, and when 
 the Confederates made one of their 
 desperate and apparently successful 
 onslaughts, the section of Ricketts' 
 battery, which was moved along the 
 plank i-oad, was actually captured, 
 the men and horses suffering terri- 
 bly. It was soon, however, recap- 
 tared by Carroll's brigade. It was 
 afterwards withdrawn and replaced by 
 a section of Dow's Sixth Maine bat- 
 tery. Hancock had done his best, but 
 apparently in vain. Mott's command 
 bad already given way; and Hays, 
 while attempting to fill up the break 
 
 in the line, was shot dead, at the head 
 of his brigade.* 
 
 The heavy and long-continued firing 
 towards the junction of the plank 
 and Brock roads, had already attracted 
 the attention of Grant and Meade. It 
 was evident that the battle was fierce- - 
 that the Confederates were present in 
 great force, and that Getty and Han- 
 cock were being taxed to the very ut 
 most. By way of furnishing relief to 
 these two commanders, Wadsworth, 
 with his own division and Baxter's 
 brigade, of Robinson's division, was 
 
 • Alexander Hats, brigadier-general of United 
 Slates volunteers and brevet lieutenant-colonel in the 
 United States army, was bom at Pittsfield, Pa., in 
 1820. He graduated at West Point in 1844. Among 
 his classmates were Grant, Hancock and Pleasonton. 
 He entered the army as brevet second-lieutenant of 
 the Fourth United States infantry. As a second-lieuten- 
 ant of the Eighth infantry, he entered upon the Mexi- 
 can campaign, during which he greatly distinguished 
 himself and rose in his profession. Soon afterwards, he 
 was appointed acting-assistant adjutant-general to Bri- 
 gadier-General Lane, and won distinction in the battle 
 near Atlixo. In April, 1848, he resigned his position 
 in the army, and engaged in the manufacture of iron, 
 in Venango county. Pa. On the outbreak of the Civil 
 War, he entered the service as colonel of the Sixty- 
 Third Pennsylvania volunteers, and was appointed 
 captain in the Sixteenth regiment of infantry, to date 
 from May 14, 1861. In the Peninsula he was attached, 
 with his regiment, to the First brigade of Kearney's 
 division, of Heintzelman's corps. At the close of the 
 seven days' contest, he was nominated for a brevet of 
 lieutenant-colonel. He took part in the Maryland 
 campaign, and was appointed a brigadier-general of 
 volunteers. He was wounded at Chancellorsville, while 
 at the head of the Second brigade, of the Third division, 
 Second army corps. At the batUe of Gettysburg, he 
 commanded the Third division of his corps, and, after 
 the wounding of Hancock, was temporarily in com 
 mand. When the army of the Potomac was reorgan- 
 ized, Hays was placed in command of the Second 
 brigade, Bimey's Third division, of the Second corps. 
 In this capacity he fought, and gahantly met his death, 
 in the Wilderness. Hays was frank, brave, quick and 
 energetic, and greatly beloved by his men. Although 
 not in the highest position, his death waa a serious loss 
 to th» army of the Potomac. 
 
PEEPARING FOR THE SECOND DAY. 
 
 667 
 
 ordered to move southward through 
 the forest, and strike Hill on the flank 
 and rear. It was a most difficult ope- 
 ration. Such was the density of the 
 forest, and so great were the obstacles 
 encountered in the face of skirmishers 
 who were evidently familiar with every 
 inch of the ground, that darkness had 
 set in before Wadsworth was in a po- 
 sition to strike as directed. His troops 
 rested on their arms for the night, 
 ready to take advantage of their fa- 
 vored position in the morning. To- 
 wards midnight, all was silent in the 
 Wilderness. Hancock had failed to 
 drive Hill back on the plank road. 
 Hill had been equally unsuccessful in 
 his attempt to dislodge Hancock. All 
 along the line the Nationals and Con- 
 federates lay so close to each other that 
 the soldiers of both armies drew water 
 from the same brook. As in the earlier 
 part of the day, a ravine divided both 
 the opposing armies in two. Hancock 
 was separated from Warren and Sedg- 
 wick. Ewell was unable to form a con- 
 nection with Hill. The battle-ground 
 was thickly strewn with dead and dy- 
 ing men. Such was the end of the 
 first day in the Wilderness. 
 
 It wa? evident to all that a great 
 battle would be fought on the morrow. 
 The ground was ill adapted for civil- 
 ized warfare. Other ground, however, 
 could not now be chosen. The incon- 
 veniences, it was felt, were common. 
 On both sides the commanders were 
 hopeful, if not confident ; and the rank 
 and file were in excellent spirits. If 
 neither had been successful, neither had 
 any reason to be ashamed of defeat. 
 
 Lee had failed to defeat Grant by 
 striking him on his flank. Grant had 
 failed to carry out his purpose of turn- 
 ing Lee's right. Each had failed in 
 his original purpose ; but both were 
 now face to face, with tlie inevitable 
 of battle before them. 
 
 Night was spent by both command, 
 ers in preparing for the conflict of the 
 coming day. Buruside, it will be re- 
 membered, had been left at Culpepper 
 Court House with the Ninth corps, his 
 instructions being to hold that place 
 for at least twenty-four hours after the 
 departure of the main body of the 
 army. He had already been ordered 
 forward ; and shortly after day-break, 
 on the morning of the 6th, he was on 
 the field, and taking position between 
 the troops of Warren and Hancock. 
 He had marched with great rapidity a 
 distance of thirty miles, and crossed 
 both the Rappahannock and the Rapi-' 
 dan. Grant's line of battle was five 
 miles long, and was facing westwai'd. 
 It lay in the following order: Sedg- 
 wick on the right; Warren in the cen- 
 tre ; then Burnside ; then Hancock on 
 the extreme left. Hancock, in addition 
 to his own powerful corps, had Getty's 
 division, of the Sixth corps, and Wads- 
 worth's division, of the Fifth, both on 
 his own right. On the Confederate 
 side, Ewell was on the left ; Hill on 
 the right; and Longstreet, who had 
 been left at Gordonsville, was hurrying 
 forward to reinforce Hill. Tiie point 
 of convergence of both armies embraced 
 the turnpike and plank road, and the 
 space between. It had become evident 
 to both commanders that the real con- 
 
668 
 
 THE WILDERNESS. 
 
 flict would take place iu the neighbor- 
 hood of the plank road, on Grant's left. 
 It was to be the same battle field as on 
 the previous day — ground on which it 
 would be impossible to use either artil- 
 lery or cavalry, and on which manoeu- 
 /ring of any kind would be totally 
 out of the question. The 300 guns of 
 the combatants were to remain idle ; 
 and of the 200,000 men about to meet 
 in a great death struggle, not more than 
 1000 would be visible at any one mo- 
 ment to any one man. Grant's order 
 was given as soon as he heard the re- 
 ports of the different commanders. It 
 was simple. " Attack along the whole 
 line at five in the morning." Lee had 
 decided to deliver an overwhelming 
 blow on Grant's left ; but as it would 
 be impossible to do so before the ani- 
 val of Longstreet, he resolved to dis- 
 tiact attention, and so gain time by 
 making a demonstration on the Na- 
 tional right. Just fifteen minutes be- 
 fore the time appointed by Grant for 
 the general attack, a sudden discharge 
 of musketry in the direction of Sedg- 
 wick announced the fact that Lee was 
 as ready for battle as his antagonist. 
 This attack, however, was not of seri- 
 ous moment. It was not pushed with 
 vigor. Sedgwick was able to hold 
 his own, and even to push his front 
 forward a few hundred yards. The 
 general plan of battle, as Grant had 
 arranged it, was, therefore, imdis- 
 turbed. 
 
 At five o'clock precisely, Warren and 
 Hancock advanced to the attack. Han- 
 cock, however, was doomed to bear 
 the principal burden of the fight. 
 
 With him, therefore, we must remain 
 and witness the tide of battle, as it 
 ebbs and flows iu his front. Dreading 
 an attack in great force, he had taken 
 the precaution to throw up earth-works 
 on the Brock road. Holding these 
 works with his left, he threw forward 
 his right and centre, consisting of two 
 divisions, under Birney, Getty's com- 
 mand, and the brigades of Owen and 
 Carroll, of Gibbon's division. Half 
 and half work formed no part of Han- 
 cock's calculations. He meant to strike 
 a firm and decisive blow. While Bir- 
 ney and G°tty made the direct attack 
 along the plank road and on both 
 sides of the same, Wadsworth, ha%'ing 
 worked his way across that part of the 
 Second corps which was advancing 
 along the right of the plank road, was 
 ready to strike Hill clean on the left 
 flank. The direct and flank move- 
 ments were made almost simultane- 
 ously; and so furious was the onset 
 that, after an hour's severe fighting, 
 the ground along Hill's entire front 
 was carried, and the line driven back 
 through the woods for about a mile 
 and a half. Hill's troops, in fact, could 
 not be halted until they had oveiTun 
 the trains, artillery, and even the head- 
 quarters of the Confederate commander. 
 The rifle-pits had been captured, with 
 many prisoners, and five stands of 
 colors. It seemed as if the battle were 
 already \vou. Anothei' vigorous onset, 
 and the presumption is that Lee's army 
 will be cut in two. The divisions of 
 Heth and Wilcox, of Hill's corps, h<»v« 
 been literally shattered to pieces. 
 
 At this supreme momeot, from <i>imfc 
 
^HalU Or WADS WORTH. 
 
 66'^ 
 
 cause not yet sufficiently explained — 
 most probably because of the disen- 
 tegration of Hancock's line, brought 
 about by the rough and tangled gi'ound 
 over which it had passed — the victors 
 paused in their tnumphant progress. 
 The pause was fatal. It was now 
 about seven o'clock. Hancock set 
 about rearranging his troops, and get- 
 ting them into battle order. He had 
 been reinfoj-ced by Stevenson's divi- 
 sion, of Burnside's corps ; and Wads- 
 worth's division was now brought into 
 proper line of battle. Getty's divi- 
 sion, now completely exhausted, was 
 replaced by Webb's brigade, from 
 Gibbon's command on the left; and 
 Frank's brigade, of Barlow's division, 
 was pushed forward from the same 
 flank. In making these arrangements, 
 however, two precious hours were wast- 
 ed. These hours of inaction proved 
 a great gain to the Confederates. Hill's 
 remaining divisions found time to come 
 up. Longstreet, too, was already close 
 at hand. Hancock was as yet ignorant 
 of the near presence of Longstreet. 
 He had looked for him in another di- 
 rection. It was known the night pre- 
 vious that he was marching up from 
 Orange Court House ; and the unavoid- 
 able conviction was that his object was 
 to strike Hancock in the left flank and 
 It was because of this conviction 
 
 rear. 
 
 that Hancock had only advanced his 
 right divisions, leaving his left, under 
 Gibbon, in charge of the works on the 
 Brock road. Hancock had correctly 
 judged. Longstreet had really been 
 making such a movement. So sudden, 
 however, and so overwhelming had been 
 
 the attack on his front, that Lee, fear- 
 ing for the safety of his whole armj^, 
 ordered Longstreet to discontinue his 
 flank movement, and to come to the 
 assistance of Hill. His arrangements 
 completed, Hancock resumed the ad- 
 vance T/ith great energy. The line in 
 his front no longer yielded to his touch 
 Again and again he attempted to prew 
 back the enemy; but it was all ir 
 vain. The battle now raged agait 
 with great fury, deeds of daring being 
 performed on both sides. Lee had ex- 
 hibited great personal bravery. When 
 Gregg's Texans came up, he put him- 
 self at their head, and was with diffi- 
 culty dissuaded from leading them to 
 the attack. For i: vvo hours the tide of 
 battle ebbed and flowed. It soon began 
 to be evident that Longsti'eet was pre- 
 sent in force, and that he was directing 
 the movements of the Confederates in 
 Hancock's immediate front. Finding 
 it impossible to make any headway, 
 nay, feeling more and more the irre 
 sistible pressure of the foe, Hancock 
 ultimately falls back, and re-forms on 
 the original line along the Brock road. 
 It is now about eleven o'clock. The 
 situation is becoming more critical 
 every moment. Wadsworth, after ex- 
 hibiting great gallantry, has just fallen, 
 pierced through the head with a bullet ; 
 and his command is in utter rout.* Ii 
 
 * James Samuel Wadsworth, brigadier-general ol 
 volunteers, was bom in Geneseo, Livingston county, 
 N. Y., October 30th, 1807. He was the son of 
 James Wadsworth, extensive landowner and philan- 
 thropist of Geneseo. He studied at Hartford and 
 afterwards at Yale, where he graduated. Choosing law 
 as a profession, he spent some time in the office of tho 
 great lawyer and statesman, Daniel Webster. He took 
 an active part in the Free-SoU movement, which dividbd 
 
 »77 
 
670 
 
 THE WILDBKNESS. 
 
 seems as if no force can check the fierce, 
 onward rush of the now triumphant 
 Confederates. 'A few moments more 
 and Hancock may be driven from his 
 works, and the National left doubled 
 ap. At this supreme moment, when 
 the Confederates seem about to reap 
 the rewards of \actory, there is a sud- 
 den pause in the battle. Why, no one 
 could tell. It afterwards appeared 
 that, when about to deal a decisive 
 blow both on Hancock's front and left 
 flank, Longstreet was shot, by mistake, 
 by his own men. He had been riding 
 with his stafF at the head of his col- 
 umn, when the cavalcade suddenly con- 
 fronted a portion of the flanking force, 
 and was mistaken for a party of Na- 
 tional horsemen. It was an unfortunate 
 DccuiTence for Longstreet, and, indeed, 
 for the whole Confederate army ; but 
 it was the salvation of Hancock, and, 
 probably, of the entire army of the 
 Potomac. 
 
 Although the fighting had, so far, 
 been mostly done by the National 
 left, the centre and right had not been 
 idle. Sedgwick, who was attacked in 
 the early morning, but who had suc- 
 cessfully maintained his position, had 
 
 • 
 
 tue democracy of the State. He voted for the repub- 
 lican candidates for presidential honors in 1856, and 
 again in 1860. Like his father, he took a deep interest 
 in all educational and philanthropic movements. He 
 iras commissioner to the Peace Convention held in 
 Washington, in 1861. When communication with the 
 capital was cut off, he chartered two ships on his own 
 responsibility, loaded them with provisions, and pro- 
 ceeded with them to Annapolis. He commenced his 
 military career as a volunteer aide to General McDowell, 
 and was present at the first battle of Bull Bun. On 
 McDowell's recommendation, he was appointed briga- 
 dier-general of volunteers, August, 1861. In March, 
 1862, he became military governor of the District of 
 
 labored in vain to carry certain in- 
 trenchments, behind which Ewell had 
 sheltered his men. His attempts had 
 been frequently repeated; his losses, 
 in consequence, were great. Two of 
 Warren's divisions had been detached 
 and sent to the assistance of Hancock. 
 The other two divisions — those of Grif- 
 fin and Crawford — held a simply defen- 
 sive attitude. It was part of the plan 
 of the day that Burnside, advancing 
 through the opening between Warren 
 and Hancock, should co-operate in the 
 general advance. It was not, however, 
 until the afternoon that he became en- 
 gaged with the enemy ; and the results 
 were unimportant. It had, in fact, 
 already become apparent that a mistake 
 had been committed, in permitting 
 Burnside to remain in independent 
 command. 
 
 After the repulse -of Hancock by 
 Longstreet, there was an almost un- 
 broken lull along the whole line of 
 battle until about four o'clock. When 
 Longstreet was wounded, Lee took for- 
 mal charge of that part of the field. 
 He was slow, however, in making his 
 dispositions. Hancock had turned to 
 good account the time which had been 
 
 Cohmibia. In November of that year, he was the re- 
 publican canditate for governor of New York, but waa 
 defeated by Mr. Seymour, the democratic candidate. 
 In December following, he was assigned to the com- 
 mand of a division in the army of the Potomac. At 
 Fredericksburg and at ChanceUorsviUe, he revealed 
 some of the first qualities of a military commander; 
 and at Gettysburg, his division saved the first day. 
 When the army of the Potomac was reorganized. Gen- 
 eral Wadsworth was assigned to the command of the 
 Fourth division, of the Fifth corps. At the head of 
 this division, as has been shown in the text, he bravely 
 met his death. Wadsworth'a career illustrated all the 
 higher and nobler characteristic > of the genuine patriot 
 
CAKilOLL'S SPLENDID CKAEGB. 
 
 &n 
 
 allowed him. Reinforcements had been 
 sent him by Meade ; his position had 
 been greatly strengthened ; and, his 
 front having been cleared by a well- 
 Bxecuted movement made by Colonel 
 Leasure, he was fully prepared to meet 
 the enemy. He had already received 
 orders from Grant to resume the attack 
 at six o'clock. He was not to be al- 
 lowed to wait so long. Shortly after 
 four o'clock, Lee, who by this time had 
 got the troops of Longstreet aud Hill 
 well jn hand, hurled them against Han- 
 cock's lines. It was evidently intended 
 that the blow should be fatal. The 
 Confederate columns, four in number, 
 tame rolling forward, firm, solid and 
 resolute, as if they meant destruction. 
 Without halting or firing a shot, they 
 approached the edge of the abatis, less 
 than a hundred paces from Hancock's 
 front. Here they paused and opened 
 a furious fire of musketiy, which was 
 kept up with great vigor. It had 
 little effect, however, on Hancock's 
 men, who were safe behind their 
 breast-woi'ks, and who replied with lie- 
 coming energy to the Confederate mus- 
 keteers. While this was going on, a 
 fire, which had broken out in the 
 woods in the afternoon, communicated 
 with the log breast-works, which soon 
 became a mass of flame. The smoke 
 and flame, which were driven by the 
 vvind in the faces of the Nationals, thus 
 preventing them from firing from the 
 parapet, gave an advantage to the Con- 
 federates. Not slow to seize the oppor- 
 tunity, Lee's men rushed forward, broke 
 through the first line, pressed into the 
 breast-works, and crowded them with 
 
 their standards. At this critical mo- 
 ment, when some of the Nationals were 
 already in full retreat towards Chan- 
 cellors ville, Carroll, of Gibbon's divi- 
 sion, in obedience to orders from 
 General Birney, rushed forward by the 
 left flank, and, falling with tremendous 
 fury on the triumphant Confederates, 
 routed them with great slaughter, re- 
 claimed the works, and saved the day. 
 At this point the attack was not re- 
 sumed. 
 
 Later in the day ai/d just before 
 dark, a vigorous attack was made by 
 Ewell on the right and front of Sedg- 
 wick's corps, on the extreme National 
 right. It was a complete surprise to 
 the Nationals ; and, although Sedgwick 
 quickly got his corps into order, and re- 
 pelled the attack, it was not until Gen- 
 erals Seymour and Shaler, of Ricketts' 
 division, had been captured, with about 
 4000 of their oflicers and men. It was 
 now dark. The sound of battle ceased. 
 The wearied soldiers, lying in many 
 cases beside dead or wounded com- 
 rades, fell asleep on their arms. The 
 piteous moanhigs of the wounded alone 
 disturbed the surrounding solitude. 
 The battle of the Wilderness, proper- 
 ly so called, was ended. 
 
 The two days' fighting had result^ 
 ed in serious loss to both armies. 
 The loss on the National side leached 
 the high figure of 20,000 men, of 
 whom probably 5000 were made pris- 
 oners. On the part of the Con- 
 federates the loss was proportionate- 
 ly great, the lowest estimate being 
 10,000, of whom but few were cap- 
 tured. Among the killed on the 
 
679 
 
 THE WILDEKlfESS. 
 
 National side were Generals Wads- 
 worthy Hays and Webb; and Han- 
 cock, Getty, Gregg, Owen, Bartlett 
 and C,irroll were wounded, some of 
 them severely. Of the Confederate 
 officers. Generals Jones, Jenkins and 
 Stafford were killed; and Generals 
 Long-street, Pegram, Pickett and Hun- 
 ter were wounded. Such a bush-fight 
 had never been fought before. 
 
 The 7th was Saturday. On the 
 May morning of that day, the rival 
 ?• armies still confi-onted each other 
 in the Wilderness. Both were bleed- 
 ing and exhausted ; and on neither the 
 one side nor the other was there any 
 disposition to renew the contest. In 
 the National ranks, there were not a 
 few who were of the opinion that a 
 backward march across the Rapidan 
 would soon be ordered. Such thoughts, 
 however, found no place in the mind 
 of General Grant. His eye was fixed 
 on Richmond ; and, although seas of 
 blood might lie between him and the 
 Confederate capital, he was not to be 
 driven from his purpose, or turned aside 
 from the object of his ambition. Dur- 
 ing the course of the day, it became more 
 and more apparent that Lee was falling 
 back in the direction of Richmond. It 
 was Grant's belief that Lee, convinced 
 of his inability to maintain the contest 
 in the open field, had decided to retire 
 and await an attack behind his own 
 works. His own mind was quickly 
 made up ; and he resolved, by a flank 
 movement on the Confederate right, 
 to interpose his whole force between 
 Lee and Richmond. Orders were given 
 accordingly; and, shortly after night- 
 
 fall, the entire National army was on 
 its way to Spottsylvania Court House, 
 some thirteen miles further to the 
 southeast. Wan-en led the way, fol- 
 lowed by Hancock, both on the Brock 
 road. Sedgwick and Burnside moved 
 on an exterior route, by way of Chan- 
 cellorsville, where, during the course 
 of the afternoon, the army trains had 
 been parked. By this movement, it 
 will be perceived, Grant abandoned 
 Germania Ford, and gave Lee an 
 opportunity to cut off his communica- 
 tions. This, however, was of the less 
 consequence, that the latter general 
 was now under the necessity of taking 
 care of his own communications, his 
 right flank being already seriously 
 threatened. Germania Ford, in fact, 
 was now of little use to Grant; and 
 Lee might take possession, or not, as he 
 thought fit. Lee was not slow to dis 
 cover the real object of his antagonist 
 and to take measures accordingly 
 Anderson, who now commanded Long 
 street's corps, received orders to movn 
 from the breast-works and take a posi 
 tion from which he would be able to 
 advance on Spottsylvanid Court House 
 in the early morning. Not finding a 
 suitable place for bivouacking, in con- 
 sequence of the fire in the woods, An- 
 derson kept moving on all night in 
 the direction of the Court House. It 
 thus happened that Warren and An- 
 derson, the former by the Brock road, 
 the latter by a parallel road a little 
 further to the west, were simultane- 
 ously marching to the same point. 
 
 It was about nine o'clock in the 
 morning when Warren began to move 
 
ALSOFS FARM. 
 
 673 
 
 his column. His desii-e was to reach 
 Spottsylvania Court House before the 
 enemy could have time to be there in 
 anything like force. Unfortunately, 
 however, his course was greatly ob- 
 structed, and his progress hindered. 
 At Todd's Tavern he was delaj^ed for 
 two hours, the road being blocked by 
 Meade's cavalry escort. About two 
 miles further on, and near one of the 
 tributaries of the Po, he was again 
 brought to a standstill by the cavalry 
 division of General Merritt, who, the 
 day before, and up to a late hour of 
 the night, had been engaged fighting 
 Stuart. At this point he lost three 
 hours. It was already daylight; and 
 when he resumed the advance, the 
 road was obstructed with barricades of 
 heavy trees. Considerable time was 
 consumed in removing these ; and it 
 May was not until eight o'clock on 
 8e Sunday morning that the head 
 of WaiTen's column, composed of two 
 brigades, under Robinson, emerged 
 from the woods, and took position on 
 the open ground at what was called 
 Alsop's Farm. This open ground or 
 clearing covered a space of about 150 
 acres, and was distant from Spott- 
 isylvania Court House some two miles. 
 At this point, the road from Todd's 
 Tavern forks — one biauch leading to 
 the Court House, a>id the other to 
 Laurel Hill. The open space was 
 traversed by an inconsiderable stream 
 called the Ny ; and the ground be- 
 yond, which ascended towards Spottsyl- 
 vania, was again covered with woods. 
 Warren's advance was half way across 
 the clearing, and on the point oi 
 
 commencing the ascent of the crest, 
 when, all of a sudden, the ridge 
 blazed with cannon, and a mui'der- 
 ous musketry fire burst forth from 
 the woods. It was an unlooked-for 
 reception. The National line stag- 
 gered, and fell back. A stampede 
 seemed to be imminent. Robinson 
 exerted himself to the utmost to hold 
 his men to their work. Getting his 
 batteries into position on the right, he 
 returned the enemy's fire promptly and 
 with vigor. He was soon, however, 
 severely wounded in the knee; and 
 his men, thus left without their leader, 
 and retaining a lively recollection of 
 their bitter experience in the Wilder- 
 ness, fell back in some confusion to 
 the woods, where, through the personal 
 exertions of General Warren himself, 
 they were, after some difficulty, rallied 
 and re-formed. Soon afterwards cam6 
 up Griffin's division, which met with a 
 similar reception, with a like result. 
 Meanwhile, Crawford's division and 
 that of Wadsworth, now commanded 
 by Cutler, had reached the battle- 
 ground. Crawford advanced on Grif- 
 fin's left ; Cutler advanced on his right; 
 and, in a brief space, the woods on 
 both flanks were cleared of the enemy. 
 Warren's entire corps was now drawn 
 up in battle line; and the troops, as 
 if convinced that another fierce and 
 bloody battle was about to be fought^ 
 proceeded of their own accord to thro\^ 
 up intreuchmeuts. Such was the com. 
 mencement of the great sti-uggle at 
 Spottsylvania Court House. The fight- 
 ing had been severe. The losses were 
 heavy. On the Nationsil side, about 
 
674 
 
 THE WILDERNESS. 
 
 1300 men were put hors de combat. 
 Some of the regiments were almost 
 cut to pieces. The Fii'st Michigan, 
 which went into the fight 200 strong, 
 came out with only 23 men uninjured. 
 The heat was most intense ; and large 
 immbers of the men suffered from sun- 
 etroke. The engagement of Sunday 
 morning, the 8th of May, is known as 
 the battle of Alsop's Farm. 
 
 It was the head of Longstreet's 
 corps, commanded, as we have already 
 seen, by Anderson, with which Warren 
 had come in collision. It was an imex- 
 pected collision; and, resulting as it 
 did, it was in the last degree iinfortu- 
 nate to the National cause. If Ander- 
 son had not been at Spottsylvania 
 Court House ahead of WaiTen, there 
 can be no doubt that the story of 
 that morning's fight would have been 
 altogether different. How mysterious- 
 ly the fates seemed to be working in 
 the interest of the Confederates ! How 
 much had been done for them by that 
 fire in the woods ! It had given them 
 their opportunity, and almost a victory, 
 the day before. It had prevented 
 Anderson from bivouacking, and, by 
 compelling him to march all night, had 
 enabled him, without any knowledge 
 or purpose of his own, to anticipate 
 the arrival of Warren, and so to inter- 
 pjite an obstacle to the advance of 
 irrant's army. And how strange that 
 Meade's own cavalry should have 
 blocked the way of his own infantry ! 
 Every obstruction put in Warren's way 
 was a benefit to Lee. Every moment 
 Warren was delayed was a double gain 
 to the Confederates. But for the fire 
 
 in the woods, which hastened Ander- 
 son's onward march, and but for the 
 unfortunate obstructions which hin- 
 dered Warren's progress, the National 
 advance, it is reasonable to presume, 
 would first have reached the clearing 
 at Alsop's Farm. In such a case, the 
 first great purpose of General Grant 
 would have been accomplished — Gen- 
 eral Lee's right would Lave been turned. 
 As it was, Lee had succeeded in plant- 
 ing his army right across Grant's line of 
 march, and in establishing a powerful 
 bulwark of defense on the Spottsyl- 
 vania Ridge. This movement upon 
 Spottsylvania brought prominently in- 
 to view, and shed fresh lustre on, the 
 great abilities of the two rival com- 
 manders. The hand of Lee and the 
 hand of Grant were distinctly visible. 
 Skill in combination, promptitude of 
 action and rapidity o£ movement en- 
 titled the one to the victory ; and tem- 
 porary failure only served to bring into 
 more conspicuous relief the military 
 science which characterized the general 
 plan of the other. 
 
 After the experience of the morning, 
 Warren did not feel himself strong 
 enough to renew the attack. He 
 awaited, therefore, the arrival of Sedg- 
 wick, who came up in the afternoon, 
 and, in the absence of Meade, assumed 
 command. Meade, with the whole of 
 Hancock's corps, except the division 
 of Gibbon, had remained at Todd'i 
 Tavern, where, it was feared, the Con* 
 federates were about to make an attach 
 in force. With the two corps, Sedg 
 wick believed himself strong enougl 
 to attempt to drive the enemy froa 
 
DEATH OF SEDGWICK. 
 
 676 
 
 his favored position on the ridge ; but 
 it was nearly sundown before his dis- 
 positions were completed. Towards 
 evening, a fruitless assault was made 
 by a New Jersey brigade, under Gen- 
 eral Neill ; and General Crawford, 
 who again attempted to advance, was 
 vigorously encountered by Ewell, and 
 driven back a full mile, with tlie loss 
 of about 100 men made prisoners. On 
 the whole, Sunday, the 8th, was an 
 unfortunate day for the Nationals. In 
 the race for Spottsylvania, the Confed- 
 erates were clearly the winners ; and 
 the prize was of almost inestimable 
 value. On the night of the above- 
 mentioned day, Lee's army was well 
 forward, and firmly entrenched on the 
 high ground on the Spottsylvania side 
 of the clearing. 
 
 On the morning of Monday, the 
 fliay 9th, Meade's entire army, having 
 ®' arrived, was formed in order of 
 battle in front of the Confederate lines. 
 Sedgwick took position on the left of 
 Warren. Burnside was posted on the 
 left of Sedgwick. Hancock, who had 
 come up from Todd's Tavern at an 
 early hour, formed in line on Warren's 
 right, on high ground which over- 
 looked the valley of the River Po. 
 The disposition was, therefore, as fol- 
 lows : Burnside on the left; then Sedg- 
 wick ; then Warren, with Hancock on 
 the right. The wings were thrown 
 forward, so as to encircle the Confede- 
 rate position. A small creek, a branch 
 of the Ny, lay between the position of the 
 enemy and that of Warren and Sedg- 
 wick ; it also separated Hancock from 
 Warren. Sheridan, with a strong cav- 
 
 alry force, set out, in the morning, on 
 a grand raid, his object being to cni- 
 Lee's railroad communications with 
 Richmond. The day was spent chiefly 
 in throwing up intrenchments, and 
 otherwise preparing for battle. Thero 
 were frequent skirmishes ; and, all day 
 long, the Confederate sharpshooters, 
 taking advantage of their peculiarly 
 favored position, were unusually active. 
 While the day was yet young, not a 
 few of the Nationals had fallen vic- 
 tims to their unerring and deadly aim. 
 Among these was General Sedgwick. 
 He had been standing in the breast- 
 works, on the extreme right of his own 
 corps, and giving instructions as to the 
 posting of some guns. He was at- 
 tended by certain members of his staff. 
 The balls of the sharpshooters were 
 whistling past them, some of them 
 dangerously near. One or two of those 
 present showed signs of nervousness. 
 "Pooh! pooh! men," said Sedgwick, 
 "they could not hit an elephant at that 
 distance." He had scarcely uttered 
 the words, when he fell dead on the 
 ground, the blood streaming from his 
 nostrils. A bullet had pierced his face 
 just below the left eye. Death was 
 instantaneous. A serene smile rested 
 on his features, as if connected with 
 his last words. The death of Sedg- 
 wick was a severe blow to the National 
 cause. He was one of the most conv 
 petent and most trusted soldiers in the 
 army of the Potomac. He was sincere- 
 ly lamented by the entire army; and, 
 as soon as the fact of his death became 
 known, the nation mourned the loss of 
 a true patriot, a brave soldier and a 
 
676 
 
 THE WILDERNESS. 
 
 true man.* General Wright succeeded 
 to tlie command of the Sixth corps. 
 
 On the morning of Tuesday, the 
 May 10th, everything indicated com- 
 iv. plete preparation for ^^attle. 
 Grawt occupied substantially the srnie 
 position as on the previous day. His 
 line stretched about six miles on the 
 north ban^' of the Po, in the form 
 of a crescent, the wings thrown for- 
 ward. The Second corps, across the 
 Po, held a line on the right, .laarly 
 parallel to the road from Shady Grove 
 Church to the Coui't House ; the Fifth 
 held the centre, on the east side of the 
 Po; the Sizth held the left, facing 
 the Court House ; the Ninth was still 
 further to the left; and in front of all 
 was a dense forest. Lee held Spottsyl- 
 
 • Major-Genebal John Sedgwick was bom in Con- 
 lecticut about ISlfi. He graduated at West Point in 
 |837. Among his classmates were Benham, Hooker, 
 irnold and French, of the National army, and Bragg, 
 vCarly and Pemberton, of the Confederate service. He 
 <ook part in the Mexican War, and distinguished him- 
 «elf in the attack on the San Cosmo Gate, which re- 
 dulted in the capture of the city of Mexico. At the 
 outbreak of the Civil War, he held the position of lieu- 
 ienant^colonel of the Second United States cavalry. 
 On the 3lBt of August, ISIJl, he was commissioned a 
 brigadier-general of volunteers, and placed in command 
 of a brigade of the army of the Potomac. We soon 
 after find him commanding the Third division, of the 
 Second corps, under General Sumner. He fought, and 
 won distinction, in the Peninsular campaign. At An- 
 iSetam he bore himself like a very hero of romance, 
 Deing twice wounded. With his record at the battle 
 of Chancellorsvllle and at Gettysburg, the reader has 
 (dready been made familiar. On the reorganization of 
 the army of the Potomac, he was one of three corps 
 •ommanders whom Meade wished to see retained 
 Ih high command. Meade loved and trusted him, 
 And, on more than one occasion, left him in command 
 of the entire army. His career in the Wilderness, with 
 its untmaely end, has been related in the text. Kind 
 and gentle in his bearing, h<» was yet firm of character, 
 and a strict disciplinarian. His corps was, in conse- 
 quence, one of the best in dfiscipUne and morale in the 
 whole army. 
 
 vanla and the groimd to the north oi 
 the Court House. His left rested on 
 Ghidy Run, bending to the north, and 
 was sheltered by strong works; hia 
 right, curving also to the north, rested 
 on the N)'; his centre, slightly thrown 
 forward, was posted on commanding 
 ground. The entire position was well 
 supported by breast-works. Not much 
 fighting had been done on the Monday. 
 Towards the evening, Hancock made 
 a movement across the Po, his object 
 being to capture a wagon train which 
 was seen moving along the road lead- 
 ing to Spottsylvania. The river was 
 crossed without difficulty; but night 
 came on before tbe operation could be 
 completed. When morning dawned, 
 the original object of the movement 
 no longer existed ; for the Confederate 
 train was already safe behind the lines 
 at the Court House. Hancock, how- 
 ever, was bent on giving effect to his 
 purpose, to the extent, at least, of se- 
 curing a lodgment nearer the enemy's 
 position. In developing his movement, 
 he found it necessary again to cross 
 the Po, which runs first almost due 
 east, and then, as it nears the Court 
 House, makes a sharp bend to the 
 south. Two miles west of the Court 
 House, it is spanned by a wooden 
 bridge. The approaches to the bridge, 
 however, were all so completely com- 
 manded by the enemy, tliat a passage 
 at that point was deemed impractica- 
 ble. Not to be hindered in his pui 
 pose, Hancock had just succeeded in 
 throwing across the brigade of Biooke, 
 a short distance above, when, by order 
 of General Meade, the whole movement 
 
LAUEEL HILL, 
 
 67^ 
 
 was suspended. It had been decided 
 at headquarters to make an attack on 
 Lanrel Hill, a strong position in front 
 of Warren and Wright ; and Hancock 
 was ordered to send two divisions to 
 assist in the proposed assault. The 
 divisions of Gibbon and Birney were at 
 once retired, the enemy taking advan- 
 tage of the backward movement, and 
 falling heavily on Birney's rear. Bar- 
 low's division, of Hancock's corps, was 
 left alone on the south side of the Po. 
 As the enemy showed a disposition to 
 attack, this, too, was quickly with- 
 drawn. It was already almost too 
 late; for Barlow's skirmishers were 
 ab'eady yielding to the vigorous pres- 
 sure of the enemy. Two brigades of 
 the division were got off without seri- 
 ous difficulty ; but the brigades of 
 Brooke and Brown were fiercely at- 
 tacked, and compelled to hold off the 
 foe at every step of their backward 
 progress. The difficulties of their po- 
 sition were aggravated by a fire, which 
 broke out in the woods between them 
 and the river. Those five brigades, 
 however, were not to be dismayed. 
 They succeeded at once in repelling the 
 assailants and in recrossing the stream. 
 The remarkable coolness and self-pos- 
 session of the men alone saved them 
 from great disaster. As it was, they 
 sustained the loss of many men in 
 killed and wounded, and one gun — 
 the first gun ever lost by the Second 
 corps. Not a few of the wounded 
 were left to perish in the flames. 
 This movement of Hancock was as un- 
 fortunate in its result, as it was ill- 
 judged in its inception. It revealed 
 
 the metal of the men, and the pluck 
 and endurance of the chiefs of brigades 
 and divisions; but it reflected no glory 
 on the corps commander. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Nationals had made 
 two unsuccessful attempts on Laurel 
 Hill. This was, perhaps, the most for- 
 midable point along the entire front 
 of the enemy's position. It had been 
 attacked in the forenoon by the bri- 
 gades of Webb and Carroll. It was 
 attacked more fiercely in the after- 
 noon by the divisions of Crawford and 
 Cutler. These attempts but revealed 
 the enormous strength of the position. 
 When Hancock arrived and joined 
 Warren, arrangements were made for 
 a united assault by the entire strength 
 of the Fifth and Sixth coi"ps. It 
 was now five o'clock in the afternoon. 
 The assault was made in splendid style. 
 In the face of a most withering firt^ 
 the Nationals in thousands — now in 
 steady line, now as if in broken groups, 
 their standard-bearers always conspicu- 
 ous — were seen struggling up the slopes, 
 and, at one or two points, even pene- 
 trating the breast- works. It was found 
 impossible, however, to effect a lodg- 
 ment or to press on against the 
 decimating fire. The Nationals were 
 compelled to fall back, and not with- 
 out dreadful loss. An hour later, 
 notwithstanding the fearful loss of life 
 in the previous encounter, the assault 
 was repeated. It was made, if possi- 
 ble, with even greater bravery : it was 
 repulsed with a still more dreadful 
 slaughter. The army of the Potomac 
 had already witnessed much dreadful 
 work. It had never before witnessed 
 
 »78 
 
«78 
 
 THE WILDERNESS. 
 
 such work as this. Not once, since 
 the commencement of the war, had 
 such masses of men, in obedience to 
 orders, marched to destruction. In 
 these two assaults alone, the Nationals 
 lost nearly 6000 men. Among the 
 killed were Generals J. C. Rice* and 
 T. G. Stevenson. 
 
 It was not, however, a day of dis- 
 aster alonsf tbe whole line. To the 
 left of WaiTen, a vigorous assault was 
 made on what seemed a weak point in 
 the Confederate line by two brigades 
 of the Sixth corps — twelve picked regi- 
 ments, under Colonel Upton. The at- 
 tack was a complete success. The first 
 line of intrenchments was carried ; and 
 several guns, with over 900 prisoners, 
 were captured. Upton expected assist- 
 ance from Mott ; but the latter failed 
 to come to the rescue. Unable, with- 
 out support, to maintain the advantage 
 he had won, Upton fell back to the 
 
 * Jaices Clay Rioe, a brigadier-general of volun- 
 teers, was bom at Worthingtxjn, Mass., December 27th, 
 1829. His eariy life was spent in a struggle to obtain 
 an education ; and, in 1854, he graduated with high 
 honors at Yale College. After some experience as a 
 teacher and editor, he studied law in Natchez, Miss., 
 and was admitted to the bar in that State. He was in 
 New York and practising law when the Civil War broke 
 out. He entered the service as a private in the Gari- 
 baldi Guard. He soon rose to be colonel of the Forty- 
 Foiirth New York volunteers, which he led through 
 the Peninsular campaign, under McClellan, and at 
 Manassas, under Pope. He was sick and unable to be 
 present at Antietam ; but he fought at Fredericksburg, 
 at the head of his regiment, also at ChanceUorsville, 
 where he was temporarily in command of a brigade, 
 and again at Gettysburg, where he greatly distinguished 
 himself. After Gettysburg, on the recommendation of 
 Meade, he was made brigadier-general of volunteers, 
 in which capacity he fought in the Wilderness and on 
 the banks of the Po, where he gallantly met his death. 
 His last words were, "Turn me over, that I may die 
 with my face to the enemy." Bice was a maa of deep 
 religious principle. 
 
 National lines, carrying with him his 
 prisoners, but leaving the captured 
 guns behind. 
 
 Such was the terrible 10th of May 
 at Spottsylvania Court House. The 
 losses on both sides, for the whole day, 
 were heavy. The National loss was 
 estimated at 10,000. The Confederate 
 loss, including killed, wounded and 
 missing, was probably not under 9,000. 
 On neither side, however, was there 
 any disposition to yield. On the con- 
 trary, both commanders were resolved 
 to renew the conflict on the morrow; 
 and preparations were made accord- 
 ingly. 
 
 On the morning of the 11th, Gen- 
 eral Grant sent a characteristic may 
 despatch to the secretary of war. !*• 
 "We have now," he wrote, "ended 
 the sixth day of very hard fighting. 
 The result to this time is much in our 
 favor. Our losses have been heavy, as 
 well as those of the enemy. I think 
 the loss of the enemy must be greater. 
 We have taken over 5000 prisoners in 
 battle, while he has taken from us but 
 few, except stragglers. / propose to 
 fight it out on this line, if it takes all 
 summer.'''' As to the wisdom of the 
 determination expressed in this final 
 sentence, different opinions have been 
 entertained and expressed. General 
 Grant had certainly another course open 
 to him. He might have executed an 
 effective turning operation, by moving 
 southward and crossing the Jamea 
 River; and many competent critics 
 have declared that by adopting such a 
 course at this stage, the success which 
 ultimately rewarded his efforts would 
 
THE SALlEffT. 
 
 679 
 
 have been secured with at least equal 
 ejrpedition, and cei'tainly at a less costly 
 sacrifice of human life. It is always 
 more easy to say what might have 
 been done, and what could have been 
 done, when the past is looked at in the 
 light of the present. General Grant 
 knew he was confronted by a powerful, 
 wily, skilful antagonist — a commander 
 iu every respect his equal, and in some 
 eenses his superior. He knew that he 
 could count on superior numbers ; but 
 he was aware also that he was opposed 
 by an ai'my which, in discipline and 
 mo7'ale, had never been surpassed in the 
 history of human warfare. What diflfi- 
 culties might be attendant on a change 
 of base he could neither foretell nor 
 foresee. In this overland campaign, in 
 truth, as at Vicksburg, General Grant, 
 while holding tenaciously to his pur- 
 pose, was climbing the ladder of expe- 
 rience. His success had not yet been 
 great; but it had been encouraging. 
 Each successive day was giving force 
 to his determination and strength to 
 his grasp ; and out of the darkness, if 
 darkness it could be called, he was 
 gradually working his way to a clearer 
 light — to a fuller knowledge of the 
 necessities and possibilities of his at- 
 uation. He would fight it out on this 
 line if it took all summer — such was 
 his determination ; but it did not by 
 any means follow that, if another and 
 more advantageous course offered, he 
 would close his eyes to the opportu- 
 nity. Whatever might be the inherent 
 value of the determination, the declara- 
 tion of the same gladdened the Na- 
 tional heart, and filled it with hope; 
 
 and the words in which it was 
 couched have assumed permanent form, 
 and added a fresh phrase to English 
 speech. 
 
 The 11th was Wednesday. The 
 morning rose bright and clear. The 
 two opposing armies lay in close prox- 
 imity to each other. As the day ad- 
 vanced there was some skirmishing; 
 but on neither side was any attempt 
 made to provoke a general engage- 
 ment. Both commanders, it was evi- 
 dent, were preparing for battle; nor 
 could doubt remain in any mind that, 
 whatever might be the result, another 
 and even more fearful encounter at 
 Spottsylvania was imminent. Grant 
 was still bent on carrying out his 
 policy of continuous hammering. His 
 success, however, on the Tuesday, in 
 his repeated attacks on the enemy'a 
 left and left centre, had not been en- 
 couraging. There was no reason to 
 hope that another attack, made in the 
 same direction, would be attended mth 
 any better results. It was resolved, 
 therefore, to strike a bold and effective 
 blow on the enemy's right centre. At 
 that point, and near the Landrum 
 House, Lee's lines formed a salient. 
 It was Grant's conviction that the 
 point was vulnerable. Arrangements 
 for the attack were made forthwith. 
 Hancock, who was chosen to strike the 
 blow, was ordered to leave his en- 
 trenchments in front of A. P. Hill, and, 
 by moving to the left, to take position 
 between the Sixth and Ninth corps. 
 The movement was to have the sup- 
 port of the entire army. Wright was 
 to extend his left, and to concentrate 
 
«80 
 
 THE WILDERNESS. 
 
 on that wing. Warren was to make a 
 diversionary movement on the Confed- 
 erate left, in his own front, the object 
 being to give the enemy sufficient em- 
 ployment in that direction, and so pre- 
 vent the withdrawal of his troops for 
 the relief of the menaced point. Burn- 
 side, for a similar reason, was to make 
 a vigorous assault on the extreme left. 
 Rain fell heavily in the afternoon. 
 When night came the rain-storm had 
 not abated ; and, as the moon was in 
 its first quarter, the night was dark 
 ind dismal. Soon after midnight, un- 
 der cover of the darkness and the 
 istorm, Hancock moved out from his 
 jntrenchments, and, guided by the 
 sompass, passed in rear of Warren 
 and Wright, and took position within 
 1200 yards of the enemy's front, at 
 the point to be attacked. Barlow's 
 division, in two lines of masses, was 
 placed on the left ; Birney's division, 
 in two deployed lines, was placed on 
 the right; Mott's division, Hancock's 
 Fourth, supported Birney; and Gib- 
 bon's division was held in reserve. 
 Of the actual strength of the position 
 about to be attacked, the Nationals 
 knew nothing. It might be weak and 
 defenseless. It might be well forti- 
 fied_ and proof against any attack. It 
 mattered not. Hancock was ready, 
 wairing for the first streak of early 
 dawn, to launch forth his brave battal- 
 ions to victory or to death. 
 
 It is now half-past four o'clock on 
 yay the morning of Thursday, May 
 12t the 12th. A heavy fog is rest- 
 ing on the entire surrounding country ; 
 «ind the feeble light of the rising sun 
 
 struggles hard to penetrate the gloom. 
 Hancock's divisions are already in mo- 
 tion. Steadily and silently they move 
 towards the salient — Barlow over open 
 ground, which extends up to the Con- 
 federate lines, Birney through the 
 thickly wooded ground more to the 
 right. Not a shot has yet been fired 
 — not a word uttered. More than 
 half of the intervening distance has 
 already been crossed. Suddenly, there 
 is a loud -resounding cheer, which 
 rings along the whole line. Sponta- 
 neously, the men take the double- 
 quick. On they roll, like a resistless 
 wave. Nothing can now restrain their 
 fierce impetuosity. They have reached 
 the abatis, torn it up, and tossed it 
 aside. With wild cries, they rush 
 bounding over the intrenchments. Bar- 
 low and BLrney's men entering almost 
 simnltaneously. Inside the intrench- 
 ments there is a terrible hand-to-hand 
 struggle, the bayonet and the clubbed- 
 musket being freely used. Nothing, 
 however, can save the doomed Confed- 
 erates. Some 4000 men, including 
 General Johnson, of Ewell's corps, and 
 General Geoi-ge H. Stewart, are sur- 
 rounded and captured ; and with them 
 thirty pieces of artillery and as many 
 colors. Meanwhile, the remainder of 
 the Confederate force, stricken with 
 terror and thrown into the wildest con- 
 fusion, have fallen back, seeking safety 
 in the rear. 
 
 This attack of Hancock's was justly 
 regarded as the most brilliant feat of 
 amis yet accomplished in the cam- 
 paign. Never was surprise more com- 
 plete or more successful. The officers 
 
A GREAT BATTLE. 
 
 68] 
 
 were taken at their breakfast. The 
 captured generals were greatly morti- 
 fied. When brought into his presence, 
 Hancock received them courteously, 
 extending his hand. Johnson took it, 
 but, with tears in his eyes, declared 
 that he would rather have died than 
 been made a prisoner. Stewart be- 
 haved with less gallantry. Hancock 
 had known him before. "How are 
 you, Stewart?" said Hancock, as he 
 offered him his hand. The reply was 
 haughty and indignant. " I am Gen- 
 eral Stewart, of the Confederate army ; 
 and, under present circumstances, I de- 
 cline to take your hand." "And un- 
 der any other circumstances, general," 
 said Hancock, with great coolness* "I 
 should not have offered it." 
 
 An hour only had elapsed since the 
 column of attack was formed. Along 
 with the prisoners, which he sent to 
 Grant, Hancock sent a note hastily 
 written in pencil, saying: "I have 
 finished up Johnson, and am now 
 going into Early." This second task, 
 as we shall soon see, he found to be 
 less easy of accomplishment than the 
 former. Early, like Johnson, com- 
 manded a division of EwelFs corps. 
 At the point penetrated, Lee's army, 
 as we have seen, formed a salient. 
 Hancock had, therefore, by his first 
 success, thrust a wedge between the 
 Confederate right and centre. It was 
 his hope that he would be able to cut 
 Lee's army in two ; and there can be 
 no doubt that if sufiicient provision 
 had been made, promptly and in force, 
 to follow up the advantage Hancock 
 had won by his first brilliant assault, 
 
 the desired end would have been ac- 
 complished. As it was, Hancock's 
 troops, flushed with success, and incaj> 
 able of being restrained after the cap- 
 ture of the intrenchments, pressed on 
 through the forest in the direction of 
 Spottsylvania, driving the flying enemy 
 before them. At the distance of half 
 a mile, they were suddenly brought 
 to a halt in their triumphant career. 
 They had reached a fresh line of 
 breast-works. Behind these works 
 Ewell had taken shelter; and rein- 
 forcements had reached him from the 
 corps of Anderson and Hill. The 
 National advance was now effectually 
 checked. It was not only impossible 
 to make headway — it was impossible 
 to remain in the position in which they 
 found themselves. The tide of battle 
 was now turned. Gathering them- 
 selves up for a supreme effort, the 
 Confederates, in overwhelming num- 
 bers and in magnificent array, rushed 
 from the breast-works, and, falling with 
 crushing weight on Hancock's men, 
 now slightly disordered by their feai-- 
 less rush through the woods, drove 
 them back to the line which they had 
 captured in the early morning. Here, 
 however, Hancock managed to rally 
 his troops ; and, getting them into line 
 on the right and left of the angle of 
 the works, he stoutly resisted the fierce 
 and repeated onsets of the enemy, and 
 firmly held his position. His situation, 
 however, was becoming every moment 
 more critical. Lee was resolved, if 
 possible, to recover the lost line of 
 works ; and, with this end in view, he 
 was putting forth the most Herculean 
 
682 
 
 THE WILDERNESS. 
 
 efforts, and bringing his entire strength 
 to bear on the one point. It was now 
 six o'clock — one hour and a half since 
 the first onset. Hancock was still 
 holding his position ; but relief was 
 sorely needed. At this opportune mo- 
 ment, when most needed, relief came. 
 Wright, who had been hurried foi'ward 
 with his Sixth corps, arrived on the 
 ground, and took position on the right 
 of the salient. Hancock, thus relieved, 
 concentrated his troops on the left of 
 the angle. A little later, about eight 
 o'clock, and with a view to relieve the 
 pressure on Hancock and Wright, 
 Burnside and Wai-ren were ordered 
 to attack along their whole fi'onts. 
 The battle now raged furiously at 
 eveiy point. No evidence was given 
 that Lee had changed his purpose. 
 The last line at the salient was still the 
 object of his ambition. On Hancock 
 and Wright he dealt his heaviest and 
 most terrific blows. Again and again, 
 and in rapid succession, he rolled 
 against them his heavy masses. He 
 seemed resolved to dislodge them. 
 Seeing this, and becoming convinced 
 that Burnside and Warren were pro- 
 ducing no impression on their re- 
 spective fronts. Grant detached two 
 divisions from the Fifth corps — those of 
 Cutler and Griffin — and sent them to 
 the aid of the Second and Sixth corps 
 lit the angle which was still regarded 
 AS the piize of battle, and where was 
 the focus of the fight. Five times did 
 Lee hurl his heavy columns against the 
 National lines entrusted with the de- 
 fense of this position. Five times, 
 afttfl" severe hand-to-hand fighting, in 
 
 which the slaughter on both sides was 
 dreadful, were the attacking columns 
 repulsed. It was not until after mid- 
 night that Lee withdrew his shattered 
 and bleeding lines and re-formed them 
 in his interior position. Hancock held 
 the works he had captured in the morn- 
 ing. The battle had lasted twenty 
 hours. The losses on either side were 
 about 10,000 men. 
 
 Such was the great battle of Spott- 
 sylvania Court House. Although not 
 a decisive victory, it was a positive 
 gain to the National cause. Its moral 
 effect was great. It was one of the 
 bloodiest battles of the war. The 
 sight presented at the angle where the 
 tide of battle surged and roared from 
 earliest dawn till past midnight of that 
 summer day, as described by eye-wit- 
 nesses, was something shocking to wit- 
 ness. The bodies of the dead and 
 wounded were piled in heaps, and min- 
 gled together in wild confusion. It 
 was, as one has said, "an angle of 
 death — one hideous Golgotha." The 
 severity of the musketiy fire was evi- 
 denced by the condition of the forest 
 after the battle. The trees were not 
 only pierced by the bullets, but literally 
 cut down. At Washington, as a relic of 
 this fight, there is preserved the trunk 
 of an oak tree which was cut through 
 and through by bullets. The trunk is 
 about twenty inches in diameter. 
 
 On the morning of the 13th, the two 
 armies confronted each other. May 
 Hancock holding his advanced **• 
 position, and the Confederates firmly 
 intienched behind an inner and shorter 
 line. Lee's position, in truth, was »i 
 
MEADE'S ADDRESS TO THE TKOOPS. 
 
 68J 
 
 invulnerable as ever. The troops on 
 l)oth sides, as well they might be, wei-e 
 sorely exhausted. The rain which set 
 in on the 11th continued to fall. The 
 ground, in consequence, was soaked, 
 jnd the roads were heavy. On this 
 day there was some manoeuvring; 
 and a severe engagement, which lasted 
 several hours, took place between the 
 forces of Burnside and those of A. P. 
 Hill. Nothing was gained on either 
 side. It was now the ninth day since 
 the army of the Potomac crossed the 
 Rapidan. In that brief space of time, 
 it had lost nearly 30,000 men, includ- 
 ing a large number of officers. It was 
 a fearful sacrifice of human life, suffi- 
 cient to appal the stoutest heart. There 
 were, indeed, throughout the land not 
 a few, who, looking only at the sacri- 
 fice, and heedless of the results, pro- 
 nounced the battles in the Wilderness 
 and at Spottsylvania useless butcheries. 
 Such was not the opinion of the gen- 
 erals in the field. It was not the 
 opinion of Secretary of War Stanton, 
 who nobly sustained Grant, and who, 
 by his daily bulletins, cheered and 
 buoyed up the hopes of the people. 
 Taking advantage of the lull on the 
 13th, General Meade addressed the 
 following stirring, congratulatory epis- 
 tle to his troops : 
 
 " Soldiers : The moment has arrived when 
 your commanding general feels authorized to 
 address you in terms of gratulation. 
 
 "For eight days and nights, almost without 
 intermissioB, in rain and sunshine, you have 
 been gallantly fighting a desperate foe, in po- 
 sitions naturally strong, and rendered doubly 
 so by intrenchments. 
 
 "You have compelled him to abandon his 
 
 fortifications on the Rapidan, to retire and 
 attempt to stop your onward progress; and 
 now he has abandoned the last intrenched po- 
 sition so tenaciously held, suffering a loss in 
 all of 18 guns, 23 colors, and 8000 prisoners, 
 including two general officers. 
 
 "Your heroic deeds and noble endurance 
 of fatigue and privations will ever be memor- 
 able. Let us return thanks to God for the 
 mercy thus shown us, and ask earnestly for 
 its continuation. 
 
 " Soldiers! your work is not yet over. The 
 enemy must be pursued, and, if possible, over- 
 come. The courage and fortitude you have 
 displayed renders your commanding general 
 confident your future efforts will result in 
 success. 
 
 " While we mourn the loss of many gallani 
 comrades, let ua remember the enemy must 
 have suffered equal, if not greater losses. 
 
 "We shall soon receive reinforcements, 
 which he cannot expect. Let us determine 
 to continue vigorously the work, so well 
 begun, and, under God's blessing, in a short 
 time the object of our labors will be accom- 
 plished." 
 
 For five days more, from the 1 3th to 
 the 18th, the armies remained rela- 
 tively in the same position — Grant con- 
 tinually throwing out towards the left, 
 in the hope of overlapping and break- 
 ing the Confederate right, the enemy 
 ever bristling out in breast-works, and 
 successfully repelling every assault. 
 The result of this continual manoeu- 
 vring was that Grant's army, which on 
 its arrival occupied a position four or 
 five miles to the northwest of Spottsyl- 
 vania Court House, was, at the end of 
 ten days, occupying a position almost 
 due east of that place, the left resting 
 at Massaponax Church, seme four miles 
 distant. Grant having gradually be- 
 come convinced of the impossibility of 
 making any impression on Lee's front 
 
684 
 
 THE WILDERNESS. 
 
 or flank, at last resolved upon a turn- 
 ing operation, by which he hoped to 
 bring him out of his intrenchraents. 
 On the 19th, he received from Wash- 
 ington reinforcements sufficient to 
 make up for all his losses ; and in the 
 afternoon of that day, much to the de- 
 light of the soldiers, who were glad to 
 turn their backs on the bloody lines at 
 Spottsylvania, orders were given for a 
 movement, to be made at midnight, 
 towards the North Anna. Lee, quick 
 to discern the purpose of his antago- 
 nist, and sleeplessly vigilant, from 
 some cause or other suspected Grant's 
 design. Resolved to hinder the in- 
 tended movement, and so gain time for 
 the transference of his own troops to a 
 new base, he ordered Ewell to make a 
 visrorous demonstration on the extreme 
 National right. Late in the after- 
 noon, Ewell executed the movement as 
 directed. He crossed the Ny, above 
 the right flank, seized the road leading 
 to Fredericksburg, and captured the 
 ammimition-train coming up from that 
 place. The National right flank was 
 guarded by a body of foot artillerists 
 who had just come up from the de- 
 fenses at Washington, and who had 
 never before been in battle. They 
 were under the command of General 
 R. O. Tyler. Ewell's attack was 
 promptly met, the artillerists, ignorant 
 of the Indian devices to which the 
 veterans were accustomed to resort 
 while fighting in the woods, fearlessly 
 exposing themselves, firing furiously, 
 and ultimately compelling the enemy 
 to fall back from the road and into the 
 woods beyond. Tyler's men suffered 
 
 severely; but the honor of repulsing 
 the enemy belongs to them. Soon 
 afterwards, some of the veterans of the 
 Second and Fifth corps came up, and, 
 continuing the pursuit, captured sev- 
 eral hundred prisoners. In conse 
 quence of this attack^ the movement to 
 the North Anna was delayed until the 
 following night. Grant's losses, which 
 we have already enumerated up to the 
 13th, had been greatly increased in the 
 interval, probably by not less than ' 
 10,000 men, making the fearful aggre- 
 gate, since the crossing of the Rapidan, 
 over 40,000 men in killed, wounded and 
 missing; yet it was not without hope 
 and confidence he turned his face to- 
 wards Richmond. Fredericksburg had 
 been the base of supplies since the 
 army entered the Wilderness. Thither, 
 cilso, had been conveyed the sick and 
 wounded. As the army moved in the 
 direction of Richmond, new bases were 
 opened at Port Royal and afterwards 
 at White House. The management 
 of this department continued to reflect 
 the highest credit on Chief-Quarter- 
 master Ingalls. 
 
 It is time now that our attention 
 should be given to certain outside 
 movements which were being carried 
 on simultaneously with those events con- 
 nected with the main army in the Wil- 
 derness and at Spottsylvania. These 
 were Sheridan's raid and the co-opera 
 tive movements of Burnside and Sigel 
 
 Sheiidan, it will be remembered, ir 
 obedience to orders, set out on the 
 morning of the 9 th with por- May 
 tions of the three divisions of •• 
 his corps, commanded respectirely by 
 
SHERIDAN'S RAID. 
 
 689 
 
 Merrit, Wilson and Gregg. His instruc- 
 tions were to engage the enemy's cav- 
 alry, to destroy the Fredericksburg and 
 Vii'ginia Central railroads, to threaten 
 Richmond, and finally to communicate 
 with, and draw supplies from Butler's 
 force on the James River. Cutting 
 loose from the main army, he swept 
 over the Po and the Ta; and crossing 
 the North Anna, he struck the Vir- 
 ginia Central, and captured Beaver 
 Dam Station. Sending out his men, 
 he destroyed about ten miles of the 
 track, also two locomotives, three 
 trains of cars, and 1,500,000 rations. 
 There, too, he recaptured 400 Na- 
 tionals, who had been made prisoners 
 in the Wilderness, and who were on 
 their way to Richmond. At Beaver 
 Dam Station he was overtaken by a 
 body of Confederate cavalry, under 
 General J. E. B. Stuart, who had fol- 
 lowed him from the Rapidan. Stuart 
 fell upon him heavily, both on flank 
 and rear; but Sheridan, although he 
 sustained some losses, was npt hin- 
 dered in his onward progress. He 
 crossed the South Anna at Ground- 
 squirrel Bridge ; and by daylight on 
 the morning of the 11th, he had 
 captured Ashland Station, on the Fred- 
 ericksburg road. After destroying six 
 iiiles of the road, a train, and a large 
 quantity of stores, he proceeded to- 
 vvards Richmond. On the same day, 
 at Yellowstone Tavern, a few miles 
 north of Richmond, he again came into 
 collision with Stuart. A severe con- 
 contest ensued, Sheridan finally obtain- 
 ing possession of the turnpike, and 
 driving the Confederate cavalry back 
 
 towards Ashland and across the north 
 fork of the Chickahominy. In this en- 
 counter. General Stuart was mortally 
 wounded ; and thus passed out of sight 
 one of the most conspicuous figures of 
 the war.* Sheridan pushed on, his 
 men greatly emboldened by their success 
 at Yellowstone Tavern ; and approach 
 ing Richmond, he niade a bold dash on 
 the outer line of works. This he easily 
 carried — Custer's brigade capturing a 
 section of artillery and 100 men. Find- 
 ing the second line too strong to be 
 assailed with any prospect of success, 
 Sheridan retraced his steps, and retired 
 rapidly to the crossing of the Chicka- 
 hominy, at Meadow Bridge. There he 
 found the bridge partially destroyed, 
 with the enemy in some force in his 
 front and pressing also on his rear. 
 Repulsing the enemy in his rear, he 
 rebuilt the bridge, under a most gall- 
 ing fire, and crossed a poi'tion of his 
 ti'oops. The remainder made a detour 
 by way of Cold Harbor, and crossed 
 
 •James E. B. Stnart, a major-general in the Confed- 
 erate service, was born in Patrick County, Virginia 
 about 1833. He graduated at West foiut in 1854, and 
 was commissioned a cavalry officer. He had reached 
 the rank of first-lieutenant when he resigned. May 
 14th, 1861. He had seen some active service in the 
 Indian country, and had come to be known as a bi-ava 
 soldier and a dashing, fearless rider. He was present 
 and fought at Bull Run, became brigadier-general in 
 September, 1861, and afterwards organized the Con- 
 federate cavalry in Virginia. He became conspicuous 
 by his celebrated raid on McClellan's rear on the 13th 
 and 14th of June, 18G2. When Lee entered Maryland, 
 in August of that year, Stuart, in the midst of a terrific 
 thunderstorm, fell upon Pope's headquarters, and cap. 
 tnred many private papers and some plans of campaign 
 In all the subsequent movements, up until his deaih, of 
 the army of Northern Virginia, Stuart played a promi- 
 nent part. After being wounded at Yellowstone Tav- 
 ern, he was conveyed to Bichmoud, where he died 
 a day or two atterwards. 
 
«8d 
 
 THE WrLDERNESS. 
 
 the Chickahominy at Bottom Bridge — 
 ground rendered forever memorable by 
 the Peninsular campaign. Haxall's 
 Landing was reached on the 14th. 
 Communication from that point was 
 ©pened with General Butler; supplies 
 were received ; and the wearied troops 
 were allowed three days to rest and 
 refit Sheridan then returned leisurely, 
 by way of Baltimore Store, White 
 House and Hanover Court House ; and, 
 on the 25th of May, he rejoined the 
 army of the Potomac. 
 
 Let us now see what success had 
 attended the co-operative movements. 
 Butler, as has been stated, moved from 
 May Fortress Moni-oe on the 4th of 
 *• May, and concenti'ated at York- 
 town and Gloucester. He had already 
 been joined by Gillmore, with the 
 Tenth corps, and W. F. Smith, with a 
 portion of the Eighteenth. He had, 
 also, a division of horse at Norfolk and 
 Portsmouth, under General Kautz, 
 His entire force amounted to over 
 S0,000 men. Gillmore had built up a 
 great reputation by his approaches on 
 Morris Island, and by his splendid 
 artilleiy practice against the city of 
 Charleston. Smith had won distinction 
 under McClellan in the peninsula, and 
 ander Grant at Chattanooga, where 
 his skilful engineering greatly contri- 
 buted to the success of the Nationals. 
 Kautz, too, was a daring and capable 
 officer. At first, it seemed as if Butler 
 proposed to move upon Richmond by 
 the old route of McClellan. This view 
 of the case received some encourao-e- 
 ment from the fact that he had already, 
 jU the 1st of May, sent to West Point 
 
 a brigade of infantry and a body of 
 cavalry, some 1800 strong — the former 
 by water, the latter by land. The real 
 object of this movement was to mask 
 his main design. It was his belief 
 that the presence of these troops at 
 West Point would attract the enemy 
 towards Richmond, and that in the 
 meantime he would be able to execute 
 the principal part of his programme. 
 As soon as this was accomplished, and 
 he had reached the point intended, the 
 troops at West Point were to march 
 across the peninsula, and join the 
 main body. 
 
 On the night of the 4th, Butlei 
 embarked his troops on transports, 
 dropped down the York, passed For- 
 tress Monroe, turned into the James, 
 and advanced up that river, preceded 
 by a fleet of gunboats. On the fol- 
 lowing day, and without encountering 
 any opposition, he put on shore, on the 
 south side of the James, at Wilson's 
 Avharf, one brigade of colored troops 
 under General Wild, at Fort Powhat- 
 tan two regiments, at City Point 
 Hinks' division, and landed the main 
 body a mile or two above, at Ber- 
 muda Hundred — a neck of land 
 formed by the James and the Appo 
 mattox, and capable of being strongly 
 fortified. Butler immediately pi'o- 
 ceeded to throw up intrenchments; 
 and the gunboats were disposed bo as 
 to protect the flanks. 
 
 Simultaneously with this movement 
 of the main body, Kautz, with 3000 
 cavalry, started from Suffolk, forced a 
 passage over the Blackwater, and, push- 
 ing westward, struck the Weldon Rail 
 
THE AEMY OP THE JAMES, 
 
 687 
 
 »oad at Stony Creek, and burned the 
 bridge. 
 
 Butler's advance had not been made 
 a moment too soon. After the depar- 
 ture of Gillmore for the north — Beau- 
 regard, having no foe in his immedi- 
 ate neighborhood, hastened to follow. 
 Gathering together what ti'oops could 
 be obtained from Charleston, Savan- 
 nah and Florida, he hurried towards 
 the James. By the time Butler reached 
 Bermuda Hundred, the van of Beaure- 
 gard's army had reached Petersburg. 
 The cutting of the railroad by Kautz, 
 and the destruction of the bridge, i-e- 
 tarded for a time the arrival of the 
 main body; but Butler was soon to 
 have in his front a powerful and skil- 
 ful antagonist, one who would test his 
 strength and fully tax his ingenuity. 
 
 At Bermuda Hundred, the 6th was 
 spent in strengthening the defenses, and 
 in making i-econnoissances. Early on 
 May the 7th, General Brooks was sent, 
 7» with five brigades, to destroy the 
 Richmond and Petersburg Railroad. 
 The enemy was found in a strong 
 position, covering the I'oad from Wal- 
 thal Junction to Chester Station. The 
 cavalry at first fell back to the line 
 of the infantry. A line of battle was 
 immediately formed; and Brooks ad- 
 vanced to the attack, driving the Con- 
 federates from their vantage ground 
 back upon the railroad. There, how- 
 ever, a determined stand was made. 
 After some severe fighting, during 
 which a bridge which crossed one of 
 the tributaries of the Appomattox was 
 destroyed, the National right was 
 pushed back in turn ; and, finally, both 
 
 parties withdrew. On the 9th, ^ay 
 another and more vigorous ad- 9. 
 vance was made upon the railroad. 
 The great object was to hinder or pre- 
 vent the arrival of the troops from the 
 South. Beauregard's men, however, 
 were already well forward ; as Kautz, 
 unable to hold the road, or to advance 
 to Petersbui'g, had returned to City 
 Point, and left the Confederates free 
 to push their way to Petersburg. The 
 attack on the 9th was made by three 
 divisions of the Tenth corps, under 
 Terry, Ames and Turner, with two di- 
 visions of the Eighteenth, under Weit- 
 zel and Wistar — Gillmore and Smith 
 commanding their I'espective _ corps. 
 They marched from camp at daylight, 
 and reached the railroad at four differ- 
 ent points. By noon, not less than 
 four miles of i-ail were torn up and 
 destroyed. The Confederates were en- 
 countered in force near Snake Creek, 
 where they occupied a strong line of 
 earth-works. A severe battle ensued, 
 the Nationals finally driving the enemy 
 across the creek, and destroying the 
 railroad. 
 
 Elated by his successes on the 9th, 
 General Butler sent to Stanton a des- 
 patch in which, taking too hopeful a 
 view of his own position, he unwisely 
 belittled the resources and ability of 
 his antagonist. Ignoi-ant as yet of the 
 fate which had befallen Kautz, he en- 
 larged on the successes of that general 
 as well as of his own. He had ob- 
 tained a position, he said, in which, 
 with proper supplies, he could hold 
 out against the whole of Lee's army; 
 he had cut Beauregard's army hope- 
 
§83 
 
 THE WILDERNESS. 
 
 lessly in two ; he had whipped D. H. 
 Hill, after a severe and well-contest- 
 ed fight; and he assured the war 
 secretary that Grant would not be 
 troubled with any further reinforce- 
 ments to Lee from the army of Beau- 
 regard. A few days more will shoAv 
 how greatly General Butler was de- 
 ceived. He had made up his mind to 
 effect a passage across Snake Creek on 
 the morrow, and crowd the enemy to- 
 wards Petersburg. That night, how- 
 ever, he received information to the 
 effect that Lee was in full retreat to- 
 wards Richmond, with Grant in pur- 
 suit; and fearing that he might soon 
 have the aiTuy of Northern Virginia on 
 his hands, he recalled his troops from 
 Snake Creek, strengthened his lines, 
 and prepared to march north to take 
 part in the investment of the Confed- 
 erate capital. During the 10th, there 
 was some fighting at Snake Creek, 
 some charges and counter-charges — nei- 
 ther party gaining on the other. On 
 the 11th, both armies rested. 
 
 How much General Butler haa de- 
 ceived himself, and what precious op- 
 portunities had already been lost, was 
 soon to be made apparent. It ought 
 to have been possible for the army of 
 the James to capture Petersburg. It 
 might even have succeeded in captur- 
 ing Richmond. The capture of the 
 one or the other would certainly have 
 had the effect of placing the Confed- 
 erates at a serious disadvantage ; and it 
 could hardly have failed to hasten the 
 inevitable end. With the arrival of 
 the army of Beauregard, the opportu- 
 nity offered to the army of the James 
 
 was hopelessly gone, Petersburg was 
 secured to the Confederates: and Rich- 
 mond was not to be taken from them ■ 
 except by the destruction of the army * 1 
 of General Lee. It would be unjust, 
 perhaps, to blame either General Bui^ 
 ler or General Grant, because richer 
 fruit was not already plucked by the 
 army of the James ; but it is not to be 
 denied that the clockwork-like accu- 
 racy of motion which characterized 
 the army of General Grant at luka and 
 Corinth, which was a prominent and 
 striking feature at Vicksburg, which 
 was, if possible, even a more promi- 
 nent and still more striking feature at 
 Chattanooga, was wanting to that huge 
 and complicated machine which was 
 set in motion on the 4th of May, when 
 the army of the Potomac advanced 
 from Culpepper Court House to the 
 fords of the Rapidan. There is a 
 limit, after all, to the ability of mor- 
 tals. General Grant's instructions to 
 Butler may have been imperfect or 
 they may have been indefinite; Gen- 
 eral Butler may, on the other hand, 
 have been wanting in discretion ; but 
 it surely implied a condition of mind 
 at once over-exacting and unrea- 
 sonable, to expect that the original 
 plan of campaign for the entire army 
 would be carried out according to the 
 strict letter of the instructions given, 
 or that success would attend its every 
 movement, and at every point. 
 
 After the rest on the 11th, there 
 were signs of life and activity again 
 inside the lines of the army of tlie 
 James. On the 12th, a general advance 
 was made in the direction of Ricb 
 
CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENTS. 
 
 681 
 
 May mond. General Butler ordered 
 12. a heavy column northward — 
 the right under General Smith, who 
 moved on the turnpike, leading to 
 Fort Darling; the left under General 
 Gillmore, who followed the line ot 
 railroad further to the west. The 
 Confederates fell back before them ; 
 and Generals Butler and Smith estab- 
 lished their headquarters that night at 
 the mansion of Dr. Friend, about nine 
 miles from Richmond. Gillmore was 
 equally well advanced on the National 
 left. It was an'anged that a general 
 attack should be made next morning 
 on the enemy's position at Proctor's 
 Creek. When morning dawned, it 
 was discovered that he had retired to a 
 strong line of intrenchments in his 
 rear. General Gillmore succeeded in 
 turning the right of this new position ; 
 but such was the strength of the 
 works, and so formidable seemed the 
 interior lines of defense, that the as- 
 sault was delayed until the 16th. 
 
 The night of the 15th was calm and 
 beautiful. A lovely moon, but slightly 
 obscured by a few fleecy clouds which 
 floated across the heavens, lit up the 
 scene. In the National camp all was 
 quiet; but everything indicated pre- 
 paredness for the proposed assault in 
 the early morning. As the morning 
 hours advanced, but before it was yet 
 dawn, a thick fog arose from the river 
 and enwrapped the surrounding coun- 
 try in gloom. As yet there were no 
 signs of life in the National camp. 
 All of a sudden the stillness of the 
 early morning hours was disturbed, 
 ind the lone echoes were aroused 
 
 by a fierce outburst of musketry and 
 the loud thundering of artillery, jfay 
 Beauregard, taking advantage of *6« 
 the fog, had fallen upon the National 
 army with his entii'e force. It was a 
 complete surprise to Butler, who was 
 ill-prepared to resist such an attack. 
 
 Beauregard had evidently made him- 
 self familiar with Butler's position. 
 He knew the ground; and he had 
 made his arrangements with admirable 
 skill. The National line, although 
 unduly extended, failed to reach the 
 river on the right. There was a mile 
 and a half of open, undulating country 
 between Smith's right and the James. 
 Beauregard's object was to turn Butler's 
 right flank and get to his rear; but 
 the more effectually to accomplish his 
 purpose, he resolved to strike heavily 
 in front, while he had given instruc- 
 tions to General Whiting — who had 
 been left behind on the Petersburg and 
 Richmond Railroad, in the rear of Gill- 
 more — to make a simultaneous onset, 
 and so cut off the National retreat. 
 Such a plan, if fully carried out, could 
 hardly have failed to prove disastrous 
 to Butler's army. 
 
 It seemed for a time as if Beaure- 
 gard's expectations would be fully re- 
 alized. The first fierce blow fell upon 
 Smith's right, which was held by Heck 
 man's brigade, of Weitzel's divnsion. 
 The blow was as overwhelming as it 
 was sudden. Heckman made a gallant 
 fisrht : but he was soon surrounded and 
 made prisoner. The much-coveted po- 
 sition was already all but won. The 
 right flank had been turned ; and the 
 Confederates were pressing on to seize 
 
690 
 
 THE WILDERNESS. 
 
 the road which leads to Bennuda Hun- 
 dred. It seemed as if all were lost. 
 Happily, deliverance was at hand. The 
 night before, General Butler had or- 
 dered three regiments of Ames' divi- 
 sion, of Gillmore's corps, to pass over 
 and reinforce Smith on the right. 
 During the darkness they had been 
 pressing forward to their appointed 
 position. The advance regiment — the 
 One Hundred and Twelfth New York — 
 was just coming up. It was almost im- 
 mediately joined by the Ninth Maine, 
 when the two met the Confederates at 
 the point where the transverse road, 
 along which they were moving, crosses 
 the road which leads to Bermuda Hun- 
 dred. At the moment of what seemed 
 victory — when about to seize the road 
 on which his hopes were so ardently 
 bent, and on the possession of which so 
 much depended — the triumphant foe 
 was brought to a standstill ; and, per- 
 plexed by this sudden and unexpected 
 manifestation of strength, he quickly 
 withdrew. The line of retreat, if re- 
 treat should be necessary, was so far 
 safe. 
 
 Meanwhile, a fierce attack had been 
 made on Smith's front. It was at- 
 tended with less success than the 
 attack on his flank. A device which 
 had proved a means of salvation to a 
 portion of Burnside's army in front of 
 Fort Sanders, at Knoxville, was here 
 again adopted with success. Tele- 
 graph wire, it appears, was found plen- 
 tifully in the neighborhood. Smith, a 
 day or two before, had caused a large 
 amount of this Avire to he wound 
 around the tree-stumps which were 
 
 abiindant in the front of his lines. 
 The wire was carried from stump to 
 stump, and formed a species of vnre 
 net-work. When, therefore, the Con. 
 federates, unconscious of the danger 
 which awaited them, came rushing 
 forward through the dense fog, they 
 tripped and stumbled, becoming inex- 
 tricably entangled in the meshes of 
 wire, and falling an easy prey to the 
 bayonet or rifle of the National soldier. 
 Discovering that no impression could 
 be made on the front of the National 
 right, and apparently indifferent to the 
 National left, Beauregard massed his 
 forces again, in larger numbers, against 
 Smith's right, this time taking fuller 
 advantage of the opening between him 
 and the river. Smith fell back and 
 formed a new line, his right now more 
 close to the James. Gillmore, also, 
 yielded to the movement and fell back. 
 Beauregard pressed closer and closer, 
 with increasing numbers; he evident- 
 ly expected Whiting to strike, as di- 
 rected, in the rear of the National 
 army, and cut off its retreat. Whit- 
 ing, however, for some reason or other, 
 failed to obey the behests of his chief; 
 and General Butler, trembling for the 
 safety of his trains, his communica- 
 tions, and the depot on the James, or 
 dered the withdrawal of the whole 
 army within the lines at Bermuda Hun- 
 dred. Beauregard followed him up, 
 and, as he could not penetrate the linas, 
 proceeded to cast up intrenchments in 
 Butler's front. In these operations of 
 the 16th, the Nationals lost over 4000 
 men. The Confederate loss exceeded 
 3000. Butler was now in a position in 
 
BUTLER AND SIGEL. 
 
 691 
 
 which he had no reason to dread the 
 enemy ; but he was literally locked in 
 on the land side. On both flanks, 
 however, he had the rivers at his com- 
 mand; and it was still possible for 
 him, taking advantage of his water 
 communications, to strike a vigorous 
 blow for the capture of Petersburg. 
 He was, indeed, making preparations 
 for some such effort, when he received 
 orders fi-om Grant to send two thirds 
 of his effective force to the assistance 
 of the array of the Potomac, then in the 
 vicinity of the Chickahominy. Thus 
 it was that Butler came to be " bottled 
 up at Bermuda Hundred." 
 
 General Kautz, meanwhile, made 
 another successful raid ; but it had no 
 practical bearing on General Butler's 
 plans. We have seen already that, 
 after his raid on the Weldon Railroad, 
 Kautz, finding it impossible to hold 
 the road, returned to City Point. This 
 was on the 8th. On the 12th, he ven- 
 tured forth again. Moving from rail- 
 road to railroad, over a wide extent of 
 country, he struck a large number of 
 stations, among which were Coalfield, 
 Powhattan, Cbula, Wilson's, Welville, 
 White and Black, Jarrett's and others, 
 and then returned to City Point on the 
 17th. At most of these points, he 
 burned the depots, tore up the tracks, 
 destroyed the stores, and made havoc 
 generally with freight-trains and loco- 
 motives wherever he found them. It 
 is true that this raid was not of any di- 
 rect or immediate benefit to General 
 Butler; but it nevertheless brought 
 forth precious fruit, and, like all the 
 other raids of a similar kind, had a 
 
 most important bearing on the final 
 issue. It weakened the South generally; 
 and it tended to isolate Richmond, and 
 hasten the end. So much for the co-oper- 
 ative movement under General Butler. 
 It is time now to turn to Sigel, 
 and see how he carried out his part 
 of the general plan. It will be re- 
 membered that he was ordered to 
 divide his troops and make a con- 
 joint movement up the Shenandoah 
 and up the Kanawha. Sigel himself, 
 with one portion, was to move up the 
 Shenandoah. Crook, with another por- 
 tion, accompanied by a division of cav- 
 alry, under Averill, was to move up 
 the Kanawha. The objectives were 
 respectively Staunton and Lynchburg. 
 These movements, which commenced 
 on the 1st of May, were less produc- 
 tive of good results than those of But- 
 ler and Kautz. Crook advanced from 
 Charleston, with Averill's cavalry in 
 advance. On the 10th of May, Ave- 
 riWf who, with 2000 cavalry, had been 
 ordered to move towards Wytheville, 
 for the purpose of destroying the lead 
 mines at that place, was met by a cav- 
 alry force, undei* Morgan, and was de- 
 feated. Crook himself, with 6000, 
 moved towards Dublin Station, where 
 he was met by a Confederate force, 
 under McCausland; and although he 
 proved himself the victor, after a se- 
 vere fight, it was not until he had lost 
 700 men, of whom pome 125 were 
 killed. He destroyed eome miles of 
 railroad; but on Morgan coming up 
 with a strong force, he withdrew, fall- 
 ing back to Meadow Bridge. Sigel 
 had no better luck than his subordi- 
 
692 
 
 THE WILDERNESS. 
 
 aates. When near New Market, on 
 the 15th, he was met by General 
 Breckenridge, whom Lee had sent to 
 resist the invasion. Breckenridge fell 
 upon Sigel with tremendous fury, driv- 
 ing him down the valley to the shel- 
 ter of Cedar Creek, near Strasburg, 
 with a loss of 700 men, 6 guns and 
 1000 small arras. Sigel's expedition, 
 in all its departments, whatever the 
 cause, had proved a complete failure. 
 It is not wonderful that, in the circum- 
 etances, General Grant should have 
 thought fit to relieve him. General 
 Hunter, who had already made a figure 
 in the war, particularly on the southern 
 coast, was placed in command. 
 
 Hunter, according to instructions 
 received from Grant, at the head of 
 about 9000 men, moved upon Staunton 
 with the view of destroying the rail- 
 road leading thence towards Charlotte- 
 ville. He had instructions, also, to 
 move upon Lynchburg. At Piedmont, 
 near Middle River, a tributaiy of the 
 Shenandoah, in Augusta County, and 
 not far from Staunton, on June 5th, 
 he encountered a Confederate foice of 
 about the same number of men, under 
 Generals Jones and McCausland. These 
 were all the concentrated forces in that 
 region, Breckenridge having been re- 
 called, with the greater part of his 
 command, to assist in the defense of 
 ilichmond. Hunter had a complete 
 success. After a severe and obstinate 
 battle, which ended only with the day- 
 light, he was master of the field, hav- 
 ing routed his antagonist, and captured 
 ir.OO prisoners, with 3 pieces of artil- 
 l' ;y. The Confederate general, Jones, 
 
 was killed. On the 8th, he was joined 
 by Crook and Averill, when he moved 
 from Staunton towards L}Tichburg, by 
 way of Lexington. By taking this 
 course, it appears, he disappointed 
 Grant, who expected him to appear 
 at Gordonsville, whither he had sent 
 Sheridan to meet him. Arrived be- 
 fore Lynchburg, Hunter found the 
 place too strong to justify any serious 
 attempts at its reduction; and as re- 
 inforcements were coming by railroad 
 from Lee's army, while his own sup- 
 plies of ammunition were all but ex- 
 hausted, he deemed it prudent to retire. 
 Not considering it safe to fall back by 
 the road he had come, he retreated by 
 way of Salem, hotly pursued by the 
 enemy. At Meadow Bridge, he ex- 
 pected to find abundant supplies; for 
 only a few days before, Crook and Ave- 
 rill had left at that place 1,500,000 
 rations, in charge of two Ohio regi- 
 ments. The place had been set upon by 
 a band of guerrillas ; and rations and 
 men had equally disappeared. It was 
 not until the 27th, nine days after his 
 retreat from Lynchburg, five days after 
 he had visited Meadow Bridge, that 
 Hunter obtained rations for his troops. 
 They had suffered terribly ; but they 
 had inflicted vast injury on the Con- 
 federates, by the destruction of foun- 
 dries, factories, mills and other prop- 
 erty. Such were the results of ihs 
 co-operative movements under Butler 
 on the one hand, and under Sigel and 
 Hunter on the other. They weakened 
 the South ; but they were not other 
 wise of any immediate practical benefit 
 to General Grant. 
 
GRANT AT THE SORTK ANNA. 
 
 693 
 
 We now return to the army of the 
 Potomac. We left it at Spottsylvania 
 Court House, about to resume its 
 march towards Eichmond. The move- 
 ment was commenced about midnight, 
 May on the 20th. Hancock led the 
 ^ way, with Torbert's cavalry in 
 advance. Moving first eastwaTd as far 
 as Mattaponax Church, under cover of 
 the remaining corps, he then turned to 
 the south and pushed his way to Mil- 
 ford Station, on the Fredericksburg 
 and Richmond railroad, some seventeen 
 miles south of his point of starting. 
 He crossed the Mattapony at Milford 
 Bridge, from which the enemy had 
 been dislodged by Torbert's cavalry, 
 and about a mile from the river, on a 
 vidge of hills, formed his column in 
 line of battle. Lee, no doubt, antici- 
 ^)ated some such movement; and, al- 
 though unwilling to run any risk by 
 striking his antagonist while executing 
 his flank march, he was not prepared 
 to be outstripped in the race for Rich- 
 mond. As noon as he was made 
 aware of Hsacock's advance. Long- 
 street's corps was headed southward, 
 and set in motion. Warren followed 
 Hancock on the morning of the 21st, 
 when Ewell was pushed after Long- 
 street. Wright and Burnside, with 
 the Sixth and Ninth corps, were still 
 within the lines at Spottsylvania, where 
 they were confronted by Hill. Burn- 
 side left on the afternoon of the 21st, 
 having first made a demonstration with 
 Ledlie's brigade, of Crittenden's divi- 
 sion, so as to deceive the enemy and 
 detain him in his position. Later, 
 Wright was preparing to follow, when 
 
 Hill, deeming the opportunity favor- 
 able for a deadly blow, fell upon his 
 retiring column with great weight. 
 The assault, howevei-, was repulsed 
 without difficulty; and Wi-ight pro- 
 ceeded on his southward mareh, Hill 
 at the same time following in the 
 wake of Longstreet and Ewell. may 
 On the morning of the 23d, the 23. 
 National army, having marched over a 
 country which, for beauty and fertility, 
 presented a striking contrast to the 
 Wilderness and the region around 
 Spottsylvania, amved on the northern 
 bank of the North Anna. Lee, having 
 the inside track, had won the race. 
 He was already well posted on the 
 south side of that stream. 
 
 Grant's position was now one of con- 
 siderable difficulty. In pursuing his 
 flank movement, it was necessary for 
 him to cross the river. It was natural 
 to conclude that Lee would offer a 
 stubborn resistance. To accomplish 
 his purpose Grant must needs hold his 
 troops well together, and handle them 
 with caution and with delicate skill. 
 
 The Grand Army, as we have said, had 
 reached the banks of the North Anna — ■ 
 the right, under Warren, at Jericho 
 Mills ; the left leaning upon the Rich- 
 mond and Fredericksburg railroad, and 
 covering Taylor's Bridge. In front of 
 the aiTuy there were three fords, known 
 respectively as Jericho, Island, Chester- 
 field or Taylor's Bridge. Grant, who 
 had already reached the railroad cross- 
 ing, was resolved to push across the 
 river with as little delay as possible. 
 Warren, with the Fifth corps, was or- 
 dered to cross at Jericho Ford; Han- 
 
 Ssa 
 
694 
 
 THE WILDERNESS. 
 
 cock, with the Second corps, was to 
 cross at Taylor's Bridge. These cross- 
 ings were about four miles apart. 
 
 Warren was allowed to cross with- 
 out opposition. Lee's attention had 
 been so fully occupied with what he 
 considered the necessities of the lower 
 ford, that he had wholly neglected the 
 ford above. Warren, however, was not 
 to be allowed to have things entirely his 
 own way. He had just got his corps 
 into position — Cutler on the right. Grif- 
 fin in the centre, and Crawford on the 
 left — when he was set upon in the 
 most savage manner by a strong body 
 of Confederates, under Colonel Brown. 
 Brown, whose force did not prove so 
 strong as at first it seemed — being 
 only one brigade of Wilson's division 
 of Hill's corps — was easily repulsed. 
 This brigade was quickly joined by 
 the three other brigades of the divi- 
 sion ; and as Heth's division, also of 
 Hill's corps, at the same time came up, 
 the Confederates resumed the attack 
 with great energy. The attack fell 
 chiefly on Griffin, who held his ground 
 with great firmness. While fully en- 
 gaging Grifiin's attention in front, 
 the Confederate commander detached 
 Brown, with his brigade, for the pur- 
 pose of assaulting Warren on his right 
 flank. Brown was at first completely 
 successful. Cutler, who, as we have 
 seen, held Warren's right, was just 
 getting into position when he was 
 struck heavily, his whole division 
 thrown into confusion, and Griffin's 
 right flank exposed. Griffin saved 
 himself by refusing the exposed flank, 
 and by hurrying forward Bartlett's 
 
 brigade to the menaced point, thus re. 
 storing the line. It was while exe- 
 cuting this movement that one of 
 Bartlett's regiments — the Eighty-Third 
 Pennsylvania — ran full against Brown's 
 column, and, by securing the first 
 fire, completely turned the tide of 
 battle. One of McCoy's men caught 
 Brown, and dragged him inside the 
 National lines. The ho'itile brigade 
 turned and fled in utter contusion, the 
 gallant Eighty-Third pouring a volley 
 of musketry into its flank and rear. 
 At all points, in front of the National 
 right, the repulse of the enemy was 
 complete. Warren had lost 350 men ; 
 but he had inflicted a much heavier 
 loss on the enemy. He held 1000 
 piisoners ; and he had secured the 
 position. 
 
 Hancock, on the left, had a much 
 more difficult task to perform. At 
 Taylor's Bridge, the Confederates had 
 constructed works of great strength. 
 The ground was peculiarly favorable for 
 defense. On the north side there is a 
 tongue of land, formed by the Norti 
 Anna and Long Creek, which for some 
 distance runs parallel with the river. 
 On this piece of ground, Hancock had 
 established himself. In his front, and 
 guarding the northern approach to the 
 bridge, was an extended redan, with a 
 wet ditch in front and rifle-trenches in 
 the rear. On the southern bank, which 
 commands the northern, there was 
 another work of similar construction. 
 These works were held by McLaws' 
 division, of Longstreet's corps, the 
 larger number of troops being, of 
 course, on the south side. Severj*) 
 
BtTKNSIDE EEPULSED. 
 
 695 
 
 bundred yards intervened between 
 Hancock's lines and the bridge-head. 
 The ground was bare, and gradually 
 ascended as it neared the bridge. It 
 was necessary, in order to gain a foot- 
 ing on the other side, to cany the 
 bridge and the defenses. To Birney's 
 well-tiied division, Hancock assigned 
 the perilous duty. Birney selected for 
 the work the two brigades of Pierce 
 and Egan. In order to afford some 
 protection to the storming party, Col- 
 onel Tidball got into advantageous po- 
 sition three sections of artilleiy. It 
 was now within an hour of sundown. 
 All things were ready for the attack. 
 At a given signal, the storming bri- 
 gades begin to advance. At the same 
 instant, the guns of the enemy open 
 upon them a most murderous fire. 
 The wisdom of Tidball's arrangement 
 is now brought prominently to light. 
 His batteries reply to those of the 
 enemy with excellent effect. Over 
 the open ground, and up the incline, 
 the brave fellows rush at the double- 
 quick. In a few seconds, they are 
 seen clambering over the parapet. A 
 second more, and the National and 
 regimental colors are floating over the 
 redan. It was, indeed, a perilous un- 
 di^rtaking; it was a brave, even heroic 
 effort; but it was an easy victory. In 
 that brief, rapid rush over the open 
 ground, 150 brave men had perished; 
 but the garrison had fled precipitately 
 over the bi'idge, leaving behind some 
 30 men, who, unable to escape, were 
 captured in the ditch. During the 
 night, several unsuccessful attempts 
 were made to regain what had been 
 
 lost, and even to burn the bridge. On 
 the following morning it was discov- 
 ered that the advanced works on the 
 south side of the river were also aban- 
 doned ; and Hancock, without expe- 
 riencing any further resistance, pushed 
 across the bridge his entire corps; 
 Wright, at the ianie time, effected a 
 crossing at Jericho Ford, and took po- 
 sition on Wan'en's right. 
 
 Three of the army corps — the Second, 
 Fifth and Sixth — were thus on the 
 south side of the North Anna River. 
 The Ninth corps— that of Burnside — 
 forming the National centre, alone re- 
 mained on the north side. It was ne- 
 cessary that this corps should be got 
 across before any further advance wa? 
 made by the other troops. This, it 
 was soon found, was a difficult, nay, in 
 the circumstances, an impossible task. 
 Lee, as we have seen, when Warren 
 crossed the river, flung back his left 
 wing, resting it on Little River; and 
 when Hancock crossed, be flung back 
 his right, resting it on the Hanover 
 marshes. With his centre, he still 
 clung to the river. Thus it was that 
 his line assumed the form of an obtuse- 
 angled triangle, the vertex thrust out 
 towards the North Anna. It followed 
 from this arrangement that, while he 
 could easily move from wing to wing 
 by interior lines, bis strongest poini 
 was bis centre. By a singular coinci- 
 dence, resulting also from the peculiar 
 form his line had assumed, Grant's 
 centre was bis weakest point. When, 
 therefore, Burnside, on the 24th, Maj 
 attempted to cross, his advance 24. 
 division, under Crittenden, was quickly 
 
696 
 
 THE WILDEKNESS. 
 
 met and repulsed, with heavy loss. 
 An attempt was made by Warren to 
 connect with Burnside, by sending 
 Crawford's division in that direction. 
 This attempt also failed, Crawford 
 being attacked by an overwhelming 
 force, and only after much difficulty 
 and great loss regaining his position. 
 
 Grant was thus completely check- 
 mated. After a pause of two days, he 
 came to the conclusion that Lee was 
 too firmly intrenched to be dislodged 
 by any further movement on his front. 
 He had recourse again to his flanking 
 tactics. Ordering Wan'en and Wright 
 to make demonstrations in their front, 
 and sending Wilson, with a cavalry 
 force, to destroy the Central Railroad, 
 he recrossed the North Anna on the 
 May night of the 26th; and heading 
 26» first well to the east, then to the 
 south, he resumed his march towards 
 Richmond. His immediate objective 
 was the Pamunkey, which is formed 
 by the junction of the North and South 
 Anna rivers. The Sixth corps, pre- 
 ceded by two divisions of cavalry, 
 under Sheridan, who had rejoined the 
 main army, led the van. It was fol- 
 lowed by the Fifth and Ninth. Han- 
 cock, with the Second, held position 
 till the morning of the 27th, when he 
 covered the rear. On the same morn- 
 ing, about nine o'clock, Sheridan took 
 possession of Hanover Ferry and Han- 
 overtown, the latter on the south side 
 of the Pamunkey, and distant from 
 Richmond about fifteen miles, from 
 White House about sixteen. On the 
 following morning, Saturday, the 28th, 
 the entire army was south of the Pa- 
 
 munkey, and in communication with 
 its new base at White House. Lee 
 was already in motion by a shorter 
 route, and was intrenching himself in 
 a strong position, prepared to dispute 
 the passage of the Chickahominy be- 
 fore the army of the Potomac had 
 reached the Pamunkey; but Grant had 
 really made a great gain by establish- 
 ing a new base of supplies at White 
 House, on the York Rivei", and in 
 easy communication with the waters 
 of Chesapeake Bay. 
 
 We are now back on the old bat- 
 tle-ground of the peninsula — ground 
 which, if not sacred, has at least been 
 rendered famous by a campaign which, 
 in spite of some noble examples of he- 
 roism and self-sacrifice, in spite of cer- 
 tain splendid exhibitions of military 
 skill, in spite even of a magnificent 
 and memorable retreat, must ever be 
 regarded as a National disaster, and, to 
 a certain extent, also, as a National 
 disgrace. The great army of the Po- 
 tomac is again here ; but, happily, it is 
 now in different hands. Now, as then, 
 the public is interested and excited by 
 frequent reports of changes of base; 
 but the reported changes of base imply 
 victory, not defeat. They imply that 
 the enemy is being driven closer and 
 closer to his last stronghold, nearer 
 and nearer to his final harbor of hope. 
 Lee never handled his men with more 
 consummate skill; his war-hardened 
 veterans were never more enduring, 
 more active or more subservient to his 
 will ; but he is now opposed to an an- 
 tagonist who is single of pui'pose, in- 
 flexible of will, tenacious of his grasp, 
 
AT THE TOLOPOTOMY. 
 
 691 
 
 and who uses his armies to win battles, 
 rather than to win political distinction 
 or the praises of men. 
 
 At this stage, both armies were 
 being considerably strengthened by 
 reinforcements. The bottling up of 
 Butler at Bermuda Hundred allowed 
 Bfeauregard to send the greater portion 
 of his troops to the assistance of Lee; 
 acd Breckenridge, relieved from any 
 severe pressure in Western Virginia, 
 was reported to be already in the 
 neighborhood of Hanover Court House, 
 with 5000 infantry and two brigades 
 of cavalry, uudei' Wickhatn and Lomax. 
 Grant was also receiving reinforce- 
 ments, W. F. Smith being now on his 
 way from Bermuda Hundred, with 
 about two thirds of Butler's best 
 troops. Convinced that a crisis was 
 at hand, both parties had been vigor- 
 ously concentrating. Now that the 
 Nationals were on the southwestern 
 bank of the Pamunkey, the direct road 
 to Richmond was across the Chicka- 
 hominy. Gi'ant immediately made ar- 
 rangements to ascertain the position 
 and strength of the enemy. Sheridan, 
 May on the 28th, was pushed forward 
 28* on the Hanover road, with three 
 brigades of cavalry, under Davis, Gregg 
 and Custer. At Hawe's Store they 
 encountered the Confederate cavalry, 
 under Fitz-Hugh Lee and Hampton. 
 A sevei-e battle ensued, the troopers 
 dismounting, and fighting for several 
 houi's with great obstinacy. The Con- 
 fedei'ates finally retired across the To- 
 lopotomy, leaving Sheridan in posses- 
 sion of the position which commanded 
 an important junction of roads. Re- 
 
 connoissances were now made by the 
 army in force. Wright moved on Han- 
 over Court House ; Hancock moved on 
 the road leading from Hawe's Store, in 
 the same direction; Warren advanced 
 towards Shady Grove Church ; while 
 Burnside's troops were so disposed as 
 to be in readiness to go to the support 
 of either the Second or Fifth corps. 
 Wilson's cavalry covered the right 
 and rear of the National army; while 
 Torbert and Gregg were moving in 
 front of the left. These movements 
 wei-e not completed without some hard 
 experience. Wright reached Hanover 
 Court House without much opposi- 
 tion. It was otherwise, however, with 
 Hancock and Warren, both of whom 
 encountered stubborn opposition, and 
 were temporarily held in check. Han- 
 cock's progress was arrested at Tolo- 
 potomy Creek; and, in spite of the 
 most vigorous efforts, he found it im 
 possible to make any headway. War- 
 ren was brought to a standstill not 
 far from Shady Grove Church, at a 
 point where the road is crossed by the 
 main branch of the Tolopotomy. At 
 this point, i^ was found, Ewell was 
 posted in great strength. It soon 
 began to be apparent that the enemy 
 was bent on turning Warren's left, by 
 moving along the Mechanicsville pike. 
 Crawford quickly covered that road 
 by a brigade of his reserves, under 
 Colonel Hardin. This brigade was fu 
 riously assailed by Rodes, at Beth- 
 esda Church, and compelled to fall 
 back to the Shady Grove road, the 
 enemy pressing closely. At this point, 
 Crawford biought up the remainder of 
 
tf98 
 
 THE WILDERNESS. 
 
 the reserves, and, with the aid of a 
 powerful battery, effectually repelled 
 the assailants. At dusk, the National 
 left was extended so as to cover the 
 Mechanicsville road. When Meade 
 >va8 made aware of the assault made 
 on Warren, he ordered an attack along 
 the whole line. Only Hancock, of the 
 other corps commanders, received the 
 order in time to act before dark. 
 With characteristic promptitude, he 
 pressed forward Barlow's division, 
 drove in the Confederate pickets, and 
 captured the rifle-pits. These move- 
 ments had the effect of developing 
 the enemy's position. Lee, it was 
 found, was posted in great strength in 
 advance of the Chickahominy ; his left 
 at Hanover Court House, and covering 
 the railroad; his centre in front of 
 Atlee's Station; his right at Mechan- 
 icsville, and covering, as we have seen, 
 Shady Grove. Such was the general 
 condition of affairs on the night of 
 the 30th. 
 
 Grant, bent upon his purpose, impa- 
 tient of delay, but realizing the diffi- 
 culty, if not impossibility, of foi-cing 
 his army across the Chickahominy by a 
 dii'ect attack on Lee's front, fell back 
 on his old tactics — a flank movement 
 by Lee's right. A movement was, 
 therefore, made upon Cold Harbor — a 
 point which commanded all the roads, 
 leading on the one hand to White 
 House, and on the other to Richmond. 
 May It was now the Slst of May. 
 
 3I« On that day, a division of Sheri- 
 dan's cavalry, under General Torbert, 
 captured and held the place, in spite 
 
 of the efforts of a strong conjoint force 
 
 of Confederate cavalry and infantry. 
 On the following day, Wednesday, the 
 1st of June, an effort was made June 
 by a body of Confederates, under '• 
 General Hoke, to regain possession of 
 Cold Haibor. The Confederates were 
 
 ! repulsed. Hoke, however, was quickly 
 reinfoi'ced ; and about noon he returned 
 
 j to the attack. It was now evident 
 
 i that the Confederate commander had 
 divined the object of his antagonist, 
 and that he was also fully awaje of 
 the value of the position. Sheridaii 
 sent word back that Torbert was sore- 
 ly pressed. He was immediate i_y "•'- 
 rected to hold on at all hazards, until 
 he was relieved by the infantry. Mean- 
 while, Wright, with the Sixth corps, 
 after marching all night from the ex- 
 treme right of the National army, was 
 approaching the scene of conflict. So, 
 too, was W. F. Smith, with the 
 Eighteenth corps, which had been 
 strengthened by four divisions of the 
 
 j Tenth, making an aggregate of 16,000 
 men. Smith, his command on board 
 transports, had left Bermuda Hundred 
 on the 29th May. After passing down 
 the James, and ascending the York 
 and Pamunkey, he reached White 
 House on the following day. There 
 he received orders to move upon New 
 Castle. It was not until he had 
 reached that place, and when he had 
 gone out of his way some twelve or 
 fifteen miles, that he was informed that 
 a mistake had been committed, and 
 that he must make a counter-march im- 
 mediately on Cold Harbor. Without 
 a moment's delay, the ordered move- 
 ment was commenced ; and about three 
 
COLD HAEBOE. 
 
 699 
 
 o'clock in the afternoon o£ the 1st of 
 June, shortly after the arrival of Wriglit, 
 Smith, with his coramaud, reached Cold 
 ' Harbor. His men sorely needed rest, 
 ' after a continuous march of twenty- 
 five miles; but no rest was yet to be 
 granted them. Orders here a\vaited 
 him from Genejval Meade to take posi- 
 tion on the right of the Sixth corps, 
 and to co-operate with Wright in an 
 immediate attack on the enemy. Pre- 
 parations for attack were made accord- 
 ingly. "Wright, with the Sixth corps, 
 took post in front of Cold Harbor — 
 Ricketts on his right, Russell in the 
 centre, and Neill on the left. Smith, 
 with his command, took part on the 
 right of the Sixth — Martindale on his 
 right, W. H. T. Brooks in the centre 
 and Devens on the left. 
 
 It was now past five o'clock, and the 
 day was fast speeding to its close. Be- 
 tween the two armies there was a 
 broad, open, undulating field, about 
 two thirds of a mile in width. Beyond 
 this open ground, there was a thin 
 strip of woods ; and a little further be- 
 yond there was somewhat of a forest. 
 In the interval, and immediately in the 
 rear of the first woods, the Confed- 
 erates had constructed lines of rifle- 
 trenches. At a given signal, the Na- 
 tionals rushed over the open space; 
 and, in spite of a murderous fire, they 
 carried the first line of rifle-trenches. 
 The success was most complete in front 
 of Smith's left and the right of the 
 Sixth corps. Vigorous efforts were 
 made to capture the second line. Several 
 desperate struggles ensued. The second 
 line was found to be impregnable. The 
 
 first line, however, was held; and in 
 the thin wood, under the shelter of the 
 trees, and under hurriedly-constructed 
 bullet-proofs, which the last few weeks' 
 experience had taught them to make, 
 the men went to sleep on their arms. 
 In this encounter. Grant had lost 2000 
 men ; but the sacrifice had not been 
 made in vain ; for he had laid his hands 
 firmly on Cold Harbor. 
 
 Thursday, the 2d of June, was spent 
 in making preparations for an- jnn^ 
 other vigorous assault. With not *• 
 a little difficulty, and with some sacri- 
 fice, Grant and Me^.de succeeded in 
 completing their arrangements. In at- 
 tempting to take the positions assigned 
 them, both Buruside and Warren were 
 vigorously assailed and severely pun- 
 ished. The new disposition of the dif- 
 ferent corps, from left to right, was as 
 follows : — Hancock, Wright, Smith, 
 Warren, Burnside. The line of battle 
 extended from Tolopotomy Creek, cov- 
 ering Bethesda Church, across the road 
 from Cold Harbor to the Chickahom- 
 iny. Sheridan, with a large body of 
 cavaliy, was •guarding the left flank, 
 all the lower fords of the Chicka- 
 hominy, and as far east as White 
 House. Wilson, with another cavalry 
 force, was guarding the right flank. 
 During the 2d, Lee had been quite as 
 active as his antagonist. He kept him- 
 self well informed of all the move- 
 ments of the opposing forces; and he 
 greatly strengthened his position, which 
 was naturally very strong, by means of 
 slashings and rifle-trenches. Loiigstreet 
 was in the centre, A. P. Hill on the 
 right, Ewell on the left. Reference to 
 
700 
 
 THE WILDERNESS. 
 
 the map will show that we are here on 
 what may be called classic or historic 
 ground. It was here that was fought, 
 some two years before, the battle of 
 Gaines' Mill. The positions of the 
 combatants, however, happened to be 
 reversed — Lee occupying that formerly 
 held by McClellau, and Grant occupy- 
 ing that formerly held by Lee. Such 
 was the situation of the rival armies 
 on the night of the 2d of June. But 
 for a severe thunderstorm which broke 
 out, accompanied by heavy rains, the 
 assault would have been made that 
 evening. As it was, orders were given 
 by Grant for a general attack along 
 the whole line, at half-past four, on the 
 following morning. Lee was equally 
 prepared ; and, if not equally sanguine 
 of ultimate success, he was equally reso- 
 lute to win, if he could. 
 
 At- earliest dawn, on the morning of 
 June Friday, the 3d, the National 
 3« army was in motion. A driz- 
 zling rain was falling, as the troops ad- 
 vanced silently, but swiftly, over the 
 open ground towards the Confederate 
 intrenchments, in which could already 
 be seen, through the dim morning light, 
 the well-known grey uniform and the 
 rows of glittering steel. The onset 
 was terrific, and on a scale of magni- 
 tude surpassing anything yet witnessed 
 in the war. The resistance was equal- 
 ly grand, and on a scale of proportion- 
 ate magnitude. Never, perhaps, in the 
 history of previous warfare was such 
 a shock of battle experienced. In a 
 space of time which has been various- 
 ly estimated from ten minutes to half 
 an hour, the battle was fought and 
 
 won, and some 15,000 men were killed 
 or wounded. " It took hardly more 
 than ten minutes of the figment men 
 call time," says Swinton, " to decid* 
 the battle. There was along the whole 
 line a rush — the spectacle of impreg- 
 nable works— a bloody loss — then , a 
 sullen falling back, and the action was 
 decided. Conceive of this in the large, 
 and we shall then be able to descend 
 to some of the points of action, as they 
 individualize themselves along the line." 
 Of such a battle it may safely be said 
 that no one, during the actual minutes 
 it covered, could think of it, far less 
 witness it, as a whole. Unlike most 
 of the other great battles, such as Au- 
 tietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellors- 
 ville, Gettysburg, and the assaults on 
 Vicksburg, which were of some dura- 
 tion, and could be contemplated as a 
 whole, this could be seen and known 
 only in fragmentary detail ; and so 
 brief was the struggle that it was a 
 memory almost as sooa as it became an 
 experience. 
 
 Some facts, however, have been pre- 
 served, and with the help of these, wq 
 are enabled to glance along the lines at 
 the moment of attack, and while the 
 struggle lasted. Hancock, who held 
 the National left, pushed forward at 
 the hour appointed the divisions of 
 Barlow and Gibbon, with Birney sup- 
 porting. Barlow, with his division 
 formed in two lines, encountered the 
 enemy in a piece of hollow ground, in 
 front of his works. Driving him fi-om 
 it, he pressed into the works them- 
 selves, capturing several hundred pris- 
 oners, a battle-flag and three guns, turn 
 
THK ]\AT1UJNALS REPULSED. 
 
 701 
 
 i g the guns upon their owners, and 
 ft rcing them back in confusion. It 
 ■was only a brief victory; for before 
 Barlow's second line had time to come 
 up, Hill's men rallied in stronger force, 
 and, returning with tremendous en- 
 ergy, reclaimed the captured works. 
 Barlow was driven back some fifty or 
 sixty yards. Here, howevei', in an ad- 
 vantageous position, far in advance of 
 his original line, he halted ; and quick- 
 ly covering his front, he held his 
 ground so firmly that he could not be 
 dislodged. Gibbon advanced at the 
 same time with Barlow: but his pro- 
 gress being checked by a -swamp, which 
 widened as he neared the enemy's 
 works, his command was separated, 
 and, consequently, weakened. With 
 great bravery, however, the troops 
 pressed forward; and in spite of the 
 destructive fire which fell full in their 
 faces, some of them actually gained the 
 works. Colonel McMahon, with a 
 portion of his brigade, reached the 
 parapet, and planted upon it his colors. 
 The next moment he fell mortally 
 wounded, and died in the hands of the 
 enemy. Among the officers of Gib- 
 bon's command who met a similar fate 
 were Colonels Porter, Morris, McKeen 
 and Haskell. General Tyler was 
 wounded. Gibbon was unable to hold 
 any part of the Confederate works; 
 but some of his troops gained an ad- 
 vanced position in which they could 
 not be reached, and from which they 
 could not with safety escape. Han- 
 cock had already lost 3000 men. 
 
 The National centre, under Wright 
 and Smith, was not more fortunate. 
 
 They made the assault with great gal- 
 lantry, and were rewarded with a tem- 
 porary success. They were soon, how- 
 ever, repulsed, and with tremendous 
 loss of life. The most they could do 
 was to hold a position somewhat in 
 advance of their original lines. The 
 fighting in front of Warren and Burn- 
 side was unimportant. Warren's line 
 was too thin and too extended to 
 justify a concentrated effort. Except 
 with his artillery, of which he made 
 good and effective use, he remained si- 
 lently on the defensive. Burnside did 
 not advance at the hour designated; 
 and when, later in the day, he claimed to 
 have gained an advantageous position 
 from which, with two of his divisions, 
 he could fall effectively on Lee's right 
 flank, the attack on the Confederate 
 right had failed. Meade, therefore, 
 countermanded the attack on the left. 
 General Wilson, it will be remem- 
 bered, was posted with his cavalry on 
 the extreme right of the National 
 army. During the course of the morn- 
 ing he had a severe but unsuccessful 
 encounter with the Confederate caval- 
 ry, under Wade Hampton. Later, he 
 fell upon an infantry brigade, of Heth's 
 division, which had been sent to en- 
 velop Burnside, and routed it, taking a 
 number of prisoners. 
 ■ The unsuccessful effort made in the 
 early morning by the National left, 
 and also by the National centre, had 
 really determined the issue of the bat- 
 tle. It was the feeling of the officera, 
 as well as of the men themselves, that 
 more could not be done — that any fur- 
 ther attempt to force the Confederate 
 
702 
 
 THE WILDERNESS. 
 
 lines would be a useless waste of life. 
 That such was the general judgment, 
 received a striking confirmation, during 
 the course of the forenoon, from a cir- 
 pumstance which is, perhaps, without 
 a parallel on any battle field. Some 
 hours after the first attack, General 
 Meade, yielding, no doubt, to the stub- 
 born and unconquerable will of Grant, 
 sent orders to each corps commander 
 to renew the attack, without any re- 
 gard to the troops on his right or left. 
 The order was communicated in the 
 usual way by the commanders to their 
 subordinate officers, by these again to 
 their subordinates, and so on through 
 the accustomed channels, until it 
 reached the men. By a singular unan- 
 imity of sentiment and will, not a man 
 stirred. It was a silent but emphatic 
 "No!" — an unexampled manifestation 
 of unanimous conviction, and a striking 
 proof of the intelligence of the Ameri- 
 can soldier. 
 
 By one o'clock, the bloody battle of 
 Cold Harbor was ended. The Na- 
 tional loss in this engagement and in 
 Ae preliminary skirmishes, was re- 
 ported at over 13,000 men in killed, 
 wounded and missing; The Confed- 
 erate loss was trifling in comparison. 
 
 For ten days the two armies con- 
 fronted each other, each endeavoring 
 to strengthen its position. There was 
 severe but partial fighting on the 4th, 
 5th and 6th, the Confederate assaults 
 in every instance being vigorously re- 
 pelled. During those days, so close 
 were the opposing lines that friendly 
 salutations were exchanged, and much 
 kindly, good-natured feeling manifest- 
 
 ed. The National soldier had plenty 
 of coffee, but he was not so well sup 
 plied with tobacco. The Confederate 
 soldier had plenty of tobacco, but he 
 was ill-supplied with coffee. The com 
 modities were freely exchanged, to the 
 gratification of both parties. On the 
 7th, there was a brief truce of two 
 hours, during which the dead were 
 buried and the wounded removed. 
 
 Meanwhile, Grant had become con- 
 vinced of the impossibility of accom 
 plishing more by direct assault on the 
 enemy's lines. It had been his hope 
 that he would be able to beat Lee 
 north of Richmond ; and then, after 
 destroying his communications north 
 of the James, to besiege Richmond or 
 follow his antagonist south, if he should 
 retreat. .It was still possible for Grant 
 to move by Lee's left flank, and to in- 
 vest Richmond from the north ; but 
 while, by adopting that course, he 
 would still be easily able to cover the 
 approaches to Washington, he would 
 be exposed to other and serious incon- 
 veniences. Abiding by the example 
 which he had followed throughout the 
 campaign hitherto, he resolved to exe- 
 cute another flank movement by his 
 own left, and, forcing his way across 
 the Chickahomiuy, to press towards 
 the James. It was all-important that 
 Washington should be rendered as , fa 
 as possible against any incursions 
 the enemy. It was important, also, 
 that while pushing his way across the 
 Chickahomiuy, Lee's cavalry should be 
 engaged in some other direction. To 
 accomplish this double purpose, Sheri- 
 dan was despatched, with two divisiona 
 
ACROSS THE CHJCKAHOMINY. 
 
 705 
 
 of hia cavalry, to destroy more effect- 
 ually all the railroads in Lee'3 rear. 
 
 On the 7th, Sheridan started with 
 Jane the divisions of Torbert and 
 
 '• Gregg. He accomplished his 
 work with promptitude and success. 
 He struck and destroyed the Rich- 
 mond and Fredericksburg Road, at 
 Chesterville Station. He struck and 
 destroyed the Virginia Central, at 
 Trevillian Station, where he encoun- 
 tered and routed some of Hampton's 
 horsemen. The work of destruction 
 was carried on as far as Louisa Court 
 House, where a stronger force was en- 
 countered. Sheridan then fell back upon 
 Trevillian, at which place the Confed- 
 erate cavalry had concentrated in great 
 strength. After a severe and bloody 
 battle, Sheridan withdrew; and, sweep- 
 ing aroutid by way of Spottsylvania 
 Coui't House and Gurney's Station, he 
 reached White House, and rejoined 
 the army of Grant. 
 
 Preparations, meanwhile, had been 
 steadily going on, with a view to a 
 rapid movement on the James. Still 
 maintaining the appearance of a desire 
 to strike some of the bridges of the 
 Chickahominy, in the neighborhood of 
 Cold Harbor, Grant was steadily mov- 
 ing more and more in the direction of 
 his own left. By gi-adually ref usuig his 
 right and developing his left, he had 
 put a large poi'tion of his army within 
 easy distance of the lower crossings of 
 that river. There was no evidence, as 
 yet, that Lee had any suspicion of his 
 real motive ; although it is difficult to 
 h>elieve he was ignorant of some of the 
 •operation* which were being carried on. 
 
 On the 10th and the 11th, Grant had 
 caused to be destroyed the railroad 
 from Despatch Station to White House, 
 and had shipped ou barges all the rails, 
 sleepers and ties to the latter place for 
 use below. The work, it is true, had 
 been done with the utmost quietness; 
 but still the doubt remains whether 
 Lee did not close his eyes to a move- 
 ment which, probably, he did not wish 
 to hinder. On the night of Sunday, 
 the 12th, the movement to the jnm 
 James was commenced. Warren, 12. 
 who took the lead, preceded by Wil- 
 son's division of cavalry, crossed the 
 Chickahorainy at Long Bridge; and, 
 taking position on the Long Bridge 
 !oad where it crosses White Oak 
 Swamp, he made certain dispositions 
 calculated to mislead the enemy as to 
 the purpose of the National com- 
 mander. Hancock followed Warren, 
 and marched at once to Wilcox Land- 
 ing, on the James. Wright and Burn- 
 side, taking an exterior route, crossed 
 at Jones' Biidge, lower down, and 
 marched to Charles City Court House. 
 Smith, with his command, marched at 
 the same time to White House, where 
 he took transports, and returned to 
 Bermuda Hundred by water. The 
 trains crossed the Chickahomiuy at 
 Cole's Fei-ry. 
 
 Lee discovered the withdrawal of 
 the National army on the morning of 
 the loth; but in place of following it 
 up, he retii-ed at once to Richmond. 
 Some delay was experienced in cross- 
 ing the James, in conse(j^uence of the 
 absence of sufficient pontoon material 
 On the night of the 14th. a pontoon 
 
704 
 
 THE WILDERNESS. 
 
 bridge, over two thousand feet in 
 length, was thrown across the river 
 at Douthard's; and by noon of the 
 June 16th, the entire army of the Po- 
 '6< tomac was south of the James. 
 On all concerned, the crossing of the 
 Chickahomiuy, the march to and cross- 
 ing of the James, reflected the highest 
 credit. The success of the whole 
 movement was complete. Thus ended 
 a campaign of forty-three days — one of 
 the most momentous and certainly one 
 of the most interesting in the war. It 
 had, on the whole, been well con- 
 ducted; in some respects, indeed, the 
 management was perfect. During that 
 lengthened period, in that tangled wil- 
 derness, where wagon travel was next 
 to impossible, and where the base was 
 so often changing, the vast National 
 army, of more than 100,000 men, never 
 suffered for want of food. It had 
 been, however, a bloody and ruinous 
 campaign, and fearfully destructive of 
 human life. The losses on the one 
 side and on the other have been vari- 
 ously estimated. Swinton, who in 
 these matters is generally both careful 
 and accurate, gives the enormous ag- 
 gregate of the National loss at 60,000 
 men — a number greater than the entire 
 strength of Lee's army at the opening 
 of the campaign. Lee's loss, accord- 
 ing to the same authority, was about 
 18,000 or 20,000, the ratio being one 
 to three. Dr. Draper, who has written 
 more recently, but who is exndently 
 disposed to lessen the disproportion, 
 estimates the National loss at over 
 54,000 and the Confederate loss at 
 32,000. The truth, it is possible, lies 
 
 between. The presumption is that in 
 Draper's columns, the Confederate loss 
 is greatly exaggerated. When we re- 
 member that the Confederates fought, 
 for the most part, behind their de- 
 fenses, and that the Nationals, after 
 the first two days' fighting in the Wil- 
 derness, were always the aggressors, 
 the estimate of Swinton seems to be 
 the more reasonable. Swinton's esti- 
 mate, of course, includes Burnside's 
 losses; but neither he nor Draper in- 
 cludes in his estimate the losses sus- 
 tained by Butler's command and by 
 that of Sigel and Hunter. 
 
 The story told in this chapter — the 
 story of the Overland Campaign, as it 
 has properly been named — will ever be 
 read with pride, if not with pleasure, 
 by the American jjeople. The justice 
 or the injustice, the right or the wrong 
 attaching to the contending parties, will 
 ultimately be forgotten ; but to latest 
 generations, men will proudly speak 
 of the army of the Potomac and the 
 army of Northern Virginia — of Grant 
 and Lee ; of Meade and Hancock, and 
 Sedgwick and Wan-en, and Wright 
 and Burnside ; of Longstreet and Hill 
 and Ewell; and of the glorious rank 
 and file of both armies. It was one of 
 those grand, protracted contests of 
 which no section of the American 
 people have, or will ever have, any just 
 cause to be ashamed. On the merits 
 of the campaign, as a whole, much has 
 been said and wiitten ; and not a little 
 difference of opinion exists. Harsh 
 things have been said of General 
 Grant ; and by not a few the policy 
 pursued in this campaign, from first to 
 
SOUTH OF THE JAMES. 
 
 705 
 
 last, has been severely condemned. 
 He fought, we are told, when he might 
 have flanked; he dashed his men to 
 death against the invulnerable lines of 
 the enemy, when he might have accom- 
 plished all he actually did accomplish 
 \vith comparative ease and with but lit- 
 cle loss of life. His tactics have been 
 contrasted with those of his great rival 
 Lee, on the one hand, and with those 
 )f his great lieutenant, Sherman, on the 
 other; and the National commander 
 has been exhibited in the unfavora- 
 ble light of being unnecessarily and 
 recklessly wasteful of the lives of his 
 men. These judgments, based on too 
 narrow a view of the entire situation, 
 have had no effect on the masses of 
 
 The Overland Campaign was, as has been mention- 
 ed in the text, largely destructive of human life. The 
 officers suffered severely. Among those already named, 
 but of -whom no notice has yet been given, was Briga- 
 dier-General Thomas G. Stevenson. He was killed at 
 Spottsylvania on the 10th of May, ISfU. Stevenson 
 was a Bostoniau by birth. At an early age he mani- 
 fested a predilection for military life. He rose from 
 the ranks, and was major of the 4th battalion of Mas- 
 sachusetts infantry at the commencement ot the war. 
 As a driU-master, he acquired a great reputation. 
 He was colonel of the 24th regiment of Massachusetts 
 infantry, and served under Foster in Burnside's North 
 
 the American people, who choose to 
 see in General Grant the hero who 
 proved himself the saviour of his 
 country, and ^^'ho at this stage of his 
 career was, by hard blows and contin- 
 uous hammering, crushing out the life 
 of the rebellious Confederacy. It is 
 not claimed that the conduct of the 
 campaign was perfect. It would not 
 be difficult to exhibit defects — defects 
 in the general plans themselves, de- 
 fects in the mode of execution — to 
 show where opportunities were lost 
 and blunders committed ; but in view 
 of so much heroism, so much unex- 
 ampled courage, such splendid work, 
 we have a voice only for praise ; none 
 for censure or complaint. 
 
 Carolina Expedition, in 1862. He took part in the 
 capture of Koanoke Island and New Berne. He was 
 appointed brigadier-general in December, 1862. He 
 afterwards took part in the operations in Charleston 
 Harbor, assisting in the reduction of Morris Island, 
 and commanding the reserves at the assault on Fort 
 Wagner. Having returned to the North to recruit 
 his health, in the fall of 1863, Burnside, who had a 
 high opinion of his ability, placed him in command 
 of the First division of the Ninth corps. In this 
 capacity he took part in the battle of the 10th of May 
 at Spottsylvania. He wa.i cut down at the pp-'v -.r? of 
 tweitv-eight. « 
 
706 
 
 ATLANTA. 
 
 CHAPTER XXXV. 
 
 berman'a AtlanUi Campaign. — Strength of hi« Anny. — General JobnMon's Army. — Deeeriptlon of Atlanta.— 
 Operations against Dalton. — Buzzard Roost. — Snake Creek Gap. — Eilpatrick wounded. — Johnston evacuates 
 Dslton. — Operations against Resaca. — Johnston crosses the Etowah. — Occupation of Rome.— Johnston 
 falls back on Allatoona Pass. — The March upon Dallas. — Battles of Pumpkin Vine Creek and New Hop* 
 Church. — Allatoona Pass turned. — General Blair joins Sherman with the Seventeenth Corps. — Garrisons left. 
 —Maich to Big Shanty. — Kenesaw, Pine, and Lost Mountains. — Confederate Defenses. — Georgia MUitia. 
 — Operations against Pine Mountain. — Death of General Polk. — Lost Mountain taken. — Continuous rain. — 
 Battle of Kulp House. — Assault on Eenesaw Mountain. — Death of General Harker. — Johnston abandons 
 Keneeaw Mountain. — Occupation of Marietta. — Nickajack Creek. — Advance to the Chattahoochee. — John- 
 ston's Position again turned. — His Defenses on the Chattahoochee. — Mills destroyed at Roswell. — Sherman 
 erossea the Chattahoochee. — Johnston retires upon Atlanta. — Approach to Atlanta. — General Rousseau's 
 Raid. — Johnston superseded by Hood. — Battle of Peach Tree Creek. — Hood Abandons his Outer Line of 
 Defenses. — Battle of July 22d. — Death of General McPherson. — Wheeler's Attack on Decatur. — Attack on 
 the Fifteenth Corps. — Biographical Sketch of General McPherson. — General Garrard's Operations at Cov- 
 ington. — Expeditions against the Macon and Western Railroad. — General Stoneman's Raid. — Destruction 
 effected at Gordon. — Defeat and Capture of Stoneman. — General McCook's Raid. — General Howard succeeds 
 General McPherson. — Sherman's Lines extended southward. — Attack on the Fifteenth Corps. — Resignation 
 of General Hooker. — Change in important Commands. — Hood's Defenses. — The City shelled. — New Plans 
 of General Sherman. — Wheeler's Raid. — Kilpatrick's Attempt on the West Point and Macon Railroads. — 
 Movement of Sherman's Entire Army towards the Railroads. — Battle of Jonesboro. — Hood evacuates and 
 General Slocum enters the City. — Repulse of General Wheeler at Dalton. — Defeat of General Sturgis. — 
 Depopulation of Atlanta. 
 
 It has already been made plain to 
 the reader that General Grant's 
 * entire attention was not given to 
 the army of the Potomac. His battle- 
 plan contemplated the dealing of two 
 deadly blows — one on Richmond the 
 other on Atlanta. To ejffect this double 
 purpose he had concentrated at two 
 separate points, two powerful armies. 
 The one was on the northern bank of the 
 Rapidan, its right at Culpepper Court 
 House, and was imder the immediate 
 direction of General Meade. The other 
 was in the neighborhood of Chatta- 
 nooga, and was entrusted to the care of 
 General Sherman. We have already 
 traced the progress of Meade's army 
 from the Rapidan to the James. Let us 
 
 now give our attention to the army of 
 General Sherman. 
 
 The total force under Sherman W8«i 
 over 98,000 men of all arms, with 254 
 gims. It was composed of three separ 
 ate organizations, the army of the Cwai 
 berland, Major-General Thomas; the 
 army of the Tennessee, Major-Genera] 
 McPherson ; and the army of the Ohio, 
 Major-General Schofield. The army of 
 the Cumberland comprised the Fourth 
 corps, Howard; the Fourteenth corps. 
 Palmer; and the Twentieth corps. 
 Hooker— in all 60,773, including 3828 
 cavalry. The army of the Tennessee 
 comprised the Fifteenth corps, Logan 
 the Sixteenth corps, Dodge; and after 
 wards the Seventeenth corps, Blair — in 
 
DESOEIPTION OF ATLANTA. 
 
 ro7 
 
 all 34,465 men, including 624 cavalry. 
 The army of the Ohio consisted of the 
 Twenty-third corps; in all 13,559, in- 
 clnding 1679 cavalry. As soon as Grant 
 had crossed the Rapidan, he telegraphed 
 Sherman to advance from Chattanooga, 
 On the morning of the 6th of May, and 
 when about to move, the position of 
 the three armies was as follows: the 
 army of the Cumberland was at Ring- 
 gold, on the Western and Atlantic Rail- 
 road, twenty-three miles southeast of 
 Chattanooga ; the army of the Tennessee 
 was at Gordon's Mill, on the Chicka- 
 mauga, eight miles west of Ringgold; 
 and the army of the Ohio near Red Clay, 
 about ten miles northeast of Ringgold. 
 
 The Confederate army, commanded 
 by Lieutenant-General Joseph E. John- 
 ston, lay in and about Dalton, fifteen 
 Qiiles south of Ringgold, on the railroad, 
 his advance at Tunnel Hill, about mid 
 v^ay between Ringgold and Dalton. 
 The force under Johnston, consisting 
 mostly of veteran troops, comprised the 
 corps of Generals Hardee, Hood, and 
 Polk, and General Wheeler's division 
 of about 10,000 cavalry, niunbering in 
 all not more than 60,000 men. 
 
 In some respects the campaign before 
 General Sherman resembled that of 
 General Grant from the Rapidan against 
 Richmond. Its objective point was 
 Atlanta, the possession of which it was 
 believed was hardly of less importance 
 to the Confederacy than the capital of 
 Virginia. Atlanta had been before the 
 war an important centre of railroad 
 communication for the Western, Atlan- 
 tic, and Gulf States, and a principal 
 manufacturing town of the South, with 
 
 a population of about 15,000. Laid out 
 in a circle two miles in diameter, in its 
 centre was the passenger depot of fouj 
 railroads, radiating to Chattanooga, 
 Augusta, Macon and Montgomery. 
 Here also were railroad machine-shops, 
 an extensive rolling mill, foimdries, raan 
 uf actories of gun-carriages, pistols, tents, 
 caps, cartridges, shot and shell, shoes 
 clothing, and other military supplies, 
 under the direction of the Confederate 
 government. The population had risen 
 diuing the war, by the accession of per 
 sons employed under the government 
 and the arrival of refugees, to not less 
 than 20,000. It was supposed that the 
 capture of Atlanta, with its vast military 
 stores and costly machinery, would be 
 a blow to the resources of the Confed- 
 eracy hardly less fatal than the captui'e 
 of Richmond. 
 
 The utmost efforts were put forth b} 
 the Confederate authorities to make 
 Atlanta secure. The line of approach 
 was made as difficult for Sherman as the 
 nature of the coimtry — in itself easy of 
 defense — and the resources of Johnstoa 
 would admit. Shoiild Sherman succeed 
 in making his way over the mountain 
 region and in crossing the rivers, both oi 
 which afforded many strong defensible 
 positions for Johnston's army, he would 
 stiU have his hardest task before hmi iu 
 the formidable works around Atlanta, 
 with an army depleted by many battle? 
 and the necessity for leaving garrison? 
 at various points. Sherman's line o. 
 conununication would, at the same time, 
 be lengthened and exposed, while John 
 ston in falling back ujMm Atlanta would 
 be approaching his base and his sujipUes 
 
ro8 
 
 ATLANTA. 
 
 A reconnoissance of General Jolm- 
 j[ay ston's position at Dalton satisfied 
 6. General Sherman that it could 
 not be carried by an attack in front, 
 even should the enemy abandon his 
 works at Tunnel HilL Immediately 
 south of Tunnel HUl is a valley about 
 three miles long and about three-quar- 
 ters of a nule wide, bounded by 
 Rocky Face Ridge, a thickly wooded, 
 steep, and rugged mountain, which com- 
 mands the railroad and other approaches 
 to Dalton, and extends southward many 
 miles on the west side of the railroad 
 and of the Oostanaula. A narrow moun- 
 tain pass called Buzzard Roost, about 
 midway between Tunnel Hill and Dal- 
 ton, is the outlet to the valley, and 
 through this pass runs the railroad to 
 Dalton. By means of oiflt^, formidable 
 batteries, and a line of rifle-pits at its 
 northern entrance, this pass had been 
 rendered impregnable, so that Dalton 
 was absolutely secure against attack 
 from the northwest; on its northeast 
 aide the town was protected by strong 
 works on MUe Creek. General McPher- 
 9on was therefore directed to move 
 rapidly southward with the army of 
 the Tennessee from his position at Gor- 
 don's MUl, by way of Ship's Gap, VU- 
 \anow, and through Snake Creek Gap— a 
 pass in Rocky Face Ridge further south 
 —upon Resaca, a station about eighteen 
 miles south of Dalton, where the rail- 
 road from that place crosses the Oostar 
 naula. The object of this movement 
 was to compel General Johnston to 
 evacuate his position at Dalton, when 
 McPherson would be in a position to 
 harass his flank, while the main body 
 
 of the National army pushed him south 
 ward. WhOe McPherson's flanking 
 movement was in progress, Genera] 
 Thomas was to make a show of attack- 
 ing in force in front of Buzzard Roost, 
 and Schofield with the army of th*' 
 Ohio was to close up with jjj^y 
 Thomas' left. Accordingly on 7. 
 the 7th, General Thomas advanced from 
 Ringgold to Tunnel HOI, which was 
 easUy carried by the Fourteenth corps 
 under General Palmer, the enemy retir- 
 ing to his stronger position at Buzzard 
 Roost. The same evening the National 
 line was established about a mile south 
 of Tunnel HiU. A demonstration in 
 force was made on the 8th against 
 Rocky Face Ridge and Buzzard Roost 
 The Fourth corps under Howard suc- 
 ceeded in carrying the ridge, but its crest 
 was found too narrow to permit of an 
 attack being made from it on the pass 
 with any prospect of success. General 
 Schofield in the mean time brought 
 up the army of the Ohio and closed 
 with the left of Thomas, which was held 
 by Howard. 
 
