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ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE; 
 
 OR, 
 
 OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 
 
■» 
 
 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE; 
 
 OR, 
 
 OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 
 
 STranslateir from tfje (German of 
 
 DR. FRANCIS THEREMIN, 
 
 BY 
 
 WILLIAM G. T. SHEDD, 
 
 PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH LITERATURE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT. 
 
 NEW-YORK: 
 
 JOHN WILEY, 161 BROADWAY; 
 13 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON. 
 
 X850. 
 
\ 
 
 *^ 
 
 -<.*> 
 
 ^4*° 
 
 Entered 'according to Act of Congress in the year 1850, . 
 
 BY JOHN WILEY, 
 
 In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern District of New- York. 
 
 J. P. Wright, Printer, 
 74 Fulton st., N. Y. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 Preface, by the Translator vii 
 
 BOOH X. 
 
 Chap. I. — Design and Use of the Proposed Investigation. 1 
 Chap. II. — Eloquence is not something between Poetry 
 
 and Philosophy 7 
 
 Chap. III. — Eloquence is neither Poetry nor Philosophy. .10 
 
 Chap. IV. — Eloquence is a Virtue 14 
 
 Chap. V.— Ideas 19 
 
 Chap. VI. — The Political and Religious Form of Practi- 
 cal Ideas 23 
 
 Chap. VII. — The Different Species of Eloquence 28 
 
 Chap. VIII. — Virtue is also Good Sense 33 
 
 Chap. IX. — The Subordinate Ideas, or Categories 38 
 
 Chap. X.— The Category, Truth 40 
 
 Chap. XI. — The Rhetorical Demonstration of Truth 42 
 
 Chap. XII.— The Categories, Possibility and Actuality 52 
 
 Chap. XIII. — The Plan and Division of an Oration 56 
 
 Chap. XIV. — First Features towards a Sketch of the Orator.69 
 
VI CONTENTS. 
 
 BOOK XX. 
 
 Page 
 
 Chap. L — Affection and Passion.. 77 
 
 Chap. II. — The Duty of the Orator to speak with Affec- 
 tion, and to awaken Affection 85 
 
 Chap. III.— The Different Kinds of Affection 91 
 
 Appendix. — Wit 97 
 
 Chap. IV. — The Means of exciting Affection : or. The 
 
 Rhetorical Presentation of Thought 101 
 
 Chap. V.— The Law of Adaptation 106 
 
 Appendix. — Taste 131 
 
 Chap. VI.— The Law of Constant Progress 134 
 
 Chap. VII.— The Law of Vivacity 146 
 
 Chap. VIII— Prose 155 
 
 Chap. IX. — Conclusion 162 
 
PREFACE, 
 by the translator- 
 
 It is believed that this little treatise upon Rhetoric 
 possesses some characteristics which render it worthy 
 of a place among the current English treatises on this 
 subject. Perhaps no one will be ready to assent to 
 all the positions laid down in it, and many may think 
 that in its method and spirit it is altogether too for- 
 eign to our own modes of thought and expression, to be 
 of any worth to the English student. Still, if used in 
 the right way, it is thought that it may be made to 
 contribute to a broad and thorough discipline in this 
 department of culture. For no production, especially 
 of a foreign mind, should be servilely received by the 
 student, or allowed to exert an arbitrary and violent 
 influence upon him. He should retain his own indi- 
 viduality and nationality in their most independent 
 and determined forms, while, at the same time, he 
 opens his mind and heart to all that is true and genial 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 in a foreign literature. Non-intercourse is as impoli- 
 tic and injurious in the world of contemplation, as it is 
 in the world of action. 
 
 Moreover, the present state of Rhetoric, considered 
 as one of the co-ordinate branches of discipline, to 
 which the mind of the student is subjected in the 
 course of liberal education, seems to call for the infu- 
 sion of an element which may be found in this trea- 
 tise of Theremin. Rhetoric, in its best estate, is but 
 the science of Form, or, to use Milton's phrase, an " or- 
 ganic" — i. e., instrumental — Art. It does not propose 
 to furnish the material of knowledge, but only to put 
 the material, when furnished, into as fine and perfect 
 forms as possible. Owing partly to this intrinsic na- 
 ture of Rhetoric as an Art, and partly perhaps to the 
 excessively popular character which science and scien- 
 tific statements have assumed in the present age, Rhe- 
 toric has become extremely superficial in its character 
 an I influence, so that the term " rhetorical" has become 
 the synonyme of shallow and showy. Dissevered from 
 Lo-dc, or the necessary laws of Thought, it has become 
 dissevered from the seat of life, and has degenerated 
 int \ a mere collection of rules respecting the structure 
 of mtences and the garnish of expression. 
 
PRErACE. IX 
 
 Any treatise, therefore, of which the tendency is to 
 restore the connection between Thought and its expres- 
 sion, cannot but be beneficial in its influence upon both 
 the theory and practice of Eloquence. Even if it were 
 constructed upon a false fundamental principle, and, 
 as a systematic whole, were incorrect, still the mere 
 effort to systematize the subject — the striving to ground 
 it in something deeper and more solid than its own 
 hollow forms, would not be without its salutary influ- 
 ence upon the art itself and the student. It would, 
 at least, direct attention to the fact, that an art like Rhe~ 
 toric should be based upon some science, and that its 
 rules and maxims, in order to be efficient and influen- 
 tial, must be the off-shoots of principles lying deeper 
 than themselves. It would point to the adaptation 
 that really exists in the nature of things, and that ought 
 actually to exist in practice, between an instrument 
 employed by the human mind, and addressing itself 
 to it, and the human mind itself. 
 
 The work of Theremin, whether it be true or false 
 in substance, is, what it purports to be, a systematic 
 Rhetoric. It does not begin with rules, and it does 
 not, in starting, deal in minute observations upon mi- 
 nutiae ; but it begins with the Ideas which are con- 
 
 B 
 
PREFACE 
 
 ceived to underlie the whole subject, and to constitute 
 the ground and soil from which the whole after-de- 
 velopement and detail will naturally spring. It begins 
 at the beginning, goes through the middle, and so ar- 
 rives at the end. 
 
 Now there is power in such a method, apart from its 
 contents. The course and movement of the system is 
 
 according to Nature. Commencing with the Matter, 
 
 s 
 it proceeds to the Form, which is to take shape and 
 
 character, and all its qualities, from that primitive ma- 
 terial for whose sake alone it has any existence at all. 
 
 " Wei may men knowen. but it be a fool, 
 That every part deriveth from his hool. 
 For Nature hath not taken his beginning 
 Of no partie ne cantel of a thing, 
 But of a thing that parfit is and stable 
 Descending so, til it be corrumpable." 
 
 Chaucer. 
 
 The Avhole tendency of such a theory of Rhetoric is 
 to produce, in practice, masculine and thoughtful dis- 
 course. The student, if we may use the term, is head- 
 ed right, by it, and is taught to apply his best power 
 to the evolution of truth and the production of thought 
 in his own mind, not surely to the neglect of the Form 
 in which it is to be expressed, but in order to the high- 
 
PREFACE. XI 
 
 est and most perfect elaboration of the Form. He is 
 taught to be severe with himself, to forget himself in 
 the theme, that he may exhibit it with that boldness 
 and freedom of manner, that daring strength and gran- 
 deur of treatment, which is absolutely beyond the reach 
 of him who is anxious respecting the impression he 
 may make — who, in short, is tormented by too much 
 consciousness of self, at a time when he should be 
 absorbingly conscious of the theme. 
 
 According to the theory here presented, the oration, 
 — meaning by this, every rounded and complete dis- 
 course, — is the evolution of an Idea, which is the germ 
 and principle of the whole composition. Hence it is 
 simple in its structure, and homogeneous in its char- 
 acter — fitted to enlist the whole attention of the hearer, 
 and to produce one distinct total impression. 
 
 Nothing can be of greater benefit to the student, than, 
 in the very beginning of his intellectual life, to be hab- 
 ituated to compose in the light, and by the guidance, 
 and under the impulse, of Ideas — than to be enabled to 
 discover those germinal truths which are pregnant with 
 life, and which, when embodied with freedom and 
 power in a discourse, constitute the ground-work of the 
 finest creations of the human mind. And apart from 
 
Xli PREFACE. 
 
 the benefit which is to be derived from this habit and 
 ability, for the practical purposes of Rhetoric, what a 
 benefit is derived from it in respect to the private con- 
 templations and enjoyment of the scholar ! Supposing 
 he does not need this ability, because he is never called 
 upon to speak or write to his fellow-men, (a supposi- 
 tion that is hardly to the credit of an educated man in 
 this peculiar age,) does he not need it, in order that 
 his own mind may reach essential truth, and may, in 
 its own reflections, follow the method and order of Rea- 
 son. In what a serene and constant illumination does 
 that mind dwell, which is able in its meditations to 
 find the fontal truth as it were by instinct, and to un- 
 fold it by its own light, and in accordance with its 
 own structure ! 
 
 By such a theory the student is introduced into the 
 world of Ideas, Laws and Principles, and is taught to 
 begin with these, and from them to work out towards 
 detail, elaboration and ornament. It is a mysterious 
 world, it is true, and it must be, from the very fact that 
 it is the source and origin. But it is the very office- 
 work of thinking, to convert these Ideas into clear con- 
 ceptions ; to put these vast unlimited truths into defi- 
 
PREFACE. Xlll 
 
 nite and intelligible discourse ; in fine, in the strict 
 meaning of the term, to develope truth. 
 
 He is the mystical and obscure discourser who leaves 
 truth as he finds it ; who does not, by the aid of close 
 thinking and a rigorous, remorseless logic, compel the 
 dark truthful Idea to yield up its secret ; who does not 
 force the contents out of the all-comprehending Law or 
 Principle. And he is the clear and intelligible discour- 
 ser, in the only high sense of the term, — clear while 
 solid, intelligible while weighty, — who, not starting in 
 light to make things light, starts in darkness and works 
 his way out into high noon. In both the Pagan and 
 Christian cosmogonies, Creation emerged from Old 
 Night. 
 
 But if we are not mistaken, the theory presented in 
 this work is true in its substance. It teaches that El- 
 oquence is moral in essence ; that it has a moral ori- 
 gin, moral means and movement, and a moral end. It 
 teaches, with what may seem pertinacity to some, that 
 in its substance and its accidents, its primary laws and 
 secondary rules, Eloquence is ethical. 
 
 This is not a new theory. As the Author remarks, 
 it was distinctly announced by the elder Cato, and 
 
XIV PREFACE. 
 
 mentioned with approbation by Quintilian, a critic 
 whose exquisite taste often brought him to an indistinct 
 intimation of truths, which a more profound genius 
 would have brought out into distinct intuition. It has, 
 moreover, been the tacitly-received theory of all the 
 great minds — the really eloquent — of the race. We 
 have it on the authority of Cicero,* that u Socrates di- 
 cere solebat, omnes, in eo, quod scirent, satis esse elo- 
 quentes." By this he could only mean, that the moral 
 feeling and interest generated by clear knowledge of 
 truth, is the ground of that methodical, earnest, and 
 animating mental action which we denominate Elo- 
 quence — a truth which may be found substantially, if 
 not formally, falling from the lips of Socrates in the 
 Gorgias. Add to this the decisive statement of Buffon, 
 "Le style — e'est Phomme," which meets with an equal- 
 ly decisive response within us, together with the views 
 of Eloquence left us in the remarkable fragments of 
 Pascal, and we find that the theory in question is no 
 newly broached one, but one that is unconsciously 
 formed by the thoughtful and eloquent mind every- 
 where. 
 
 * De Oratore. L, 14. 
 
PREFACE. XV 
 
 Most certainly the tendency and influence of such a 
 theory of Eloquence must be good and elevating. Set- 
 ting aside the fact, that if it be the true theory, it is the 
 only one by the aid of which Eloquence can come into 
 existence, it is the only working theory — it is most cer- 
 tainly a great point gained, if an Art, so often supposed 
 to be at farthest remove from earnestness and serious- 
 ness, which is regarded too commonly as the Art by 
 which the ornaments are furnished when the solid and 
 real work has been done, is shown to have its native 
 seat and source in Ethics. The expression of thought 
 by this theory becomes a sincere process, and the mind, 
 while giving utterance to its reflections, is really con- 
 tributing to the moral culture and developement of the 
 man. The productions of such a Rhetoric are marked 
 by that grave and conscientious character which is the 
 natural fruit of simplicity and sincerity in the mental 
 processes. The influence of the theory is felt even in 
 the language employed. It is no longer stiff, stilted, 
 and aloof from the thought, but pliant, vital, and con- 
 substantial with it. 
 
 Finally, it is believed that the theory of Eloquence 
 here set forth, harmonizes with the true theory of Art. 
 Perhaps the greatest defect in many of the current 
 
XVI PREFACE. 
 
 treatises upon Rhetoric is the absence of correct views 
 of the principles of Art. Oratory is confessedly one of 
 the Fine Arts ; and how, then, can a clue to its mystery 
 and power be obtained without a philosophic knowl- 
 edge of those laws and principles by which Embodi- 
 ment, whether in Nature or Art, is regulated and im- 
 pelled ? 
 
 We say Embodiment whether in Nature or Art, be- 
 cause the method of each is essentially the same. In 
 both, a creative Idea is the starting point and the guid- 
 ing principle, and the movement in both is free and 
 original. A genuine work of Art is no more a copy or 
 a mechanical production, than a work in Nature is. It 
 is not the product of ingenuity improved by practice 
 and experience, but of impulsive genius, and the same 
 characteristics are found in it, according to the degree 
 of its perfection as a work of Art, that are found in Na- 
 ture. Indeed, we demand that a work of Art have Na- 
 ture in it, i. e., be original, fresh, living, glowing, breath- 
 ing ; a demand that would be unreasonable if there 
 were no likeness at bottom between Art and Nature. 
 As Nature, according to Sir Thomas Brown, is the Art 
 of God, so Art is man's Nature, and sustains the same 
 
PREFACE. XV11 
 
 relation to the Finite mind that Creation does to the 
 Infinite. 
 
 By this is not meant, of course, that it sustains the 
 same relation materially, but only formally. The 
 work of Art is the creation of the Finite Imagination, in 
 the sense that it is the embodiment and result of an 
 Idea, a productive thought, which sprang from the in- 
 nermost recesses of this human faculty. As Nature 
 is the result and embodiment of divine Ideas, so Art 
 is the result and embodiment of human Ideas. The 
 two differ from each other as the Infinite differs from 
 the Finite, but they are alike, as reason in man is the 
 same in kind with reason in God. We say, then, that 
 the work of Art is formally — i. e., in respect to its origin 
 from a productive Idea, and in respect to the plastic 
 method of its construction, — like the work of Nature ; 
 that man, the Artist, works creatively, not in the abso- 
 lute and highest sense of creating something out of no- 
 thing, in which sense God is the only creator, but in the 
 secondary yet significant sense of embodying Ideas, of 
 producing works to which the terms applied to the 
 works of Nature, find a natural and spontaneous appli- 
 cation, the world over. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 Now, it is evident that Rhetoric, whose office it is to 
 guide the student into the right method of embodying 
 his thought, and which is the very science of Form, 
 should itself be formative, constructive, plastic. But 
 how is such a Rhetoric possible, if the theory that is 
 formed is not only not conformed to, but positively 
 contradicts, the laws and principles of what, after the 
 remarks above made upon Nature and Art, may be de- 
 nominated Universal Art ? Plainly, then, it is only by 
 a deep and true insight into the nature of Art, in its 
 widest sense, that a system of Rhetoric can arise that 
 will lead to the production of works appealing with 
 power to the imagination as well as the intellect. 
 
 This treatise of Theremin, while it strictly distin- 
 guishes Eloquence by virtue of its moral character and 
 its external aim and end, from a merely artistic process, 
 at the same time sufficiently recognizes the aesthetic 
 element in it, and while, by some, the Author might 
 be thought to have carried out his theory too rigorously, 
 and have shown too much fear lest the high ethical 
 character of Eloquence should be suffered to lose it- 
 self in the lower sphere of mere Art, he has by this 
 very thing imparted to Eloquence a still higher char- 
 acter and a still more energetic power. For by thus 
 
PREFACE, XIX 
 
 insisting that, while the means employed by Eloquence 
 may be aesthetic, and the form in which it appears ar- 
 tistic, the great end constantly aimed at must be mor- 
 al, and only moral, the Author has furnished a Rhe- 
 toric that is not only formative and plastic, but organ- 
 ific, and has thus superinduced life upon the lifeless. 
 Art in this case passes over into the production of liv- 
 ing realities ; the old fable of Pygmalion becomes ac- 
 tuality ; the oration is not only a beautiful and fault- 
 less Form, it is also a living Soul. 
 
 The work has been translated mainly for the pur- 
 pose of furnishing a text-book,. to be used in a free re- 
 productive manner in giving instruction in the depart- 
 ment of Rhetoric. It is believed, however, that any 
 one who shall make use of it, by entering into its spirit 
 and method in a free and independent manner, will 
 find more or less in it promotive of a sound way of 
 thought, and a serious deep-toned Eloquence. 
 
 THE TRANSLATOR. 
 
 University of Vermont, Nov. 2Uh, 1849. 
 
ELOaUENCE A VIRTUE; 
 
 OR, 
 
 OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 DESIGN AND USE OF THE PROPOSED INVESTIGATION. 
 
 It has often surprised me, that while in modern times the 
 theory of the Fine Arts, and especially of Poetry, has reached 
 so high a degree of clearness and completeness, Rhetoric still 
 consists of unconnected principles, and is not competent either 
 to guide the practice of Eloquence by sure rules, or to give sat- 
 isfactory information with respect to the nature and qualities 
 of the subject of which it treats — of Eloquence itself. Hence 
 it has seemed to me not to be superfluous to make the attempt, 
 whether the gift of Eloquence cannot be represented as one of 
 the fundamental powers of man, and whether its laws cannot 
 2 
 
2 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 be derived from one of the higher philosophical sciences, so 
 that everything uncertain and mutable may disappear from the 
 Theory as well as the Practice of it. 
 
 I must, indeed, fear that such an undertaking will appear 
 useless to many, and that I shall be asked " What is gained 
 by Theories generally ? Has all the philosophizing upon Art, 
 in modern times, produced a more beautiful bloom of Poetry ? 
 Did not Eloquence attain its highest perfection among the an- 
 cients, although probably among them, as among us, its high- 
 est principle either remained unknown, or at least, never dis- 
 tinctly presented itself to the orator ? Only by means of rules 
 which were drawn from experience, and which had respect to 
 individual particulars in the formation of the oration, only by 
 means of a constant practice which began in earliest youth and 
 never ceased, and not by means of general theories, did De- 
 mosthenes and Cicero form themselves ; only by means of a 
 similar discipline, and not by means of text-books, can Elo- 
 quence, which has sunk so very low among us, be raised up, 
 if indeed it is to be raised up at all." 
 
 These objections would be perfectly well grounded, if Elo- 
 quence, since the establishment of the Christian Church, had 
 not appeared in a form entirely unknown to the ancients, and 
 one to which we are obliged to have special reference. The 
 political and civil relations amidst which, exclusively and alone, 
 Eloquence appeared among the ancients, were sufficient of 
 themselves to secure it from deviations from the true course, 
 and to render more precise theories unnecessary. For him, who 
 spoke before the court or in the popular assembly upon a mat- 
 ter which would be decided immediately upon the close of his 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 6 
 
 oration, the effect was the surest proof whether he had spoken 
 well or not ; and when the highest personal interests were at 
 stake, it was very natural that the orator should call forth all 
 his powers in order to succeed, and that he would learn to un- 
 derstand and avoid those faults which might draw after them 
 the loss of wealth, influence, life, and freedom. The sacred 
 orator, on the contrary, stands in a relation to his hearer, and 
 treats of a subject, which do not allow of such decisive proof. 
 Whether he has instructed, edified, improved, or has merely 
 superficially pleased and moved his hearer, the effect of his ser- 
 mons can very seldom inform him, since this, from its very na- 
 ture, remains concealed in the mind, and almost never comes 
 into sight. Since therefore he is not, like the orator before the 
 court and in the popular assembly, impelled towards the pre- 
 scribed end by a pressing danger ; since he is not shut up with- 
 in such narrow limits, which render deviation to the right or 
 left almost impossible, he runs the greatest risk of error, if 
 without settled theory and principles. He must be able to give 
 the most accurate account, to his own mind, of all that he does ; 
 and that deeper insight into the principles of Eloquence, which 
 the ancient orator did not need, is indispensable to him. 
 
 Moreover, many are of opinion that Eloquence, which in 
 Greece and Rome reached so high a degree of perfection, dis- 
 appeared from the earth with the destruction of ancient freedom, 
 and never again found its home upon it. According to this 
 opinion, Eloquence is therefore less an original impulse in man, 
 than Poetry ; it is a creature of circumstances, by which it is 
 not only more or less favored, but is produced and destroyed ; 
 the republican constitutions of antiquity were necessarv to its 
 
4 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 developement ; and now, when social life, the spirit of the age, 
 and the form of government, are so entirely different, that 
 which we call Eloquence is either utterly unworthy of this 
 name, or is only the mere shadow of that ancient powerful 
 faculty/* Whether this opinion is well grounded or not, can 
 be known only after such an investigation as we are intend- 
 ing to institute. If we do not succeed in showing that Elo- 
 quence is one of the fundamental powers in man, this opinion 
 will stand unassailed, and whoever in modern times thinks 
 himself to be an orator must simply give up his pretensions. 
 But if we do succeed, and do actually point out a particular 
 original power, whose developement in a certain direction ne- 
 cessarily produces Eloquence, then Eloquence is no longer the 
 ephemeral bloom of a particular age ; and although it may 
 conceal itself, and sometimes may appear under another 
 name, it nevertheless lives a life just as real and forceful, in 
 modern, as in ancient times. 
 
 Finally, there are men — and men, too, highly distinguished 
 for learning and science, — who set a very low estimate upon 
 Eloquence, and would have nothing to do with it. For, in 
 their opinion, it is perfectly clear that its purpose is to excite 
 the feelings, which is always useless, and sometimes even in- 
 jurious ; nay, Eloquence commonly carries its pretensions 
 still further, and, in the best orators, it is the design plainly 
 prominent, and even acknowledged by themselves, to master 
 the heart, to rule the will, and turn it whithersoever they 
 
 * Magna ista et notabilis eloquentia .... quae in bene consti- 
 tutis civitatibus non oritur.— De Cans. Corr. Elog., c. 40. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. D 
 
 wish. But this, from its very nature, whatever be the manner 
 in which it is done, is not at all compatible with the relations 
 in which man stands to his fellow-man, and is therefore, strict- 
 ly considered, contrary to morality ; and the more so, from 
 the fact, that commonly the orator makes use of cunning and 
 deceptive tricks of art, rather than honorable weapons. In 
 their opinion, we should address the understanding alone, and 
 satisfy it by means of stringent arguments ; all excitement of 
 the Feelings, and influencing of the Will, were better omit- 
 ted. This class of opponents, as has been remarked, is a very 
 important one ; at its head stand names of distinction — Aris- 
 totle^' among the ancients, Kantf among the moderns ; their 
 objections have the very strongest appearance of truth, and 
 as yet have not been answered in a satisfactory manner by 
 any of the modern advocates of Eloquence, who have made 
 far too little of them. But this question also, whether there 
 
 " 'AAA' o\tjs ovaris irpds 66%av rrjs rpayfxareiag rrjg ire pi rrjv prjropiKriv, ov% 
 v$ opdios k'xovros, 'aW tog dvayKaiov rrjv eiripii\eiav iroirjriov. 
 
 Rhetor., Lib. Ill, c. 1. 
 
 t I must confess, that while a beautiful poem always gives me pure 
 pleasure, the perusal of the best orations of the popular orators of 
 Rome, or the parliamentary or pulpit orators of the present time, is al- 
 ways accompanied with the disagreeable feeling of disapprobation to- 
 wards a cunning art which understands how to move men like machines, 
 to a judgment which, upon calm after- thought, must lose all its worth 
 with them. Oratory, considered as the art of making use of the weak- 
 nesses of men, for its own purposes, (be these never so well meant, or 
 be they actually good, as they are always intended to be,) is worthy of 
 no esteem at all. — Critik der Urtheilskraft. p. 215. 
 
 It is also said of Eloquence, in the Dialogue de Caus. Corr. Eloq., c. 
 40, that it is " alumna licentias, quam stulti libertatem vocabant, comes 
 seditionum, effrenati populi incitamentum, sine obsequio, sine servitute, 
 contumax, temeraria, adrogans." 
 
 1* 
 
6 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 is anything contrary to morality in the attempt to acquire 
 mastery over the minds of others, can be decided only by 
 means of such an investigation as we contemplate. For, if it 
 should actually turn out to be impossible to derive each and 
 all of the rules of Eloquence from one and the same funda- 
 mental principle ; if the theory of Eloquence should be found 
 to consist only of some maxims derived from experience and 
 observation, which can be brought together under no unity, 
 this would certainly be a very strong presumption against it. 
 The impossibility of constructing its fundamental principles 
 philosophically, would greatly lower it, and would throw it 
 into the same class with other abilities of an ambiguous na- 
 ture, in relation to which this same thing occurs — with Pru- 
 dence, Worldly Wisdom, Hypocrisy, or, in the phrase of Pla- 
 to, 2 ^ with the art of Cookery. If, however, we succeed in lay- 
 ing down an all-comprehending principle as the ground of 
 Eloquence, it will then appear of itself, whether this is good 
 or bad ; although Eloquence would be acquitted of all charges 
 on the score of being contrary to morality, from the mere phi- 
 losophical form of its theory, since that which depends upon a 
 fundamental power of man, cannot possibly contradict his 
 moral sense. 
 
 * Platonis Georgias ed. Heindorf, p. 53. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 ELOQUENCE IS NOT SOMETHING BETWEEN POETRY AND 4 
 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Three different characteristics of Eloquence attract notice 
 immediately upon the first examination. First, it is evident 
 that Eloquence seeks to separate the true from the false, and 
 to satisfy the understanding by argument. The powerful 
 enthymemes of Demosthenes, the assertion of Aristotle that 
 Eloquence is akin to Dialectics, and Cicero's affirmation that 
 he had made himself an orator, not in the schools of the Rhe- 
 toricians, but in the walks of the Academy,^ testify plainly 
 enough to the affinity of Eloquence with Philosophy. Se- 
 condly, Eloquence approximates to Poetry also, through the 
 liveliness of its representations, and the use of turns and fi- 
 gures which are similar to those of Poetry. But, thirdly, 
 Eloquence is distinguished from Philosophy as well as Poetry 
 by the outward end after which it strives, by that mastery 
 over minds, which it does not quietly wait for, but obtains by 
 a struggle, and by the innumerable references which must be 
 regarded in such a striving, and which are entirely foreign to 
 Philosophy as well as to Poetry. 
 
 Characteristic marks of three kinds, therefore, are to be 
 
 * Fateor me oratorem, non ex rhetorum officinis, sed ex academic 
 spatiis extitisse. — Orator, c 3. 
 
ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR 
 
 found in Eloquence : 1. An affinity with philosophy ; 2. An 
 affinity with Poetry ; 3. A striving after an outward end. 
 In order to find a fundamental principle of Eloquence, one of 
 these three characteristics must be made predominant; for 
 they cannot exist beside each other in equal dignity. Should 
 it be affirmed that the Beautiful and the True, which in Poetry 
 and Philosophy are principal, in Eloquence appear as adjuncts 
 and subservient to outward ends, the difficulty is not yet re- 
 moved ; for the question ever returns — What is the law ac- 
 cording to which the True and the Beautiful may be used for 
 the attainment of outward ends ? So long as this is not given, 
 Eloquence*- has not found its highest fundamental principle. 
 
 If we take our stand upon this point of view, where Elo- 
 quence appears as something fluctuating between Philosophy, 
 Poetry, and mere Worldly Wisdom, the theory projected in ac* 
 cordance with this view, cannot satisfy the philosopher ; and 
 just as little will it be a sure guide for the pupil in oratory. 
 
 First, the teacher says to him, " You must select a subject, 
 and must endeavor to treat it fundamentally," This he does 
 in all faithfulness, and thus, imperceptibly, there arises under 
 his hands a philosophic essay. " This is good for nothing," 
 says the teacher, * where is the rising sweep, the life, the poetic 
 ornament, by which these truths are to make an entrance ?" 
 This censure seems just to him, and he now throws himself 
 into the other extreme, and that which he produces is the 
 most disagreeable of all caricatures — poetic prose. Having 
 once more failed, it is now said to him, " You discourse as if you 
 were alone by yourself, with no hearers before you, into whose 
 circumstances, into whose way of thinking, you must enter !" 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 9 
 
 Who will find fault with the pupil, if at this point he falls into 
 a sort of desperation, and addresses his instructor somewhat 
 after this manner : " In Heaven's name ! what is that you re- 
 quire of me ? Am I to unite, in one, three things entirely- 
 different from each other : philosophic profundity, poetic or- 
 nament, and reference to an outward end ? Tell me first, if 
 this union is possible ; and if it is, then give me the higher 
 principle under which three so different requisitions can be 
 brought into one ; show me the rule which determines how 
 much I may concede to the subject-matter, how much to beauty 
 of form, how much to the hearer, in order that each may co- 
 exist with all, and that an unlucky preponderance may not 
 oscillate from one side to another. For I can now no longer 
 cast my work in an old form, without troubling myself about 
 the wherefore, without asking myself why that which I pro- 
 duce must look precisely thus, and whether it might not look 
 entirely differently ; I wish in my oration, from beginning to 
 end, to see the necessity of every single part. So then show 
 me the principle which groups all others under itself, and from 
 which all rules readily derive themselves/' 
 
10 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 ELOQUENCE IS NEITHER POETRY NOR PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 If, therefore, one of the three characteristic marks of Elo- 
 quence is to be made the fundamental one, it might be supposed 
 that its affinity with Poetry is the one, and that the same fun- 
 damental principle which reigns in the representations of 
 Poetry must also guide in the practice of Oratory. But this 
 would pre-suppose that Eloquence give up its striving after 
 an outward end, as something incompatible with Poetry, which 
 it cannot do without renouncing its own nature and peculiarity 
 — or else that Poetry adapt itself to this striving, and to all 
 the references connected with it, which is equally impossible. 
 
