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 Ml . BLAINE 
 
 tlis Foreign Policy. 
 
 AN EXAMINATION OF HIS MOST IMPORTANT 
 
 DISPATCHES ^A^HILE SECRETARY 
 
 OF STATE. 
 
 DP:ER.I0E3, 2S CD'En<I'TS=>. 
 
 BOSTON : , • 
 
 Published by H. W. HALL, 352 Washington Street. 
 1884. 
 
 % 
 
CoPYKiGiiT, 1884, BY II. W. Hall. 
 
I. 
 
 The Republican candidate foi' the Presidency has during the last 
 twenty years played a leading part in the politics of this country. 
 Yet, with one exception, he has held no position which was a test of 
 \ his capacity for mastering the details of office and his ability not 
 merely to debate, but to decide, questions which concern the national 
 welfare. This exception, however, is an important one. During the 
 G-arfield administration Mr. Blaine was so conspicuous a Secretary of 
 State that the English term " Premier" was imported and applied to 
 him, because his seemed too dazzling an individuality to be reduced to 
 the mediocrity of the rest of the Cabinet. Now, it is fair to assume 
 that the methods of Mr. Blaine as President will not materially differ 
 from the methods of Mr. Blaine as Secretary. At this time therefore, 
 when so many are with seriousness and honesty weighing the argu- 
 ments for and against him, an examination of these ten months of his 
 official life, even if short and incomplete, must be full of useful les- 
 sons with regard to his fitness for the higher office which has been so 
 long the object of his ambition, 
 
 THE SPANISH CLAIMS COMMISSION. 
 
 Mr. Blaine became Secretary of State in March, 1881, and he had 
 been only a few weeks in office when his attention was attracted by 
 the proceedings of the Spanish Claims Commission, which was then 
 sitting. This Commission was composed of two arbitrators, who 
 could name an umpire whenever they disagreed, and had been estab- 
 lished pursuant to the agreement of 1871 with Spain for the settle- 
 ment of claims of citizens of the United States for wrongs and in- 
 juries committed by the Spanish authorities during the Cuban Insur- 
 rection. It was specified- in the agreement that " no judgment of a 
 Spahish tribunal disallowing the affirmation of a party that he is a 
 ci'tizlen of the United States, shall prevent the arbitrators from hearing 
 a reelamajfeion presented in behalf of said party by the United States 
 Goverjlment." This allowed the arbitrators to disregard the decision 
 of a ;,panish court on the question of citizenship ; and as a return for 
 
such a concession, " the Spanish Government may traverse th# alle- 
 gation of American citizenship, and thereupon competent and suffi- 
 cient proof thereof may be required." It was believed that many of 
 the claims would be based upon fraudulent certificates of naturaliza- 
 tion, and this part of the agreement was framed for the purpose of 
 preventing this injustice to the Spanish Government by allowing the 
 Commission, whenever such fraud was alleged, to inquire into the 
 truth or falsity of the allegation. That such inquiry could be made 
 had been expressly conceded by Mr. Blaine's predecessor, Mr. Evarts, 
 in a communication to the Spanish Minister ; and therefore when 
 fraud was alleged in the certificate of one Buzzi, who held a claim for 
 half a million of dollars, the umpire, Count Lewenhaupt, the Swedish 
 Minister at Washington, ruled, as a matter of course, that the Com- 
 mission could go behind the naturalization papers, and inquire into the 
 manner in which they were obtained. In opposition to one of the 
 express conditions of the agreement and the admission of so distin- 
 guished a lawyer as Mr. Evarts, Mr. Blaine notified Count Lewenhaupt 
 that he would not permit the Commission to go behind the certificate 
 " to denationalize an American citizen," and that the arbitration could 
 not proceed. This decision was not only unjust but dangerous, be- 
 cause it would have established a binding precedent in future cases 
 when the United States might be the defendant. It bewildered the 
 Commission, and stopped its proceedings as long as Mr. Blaine re- 
 mained in office. Serious complications with Spain might have 
 resulted, but Mr. Frelinghuyseu, within a decent interval after Mr. 
 Blaine's retirement, informed the Commission that a certificate of 
 naturalization could be impeached by showing that " fraud consisting 
 of intentional and dishonest misrepresentation was practiced upon the 
 court which granted the certificate." This directly reversed Mr. 
 Blaine's decision, enabled the Commission to contuiue peacefully 
 to the close of its labors, and rescued the Government from the dis- 
 reputable position of holding that there is no difference in the effect 
 of fraudulent and genuine naturalization papers for the purpose of 
 establishing claims against a foreign government. 
 
 MEXICO AND GUATEMALA. 
 
 Mr. Blaine refers, in his letter of acceptance, to projects that will 
 " powerfully contribute at no distant day to the universal acceptance 
 of the philanthroi)ic and Christian principle of arbitratioii ; " and he 
 made, while in office, a noteworthy contribution to the prf.ctical 
 working of this principle by attempting to arbitrate between the 
 Kepublics of Mexico and Guatemala. These two countries had dis- 
 
puted for a long time about the ownership of certain provinces, and 
 the Guatemalan minister at Washington, in a letter to Mr. Blaine, 
 had appealed to the good offices of the Government of the United 
 States. Mr. Blaine, as a result of this appeal, on the part of only 
 one of the disputing parties, sent a long dispatch to the Mexican 
 Government, in which he offered arbitration, and conveyed to the 
 Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs the following information 
 about the history of his own country : — 
 
 In the time of the Empire, the forces of Iturbide overran a large part of 
 the territory of what now constitutes Central America, which had then re- 
 cently thrown off the Spanish domination. The changing fortunes of war 
 resulted in the withdrawal of Mexican forces from most of that region, ex- 
 cept the important provinces of Soconusco and Chiapas, which remained 
 under their control. Since that time the boundaries between the two 
 countries have never been adjusted upon a satisfactoi-y basis. Mexico, be- 
 coming a republic, did not forego claims based on the imperial policy of con- 
 quest and absorption,* while Guatemala, resisting further progress of Mexi- 
 can arms, and disputing, step by step, the conquests already made, has 
 never been able to come to a decision with her more powerful neighbor con- 
 cerning the relative extension of their jurisdiction in the disputed strip of 
 territory lying between the Gulf of Tehauntepec and the Peninsula of Yu- 
 catan, t 
 
 .Admiration might be felt, even in these days of Encyclopedias, 
 for Mr. Blaine's research, if this identical information had not 
 appeared in the letter of the Guatemalan minister to Mr. Blaine. J 
 After deriving his history from Guatemala, and calling attention 
 to the deep and lasting obligations of Mexico to the United States, 
 Mr. Blaine proceeded to sum up the arguments in favor of Guatemala, 
 and closed with the following startling statement : — 
 
 Especially would the President regard as an unfriendly act toward the 
 cherished plan of upbuilding strong republican governments in Spanish 
 America, if Mexico, whose power and generosity should be alike signal in 
 
 * Italics are ours, unless otherwise stated. tU. S. Foreign Relations, 18S1, p. ^<"•S. 
 
 J This is evident hy a comparison with the following passage from that letter: " As 
 soon as the Central American republics had shaken off the sway of Spain, Mexico, consti- 
 tuted then as an empire by Iturbide, began to show its tendency to an increase of terri- 
 tory toward the south, by encroaching on the boundaries of the said republics. With 
 jhat object the armies of the Mexican Empire passed through the whole of Guatemala, 
 tnd were only stopped by the patriots of Salvador, who defeated them at a place which, 
 in remembrance of such an event, bears to this day the name of Mejicanos. Guatemala 
 llost, nevertheless, the two important provinces of Soconusco and Chiapas. 
 