 On the same day McPherson suc- 
 ceeded in passing through Snake Creek 
 Gap, surprising a force of Confederate 
 cavalry there, and approached within 
 a mile of Resaca, which, however 
 proved too strong to be carried by 
 assault. He therefore fell back to a 
 strong position at the west end of Snake 
 Creek Gap. General Sherman finding 
 that McPherson's flank demonstration 
 had failed of its intended effect, set the 
 whole of his army in motion for Snake 
 Creek Gap, with the exception of two 
 divisions of Howard's corps and »om« 
 
EVACUATION OF DALTON. 
 
 70S 
 
 .cavalry, left to threaten the front of 
 Buzzard Roost. The National loss on 
 the 8th and 9th was about 750 killed, 
 wounded, and missing, the greater 
 number being only slightly wounded. 
 
 Resaca is situated on a peninsula 
 formed by the junction of the Conasauga 
 with the Oostanaula, across which, from 
 river to river, the Confederates had con- 
 structed a continuous line of rifle-pits 
 with strong field-works, their flanks 
 being protected by the two rivers. A 
 line of retreat southward was left open 
 across the Oostanaula. 
 
 On the 13th of May the army of 
 May General Sherman passed through 
 13. Snake Creek Gap and got into 
 position in Sugar Valley, a tract on the 
 east side of the ridge mn^b broken by 
 hills covered with a dense undergrowth. 
 In covering the movement, while press- 
 mg the enemy toward Resaca, General 
 Kilpatrick received a flesh-wound, 
 which imfitted him for active duty for 
 several months. The National lines 
 were advanced during the day toward 
 Resaca, so that the right, under McPher- 
 son, rested on the Oostanaula about 
 two miles below the town, and extended 
 north to the centre under Thomas — the 
 left, imder Schofield, extending from 
 Thomas' left to the Conasauga, near 
 Tikon. a railroad station about midway 
 between Resaca and Dalton. 
 
 In the mean time General Johnston 
 had observed Sherman's movement and 
 detected its object ; and considering his 
 position at Dalton no longer tenable, he 
 had moved southward on the 12th, and 
 having the shorter line of march, reached 
 Resaca with his entire force before the 
 »»» 
 
 army of Sherman had got through 
 Snake Creek Gap. Dalton was immedi 
 ately occupied by the divisions of 
 Howard's corps left before Buzzani 
 Roost, which follownug in the rear oi 
 Johnston joined the National left on the 
 14th near Tilton. Sherman, in thus com 
 pelling Johnston to evacuate a position 
 of such extraordinary strength as that 
 of Dalton, demonstrated his ability to 
 make his way to Atlanta, between 
 which and Dalton no jiosition was likely 
 to be held by the Confederates which 
 might not be as easily turned. 
 
 On the morning of the 14th the 
 Confederates were in complete ji^j 
 readiness to receive an attack, 14. 
 having spent the previous night in 
 strengthening their already formidable 
 earth-works. General Hardee held 
 their right, General Hood their centre, 
 and General Polk their left. At an 
 early hour skinnishing commenced. A 
 body of infantiy with cavalry' was sent 
 across the Oostanaula to tii'eaten Cal- 
 houn in the rear, fuiiher south on the 
 railroad, by which movement General 
 Shei-man hoped to turn Johnston's left, 
 and thus cut off his retreat, but this 
 the natiu-e of the ground rendered 
 impossible. At noon there was heavy 
 firing along the whole line. About one 
 o'clock an attempt was maxle by 
 Palmer's coi-ps from the left centre to 
 break the enemy's line and force him 
 from an elevated position in the immedi- 
 ate front. To* reach the point aimed at, 
 it was necessary to descend the slope of 
 a hill commanded by the enemy's artil- 
 lery, to ford a stream bordered with a 
 thick growth of bushes and vines, and 
 
710 
 
 A'MjAITIA. 
 
 then to cross a space intersected by 
 ditches and otherwise obstructed. 
 Under a miirderous fire of musketry 
 and artillery the hill was descended 
 and the stream crossed; but the troops 
 becoming confused among the ditches 
 and obstructions, and finding no shelter 
 from which the plunging fire of the 
 enemy might be returned, were forced 
 to retire, after losing 1000 of their 
 number. Further to the left, about the 
 same time, General Judah's division of 
 the Twenty-Third corps and Newton's 
 division of the Fourth, drove the enemy 
 from an important position on their 
 outer line. By this means, although 
 the position taken was not held, the 
 National line was advanced. Artillery 
 was also got into a position which pre- 
 sented the enemy from occupying the 
 works. At both extremities of the line 
 heavy skirmishing took place, the den- 
 sity of the woods and undergrowth 
 preventing the use of artillery. 
 
 About three in the afternoon, General 
 Johnston massed a heavy force on the 
 road to Tilton vdth the view of turning 
 the National left flank, held by Stanley's 
 division of the Fourth corps. The 
 attack was made with overwhelming 
 numbers, who rushed on with loud yells, 
 and with such impetuosity that Stanley's 
 troops were forced in confusion from 
 the hill on which they were posted. 
 The movement ordered by Johnston 
 had been detected eai'ly enough to per- 
 mit of Haoker's corps being moved fi'om 
 the centre to reinforce the National 
 left. The enemy's advance was soon 
 checked; and Stanley's troops having 
 l>een raided, the Confederates were. 
 
 about dusk, driven back to their line* 
 with severe loss. 
 
 While this movement was going on, 
 General McPherson sent the Fifteenth 
 corps with a portion of the Sixteenth 
 across Camp Creek, to carry a hill and 
 rifle-pits on the enemy's left in front of 
 Resaca. This was effected, and -with 
 little loss. As this position commanded 
 the works, the railroad, and the trestle 
 bridges across the Oostanaula, desperate 
 efforts were made by the enemy after 
 dark to retake it, but in vain. Heavy 
 columns Avith fixed bayonets moved up 
 to the very crest of the hill, but were 
 compelled to retire in confusion before 
 the steady fii-e of the National troops. 
 At ten o'clock fighting was over fur the 
 day. 
 
 Both armies strengthened their posi- 
 tions during the night; and on ji^y 
 the morning of the 15th, under 16. 
 cover of severe skirmishing, prepara- 
 tions were made by General Sherman 
 for an assault upon two fortified hills, 
 on the enemy's extreme right, the key 
 of the whole position. General Hook- 
 er's coi-ps was moved to the extreme 
 left, Howard's, Schofield's, and Palm- 
 er's to the right. Soon after one 
 o'clock. Hooker sent Butterfi eld's divi- 
 sion forward as the assaulting column, 
 sii})ported by the divisions of Geary 
 and Williams. After several attacks 
 the Confederates were driven fi'om a 
 portion of their Lines ; and a lodgm^n 
 was secured under the projecting work 
 of a lunette mounting 4 guns. Furthei 
 advance, however, was found impossi 
 ble, owing to a severe fii'e from neigh- 
 boring lifle-pits, and the troops seeking 
 
JOHNSTON RETREATS. 
 
 71- 
 
 such shelter as was available, contented 
 themselves with holding the position 
 gained. Towards the close of the after- 
 noon General Hood's corps made an 
 unavailing effort to dislodge them. 
 Later under cover of night, and in 
 epite of a sharp fire from the Confeder- 
 ates, the ends were dug out of the works 
 and the guns hauled out with ropes. As 
 soon as a breach was made the troops 
 rushed in, and after a fierce struggle 
 made themselves masters of the lunette. 
 General Johnston abandoned his 
 position during the night, leaving 
 behind another four-gun battery and a 
 quantity of stores, and retreated toward 
 Kingston, thirty-two miles south of 
 Resaca on the railroad. Resaca was im- 
 mediately occupied by the troops of 
 General Thomas, who succeeded in saving 
 the wagon road bridge. The raUroad 
 bridge, however, had been biimt. John- 
 ston's army owed its escape from Sher- 
 man at Resaca to the impracticable 
 nature of the valley between the town and 
 Snake Creek Gap, whicli greatly retarded 
 the passage of troops, and afforded the 
 Confederate army time to march from 
 Dalton by comparatively good roads, 
 which Johnston with wise foresight had 
 kept in order. Had the National army 
 arrived first at Resaca, nothing could have 
 sared the army of the Confederates. 
 Once in their strong position at Resaca, 
 It cost much severe fighting to make 
 them abandon it. The total National 
 loss in the two days' fighting was not 
 less than 4000 killed and wounded, 
 while that of the Confederates probably 
 did not exceed 2500, as they fought for 
 the most part behind earth-works. 
 
 The Confederate loss included Koout 
 1000 prisoners. 
 
 The whole army started in poisnit of 
 Johnston, General Thomae, directly ot 
 his rear, crossing the O^stanaula at 
 Resaca, General McPleraon at Lay's 
 Ferry, a few miles to the southwest, 
 while General Schofleld, making a wide 
 detour to the left of Thomas, ma'-ched 
 by obscure roads Across the Conasauga 
 and Coosawatteu rivers, which unite 
 near Resaca to form the Oostanaula. 
 On the 1 7th the march was contin- jj^j 
 ued southward by as many roads 17. 
 as could be found, in a direction parallel 
 with the raUroad, but no enemy was 
 seen till within the vicinity of Adairs- 
 ville, thirteen miles south-southwest of 
 Resaf^a, between the railroad and the 
 Oostanaula. There, about sunset, the 
 advance division imder General Newton 
 had a sharp skirmish with the enemy's 
 rear-guard. Next morning the Confed- 
 erates had disappeared, but were found 
 again in force four miles beyond King- 
 ston, on ground comparatively open and 
 well adapted for a grand battle. They 
 held strong works at CassvUle, five 
 miles east of Kingston, and on the 19th 
 dispositions were made for a general 
 engagement. While, however, Sherman 
 was converging on the Confederate posi- 
 tion, Johnston retreated in the night 
 across the Etowah, burning the bridge? 
 at Cartersville, thus leaving the country 
 north of the Etowah in the possession 
 of General Sherman. It had, however, 
 been completely stripped of supplies 
 Shennan now gave his troops a few 
 days' rest, the army of Thomas Ipng 
 near Cassville, McPherson's about King 
 
712 
 
 ATLANTA. 
 
 ston, and Schofield's at Cassville depot 
 and toward the Etowah Bridge. In the 
 raean time the railroad, which had 
 received but little injury, was restored 
 to running order. Trains laden with 
 upplies arrived at Kingston on the 
 20th, and tlie wounded were sent back 
 to Chattanooga, with which place tele- 
 graphic communication also was kept up 
 as the army advanced. 
 
 General Jefferson C. Davis had on 
 the 17th marched towards Rome, at 
 the confluence of the Oostanaula and 
 Etowah, fifteen miles west of Kingston. 
 After a sharp fight on the 1 9th he got 
 possession of the town, several forts, 
 eight or ten large guns, and large quan- 
 tities of stores, as weD as valuable mills 
 and foundries. 
 
 General Johnston retired upon Alla- 
 toona Pass, an almost impregnable 
 position on the railroad, about five miles 
 »outh of the Etowah River. General 
 Sherman determined not even to 
 ittempt the pass in front, but to turn 
 it. Accordingly, on the 23d, leaving 
 garrisons at Rome and Kingston, and 
 larrying with him in wagons supplies 
 'or twenty days, he put the army in 
 notion for Dallas, a town about fifteen 
 ailes south-southwest of Allatoona 
 J 'ass, and eighteen miles directly west 
 OS Marietta, hoping by thus threatening 
 M irietta to compel Johnston to evacu- 
 ate the pass. The roads through the 
 rug. ;ed and densely wooded region to 
 be t-'aversed were few and bad, and the 
 march was necessarily slow. The 
 moveTient and its objects were soon 
 deteci ^d by Johnston, who also set his 
 troopa in motion toward Dallas, to pro- 
 
 tect the approaches to Marietta. In the 
 march upon Dallas, McPherson, holding 
 the National right, made a detour south- 
 westward by Van Wert, about fourteen 
 miles west of Dallas, while Thomas 
 moved nearly due south, with Schofield 
 on his left. On the 25th, Hooker's 
 corps, the advance of General Thomns, 
 moving on the main road to Dallas, 
 when near Pumpkin Vine Creek, met 
 portions of Hood's and Hardee's coips: 
 and a severe contest took place jig.. 
 for a position at New Hope 26. 
 Church, where three roads meet, from 
 Ackworth, Marietta, and Dallas. The 
 enemy, however, having hastily thrown 
 lip earth-works, and night coming on ac 
 companied by heavy rain, he retained 
 possession of the roads. Hooker lust. 
 600 men in this affair. Next morning 
 the Confederates were found well 
 intrenched, substantially in front of the, 
 road leading from Dallas to Maiietta. 
 It was necessary, therefore, to make 
 dispositions on a larger scale. McPher- 
 son was moved up to Dallas, Thomas 
 was deployed against New Hope 
 Church, and Schofield moved toward 
 the left so as to strike and turn the 
 enemy's right. Owing to the difficult 
 nature of the country, these movements 
 occupied two days, and were attended 
 with heavy skirmishing ; but as the 
 vicinity was for the most part densely 
 wooded, artiUery could not be used, 
 and the casualties were comparatively 
 few. On the 28th, just as McPheiBOB 
 was closing up to Thomas in front oi 
 New Hope Chm-ch, he was repeatedly 
 and desperately attacked by a large 
 Confederate force, and the contemplated 
 
BIG SHANTY AND MARIETTA. 
 
 ■:ia 
 
 movement was temporai-ily checked, but 
 tlie enemy was finally driven back with 
 a loss of 2000 killed and wounded. 
 
 After the delay of a few days the 
 movement toward the left was resumed, 
 McPherson taking up the position in 
 front of New Hope Church which 
 rhomaphad previo" > ..^cupied, Thom- 
 as and Schofield taking positions still 
 further to the left. This movement was 
 June effected on the Ist of June. All 
 1. the roads leading back to AUa- 
 toona and Ackworth were occupied. 
 General Stoneman's cavalry pushed into 
 the east end of Allatoona Pass, and 
 General Garrard's marched around by 
 the rear to its west entrance. These 
 movements being effected without 
 opposition, the pass fell into Sherman's 
 possession. He found it admirably 
 adapted for use as a secondary base, 
 and gave the necessary orders for its 
 defense and gamson, and for the recon- 
 struction of the railroad bridge over 
 the Etowah, thus restoring his commun- 
 ications by railroad, by which stores 
 were again brought to his camps. 
 Still working toward the left. General 
 Sherman determined on the 4th to leave 
 Johnston in his intrenched position at 
 New Hope Church, and moved towards 
 the railroad above Ackworth, which was 
 reached on the 6th of June. Here the 
 army remained several days ; and here 
 on the 8th General Blair arrived, with 
 two divisions of the Seventeenth corps, 
 and Colonel Long's brigade of cavalry 
 of General Garrard's division, which had 
 been awaiting horses at Columbia. This 
 addition to Sherman's forces made up 
 for his losses in battle and for the 
 
 diminution of his numbers by gamsons 
 left at Resaca, Rome, Kingston, and 
 Allatoona Pass. On the 9th, jm,^ 
 communications in the rear being 9. 
 secure and supplies abundant, the 
 movement was resxmied and the march 
 continued to Big Shanty, the next station 
 on the railroad east of Allatoona Pass. 
 Between Big Shanty and Marietta 
 intervenes a mountainous district fall 
 of defensible positions, covering per- 
 fectly the town of Marietta, and the 
 railroad as far as the Chattahoochee. 
 Three conical peaks in this region, 
 links in a continuous foi-est-covered 
 chain, form prominent features in the 
 landscape. These are Kenesaw Moun- 
 tain, Pine Mountain, and Lost Mountain. 
 Kenesaw Mountain, a double peaked em- 
 inence, and hence sometimes called the 
 Twin Mountain, 1200 feet high, lies 
 immediately northwest of Marietta and 
 west of the railroad Lost Moiintain 
 lies west of Marietta. Pine Mountain, 
 a rugged cone-shaped peak, half a mile 
 to the north of these and opposite 
 the space between them, forms the 
 apex of a triangle of which the others 
 form the base. On each of these moun- 
 tains the enemy had signal stations from 
 which the movements of Sherman's 
 army could be easily noted. The hill- 
 tops were covered with batteries; and 
 on the spurs leading from them 
 might be seen large numbers of men 
 felling trees, digging rifle-pits and in 
 other ways preparing for a desperate 
 defense. The Confederate lines extended 
 about two miles westward from th* 
 railroad, t>n which their right rested. 
 Their works, which comprised sever*! 
 
714 
 
 AILANTa. 
 
 snccessive lines of intrenchments, con- 
 sisted of log barricades with earth 
 thrown against them, and a formidable 
 abatis, to which was added in many 
 places a chevaux-de-frise of pointed 
 fence-rails. The parapet thus formed 
 was from six to eight feet thick at the 
 top, for the infantry, and, where field- 
 guns were posted, from twelve to fifteen 
 feet thick. The force at the disposal 
 of General Johnston at this time was, 
 according to the reports of prisoners, 
 deserters, and scouts, nine division? of 
 7000 men each, in addition to which 
 Governor Brown had sent to his assis- 
 tance an auxiliary force of 15,000 Geor- 
 gia militia, who, though imdisciplined, 
 were capable of good service behind 
 earth- works and as laborers in the con- 
 struction of fortifications. Hardee's 
 corj^s held the Confederate right, Polk's 
 the centre. Hood's the left. Their 
 cavalry, to the number of about 15,000, 
 operated on the right and left flanks and 
 on the National rear. 
 
 The National lines were gradually 
 advanced toward the Confederate posi- 
 tions. McPherson's command, now 
 transferred to the extreme left, moved 
 towards Marietta, his right on the rail- 
 road ; Schofield, shifted to the right, 
 moved on Lost Mountain ; Thomas, 
 remaining in the centre, moved on 
 Kenesaw and Pine Mountains. General 
 ' Garrard's cavalry covered the left wing, 
 and General Stoneman's the right. 
 General McCook guarded the rear, the 
 railroad communications, and the depot 
 at Big Shanty. By the 11th the lines 
 were close up; and dispositions were 
 *iien made to break the enemy's line of 
 
 defense between Kenesaw and Pine 
 Mountains. On the 14th, during jm|g 
 a heavy cannonade by the Fourth 14. 
 corps, General Polk, who commanded 
 on Pine Mountain, was struck by the 
 fragment of a shell and killed ; and the 
 same night. Hooker's corps, moving 
 round its base to cut off their retreat, 
 the Confederates abandoned their works 
 on Pine Mountain, carrying off, how- 
 ever, their guns and war material. On 
 the morning of the 15th, Stanley's 
 division of the Fourth corj5s quietly 
 occupied the position. 
 
 After the abandonment of Pine 
 Mountain, General Johnston drew back 
 his centre to a strong line of intrench- 
 ments connecting Kenesaw and Lost 
 Mountains. The 15th, 16th, and 17th 
 were occupied with incessant skir- 
 mishing. On the afternoon of the 15th, 
 General Schofield carried the first line 
 of the Confederate works at the foot of 
 Lost Moimtain. During the 17th, the 
 left and centre, which were so far 
 advanced that a general engagement 
 would otherwise have resulted, remained 
 quiet. The right and left centre were 
 advanced more thar a mile, to a line of 
 defensive works which the enemy had 
 evacuated. Towards evening, after 
 heavy skirmishing, the enemy's left 
 was dislodged from the intrenchments 
 at Lost Mountain and the long line of 
 breast-works connecting it with Kene- 
 saw Moimtain. The Confederates were 
 pressed at all points, and skirmishing 
 continued in dense forests and across 
 difficult ravines, until they were again 
 found strongly posted and intrenched, 
 with Kenesaw Mountain as a salient, 
 
A.SSAirL'1 O^r KENESAW. 
 
 715 
 
 theii" right wing thrown back to cover 
 Marietta, and their left behind Nose's 
 Creek, covering the railioad back to the 
 C'hattahoochee. They were thus enabled 
 to contract and strengthen their lines. 
 During these operations the rain fell 
 almost continuously for three weeks, 
 making the narrow wooded roads mere 
 mud gulleys and a general movement 
 impossible. But every opportunity was 
 taken to advance the National lines closer 
 and closer to the enemy ; and the men 
 kept up incessant picket firing. 
 
 On the 2 2d the enemy made a sudden 
 J une attack on portions of Hooker'^ and 
 22. Schofield's corps on the National 
 right near the Kulp House. The blow 
 fell mostly on the divisions of Generals 
 Williams and Hascall. The ground 
 was comparatively open ; but though 
 the skirmish lines and an advanced 
 regiment of General Schofield's — sent 
 out to hold the enemy in check untU 
 preparations for his reception could be 
 completed — were drivec in, yet when 
 the enemy reached the National line of 
 battle he received a terrible repulse. 
 Many prisoners were taken, and the 
 Confederates were compelled to aban- 
 don their dead and wounded. The 
 National centre was now established in 
 front of Kenesaw Mountain ; but so 
 many men were required to hold the 
 
 ' railroad and the line along the base of 
 the moimtain, that only a small force 
 
 , was left with which to attempt a flank 
 movement to the right. There was, 
 Lowever, now no alternative but to 
 assault the enemy's lines or turn his 
 position. Either coui*se had its difficul- 
 ties and dangers. Both the enemy and 
 
 his own officera expected Shei-man to 
 "outflank." General SheiTuan deter- 
 mined to assault. His reason for a 
 depart'ore from the course which had 
 hitherto been so successful was, that an 
 army to be efficient must not settle 
 down to one single mode of olfence, but 
 must be prepared to execute any plan 
 likely to result in success. The part o 
 the enemy's lines selected to be assault 
 ed was the left centre. A strong 
 column, if thrust through at that point, 
 and pushed on boldly two and a half 
 miles, would reach the railroad below 
 Marietta and cut off the enemy's right 
 and centre from the line of retreat which 
 could then be overwhelmed and de 
 stroyed. On the 24th of June, there- 
 fore. General Sheiinan ordered that an 
 assault should be made at two points 
 south of Kenesaw Mountain on the 
 27th, thus affording three days for 
 preparation and reconnoissance. One 
 of these assaults was to J^e made near 
 Little Kenesaw by General McPherson's 
 troops, the other about a mile furthei 
 south by those of General Thomas. 
 
 On the morning of the 27th, at the 
 hour and in iho, manner prescribed, 
 the assaults were made ; but both f juled. 
 and many valuable lives were jn^f 
 lost, including that of General 2<. 
 Harker. At six in the morning, Blair's 
 corps, holding the extreme left of Mc- 
 Pherson's line, moved on the east side 
 of the mountain, while the corps of 
 Dodge and Logan assaulted the adj<>ia 
 ing northern slope. The brunt of the 
 attack was borne by three brigades o/ 
 Logan's corj)8, which, pushing impetu 
 ously up the hill scattered *iii Confod 
 
ne 
 
 ATLANTA. 
 
 srate skirmishers and captured some of 
 "heir rifle-pits, making also some pris- 
 mers. These troops pressed forward 
 rill they arrived at the foot of a pre- 
 '"ipitous cliff thirty feet high, from 
 which the enemy poured a plunging 
 re and rolled down huge stones. 
 Here the line retired and fortified on 
 the extreme right. For the second and 
 more important attack, portions of the 
 division'} of Newton and Davis were 
 selected. When the signal was given, 
 the troopa charged up the slope of the 
 mountain in face of a murderous fire 
 from a battery on the summit, pene- 
 trated two lines of abatis, carried a line 
 of rifle-pits beyond, and reached the 
 works ; but a destnictive fire of mus- 
 ketry and artillery from the enemy soon 
 made it necessary to recall the men. 
 General Newton's troops returned to 
 their original line, while the biigade of 
 Davis threw up brea.st-works between 
 those they had carried and the main 
 line of the enemy. The entire contest 
 lasted little more than an hour ; but it 
 cost General Sherman 3000 men in killed 
 and wounded, while the enemy, fighting 
 behind breast-works, suffered little. 
 
 During the day there had lieen some 
 sharp skirmishing with the enemy's 
 left wing; and General Cox's divi- 
 sion pushed fonvai'd to a point nine 
 miles south of Marietta and not more 
 han three fi-om the Chattahoochee. 
 From his elevated position on Kenesaw 
 Mountain, General Johnston had been 
 able to watch SheiTuan's movements 
 and to judge correctly at what point 
 the main attack would fall, and had 
 'leen ready to receive it with his main 
 
 force. Though Sherman admitted that 
 this attempt was a complete and costly 
 failure, he yet took upon himself the 
 entire responsibility, claiming tha'^, it 
 was not altogether without good fniits, 
 inasmuch as it satisfied Johnston that 
 he would assault, and that boldly, when 
 an assault appeared to be the surest 
 means of success. 
 
 General Sherman could not rest long 
 under the imputation of defeat ui 
 failure. He almost inunediately com- 
 menced preparations to turn the enemy's 
 left. On the 1st of July, Generals j^w 
 Hooker and Schofield advanced 1. 
 about two miles to the right, and 
 McPherson was ordered to shift rapidly 
 his whole force from the extreme left 
 to the extreme right of the National 
 lines and push on to Nickajack Creek, 
 which falls into the Chattahoochee foui 
 miles below the railroad bridge. Gen 
 eral Garrard with his cavalry was sent 
 to occupy McPherson's place in front 
 of Kenesaw, while General Stoneman 
 moved on his flanks to strike the river 
 near Turner's Ferry, two and a half 
 miles below the railroad bridge. Mc- 
 Pherson commenced his movement on 
 the night of the 2d. The effect waa 
 instantaneous. The object of the move- 
 ment was at once detected by General 
 Johnston, who withoiit further delay 
 prepared to evacuate Kenesaw Mo\intain 
 and fall back to the Chattahoochee. 
 Simultaneously with McPherson's move- 
 ment, Johnston's rear-guard abandoned 
 the works which for three weeks had 
 been so resolutely defended; and before 
 dawn on the morning of the 3d j^jy 
 the National pickets occupied th* J** 
 
THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. 
 
 717 
 
 'irest of Kenesaw. General Thomas' 
 whole line was then moved forward to 
 the railroad and thence southward to 
 the Chattahoochee; and General Sher- 
 man entered Marietta at half -past eight 
 in the morning, just as the enemy's 
 cavalry left the town. General Logan's 
 coqjs, which had not moved far, was 
 ordered back to Marietta by the main 
 road ; and McPherson and Schofield 
 were instructed to cross Nickajack 
 Creek, attack the enemy in flank 
 and rear, and, if possible, harass him 
 while crossing the Chattahoochee. 
 Johnston was too good a general to 
 be thus caught ; and he had covered his 
 movement well. He had constructed a 
 strong tete-dni-pont at the Chattahoochee 
 with an advanced intrenched line across 
 the road at Smyrna camp-rceeting 
 ground, five miles from Marietta where 
 General Thomas found him, his flanks 
 protected by Nickajack and Rotten- 
 wood Creeks. In his retreat, Johnston 
 left behind about 2000 mtn, principally 
 stragglers, who were made prisoners. 
 
 General Johnston was obliged to 
 leave his new position by another flank 
 movement ; and on the night of the 4th 
 he fell back to the Chattahoochee, which 
 he I -ossed with the main body of his 
 army, leaving Hardee's corps on the 
 light bank. General Sherman left a 
 l^urrison in Marietta and moved up to 
 the Chattahoochee. On the evening 
 of the 5th, the troops of Thomas and 
 McPherso'v occupied a line extending 
 from a short distance above the lailroad 
 bridge to the mouth of Nickajack Creek, 
 while those of Schofield were posted in 
 the rear of Smyrna as a resei-ve. The 
 
 enemy lay behind a line of unusual 
 strength, covering his pontoon bridges 
 and the railroad, and beyond the river. 
 Heavy skirmishing during the 5th along 
 the entire front demonstrated the 
 strength of the enemy's position, w^hich 
 it became appai-ent could be turned only 
 by crossing the river, a deep and rapid 
 stream, passable only by means ol 
 bridges, except at one or two difficult 
 fords. 
 
 General Sherman judged that it 
 would be easier to cross the river at 
 once, before the enemy had time to 
 make a more thorough preparation and 
 regain confidence. Accordingly, Scho- 
 field was ordered to move eastward 
 from his position near Smyrna, to cross 
 near the mouth of Soap's Creek, eight 
 miles north of the railroad bridge, and 
 effecl a lodgment on the east banlc 
 This was most successfully and skilfiilly 
 accomplished on the 7th of July, j^iy 
 General Schofield completely 7. 
 surprising the guard and cajjturing a 
 gun, and immediately afterwards lapug 
 pontoon and trestle bridges, and taking 
 up a strong position on high and com- 
 manding groimd from which good roads 
 led eastward. At the same time Gen- 
 eral Garrard moved rapidly on Rosewell 
 a town near the Chattahoochee, neailj 
 due north of Atlanta, and about seven 
 miles above the point where Schofield 
 crossed, and destroyed there some 
 woollen and cotton mills, from which 
 the Confederate amiies had been long 
 supplied. Gan-ard was then orderoc' 
 to secure the ford at Rosewell and hold 
 it till relieved by infantry. As General 
 Shei-mau intended transferrinif tlic army 
 
718 
 
 ATLANTA. 
 
 of tke Tennessee from the extreme right 
 to the left, he ordered Thomas to send 
 his nearest division of infantry to 
 Rosewell to hold the ford till MvPher- 
 son could send up a corps from the 
 neighborhood of Nickajack Creek. 
 General Newton's division was sent, 
 and held the ford till the arrival of 
 Dodge's corps, which was soon followed 
 by McPherson's whole army. On the 
 9th a crossing was effected at Rosewell 
 and a good bridge constructed, while 
 the enemy ^^a- amused by feints, 
 extending from Powers Ferry, four 
 miles above the railroad bridge, to 
 Turner's Ferry, three miles below it. 
 Under cover of the same demonstrations 
 General Howard also built a bridge at 
 Power's Feny. Thus duiing the 9th 
 three good points of crossing were 
 secured above the position of the enemy, 
 with good roads leading to Atlanta. 
 General Johnston then took the alarm; 
 and on the night of the 9th withdrew 
 Hardee's corps to the left bank, aban- 
 doned his Ute-du'-pont, burnt his bridges, 
 and left Sherman, on the morning of 
 July *^^ lOtli of July, master of all 
 10. the country north and west of 
 the Chattahoochee. The Confederate 
 army then fell back to the outer fortified 
 lines around Atlanta, abandoning the 
 whole line of the river, except the left 
 ving, which remained a short time in 
 the neighborhood of Turner's Ferry, 
 expecting an attack in that quarter. 
 General Sherman, however, rapidly and 
 quietly moved the remainder of the 
 army of the Tennessee to its old position 
 on the extreme left. 
 
 One of the objects of General Sher- 
 
 man's campaign, the advancement oi 
 the National lines from the Tennessee 
 to the Ch,attahoochee, had now been 
 attained ; and Atlanta was only eight 
 miles distant. The main armies remained 
 quiet in their camps on the Chattahoo 
 chee from the 10th of July to the 16th 
 In the mean time stores were collected 
 at Allatoona, Marietta, and Vining'e 
 Station ; the railroad guards and garri- 
 sons were strengthened, and the bridges 
 and roads leading across the river were 
 improved. The railroad was in com 
 plete order ; and stores had been brought 
 by it as early as the 8th within a mile 
 of the bridge. A sufficient force waa 
 detailed to go to the left bank of the 
 river to occupy the works of the enemy. 
 These were found to be of the most 
 formidable character, extei) ling more 
 than five miles along the river, with 
 almost impenetrable lines of abatis. 
 
 In anticipation of the present position 
 of affairs,General Sherman had collected 
 a well-appointed cavalry force, about 
 2000 strong, at Decatur, Ala., with 
 orders, on receiving notice by telegraph, 
 to push rapidly southward, cross the 
 Coosa at the railroad bridge or the Ten 
 Islands, and to push on thence by the 
 most direct route to Opelika, with the 
 object of destroying effectually the 
 railroad running westward from that 
 place, and thus cutting off from John 
 ston's army an important source of 
 supplies and reinforcement. The com 
 mand of this expedition was given to 
 General Rousseau, commanding the 
 district of Tennessee. As soon as 
 Johnston was well across the Chattar 
 hoochee, and Sherman had commenced 
 
JOHNSTON REMOVED FROM COMMAND. 
 
 71« 
 
 aianoeuvrmg on Atlanta, the requisite 
 lotice was given; and, on the 10th of 
 July, General Rousseau commenced his 
 march. He passed through Talladega, 
 reached the railroad on the 16th about 
 twenty-five miles west of Opelika, and 
 broke it up all the way back to that 
 place, as well as several miles of the 
 branch railroads leading towards West 
 Point and Columbus. Then turning 
 northward he arrived at Marietta on the 
 2 2d, his loss not having exceeded 30 
 men. 
 
 The sudden abandonment of his 
 formidable line of defenses on the left 
 bank of the river, by General Johnston, 
 occasioned the utmost dissatisfaction 
 ir?th his conduct of the campaign, 
 '»«Decially in Atlanta, where it was 
 expected he would make a stand on the 
 Chattahoochee, which it was argued he 
 30uld easily do, being in the immediate 
 Qeighborhood of his supplies. His 
 retreat from the Chattahoochee wa*f the 
 crovTning ofEence with the enemies of 
 this able general, whose inferiority of 
 force had made it impossible to avoid 
 Sherman's outflanking movements, but 
 who had nevertheless kept his army in 
 a compact body, wath insignificant 
 losses of guns or material of war. His 
 removal was loudly demanded ; and on 
 the 17th, in accordance with orders 
 from the Confederate War Department, 
 he turned over his command to General 
 flood. With this change in commanders 
 commenced a change in the character 
 of the campaign in accordance with the 
 difference in the genius of the two gen- 
 erals, which it was hoped would have 
 an important influence on the viorak of 
 
 the troops, discoviraged by a long 
 succession of retreats from fortified 
 positions. 
 
 The whole of General Sherman's 
 army crossed the Chattahoochee j^y 
 on the 17th, with the exception 17. 
 of Davis' division of the FouT-teentL 
 corps, left to watch the railroad bridge 
 and protect the rear, and preparations 
 were made to move upon Atlanta. The 
 army of the Cumberland, now occupying 
 the right and right centre, rested on the 
 river just above the raih'oad bridge. 
 The left centre was occupied by the 
 army of the Ohio, the left by the army 
 of the Tennessee. The line thus formed 
 made a grand right-wheel march, of 
 which the army of the Cumberland waa 
 the pivot ; and on the evening of the 
 l7th came into a position along the Old 
 Peach Tree road, about northeast of the 
 railroad bridge. On the 18th, the left 
 vping, swinging round rapidly, struck 
 the Georgia Railroad about two miles 
 west of Stone Mountain, a huge mass 
 of granite fifteen miles northeast of 
 Atlanta. General McPherson, with the 
 aid of Gan-ard's cavaby, which moved 
 on his flank, broke up about four miles 
 of this road, while General Scliofield 
 occupied Decatur, six miles east of 
 Atlanta, and General Thomas moved 
 his troops up towards Peach Tree Creek, 
 a small stream flo^\ing southwestward 
 to the Chattahoochee, a little above the 
 railroad bridge. The Confederates 
 believing that their left was the real 
 point of attack, and that Sherman would 
 approach Atlanta from the southwest, 
 and oj>po8e these movements wth an 
 inadequate force of infantry and a few 
 
nb 
 
 AtLAi4tA. 
 
 cavalry. Thus McPherson and Schofield 
 were able on the 19th to pass eastward 
 of Decatur within the naturally strong 
 defensive lines of Nance's and Peach 
 IVee Creeks ; and on the same day 
 Thomas, moving more directly from the 
 north, though meeting with more oppo- 
 sition, succeeded in crossing Peach Tree 
 Creek in fi'ont of the enemy's intrenched 
 lines. The National armies then lay in 
 a curved line north and northeast of 
 Atlanta, extending from the railroad 
 which nms between Atlanta and the 
 river to the Georgia Railroad and some 
 distance south of it. 
 
 On the 20th, the National lines 
 moved still nearer Atlanta ; but as a 
 trap existed between the lines of Scho- 
 field and Thomas, two divisions of 
 Howard's corps of Thomas' army were 
 moved to the left to connect with 
 Schofield. By this movement Newton's 
 division of Howard's corps was left 
 alone to hold an important position on 
 the road leading fi'om Atlanta to Buck- 
 head. General Hood soon detected the 
 weak point, and was not slow in taking 
 advantage of the opportunity thus 
 afforded him. He was soon, therefore, 
 in a position in which he was ready to 
 strike a blow which might go far towards 
 retrieving many disasters. General 
 Sherman had, however, sent orders to 
 Newton and the rest of the ai-my of the 
 Cumberland to close up rapidly towards 
 the left. Newton accordingly moved 
 to a prominent ridge, where his troops 
 stacked arms and made a temporary 
 halt, but, beyond throwing up piles of 
 logs and rails, made no defensive 
 preparations, no attack being appre- 
 
 hended, prisoners just brought in having 
 reported that there was no considerable 
 force of the enemy within a mile and a 
 half. Hood had in the mean time 
 been massing his forces in the woods 
 immediately in front of the position of 
 General Newton and of General Hook- 
 er's force, which was approaching from 
 the right, hoping to fall upon his adver- 
 saries while in motion and cut the 
 National army in two. At four ],j|y 
 o'clock in the afternoon he ad- 20. 
 vanced suddenly from the woods, with- 
 out skirmishers, directly on the position 
 of Newton. His appearance was alto- 
 gether unexpected ; nevertheless >^he 
 National troops instantly sprang to 
 anns. and from behind theii' log and 
 rail breast-works poured a deadly fire 
 into the dense masses of the enemy 
 Well-served batteries also, which New 
 ton had posted on his banks, aided tc 
 keep the Confederates in check. 
 
 General Hooker's whole corps was 
 uncovered ; and it had to fight on compa 
 ratively open ground. Geary's division 
 was thrown back in some confusion. 
 Rallying quickly it recovered its ground 
 and kept the enemy in check till Ward's 
 division came up. Ward met the 
 enemy's charge by a counter-charge, 
 and after a brief but fierce sti-uggle 
 drove him back. The division of 
 Williams, further to the right and next 
 to that of Geary, though desperately 
 attacked, repulsed every onset with 
 heavy loss. The battle had lasted four 
 hours, when Hood drew his forces 
 rapidly back to their intrenchments, 
 leaving on the field 600 dead, and 1000 
 severely wounded, a number of piisonerSf 
 
oENEiiAL Mcpherson. 
 
 n: 
 
 and seven regimental flags— his total 
 loss being estimated by General 
 Sherman at not less than 5000. The 
 National loss was 1900, sustained 
 principally by the corps of General 
 Hooker, upon which fell the brunt of 
 the battle. General Johnston's division 
 of Palmer's corps had also been engaged, 
 )ut being well defendev. its loss was 
 comparatively light. 
 
 The Confederates kept within their 
 mtrenched position during the 21st, 
 ',heir right beyond the Georgia Railroad 
 *ud their left extended towards Turner's 
 Feny, at a general distance of four 
 miles from Atlanta, In the course of 
 the day a strongly fortified hill in front 
 of the exti'eme National left, which 
 completely commanded Atlanta and the 
 two principal roads leading north and 
 south from the city, was earned by 
 General Leggett's division of the Seven- 
 teenth corps, though with a loss of 750 
 men. Two desperate but unsuccessful 
 attempts to regain this position were 
 made by the Confederates, who when 
 they finally retired left their dead and 
 wounded on the slope of the hill. 
 
 On the morning of the 2 2d, the whole 
 of the advanced line of the enemy was 
 found abandoned, which led Sherman to 
 suppose that Hood was about to give 
 up Atlanta without further contest. 
 lie was, however, only preparing to 
 repeat on a larger scale the experiment 
 cf the 20th. Pretending to be falling 
 Dack upon the city, he hoped to decoy 
 General Sherman into a rapid advance, 
 and then suddenly, with all his force, 
 strike the National army while in 
 motion, at such weak points aa should 
 
 offer. Unsuspectingly Sherman pushed 
 his troops beyond the abandoned works 
 He found the enemy occupying a linp 
 of finished redoubts completely covering 
 the approaches to the city, and actively 
 engaged in connecting these redoubts 
 with curtains, strengthened by rifle- 
 trenches, abatis and chevaux-de-frisf^ 
 Satisfied that Hood meant to fight, 
 Sherman immediately resimied the dis- 
 positions for pressing towards the city 
 on its east and northeast fronts. The 
 National line by these movements be 
 came so contracted, that the Sixteenth 
 corps, under General Dodge, which 
 fonned the right of the army of the 
 Tennessee, was crowded out of its posi- 
 tion, and was directed to march to the 
 extreme left of the line, to aid in the 
 defense of the hill which had been car- 
 ried by the Seventeenth corps the day 
 before, and which was stiD held by 
 Leggett's division. 
 
 At ten in the morning, and about 
 the time the movement was j^jy 
 commenced. General Sherman, 5:2. 
 in company with General Schofield, was 
 examining the enemy's lines, whe:i he 
 was joined by General McPherson, who 
 described the condition of things en his 
 flank and the disposition of his tj^ops. 
 Sherman explained to him that if seri- 
 ous resistance were met in Atlanta, as 
 seemed probable, he should extend to 
 the right, and did not want much dis 
 tance gained on the left. McPhersou 
 then described the hill occupied by 
 Leggett's division as essential to the 
 occupation of any ground to the east 
 and south of the Augusta Railroad. 
 Sherman therefore ratified McPhei-son'e 
 
722 
 
 atlania: 
 
 disposition of bis troops, and modified 
 a previous order sent him in writing to 
 employ Dodge's corps in breaking up 
 the railroad, and sanctioned its going, 
 as already ordered by McPherson, to 
 his left, to hold and fortify the position 
 there. McPherson remained with Gen- 
 eral Sherman till noon, when reports 
 arrived indicating a movement of the 
 enemy towards the left flank. He then 
 mounted his horse and rode away with 
 his staff. 
 
 General Sherman had the day before 
 sent Garrard's cavalry to Covington, on 
 the Augusta Railroad, forty-two miles 
 east of Atlanta, with instructions to 
 send out detachments from that point 
 to destroy the two bridges across the 
 Yellow and Ulcofauhatchee rivers, trib- 
 utaries of the Ocmulgee. McPherson 
 had also left his wagon train at Decatur, 
 under a guard of three regiments com- 
 manded by Colonel Sprague. 
 
 Soon after the departure of McPher- 
 son, sounds of musketry to the left and 
 rear rapidly gromng into volume and 
 accompanied by the roar of artillery^ 
 were heard, and about the same time 
 the reports of guns in the direction of 
 Decatur. There could be no doubt 
 now as to what the enemy was about. 
 Hood was throwing a superior force on 
 the National left flank while he held 
 the National forces with his forts in 
 front, the only question being as to the 
 amoimt of force at his disposal. Orders 
 were immediately sent to all parts of 
 the right and left centre to give fxill 
 employment to the enemy along the 
 vvhole line, and for Schofield to hold as 
 large a force as possible in reserve 
 
 awaiting developments. Not more 
 than half an hour had elapsed aftei 
 McPherson had parted from Sherman, 
 when his adjutant-general. Colonel 
 Clarke, rode up and reported him killed 
 or a prisoner. He had ridden to 
 General Dodge's colunm, moving as 
 before described, and had sent off nearly 
 all his staff and ordei'lies on various 
 errands, and taken a narrow road that 
 led through the woods to the left and 
 rear of General Giles A. Smith's divi- 
 sion, which was on General Blair's 
 extreme left. A few minutes after he 
 had entered the woods a shai-p volley 
 was heard from the direction in 
 which he had gone, and his horse had 
 come out riderless, with two wounds. 
 Sheiinan immediately despatched a staff 
 officer to General Logan, commanding 
 the Fifteenth Corps, dii'ecting him to 
 assume command of the army of thfc 
 Tennesee and hold the ground already 
 chosen, especially the hill occupied by 
 General Leggett's division. 
 
 Already the whole line was engaged 
 in battle. McPherson upon reaching 
 the left had found the Sixteenth corps 
 going into position to prolong the flank, 
 and at that time facing to the left in a 
 direction perpendicular to the main 
 line. Between the right of the Six 
 teenth corps and the left of the Seven 
 teenth was a wooded space of about 
 half a mile. Shortly after twelve jQ]y 
 o'clock the enemy emerged from 22. 
 the woods in front of these corps m 
 three columns, and attacked tne Six 
 teenth corjis. Three desperate assaults 
 were repulsed by Dodge, in the last of 
 which the enemy suffered severely from 
 
AilAOiS. UiN U^VAVVK. 
 
 rta 
 
 the National batteries. It was during 
 the ] ull in the battle which now occmred 
 that McPherson had attempted to ride 
 through the woods to G. A. Smith's 
 division on the left of the Seventeenth 
 corps, it having been reported that the 
 nemy was about attempting to push 
 a force through the gap above mentioned 
 between the two corps. After sending 
 the only remaining member of his staff 
 with orders to obtain a brigade from 
 Logan's command and throw it across 
 the gap, with a single orderly he struck 
 into the road before mentioned. The 
 enemy's skirmish line, however, had 
 already advanced close up to the road, 
 and before he was aware he was within 
 fifty feet of it. A volley brought him 
 to the ground, mortally wounded. 
 
 Wangelin's brigade, the one ordered 
 ap from Logan's command, arrived 
 in time to partially check the Confed- 
 erates, but not soon enough to prevent 
 a portion of their force getting in the 
 rear of the Seventeenth corps, while 
 other masses of troops were pushed 
 tgainst the hill held by Leggett, whose 
 division, as well as that of G. A. Smith, 
 was attacked in front and rear, and 
 obliged to fire alternately from behind 
 their own breast-works and an aban- 
 doned parapet of the enemy. Leggett's 
 troops held firmly a fortified angle at 
 the top of the hill, against which the 
 Confederates threw their columns with 
 desperate but fruitless energy. In the 
 mean time Smith, who had been com- 
 pelled to draw back his more exposed 
 lines, and in doing so to abandon two 
 guns, took up a new line, whose right 
 connected with the division of Leggett, 
 
 his left diawn back and facing south- 
 east. The Confederates could make 
 no impression on this new formation of 
 the corps, whose deadly fire compelled 
 them to recoil again and again, mowing 
 down whole ranks at a time and cover 
 ing the ground and ditches with dead 
 and wounded men. A portion of the 
 force that had penetrated the gap before 
 mentioned, renewed the attack on the 
 right flank of the Sixteenth corps, and 
 captured on its first advance a 6-gun 
 batteiy which was moving unsupported 
 along a narrow road through the woods. 
 They were soon checked, however, by 
 the divisions of Sweeney and Fuller, 
 and diiven back with the loss of many 
 prisoners. Several of Sweeney's regi- 
 ments had expen-led their ammunition, 
 but charged with the bayonet, when the 
 enemy broke and fled. At about half 
 past three the Confederates desisted 
 from their attack on the left flank, 
 having sustained very heavy loss zind 
 gained no ground. 
 
 In the mean time two divisions of 
 Wheeler's cavalry, with a section of 
 artillery, had taken a wide cu-cuit to the 
 eastward and fallen upon Decatur im- 
 opposed — Sherman having sent Gar 
 rard's cavalry to Covington, as before 
 stated — and attempted to capture the 
 wagon trains ; but Colonel Sprague cov 
 ered them with great skill and success, 
 sending them to the rear of Schofield 
 and Thomas, and not withdrawing 
 from Decatxir till every wagon wa 
 safe, except three which the teamsterB 
 had abandoned. 
 
 A pause in the battle occurred about 
 four o'clock. Hood was ma.ssing troopK 
 
784 
 
 ATLiAJNTA. 
 
 For an attack on the Fifteenth corps, 
 now commanded by General M. L. 
 Smith, which, immediately adjoining the 
 Seventeenth coi-ps, held the right of the 
 army of the Tennessee, behind strong 
 breast-works. At half-past four, while 
 the attention of the extreme left was 
 occupied by a pretended attack, a heavy 
 force of the enemy, two lines deep, 
 marched directly on the left of the 
 Fifteenth corps, driving in two regi- 
 ments of skirmishers and capturing two 
 guns. Lightbum's brigade, which held 
 this part of the line protected by breast- 
 works, kept the enemy at bay by well- 
 directed discharges of 20 pounder Par- 
 rott guns. Presently a second strong 
 column of the enemy appeared, and 
 rapidly and steadily approached, heed- 
 less of the fearful furrows made in its 
 ranks by well-directed artillery. The 
 attack had now become sufficiently for- 
 midable ; but when a thu-d column of 
 the Confederates was seen pouring in on 
 the rear through a deep cut in the 
 Georgia Railroad, Lightbum's troops, to 
 avoid certain capture, retired in confu- 
 sion to the second line of breast-works 
 500 yards fi'om the main line; and the 
 abandoned works with two batteries 
 fell into the hands of the enemy. The 
 position lost was one of the utmost 
 importance, and Sherman sent orders to 
 Schofield — which, however, he had an- 
 ticipated — to make the Fifteenth corps 
 regain its ground at any cost. To aid 
 he movement, batteries from Schofield's 
 corps were so posted that by means of 
 them the enemy and his works beyond 
 might be shelled, and the approach of 
 rflinfoi-cements prevented. The Con- 
 
 federates were on the point of turning 
 the captured PaiTott guns upon the 
 inner National line, when the Fifteenth 
 corps, supported by some of Schofield's 
 troops, advanced with loud cheers to 
 the attack. After a fierce struggle, in 
 which the fight was sometimes hand to 
 hand across the narrow parapet, the ene- 
 my was driven out of the works and the 
 guns retaken. Repeated discharges of 
 grajae and canister into the retreating 
 masses caused fearful carnage. Thus 
 ended the battle, by far the bloodiest 
 that had yet been fought in Georgia. 
 The Confederates were defeated at all 
 points. Their dead left in front of the 
 National lines numbered 2200 from 
 actual count, of which 800 weie deliv- 
 ered to them under flag of trace. Theii 
 total loss in killed was computed by 
 General Logan at 3240 ; in addition to 
 which they lost 3000 prisoners, includ 
 ing 1000 wounded and many commis- 
 sioned officers. Owing to the closeness 
 and desperation of the conflict, the pro- 
 portion of killed was unusually large. 
 Hood could til afford these heavy losses, 
 as his force was originally smaller 
 than Sherman's. The total National 
 loss was 3722, the greater part being 
 killed and wounded. Sherman's amiy, 
 however, had sustained an irrepara 
 ble loss in the death of General Mc- 
 Pherson " He was " said Sherman : 
 " a noble youth, of striking personal 
 appearance, of the highest professional 
 capacity, and with a heart abounding 
 in kindness that drew to him the affec- 
 tions of all men." His body was recov 
 ered and carried in the heat of battle 
 to General Shennan. who sent it. in 
 
CAVALKY EXPEDITIONS. 
 
 rsrs 
 
 ({barge tu his personal staflF, back to 
 Marietta, on its way to his Northern 
 home.* 
 
 Garrard, with his cavalry, returned 
 July from Covington on the 24th, 
 21. having thoroughly accomplished 
 his mission to destroy the bridges over 
 the Yellow and Ulcofauhatchee rivers, 
 besides burning a train of cars, 2000 
 bales of cotton, and the depots at Cov- 
 ington and Conger's Station. He also 
 broke up the railroad between those 
 two places for seven miles, and brought 
 in 200 prisoners and some good horees, 
 having lost in the expedition only two 
 
 • QBiraaaAi, Jaices Birdsktk McPherson was born 
 in Sandusky Co., Ohio, on the 14th of November, 1828, 
 and entered the Military Academy at ^Vast Point in 
 1849. He graduated at the head of his class on the 
 30th of June, 1853, and was then appointed brevet 
 second lieutenant of engineers and assistant instructor 
 of practical engineering at the Academy. He remained 
 in this position till 1854, when he was appointed 
 assistant engineer on the defenses of New Tork harbor. 
 In 1857, he was in charge of the construction of Fort 
 Delaware, and subsequently of the fortifications on 
 Alcatras Island, in San Francisco Bay. In 1861 he 
 was placed in charge of the fortifications in Boston 
 harbor. In the same year he was made captain, and 
 in November became aide-de-camp to neieral Halleck 
 in the Western Department, with the rank of lieuten- 
 ant colonel. He was chief engineer of tlie army of 
 the Tennessee in the expeditions against Forts Henry 
 and Donelson, and he was also at the siege of Corinth. 
 In May, 1862, he was appointed brigadier-general of 
 volunteers, and in the following month general super- 
 intendent of military roads in West Tennessee. In 
 September of the same year he was on the staff of 
 General Grant, with the rank of major-general of 
 volunteers. Subsequently, he was appointed brigadier- 
 general of the regular army, his rank dating from 
 August, 1st, 1863. Two months later he led a column 
 into Mississippi, and defeated the enemy at Canton, 
 m Sherman's expedition to Meridian he was second in 
 command, and in the Atlanta campaign commanded 
 the army of the Tennessee. McPherson was distin- 
 guished for bravery. Industry, and indefatigable 
 energy. In the language of General Grant, he was 
 "one of the ablest engineers and most skilful gener- 
 als " 
 
 98* 
 
 men. The Georgia Railroad being now 
 unavailable to the enemy, Sherman 
 turned his attention to the railroad 
 connecting Atlanta with Macon, the 
 only avenue left by which supplies could 
 be brought to the enemy. For this 
 purpose he organized his cavalry into 
 two large bodies, to move in concert 
 from each wing of the army, while the 
 army of the Tennessee was to be shifted 
 at the same time by the right to East 
 Point, a station six miles southwest of 
 Atlanta, at the junction of the Maoon 
 and West Point roads. Stoneman was 
 transferred to the left flank, and Gar- 
 rard's cavalry added to his own, making 
 an effective force of 5000 men. On the 
 right flank McCook, to whose command 
 was added the cavalry brought by Gen- 
 eral Rousseau, had an aggregate forcf 
 of 4000 men. These two well-appoin 
 ted bodies of cavalry, which Shermac 
 considered more than a match foi 
 Wheeler, were directed to move in won 
 cert, Stoneman's by the left around 
 McDonough, McCook's by the right on 
 Fayetteville. On the night of the 28tb 
 they were to meet on the Macon Railroat 
 near Lovejoy's, thirty miles south of 
 Atlanta, and break up the track thor- 
 oughly. The enemy's communications 
 would then be all destroyed, and it was 
 hoped the speedy evacuation of Atlanta 
 would follow. 
 
 Just before starting on the expedition 
 Stoneman requested permission to p?-<> 
 ceed, after accomplishing the proposeo 
 destruction of the railroad, to Macon and 
 Andersonville, and release the Union 
 prisoners there. To thi.H, as thfte was 
 a possibility of success, and, to use 
 
/26 
 
 ATLANTA. 
 
 Sherma'^'s words, "something captiva- 
 ting in tiie idea," consent was given by 
 General Sherman, on the condition, 
 however, that Wheeler's cavalry should 
 first be defeated, and that Stoneman 
 ehoiild make the attempt with his own 
 cavalry only, that of Garrard to return 
 immediately to his own flank of the 
 National army. 
 
 Thp two expeu.cioiLc get out on the 
 July 27th, Stoneman marching as pro- 
 27. posed towards McDonough, and 
 sending Garrard to Flat Rock to cover 
 his movement. McCook moved down 
 the west bank of the Chattahoochee. 
 But Stoneman, instead of proceeding to 
 Lovejoy's, turned off almost immedi'«tely 
 towards the Georgia Railroad, following 
 it as far as Covington. He then struck 
 due south to the east of the Ocmulgee, 
 for Macon, sixty miles distant, and ar- 
 
 ived in the vicinity of that place on the 
 30th. A detachment was sent eastward 
 to Gordon, on the Georgia Central Rail- 
 road, where 11 locomotives and several 
 trains loaded with stores were destroyed, 
 and several bridges between that place 
 and Macon. But having learned that 
 on the previous day the prisoners in 
 Macon had been sent away to Charles- 
 ton, Stoneman decided to return at once, 
 without attempting to reach either 
 Macon or Andersonville. He accord- 
 ingly turaed northward in the evening 
 
 ^ly but on the following morning, 
 when about twenty miles from 
 Macon^ encountered a heavy force. 
 Dismoimting a portion of his command, 
 as the country was imfavorabie for cav- 
 alry operations, he threw them foiward 
 Hs gkirmifihei'b. He sioon h<)wever, 
 
 31 
 
 found himself surrounded by a superior 
 force. He then gave directions to the 
 greater part of his troops to cut their 
 way as well as they could through the 
 enemy's lines, while he with several 
 hundred men and a section of artillery 
 occupied their attention. He was finally 
 compelled to surrender. One of his 
 three brigades was captured with him; 
 one, under Colonel Capron, was sur- 
 prised and scattered on its way back 
 and the third, under Colonel Adams, 
 arrived almost intact within the Nation 
 al lines. Garrard remained at Flat 
 Rock till the 29th, awaiting orders 
 from Stoneman, when he marched to- 
 wards Covington; but learning thure 
 that he had gone southward, returned 
 to his position on the left flank of the 
 army. 
 
 McCook, who marched along the west 
 side of the Chattahoochee, on amving 
 at Rivertown, crossed on pontoons and 
 marched to Palmetto Station, on the 
 West Point Railroad, twenty-five miles 
 south of Atlanta, and destroyed the 
 track there. He then moved eastward 
 upon Fayetteville, and biimt 500 ai-my 
 wagons, killed 800 mules, and made 
 prisoners of several hundred quarter- 
 masters' men. He reached the appoint- 
 ed rendezvous at Lovejoy's on the night 
 of the 28th, burnt the depot and tore 
 up a section of the raih'oad ; but hi^' 
 work of destruction being interfered 
 with by an accumulating force ot tb^ 
 enemy, and hearing nothing of Stone 
 man, he turned off towards the soutii 
 west and marched to Newman, a statiori 
 on the West Point Railroad. Here he 
 encountered an infautjy force of tli*^^ 
 
MAGNIFICENT ADVANCE REPULSED, 
 
 W 
 
 enemy on its way from Mississippi to 
 Atlanta, which had been delayed by the 
 break he had effected on the road at 
 Palmetto. This force, with the pursu- 
 
 ng cavalry, hemmed him in, and he was 
 compelled to drop his prisoners and cut 
 
 is way out, in doing which he lost 
 
 ome 500 officers and men. The total 
 losses of Stoneman's and McCook's 
 commands amounted to not less than 
 1500 men. Owing to Stoneman's failure 
 to co-operate with McCook at Lovejoy's, 
 the damage done to the Macon Railroad 
 was not effectual, and the communica- 
 tions of Hood in the direction of Macon 
 were soon restored. Atlanta ob**-ined 
 a respite of at least a month. 
 
 While these raids against the South- 
 em railroad communications of Atlanta 
 had been going on, the army of the 
 Tennessee, now under the command of 
 Major-General Howard — appointed by 
 
 he president to succeed General Mc- 
 Pherson — had, in accordance with the 
 plans of Sherman, been drawn out of 
 i;S intrenchments on the left flank, and 
 moved during the 27th, behind the rest 
 of the army, to a position on the extreme 
 right, the right flank being held by the 
 corps of General Logan. The line of 
 the army was thus prolonged southward 
 beyond Proctor's Creek, and facing 
 eastward. About ten in the morning 
 all the army was in position, and the 
 men were busily engaged in throwing 
 ap the usual defense of logs and rails. 
 Davis' division of the Fourteenth corps 
 had been ordered by Sherman, on the 
 day before, to move down to Turner's 
 Ferry, and thence towards Whitehall or 
 East Point, and if possible to reach the 
 
 flank of Howard's new line, so that in 
 case Hood should attempt to repeat the 
 experiment of the 2 2d, and attack any 
 part of the army while in motion, his 
 force might be taken in flank at an on 
 expected moment 
 
 Hood was not long in finding cm 
 that the army of Sherman was swinging 
 round towards the Macon Railroad, and 
 massed troops in the same direction tc 
 oppose the movement. At noon jq], 
 on the 28th, the Confederates 28. 
 moved out of Atlanta by the Bell's Feriy 
 road, formed in the open fields behind 
 a rising ground, and advanced in paral- 
 lel lines directly against the Fifteenth 
 corps, expecting to find it detached and 
 unsupported. Fortunately Logan's 
 troops had thrown up breast-works, and 
 though the advance of the Confederate 
 columns was " magnificent," as Sherman, 
 who witnessed it, said, it was only to 
 be followed by a recoU before steady 
 volleys of musketry and incessant dis- 
 charges of grape and canister. In spite 
 of the efforts of their officers the men 
 broke and fled, and though rallied again 
 and again, at some p^irts of the line as 
 often as six times, they were, about 
 four o'clock in the afternoon, compblled 
 to retire, with a loss of not less than 
 5000. Logan's loss was reported at less 
 than 600. Had Davis' division come 
 up at any time before four o'clock, this 
 complete repulse of the enemy might 
 have been made a disastrous lont 
 Owing to the difficult nature of th 
 country through which his march lay 
 and the absence of ropds, Davis was un- 
 fortunately delayed. This was the last 
 attempt of the ener\7 to check the 
 
728 
 
 ATLANTA. 
 
 extension of Sherman's lines by the 
 flank ; and though the extensions south- 
 svard were met by well consti-ucted forts 
 and rifle-pits between the National army 
 and the railroad to and below East Point, 
 the defensive was strictly adhered to. 
 The National line was prolonged on the 
 1st of August still further southward be- 
 yond East Point, by transferring Scho. 
 Seld's army and Palmer's corps to the 
 right. 
 
 About this time several changes in 
 important commands took place. Hook- 
 ^T, offended because of the appointment 
 >f General Howard as the successor of 
 WcPherson, resigned his command of 
 the Twentieth coips, and General Slo- 
 'nim was appointed in his place. Slocum 
 was at Vicksburg, and until he arrived 
 the command devolved on General S. 
 H. Williams. Palmer at the same time 
 resigned his command of the Fouiteenth 
 C01-J1S, and was succeeded by General 
 Jefferson C. Davis. The command of 
 the Fourth corps, vacated by the pro- 
 motion of General Howard, was given 
 to General D. S. Stanley. 
 
 From the 2d to the 15tl^. of August, 
 «he National line was extended still 
 further to the right, in the hope of 
 flanking Hood in that direction. The 
 Twenty-Third corps, supported by the 
 Fourteenth, was transferred from the 
 left to a position below Utoy Creek — 
 a small stream flowing westward to 
 the Chattahoochee — where it joined on 
 Logan's right and formed the right 
 flank. Reilley's brigade of Cox's divi- 
 kng. ^^^° made an attempt on the 5th 
 6. to break through the enemy's line 
 about a mile below Utoy Creek, but 
 
 failed, losing about 400 men. On the 
 next day, however, the j.o8ition waa 
 turned by General Hascall, and Genera] 
 Schofield advanced his whole line close 
 up to and facing the enemy below Utoy 
 Creek. Still he could get no foothold 
 on either the West Point or Macon 
 Railroad. The enemy's line, in which 
 was now a large body of Georgia militia, 
 at this time was about fifteen miles long, 
 extending from near Decatur to East 
 Point and beyond, and his positions 
 were so masked by the hills and woods 
 that the weak parts of the line could 
 not be discovered. 
 
 Along the west side of the raili'oad 
 from Atlanta to East Point, a distance 
 of six miles, the enemy had an admira- 
 bly constnicted line of defenses, wdthin 
 which was a second line, consisting of 
 a series of redoubts of great thickness 
 of parapet connected throughout by a 
 continuous infantry })arapefc, covered by 
 abatis, chevaux-de-frise, and other im- 
 pediments. The inner line ot works 
 completely suiTounded the city, and 
 extended southwe8t^vard as far as and 
 ai'oimd East Point, thus coveiing the 
 point of Junction of the West Point 
 and Macon Railroads. The National 
 army had been so shifted by successive 
 movements from its first position, in 
 which it had threatened the city on the 
 north and northeast, that now, while 
 the northern approaches were covered 
 by its extreme left, the extreme right 
 lay" southwest of Atlanta, and in a line 
 parallel with the railroad, at an aveiage 
 distance of two and a haK miles, the 
 intervening space being a naiTOW belt 
 of rough wooded country, the scene of 
 
THE GRAND MOVEMENT POSTPONED. 
 
 ,'ih 
 
 constant skirmishing. Hood's position 
 seemed to be impregnable ; and although 
 his nxmibers were inferior to those of 
 • Sherman — yet his advantage in holding 
 the interior lines made up in a great 
 measure for his want of men, and the 
 contest seemed likely to be indefinitely 
 protracted. Sherman became satisfied 
 that the enemy's lines could be canied 
 by assault only at a fearful sacrifice of 
 life, and determined to adopt another 
 plan of operations. His object now 
 was to get possession of the Macon 
 Raili'oad, the only line left by which 
 Hood's army could be reinforced, and 
 on which it was wholly dependent for 
 supplies. This effected, Hood might be 
 compelled to evacuate the city or sur- 
 render. To gain this end Sherman 
 determined to move his entire army. 
 But before moving, he had a battery of 
 foiu" 4i-inch rifled guns put in position, 
 and a steady fii'e opened upon the city 
 — the object being to impress the enemy 
 with the conviction that regular siege 
 operations were commenced. Several 
 extensive fii-es were also thus caused in 
 the city, and the ru nnin g of trains on the 
 Macon Raih-oad was inteiTupted; but 
 the enemy resolutely held the forts, 
 willing, apparently to see the city laid in 
 lUihes rather than abandon them. Sher- 
 man therefore commenced his new move- 
 ment, which amounted to nothing less 
 than raising the siege of Atlanta and 
 taking the field with his main force, and 
 asing it against the communications of 
 Atlanta instead of against its intrench- 
 (uents. 
 
 By the 16th of August, Sherman had 
 ''ompleted his plans, according to which 
 
 the Twentieth corps, under Wil- Aug. 
 liams, was to be moved back to the ^^' 
 intrenched position at the Chattahoo- 
 chee Bridge, and the main army was to 
 march to the West Point RaUroad, neai 
 Fau'bom, and aftei-wards to the Macon 
 road at Jonesboro, the wagons loaded 
 with provisions for fifteen days. But 
 befoi'e putting these plans in execution 
 Shei-man learned that WTieeler, wth a 
 force of cavalry, vaiiously estimated 
 at from 6000 to 10,000 men, had 
 passed ai-ound by the east and north. 
 Making his appearance on the Nation- 
 al lines of communication, he captured 
 900 head of cattle, and made a break 
 on the railroad near Calhoun. Shei 
 man, therefore, thinking that in th« 
 absence of Wheeler's cavalry, the tasL 
 he had marked out for the whole ai'mj 
 might be accomplished by a strong 
 mounted force, suspended his ordei-s foi 
 the grand movement by the right flank, 
 and dispatched Kilpatrick — who had 
 now recovered fiom the wound he re 
 ceived at Resaca — with a force of 500C 
 well-appointed cavaliy to tear up the 
 railroads. Kilpatrick left his camp 
 near Sandtowu on the 18 th and struck 
 the West Point Railroad at Fairboni, 
 the Macon Railroad at Love joy's; but 
 being much harrassed by a body of in- 
 fantry and by Ross's cavalry, was not 
 able to effect any permanent damage on 
 the roads — not enough to internipt their 
 use for more than ten days. He (hei 
 returned northward and eastward, anu 
 reached Decatur on the 2 2d. 
 
 It now became appai-ent to Sherman 
 that his original plan must be earned 
 out. All the army commanders were 
 
/30 
 
 ATLANTA. 
 
 at once notified to send their surplus 
 wagons, the sick and wounded, and in- 
 cumbrances of all kinds, back to the 
 intrenched position at the Chattahoochee 
 Railroad Bridge, and that the movement 
 must commence on the night of the 25th. 
 Th(? Twentieth corps marched back to 
 the bridge. The Fourth corps, under 
 General Stanley, was drawn out of its 
 line on the extreme left, and marched 
 to a position below Proctor's Creek. 
 The movement was continued on the 
 night of the 26th, the army of the 
 Tennessee being drawn out and moved 
 rapidly by a circuit towards Sandtown 
 and across Camp Creek ; the army of 
 the Cumberland south of Utoy Creek. 
 The army of the Ohio remained m its 
 position. A third movement placed 
 the army of the Tennessee on the West 
 Point Railroad above Fairbom, the 
 army of the Cumberland above Red 
 Oak, and the army of the Ohio near 
 Diggs and Mims. The whole front of 
 the city was thus uncovered, much to 
 the astonishment of the Confederates, 
 who, for a short time, not being able in 
 any other way to account for these 
 strange operations, supposed that Sher. 
 man had begun a retreat. 
 
 The 28th of Augiist was devoted by 
 Ane. Sherman to the destruction of the 
 'i8. West Point Railroad, between 
 Fairbom and Red Oak, and for some 
 distance above. The work was tnor- 
 oiighly done. The road was destroyed 
 for twelve and a half miles, the ties 
 being burnt, and the rails twisted. Sev- 
 eral cuts were made across the road and 
 filled up with logs, tnmks of trees, 
 fragments of rock, and earth, among 
 
 which were placed shells prepared as 
 torpedoes, to explode in case of an 
 attempt to clear them out. Sherman, 
 after having personally inspected this 
 work, and seen that the destruction was 
 so complete that it would be very 
 difficult to restore the road to working 
 condition, ordered the whole army to 
 move next day eastward by several 
 roads — Howard, on the right, towards 
 Jonesboro ; Thomas, in the centre, by 
 Shoal Creek Church to Couch's, on the 
 Decatur and Fayetteville road ; and 
 Schofield, on the left, about Morrow's 
 Mills. 
 
 Hood now began to understand the 
 object of these movements ; but still 
 unaware that Sherman's whole army 
 was marching on his communications, 
 he contented himself with sending only a 
 part of his force, the corps of Hardee 
 and S. D. Lee, to Jonesboro, remaining 
 himself in Atlanta with Stewart's coi-pa 
 and the Georgia militia. 
 
 The several columns of Sherman's 
 army were again in motion in a south- 
 easterly direction on the 30th. Ang. 
 Thomas, in the centre, encounter- 30 . 
 ing little opposition, attained his posi- 
 tion at Couch's early in the afternoon ; 
 Schofield being near the enemy, moved 
 cautiously on a circle around East Point, 
 and came into position towards Rough 
 and Ready ; Howard, who had the 
 outer circle, and therefore a greatej 
 distance to move, met with some opposi 
 tion, which, however, he easily overcame, 
 passed Renfrew, the point indicated for 
 him in the orders of the day, and 
 at night halted within half a rrule of 
 Jonesboro. Next morning, findi-xg 
 
MOVEMENT ON JONESBOBO. 
 
 rsi 
 
 himself in the presence of the heavy- 
 force under Generals Hardee and Lee, 
 Howard deployed the Fifteenth corps, 
 and disposed the Sixteenth and Seven- 
 teenth on its flank. 
 
 Sherman had in the meantime, as 
 soon as he learned that Howard had 
 passed Renfrew, directed Thomas to 
 send to that place a division of Davis' 
 corps, also to move Stanley's corps in 
 connection with Schofield's force,to wards 
 Rough and Ready, and then to send 
 forward a strong detachment to feel for 
 the railroad. Schofield was also ordered 
 to move boldly forward and strike the 
 tailroad near Rough and Ready. These 
 ^Qg_ movements were progressing on 
 31. the Slst, when the Confederates 
 moved out of their works at Jonesboro, 
 and attacked the position of Howard, 
 but were steadily and repeatedly re- 
 pulsed. After a contest of two hours' 
 duration, they withdrew, losing in killed, 
 wounded, and captured, 3000 men, 
 besides general officers, including Major- 
 General Anderson, mortally wounded. 
 Howard's loss was slight, as his men 
 fought behind breast- works. It whs 
 observed on this occasion that the Con- 
 federate troops had begun to lOse the 
 enthusiasm and dash which b^•.d hitherto 
 characterized their attacks. 
 
 Hearing the sounds of battle about 
 noon, Sherman renewed his orders to push 
 the other movements on the left and 
 centre, and about four o'clock received 
 reports that Howard had thoroughly 
 repulsed the enemy at Jonesboro ; that 
 Schofield had reached the railroad a 
 mile below Rough and Ready and was 
 busy breaking it up ; that Stanley was 
 
 on the road below Schofield, and was 
 also breaking it up, and that General 
 Davis' corps had struck the road within 
 four miles of Jonesboro. Orders were 
 then given for the whole army to mov 
 on Jonesboro ; Thomas from the north 
 with Schofield on his left. Howaro 
 was to hold the Confederates in their 
 fortifications till the rest of the army 
 could close in upon them. The troops 
 were also ordered to continue the des 
 truction of the railroad as they moved 
 along it. Garrard was charged to 
 watch the roads northward, and Kil- 
 patrick was sent southward along the 
 west bank of the Flint River, to threaten 
 or attack the railroad below Jonesboro. 
 It was expected that the whole army 
 would be able to close in on Jonesboro 
 by noun on the 1st of September; bul 
 the corps of Davis alone, having a com 
 paratively short distance to travel, wa 
 up in time, and was deployed fa«in 
 southward, its right in connection with 
 the corps of Howard, its left on tho 
 railroad. Stanley and Schofield wero 
 moving along the Rough and Readj' 
 road, breaking it up at the same time 
 and Sherman fearing that night would 
 come on before their arrival, and that 
 the enemy woiild then be able to escajx 
 him without a fight, ordered the corpa 
 of Davis to assault the enemy's works 
 at once. The troops advanced to the 
 attack across open fields under a wither 
 ing artillery and musketry fire. After 
 a desperate fight, which lasted two 
 hoiirs, they drove the Confederates from 
 their works, capturing two 4-gun batter- 
 ies — one of them Loomis', lost at Chick 
 amauga — some battle-flags, and a large 
 
m 
 
 ATLANTA. 
 
 number of prisoners, including the 
 greater part of Govan's brigade, with 
 its commander, which had f o med part 
 of the celebrated "fighting division" of 
 Cleburne. Repeated orders were sent, 
 urging the rapid advance of Stanley 
 and Schofield, but the want of roads and 
 the difficiJt natui-e of the countiy pre- 
 vented their coming up and getting into 
 position for attack before fm-ther oper- 
 ations were rendered impracticable by 
 the approach of night. Had they 
 been able to close in upon Hardee a few 
 hours earlier, his entire force woidd in 
 all probability have been captured. As 
 it was, Hardee had to evacuate the place 
 during the night and fall back seven 
 miles to Lovejoy's, where he intrenched 
 in a naturally strong position. About 
 two o'clock in the morning the \\'atchei's 
 in Sherman's camp heard in the direction 
 of Atlanta, about twenty miles distant, 
 the sounds of heavy explosions, followed 
 by a succession of minor reports re- 
 sembling the rapid firing of cannon and 
 musketry. About four o cJock: similar 
 sounds were heard, indicating a night 
 attack on the city by Slocum, or that 
 Hood was blowing up his magazines 
 and preparing to evacuate. Never- 
 theless, when the approach of day made 
 it clear that Hardee had abandoned his 
 works at Jonesboro, Sherman moved 
 his army in pursuit. Hardee was found 
 Ji his intrenched position at Lovejoy's, 
 his flanks protected by a branch of 
 iValnut Creek to the right and a small 
 onfluent of the Flint River to his left. 
 In the mean time, in Atlanta the 
 utmost consternation and excitement 
 had arisen when it became known that 
 
 the main army of Sherman had gol 
 between Hardee's force and the city. 
 Hood immediately gave orders for the 
 evacuation of his works and the remov- 
 al of as much of the ammunition and 
 stores as was possible with his limited 
 means of transportation, and for thf 
 destruction of the rest. Large quanti 
 ties of pro\'isions in the public store 
 houses were distributed to the inhabi 
 tants and to the troops. The rolling 
 stock of the railroads, consisting of 
 about 100 cars and 6 locomotives, were 
 gathered together near the rolling-mill 
 in the evening, by which time all th(j 
 troops except the rear-guard had got 
 away. The care were then laden mth 
 the surplus ammunition, and, together 
 with the depots, storehouses, and all 
 that could be of use to the National 
 army, set on fire about midnight. This 
 occasioned the series of explosioiis thai 
 had been heard in Sherman's camp. 
 Slocum, at the Chattahoochee Bridge, 
 also hearing these sounds, sent out early 
 in the morning of the 2d of Sep- gept. 
 tember a strong reconnoitring 2. 
 column, which pushing forward with 
 out meeting any opposition, arrived 
 at Atlanta about nine o'clock, when th*. 
 mayor made a formal surrender of tht 
 city, only requesting the security of 
 private property and protection for non 
 combatants, which were readily guaran 
 teed. Ward's division then marched 
 into the city with drums beating and 
 colors flying, and the National bannei 
 was raised over the court-house amid 
 hearty cheers from the troops. Eleven 
 heavy guns were found in the fortific» 
 tions, and a number which had been 
 
REMOVAL OF CIVILIANS. 
 
 733 
 
 buried were subsequently dug up. 
 There were also found 3 locomotives 
 uninjured, 3000 muskets in good order, 
 and a quantity of tobacco and other 
 stores. Of the valuable machinery in 
 the Confederate Government work- 
 shops, part had been removed to Augus- 
 ta and Macon, and part destroyed. 
 
 The object of Sherman's movement 
 against the Macon Railroad having been 
 attained, by ihe surrender of Atlanta, 
 he gave up tb * pursuit of Hardee's force. 
 To follow it through a country covered 
 with forest'i, would have been useless. 
 He therefcrf; issued orders on the 4th for 
 the return of the anny by slow marches 
 towards Atlantrt,. On the 5th it was 
 back at Jonesbr-o ; on the 7th it moved 
 to Rough and Ready, and on the 8th 
 camps were sel icted — for the ai my of 
 the Cumberlat d around Atlanta, for 
 ^he army of tl'8 Tennessee about East 
 Point, and foi the army of the Ohio 
 at D(catur. 
 
 Sherman's final success in compelling 
 the evacuation of Atlanta was owing in 
 a great degree to the mistake made by 
 Hood in sending off his cavalry under 
 Wheeler to operate against the National 
 communications far beyond the reach 
 of recall, thus enabling Shei-man's cav- 
 alry, followed quickly by his main army, 
 ^o fall upon the railroads south of At- 
 lanta. Up to the time of Wheeler's 
 raid, Sherman's railroad communications 
 between Atlanta and Chattanooga had, 
 owing to his skilful dispositions, been 
 scarcely interrupted. In Chattanooga 
 had been accumulated a sufficient quan- 
 tity of stores to render the array indepen- 
 dent of Nashville ; and when Sherman 
 
 heard of Wheeler's departure, which 
 took place soon after the unfortunate 
 raid of Stoneman, he felt no uneasiness, 
 as it left him supeiior in cavalry to his 
 adversary. Wheeler struck the rail roa 1 1 
 at Adairsville, midway between Atlaut 
 and Chattanooga, and captured thero 
 900 head of beef cattle ; proceeding 
 then northward, he did some damage at 
 Calhoun. On the 14th he made his 
 appearance at Dalton, and demanded, 
 in order "to prevent the effusicu of 
 blood," an immediate and unconditional 
 surrender. Colonel Siebold, who was 
 in command of the garrison of 500 or 
 600 men, replied in the negative ; and 
 sending word to General Steedman, 
 commanding at Chattanooga, he held 
 out against the Confederates till the 
 following day, when reinforcements 
 arrived. Wheeler then went to East 
 Tennessee; and the railroad between 
 Atlanta and Chattanooga was immedi- 
 ately restored to running order. Sub 
 sequently he desti'oyed a large part oi 
 the raili-oad between Chattanooga and 
 Knoxville ; and diu-ing the latter part of 
 August and the first week in Sept/;mbei 
 he endeavored to break up the laili'oad 
 and interrupt telegraphic con munica- 
 tions between Chattanooga and Nash- 
 ville. He was, however, comjielled t(j 
 retire southward pursued by (reueraltj 
 Rousseau, Steedman, and Granger, to 
 wards Florence, in northern Alabama 
 Having determined to remove all 
 ci\alians from Atlanta and to retain tin 
 town for military purposes exclusively 
 Sherman issued an order dated ggpt. 
 5th September ordering all fami- t. 
 lies living in Atlanta whose male 
 
?b4 
 
 ATLANTA. 
 
 representatives were in the Confederate 
 sei-vice, or had gone south, to leave the 
 city within five days. All northern 
 citizens not connected vnth the army, 
 unless they obtained from him or from 
 xeneral Thomas permission to remain, 
 were also to leave the city in five days or 
 to be liable to imprisonment. To facil- 
 itate the removal of the inhabitants, 
 the number of whom had greatly 
 diminished during the progress of the 
 siege, Sherman proposed to Hood, still 
 remaining at Lovejoy's, a truce of ten 
 days. Hood agreed to the proposal, 
 although he protested against the 
 measure as one of unnecessary cruelty. 
 Sherman replied in a characteristic let- 
 ter to H od, showing that the conduct 
 of Johnston and other Confederate 
 commanders afforded sufficient prece- 
 dent for his action. The inhabitants 
 who still remained in Atlanta were very 
 unwilling to be sent away, and the 
 mayor, James M. Calhoun, addressed a 
 letter to Sherman, asking a reconsider- 
 ation of the order to which the latter re- 
 plief*., showing in clear and forcible 
 
 language the propriety of the measure he 
 had determined on, at the same time dem- 
 onstrating that the hardships of war so 
 much complained of had been brought 
 upon the Southern people by their own 
 action. The truce agreed upon extended 
 from the 12th of September to the 22ci 
 and was subsequently prolonged. The 
 National Government furnished trans- 
 portation as far as Rough and Rea<^y, 
 for such of the inhabitants as wished 
 to move southward, and for those desir- 
 ing to move liorthward, as far as Chat 
 tanooga^ They were permitted to take 
 ^\ath thom their movable property, for 
 which also transportation was furnished. 
 Negroes who chose to do so were allowed 
 to go with their masters. Of those who 
 remained, the men were put in govern- 
 ment employ, and the women and 
 childi-en were sent outside the lines. 
 During the truce there were removed 
 to Rough and Ready 446 families, com 
 prising 705 adults, 860 children, and 
 470 servants. The amoimt of house- 
 hold goods removed was an average oi 
 1,661 pounds to each family 
 
PETERSBURG. 
 
 786 
 
 CHAPTER XXXVI. 
 
 Tfc» Army of the Potomac. — Description of Petersburg. — Movement on Petersburg under GUImora and 
 Kautz. — The Eighteenth Corps at Bermuda Hundred.— The Outer Defenses of Petersburg taken. — 
 Movement of Terry against the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad. — Army of the Potomac before 
 Petersburg. — Four Days of Unsuccessful Assaulting. — The Confederate Troops reoccnpy their Lines in 
 Front of Butler's Position. — Attack on Sheridan's Wagon Train at White House. — Movement against the 
 Weldon Railroad. — Skirmish at Davis' Farm.— Fire directed against the Appomattox Bridges. — Deep 
 Bottom occupied by Foster. — The Movement against the Weldon Railroad resumed. — The National Line 
 broken through.— Disastrous Consequences. — Heavy Losses in Prisoners. — Advance of Wright towards the 
 Weldon Railroad. — The Vermont Brigade driven back.— Attack on the Tenth Corps.— Sheridan's Cavalry 
 attacked while on the March from White House. — Friendly intercourse between Pickets. — Petersburg 
 Bombarded. — March of the Sixth Corps to the Relief of Wilson's Cavalry. — Raid of Wilson and Kantz 
 against the Weldon and Danville Railroads. — The Weldon Railroad cut — Railroad Destruction at Burkee- 
 ville and on the Danville Road. — Battle at Staunton Bridge. — Fight at Stony Creek and Reams' Station.— 
 Disastrous Rout of Wilson's Column. — Escape of Kautz's Command. — Long Route taken by Wilson. — 
 The Weldon Railroad cut by the Sixth Corps. — A Demonstration frustrated. — Confederate Assault on a 
 National Earthwork. — The Fourth of July in the Lines before Petersburg. — A sudden Attack repulsed. 
 — A Dead Lock. — Effect of incessant hard Fighting. — Grant retains Butler in his Command. — Change in 
 Corps Commanders. — Occupation of Strawberry Plains. — The Mine at Petersburg. — The Feint at Deep 
 Bottom. — Demonstrations towards Richmond. — Lee hurries large numbers of Troops to the North Side of 
 the James. — Explosion of the Mine. — Advance of the Storming Column. — Delay. — The Repulse. — Root 
 of Ferrero's Colored Division. — The Fort recaptured by the Confederates. — Delay in burying the Dead.-- 
 Causes of FaUure. — Explosion of a Confederate Mine. — Deserters. — Terrific Explosion at City Point.- 
 Perseverance of Grant.— Gradual Exhaustion of the Southern Fighting Element. — The Dutch Gap CanaL 
 — Movements North of the James. — Fight at Strawberry Plains. — Demonstrations at Deep Bottoit.— 
 Battle of Deep Run. — Ludlow's Movement from Dutch Gap. — Operations against the Weldon Railroad.— 
 Battle at Davis' Farm. —Battles for the Weldon Railroad. — Destruction of the Track.— Battle of Reams' 
 Station. — Pickett attacks Butler's Position.— Heavy Bombardment of Petersburg. — Gregg's Recconnois- 
 sanc* towards Stony Creek.— A tacit Truce broken.— Redoubt captured by De Trobriand.— Extension ol 
 the City Point Railroad.- General Hampton's great Cattle Raid,— Movement from Deep Bottom towards 
 Richmond.— Battle of Chapin's Farm. — Capture of Battery Harrison. — Capture of New Market Heights. 
 — Repulse at Fort GUmer. — Beconnoissance by Kautz and Terry towards Richmond. — Attack on Battery 
 Harrison repulsed.— Movement towards the South Side Railroad.— Capture of Fort McRae.— Repulse of 
 Potter's Division.— Kautz's Cavalry surprised and routed. — Repulse of the Enemy by Terry.— Beconnois- 
 aances.— Simultaneous Movements North of the James towards Hatcher's Run— Battle of Hatcher's Run. 
 Gregg's Raid to Stony Creek Station.— Warren's Operations on the Weldon RaUroad towards Hicksford. 
 
 Without the loss of a wagon or a 
 single piece of artillery, the army 
 'of the Potomac had been trans- 
 *ened from the north bank of the 
 Chickahominy to the south side of the 
 James. The Confederates were aware 
 that some such movement was intended ; 
 but they had not counted on its being 
 executed with so much celerity. As the 
 
 wearied soldiers marched along the dusty 
 roads, they met with little annoyance 
 save from the heated atmosphere and 
 the burning sun. The column which 
 moved from Long Bridge to Wilcox 'a 
 Wharf, it is true, had a sharp engage- 
 ment with the enemy near White Oak 
 Bridge, on the borders of the swamps ; 
 but Wilson's cavalry and Crawford's 
 
/36 
 
 PETERSBURG. 
 
 advanced division of the Fifth corps, 
 with a loss of not more than 200 men, 
 ibove them back. Making allowance 
 for stragglei-s, and for a skirmishiag 
 line cut off at Cold Harbor, the entire 
 loss attendinfc the movement did not 
 exceed 400 men. It had been Grant's 
 fij-st intention to fall upon Lee's ai-my 
 again and again from the B,apidan to 
 the Chickahominy, and by a succession 
 of heavy blows to break it up, or so 
 wt dken it, that when it should at last fall 
 back upon Richmond, that city would 
 prove an easy conquest for his victor- 
 ious legions. His scheme failed. The 
 numerical strength of the enemy proved 
 greater than had been supposed ; and 
 General Lee A\as careful '"'^ his retro- 
 grade movements never to tight except 
 in impregnable positions. 
 
 Petersburg was now the immediate 
 object of Grant's attention. In any 
 attempt to approach Richmond from 
 the south, the occupation of Petersburg 
 must be an important prelimiaary step. 
 The holding of that city would Sever 
 the enemy's communications southward, 
 and afford many material advantages 
 in the investment of Richmond. Grant 
 had wished to gain possession of it in 
 the outset; and in his grand plan of 
 campaign he had arranged that it 
 should be taken and held by the army of 
 the James, which, however, had proved 
 inadequate to the task. Situated on 
 the right or south bank of the Appo- 
 oiattox, at a distance of 22 miles south 
 if Richmond, and 10 miles southwest 
 if the James at City Point, and having 
 ft population at the beginning of the 
 war of over 18,000. Petersburg ranked 
 
 as the third town in Virgiriia. It was 
 the focus of convergence of five rail- 
 roads: the Richmond road ninning north 
 the Weldon road running south to the 
 Carolinas ; the South Side road i-unniag 
 west to Lynchbiirg ; the Norfolk road 
 running southeast and the short road 
 ninning northeast to City Point The 
 town was defended by a series of skil 
 fully constimcted earth- works, consisting 
 not only of square redoubts, but 
 also of well-established rifle-trenches, 
 extending around it in a semicircle, 
 both ends resting on the river, the north- 
 em extremity being strengthened by 
 batteries on the opposite side of tl e 
 stream. 
 
 General Butler, it will be remembered, 
 had already made a demonstration against 
 Petersburg. Having been frequently 
 infoiTued by deserters that the ganison 
 was much weakened by the withdrawal 
 of troops to reinforce Lee, he, early in 
 the month of June, made preparations 
 for sending a force in that direction. 
 A pontoon bndge ^vas constructed, to be 
 throAvn across the Appomattox, and 
 gun-boats were sent up the nver to 
 reconnoitre. The expedition was placed 
 under the charge of General Gillmore, 
 who led the infantry column, about 
 3500 men, consisting of Hawley's brig 
 ade of the Tenth corps, and a brigade 
 of colored troops under General Hinks. 
 The cavaliy 1400 strong, was com 
 manded by Kautz. It was arranged 
 that Gillmore, having crossed to the 
 east bank of the Appomattox by the 
 pontoon bridge, should proceed by the 
 turnpike road towards the town, and 
 attack it from that direction, while 
 
THE OUTEH DEFENSES. 
 
 731 
 
 Kautz, also crossing the river, should 
 fetch a wide circuit and make his attack 
 on the south or southwest side of the 
 town ; the movements of the two bodies 
 of troops to be so timed that they should 
 -nter the place simultaneously at differ- 
 ent points. It was hoped that the town 
 might thus be captured, and that if not 
 held, at least all its suppKes and stores 
 of ammunition might be destroyed, 
 Butler was to make a demonstration 
 in the mean time against Fort Clifton. 
 
 On the 8th of June, shortly after 
 dusk, the pontoon bridge was laid down 
 near Point of Rocks, and about mid- 
 night Kautz's cavalry crossed by it, 
 quickly followed by Hawley's brigade, 
 which was soon afterwards joined by 
 the colored brigade of Hinks. Before 
 ei^ht o'clock in the morning;. Follett's 
 battery was brought up in front of the 
 woods near Point of Rocks, and began 
 to shell the Confederate lines near Fort 
 Clifton. The gun-boats Commodore 
 Perry and General Putnam also opened 
 fire on the same position. A brisk fire 
 was kept up thus till noon. A battery 
 which the enemy brought down, and 
 which threw 30-pounder shells at Gen- 
 oral Weitzel's signal station, was soon 
 silenced. In the mean time Gillmore 
 Jnno *^<i Kautz had pressed on, mak- 
 9. ine a detour so as to avoid the 
 lin? of Fort Clifton, and were rapidly ap- 
 proaching Petersburg. The infantry 
 met with no serioiis opposition till 
 vvithin about two miles of the town, 
 ?\'hen the Confederate skirmish lines 
 were encountered, but quickly driven 
 back. Arrived in front of the town, 
 ind sufficiently near to be able to 
 
 examine the fortifications critically. 
 Gillmore came to the conclusion that 
 they were too strong to be attempted 
 by the force imder his command, rie, 
 therefore, withdrew his troops about 
 noon, and got back to camp the same 
 evening. In the mean time Kautz on 
 his side had forced the intrenchment« 
 and actually engaged the enemy in the 
 streets. But the Confederates concen- 
 trated against him what force they 
 had; and he was compelled to retire, 
 although he earned off with him 40 
 prisoners. His loss was only about 20 
 killed and wounded. 
 
 At one o'clock on the morning of the 
 15th, the Eighteenth corps which j^q^ 
 had anived at Bermuda Hundred 16 . 
 on the previous evening, in transports, 
 by way of Fortress Monroe, set out for 
 Petersburg. Kautz's cavalry in the 
 advance crossed the Appomattox b 
 the pontoon bridge near Point of Rocks 
 Brooks' and Martindale's di\nsions fol 
 lowed together with Hinks' two brigades 
 of colored troops. The route taken was 
 the same as that pursued a week pre- 
 vious by Gillmore and Kautz. Soon 
 after daylight Kautz, advancing along 
 the City Point road, encoimtered skir- 
 mishers, and drove them out of a small 
 earth-work. The troops of Hinks and 
 Brooks followed rapidly, and soon after- 
 wards, near Harrison's Creek, a line of 
 rifle-trenches with two 12-pounder8 was 
 discovered, from which solid shot flew 
 over the head of the column. Hinka 
 deployed skirmishers, scattered the ene- 
 my through some neighboring woods 
 and finally secured a position near 
 Baylor's Faim. fn.m which the Fifth 
 
738 
 
 PETEKSBuRG. 
 
 and Twentj Kfth colored regiments car- 
 ried the enemy's works, capturing one 
 of the gims and turning it on the 
 retreating Confederates. The division 
 of Brooks now moved up, with Bum- 
 ham's brigade in the advance and 
 ntered a strip of woods which con- 
 cealed the main outer line of the defenses 
 of Petersburg, about two miles from 
 the town. Hinks then moved his divi- 
 sion towards the left, on the Jourdan 
 Point road, while Mai-tindale, with 
 Stannard in the advance, moved on by 
 the river road. A line was thus formed 
 in front of the Petersburg intrench - 
 ments, in which Martindale held the 
 right, Brooks the centre, and Hinks the 
 left. Active skirmishing went on while 
 these positions were being taken, and 
 the fire of the sharpshooters told severely 
 on the troops. Just before sunset, the 
 order was given to carry the enemy's 
 kvorks by assault ; and the whole line 
 lushed forward, swept the entire range 
 uf rifle-pits in spite of a heavy artillery 
 fire, and drove the enemy from the 
 intrenchments. Sixteen guns, a battle- 
 flag, and 300 prisoners were taken. 
 Had an adequate supporting force been 
 at hand, the second line of works might 
 have been taken with comparative ease. 
 The National loss was about 500 men. 
 The Second coi-ps began to arrive in 
 the evening, and before morning the 
 whole of it had reached the scene of 
 action During the night Bimey's 
 division held the captured earth-works, 
 against which the enemy knowing theii' 
 value, made demonstrations, but in vain. 
 \Vhile the infantry were thus operating 
 I i awards Petersburg from the northeast. 
 
 Kautz, on the extreme left, -mth Spear's 
 brigade in the advance, moved against 
 the enemy's works near the Norfolk 
 Railroad and on the Baxter road. After 
 a brisk cannonade on the position, 
 which was well fortified with artillery 
 a charge was made by Kautz's mep 
 armed with carbines ; but the work 
 proved too strong to be carried, and 
 Kautz was compelled to retire So far 
 Petersburg had been defended by its 
 local garrison, but the Confederate 
 troops in the neighborhood were rapidly 
 concentrating to its aid. 
 
 On the morning of the 16th, treneral 
 Butler having learned that a |)or- j,|^jp 
 tion of the Confederate forces in 16. 
 front of his intrenchments at Benuuda 
 Hundred had been hurried oft' to Petei"s- 
 burg, sent out General Terry with a 
 part of the Tenth corps to reconnoitre. 
 The Confederates gave way before 
 them ; and the reserves coming up, their 
 line was broker, through, and finally 
 the raiLroad was reached near VValthal 
 Junction. While a working party tore 
 lip the track and puiied down the tele- 
 graph for about two miles, the main 
 body of General Terry's force moved 
 along the road by which it was sup- 
 posed Lee's advance was approaching. 
 But the Confederates at length came 
 dowTi upon them in force and compelled 
 a retreat. The result of the movement 
 was, that travel by the railroad was 
 interrupted for about a day. 
 
 In the mean time the National tiuo{)8 
 wei-e gathering ai'ound Peters bui'g. 
 Eai'ly on the morning of the- 16th, Bii'- 
 ney sent Colonel Egan's brigade against 
 a redoubt on his left, which was carried 
 
CONFEDERATE POSITION CARRIED. 
 
 739 
 
 «nd held, with the loss of about 100 
 men. An attempt wag made to push 
 forward the picket lines, when skii"- 
 mishing and artilleiy filing ensued. But 
 reinforcements for the Confederates 
 were now rapidly arriving from various 
 quarters, and in such numbers that it 
 was thought advisable not to push the 
 troops forward till the arrival of Bum- 
 side's corps. Kautz, however, had 
 moved out with his cavalry to the left 
 across the Norfolk Railroad, to occupy 
 ^ound for the Ninth and Fifth corps. 
 In the afternoon Bum&ide, having 
 irossed the James by the pontoon bridge, 
 came up with the Ninth corps, after 
 a severe forced march from Charles 
 City Court House. Line of battle was 
 then fomied, with the Second corj^ts in 
 the centre, the Eighteenth corps on the 
 right, and the Ninth corps on the left. 
 Bimey's division held the right of the 
 Second coi-ps, General Barlow's the left. 
 To tht, left of Barlow was General Pot- 
 ter's division of the Ninth corps. The 
 ground between the opposing lines, 
 though broken and rugged, was rather 
 open, with here and there fields of grain. 
 At six o'clock the attack was commenced 
 and kept up for three hours. Bimey's 
 division earned the crest in its front, 
 and held it. Barlow's advanced brig- 
 ade found more difliiculty, the enemy 
 being somewhat concentrated in its 
 front. At length Miles' brigade of 
 Barlow's division and Giifiin's of Pot- 
 ter's division, charging in face of a de- 
 sti-uctive artillery fire, succeeded in 
 gaining a foothold in the rifle-pits out- 
 side of the stronger works. The troops 
 b*»ing here annoyed by the enemy's fire, 
 
 Barlow determined to make an assault 
 on his main works; and Bumside 
 prepared a column to make the attempt 
 in connection with him. But the enemy 
 having opened a severe fire upon Bum 
 side's troops, cutting off a skinnish line 
 of 300 men in Barlow's front; the 
 assault was deferred till morning, 
 Bimey's loss during the three hours' 
 fighting was about 500 men. Potter's 
 division in its charge on t^e rifle-pits 
 lost about the same number. The right 
 had not taken an important part in the 
 contest and had suffered but little. 
 The total National loss since the begin- 
 ning of the action was between 1500 
 and 2000, while that of the Confederates 
 owing to their advantage of position, 
 was comparatively small. 
 
 On the morning of the 17th, at four 
 o'clock, BiuTiside ordered Potter's jnu«i 
 division to take the works in its 17. 
 front ; and Griffin's brigade, supported 
 by Curtin's, canied it with a i-uah, cap- 
 turing 6 guns, 16 oflicers, 400 men, and 
 a stand of colors. A pause then oc- 
 curred in the assault; but sharp skir 
 mishing was canied on by the picket 
 lines, and the artillery on both sides 
 kept up a steady fire. In the afternoon 
 Potter's division w2j3 relieved by the 
 divisions of Wilcox and Ledlie. An 
 advance by Ledlie's division was then 
 ordered ; and the charge was gallantlj 
 made, covered by a brisk artillery fire 
 The intrenchments were reached ; aftei 
 a short but bloody contest over th 
 breas1>work8, the Confederates wen- 
 driven out of them and the position 
 was carried; and although several at- 
 tempts were made by the enemy to 
 
740 
 
 PETERSBURG. 
 
 recover the lost ground, it was firmly 
 held. Bumside, now so near was 
 actually able to throw shot into the 
 town. The other portions of the line 
 had, auriug the day, been engaged in 
 skirmishing, but without attempting 
 
 ny decisive assault. The enemy's 
 position, opposite the Second corps — 
 temjiorarily commanded by Bimey, in 
 the absence of Hancock, who was suf- 
 fering fnom an old wound — was deemed 
 too strong to be attacked with any hope 
 of success. Barlow's division, on the 
 left of the Second corps, had taken part 
 in Bumside's charge in the morning, 
 and rendered efficient service. On the 
 right, the greater part of the Eighteenth 
 corps, under General Smith, was relieved 
 from the position it had carried ; and 
 recrossing the pontoon bridge over the 
 Appomattox at night, it regained the 
 intrenchments at Bermuda Hundred in 
 the morning. The divisions of Hinks 
 and Martindale, on the extreme right, 
 remained, as they could not be with- 
 drawn to advantage. The Fifth corps, 
 under Warren, came up on the left, and 
 was massed there in the rear of Bum- 
 side. About nine o'clock at night the 
 enemy appeared in force on Bimey's 
 front, but was driven back. Somewhat 
 later, under cover of a vigorous shelling 
 fi-om the Confederate batteries, the 
 enemy suddenly reappeared in two 
 columns, one in front, the other in flank, 
 and made a desperate and finally suc- 
 cessful effort to recover the works taken 
 by Bumside during the afternoon. 
 Leaping the defenses in the dark, the 
 Confederates succeeded in driving out 
 the National troops. 
 
 On the same day, early in the mom 
 ing, a body of the enemy, consisting of 
 parts of the divisions of Pickett and 
 Fields, attacked the National lines neaj 
 the James. Foster's division of the 
 Tenth corps, which held a line extend 
 ing from near Ware Bottom Church 
 towards the Appomattox, was pushed 
 back some little distance. 
 
 It was now the morning of the 18th. 
 The National line in front of j^^g 
 Petersburg was disposed as fol- 18. 
 lows, from right to left : two divisions 
 of the Eighteenth corps, under Martin- 
 dale and Hinks ; the Sixth under Wright ' 
 the Second under Bimey; the Ninth 
 under Bumside, and the Fifth undei 
 Warren. It had been intended to make 
 another assault at four o'clock in the 
 morning ; but skirmishers having been 
 sent out, it was foimd that the enemy 
 had abandoned the works immediately 
 in front for an inner series of defenses 
 New combinations, therefore, became 
 necessary. Skirmishing and artilleiy 
 firing went on while the enemy's new 
 defensive line was being reconnoitred. 
 A general advance of the three corps on 
 the left was ordered at noon. Giblxn's 
 division of the Second corps was 
 pushed forward, while the rest of the 
 coi-ps threw out double lines of skir- 
 mishers to divert the enemy's attentiop.. 
 Gibbon's troops moved promptly up 
 towards the works, which were neai- t!ie 
 railroad to City Point ; but when they 
 got out from under cover they were 
 suddenly struck by a murderous enfilad- 
 ing fii-e on the left. For a time the 
 men pressed vigorously forward ; but 
 their ranks were so sw^ept by incessant 
 
•ITJE WELDON RAILROAD. 
 
 74] 
 
 ■ volleys, that at last even the veterans 
 recoiled. The breast-vrorks were not 
 even reached when the men began to 
 retire, leaving their dead and wounded 
 on the field. At four o'clock in the 
 afternoon another storming party was 
 organized. It consisted of Mott's divi- 
 fdon, with detachments from the two 
 other divisions, all of the Second corps. 
 Shortly before five in the afternoon, 
 Mott moved out his force in two col- 
 umns, and the two leading brigades 
 burst upon the enemy in gallant style ; 
 but in spite of an exhibition of the most 
 resolute bravery, they were forced back 
 with terrible loss, by a concentrated 
 artillery and musketry fixe. The Sixth 
 and Ninth corps were little more suc- 
 cessful than the Second ; Martindale's 
 division of the Eighteenth corps, al- 
 though at first attended with some suc- 
 cess, shared the same experience as the 
 others. The fighting was continued 
 into the night, but gradually died away 
 in picket firing. The losses during the 
 day had been very heavy, especiaDy on 
 the part of the Second corps. During 
 the whole operations from the 16 th to 
 the 18th of Jime, the estimated loss in 
 killed, wounded and missing was not 
 under 9000 men. The four days' 
 assaults had had no other result than 
 the decimation of the storming columns. 
 During the 19th, arrangements were 
 made under a flag of truce for burying 
 the dead, and carrying off the wounded 
 between the Lines. The Sixth corps, 
 which had been on the north side of 
 the Appomattox, near Port Walthal, 
 svas relieved by the Eighteenth corps, 
 md Jdoved into line on the right. 
 
 General Ferrero's division of the Ninth 
 corps, also anived, and was posted in 
 the fi'ont. Three Gou federate rams 
 descended the James, nearly as far as 
 Dutch Gap, but were soon driven back 
 by the fleet. The Confederates contin 
 ued to intrench on the west side of th 
 Appomattox as industrioiisly as the 
 National troops did on the east side ; 
 and having no apprehensions of imme- 
 diately losing Petersbiu'g, they made 
 some movements in other directions. 
 Beauregard in his hurry to reinforce 
 Petersburg had hastily deserted his old 
 lines in front ^;f Bermuda Hundred 
 and the Tenth corps, as has been stated 
 made use of the opportunity to cut the 
 Petersbui'g and Richmond Railroad ; 
 but when they were driven back, the 
 Confederates reoccupied their works, 
 and from these lines made a alight 
 demonstration in front and some ididing 
 movements in the neighborhood of th 
 James. On the night of the 19th, they 
 succeeded in destroying the wharves at 
 Wilcox's and Westover Landings, and 
 sent small bodies of troops along the 
 river to do whatever other mischief they 
 couli They also threw up earth- works 
 near Turkey Bend ; but they were easily 
 shelled out of them by the gun-boats. 
 
 On the 21st, active movements were 
 again commenced by the main jm|g 
 army, and once more by the left 21. 
 flank, with the object of severing the 
 communications to the south of Peters- 
 burg by the Weldon RailroatL On the 
 previous night the Second corps had 
 been moved from its position in the 
 right centre of the line to the left, the 
 gap thus formW being closed up by the 
 
 «•• 
 
)43 
 
 PETERSBURG. 
 
 extension of the Ninth corps and part 
 of the Eighteenth. It then struck across 
 the Norfolk Railroad, and marched 
 rapidly southward, though under an 
 intensely hot eun and through clouds 
 of stifling and blinding dust, with the 
 ateadiness which had so often charac- 
 terized it during flank marches in pres- 
 ence of the enemy. Griffin's division of 
 the Fifth corps was detached to follow ; 
 the Sixth corps was also moved out in 
 support. Before noon the main cdlumn 
 halted ; but in the afternoon Barlow's 
 division of the Second corps, with sharp- 
 shooters skirmishing in advance, was sent 
 forward, and struck the enemy's lines 
 in the neighborhood of the Jerusalem 
 road which runs southward from Peters- 
 burg, about midway between the Nor- 
 folk and Weldon railroads. The di^nsion 
 was then halted and put into position, 
 ind skirmishers were advanced. These 
 met a stout resistance from dismounted 
 cavalry pickets; and almost immedi- 
 ately, infantry were discovered in force 
 with artillery planted in earth-works. 
 It was evident that the enemy under- 
 stood the value of the Weldon Railroad, 
 and was prepared as well as determined 
 to defend it. After a severe skirmish 
 Baiiow's advanced line withdrew and 
 rejoined the main column. Gibbon had 
 in the mean time reconnoitred towards 
 Petersburg, but without result. On the 
 extreme left the enemy's movements 
 were so threatening that a squadron 
 of cavaliy was sent round to protect 
 that flank. The Second corps was then 
 retired to form in position for the night, 
 with Bai'low's division on the left, Mott's 
 in the centre, and Gibbon's on the right 
 
 Beyond Gibbon's division was Griffin's 
 of the Fifth corps. The Sixth corps 
 was intended to be posted between the 
 Second corps and the Weldon Railroad. 
 Ricketts' division came up and took a 
 position on Barlow's left, and the othei 
 division followed. There was a littl 
 cavalry skirmishing on the extreme left, 
 and the Confederate scouts made a 
 slight dash in the evening towards the 
 National position ; but the day closed 
 without any more important movement. 
 The fight in the afternoon took place 
 on what was known as Davis' Farm, 
 about 3 miles from the city and within 
 a mile of the railroad. 
 
 The day was comparatively quiet is 
 the lines east of Petersburg. The Con- 
 federates early in the morning opened 
 fire towards the headcjuarters of the 
 Sixth corps, which had not at that time 
 moved out ; and there was more or less 
 firing during the day, especially towards 
 the right. The bridges over the Appo- 
 mattox connecting Petei-sburg and 
 Pocahontas now underwent a daily 
 shelling from the National batteries. 
 The fire directed on the railroad bridge 
 caused great annoyance to the enemy, 
 as it tended materially to obstruct the 
 passage of cars. 
 
 Some important movements took place 
 during the day, to the north of Peters 
 burg. Early in the morning Foster's 
 division of the Tenth corps, crossed to 
 the north side of the James River by a 
 pontoon bridge laid by General Weitzel 
 on the previous evening, to a point 
 between Aiken's Landing and Fom 
 Mile Creek- Foster advanced towaitis 
 the Kingsland road, drove in the enemy's 
 
FOSTEK AT DEEl' BOTTOM. 
 
 M3 
 
 piekets and intrenched at Deep Bottom, 
 about 1 miles from Richmond. On the 
 opposite side of the river was the bat- 
 tery of the enemy known as Howlett's. 
 Near this point a fight between the moni- 
 tors and Confederate rams took place ; 
 but though the latter were aided by 
 the battery, they were driven back to 
 their usual position on the weit side 
 of Dutch Gap. The heavy Dahlgren 
 guns soon silenced the battery; and in 
 the evening they were opened on the 
 enemy manoeuvring in front of Foster. 
 Foster was thus enabled to hold his 
 own for some time without molestation. 
 Meanwhile the Eighteenth corps again 
 left its camp near Bermuda Hundred, 
 once more crossed the pontoon bridge, 
 marched to the lines in front of Peters- 
 Ixurg, and took the position vacated 
 by the Sixth corps. The result of the 
 various aiTay movements on the 21st 
 was, that at night the different com- 
 mands lay as follows : Foster's division 
 was north of the James at Deep Bottom ; 
 the remainder of the Tenth corps being 
 with Butler at Bermuda Hundred. In 
 the intrenchments east of Petersburg, 
 the right was held by Smith, the centre 
 by Bumside, the left by Warren. Three 
 or four miles to the south, threatening 
 the Weldon Railroad, were the corps of 
 Hancock and Wright, with Grifl^'s 
 division of Warren. 
 
 The movement against the Weldon 
 Railroad was resumed early on the 2 2d. 
 Now that the capture of Petersburg had 
 lune come to be considered out of the 
 22, question for the present, the sev- 
 erance of the Weldon Railroad became 
 a primary object. The Sixth corps, the 
 
 whole of which had come up duiin^ the 
 night, prepared to move, in conjunction 
 with the Second corps, directly against 
 the railroad. The position of the 
 Second corps was near the Jerusalem 
 road, Gibbon's right resting on the left 
 of the road, with GriflSn's division o 
 the Fifth on the further side. Gibbon's 
 troops were already well up to the 
 enemy's works and needed only to go 
 into position and intrench, as any furthei 
 advance on their part might bring on a 
 general engagement before the line was 
 properly established. The left of the 
 line, therefore, consisting of the Sixth 
 corps with the diAnsions of Barlow and 
 Mott of the Second was ordered to ad- 
 vance, the movement to commence at 
 daybreak. By some misunderstanding 
 the march was delayed. At last the 
 two corps began to move, at the same 
 time, though independently of each 
 other, each commander having been 
 cautioned to protect his flank well in 
 case connection were not made with the 
 other corps. The line had been deploy- 
 ed in rather an open style, and covered 
 a wide extent of ground, which being 
 difficult and intricate, and the movemeni 
 made in presence of the enemy, il 
 was thought desirahlu to mass more 
 closely. Accordingly Barlow, who held 
 Hancock's left, pressed well in to 
 the right and threw two brigades into 
 reserve, the remainder of his troopg 
 forming the advance line. But on 
 entering the woods a gap began to foiTO 
 between his left and the right of the 
 Sixth corps, and he placed some regi 
 ments to guard his flank. Meanwhile, 
 Mott had, without difficulty, obtained 
 
744 
 
 PETERSBURG. 
 
 the position indicated for him and had. 
 b^un to intrench ; Gibbon was already 
 in position ; and Barlow having moved 
 forward sufficiently was also about to 
 intrench, when the startling sound of 
 musketry was heard on his flank, and 
 soon afterwards in his rear. With a 
 new of checking the movement against 
 the railroad, the Confederate force under 
 Hill was approaching in several col- 
 umns, preceded by a dense cloud of 
 skirmishers. The Sixth corps was far 
 distant on the left and rear. A wide 
 gap was thus left in the National line ; 
 but it was happily filled up in time to 
 prevent fatal results. Quick to take 
 advantage of the mistake committed. 
 Hill pushed on an entire division, with 
 Mahone's brigade in the advance, into 
 the intervening space. The attack was 
 made with tremendous energy. Barlow 
 was the first to feel the weight of the 
 onset. His division bending under the 
 blow was quickly rolled up, thus ex- 
 posing Mott's left flank. Mott in turn 
 was struck heavily and fell back, leaving 
 exposed the left of Gibbon. Gibbon 
 shared the fate of Mott and Barlow. 
 The intrenchments of each of the three 
 divisions were captured. Such was the 
 suddenness and impetuosity of the 
 attack, and so great was the confusion 
 resulting from it, that several whole 
 regiments were swept off and captured 
 dmost without a fight. McKnight's 
 battery, which had been ably handled, 
 was surrounded and captured entire. 
 The career of the enemy, however, was 
 now checked by the firmness of the 
 Twentieth Massachusetts under Captain 
 Patten, who executed a change of front 
 
 vrith remarkable coolness, courage and 
 skill. The broken corps was at length 
 rallied. Miles' reserve brigade of Bar- 
 low's division was brought up ; Clark's 
 New Jersey battery on the right of the 
 Jerusalem road wathstood successfully 
 the concentrated fire of the enemy; 
 Gibbon's division, or rather what was left 
 of it, was also rallied, and the beginning 
 of a new line was auon formed. 
 
 It was now towards evening. After 
 an unsuccessful effort made by Gibbon 
 to capture the lost batteiy, Meade 
 came to the front. Observing that 
 the enemy's troops were not in 
 sufficient number to cope with his 
 own if well handled, Meade again 
 sent forwaixi the Second and Sixth 
 corps. The- Sixth met vdth little oppo- 
 sition, and attained the position aimed 
 at earlier in the day. The Second corps 
 went through the woods in strong 
 skirmishing lines, and succeeded, though 
 not without some effort, in regaining a 
 part of the gi-ound from which it had 
 been driven. It then went into intrench- 
 ments, and passed the night in throwing 
 up works and placing batteries for the 
 protection of the line. The division of 
 Giiffin also came up and covered the 
 right. The loss sustained in this un- 
 fortunate and unskilfiilly managed 
 affair was principally in prisoners, some 
 2000 having been taken by the enemy, 
 including 50 or 60 officers ; the numbei 
 of kUled and wounded was only about 
 500. Four guns also were lost and 
 several colors. Picket firing was kepi 
 up all night, as the last advance had 
 placed the opposing lines in close prox- 
 imity. A reconnoissance and advance 
 
SKIRMISHING A^ND CANNONADING. 
 
 745 
 
 made at daylight, disclosed the fact that 
 the Confederates were strongly in- 
 trenched along the east side of the 
 Weldon Railroad. To the east of Pe- 
 tersburg a sharp artillery and musketry 
 fire was kept up all night; but on 
 
 either side was an advance attempted. 
 
 On the 23d, Wright moving out to 
 
 the extreme left, found that the enemy's 
 
 lines did not extend far in that direction. 
 
 June -^^ ^^^^ * reconnoitring force to 
 
 23. the railroad, which was reached 
 svithout opposition, and the telegraph 
 wires were cut. The Vermont brigade, 
 consisting of three regiments, was at 
 once pushed forward with instructions 
 to hold the road ; but the troops had 
 hardly reached their destination when a 
 division of the enemy under Anderson 
 came down upon their flank and drove 
 them back, capturing several hundred 
 
 risoners, and then, flushed vrith success, 
 
 fter pushing back the Vermont brigade 
 to the main body, commenced a general 
 attack. The result was that Wright 
 withdrew his line towards evening to 
 the cover of breast-worb Little else 
 of importance occurred during the day. 
 On the 24th the enemy opened a 
 furious artillery fire in front of the 
 Eighteenth corps. At its close, a charge 
 June ^^ made by Hoke's brigade 
 
 34. on Stannard's division of the 
 Tenth corps. The attack fell chiefly on 
 the brigade of Colonel Henry^ who, ob- 
 serviug that the attacking force was not 
 large, drew in his skirmishers; and 
 >vhen the enemy commenced to run 
 over his rifle-pits, he caused the For- 
 tieth Massachusetts, armed \vith the 
 Spencer repeating-rifle, to open fire 
 
 upon them. This, with artillery in flank, 
 easily separated the enemy's skirmishing 
 line from his reserve; and about 150 
 prisoners fell into Hemy's hands. On 
 the evening of the same day, Sheridan's 
 cavalry was attacked while on the marcl 
 from White House to rejoin the main 
 army. A brigade of infantry was sent 
 to his relief; but the affair was very 
 bloody, and the rear-guard sufiV^red 
 severely. The enemy was beaten off 
 at length ; and the wagon train, several 
 miles in length, was saved, but not 
 before a loss of 500 or 600 had been sus 
 tained. Sheridan's force crossed the 
 James in safety on the 25th, four or five 
 miles above Fort Powhatan, at a point 
 where the pontoon bridges could be 
 guarded by gun-boats. 
 
 During the 25th the enemy was busily 
 engaged in repairing the Weldon Rail 
 road, and the National forces in strength 
 ening their positions. All along the 
 line, owing to the proximity of the 
 opposing pickets, there was skirmishing 
 with occasional artillery firing, but no 
 serious fighting. About ten o'clock at 
 night a sharp attack was made on the 
 right of the Fifth corps and on the left 
 of the Ninth. It was commenced by 8 
 heavy artillery fire, which lasted about 
 an hour, followed by the advance of a 
 strong skirmish line up to the National 
 breast- works ; but the enemy was easily 
 repulsed, and the loss was not great or 
 either side. 
 
 From the 26th to the 29th, corapara 
 tive quiet prevailed in the camps, broken 
 occasionally by picket firing, skirmishing 
 near the working parties, and desultory 
 cannonading. From the front of Smith's 
 
IM 
 
 PETERSBURG. 
 
 •jorps a 30-pounder Parrott shell was 
 ^itrown into the city every five minutes, 
 ind with such regularity that it came 
 o be called the " Petersburg express." 
 rhe earth-works along the National 
 lines underwent constant improvement 
 antil they became almost impregnable. 
 A.bout eleven o'clock on the morning of 
 the 27th, the Confederates, much 
 annoyed by the regular fire of the 30- 
 pounder Parrott on the city, opened 
 from their heavy guns on the west side 
 of the Appomattox. The batteries in 
 Smith's front, where many guns were 
 now in position, opened in reply, and 
 shelled the city, as well as the enemy's 
 batteries beyond the river, till noon. 
 The opposing pickets along some parts 
 of the line entered into an agreement 
 not to fire upon each other, and the 
 result was an unusual degree of quiet 
 for a little while ; but Bimey found it 
 necessary to prohibit the more intimate 
 intercourse which this state of things 
 had a tendency to bring about. By 
 the Second corps on the left, some move- 
 fiients were made with the view of 
 guarding against hostile demonstrations 
 on the flank. Hancock, now convales- 
 cent, resumed command of this corps in 
 the evening. At one o'clock in the 
 'noming of the 28th there was a false 
 alarm ; and the Eighteenth corps got 
 onder aims. About this time some very 
 heavy siege guns were got into position, 
 ind a bombardment of the ci+y was com- 
 menced by bursting a shell over it every 
 quarter of an hour during the night. 
 This fire was continued for some time ; 
 and on the night of the 30th it caused a 
 (•onflagration in th e town The weather. 
 
 which for many days and nights had beet 
 intensely hot, causing great suffering to 
 the men, whether on the march or in 
 camp, now grew a little cooler. The 
 excessive heat had been severely trying 
 to the wounded. The agents of the 
 Sabitary and Christian Commissions 
 availed themselves of the opportunity 
 afforded by these days of comparative 
 quiet to distribute vegetables and luxu- 
 ries among the troops, and in other 
 ways to contribute to their comfort. 
 
 In the movement against the Weldon 
 Railroad, it had been arranged that 
 Wilson and Kautz should co-operate 
 with a strong cavalry force. About two 
 o'clock in the morning of the 2 2d of 
 June, Wilson and Kautz set out from 
 Blackwater Creek, a little south of Prince 
 George Court House. Wilson was in 
 command. The united force numbered 
 6000 to 8000 men, with 3 batteries of foui 
 guns each, half rifled ordinance, and half 
 light 12-pounder8, besides a battery of 
 four small mountain howitzers. The col- 
 umn struck the Weldon Railroad at 
 Reams' Station, tore up and burnt the 
 track for several hundred yards, and de- 
 stroyed the water tank, depot and public 
 buildings, as well as a saw-mill at Dutch 
 Cross Roads. Moving westward as far 
 as Dinwiddie Coiirt House, the command 
 proceeded northward to the Petersburg 
 and Lynchburg Railroad, striking it at 
 Sutherland Station, and marching thence 
 westward to Ford's Station, about 22 
 miles from Petersburg, the brigade of 
 Kautz being in the advance. At this 
 point, which was reached before even 
 ing, several miles of the track "^ere 
 destroyed as well as 2 locomotives and 
 
THE BRIDGE AT STAtTNTOif RIVER. 
 
 747 
 
 1 6 care ; the depot and some stores were 
 also burnt. All this was accomplished 
 before midnight, when the command 
 bivouacked. In the morning, about two 
 o'clock, Kautz again set out in advance, 
 and by rapid mai'ching soon left a wide 
 gap between his portion of the column 
 and that under Wilson. His course lay 
 along the railroad in the direction of 
 Burkesville, the point of intei-section of 
 the Lynchburg and Danville railroads. 
 He reached Wilson's Station about four 
 o'clock, Black and White about seven 
 o'clock, and Ncttaway at noon, whence 
 he hurried on to Burkesville. At this 
 place the depots, cars, and similar prop- 
 erty were destroyed, as well as sev- 
 eral miles of the track eastward and 
 westward. The railroad here was con- 
 structed of strap rails laid on longitu- 
 dinal stringere of dry yellow pine. 
 While the the rear was engaged in 
 burning and otherwise destroying the 
 depots and other buildings along the 
 road, advanced parties collected iry 
 rails, piled them up against the stringere 
 and set the whole on fire. This was 
 done with so much method and celerity 
 that miles of the railroad were burning 
 at once. 
 
 The main part of the column, some 
 miles in the rear, near Nottaway Court 
 House, encountered about three o'clock 
 in the afternoon a Confederate force on 
 its right flank, consisting of two regi- 
 ments under Colonel Barringer and 
 General Bearing. The Second brigade, 
 under Colonel Chapman, was formed in 
 Jen© ^i"® ; ^^^ * sharp fight ensued, 
 23 . which lasted till nightfall, when 
 the enemy withdrew, carrying off 84 
 
 prisonera. The loss on each side was 
 about 60. Wilson's troops bivouacked 
 at Nottaway ; Kautz bivouacked not 
 far from Burkesville. Both commands 
 marched towards Meheirin in the mora 
 ing — Wilson's across the countiy. 
 Kautz's along the railroad — fonned a 
 Junction there, and moved on to Keys- 
 ville, where the column bivouacked for 
 the night, Kautz's men having worked 
 hard all day on the railroad, of which 
 they destroyed 18 miles of the track 
 besides other railroad property. The 
 march and the work of destniction were 
 resumed early on the 25th ; and the 
 whole column pressed rapidly forward 
 till about three o'clock in the afternoon, 
 when the advance came up to the cov- 
 ered bridge over the Staunton Kiver. 
 From Burkesville to this bridge, a dis- 
 tance of about 35 miles, the railroad 
 track had been thoroughly destroyed. 
 Eastward of Burkesville the track had 
 also been torn up, making an aggre- 
 gate of 50 miles of railroad put out of 
 running order. It was very desir- 
 able that the bridge also should be 
 destroyed, as it would consume much 
 time to replace it. But the Confederates 
 were well aware of its value ; and while 
 Wilson and Kautz had been destroying 
 the track, they had collected in the 
 neighborhood of the bridge a consider- 
 able force of Virginia and North 
 Carolina militia, some of whom had 
 been brought up from Danville. They 
 had also made such good use of their 
 time as to throw up intrenchments in 
 front of the bridge, and construct earth- 
 works, in which they had placed some 
 artillery. They had besides, placed it 
 
748 
 
 PETERSBURG. 
 
 piece of ordnance on an armored car, 
 which could be moved on the railroad. 
 On the approach of the National troops 
 June the enemy opened fire %Yith gi-ape 
 '^'** and canister. Kautz's four regi- 
 nents at once deployed on the right and 
 eft of the main road. Sharp skirmish- 
 mg, with considerable loss on the side 
 of Kautz, was kept up for some time ; 
 but it soon became evident that under 
 the circumstances the National troops 
 could accomplish nothing without suf- 
 fering disastrously ; and they were 
 compelled to withdraw, after having 
 burnt the railroad depot. The chief 
 object of the raid had, however, been 
 now accomplished ; and at night the 
 column moved eastward reaching 
 ^Veylsburg, about daylight on the 
 26th. After an hom-'s halt the line of 
 mai'ch was again taken up, the route 
 'hosen for the return lying through 
 Christianville and across Meherrin 
 Creek, and thence to Double Bridges 
 on the Nottaway. The enemy's cavalry 
 brigade again appeared, this time on 
 the left ilank, and some unimportant 
 skirmishu'.g followed. The Nottaway 
 River was reached about noon on the 
 28th at Double Bridges ; and the pickets 
 stationed there were easily driven across 
 the bridge by Mcintosh's second bri- 
 gade, which was in the advance. It 
 had been intended to cross the Weldon 
 Ka'lroad at Jarrett's Station ; but infor- 
 mation having been received that a 
 large furce composed of militia and reg- 
 ulars from Weldon had been collected 
 there, the route was changed to Stony 
 Creek, about midway between Jarrett's 
 and Reams' stations. Mcintosh's br 
 
 gade with the Second Ohio and Third 
 Indiana, dashing across the bridge, met 
 at once a spirited resistance. Never 
 theless the men all got over, and Mc 
 Intosh foixned line of battle ; but 
 a considerable Confedeiate force was 
 found lying on the road to the station. 
 After some skii-mishing, the National 
 troops foimd it necessaiy to act on the 
 defensive ; and they got together as 
 rapidly as possible a breast-work of 
 rails, logs, and earth, in the usual 
 manner. It was not long before they 
 had to repel several charges. 
 
 Wilson, now fearing that if he 
 remained long in that vicinity the ene- 
 my might gather about him a force 
 from which he could not escape, deter- 
 mined to withdraw ; an*' about eleven 
 at night he sent off the command of 
 Kautz with the wagons and ammunition 
 trains, and between 1000 and 200( 
 negroes, collected on the march, towards 
 Reams' Station. Wilson himseK fol- 
 lowed before daylight with the remain- 
 der of his force, with the exception of 
 3 regiments left in the intrenchments 
 to do what they could towards detain- 
 ing the enemy. Kautz, on approaching 
 Reams' Station, found the Confederal-es 
 posted in great strength, and was a1 
 once pressed in front and rear by both 
 cavalry and artiUeiy. ^Vhen j^^g 
 Wilson came up with the bulk of 29. 
 his force, he attempted to fonii line of 
 battle ; but he was very soon attacked 
 and defeated, and his entii'e force thrown 
 into confusion. Of couree the detach- 
 ment left at Stony Point could not long 
 hold out ; it was flanked and partly cut 
 off. The situation of Wilson's colun \ 
 
KETUEN OF WILSON'S CAVALEr. 
 
 74S 
 
 Qow became extremely critical ; it was 
 almost eutirely surrounded by a greatly 
 auperior force; and it soon became a 
 question, not whether the National cav- 
 alry could hold their ground, but 
 whether thoy could not be captured in 
 a body. The plan finally adopted, per- 
 haps the best under the circumstances, 
 was for each regiment or squadron to 
 make its escape separately as it best 
 could. Kautz turned off nearly due 
 south with his command. Detachments 
 moved in various directions; and a 
 general stampede was made for the lines 
 near Petersbirrg, over ditches and fences, 
 through swamps and woods, and along 
 concealed by-paths, to escape the fiercely 
 pui'suing foe, who chased the fugitives 
 clo8« up to the National lines. On the 
 night of the 28th, the main part of 
 Kautz's command reached the picket 
 reserve in a state of terrible exhaustion 
 and excitement, and remained there 
 through the night. They did not reach 
 their old camp till the evening of the 
 30tL Squads and solitary horsemen 
 continued to straggle back within the 
 lines for two or three days. Badly as 
 Kautz's troops had fared, they might 
 have had much worse fortune had it 
 not been for their commander's intimate 
 knowledge of the country, which en- 
 abled him to get his men through rapid- 
 ly. But they were aL thoroughly used 
 up, some of the men coming in asleep 
 U their saddles. 
 
 Wilson was so long without being 
 iieard from, that it was feared he had 
 been captured with all his men. The 
 main part of his force did not ride in 
 till the 1st of July. He had retreated 
 
 in the night by the road leading south 
 eastward towards Suffolk, a&d making a 
 wide circuit, secured safety at the ex- 
 pense of a long route. He crossed the 
 Nottaway about 30 miles from Peters- 
 burg, and the Blackwater at the County 
 Road bridge; turning then northward 
 he made his way to Cabin Point, and 
 rode thence into the Union lines about 
 5 miles from Fort Powhatan. His 
 entire force was in wretched plight when 
 it retui-ned. Both men and horses were 
 worn out and jaded to the last degree. 
 Their clothing and accoutrementp were 
 torn and spoiled, and their horses hai'dly 
 able to walk. They had lost their alL 
 The enemy had got possession of the 
 entire wagon train — 16 guns, nearly all 
 their caissons, and many horses. The 
 total loss in men was about 1500. Of 
 the large number of negroes collected, 
 the greater part were recaptured. The 
 ambulances, filled with sick and woimd- 
 ed, had been left on the field at Reams' 
 Station, under a hospital flag. Notwith- 
 standing the unfortunate termination of 
 the expedition. Grant expressed himself 
 satisfied with the result, inasmuch as 
 the Danville .Railroad had received 
 so much damage that considerable 
 time must elapse before it could be 
 restored to working crdei The 
 Sixth corps, which had set oat for 
 Reams' Station in the hope of relieving 
 General Wilson's force, dJd not anive 
 until all was over. The Confederates 
 had disappeared from that point; and 
 the troops took advantage of then 
 absence to destroy the railroa<l and 
 telegraph for soUiC miles. Man) 
 fugitive negroes, who aad IvUowed 
 
750 
 
 PETERSBUEG. 
 
 Wilson's cavalry, took refuge with 
 the Sixth corps. 
 
 It was now the 1st of July. Little 
 of moment occurred during the day in 
 the lines before Petersburg. About ten 
 July o'clock, however, a heavy musket- 
 1. ry fire from the Confederates 
 broke out in front of the Ninth corps, 
 followed presently by a charge upon 
 an earth-work which General Ledlie 
 had foT some days been engaged in 
 throwing up. After a sharp but short 
 conflict the Confederates were driven 
 back with considerable loss, as the posi- 
 tion was well defended by flanking 
 batteries. The firing continued at in- 
 tervals through the night. About three 
 o'clock in the afternoon of the 2d of 
 July a sharp artillery fire was opened 
 by the enemy on the line of the Eight- 
 eenth corps, and was warmly responded 
 to by the National batteries. This con- 
 tinued for about two hours, without 
 any important result. On the evening 
 of the 3d there was some firing on the 
 right centre. 
 
 The Fourth of July was celebrated 
 in the lines before Petersburg by a 
 national salute of 34 shots from a 30- 
 pounder Parrott in front of Smith's 
 position, followed by a general play of 
 artillery on the steeples of Petersburg. 
 The military bands also played national 
 \irs all along tlie line. 
 
 Comparative quiet reigned until the 
 7th, when a battery of heavy guns in 
 front of the Fifth corps opened fire 
 upon a body of Confederates who were 
 observed to be throwing up a new work. 
 Ageneral cannonading and afireof sharp- 
 shooters followed. In the morning 
 
 and early part of the 8th there j^|j 
 was little firing. About four 8. 
 o'clock in the afternoon however, th« 
 Confederates springing suddenly to 
 their feet, with their accustomed battle- 
 yell, poured a volley of musketry into 
 the intrenchments in front of Turner' 
 division, on the left of the Eighteenth 
 corps. They then quickly deployed a 
 skirmishing line, and moved rapidly on 
 the works along the front of Martindale 
 and Stannard. The entire space be- 
 tween the opposing lines was soon cov- 
 ered with a dense cloud of mingled 
 smoke and dust ; and the musketry fir- 
 ing was very sharp for a time ; but the 
 enemy was driven back without having 
 reached the breast- works. In the mean 
 time the batteries aU along the front of 
 the three corps on the right were open- 
 ed; and shot and shell were thrown 
 not only into the space which the Con- 
 federates had attempted to cross, but 
 into the city and over the Appomattox. 
 The superior weight of metal of the 
 National batteries soon overpowered 
 those of the enemy. The loss in this 
 affair was not very great on either side, 
 although the Confederates got the worst 
 of it, as they were uncovered in their 
 unsuccessful charge, while their oppo- 
 nents were well protected. The cannon- 
 ading was all over at dusk. 
 
 After this, there was again foi 
 some days a pause in the fight. It 
 was not until the 18th, that hostilitiee 
 took again any very active shape. On 
 that day, a 13-inch mortar, which aftei 
 some difficulty had been got into posi- 
 tion in front of the Eighteenth corps, 
 began to throw its huge shells into th« 
 
THE MINK. 
 
 nt 
 
 enemy's works. On the following day 
 tbero was steady artilleiy firing in front 
 of tlie Ninth and Eighteenth corjis as 
 well as from the batteries of the Fifth. 
 A heavy rain, the fii-st of any account 
 lince the army left Spottsylvania Court 
 House, began to fall early in the morn- 
 ing, and continued all day and into the 
 night. Its cheering influence on the 
 army was of great value. There was 
 enough of it to lay and thoroughly 
 penetrate the dust, which owing to the 
 long-continued drought and the ceaseless 
 tread of many feet, had become several 
 inches deep in the camps. 
 
 On the same day General Grant 
 rescinded an order of the War Depart- 
 ment by which General Butler was 
 relieved of his command. Grant not 
 only restored Butler, but in addition to 
 the Tenth and Eighteenth coqis, he 
 gave him command of the Nineteenth 
 corps, just arrived at Fortress Monroe 
 from the South, and of which General 
 Emory's division had gone ti- aid in the 
 defense of Washington. N<ii .ung after 
 thiSjGeneral Smith was relieved of the 
 command of the Eighteenth corps, and 
 was succeeded temporarily by General 
 Martindale, and then permanently by 
 General Ord. General Gillmore also, 
 who had been relieved of the command 
 of the Tenth corps, was succeeded 
 temporarily by Generals Brooks and 
 ferry, and permanently by General 
 Bimey, formerly of the Second coi-ps. 
 
 About ten o'clock in the forenoon of 
 the 20th the fire of the 13-inch mortar 
 vvas directed across the river. This was 
 responded to by a concentrated artillery 
 lire from the enemy, which in its turn 
 
 was replied to by the National 30- 
 pounders and 8-inch mortars, together 
 with the light batteries. This lasted 
 four hours without any important 
 result. The Confederates had estab 
 lished a battery of Whitworth guns afc 
 Strawberry PlainSj about a mile fi'om 
 the pontoon bridge over the James, from 
 which they were able to deliver aa 
 enfilading fire on the gun-boats, and had 
 disabled the Mendota. A Maine regi- 
 ment was moved out to occupy the 
 position, which it succeeded in doing 
 on the 2l8t, but was driven out of it 
 again at night. With the help of the 
 gun-boats, the Nationals quickly recov- 
 ered the position. Cannonading was 
 kept up for the next four or five days , 
 but there was no general engagement. 
 