 When Poetry clothes its ideas in forms, it can demand 
 nothing more than the perception and recognition, that the 
 idea is perfectly suited to the form, and the form to the idea ; 
 its design can never be to implant the ideas, which it has 
 wrought out with such pleasure to itself, in another mind ; the 
 one process would injure the other ; in the two-fold effort to 
 exhibit his own mind and to work upon the mind of another, 
 the Poet would succeed in neither. Indeed, nothing is so 
 very much suited to produce the feeling of displeasure and 
 disgust as an oration overloaded with poetical ornament ; we 
 pity the ignorance which selects means so unsuitable for its 
 ends ; we are indignant at the profanation which would force 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 11 
 
 Poetry to subserve outward ends. Eloquence, therefore, can- 
 not be regarded as a part of Poetry. 
 
 But, secondly, is it not possible to make the Philosophic 
 element in it the fundamental principle of Eloquence? 
 Since in Eloquence, as in Philosophy, Ideas are presented in 
 a certain sequence and in a certain connection, its coincidence 
 with the art of Philosophizing might be so great as that it 
 should fall into this and constitute only a part of it. But 
 here the very obstacle which rendered the union of Elo- 
 quence with Poetry impossible, shows itself again — that 
 striving, namely, after an outward end, which is just as es- 
 sential to Eloquence as it is foreign to Philosophy. Philoso- 
 phy can recognize no other law by which its representations 
 are to be guided, than that which lies in the Ideas themselves ; 
 these Ideas themselves are simply to come forth in their 
 greatest possible clearness, and in their greatest possible com- 
 pass. The problem of Eloquence, on the contrary, is to gain 
 over to its Ideas a mind thus or thus disposed. The laws 
 which Philosophy follows in its representations cannot there- 
 fore be the highest and sole rules of Eloquence, since, besides 
 these, it has still others to obey which are imposed upon it 
 by the outward end after which it strives. 
 
 This truth is of the greatest importance for the success of 
 our investigation, and I must call attention to it the more, 
 since from the great tendency of the Germans to Philoso- 
 phizing, it is certainly to be feared that it will meet with op- 
 position from many of my readers. " Is not,' 2 it may be ob- 
 jected, " this profound and powerful developement of Ideas, 
 which is the essential element in the Philosophic representa- 
 
12 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 tion, itself also the most infallible means of making an 
 entrance for these Ideas into the minds of others,"~and thus of 
 fulfilling all the requisitions of Eloquence ?" Let one make 
 this attempt, but let him make it with thoroughness, without 
 suffering himself to be diverted by circumstances from the 
 purpose once fixed upon. Let one lose himself entirely in 
 the Idea ; let him develope it in its whole compass ; let him not 
 omit even the least of all that can serve to exhibit it still more 
 clearly ; let him forget, as is fitting, the place where he stands ; 
 let him confine himself to no definite time, but speak until 
 his subject is exhausted ; let him not trouble himself about 
 his hearers, about the degree of their culture, about their ca- 
 pacities, qualities, prejudices, and inclinations ; in a word, let 
 him seek only to express his own mind ; — will such a discourse 
 be adapted to gain over an opposing mind and to transfer the 
 sentiments of the orator into his hearers ? I think not. 
 Hence no one who refers the Rhetorical manner and method 
 to the Philosophical, is able in his practice to remain true to 
 his theory. Imperceptibly he concedes something to time, to 
 place, to the occasion, to the hearers ; and thus there arises a 
 product which is neither Philosophical nor Rhetorical, and 
 which can satisfy no one who is accustomed to judge of things 
 with strictness. 
 
 If I understand him rightly, Aristotle makes this attempt, 
 which must ever be a failure, to connect Eloquence with the 
 art of Philosophizing, in order to obtain a simple, firm, con- 
 stituent principle for it. In the very beginning of his work 
 he lays down the position that Eloquence is akin to Dialectics, 
 and it seems as if all is to be derived from this, and that Rheto- 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 13 
 
 ric is in this way to acquire a scientific unity. But this first 
 assertion compels him to a second, by which Eloquence be- 
 comes strangely limited in its sphere. " In Eloquence," he 
 says, " which depends upon Dialectics, the arguments are the 
 only thing pertaining to the art, and it should, properly, con- 
 fine itself simply to showing whether a thing has or has not 
 happened. It is owing to the imperfection of governments 
 alone, that Eloquence has introduced the Ideas of Justice and 
 Injustice into its sphere, and assumes to excite the Feelings." 
 Now, it would be interesting to see what sort of a Rhetoric 
 would have arisen, if Aristotle had strictly maintained and 
 carried out this principle ; but whether it was because an 
 Eloquence so narrrowly limited did not satisfy him, or be- 
 cause he felt himself obliged to take Eloquence as he found 
 it in actual existence, he lets the principle drop again imme- 
 diately. Hence we are not a little surprised to see how soon 
 he is no longer content with the purely dialectic arguments, 
 but, besides these, calls in those means of persuasion also 
 which lie in the moral state of the orator and in the inward 
 condition into which the hearer has been put. But, in order 
 to the apprehension of these, Dialectics no longer suffices ; 
 the knowledge of the virtues and the affections is requisite 
 for this, and Aristotle finds himself compelled to the acknow- 
 ledgment that Eloquence is no longer akin to Dialectics 
 alone, but also to the Ethical science called Politics. Thus 
 he gets a fundamental principle having a two-fold nature, and 
 destructive of all scientific unity — a quality, moreover, that 
 is not to be met with again in the whole work. 
 2 
 
14 ELOCIUENCE A VIRTUE ; GR 5 
 
 CHAPTER IV, 
 
 ELOQUENCE IS A VIRTUE. 
 
 Since, therefore, Rhetoric cannot acquire a scientific form* if 
 Eloquence is to be regarded as something fluctuating between 
 Poetry and Philosophy ; since, furthermore, it can be subor- 
 dinated neither to Poetry nor Philosophy, there is only one 
 way left to find its highest fundamental principle — if it has one, 
 — namely, to examine the third of the characteristic qualities 
 noticed in it, the striving after an outward end, and to see if 
 it will not lead to a firm fundamental principle. 
 
 Production in Poetry and Philosophy is a species of ac- 
 tivity which may be denominated the isolated, or that which 
 retreats into itself again. For it simply unfolds an Idea, and 
 in the process has no other end but this Idea and its unfold- 
 ing. That which has been formed in this way can, indeed, 
 like all that exists, exert an outward influence ; yet it never 
 owes its origin to the design of exerting such an influence. 
 
 There is another species of Activity, which always aims at 
 an outward change, either in the sentiments and conduct of 
 men, or in the social and family relations, or in the civil and 
 ecclesiastical. Now, to this species of Activity — the sum-total 
 of which constitutes Social Life — Eloquence also belongs, and 
 it is so entirely implicated in the circumstances existing at the 
 particular time, that even in thought it cannot be separated 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 15 
 
 from, them. For although it is easy enough in the case of a 
 tragedy of Sophocles, to contemplate it as something existing 
 for itself, and to think of it as separated from all the civil re- 
 lations of the poet, such a separation in the case of an oration 
 by Demosthenes cannot be so effected in the least degree. 
 Nothing in it is an isolated piece of art ; nothing can be torn 
 out from the web of circumstances in which it was spoken ; 
 only in connection with these does it constitute a unity, 
 which again was nothing but an act, — a point in the political 
 career of the orator. When the ancient orators appeared, 
 their discourse was an action in the strictest and most com- 
 mon signification of the word ; an action that was none the 
 less worthy of the name, and none the less powerful, because 
 they made use of speech instead of limbs, weapons, or other 
 instruments. Nay, even in our unrhetorical times, if one were 
 to regard the discourses of a sacred orator as a series of little 
 separate pieces of art, delivered every Sunday, everybody cer- 
 tainly would protest against such a view, and demand that his 
 orations be regarded as individual attempts to influence his 
 hearers, — as individual acts in the discharge of his calling ; 
 whereby they would also become lost in the sum- total of his 
 social influence. But since all the influence of man in his 
 various relations is, or should be, under the guidance of the 
 moral law, the practice of Eloquence — inasmuch as it is, in 
 reality, influence of this sort — can be subjected to no other than 
 Ethical laws. Eloquence strives to produce a change in the 
 sentiments and conduct of other men ; the question, after its 
 fundamental principles, therefore, becomes changed quite na- 
 turally into this ; What are the laws according to which a free 
 
16 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OK, 
 
 being may exert influence upon other free beings ? And the 
 answer to this question can be derived only from Ethics. 
 
 We will attempt to answer it. And if it shall turn out that 
 all the rules of Eloquence, which have been truly and cor- 
 rectly acknowledged as such, but which have been placed be- 
 side each other in no inward connection, can be derived from 
 the laws, according to which a free being may exert influence 
 upon other free beings, there will be no doubt that Rhetoric, 
 considered as the theory of Eloquence, is a part of Ethics, 
 and that Eloquence itself is an ability to exert influence ac- 
 cording to ethical laws — that is, is a Virtue. 
 
 In this way, moreover, the perplexity will be removed in 
 which Theorizers find themselves when they would deter- 
 mine whether Eloquence is an art or not, and generally, what 
 it is in reality. They cannot declare it to be an art, since it 
 is plain that it aims at the attainment of an outward end, and 
 not at a free and uninterested representation of the Beautiful. 
 To the level of a trade, however, it cannot be degraded ; hence 
 a distinction is made between fine and non-fine, aesthetic and 
 non-sesthetic, arts ; strange expressions and difficult to be un* 
 derstood ! # Into this latter class Eloquence is thrown, with 
 the additional remark, that it merits the name of an art, in 
 so far as we connect with this term the conception of a prac- 
 tised and cultivated capacity and ability to produce works 
 w r hose individual parts in their closest connection unite for 
 
 * Schott's Theory of Eloquence, 1807, p. 17. Fundamental Princi- 
 ples of Rhetoric and Homiletics, by the same, 1815, p. 420. — A con- 
 densed summary of the first mentioned work of Schott, by Prof. Parl$. 
 may be found in the Bibliotheca Sacra. — T?\ 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 17 
 
 one and the same end. Under this conception, however, be- 
 longs also every ability of a mechanical kind, and hence no- 
 thing is added to the dignity of Eloquence by such a dis- 
 tinction. But if the view of Eloquence brought forward by 
 us can be maintained, not only a much more settled and defi- 
 nite place would be secured to it, but also a place in the high- 
 est degree honorable. It would belong to that which is high- 
 est among men, to Virtue ; and could be called an Art only in 
 so far as the name of Art could be given to Virtue itself. 
 
 But in saying that Eloquence is a virtue, it is by no means 
 meant that a certain degree of moral excellence is enough in 
 order to Eloquence, and that all that is usually derived from 
 Art, Learning, and Science, can be dispensed with. It is only 
 meant that the arrangement and definition of that which Elo- 
 quence derives to itself from these different departments, be- 
 longs peculiarly to Ethical laws ; but this is the very thing that 
 is demanded of a highest fundamental principle. Who, for ex- 
 ample, would deny that the imagination is the highest law- 
 giver for the painter ? And yet no painting can be completed 
 by the imagination alone. There is needed, besides, mechan- 
 ical skill, knowledge of colors, of perspective, of anatomy, of 
 history ; the imagination as the highest fundamental principle, 
 merely determines how each of these knowledges and abilities 
 shall be applied. In like manner, means of various kinds are 
 necessary to the orator, according to the different relations 
 which he sustains, and according to the different ends which 
 he proposes to himself, which are to be obtained only by study 
 and practice ; but that which determines where, how, and in 
 what degree, each of the existing means shall be applied, is 
 2* 
 
18 ELOaUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 the Ethical law, to which belongs every judgment regarding 
 our relations, our ends, and our social influence. So that here 
 the moral law does not merely point out the time for the 
 action, leaving the guidance of the action to another principle, 
 as would be the case in the practice of any particular art ; but 
 Eloquence, in all its various forms, is nothing but the develope- 
 ment of the Ethical impulse itself. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 19 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 IDEAS. 
 
 But what is the tenor of this highest law of Eloquence, 
 which, according to what has been said, must necessarily be an 
 Ethical one? It does not seem to us to be necessary here to 
 unfold from the bottom a new and peculiar system of morals ; 
 it will be sufficient to consider closely the relation which the 
 orator sustains to the hearer. The few positions which we 
 shall lay down, will, it is hoped, meet with a confirmatory re- 
 sponse in the moral feeling of every cultivated man. 
 
 The orator has plans and designs which he would realize, 
 and to this end he must first overcome the sluggishness of in- 
 different minds, and give them an impulse to action ; and 
 secondly, he must overcome those who openly oppose, and 
 carry them along with him. But he has no compulsory 
 authority at all over the minds of others ; he is not a law- 
 giver, who ordains the relations of men, and thus gives them 
 direction in a mediate, yet sure and irresistible manner ; he 
 is not a ruler, who leads a whole people hither and thither, 
 because he has control over the possessions, life, and standing 
 of every individual. He stands upon a perfect equality with 
 those upon whom he would exert an influence ; and since his 
 relation to them ensures him no open authority over their 
 freedom, he may not surreptitiously obtain it in any secret 
 manner ; he must respect their freedom, and neither by exciting 
 
20 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR. 
 
 their emotions, nor deluding their understandings, deprive 
 them of this prerogative. The hearer who is carried away, 
 must, at the same time, act independently also ; and while he 
 follows the will of the orator, he must not merely believe that 
 he is following his own will, but must actually follow it. But 
 how is the solution of such a difficult, and, as it would seem, 
 insoluble problem, rendered possible ? From the fact that 
 there is something altogether universal and necessary which 
 all men will — something which they must will, from their 
 moral nature ; from the fact that the true freedom of man is 
 constantly striving after the realization of certain ideas, 
 which can be enumerated and distinctly pointed out. The 
 orator, therefore, has satisfied all the requisitions of morality, 
 as soon as he has carried back his present design to one of 
 those ideas which every individual of his hearers wishes to 
 realize. For, in this way, the freedom of one man is not de- 
 stroyed by the influence of another upon him ; he only fulfils 
 from an impulse from without, what he is constantly seeking 
 to fulfil from an inward impulse. The highest law of Elo- 
 quence, therefore, is this : — the idea which the orator wishes 
 to realize, is to be carried back to the necessary ideas of the 
 hearer. 
 
 Of these necessary ideas we must now obtain a more dis- 
 tinct apprehension. Ideas, generally, are productive thoughts, 
 which impel to production and action, and are themselves the 
 germ of that which is to be produced, as well as the rule by 
 which its form is to be constructed. As there are plastic,* 
 
 * Plastic is here used in its strict signification, to denote that which 
 pertains to sculpture, including works both in stone and bronze.— Tr. 
 
OCTLIXES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 21 
 
 musical, poetic ideas, from which the creations in each of these 
 spheres of art originate ; so there are also ethical ideas, 
 which are destined to be embodied in life, which lie in the 
 reason, must be pre-supposed to be in every man considered 
 as a being endowed with reason, and are, moreover, actually 
 in-dwelling in every one, though not in equal clearness and 
 liveliness. For the mind in action, these ideas flow together 
 into one, and form a whole, which flames before it as the one 
 highest, after which it strives, and which is capable of an out- 
 ward realization in its action. But in reflection, and in verbal 
 statement, this one highest divides into three different ideas, 
 according as it is referred to the circumstances under which 
 action occurs, or to the character of the subject who acts, or 
 to the necessary inward and outward consequences of the ac- 
 tion. Every man wills the highest, in so far as it is closely 
 determined and conditioned by his peculiar relations ; this is 
 the Idea of Duty, Every man wills to be inclined and able to 
 produce the highest at all times, and everywhere ; this is the 
 Idea of Virtue. Every man wills that each and every one of 
 his actions produce a series of internal and external conse- 
 quences that will render the production of the highest easier 
 for him in future ; this is the Idea of Happiness. In a word, 
 every man wills to fulfil his duty, wills to form himself to vir- 
 tue, wills to promote his own happiness.^ These are the ne- 
 
 * The author here means to say that man wills to fulfil his duty, to 
 form himself to virtue, and to promote his own real happiness, ideally — 
 not actually. By virtue of his moral constitution, he wills and must 
 will this, though by reason of sin he actually does not. But the orator 
 must address man as he came from his Creator, and not as he has made 
 himself; he must appeal to that which is highest in him, even although 
 
22 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; Oft, 
 
 cessary practical ideas which are to be met with in every man, 
 and freedom consists only in following these ideas uncondi- 
 tionally. 
 
 It is plain now, in what consists the first duty of the ora- 
 tor. The hearer, while he is borne along, is, nevertheless, to 
 remain free, and through the whole of his oration the orator is 
 to carry back the idea everywhere present in it, to the neces- 
 sary ideas of the hearer. He, in this way, shows them how, 
 in order to fulfil their duty — in order to elevate themselves to 
 virtue — in order to promote their happiness, they must also 
 realize his propositions ; how the ideas of Duty, of Virtue, of 
 Happiness, of themselves necessarily produce this very dispo- 
 sition, necessarily impel them to the very conduct to which he 
 would urge them. In this way, the orator not only respects 
 the freedom of the hearer, but while he seems to overpower 
 and utterly subject him, raises him, through the enlivenment 
 of his ideas, to the very highest grade of an independent self- 
 consciousness. It is for this reason, also, that men who abhor 
 all compulsion, and are ready to resist all compulsory violence, 
 love the orator and follow him gladly, because he gives them 
 a direction, by means of ideas, the most powerful and certain, 
 yet, at the same time, most innocent force by which men are 
 controlled. "Whoever feels himself to be compelled, says 
 Xenophon, "hates, as if he were deprived of some good; who- 
 ever is persuaded, loves as if he had received a benefit."^ 
 
 it does not find a realization in his actual life.. Only in this way can 
 he profoundly move or elevate his hearer.^— ^V» 
 
 * Memor. 1.2, 10. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 23 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS FORM OF PRACTICAL IDEAS. 
 
 But only in the most general relations — relations in which 
 men meet each other as free beings merely, and before any 
 relation of a more limited sort has developed itself from this 
 original relation, do the regulating ideas of the will appear as 
 Duty, Virtue, and Happiness. Through every closer connection 
 among men, by which that original relation is further devel- 
 oped and unfolded, these ideas also obtain a stricter determin- 
 ation, a wider unfolding, and, consequently, another name. 
 There are, however, two relations among men which have the 
 common aim to render easy the realization of practical ideas, 
 and which have both been established by God, the one in a 
 supernatural manner, the other by a necessity of nature. The 
 first is the Church ; the second is the State. 
 
 We will, in the first place, consider what form the ethical 
 ideas assume in this latter relation. Since in the State the 
 universal ethical law, in its application to particular cases, 
 becomes more closely determined by positive laws and ordi- 
 nances, Civil Law here comes in, in the place of Duty. Since, 
 furthermore, in the State, the happiness of every individual 
 consists in his activity as a citizen being unrestricted, and 
 since this cannot be unless there is a flourishing condition of 
 the commonwealth, the ethical idea of Happiness becomes 
 changed mto the striving after the well-being of the State. 
 
24 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 Lastly, Virtue here comes into notice only in so far as the 
 highest — to the production of which it is disposed and suited— 
 also promotes the well-being of the commonwealth, and in 
 this reference Virtue is called Merit. Civil Law, the Common 
 Weal, and Merit, are, consequently, the necessary ideas, by 
 which every member of State, as such, is guided in his con- 
 duct ; and the first duty of the orator, if he is dealing with his 
 hearers as members of a State, consists in showing them how, 
 through the execution of that which he proposes, Civil Law 
 will be obeyed, the Common Weal will be promoted, and 
 Civic Merit will be acquired* 
 
 But these ideas attain a perfect unfolding, neither in the 
 general ethical relations, nor in the particular political, since 
 in these they remain shut up within the sphere of the earthly, 
 which can never satisfy man, from his very nature. They 
 acquire their highest dignity only through religion, and through 
 their reference to the Deity, who imparts this reference to 
 them. Hence they appear in the Church, where the Christian, 
 as such, exercises an influence upon the Christian, regards 
 his own activity as an efflux from the Deity, or as a striving 
 to return back into Him, and thereby imparts to these ideas an 
 actuating power, both for himself and others, of which they 
 are always destitute when man does not rise above and be- 
 yond his own individuality. 
 
 In the Church, however, a divine institution, and under di- 
 vine guidance, the human reason cannot be regarded as the 
 highest law-giver ; God alone is the supreme law-giver who 
 speaks to us through his natural word in the Conscience, and 
 his revealed word in the Gospel, and gives us a rule of con- 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 25 
 
 duct ; what, therefore, this commands in a particular instance, 
 is not merely Duty, (an idea that carries man back no further 
 than to himself merely,) but the Will of God. Furthermore, 
 when the Christian contemplates that disposition of the soul 
 which is constantly applying itself to good works, and is able 
 to perform them, he cannot possibly stop at mere Virtue ; for 
 this denotes that degree of moral perfection to which man can 
 raise himself — which he can attain by a constant struggle with 
 sin. But the Christian knows of something higher ; he be- 
 holds moral perfection as it reigns, without struggle, and 
 without conflict, in the divine Being ; and hence this perfect 
 condition of the soul can, for him, consist only in resemblance 
 to God, or, since the invisible God has become man, and has 
 lived and acted in human relationships, in resemblance to 
 Christ. Happiness, again, he cannot possibly seek in a series 
 of states and conditions, each one of w T hich renders the pro- 
 duction of the highest good, easier in the next following ; in- 
 stead of this, his eye, pressing forward into eternity, beholds 
 the final goal to which this series conducts — namely, intimate 
 union with God, or Blessedness ; he, therefore, as his guiding 
 idea, chooses this alone, which is the goal, and not Happiness, 
 which conceived of in its highest ethical purity, can yet con- 
 stitute only the way to this goal. 
 
 Hence, when an orator contemplates himself and his hearers 
 as members of the Church, his first duty consists in bringing 
 the Idea which he would impart to them, into connection 
 with the Ideas which he must necessarily presuppose in 
 them ; and these, according to the foregoing, are the W r ill of 
 God, Resemblance to God, Blessedness. If no one of these is 
 3 
 
26 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 prominent in a sermon, as the point from which everything 
 is viewed, so much is certain at least — the sermon does 
 not belong to the sphere of Eloquence. It is not conceivable, 
 however, why the sacred orator should deem it unworthy of 
 his office to be at home in this sphere of Eloquence, since ac- 
 cording to what has been said before, Eloquence is not only 
 the most innocent of all influences, but is Virtue itself. It 
 has shown itself to be such thus far, and, it is hoped, will 
 prove itself to be such, still more, in what is to follow. 
 
 I must here beg my readers to carefully note a result which 
 flows with the greatest certainty from the investigation thus 
 far, the truth of which, however, has never been strictly 
 proved, nay, has been doubted by most — namely, that eccle- 
 siastical Eloquence is entirely one and the same with politi- 
 cal, as to its Ideas, 2. e., as to its nature. 
 
 In saying this, however, we do not deny that they differ 
 from one another in their outward form, in an important de- 
 gree ; for Church and State are very different relationships, 
 and relationships always exert a material influence upon 
 every species of moral activity .^ 
 
 ■ It is apparent furthermore, that even if it be granted that 
 the political and judicial Eloquence of the Ancients has per- 
 ished, still only one form of the thing, and not the very thing 
 
 * Herder says in his letters upon the study of Theology, (letter 40,) 
 " Whoever takes the judicial orations of Demosthenes and Cicero, as 
 an absolute model for his sermons, has no true conception either of a 
 sermon or of a judicial oration; he does not understand the true end of 
 either." True, if he makes them an absolute model. But as I have pre- 
 sented the matter, this objection would not, it is hoped, apply to my 
 view. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 27 
 
 itself, has perished ; for this has risen again in Ecclesiastical 
 Eloquence with a still higher splendor ; the Ideas upon which 
 Eloquence is based have been made more splendid by passing 
 through the medium of Religion, and whatever deficiency 
 modern Eloquence may have in perfection of form, when com^ 
 pared with ancient, it is compensated for by the superiority 
 of its subject-matter, while, at the same time, it is to be re-f 
 membered that perfection in the outward form is far more 
 easily attained when the subject is of a less elevated nature, 
 than when it is of the absolutely highest. Finally, it is ap- 
 parent, that even if it be granted that Ecclesiastical Eloquence 
 itself has disappeared, as is actually asserted by some, still 
 Eloquence itself is not destroyed, but must be sought for in 
 the intercourse of men, in their daily society. In a word, 
 Eloquence is eternal, for it rests upon that which is eternal in 
 man — upon his ethical Ideas.^ 
 
 * L' eloquence peut se trouverdans les entretiens et dans tout genre 
 d'ecrire. Elle est rarement, ou on la cherche, et elle est quelquefois ou 
 on ne la cherche point. — La Bniyere. 
 
28 ELOaUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF ELOQUENCE. 
 
 Although all three of these Ideas may be employed very pro- 
 perly on one and the same occasion, as motive grounds, yet 
 most commonly, the aim of the orator has a more easy refer- 
 ence to one of them, which is then predominant, and to which 
 the others, when they are employed, are subordinated. This 
 circumstance led the Ancients to assume three species of ora- 
 tions, of which one has Legality and Illegality, another, Public 
 Advantage and Public Detriment, and the third, Civic Merit 
 and Civic Demerit, for its subject-matter. The first is the ora- 
 tion before the court of justice ; the second, the deliberative 
 or political oration ; the third, the panegyrical or demonstra- 
 tive oration. Correct as this division is, the Ancients have 
 nevertheless, so far as I am aware, given no satisfactory 
 ground for it, as indeed they were in general well fitted for 
 comprehending and distinguishing the Actual, but were less 
 successful in referring it to its higher principles. For that 
 which Aristotle, from whom the later Rhetoricians derive this 
 division,* offers in its justification,! has in truth more resem- 
 blance to a jest, however earnest he may have been in it. 
 There are, says he, as many species of orations as there are 
 
 * auintil. Ill, 4. 
 
 t Rhetor. I, 3. Cicero derives this division in the same way. De 
 Partitione, c, III. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 29 
 
 species of hearers ; but the hearer is either a spectator or 
 a judge, and this latter again, in respect to the Future, and in 
 respect to the Past ; hence there arise the demonstrative, the 
 deliberative, and the judicial orations. This supposition, of 
 a hearer who is merely a spectator, is most remarkable. The 
 demonstrative orations of the Sophists, (i. e., discourses 
 having no other aim but to strike by the jingle of words,) 
 were indeed listened to with applause in the time of Aristotle ; 
 but this must be regarded only as a piece of bad taste, and 
 not as a natural impulse in man, upon which to build philosor 
 phically. Furthermore, although the relations in which the 
 hearers usually stood to the orator in the ancient Kepublics, 
 are imperfectly indeed denoted by this passing of judgment 
 on the Past or the Future, yet it is by no means shown 
 thereby, that there were only so many and could be no more 
 of such relations/* 
 
 On the contrary, if these three species of orations are placed 
 beside the three Ideas above-mentioned, it is apparent that 
 these are the only ground upon which the division in question 
 rests. For since among the Ancients, only the political rela- 
 tion reached any good degree of perfection, these Ideas could 
 be actualized among them only under the form of the Legal 
 and the Illegal, the Weal and the Detriment of the State, Civic 
 Merit and its contrary, and this very relation is also assigned 
 as the subject-matter of the three species. 
 . If divisions are to be made at all in Eloquence, the different 
 species cannot be determined by a reference to the Form 
 
 * That also does not seem to be satisfactoiy which occurs to Q,u;n- 
 tjlian, cuncta rimanti, III, 4. 
 3* 
 
30 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 and Matter, and to the manner in which both interpenetrate each 
 other ; in Poetry this can be done ; in Eloquence it cannot be,* 
 for the reason, that the Form and the Matter vary with the 
 relations which the orator and the hearer sustain, and these 
 relations are too numerous to be specified. The leading 
 Ideas are the permanent in Eloquence, the only thing which 
 does not change ; and on this account, they of themselves alone 
 furnish a ground of division. 
 
 If , these three species constitute a valid division in political 
 Eloquence, they must be found in sacred Eloquence also, 
 since the fundamental Ideas are the same in both. To coun- 
 sel for the well-being of the State, and to point out the way to 
 eternal well-being, is a moral activity of one and the same kind ; 
 as also there is no practical difference between accusing a 
 criminal and inveighing against a vice, between praising a 
 meritorious man and recommending a virtue. It is only to 
 be regretted that the names by which the Ancients designated 
 these species are suited to political Eloquence alone ; and it 
 could be wished, that appellations of an entirely general char- 
 acter might be introduced, which could be applied indiscri- 
 minately to both political and sacred Eloquence. 
 
 That species of oration which is based upon the Idea of 
 Virtue was developed latest ; it first received its complete 
 unfolding through the Church, to which the State was 
 always unfavorable. For this reason, also, this species 
 was never known among the Ancients in its purity. Aris- 
 totle apprehends it merely on the side of the praise and 
 
 * Oratorum genera esse dicuntur tamquam poetarum. Id secus est 
 
 Cicero de optimo genere oratorum, c. I. 
 
I OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 31 
 
 blame which it dispenses, and makes it a demonstrative oration 
 without any practical aim. Cicero, who adheres closely to 
 this same view, doubts whether it can be regarded as a species 
 at all, and whether it is necessary to give rules concerning it.* 
 And contemplated from this point of view, it certainly does 
 not belong to Eloquence. If a writer praises and censures 
 with no other purpose but to praise and to censure, produc- 
 tions of two kinds can arise : a Lyrical Poem, if the writer sur- 
 renders himself to his feelings ; or an historical representation, 
 if he follows the thread of a narrative. It will be an oration 
 only in case the purpose to awaken a certain disposition in 
 the hearer, — to determine him to a certain course of conduct, 
 is connected with the praise and the censure. The Idea of 
 Virtue is employed in this way certainly by the Ancients ; yet 
 it is seldom predominant, and commonly is subordinate mere- 
 ly, as when Demosthenes places before the Athenians the ex- 
 ample of their forefathers as an incitement to great deeds, or 
 pictures the worthlessness of an opponent in order to give 
 greater weight to his defence or accusation. 
 
 A peculiar species of oration, based upon the Idea of Vir- 
 tue, was first formed in the Christian Church ; here the moral 
 perfection, which is conceived of as being in God, which was 
 manifested in Christ, after w T hich whole companies of saints 
 strove, was exhibited to believers for imitation. With the 
 panegyrical oration in praise of the saints, was soon conjoined 
 the funeral oration, which is also constructed upon the Idea 
 of Virtue, and which deserves the name of an oration only 
 when, through commendation of the deceased, it seeks to 
 
 * De Oratore, II, c. 11. 
 