 " Many years later the Central American territory was once more invaded by 400 men 
 of the regular Mexican federal army, who were luckily driven from it. * * * However, 
 the slow and partial annexation of territory has not ceased one single day, showing well 
 that if the form of government in Mexico has changed from the empire to the republic, the 
 tendency to enlarge the territory and to overstep the boundaries toward the south has 
 remained the same." (.Id., p. 598.) 
 
such a case, shall seek or permit any misunderstanding with Guatemala, 
 when the path toward a pacific avoidance of trouble is at once so easy and 
 60 imperative an international duty.* 
 
 IMr. Blaine had too much the air of a judge who had crammed 
 the brief of one party and prejudged the whole case. The unfavor- 
 able impression made by allusions to the Mexican " policy of con- 
 quest and absorption," could not be cured by references to " our 
 recognized impartiality," "amicable counsel," " purity of motive 
 and benevolence of disposition," nor by holding up this country 
 to view as "the guarantor and guardian of Republican princi- 
 ples."! '^^^ Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed his- 
 high appreciation of the kindness of the United States. He replied 
 that the question of appointing a commission to survey the tract in 
 dispute was pending, and that there was nothing to submit to arbi- 
 tration until that question was decided. This was a polite way of 
 declining with thanks. Mr. Blaine, however, feared that Guatemala 
 "might cede her territorial rights in dispute to some European 
 power "J — one of the many symptoms of the nightmare about Euro- 
 pean interference that he suffered during his official experience § — 
 
 * U. S. Foreign Relations, 1881, p. 767. t M., p. 766. J Id., p. 770. 
 
 §Thc following extracts from a very long, but otiierwlse unimportant, dispatch, dated 
 December 1, from Mr. Blaine to the United States Minister to the Hawaian Islands, will be 
 interesting in this connection. It was called forth by rumors that the Government of Ha- 
 waii was considering the advisability of remedying the decrease of native population ))y the 
 im)(ortation of British coolies and Chinese, and shows that Mr. Blaine's sensitiveness about 
 European iuterferenite with an " American system " sometimes verged upon hypochondria: 
 "It is readily seen witli what concern this Government must view any tendency toward 
 introducing into Hawaii new social elements destructive of its necessarily American 
 character. The stea<Iy diminution of the native population of the islands, amounting to 
 some ten per cent between 1873 and 1878, and still continuing, is doubtless a cause of great 
 al.%rm to the Government of the kingdom, and it is no wonder that a solution should be 
 Bought with eagerness in any seemingly practicable quarter. The problem, however, is not 
 to l)e met Ijy a substitution of Mongolian supremacy for native control — as seems at first 
 Blglit p()ssil)le through tlic rapid increase in Chinese immigration to the islands. Neither is 
 n wliolcsale introduction of the coolie element, professedly Anglo-Indian, lilcely to afford 
 any more satisfactory outcome to tlie difficulty. The Hawaiian Islands cannot be joined to 
 the Asiatic system. If they drift from their independent station it must be toward assimi- 
 lation ami idcntilh^alion with the American system, to which they belong by the operation 
 of natural hiws, and must belong by tl>e operation of political necessity. 
 
 ♦ * » ♦ * * * 
 
 " In thi.4 line of action the United States does its simplcduty both to Hawaii and itseK". 
 and it cannot permit such obvious neglect of national interest as would be involved I j 
 •Jlentaciiulcsc.ence In any movement looking to a lessening of tliose American ties and th '", 
 •tibiititiition of alien an<l hostile interests. It firml}' believes that the position of the Ha- \ 
 Waliun Islands as tlic key to the dominion of the American Pacific demands their neutrality, 
 to wlilc.li end it will earnestly co-opurato with the native Government. And if, through any 
 CAiiHc, tlie maintenance of such a position of neutrality should be found by Hawaii to be 
 Imprarticjiljle, tills (iovernraent would then unhesitatingly meet the altered situation by 
 seeking an avowedly American solution for the grave issues presented." (U. S. Foreign 
 ItclatioMs, H.'^I, pp C'tS, CtO.) 
 
 NowIhtc in this dispatch does Mr. Blaine suggest a remedy for the evil by recommend- 
 ing a rare whoso characteristics are purely American. 
 
and persisted in his offers of kind ofBces until the Mexican minister 
 had passed through the successive stages of surprise, annoyance, and 
 anger. Hitherto he had evidently believed tha^ a friendly power 
 acted as arbitrator at the desire of all the contestants. That arbitra- 
 tion could be forced upon one of them as an "imperative interna- 
 tional duty," was a principle of international law that he could not 
 comprehend. He issued a memorandum in which he replied at 
 length to the arguments in favor of Guatemala advanced by Mr. 
 Blaine, and even alluded with some disrespect to the latter's incur- 
 sion into Mexican history, by remarking that "in this statement 
 several historical inaccuracies are apparent ; one especially which 
 must be attributed to misinformation, or an imperfect acquaintance 
 with Mexican history."* For the purpose of furnishing more reliable 
 sources of information than Guatemalan dispatches, he charitably 
 IDresented our Government with a number of documents and volumes 
 on Mexican history, two of which, with stately Spanish titles, are 
 described as " enormous," f In a word, his manifest irritation 
 made such an impression upon Mr. Morgan, the Minister of the 
 United States to Mexico, that he tried to discourage his chief from 
 any further discussion of the subject by this plain advice. 
 
 I venture to suggest that, unless the Government is prepared to announce 
 to the Mexican Government that it will actively, if necessary, preserve the 
 peace, it would be the part of wisdom on our side to leave the matter where 
 it is. Negotiations on the siibject will not benefit Guatemala, and, you may 
 depend upon it, what we have already done in this direction has not tended 
 to the increasing of the cordial relations which I know it is so much your de- 
 sire to cultivate with this nation. J 
 
 Mr. Blaine did not like advice, and on November 28th, just 
 before leaving the Cabinet, he retorted : — 
 
 Sir: Referring to your correspondence with this Department since its 
 instruction tendering the good ofBces of the Government of the United 
 States in aid of the amicable settlement of the differences between Mexico 
 and Guatemala, I have to remark that it would be a matter of the gravest 
 disappointment if I found myself compelled to agree with you in the con- 
 clusion which you seem to have reached in your last dispatch. 
 
 ********** 
 
 "To leave the matter where it is," you must perceive, is simply impos- 
 sible, for it will not remain there. The friendly relations of the United 
 States and Mexico would certainly not be promoted by the refusal of the 
 good offices of this Government, tendered in a spirit of the most cordial re- 
 
 * U. S. Foreign Relatious, 1881, p. 787. f/d., p. 784. 
 
 J Id., p. 809. 
 
6 
 
 g:iid both for the intorosts and honor of Mexico, and suggested only by the 
 earnest desire to prevent a war useless in its purpose, deplorable in its 
 means, and dangerous to the best interests of all the Central American re- 
 jiublics in its conso(iucnccs. To put aside such an amicable intervention as 
 an unfriendly intrusion, or to treat it, as I regret to see the Mexican Secre- 
 tary for Foreign Affairs seems disposed, as a partisan manifestation on be- 
 half of claims which we have not examined and interests which we totally 
 misunderstand, can certainly not contribute " to the increasing of the cor- 
 dial relations which you know it is so much our desire to cultivate with 
 Mexico." » * * You will, therefore, upon the receipt of this instruction, 
 ask for an interview with the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. You will press 
 upon his reconsideration the views which you have already submitted to 
 hira; assure him of the earnestness with which this Government desires a 
 peaceful solution of the existing differences, and inform him of our profound 
 regret and disappointment that the tender of our good offices has not been 
 
 received in the spirit in which it was made. 
 
 ********** 
 If this Government is expected to infer from the language of Sefior 
 Mariscal that the prospect of such a result is not agreeable to the policy of 
 Mexico, and that the interest which the United States have always mani- 
 fested in its consummation renders unwelcome the friendly intervention 
 whicli we liave offered, I can only say that it deepens the regret with which 
 we will learn the decision of the Mexican Government, and compels me to 
 declare that the Government of the United States will consider a hostile 
 demonstration against Guatemala for the avowed purpose, or with the cer- 
 tain result of weakening her power in such an effort, as an act not in con- 
 sonance with the position and character of Mexico, not in harmony with the 
 friendly relations existing between us, and injurious to the best interests of 
 all the republics of this continent.* 
 
 From this, it would seem that Mr. Blaine might have been led 
 into active interference, because Mexico would not allow him to 
 settle lier boundaries. Fortunately, Mr. Blaine and the whole ques- 
 tion disappeared from the scene together. Neither were his appre- 
 hensions of European intervention, or of a war between the two 
 countries, ever realized. Even Guatemala must have concluded that 
 there was too much ardor in " the benevolence of disposition" of our 
 Government. Full powers for the settlement of the question were 
 doloi^atod by the Congress of that Republic to President Barrios, 
 and the whole matter — soon after Mr. Blaine's retirement from the 
 Cal)iuet — was amica))ly arranged without any intervention on the 
 part of the United States. Mr. Blaine's own account of this occur- 
 rence is creditable to his powers of imagination. While fighting his 
 diph)n)atic liattles over again before the Committee in the Chili- 
 Peruvian Investigation, he said: "A minister first special and 
 supplciiienli'd by another minister came to this country and asked the 
 
 • U. 8. Foreign Uelatioua, pp. 8U-817. 
 
intervention between Guatemala and Mexico. We offered to medi- 
 ate, and did mediate as the friend of both parties." *' 
 
 COSTA RICA AND COLOMBIA. 
 