 At this date there was completed an 
 important work which had been j^j- 
 commenced by Bumside just a 26. 
 month before, and when the conviction 
 had been forced upon the National 
 commanders by the disastrous repulse 
 of several storaiing columns, that the 
 defenses aroimd Petersburg were im- 
 pregnable against diiect assault. This 
 was nothing less than a great mine 
 which had been constmcted under one 
 of the most important of the enemy's 
 works. The idea of this mine originated 
 vrith Lieutenant-Colonel Pleasants, of 
 the Forty-Eighth Pennsylvania, who, as 
 well as many men of his regiment, had 
 been familiar with mining operations 
 before the war. To the men of this 
 regiment the consti-uction of the mine 
 was intrusted and by them completed. 
 The work of excavation was begun on 
 the 25th of June, vrith the utmost 
 
 •i 
 
r52 
 
 PETERSBURG. 
 
 [•recautions as to secrecy, in the side 
 of a ra\nne surmoiinted by an earth- 
 work in front of the position of the 
 Ninth corj)S, and was perseveringly 
 pushed on towards the doomed fort, 
 lituated about 2000 yards from the city. 
 he distance to be mined was about 
 00 feet. The mine was constructed 
 in the usual manner, the surface 
 having been first carefully measured 
 by triangulation. As the excavation 
 went on, the earth was orought out 
 and thrown on works, oo as not to give 
 rise to inquiries by being allowed to 
 accumulate in great heaps. The gallery 
 was made in the usual shape, about 4 
 feet wide at the bottom and sloping 
 upwards so as to be narrower at the top. 
 The height was about 4i feet. The 
 groimd rose towards the fort, and the 
 tunnel was so cut as to slope in an up- 
 ward direction. Difficulties in the shape 
 i)f water and quicksands were encounter- 
 ed and overcome, though the mine remain- 
 ed very damp. When the locality of the 
 fort was reached, there was only about 
 20 feet of the earth intervening; and the 
 sound could be distinctly heard overhead 
 of the nailing of planks and timbers, 
 indicating that the occupants of the fort 
 were making a floor for their artillery. 
 Wings were then extended to the right 
 and left, in which 8 magazines were 
 formed, 4 in each gallery, carefully 
 ' tamped " or separated by packings of 
 eand-bags and wood. Wooden pipes 
 were laid along the tunnel to within 
 100 feet of the magazines. The ventila- 
 tion of the mine was effected by sinking, 
 just within the exterior line of works 
 to the side of the tunnel, a shaft, at tb;^ 
 
 bottom of which a fireplace was buill 
 with a grating opening into the gallery, 
 and by means of a fii-e kept burning at 
 this point a cun-ent of air was caused. 
 The smoke issuing from the top of the 
 shaft of course could not be concealed, 
 but attention was diverted from it by 
 keeping fires at various places along the 
 line. Finally, when all was complete, 
 the chambers were charged with about 
 four tons of gunpowder. To keep the 
 enemy from obtaining a knowledge of 
 what was going on, intercoui'se between 
 the opposing picket lines was strictly 
 prohibited; and an incessant skimiishing 
 and artillery fire was kept up in front 
 of the Ninth corps, even while all along 
 the rest of the line there was compara 
 tive inaction. The plan of assault was 
 to explode the mine and immediately 
 afterwards open a cannonade from all 
 the guns along the Mne, niunbering 
 nearly 100. Then, before the enemy 
 could recover from the confusion and 
 dismay which would be naturally created 
 by the explosion and sudden burst of 
 a tremendous artillery fire, a strong 
 storming party was to rush through the 
 gap which it was supposed would be 
 made in the line of the enemy's works, 
 and endeavor to carry the position 
 beyond — a very strongly fortified crest, 
 called Cemetery Hill, completely com- 
 manding the city, and the key of the 
 enemy's position. The National linea 
 had for a long time been gradually 
 pushed foiTvard till they were now 
 not more than 150 yards distant from 
 those of the enemy, the nearest point 
 being: the undermined fort. The inter 
 vening space was swept by tho eneJiiy's 
 
THE FEINT AT DEEP BOTTOM. 
 
 753 
 
 artillery; and near the fort itself abatis 
 and vanous other entanglements had 
 been placed. 
 
 To add to the probability of success, 
 Grant detennined, before exploding the 
 mine and commencing the assault, to 
 induce Lee to draw off a large propor- 
 tion of his troops fi'om Petersburg by 
 making a feint in another direction. 
 With this end in view he began a series 
 of movements which indicated a design 
 to transfer operations to the neighbor- 
 hood of Richmond. Grant's line at 
 this time was not less than 20 miles 
 long. On its extreme right, across the 
 James at Deep Bottom, Just above Four 
 Mile Creek, Foster, with his division of 
 the Tenth coi-jis, had bet- u for a long 
 time in possession of an intrenched 
 camp — a position of considerable im- 
 portance, since, so long as it was held, 
 the enemy could neither make a demon- 
 stration on the National right flank 
 from Malvern Hills, which they still 
 occupied, nor any successful attempt to 
 obtain on the James a position from 
 which it would be possible to blockade 
 the river. It also constituted an excel- 
 lent base for an advance on Richmond 
 from the southeast, by three parallel 
 roads, and thus served admirably for the 
 feint now about to be made in that di- 
 rection. A pontoon bridge, thoroughly 
 p'otected by gunboats, lay across the 
 James in the rear of Foster's position ; 
 but in his front was a large force of the 
 enemy, effectually barring any advance 
 on his part. About a mile and a half 
 below the position of Foster, at Straw- 
 berry Plains, also held by a small 
 National force, a second pontoon bridge 
 
 was thrown across the river on the 21st 
 of July, and on the following day a bri- 
 gade of the Nineteenth corps crossed 
 by it and secured the bridge head. 
 The Confederates made a large addition 
 to their force in front of Foster's pos: 
 tion ; and on the 26th there was in that 
 direction ra[iid and heavy artilleiy and 
 muskotiy fuing, in which the gun-boats 
 took part. Skirmishing also was con- 
 tinued through the day by Foster's 
 infantiy, with a loss of about 50 men. 
 In the the mean time, at four o'clock in 
 the afternoon of the 26th, the Second 
 cordis quietly began to march from its 
 position on the extreme left of the line 
 before Petersburg, soon followed by 
 Sheridan's cavalry, which had been 
 lying in camps around its flank and rear 
 The column moved very rapidly with 
 out straggling — Barlow's division first, 
 Mott's and Gibbon's next, to Point o 
 Rocks on the Appomattox — and crossed 
 the river early in the evening. The 
 march was then continued to the James, 
 which was reached by midnight at 
 Jones' Neck, and before daylight the 
 crossing began by the pontoon bridge, 
 which had beenjsovered with grass and 
 hay, to prevent noise. The cavalry 
 followed soon after daybreak, and 
 passed the infantry on the New ]\Iarkel 
 road. A line of battle was then fonue<l, 
 in which the cavalry of Sheridan and 
 Kautz held the right. The Second 
 corps lay at Strawberiy Plains, the 
 brigade of the Nineteenth coi-jis on its 
 left, with Foster in his old position at 
 Deep Bottom on the extreme left. 
 
 Ill front of the Second corps lay a 
 body of the enemy under General 
 
7M 
 
 PETERSBURG. 
 
 Kei-shaw, along a road skirting a pine 
 forest, and in rifle-pits, with a battery of 
 four 20-pounder Parrott guns. Up to 
 this position from near the bridge ran a 
 road, by which the Second corps, about 
 July seven o'clock, began to advance, 
 
 27. the skirmishers spreading out 
 across the open space in front of the 
 enemy, while the gun-boat Mendota in 
 the stream opened fire with her 100- 
 poimder Parrotts. A rapid fire was 
 opened at the same time from the en- 
 emy's battery. In the mean time, how- 
 ever, Miles with his brigade of Barlow's 
 division, having made a rapid movement 
 under cover, got on the flank of the 
 enemy's position and made a brisk 
 charge. Kershaw immediately retreat- 
 ed, abandoning his battery, which proved 
 to be one taken from Butler at Drurj^'s 
 Bluff two months before. 
 
 On the 28th, the tro< 'ps north of the 
 James continued to make demonstra- 
 tions; and the gun-boats occasionally 
 shelled the woods. At nine o'clock in 
 the morning a general advance of the 
 cavalry was ordered ; and after a march 
 of three miles, Sheridan came upon a 
 strong infantry force. His command 
 then quickly dismounted and foimed 
 jujy in a belt of woods, Greggs' divi- 
 
 28. sion on the right, Torbert's on 
 the left. Torbert's division on being 
 attacked fell back into the woods, but 
 was soon rallied ; and the brigades of 
 Merritt and Davies making a charge, 
 
 he enemy broke and left the field, after 
 
 osing about 150 men in killed, wounded, 
 
 nd prisoners, besides the colors of two 
 
 North Carolina regiments. Gregg's 
 
 division, losing a gun and many men. 
 
 was steadily forced back until about five 
 o'clock in the afternoon, when it was 
 relieved by the an-ival of (xibbou's di- 
 vision of the Second corps. The demon 
 stiations were continued on the 29th; 
 and a train of about 400 empty wagons 
 was sent over one of the pontoon bridges 
 to the north side of the James, as if an 
 advance in great force towai'ds Malvern 
 Hills were intended. Nearly 20,000 men 
 and 20 cannon had now actually been 
 sent over; and the suspicious of the 
 enemy were aroused at last to such an 
 extent as to produce the effect desired 
 by Grant. Lee hunied off from Petere- 
 burg a large force to the Richmond side 
 of the James ; and as early as the even- 
 ing of the 28th, Mott's division of the 
 Second corps was secretly moved back 
 to Petersburg. After dark the remain- 
 der of tlat corps and all tho cavalry 
 recrossed the river, and marching all 
 night arrived before daybreak in the 
 lines before Petersburg. 
 
 The time for the explosion of the 
 min'-* aad now come. Soon after mid- 
 night of the 29th all the troops were 
 got into position. The Ninth corps, 
 which was to head the assault, was 
 drawn up in front of the mine, Ledlie's 
 division in the advance, Willcox's and 
 Pottei"'s next, in support, and Ferrero'e 
 consisting of colored troops, in the rear. 
 The Eighteenth corps, had been with- 
 drawn from its position on the right of 
 the Ninth corps and posted in its rear. 
 Mott's division of the Second corps, just 
 returned from the north side of the 
 James, was moved into the po8iti:)n 
 vacated by the Eighteenth corps; and 
 the other divisions of the Second corps 
 
INSIDE THE CKATER. 
 
 75t 
 
 as they arrived were placed in adjoin- 
 ing positions. The whole force was 
 closely massed, only the necessary gar- 
 risons being left in the more distant 
 intrenchments. Thus the assaulting 
 force consisted of the Ninth corps sup- 
 ported by the Eighteenth, with the 
 Second corps in reserve on the right 
 and the Fifth on the left. The cavalry 
 were to operate on the left if opportun- 
 ity should offer. The time for lighting 
 the fuse was fixed at half-past three in 
 the morning of the 30th ; and the troops 
 at that hour were in entire readiness, 
 impatiently awaiting orders. 
 
 At the appointed moment the fuse 
 was lit; but the mine did not explode. 
 The fuse was imperfect. It had been 
 spliced in two places ; and at one of the 
 splices, the fire had stopped. Two brave 
 men who had faith in the mine, and 
 who had toiled at it night and day 
 under Pleasants, volunteered to go in 
 and apply the match afresh. Grant 
 and Meade were at the front. It is now 
 ten minutes to five o'clock. The earth 
 in the neighborhood trembles ; and then 
 with a tremendous explosion, what seems 
 a conical mountain rises in the air, 
 streaked and serried with lightning. 
 For a moment, it hangs poised; and 
 then the beholder sees in mid air, tim- 
 ber, stone, earth, bodies and limbs of 
 men, and some of the heavy guns of the 
 ''^ork. Two hundred men, many of 
 them still asleep, had been blown into 
 fragments. It waa a horrible, shocking 
 affair. So soon as the mass fell to earth, 
 100 guns opened fire upon that living 
 Golgotha. 
 
 T^et us now see what advantage was 
 
 gained by the desperate but not wholly 
 unjustifiable experiment. Success de- 
 pended entirely upon rapidity of action. 
 A huge gateway had been opened to 
 Cemetery Ridge, and thence jito Peters- 
 burg. But where is the stonning col- 
 umn ? Ledlie's division which had been 
 selected by lot was slow to move. 
 When it did move, it halted in the centre 
 for at least an hour. Fen-ero who with 
 his colored troops was to follow Ledlie, 
 could not advance, as the crater was 
 choked. Bumside was ordered to move 
 forward all his troops ; but still there 
 was delay. Ord, now in command of the 
 Eighteenth corps, was peremptorily ord- 
 ered by Meade to press into the gap ; but 
 he declared it to be impracticable ; and 
 no doubt, he spoke the truth. There 
 was no other way by which the troop 
 could advance, except by the crater, and 
 that was now crowded, literally blocked. 
 The scene inside the crater when 
 first entered by the Nationals, is not to 
 be described. It was a Pandemonium 
 of horror. In the huge chasm, some 
 200 feet long, 60 feet wide, and 30 feet 
 deep, were scattered the debrU of the 
 work, with the "torn and tattered frag- 
 ments of human beings. Some of the 
 more fortunate victims were half-buried 
 and piteously calling for help. Not a 
 few were calling for water ; and the cry 
 was general "Yanks, for God's sake, 
 take me out ; I'll do as much for you 
 some time." In such a scene of chao 
 and agony, it is not to be wondered at 
 if the National soldiers, left for the 
 most part without competent leaders, 
 should have halted, and pelded to the 
 cliiiina of humanity. The halting 
 
66 
 
 P JTERSBURG. 
 
 however, was ruinous ; for it gave the 
 Confederates time to recover from the 
 alarm and stupor occasioned by the explo- 
 sion ; and the well directed fire of the 
 £funs on Ceriietery Ridge falling upon the 
 aow unfortunate Nationals aggravated 
 the horrore of that scene of agony and 
 death. It was impossible to advance ; 
 it was impossible to retire ; and the 
 officera who were present had no longer 
 any control. The carnage was frightful. 
 It was not a valley of the Shadow of 
 Death. It was a valley of Death itself. 
 
 As early as nine o'clock, Bumside 
 was directed to withdraw his troops at 
 pleasure. It was two o'clock before the 
 order was carried out and not until 
 General Bju-tlett who led the attack, 
 had been captured with the greater 
 portion of his staff. The mine had 
 proved a great and sorrowful faUure. 
 Although no new thing in war, it was 
 
 barbarous conception ; and success 
 through such a channel would hardly 
 have been glory. 
 
 The National loss was about 5000, 
 while that of the Confederates, includ- 
 ing 200 prisoners, did not much exceed 
 July 1000. On Sunday, the Slst, a 
 31. flag of truce was sent to the ene- 
 my with a request for permission to 
 hnry the dead and care for the wounded ; 
 but owing to an informality this wag 
 aot obtained till Monday, when an 
 UTTustice took place in the morning 
 from five till nine. In the mean time 
 many of the severely wounded died 
 from exposure, in great suffering, much 
 aggravated by the extremely hot 
 weather ; and the bodies of the slain 
 had become so discolored anr^ ■'woUen 
 
 from lying in the sun, that the remains 
 of the white men could scarcely bf 
 distinguished from those of the negroes 
 
 The failure of the mine was a great 
 disappointment. It was expected by 
 many that Petereburg was about to fall 
 Grant, himself, shared the disappoint 
 ment ; but he was not discouraged. 
 As soon as the truce was concluded, 
 the filing was resumed. On the 4th 
 of August, Grant left for Washington. 
 On this day also a short engage- j^„g^ 
 ment took place on the James i- 
 between the gun-boats and a battery on 
 the north bank. For five days previous, 
 intercourse between pickets had been 
 prohibited by the enemy. This circum 
 stance, and the report of deserters that 
 mining was going on, led to suspicions 
 that an attack might be expected. 
 These suspicions proved to be well- 
 foimded. About five o'clock on the 
 evening of the 5th, a mine was Aug. 
 fired by the enemy in fi'ont of the 6 . 
 Eighteenth corps, and followed up by 
 rapid and continuous musketry firing. 
 But the mine failed, having becm 
 exploded several rods outside of the 
 head of a sap it was intended to reach. 
 A considerable mass of earth was thro^vn 
 into the air; but the dust and smoke 
 had hardly subsided when the National 
 troops were busily engaged pouring 
 volleys into the enemy's works, from 
 which no charge was made. There was 
 considerable artillery firing for a time 
 but the loss was not heavy on either 
 side. 
 
 On the 9th, about noon, a ten-ific 
 accidental explosion took place at City 
 Point. An ordnance boat lying at the 
 
DUTCH GAP CANAL. 
 
 767 
 
 ?rliarf suddenly blew up with a contin- 
 uous roar that was heard in all direc- 
 log. tions for many miles. The cause 
 9. of the explosion is imknown, but 
 •t is supposed to have been the dropping 
 of a case of fixed ammunition. Its 
 effect was most disastrous, in the loss of 
 life, in the number of persons frightfully 
 mutilated, and in the destruction of 
 property. The boat and another near 
 it were blown to fragments. The bluff 
 close by was penetrated by a vast quan- 
 tity of shells, balls, bullets, and frag- 
 ments of various ammunition, and a 
 number of buildings were thrown down. 
 Parts of vessels and houses mingled 
 with limbs and pieces of himian bodies 
 were scattered around in all directions; 
 and even the boats on the river did not 
 escape. Between 60 and 70 pereons 
 were killed and about 130 were wound- 
 ed. The majority of the sufferers were 
 laborers, many of them colored. 
 
 The repulse of the National forces in 
 the attack on Cemetery Hill, led +o the 
 belief that operations at Petersburg 
 would cease for some time. Grant, 
 ho^vever, was not a man to be so easily 
 discouraged. The Confederates had, 
 it is true, constructed near the side of 
 the fort destroyed by means of the mine, 
 a new work, from which they opened 
 fire on the National lines on the 1 2th of 
 August ; and the defenses of Petersburg 
 were apparently as strong and as perti- 
 na<nously defended as they had been 
 t\vo months before. But the war was 
 sustained on the part of the Confederacy 
 inly by the most strenuous efforts; and 
 its aiTnies were kept up to a point at 
 'A'hich the defensive could be success- 
 
 fully maintained only by a conscription 
 of the most ruthless character. The 
 best part of the Southern fighting ele- 
 ment had long been consumed ; and old 
 men and boys now constituted almost 
 the only recruits that could be obtained. 
 None knew this better than General 
 Grant; and upon this fact he seems to 
 have placed much reliance, and drawr 
 from it encouragement to persevere. He 
 knew that, although the soldiers of the 
 Confederates had no superiors, every 
 battle and skinnish diminished theii 
 numbers. He knew also that, although 
 the Confederate government controlled 
 almost the entire resom-ces of the South, 
 they were rapidly wasting away, and 
 that finally the States in rebellion must 
 succumb from sheer exhaustion. 
 
 A work, which it was supposed would 
 prove of great value, was commenced 
 by Butler about the middle of August 
 This was the construction of a canal at 
 Dutch Gap, on the James, where a 
 bend in the river, 11 miles south-south 
 east of Richmond in a direct line, forms 
 a peninsula called Farrar's Island, con- 
 nected with the north bank by a neck 
 of land about 175 yards wide. A navi- 
 gable channel cut across this neck would 
 save a circuit of not less than 6 miles 
 around the bend. The preliminary 
 survey was made on the 7th of August, 
 and a large niunber of workmen com- 
 menced digging soon afterwards. 1 1 
 was Butler's expectation that this canal 
 when completed, would prove of im- 
 mense service to the National army. It 
 would, he conceived, be deep enough to 
 allow the passage of large war vessels ; 
 and he felt confident that the iron-clada 
 
758 
 
 PETERSBURG. 
 
 vvould then be able to ascend to the 
 upper part of the river, without 
 [laasing by the circuitous channel around 
 the peninsula, which was full of torjie- 
 does, and other obstructions, besides 
 being gtiarded by Confederate gun -boats, 
 whose usual station was at Dutch Gap. 
 \yhen completed and occupied it would 
 .ilso flank the enemy's strong and impor- 
 tant position at Howlett's, opposite the 
 southwestern extremity of Farrar's 
 Island, from which the river was swept 
 at this point with heavy batteries. It 
 would be a long step in the approach 
 to Fort Darling, and would •> ake 
 necessary on the part of the enen } a 
 new and more extended line of defense, 
 and thus find occupation for h large 
 Auff. number of their troops. On the 
 10. 1 0th of August a force was thrown 
 across the river at this point ; and the 
 work wa.s prosecuted with impunity un- 
 til the 12th, when, soon after daybreak, 
 the enemy collected in the vicinity in 
 such force that the National gun-boats 
 opened fire upon him and kept it up 
 several hours. On the following morn- 
 ing two Confederate rams appeared, 
 and taking a position under the lee of 
 Farrar's Island, where they were shel- 
 tered fi'om the fire of the National gun- 
 boats, began to shell the negro troops 
 engaged -n digging the canal. The 
 battery at Howlett's also opened fire, 
 and was replied to by the National 
 battery at Crow's Nest, near Dutch Gap. 
 The river being full of obstructions at 
 the extremity of Farrar's Island, the 
 National gun-boats could not get near 
 enough to take part in the engagement. 
 The troops on the isthmus had already 
 
 thrown up intrenchments along a 
 portion of the line of the proposed canal ; 
 and, though exposed to a fire from 
 Howlett's battery on the west, and from 
 2 gun-boats on the north, which contin- 
 ued till noon, they were able to remain 
 at work. A gun at Howlett's battery 
 was disabled by a shot fi'om that at 
 Crow's Nest. The enemy showed signs 
 of a deteiTnination to dispute energet- 
 ically the National advance in this di 
 rection. On the 13th, operations on the 
 canal were covered by another move 
 ment on the part of Grant, to the north 
 of the James, made in the hope of again 
 inducing Lee to send away a portion of 
 his forces from Petersburg to favor a 
 new movement against the Weldon 
 Railroad. 
 
 The Second corps, which had been 
 moved up from Petersburg, was put on 
 board of a fleet of transports at City 
 Point; and on the 13th the ves-^Ang. 
 sels went down the river, with ^** 
 the bands playing, as if bound for For- 
 tress Monroe. The movement was pur- 
 posely made in an ostentatious manner, 
 in order that it might be noted by the 
 enemy, and cause him to believe that 
 Grant was sending a poition of his 
 forces to Washington. When night 
 fell, the transports were headed up the 
 river, and ascending at full speed soon 
 reached Deep Bottom, where the troops 
 were all put on shore by noon on the 
 following day. On the same night 
 two divisions of the Tenth corps crossed 
 the James by the pontoon bridge to the 
 same point, as did also Gregg's cavalry 
 division, and joined Foster in his old 
 position thei'e Early on the raorniiifi 
 
STRAWBERRY PLAINS. 
 
 of the 14th, Foster's brigade was moved 
 out towards Strawberry Plains, where 
 the enemy was found strongly posted 
 in intrenchments situated on command- 
 ing ridges covering the Kingsland road, 
 ,vith a line of rifle-pits in front. As the 
 dvance pressed forward, considerable 
 kinnishing took place ; but the enemy 
 gradually fell back to the rifle-pits, 
 which at length were charged and easily 
 taken by the Tenth Connecticut and 
 Twenty - Fourth Massachusetts, with 
 about 100 prisoners. The enemy was 
 in the mean time hurrying troops over 
 from his right to the region of Malvern 
 Hills ; and it became essential that the 
 National force should form in order of 
 battle, and push forward as rapidly as 
 possible. Accordingly, Gregg's cavalry 
 swept out to the National right, clearing 
 the roads of the enemy's pickets, and 
 opening the way for the Second corps. 
 Aug. ^ost of the day was consumed in 
 14. getting the troops into position. 
 When the line was formed, the cavalry 
 covered the right flank of the Second 
 corjis, which stretched towards the left 
 as far as Four MUe Creek On the 
 other side was the Tenth corps, its right 
 resting on the creek, its left on the 
 intrenched bluff at Deep Bottom. The 
 gun-boats in the river took such posi- 
 tions that they were able to shell the 
 Confederate works occasionally. An 
 attempt was made to push the whole 
 line forward in the evening. The Tenth 
 corps charging the enemy's outer works 
 in a line of woods about a mile from the 
 pontoon bridge, after a sharp engage- 
 ment succeeded in carrying them, at the 
 same time capturing four 8-inch brass 
 
 howitzers and a number of priso am 
 In the centre of the line, Gibbon'n and 
 Barlow's divisions of the Second corjie 
 moved out towards the Confederate 
 works, and succeeded in establishing 
 themselves some distance in advance oi 
 the position which they had earned in 
 the feint made two weeks before. The 
 assault was now made by Gibbon's divi 
 sion, Colonel Macy's brigade in the 
 advance. Crossing a com field and going 
 over a hill, they descended into a ravine, 
 where a stream, flowing through swampy 
 land and thick brush, formed an impene- 
 trable barrier The charge was made 
 under a severe artillery fire of the 
 enemy, which also raked the ravine. 
 Natural obstacles rendering any further 
 progress ur'ixvsaiWe, the men availed 
 themselves of what shelter they could 
 find, and after a short time were with- 
 drawn. The entire loss sustained by 
 the Tenth and Second corps was about 
 1000 men. 
 
 Skirmishing was kept up all day on 
 the 15th, the object being to extend the 
 line to the right and secure a strongei 
 position. The Tenth corps was moved 
 across Four Mile Creek and placed j^Qg_ 
 on the right of the Second, the 16. 
 cavalry in the mean time covering the 
 right flank and skirmishing. Holding 
 a position on the Charles City Road, 
 they confronted there detachments of 
 the enemy's cavalry, which with othei 
 reinforcements had been hunied ovei 
 from Petersburg during the preceding 
 day and night. Supposing that Grant 
 was threatening Malvern HUls, the 
 enemy's infantry was pushed as rapidly 
 as possible in that direction, while his 
 
rso 
 
 PETEKSBURQ. 
 
 cavalry was kept on the roads le d- 
 ing northwestward towards Richmond, 
 There was constant manceuvring and 
 heavy skirmishing during the day, in 
 the course of which about .^00 men 
 were killed or wounded on the part of 
 the Nationals, without any important 
 nd vantage having been gained. The 
 intense and debilitating heat during 
 this and the preceding day not only had 
 a very depressing effect on the troops, 
 but caused some loss by sunstroke and 
 exhaustion. 
 
 More decided efforts were made to 
 Aug. advance on the Itith. Gregg's 
 16. cavalry stretching out on the 
 Charles City Road, on the extreme right, 
 covered that flank. On his left was 
 Cktlonel Craig's brigade of Mott's divi- 
 sion of the Second corps ; then came the 
 Tenth corps and the remainder of the 
 Second. The extreme left at Deep Run 
 \vas held by colored troops. The region 
 n which the movements were about to 
 take place was covered with dense 
 forest and undergrowth, with only here 
 and there a small cleared space. To the 
 difficulties thus presented to the man- 
 oeuvres of troops was added the intense 
 heat of the day, which was one of the 
 most sultry and oppressive of the season. 
 The eai'liest movement was made by the 
 cavalry of Gregg, along the Charles 
 City Road as far as Deep Bottom Creek 
 or Deep Run, where he was joined by 
 
 brigade of Barlow's division under 
 Miles. Further progress was disputed 
 by a brigade of Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry, 
 which, however, was quickly driven 
 back vpith the loss of its commander, 
 <vho was killed while attempting to 
 
 rally his men. The column then pushed 
 forward on the siime road ueai- to 
 Wliite's Tavern, not more than 7 milee 
 from Richmond, where the enemy was 
 found intrenched in a position too strong 
 to justify attack. Miles then vsdthdi-ew 
 his brigade towards the right of the 
 main line under Birney, marching back 
 by the route which he had taken in 
 advancing. On seeing this, the enemy, 
 collecting from various quarters a con- 
 siderable force at White's Tavern, 
 moved rapidly dovm upon Gregg's 
 command in the afternoon, and drove 
 it back to Deep Run, where Gregg made 
 a stand, and easily maintained himself 
 for some time. Meanwhile there had 
 been some very sharp fighting on the 
 centre of the line. Terry's division of 
 the Tenth corps pushed forwax'd into 
 the wooded region between the Central 
 and Charles City roads, Foster's brigade 
 in front. Pond's and Hawley's in support, 
 with Craig's brigade of the Second corps 
 on the light. Aiter a toilsome march 
 under a burning sun, over ground much 
 broken with ravine and jungle, the en- 
 emy's picket line was at last found and 
 driven in. Artillery firing followed, 
 and some slight works and a few piis- 
 oners were captured- The main Avorks 
 were then charged upon by Pond's 
 brigade, supported by Hawley's and 
 some colored troops ; and after an hour g 
 hard and close fighting at short range 
 in the dense woods, in which the loss 
 on both sides was severe, the intrench- 
 ments were carried, 200 prisoners being 
 taken and some colors. The National 
 troops then occupied the intrenchments 
 and prepared to hold them against the 
 
DEEP BOTTOM. 
 
 761 
 
 Confederates should they return in 
 force. About this time Colonel Craig 
 wath his brigade was despatched to the 
 assistance of Gregg's cavalry, which the 
 enemy, having received reinforcements, 
 was driving back rapidly. In the en- 
 gagement which followed, Craig was 
 killed; and his brigade, partly in con- 
 sequence of this, being thrown into con- 
 fusion, fell back, losing many prisoners. 
 The cavalry and infantry on the right 
 having now given way, the Confederates 
 concentrated their efforts against the 
 infantry in the centre, upon which they 
 made a series of desperate assaults, and 
 at length got possession of the works 
 which had been won from them with 
 such hard fighting ; and notwithstanding 
 that Bimey, about six o'clock, made an 
 effort to regain them, they held the 
 position. Having succeeded in forcing 
 back the right, the enemy was now able 
 to direct an enfilading fire on the centre ; 
 and the whole National line was with- 
 drawn at dark, having sustained during 
 the day a loss of some 1500 men, that 
 of the enemy being nearly as great. 
 The line at night was substantially the 
 same as it had been in the morning. 
 
 While these events were taking place 
 on the right, Major Ludlow, at Dutch 
 Gap, moved out about 1000 men on trans- 
 ports to Aiken's Landing, and marched 
 thence to Cox's Ferry, two or three 
 miles above Dutch Gap, where he in- 
 trenched. On the afternoon of the 
 following day, Howlett's battery and a 
 Confederate ram opened fire on the 
 men engi^ed in digging the canal, 
 which was replied to by the battery at 
 Crow's Nest and by the monitors. 
 
 After dark, Ludlow seeing that he 
 would not be able to maintain himself 
 in his advanced position at Cox's Ferry, 
 withdrew his troops and returned to 
 his old position at Dutch Gap. 
 
 On the 17th, there was little or no 
 fighting on the right. Between four and 
 six in the afternoon, the killed of the 
 day before were buried under a flag of 
 truce, each party taking charge of its 
 own dead. The 18th also was quiet in 
 the immediate neighborhood of Deep 
 Bottom ; but at night a fierce assault was 
 made on the intrenchments of the Tenth 
 corps, by a division of the enemy, who 
 charged in column on a portion of the 
 line held by Terry's division and ^ng, 
 W Bimey's colored brigade. 18. 
 The firmg was very close and verj 
 heavy for an hour, but the Confederates 
 were repulsed with a loss of not less 
 than 1000 men. On the 19th, there 
 was some skirmishing, but no general 
 engagement. The aggregate National 
 loss in this second demonstration, at 
 Deep Bottom, was estimated at not less 
 than 5000 • that of the enemy at 3000. 
 But the movement had answered its 
 purpose ; and the troops were rapidly 
 marched back to tte lines before Peters 
 burg, a division of the Second corps 
 arriving there by the morning of the 
 20th. 
 
 Little of importance occurred at 
 Petersburg while the bloody struggle 
 was going on in the neighborkood of 
 Deep Bottom. Artillery and picket 
 firing went on till the evening of the 
 15th, when it was suspended for a shoii 
 time by an extraordinary rain storm, 
 which swept away many tents and 
 
res 
 
 PETEKSBUKG. 
 
 Butiers'booths and flooded the trenches. 
 On the morning of the 18th, at one 
 o'clock, the enemy opened a tremendous 
 fire all along the line, and continued it 
 for two hours ; but no assault followed, 
 ^bout an hour after the cannonading 
 eased, operations against the Weldon 
 Railroad were commenced by the move- 
 ment of the Fifth corps ia that direction. 
 Leaving camp with four day's rations, 
 the march was directed towards Reams' 
 Station; and between seven and eight, 
 the advance arrived at Six Mile Station, 
 near which a mile of the track was torn 
 up, and the rails destroyed Little 
 opposition was experienced during this 
 movement, which wae ^ lite unexpected 
 by the enemy; and while the first divi- 
 sion under Griffin was engaged in 
 destroying the railroad track, the other 
 divisiors advanced two or three miles 
 towards Petersburg, driving in the skir- 
 mishers. At Yellow Tavern, about ten 
 o'clock, the column encountered a bri- 
 gade of cavalry, which was driven back 
 as far as Davis' Farm, two and a haK 
 miles from Petersburg. But at this 
 point a force of the enemy, consisting 
 of two divisions of Hill's corps under 
 Heth and Mahone, came hurrying down 
 the railroad. The National line was 
 immediately formed in the open field, 
 the Third division under Crawford on 
 the right of the railroad, and the Second 
 4ng under Ayres on the left. About 
 18. two o'clock the enemy emerged 
 from the woods in front and made an 
 impetuous charge. For a time the two 
 divisions under Crawford and Ayres 
 got the worst of it, and were driven 
 half a mile d ^wn the railroad ; but the 
 
 Fourth division under Cutler and some 
 other troops coming up, the Nationals 
 were enabled to stretch out around and 
 were successful in flanking the enemy's 
 left. This turned the tide of battle ; and 
 the Confederates were finally repulsed 
 The contest was over before dark ; and 
 the National troops immediately went 
 to work throwing up breast-worka 
 Although heavy rain fell at night, and 
 the enemy, fearing another attack, threw 
 shells into the lines from midnight till 
 daybreak, the National troops were 
 found strongly intrenched ©n the rail- 
 road 2i miles south of Petersbiirg. The 
 loss on the part of the Nationals, inclu- 
 ding 160 prisoners, was somewhat over 
 1000; that of the Confederates, in- 
 cluding 30 prisoners, was, by their own 
 account, only about 500. 
 
 The Fifth corps had thus secured an 
 intrenched position on the Weldon Rail 
 road. It was not likely, however, that 
 the Confederates would allow it to be 
 quietly retained. If left isolated, the 
 troops would very soon be driven off or 
 surrounded and captured. It was thus 
 of the utmost importance, that this new 
 position on the extreme left should be 
 connected with the main line before 
 Petersburg; and reinforcements were 
 accordingly set in motion. The enemy 
 having withdrawn nearer to the city 
 during the night, leaving only a picket 
 line in front, the National skirmishers 
 were pushed forward early, on the morn- 
 ing of the 19th. The whole line fol 
 lowed, throwing up breast- works as they 
 proceeded, and planting batteries to 
 strengthen the advanced position. This 
 went on without opposition till about 
 
THE WJKLDOiV RAILKOAb. 
 
 763 
 
 ten o'clock, when a short skirmish 
 occurred in front of the picket lines on 
 the right, at which point the enemy was 
 reconnoitring. The troops had all got 
 into line about noon ; but a portion of 
 the gap betvveen the right of the Fifth 
 corps and the old line of intrenchments 
 near the Jerusalem road still remained 
 unoccupied. The new line when ar- 
 ranged stood as follows : WUlcox's divis- 
 ion of the Ninth corps having just amved 
 held the extreme right; then came a 
 brigade of Cutler of the Kfth corps; 
 then Cravrford; then Ayres; then on 
 the extreme left Griffin b Jivi-'\ n and 
 the remainder of Cutler's. The railroad 
 ran between the divisions of A^Tes and 
 Aug. Cravrford. About four o'clock, 
 19. heavy rain falling at the time. 
 General A. P. Hill broke suddenly upon 
 the line, with both divisions of his corps, 
 under Mahone and Heth. Mahone, 
 having with him the brigades of Cling- 
 man and Colquitt as well as his own, 
 attacked the right with great fury, first 
 striking the picket line, which consisted 
 of Bragg's brigade. The advanced regi- 
 ment was quickly driven back from the 
 cornfield where it had been posted, to 
 the National breast-works, losing many 
 men. The enemy had discovered the 
 gap at this part <>f the line, and rushed 
 through it like a torrent, thus getting 
 •/etween the divisions of WUlcox and 
 >awford. Desperate artUlery and 
 nusketry fighting ensued. But WUl- 
 cox's brigades were kept closely massed, 
 Hartranft on the right, Humphrey on 
 the left; and they remained unbroken. 
 Hill then, while keeping Willcox and 
 Cravrford occxipied in front with Cling- 
 
 man's and Mahone's brigades, des- 
 patched part of Colquitt's brigade to 
 drive in that under Bragg. After des- 
 perate fighting this was accomplished, 
 and the right of Crawford's division, 
 where Lyle was posted, was completely 
 flanked. Colquitt, Joined by other 
 forces, succeeded in getting a front, 
 flank, and rear fire on a part of Craw- 
 ford's division, the consequence of which 
 was that more than 1500 men, compris- 
 ing nearly the whole of Hartshorn's bri 
 gade and part of Lyle's and Wheelock's, 
 were cut off and captured. 
 
 While this was occurring on the right 
 of the railroad, the divisions on the left 
 under Ayres, Griffin, and Cutler were 
 attacked by the troops under Heth. 
 The advance of the Confederates was 
 made with great impetuosity the Na- 
 tional picket line was driven in, and the 
 advanced intrenchments were soon taken; 
 but at the second and main line the 
 Confederates received a bloody repulse, 
 not, however, before Hayes' brigade of 
 regulars, who had held their post with 
 great firmness, were badly cut up. The 
 line on their right and left having been 
 forced back; they became exposed to an 
 enfilading fire, and sustained a heavy 
 loss in killed and wounded, besides 500 
 or 600 captured. Among the captured 
 and wounded was General Hayes. 
 
 Very ojTijiortunately, just at the time 
 when the right centre had become 
 broken and the centre was giving way, 
 the First and Second divisions of the 
 Ninth corps under Potter and Wliite 
 came up. Although they had made a 
 long and toilsome forced march over 
 roads now reduced to mud by the latf 
 
7G4 
 
 PETERSBURG. 
 
 heavy raiiis, they were immediately 
 formed and sent in on the charge ; and 
 the enemy was overlapped and turned. 
 In the meantime the battle had become 
 so confused on Crawford's right that 
 the combatants could not be distin- 
 guished ; and the artillery now directed 
 on that point, swept down friend and 
 foe alike. The result was, that the 
 contest, was decided against the Confed- 
 erates ; and the disordered lines of the 
 National troops were soon raUied. 
 Night, however, had fallen before the 
 battle was entirely over. The National 
 loss in killed and wounded was esti- 
 mated at 1 500. The Confederates had 
 lost about the same number. In pris- 
 oners they lost not more than 250, while 
 they captured, mostly from the divisions 
 of Ayres and Crawford, not less than 
 2700, including 9 field officers and 60 or 
 70 line officei-s. On the following day, 
 the 20th, there was some cannonading, 
 but no general fighting. 
 
 On the 21st the enemy made another 
 
 Aug. 
 
 effort to recover the Weldon Rail- 
 
 21. road. The National line lay sub- 
 ntantially as it did on the 19th, the first 
 three divisions of the Ninth corps 
 holding the right and the Fifth corps 
 the left. Cutler's division lay across 
 the railroad, Cra-vvford's being on its 
 light, Griffin's and Ayres' on its left. 
 At four o'clock in the morning the 
 Confederates opened a heavy artillery 
 fire along the whole line, from the left 
 to the Appomattox, and about seven 
 o'clock made a feint towards the Ninth 
 I'orpa At nine the attack commenced 
 in earnest, with a terrific fire of both 
 Holid shot and shell from all their bat- 
 
 teries, \vhich was replied to with at 
 least equal power. Shortly afterwards 
 the enemy's column emerged from the 
 woods and dashed in fine style across 
 the open space in front of the National 
 breast-works. It was intended that the 
 attack should be made in two columns, 
 one in front, the other in flank ; but the 
 flanking column on the left of the rail- 
 road, instead of striking the extreme 
 left, under Griffin, fell upon the right 
 of Ayres' division and the left of Cutler's. 
 The National skirmishers were soon 
 driven in, and their pits taken ; but on 
 approaching the works, the Confederates 
 were received with a steady fire of 
 musketry, and although they again and 
 again advanced to the charge, they 
 were always repulsed. On the right, 
 they did not succeed in reaching th 
 main works, and suffered much fron« 
 both artillery and musketry. On th 
 left, a colmnn which approached by the 
 Vaughan road was caught with a cross 
 fire; large niimbers threw down their 
 arms and surrendered, and the remain- 
 der exposed to a hot fire, hastily with- 
 drew. An effort to flank the extreme 
 left also failed. The main force of the 
 attack, however, fell on the divisions of 
 Ayres and Cutler. The battle was brief 
 — lasting only two hours. It was 
 nevertheless one "f the most desperate 
 contests of the campaign. In the 
 stmggle the Confederate generals 
 Saunders and Lamar were killei 
 
 On the morning of the 22d it wa* 
 discovered that the enemy, had retired 
 and intienched himself about 3 miles 
 from Petersburg. Skirmishers were 
 then thrown out, and both armies went 
 
REAMS' STATION. 
 
 76t 
 
 ro work industriously witli the spade. 
 The picket lines were busily engaged in 
 skirmishing all day ; but there was no 
 general engagement. During the pre- 
 vious week, one division of the Second 
 corjis had been withdravpTi from Deep 
 Bottom and hurried back to Petersburg. 
 It tooK possession of the intrenchments 
 vacated by the Fifth corps when it 
 marched for the Weldon Railroad. The 
 other two divisions, with Gregg's caval- 
 ry and the Tenth corps, also left Deep 
 Bottom on the night of the 20th, where 
 Foster's briarade remained alone. March- 
 ing rapidly all night, the two divisions 
 of the Second corps reached the lines 
 of the Ninth on the morning of the 21st, 
 and on the 2 2d Barlow's division, tem- 
 porarily commanded by Miles, was set 
 to tearing up the track of the Weldon 
 Railroad in the rear of the Fifth corps 
 towards Reams' Station, in which it was 
 joined by Gibbon's division on the fol- 
 lovnng day The Fifth corps a_30 tore 
 up a portion of the track towards Peters- 
 burg, so that by the night of the 24th 
 the railroad was thoroughly destroyed 
 from a point four miles below Petere- 
 burg down to two miles below Reams' 
 Station. The cavalry under Gregg 
 covered the work of the infantry during 
 these operations, and had several skirm- 
 ishes vdth the enemy. 
 
 On the morning of the 25th, Gibbon's 
 division of the Second corps moved 
 
 Aug. 
 
 down the railroad below Reams' 
 
 26. to continue the work of destruc- 
 tion ; but when about a mile below the 
 station, its advance, consisting of caval- 
 ry, was suddenly checked and driven 
 back by the enemy's picket line. 
 
 Smythe's brigade of infantiy was at 
 once pushed forward and deployed as 
 skirmishers, the cavalry retiring behind 
 them. Smythe drove back the enemy's 
 skirmish line some distance, but pres- 
 ently meeting a stronger force, was 
 himself compelled to fall back to the 
 main body of the division, which was 
 now in line of battle, the Third brigade 
 on the right of the track, the First on 
 the left, the other troops in suppoi-t 
 Before noon the enemy had appeared 
 in some force on Gibbon's left, making 
 towards his real" but this movement 
 was checked by a party of Gregg's cav- 
 alry, and the Confederates were driven 
 off. A little later some cavalry of the 
 enemy appeared in front, in the direction 
 of Dinwiddie Conrt House, but were 
 checked by Chapman's cavalry brigade 
 While this desultory fighting was going 
 on m the neighborhood of Gibbon'6 
 division. General Hill was making pre 
 parations to attack that under Miles at 
 Reams' Station. It occupied the old 
 intrenchments constructed by the Sirth 
 coi-ps, which in a semicircular form par 
 tially surrounded the station, and cov 
 ered the railroad both above and below 
 that point. The enemy appeared in 
 front of Miles soon after twelve o'clock, 
 and Hancock immediately ordered Gib- 
 bon to fall back and form a junction with 
 the left of Miles. The cavaby followed 
 and was disposed so as to cover the 
 left flank and rear. Gibbon an-anged 
 his line so that it faced the south and 
 southeast, looking down the railroad. 
 About two o'clock the enemy's skirmish 
 line advanced and swept forward with 
 the accustomed battle yell ; but it soon 
 
766 
 
 PETERSBURG. 
 
 fell back in confusion under a sharp 
 fire from infantry and artUleiy, suffering 
 severely. Skirmishing followed till 
 about half-past three, when the enemy's 
 column emerged from the woods in close 
 ine of battle, and with bayonets fixed 
 rushed towards the National works. At 
 the distance of twenty paces it was met 
 oy a murderous fire of musketry and of 
 artillery from 4 batteries, when it re- 
 coiled, broke, and hastened back under 
 cover, having suffered frightful loss. 
 Another assault, made an hour later, 
 had a similar lesult. 
 
 The Confederates now began to fell 
 trees for the purpose of planting batter- 
 ies; and notwithstanding shells were 
 thrown among them, they succeeded at 
 length in getting a very heavy concen- 
 tric fire upon the National lines, into 
 .vhich they poured shell and shot with- 
 out an instant's cessation for twenty 
 minutes, and with a most desti-uctive 
 eflEect. The result was that the Nation- 
 aI troops became to a certain extent 
 demoralized ; and when at last the 
 shelling ceased and the enemy's storm- 
 mg column again advanced with renewed 
 fury, the fire with which it was received 
 was less vigorous than before. The 
 (eft and centre of Miles' division, upon 
 which the blow fell, allowed the enemy 
 to gain the breast-works, and after a 
 bloody hftndto-hand contest, the Nation- 
 si lines were broken through, and a 
 genera) rout followed, although some 
 regiments and companies remained 
 fighting with heroic determination. Of 
 the 12 gims which had been used with 
 tmch destructive effect during the day, 
 \f were lost. At this crisis a part of 
 
 Gibbon's division was hurried acroae 
 the rear from the left, under a heavy 
 fire, to the support of Miles, a distance 
 of more than half a mile, and arrived 
 in time to drive back the enemy in that 
 quarter, though at a fearful cost in 
 killed and woimded. Thus aided. Miles 
 was enabled to rally his division and 
 partially restore his lines. But while 
 a portion of Gibbon's troops were thus 
 employed, a fierce attack was being 
 made on the left by a large force of the 
 enemy, consisting of Heth's division of 
 infantry and Hampton's divi«.ion of cav- 
 alry, equalling in impetus that which 
 had been made on the centre. Gibbon's 
 troops, already exhausted by their exer- 
 tions, were hurried back to the left, 
 where the enemy was in great force. 
 Although desperately resisted by some 
 brave regiments, who allowed them 
 selves to be cut to pieces rather than 
 give way, the Confederates overpowered 
 all opposition ; and Hancock was finally 
 compelled to withdraw his corps from 
 Reams' Station and retire towards the 
 lines of the Fifth corps. Gregg had in 
 the mean time brought his dismounted 
 cavalry to the assistance of the infantry 
 and the enemy, who had suffered veiy 
 severely, did not pursue. Thus ended 
 the battle of Reams' Station — one of 
 the most obstinately contested battles of 
 the war. The National loss was votj 
 heavy, amounting to not less than 30()!! 
 of which 2000 were prisoners. Seven 
 stands of colors and 9 cannon were also 
 lost. The enemy's loss in killed and 
 wounded was about 1 500. The Nation 
 al forces continued to hold the Weldon 
 Railroad at Yellow Tavern. 
 
FEIENDLY FEELING. 
 
 767 
 
 On the 25th the Eighteenth corps, 
 on the right of the National line before 
 Petersburg, and the Tenth corps at 
 Deep Bottom and Bermuda Hundred, 
 had begim exchanging positions. These 
 movements produced a demonstration 
 jn the part of General Pickett in front 
 of Butler's position. Opening fire from 
 the long silent artillery, the enemy 
 reinforced his skirmish line and ad- 
 vanced it against that of General Butler. 
 A sharp flght ensued ; but the enemy 
 soon withdrew, losing 60 prisoners. 
 The killed and wounded wo-.a few on 
 either side. The movement of the 
 troops was then continued, and was 
 completed during the night of the 26th. 
 
 The shelling of Petersburg was re- 
 sumed with great vigor on the 29th, 
 and was continued for some time all 
 along the line with a fury unparalleled 
 for many weeks, but the casualties re- 
 sulting from it were few. There was 
 at the same time considerable artil- 
 lery firing between batteries and gun- 
 boats on the James in the vicinity of 
 the Dutch Gap Canal, the work on 
 which, was being vigorously prosecuted 
 
 Since the destruction of a portion of 
 the Weldon Railroad the enemy had 
 had recourse to wagons, to convey their 
 supplies from Stoney Creek, eight miles 
 south of Reams' Station, around by the 
 Boydton plank road to Petersburg; 
 Sept. and on the 2d of September, 
 
 2. Gregg made an important recon- 
 iioissance in that direction. At daylight 
 his cavalry, supported by Crawford's 
 livision of the Fifth corps, moved out 
 some distance; and Smith's brigade 
 marched up the Vaughan road towards 
 
 the plank road and in the direction of 
 Petersburg. The plank road was dis- 
 covered to be well fortified Retumiag, 
 Smith was attacked by some of the 
 enemy's cavalry, but escaped withou 
 much loss. The whole force then re 
 turned to camp. 
 
 As usual during periods of compara- 
 tive inaction, friendly intercourse be- 
 tween pickets and the exchange of 
 newspapers began to take place along 
 a part of the lines. When such a tacit 
 truce existed, the men were accustomed 
 to walk about at their ease in front of 
 the works, trusting fully in the honor 
 of their antagonists. But, on the 1st 
 of September, while a large numbei 
 were thus promenading outside the 
 trenches, the National batteries com 
 menced playing on the town, and a 
 voDey of musketry was fired in reply 
 from the Confederate works, on the 
 exposed troops, of whom some 200 
 were killed or woimded. This put an 
 end to amicable relations for some time. 
 On the night of the 4th, about eleven 
 o'clock, news of the fall of Atlanta 
 having arrived in camp, a S8 ate was 
 ordered of 100 shotted gims .U along 
 the line from the extreme rig • t to the 
 extreme left. To the roar of tne artil 
 lery the troops added their enthusiastic 
 cheers, and the enemy, apprehending a 
 general attack, replied briskly, but the 
 firing was discontinued about one 
 o'clock. 
 
 For several days along Grant's now 
 extended lines, little of importance 
 occurred beyond the usual desultory 
 cannonading at intervals. On the left, 
 near the Jerusalem plant road, the 
 
768 
 
 PETERSBURG. 
 
 National and Confederate lines Had 
 been for some time in such close prox- 
 imity, that at one point the opposing 
 pickets could converse without diffi- 
 culty. Hancock determined to drive 
 the enemy out of this advanced posi- 
 tion, as being too commanding and 
 dangerous, and gave orders to Mott, 
 whose division lay opposite to the point 
 in question, to direct a movement 
 against it. Accordingly, at one o'clock 
 Sept. on the morning of the 10th, the 
 10. Ninety-Ninth Pennsylvania and 
 the Twentieth Indiana were sent under 
 General De Trobriand to carry the 
 work. The approach was made silently, 
 the enemy's picket line was surj^rised, 
 and the position was flanked and taken, 
 with very little firing. The affair was 
 a perfect success. The enemy opened 
 an artillery fire, and, somewhat later, 
 made a vigorous but unsuccessful effort 
 to recover the lost ground. Ninety 
 prisoners were taken, while the Nation- 
 al loss was less than 20. 
 
 On the 14th the long continued de- 
 sultoiy firing was followed by a fierce 
 cannonade directed on Petersburg, shells 
 being thrown into the city for two 
 hours at the rate of 20 a minute. This 
 the enemy replied to, by bombarding 
 the single towers which had been 
 erected on the Appomattox, and by 
 shelling the working party on the Dutch 
 Gap Ganal. Very early on the morn- 
 mg of the 15th, movements of the ene- 
 my's cavalry on the left having been 
 reported, a brigade of the Fifteenth 
 corps, preceded by several regiments of 
 cavalry, was sent out towards the 
 Vaughan road. The enemy's lines at 
 
 Poplar Spring Church were broken 
 through, and reconnoissances made 
 in various directions ; but although 
 Bearing's cavalry was encountered and 
 a little skirmishing took place, the 
 troops finally returned to camp without 
 having discovered the character of the 
 enemy's movement, which proved to be 
 the most daring and successful raid of 
 the campaign. Setting out from Reams' 
 Station on the morning of the 15th, 
 Hampton, with a body of cavalry, con- 
 sisting of 4 brigades, and 2 batteries, 
 marched rapidly around the National 
 left, and appeared suddenly on the 
 morning of the 16th, in the rear of the 
 centre. His object was to seize a herd 
 of 2500 cattle at Sycamore Chm-ch 
 about a mile south of Coggin's Point 
 on the James, and nine miles northeast 
 of Prince George Coiirt House. Spear's 
 cavalry brigade was picketed arounc? 
 the point to be attacked ; but the eiie 
 my rushed in so unexpectedly, ggpj 
 that it was taken completely by 16. 
 surprise. The* pickets were quickly 
 driven in ; and two regiments, the 
 Thirteenth Pennsylvania and the First 
 District of Columbia, were entirely 
 broken and stampeded, the latter being 
 captured entire with all its horses, arms, 
 equipments, wagons, and camp. The 
 enemy, by making a wide detour around 
 the National left, had succeeded com- 
 pletely in concealing his movements. 
 As soon as the cattle were secured, thej 
 were driven off. Hampton's troopers 
 then set out on their return, pursued 
 by the divisions of Gregg and Kautz, 
 aa far as Belcher's Mill on the Jerusfr 
 lem plank road. At this point the 
 
CHAPIN'S FAEM. 
 
 7«& 
 
 Confederates under Rosser and Dealing 
 made a stand and repulsed an attack 
 made on them by the brigades of Smith 
 and Stednian. The other portions of 
 Hampton's column moved ofi with the 
 cattle at their leisui-e. By this daring 
 and skilful operation, Hampton se- 
 cured an abundant supply of meat 
 for Lee's army. Besides the cattle, he 
 canied ofE 300 prisonei-s, 200 mules, 
 and 32 wagons. Among the captures 
 was also a telegraphic construction 
 corps of 40 men, with their train and 
 20 miles of wire. The entire loss of 
 the enemy did not exceed 50. While 
 Hampton's raid was in progress, the 
 entire skiniiish line of the Fifth corps 
 was driven into the intrenchments, with 
 the loss of 90 men made prisoners. 
 From the 16th to the 23d, sharp picket 
 filing was kept up along the Ime re- 
 sulting in many casualties. 
 
 On the night of the 28th, the army 
 Sept. ^^ *^^ James, xinder Butler, con- 
 
 28. sisting of the Tenth corps under 
 Bimey, holding the right of the main 
 line before Petersburg ; the Eighteenth 
 corps, under Ord, at Bermuda Hun- 
 dred, and Kautz's division of cavalry, 
 were quietly but rapidly moved from 
 their positions, in light marching order, 
 to the James, over which they crossed, 
 on muffled pontoon bridges, the Tenth 
 c<^)rps to Deep Bottom, and the Eight- 
 eenth to Aiken's Landing, about mid- 
 way between Deep Bottom and Dutch 
 Gap. At daylight on the morning of 
 the 29th, the Eighteenth corps advanced 
 by the Varina road, which runs in a 
 
 northwesterly direction to the New 
 Market road. Having proceeded about 
 
 a mile the enemyu pickets were met, 
 and skirmishing began, Stannai'd's di- 
 vision in the advance. Two or three 
 miles from Aiken's Landing, a long line 
 of iatrenchments was found running 
 westward from the road to the James 
 and ending there in a well-constmcted 
 fort. The region traversed by these 
 intrenchments is in the neighborhood 
 of Chapin's and Ball's blnffs, and was 
 known as Chapin's Fann. In front of 
 the fortifications was an open plain. 
 Line of battle was formed in the woods 
 on the edge of this plain, Stannard's 
 division on the left near the live?', 
 Heckmn.'s on the right. The third 
 division under Paine was operating ^vith 
 the Tenth corps on a different road. 
 In front of Stannard were sti'ong con- 
 nected forts, including the works kno\vn 
 as Battery Harrison. The latter was 
 well provided with artillery and sur- 
 rounded by a wide and deep ditch. In 
 front of Heckman was a line of lifle- 
 pits defended by infantiy. The troops 
 having been formed under cover of the 
 woods, dashed across the plain under a 
 heavy fire from the forts and rifle-jiita 
 and from the gun-boats in the river, 
 and carried the entire line of works, 
 including Battery Hanison, capturing 
 16 pieces of artillery and 200 prisoners. 
 The attack was, in fact, a surprise. 
 Fortunately there were but few troops 
 in the works, and these mostly inex- 
 perienced, or the affair would have 
 been much more bloody. As it wa.«, 
 the success was purchased at a hi^avj 
 cost, the National loss being about 800 
 The fighting was all over by ten o'clock 
 and the men were set to work throwing 
 
770 
 
 PETERSBUKG. 
 
 up breast- works and strengthening their 
 position. The Confederate gun-boats 
 and batteries on the other side of the 
 James, however, kept up such an annoy- 
 ing fire that it was found impossible to 
 hold the portion of the works on the 
 left near the river. They were there- 
 fore abandoned. 
 
 The Tenth corps had in the mean 
 time marched from Deep Bottom 
 towards New Market, crossing Four 
 Mile Creek. The enemy was found at 
 the junction of that road with the New 
 Market road, where strong breast- works 
 had been constructed in a commanding 
 position called New Market Heights, a 
 marshy tract of ground in front, covered 
 with stunted trees and a dense \mder- 
 gi-owth besides being obstructed by an 
 abatis. Over this piece of difficult 
 groimd Paine's colored troops were 
 directed to charge. In spite of the 
 formidable obstacles in their path, and 
 under a very destructive musketry fire, 
 they rushed to the works and carried 
 them at the point of the bayonet with- 
 out firing a shot. This position being 
 the key-point of the line of defenses, 
 was stoutly defended by the Confeder- 
 ates ; but nothing could withstand the 
 impetuous onset of the colored troops. 
 Terry's division of the Tenth coi-ps 
 pushed in on the right and flanked the 
 enemy, who fell back from the heights 
 and Terry immediately occupied them. 
 The National loss was about 1500, sus- 
 tained chiefly by the colored division; 
 that of the enemy was much less. Bir- 
 ney then pushed on in the direction of 
 Richmond, along the New Market road, 
 to the point where the Mill road enters 
 
 it, three miles west of New Market 
 After carrying some feebly defended 
 earth-works here, the advance drove the 
 enemy as far as the junction of the 
 Varina and New Market roads, six 
 miles southeast of Richmond Here, 
 on Laurel Hill, was found a substantial 
 fortification called Fort Gilmer, consist- 
 ing of a semicircular main work ^th 
 other works on each side, a wide and 
 deep ditch extending in front of the 
 intrenchments. The advance was im- 
 mediately deployed on the right, »nd 
 W. Bimey's colored brigade on the 
 left. About two o'clock an assault 
 was ordered, and several charges werr 
 made ; but each time the troops wen 
 compelled to retire with great loss, 
 a severe artillery and musketry fir* 
 from both flank and front completelj 
 sweeping the open space over whicl 
 the storming parties had to move. Th< 
 colored troops on the left succeeded ii) 
 reaching the ditch ; but the few men 
 who mounted the parapet never return 
 ed. It soon became evident that the 
 position was too strong to be taken, and 
 before dusk the troops were called off. 
 The enemy was left in secure possession 
 of Laurel Hill, having suffered but '■ ttle 
 loss, while that of the Nationalb was 
 not less than 500. 
 
 Kautz having early in the icioming 
 reconnoitred the roads before the ad 
 vance of the infantry columns, tiirned 
 off about nine o'clock to the right and 
 moved up the Central road toward? 
 Richmond, in which direction he mel 
 no opposition till within two or thret 
 miles of the city, when a fort ne*r tht 
 tollgate opened upon him. Terry aJeo 
 
BATTERY HARRISON. 
 
 771 
 
 whose division had been sent to the 
 support of Kautz, marched across from 
 the New Market to the Central road, 
 and pressing on rapidly came within 
 sight of the spires of Richmond. But 
 both withdrew about sundown. The 
 country had been found full of fortifi- 
 cations, and the enemy everywhere 
 showed a disposition to resist. The line 
 of the army at night was formed with 
 the Tenth corps in the centre, the cav- 
 alry on the right, and the Eighteenth 
 corps on the left. 
 
 About two in the afternoon of the 
 30th, the Confederates, having been 
 largely reinforced from Petersburg 
 during the night and morning, appeared 
 in great force in front of Battery Har- 
 rison and the line of captured works 
 now held by the Eighteenth corps. 
 Their plan of attack was, to break 
 through these and separate the Eight- 
 en th and Tenth corps. The blow fell, 
 therefore, on the right of the Eighteenth 
 and the left of the Tenth. The action 
 was commenced by a cannonade from 
 Sept. *^^ enemy of fifteen or twenty 
 30. minutes' duration, followed by a 
 charge on Paine's colored division, now 
 getting position on the right of the 
 Eighteenth corps, and on W. Bimey's 
 colored brigade, on the left of the Tenth. 
 But Paine and Bimey held their ground 
 well, delivering a witheiing fire of 
 musketry, while the batteries made 
 great devastation in the charging col- 
 lunn. The weight of the attack fell, 
 however, on Stannard's division. Form- 
 uig in three strong lines on the edge of 
 the woods, the Confederates charged 
 npon it with great fury under cover of 
 
 a hot shelling from their gun-boats and 
 an enfilading fire from the batteries on 
 the other side of the river. Stannard's 
 men had been instructed to lower theii 
 pieces ; and theu* fire was incessant and 
 murderous. Three times the Confed- 
 erates charged ; but each tims, although 
 they got near the works, they were 
 driven back with great slaughter to 
 their cover in the woods. They lost 
 in this affair, including 200 prisoners, 
 of whom 20 were officers, nearly 800 
 men. The National loss did not exceed 
 200. At night heavy rain fell, continu 
 ing through the following day and 
 night; and the surface of the country 
 was soon covered with deep mud, ren 
 dering the movement of artillery and 
 wagons, and even the march of troops, 
 exceedingly difficult. 
 
 These movements on the north side 
 of the James having, as was intet ied, 
 induced Lee to send off a great pi-'.t of 
 his forces in that direction. Gran* who 
 had for several days been making.; pre- 
 parations for the movement, despatched 
 on the 30th a column from the left flank. 
 The National force remaining near 
 Petersburg while the army of the James 
 was operating towards Richmond, con 
 sisted of three corj5s and the second 
 division of cavalry. Of these the 
 Second corps and parts of the Fifth and 
 Ninth were now left to hold the long 
 line of the Weldon Railroad and Peters- 
 burg intrenchments, while two divisions 
 of the Ninth corps with two division 
 and a brigade of the Fifth were consti 
 tuted a column of advance undei 
 Warren. On the 29th, a reconnoissance 
 had been made by Gregg's cavalrv 
 
rr2 
 
 PETEESBURG. 
 
 supported by two biigades of infantry, 
 towards the Poplar Spring Church 
 road beyond the Vaughan turnpike. 
 On leaching the Weldon Railroad 
 Gregg struck off to the south of Yellow 
 Tavern, but after sending the different 
 origades in various directions fell back 
 again. About five o'clock the enemy, 
 who had followed Gregg on his return, 
 attacked him with two pieces of artillery; 
 and skirmishing, resulting in little loss 
 to either side, continued till dark, when 
 'Ti-egg retmned to his former lines. 
 
 On the following morning the column 
 under Wan-en set out from Four Mile 
 Station on the Weldon Railroad, the 
 headquarters of the Fifth corjjs, the 
 cavalry under Gregg on the extreme left, 
 while the divisions of Griffin and Ayres, 
 with Hoffman's brigade of the Fifth 
 corps, followed by the divisions of 
 Willcox and Potter and several ltf»+tei- 
 ies, moved out in the direction of Poplar 
 Grove, on the South Side Railroad, 15 
 miles west of Four Mile Station. The 
 march was made in a northwesterly 
 du-ection ; and soon after twelve o'clock, 
 haviag struck the Squirrel Level road, 
 Peebles' Faiin was reached, about three 
 miles from the railroad and four or five 
 southwest of Petersburg. Here was 
 discovered a redoubt, called Fort 
 McRae, in which were several small 
 rifled guns, and connected with it a 
 strong line of intrenchments on com- 
 manding ridges. In front was an open 
 space of ground swept by the guns of 
 the redoubt. The task of charging 
 uver this and capturing the crest was 
 assigned to Grifiin's division, which 
 advanced in three lines one behind 
 
 another, and earned the works, driving 
 the enemy out at every point and taking 
 about 50 prisoners and one gun. The 
 National loss was about 150. The 
 column then re-foi-med ; and the march 
 being resumed the enemy was found 
 occupying a strong work on a hill half 
 a mile further on. At five o'clock 
 Potter's division, attempting to press 
 up the acclivity on which the Confed- 
 erates were posted, sustained a severe 
 repulse, and being in its turn charged, 
 was thrown into confusion. A flanking 
 column of the enemy now appeared in 
 gi-eat force, broke in between the divis 
 ions of the Fifth and Ninth corps, and 
 swept off more than 1500 prisoners 
 chiefly from Potter's division. The 
 further progress of the enemy, however, 
 was checked by the rapid approacii &i 
 Griffin's division. The National loss 
 was over 2500, of which 1600 belonged 
 to Potter's division. The Confederate 
 loss did not exceed 500. 
 
 Od the 1st of October the enemy 
 made two attacks on the division Q^^ 
 under Ayres, but both were easily 1 . 
 repulsed. Another was made, in the 
 pouring rain, by Hampton's cavalry 
 division, upon Gregg, who covered the 
 left flank beyond the Vaughan road. 
 Hampton succeeded in driving him 
 back from one line of intrenchments to 
 another, but finally retired taking with 
 him 100 prisoners. The National force 
 continued to hold intrenchments four 
 miles fi'om the South Side RaUroad, 
 connecting on the right with the old 
 line of works at Petersburg ; but the 
 enemy retained and used the railroad. 
 On the 2d, General Mott moved out 
 
ATTACK ON THE NATIONAL RIGHT. 
 
 773 
 
 towards the Boydton plank-road, over 
 which supplies were now conveyed in 
 wagons to Petersburg ; but the enemy 
 was found strongly intrenched in 'front 
 of the road, and Mott was compelled to 
 
 f^tire, with a loss of 100 men. 
 
 Meanwhile, there had been some 
 activity on the north side of the James. 
 On ihe morning of the 1st of October, 
 General Terry, preceded by Kautz's 
 cavalry, made a reconnoissance towards 
 Richmond on the Central or Darbytown 
 and Charles City roads. When within 
 3 miles of the city the Confederate skir- 
 mishers were encotmtered and driven in, 
 and Terry continued to advance until 
 he approached the main line of defenses, 
 which ran across both roads ; but fur- 
 ther progress was prevented by vigor- 
 ous shelling on the part of the enemy. 
 After reconnoitring carefully, TeiTy 
 and Kautz returned at night, having 
 suffered but little loss. The rain and 
 mud caused a suspension of operations, 
 beyond reconnoitring and intrenching. 
 Nothing of importance occurred till the 
 7th, when the enemy made a sudden 
 and partially successful attempt to turn 
 the right flank of the army of the James. 
 This flank lay in a line running to the 
 northeast of Battery Harrison, where 
 the Eighteenth corps was firmly in- 
 trenched, about 7 miles south of Rich- 
 mond. To the right of the Eighteenth 
 corps lay the Tenth, across the New 
 Market and Central roads ; and on the 
 extreme right was the cavalry of 
 
 teneral Kautz, consisting of only two 
 Brigades vmder Spear and West, with 
 two batteries, each of four 3-inch rifled 
 guns, resting on the Charles City road, 
 
 at a distance of 5 miles southeast of 
 Richmond. At an early hour in the 
 morning a large force of the enemy 
 under General Anderson, consist- qcj 
 ing of two full divisions of in- 7. 
 fantry and a brigade of cavalry, aj)- 
 proached by the Darbytown and Charles 
 City roads, and fell unexpectedly upon 
 Kautz's cavalry. Taken completely b} 
 surprise Kautz's troops broke into t 
 perfect rout and scattered over the 
 country in the rear, followed by the 
 batteries, which being left without sup- 
 port could not remain in safety. They 
 were soon imbedded in mud, and cap 
 tured with all the caissons and most ol 
 the horses. Kautz lost 300 of his men 
 in captured, killed and wounded. The 
 Confederates having now stampeded the 
 National cavalry and got possession of 
 the Central road, advanced towards the 
 Tenth corps, which lay in a strongly 
 intrenched line, its right held by Terry 
 who with the first division covered the 
 New Market road, — the troops being 
 disposed in rifle-pits in the thick woods. 
 On the left of the line of the Tenth 
 corps the ground was open ; and on this 
 side was posted the artillery, consisting 
 of four 6-gun batteries, so planted as 
 not only to sweep the ground in front, 
 but to some extent that over which the 
 right must be approached by the enemy 
 Of Terry's division, upon which the 
 attack fell, Pond's brigade held the left, 
 Abbott's the centre, and Plaisted's the 
 right. Curtis' brigade of Foster's divis- 
 ion was also brought up and placed in 
 line with these. When the Confeder- 
 ates approached, between nine and ten 
 o'clock, they found themselves under a 
 
 «*o 
 
774 
 
 PETERS BITRG. 
 
 cross fire of artillery from the National 
 left. An attempt was made to reply 
 by two batteries; but these were soon 
 overpowered. In the meantime Field's 
 infantry division dashed over the open 
 Bpace at the double-quick, and in spite 
 of the felled trees, succeeded in gaining 
 the woods on the National right. The 
 National troops in the woods remained, 
 quiet tin the enemy got very close, in 
 front of the centre under Abbott, when 
 the four brigades above mentioned rose 
 from their places of concealment and 
 poured into the advancing column a 
 most destructive fire — that of Abbott's 
 brigade, which was pai-tially armed with 
 the Spencer repeating rifle, proving very 
 deadly, as the fighting took place within 
 short range. The Confederates, how- 
 ever, continued the struggle for some 
 time. At length, after a vain though 
 iesperate rush on Pond's brigade, they 
 were compelled to withdraw. Terry's 
 division was then put in motion to 
 follow and, if possible, to flank the 
 enemy, causing him to fall back to the 
 Charles City road, leaving the Central 
 road to the National troops. While the 
 struggle was proceeding on the right of 
 the army of the James, a demonstration 
 was made by the enemy on the left, at 
 Battery Harrison, but without result. 
 The National loss during the day did 
 not exceed 500. 
 
 There was anothw breathing spell, 
 which lasted for several days. The 
 Nationals continued to intrench busily 
 along the lines they held. The enemy's 
 iron-clads near Cox's Ferry annoyed to 
 some extent the picket line on the left 
 flank of the Eighteenth corps with an 
 
 enfilading fire; but comparatively few 
 casualties occurred. The work on th« 
 Dutch Gap Canal was prosecuted indus- 
 triously, subject to an artillery fire from 
 Howlett's battery, which, however, the 
 National gun-boats and batteries suc- 
 ceeded in temporarily silencing on the 
 11th. On the 13th, General Butler put 
 87 prisonei-s at labor under the enemy's 
 fire at the canal, in retaliation for Con- 
 federate ill-treatment of National color- 
 ed soldiers at Fort Gilmer. 
 
 On the 12th, General Terry, tempora 
 rily commanding the Tenth corps, made 
 a reconnoissance in force towards q^^^ 
 the right, taking with him the first 12. 
 division under Ames, the colored divis- 
 ion under W. Birney, and a part of 
 Kautz's cavalry division. The colmnn 
 set out in the evening, but halted during 
 the night. In the morning it moved 
 again, and struck the Central road neai 
 the point from which Kautz's command 
 was driven on the 7tli. The cavalry 
 then stretched out to the Charles City 
 road, dismounted and deployed as skir- , 
 mishers, thus covering the extreme right 
 between that road and the Central road ; 
 whUe W. Birney deployed on the left of 
 the Central road, and Ames on the right 
 towards the left of the cavalry. About 
 seven o'clock the Confederate videttet 
 were encountered on the Charles Cit] 
 road, and driven back over a mile 
 towards a series of intrenchments whicl- 
 blocked the way. There they halted 
 and as soon as the Nationals wer 
 within easy range, they opened a sharp 
 and merciless fire. This was quickly 
 returned ; but Terry's object being to 
 discover the length and strength of thie 
 
(JHAKLES CITY KOAD. 
 
 77B 
 
 new line of the enemy, he kept his 
 troops as much as possible under the 
 shelter of a strip of woods in front of 
 the works. Continuing to push out 
 brigades in reconnoitring charges, at 
 various points, he soon felt the whole 
 series of intrenchments ; but made no 
 serious demonstrations, except on the 
 enemy's extreme left, which, it was sup- 
 posed, was overiapped by the National 
 right, and whicii Pond's brigade was 
 ordered to turn. The works at this 
 point were, however, found to be re- 
 fused ; and as the National troops 
 rushed forward they were caught by an 
 enfilading fire and suffered severely. 
 This encouraged the Confederates to 
 sally from their breast- works on other 
 parts of the line, and charge with all 
 their available force. It was not, how- 
 ever, attended with much success ; and 
 soon after four in the afternoon the 
 National troops were withdrawn un- 
 broken. Before darkness fell, they were 
 back within their own intrenchments. 
 The losses were unimportant. 
 
 On the left, to the west of the Wei- 
 don Railroad, a reconnoissance was 
 made on the 8th, somewhat similar to 
 that made by Terry and Kautz. It was 
 \ general advance of the Fifth and Ninth 
 corps, the object being to feel the ene- 
 my's position, to push forward the lines, 
 and to occupy if possible aU the series 
 of works connected with Fort McRae 
 which had been taken. The Fifth corjis, 
 temporarily under Crawford, moved out 
 on the West Halifax, Vaughan, and 
 Squirrel Level roads ; and of the Ninth 
 corps, temporarily under Parke, Pot- 
 ter's division pushed out near the Pe- 
 
 gram House, and Willcox's took the 
 Church road, Ferrero's division being 
 left in reserve. WUlcox got as far as 
 the Boydton plank road, but foimd it 
 strongly defended by lines of intrench 
 ments. After a day spent in skirmish 
 ing and hard marching, both corps re- 
 turned to camp. 
 
 In front of the Second corps at Pe 
 tersburg a great deal of skirmishing 
 and mortar firing occurred from time 
 to tinae, especially at the redoubt where 
 the picket lines were closest — a work 
 which had been captured by De Trob- 
 riand about a month before, and since 
 named Fort Sedgwick. The soldiers 
 gave it the name of " Fort Hell" On 
 the 8th this firing was very severe, and 
 on the 11th the enemy's cannonading 
 was so vigorous and prolonged that it 
 was thought a general attack on tht 
 National lines was intended. 
 
 There was comparative quiet again 
 untU the 26th. In the meantime, Grant 
 had been completing his plans for an 
 other movement against the stubborn 
 defenses of Richmond. He proposed 
 to make a strong feint on the right 
 by the army of the James, which was 
 to move as if aiming to get round the 
 left flank of the enemy, and at ite same 
 time to execute a series of operations of 
 a more determined character by the 
 army of the Potomac, with the object 
 of turning the enemy's right flank neai 
 the South Side Railroad. On the even 
 ing of the 26th the whole army wa 
 ordered to be in readiness to mo re at 
 daybreak, on the following morning. 
 Up to this time the proposed movement 
 had been kept, as was supposed, pr 
 
776 
 
 PETERSBURG. 
 
 foundly secret; and nothing was done 
 whicli could give rise to a suspicion, on 
 the part of the enemy, that an advance 
 would be made for some days. On this 
 evening, however, all disguise was aban- 
 loned; and such arrangements were 
 snade that if the contemplated move- 
 ment proved successful, it would be 
 possible without inconvenience perma- 
 nently to leave the old camp. The sick, 
 the baggage, the commissary stores, 
 5amp equipage, and other property, 
 were sent to City Point ; the sutlers 
 also took their goods thither. Rations 
 for three days were issued to the cav- 
 alry, and for four days to the infantry. 
 The intrenchments at Petersburg were 
 to be held by the artillery, with only 
 yuch infantry support as was absolutely 
 Qecessary. 
 
 The great movement of the army of 
 fbe Potomac commenced on the 27th. 
 Before dawn the entire anny, with the 
 exception of the detachments from each 
 Oct. corps left in the trenches, was on 
 -7. the march — Gregg's cavalry on 
 the extreme left moving towards Reams' 
 Station and then in a westerly direc- 
 tion ; next on the right Egan's second 
 and Mott's third division of the Second 
 corps, with three batteries under Major 
 Hazard, moving southwesterly down the 
 Vaughan road ; then Warren's Fifth 
 corps on the Squirrel Level road ; and 
 laflt of all, on the extreme right, the 
 Xinth corps under Parke, moving as 
 did all the columns in a southwesterly 
 
 direction towards Hatcher's Run 
 
 a small stream rising near Sutherland 
 Station on the South Side Railroad, and 
 Sowing in a southeasterly direction to 
 
 Rowanty Creek, a tributary of the Not- 
 taway. It was intended that the two 
 divisions of the Second corps and 
 Gregg's cavalry should march as se- 
 cretly and as rapidly as possible by a 
 wide detour around the enemy's right 
 flank, and should then seize the line of 
 defenses on Hatcher's Run at the point 
 where the Boydton road crosses it, from 
 which to the South Side Railroad it was 
 supposed little opposition would be met. 
 The Fifth and Ninth corps were at the 
 same time to demonstrate against the 
 works at Hatcher's Run, directly in 
 front ; and the Fifth was to form con- 
 nection with the Second corps there, 
 the Ninth remaining on the right of the 
 Fifth. Hancock and Gregg reached 
 Hatcher's Run by the Vaughan road at 
 half-past seven. The road, at this point, 
 was found much obstructed with felled 
 trees ; and the banks of the stream, par- 
 tially cleared so as to give range from a 
 line of rifle-pits on the opposite bank, . 
 were held by a small force of dismounted 
 cavalry. Egan's division rapidly de- 
 deployed; and Smyth's brigade, form, 
 ing the first line, quickly forded the 
 stream, carried the slight defenses, took 
 about 20 prisoners, and dispersed the 
 remainder of the small force. About 
 noon Hancock and Gregg reached th€ 
 Boydton road. The enemy was found 
 fully on the alert ; and Gregg's troops 
 covering the left, were opened upon 
 from artillery and the carbines ol 
 Young's dismounted cavalry. Grnnt 
 and Meade were both on the ground it 
 this time; and although it was evid nt 
 that the enemy had received info? i& 
 tion of the movement in time to le 
 
BOTUTON BOAD. 
 
 771 
 
 prive it of the character of a surprise, 
 it was thought that an advance might 
 yet be attended with success. Accord- 
 ingly Egan's division was deployed on 
 the right of the Boydton plank road, 
 acing towards the bridge over Hatch- 
 r's Run, Mott's division on the left of 
 ^e road, De Trobriand's brigade con- 
 necting with Gregg on the extreme left ; 
 while McAllister's brigade of Mott's 
 division was placed in the rear to watch 
 the enemy, who had a battery at some 
 distance down the plank road. The 
 bridge was then seized by a skirmish 
 line in the advance of Egan's division 
 and the stream crossed. The next thing 
 to be done was to cairy the enemy's 
 works beyond ; and in order to prepare 
 for this, Egan's division was, about one 
 o'clock, disposed with Price's brigade in 
 he centre, Rugg's on the left, and 
 Smyth's on the right, Beck's battery 
 co-operating on the latter flank. McAl- 
 lister's biigade was withdrawn from 
 watching the enemy in the rear and de- 
 ployed in support of Egan. The Fifth 
 corjis being now heard firing rapidly on 
 the right, the attack on the works was 
 delayed till it should approach and co- 
 operate. Owing however, to the difficult 
 nature of the thickly wooded country 
 in which the operations were being 
 conducted, and the intricacy of the 
 roads, the Fifth corps f aUed to connect ; 
 and after waiting until four o'clock, 
 Hancock prepared to make the assault. 
 The enemy, in the mean time, having 
 discovered that while the left flank 
 of Hancock's force was covered by 
 Gregg's cavalry, his right was entirely 
 anprotected, took the offensive. Mar 
 
 hone's strong division of Hill's corps 
 burst suddenly upon Hancock's right 
 and partially turned it, sweeping off at 
 the same time a section of Beck's bat 
 tery ; then getting across the plank 
 road, it bore down upon Egan in the 
 rear. Egan promptly changed front 
 with his own and McAllister's brig- 
 ades; and with the aid of three bat- 
 teries, after a severe and prolonged 
 fight, he succeeded in repulsing Ma- 
 hone. Egan was now in turn able to 
 attack the Confederates in flank, com- 
 pelling them to abandon the guns they 
 had captured, as well as three of theii 
 own flags, besides taking nearly 1000 
 prisoners and one gun. The loss of the 
 Second corps in this affair was esti 
 mated at 1000 in killed, wounded and 
 prisoners. 
 
 After this attack by Mahone had 
 been repulsed, and just before dark, the 
 enemy, with a force of five brigades, 
 made a vigorous demonstration on the 
 left against Gregg's cavalry. Gregg, at 
 first, fell back; but, soon rallying, he 
 drove back the enemy and re-established 
 his lines. 
 
 Rain had fallen in the afternoon, 
 tending to make manoeuvres difficult* 
 the ammunition was nearly exhausted 
 and so far the Confederates had shown 
 themselves not only vigUant but strong. 
 and had inflicted a loss about as great 
 as they had sustained. There was neeJ 
 for great caution ; and as there wae 
 reason to believe that the enemy would 
 soon gather in greater force, it wat 
 deemed imprudent to prosecute the 
 movement by the left flank Soon after 
 dusk, therefore, the retrograde march 
 
778 
 
 PETERSBURG. 
 
 was commenced by the route taken in 
 the morning. It occupied the entire 
 night and part of the next day. The 
 old camps were regained by the Second 
 corps with comparatively little loss. 
 Many of the wounded, however, had 
 been left on the field, the column not 
 being provided with the means of trans- 
 portation. 
 
 The task of the Fifth and Ninth 
 corps had been to demonstrate against 
 the enemy's works at Hatcher's Run in 
 front, so as to cover the movement of 
 the Second corps by the left and finally 
 to co-operate with it ; but this they 
 had only partially succeeded in accom- 
 plishing. Having only a short distance 
 to march, they had indeed soon made 
 ^heir appearance in front of the works 
 and got into position, the Ninth on the 
 right, the Fifth on the left. Skirmishing 
 was earned on during the greater part 
 of the day by the infantry ; but the use 
 of artillery was made extremely diflBcult 
 in that region by the almost impenetra- 
 ble woods, which rendered military mar 
 noeuvres almost impossible. The enemy 
 being familiar with every inch of the 
 ground had in this respect greatly the 
 advantage. Although the commands 
 of Hancock and Warren were during a 
 great part of the day not very far apart, 
 a junction was rendered altogether im- 
 practicable by the natural obstacles 
 presented in the shape of dark, dense 
 svoods and swampy ground. The ob- 
 scurity of the few miserable roads was 
 such that troops got into the opposing 
 lines, and staff officers lost their way in 
 the forest gloom. The two corps found 
 the enemy's defenses in front, too strong 
 
 to be pierced, and had to content them 
 selves with maintaining their position, 
 which they retained all day and through 
 the night until orders arrived from 
 Grant to fall back. The loss thus sus- 
 tained in manoeuvring and skirmishing 
 was about 500. The aggi-egate losses 
 attending the entire movement by the 
 left flank were not much short of 1500 
 men. The enemy suffered less in killed 
 and wounded, but lost many more in 
 prisoners. Thus ended what is known 
 as the battle of Boydton Road. 
 
 The demonstrations made by Butler 
 and his Tenth corps were comparatively 
 barren of any good results. On the 
 Williamsburg road he was attacked and 
 defeated. On the York River Railroad 
 he captured a fort which he afterwards 
 abandoned. His loss was about 1500 
 men. The Confederates lost about 200. 
 
 At dusk in the evening of the 27th, 
 General Miles, who had been left in the 
 Petersbiirg lines with the first division 
 of the Second corps, under cover of a 
 terrific cannonade, sent a small storming 
 party, consisting of 100 volunteers, un- 
 der Captain Price, against a fort which 
 was situated near the spot where the 
 mine had been exploded in Jidy. This 
 small party, having moved quickly, and 
 as sdently as possible across the inter 
 vening space, clambered over the para 
 pet ; and although Price who led the 
 assault was Idlled, they actually drove 
 the enemy out of the worka Had the 
 attack been made by a larger force it 
 might have resulted disastrously for the 
 enemy ; but as it was impossible for so 
 small a body of men to hold an impor- 
 tant fort against the overwhelming 
 
ATTEMPTED SURPBISEB. 
 
 779 
 
 force which was immediately thrown 
 upon them from right and left, they 
 promptly retreated, losing 10 of their 
 number, but carrying off 30 prisoners, 
 among whom were several officers. 
 
 About ten o'clock on the night of 
 the 30th, the Confederates having ob- 
 tained information as to the strength 
 and position of a portion of the Na- 
 tional picket lines in front of Fort 
 Davis, undertook, and successfully car- 
 ried out, one of those little surprises 
 which, as practised against themselves, 
 they had had frequent and painful 
 Oct. experience. A body of Confed- 
 '^^' erates getting in the rear of the 
 National pickets caUed to them to " fall 
 in." These troops, being mostly raw 
 recruits, and believing themselves to be 
 among friends, promptly obeyed the 
 call, and the entire line, consisting of 
 380 men, was captured. The immedi- 
 ate result of this surprise was to uncover 
 the National intrenchments at the point 
 of junction of the corps of Warren and 
 Hancock. On this unprotected point, 
 the enemy advanced. Fortunately, the 
 National officers had been put on their 
 guard by a sentinel who had escaped 
 his captors ; and when the Confederates 
 came within range they found them- 
 selves under a heavy musketry fire, to 
 which was soon added that of artillery. 
 After about an hour's fighting, in which 
 the loss did not exceed 100 on either 
 side, the enemy withdrew. 
 
 On the 4th of November there was 
 harp skirmishing in the neighborhood 
 >i Fort Sedgwick ; and, on the night of 
 the 5th the enemy succeeded, by a sud- 
 den attack, in getting poesession of a 
 
 considerable portion of the NationaJ 
 picket line in that vicinity, and immedi- 
 ately began to reverse the works Not. 
 and to intrench. At the same time *• 
 another body of the Confederates car 
 ried the picket Une opposite the crater 
 The skirmishing was attended with 
 little loss on either side. It was nec- 
 essary, however, that the enemy should 
 be promptly dislodged ; and a furious 
 cannonade having been opened upon 
 them from the forts and batteries to 
 the right and left, the whole line 
 was aroused. At daybreak, after some 
 desperate fighting, the captured works 
 were recovered ; and the line was re 
 established from Fort Sedgwick to the 
 crater. On the 6th, a similar attack 
 was made by the enemy on the left, 
 but was quickly repulsed. This desul 
 tory %hting, with little result beyond 
 its tendency to wear out both the com 
 batants, had become constant, and is 
 fact, almost monotonous. The men 
 about this time began to build log- 
 huts, the weather having become uncom 
 fortably cold 
 
 On the 1st of December a raid wa* 
 undertaken by Gregg's cavalry against 
 the Weldon Railroad, at Stony Creek 
 Station, 18 miles south of Petersburg. 
 At half-past three in the morning Dee 
 Giegg broke camp and set out in * 
 a southerly direction, his second brig- 
 ade in the advance, the first brigade 
 next, the third in the rear. The enemy's 
 pickets were met before daybreak ; but 
 no serious opposition was encountered 
 until the column arrived at Rowanty 
 Creek, where a cavalry force dis- 
 puted the advaDoe, but was qaickly 
 
T«0 
 
 PETERSBURG 
 
 dispersed. The third, brigade was then 
 jeft to cover the rear; and the column 
 passed on to Duvall's Station, where 
 the first brigade also was dropped, to 
 destroy certain maniifacturing establish- 
 
 nents and to protect the flanks. The 
 ^econd brigade then went on to Stony 
 Ci-eek Station, two miles further on. 
 There they found a well-built fort, 
 which they captured and destroyed, 
 spiking the guns and carrying oflE'the 
 greater portion of the garrison as pris- 
 oners. While this work of destruction 
 was going on, a brigade of Hampton's 
 cavalry came upon the scene. Gregg 
 deemed it convenient to retreat. The 
 Confederates followed, harassing his 
 rear as far as Rowanty Creek. At that 
 point the pursuit was discontinued. 
 The entire loss sustained by Gregg was 
 not over 40, all of whom he managed 
 to cany off, together %vith 175 prisoners 
 and about 100 negroes. 
 
 A few days af tenvards another move- 
 ment, on a much larger scale, was made 
 against the Weldon Railroad, which it 
 was of the utmost importance that the 
 enemy should not be allowed to re- 
 cover. On the 6th of December a 
 heavy column, consisting of the Fifth 
 corps, Mott's division of the Second 
 corps, and Gregg's division of cavalry, 
 Dec. in all about 20,000 men, with 22 
 
 ®* pieces of artillery, under General 
 Warren, was massed on both sides of 
 the AV^eJdon Railroad between the Hali- 
 fax and Jerusalem roads. There the 
 troops bivouacked for the night. Heavy 
 rain extinguished the camp-fires ; but 
 before daybreak the troops were on the 
 inarch, the cavalry starting at four 
 
 o'clock. The column took the Jerusalem 
 road, and struck the Nottaway at the 
 point where Freeman's Bridge had for 
 merly been, about 18 miles south-south 
 east of Petersburg. The cavalry crossed 
 the river, which was about three feet 
 deep, by fording ; the infantry ciossed 
 by a pontoon bridge ; and the whole 
 coliunn was on the south side of the 
 stream before daylight on the morning 
 of the 8th. The cavalry bivouacked at 
 Sussex Court House ; the infantry be- 
 tween that place and the river. At 
 three o'clock the cavalry set off in a 
 southwesterly direction towards Jar- 
 rett's, a station on the raih'oad about 30 
 miles south of Petersburg, the infantry 
 following rapidly. About twelve o'clock 
 the cavalry advance reached the point 
 where the railroad crosses the Notta- 
 way, seized and burned the bridge, and 
 then began to tear up the track. Th 
 infantry arrived soon after and com 
 pleted the work of destruction by burn- 
 ing the sleepers and twisting the rails. 
 This work was continued for 5 miles, 
 as far as Jaixett's Station, where the 
 depot and water tank were destroyed. 
 The following day the column, stiU 
 moving southward, destroyed the track 
 as fai" as Bellfield, on the Meher- 
 rin, 37 miles south of Petersburg. At 
 Three Creek, 3 miles north of Bellfield 
 the enemy burned the bridge and iis 
 puted the passage of the cavahy; bu 
 Dennison's battery having opened upoi 
 them, and the Tenth New York having 
 forded the stream on the National left, 
 and flanked the position, the Confeder 
 ates fell back to Bellfield Hicksford, 
 opposite Bellfield, was found protec*«d 
 
RETURN OF WARREN. 
 
 781 
 
 on both sides of the river by strong 
 intrenchments, within which were some 
 of Hampton's cavalry and a body of 
 militia ; and when the National troops 
 got within range, a hot fire was dii-ected 
 on them. Several charges were made on 
 the enemy's works ; but Warren finally 
 drew the troops off, and most of the cav- 
 alry bivouacked that night noi^th of 
 Three Creek. Up to this time during the 
 march a cold rain had poured down, mak- 
 ing the roads almost impassable ; but 
 now the increasing cold was accompanied 
 with a stoi-m of hail and snow, and the 
 situation of the troops became one of 
 extreme discomfort. It was determined, 
 therefore, not to prosecute operations 
 against Hicksford, the strategic value of 
 which was not sufiSciently great to 
 
 A^ this period in the History of the War the rail- 
 road had become not only a useful but a most potent 
 military factor. It had been, as we have seen, of 
 rignal service at Chattanooga. It had rendered poasi 
 ble Sherman's movement on Atlanta, and had greatly 
 facUitated his March to the Sea. Without the railroad, 
 Thomas would have found it impossible not only to 
 resist the fierce onsets of Hood, but even to maintain 
 himself, in Tennessee ; and the advantages which it 
 secured for the army in front of Petersburg and Rich- 
 mond were many and invaluable. To the end of the 
 war it continued to be an agent of first-class utility 
 and power ; nor is it any disparagement to the rank 
 and file to say that but for the railroad and the admir- 
 able uses to which it was put, the war would have 
 assumed a different character and been attended prob- 
 ebly by a different result. The eitablishment of this 
 oranch of the service was due to the active brain and 
 far-reaching vision of Secretary Stanton : its suc- 
 Mssfol management is to be credited to the skill, 
 ljsp*r"enj»(, activity and untiring energy -of General 
 D. V. McCallum. On the 11th of February, 1862, 
 McCteiium was appointed military direcuir and 
 superintendent of railroads, in the United States, with 
 authority controllable only by the War Department ; 
 and commanding officers everywhere were directed, 
 on pain of dismissal from the serv-ice, not to in- 
 terfere with the working of the new Department. 
 The respunBibilities of the head of the Bailroad 
 :£01 
 
 \vaiTant any heavy sacrifice of life. 
 
 On the morning of the 10th WaiTe& 
 commenced his march back towards the 
 National lines, the enemy follovsdng and 
 attempting to hai-ass his rear. Uis 
 troops got back to camp on the 12th 
 much exhausted, but without having 
 sustained any great loss. 
 
 With the exception of two reconnois 
 sances which were made with a view to 
 direct attention from Warren, this was 
 the last operation of importance in the 
 year. The holiday season came on. 
 The men were allowed some rest, 
 numbers of them obtained furloughs. 
 The festivities proper to the season were 
 not overlooked; and the Christmas of 
 1864 spent in the lines before Peters- 
 burg will not soon be forgotten. 
 
 Department were scarcely second to those of the 
 eneral-in-chief . One of the greatest feats accom- 
 plished by McCallum was when he transferred Hooker 
 with the Eleventh and Twelfth corps, over 23,000 
 strong, with artillery, trains, baggage and animalo 
 from the Rapidan in Virgiiiia, to Stevenson, Alabama, 
 a distance of 1192 miles, within the brief space of 
 seven days. But for the railroad, Hooker could not 
 have been present at Chattanooga ; and few will deny 
 that the success on Lookout Mountain contributed to 
 the final victory at .Missionary Ridge. The work done 
 between Chaltauooga and Atlanta la repairing 138 
 miles of railroad, was scarcely less wonderful. 
 In his report, Gener^ McCallum gives it as his 
 opinion that but for the railroad, Slierman'i' 
 campaign, in jjlace of being a success, "would ha\e 
 resulted in disaster and defeat." An idea of the De- 
 partment and of the magnitude of its work may be 
 obtained from the following figures. At one time, 
 such was the pressure brought to bear on this branch 
 of the service, McC'allum had under him as many as 
 24,964 men. During the war he operated in all 2106 
 miles, and made use of 419 engines and 6330 cara Of 
 bridges he buUt over 26 miles, and of track he laid 
 or relaid 641 mUes. The expenses of the Department 
 amounted to $42,462,145.55. The property when 
 sold realized $12,636,965.83. General .McCallum had 
 several able assistants, among whom were General 
 Anderson, General Devereui and Col. \V. VV. Wrifcht 
 
t8» 
 
 THE SHENANDOAH. 
 
 CHAPTER XXXVII. 
 
 rhc Valley of the Shenandoah — Memoiy of Jackson — Banks and McDowell — Fremont and Shields — The Co- 
 operative Movement — Sigel and Hanter — Ljiichburg — Meadow Bridge — Burbridge^Pound Gap — Th« 
 ESect of Morgan's Retreat — Washington Exposed — The Shenandoah Valley Unguarded — Early's Invasion 
 — Sigel's Betreat — A Panic — Lincoln calls for Militia — General Lewis Wallace at Baltimore — He hastens 
 to the Monocacy — At Frederick — Wallace joined by Ricketts — Preparations to relieve Washington — 
 Wright and Emory — Battle of the Monocacy — A Fierce and Protracted Struggle — The Stone Bridge — 
 Ricketts Outflanked — The Confederate Force — Wallace orders a Betreat — Wallace by his heroic resisunce 
 saves the Capital — Great Excitement in Baltimore and Washington — Approach of Early towards Wash- 
 ington — Near Forts Stevens and De Russey — Augur's Beconnoisance^Early's Retreat — Wright in Pursuit 
 — Snicker's Ferry — Island Ford — Kemstown — Banker Hill Road — Death of Colonel Mulligan — McCans- 
 land at Chambersburg — Burning of Chambersbnrg — McCaasland's Retreat — Pursued by Averill — Panic in 
 Maryland and Pennsylvania — Consolidation — The Middle Military Division — Hunter Believed — Sheridan 
 in Command— Force and Composition of Sheridan's and Early's Armies — Advance of Sheridan up the 
 Shenandoah Valley to Cedar Creek — Mosby attacks Sheridan's Wagon Train — Retreat of Sheridan from 
 Cedar Creek — Destruction of Stock, Grain, etc. — Penrose's Brigade — Massacre near Snicker's Gap — Panic 
 in Maryland — Sheridan at Bolivar Heights — Sheridan at Berryville — Offensive Movements resumed — 
 Battle of Winchester — Advance to Cedar Creek — Battle of Fisher's Hill — Advance to Staunton — Early at 
 Browns Gap — Murder of Lieutenant Meigs — Betreat of Sheridan towards Cedar Creek — Devastation of the 
 Shenandoah Valley — Rosser's Cavalry Stampeded — Position of the Army at Cedar Creek — Early's Noctur- 
 nal Flank Movement — A Daring and Successful Attack — A complete Surprise — Wright compelled to Retreat 
 —At Middletown — Wright again Driven Back — Order Restored — Sheridan stUl Absent — Sheridan's Ridt 
 from Winchester — The Tide of Battle Turned— A complete Victory — End of the Battle at CedAr Creek- 
 Honors to Sheridan. 
 
 1864. 
 
 On more than one occasion already, 
 it has been our duty to linger 
 with the reader in the valley of 
 the Shenandoah. Almost from the 
 commencement of the war, the tide of 
 battle surged in . or around this now 
 famous valley. It was already memora- 
 ble as the scene of Jackson's first great 
 campaign — the scene of the humiliation, 
 if not defeat, of Banks and McDowell, 
 of Fremont and Shields. In connection 
 with the investment of Petersburg and 
 the approach to Richmond, it has again 
 Decome the scene of important opera- 
 tions. In a previous chapter, and in 
 their proper place, some of these opera- 
 tions have been described in detail 
 
 At the commencement of the Wilder- 
 ness campaign. General Grant entrusted 
 certj»ln co-operative movements which 
 were to be conducted in the Shenan- 
 doah and Kanawha Valleys, to the care 
 of General Sigel. It will be remem- 
 bered that Sigel was singularly unfor- 
 tunate in a series of encounters which 
 he had with Breckenridge ; and about 
 the middle of May he was superseded 
 by General Hunter. Hunter, it will 
 also be remembered, although he won 
 a battle and inflicted heavy loss on the 
 enemy, found it necessary to fall back 
 from Lynchburg, which he was inveat- 
 rng; and, much to the annoyance and 
 disappointment of General Grant, he 
 
£;AKLY'S INVASION. 
 
 788 
 
 oaade an unfortunate, even disastrous 
 retreat by way of Meadow Bridge to- 
 wards the Kanawha. 
 
 It had been arranged that General 
 Burbridge, who was commanding in 
 Kentucky, should co-operate with Hun- 
 ter in the movement against Lynch- 
 burg. While Hunter, with the com- 
 bined forces of Crook and Averill, was 
 to move direct on Lynchburg, Bur- 
 bridge was to enter Virginia on the 
 extreme southwest, with the view of 
 engaging the attention of the enemy, 
 and preventing any movement on 
 Hunter's rear. It was not doubted at 
 the time that this two-fold movement 
 would be attended with complete suc- 
 cess ; for, as General Breckenridge, 
 with his command, had been with- 
 drawn to the assistance of General Lee, 
 there was no Confederate force of any 
 miportance to the immediate west of 
 the Blue Ridge. We have already 
 seen that Hunter failed in carrying out 
 his part of the programme. It remains 
 to be seen that Burbridge, in all that 
 regarded the general plan, was equally 
 unsuccessful. The object of Burbridge's 
 movement was discovered by the Con- 
 federates ; and as they could not hope 
 to defeat it by a direct attack in front, 
 they resolved to thwart it by detaining 
 the general and his command in Ken- 
 tucky. With this end in view, the 
 ever-vigilant and the ever-ready Morgan 
 made a dash into that State. Dividing 
 his troops, he sent them out in different 
 iirections. Encountering almost no 
 »pt)08ition, they moved through Pound 
 Gap, and struck successively PaintvUle, 
 Hazel Green, Owingsville, Flemmgs- 
 
 biirg, Maysville, and other places, seiz 
 ing property, breaking up railroads, 
 burning bridges, and capturing a body 
 of National troops under General Hob- 
 son, some 1600 strong. On the 12th 
 of June, in the vicinity of Cynthiana, 
 Burbridge, who had i etumed from jnn^ 
 south-western Vi/jjiiia and also 12. 
 had been wo''Vli)g his way back with 
 great rapidity, fell upon Morgan with 
 his whole force, routing him utterly, 
 with a loss of 300 killed and wounded 
 and as many prisoners. Of Hobson's 
 command 1000 horaes and 100 men 
 were recaptxired. Burbridge's lo8«} was 
 150. Morgan's men, utterly demoral 
 alized and flinging down their isrms, 
 fled in all directions ; but they had, 
 nevertheless, accomplished their pur 
 pose. They had brought Burbridge 
 back to Kentucky, where -his wearied 
 troops remained until they were re 
 quired by Sherman. 
 
 The faUiire of this conjoint move- 
 ment, coupled as it was with the retreat 
 of Himter across the mountains, left 
 Washington exposed and the Shenan 
 doah Valley practically unguarded. 
 Lee, quick to seize his opportunity 
 resolved to make a demonstration in 
 the direction of Harper's Ferry. His 
 object seems to have been three-fold — 
 to induce Grant to withdraw some of 
 the troops from before Petersburg, 
 to procure supplies, and to make 
 an attempt on the National Capital 
 Early, who, during the disability of 
 Ewell, was in command of the upper 
 part of the valley, having been rein, 
 forced by a body of Breckenridge'a 
 troops, was quickly in motion at the 
 
7R4 
 
 THE SHENANDOAH. 
 
 Lead of soDie 20,000 or 25,000 men, 
 lu spite of the hot weather, he marched 
 at the rate of about 20 miles a day. 
 
 As soon as Grant became aware of 
 this new movement of the enemy, he 
 ordered Hunter, who was then on the 
 Kanawha in Western Virginia, to trans- 
 port his troops, with all possible haste, 
 Dy river and rail, to Harper's Ferry. 
 Insuperable obstacles, however, lay in 
 Hunter's way. The river was low, and 
 the railroad was broken in several 
 places. As Hunter was not able to be 
 foi-ward in time, other arrangements 
 had to be made to meet the emergency. 
 The Sixth corps was taken from its 
 lines in front of Petersburg, and sent 
 to cover Washington. The Nineteenth 
 coi-ps, under General W. H. Emory, 
 which had just arrived in Hampton 
 Roads from the Gulf Department, was, 
 without being allowed to disembark, 
 pushed after the Sixth. 
 
 Meanwhile, Early was advancing. 
 On the 3d of July he was at Martins- 
 burg, where Sigel was in command. 
 July Sigel, unable to offer any effec- 
 3. tive resistance, retired across the 
 river, and took possession of Maryland 
 Heights, leaving to the enemy the roll- 
 ing stock, heavy trains laden -nath sup- 
 plies for General Hunter, and other 
 valuable stores. A panic seized the 
 entire surrounding country. It recalled 
 the memory of the two former inva- 
 sions, that which preceded Antietam 
 and that which preceded Gettysburg. 
 Preparations were everywhere made to 
 'eave the menaced region. At Fred- 
 erick, on the 5th, the railroad trains 
 were loaded with government stores ; 
 
 and arrangements were made for the 
 evacuation of the city. On the same day 
 Hageratovra was occupied by the cav 
 aby of the enemy ; the stores were jqj, 
 plundered, and a requisition was 6. 
 made on the inhabitants for $20,000. 
 The money was paid, and the raideiB 
 left. President Lincoln, yielding to the 
 excitement, and realizing the presence 
 of danger, at the same time issued 
 a call for militia — 12,000 fi'om New 
 York, 12,000 from Pennsylvania, and 
 6000 from Massachusetts. The caL 
 was promptly responded to by each of 
 the different States. 
 
 General Lewis Wallace was at that 
 time in command of the Middle De 
 partment, having his head-quarters at 
 Baltimore. WaDace had heard some 
 vague rumore regarding the disasters 
 which had befallen Sigel. More posi- 
 tive information soon reached him ; and 
 he became aware that the enemy having 
 crossed the Potomac was alreading in 
 Couch's Department. Convinced that 
 a movement was intended against Balti- 
 more and Washington, Wallace vrith 
 all haste possible, adopted measures for 
 checking the progress of the invadei-s. 
 On the 5th of July, with the few ava'l- 
 able troops at his command, he took a 
 strong position on the Monocacy River. 
 There he concentrated his forces ; and 
 the groimd chosen was such as enabled 
 him to cover the Baltimore and Ohio 
 crossing, and the principal roads leading 
 to the cities now supposed to be in 
 danger. On the 6th all the men, who 
 could be spared from watching the 
 railroads, were gathered together at the 
 appointed rendezvous. There was sora* 
 
THE MONOCAOY. 
 
 rss 
 
 skirmiflhiiig on the 7th with varying 
 success. On the «vening of that day, 
 however, the Confederates who had 
 assembled in some force in front of 
 Frederick were charged by Colonel 
 Charles Gilpin at the head of his regi- 
 ment, and driven back to the woods. 
 The situation was now becoming serious 
 not only for Wallace but for Baltimore 
 and Washington. Happily, however, 
 relief was at hand. Ricketts' division, 
 the advance of the Sixth coi-ps, reached 
 Washington late on the night of the 
 6th of July. Ricketts with his division 
 was sent to Baltimore the same night, 
 with orders to push on towards the 
 Monocacy as quickly as possible. On 
 the 8th Wallace was joined by Rick- 
 etts, and made aware that Wright with 
 the remainder of the corps, and Emory 
 with the Nineteenth corps, were on 
 their way to Washington. Becoming 
 more and more satisfied that the Con- 
 federates were bent on marching to the 
 Capital, he withdrew what troops he 
 had sent for the defense of Frederick to 
 his chosen position on the Monocacy. 
 There on the morning of the 9th he 
 made dispositions for battle. His right 
 July ^^'^ under E. B. Tyler, and cov. 
 9. ered the railroad at the Baltimore 
 pike. His left was under Ricketts and 
 held the Washington pike. On the 
 left wing the main attack was exjiected. 
 Each wing had 3 guns — Colonel Brown, 
 with his o\vn command and a body of 
 mounted infantry guarded a stone bridge 
 on Tyler's extreme right ; and the lower 
 foi-ds were protected by a body of cav- 
 alry under Clendennin. Near the rail- 
 road at a block-house, was a rude earth- 
 
 work, mounted with a 24-pouader 
 howitzer. Of Ricketts' division, three 
 regiments were yet behind. It was 
 expected, however, that they would 
 arrive by rail at one o'clock. Wallace's 
 entire force was about 8000. Early 
 was already in his front with 16 
 Napoleon guns, a strong body of cav- 
 alry, and some 16,000 infantry. 
 
 It was near nine o'clock when }'Iarly 
 opened the fight. The attach was 
 made with tremendous fmy. The 
 shock was felt almost instantan ously 
 on both wings of the National »rmy. 
 Brown soon found it difficult t< main- 
 tain his position on the Nationa' right. 
 At the same time, a bold anc , as it 
 proved, successful movement v as exe- 
 cuted against the National !» ft. A 
 large body of Confederates having 
 moved by their own light, si cceeded 
 in crossing the Monocacy out - f range 
 of Ricketts' guns. Ricketts, finding 
 himself outflanked, wheeled ar. and so 
 as to face the foe; but in his n' v posi- 
 tion he found himseK exposed to an 
 overwhelming force in his fi'ont, as well 
 as to an enfilading fij-e ttom i'arly's 
 guns across the stream. The buttle 
 lasted for many weary hours, the Na- 
 tionals offering a stout and stubtH'i-n 
 resistance to the repeated onsets of 
 vastly superior numbers. Tyler wLUe 
 holding his own position, sent all the 
 assis^^^ance he could to Ricketts. It 
 w:as confidently expected that Ricketts' 
 thi-ee regiments would be fonvard by 
 one o'clock. It was now, however, far 
 in the afternoon ; and as yet thei-e were 
 no signs of coming relief. Towai-d' 
 four o'clock, Wallace, despairing of as 
 
786 
 
 THE SHENANDOAH. 
 
 distance and seeing the Confederates 
 issuing from the woods in two strong 
 columns to deliver a crushing and per- 
 haps final blow, ordered Ricketts to 
 retreat by the Baltimore road. Brown 
 still held the stone bridge. Fighting 
 desperately he continued to hold it 
 until Ricketts' column was safe. At 
 five o'clock Brown was compelled to give 
 way. He fell back by the Baltimore 
 pike. Tyler, with his remaining force, 
 had no choice but follow. It was only 
 by the narrowest chance that he and 
 his staff, cut off from the rest of the 
 troops, contrived to make good their 
 escape. At New Market, the fugitives 
 were joined by the three absent regi- 
 ments of Ricketts' division; and the 
 retreat towards Ellicott's Mills was 
 covered. The wearied troops bi- 
 vouacked some 12 miles from the field 
 of strife. The battle of the Monocacy 
 was a defeat to the small body of Na- 
 tional troops engaged ; but it was a 
 gain to the National cause. Wallace 
 had lost nearly 2000 men, of whom 
 over 1200 were missing; but he had 
 given Wright ind Emory time to reach 
 Washington. He had, in truth, saved 
 the Capital. It was not denied that 
 Early, if he had advanced immediately 
 after the battle, might have captured 
 Washington. His troops, however, had 
 been severely tried ; and they needed 
 rest. He halted for a day. That 
 pause made the Capital secure. Wright 
 and Emory were forward in force ; and 
 the former at Grant's urgent request 
 was placed in command of all the troops 
 which could be made available for the 
 defense of Washinjgfton. 
 
 For some days the wildest excitement 
 prevailed ; and it was feared that both 
 Baltimore and Washington were in 
 danger. Johnson, with his cavalry 
 moved towards Baltimore; but finding 
 all the approaches to the city so well 
 guarded that success was not to be 
 expected from any attack which he 
 could hope to make, he contented mm 
 self with a general destmction of the 
 railroads. He burned the bridges and 
 tore up the tracks ; and in the work of 
 vandalism he was exceeded by his lieu- 
 tenant the notorious Gilmore, who 
 stopped the trains, plundered the pas- 
 sengers and the mails, and burned the 
 cars. Early moved on Washington, 
 advancing with great caution. On the 
 12tb he was within 4 miles of the j^iy 
 city, on the north side, and in 12. 
 front of Forts Stevens and de Russey 
 His skinnishers and shai-pshooters be- 
 gan to be a source of some annoyance ; 
 and with the view of developing his 
 strength General Augur sent out from 
 Fort Stevens a brigade of veterans. 
 These had not advanced far before they 
 felt the foe in very considerable force. 
 A severe struggle ensued, each party 
 losing about 300 men. Made aware 
 of the concentration of troops in Wash- 
 ington, and deeming success impossible, 
 if not trembling for his own safety, 
 Early now beat a hasty retreat. On 
 the night of the 12 th he crossed the 
 Potomac at Edward's Ferry, carrying 
 with him a large amount of booty, in 
 eluding some 2000 head of cattle and 
 some 5000 horses. 
 
 On the 13th Wiight commenced the 
 pursuit, taking with him the two divi 
 
AVERILL DEFEATS EARLY. 
 
 787 
 
 sions of the Sixth corps, and the Nine- 
 teenth corps under Emory. Moving 
 northwestward from Washington to 
 Poolesville, he crossed the Potomac just 
 below Edward's Ferry, and marched to 
 Leesburg, where he was joined by 
 Ricketts. On the l7th Duffie's cavalry, 
 of Crook's command, had overtaken 
 and captured a portion of the enemy's 
 train at Snicker's Gap, near the She- 
 nandoah, and Crook himself coming up 
 soon afterwards, the Confederates were 
 driven through the gap after a sharp 
 fight. They held the ferry, however, 
 on the west side of the river, where 
 they planted two guns and put a stop 
 to the pursuit for a while. On the 18th 
 the whole of Wright's and Crook's 
 forces had passed through Snicker's 
 Grap, except Duffie's cavalry, sent north- 
 ward to Ashby's Gap to guard against 
 an attempt of the enemy to flank the 
 National right. Shortly after mid-day 
 the infantry crossed at Island Ford, 
 two and a haK miles below Snicker's 
 Ferry, the Thirty-Foiirth Massachusetts 
 in the advance and driving the enemy. 
 Crook's force also was soon over the 
 river; and line of battle was formed, 
 Colonel WeUswith the Thirty-Fourth 
 Massachusetts being on the left and 
 Colonel Thorbum's brigade on the 
 right. A sharp engagement ensued. 
 The Sixth corps also had commenced 
 crossing, when the enemy, under Breck- 
 eoridge, finding the rear attacked, re- 
 turned quickly, and charged and drove 
 back Colonel Thorbum's brigade, com- 
 pelling it to recross the river. Colonel 
 Wells then withdrew his force in good 
 ■Mxler; and the enemy retained posses- 
 
 sion of the west bank. Duffie had nu 
 better fortime at Ashby's Gap. He 
 had driven Imboden through the gap 
 and across the river; but the enemy 
 having returned in force, he was him 
 self compelled to retreat. A loss of 
 about 500 was sustained in these two 
 fights ; and some of the wounded were 
 left in the hands of the enemy, who was 
 then allowed to pursue his way leisurely 
 towards Winchester and Strasburg 
 The column under Wright crossed the 
 river. It soon, however, returned and 
 marched back to Leesburg, where it 
 was divided. Crook with his portion of 
 the force going to Harper's Ferry, and 
 Wright with the Sixth corps to Wash- 
 ington. 
 
 On the 19th, Averill, moving up the 
 Shenandoah Valley from Martinsburg, 
 encountered and drove back a body of 
 cavalry at Darksville. Next morning 
 he continued his march in the same 
 direction. As he approached Win- 
 chester, General Early came out of his 
 old intrenchments to meet him. The 
 battle which ensued lasted three hours, 
 when the Confederates, after losing 
 about 400 men in killed and wounded, 
 retired to their intrenchments, leaving 
 Averill master of the field, with 4 can- 
 non, several hundred small arms, and 
 about 200 prisoners. Averill's loss was 
 about 250. 
 
 Soon afterwards General Averill wae 
 rejoined by General Crook with his in 
 fantry, just returned from the unfor 
 tunate affair at Island Ford. Tiie force 
 under Crook was now about 10,00( 
 men, consisting of Averill's and Duffie's 
 cavalry and two divisions of infantry 
 
fSS 
 
 THE SHENANDOAH. 
 
 On the 23d, after some sTrirmishing at 
 Kemstown, foui miles south of Win- 
 cliester, the National cavalry was forced 
 back, by the enemy, on the main body ; 
 and on the following day they were 
 
 Iriven through Winchester in confu- 
 sion towards Bunker Hill, thus com- 
 pletely uncovering the flanks of the 
 infantry. General Crook had drawn 
 up his force in line of battle ; but when 
 his cavalry broke he was compelled to 
 beat a retreat. The Confederates, 
 who had received reinforcements, and 
 nho were in much superior force, were 
 able completely to outflank Crook's 
 .ine. The retreat continued on the 
 Bunker Hill road till night. The Na- 
 tional loss was under 1200, including 
 pnsonera. Among the killed was Col- 
 onel Mulligan, whose brigade covered 
 
 he retreat. 
 
 On the 25th, Crook halted at Mar- 
 tinsburg, to gain time for getting off 
 his trains ; but after a shai-p artillery 
 engagement he again fell back, and on 
 the following day crossed the Potomac 
 into Maryland, leaving the Confeder- 
 ates in possession of the west bank of 
 the river from WUliamsport to Shep- 
 herdstown. Another panic seized the 
 people of Maryland and Southern 
 Pennsylvania. On the 28th, General 
 Kelley crossed the Potomac and ro- 
 occupied Martinsburg, which the Con- 
 federates had already evacuated. On 
 the morning of the 30th a force of 200 
 or 300 cavalry, under McCausland, 
 crossed the Potomac and marched to- 
 wards Chambersbiu'g. McCausland, on 
 his arrival, offered to spare the place 
 for the sum of $600,000 ; but as this I 
 
 was not forthcoming, he set fire to the 
 town ; and two-thirds of it were laid 
 in ashes. McCausland withdi'ew about 
 eleven o'clock ; and immediately after 
 wards Averill, who, with his cavalry, 
 had just arrived at Chambersburg, set 
 out in pursuit. Averill followed Mc- 
 Causland as far as Hancock, at which 
 place the raiders, who were well 
 mounted, succeeded in crossing the Po- 
 tomac. 
 
 At the beginning of August, great 
 excitement was produced in the border 
 regions of Maryland and Pennsylvania 
 by the reported reappearance of the 
 Confederate raiders. Mosby had crossed 
 the Potomac at Cheat's FeiTy, with a 
 small body of cavalry ; but he quickly 
 retired, carrying with him considerable 
 plxmder. Early, it was rumored, had 
 entered Pennsylvania, at the head o 
 40,000 men ; but General Wright, with 
 the Sixth and a portion of the Nine- 
 teenth corps, scoured the country and 
 failed to find him or any trace of his 
 presence. Pennsylvania, however, was 
 now thoroughly aroused. It was known 
 that the Confederate general, Johnson, 
 was raiding and working Jesti-uction 
 in Maryland. On the 7th of August, 
 Averill fell upon this force on ^ng, 
 the Romney road, as they were 7. 
 retiring towards Moorefield, and routed 
 them, cjipturing all their artilleiy, with 
 many wagons and small-aims, and 500 
 prisoners. 
 
 These successive raids had convinced 
 General Grant that a powerful force, 
 under a competent leader, was now 
 needed in the valley of the Shenan 
 doah. Without delay he consolidated 
 
BERRYVILLE. 
 
 789 
 
 the WasMngton, Middle, Susquehanna, 
 and Southwest Virginia Departments 
 into what he called the Middle Military 
 Division, and placed it under the com- 
 mand of General Hunter. Grant visited 
 Hunter, who was concentrated on the 
 Monocacy, and gave him his instruc- 
 tions. These raids must be ended ; 
 and to prevent their repetition every- 
 thing which can not be consumed 
 must be destroyed- Hunter expressed 
 a willingness to be reKeved ; and on 
 the 7th of August, the command was 
 given to .Sheridan, who promptly en- 
 tertui upon his duties. 
 
 The force under the command of 
 Sheridan consisted of the Sixth corps 
 under Wright, and the Nineteenth under 
 Emory, the old army of Western Vir- 
 ginia, comprising the Eighth corps, un- 
 der Crook; the entire first division of 
 Potomac cavalry ; Averill's division ; 
 Lowell's brigade, which had been usu- 
 ally kept near Washington, and Kel- 
 ley's command ; to which was soon after- 
 wards added Wilson's second division 
 — in all about 40,000 men, of which 
 10,000 were cavalry, with about twenty 
 6-gim batteries. The force under Early, 
 including the two infantry corps of 
 Rodes and Breckenridge, consisted of 
 about 30,000 men, of which 10,000 
 were cavalry, with fourteen 6-gun bat- 
 teries, and at this time was at Winches- 
 ter, 27 miles west-southwest of Harper's 
 Ferry. 
 
 At sunrise on the rooming of the 
 10th of August, Sheridan began the 
 movement of his forces from Halltown, 
 about 4 miles west of Harper's Ferry. 
 Marching at first westward, he reached 
 
 Charlestown in two hours, from which 
 point the Nineteenth corps, preceded 
 by the cavalry brigades of Custer ^^g, 
 and Gibbs, struck off to the left ^0. 
 for Berryville, 15 miles southwest. 
 Further to the left marched the com- 
 mand of Crook, while on the right the 
 Sixth corps, preceded by the brigades 
 of Devin and Lowell, moved along the 
 Winchester road, turning off a few 
 miles towards Berryville to join the 
 Nineteenth. The weather during the 
 march was oppressively hot; and the 
 roads, in rainy seasons almost impassa- 
 ble from deep mud, were now covered 
 with a thick layer of dust, which the 
 rapid tread of many thousand feet, with 
 horses, artillery and wagon trains raised 
 in stifling clouds. About noon the 
 several cavalry brigades of Custer, De- 
 vin, Gibbs, and Lowell formed a junc- 
 tion at Berryville. Four miles west of 
 this place, on the road to Winchester, 
 a body of the enemy's skirmishers was 
 found and driven off. The infantry 
 bivouacked in the neighborhood of 
 Berryville, on the different roads by 
 which they had approached, the Sixth 
 corps on the right, the Nineteenth in 
 the centra, the Eighth on the left. 
 The cavalry, posted in the advance, 
 held the roads leading to Winchester 
 and Millwood, the latter place being 
 occupied by Colonel Cesnola's regi- 
 ment. On the 11th the army took the 
 road leading to Winchester, the cavalry 
 in the advance. Custer's brigade, on 
 Arriving at Sulphur Springs Bridge, 
 about 4 miles east of Winchester, en 
 countered a body of the enemy. A 
 sharji skirmish took place, lasting two 
 
790 
 
 THE SHENANDOAH. 
 
 hours, Cnster being flanked and driven 
 back. Meanwhile Devin's brigade, fol- 
 lowed by Gibbs', had moved towards 
 White Post, aiming to arrive by a cir- 
 cuitous route at Newtown, with the 
 design of flanking the enemy, who, it 
 was now ascertained, had begun to 
 withdraw southward, along the road 
 leading to Strasburg. This object, 
 however, was not attained. The ad- 
 vance under Cesnola encountered the 
 enemy's skirmishers near White Post, 
 and drove them back on the road lead- 
 ing to Newtown. On arriving at the 
 road leading south to Front Royal, a 
 brigade of Confederate infantry was 
 discovered, with three field pieces, in a 
 very strong position. The advance 
 waited till the remainder of Devin's 
 brigade arrived, wbfn a severe fight 
 ensued, lasting from eleven o'clock till 
 twelve, but without any decisive result. 
 At four o'clock Crook came up with 
 his infantry and relieved Devin. The 
 latter then marched on to the assistance 
 of Gibbs, who had got nearly to New- 
 town and engaged the enemy, and was 
 aow falling back. Devin arrived just 
 in time to check the Confederates, who 
 then retreated to the woods, unpur- 
 sued, the National troops also retiring 
 about a mile and bivouacking with a 
 strong picket guard in front. The Con- 
 federates by hard fighting succeeded in 
 olding Newtown, and in covering their 
 trains, which passed down safely towards 
 Strasburg. The total National loss 
 was about 300, chiefly in cavalry. The 
 iafantry, although not much engaged, 
 suffered severely in marching, and lost 
 uiany men from sunstroke. 
 
 On the morning of the 12th, it hav- 
 ing been ascertained that the enemy 
 had retreated, Sheridan's army ^ng^ 
 moved forward again. The cav- 12. 
 aby advanced, skirmishing most of the 
 way, to Cedar Creek. About noon 
 they found a force of the enemy on a 
 hill in front of Strasburg. The Con- 
 federates shelled and drove back the 
 cavalry skirmishers, till they were re- 
 lieved by the Eighth corps, which had 
 now arrived. The remainder of the 
 army in passing through Newtown and 
 Middletown met with no opposition, 
 and on arriving at Cedar Creek bivou- 
 acked on the east bank, on the west 
 side of which the enemy held a position 
 in some old breast-works. There was 
 active skirmishing during the remainder 
 of the day, and in the evening some 
 shelling across the creek, but no gen- 
 eral engagement On the following 
 day, the enemy having fallen back in 
 the night, the National skirmishers got 
 into Strasburg, but were compelled to 
 retire again. On the evening of the 
 14th the heights in front of the town 
 were captured ; and on the following 
 morning the small force of the enemy 
 which had held Strasburg for two days 
 withdrew. The works on Fisher's HUl, 
 however, still commanded the place. 
 
 News, however, had now arrived 
 which caused Sheridan with his whole 
 army to conmience a rapid retreat to- 
 wards Harper's Ferry. On the 13th, 
 while the National army was lying in 
 front of Strasburg, Mosby with a few 
 light troops dashed through Snicker'R 
 Gap, crossed the Shenandoah, and fell 
 suddenly on the rear of Sheridan's 
 
CKOOKED RUN. 
 
 791 
 
 supply train near Benyville on its way 
 to Winchester, about 4 miles from the 
 gap. The guard, consisting of Kenly's 
 brigade of himdred days' men, became 
 panic-stricken when Mosby made his 
 charge. A few brave men fought well 
 or a while, but the rest made ofi as 
 ra})idly as possible. Mosby captured 
 and destroyed 75 wagons, chiefly laden 
 with cavalry baggage, besides securing 
 200 prisoners, 600 horses and mules, 
 and 200 head of cattle. He then re- 
 tired, having lost only two men killed 
 and 3 wounded. The National loss 
 was not much greater. But this dis- 
 aster in the rear, though not fatal in 
 itself, caused it to be reported that 
 Longstreet with his entire corps was 
 getting into a position across Sheridan's 
 Lhti of communications, and was cutting 
 ofl his whole army. The consequence 
 ^as that on the 15th Sheridan got his 
 ine. ^ corps and the various cavalry 
 16. brigades in readiness to retreat. 
 The movement commenced about 
 eleven at night, the Nineteenth corps 
 taking the lead towards Winchester, 
 followed the next day by Crook's com- 
 mand, the Sixth corps bringing up the 
 rear To prevent flanking operations 
 on the paii; of the enemy from the 
 gaps in the Blue Ridge, and to cover 
 the retreat in that direction, Devin's 
 cavalry brigade had been sent a few 
 miles to the southeast towards Front 
 RoyaL In the meantime a body of the 
 enemy, forming a part of Kershaw's 
 division, which had taken part in the 
 recent actions near Malvern Hill s, had 
 come by railroad to Mitchell Station, 
 and marched thence to Front Royal ; 
 
 and on the morning of the 16th Cus- 
 ter's brigade, followed not long after 
 wards by that under Gibbs, was sent 
 to the 8upjx)rt of Devin. Custer 
 arrived soon after noon and took posi- 
 tion on the left of Devin. The line 
 had not been long formed, however, 
 before the enemy suddenly appeared 
 marching in two columns, one of infan 
 try, the other of cavalry, along the 
 road leading northward from Front 
 Royal to the Shenandoah. A brisk 
 artUlery fight then took place, the Con 
 federates using 8 pieces, thoixgh with 
 out much effect. Their cavaliy having 
 crossed by the bridge and their infantry 
 by the ford, they advanced to carry 
 the National batteries, but were re- 
 pulsed on the right by a charge from 
 two regiments of Devin's brigade, each 
 of which captured a flag. The Confed 
 erates were thus again driven over the 
 river. Meanwhile, having secured a 
 good position for their artUlery, they 
 attempted to turn the National left. At 
 this time a brigade of Kershaw's divi- 
 sion crossed the river, when a series of 
 charges and counter-charges took place 
 with the brigade of Custer. The fight- 
 ing continued till after dark ; and when 
 the Confederates fell- back to recross 
 the river 150 of them were made pris- 
 oners at the ford. The killed and 
 wounded did not exceed 100 on either 
 side. This affair took place near 
 Crooked Run, a small tributary of the 
 Shenandoah, a little below the conflu 
 ence of the north and south forks 
 Early the next morning Custers and 
 Devin's brigades fell back on the road 
 I leading northward to Winchester to 
 
7dS 
 
 THE SHENANDOAH. 
 
 follow the infantry column, carrying 
 out as they went orders which had 
 been given for the capture or destruc- 
 tion of all the stock, grain, hay, 
 and everything else which could con- 
 
 ribute to the sustenance of man or 
 oeast. Fields and gardens were rav- 
 aged and swept clean. 
 
 The enemy followed closely upon the 
 heels of Sheridan. The Sixth corps, 
 which brought up the rear of the in- 
 fantry column, had left Winchester on 
 the morning of the 17th, Colonel Pen- 
 rose's brigade, consisting of only about 
 500 men, having been left behind as a 
 lupport to Torbert's cavalry. About 
 Lng. ^^** o'clock the advance of the 
 
 17. enemy, approaching by the New- 
 town and Winchester turnpike, attacked 
 Penrose, who had deployed his small 
 brigade in skirmishing order, with the 
 savalry on his flank, about a mile out 
 of the town on the road leading to 
 Kemstown. The cavalry, however, 
 gave way, leaving Penrose to make the 
 best fight he could behind fences, trees, 
 and walls. Just before dark, the 
 enemy having received large acces- 
 sions of numbers, was able to flank 
 Penrose's little force; and it was soon 
 broken, losing 300 prisoners, the re- 
 fTAinder, with Penrose and a few officers, 
 making their way through Winchester, 
 escaped towai-ds Clifton and Martins- 
 burg. That night the enemy occupied 
 Winchester. The National cavalry 
 oivouacked at Berryville, next day 
 lAking up the line of retreat towards 
 Harper's Ferry, being much harassed 
 on their flanks and rear by the Confed- 
 erate cavalry. 
 
 On the 18th, some men in citizens 
 dress, killed a corporal and two laen 
 belonging to an advanced post of the 
 Fifth Michigan Cavalry, picketing at 
 Snicker's Gap, and hastily made off. 
 Several other similar occurrences took 
 place ; and on the 19th, General Custer 
 ordered some houses of disloyal citizens 
 to be destroyed in retaliation. WhUe 
 a squad of men from the Fifth Michi- 
 gan were engaged in carrying out this 
 order, they were set upon by Mosby's 
 men and compelled to fly in confusion: 
 18 of them were overtaken ; and of 
 these 15 were killed. This affaif which 
 took place near Snicker's Gap turnpike, 
 was followed by another retaliatory 
 order for the destruction of more houses 
 of disloyal citizens. 
 
 During the retreat of Sheridan's 
 army, Averill, who commanded at Mar- 
 tinsburg, continued to hold the place; 
 but the alarm had become so great 
 on the 18th, that he abandoned it with 
 his main force, leaving only one com- 
 pany, which was driven out on the fol- 
 lowing day. Another panic then aiose 
 in that neighborhood and spread into 
 Maryland. In Hagerstown, merchants 
 packed their goods and sent them north- 
 ward ; the quartermasters' stores were 
 loaded on railroad trains in readiness 
 to be rapidly transported to Frederick 
 the sick and wounded were sent to 
 Harrisburg. In the mean while Averill 
 took possession of the fords of the 
 Potomac from Shepherdstown to WU- 
 liamsport. Once more prepai'ationa 
 were made to resist an attempt on the 
 part of the enemy to ci'oss over to Mary- 
 land ; and on the 19th Sheridan's wagon 
 
BOLIVAR HEIGHTS. 
 
 tn 
 
 train was reported to be " safe " back 
 at Hagerstown. The panic soon died 
 out; and the enemy, a few of whose 
 advanced cavalry had actually got near 
 the Potomac, began to retire. On the 
 20th some of the National cavalry again 
 entered Martiosburg. 
 
 On the 2l8t, Sheridan had disposed 
 his aiTuy advantageously about two 
 miles out from Charlestovni towards 
 Summit Point. It extended in a line 
 from the Smithsfield to the Berryville 
 road, the Sixth corps on the right, the 
 Eighth in the centre, and the Nine- 
 iug. teenth on the left. About eight in 
 21. the morning Early came up, and 
 with a part of his force attacked the 
 advanced cavalry skirmishers on the 
 right and left, easily driving them in. 
 The main body of his army moved off 
 across the National right ; but with a 
 small force he drove back Wilson's 
 ili vision of cavalry from a good position 
 on Summit Point with severe loss. He 
 then threw a few brigades against the 
 Sixth corps and the right of the Eighth ; 
 and fighting ensued, which lasted from 
 ten o'clock till the close of the day, in 
 the course of which the Sixth corps 
 steadily advanced till it came upon the 
 enemy's line of battle ; but it sustained 
 heavy losses in the continuous heavy 
 skirmishing, and retired to its original 
 position at dark Cannonading was 
 kept up for some time ; but the resiilt 
 of the battle was, that Sheridan's army 
 again fell back and took a position on 
 Bolivar Heights, his right resting on 
 the Potomac, his left on the Shenan- 
 doah, his headquarters at Halltown. 
 The position of the army here was ex- 
 
 ceedingly strong, far outnumbering the 
 enemy ; and reinforcements with sup- 
 plies were being sent to it daily. In the 
 mean time the enemy's cavalry ranged 
 the country in all directions at will 
 On the 24th, a reconnoitring force of 3 
 brigades sent out towards Charlestown 
 discovered that Early was there in force, 
 with his pickets out towards Bunker 
 Hill. On the 25th, Torbert's cavalry 
 was sent to reconnoitie in full force in 
 the direction of Leetown, Wilson's 
 division moving out from Halltown 
 and uniting with Merritt's at Kearneys- 
 ville, from which point the enemy's 
 skirmishers retired. The National 
 troops had the advantage for a little 
 while ; but the face of affairs soon 
 changed, and the Confederates drove 
 back the divisions of WUson and Mei 
 ritt, which were very badly handled, 
 and compelled to abandon Keameys- 
 ville, and make the best of their way 
 towards Harper's Ferry. A running 
 fight ensued, lasting from eleven in the 
 forenoon till dark, by which time Mer- 
 ritt's division was safe in camp at 
 Bolivar Heights ; but Custer's brigade, 
 which had the rear in the retreat, did 
 not fare so well At Shepherdstown 
 Custer found himself cut off from the 
 Halltown road, by which he intended 
 to march, and was finally compelled to 
 seek safety by crossing the Potomac. 
 The enemy did not venture to follow, 
 but held the river fi-om Shepherdstown 
 to Williamsport, and on the following 
 day made demonstrations as if designing 
 to cross at the fords. In the afternoon 
 Thorburn's division of Crook's corps 
 and Lowell's cavalry pushed ou* or « 
 
794 
 
 THE SHENANDOAH. 
 
 reconnoissance towards Halltown. The 
 infantry soon encountered the Con- 
 federates, and after a contest, which 
 lasted only twenty minutes, drove them 
 to the cover of their artillery. Lowell 
 with his cavalry then dashed in on the 
 flank and cut oflE 69 prisoners, including 
 6 ojBScers. The result of this reconnois- 
 sance was that the enemy was found 
 to have left Sheridan's front ; and about 
 seven o'clock in the morning of the 
 28th he was again on the march in the 
 direction of Charlestown, his cavalry in 
 the advance carefully reconnoitring in 
 various directions. By ten o'clock the 
 Nineteenth corps reached Charlestown ; 
 and the entire army pushed on to the 
 old line of battle held during the en- 
 gagement a week before, about 2 miles 
 beyond the town, the Sixth corps hold- 
 ing the right, the Nineteenth the cen- 
 tre, and the Eighth the left. Then 
 having formed line of battle, the army 
 awaited the result of the cavalry ad- 
 vance. On the morning of the 29th 
 Ang. ^^® Confederates were found near 
 29. Smilhsfield ; and General Merritt 
 making a vigorous attack upon their 
 cavalry drove it back through the town 
 and over Oj'equan Creek. A reconnois- 
 sance was then made beyond the creek 
 by General Custer's cavalry with Ran- 
 som's baUery; but encountering the 
 Confederate skirmishing line he retired 
 igain across the stream in the direction 
 of Smithsfield, followed by the enemy's 
 infantry, which, however, on the ad- 
 vance of General Ricketts' division fell 
 back again rapidly. Sheridan's army 
 then again retired upon Charlestown, 
 and remained quiet till the morning of 
 
 the 3d of September, when it was again 
 put in motion in a southwesterly di- 
 rection. Crook's command occupying 
 the left, the Nineteenth corps the cen- 
 tre, and the Sixth the right. Between 
 ten and eleven the second oAvalry ggpj 
 division on the extreme right was o. 
 attacked by Lomax's cavalry about 7 
 nules south of Martinsburg. Lomax's 
 troops, however, were driven from tnc 
 field. About noon Crook's command 
 reached the vicinity of Berryville, 
 where it was attacked by a large Con- 
 federate force, approaching from the 
 direction of Winchester. Crook hastUy 
 formed his men ; and a battle ensued, 
 which lasted tUl dark, when the enemy 
 retired, having suffered severely. The 
 remainder of the army then coming up, 
 got into position in the neighborhood of 
 Berryville, and threw up substantial 
 breast- worka Here Sheridan remained 
 about two weeks, content to hold his 
 own in the valley, without attempting 
 any venturesome expedition, but keep- 
 ing his force weU in hand, so as to 
 check any movement on the part of 
 Early. During this time frequent re- 
 connoissances were made both by the 
 Confederate and the National cavalry. 
 Sheridan had now been considerably 
 over a month in the valley, with an 
 army decidedly superior to that of 
 Early; and his marches and counter- 
 marches had been a source of much 
 perplexity and some dissatisfaction with 
 the Northern public. His campaign so 
 far had been one of manoeuvres, in 
 which decisive fighting was avoided. 
 The enemy, however, had been kept 
 constantly occupied ; and a force which 
 
WINCHESTER 
 
 796 
 
 Lee could ill spare had been kept away 
 from Petersburg, or from reinforcing 
 Hood at Atlanta. When Atlanta fell, 
 it ceased to be a part of Grant's policy 
 to keep Early with a large force idle in 
 ihe valley; and about the middle of 
 September he paid a hasty visit to the 
 apper Potomac, had an interview with 
 Sheridan, and gave him permission to 
 change the character of the campaign 
 by commencing a series of offensive 
 operations. 
 