32 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR 
 
 impel the hearer to good inclinations and resolutions. E very- 
 department of Literature, nevertheless, has its limits, where 
 it borders upon some other ; thus this species of oration, 
 based upon the Idea of Virtue, forms the transition from 
 Eloquence to the Lyrical Poem, on the one hand, and to Histo- 
 rical Representation on the other. For this reason, the great- 
 est care is requisite in the orator at this point, in order not to 
 lose himself in one or the other. It would be forgetfulness of 
 the relations in which he stands to his hearers, and, conse- 
 quently, contrary to morality, if, without thinking of their 
 benefit, he should give himself up entirely to his feelings, or 
 should follow out a Historical Representation ; either of which 
 may be done only so far as it contributes to the attainment 
 of an ethical end. It is difficult, I acknowledge, for the ora- 
 tor to describe his hero with some good degree of complete- 
 ness, and still bring all under such a practical point of view 
 as that he can be sure of exerting an influence upon the 
 hearer. Yet the solution of this problem is not impossible s 
 as the great models show. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 33 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 VIRTUE IS ALSO GOOD SENSE. 
 
 In case the orator satisfies the requisitions of duty, by refer- 
 ring the end he has in view to the ethical Ideas of the hearer, 
 the question arises, whether this course is also in accordance 
 with good sense, and whether there are not other and far 
 more effectual means of gaining entrance to men's minds, and 
 of giving them a direction. Should this be found to be the 
 case — should it be found that the orator in reality has only to 
 choose between acting contrary to good sense, by following 
 out moral principles, or acting contrary to good morals, by 
 following out the rules of good sense, we must then give up 
 the design of giving a systematic form to the Theory of Elo- 
 quence, since nothing is capable of a systematic form which 
 is either essentially incomplete in itself, or stands in open 
 contradiction to one of the fundamental impulses in man — 
 the moral. But, furthermore, this question itself could not 
 even arise, if the science of morals were only a little more 
 developed than, alas, it actually is, although man has been 
 employed in its unfolding for so many centuries. We should, 
 in that case, see that Ethics, since it includes the whole con- 
 duct of man, must also furnish the means requisite to attain 
 rational ends ; that it cannot exist at all as a science, — that 
 there can be, absolutely, no conduct in conformity with prin- 
 ciples, if the same laws which prescribe our actions do not, at 
 
34 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OB, 
 
 the same time, also point out the way and means whereby they 
 will best succeed. In accordance, however, with views now 
 prevailing, we hear much of good sense, as an attribute which 
 often leads aside from the path of morals, and which, in its 
 resources, shrewdly derived from experience and personal ob- 
 servation, furnishes us the surest means of attaining our 
 ends. Whether this is so or not, I leave undecided ; but that 
 for the orator the moral action is also good sense — L e., is the 
 true way of attaining his ends — is already apparent, from the 
 investigation thus far. For we have found this to be a law — 
 namely, that the orator must make his design subserve the 
 moral Ideas of his hearers, otherwise he must not attempt to 
 give them a direction. But so very much is Virtue one 
 with good sense, that this very reference to the moral Ideas of 
 the hearer is the only infallible means of giving him a direc- 
 tion. Will one here say, " No ! the orator must address him- 
 self to the passions of men; he must make use of them 
 where he finds them excited ; he must arouse them where he 
 cannot pre -suppose their existence, for only in this way are 
 minds and hearts swayed. Who will deny that they are not 
 very often swayed in this way, and that a practised orator, 
 who understands how to inflame the passions, is able to get 
 the victory over a less practised orator, who aims only to 
 awaken moral Ideas ?" The case, however, must not be 
 stated in this way, but we must imagine two men of equal 
 talents, one of whom takes hold of the hearer in the way pre- 
 scribed by us, on the side of his moral Ideas — that is, on his 
 stronger side, — and the other of whom endeavors to seize him 
 by his weak side, to corrupt, to blind, to deceive him ; the 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 35 
 
 first, I affirm, will always succeed, the second will always 
 fail. 
 
 And, indeed, for this reason — because by virtue of his hu- 
 man nature, moral Ideas are in-dwelling in every individual 
 hearer, while, on the contrary, the possession of a human na- 
 ture does not imply that man is controlled at all times by pas- 
 sion, or even that he is peculiarly liable to be. Consequently, 
 if the orator pre-supposes the presence of passion, it is very- 
 possible for him to be mistaken ; and if the orator endeavors 
 to excite passion, such an undertaking is always very doubt- 
 ful, since a firm point to which he can fasten is wanting. 
 This point, on the contrary, is always found, and the orator is 
 always sure to awaken interest, so soon as he claims to have 
 morality on his side. 
 
 Secondly, even supposing that the passions exist as gene- 
 rally in the hearer as the moral Ideas, yet these latter possess 
 this advantage over the former, that they are the same in all, 
 while the passions, on the contrary, are different in each indi- 
 vidual. But the orator cannot address himself to each parti- 
 cular individual ; one and the same effect is to be produced 
 in the most diverse minds by one and the same oration. Now, 
 how wanting in good sense would the orator be, if he should 
 neglect the universal interest grounded in human nature, in 
 order to speak of the particular interest grounded in a pas- 
 sion which could affect only some particular minds, and with 
 respect to which the most would be cold and indifferent ! 
 
 In the third place, in addition to this, a very true remark, 
 and one that is very much to the honor of man, applies here — 
 namely, that taken singly, men may, indeed, be full of little 
 
36 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 passions ; but so soon as they are collected in great masses, 
 each one seems to give up the base portion of his individual- 
 ity, in order to preserve the purely human in it, which is al- 
 ways good. When man loses himself in a multitude, he is no 
 longer the narrow-hearted creature governed by desire and 
 self-seeking ; but his interests melt in with those of all the 
 others, and, consequently, cannot be other than pure and 
 noble. The greater, therefore, the assemblage is, the more 
 large-minded must the orator be, or it is all over with him. 
 
 Nay, even the deception which is so often employed by 
 popular orators, proves that a direction can be imparted to 
 men only by means of moral Ideas ; for how does the orator 
 succeed even in this case ? By no means by appealing to 
 Avarice or Revenge, directly, and endeavoring to inflame 
 these passions ; for no one has ever been able to carry away a 
 great multitude by this means. On the contrary, the art of 
 the deceiver of the people has ever consisted in clothing the 
 desires growing out of their particular passions in the garb of 
 requirements, based upon the universal moral Ideas. Thus the 
 Demagogues in the French Revolution were able to bring about 
 their great results only by concealing their selfish designs un- 
 der the Ideas of Justice, the Common Weal — i. e. 9 under moral 
 Ideas ; and they could not but succeed, for owing to the mis- 
 fortune of the times, there were none who were able to exhi- 
 bit these Ideas in their pure form with equal force. But that 
 the pure moral Ideas, when they are presented with power, 
 gain the victory, (even in the most frivolous and corrupt 
 minds,) over that false play with Ideas, the case of Demos- 
 thenes proves, who beat down his opponent, not merely by 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 37 
 
 means of his massive Style and his perfect Declamation, but 
 mainly by means of the purity of his Will, and the power 
 of his moral Ideas. 
 
 Fourthly, it is to be remembered that every hearer is by 
 nature suspicious, particularly when he perceives that the 
 right to influence his mind is claimed, and when he reflects 
 that he should yield himself up only to one who appears to 
 him to be an honest man. It is for this reason, also, that 
 teachers of Rhetoric attach so much importance to the way in 
 which the speaker appears to the hearer, and to the first im- 
 pression which the hearer receives from the orator. But 
 nothing is so difficult as to play the honest man, and one is 
 far more readily taken for an honest man, if he really is one. 
 For the consciousness of being in the right imparts a coloring 
 to the style, and an emphasis to the tone, which an evil con- 
 science can imitate only in part, never perfectly ; and the 
 morally bad which peers through, will always induce a sus- 
 piciousness in the hearer, which renders him less susceptible 
 to influence. Hence, when Rousseau advised a young and 
 afterwards very distinguished French advocate, Loiseau de 
 Mauleon, to undertake the defence of only such causes as he 
 was convinced were just, this was a Rhetorical rule, for 
 the very reason that it was an ethical tule, and adapted to 
 promote, in the same degree, both Integrity and Eloquence. 
 
3S ELOaUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 THE SUBORDINATE IDEAS OR CATEGORIES. 
 
 The orator, in this moral striving to connect his particular 
 Ideas with the universal and necessary Ideas of his hearers, is 
 liable to meet with obstacles of three different kinds. Fij^t, 
 there are the obscure and undeveloped conceptions which the 
 hearer forms of the nature of things, whereby he may be pre- 
 vented from recognizing something which the orator holds 
 out (as e. g. t Duty, Virtue, or Happiness,) as really being 
 such, and so from taking it up into his own Ideas. Secondly, 
 the hearer, from a defective knowledge of existing relations, 
 and of the present state of things, may be in doubt whether 
 an Idea, from which in other respects he does not dissent, is 
 practicable. Lastly, the hearer may form a different opinion 
 with respect to the actual reality of a matter to which the 
 orator would apply one of the higher Ideas, or, to speak gene- 
 rally, may not be convinced of its real historical existence. 
 Hence arises the necessity for the orator, first, to instruct the 
 hearer in the true ifature and quality of things ; secondly, to 
 make clear to him the practicability of the proposed under- 
 taking ; thirdly, to show him that the matter in question has 
 been actually realized, or to convince him of its historical 
 certainty. Hence arise, for the theory of Eloquence, three 
 subordinate Ideas, or Categories, as I would rather call them : 
 Truth, Possibility, Actuality. And here it is evident that 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 39 
 
 moral attributes alone do not suffice for the management of 
 these Categories, but that Philosophic culture, and a great com- 
 pass of solid knowledge, is requisite. If it is asked by what 
 right, then, we bring these Categories into a theory of Eloquence 
 grounded upon ethical principles, I would reply : Because the 
 moral maxim, that the orator should refer his particular 
 Idea to the universal Ideas of the hearer, can be followed out, 
 only in case the doubts, or false views of the hearer, in relation 
 to the categories, Truth, Possibility, and Actuality, are re- 
 moved ; and this work, since it is under the guidance of a 
 moral principle, must also be regarded as moral in its nature. 
 And secondly, because the orator, in case he did not possess 
 the scientific culture and the substantial knowledge which are 
 requisite, would be morally obligated to attain them, since 
 they are the necessary means, in order to the execution of a 
 moral undertakiog* The orator, even if he acquires Philoso- 
 phic culture and Historical knowledge, to the full extent per- 
 mitted and required by the highest ethical principles, does not 
 thereby become a Philosopher or Historian, but must ever be 
 regarded as one whose sphere is action, and who seeks to ex- 
 ert an influence externally. 
 
40 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 THE CATEGORY, TRUTH. 
 
 If we should make Truth — i. e., the exhibition of the essen- 
 tial nature of things — the ultimate end in Eloquence, Elo- 
 quence would thereby become entirely identical with Philo- 
 sophy. But we regard it only as a subordinate Category, to 
 which the higher moral Ideas lead. In this way Eloquence 
 maintains its ethical character, and at the same time its affi- 
 nity with Philosophy is explained. 
 
 It is therefore allowable, and oftentimes necessary, for the 
 orator to philosophize, whether the need of the Truth, as such, 
 becomes apparent only after the conflict between the practical 
 Ideas of the orator and the hearer has begun — in which case, 
 Truth merely furnishes the intermediate positions by which 
 the former are the more easily made to harmonize with the 
 latter ; or whether the orator begins with the exhibition of the 
 Truth — a thing that may be done if it accords with the aim and 
 the circumstances of the orator, and if the moral impulse from 
 which it originates and the moral design for which it is done, 
 are plainly to be seen. Then this impulse itself and this de- 
 sign will set the bounds within which the Rhetorical presenta- 
 tion of Truth must be kept, and by which it is distinguished 
 from the Philosophical, which aims at the mere developement 
 of Ideas without reference to anything farther. 
 
 The exhibition of Truth is an object of prime importance 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 41 
 
 in sacred Eloquence, and is one of the characteristics by 
 which it is specially distinguished from secular Eloquence. 
 In secular Eloquence, only one deed, one single resolve, is 
 sought to be produced by the orator. This determines, and of 
 necessity limits very narrowly, all that belongs to the mere de- 
 velopement of a subject and the mere informing of the mind, 
 The problem of the sacred orator, on the contrary, is — to con- 
 duct man to eternal life through the knowledge of God and of 
 His Son, and to mould his spirit in such a way that not 
 merely one good deed, but a complete change of the inner 
 man, and a whole series of good deeds, may be the result. Be- 
 flections upon human nature and its relation to God, so far as 
 they are referred back to Happiness, Virtue, and Duty, are 
 therefore perfectly in place in the sacred oration. 
 
 Nevertheless, the Rhetorical presentation of Truth is en- 
 tirely-different from the Philosophical; for, in Philosophy, 
 Truth is moulded wholly, and on all sides, in a statuesque 
 manner, so to speak, so that as in the case of a statue, there is 
 no particular point of view, no perspective, for it, but it pre- 
 sents a p o the beholder wherever he stands. In 
 Eloquence, on the contrary, Truth appears only in a pic- 
 turesque manner, and in profile, so to speak, for the orator 
 presents only so much of it to the hearer, as is necessary to 
 convince him, and as the theme requires. While, therefore, 
 Duty commands the orator to strive after scientific culture, 
 so bids him to forget and sacrifice all the sensible, pro- 
 found, and excellent thought he may have upon a topic, if it 
 lispensably necessary to the attainment of his end. 
 4# 
 
42 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR ; 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 THE RHETORICAL DEMONSTRATION OF TRUTH. 
 
 Two points, therefore, have been fixed with respect to Philo- 
 sophizing in Eloquence : first, that some exhibition of politi- 
 cal, ethical, and religious truths is necessary in Eloquence ; 
 second, that this exhibition cannot be made with the complete- 
 ness of Philosophy. From this it follows, further, that the 
 strict demonstration of a proposition — i. e. f its derivation from 
 the one highest principle of all knowledge — is not allowable in 
 an oration ; since by a method of this sort, the practical aim 
 of the oration would either be destroyed entirely, or at best 
 would only faintly glimmer through. Here, therefore, arises 
 the difficult question : How is Truth to be established in Elo- 
 quence, if it is not allowable to demonstrate it Philosophi- 
 cally ? 
 
 In answer, it is to be noted in the first place, that there are 
 many truths which do not need such a demonstration, and to 
 which the orator can gain the assent of all hearers by a plain 
 explication, by a happy illustration, by a fitting application of 
 it to a circumstance in plain view. 
 
 If this is not possible, then doubt respecting any particular 
 Truth, since it cannot be removed by means of a demonstra- 
 tion, must be removed by means of Authority ; that is, the 
 Authority of the hearer himself or the Authority of another. 
 And this latter, again, is either human or divine. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 43 
 
 The orator cites the Authority of the hearer himself, when 
 he shows him that, in rejecting a certain Truth, he stands 
 in contradiction to himself, and to convictions to which he 
 has given expression upon other occasions. This species of 
 argument, which, from its brevity and convincing power, has 
 such a great advantage over philosophical demonstrations, is 
 to be strongly recommended to the orator, and in order to be 
 able to apply it with success, he must have the views and 
 opinions of the general mass constantly in view, and as much 
 as possible must enter into them. Herein, I believe, partly 
 consists the Popularity so highly praised, and always required, 
 in the orator. I am not afraid that the orator, in thus con- 
 stantly referring to the in ate convict'ons of his hearers, will 
 find that which is false and degrading. It would indeed be 
 degrading to proceed from an Idea which the orator him- 
 self regards as absurd, for the sake of pleasing the hearer ; but 
 why are the opinions diffused among the mass of men to be 
 regarded as false and absurd, as a matter of course ? On the 
 contrary, is it not an essential characterist c of human nature 
 that the Truth can never utterly die out of i , but that a por- 
 tion of it is ever preserved pure and genuine ? And why 
 should not the orator present what he has to say, in this form, 
 rather than in a systematic argument ? Since, moreover, the 
 freedom of the hearer must be respected, it will be respected 
 far more if I mould him, so to speak, from within outward, 
 and by means of the developement which I impart to his own 
 Ideas, than if I lace him up in a system foreign to him. And 
 I shall have less reason for attempting this last, because, by 
 joining on upon his own inward conviction, I can with less dif- 
 
44 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 ticulty gain him over to a salutary truth ; and because, on the 
 contrary, the finest philosophical explication would perhaps 
 only weary him and render him indifferent to his own true 
 well-being and the practical aim of my oration. Hence, if an 
 orator in the expression of his Ideas, seeks to please himself 
 simply, and for this reason forgets his hearers and the end 
 which he has or should have in view, I affirm that this is not 
 only contrary to good sense, since he can never in this way 
 attain his end, but it is also contrary to morality — it is repre- 
 hensible self-seeking. And the evidence that it is contrary to 
 morality, is found in the very fact, that it defeats his under- 
 taking. For the orator, with all his powers, is now in the 
 Ethical domain, and consequently, that which aids these 
 powers must be morally good, and that which thwarts them 
 must be morally bad. The distinctive character therefore, of 
 oratorical discourse, is Popularity, using the term in its high- 
 est sense ; and the orator is to join on upon the Truth as it 
 exists among the mass of the people, and to esteem the gen- 
 eral form in which he finds it here, more highly than that 
 particular form which he has given to it in his Philosophical 
 system. 
 
 If, however, there should be no one anions: the Ideas of the 
 hearer which the orator can employ as the basis of his argu- 
 mentation, then, since a scientific investigation is entirely for- 
 bidden him, he must betake himself to human or divine Au- 
 thority. And, indeed, nothing is more frequent than the em- 
 ployment of the former of these in speeches upon legal cases 
 and affairs of state. If the orator thinks that the enlivenment 
 of the Ethical Ideas of the judge is not sufficient in order to 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 45 
 
 obtain from him the desired decision, he cites the Authority of 
 the law : and if an opinion which is being maintained is not 
 in accordance with the conceptions of a political assemblage, it 
 must then be shown that, in a similar case, a statesman of ac- 
 knowledged wisdom thought or spoke in the very same way. 
 
 To sacred Eloquence, in particular, Authority, and indeed 
 a divine Authority, is so necessary, that this species of Elo- 
 quence would not have arisen, and, even now, cannot exist, 
 without it. The highest of all truths — those pertaining to 
 the relation of God to man — are here presented to view, in 
 order to serve as a guide to man in his striving after Happi- 
 ness, and as motives to sanctiiication. Even granting, what, 
 however, is not to be granted, that these truths can be reached 
 by Philosophic Deduction alone, yet this method is not to be 
 followed by the orator ; for, although knowledge, indeed, 
 might be imparted in this way, yet all the practical benefits 
 of knowledge would be lost, or, at best, would be but scantily 
 reaped. Furthermore, neither the Authority of the hearer, 
 nor that of any man whatever, is a sufficient foundation upon 
 which to base truths of such importance, and which lie en- 
 tirely beyond the ordinary field of view. They need, there- 
 fore, a divine Authority, when they are employed in public 
 discourse, to promote the sanctification and blessedness of men. 
 It was for this reason that, among the Ancients, who were des- 
 titute of a positive Revelation, not even a purely moral Elo- 
 quence could be developed along with political Eloquence, 
 notwithstanding the high degree of excellence which charac- 
 terises their ethical systems, and that a religio-moral Elo- 
 quence did not appear until Christianity appeared. This 
 
46 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 species of Eloquence rises and sets according as Faith in a 
 divine Revelation grows stronger or weaker ; and, from the 
 very nature of the case, in proportion as the sacred orator 
 loses the conviction of the divine Authority of the Bible, his 
 Eloquence, also, must Jose in Power and Dignity. Let one 
 imagine to himself a pulpit orator endowed with the finest ta- 
 lents, but who places his own individual reason not beneath, but 
 above Revelation, and who, consequently, in determining the 
 relations which God sustains to man, and which men should 
 sustain to each other, can appeal to no higher divine Authori- 
 ty. If the predominant bent of his mind is Philosophic, he 
 will make it his principal business to exhibit, to explain, and, 
 as far as possible, to demonstrate, the principles of his reli- 
 gious and ethical systems. Now, passing over the objection 
 to such an undertaking, that it is ordinarily not suited to the 
 average degree of culture in a promiscuous assembly, I ask 
 what, at most, can be the result, even supposing that the 
 hearer rightly apprehends all the views of the speaker ? 
 Scientific culture, indeed ; but the improvement of the heart 
 and life of the hearer, and not scientific culture, was the de- 
 sign of the orator, and he must miss of this, since his whole 
 time has been taken up in the endeavor to establish certain 
 truths, and none is left, to connect them with the higher prac- 
 tical Ideas of the hearer. Ke will, perhaps, attempt to do 
 this in the conclusion ; but if the whole of the oration, up to 
 the conclusion, has not been planned with the design to 
 awaken moral interest, the orator will in vain labor after this 
 in the application of his discourse. 
 
 Furthermore, it seems to me that one can never have so 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 47 
 
 firm and unshaken confidence in the religious and practical 
 views which he derives from a human system, be it his own 
 or another's, as in those truths which, having acknowledged a 
 revelation, he receives on its Authority. Hence, there will 
 always be in the minds of pulpit orators who are skeptical 
 respecting a Revelation, a certain embarrassment, scarcely per- 
 ceived by themselves, which will betray itself in their pre- 
 sentation of Truth, now by a cold, indifferent tone, now by 
 unnatural effort and distorted zeal ; and thus the truths pre- 
 sented by them, however excellent they may be, will never 
 acquire the influence over the feelings and the will which a 
 calmer, more powerful emphasis would have imparted. 
 
 But what carries this embarrassment to the highest pitch, 
 and must, in the utmost degree, weaken the Rhetorical power 
 of a pulpit orator in the exhibition of truth, is the obscure 
 feeling which will certainly press upon him, that, considering 
 the relation which he sustains to his hearer, there is some- 
 thing contrary to uprightness in such a way of thought ; and 
 this not merely because he is acting contrary to the designs 
 of the State and the Church, who have appointed him to pro- 
 claim, not his own individual and human opinions, but divine 
 truth — although this seems to me to be a very well-grounded 
 scruple — but principally because his office invests him with a 
 dignity and respect which must appear as unwarrantable as- 
 sumption in the case of every one who does not found his 
 teaching on divine Authority. It is true, indeed, that when 
 a man appears before other men, in order to prosecute the 
 guilty, or defend the innocent, or to propose measures for the 
 Common Weal, he needs no impulse from above, and no divine 
 
48 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 Authority, in order to do this. But it is difficult to under- 
 stand how a man, with no basis but his own strength alone, 
 and not regarding himself as the ambassador of a higher be- 
 ing, can dare to point out to his fellow-men, this, as the road 
 to salvation, and that, as the road to perdition, and now, to 
 urge them on by the prospect of the punishment and retribu- 
 tions of a future world, and now, to hold them back. He can 
 acquire the right to do this only through a wisdom and vir- 
 tue higher than human ; and who will venture to ascribe 
 these perfections to himself? The higher the degree in which 
 he does really possess them, the greater, it seems to me, must 
 be his dread of being made vain, even in his feelings, by ap- 
 pearing in public. Moreover, he sees among his hearers 
 persons who are his equals in moral and scientific culture, or, 
 it may be, his superiors. Feeling as though, in this case, it 
 would be unbecoming to seize with a strong grasp upon their 
 minds, he seeks to say to his little public only what is pa- 
 thetic, agreeable and entertaining ; and if he describes a 
 vice, he gives them to understand that he does not suspect 
 any one of his hearers^ but has in his eye certain other per- 
 sons who are out of their circle. Emotion is everything for 
 him, and the awakening of Feeling that comes to nothing ; 
 he seeks to be brilliant by means of external attractions and 
 an ornamental style ; # and thus his discourses are deprived 
 of power and usefulness by his skepticism. 
 
 Let one, on the contrary, imagine to himself a sacred ora- 
 tor of less talent, but who, to a sincere will to do good, joins 
 
 * Un clerc mondain ou irreiigieux, s'il monte en chaire, est declama- 
 teur. — hn Bruy&re. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 49 
 
 an unshaken belief in the truths of the Christian religion ; 
 and let him see what a higher elevation and sweep his dis- 
 courses will receive from this single circumstance. While he 
 derives the sublimest truths from the Holy Scriptures, where 
 they are given to him in the clearest, most popular form, he 
 is, at the same time, through the divine Authority of the Bi- 
 ble, raised above all prolix developements and arguments, and 
 without troubling himself about them, can apply his whole 
 power to directly impressing the minds of his hearers. The 
 truths exhibited by him will be the more readily believed, 
 since he himself speaks only because he believes, and since 
 his firm inward conviction gives an equally calm and moving 
 emphasis to his tone, before which all doubt must disappear. 
 With all the humility produced by a sense of the weakness of 
 the human reason, as well as of his own moral deficiencies, he 
 yet feels that, without assumption, he may address instruction, 
 rebuke and exhortation to his equals, nay, to those better and 
 wiser than himself, since he speaks to them, not in his own, 
 but in God's name ; and since as an ambassador of the 
 Highest, he is raised above every one, be he who he may. 
 Since, therefore, the design of the sacred orator to lead to Vir- 
 tue and Happiness through the knowledge of the truth, is to 
 be attained only through his belief in Eevelation ; since with- 
 out this, the relation which he sustains to his hearers has not 
 even a moral validity, it is plain that belief in Eevelation in 
 his case, must not only be regarded as a religious characteris- 
 tic, but as a moral excellence also, and should be strictly re- 
 quired in him. It is in this connection the more mournful to 
 notice, that so many, from a groundless fear of giving displea- 
 5 
 
50 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 sure by recognizing a divine Authority, either conceal their 
 belief in it altogether, or else give only timid utterance to it, 
 and thereby deprive their discourses of power, dignity, use- 
 fulness, and consequently in the end, of the approbation of the 
 public also. 
 
 To him who is animated by the lofty desire of rivalling 
 the political Eloquence of the Greeks, and of speaking from 
 the pulpit with Demosthenean power, I would say " Science, 
 Learning, Style, Delivery, these all render easier the practice 
 of Eloquence, but do not make the orator. Demosthenes be- 
 came an orator through the greatness and solidity of his 
 character, and these qualities are indispensable to you too, in 
 order to the attainment of your aim ; but they are not all you 
 need. Though the greatest perfection attainable here, were 
 yours, yet you are not free from human weakness, and who 
 gives you the right to proclaim salvation or damnation to 
 your brethren, who are not worse than yourself? This diffi- 
 culty you will feel ; you will not venture to speak to them with 
 power; you will be compelled to content yourself with exci- 
 ting their emotions, or enriching their stores of information 
 with new views ; you will perhaps, for a time, be listened to 
 with applause by a mixed assembly ; but the abiding, eternal 
 renown — the salutary, ever-onward-rolling influence of your 
 efforts, is gone. You are weak and fearful so long as you 
 would rest upon yourself ; dare to regard yourself as the or- 
 gan of a higher Being, and you are all power and all courage. 
 Faith plants you firm and sure ; your teaching is no longer 
 that of the Pharisees — unmeaning sound, and useless hair- 
 splitting ; you teach with power, like Jesus himself — for he 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 51 
 
 spake the words of His Father, and you speak His. Appro- 
 priate each and every one of His words, as well as those 
 which His spirit gave to His Apostles ; but take them in the 
 very sense in which they spake them. You do not believe it 
 now, but your own experience will soon teach you, that in the 
 doctrines of our religion lies hidden all the power of sacred 
 Eloquence." 
 
 Would that many might understand me, and through 
 Eloquence be led to Christianity ! A great honor for 
 Eloquence, and a glorious gain for Christianity ! For were it 
 not as well and fitting to attain to Christian faith through Elo- 
 quence, as by the ordinary way of adversity and suffering ? 
 
52 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE \ OR. 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 THE CATEGORIES, POSSIBILITY AND ACTUALITY. 
 
 As the higher Rhetorical Ideas lead the orator to the Category 
 Truth — i. e. 9 to the exhibition of the nature of things, — they 
 also frequently demand the proof of the possibility and actual 
 existence of a thing. And hence, in addition to Truth, Possi- 
 bility and Actuality come into view as subordinate Rhetorical 
 Ideas, or Categories. 
 
 The Idea of Possibility is employed in a special manner in 
 the oration before deliberative bodies. In this case, however 
 apparent the benefits are that accrue from the execution of 
 the proposed undertaking, yet the courage of the hearer often 
 falls on reflecting how difficult the undertaking is, and his in- 
 dolence intrenches itself, so to speak, behind the objection 
 that it is impossible. This objection must be removed, and 
 the orator must show clearly the practicability of his proposi- 
 tion. As the hindrances which seem to stand in his way 
 disappear, one after another, the Ethical Idea in the hearer 
 acquires Vitality and Force, and begins to impel him to ac- 
 tion. Demosthenes would have employed all ethical motives 
 in vain, in order to incite the Athenians to resist Philip, if he 
 had not also, at the same time, made clear to them the practi- 
 cability of his proposition, and the Possibility of success. We 
 see what an amount of solid knowledge is requisite in the 
 orator, how he must have thoroughly examined all the rela- 
 
OUTLINES OP A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 53 
 
 tions of the State, and have calculated all its resources, in or- 
 der to acquit himself well in respect to this point. It does not 
 belong to my plan to mention all the cases which the Idea of 
 Possibility includes ; and I content myself with remarking — 
 in accordance with my main design — that this Idea, however 
 weighty and important it may be, is yet subordinate to the 
 Ethical Idea of State-weal. For only through this is the 
 orator led to the consideration of the Possibility of a thing ; 
 and he can have no finer impelling motive to attain all the 
 knowledge requisite for this, than that love of country by 
 which he is inspired. 
 