 There was also a boundary dispute between Colombia and Costa 
 Rica ; and these republics finally agreed upon the peaceful arbitra- 
 tion of their respective claims. The arbitrator was to be either the 
 King of Spain, the King of the Belgians, or the President of the 
 Argentine Republic. In the belief that Mr. Blaine would be de- 
 lighted to learn of this instance of the efficiency of the "philan- 
 thropic and Christian principle," the Minister of the United States 
 accredited to Colombia hastened to communicate the intelligence to 
 him in the following artless way : — 
 
 The deep interest which you have manifested in your instructions to 
 me, that the causes of the strained relations between the Governments of 
 Colombia and Costa Rica might be removed in a friendly manner, perhaps 
 justifies me in adding that, although the differences between these two 
 neighboring republics might not seem to have been of sufficient importance 
 to liave called for the elaborate machinery which has been provided for 
 their adjustment, it cannot be otherwise than gratifying to you to learn that 
 by the proposed treaty, now awaiting approval by the Colombian Congress, 
 the danger of a breach of the peace in Central America has been averted, 
 and the anxiety in the public mind connected with that subject has been al- 
 layed, t 
 
 Mr. Blaine had heard of the proposed treaty from another source, 
 and with the determination that "the anxiety in the public mind 
 connected with this subject" should not be so easily " allayed," he 
 had already sent the following instructions : — 
 
 In your dispatch No. 187, date July 19, 1880, you indicate that the set- 
 tlement of this boundary line will determine whether the islands in the 
 neighborhood of the Boco del Torro, on the Atlantic coast, and the Gulf of 
 Dolce, on the Pacific, be properly within the territory of the State of 
 Panama or the Republic of Costa Rica. 
 
 If I have rightly understood you, therefore, this contention involves the 
 question as to whether certain portions of the littoral on both oceans, lying 
 in the neighborliood of some of the projected interoceanic cornmunications, 
 belong to the State of Panama, the neutrality and territorial integrity of 
 which the United States of America has guaranteed by the thirty-fifth arti- 
 cle of the treaty of 1846, or to Costa Rica, with whom our treaty relations 
 are different. 
 
 Under these circumstances, while the Government of the United States 
 of America does not expect or claim the position of necessary arbitrator in 
 
 * House Report, No. 1790, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 240. 
 fU. S. Foreign Relations, 1881, p. 354. 
 
differences bebveen those two republics, it cannot but seem strange that 
 Colombia has not commuuicatcd to this Government its intention to submit 
 to arbitration the boundaries of the State of Tanama, the territorial integ- 
 rity of whicli the United States of America has guaranteed by a treaty, the 
 provisions of which it has been more than once called on to execute. 
 
 »,♦******* 
 You will take an opportunity, as from yourself, not under instructions 
 from, but with full knowledge of, your Government, to say to the Minister of 
 Forei'ii AlTairs that the Government of the United States of America cannot 
 satisfactorily account for the absence of any official communication upon a 
 subject in which it is so directly interested; and that while it recognizes the 
 wisdom of the method of arbitration in the solution of international differ- 
 ences, and has no objection to urge to the arbitrators who have been named, 
 it thinks that its opinion, both as to the character of the submission and the 
 choice of arbitrator, should have been consulted and considered, and that it 
 will not hold itself bound, where its rights, obligations, or interests may be 
 concerned, by the decision of any arbitrator in whose appointment it has 
 not been consulted, and iu whose selection it has not concurred.* 
 
 For the purpose of heading off European- interventiou, he in- 
 formed the King of the Belgians : — 
 
 It belongs, of course, to His Majesty the King of the Belgians to deter- 
 mine how far his acceptance of the arbitration which has been asked of him, 
 will be influenced by the fact that he may be called upon to decide questions 
 of grave consequence and direct interest to this Government which have 
 been raised without our knowledge, and are to be settled without our par- 
 ticipation. But it is proper, in order to avoid any future misunderstanding, 
 or anything that may then be construed into intentional disrespect of the 
 decision wliich His Majesty may make, that His Majesty should be informed 
 that while the Government of the United States has neither formed nor de- 
 sires to express any opinion upon the mei-its of the convention between 
 Costa liica and the United States of Colombia, yet it will not hold itself 
 bound by any decision which would modify or limit either the rights or iu' 
 terests which may have been secured to it by the treaty of 1846, the obliga- 
 tions of which it has discharged, from the date of its signature to the pres- 
 ent day, with scrupulous fidelity, unless it has had full opportunity to ex- 
 plain and enforce those rights and interests before an arbitrator in whose 
 appointment it has been consulted and in whose selection it has concurred. t 
 
 And gave notici' in about the same termsj to the King of Spain; 
 but to the President of the Argentine Republic he seems to have paid 
 no attention. 
 
 As a result of tnese dispatches the Government of Costa Rica 
 deferred any immediate action. In the words of the representative of 
 that (loverument to Spain, the position of the United States was a 
 *' cloud upon the project." § Mr. Blaine denied the right of a friendly 
 
 *r. S. Korclffti Rvlattons, 18S1, pp. 855, ;i66. ild., p. 72. 
 
 1 7t/., i<. 1057. §/d., p. 1067. 
 
9 
 
 Goverument to arrange its own boundary lines. Only the strongest 
 reasons based on immediate danger to important interests could excuse 
 this champion of arbitration as " an imperative international duty " for 
 so dictatorial a proceeding. Such interests he claimed from Article 
 XXXV. of the treaty of 1846 with Colombia. This article is a great 
 factor in Mr. Blaine's diplomacy. In addition to the lavish use of it 
 in the above dispatches, it is the groundwork of his remarkable circular 
 to the European powers in reference to the Panama Canal. It re- 
 quires, therefore, a careful examination. 
 
 THE TREATY OF 1846 WITH NEW GRANADA. 
 
 In 1862 New Granada, which included the State of Panama, took 
 the name of the United States of Colombia. The treaty of the 12th 
 of December, 1846, with New Granada was a general treaty of peace, 
 amity, navigation, and commerce. The object of Article XXXV. was 
 to define the relations of the two countries to the Isthmus of Panama. 
 The first part of the article recites the benefits that the United States 
 is to receive. It is to have the same rights and privileges in com- 
 merce and navigation, to be liable to no more than the same tolls, 
 and, in all important respects, to be considered in the same position, 
 as New Granada herself. For these benefits, as in every contract, the 
 United States is bound to give something in return ; and, therefore, 
 "as an especial compensation for the said advantages and for the 
 favors it has acquired by the fourth, fifth, and sixth articles of this 
 treaty, the United States grants, positively and efficaciously, to New 
 Granada, by the present stipulation, the perfect neutrality of the 
 before-mentioned isthmus, with the view that the free transit from 
 the one to the other sea may not be interrupted or embarrassed in 
 any future time while this treaty exists ; and, in consequence, the 
 United States also guarantees, in the same manner, the rights of sover- 
 eignty and property which New Granada has and possesses over the 
 said territory." The treaty was to run for twenty years. If, how- 
 ever, twelve months before the expiration of that time, neither Gov- 
 ernment should notify the other of its intention to reform or abrogate 
 it, the treaty was to continue until such twelve months' notice should 
 be given. No such notice had ever been given by either Govern- 
 ment, and the treaty was still in force ; but the fact that it could be 
 abrogated in so short a time made it very insecure ground for diplo- 
 matic manoeuvres. 
 
 In Article XXXV. there is no statement of any guarantee of ter- 
 ritorial integrity ; and when Mr. Blaine alleges, as he does repeatedly. 
 