 A reconnoissance made on the 13th 
 by the first cavalry division supported 
 by Getty's division of the Sixth corps, 
 to Lock's Ford on the Opequan, showed 
 that the Confederates were on the west 
 bank in some force. Three days later 
 it was discovered that they had disap- 
 peared entirely from the neighborhood 
 of the left wing of the National army 
 on the Winchester and Berryville turn- 
 pike, and that they had but a weak 
 Une on the right. On the 18th the 
 Confederate general, Gordon, with his 
 division of infantry, occupied Martins- 
 burg, but was speedily driven out of it 
 again by AverilL Sheridan now hav- 
 ing become satisfied that the main body 
 of the Confederates had moved to the 
 vicinity of Bunker Hill and Stephen- 
 son's Depot, resolved by a rapid move- 
 ment westward towards Winchester, to 
 get into their rear. On the afternoon 
 of the 1 8th, therefore, the troops were 
 placed under arms and held in readi- 
 ness to march at a moment's notice. 
 At three o'clock on the morning of the 
 Sept. l^th the Sixth and Nineteenth 
 lS« corj)s were set in motion, the 
 Sixth being directed to march in par- 
 
 allel columns on each side of the Win- 
 chester and Berryville turnpike with 
 the artillery, ammunition, and supply 
 trains between them on the road, the 
 Nineteenth corps following by th«» 
 same road in similar order. Croo 
 with the Eighth corps was ordered to 
 move at five o'clock from his position 
 in the vicinity of Summit Point, across 
 the country in a southwesterly direc- 
 tion, and form a junction with the 
 Sixth and Nineteenth corps at the 
 point where the Winchester and Berry- 
 ville turnpike crosses the Opequan, 5 
 miles east of Winchester. Torbert and 
 Averill, with their large cavalry force, 
 were directed to occupy the enemy's 
 attention by demonstrating on his left. 
 Shortly after daylight Wilson's division 
 of cavalry crossed the Opequan and 
 skimiished with the enemy, who were 
 discovered to be in force on the west 
 bank. The march of the Nineteenth 
 corps was by some means so delayed 
 that it did not cross the Opequan till 
 about noon, and thus Early had time 
 to draw in his left from its advanced 
 position near Bunker HUl. Such was 
 the resistance offered that the first and 
 second lines were thrown into some 
 confusion, and forced to retii-e behind 
 the third ; but as soon as Sheridan got 
 his batteries into a position fi'om which 
 they were able to silence the enemy's 
 guns, order was restored, and they 
 again advanced, retaking the position 
 from which they had been driven, and 
 holding it until reinforced by Crook, 
 whose troops had been kept in reserve 
 on the east side of the creek Then 
 followed one of the most fiercely con 
 
796 
 
 THE SHENAlUx^oAH. 
 
 tested battles of the war, the opposing 
 lines being at some points not more 
 than 200 yards apart. About three in 
 the afternoon Crook's first division got 
 into position on the right and his 
 second in the rear, supporting a divi- 
 sion of the Nineteenth corps. About 
 this time, also, Torbert, with Averill's 
 and Merritt's cavalry divisions, arrived 
 on the extreme right. Sheridan then 
 ordered an advance along the entire 
 line. The Confederates stubbornly 
 maintained their ground against the 
 National infantry, but gave way finally 
 before a most brilliant and successful 
 charge of the cavalry, made at a critical 
 moment. The battle lasted till five in 
 the evening. The victory, however, 
 was of the most decisive character. 
 Early's troops were driven from the 
 field in confusion ; and, according to a 
 despatch of Sheridan's, they were sent 
 " whirling through Winchester," whence 
 they retreated rapidly to Fisher's Hill, 
 3 miles south of Strasburg. Night 
 prevented Sheridan from continuing 
 the pursuit. Such was the battle of 
 Winchester. Sheridan captured 2500 
 prisoners, on the field and in the pur- 
 suit In the hospitals at Winchester 
 he found nearly 3000 wounded. The 
 Confederates left behind them, also, 5 
 guns and 9 battle flags. Early's entire 
 loss must have amounted to 6000. 
 Sheridan's entire loss could hardly have 
 been much under 5000. On both sides 
 several prominent oflicers were killed, 
 mong them General David Russell 
 and the Confederate general, Rodes. 
 
 The position of Early at Fisher's 
 Rill was one of ertrnordinary natival 
 
 strength. His iim extended in a west 
 erly direction across the Strasbm-g val 
 ley, the i-ight resting on the North 
 Fork of the Shenandoah, the left or 
 Little North Mountain. From this 
 position Sheridan soon made prepara 
 tions to drive him ; and after a good 
 deal of manoeuvring, his army about 
 noon on the 2 2d lay as follows: Sept. 
 Crook's corps on the right, the 22. 
 Sixth in the centre, and the Nineteenth 
 on the left. While Wright and Emorj 
 made demonstrations on the left and 
 centre, and Averill drove in the ene- 
 my's skirmishers. Crook moved out to 
 the extreme right. After a long and 
 arduous march, he got round and 
 flanked Early's left between four and 
 five in the afternoon, and made a furi- 
 ous attack, sweeping down behind th« 
 enemy's breast-works, and driving the 
 Confederates out of them in the greates 
 confusion. While Crook was thus 
 carrying everything before him on the 
 enemy's left, Wright attacked the Con- 
 federate centre, separating the two 
 wings. The enemy broke and fled 
 towards Woodstock, leaving behind 
 him 16 guns and 1100 prisoners. The 
 victory at Fisher's Hill was the more 
 easily won from the fact that Early 
 dreaded an attack from Torbert, who, 
 it was known, was coming through the 
 Luray Valley with his cavalry. Tor- 
 bert, however, had been effectively heLl 
 in check by an inferior force near Mel 
 ford. 
 
 Sheridan marched, the night aftei 
 the battle, to Woodstock, but halted 
 there in the morning to give his troop 
 rest and to await the arrival of jation* 
 
DEVASTATION OF THE VALLEY. 
 
 7»7 
 
 Averill pushed on in advance, drove the 
 Confederates to Mount Jackson, where 
 they made a stand and resisted his 
 further progress. Sheridan soon after- 
 wards advanced to Mount Jackson and 
 hence to New Market ; and on the 
 25th his headquarters were at Harri- 
 sonburg, his cavalry moving towards 
 Staunton. On the 24th, Torbert had 
 a sharp engagement near Luray with 
 the enemy's cavalry, who were trying 
 to operate in Sheridan's rear; but he 
 succeeded in driving them up the 
 valley; and on the 26th he rejoined 
 the main army. Early retreated to 
 Port Republic, and thence to Brown's 
 Grap, a depression in the Blue Ridge 
 15 miles southeast of Harrisonburg, 
 which he held in force, and retained, 
 in spite of several attempts to drive 
 him from it. Torbert, with Wilson's 
 di^nision of cavalry and a brigade of 
 Merritt's, entered Staunton on the 
 moi-ning of the 26th and destroyed a 
 quantity of the enemy's property ; then 
 marching along the railroad to Waynes- 
 boro, he tore up the track for the entire 
 (.llstanee, as well as the bridges over 
 Christian's Creek and the South River, 
 finally retiring to Harrisonburg by way 
 of Staunton, destroying or carrying off 
 large supplies of forage and grain. 
 
 Several reconnoissances made to- 
 wards Early's position at Brown's Gap 
 showed that he enjoyed unusual facili- 
 ties for defense. He had thrown up 
 intrenchments and prepared to make a 
 determined stand. An advance on 
 Lynchburg on the part of Sheridan, 
 with Early in his rear now receiving 
 reinforcements, would have been ex- 
 
 tremely hazardous. His communication? 
 would have been at once interrupted. 
 As it was, numeroiis guerrilla bands, 
 under the lead of Mosby, White, and 
 other partisan chieftains, kept up ar. 
 annoying warfare between Strasbur 
 and the Potomac ; and ever since th 
 army left Harper's Ferry, every small 
 party and every straggler had been 
 " bushwhacked " by the people of the 
 valley, many of whom had obtained 
 protection passes from earlier com- 
 manders. Lieutenant John Meigs, of 
 the engineer corps, was overtaken and 
 murdered in a uanow wooded road 
 between Harrisonburg and Dayton ; 
 but in retaliy.ion for this, all the 
 houses within five miles were burned 
 by order of SI eridan. Nothing was to 
 be gained by staying any longer in the 
 neighborhood of Port Republic and 
 Cross Keys; and it remained only to 
 fall back down the valley to some 
 point which could be easily and firmly 
 held, and to which the winter supplies 
 for the army might be conducted in 
 safety. On the 6th of October, oct. 
 therefore, Sheridan withdrew his <>. 
 forces from the various advance points 
 which they had occupied, and marched 
 northward, destroying on his way, in 
 accordance with ordei*s from Govern 
 ment, all the hay, gi'ain, and forage to 
 be found, beyond what was necessary 
 for the use of his own army. In a des- 
 patch dated October 7th, Sheridan says 
 
 " The whole country from the Blue Kidge 
 to the North Mountain haa been made unten- 
 able for a rebel army. I have deatroyed oyei 
 2000 bama filled with wheat, hay, and farming 
 implements, over 70 mills filled with wheat 
 and flour Four herds of cattle have been 
 
79« 
 
 THE SHENANDOAH. 
 
 Jriven before the army, and not less than 3000 
 iiliitp have been killed and issued to the 
 troops. This destruction embraces the Luray 
 fiud Ijittle Fork yalleys as well as the main 
 valley." 
 
 As Sheridan returned down the 
 valley towM-ds Cedar Creek, he was 
 closely followed by the Confederate 
 cavalry under Rosser, supported by the 
 main body of Early's army. On the 
 Qct. 9th, the head of Sheridan's in- 
 9. fantry column having entered 
 Strasburg by the east road, while the 
 rear was still some miles further south 
 the enemy following the cavalry on the 
 »rest road had advanced so far as to 
 yet on the left flank of the infantry 
 column, Custer and Merritt then 
 turned and attacked with their cavalry, 
 A^hen a report having spread among 
 Rosser's men that the National infantry 
 were at the same time flanking them, 
 they immediately gave way and broke 
 into a stampede. The pursuit was 
 continued 7 miles. The loss of the 
 enemy was not great, being only about 
 300 men, including prisoners; but he 
 abandoned 11 guns, 4 caissons, and an 
 ammunition train. Things remained 
 quiet for several days after this affair ; 
 but on the 12th the Confederates 
 again appeared in the neighborhood 
 3f Strasburg and opened an artillery 
 fire on Emory's and Crook's corps. 
 These troops were then partially with- 
 tlrawn and Crook pushed out a recon- 
 noissance, which brought on a smart 
 engagement of three hours' duration. 
 Night, however, closed upon the 
 scene without any advantage and with 
 little loss to either side. 
 
 On the 16th, Sheridan went to 
 
 "Washington on important businese^ 
 leaving the army under the command 
 of General Wright, whose corj^s ogt_ 
 was, in the meantime, intrusted to 15. 
 General Ricketts. Fisher's Hill had 
 been abandoned as not affording any 
 good defensible line on its southern 
 slope, on which side Early would be 
 likely to approach ; and the army had 
 now lain for several days in front of 
 Strasburg, behind breast-works thrown 
 up on rising and rolling ground, mostly 
 along the east side of Cedar Creek — 
 Crook with the Eighth corps on the left, 
 the Nineteenth corps in the centre, the 
 Sixth on the right. On the right of 
 the Sixth, a little in the rear and in 
 reserve, were the two cavalry divisions 
 of Custer and Men-itt. The line was 
 4 or 5 miles long, and following the 
 course of the creek, nearly north and 
 south. Crook's corps rested its left 
 flank on the North Fork of the Shenan 
 doah and its right on the Winchester 
 and Strasburg turnpike, the principal 
 highway in that region. Behind Crook's 
 left and at right angles to it, with a 
 view to guard against any turning 
 movement on that flank, lay a force 
 about equivalent to a brigade, known as 
 Etching's provisional division. North 
 of the turnpike came the Nineteenth 
 corps, Grover's division holding its left 
 and resting on the turnpike, where it 
 joined Thorbum's division of Crook's 
 command. The Sixth corps on the 
 right, and the second cavalry division, 
 were not strongly protected with works, 
 as was all the rest of the line, but were 
 well posted on high ridges, and held 
 firmly the Middle road, or that which 
 
EARLY'S NOCTURNAL FLANK MOVEMENT. 
 
 799 
 
 rans next north of the txtmpike. A 
 Hmall stream called Meadow Run flows 
 into the creek between the two roads 
 mentioned. In fi-ont the National po- 
 sition was considered impregnable, ex- 
 cept by surprise, and to turn it would 
 be, it was believed, an undertaking of 
 extreme temerity. To guard against 
 surprise on the left, the North Fork 
 was picketed by Powell's cavalry divi- 
 sion from Cedar Creek all the way to 
 Front Royal. Weir's battery com- 
 manded the fords, supported by cavalry, 
 which were so posted as to prevent 
 surprise from the direction of the 
 Luray Valley. Artillery was posted in 
 front of the positions of Crook and 
 Emory, so as to command the ford and 
 the bridge over Cedar Creek, as well as 
 the rising ground on the west side. 
 The wagon trains and reserve artillery 
 lay in the rear on the turnpike. On 
 the 17th the cavalry on the right under 
 Cluster was attacked by Confederate 
 cavalry and infantry ; and a severe 
 skirmish ensued, restilting in the re- 
 pulse of the enemy. Next day a care- 
 ful reconnoissance was made from the 
 left towards Strasburg and Fisher's 
 Hill ; but no sign of movement on the 
 part of the enemy was discovered. 
 Despatches, however, were captured ; 
 and it was thus ascertained that re- 
 inforcements had been sent to Early, 
 for the purpose of enabling him to 
 attack and defeat Sheridan. 
 
 Early, in fact, had just received a 
 reinforcement of some 12,000 men. His 
 actual strength was thus increased to 
 27,000. His army was still smaller 
 than that of Sheridan. Enoouratred, 
 
 however, by so large an accession of 
 strength, Early prepared to put m exe- 
 cution one of the most audacious 
 movements of the war. Before break 
 of day on the 19th, he arranged his 
 troops at Fisher's Hill and began to 
 move against Sheridan's lines. His cav 
 airy and light artillery were directed to 
 advance against the National right, so 
 as to occupy the attention of Torbert 
 and the Sixth coi-ps. His infantry 
 marched in five columns, of which Gor- 
 don's, Ramseur's, and Pegram's were 
 ordered to place themselves by o^t, 
 daybreak on the left rear of the 1^- 
 whole National position, while Ker- 
 shaw's and Wharton's were to endeavor 
 to get, about the same time, close 
 under the intrenched rising groimd on 
 which lay Crook's command. To turn 
 the National left, it was necessary that 
 Early's columns should descend into 
 the fforore at the base of the Massanut 
 ten Mountain, ford the North Fork of 
 the Shenandoah, and skirt Crook's en- 
 campment for some distance, in some 
 places within 400 yards of his pickets. 
 It was a hazardous as well as audacious 
 experiment ; but it was executed with 
 wonderful skill and, as the result 
 proved, with complete success. The 
 movement was conducted quietly, and 
 with great caution. The result was 
 that before daybreak the Confederate 
 infantry, formed and ready for battle, 
 lay ^\^thin 600 yards of the National 
 cam J 13. Gordon's column was diagon- 
 ally in the rear of the Nineteenth 
 corps; on the left of Crook, facing 
 Kitching's provisional division, was 
 Hamseur supported by Pegram ; in 
 
oOO 
 
 THJfl SHENAJiDOAH. 
 
 front of Crook was Kershaw supported 
 by Wharton. Under cover of the 
 morning mist, Kershaw's column moved 
 rapidly through Crook's picket line, 
 and with tremendous fury rushed upon 
 the intrenchments. The onslaught was 
 feai-fuL The surprise was complete. 
 
 In a quartei of an hour Crook's 
 gallant army of Western Virginia be- 
 came a disorganized mass of fugitives 
 in rapid rout towards the position of 
 the Nineteenth corps. Crook lost sev- 
 eral batteries, some 700 men made 
 prisoners, and about 100 in killed and 
 wounded. The Sixth corps was at the 
 same time menaced ; and its attention 
 occupied by the enemy's cavalry and 
 light artillery. It fell to the lot of the 
 Nuieteenth corps to resist unaided the 
 shock of Gordon's colimin, now advanc- 
 ing solidly massed up the slope of a 
 broad bare hQl which commanded Em- 
 ory's camp. The Confederate force, 
 including the divisions of Ramseur and 
 Pegram, was as strong as Emory's, and 
 v\a8 supported by another column com- 
 ing up through the woods on the left, 
 aud along the turnpike in fi-ont. The 
 Xiueteenth corps was thus not only 
 taken in the rear, but outnumbered. 
 Still it held out for about an hour; 
 and then its left gave way, leaving a 
 [>art of the artillery in the enemy's 
 hands. The left and centre of the 
 National army had now fallen into 
 complete confusion ; and all the trains 
 that could be got away were sent off 
 in haste along the turnpike towards 
 Winchester. The sun was now high 
 in the heavens; and the extent of the 
 disaster was rendered visible. The 
 
 Confederates had succeeded in rolling 
 up the left of the line, and in severing 
 Powell's cavalry division on the ex 
 treme left from the rest of the ai-my , 
 and they were now forcing back the 
 entire centre, and occupying the in 
 trenchments of the Nuieteenth corps 
 as they had those of Crook's command 
 They had also captured 18 pieces ol 
 artillery, thus not only lessening the 
 National power for defense, but in- 
 creasing their own power for attack. 
 The captured cannon were turned with 
 ten-ible effect on theii' late possessors. 
 The Sixth corps was now ordered over 
 from the right ; and these troops, exe- 
 cuting quickly a change of front which 
 brought them at right angles to their 
 former line, were soon engaged in des- 
 perate battle. The resistance made by 
 the Sixth coips in covering the retreat 
 afforded opportunity for re-forming the 
 fugitives to some extent; but the Con- 
 federates increased their artillery and 
 musketry fire to the utmost, and stiLl 
 pressed the National left flank, with 
 the view, apparently, of getting full 
 possession of the turnpike, that they 
 might seize the trains and get between 
 the National army and Winchester. 
 The enemy pressed the left much mort 
 vigorously than the right. Merritt's and 
 Custer's cavalry were transferred from 
 the right to the left ; and a severe con 
 test took place in the thickly wooded 
 country near Middletown, in which the 
 left had been placed by its rapid re- 
 treat. About nine o'clock Sheridan's 
 army had got into line of battle again, 
 and made desperate efforts to check 
 the enemy. Both sides used artillerj' ; 
 
SHERIDAN'S FAMOUS RIDE. 
 
 801 
 
 bat the Confederates had greatly the 
 advantage in this arm, having not only 
 their own batteries, but the captured 
 guns of their antagonists besidea The 
 Sixth corps held its ground well ; but 
 Orook's corps on the left was forced 
 back, and the whole line gradually 
 gave way, the enemy again getting 
 past the National left flank, and finally 
 gaining the village of Middletown, 
 about 3 miles northeast of the posi- 
 tion from which Sheridan's army had 
 been driven. The principal aim of the 
 National commanders now was to cover 
 the trains and draw off the army with 
 as little loss as possible to Newton, 
 where they hoped to be able to re-form 
 and offer an effective resistance. The 
 battle had been completely lost. Camps, 
 earth-works, some 24 guns and 1800 
 prisoners — all were left in the hands of 
 the enemy. The routed Nationals were 
 .flying in all directions, large numbers 
 of them making their way to Win- 
 chester. 
 
 The National army fell back, as we 
 have seen, first towards Middletown, 
 and afterwards in the direction of 
 Newton. About a mile or so in the 
 rear of Middletown, Wright succeeded 
 in restoring something like order. 
 Sheridan was still absent. He had 
 been, as we have mentioned, on a visit 
 to Washington. On his return, he 
 dpent the night at Winchester. It was 
 Qot until his army had been defeated 
 that he was made aware of Early's 
 attack. He Wfus in his saddle in a 
 minute. He had scarcely left Win- 
 chester when he beheld sad evidences 
 of the disaster wliich had befallen his 
 
 army. The road was covered with 
 wagon trains and crowds of weary 
 fugitives. As he rode along on his 
 splendid charger, the air was rent with 
 cheers. The fugitives felt abashed and 
 halted ; and the wounded by the way- 
 side feebly waved a joyful salute. He 
 did not slacken his pace to rebuke oi 
 encourage. Waving his hat to the 
 cheering crowds, his horse still at full 
 gallop, he shouted, "Face the other 
 way, boys ! Face the other way ! We 
 are going back to our camps. We are 
 going to lick them out of their boots." 
 The words were electric. The tide of 
 fugitives began to turn. As he neared 
 the main body, the enthusiasm became 
 unboimded. Officers and men tossed 
 their hats and cheered to the echo. He 
 repeated his fiery words, " Boys, if I 
 had been here this would never hav 
 happened. We are going back. Well 
 have all these camps and cannon baci 
 again." What Sheridan said, he meant ; 
 and the men believed him. He was in 
 the field shortly after ten o'clock. 
 
 There was a lull in the fight, which 
 lasted several hours. Wright, as has 
 been mentionM, had already restored 
 order, and made dispositions, if not for 
 attack, at least for effective resistance. 
 Sheridan approved of the arrange- 
 ments ; and amid the most enthusiastic 
 cheers, he rode along the lines, study- 
 ing the ground and encouraging th 
 men. About one o'clock Early mad 
 a charge, which was vigorously repulsed 
 by Emory. About three o'clock Sheri 
 dan gave the order, "The entire line 
 will advance. Tlie Nineteentli corj)8 
 will move in coimection ^^'it^1 the SixtL 
 
902 
 
 THE SHEKANDOAH. 
 
 The right of the Nineteenth will swing 
 to the left, 80 as to drive the enemy upon 
 the pike." The order was promptly 
 obeyed. The entire line moved forward 
 — Getty's division leading the charge. 
 IVIerritt's cavalry covered the left flank ; 
 nc" Custer's cavalry was thrown out on 
 the right. As the Nationals advanced 
 they were checked for a moment by a 
 tremendous fire of artillery and mus- 
 ketry. The check, however, was but 
 momentary ; for Emory swung around 
 upon the foe and by two gallant charges 
 greatly disordered his lines. Almost 
 at the same moment, the National cav- 
 alry fell upon Early's flank. The tide 
 of battl had already turned. The 
 Confedera es fought with bravery and 
 determination ; but Sheridan's boys 
 now fighting in the presence of their 
 favorite chief ere not to be resisted. 
 The battle, in fa t, was already won ; 
 and what was so recently a retreat, was 
 now changed into a pursuit. It was a 
 perfect rout. On his arrival, Sheridan 
 said " we'll have all those camps and 
 cannon back again." His word was 
 made good. That night, the National 
 mfantry halted within their old camps ; 
 but the cavalry pursued, hanging upon 
 the flanks and rear of the retreating foe, 
 until he was beyond St asburg, and 
 night fell upon the scene. Early halted 
 for the night at Eisher i Hill, and m the. 
 
 morning resumed his retreat southward. 
 In the pursuit, aU the captured guns 
 were recovered. The Nataonak cap 
 tured not only their own guns, but 23 
 of those of the enemy, together with 
 1500 prisoners, and any quantity of 
 horses, mules, ambulances, wagons and 
 stores of various kinds. 
 
 Such was the Battle of Cedar Creek : 
 and such was the end of the gre&l 
 campaign in the Shenandoah Valley 
 It was one of the most brilliant cam 
 paigns of the war. It was chai-acter 
 ized by vigor and skill ; and it wa> 
 crowned with success. Sheridan had 
 captured during the campaign 13,000 
 prisoners and killed and woimded 
 10,000 men. His own loss, however, 
 was great — reaching the high figure of 
 16,000 men. He had now taken his 
 place among the great captains of the 
 age. His praise was in every mouth. 
 His famous ride from Winchester has 
 been immortalized by the combined 
 influences of poetry and song. It was 
 a proud honor which was conf eiTed upon 
 him when some three weeks afterwards 
 on the occasion of the resignation of 
 General McClellan, he was promoted to 
 the rank of Major-Greneral in the regu 
 lar army ; but it was an honor to which 
 he had entitled himself by daring, by 
 energy, by unwearied activity and by 
 success. 
 
THE MARCH TO THE SKA. 
 
 80o 
 
 CHAPTER XXXVIII. 
 
 Vih^rm»B at Atlanta — How the Men were Occupied — Position of the National Forces — Hood Ralllea mi 
 JoneeIx>ro — Speech of JefEereon Davis at Macon — New Confederate Policy — Thomas sent to Nashville — 
 Movements of Hood — AUatoona Pass — Arrival of General Corse — General French demands its Surrender 
 — Corse's Reply — Ready for the "Useless Elffusion of Blood" — The Assault — Corse Wounded — Sherman 
 at Kenesaw Mountain — The Confederates Retreat towards Dallas — Sherman at Kingston — Sherman at 
 Rome — Hood Before Resaea — Demands its Surrender — Colonel Weaver's Reply — The National Post at 
 Dalton Captured — Sherman at Resaea — Communications with Rome Re-opened — Affairs at Snake Creek 
 Gap and Ship's Gap — Rapid Retreat of Hood to Gadsden — Beauregard Assumes Command — Sherman at 
 Gaylesville — New Plan of Campaign — Sherman's Proposal to Grant — The March to the Sea Suggested — 
 Grant Consents — Sherman Prepares for the March — He Sends some of his Troops to Thomas — Sherman's 
 Army Re-organized — Atlanta in Flames — The Railroad Routes to the Sea — Order of March — Troope to 
 Live on the Country — " Uncle BUly " and the Troops — The Men in Fine Spirits — Feint on Macon — Battle 
 of Grlswoldville — Occupation of Milledgeville — Flight of the Legislators — Howard Crosses the Oconee — 
 Occupation of SandersvUle — Sherman at Tennllle Station — KUpatrick Defeats Wheeler — Crossing the 
 Ogeechee — Approach to Savannah — The Savannah and Ogeechee Rivers — Captain Duncan and two Scouts 
 Reach the Fleet — Rejoicing in the North— Foster's Co-operative Movement— Fort McAllister— Preparing 
 to Assault — The Fort Reduced — Arrival of Foster and Dahlgren — Sherman on board the Nemaha — The 
 Surrender of Savannah Demanded — Hardee Refuses — Kilpatrick Cuts the Gulf Railroad .Savannah 
 Invested — Uiaor Causeway — Corduroy Road — Vigorous Preparations for the Assault — Hardee's Fo«ition 
 Desperate— After Destroying all the Confederate Property, he Retreats during the Night — Sherman Enters 
 the City— His Christmas Present to President Lincoln— Halleck and Grant's Congratulations- -A Compli 
 ment from Grant — A Successful Campaign— The Inherent Weakness of the Confederacy Demonstrated— 
 Fearful Destruction of Property— General Geary Appointed Military Governor of Savannah— Resolution 
 of Snbmissior to the Laws of the United States— Sherman Perfecting his Plan for the March through the 
 Carolinas. 
 
 1864. 
 
 AiTER the fall of Atlan+a, there was 
 a lull in the campaign. The 
 wearied armies on both sides 
 were permitted to enjoy a brief period 
 of repose. They were not, however, 
 allowed to be wholly idle. Hood col- 
 lected and recruited his forces at Love- 
 joy's Station. Sherman's head-quarters 
 were at Atlanta. Some of his men 
 obtained leave of absence. Those who 
 remained were employed in the con- 
 struction of huts and barracks, in 
 strengthening the defenses of the city, 
 and in repairing the railroads. Supplies 
 md recruits were hurried forward from 
 
 Chattanooga. It seemed as if Sherman 
 intended to hold Atlanta \vith a strong 
 garrison, and to make it the base foi 
 further operations towards the South. 
 Before the end of September the place 
 was so strengthened and filled with 
 supplies that, with a small ganison, it 
 woiild have been able to resist the 
 attacks of vastly superior numbers. 
 
 The city was held by the army of 
 the Cumberland under Thomas. Th 
 army of the Tennessee, under Howard, 
 was gro-uped about East Point, and the 
 army of the Ohio, under Schofield, held 
 Decatur The cavalry consisted of two 
 
804 
 
 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 
 
 iivisions : one stationed at Decatur, 
 jnder Garrard; the other, under Kil- 
 patrick, was posted near Sandtown, 
 with a pontoon bridge over the Chattar 
 hoochee, from which position any 
 movement of the enemy towards the 
 west could be watched- Niimerous 
 changes occurred in the composition of 
 the armies. The term of service of 
 many of the regiments had expired, 
 and the temporary suspension of active 
 operations afforded an opportunity to 
 consolidate and reorganize, to reclothe 
 and equip the men, and to make prep- 
 arations for another campaign. The 
 garrisons in the rear also, and at points 
 along the railroad, were strengthened 
 to make the communications more se- 
 ciire. Wagner's division of the Fourth 
 corps and Morgan's division of the 
 '^'ourteenth corps were sent back to 
 Chattanooga. 
 
 General Hood, recovering with sur- 
 prising elasticity from the stunning 
 blow which he received in the loss of 
 Atlanta, rallied and reorganized his 
 forces at Jonesboro, receiving his sup- 
 plies by the Macon Railroad. His 
 army numbered about 40,000 men, ex- 
 clusive of the Georgia militia, which, 
 as if to give the impression that no 
 immediate offensive movement was con- 
 templated, were withdrawn by Gov- 
 ernor Brown soon after the evacuation 
 of Atlanta. The governor expressed a 
 hope, however, that he should be able 
 to return the militia force to Hood's 
 command in greater numbers and with 
 equal efficiency when the interests of 
 the public service should require it. 
 
 It was not the intention of the Con- 
 
 federate authorities, however, to allow 
 their principal Southern army to remain 
 inactive. Whatever declarations they 
 might make to the public in the hope 
 to belittle Sherman's successes, they 
 were well aware that the capture of 
 Atlanta was a blow at the heart of the 
 Confederacy, and that it would be so 
 considered by the Southern people. It 
 was evident that if Georgia and the 
 Gulf States were to be saved to the 
 Confederacy, something must be done, 
 and that without delay, to arrest the 
 victorious progress of the National 
 army. While affairs were in this posi- 
 tion, Jefferson Davis set out on a tour 
 of inspection through the South ; and 
 at Macon, on the 23d of Septem- gept. 
 ber, he delivered an address on 2o 
 the crisis, maiked by so many indiscreet 
 admissions that some of the Confederate 
 journals refused to believe the reports 
 to be genuine. In this address he 
 spoke with undisguised vexation of the 
 depletion of Hood's ranks by desertion 
 and absenteeism ; and he promised that 
 if all the men away without leave would 
 return to their duty, Sherman's army 
 should meet the fate that befell that of 
 the French empire in its retreat from 
 Moscow. 
 
 The new policy to be inaugurated in 
 the South by the Confederates was in 
 a measure foreshadowed by the speech 
 of Davis at Macon. It was boiTowed 
 from that which Sherman had himself 
 so successfully carried out in his cap 
 ture of Atlanta, and had the merit o 
 boldness if not of originality and far 
 sightedness. In accordance with this 
 new plan of the Confederates, Hood's 
 
HOOD Al DALLAS. 
 
 806 
 
 whole army was to move rapidly in a 
 compact body to the north of Atlanta, 
 and after breaking up the railroad 
 between the Chattahoochee and Chat- 
 tanooga, push on to Bridgeport and 
 there destroy the great railroad bridge 
 over the Tennessee River. Atlanta 
 would then be cut off from Chat- 
 tanooga and the latter from Nashville. 
 Sherman thus separated from his prim- 
 ary and secondary bases, would find 
 Atlanta but a barren conquest It 
 would, indeed, have been difficult for 
 him to hold it ; for he would soon have 
 foimd himself in perplexity from the 
 want of provisions and supplies, which 
 would be intercepted in all directions 
 by the Georgia militia. Forrest, un- 
 doubtedly the best of the Confederate 
 cavalry officers, was already operating 
 in southern Tennessee, where the Na- 
 tional force was barely adequate to the 
 task of protecting the communications 
 between Nashville and Chattanooga. 
 It was anticipated, also that the re- 
 sumption of offensive movements on 
 the part of Hood would restore the 
 morale of his army, which had become 
 dispirited by its long series of retreats 
 and reverses ; and that the opposite 
 effect would be produced on the army 
 of Sherman if compelled to abandon 
 conquests effected at the cost of so 
 many severe battles and painful 
 marches. Such was the plan devised 
 by the Confederate authorities — a plan 
 which if vigorously carried out, and 
 against a less able general than Sher- 
 man, might have been productive of 
 the most disastrous consequences to the 
 National arms. It will be seen that 
 
 Sherman was fully equal to the emer 
 gency, and that the prophecies of tht. 
 Southern press, that the " great flanker" 
 was about to be "out flanked," were 
 
 not to be fulfilled. On the 28th 
 
 Sept. 
 
 of September, as soon as he be- !J8. 
 came convinced that the enemy intend 
 ed to assume the offensive, Sherman 
 sent Thomas, his second in command, 
 to Nashville, to organize the new troop? 
 expected to arrive there, to make pre 
 liminary preparations, and to look after 
 Forrest. 
 
 In spite of strenuous opposition, 
 Hood was retained at the head of the 
 Confederate army, with Cheatham, 
 S. D. Lee, and Stewart, commanding 
 his three corps. Wheeler remained in 
 coBomand of the cavalry, which had 
 been largely reinforced. Hood soon 
 moved westward towards the Chatta- 
 hoochee, taking a position facing Sher- 
 man and covering the West Poin 
 Railroad about Palmetto Station. He 
 also threw a pontoon bridge over the 
 Chattahoochee, and sent cavalry de- 
 tachments beyond it in the direction of 
 Carrollton and Powder Sj)rings. About 
 the 2d of October his whole Qct. 
 army was over the Chattahoochee, 2 . 
 and on the march towards Dallas, 
 where his three corps were directed to 
 concentrate. At this point he was aide 
 to threaten Rome and Kingston, as well 
 as the fortified places on the railroad 
 to Chattanooga, while there remained 
 open to him in case of defeat, a lit.9 
 of retreat eouthwestward into Alabama. 
 Advancing eastward from Dallas to 
 the railroad, he captured Big Shanty 
 and Ackworth Stations, broke the tele 
 
806 
 
 THE MAKOH TO THE SKA. 
 
 graph wires, and destroyed the railroad 
 between those places. He also sent 
 an infantry division under General 
 French against the National post at 
 Allatoona Pass through which lay the 
 lailroad and Sherman's line of commun- 
 ications. Here were stored more than 
 1, 000,000 rations for the National 
 aimy, the capture of which would 
 prove an important acquisition to Hood's 
 impoverished commissariat. The natural 
 stiength of the position at Allatoona 
 Pass was such, that 1000 men could 
 hold it against ten times their number so 
 long as supplies held out. Its redoubts 
 were at this time garrisoned by only 
 three small regiments under Colonel 
 Tourtellotte. In the possession of the 
 Confederates it would have effectually 
 interrupted the National communica- 
 tions between Chattanooga and Atlanta, 
 and might have necessitated the evacua- 
 tion of the latter city. It will be seen, 
 therefore, that Hood had excellent rea- 
 sons for striking suddenly and with a 
 large force at this point. 
 
 Well aware that his seat at Atlanta 
 was insecure while his long line of com- 
 munications lay exposed to interrup- 
 tion, Sherman, on hearing that Hood 
 had crossed the Chattahoochee, des- 
 patched General Corse vsdth a division 
 of the Fifteenth corps to Rome. Slocimi 
 was ordered to hold Atlanta and the 
 railroad bridge over the Chattahoochee 
 with the Twentieth corps. A freshet of 
 the river having carried away the 
 bridges, three pontoons were laid on 
 the 4th of October, and the Fifteenth, 
 Seventeenth, Fourth, Fourteenth, and 
 Twenty-Third corps were put in motion 
 
 towards Smyrna camp-ground. The 
 following day they were moved to the 
 strong position about Kenesaw Moun- 
 tain. Anticipating the enemy's move- 
 ment against Allatoona Pass, Sherman 
 had already signalled and telegraphed 
 to Corse to reinforce that post from 
 Rome, and hold it until the main body 
 of the National army could come to his 
 assistance. On receiving the message, 
 Corse immediately placed a brigade of 
 900 men on the cars and reached Alla- 
 toona on the night of the 4th, just in 
 time to be ready to meet the attack of 
 French's division. With this addition 
 the garrison nimibered loOO men, with 
 6 guns. 
 
 Early on the morning of the 5th, 
 French with 6000 men, and sup- q^.^^ 
 ported by two other divisions, 6. 
 approached Allatoona, and sent a letter 
 to Corse demanding an uumediate siu'- 
 render, in order to avoid "a useless 
 effusion of blood," giving only five 
 minutes for an answer. Coree was 
 ready within the time specified. His re- 
 ply was that he and his command were 
 ready for the " useless effusion of blood " 
 as soon as it was agreeable to Fren ;h. 
 This was immediately followed bj a 
 Confederate attack which comment ed 
 at eight o'clock and continued till two 
 in the afternoon. Driven by the des 
 perate assaults of overwhelming num 
 bers, Corse's troops contested the ground 
 foot by foot, from their intrenchments 
 to the hill, and from the hill to the • 
 fort Corse, although bleeding and at 
 times insensible, having been wounded 
 early in the action, still fought on with 
 an obstinacy and desperation worthy of 
 
SHERMAK AT ROME. 
 
 Sol 
 
 the great stake for which he contended. 
 During the heat of the contest, about 
 ten o'clock, Sherman reached the Kene- 
 saw Mountain, 18 miles distant from 
 Allatoona, and from its summit saw 
 the smoke of battle and heard faintly 
 the sounds of artillery. The distance 
 being too great to send troops to take 
 part in the battle, Sherman directed 
 General Cox with the Twenty-Third 
 corps to move rapidly westward from 
 the base of Kenesaw, strike the road 
 from Allatoona to Dallas, and threaten 
 the rear of the attacking force. He 
 also succeeded in getting a signal 
 message to Corse notifying him of his 
 presence. Sherman had great confi- 
 dence in that general and in the result 
 of the battle, and said while reviewing 
 it from his remote stand-point : " I know 
 Corse ; so long as he lives, the Alla- 
 toona Pass is safe." The assaulting 
 columns of the enemy, thrown back 
 again and again, were finally compelled 
 to retire towards Dallas. Their retreat 
 was hastened by apprehensions .'>f the 
 co-operating movement of Cox towards 
 the only road by which they could 
 escape. Unfortimate delays, arising 
 from rain and mud, prevented Cox 
 from intercepting the Confederates on 
 the road back to Dallas ; but they left 
 800 killed, wounded, and prisoners, in 
 the hands of Corse. The garrison lost 
 nearly haK its number, in killed and 
 wounded. The little town of Alla- 
 toona was reduced to a mere wreck by 
 the severe fire of the Confederates. All 
 the artillery and cavalry horses were 
 killed. The valuable stores, however, 
 were saved, and the fort and pass were 
 
 held. This battle was the decisive 
 event in the pursuit of Hood. Corse 
 notwithstanding his severe wounds, 
 was able to return the same night to 
 Rome with the remainder of his com- 
 mand. The only important injury done 
 by the Confederates in this vicinity 
 was the destruction of 6 or 7 miles of 
 railroad between Big Shanty and Allar 
 toona, which was immediately put in 
 course of restoration. Sherman re- 
 mained several days in the vicinity of 
 Allatoona, watching the movements of 
 Hood, suspecting he would march for 
 Rome, and thence towards Bridgeport, 
 or else to Kingston. 
 
 On the 6th and 7th, Sherman pushed 
 out his cavalry towards Burnt q^.^^ 
 Hickory and Dallas, and disco v- 6. 
 ered that the enemy had moved west- 
 ward. Inferring from this that Hood 
 would attempt to break the railroad 
 again in the neighborhood of Kingston, 
 he put his army in motion on the 
 morning of the 8th through Allatoona 
 Pass and arrived at Kingston on the 
 10th. There he learned that Hood 
 had threatened but passed by Rome, 
 and that he was crossing the Coosa by 
 a pontoon bridge 11 miles below. He 
 therefore, on the 11th, moved his q^j^ 
 army to Rome, and sent Gar- 11 • 
 rard's cavalry and the Twenty-Third 
 corps under Cox across the Oostanaula 
 to threaten the flanks of the enemy as 
 he passed northward. Gaixard drove 
 a Confederate cavalry brigade beyond 
 the Narrows leading into the valley oi 
 the Chattooga, and captured 2 field 
 pieces. 
 
 Hood, however, moved with g^e^t 
 
808 
 
 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 
 
 rapidity on his northward march, and 
 on the 12 th appeared with Stewart's 
 Oct. coi-ps in front of Resaca, and de- 
 12. nianded its immediate and un- 
 -^onditional surrender. He promised 
 hat all the white officers and soldiers 
 hould be parolled in a few days, but 
 he threatened that if the place should 
 be captured by assault, no prisoners 
 would be taken. To this demand 
 Colonel Weaver, who held the defenses 
 of the place with 600 men and 3 pieces 
 -)t artillery, replied : " If you want it, 
 come and take it." The garrison 
 mauned the rifle-pits surrounding the 
 works, and kept the enemy's skrr- 
 mishers at bay. During the day masses 
 of Confederate troops continued to 
 pass the fort ; but no serious attack 
 was made on them, the enemy being 
 more intent on destroying the railroad 
 towards Dalton. Sherman had at first 
 intended to move his army into the 
 Chattooga Valley, to interpose between 
 the enemy and his line of retreat down 
 !the Coosa, but fearing that Hood 
 woTild then move eastward by Spring 
 Place and down the i'ederal road, he 
 determined to move against him at 
 Resaca. Although repulsed at that 
 place by Colonel Weaver, Hood h^ad 
 succeeded in breaking up the railroad 
 fi'om Tilton to Dalton. At Tilton, 
 during the night of the 12th, he cap- 
 liu-ed a blockhouse garrisoned by a 
 part of the Seventeenth Iowa, after a 
 gallant defense. At Dalton, owing to 
 the negligence of the National scouts, 
 the Confederates were able to surround 
 the foi-t garrisoned by the Forty -Fourth 
 aolored regunent, under Colonel John- 
 
 ston, before adequate preparations for 
 defense could be made. A summons 
 to surrender, signed by Hood, similar 
 to that sent Colonel Weaver being sent 
 in, Colonel Johnston, finding that Buz- 
 zard Roost and other important points 
 commanding his position were already 
 in the enemy's hands, complied with 
 the demand. During the 14th and 
 15th the enemy was occupied in com- 
 pleting the destraction of the railroad 
 as far as Tunnel Hill. The rolling 
 stock had been mostly removed ; and of 
 this kind of property only a few box 
 cars were destroyed. 
 
 With the main body of his army, 
 Sherman arrived at Resaca on the 14 th, 
 where he encamped for the night. 
 Determining to strike Hood in flank or 
 force him to battle, he directed the 
 army of the Tennessee, under Howard, 
 to move to Snake Creek Gap, where 
 a portion of the enemy's forces held the 
 old National lines, and General Stanley 
 with the Fourth and Fourteenth corps 
 to march by way of Tilton across the 
 mountains to the rear of the gap in the 
 neighborhood of Villanow Howai"d 
 skirmished with the Confederates diir 
 ing the forenoon of the 15th^ q^j 
 with the view of detaining them lo- 
 till Stanley should have time to get m 
 their rear ; but they gave way about 
 noon, and though followed through tht 
 gap, escaped before Stanley had oeei 
 able to reach the further end of the 
 pass. 
 
 The approach of the National columns 
 now warned Hood to move off west 
 ward; and the 16th of October found 
 him in full retreat for I^afayette 
 
vlAYLBSVILLE. 
 
 808 
 
 Towards that place also Sherman 
 moved his army, with the view of cut- 
 ting off Hood's retreat. At Ship's 
 Gap, Ho'.»d left some troops intrenched, 
 to detain his pursuers; but Wood's 
 li vision of the Fifteenth corps rapidly 
 arried the advanced posts held by two 
 ■ompanies of a South Carolina regi- 
 ment, making the men prisoners. The 
 remainder of the regiment escaped to 
 the main body near Lafayette. Next 
 morning Sherman's force passed over 
 into the valley of the Chattooga, the 
 army of the Tennessee moving in pur- 
 suit, by way of Lafayette and Alpine, 
 towards Blue Pond ; the army of the 
 Cumberland by Summerville and Mel- 
 ville Post Office to Gaylesville, and the 
 army of the Ohio and Gaixard's cavalry 
 from Villanow, Dirt-town, and Goover's 
 Gap to Gaylesville. Hood, however, 
 vas little encumbered with trains ; and 
 8 he marched with great rapidity in 
 a southwesterly direction, through a 
 broken and mountainous country, he 
 succeeded m getting into the naiTow 
 gorge formed by the Lookout range 
 abutting against the Coosa River in the 
 neighborhood of Gadsden. 
 
 During this retreat of Hood into 
 northern Alabama, he had frequent 
 opportunities to join battle with his 
 pursuers. Of these, however, he de- 
 clined to take advantage. He remained 
 at Gadsden till near the end of October, 
 receiving a few reinforcements brought 
 Oct. ^P ^y Beauregard, who on the 
 17. 17th assumed command of the 
 confederate Military Division of the 
 West, Hood still retaining his special 
 command; though subject to the super- 
 
 vision or direction of Beaureijard. The 
 latter published an address appealing 
 to his countrymen of all classes and 
 sections for their support and confi 
 dence, and urging soldiers absent with- 
 out leave to return to the army. The 
 address seems to have had little effect. 
 On the 19th the National armies la} 
 grouped about Gaylesville. 'n the q^i 
 rich valley of the Chattooga, a 19. 
 region abounding in com and cattle. 
 Here Sherman resolved to let his mei> 
 live on the country for a whUe, conten- 
 for the present to watch hie enemj 
 without wearing out his troupy in a use 
 less pursuit. Hoping that Hood would 
 turn towards Huntersville and Bridge 
 port, he posted the ai-my of the Ten 
 nessee near Little River, with orders tc 
 keep within supporting distance of th« 
 cavalry, which was directed to watcl 
 Hood in the neighborhood of Hill's 
 Valley, and give the earliest notice pos- 
 sible of his turning northward. ITie 
 army of, the Ohio was posted at Cedar 
 Bluff, with orders to lay a pontoon 
 bridge across the Coosa and reconnoitre 
 towards Center and in the direction of 
 Blue Mountain. The army of the 
 Cumberland was kept in reserve at 
 Gayles\'ille. In the mean time com- 
 munications were opened to Rome, and 
 a large force was engaged in repairing 
 the railroads. The injuries done to 
 these were confined to two sections, one 
 7 miles long between Big Shanty ami 
 Allatoona, and the other 21 miles long 
 between Resaca and Tunnel HilL By 
 the 20th the road was in running ordei 
 again from Resaca to Atlanta. On the 
 28th, trains left Chattanooga for the 
 
SIO 
 
 THE MARCH TO THK SEA. 
 
 latter place. Atlanta was abimdantly 
 supplied with provisions ; but forage was 
 scarce; and Slocum was instructed to 
 send strong detachments m the direc- 
 tion of South River, for the purpose of 
 iollectinc' com and fodder. He was 
 also to put his wagon trains in good 
 condition for further service. 
 
 Hood had not succeeded in interrupt- 
 ing the National communications to 
 such a degree as would compel the 
 evacuation of Atlanta Having failed 
 permanently to disable the railroad, he 
 had been driven into nothem Alabama, 
 where he was now separated from that 
 admirable railroad system by means of 
 which his army had been so well and so 
 long supplied. Georgia and the whole 
 southeast was left exposed to the inva- 
 ders; but on the other hand there 
 seemed open to Hood the opportunity 
 of carrying the war into Middle Ten- 
 Qessee and Kentucky, where the richly 
 stored cities and farms afforded tempting 
 chances foi plunder. His ej^perience 
 during the retreat had been such as to 
 satisfy him that he was able, with the 
 army at his command, to endanger at 
 any moment, Sherman's communicationa 
 It was his conviction that Sherman 
 would not be able to follow him, and 
 that even then, he would have but 
 little ehance of overtaking his army. 
 Sherman, however, had resolved upon 
 a bolder course, and one promising 
 greater and more important results. 
 He had previously submitted to General 
 Grant the outlines of a plan for the de- 
 struction of Atlanta and the raUroad 
 back to Chattanooga, to be followed by 
 a march through the heart of Georgia 
 
 to one of the Atlantic seaports. This 
 proposition he now renesved from 
 Gaylesville, and it received the sanction 
 of the commander-in-chief. On the 2d 
 of November, Grant wrote to Sherman 
 "with the force you have left with 
 General Thomas he must be able to take 
 care of General Hood, and destroy him. 
 I do not see that you can withdraw 
 from where you are to follow Hood, 
 without giving up all we have gained 
 in territory. I say then, go on as you 
 propose." On the 8th, in a letter dated 
 the 7th, came Grant's adieu. "Great, 
 good fortune attend you." 
 
 The original plan of the campaign had 
 been, after capturing Atlanta, to hold 
 it, and, using that city as a secondary 
 base, to move an army eastwai'd through 
 Georgia, leaving garrisons at points 
 along the railroads across the State, 
 and thus cut the Confederacy in two 
 from west to east, as had been done 
 from north to south by the opening of 
 the Mississippi. The execution of this 
 plan would have requii-ed large details 
 of troops, and it was willingly abau 
 doned. Sherman's plan, which was 
 substituted for this, effectually secured 
 the same advantages. When Hood 
 crossed the Chattahoochee on his flank- 
 ing march upon the National communi- 
 cations, he was moving in the very 
 direction in which Sherman wished him 
 to go ; and it was with feelings not 
 unmixed with anxiety that the National 
 commander watched the movements of 
 his antagonist xmtil, instead of returning 
 to Jonesboro, he moved off from Gads 
 den to the neighborhood of Decatur. 
 The ill-advised strategy of Hood gave 
 
PREPAKATIONS FOR THE MARCH. 
 
 811 
 
 Sherman the very opportunity he de- 
 Mred ; and he prepared at once to avail 
 himself of it. 
 
 On the 26th of October, considering 
 his army unnecessarily large for his 
 )ct. purp*^^®' ^^^ having a8cert;ained 
 26. that Hood had moved westward 
 across Sand Mountain, Sherman de- 
 tached the Fourth corps under General 
 Stanley, with orders to proceed to 
 Chattanooga and report to General 
 Thomas at Nashville. On the 30th, 
 the Twenty-Third corps, commanded 
 by Schofield, was also sent to Thomas, 
 to whom Sherman delegated full power 
 over all the troops subject to his com- 
 mand, except the four corps with which 
 he designed to move into Georgia, 
 This gave to General Thomas the Fourth 
 and Twenty-Third corps, the two divi- 
 sions under General A. J. Smith — then 
 en route for Tennessee from Missoxui — 
 all the garrisons in Tennessee, as well 
 as all the cavalry of Sherman's Military 
 Division, except one division under Kil- 
 patrick, which was ordered to rendez- 
 vous at Marietta. General Wilson, who 
 had arrived from the army of the Poto- 
 mac to take command of the cavalry of 
 Sherman's army, was sent back to 
 NashvQle, with all dismounted detach- 
 ments, and with directions to collect as 
 papidly as possible the cavalry serving 
 in Kentucky and Tennessee, to mount, 
 organize, and equip them, and report to 
 Thomas for duty. These forces it was 
 hoped would enable Thomas to defend 
 the railroad from Chattanooga to Nash- 
 ville, and, at the same time, leave him 
 an army which would be a match for 
 that of Hood, should he cross the Ten- 
 
 nessee and move northward. Thomag 
 was also fully informed of Sherman's 
 plans, and at the same time assured 
 that until he felt fully confident of 
 being able to cope with Hood, the east 
 ward movement on the part of Sherman 
 would not be commenced. 
 
 By the Ist of November Hood had 
 moved his army from Gadsden and 
 appeared in the neighborhood of j^^^ 
 Decatur. Sherman then began !• 
 preparations for his march througl' 
 Georgia. The army of the Tennessee 
 returned by slow and easy marches tr 
 the neighborhood of Smyrna camp 
 ground. The Fourteenth corps was 
 moved to Kingston, from which point 
 a"] surplus artillery, all baggage not 
 needed for the contemplated laovement, 
 and all the sick and wounded, and the 
 refugees, were directed to be sent back 
 to Chattanooga. The troops were at 
 the same time put in the most efficient 
 condition for a long and difficult march 
 From the 2d to the 11th of November 
 every locomotive and car on the Chat 
 tanooga and Atlanta Railroad was put 
 in requisition. The vast supplies o' 
 provisions, forage, stores, and machinery, 
 which had been acciunulated at Atlanta, 
 Rome and other points, and eveiything 
 likely to impede the movements of the 
 army, were sent safely to Chattanooga. 
 On the night of the 11th the last train 
 left Atlanta for the north. Everything 
 being now ready Corse, who still re- 
 mained in Rome, was ordered to destroy 
 the bridges there, as well as all the 
 foundries, mills, shops, warehouses, or 
 other property that could be useful to 
 the enemy, and move on Kingston At 
 
hi3 
 
 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 
 
 the same time the railroad near Atlanta 
 aad between the Etowah and the Chat> 
 tahoochee was directed to be effectually 
 destroyed. The garrisons north of 
 Kingston were ordered to withdraw 1> 
 
 'hattanooga, taking with them all pub- 
 
 .c property and railroad stock, and to 
 take up the rails north of Resaca and 
 preserve them for future use. The 
 railroad between the Etowah and the 
 Oostanaula was left imtouched, as it 
 might be necessary to reoccupy the 
 country as far as the line of the Etowah. 
 On the 12th of November the message 
 f^QY^ " All is well " was telegraphed 
 
 !'-• to Thomas ; the wire was then 
 cut, and Sherman's army stood alone, 
 without any communication in the rear. 
 By the 14th, all the troops had arrived 
 at or near Atlanta, and by orders of 
 Sherman was grouped into two wings ; 
 the right and left, commanded resp wt- 
 ively by Generals O. O. Howard and 
 H. W. Slocum. The right wing was 
 composed of the Fifteenth corps, Gen- 
 P. J. Osterhaus, and the Seventeenth 
 corps, General Frank P. Blai- com- 
 manding. The left wing was com- 
 posed of the Fourteenth corps, --Teneral 
 Jeff. C. Davis and the Twentieth coi-pa. 
 General Slocum. The Fifteenth coq>s 
 had four divisions, those of Woods, 
 Hazen, Smith and Corse. The Seven- 
 teenth had three divisions, those of 
 Mower, Leggett and Smith. The 
 Fourteenth corps had three divisions, 
 those of Carlin, Morgan and Baird. 
 The Twentieth corps had also three 
 di\nsious, those of Jackson, Geary and 
 
 Ward. The cavalry division was held ■ 
 separate, and was subject to orders from 
 
 Sherman only. It was commanded 
 by Judson KUpatrick, and was c->m 
 posed of two brigades, commanded re 
 spectively by Colonels Eli H. Murray 
 of Kentucky, and Smith D. Atkins of 
 Illinois. The total strength of tb< 
 army was about 60,000 : — infantry 
 about 64,000, cavalry nearly 5000, 
 artillery nearly 2000. General Barry, 
 in fitting out the artillery, which was 
 reduced to the minimum, withdrew 
 every doubtful or suspicious horse. 
 Each artUlery carnage had eight horses, 
 and each battery a reserve of twelve 
 Sherman issued orders to regulate the 
 conduct of the troops on the march. 
 The whole force moved rapidly south 
 ward, and on the 14th of November 
 lay agaui around Atlanta. 
 
 On the 16th all the buildings in the 
 city, except the dwelling-houses jjq^. 
 and churches, were destroyed 16. 
 under the direction of Captain Poe, the 
 chief of engineers. The several corps 
 having been supplied with clothing 
 and such equipments as were necessary, 
 from the depots, and everything valu- 
 able to the Government removed, the 
 torch was applied in the evening t<j the 
 various buUdings, the most substantial 
 of which had been previously mined 
 For many hours the heavens were 
 lighted up by the flames of this va^,' 
 conflagration, which was rendered more 
 awful by the explosion of shells and 
 magazines. By the dawn of the 16th 
 all that was valuable of the city lay in 
 ashes. The property destroyed in- 
 cluded all the buildings connected with 
 the railroads, the passenger depots, 
 freight bouses, a number of locomotivee 
 
SHERMAN LEAVES ATLANTA. 
 
 813 
 
 cars, and every description of rolling 
 stock ; the machine shops, mills, arse- 
 nals ; the laboratory, the armory, many 
 business houses, the institutions of 
 learning, and all the hotels except the 
 Grate City ; in all about 1800 buildings, 
 exclusive of woodsheds and outhouses, 
 the whole valued at about $2,000,000. 
 As far as possible private property was 
 spared, the object being merely to 
 render the city useless to the enemy 
 when he should reoccupy it. 
 
 Connecting Atlanta with the sea- 
 board are two great lines of railroad, 
 nearly parallel and having a general 
 southeasterly direction, one terminating 
 at Charleston, 308 miles distant, the 
 other at Savannah, 293 miles distant 
 The former line is composed of the 
 Georgia Railroad, 171 miles long, ex- 
 tending from Atlanta to Augusta, and 
 of the South Carolina Railroad, 137 
 miles long, extending from Augusta to 
 Charleston; the latter consists of the 
 Western and Macon road, 103 miles 
 long, connecting Atlanta and Macon, 
 and of the Georgia Central Railroad, 
 190 miles long, connecting Macon with 
 Savannah. From Augusta there runs 
 a cross railroad due south to Millen, on 
 the Georgia Central Railroad, 53 miles 
 long, affording a second route to Savan- 
 nah from Atlanta, 10 miles longer than 
 that through Macon. The belt of 
 country between the twr main lines of 
 railroad, as far east as Augusta and 
 Millen, is of an average breadth of 40 
 miles ; east of these points the country 
 between the roads gradually expands 
 to a width of nearly 100 miles. The 
 Georgia joad, after the capture of 
 
 Atlanta, had lost much of its import 
 ance. All the others, however, includ- 
 ing that between Augusta and Millen, 
 were important links in the chain of 
 communications between the northern 
 and southern portions of the Confeder- 
 acy. The feeling was prevalent, there- 
 fore, that the destruction of these links 
 would be a severe blow to the enemy. 
 The region included within these rail 
 roads was probably the richest and 
 most populous of Georgia, containing 
 Milledgeville, the capital of the State, 
 and other important towns. It was 
 reported to be rich in all kinds of agri- 
 cultui-al produce and abundantly able 
 to supply the wants of a large invading 
 army. 
 
 While Atlanta was yet v flames, 
 SheiTuan's army began its march east 
 ward in four colimms. The two consti- 
 tuting the left wing under Slocum, 
 followed the railroad towds Augusta, 
 while the two composmg the righ^ 
 wing under Howard, accompanied bj 
 Kilpatrick's cavalry, marched in the 
 direction of Jonesboro and McDonough, 
 with orders to make a strong feint on 
 Macon, to cross the Ocmulgee about 
 Planter's Mills, and rendezvous in the 
 neighborhood of Gordon in seven days. 
 Slocum moved by way of Decatur and 
 Stone Mountain, with orders to tear u} 
 the railroad from Social Circle to Mad 
 ison, to bum the important railroad 
 bridge across the Oconee, east of Madi- 
 son, and then to turn southward and 
 rendezvous at Milledgeville on tht> 
 seventh day. Sherman himself left 
 Atlanta on the 16th in company with 
 the Fourteenth corps, which marched 
 
81i 
 
 THE MAKCH TO THE SEA 
 
 by way of Lithonia, Covington, and 
 Shady Dale, also towards Milledgeville. 
 AH the corps were provided with good 
 wagon trains, in which the supplies of 
 ammunition were abundant, but with 
 only twenty days' bread, forty days' 
 sugar and coffee, beef cattle equal to 
 forty days' supplies, and a double 
 allowance of salt. Three days' forage 
 in grain was also taken. The instructions 
 were that the army should live, during 
 the march, chiefly if not altogether on 
 the country, which abounded in com, 
 sweet potatoes, and cattle. It was not 
 at first known to the men whither they 
 were marching. The opinion prevailed 
 that they were off for Richmond. 
 The day was unusually fine ; and a 
 feeling of exhilaration seemed to per- 
 vade all minds. As he moved about, 
 Sherman was frequently greeted with 
 the words " Uncle Billy, I guess Grant 
 is waiting for you at Richmond.'' 
 
 At what point, on the seaboa'*'?. Sher- 
 man would come out coma not be 
 definitely fixed. It was not impossible, 
 as he would be obliged to subsist at 
 least partially on the country, that a 
 force inferior to his own might compel 
 him to abandon his plans and seek a 
 point different from that intended. 
 The blindness of the Confederate au- 
 thorities, however, allowed them to send 
 Hood's arc y — the only considerable 
 force they had between Richmond and 
 the Mississippi — northward on an offen- 
 sive campaign, thus leaving the whole 
 southeast open, with little opposition 
 to be dreaded by the National forces 
 on any route they might take. Sher- 
 man's first object was to place his army 
 
 in the heart of Georgia, interposing it 
 between Macon and, Augusta, and thus 
 obliging the Confederates to scatter 
 their forces in order to defend not only 
 those points, but Millen, Savannah, 
 and Charleston. It was his opinion 
 that by means of pretended demonstra 
 tions on places widely separated, leav- 
 ing it doubtful whether the immediate 
 objective was Augusta or Macon, or 
 both, he would be able to perjilex the 
 enemy and insure a speedy and unin 
 terrupted march to the coast. 
 
 Howard's command, of which the 
 Fifteenth corps formed the right fol- 
 lowing the railroad southward as far 
 as Jonesboro, encountered the mounted 
 troops of Iverson ; but these were 
 "luickly dispersed by Kilpatrick's cav- 
 alry. The column then moved east- 
 ward through McDonough and Jackson 
 to the Ocmulgee, crossed it at Planter's 
 Mills and passing southward through 
 Monticello and Hillsboro, and between 
 Milledgeville and Clinton, struck the 
 Georgia Central Railroad on the 22d, 
 the left at Gordon, 20 miles east j^^y^ 
 of Macon, the right extending 22. 
 westward towards Griswoldville. In 
 conjxmction with the operations of 
 Howard's column, the greater part of 
 the National cavalry under Kilpatrick 
 made a circuit by the right, through 
 Griffin and Foi-syth, towards Macon. 
 At first the Confederates supposed this 
 to be only a raid on a grand scale ; but 
 on the approach of Howard's column — 
 and still remaining ignorant of Slocxira'a 
 movement in the direction of Augusta 
 — they began to think that Sherman 
 was aiming at the capture of Macon 
 
GBISWOLDVILLE. 
 
 m 
 
 They, therefore, concentrated at that 
 place all their available force, consisting 
 of some cavalry under Wheeler, a small 
 body of veterans, and several brigades 
 of militia. On the 20th, 800 of Kil- 
 {tatrick's cavalry with 4 cannon, made 
 a pretended attack on East Macon, two 
 miles east of the city, and drove the 
 enemy within his intrenchments. Lit- 
 tle loss was sustained on either side ; 
 but the movement very effectually ac- 
 complished its purpose of confirming 
 the Confederates in the belief that 
 Macon was Sheiman's objective. The 
 National cavalry then, after destroying 
 several miles of railroad east of Wal- 
 nut Creek, withdrew to Griswoldville. 
 The Fifteenth and Seventeenth corps 
 having struck the Georgia Central 
 Railroad on the 2 2d, as already stated, 
 immediately commenced to destroy the 
 track and the road-bed between Gordon 
 and Griswoldville. 
 
 While this work was gomg on, onf> 
 of the severest battles of the campaign 
 took place. Walcott's brigade of in- 
 fantry, with a section of artillery and 
 some cavalry, forming the extreme 
 right of the Ilfteenth corps, had been 
 thrown forward to Griswoldville to 
 cover that flank, and also to continue 
 the demonstration on Macon commenc- 
 ed by Kilpatrick. At the same time 
 Howard s trains were closing up, and 
 his men were destroying the raiboads. 
 Walcott, after burning the principal 
 buildings in Griswoldville, posted his 
 troops in a wood protected in fi-ont by 
 an open morass, and threw up a raU 
 breast-work. About two in the after- 
 loon a force of the enemy, about 500C 
 
 strong, moved out of Macon and ap 
 proached the National position. Fall 
 ing back slowly, the National cavalry 
 placed themselves in connection with 
 the infantry so as to protect them in 
 flank and rear, and leave the enemy no 
 alternative but to make a direct front 
 attack. The Confederate force, ccn^ 
 sisting of a part of Hardee's old com 
 mand brought up from Savannah and 
 several brigades of militia, advanced 
 boldly ; and, being mostly inexperienced 
 troops, and ignorant of the strength of 
 the National position, they attempted to 
 carry it by storm. They made six 
 desperate assaults, which Walcott's vet 
 erans, well protected by theii- breast- 
 works, repelled with ease, and with 
 little loss, while the Confederates mov- 
 ing with difficulty through the morass, 
 were exposed to a steady fire from men 
 conscious of security, and suffered se- 
 verelj- When they retired, they left 
 300 dead upon the field. The Confeder- 
 ate loss, according to their own account, 
 was 614, including General Anderson 
 severely wounded. It was probably 
 nearer 2000. After this battle, Macon 
 might easily have been taken by 
 Howard, but now that the raili'oad 
 connections were destroyed, its posses- 
 sion was no longer an important object. 
 In the mean time, the left wing of 
 Sherman's army continued its march 
 along the Augusta and Macon Railroad 
 in two })arallel columns, the Twentieth 
 corps on the left, the Foiu-teenth, accom- 
 panied by Sherman, on the light. The 
 latter corps having thoroughly de- 
 stroyed the railroad as fai' as Covington, 
 turned south, on the 19th. towaixh 
 
816 
 
 THE MABCH TO THE SEA. 
 
 Milledgeville ; while the Twentieth 
 corps, which had previoiisly marched 
 on the north side of the railroad, con- 
 tinued the work of destroying the track 
 and the bridges as far as Madison 30 
 miles north of Milledgeville and 90 
 niles west of Augusta. To strengthen 
 the conviction that this movement was 
 intended to threaten Augusta, the cav- 
 alry, moving on the left wing, was sent 
 as far east as Union Point, 7*^ miles 
 west of that city. From Mad-^ot the 
 Twentieth corps turned off nearly due 
 south, and passing through Eatonton, 
 ^Qy^ its advance arrived at Milledge- 
 21. ville on the 21st, followed, next 
 day, by the Fourteen) th corps, which 
 passed through Shady Dale and Eaton- 
 ton, neither coips having encountered 
 any opposition during its marcL 
 
 When Sherman's army set out from 
 Atlanta, the Georgia legislature was in 
 session at Milledgeville, but the ap- 
 proach of Kalpatrick's cavalry caused 
 no alarm there, as the movement was 
 supposed to be only a raid, and that its 
 object was Macon. When, however, on 
 the ] 8th, it was discovered that How- 
 ard with the right wing was moving 
 through McDonough in a southeasterly 
 direction, and that Slocum was also 
 approaching from the north, a panic 
 seized the whole body of legislators, 
 who fled with all possible haste to 
 Augusta. After this exodus several 
 days of quiet passed, when on a bright 
 sunshiny morning an advanced regi- 
 ment of the Twentieth corps entered 
 the capital of Georgia, with the band 
 playing the national airs. 
 
 Only a few of the National troops 
 
 entered Milledgeville. Two or three 
 regiments were detailed under the 
 orders of engineers to destroy govern- 
 ment and certain other property. The 
 magazines, arsenals, depot buildings, 
 factories of various kinds, with store- 
 houses cntaining large amounts of 
 government property, and about 1700 
 bales of cotton, were burned. Privatt 
 houses, even those of noted Confeder 
 ates, were left xminjured, as well as 
 the Capitol ; and the inhabitants were 
 protected as far as possible from pil- 
 lage or insult from the soldiery. The 
 hospital surgeons, the principal of the 
 Insane Asylum, and others, expressed 
 their thankfulness for the excellent 
 order preserved duiing the National 
 occupation. Some stores and about 
 2500 small-arms fell into the possession 
 of the National troops ; and a number 
 of Union prisoners were liberated from 
 the penitentiary. 
 
 While Sherman's left wing was en- 
 joying a temporary rest at Milledge- 
 ville, the right, under Howard, moved 
 eastward along the Georgia Central 
 Railroad, with orders to destroy it 
 thoroughly as they went, as far as Ten- 
 nille Station. The Confederates now 
 became aware that Macon was not to be 
 serioiisly attacked ; and Wheeler, march- 
 ing with all speed, got across the 
 Oconee near the railroad bridge, and, 
 aided by a body of militia under Gen 
 eral Wayne, prepared to dispute the 
 passage. When Howard airived on 
 the 23d, he found the guard there so 
 strong that a crossing coidd be effected 
 only at considerable loss. After skir- 
 mishing near the rivei a day or two to 
 
WAYNESBOKO. 
 
 817 
 
 occupy the enemy's attention, the Fif- 
 teenth corps was moved to a ford 8 
 miles below, and a pontoon bridge was 
 laid without much difficulty. The 
 Confederates then retreated ; and by 
 e 26th the whole risrht winof had 
 ossed the river, and moving eastward 
 as engaged in destroying the railroad. 
 The left wing crossed the Oconee near 
 Milledgeville on the 24th, and moved 
 by two roads in a southeasterly direc- 
 tion towaj'ds Sandereville, a small town 
 38 miles from Milledgeville, and a little 
 north of the railroad. The Fouiteenth 
 corps now took position on the left of 
 Slocum's column, and Shennan accom- 
 panied th« Twentieth corps towards 
 Sandersville. On approaching this 
 Nov. pl'^^e on the 25th, the bridges 
 25. across Buffalo Creek were found 
 to have been burned. Next day the 
 two coi-ps, marching by jiarallel roads, 
 entered the town almost at the same 
 moment, skirmishing with and driving 
 out Wheeler's cavalry, which had at- 
 tempted to impede their progress. On 
 the 27th and 28th both wings lay 
 encamped between Sandersville and 
 Irwin's Cross-Roads, a few miles south 
 of the railroad. About this time also 
 Sherman shifted his quarters from the 
 left vring to the Seventeenth corps, 
 then at Tennille Station, opposite San- 
 dei'sville. 
 
 Kilpatrick, after the demonstration 
 at Macon which ended ^vith the action 
 at Griswoldville, shifted his cavalry 
 force to the left wing, and remaining 
 a 1 1,1) at Milledgeville to recruit, was 
 directed to move rapidly eastward and 
 break the railroad bet^veen Millen and 
 
 Augusta, thus threatening Augusta 
 and covering the passage of the maiL 
 body of the army across the Ogeechee, 
 the next great river on Sherman's route 
 east of the Oconee. After breaking 
 the railroad, Kilpatrick was ordered to 
 turn southward and move rapidly upon 
 Millen, to rescue the National prisoner? 
 supposed to be confined there. On th«- 
 27th, a few hundred of his cav- jy^^y 
 airy, under Captains Hays and 21. 
 Estes, dashed into Waynesboro, on the 
 railroad, 30 miles south of Augusta, 
 where they did some damage ; but it 
 having been ascertained that the prison- 
 ers had for several weeks previous been 
 in the coui-sc of removal from Millen to 
 some less exposed point in southern 
 Georgia, no demonstration was made on 
 that town. The advanced cavalry 
 detachment now fell back to its main 
 body, which lay east of the Ogeechee 
 near Louisville. Kilpatrick had re- 
 tired thence to meet the infantry, with 
 instructions from Sherman not to risk 
 a battle unless circumstances should 
 greatly give him the advantage. But 
 the appearance of the cavalry on the 
 left flank of the National army, led 
 the Confederates to suppose that Au 
 gusta was the real objective of the 
 campaign. Shennan, therefore, ordered 
 Kilpatrick to leave all his wagons and 
 other incumbrances with the It ft wing 
 and to move towards A\Tieeler's cav- 
 alr}% which was hovering around in th. 
 direction of Augusta ; and if Wheeler 
 desired fighting to give him all he 
 wanted. Accordingly, Kilpatrick, svy 
 poi-ted by Baird's division of infantr) 
 of the Fourteenth corps, again moved 
 
«18 
 
 THE MAECH TO THE SEA. 
 
 in the direction of Waynesboro. En- 
 countering AVlieeler in the neighbor- 
 Qgg^ hood of Thomas' Station, on the 
 i- 3d of December, Kilpatrick at- 
 tack ihI Lim in position, diiving him 
 from three successive lines of barri- 
 cade«, through Waynesboro and across 
 Brier Creek, the biidges over which 
 he burned. Marching rapidly south- 
 vvai-d from Waynesboro, he rejoined 
 the left wnng at Jacksonboro, 20 miles 
 •iast of Millen, on the 5th. 
 
 On the 28th of November the Four- 
 teenth corps stinick the Ogeechee at 
 Fenn's bridge, 15 miles north of Sand- 
 ersville. The river was crossed by pon- 
 toons; and marching along its north 
 bank, the corps anived at Louisville on 
 the 29th. Upon reaching Buckhead 
 Creek, it then turned eastwaid to Lump- 
 kin's Station, on the Augusta and Millen 
 Railroad, 10 miles south of Waynes- 
 boro. On the 3d and 4th of December 
 it destroyed a considerable portioj of 
 the track, and then marched in a south- 
 easterly direction for Jacksonboro. At 
 the same time the Twentieth corps 
 moved along the railroad, which from 
 Davisboro Station runs parallel with 
 the Ogeechee for about 20 miles. The 
 Fifteenth and Seventeenth corps moved 
 along the south side of the railroad, 
 the Fifteenth, mth which was General 
 Howard in person, keeping on the right 
 flank and about a day's march ahead, so 
 »s to be ready to turn against the flank 
 oi any force of the enemy that should 
 attempt to oppose the progress of 
 the main body. The Twentieth and 
 Seventeenth corps had been some d»ys 
 ffligaged in destropng the railroad be- 
 
 tween Tennille Station and the Ogee 
 chee. This river, being here about 
 sixty yards wide, and naturally a strong 
 defensive line to the enemy, might 
 have been rendered a serious obstacle. 
 On the 30th, however, a crossing \\ as 
 effected vdth little difiiculty, the fio\. 
 Twentieth at the railroad bridge 30. 
 and the Seventeenth near Bai-ton Sta 
 tion, a few miles further east. These 
 two coi-ps advanced steadily along the 
 railroad, and on the 2d of Decembei 
 the Seventeenth reached Millen ; the 
 Twentieth, passing a little north of 
 that town through Birdsville, moved iu 
 a southeasterly direction, while the 
 Fifteenth in two columns, stUl a day's 
 march m advance of the main body 
 kept along the west bank of the 
 Ogeechee. The whole army then turn 
 ing slowly round frorr. its easterly 
 course, moved directly southward in 
 parallel columns, all except the Fif- 
 teenth corps — which was directed to 
 cross to the east bank on arriving at 
 Eden Station — between the Ogeechee 
 and Savannah Rivers, the Seventeenth 
 corps following the railroad and tear- 
 ing it up while advancing, the Four- 
 teenth keeping along the Savannah 
 River road, and the Twentieth march- 
 ing down the middle road by way of 
 Springfield. Kilpatrick covered the 
 rear, and kept at bay such scattered 
 bodies of the enemy's cavalry as 
 attempted to harass the columns while 
 in motion. 
 
 The advantage of the feint which 
 had been made towards Augusta now 
 became apparent. A considerable 
 number of Confederate troops had 
 
 1 
 
THE GULF KAILKOAD CUT. 
 
 81S 
 
 been concentrated at that place. Had 
 Sherman's true object been known, 
 these might have been used to obstruct 
 his march to Savannah, towards which 
 he was now moving. The weather 
 which had been for the most part 
 favorable during the first half of the 
 campaign, became rainy after the col- 
 umns passed Millen. As the army 
 approached Savannah, the coimtry was 
 found more marshy and difficult. Great 
 obstructions were met in tin- shape of 
 felled trees where the roads crossed the 
 creek swamps or narrow causeways ; 
 but these the well -'organized pioneer 
 companies rapidly removed. No im- 
 portant opposition was encountered till 
 the heads of the columns were wthiu 
 about 15 miles of Savannah. Here all 
 the roads leading to the city were again 
 found obstructed -with felled timber ; 
 but the imperfect defenses thus formed 
 were easily turned and the enemy 
 driven away. 
 
 By the 10th of December the Con- 
 Dec, federates had retired within their 
 10. lines at Savannah. These follow- 
 ed a swampy creek which falls into the 
 Savannah River about 3 miles above 
 the city and extended thence to the 
 head of a corresponding creek which 
 falls into the Little Ogeechee. These 
 streams formed excellent cover for the 
 enemy, flowing through marshes and 
 rice fields, which could be flooded either 
 by the tide-water or from inland ponds, 
 the gates of which were covered by 
 heavy artillery. 
 
 To prevent an attack on the Gulf 
 Railroad, at that time employed to its 
 utmost capacity in bringing supplies 
 
 and reinforcements to the city, the Con. 
 federates sent a force across the Ogee- 
 chee, which they supposed woujd be 
 able to check the advance of the Fif- 
 teenth corps. The greater part of this 
 corps had, however, passed over to the 
 east bank of the river on the 7th neai 
 Eden Station ; and the next day Corse's 
 division was pushed forward between 
 the Little and Great Ogeechee, in ad- 
 vance of the main column, to the canal 
 connecting the Ogeechee with the 
 Savannah. A position was taken up 
 on the south side of the canal and in- 
 trenched ; the Confederates abandoning 
 the portion of their advanced line there 
 and retiring within the fortifications oi 
 Savannah. Reinforcements fi'om the 
 Fifteenth corps were sent to Corse; 
 and on the 9th a detachment moved 
 forward to the Gulf Railroad, tore up 
 the track for several miles, and cap 
 tured a train of 18 cars with many 
 prisoners, thus cutting off communica- 
 tions between Savannah and the south 
 No supplies could reach the city bj 
 the accustomed channels ; while the 
 investing forces had large herds ol 
 cattle, brought * with the s . ray oi 
 gathered from the country on the 
 march ; and although stUl without 
 communication with the f.»^,et, thej 
 had yet remaining in the ?-rjiy wagons 
 a considerable supply oi breadstuffe 
 and other necessaries. The fine rice 
 crops, along the Savannah and Ogee- 
 chee rivers, aftorded abundance Oj 
 fodder for the cattle, as well as food for 
 the men. The country south f/ the 
 Ogeechee was also open »j fcr^i^iny 
 ground. 
 
320 
 
 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 
 
 The only approaches to Savannah 
 were the two railroads, and the Au- 
 gusta, Louisville and Ogeechee dirt 
 roads, all narrow causeways and com- 
 manded by heavy ordnance, against 
 which it would have been useless to 
 oppose the light field gims with which 
 Sherman's army was provided. The 
 strength of the enemy at that time was 
 also unknown to the National com- 
 mander, and he determined not to us- 
 sault immediately, trusting that the 
 operation of time would bring about 
 the desired result. Sherman, therefore, 
 instructed his army commanders to 
 invest the city as closely as possible 
 from the north and west, and to re- 
 connoitre the ground well in their front. 
 The 11th and 12th of December were 
 passed in putting the troops in position, 
 erecting breast-works, and establishing 
 batteries. The army lay in a semicir- 
 Dgp^ cular line about ten miles long — 
 12. the left resting on the Savannah 
 River at a point 3 miles distant from 
 the city, the right on the Gulf Railroad 
 at a distance of 11 miles — everywhere 
 confronted by the enemy's strong line 
 of earth-works, which constituted the 
 exterior fortifications of the city. 
 
 In the mean time, in order to facili- 
 tate communications with the fleet. 
 Captain Duncan, with two scouts, was 
 sent down the Ogeechee is a small 
 skiff, on the night of the 9th. Con- 
 cealing themselves in the rice swamps 
 during the following day, they resumed 
 the perilous voyage at night, and suc- 
 ceeded in getting past Fort McAllister 
 and the Confederate picket-boats dur- 
 ing a rain-storm. They then made their 
 
 way into Ossabaw Sound, where on the 
 morning of the 11th they were picked 
 up by the National gun-boat Flag, and 
 immediately conveyed to Hilton Head. 
 General Foster was at that time operat- 
 intr asrainst the Charleston and Savan 
 nah Railroad with the view of destroy 
 ins: the communications of Savannah 
 with the north. He was immediately 
 sent for, and received Howard's dis 
 patch of the 9th : " We have had per- 
 fect success, and the army is in fine 
 spirits." This was the first direct 
 intelligence from Sherman's army since 
 its departure from Atlanta, and its 
 reception caused universal rejoicing in 
 the North. 
 
 The co-operative movement of Foster 
 against the Charleston and Savannah 
 E^ilroad, the object of which was to 
 effect a lodgment at Pocotaligo or a 
 Grahamville, had only partially suc- 
 ceeded. The o^^edition dispatched 
 for this purpose, consisting of 5500 
 men under General Hatch, together 
 with a naval brigade under Commander 
 Preble, and gvm-boats from Admiral 
 Dahlgren's squadron, arrived soon after 
 daylight at Boyd's Point, where the 
 troops were landed. They advanced 
 skirmishing some miles ; but not being 
 acquainted with the country did not 
 succeed in reaching the railroad, and at 
 night were compelled to withdraw. 
 Next day, however, the march was 
 resumed ; and the troops were pushed 
 on towards the enemy's position near 
 Grahamville. Str^vug works, cot sist- 
 ing of a fort and baitery, with rifle-j.its, 
 were found at Honey Hiil, 3 Piiles fr'>ui 
 Grahamville. The ganiflon hiwev^r 
 
FORT McALHSTEK, 
 
 821 
 
 * ts slim, there being only 1500 men un- 
 ci, r Genera] G. W. Smith, with 7 pieces 
 ot artillery. The position was imme- 
 diately attacked An engagement en- 
 sue \, lasting six hours, and the National 
 trocps were on the point of carrying 
 he yorks, when reinforcements arrived 
 or the enemy. These consisted of a 
 regi; aent of infantry and some cavalry, 
 andt r General Robertson, who brought 
 also another battery. It being found 
 impojsible now to contend against the 
 increi::aed force of the enemy, protected 
 aa they were by their defenses, the 
 National force was withdrawn to a 
 good position on the Savannah road, 
 having sustained a loss of 740 men. 
 The operations on the part of Foster, in 
 which there was a good deal of desul- 
 tory fighting, were continued for several 
 days; and, although he did no* succeed 
 in getting possession of the raihoad, in 
 guarding which the Confederates dis- 
 pKyed. gieat tenacity, his troops under 
 Hatjh secured a position on the peniu- 
 aula or neck between the Coosawatchie 
 and Tullafinney Creek, about three- 
 quaiters of a mile from the railroad. 
 From this point, the intervening woods 
 having been cut down for the purpose, 
 they could clirect the fire of their artil- 
 lery on the jassing trains. 
 
 As the gr€ &ter part of the fleet was 
 already in o/ at the entrance of the 
 Savannah River, nothing remained to 
 be done but to send a few vessels to 
 Warsaw and Ossabaw Sounds to open 
 ommunicatioES with the army. The 
 atter sound, the estuary of the Ogee- 
 chee, affording the most practicable 
 mode of accomplishing this object, 
 
 Sherman took meastires to reduce Fort 
 McAllister, a strong redoubt on the 
 right bank of the river, which its guns 
 commanded. This fort, situated 6 miles 
 from the sound and about 18 miles 
 southwest of Savannah, was highly im- 
 portant to the seciuity of the city in 
 the rear. It was one of the strongest 
 of its class in the South ; and it had suc- 
 cessfully resisted the attacks of a small 
 fleet of iron-clads in the early part oi 
 the year 1863. It mounted 23 guns 
 en barbette and one mortar, including 
 several 8-inch anl 10-inch pieces. 
 Every line of approach to the fort was 
 commanded by howitzers and field 
 pieces placef u the bastions. A deep 
 ditch 40 feco ivide, into the bottom of 
 which were driven palisades, extended 
 along its front ; and a formidable line of 
 abatis ran along the outer edge of the 
 ditch, beyond which the approaches 
 were thickly planted with torpedoes. 
 Fortunately the garrison was not strong, 
 consisting of only two companies oi 
 artillery and three of infantry, in al. 
 about 200 men, in command of Major 
 Anderson. It would doubtless have 
 been reinforced in a few days. On the 
 evening of the 12th, Hazen's division 
 of the Fifteenth corps was marched 
 from its position on the Gulf Railroad 
 to the Ogeechee, just below the mouth 
 of the Canoochie, where the bridge, 
 known as King's Bridge, having been 
 destroyed was rapidly reconstructed in 
 a substantial manner. At daybreak o\ 
 the 1 3th Hazen crossed to the west Dec, 
 bank and pushed on towards Fort 13. 
 McAllister, his orders being to carrj, 
 it by assault Hazen reached thf 
 
 999 
 
83a 
 
 THE MABOH TO THE HhA. 
 
 vicinity of the fort about one o'clock, 
 and deployed his division in such a 
 manner that both flanks rested on the 
 river. His skirmishers were posted 
 behind the trunks of trees whose 
 branches had been used by the enemy 
 n constructing the abatis. About 
 five o'clock the assault was made, with 
 9 regiments, at three points. In a very 
 short time, the intervening space of 600 
 yards was crossed, the abatis sur- 
 mounted, and the ditch reached. A 
 few minutes sufficed to tear down 
 enough of the palisades to permit the 
 passage of the troops, who with loud 
 cheers and great enthusiasm rushed in 
 swarms over the parapet and planted 
 their colors on the rampart. In twenty 
 minutes from the time the assault was 
 commenced the fort was won. The 
 struggle was brief. The losses were 
 not great on either side. The victory, 
 however, was complete. Shermaa him- 
 self, was an eye-witness of the Dera- 
 tions from a rice-mill on the opposite 
 bank of the river. 
 
 No communication had yet been 
 effected with the fleet. From a signal 
 station at the rice-mill, Sherman's offi- 
 cers had been for two days gazing 
 anxiously over the rice fields and salt 
 marsh, in the direction of Ossabaw 
 Sound, but no vessel came in sight. 
 \Vhile the preparations for assaulting 
 Fort McAllister had been going on, 
 the smoke-stack of a small steamer evi- 
 dently approaching became visible on 
 the horizon. Just before the assault 
 was made, the steamer was signalled. 
 Answer was given ; and, as soon as 
 be saw the colors fairly planted on the 
 
 fort, Sherman, in company with How 
 ard, proceeded in a small boat to meet 
 Hazen ; but finding that he had not 
 yet been able to communicate with 
 the steamer, which was hid from him 
 by some intervening woods, he tooi 
 another small boat with a crew, and 
 pulled down the river to it. It proved 
 to be the tug Dandelion, Captain Wil 
 liamson, who announced that Admiral 
 Dahlarren and General Foster were on 
 their way and might be hourly expected 
 in the soimd. Sherman, after writing 
 a despatch to the War Department, 
 his fii^t since leaving Atlanta, returned 
 immediately to Fort McAllister. Be- 
 fore daylight on the 14th he received 
 intelligence that Foster had actu- oec. 
 ally arrived in the steamer No 14. 
 maha and was anxious for an inteniew. 
 Sherman immediately went on board 
 the Nemaha, and after a consultation 
 proceeded in that steamer to meet 
 Dahlgren, whose flag-ship, the Harvest 
 Moon, was in Warsaw Sound. Meas- 
 ures were at once concerted for opening 
 pennanent communication between the 
 army and the fleet; and Dahlgren, 
 having agreed to engage the attention 
 of the forts at Wilmington and Rose 
 dew, Sherman returned to Fort Mc 
 Allister the follomng day, confident of 
 being able to carry the defenses of 
 Savannah as soon as his heavy ordnance 
 from Hilton Head should anive. Or 
 the 17th a number of 33-pounder 0^^ 
 Parrott guns were landed from 17. 
 transports, at King's bridge, on the 
 Ogeechee, where the new base was 
 established, the obstructions in the 
 river below having been removed : and 
 
HARDEE RETIRES FROM SAVANNAH. 
 
 «n3 
 
 Sherman despatched from Slocum's 
 headquarters, by flag of truce, a formal 
 demand for the surrender of the city. 
 This was refused by General Hardee, 
 who was in command there with about 
 15,000 men. Hardee expressed a de- 
 ermination to hold the city to the last, 
 saying that his communications were 
 yet open, that he was fully supplied 
 with subsistence stores, and was able 
 t<» withstand a long siege. On the 
 same day, a large body of cavalry under 
 Kilpatrick, with infantry sapports, were 
 sent down the Gulf Railroad as far as 
 the Altamaha River, for the purpose of 
 destroying the track. This work was 
 thoroughly accomplished for the entire 
 distance, including 4 miles of trestle- 
 work immediately adjoining the river. 
 
 The city was now invested on every 
 side except along the Savannah River. 
 That river, which was filled with ob- 
 structions and commanded by the guns 
 of Forts Jackson, Lee, and Lawton. was 
 in possession of the enemy nearly as 
 far towards the sea as Fort I'jlaskL 
 Opposite the city is Hutchinson's 
 Island, several miles long, the west 
 end of which was in possession of Slo- 
 cum's troops; but the lower end still 
 remained in the hands of the enemy. 
 A little below the island, on the South 
 Carolina side, the Union Causeway 
 which runs north through the swamps 
 intervening between Savannah and 
 Charleston, afforded a way of escape to 
 Hardee. 
 
 Reconnoissances from the left flank 
 had shown that it was impracticable to 
 push a considerable force across the 
 Savannah River vnth a view to occupy 
 
 the causeway, as the enemy holding 
 the river opposite the city with iron 
 clad gun-boats, would be able to destroy 
 any pontoons laid down between Hut- 
 chinson's Island and the South Carolina 
 shore. Sherman, therefore, ordered Slo 
 cum to get his siege guns into po.nitiou, 
 and prepare for an assault; while he 
 himself, proceeded to Port Royal and 
 made anangements to have the Union 
 Causeway occupied from the north by 
 the troops of Foster. In the meantime 
 a substantial corduroy road had been 
 constructed across the swamps and rice 
 fields from the Ogeechee, at King's 
 Bridge, to the vicinity of the city 
 Along this road the heavy siege gun." 
 were transported to their position, a? 
 well as supplies for the armj. 
 
 Hardee seeing this, and well aware 
 that the avenue of escape northward 
 w^ould not be allowed long to remain 
 open to him, immediately made prepar 
 ations for evacuating the city. On the 
 afternoon of the 20th he caused Dgc^ 
 his troops to destroy the navy 20. 
 yard and the Confederate Government 
 property; while the two iron-clads 
 Georgia and Savannah moved up the 
 river, and, supported by several bat- 
 teries, opened on the National left 
 a furious fire, which was continued all 
 night, with a view to cover the retreat 
 The Confederate troops were conveyed 
 across the river, during the night, ii 
 steamboats and row-boats and on rafts 
 and on the morning of the 21st, tavinj; 
 blown up the iron-clads and the forts 
 below the city, they were well on theii 
 way towards Charleston. 
 
 Hardee's retirement was discovered 
 
iu 
 
 THE MAR H 10 THE SKA. 
 
 by the National pickets at dawn on the 
 2l8fc; and several regiments were sent 
 forward to occupy the deserted intrench- 
 ments. A few nuurs later Sherman, 
 who had just returned from Hilton 
 Dg^^ Head, entered the city at the head 
 'il. of his body-guard and received 
 the formal surrender from the muni- 
 cipal authorities. On the same day 
 Foster communicated with the city by 
 steamers, taking up what torpedoes 
 could be found and passing safely over 
 others. Measures were also taken for 
 clearing the channel of all obstructions. 
 The captures included 800 prisoners, 
 150 guns, 13 locomotives in good order, 
 190 cars, a large supply of ammunition 
 and material of war, 4 steamboats, be- 
 sides the iron-clads and transports blown 
 up by the enemy, and 33,000 bales of 
 cotton safely stored. 
 
 Writing to President Lincoln on the 
 2 2d of December, Sherman said : " I beg 
 to present you, as a Christmas gift, the 
 ^ity of Savannah, with 150 heavy guns 
 and plenty of ammunition, and also 
 about 25,000 bales of cotton." Lincoln 
 replied, thanking Sherman for his gift. 
 Elalleck and Grant both wrote letters 
 af congratulation to the victorious gen- 
 eral. " I never " wrote Grant " had a 
 doubt of the result. When Appre- 
 hensions for your safety were expressed 
 by the President, I assured him that 
 with the army you had, and with you 
 in command of it, there was no danger 
 but that you would reach salt water in 
 some place. But I should not have 
 felt the same security — in fact 1 would 
 not have entrusted the expedition to 
 any other living conunander " 
 
 Thus ended the great march to the 
 sea — a march which, while it command- 
 ed the attention of the world, and estab 
 lished on soKd foundations the militarj- 
 reputation of General Sherman, dem- 
 onstrated, in the most striking man- 
 ner, the inherent weakness of the 
 Confederacy. The campaign had lasted 
 over five weeks ; and, during that 
 time, an army 65,000 strong, with 
 10,000 horses, over a tract varying from 
 20 to 60 miles in width, traversed a 
 distance of 300 miles, Sherman had 
 lost only 567 men, of whom 63 were 
 killed, 245 wounded, the remainder 
 missing. A track of desolation marked 
 the progress of the army. Over 20,000 
 bales of cotton had been destroyed, 
 and probably over 25,000 bales cap- 
 tured. There were captured besides 
 some 10,000,000 poimds of corn, and 
 an equal amount of fodder ; neai'ly 
 1,500,000 rations of meat ; about 1,000, 
 000 rations of bread ; 483,000 rationr 
 of coffee, 581,000 of sugar, about 1,150, 
 000 of soap, and 137,000 of salt. This, 
 however, was not alL Over 320 miles 
 of raiiroad were destroyed ; and so 
 complete waa the work of destruction 
 that conununications between the Con- 
 federate armies in Virginia and those 
 in the west were finally and effectually 
 severed. Sherman had. during his 
 march, forced into his service some 5000 
 horses and 4000 mules, and captured 
 1328 prisoners, with 167 guns. His 
 army entered Savannah, accompanied 
 by more than 10,000 negroes, who 
 everywhere haUed the National troops 
 as deliverers. According to Sherman's 
 own estimate, damage was done to the 
 
SAVANNAH StTBMISSIVE. 
 
 896 
 
 State of Georgia to the extent of 
 $100,000,000, of whicli $20,000,000 
 t least inured to the advantage of the 
 National government. 
 
 General Geary was appointed mili- 
 tary commander of Savannah, immedi- 
 ately after the surrender. On the 26th 
 from his head-quarters in the field, 
 General Sherman issued special orders, 
 giving instructions as to the course of 
 conduct to be pursued by the military 
 authorities towards the inhabitants of 
 the captured city. The orders were 
 strict ; but they were not unjust, nor 
 could they even be called severe. The 
 property of the peaceful citizens was 
 to be respected. Industry of all kinds 
 was to be encouraged. Assistance was to 
 be tendered to all deserving families or 
 individuals who, from whatever cause 
 were in necessitous circumstances. The 
 Mayor was instructed to give public 
 notice that the time had come when all 
 must choose their course, and decide 
 whether they were willing to remain 
 within the National lines, and conduct 
 themselves as good citizens, or depart 
 in peace. Those who prefen'ed to 
 leave were to report their names to 
 the Chief-Quarterraaster ; and measures 
 would be taken to secure them safe 
 transport beyond the lines. Sherman 
 deemed it his duty to lay hib hand 
 somewhat hfeavily on the press. Only 
 tw* newspapers were to be published 
 in the city ; and their editors and pro- 
 
 prietors were to be held to the strictest 
 accountability. 
 
 In the grave emergency in which 
 they now found themselves, the inhab- 
 itants of Savannah conducted them- 
 selves with the utmost propriety. 
 Their behavior, indeed, was in striking 
 contrast with that of the inhabitants of 
 other Confederate citiea No iU feeling 
 was manifested towards their captors 
 by word or deed. On the contrary 
 there was evidence that the occupation 
 of the city by the Nationals, was felt 
 to be a deliverance. A latent Union 
 sentiment soon began to reveal itself ; 
 and as early as the 28th of December, 
 a meeting of influential citizens was 
 held at the call and under the presi 
 dency of Mayor Arnold, and resolu 
 tions -vere passed — acknowledging thf 
 duty of submission to the laws of the 
 United States, and asking protection 
 accordingly, respectfully requesting 
 his Excellency, the Governor of Georgia, 
 to call a convention of the people of 
 that State, and thus afford an oppor- 
 tunity of voting upon the question 
 whether the war between the two sec- 
 tions of the country should continue, 
 and finally tendering thanks to the 
 military commander for his " urbanity ' 
 and his " uniform kindness." 
 
 The year 1864 was all but ended 
 Before the close, however, Shrrm&L 
 had perfected his plans for the ) <>}•« 
 ted march through the Can>b"njM 
 
^a« 
 
 HOOD ANT) THOMAS IK TEKNESSEE. 
 
 CHAPTER XXXIX. 
 
 fhomaa at Nashville — Shennan's Instmctions — Sherman Divides his Army — Troops sent to Thomas — What 
 the Confederates thoaght of Sherman's Movements — Grant's Opinion of Hood's Conduct — Hood playing 
 into the hands of his Antagonist — Appearance of Forrest in Tennessee — At Waterloo — ^Forreet Attacks 
 Athens — Campbell Compelled to Surrender — Forrest Advances to Pulaski — Held in Check by Bousseau— 
 Forrest Divides his Command^Bniord at Huntsville — Pursued by Granger's Cavalry — Forrest destroys 
 the Railroad between Carter's Creek and Spring Hill — Buford and Forrest Pursued by Rousseau, Wash 
 borne and Morgan — The Confederates Escape to the South Side of the Tennessee— Thomas Re-arranging 
 and Re-distributing his Troops — The Confederates Attack the Garrison at Decatur — Granger makes a 
 Stubborn Resistance — The Confederates Compelled to Retire— The Confederates at Cypress Creek — Held 
 In Check by General Croxton — Hood's Purpose — Thomas Divines his Plans — Rosecranz in Missouri — The 
 Condition in which he Found the State — The Confederates Encouraged by the Failure of the Red River 
 Expedition— General Sterling Price — "Knights of the Golden Circle"—" Sons of Liberty "—Threatened 
 Rising in Missouri — Rosecranz Communicates with the Government at Washington — Arrest of the Belgian 
 Consul — The Government Incredulous — Rosecranz Resolute — Shelby at Batesville — Rosecranz joined by 
 A. J. Smith — Shelby at Bloomfield — Pilot Knob— General Evring at RoUa — Price before Jefferson City— 
 Compelled to Move oS in a Westerly Direction — Price already a Disappointed Man— Danville and High 
 Hill — Price Retreats followed by Pleasonton--Fagan at Independence — Routed by Pleasontoi -At the 
 Big Bine— Curtis at Westport — Severe Engagement — The Confederates Routed — At Marais des Cygnes- 
 Prlce Surprised — Falls Back to Little Osage Crossing— Marmaduke and Cabell Captured — The Confederate 
 Retreat into Arkansas— Pleasonton Resting his Men at Fort Scott— Price at Newtonia — Engagement a 
 Fayotxeville — The Confederates driven off with Heavy Loss— Price's Invasion a Failure — Grant DispU-ased 
 with Rosecranz — Minor Operations in Southwestern Virginia and East Tennessee — Morgan's Last Raid- 
 Oeath of the Guerrilla Chief — Generals Qillem and Burbridge — Breckenridge to Command in East Tennessee 
 — Stoneman's Raid — Strawberry Plains — Saltville — Bean Station — Burbridge at Bristol — At Abingdon — 
 Marion- Hood and Thomas Confronting each other— Preparing for the Conflict— Re-appearance of Forrest 
 —Thomas Waiting for Reinforcements— Schofield at Columbia — At Franklin — Schofield Forms his Line 
 »l Battle — The Battle Ground— The West Bank of the Harpeth River— Hood Resolves to Attack Schofield's 
 Centre — The Battle Begun— The Confederates Attack with Great Fierceness — The National Line Penetrated 
 —Almost a Confederate Victory — Stanley to the Rescue — Opdyke's brave 'First Brigade" — The Tide of 
 Oatiie Turned- The National Line Restored — Repeated Onsets — Midnight — Sounds of Battle Hushed- A 
 National Victory — Opdyke Complimented — Losses on both sides Heavy — Position of Thomas' Troops 
 Before Nashville — Montgomery Hill — Murfreesboro — Overall's Creek — Fort Rosecranz — Thomas' Delay 
 Misunderstood at Washington — Grant Dissatisfied — Hurries from City Point — Explanations — Intense Cold 
 — The Ground Impassable — The Weather Moderates — Immense Activity in Both Camps — Thomas' Plan of 
 Battle— Montgomery Hill Carried— The Confederates Forced Back at aU Points — Nolensville Turnpike— 
 The Night of the 15th of December — Preparing to Resume the Conflict — Second Day of the Battle— 
 Overton's HiU— Tremendous Firing— The Confederates Routed — Vigorous Pursuit— Rutherford's Creek- 
 Waiting for the Pontoon Train— Duck River— Severe Weather— Thomas Resolves to Continue the Pur- 
 suit- Wilson's Cavalry— Lamb's Ferry— The Confederates Across the Tennessee River — Thomas Order* 
 the Main Army to Discontinue the Pursuit — Cavalry Skirmishing — " Thomas has Done Magnificently "- 
 Hood's Army Ruined beyond Recovery — Estimate of Hood — Osband's Expedition — Davidson's Eipedition- 
 Qrierson'p Exredition — Great Destruction of Property. 
 
 In the 
 
 adapter immediately preced- 
 we have seen that General 
 'Sherman about the end of Sep- 
 tember, and while hip headquarters 
 
 S64 
 
 were still at Atlanta, sent General 
 Thomas, his second in command, to 
 Nashville, with insti'uctions to organize 
 such troops as might be placed at his 
 
SHERMAN DIVIDES HIS ARMY. 
 
 M7 
 
 disposal, and to keep a watchful eye 
 on the movements of the great Confed- 
 erate raider, General Forrest. Later, 
 towards the end of October, and while 
 the main body of the National anny 
 »vas halting at Gaylesville, Sherman, 
 who had now obtained Gi-ant's consent 
 to advance to the coast, divided his 
 army into two parts. Under his own 
 pereonal command, and for the purpose 
 of pushing his way through Georgia, 
 te retained four corps. The other two 
 corps — the Fourth, imder General Stan- 
 ley, and the Twenty-Third, under Gen- 
 eral Schofield — he sent to Thomas. 
 General Wilson, who had quite recently 
 arrived from the army of the Potomac 
 and taken command of Sherman's cav- 
 alry, was also sent to Nashville to 
 report to Thomas for duty. He took 
 with him some dismounted detach- 
 ments, and had instructions to collect, 
 mount, organize, and equip all the cav- 
 alry serving in Kentucky and Ten- 
 nessee. It was Sherman's conviction 
 that thus reinforced, Thomas would be 
 quite able to cope with any forces 
 which Hood might succeed in bringing 
 against him. 
 
 It is now generally understood that 
 the Confederate authorities were com- 
 pletely taken by surprise at Sherman's 
 audacious movement. His lines of 
 defense were of enormous extent. The 
 distance from Atlanta to Louisville is 
 474 miles- from Atlanta to Nashville, 
 289. The railroads connecting the 
 army with these lines, it was necessary 
 to protect. It was the belief of Davis 
 and his associates that, as soon as the 
 National lines were seriously threat- 
 
 ened, Sherman would abandon Georgia. 
 They had no conception that he would 
 of his own accord sunder his communi 
 catioDS and boldly march to the sea 
 When Sherman did march, one read. 
 with surprise that Hood did not follow 
 him. " Hood," says General Grant io 
 his report, " instead of following Sher- 
 man, continued his move northward, 
 which seemed to me to be leading to 
 his certain doom. At all events, had I 
 the power to command both armies, I 
 should not have changed the orders, 
 under which he seemed to be acting." 
 Sherman, before his departure, made 
 Thomas fully acquainted with his plans, 
 delegated to him the command of all 
 troops and garrisons, not absolutely in 
 the presence of the commander-in- chief, 
 and instructed him to pursue Hood, 
 if he should attempt to follow the 
 main army, but, by all means, to keep 
 a firm hold on Tennessee. 
 
 Long before Sherman divided his 
 anny, attempts were made by the Con- 
 federates, to destroy the conmiunica- 
 tions of Nashville with the southeast. 
 On the 23d of September, Forrest Sept. 
 at the head of 7000 cavalry, after 2:{. 
 having crossed the Tennessee, near 
 Waterloo, made his appearance before 
 Athens, a small town on the railroad 
 from Decatur, and about 90 miles south 
 of Nashville. The place was held by 
 Colonel Campbell, with 3 colored regi- 
 ments and about 150 men from the 
 Third Tennessee cavalry. Campbell, 
 on the approach of Forrest, retired to 
 the fort. On the morning of the 24th 
 the town was completely invested ; anrl 
 a vigorous fire was opened u]Hra llit- 
 
d28 
 
 HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. 
 
 garrison from a 12-pounder battery. 
 The guns of the fort replied. Camp- 
 bell, however, was unequally matched ; 
 and after an artillery contest of two 
 hours' duration, he \"elded to the 
 lemands of his antagonist and surrend- 
 ered. Had he held out about half an 
 hour longer, he might have been rein- 
 forced by the Nineteenth Michigan, and 
 the One Hundred and Second Ohio 
 regiments. As it was, these regiments 
 were overpowered and captured. For- 
 rest then advanced to Pulaski. That 
 place, however, had been well cared 
 for by General Rousseau ; and the 
 Confederate general moved eastward, 
 cutting the railroads as he advanced. 
 Meanwhile, it began to be seen that 
 Forrest was bent on serious work ; and 
 National troops were pushed forward 
 from all directions to resist his pro- 
 gress. Rousseau at the head of a body 
 of troops moved by rail to Tullahoma. 
 Steedman advanced from the Etowah 
 district to the north side of Tennessee. 
 Newton's division of the Fourth coi-ps 
 arrived from Atlanta on the 28th and 
 replaced Steedman's command at Chat- 
 tanooga. Morgan's division of the 
 Fourteenth corps, also from Atlanta, 
 and accompanied by General Thomas, 
 arrived at Nashville on the 3d of 
 October. 
 
 Forrest had by this time divide 
 his forces. One column consisting of 
 4000 men, under Buford, he sent south ^ 
 towards Huntsville. The other col- 
 umn, consisting of 3000 men, he led, 
 himself, in the direction of Columbia. 
 Buford, as early as the 30th of Sep- 
 tember appeared before Huntsville, 
 
 and in vain summoned the garrison to 
 surrender. Moving off, he appeare<l 
 before Athens on the afternoon q^j^ 
 of the 2d of October. That 2.' 
 place had, in the meantime been re 
 gamsoned by the Seventy-Third Indi 
 ana, Lieutenant-Colonel Slade. Aftei 
 a useless attack made almost immedv 
 ately after his arrival, and another 
 equally useless attack on the following 
 morning, Buford, pursued by some of 
 Granger's cavalry, was compelled to 
 retreat towards the Elk River. For- 
 rest had little better success than his 
 lieutenant. He did not venture to 
 make an attack on Columbia ; but on 
 the 3d he destroyed about 5 miles of 
 railroad between Carter's Creek and 
 Spiing Hill. He then parolled his 
 prisoners and moved off in the direc- 
 tion of Mount Pleasant Hill. It novv 
 became apparent that both Buford an, 
 Forrest were aiming to make good 
 theii" escape to the south side of the 
 Tennessee ; and the various National 
 commands, particularly those unci or 
 Rousseau, Washbume and Mor^'in 
 closed in upon them, with a view to 
 prevent their crossing the river, and if 
 possible to effect their capture. 1 he 
 Confederates, however, knew every ii ch 
 of the ground ; and in spite of » most 
 vigorous pursuit, both accompushed 
 their purpose, Buford crossing the 
 Tennessee on the 3d and Forrest on 
 the 6th. The ferry-boats and othei 
 means of crossing were destroyed ; bu 
 the pursuit was not rx>ntinued, 
 
 Thomas now spent some time in 
 re-an-anging and re-distributing hife 
 troops. His great object was to guard 
 
KOSECRANZ IN MISSOURI. 
 
 well all the avenues of approach, and 
 yet to have his ti-oops so in hand that 
 he could concentrate with ease and 
 rapidity in the event of the enemy 
 attacking him in force. It was not 
 Qct^ imtU the 26th that Hood made 
 26. any further demonstrations. On 
 that day, a large force of Confederate 
 infantry appeared before Decatur, and 
 attacked the garrison, but without 
 effect. Granger held the plap« ; and 
 on the 27th reinforcements were sent 
 him with instructions to hold out to 
 the bitter end It seemed as if the 
 enemy was bent on serious business ; 
 for he proceeded at once to establish a 
 line of rifle-pits within 500 yards of the 
 town. On the 29th, however, after 
 having had on the previous day some 
 bitter experience of the daring and 
 energy of Granger's men, who made 
 two separate and successful sorties, the 
 Confederates retired in the direction of 
 Courtland. On the same day, it was 
 reported to Thomas that a body of the 
 enemy was crossing the river, near the 
 mouth of Cypress Creek, about 2 miles 
 below Florence. General Croxton was 
 in command at that point ; and on re- 
 ceipt of the intelligence, Thomas imme- 
 diately sent to his aid a division of 
 cavalry under General Hatch, with m- 
 stnictions to guard the passage /f the 
 river imtil the arrival of the Fourth 
 corps, now on its way from Georgia. 
 
 It now became evident that Hood 
 mtended to invade Middle Tennessee ; 
 and Thomas hurried forward prepara- 
 tions accordingly. Before, however, 
 we enter upon a detailed account of 
 the events which led to the great 
 
 i«9T 
 
 battles of Franklin and Nashville, and 
 the subsequent pursuit and destriKJtion 
 of Hood's army, it is fitting to refer to 
 certain events which were taking place 
 or were about to take place, in Mis 
 souri and Eastern Tennessee. 
 
 After the battle of Chickamauga 
 Rosecranz, who was superseded by 
 Thomas, was assigned to the command 
 of the Department of the Missouri. 
 He reached St. Louis m the beginning 
 of January, when he found the State 
 of Missouri in a very troubled condi- 
 tion. It was menaced by foes without, 
 and by hidden but not less dangerous 
 foes within. The failure of the Red 
 River expedition, and the expulsion of 
 Steele from the country below the 
 Arkansas River, had a most disastrous 
 effect upon the National cause, to the 
 west of the Mississippi. At least two- 
 thirds of the State of Arkansas was 
 left in undisturbed possession of the 
 Confederates. It was well known that 
 General Sterling Price, the great guer- 
 rilla chief in that region, was making 
 active preparations for an^^ther raid 
 into Missouri Missouri was still under 
 the authority of the National Govern- 
 ment ; but the inhabitants of the State 
 were largely in sympathy vrith the 
 Confederacy. The loyal people of the 
 State were over-awed and compelled to 
 conceal their sentiments. Secret asso 
 ciations — such as the " Knights of the 
 Golden Circle," the * Order of Ameri 
 can Knights," and the " Sons of Lib- 
 erty " — abounded ; and it was reported 
 to Rosecranz that when Price should in- 
 vade Missouri, the members of these 
 societies would join him in number* tc 
 
SSO 
 
 HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. 
 
 the extent of at least 23,000 men. 
 Rosecranz had good reason to believe 
 that the reports regarding these secret 
 societies and their purposes were not 
 without foundation. He accordingly 
 >ommunicated his information to the 
 government, and asked for reinforce- 
 ments. The government was at first 
 mcredulous, believing the danger to be 
 more imaginary than real, and was 
 encouraged in this belief by the report 
 ©f General Hunt, who had been sent to 
 make a tour of observation throughout 
 the State. On being informed that 
 arrangements had been made to initiate 
 the revolution in St. Loms by murder- 
 ing the Provost-Marshal, and seizing the 
 State government, Rosecranz arrested 
 the Belgian consul, who was the State 
 commander, with his deputy, secretary, 
 lecturer, and about 40 members. The 
 government, still incredulous, ordered 
 their release ; but Rosecranz was reso- 
 lute ; and the government, on receiving 
 fuller information, justified his course, 
 and countermanded the order. There 
 can now be no doubt that the prompti- 
 tude and vigilance of Rosecranz at this 
 crisis did much to prevent tLe threat- 
 ened rising. The arrest of the State 
 commander struck terror into the 
 hearts of the conspirators. 
 
 Price and his friends, meanwhile, 
 were preparing to carry out their part 
 ©f the programme. It was now the first 
 week in September. Rosecranz received 
 information from Washbume who kept 
 a keen eye on the movements of the 
 Confederates in Arkansas, that Shelby 
 was at BatesviUe, in Northern Ar- 
 'cansas, and that, as soon as he was 
 
 joined by Price, the invasion would be 
 commenced. Rosecranz communicated 
 the intelligence to Washington ; and 
 Halleck without a moment's delay 
 telegraphed to Cairo, directing A. J. 
 Smith, who was then on his way, with 
 6000 troops to join Sherman in North- 
 em Georgia, to halt and proceed to 
 St. Louis, where he was to report to 
 Rosecranz. 
 
 On the 23d of September, the ad- 
 vance of Price's force, under Shelby, 
 occupied Bloomfield, in Stoddard Coun- 
 ty, which had been evacuated by the 
 National troops on the night of the 21st. 
 On the 26th the Confederates gept. 
 moved on Pilot Knob, which 26. 
 fortimately had been occupied the day 
 before by General Hugh S. Ewing 
 with a brigade of A. J. Smith's com- 
 mand. With this force, and the garri- 
 son of PUot Klnob and some outlying 
 posts, Ewing undertook to make a 
 stand against the Confederates, who 
 without delay made preparations to 
 carry the place by assault. The fort 
 occupied by the National forces was a 
 strong one, mounting four 24-pounder8, 
 four 3 2 -pounders, and four 6-pounder 
 Parrotts, besides two 6-pounder Par- 
 rotts moimted outside. The enemy 
 advanced against it on the 27th, in full 
 confidence of being able to carry it by 
 assault ; but he was driven back with 
 a loss of about 1000 men, by a well- 
 directed artillery and musketry fire 
 The fort, however, was commanded by 
 a neighboring height called Shepherd 
 Mountain, and the enemy having occu- 
 pied this position Ewing determined to 
 abandon the work. He had previously 
 
PILOT KNOB. 
 
 831 
 
 «nt away his stores to St. Louis. 
 Blowing up his magazine, he fell back, 
 keeping up a running fight with the 
 enemy as far as Harrison Station, on 
 'he Southwest Branch Railroad. Here 
 he prepared to make another stand, 
 behind breast-works left by a party of 
 militia who had previously occupied 
 the place. Ewing in his defense of 
 Pilot Knob rendered important service 
 by detaining the entire force of Price, 
 and affording time to put St. Louis in 
 a state of defense, then covered only 
 by a portion of A. J. Smith's infantry 
 and some regiments of cavalry thrown 
 out as far as practicable towards the 
 enemy. The Confederates followed 
 him up closely, and cut the railroad on 
 both sides of him, thus severing his 
 communications with both Rolla and 
 St. Louis. He was only saved from 
 another assault by the opportune arrival 
 of Colonel Beveridge, of the Seven- 
 teenth Illinois cavalry, with 500 men. 
 The enemy taking these to be only the 
 advance of large reinforcements, de- 
 layed the intended attack • and Bever- 
 idge, in the night, with the main body 
 of the troops, succeeded in reaching 
 RoUa. 
 
 In the mean time, Springfield being 
 considered secure, General Sanborn 
 moved with all his available cavalry to 
 reinforce Rolla, where General McNeil 
 was in command and preparing to pro- 
 tect the depots and great supply trains. 
 
 A. J. Smith's infantry, aided by the 
 militia and the citizens, the whole 
 under the command of General Pleason- 
 ton, made St. Louis secm-e. General 
 
 B. Gratz Brown was placed by Rose 
 
 cranz in charge of the militia Brown 
 concentrated at Jefferson City, the 
 troops of the Central District ; and 
 being reinforced by General Fisk with 
 aU the available troops north of the 
 Missouri, as well aa aided by the- 
 enthusiastic exertions of the citizens, 
 he made thorough preparations to drive 
 back the invaders from the State capi- 
 tal. Towards ib'^a pjint Prioe, who 
 had remained a day or two at Rich- 
 wood's, threatening St. Louis, was rap- 
 idly marching. On the 7th of October 
 he had crossed the Osage not far from 
 the city. But McNeil and Sanborn, 
 moAring with all their available cavalry 
 succeeded by forced marches in reach- 
 ing the city first ; and having united 
 their commands with those of Fisk and 
 Brown, they so increased the defensive 
 force within the city, that Price deem- 
 ing it prudent not to attack, moved off 
 in a westerly direction. Pleasonton 
 arrived at Jefferson City on the q^j^ 
 morning of the 8th, and assumed 8. 
 chief command. Sanborn with all his 
 mounted troops, about 4000, was or 
 dered to follow and harass the enemy, 
 but not to attack until the remaining 
 cavalry and infantry supports could 
 come up. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 9th, the Con- 
 federates entered California, 25 mUes 
 west of Jeffereon City, on the Pacific 
 Railroad, and burnt the depots and a 
 train of cars. From California, after 
 tearing up the railroad track some 
 distance on each side of the town, they 
 moved on to Booneville, in Cooper 
 County. Price was already a sorely 
 disappointed man. He had. it is true. 
 
632 
 
 HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. 
 
 obtained a few recruits ; but the " Sons 
 of Liberty," the " Knights of the Gold- 
 
 m Circle," had sadly failed him at the 
 •ritical moment, when at least a tem- 
 
 wrary success was possible. 
 
 On the 13th the Confederate chief 
 vnthdrew from Booneville, and, contin- 
 uing his march westward, occupied 
 Lexington, in Lafayette County, on the 
 Qct^ 17th. For the purpose of forag- 
 
 17. ing and obtaining recruits and 
 conscripts, detached bodies of his force 
 were sen* in various directions, some 
 as far as the borders of Kansas, some 
 as far east as Danville and High Hill, 
 Montgomery County. Wherever they 
 made their appearance they worked 
 terrible destruction. The militia wei-e 
 driven out of Sedalia, in Pettis County, 
 with severe loss ; and at Glasgow, in 
 Howard County, 6 companies of the 
 
 Foi-ty-Third Missouri were compelled 
 to surrender. 
 
 The National troops did not pursue 
 actively imtU Pleasonton came up, when 
 they advanced towards Booneville and 
 harassed Price's rear. Most of the 
 National cavalry were concentrated at 
 the Black Water, awaiting the arrival 
 of Colonel Winslow from Washburne's 
 command. He came up, on the 19th, 
 bringing with him 1500 troopers with 
 whom he had followed the enemy from 
 Arkansas. Pleasonton, having now f^t 
 east 6500 mounted men, exclusive ^x 
 38cort guards, moved from Sedalia in 
 pursuit of Price. At Independence, on 
 the 2 2d, he came up with and routed 
 the Confederate general, Fagan, cap- 
 turing 2 guns. 
 
 On the morning of the 23d, Pleason- 
 
 ton approached the Big Blue At We«jt 
 port where General Curti*. then in 
 charge of the Department of q^^^ 
 Kansas, had been vigorously but 23. 
 unsuccessfully attacked, the day before 
 he found the main body of the Confed 
 erates. Pleasonton fell upon them witl 
 tremendous energy at the early hour ol 
 seven. The battle raged with great 
 fury, until about one in the aftemoou, 
 when the Confederates gave way and 
 fled towards Little Santa Fk Pleason 
 ton ivnd Curtis who had now united 
 thei« lorces lollowed in close pursuit 
 At Marais des Cyernes, at four o'clocl 
 on the Ui'^ming of the 25th, the 
 National troops came up with the 
 fugitives, when Pleasonton snrprised 
 and aroused the camp by a heavy fire 
 of artillery. Price arose and flei 
 leaving behind him his camp equipage, 
 one cannon, several hundred head of 
 cattle, and 20 wagons full of plunder 
 The Confederates, keeping up a runaing 
 fight, fell back to Little Osage Cross- 
 ing, where two advanced brigades 
 under Benteen and Phillips charged 
 upon and broke their lines, capturing 
 Generals Marmaduke and Cabell, 4 
 field officers, about 1000 prisoners, 8 
 pieces of artillerj'', and some 1500 stand 
 of arms. The pursuit was continued, 
 Sanborn's brigade again leading the 
 way. The Confederates were over- 
 taken ; and after a brief but stubborn 
 resistance, they crossed the Marmiton, 
 and fled under cover of the night, into 
 Arkansas. In six days 204 miles had 
 been traversed. Price was falling back 
 at panic speed. The line of his retreat 
 was strewn with the wrecks of wagon? 
 
DISSATISFACTION WITH EOSEORANZ. 
 
 Hid 
 
 had other necessaries and accompani- 
 ments of the battle-field. Pleasonton 
 had retired to Fort Scott to rest his 
 ^aded men and horses. Sanborn, how- 
 ever, was still in close pursuit. At 
 Newtonia, Price made another and a 
 final stand ; and but for the timely 
 arrival of Sanborn, he would have won 
 a decided victory over the National 
 troops under Blunt. As it was, Price 
 made his escape into Western Arkansas 
 followed by Ourtis. The last struggle 
 in connection with this Missouri inva- 
 sion was at Fayetteville. The place 
 was held by Colonel La Rue, with the 
 First Arkansas cavalrj' — a -/'Jy of 
 men who, amid gx'eat trial and hard- 
 ship, remained true to the Union. 
 Colonel Brooks had surrounded Fay- 
 etteville with some 2000 Confederates. 
 He had been joined by Fagan's division 
 of Price's flying army. La Rue might 
 have held out against Brooks ; but it 
 would be a hopeless struggle against 
 the combined forces of Bi'ooks and 
 Fagan. At the critical moment Curtis 
 came up ; the Confederates were driven 
 off with heavy loss, and La Rue was 
 saved- Such was the end of the inva- 
 sion ; and no airther attempt was made 
 on Missonri. Sterling Price's name had 
 long been a tower of strengtl to the 
 Confederate cause in the West. His 
 prestige was gone forever. Missouri 
 vvas no longer — and, indeed, had no 
 reason to be — in sympathy with seces- 
 sion. The State, which had suffered 
 much,. now began to enjoy some degree 
 of tranquility. 
 
 Price had accomplished little by his 
 raid, beyond the destraction of about 
 
 $5,000,000 of property, and laying 
 waste the country through which he 
 passed. He obtained 5000 or 6000 
 recruits or conscripts, took 1500 stand 
 of arms, one cannon, many horses, and 
 large herds of cattle, vrith a rast 
 amount of plunder, in the shape of 
 clothing, forage, and provisions ; but 
 of this he lost nearly all in his precipi- 
 tate retreat, besides 10 guns and 1958 
 prisoners. In his flight from Newtonia, 
 he abandoned ordi^stroyed most of bin 
 wagon- trains ; and his men and horses 
 suffered severely. Large numbers of 
 his followers left him ; and when he 
 recrossed the Arkansas, his force had 
 been reduced by desertion and losses 
 to xcss than 50uO men, only partially 
 armed and mounted. His artillery had 
 dwindled down to 3 Parrott guns and 
 one 12-pounder mountain howitzer; and 
 of his train, Avhich originally consisted 
 of 200 wagons, but 53 remained. The 
 entire National loss, according to the 
 official report of General Rosecranz, 
 was, in killed, wounded and missing, 
 only 346 officers and men. 
 
 General Grant was ill-satisfied with 
 the whole affair. In his judgment, the 
 invasion ought fo have been nipped in 
 the bud. In his report he says : " the 
 impunity with which Price was enabled 
 to roam over the State of Missouri foi 
 a long time, shows to how little pur 
 pose a superior force may be used ' 
 There is no reason why General Ros« 
 cranz should not have concentrated hi 
 forces and beaten and driven Price 
 before the latter reached l*ilot Knob." 
 Rosecranz could hardly, in truth, have 
 made a moi-e \\Tetched use than he did 
 
834 
 
 HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. 
 
 >f a large portion of his troops. He 
 was slow to act ; and when he did act, 
 he did not act with wisdom During 
 the entire pursuit, the troops of A. J. 
 Smith were practically neutralized. If 
 tistead of ordering him to follow Pleas- 
 nton in the direct pursuit of Price, he 
 ad ordered him to continue his move- 
 ment westward, Price ought to have 
 been captured. Af It was, Price ob- 
 tained time, and when pressed, he had 
 to deal with Pleasonton and the cavalry 
 alone. It was the 2X\ of October when 
 Smith arrived at Independence ; but it 
 was too late, for Pleasonton was already 
 engaged with the enemy and the loud 
 thunders of artillery were heard in the 
 direction of the Big Blue River. His 
 troops were weary and footsore ; and 
 believing that his services were no 
 onger needed, he marched them to Har- 
 isonville, where they enjoyed a brief 
 nterval of rest. The fame of Rosecranz 
 was clouded at Chickamauga. It was 
 permanently injured by his conduct of 
 iffairs in Missouri. 
 
 Less immmediately connected with 
 che Geoigia and Tennessee campaigns, 
 but still having a most important bear- 
 ing on the general issue, were some 
 minor operations which took place in 
 Southwestern Virginia and East Ten- 
 nessee in the fall of the year. It had 
 been a favorite theory with some experi- 
 enced military men that in the event 
 of Lee sustaining any great disaster in 
 the East, he would retire with his army 
 to Southwestern Virginia, and passing 
 thence into East and Middle Tennessee, 
 there concentrate the remaining forces 
 ■>i the Confederacy. He would then 
 
 be in a position to threaten Naji dl*. 
 Chattanooga, or Louisville ; and it wat 
 predicted that the decisive battle of the 
 war would be fought somewhere in the , 
 Southwest. For this reason, a consid 4 
 erable National force was retained ii 
 East Tennessee. Knoxville was well 
 fortified ; and outlying bodies of in 
 fantry and cavaliy were pushed w*^ll 
 up the railroad and the Holston River 
 Valley towards the Virginia line. But 
 after the commencement of the great 
 Atlanta and Richmond campaigns, in 
 May, affaire in East Tennessee lost 
 ^nuch of their interest, the forces on 
 00th sides being concentrated, as much 
 as possible, on the more important 
 scenes of operatiors. The presence of 
 scattered bodies of irregular Confeder- 
 ate cavalry in Southwestern Virginia 
 proved a source of constant alarm in 
 Eastern Kentucky. These rough riders, 
 dashing through the gaps of the Cum 
 berland Mountains, would fall upon iso- 
 lated posts, capture their garrisons, and 
 after plundering in the adjacent country ' 
 would get back again to their mountain 
 retreats before they could be overtaken^ 
 It was on one o"' these plundering ex- 
 peditions that Morgan, in the month of 
 June, and after the burning of Cynthi- 
 ana, as has already been mentioned, 
 was overtaken and badly defeated bj 
 General Burbridge. For some time 
 afterwards, Morgan did not venture to 
 take the offensive. He was of too rest 
 less a nature, however, to remain long 
 inactive ; and by the beginning of Sep- 
 tember he had again set his band of 
 guerrillas in motion. He occupied 
 GreenvUle, East Tennessee on the 3d 
 
QILLEM DEFEATED. 
 
 835 
 
 but his comiLAnd was surpriaed the 
 game night by General Gillem, who 
 ggp^^ had made a forced march from 
 
 9. ' Bull's Gap. The Confederate 
 chief with a portion of his staff was in 
 the house of a Mrs. Williams. The 
 house was surrounded ; and Morgan 
 while attempting to escape was shot 
 dead. The death of Morgan was fol- 
 lowed by another short season of com- 
 parative inaction, both parties being 
 content to remain on the watch, await- 
 ing the development of events around 
 Atlanta. 
 
 About the begmning of Octobe", Gen- 
 eral Burbridge with 2500 men set out 
 on an expedition from Kentucky against 
 the salt-works in Southwestern Virginia, 
 which were of great importance to the 
 enemy. After heavy skirmishing he 
 succeeded in driving the Confederates 
 from Clinch Mountain and Laurel Gap. 
 Qpt^ Coming up with them again on 
 2. the 2d of October, about 4 miles 
 from Saltville, he drove them back 
 within their defenses in tbt immediate 
 neighborhood of the salt-works. Here, 
 however, they bade defiance to the 
 National troops; and Burbridge, his 
 ammunition being exhausted, found it 
 necessary to retire. He had sustained 
 a loss of 350 men. 
 
 General Gillem having fallen back 
 after General Burbridge's withdrawal 
 into Kentucky, from Greenville to 
 Bull's Gap, and thence to Mon-istown, 
 42 miles from Knoxville, was followed 
 Dy a Confederate force, under Vaughan. 
 J)n the 26th of October, Vaughan ven- 
 tured to attack Gillem but was repulsed 
 Two days afterwards Vaughan attacked 
 
 again, but, receiving a stiU more severe 
 repulse, retreated, pursued by Gillem 
 as far as Limestone, 98 miles east of 
 Knoxville. After remaining in that 
 advanced position until the 7th of 
 November, Gillem, whose force was 
 only 1500 men, consisting of 3 regi 
 ments of Tennessee cavalry, retired to 
 Bull's Gap, where Breckenridge, now 
 at the head of the Confederate forces in 
 East Tennessee, some 3000 strong, at 
 tacked him on the 11th. He too was 
 repulsed. On the 12th, Gillem with- 
 drew his forces from Bull's Gap, and 
 began to retreat in the direction of 
 Knoxville. In the evening Brecken- 
 ridge got his force on Gillem's flank 
 and rear by moving through Laurel 
 Gap. His cavalry, under Vaughan and 
 Duke were in front. Soon after mid- 
 night Breckenridge attacked Gil- j^^y 
 lem's retreating col umn near Mor- 13. 
 ristown, charging upon both flanks and 
 at the same time breaking his centre. 
 The National force was routed, one 
 regiment after another giving way till 
 men and horses became mixed up 
 together in inextricable confusion. A 
 panic ensued. Owing to the darkness 
 few casualties occurred ; but the men 
 threw away their arms and sought 
 safety in flight. All the artillery and 
 the baggage were left in the hands of 
 the enemy. The Confederate general 
 claimed to have captured 70 wagons, 
 six 11 -pounder Parrott guns with theii 
 horses and ammunition, 18 stand o 
 colors, 316 prisoners, and about 200 
 horees and mules. The remainder of 
 Gillem's command, about 1000 in nunj 
 ber, escaped to Strawberry Plains and 
 
§36 
 
 flOOD AND THOMAS IN TENN ESSEE. 
 
 thence to Knoxville. Breckenridge 
 assumed the air of a conqueror in East 
 lennessee, and issued a proclamation 
 (tromising protection to all who should 
 lay down their arms and become peace- 
 able citizens. He continued to advance, 
 by way of Strawbeiry Plains, in the 
 jfoy, direction of Knoxville. On the 
 18. 18th he withdrew as rapidly as 
 he had advanced; and on that day 
 General Amraen, reinforced by 1500 
 troops from Chattanooga, reoccupied 
 Strawberry Plains. On the 23d of 
 November the main torce of the enemy 
 wm reported to be at New Market, 8 
 m'Jes to the north. 
 
 About this time General Stoneman 
 was ordered from the West to take 
 general directior of affairs in East 
 Tennessee. As soon as he arrived he 
 instructed Burbridge to march, with all 
 his available force in Kentucky, by 
 way of Cumberland Gap, to the relief 
 of Gillem. Stoneman was directed by 
 Thomas to concentrate as large a force 
 as he could, and move against Brecken- 
 ridge, with the object of either destroy- 
 ing his force or driving it into Virginia- 
 He was also directed to destroy, if 
 possible, the salt-works at Saltville, and 
 the East Tennessee and Virginia Rail- 
 road from the Tennessee line as far 
 into Virginia as he could go without 
 endangering his command. Learning 
 >n the 6th of December that Brecken- 
 ridge was falling back towards Vir- 
 ginia, Stoneman made preparations to 
 foHow him ; and having concentrated 
 Q the commands of Burbridge and 
 12. Gillem at Bean's Station, he set 
 nit on the 12th for Bristol The ad- 
 
 vance under Gillem reached -Jonesborc 
 the same day, and drove the rear-guard 
 of Vaughan's cavalry through the 
 town. Gillem then turned northward 
 to Kingsport, on the North Fork of 
 the Holston, crossed the river, scaled 
 the bluff, on which Duke was posted 
 defeated him, and killed, captured, oi 
 dispersed the whole command. The 
 Confederates left in his possession 
 8 wagons and the entire camp equi- 
 page. Burbridge moved upon Bristol, 
 where lie struck Vaughan, and skir 
 mished with him until Gillem's column 
 came up. Vaughan was also com 
 pletely defeated, with the loss of some 
 300 prisoners and much property. 
 Burbridge then pushed on to Abing 
 don, cut the railroad between Saltville 
 and Wytheville, to prevent reinforce- 
 ments coming from Lynchburg to tht 
 force defending the salt-works. Gillem 
 also reached Abingdon on the 15th. 
 The enemy under Vaughan had in the 
 mean time reached Marion, havijig 
 marched liy & road parallel with that 
 by which Stoneman's fore, had ad 
 vanced, and had begun to intrench 
 But Gillem pushed on after Vaughan, 
 and after a hard march of 29 miles he 
 came up with him, early on the 16th. 
 He attacked him instantly, and d^^^ 
 after completely routing him, 16. 
 drove him to Wytheville, 30 miles 
 further, captuiing the place, with 200 
 prisoners, 7 pieces of artillery, and a 
 large wagon train. All the enemy's 
 stores and supplies were destroyed, aa 
 well as the extensive lead-works neai 
 the tovtTQ, and the railroad bridges ovei 
 Reedy Creek. Stoneman now turned 
 
FORREST AT JOHNSONVILLE. 
 