 Moreover, this Idea is found in sacred Eloquence also. 
 Those acquainted with the human heart know how often we 
 endeavor to quiet our conscience, when it brings to our notice 
 our neglected duties, by the excuse that it was impossible for 
 us to perform them. Hence, it is not enough for the orator 
 to recommend a particular action as belonging to an ethically 
 perfect course of conduct ; he must so understand mankind 
 generally, and the condition of society around him, as to be 
 able to enter into an examination of all their relations, and to 
 show that that which he advocates, is, in the highest degree, 
 adapted to their relations. In this way, the high religious 
 Ideas are taken out of their abstract and universal forms, and 
 put into the concrete and definite forms of human life ; and 
 nothing imparts a more active life to the Ideas of the hearer, 
 than this full unfolding of them, and nothing seizes more 
 powerfully upon his mind. But a strong will is needed on 
 the part of the orator, in-order to compel the very same spirit 
 which has soared up to the highest objects of thought, to de- 
 5* 
 
54 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ', OR, 
 
 scend suddenly to the minutest detail of human life, without 
 thereby losing its fire and elasticity. Few are able to do this, 
 and hence, since it is easier, the orator often deems it more 
 befitting to roam about among abstract and formless Ideas. 
 
 The category of Actuality is of peculiar importance in the 
 judicial oration ; for although the sentence of the law, respect- 
 ing a particular act — that of murder, e. g. — is not a matter of 
 doubt in the least, yet the act itself sometimes is, and its 
 Actuality can be affirmed or denied. Here the wide field of 
 narrative-proof and statement opens to the orator ; a part of 
 Rhetoric upon which the issue of a cause depends, and which 
 the Ancients consequently cultivated with great care. Yet, 
 however important it may be, the ethical Idea of Civil Law 
 presides over it ; without this Idea, the question respecting 
 the Actuality of a thing, would not arise in Eloquence, and it 
 must ever be kept in view as the last goal to which the narra- 
 tive-statement tends. Hence no objection against the ethical 
 principle laid down by us as the foundation of Eloquence, 
 can be brought from the fact that the Historical element 
 predominates in this species of oration ; for the oration, 
 before the court, still remains a moral procedure, in accord- 
 ance with the Idea of positive Law, although this latter leads 
 directly to the notion and exhibition of the Actuality of a 
 thing. 
 
 This subordinate Idea is also found in sacred as well as in 
 political Eloquence. In this department, it exists in very 
 close connection with the category Truth, the latter category 
 very commonly leading to the former. For it is a peculiarity 
 of Christianity that it establishes the Truth, not by means of 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 55 
 
 Demonstration, but by means of Facts — as, e. g\, the Love of 
 God, by the sacrifice of His Son ; immortality, by the Resur- 
 rection of Christ. If these Facts are doubted, they must be 
 shown to be actual by means of a historical examination of 
 witnesses. Such investigations are of the greatest interest, 
 because the Truth established thereby stands in such close 
 connection with the highest practical Ideas — with Duty, 
 Happiness, and Virtue. Furthermore, to this category belong 
 those passages, whether in political or sacred oratory, in 
 which the quality of a person, or a thing, is described, in or- 
 der to apply to it one of the higher Ideas. 
 
 o 
 
56 ELOQ.UENCE A VIRTUE J OR 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 THE PLAN AND DIVISION OF AN ORATION. 
 
 By laying down the Rhetorical Ideas and Categories, we have, 
 as it were, measured off the domain of Eloquence, and found 
 the materiel on which it labors. By contemplating, there- 
 fore, these Ideas in their first movement, we also become ac- 
 quainted with the Form, in its first and most general features, 
 which the Rhetorical materiel assumes. This is the doctrine 
 of the Plan and Division of an oration, respecting which, or- 
 dinarily very good and correct, but, for the most part, merely 
 logical, rules are given, which, consequently, relate only to the 
 Form ; teaching, it is true, how to distinguish the Good from 
 the Bad in the Form, but not pointing out the way to find 
 the former, and avoid the latter. We wish here to unite 
 both, and to investigate this materiel, not only in a formal, 
 but also in a real manner. We must needs succeed, since we 
 conceive of Eloquence as a procedure according to Ideas, in 
 which Ideas the Matter as well as the Form of that which is 
 to be produced, is contained ; since, consequently, we never 
 separate the Form from the Matter, and are, therefore, enabled 
 to determine on this theory, not only how the division is to 
 be made, but also what is to be divided. 
 
 Let us, therefore, imagine to ourselves a man who possesses 
 the ability to bring out ethical Ideas into his consciousness in 
 great Power and Vitality, and who is animated with the de- 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 57 
 
 sire to represent these Ideas in the Actual, or rather to mould 
 the Actual into conformity with these Ideas. Such an one 
 can employ, for this purpose, no other means than the Ideas 
 themselves, and their expression in language ; and he knows 
 that his undertaking will succeed only in case he is not sub- 
 servient to the passions of his hearer, but rather subjects him- 
 self to the Ideas of the hearer — to that which is Highest and 
 Best in him. He, therefore, brings his hearer before his mind, 
 at first with merely the main features of his ethical nature, 
 and with those requisitions which every man imposes upon 
 himself — viz., to fulfil his Duty, to form himself to Virtue, to 
 lay a foundation for Happiness. When he addresses members 
 of the State or Church, he conceives these Ideas in the parti- 
 cular form given to them by each of these relations. Every 
 citizen, the political orator pre-supposes, desires to have Law 
 and Justice administered, the Common Weal promoted, and 
 to acquire personal Merit ; every Christian, the sacred orator 
 pre-supposes, desires to fulfil the Law of God, to raise himself 
 to Likeness with Him, and to become capable of Eternal 
 Blessedness. That these Ideas are leading Ideas in each and 
 every hearer, the orator pre-supposes ; but even if he is mis- 
 taken—even if no one of them, in any one of the above 
 specified forms, exists in the hearers — a thing which we affirm 
 to be impossible — still this confident pre -supposition would be 
 the best means by which to generate them ; for in proportion 
 as men are assumed to be better than they are, and are so 
 treated, do they become better than they are. 
 
 When the orator has thus brought the hearer before him, 
 he will find it better adapted to his purpose, either to refer the 
 
 & 
 
5S ELOaUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 particular Idea of his oration to one only, of the above-men- 
 tioned Ideas, be it one of the higher or subordinate, or else to 
 connect it with several of them. The orations constructed in 
 the former way, I would denominate simple ; those in the 
 latter, complex. In the simple oration, Happiness, or Virtue, 
 or Duty, is the predominating Idea, or else Truth, or Possibil- 
 ity, or Actuality, shaped and moulded by one of these former. 
 In the complex oration, Truth, e. g., takes the lead, and Virtue 
 and Happiness follow ; or whatever may be the order found 
 best adapted to the particular Idea of the oration, and to the 
 relations peculiar to it. 
 
 And now the orator makes a perfectly simple and natural 
 beginning, by specifying his general design, and designating 
 the Ideas or Categories, whether one or more, to which he in- 
 tends to refer. This, and nothing more than this, is the Ex- 
 ordium. Its distinguishing characteristics are clearness and 
 plainness. The orator announces the contest to the hearer, 
 and tells him at what point he intends to attack him ; and the 
 hearer can well engage in it, because the fight is with honor- 
 able weapons, and the advantage is always on the side of the 
 vanquished. 
 
 Since, among the Ancients, the subject upon which the ora- 
 tor wished to speak was usually known to the hearers, the 
 Exordium — so far as it contained an announcement of the 
 subject — must naturally be very brief; and it became more 
 extended only when the orator wished to present himself in a 
 more advantageous light in the existing circumstances, or to 
 remove certain prejudices respecting himself personally, which 
 might hinder his success. This advantage, arising from the 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 59 
 
 hearers being acquainted with the subject, and from a set oc- 
 casion, is afforded to the sacred orator by the Festival days in the 
 Christian Church, and also, to some extent, at least, by the Scrip- 
 ture text. For this, provided it is rightly selected, already 
 contains the particular Idea of the orator, which needs only a 
 slight explanation, in order to spring forth from it into plain 
 view. Moreover, the text is often interwoven with the circum- 
 stances and relations to which it was applied at the time of its 
 first utterance, and the orator needs only to realize them to 
 himself, in order to discover the same or similar relations in 
 the present time, upon which it shall exert its influence. Since, 
 therefore, the Text specifies not only the Idea, but also the envi- 
 ronment in which it is to unfold itself, this important advantage 
 enables the sacred orator to abridge his exordium, especially 
 as he does not need, like the political orator, to fill it out with 
 assurances that his purposes are pure. For, in the first place, 
 the whole drift and connection of his sermon, and still more 
 of his life, is the best evidence of this ; and, in the second 
 place, since he ever appears as the ambassador of a higher 
 Being, and never in his own name, it is not befitting in him 
 to be anxiously careful about himself. That which so often 
 lengthens out the Exordium is the undue employment of the 
 subordinate Categories — the exhibition of the True or the Ac- 
 tual, e. g. — the orator, with the design of interesting, address- 
 ing himself to man's mere desire for knowledge, without re- 
 gard to the demands of his moral nature, I cannot favor 
 this method, and believe that it may be followed only in rare 
 instances. For, in the first place, time is in this way spent in 
 merely paving the way for the Idea, which might be better 
 
60 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OK, 
 
 employed in the developement of the Idea itself. In the se- 
 cond place, the preliminary representations by which the ora- 
 tor would prepare the way for the theme, are often as remote 
 from the minds of the hearers as the theme itself, so that he 
 might just as well employ this as to introduce the former. 
 Finally, in the third place, since the mere desire for know- 
 ledge is, or should be, subordinate to the moral Interest, the 
 orator can hardly fail to interest the hearer in his main Idea, 
 if he connects it immediately with one of the higher moral 
 Ideas — a thing that can be done without a long circumlocu- 
 tion. 
 
 At the end of the Introduction, the orator may announce 
 the two or three parts which contain the developement pro- 
 per ; for why should he not carefully employ this, as well as 
 every other opportunity, to aid the hearer's attention, and to 
 facilitate his comprehension of the whole ? If the hearer is 
 compelled to stretch his power of attention too much, he 
 either slackens it altogether, or else the effect of the oration is 
 exerted on the cognitive powers alone, and not on the Will, 
 which, for the orator's purposes, is tantamount to no effect 
 at all. 
 
 If we do not find this practice observed in the orations of 
 the Ancients, or any announcement of the Plan and Division, 
 this may proceed from two reasons. First, the method to 
 which they were obliged to accommodate themselves, was 
 prescribed to them by the occasion on which they spoke, far 
 more than is the case with the sacred orator, and since this 
 method, especially in the instance of the orator before a court, 
 was almost always one and the same, it seemed unnecessary 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 61 
 
 to announce it formally. Secondly, — and this appears to me 
 to be the chief reason — such a formal statement of the Plan 
 would have been evidence of study and previous preparation, 
 the appearance of which they avoided as carefully as they 
 sought to maintain that of Extemporizing. For they had to 
 deal with a suspicious Public, who would have attributed 
 such previous preparation only to the design to deceive. But 
 the case is different with the sacred orator, who may allow 
 the diligence which he has bestowed with an honest intention, 
 to continually appear in his oration, since he can excite 
 thereby in the hearer nothing but the expectation of a mass 
 of information all the more fundamental for this. If, however, 
 the sacred orator would, for any reason, omit the formal men- 
 tion of the grounds of his oration, of the plan which he has 
 sketched for himself, he is free to do so ; for though, indeed, 
 it is absolutely necessary that he endeavor to arrange his 
 thoughts in the clearest and best manner, it is not absolutely 
 necessary that he specify beforehand how he has arranged 
 them. 
 
 But what is the principle upon which the Division of an 
 oration should proceed ? Beginning with the simple oration, 
 this contains as many heads as there are principal positions, by 
 which the leading design of the orator is connected with une of 
 the higher, or one of the subordinate Ideas, as the case may be. 
 In the sermon of Bernhardt — e, g., entitled, " The worthy 
 celebration of the Sacrament is a source of the noblest enjoy- 
 ment," — the leading design of the orator is referred solely 
 to the Idea of Happiness, and is connected with it by the fol 
 lowing positions ; The worthy celebration of the Holy Sacra- 
 6 
 
62 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 ment affords us a view of our Redeemer in the most affecting 
 greatness of his character ; it wakens us to the consciousness of 
 the highest of vocations ; it fills us with the feeling of the highest 
 of fellowships ; it makes us alive to the most blessed of all hopes. 
 If Duty is the single predominant Idea, the oration divides into 
 as many heads as there are principal positions employed by 
 the orator, to make it apparent that the state of mind, or 
 course of conduct, recommended by him, is a Duty. If Vir- 
 tue is the predominant Idea, the oration may be divided ac- 
 cording to the different motives existing for the practice of a 
 particular Virtue, or according to the different characteristic 
 marks by which the particular Virtue is made to melt in, and 
 become one with the universal Idea of Virtue. 
 
 But the simple oration may also be constructed according to 
 one of the subordinate Ideas — Truth, Possibility, Actuality — 
 provided only its connection witfy the higher Ideas is, from the 
 very beginning, clearly and definitely established. To illus- 
 trate : the false notions which Christians form of Divine Pro- 
 vidence, or of the efficacy of Prayer, stand in the way of their 
 religious and moral developement ; from this point of view, in- 
 struction respecting Providence and the efficacy of Prayer, 
 according to the Idea or Category of Truth, may be the only 
 object of the oration. Yet, such instruction should not de- 
 generate into a complete treatise on these subjects, but the 
 orator should bring forward, in his refutation or indoctrina- 
 tion, that only which is specially important in practical 
 respects. 
 
 In a political oration, the whole may be referred to the Idea 
 of Possibility, in order to show that the proposition in ques- 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 63 
 
 tion, which confessedly promotes the Common- Weal is also 
 practicable. The same may be done in sacred oratory, in order 
 to weaken the force of excuses for committing a fault, derived 
 from the impossibility of avoiding it, and for neglecting a 
 virtue, from the impossibility of practising it. It is evident, 
 moreover, that in this case the orator should combat those 
 objections only, which the hearer actually makes, or, at least, 
 may easily make. The positive reasons, on the other hand, 
 for the practice of the Virtue then divide oft into main masses 
 by themselves which form the Parts of the oration. 
 
 In like manner, also, the Idea of Actuality, referred to one 
 of the higher Ideas, may be the predominant Idea in an or- 
 ation, as is most commonly the case before a court of justice. 
 Here, the different proofs that a thing has or has not happened, 
 fall into several classes, and these are the Parts of the oration. 
 The old Rhetoricians, however, give us information on this, 
 w r ith a minuteness of detail which leaves nothing to be desired. 
 In the sacred oration, also, Actuality may be the sole predo- 
 minant Idea — first, when the orator wishes to prove a disput- 
 ed fact belonging to sacred history ; and, secondly, when he 
 would sketch a picture of an important personage or fact, that 
 shall be fruitful in practical application. In the first instance, 
 he will maintain such a particular fact, not against skepticism 
 in general, but against the doubts of his contemporaries only ; 
 he will not therefore take into view the objections of former 
 times, but those only that are peculiar to their time ; he will 
 make a selection accordingly, from the mass of proofs which 
 are at his command, and these are easily divided, according to 
 their intrinsic character, into certain classes and divisions. In 
 
64 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 the second instance, the orator brings into notice those qualities 
 and characteristics of a person or a thing which are most con- 
 gruous with the practical Idea which guides the whole oration. 
 Thus, Actuality is the single predominant Idea in the sermon 
 of Reinhard upon " The characteristics of the Church of Christ 
 as seen in its origin ;" and he describes this origin as pure in 
 its sources, miraculous in its circumstances, noble in its aim, 
 beneficent in its consequences. 
 
 A peculiarity, not so much in the manner of the division it- 
 self, as in the way of announcing it, is found in the French 
 orators, especially in Massillon. When, namely, it is their 
 principal business to combat the erroneous notions of their 
 hearers — and any one of the above-mentioned predominant 
 Ideas may lead to this, although the three higher less often 
 than the three subordinate ; in such cases, I say, they are wont 
 to announce, not those correct views which they wish to un- 
 fold, but the erroneous ones which they wish to combat. It is 
 apparent that it amounts to the same thing in the end ; for the 
 employment of this mode presupposes that the orator has di- 
 vided th3 errors and their contrary truths into equal and cor- 
 relative masses, and hence it makes no difference which of the 
 two he announces specifically. There is always, however, some- 
 thing hazardous in this mode of proceeding, since it is easier 
 to bring truths of which the speaker is himself thoroughly 
 convinced, into a sure and certain connection, than the errors 
 and doubts current among the multitude ; and if the orator has 
 not so arranged these as that the threads of a full developement 
 of the truth can be wound upon them, he will not combat 
 them with success. The want of connection, and the breaks, so 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC, 65 
 
 frequently to be noticed in Massillon's sermons, are perhaps 
 to be attributed to this manner of arranging the parts of an 
 oration, which became an almost uniform habit with him ; 
 hence only the practised and skilful orator — and he only rare- 
 ly — should make use of this manner. It is alwa) 7 s safest for the 
 orator to present in the very outset his own conviction, having 
 some reference however to prevalent errors, and to combat 
 these only when they come up of themselves in the develope- 
 ment of his own thoughts. 
 
 But the complex oration, in which several Ideas arc placed 
 beside each other in equal importance, is of more frequent 
 occurrence than the simple oration^ of the division of which 
 we have been speaking. It is apparent, at the first glance, 
 that this species of oration conducts, with much more force 
 and certainty, to the end in view, than the other. For, if the 
 orator brings his leading Idea into connection with those of 
 the hearer, only on one side, it is very possible for him to fail 
 in the attempt to show its identity with them. In order to 
 win over the hearer completely, the orator must lead him con- 
 tinually to one and the same goal from several points ; the 
 orator's Idea, if I may be allowed the expression, must con- 
 tinue to wind around the Idea of the hearer until it has be- 
 come completely incorporated with it. 
 
 It is evident, now, that the complex oration has as many 
 parts as there are predominant Ideas in it ; and each one of 
 these parts, again, may be regarded as a simple oration, and be 
 divided according to the same rules, so that that which forms a 
 main division in the simple oration, becomes a subdivision in 
 6* 
 
66 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 the complex. A common method, here, is to begin with the 
 Category of Truth or Actuality, in order to throw due light 
 over the subject of which the orator would treat, and then, in 
 order to waken a higher interest, to follow up with the Idea 
 of Virtue, Happiness, or Duty. This is the almost too uni- 
 form mode of division, when the orator speaks, first, of the 
 nature, and, secondly, of the effects. But unless the Catego- 
 ries Truth and Actuality are handled by a very skilful master, 
 discourse based upon them often becomes somewhat cold and 
 tedious, and the hearer remains indifferent towards a subject 
 of which the orator indeed gives right conceptions, but the 
 relation of which to the higher demands of his moral nature, he 
 does not make plain to him. Or else the orator, conscious him- 
 self of this coldness and dryness, allows himself to be led into 
 the error of interweaving into this part of his oration those 
 higher means of moving his hearers which should not be em- 
 ployed until later ; and in this way he oversteps the limits 
 which he has prescribed for himself, and anticipates the con- 
 tents of the divisions which are to follow, which he is now 
 unable to fill out. Instead, therefore, of placing Truth and 
 Actuality in an equal rank with the higher ethical Ideas, it 
 may often be more suitable to subordinate them to these ; to 
 make Happiness, Duty, or Virtue principal parts, and to in- 
 sert the representation of Truth and Actuality only when the 
 need of it becomes plainly apparent in the course of the de- 
 velopement of those higher Ideas. But, again, there are some 
 subjects in which the Idea of Truth or Actuality has such a 
 decided preponderance, that the orator must make it predomi- 
 nant throughout his oration, and must interweave what he haa 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 67 
 
 to say respecting Happiness, Virtue, and Duty, in the indi- 
 vidual developements of the True or the Actual. 
 
 In this way, the six Rhetorical Ideas are associated with 
 each other in an order and interchange the most manifold. 
 The counter-action which the orator expects from the hearer, 
 determines him to begin, now with this and now with that 
 Idea, and to follow up with the others, thus or so ; and hence 
 no universal rule can be laid down regarding a Plan of this 
 sort, since existing circumstances and relations have so great 
 influence upon it : the Plan is, in fact, a resolution which 
 the moral powers form, and which is shaped by the peculiar 
 occasions and inducements which lead to it. 
 
 The course and movement of Ideas in a great orator can an- 
 imate to a similarly pregnant and powerful movement in no 
 other way than as the example of the hero animates to Virtue . 
 Demosthenes, e. g\, in the first oration against Philip, begins 
 with the Idea of Possibility ; he shows how a more fortunate 
 issue may be expected in the case of further expeditions ; and 
 as he proceeds, the doubts of his hearers vanish, their breasts 
 swell, and fill with heart and hope. But the orator does not 
 stop with considerations of a general nature ; he goes into de- 
 tail, and lays before the people a circumstantial plan of all that 
 is to be done. In this way he satisfies the understandings of 
 his hearers, elevates their minds, and renders them open to the 
 higher Ideas of State-weal, of Civic Merit, by which they are 
 now carried captive at the will of the orator. But there is no 
 course and movement of Ideas of such irresistible power as the 
 one in the oration for Ctesiphon, in which, in accordance with 
 the Idea of Possibility, it is first shown that the speaker could 
 
63 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR 
 
 not by any possibility have foreseen the issue of the battle at 
 Chseronea, and then the Idea of Virtue follows with a startling 
 rapidity — the orator affirming that, even if he had foreseen all, 
 he should nevertheless have given no different counsel. The 
 well-known division of Cicero's oration for Milo, according to 
 the Ideas of Actuality and Legality, has some resemblance 
 to the wonderful method of this oration of Demosthenes. 
 
 In the oration of Demosthenes upon the affairs of the Cher- 
 sonesus, the Idea of Public Advantage is not connected, but 
 entangled with that of Civil Law, in a highly singular man- 
 ner. For, while according to the former he shows that the ar- 
 my which Diopeithes commanded in # that country, should not 
 be disbanded, he, at the same time, according to the latter, ex- 
 culpates their general with respect to the acts of violence with 
 which he was charged : a procedure to which he was proba- 
 bly compelled by the circumstances of the case, and which he 
 carries through with extraordinary self-confidence, but which 
 I would recommend no one to imitate, since, of Ideas thus en- 
 tangled, the one commonly would be prejudicial to the other. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 69 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 FIRST FEATURES TOWARDS A SKETCH OF THE ORATOR. 
 
 It has been remarked, respecting the Science of Morals, 
 that there are three points from which it may be contemplat- 
 ed, and that a complete Philosophic presentation of it is 
 rendered possible only by connecting these different views. 
 Morals, in the first place, may be regarded as the enumera- 
 tion of all those commandments derived from the one highest 
 law, by which the will ought to be directed, and of the du- 
 ties imposed by them. Secondly, the question may arise 
 with respect to that character in the Subject, or agent, which 
 is inclined and able to fulfil all these duties ; and developed 
 in this direction, the Science of Morals becomes a presenta- 
 tion of Ideal Virtue, or of Ideal Virtues. In the third place, 
 again, the Product may be contemplated, which perfect Virtue 
 produces by the fulfilment of all its duties, and this becomes 
 the chief object in view, under the names of Prosperity, Hap- 
 piness, the Highest Good. But, instead of connecting in one, 
 these three different views, writers upon Morals commonly 
 make but one of them prominent in their theories, which, con- 
 sequently, must be one-sided and unsatisfactory. For does 
 not the sum-total of all the different and scattered Virtues 
 pre-suppose an acting Subject, in which they can concentrate 
 and come into actual practice ; and when this Subject is seen 
 
70 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 acting, what is more natural than the inquiry after the Pro- 
 duct of its activity ? 
 
 We make these well-known statements, in the first place, 
 in order, by placing the three different forms of .the system of 
 Morals beside the three highest Ehetorical Ideas mentioned 
 by us, to justify our having assumed these latter as funda- 
 mental Ideas ; and in the second place, still more, for the rea- 
 son that these fundamental Ideas furnish rules for the treat- 
 ment of Rhetoric as a system. If Rhstoric, as we affirm, is 
 only a more general unfolding of Morals, the selection of one 
 particular point of view, alone, would be a fault in Rhetoric, 
 as well as in Morals, and the combination of all the points of 
 view becomes as necessary in the former as it is in the latter. 
 We have thus far developed the part of Morals which is called 
 Rhetoric, from the Idea of Duty, as a point of view. For we 
 began with laying down a law, of which we have pointed out 
 the application, and from which we have derived several indi- 
 vidual rules ; and we have believed it necessary to take this 
 method, for the sake of greater intelligibleness. Cicero and 
 Quintilian — to compare those Philosophers who have devel- 
 oped Morals from the Idea of Virtue, as a point of departure — 
 it seems to us, have in view particularly the representation 
 of the Perfect Orator, whom Quintilian describes even from the 
 time of his first instruction in school. But their representa- 
 tions are somewhat ambiguous, since, although in this way of 
 treating the subject, we are, indeed, made sufficiently ac- 
 quainted with the character and qualities of the orator, we 
 can yet form no definite conception of his activity, because 
 the rule by which it is to be judged of, remains unknown. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 71 
 
 If now, as we have said above, we have sought to avoid 
 this fault by laying down firm fundamental principles, 
 we must also guard against falling into the opposite error of 
 forgetting the character and qualities of the orator. The re- 
 presentation of these is the more important, since it might 
 seem as if the mere knowledge and skilful application 
 of the rules laid down by us were sufficient for the orator, 
 and as if his moral character and qualities were to receive 
 no farther notice ; which, if it were actually the case, would 
 frustrate our endeavor to construct Rhetoric as a part of 
 Morals. But such is not the case, and furthermore, it is im- 
 possible to follow all these rules, unless there be moral strength 
 of Character, unless there be Virtue, and, in the case of the 
 sacred orator, unless there be the inner life of Faith. 
 
 For the distinctive agency of the orator consists in giving a 
 powerful impulse and direction to the minds of others, and he is 
 not equal to this unless the goal to which he would direct them 
 is plainly in his eye, and unless he earnestly desires to reach it 
 himself. In a word, he must possess, so to speak, the Faculty 
 of Moral Ideas, and these belong to Character. The Imagina- 
 tion, it is true, generates those Ideas from which the creations 
 in the sphere of Art proceed ; although, even in the case of 
 Art, as it seems to me, the products are always somewhat 
 lacking in body and firmness, unless they are set up by Char- 
 acter. But, inasmuch, as the Will is the object which Elo- 
 quence seeks to influence, Eloquence must originate in the Will, 
 in the moral state of the orator. Take the sacred orator for 
 instance : where will he find matter for his discourses, if his 
 own sanctification, if the moral and religious condition of men, 
 
72 ELOO.UENCE A VIRTUE \ OR. 
 
 does not lie near his heart — if he does not earnestly desire to 
 improve human character ? In him alone who is animated by 
 these motives — who labors upon himself, and contemplates 
 men around him with the design of elevating them to a high- 
 er degree of perfection — only in such an one will Ideas that 
 may be referred and applied easily to the highest aim and 
 end of the human Will, be generated in their constant an4 
 abounding fulness ; and such Ideas are, beyond question, 
 motive-powers, moral and Christian in their nature. Nay, 
 they presuppose a higher grade of morality — one that is 
 raised far above that which is commonly called Virtue, the 
 mere abstaining namely from Vice, and an irreproachable life. 
 For if it is morally beautiful to will, at all times, that which 
 is Best and Worthiest, for its own sake, it is still more beauti- 
 ful by far, to desire at the same time, in connection with this, 
 that which is Best and Worthiest for all mankind. This de- 
 sire may be wanting in a man, and he not be morally bad in 
 his life ; but a far higher degree of moral perfection must be 
 ascribed to him of whom it is the sole and actuating princi- 
 ple. Hence it is certainly no envious complaint, when a sa- 
 cred oration is charged with being wanting in such moral 
 Ideas as alone can beget a disposition of soul that is constant- 
 ly employed in promoting the well-being of humanity. To 
 give expression to one ? s self merely, to depict certain favorite 
 views with self-complacency, cannot be represented as a vice 
 exactly ; but it is certainly proof of an imperfect nature, 
 which is not able to forget itself, and to live only in the well- 
 being of others ; it indicates a want of that higher Character 
 by which the orator produces the stuff and material employed 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 73 
 
 by him, and which, since the creative power in man is desig- 
 nated generally by the term Genius, we would style Moral Ge- 
 nius. In vain, therefore, is the command, " Refer your Ideas 
 to the highest human Ideas," addressed to him who, absorbed 
 in his own emotions, fancies and notions, does not feel the he- 
 roic impulse to seize upon the hearts of men, and to mould them 
 into a nobler state ; for he is lacking in the first and most ne- 
 cessary things — in Ideas, — and instead of these, he will play 
 with figures, dissolve in soft emotion, or bring forward informa- 
 tion, which is quite entertaining, it may be, but which produces 
 no effect upon the Will. 
 
 That which is true of the sacred orator, is true also of the 
 civil orator. If he does not cling with disinterested love to 
 his father-land, and is not impelled by this love to study close* 
 ly the internal relations of his country, and to mark attentive- 
 ly the changes in its foreign relations, how is he, in important 
 and difficult emergencies, to acquire correct views and to form 
 salutary plans, without delay ? He will be dumb, as was the 
 case with the Athenian orators on hearing that Philip had ta- 
 ken Elatsea. " For," as Demosthenes said, " that day and that 
 occasion demanded a man who had traced events from the be- 
 ginning, and had formed a correct conclusion for what reason 
 and for what end Philip had done that." And how had De- 
 mosthenes, the only one who spoke on this day, obtained this 
 keener insight, except through his love of country, in which res- 
 pect he was in advance of all his fellow-citizens ? It may in- 
 deed be said, that in the absence of love of country, self-interest, 
 hatred and friendship, preconceived opinions, political systems, 
 7 
 
74 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ) OR, 
 
 will not leave the orator destitute of Ideas and Plans. Perhaps 
 not ; but here the great difficulty presents itself, that these ve- 
 ry designs are to be subjected to the highest ends of the State, 
 and not of the individual Will, and this must be uncommonly 
 difficult to accomplish, if they did not spring up in dependence 
 upon and subjection to, the Common Weal, but were suggested 
 by other and less noble motives. In order that his selfish Plans 
 may succeed, the orator, as has been remarked, must bring them 
 into connection with the highest moral Ideas ; and if this con- 
 nection is not a natural, but a forced one, talent of the first or- 
 der will often fail in the endeavor to carry through the decep- 
 tion,*' and the web of its argument will be torn into shreds by 
 another orator, who perhaps speaks with less power, but whose 
 Ideas have grown up out of the ground and soil of Patriotism. 
 A fine instance of this is afforded in the two orations, which, 
 according to Sallust, were delivered by Caesar and Catointhe 
 Roman Senate, respecting the punishment of the fellow-con- 
 spirators of Cataline. What can be finer than the arrangement 
 of Caesar's oration ; how cunningly does he understand how to 
 render the Ideas of magnanimity, positive law, and public ad- 
 vantage, available in a case in which it was his sole aim to sup- 
 port the mere instruments of his own ambitious plans ! With 
 less art, but with greater power, the honest Cato forces his 
 way through, and the whole Senate sides with him. And 
 thus, finally, by our own examination and by the example of 
 
 * A wrong design is betrayed by the contradictions in the course 
 and connection of thought. 
 