10 
 
 that tho Ignited States had guaranteed the "territorial integrity" of 
 the State of Pauaina, he uses a phrase that is coined for the occasion. 
 The United States guarantees two things — the neutrality of the 
 Isthmus and the rights of sovereignty and property of New Granada 
 over that portion of its territory. The guarantee is — to use the legal 
 expression — the consideration moving from the United States to the 
 other contracting jnirty ; or, to put it more plainly, the benefit con- 
 ferred by the United States upon Colombia in return for the advan- 
 tages received from that Government. It can therefore give the 
 United States no right to interfere with the action of Colombia her- 
 self, because such a right would be a restriction on the freedom of 
 action of that Government, and therefore not a benefit. This is per- 
 fectly plain on the face o^ the treaty, but there is also a decision ex- 
 pressly in point. In 1865 there was an insurrection in Colombia, 
 and that Government appealed for aid to the United States. Under 
 the following opinion of the Attorney-General aid was refused :. — - 
 
 "The United States did guarantee New Granada in the sovereignty and 
 property over the territory. This was against other and foreign Govern- 
 ments. Without language more explicit and direct to that end, it cannot be 
 that New Granada desired, or that the United States intended to give, a 
 guarantee to New Granada against the conduct of the citizens of the latter. 
 The acceptance of such a guarantee would amount to a sun-ender of sover- 
 eignty on the part of New Granada. * * * * The history of the relations 
 whicli this Government has ever borne toward other nations of the world, 
 forbids the idea that it ever desired or intended to obtain such control over 
 tlie internal affairs of any other Government. The positive and efficacious 
 guarantee of perfect neutrality mentioned in the treaty must be regarded as 
 having reference to foreign powers." * 
 
 For the same reasons the United States, by guaranteeing the neu- 
 trality of the Isthmus, does not become the sole guarantor. This 
 would give it the right to interfere against Colombia herself when- 
 ever that Government should invite any other nation to become a 
 guarantor also. 
 
 Any misconception of Article XXXV. could have been prevented 
 by a glance at the history of the treaty. In bSfjIj, IHCS, and 1870 
 attempts were made by the Government of the United States to in- 
 crease its control (jver the Isthmus by a new treaty or an amplification 
 of the original treaty. All such attempts were resisted by the 
 Coloml)ian (iovernment. As late as the j^dministration of President 
 Hayes, when the Salgar-Wyse Convention was made, in which the 
 Colond)ian Government granted certain concessions to M. de Lesseps 
 relative to the construction of a canal, it occurred to Mr. Evarts that 
 
 • Opinions of the Attorney-Generals, Vol. XL, p. 392. 
 
11 
 
 such concessions might affect the interests of this country. This was 
 not an unnatural conclusion, as the rights and privileges granted by 
 the treaty of 1846 to the United States applied "to any modes of 
 communication that now exist or may hereafter be constructed." 
 Mr. Evarts did not assume, however, that he could interfere with the 
 rights of Colombia over her own territory, but undertook to secure 
 an amplification of Article XXXV. giving to the United States the 
 right to revise such concessions. The Colombian Minister at Wash- 
 ington refused to open a discussion on such a basis.* 
 
 The United States then yielded its claim to a revision of the 
 concessions, and a protocol f was drawn up, the principal effect of 
 which was to limit the use of the canal for war vessels in time of 
 peace to Colombia and the United States ; or if war vessels of other 
 nations were at any time allowed to use it, they could only do so 
 "subject to such regulations and restrictions as the said contracting 
 parties may jointly adopt." This protocol the Colombian Minister 
 consented to sign ; but on his return to Colombia to obtain the ratifi- 
 cation of his Government, the Government not only rejected the pro- 
 tocol, but the people accused him of treason. J The excitement ran 
 so high that the recall of the Minister to the United States was re- 
 quested. In the meantime, Mr. Blaine had succeeded Mr. Evarts, and 
 the notification of the Colombian Government of its disapproval of 
 
 *As will be seen by the following, he did so in strong terms: "He did not even 
 imagine that the enlightened American Government proposed to discuss the right of 
 Colombia, as an independent and sovereign nation, to conclude conventions of the nature 
 of that which she has concluded with Mr. Lucien N. B. Wyse for the construction of an 
 interoceauio canal through her own territory. 
 
 " Although the ' whereases ' of the draft presented to him are based upon the very ob- 
 ligations contracted by the Government of the United States of America in Article XXXV of 
 the aforesaid treaty of 1846,— that is to say, upon obligations designed to guarantee the sover- 
 eignty of Colombia over the Isthmus of Panama, — Article I. of the draft prepared by his ex- 
 cellency the Secretary of State is, in the opinion of the undersigned, in direct derogation of 
 the very sovereignty which it is proposed to guarantee, when it proposes to Colombia to agree 
 tliat before granting a privilege similar to that which it has granted, it needs to secure the 
 consent and approval of a foreign power," (U. S. Foreign Relations, 1881, pp. 381, 382.) 
 
 tU. S. Foreign Relations, 1881, p. 374. 
 
 X Nothing can demonstrate more clearly how far from the Colombian mind was the 
 idea of a sole guarantee by the United States, than the following exti-act from the defense 
 of the Colombian Minister, for having signed the protocol granting these concessions to the 
 United States : " No great effort of the imagination is required to discover that the inten- 
 tion of tlie Colombian Minister in drafting that part of the article of the protocol just copied, 
 was to determine the possibility that by treaty, other powers might also take part in 
 guaranteeing the neutrality of the interoceanlc route and the sovereignty of Colombia over 
 its own territory; thereby inducing these powers to hasten the celebration of the said 
 treaties with the bait of concessions made to the United States, this up to the present time 
 having been the only nation that had offered lier guarantee, and this same constituting the 
 foundation of all the concessions hitherto granted." (U. S. Foreign Relations, 1881, p. 386. ) The 
 italics are in tlie original. 
 
12 
 
 the protocol was made to him. Neither in the protocol nor in the 
 original proposition of Mr. Evarts was it affirmed that the United 
 States should have the sole guarantee of neutrality. 
 
 THE PANAMA. CANAL. 
 
 According to Mr. Blaine, however, the treaty gave him not only 
 the right to prevent any settlement of the boundaries of Colombia 
 without his permission, but also to forbid any action on the part of 
 that Government looking to a guarantee of the neutrality of the Isth- 
 mus from any other nation than the United States. He created in 
 the original treaty, rights that were not even claimed in the amplifica- 
 tion. As soon as he heard " rumors " that Colombia intended to ask 
 the P^uropean powers for some sort of joint declaration of the neu- 
 trality of the Isthmus, he sent a circular to all the European powers, 
 and the following dispatch to the Minister of the United States 
 accredited to Colombia : — 
 
 Your No. 269 * * reports the rumors which reach you confidentially, 
 to the effect that Colombia is seeking from the European powers some sort 
 of joint declaration of the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama, as well as 
 of Colombian sovereignty over the territory thereof. 
 
 In view of like rumors which reached me from various channels, exhibit- 
 ing a tendency on the part of some of the maritime powers to consider the 
 expediency of uniting in such a guarantee, I had already prepared a circular 
 instruction to the representatives of the United States in Europe, directing 
 them in event of their having cause to believe that this movement is assuming 
 tangible proportions, to acquaint the respective Governments to which they 
 are accredited with the view of the President — that the existing guarantees, 
 under the treaty of 1846 between the United States and Colombia, are com- 
 plete and sufficient, and need no supplemental reinforcement from any 
 other source. 
 
 I am not yet prepared to direct the communication of this dispatch in 
 extenno to the Colombian Government ; but if the feeling of excitement 
 which arose on Seflor Santo Domingo Vilas's return to Bogota, and culmi- 
 nated in a request for your recall, should have yielded to a better spirit, 
 showing a return of confidence, you may, if proper occasion offers, inform 
 the Colombian Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the stand taken by this Gov- 
 ernment to check the apprehended movement of the powers of Europe in 
 tlio direction of a joint guarantee, as needless, as offensive to Colombia, and 
 to tlie United Status as well.* 
 
 The dispatch was written on July the 24th. At that time Mr. 
 lilaine knew the sensitive condition of the Colombian mind toward 
 the treaty, and that his dispatch and circular would be published. 
 His perversions of a treaty which could be re-formed on twelve 
 moutha' notice could produce but one result. A resolution was passed 
 
 *U. 3. Foreign Kclatlons, 1881, pp. 356, 357. 
 
13 
 
 by the Colombian Congress instructing the President of Colombia to 
 notify the President of the United States of the intention of Colombia 
 to abrogate the treaty. Mr. Blaine, however, left the Cabinet just 
 before the resolution was passed, and Colombia, like many other 
 nations, felt the consequent lull that set in, after his departure, in our 
 foreign relations. The notice has therefore not been sent to our Gov- 
 ernment, but is probably being held in reserve until Mr. Elaine him- 
 self, or some one equally sensational, shall control the State 
 Department. 
 