 9&1 
 
 ha attention towards Saltville. His 
 troops entered that place on the 20th, 
 Dec, capturing 8 pieces of artillery and 
 20. a large quantity of anununition 
 of all kinds. They also destroyed the 
 buildings belonging to the Confederate 
 government, as well as nearly all the 
 machinery, kettles, vats, engines, and 
 boilers of the salt-works, said to be 
 among the most extensive in the world, 
 and an immense quantity of salt. 
 
 In this great raid, besides the dam- 
 age done to the salt-works and lead- 
 mines, there were captured 20 pieces 
 of artillery, 900 prisoners, 200 negroes, 
 8000 hogs, many cattle, and 200 mules. 
 Eleven foundries, 90 flour and saw 
 mills, 30 bridges, and the depots at 
 Glade Spring, Marion, and Wytheville, 
 were destroyed, as well as 13 locomo- 
 tives, about 100 cars, and many miles 
 of railroad track. It was estimated 
 that the loss to the Confederates in 
 stores alone amounted to $2,000,000. 
 Th^ rapidity, with which Stoneman 
 mo ed, enabled him to take the entire 
 region he traversed by surprise, so that 
 the citizens had not time to run off 
 their stock After these disasters, 
 Rreckenridge made no further attempts 
 fo threaten East Tennessee. Stoneman 
 returned to Knoxville, accompanied by 
 GUlem's command ; Burbridge marched 
 back to Kentucky by way of Cumber- 
 land Gap. 
 
 We now return to Hood and Thomas. 
 Ilood, we have already said, had made 
 such movements as left Thomas in no 
 doubt that he intended to invade Mid- 
 dle Tennessee. He had been for some 
 time repairing the Mobile and Ohio 
 
 Railroad for the purpose of supplying 
 his army; and trains were running as 
 far north as Corinth and thence east- 
 ward to Cherokee Station, transporting 
 supplies from Selma and Montgomery. 
 Wood's division of the Fourth corp 
 reached Athens on the 3l8t of q^j 
 October,and the other two divis- 81 . 
 ions rapidly foUowed. The Twenty- 
 Third corps under Schofield, awaiting 
 at Resaca the orders of Thomas, as 
 soon as it was known that Hood had 
 appeared in force along the south side 
 of the Tennessee River, was directed to 
 concentrate at Pulaski, and was now 
 also on its way in the rear of the 
 Fourth corps. The Confederates hav 
 ing on the 31st effected a lodgment for 
 their infantry on the north side of th* 
 Tennessee River about 3 mUes above 
 Florence, and driven Croxton above 
 Shoal Creek, General Stanley was di- 
 rected also to concentrate the Fourth 
 corps at Pulaski. 
 
 In the mean time Forrest, with 17 
 regiments of cavalry and 9 pieces of 
 artillery, had commenced moving north- 
 ward from Corinth, and from Paris, 
 Tennessee. On the 28th of October 
 he appeared before Fort Heiman, an 
 earth- work on tlie west bank of the 
 Tennessee about T5 miles from Paducah, 
 where he captured a gun-boat and 3 
 transports, having previously burned 
 the steamer Express. On the 2d of 
 November he had succeeded in planting 
 batteries both above and below Jack- 
 sonville, an important base of supplies, 
 and the terminus of the Northwestern 
 Railroad. He thus completely block 
 aded the river and prevented the 
 
 nit 
 
83S 
 
 HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. 
 
 escape in either direction of 8 gun-boats, 
 8 transports, and about a dozen barges. 
 The garrison consisted of about 1000 
 men under the command of Colonel 
 Thompson. The naval forces under 
 Lieutenant King attacked the enemy's 
 batteries below Johnsonville. They 
 were repulsed, however, after a severe 
 contest, but not until they had recap- 
 tured a transport, with two 20-pounder 
 Parrotts and a quantity of ammunition 
 and stores on board, and compelled the 
 enemy to destroy one of the captured 
 Not. gun-boats. On the 4th the Con- 
 4. federates opened fire on the town, 
 as well as on the gun-boats and trans- 
 ports, from batteries on the west bank. 
 In the artillery contest which ensued 
 the gun-boats were soon disabled ; and, 
 to prevent their falling into the hands 
 of the enemy they were set on fire, 
 mth the transports. Unfortiinately 
 the flames spread to the buildings of 
 the commissary £.:■. I quartermaster's de- 
 partments, which togetisr witi ?, Wge 
 amount of stores on the levee, were 
 totally destroyed, involving a loss to 
 the Government of about $1,500,000. 
 
 On the 5th, after directing upon the 
 garrison a furious cannonade of an 
 hour's duration, the enemy withdrew, 
 crossed to the east bank above the 
 town, and marched off in the direction 
 of Clifton. On the same dav Schofield, 
 with the advance of the Tweuty-Third 
 coi'ps, arrived at Nashville; and being 
 sent immediately by railroad to John- 
 eonATlle, he arrived there at night, 
 only to find that the enemy had disap- 
 peared. Schofield was directed to 
 leave a body of troops at Johnsonville 
 
 sufficiently numerous for its defena*- 
 With the rest of his force he wat 
 ordered to join the Fourth coq)s at 
 Pulaski, assume command of all the 
 troops in that vicinity, and, watching 
 the movements of Hood, retard his 
 advance into Tennessee as much as 
 possible. He was not, however, to risk 
 a general engagement till A. J. Smith 
 should anive from Missouri, and until 
 Wilson had remounted the cavalry 
 regiments whose horses had been taken 
 for the use of Kilpatrick's division in 
 Georgia. 
 
 General Thomas, now found himself 
 confronted by that anny of veterai 
 troops which, under General Johnston 
 had made such persistent opposition to 
 the advance of Sherman's largely super 
 ior force from Dalton to the Chatta 
 hoochee, reinforced by 12,000 well 
 equipped cavalry under Forrest — pej 
 haps the boldest and ablest, as well a* 
 the most unscrupulous of the Contni- 
 erate cavalry officers. Hood's an ay 
 n.^-R- cons? ted of a^out 45,000 infan.ry 
 and from 12,000 to lo,000 cavalry. 7 he 
 available force of Thomas at this t, tne 
 was less than half that of Hood, c )m 
 prising only about 12,000 men lu dei 
 Stanley, 10,000 under Schofield, al out 
 4000 cavalry under Hatch, Crox>on'^ 
 brigade of 2500 men, and Caproj 's oi 
 1200, in all about 30,000 men. The 
 remainder of his force was 8ta1ione<i 
 along the railroad to keep open com 
 mimications at Chattanooga, Decatui 
 Huntsville, Bridgeport, Stevenson, Mur 
 freesboro, and intermediate posts. It 
 was necessary that all these pointe 
 should be well guarded. 
 
HOOb55 iJjiiiAl. 
 
 83S 
 
 Hood remained inactive in the neigh- 
 borhood of Florence from the Ist to 
 the 17 th of November, influenced 
 doubtless by his uncertainty respecting 
 the movements of Sherman. He had 
 laid a { ontoon bridge over the Tennes- 
 see Ri rer in place of the destroyed 
 railroa-l bridge, and had sent over to 
 the north side S. D. Lee's infantry 
 corps and two cavalry divisions, which 
 skirmished continually with the com- 
 mands of Hatch and Croxton along the 
 line of Shoal Creek. His other two 
 corps re/aained on the south side of the 
 ^Qj^ T.'Tinessee till the 17th of Novem- 
 1 7 . ber, when Cheatham's corps also 
 crossed t > the north side, and Stewart's 
 preparvd to foUow. On the same day 
 a portj m of Lee's corps moved up the 
 Lawrouceburg road to Bough's Mill on 
 Shoal Creek, skirmishing a little with 
 
 atch's cavalry, and then retiring to 
 Bome neighboring bluffs, went into 
 ?^\mp. 
 
 Thiri delay, on the part of Hood was 
 a ei eat gain to the National command- 
 er. Thomas was anxiously awaiting 
 the ftrrival of promised reinforcements. 
 In a few days or weeks at most, the 
 term of service of a large number of 
 his t^)ops would have expired ; but 20 
 one year regiments were on their way 
 to take their place. A. J. Smith, with 
 two veteran divisions, already well 
 advanced on his joirmey, was approach- 
 ing from Missouri. Wilson, having all 
 but completed his arrangements, would 
 soon Join him with 12,000 effective 
 cavalry. In addition to these which 
 could be confidently counted upon, 
 there had been collected at Chattanooga, 
 
 some 7000 convalescents which, if not 
 available for marching, would at least 
 be serviceable for garrison duty. These 
 forces, when all concentrated, would 
 increase Thomas' available force to 
 an army almost as large as that of the 
 enemy. Had Hood delayed his advance 
 one week or ten days longer, Thomas 
 would have been able to meet him at 
 some point south of the Duck j^q. 
 River. Hood, however, began 19. 
 his advance on the 19th, moving bj 
 parallel roads from Florence toward? 
 Waynesboro, and driving Hatch's cav 
 airy out of Lawrenceburg, on the 2 2d 
 It then became the policy of Thomas 
 to retire in the direction in which his 
 reinforcements were approaching, and 
 at the same time to delay the enemy 
 as much as possible. Schofield began 
 to remove the public property from 
 Pulaski preparatory to falling back 
 towards Columbia — two divisions of 
 Stanley's corps having been sent to 
 Lynnville, 15 miles north, to protect 
 the railroad and secure the passage of 
 the wagon -trains. Capron's brigade of 
 cavalry was stationed at Mount Pleas 
 ant to cover the approaches from the 
 southwest to Columbia, where was held 
 in position, a brigade of Ruger's divi 
 sion of the Twenty-Third corps. O* 
 the other two divisions of that corps, 
 one was directed to move to Columbi*, 
 and the other by way of Waverly to 
 Centerville, to occupy the crossings of 
 the Duck River, near Columbia, Wii 
 liamsport, and Gordon's Ferry. On 
 the 23d Granger withdrew by rail, 
 without any opposition, on the part of 
 the en "my, the garrisons at Athens, 
 
 i 
 
y*0 
 
 HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. 
 
 Decatur, and Huntaville to Stevenson, 
 i«ending 5 new regiments from that 
 place to Murfreesboro, and retaining 
 the original troops of his command. 
 On the same night, Schofield evacu- 
 
 ted Pulaski and retired towards 
 Columbia, where he arrived on the 
 24th. The officer, commanding at 
 Johnsonville, was ordered to remove all 
 public property and retire to Fort 
 Donelson and thence to Clarksville. 
 
 On the 24th and 25th some dismount- 
 ed cavalry of the Confederates skir- 
 mished with Schofield's troops at Col- 
 umbia; and, during the 26th and 27th, 
 the infantry having come up, they 
 made more decided demonstrations, but 
 did not assault. Their movements, how- 
 ever, indicated an intention to cross the 
 Duck River, above or below the town. 
 Schofield, therefore, withdrew to the 
 north bank on the night of the 27th, 
 and took up a new position, in which 
 he remained undisturbed during the 
 28th. In front of the town, two divi- 
 sions of the Twenty-Third corps were 
 placed in line, holding all the neigh- 
 boring crossings, while Stanley's corps, 
 posted in reserve on the Franklin turn- 
 pike, was held in readiness to repel 
 any attempt, on the part of the enemy, 
 to force a passage. General Wilson, 
 with a body of cavalry, held the cross- 
 ings above those guarded by the in- 
 jjoy^ fantry ; but, about two o'clock 
 
 29. on the morning of the 29th, the 
 Confederates drove him back and 
 pushed over the river at the Lewisburg 
 turnpike, and, a lit^Je later, a body of 
 their infantry crossed at Huoy's Mills 
 6 miles above Columbia. .Schofield 
 
 now finding his communication with 
 the cavalry interrupted, and his line of 
 retreat towards Franklin threatened, 
 prepared again to fall back. Stanley, 
 with a division of infantry, was sent tc 
 Spnng Hill to protect the passage of 
 the trains, and keep open the road for 
 the retreat of the main force in that 
 direction. He arrived just in time to 
 drive off the enemy's cavalry, and to 
 save the trains. Soon aftei"wards, he 
 was attacked by both infantry and 
 cavalry, and had considerable difficulty 
 in maintaining his position till dai-k. 
 Schofield, though not attacked at Huey'e 
 Mills, was actively engaged all day 
 resisting the enemy who attempted a 
 crossing at Columbia. Late in the 
 afternoon, and, after giving direction 
 for the retreat of all the troops north 
 ward at dark, he took with him Ruger' 
 division and hastened to the relief of 
 General Stanley, at Spring Hill. Leav- 
 ing a brigade to hold the turnpike, a< 
 this point, he pushed on to the cross- 
 roads, near Thompson's Station, whence 
 a body of the enemy's cavalry hastily 
 made off at his approach, leaving their 
 camp-fires burning. The main body ot 
 Schofield's command withdrew safely 
 from Columbia after dark, on the 29th, 
 passed Spring Hill without molestation, 
 at midnight, the cavalry moving on the 
 Lewisburg turnpike, on the right of the 
 infantry line of march. The whole 
 command got into position, at j^q^^ 
 Franklin, 18 miles south of Nash- 30. 
 ville, early on the morning of the 30th. 
 Line of battle was formed at once on 
 the south side of the town in expecta 
 tion of the enemy's immediate approack 
 
frane:lin. 
 
 84] 
 
 The battle-ground was well chosen. 
 
 Franklin is situated on the west bank 
 of the Harpeth River, a bend of which 
 incloses more than half of the town on 
 the east and north, leaving only a part 
 
 f the west and south sides exposed. 
 
 rhe National troops were disposed in 
 a line running southeast, both flanks 
 resting on the river — the Fourth corps 
 on the right, the Twenty-Third on the 
 'eft. The cavalry were posted on both 
 sides of the town on the north bank, 
 where also was a fort on the hill com- 
 manding the town and the railroad, 
 besides earth- works and some artillery. 
 From the outset the troops worked 
 enei'getically in the erection of breast- 
 works of logs and earth, while the 
 skiiToishers in front endeavored to 
 check the enemy's advance. Between 
 the lines of the two armies extended a 
 broa?. plain, broken by slight undula- 
 tions and little hills, interspersed by 
 clumps of bushes and groves of trees. 
 
 The object of Schofield in making a 
 stand at Franklin was to detain Hood 
 until the trains could be got off safely 
 over the Harpeth Bridge and well on 
 theii- way to Nashville. To refuse 
 battle would have been to expose his 
 command to certain attack from superior 
 forces while on the march, the result of 
 which would, doubtless, have been the 
 destiiiction of the wagon-trains and 
 the greater part of the artillery. Such 
 a calamity might have been followed 
 Dy the fall of Nashville, and the aban- 
 donment of a large part of Tennessee. 
 Hood's object was to overwhelm Scho- 
 field at once, or at least compel him to 
 sacrifice his artiUery and stores. He 
 
 therefore hurried up his troops and 
 massed them behind a screen of thick 
 woods, in a line parallel with that oi 
 Schofield, Stewart's corps being on the 
 right, Cheatham's on the left, and Lee'h 
 in reserve in the rear. These move 
 ments were made with such celeritj- 
 that Hood very nearly took Schofield 
 by surprise. The Confederate chief 
 rode along his front, telling his men 
 that the National lines were weak, and 
 that when these were once broken 
 Thomas would be compelled to leave 
 Tennessee His own army was in 
 excellent condition. With his usual 
 boldness and confidence of success, 
 Hood determined to attack the centre 
 of Schofield's line, hoping to pierce it, 
 and then to push in through the town 
 to the bridges, when he would capture 
 the trains, and at the same time cut the 
 opposing anny in two. At four o'clock 
 in the afternoon he advanced to the 
 attack. The National skirmishers 
 slowly retreated to their works, ex 
 changing a sharp fire with those of the 
 enemy; and then a tremendous can- 
 nonade was opened from the ai-tillery 
 along Schofield's line. The cloud of 
 hostile skirmishers was quickly fol 
 lowed by the long and massive lines 
 foiu" deep, of Cheatham and Stewart 
 As the Confederates approached, the^ 
 were received by a tremendous mus 
 ketry, as well as, artillery fixe. On 
 they came, however, with fierce energy 
 A terrific struggle ensued. At length 
 one of Cheatham's divisions gained the 
 outworks held by Wagner, and forced 
 him back on the stronger lines held hy 
 Cox and Rugor. The Confederatoe 
 
84« 
 
 HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. 
 
 then re-fonning their lines, again rushed 
 on, and after a most desperate and 
 bloody contest, penetrated the second 
 line of defenses, and captured two guns. 
 The situation had already become 
 critical in the last degree. It seemed 
 as if Hood had already victory in his 
 grasp. At this supreme moment, Stan- 
 ley rode forward to the head of 
 Opdyke's brigade, of Warren's division, 
 which was posted behind the works, 
 and ordered it forward with Conrad's 
 brigade in support. Opdyke's voice 
 was immediately heard ringing loud 
 and clear above the tumult. " First 
 brigade, forward to the works," he 
 cried, himself leading the way. His 
 brave men promptly responded to the 
 call. On they went with firm and 
 steady step. With crushing weight 
 they fell upon the exultant columns of 
 the foe. The Confederates, at the very 
 moment when victory seemed secure, 
 were not only checked in their trium- 
 phant career; they we^e driven back 
 with fearful slaughter. The gap was 
 closed — the National line restored. By 
 this gallant charge the works and guns 
 were recovered ; and 300 prisoners 
 with 10 battle-flags were captured. 
 Hood, however, was unwilling to give 
 up the contest. Again and again, in 
 four successive assaults, he flung his 
 men, as if with the energy of despair, 
 on the now compact National lines ; but 
 it was all in vain. After dark the' 
 Confederates, moving to their own left, 
 aiade a vigorous attack on the National 
 right ; but this too was repulsed by 
 Hanley's first division, under Kimball, 
 (t was midnight when the sounds of 
 
 musketry and artillery ceased. Hood, 
 bitterly mortified at the result of the 
 contest, had withdrawn his men. Such 
 was the battle of Franklin — a battle 
 which did honor to the genius of Scho- 
 field, but which, according to the con- 
 current testimony of Wood, Stanley 
 and Thomas himself, was won by Op 
 dyke and his gallant brigade. It was 
 the voluntary testimony of each of 
 thesf generals, that but for Opdyke 
 and his men, their skill, promptitude 
 and gallantry, " disaster instead of vic- 
 tory would have befallen the National 
 arms at Franklin." Opdyke had al- 
 ready figured at Shiloh, where he waa 
 twice wounded, at Chickamauga, at 
 Missionary Ridge, at Rocky Face, and 
 at Peach Tree Creek. He was spared 
 at Franklin to perform equally noble 
 deeds at Nashville. 
 
 On both sides the losses were severe. 
 Hood's loss was about 6000, some of 
 his best generals had perished ; and 
 many of them were severely wounded. 
 Schofield's loss was not so heavy — 2326 
 in all, of whom 189 were killed, 1033 
 wounded, and 1104 missing. Among 
 the wounded were Generals Stanlev 
 and Bradley. 
 
 It would be difficult to over-estimate 
 the importance of the victory at Frank 
 lin. It checked Hood's advance ; it 
 gave Schofield time to remove his 
 troops and his property to Nashville ; 
 and what was of equal value, from a 
 National point of view, it greatly dis- 
 couraged and bowed down the spirits 
 of the Confederate rank and file. 
 
 After the battle, Schofield in com- 
 pliance with orders from Thomas, fell 
 
OVERALL'S (JKEEK. 
 
 843 
 
 back to Nashville, in front of which, 
 by noon on the Ist of December, a 
 Ogj^ line of battle was formed. The 
 
 1. army of Thomas was now about 
 ^6,000 strong. Steedman had come up 
 
 rem Chattanooga with 5000 men. 
 A- J. Smith with his command had 
 mived from Missouri on the 30th. 
 Other reinforcements were rapidly ar- 
 riving. Thomas had taken every care 
 to strengthen his position. Forts 
 Nogley, Morton, Confiscation, Houston 
 tnd Gillem, situated on commanding 
 .Heights, guarded the approaches from 
 the south. Behind these, and in front 
 of NashvUle, lay Thomas' army ; A. J. 
 Smith on the right, resting on the 
 river ; the Fourth corps commanded by 
 Wood in the absence of the wounded 
 Stanlf 7, in the centre ; and the Twenty- 
 Third corps, under Schofield on the 
 left. Wilson with the cavalry, was 
 stationed, to secure the interval be- 
 tween Schofield and the Cumberland 
 above the city. Steedman arrived in 
 the evening, and took up a position 
 about a mUe in advance of the left 
 centre of the main line and on the left 
 of the Nolensville turnpike. This 
 positio 1, however, was considered to be 
 too mnch exposed, and the cavalry 
 were d'j-ected to take post on the north 
 side of the river at Edgefield, Steed- 
 man's troops taking their place in the 
 line between Schofield and the river. 
 On the afternoon of the 2d of Decem- 
 ber small parties of the enemy's cavalry 
 engaged the National skirmishers ; but 
 their infantry did not appear in force 
 till the latter part of the following day, 
 when Hood began to establish his main 
 
 line. Early on the 4th he occupied 
 the high ground on the southeast side 
 of Brown's Creek, extending j^g^^ 
 fi-om the Nolensville turnpike 4. 
 — his extreme right in a westerly direc- 
 tion across the Franklin and Granny 
 White turnpikes to the hUls south and 
 southwest of Richland Creek, and along 
 that stream to the HUlsboro turnpike. 
 Both flanks were covered by the cav- 
 alry. The enemy's salient was jn 
 Montgomery HUl, within 600 yards of 
 the National centre. An artillery fire 
 was opened on his lines from several 
 points, but brought no reply. In this 
 position Hood's army remained till the 
 15th of December. 
 
 Dming this interval, there occurred 
 some operations of a minor character. 
 Murfreesboro was then held by General 
 Rousseau. The garrison at Murfrees- 
 boro had been considerably strength 
 ened by the arrival of a body of troops 
 under General Milroy, who had been 
 ordered up from Tullahoma. Thomas 
 was particularly anxious that nothing 
 should be allowed to disturb his 
 communication with Chattanooga. He 
 kept, therefore, a watchful eye on the 
 railroad. Hood was not ignorant of 
 the importance of this line of commu 
 nication ; and on the same day on 
 which the latter took position in front 
 of Thomas, Bates' division of Cheat- 
 ham's corps appeared at Overalls 
 Creek, and made an attack on the 
 block-house at the railroad crossing 
 The little garrison made a stout re- 
 sistance ; and on the arrival of Milroy 
 who was sent with 3 regiments fioin 
 Fort Rosecranz, Bates was com pel hid 
 
844 
 
 HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. 
 
 o retire. During the tliree following 
 lays, Bates was largely reinforced \\'ith 
 X)th cavalry and infantry ; and it 
 seemed as if he were bent on making an 
 Msault on the fort. On the 8th, Buford 
 \^, at the head of a body of cavalry 
 8. dashed into Murfreesboro. At- 
 tacked by a regiment of National in- 
 fantry, Buford found it necessary t(^ 
 retire from the town. Determined that 
 kifl day's labor should not be altogether 
 fruitless, he swept around by way of 
 Lebanon, and along the Cumberland, 
 with the evident intention of cutting 
 Thomas' communication with Louis- 
 ville; but the gun-boats on the river 
 made it impossible for him to carry out 
 his designs. On the same day, Milroy 
 encoimtered the Confederates in some 
 force on the Wilkeson turnpike, and 
 after a severe struggle, routed them, 
 inflicting a loss of 30 killed, and 175 
 wounded, and capturing over 200 pris- 
 oners and 2 guns. Milroy's loss was 
 about 205 men killed and wounded. 
 
 Thomas' protracted delay was misun- 
 derstood and misinterpreted at Wash- 
 ington. Grant, himself, who had great 
 faith in Thomas, was dissatisfied. Hood, 
 <t was thought, was having matters too 
 much his own way. Grant, resolved to 
 have the mystery of the delay ex- 
 plained, hurried from City Point for 
 Nashville. He had only proceeded as 
 far as Washington, when he received 
 from the West, telegraphic messages 
 fully explaining the situation, and con- 
 vincing him that he had not mistrusted 
 his man, and that all was well in Ten- 
 nessee. Grant did not pursue his 
 journey Thomas was really making 
 
 the best possible use of his time. Hie 
 numbers were superior to those of 
 Hood, but he was deficient in cavaliy. 
 Time was of the utmost importance to 
 Wilson, who was organizing with all 
 the rapidity possible in the circum- 
 stances. The weather, besides, had 
 been unfavorable. On the morning of 
 the 9th, there was a heavy sleet-storm, 
 which covered the ground with ice. 
 For a week the ground was such, that 
 it was impossible to move ; and the 
 cold was most intense. 
 
 On the 14th, the weather moderated 
 considerably. In both camps the ut- 
 most activity prevailed. It was evident 
 that both armies were fully prepared 
 for a great test struggle. Thomas con 
 vened his corps-commanders ; and a 
 plan of battle was discussed and agreed 
 upon. The left flank of the enemj 
 was his weak point. It was the gen 
 eral conviction that the point was vul 
 nerable — that it could be turned. It 
 was resolved, therefore, to make a 
 feigned attack against Hood's right, 
 and to follow it by an eifective blow 
 against the left. The morning of the 
 15th was gloomy. A dense fog j)gp 
 overhung the entire country 16. 
 around. It was not until the morning 
 was fai- advanced, that it was possible 
 to move the troops to their assigned 
 positions. Steedman had received in 
 stmctions, the night before, to advanc 
 against the enemy's right, east of the 
 Nolensville turnpike. As soon as th 
 light peiTuitted, he proceeded to cany 
 out his instructions. 
 
 Immediately after the completion 
 of Steedman's movement, Smith and 
 
JiiASHVILLE. 
 
 U6 
 
 tVilson pushed out along the Harding 
 turnpike, .and, wheeling to the left, ad- 
 vanced against Hood's position, across 
 the Harding and Hillsboro turnpikes. 
 A.t the same time, Johnson's division of 
 'Avalry was sent to operate against a 
 oaltery of the enemy at Ball's Landing, 
 on the Cumberland, 8 miles below 
 Nashville ; and, late in the afternoon, in 
 conjimction with some gun-boats, he en- 
 gaged it, continuing the firing till dark, 
 and with such effect that the Confed- 
 erates disappeared from that vicinity 
 during the night. The remainder of 
 Wilson's cavalry, moving on the right 
 flank of A. J. Smith's troops, Hatch's 
 division leading and Knipe's in reserve, 
 struck the enemy at Richland Creek, 
 near Harding's House, drove him back 
 rapidly, capturing a number of prison- 
 ers and wagons. Continuing to ad- 
 vance, and still swininnsr a little towards 
 he left, they came upon a redoubt 
 containing 4 guns. The redoubt was 
 carried by assault ; and the captured 
 guns were turned upon the enemy. 
 The same troops then advanced against 
 another and stronger 4-gun redoubt, 
 capturing it with 300 prisoners. At 
 this stage it was discovered that Smith 
 had not advanced sufficiently to the 
 right. Schofield, therefore, with the 
 Twenty-Third corps, was directed to 
 leave his position in reserve, and ad- 
 vance to Smith's right. This move- 
 ment Schofield rapidly accomplished ; 
 and the cavalry were thus enabled to 
 operate more freely on the enemy's 
 rear. The Fourth corps, under Wood, 
 formed on the left of Smith's command, 
 «.nd as soon as the latter had struck 
 
 the enemy's flank, assaulted Mont- 
 gomery Hill. This position, the most 
 advanced in Hood's line, was carried, 
 at one o'clock, by a brigade of thf- 
 second division. The Fourth corj)8, 
 still connecting with Smith's left, con- 
 tinued to advance, carrying by assault 
 all that portion of Hood's line in its- 
 immediate front, and capturing severai 
 pieces of artillery, with 500 prisoners 
 and some colors. The Confederates 
 were driven out of their original line 
 of works, and forced back to a position 
 along the biase of the Harpeth Hills, 
 still holding their line of retreat by the 
 Fi-anklin and Granny WTiite turnpikes. 
 
 The National line was readjusted at 
 nghtfall so as to run along the east 
 [ide of the Hillsboro turnpike — Scho- 
 field on the right, Smith in the centre, 
 and Wood on the left, with the cavalr} 
 on the riojht of Schofield. Steed man 
 continued to hold the position he had 
 gained in the morning, east of the 
 Nolens\alle turnpike. The day's oper- 
 ations resulted in the forcing back oi 
 the enemy at all points, with a loss of 
 16 pieces of artillery, 1200 prisoners, 
 several hundred stand of arms, and 4C 
 wagons. The National loss was slight 
 The original plan of battle had been 
 strictly adhered to, and, with but few 
 alterations, fully carried out. The 
 entire army bivouacked in the line of 
 battle formed at dark ; and prepare 
 tions were made to renew the contest 
 on the foDowing day at an early hour 
 
 On the 16th, at six in the mom- pgg^ 
 ing, the struggle was resumed. 16. 
 Wood pressed back the Confederate 
 skirmishers across the Franklin tuno 
 
B46 
 
 HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. 
 
 pike ; and then swinging a little to the 
 right he advanced in a southerly direc- 
 tion, driving the Confederates before 
 him until he came upon their new main 
 line of works, at Overton's Hill, about 
 miles south of the city, and on the 
 east side of the Franklin turnpike. 
 Steedman moved out from Nashville by 
 the Nolensville turnpike, and formed 
 his command on the left of Wood, 
 whose left flank he thus effectually 
 secured. Smith moved on the right of 
 Wood's corps and established con- 
 nection with it, thus completing a new 
 line of battle. Schofield's corps re- 
 mained in the position taken up at 
 dark on the 15th, in which his troops 
 faced eastward and towards the enemy's 
 left flank, while those of Smith and 
 Wood faced towards the south. Wil- 
 son's cavalry was dismounted and 
 formed on the right of Schofield. 
 These dispositions having been com- 
 pleted, it was determined to continue 
 the movement against the enemy's left 
 flank ; and the entire National line 
 moved to within 600 yards of that of 
 the enemy at all points. About three 
 in the afternoon an assault on Overton's 
 Hill was ordered to be made by two 
 brigades of Wood's corps, aided by a 
 colored brigade from Steedman's com- 
 mand. But as the ground on which, 
 the assaulting columns were formed 
 was open and exposed to the view of 
 the Confederates, they anticipated the 
 movement, and drew reinforcements 
 from their left and centre to strengthen 
 the menaced position ; and, when the 
 assault was made, they directed a tre- 
 mendous fire of grape, canister, and 
 
 musketry upon the National troops 
 Wood's men, however, moved steadily 
 onward up the hill until near its crest, 
 when the reserves of the enemy rose 
 suddenly and opened upon their assail- 
 ants a most destructive fire, which 
 caused them to waver and ultimately 
 to fall back, leaving their dead and 
 wounded lying among the felled trees. 
 The troops were immediately re-formed 
 in their old position by Wood, in readi- 
 ness for a renewal of the assault. 
 
 Smith and Schofield then moved 
 against the works in their respective 
 fronts, and carried all before them, 
 breaking the enemy's lines in a dozen 
 places, captming all his artillery with 
 thousands of prisoners, including four 
 general officers. Wilson's cavalry dis- 
 mounted, attacked the enemy at the 
 same moment, gained firm possession 
 of the Granny White turnpike, and 
 thus closed one of the routes which 
 had remained open to the Confederates 
 for retreat in the direction of Franklin. 
 Wood's and Steedman's troops, now 
 hearing the shouts of their victorious 
 comrades on the right, again rushed 
 impetuously forward to renew the as- 
 sault on Overton's Hill. Although 
 received with a very heavy fire, their 
 onset proved irresistible. The Confed 
 erates broke, and, leaving their artillery 
 and a large number of prisoners, fled ij 
 confusion to the Brentwood pass 
 through which runs the Franklin turn 
 pike, closely followed tiU dark by th 
 Fourth corps. Wilson, at the sami 
 time, hastily mounted Knipe's and 
 Hatch's divisions of his command, and 
 sent them in pursuit along the Granny 
 
THE PUnsUll. 
 
 847 
 
 Wliite turnpike, with directions to 
 reach Franklin, if possible, in advance 
 of the enemy. After proceeding about 
 a mile they came upon a body of Con- 
 federate cavalry under Chalmers, behind 
 barricades constructed across the road. 
 The position was charged, at once, by 
 the Twelfth Tennessee cavalry, under 
 Colonel Spalding, when the Confeder- 
 ates broke and scattered in all direc- 
 tions, leaving a number of piisoners, 
 among whom was General E,ucker. 
 Such was the battle of Nashville. 
 
 During the two day's operations 
 4462 prisoners were taken, including 
 287 officers, from the grade of major- 
 general downwai'd, besides 53 pieces 
 of artillery and thousands of small-amis. 
 The Confederates left 3000 of their 
 dead and wounded on the field of bat- 
 le. The total National loss did not 
 exceed 3000, and of this number very 
 few were killed. 
 
 Next morning, the pursuit was con- 
 Dgg^ tinned, the Fourth corps pushing 
 17. towards Franklin by the direct 
 turnpike, and the cavalry by the Granny 
 White turnpike to its intersection with 
 that road, beyond which point they 
 moved in advance of the infantry. 
 Johnson's cavalry division was sent by 
 Wilson direct to the Harpeth River by 
 the Hillsboro turnpike, Avith instruc- 
 tions to cross and move rapidly towards 
 Franklin. The main cavalry column, 
 Knijie's division in the advance, over- 
 took the enemy's rear-guard 4 miles 
 north of Franklin, at Hollow Tree Gap, 
 and carried the position by simultane- 
 ous charges in both front and flank, 
 OApturing 413 prisoners and 3 stand of 
 
 colors. The Confederates then fel] 
 back rapidly to Franklin, and endeav 
 ored to defend the crossings of the 
 Harpeth ; but, Johnson's division com 
 ing up from below on the south side 
 of the stream, they were compelled to 
 retire. The National forces took {>o8 
 session of the town, in which were the 
 enemy's hospitals, containing over 2000 
 wounded, of whom about 200 were 
 Union soldiers. Wilson continued the 
 pursuit towards Columbia, the Confed- 
 erate rear-guard slowly retiring before 
 him to about 5 miles south of Franklia, 
 where it halted in some open fields on 
 the north side of the West Harpeth 
 River, apparently disposed to make a 
 stand. Wilson at once deployed Knipe's 
 division as skirmishers, with Hatch's 
 division in support, and ordered his body- 
 guard, the Fourth United States caval- 
 ry commanded by Lieutenant Hedges, 
 to attack the Confederates. Form- 
 ing on the turnpike in column of fours, 
 the gallant little band charged with 
 di'awTi sabres, and succeeded in break 
 ing their centre, while Knipe's and 
 Hatch's men drove back their flanks, 
 scattering the entire command and cap- 
 turing their artillery. Night came on; 
 and the fugitives escaped. The Fourth 
 coqis had followed, in the rear of the 
 cavalry, as far as the Harj)eth River. 
 There, however, their progr-ess was 
 stayed. The bridges were destroyed, 
 and there was too much water in the 
 stream to penuit the crossing of infantry. 
 The construction of a trestle bridge was 
 commenced ; but it was not comj»leted 
 hefi'iv tiiglit-fall. Steedman's command 
 followeti the Fourth corps and encamped 
 
^48 
 
 HOOD AND THOMA.S IN TENNESSEE 
 
 near it on the banks of the Harpeth. 
 Smith and Schofield, with their corps, 
 also joined in the pursuit, marching 
 along the Grann)^ White turnpike to 
 its intersection with the direct road to 
 Franklin. At that point they encamped 
 for the night. 
 
 The pursuit was resumed by the 
 cavalry, and pushed the next day as far 
 Dec, as Rutherford's Creek, 3 miles 
 
 18. from Columbia. The Fourth 
 corps crossed to the south side of the 
 Harpeth and closed up with the cavalry, 
 the enemy offering no opposition during 
 the day. Heavy rains having succeeded 
 to the cold which had delayed Thomas' 
 o})eration8 at Nashville, not only made 
 the roads almost impassable, but swelled 
 the streams and rivers to such an extent 
 that the pursuit became extremely diffi- 
 ciilt. Rutherford's Creek had swollen so 
 rapidly, that it was found to be unford- 
 able soon after the enemy had crossed. 
 The splendid pontoon train with its 
 experienced pontoniers, belonging to 
 the army of Thomas, had been taken 
 by Sherman for his Georgia campaign. 
 A pontoon bridge, hastily constructed 
 at Nashville, was on its way ; but the 
 wretched state of the roads retarded 
 Dgg^ its arrival. During the 19th, 
 
 19. efforts were made by the ad- 
 vanced troojis to get across Rutherford's 
 Creek. They were only partially suc- 
 cessful, only a few skirmishers effecting 
 a lodgment on the south bank. Smith's 
 and Schofield's commands crossed to 
 the south side of the Harpeth, the form- 
 er advancing to Spring Hill, the latter 
 to Franklin. On the morning of the 
 20th, Hatch having succeeded in throw- , 
 
 ing a floating bridge over Rutheriord'ft 
 Creek, got his entire division over, an(i 
 pushed on for Columbia; but on reach 
 ing Duck River he found that the Con 
 federates had got everything across tb« 
 night before by a pontoon bridge, whicL- 
 they had carried off, and that the rivei 
 was impassable. In the course of tli 
 day Wood constructed a foot bridge 
 over Rutherford's Creek; and by night- 
 fall having crossed all his infantry, as 
 well as one or two of his batteriess. he 
 pushed on to Duck River. 
 
 The pontoon train came up about 
 noon, on the 2l8t; and, in spite of the 
 severe cold which had now set in, the 
 bridge was completed before night f al 1 
 and Smith's command pushed across 
 Materials for the construction of anothei 
 bridge were hurried forward to Duck 
 River. This bridge was finished in 
 time to permit Wood's coromand to 
 cross to the south side, late in th 
 afternoon of the 2 2d, and to get into 
 position on the Pulaski road, about 
 two miles south of Columbia. 
 
 Notmthstanding the severity of the 
 weather and the vexatious delays which 
 he had experienced, Thomas resolved 
 to continue the pursuit. This duty he 
 assigned to Wilson's cavalry and the 
 Fourth corps. The infantry was to move 
 along the turnpike — the cavalry was 
 to march on its flanks, across the fields. 
 Smith's and Schofield's corps were to 
 follow more leisurely, and to be used 
 as occasion demanded. Hood had now 
 formed a powerful rear-guard, composed 
 of Forrest's cavalry and about 4000 
 infantry under General Walthall, made 
 up of detachments from all his organized 
 
DEFEAT OF HOOD. 
 
 649 
 
 force. This rear- guard, undaunted 
 and firm, did its duty to the last. All 
 the rest of Hood's once noble army 
 became a disheartened rabble of ragged, 
 barefooted, and half -armed men, whose 
 privations and discouragement led them 
 to take every opportunity of escape 
 *rom the Confederate sei-vice. 
 
 Wilson crossed the Duck River on 
 the 23d ; and on the foDowing day, 
 supported by Wood, he came up with 
 the enemy at Lynnville and at Buford's 
 Station. A stand was made at both 
 these places ; but the Confederates were 
 quickly dislodged with considerable 
 loss, and followed up so rapidly that 
 they had not time to destroy the bridges 
 9ver Richland Creek. On the morning 
 oi the 25th they evacuated Pulaski, 
 Qgg^ and were pursued in the direction 
 86. of Lamb's Feny, over an almost 
 impracticable road and through a coun- 
 try devoid of sustenance for men or 
 horsea During the afternoon Colonel 
 Harrison's brigade found them strongly 
 mtrenched, at the head of a deep and 
 heavily wooded ravine, through which 
 the road ran. Their skirmishers were 
 driven in ; but the attack was delayed 
 until the remainder of the cavalry 
 should come up. The enemy then, 
 recovering some of its old audacity, 
 took the opportunity to sally from his 
 breast-works, driving back Harrison's 
 skirmishers, and capturing one gun. 
 The Confederates were ultimately 
 driven back, with a loss of some 50 
 prisoners ; but the gun was not recov- 
 ered. The cavalry, in piirsuit, moved 
 90 rapidly that their supply trains were 
 left far in the rear ; and both men and 
 
 animals suffered much in consequence 
 Wood's corps following the cavaby on 
 the night of the 26th encamped 6 miles 
 out from Pulaski, on the Lamb's Ferry 
 road, and reached Lexington, Alabama, 
 30 miles from Pulaski, on the 28th. 
 The Confederates, by this time, d^^, 
 had made good their escape 28. 
 across the Tennessee River at Bain 
 bridge ; and Thomas ordered the pur- 
 suit to cease. At Pulaski 200 of the 
 enemy's wounded and sick were found 
 in the hospital ; and 4 guns were taken 
 out of Richland Creek. The road, all 
 the way from NashviUe to Bainbridge, 
 was strewn with wagons, limbers, 
 small-arms, and blankets, affording con- 
 clusive evidence that the retreat of 
 Hood's troops had been of the most 
 disorderly character. 
 
 Although the pursuit of Hood, by 
 the main army, had been discontinued, 
 a force of 600 cavalry under Colonel 
 Palmer, made up from various regiments, 
 set out from Decatur, in the direction 
 of Hood's line of retreat. Palmer as 
 certained at Leighton that Hood had 
 passed through that place on the 28th, 
 and marched in the direction of Colum- 
 bus, Mississippi. Avoiding the cavalry 
 of the Confederates, and moving rapidly 
 by way of LaGrange, Russell ville and the 
 Cotton-Gin road. Palmer overtook their 
 pontoon train, consisting of 200 wagons 
 and 78 pontoon boats, about 10 miles 
 from Russellville, the whole of which 
 he destroyed. Then, having ascertained 
 that a large supply train was on its 
 way to Tuscaloosa, he set out on the 
 Ist of January towards Aberdeen, Mis 
 sissippi, and succeeded in surprising i1 
 
850 
 
 HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. 
 
 about ten o'clock the same night, just 
 beyond the Mississippi boundary line. 
 This train, consisted of over 100 wagons 
 and 500 mules. The wagons he burned ; 
 the mules he sabred or shot. After 
 encountering and pressing back Roddy's 
 cavalry, near Leighton, Alabama, and 
 capturing and destroying Hood's pon- 
 toon train, about 10 miles from Russell- 
 ville he pushed on for Moulton. Meet- 
 ing a body of Confederates at Thorn 
 Hill, he attacked and routed them. He 
 arrived safe at Decatur on the 6th of 
 January. 
 
 While Hood was before Nashville, 
 he sent into Kentucky a force of about 
 800 cavalry with 2 guns, under General 
 Lyon, with instructions to operate 
 against the railroad communications 
 with Louisville. To protect these, 
 McCook's division of cavalry was on 
 the 14 th of December sent to Bowling 
 Green and Franklin. Lyon captured 
 Hopkinsville, but was soon afterwards 
 met and routed by Lagrange's brigade 
 near Greenburg. Then, making a wide 
 detour by way of Elizabethtown and 
 Glasgow, he succeeded in getting to 
 the Cumberland River, at Burkville, 
 where he crossed. Proceeding thence, 
 byway of McMinnville and Winchester, 
 to Larkinsville, Alabama, on the Mem 
 phis and Charleston Railroad, he at 
 tacked the little garrison, at Scottsboro 
 on the lOlh of January, but was again 
 repulsed. This time, however, his com- 
 mand scattered and was pursued to the 
 Tennessee River, beyond which he 
 managed to escape with about 200 
 men, the rest of his force dispersing in 
 squads ainons' the mountains Palmer 
 
 with 150 men crossed the Tennesset 
 River and went in pursuit of Lyon 
 and on the 1 4th of January, he surprised 
 him in camp at Red Hill, on the road 
 from Warrentown to Tuscaloosa, cap 
 turing Lyon with 100 of his men, anc 
 his one remaining piece of artillery 
 Lyon, however, shooting a sentinel, 
 eflFected his escape. 
 
 The total National losses in the vari 
 ous operations of the campaign in Ten 
 nessee, including killed, wounded, and 
 missing, did not exceed 10,000 men; 
 while that of the enemy in prisoners 
 alone was 13,189, including nearly 1000 
 officers of all ranks, 72 serviceable pieces 
 of artillery, and a large number of 
 battle-flags. More than 2000 deserters 
 also came within the National lines and 
 took the oath of allegiance. 
 
 The success which attended General 
 Thomas, in this campaign, was in some 
 respects without parallel in the entire 
 history of the war. In many of the 
 campaigns larger numbers were en 
 gaged, and the fighting was more severe ; 
 but in none of the campaigns was an 
 opposing army so thoroughly demol- 
 ished. It was the first time that a 
 Confederate army had been annihilated. 
 Thomas had reason to be proud of hie 
 victory. With an army hastily made 
 up of fragments of three separate com 
 mands, numerically weaker, and greatly 
 inferior in dicipline to that to which he 
 was opposed, he not only held his own, 
 not only repelled successive attacks, 
 but won a signal, even a crowning 
 victory. It has already been mentioned 
 that Grant was impatient of what he 
 called Thomas' " unnecessaiy delay 
 
CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENTS. 
 
 86 
 
 oefore the battle of Nashville. Al- 
 thougn not abandoning the opinion 
 that the delay was perilous and to a 
 certain extent unnecessary, the Lieu- 
 tenant- General afterwards declared that 
 Thomas' success would be accepted as 
 
 vindication of that distinguished 
 officer's judgment. In his letter to 
 Sherman on the 18th of December, 
 Grant says "Thomas has done magnifi- 
 cently." Thomas was slow but he was 
 sure. He was already renovpned as the 
 "Rock of Chickamauga." As the con- 
 queror of Hood, the hero of the great 
 Tennessee campaign, he was henceforth 
 to take a foremost place, vdth Grant 
 and Sherman and Meade and Sheridan. 
 The government evinced its appreciation 
 of his gieat services by appointing him 
 major-general in the regular army, his 
 rank to date from the 15th of Decem- 
 ber — the day on which he won his 
 crov?Tiing victory at Nashville. 
 
 On the 30th of December, Thomas 
 proclaimed the campaign at an end, 
 and gave orders for the distribution of 
 his troops in winter-quarters, at East- 
 port, in Northern Mississippi, at Athens 
 and Huntsville, in Alabama, and at 
 Dalton, in Georgia. This arrangement, 
 however, was not satisfactory to Gen- 
 eral Grant and the War Department. 
 The Secession cause must now be 
 crushed — such was the determination 
 of General Grant; and in this deter- 
 mination he was fully supported by the 
 government. Until this result should 
 be achieved, there was to be no rest for 
 the National armies. Thomas was, 
 therefore, instructed to countermand 
 vhe orders given, and to make a new 
 
 disposition of his troops. Wood vdth 
 the Fourth corps was to go to Hunts 
 ville. Smith, Schofield and Wilson 
 were to concentrate at Eastport, and to 
 hold themselves in readiness for furthei 
 orders. 
 
 Hood with a shattered fragment of 
 his army had made his way to Tupelo 
 Mississippi. There, on the 23d of Janu 
 ary, he was relieved of his command, at 
 his own request ; but it would be use- 
 less to deny that his resignation had 
 become a necessity. A capable and 
 dashing officer, he was Longstreet's 
 tower of strength at Gettysburg, where 
 he lost an arm. He fought with equal 
 energy and daring at Chickamauga, 
 where he lost a leg. He held him- 
 self responsible for the conception of 
 the Tennessee campaign ; and he strove 
 hard, he tells us, to do his duty in 
 its execution ; but his plan and mode 
 of battle would have been more per 
 feet, if he had awaited, not made, the 
 assaults. As it was, he acted precisely 
 as his antagonist wished him to act. 
 Hood added another name to that list 
 of capable men, who had figured on 
 both sides — men who as corps or divis- 
 ion commanders were equal to any 
 emergency ; but who, being unequal to 
 the responsibilities of uncontrolled 
 authority, were found wanting, when 
 entrusted with supreme command. 
 
 Simultaneous with these operations 
 in Tennessee, and having for their 
 object the occupation of the Confeder 
 ate forces to the west of both Shermai 
 and Thomas, there were some minoj 
 and co-operative movements of which it 
 is necessary to give a brief account 
 
?52 
 
 HOOD AND IHOMAS LN TENxNESSEE. 
 
 One of these was sent out from Vicks- 
 burg, in the latter part of November, 
 against Hood's communications with 
 Mobile. The force employed, consisting 
 of about 2000 cavalry, with 8 pieces of 
 itillery, under Colonel Osband, after 
 well executed flank movement on 
 Jackson on the 24th, started northward 
 for the Mississippi Central Railroad 
 Bridge over the Big Black. The bridge 
 ifQj^ was reached on the 27th, captured 
 27. after a sharp fight and destroyed. 
 The wagon-road bridge and 30 miles of 
 railroad track were also destroyed, with 
 all the intermediate depots and build- 
 ings, besides 2600 bales of cotton, sev- 
 eral locomotives and cars, and a large 
 amount of stores at Vaughan Station. 
 Hood's army was thus cut off from 
 the supplies accumulated for its use 
 at Jackson; and the railroad was 
 rendered unavailable for months. 
 The expedition, although considerably 
 harassed on its return by bodies of the 
 enemy, got back to Vicksburgon the 4th 
 of December, without having suffered 
 any material losses. 
 
 Another expedition, under General 
 Davidson, set out from Baton Rouge, 
 with a similar object, on the 27th of 
 November, comprising a force of 4200 
 men in two divisions, commanded by 
 •reneral BaUy and Colonel Davis, with 
 96 wagons and 8 guns, and reached 
 Tangipaha, on the Jackson Railroad, on 
 the 1st of December. Five miles of 
 the track were torn up and the railroad 
 buildings and bridges burned. Unfor- 
 timately, some dwelling houses caught 
 <ire ; and a part of the town was con- 
 sumed The column then proceeded to 
 
 Friiuklin\nlle ; and there, also, the traci 
 was torn up. Columbia and Augusta 
 were also visited. The enemy's cavalry 
 under Scott, now made its appearance 
 and a shaif) skirmish occurred, on th 
 Yazoo City and Vicksburg road on the 
 2d. After a weary march, over j)^, 
 roads rendered almost impassable 2. 
 by heavy rains, the command airived 
 at West Pascagoula, on the 12th. On 
 the 16th, the Mobile and Great North- 
 em Railroad was cut at Pollard's, 72 
 miles northeast of Mobile, by a column 
 of iufantiy and cavalry, under Colonel 
 Robinson. A few miles of the track 
 were torn up, and the depot, 8 cars, and 
 a large amount of stores, including 2000 
 stand of arms, were destroyed. 
 
 Another co-operative movement, from 
 Memphis, had greater success. On the 
 21st of December, General Dana q^^^ 
 sent General Gnerson, with some 21 . 
 3000 cavalry, to cut the Mobile and 
 Ohio Railroad. The column moved 
 directly eastward, threatening Corinth. 
 Detachments, sent for the piu^ose, cut 
 the telegraph vvire between Grand 
 Junction and Corinth, as well as that 
 between Booneville and Gumtown, oc 
 the Mobile and Ohio road. On the 
 latter road they also destroyed 4 bridges 
 between the same points. The main 
 column, moving rapidly on Tupelo, 
 surprised and captured or disj^ei-sed 
 Forrest's camp of dismounted men at 
 Verona. At this place, were destroyed 
 32 cars, loaded with new wagons, pon- 
 toons, and supplies, 300 army wagons, 
 most of which had been captured from 
 General Sturgis at Gumtown, 4000 new 
 English-made carbines intended for th© 
 
GRIEESON'S EXPEDITION. 
 
 853 
 
 use of Forrest's troops, also large 
 amounts of ordnance stores, quarter- 
 masters' and commissary stores for 
 Hood's army. On leaving Verona the 
 column moved southward along the 
 line of railroad, which was thoroughly 
 destroyed, to a point between Egypt 
 and Prairie Stations. Telegrams were 
 taken from the wires at Okalona from 
 Generals Taylor and Gardner, ordering 
 Egypt to be held at aU hazards, and 
 promising reinforcements from Mobile 
 and elsewhere. Eygpt was held by a 
 garrison of about 1200 infantry and 
 cavalry, with 4 guns on platform cars. 
 f)ec. Grrierson attacked the place on 
 28. the 28tk While the attack was 
 going on, two trains loaded with 
 infantry, under Gardner, came in sight. 
 Grierson sent a force to meet them 
 and to hinder their approa^L The 
 expected aid not coming up, the garri- 
 son, after a fight of about two hours, 
 was dispersed with a loss of 500 pris- 
 oners and General Gholson killed. At 
 Egypt the Nationals destroyed a train 
 of 14 cars and 1000 stand of arms. 
 T^ farther prosecution of the raid was 
 
 now given up, the hostile force in front 
 and the great number of prisoners and 
 captured animals making rapid move- 
 ment impossible. The column, accord- 
 ingly, turned to the southwest, and 
 marching through Houston and Belle, 
 fontaine, struck the Mississippi Central 
 Railroad at Winona. A detachment, 
 sent to Bankston, destroyed the large 
 and valuable factories which supplied 
 the Confederate army with clothing and 
 shoes, as well as large quantities oi 
 wool, cloth, and leather. Another de- 
 tachment destroyed the new machine- 
 shops and all the Confederate govern- 
 ment property at Granada. A brigade, 
 sent southward from this place, tore up 
 the railroad track and pulled down the 
 telegraph wire for 35 miles, and meet- 
 ing a brigade of Confederate troope 
 imder Wirt Adams at Franklin, chained 
 and drove it from the field with a lose 
 of 25 killed. The column, after destroy- 
 ing an immense amount of property, 
 arrived safely at Yicksburg, on the 
 5th of January, bringing in 550 pris- 
 oners, 1000 negroes i*nd 800 korses and 
 mulea. 
 
H64 
 
 THE BLOCKADE AND THE PEIVATBERS. 
 
 CHAPTER XL. 
 
 ]• Steaernxj of the Bloeka4e — The Blockade Bnnners — The Temptation — The Efforta of the GoTernmant-' 
 Gfiowing Strength of the N»t«1 Serrice— GUlmore's Expedition to Florida — Seymour Placed in Immediate 
 rommand — On St. John's Biver — At Jacksonville — At Baldwin — Gillmore Returns to Hilton Head — 
 Seymour's Blunder — Suwannee Eiver — Barber's Station — Olnstee Station — Battle of Olustee — Bravery of 
 the Negroes — Seymour Falls Back on Jacksonville — Destruction of I*roperty — The Expedition a Failure — 
 North Carolina — New Berne— Plymouth — Washington — Pickett's Unsuccessful Attempt on New Berne — 
 Confederate Attack on Plymouth — Forts Warren, Wessels and Comfort — The Albemarle — Capture of 
 Plymouth — Hoke Demands the Surrender of New Berne — Melancthon's Blockading Squadron — Th« 
 Sassacus Buts the Albemarle — The Albemarle Retires — Hoke Abandons the Siege of New Berne — Quiet 
 in Albemarle Sound and along the Coast of North Carolina — Bumside's Conquests in 1863 for the most 
 part recovered by the Confederatee — Cuahing and the Albemarle — Cuahing's Bravery — Destruction of the 
 Albemarle — Plymouth Recaptured — Wilmington the one Open Port — Its Defenses — Arrangements Made 
 to Reduce it — A Joint Expedition — Porter and Butler — Grant's Instructions to Butler — The Troops on 
 board Transports — A Formidable Fleet — A Storm at Sea — Cape Fear — The Transports Seek Shelter a* 
 Beaufort — Fort Fisher — The Powder Ship — The Experiment a FaUure— The First Attack on Fort Fishe; 
 — A Magnificent Bombardment — The Second Day — The Troopa Landed — " Yankee Doodle" — Bravery o> 
 Curtis — Difference of Opinion — The Troops Re-embarked — The Assault a FaUure — A National Disap 
 pointment — Grant Ofiended — Preparations for Another Assault — Grant Sends an Increased Land Force — 
 Terry in Command — The Combined Forces at New Inlet — The Strengfth of Fort Fisher — The Armamenl 
 of the Fleet — A Terrific Bombardment — Terry Rebolves to Assault — Porter Concurs — The Signal Given— 
 The Marines Driven Back — The Palisades— Curtis' Brigade — A Terrible Struggle — Curtis Joined by 
 Pennybacker and Bell — Hand-to-hand Rghting — Fighting over the Traverses — Arrival of Blackman and 
 Abbott — Fort Fisher Captured — Hoke's Attack on the National Line — His Retreat— 'The Struggle at Fort 
 Fisher one of the most gallant in the War — A Brave Assault — A Heroic Defense — A Fearful Explosion — 
 The Confe<lerate8 Blow Up Fort CasweU— All the other Works Deserted— The Blockade of Wilmington 
 Sectired — A Pause — General Schofield Ordered to the Coast of North Carolina — His Arrival at Fort Fiahei 
 — The Department of North Carolina — Schofield in Command — Ordered to Co-operate with Sherman — 
 Capture of Fort Anderson — Wilmington Abandoned by the Confederates — Occupied by the Nationals — 
 A Severe Blow to the Confederates — Mobile — A Co-operative Movement — Canby, Wilson and Thatcher— 
 MobOe a place of Great Strength — Canby and Thatcher Move Against It — On the East Side — Spanish Port 
 —The Siege — The Assault — The Work Abandoned — Occupied by the Nationals — Tort Blakely — A place 
 of Great Strength — Canby Resolves to Assault — A Rush into the Jaws of Death — A Desperate Struggle — 
 " Remember Port Pillow " — A National Victory — Surrender of Mobile — Wilson's Co-operative Movement 
 — At Elyton — At Montevallo — Ebonezer Church — Selma Captured — Great Destruction of Property — At 
 Montgomery — The Place Surrrendered — At Macon — A Most Successful and Most Destructive Raid — The 
 Privateers— The Savannah— The Petrel— The Juda— The Nashville— The Sumter— The Later Privateers— 
 The Florida — Her Depredations — Captured at Bahia — Sunk in Hampton Roads — The Tallahassee and 
 Chickamauga — Destroyed at Wilmington — The Georgia — Captured near Lisbon — The Olustee — Th« 
 Shenandoah — Surrendered to the British Government — The Stonewall — Surrendered to the Spaniards a 
 Havana — The Alabama — Her Mission of Destruction — Captain Semmee — At Cherbourg — The Kearsarg 
 and the Alabama — The Great Battle — Captain Winalow — The Deerhound — The Courronne — Winslow' 
 Skilful Fighting — The Kearsarge Victorious — The Alabama Sunk— Her Record. 
 
 Naval and coast operations have 
 already, at dififerent times, occu- 
 pied OUT attention, in the course 
 of this work. These operations had for 
 
 1864. 
 
 their primary object, the establishmen 
 and maintenance of an effective block 
 ade of all the ports on the coasi, 
 through which the Confederacy m %h.i 
 
JSXFEDITION TO FLOEIDA. 
 
 856 
 
 obtain succor or supplies. It can well 
 be understood that the maintenance of 
 such a blockade was a severe strain on 
 the energies of the North. It implied 
 the presence of armed vessels, all along 
 he extended seaboard, gun-boats in the 
 'vers and bayous, and large bodies of 
 (irmed men at suitable points, and at 
 convenient distances all along the coast. 
 Blockade-running, which offered pecu- 
 liar temptations to the foreign trader, 
 was at first beset with little difficulty. 
 The reward was great; and the risk 
 was small Time, however, and the 
 progress of the war worked a great 
 change. The Navy grew ia strength ; 
 and the perils and risks of the blockade- 
 runner multiplied. At the close of 
 1863, there were of iron-clad steamers 
 75 ; of side-wheels 203 ; of screws 198; 
 of sailing vessels 112 — in all 588. The 
 umber of guns was 4443, and the 
 ggregate tonnage 467,967. On the 
 1st of July in that year, there were 
 34,000 seamen ; and during the year 
 enlistments for the naval service aver- 
 aged over 2000 per montk In 1864 
 the number of vessels had increased to 
 671 ; the number of guns to 4610 ; and 
 the tonnage to 510,396. At the begin- 
 ning of the war, there were in the ser- 
 vice 7600 men ; at its close the figures 
 were 51,500. 
 
 In the spring of 1864, the naval 
 forces were divided into four separate 
 squadrons, of which one was stationed 
 in the James River, one in the Sounds 
 of North Carolina, the other two lying 
 off Cape Fear and the adjacent inlets. 
 Each of these squadrons was placed 
 under a competent officer ; and the 
 
 head-quarters were established at Beau 
 fort, North Carolina. Port after por* 
 had gradually been wrested from th 
 Confederacy, until in almost every har 
 bor and along the banks of the Missis- 
 sippi, the National flag floated supreme 
 After the destruction of the forts in 
 Charleston Harbor, and in Mobile Bay 
 Wilmington was the only port of first 
 class importance, which continued t< 
 invite the enterprise and to tempt the 
 the cupidity of the blockade-runners. 
 As we have already brought down the 
 story of the naval and coast engage- 
 ments to the year 1864, and as separate 
 chapters have been devoted to Charles- 
 ton Harbor and to Mobile Bay, we pro- 
 pose to make this chapter exhaustive 
 of all the remaining naval and coast 
 operations, for whatever purpose, cov- 
 ering, of course, those connected with 
 the blockade and the privateeiing inter 
 ests of the SoutL 
 
 Although not in any direct way con- 
 nected with the blockade, yet having 
 all the essential characteristics of a 
 coast operation, place must be found at 
 the outset here for a brief record of the 
 ill-starred expedition which was sent to 
 Florida, in the early months of 1864. 
 Towards the close of 1863, report? 
 w^re freely circulated, to the effect, that 
 Florida, tired of the war, was sighing 
 for amnesty and restoration to the 
 Union. Gillmore, since the demolition 
 of Fort Sumter, his troops compara 
 tively unemployed, had remained a 
 Hilton Head. It was the opinion oi 
 that officer, that such being the state oi 
 feeling in Florida, his men might be 
 used to some advantage in an expediticr 
 
at 
 
 THE BLOCKADE AND THE PRIVATBERS. 
 
 to that State. In January, Lincoln 
 gave his consent to the proposed exped- 
 ition — at the same time commissioning 
 as major, Mx. John Hay, one of his 
 private secretaries, and sending him to 
 Hilton Head, to join Gillmore and pro- 
 ceed with him as the representative of 
 the Executive. Gillmore hurried for- 
 ward the necessary preparations ; and 
 the expedition, under the immediate 
 command of General Truman Seymour, 
 consisting of 4500 infantry and 400 
 cavalry, on board 20 steamers and 8 
 Feb. schooners, left Hilton Head, on 
 
 6. the 6th of February. On the 
 following day, they entered the St. 
 John's River, and proceeding upwards, 
 landed at and occupied Jacksonville, in 
 the afternoon. Jacksonville was found 
 to be in ruins, and, with the exception 
 of a few women and children, aban- 
 doned by the inhabitants. On the 8th, 
 the army in three columns — commanded 
 respectively by C. C. Barton, Forty- 
 Eighth New York, J. R Hawley, 
 Seventh Connecticut, and Guy V. 
 Henry, Fortieth Massachusetts, set out 
 from Jacksonville in the direction of 
 Baldwin. Henry, who commanded the 
 cavalry, led the advance. On the way, 
 Henry found the Confederates in some 
 force, at Camp Vinegar. Passing the 
 camp, he surprised and captured, some- 
 what in the rear of the Confederates, 4 
 guns, and a large amount of commis- 
 sary stores. Baldwin was reached 
 
 bout sunrise, on the morning of the 
 9 th, when another gun was captured, 
 together with 3 cars, a large quantity 
 of cotton, and stores of all kinds, to the 
 value of about $500,000 Henry 
 
 pushed forward in the direction ol 
 Lake City ; but discovering that the 
 Confederate general, Finnegan, vrf£ in 
 the neighborhood, and not knowing the 
 exact strength of his command, he fell 
 back about 4 miles, and telegraphed to 
 Seymour for orders and supplies. 
 
 Gillmore had accompanied the ex 
 pedition as far as Baldwin. It was not 
 his intention to penetrate further into 
 the interior. Giving Seymour instruc- 
 tions to that effect, he returned to Hil- 
 ton Head, which he reached, on the 
 15th. Seymour, however, having been 
 informed that Finnegan had fallen back 
 from Lake City, gave way to his own 
 strong impulses and assumed the respon- 
 sibility of pushing forward his troops, 
 bare almost of supplies, in the direc- 
 tion of the Suwannee River. Thence 
 he telegraphed to Gillmore, notifying 
 him of the fact and asking him to make 
 a demonstration against Savannah, with 
 one of the iron-clads, so as to present 
 reinforcements being sent to Finnegan. 
 Gillmore was astounded. He saw, at a 
 glance, the peril to which Seymour was 
 exposing himself and his 6000 troops. 
 There was no reason why Finnegan 
 should not receive reinforcements from 
 both Georgia and Alabama. In such 
 a case, Seymour's force would be over- 
 whelmed and probably destroyed. Gill 
 more, without a moment's delay, sent 
 a message to his lieutenant remonstra 
 ting against the folly of such conduct. 
 
 It was too late, Seymour was already 
 caught in a trap. On the mom- Yeh. 
 ing of the 20th, he had pressed 20. 
 forward, from Barber's Station, along the 
 road which runs parallel with the rail 
 
OLtlSTEE, 
 
 867 
 
 road. He was within three miles of 
 Olufltee Station. At this point there 
 was a swamp and a heavy pine forest. 
 Under cover of these, Finnegan had 
 disposed his men. It was now near two 
 o'clock in the afternoon. The head 
 of Seymour's column had no sooner 
 come up, than the woods blazed with 
 the fire of musketry and artillery. 
 Henry's cavalry with Stevens' battalion 
 and Hawley's Seventh Connecticut were 
 the first to suffer. Hawley hui-ried 
 forward the Seventh New Hampshire, 
 Colonel Abbott, with the batteries of 
 Hamilton, Elder, and Langdon. The 
 National artilleiy suffered terribly. 
 In the brief space of twenty minutes 40 
 out of 50 horses were killed, and 45 
 out of 82 men. What remained of the 
 artillery force fell back, leaving behind 
 two guns. 
 
 The battle, however, continued to 
 rage with great fury. Seymour almost 
 atoned for the blunder he had commit- 
 ted, by his activity and daring. He 
 was everywhere present, and the bullets 
 of the enemy whistled around him in 
 vain. Hawley's brigade having suffered 
 terribly, the Eighth United States, a 
 negro regiment from Montgomery's bri- 
 gade, was sent to its support. This 
 regiment, which had never before been 
 under fire, behaved with the utmost 
 gallantry. For two houi-s it held an 
 exposed position in front ; and its losses 
 ■ — including its brave commander and 
 amounting in all to 350 men — attested 
 the severity of the fighting. Barton's 
 brigade, composed of the Forty-Eighth, 
 Forty-Ninth, and One Hundred and Fif- 
 teenth New York, was brought up in 
 
 turn. On the part of this brigade 
 nothing was wanting in the matter of 
 bravery ; but it proved of no avail It 
 advanced only to repeat the experience 
 and to share the fate of that which had 
 gone before. For a while the struggle 
 was prolonged. Barton's men, already 
 severely punished, were showing signs 
 of weakness. The Confederates seemed 
 to think that their opportunity had 
 come for a final and crushing charge. 
 Gathering up their strength, and as if 
 resolved to make short, sharp work with 
 their antagonists, they came rolling for- 
 ward in overwhelming numbers and 
 with resistless energy. It was a critica. 
 moment. Montgomery, with his tw« 
 remaining negro regiments, the Fifty- 
 Fourth Massachusetts and the First 
 North Carolina, rushed forward to the 
 rescue, and received the full weight of 
 the Confederate onset. This was the 
 turning point in the fight. The negroes 
 fought with the energy of despair, and 
 although their comrades were fallins' on 
 «very side, they firmly held their ground. 
 Although ultimately overpowered and 
 driven back, it was not untQ Seymour 
 had found time to rally and re-adjust hia 
 lines and get his guns in position. Four 
 vollies of grapeshot from the National 
 batteries compelled the Confederates to 
 halt. It was now about four o'clock. 
 Seymour ordered a retreat. The Con 
 federates attempted to pursue ; but the 
 National guns, handled with skill and 
 fired with great rapidity, made such 
 havoc in their lines that they were com- 
 pelled to desist. Seymour fell back 
 with the wreck of his command to 
 Jacksonville; and finally the whole 
 
8S8 
 
 THE BLOCKADE AND THE PRIVATEERS. 
 
 command returned to Hilton Head. 
 The estimated loss of the Nationals in 
 this campaign was nearly 2,000 men. 
 At Jacksonville, Seymour destroyed 
 stores valued at $1,000,000. The Con- 
 federate loss was under 1000 men. 
 Such was the battle of Olustee, and 
 such was the result of the test applied 
 to the loyal sentiment of Florida. 
 
 From the date of Seymour's unsuc- 
 cessful experiment, Florida no longer 
 commanded attention imtil the close of 
 the war. Early in the year 1864, how- 
 ever, the east coast of North Carolina 
 became the theatre of some important 
 operations. Since 1862, when they 
 werf captured by General Bumside, 
 New Berne, Plymouth, and Washing- 
 ion had been held by National garri- 
 jons. In February 1864, an unsuccess- 
 ful attempt was made by a body of 
 Confederates, under General Pickett, to 
 recapture New Berne. After setting 
 on fire the gun-boat Underwriter, 
 Pickett claimed a victory and retired. 
 It was, however, a barren victory ; for 
 he had left the defenses of New Berne 
 untouched. 
 
 About the middle of April, a more 
 daring as well as more successful effort 
 was made against Plymouth, at the 
 head of Albemarle Sound, and at the 
 mouth of the Roanoke River. The 
 place was well fortified, and was held 
 by General Wessels, with a force of 
 «'.)me 2400 men, consisting of the Eighty- 
 Fifth New York, One Hundred and 
 First and One Hundred and Third 
 Pennsylvania, Sixteenth Connecticut, 
 and 6 companies from other regiments. 
 [n the river, in front of the town, were 
 
 the gun-boats Southfield, Miami, and 
 Bombshell. In the immediate neigh- 
 borhood, and guarding the approaches 
 to the town were four forts — Fort Wai 
 ren, Fort Williams, Fort Wessels, and 
 Fort Comfort. On the 17th of j^^^\ 
 April, General Hoke, with about 17. 
 7000 Confederates, appeai-ed in the 
 vicinity of Plymouth ; and, on the same 
 day, he made an attack on Fort War- 
 ren, which was about a mile above the 
 town. On the morning of the 18th, the 
 attack was resumed with greater energy ; 
 and powerful assistance was rendered 
 by the Confederate ram Albemarle 
 which came down the Roanoke River. 
 The National gun-boat Bombshell came 
 to the aid of the garrison, but ^vas soon 
 disabled and captured. Hoke then fell 
 upon Fort Wessels, a mile nearer the 
 town ; and, although a vigorous resist- 
 ance was offered, the fort was at length 
 captured. Plymouth was now closeh 
 invested. Hoke pressed the siege with 
 great energy ; he brought his batteries 
 closer upon the town; and the Albe- 
 marle, having run past Fort Warren, 
 fell upon the unarmed gun-boats. The 
 Southfield was first struck. The blow 
 was fatal ; for she speedily went down 
 The Miami was next attacked ; and 
 although she managed to escape down 
 the river, it was not until her command- 
 er was killed, and many of her guns 
 were disabled. The Albemarle then 
 turned her guns upon the town, pour 
 ing upon it a perfect storm of shot and 
 shell. On the following day, Hoke, 
 having pushed his batteries within 
 1100 yards of the town, opened upon 
 it a tremendous fire. He then made a 
 
DESTEUCTION Or rmfi ALBEMARLE. 
 
 859 
 
 general assault. Wessels made an ob- 
 atinate defense ; but lie was ultimately 
 compelled to surrender tlie place with 
 1600 prisoners, 25 guns, and 2000 
 small arms. The fall of Plymouth 
 '•endered necessary the evacuation of 
 Washington, a little town at the mouth 
 of the Tar River, some 32 miles north 
 of New Berne. 
 
 Pursuing his victorious career, Hoke 
 then pushed towards New Berne. Ar- 
 rived in front of the place he demanded 
 its surrender, which was refused. He 
 then commenced a siege. Captain 
 Cooke of the Albemarle somewhat 
 over-elated by his success at Plymouth, 
 and feeling confident that a similar 
 success would attend him in the broader 
 waters further down, pushed on again 
 to the assistance of Hoke. He was 
 ignorant of the fate which awaited him. 
 Captain Melancthon, with his blockad- 
 ing squadron, was then guarding the 
 waters of Albemarle Sound. His prin- 
 cipal vessels were the Mattahesset, the 
 Miami, the Wyalusing, the Whitehead, 
 
 May 
 
 and the Sassacus. It was now 
 
 6. the 5th of May. The Albemarle 
 was accompanied by the captured boat 
 Bombshell The Sassacus gave the 
 Bombshell a broadside which compelled 
 her to strike her flag. She then butted 
 the Albemarle, forcing her hull under 
 the water. The Sassacus, however, 
 was severely punished for her temerity, 
 a 100-pound Brooks bolt passing 
 through one of her boilers, Mlling 3 
 men, and wounding 6, and filling the 
 vessel with scalding steam. When the 
 cloud of steam passed away, the Albe- 
 marle was seen moving off in the direc- 
 
 tion of Plymouth, firing as she fled. 
 The Bombshell was left behind. Hoke 
 was compelled to abandon the siege of 
 New Berne. It was a National victoiy. 
 For some months there was quiet in 
 Albemarle Sound, and all along th 
 coast of North Carolina. The conquests 
 made by Bumside, in 1862, had for the 
 most part been recovered by the Con- 
 federates ; but Roanoke Island and New 
 Berne remained in the hands of the 
 Nationals. The Albemarle continued 
 to be a source of annoyance and even 
 terror to the blockading vessels. To- 
 wards the end of October, Lieutenant 
 W. B. Cushing, one of the bravest of 
 the young ofiicers in the naval service, 
 undertook to destroy the monster. It 
 was lying at the time in the harbor of 
 Plymouth, behind a raft of logs, some 
 30 feet in width. A small steam launch, 
 fitted up as a torpedo boat, was placed 
 in Cushing's charge. On the night of 
 the 27th of October, with a crew Oct. 
 of 13 oflicers and men, he moved 27. 
 up the Roanoke, and arrived, before he 
 was perceived by the enemy, within 
 twenty yards of the Albemarle. The 
 torpedo was und6r the ram and explod- 
 ed before the enemy had time to fire a 
 shot. Cushing's own account best tells 
 the story: "The torpedo," he says 
 "was erploded at the same time that 
 the Albemarle's gun was fired. A shot 
 seemed to go crashing through my boat 
 and a dense mass of water rushed in 
 from the torpedo, filling and completely 
 disabling her. The enemy then con- 
 tinued to fire at fifteen feet range, and 
 demanded our surrender, which I twice 
 refused." Cushing escaped into the 
 
800 
 
 THE BLOCKADE AND THE PEIVATEJSaS. 
 
 water, and, in spite of the bullets of the 
 enemy, managed to reach the shore. 
 Most of his crew were captured or 
 drowned- In the morning, he learned 
 that his work had been effectually ac- 
 complished. The Confederate ram was 
 completely destroyed. A few days 
 later, Plymouth was recaptured by 
 CJommodore Macomb, and the National 
 flag was unfurled over the simken 
 Albemarle. 
 
 It has already been stated in this 
 chapter that Wilmington, North Caro- 
 lina, was the one seaport remaining to 
 the Confederacy through which foreign 
 supplies could be obtained. Charleston 
 had not yet fallen; and Mobile was 
 still a stronghold of the Confederates ; 
 but the blockade of both harbors was 
 complete, and there were few who 
 deemed it possible to run the gauntlet 
 of either the one or the other. Of all 
 the Confederate ports WUmington was 
 th*' most difficult to close against the 
 blockade-runners. It was peculiarly 
 and favorably situated, some thirty 
 miles up Cape Fear River. It could not 
 be approached without passing certain 
 formidable works which, at the mouth 
 of the river and on the borders of the 
 sea, the Confederates had erected for 
 purposes of defense There are two 
 channels admitting to Cape Fear River 
 The southwest or main channel is about 
 ^i miles wide, with a depth of from 10 
 to 14 feet of water on the bar. It was 
 protected by Fort Caswell on Oak 
 1 Island, and by the Light-house battery 
 on Smith's Island. The northwest 
 channel, called New Inlet, less than 2 
 miles wide and the water less deep than 
 
 in the other, was protected by Fort 
 Fisher — a first-class casemated earth- 
 work, on the mainland, near Federal 
 Point. The interior of the peninsula 
 which lies between Cape Fear River 
 and the Atlantic Ocean is for the most 
 part sandy and low, in few places rising 
 higher than 15 feet above high tide. 
 To reach Wilmington it was necessary 
 to pass through one or other of these 
 inlets. So long as the Confederates 
 held the works, ingress was easy to a 
 friend, perilous to a foe. 
 
 As early as the beginning of 1864, 
 the government at Washington, had 
 made arrangements for the capture of 
 Wilmington. General Bumside, who 
 was intrusted with the expedition, was 
 collecting troops for the pui-pose, at 
 Annapolis, when he was summoned by 
 General Grant to join the army of the 
 Potomac. Later, in the summer of the 
 same year and simultaneously with th 
 preparations for the attacks on the 
 forts in Mobile Bay, arrangements were 
 made for reducing the works at the 
 mouth of Cape Fear River. With ihis 
 end in view, gun-boats armored and 
 unarmored were assembled in Hampton 
 Roads ; and in October, Admiral Por- 
 ter, charged with the execution of the 
 naval portion of the task, found him- 
 self at the head of a fleet of 50 war 
 vessels, including the New Ironsides 
 and several monitors. The plan which 
 had been first suggested to Bumside by 
 Mr. Kidder, a Boston gentleman, and 
 which had been approved of by the 
 government was again accepted ; and 
 Grant agreed to send the bulk of Sher 
 idan's force to co-operate 'vith Porter 
 
FORT FISHER. 
 
 in the intended movement Sheridan's 
 men, however, it was soon found, could 
 not be spared from the Shenandoah 
 Valley ; and the expedition against 
 Wilmington once more fell through. 
 It was now resolved to make a direct 
 
 ttack on Fort Fisher and its depend- 
 encies. Preparations were hurried for- 
 ward ; and a reconnoissance of Fort 
 Fisher was made, with the help of the 
 blockading squadron, by Generals God- 
 frey Weitzel and Charles K. Graham. 
 Rumors of the projected movement 
 against Wilmington reached the ears of 
 the Confederates. General W. H. C. 
 Whiting, an accomplished and skilful 
 engineer was then in charge of that 
 region. Under his direction, new works 
 were thrown up to strengthen Fort 
 Fisher ; and the garrison was increased. 
 Another delay took place ; and it was 
 not until December that the expedition 
 actually set out. Grant having de- 
 tached 6500 troops from the forces 
 under Butler, placed them under the 
 immediate command of Weitzel. The 
 object of the expedition, as stated in 
 Grant's instructions to Butler, was, 
 first, the closing of the port of Wil- 
 mington, and, second, the capture of 
 that city. It was not intended that 
 Butler should accompany the expedi- 
 tion. 
 
 On the 8th of December, the troops 
 j)gg^ destined to take part in the pro- 
 
 8. posed movement — Ames' division 
 of the Twenty-Fourth corps, and 
 Paine's division of the Twenty-Fifth 
 (colored) corps — left Bermuda Hun- 
 dred in transports. On the foDowing 
 day they were at Fortress Monroe ; and 
 
 401 
 
 Butler notified Porter that his troops 
 were ready to proceed. On the 14th, 
 at noon, when off Cape Henry, Butler 
 joined the transports in his flag-ship, 
 the Ben Deford. The transport fleet 
 then put to sea. Porter's formidable 
 fleet had preceded it by 36 hours. On 
 the evening of the 15th the ti'ansports 
 with the troops on board, arrived at 
 the appointed rendezvous, about 25 
 miles east of Fort Fisher. The weather 
 had been beautiful, since the 13th. 
 For three days more, while the army 
 waited for the navy, the ocean was 
 perfectly calm. It was not until the 
 evening of Sunday, that the fleet made 
 its appearance. Then, however, the 
 weather which had been so propitious 
 had become gloomy and threatening. 
 A strong wind was coming up from 
 the southeast ; and the sea was covered 
 with white-caps. The wind increased 
 in violence until, on the 20th, it blew 
 a perfect hurricane. It was one of 
 those storms which are common on that 
 coast, and which have given its name 
 to Cape Fear. By advice of Porter, the 
 transports returned to Beaufort, some 
 TO miles up the coast. There they 
 foimd shelter and took in coal and 
 water. The storm lasted for 3 days, 
 and was one of the severest experi 
 enced in 30 years. Porter's fleet, while 
 it lasted, rode at anchor. On Dgc, 
 Friday the 23d, Butler, who had 23. 
 accompanied the expedition, and, con 
 trary to Grant's expectation, had taken 
 personal command, sent Captain Clarke, 
 one of his aids, in the anued tug Cham- 
 berlain to inform Porter that the fleet 
 would be at the rendezvous by sunset 
 
■■(52 
 
 THE BLOCKADE AND THE PRIVATEERS. 
 
 next day. Clarke returned to Butler 
 on Saturday at suniise, with the report 
 tliat Porter could not wait the arrival 
 of the troops, and that his purpose was 
 to fire the powder-ship at one o'clock 
 Jiat morning. Butler was indignant, 
 l)ecause he considered the presence of 
 the troops essential to the success of 
 the experiment. The powder-ship was 
 exploded as Porter declared it would 
 be ; but the experiment was fruitless. 
 
 What was the experiment ? It ap- 
 pears that on the first of October 1864, 
 an accidental explosion of 150,000 
 pounds of gunpowder took place at 
 Erith, in England; and such was the 
 force of the concussion that 100 yards 
 of embankment was blown away, and 
 a large number of houses destroyed. 
 Butler taking a hint fi'om this fact, 
 conceived the idea that a similajr ex- 
 plosion in the near neighborhood of 
 Fort Fisher woiild have a similar result. 
 It was his expectation that it would 
 shake down, at least, a portion of the 
 walls and demoralize the garrison. He 
 had grievously miscalculated. The 
 experiment was fairly made. Two hun- 
 dred and fifteen tons of gunpowder 
 were exploded, without any apprecia- 
 ble result. 
 
 Porter, not discouraged by the failure 
 of the gunpowder experiment, resolved 
 to proceed without delay to the attack. 
 The squadron selected for that purpose 
 poDLsisted of 33 vessels, carrying over 
 400 guns, with a reserve of 17 small 
 gun boats, carrying about 100 guns. 
 The first line was composed of the New 
 Ironsides, the Monadnock, Canonicus 
 and Mahopac — all iron- clads. The sec- 
 
 ond line was composed of the heavy in 
 gates Minnesota, Colorado, Wabash and 
 other vessels of similar weight and con 
 struction. There was yet another line 
 in rear of the second ; and two divisions 
 took side positions, to the north and 
 east, and to the south and southeast, so 
 as to be able to direct an enfilading fire 
 on the works. The bombard- J)qc. 
 ment was "magnificent for its 24. 
 power and accuracy." Clouds of dust 
 arose fi'om the fort, and concealed 
 everything from view. It was impossi- 
 ble for the garrison to make any show 
 of resistance. The gunners retired 
 behind their bomb-proofs ; and in less 
 than an hour and a quarter the fort 
 was silenced. For five hours, the 
 bombardment continued ; and at sun- 
 set when Butler arrived in his flag-ship 
 with some of the transports, Porter sig- 
 nalled his fleet to retire for the night. 
 
 Arrangements were made, early on 
 the morning of the 25th, for a joint 
 attack by the troops and the fleet. It 
 was agreed between Porter and Weitzel 
 that, as soon as the transports arrived, 
 the troops should attempt to effect a 
 landing under cover of the fire from 
 the ships, and proceed to take the place 
 by storm. It was an hour past Dqc. 
 noon before the transports were 26. 
 fully forward. The fleet had already 
 for some hours been firing upon the 
 works. Without delay, and by the 
 help of launches, a landing was effected 
 about 3 miles above Fort Fisher. Gen- 
 eral Curtis with about 550 men, wag 
 the first to reach the shore. The Na 
 tional flag was quickly planted on a 
 deserted battery A» soon as it wae 
 
FAILURE OF THE FIEtJT ATTACK. 
 
 863 
 
 Seen, the air was rent by cheers from 
 the men still on board the transports ; 
 and the bands struck up " Yankee 
 Doodle." Curtis pushed along the 
 <jhore, until his skirmish line was within 
 50 yards of Fort Fisher. It was Por- 
 ter's belief that there was " not a rebel 
 within five miles of the fort." Weitzel 
 had a very different opinion. He had 
 landed with Curtis, and advanced to 
 within 800 yards of the work. It 
 would be " butchery " he thought, to 
 make an assault under the cii'cumstances ; 
 and returning to Butler on board the 
 gun-boat Chamberlain, he so reported, 
 Butler after some consideration came 
 to the same conclusion ; and about five 
 o'clock in the afternoon, when about 
 one-half of his troops were landed, he 
 ordered them to re-embark. In the 
 meantime Curtis, still pressing forward, 
 had captured the half-moon battery 
 with 220 men. He had notified Gen- 
 eral Ames of the fact, calling for assist- 
 ance, and declaring his belief that he 
 could take the fort. Ames, ignorant 
 of the order which had been given to 
 re-embark, sent Colonel Bell's brigade 
 to the support of Curtis. It was now 
 after sunset ; and before Curtis could 
 make a further advance, the firing of 
 the fleet ceased, and night closed in 
 upon the scene. As soon as Ames 
 t)ecame aware of the order to withdraw 
 bis troops, he put them on board the 
 launches and retiuned to the transports. 
 The attack on Fort Fisher from which 
 so much was expected, thus resulted in 
 total failure. On the following day, 
 the transports, with the troops on board, 
 left for Hampton Eoads. 
 
 The result of the experiment on Fort 
 Fisher was a source of deep and gen 
 eral disappointment. No one was 
 more disappointed than General Grant 
 himself. He was greatly displeased. 
 It was his opinion, as it was that o 
 Admiral Porter, that the place might 
 have been taken, if the land forces had 
 acted with sufficient detenniuation, and 
 if the advance had been adequately 
 sustained. Several of the officei-s vol- 
 untarily reported to Grant that, ^vheu 
 recalled, they had nearly reached the 
 fort, and that, in their judgment, it 
 could have been taken without much 
 loss. Which was right in this instance, 
 General Weitzel, who landed and in- 
 spected the works, or Admiral Porter, 
 who saw them only from his flag-ship, 
 will possibly always be a divided ques- 
 tion. It does not seem fair, however 
 to blame General Butler for acting o 
 the advice of Weitzel who, according to 
 Porter's own confession, was a thorough 
 soldier and an able engineer, whose busi- 
 ness it was to know more about assault- 
 ing than he did. Whatever may have 
 been the fact, in the circumstances, it 
 was Grant's determination that the fort 
 should be taken and the blockade of 
 Wilmington reduced. While therefore 
 the South was rejoicing over what they 
 claimed to be a \Tictory, the Lieutenant- 
 General was making arrangements for 
 dealing a more effective, and, as it 
 proved to be, a decisive blow. 
 
 For some days after the departure of 
 the transports. Porter, with his 
 fleet, was still off New Inlet, in 
 the neighborhood of Fort Fisher. Here 
 he received instructions from Grant, 
 
8M 
 
 THE BLOCKADE AND THE PKIVATEERS. 
 
 ordering him to remain, and promising 
 to send h\m an effective land force, 
 Ypith a proper leader. It was still liis 
 belief that the fort could be taken. In 
 addition to the troops which had gone 
 back in the transports to Hampton 
 Roads, he sent a brigade of 1500 men, 
 and a small siege train. General Terry 
 was to command. The new expedition 
 Jan. ^^^ Hampton Roads on the 6th 
 6. of January, and on the 8th ren- 
 dezvoused off Beaufort, where Porter 
 was taking in coal, ammunition and 
 other needed supplies. The weather 
 was boisterous ; and it was not until 
 late on the night of the 12th that the 
 combined forces arrived off New Inlet. 
 It had been arranged that the troops 
 should be landed some distance above 
 the fort, and that they should then in- 
 trench across the point to Cape Fear 
 River, so as to prevent reinforcements 
 being sent from Wilmington. The land- 
 ing effected, and the position secured, 
 the assault was to be made simultane- 
 ously by the troops and by the fleet. 
 Fort Fisher, as we have seen already, 
 was a place of wonderful strengtL 
 Admiral Porter, who was at Sebastopol 
 during the siege, pronounced it much 
 stronger than the famous Malakoff. 
 With the immediately connected works, 
 it mounted 75 gims. The armament 
 of the whole works guarding the ap- 
 proaches to Wilmington was about 160 
 guns, among which were some 150- 
 pounder Armstrongs. The attacking 
 squadron carried 500 guns, some of 
 them the largest in the world. It was 
 a concentration of destructive machin- 
 ery unparalleled in the world's history. 
 
 On the morning of the 13th, at an 
 early hour, the landing of the troops 
 commenced. Some 200 boats jg^^ 
 and a large number of steam- tugs 13. 
 were employed in the operation. Th( 
 fleet, divided into 3 columns, covered 
 and protected the boats and the land 
 ing ; and as early as three o'clock in the 
 afternoon 8000 troops were on shorw 
 Each man carried with him 3 days' 
 rations and 40 rounds of ammunition. 
 There was put on shore also an abun- 
 dant supply of intrt^ching tools. Dur- 
 ing the entire process of landing, the 
 fleet was pouring shot and shell into 
 the fort. The bombardment had been 
 teirific. It was calculated that, while 
 it lasted, four shots were fired from the 
 fleet every second, and that during tht 
 course of the day, the ipon-clads alone — 
 the New Ironsides, Sangus, Mahopac 
 and Canonicus — fired upwards of 2000 
 shells. It is not wonderful that undei 
 such a fii-e, the Confederates should 
 have been compelled to take sheltei 
 imder their bomb-proofs. At dark, 
 about an hour after the landing of the 
 troops had been effected, t?»e wooden 
 vessels were drawn off for the night. 
 The iron-clads remained at their an 
 chorage, firing slowly at internals, dur 
 ing the darkness. 
 
 As soon as the troops were landed, 
 they were set to work, throwing up 
 intrenchments ; and as early as eight 
 o'clock on the morning of the 14th, 
 they had constructed a good j^^, 
 breast- work stretching from the 14. 
 river to the sea, and partially cf^s^sred 
 by abatis. During the course of the 
 day, a reconnoissance was made to 
 
SECOND ATIAUK ON FOBT FISHES. 
 
 865 
 
 mthiii 500 yards of the fort The 
 principal result of this reconnoissance 
 was that General Terry, in view of the 
 difficulty of conducting a regular siege 
 on the narrow and exposed peninsula, 
 came to the conclusion that the wiser 
 course would be to make an immediate 
 assault In this Admiral Porter con- 
 curred ; and it was decided that the 
 assault should be made at three o'clock, 
 :)n the afternoon of the 1 6th. Arrange- 
 nents were made for the army to as- 
 sault the western half of the land face, 
 while a co-operating force of sailors and 
 marines should attack the northeast 
 bastion. The troops were kept busy 
 strengthening the line of breast- works, 
 and getting the guns into position as 
 soon as they were landed ; and, all day 
 long and all night through, a slow and 
 deliberate fire was maintained by the 
 fleet Fort Fisher, before the sun went 
 down on the 14th, was badly pounded. 
 Most of the guns were injured ; not a 
 few of them were silenced ; and what 
 with the slow but continuous fire of 
 shot and shell during the night, suffi- 
 cient openings were made to warrant 
 an assault, in the morning. 
 
 On the morning of the 15th, every- 
 lan. thing was ready for the attack. 
 16. The ships were in position ; and 
 the soldiers and marines were prepared 
 to move at the word of command. At 
 eleven o'clock, the fleet opened a fire 
 which was unparalleled in the history 
 of naval warfare. Under its cover 
 1000 sailors and 400 marines, com- 
 manded by Fleet-Captain K K. Breese, 
 were landed on the beach; and by 
 digging rifle-trenches, they worked their 
 
 way to a point within 200 yards of the 
 sea-front of the fort, where they lay 
 awaiting the final signal for attack. 
 The troops selected for the attack were 
 the brigades of Curtis, Pennybacker 
 and Bell, of Ames' Division. Paine' 
 division of colored troops and Abbott's 
 brigade were left in charge of the in- 
 trenchments facing Wilmington. It 
 was now three o'clock. All this time 
 the fleet continued to thunder against 
 the fort, working terrible destruction. 
 At half-past three o'clock the signal 
 was given. All the steam whistles 
 screamed and roared. The ships di- 
 rected their fire to the upper bat- 
 teries. The sailors, led by Captain 
 Breese, eager to win the laurels of the 
 day, rushed forward, with reckless 
 energy, towards the parapet of the fort, 
 already swarming with Confederate 
 soldiers and blazing with the fire of 
 musketry. It was intended that the 
 marines should cover the assaulting par 
 ty ; but for some unknown reason they 
 failed to fire upon the Confederates 
 who exposed themselves on the parapet. 
 It was Porter's opinion that if the 
 marines had made a proper use of their 
 guns, the first assault would have been 
 a complete success. " I saw " he says 
 "how recklessly the rebels exposed 
 themselves, and what an advantage 
 they gave our sharpshooters whose guns 
 were scarcely fired, or fired with no 
 precision." In spite, however, of tli< 
 murderous fire to which they were e.\ 
 posed, the sailors pressed forward, some 
 of them actually reaching the parapet. 
 The advance was swept away like chafl 
 before a mighty rushing wind. Tha 
 
THE BLOCKADE AND THE PRIVATEEES. 
 
 men in the rear seeing the slaughter in 
 front, were seized with a panic and fell 
 back in some confusion. The attack on 
 this part of the fort was a failure, 
 except in so far as it diverted attention 
 "rom the action of the troops. 
 
 Before the signal for assault was 
 given, the soldiers had, under cover of 
 hastily constructed breast-works, ap- 
 proached within a few hundred yards 
 of the fort. At the word of command, 
 they sprang forward and went bounding 
 towards the palisades. These, already 
 much damaged by the fixe from the 
 fleet, soon yielded to the vigorous 
 blows of the axemen. Curtis' brigade, 
 which led the attacking force, pushed 
 on in the face of a severe enfilading 
 fire A lodgment was quickly effected 
 on the west end of the land front. 
 Here a terrible hand-to-hand struggle 
 commenced. The cannoniers rushed 
 to their guns ; and the parapet bristled 
 with bayonets. Curtis, one of the 
 bravest of the brave, was sore beset. 
 He was soon, however, joined by Penny- 
 backer, who took position on his 
 right, and by BeU, who occupied the 
 space between the fort and the river. 
 " Hand-to-hand fighting " says General 
 Terry, " of the most desperate charac- 
 ter ensued, the huge traverses of the 
 land face being used successively by the 
 enemy as breast- works, over the tops of 
 which the contending parties fired in 
 each other's faces." Niae of these 
 traverses were carried one after the 
 other by the National troops. It was 
 now about five o'clock. The battle had 
 lasted a full hour and a half. It be- 
 came apparent that more troops were 
 
 needed to support the assaulting col 
 umn. Terry, therefore, ordered up 
 Abbott's brigade from the line of in- 
 trenchments facing Wilmington. Breeae 
 being, at the same time, ordered to oc 
 cupy that position with his sailors and 
 marines. Paine, also, being ordered tc 
 send down one of his best regiments 
 forwarded the Twenty-Seventh, a negi'c 
 regiment, under Brigadier-Greneral A. 
 M. Blackman. Meanwhile, the combat 
 waxed fiercer and fiercer. There was 
 no lull — no interruption. Amid the 
 ruins of barracks and storehouses, in 
 the deep sand-hollows, and over the 
 bodies of dead and dying comrades, the 
 terrible struggle was prolonged. While 
 this desperate fight was going on, inside 
 the work, the fleet was not idle ; and 
 by means of signals, which were ex- 
 changed with great accuracy, such of 
 the ships as were in position were 
 enabled to pour upon the fort a well- 
 directed and most destructive fire, with 
 out in any way interfering with the 
 action of the troops. Some of the 
 ships, from the moment the action com- 
 menced, continued to sweep the groimd 
 more to the south, so as to make it 
 impossible for any reinforcements to 
 reach the fort from that direction. 
 
 The battle commenced at haK past 
 three o'clock. It was now dusk. Nine 
 of the traverses which had been used 
 as breast-works, one after the other 
 had been carried. It was about this 
 time that Blackman reported to Ames, 
 and that Abbott, with his little band, 
 entered the work. The arrival of these 
 reinforcements gave intensity to the 
 struggle. Blackman's troops, aftei 
 
FORT CASWELL BLOWN UP. 
 
 S61 
 
 having been under the heavy fire for a 
 little while, were withdrawn. It was 
 aow near nine o'clock. The fighting 
 still continued for the possession of the 
 traverses. At length two more of them 
 were canied ; and the Confederates fell 
 back, Abbott pi'essing them with great 
 vigor, and finally diiving them from 
 their last stronghold. The entire work 
 was now in the hands of the Nationals. 
 Some of the gamaon had fled down the 
 Point to Battery Buchanan. Thither 
 they were hotly pursued by Abbott 
 and by Blackman ; and about midnight, 
 Colonel Lamb, the conunandant of the 
 fort, and Major-General Whiting, and 
 such of the garrison as were not in the 
 hands of General Terry, were made 
 prisoners. Hemmed in between the 
 water and their antagonists, they had 
 no choice but to surrender. 
 
 About four o'clock in the afternoon, 
 eneral Hoke approached the line of 
 mtrenchments which had been thrown 
 up across the peninsula, so as to guard 
 against any surprise from the north ; 
 and it seemed for a time as if he meant 
 to make a vigorous attack. Paine was 
 in readiness to receive him. Hoke, 
 however, after a slight sMrmish vnth 
 the National pickets, retired. His de- 
 parture was a relief to General Terry. 
 A vigorous and well-sustained attack 
 m that direction, might have changed 
 the fortunes of the day. 
 
 Such, then, was the great struggle 
 for the possession of Fort Fisher ; and 
 Buch was the result. No more gallant 
 assault was ever made. No more glori- 
 ous resistance was ever oflFered. To 
 both North and South. Fort Fisher 
 
 will ever be a source of common pride 
 On both sides were revealed the intelli- 
 gent purjiose and indomitable spirit of 
 the American soldier. 
 
 The garrison originally numbered 
 over 2300 men, of whom 1971 with 
 112 officers were captured. General 
 Whitney and Colonel Lamb were both 
 severely wounded. The National loss 
 in killed, woimded and missing was 
 about 690. Ames' brigade command- 
 ers, Curtis, Pennybacker and Bell, were 
 each of them woimded, the two former 
 severely, Bell mortally. On the part 
 of the fleet, there was a loss of about 
 250 or 300 men ; and two 15-inch guns 
 were exploded on board the monitors. 
 On the morning of the 16th a fearful 
 accident occurred. From some un- 
 knovra cause, the principal maga- j^n, 
 zine of the fort exploded, scatter- 16. 
 ing death and ruin all around. Some 
 200 men were killed; and about 100 
 were wounded. 
 
 On the 16th and 17th the Confeder- 
 ates blew up Fort Caswell on the right 
 bank of the river. They abandoned 
 also Battery Holmes, on Smith's Island, 
 together with all the works at Smith»- 
 ville and Reeve's Point. The Nationals 
 were thus left in entire and absolute 
 control of all the works which com- 
 manded the mouth of Cape Fear River. 
 Li the different works were found 169 
 pieces of artUlery, most of them of 
 heavy calibre and some of them of the 
 best English make ; over 2000 stand o 
 small arms, with stores and ammunition 
 in large quantities. The blockade of 
 Wilmington was thus effectually se 
 cured ; and Wilmington itself was uyw 
 
868 
 
 THE BLOCKADE AND THE PBIVATEEB» 
 
 to command the attention of General 
 Terry and Admiral Porter. 
 
 Some weeks were allowed to elapse 
 before active operations were resumed, 
 In the direction of Wilmington. It 
 was not deemed advisable to make an 
 dvance, until the land troops were 
 considerably reinforced. It was known 
 that Hoke, with a strong force of Con- 
 federates, was occupying an intrenched 
 line which extended across the penin- 
 9ida, from the sea, at Masonboro Inlet 
 to Sugar Loaf Battery, on the east 
 bank of Cape Fear River, and almost 
 to Fort Anderson, a strong work which 
 stood on the west bank of the river. 
 General Terry having supplied the 
 requisite niimber of men to guard the 
 different works, strengthened his line 
 of intrenchments, which, as we have 
 een, extended across the peninsula, 
 ome two or three miles to the north of 
 Fort Fisher. Meanwhile, Admiral Por- 
 ter had pushed some of his lighter 
 vessels through New Inlet into Cape 
 Fear River ; and Cushing, in obedience 
 to the orders of the Admiral, had 
 raised the National flag over Fort Cas- 
 well, and the works at SmithsviUe. 
 
 General Grant had not been unmind- 
 ful of the 'afficulties, aa \^ ell as oppor- 
 tnnities, «vhich might follow upon the 
 capture of Fort Fisher. Occupied as 
 he was, with the work immediately 
 before Petersburg and Jiichmond, his 
 mental eye continued io survey the 
 whole vast field of -war operations. 
 Sherman was already, with the consent 
 of the Lieutenant-Generjil, .making pre- 
 parations for his return march through 
 the CaroHnas. Thomas' success had 
 
 been such that he was left almost 
 without a rival in Tennessee. He had 
 about him more men than he could use , 
 and he had already ordered Schofield 
 with the Twenty-Third corps, to go 
 into winter-quarters at Eastport, Missis 
 sippi. Grant, however, had work foi 
 Schofield and his men. It was his 
 determination to hasten matters to a 
 close; and with this end in view, he 
 had resolved to concentrate the armies 
 of the republic. When about to carry 
 out the orders of Thomas and retire to 
 Eastport, Schofield received instruc- 
 tions, from Grant, to proceed to the coast 
 of North Carolina. The instructions of 
 the Lieutenant-General were promptly 
 obeyed. Proceeding by steamers down 
 the Tennessee and up the Ohio to Cin- 
 cinnati, and thence by rail, he reached 
 Washington and Alexandria on the 
 23d of January. His troops were again 
 embarked ; and on the 9th of feh. 
 February, Schofield, with Cox's 9. 
 division arrived at Fort Fisher. The 
 remainder of the troops followed, some 
 of them going to New Berne. After 
 the capture of Fort Fisher, Butler had 
 been superseded by Ord, in the com- 
 mand of the Department of Virginia 
 and North Carolina. A separate De- 
 partment was now made of North 
 Carolina, and intrusted to Schofield. 
 Schofield, however, was to act under 
 orders from General Sherman and to 
 co-operate vrith him. Sherman was 
 expected to be in the neighborhood of 
 Goldsboro, between the 2 2d and the 
 28th of February ; and Schofield, march 
 ing from Wilmington or New Berne 
 was to join him at that place. There 
 
MOVEMENT AGAINST MOBILE. 
 
 869 
 
 were now in the immediate neighbor- 
 hood of Fort Fisher some 20,000 men. 
 
 No time was now lost in moving 
 towards Wilmington. Two days after 
 the arrival of Schofield, Terry advanced 
 against Hoke. Driving in the pickets, 
 he threw up a fresh line of intrench- 
 ments close to those of his antagonist. 
 An unsuccessful attempt was made to 
 turn Hoke's left. The attempt to turn 
 his right was more successful ; and 
 Fort Anderson was speedily enveloped 
 by the divisions of Ames and Cox. It 
 Pgl,^ was the 18th of February. On 
 18. the same evening, the garrison, 
 convinced of their danger, abandoned 
 the fort, taking with them 6 guns and 
 some valuable property, but leaving 
 behind them 10 heavy guns and a large 
 q^uantity of ammunition. The work 
 was occupied next morning ; and over 
 t waved the National flag. After the 
 mpture of Fort Anderson, Ames crossed 
 to the east side of Cape Fear River to 
 assist Terry. Hoke abandoned his in- 
 trenchmeuts and fell back towards 
 Wilmington. The National troops 
 pressed forward on both sides of the 
 river. Fort Strong and Fort St. Philip 
 were successively deserted by the Con- 
 federates. On the 21st, Cox was on 
 Eagle Island and flinging shells into 
 Wilmington. Feeling his situation to 
 be desperate, Hoke ordered a general 
 destruction of property. Several steam- 
 ships, including the Chickamauga and 
 Tallahassee were destroyed by fire, 
 Feb. together with large quantities of 
 22. military and naval stores. On 
 the morning of the 2 2d, it was discovered 
 that the Confederates had abandoned 
 
 the town ; and Schofield and his vie 
 torious troops entered unopposed. The 
 fall of WUmington was a serious blow 
 to the Confederate cause. It had long 
 been a fruitful source of supplies ; and 
 it could ill be dispensed with. Lee, i 
 was known, had manifested mucL 
 anxiety regarding Wilmington ; and 
 after the capture of Fort Bisher, there 
 was found in the work a letter, in 
 which he informed the officer command 
 ing that if WUmington should be taken, 
 Richmond could not much longer hold 
 out. Grant's plans were working ad- 
 mirably ; and the end, day after day 
 was more visibly drawing nigL 
 
 In a separate chapter, we have 
 al?eady given a detailed account of the 
 operations in Mobile Bay — operations 
 which, in August, 1864, resulted in the 
 capture of the forts which commanded 
 the entrance. In the upper portions 
 of the bay, the waters are shallow. It 
 was found impossible, in consequence, 
 to move the fleet sufficiently near the 
 town to make bombardment possible ; 
 and as the land force was too small to 
 attack without the aid of the fleet, 
 operations were suspended until the 
 spring of 1865. 
 
 Mobile, however, still conmianded 
 Grant's attention ; and when Sherman 
 had completed his triumphal march 
 through Georgia to the sea, and Thomas 
 had cut to pieces Hood's army in Mid 
 die Tennessee, fresh arrangements were 
 made for the reduction of this Confed- 
 erate stronghold. The conduct of the 
 movement against Mobile was intrusted 
 to General Canby, then commanding 
 the West Mississippi army with head- 
 
 soy 
 
870 
 
 THE BLOCKADE AND THE PRIVATEERS. 
 
 quarters at New Orleans. A co-opera- 
 tive movement was placed in charge of 
 the famous cavalry leader, General J. H. 
 Wilson, who was to act under or- 
 ders from General Thomas. Admiral 
 Thatcher, then in command of the West 
 Gulf S<juadron, was also ordered to 
 proceed to New Orleans and confer 
 with General Canby. It was believed 
 that by using vessels of light draught, 
 the fleet would be able to co-operate 
 with the army. Canby proceeded at 
 once to collect his forces ; and he soon 
 had around him, or acting under his 
 orders, and towards a common end, an 
 army of about 45,000 men. It consisted 
 of Granger's newly organized corps, the 
 Thirteenth, 13,200 strong; A, J. Smith's 
 corps, the Sixteenth, 16,000 strong ; 
 Steele's column, which came up from 
 Pensacola, 13,200 strong ; with artillery, 
 cavalry and engineers to the number of 
 3000. The Confederate forces in the 
 Department, were under the command 
 of General Richard Taylor, who was at 
 Meridian, General D. H. Maury, with 
 9000 men was immediately in charge 
 of Mobile, and its defenses. 
 
 About the middle of March, every- 
 thing was in readiness for the forward 
 movement. Wilson, who as we have 
 seen, was to co-operate with his cavalry, 
 was also ready to swoop from the north, 
 down through Alabama. During the 
 course of the three years of the war, 
 Mobile had been made a place of great 
 strength. On the western side particu- 
 larly, it was considered impregnable. 
 A direct attack on that side was deemed 
 too hazardous. It was, therefore, de- 
 tiMTnined to make a flank movement, 
 
 up the eastern shore, and, in concert 
 with the fleet, which Thatcher had con 
 trived to bring up, to seize the fortificar 
 tions on the islands and the mainland 
 at the head of the bay. On the j[^j. 
 24th of March, the Thirteenth 24. 
 corps, having mai'ched along the penin 
 sula from Fort Morgan, reached Dan 
 ley's, on Fish River. The Sixteenth 
 corps which had crossed the bay in 
 transports, and had landed under cover 
 of the fleet, was already at the appoint- 
 ed rendezvoiia On the 25th, the Thir- 
 teenth and Sixteenth corps advanced 
 from Fish River, up the east side of the 
 bay, along the Belle Rose and Blakely 
 Roads. The roads were strewn with 
 tor].')edoes, some of which exploded, 
 killing men and horses. On the 26th, 
 having encountered only a few skir 
 mishera by the way, the National ad 
 vance was in the neighborhood of Span 
 ish Fort, some 7 miles east from Mobile 
 The reduction of this fort was deemed 
 a preliminary necessity ; and, on the 
 following day, it was completely in 
 vested on the land side, Smith being on 
 the right, and Granger on the left. 
 This fort was of great strength, the 
 works extending about two miles. It 
 was garrisoned by nearly 3000 men, 
 under General R. Gibson. 
 
 The siege of Spanish Fort lasted for 
 two weeks On the 27th, as the day 
 advanced, and all during the night, the 
 firing was on a scale of unusual mag 
 nificence. Besiegers and besieged viec 
 with each other, the bombardment and 
 the response being equally terrific; an (a 
 spectacle unique in its character, as 
 grand and imposing as it was fitted to 
 
BLAKBLT. 
 
 871 
 
 alarm, was fumislied to the citizens of 
 Mobila Canby, day after day, drew 
 his lines closer and closer, the fire tell- 
 ing more and more effectually on the 
 works. Excellent work was done 
 by the vessels of the fleet. They 
 not only neutralized the vessels of the 
 enemy, but succeeded, from time to 
 time, in throwing 100-pound shells into 
 
 April *^^ ^°^- ^^ *^^ ^^^ ^^ April 
 8. an assault was made by Colonel 
 Bell's Eighth Iowa regiment, of Gedde's 
 brigade of Carr's division. The garri- 
 son was composed mainly of Texans, 
 who fought with tremendous energy. 
 The Texans received the advancing 
 column with a tremendous musketry 
 fire. Bell, however, pushed his men 
 forward in greater force, cheering them 
 by his words and sustaining them by 
 his example. The Iowa men charged 
 over the works in the most gallant 
 manner ; and after a desperate hand-to- 
 hand struggle, they foimd themselves 
 in possession of about 300 yards of the 
 intrenchments, with several colors, and 
 about 360 prisoners. Gibson, convinced 
 that the position was no longer tenable, 
 proceeded to withdraw his troops. 
 About midnight, the firing from the 
 fort ceased ; and, shortly after two 
 o'clock on the morning of the 9th, Ber- 
 tram's brigade entered and took posses- 
 sion of the place, without encoimtering 
 any opposition. The immediate fruits 
 of victory were 600 prisoners, the en- 
 tire works, with 30 heavy guns, and 
 military stores in abundance. 
 
 C)n the night of the 11th, Forts Hu- 
 gei and Tracy, which commanded the 
 mouth of the Blakely River, were also 
 
 abandoned ; and the key tr> Mobile was 
 now in the hands of the Nationals 
 The fleet moved up the Tensas ±nrU 
 River towards Mobile, picking ll. 
 up, as it advanced, some 35 tor 
 pedoes, and coming to anchor within 
 shelling distance of the city. In cross- 
 ing Blakely Bar, two of the vessels 
 were sunk. The army moved along the 
 east bank of the river towards Blakely, 
 where the Confederates had constructed 
 a strong line of works, about three 
 miles in length, both extremities resting 
 on high ground, and extending to the 
 river. These works comprised nine 
 redoubts, or lunettes, and were armed 
 with forty guns. The garrison, which 
 was under the command of General St. 
 John Lidell, was composed of veterans 
 from Hood's army, and was about 3500 
 strong. Lidell had for his immediate 
 subordinates, Generals Thomas and 
 CockerelL 
 
 Blakely had been closely invested bj 
 Hawkins' negroes since their arrival from 
 Pensacola. On the afternoon of Sunday, 
 the 9th of April, Canby arrived at ji^prf] 
 Blakely with the troops, which had 9. 
 been engaged in the capture of Spanish 
 Fort. Immediately after his an-ival, he 
 decided upon an assault. It was, he 
 knew, a perilous undertaking ; but much 
 precious time would necessarily be 
 wasted in a siege. He resolved to run 
 the risk. The ground to be traversed 
 was covered with chevaucc-de-fi-ise, abat/i 
 and torpedoes ; in the immediate ti-on 
 of the works was a broad, deep ditch 
 and forty gims, with their angry mouths, 
 threatened every avenue of approa^ih. 
 Canby drew up his divisions in line of 
 
87a 
 
 THE BLOCKADE AND THE PRIVATEEKS. 
 
 battle. Hawkins, with his negroes, was 
 on the right ; Veatch and Andrews of 
 the Thirteenth corps, were in the centre ; 
 and Garrard's division of the Sixteenth 
 corps was on the left. The remainder 
 of the Sixteenth corps was held in 
 reserve. Half past five o'clock was the 
 hour fixed for the assault. The ap- 
 pointed moment had all but arrived ; 
 and the men were waiting impatiently 
 for the signal. The sky was overspread 
 with gloom ; and low growling sounds 
 of distant thunder came rolling from 
 the west. These sounds were soon 
 rendered inaudible by the nearer and 
 more alarming thunders of rival artil- 
 lery. WhUe the National guns thun- 
 dered over the intervening space, the 
 advance was made almost simultaneous- 
 ly, along the whole line. Never did 
 troops behave more nobly. Never was 
 attack made in cii'cumstances of greater 
 difficulty. It was a rush into the very 
 jaws of death. Torpedoes were ex- 
 ploding, at every step ; the abatis and 
 other obstructions made progress next 
 to impossible ; while the terrific fire 
 from the enemy's guns, swift and uner- 
 ring, ploughed long lanes in the advanc- 
 ing columns. Nothing daunted, how- 
 ever, the brave fellows pressed forward. 
 Here, as at Port Hudson, the negro 
 troops were on the right ; and here, as 
 there, they rivalled their white compan- 
 lons-in-arms, by feats of valor. They 
 were the first to advance — the first en- 
 gaged in deadly conflict with the enemy. 
 Garrard, on the left, when the signal 
 was given pushed forward only a por- 
 tion of his men, his object being to 
 discover a suitable avenue to advance in 
 
 force. No such avenue being discovered 
 he gave the word " Forward ; " and his 
 brave fellows, heedless of the withering 
 fire from the Confederate breastworks, 
 went bounding forward. The centre 
 also was quickly at work. From the 
 extreme right to the extreme left, the 
 whole line, extending about three miles, 
 was engaged in the assault. At all 
 points the experience was very much 
 the same. The great difficulty was 
 to reach the works. For more than 
 half an hour, the entire Hne, struggling 
 with the obstacles which lay in the way, 
 and thrown into disorder from time to 
 time by exploding torpedoes, was ex- 
 posed to the g\ms of the enem}'. At 
 length, as the day was waning, victory 
 dawned on the National left Garrard's 
 men, cheered by the example of their 
 chief, had worked their way through the 
 obstructions. Harris' brigade swept 
 over the ditch, and clambered up the 
 face of the works ; while those of Gil- 
 bert and Rinaker, having turned the 
 right of the fort, rushed in, and cap- 
 tured General Thomas, with 1000 of his 
 men. The struggle was more protract- 
 ed, in the centre and on the left. Veatch 
 and Andrews met with a most stubborn 
 resistance, and suffered terriblv from the 
 enemy's fire, as weU as from the ex- 
 ploding torpedoes. The presence of 
 the negroes seemed to rouse the wrath 
 of the Confederates ; and the struggle 
 on the left raged, for a time, with 
 tremendous fury. At length the cry 
 was raised "Remember Fort Pillow. " 
 "Remember Fort Pillow" rang along 
 the line. The words were electric ; 
 and Hawkins' dusky brigades, as if 
 
WILSON'S GREAT KAID. 
 
 873 
 
 yielding to a new and overwhelming 
 impulse, and filled with superhuman 
 energy, with wild cries, went rushing 
 over the embankments, and swept the 
 enemy before them, like chaff before 
 he wind. The battle of Blakely was 
 nded. It was only one hour and a half 
 since the Nationals advanced to the 
 assault; and already they were in pos- 
 session of all the works, with 40 pieces 
 of artillery, 4000 small arms, 16 battle 
 flags, and a large quantity of ammuni- 
 tion. They had captured over 3000 
 men, with several officers of high rank, 
 including Generals Lidell, Cockerell 
 and Thomas. The Confederate loss was 
 estimated at 500 in killed and wound- 
 ed. The National loss was much 
 more severe — probably not much under 
 1000. 
 
 With the fall of Fort Blakely per- 
 ished the last hopes of the Confederates 
 in Mobile. On the 11th, Maury retired 
 from the place, and, with 9000 men in 
 gun-boats and transports made his way 
 up the Alabama River. Before his 
 departure, he caused to be sunk the two 
 powerful rams, Huntsville and Tusca- 
 Aprll loosa. On the evening of the 
 12. 12th the place was suiTendered 
 On the following day, Veatch's division 
 entered the town; and the National 
 banner was hoisted on the public build- 
 ings. Thtis ended another successful 
 campaign. 
 
 The story of the capture of Mobile 
 would be incomplete without a brief 
 reference to the co-operative movement 
 which was conducted under the imme- 
 diate direction of General Wilson. 
 After the expulsion of Hood from East 
 
 Tennessee, Thomas, as has been stated 
 already, had a large unemployed force 
 on hand. We have already seen what 
 use was made of Schofield and his com 
 mand. It remains for us to follow 
 Wilson on his famous cavalry raid 
 through Alabama. Wilson had been, 
 for a brief space, with the cavalry of 
 the Military Division of the Mississippi, 
 on the north side of the Tennessee 
 River, in Lauderdale County, Alabama. 
 On the 23d of February, he was visited 
 by General Thomas who gave him in- 
 structions regarding the intended move 
 ment. It was designed to be co-opera- 
 tive with that of Canby; and it was 
 expected that while he would be giving 
 the Confederates sufficient occupation, 
 and 80 preventing them from sending 
 reinforcements against Canby, he 
 would be able to destroy Selma, Tusca 
 loosa, and the other great iron centres of 
 the State. The cavalry were in excel 
 lent condition ; and the necessary ar 
 rangements being quickly completed, 
 they set out on the 2 2d of March, ^(lt. 
 The entire force under Wilson, 22. 
 numbered about 13,000, all mounted 
 except some 1500 who were detached 
 to guard the numerous supply and 
 baggage trains. The troops were ar- 
 ranged in three divisions, and were 
 commanded respectively by Long, Up- 
 ton, and McCook. They were accom 
 panied by 6 batteries. There were 250 
 wagon trains, together with a light pon 
 toon train of 30 boats, borne by some 
 56 mule wagons. Each trooper cairied 
 with him five days' rations, 24 pounds 
 of grain, an extra pair of horse-shoes, 
 and 100 rounds of ammunition. The 
 
874 
 
 THE BLOCKADE AND THE PBIVATEERS. 
 
 expedition, it was expected, would not 
 last over 60 days. As but little opposi- 
 tion was encountered, it is unnecessary 
 to dwell minutely on the details of this 
 raid- Wilson was at Elyton on the 
 30th. Thence he despatched Croxton's 
 brigade, of McCook's division, to Tusca- 
 loosa, with instructions to destroy the 
 foundries and factories, and other 
 pubKc property. Wilson, himself push- 
 ed forward to Montevallo, which he 
 reached on the afternoon of the 31st. 
 There, he destroyed a large niunber of 
 ironworks, rolling-mills and collieries. 
 There, too, he encountered and defeated 
 a body of Confederate cavalry, captm*- 
 ing 3 guns and several hundred prison- 
 ers. At Ebenezer Church, near Boyle's 
 Creek, he was confronted by Forrest, 
 with 5000 men. Forrest was routed 
 and driven in confusion towards Selma, 
 leaving behind him 2 gims and 200 
 April prisoners. At f cm- o'clock, in the 
 2. afternoon of April 2d, Wilson's 
 troopers were in sight of Selma. Prep- 
 arations were made for an immediate 
 assault The place was well fortified ; 
 and Forrest was there at the head of 
 7000 men. Forrest had manifested an 
 unwillingness to attempt a defense 
 with so small a force ; but Taylor, who 
 made good his own escape, ordered him 
 to hold it at all hazards. The attack 
 was made without any delay. It was 
 made at two separate points, and with 
 tremendous energy, Long and Upton 
 Doth distinguishing themselves by their 
 bravery. It was not yet dark when 
 the Confederates were fleeing from the 
 place in wild confusion. Fori-est, 
 Roddy and Armstrong contrived to 
 
 escape by the Bumsville road. Selma 
 with 32 guns, 2700 prisoners, of whom 
 150 were officers, was now in the hands 
 of the Nationals. Twenty-five thous- 
 and bales of cotton were found blazing. 
 Wilson fired 10,000 more, together with 
 the foundries, arsenals, machine-shops 
 and other public property. 
 
 On the 12th of April, WUson was a1 
 Montgomery, the original seat Aprii 
 of the Confederate government. 12. 
 The place had been in chai'ge of Wirt 
 Adams. Adams, however, had already 
 fled, having set on fire before he left, 
 some 90,000 bales of cotton. Mont- 
 gomery was formally surrendered by 
 the city authorities. Wilson remained 
 in the place two days, during which he 
 destroyed 5 steamboats, several locomo 
 tives, one armory, and several foundries, 
 and then entered Georgia, On the 16th. 
 he captured Columbus, taking 52 guns 
 and 1200 prisoners. He caused to bo 
 destroyed a large quantity of property — 
 about 115,000 bales of cotton, 200 cars, 
 15 locomotives, with the navy yard, 
 arsenal, and factories of various kinds, 
 and a vast quantity of stores. Among 
 the property destroyed was the Con- 
 federate ram Jackson, which mounted 
 six 7-inch guns. On the 2l8t, WUson, 
 pushing on, had reached Macon, which 
 was surrendered under protest. Here 
 he heard for the first time of the arm- 
 istice between Sherman and Johnston. 
 Here also he was joined by Croxton, 
 who, it will be remembered was sent 
 to Tuscaloosa. He captured that plac 
 on the 3d of April, and proceeded 
 thence through Jasper, Talladega and 
 Newman, thus completing a march of 
 
THE SUMTEH. 
 
 87B 
 
 fiftO miles in 30 days. During this raid, 
 which was in the last degree disastrous 
 to the Confederate cause, Wilson cap- 
 tured 5 fortified cities, 288 pieces of 
 ai-tillery, 23 stand of colors and 6820 
 
 )risoner8. The property he destroyed 
 j?as enormous. His own loss did not 
 
 iiuch exccied 700, of whom 90 were 
 killed. 
 
 From an early period, in the history 
 of the war, the North suffered severely, 
 while the South equally benefitted, by 
 the blockade-i-unners, and also by priv- 
 ateers on the high seas. By closing the 
 ports of Charleston, WUmington and 
 Mobile, the business of the blockade- 
 runners was effectually ended. To- 
 wards the end of 1864, the privateers 
 had been for the most part swept from 
 the seas ; but it was not until after the 
 fall of the Confederacy, that the depre- 
 dations of these vessels wholly ceased. 
 A brief account of the origin, doings, 
 and fate of what were caUed the Con- 
 federate cruisers, will, it is thought, 
 form a not inapt conclusion to the 
 present chapter. 
 
 Scarcely had the war broken out, 
 when certain vessels specially built or 
 reconstructed for the purpose, heavUy 
 armed and floating the Confederate 
 flag, began to prey on the commerce of 
 the North. One of the first of these 
 vessels was the Savannah, a schooner 
 of 50 tons, and carrying an 18-poimd 
 swivel Early in June, 1861, she suc- 
 ceeded in eluding the blockading- 
 stpiadron off Charleston, and captured 
 a Maine brig, laden with sugar and 
 bound for Philadelphia. Soon after- 
 
 ivards, however she came in the way 
 
 of the United States brig-of-war Perry 
 and was obliged to surrender. Another 
 of these vessels was the Petrel. She, 
 too, successfully ran through the block- 
 ade of Charleston, and was about to 
 commence her work of destruction 
 when she was pursued, and blown to 
 pieces by the United States frigate, 
 St. Lawrence. The Juda, another 
 privateer, was burned on the 14th of 
 September, 1861, in the harbor of Pen- 
 sacola. The Nashville was another of 
 the vessels of the privateer class. She 
 destroyed a valuable merchant ship 
 called the Harvey Birch, near the 
 English coast. She then proceeded to 
 Southampton ; but the Tuscarora being 
 there, she returned, and escaping from 
 the National ship, made her way back 
 safely to Southern watei-s. The Nash 
 ville, as has been narrated elsewhere, 
 was finally destroyed on the 22d of 
 Febi-uary, 1863, on the Ogeechee River 
 near Fort McAllister. Of all the orig 
 inal privateers, the most destructive 
 was the Sumter. During her brief 
 career, under the guidance of Captain 
 Semmes, she played terrible havoc 
 among American 'merchant ships She 
 was finally forced to take refuge in the 
 waters of Gibraltar, where she wae 
 blockaded by the Tuscarora. Finding 
 that he was not likely ever to be able 
 to take his vessel out, Semmes sold the 
 Sumter, and, afterwards, with hie 
 officers, proceeded to Liverpool, wherf 
 he awaited the completion of the 
 Alabama. 
 
 The privateers of a later date were 
 of a more formidable character. They 
 were constructed, for the moat part, in 
 
876 
 
 THE BLOCKADE AND THE PBIVATEERS. 
 
 British ship-yards. The first of these 
 vessels was the Oreto, built at Birken- 
 head. She was finished in the fall of 
 1862, and immediately left England, 
 flying the British colors, for Nassau, 
 New Providence. Thence, her colors 
 unchanged, she sailed for Mobile, 
 which in spite of the blockade, she 
 reached on the 4th of September. 
 About the end of December, she moved 
 out from Mobile, ran the blockade, and 
 commenced her work of destimction. 
 She was now named the Florida, and 
 was fully armed. In the space of three 
 months, during which she remained 
 mostly in American waters, now cruis- 
 ing among the West India Islands, and 
 now sweeping along the coasts of the 
 United States, she captured 15 vessels, 
 2 of which were afterwards converted 
 into cruisers, the rest destroyed. In 
 August 1863, she crossed the Atlantic, 
 reaching Brest on the 4th of September. 
 At Brest she was for a brief period 
 forcibly detained. Set at liberty, she 
 again crossed the Atlantic ; and, run- 
 ning along the coast of Brazil, she de- 
 stroyed the bark Mandamon, off the 
 port of Bahia, and then ran into that 
 harbor. There, contrary to law, she 
 was captured by the U. S. steamer, 
 Wachusett, and conveyed to Hampton 
 Roads, where not long afterwards, she 
 was sunk. The Florida was first com- 
 nanded by Maffit, later by Morris. 
 
 Besides the Florida and the Alabama, 
 of which latter we shall have something 
 to say presently, there were other ves- 
 sels, most of them British-built, all of 
 them powerful, and every one of them 
 dwitruc'^ve, according to opportunity 
 
 The Tallahassee, in a cruise of ten dayp 
 destroyed 33 vessels. The Chicka 
 mauga, during her career, destroyed 
 property at sea, to the amount of 
 $500,000. Those vessels were x'Jti- 
 mately compelled to take shelter in the 
 inland waters at Wilmington, where 
 as has been mentioned in a previous 
 chapter, they were both destroyed by 
 the Confederates. The Georgia, orig- 
 inally called the Japan, and built at 
 Glasgow, was, after she had accom- 
 plished a vast amount of destruction, 
 captured by the National fiigate, Niag 
 ara, about 20 miles off Lisbon. The 
 Olustee, a powerful vessel of 1100 tons, 
 schooner-rigged, with two propellers, 
 appeared in 1864, and, in November of 
 that year, captured many vessels bound 
 for New York. The Shenandoah, built 
 at Glasgow, under the name of the Sea 
 Kang, in 1863, was purchased by the 
 Confederates in 1864, and taken to 
 Madeira, where she took in her arijus, 
 stores and crew. Thence she sailed for 
 Australia, and the North Pacific. Dur- 
 ing her marauding career, which lasted 
 for some time after the war was over 
 she destroyed some 25 ships. She was 
 eventually taken back to Europe, and 
 surrendered to the British government 
 Another of those vessels, named the 
 Stonewall, was built in France for the 
 Danish government. She became Con 
 federate property by right of purchabe 
 At the close of the war, she was sur 
 rendered to the Spanish oflScials a 
 Havana, and given up by them to the 
 United States. 
 
 The great naval event on the high 
 seas, dming the course of the war wae 
 
THE ALABAMA AND THE KEAKSAKGE. 
 
 877 
 
 fclie fight between the Alabama and the 
 Kearsarge. The Alabama was built 
 at Birkenhead, by Laird, and was first 
 named the " 290." When completed 
 in July, 1862, she was taken to Ter- 
 ceira, one of the Western Islands, under 
 the command of a British captain. 
 There she was joined by another Brit- 
 ish vessel from which she received her 
 armament. On the day following, the 
 British screw steamer Bahama arrived, 
 bringing with her Captain Semmes and 
 the other officers, formerly of the Sum- 
 ter, and 20 more of her crew. On 
 Sunday, August 26th, she steamed out 
 of port. When out in the open sea. 
 Captain Semmes appeared on deck, in 
 full uniform, mustered the crew, read 
 his commission, as post-captain, in the 
 Confederate navy, and announced that 
 the " 290 " was henceforth to be known 
 as the Confederate sloop-of-war, Ala- 
 bama. The British flag was hauled 
 down ; and the Confederate ensign and 
 pennant were hoisted and saluted. On 
 the 29th of August, she went forth on 
 her mission, which was to " sink, bum, 
 and destroy everything which flew the 
 ensign of the so-called United States of 
 America." For well nigh two years, 
 she continued faithful in the perform- 
 ance of this terrible work. By the end 
 of October, she had made 27 prizea 
 Most of the vessels attacked, being 
 unarmed, fell an easy prey. In Janu- 
 ary, 1863, she encountered the Hat- 
 teras, one of the blockading ships off 
 Galveston. The Hatteras was lightly 
 armed ; and in one-quarter of an hour, 
 she went down imder the heaAry fire of 
 her antagonist. After cruising for a 
 
 time in the West Indies, and then along 
 the coast of BrazU, Semmes crossed the 
 Atlantic to Cape Town, where he re- 
 mained for some time. Thence he pro 
 ceeded to the Malay Archipelago, which 
 he reached in November ; and after an 
 unproductive cruise of three months 
 he returned homewards. On the 11th 
 of Jime, 1864, he went into the French 
 harbor of Cherbourg. In her pro- 
 tracted wanderings, the Alabama had 
 captured 47 vessels, of which 45 were 
 destroyed. 
 
 At that time the U. S. steamer 
 Kearsarge, Captain John A. Winslow, 
 was lying in the Dutch port of Flush- 
 ing. Of the presence of the 
 Alabama at Cherboui'g, Winslow 
 was immediately made aware, thi-ough 
 the American Consul at that port. On 
 the 14th, the Kearsarge appeared off 
 Cherbourg. On the day following, 
 Winslow received a note from Semmes, 
 in which the latter requested j^^g 
 him not to depart, as it was his 16. 
 intention to take the opportunity offer ■ 
 ed for testing the merits of the two 
 ships. Winslow, perfectly willing to 
 oblige, remained. In proportion and 
 armaments, the vessels were about 
 equal. The Alabama was about 220 
 feet, and 1150 tons; she carried one 
 7-inch Blakely rifle, one 8-inch smooth 
 bore 68-pounder, and six 32-pounders. 
 The Kearsarge was 214i feet long, and 
 1030 tons; and carried two llinc 
 Dahlgren guns, one 30-pounder nfle 
 and four 32-pounders. The Alabam 
 had about 140 officers and men. Th 
 Keai-sarge had 22 officers and 14C men. 
 Winslow. for the sake of pro*<H;tfo-s 
 
878 
 
 THE BLOCKADE AND THE PlilVAiEEKS. 
 
 hung his anchor cable over the midship 
 section of his vessel on either side ; 
 and in order to make the addition less 
 unsightly, he caused the chains to be 
 boxed over with inch deal boards, 
 rhe same experiment had been made by 
 Farragut, when moving up the Missis- 
 ippi, in 1862. 
 
 On Sunday morning, the 19th of 
 joQg June, about twenty minutes past 
 19. ten, the Alabama was seen steam- 
 ing out of Cherbourg, accompanied by 
 the Frrnch iron-clad Courronne, and fol- 
 lowed by the steam yacht Deerhound, 
 owned by an Englishman, of the name 
 of Lancaster. Winslow, on seeing the 
 Alabama approach, steamed out to 
 sea, in order that no questions should 
 be raised as to the line of jurisdiction. 
 When about 7 miles out from the 
 breakwater at Cherbourg, the Alabama 
 being about a mile behind, Winslow 
 wheeled round and made direct for his 
 antagonist The Alabama opened fire 
 at once ; and loading with wonderful 
 rapidity, she fired a second and a third 
 broadside, without receiving any re- 
 sponse. The Kearsarge had received 
 no harm as yet, except in the rigging ; 
 but Winslow, being now within 900 
 jards of his antagonist, and fearing the 
 effects of another broadside, sheered 
 liis vessel and opened fire. The two 
 ships were soon broadside to broadside. 
 iSemmes, however, fought shy. It was 
 evident that he did not seek close 
 action ; and Winslow, fearing that in 
 the event of his antagonist being sorely 
 pressed he might make for the French 
 shore, attempted to run under the stem 
 of the Alabama. The effect of this 
 
 movement, on the part of the Kear 
 sarge, was to force the Alabama, with 
 a full head of steam, into a circular 
 track. The Kearsarge followed. For 
 an houi' the two vessels kept moving 
 in a series of circles, starboard bearing 
 upon starboard, both firing heavily and 
 drifting with the tide further fiom the 
 shore. It was now about noon. The 
 combat had lasted an hour. The ves- 
 sels had described seven circles. They 
 were thus about 4 miles further from 
 the French coast, than they were at 
 the commencement of the action. The 
 Alabama was already at the mercy of 
 her adversary. The filing fi'om the 
 Confederate from the fii-st had been 
 rapid and wild. The filing from the 
 Kearsarge was slow, steady and deliber- 
 ate. The result was that while the Kea- 
 sarge was comparatively uninjured, tht 
 Alabama was sorely damaged. She 
 had received several 11-inch sheila. 
 Of these, one had disabled a gun, kill 
 ing or wounding some 18 men; and 
 another had penetrated the coal bunker, 
 where it exploded, and blocked up the 
 engine room. Her sides were shattered, 
 and pierced -with holes. On her seventh 
 rotation in the circular track, the Ala- 
 bama winded, setting fore try-saU and 
 two jibs, with head in shore. Her port 
 broadside with only two guns, was now 
 presented to the Kearsarge ; and she 
 was moving slowly. Winslow was now 
 in a position to use grapeshot with 
 effect. A few more guns were fired ; 
 and the flag of the Alabama disap 
 peared. A white flag was then dis- 
 played over her stern ; and Win- 
 slow, respecting the signal of distresa 
 
THE ALABAMA SUNK. 
 