 'E7T£t<5ttv tis, oHfiai, KCLKOvpy&v &rc fif) 7rpo$fiKOVTa Trpdyfiara tov$ \6yovs pera- 
 <p£py, dverxfipci'fai'aj'** tyai&oQai.— Demwtk. adv&rms lAptinem, p. 190, ed.Wtifr 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 75 
 
 the younger Cato, that definition of the orator is justified, 
 which, according to Quintilian,* originated with the elder 
 Cato, and which is indisputably the best that has come down 
 to us from antiquity, viz : The orator is an upright man who 
 understands speaking. 
 
 * Instit. XII, 1. 
 
BOOS XI. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 AFFECTION AND PASSION. 
 
 Before we proceed further, let us cast a glance over the path 
 which we have opened. 
 
 It was our design to seek for a highest fundamental princi- 
 ple, that should bring unity and connection into the fragmen- 
 tary and disconnected Theory of Eloquence. In order to 
 this, we made one of the characteristics of Eloquence — the 
 striving to produce an influence outwardly — its essential 
 characteristic, and in this way found that it stands upon an 
 ethical basis and ground, and is an active process ; that, as it 
 proceeds only from Ideas, it can address itself only to Ideas. 
 The developement of this single thought has already led us 
 to important results, and has combined into a systematic 
 unity, many assertions which in the common Theories of Elo- 
 quence are laid down without proof; and we have also been 
 enabled by it to correct many errors in the prevailing views 
 on this subject. We have seen that there is but one Elo- 
 quence, and that civil Eloquence is connected with sacred by 
 the unity of its constituent principle, although each is diffe- 
 rently modiiied by the particular relation in which it moves ; 
 7# 
 
78 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 that the Ancients, in conformity with a feeling in the highest 
 degree correct, have assumed three species of Eloquence, 
 corresponding to the three highest Ideas ; by laying down 
 Truth as a subordinate Rhetorical Idea, we have found again 
 one of the characteristics of Eloquence — its inclination to 
 Philosophy, but, at the same time, as we flatter ourselves, 
 have thrown some light upon the difficult question respect- 
 ing the dividing line between Philosophy and Eloquence ; 
 we have given rules respecting the plan and division of an 
 oration which proceed according to Ideas, and, therefore, are 
 preferable to the common method of division, which proceeds 
 merely according to Conceptions ; and, finally, in order to 
 justify our ethical view, we have in different places made it 
 apparent that the orator is capacitated for the performance of 
 his proper business only by means of a truly moral state of 
 heart. 
 
 And thus, as we believe, has our ethical principle main- 
 tained itself, so far as that part of Rhetoric is concerned 
 which embraces the doctrine of invention and arrangement ; 
 for all the rules which can properly be given respecting these 
 subjects flow directly from the fundamental law laid down by 
 us, which, in its developement, has shown not only how each 
 and everything in this part of Eloquence should be, but also 
 why it should be so, and not otherwise. To maintain this 
 principle with respect to that part of Rhetoric which is now 
 to follow — with respect to Elocution, so called — seems a work 
 of greater difficulty. For since the excitement of the Affec- 
 tions, or at least of the Passions, is that with which we have to 
 do here, how, it may be asked, is this to take its origin from an 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 79 
 
 ethical principle — nay, even to be justified before it ? Further- 
 more, we are here, and rightly tco, to expect the outlines at 
 least, of a Theory of Prose ; and it would seem that an ethi- 
 cal principle could in no way lead to it. It does indeed seem 
 so ; but it is seeming merely ; for, in fact, this part of Rheto- 
 ric constitutes the very triumph of the ethical view, since 
 problems are solved by it which can be solved by no other 
 view. 
 
 But we must, in the first place, express our regret at the 
 errors by which this part of the subject has been disfigured, 
 and for which the Ancients, properly, are responsible, who, 
 since they are now universally lauded, must here, at least, 
 take home a merited blame. This blame falls, first, upon the 
 Rhetoricians, who again can throw the accusation back upon 
 the orators themselves, or, rather, upon the circumstances 
 amidst which they spoke. Ancient Ebquence owed its power 
 and definiteness principally to the rapidity with which the 
 effect followed immediately after the oration was ended ; but 
 in this very circumstance lay also a source of degeneration. 
 For, since the orator contended for honor, property and life, 
 and since the possession or loss of these depended upon the 
 effect of the oration, he would, in this his strait, find every 
 means good, of whatever sort, provided it only led to the end 
 in view ; and he who could get hold of no noble means, must 
 often content himself with bad ones, satisfied if he only at- 
 tained his end, and not considering that he would have at- 
 tained it with much more certainty had he employed worthier 
 means. Hence the orators allowed themselves in artifices of 
 many sorts, in order to deceive the judges and the people — 
 
80 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE } OR, 
 
 to dazzle them and excite their passions. This Practice, 
 which, of necessity, must often succeed, passed over into the 
 Theory of Eloquence, which, in this instance, as generally, 
 was not able to rise above the existing Practice. The arti- 
 fices for stimulating the minds of the hearers were collected 
 together and arranged in a connected series ; and Rhetoricians, 
 who held the excitement of the passions to be necessary in 
 their art, taught for this end, not the training of the mind, 
 to use Plato's phrase,^ but the actual deceiving of the mind. 
 Aristotle does this in the section of his Ehetoric where he 
 treats of the Passions ; and Cicero speaks of the means which 
 he employs for exciting them with a frankness at which we 
 cannot but be surprised.! 
 
 But it is, perhaps, equally surprising that these writers, 
 and those who have harmonized with them in sentiment, 
 should have been implicitly believed, and that these artifices 
 should have been held necessary and indispensable in secular 
 Eloquence at least. The example of Demosthenes alone, it 
 seems to me, could not but have led to the thought that they 
 might be dispensed with, and that other means might be em- 
 ployed in their stead, which are not only much nobler, but 
 also much more reliable. If this orator had written a Ehe- 
 toric, it would certainly have been different from Cicero's 
 Rhetorical writings, and have been not unworthy of his instruc- 
 tor Plato, who, in the Gorgias, lays down such a strict view 
 
 * ¥vx<iYi>iyia..—PhcbdruSi p. 331, ed. Heindorf. 
 
 t Qua (miseratione) nos ita dolentet- usi sumus, ut puerum infantem 
 in manibus perorarues tenuerimus; ut alia in causa, excitato reo nobili, 
 sublato etiam filioparvo, plangoreet lamentatione complerimus forum. 
 
 Orator, c. 38. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 81 
 
 of Eloquence. But the Eloquence of Demosthenes, like his 
 character, possesses an elevation, which, of necessity, must 
 fail of being apprehended ; and owing to their inability to 
 rightly estimate the Rhetorical means which he employs, the 
 Ancients, and we after them, have believed to have detected 
 the very same artifices in him, which are plainly apparent in 
 other orators. • 
 
 In order to prepare the way for this part of Rhetoric, it is 
 necessary to enter upon a psychological investigation, and to 
 establish a distinction between two things, which, though very 
 different from each other, are yet commonly confounded with 
 each other — namely, between Affection and Passion. The 
 movements in our minds differ very much in their nature, 
 their duration, and their importance, according as they are 
 produced by external objects, or are generated from within 
 outwards. An external object, or the representation of it, ex- 
 cites, if we desire or loathe it, a movement within us which 
 is rightly called Passion, since we are passive in the matter, 
 and yield ourselves up to an influence which operates upon 
 us from without. This condition of the soul cannot, in strict- 
 ness, be justified, since it supposes the inactivity of the Rea- 
 son, a power which, indeed, cannot always prevent the recep- 
 tion of impressions from without, but which should, neverthe- 
 less, limit, elevate, and, if they are injurious, suppress them. 
 Moreover, this inward condition is, in its nature, unquiet, 
 perplexed, and painful to the mind, which is always troubled 
 by the feeling of dependence upon external objects, and in its 
 duration it is transient, since it is produced by a transitory 
 object. Entirely different from this, is that excitement of the 
 
82 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 mind which owes its origin to an Idea ; I call it Affection, 
 (Affekt,) and not Passion, since the spirit in this case affects 
 itself through its own activity, instead of passively receiving 
 an impression from without, as in the other case. Yet this 
 term Affection, which renders me liable to misapprehension, 
 and is not, by any means, adequate, I employ only because I 
 know of no better one. What, however, I mean by it, will bo 
 clear from what follows. A mind in which an Idea has be- 
 come living consciousness, cannot possibly retain that cold- 
 ness which accompanies mere abstract representations or con- 
 ceptions ; for since the Idea contains within itself the notion 
 of an activity of some sort, and the impulse to it, it must ne- 
 cessarily appropriate to itself all the powers of the soul, and 
 set them in motion in one definite direction ; and from this 
 united working of all the faculties — from the exertion accom- 
 panying it, an inward state must arise, distinguished by a 
 higher degree of warmth and life. In case a creation in the 
 domain of Art results from the Idea, this inward state is de- 
 nominated Poetic or Artistic inspiration, and is universally 
 recognized and esteemed as Good and Beautiful in its nature. 
 But the same warmth and glow attends upon all ethical Ideas 
 which strive to break forth into activity; nothing but the 
 mere refraining from Evil can have coldness of soul as its at- 
 tendant ; he who strives to produce something Great and 
 Good, will never be # without ardor, without affection. Yet 
 we should never apply the name Passion to this fine mental 
 manifestation ; this term indicates the inactivity of the higher 
 spiritual powers, while, on the contrary, Affection, as distin- 
 guished from Passion, supposes the highest activity of the 
 
OTTTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 83 
 
 Reason, which is the parent of Ideas. Furthermore, the 
 warmth of Feeling and of Passion is obscure and vague — to 
 use a comparison, is like a dimly burning fire ; Affection, on 
 the contrary, constantly conscious, constantly attentive to the 
 slightest hint of Reason, capable of checking itself in the midst 
 of the most rapid course, is to be compared to the sun-light, 
 which brings even more clearness than warmth with it. For this 
 reason, and also because Affection does not, like Passion, di- 
 vide the mind into two contending parties, but unites all the 
 powers of the soul, and all the emotions of the heart, in finest 
 harmony with the Reason, it is the happiest state by far to 
 which man can raise himself. That it is also a perfectly 
 moral state, it seems unnecessary to add. It is, especially 
 when generated by ethical Ideas, man's moral nature itself, 
 and that, too, in its finest splendor, its highest dignity, and 
 elevated far above that coldness of soul which is sometimes 
 denominated rational, although with great injustice, since a 
 powerful activity of the Reason must necessarily banish all 
 coldness. Finally, Affection is distinguished from Passion, 
 by the fact that the former is as permanent as the latter is 
 transient. For since the Idea which generates it can never 
 be exhausted by a single exhibition, but only by a continued 
 series of exhibitions, and, therefore, has a long-continued ex- 
 istence — nay, if it is a moral Idea, an eternal existence, for 
 the contemplating mind, it imparts this attribute and duration 
 to the menial affection which accompanies it. 
 
 Instead, however, of duly distinguishing between two men- 
 tal manifestations so diverse as those above described, it is too 
 common to denominate everything as Passionate, that is at- 
 
S4 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 tended with any degree of fire and life ; and it often happens 
 that that which is Beautiful and Excellent in the highest de- 
 gree, is degraded by the debasing conception which is con- 
 nected with this word. We should, therefore, never ascribe 
 to one who is given up to an Art, or a Science, as soon as he is 
 capable of producing something within its sphere, by his own 
 independent power, a Passion for this Art or Science ; his 
 love is an Affection which is generated by Ideas ; and he, 
 alone, has a Passion for an Art who merely desires to con- 
 template its creations for the sake of the pleasure they pro- 
 duce, without being excited to any activity of spirit by them. 
 In the social relations of men also, not all Love is Passion. 
 Love is Passion only when it strives after the possession of 
 the loved object, as after the possession of a piece of property 
 which it wishes to obtain and hold ; it is something far high- 
 er, it is Affection, so soon as the Idea of a perpetual connec- 
 tion comes to lie at the bottom of it ; an Idea which is neither 
 disturbed by separating circumstances, nor grows cold from 
 the earthly possession of the object. Speaking generally, the 
 action of man should never be Passionate, but always Affec- 
 tionate ; it should never betray the fire which an external ob- 
 ject has kindled, but should be constantly animated by that 
 mild and clear warmth which accompanies all that springs 
 from the inward depths of the spirit. And thus let us, in 
 Eloquence also, distinguish the discourse of a man who is 
 filled with an Idea, which he would impart to others in an 
 equal degree of clearness and warmth, from the effort, ever 
 to be condemned, to awaken their Passions. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 83 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE DUTY OF THE ORATOR TO SPEAK WITH AFFECTION AND 
 TO AWAKEN AFFECTION. 
 
 Having, in the foregoing, shown that true Affection as distin- 
 guished from Passion, is never morally wrong, but is always to 
 be regarded as intrinsically Beautiful and Excellent, we now 
 go still farther, and affirm, that it is absolutely necessary that 
 the orator speak with Affection. For he goes before an as- 
 sembly only in order to impart to it the Idea by which he 
 is himself pervaded ; and this Idea, if it actually be an Idea, 
 must be accompanied with Affection. If we find the orator 
 wanting in this, we are justified in assuming that he is not 
 animated by an Idea ; that he seems to purpose and undertake 
 something, but in reality has no definite purpose, and, there- 
 fore, is in contradiction with himself ; that he pursues his 
 business from necessity merely, like a day-laborer, or from 
 by-ends like a demagogue, or from cold and chilling van- 
 ity, like a mere fine speaker ; and any one of these as- 
 sumptions, if just and warranted, will prevent the hearer 
 from respecting the man, or opening his heart to him. What 
 we have said, moreover, respecting the difference between Af- 
 fection and Passion, will, it is hoped, protect us from the 
 charge of demanding in the orator, feverish heat, sickly 
 emotion, or strained animation; we demand warmth with 
 thoughtfulness, feeling with reason, emphasis without dis- 
 tortion, light and fire without vapor ; fine qualities, which 
 8 
 
86 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 even the common hearer knows how to estimate, and readi- 
 ly distinguishes from the Extravagant and Artificial. 
 
 Every one who has ever come before the people, filled with 
 a great Idea, has spoken with Affection ; but with the great- 
 est Affection by far, He who gave utterance to the greatest 
 Ideas ; namely, Christ. This Light of the World reveals 
 eternal Truth with an abiding Inspiration, which is at one 
 time mild and gentle, at another, with thunder and crash ; 
 a great example for every sacred orator, and one that warrants 
 him in dispensing with all, so called, philosophical calmness, 
 and obligates him to speak with similar Affection. 
 
 Supposing, now, that there are means whereby Affection 
 can be imparted to others, it is plain that the use of these 
 means can never be injurious, but always and only beneficial. 
 For they never rouse up mere blind feeling to a life and en- 
 ergy that renders Reason inactive ; on the contrary, mere 
 blind feeling is held in subordination, since the orator compels 
 it to co-operate towards his ends, and, in this way, there arises 
 inward harmony, which is man's most perfect condition. The 
 fear, also, that the orator may go too far in exciting Affection, 
 seems to me to be entirely unfounded, for Affection is gen- 
 erated by a stronger activity of the Reason, in which there 
 can be no excess, and the calm Thought must at every mo- 
 ment lead back within its proper limits the discursive Feeling. 
 Passion most certainly may become too strong, or rather, it 
 should never become so, but how the Ideas of the moral 
 Reason can be accompanied with too lively Affection, or how 
 it is possible for these same Ideas, sanctified by Religion, to 
 seize upon the mind with too great power, I, at least, cannot 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 87 
 
 imagine. The orator, therfore, if he is able to excite Affection, 
 need prescribe no limits to himself while making the attempt ; 
 owing to human weakness, instead of going too far, he will or- 
 dinarily have to blame himself for having done too little. And 
 if it is objected that Affection, like every lively frame of the 
 soul, is transitory, I ask whether it isTor this reason merely, to 
 be deemed worthless, and whether every single hour which is 
 spent in the feeling of enthusiasm for the Highest and Best is 
 not a positive gain and a beautiful reward for the soul that is 
 the subject of it ? But this objection is without foundation ; for 
 Affection owes its existence to the heightened activity of Reason 
 alone ; and Reason, by means of the fuller developement it 
 has received in the process, is always of itself independently 
 able to reproduce Affection. 
 
 Invariably excluding everything Passionate, and assuming 
 that Affection can be imparted to the hearer, we can now, 
 without any opposition whatever, we hope, lay down the as- 
 sertion, that it is the duty of the orator to awaken Affection. 
 In case, either from principle or from inability, he disclaims 
 this obligation, his activity must be limited to that of which 
 we have treated in the First Book ; namely, to proving that 
 the particular Idea of his oration is contained in the general 
 Idea of the hearer, and that the hearer, if he wills Duty, or 
 Virtue, or Happiness, must also will this or that procedure 
 to which these Ideas lead. But what is accomplished by this ? 
 As good as nothing. This might indeed do, if in man, Know- 
 ing, Willing, and Doing, were one and the same act. In this 
 case, he would only need to know that he ought to will, in or- 
 der to will, and would only need to will, in order to do. But 
 
S8 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 such is not the case. There is a cold abstract Knowing which 
 generates no Willing ; there is a feeble Willing which never 
 passes over into Doing. But to what does this cold Know- 
 ing and this feeble Willing lead, and how can the orator be 
 satisfied with producing it ? For the very reason, that some- 
 thing is to be accomplished which is not yet accomplished ; 
 for the very reason, that he finds the State and the Church 
 in a corrupt, or at least an imperfect condition, and would have 
 it changed for the better ; for this, and no other reason, does 
 he come forward as an orator ; this is the end towards which 
 he must labor, if he would not be in contradiction with him- 
 self; and if he does not attain it, he has spoken in vain. But 
 in order to attain it, it is necessary, that the Idea of the hear- 
 er be raised to such a grade of vitality as that it can immedi- 
 ately pass over into act ; for that blazing up of all the inward 
 powers which we denominate Affection, indicates the moment 
 when the Idea is breaking through and coming forth into 
 Actuality. If the capacity of being conscious of Ethical Ideas 
 must be predicated of every man, and yet very few act in ac- 
 cordance with Ideas, this is only because Affection is wanting 
 in them, the very link itself, which, in the chain of human ac- 
 tivity, connects Willing with Doing. The sentiment which 
 the orator labors to produce in his hearers, and the resolution 
 which he seeks to have them take, are to be brought about 
 immediately, not only when he speaks before the judge or be- 
 fore his fellow-citizens, but also when he speaks before a Chris- 
 tian assembly. For if it is not brought about immediately, 
 when will it be? At another time? But why defer that 
 which is in itself good ? Or would the orator merely enlight- 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 89 
 
 en and cultivate the Reason, under the conviction that well- 
 regulated action will then be developed of itself, from it ? But 
 experience proves the contrary ; it shows us men of very- 
 cultivated Reason, who either do not act at all, or act wrongly. 
 And, moreover, how is this gradual cultivation possible in the 
 case of the orator, to whom, at this one particular moment, a 
 mind is surrendering itself, which perhaps will never again 
 fall within the sphere of his influence ? Is nothing at all to 
 be done for such an one, and how long is the orator to wait 
 for something to be developed of itself, from the audience be- 
 fore him ? Their ethical Ideas they bring with them ; they 
 are therefore, at this moment, just as susceptible to every good 
 influence, as they will be years hence ; for it is the individual 
 who changes — the mass, on the whole, is ever the same. The 
 objection in question proceeds from the false supposition, 
 that it is necessary for the orator to laboriously impart to men 
 that intelligence which lies at the bottom of action ; but he is 
 spared this labor, since every man by nature possesses the 
 ethical Ideas. Perhaps there is sometimes in the orator, as in 
 the hearer, an aversion towards the exhibition of Affection, 
 which conceals itself behind these objections, but which, after 
 what has been said, can hardly pass as praiseworthy. 
 
 If now it be asked, in what does the business of the 
 orator properly consist — in conviction or persuasion — I con- 
 fess that I can declare decidedly neither for the one nor for 
 the other, and that it seems to me the question ought not to 
 be asked, since it is based upon a false Eloquence. 
 
 So far as conviction is concerned, this is by no neans suffi- 
 cient to constitute the substance of Eloquence, if by ii ier- 
 8* 
 
90 "eloquence a virtue ; or, 
 
 stood the proof that the particular Idea of the orator is con- 
 tained in the general Idea of the hearer. But this is hardly 
 the meaning given to the word ; it is generally taken to de- 
 note a demonstration, by means of which the whole Philoso- 
 phic connection of the thoughts of the orator is impressed 
 upon the hearer, in order that he may be excited to one par- 
 ticular act. Conviction of this sort seems to me to be an im- 
 possibility, and I believe that the best Dialectician has not 
 yet succeeded in entirely bringing over his opponent to his 
 own standing point. But even if it were a possibility, I 
 should deem it useless for the orator to start from the highest 
 principles of all knowledge and action, when he might di- 
 rectly, and with entire certainty of success, fasten on upon 
 the ethical Ideas. It were also sad, in the highest degree, to 
 be compelled to go through with a course in Philosophy with 
 a man in order to move him to the performance of a good ac- 
 tion. But this part of the subject, as I believe, has been suf- 
 ficiently explained in the First Book. I can as little approve 
 of persuasion, if by it is understood the distortion or darken- 
 ing of representations, in order to excite the Passions ; no 
 able orator will betake himself to this means, and we have 
 shown that he has no need to do so. If, however, conviction 
 may be taken to denote the production of the Idea in consci- 
 ousness, and persuasion its elevation and transformation into 
 Affection — which, however, as I believe, the common use of 
 language does not permit — I would answer the question above 
 by saying, that the business of the orator consists neither in 
 conviction nor persuasion alone ; but that his conviction should 
 be persuasive, and his persuasion convincing. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 91 
 
 CHAPTER III. # 
 
 THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF AFFECTION. 
 
 Before we proceed to treat of the means of exciting the Af- 
 fections, we must first become acquainted with the different 
 kinds of Affections. Affection is not always one and the 
 same ; for, in the first place, the Ideas upon which it attends, 
 although all of them of an ethical nature, may be very diffe- 
 rent from each other. In the second place, the character and 
 qualities, as well of the Subject in whom the Idea is generated 
 as of the Object to which it is referred, vary. For example, 
 the Idea of Duty may be generated in a guilty or in an innocent 
 mind — may be applied to a guilty or an innocent man ; and 
 in relations so dissimilar, the Affection arising from the en- 
 livenment of this Idea must assume different hues. Finally, 
 in the third place, several Affections, in themselves different, 
 may flow together, and, by their union, form a third. The 
 knowledge of these different kinds of Affections seems to us 
 to be necessary, since, without it, it will be impossible to deter- 
 mine whether the means of exciting the Affections which we 
 shall present, are sufficient or not. This knowledge will also 
 enable us the better to distinguish the Affections from the 
 Passions — a distinction upon which I lay the greatest stress, 
 since only through its observance can Eloquence be restored 
 again to its proper rank. Indeed, it does not escape me, that 
 I am here entering upon the dangerous ground of Psychology, 
 
92 ELOaUENCE A VIRTUE J OR 
 
 so called, from which perhaps the fragments of so many un- 
 successful undertakings in this department of Khetoric ought 
 to deter me ; yet the safe clue with which I venture into this 
 domain, will perhaps preserve me from a similar failure. It 
 is true, that nothing can be done in Psychology, if that obser- 
 vation of self and of others, from which it draws its truths, is 
 pursued at hap-hazard, and without leading principles. 
 But here we have something firm, universal, and sure, in 
 the ethical Ideas, which we bring down into the lower region 
 (so to speak) of the mind, only in order to observe what will 
 result from their contact with the natural feelings and the dif- 
 ferent inward states of men. In this, or in a similar way, 
 it may perhaps not be impossible to distinguish and to de- 
 signate satisfactorily all the different movements in the mind 
 which so interpenetrate and run through each other, and 
 which no so-called empirical Psychology has as yet syste- 
 matized. Yet, what we shall be able to do here, can be re- 
 garded as only a slight contribution towards such an under- 
 taking. 
 
 Without regard now to the Idea of Duty, it is apparent 
 that the inward state of a man who is warmed and enlivened 
 by it, and who strives with all his powers to realize it in con- 
 duct, must be remarked as a peculiar Affection. It is deno- 
 minated Zeal, and it is naturally the strongest in him who 
 regards the law which he obeys from love, as a truly divine 
 law ; it is weaker in degree, yet not essentially different, in 
 the mind of him who receives the law by which he regulates 
 his conduct, from the State solely, or who believes that he im- 
 poses it upon himself. If, however, man does not strive after 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 93 
 
 the realization of an Idea, but after the possession of an out- 
 ward good, his Zeal, which at first was an Affection, dege- 
 nerates into Passion. If the Idea of Duty has been sup- 
 pressed for a long time in a man's mind, and again acquires 
 dominion within it, it begets, with reference to his past faulty 
 state, Shame and Repentance, the liveliness of which, like 
 that of Zeal, is in proportion to the seriousness of the sphere 
 in which the Duty is conceived to be obligatory, and which, 
 like the Affection of Zeal, would cease to be pure Affections, 
 if the individual, instead of charging himself with the posi- 
 tive neglect of duty, should charge upon himself merely the 
 neglect to make use of a favorable opportunity to promote 
 some earthly advantage. The perception, in the case of 
 another, of the difference between what he actually does and 
 what he ought to do, excites in different degrees the Affection 
 of Anger, which, in order to remain a pure Affection, must 
 never go farther than to the bad action itself, and which be- 
 comes a Passion so soon as it is directed against the person 
 of the agent. 
 
 The Idea of Virtue, whether its perfection in God, in 
 Christ, or the approximation to its perfection in a good man, 
 be considered, through the Affection accompanying it, be- 
 comes Love, Friendship, Esteem, Benevolence, Emulation, 
 Admiration. These are pure expressions, from which the 
 common use of language has already banished every notion of 
 passionateness, with the exception only, that by Love is not 
 always meant an Affection, generated by the Idea of Virtue, 
 for an object in which this Idea is perfectly, or in part real- 
 ized, but often, also, a passionate desire for that which stimu- 
 
94 ELOaUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 lates unnaturally. Love, as an Affection, has the Godhead for 
 its highest object, with which it strives to unite and become 
 one, and can pass over to a human being only in case the 
 human being manifests something divine. Accordingly, it is 
 more perfect in its nature than Friendship, since it reveringly 
 recognizes the whole Individuality of the loved object, while 
 Friendship, on the contrary, is generated by esteem for only 
 certain particular, mainly moral, qualities. Yet, as Love 
 strives after an abiding union with its object, so there is also 
 in Friendship the desire for community of feeling and action ; 
 if this fails, Esteem remains, which is denominated Benevo- 
 lence, when it is accompanied with the impulse to manifest it- 
 self in procuring some earthly advantage for the object of 
 its regard. Emulation is inseparable from Love and Friend- 
 ship, and, in general, arises in a mind that is pervaded by the 
 Idea of Virtue, on seeing its Ideal of Excellence more perfect- 
 ly realized in another being than itself. Admiration is the 
 loving recognition of another's Excellence, when it is unattaina- 
 ble by us, or, at least, when it seems so far removed from our own 
 Ideal, that we cannot strive after it, without renouncing our 
 own Ideal, and ourselves, as it were. Thus the Hero admires 
 the Poet, and the Poet the Hero, while each follows after a 
 restricted Ideal, and one that is and must be foreign to the 
 other. But no one admires either the invisible Godhead, or 
 the Godhead as revealed in Christ, for the very reason that 
 its perfection is without limits or restrictions, and, conse- 
 quently, may be taken as an Ideal by every man. The Idea 
 of Virtue produces the Affection of Contempt and JDisesteem 
 towards those who seem to be destitute of the Idea of Virtue ; 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 95 
 
 though Disesteem more properly has reference to the absence 
 of civic merit, or desert in relation to the State. Contempt is 
 a very harsh, and, therefore, an imperfect Affection ; he alone 
 feels it who stands upon a low point of view, and who believes 
 himself to be the creator of the virtue he possesses. He who 
 is convinced that he has received it from God, without any 
 merit of his own, will be more inclined to Pity than Contempt, 
 in relation to the sinner. 
 
 Finally, in the third place, the following Affections are as- 
 sociated with the Idea of Happiness : — Longing after the 
 highest Good, Hope to obtain it, Gratitude towards him who 
 has rendered aid in obtaining it, Pity for the erring who 
 does not strive after it at all, or in a false way, Fear of all 
 that might deprive us of it, and Abhorrence of evil within 
 ourselves, as the worst enemy of our true happiness. Yet, in 
 order to preserve these affections pure, the Idea of Happiness 
 must be conceived in its greatest purity ; and it is for the 
 very reason that this is seldom done, that the Affections at 
 this point border so closely upon the Passions. He who 
 stands upon the position of the mere moralist, and seeks his 
 happiness in an unhindered activity, will detect in himself 
 a displeasure, not altogether pure and unselfish, towards all who 
 oppose him in any way. But these Affections most easily 
 degenerate into Passions, when the Idea of Happiness is ap- 
 plied to political relations, and the individual animated by it 
 is striving after the welfare of the State. So long as Enthu- 
 siasm only, is felt in relation to those who promote the wel- 
 fare of the State, and Displeasure only, in relation to those 
 who disturb it, these are beautiful Affections, and worthy of 
 
96 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 esteem ; but, instead of Enthusiasm, there very easily arises 
 blind Adoration, and instead of Displeasure, raging Hatred ; 
 and these political Passions, which pre-suppose a great obscu- 
 ration of the rational Idea of Happiness, are the more frightful, 
 because it is easy for every man to justify to himself, and to 
 others, his own selfish efforts, under the appearance of a patri- 
 otic disposition. In like manner, Enmity against him who 
 has done us some injury, is never an Affection, but always a 
 Passion. The same is true of Envy, in which the Begrudg- 
 ing another of his Happiness is connected with Hatred to- 
 wards him for having it. Even Pity has something of Passion 
 in it, if we deplore the case of an unhappy person, not for his 
 own sake, but from a lurking, unconscious intimation, that 
 possibly we may soon find ourselves in his condition. It is a 
 true Affection only when, as has been said before, it springs 
 from the pure Idea of Happiness dwelling in us, and in some 
 degree realized in our own case, but which we miss in the 
 striving of another, or when our feeling for the miserable is 
 elevated and ennobled by the additional influence of the 
 Ideas of Justice and of Virtue, as is the case on seeing an in- 
 nocent man stricken with disease, or a man who, considering 
 his high qualities, merited a better fate. As the sight of an 
 innocent man, stricken with disease, calls forth an elevated 
 Pity that is full of Affection, so the sight of prosperous Vice 
 begets Moral Indignation,* which, like Compassion, is a 
 mixed Affection, and springs from the connection of the Idea 
 of Justice with the Idea of Happiness. 
 