 The broadcast distribution of the above-mentioned "circular 
 instruction" was one of the most famous of Mr. Blaine's. undertak- 
 ings in diplomacy, but is also one of the hardest to understand. In 
 the first place, Mr. Blaine assumed that the treaty with New Granada 
 gave the United States the right to be the sole guarantor of the 
 neutrality of the Isthmus. This assumption has been shown to be 
 groundless. In the second place, he overlooked a treaty the exist- 
 ence of which not only proved his premises to be false, but gave a 
 somewhat comic appearance to the peremptory tone of the circular. 
 The treaty with New Granada was not ratified until 1848. In 1850, 
 only two years later, the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was ratified with 
 Great Britain. This treaty was necessitated by a complication of the 
 interests of Great Britain and the United States. in Central America, 
 and for the purpose of adjusting the relations of the two countries to 
 a proposed canal through that territory. However advantageous it 
 may be for the United States to obtain the sole guarantee of the 
 neutrality of the canal, this treaty had never been abrogated, and 
 until abrogated was the supreme law of the land. Bearing this in 
 mind, the principal extracts from the treaty and the circular will be 
 entertaining and instructive, as a commentary upon Mr. Blaine's 
 diplomatic methods. 
 
 Dispatch of June 14th, sent 
 by Mr. Blaine to Mr. Lowell, 
 United States Minister to Great 
 Britain, and mutatis mutandis 
 to the other United States Min- 
 isters in Europe.* 
 
 The United States recognizes a 
 proper guarantee of neutrality as 
 essential to the construction and 
 successful operation of any higli- 
 way across the Isthmus of Panama, 
 
 The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty 
 between the United States and 
 Great Britain, ratified July 4, 
 1850. 
 
 *U. S. Foreign Relations, 1881, pp. 537, 540. 
 
14 
 
 and in tlu- last generation every step 
 was taken by this Government that 
 is deemed requisite in the premises. 
 The necessity was foreseen and 
 abundantly provided for long in 
 advimce of any possible eall for the 
 actual exercise of power. 
 
 In 1846 a memorable and im- 
 portant treaty was negotiated and 
 signed between the United States 
 of America and the Republic of 
 New Granada, now the United 
 States of Colombia. By the thirty- 
 fifth article of that treaty, in ex- 
 change for certain concessions 
 made to the United States, we 
 guaranteed, " positively and effi- 
 caciously," the perfect neutrality 
 of the Isthmus, and of any inter- 
 oceanic communications that might 
 be constructed upon or over it for 
 the maintenance of free transit 
 from sea to sea; and we also guar- 
 anteed the rights of sovereignty 
 and property of the United States 
 of Colombia over the territory of 
 the Isthmus as included within tlie 
 borders of the State of Panama. 
 
 In the judgment of the Presi- 
 dent, this guarantee given by the 
 United States of America does not 
 require re-enforcement, or acces- 
 sion, or assent from any other 
 power. * * « 
 
 If the foreshadowed action of 
 the European powers should as- 
 sume tangible shape, it would bo 
 well for you to bring to the notice 
 of Lord Granville the provisions of 
 the treaty of 1X40, and especially of 
 its thirty-fifth article, and to inti- 
 mate to him that any movement in 
 the sense of supplementing the 
 guarantee contained therein would 
 necessarily be regarded by this 
 (iovernmcnt as an uncalled-for in- 
 trusion into a field where the local 
 and general interests of the United 
 States of America must be con- 
 sidered before tho.se of any othcu- 
 
 ARTICLE L 
 
 The Governments of the United 
 States and Great Britain hereby de- 
 clare that neither one nor the other 
 will ever obtain or maintain for 
 itself any exclusive control over 
 the said ship canal; agreeing that 
 neither will ever erect or maintain 
 any fortifications commanding the 
 same or in the vicinity thereof, or 
 occupy or fortify or colonize or as- 
 sume or exercise any dominion 
 over * * * any part of Central 
 America. * * * 
 
 ARTICLE V. 
 
 The contracting parties fur- 
 ther engage that when the said 
 canal shall have been completed, 
 they Avill protect it from interrup- 
 tion, seizure, or unjust confiscation, 
 and that they will guarantee the 
 neutrality thereof, so that the said 
 canal may forever be open and free, 
 and the capital invested therein 
 secure. * * * 
 
15 
 
 power save those of the United 
 States of Colombia alone, which 
 has already derived, and will con- 
 tinue to derive, such eminent ad- 
 vantages from the guarantee of this 
 Government. * * * 
 
 Any attempt to supersede that 
 guarantee by au agreement between 
 Euroi^ean powers * * * would 
 be regarded by this Government as 
 an indication of unfriendly feeling. 
 
 During any war to which the 
 United States of America or the 
 United States of Colombia might be 
 a party, the passage of the armed 
 vessels of a hostile nation through 
 the canal at Panama would be no 
 more admissible than would the 
 passage of the armed forces of a 
 hostile nation over the railway lines 
 joining the Atlantic and Pacific 
 shores of the United States or of 
 Colombia. 
 
 You will be careful, in any con- 
 versations you may have, not to rep- 
 resent the position of the United 
 States as the development of a iiew 
 policy, or the inauguration of any 
 advanced, aggressive steps to be 
 taken by this Government. It is 
 nothing more than the pronounced 
 adherence of the United States to 
 principles long since enunciated by 
 the highest authority of the Govern- 
 ment, and now, in the judgment of 
 the President, firmly inwoven as an 
 integral and important part of our 
 national policy. 
 
 AKTICUE VI. 
 The contracting parties in this 
 convention engage to invite every 
 State with which both or either 
 have friendly intercourse, to enter 
 into stipulations with them similar 
 to those which they have entered 
 into with each other, to the end that 
 all other States may share in the 
 honor and advantage of having con- 
 tributed to a work of such general 
 interest and importance as the canal 
 herein contemplated. * * * 
 
 ARTICLE 11. 
 Vessels of the United States or 
 Great Britian traversing the said 
 canal shall, in case of war between 
 the contracting parties, be exempt- 
 ed from blockade, detention, or cap- 
 ture by either of the belligerents; 
 and this provision shall extend to 
 such a distance from the two ends 
 of the said canal as may hereafter 
 be found expedient to establish. 
 
 ARTICLE VIII. 
 The Governments of the United 
 States and Great Britain having not 
 only desired, in entering into this 
 convention, to accomplish a particu- 
 lar object, but also to establiah a 
 general 2mncl2)le, they hereby agree 
 to extend their protection, by treaty 
 stipulations, to any other practi- 
 cable communications, whether by 
 canal or railway, across the Isthmus 
 which connects North and South 
 America, and especially to the mi- 
 teroceanic communications, should 
 the same prove to be practicable, 
 whether by canal or railway, which 
 are now proposed to be established 
 by the way of Tehuantepec or 
 Panama. * * * 
 
16 
 
 It will lie i\'ineinl)ei\'d tluit in the dispatches which stifled the ar- 
 bitration between Colombia and Costa Rica, Mr. Blaine continually 
 (jnoted the treaty of 184G with New Grenada as guaranteeing the 
 '• territorial integrity " of the Isthmus. In the circular to the 
 P^uropean powers uo claim is made to such a guarantee. Mr. Blaine's 
 report of the contents of the treaty is adapted to the circumstances of 
 each particular case. There was no question of boundary to be argued 
 with the powers, and the invention of the phrase " territorial integ- 
 rity " was, therefore, unnecessary. To compensate for this omission, 
 they were informed of various geographical and statistical facts : that 
 the possessions of the United States on the Pacific coast are " im- 
 perial in extent ; " that " the States of California and Oregon and the 
 Territory of "Washington, larger in area than England and France, pro- 
 duces a ton of wheat to each inhabitant." 
 