 8'r9 
 
 iiscontinued firing. Within two min- 
 utes, the Alabama again opened fire from 
 her two guns on the port side. The 
 Kearsarge quickly responded ; and then 
 fiteaming ahead, Winslow placed his 
 V essel right across the bow of the Ala- 
 oama, and was about to open a raking 
 fire. The white flag, however, was 
 still floating ; and Winslow again re- 
 served his fire. Almost immediately 
 .afterwards, the boats of the Alabama 
 were lowered ; and in one of them 
 came an officer who informed Winslow 
 that the Confederate vessel had sur- 
 rendered, and that she was fast sinking. 
 Twenty minutes after the surrender, 
 the Alabama went down in the deep 
 waters of the English Channel. She 
 went down stem foremost, her bow 
 rising high in the air, and her main- 
 mast breaking oif, as she disappeared. 
 Semmes flung his sword into the sea. 
 He and his officers, and some of the 
 crew, were picked up by the Deerhound, 
 
 and carried to England. Some 65 or 
 70 men, a number of them wounded, 
 were rescued by the boats of the Kear- 
 sarge. Several others were got on 
 board by two French pilot boats, and 
 taken to France. Although the Ala- 
 bama had fii'ed some 370 shot and 
 shell, the Kearsarge was but little 
 injured ; and the casualties on board 
 amounted to only 3 wounded. This 
 great naval duel, the greatest perhaps 
 in the century, was witnessed by thous- 
 ands of people on the French shore. 
 Such was the end of the Alabama — a 
 privateer which, during her career, had 
 captured and for the most part burned 
 65 vessels, which had destroyed pro- 
 perty estimated at $10,000,000, and 
 which, more than any ship of her class, 
 had driven American commerce from 
 the sea. On sea, as well as on land, 
 the National cause was now gaining 
 the ascendency. Time was working 
 steadily in favor of the right 
 
no 
 
 THE MAEOH THROUGH THE CAilOLINAS. 
 
 CHAPTER XLI. 
 
 barman stUl »t Sftvumah — Ordered to Tmnoport hi« Troops to the James — Sherman Presses dta Mare 
 Orerland — Correspondenee with Grant — Earnest Entreaties — Orant Consents to the Overland March — 
 Preparations — Foster left in Command of Savannah — Howard's Troops Embarked for Beaafort — Slocmn 
 Ordered to the Coosawhatchie — Sherman at Hilton Head — The Floods — The Troops Detained — Slocum at 
 the Salkahatchie — Blair at Orangeburg Bridge — Sherman Sets Ont for Colombia — Little Congaree Brid/st 
 — Shells Flong into Columbia — The Army before Colombia — Surrender of Columbia — The City in Flames— 
 Wade Hampton's Orders — Charleston — The City Threatened — General Hardee in Command — The Place 
 Elracuated — Formal Surrender of Charleston and all the Harbor Defeases — Qillmore Takes Possession- - 
 A Grand Demonstration — A Distinguished Assemblage — General Anderson Restores the Old Flag to 
 Fort Sumter — Address by Henry Ward Beecher — Great Rejoicing — Slocum at Rocky Mount — Kilpatrick 
 at Lancaster — The Catawba Greatly Swollen — On to Cheraw — Kilpatrick Surprised — Almost a Defeat — 
 The Confederates Concentrating — Sherman Sets Ont from Fayetteville — Pushing on to Goldsboro — Hardee 
 Attempts to Hinder the Advance — Pretence of Moving on Raleigh — Sherman Resolves to Dislodge Hardee 
 — A Strong Position — Severe Fighting — A Dismal Night — A Confederate Retreat — The Battle of 
 Ave(ry8boro — A National Victory — The Goldsboro Road — Howard at Lee's Store — Sherman Starts for 
 Goldsboro — Overtaken by the Way — Bad News — Compelled to Return — Slocum in Danger — The Con- 
 federates in Force under Johnston — In a Strong Position — The Confederate Attack — The Battle of 
 Bentonville — Fearing's Brave Brigade — The Confederates Surprised — Terrible Fighting — The Confederates 
 Driven Back — The Day Saved — Morgan's Division Covered with Glory — A National Victory — Arrival of 
 Howard and the Right Wing — Result of the Three Day's Fighting — A Great National Gain — Sherman's 
 Purpoce — In Communication with Schofield and Terry — Schofield's Advance on Goldsboro— The Country 
 Flooded — The Confederates in Force under Bragg — The March to Kinston — The Importance of the Rail 
 road — Jackson's MUls — Severe Encounter on the Trent and Upper Trent Roads — Bragg Compelled to R«tir 
 aeross the Neuse — Schofield at Kinston — The Three Armies United — The Object of the Campaign Practi 
 eally Accomplished — The Railroads Repaired — Sherman at City Point — He Meets Lincoln, Grant and Porter 
 — Lincoln's Conversation — " Stop this Blood-shed " — The Grand Result of the Campaign — Stoneman's Raid 
 —His Instructions — Collecting his Troops — A Demonstration in the direction of Bristol — Movement Across 
 Stone Mountain — Stoneman at Boone — At Wilkesboro — Crossing the Yadkin River — On Cranberry Plain 
 — At Jacksonville— General Destruction of the Railroads — No Rest for the Troopers — Stoneman on the North 
 Carolina Railroad, between Danville and Greensboro^Burning the Factories at Salem — On the Road to 
 Salisbury — Encounter with Pemberton — The Confederates Defeated — Fearful destruction of Property — 
 Motherwell on the Catawba Biver — Burning of the Railroad Bridge — The End of a most Destructive Raid. 
 
 From the moment that General Sher- 
 man had demonstrated the hol- 
 * lownesa of the Confederacy, by 
 his almost unopposed march to the 
 eea, General Grant, impatient of 
 delay and determined to force matters 
 to a final issue, was anxious that his 
 lieutenant should return northward, 
 and bring his army into conjunction 
 with the army of the Potomac and the 
 army of tne James, then confronting 
 
 General Lee at Petersburg and Rich- 
 mond. 
 
 The question was, how was this 
 transfer of so large an army to be ac- 
 complished? There were two modes 
 which at once suggested themselves 
 The army could be transferred by sea 
 It could also be transferred by a land 
 march through the Carolinas. Both 
 modes of transfer would be attended 
 with difficulty. It was mid-wint,er 
 
THE MARCH COMMENCED. 
 
 881 
 
 I h- re were many and serious objections 
 to conveying so many thousands of 
 men, with all the appurtenances of war, 
 on board transports, along such a coast, 
 .t such a season There were also 
 Qany and serious objections to the 
 narch overland. Of the two modes, 
 Sherman very wisely concluded in favor 
 of the transfer by land. Grant, how- 
 ever, had ordered that the army should 
 be carried to Virginia by sea. Sher- 
 man prepared to obey. It was ^vith 
 the utmost reluctance, however, that 
 he was taking such a course. " I have 
 now completed my first step " he writes 
 to Grant. " I should like to go to you 
 by way of Columbia and Raleigh, but 
 will prepare to embark as soon as ves- 
 sels come. You know well how much 
 better troops arrive by a land march 
 thai when carried by transports." Still 
 latei, when the movement had actually 
 commenced, and when he was about to 
 embark his troops, he wrote from Poc- 
 otaligo to Grant. "I know," he says, 
 "that this march is necessary to the 
 war. It must be made sooner or later, 
 and I am in the proper position for it. 
 I ask no reinforcements, but simply 
 wish the utmost activity at all other 
 points, so that the enemy may not 
 concentrate too powerfully against me. 
 I expect Davis vrill move heaven and 
 earth to resist me, for the success of my 
 army is fatal to his dream of empire. 
 Richmond is not more vital to his 
 cause than is Columbia. " Grant 
 jaelded. " I am gratified," writes 
 Shennan in reply, "that you have 
 modified your former ordei-s, as I 
 feared the transportation by sea would 
 
 very much diatui-b the unity and mor- 
 ale of my army, now so perfect." 
 
 In refitting the army, which was 
 about 60,000 strong, in regulating the 
 local government, and in making th 
 proper disposition of the captured cot 
 ton and other property, Shemian con 
 sumed nearly a month. During that 
 time he had a visit from Secietary 
 Stanton. Grant sent Grover's diviaidc 
 of the Nineteenth cor]i8 to garrison tht- 
 forts; and on the 18th of Janii- jjjj 
 ary Sherman transferred thene IS. 
 and the city itself to General Foster. 
 Foster was, at the same time, instructed 
 to follow the movements of the army 
 inland by occupying, in succession, the 
 city of Charleston and such other 
 points northward along the coast as 
 were of any strategic value. Sherman 
 had already made up his mind to make 
 Goldsboro the point from which he 
 would re -open communications with 
 the seaboard; and he had given orders 
 to Colonel Wright, superintendent of 
 military railroads, to proceed in ad- 
 vance to New Berne, and extend the 
 railroad from that point to Goldsboro— 
 a distance of about 45 miles — by the 
 16th of March. Schofield, as has been 
 mentioned in a previous chapter, was 
 directed to move with the Twenty- 
 Third corps, from New Berne and 
 Wilmington upon Goldsboro, so as to 
 be there if possible on the arrival lA 
 Sherman. 
 
 Before commencing the marcn, ilow- 
 ard was directed to embark his com 
 mand and proceed by sea to Beaufort 
 South Carolina, and from that poin 
 to send a force to make a lodgment f^ 
 
8S2 
 
 THE MARCH THKOtTGH THE OAROLINAS. 
 
 I he Charleston Railroad at or near 
 I'ocotaligo. Tkis was effected on the 
 15th of January by the Seventeenth 
 corps under Blair; and a depot of sup- 
 plies was established near the mouth 
 of Pocotaligo Creek, having easy water 
 communication with Hilton Head. 
 Slociun with the left wing of the 
 army, and Kilpatiick with the cavalry, 
 were ordered to rendezvous about the 
 same time near Robertsville and Coos- 
 awhatchie, in South Carolina, with a 
 depot of supplies at Pureysburg or 
 State's FeiTy on the Savannah River. 
 Slocimi, accordingly, had a pontoon 
 bridge laid over the river opposite 
 Savannah. He also repaired and cor- 
 duroyed the Union Causeway, which 
 traverses the rice-fields northward from 
 the city. Heavy rains, however, 
 
 welled the river and overflowed all 
 Jie adjacent low groimds, covering the 
 causeway with water 4 feet deep and 
 breaking the pontoon bridge. Com- 
 pelled to seek a crossing higher up 
 the river, he moved to Sister's Ferry; 
 but as the bottom-lands were over- 
 flowed there also, he was again de- 
 tained. 
 
 On the 2 2d of January, Sherman 
 went to Hilton Head, where he had a 
 conference with Admiral Dahlgren 
 and General Foster. He then pro- 
 ceeded to Beaufort, and on the 24th to 
 to Pocotaligo, where the Seventeenth 
 corps, under Blair, was encamped. 
 
 rhe Fifteenth corps had not yet con- 
 centrated. Wood's and Hazen'a divis- 
 ions only being at Beaufort. J. E, 
 Smith's division was marching from 
 Savannah to join them by the coast 
 
 road; and that of Corse was detain*, 
 by storms and the floods. On tht 
 following day, and in order to j^^j 
 strengthen the conviction on the 26. 
 part of the enemy that Charleston wa 
 to be the objective of Sherman's move 
 ments, a demonstration was madx 
 against the Combahee Ferry and tht 
 railroad bridge across the Salkahatchie 
 Feigned movements were made, as il 
 it was intended to cross. No real 
 movement, however, was made until 
 the waters abated. 
 
 By the 29th, the floods had retired 
 from the roads west of Savannah sulfi 
 ciently to permit Slocum to put the 
 left wing in motion, at Sister's FeiTj. 
 A gun-boat, sent thither by Dahlgi-en, 
 covered the troops while crossing. 
 Three divisions of the Fifteenth corps 
 also had closed up at Pocotaligo ; and 
 the right wing being ready to start, 
 Howard was directed to move the 
 Seventeenth corps along the Salkahat- 
 chie as far as River's Bridge, and the 
 Fifteenth by Hickory HUl, Loper's 
 Cross-Roads, Anglesey Post Ofiice, and 
 Beaufort's Bridge. Hatch's division 
 was directed to continue the feints at 
 the railroad bridge and the ferry, till 
 Sherman's movement should turn the 
 enemy's position and compel him to 
 fall back behind the Edisto. The 
 march of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth 
 corps began on the 1st of Febru- j-gj,^ 
 ary; and though all the roads !• 
 leading north were obstructed by felled 
 trees, the pioneer battalions cleared the 
 path of the army so rapidly, that, on 
 the 2d, the Fifteenth corps reached 
 Loper's Cross-Roads, and the Seveii 
 
ORANGEBURG. 
 
 883 
 
 teenth, River's Bridge. Slocum was 
 still hindered by the floods at Sister's 
 Ferry ; but he had managed to push to 
 the east bank two divisions of the 
 Twentieth corps under Williams, with 
 Kilpatrick's cavalry. Kilpatrick was 
 
 rdered to Blackville by way of Barn- 
 well. Williams was ordered to Beau- 
 fort's Bridge. Slocum was dii-ected to 
 get the remainder of his command over 
 Hs rapidly as possible, and join the 
 right wing, on the South Carolina 
 Railroad. The right wing was ordered 
 to cross the Salkahatchie — which was 
 still held by the enemy in force, with 
 infantry and artillery intrenched at 
 River's and Beaufort's Bridges — and to 
 push on to the South Carolina Rail- 
 Feb. ^^^^ ^^ '^^ T^^^ Midway. River's 
 
 3. Bridge was carried, on the 3d of 
 February, by two divisions of the 
 Seventeenth corps, those of Mower and 
 G. A. Smith. Mower and Smith led 
 their troops in person, wading the 
 swamp, which was nearly 3 miles wide. 
 A lodgment was effected below the 
 bridge ; and the brigade which guarded 
 it was driven towards Branchville. 
 
 The line across the Salkahatchie was 
 thus broken ; the enemy retreated at 
 once beyond the Edisto at Branchville. 
 Sherman's army moved rapidly to the 
 South Carolina Railroad, at Midway, 
 Bamberg, and Graham's Station. The 
 track of the railroad was then torn up 
 all the way from the Edisto as far 
 west as Blackville. To this point 
 Kilpatrick had, in the mean time, 
 brought up his cavalry. Ordered to 
 proceed towards Aiken and threaten 
 Augusta, he skirmished heavilv with 
 
 Wheeler's cavalry at Blackville, Willis- 
 ton, and Aiken. The destruction of 
 the railroad was continued aa far as 
 Windsor, 20 miles east of Augusta. 
 By the 11th, the entire army was oa 
 the railroad from Midway to Johnson's 
 Station, thus dividing the enemy's 
 forces, which lay westward at Aiken 
 and Augusta and eastward, at Branch 
 ville and Charleston. A movement on 
 Orangeburg was commenced, the Seven- 
 teenth corps crossing the South Fork 
 of the Edisto at Binnaker's Bridge, and 
 moving straight on that place, the 
 Fifteenth crossing at Holman's Bridge 
 and moving to Poplar Springs, in sup- 
 port. On the 12th, the Seventeenth 
 corps finding the Confederates in- 
 trenched in front of the Orangeburg 
 Bridge, carried their position at a dash, 
 compelling them to retire, beyond the 
 bridge, to the protection of a battery 
 which was covered by a rampart oi 
 cotton and earth. Blair keeping G. A 
 Smith's division near the bridge, sen! 
 the other two divisions to a point, two 
 miles below, where Force's division 
 crossing by a pontoon bridge, and mov- 
 ing rapidly up to the position held by 
 the Confederates, compelled them to 
 retreat. Smith iomiediately pushed 
 over the bridge and took possession of 
 the enemy's abandoned battery. The 
 bridge, which had been partially burned, 
 was then repaired ; and the whole 
 corps was in Orangeburg by four p^j, _ 
 o'clock in the aftenioon, and, at 1-. 
 work, tearing up the railroad. By the 
 14th, Blair had destroyed the track, as 
 far northward as Lewnsville, and drivei 
 the Confederates across the Congai-e*- 
 
BU 
 
 THE MAKOB. THKOUQH THE 0AR0LINA8. 
 
 As they retired, they burned the bridges 
 in their rear. 
 
 Sherman, without making demon- 
 strations on Branchville or Charleston, 
 which his movements had already made 
 untenable, set all his columns in march 
 for Columbia, the Seventeenth corps 
 following the State road ; the Fifteenth 
 crossing the North Edisto from Pop- 
 lar Springs, at Schilling's Bridge, and 
 taking a coxmtry road which enters 
 the State road at Zeigler's. On the 
 1 5th, this corps found the enemy 
 strongly posted at the Little Congaree 
 Bridge, having a tete-de-pont on the 
 south side, and on the north side a well- 
 constructed fort, the artillery of which 
 commanded the bridge. The ground 
 in front was level and open. It was 
 covered with a fresh deposit of mud, 
 from which the water of a freshet had 
 only just retired. General Wood, how- 
 ever, by sending a brigade through a 
 cypress swamp to the left, succeeded in 
 turning the flank of the tete-de-pont; and, 
 promptly following up his advantage, 
 he got possession also of the bridge and 
 fort. Some delay was occasioned in 
 repairing the bridge, which had been 
 partially burnt, so that the column did 
 not arrive at the Congaree, opposite 
 Columbia, tUl the following morning. 
 By that time the enemy had burnt the 
 fine bridge at that point. 
 
 The inhabitants could now be easily 
 Been running about the streets ; and 
 small bodies of cavalry occasionally 
 showed themselves. Against these was 
 directed, for some time, the fire of one 
 gun ; but, subsequently, it was turned 
 by oixier of Sherman against the walls 
 
 of the unfinished State House. A few 
 shells were also thrown at the railroad 
 depot to scatter the crowds who were 
 carrying oflE sacks of com and meal. 
 Of course no white flag was visible, or 
 any sign of a disposition to surrender. 
 Slocum came up with the left wing 
 within an hour after the arrival of 
 Howard's column; and the latter was 
 directed to cross the Saluda River 
 about 3 miles above the city, to pro 
 ceed thence across the Broad River 
 and to approach the city from the 
 north. Slocum was directed to cross 
 the Saluda at Zion Church, to proceed 
 thence northward towards Winnsboro 
 and to break up the railroad and 
 bridges in the vicinity of Alston. On 
 the night of the 16th, Howard had 
 thrown a flying bridge across the Broad 
 River about 3 miles above the city. By 
 this means he got one brigade over. 
 In the morning a pontoon bridge 
 was laid, and preparations were made 
 for an advance upon the city. 
 
 Meanwhile the mayor had appeared 
 and made a formal surrender to Yei\i, 
 Colonel Stone, of the Twenty- 17. 
 Fifth Iowa, at the Saluda Bridge. A 
 small party, from the Seventeenth corps, 
 had also crossed the Congaree, in a 
 skiff, and entered the city, from the 
 west. Stone's brigade was then posted 
 in the streets of the city ; and, for some 
 time, good order prevailed. Subse 
 quently, however, half drunken sol- 
 diers and released prisoners, enter- 
 ed stores and private dwellings and 
 helped themselves to any valuable? 
 they could find, robbing ladies and 
 gentlemen of their watches and jewelry 
 
FALL OF CHARLESTON. 
 
 885 
 
 m the streets, and committing vari- 
 ous other crimes when not immedi- 
 ately under the eyes of their oflScers. 
 Orders were given for the destruction 
 >f all arsenals and such other public 
 property as could not be made use of 
 by the army, as well as all railroads, 
 depots, and machinery that might be 
 subsequently made available to the 
 enemy. They were to spare private 
 dwellings, as well as schools, colleges, 
 and such institutions. The Fifteenth 
 corps passed through the city in the 
 course of the day, marching out by 
 the Camden road. The Seventeenth 
 corps did not enter the city at all ; and 
 the left wing halted about 2 miles 
 distant. 
 
 General Wade Hampton, who was 
 in command of the Confederate rear- 
 guard of cavalry, had, before leaving 
 the city, ordered that all cotton, 
 whether belonging to the Confederate 
 government or to individuals, should 
 be collected in the streets and burned. 
 The bales were cut open ; and the loose 
 cotton, scattered and blown about by 
 a high wind, which prevailed at the 
 time, lodged in trees, on the roofs of 
 houses, and on piazzas and verandahs, 
 thus offering great temptation to the 
 floating fire which filled the air. Some 
 of the great heaps of cotton were still 
 burning when the National troops took 
 possession. The flames, however, were 
 soon extinguished by the exertions of 
 the soldiers. Sherman's instructions 
 had not yet been put in execution, 
 when the smouldering heaps of cotton, 
 fanned by the wind, broke out again 
 into flames, which were communicated 
 
 to some of the adjacent buildings 
 About dark, the conflagration spread to 
 such an extent, as to be altogether be- 
 yond the control of the single brigade 
 stationed in the city ; and Wood's 
 whole division was ordered in, to 
 check the progress of the flames. By 
 midnight, the fire became quite unman- 
 ageable. Drunken soldiers had cut the 
 hose ; and, in some instances, they went 
 round with torches, deliberately setting 
 fire to buildings which would otherwise 
 have escaped. In spite of the exertions 
 of Sherman, who was up nearly all 
 night, and of Generals Howard, Logan, 
 and Wood, the fire was not got under 
 control until about four o'clock in the 
 morning, by which time the whole of 
 the business portion of the city was in 
 rains. The arsenals, railroad depots, 
 machine shops, and other public prop- 
 erty, were destroyed on the 18th and 
 19th, as well as the raUroad track as 
 far as Kingsville and the Wateree 
 Bridge, and also towards Wrcinsboro. 
 
 Columbia, the political capital of 
 South Carolina, feU on the 17th of 
 February. On the following day feli 
 Charleston, the commercial capital. The 
 destruction of the inland routes of 
 travel and supply, by the army of Gen 
 eral Sherman on its march through the 
 Carolinas, made the whole sea-coast 
 northward, from Savannah to New 
 Berne absolutely worthless and even 
 untenable. The National fleet occu 
 pied the entrance to Charleston harbor. 
 Morris Island was also held ; an ar 
 tUlery fire was, at intervals, directed 
 against Fort Sumter and the city itself; 
 but the capture of either had proved 
 
886 
 
 THE MABCfl THROUGH THE OAKOLINAS. 
 
 to be a task of extreme difficulty, and 
 in fact impossible by the navy, without 
 the aid of a large co-operating land 
 force. The strategic value of Charles- 
 ton was not, however, so great as to 
 warrant the sending against it an expe- 
 lition of the magnitude which would 
 have been necessary for its reduction. 
 The closing of the harbor, by a block- 
 ading fleet, effected nearly all that 
 would have been accomplished by the 
 actual occupation of the city. This 
 had been secured by the presence of 
 Admiral Dahlgren's fleet of iron-clads. 
 Some thought was entertained, early 
 in the summer of 1864, of attacking 
 Fort Sumter and attempting the pas- 
 sage with monitors ; but the idea was 
 finally abandoned. It was not until 
 l«gl,_ the 8th of February, 1865, when 
 8. GUlmore succeeded Foster in 
 ommand of the Department of the 
 South, that active measures were taken 
 to reduce the city. 
 
 General Hardee was at that time in 
 command, in Charleston, with a force 
 of about 15,000 men, comprising the 
 regular garrison and troops with which 
 he had retreated from Savannah. On 
 the 10th, operations were commenced 
 by the construction of a bridge across 
 the creek separating Folly and Cole's 
 islands from James Island ; and a force 
 under General Schimmelpfenig, 3000 
 trong, effected a lodgment on the 
 latter about 3 miles southwest of 
 Charleston. Skirmishers, who were 
 thrown forward, encountered the en- 
 emy at Grimball's, on Stono River. A 
 mortar schooner and two tin-clads also 
 nioved up the Stono Ri^^er and shelled 
 
 the enemy, and at the same time cov 
 ered the flank of the National troops 
 About half -past four, General Haitweli 
 moved his whole biigade forward in 
 columns, doubled on the centre, and 
 carried the enemy's rifle-pits at the 
 double-quick. The contest was brief, 
 as the Confederates retreated rapidly to 
 their main works, abandoning then 
 dead and wounded, and losing about 
 20 prisoners. The National loss was 
 about 80. As this movement was only 
 a feint, the troops of General Schim 
 melpfenig were soon afterwards with- 
 drawn. On the 12th and 13th, demon- 
 strations were made, by a force under 
 General Potter, along the approaches 
 from Bull's Bay towai'ds Mount Pleas- 
 ant, with the view of threatening 
 Charleston from the north. General 
 Hatch's column, moving northward 
 from Pocotaligo, threatened Charleston 
 from the south. Hardee soon became 
 aware that his hold on the city was very 
 precarious. His railroad communica- 
 tion with Branchville, as well as with 
 Savannah, was destroyed. The rail- 
 road running northward to Florence, 
 the only remaining one, was in dariger. 
 A prolonged defense of the ci^.y could 
 only end in his being encircled by 
 National forces, and compelled to sur- 
 render his whole army. If he could 
 effect a junction with Johnston, he 
 might yet render important service to 
 the Confederacy. About midnight of 
 the 17th, therefore, as the last of Yeh. 
 the Confederate troops were leav- 17. 
 ing, they fired the upper part of the 
 city, where were the railroad Ijuildings 
 containing several thousand bales of 
 
THE OLD FLAG ON FORT SUMTER. 
 
 887 
 
 ftotton. In these buildings were stored, 
 in addition to the cotton, a large quan- 
 tity of rice, and 200 kegs of gunpowder. 
 About half-past three in the morning 
 a terrific explosion took place, killing 
 about 150 people, and mutilating about 
 200, among whom were women and 
 children, who wei'e caiTying off the rice. 
 At daylight, several rams ia the inner 
 harbor, near the city, were blown up. 
 The mayor, soon aftei-ward, sent a note 
 to GUlmore, stating that the Confeder- 
 ate military authorities had withdrawn ; 
 and at nine o'clock on the morning of 
 Ye\), the 18th, the city of Charleston, 
 18. with Forts Sumter and Moultrie, 
 Castle Pinckney, and all the defensive 
 works, were formally surrendered, 
 (iillmore's troops were promptly moved 
 ap to the city ; and the National flag 
 was restored to the parapet of Fort 
 umter amid the deafening cheers of 
 vhe troops. 
 
 The soldiers were, immediately, set 
 to work to check the progress of the 
 flames, in the upper part of the city. 
 The fire, however, had already got such 
 headway that the cotton warehouses, 
 arsenals, quarter - masters' stores, the 
 railroad bridges, some vessels in the 
 Hhip -yards, and a large number of 
 dwellings were destroyed before this 
 could be effected. The lower part of 
 the city, within range of the fii-e of the 
 (leet, had suffered much from shot and 
 shell, in the course of the protracted 
 eiege, and had long been in a ruinous 
 -.endition. The wealthy residents had 
 deserted the city ; and the population, 
 now reduced to about 10,000, mostly 
 negroes and poor whites, had no means 
 
 of escape. " Any one," said Sherman, 
 " who is not satisfied with war should 
 go and see Charleston, and he will 
 pray, louder and deeper than ever, 
 that the country may in the long 
 future be spared any more war." Sev- 
 eral hundred desei-tei-s from Hardee's 
 army, who had concealed themselves in 
 houses, whUe the evacuation was going 
 on, surrendered when Gillmore's troops 
 entered the city. Among the captures 
 were 450 cannon, found in the forta 
 and other defenses, 8 locomotives, and 
 a large number of passenger and plat- 
 foi-m cai"s, all in good condition. 
 
 The memorable siege of Charleston 
 commenced actually, on the lOtk of July 
 1863, when GUlmore landed on Morris 
 Island, The city had been under fire 
 542 days ; and the suiTender took place 
 on the fourth anniversary of the inaug- 
 uration of Jefferson Da%as, as president 
 of the Southern Confederacy. The 
 moral effect of the fall of Charleston 
 was very great, not only in the North 
 and in the South, but in Europe also. 
 
 The circiunstances of the surrende 
 of Fort Sumter, by General Ajiderson 
 had produced an impression on tht 
 public mind too deep to be readily 
 erased ; and President Lincoln, desirous 
 to commemorate its restoration, made 
 arrangements for a celebration worthy 
 of the occasion. The old flag was 
 restored, with great pomp and solem- 
 nity, on the 14th of April. A large 
 number of citizens, on board the 
 steamer Oceanicus, arrived from New 
 York to take part in the ceremonies. 
 Colonel S. L. Woodford took gen 
 eral charge of the day's proceedings 
 
888 
 
 THE MARCH THROUGH THE CAROLINAS. 
 
 Gathered around the flag-staff, the entire 
 company, led by W. B. Bradbury, sang 
 his song, " Victory at Last." This was 
 followed by "RaUy round the Flag." 
 Prayer was offered by the Rev. Mat- 
 thew Harris, chaplain of the United 
 States Army. Selections fi'om the 
 Book of Psalms were read by Dr. R. 
 S. Storrs, of Brooklyn. General To^vn- 
 send. Assistant Adjutant-General, read 
 Major Anderson's despatch of April 
 I8th, 1861. This done, Anderson's 
 faithful servant. Sergeant Hart, ap- 
 peared with a new mail-bag containing 
 the identical flas: which had been taken 
 down on the day of surrender, four 
 years before. The precious relic, now 
 a memorial of victory as well as of 
 defeat, was attached to the halyards. 
 Anderson then delivered a brief but 
 touching address, after which, he 
 boisted the old banner to the peak of 
 the flag -staff, amid heaven - rending 
 cheers, the whole multitude then 
 breaking forth into singing "The Star- 
 Spangled Banner." As soon as the 
 singing was over, deafening peals were 
 thundered forth from four guns on the 
 fort. These were responded to by all 
 the batteries which had taken part in 
 the bombardment, in 1861. The pro- 
 ceedings were concluded by an address 
 from the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher, 
 an address which, for power, pathos, 
 grandeur of thought and all the other 
 elements of fij-st-class oratory, has sel- 
 dom been equalled, rarely surpassed. 
 Feb. On the 23d of February, 
 23. Georgetown, on the South Caro- 
 lina coast, about 50 miles northeast 
 of Charleston, was evacuated by the 
 
 Confederate forces. On the 26th, 
 Admiral Dahlgren entered and took 
 possession. 
 
 In the mean time. General Slocum, 
 with the left wing and the cavalry, had 
 crossed the Saluda and Broad rivers, 
 breaking up the railroad near Alston, 
 and as far as the bridge over the Broad 
 River, on the Spartanburg road. The 
 main body moved towards Winnsboro, 
 where it arrived on the 21st of Feb 
 ruary. Destroying the railroad, as far 
 as Blackstakes Depot, Slocum then 
 turned towards Rocky Mount, on the 
 Catawba. He arrived there, with the 
 Twentieth corps, on the 22d, and having 
 laid a pontoon bridge, crossed the next 
 day. Kilpatrick's cavalry crossed over, 
 the same night, during a heavy rain, and 
 pushed on to Lancaster, whither jSeam-e- 
 gard had retired with the Confederate 
 cavalry. Heavy rains prevailed fi'om 
 the 20th to the 26th, making the roads 
 almost impassable and swelling the 
 rivers. The Catawba became so swol" en 
 that the pontoon bridge gave way be- 
 fore the Fourteenth corps had effected 
 a crossing ; and much difficulty was ex- 
 perienced in the work of reconstruc- 
 tion. When General Davis got his 
 command over, the whole left wing was 
 put in motion for Cheraw. 
 
 The right wing had crossed the, 
 Catawba before the heavy rains set in, 
 and pushed on for Cheraw. Detach 
 ments were sent, from the Fifteenth 
 corps to Camden, to bum the bridge 
 over the Wateree, as well as the railroad 
 depot and public storea At Lynch's 
 Creek the right wing was delayed by 
 the badness of the roads, just as the 
 
FAYETTEVILLE. 
 
 ^ 
 
 left wing had been at the Catawba. 
 The leading division of the Twentieth 
 corps entered Chesterfield on the 2d of 
 March, skirmishing with Butler's cav- 
 ^g^. ^^ ; *°^ about noon, on the 3d, 
 
 8. the Seventeenth corps entered 
 Cheraw, the Confederates falling back 
 across the Pedee and burning the bridge 
 after them. A large amount of ammu- 
 nition and numerous pieces of artillery 
 were destroyed at Cheraw, aa were also 
 the railroad bridges and trestles, as far 
 as Darlington. Without delay, the col- 
 umns were put in motion in the direction 
 of Fayetteville, North Carolina, the 
 right wing crossing the Pedee at 
 Cheraw, the left wing and the cavalry 
 at Sneedsboro, Kilpatrick's cavalry, 
 keeping well on the left flank. In 
 spite of the unfavorable weather and 
 the wretched roads, the Fourteenth and 
 Seventeenth corps, on the 11th of 
 March, reached Fayetteville, on the 
 Cape Fear River. There they had a 
 sharp skirmish with Wade Hampton's 
 cavalry, the rear-guard of Hardee's re- 
 treating army, which, after crossing the 
 river, biimt the bridge. On the morn- 
 Mar. ^S o^ ^^® ^^^^ ^^ March, at day- 
 
 10. light, Kilpatrick, who was on the 
 left, and exposed, was suddenly at- 
 tacked by Hampton and his cavalry. 
 Hampton gained possession of the 
 camp of Spencer's brigade, and the 
 house in which Kilpatrick and Spencer 
 had their quarters. Kilpatrick, who 
 was asleep at the time, escaped, with 
 only pantaloons and slippers ; but suc- 
 ceeding in rallying his men, on foot, in 
 a neighboring swamp, he attacked the 
 enemy so vigorously, that he regained 
 
 his camp, horses, and artillery. The 
 Confederates rapidly made off, taking 
 with them a few prisoners, but aban- 
 doning their dead. The army remained 
 during the 12th, 13th, and 14th a< 
 Fayetteville. The buildings of wha 
 was called the Arsenal of Construction 
 which covered 50 acres of ground 
 and which contained a vast amount ol 
 machinery, brought from Harper's 
 Ferry, were destroyed. All the build 
 ings were burnt, and the machinery 
 destroyed, under the sujiervision ol 
 Colonel Poe, the chief engineer of the 
 army. 
 
 Up to this time, Sherman had suc- 
 ceeded in keeping his army between 
 the diirided and scattered portions of 
 the enemy's forces. The latter, how 
 ever, were now concentrating on Sher 
 man's left flank. The troops, with 
 which Beaxu-egard left Columbia, had 
 been reinforced by Cheatham's corps 
 from Hood's broken army, and by the 
 garrison of Augusta. Hardee also had 
 got across the Cape Fear River; and 
 he would soon be able to join the 
 other armies. These various bodies of 
 the enemy, wheh united, would consti- 
 tute a formidable force, superior, in 
 fact, to Sherman's in cavalrj', and but 
 little inferior in infantry and artillery. 
 Commanded as they were, by the skilful 
 and experienced Johnston, Sherman 
 had need to move with caution. Before 
 arriving at Fayetteville, he had sent tw: 
 trusty scouts to Wilmington, with Lntei 
 ligence respecting his position. The 
 scouts made their way safely ; and oe 
 the morning of the 12th of March, a 
 small steamer arrived at Fayetteville 
 
890 
 
 THE MARCH IHROUGH THE CAROLINAS. 
 
 from Wilmington. It returned, tte 
 same day, with despatches for General 
 Terry, and for General Schofield, at 
 New Berne, informing them that the 
 army would move on the 15th, for 
 ioldsboro, and directing them to move 
 iheir forces on the same point. 
 
 Aa delay would be highly dangerous, 
 in face of the probable combination of 
 the enemy's forces, Sherman moved out 
 of Fayetteville, on the 15th. The 
 weather was still unfavorable ; and the 
 roads had to be corduroyed to allow 
 the passage of wagons and artillery. 
 Kilpatrick was directed to move by the 
 plank road, as far as Averysboro and 
 beyond. He was to be followed by 
 four divisions of the left wing, ^vith as 
 few wagons as possible. The remainder 
 of the train, under the escort of the 
 other two divisions of the left wing, 
 were ordered to take a shorter and 
 more direct road to Goldsboro. How- 
 ard, with the right wing, was ordered 
 to send his trains well to the right, 
 towaids Faisoo's Depot and Goldsboro, 
 holding four divisions in readiness to 
 aid the left wing, if it should be at- 
 tacked while in motion. 
 
 General Sherman accompanied the 
 left wing, ^\ath Kilpatrick's cavalry in 
 advance, as far as Kyle's Landing. At 
 Taylor's Hole Creek, Kilpatiick en- 
 countered the rear-guard of the enemy's 
 cavalry ; and a brigade of infantry was 
 sent at his request to hold a line of 
 j[gp_ barricades. On the morning of 
 .16. the 15th, the column, advancing 
 in the same order, found a large force 
 of the enemy under Hardee, in an 
 intrenched position, in the vicinity of 
 
 Averysboro, where the road branches 
 off towards Goldsboro. Hardee's 
 intention was, evidently, to detain 
 Sherman, so as to give Johnston time 
 to concentrate his forces. It was neces- 
 sary, therefore, to get possession of the 
 Goldsboro road without delay ; and 
 at the same time desirable to keep up, 
 as long as possible, a pretence of mov- 
 ing on Raleigh. 
 
 Sherman, immediately, made pi-epara- 
 tions to dislodge Hardee's force. Slo- 
 cum was ordered to push forward and 
 carry the position. The Twentieth 
 corps, imder Williams, led the attack ; 
 and Ward's division, which was in the 
 advance, found a brigade of heavy 
 artillery, armed as infantry, posted 
 across the road behind a light parapet, 
 with a battery which commanded the 
 open ground in front. A brigade, sent 
 round by the left, turned this line, and 
 then made a quick charge. The Con 
 federate brigade broke, and fell rapidly 
 to a second and stronger line. In doing 
 so, it suffered severely, from the fire of 
 a well-posted battery under Major Rey- 
 nolds. Ward's division advanced over 
 this ground, capturing 217 men and 3 
 guns. On approaching the enemy's 
 second line, Jackson's uivision was de- 
 ployed on the right of Ward's ; and 
 two divisions of the Fourteenth corps 
 were deployed on the left, well towards 
 the Cape Fear River. Kilpatrick, who 
 was acting in concert with Williams, 
 got a brigade on the road ; but it waa 
 furiously attacked by a Confederate 
 division under McLaws, and compelled 
 to fall back to the flank of the infantiy. 
 Late, in the afternoon, the whole line 
 
BENTONVILLE. 
 
 891 
 
 advanced, and drove the Confederates 
 within their intrenchments. During the 
 dismal and stormy night which followed, 
 they retreated over a wretched road in 
 the direction of Smitkfield. Such was 
 the battle of Averysboro. The Na- 
 tional loss was 7? killed and 477 
 wounded. The enemy left 108 of their 
 dead on the field. 
 
 Ward's division kept up a show of 
 pursuit for some distance. The re- 
 mainder of Slocum's command, turning 
 to the right, crossed the South River 
 and took the Goldsboro road. Kil- 
 patrick crossed more to the north, with 
 orders to move eastward and guard the 
 flank in that direction. The wagon- 
 trains, with their escorts, and Howard's 
 column, were, in the mean time, slowly 
 toiling along the miry roads towards 
 Bentonville and Goldsboro. 
 
 Sherman remained with Slocum and 
 the left wing, on the night of the 18th, 
 on the Goldsboro road, about 5 miles 
 from Bentonville. Howard was at 
 Lee's Store, some 2 miles to the south. 
 The pickets of both columns were well 
 thrust forward- There was no sign to 
 indicate that the enemy intended to 
 ofEer further opposition to the march. 
 Har^ Sherman, therefore, on the mom- 
 19. ing of the 19th, ordered Howard 
 to move, with the right wing, by the 
 Goldsboro road. A little later, he rode 
 on hiniseK in the same direction. His 
 object was to advance with the column, 
 and open communications with Scho- 
 field and Terry, who were knowTi to be 
 moving up from New Berne and Wil- 
 mington. He was only about 6 miles 
 on his journey, when he heard cannon- 
 
 ading on the northwest, and when he 
 was overtaken by some staff officers, 
 who informed him that Slocum had 
 encountered the entire Confederate 
 army under General Johnston. Slocum 
 was ordered to call up the two divis 
 ions which were guarding the wagon 
 trains, as also, Hazen's division of th 
 Fifteenth corps, which was near Lee's 
 Store. Sherman promised to hurry up 
 ■with Blair's corps, and the three re- 
 maining divisions of the Fifteenth, and 
 fall upon Johnston's left rear. Slocum 
 felt the foe, at a very early hour on the 
 19th, and just when he had advanced 
 from his camp. By ten o'clock, the 
 Confederates, cavalry and artillery, were 
 present in great force. At noon, the 
 fighting had become stubborn and se- 
 vere. It was now discovered that the 
 whole of Johnston's army, augmented 
 by the commands of Hoke and Hardee 
 was in a fortified position, in front o 
 the left wing of the National army 
 prepared to attack, and already hopeful 
 of victory. It was, indeed, a surprise. 
 Preparations were made in all haste to 
 resist the thre.atened attack. Barri 
 cades were hurriedly thrown up ; orders 
 were sent for the two divisions of the 
 Twentieth corps, who were guarding 
 the wagon-trains, also for Hazen's Ji 
 vision of the Fifteenth. Morgan and 
 Carlin, with their respective diWsiona, 
 were on the extreme National left^ 
 Carlin to the left of Morgan. It wa 
 now half-past two o'clock. With tre- 
 mendous fuiy, the Confederates came 
 rushing out of the woods, and sent 
 Carlin's division into the air. Morgan's 
 division stood firm. Tli^- biigadt!*' 
 
89* 
 
 THE MARCH THROUGH THE CAROLINAS 
 
 of Mitchell and Vandevere were in 
 line ; and Fearing's brigade was in 
 reserve. General Davis, then in com- 
 mand of the Fourteenth corps, which 
 was thus savagely attacked, realizing 
 the danger, with which the whole army 
 was threatened, rode to the front, faced 
 Fearing's brigade to the left, and hurled 
 ',t upon the Confederate's flank. " Push 
 right in the direction of that heaviest 
 firing," shouted Davis to Fearing, " we'll 
 whip them yet." " Well whip them 
 yet," echoed the boys; and on they 
 went, over the swampy ground, and 
 fell like a thunderbolt on the unsus- 
 pecting foe. The Confederates reeled 
 and staggered and fell back; and such 
 was the confusion into which they 
 were thrown, that it was an hour, 
 before they were able to resume the 
 attack. The day was saved ; for Sher- 
 man was thus afforded time to re-form 
 Davis' left and centre. In that gal- 
 lant charge, young Fearing was dis- 
 abled by a bullet, and himdreds of his 
 brave men were either killed or wound- 
 ed. Davis' line was drawn back and 
 formed, in open fields, half a mile to rear 
 of the old line ; and the artillery were 
 massed on a commanding knoll, so as 
 to sweep the whole space between the 
 new line and the enemy. Morgan's 
 troops, on that day, won for themselves 
 imperishable renown. Again and again, 
 did the Confederates come up to the 
 attack. Again and again were they 
 repulsed, with heavy loss. "If Mor- 
 gan's troops can stand this," said Davis, 
 "all is right. If not, the day is 
 lost." In the midst of the hottest of 
 the fight, Coggswell's brigade, of the 
 
 Twentieth corps, came up and moved 
 into the gap between Custer and Mor- 
 gan. This position it gallantly held, 
 until the end of the struggle. The 
 National forces, said Sherman, received 
 " six distinct assaults, by the combine 
 forces of Hoke, Hardee, and Cheatham, 
 under the immediate command of Gen- 
 eral Johnston himself, without giving 
 an inch of ground, and doing good exe- 
 cution on the enemy's ranks." The 
 Confederates suffered terribly from the 
 National artillery, they themselves be- 
 ing weak in that arm. During the 
 night of the 19th, Slocum's wagon- 
 train, with its guard of two divisions, 
 and Hazen's division, came up, as 
 ordered, and, taking position, rendered 
 the left wing almost impregnable. 
 
 The right wing, moving to the relief 
 of the left, experienced at first but lit 
 tie opposition. It soon, however, en 
 countered a body of cavalry, posted 
 behind a barricade, at the fork of the 
 road, near Bentonville. The cavalry 
 were quickly dislodged, and the forks 
 of the roads secured It was now dis- 
 covered that the left flank of the enemy 
 was thrown back, and that he had con- 
 structed, in his front, a line of parapet, 
 in the form of a bastion. The salient 
 of this line was on the main road to 
 Goldsboro, between Slocum on the 
 west, and Howard on the east. The 
 flanks rested on Mill Creek, and cov 
 ered the road back to Smithfield. By 
 four o'clock, on the afternoon of th 
 20th, Howard had established a strong 
 connection on his left with Slocum, 
 Line of battle was formed, in front of 
 the enemy's intrenched position, and 
 
AT KINSTON. 
 
 898 
 
 Johnston was put on the defensive, 
 with Mill Creek, and only a single 
 bridge in his rear. Sherman, however, 
 having little to gain by a battle, was 
 in no haste to strike. Skirmishing was 
 kept up all day ; and there was some 
 heavy artillery firing. 
 
 On the 21st, skimiishuig and artillery 
 firing were kept up. Some bold and 
 ]|Iar^ dashing efforts were made to dis- 
 21. cover a weak point in the ene- 
 my's linea On one occasion. General 
 Mower, with his division of the Seven- 
 teenth corps, pushed his way around 
 the Confederate flank, almost to the 
 bridge at Mill Creek He was glad, 
 however, to return to the defenses of 
 his own lines. During the night, John- 
 ston retreated on Smithfield, leaving 
 his pickets behind him, his dead un- 
 buried, and his wounded va field hos- 
 pitals. He was pursued some 2 miles 
 beyond Mill Creek. 
 
 Such was the battle of BentonvUle. 
 It cannot be called one of the greatest ; 
 but it was certainly one of the most 
 important battles of the war. If Sher- 
 man's army had been defeated at Ben- 
 tonville, and Johnston thus set free to 
 join Lee at Petersburg and Richmond, 
 the result might have been disastrous 
 in the extreme. As it was, the country 
 was brought one stage nearer the de- 
 sired end. In the three days' fighting, 
 the Nationals lost 1646. The Confed- 
 erate loss was probably not under 3000. 
 
 Sherman had now accomplished his 
 purpose. He had already, to all in- 
 tents and purposes, effected a junction 
 with Schofield and Terry. Schofield 
 had entered Goldsboro on the 2l8t. 
 
 Terry was in possession of the Neuse 
 River at Cox's Bridge. 
 
 As soon as Wilmington fell into his 
 hands, Schofield took measures to 
 carry out Grant's orders, with regard to 
 the movement on Goldsboro. General 
 Palmer, then commanding the New 
 Berne district, was sent from Wilming- 
 ton, with instructions to march from 
 New Berne, with 5000 men, to occupy 
 Kinston — a small town on the Neuse 
 River and on the railroad to Golds- 
 boro, about 22 miles from that place 
 and 32 from New Berne. Ruger's divi- 
 sion, of the Twenty-Third corps, was 
 sent from Fort Fisher to reinforce him. 
 The immediate object of this move- 
 ment was to get possession of and 
 hold the railroad, in order to establish 
 a depot of supplies at Kinston, and so 
 facilitate the subsequent movement 
 upon Goldsboro, when Sherman should 
 arrive. Palmer was not able to com- 
 plete his preparations for an advance so 
 soon as was expected ; and, on the 6th 
 of March, General Cox arrived at jjar. 
 New Berne, assumed command, 6' 
 and commenced the forward move- 
 ment. The Confederates, after being 
 driven out of Wilmington, had re- 
 treated northward to Goldsboro; and 
 ha\ang determined to defend that 
 place, they decided to make their first 
 stand at Kinston, at which point about 
 1200 troops were concentrated unde 
 General Bragg. The march to Kinston 
 was one of extreme difficulty. The 
 morasses were impassable; and the 
 Neuse River was too shallow to admit 
 the heavy gim-boats. It became, there- 
 fore, a matter of the last importance, that 
 
994 
 
 THE MARCH THROUGH THE CAROLINAS. 
 
 the line of railioad to Kinston should 
 come under the control of the National 
 army. 
 
 The 6th, was spent in clearing the 
 roads and in building bridges. On the 
 norning of the 7th, the enemy was 
 found in some force, at the point where 
 the Dover and Jackson roads meet the 
 Trent road. Classou drove him back 
 to Jackson's Mills, 4i miles from Kins- 
 ton. On the 8 th, there was some sharp 
 fighting, the Confederates, in course of 
 the day, rushing from their works at 
 Jackson's Mills, falling upon Curtis' 
 division with great force, and over- 
 whelming the Twenty-Seventh Massa- 
 chusetts and the Fifteenth Connecticut. 
 The Nationals were compelled to fall 
 back, and foim a new line of battle. 
 
 During the whole of the 9th, there 
 was lively skirmishing, but without any 
 ]j[j^y^ decisive result. On the 10th, ho w- 
 10. ever, the enemy, who had received 
 large reinforcements, attacked in a bold 
 and determined manner, hoping to 
 defeat Schofield, before Couch, who was 
 now on his way from Wilmington, 
 could come up. The National forces 
 were well intrenched at the junction of 
 the Trent and Upper Trent roads. 
 Schofield and Cox were both on the field, 
 as were also Bragg, Hill, and Hoke on 
 the side of the Confederates. The 
 enemy made two fierce attacks — one 
 falling on Carter's division on the left, 
 the other on Ruger's division in the 
 centre. Both assaults were decisively 
 repulsed, with heavy loss to the enemy. 
 Bragg withdrew his troops, leaving 
 behind him his dead and wounded with 
 •several hundred j^risoners. His total 
 
 loss was about 1500 in killed, wounded, 
 and missing. Couch came up from 
 Wilmington, on the morning of the 
 11th; and Bragg fell back across the 
 Neuse to Kinston, where he burnt the 
 biidge and, for a short time, held the 
 north bank of the river, 
 
 Schofield, having no pontoon train, 
 could not cross the Neuse until the 
 14th. On that day, Bragg abandoned 
 Kinston, and set out to join Johnston, 
 who was then concentrating for the 
 piu-pose of attacking Sherman's left at 
 Benton ville. Immediately after getting 
 possession of Kinston, Schofield set a 
 large force at work in the reconstruction 
 of the railroad, under the direction of 
 Colonel Wright. He, also, re-built the 
 wagon-bridge over the Neuse, brought 
 forward supplies, and prepared for a 
 fiu-ther advance. On the morning of 
 the 20th, he left Kinston ; and on ji^j 
 the evening of the 21st, he took "H- 
 possession of Goldsboro with little op 
 position. TeiTy left Wilmington on th« 
 15th, and moving steadily northward 
 reached Faison's Depot on the 20th; 
 and, in obedience to Sherman's orders, 
 he advanced thence to Cox's Bridge, 10 
 miles above Goldsboro, and secured a 
 crossing of the Neuse, on the 22d 
 The three annies were united ; and the 
 object of the campaign was accom 
 plished. The railroads from Goldsborc 
 to Wilmington and New Berne were 
 quickly repaired ; and supplies in abun 
 dance were moved forward to Kinston 
 
 On the 23d, the different commands 
 had camps assigned to them, in the 
 vicinity of Goldsboro. On the 25th, 
 the railroad from New Berne was agair 
 
THE RESULT OF TUE MAKCH. 
 
 89.S 
 
 in working order ; and the fii'st train 
 of cars came in. The troops were soon 
 supplied with abundance of food and 
 clothing. In harmony with an arrange- 
 ment already made, Shei-man, leaving 
 fhe army in charge of Schofield, pro- 
 ceeded by rail to Morehead City, and 
 *^i\ ^nce by steamer to Cit-y Point. There, 
 in the upper saloon of llie River Queen, 
 j[j^j^ on the eferSth.g of the 27 th of 
 
 27 . March, he ii^et President Lincoln, 
 General G-:ar.t, and Admiral Porter ; 
 and then occurred that famous con- 
 sultation, which is one of the memor- 
 able incidents of the war. Lincoln 
 looked care-worn and anxious. Grant 
 eat silent and imperturbable, smoking 
 his cigar. Pleased with the promising 
 aspect of things, and convinced that 
 the hour of victory was at hand, Lin- 
 
 oln was yet most desirous to put an 
 end to further bloodshed. " As long 
 a; the rebels lay down their ai-ms, I 
 don't care how it is done." " Stop this 
 bloodshed ; " he added, " stop this hor- 
 rible war; I know I can manage all 
 the rest. What signify the terms, 
 so long as we get peace ! " On hearing 
 Sherman's account of his own position, 
 he expressed the fear that Johnston 
 might escape southward by the rail- 
 I'oad, and thus render necessary further 
 pursuit. " He cannot move southward," 
 said Sherman, " vnthout breaking up 
 his army, which, once disbanded, can 
 never again be re-united ; and I have 
 
 lestroyed the railroads, so that they 
 
 ■an not b^, used for a long time." 
 At this point, Grant, who had not 
 taken any pai-t in the conversation, 
 interjected the fjnestion, " What is to 
 
 prevent them laying the rails again ? ' 
 " Why " answered Sherman, " my bum 
 mers hav'nt done things by halves. 
 All the rails have been twisted ; and 
 they are as crooked as rams' horns. 
 They can never be used again." The 
 conversation turning upon the terms 
 of surrender which should be allowed 
 Johnston, Shennan said : " I can com- 
 mand my own terms ; Johnston will 
 have to yield." Lincoln said : " Get 
 his surrender on any terms." Sherman 
 never saw Lincoln again. It was the 
 opinion of Grant and Sherman that one 
 or the other would have to fight one 
 more bloody battle, but that it would 
 be the last. Sherman returned to New 
 Berne by the steamer Bat. 
 
 In the march across the Carolinas, aa 
 in that from Atlanta to Savannah, the 
 army of Sherman wasted a wide belt 
 of country, of an average breadth o 
 not less than 40 miles, consuming al 
 the forage, cattle, hogs, sheep, poultry, 
 and corn meal. Hundreds of miles of 
 railroad were destroyed and thousands 
 of bales of cotton burned. There were 
 captured 85 canncto, 4000 prisoners and 
 25,000 animals. Many thousand negroes 
 also were set free. 
 
 These results were uo doubt import- 
 ant; but the grand lesult which Sher- 
 man had achieved, and one of the 
 grandest results of the war, was that no 
 Confederate force could now hinder the 
 junction, if necessary, of his own iorci^n 
 with those of Grant. 
 
 Simultaneously with these converg- 
 ing movtMiierits of the .so\eral armies, 
 Stoneman made his last great raid. It 
 was part of General Grant's plan that 
 
896 
 
 THE MARCH THROUGH THE UAROLII^AS. 
 
 Stoneman should aid Sherman's move- 
 ments by a cavalry raid into South 
 Carolina. Before Stoneman was ready 
 to move, Sherman had advanced so far 
 on his march backward from the sea, 
 that the co-operative movement of the 
 tavaJry was not necessary. Stoneman 
 was, therefore ordered to march east- 
 ward, and destroy the Virginia and 
 Tennessee Railroad, in the direction of 
 Lynchburg. On the 20th of March, he 
 collected the cavalry brigades of Palm- 
 er, Miller and Brown, of Gillem's 
 division, at Mossy Creek. His whole 
 force was about 6000 strong. Having 
 moved eastward, to Bull's Gap, he 
 divided his troops, sending Miller to 
 make a demonstration in the direction 
 of Bristol, himself proceeding with tLe 
 rest to Jonesboro, where he crossed 
 over Stone Mountain to Boone, in North 
 Mar. Carolina. At Boone, on the 28th, 
 28. he skirmished with the enemy, 
 and captured 200 Home Guards. The 
 day after, he was at Wilkesboro, where 
 he captured stores and some prisoners. 
 Continuing his march, he crossed the 
 Yadkin River, at Jonesville ; and then, 
 facing to the north, he advanced to 
 Cranberry Plain, Carroll County, Vir- 
 ginia. Thence, having sent Miller to 
 Wytheville to destroy the railroad, he 
 himself, with the main body, moved on 
 Jacksonville. From Jacksonville he 
 sent out raiding parties in all directions. 
 One of these, under Major Wagner, 
 having advanced on Salem, swept along 
 the railroad to the east, destroying it 
 from New River Bridge to within 4 
 miles of Lynchburg. Another, and a 
 larger party, under Stoneman himself, 
 
 advanced on Christiansburg, and de- 
 stroyed about 90 miles of rail Stone- 
 man's prescribed task being thus accom- 
 plished, he collected his forces, and 
 returned to Jacksonville. 
 
 There was still, however, work to be 
 done ; and Stoneman was not disposed 
 to rest his troopers imtil that work was 
 accomplished. On the 9th of ^prf] 
 April, his face now turned to the 9. 
 south, we find him on the North Caro- 
 lina railroad, between Danville and 
 Greensboro, his whole command at 
 work tearing up rails and demolishing 
 bridges. Palmer destroyed the railroad 
 between Greensboro and Salisbury, 
 burned the factories at Salem, and 
 captured some 400 men. Stoneman, 
 with the main body, moved on Salis- 
 bury, which was a provision depot, and 
 known to be guarded by a Confederate 
 force, some 3000 strong, under General 
 W. M. Gardiner. The Confederates 
 were found at Grant's Creek, 10 miles to 
 the east of Salisbury, well posted, with 
 18 guns. The entire foroe was under 
 the command of Pemberton, Grant's 
 old opponent, still faithfully serv- 
 ing the Confederates, although reduced 
 to the rank of ColoneL The Nationals 
 charged the Confederate position. The 
 struggle was brief. The Confederates 
 broke and fled, leaving behind them 
 some 1200 men, who were made pris 
 oners, all their guns, 3000 small arms, 
 and a vast quantity of stores. Salisbury 
 was occupied without further resistance 
 The work of destruction was repeated 
 Ammunition, provisions, clothing, medi 
 cine, 10,000 small arms, 4 cotton fac 
 tories, 7000 ba^es of cotton, all were 
 
BRIL»aE OVER THE OATAWBA BURNED 
 
 897 
 
 lelivered up to the flames. The prison 
 pens, from which the Union prisoners 
 had already been moved, were fired ; and 
 the rails for miles on both sides of the 
 town were torn up and destroyed. 
 Stoneman now set out for East Teimes- 
 see, taking with him the prisoners and 
 the captured clothing, and followed by 
 thousands of negroes. 
 
 On the 18th, General Palmer, whose 
 command was at Lincolntown, sent 
 Major E. C. Motherwell, with a body 
 of some 250 mounted men, belonging 
 to the Twelfth Ohio cavalry, towards 
 the point where the Charlotte and 
 South Carolina Railroad crosses the 
 Catawba River His instructions were 
 to destroy the railroad bridge. By 
 this time, Richmond had fallen; and 
 Davis, the Confederate president, was 
 at Charlotte with a considerable force. 
 Vaughan and Duke, who had come 
 down L'om the borders of Virginia, it 
 was ascertained were also in the neigh- 
 borhood. Motherwell, in consequence, 
 found it necessary to move with great 
 caution. At Dallas he encountered the 
 cavalry leaders. He cunningly, how- 
 ever, evaded battle. On the following 
 
 morning, the 19th, at day-break, the 
 National troops were well formed. Aq 
 vancing to the bridge, they captured the 
 picket and surprised the guard, ^prfj 
 The torch was soon applied ; and 19. 
 in about thirty minutes the splendir" 
 structure, some 1150 feet in length, and 
 about 50 feet above the water /as com 
 pletely destroyed. After skirmishing 
 with some Confederate cavalry, under 
 Ferguson, MotherweP's men began to 
 move backwards in the direction of Dal- 
 las. Early on tne 20th, having marched 
 all nigh^, they rejoined the main body of 
 t^ brigade, with 325 prisoners, 200 
 horses, and two pieces of artillery. 
 
 This last raid of Stoneman was one 
 of the most destructive during the war. 
 He captured from fii-st to last some 6C-00 
 men, about 56 pieces of artillery, small 
 arms in great abundance, "^ ith othei 
 property of imtold value. If the fat. 
 of the Confederacy had not been al 
 ready sealed, it must have hastened the 
 end. As it was, it helped to complete 
 the punishment of the South, and, by 
 throwing some darker lines upon the 
 canva.: made more horrible the picture 
 of civil war. 
 
THE FALL OF PETEKSBDRa AND EICHMOND, 
 
 CHAPTER XLII 
 
 .~«nt holding on to the Weldon Railroad — Sheridan master of the Shenandoah Valley— Dutch Gap Canai- 
 The Explosion — James River Flooded — Confederate Fleet in the James — Fort Brady — Battery Parsons- 
 Preparing for Attack along the Whole Lane — Rovanty Creek — Hatcher's Run — Smyth at Armstrong's Mill- 
 The Boydton Plank-Road — Dabney's Mills — -The Second Battle of Hatcher's Run — Movement fnim the 
 Shenandoah — Hancock in Command of the Middle Military Division — Sheridan at Kernstown — At Stras 
 burg — At Woodstock — At Staunton — Custer at Waynesboro — Sheridan's Troops at ScottsWlle and New 
 Market — Hardwicksville — Amherst Court House — Sheridan at Ashland Station — Terrible Destruction of 
 Property — Richmond in Consternation — Lee Preparing to Penetrate the National Lines — Grant on his 
 Guard — Lee's Attack on the Ninth Corps at Fort Steadman — Fort Steadman Captured by the Confed- 
 erates — A Terrific Struggle — Fort Steadman Re-captured by the Nationals — General Advance of th< 
 National Left — Wright and the Sixth Corps Heavily Engaged — The Advanced Position held by the 
 Nationals — Grant's Plan of Attack— His Old Tactics — White Oak Road and Five Forks — The National 
 Line — Its Vast Extent^Disposition of the Troops — General Directions — The Night of the 29th of March— 
 The National Troops in Motion — Warren and Humphreys on the White Oak Road — In Front of the 
 Enemy's Right Flank — Sheridan at Dinwiddle Court House — Grant's Instructions to Sheridan — The 
 Position of Lee's Army — Lee's Extended Line — His Difficulty — His Plan of Battle— Longstreet left in front 
 of the National Right — The Morning of the 30th — Bad Road — Grant in no Haste to Strike — The Delay a 
 Gain to L oo The Confederate General Preparing to Acton the Offensive — Warren on the Boydton Plank 
 Road — Ayres, Crawford and Griffin— Warren's Disposition of his Troops — His Advance — The Battl< 
 Begun — Fierce Sortie by Lee — Ayres and Crawford Driven Back — (Jriffin Stands Firm — Chamberlain's 
 Brigade — The Confederates Driven Back — Warren Attacks the Works at Hatcnor a Run — Lee's Sortie a 
 failure — He Attacks Sheridan at Five Forks — The National Cavalry Driven in Confusion — Dinwiddle 
 Court House — Devin and Da vies Isolated from the Main Body — Sheridan in Great Straits, but Equal tr 
 the Situation — The National Cavalry Recruited — Severe Fighting — Sheridan Dismounts his Men — The 
 Clonfederates Pressed — Night and Keiief — Sheridan Praised by Grant — An Anxious Night — Alarming 
 Rumors — Warren Ordered to Sheridan's Relief — Gravelly Run — Lee Falls Back from Dinwiddie — He 
 Takes Position at Five Forks — A Junction Effected by the National Infantry and Cavalry — Sheridan 
 Assumes Command of the Entire Force — Saturday, April 1st — The Key-Point of the Position — A Morning 
 Struggle — Sheridan Preparing to Attack — His Plan of Battle — He Blames Warren for Delay — Four 
 o'clock— Assault on the Confederate Position at Five Forks — Warren's Advance — A Warm Reception— 
 Ayres and Crawford Badly Punished — Griffin Again to the Rescue— The Rally — The Battle Raging -Ad vane* 
 of the Cavalry — The Confederates Routed — A Brave Remnant — A Complete Victory — Difference Betweei 
 Sheridan and Warren — Sheridan's Charges not Sustained by Facts — The Disaster at Five Forks a Sar 
 Blow to Lee — His Right Flank was Turned — Grant and Meade Quick to Act- The Thunder of th. 
 National Guns — A Hideous Night — The General Assault — Parke and Wright Carry all Before Them- 
 Ord at Hatcher's Run — He Unites with Wright — The Clayborne Road — Sutherland's Station — The SimiL 
 Side Railroad Lost to the Confederates— Forts Gregg and Alexander— Gibbon's Heroic Attack — Capture ol 
 the Forts — The Investing Line Drawn Close — Lee's Inner Line — Bold and Aggressive to the Last — Ai 
 OfEensive Sally— Heath's Division of A. P. Hill— Death of Hill— The End at Hand— " Richmond Must B» 
 Evacuated " — Scene in St. Paul's Church — A Sad Sunday — A Night of Horrors — Richmond and Peters 
 burg Ev»cvi»ted — Entrance of the National Troops — The Old Flag Restored — Joy and Gratitude. 
 
 Wk return now to the neighborhood 
 of Petersburg and Richmond, 
 where after the battle of Hatch- 
 •jrs Run and at the conclusion of 
 
 1866. 
 
 Warren's expedition, as before de 
 scribed, the army of the Potomac and 
 the army of the James went into win 
 ter quarters. With the left -^f thu 
 
DBSTRXJCTION OF THE DREWRY. 
 
 army of the Potomac, Grant maintained 
 a firm hold on the Weldon Railroad. 
 His right, which consisted of the army 
 of the James and which was stationed 
 on the north side of the river of that 
 name, extended to within a few miles 
 of Richmond. Sheridan, now undis- 
 puted master of the Shenandoah Valley 
 from Harper's Ferry to Staunton, had 
 his headquarters at Kemstown, near 
 Winchester. 
 
 It was not until near the end of 
 March, that Grant was ready for a 
 general movement upon the Confeder- 
 ate Knes. The opening months of the 
 year, however, were not spent wholly 
 in idleness. Several events of minor 
 importance served to disturb the mo- 
 notony of winter quarters. On New 
 Jan. Year's day, the bulkhead of the 
 !• Dutch Gap Canal was partially 
 blown out by the explosion of mines. 
 The earth was thrown up to a consid- 
 erable height ; but, instead of being cast 
 forward, as was desired, it fell back 
 into its foiTner position. Connection 
 mth the river \va8 not established ; and 
 oi course the canal remained useless 
 for the pui-poses for which it was in- 
 tended. 
 
 Heavy rains, about the middle of 
 January, swelled the James River to 
 several feet above its ordinarj' level, 
 flooding the low grounds along its 
 banks, and tearing away the pontoon 
 bridges at Aiken's Landing and Dutch 
 Bottom ; and the enemy, taking advan- 
 tage of the high water, dui-ing the 
 absence of Porter's fleet, prepai-ed his 
 iron-clads in the James for a descent on 
 City Point. A fleet composed of 3 
 
 iron-clads, the Virginia, Richmond and 
 Fredericksburg, each carrying 4 guns; 
 the wooden vessels Drewiy, Nanse 
 mond and Hampton, each of 2 guns; 
 the Bedford, one gim ; the steamer 
 Torpedo, and 3 torjiedo boats, at a very 
 early hour on the morning of the 2-4th, 
 dropped down from their anchor- Jj^q 
 age above the Howlett batteries. 24. 
 Moving silently under cover of the 
 darkness, they had all but passed Fnrt 
 Brady, when the guns of the fort 
 opened upon them a tremendous fire. 
 The vessels made a vigorous response, 
 and moving onward were soon beyond 
 the range of the guns. In the brief 
 struggle one of the guns of the fort, a 
 100-pounder Parrott, was dismounted. 
 On reaching the obstructions at Dutch 
 Gap, the Fredei-icksburg pushed 
 through under a full head of steam. 
 The Richmond, the Vh'ginia and the 
 Drewry gi-ounded in att^npting t. 
 follow; and the Fredericksburg was 
 compelled to retura to their assistance. 
 The Drewry could not be got ofl:; and 
 as daylight was approaching, and the 
 fleet was now within range of Battery 
 Pai'sons, she was abandoned. A shell 
 firom the battery, subsequently falling 
 into her magazine, she blew up and 
 was totally demolished. The remain 
 der of the fleet retired up the river. 
 The loss in killed and wounded did 
 not exceed 20 on either side. 
 
 About this time some futile attempts 
 were made to renew negotiations fo 
 peace. After the entire breaking up 
 of Hood's army by Thomas, and the 
 march of Sherman, almost unopposed, 
 from Atlanta to Savannah, a conviction 
 
900 
 
 rHE FALL OF PETERSBURG AND RICHMOND. 
 
 began to prevail very generally in the 
 South as well as in the North, that the 
 strength of the rebellion was broken. 
 Without Sherman's command, the Na- 
 tional forces in the field were anffi- 
 ciently numerous to ensure final success. 
 The North had, therefore, one great 
 army to spare, while the Confederacy, 
 in men, in resources of every kind, and 
 In the spirit with which the contest was 
 carried on, was known to be failing 
 rapidly. A belief came to be generally 
 entertained in the North, that a large 
 portion of the Southern leaders were 
 not indisposed to accept peace, even on 
 condition of entire submission to the 
 National authority. Some of the best 
 and more sagacious of the Confederate 
 le«A<5rj had long seen that success was 
 ho^^eless; and they were only solicitous 
 f bringing the war to a close in some 
 way which should not wound too 
 Keenly the pride and self-respect of the 
 Southern people. A large class in the 
 North were also desirous that efforts 
 should be made to put a stop to the 
 war as soon as it could be done without 
 materially sacrificing the national inter- 
 ests. Into the details of these peace 
 efforts we shall not enter. They were 
 all failures, and they had no appreci- 
 able effect on the war. 
 
 It was now the Slst of January. 
 There were signs of imusual activity 
 all along the National lines. Grant, 
 resolved to put in execution a long 
 projected movement towards the ene- 
 my's right had issued marching orders 
 to the entire army in front of Peters- 
 burg — the Second, Fifth, Sixth and 
 Niath corps. The hospitals were 
 
 cleared, and the sick sent back to City 
 Point; the quartermasters' and com- 
 missary stores also were sent out of 
 harm's way. The cars were kept run- 
 ning constantly to City Point until the 
 afternoon of Saturday the 4th of Feb- 
 ruary, when Gregg's division of cavalry 
 received orders to march at three on 
 the following morning. The Fifth 
 corps was to follow at five, and the 
 Second at six. The object of the move 
 ment was to get possession of the 
 South Side Railroad, which, it was 
 hoped, would cause the evacuation of 
 Petersburg. Gregg's division started 
 at the hour appointed ; and, mov- Yeh. 
 ing along the Jerusalem plank- 6. 
 road, the advance reached Reams' Sta 
 tion soon after daybreak. The Fifth 
 corps moved along the Halifax road — 
 Ayres' division in the advance. Griffin's 
 next, and Crawford's in the rear. These 
 troops formed the expeditionary oi 
 flanking column. Along the Vaughan 
 road marched Smyth's and Mott's di- 
 visions of the Second corps. These 
 troops had the duty assigned them of 
 moving directly on the enemy's works 
 at Hatcher's Run, while the Fifth corps 
 and Gregg's cavalry marched around 
 their right. The weather and the roads 
 were good ; and the troops, carrying 
 four days' rations, were in excellent 
 spirits. Gregg's cavalry column, ad 
 vancing from Reams' Station towards 
 Dinwiddle Court House, encountered, 
 at Rowanty Creek, a body of Wade 
 Hampton's cavalry, dismounted and in 
 trenched. After a sharp skirmish, the 
 bridge across the creek, and the works 
 were carried; and 22 of the garrison 
 
HATCHER'S BUN. 
 
 »01 
 
 were made prisoners. The Nationals 
 lost 20 men. The stream was, at this 
 time, about 20 feet vsdde. As it was 
 too deep for fording, it was necessary 
 to construct bridges to enable the 
 Fifth corps to get over with its ord- 
 nance, supply trains, and ambulances. 
 This caused a delay of several hours. 
 The cavalry, however, moved on rap- 
 idly to Dinwiddle Court House, where 
 they captured an empty wagon train, 
 and sent out scouting parties in vari- 
 ous directions. At nightfall Gregg 
 retuj-ned to Rowanty Creek, and en- 
 camped. 
 
 General Humphreys, with the second 
 and third divisions of his corps, moved 
 down the Vaughan road to Hatcher's 
 Run — Mott with the third division in 
 tie advance, De Trobriand's brigade 
 leading. De Trobriand deployed his 
 brigade ia line of battle ; and, sending 
 the Ninety-Ninth Pennsylvania over in 
 skirmishing order, he carried the works 
 and secured the ford. The Cuoieder- 
 ates were compelled to take refuge in 
 the woods. The brigade then taking 
 position on a hill beyond the ford, 
 threw up intrenchments. But the cav- 
 alry battalion, which had crossed a 
 little to the south of the Vaughan 
 road, while pursuing the enemy and 
 reconnoitring on the left, met a small 
 force in ambush, from which it received 
 a sharp volley, and lost a number of 
 'oen and horses. 
 
 General Smy+h, in the mean time, 
 before the run was crossed and while 
 his division was yet half a mile from 
 the stream, turned off to the right, 
 
 ng a by-path, leading northeastward 
 
 towards Armstrong's Mill and Ford 
 After an advance of about a mile, a 
 heavy force of the enemy, under Gordon, 
 was found in a strong position, with 
 pickets thrown out in front. The Con 
 federates having retired within their 
 breastworks, Smyth formed his men in 
 line of battle, his left connecting with 
 Mott's right. Earth-works were also 
 thrown up and other preparations made 
 to resist an attack. Skirmishing went 
 on tUl about two o'clock, when a fui-i 
 ous artillery fire was begun by the 
 enemy. About half-past four, the ene- 
 my fell with great weight on Smyth's 
 right flank, striking principallj McAl- 
 lister's and Murphy's brigades. With 
 their accustomed yell, the Confederates 
 pressed through a diflScult swamp upon 
 which Smyth's right partly rested , 
 but the troops, standing firm behind 
 their breast-works, received them with 
 such a musketry fire that they fell back 
 again to the woods. This attempt to 
 cany the works on the right flank, and 
 thus turn the National position, was 
 repeated a second and a third time, but 
 with the same result. It was not until 
 darkness fell that the fighting was dis- 
 continued. Smyth's lines remained 
 intact. When morning dawned, it was 
 found that the Confederates had aban- 
 doned their ground in front of the 
 Second corps. During the night the 
 lines were re-formed so that the fgi, 
 Fifth and Second corps were •• 
 brought into connection, the SeconJ 
 on the right, the Fifth on the left^ 
 the latter covered by Gregg's cavalry. 
 The Sixth and Ninth corps were also 
 BO disposed as to be able to rendei 
 
902 
 
 THE FALL OF PETERSBURG AND RICHMOND, 
 
 assistance to the Fifth and Second, if 
 necessary. The lines, as usual in the 
 presence of the enemy, were covered 
 vrith rude breast-works. Early in the 
 forenoon, De Trobriand and McAllister 
 oioved out their brigades and recon- 
 noitred in the dii-ection of Petersburg. 
 About noon, Crawford's division of the 
 Fifth corps was sent towards Dabney's 
 Mills with the \new of getting to the 
 Boydton plank-road. The entire region, 
 to be traversed in this direction, was ill 
 adapted for marching or manoeuvring. 
 It was covered with thick woods, and 
 broken up in all directions with swamps 
 and ravines. There was but one road ; 
 and it was so narrow that two wagons 
 could not pass each other. The troops, 
 advancing in skinnishing order on the 
 right and left of the road, were more 
 unfortunate than those moving along 
 it, as the ground was softer, covered 
 with thick underbrush, and swai-ming 
 with Confederate sharp-shooteiu T'^e 
 men lost their shoes in the mud ; and 
 their muskets and ammunition were 
 made useless by water. About two 
 miles above the Vaughan road, Craw- 
 ford's skirmishers met those of the 
 enemy under Pegram, and drove them 
 back. Pegram sent for assistance, and 
 was quiikly reinforced by Evans' di- 
 vision. The persevering advance of 
 Crawford was at length checked, but 
 not before the enemy had been driven 
 Deyond Dabney's Mills. 
 
 Gregg with the cavalry, on the left 
 
 f the Vaughan road, had been fighting 
 
 or some time, the enemy's cavaliy 
 
 having commenced the day by pressing 
 
 his rear so that Davies' brigade, and 
 
 subsequently the entire division, became 
 engaged. During a lull in the fighting, 
 the cavalry threw up breast-works, 
 which proved of immense advantage. 
 Towards evening the enemy attacked 
 again in force, driving in the picket 
 and forcing the troops to take refuge 
 behind their intrenchments. Heavy 
 firing followed, the Nationals, some oi 
 whom were armed mth the Spencei 
 rifle, inflicting considerable loss upon 
 the enemy. The battle became very 
 severe; and Gregg, who was finally 
 driven out of his breast-works, was 
 forced back to Hatcher's Rim. 
 
 While the cavalry had thus been 
 desperately engaged on the left, the 
 infantry on the right of the Vaughan 
 road had to withstand repeated shocks. 
 Soon after five o'clock, the enemy came 
 down upon the Fifth corps. As it was 
 apprehended that Crawford's division, 
 entangled in the woods, might be cut 
 off, Ayres' division was sent to its sup- 
 port ; but while moving in column it 
 was attacked and diiven back. Wheat- 
 on's division of the Sixth corps, which 
 arrived about five o'clock, was also 
 ordered up to the support of Crawford, 
 and part of it was, for a time, hotly 
 engaged. This division, however, shan,d 
 in the general reverse, and soon joined 
 the Fifth corps and Gregg's cavaliy, 
 both of which Avere falling back in 
 confusion. The force of the enemy 
 consisted of Pegram's and Evans' divis 
 ions of Gordon's corps, and Mahcne' 
 division of A, P, Hill's corps. In th 
 presence of these veteran troops, and 
 in a broken and swampy countiy, in 
 which the enemy had ^eatly the 
 
SHEKIDAN'S GREAT EAID. 
 
 908 
 
 advantage, in being well acquainted vvith 
 the ground, a retreat could not be con- 
 ducted with anything like a regular 
 formation. The scattered troops fought 
 as they fell back, every irian for him- 
 self, firing from behind trees and such 
 shelter as they could find ; nor was it 
 until the Vaughan road and Hatcher's 
 Run were reached and the intrench- 
 ments regained, that the routed col- 
 umns could be rallied. Flushed with 
 success, the Confederates dashed out of 
 the woods into the open space in fi'ont 
 of the works. Received with a sharp 
 fire they fell back quickly to their 
 cover, without attempting to carry the 
 defenses. Thus ended the second bat- 
 tle of Hatcher's Run. The Confeder- 
 ate loss was about 1000 in killed and 
 wounded. Among the former was 
 General Pegram. The Nationals sus- 
 tained a loss of nearly 2000 men. 
 General Crawford's division suffered 
 severely. 
 
 ' The National troops busied them- 
 selves all night, and during the morning 
 Feb. ^^ *^^ '^*^' ^^ strengthening their 
 
 7 . defenses, believing that the Con- 
 federates would attack again ; but, as 
 they showed no disposition to do so, 
 Crawford's division was sent out to 
 reconnoitre. The enemy was found in 
 a strong position higher up the stream, 
 between Armstrong's and Burgess' 
 Mills. A sharp musketry fire was kept 
 up for some time ; but as Crawford was 
 not strong enough to force the enemy's 
 lines, he fell back again towards the 
 intrenchments. There was also con- 
 ^derable artillery firing during the day. 
 On the 8th there was no fighting. The 
 
 troops, however, were kept busy during 
 the entire day throwing up iutiench- 
 ments and defensive works. The result 
 of the entire movement was the pro- 
 longation of the National line in the 
 direction of the South Side Railroad, aa 
 far as Hatcher's Run, to which the 
 City Point Railroad was continued 
 
 Before commencing a general moy^e- 
 ment of the armies operating against 
 Richmond and Petersburg, it was of 
 the utmost importance that all the 
 enemy's communications, north of the 
 James, should l-e cut oii. To accom- 
 plish this object, and with a view also 
 if possible, to reinforce Sherman, who 
 was inferior to his opponents in ca\^alry, 
 Grant determined to set in motion an 
 expedition from the Shenandoah Val- 
 ley. Placing General Hancock tempo 
 rarily in charge of the Middle MUitarj 
 Division, with his headquarters at Win 
 Chester, Grant directed Sheridan to pro 
 ceed with an adequate cavaliy force to 
 Lynchburg, and after thoroughly break 
 ing up the railroad and canal, to pus> 
 southward and join Sherm.in. Accord 
 ingly, Sheridan, on the 27th of Febru- 
 ary, left his camp at Winchester with 
 about 10,000 cavalry, comprising Mer- 
 ritt's first division, Custer's third divis 
 ion, and a brigade under Colonel Cape 
 hart, Avith 4 gims. For some days 
 before the march commenced, heavy 
 rains had prevailed. The roads there 
 fore, were very bad ; and the streams 
 and rivers were greatly swollen. The 
 troops, however, marched along the 
 turnpike, Avhich, being macadamized; 
 was in comparatively good condition, 
 and passed successively through Kem& 
 
 I 
 
904 
 
 THE FALL OF PETEKSBURG AND RICHMOND. 
 
 town, Middletown, and Strasburg, reach- 
 ing Woodstock, vpithout encountering 
 opposition. At Woodstock the column 
 bivouacked, having marched 30 miles 
 »n the first day. Thence the march 
 was continued, on the 28th, through 
 Edenburg and Hawkinsburg to the 
 North Fork of the Shenandoah, which 
 was crossed by a pontoon bridge be- 
 tween Mount Jackson and New Market. 
 After a march of 27 miles, the troops 
 bivouacked at Lincoln's Mills, between 
 Harrisonburg and New Market. On 
 the 1st of March, the column moved 
 26 miles, passing through Harrisonburg, 
 Mount Crawford, and Mount Sydney, 
 and, crossing Middle River, encamped 
 about 4 miles from Staunton. At this 
 place, it was known, Early had his 
 head-quarters. The Confederate chief, 
 dowever, had anticipated Sheridan's 
 approach, and warned the inhabitants, 
 who removed from the town much of 
 their money and valuables. 
 
 The only skirmishing, so far, had 
 been at the North River, near Mount 
 Crawford, where Capehart's brigade 
 had a sharp contest vrith some cavalry 
 of Rosser's division, who were trying to 
 bum the bridge. The bridge, however, 
 was saved; and 37 prisoners and 21 
 wagons were captured, with a loss of only 
 6 men. The weather had been good, 
 permitting 83 miles of the march to be 
 easily accomplished. During the night 
 of the 1st of March, the rain began to 
 fall About nine o'clock, while the troops 
 were encamped outside of Staunton, 
 Devin's brigade moved up to the town, 
 drove out the pickets, and occupied 
 it without op|»osition. Turning then 
 
 towards the left, the brigade marched 7 
 miles along the road leading to Rock 
 fish Gap, and destroyed the trestle 
 bridge of the Virginia Central Raili'oad 
 at Christian's Creek. 
 
 On the 2d of March, Sheridan's 
 column, heedless of the rain, jjgj^ 
 wflich stUl continued to fall in 2. 
 torrents, moved through Staunton ; and 
 the march was continued towards 
 Waynesboro, on the South River, 13 
 miles southeast, whither Early had 
 retreated with the forces under his 
 command At Fisherville, Custer's 
 division, in the advance, encountered 
 the enemy's videttes and drove them 
 back towards Waynesboro. On arriv- 
 ing near the latter place, the Confed- 
 erates were found in an intrenched 
 position, with 5 guns. Custer then, 
 placing Colonel Pennington's brigade 
 on the right, and Colonel Welles' on 
 the left, with Capehart's in reserve, de- 
 ployed two regiments of the advanced 
 brigades as skirmishers, who moved to 
 the attack firing briskly. Much to the 
 surprise of their assailants, the Confed- 
 erates, after filing a single volley, broke 
 and attempted to retreat ; but Custer's 
 troops, rushing in and surrounding 
 them, captured some 1600 men, about 
 two-thirds of Early's whole command 
 Among the captures were 11 gims, 17 
 battle-flags, over 100 horses and mules, 
 and about 200 wagons loaded with sub- 
 sistence stores. Early's personal bag 
 gage was taken, but he himself escaped 
 to Charlottesville. This was the end 
 of Early as a military leader. 
 
 Custer's division and Capehart's 
 brivjade crossed the South River and 
 
SHERIDAN MOVING TO W^ITE HOUSE. 
 
 906 
 
 moved on rapidly in pursuit as far as 
 Greenwood Station, destroying the de- 
 pot and a train, in which were 6 pieces 
 of artillery with commissary and ord- 
 nance supplies, which Early had in- 
 tended to send away. The prisoners 
 were sent to Winchester under an 
 escort of 1500 men. On the 6th, the 
 escort was attacked, while crossing the 
 North Fork of the Shenandoah, by a 
 small force under Rosser. Rosser, 
 however, was beaten off, and the num- 
 ber of prisoners was increased. The 
 detachment arrived at Winchester, with 
 its charge, safe. Sheridan's entire col- 
 umn having come up to Waynesboro, 
 the march was resumed, on the morning 
 of the 3d, in the direction of Char- 
 lottesville, 18 miles to the east. The 
 rain was still falling ; and the roads were 
 wretched. The troops, destroying the 
 ailroad and bridges, as they moved 
 long, arrived at Charlottesville on the 
 day of starting ; but they were de- 
 tained there two days, awaiting the 
 arrival of the wagon trains, which were 
 delayed by the wretched condition of 
 the roads. In the mean time bodies of 
 troops sent out, destroyed the railroad 
 in the direction of both Lynchburg and 
 Richmond, as well as the large iron 
 bridges over the North and South forks 
 of the Rivanna River. 
 
 The delay, occasioned by the detention 
 of his trains, finally caused Sheridan to 
 abandon the idea of capturing Lynch- 
 H[ar. ^^^g ', aiid, on the morning of the 
 6. 6th, dividing his force into two 
 .olumns, he sent one southward to 
 Scottsville, whence it marched up the 
 James River Canal to New Market, 
 
 destroying every lock between thos« 
 towns, and working destruction gener- 
 ally. From New Market a detachment 
 was sent on to Duguidsville, to secure 
 the bridge at that point. It was found, 
 when the front was reached, that the 
 bridge was already destroyed, as was 
 that also over the James at Hard wicks- 
 ville. The other column, which moved 
 in a southwesterly direction, succeeded 
 in destroying the railroad as far as Am- 
 herst Court House, 16 miles north of 
 Lynchburg. Thence it moved across 
 the country to New Market, where the 
 two columns effected a junction. The 
 Jame-a River was now so much swollen, 
 that the pontoons were foimd to be 
 useless. The Confederates had also 
 destroyed the bridges by which Sheridan 
 had hoped to get to the South Side 
 Railroad. He had, therefore, only two 
 alternatives, either to return to Winches- 
 ter or to march as rapidly as possible to 
 White House. Choosing the latter 
 course, he followed the James River 
 Canal towards Richmond, and destroyed 
 every lock, besides cutting through the 
 banks wherever that was pi-acticable, as 
 far east as Goochland. On the 10th, at 
 Columbia, at the confluence of the Riv- 
 anna with the James, he concentrated his 
 whole force Remaining there one day. 
 he sent scouts to Grant, with information 
 as to his position and intentions with 
 a request that supplies be sent to meet 
 him at White House. His scouts Ug^. 
 arrived at head-quarters, on the !*-• 
 night of the 12th ; and an infantry force 
 was -mmediately sent by Grant to take 
 possession of White House, whither 
 abimdant supplies w»re forwarded 
 
d06 
 
 THE FALL OF PEl'ERSBCrRG AJSID RICHMOND. 
 
 Sheridan, then moving as if he intended 
 to threaten Richmond, arrived at the 
 Central Railroad, near Ashland station. 
 He then crossed the South Anna and 
 the North Anna ; and having destroyed 
 all the bridges and many miles of rail- 
 road, he proceeded down the north 
 bank of the Pamunkey to White House, 
 where he anived on the 19th, his men 
 and horses in great need of rest and 
 supplies. 
 
 The amount of property destroyed, in 
 this great raid, was enormous. It was 
 estimated that the property destroyed 
 by Custer alone amounted to $2,000,- 
 000. Not a bridge was left standing 
 over the James between Richmond and 
 Lynchburg. Every railroad bridge was 
 destroyed between Staunton and Char- 
 lottesville, as well as between the lat- 
 ter place and Buffalo. The aqueduct 
 at Columbia was badly damaged. No 
 kind of property m as spared. It was 
 a general and complete destrac^'ion. 
 Richmond was filled with consterna- 
 tion. The Confederate government 
 was paralyzed. On the 24th, Sheridan 
 moved from White House, crossed the 
 James River at Jones' Landing, and on 
 the 27th, formed a junction vdth the 
 army of the Potomac, in front of Pet- 
 ersbiirg, taking position in Gregg's old 
 camp on the left and rear of the army. 
 
 The course of events in North Caro- 
 lina had now made it the most prudent 
 policy for Lee and Johnston to unite 
 their forces ; and Grant's great source of 
 anxiety at this time was the probability 
 that the Confederates would leave their 
 strong lines about Petersburg and Rich- 
 mond for the purpose of accomplishing 
 
 this union of the two great Confederate 
 armies. " I had spent days of anxiety," 
 says General Grant in his report, " lest 
 each morning should bring the report 
 that the enemy had retreated the night 
 before. I was firmly convinced that 
 Sherman's crossing the Roanoke would 
 be the signal for Lee to leave. With 
 Johnston and him combined, a long, 
 tedious, and expensive campaign, con 
 suming most of the summer, might be- 
 come necessary." From the reports ol 
 deserters and from other sources. Grant 
 had become fully convinced that some 
 such movement was intended, and that 
 Pet»^rsburg was about to be abandoned. 
 L' *:, in truth, had already resolved to 
 penetrate the National lines, and, what- 
 ever the risk, to attempt to force his 
 way from the Appomattox to the 
 Roanoke. 
 
 To prevent such a movement, and 
 with a view to force a final issue. Grant 
 had made arrangements, as early as the 
 24th of March, for a general attack on 
 the 29th. Lee, however, was also bent 
 on carrying out his perilous purjiose; 
 and, on the morning of the 25th, jfg,.^ 
 he fell with crushing weight on 26. 
 the lines of the Ninth corps in front ol 
 Fort Stead man — a square work on 
 Hare's Hill, about a mile from the 
 Appomattox. It was the second regu- 
 lar fort in the right of the National 
 lines. The first was Fort McGOvery, 
 close by the river. The thii'd, to the 
 south, was Fort Haskell. Fort Stead- 
 man mounted 9 guns, and was sup 
 ported by mortar batteries on the right 
 and left. The National line, at this 
 point, was guarded by McLaughlin's 
 
ADVANCE OF THE NATIONAL LEFT. 
 
 907 
 
 brigade of Willcox's division, the Four- 
 teenth New York Heavy Artillery being 
 inside the fort. Gordon's corps con- 
 sisting of three divisions, was massed 
 against it at daylight. The rest of 
 
 iee's army was, at the same time, held 
 in readiness, should the proposed at- 
 tempt prove successful, to make an 
 attack on the National left. The dis- 
 tance between the opposing lines, at 
 Fort Steadman, was only 150 yards. 
 At daybreak, Gordon's troops, having 
 got through the obstructions in their 
 own immediate front, rushed over the 
 interval, charged up the acclivity to the 
 fort, and worked their way rapidly 
 through the abatis. The assatilt was 
 executed in so bold and skilful a man- 
 ner that the National officers were sur- 
 prised. Gordon's troops carried the fort 
 almost without any opposition. Turn- 
 ing the guns of the fort towards the 
 right and left, they compelled the aban- 
 donment of the mortar batteries, which 
 they immediately occupied. Over 500 
 men were made prisoners, including 18 
 commissioned officers. 
 
 Resolved to extend their conquest, 
 the victors moved upon Fort Haskell, 
 then commanded by Major Woermer. 
 The situation had become extremely 
 critical ; and, if Gordon had been well 
 supported, a serious disaster might have 
 befallen the National army. From 
 ■lome cause or other, Lee lost his oppor- 
 tunity. It was his last. Willcox's 
 men were rallied ; Hartranft, with his 
 division, came to the rescue ; and all 
 the neighboring batteries concentrated 
 their fire on Fort Steadman, and the 
 Confederate advance. The enemy made 
 
 good and effective use of the captured 
 guns. It soon became manifest, how 
 ever, that he was engaged in a hopeless 
 struggle. The concentrated fire of the 
 different batteries was working terrible 
 destruction Hartranft's men pressed 
 towards the captured fort, with ai 
 energy and a detennination seMon 
 equalled in war. For a time the battl. 
 raged fiercely. Finally, however, tb. 
 Confederates, recently so elated with 
 victory, were forced back into, and out 
 of Fort Steadman. Some of them 
 made the rash attempt to regain theu 
 own lines ; but such was the enfilading 
 fire from the National artillery, which 
 swept the intervening ground, that 
 they were literally cut to pieces. About 
 1900 surre-ndered, rather than make 
 the perilous attempt. Fort Steadman 
 and the 'x^f works were of couree 
 recovered. The entire Confederate loss 
 was about 2500. The National losb 
 was estimated at 68 kUled, 337 wound 
 ed, and 506 missing. The contest was 
 over by ten o'clock. At Gordon's 
 request, a brief trace was agreed upon ; 
 and the dead were "buried. 
 
 A general advance of the National 
 left was ordered a little later in the 
 forenoon. The Sixth corj>s which lay 
 on the left of the Ninth, and the Second 
 which was on the left of the Si.xth, 
 moved out against the Confederate 
 picket line, which was far in advance u\ 
 the main line of works. The picket lino 
 was captured, without much difficulty; 
 and many prisoners were taken. It was 
 not to be supposed, however, that tlio 
 Confederates would allow the adv;iiictd 
 position to remain in the possession 
 
90S 
 
 THE FALL OF PETERSBUKQ AND RICHMOND. 
 
 of their antagonists, without making 
 a bold effort to reclaim it. Accord- 
 ingly, about half-past two in the after- 
 noon, a vigorous assault was made upon 
 the Sixth corps. A little later, about 
 half -past four, a similar assault was made 
 on the Second corps. The fighting 
 was protracted and severe ; but the 
 Confedorates were ultimately driven 
 back, and, at night, the advanced posi- 
 tion was held by the Nationals. 
 
 Grant's original purpose, which was 
 to open the campaign by a general 
 movement by the left flank, on the 
 2yth, was not in any way affected by 
 the events of the 25th. Adhering to 
 his {>lan, he pushed forward prepara- 
 tions for the grand movement. It will 
 be observed that the movement, con- 
 templated by Grant, was, in its main 
 features, a repetition of those tactics, 
 with which we were made familiar, 
 during the Wilderness campaign. It 
 was his pui'pose to mass on his own 
 left, and, using his right as a pivot, to 
 fall with overwhelming force on Lee's 
 right and vulnerable flank. With the 
 exception of the Ninth corps, which 
 was to form the National right and to 
 be the pivot of the movement, the turn- 
 ing column was to embrace th^ entire 
 army of the Potomac, Sheridan's cav- 
 alry force, and nearly the whole army 
 ">f the James. The right of Le^'s 
 ntrenched line, running southwestward 
 from Petersburg, crossed Hatcher's Run 
 at the Boydton plank road. Thence 
 it extended some distance westward, 
 parallel with Hatcher's Run and along 
 the White Oak roai This line cov- 
 ered Lee's main communication by the 
 
 South Side Railroad. About 4 miles 
 further to the west of the termination 
 of this intrenched front, there was a 
 detached line, running also along the 
 Wliite Oak road, and covering an im- 
 portant strategic point, known as Five 
 Forks. Such was the position which 
 Grant proposed to turn. 
 
 On the 27th, General Ord, then in 
 comm\ud of the army of the James, 
 moved over with the greater portion of 
 his troops, from the Richmond front to 
 the lines before Petersburg. The force, 
 thus transferred, consisted of two di- 
 visions of the Twenty-Fourth corps, 
 under General Gibbon ; one division of 
 the Twenty-Fifth corps, under General 
 Bimey ; and a small division of cavalry, 
 under General McKenzie. They took 
 position on the extreme left of the 
 National line, on the ground occupied 
 on the 25th, by the Second and Fifth 
 corps. The Ninth corps, under General 
 Parke, and the remainder of Ord's com- 
 mand, under General Weitzel, were 
 left to guard the extended line of. 
 intrenchments. 
 
 On the 29th, at an early hour, the 
 Fifth and Second corps, commanded 
 respectively by Warren and Hum- Mar. 
 phreys, led the general advance. ^9. 
 The distance to be traversed was not 
 great ; but the roads were in a wretched 
 condition, and progress was necessarily 
 slow. Warren, marching well to the 
 left, crossed Rowanty Creek, and then, 
 tiiming to the right, moved northward 
 along the Quaker road. Humphreys 
 advancing by the Vaughan road, cross- 
 ed to Hatcher's Run, some 4 miles 
 above Rowanty Creek, and then, like 
 
jEE's oeitiu'Al, position. 
 
 909 
 
 Warren, turned his face to the north. 
 The two corps, on roads nearly parallel, 
 were thus marching towards the flank 
 of the Confederate intrenchments. War- 
 ren had advanced to within 2 miles of 
 the Confederate works, before he en- 
 countered anything like serious opposi- 
 tion. The enemy was then felt in 
 Bome strength. A sharp contest en- 
 sued, the weight of the resistance being 
 chi y bome by Chamberlain's advance 
 brigade, of Griffin's division. Griffin 
 not only held his own — he repulsed the 
 Confederates, who left behind them 
 100 men as prisoners, with a consider- 
 able number of dead and wounded. 
 The National loss, in the encounter, did 
 not exceed 370 men. Warren pressed 
 on, and drew fire from the Confederate 
 works on the White Oak road. Hum- 
 phreys, whose pathway was mure diffi- 
 cult than that of Warren, had neared, 
 )ut not reached the Confederate works, 
 when night compelled him to discon- 
 tinue his advance. Sheridan, mean- 
 while, having moved by a more cir- 
 cuitous and more adventurous route, 
 had reached Dinwiddle Court House, 
 about 6 miles southwest of the position 
 occupied by the right of the National 
 advance. 
 
 Such was the situation on the night 
 of the 29th. The National line was 
 practically unbroken from Dinwiddle 
 Court House, to the Appomattox, and 
 was in the following order : Parke, 
 Wright, Ord, Humphreys, Warren, 
 Sheridan. It had been Grant's inten- 
 tion — and instructions had been given 
 accordingly — that Sheridan should cut 
 loose from the rest of the army, and 
 
 set out on an expedition against the 
 South Side and Danville RaUroads. 
 The Lieutenant-General, in the brief 
 interval, had changed his mind with 
 regard to the disposition of the cavalry ; 
 and on the 29th, he so informed Sheri- 
 dan. " I now feel " wrote Grant, " like 
 ending the matter, if it is possible to 
 do so, before going back. I do not 
 want you, therefore, to cut loose, and 
 go after the enemy's roads at present. 
 In the morning, push around the ene- 
 my, and get on his right rear. We 
 will act all together as one army here, 
 until it is seen what can be done with 
 the enemy." 
 
 The position of Lee had now become 
 extremely critical. To a man of weaker 
 nerve, and less fruitful of resource, it 
 would certainly have seemed desperate. 
 He knew that Grant was massing his 
 troops on his own left, and that a vig- 
 orous attack was contemplated in the 
 direction of the Confederate right. As 
 yet, however, he was ignorant of the 
 actual condition of the National right. 
 He did n<^t know that Grant had so 
 concentrated on his own left, that he 
 was incapable of making any offensive 
 movement with his light. It Avas allim 
 portant that effective resistance should 
 be offered to the threatened movement, 
 on his right ; for if success should at- 
 tend his antagonist in that direction, 
 his only remaining lines of communica- 
 tion with the rest of the Confederacy 
 would be effectually severed. It was 
 also of the utmost importance, as he 
 conceived, that his long intrenched 
 line — some 35 miles in length — which 
 covered Petersburg and Richmop i 
 
910 
 
 THE FALL OF PETEKSBURG AND RICHMOND. 
 
 sliould be preserved intact ; for if the 
 line sliould be penetrated, at any one 
 point, the struggle would be rendered 
 hopeless. To oppose the threatened 
 movement, and to protect his intended 
 ine, he had only 37,000 muskets, and 
 BmaU body of broken-down horse. 
 [n the emergency, the Confederate com- 
 mander was not found wanting. Of 
 the two evils which stared him in the 
 face, and from one or other of which 
 escape was impossible, he chose the 
 less. He sti-ij^ped his intrenched lines, 
 as far as was possible, and concentrated 
 his strength on his th-eatened right 
 flank. It was unfoi+nnate for Lee that 
 he was ignorant of tne strength of the 
 Nationals, in front of his owti left. 
 Two divisions of Longstreet's corps, 
 some 8000 strong, guarded the lines of 
 Richmond ; and Mahone's division of 
 Hill's corps protected those in front of 
 Bermuda Hundred. On the Petersburg 
 side were the divasions of Wilcox, 
 Pickett, Bushrod Johnson, and the rem- 
 nant of Ewell's corps, now under Gor- 
 don. Lonajstreet was ordered to remain 
 where he was for the present ; he was 
 to move to the Petersburg side, as soon 
 as he discovered any weakening of the 
 lines in his front. From the troops on 
 the Petersburg side he drew two divis- 
 ions and three brigades — a force of 
 about 15,000 men; and to these he 
 added what remained of Fitz-Lee's cav- 
 alry. Leaving only some 6000 or 7000 
 men in the Petersburg intrenchments, 
 he hastened, during the stormy night of 
 the 29th and 30th, and placed the troops 
 thus collected in front of the position 
 in which Warren and Humphreys were 
 
 arrested by the darkness. 
 
 On the morning of the 30th, the Na- 
 tional troops were in position and ready 
 to strike. The storm had ceased ; ijij^f^ 
 but the ground was soaked with 30. 
 rain, and the roads were wretched. It 
 was found next to impossible to move 
 the heavy trains. Such in fact, was the 
 condition of the entire surrounding 
 country, that Grant was in no haste to 
 force a decisive issue. Humphreys and 
 Warren were pushed forward, and 
 placed close in front of the Confederate 
 line on the White Oak road and Hat- 
 cher's Run. Sheridan despatched a 
 body of cavalry under Devin, support- 
 ed by Davies" brigade of Crook's divis- 
 ion, in the direcdon of Five Forks. 
 The Confederates, however, were found 
 there in great force ; and the cavalry 
 returned to Dinwiddie Court Hoiise. 
 During the coxu"se of the day. Grant 
 became convinced, from reconnoissances 
 made by his subordinates, that the Con 
 federate lines were weak, and that they 
 might be penetrated without great 
 difficulty. He resolved, therefore, to 
 reinforce Sheridan rather than extend 
 his line, and while leaving it to that 
 officer to execute the flanking move- 
 ments, to assault the enemy's lines with 
 the other corps. 
 
 It was now Friday, the Slst. The 
 ground was still unfavorable for moving 
 large masses of men with all the jja^^ 
 imjjedimenta of war. Grant, be- 31. 
 lieving his position secure, ani influ 
 enced by the weather and the impassa 
 ble character of the ground, was still 
 unwilling to make too much haste 
 Lee, however, had decided differently 
 
A DASHING CONFEDEBATE CHARGE. 
 
 9U 
 
 Grant's delay in striking what was 
 meant to be a decisive blow, had been 
 a great gain to Lee. lie was, indeed, 
 but ill prepared to resist an attack on 
 the morning of the 30th. His troops, 
 however, were now well forward ; antl 
 he had got them into position. The 
 weather had given him time. His pos- 
 ition, however, was pregnant with peiil. 
 Further delay would be no gain to him ; 
 it might be his ruin. Brave and full 
 of resource to the last, he resolved to 
 repeat the experiment which had been 
 so successful in the past, and by reason 
 of which he had foiled so many turning 
 movements. Warren held position, on 
 the Boydton plank-road, with the divis- 
 ions of Grif&n and Crawford. The 
 division of Ayres was thro^vn forward 
 to the west of that road. Early on tLe 
 morning of the 31st, Griffin was relieved 
 by Miles' division of the Second corps, 
 and was thus enabled to develop more 
 fully towards the left. Warren^ in fact, 
 moved his entire corps to the westward 
 of the Boydton road, and pressed for- 
 ward, in the direction of the extreme 
 right of the Confederate line. Ayres' 
 division was in advance ; Crawford's was 
 in the rear, and somewhat to the ri^ht 
 of Ayres' ; Griffin's was in the rear and 
 to the right of Crawford's. Sheridan 
 was so far to the left that several miles 
 intervened between the National caval- 
 ry and Warren's left flank. Warren 
 has been found fault with for this dis- 
 position of his troops ; but, in the cir- 
 cumstances, it is difficult to see how he 
 could have arranged them differently, 
 without acting in opposition to the 
 first principles of military science. He 
 
 could not know at what point the 
 enemy would strike; and so, in place 
 of extending a thin weak line from 
 Himiphreys' left, he disposed his troops 
 in masses en echelon, so as to be ready 
 to resist attack from whatever direct 
 ion it might come, with reinforcements 
 close at hand. Warren was desirous 
 to obtain possession of the White Oak 
 road, beyond the extreme left of the 
 Confederate line of intrenchments ; and 
 after he had received instructions to 
 suspend operations for the day, he ob- 
 tained permission from General Meade 
 to reconnoitre and take possession of 
 the position, if he found it possibln 
 to do so. 
 
 It was this movement which precipi 
 tated the conflict. It was now half- 
 past ten o'clock. Ayres' division, with 
 Winthrop's brigade in advance, had 
 been pushed forward in the directior 
 indicated. The reconnoissance wa 
 scarcely begun, when the enemy was 
 felt; and Lee, with the swiftness of 
 lightning and with the weight of an 
 avalanche, fell upon Warren's advance. 
 Ayres was stunned by the blow, and 
 forced back upon CraAvford. Cravsrford 
 in his turn, pressed by the foe, and dis- 
 organized by the- fugitives, broke and 
 fell back upon Grifiin. The wisdom of 
 the echelon arrangement was now made 
 visible. Griffin stood firm and immov- 
 able ; and, in the more open ground in 
 which his division was posted, the othei 
 two divisions were quickly rallied. 
 The Confederates, elated with wha 
 promised to be a complete victory, 
 were effectually held in check, and 
 Warren, as soon as his lines were re 
 
912 
 
 THE FALL OF PETERSBURG AND RICHMOND. 
 
 stored, made a vigorous counter-charge. 
 Humphreys pushed Miles' division for- 
 ward to Warren's right ; and, while the 
 Fifth corps attacked the Confederates 
 in front, Miles fell heavily on their left 
 iank- For a time the fighting was 
 'vely and spirited in the extreme. 
 Chamberlain's brigade of the Fifth 
 corps, particularly, covering itself with 
 glory. The Confederates were soon 
 compelled to fall back behind their in- 
 trenchments. Humphreys pressed for- 
 ward with great energy, and made 
 hold attacks on the works at the inter- 
 section of the Boydton and White Oak 
 roads, and on the west side of Hatcher's 
 Rim. The works, however, were too 
 strong and too well guarded to be 
 assailed with success. 
 
 Lee had failed in his attack on War- 
 In regaining his intrenchments. 
 
 ren 
 
 owever, he had sustained but little 
 OSS. He was quickly ready for another 
 Dold and determined effort, which he 
 confidently hoped wovdd be attended 
 with better, perhaps enduring success. 
 Sheridan, as we have seen, had failed 
 in the attempt which he made on Five 
 Forks, on the 30th. Impressed, how- 
 ever, with the strategic value of the 
 position, and imdismayed by the exper- 
 ience of the day before, Sheridan made 
 another attempt on the morning of the 
 Slst. Devin's division, supported by 
 Davies' brigade of Crook's division, was 
 pushed forward again in the direction 
 of Five Forka Crook, with his other 
 two brigades, those of Smith and 
 Gregg, encountered and held in check 
 a hostile cavalry force at Chamberlain's 
 Creek. While the Confederate cavalry 
 
 were thus occupied with Crook, an , 
 the Confederate infantry were engaged 
 with Warren, Five Forks was left com 
 paratively unprotected ; and the place 
 was Beizad without difficulty by Devin 
 and Davies. His infantry safe behind 
 their works and Warren's progress 
 effectually checked, Lee resolved that J 
 live Forks should not be left in the ' 
 hands of his antagonist. Detaching 
 porL 2JS of the two divisions of infantry 
 under Pickett and Bushrod Johnson 
 he sent them to regain the lost position. 
 Advancing by the White Oak road, 
 they soon reached Five Forks. The 
 National cavalry were driven from the 
 place and forced back in confusion on 
 Dinwiddle Court House. Pursuing 
 vigorously, with cavalry and infantry, 
 the Confederates reached Chamberlain's 
 Creek, which they attempted to cross ; 
 but, being stoutly resisted by Smith's 
 brigade, they were compelled to seek a 
 crossing further up the creek. Falling 
 upon Davies' brigade, ^nth great weight, 
 they forced it back against the left 
 flank of Devin's division. Both com- 
 mands were thus isolated from the 
 main body, which was at Dinwiddle 
 Court Housa Devin and Davies were 
 thus compelled to make a long detour, 
 by the Boydton plank-road, in order 
 to rejoin their chief and the main body 
 Deceived by this movement, and be 
 lieving it to be a forced retreat, tho 
 Confederates made a left wheel, and 
 were about to make a vigorous pursuit 
 Sheridan, quick and ready, always, in 
 truth, equal to the situation, realized at 
 once his new difficulty, and the oppor- 
 tunity which was so promptly and 
 
GEAVELLY ETJN. 
 
 913 
 
 unexpectedly presented. With the bri- 
 gades of Gregg and Gibbs he charged 
 upon the now exposed flank and rear 
 of the Confederates, and compelled 
 thenc to face about and so give up the 
 [)ursnil Devin and Davies soon re- 
 joined the main body, upon which the 
 Confederates now f eU with tremendous 
 fury, and ^th the combined strength 
 of the cavalry and infantiy then at 
 hand. The numbers were not unequal ; 
 but the fire-arms of their infantry gave 
 the Confederates an advantage. Plucky 
 as he had always shown himself, on 
 every battle-field on which he had been 
 actively engaged, and determined to 
 bear his own burden and do his own 
 work, Sheridan dismounted his troopers, 
 and, placing them behind light breast- 
 works, he opened upon the Confeder- 
 ates, a musketry fire, so swift and so 
 deadly, that they were compelled to 
 fall back The National cavalry, al- 
 though successful in repelling the attack 
 of the enemy, had been somewhat se- 
 verely handled ; and a renewed assault 
 might have been attended with some 
 danger. Happily, darkness intervened, 
 and, for the night, made a fresh assault 
 impossible. 
 
 Grant was greatly pleased with Sheri- 
 dan's conduct. He displayed, he said, 
 ^eat generalship. He did not retreat 
 on the main army, " to tell the story of 
 superior forces encountered." On the 
 contrary, " he deployed his cavalry on 
 foot," and, by compelling the enemy to 
 do the same, " made his progress slow." 
 This was high praise from the Lieu- 
 tenant-General ; but it was justified by 
 the fact. Sheridan had undoubtedly. 
 
 done weU — all indeed he could do ; but 
 no one knew better than himself that 
 the shades of evening had fallen like a 
 blessing. 
 
 The night of the 31st of March, waa 
 an anxious night, at the head-quarters 
 of the National army. It was known 
 that the cavalry had been attacked and 
 driven from Five Forks, and that they 
 had been attacked again, in force, at 
 Dinwiddle Court House. It was the 
 general conviction, that Sheridan could b 
 not hold his own, unless strongly rein- 
 forced. Warren, accordingly, was or- 
 dered to his relief vnih the Fifth corps. 
 Warren promptly obeyed, and hurried 
 off Ayres, with hia division. Unfor- 
 tunately, however, the bridge at Gravel- 
 ly Run, over which it was intended 
 that Ayres' troops should pass, was 
 ^o^ud to be destroyed. The construc- 
 tion of a bridge, sufficient to pass in 
 fantry, necessarily occasioned some de 
 lay. It was near twQ o'clock on the 
 morning of April 1st, when the division 
 was crossed and on its way to Dinwid- 
 dle. When made aware of the condi- 
 tion of the crossing at Gravelly Run, 
 Meade suggested to Warren the pro- 
 priety of sending troops both by the 
 Boydton road, and by the Quaker road, 
 considerably further to the east. It 
 was a distance of about 10 miles to 
 Dinwiddle by the Quaker road; and 
 Warren not unjustly judged that the 
 wiser course was to abide the issue of 
 the movements already commenced, 
 retaining the divisions of Griffin and 
 Cravpford where they were, until he 
 should hear that Ayres had reached 
 Dinwiddle. The result proved that h«i 
 
914 
 
 THE FALL OF PETERSBURG AND KICHMOND 
 
 acted not unwisely. While this anxiety 
 prevailed at head-quarters, Sheridan, 
 himself, had ceased to have any fear 
 regarding his position. Before mid- 
 night, indeed, he became aware that 
 Lee had mthdrawn the greater part of 
 is troops from his immediate front. 
 Fearing for the welfare of the isolated 
 l^orce in the immediate front of AVarren, 
 [liee, as early as ten o'clock, on the night 
 of the 31st, had recalled his troops from 
 Dinwiddle, and taken position at Five 
 Forks. In such a position, in the event 
 of any attack being made by Warren, 
 he would be better able to render the 
 needed assistance. At earliest dawn 
 April o'^ *^® morning of April Ist, and 
 1 . shortly after he had been joined 
 by Ayres, Sheridan put his whole force 
 in motion, in the direction of Five 
 Forks. Warren, meanwhile, had march- 
 ed across the country, with his two 
 3ther divisions ; and, by seven o'clock, 
 he formed a junction witn the cavalry, 
 midway between Dinwiddle and Five 
 Forks. Sheridan, who ranked Warren, 
 assumed command of the entire force. 
 He had now under his immediate con- 
 trol, four divisions of cavalry, and three 
 of infantry — an aggregate force, a; least 
 25,000 strong. It would be difficult, 
 if not impossible, for Lee to oppose 
 him at Five Forks with more than half 
 of that number. 
 
 Such was the condition of affairs on 
 Saturday, April Ist. Lee's line, as we 
 have seen, all the way between Hatch- 
 er's Run and the Appomattox, was 
 thinly guarded. There was hardly 
 more than one man to five yards of 
 front. Confi'onting this line, ae has 
 
 also been mentioned, were the corps o* 
 Parke, Wright, Ord and Humphreys. 
 At any one point that line might have 
 been easily penetrated. The original 
 plan of battle, however, was strictly 
 adhered to. Grant remained resolut 
 in his determination to turn the Cou 
 federate right flank ; and to this end 
 he was bending all his energies. The 
 key-point of the entire situation was 
 Five Forks. For the defense of this 
 position, Lee had accumulated aU his 
 available force. Towards this point 
 Sheridan was now marching with both 
 cavalry and infantry. As early as four 
 o'clock, on the morning of the 1st, an 
 attack was made by the Confederates, 
 on Foster's division of the Twenty- 
 Fourth corps. The blow, which was 
 unexpected, was swiftly and skilfully 
 delivered, and was attended with mo- 
 mentary success. Foster's men yielded 
 to the pressure ; and the Confederate 
 flag was raised on the deserted parapet. 
 The Nationals quickly rallied ; and the 
 enemy, glad to escape to his lines, left 
 behind him some 50 prisoners. For a 
 time the artillery thundered ; and there 
 were demonstrations made by the Na- 
 tionals along the whole line. This 
 morning affair, however, was only an 
 episode ; it was not the great feature of 
 the day. During the morning and 
 forenoon, Sheridan kept pressing for- 
 ward, in the direction of Five Forks. 
 By two o'clock, he had forced the Con- 
 federates inside their works. Merritt 
 with his cavalry, while he was to hold 
 the enemy firmly in his front, was in 
 structed to make a vigorous demonstra 
 tion. as if his real object was to turn 
 
FIVE FORKS. 
 
 915 
 
 tu3 opponent's right flank. Warren, 
 svith the Fifth corps, was ordered to 
 move, so that, at the proper time, his 
 whole weight would fall on the Con- 
 federate left. In order the more com- 
 pletely to enclose his antagonist, in his 
 toils, Sheridan directed McKenzie, with 
 his brigade, to move along the White 
 Oak road, and take place on Warren's 
 right, thus guarding against any hostile 
 movement, which might be made from 
 the diiection of Petersburg. It was a 
 well arranged plan ; and there was 
 every leason to believe that, if prompt- 
 ly executed, it would be attended with 
 complete success. McKenzie, when ad- 
 vancing to take the position assigned 
 him, encountered and routed a body of 
 the enemy's cavalry, driving them to- 
 wards Petersburg. He had returned 
 and joined the main body, on the 
 White Oak road, just as Warren ad- 
 vanced to the attack 
 
 It was now foirr o'clock. Sheridan 
 had expected to make the attack, at an 
 earlier hour. He had, himself, as we 
 have seen, reached the ground about 
 two o'clock. He blamed Warren for 
 the delay. That general, before resum- 
 ing his march to the point assigned 
 him, deemed it mse to form his whole 
 corps in battle order. This, of course, 
 consumed a certain amount of time ; 
 and Warren informed his chief that he 
 could not be ready for an assault before 
 four. At the hoiir named, he was 
 ready. Ayres was on the left ; Craw- 
 ford was on the right ; and Griffin was 
 behind Crawford in reserve. Each of 
 the two advanced divisions had two bri- 
 gades in front ; and each brigade was 
 
 in two lines of battle. The third bri 
 gade of each was also aiTanged in tw<' 
 lines of battle, behind the centre of the 
 two former lines. Giiffin's division 
 which, as we have said, was in the rear 
 of the right, was arranged in column of 
 battalions in mass. The lines, as they 
 advanced, were to keep closed to the 
 left; and they were to pi'eserve their 
 direction, in the woods, by keeping the 
 sun over their left shoulders. The point, 
 immediately aimed at, was on the 
 White Oak road, and a little beyond 
 the enemy's left flank. That point 
 reached, they were to swng around 
 pivoting on the left ; and then, having 
 foi-med perpendicular to the White 
 Oak road, they were to advance and 
 fall on the Confederate left. 
 
 The entire distance, between Warren 
 and the White Oak road, was only 
 about 1000 yards A few minutes was 
 sufficient to enable the Fifth corps te 
 accomplish the intended movement 
 The enemy had, in the meantime, re- 
 fused his left in a crotchet, about 100 
 yards in length, and turned northward 
 to the main line. This refused line was 
 covered by a strong breastwork, and 
 by a dense undergrowth of pines 
 Ayres' division which, as we have said, 
 was to be the pi^ot on which the other 
 two divisions were to wheel, as soon as 
 it effected its ctiange of front, encoun- 
 tered the enemy's skirmishers in front 
 of the crotchet. Crawford's division, ir 
 taking position, was exposed to a heav; 
 fire on its left — a fire which was, at the 
 same time, working some mischief ol 
 Ayres' right. Crawford, in order to 
 obtain the shelter of woods and a ridge 
 
916 
 
 TUE FALL OF PETERSBURG AND RICHMOND. 
 
 obliqued somewhat to the right, and 
 thus produced a gap between his own 
 division and that of Ayres. Ayres' 
 right, in fact, was for a time, so to 
 apeak, "in air;" and so terrific was the 
 fire on that exposed flank, that the 
 troops became unsteady, large numbers 
 of them breaking and falling back to 
 the rear. This, however, was but a 
 short-lived difficulty; for Griffin flung 
 his division into the gap, and Ayres, 
 his men quickly rallying, rushed upon 
 the intrenched crotchet, and by an im- 
 petuous charge, carried it, capturing 
 about 1000 men, with several battle 
 flags, Griffin fell upon the works, in 
 his front, and captured them, taking 
 1 500 prisoners. Crawford, moving more 
 to the right, reached the Ford road ; 
 and then, wheeling round, his face now 
 to the south, he fell upon the enemy's 
 rear, and captured 4 guns. The sound 
 of the guns on the right, was the signal 
 for the cavalry to attack. Merritt led 
 his troopers forward with great gallan- 
 try, Devin and Custer, his immediate 
 subordinates, rivalling each other in 
 deeds of daring and of skill. The cav- 
 alry, however, were Avarmly received ; 
 and, in a few seconds, numbers of ^der- 
 less horses were seen galloping over the 
 clain, wildly screaming and sniffing the 
 air with terror — sad evidences of the 
 deadly precision of the musketry fire of 
 the enemy. The Confederates, pressed 
 in front flank and rear, in great num- 
 bers, threw down their arms. A smaU 
 but determined body, however, contin- 
 ued to parry the thrusts of the cavalry 
 in the front, and the hostile movements 
 of Warren, who had again concentrated 
 
 his forces at right angles with the 
 White Oak road. Warren experienced 
 a most stubborn resistance. At this 
 stage, the personal courage of that gen- 
 eral was conspicuously revealed. His 
 troops, somewhat disorganized, halted 
 without orders, in their forward move 
 ment. Wairen sprang to the front, ana 
 called on his men to follow him. ITie 
 action was electric. The call was irre- 
 sistible. There was one ■nald rush ; 
 the works were carried ; and all that 
 remained of the enemy was captured. 
 In this final *^ffort, Warren had his 
 horse shot undtc' hira ; and, but for the 
 timely interfeience of Colonel Rich- 
 ardson, who was severely wounded in 
 shielding his loved commander, he 
 himself might have penshed. Pickett 
 and Johnson had done their best ; but 
 their best had failed. Those of the 
 Confederates, who were not captured, 
 were now retreating in wild confusion, 
 in a western direction, hotly pursued 
 by the mounted divisions of Merritt 
 and McKenzie. The trophies of the 
 day were several guns and colors, with 
 more than 5000 prisoners. Of these 
 last, 3244 were taken by the Fifth 
 corps. The National loss was compar- 
 atively trifling, not exceeding 1000 in 
 all, of which 634 belonged to the in- 
 fantry. 
 
 Such was the battle of Five Forks, 
 Of all the battles of the war, few wer« 
 more brilliant or more decisive. It 
 redounded to the honor and increased 
 the already great reputation of General 
 Sheridan. It was equally a credit to 
 General Warren. It was his Fifth 
 corps which, under his direction, fought 
 
A TERRIFIC CA5JN0NADB. 
 
 gn 
 
 md won the battle. The plan was 
 Sheridan's. The execution of the plan, 
 which was perfect, was mainly done by 
 Warren. For some cause, not satisfac- 
 torily explained, although both generals 
 have written and published on the sub- 
 ject, Sheridan, after the battle, relieved 
 Warren from duty ; and General Griffin 
 was assigned to the command of the 
 Fifth corps. An unpleasantness seems 
 to have existed from the moment that 
 the Fifth corps was ordered to co-oper- 
 ate with, and act under instractions, 
 from Sheridan. It is not so clear on 
 whom the blame for the existence of 
 such a feeling' should rest. Sheridan 
 was dissatisfied with Warren at Din- 
 widdle Court House. His conduct, he 
 thought, was dilatory The cause of 
 the delay has already been explained 
 The bridge at Gravelly Run, by the 
 Boydton plank-road, had been destroy- 
 ed ; and before the run could be crossed, 
 a new bridge had to be constructed. 
 Successful, though he was. General 
 Warren faUed to please Sheridan, at 
 Five Forks. In preparing for battle, 
 he thought, he was slow. He seemed 
 to be lukewarm, or, as Sheridan him- 
 self put it, " his manner gave me the 
 impression that he wished the sun to 
 go down before dispositions for the 
 attack could be completed." This, 
 however, was not all. He blamed him 
 because some of his troops gave way, 
 at the commencement of the contest ; 
 and he charged him, with not exerting 
 himself sufficiently to inspire them 
 with confidence. Such charges, the 
 reader will perceive, are not sustained 
 Dy our narrative. They are not justi- 
 
 fied by the actual facts of the battle. 
 It is difficult, indeed, to acquit Sheri- 
 dan of something like rashness or in- 
 considerate haste in his treatment of 
 Warren. The Lieutenant -General, of 
 course, was made aware of the diffi- 
 cidty between the two commanders • 
 and it is only just to General Grant to 
 say, that his sturdy common sense was 
 never more strikingly displayed, than 
 when, refusing to take any part in the 
 quarrel, he appointed Warren to the 
 chief command in the Department of 
 the Mississippi, then in need of a first 
 class man.* 
 
 The news of the disaster, at Five 
 Forks, was soon known to General Lee. 
 It was a terrible blow. He knew its 
 full meaning. His right flank was 
 turned. The enemy was in his rear. 
 A general assatilt was certain ; and all 
 he could do now was to hold on, an 
 provide for a retreat. The news, o 
 course, was as quickly known to Meade 
 and Grant. Nor were they slow to 
 act. Instantaneously, from their multi- 
 tudinous throats, the National guns, all 
 along the line before Petersburg, opened 
 their murderous fire; and night was 
 made hideous by the roar of artillery 
 and the hissing and bursting of shells. 
 The cannonade continued the entire 
 night. Wrisrht, Parke and Ord were 
 ordered to attack m the early morning ; 
 and Miles' division of Humphreys' 
 corps was ordered to the support of 
 Sheridan. 
 
 • Coppee's Grant and Bit Oampaignt, p. 43*. Sain- 
 ton's Campaign* of the Army of tJu Potomac, p. GOl. 
 BebeOion Record, toL H, pp. M6, 64fl. Ixj^in^g 
 Oimi War, vol. UI, (noU) MZ 
 
 «•« 
 
i;18 
 
 THE FALL OP PETERSBURG AND RICHMOND. 
 
 The 2d was Sunday. At earliest 
 dawn, the assault was opened from 
 April *^^ Appomattox to Hatcher's 
 
 2. Run, Parke, with the Ninth 
 corps, was on the right. Wright, with 
 he Sixth corps, was on the left of Parke. 
 J)rd was on the left of Wright. Parke 
 quickly carried the outer line of in- 
 trenchments ; but he was compelled to 
 halt before an inner cordon of works, 
 on which he could make no impression. 
 Wright, carrying everything before 
 him, and attaining the Boydton plank- 
 road, swept to the left, down the Con- 
 federate intrenchments, and captured 
 many guns and several thousands of 
 prisoners. Ord forced the lines at 
 Hatcher'^ Run, and formed a connec- 
 tion with Wright. Their combined 
 forces then swung to the right, and 
 advanced by the Boydtot road, in the 
 direction of Petersburg. Hiimphreys, 
 who was still more to the left, when 
 he heard of these successes, advanced 
 with two divisions of the Second 
 corps — the divisions of Mott and 
 Hays — storming and carrying a re 
 doubt in his front, and making a con 
 nection with the Sixth corps. Miles 
 with the remaining division of Hum 
 phreys' corps, had, in the meantime, 
 joined Sheridan, and, imder his orders, 
 attacked the remains of the Confeder- 
 ates who had gathered together, west 
 f Hatcher's Run, at the intersection of 
 ahe Claybome road, and driven them 
 lo Sutherland's Station, on the South 
 Side Railroad. Sheridan, at the same 
 time, was hotly pursuing the enemy 
 with the divisions of Bartlett and 
 Crawford of th*. Fifth corps At 
 
 Sutherland's Station, Humphreys re 
 claimed Miles' division ; and Sheridan, 
 returning to the Five Forks, moved 
 across the South Side Railroad, at 
 Ford's and WUson's stations, with the 
 view of striking the Confederates all 
 Sutherland's, in the rear. Miles, mean 
 while, had attacked and routed the foe, 
 at that point, capturing 2 guns and 600 
 men. The South Side Railroad, theii 
 most important line of communication, 
 was thus lost to the Confederates. 
 While these events were taking place. 
 Gibbon's ilivision of Ord's command, 
 had pushed its way to Forts Gregg 
 and Alexander, two strong, enclosed 
 redoubts, the most salient and com 
 manding to the south of Petersburg 
 Fort Gregg was strongly raannti by 
 Harris' Mississippi brigade ; and, for a 
 time. Gibbon's men dashed themselves 
 against it, in vain. Ultirnatf-ly, h^.w 
 ever, and at the early hour of se/en, 
 the fort was carried. It had been a 
 terrific and most determined struggle. 
 Gibbon had lost 500 men ; and of the 
 250 defenders of t>e work, only 3C 
 remained. Fort Alexander, which was 
 but imperfectly p/otected, was more 
 easUy taken. The investing line was 
 now drawn tight and close around Pe- 
 tersburg. 
 
 In this inner line, which was well 
 protected, and which admitted of 
 greater concen ration, Lee was still 
 strong. It was now about ten o'clock. 
 Longstreet, ha ing at length discovered 
 that the force which confronted him, 
 on the north of the James, was a mf re 
 mask, and having withdrawn several o^ 
 his brigades, had just joined Lee • 
 
DEATH OF A. P. HILL. 
 
 919 
 
 Petersburg, with Banning's brigade of 
 Field's division. Thus strengthened, 
 Lee, having made the best arrange- 
 ments possible for the defense of the 
 city, resolved to make an offensive 
 sally, in the direction of the National 
 right, and vnth the view of regaining 
 some works which had been captured 
 by the Ninth corps. Heth's division 
 of A. P. Hill's corps was pushed for- 
 ward to the attack ; and such was the 
 vigor of the onset that the Ninth corps 
 was able with difficulty to maintain its 
 ground. The National troops, then 
 holding City Point, were ordered to its 
 support ; and Heth, after a bold and 
 most determined effort, was repulsed. 
 In this final struggle, A. P. Hill, one of 
 Lee's best generals, and one who during 
 the four years of strife, had taken a con- 
 spicuous part in the defense of Rich- 
 mond, was killed. He had oeen convers- 
 ing with Lee and Mahone. The sounds 
 of battle were coming nearer and nearer. 
 "How is this, General?'' said Lee to 
 Hill, " youi- men are giving way." Fling- 
 ing over his uniform a rough coat, Hill, 
 accompanied by a single orderly, rode 
 forward to reconnoitre. Li a wooded 
 ravine, he came upon half-a-dozen sol- 
 diers, in blue. They raised their rifles 
 and fired. Hill fell dead on the spot.* 
 
 • AxBBOSE Powell Hill, who came to his on timely 
 end doling the final assault on the lines before Peters- 
 Durg, was bom in Culpepper County, Virginia, in 
 1824. He was thus at the time of his death, only 41 
 years of age. In the county, which gave him birth 
 his father was a 'leading merchant, and a prominent 
 politician. Young Hill entered the military academy 
 n 1843, and graduated in 1847, in the same class with 
 leneral Bumaide. He became lieutenant in Beptem- 
 Der, 1861 ; and in 1855 he was promoted to the rank of 
 eaptain. Later, in the same year, he was appointed an 
 Mslatknt in the Coast Survey. This position he held 
 
 The end was now close at hand. 
 The grand drama, so full of strange 
 scenes, and tragic incident, and bo 
 fraught with the destiny of a great 
 nation and people, had reached its last 
 act. Lee was now fully convinced that 
 he could no longer maintain his posi' 
 tion. He decided to hold on until night, 
 and then to retreat by the Danville 
 road, in the hope of effecting a junction 
 with Johnston. About half past ten 
 o'clock, and immediately after the re- 
 pulse of Heth, he telegraphed to Jef- 
 ferson Davis, saying, "My lines are 
 broken in three places ; Richmond 
 must be evacuated this evening. " 
 When the message was handed him by 
 Colonel Taylorwood, Davis was in his 
 
 until March, 1861. When VLrginia seceded, he joined 
 the volunteers of that State, becoming colonel of th« 
 Thirteenth regiment. He took part in the battle of 
 Bull Run. He fought at Williamsburg, where he 
 held the rank of brigadier-general. For his bravery 
 in that fight, he was made major general; and on the 
 25th of June, 1863, he formed one of the council of 
 war, held at Richmond. He was present at Mechan- 
 icsville, and took part in all the subsequent battles of 
 the " Seven Days." He fought against Pope, through- 
 out the Virginia campaign. He was present at An . 
 tietam, at Fredericksburg, at Chancellorsville. When 
 " Stonewall" Jackson received his death wound, the 
 command devolved upon Hill, who was himself se- 
 verely wounded, almost immediately afterwards. For 
 his gaUant conduct at ChanceUorsvilie he was made a 
 lieutenant-general, and put in command of one of 
 three great corps into which the army of Virginia was 
 divided. He took par* 'n the three days' fighting at 
 Gettysburg. He was more fortunate on the first day, 
 than he was on the second and third. From that dat« 
 onto the end, including the manoeuvring in the neigh 
 borhood of Mine Run, the battles In the Wilderness 
 at Spottsylvtinia, at Cold Harbor, before Petersburg 
 and Richmond, he was a prominent actor in the army 
 of Virginia. He lived to see almost the bitter end- 
 but he was spared the humili&te>io which rested so 
 heavily on some of his associates Whatever may b« 
 the opinion entertained regarding the cause, in which 
 and for which he fought, to Ambrose Powell Hill 
 most be accorded a high place among the great hoI- 
 diers begotten, on either side, by the Olvl) W»r. 
 
MO 
 
 THE FALL OF PETERSBUEG AND RICHMOND. 
 
 aeat, in hifl customary place of worship, 
 the Episcopal Church of St. Paul. A 
 livid pallor passed over the face of the 
 ruined president; and he quietly left 
 the church. It was evident to the 
 assembled congregation that something 
 dreadful had happened. The deepest 
 silence prevailed, and the religious ser- 
 vices were closed. In dismissing the 
 congregation, the rector. Dr. Minne- 
 gerode, gave notice that General Ewell, 
 the commander in Richmond, desired 
 the local forces to assemble at three 
 o'clock, in the afternoon. The news 
 passed from lip to lip, and from church 
 to church ; and the sorrowful utterance 
 came from many a pulpit that the 
 same congregation might never meet 
 Again. 
 
 It was, indeed, a sad Sunday in 
 Richmond. The government would 
 give the citizens no positive informa- 
 tion. As the afternoon advanced, how- 
 ever, there was no longer any doubt 
 that the city was about to be aban- 
 doned. At all the Departments, the 
 utmost activity prevailed ; and wagons 
 laden with trunks and boxes were be- 
 ing hurried thence to the station of the 
 Danville Railroad. Davis left the city, 
 about eight o'clock. The members of 
 the Confederate Congress and of the 
 Virginia Legislature had all departed, 
 by nine o'clock. At midnight, all that 
 remained of the Confederate govern- 
 ment was the War Department; and 
 t was represented by Major Melton, 
 J one. 
 