 Aristotle, who, in the beginning of his Rhetoric, condemns 
 
 * Nemesis, 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 97 
 
 the excitement of the Passions, but who afterwards, unable to 
 carry out his theory independently, adapts himself to the ne- 
 cessities of the case, treats of the subject-matter of this chap- 
 ter with evident interest, and with the precision in the speci- 
 fication of particulars peculiar to him. He assumes eleven 
 Passions : — Anger, Placability, Love, Hatred, Fear, Sha?ne, 
 Benevolence, Moral Indignation, Pity, Envy, Emulation. It 
 is easy to see how, in this enumeration, things the most di- 
 verse are brought together — e. g., the mean vice of Envy* 
 with the noble striving of Emulation, and, consequently, how 
 necessary it is to distinguish between Affection and Passion. 
 Let it also be noticed that this list of Aristotle is not more 
 copious than our own, and, consequently, that we have not 
 been compelled, in order to systematically arrange the actual 
 phenomena of consciousness, to mutilate them in the least* 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 WIT. 
 
 If we, of right, require in the orator the ability to awaken 
 Affection, we should also, perhaps, require that he have Wit. 
 Wit is the destruction of Affection ; it is the bent of a mind, 
 which, instead of being carried away by the Holy and the 
 Great, makes it an object of its scrutiny, and entertains itself 
 with the apparent contradictions and contrasts which are con- 
 tained in it. The play of such a mind is much more sure 
 9 
 
98 ELOaUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 and safe when it is directed against a Passion, which continu- 
 ally presents a great number of weak points, and which is 
 always checked and abated whenever Wit gets the upper 
 hand. It might, therefore, seem as if the weapon of Wit 
 were necessary to the orator, not indeed for attack, but 
 for defence against a Passion or an Affection awakened by his 
 opponent, that is working against him. This is the only 
 one, among the many shallow reasons mentioned by Cicero, 
 for the employment of Wit in Eloquence, that is not utterly 
 to be rejected.^ And, indeed, it cannot be denied that a 
 well-applied sally of wit is of great effect when the orator needs 
 merely to free himself from some entanglement, to help himself 
 quickly out of a momentary embarrassment, and by a brief 
 word to get rid of a matter, especially if it does not pertain 
 to the higher relations of human existence, and is of no special 
 importance to any one. Yet, when the orator has in view the 
 excitement of a great and powerfully moving Affection, Wit, 
 however skilfully applied, can produce only an injurious effect. 
 It may indeed deprive the reasoning of an opponent of its 
 force, and extinguish the fire which he has kindled ; but the 
 hearer is thereby put into an indifferent mental state that is 
 destitute of Affection, and one in which he is more inclined to 
 reflection than to action. But the orator should never let it 
 come to this, for while in this way he destroys the Affection 
 or Passion which his opponent has called forth, he at the 
 same time destroys that which has been produced by himself, 
 and must, after an interruption so disturbing in its effects, be- 
 
 * Q,uod frangit adversarium, quod impedit, quod elevat, quod deterret, 
 quod refutat.— De Oratore, II. 58. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 99 
 
 gin his whole work over again. The intermingling of Wit in 
 an oration, is therefore unworthy of a true orator, and it seems 
 to me the orator is upon true and high ground only when, 
 without utterly annihilating the particular Affection which has 
 been called forth in opposition, he throws it back with re- 
 doubled force upon his opponent. In this way, without any 
 cold and indifferent state intervening, Affection follows upon 
 Affection, and that awakened last is strengthened by the con- 
 trast with the preceding. It will not be more difficult, it will 
 rather be more easy for him who speaks with the conscious- 
 ness of the goodness of his cause, and can apply the whole 
 power of the moral Ideas to his own purposes, to suddenly re- 
 verse a false feeling in the mind of the hearer, which is un- 
 favorable to himself, than first to kill all feeling in him, and 
 then re-animate him for his own purposes. 
 
 In order to clearly perceive how foreign Wit is from Elo- 
 quence, let one consider the nature of sacred Eloquence, and 
 ask himself, What would be the effect of a witty sally — against 
 an oppose r of religion, for example — in the midst of a serious 
 discourse ? Would it not, of necessity, so destroy the whole 
 impression of the discourse as that it would be impossible to 
 think even, of renewing it again ? Of similar effect, also, is 
 Wit in political Eloquence, although less hazardous, because 
 the contrast with the main character of the discourse is not so 
 sharp and striking. Upbuilding, to speak generally, is the 
 proper function of the orator ; he can therefore have to do 
 with destroying, only in passing and briefly. 
 
 The tendency to Wit and the capability of employing it, 
 were very slight, in the serious mind of Demosthenes, in which 
 
100 ELOaUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 great affections were constantly dominant, while they were 
 prominent qualities in Cicero. The latter took great pleasure 
 in practising this talent, which flattered his vanity, while in 
 the orations of Demosthenes no traces of it are to be met with, 
 although he was often the subject of the witty sallies of his 
 contemporaries. Quintilian, who in general is more prejudiced 
 in favor of his countryman than he should be, in reference to 
 this quality places him above Demosthenes ; a totally false 
 judgment, since he praises him on account of a quality which 
 rather merits condemnation. Cicero is very entertaining 
 perhaps, to the modern reader, in those passages in which he 
 covers his opponent with wit and ridicule, but let one only 
 observe how Demosthenes refutes his adversary with earnest 
 vehemence, with what masterly ability he converts defence into 
 an attack, and hurls back as an accusation the annihilated 
 charge of his opponent, and then ask himself which method is 
 most conformed to the end of the orator, most elevated and 
 noble, most virtuous ? 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 101 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE MEANS OF EXCITING AFFECTION ; OR ; THE RHETORICAL 
 PRESENTATION OF THOUGHT. 
 
 The way for the investigation of the important inquiry, 
 by what means Affection can be excited, seems to have been 
 sufficiently prepared, by what has been said in proof of the 
 moral dignity and worth of this mental state, and of the duty 
 of the orator to call it into existence. We do not treat of the 
 excitement of the Passions, because it is a subject which can 
 find a place only in a Rhetoric constructed according to en- 
 tirely false, or, at least, imperfect principles. Aristotle, upon 
 this subject, imparts an amount of instruction which, in com- 
 pleteness and fulness of rich and fine remark, can hardly be 
 surpassed. Yet it all amounts simply to this, that each Pas- 
 sion has its particular object by which it can be excited, if it 
 be depicted in lively colors, and placed vividly before the 
 view. A little imagination and so-called knowledge of hu- 
 man nature, accompanied with a versatile character, or an evil 
 will, is often sufficient in order to succeed in this. It is not 
 even necessary that the orator himself feel the Passion which 
 he would enkindle ; nay, this might rather be a hindrance to 
 him, since it would destroy his coolness and self-possession. 
 We acknowledge, moreover, that in many circumstances, and 
 having to do with certain characters, it may be much easier 
 to allow a Passion to blaze forth, than to produce an Affection ; 
 9* 
 
102 • ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 nay, that the former, in comparison with the latter, is mere 
 child's-play. But besides that such a procedure is not moral 
 in its nature, it is also a highly uncertain and deceptive 
 means in order to attain a Rhetorical end, as we have already 
 shown ; so that Good Sense, which goes hand-in-hand with 
 Duty, limits the activity of the orator to the production of 
 Ideas, and their enlivenment into Affections. 
 
 While now a Passion may be made to blaze forth, by one 
 who is destitute of Passion himself, he alone, on the other 
 hand, is able to awaken an Affection, who is himself enliven- 
 ed and pervaded by it. For the aim, in this case, is not to ren- 
 der the mind of the hearer susceptible to the stimulus of an 
 external object, in order to which, it is not indispensably 
 necessary that the orator himself be strongly affected by it ; 
 but to transfer something that has been generated in the 
 depths of the soul, into another person, which can be done 
 only in proportion as the orator himself possesses that which 
 is to be produced. Furthermore, it has been shown, that in 
 the mind of the orator the Affection is most intimately con- 
 nected with the Idea, and that it arises only as an effect of the 
 Idea, and in proportion to the degree in which the Idea is un- 
 folded and developed. In like manner, it can never be pro- 
 duced in the mind of the hearer by means which lie without 
 the Idea, but only by means of the Idea itself, and its pre- 
 sentation. Only when the orator succeeds in imparting the 
 Idea which is living, and creative in his own mind, to the 
 hearer, in an equal degree of force and clearness, will the Idea 
 break forth into activity in both speaker and hearer with 
 equal power, i. e., be accompanied with the same Affec- 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 103 
 
 tion in each. If, therefore, we can discover a particular 
 and peculiar manner of presentation, by which an ethical Idea 
 may be gradually carried up to its highest completeness in 
 the mind of another, we shall have discovered the true means 
 of awakening Affection. I say a particular and peculiar 
 manner of presentation, for at this point especially, it must 
 be evident, that it can be neither a Philosophical nor a Poeti- 
 cal manner. For although Philosophy exhibits Ideas in them- 
 selves, and Poetry, an Idea in a sensuous dress, yet neither 
 strives to excite an Affection from which a sudden revolution, 
 either in the inward state of a man, or in the outward condition 
 of human society, may proceed ; and even if anything similar 
 to this results from the Philosophical or Poetical manner of 
 presenting Ideas, yet the design to attain it, forms no part of 
 this manner of presentation, and exerts no influence upon it, 
 when it is pure and perfect in its character and execution. 
 But the Rhetorical manner of presenting Ideas has the ex- 
 citement of Affection, for its peculiar aim and end ; and I 
 affirm that this is the only point of view from which we can 
 proceed, if we would consecutively and systematically derive 
 its rules and laws. After having treated, in the First Book, 
 of the Plan and Division, we shall therefore now endeavor to 
 penetrate more deeply into the secret of Rhetorical Compo- 
 sition. 
 
 The success of our attempt to refer the Theory of Elo- 
 quence to ethical principles, would be very doubtful, if we 
 should now find ourselves compelled to leave the path which 
 we have hitherto trodden, and to deduce the laws of the 
 Rhetorical presentation of thought, which have for their aim 
 
104 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR 
 
 the awakening of Affection, from some other domain than 
 that of Ethics ; perhaps from a newly-invented Theory of the 
 Beautiful and Sublime, which we had connected as a little 
 addendum with the main system, or perhaps from the Theory 
 of the Emotions, and some shrewd empirical rules for exerting 
 an influence upon the human mind. But we find ourselves 
 in no such desperate position, but take up our investigation 
 again, precisely at the point where we dropped it in order to 
 explain some subjects which presented themselves, by the aid 
 of the principles which had been established, and proceed in 
 the deduction of the laws, according to which a free being 
 may exert influence upon other free beings. The first was : 
 the orator must subordinate his particular Idea to the univer- 
 sal and necessary Ideas of hearers ; and upon this was based 
 all that we have thus far developed. It is now incumbent 
 upon us to lay down the remaining laws which are to be ob- 
 served in this case, and to show how they, and they only, are 
 the best, sole means of attaining the end which the orator 
 must of necessity prescribe to himself, viz. the production of 
 Affection. 
 
 He, therefore, who, as a free being, would work upon other 
 free beings, and has already brought his particular Idea into 
 harmony with their innate and necessary Ideas, must, in the 
 first place, closely adapt his method of treating the subject to 
 existing circumstances and relations. He must, in the second 
 place, with all this reference to the position in which he finds 
 himself, with all the resistance or avoidance of the obstacles 
 which he meets in his path, at the same time be shut up and 
 continue, in one constant, unceasing, progressive process. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 105 
 
 But since, in the third place, through this advancing move- 
 ment, the entire relation of the orator is every moment chang- 
 ing, and assuming another form and shape, every element of 
 his activity must likewise be distinguished by a particular 
 form and shape ; and as his method, as a whole, was adapted 
 to the relations which he found already existing, so each of 
 the steps in it must be in harmony with these changes brought 
 about by himself. 
 
 These three laws — the first of which we denominate the 
 Law of Adaptation, the second the Law of Constant Pro- 
 gress, the third the Law of Vivacity — we shall now examine, 
 and endeavor to apply to Eloquence, as the means of excit- 
 ing Aifection P 
 
106 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE '> OR r 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE LAW OF ADAPTATION. 
 
 It is not merely a maxim of good sense, it is an ethical law, 
 that our influence upon others should be adapted to the cir- 
 cumstances under which it is attempted to be exercised. These 
 circumstances are no other than our relations to otir fellow- 
 men, which again are determined by their particular Individu- 
 ality, and by all that is connected with this. But every man 
 demands that his Individuality be respected, and although he 
 acknowledges that it can and must undergo modifications, he 
 nevertheless demands that these consist not in the suppression, 
 but in the cultivation and elevation of what is already existing 
 within him. Since this is a demand which every man makes, 
 and since it is a moral law, that we so harmonize our claims 
 with those of others, that they can co-exist with each other, 
 this same law imposes upon us the obligation to respect their 
 Individuality — L e., in our method of procedure to adapt our- 
 selves to existing relations and circumstances. For in endea- 
 voring to realize an Idea, we assert and maintain our own In- 
 dividuality ; but in order that this may not be done at the ex- 
 pense, or by the suppression, of the Individuality of others, the 
 preponderance which we are endeavoring to acquire must be 
 made easy and compensated for, by the closest possible insin- 
 uation of our own Individuality into that of our hearers. 
 Hence arose the first duty to fuse our Ideas with theirs ; hence 
 
OUTLINES OP A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 107 
 
 arises, now, the second duty of recognizing their Individuality 
 while asserting our own, and of employing the greatest care- 
 fulness while penetrating into anything that can possibly be 
 regarded as belonging to it. But since, according to what we 
 have before affirmed, the highest virtue is also the highest 
 good sense, the employment of this moral adaptation, while 
 we are endeavoring to exert an influence upon others, will be 
 the surest means, and the necessary condition, of securing a 
 successful result. It is this by which the practical man, in 
 the higher and better sense of the word, is distinguished ; and 
 if his method is uniformly characterised by this quality, and 
 for this reason is never fruitless, we should, while ascribing 
 good sense to him, at the same time not overlook the moral 
 ground and source of this quality. There are men who at 
 first sight inspire confidence, because they assert a distinctive 
 and superior Individuality with dignity, and set it forth with 
 modesty, while at the same time they concede ii§ full rights to 
 the Individuality of every other man. Hardly have they com- 
 menced the management of a difficult case, when all obstacles 
 and opposition vanish, because every hearer, on seeing them 
 proceed, is soon convinced that their influence upon him can 
 result only in his own benefit. These are the men who con- 
 trol and give direction to social life, and to such examples must 
 we look if we would obtain a true and lively notion of the 
 distinctive peculiarity of the orator. On the contrary, there 
 are persons who are ever ready and desirous to exert a good 
 influence upon others, but who, because they always bring for- 
 ward their propositions at the wrong time, and are not able to 
 adapt them to the individual peculiarities of those with whom 
 
10S ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 they have to do, invariably fail in their plans and enterprises J 
 good men, perhaps, and yet, without doubt, men who need a 
 higher moral cultivation. They are the genuinely unrhetori- 
 cal natures, exactly adapted to place clearly and plainly before 
 the eye, what the orator should not be. 
 
 Now the Law of Adaptation is as valid in relation to a rhe- 
 torical, as it is in relation to a moral procedure, and imparts 
 to it, if it is formed after it, certain qualities which are of an 
 ethical origin, and which, at the same time, may be regarded 
 as the best means of exciting Affection. 
 
 In the first place, an oration adapted to existing relations, 
 will be so suited to the hearer's power of comprehension, as 
 that it will neither strain it to over-exertion, nor leave it un- 
 employed. For the power of comprehension depends upon 
 the learning and intellectual cultivation of the hearer, along 
 with which it forms a part, and indeed a very essential part, 
 of his Individuality, which is to be respected by the orator, 
 and which he would offend against in an inexcusable manner, 
 if he should fatigue it by too great obscurity, or too great 
 plainness, in his discourse. And since, in order to avoid both 
 these faults, a very accurate acquaintance with the Public 
 whom he addresses is necessary, and one which he cannot ob- 
 tain without a diligent study of it, he is obligated to engage 
 in this study ; otherwise, he would incur the very same blame 
 which he does, who undertakes a particular business, and ne- 
 glects to acquire the knowledge necessary to its prosecution. 
 It is indeed true, that, even among the same class of hearers, 
 the degree of cultivation in each one is different ; yet, it is 
 easy to strike a mean, and from this to form the image, if I 
 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 109 
 
 may so say, of a universal or model hearer ; and this image, if 
 the orator keep it constantly before him, and address all he 
 has to say to it, will keep him from the two extremes above* 
 mentioned. 
 
 If an orator is not able to form a correct judgment respect- 
 ing the Public which he is to address, or to occupy their at- 
 tention in a manner adapted to their power of attention, this 
 cannot be regarded as a natural and unavoidable defect, and 
 so be merely matter of regret, but must be considered as a 
 moral defect; for his inadequateness ought not to have es- 
 caped his notice, and he should have given up a profession to 
 which he had not become equal, especially since, in the majo- 
 rity of cases, he might have made up for what was wanting in 
 natural talent, by persevering diligence. Nay, even if the 
 orator possesses the greatest natural talents, it will be impos- 
 sible for him to form a correct judgment respecting the intel- 
 lectual state of cultivated hearers, and to adapt his conceptions 
 to theirs, unless he possesses scientific and learned culture ; 
 this, therefore, he should acquire ; ignorance in him is to be 
 regarded as weakness of moral character, and as such, is to in 
 cur moral condemnation. Here, again, we see how, in the 
 case of the orator, the activity of all his powers is, or should 
 be, under the guidance of a moral principle. 
 
 In the acquisition of learned and scientific culture, he is to 
 set no limits to himself; let him go as far as he may and 
 can ; let him keep even step with his age, or let him press on 
 before it ; only let him never forget that Learning and Science, 
 for him as an orator, are only means, and not ends, and that 
 he may not put the exhibition of what he has made his own 
 10 
 
110 elogujence a virtue; or, 
 
 in these departments, in the place of the moral Ideas which 
 he is to set before the popular mind. This would be a vanity 
 intrinsically contrary to morality ; it would cause him to lose 
 sight entirely of the hearer's power of comprehension, and 
 oftentimes to present things that would weary the attention of 
 his audience to no purpose, or only awaken obscure images, 
 instead of distinct conceptions ; and this is the second, and 
 as it appears from investigation, also culpable error, which the 
 Law of Adaptation forbids, in respect to the hearer's power of 
 comprehension. 
 
 In this adaptation of the oration to the hearer's power of 
 comprehension, which, as we have seen, is of an ethical origin, 
 we find the first means of exciting Affection. In order that 
 the hearer may be induced to take part in a series of concep- 
 tions, it is absolutely necessary that the activity which is re- 
 quired of him be not fatiguing in its nature ; in case it were 
 fatiguing, it would soon become irksome to him, and he would 
 surrender himself to an inactivity that would render all further 
 efforts of the orator fruitless. And even if the hearer should 
 be willing to exert himself, to attentively follow a discourse 
 which taxed his powers to the utmost by its obscurity, yet the 
 too great stretch of the power of comprehension would exert 
 a deadening influence upon Feeling and Imagination, and 
 would render it impossible to excite them. But the power of 
 attention is weakened by the too great plainness, as well as 
 the too great obscurity, of that which is presented to it, and 
 the gentler stirrings of Affection will ever disdain to wake at 
 the bidding of an orator who cannot even satisfy the under- 
 standing. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. Ill 
 
 Here, I fear, I shall be met with the objection, that he who 
 has good sense enough to see the correctness of the remarks 
 just made, will need nothing more than this good sense itself, 
 in order to direct himself acordingly, and to impart to his ora- 
 tion the right relation to the hearer's powers of comprehen- 
 sion, so that the moral qualities and character of the orator 
 need not come into account at all. This may have actually 
 been the case in Athens, and in Eome, with many a dema- 
 gogue ; yet, such an example would prove nothing here ; for 
 he who in Athens, or Rome, should have set forth something 
 utterly unintelligible, would have been immediately driven off 
 from the bema by the scorn and laughter of his impatient 
 hearers. Under these circumstances, therefore, where the ne- 
 cessity of following the rules above-mentioned was so clear 
 and pressing, the moral character and qualities requisite in 
 other circumstances, might, perhaps, have been dispensed with 
 in the orator ; but from the fact, that a bad man may be com- 
 pelled, by circumstances of a highly pressing nature, to a cer- 
 tain method of procedure, it cannot be inferred that this 
 method of procedure is not of an ethical nature, and that, 
 other things being equal, the bad man can succeed in it as 
 well as the good. For only contemplate, for a moment, the 
 sacred orator of our own times, whose relation to his hearers 
 is far more unhampered than that of the ancient orator, since 
 they cannot react upon him in a manner so totally destruc* 
 tive of success, as iu the case above-mentioned, and how diffi- 
 cult, nay, how impossible, it often seems, even for men of 
 the shrewdest good sense, men whom no one cr.ii deny to be ca- 
 pable of forming a correct estimate of the capacity of their 
 
112 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 audience, to keep themselves in their discourse upon the right 
 level, and neither too high nor too low. Carried away by 
 complacency in something which they have learned or origin- 
 ated, they at one time require impossibilities of the hearer's 
 power of comprehension ; at another, from mere habit, stick- 
 ing to common-places, they set forth that which is perfectly 
 well known to their audience, in a prolix and wearisome man- 
 ner. Does not the former testify of too great vanity and 
 self-complacency, which are certainly faults of a moral nature ; 
 and does not the latter, as does all supine yielding to mere 
 habit, pre-suppose a lack of strength and elasticity in the 
 character ? 
 
 Thus it is apparent that even this excellence in an oration 
 — viz. that it is adapted to the hearer's power of comprehen- 
 sion, although it is only a very subordinate excellence, camiot 
 be reached without qualities in the orator that are morally 
 good. If I have succeeded in demonstrating the truth of this 
 assertion, I believe I have thereby done those young men no 
 little service, who are devoting themselves to Eloquence. 
 Science and Learning prepare them beforehand for an office in 
 which Science and Learning can no longer be the principal ob- 
 ject of their endeavors, but must be subordinated to the higher 
 aim, to the attainment of which they are subservient. That 
 this higher aim is actually a higher, it will be very difficult 
 for them to understand, especially since the instruction at the 
 common and higher schools, as these have hitherto been con- 
 stituted, exhibits Learning and Science to them as the high- 
 est of all things, to which nothing, Religion and Morality not 
 excepted, should be preferred. In vain, therefore, are they 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 113 
 
 now urged to banish everything purely Scientific, both in 
 Matter and Form, from their discourses ; they despise this 
 rule, which appears to them only as timid concession, and 
 which, it cannot be denied, is commonly represented to them 
 as such, by their teachers ; in default of the Professor's chair, 
 they would employ the Pulpit instead of it, and would make 
 the bold attempt to raise the people to the heights where they 
 themselves are soaring. If they finally come back from their 
 error, yet the loss of heart and inspiration often causes them 
 to sink down into superficiality and common-place. If, on 
 the contrary, this accommodation of discourse to the hearer's 
 power of comprehension is not a mere shrewd and skilful 
 concession, but a perfectly moral procedure, if the opposite 
 to it is contrary to duty, and if it is exhibited from this 
 point of view, a young and noble mind will readily follow 
 a rule, the observance of which it believes does not degrade, 
 but, on the contrary, elevates and ennobles. 
 
 Yet the Law of Adaptation requires not only that the ora- 
 tion be adapted to the capacity of the hearer, but also that the 
 orator have reference to his whole Individuality, to his posi- 
 tion, his relations, to the occurrences which enter deeply into, 
 and determine his fortune and fate. And this kind of adapt- 
 ation is far more difficult to attain to, than the first. In or- 
 der to this, it is necessary that the orator know, and have 
 before his eye the innumerable elements which enter into 
 the civil, moral, and religious condition of man ; namely, 
 the circle of his ideas and experiences, the thoughts that rre 
 common or foreign to him, the images with which his imagina- 
 tion is commonly employed, the more or less perfect Ideal of 
 10* 
 
114 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 happiness, of civil, moral, religious perfection, which floats 
 before him, his virtues and vices, his wishes and desires, to- 
 gether with all the more intimate modifications imparted to his 
 Individuality by standing in society, by wealth, by political 
 events, by the condition of the Church and State to which he 
 belongs. 
 
 This adaptation of the oration to the hearer's power of com- 
 prehension, the best teachers of Rhetoric seem to have recog- 
 nized as a means of exciting the Affections (in their sense in- 
 deed, according to which they were merely Passions) ; at least, 
 I know no other reason why Aristotle in his Rhetoric, imme- 
 diately after presenting the theory of the Passions, follows with 
 a description of the manners of men, according to their age, 
 rank, and wealth,^ although he does not explain what use the 
 orator is to make of this latter knowledge. 
 
 Cicero also, would have the orator be a shrewd and subtle 
 man, who has thoroughly scrutinized the character, and way of 
 thought of his hearers, according to their age and standing in 
 society ;f and he only errs in expecting of shrewdness and 
 subtlety what may be best accomplished by morality. A crafty 
 man may indeed succeed in detecting this or that weak side 
 of a character, in order to attach to it the threads by which he 
 would lead it ; but in order to so enter into, and feel, the views, 
 the sentiments, and the position of a man, as to be able to ad- 
 
 * Rhet. Lib. II. c. xii.— xvii. 
 
 t Acuto homine nobis opus est, et natura usuque callido, qui sagaciter 
 pervestiget. quid sui cives, iique homines quibus aliquid dicendo persua- 
 dere velit, cogitent, sentiant, opinentur, expectent. Teneat oportet 
 venas cuj usque generis, eetatis, ordinis, et eorum apud quos aliquid aget 
 aut erit acturus, mentes sensusque degustet. — De Oral. I. 51. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 115 
 
 dress his whole Individuality in a manner to benefit and ele- 
 vate, something more than craftiness is needed ; shrewd good 
 sense is indeed needed, but such as is under the guidance 
 of moral feeling, and that disinterested benevolence which 
 readily surrenders itself up to sympathy with men, and to the 
 contemplation of the objects in which they are interested. 
 
 Furthermore, the knowledge of the hearer's capacity thus 
 obtained, should not be used to favor his errors and to flatter 
 his passions, but it should be employed to excite the Affec- 
 tions in a negative way at first — z. e., to avoid all that might 
 displease, and so injure the hearer as such, or that might 
 render things, in themselves indifferent to him, matters of 
 offence. Without this care beforehand, the excitement of Af- 
 fection is not to be thought of. In vain does the orator speak 
 with fire and emphasis ; in vain is the hearer inclined to suffer 
 himself to be warmed and animated by the Idea which the 
 orator imparts to him, if the orator detains or wearies him in 
 the way to the goal in view, by a thousand minor matters irk- 
 some in their nature. And this is no undue or sickly sensi- 
 bility on the part of the hearer, for the claim itself, w T hich I 
 as an orator make upon him, to entirely surrender himself in 
 one respect to me, imposes the duty upon me to spare him as 
 much as possible in all other respects. Hence, the orator also, 
 if he is endowed w r ith true moral wisdom, must know how to 
 go around all the difficulties which he cannot at the moment 
 overcome ; this is at once Duty and Good Sense. Thus, the 
 Apostle Paul, in order the better to reach his great aim, spared 
 the prejudices of his cotemporaries, and became all things to 
 all men, if by any means he might save some. 
 
116 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE; OR, 
 
 The orators of antiquity, Demosthenes perhaps alone ex- 
 cepted, because they did not apprehend the true ground of this 
 Adaptation in the oration, sometimes practised a species of 
 artifice and trickery as unworthy of a high-minded man, as it 
 was useless towards the attainment of their aim. When 
 Cicero pretended that he could not call to mind the name of 
 Polycletus, and it was mentioned to him aloud by one of the 
 by-standers,^ he, without doubt, intended by this seeming ig- 
 norance of the history of Grecian Art, to fall in with the notion 
 of his fellow-citizens, that to employ one's self with such ob- 
 jects as those of Art was unworthy of a Statesman. For my 
 part, I can see in this, only an excess of Rhetorical Adapta- 
 tion, and, consequently, something contrary to Morality. 
 Moreover, I do not understand of what use this little piece of 
 trickery could be to a man who knew how to set such mighty 
 springs in motion. But it is the fate of all one-sided endea- 
 vors, to soon degenerate into the production of mere form 
 without substance. This was very soon the case with an- 
 cient Eloquence, because the Ancients misapprehended the 
 moral nature of Eloquence, and regarded it only as an instru- 
 ment for the attainment of ambitious designs.! 
 
 * Verrina, IV. 3.— Wolf ad Leptineam, p. 300. 
 
 t An artifice similar to this of Cicero's, only still more shrewd and 
 cunning, is attributed to Demosthenes, in order to explain the following 
 passage in the oration for Ctesiphon : " For I, (thus he addresses iEschi- 
 nes,) and all these with me, call you a hireling, first of Philip and now of 
 Alexander! If you doubt, ask these present; but I will rather do it for 
 you. Does it seem to you, Athenians, that iEschines is a hireling or 
 a guest of Alexander ? Do you hear what they sayT — Von Raumer's 
 Translation, p. 12*2. 
 