 The countries to whom the circular was addressed, wnth the excep- 
 tion of England, felt very little interest in the question so suddenly 
 thrust upon them, and replied wnth an air of polite indifference. 
 France had "received no official communication" of an applica- 
 tion for a joint guarantee, but would read the dispatch ".with due 
 care and consideration."* Italy showed that "the subject was not 
 new," but "could not pronounce any opinion"f for the present. 
 Kussia " had no knowledge of the existence of such a proposition. "J 
 Spain " had not only not received any invitation," * * * " but this was 
 the first information it bad had of any such proposition. "§ Sweden 
 and Norway did not know, but thought that " Great Britain might 
 have some objection ; " whereupon they were assured by the United 
 States Minister at Stockholm that the Pacific slope Was " one of the 
 fattest pieces of territory on the face of the earth. "|| Austria-Hun- 
 gary, although invoked by no less a personage than Mr. William 
 "Walter Phelps, " really felt very little interest in the question," and 
 had the bad taste to say so, even after Mr. Phelps had stated " that it 
 was only an old policy, and the declaration of an old right, which 
 was founded on a solemn treaty more than twenty years ago," and 
 had adorned the discussion with " a running commentary and analvsis 
 in the simpler language of tlie mlon " and with arguments " in literary 
 and undiploimitic (U.'ihabille,"% With England the affair was more 
 serious. It may bo diplomacy to talk of an old policy that had never 
 existed, and a solemn treaty which gives no grounds for your posi- 
 
 • U. 8. Fon-lgn lU-hitl.jiirt, 1 si, j,. 417. § Jd., p. 1062. 
 
 t ''^ . !'■ ^- II Id., p. 1073. 
 
 J '"^ . !•■ '"•-'»• II Id., p. 61. 
 
17 
 
 tion, to foreign powers who do not feel sufficient interest to investigate 
 the truth of such statements, but it is hard to find any explanation 
 for such action toward England, the other contracting party in the 
 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. A late celebrated English statesman, when 
 charged with having written certain objectionable lines in one of his 
 early poems, emphatically denied the charge, and to prove that he was 
 right, republished the poem with the lines omitted. In the same way 
 the subtle Secretary of State may have believed that to ignore the 
 treaty was to make it non-existent. But we find that he afterward, 
 of his own accord, admitted its existence, and present binding force. 
 Perhaps he supposed that treaties could be eliminated at will from the 
 solution of any international problem. This theory is also upset when 
 we remember his veneration for the sacred character of the impotent 
 but omnipresent treaty of 1846. There is but one explanation left. 
 At the time Mr. Blaine wrote his circular, in all probability he did 
 not know of the existence of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, or if he had 
 heard of it, he must have forgotten its object and results. 
 
 The circular was distributed on June 24th. From the English 
 Foreign office for almost five months no reply was received. Finally, 
 on November 10th, Lord Granville wrote as follows : — 
 
 Her Majesty's Government have noted with satisfaction the statement 
 made by Mr. Blaine that there is no intention on the part of the Govern- 
 ment of the United States to initiate any discussion upon this subject, and 
 in the same spirit I do not now propose to enter into a detailed argument in 
 reply to Mr. Blaine's observations. 
 
 I should wish, therefore, merely to point out to you that the position of 
 Great Britain and the United States with reference to the canal, irrespective 
 of the magnitude of the commercial relations of the fo/mer power with 
 countries to and from which, if completed, it will form the highway, is de- 
 termined by the engagements entered into by them respectively in the con- 
 vention which was signed at Washington on the 19th of April, 1850, com- 
 monly known as the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and Her Majesty's Govern- 
 ment rely with confidence upon the observance of all the engagements of 
 that treaty.* 
 
 There is a conciseness about this that verges upon irony. It is in 
 very sharp contrast to Mr. Blaine's sonorous proclamation. The 
 English Minister does not take advantage of the treaty by a mere 
 citation. With more than twenty years' experience as a Cabinet 
 Minister, he has the air of a teacher instructing a pupil ; he tells him 
 at what place and on what day the treaty was signed, and that it is 
 commonly known as the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. He even seems 
 upon the point of mailing him a copy, and he might have done so if 
 
 * U. S. Foreign Eelatione, 18S1, p. 549. 
 
18 
 
 the action of the Mexican Minister had been suggested to him as a 
 precedent. In the nieantinie, however, Mr. Blaine had detected the 
 existence of the Clayton-Hulwer Treaty. On November 19th he 
 wrote a dispatch which crossed Lord Granville's communication of 
 November lUth ; in this he not only condescended to admit the force 
 of the treaty, but to suggest reasons for its abrogation. One theory 
 has been given, and now it is only fair to hear Mr. Blaine's own ex- 
 planation of his omission of all mention of the treaty in one dis- 
 patch and his acknowledgment of it in the other. When lecturing 
 upon his South American Policy before the Committee in the Chili- 
 Peruvian investigation, he went out of his way to throw this light 
 upon the subject : — 
 
 But, practically, both the communications — both the papers — were 
 prepared at the same time; that is, the original circular letter of the 24th of 
 June, wlien sent, had the sequel to it blocked out, and so far blocked out that 
 the President and myself had gone over the points to be presented, and the 
 notes upon it were very full. That, when the President was shot, was laid 
 aside, and was never withdrawn from its pigeon-hole until President Arthur 
 had been thirty or forty days in the exercise of his Presidency, but was sent 
 weeks after lie had succeeded by reason of the President's death.* 
 
 To remain pigeon-holed for five months was an ignoble fate for a 
 document that ought to have gone to England with the great circular. 
 Of course, the English Government would judge of the dispatches by 
 the dates, and the explanation is of no importance from an interna- 
 tional point of view. Like an aside in a play, it is meant for the 
 spectators, and not the actors. It is only necessary to look over the 
 parallel passages of the circular and the treaty, as given above, to 
 see that Mr. Blaine's explanation — to put it mildly — must have 
 been based on an imperfect recollection of the facts. If it were 
 true, the nuitter would look more whimsical than before. Some 
 consideration might be shown for a diplomat overwhelmed by the 
 magnitude of the interests intrusted to him, forgetting the existence 
 of an important treaty, but finding out and correcting his error five 
 nmnths afterward. To supplement a dispatch .in which every argu- 
 ment assumes the non-existence of a treaty ])y another admitting 
 the treaty, and ariruiiig in favor of its abrogation, would be too re- 
 markable an exhibition even for Mr. Blaine's diplomacy. One is 
 ignorance, the other stupidity. Now, Mr. Blaine is not a stupid 
 man, and we refuse to accept this explanation. The more plausible 
 theory of ignorance is much more flattering to him.t 
 
 • Mouse Report, No. 1790, 47tli Congress, First Session, p. 205. 
 
 t It li» gr:ilifyliig to observe tliat Mr. Blaine's cxplauation is notaccepted by an entluisl- 
 
19 
 
 It is unnecessary in these limits to discuss the Monroe Doctrine. 
 Let us admit that the correct policy for the United States is to secure 
 the control of any canal through the Isthmus. The first step in such 
 a policy is to procure the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. 
 A skillful negotiator working for that end, would as courteously as 
 possible suggest his reasons for the desired changes ; he would, above 
 all things, avoid saying anything that would lead the other Govern- 
 ments to resist his proposals, and to stand upon their rights as a matter 
 of national feeling. Lord Palmerston once said that discourtesy was 
 not au American fault, but that the American Government was often 
 allowed by European diplomacy to take liberties in dispatches because 
 such documents were often mere speeches to the people. Mr. Blaine 
 proved this assertion. It is no exaggeration to say that between 
 European Powers the tone of his dispatches of June 14th and Nov- 
 ember 19th would have resulted in a cessation of friendly relations. 
 Taken in connection with the entire and offensive disregard of the 
 treaty in the circular of June 14th, the use of the following state- 
 ments, however true, in the dispatch of November 19th, at the begin- 
 ning of a delicate negotiation for the abrogation of the treaty, is 
 typical of a system of diplomacy that is peculiar to Mr. Blaine. 
 
 The military power of the United States, as shown by the recent Civil 
 War, is without limit, and in any conflict on the American continent alto- 
 gether irresistible. 
 
 ********** 
 
 This Government, with respect to European States, will not consent to 
 perpetuate any treaty that impeaches our rightful and long-established 
 claim to priority on the American continent. 
 
 ********** 
 
 If it be asked why the United States objects to the assent of European 
 Governments to the terms of neutrality for the operation of the canal, my 
 answer is that the right to assent implies the right to dissent, and thus the 
 whole question would be thrown open for contention as an international 
 issue. It is the fixed purpose of the United States to confine it strictly and 
 solely as an American question, to be dealt with and decided by the Ameri- 
 can Governments. 
 