 The tumult had already become great 
 duiiug the afternoon. It became more 
 ^oleiit, when darkness set in. The 
 
 City Council, dreading the consequences 
 which might result from a drunken sol- 
 diery and an intoxicated rabble, ordered 
 the destruction of all liquors. By mid- 
 night, wine, spirits, beer, and other in 
 toxicating liquids ran down the sti'eets 
 in streams ; and the authorities soon 
 became aware, from the number of 
 drunken and disorderly stragglers, that 
 they had committed a grave blunder, 
 and unwittingly created the very evU, 
 they wished to prevent. As no one 
 could leave the city without a pass 
 from the Secretary of War, and as no 
 one could find :;hat functionary. Rich 
 mond, during tne .veary night hours, 
 became a very Pandemonium. Noth- 
 ing was sacred. Nothing was safe. 
 The horrors of the situation were ag- 
 gravated when, at three o'clock in the 
 morning, Ewell, in obedience to oi-ders 
 from Major Melton, set fire to the 
 warehouses. The conflagration was 
 soon beyond control. One thousand 
 houses, covering thirty squares — one- 
 third of the city — were on fire. The 
 War Department, the Treasury, many 
 churches and public buildings, were 
 consirmed. In the midst of the confu- 
 sii^n, the howling mob liberated the 
 prisoners from the State Penitentiary, 
 and then fired the place. Towards 
 morning, when the tumult was at its 
 height, a magazine near the alms-house 
 exploded, with a concussion which 
 shook the city to its foundations 
 Another explosion soon followed. I 
 was the blowing up of the Confederat 
 ram Virginia. A little later, the Fred 
 ericksburg and Richmond, also iron 
 clads, were blown up ; and the receiy 
 
JOY ANL» QBATITUDE. 
 
 ing ship Patrick Henry was scuttled 
 and sunk. In the early morning, 
 El well, wrapt in a faded cloak and a 
 plouched hat, rode away on an iron- 
 gray horse. 
 
 As soon as it \\:i.s liglit on Monday 
 pril mo ing, General Weitzel, who 
 
 S. was holding the National lines 
 north of the James, crossed the aban- 
 doned defenses ; and, at six o'clock, he 
 and his staif, with the second brigade 
 of the third division of the Twenty- 
 Fourth corps, commanded by Geneial 
 Ripley, were in the suburbs of the 
 city. At that time the fire was raging 
 fiercely ; and shells, exploding in the 
 burning arsenal, were ocreaming over 
 the doomed city. At eight o'clock, 
 Weitzel and his stafi entered Rich- 
 mond ; and Lieutenant De Peyster, hav- 
 ing ascended to the roof of the Virginia 
 State House, hoisted over it the old 
 flag of the Republic. The city was 
 >laced under military rule. General 
 Shepley, the same who was put in 
 command of New Orleans, wheu it 
 was captured, was put in conunand 
 of Richmond. Lieutenant - Colonel 
 
 Manning was made provost -marshal 
 The flames were soon got under; and 
 order was restored. With Richmond 
 were captured 1000 prisoners, 5000 sick 
 and wounded in the hospitals, 500 
 cannon, 30 locomotives and 300 cars. 
 Petersburg was taken possession of 
 simultaneously with Richmond. 
 
 The fall of Petersburg and Rich- 
 mond naturally enough filled the North 
 with joy and satisfaction. With the 
 speed of lightning, the glad intelligence 
 was carried broad and wide over the 
 land ; and before nightfall, on that 
 memorable day, the sentiments of the 
 people had found expression in the 
 most enthusia^'tic demonstrations of 
 delight. In tUe larger centres of pop 
 ulation, business was suspended, the 
 public places were crowded; patriot- 
 ic speeches were delivered ; cannon 
 boomed and church bells chimed ; 
 while, in most cases, the assembled 
 multitudes, controlled by a common 
 sentiment, recognized the hand of the 
 God of Battles who had given them 
 the victory, by spontaneous outboTBta 
 of gi-ateful song 
 
922 
 
 THE LAST DAYS OP THE WAR. 
 
 CHAPTER XLIII. 
 
 He End at Hand — The Confederate Retreat — Chesterfield Court House — Amelia Court House — ^The Pursuit- 
 Sheridan at JettersvUle — Paine's Cross Roads — A Severe Encounter — Lee pushes on towards Deatonsville 
 — Conduct of the Pursuit — Collision at Farmville — Death of General Read — Sailor's Creek — Capture of 
 Ewell — Lee crosses the Appomattox — The Horrors of the Retreat — Lee in a Strong Position — Attacked by 
 Humphreys — Death of General Smith — Prince Edward Court House — Correspondence between Grant and 
 Lee — Appomattox Station — Sheridan Strikes and Drives Back Lee's Vanguard — Lee's Retreat Cut Off — 
 Grordon's Vain Attempt to Cut Through Sheridan's Lines — Lee goes to meet Grant — The Interview — The 
 Surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia — The Terms of Surrender — The Magnanimity of the 
 Conqueror — Lee's Farewell to hia Troops — A Touching Scene — The Keystone of the Confederacy Gone — 
 National Rejoicing — Clouded Joy — Grant in Washington— The Cabinet Meeting — Ford's Theatre — 
 Assassination of Lincoln — John Wilkes Booth — A Real Tragedy — The Nation in Grief — Attempt on the 
 Life of Secretary Seward — A Fonl Conspiracy — Lincoln's Funeral — The Fate of the Conspirators — 
 Sherman at Goldsboro — Reconstruction of his Army — Johnston Retreats — The Pursuit — A Letter from 
 Johnston — Sherman's Reply — Durham's Station — Meeting of the two Generals — The Second Meeting — 
 The Memorandum — Sherman's Mistake — The Memorandum disapproved of — Grant at Sherma^i's Head- 
 quarters — The Surrender of Johnston — Wade Hampton Unfaithful — Surrender of Taylor — Surrender of 
 Farrand — The Confederate Cabinet — Flight of Davis — Faithful Reagan — Mrs. Davis in Danger — Davis r.t 
 Irwinsville — Capture of Davis — Capture of Stephens— Surrender of Jeff. Thompson — Kirby Smith stiJl 
 holds out — Hopes of Foreign Help — Collision of the Rival I'orce? on the Rio Grande — Brazos Santiago — 
 Barrett and Slaughter — Palmetto Ranche — Colored Troops — The trave Sixty-Second — The Thirty-Fourth 
 Indiana — The Last Battle of the War — Kirby Smith Asking Terms of General Canby — Deserting his 
 Post— General Buckner— The War Ended— The Cost— A Fearful Sacrifice— The Sacrifice not in Vain— 
 The End Foreseen and Provided For — The Grand Review at Washington — One Conspicuous Figure Missed 
 — ^The Disbandment of the Troops — A Difficult Problem Satisfactorily Solved — Sherman's Farewell to hi« 
 Command — Grant's Last Order — A Kindly "Adieu " — Our Task Completed. 
 
 The bloody and protracted tragedy 
 which was commenced on the 
 ^^^' 12th of April, 1861, when the 
 first Confederate shot was fired against 
 Fort Sumter, was now drawing rapidly 
 to a close. The fall of Richmond and 
 Petersburg was the true beginning of 
 the end. The backbone of the Confed- 
 eracy was broken. At an earlier stage 
 of the contest, these places might have 
 been abandoned without radically in- 
 juring the Secession cause. Lee, how- 
 ever, had been pleased to stake his all 
 on the defence of those famous lines; 
 and now that they were broken, it was 
 
 all but impossible for him again to 
 rally his forces in any position, in 
 which he could hope to offer an effect' 
 ive or protracted resistance. 
 
 Richmond and Petersburg were, as 
 we have seen, occupied by the National 
 troops on Monday the 3d of April. April 
 The Confederate chief, mean- 3. 
 while, had concentrated his forces at 
 Chesterfield Court House, a point mid- 
 way between Richmond and Petersburg, 
 and then pushed out in a westerly direc- 
 tion. The evacuation and retreat were 
 conducted with wonderful skill. It was 
 Lee's intention to push on as quickly 
 
SHERIDAN AT JETTERSVILLB. 
 
 U23 
 
 as possible to Biu'kesville, a station 
 about 52 miles west of Petersburg, and 
 where the South Side and Danvnie 
 Railroads cross each other. If he could 
 reach that point and destroy the bridges, 
 ji his rear, he might succeed, by 
 pushing his way towards Danville, not 
 only in putting distance between him- 
 self and his pursuera, but in effecting a 
 Junction with Johnston. In that case, 
 as he not iinreasonably concluded, he 
 might, at least, be able to exact more 
 favorable terms from the conqueror. 
 His past experience encoui*aged him to 
 hope for the best. He had already 
 successfully conducted two famous 
 retreats — one after Antietam and 
 another after Gettysbuj-g. On the 
 morning of the 3d, he had already 
 succeeded in putting 16 miles between 
 his army and Petersburg. Lee was in 
 excellent spirits. On Tuesday the 4th, 
 April ^^ reached Amelia Court House, 
 4. and struck the Danville Railroad. 
 He had made arrangements to receive 
 here 250,000 rations which were to 
 be sent from Danville. His stores were 
 already exhausted ; for he had started 
 on the march, with provisions only for 
 a single day. At Amelia Court House, 
 however, there were no supplies. They 
 had, it appeared, been promptly sent. 
 The loaded trains had reached their 
 destination on the afternoon of Sunday. 
 Immediately on his arrival, however, 
 the officer in charge received an order 
 from the Richmond authorities to bring 
 on the train to Richmond, and take on 
 board the personnel and effects of the 
 Confederate government. The officer 
 obeyed, and proceeded to Richmond 
 
 without unloading the CKTb. The 
 sui-prise, sorrow and indignation of the 
 Confederate commander, when the sad 
 fact was disclosed to him, may well be 
 imagined. His men were already fam 
 ishing. It was impossible to proceet. 
 until they collected what supplies could 
 be obtained from the surrounding 
 country. The delay, thus occasioned, 
 not only robbed Lee of all the advan- 
 tages of the start ; it proved the ruin of 
 all his plans and prospects. 
 
 The National army, meanwhile, was 
 not permitted to remain idle. Grant 
 had taken possession of both Richmond 
 and Petersburg. With the exception 
 of the troops under Weitzel, all the 
 rest of his forces were south or south- 
 west of Petersburg. We have already 
 said that Lee's objective was Burkesville. 
 Towards the same point, and advancing 
 in two lines, the Nationals were now 
 converging. It was Grant's great object 
 to reach Burkesville, before Lee should 
 be able to attain that point. The troo})8 
 of the army of the James, under Ord, 
 were moving by the South Side or 
 Lynchburg RaUroad. Sheridan, vnth 
 the cavalry and the Fifth corps, follow- 
 ed by the Second and Sixth corps, was 
 moving in a line, more to the north, and 
 nearer the Appomattox. On the after 
 noon of the 4 th, at the head of the 
 cavalry, he struck the Danville Railroad, 
 at Jettersville, some 7 miles southwest 
 of Amelia Court House. The Fifth 
 corps was following close in the rear of 
 the cavalry. Lee, who, as we have seen, 
 had reached Amelia Court House, on 
 the morning of the same day, was com 
 pelled to halt at that place, in order tc 
 
9S4 
 
 THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR. 
 
 obtain provisions, hia supplies having 
 been carried on to Richmond. On 
 reaching Jettersville, Sheridan soon 
 learned of the whereabouts of Lee, and 
 was naturally overjoyed at the thought 
 that he had been able to fling himself 
 across his antagonist's line of retreat. 
 To Meade, who was some 16 miles in the 
 rear, sick and encamped for the nigVt, 
 Sheridam sent a message urging him to 
 push forward the Second and Sixth 
 corps, with all possible haste. "Do I 
 understand" said Meade "that General 
 Sheridan believes that Lee's army will 
 be destroyed or captured, if my troops 
 reach the Danville Railroad by mom- 
 ning ? " " Yes sir " was the prompt reply. 
 Without a moment's delay, the worn-out 
 men were again in motion. To Grant, 
 Sheridan at the same time wrote, saying 
 " I wish you were here, yourself. I feel 
 confident of capturing the army of 
 Northern Virginia. I see no escape for 
 General Lee." On the afternoon of the 
 April ^*'^' Meade had come up with 
 o. the Second and Sixth corps, and 
 joined Sheridan at Jettersville. Grant, 
 meanwhile, was pressing forward, with 
 Ord and the army of the Jamea On 
 the evening of the 4th, he had encamped 
 vrith the main body of that army at 
 Wilson's Station. At half past six on 
 the following day, close by Nottoway, 
 about 9 mUes southeast of Buxkesville, 
 and some 12 miles south of Jettersv/ile, 
 and when about to encamp for the 
 night, Grant received Sheridan's letter. 
 With all possible speed, he hurried 
 forward two divisions of the Twenty- 
 Fourth corps to Burkesville, leaving 
 Bimey with the remainder of the col- 
 
 umn at Blacks and Whites. At eleven 
 o'clock, the advance had reached Burkea- 
 Anile Junction ; and about the same hour 
 Grant joined Sheridan at Jettersville 
 When the Lieutenant-General arrived at 
 the unpretentious little building, which 
 Sheridan had made his head-quarters, 
 the latter was in bed and asleep. In a 
 few seconds, however, he was in the pres- 
 ence of his chief and sketching on the 
 back of a letter, the relative positions of 
 his own troops and the columns of Gen 
 eral Lee. Grant took in the situation at 
 a glance. " Lee is caught " he said. " It 
 will be hard work for him to get away." 
 Lee's position had already become 
 sufficiently desperate. He was not only 
 cut off from his main line of retreat ; 
 he was overtaken by the vastly superior 
 numbers of the enemy. The two days' 
 delay had indeed been fatal. On the 
 night of the 4th, and during the earliei 
 portion of the 5th, he had a choice of 
 two possible courses. He might have 
 fallen upon Sheridan's isolated com- 
 mand, and attempted to cut his way 
 through, and so make himself master 
 of the Danville route ; or, by doubling 
 on his track, and striking out in a west- 
 erly direction, he might have endeav- 
 ored to push his way to Lynchburg 
 and the moimtains beyond. The former 
 of these courses was no longer open to 
 him, on the evening of the 5th ; for 
 Meade, as we have seen, had already 
 arrived with the Second and Sixth 
 corps of the army of the Potomac. 
 Sheridan has since given it as his op n- 
 ion, that Lee might, during the earlier 
 portion of the 5th, have attacked him 
 with success, and pursued his way to 
 
FARMVILLE. 
 
 Bnrkesville Junction. In this opinion 
 we do not concur. Sheridan had with 
 him an excellent force, about 18,000 
 strong, including infantiy and cavalry ; 
 and he had already found time to throw 
 ap ia his front a powerful line of breast- 
 
 orks. Lee's entire force, weary, dis- 
 pirited and hungry, did not exceed 
 20,000 ; and on the 5th, as on the 4th, 
 it was broken up into foraging parties. 
 At all events, no such experiment was 
 made ; and now it was questionable 
 whether the other alternative could 
 be adopted with any prospect of suc- 
 cess. On the afternoon of the 5th, 
 Brigadier-General Davies, whom Sheri- 
 dan had sent out early in the day, with 
 a mounted force, to operate to the left 
 and in front of Jettersville, struck a 
 tiain of 180 wagons, escorted by a body 
 of Confederate cavalry at Paine's Cross- 
 Koads. Davies fell heavily upon the 
 cavalry and routed them, capturing 5 
 pieces of artillery and a number of 
 prisoners. The wagons, he destroyed. 
 Almost immediately afterwards, Davies 
 was beset with a considerable body of 
 Confederate infantry ; and it might 
 have gone hard with him and his men, 
 had he not, at the opportune mouient, 
 been reinforced by the brigaaes of 
 Gregg and Smith, of the Second cavalry 
 division. As it was, the fighting was 
 severe ; but the National troops found 
 their way back to Jettersville. 
 
 On the morning of the 6th, the entire 
 «rmy of the Potomac, which, the night 
 previous, had concentrated at Jetters- 
 ville, moved northward, in the direc- 
 tion of Amelia Court House. Meade 
 had resumed control of the Fifth corps ; 
 
 and Sheridan thenceforward operated 
 with the cavalry alone. It was soon 
 discovered that Lee, who had, at night- 
 fall, on the previous day moved on 
 from Amelia Court House, had slipped 
 past the left flank of the National army 
 and that, with all his forces, he was now 
 moving rapidly westward, in the direc- 
 tion of Deatonsville. The order of 
 march was immediately changed. The 
 Sixth cordis was moved from the right 
 to the left. The Second corps was then 
 ordered to push forward by the Dea 
 tonsvillr route ; the Fifth corps was to 
 move by a parallel route on the right 
 and the Sixth coi'ps was to move by 
 another parallel route to the left 
 There were thus three pursuing col 
 umns — one close on the enemy's rear, 
 one on a parallel line to the north, and 
 another on a parallel line to the south. 
 Sheridan, with the cavalry, led the van 
 of the left or southern column. 
 
 While the army of the Potomac was 
 thus pressing hard upon the retreating 
 foe, the army of the James, imder the 
 skilful direction of General Ord, was 
 pushing its way rapidly from BurkeS' 
 ville Junction, in the direction of Farm 
 ville. Ord, as we have seen, had reach 
 ed Bui-kesville, with the advance of the 
 army of the James, on the night of the 
 5th. On the morning of the 6th, his 
 troops being well forward, he set out, 
 at an early hour for Farm ville, as above 
 mentioned, his object being to antici 
 pate the arrival of the van of the 
 Confederate army, and to destroy the 
 bridges which at that place cross the 
 Appomattox. Eager to accomplish hit? 
 purpose, Ord pushed forward a light 
 
9X6 
 
 THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR. 
 
 column, consisting of two regiments of 
 infantry, and a squadron of cavalry, 
 u ader the command of Brigadier-General 
 Thomas Read. On the way, and when 
 iuflt approaching Farmville, Read en- 
 countered the van of Lee's army. There 
 was an immediate collision. The Con- 
 federates, who were greatly superior in 
 numbers, fought with the energy of 
 men who knew that their last hopes, 
 if not gone, were at least trembling in 
 the balance. Read, however, presented 
 a bold and determined front. Fighting 
 at the head of his men, he held the 
 Confederates at bay, until Ord had 
 time to come up with the main body. 
 It was a noble service, nobiy done. 
 In the struggle Read* wav shot and 
 killed, in a hand-to-hand contest with 
 General Bearing ; and his command 
 waa overwhelmed. The Confederates 
 had saved the bridges ; and when Ord 
 arrived they intrenched themselves. 
 
 Meanwhile the three columns of the 
 army of the Potomac were pressing 
 forward with all possible haste. Sher- 
 idan with his cavalry, as we have seen, 
 moved at the head, and in advance of 
 the left column. He was already close 
 upon Deatonsville, when he espied the 
 whole Confederate army struggling to- 
 wards the west. It was evident, at a 
 glance, that Lee's men were greatly 
 
 •Brioadikb-Genkbax S. T. Bras, was a native 
 of Massachusetts. He entered the Service in January, 
 1862, as captain of unattached cavalry from his native 
 State. At Gettysburg, where he distinguished him- 
 self, and wafl severely wounded, he held a staS ap- 
 pointment. He held command under Qrant from the 
 Rapidan to the James, and before Bichmr>nd and 
 Petersburg. When Ord was appointed to the cow* 
 ooand of the army of the James, he made Bead his 
 itaff o6Soer 
 
 exhausted. In this terrible march the 
 splendid training and high morale of 
 the army of Northern Virginia were 
 conspicuously revealed. Never was 
 army in so severe a plight. It wan 
 marvellous, indeed, that, in the circum- 
 stances, the troops could be held to- 
 gether. They knew that the entire 
 army of the Potomac was pressing close 
 upon their heels ; and it was scarcely h 
 surprise when the van was struck by 
 the army of the James. Escape was 
 hardly to be hoped for ; but strong 
 nerve and high purpose amply supply 
 the place of hope. Sheridan was not 
 slow to see his opportunity; nor was 
 he dilatory in turning it to account. 
 He made his arrangements with admir- 
 able skill. Right in front of him was 
 a Confederate wagon-train escorted by 
 a powerful force of infantry and cav 
 airy. Crook was ordered to attack the 
 train. C-Lister was ordered at the same 
 time to press forward and attack a 
 point further in advance. If Crook 
 should not succeed in his attack, he 
 was to move on again, ahead of Cus- 
 ter ; and this mode of action was to be 
 kept up, until finally a weak point 
 should be discovered. The experiment 
 was attended with almost immediate 
 success. Crook, unable to make any 
 impression in his front, was compelled 
 to fall back. Custer, however was 
 more successful. Gaining the road at 
 Sailor's Creek, a small tributary of the 
 Appomattox, he immediately engaged 
 the enemy. Crook and Devin with 
 their respective divisions, having hur 
 x'led to his aid, the Confederate line 
 was pierced ; and there were captured 
 
SAILOR'S OEEBK. 
 
 Wi 
 
 400 was^ons, 16 p'-'cea of artillery, with 
 a large number of prisoners. 
 
 One of the most immediate as well 
 as most important effects, produced by 
 this onslaught, was the cutting off from 
 the main body of Lee's army, the entire 
 corps of General Ewell, with a portion 
 of Pickett's division. It was all-im- 
 portant that this force should not be 
 allojved to escape. With the view of 
 detaining them, until Wright, with the 
 Sixth corps, should have time to come 
 up, Sheridan ordered a mounted charge, 
 which wan made in a most spirited 
 manner by Colonel Stagg, and his brave 
 brigade. It was not long until the 
 advance division of the Sixth corps, 
 under General Seymour, made its ap- 
 pearance. Seymour was ordered to 
 carry the road on which the Confeder- 
 tes were posted. Pushing his men 
 orward with great energy, Seymour 
 compelled the Confederates to fall back. 
 This, however, they did slowly, con- 
 testing every inch of the ground, and 
 turning and striking heavily at almost 
 every step. So vigorous, in truth, be- 
 came the resistance, that Seymour found 
 it necessary to halt his men and await 
 the arrival of Wheaton's division, also 
 of the Sixth corps. Wheaton was 
 speedily on the ground, and in position 
 on Seymour's left. The advance was 
 then renewed. The Confederates, no 
 longer able to resist the tremendous 
 pressure on their front, fell back, until 
 the lines of the Sixth corps had reached 
 Sailor's Creek. Sheridan's cavalry could 
 Qow be seen on the high ground to the 
 south of the creek ; and the long lines 
 of smoke, arising from the bum^ingr 
 
 wagons, gave sad evidence of the de 
 stnictive work which had been going 
 on. It would be difficult to imagine a 
 situation more critical than that in 
 which Ewell and his brave followei 
 now found themselves. Encompassed on 
 every side, and barred from every pos 
 sibility of escape, they still gave blow 
 for blow ; and, almost at the last mo 
 mr-nt, they poured so deadly a volley 
 into the ranks of their assailants, that 
 a portion of Wright's veteran line bent 
 and g8"e way. It was impossible, 
 however, to maintain the struggle 
 against +he vastly superior numbers of 
 tho Nationals. Pressed in front by the 
 Sixth corps, and charged in flank and 
 rear by Sheridan's cavalry, Ewell's vet- 
 erans threw down their arms ia token of 
 siirrender. Over 6000 men were made 
 prisoners ; and among the captured were 
 General Ewell himself, and four othei 
 general officers. The National loss in 
 this encoimter at Sailor's Creek, was 
 about 1000, in killed and wounded. 
 
 The National victory at Sailor's 
 Creek, might have been less easily 
 won — it would certainly have been less 
 decisive — if the movements of the 
 Second corps had been conducted with 
 less energy. Following, as we have seen, 
 right in the rear of the retreating Con- 
 federates, Humphreys never gave them 
 a moment's rest, until, at evening, he 
 crowded them together, at Sailor's Creek. 
 In the confusion which prevailed, when 
 the Confederates thus found them- 
 selves pressed on aU sides, Humphreys' 
 men captured a large train, and many 
 hundreds of prisoners, together with 
 1 8 flags and several pieces of artillery. 
 
938 
 
 THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAS, 
 
 During the night of the 6th, and the 
 morning of the 7th, Lee with the shat- 
 tered remains of his once magnificent 
 ^p,.jj army, crossed the Appomattox, 
 
 7 . by the bridges, a few miles east of 
 Farmville. Resolved, if possible, to 
 make the Appomattox an impassable 
 bjirrier between himself and his pur- 
 suers, he ordered the bridges to be 
 destroyed. Humphreys, however, with 
 the Second corps, was close upon his 
 heels. The second span of the railroad 
 bridge was already burning ; it was left 
 to the mercy of the flames. The wagon- 
 road bridge was just fired ; it was saved. 
 Humphreys' troops were pushed across 
 without much difficulty, Barton's divis- 
 ion leading. The Confederates, who 
 seemed to be posted in considerable 
 force, on the heights on the opposite 
 "de, disappeared as the Nationals ap- 
 proached, leaving behind them several 
 pieces of artillery. Ten guns had also 
 been left on the south of the river. 
 Signs were already abundant that Lee. 
 and his whole army, brave and indoro ■. | 
 able as they all were, could not miich 
 longer hold out. Men and horses were 
 sinking by the wayside from pure ex- 
 haustion ; and thousands had let fall 
 their muskets from sheer inability to 
 carry them. Without food and sleep, 
 more could not be expected from man 
 or beast ; but neither food nor sl'^ep 
 was to be granted them until the bii-ter 
 end. The horrors of that march have 
 not, perhaps, been equalled since the 
 famous Moscow retreat. 
 
 The impossibility of continuing the 
 march westward began to be apparent 
 to alL On the night of the 6th, when 
 
 the army of Northern Virginia was 
 well across the Appomattox, several of 
 the chief officers of that army met 
 around the bivouac fire, and consulted 
 as to what it was best to do, in the cir 
 cumstances. General Lee was not 
 present. Three lines of conduct were 
 suggested : — to disband, allowing the 
 troops to make their way, as best they 
 might, to some fixed rallying point ; to 
 abandon the trains and cu* their way 
 through the opposing lines ; or to sur- 
 render. After a short consultation, it 
 was agreed that two of the suggested 
 lines of conduct were impracticable ; 
 and the voice of the council was in 
 favor of suiTender. General Pendleton 
 was commissioned to communicate the 
 result of theii deliberations to General 
 Lee. The probability is that Lee's 
 private opinion did not differ from that 
 of his officers ; but, refusing to regard 
 the situation as so desperate, he lent 
 an apparently unvnlling ear to their 
 advice. It would be time enough, he 
 thought, to surrender when he had abso- 
 lutely no other choice. He was not yet 
 reduced to that extremity. Pendleton 
 was still with his chief, when the con- 
 versation was broken short by the loud 
 thunders of artillery — sounds which too 
 plainly told that the relentless and un- 
 tiring pursuer was again upon the 
 track. In his determination not to 
 surrender, Lee was, no doubt, encour- 
 aged by the fact that Davis and his 
 colleagues were at Danville, and mak- 
 ing strenuous efforts to reorganize the 
 government. Lee was still aware thai 
 the Confederate authorities — if such 
 authorities could be said now to exist — 
 
PEINCE EDWARD GOUET HOUSE. 
 
 929 
 
 had no intention as yet of giving up 
 the contest ; and he was hardly to be 
 blamed — especially when we remember 
 that he was the most trusted and hon- 
 ored man in the Confederacy — if he was 
 unwilling to incur the odium of aban- 
 doning the sinking vessel, while a sin- 
 gle ray of hope remained. 
 
 The army of Northern Virginia, or 
 rather what remained of that once mag- 
 nificent organization, was now concen- 
 trated, in a strong position, some four 
 or five miles north of Farmville, and 
 covering both the stage and plank 
 roads. The ground in front, which was 
 open, and gently sloping downwards in 
 the direction of Appomattox, was cov- 
 ered with intrenchments and batteries. 
 Humphreys, as soon as he had crossed 
 the river with the Second corps, re- 
 newed the pursuit. Barlow, with the 
 first division, moved in the direction 
 of Farmville, which the Confederates, 
 on his approach, abandoned, after firing 
 the bridges, and destroying 130 wagons. 
 Humphreys, himself, with the divisions 
 of Miles and De Trobriand, making a 
 more direct pursuit, soon found nimself 
 confronted by Lee's army in its in- 
 trenched position. He saw at a glance 
 how vain it would be to make any at- 
 iempt in front. Having sent instruc- 
 tions to Barlow to come up without 
 delay, he proceeded to execute a flank 
 movement, in the hope of dislodging his 
 antagonist. He soon discovered that 
 bis own lines were outflanked by those 
 of the Confederates, both on the right 
 and on the left ; nor was he any longer 
 a doubt that he had in front of him 
 all that remained of the army of North- 
 
 ern Virginia. Extending his right the 
 length of one division, Humphreys 
 ordered Miles to make an attack with 
 three regiments. Miles made a bold 
 and vigorous attempt ; but he was com 
 pelled to fall back, with a loss of over 
 600 men in killed and wounded. Among 
 the former were General Smyth* and 
 Major Mills. Among the latter were 
 Generals Mott, Madill and McDougall, 
 as also Colonel Starbird, of the Nine- 
 teenth Maine. It was night before Bar- 
 low caii^e up ; and it was agreed not to 
 repeat tne assault until the morning. 
 
 On the morning of the 7th, Sheridan 
 had despatched two mounted divisions 
 under Merritt, to Prince Edward Court 
 House. The remaining division of his 
 cavalr)^, commanded by Crook, he sent 
 to Farmville. The bridges having been 
 destroyed at Farmville, Crook's troop- 
 ers were compelled to wade the stream 
 — a task which was not accomplished 
 without considerable difficulty. On 
 the north side of the Appomattox, they 
 fell upon a body of Confederate infan- 
 try who were guarding a wagon-train. 
 A sharp skirmish ensued. The Con- 
 federates, however, were greatly in the 
 
 * BkIGADCEB-QBITBRAI. ThOKAS a. SltTTH -WM 
 
 bom in Ireland. At aK early age he came to the 
 United States, and settled at Wilmington, Del., be- 
 ooming engaged in course of time in the coach-build- 
 Ing business. When the war broke out, he recruited 
 a company in Wilmington. Proceeding thence to 
 Philadelphia, he joined a three months' regiment, 
 then leaving for the Shenandoah VaUey. On his 
 return home, a Delaware regiment was just about to 
 proceed to the seat of war. Smyth accepted the post 
 of major. He rose gradually, becoming successively 
 lioutenantcolonel, and colonel, until finally he was 
 promoted to tlie rank of brigadier-general, for his 
 bravery at Cold Harbor. In the engafr.ment neai 
 Farmville. where he received his death wound, he com 
 manded the second division of the Second army corps. 
 
&30 
 
 THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR 
 
 maj^^iity ; and Crook, after an effectual 
 effor*" to dislodge the enemy, found it 
 necessary to fall back. In this stmg- 
 gle, General Gregg, one of liis brigade 
 commanders, was surrounded and cap- 
 tured. On Ms arrival at Prince Edward 
 Court House, Sheridan, who marched 
 with the command of Merritt, found 
 General McKenzie, with his division of 
 cavalry from the army of the James, 
 and ordered him to cross the bridge on 
 the Buffalo River, and make a recon- 
 noissance in the direction of Prospect 
 Station, on the Lynchburg Railroad. 
 Information had, in the meantime, been 
 received from Crook, that the Confed- 
 erate army had crossed to the north 
 bank of the Appomattox. Resolved 
 to outrun Lee, and to interpose between 
 his army and Lynchburg, Sheridan 
 ordered Merritt to push forward and 
 encamp at Buffalo River, and, at the 
 same time, sent instructions to Crook 
 to recross the Appomattox and encamp 
 at Prospect Station. 
 
 Such was the general situation, at 
 nightfall on the 7th. On that same 
 evening, and immediately after the re- 
 pulse of Miles, as before described, Lee 
 received the following letter : — 
 
 " April tth, 1865. 
 "Qbiteral: The result of the last week 
 must convince you of the hopelessness of fur- 
 ther resistance on the part of the Army of 
 Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that 
 it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from 
 myself the responsibility of any further effusion 
 of blood, by asking of you the surrender of 
 that portion of the Confederate States army 
 known as the Army of Northern Virginia. 
 
 " U. S. Geant, Lieut-QeneraL 
 " Genwal E. B. Lbb." 
 
 To this letter Lee wrote an immedi- 
 
 ate answer : but it was not until 
 
 April 
 
 the following morning that it 8. 
 reached Grant at Farmville. It waa 
 oOuched in these words : — 
 
 " April 7th, 1865. 
 
 " Genebal : I have received your note Oi 
 this date. Though not entertaining the opin- 
 ion you express of the hopelessness of further 
 resistance on the part of the Army of Northern 
 Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid 
 useless eflFusion of blood, and, therefore, before 
 considering your proposition, ask the terms 
 you will offer, on condition of its surrender. 
 
 " R. E. Lee, General. 
 
 " Lieut.-General U. S. Gbant." 
 
 On the instant Grant replied as 
 
 follows : — 
 
 " April Sth, 1865. 
 
 " General : Your note of last evening, in 
 reply to mine of same date, asking the condi- 
 tion on which I will accept the surrender of 
 the Army of Northern Virginia, is just re- 
 ceived. In reply, I would say that peace being 
 my first desire, there is but one condition that 
 I insist upon, viz. : That the men surrendered 
 shall be disqualified for taking up arms against 
 the government of the United States until 
 properly exchanged. I will meet yon, or des- 
 ignate oflBcers to meet any officers you may 
 name for the same purpose, at any point agree- 
 able to you, for the purpose of arranging defi- 
 nitely, the terms upon which the surrender ol 
 the Army of Northern Virginia will be received. 
 " U. S. Grant, Lieut.-6eneral. 
 
 " General R. E. Lee." 
 
 We left Lee in a strongly intrenched 
 position, a few miles to the north of 
 the Appomattox. As soon as he in- 
 dited his reply to Grant's first message, 
 he resumed his retreat under cover of 
 the darkness ; and so quietly waa it con 
 ducted that Humphreys waa ignorant 
 of the fact, until morning, when he was 
 prepared to renew the attack. Lee's 
 
GRANT SUGGESTS TERMS OF SURRENDER. 
 
 931 
 
 skilful generalship was again conspicu- 
 ously revealed. Ever vigilant, ever fer- 
 tile in resource, and ever active, he had 
 again put miles between himself and 
 his pursuers. The fact that Lee had 
 retreated during the night was at once 
 made known to Grant, who immediate- 
 ly gave orders for the renewal of the 
 pursuit. The Second and Sixth corps, 
 ander the immediate direction of Meade, 
 w^ho was accompanied by the General- 
 in-chief, were pushed forward with all 
 possible haste along the north bank of 
 the Appomattox. Sheridan, mean- 
 while, had made excellent use both of 
 his troopers and of his time. Lee was 
 pressing along that gradually narrow- 
 ing neck of land which Kes between the 
 head waters of the Appomattox and the 
 affluents of the James. It was of the 
 utmost importance that Sheridan should 
 be able to interpose his troops between 
 Lee's ai-my and Lynchbtirg. If he 
 could close the outlet in the direction 
 of that city, it would be all ovej v^th 
 Lee, pursued closely as he was by the 
 Second and Sixth corps, under the direc- 
 tion of Meade and the General-in -chief. 
 This was precisely what Sheridan was 
 aiming at, and what, within a few 
 hours, he actually did accomplish. Hav- 
 ing learned from one of his scouts, 
 early on the morning of the 8th, that 
 four trains of cars, with supplies for 
 Lee's army, were at Appomattox Sta- 
 tion, he at once notified Merritt and 
 Crook, and briskly pushed the whole 
 command towards that point. Lee was 
 not ignorant of the extreme peril of his 
 situation ; but he kept pressing eagerly 
 forward, still clinging to the skirts of 
 
 hope, and, in spite of almost irresistiblfl 
 evidence to the contrary, indulging the 
 thought that he might yet find refuge 
 among the ranges of the Blue Ridge, 
 beyond Lynchburg. In these circum 
 stances he received Grant's second let 
 ter, and replied as follows : 
 
 " April 8th, 1865. 
 
 " Gexekal : I received at a late hour youj 
 note of to-day. In mine of yesterday, I did 
 not intend to propose the surrender of the 
 Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the! 
 terms of your proposition. To be frank, I do* 
 not think the emergency has arisen to call for 
 the surrender of this army ; but as the restora- 
 tion of peace should be the sole object of all, I 
 desire to know whether your proposals would 
 tend to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you 
 with a view to surrender the Army of Northern 
 Virginia ; but so far as your proposition may 
 affect the Confederate States forces under my 
 command, and tend to the restoration of peace, 
 I should be pleased to meet you at ten, a.m., 
 to-morrow, on the old stage-road to Richmond, 
 between the picket-lines of the two armies. 
 
 "R. E.Lee, General 
 
 "Lieut. -General U. S. Grant." 
 
 This note was received by Grant about 
 midnight ; and he replied next morn- 
 ing in the following terms : 
 
 " April dth, 1865. 
 
 " General : Your note of yesterday is re- 
 ceived. As I have no authority to treat on the 
 subject of peace, the meeting proposed for ten 
 A.M., to-day, could lead to no good. I will 
 state, however. General, that I am equally 
 anxious for peace with yourself; and the whole 
 North entertain the same feeling. The terms up- 
 on which peace can be had are well understood. 
 By the South laying down their arms they will 
 hasten that most desirable event, save thousands 
 of human lives, and hundreds of millions of 
 property not yet destroyed. Sincerely hoping 
 that all our difficulties may be settled, without 
 the loss of another life, I subscribe myself, 
 
 " U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-GeneraL 
 
 " General R. E. Lee." 
 
tfS% 
 
 THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR. 
 
 As soon as he had finished this let- 
 ter, Grant left Meade in charge of the 
 Second and Sixth corps and hurried on 
 to join Sheridan and Griffin. While 
 the letter was on its way, and before 
 the General-in-chief had joined the one 
 01 the other, further parley had become 
 unnecessary. Sheridan had already 
 settled the question. On the morning 
 of the 8th, after a forced march of 
 about 30 miles, his advance, under 
 Custer, had leached Ajjpomattox Sta- 
 tion, about four miles to the south of 
 A.ppomattox Court House. Lee's van- 
 guard had jusi arrived with four trains 
 of cars, laden vpith supplies. Custer, 
 with lightning-Kke rapidity dashed up- 
 on the rear of the trains, and captured 
 them. Supported by Devin, who had 
 come up, he then rushed with fierce 
 energy on the vanguard, and drove it 
 back to Appomattox Court House, near 
 which was the main body of Lee's 
 army. Twenty-five guns, a hospital 
 train, a large number of additional 
 wagons, with many prisoners, were 
 captured by the National cavalry. 
 Sheridan, hurrying forward with the 
 remainder of his command, flung him- 
 self across the line of Lee's retreat, 
 with the determination of holding his 
 ground at any and every risk until the 
 morning, when, he knew, he would be 
 joined by Ord, and the army of the 
 James, and by Giiffin vrith the Fifth 
 3orp8. He knew also that by that time, 
 Meade, with the Second and Sixth corps, 
 would be well forward and able to faU 
 with effect on the Confederate rear. 
 Such was the situation of affairs on the 
 night of the 8tL Lee was completely 
 
 cut off from his own line of retreat 
 Brave and resolute to the last, and be- 
 lieving that he had nothing but cavalry 
 in front of him, he decided to make an 
 attempt, at least, to cut through Sheri- 
 dan's lines. 
 
 Early on the morning of the 9th 
 Lee was ready to carry out his purpose 
 His heart, however, must have ^pri] 
 bled vrithin him, when he looked 9 . 
 around him, and beheld the wretched 
 remnant of what was once the proud 
 and invincible army of Northern Vir 
 ginia. It consisted of two thin lines — 
 t'^e one composed of what was left of 
 Hill's, now Gordon's command, the 
 other of the wreck of Longstreet's 
 corps. Between these lines were the 
 debris of the wagon-train, and some 
 thousands of miserable creatures who 
 were too weak to carry arms. Lee 
 gave orders to Gordon to cut his way 
 through, at all hazards. The charge 
 was made with tremendous energy. 
 Such, in ti-uth, was the violence of the 
 shock, and so persistent was the pres- 
 sure, that Sheridan's men who had dis- 
 mounted to resist the attack, were 
 forced back. At this critical moment, 
 Sheridan, who had been to Appomattox 
 Station for the purpose of hurrying for- 
 ward Ord, arrived on the scene of action. 
 Knowing well the purpose of the en- 
 emy, and keenly alive to the value of 
 time, he directed his troopers to fall 
 back gradually, but to continue to offer 
 a firm and steady resistance, so as to 
 allow Ord, with his infantry, to come 
 up and form his lines. This done, they 
 were to move to the right and mount. 
 Sheridan's orders were adjnirably 
 
GRANT AND LEB AT MoLEAN'S HOUSE. 
 
 933 
 
 executed. As soon as the cavalry moved 
 towards their own right, the Confed- 
 erates beheld to their amazement, the 
 glittering arms and serried ranks of the 
 infantry. The unlooked for vision had 
 
 11 the effect of a stunning and unex- 
 pected blow. The Confederates imme- 
 diately discontinued their pressure, and 
 began to give way. The National in- 
 fantry were now pressing upon the 
 confused and bewildered multitude. 
 Sheridan had ridden round to the Con- 
 federate left flank ; his bagi»H bad 
 sounaed the order to remount ; and he 
 was just about to fall with all his weight 
 on the already disordered mass, when 
 a flag of truce was presented to Custer 
 who led the advance. Sheridan rode 
 to Appomattox Court House, where 
 he was met by General Gordon and 
 General Wilcox. Gordon asked for a 
 suspension of hostilities, and informed 
 Sheridan that Grant and Lee were, 
 even now, making arrangements for the 
 surrender of the army of Northern Vir- 
 ginia. There was no more fighting 
 between the two great rival armies — 
 the army of the Potomac and the army 
 of Northern Virginia. 
 
 On the morning of the 9th, a heavy 
 fog enveloped the entire country around 
 Appomattox Court House. Long be- 
 fore that fog dispersed, Lee, clad in a 
 new gray uniform, might have been 
 seen at a camp-fire with Mahone and 
 Longstreet. Care and anxiety were 
 written on each of their countenances. 
 
 ^ongstreet, his arm in a sling, and a 
 cigar in his mouth, sat on the trunk of 
 a felled tree. Gordon had been sent 
 on his mission. It was agreed that if 
 
 319 
 
 success were denied him there was no 
 longer any chance of ef^jape. Of Gor- 
 don's failure to penetrate the National 
 lines, they were soon made aware. Lee 
 mounted his horse. " General Long 
 street," he said, " I leave you in charge 
 I am going to hold a conference with 
 General Grant." He then rode off. On 
 his way he received Grant's letter, be- 
 fore quoted. He replied immediately : 
 
 " April 9, 1865. 
 
 '•General: I received yoar note of this 
 morning, on the picket-line, whither I had come 
 to meet you, and ascertain definitely what 
 terms were embraced in your proposition of 
 yesterday, with reference to the surrender of 
 this army. I now ask an interview, in accord- 
 ance with the offer contained in your letter ol 
 yesterday for that pcrpose. 
 
 " R. E. Lee, General. 
 
 " Lieut-General U. S. Grant." 
 
 To this Grant replied as follows : 
 
 " April 9th, 1865. 
 
 " General : Your note of this date is but 
 this moment (11.50 a.m.) received. In conse- 
 quence of my having passed from the Rich- 
 mond and Lynchburg road to the Farmville 
 and Lynchburg road, I am at this writing, 
 about four miles west of Walter's Church, and 
 will push forward to the front for the purpose 
 of meeting you. Notice sent to me on this 
 road, where you wish the interview to take 
 place, will meet me. 
 
 "U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
 
 " General R. E. Lee." 
 
 The scene and the main features of the 
 interview have been preserved for us by 
 an eye-witness. It took place at the 
 house of Mr. Wilmer McLean — a square 
 brick building surrounded with roses, 
 violets, and daffodils. Grant — with his 
 slouched hat, dark blue frock-coat un. 
 buttoned and covered -Vrith mud, gray 
 
^34. 
 
 THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR. 
 
 pantaloons tucked in his soiled boots, 
 and a dark waistcoat, and with nothing 
 to indicate his rank, except the double 
 row of brass buttons and the three silver 
 stars — walked up to the house, accom- 
 panied by Ord, Sheridan, and their re- 
 spective staffs. Lee had already ar- 
 rived ; and his blooded iron-gray horse, 
 'in charge of an orderly, was nibbling at 
 the grass. Grant and two aids entered 
 the house ; the othera who accompanied 
 him, sat down on the porch. Lee was 
 standing beside a table, wearing a bright 
 bluish-gray imiform, a military hat, with 
 a gold cord, buckskin gauntlets, high 
 riding-boots, and the splendid dress- 
 sword which had been presented to 
 him by the State of Virginia. Tall 
 and erect, he had a fine soldierly bear- 
 ing. It was noticed that his hair was 
 long and gray. He was attended only 
 by Colonel Marshall, his chief of staff. 
 On Grant's entrance the two shook 
 hands, sat down and proceeded to busi- 
 ness. As Lee made no special request, 
 Grant at once wrote out his terms : 
 
 " Appomattox Court Housb, ) 
 April 9, 1865. \ 
 
 "Gknebal: Id accordance with the sub- 
 stance of my letter to you of the 8th instant, I 
 propose to receive the surrender of the Army 
 of Northern Virginia on the following terms, 
 to wit: Rolls of all the officers and men to be 
 made in duplicate, one copy to be giren to an 
 officer designated by me, the other to be re- 
 tained by such officers as you may designate. 
 The officers to give their individual paroles, not 
 to taKe up arms against the government of the 
 United States until properly exchanged, and 
 each company or regimental commander to sign 
 alike parole fo. the men of his command. The 
 irms. artillery, and public property to be parked 
 »nd stacked, and turned over to the officers ap- 
 Dointed by me to receive them. This will not 
 
 embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor theii 
 private horses or baggage. This done, each 
 officer and man will be allowed to return to his 
 home, not to be disturbed by United States 
 authority so long a,s they observe their paroles 
 and the laws in force where they may reside. 
 " U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General 
 " General R. E. Lee." 
 
 The following is Lee's letter of ac 
 ceptance : 
 
 " Headquarters Army of Northern ) 
 Virginia, April 9, 1865. \ 
 
 "General: I have received your letter oi 
 this date, containing the terms of the surrender 
 of the Army of Northern Virginia, as proposed 
 by you. As they are substantially the same as 
 those expressed in your letter of the 8th inst., 
 they are accepted. I will proceed to designate 
 the proper officers to carry the stipulations 
 into effect. 
 
 " R. E. Leb, General. 
 " Lieut.-General U. S. Grant." 
 
 The signatures had just been at- 
 tached, when Lee, after a moment's 
 reflection, said that he had forgotten 
 one thing. Many of the cavalry and 
 artillery horses belonged to the men 
 who had charge of them. It was too 
 late, however, to speak of that now. 
 Grant replied, " I will instruct my pa- 
 rolling officers that all tke enlisted men 
 of your cavalry and artillery, who own 
 horses are to retain them, just as the 
 officers do theirs. They will need them 
 for their spring ploughing, and other 
 farm work." Lee seemed greatly 
 pleased with Grant's prompt com- 
 pliance with his only half-expressed 
 wish. " General," he said earnestly, 
 " there is nothing which you could 
 have accomplished more for the good 
 of the people or of the government." 
 
 Grant's terms were in the last de 
 gree magnanimous and liberaL They 
 
ThjtiJ uJSiOJS SAVED. 
 
 935 
 
 revealed ii')bility of soul and delicacy of 
 sentiment on the part of the conqueror 
 who granted them, on the pai"t of the 
 government which sanctioned them, 
 and on the part of the people who 
 gave them their approval. The agree- 
 ment was such as sufficiently sustained 
 the dignity of those who had triumphed 
 without unnecessarily wounding the 
 feelings of those who had been van- 
 quished. It was one of the grandest 
 examples yet given to the world of the 
 refining and softening influences of 
 modern civilization- -an example which 
 contrasted strangely and strikingly with 
 the barbai'ous habits of the past. Gen- 
 eral Grant will live in history as a great 
 soldier ; he will be remembered also as 
 a high-souled hero in the hour of vic- 
 tory. If battles must still be fought, 
 blood be shed, and valuable lives sacri- 
 ficed, it is gi-atifying to think that 
 cruelty, under the guise of justice, is no 
 longer to be a necessary adjunct of 
 party, sectional, or national triumph. 
 
 After the sun-ender, Lee rode back 
 to his troops to bid them farewell. His 
 reception was a something unparalleled, 
 in such circumstances " Whole lines of 
 battle," says an eye-witness, " rushed up 
 to their beloved old chief, and choking 
 with emotion, struggled vrith each other 
 to wring him once more by the hand. 
 Men who had fought throughout the 
 war, and knew what the agony and hu- 
 miliation of the moment must be to 
 him, strove with a refinement of un- 
 selfishness and tenderness, which he 
 alone could fully appreciate, to lighten 
 his burden and mitigate his pain. With 
 tears pouring down both cheeks. Gen- 
 
 eral Lee, at length, c»>m!'>^anded voice 
 enough to say : ' Men, 'T'* have fought 
 thi'ough the war together. I have done 
 the best that I could for you.' Not an 
 eye that looked on that scene was dry." 
 On the 12th of April, three d-tys after 
 the surrender, the Confederate" march- 
 ed by divisions to an appointed place in 
 the neighborhood of Appomattox Court 
 House, and stacked their arms and de 
 posited their accoutrements. Of nearly 
 28,000 men, only about 8000 had mus 
 kets in theii- hands. Among the sur 
 rendered property there were 30 cannoi 
 and 350 wagons. Paroles were distri 
 buted to the men ; and the army o' 
 Northern Virginia passed out of exist 
 ence. The war was now practically 
 ended. It was impossible for the othei 
 armies for any length of time to prolong 
 the struggle. The army of Noithera 
 Virginia — as Swinton, at the close of his 
 masterly history of the army of tht 
 Potomac, puts it — was the " keystone ' 
 of the Confederate structure. The key 
 stone removed, the structure fell with 
 "a resounding crash." 
 
 A year, all but three weeks, had 
 elapsed since Grant crossed the Rapidan. 
 It had been one of the severest and 
 most protracted campaigns on record 
 When it commenced, Lee had undei 
 him 65,000 men. We have seen what 
 a miserable remnant was left. Between 
 the Rapidan and Appomattox Court 
 House, Grant lost, as nearly as possible, 
 in killed, wounded and missing 100,000 
 men — an enormous sacrifice ; but it 
 saved the Union, and perpetuated the 
 Republic. 
 
 It was natural, that, in the circum 
 
936 
 
 THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR. 
 
 stances, there should be great joy all 
 over the North. The secretary of war 
 issued the following order : 
 
 " That a salute of two hundred guns be fired, 
 t the head-quarters of every army, and at 
 Yery post and arsenal in the United States, 
 nd at the Military Academy at West Point, 
 n the day of the receipt of this order, in com- 
 memoration of the surrender of General R. E. 
 Lee and the army of Northern Virginia, to 
 Lieutenant-General Grant and the army under 
 hie command — report of the receipt and exe- 
 cution of this order to be made to the Adju- 
 tant-General at Washington." 
 
 These orders were gladly obeyed ; 
 and In addition to the demonstrations 
 thus brought about, there were public 
 and voluntary rejoicings in every town- 
 ship and every city throughout the 
 Noi-thern States. 
 
 On the day of the siirrender of Gen- 
 ral Lee, President Lincoln returned to 
 Washington. He had been for some 
 tlays at City Point, where, as has been 
 mentioned in a previous chapter, he 
 had a conference with Generals Grant 
 and Sherman, and Admiral Porter. 
 After the occupation of Richmond, by 
 the National troops, Lincoln, on board 
 the Malvern, Porter's flag-ship, moved 
 up the James. Leaving the Malvern 
 near Rocketts, the president and the 
 admiral proceeded to Richmond in the 
 oi^mmander's gig. Lincoln's reception 
 *ras most cordial, the emancipated slaves 
 crowding around him to such an ex- 
 tent, that a file of soldiers had to be 
 called in, to clear the way. Halting 
 for a time, and resting at Weitzel's 
 quarters, he entered an open carriage 
 and rode rapidly through the principal 
 sti'eets, and was soon again on board. 
 
 and on his way back to City Point He 
 visited Richmond again on the 6th of 
 April, two days later, and granted per- 
 mission to the Vu'ginia Legislature to 
 assemble, on the understanding that 
 the members would adopt measures for 
 the withdrawal of the Virginia troops 
 and all other obstructions, which might 
 tend to hinder the action of the general 
 government. In a few days, however, 
 it was discovered that the gentlemen of 
 the State Legislature of Virginia were 
 abusing their privilege ; and almost im 
 mediately after his return to Washing 
 ton, Lincoln directed Weitzel to revoke 
 the safeguard which he had granted 
 them, and to allow said gentlemen to 
 return to private life. Th'3 return ol 
 the president to the National capital, 
 associated as that return wa/4, with a 
 crowning National victory, was made 
 the occasion of great rejoicing and fes 
 tivity. Each successive day had its 
 special excitement. On the 11th, Lin- 
 coln issued two proclamations — one 
 declaring that certain ports in the 
 Southern States 'vould be closed until 
 further notice, and another, demanding 
 for vessels of the United States, in 
 foreign ports, those privileges and im 
 munities which, during the war, had 
 been denied, on the plea that equai 
 rights had to be accorded to each belli- 
 gerent. In the evening the city was 
 illuminated. At the Executive Man 
 sion, which was especially brilliant with 
 light, the president addressed a larg 
 assemblage of citizens. He spoke hope- 
 fully and encouragingly regarding the 
 future, and set forth his views regard- 
 ing the reconstruction of the South. It 
 
ASSASSINATION OF LINCOLN. 
 
 93? 
 
 « U) noticed there was nothing like bit- 
 
 ttjness or ill-feeling towards the, now 
 
 ad but subjugated, foe. There were 
 
 no 8 iggestions of vengeance, retaliation, 
 
 or punishment of any kind. It was a 
 
 peech which revealed a heart full of 
 
 oy and satisfaction, because a great 
 
 od destructive war was all but ended, 
 
 and because the sunshine of peace was 
 
 about to rest upon the entire country 
 
 and people. All this joy, howevor, was 
 
 soon to be clouded. The last sad act 
 
 of the protracted drama had yet to be 
 
 witnessed. 
 
 The 14th day of April, 1865, is des- 
 tined to immortal memory in the history 
 of the United States. On that day, 
 with imposing solemnities. General 
 Anderson hoisted over Fort Sumter the 
 same old flag which, four years before, 
 he hitd taken down and stowed away in 
 hope of its future usefulness. This 
 Btory^ however, has aiready been told 
 in its proper place. It wao a gladsome 
 day throughout the reputi'c; and pre- 
 parations were being maur over the 
 length and breadth of the land for a day 
 of National thanksgiving. On the 
 morning of the 14th, General Grant 
 amved in Washington. He was ac- 
 companied by Captain Robert Lincoln, 
 the president's son, one of his staflf 
 officers. A Cabinet council was held 
 at eleven o'clock. General Grant was 
 present. Lincoln, it was observed, was 
 in excellent spirits. Although not ig- 
 norant of the reports which were in 
 circulation as to the existence of a con- 
 spiracy which threatened not only his 
 awn kte, out the lives of all the princi- 
 pal membera of the government, as well 
 
 as those of Grant and Sherman, he 
 seemed to have no forebodings of evil 
 Delighted at the course events had 
 taken, and pleased with the prospect of 
 peace, his conversation turned chiefly 
 on the policy of conciliation to be pur- 
 sued towards the South. At the close 
 of the Cabinet meeting, he made an ar- 
 rangement with General Grant to visit 
 Ford's Theatre in the evening; and a 
 box was immediately eng^iged. The 
 news spread like wild-fire ; and when 
 the doors were opened, the theatie was 
 speedily crowded in every part. The 
 play for the night was " Our American 
 Cousin." Between eight and nine 
 o'clock the presidential party arrived. 
 It consisted of Lincoln himself, Mrs. 
 Lincoln, Miss Clara Hams, daughter 
 of Senator Ira Hai-ris, and Major H. R 
 Rathbone. General Grant, it was ob- 
 served, was not with them. He had, it 
 was afterwards learned, been summoned 
 to New York on important and press- 
 ing business. The box, prepared for 
 and occupied by the party, was in the 
 second tier. AJong its spacious front 
 was draped the American flag. 
 
 It was now a few minutes after ten 
 o'clock. The performance was drawing 
 to a close. The attention of the 
 audience was completely absorbed. All 
 of a sudden, there was heard the sharp 
 crack of a pistol. The sound came 
 from the president's box. At the same 
 instant, there appeared, in front of that 
 box, a man, who, brandishing a gleam 
 ing dagger, exclaimed "Sic semper 
 pyrannia " — so may it be always with 
 tyrants — the motto engraven on the 
 seal of the State of Virginia Placing 
 
 !^ 
 
»38 
 
 THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR. 
 
 his hand on the rail, he sprang from 
 the box towards the stage. In his 
 descent, one of his spurs — for he was 
 booted and spurred on the occasion — 
 becoming entangled in the folds of the 
 National flag, his leap was broken ; and 
 he fell heavily on the floor. Quickly 
 pringing to his feet, but showing that 
 he was severely injured, especially in 
 one of his legs, he again brandished hfe 
 weapon in the face of the excited and 
 bewildered audience^ and shouted " The 
 South is avenged." Rushing to the 
 rear of the stage he disappeared, before 
 either actors or audience could recover 
 themselves or realize what had hap- 
 pened. So sudden was the whole affair, 
 that it almost seemed as if it formed an 
 incident in the play. It was far other- 
 wise. The play had become a real 
 tragedy. A foul mui'der had been com- 
 mitted. The murdered man was Pres- 
 ident Lincoln. The assassin was John 
 Wilkes Booth. 
 
 Booth was an actor by profession, 
 and well acquainted with the building. 
 He was well known, also, to all the em- 
 ployes, and had no difficulty in gaining 
 admission to any part of the house. It 
 appeared that immediately before the 
 tragedy occurred, he passed near the 
 box in which were seated the president 
 ind his friends. Presenting a card to 
 Mr. Lincoln's messenger he looked, for 
 I minute, upon the orchestra and the 
 Audience. Then, entering the vestibule 
 at the box, he fastened the door with a 
 piece of plank, which had evidently 
 been provided previously for the pur- 
 pose, the object being to make it 
 impossible to open the door from with- 
 
 out. Pulling a Derringer pistol froro 
 one pocket with his right hand, and a 
 dagger from another pocket with hie 
 left, he moved into the box, quietly 
 and unobserved. The entire party 
 were absorbed in the perfonnance 
 The president was leaning fo:-ward, 
 holding aside the curtain with his left 
 hand, his head being turned slightly 
 towards the audience. Holding his 
 pistol over the back of the president's 
 chair. Booth fired. The ball entered 
 behind Mr. Lincoln's left ear, passed 
 through the brain and lodged behind 
 the right eye. The head fell forward ; 
 and the eyes closed. He lived for nine 
 hours afterwards ; but he was never 
 again conscious. Major Rathbone 
 startled by the sound of the pistol 
 and seeing what had happened, sprang 
 upon the assassin ; but Booth, dropping 
 his pistol, swung his dagger, inflicting 
 a severe wound on the major's left arm, 
 and then leaped over the rail. Such 
 was the end of Abraham Lincoln — the 
 beloved of the people, the emancipator 
 of the slave, the man who, of all others, 
 was best fitted for the high but delicate 
 and difficult position which he held 
 during the stormiest period of his 
 country's history. His four years of 
 unceasing toil and agony saved the 
 Union. His life-blood, thus ruthlessly 
 shed, sealed it and made it perpetual. 
 His name will ever remain one of the 
 greatest in American history ; and 
 while Washington, to latest ages, will 
 be spoken of as the Father, LincolD 
 will be remembered as the Saviour of 
 his country. 
 
 The death of Lincoln filled the natioc 
 
ATTEMPT O^J rtlE LIFE OF SEWARD. 
 
 93S 
 
 with woe. and covered it with sack- 
 cloth. Every one felt as if he had lost 
 a personal friend. No one felt the 
 blow more than Stanton, the stem and 
 unbending secretary-of-war. Leaning 
 Dver the body of the dead president, 
 and overwhelmed ^vith grief, he mourn- 
 fully said, " No one will ever know the 
 anxious hours that you and I have 
 spent together. You were my only 
 witness. Now, you are gone, and I am 
 left alone." Lincoln's funeral in many 
 [larticulars was, perhaps, unprecedented 
 in modern times. The body having been 
 embalmed lay, in state, in the East 
 Room of the White House. On the 
 19th of April, after the funeral services, 
 the remains were removed thence by 
 way of BaltiBiore, Philadelphia, New 
 '^ jrk, and Albany, to Springfield, Illi- 
 'lois, where they were interred. In each 
 of those cities multitudes crowded to 
 look on the face of the dead president ; 
 and it is but truth to say, that the 
 entire people of the Noiih were mourn- 
 ers on the occasion. No chief-mler of 
 any people — no monarch in all the past 
 — was ever more loved in life, or more 
 honored in death. His grave is now, 
 and ever will be, a point of attraction, 
 not only to the American people, in 
 whose sei-vice he lost his life, but to 
 liberty-loving pilgrims from all lands. 
 He died a martyr to liberty. His mur- 
 der made his name immortaL 
 
 On the same evening on which 
 Lincoln was shot, a murderous assault 
 
 vas made on Mr. Seward, the secretary. 
 
 .f-state. Although the assassin, in 
 this case, was less successful in the 
 accomplishment of his purpose, the 
 
 enterprise was (pxite as daring, and 
 revealed, equally with the other, the 
 foul character of the conspiracy, and 
 the villainous methods, as well as des- 
 perate energy, of its agents. Mr. 
 Seward, a few days before, h?A been 
 thrown from his caniage, and waB, 
 in consequence, confined to his bed- 
 room. About the same time that the 
 tragedy occurred in the theatre, a mar 
 called at Mr. Seward's house. On 
 being refused admittance, he rushed 
 past the porter and flew up two flights 
 of stairs straight to Mr. Seward's room. 
 At the door of that room, he was met 
 and resisted by the secretary's son, Mr. 
 Frederick William Seward. With the 
 butt-end of his pistol, he struck the 
 younger Seward to the floor, fracturing 
 his skull. Then, pushing aside Miss 
 Seward, who had been attracted by the 
 noise, he rushed into the sick-room, 
 sprang upon the bed, and inflicted som 
 fearful wounds on Mr. Seward's face 
 and neck. An invalid soldier named 
 Kobinson, who was in attendance on 
 Mr. Seward, seized the assassin from 
 behind, and struggled with him ; while 
 Mr. Seward himself, his arm in a sling, 
 and the blood atreaming from his gaping 
 woimds, resisted with what energy he 
 could command. Meanwhile the cry 
 of " Murder ! " rang through the house ; 
 and the assassin becoming alanred, and 
 shaking himself free of Robinson, made 
 hLs way down stairs and into the opcE 
 street. Mounting a horse which wa« 
 there waiting for him, he was soon out 
 of sight. The assassin, in this case, was 
 Lewis Payne PowelL He was the son 
 of a Florida clergyman ; and he had 
 
940 
 
 THE LAST DAYS OP THE WAIt. 
 
 served in the war. He belonged to 
 the same gang with Booth. 
 
 The principal agents of the conspiracy 
 were afterwards captured and brought 
 U) trial. Summary justice was dealt 
 out to Booth, He was shot and killed 
 by his pursuers in a tobacco-barn, at 
 Garrett's Farm, some 20 miles below 
 Fredericksburg. Harold, who was 
 with Booth when he was shot ; Mrs. 
 Surratt, who had harbored the con- 
 spirators; Atzerott, who had been 
 appointed to kill Vice-President John- 
 son ; and Payne wno made the attack 
 on Mr. Seward — all these were found 
 guilty and executed on the 6th of July. 
 Several other conspirators — among 
 them Dr. Mudd, who set Booth's broken 
 limb — were sentenced to imprisonment 
 for longer or shorter terms. It was 
 suspected, at the time, that the conspii"- 
 acy had the encouragement of some of 
 the Confederate leaders. This suspi- 
 cion has not been justified by any facts, 
 hitherto made public. 
 
 The assassination of the president, 
 painful as the blow was felt to be by 
 the whole people, did not, in any seri- 
 ous way, disorganize the government 
 machine or impede its working. 
 Within six hours after Lincoln's death, 
 Andrew Johnson, the vice-president, 
 was sworn into office as president. Mr. 
 Johnson on taking the chair of 
 Washington, and assuming the reins of 
 government, requested the members of 
 the cabinet to retain their offices. The 
 tide of affairs thus rolled on, neither 
 checked nor diverted by what had 
 happened. 
 
 The reader must now return with us 
 
 to Goldsboro, where we left the army 
 of General Sherman, resting, and pre- 
 paring for another march which, it 
 was hoped, would result in the destruc 
 tion or capture of the Confederate army 
 under General Johnston. In a previous 
 chapter, we have given an account of 
 the visit made to City Point by Gen- 
 eral Sherman, and of the interview 
 which he there had with President 
 Lincoln and with General Grant. 
 While at City Point, Sherman obtained 
 peiTnission from Grant to make some 
 radical changes in the organization of 
 his forces. On his return to Goldsboro, 
 he proceeded at once to the work of 
 reconstruction. His left wing he con- 
 stituted a distinct army, under the 
 title of "the Army of Georgia," 
 and entrusted it to the command of 
 General Slocum. This army consisted 
 of two corps, which were commanded 
 respectively by Jeff. C. Davis and Jos. 
 A. Mower. The Tenth and Twenty- 
 Third corps he named " the Army of 
 the Ohio," and placed it under the com- 
 mand of General Schofield. The corps 
 commanders of General Schofield's 
 army were J. D. Cox and A. H. Terry. 
 These changes were considered neces- 
 sary for various reasons, but mainly for 
 the purpose of discipline and efficiency 
 in the entire command ; and they were 
 made, as we have seen, with the con- 
 sent and approval of General Grant 
 Sherman had thus, under his direc 
 command, three sepaiate armies — the 
 army of the Tennessee, under Howard 
 the army of Georgia, under Slocum 
 and the army of the Ohio, under Scho 
 field. Howard was on the right ; Slocuic 
 
SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON— CORRESPONDENCE. 
 
 941 
 
 w&a on the left ; Schofield was in the 
 centre. The cavalry force was under 
 the immediate dii-ection of Kilpatrick. 
 The effective strength of the entire 
 command was 88,948. Of this force 
 2443 belonged to the artillery, and 
 5537 to the cavalry. 
 
 Sherman's preparations were not 
 completed when, on the 6th of April, 
 he learned of the victory which had 
 been won at Five Forks, and of the 
 subsequent evacuation of Richmond 
 and Petersburg. Wisely judging that 
 Lee would attempt to effect a junction 
 with Johnston, he countermanded the 
 orders which had already been given, 
 and made arrangements to march di- 
 rectly on Johnston's army, which was 
 at Smithfield, some 35,000 strong. On 
 the 10th, Sherman's entire army was 
 in motion, towards the point indicat- 
 ed. The left wing, supported by the 
 centre, moved on the two direct roads, 
 leading to Smithfield and Raleigh. 
 Howard moved more tc the right, 
 feigning the Weldon road Teriy and 
 Kilpatrick pushed along the west bank 
 9f the Neuse River, in the same general 
 direction. Smithfield was reached on 
 the 11th, when it was found that John- 
 ston had retreated with his whole army 
 towards Raleigh, and that he had 
 burned the bridges in his rear. The 
 bridges, of course, had to be rebuilt — 
 a task which consumed the remainder 
 of that day. During the night, Sherman 
 received a message from Grant, inform- 
 ing him of the surrender of Lee and the 
 array of Northern Virginia, at Appo- 
 mattox Coiirt House. On the morning 
 of the 12th, the joyful intelligence 
 
 was communicated to the army, amid 
 the wildest demonstrations of delight 
 It was felt by all, that the war was April 
 all but over. " Glory to God," 12. 
 said Sherman, "and our country, and 
 all honor to our comrades in arms, 
 towards whom we are marchins:. A 
 little more labor, a !ittle more toil on 
 our part, the great race is won, and om 
 government stands regenerated aftei 
 four long years of war." 
 
 The pui'suit was resumed on th« 
 12th. On the evening of that day, 
 Sherman was at GuUey's, ^vith the head 
 o* Slocum's column. On the 13th, he 
 entered Raleigh, and ordered the sever- 
 al heads of column towards Ashville, 
 in the direction of Salisbury or Char- 
 lotte. It was feared by Sherman and, 
 indeed, by all the ofiicers, that Johnston 
 would retreat into the hill country of 
 South Carolina and Georgia, break up 
 his army into small bands, and thua 
 indefinitely prolong the war. They 
 were all desirous that the surrender oi 
 that army should be secured on any 
 reasonable terms. It was not, there- 
 fore, without a feeling of grateful relief 
 that Sherman, on the morning of the 
 14th, and while still at Raleigh, April 
 received from Johnston a note, 14. 
 inquiring whether " in order to stop 
 the further effusion of blood and 
 devastation of property," he was willing 
 to make a temporary suspension of 
 active operations, and to communicate 
 to General Grant the request that he 
 would take like action in regard to 
 other armies, the object being to per- 
 mit the civil authorities to enter into 
 the needful arrangements to terminate 
 
 311 
 
d4a 
 
 THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAB. 
 
 tlie existing war. To this note, Sher- 
 man replied as follows : 
 
 " April 14th, 1865. 
 "Qenkral: I have this moment receiyed 
 jour communication of this date. I am fully 
 empowered to arrange with you any term? for 
 vhe suspension of further hostilities between 
 the armies commanded by you and those com- 
 m<inded by myself, and will be willing to con- 
 er with you to that end. I will limit the 
 advance of my main column, to-morrow, to 
 Morrisville, and the cavalry to the University, 
 and eipect that yon will also maintain the 
 present position of your forces until each has 
 notice of a failure to agree. That a basis of 
 action may be had, I undertake to abide by the 
 same terms and conditions as were made by 
 Generals Grant and Lee, at Appomattox Court 
 House, on the 9th inst., relative to our 
 two armies ; and furthermore, to obtain from 
 General Grant an order to suspend the move- 
 ments of any troops from the direction of 
 Virginia. General Stoneman is under my 
 command, and my order will suspend any 
 devastation or destruction contemplated by 
 him. I will add that I really desire to save 
 the people of North Carolina the damage they 
 would sustain by the march of this army 
 through the central or western parts of the 
 State. 
 
 " W. T. Shbbman, Major-GeneraL" 
 
 On the 16 th, an answer was received 
 from Johnston, agi'eeing to a meeting 
 to be held, on the following day, at a 
 point midway between the National 
 advance at Durham's, and the Confed- 
 erate rear at Hillsboro. At eight o'clock 
 on the morning of the 17th, a car and a 
 ipril locomotive were waiting to con- 
 17. vey Sherman and his attendants 
 to Durham's Station. The general was 
 just entering the car when the tele- 
 graph operator approached him in great 
 haste, and informed him that he was 
 just now receiving in cipher from 
 
 Morehead City, a most important dee. jj 
 patch, which, he thought, it might U " 
 well for him to see. Sherman delayed 
 the train, until the message was trans 
 lated and written out. It was fr(iui 
 the secretary-of-war ; and it conveyed 
 the sad intelligence of the fate which 
 had befallen President Lincoln, of the 
 attack which had been made on Mr. 
 Seward and his son, and of the suspi- 
 cions that were entertained, that the 
 conspirators had intended to assassin 
 ate General Grant and all the princi 
 pal officers of the government. The 
 operator alone, hitherto, had seen the 
 message. Assured of this, Sherman 
 enjoined him to preserve the utriost 
 secrecy, until he should return. The 
 train was then permitted to stait. 
 About ten o'clock, the pai'ty reached 
 Durham's Station, where General Ki' 
 patrick, with a squadron of cara'ry, 
 was waiting to receive his chief. Led 
 horses had been provided for Sherman 
 and his staff. Mounted on these, and 
 preceded by a small platoon and the 
 bearer of a white flag, they were soon 
 on their way to the appointed place of 
 meeting. The morning, we are told, 
 was exceptionally beautifuL Nature 
 was clad in her robes of richest gieeu. 
 The ail- was vocal with the songstere of 
 the grove, and laden with the fragrance 
 of the fiTiit trees, just bursting into 
 bloom. Everywhere there was that 
 which appealed to and pleased the 
 senses ; and there was, besides, an in 
 vigorating freshness in the suiTounding 
 atmosphere. It was not wonderful 
 that in such circumstances, and on such 
 a mission, a feeling of elation, a seuM 
 
THE CONFBEENCB AT BENNETT'S HOCTSK. 
 
 943 
 
 uf gladness, should have been experi- 
 enced by the entire party — by Sherman 
 quite as much as by the others, soul- 
 bm-dened though he was by the sad in- 
 telligence which he had just received, 
 and which he could not as yet reveal. 
 
 About five miles from Durham's the 
 flag-bearers met ; and the announce- 
 ment was ma(Je that General John- 
 -iton was near at hand. He was soon 
 in sisrht. Bv bis side rode General 
 Wade Hampton ; and close by, and 
 forming {)art of his peraonal staff, were 
 jMajor Johnston and Captain Hampton. 
 General Sherman had a larger retinue, 
 which includeci, among others. General 
 Kilpatrick, General Barry, and Colonel 
 Poe. ShermaTi and Johnston who, 
 although thirteen years in the I'egular 
 8rmy, had never met befoi-e, saluted 
 nd shook hands, and then introduced 
 their respective attendants. This done, 
 and still on horseback, they repaired to 
 a small fann house, on the Chapel Hill 
 road — a wooden sti-ucture situated on 
 the brow of a hill, and owned and 
 occupied by a Mr. Bennett and his 
 family. At the request of the two 
 generals, the inmates vacated the 
 premises and retired to one of the 
 adjoining buildings. Pen, ink and 
 paper were brought into one of tlie 
 rooms l)y an orderly. The orderly 
 having retii-ed, the two generals were 
 left alone. " I have just received," said 
 Sherman, " bad news — the worst news, 
 general, in my judgment, that we have 
 had for a long time. It is especially 
 damaging to your cause." He then 
 handed Johnston the despatch, and 
 watched him closely while he read. 
 
 Johnston's exclamations showed how ut- 
 terly he was shocked ; and the perspir- 
 ation, which came out in large bead like 
 drops on his high forehead, revealf>d the 
 inner agony of the man. He denounced 
 the act as a disgrace to the age, and 
 expressed the hope that Sherman did 
 not charge it to the Confed/rate gov- 
 ernment. SheiTTian wa.s willing to ex- 
 onerate Johnston himself ayd Lee, and 
 indeed, all the liigher officers of thefc 
 Confederate army; but he confessed, 
 he had his (ioubts regarding such men 
 as Davis, Sanders, and others of that 
 stripe. Pie told Johnston that his own 
 army was as yet ignorant of what had 
 happened, and that he had not revealed 
 the painful intelligence even to his own 
 staff. He dreaded the result which 
 might follow from the communication 
 of the newe to the soldiers ; for with 
 his army, as indeed, with all the armies 
 of the Union, Lincoln was a great 
 favorite. If the spirit of retaliation 
 seized them, and was by any provoca- 
 tion forced into open expression, it 
 might be difficult, if not impossible, to 
 hold them in restiaint; and the fate of 
 Raleigh might be more fearful than the 
 fate of Columbia. He expressed the 
 belief that Johnston, himself, must be 
 convinced of the folly and even cruelty 
 of prolonging the contest, and offered 
 to accept his sirrrender and that of all 
 the troops subject to his orders, on tho 
 identical terms which had been granted 
 to General Lee. 
 
 Johnston admitted that the cause 
 with which he was identifieil, was lost. 
 Any further fighting, he said, woiUd be 
 " murder." For himseK he asked 
 
944 
 
 THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAK. 
 
 nothing. He was anxious only for his 
 men. The terms granted to Lee were, 
 he thought, in the last degree magnan- 
 imous. He wished, however, to obtain 
 some general concessions which, he con- 
 id ered, were necessary to secure the 
 af ety of his followers ; and he insisted 
 npon certain guarantees which Sherman 
 had no authority to concede. " Why," 
 he asked, "can we not make this sur- 
 render universal ? " "I know," he said, 
 " I can get an order from Mr. Davis 
 that all the Confederate armies shall 
 disband." It was Johnston's earnest, 
 anxious desire that the sun-ender should 
 cover not only his own army, but all 
 the Confederate forces east and west of 
 the Mississippi. The two generals 
 could not come to an agreement ; and 
 Johnston asked that the conference be 
 postponed for some days. Sherman 
 would grant one day only. It was ar- 
 anged that they should meet at the 
 same place the following day at noon ; 
 and the interview, which had lasted 
 three hours, was brought to a close. 
 
 On his return to Raleigh, Sherman 
 issued an order to the army, making 
 public the contents of the telegraphic 
 message. The impression produced 
 was, as he had expected, painful in 
 the extreme. Every countenance gave 
 evidence of deep and genuine sorrow. 
 Sherman watched the effect closely. 
 He saw and felt that the slightest cir- 
 cumstance might provoke a terrible 
 revenge. Happily, however, in no 
 single instance was there any attempt 
 at retaliation. Summoning together 
 his general officers, he conferred with 
 them aa to the course to be followed 
 
 with Johnston and his army. It was 
 felt by aU that, if the enemy could only 
 be brought to bay, he covdd be easily 
 destroyed. That, however, was the 
 difficulty. The country was peculiarly 
 in Johnston's favor. If the worst 
 should happen, it would be possible for 
 the Confederate leader to break up his 
 army into separate bands and scatter 
 them in different diroctioiis. Such an 
 event was dreaded, as it would lead to 
 an indefinite prolongation of the war. 
 The general voice was, therefore, in 
 favor of leniency. It was, in the last 
 degree, desirable that the war should be 
 ended at once. On the following day 
 the two generals-in-chief met, as April 
 agreed upon, at Bennett's house. 18. 
 Sherman arrived at noon. Johnston 
 did not come up until it was about two 
 o'clock. He was accompanied, as on 
 the day before, by General Wade 
 Hampton. Johnston had not changed 
 his mind since the meeting on the pre 
 vious day. He had authority, he said 
 over all the Confederate armies. He 
 wished the surrender to be universal 
 He insisted, however, upon obtaining 
 some guarantee which would secure the 
 political rights of his officers and men 
 Sherman argued that all such rights 
 were covered by the example which had 
 been set at Appomattox Coiui, House. 
 Lincoln's proclamation of December 
 8th, 1863, was still in force ; and that 
 instrument enabled every Confederate 
 soldier and officer, below the rank oi 
 colonel, to obtain an absolute pardon 
 by laying down his arms and taking 
 the common oath of allegiance, (ien- 
 eral Grant had extended the principle 
 
THE MEMORANDUM. 
 
 »4£ 
 
 so as to include all the officers, General 
 Lee, himself, not excepted. At this 
 stage Johnston informed Sherman that 
 Mr. Breckenridge was near at hand, and 
 asked whether he might not be per- 
 mitted to take part in the conference. 
 Sherman, at first, objected, on the 
 ground that negotiations should be 
 confined strictly to belligerents. It 
 was finally agreed, however, that Breck- 
 enridge might be allowed to be present 
 in the capacity of a major-general, but 
 not as the Confederate secretary-of-war. 
 Breckenridge confiimed all that John- 
 ston had said regarding the state of 
 feeling which prevailed among officers 
 and men concerning their political 
 rights, in case of surrender. After the 
 lapse of some hours, Sherman, recalling 
 the conversation he had with Mr. Lin- 
 coln, at City Point, and anxious to em- 
 Dody the views there presented to him, 
 as well as to conform somewhat to the 
 wishes of his opponents, sat down and 
 drew up a "memorandum" or basis of 
 agreement. This document, which wil] 
 be found below,* was signed by both 
 
 •" Memorandum or Bans of agreement, made thii 19th 
 day of April, A. D. 1865, riear Durham') Station, 
 in the State of North Carolina, by and between Oen- 
 erai Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Confed- 
 erate army, and Major-OeTieral William T. Sheb- 
 UAS, eomnuMiding the army of the United State* in 
 North Carolina, both present : 
 
 1. Thecont«cilng armies now in the field to main- 
 tain the itatu quo, until notice is given by the Com- 
 manding general of either one to its opponent, and 
 
 easonable time — say forty-eight hoars — allowed. 
 
 2. The Confederate armies now in existence to be 
 disbanded and conducted to their several Stat« capitals, 
 there to deposit their arms and public property in the 
 State arsenals ; and each officer and man to execute 
 and file an agreement to cease from acts of war. and 
 abide the action of both State and Federal authority 
 The number of arms and munitions of war to be reported 
 
 parties, and sent to Washington for the 
 approval of President Johnson. Mean 
 while, it was agreed that both armiea 
 should remain in statu quo, until an 
 answer should be received from Wash 
 ington. 
 
 Major Henry Hitchcock reached 
 Washington, with the memorandum, on 
 the 2l8t of April. The public April 
 mind was still intensely excited 21. 
 over the assassination of Lincoln, and 
 over the binital, although less successful, 
 attack which had been made upon the 
 life of Secretary Seward. The terms 
 which Sherman proposed to grant to 
 the South accorded ill with the tone of 
 public feeling. The blood of Lincoln 
 was calling loudly for vengeance; yet, 
 one of the most trusted and honored 
 generals of the Union was proposing to 
 grant, to the now conquered South, 
 terms which implied an utter forgetful- 
 ness of all th' "vents of the war. The 
 memorandum, in fact, was universally 
 condemned. It was disapproved by 
 the president, by the secretary-of-war, by 
 the Lieutenant-general, and, indeed, by 
 
 to the Chief of Ordnance at Washington City, subject 
 to the future action of the Congress of the United 
 States, and in the mean time, to be used solely to 
 maintain peace and order within the borders of the 
 States respectively. 
 
 3. The recognition, by the Executive of the United 
 States, of the several State governments, on theii 
 officers and Legislatures taking the oaths prescribed 
 by the Constitution of the United States, and where 
 conflicting State governments have resulted from the 
 war, the legitimacy of all shall be submitted to the 
 Supreme Court of the United States. 
 
 4. The re-establishment of all the Federal Courts 
 In the several States, with powers as defined by the 
 Constitution of the United States and of the States re 
 spectively. 
 
 5. The people and inhabitants of all the States li 
 be guaranteed, so far as the Executive can, thci' 
 
*46 
 
 THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR. 
 
 every member of the cabinet ; and, later, 
 when it found its way into the news- 
 papers, it called forth against Sherman 
 a perfect howl of indignation. Time, 
 however, has set this whole matter forth 
 
 n its true light ; and General Sherman's 
 patriotism shines not the less brightly 
 that it, temporarily and most unjustly, 
 suffered an eclipse. 
 
 General Grant set out immediately 
 for Raleigh, with instmctions from the 
 secretary-of-war to declare the rejection 
 of the memorandum, and to assume 
 direction of military affairs. From 
 Morehead City, he telegraphed to Sher- 
 man the decision of the government ; 
 ipril ^^^j ^^ ^^® morning of the 24th, 
 
 24. he reached the head-quarters of 
 the army at Raleigh. Grant directed 
 Sherman to communicate the decision 
 
 »f the government U Johnston, to 
 notify him that the truct would expire 
 
 political rights and franchises, as well as their rights 
 •f person and property, as defined by the Constitution 
 of the United States and of the States respectively. 
 
 6. The Executive authority of the Government of 
 the United States not to disturb any of the people by 
 reason of the late war, so long as they live in peace 
 »nd quiet, abstain from acts of armed hostility, and 
 9)>ey the laws in existence at the place of their resi- 
 ■ience. 
 
 7. In general terms — the war to cease ; a general 
 »mnesty so far as the Executive of the United States 
 ^HD command, on condition of the disbandment of the 
 Confederate armies, the distribution of arms and the 
 •eMinii)tii)n of peaceful pursuits by the officers and the 
 ut-ii liithiTtn rnmp'ising said armies. 
 
 .N e iiff f\M\ empowered by our respective prln- 
 
 npalt. U) luitill these terms, we individually and 
 
 •-•flicially pledge ourselves to promptly obtain the 
 
 necessary authority, and to carry out the above pro^ 
 
 gramme. 
 
 W. T. Shkrmabt, Mn^r-Oeneral, 
 
 CommnnAing Army of t)u United SUiUt in North 
 
 UToUlUi 
 
 J E .loHNSTON, Gerifral 
 Omnwuutdt/tg Uott/cdcrale ataUt Ann)/ in NorlA 
 Oarciim.a. 
 
 within forty-eight hours after the 
 receipt of the message, and to demand, 
 at the same time, the immediate sur- 
 render of his army. This was the full 
 extent of Grant's interference. Sher 
 man was permitted to carry on and 
 conclude the negotiations with Johnston. 
 On receiving Sherman's message announ 
 cing the decision of the government at 
 Washington, Johnston requested an- 
 other interview. It was promptly 
 granted; and on the following day, the 
 26th of April, the two commanders met 
 again, at the same place, when articles 
 of agreement were signed. The follow- 
 ing is the document as approved and 
 signed by General Grant. 
 
 " Terms of a Military Convention, entered inU 
 this 2&th day of April, 1865, at Bennetfi 
 House, near Durham's Station, North Caro- 
 lina, between General Joskph E. Johnston , 
 Commanding the Confederate Army, and 
 Major-General W. T. Sherman, Command- 
 ing the United States Army, in North 
 Carolina. 
 I. All acts of war on the part of the troops 
 under General Johnston's command to cease 
 from this date. 2. All arms and public prop- 
 erty to be deposited at Greensboro, and de- 
 liyered to an ordnance-oflBcer of the Uniteil 
 States Army. 3. Rolls of all the oflBcers and 
 men to be made in duplicate ; one copy to be 
 retained by the commander of the troops, and 
 the other to be given to an ofiBcer to be desig 
 nated by General Sherman. Each oflBcer and 
 man to give his individual obligation, in writing, 
 not to take up arms against the Government ol 
 the United States, until properly released from 
 his obligation. 4. The side-arms of officers, 
 and their private horses and baggage to be 
 retained by them. 5. This being done, all the 
 officers and men will be permitted to return 
 to their homes, not to be disturbed by the 
 United States authorities, 8o long sb they 
 
DAVIS AT IRWINSVILLE. 
 
 94^ 
 
 observe their obligation, and the laws in force 
 « here they may reside." 
 
 W. T. Sherman, Major- General, 
 Commanding United States Forcet in North GaroUna. 
 
 J. E. Johnston, General, 
 OommandiTig Gonfederate States Forcet in North 
 
 Carolina, 
 ipproved : U. S. Grant, Lieut.-General." 
 
 Wade Hampton, wlio refused to 
 abide by the terms of the capitulation, 
 dashed off with a body of cavaliy in 
 the direction of Charlotte, where were 
 Davis and the other members of the 
 Confederate government. The remain- 
 der of Johnston's army, some 30.000 
 strong, after having formally smTen- 
 dered arms, were permitted to return to 
 their homes. So passed out of exist- 
 ence the second great army of the 
 Confederacy. 
 
 Surrenders and captures now fol- 
 lowed in rapid succession. On the 4th 
 of May, at Citronella, Ala., General 
 Richard Taylor, who commanded the 
 Confederate forces on the east of the 
 Mississippi, sun-endered with his entire 
 command. At the same time and place 
 Commander FaiTand surrendered to 
 Rear- Admiral Thatcher, that portion of 
 the Confederate n&vj which was in the 
 Tombigbee. 
 
 On the 10th of May, the head and 
 front of the offending cause was cap- 
 tured in the person of Jefferson Davis. 
 After the faU of Richmond, Davis had 
 attempted to maintain the semblance of 
 i government at Danville. On the 
 lOth of April, on hearing of the surren- 
 ier of Lee, he proceeded to Greensboro, 
 accompanied by the different members 
 of his cabinet. At Greensboro, where 
 he met Johnston and Beauregard, and 
 
 vainly endeavored to induce them to 
 attack Sherman, Davis was coldly i-e 
 ceived. For three days he and his 
 party were compelled to content them 
 selves vrith what accommodations could 
 be obtained in a railroad car. From 
 Greensboro they proceeded to Charlotte, 
 where they remained until they werf 
 informed of the surrender of John^tni 
 Davis was anxious, if possible, to iv.-k . 
 Taylor, who was beyond the Chatta 
 hoochee ; and it was his hope that a 
 vigorous resistance might yet be made, 
 if the forces of that general could be 
 united with those of KLrby Smith, west 
 of the Mississippi. All such hopes 
 were soon blasted. At Washington, 
 Ga., there was a scramble among Davis' 
 ministers for what gold they had been 
 able to caiTy with them. Well aware 
 that they were being pui-sued, and 
 alarmed by the mmors which were 
 reaching them of the near presence of 
 the National troopers, they now scatter- 
 ed — Postmaster-general Reagan alone 
 of all the members of the cabinet, re 
 maining with Davis. At this stage, 
 Mrs. Davis, her children, and her sister, 
 Mrs. Howell, were pushing towards the 
 Gulf in wagons, on a nearly parallel 
 route, about 18 miles distant. Learning 
 that they were in danger of being 
 attacked and robbed by a band of Con- 
 federate soldiers, who imagined that 
 Mrs. Davis and her party were carrying 
 off a large amount of specie, Davis 
 hastened to their assistance. He joined 
 them as they were approaching Irwins- 
 ville, the capital of Irwin County, Ga., 
 nearly due south of Macon. There the 
 weary fugitives encamped for the night 
 
948 
 
 THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR 
 
 Meanwhile two detachments of General 
 Wilson's cavalry — one under Colonel 
 Piitchard, the other under Colonel 
 Hamden — who for some days had been 
 m hot pursuit, were rapidly closing in 
 upon them. A prize of $100,000, which 
 was to reward the successful captor, 
 was, no doubt, lending some intensity 
 to the purpose of the pursuers. At 
 iay-break, on the 10th of May, the 
 camp was surrounded, and the entire 
 party were made prisoners. Pritchard's 
 men had the honor of the capture. 
 Conveyed first to Wilson's headquarters 
 at Macon, the prisoners were sent 
 thence by way of Savannah to Fortress 
 Monroe. Alexander H. Stephens, who 
 was captured about the same time, 
 was sent to the same prison. He and 
 Reagan were afterwards transferred to 
 Fort Warren, in Boston harbor. 
 
 On the 11th of May, General Jeff. 
 Thompson, who commanded in Arkan- 
 sas, surrendered at Chalk Bluff, with 
 about 7500 men. One Confederate 
 anny still continued to hold out. It 
 ^^as that of General Kirby Smith. 
 Long after the surrender of Lee, Smith 
 professed, at least, to be sanguine and 
 hopefuL Towards the very last days 
 of April he addressed his soldiers as 
 " the hope of the nation," and exhorted 
 them to fight on for their liberties and 
 their homes. " You poosess," he said, 
 " the means of long resistance ; you 
 have hopes of succor from abroad. 
 Protract the struggle, and you vnll 
 surely receive the aid of nations who 
 already deeply sympathize with you." 
 Smith was encouraged in his attitude 
 of resistance by the sentiments which 
 
 prevailed among the people of the 
 South-west. In Louisiana and in Texas, 
 in several of their more populous cen 
 tres, public meetings were held and 
 resolutions adopted in favor of continu- 
 ing the contest. Of the existence of 
 this feeling in those States, and of the 
 stubborn energy of Kirby Smith, the 
 authorities at Washington were not 
 ignorant. Preparations were made for 
 a vigorous camjiaign in Texas ; meafiuren 
 were adopted for the collection of a 
 large force at New Orleans ; and Gen- 
 eral Sheridan received instructiom to 
 hold himself in readiness to assume the 
 command. These arrangements, be- 
 coming unnecessary, were never fully car- 
 ried out. The end, for which all were 
 impatiently longing, was rapidly ap- 
 proaching. It was not to be deferred 
 by the stubbornness of any general, o 
 by the wishes of any section of the 
 people. 
 
 Meanwhile, collisions were taking 
 place between poitions of the rival 
 forces on the borders of the Rio Grande. 
 One of these, which happened near 
 Brazos Santiago, and which resulted 
 somewhat unfavorably for the Nationals, 
 proved to be the last battle of the war. 
 Colonel Theodore H. Barrett, who was 
 in command of the National troops at 
 Brazos Santiago, was short of horses for 
 his men. In order to supply this want, 
 he sent Colonel Bronson, on the evening 
 of the 11th of May, with some 300 men, 
 to surprise and capture a Confederate 
 camp on the Rio Grande. The surprise 
 was complete. Bronson drove the foe 
 before him, captured a number of horses 
 and made some prisoners. Having 
 
THE COST OF THE WAB. 
 
 349 
 
 fallen back, he was joined on the morn- 
 ing of the 13th by Colonel Morrison, 
 at the head of some 200 men. BaiTett 
 now assumed command in person. The 
 Confederates, it was discovered, were 
 'ollected in considerable force in the 
 V icinity of what was known as Palmetto 
 May Ranche. Resolved to disperse 
 13. them, BaiTett ordered another 
 attack. After some skirmishing which 
 lasted during the gi'eater part of the 
 forenoon, the Confederates were driven 
 back some miles, when the Nationals 
 halted on a piece of rising ground about 
 a mile from the ranche. The National 
 left rested on the Rio Grande. In this 
 position, about four o'clock in the after- 
 noon, Barre+t was fiercely attacked by 
 a strong Confederate force, under the 
 command of General Slaughter. Bar- 
 rett was without guns. Slaughter was 
 well supplied with both cavalry and 
 artillery. Barrett was compelled to 
 fall back. This, however, he did with 
 great skill and with very considerable 
 success. For three hours the running 
 fight was kept up. The Confederates 
 made repeated and savage onsets on 
 Barrett's front and right flank. The 
 recoiling force, however, was admirably 
 covered by a body of colored troops 
 belonging to the Sixty-Second regiment, 
 who boldly and firmly maintained their 
 line and successfully repelled every 
 attack of the enemy. In the struggle 
 some 48 men of the Thirty-Fourth 
 Indiana, who had been thrown out as 
 skirmishers to protect the flank of their 
 regiment, were cut off and captured by 
 Slaughter's cavalry. About sunset, 
 tlie pressure ceased, and the fighting | 
 
 was discontinued. Such was the battle 
 of Palmetto Ranche, famous as beinf 
 the last in the Civil War. 
 
 A few days later came the last sui 
 render. Kirby Smith had, at length 
 discovered the hopelessness of his cause 
 He had heard of the surrenders of John 
 ston and Taylor and Thompson. He 
 had heard also of the arrival of Sheridan 
 at New Orleans. The expected foreign 
 aid had not yet arrived. Further resist 
 ance, he saw, was useless. He sent mes- 
 sengers to General Canby, who was at 
 Baton Rouge, to t.scertain the terms of 
 surrender ; but, before the negotiations 
 were completed. Smith had abandoned 
 his post and made his escape into 
 Texas. General Buckner, who it will 
 be remembered, was left in a similar 
 plight at Fort Donelson, assumed com- 
 mand ; and on the 26th of May, jfay 
 all that remained of the Confed- 26. 
 erate anny in the Trans-Mississippi De 
 partment, was surrendered t* Canby, a1 
 New Orleans. The Civil War was ended 
 
 The struggle which extended ovei 
 four weaiy years, was as severe as it waa 
 protracted. To the entire people, north 
 and south, it was a long-continued bap- 
 tism of fire. The whole nation, so to 
 speak, passed through the burning fiery 
 fumaca On both sides the war had 
 been conducted at a fearful cost of 
 blood and treasure. The total number 
 of troops called for by the National 
 government, was 2,942,748. The total 
 number obtained was 2,690,401. Mak 
 ing allowance for the terms of service 
 which varied from six months to fouf 
 years, it is safe to conclude that there 
 were in actual service about 1,500,000 
 
950 
 
 THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAK. 
 
 men. Of these some 60,000 were killed 
 m battle, 35,000 were mortally wound- 
 ed, and 184,000 died in the hospitals of 
 disease. It is scarcely an exaggeration 
 to say, that, on the part of the Nation- 
 als alone, 300,000 men died on the 
 battle-field or in the hospitals, and that 
 as many more were crippled or other- 
 wise disabled for life. The Confeder- 
 ate armies in point of actual nxmibers, 
 were not equal to the National armies ; 
 but their losses could hardly be less 
 It would certainly not be an over-esti- 
 Qoate to say that, through the war, 
 the entire countiy sustained an actual 
 loss of 1,000,000 able-bodied men. An 
 idea of the pecuniary cost of the war 
 may be obtained from the fact that the 
 National debt, which in June, 1861, 
 was only $90,867,828, had, at the be- 
 ginning of January, 1866, reached the 
 igh figure of $2,749,491,745. On a 
 air calculation, it is estimated that the 
 expenditures of the government, during 
 the last year of the war, exceeded the 
 whole expenditures of the government 
 from the inauguration of Washington 
 to the inauguration of Buchanan. 
 These figures do not cover the enor- 
 mous sums paid out by individual 
 States, and by local bodies, in fitting 
 out their several contingents ; they do 
 not include the millions volimtarily 
 contributed by the people to the Sani- 
 ary and Christian Commissions; nor 
 do they make any account of the fact 
 that the once blooming and wealthy 
 South was literally exhausted, prostrat- 
 ed, and laid waste. It was a fearful 
 sacrifice — one of the greatest ever made 
 hy any people. Whether it was a 
 
 necessary sacrifice will probably for 
 ever remain a debatable question. One 
 thing, however, is certain : it was not 
 made in vain. Out of the fiery ordeal 
 came forth a regenerated America — a 
 grander and more glorious Union 
 Great questions, involving ever-recur 
 ring, never-ending trouble, were finally 
 settled. The Southern Confederacy was 
 crushed, and, with it, the spirit of rebel 
 lion. Slavery was abolished ; and free 
 dom was proclaimed to be the birthright i 
 of man, irrespective of race or color. 
 And, what will be found to be of equal 
 importance to the future of America, 
 and, indeed, to the future of mankind, 
 the original National Union was saved. 
 The end which had, at last, come 
 had been foreseen ; and, even before 
 the assassination of President lancoln, 
 arrangements had been made to discon- 
 tinue all drafting and recruiting, to 
 curtaU purchases of army supplies, to 
 reduce the number of general and staff 
 officers, and to remove whatever mil 
 itary restrictions had been laid on 
 trade and commerce. Preparations 
 were made, at Washington, for the re- 
 ception of the victorious legions which 
 had followed the leadership of Grant 
 and Sherman. On the 22d and 23d of 
 May, the grand review took place. In 
 the presence of multitudes of their re- 
 joicing fellow ■ citizens, over 200,000 
 veterans, victors in many a hard-won 
 fight, marched before the president and 
 his cabinet. On those two days, in 
 Washington, an element of sadnes. 
 mingled with the general joy. One 
 prominent figure was missed. Lincoln, 
 the beloved of all, was in every map r 
 
DISBANDMENT OF THE ARMIES. 
 
 Ul 
 
 thoughts ; but he was not there. His 
 work, however, had been nobly done ; 
 and amid the imposing grandeur and 
 magnificence of the spectacle, men's 
 minds were impressed with the old 
 truths, that " the good which men do 
 -ives after them," and that when the 
 blessed rest from their laboi-s " their 
 works do follow them." 
 
 A diflBcult task had yet to be per- 
 formed by the government, before it 
 could be said that the nation had fairly 
 entered upon the enjoyment of peace. 
 In crushing out the rebellious elements 
 of the States recently in revolt, and in 
 bringing back those States to their 
 aUegiance and I'estoriug them to the 
 Union, it had been necessary, as we 
 have seen, to call into existence and to 
 sustain large military and naval organ- 
 izations. For the purpose for which 
 hey were created, these war forces were 
 o longer necessary. What was to be 
 done vrith them ? They must be re- 
 tained or disbanded ; and each alter- 
 native was beset with difficulty. If 
 retained, how were they to be em- 
 ployed ? If disbanded, might they not 
 be provoked into open resistance ? The 
 problem to be solved was not entirely 
 new; but there was somewhat of nov- 
 elty in the circumstances ; and the 
 entire civilized world was interested in 
 the mode and character of its solu- 
 tion. It was not the first time that 
 huge armies, after having saved, had 
 proved the ruin of the commonwealth, 
 rhoughtful men remembered the ex- 
 perience and fate of Rome, and, later, 
 the experience and fate of France. 
 Once more the crucial test was about 
 
 to be applied. What was to be the 
 result? The test was applied; and 
 the result was in the last degree satis- 
 factory. The problem was solved in a 
 manner which did honor to the Ameri 
 can soldier, to American institutions, 
 and, indeed, to the general intelligence 
 of the nineteenth century. 
 
 It had never, in truth, been a seiious 
 question with the government or with 
 the people, what should be done with 
 the soldier, when the war was over. 
 It was taken for granted by all, the 
 soldier himself included, that he should 
 return to his home, and resume the 
 duties of peaceful citizenship. Accord 
 ingly, before the end of May, an'ange 
 ments were made for disbanding the 
 armies. Sherman, in a touching ad 
 dress, bade farewell to his command, 
 on the 30th of May ; and, on the June 
 2d of June, General Grant issued, 2. 
 to all the armies, the following order 
 
 " Soldiers of the Armies op the Unitei) 
 States: — By your patriotic devotion to your 
 country, in the hour of danger and alarm, 
 your magnificent fighting, brayery, and endur- 
 ance, you have maintained the supremacy o) 
 the Union and the Constitution, overthrown 
 all armed opposition to the enforcement of the 
 laws and of the proclamation forever abolish- 
 ing slavery — the cause and pretext of the 
 rebellion — and opened the way to the rightful 
 authorities to restore order and inaugurate 
 peace, on a permanent and enduring basis, on 
 every foot of American soil. Your marches, 
 sieges, and battles, in distance, duration) 
 resolution, and brilliancy of results, dim the 
 lustre of the world's past military achieve- 
 ments, and will be the patriots' precedent, i' 
 defense of liberty and right, in all time t 
 come. In obedience to your country's call, 
 you left your homes and families, and volun- 
 teered in her defense. Victory has crowna'' 
 
962 
 
 THE LAST DATS OF THE WAE. 
 
 your Talor, and secured the purpose of your 
 patriotic hearts ; and with the gratitude of your 
 countrymen, and the highest honors a great and 
 free nation can accord, you will soon be per- 
 mitted to return to your homes and families, 
 conscious of haying discharged the highest 
 duty of American citizens. To aobiere these 
 glorious triumphs, and secure to yourselves, 
 your fellow-countrymen, and posterity, the 
 blessings of free institutions, tens of thousands 
 of your gallant comrades have fallen, and 
 sealed the priceless legacy with their blood. 
 The graves of these a grateful nation bedews 
 with tears, honors their memories, and will ever 
 cherish and support their stricken families." 
 
 The work of disbandment, which 
 had been already commenced, was car 
 ried on steadily, th'3 government giv 
 ing to it a lai-ge shaie of its atten- 
 tion; and, a.s early as the 15th of 
 November, over 800,000 troops had 
 been transported, mustered out and 
 paid. At the beginning of November, 
 1866, when the musteiing process was 
 completed, as many as 1,023,021 sol- 
 diers had been restored to their homes, 
 and to the avocations of peaceful life. 
 There was no jarring, no resistance. 
 It was a gi-and experiment ; and it 
 resulted in a splendid success. Such 
 an expeiiment, attended by such a 
 result, had never before been wit- 
 oessed. The disbandment, without 
 any serious disturbance to the com- 
 cn.inity, of so many thousands of men, 
 most of them inured to all the habits, 
 AS well as hardships of the soldier's 
 life, was, at the time and not unjustly, 
 regarded as another great victory — a 
 victory, in some respects, even greater 
 than that which had just been won 
 by the sword. It was a real triumph 
 of popular government — another gen- 
 
 uine proof of the inherent strength of 
 the republic. 
 
 We have now completed the task we 
 assigned ourselves at the commencementj 
 of this volume. We have traced the] 
 History of the Great Civil War from: 
 its commencement at Fort Sumter, in 
 1861, to its triumphant close in the dis- 
 bandment of the Armies of the Union, 
 in 1865. We have shown the causes 
 whicli brought about the struggle, and 
 have traced our troubles to their true 
 source. We have swept the whole 
 horizon of tlie war, pointing out to the 
 reader the various complex movements 
 of the contending forces, and seeking 
 to separate each, yet so blend all as to 
 enable him to understand not only each 
 separate operation, but its eeneral bearing 
 upon the whole great drama. We have 
 seen the tide of victory roll backward 
 and forward, at times seeming to en- 
 gulf the hopes of those whose prayers 
 were for the triumph of the Union, yet 
 after all sweeping onward in one grand 
 irresistible swell to victory and peace. 
 We have seen the Union preserved, the 
 contending armies quietly returning; to 
 their homes, and a new reign of peace 
 and good will inaugurated. 
 
 Such a story, the most sublime and 
 thrilling that human pen can relate, can 
 point but one moral — that the institu- 
 tions which were worth fighting for so 
 nobly are worth preserving ; that the 
 Union which has cost us so much bloodl 
 and treasure, which has brought us free- 
 dom and prosperity, must be cherished 
 as the most precious possession we can 
 transmit to future generations. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 96« 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Thb Great CrvTL War. 
 
 A. 
 iJJBOTT Gfen., brigade of, at the capture of Fort 
 Fisher, 863. 
 
 Abercrombie, Gen., at the battle of Fair Oaks, 238. 
 
 Ackworth Station, Ga. , captured by Gen. Hood, 805. 
 
 Acquis creek, McClellan's army moves towards, 279 ; 
 arrlTal of McClellan at, 280 ; deserted by the Na- 
 tionals, 801. 
 
 Adairsville, Qa. Gen. Newton skirmishes with Gen. 
 Johnston's rear-guard at, 711. 
 
 Adams, Gen. severely wounded at Chlckamauga, 554. 
 
 Aiken, skirmish of Kilpatrick with Wheeler at, 883. 
 
 Alabama. Confederate cruiser, depredations of, 877 ; 
 sunk by the Kearsarge oS Cherbourg, 879. 
 
 Albemarle, Confederate ram, at the siege of Ply- 
 mouth, 858 ; her fight with the Sassacus — sunk in 
 the Roanoke river by Lieut. Gushing, 859. 
 
 Alexander, Gen., brigade of, at Chattanooga, 569. 
 
 Alexandria, Va., occupation of, by National troops, 85. 
 
 Alexandria, La., taken possession of by Admiral Por- 
 ter, 438 ; occupied by the Confederates, 597 ; Na- 
 tional troops occupy, 624 ; evacuation of, 638. 
 
 Alice Dean and McCombs, steamers, seized by Gen. 
 Morgan at Bradenburg, Ky., 595. 
 
 AUatoona Pass, Ga., operations of Gen. Sherman's 
 army at, 713 ; heroic defense of, by Gen. Corse, 806 ; 
 battle of, 807. 
 
 Allyn, Lieut. S., bravery of, at Port Hudson, 443. 
 
 Alsop's Farm, surprise of the National troops at, 673 ; 
 battle of, 674. 
 
 Ames, Gen., at the capture of Fort Fisher, 866 ; at 
 Fort Anderson, 869. 
 
 Ammen, Gen., re-occupies Strawberry plains, 836. 
 
 Anderson, Col., surrender of Fort Gaines by, to the 
 Nutionals, 648. 
 
 Anderson, Gen. G. T., at Santa Rosa, 67 ; at the bat 
 tie of Shiloh, 109 ; at the battle of Fredericksburg, 
 457 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 614 ; at the battle 
 of the Wilderness, 666 ; severely wounded at the 
 battle of Griswoldville, 815. 
 
 ^derscn, Major-Gen. , mortally wounded at the bat- 
 tle of Jonesboro, 731. 
 
 Anderson, Major R., in command of cTharlestnn har 
 
 bor — headquarters at Fort Moultrie — letter of, re 
 lating to Fort Moultrie, 12 ; moves into Fort Sumter 
 16 ; his refusal to surrender Fort Sumter, 23 ; sur- 
 render of Fort Sumter by, 31 ; (Gen.) hoiots the 
 National flag on Fort Sumter, 888. 
 Andrews, Gen. , at the battle of Chancellorsville, 467. 
 Anthony, Col. D. C, in the affair at Colliers ville, 562. 
 Antietam, description of the battle-groun<?. of, 317 ; 
 battle of, 319-327 ; Capt. Noyes' description of 
 after the battle, 330 ; President Lincoln's story of 
 the effect of the battle of (note), 382. 
 Antietam creek, bridges on, 319. 
 Appomattox court house, Gen. Lee's surrender at, 934. 
 Archer, Gen., at the battle of Chancellorsville, 460 
 
 captured at the battle of Gettysburg, 503. 
 Arkadelphia, occupied by the Nationals, 606. 
 Arkansas, joins the Confederacy, 33 ; compulsory 
 r.ei reat of Gen. Price into — the flag of the Union 
 floating in, 97 ; operations of Gen. Curtis in, 97, 
 98 ; march of Gen. Curtis through, 855-357 ; opera- 
 tions against guerrillas in, 359-306 ; operations of 
 Gens. Steele and Davidson in, 605, 606. 
 Arkansas, Confederate ram, description of, 429 ; action 
 of, with Carondelet, Tyler, and EUet's ram Quees 
 of the West, 430 ; destruction of (note), 431. 
 Arkansas Post, battle of, 387. 
 Arlington heights, occupied by the Nationals, 85. 
 Armistead, Gen., brigade of, at the battle of Malvern 
 hills, 268 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 525 ; taken 
 prisoner at Gettysburg, 529. 
 Armitage, Gen., fatally wounded at Gettysburg, 628. 
 Armstrong, Gen., raids made by, 159. 
 Army of the Potomac, effective strength of, undei 
 Gen. McClellan, 191 ; address of Gen. McClellan 
 to, 270 ; Gen. McClellan takes leave of, 336 ; ad. 
 dress of Gen. Burnside to, 337 ; reorganization of, 
 338 ; distrust occasioned in, by Gen. Burnside's 
 failure at Fredericksbtirg, 354 ; address of Gen. 
 Hooker to— demoralization In, 451 ; addresses of 
 Gen. Hooker to, 484, 495 ; addressee of Gen. Meade 
 to, 496, 500 ; consolidation of, by Gen. Me«d^ 
 
INDEA. 
 
 668-6<(0 • corps oommanderB of, 658 ; mo7ements 
 of. from the Rapidan to Spottejlrania court house, 
 660-678 ; address of Gen. Meade to, 683 ; move- 
 ments of, from Spottsylvania court house to the 
 rhickahominy, 683-704 ; operations of, against 
 Petersburg, 735-780. 
 my of the United States, condition of, in 1861. 35. 
 
 .irmy of Virginia, under Gen. Pope, how constituted, 
 277 ; address of Pope to, 278 ; Pope asks to be 
 relieved of command of, 379 ; orders issued by Pope 
 to, 281. 283 ; retreat of, to the north fork of the 
 Rappaliannock, 287, 388 ; great exhaustion of, 398 ; 
 effective force of, after retreating to Centreville, 
 301 ; losses of. 304. 
 
 irnold, Gen. Rich., at the sieg; of Fort Morgan, 648. 
 
 Arnold, Major, at the battle of Santa Rosa, 68. 
 
 isboth, Gen., at the battle of Pea Ridge, 97. 
 
 Asht-r, Gen. T., killed at the battle of Cross Keys, 351. 
 
 Ashby's Gap, Va., skirmishes at, 493 ; battle at. 787. 
 
 Ashlan** Station, captured by Gen. Sheridan, 685. 
 
 Assassination of President Lincoln, 937-940. 
 
 Atchafalaya, Gen. A. J. Smith's operations on the, 628. 
 
 Athens, Teun., surrender of, to Gen. Forrest, 838. 
 
 Atlanta, Ga., description of, 707 ; account of Sher- 
 man's march to, from Chattanooga, 708 ; occupation 
 of, by Sherman's forces, 733 ; civilians removi-d 
 from, 733 ; depopulation of, 734 ; disposition of 
 Sherman's forces in and around, 803 ; extensive de- 
 struction of buildings in, by order of Sherman. 812. 
 
 Tvcanta, iron-clad, captured by Capt. Rodgers, 588. 
 
 ingTir, Qen., operations of, between Port Hud.>ion and 
 uimton, 438 ; at Port Hudson, 441 ; sends a brigade 
 to cneck Early's advance on Washington, 786. 
 
 Augusia, Qa., Sherman's feint in the direction of, 817. 
 
 Averill, Qen., expedition of, on the Rappahannock— 
 displaced by Gen Hooker, 483 ; defeat of, by Gt'U. 
 Morgan, 691 ; defeats Gen. Early near Winchester, 
 787 ; aefeats Johnson, on the Romney road, 788. 
 
 Averysboro, N. C, battle of, 891. 
 
 Ayrea Qen., at the battle of Gettysburg, 515. 
 
 B. 
 
 Bachi, Livnt., services of, at Pleasant HiU landing. 
 
 Red river, in the gunboat Lexington, 633. 
 Bailey, C'api. T., commands a division of the fleet at 
 
 the capture of New Orleans, 150. 
 Bailey, Col., Batteries of, at the battle of Fair Oaks , 335. 
 Bailey. Lieut. -Col., dam constructed by, on the Red 
 
 river, ne«r Alexandria, G36. 
 Baird, Gen., operations of, 538 ; at the battle of 
 
 Chickamauga, 550 ; at the battle of Chattanooga. 572. 
 Baker, Col. E. D., killed at Ball's Bluff, Va., 54, 
 Baldwin, Col. , operations of, at Liberty gap, 543. 
 Baldwin, Fla., Jestruction of property at, 856. 
 Ball's Bluff. Va., battle of, 54. 
 Baltic, steamer, sent from New York with reinforoe- 
 
 ments to Fort rtumter. 86. 
 
 Baltimore, preparations made at, to resist the threat- 
 ened invasion of the Confederates, 493. 
 
 Banks, Gen. N. P., in command on the Maryland 
 side of the Potomac, 52 ; commands a corps of the 
 army of the Potomac, 193 in command at Har- 
 per's ferry. 242 ; retreat of, 347 ; at the battle of 
 Cedar mountain, 285 ; in command at Washington, 
 310 ; expedition of, arrives at New Orleans. 431 ; 
 sends an expedition to Galveston, 432 ; operations 
 of. in Lousiana, 434 ; sends an expedition to Bayou 
 Teche, 435 ; operations of. against Port Hudson, 
 436 ; second expedition of, to Bayou Teche, 437 ; 
 attacks Port Hudson, 441, 443 ; failure of his attacks 
 on Port Hudson, 444 ; lays siege to Port Hudson, 
 445 ; Port Hudson surrenders to, 440. 447 ; ordered 
 to the conquest of Texas, 597 ; sends an expedition 
 to Sabine city, 598 ; expedition «'f, to Texas, 600 ; 
 expedition of, to Shreveport, 621 ; at the battle of 
 Sabine cross roads, 628 ; ordered to close he cam- 
 paign, 635. 
 
 Earksdale, Geu., at the battle of Chflncellorsviile, 
 457 ; in charge of Marye's hill, 473 : killed at th« 
 hattle of Gettysburg, 518. 
 
 B&rlow, Gen., brigade of, at the battle of Chancel 
 lorsviUe, 459 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 504 
 wounded and taken prisoner, 505. 
 
 Barnes, Gen., at the battle of Gettysburg, 512 ; 
 
 Bartlett, Gen. , at the battle of the WUdemess, 672 , 
 brigade of, at the battle of Jericho ford. 694. 
 
 Barron, Commodore, surrender of at Fort Hatteras,ft') 
 
 Bassett, Major, killed at capture of Marye's hill, 476. 
 
 Baton Rouge, occupied by Gen. WUliams, 430 ; flee! 
 of Admiral Farragut at, 437. 
 
 Battery Harrison, capture of, 769 ; tmsuccessful at 
 tempt of the Confederates to regain, 771. 
 
 B.ittery Holmes, abaiidon<-'l by the Confederate*. 867 
 
 Battle of— 
 Allatoona Pass. 807. 
 Alsop's Farm, 674. 
 Antietam. 319-327. 
 Arkansas Post, 387. 
 Ashby's Gap, 787. 
 Atlanta,720, 723-787 
 Averysboro, 891. 
 Ball's Bluff, 54. 
 Baylor's Farm, 737. 
 Bean Station, 596. 
 Belmont, 01. 
 BentonviUe. 893. 
 Bermuda Hundred. 887 
 Big Bethel, 63. 
 Big Black, 413. 
 Blackburn's Ford, 87. 
 Blakely. 873. 
 Boston Mountains, 862 
 Boydton Road, 778. 
 Bristow Station. 391 
 
IWDEX, 
 
 855 
 
 Battle of— 
 Bull Run, 40 ; 2d battle, 301. 
 Cane HUl, 363. 
 C»ne River, 635. 
 Camifex Ferry, 58. 
 Carmck's Fonl, 50. 
 Cedar Creek, 802. 
 C!hampion Hills, 411. 
 Chancellorsville, 461-470 
 Chantilly, 303. 
 Chapin's Farm, 769. 
 Chattanooga, 56&-573. 
 Ch-oamacomico, 66. 
 CTiickamanga, 550-556. 
 Chickasaw Bayou, 879. 
 Cold Harbor, 698-703. 
 Corinth, 163-167. 
 Crooked Run, 791 
 Cross Keys, 251. 
 Dalton, 708. 
 Davis' Farm, 742 
 Deep Run, 760. 
 Dug Springs, 55. 
 Elk Horn, 97. 
 Fair Oaks, 230-241. 
 Fisher's HUl, 796. 
 Five Forks, 916. 
 Fort Darling, 689. 
 Franklin, 842, 
 Fredericksburg, 343-351. 
 Gaines' Mill, 259-261. 
 Gettysburg, 502-538. 
 Gleudale, 265. 
 Grand Coteau, 599. 
 Gravelly Run, 913. 
 Griswoldville, 815. 
 Groveton, 295. 
 Gumtown, 630. 
 Hampton Roads, 207-211. 
 Hanov«r Court House, 281. 
 Hatcher's Run, 777 ; 2d battle, 908 
 Hatchie, 167. 
 Huntsville, 602. 
 Island Ford, 787. 
 luka. 161. 
 
 Jenkins' Ferry, 640. 
 Jericho Ford, 694. 
 Joueeboro, 731. 
 Kenesavr Mountain, 715. 
 Kinston, 894. 
 Kernstown, 243. 
 KirtsvUle, 358. 
 Knoiville, 675. 
 Kulp House, 715. 
 Avergne, 180. 
 LAMe Osage Crossing, 832. 
 Lookout Mountain, 566. 567. 
 
 Battle of— 
 
 Malvern HUls, 267-369. 
 
 Manassas, 299. 
 
 Marais des Cygnes, 883. 
 
 MechanicsvUle, 258, 359. 
 
 Middletown, 800. 
 
 MUl Spring, 81, 
 
 Missionary Ridge, 568. 
 
 Monocacy, 786. 
 
 Morristown, Tenn. , 886. 
 
 Murfreesboro, 180-186. 
 
 Nashville, 847. 
 
 New Hope Church, 718. 
 
 New Market, 691. 
 
 Ny River, 684. 
 
 Olustee. 858. 
 
 Pea Ridge, 97, 98. 
 
 Peach Tree Creek, 780. 
 
 Perryville, 177. 
 
 Pittsburg Landing, 105. 
 
 Pleasant Hill, 680. 
 
 Port Gibson, 405. 
 
 Prairie Grove, 863, 
 
 Raymond, 407. 
 
 Reams' Station, 760. 
 
 Resaca, 710. 
 
 Rich Mountain, 49. 
 
 Sabine Cross Roads, 08& 
 
 Sabine Pass. 598. 
 
 Sailors' Creek. 927. 
 
 Salem Heights, 478. 
 
 Salisbury, 896. 
 
 Santa Rosa, 67. 
 
 Savage Station, 363. 
 
 Secession ville, 580, £81. 
 
 Seven Pines, 230-341. 
 
 Shiloh, 105-111. 
 
 South Mountain, 815. 
 
 Spottsylvauia Court House, 6Ti-tfSt 
 
 Springfield, 603. 
 
 Trevillian, 703. 
 
 Warrenton Turnpike, 393. 
 
 Wauhatchie, 561. 
 
 Waynesboro, 904. 
 
 Weldon Railroad, 743, 763-766 
 
 West Point, 613. 
 
 Westport, 832. 
 
 White Oak Swamp, 364 
 
 Wilderness, 662-671. 
 
 Williamsburg, 214-225. 
 
 Wilson's Creek, 56. 
 
 Winchester, 796. 
 Baxter, Col. , at Gettysburg, 537. 
 Baylor's Farm, battle of, 787. 
 Bayou Sara, forces of Gen. Banks at, 440. 
 Bayou Teche, operations of Banks on th 
 Bean Station. Tenn.. battle of. 596. 
 
966 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Beanf ort, S. C. , condition of, 75 ; naval force at, 76. 
 
 Beauregard, Gen. P. G. T., in command at Charles- 
 ton, 26 ; at Manassas junctioo, 36 ; in command at 
 Shiloh, 108 retreats to Cormth, 114; Oight of, 
 from Cormth, 119; at Tupelo, 190; relieved by 
 Gen. Bragg. 121 ; proclamation of, 584 ; at Bermuda 
 Hundred, 687 ; placed in command of the Confed- 
 erate military division of the west, 809. 
 
 Bee, Gen., at the battle of Bull Run, 41. 
 
 Beecher, Rev. H. W., powerful address given by, at 
 Fort Sumter, 888. 
 
 Bell, Capt., commands a division of the fleet at the 
 capture of New Orleans. 160. 
 
 Bell, Gen. , at the capture of Fort Fisher, 866 ; mortally 
 wounded at Fort Fisher, 887. 
 
 Belgian Consul, arrest of the, at St. Louis, 830. 
 
 Belmont, Mo., battle of, 61. 
 
 Beltzhoover, Col. , at the battle of Belmont, 60. 
 
 Benedict, Col., at the battle of Pleasant hill, 630. 
 
 Benham, Gen., at the battle of SeceBsionville, 580. 
 
 Benjamin, Judah P., circular of, 584. 
 
 Bentonville, battle of, 893 
 
 Bermuda Hundred, battle ol' 687. 
 
 Berry, Gen. , at the battle of WiUiamaburg, 817. 
 
 Berry, Gen., at the battle of Chancellors ville, 468, 
 462 ; death of, 470. 
 
 Berryville, Gen. Sheridan's forote at, 789, 794. 
 
 Best, Capt., battery of, at ChancellorsvUle, 462. 
 
 Bethesda Church, attack of Gen. Rodec at 697. 
 
 Big Bethel, Gen. Rerce's attempt on, 62 
 
 Big Black, battle of, 413. 
 
 Big Shanty Station, Ga. , captured by Gen. Hood, 805. 
 
 Big Tybee Island, seized by the Nationals, 75 ; descrip- 
 tion of, 139. 
 
 Birge, Gen. , operations of, 636. 
 
 Bimey, Gen. , at the battle of Williamsburg, 218 ; at 
 the battle of Fair Oaks, 236 ; at the battle of Chan- 
 tUly, 803 ; at the battle of Fredericksburg, 346 ; at 
 the battle of Chancellorsville, 4B9 ; at the battle of 
 Gettysburg, 511 ; raid of, in Virginia, 656 ; division 
 of, at Taylor's bridge, 695. 
 
 Blackburn's Ford, battle at, 37. 
 
 Blackman, Gen., at the capture of Fort Fisher, 866. 
 
 Blaisdell, Col., at the battle of Williamsburg, 216. 
 
 Blair, Gen. Frank P , at the battle of Chickasaw 
 bayou, 378 ; in contact with Gen. S. D. Lee at 
 TuBCumbia, 563 ; in command of the seventeenth 
 corps under Sherman, 718. 
 
 Blakely, battle of, 873. 
 
 Blockade of the Southern ports by the Nationals, 61 , 62. 
 
 Blockade of Charleston, declared raised by Beaure- 
 gard and Ingraham, 584. 
 Jlooming Gap, Gen. Jackson surprised at, 242. 
 
 Blue Wing, steamer captured by the Confederates, 385. 
 
 Blunt, Gen. J. G., defeat of Cooper at Fort Wayne, 
 Mo., by, 361 ; defeat of Marmaduke by, 363 ; at the 
 b»ttle of Prairie grove, 865 : takes possession of 
 
 Van Buren, Ark., 366; defeat of Oen. Cooper oy 
 604 ; relieved of his command, 606. 
 
 Boggs, Capt. C. S. , his report of the exploits of the 
 gun-boat Varuna, 152. 
 
 Bolivar Heights, affair at, 314 , Sheridan at, 798. 
 
 Boomer, Col. , at the battle of luka, 161. 
 
 Bombshell, gun-boat, capture of, by the Confederates, 
 858 ; deserted by the Confederates, 859 
 
 Booth, Major L. F., killed at Fort Pillow, 617. 
 
 Booth, J. Wilkes, assassinates President Lincoln, 
 938 ; death of, 940. 
 
 Border States, condition of the, 47. 
 
 Boswell, Capt. , killed at the battle of Chancellorsville 
 464 
 
 Boston Mountains, Mo. , battle of, 362. 
 
 Bowling Green, Ky., headquarters of A. 8 Johnston's 
 army, 83 ; evacuation of, 94. 
 
 Bowen, Gen. J., at the battle of Charapiou Hills, 410. 
 
 Boyd's Creek, batteries erected at, 76. 
 
 Boydton Road, battle of, 778. 
 
 Bradford, Major W. F., at Fort POlow, 617 ; murdei 
 of, by the Confederates, 619. 
 
 Bradley, Gen., brigade of, at the battle of Chicks, 
 mauga, 551 ; wounded at the battle of Franklin, 842. 
 
 Bragg, Gen. B., forts at Pensacola held by, 68; at 
 Shiloh, 106 ; succeeds Beauregard in the command 
 of the army of the Mississippi, 120 ; at Chattanooga, 
 171 ; proclamation of, to the Kentuckiaus, 172 ; 
 inaugurates a provisional governor of Kentucky, 
 173 ; battle of Perryville or Chaplin's hills fough 
 by, 177 ; retreat of, to Chattanooga, 178 ; cavalry 
 raids of, into West Tennessee and Kentucky, 180 ; 
 battle of Murfreesboro fought by, 180 ; retreat of, 
 187 ; at Shelbyville, 542 ; retreat of, 544 ; retires 
 from Chattanooga, 547 ; at the battle of Chicka. 
 mauga, 549 ; report of, 552 ; victory of, at Chicka 
 mauga, 555 ; at the battle of Chattanooga, 568 , 
 defeat of, by Gen. Grant, 573 ; retreat of, to Dal ton, 
 574 ; relieved of his command. 578 ; driven over the 
 Neuse to Kinston by Schofield, 894. 
 
 Bramhall, Gen., at the battle of Williamsburg, 215. 
 
 Branch, Gen., killed at the battle of Antietam, 327. 
 
 Brannan. Gen., at the battle of Chickamauga, 550, 
 operations of, at Pocotaligo, 581. 
 
 Brashear City, Weitzel's expedition to, 435 ; Gen. 
 Banks at, 437 ; capture of, by the Confederates, 445. 
 
 Breckenridge, Gen. J. C, at the batt'e of ShUoh, 107 
 at the battle of Murfreesboro, 180 at the battle of 
 Chickamauga, 551 ; at the battle of Chattanooga 
 568 ; defeats Gen. Sigel near New Market, 692 
 defeats Gen. GUlem near Morristown, Tenn., 836. 
 
 Breese, Capt. K. R., in command of the sailors and 
 marines at the capture of Fort Fisher, 865. 
 
 Bristow Station, battle of, 291 ; Gen. Banks destrore 
 property at, 301. 
 
 Brooke, Gen., at the battle of Savage station. 3<0 
 at the battle of Gettysburg, 515. 
 
INDEX 
 
 957 
 
 kfi, Qen., operations of, from Bennuda hun- 
 dred, 687. 
 
 Brown, Col., at Chicamacomico, 66. 
 
 Brown, Col. Harvey, at Fort Pickens, 68. 
 
 Brown, Col., at the battle of Chancellorsville, 459. 
 
 Brown, Col., at the battle of Jericho ford, 694 
 
 Brown, CoL , at the battle of Monocacy, 785. 
 
 Brown, Gen., severely wounded at the battle of 
 Springfield, Mo., 602. 
 
 Brown, Gen., in charge of militia at St. Louis, 831. 
 
 Brown, Gen. E. B., his encounter with guerrillas and 
 Indians, 606. 
 
 Brown, Gov., sends the Georgia militia to Gen. Jos. 
 E. Johnston's army, 714. 
 
 Brown's Gap, strength of Early's position at, 797. 
 
 Bruinsburg, Miss., expedition of Gen. Grant at, 408. 
 
 Brunswick, Qa. , taken possession of, by Nationals, 141. 
 
 Buchanan, Commodore McKean, death of, in the 
 Calhoun, at Carney's bridge, 435. 
 
 Buchanan, Franklin, Ln command of the Confederate 
 iron-clad Merrimac, 203 ; (Admiral) in command of 
 iron-clad Tennessee, 642 ; severely wounded ^ ac- 
 tion in MobUe bay, 647. 
 
 Buchanan, President James, reply of, to the South 
 Carolina commissioners, 19. 
 
 Buckner, Gen. 8. B., at Fort Donelson, 85 ; surrender 
 of, 94 J retreats from Knoiville, Tenn., 544. 
 
 Buell, Gen. D. C, in charge of the departmest of the 
 Ohio, 80 ; in command of the army of the Cumber- 
 land, 83 ; ordered to join Grant at Shiloh, 103 ; hia 
 interview with Grant, 105 ; his arrival at Shiloh, 
 110 ; at Corinth, 117 ; army of, sent to Chattanooga, 
 130 ; approaching Chattanooga, 171 ; moves from 
 Louisville, 174 ; at Perryville, 175-177 ; supplanted 
 by Gen. Bosecrans, 178. 
 
 Buford, Col., at the battle of Belmont, 60. 
 
 Buford, Gen-, operations of, 616 ; at Columbus, 619 ; 
 cavalry attack of, against Murfreesboro, 844 
 
 Bull Run, battle of, 40 ; second battle of, 801. 
 
 Burbridge, Qen., at the battle of Chickasaw bayou, 
 378 ; National standard planted by, on Fort Hind- 
 man, Ark., 388 ; at the battle of Grand Coteau, 
 699 ; his pursuit of Morgan to Cynthiana, 783 ; hia 
 expedition against the Virginia salt works, 885. 
 
 Burns, Gen. , at the battle of Fair Oaks, 238 ; at the 
 battle of Savage station, 3G8. 
 
 Bumside, Gen., A. E., at the battle of BuU Bun, 40, 
 41, 43 ; biographical sketch of — commands the ex- 
 pedition to Pamlico Sound, 123 ; proclamation by, 
 and Goldfloorough, to the people of North Carolina, 
 181 ; at New Berne, 182, 135 ; at Fort Macon, 136 ; 
 capture of Fort Macon by — summoned to Fortress 
 Monroe, 137 ; at the battle of Antietam, 325 ; or- 
 dered to take command of the army of the Potomac, 
 336 ; order of, on assuming command, 337 ; plan 
 of, to attack Fredericksburg, 838 ; mortification of, 
 uid hid division commanders, S40 : losses of, at the 
 
 battle of Fredericksburg, 351 ; entire army o' 
 withdraws to Falmouth, 853 ; letter of, awnunisg 
 the entire responsibility for the disaster at Fred 
 ericksburg, 854 ; relie red of his command at his 
 own request, 354 ; appointed to the command at 
 the department of the Ohio (note), 449 ; ordered to 
 join Rosecrans, 543 ; enters Knoxville. 545 ; Cum 
 berland gap surrenders to, 545, 546 ; encounter of 
 with Longstreet, 575 ; his defense of KnoxviUe, 
 576 ; in command of the ninth army corps at Cul- 
 pepper, 660, repulse of, at the North Anna, 695. 
 
 Burton's Georgia brigade, at Bull Run, 41. 
 
 Butler, Gen. B. F., at Fortress Monroe, 35 ; declaren 
 slaves contraband of war, 47 ; ordered to takd 
 command at Fortress Monroe, 63 ; relieved of hia 
 command at Fortress Monroe, 63 ; success of, a^ 
 Hatteras, 65 ; departure of, from Hampton Roads 
 with troops for New Orleans, 157 ; moves up the 
 James river from Fortress Monroe, 686 ; despatch 
 of, to Stanton, 687 ; operations of, against Peters- 
 burg, 736 ; additional corps placed under, by Gen. 
 Grant, 751 ; joins the expedition against Fort 
 Fisher, 861-863 ; superseded by Ord, 868. 
 
 Butterfleld's brigade at the battle of Gaines' Mill, 360. 
 
 C. 
 CiBKLL, Gen. W. L., defeat of, at FayetteriUe, 603 , 
 
 operations of, 639. 
 Caldwell, Commander, C. H. B. , at the attack on Port 
 
 Hudson, 441. 
 Caldwell, Gen. , at the battle of Antietam, 334 ; at the 
 
 battle of Gettysburg, 514. 
 Calhoun, J. M., letter of, to Gen. Sherman in relation 
 
 to the removal of civilians from Atlanta, 734. 
 Cameron, Brig-Gen. , at the battle of Grand Coteau, 
 
 600 ; at the battle of Sabine cross roads, 628. 
 Cameron, Col., killed at the battle of Bull Bun, 44 
 Cameron, Secretary, resigns the war department, 'ill. 
 Campbell, Col., surrender of Athens, Tenn. by, to 
 
 Gen. Forrest, 838. 
 Canby, Qen., commands the Shreveport exp<Alitiou. 
 
 638 , in command of the western military division. 
 
 641; operations of, against Mobile, 869-87S. 
 Cane HiU, battle of, 863. 
 Cane River, battle of, 635. 
 
 Carlin's brigade at the battle of PerryvUlo, 177. 
 Carnifex Ferry, battle of, 53. 
 Carolinas, Gen. Sherman's march through the, 880 
 
 897 ; waste and destruction effected iu the, by 
 
 Sherman's troops, 895. 
 Carr, Gen., at Pea Bidge, 97 ; at the battle of B> 
 
 Black, 413 ; at Little Rock, 638. 
 Carrack's Ford, Va. , battle of, 50. 
 Carroll, Gen., brigade of, at the battle of Getty siburx 
 
 530 ; splendid charge of, at the battle of the Wli(l«» 
 
 ness, 671 ; wounded, 672. 
 Carter. Qen. S. P., at KnoxviUe, M6. 
 
»58 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 OMej, Gen., ^^irJidon o( at the battle of Williamsbnrgh, 
 
 830 ; at th« battle of Fair Oaks, 234. 
 Cass, Qen. I/>wifl, conduct of, prior to hostilities, 15. 
 Oatlett'g Station, Pope's army-train surprised at, 288. 
 Ced»r Creek, Qen. Sheridan's army at, 790 ; Early's 
 / temporary victory at, 799 ; battle of, 803. 
 I War Mountain, or Cedar Run, Va., battle of, 286. 
 ,' iemetery Ridge, near Petersburg, unsuccessful as- 
 saults upon, from the "crater," 755, 756. 
 I Vntreville, Va., Union army under Gen. Pope at, 801. 
 Jeanola, Col., driyes the Confederates back from 
 
 their position at White Post, 790. 
 Chalmette, Confederate regiment, unconditional sur- 
 render of, to Capt. Bailey, 154. 
 Chalmers, Qen., at Shiloh, 109 ; at Colliersville, 562. 
 Chamberlain, Col., at the battle of Gettysburg, 513. 
 Chambers, Col., at the battle of luka, 161. 
 Chambersburg, Pa. , capture of, by Gen. Stuart, 338 ; 
 
 burnt by Gen. McCansland, 788. 
 Champion HUls, Miss., described, 410 ; battle of, 411. 
 Chancellorsville House, Va., headquarters of Gen. 
 