 Here, say the Scholiasts, Demosthenes purposely pronounced the 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 117 
 
 If such an extreme Adaptation on the part of the orator is 
 to be condemned, the opposite fault — namely, striking vio- 
 lently against existing and unalterable relations — is likewise 
 to be regarded as contrary to morality, and contrary to good 
 sense. A shock of this kind annihilates immediately the 
 effect of the most powerful oration, and we need only to. ex- 
 amine the sort of displeasure which is excited by it, in order 
 to see that the orator who has committed the fault in question, 
 is chargeable, not with a defect in good sense, or in pro- 
 ductive genius, but, what is far worse, in moral feeling. If 
 
 word ni(T$a)Tds, with an incorrect accent, and represented the excla- 
 mation of the hearers, who repeated the word in order to correct the 
 pronunciation, as an answer to his question, and as a declaration on 
 their part that they regarded iEschines as an hireling. This expla- 
 nation is given upon the authority of the Scholiasts, and, so far as I 
 know, is accepted by many, because the reader is particularly delighted 
 with discovering such artifices in orators ; but that it is the correct one, I 
 doubt. Certainly such a misplacing of the accent would have offended 
 the ears of the Athenians extremely, and might have occasioned an ex- 
 clamatory correction on their part ; but could this same excitable public 
 have thus coolly entered into the deception, and pretended to pronounce 
 a judgment respecting iEschines, when they only corrected Demosthe- 
 nes'? It seems to me, that Demosthenes, by this artifice, in reality so im- 
 pertinent to the occasion, would not have won over the minds of his hear- 
 ers, but would have only exasperated them. But besides this, while ex- 
 amining the orations of Demosthenes, we should at least consider what 
 is due to his character, the dignity of which, even though but half recog- 
 nized, must protect him from the suspicion of having meddled with such 
 miserable conceits ; we should consider that in this most tragic hour of 
 his life, his strongly exercised soul could only hurl bolt-like Ideas and not 
 play with accents. Moreover, what is more natural than to suppose, as 
 an explanation of this passage, thai he could from the first reckon upon 
 a strong party among the audience, and might anticipate that they 
 would answer the question according to his wishes 1 This, much more 
 befitting explanation is also found in the Scholiasts, who ascribe this 
 answer to a friend of the orator, the comic poet Menander. 
 
118 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 an audience should be so obtuse as not to be offended by mis- 
 takes of this kind — and this is oftener the case than one 
 would think — this indeed renders the labor of the orator 
 easier on the one side, but it renders it more difficult on 
 the other ; for, as the audience does not perceive the want of 
 Adaptation, neither will it perceive the presence of Adapta- 
 tion in an oration. The orator, therefore, should congratulate 
 himself only in an audience that is cultivated enough to be 
 displeased with the slightest unbefitting expression ; if he 
 does not find his audience to be of such a character, he must 
 seek to elevate it to this height, while he shows it a respect 
 which it will certainly learn more and more, to estimate and 
 understand. 
 
 But with respect to what he may venture upon, and what 
 he may not venture upon, let the orator decide, not according 
 to the conjectures of worldly shrewdness and sense, but accord- 
 ing to moral principles ; the hardest and strongest statements, 
 provided only they are adapted and suitable — provided only 
 the orator is called upon, by virtue of his office and his call- 
 ing, to make them — will never do injury ; they will never 
 weaken, but will always strengthen the effect of his oration, 
 and the Affection w T hich he would produce. How cultivated 
 was the feeling for the Befitting and the Adapted, in the 
 Athenians in the time of Demosthenes, and yet this orator 
 never feared to charge home upon them, with the greatest 
 force and impressiveness, their degeneracy, their failures and 
 weaknesses ; and I am not aware that he ever injured the ef- 
 fect of his orations by the freedom which was so unmistake- 
 ably connected with his love for his country and the existing 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 119 
 
 constitution. Still less should the sacred orator fear to de- 
 pict moral and religious corruption, according to its true re- 
 ality, and to terrify the impenitent sinner by the retributions 
 of the future life. He who omits to do this from fear of es- 
 tranging his audience from himself, does not consider that 
 the hearer altogether involuntarily judges of the orator ac- 
 cording to moral rules, and allows him to venture upon all 
 that he may rightfully venture upon ; that the most vehe* 
 inent charges do not exasperate him, provided only he sees 
 that the orator, by virtue of the relation in which he stands 
 to himself, is justified therein ; nay, that there is a propen- 
 sity in the moral and religious nature of man, which is close- 
 ly akin to the propensity for the Terrible and Sublimt, by 
 virtue of which he is better pleased with a merited humilia- 
 tion, that may lead to better sentiments, than with that su- 
 perficial emotion which is generated by flattering and specious 
 discourse* Thus the renowned orators who spoke before 
 Louis XIV. and his Court — an auditory who surely would 
 never have pardoned the slightest impropriety in them — 
 often employed and applied all the terrors of religion, and all 
 the censorial power of their office, and always with the great* 
 est effect* 
 
 While, on the one hand, Adaptation in the oration pre* 
 vents every offence that might suppress Affection in the 
 hearer, on the other it contributes directly to the awakening 
 of Affection. If, namely, the orator moves in a circle of such 
 thoughts, images, and allusions, as recall into memory the 
 experiences of the hearer himself, and the scenes of which he 
 was himself a witness, the oration must influence with double 
 
120 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE; OR, 
 
 power. For in this way the Idea is not merely made clear 
 and distinct to his mind, but since the orator associates it 
 with all that the hearer has himself thought and felt, the 
 whole inner being of the hearer is taken possession of, and 
 that inward fermentation, which we denominate Affection, 
 is awakened. There may be many forms of expression suit- 
 able to the thought, and intelligible to the hearer ; but there 
 is perhaps still another in particular, by which a region of his 
 mind enveloped in darkness may be suddenly filled with light, 
 and which at least strikes some of the manifold threads of 
 which the web of his feelings consist ; this latter form the 
 orator should know how to find, and he will be enabled to 
 find* it by means of that study of his hearers which is 
 grounded in an interest for their well-being. If he should 
 prefer another mode of presentation, to this form of clothing 
 his thought, this would be an egotistic procedure that would 
 punish itself by the inefficiency of the oration. But the oc- 
 casional oration shows how strong the impression is, which 
 can be produced by the wise use of feelings already ex- 
 isting in the hearers. If the preacher speaks on the occasion 
 of the opening of a campaign, or of a festival in commemo- 
 ration of a victory or a peace, he may, in this instance, pre- 
 suppose the existence in the hearers of certain prevailing 
 views and opinions, certain hopes and fears, certain feelings 
 of joy and thankfulness, with greater certainty than in the 
 case of ordinary discourses, when the relations that exist 
 are not so determinate and precise ; and if he understands, 
 with only moderate wisdom, how to converge all these diffe- 
 rent rays into the focus of his leading Idea, he will be able 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 121 
 
 to raise his Idea to a very high grade of Affection. This is 
 the reason why the effect of sermons on Festival occasions is 
 always greater than that of ordinary discourses on the Sabbath. 
 In the former case, the hearer, however unfavorable his mental 
 state may be for the purposes of the orator, nevertheless, al- 
 ways brings with him some sentiments of a religious charac- 
 ter, upon which the orator can very easily fasten. 
 
 It also belongs to this Adaptation in the oration, that the 
 orator never rise into expressions, phrases, and images that are 
 above the language of cultivated society, even before an audito- 
 ry that would be able to follow a higher style of thought, and to 
 understand more exquisite modes of speech. I mention this 
 for the sake of those who think they impart a peculiar dignity 
 and force to their discourse, by the use of poetic ornament, by 
 employing words which they bring forth from the dust of past 
 centuries, and by constructions which are foreign to pure prose. 
 But this is always only a cold show without power : if power, 
 as I affirm, can mean nothing else than the efficiency of the ora- 
 tion in exciting Affection. In the throng of active life, amidst 
 heart-rending misfortunes, during the silent hours of contem- 
 plation, does the hearer make known his thoughts and feelings 
 to himself and to others, in a highly flowery style, and in 
 strange unusual phraseology ? Certainly not. The style of 
 expression which spontaneously associates itself with the silent 
 emotions of our heart, when they come forth into conscious- 
 ness, is always as noble as it is simple ; if therefore the orator 
 would penetrate into our inner life, and renew again the tra- 
 ces of forgotten thoughts and feelings, if he would actually ad- 
 dress us, he must employ the very same well-known and cus- 
 11 
 
122 ELOQUENCE A VlRTtJE J Olt, 
 
 tomary language in wliich we are wont to commune with our- 
 selves. Every strange expression, nay, every unusual phrase, 
 tears us away from ourselves, instead of leading us back into 
 ourselves ; and the stream of inward harmonies, which per- 
 haps was on the point of flowing forth, suddenly breaks upon 
 some such unexpected obstacle, and is dissipated. Moreover, 
 with the disturbance of this flow is connected displeasure to- 
 wards a man who decks himself out in a showy costume of 
 sounding phrases, which, after all, are not so very difficult to 
 collect together, instead of employing my common, every-day 
 language along with me, to his own true advantage, as well as 
 mine. Those very rare instances when the speaker selects an 
 unusual expression for an unusual thought, are of course ex- 
 cepted here ; but to allow one's self in even the slightest de- 
 parture from ordinary language^ unless there is some particu- 
 lar reason to justify it, seems to me to be unadapted to the ora- 
 tion, and contrary to its aim, and is therefore, according to the 
 theory of Eloquence here laid down, morally blame-worthy. 
 
 It will of course be understood in this connection, that I do 
 not intend to disapprove of the use of Bible language ; on the 
 contrary, I would recommend to all sacred orators, the frequent 
 employment of the expressions and images of the sacred Scrip- 
 tures, as a highly adapted and effectual means of exciting Af- 
 fection, provided only they be not brought in merely to fill up 
 empty space, but are fused into the discourse, retaining their 
 whole dignity and force. They are highly adapted ; for the lan- 
 guage of the Bible can never become antiquated, because it 
 affords so many highly significant expressions for the manifold 
 conditions of human life and states of the human heart, many 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 123 
 
 of which also appear as proverbial phrases in the language of 
 common intercourse ; and however much, religious education, 
 and the reading of the Bible, may have been neglected, the or- 
 ator may yet, in the case of the generality of hearers, reckon 
 with certainty upon a thought being understood sooner in a 
 Biblical than in a Philosophical dress. But the great power of 
 Bible language, in awakening Affection, consists principally in 
 this — that, in it, the expression for the Understanding, and the 
 expression for the Feelings, are not different, as in merely 
 human representations, but are always one and the same. 
 The figures, so frequent in the Bible, while they have all the 
 precision of an abstract terminology, at the same time trans- 
 fer the Idea into the web of human relationships, and clothe it 
 with all that can exert influence upon the mind ; they are a 
 ray which unites in one, both light and heat, and passes over 
 from the mind into the heart, thus kindling the whole man. If 
 now, as is often the case, a sentence from the Bible, on our first 
 meeting with it, or upon after-occasions, has awakened a whole 
 series of pious emotions, the orator, by citing it as he passes 
 on, can evoke anew the Affection which has already become con- 
 nected with it,, and can apply it to the purposes of his oration. 
 On account of this great advantage, I would advise the employ- 
 ment of the language of the Bible, even though the orator can- 
 not presuppose that the hearer is acquainted with it, or that it 
 has ever contributed to awaken his inward life ; for by this 
 frequent employment of it, this closer acquaintance, and this 
 influence upon the mind, will be brought about by degrees. 
 
 But that which prevents the orator from entering into the 
 conceptions of his hearers, speaking to them in their own Ian* 
 
124 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 guage, and exciting Affection by the Adaptation of his dis- 
 course to their Individuality, is, in the last analysis of it, noth- 
 ing but a moral defect. In the main, it is that self-complacent 
 vanity which only desires the pleasure of expressing itself apt- 
 ly and agreeably, and which shrinks from the difficult and of- 
 tentimes violent effort which is requisite in order to go out 
 from self, and into another Individuality. From this weak- 
 ness arise, in sacred Eloquence, the loosely constructed, flow- 
 ery orations, which, indeed, since they are adapted to excite 
 the fancy of the hearer, often meet with enthusiastic ap- 
 plause, (inasmuch as men generally, blinded by their own 
 vanity, seldom set such an estimate upon the vanity of 
 others, and chastise it, as it deserves,) yet whose idle play 
 of thoughts and images can never produce a noble Affection 
 urging on to great resolves. Secondly, there is also a certain 
 aversion to the process in question, which may be found even 
 in noble and tender minds, and which prevents them from en- 
 tering into the relations of their hearers, seizing their hearts 
 with a strong grasp, and thus giving to their discourse that 
 Adaptation which awakens Affection. If an orator absorbs 
 himself entirely in the Idea, and developes it with great care- 
 fulness, but touches only superficially and generally upon the 
 relations in which it is to be realized, in order not to strike 
 against any obstacle, or to give offence to any one, we may 
 presuppose with certainty the existence of the very aversion 
 above-mentioned. Thirdly, too great yielding on the part of 
 the orator, in sacrificing his Idea and his Individuality, and in 
 employing himself solely with the relations and inclinations 
 of his hearers, in order to say something agreeable and pleas- 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 129 
 
 ing to them, deserves the very same, if not greater, moral con- 
 demnation, as the faults already mentioned, and exerts the 
 same debilitating influence upon the discourse ; an orator who 
 is thus moved, often lets his hearers melt away hi powerless 
 emotion, but he will never kindle in them a true Affi on, 
 since the clear ray of his Idea, by which alone this if I a ac- 
 complished, never breaks through the veil which surrounds it. 
 Thus we have specified three errors : absorption in self, ab- 
 sorption in the Idea of the oration, absorption in the relations 
 of the hearers. If a Rhetorical presentation of thought has a 
 decided preponderance to one of these three sides, it is without 
 Adaptation, and powerless. In order, therefore, to speak with 
 perfect Adaptation, the orator must so bring together, unite, 
 and reconcile these three different claims, which his own Indi- 
 viduality, the Idea of his oration, and the Relations of his hear- 
 ers, make upon him, as that each one of them be satisfied with- 
 out any disparagement to the others ; and in order to do this, 
 nothing more is necessary, than is required in order to any truly 
 moral action — namely, a constantly clear consciousness of our 
 own Individuality, of the Idea according to which, and of the 
 Relations in which, we act. But in order to the solution of 
 this problem, extremely great strength of character in Rhetori- 
 cal as well as in Moral respects, is necessary ; and how very 
 much both are one and the same in essence, is seen in the fact, 
 that orations, which are excellent both as Rhetorical and Moral 
 processes, are not distinguished by any outward brilliancy and 
 splendor ; for when the three different elements above-mention- 
 ed are fused together, their colors flow into each other, while, 
 on the contrary, imperfect orations, for the very reason that 
 11* 
 
130 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 some one of these elements appears separated from the others, 
 provided they are elaborated with any tolerable degree of abil- 
 ity, readily acquire a brilliancy which astonishes the ignorant 
 hearer, but which truly enlivens neither him nor any one else. 
 
 In this respect Demosthenes deserves the very highest 
 praise, since no orator has ever united with such a dignified 
 presentation of his own Individuality, and such a transparent 
 developement of his Idea, such an all-comprehending reference 
 to existing Relations ; and from the constant fusion of these 
 three constituent elements, originates his forcible simplicity, 
 which would have been totally destroyed, if, in his orations, 
 the Lyrical and the Philosophical had ever been separated 
 from the Real. On the other hand, Cicero is far less deserv- 
 ing of being set up as a model of Adaptation in the oration ; 
 not that he ever rises above his hearer's power of comprehen- 
 sion, or brings forward anything unbefitting and offensive, 
 but at one time his own Individuality, at another, his Idea, at 
 another, the existing Circumstances, are too prominent ; and 
 that one of these three elements which is predominant at 
 any time, throws the other two into the shade. But on ac- 
 count of this very fault, his coloring is more brilliant than 
 that of Demosthenes, and he can, in general, be understood 
 with less laborious study into the relations of the age in 
 which he appeared. 
 
 Without wishing in the least to compare Massillon with 
 Demosthenes, or Bossuet with Cicero, they nevertheless have 
 this similarity — that Massillon, like the Grecian orator, with- 
 out giving up himself and his Idea, realizes to himself, in the 
 most accurate manner, the life of his hearers ; on the contrary, 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 131 
 
 Bossuet, and indeed, as I conjecture, on account of a less pure 
 character, almost entirely neglects this latter reference. For 
 this reason, Massillon inspires us, and we forget to admire 
 him — the highest praise that can be given to the orator ; on 
 the contrary, Bossuet excites, even by his most sublime reli- 
 gious elevation, nothing but cold admiration, or, at most, an 
 inflammation of the Fancy that is morally useless. If, more- 
 over, the French themselves almost always place Bossuet be- 
 fore Massillon, this only proves, like many other judgments of 
 their critics, how little they know how to recognize and esti- 
 mate that which is truly excellent in their own literature. 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 TAS TE. 
 
 What Taste properly is, is as much a matter of dispute, as 
 is the place which it should hold in a Theory of Ait, and the 
 influence which should be conceded to it in the production 
 and criticism of works of Art. Indeed, the attempt has been 
 made in modern times to bring it into utter condemnation^ 
 and to strip it of all influence, as a perverted principle which 
 we have derived from the French ; yet since the Public, how- 
 ever much it may have been enjoined upon it not to exercise 
 Taste in its judgments, does not, nevertheless, cease to regard 
 its requisitions as valid ; since, likewise, Taste sometimes un- 
 consciously influences the judgments of those who despise it, 
 
132 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OK, 
 
 it would seem that it only needs to be seen in the right light, 
 and to be placed in the right position, in order to be univer- 
 sally recognized. It can, indeed, find no place in such theo- 
 ries as recognize no other rules for Art but those which the 
 Imagination imposes upon itself; for Taste will never have 
 any connection with the Imagination, so long as the Imagi- 
 nation works separate from the other faculties of the soul. 
 But in this very separation lies the fault ; for how is it possi- 
 ble that Art, which, from its nature, is to seize upon the whole 
 man, should excite into action the Imagination alone, and not 
 the other powers also ? And even if this should be the case, 
 still the ethical power, although it will not indeed predominate 
 in Art as it does in Rhetoric, will certainly not be without 
 influence upon the impulse of the Imagination predominant 
 in it. 
 
 In the ability, then, of working according to ethical Ideas, 
 I would seek the source of Taste, and affirm that Taste is 
 nothing but the selection of the Befitting and Adapted, guided 
 by ethical Ideas. Its proper home, therefore, is within the 
 sphere of Eloquence ; or rather, its sphere should be extended 
 over the whole practical life of the orator, since regard for the 
 individual peculiarities of his fellow-men, and for the rela- 
 tions in which he finds himself to them, should accompany 
 him at all times. But if Taste has become a moral habit in 
 him, I do not understand how he can suddenly drop it, when 
 he turns back from the circle of his outward activity into 
 himself, in order to unfold the Ideas of his Imagination, and 
 how he can here speak with himself in a language, and make 
 use of a manner of representation which he would never allow 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 133 
 
 himself in, in his relations to his fellow-men. Taste in the 
 above-given sense, should therefore extend itself over all 
 Poetry ; the Ideas of the Imagination must be made to pass 
 through this medium, and if this is done, they will gain in 
 liveliness, and the discourse in power and perfection. For in 
 order to make his work a living whole — in order to give it In- 
 dividuality — the artist must impart to it characteristics of the 
 most precise stamp; and some of them will always be failures, 
 unless, besides the other relations in which the work origin- 
 ated, the moral relations also, are to be recognized in it by the 
 regard paid to them. But Eloquence, in respect to Taste, 
 must always differ from Poetry in that, in the case of Elo- 
 quence, the selection of the Befitting and Adapted is accom- 
 panied with the design of exciting Affection, while Taste in 
 the Poet, on the contrary, is a quality that works without any 
 design in view, except the mere production of Beauty. More- 
 over, the term Taste, so offensive to many, would not be so 
 unsuitable to denote such a separating, selecting principle, as 
 has been spoken of; while, at the same time, it would occur to 
 us, that as the sensuous Taste manifests itself differently in 
 different persons, so also the moral Taste does not pass the 
 same judgments in Eloquence and Poetry, in different ages 
 and relations ; for although the rule remains ever the same, it 
 is modified by circumstances in the most manifold way. 
 
134 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OK T 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE LAW OF CONSTANT PROGRESS. 
 
 After having previously become acquainted with the main 
 parts into which the oration divides, we have now also seen 
 what should be the nature of the subordinate represen- 
 tations by which the Ideas are developed. But the ques- 
 tion now arises, as well in respect to those main parts, as to 
 these subordinate representations : By what Law are their 
 order and succession determined ? We set forth here the 
 Law of constant Progress, and have, in the first place, to 
 show that this is an ethical Principle. 
 
 Not only should the inward moral developement of man, 
 considered as a striving after a perfection never to be abso- 
 lutely reached, be a constant progress, but also when in active 
 life he attempts the actualization of an ethical Idea, he should 
 seek to approach continually, and without intermission, the 
 prescribed goal. If the difficulties that stand in the way, de- 
 termine him to entirely give up his plan, or if, occupying him- 
 self with secondary things, he suffers himself to be turned 
 aside from the path upon which he has entered, so that he 
 returns back into it late, and with spent energies, we justly 
 charge him with being wanting in that heart, that constancy, 
 that force of character which is an essential constituent of 
 Virtue. He cannot, it is true, approach his goal always in a 
 straight line, so to speak, and with even pace ; he will some* 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 135 
 
 times advance slower, because he must remove the obstruc- 
 tions which oppose him, out of his way, or because he must 
 slowly prepare the way for a work which cannot succeed at 
 once. But even while making these elaborate preparations, 
 the eye should never lose sight of the goal, and the striving 
 to reach it, must be plainly apparent, even in the greatest di- 
 gressions* But this progress itself receives its perfection 
 from the steady constancy prevailing in it — ?. e., from the 
 easy connection and fusion of the parts of the process, so that 
 each particular part, as it was occasioned and prepared for, by 
 what preceded, so in its turn serves as the occasion and pre- 
 paration for what follows. If this essential requisite be want- 
 ing, and the movement of the discourse is only by leaps and 
 impulses, individual brilliant fragments may, indeed, be the 
 result, but no continuous ethical life. 
 
 From Ethics, therefore, we derive the Law of constant Pro- 
 gress, (for it is contained necessarily and essentially in Ethics,) 
 and not from the art of representation employed in Philosophy 
 or Poetry, in which it is to be met with only under many li- 
 mitations, nay, is often forced out by the opposite principle. 
 For the activity of the Poet, like that of the Thinker, returns 
 back into itself, because of the effort to impart roundness and 
 finish to its creations, and is accompanied with a rest and sa- 
 tisfaction which is grounded in the" consciousness of the pos- 
 sibility of perfectly representing its Idea. The ethical striv- 
 ing, on the contrary, in the consciousness that it can never 
 reach the Ideal of its Perfection, nay, can never exhibit even 
 a single Idea perfectly realized in actual existence, is never to 
 give itself up to rest and self-satisfastion, but with abiding zeal, 
 
136 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 though with reflection, is to hasten on immediately from each 
 step in the process that has been taken, to a new one. And 
 if the law of constant Progress is found in certain species of 
 Poetry — as for example, the Drama — it must not be* suppos- 
 ed that Rhetoric borrowed it from them ; on the contrary, it 
 imparted it to them, since the Drama is the representation of 
 the ethical activity of men, and must therefore retain some- 
 thing of the ethical element in it. 
 
 As, therefore, the individual actions in a complete moral 
 process join on uponone another, so also in the oration should 
 the ethical Ideas and the adapted representations which serve 
 to develope them, be methodically arranged. *So unceasing 
 and vehement is the progress of the genuine orator, that he 
 detests every thought, every word that does not bring him 
 nearer the goal, as a weakness, a fault, nay, as a sin, and casts 
 it from him. If it is necessary to instruct the hearer in things 
 of secondary importance, that might have influence upon his 
 decision ; to moderate his excited feelings ; to obviate an ob- 
 jection ; he checks for a moment the rapidity of his course, yet 
 only in order to be able to advance with so much the greater 
 speed ; nay, it may sometimes seem as though he were de- 
 viating entirely from his path, yet, even in his deviation, the 
 movement towards the goal is constantly apparent, and it is 
 soon seen that he turned aside into the by-path, only in order 
 to reach the goal the sooner. And in this movement, sometimes 
 vehement, sometimes gentle, thought without effort joins on 
 upon thought, so that, from the first to the last, there is an un- 
 broken chain, in which not the least break, either for the Un- 
 derstanding or for the Feelings, is discoverable. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 137 
 
 Furthermore, it is plain, that by the application of this 
 ethical principle to the Rhetorical presentation of thought, its 
 chief aim, the production of Affection, is reached. If men 
 find in themselves no enthusiasm for a really great and beauti- 
 ful Idea, the reason must be, either that they do not contem- 
 plate it in all its relations to Happiness, Virtue, and Duty, or 
 that they allow themselves to be too greatly dampened by 
 the individual difficulties in the way of its realization. But 
 if all the individual elements and relations of the Idea are 
 made to pass before their minds, one after another, in rapid 
 progression, so that they can take in at a glance, all that is 
 great, sublime, and rich in blessing, flowing from it, it is im- 
 possible that they should not warm towards it ; every new re- 
 presentation on the part of the orator, is a new spur which 
 urges them on to the realization of the Idea. At the same 
 time, the mind depressed and bowed down by the presenta- 
 tion of difficulties and hindrances, is, as it were, freed from 
 a burden, by the removal of its doubts, so that it no longer 
 anxiously holds itself in reserve, but can freely and readily 
 yield itself up to the influence which is exerted upon it. But 
 in order that this warmth with which the mind begins to glow, 
 may not grow cold, but may increase and constantly diffuse 
 itself, it is necessary that this progress of the orator be also 
 constant. If the thoughts are not closely linked together, so 
 that the understanding perceives a defect in their connection ; 
 if it is difficult for the mind to change from one feeling 
 already awakened, to another, or to pass from a feeling to 
 thoughts not specially connected with it, there arises Reflec- 
 12 
 
138 ELOaUENCE A VIRTUE \ OR, 
 
 tion in the hearer's mind, not upon the Idea, but upon the ora- 
 tor ; and the effect of this Reflection is so chilling, that all the 
 warmth which had already been produced perhaps, at once 
 vanishes, and the orator must begin his work over again from 
 the beginning. In the case of a constant Progress, on the 
 contrary, the effect of what follows is strengthened and favor- 
 ed by what precedes, and the effect of what precedes by the 
 effect of what folio ws. # 
 
 Thus have we shown, as we flatter ourselves, that through 
 this Law of constant Progress, which is ethical in its ori- 
 gin, the chief aim of the Ehetorical presentation of thought, 
 the excitement of Affection, is also reached. But in order 
 to obtain a more thorough insight into the scope and appli- 
 cation of the Law, we subjoin in addition the following par- 
 ticulars. 
 
 In the first place, so far as respects this necessary progress 
 in the oration, it is to be noticed that, though it admits of 
 narration, it entirely excludes description. In narration, the 
 different constituent parts of a subject follow one upon 
 another, and the progress of the oration is not checked by it ; 
 but in description, on the contrary, these constituent parts 
 stand beside each other, and form a quiet picture, whereby 
 the swift, strong movement of the oration is stopped. Hence 
 the orator, if called upon, as is very often the case, to des- 
 cribe the character of a person, or a particular posture of 
 things in actual life, should never in his narration exhibit the 
 
 * Cicero seems to mean the same thing, when he says : Deinde 
 inventa, non solum ordine, sed etiam momento quodam atque judicio 
 dispensare atque componere. — De Orat., I. 31. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 139 
 
 different qualities of a person, or the different characteristics 
 of things, beside each other, but he should find a Historical 
 thread, by means of which his representation may run off like 
 a gradually developing History. It is exceedingly difficult 
 to do this, since, in order to do it, the orator is often obliged 
 to do violence to the representation as it exists in his own 
 mind, and to take objects which he has apprehended and con- 
 templated as a quiet whole, out of this form, and put them 
 into another. Yet this is absolutely necessary ; unless it be 
 done, the orator falls away from the Rhetorical into the Po- 
 etical representation, and allows himself and his hearers a rest 
 that is destructive of all Affection. The descriptions in the 
 orations of the Ancients, are wrought entirely according to this 
 principle ; they are always narrative, never descriptive ; in 
 modern Rhetoric, the contrary is almost always the case, and 
 hence the heavy dragging movement found in it. 
 
 The Law of Progress also determines the extent of the de- 
 velopement of each individual thought that appears in the 
 Rhetorical series. For the orator must not allow one thought 
 to so expand and become prominent at the expense of another, 
 as to produce a pause in the movement of the oration. The 
 recondite nature of many thoughts, which require develope- 
 ments, explanations, arguments, may often lead to this fault. 
 Hence the genuine orator will rather make up his discourse 
 out of thoughts that need only to be enounced, not explained 
 and proved. Strictly speaking, it is a fault to express the 
 same thought in different language — the first time obscurely, 
 the second time by explanation and circumlocution ; for the 
 Law of Progress, strictly observed, requires that the de- 
 
140 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ) OR, 
 
 velopement of the thought progress with every new sentence ; 
 the orator, therefore, must know how to find immediately, 
 the plainest, most forcible expression, and to be satisfied with 
 it once for all. 
 
 With respect to the arguments often necessary in Elo- 
 quence, it might seem as though they must stop the swift 
 current of the oration, and impart to it that slow movement 
 — returning into itself — which is peculiar to Philosophy. 
 Yet this w r ill not be the case, provided these arguments are 
 brought forward according to the general principles laid down 
 in the First Book. Would the orator show the Possibility 
 of a thing, he does it by proposing a Plan, by citing an Ex- 
 ample, showing that in similar circumstances the like has al- 
 ready been done ; would he prove the Actuality of a fact, he 
 cites Testimony, and establishes its validity. In this way 
 every thing is made out by the exhibition of the Real, of the 
 plainly Apparent, and there is no need of a slow, tedious 
 chain of abstract propositions. This is not necessary even 
 when the Truth of a thing is to be demonstrated ; in this 
 case, the orator refers to a universally recognized Authority, 
 the weight of which immediately decides the question ; or he 
 makes use of public opinion, which has already, on another 
 occasion, decided according to truth, and shows his hearer, by 
 means of a brief and readily-apprehended enthymeme, that 
 he cannot possibly judge differently, or decide differently, in 
 the present case, from what he did in the former, without fall- 
 ing into self-contradiction. In this way Demosthenes con- 
 structs his formidable enthymematic trains of Eeasoning, 
 which, so far from hindering the progress of the orator, are 
 
OUTLINES OP A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 141 
 
 rather to be compared to the lightning, in force and 
 rapidity. 
 