 ********** 
 
 You will at the earliest opportunity acquaint Lord Granville with the 
 purpose of the United States touching the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and, in 
 your own way, you will impress him fully with the views of your Govern- 
 
 astic supporter, who defends him in the following cogent manner: "He forgot a certain 
 matter of fact, the item in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. But this was no crime. We cannot 
 all be omniscient, like Mr. Tilden. Other people forget matters of fact. Some in Boston 
 forget that the episode of the ' Mulligan Letters,' for instance, was one that did not discredit 
 Mr. Blaine, but made him appear so much the stronger." * * * ("The Case of Mr. Blaine," 
 by Edwin D. Mead, p. 16.) 
 
20 
 
 ment. I refrain from directing that a copy of this instruction be left with 
 his lonlsliip, because, in reviewing the case, I have necessarily been com- 
 pelled, in drawing illustrations from British policy, to indulge somewhat 
 freely in the arnumenlum ad hominem. This course of reasoning, in an in- 
 struction to our own Minister, is altogether legitimate and pertinent, and 
 yet might seem discourteous if addressed directly to the British Govern- 
 ment.* 
 
 ]Mr. Blaine himself seems impressed by the discourtesy of his own 
 dispatch. As the dispatch was published immediately, it was to all 
 effect " addressed directly to the British Government." Of the un- 
 fortunate impression made by it, some idea may be obtained from one 
 of the most sensible and temperate of the English Journals. f While 
 admitting the justice of the claim" of the United States to the control 
 of the canal, it says : " It is difficult for Englishmen to read such a 
 dispatch unmoved, and to repress the inclination to answer it by a 
 definite refusal to modify the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, leaving the 
 Government at Washington to take such steps as they may deem ex- 
 pedient. It is vain, however, for nations to give way to temper ; the 
 evidence that the wording of the dispatch is intended to please Amer- 
 icans rather than to displease Englishmen, is very strong, and in the 
 interest of both nations it is wiser to regard only the substance of the 
 request thus rudely pressed upon British attention." 
 
 THE IRISH SUSPECTS. 
 
 It is impossible to pass from Mr. Blaine's negotiations with Great 
 Britain without alluding to the reputation that he seems to have 
 acquired as the defender of the American citizen abroad — a reputa- 
 tion which he undertakes to sustain in the glowing periods of his letter 
 of acceptance. While Secretary of State, Mr. Blaine had an excel- 
 lent opportunity for the display of his enthusiasm on this subject. 
 On March 2, 1881, an act was passed by the English Government 
 caMed the Coercion Act, " for tlie better protection of persons and prop- 
 erty in Ireland." This act in certain cases suspended the right of 
 habeas corpim, by providing that in certain " proscribed districts," any 
 person reported by the Lord-Lieutenant to be " reasonably suspected " 
 of certain wrongful acts could be arrested and imprisoned without 
 bail for as long a time as the Government saw fit. Several persons 
 who claimed to be American citizens were arrested under this act as 
 " suspects." I'he first was Michael P. Boyton, one of the traversers 
 
 * U. R. Forelftn Relations, 1S81, pp. .555, 559. 
 t The y.conomist, Uoc. 24, 1881. 
 
21 
 
 in the State Trials at Dublin. He claimed to he an American citizen, 
 and, as proof of that claim, produced a passport issued to him by 
 Mr. Seward, when Secretary of State in 1866, and demanded a new 
 one. As there were discrepancies in Mr. Boyton's statements relative 
 to his citizenship, Mr. Lowell declined to interfere or to give him a 
 new passport. On INIarch 31st Mr. Blaine wrote to Mr. Lowell : — 
 
 I have received your dispatch No. 140, of the 12th instant, in relation to 
 the arrest of Mr. Michael 1'. Boyton, and his application for protection as an 
 American citizen. Your action thereon, in connection with your previous 
 action on Mr. Boyton's application for a new passport, receives the entire 
 commendation of the Department as discreet and proper. 
 
 The facts so far elicited show the wisdom and importance of a careful 
 examination of cases giving rise to international complaints; and while it is 
 most desirable to omit no steps or take no positive action which might re- 
 sult in unduly embarrassing an American citizen in the assertion of his per- 
 sonal rights or hindering his immediate protection in case of urgent need, it 
 is on the other hand equally desirable that you should be (as you appear to 
 have been) watchful to guard against introducing any avoidable element of 
 uncertainty or contradiction into the discussion of questions of such intrin- 
 sic gravity between the two Governments. In the case of Mr. Boyton, as in 
 any other which may arise, I have every confidence in your discretion, 
 equally with your zeal in the protection of American rights.* 
 
 And again on May 26th : — 
 
 * The prudence you have shown in dealing with Mr. Boyton's claim of 
 citizenship is commendable, and the statements as to the law in his case, 
 made in your letters to him, are in full accord with the interpretation of 
 this Department. 
 
 In answer to a resolution of the Senate, calling for the facts and corre- 
 spondence in the matter, I laid before the President a full report, which was 
 communicated to the Senate on the 20th instant. In that report I showed 
 that the evidence presented by Mr. Boyton himself, and by his friends here 
 in his behalf, was not such as to prove his claim to citizenship under our 
 laws.t 
 
 The next application was made by Joseph B. Walsh, who was 
 imprisoned some time in April. After several efforts Mr. Lowell 
 silcceeded in securing his release in November, on account of ill- 
 health. He was the only "suspect" who was liberated while Mr. 
 Blaine was in office. 
 
 On the 26th of May, Mr. Blaine called Mr. Lowell's attention to 
 the arrest of Joseph D'Alton. Mr. Lowell took no action, because 
 he had received no proofs of citizenship, and communicated this to 
 
 * House Ex. Doc. 155, Part 2, 47th Congi-ess, First Session, pp. 4, 5. 
 t Id., p. 5. 
 
22 
 
 Mr. Blaine m a dispatch received on July 28tb. No further mention 
 WHS nuule of this application until Mr. Frelinghuyseu became Secre- 
 tary of State, and instituted an inquiry which resulted in the dis- 
 covery that no such person had been arrested. 
 
 Daniel McSweeny was arrested some time in June, and was the 
 next who appealed to the Legation of the United States. After some 
 delay and correspondence, Mr. Lowell finally wrote to him on Sep- 
 tember 22d, as follows : — 
 
 I have not thought it proper to make any application for your release 
 from prison, for the following reasons: — 
 
 The Coercion Act, however exceptional and arbitrary, and contrary to 
 the spirit and fundamental principles of both English and American juris- 
 prudence, is still the law of the land, and controls all parties domiciled in 
 the proclaimed districts of Ireland, whether they are British subjects or not. 
 It would be manifestly futile to claim that naturalized citizens of the 
 United States should be excepted from its operation. 
 
 The only case, in my opinion, in which I ought to intervene, would be 
 where an American citizen who is in Ireland attending exclusively to his 
 private business and taking no part whatever in public meetings or political 
 discussions should be arrested. Under such circumstances it would be 
 proper to appeal to the courtesy of the Government here on the ground of 
 mistake or misapprehension, aud ask for the release of the prisoner. 
 
 I have communicated these views to the Department of State, and I 
 have received, so far, no instruction in a contrary spirit. 
 
 It does not appear to me that the reasons above given for intervention 
 exist in your case, so far as I understand it.* 
 
 On August ;kl Mrs. McSweeny had written to Mr. Blaine, but 
 received no answer, as is seen by a letter from McSweeny himself to 
 his daughter in San P'rancisco, in which he says: "Your mother 
 wrote to Mr. Blaine about my case, but that gentleman did not deign 
 even a reply. I heard nothing whatever from him. * * * So it w^ould 
 appear that we appealed to the wrong man." f There was no doubt 
 about the citizenship of McSweeny; and his- release was with some 
 didicidty obtained after Mr. Blaine was succeeded by Mr. Freling- 
 huyseu. 
 
 The case that followed was that of John McEuery, which was 
 presented, about August 3d, to Mr. Lowell by Mr. Brooks, the 
 L'nited States Consul at Cork. The latter sent McEnery's naturali- 
 zation jiapers, and asked for instructions. Mr. Lowell, for the same 
 reasons as are given in the above letter to McSweeny, instructed him 
 not to interfere, and on August lltli wrote to Mr. Blaine as follows : — 
 
 I have tlie honor to inclose a copy of the correspondence between Mr. 
 brooks, tlie United States Consul at Cork, and myself, in relation to the case 
 
 • MniiHc Kx. Dim;. 155, Part 2, 47th Congress, 1st Session, p. 69. 
 