 Hooker, 454 ; takes fire and is abandoned, 470. 
 Chancellorsville, Va., first battle of, 461 ; second bat- 
 tle of, 467 ; captured by the Confederates, 470, 471. 
 Chantmy, Va., battle of, 302. 
 Chapin's Farm, Va., battle of, 769. 
 Chaplin's Hills, Ky., battle of, 177. 
 Charleston, excitement in, 16 ; attempt of Beaure- 
 gard and Ingraham to raise the blockade of, 683, 
 (584 ; circular of J. P. Benjamin in relation to the 
 blockade of, 584 ; Dupont's attack on the fortifica- 
 tions of, 584-587 ; operations of Gen. Gillmore against 
 the defenses of, 588-592 ; evacuation of, by Qen. 
 Hardee, 886 ; surrender of, to Gen. Gillmore, by the 
 mayor, 887 ; explosion with loss of life and great 
 fire in, 886 ; remarks of Gen. Sherman on the ruin- 
 ous condition of — Gen. Anderson sent thither to 
 raise the Stars and Stripes again on Fort Sumter, 887. 
 Charleston and Savannah Railroad, movements of 
 
 Gen. Foster against, 820. 
 Charleston Forts, paper respecting, addressed to 
 President Buchanan by South Carolina representa- 
 tives, 19. 
 Charleston Harbor, condition of, prior to the war, 11 ; 
 
 description of the forts in, 585. 
 Chase, Secretary, visit of, to Fortress Monroe, 228. 
 Chattahoochee River, Ga., Gen Johnston driven across 
 
 the, by Qen. Sherman, 717, 
 Chattanooga, Tenn., strategic importance of, 171 ; its 
 position and surroundings, 541 ; battle of, 668-573. 
 tlieatham. Gen., at Belmont, 60- at the battle of 
 Bhiloh, 109 ; at the battle of Perryville, 176 ; at 
 th« battle of Murfreesboro, 180 ; at the battle of 
 Chickamauga, 551. 
 Cheraw, destruction of proonrty at, by Sherman, 889. 
 Chesapeake and Albemarle Canal, operations of Lieut. 
 JeSers on the, 130. 
 
 ChlcamacomJco, battle of, 66. 
 
 Chickahominy, crossed by Qen Grant's army, 703. 
 Chickamauga, position of, 549 ; battle of, 660-556. 
 Chickamauga, steamship, destroyed by the Confeder. 
 
 ates, 869 ; depredations of, 876. 
 Chickasaw Bayou or Haines' Bluff, battle of, 379 : 
 
 sad scenes after the battle of, 381. 
 Churchhill, Gen. T. J., in command of Fort Hint 
 man. Ark. ,386; surrenders the fort to the mill tar 
 authorities, 388. 
 City Belle, steamer, captiired by the Confederates, 688 
 City of New York, steamer, lost at Hatieras, 124. 
 City Point, terrific explosion with loss of life at, 756 
 meetings of Gens. Grant and Sherman, AdnUral 
 Porter, and President Lincoln at, 895. 
 Clark, Gov. H. T., counter-proclamation of, to th« 
 
 people of North Carolina, 131. 
 Classen, Capt. , operations of, at Fort Gaines, 648. 
 Clayton, Col. P., repulses the attack of Marmadoks, 
 
 at Pine Bluff, Ark. , 607. 
 Cleburne, Gen., at the battle of Murfreesboro, 180 ; 
 
 at the battle of Chickamauga, 551. 
 Clendennin, Gen. , at the battle of Monocacy, 785. 
 Clifton and Arizona, gun-boats, captured by the Con- 
 federates, 598. 
 Coateg, Col. J. H , operations of, at Yazoo city, 615. 
 Cobb. Gen. , at the battle of Gaines' mill, 260 ; at tlw 
 
 battle of Fredericksburg, 344. 
 Cobb, guerrilla leader, defeated by Col. Merrill, 358 
 Cockerell, Gen., captured at Fort Blakely, 893. 
 CockereU's brigade at Missionary Ridge, 569. 
 CoggBwell, Col., at the battle of Ball's Bluff, 54. 
 Colburn, Qen. , defeated by Van Doru and Forrest, 538. 
 Cold Harbor, Va. , battle of, 699-702. 
 Colquitt, Gen., at the battle of ChanceUorsvLUe, 460 
 Colston, Gen. , at the battle of ChanceUorsvLUe, 460. 
 Columbia, Tenn., retreat of Gen. Schofield from, 840. 
 Columbia, S. C, surrender of, by the mayor to OoL 
 Stone, 884 ; disorderly conduct of drunken soldiers 
 in, 884 ; great fire in, 885. 
 Columbus, Ga. , captured by Gen. Wilson, 874. 
 Columbus, Ky., seized by Qen. Polk, 58 ; Confederate 
 
 post at, 80 ; evacuation of, 94. 
 Commissioners, South Carolina, correspondence of 
 
 with President Buchanan, 19 
 Congress, destroyed by the iron-clad Merrimac, 204. 
 Congress, Southern, assembled at Montgomery, 23. 
 Cook, Major, isolated with Col. U. Dahlgren, from 
 
 their command, in the Virginia raid, 657. 
 Cooke, Capt., his operations with the ram Albe- 
 marle at the siege of Plymouth, 869. 
 Cooke, Qen. St. Q., at the bactle of Gaines' mill, 261 
 Cool Arbor, Va., headquarters of Gen. McCleUan, 286 
 Cooper, Adjt.-Gen , iniquity of, 13. 
 Cooper, Qen. , defeat of, by Qen. Blunt, 604. 
 Coosaw River, obstructions placed on, 76. 
 Coosawhatchie River, Gen Slocum at the, 882. 
 
IN DEX. 
 
 9SS 
 
 Oarinth, description of, 114 ; ersciutioii of, by Beaa- 
 regaid, 119 ; battle of, 163-167. 
 
 Gomjm, Dr. , at the battle of ShUoh, 109. 
 
 Corse, Qen., at the battle of Chattanooga, 569 ; ironnd- 
 ed at Chattanooga, 570 ; his defense of Allatoona 
 pass, 806 ; services of, near Savannah, Ga., 819. 
 
 Coate, N. L., surrenders the cutter WUliam Alien, 18. 
 
 Cotton, J. A., Confederate steamer, destruction of, 435. 
 
 Couch, Gen. D. N., at the battle of Williamsburg, 
 214 ; at the battle of Fair Oaks, 235 ; at the battle 
 of Malvern hills, 268 ; at the oattle of Fredericks- 
 burg, 348 ; at the battle of ChancellorsviUe, 454. 
 
 Courronne, French iron clad, at the fight between the 
 Kearsarge and the Alabama, 878. 
 
 Covington, steamer, set on fire and abandoned, 637. 
 
 (>)X, Geo. , at Kanawha valley, 51 ; at the battle of 
 South mountain, 315 ; his capture of Fort Ander- 
 son, 869. 
 
 Craft, Col. , in the attack on Fort Donelscn, 91. 
 
 Craig, Col., killed at Deep bottom, 761. 
 
 Crampton's Gap, skirmish at, 316. 
 
 Crater of Petersburg mine, scene inside the, 755. 
 
 Craven, Capt., in the attack on Fort St. Philip, 152. 
 
 Craven, Capt. T. A. M., lost in the Tecumseh in 
 Mobile bay — biographical sketch of {note), 644. 
 
 Crawford, Qen. , wounded at the battle of Antietam, 
 322 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 518 ; at the bat- 
 tle of the Wilderness, 663 ; repulse of the Confed- 
 erates by, at Shady grove road, 697. 
 
 Cricket, steamer. Confederate attack on the, 633. 
 
 Crist, Col., at Port Koyal ferry, 76. 
 
 Crittenden, U. S. Senator, devotion of, to the Union, 57. 
 
 Crittenden, Gen. T., at Shiloh, 110 ; at the battle of 
 PenyvUle, 174 ; at the battle of Murfreesboro, 180 ; 
 takes possession of Lafayette, Tenn., 547 ; at the 
 battle of Chickamauga, 550. 
 
 Crocker, Lieut. F., failure of the naval expedition m 
 charge of, to Sabine city, 598. 
 
 Croker, Gen., at the battle of Champion hills, 411. 
 
 Crook, Qen., defeats Qen. McCausland at Dublin sta- 
 tion, 691 ; drives the Confederates tiirough Snick- 
 er's gap — at Island ford, 787. 
 
 Crooked Kun, Va., battle of, 791. 
 
 Cross, Col., at the battle of Antietam, 324. 
 
 Cross, Gen., killed at the battle of Gettysburg, 616. 
 
 Cross Keys, Va., battle of, 251. 
 
 Crowen and Wheeler, batteries of, at the battle of 
 Williamsburg, 218. 
 
 Croxton, Gen., in command at Cyprosa creek, 839. 
 
 Crufts, Gen., division of, at Wauhatchie; 566 : at the 
 battle of Chattanooga, 568. 
 
 Orutckfield, Col., wounded at ChancellorsviUe, 463. 
 
 Culpepper Coui-t House, arrival of Qen. Pope at, 385 ; 
 Qen. Grant's headquarters at, 658. 
 
 Cumberland sunk by the iron-clad Merrimac, 203. 
 
 (.'urtin, Gov., of Pennsylvania, orders aU able-bodie<l 
 men to organize for the defense of the State, 309. 
 
 Curtis, Qen., brigade of, in the attack on Fort Piahar, 
 866 ; severely wounded at Fort Fisher, 867. 
 
 Curtis, Gen. S. R., operations of, against Gen. Price, 
 97 ; victory of, at the battle of Pea ridge, 98 ; at 
 Batesville, Ark., 355 ; arrives at Helena, 357 ; defeat 
 of the Confederates at Fayetteville, Mo., by, 833. 
 
 Cushing, Lieut. W. B., destroys the Confederate ram 
 Albemarle, in Plymouth harbor, N. C. , 860. 
 
 Custer, Capt. , death of, at Columbia, Ky. , 596. 
 
 Custer, Gen. G. A., raid of, in Virginia, 656 ; repulae 
 of, by the Confederates at Sulphur springs brid|^, 
 789 ; at Crooked run, 791. 
 
 Cutler, Gen., at the battle of Gettysburg, 608 ; at the 
 battle of Jericho ford, 694. 
 
 Cynthiana, Ky., Morgan routed by Qen. Borbridg* 
 near, 783. 
 
 D. 
 
 Dabnxt'b HiiiiiS, battle of, 777 ; second battle of, M3. 
 
 Dahlgren, Admiral, his bombardment of Fort Sumtar 
 and Fort Wagner, 589, 590. 
 
 Dahlgren, Col., raid of, in Virginia, 656 ; death of, 867. 
 
 Dallas, Ga., Sherman's movement upon, 713. 
 
 Dalton, Gfa., battle of, 708 ; Qen. Johnston evacuates, 
 709 ; surrender of the garrison at, to Qen. 
 Hood, 808. 
 
 Dam constructed on the Bed river by Col. Bailey to 
 facilitate the escape of Porter's vessels, 636. 
 
 Dana, Gen , at York river, 227 ; wounded at the bat- 
 tle of Antietam, 323. 
 
 Dana, Gen. N. J. T., in command of expedition to the 
 Rio Grande, Tex., 601. 
 
 Danville Railroad, destruction effected on, by Gena 
 Wilson and Kautz, 746. 
 
 Davidson, Qen., surrender of Little Bock, Ark., to, 
 60C ; expedition of, from Baton Rouge against 
 Hood's communications, 852 
 
 Davis, Gen. A., killed at the battle of Fair Oaks, 288 
 
 Davis, Capt. C. H., his naval engagement near ^em. 
 phis, 144 ; Memphis surrenders to, 146. 
 
 Davis, Col. , cavalry exploits of, 483. 
 
 Davis, Gen., at Pea ridge, 97 ; at Corinth, Hi ; at 
 Murfreesboro, 180. 
 
 Davis, Gen. Je£E. C, operations of, 537 ; at tL* battle 
 of Chickamauga, 551 ; capture of Rome, Gta. by, 
 712 ; appointed to succeed Gen. Palmer in command 
 of the fourteenth corps, 728. 
 
 Davis, JefEerson, cunning of, 12 ; inaugnratfrJ Presi- 
 dent of the Confederacy, 23 ; his despatch from 
 BuU Run, 45 ; justifies the seizure of Hickhjan and 
 Columbus, 58 ; note to Gen. Polk by, 61 ; ttiograpb 
 message of, to Gen. Bragg, 120 ; visit of, «o Gen. 
 Bragg, at Murfreesboro, 179 ; visit of, to the army, 
 at the battle of White Oak Swamp, 265 ; aodresi 
 of, to the army in Eastern Virginia, 271 ; sieeah of, 
 at Macon, on de«rtion and absent«eisin. 8(-i ; cap 
 tui-o of, near Irwiusvillf, Oa. , 947 ; imprii jned %» 
 Fortress Monroe. 948. 
 
?60 
 
 1 iN U Ji A 
 
 Davis* two MiBsissippi regiments captured at Qettys- 
 
 burg, 503. 
 Davis' Farm, battle of, 742. 
 Decatur, Mo., seized by Gen. Mitchell, 115. 
 Decatur Tenn., Gen. Hood's demonstration against 
 
 the g^arriaou of, 829. 
 De Ourcy's, Gen., brigade at Chickasaw bayou, 379. 
 Deep Bottom, Va., severe fighting near, 758-761. 
 De»p Kun, Va. , battle of, 760. 
 Dfwrhound, steam-yacht, picks up the men and officers 
 
 of the Alabama, off Cherbourg, 879. 
 D*'nnis, Gen., at the battle of Raymond, 407. 
 Denver, Gen., at Corinth, 118. 
 
 De Trobriand, Gen. , at the battle of Gettysburg, 511 ; 
 Confederate position carried by, at Petersburg, 768. 
 Desher, Gen. H. , killed at Chickamauga. 554. 
 Devens, Col. Chas. at the battle of Ball's bluff, 53 ; 
 (Gen.) at the battle of WUliarasburg, 220 ; wounded 
 at the battle of ChancellorsvUle, 461. 
 Devereui, Col., at Gettysburg, 537. 
 Devin, Gen., occupies Staunton, 904 ; cavalry under, 
 
 at Five forks, 910, 912 ; at Sailor's creek, 926. 
 Dickey, Capt., killed at Sabine cross roads, 629. 
 Oil, Gen., in command at Fortress Monroe, 594. 
 Dodge Gen., operations of, 539 ; in command of the 
 
 sixteenth corps under Sherman, 706. 
 Doherty, private, bravery and death of. at the battle 
 
 of WUliamsburg, 216. 
 Doles, Gen. , at the battle of Chancellorsville, 460. 
 Donaldsonville, occupied by the National troops, 
 named Fort Butler, 430 ; attempt by the Confeder- 
 ates to recapture, 445. 
 Doubleday, Gen., brigade of, at the battle of Warren- 
 ton turnpike, 293 ; at the battle of Antietam, 319 ; 
 at the battle of Fredericksburg, 345 ; at the battle 
 of Gettysburg, 503. 
 Douglass, Col., killed at the battle of Antietam, 320. 
 Dowdall's Tavern, rout of the National right at, 462. 
 Draft proclamation for 300,000 militia, 283. 
 Draper's Dr. , opinion of the Emancipation proclama- 
 tion 391, 392 ; his opinion of the losses in the Over- 
 land campaign. 704. 
 Drayton, Gen. T. F. , in command of Fort Walker, 73. 
 Drayton, Commander, operations of, at Fort McAllis- 
 ter, 583 ; at MobUe bay, 644. 
 Drewry, steamer, destroyed on the James river, 899. 
 Duff, guerrilla chief, brutal action of, towards Ger- 
 man Unionists, 367. 
 Duffie, Gen., captures a portion of Gen. Early's train 
 
 at Snicker's gap, Va. , 787. 
 Dug Springs, battle of, 55. 
 Duncan, Gen. J. K., in command of the Confederate 
 
 defenses below New Orleans, 14fi. 
 Ditnker Church, focus of the battle of Antietam, 319. 
 Dunnington, Col., surrenders Fort Hindman, Ark., 388. 
 Danovant, Col. K. G. M., at Bay point, 73. 
 Dupont, Commodore, in command of fleet at Hampton 
 
 roads, 70 ; fleet of, enters Port Itoyal, 73 ; angnc- 
 cossful attempt of, to reach the Savannah river, 76 ; 
 expedition of, along the coast of Florida, 141 ; order 
 of, to Worden, to attack Fort McAUister, 582 
 ordered to attack Charleston. 684 ; his order of 
 battle for an attack on the Charleston forts, 585 ; 
 superseded by Admiral Dahlgren, 588. 
 
 Dutch Gap Canal, construction of, conmienced by 
 Gen. Butler, 757 ; Major LudloVs movement from, 
 761 ; faUure of, 899. 
 
 Dwight, Col., at the battle of Williamsburg, 216. 
 
 Dwight, Gen. W., enters Alexandria, La., 438; at 
 the attack on Port Hudson, 443, 444 ; at the battle 
 of Pleasant hill, 630. 
 
 Eablt, Gen. Jubal A., at the battle of Bull Run. 48 ; 
 at the battle of Williamsburg, 219 ; at the battle of 
 Fredericksburg, 347 ; at Marye's lull, 473 ; at Salem 
 church, 479 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 504 ; at 
 the salient, 681 ; his invasion of Maryland, 784 ; 
 defeats Gen. Lewis Wallace at the battle of Mono- 
 cacy, 785, 786 ; defeat of, by Gen. AveriU, 787 , 
 attacks Sheridan's force at Summit point, 793 ; de- 
 feated Hy Sheridan at Winchester and Fisher's hill, 
 798 , retreats to Woodstock and Brown's gap, 797 
 his victory over Sheridan's troops at Cedar creek. 
 801 ; Sheridan tiirns his victory into defeat, 802 
 routed by Sheridan at Waynesboro, 904. 
 
 Eastport, steamer, blown up by the Nationals, 638. 
 
 Eddy, Col., mortally wounded at luka, 161. 
 
 Edentown, N. C, taken possession of by Lieut. A 
 Maury. 130. 
 
 Egan, Col., at the battle of ChantiUy, 303. 
 
 Egypt, Miss., capture of by Gen. Grierson, 853. 
 
 Elizabeth City, N. C, description of — expedition oi 
 Commander Rowan against, 129. 
 
 Elk Horn, Confederate name for battle of Pea ridge, 97. 
 
 Ellet, Jr. , Col. C. , ram squadron of, joins flotilla of 
 Davis, 144 ; operations of, before Memphis, 145. 
 
 Ellet, Gen. A., in command of marine brigade, in the 
 Red river expedition, 623. 
 
 Elliott, Capt. S., in command of Fort Beauregard, 73 
 
 Emancipation proclamation issued by President Lin 
 coin, 391 ; diversity of opinion regarding, 392. 
 
 Emory, Gen,, division of, at Berwick, La., 437 ; at th«> 
 battle of Sabine cross roads, 629 ; at the battle oJ 
 Pleasant hill, 630 ; at Washington, 786. 
 
 Ericsson, Capt John, biographical sketch of, 206. 
 
 Evans, Col. , holds the Stone bridge at Bull Run, 40 ; 
 Confederate force under, on Goose creek, 53. 
 
 Ewell, Gen. B. S., at Bull Run, 43; pursues Ge« 
 Banks to Strasbiirg, 246 ; at the battle of Cross 
 keys, 251 ; defeated by Gen. Hooker near Bristow 
 station, 291 ; at the battle of Warrenton turnpike. 
 393 ; at the battle of Fredericksburg, 347 ; at the 
 ba*'!" of Gettysburg, 504 ; at the battle of the WU 
 
INDEX. 
 
 961 
 
 derness, 664 ; captured at the battle of Sailor's 
 
 creek, 927. 
 Ewing Gen. H. S. his defense of Pilot Knob, 830. 
 Explosion, of the Petersburg mine, 754 ; of ordnance 
 
 stores at City point, 756 ; of the principal magazine 
 
 at Fort Fisher, 867 ; at Charleston, 887. 
 
 Paoah, Gen., defeat of, at Independence, Mo., 832. 
 
 Fair Oaks, Va., battle of, 230-241. 
 
 Falmouth, Va., station and bridges at, destroyed by 
 fire, 301 ; description of, 339 ; pontoons at, 840. 
 
 Fanny, steam-tug, captured by Confederates, 66. 
 
 FamsTTorth, Col., killed at Gettysburg, 528. 
 
 ?arragTit, Admiral D. G., biographical sketch of, 146 ; 
 in command of the western gulf squadron, 147 ; 
 fleet of, attacks the Mississippi forts. 151 ; official 
 report of, of his operations at New Orleans, 155 ; 
 operations of, against Vicksburg, 371 ; attack of, 
 on the Arkansas ram — bombardment of Donaldsou- 
 Tille by, 430 ; sends a naval force to Sabine pass, 
 598 ; fleet of, at Mobile, 614 ; reconnoissance of 
 Forts Morgan and Gaines made by, 641 ; operations 
 of, against the Mobile bay forts, 644. 
 
 Farrand, Commander, surrenders the Confederate 
 navy to Admiral Thatcher, 947. 
 
 Faulkner, Col., surrender of Union city to, 616. 
 
 Faxon, Major, killed at the capture of Marye's hUl, 4T5. 
 
 Fayetteville, Mo., Confederates driven from. 833. 
 
 FayetteviUe, N. C, destruction effected at, by Sher- 
 man's forces, 889. 
 
 Femandina, Fla., surrender of, to Dupont, 1.^1. 
 
 Ferrero, Gen., his defense of Ejioxville, 570 ; at the 
 battle of Bean station, 597. 
 
 Fessenden, Col., wounded at Cane river, 635. 
 
 Fessenden, Senator, action of, prior to the war, 13. 
 
 Finnegan, Gen., defeats Seymour at Olustee, 856, 857. 
 
 Fisher's Hill, Va., battle of, 796. 
 
 Fitch, Lieut. , operations of, on the Cumberland, 537. 
 
 Five Forks, Va., battle of, 916. 
 
 Flag, of the Union, floating in Arkansa.s, 97 ; United 
 States, hoisted at Memphis, 146 ; hoLsted at New 
 Orleans, 156 ; the old, restored to Fort Sumter, 887. 
 
 Florida, Confederate cruiser, operations of the, 876. 
 
 Floyd, J. B., strange conduct of, while secretary of 
 war, 12 ; implication of, in the Indian trust fund 
 defalcation, 19 ; (Qen.) assumes command of the 
 Confederate forces, 51 ; outnumbered at Camifei 
 ferry, 52 ; at Fort Donelson, 85 ; flight of, 93. 
 
 Foote, Admira. A. H., leaves Cairo, 83 ; capture of 
 Fort Henry by, 84 ; moves up the Cumberland, 86 ; 
 at Fort Donelson, 88 ; fleet of, returns to Cairo, 89 ; 
 expedition of, to Fort Pillow, 143 ; retires from 
 Fort Pillow, 144. 
 
 Ford, Col. T. H., in command of forces on Maryland 
 heights, 813 ; retires to Harper's ferry — dijmissed 
 from the service, 314 
 
 Forrest, Qen. N. B., cavalry of, at Port Donelson, »0 
 raids by, in Kentucky and Tennessee, 170 ; plunder, 
 ing expeditions of, 188 ; raid by, on Davis' mills, 
 374 ; operations of, 538 ; exploit of, 540 ; at the 
 battle of Chickamauga, 550 ; in eonunand of the 
 cavalry ot North Mississippi, 611 ; his attack on 
 Gen. W. S. Smith, 613 ; bis capture of Fort Pillow, 
 618 ; defeats Gen. Sturgis, at Gum town, 619 : hi« 
 raid upon Memphis, 620 ; operations of, in Middle 
 Tennessee, 827, 828, 837, 838 ; routed by Gen. WU- 
 son, near Boyle's creek, 874. 
 
 Forman, Major, affair of, with Indians, 368. 
 
 Fort Alexander, Va., capture of, 918. 
 
 Fort Anderson, N. C, siege and capture of, 860. 
 
 Fort Blakely, MobUe, faU of, 873. 
 
 Fort Barrancas, Pensacola, burned and abandoned by 
 the Confederates, 141. 
 
 Fort Barton, N. C. , bombardment of, by Goldsborough, 
 126 ; capture of, 128. 
 
 Fort Beauregard, S. C. , abandoned by the Confeder- 
 ates and the National flag raised over, 74 
 
 Fort Caswell, N. C. , blown up by the Confederates, 867 
 
 Fort Clark, N. C, abandoned, 64. 
 
 Fort Clinch, Fla., surrender of, 141. 
 
 Fort Darling, Va., battle of, 689. 
 
 Fort de Kussy, La., in possession of the Confedermten, 
 597 ; capture of, by Gen. A. J. Smith, 624. 
 
 Fort Donelson, Tenn., description of, 85 ; operationa 
 against, 88 ; surrender of, 94. 
 
 Fort Esperanza. Tex., taken by Gen. Washburne, 601. 
 
 Fort Fisher, N. C, unsuccessful expedition of Gena. 
 Butler and Weitzel and Admiral Porter against, 
 861-863 ; capture of, by Gen. Terry and Admiral 
 Porter, 864-«67. 
 
 Fort Forrest, N. C, Curlew steamer beached an<! 
 blown op at, 126, 128. 
 
 Fort Gaines, Ala., surrender of, by Col. Anderson, 648. 
 
 Fort Gilmer, Va. , repulse of colored brigade at, 770. 
 
 Fort Gregg, S. C. , abandoned by the Confederates, 693 
 
 Fort Gregg, Va., assault and capture of, 918. 
 
 Fort Hatteras, N. C. , surrender of, 65. 
 
 Fort Heiman, on the Tennessee river, steamboats cap- 
 tured at, by Forrest, 837. 
 
 Fort Henry, Tenn., in charge of Gen. Tilghman, 83 ; 
 capture of, 84. 
 
 Fort Hindman, Ark., commanded by (ien. T. J. Church 
 hill — surrender of. to Admiral Porter, 388, 
 
 Fort Huger, Ala., abandoned by the Confederates, 871, 
 
 Fort Jackson and Fort St. Philip, La., description of, 
 149, surrender of, to Capt. Porter, 15."). 
 
 Fort McAllister, Ga., unsuccessful attacks on, 682, 
 583 ; capture of by Gen., Hazen. 822. 
 
 Fort Macon, N. C, description of, 135 ; capture of, 137. 
 
 Fort McRae, Pensacola, silenced, 68 ; buraed and 
 abandoned by the Confederates, 141. 
 
 Fort McBae, Va., capture of, 772. 
 
 Fort MagTuder Va. occupied by the Na.ioiuJa, 281, 
 
96S 
 
 INDEX, 
 
 ITort Marion, Fla., surrender of. to ccminaDder C. R. 
 P. Rodgere, 141. 
 
 Fort Morgan, N. C, destroyed, 66. 
 
 Fort Morgan, A]a., surrender of, to the Natioual.s, 649. 
 
 Fort Moultrie, S. C, abandoned by Major Ander- 
 I son, 16. 
 
 Fort Ocracoke, N. C. , destroyed, 66. 
 
 Fort Pemberton. Miss., unsuccessful attack on, 3!tT. 
 
 Fort Pickena, in charge of Col. Harvey Brown, 68. 
 
 Fort Pillow, Tenn. , abandoned by the Coufedprates, 
 114 ; again deserted by the Confederates, 144 ; de- 
 scription of. 617 ; capture of, by assault and mas- 
 sacre of the garrison by Gen. Forrest, 018. 
 
 Fort Powell, Ala., abandoned and blown up, 647. 
 
 Fort Powell, Miss, captured by the Confederates, 
 165 ; retaken by the Nationals, 166. 
 
 Fort Pulaski, Ga., in the hands of the Confederates, 
 76 ; capture of, 140. 
 
 Fort Randolph, Tenn., surrender of , 145. 
 
 Fort Richardson, Miss., constructed b^ snppers and 
 miners at the battle of ('orinth, 164. 
 
 Fort Robinett, Miss., Van Dom under fire fp^w the 
 guns of, at the battle of Corinth, 163. 
 
 Fort St. Philip, La., see Fort Jackson. 
 
 Fort St. Philip, N. C, abandoned, 869. 
 
 Fort Sanders, Tenn,, attacked by the Coufederaif^ 
 576 ; death of Gen. W. P. Sanders a'. (;«><«), 578. 
 
 Fort Sedgwick, Va., operations in the neigh borhoor 
 o£ 779. 
 
 Fort Steadman, Petersburg, capture and recapture of, 
 907. 
 
 Fort Strong. Ala,, deserted by the Confederates, 869. 
 
 Fort Sumter, description of — occupied by Major An- 
 derson, 12 , Gen. Beauregard's demand for the sur- 
 render of, 26 ; surrendered, 31 ; a shapeless mass 
 of ruins, 591 ; abortive attempt of the Nationals to 
 take possession of, 592. 
 
 Fort Thompson, N. C, attack of Gen. Foster on, 132 ; 
 Confederates driven from, 134. 
 
 Fort Tracy, Ala., abandoned by the Confederates, 871. 
 
 Fort Wagner, S. C., operations of Gen. Oillmore 
 against, 589 ; bombardment of, by Admiral Dahl- 
 gren, 590 ; evacuation of, by the Confederates, 592. 
 
 Fort Walker, S. C, abandoned, 74. 
 
 Fort Warren, N. C, captured by Gen. Hoke, 868. 
 
 Fort Weasels, N. C, captured by Gen. Hoke, 859. 
 
 Fort William, Miss., Van Dorn under fire from the 
 guns of, at the battle of Corinth, 166. 
 
 Fortress Monroe, headquarters of Gen, Butler, 86 ; 
 armaments sent to, 194. 
 
 Foster, Gen. J. G., part taken by, in capture of Roa- 
 noke, 126 ; at New Berne, 132 ; appointed military 
 governor of New Berne, 135 ; operations of, 694 ; 
 Uvlsion of, at Deep Bottom, 743 ; his movement 
 againjrt the Charleston and Savannah railroad, 830 ; 
 dty aad forts of Savannah transferred t - ^y Qen. 
 ShDmaii, 881. 
 
 Foster, Major, defeat of, by Coffee and Hughes a^ 
 Lone Jack, Mo., 359 
 
 Fouke, Col., at the battle of Belmont, 60. 
 
 Fox, Oustavus O., plan of, to relieve Fort Sumter, 26, 
 
 Franklin, Gen. W. B,, at Bull Run, 43 ; operations on 
 the York river, 226 ; at the battle of White Oak 
 Swamp, 265 ; at Crampton's gap, 31G ; at the battle 
 of Antietam, 332 ; at the battle of Fredericksbuig, 
 345 ; relieved of his command, 354 ; at Sabine pass, 
 598 ; ordered to Opelousas, 599 ; expedition to 
 Shreveport in charge of, 623 ; at the battle of 
 Sabine cross roads, 628. 
 
 Franklin, Tenn., Gen. Schofield at, 840; battle of 
 843 ; losses at, 843. 
 
 Frazier. Gen., surrender of Cumberland gap by, 545, 
 
 Frederick, Md., Gen. Lee's army encamped near, 308 ; 
 Confederates driven from, 785 
 
 Fredericksburg, Va., evacuation of, by Gen. Bumside, 
 301 ; absence of pontoons prevents the capture of. 
 339 ; demand by Summer for the surrender of, 340 ; 
 bombardment of, by order of Gen. Burnside — de- 
 scription of, 342 ; battle of, 343-861. 
 
 Fremont, Gen. John C. , appointed to the command of 
 the Western department, 55 ; relieved of his com- 
 mand, 56 ; in command of the Mountain depart- 
 ment, 193 ; advance of, attacked by Gen. Jackson, 
 251 ; relieved of his command, 277. 
 
 r-euch, Geu., at the battle of Fair Oaks, 239; at 
 the battle of Gaines' mill, 260 ; at Antietam, 834 ; 
 ft the battle of Fredericksburg, 348 ; at the battle 
 of ChancellorsviUe. 470; pursuit of Gen. Le« 
 b,'- .'538. 
 
 FreccH, Qen., at Blackwater, 598 • at Brandon, Gil ; 
 demardr the surrender of AUatoona pass, 806. 
 
 Front Roy*l irovement of Oen. Jackson against, 248 , 
 engagement nenr 790. 
 
 Q. 
 
 Gadbdkn, Ala., ani' of Gen. Hood at, 809. 
 
 Gaines' MUl, battle of, 350-261. 
 
 Gainesville, (or Grove*ou.\ battle of, 295 ; cnlpabl* 
 
 absence of Gen, Porter from, 296. 
 Galveston, in charge of Comijiodore Renshaw, 482 
 
 recapture of, by Gen. MagTpd«r, 432-434. 
 Gardiner, Col., in command of Cbirlaston harbor, 12 
 Gardner, Gen. F., in command at Port Hudson, 441 
 
 entreated to surrender by Oen Baoka 448 ; any 
 
 render of Port Hudson by, 446-447. 
 Garesclie, Col., killed at Murtreesboro, 186. 
 Garfield, Gen. J. A., appointed chief of staff to Bose 
 
 cranz, 18S ; heroic conduct at Chickamauga, 555. 
 Garnett, Gen., at Laurel hill, 49 ; killed at the battl» 
 
 of Carrack's ford, 50. 
 Garnett, Gen., killed at the battle of Gettysburg, 528. 
 Geary, Col. J. W., skirmish of, at Harper's ferry, 52; 
 
 occn[iies Harper's ferry, 242; (Gen.) at the battle of 
 
 Gettysburg, 522; at Wauhatchie, 660-566; at th» 
 
INDEX. 
 
 963 
 
 bstue of Chattanooga, 568 : appointed military 
 aommandef of Savannah, 835 
 j«orffotown, S. C, evacuated by the Confederates — 
 
 taken posgessinn of by Admiral Dahlpfren, 888. 
 -jwirgla. Confederate cruiser, captured by the Na- 
 tional frigate Niaa;ara, oflf, Lisbon, 876. 
 
 .1etty, (Jen. , at Suffolk, 594 ; wounded at the battle of 
 the Wilderness, 672. 
 
 Gettysburg, Pa., description of, .501 ; battle of. .503-5.33. 
 
 Oholson, Gen., at the battle of Williamsburg, 317 ; 
 killed at Egypt, Miss., 8.5.3. 
 
 Oibbon, Gen., at the battle of Warrenton turnpike, 
 M3 : at the battle of Fredericksburg, .345 ; at the 
 attack on Marye's hill, 47.3 ; at the battle of Gettys- 
 burg, 535 ; wounded. 538. 
 
 Glibson, Gen. R., in command of the Confederates 
 at Spanish fort, Mobile, 870 ; evacuates the 
 fort, 871. 
 
 •9Ubert Gen., at the battle of Perryville, 174 , at 
 the battle of Franklin, 538. 
 
 SiUem, Gen., surprise and capture of Morgan at 
 Greenville by, 835 ; defeat of, by Breckenridge, 836. 
 
 4tllmore, Gen. Q. A., services of, at the siege of Fort 
 Pulaski, 138, 189 ; his defeat of Pegrara. 544 ; su- 
 persedes Gen. Hunter at Charleston. 588 ; opera- 
 tions of, against the defenses of Charleston, 589 ; 
 opens fire on Charleston, 591 ; secures the blockade 
 of Charleston, 593 ; at Bermuda hundred, 687 ; his 
 movements against Petersburg, 736 ; authorized to 
 undertake operations in Florida, 855 ; operations 
 of, ag;ainst Charleston, 886 ; surrender of the city 
 of Charleston, with all the harbor forts to, 887. 
 
 lUmore, Ijeut., raid of, into Maryland, 786. 
 
 Qilpin, Col. C, drives the Confederates from Freder- 
 ick, Md., 785. 
 
 Gist, Gen., at the battle of Chickamanga, 550. 
 
 Gladden, Gen., killed at the battle of Shiloh, 108. 
 
 Olendale, or Frazier's Farm, battle of, 265. 
 
 Goldsboro, N. C. junction of Schofield's and Sherman's 
 forces at, 894. 
 
 Qoldsborongh, flag officer, biographical sketch of — 
 intrusted with the expedition to Pamlico sound, 
 133 ; operations of, at Sewall's point, 238. 
 
 Gooding, Col., at the battle of PerryviUe, 177. 
 
 Gordon's Landing, ojwrations of Farragut at, 439. 
 
 Gorman, Gen., expedition of, on the White river, 389. 
 
 Graham, Gen. , at the battle of Gettysburg. 511. 
 
 Grand Coteau. La., battle of, 599. 
 
 Grand Gulf, Miss., operations of Gen. Grant at, 403 ; 
 telegram of Gen. Grant to Gen Halleck from, 407 ; 
 batteries at, engaged by Farragut, 439. 
 hunger. Gen. (i., at Corinth, 119; operations of, 
 588. 543 • at the battle of Culckamauga, 556 ; re- 
 luctance of, to relieve Buruaide, 577 ; at Mobile 
 harbor, 642 ; surrender of Forte Gaines and Morgan 
 to, (M8, «4» ; his pursuit of Buford, 828 ; corps of, 
 tt tke final operations a^falnst Mobile, 870. 
 
 Grant. Gen. U 8,. in command at Ca'ro — takes poe 
 session of Paducah. and attacks Belmont, 59 , pre 
 pares to attack Fort Henry. 83 ; marches on Fort 
 DoneJson, 86 ; surrender of Fort Donelson to. 94 ' 
 in command of the district of West Tennessee, 98 
 removed from his command. 99 ; in command at 
 Savannah, Tenn., 101 ; at Shiloh. 105 ; becomes 
 commander-in-chief in the west, 159 ; Jackson, 
 Tenn., headquarters of, 370 ; at La Grange, 371 : 
 meeting of, and Sherman at Columbus — head 
 quarters of, at Oxford, Miss., 373 ; La Grange re 
 entered by, 374 ; operations of, preparatory tt 
 attack on Vicksburg, 394-401 ; at the battle of 
 Champion hills, 410 ; assault ordered by, on Vicks- 
 btirg, 415 ; another assault made by, 417 ; report 
 of, 419 ; siege of Vicksburg determined upon by, 
 420 ; surrender of Vicksburg to, 434-426 ; (note) 
 436 ; appointed to the command of the new military 
 division of the Mississippi, 558 ; at Chattanotjga, 
 559 ; at the battle of Chattanooga, 568 ; despatch 
 of, 574 ; visit of, to Gen Banks, 597 ; appointed 
 lieutenant-general, 651 ; takes command of the 
 army of the Potomac, 653 ; command of the ai mies 
 of the United States assumed by, 653 ; statf of, 
 659 ; operations of. in Virginia, 660-705 ; operations 
 of, against Petersburg, 735-781 ; his final operations 
 against Petersburg and Richmond, 898-931 ; his 
 pursuit of Gen. Lee. till the surrender at Appomat 
 tox court house, 922-934 ; his correspondence >ritl 
 Lee, relative to terms of surrender. 930, 931, 983 
 934 ; his losses during the campaign, 935 ; order of 
 on the disbandment of the army, 951, 952. 
 
 Gravelly Run, Va., battle of, 913. 
 
 Graves. Major, mortally wounded at the battle of 
 Chickamauga, 554. 
 
 Green, Gen. T. . depredations of, 598 ; at Wiidon'j 
 farm, 637 ; killed at Pleasant hill landing, 639. 
 
 Greene, Gen. at the battle of Gettysburg, 519. 
 
 Gregg, Gen., at Port Royal ferry, 76 ; mortally 
 wounded at the battle of Fredericksburg, 346. 
 
 Gregg, Col. . cavalry exploits of. 493 ; engageme-'. of, 
 with Gen. Stuart. 490 ; at the battle of Gettys- 
 burg, 538 ; (Gen.) wounded at the battle of the 
 WUdemess, 673 ; at the battle of Trevillian, 708 ; 
 his raid to Stony creek station, 779. 
 
 Gregg, Gen. . at the battle of Raymond, Miss, 407. 
 
 Gregory, acting-master, gallant fight of, with 8 Con- 
 federate gun-boat, 144. 
 
 Qrierson, Gen. B. H. , cavalry exploit of, 401 ; opera 
 tions of, near Port Hudson, 438 ; at Memphis, 613 
 at Gum town, 619 ; his expedition from Memphi 
 against the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, 852. 
 
 Griffin, Gen., reconuoissance of, after the battle of 
 Antietam, 331 ; at the battle of Chancellorsville 
 455 ; at the battle of Jericho ford, 694. 
 
 Qrifflths, Serg. T. , daring action of, at Vickaborg. 41 "3 
 
 ariswoldTille.Ga., battle of. 81S. 
 
H< 
 
 IMDEX. 
 
 aroTer, (ien., at the battle of Williamsbnig, 216; 
 brigade of, at the battle of Gainesville, 296 ; divi- 
 sion of, moves up tne Atchafalaya, 437 ; at the at- 
 tack on Port Hudson, 441, 443, 444. 
 
 Groveton, Va., or Gainesville, battle of, 295. 
 
 Guerrilla warf.ire, in Missouri, 358 ; in Arkansas, 
 859 ; in Texas, 366. 
 
 Muitar, Col., defeats Poindexter, the guerrilla, 358. 
 
 9iun Town, defeat of Gen. Sturgisby Forrest at, 620. 
 
 H. 
 
 EIackblman, Gen., killed at Corinth, Miss., 164 
 
 Hagerstown, Md., stores in, plundered by Early, 784 
 
 Haines' Bluff, abandoned by the Confederates, 414 
 
 Halleck, Gen. H. W., takes charge of the western de- 
 partment. 56; in Mis.'^ouri 80: plan of, to attack 
 the Confederates, 83 ; takes command of the army 
 of the Tennessee. 116 ; advance of, to Corinth, 119 ; 
 in command of the troops in the valley of the Mis- 
 sissippi, 193 ; generalin-chief of the entire army 
 of the United States, 273 : appointed chief of staff 
 at Washington, 653. 
 
 Hamilton, Gen., division of, at the battle of luka, 
 161 ; at the battle of Corinth, 163. 
 
 Hampton, Col. Wade, at the battle of Bull Run, 43 ; 
 (Oen. ) at the battle of Gettysburg, 528; at Hawe's 
 store, 697 ; cattle carried off by, from Sycamore 
 church, 769 ; compels Gen. Warren to withdraw 
 from Hicksford, 781 ; orders all the cotton in Colum- 
 bia, S. C, to be burned, 885 ; his refusal to abide 
 by the terms of capitulation of Gen. Johnston, 947. 
 
 cl&mpton Koads, land and naval armament in. 70 ; 
 fleet in, proceeds to sea, 71 ; expedition of Burnside 
 and Qoldsborough leaves, 124 ; naval engagement 
 Between the Merrimac and the Monitor in. 307-211. 
 
 Hancock, Gen. W. S., at the battle of Williamsburg 
 218 ; biographical sketch of (note), 221 ; at the bat- 
 tle of Savage's station, 263 ; at the battle of Fred- 
 ericksburg, 348 : at the battle of Chancellorsville. 
 469 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 506 ; wounded, 
 i28 ; takes command of the Second army corps. 658 ; 
 wounded at the Wilderness, 672 ; placed tempo- 
 rarily in charge of the Middle military division, 903. 
 
 Sanover Court House, battle of, 231. 
 
 tiardee, Gen., at the battle of Shiloh, 105 ; at Chatta- 
 nooga, 171 ; at the battle of Murfreesboro, 183 ; at 
 the battle of Chattanooga, 568 ; at the battle of 
 Resaca, Ga., 709 ; at the battle of Jonesboro, 732 ; 
 his evacuation of Savannah, 823 ; his evacuation of 
 Charleston, 886 ; defeated at Averysboro, 891. 
 
 Bardie, Gen., at the battle of Fredericksburg, 344. 
 
 Harding, Col. A. , his defense of Fort Donelson, 587. 
 
 Barker, Gen., killed at Kenesaw mountain, 715. 
 
 Harper's Ferry, Va., seized by the Richmond authori- 
 ties, 48 ; Johnston evacuates, 49 ; description of, 
 813 ; siege and surrender of, 314 ; Col. Miles mor- 
 tallT wounded at the sieffe of, 314 ; fatal effect of 
 
 the surrender of. 314, 315 ; stores at, in tlie pot;««5 
 slon of the Confederates, 316 ; Confederates leav* 
 317 ; recapture of, by the Nationals, 832. 
 
 Harriet Lane steamer, sent to the relief of Fort Sum 
 ter, 26 ; capture of, at Galveston, 433. 
 
 Harris. Col. L. A., at the battle of Perryville, 177 
 
 Harrisburg, Pa., excitement at, 4S2. 
 
 Harrison, Col., defeats Cabell, at Fayetteville, 603 
 
 Harrison, Col., cavalry operations of, against Porter 
 fleet, descending the Red river, 632. 
 
 Harrow, Gen., at vhe battle of Gettysburg, 527. 
 
 Hartsuff, Gen., wounded at Antietam, 320, 
 
 Haskell, Col., killed at Cold harbor, 701. 
 
 Hatch, Gen. John P., expedition of, against !:.•>■ 
 Charleston and Savannah railroad, 820. 
 
 Hatcher's Run, battle of. 777 ; second battle of, 91)3 
 
 Hatchie, battle of the, 167. 
 
 Uatteras, expedition of Butler and Stringham ,o, 6." 
 
 Hawkins, Col., left in charge at Hatteras, 65. 
 
 Hawkins, Col., surrender of Union city, Tenn. by, 616 
 
 Hawley, Col., at the battle of Olustee, Fla., 857. 
 
 Hay, Major John, with the expedition to Florida, 8.56 
 
 Haycock, Major, killed at Marye'shill, 475. 
 
 Hayes' brigade, at the Weldon railroad, 763. 
 
 Hayne, Col. , in the attack on Fort Donelson, SO. 
 
 Hays, Gen. Alex., at Gettysburg, 519 ; killed at tlv< 
 battle of the Wilderness {note), 666. 
 
 Hazard, Capt., at the battle of Fair Oaks, 239 ; mot 
 tally wounded at White Oak swamp, 265. 
 
 Hazard, Commander 9. G., with expedition of Bum 
 side and Goldsboro, 123. 
 
 Hazard, Gen., repulse of, by Gen. Terry, 590. 
 
 Hazel Grove, Va., abandoned by Gen. Hooker, 467 
 
 Hazen, Col., brigade of, at the battle of Shiloh, 110 ; 
 at the battle of Murfreesboro, 185 ; at the battle ol 
 Chickamauga, 550 ; (Gen.) at Wauhatchie, 559 ; at 
 Chattanooga, 572 ; captures Fort McAllister, 822. 
 
 Hazlitt, Capt., killed at Gettysburg, 513. 
 
 Heckman, Gen., made prisoner at Bermuda hundred. 
 689. 
 
 Heintzelman, Gen., at Bull Run, 39 ; in command ni 
 a corps in the army of the Potomac, 193 ; at the 
 battle of Williamsburg, 214 ; bandB ordered by. to 
 strike up national and martial airs (tioU), 221 ; at 
 the battle of Fair Oaks, 236 ; at the battle of Sav- 
 age's station, 263 ; at the battle of Glendale, 265 ; 
 at the battle of Gainesville, 295. 
 
 Helena, Aik. , attack on, by Price and Marmadnke, 605 
 
 Henry, Col., repulse by, of Hoke's brigade, before 
 Petersburg, 745 ; at the battle of Olustee, &57. 
 
 Herbert, Gen. h.. at the battle of Corinth, 164 
 
 Herron, Gen. F. I. , at the battle of Prairie grove, 362 
 operations of, 598 ; operations of (note), 607. 
 
 Heth, Gen., at Gettysburg, 525 ; at the battle of tb« 
 Wilderness, 666 ; at the battle of Jericho ford, 994 
 
 Hickman, Ky., seized by Gen. Polk, 58. 
 
 Hicbman. Miss., capture of, by the Confederates. 618 
 
INDEX. 
 
 965 
 
 BiekB, CoL S. Q., afiair of, at Fort Anderson, 616. 
 
 Hicksford, Va., Gen. Warren withdraws from, 781. 
 
 Biggins, Col. , in command of Forts Jackson and St. 
 Philip, 148 ; surrenders to Porter, 155. 
 
 Higginson, CoL, at Edisto, S. C, 589. 
 
 Highlanders, 7»th N. T., at Bull Run, 44; at Port 
 Royal, 76 ; at ChantUly, 303 ; at KnoxTille (note), 578. 
 
 Hildebrand's brigade, at the battle of Shiloh, 106. 
 
 Hill, Gen. A. P. , at the battle of MechanicsviUe, 258 ; 
 at the battle of Gaines" mill, 259 ; at the battle of 
 Glendale, 265 ; at the battle of Gainesville, 296 ; at 
 the battle of Antietam, 327 ; at the battle of 
 Fredericksburg, 343 ; wounded at batWe of Chan- 
 ceUorsrille, 464 ; at battle of Gettysburg, 503 ; at 
 battle of the Wilderness, 666 ; killed at the final 
 assault on the lines before Petersburg (note), 919. 
 
 nil. Gen. D. H., at ihe battle of Williamsburg, 219 ; 
 at the battle of Fair Oaks, 234 ; at the battle of 
 Gaines' mill, 260 ; at battle of Malvern hills, 268 ; 
 at battle of Antietam, 818 ; ordered to attack Little 
 Washington, 594. 
 
 Hilton Head, 8. C, Gen. Thos. W. Sherman makes 
 improvements at, 75 ; Gen. W. T. Sherman at, 882. 
 
 Hindman, Gen., killed at the battle of Shiloh, 108. 
 
 Hindman, Gen. T. C, guerrillas commanded by, 359 ; 
 at the battle of Prairie grove, 363 ; retreat of, 366. 
 
 Hlnks, Gen., division of, at City point, Va., 686. 
 
 Hobson, Gen., his pursuit of Gen. Morgan, 595 ; his 
 entire command captured by Morgan, 783. 
 
 Holland, Gen., at battle of Springfield, Mo., 602. 
 
 Hollins, Capt., boast of, 68 ; at Fort Pillow, 148. 
 
 Holmee, Gen., at Bull Run, 43. 
 
 Sood, (Jen. J. B. , at the battle of Fredericksburg, 
 843 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 511 ; at the battle 
 of Chickamauga, 549 ; at the battle of Resaca, 709 ; 
 supersedes Johnston on Sherman's approach to 
 Atlanta, 719 ; evacuates Atlanta, 732 ; protests 
 against Sherman's order for the removal of civilians 
 from Atlanta, 734 ; reorganizes his forces at Jonee- 
 boro, 804 ; moves westward on Sherman's commun- 
 ications, 805 ; retreats into Northern Alabama, 808; 
 his disastrous campaign against Thomas, 837-851 , 
 hJB total defeat at Nashville, 843-847 ; pursued by 
 Wilson's cavalry to the Tennessee river, 847-849 ; 
 pursued by CoL Palmer, 849 ; his losses in the Ten- 
 nessee campaign, 860; relieved of his command, 851. 
 
 hoKe Gen. , at the battle of Gettysburg, 519 ; atti'mpts 
 H) regain possession of Cold harbor, 698 ; his 
 anack upon Forts Warren and Wessels, 858 ; his 
 (lege of Plymouth, N. C, 868 ; captures Ply- 
 month — abandons the siege of New Berne, 859 ; 
 attempts to relieve Fort Fisher, 867 ; evacuates 
 Wilmington, 869. 
 
 Hooker, Gen. Jos., at the battle of Williamsburg, 
 214 ; vain appeal of, to Gen. Sunmer for help, 217 ; 
 biographical sketch of (Twte), 220 ; division of, sus- 
 '«in8 severe loss, 221 ; at the battle of Fair Oaka, 
 
 889 ; at the battle of Glendale, 266 ; defeats EweU 
 near Bristow station, 291 ; at the battle of Gaises- 
 ville, 295 ; wounded at the battle of Antietam, 821; 
 at the battle of Fredericksburg, 344-849 ; grand 
 charge of, 350 ; assumes command of the anny of 
 the Potomac, 364 ; past career and personal appear 
 ance of, 449, 450 ; address of, to the army of the 
 Potomac, 451 ; army of, takes posit' on at Chancel 
 lorsville, 454 ; boast of (note), 4!k. ; fatal blunde? 
 of, 456 ; struck by a cannon ball, 470 ; retreats 
 across the Rappahannock, 481 ; address of, to the 
 army of the Potomac, 484 ; relieved of his com- 
 mand, 495 ; farewell address of, to the army, 495, 
 496 ; at Nashville, 559 ; at Wauhatchie. 556 , *t 
 Lookout mountain, 566, 567 ; at the battle of Chat 
 tanooga. 568 ; in command of the twentieth corpf 
 under Sherman, 706 ; resigns his command, 728. 
 
 Houston, Col. , at the battle of Prairie grove, 365. 
 
 Hovey, Gen A. P., defeats Gen. Rust on the White 
 river, 356 ; at Chickasaw bayou, 381 ; wounded at 
 Arkansas post, 387 ; at Champion hills, 410. 
 
 Howe, Gen., at the attack on Marye's hUl, 473. 
 
 Howard, Gen. O. O., brigade of, at the battle of Bull 
 Run, 43 ; at the battle of Fair Oaks, 239 ; wounded 
 at Fair Oaks, 240 ; at the battle of Fredericksbivrg, 
 348 ; at the battle of Chancellorsville, 453 ; at the 
 battle of Gettysburg, 504 ; at Wauhatchie, 560 ; 
 commands the fourth corps under Sherman, 706 ; 
 in command of the army of the Tennessee, 727. 
 
 Huger, Gen., flight of, from Norfolk, Va., 2?9 ; at 
 Fair Oaks, 234-239 ; at White Oak swamp, ?65. 
 
 Hughes, guerrilla chief, surprises the garrison of In 
 dependence. Mo., 359. 
 
 Humphrey, Gen. Andrew A, at the battle of Chan 
 cellorsville, 455 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 511 
 
 Hunter. Gen. David, succeeds Gen. T. W. Sherman. 
 139 ; surrender of Fort Pulaski to, 140 ; at Jamee 
 island, 580 ; superseded by Gen. Mitchell. 581 ; 
 resumes command of the department of the South, 
 582 ■ ordered to attack Charleston, 584 ; unable tt 
 a.ssist Dupont, 587 ; removed from command, 588 
 defeats Jones and McCauslaud at Piedmont, 69£ 
 
 Huntsville. Mo., battle of, 602. 
 
 Huntsville, Tenn., threatened by Gen. Buford, 828. 
 
 Huntsville, ram, sunk by the Confederates, 873, 
 
 Hurlbut, Gen. Stephen A., at Pittsburg landing, 101 ' 
 at Corinth, 118 ; near Pocahontas, 162 ; victory 
 at the Hatchie, 167 ; at Memphis, 609 ; le 
 charge of expedition, at Meridian, 614 
 
 I. 
 Ihboden, Gen., at the battle of Gettysburg, 681. 
 Immel's battery, at the battle of Corinth, 166. 
 Independence, Mo., captured by guerrillas, 859. 
 Indian Territory, active hostUities in, 367. 
 IngaUs, Chief Quarter-master, at Port Royal, S. 
 Tngraham, flag-officer, proclamation of 584. 
 
d66 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Island Ford, Va., battle of, 787. 
 
 Island No. 10, in charge of PoUc, 83 ; Burrender of, 96. 
 
 [uks. Miss.. de8<«i|>tion of, 159 ; abandoned by the 
 
 Nationala, 160 ; battle of, 161. 
 Irerson, Uen., at the battle of ChancelloreTille, 46U. 
 
 'ACK80N, Gen. J. S., killed at Perryrille, Ey., 176. 
 
 fsckson, Gen. T. J. (Stonewall), at Bull Kun, 43 ; 
 operations of, in the valley of the Shenandoah, 243- 
 345 ; retreat of, before the forces of Fremont and 
 Shields, 249 ; biograpliical sketch of {note), 253 , at 
 Hanover court house, 257 ; at the battle of Gaines' 
 mill, 260 ; at the battle of White Oak swamp, 265 ; 
 retreat of, after the battle of Cedar mountain, 287 ; 
 at the battle of Antietam, 319 ; at the battle of 
 Fredericksburp. 340 ; attack of, on Gen. Hooker at 
 Chancellorsville, 461 ; mortally wounded, 463 ; re- 
 marks on the character of (note), 464. 
 
 Jackson, Confederate ram, destruction of, 874. 
 
 Jackson, Miss., capture of, by Gen. Grant's forces, 
 409 ; evacuation of, by Gen. Johnston (note), 427 ; 
 precipitate retreat of the Confederates from, 611. 
 
 Jacksonville, Fla., taken possession of by the Na- 
 tionals, 141 ; occupied by Gen. c<eyinour, 856 ; stores 
 at, destroyed by Seymo ir, 858. 
 
 James Island, occupied, 580 ; abandoned, 681. 
 
 James River, Magruder'e forces on the, 195 ; National 
 gun boats on the, 229 ; Butler moves up the, 686 ; 
 crossed by the army of the Potomac, 704. 
 
 James River Canal, damaged by CoL Wyndham, 488' 
 locks and banks of, destroyed by Sheridan, 905. 
 
 Jameson, Gen., at the battle of Williamsburg, 218. 
 
 Jeffers, Lieut., operations of, at the mouth of the 
 Chesapeake and Albemarle canal, ISO. 
 
 Jenkins, Gen. A. G., at Chambersburg, Pa., 494; 
 killed at the battle of the Wilderness, 673. 
 
 Jenkins' Ferry, Ark., battle of, 640. 
 
 Jericho Ford, Va., battle of, 694. 
 
 Jettersville, Oen. Sheridan at, 924. 
 
 Johnson, Andrew, sworn into office as president, 940. 
 
 Johnsonville, Tenn., destruction of stores at, caused 
 by Forrest — arrival of Schofield at, 838. 
 
 Johnson, Gen. B. T., encounters Kilpatrick at Beaver 
 dam station, 656 ; his raid towards Baltimore, 786. 
 
 Johnson, Uen. E., at the battle of Gettysburg, 519 ; 
 captured at Spottsylvania, 681. 
 
 Johnson, Gen. K. W., at the battle of Murfreeaboro, 
 180 ; operations of, 542 ; at the battle of CTiicka- 
 mauga, 550 ; at the battle of Chattanooga, 572. 
 
 'ohnston, Col., surrenders the fort at Dalton. 808. 
 
 'ohnston. Gen. A. S., strong position held by, 80 ; 
 strength of his army, 83 ; his letter to Jefferson 
 Davis, 95 ; proclamation of, on assuming command 
 of the Confederate army, 103 ; killed at the battle 
 of ShUoh, 108. 
 
 Johaston, Gen. Jos. E. in the vallev of the Shenan- 
 
 doah, 86 ; in command at Winchester, 36 ; deeeivet 
 Patterson, 89 ; gains the battle of Bull Bun, 46 
 at Harper's ferry, 48 ; evacuates Harper's ferry, 49 
 Manassas evacuated by, 193 ; at the battle of Wil 
 liamsburg, 217 ; retreat of, 223 ; at the battle oi 
 Fair Oaks, 234 ; instructions of, to Pemberton, 
 408; forces of, at Dalton, Ga., 707, tivacuation of 
 Daltou by, 709 ; retreat of, to Besaca, 711 ; at Alia 
 toons pa.ss, 713 ; at Kenesaw mountain, 714 ; at 
 the Chattahoochee river, 717 ; retires to Atlanta, 
 718 ; removed from his command, 719 ; defeat of 
 by Slocum near Bentonville — retreats t" "mithfic'd 
 893 ; surrenders his army to Sherman, •„ i". 
 
 Joinville, Prince de at Williamsburg. 224. 
 
 Jones, Gen. Sam., killed in the Wilderness, 672. 
 
 Jones, Gen. W. E., killed at Piedmont, 692. 
 
 Jonesboro, Ga. , battle of, 731. 
 
 Jouett, Capt., captures the Selma in Mobile Bay, 64& 
 
 Jnda, schooner, burning of the, at Santa Rosa, 67 
 
 Judah, Gen. his pursuit of Gen. Morgan, 696 : at fht 
 battle of Resaca, Ga., 710. 
 
 Kautz, Gen. A. V., operations of, against the Weldon 
 railroad, 686 ; raid of, 691 , movement of, against 
 Petersburg, 737 ; his command surprised and routed 
 on the Charles City road, 773 
 
 Kearney, Gen. Phil., at the battle of Williamsburg, 
 214 ; at the battle of Fair Oaks, 236 ; at the battle 
 of Glendale, 266 ; at the battle of Gainesville, 295 : 
 killed at the battle of ChantiUy, 803 ; biographical 
 sketch of (note), 305. 
 
 Kearsarge, corvette, sinks the Alabama, 879. 
 
 KeUy, Gen. B. F., valor of, at Philippi, W. Va., 49 
 reoocupies Marttnsburg, Va., 788. 
 
 Kemper, Gen., at Qettysbtirg, 525 ; wounded, 528. 
 
 Keneaaw Mountain, situation of, 713 ; battle of, 715. 
 
 Kenly, Gen. J. R., defeat of, at Front Royal, a47 
 brigade of, panic stricken at Berryville, 791 . 
 
 Kentucky, coveted by the Confederacy — legislature 
 of, refuses to call a convention, 56 ; loyalty of, 57 
 
 Keokuk, iron clad, destruction of the, 587. 
 
 Kernstown, battle of, 243 ; skirmishing at, 788. 
 
 Kershaw, Gen., defeat of, at Strawberry plains, 754 
 
 Keyes, Gen. E. D., at Bull Ron, 43 ; in command oi 
 a corps in the army of the Potomac, 193 ; at the 
 battle of Fair Oaks, 236. 
 
 Kilpatrick, Gen. Judflon, cavalry exploits of, 483 ; a 
 the battle of Gettysburg, 528 ; raid of in Virgiuir 
 656 ; wounded at Sugar valley, Ga., 709 ; his at, 
 tempt on West Point and Macon railroads, 729 
 defeats Wheeler at Waynesboro, 818 ; skirmish of 
 with Wheeler at Aiken, 883 ; narrow escape of 
 from Wade Hampton, at Fayetteville, 889. 
 
 King, Gen. Rnfus, joins Pope at Culpepper, 284 
 at Warrenton turnpike, 293 ; at GaineeviUe, 896 
 
 Kinston, N. C, battle of, 884. 
 
INUEA. 
 
 KirkBvlUe, Mo., battle of, 358. 
 Kleim, Gen., at the battle of Williamsburg, 230. 
 " Knights of the Golden Circle," in Missouri, 829. 
 Knoxville Tenn., occupied by the Nationals, 544 ; 
 
 siege of, by Longstreet, 575 ; siege raised. 578. 
 Kulp House, near Marietta, Ga., battle of, 715. 
 
 LAtfB, Col., captured at Fort Fisher, N. C, 867. 
 
 Lamar, G. B., purchase of arms by, 14. 
 
 Lamar, Col. J. G., in command at Secessionville, S. C, 
 580 ; his repulse of Gen. Benham, 581. 
 
 Lancaster, ram, destroyed at Vicksburg, 439. 
 
 Lander. Gen., his surprise of Jackson at Blooming 
 gap — mortally wounded at Balls' bluff, 242. 
 
 Landrum's brigade at Sabine cross roads. 627. 
 
 Lanman's brigade at Fort Donelson, 86; at Jackson, 427. 
 
 Laurel Hill, Va. , two unsuccessful attempts on, 677. 
 
 Lawler, Qen., gallant conduct of, at the Big Black, 413. 
 
 Lawton, Gen., severely wounded at Antietam, 320. 
 
 Lee, Gen. A. L. , in the expedition to Shreveport, 624; 
 at Wilson's farm, 627 ; at Sabine cross roads, 628. 
 
 Lee, Admiral S. P., in the battle below New Orleans, 
 152 ; sends gun-boats up the Nansemond, 594 
 
 Lee, Gen. Fitz Hugh, encounters Gen. Sheridan at 
 Hawe's store, 697 ; cavalry of, at Deep bottom, 760; 
 
 Lee, Gen. R. E. his plan of campaign. 51 ; sent to 
 take charge of the coast defenses of South Carolina, 
 52 ; pursuit of McClellan by, 263 ; at the battle of 
 Glondale, 265 ; at the battle of Malvern hills, 268 ; 
 report of, 272 ; biographical sketch of (note), 275 ; 
 report of (note), 301 ; his losses in Virginia, 304 ; 
 his proclamation to the people of Maryland. 308 ; 
 invades Maryland — his plan discovered. 310 ; his 
 losses at Antietam, 827 ; retreats to Virginia, 331 ; 
 at the battle of Fredericksburg, 340 ; army of, near 
 Fredericksburg, 452 ; plans and movements of, 
 457-459 ; congratulates his army, 485 ; address of, 
 to his army, 498 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 508 ; 
 retreat of, 531 ; his operations in Virginia, 661-705 ; 
 operations of, in defense of Petersburg, 735-781 ; 
 retreats after the fall of Petersburg. 922 ; his cor- 
 respondence with Grant relative to surrender, 930- 
 9*4 ; bid^ bis army farewell, 935 ; his losses, 935. 
 
 Lee, Gen. S. D., in the afEair at Tuscumbia, Ala., 503. 
 
 Lee, Gen. W H. F., at Bapidan station, Va., 4S3 ; 
 wound wl at Brandy station, 490. 
 
 Ijee, Lisut. -Commander, mortally wounded, on board 
 the Harriet Lane, at Galveston, 433. 
 
 Lexington, Mo., strrender of, 66. 
 
 Lidole, Qen. , division of. at Chickamauga, 660. 
 
 UdeU, Qen. St. J. , captured at Blakely, AJt . 873. 
 
 Ufeof— 
 Bumside, Qen. Ambrose E., 133. 
 Cravei. Capt. Tunis A. (iwte), 644 
 Dup'.nt, Commodore Samuel F., 70. 
 QpldatKirongh, Capt. Louis M.. 18S 
 
 Hancock, Qen. Winfield S. [note), 221. 
 
 Hays, Qen. Alexander (note), 666. 
 
 Hill, Gen. Ambrose P. (note), 919. 
 
 Hooker, Gen. Joseph (note), 230. 
 
 Jackson, Gen. Thomas J. (Stonewall). (noU), 3S9 
 
 Kearney, Gen. Philip (Tiote), 805. 
 
 Lee, Gen. Robert E. (note), 275. 
 
 McPherson, Gen. James B. (note), 735 
 
 Meade, Gen. George Q., 496. 
 
 Pope, Gen. John, 277. 
 
 Head, Gen. S. T. (note), 926. 
 
 Reynolds, Qen. John F. (note), 536. 
 
 Rice, Gen. James C. (note), 678. 
 
 Sanders, Qen. William P. (jiote), 578. 
 
 Sedgwick, Gen. John (note), 676. 
 
 Sherman, Gen. Thomas W., 70. 
 
 Shields, Gen. James (note). 345. 
 
 Smyth, Gen. Thomas A. (note). 929. 
 
 Stringham, Commodore Silas H. , 63. 
 
 Stuart, Gen. James E. B. (note), 685. 
 
 Thomas, Gen. George H., 82. 
 
 Wadsworth, Gen James S. (note), 669. 
 
 Zollikoffer, Gen, Felix K., 81, 
 
 Lincoln, President Abraham, his opinion on the sit 
 nation, 24 ; caUs out the militia, and summoni 
 Congress, 33 ; calls for additional troops, 46 ; mes- 
 sage of, to Congress, 47 ; caUs for troops from 
 Kentucky, 56 ; letter of, to the governor of Ken- 
 tucky, 57 ; order of, for forward movement of land 
 and naval forces, 80 ; proclamation of, announcing 
 National victories, 157 ; telegram of, to Rosecrans, 
 188 ; orders the army to move towards Manassas, 
 193, letter of, to McClellan, 194 ; prophetic words 
 of, 200 ; visits Fortress Monroe, 228 ; visit of, lo 
 McClellan at Harrison ',s landing, 272 ; visit of, to 
 the army, 332 ; letter of, to the people of Missouri, 
 357 ; weakness of, 876 ; issues his famous emanci- 
 pation proclamation, 891 ; proclamation of, an 
 nonncing the enforcement of the law of enrolment 
 and draft, 486 ; calls out the militia, 492 ; announce 
 ment of, 530 ; a call for militia, 784 ; visits Rich- 
 mond, 936 ; assassination of, 937, 938. 
 
 Little Bethel, attempt to surprise, 62. 
 
 Little Crow, shot near Hutchinson, Minn. 607. 
 
 Little, Qen. L. H., killed at the battle of Iiika, 162, 
 
 Little Osage Crossing, Mo., battle of, 832. 
 
 Little Rock, Ark,, head-quarters of the guerrillas 
 355 ; Curtis prepares to move against, 356 ; erpa 
 dition against, 889 ; surrendered to Qen. Davidson 
 606 ; Steele departs from, to co-operate with Banki 
 against Shreveport, 638 ; return of Steele to, 640. 
 
 Lockwood's Maryland Brigade, at Gettysburg, 618 
 
 Logan, Gen. John A. , at Belmont, 60 ; at Fort Donelsoa 
 90; at the battle of Raymond, Miss., 407 ; at th« 
 battle of Champion hills, 411 ; in command of tJ>- 
 fifteenth corps under Sherman, 706. 
 
 Lone Jack, Mo. , defeat of Major Foster at, 369. 
 
968 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 'vongstreet, Qen. Jas., at Willl&msbarg, 216 ; at Fair 
 Oaka, 334 ; at MechauicsvUle, 358 ; at Gaines' mill, 
 269 ; at Qaineaville, 29S ; at South mountam, 816 ; 
 at Antietam, 318 ; at Fredericksburg, 34H ; at 
 Gettysburg, 508 ; at Chickamauga, 551 ; lays siege 
 to Knoxrille, Tenn. 577 ; retreats from Knoxville, 
 677 ; invests Suflolk, Va. 594 ; at Bean station, 
 596 ; wounded in the Wilderness, 670 ; in the lines 
 before Richmond, 910 ; joins Lee at Petersburg, 918. 
 
 Lookout Mountain, Qa., battle of, 566, 567. 
 
 Lortng, Gen. W. W., at Champion hills, 410 ; in com- 
 mand at Canton, Miss., 611. 
 
 Lost Mountain, Ga. operations of Schofield at, 714. 
 
 Louisa Court House, Va., surprise and capture of 
 Confederate cavalry at, 387. 
 
 LoreU, Gen. M., Confederate troops at New Orleans in 
 eommand of, 148 ; evacuates New Orleans, 156 ; 
 Joins Price and Van Dom near Corinth, Miss. , 168. 
 
 Lovell, steamer, sunk by the Nationals, 146. 
 
 Lowe, Col. J. W., killed at Camifei ferry, 53. 
 
 Lynch, Capt. W. F., in charge of the coast defense of 
 North Carolina, 135 ; flies from Elizabeth city, 129. 
 
 Lyon, Qen. Nat., in command at Springfield, Mo., 65 ; 
 kiUed at the battle of Wilson's creek. Mo., 56. 
 
 Lyon, Qen., cavalry raid of. Into Kentucky, 850. 
 
 Lytle, Col. W. H. wounded at Camifex ferry, 62 ; 
 wounded at the battle of Perryvllle, 177. 
 
 M. 
 
 McArthur, Gen. John, brigade of, at Fort Donelson, 
 86 ; at the battle of Corinth, 164. 
 
 McCall, Qen. Geo. A., at the battle of Mechanicsvllle, 
 258 ; capture of, at the battle of G^lendale. 866 
 
 McCallum, Col. D. C, superintendent ot military 
 railroads, energy of, 558 ; (note), 781. 
 
 McCausland, Gen., affair of, with Gen. Crook near 
 Dublin station, 691 ; defeated by Gen. Hunter at 
 Piedmont, 693 ; sets fire to Chambersburg, Pa., 788. 
 
 iVlcClellan, Qen. Geo. B. , in Western Virginia, 35 ; in 
 Northeastern Virginia. 47 ; issues an address to 
 the people and his soldiers, 48 ; head-quarters of, 
 at Waahington, 60 ; appointed commander-in-chief, 
 79 ; inactivity of, 191 ; Lincoln dissatisfied with — 
 liis army on the peninsula, 194 ; at Torktown, 196- 
 201 ; at Williamsburg, 234 ; at Fair Oaks, 238 ; at 
 MechanicsviUe, 258 ; his letter to the secretary of 
 war. 262 ; at Savage's station, 262 ; at Malvern 
 hills, 264 ; his report of the battle of Malvern hills, 
 269 ; at Harrison's landing — his address to the 
 army, 270 • his correspondence with the government, 
 272 ; at Acquia creek, 275 ; in command of the 
 reconstrncted army of the Potomac, 304 ; at South 
 mountain, 315 ; at Antietam, 313-333 ; superseded 
 by Bumside, 333 ; bids adieu to his troops, 836. 
 
 tfcClernand, Gen. John A., at Fort Donelson, 86 ; 
 at Pittsburg landing, 102 ; assumes command of the 
 arm^ of the Mississippi, 383 ; at the battle of 
 
 Champion hilU, 410 ; pursues the ^nfederatea 
 413 ; conduct of, at the siege of Vicksburg, 417 
 removed from command of the thirteenth corps, 
 420 ; at Alexandria, La., 637. 
 
 McCook, Col. Dan., at Doctor's creek, 175 ; at Chick 
 amauga, 550 ; his raid on the railroad south o> 
 Atlanta, 736 ; his movement against Lyon. 826. 
 
 McCook, Col. R. L. , at Camifex ferry, 52. 
 
 McCook, Gen. A McD., at the battle of Shiloh, 110 
 at PerryvUle, 174-177 ; at Murfreesboro, 180 : al 
 Ijberty gap. 543 ; at Chickamauga, 550. 
 
 McCown. Gen., at the battle of Murfreesboro, 180. 
 
 McCuUoch. Gen., mortally wounded at Pea ridge, 97 
 
 McCullough. Col., murder of, at KirksvUle. Mo , 35b 
 
 McDowell. Gen. Irwin, occupies Arlin^on heights 
 and Alexandria, 35 ; in conmand of the forces 
 in Virgfinia, 86 ; ordered t; attack the Confed- 
 erate position at Manassas junction, 36 ; his 
 first plan, 87 - his second plan, 38 ; defeated at 
 Bull Run, 45, 46 : his removal, 46 ; in command 
 of a corps in the army of the Potomac, 193 ; hi> 
 corps detached apd detained to defend the capital 
 194 ; at Fredericksburg. 246 ; at Gainesville, 396 
 at Manassas, 299. 
 
 McGUvray, Col. F., batterios «*, at Gettysburg, 636 
 
 McGinnis, Gen., at the b»tUe of Champion hUb 
 411 ; at the battle of Grand Cotean. 51)9. 
 
 Mcintosh, Gen., mortally wounded at Pea ndge, 97 
 
 McKean, Gen. Thos. J., at the battle of Corinth, 16S 
 
 McKee, Major, operations of, at Yazoo citv, 615. 
 
 McKeen, Col., killed at Cold harbor, 701. 
 
 McLaws, Qen. Laf., at Malvern hills, 268; at Fre 
 dericksbnrg, 343 ; at Salem church, 479 ; at Qetv?* 
 burg, 514 ; division of, at Taylor's bridge, 604- 
 
 McMahon, Col., death of, at Cold harbor, 701. 
 
 McMillan, Gen., at the battle of Pleasant hill 630 
 
 McNeil, Gen. John defeats Porter at Kirksville. Mo 
 358 ; defends Cape Girardeau, 603 ; commands tl 
 army of the frontier, 606. 
 
 McPheeters, Gen., defeat of, by Gen. Weitzel, 431. 
 
 Mcpherson, Gen. J. B., drives the Confederates from 
 Lamar to Holly springs, 371 ; at the battle of Ray- 
 mond, Miss., 407 ; capture of Clinton by, 408 ; 
 Jackson occupied by, 409 ; at Champion hUls, 410 ■ 
 at the Big Black, 413 ; at the investment of Vicks- 
 burg, 415 ; in charge of Vicksburg, 427 ; join* 
 the expedition to Meridian, 609 ; at Meridian, 612 ■ 
 commands the army of the Tennessee under Sher 
 man, 706 ; death of, 723 ; biographical notice ol 
 {■note), 725. 
 
 Macomb, Commodore, recaptures PLvmouth, 860. 
 
 Macon, Ga. surrendered to Gen. WUaon. 874. 
 
 Magoffin, Gov., of Kentucky, refuses to raiae troops foi 
 the Union, 66 : letter of, to the President. 57. 
 
 Magruder, Qen. John on the Peninsula, 35 ; his opin 
 ions of McClellan'B oi>eration«. 199 : at WUliams. 
 bur£, 219 ; retreat of, tSA ■ attacks Sed^n^lM <) 
 
IJN ilJiX. 
 
 96S 
 
 Savag* station, 263 - 91endale, 265 ; at Malvern 
 hills, 268 ; recaptm^ Galveston, 432-434. 
 
 Mahone, Gen., at Fair Oaks, 240 ; at Gettysburg, 517. 
 
 Malvern Hills, battle of, 264-269. 
 
 Manassas, battle of (second battle of Bnll Run), 299. 
 
 Manassas, ram, 69; at New Orleans, 151 ; destroyed, 163. 
 
 Mansfield, Gen, Joseph K. F., at Ocean view and 
 Norfolk, Va., 228 ; killed at Antietam, 321. 
 
 Mansura, La., attack on the Nationals at, 638. 
 
 Marais des Cygnes, Mo. , battle of, 832. 
 
 Marland, Lieut., bravery of, at Grand Coteau, 600. 
 
 Marmaduke, Gen., at Corinth, 118 ; defp'ited at Bo«i- 
 ton mountains, 362 ; at Prairie g^rove, 864 ; at 
 Springfield, Mo., 602; at Hunts vilie. Mo., 6U2 ; at 
 Cape Girardeau, 603 ; repulsed at Helena, Ark. 605; 
 repulsed at Pine bluff, 607 ; operations of, 639. 
 
 Martinsburg, Banks' forces at, 348 ; panic at, caused 
 by Early's invasion, 784 ; AverUl abandons, 792. 
 
 Marye's Hill, Va., ca| 'ire of, by the Nationals, 472- 
 475 ; recapture of, i/ the Confederates, 479. 
 
 Maryland, its weakness geographically, 48 ; Lee'a 
 proclamjt'on to the people of, 309 ; all able-bodied 
 men ordered out for the defense of, 309. 
 
 Massacres, at Fort Pillow, 618 ; at Snicker's gap, 792. 
 
 Maury, Gen. Dabney, at the battle of Corinth, 164 ; in 
 charge of the defenses of Mobile, 870 ; retreats up 
 the Alabama river, 873. 
 
 Meade, Gen. G«o. G., severely wounded at Qlendale, 
 266 ; at Antintam, 319 ; at Fredericksburg, 346 ; at 
 Chancellorsville, 463 ; takes command of the army 
 of the Potomac, 495 ; his address to the army, 496 ; 
 biographical sketch of, 496, 497 ; telegraphs to the 
 war department, 498 ; his order to the army, 500 ; 
 at Gettysburg, 507 ; his address to the army, 529, 
 530 ; consolidates the army of the Potomac, 658 ; 
 his staff, 659 ; epistle of, to his troops, 683. 
 
 Meagher, Gen. T. F., at Fair Oaks, 239 ; at Gaines' 
 mill, 260 ; at Glendale, 266 ; his bravery at Antie- 
 tam, 324 ; wounded, 325 ; at Fredericksburg, 848. 
 
 MrK;hanlc8ville, Va., battle of, 258, 259. 
 
 Meigs. Lieut. J. , murdered near Harrisonburg, Va. , 797. 
 
 Memphis, Tenn. , naval engagement before, 145 ; 
 taken possession of by the National troops. 146. 
 
 Memphis and Charleston Railroad, plant of, destroyed 
 by Geu. Mitchell, 115. 
 
 Mercedita, steamer, disabled by the Confederate 
 ram. Palmetto State, off Charleston, 584. 
 
 Meridian, expedition of Sherman to 610 ; Confeder- 
 ates retreat from, 611 ; destroyed property at, 612. 
 
 Merrill, Col., compels Porter and Cobb to retreat, 
 358 ; skirmish of, with Marmaduke, 602. 
 
 ierrimac, iron-clad, in Hampton Roads, 201 ; sinks 
 the Cumberland, 203 ; destroys the Congress, 204 ; 
 her contest with the Monitor, 207-211 ; blown up 
 by the Confederates, 213 ; explosion of, 229. 
 
 Mlddletown, Va., battle of, 800. 
 
 UUm. Col. D. S., at Bull Ron, 39 ; remissness of, at 
 
 Harper's Ferry, 313 ; mortally wouiided, 314 
 
 MUitia, caU of President Lincoln for 75.000, after th« 
 faU of Fort Sumter, 33 ; call for 120,000, 492 ; call 
 for 29,000, from the states of New York, Pennsyl 
 vania and Massachusetts, 784. 
 
 MUledgeville, Ga., occupied by Gen. Sherman, 816. 
 
 Mill Spring, Ky., battle of, 81, 
 
 Milroy, Gen. R. H., at the battle of Cross keys, 251 
 at Gainesville, 295 ; retreats from Winchester, 491 
 defeats the Confederates on Wilkeson turnpike, 844. 
 
 Mine at Petersburg, construction of, commenced by 
 Burnside, 751; description of, 752; explosion of, 755 
 
 Mine at Petersburg, sprang by the Confederates, 756 
 
 Missionary Ridge, Ga., battle of, 568. 
 
 Mississippi River, operations of Foote on the, 143 
 Porter's services on the, 149 ; Farragut's operation? 
 on the, 161-157. 
 
 Mississippi, steamer, destroyed at Port Hudson, 437 
 
 Missouri, division of sentiment in, 357 ; guerrilla 
 warfare in, 358, 359 ; Price's invasion of, 829-833. 
 
 Mitchell, Capt., sets fire to the floating battery 
 Louisiana — sent prisoner to the North. 155. 
 
 Mitchell, Gen. O. M., operations of, in Tennessee, 
 115 ; joins Buell's army, 171 ; succeeds Gen. Hunter 
 in the department of the South — death of, 581. 
 
 Mitchell, Gen. R. P., at the battle of Perryville, 177 ; 
 at the battle of Chickamauga, 556. 
 
 Blobile, Ala., description of, 642 ; operations of Canby 
 and Thatcher against, 869-873 ; surrender of, 873. 
 
 Mobile and Ohio Railroad, fight by Gen. Smith, vritb 
 Confederates on the, 118. 
 
 Mobile Bay, operations of Farragut in, 641-649. 
 
 Monitor, contest of the, with the Merrimac, 207-211 i 
 founders off Cape Hatteras, 213. 
 
 Monocacy, Md., battle of, 786. 
 
 Sfonroe, Mayor, refuses to surrender the city of New 
 Orleans, or take down the Confederate flag, 156. 
 
 Montauk, iron-clad, attacks Fort McAllister, 582. 
 
 Montgomery, Ala,, gathering of Southern delegates 
 at, 23 ; surrender of, to Gen. Wilson, 874. 
 
 Moorefield, Va., Confederate force defeated at, 788. 
 
 Morell, Gen., at the battle of Mechanics ville 258 
 
 Morgan, Gen. J. H. , raids by, in Kentucky and Ten- 
 nessee, 170 ; marriage of, at Murfreesboro, 179 
 raids by, in Tennessee and Kentucky, 188 ; raids 
 by, in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio, 595, 596 ; de 
 feats Gen. Averill, 591 ; his raid in Kentucky tc 
 Cynthiana, 783 ; killed at Greenville, Tenn., 835. 
 
 Morgan, Gen. Geo. W., at Cumberland gap, 171 : 
 at Fair Oaks, 238 ; at Chickasaw bayou, 878 ; a« 
 Arkansas post, 887 ; bis pursuit of Forrest, 828. 
 
 Morning Light, gun-boat, captured off Oaiveston,434 
 
 Morris, Col., killed at the battle of Cold harbor, 701 
 
 Morris, Gen., at the battle of Carrack's ford, 50. 
 
 Morrison, Major, at Port Royal ferry, S. C, 76 ; ax 
 the battle of Secessionville, 8. C, 581. 
 
 Morristown, Tenn., battle of, 835. 
 
970 
 
 INDEX 
 
 J^orton, (ion., operations of, at Chattanooga, 657. 
 MoBby, Opt. J. S., raid of, at Cheat's ferry, 788; 
 
 Bupplr train captured by, at Berry ville, 791. 
 Mower. Gen., distinguished services of, at the battle 
 
 of t'joasant hill, 031 ; at Clouterville, 635. 
 Md1>«/ #, Capt., killed in action at Mobile bay, 647. 
 ^nU'ran, Col., surrender of Lexington, Mo., by, 56 ; 
 
 lL>"Jed at Bunker hUl, Va. ; 788. 
 [r rfreesboro, Tenn., battle of. 180-186 ; retreat of 
 
 Bragg from, 187 ; Buford's cavalry threatens, 844. 
 Murphy, Col. K. C. , in charge at luka, 160 ; surrenders 
 
 P.-"\y springs to Van Dom, 374. 
 
 N. 
 
 <AOLEE, Gen. , at the battle of Fair Oaks, 235. 
 
 Nansemond River, gun-boats sent up the, to co-operate 
 with the land forces, 594. 
 
 Sash ville, Tenn., held by the Confederates, 82 ; 
 abandoned by the Confederates. 95 ; held by Gen. 
 Negley, 179 ; forces of Gen. Thomas concentrated 
 at, 842 , Hood defeated at, 847. 
 
 Sashville, Confederate steamer, burning of, 582. 
 
 Navy, United States, condition of the, 25 ; strength 
 of the, in 1863 and 1864, 855. 
 
 N'egley, Gen. Jas. S., holds Nashville, 179 ; at Mur- 
 freesboro, 180 ; letter of, to Gen. Thomas, 549 ; at 
 Chickamauga, 552. 
 
 \egTO troops, bravery of, at Port Hudson, 441 ; mas- 
 sacre of, at Fort Pillow, 618 ; at the assault on 
 Cemetery hill, Petersburg, 755 ; gallantry of, at 
 New Market heights, 770 ; heroic conduct of, at 
 Olustee, 857 ; war-cry of, at Blakely, 873, 873. 
 
 Nelson, Gen., at Shiloh, 105 ; at Richmond, Ky., 170. 
 
 Newark, Mo., captured by Porter, the guerrilla, 358. 
 
 New Berne, N. C, expedition to, 131 ; description of, 
 132 ; capture of, 134 ; flight of the inhabitants of, 
 135 ; besieged by Gen. Hoke — siege raised, 859. 
 
 New Falls City, steamer, sunk at Springfield, La ,626. 
 
 New Hope Church, Ga., battle of, 712. 
 
 New Madrid, Mo., evacuated by the Confederates, 96. 
 
 New Market, Va., battle of, 691. 
 
 New Orleans, description of, 147, 148 ; defenseless 
 condition of, 155 ; capture of, 156. 
 
 Newton, Gen., at York river, 226 ; at the attack on 
 Marye's hiU, 474 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 008. 
 
 Newtonia, Mo., Confederates driven out of, 833. 
 
 NichoLs, Gen., brigade of, at Chancellorsville 460. 
 
 Sim's battery, at the battle of Grand Coteau, 599 ; at 
 the battle of Sabine cross roads, 628. 
 
 Norfolk, Va., surrendered to Gen. Wool, 229. 
 
 North Anna, crossed and recrossed by Grant, 693, 696. 
 
 Noyes, Capt , depicts Antietam after the battle, 830. 
 
 Ny River, Va., battle of the. C84 
 
 O. 
 Oak Grove, Va., severe fight at, 257. 
 Ocean View, V». , landing of National troops at, 828. 
 
 Oglesby, Gen. Rich J., in the attack on Fort Done 
 
 BOQ, 8G ; severely wounded at Corinth, 164. 
 Olmstead, Col. C. H., surrenders Fort Pulaski, 140 
 Olustee, Fla., battle of, 858. 
 Olustee, cruiser, depredations of, 876. 
 " On to Richmond I " 191, 206. 
 " On to Vicksburg I ■' 393. 
 Opdyke, Gen., at the battle of Franklin, 842. 
 Opelousas, La., captured by Gen. Banks 438; ri 
 
 occupied by Gen. Richard •. »ylor, 445. 
 Orangeburg, S. C. , occupation of by Gen. Blair 88! 
 Orchard Knob, Tenn., capiL.red y J"!!. Wood, 505 
 
 Grant's head quarters at, 568. 
 Ord. Gen , ordered to luka, 160 ; victo.-y of, at tli 
 
 Hatchie, 167 ; in command of the thirteenth corj 
 
 at Vicksburg, 420. 
 " Order of American Knights," secret aEsociation, i 
 
 Missouri, 829. 
 Osband, Col., reconnoissance of, 615 ; expedition o 
 
 fromVicksburg against Hood's communications, 851 
 Osterhaus, Gen., wounded at the Big Black, 418 
 
 at Wauhatchie, 566 ; at Chattanooga, 568. 
 Overall's Creek, Tenn,, attack on blockhouse at, 84J 
 Owen, Gen., at (Gettysburg, 626;ln the Wilderness, 671 
 Owen, Lieut., with gun boats at Yazoo city, 615. 
 
 P. 
 
 Page, Gen. R. L., surrenders Fort Morgan, Ala , 641 
 
 Paine, Gen., at Corinth. 118 ; wounded at Port Hui 
 son, 444 ; at Fort Fisher, 866. 
 
 Palmer, Gen. Innis A , at Corinth, 118 ; atMurfreei 
 boro 180; at Chickamauga, 530 ; at Wauhatchi 
 559 ; commands the fourteenth corps under Shu 
 man, 706 ; resigns his command, 728. 
 
 Palmer, Col., cavalry under, captures Hood's ponvoc 
 train after the battle of 'ish ville, 849 ; capiuj< 
 Gen. Lyon in camp at Red ni.l, 850, 
 
 Palmetto Flag, unfurled over Castle Pinckney, I7. 
 
 Palmetto Ranche, Tex , last battle of the wi.i 948. 
 
 Pamlico Sound, expedition to, 125. 
 
 Paris, Comte de, on the battle of Antietam .188. 
 
 Parke, Gen. J. G., at Roanoke Island, 130 , at Ne 
 Berne, 132 ; expedition of, to Fon Macon. 13C 
 invests Moorehead City, 136 , at I'ltwiddie coa 
 house, 909 ; penetrates the lines av Petersl>urg. 91! 
 
 Parkersburg, Va., occupied by Gen. McClellan. 48 
 
 Patten, Capt. , courage of, at the W eldon railroad 74- 
 
 Pai'.erson, (ien., posted near Harper's ferry, 35 ; ou 
 generalled by Johnston, 39 ; blunder of, 46 ; at tli 
 battle of Williamsburg, 216 ; at Fair Oaks, 239. 
 
 Pawnee, sent with reinforcements to Fort Sumter, 2i 
 
 Peach Tree Creek, Ga., battle of, 720. 
 
 Pea Ridge, Mo. , battle of, 97-98. 
 
 Peck. Gen. J. J., operations of, at Suffolk. Va., 593. 
 
 Pegram, Gen , surrenders at Rich mountain, 49 ; Qi 
 feated at Somerset, Ky. , 544 ; wounded in th 
 WiHerness, 672 ; killed at Hatcher's run, 903, 
 
INDEX 
 
 »?1 
 
 Pemberton, Gen. J. C, position of, at the Tallabnsha 
 and Tallahatchie, 371 ; instructions from Gen. John- 
 ston to, 408 ; his views on the situation, 409 ; at 
 Champion hills, 410 ; retreat of, 411 ; shut up in 
 Vicksburg, 421-423 ; surrenders Vicksburg, 424- 
 436 , defeated at Salisbury, N. C, 896. 
 
 Pender, Gen., at Gettysburg:, 503. 
 
 I'endleton, Gen., at Chancellorsville, 457; advises 
 Lee to surrender, 928 
 
 Pennsylvania, prepares to resist invasion, 309. 
 
 Penny backer. Gen., at the capture of Fort Fisher, 
 N. C. 866 ; severely wounded at Fort Fisher, 867. 
 
 Pensarola. Fla , abandoned by Gen T. N. Jones, 141. 
 
 Perryville, or Chaplin's Hills, Ky., battle of, 177. 
 
 Petersburg-, description of, 736 ; operations of Gen. 
 Grant against, 73G-782 , assaults upon the defenses 
 of, 728-741 ; the great mine at, 751 ; explosion of 
 the mine at, 764 ; disastrous assault at 756 ; opera- 
 tions of Grant at, its downfall, 898-921. 
 
 Pettigrew, Col J. J., landing of, at Castle Pinckney, 
 17 ; taken prisoner at Fair Oaks, 238 ; (Gen.) at 
 Gettysburg, 525 ; at Blackwater, 593. 
 
 Petrel, privateer, destroyed by the St. Lawrence, 875. 
 
 Phelps, Lieut., on Tennessee river, 85 ; in command 
 of the Eastport when blown up, 633 ; operations of 
 with the gun-boats Juliet and Fort Hindman, 634. 
 
 Phillips, Col., defeats Col, Taylor, 309 ; defends Fort 
 Blunt, 604 ; defeats Quantrell at Fort Gibson. 607. 
 
 Pickett, Gen, at Williamsburg. 216; at Fredericks- 
 burg, 343 ; at Gettysburg, 523 ; wounded iii the 
 Wilderness, 672. 
 
 Pillow, Gen. G. J., plan of, to seize CoKmbos, Kv ,58 ; 
 at Fort Donelson, 85 ; flight from Foii Donelson, 93. 
 
 Pilot Enob, Mo., defense of, by Gen. H. S. Ewing, 830. 
 
 Pittsburgh Landing, described, 101 ; battle of, 105. 
 
 Plaquemine, La., attacked by Gen. Taylo'. 445. 
 
 Pleasant HUl, La. , battle of, 630. 
 
 Pleasonton, Gen., cavalry of, at Chancellorsville, 457 ; 
 his encounter with Gen Stuart, 490 ; his operations 
 against Price in Missouri, 831-834. 
 
 Plymouth, N. C, expedition against, 131 ; siege of, 
 858 ; surrender of, to Gen. Hoke, 859 ; recaptured 
 by the Nationals, 860. 
 
 Polk, Gen., Hickman and Columbus, Ky , seized by 
 58 ; at Belmont, 60 ; in commani Columbus, 82 ; 
 evacuates Coltimous, 94 ; at Shilon, 106 ; at Chat- 
 tanooga, 171 ; at Murfreesboro, 183 ; joins Bragg's 
 army, 546 ; at Chickamauga, 550 ; in command at 
 Meridian, 611 ; retreats to Demopolis, Ala., 611 ; at 
 Res&ca, Qa. , 709 ; killed at Pine mountain, 714. 
 ope, Gen. John, operations of, against Island 
 No. 10, 96 ; at Corinth, 118 ; at Fort Pillow, 
 143 ; recalled to Corinth, 144 ; ordered to Virginia, 
 159 ; biographical sKetch of, 277 ; address of, to 
 the army of Virgiuia, 278 ; orders issued by, 
 281 Confederate reply toordersof. 2H2 ; at Gaines- 
 ville 295 ; his cUargtss against Gen. Porter. 297 ; 
 
 report of (note), 801 ; his losses in Virginia 304 
 relieved from command, 804 ; operations of, against 
 Sioux Indians, 607. 
 
 Porter, Admiral David D., in command of mortar 
 boats below New Orleans, 147 ; at Haines' Bluff, 
 381 ; his attack on Fort Hindman, Ark., 386 ; hi* 
 fleet in the Mississippi, 395 ; passes the batteries at 
 Vicksburg, 401 ; his services at the siege of Vicks 
 burg, 417 ; bombards Vicksburg 4'^1 . Arkansas- 
 ram destroyed by (note). 431 ; on the Yazoo river 
 614 ; on the Red river, 622 ; his letter to the secrt- 
 tary of the navy, 624 ; at Springfield landing, K27 
 his perilous return down the Red river 632 637 
 his expeditions against Fort Fisher, N. C, 861 8il7 
 
 Porter, Gen. Fitz John, at BuU Run. 41 : at Yorh 
 river, 226 ; occupies Hanover cojrt house, 232 , at 
 Mechanisville. 258 :at Gainas' mOI. 260 , at Malvern 
 hills, 268 ; at Manassas, 299 ; ut Antietam 319 
 pursues Hen. Lee. 331, 
 
 Porterfield, Gen., issues an address at Grafton 48 
 
 Port Gibson, Miss., battle of, JOS, 
 
 Port Hudson, the Hartford and Albatross pass tht 
 batteries of, 436; situation and defenses ol, 440; 
 bravery of the garrison of, 445 ; surrender of, 446, 
 
 Port Republic, bridge at, carried by Gen. Jackson, 2.53. 
 
 Port Royal, S. C , operations of expedition to, 72-75. 
 
 Port Royal Ferry, fortified camp of Confederates at, 
 76 ; result of expedition to, 77. 
 
 Posey, Gen., at the battle of Getty burg, 517. 
 
 Potter. Gen., repulse of, near Foi JIcRae. Va., 772 
 
 Powder ship, exploded near Fort Visher, N C. , 862. 
 
 Powell, ijow^ Payne, his attempt to assassinate 
 Secretary Seward, 939. 
 
 Prairie Grove, Mo., battle of, 363. 
 
 Prentiss, Gen. , at Pittsburg landing, 103 ; made pris- 
 oner at Shiloh. 107. 
 
 Preston, Gen., at the battle of Chickamauga, 551. 
 
 Price, Gen. Sterling, surrender of Lexington, Mo. 
 to, 56 ; retreat of, 97 ; at Corinth, 118 ; defeat of, 
 at luka, 161 ; retreat of, 162 ; at Corinth, 1G3 ; re- 
 pulsed at Helena. Ark , 605 ; at Prairie O'Aan, 639 
 his disastrous invasion of Missouri, 829-8B3. 
 
 Prime, Major, constructs redoubts at Corinth. 164 
 
 Pryor, Gen. Roger A, conveys proposal to Majn' 
 Anderson in Fort Sumter, 27 ; at Williamsburg, 21 7 
 at Fair Oaks, 239. 
 
 Pumpkin Vine Creek, Ga., Gen. Hooker's oiicountei 
 with Hood and Hardee's corps at. 712. 
 
 Putnam, (ten., killed at Fort Wagner, S C. 691. 
 
 Qn&NTRBlX. guerrilla, raid of, on Lawrence, Kkn. 
 606 ; defeated by Col. Phillips at Fort Giwwn. 607 
 
 R. 
 Rains. Gen., at the battle of Fair Oaks. 235 
 Itaudolpli » battery at Chancellorgville, 4S9. 
 
97S 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 R&DBom, Gen., captures Aransas pass, lex., 601 ; at 
 the battle of Sabine cross roads, 628. 
 
 Rappahannock, retreat of Pope's army over the, 288. 
 
 Elaymond, Miss., battle of, 407. 
 
 Bead, Gen. S. T., killed near Farmville (note), 926. 
 
 Beams' Station, battle of, 766. 
 
 Bed River expedition, see Shreveport, 621-638. 
 
 Heno, Gen. Jesse L., at Roanoke, 126 ; at New Berne, 
 132 ; expedition of, to Fort Macon, 135 ; at Gaines 
 rtlle, 295 ; gallantry of his brigade, 300 ; at Chan- 
 tilly, 803 ; killed at South mountain, 316. 
 
 Renshaw, Commodore W. B., in command at Galves- 
 ton, 432 ; killed on board the Westfield, 433. 
 
 Resaca, Ua., description of, 709 ; battle of, 710 ; Gen. 
 Johnston retreats from, 711 ; Hood repulsed at, 808. 
 
 Reynolds, Gen., at MechanicsvUle, 259 ; at Gainesville. 
 295 ; at Manassas, 299 ; at Fredericksburg, 345 ; first 
 corps of, below Fredericksburg, 454 ; kUled at Qet- 
 tysburg, 503 ; biographical sketch of (note), 535. 
 
 Rice, Gen. James C, at Gettysburg, 513; killed at 
 the assault on Laurel hiU, Va. , (note), 678. 
 
 Richardson, Gen., at York river, 226 ; at Fair Oaks, 
 237 ; killed at Antietam, 324. 
 
 Richardson, Gen., operations of, at Tazoo city, 616. 
 
 Rich Moun'ai- Va., battle of, 49. 
 
 Richmond, , defeat of Gen. Nelson at, 170. 
 
 Richmond Va., capital of the Confederacy, 33 ; Gen. 
 Butler's scheme for the capture of, 655 ; movement 
 of Gen. Grant against, 753, 754 ; demonstration 
 against, by the second and tenth army corps, 
 758-761 ; movements of the army of the James, 
 towards, 769-779 ; evacuation of, 919-921. 
 
 Bicketts, Gen. Jas. B , at Antietam, 319 ; at Gettys- 
 burg, 519 ; at the battle of Monocacy, Md., 785. 
 
 Roanoke Island, surrender of, 128. 
 
 Robinson, Gen. J. C, at the battle of Gettysburg, 
 503 ; severely wounded near Alsop's Farm, Va., 678. 
 
 Bodes, Gen. R. E., at Fair Oaks, 235; at Chancel- 
 lorsvUle, 465 ; at Gettysburg, 504 ; in the Wilder- 
 ness, 664 ; killed at Winchester, 796. 
 
 Rodgers. Commander C. B. P. , at Port Royal ferry, 76. 
 
 Elodgers, Commodore John, commands the gunboats 
 on the James :'7er, 264 ; at Malvern hills, 26S. 
 
 Rodman, Gen., mortally wounded at Antietam, 327. 
 
 Rodney, Miss., attack on the batteries opposite, 403. 
 
 Rogers, Col., killed at Fort Robinett, Corinth, 166. 
 
 Etome, Ga., capture of, by Gen. Jeff. C. Davis, 712 ; 
 Gen. Corse at, with the fifteenth corps, 806. 
 
 Bomney, Va. , occupied by Confederates, 48. 
 
 Sosecranz, Gen. W. S., at Rich mountain, 49; at 
 Carnifei ferry, 52 ; takes charge of the army of 
 the Mississippi, 159 ; defeats Price and Van Dom 
 at Corinth, 166 ; takes command of the army of 
 the Cumberland, 167 ; at Nashville, 179 ; at Mur 
 freesboro, 180 ; receives the thanks of the presi- 
 dent, 188 ; at Chickamauga, 549 ; defeat of, 555 ; 
 withdraws his army to Chattanooga, 556 • relieved 
 
 of his command, 658 ; in command of the depart 
 
 ment of the Missouri, 829 ; measures taken by, to 
 
 repel the invasion of Price, 829-834. 
 Ross, Gen. L F., operations of, at Yazoo cdty, 615. 
 Rousseau, Gen. L. H., at Perryville, 176 ■ at Mur 
 
 freesboro, 180 ; his cavalry raid from P«catur tf 
 
 Marietta, 719 ; at Tullahoma, 838. 
 Rowan, riommander Stephen H., destroys a flotill 
 
 in the harbor of Elizabeth city, 129. 
 Rowley, Gen , at the battle of Gettysburg, 503. 
 Rucker, Gen., taken prisoner at Nashville, 847. 
 Ruger, Gen., at the battle of Gettysburg, 522. 
 Ruggles, Gen., at Santa Rosa, 67 ; at Philoh, 109 ; 
 
 New Orleans, 148. 
 Russel, Lieut. J. H., exploit of. at Santu Rjsa, 67. 
 Bussell, Gen. D. A., killed at Winchester, 796. 
 
 Sabine Pabb. capture of, 434 ; battle of, 898. 
 
 Sabine Cross Roads, battle of, 629. 
 
 St. Augustine, Fla., surrender of, 141. 
 
 St. Helena Bay, occupied by the Nationals, 76. 
 
 Sailor's Creek, Va., battle of, 927. 
 
 Salisbury, N. C, battle at Grant's creek, near 896 
 
 Balkahatchie River, the passage of, forced, 883. 
 
 iaitworks in Virginia, expedition of Burbridge agiilnat 
 SS."! ; destroyed by Stoneman's troops, 837. 
 
 Sanborn, Gen., his pursuit of Gen. Price, 831-833. 
 
 Sanders, Gen , operations of, 544 ; death of (note), 678 
 
 Santa Rosa Island, night attack on troops at, 67. 
 
 Saunders. Gen., killed at the Weldon railroad, 764. 
 
 Savage Station, Va., battle of, 263. 
 
 Savannah, Ga., Sherman's approach to, on thf 
 march from Atlanta, 819 ; investment of, by Sher- 
 man, 823 ; escape of Gen. Hardee from, 823 ; 
 occupation of, by Sherman, 824 ; Sherman's despatcL 
 announcing the fall of, 824 ; Gen. Geary appouiteri 
 military governor of, 825 ; left in charge of Gee 
 Foster, 881 
 
 Savannah, privateer, surrenders to the Perry, 870. 
 
 Schenck, Gen. R. C, at Bull Run, 48 ; at Cross kcyt> 
 251 ; at Gainesville, 295. 
 
 Schimmelpfenig, Geo., at Gettysburg, 504, 606. 
 
 Schofield, Gen. J. M., in command of the Missour 
 military district, 357 ; his report of operations ic 
 Missouri and Arkansas, 358 ; defeat of Rains by, 
 361 ; resignation of, 862 ; commands the army o' 
 the Ohio, 706 ; retreats from Pulaski to Frank 
 lin, 840 ; his repulse of Hood at Franklin, 842 
 falls back to Nashville, 843 ; at the battle of Nash 
 ville, 845 ; sent to North Carolina with his corps 
 868 ; occupies Wilmington, 869 ; movements ol 
 from Wilmington to Goldsboro, 893, 894. 
 
 Schurz, Gen. C, at Gainesville, 295 ; at Chancellors 
 ville, 461 ; at Gettysburg, 504 ; at Wauhatchie, 561 
 
 Scott, Gen. Winfield, statement of, regarding pur 
 cha.se of arms by the States. 14 : advice of, k 
 
INDEX 
 
 9n 
 
 eominanders of Soathem forts, 16 ; mistake of, at 
 Bull Enn, 46 ; resignation of, 79. 
 
 Sesibrook, S. C, batteries erected at, 76. 
 
 Sears Lieut., noble work of, at the battle of luka, 161. 
 
 Seoessionville, 8. C, battle of, 580 ; (note). 581. 
 
 Sedgwick, Gen. John, at York River, 326 , at Fair 
 Oaks, 237 ; at Savage station, 263 ; wounded at 
 \ Dtietam, 322 ; attack of. on Marye's hill, 473 ; 
 repulsed at Salem church, 478 ; retreat of ,(»o<£), 480; 
 at Gettysburg, 510 ; raid of , in Virginia, 656 ; com- 
 mands the sixth corps, 659; death of, 675; (note), 676. 
 
 Selma, gun-boat, captured by the Melacomet, 645. 
 
 8«lm», Ala., capture of. by Gen. Wilson, 874. 
 
 Selfridge, Lieut. T. O., at Pleasant hill landing, 633. 
 
 Semmes, Capt. Raphael, commands the cruiser 
 Sumter, 875 ; takes command of the Alabama, 877 ; 
 his disastrous encounter with the Kearsarge, 878. 
 
 Seward, Secretary \V. H., advice given by, 391 ; L. 
 Payne Powell's attempt to assassinate, 939 
 
 Seymour, Gen., at Mechanicsville, 259 ; at Giendale, 
 266 ; captured in the WOderness, 671 ; his opera- 
 tions in Florida, 856-858 ; defeat of, at Olustee, 858. 
 
 Shackelford, Gen., at Cumberland gap, 545 ; surrender 
 of Gen. Morgan to, 590 ; at Bean Station, 596. 
 
 Shaeffer, Gen. J. W., killed at Murfreesbnro 184. 
 
 Shaler, Gen., at the capture of Marye's Hiil, 474; 
 captured at the battle of the Wilderness. 671. 
 
 Shaw's brigade at the battle of Pleasant hul, 680. 
 
 Shelby viUe, Tenn., taken by the Nationals, 543. 
 
 SJnenandoah, cruiser, depredations •f, 876. 
 
 Shenandoah Valley, operations of Gen. Banks in, 243 ; 
 operations of Gen. Jackson in. 247 ; operations 
 of Gen. Sheridan in, 789-802. 
 
 •Iheridan, Gen. P. H., at Perryville, Ky., 177 ; at 
 Murfreesboro 180 ; operations of, 538 ; at Chatta- 
 nooga, 572 ; raid of, in Virginia, 685, 686 ; encounter 
 of, with Fitz Hugh Lee and Hampton, 697 ; at 
 Trevillian, 703 ; commands the Middle military 
 division, 789 ; operations of, in the Shenandoah val- 
 ley, 789-802; his great raid fromWinchester, 903-906; 
 at Five forks, 910-917 ; pursues Lee to Jettersville, 
 923-826 ; at Deatonsville, 926 ; at Appomattox 
 station, 933 ; ordered to proceed to Texas, 948. 
 
 Sherman, Gen. Thomas W., at Bull Run, 41 ; with 
 the army of the Cumberland, 58 ; commands the 
 land forces in the South Carolina expedition — bio- 
 graphical sketch of, 70 ; occupies and strengthens 
 Hilton head. 75. 
 
 tlherman. Gen. William T., gallantry of, at Shiloh, 
 101 ; at CoUege hiU, 872 ; at Chickasaw bayou, 376 ; 
 at MUliken's bend, 383 ; order of, to his army corps, 
 384 ; at Arkansas post, 887 ; demonstration of, at 
 Haines' bluff. 404 ; operations of, at Jackson, 4f)9 ; 
 ordered to Bridgeport, 413 ; onward march to Vicks- 
 burg — takes possession of Haines' bluff, 414 ; opera- 
 tions of, near Lake Pontchartrain, 438 ; at Port 
 Badt.0D 441 ; In command of the department of 
 
 the Tennessee, 558 ; at Chattanooga, 568 ; at the 
 battle of Chattanooga, 568 ; relieves Bumside at 
 KnoxvUle, 577 ; his expedition to Meridian, 610 ; 
 his return to Vicksburg, 614 ; assumes command of 
 the military division of the Mississippi, 653 ; details 
 of his Atlanta campaign, 706-734 ; turns Johnston's 
 position at Dalton, 709 ; attacks Johnston at Resaca, 
 710 ; compels Johnston to evacuate Resaca, 711 ; 
 captures Allatoona pass, 713 ; compels Johnston to 
 evacuate his positions on Kenesaw. Pine and Lost 
 mountains, 714-717; his march to the Chattahoochee, 
 717; his series of operations ag» -st Atlanta, 718- 
 734 ; his operations against Hnt . ,3-809 ; pursues 
 Hood to Resaca, 808 ; his new ^lan of campaign, 
 
 810 ; prepares for the great march through Georgia, 
 
 811 ; burns Atlanta, 812 ; his order of march, 813 ;. 
 threatens Macon, 815 ; his troops enter Milledge- 
 ville, 81 6 ; crosses the Oconee 817 ; his cavalry 
 ieleats Wheeler at Waynesboro, 818 . crosses the 
 Ogeechee, 818 ; approaches Savannah, 819 ; captures 
 Fort McAllister — communicates with the fleet, 
 822 ; invests Savannah, 823 ; destruction effected by 
 his army on the march from Atlanta to Savannah, 
 824, 825 ; his march through the Carolinas, 881- 
 894 ; detention of, by floods, 882 ; crosses the Sal- 
 kahalchie — moves on Orangeburg — drives the 
 Confederates across the Congaree, 883 ; occupies 
 Columbia, 884, 885 ; advances to Cheraw, 888 ; his 
 cavalry surprised by Wade Hampton — destroys 
 the old arsenal at Fayetteville, 889 ; at Averysboro 
 891 ; at Bentonville, 893 ; joins Schofield at Golds 
 boro, 893 ; his final operations against Gen. John 
 ston in North Carolina, 940-943, his pursuit of 
 Johnston to Smithfield, 941 ; his conferences with 
 Johnston, and basis of agreement for surrender, 
 943, 944, {note) 94") ; Johnston surrenders to, 947. 
 
 Shields, Gen. J., takes command of Lander's troops, 
 242 • operations of, in the valley of the Shenan 
 doali, 243, 244 ; biographical sketch of {note), 245. 
 
 Shiloh, first battle of, 105 ; second "r lie of, 111. 
 
 Sibley, Col., inflicts punishment on tne Sioux, 369. 
 
 Sickles, Gen. Dan. E. , at Fair Oaks, 239 ; skii-mish of 
 with Gen. Jackson at the Furnace — at ChanceUois 
 ville, 469 ; at Gettysburg, 507 ; wounded, 514. 
 
 Sigel, Gen. Franz, at Dug springs. Mo., 55; retreats to 
 RoUa, 56 ; at Pea ridge, 97 ; at Cedar mountain, 
 Va., 286 ; defeated at New market, 691 ; relieved 
 of his command, 692 ; retires from .Martinsburg,784. 
 
 Sill, Gen, J. W., division of, sent to Frankfort, 178 : 
 death of, at the battle of Murfreesboro, 183. 
 
 Simmons, C«l., mortally wounded at Giendale, Vi»., 266 
 
 Sioux Indians, savage attack of, on the village of New 
 Ulm, 369 ; execution of a party of, 607. 
 
 Slaves, conduct of the, prior to the declaration o 
 eimancipation, 392 ; flocking of, to Gen. Sherman's 
 army, in the Meridian expedition, 613 
 
 Blocum, Col. J. S. , killed at the battle of Bull Ron, V 
 
 A 
 
974 
 
 ttJDBA. 
 
 Bloewn, Gen. Henry W., at the battle of Gaines' mill, 
 360 ; at Chancello sville, 455, 469 ; at Gettysburg, 
 607 ; in command of the twentieth corps, 738 ; enters 
 Atlanta, 732; defeats Hardee near Averysboro, N. C, 
 891 ; repulses Johnston near BentonvUle, 893. 
 
 Smith Col. O. , gallant charge of, at Wauhatchie, 561. 
 
 f^mith. Gen. A. J., at the battle of Chickasaw bayou, 
 378 • post of honor given to, after the capture of 
 Fort Hindman, Ark. , 388 ; at Gumtown, 619 ; 
 axpeditions of. against Gen, Forrest, 620 ; in the 
 Shreveport expedition, 622 ; his capture of Fort de 
 Rnssey, 624 ; at the battle of Pleasant hill, 630 ; at 
 Clonterville, 635 ; at the battle of Nashville, 846 ; 
 corps of, at the operations against Mobile 870. 
 
 ismith, Gen. C. F., at Belmont, Mo., 60 ; at Fort Don- 
 elson, 86-93 ; supersedes Grant, 99 ; death of, 101. 
 
 Smith, Gen. G. C, operations of, 538. 
 
 Smitj, Gen. G. \V., at the battle of Fair Oaks, 234 ; 
 brigade of, at the battle of Antietam, 323. 
 
 Smith, Gen. J. E., at the battle of Chattanooga, 669. 
 
 Smith, Gen. Kirby, at Bull Run, 45 ; defeats Gen. 
 Nelson at Richmond, Ky., 170 ; at the battle of 
 Jenkins' ferry, 639 ; surrender of, 949. 
 
 Smith, Gen. M. L., division of, at Fort Donelson, 86 ; 
 at Corinth, 118 ; severely wounded at Chickasaw 
 bayou, 378 ; at the battle of Chattanooga, 569. 
 
 Smith, Gen. T. K., in the Shreveport expedition, 636 ; 
 at Pleasant hill landing, 632 ; at Clonterville, 635. 
 
 Smith, Gen. W. F., at Williamsburg, 214 ; at Chatta- 
 nooga, 559 ; at Bermuda hundred, 687. 
 
 Smith, Gen. W. S., at Memphis. 609 ; retrejitof, 618. 
 
 Smyth, Gen. T. A., killed near Farmville (note), 929. 
 
 Snake Creek Va. , affair at, 688. 
 
 Snake Creek Gap, McPherson's movement on, 708. 
 
 Snieker's Gap, Va., massacre at, 793. 
 
 " Sons of Liberty," secret association in Missouri, 829. 
 
 Southfield, gun-boat, sunk by the Albemarle, 858. 
 
 South Mountain, Md., battle of, 315. 
 
 Spanish Fort, Mobile, invested, 870 ; surrenders, 871 . 
 
 Spear, Col. , killed at the capture of Marye's hUl, 474. 
 
 Spottsylvania Court House, battles around, 675-683. 
 
 Springfield, Mo., battle of, 603. 
 
 Stafford, Gen., killed Ln the WUdemess, 673. 
 
 Stahl, Gen., at the battle of Cross keys, 251. 
 
 Stanley, Gen. D. S., at luka, 161 ; at Corinth, 165 ; 
 operations of, on the Harpeth river, 538 ; at Chick- 
 amauga, 554 ; in command of the fourth corps 
 nnder Sherman, 728 ; wounded at Franklin, 842. 
 
 Stannard's, brigade at Gettysburg, 525. 
 
 Stanton. Edwin M., made secretary of war, 79 ; visita 
 Fortress Monroe, 328 ; his draft orders of 1862, 283 ; 
 his despatch to the governors of the Northern 
 States, 485 ; meets Gen. Grant at Indianapolis, 558 ; 
 his lamentation at the death-bed of Lincoln, 939. 
 
 (Star of the West, attempts to relieve Fort Sumter, 31. 
 
 Starke, Gen., killed at the battle of Antietam. 320. 
 
 Starkweather's brigade, at Perryville, Ky., 177. 
 
 Steadman, Gen., charge of, at Chickamauga, 560. 
 
 Steedman, Gen. James B., at Nashville, 844. 
 
 Steele, Gen. F. , his operations on the eastern banks 
 of the Mississippi, 372 ; at Chickasaw bayou, 878 
 at Helena, 605 ; captures Little Rock, 606 ; at Cam 
 den, 639 ; at Jenkins' ferry, 640 ; at Mobile, 870 
 
 Stein, Gen., killed at the battle of Prairie grove, 366 
 
 Steinwehr, Gen. , at the batvle of Gainesville, 295 ; a' 
 Chancellorsville, 461 ; at Wauhatchie, 561. 
 
 Stephens, Commander, disastrous enterprise of, tr 
 take possession of Fort Sumter, 592. 
 
 Stevens, Gen. I. I., occupies Fort BeauregarO, 75 
 expedition of, to Port Royal, 76 ; raid of, neat 
 Pocotaligo^at Secession ville, 580 ; death of, at 
 Chantilly, 803 ; biographical sketch of (7U>te), 806. 
 
 Stevens, Gen., at the battle of Shiloh, 109. 
 
 Stevens' Maine battery, at Gettysburg. 519. 
 
 Stevenson, Ala., seized by Gen. Mitchell, 115. 
 
 Stevenson, Gen. Carter L., at Champion hills, 410. 
 
 Stevenson, Gen. Thomas G., killed near Spottsyl 
 vania. 678 ; biographical sketch of (ru)te), 705. 
 
 Stewart, (Jen. G. H., captured by Gen. Hancock, 681 
 
 Stewart's brigade, at the battle of Shiloh, 106. 
 
 Stone, Gen. C. P., at PoolesviUe, Md., at Ball's Bluff. 
 53 ; in the Shreveport expedition, 624. 
 
 Stoneman, Gen. Geo , repulsed at Williamsburg, 214 . 
 in command of the four divisions of cavalry, 451 ; 
 expedition of, to destroy railroads — taken prisone . 
 736 ; his operations against Breckenridge in East 
 Tenne3.see,836 ; raid of, into South Carolina. 85>5-897 
 
 Su^ny Creek Station, Gen. Gregg's raid against, 770. 
 
 Strasburg, Va.. advance of Sheridan's army vo, 790. 
 
 Streight, Col. A. D, expedition of, 539 ; capture of , 540 
 
 Stringham, Commodore S. H., commands tne fleet 
 in the expedition to Hatteras, 63. 
 
 Strong, Gen., severely wounded at Fort Wagner, 590. 
 
 Stuart, Gen., at the battle of Chickasaw bayou, 378. 
 
 Stuart, Gen. J. E. B., raid of, at Hanover court 
 house, 257 ; at Catletts station, 288 ; posi. at Man- 
 assas surprised by, 290 ; raid of, into Pennsylvania, 
 332 ; at Chancellorsville, 464 ; cavalry engagement 
 with Gregg, 490 ; at Gettysburg, 623 ; surpriseii 
 by Gen. Custer, 656 ; death of (riote), 685. 
 
 Sturgis, Col., gallantry of, at the battle of Raymond 
 Miss., 407 ; (Gen.) defeat of, at Gumtown. 620 
 
 Suffolk, Va., siege of, 594. 
 
 Sumner, Gen. E. V., in command of a corps in th- 
 army of the Potomac, 193 ; at WUliamsburg, 2l4 , 
 at Fair Oaks, 237 ; at White Oak swamp, 265 ; at 
 Antietam, 322 ; at Fredericksburg, 347 ; relieved ot 
 his command, 354 ; death of (note), 449. 
 
 Sumter, privateer, blockaded at Gibraltar, 875. 
 
 Surrender of, Gen. Jeff. Thomson in Arkan.sa«, 948 
 Gen. Joseph Johnston in North CaroUns,, 947 ; Gen 
 Kirby Smith in Texas, 949 ; Gen. R. E. Leo ir 
 Virginia, 934. 
 
 " Swamp Angel," a hu£e Parrott gxm. g» c«uled. 691 
 
INDEX. 
 
 976 
 
 Svreitzer. Gen., at Gettysburg, 514. 
 Sweitzer's Texan cavalry at Pleasant hill, 630. 
 Swinton, William, his opinion of the losses in the 
 
 overland campaign, 704. 
 Sykes, Gen. at Mechanicsville, 258 ; at Gaines' mill , 
 
 269 ; at ChancellorsvUle, 456 ; at Gettysburg, 507. 
 
 T. 
 
 ALLAHAS8EE, Confederate cruiser, depredations of, 
 876 ; destroyed by the Confederates, 869. 
 
 Taliaferro, Gen. wounded at Warrenton turnpike, 293. 
 
 Tatnall, Commodore Josiah, at Beaufort, S. C, 73. 
 
 Taylor, Gen. Richard in command of Confederates in 
 Louisiana, 437 ; defeat of, 438 ; operations of, 597 ; 
 in command of the Confederate department of the 
 South, P70 ; surrender of, at Citronella, Ala. , 947. 
 
 Taylor's Bridge, Gen. Hancock at, 694. 
 
 Tecumseh, monitor, strikes a torpedo and sinks, 644. 
 
 Tennessee, Confederate ram, in Mobile hay, 641 ■ de- 
 scription of, 643 ; surrenders to Farragut, 647. 
 
 TerriU, Qeu. , battery of, at Shiloh, 110 ; at Perry ville, 
 Ky., 176 ; mortally wounded, 177. 
 
 Terry, Gen. , A. H., at Stono river, 589 reconnoissance 
 made by, towards Richmond, 773 ; his capture of 
 Fort Fisher, 864-807 ; joins Sherman's army near 
 Goldsboro, N. C.,894. 
 
 Texan Martyrs, 867. 
 
 Thatcher, Admiral, operates against Mobile, 870. 
 
 Thayer, Col., at Fort Donelson, 91 ; at Chickasaw 
 bayou, 380 ; (Gen.) at Prairie D'Ann, 639. 
 "homas. Gen. Geo. H., defeats Zollikoffer at Mill 
 spring. 81 ; antecedents of, 82 ; at Perryville, 174 ; 
 at Murfreesboro, 180 ; at Chickamauga, 550 ; firm- 
 ness of, at Chickamauga, 555 ; in charge of the 
 department of the Cumberland, 558 ; at Chattanooga, 
 565 ; commands the army of the Cumberland under 
 Sherman, 706 ; sent to Nashville by Sherman, 805 ; 
 left to cope with Hood in Tennessee, 811 ; his avail- 
 able force when Hood entered Tennessee, 838 ; his 
 campaign against Hood, 837-851 ; favored by Hood's 
 delay, 839 ; fights at Spring hill — evacuates Co- 
 lumbia, 840 ; takes the offensive against Hood, 844 ; 
 commands in front of Nashville, 844-847 ; defeats 
 Hood, 847 ; appointed major-general in the regular 
 army, 851 ; his instructions to Gen, Wilson, 873. 
 iTjomas, Gen., captured at Blakely, Ala., 872. 
 
 Thompson, Gen. Jeff., at Fort PUlow, 143 ; retreat of, 
 146 ; surrenders at Chalk bluff. Ark., 948. 
 
 ["homptton, Gen. A. P , killed at Fort Anderson, 617. 
 
 ridball, Col., artillery of, at Taylor's bridge, 695. 
 
 Widen, Major, kiUed at Chantilly, 304. 
 
 Tilghman, Gen., surrenders Fort Henry to Foote, 84. 
 
 rilton. Gen., at Gettysburg. 514. 
 
 Tilton, Oa., capture of a blockhouse at, 808. 
 
 Tolopotomy Creek, Va., Gen. Hancock at, 697. 
 
 Torbert G«n., capture of Cold harbor by, 098, at 
 Trevillian, 708 ; engagement of, at Luray 797. 
 
 Totten, Gen. , at the battle of Prairie grove, 368. 
 
 TourteUotte, Col , In charge at Allatoona paae, 806 
 
 Towers' brigade, gallantry of, at Manassas, 800. 
 
 Trevillian, Va., battle of, 703. 
 
 Tullahoma, abandoned by the Confederates, 543. 
 
 Tupelo, Miss., Gen. Hood's broken army at, 851. 
 
 Turchin, Gen., at Wauhatchie, 560. 
 
 Tuscaloosa, Ala., captured by the Nationals, 874. 
 
 Tuscaloosa, ram, sunk by the Confederates. 873. 
 
 Tuscumbia, Mo., seized by Gen. Mitchell, 115. 
 
 Tyler, Gen. E. B., at Blackburn's ford, 87 : at Por 
 
 Republic, 252 ; at Monocacy, 785. 
 Tyler, Gen. R. O., in command of artillerists, 684 
 
 wounded at Cold harbor, 701. 
 Tyner's Station, Tenn., burned by the Nationals, 585 
 Tyndall'B brigade at Wauhatchie, 561. 
 
 IT. 
 Uhion Citt, Tenn., captured by Gen. Forrest, 616. 
 Underwriter, gun-boat, set on flre at New Berne, 856. 
 Upton, Col., at Spottsylvania court house, 678. 
 
 V. 
 Van BtlRKN, Ark., captured by Gen. Blunt, 366. 
 Vance, Col. , killed at Sabine cross roads, 629. 
 Van Cleve, Gen., at Murfreesboro, 180 ; at Chicka 
 
 manga, 550. 
 Vandever's brigade at Chickamau^, 554. 
 Van Dorn, Gen. Earl, at Pea ridge, 97 ; at Corinth 
 
 118 ; at Pocahontas, 163 ; defeated at Corinth. 186 
 
 captures Holly springs, 374 ; operations of 538. 
 Van Pelt, Lieut., killed at Chickamauga, 550. 
 Vaughan, Gen., defeat of, by Gen. Gillem, 835, 836 
 Velocity, gun-boat, captured off Galveston, 484. 
 Verona, Miss. , destruction of property at, 852. 
 Vicksburg, situation of, 376 ; operations previous tc 
 
 the attack on, 394r401 ; assaults on, 415-419 ; sui 
 
 render of, to Gen. Grant, 427. 
 Viele, Gen. Egbert L., at the siege of Fort Pulaski 
 
 139 ; at Ocean view and Norfolk, Va., 228, 229. 
 VUlepigue, Gen., at Fort Pillow, 143 ; at Corii.th, 164 
 Vincent, Gen., killed at Gettysburg, 513. 
 
 W. 
 
 Wadsworth, Gen., at Gettysburg, 503 ; killed in tUt 
 Wilderness — biographical sketch of (note), 669. 
 
 Wainwright. Commander, death of, on board the Har 
 net Lane, at Galveston, 433. 
 
 Walcott, Gen., his victory at GriswoldvUle, Ga., 815. 
 
 Walker, Gen., at Raymond, Miss., 407 ; joins Bragg'* 
 army, 546 ; at Chickamauga, 550. 
 
 Wallace, Gen. W. H. L. , at Fort Donelson, 90 ; mo» 
 tally wounded at the cattle of Shiloh, 107. 
 
 Wallace, Col. Lewis, defeats the Confederates •■ 
 Romney, 49 ; (Gen.) at Fort Donelson, 87 ; D'/fim 
 conduct of, 93 ; in command at Fort Henry, 98 ; a» 
 Crump's landing, 102 ; at Shiloh, 105 ; at Corinth 
 118 : defeat of, at the battle of Monocacy, 786. 
 
976 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Ward. Gen., at the battle of Chancellorsville, 465 ; at 
 the battle o< Gettysl ■org, 511. 
 
 Warren, Gen. G. K., at Manassas, 300 ; at the attack, 
 on Marye'B hill, 472 ; at Gettysburg, 613 ; commands 
 the fifth army corps, 658 ; at Jericho ford, 094 ; at 
 the Weldon railroad, 780 ; at Five forks, 916 ; in 
 command of the department of the MissiBsippi, 917. 
 
 ^''arrenton Turnpike, Va. , battle of, 293. 
 
 Warrenton, Miss., fleet passes the batteries of, 401. 
 
 Warrington, near Pensacola, burning of, 68. 
 
 Warsaw Sound, occupied by the Nationals, 75. 
 
 Wasnburne, Gen. C. C. , at Jacksonport, Ark., 356 ; 
 at Helena, 857 ; at Grand Coteau, 599 ; captures 
 Fort Esperanza, 601 ; pursues Forrest, 828. 
 
 Washington, D. C, contemplated seizure of, by the 
 Confederates, 34 ; arrangements for the defense of, 
 80 ; troops left for the defense of, 192-194 ; measures 
 taken for the safety of, 349 ; Gen. Pope charged with 
 the protection of, 278 ; threatened by Early, 786. 
 
 Wauhatchie, Ga., battle of, 561. 
 
 Waynesboro, Qa. , battle of, 904. 
 
 Webb, Gen., at Gettysburg, 527; killed in the Wil- 
 demesa, 672. 
 
 Weber, Gen., at the battle of Antietam, 334. 
 
 Weed, Gen., killed at the battle of Gettysburg, 518. 
 
 Weitiel, Gen. G. , his victory at I.A>)adieTilIe, La. , 481 ; 
 at B^^ck, La., 437 ; at Port Hudson, 441 ; at 
 Bermuda hundred, 687 ; at Fort Fisher, 861-863. 
 
 Weldon RaUroad, movements of Grant's forces against, 
 741-745 ; series of battles for the possession of, 
 743, 763-706 ; Warren's expedition against, 779-781. 
 
 "Vessels, Hen., bis defense of Plymouth, N. C, 859. 
 
 Westfield, gun-boat, at Galveston, 433 ; blown up, 433. 
 
 West Point, Miss., battle of, 613. 
 
 Westport, battle of, 833. 
 
 Wheeler, Gen., attempts to recapture Fort Donelson, 
 537 ; at Chickamauga, 549 ; his raid against Sher- 
 man's communications, 739 ; repulsed at Dalton, 
 Ga., 733 ; defeated at Waynesboro, 818. 
 
 White, Gen. J., surrenders Harper's ferry, 314. 
 
 Whit« House, Va., Sheridan's cavalry attacked at, 745. 
 
 White Oak Swamp, Va., battle of, 264. 
 
 White River, expedition of McClemand up, 886. 
 
 Whiting, Gen. W. H. C, at Gaines' mill, 360 ; taken 
 prisoner at the capture of Fort Fisher, 867. 
 
 Whitn^, Gen., severely wounded at Fort Fisher, 867 
 
 Whipple, Gen., at Chancellorsville, 459. 
 
 Wbittaker, Gen., brigade of, at Chickamauga, 566 ; 
 at Wauhatchie, 566. 
 
 Wilcox, Gen., repulse of the Nationals at Salem 
 heights by, 476-478 ; at Gettysburg, 617, 525 ; in 
 the Wilderness, 666. 
 iVlloox, Gen. O. B., brigade of, at Bull Bun, 4S; at 
 Fredericksbori; 848. 
 
 Wild, Gen., in command of colored troops on th( 
 James river, 686. 
 
 Wilder, Gen., operations of, 543, 54S. 
 
 Wilderness, Va. , the battles in the, 664-673. 
 
 Williams, Gen. A. L., at Chancellorsville, 469 , at 
 Gettysburg, 518 ; at Averyaboro, 890. 
 
 Williams, (Jen. F., operations of , against Vicksburg 
 371 , death of, defending Baton Bouge, 430. 
 
 Williamsburg, Va., battle of, 214-235. 
 
 Willich, Gen., operations of, 542 ; at Chattanooga, 678 
 
 Wilmington, N. C, occupied by Gen Schofield, 869. 
 
 Wilson, Gen. Jas. H., encounters Wade Hampton's 
 cavalry and routs Heth's infantry, 701 ; his expedi- 
 tion against the Weldon and Danville railroads, 
 746 ; pursues Hood from Nashville, 847 -849 ; hid 
 raid in Alabama and Georgia, 873-875. 
 
 Wilson, Col. WUliam, Zouaves of, on Santa Rost 
 island, 67. 
 
 Wilson's Creek, Mo., battle of, 56. 
 
 Winchester, Va. . Banks attacked by Jackson at, 347 
 Early defeated near, 787 ; battle of, 796. 
 
 Winslow, C»pt., sinks the cruiser Alabama, 877. 
 
 Winthrop, Major Theo., killed at Big Bethel, 63. 
 
 Wistar, Gen , attempts to take Richmond by surprise. 
 655 ; at Bermuda hundred, 687. 
 
 Withers, Gen., at Shiloh, 109 ; at Murfreesboro, 180 
 
 Wood, Gen., at Murfreesboro, 180 ; at Orchard knob 
 503 ; at Chattanooga, 672 ; at Naabville, 845. 
 
 Wool, Gen. J. E., 'n command at Fortress Monroe, 
 63 ; at Ocean Vie« and Norfolk, Va., 238, 229. 
 
 Worden, Lieut. J. L., in command of the Monitor, 
 306 ; operations of, at Fort McAllister, 582. 
 
 Wright, Gen. G. H., captures Fort Walker, 75 ; his 
 expedition to Florida, 141 ; at SecessionviUe, 580 ; 
 commands tirst division of sixth corps, 659 ; suc- 
 ceeds Sedgwick in command of sixth corps, 676 
 at Spottsylvania, 683 ; at Cold harbor, 699 ; move* 
 on the Weldon railroad, 743 ; in command of tht 
 trotips around Washington and pursues Early, 786 
 his successful attack on the Confederate lines, 918 
 at SiUor's creek, 9*7. 
 
 Wytheville, Va., Stoneman's great raid on, 836. 
 
 Y. 
 Yazoo Cttt, Mias., failure of operations at, 615 
 Yazoo Pass experiment, 396, 397. 
 Yazoo River, situation of, 377 ; Porter's fleet In, 414 
 York, Pa., exactions of the Confederates at, 499. 
 Yorktown, Va., operations at. 195-199. 
 
 Z. 
 
 ZOIXTKOFFBR, Gen, Felix K., enters Kentucky fr 
 
 the east, 58 ; kiUed at MiU spring, Ky., 81. 
 Zook. Gen., mortally wounded at Gettysburg, 61P 
 
.i'OO 
 
^-^ -^^^ 
 
 
 >r: 
 
 <<■■ •■^•-. 
 
 .^^ % 
 
 ■^/. .^^^ 
 
 <^ •■'■:. 
 
 ,-Y 
 
 >a' -S>. 
 
 ^■^• 
 
 
 .-.<■■ 
 
 ^ V 
 
 ,\^ ■^■- 
 
 ^^' 
 
 .>^% 
 
 •^^ 
 
 >-N , 1 ' « 
 
 ^^ v^^ 
 
 ■•/ .<\' 
 
 
 ' • " ^ \\ 
 
 vN^" 
 
 ■>- » » , V ' 
 
 
 ^> ,^^^ 
 
 
 >0 C' 
 
 
 >"^ ■''^ 
 
 
 
 ^'^ 
 
 .-^ '^. 
 
 ^^ '■^ 
 
 ^' -i^. 
 
 
^.. .-^^ 
 
 •.V 
 
 
 ,0o. 
 
 X''- 
 
 . ,^' 
 
 X^"^ -•^ct 
 
 %0o. 
 
 "^/. <^'' 
 
 '':>- V''