 It often happens that a thought, in a position from which 
 the logical arrangement would not displace it, exerts a retard- 
 ing influence, and interrupts the continuity of the Rhetorical 
 series, because it seems neither to have been sufficiently pre- 
 pared for by what precedes, nor to sufficiently prepare for what 
 follows. To avoid this case, and so to present every single 
 thought as that it shall not only not retard, but accelerate 
 the sweep of the oration, is one of the most difficult problems 
 in Eloquence ; yet it may be solved, as it seems to us, by the 
 aid of the principles which we have laid down. In order to 
 this, we must recognise a gradation in the relative rank of the 
 Rhetorical Ideas. Though Duty, Virtue, and Happiness, are 
 all equal in importance, yet the three forms under which they 
 present themselves are not. The first of these forms is the 
 Religious, then follows the Ethical, and lastly the Political. 
 Under these, again, stand Truth, Possibility, and Actuality, 
 in the order in which they are here mentioned. Now in 
 every separate developement of a subordinate Idea, if all that 
 pertains to it is not fused with a higher Idea, and interwoven 
 at all points with the developement of it, the steady flow of 
 the oration is retarded and checked. Suppose that a sacred 
 orator is discoursing with reference to the Ideas of Truth and 
 Actuality — e. g., that he wishes to present the events of his 
 time from a religious point of view — beginning with the de- 
 velopement of Truth, he may, provided he has reached a pro- 
 per place for it, cast a passing glance at Actuality ; for des- 
 cription based upon this latter subordinate Idea, if he should 
 12* 
 
142 ELOaUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 begin with it, or should give it a developement independent 
 of that of Truth, would be a dead stop, and not progress, and 
 could not well be connected either with what followed or 
 with what preceded. 
 
 An orator before the Court, or before the people, commits 
 the same error, if, when he might make the higher Idea of 
 Duty or of Virtue predominant, he neglects it, and allows 
 himself in a developement entirely unconnected with it, of 
 the Idea of Civil or Positive Law, which he should have em- 
 ployed only as a corollary and confirmation of the former. 
 With all the modesty that becomes us Moderns in criticising 
 the great models of Antiquity, I venture to charge iEschines 
 with committing this latter error in his oration against Ctesi- 
 phon. Since his attack upon Demosthenes in strictness was 
 based upon the Idea of Virtue, since he wished to represent 
 his life and character as unworthy and detestable, it was a 
 mistake to dwell so long, as he does, in the very beginning, 
 upon the positive statutes that might take from his opponent 
 the crown which had been decreed to him. We feel, in the 
 perusal, how weak this whole first part of his oration is, and 
 how little it prepares for the succeeding part, in which he ex- 
 amines the life of Demosthenes ; nay, between these two parts 
 there is a chasm over which he could not possibly carry his 
 hearers without their minds becoming entirely cold and emo- 
 tionless. That Demosthenes perceived this mistake, it seems 
 to me is evident, from the circumstance that he protests in 
 the very beginning of his oration, against the demand of his 
 opponent, that he shall in the defence follow the same plan 
 which he did in the attack ; far from doing this, he rather sets 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 143 
 
 forth the Idea of Virtue as the Idea upon which he shall found 
 his oration, and not until after he has refuted a great portion 
 of the objections brought against him, by a history of his 
 past life, does he occupy himself with the examination of the 
 positive laws which seem to be adverse to the proposition of 
 Ctesiphon. Hence, from the beginning of this oration to the 
 end, there is no pause to be perceived, but the mind is kept 
 continually on the stretch, and borne along unceasingly from 
 one important point to another. 
 
 To impart this constant flow to an oration, is perhaps the 
 most difficult among the many difficult things in Eloquence. 
 A Poem, like the Poet himself, is born ; in some fine moment 
 of inspiration it stands out before him, an articulated whole, 
 and, so far as the place, at least, is concerned, is completed 
 without further effort. But as Virtue is born with no man, 
 but is acquired only through a long series of efforts, so like- 
 wise the oration, considered as a moral product, is never com- 
 plete in its first origin, but becomes so only by means of labor 
 and pains perse veringly applied to it. Nay, inasmuch as the 
 activity even of the most virtuous man can never be wholly 
 perfect — i, e., can never be wholly conformed to the Law, and, 
 at the same time, to existing relations — the question may arise, 
 whether the oration, which, according to my assertion at least, 
 is a moral act and process, can be perfect — a question which I 
 should answer in the negative. The Adaptation which has 
 been spoken of in a former chapter, can itself be reached only 
 approximately ; for in order to be perfect, an absolutely Divine 
 knowledge of all characters and relations would be requisite. 
 The second law also, laid down by us — that of constant Pro- 
 
144 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 gress — in its perfection can belong only to the action of 
 God in the government of the world, but never to human 
 action, which is ever imperfect. But be this as it may, so 
 much is certain, and with respect to it every man will agree 
 with me, and the more readily the better orator he is, that 
 in the plan of the oration as it is first presented to the mind, 
 the thoughts are never found already arranged in this con- 
 stant progressive flow, but must be afterwards wrought into 
 it. As they first present themselves, they are hard, brittle, 
 and separate particles ; the mind must seize them, and by 
 grinding them incessantly upon each other, crush them, until 
 the friction kindles the mass, and it runs like molten ore. 
 The higher Ideas, thrown, as it were, into this solution, take 
 up the thoughts which belong to them, and which, now that 
 they are fluid, obey the mystic power which attracts like to 
 like, so that they form themselves into a firm chain. 
 
 Here the truth of our assertion becomes very apparent 
 again, that it is the Character which makes the orator. Could 
 the most brilliant Imagination, and the most profound and 
 penetrating Reason, succeed in so elaborating the thoughts, if 
 they were not guided and supported by the power of the mor- 
 al Will ? Both Imagination and Reason, taken by themselves 
 alone, lead the orator away from the sharply-drawn line along 
 which he should move, and seduce him into a useless pause, and 
 an idle undue unfolding of his thoughts. They can find no in- 
 terest at all, in the elaboration of the unpretending, highly sim- 
 ple conceptions borrowed from common life ; at the same time, 
 they grow weary, and, finally, try to exchange an irksome 
 business for one more agreeable, unless they are actuated and 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC HHETORIC. 1 1 > 
 
 urged on by another power. And this power is not the mere 
 empty rage for shining before an assembly ; for vanity is not 
 capable of such a tension of mind ; nay, vanity does not even 
 feel itself to be called upon to make such an effort, since it is 
 satisfied with a loosely constructed oration garnished with some 
 showy passages. For the hearer is capable of criticising such 
 an oration and of admiring it, but let him be ever so culti- 
 vated, he can never do full justice to an excellence lying so 
 deep as the steady unceasing sweep of thought. He only feels 
 its effects upon him, like the breathing of the living Spirit, with- 
 out knowing the cause ; and for the very reason that so much 
 that is Beautiful and Excellent arises in his own mind, he forgets 
 that the orator has spoken excellently. That Demosthenean 
 determination, that iron diligence, which is requisite in order 
 to the formation of the rhetorical, constantly progressive train 
 of thought, can spring only out of the effort to fill the minds of 
 others with great Ideas, in which the orator has lost himself; 
 the effort to satisfy his own conscience, and to employ only that 
 which can rightfully contribute towards his success: and what 
 is such an effort but the moral power of the Character in its 
 finest developement and highest dignity ? 
 
146 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OH, 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE LAW OF VIVACITY. 
 
 In the beginning of this treatise, we attempted to seize 
 the active process of the orator in its origin, as it unfolds it- 
 self under the guidance of certain definite moral Ideas. In 
 this second part of the work, we have sought to become ac- 
 quainted with the nature of the representations with which the 
 leading Idea of the orator becomes encompassed, as well as 
 with the rules in accordance with which these representations 
 are linked together. We have now to conceive of the active 
 process of the orator, as it comes forth into Language from his 
 inward being, and here we find that his progress in the de- 
 velopement of his Idea, and the effect produced by it upon the 
 hearers, cause his own relation to them, though remaining the 
 same in substance, to change every moment in respect to in- 
 dividual circumstances ; and we demand that this active pro- 
 cess of his, without wavering in its essential character and pur- 
 pose, do, nevertheless, through a constant variation in the 
 form, keep company with all these different variations in his 
 relations. This is the third and last Law of the Rhetorical pre- 
 sentation of thought. We denominate it the Law of Vivacity. 
 Like the former Laws that have been mentioned, this Law 
 also is of ethical origin, and wholly foreign to the Philosophi- 
 cal, as well as the Poetical, presentation of thought. In both of 
 these latter the mind isolates itself, and since it is not its de- 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC, 147 
 
 sign to exert an influence upon the circumstances which sur- 
 round it, so neither does it allow circumstances to exert an 
 influence upon itself. Hence the unvarying uniformity of 
 the state and condition in which it remains from the begin- 
 ning to the end of its work, allows the mind, in these latter 
 cases, to give to its products a fixed, unchangeable form. Moral 
 activity, on the contrary, would entirely preclude such an iso- 
 lation ; it is itself a constant reception of outward influences, 
 and an equally constant reaction upon them ; and since all 
 that is outward is never still, but fluctuates restlessly hither 
 and thither, man, when in action, must change his position 
 in respect to the outward every moment. This is not bend- 
 ing the Will to the force of circumstances, but is in reality 
 the only means of obtaining dominion over them ; their con- 
 stantly varying pressure would utterly overwhelm, if the 
 manner of meeting them did not vary with equal rapidity. 
 True Virtue on the side of Law, is indeed unalterably the 
 same, but on the side of Life, is constantly changing and new. 
 It would betray a want of elasticity in the character, if one 
 should continue the same way of action in entirely different 
 circumstances. 
 
 This change in the position and movements of the orator, 
 peculiar to moral activity of all sorts, can be perceived in the 
 case of the activity of the orator, only in the thoughts and the 
 words, and in their constantly varying turns, since the orator 
 makes use of thoughts and words only, in order to the realiza- 
 tion of his Idea. These turns are the so-called rhetorical 
 Figures: an expression which must not be taken to denote 
 mere ornaments coldly and artificially contrived to set off the 
 
148 ELOQUENCE A VlfcTUE J OR, 
 
 discourse, (to which the expression might indeed lead,) but 
 Turns and lively Movements in thought and language, 
 prompted by the Imagination under the guidance of rhetorical 
 Affection in conflict with the opposing sentiments of the 
 hearers ; for which reason, perhaps, these latter expressions are 
 preferable, because they are liable to no such misunderstand- 
 ing. Similar turns arise easily and naturally in the social in- 
 tercourse of cultivated and lively minds. For since social 
 life of the higher order involves the mental cultivation of 
 minds through the interchange of views, each man alternately 
 playing the part of the orator and the hearer, it is evi- 
 dent that, although from the language of such social life, 
 nothing indeed is to be learned in relation to the rhetori- 
 cal series of representations, because it is, of necessity, frag- 
 mentary in its matter, yet much is to be learned from it in 
 relation to the turns of thoughts and words, which become 
 more lively and forcible on account of the closer action and 
 reaction within this sphere. The so-called Figures which are 
 employed by orators, and which are specifically enumerated 
 by Rhetoricians, are in reality only such turns of thought and 
 expression as arise in the active intercourse of men, elevated 
 and polished in order to adopt them to a higher connection. 
 Hence, if the orator would employ Figures rightly, he should 
 not borrow them from manuals of Rhetoric, or even from the 
 most perfect works in Eloquence, but should go back to the 
 language of common intercourse, and appropriate to his own 
 purposes all those living movements and turns in thought and 
 expression, the influence of which he has felt upon himself, 
 and has also imparted to others. Or rather, the orator must 
 
OUTLINES OP A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 149 
 
 realize the hearer to himself with definite features, with all 
 his opposing views and inclinations, and represent the whole 
 oratorical process to himself, not monologically, but dialogi- 
 cally ; then he will know instinctively, the proper time* to 
 waken attention, to instruct, to exhort, to show the connection 
 or the opposition of several thoughts, to meet an objection, 
 to hurl it back again, to place a truth in clear light by an 
 unexpected surprising turn, to pass from one truth to another, 
 to restrain his feelings, to give them full play, &c. Having 
 such a lively sense of his position and relations, and of the 
 changes which he is producing in them by the progress which 
 he is constantly making, his thoughts, and consequently, 
 their expression, will take on a different form at every step. 
 
 But if this alternation of forms in the rhetorical presenta- 
 tion of thought, is of ethical origin, as we have endeavored to 
 show, it is also the most powerful and effectual means of all, 
 in exciting Affection.! For Affection in the hearer is kin- 
 dled by Affection in the orator ; and how can the orator show 
 more plainly, that he is wholly animated by an Idea, and by 
 the striving to impart it to others, than by exhausting all the 
 most lively forms of presentation ? Adaptation, in the dis- 
 course, taken by itself alone, would not produce such an 
 impression ; even the firmest and most labored chain of 
 thought, unless each link in it were distinguished by a pecu- 
 liar structure, would, in the end, only weary by a fixed uni- 
 formity. But by means of the peculiar, and often surprising 
 
 * Cicero. Orator. 39 et 40. 
 
 t Jam vero ad affectus nil magisducit. — Quint. IX. 1. 
 13 
 
150 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 turn, in which each new representation is announced, it is 
 made to pierce more deeply into the mind, which, incessantly 
 stimulated on so many sides, is compelled, in the end, to yield 
 itself up without resistance, to the exercise of Affection. 
 
 This influence upon the Affections is the distinguishing 
 mark by which we can recognise Rhetorical figures, and can 
 separate them from Poetical. The latter are created by the 
 Imagination for the Imagination ; they are a painting, a pic- 
 turing, a representing. The Rhetorical figures are produced 
 by the Mind — using this term to denote the whole inner 
 being of man so far as it is under the guidance of the Will 
 — for the Mind ; they should seize, enchain, move, carry away. 
 Poetical figures are brilliant and adorned, and Poetic Art 
 delights in their splendor ; Rhetorical figures are a naked 
 power, which avoids all pomp, because its influence is liable to 
 be hindered thereby, or to be directed to the Imagination in- 
 stead of the Affections. If the orator would acquire a quick 
 feeling and an unerring sense for Rhetorical figures, let him 
 read Demosthenes ; for in respect to him, the Ancients boast 
 that he never brought forward a thought without expressing 
 it in some peculiar figure.^ In reading Demosthenes, we 
 shall also perceive most clearly, how great is the differ- 
 ence between Rhetorical and Poetical figures ; for no style 
 can be freer from all that we denominate Poetry of expres- 
 sion, than that of Demosthenes. In saying this, however, we 
 would by no means assert, that none of those figures which 
 are commonly termed Poetical, are to be permitted in an ora- 
 
 * Cicero Orator, c. 39, — Et vero nullus fere ab eo locus sine quadam 
 conformatione sententiae dicitur. 
 
OUTLINES OP A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 151 
 
 tion. Everything depends upon the application, upon rela- 
 tive position and influence, and it is very possible indeed, that 
 in a different use and connection the same figure would at one 
 time depict to the Imagination, at another awaken Affection. 
 
 There being this difference between Poetical and Rhetori- 
 cal figures, the specific enumeration of the former is as pro- 
 per, as that of the latter is improper. Since the Imagination 
 renders itself independent of the external world, and allows it 
 no influence upon its creations, its forms are by no means in- 
 numerable in their manifoldness ; for their source is in the Im- 
 agination alone, which, notwithstanding all its opulence, is, like 
 every human faculty, limited by certain definable laws. Hence, 
 in the enumeration of the different species of Poetry, as well 
 as in the specification of Poetical figures, completeness is at- 
 tainable. But since the moral activity of man, on the con- 
 trary, is constantly conditioned by his relations to the exter- 
 nal world, all the changes of which can never be computed, it is 
 impossible to enumerate with satisfactory completeness, the 
 forms under which this activity appears. For this reason, 
 we may not in Eloquence, as in Poetry, assume certain species 
 distinguished by Form and Matter ; and hence it was an absurd 
 undertaking to attempt to bring under certain fixed rubrics, 
 the turns which the thoughts of the orator receive, under 
 the influence of the constantly varying cir cumstat ces amidst 
 which his activity is put forth. This mistake would never 
 have been made, if the ethical character of Eloquence had been 
 recognised, and if Eloquence had been properly distinguished 
 from Poetry. That the undertaking was a failure is perfectly 
 evident. There are fine and noble turns of thought in De- 
 
152 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 mosthenes, which no Rhetorician has yet put on his list ; and 
 many have also been invented by orators of the Church, that 
 were entirely unknown to the Ancients. 
 
 Owing to this confounding of Poetical and Rhetorical 
 figures, there arose among the Ancients an entirely false view 
 of the use and influence of the latter. Cicero and Quintilian 
 agree in this, that they may, in part at least, be employed as 
 adornment merely, of the oration, and to please the hearer.^ But 
 this should never be the purpose for which they are employed, 
 if, as we affirm, they are not productions of the Imagination 
 for the Imagination, but of the Mind for the Mind. Quintilian 
 gives another excellent rule, but one that by no means har- 
 monizes with his other statement just cited, when he says, 
 that all that does not promote the design of the orator, hinders 
 it ;f and certainly, nothing so little promotes, and consequent- 
 ly so greatly hinders, the awakening of a strong Affection 
 that seizes upon the whole mind, and breaks forth into acts, as 
 that light play of the Imagination which leaps from figure to 
 figure. Hence, we assert that no figure should be allowed 
 in an oration, unless each and every word in it, according to 
 the expression of QuintiHan,J awaken an Affection of some 
 sort. Any other use of figures on the part of the orator 
 would betray a departure from his purpose, — L e. 9 a moral 
 weakness, — .and instead of contributing to his design, would 
 
 * Ex collocatione verborum quae sumuntur quasi lumina, magnum 
 afterunt omatum orationi. — Oicero. Orator, c. 39. — Major pars harum 
 figurarum posita est in delectatione. — Quintilian, IX. 3. 
 t Obstat enim quidquid non adjuvat. — Quintilian, VIII. 6, 
 X Gtuot verba, totidem affectus. — Quintilian, IX. 3. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 1§3 
 
 only stand in its way, — i. e., would leave the mind cold, in- 
 stead of warming it. 
 
 Furthermore, figures, which consist in peculiar turns of 
 thought, are likewise subject to those Laws of Adaptation 
 and constant Progress, which we have laid down for the 
 guidance of Rhetorical discourse generally. If the orator 
 wastes the most impressive and powerful of these figures 
 upon trivial occasions, or employs them imprudently at a 
 time when the mind is not prepared for so violent an impres- 
 sion, this unsuitable application of them will hinder and des- 
 troy their influence. And since, in order to prevent Affec- 
 tion from becoming cold, the thoughts themselves must run 
 on in a continual series, it is also necessary, in order to the 
 same end, that the turn which one thought has taken, easily 
 and naturally lose itself in that which the following thought 
 will assume. In this connection, it is also to be remarked, 
 that the most perfect concatenation of figures loses its effect, 
 if it is repeated successively, after short intervals ; for the 
 mind once impressed, is immediately rid of the impression, 
 by the repetition of that which produced it, and is led 
 away to an idle contemplation of the mere Form, irrespective 
 of the Matter ; the constant recurrence of which would, in this 
 case, produce only a poetico-musical enjoyment. 
 
 And as we have seen that every offence against the Rhe- 
 torical Laws is to be regarded as a moral defect, so also the 
 wrong use of figures is not to be ascribed to a want of Ge- 
 nius, but only to a weakness of Character. It is vanity, if 
 the orator is profuse in figures for the sake of show and orna- 
 ment ; it is obtuseness of moral feeling, if the orator em* 
 13* 
 
154 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 ploys them unsuitably ; it is sluggishness, incapacity of en- 
 thusiasm in respect to lofty Ideas, if the orator does not un- 
 derstand how to give to a thought those forcible turns by 
 which alone he can produce the designed impression. Hence, 
 not by means of the mere knowledge of this or of other rules, 
 but only by means of those moral excellences which are op- 
 posed to the faults above-mentioned, will the orator be en- 
 abled to employ figures rightly and with effect. In order to 
 this, a mind is needed which can warm towards moral Ideas ; 
 which, along with all its inspiration and enthusiasm, can keep 
 up a calm, accurate survey of circumstances, and which is far 
 more interested in the true advantage of the hearer — in his 
 improvement and elevation — than in his applause. 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 155 
 
 CHAPTER VIIL 
 
 PR08E. 
 
 In the beginning of this Second Book, we promised to sketch 
 the main features of a Theory of Prose, and to derive them 
 from the ethical principle which we have sought to establish 
 as the foundation of Rhetoric, We now attempt to fulfil 
 this promise. 
 
 We shall first set forth the distinguishing marks of Prose, 
 while at the same time, for the sake of greater distinctness, 
 we shall compare them with the peculiar characteristics of 
 Poetic discourse. 
 
 The first difference between Poetry and Prose lies in the 
 Period. Not that the Period is peculiar to Prose alone, and 
 might be dispensed with in finished Poetry. But in Poetry 
 it appears only as a necessary form in the connection of 
 thoughts upon which no special emphasis is laid. In Prose, 
 on the contrary, while it retains this first original characteris- 
 tic, it acquires a still higher significance, and seems to serve 
 particular purposes. Hence we require in Prose, that each 
 Period be marked by something peculiar to itself, and be 
 distinguished from what precedes and follows it, by its form, 
 while in Poetry, we do not regard it as a fault, and hardly 
 notice it, if several sentences exceedingly simple, and entirely 
 similar in their structure, follow one another. 
 
 The second difference lies in the words used. In Poetry, 
 
156 ELOaUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 
 
 every word has worth, not only by virtue of its sense, but also 
 by virtue of its sound and its mere existence ; the most im- 
 portant and the most unimportant words, in respect to sense, 
 as integral parts of the same whole, have equal rank, like cit- 
 izens of a free State. In Prose, on the contrary, the worth 
 of words differs according to their sense ; in every sentence 
 there is one or more words which, by their peculiar position, 
 are elevated and placed in the light, so that the others are 
 subordinate to them, and seem to be designed only to elevate 
 and minister to them. 
 
 The third difference lies in the relation between long and 
 short syllables, which, in Poetry, is termed Metre, in Prose 
 is termed Number. The difference between the two may 
 perhaps, be best exhibited under the following general cha- 
 racteristics : Metre, though adapted to the Idea, yet appears 
 as something independent in itself, and seeks to attract atten- 
 tion to itself, aside from the thoughts and feelings expressed 
 through it. Hence it not merely determines, with the great- 
 est exactness, the number and succession of long and short 
 syllables ; it also separates them into individual'metrical mem- 
 bers, the frequent repetition of which, impresses their pe- 
 culiar form so much the more, upon the ear and the mind. If 
 the difference between long and short syllables is not duly 
 marked in a sentence, Poetry makes up for what its 
 form would lose thereby in peculiarity and independence of 
 character, by counting and limiting the number of the syl- 
 lables which compose the individual line, and by the regular 
 recurrence of the same sound at the end of the verse. Num- 
 ber, on the contrary, far from separating itself from the 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 157 
 
 thought, remains constantly subordinate to it, and it would 
 be regarded as one of the greatest faults of a Prose Period, 
 if one of its parts, by a succession of tones too striking and 
 too agreeable to the ear, should attract attention from the 
 Matter to the Form. Number, therefore, arranges the suc- 
 cession and number of long and short syllables, only so far as 
 is necessary in order that the impression of the discourse 
 upon the sensuous organs may be adapted to the impression 
 which is to be produced upon the mind, so that the mind may 
 not feel less, because the ear has either experienced no agree- 
 able sensation at all, or has been offended. And that Num- 
 ber may not usurp an independence that does not belong to 
 it, it is necessary, and is also universally required, that it be 
 adjusted most accurately to the Matter, as well as the Form ; 
 that it vary with every new thought, nay, every new Period, 
 and thus flow forth in constant manifoldness. 
 
 If, as I believe, the peculiar characteristics of Prose have 
 been sufficiently exhibited in what has been said, the question 
 now arises: From what principles can we deduce such a form 
 of discourse, and show that it must be constituted so, and 
 not otherwise ? This problem seems never to have been pro- 
 posed even, while yet a similar one respecting the forms of 
 Poetry, has employed many Theorizers, and has been suc- 
 cessfully solved by them. Why, then, is there Prose at all ? 
 What right has it to exist by the side of Poetry ? Should 
 men generally, speak only in verse, and is it owing merely to 
 convenience or inability, that they do not ? We feel that 
 this cannot possibly be, for there are modes of presenting 
 thought in which Poetical forms cannot be employed at all. 
 
158 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR 
 
 And this does not arise from their intrinsic difficulty, for 
 finished Prose has its peculiar excellences, and, conseque ntly, 
 its difficulties also, which are not easier to master than those 
 of Versification. If, now, Prose is to maintain itself as a pe- 
 culiar form of presenting thought, the rightfulness of its 
 claims must be demonstrable from rational grounds. Or shall 
 we, after having deduced the necessity of the forms of Poetry, 
 represent Prose as a thorough and complete opposite to them, 
 and consider the matter as settled in this way, because there 
 can be nothing which has not its opposite ? But, not to 
 mention that this principle is not justifiable in itself, it could 
 not, even if it were correct, find its application here, because 
 although Prose and Verse indeed differ from each other, they 
 by no means constitute a proper antithesis, the members of 
 which run parallel to each other, and have purely opposite 
 and mutually correspondent marks. 
 
 The right of Prose to assert its place beside Poetry, and 
 the necessity of the characteristic marks perceived in it, can 
 be satisfactorily shown, only in case it is construed from ethi- 
 cal principles. In deriving the rules to which the moral acti- 
 vity of man, so far as it makes use of discourse for its pur- 
 poses, is subjected, we had arrived at the Law of Vivacity ; 
 while we further develope it, we shall see Prose with all that 
 is peculiar and distinctive in it, originating from it. 
 
 For, in the first place, since according to the Law of Viva- 
 city, each thought should appear with a peculiar turn and 
 movement, it must naturally impart a peculiar form and 
 structure to the Period also, in which it is presented. On 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 159 
 
 this ethical ground* therefore, the carefulness with which the 
 Period is formed in Prose, is explained and justified, while, 
 on the contrary, a similar carefulness in Poetry, would not 
 only be unnecessary, but a fault also. For the change in the 
 form of the Period is expressive of a change in the mental 
 state — a change which is required in the orator, but not al- 
 lowable in the Poet, since he purposes to exhibit only one 
 and the same tone of mind. With the same right that fig- 
 ures in the Thought are assumed in Rhetoric, we believe we 
 may assume figures in the Period, which are to be distin- 
 guished still further, from figures in the Language. More- 
 over, much that is cited by Rhetoricians under this latter 
 name, is a peculiarity in the structure of the Period, rather 
 than in the position of the words — e. g., the Climax, the 
 Antithesis, the Isocolon, the Prosapodosis, and the Coinotes, 
 arising from the connection of the Epibole and Epiphora. 
 
 But not only does the Law of Vivacity exert its influence 
 upon the structure of the Period, it also exerts it secondly, 
 upon the position of the words. For since the greatest care 
 must be taken that the thoughts do not flow into each other, 
 so as to form one uniform mass, it is evident that those parti- 
 cular words which express each particular thought most 
 plainly, should be made prominent, and be distinguished from 
 the others. From this ethical view of Prose, not only is the 
 peculiar Emphasis laid upon the most important words — as the 
 Substantive, Adjective, Verb — explained, but also the origin of 
 the more exquisite figures of Speech — as Paranomasia, Para- 
 diastole, Antanaclasis, Epanode, Diaphora, Homceoptoton, &c. 
 
160 ELOdUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 
 
 The use of these figures in Poetry, is condemned of right, 
 because in Poetry the essential thing is not the distinguish- 
 ing of one thing above another, but the connecting of 
 one thing with another. And if Poetry has appropriated 
 one or another of these figures — as, e. g. 9 the Homceoptoton, 
 from which Rhyme seems to have arisen — it has yet entirely 
 altered it ; for in Prose, a proposition is individualized by the 
 Homceoptoton ; in Poetry, the metrical lines are linked and 
 united together by Rhyme. 
 
 Finally, in the third place, the Law of Vivacity permits 
 neither Metre, nor Rhyme, nor the numeration of syllables ; 
 for through these, the outward form of presentation acquires 
 a repose, and an evenness of proportion — it expresses a compla- 
 cency — which, indeed, belongs necessarily to the finished un- 
 folding of Poetical Ideas, but which must ever be foreign to 
 the active process of the orator, which is full of Affection in 
 itself, and seeks to awaken Affection in the hearer. Never- 
 theless, since that which is peculiar in the Rhetorical thought 
 seeks to express itself, not only in the structure of the Period, 
 and the position of the words, but also in the relation of the 
 long and short syllables ; since, in order to the more distinct 
 separation of the thoughts, there must be the slower pace of 
 some, ana 1 the more rapid flight of others, and this difference 
 must be made perceptible to the mind through the ear, the 
 Law of Vivacity requires a mingling of syllables, in respect to 
 their quantity, suited to the existing thought, but going no 
 further than to vary with each Period, and never occupying 
 the mind at the expense of the thought* For if this were 
 the case, the orator would betray a complacency which is pro- 
 
OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 161 
 
 per in the Poet, but which is forbidden to him by the Law of 
 Vivacity ; and, moreover, he would fail to reach the end at 
 which he aims — the production of Affection in the hearer — 
 if the hearer should come to be as much delighted by the 
 musical enjoyment of the melody, as impressed by the force of 
 the thought. 
 
 14 
 
162 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 We have thus far endeavored to unfold and perfect our 
 theory of the ethical nature of Eloquence, in three different 
 ways ; by showing, first, that all of its essential Laws are of 
 moral origin ; secondly, that a morally good Character, alone, 
 imparts the inclination and the ability to follow these Laws ; 
 thirdly, that the orator is sure of success, only in proportion as 
 he strictly obeys these moral Laws, and puts away all refer- 
 ences of a less pure nature. 
 
 And as in running out these laws, we have arrived at the 
 construction of Prose as a necessary form of presenting 
 thought, we believe we may here lay down our pen, inasmuch 
 as what has been said will be sufficient to enable him who has 
 followed us thus far, to form a judgment respecting the cor- 
 rectness of our hypothesis ; and it will not be difficult for him 
 who falls in with it, to apply the principles we have laid 
 down, to the subject of Declamation, and other secondary sub- 
 jects connected with Eloquence, of which we have not 
 treated. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 3^77-5 
 

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