23 
 
 of Mr. McEnery, a "suspect," confined in Limerick Jail, under the so-called 
 " Coercion Act." I hope that the views I have expressed in my letter in re- 
 latiQ;n to the intervention of this Legation in Mr. McEnery' s case will meet 
 with the approbation of the Department of State.* 
 
 This was received by Mr. Blaiue on August 25th, but he never 
 disapproved of Mr. Lowell's action, nor of his construction of the 
 law. McEnery's release was also effected by Mr. Frelinghuysen. 
 
 The last application, while Mr. Blaine was Secretary, was made 
 to Mr. Blaine personally, in behalf of O'Connor, who was arrested on 
 October 22d. He had a brother,?. C. O'Connor, living in Baltimore, 
 who wrote to Mr. Blaine on November 10th, inclosing a copy of his 
 brother's naturalization papers, and asking for intervention on the 
 ground of American citizenship. Mr. Blaine replied to Mr. O'Con- 
 nor on November 10th in a letter, from which an extract will be 
 given below, but paid no further attention to the matter until 
 December 9th, — just a month after the case had been brought to 
 his attention, — when he sent to Mr. Lowell a copy of the letter and 
 the naturalization papers, with a very brief explan'ation. O'Connor, 
 like the others, was liberated soon after Mr. Frelinghuysen became 
 Secretary. 
 
 This is a summary of the cases that came before the Department 
 of State during Mr. Blaine's term of office. Mr. Blaine left the 
 question entirely to the discretion of Mr. Lowell. From June 2d 
 until his retirement from the Cabinet, at the end of December, he 
 communicated with Mr. Lowell but once in reference to the imprison- 
 ment of American citizens, and that was on December 9th, simply to 
 notify him of the application of Mr. O'Connor. Until December 
 9th, although he continually received information from Mr. Lowell 
 which called for expressions of approval or disapproval, he seems to 
 have preferred to let the matter take its own course, without any 
 assistance or comment from the Department at home. This silence 
 is the more significant because, as appears from what follows, it was 
 probably the result of a change in Mr. Blaine's convictions with 
 respect to the effect of the " Coecrcion Act." 
 
 At first he took the ground with a determined air that an excep- 
 tion should be made in favor of American citizens, as is shown by 
 the following telegram to Mr. Lowell, of May 26th : — 
 
 Evidence of Joseph D' Alton's American birth said to have been sent to 
 Consul Barrows. If reasonably satisfactory, say to Lord Granville that if 
 charges he against D' Alton warranting legal process, we expect no less than 
 a speedy and impartial trial, or, if not tried, his prompt release, t 
 
 * House Ex. Doc. 155, Part 2, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 48. t Id., p. 6. 
 
24 
 
 And by an extract from a dispatch of June 2d : — 
 
 If American citizens while within British jurisdiction offend agJiinst 
 British laws, this Government will not seek to shield them from the legal 
 conseiiuenees of their acts; but it must insist upon the application to their 
 cases of those common principles of criminal jurisprudence which in the 
 United States secure to every man w'ho offends against its laws, whether he 
 be an American citizen or a foreign subject, those incidents to a criminal 
 prosecution which afford the best safeguard to personal liberty and the 
 strongest protection against oppression under the forms of law, which might 
 otherwise be practiced through excessive zeal. 
 
 That an accused person shall immediately upon arrest be informed of 
 the specific crime or offense upon which he is held, and that he shall be 
 afforded an opportunity for a speedy trial before an impartial court and jury, 
 are essentials to every criminal prosecution, necessary alike to the protection 
 of innocence and the ascertainment of guilt.* 
 
 June 2d was the date that closed Mr. Blaine's active connection 
 with this question. His attitude thereafter was purely passive. On 
 June IGth he heard Lord Granville's view of the law in the following 
 dispatch from Mr. Lowell, received on that day : — 
 
 I had informed Lord Granville that written instructions were on the way. 
 He replied that as it was not easy for him to understand on what grounds of 
 international law my Government would base its claim that American citizens 
 should be treated better than British subjects, when both had exjiosed them- 
 selves to the operation of an act of Parliament, he should prefer not to give 
 me any more definite answer until I was more fully instructed from home. I 
 
 And on July 28tli he learned the opinion of Mr. Lowell himself, 
 from the following communication, written in reply to Mr. Blaine's 
 instructions of June 2d : — 
 
 I would respectfully suggest whether any step would be gained toward 
 the speedy trial or release of Walsh by an argument against the law itself 
 under which he was apprehended. So long as Lord Granville expressly de- 
 clines to make any distinction between British subjects and American citi- 
 zens in the application of this law, — a position which I presume may be justi- 
 fied by precedents in our own diplomatic history, — I submit to your better 
 judgment whether the only arguments I can use in favor of Walsh must not 
 be founded upon some exceptional injustice in the way in which he has been 
 treated. J 
 
 Mr. Blaine's continued silence after the receipt of these dispatches 
 in the face of a statute of the United States, § would in itself be strong 
 evidence that he had retired from his position of May 2Gth and June 
 2<1, and accepted Lord Granville's view ; but positive proof of sucli a 
 
 * House K\. Doc. 15.1, Parts , 47tli Congress, First Session, p. 38. 
 
 t Id., p. iO. J Id., p. 43. 
 
 § " Whciu'ver It 1h iiiailc known to tlic l'rc6i<lcnt that any citizen of the United States 
 
25 
 
 retreat is afforded by the following extract from his letter of Novem- 
 ber 2r)th to Mr. P. C. O'Connor, to which allusion has already been 
 made. 
 
 " The act of Parliament" under which Mr. O'Connor is held, is a law of 
 Great Britain; and it is an elementary piinciple of public law, that in such 
 a case the Government of that country, in the exercise of its varied func- 
 tions — judicial and executive — administers and interprets the law in ques- 
 tion. The right of every Government in this respect is absolute and sover- 
 eign, and every person who voluntarily brings himself within the jurisdic- 
 tion of the country, whether permanently or temporarily, is subject to the 
 operation of its laws, whether he be a citizen or mere resident, so long as in 
 the case of the alien resident, no treaty stipulation or principle of interna- 
 tional law is contravened by the proceedings taken against him. In stating this 
 familiar principle, no more is conceded to Great Britain than every country 
 may of right demand, and it is one of the sovereign rights that the Govern- 
 ment of the United States has always insisted upon and maintained for itself.* 
 
 It is needless to inquire which of Mr. Blaine's views is the correct 
 one. It is only necessary to state that the later and riper opinion 
 was not followed by Mr. Frelinghuysen.-f Mr. Blaine not only ap- 
 proved of Mr. Lowell's acts, but adopted his opinions. Yet Mr. Blaine 
 poses as the defender of American citizenship, and Mr. Lowell still 
 endures much unpopularity and some invective. This can only be ex- 
 plained on the supposition that the atmosphere of threatening gloom 
 which envelops Mr. Blaine's negotiations with England and the rest 
 of Europe in relation to a canal that may never exist in his genera- 
 tion, has blinded the eyes of many of the American people to his real 
 attitude toward the less magnificent question of American citizenship, 
 in which he felt no interest, and where there was no opportunity for 
 glittering diplomatic display. 
 
 has been unjustly deprived of bis liberty by or under the authority of any foreign Govern- 
 ment, it sliall be the duty of tlic President forthwith to demand of that Government the 
 reason of such imprisonment ; and if it appear to be wrongful and in violation of the rights 
 of American citizenship, the President shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen; 
 and if the releas<; so demanded is unreasonably delayed of refused, the President shall use 
 such means, not amounting to acts of war, as lie may think necessary or proper to obtain 
 or effectuate the release." * • * (Revised Statutes of the United States, §§ 2001.) 
 
 * Congressional Record, Vol. 13, p. 1136. 
 
 t As is shown liy his dispatch of April 25th to Mr. Lowell, in which he says : "The 
 President is aware tliat Ireland is now in an exceptional condition. But even if ail be true 
 •which is stated ; if it is impossible to conduct a trial by jury of a brealier of the peace with 
 any hope of conviction even with the clearest proof; if the witness who testifies against 
 such an offender docs it with his life in his hands; if it be impossible for owners of property 
 to collect rents under any process of law; if those who are responsible for the administra- 
 tion of the law in Ii-eland are seeking to do away with this unliappy condition — even if all 
 this be true, it furnishes no sufficient reason why an American citizen should remain incar- 
 cerated without accusation, without chance of trial, without opportunity for release." 
 (House Ex. Doc. 155, Part 3, 47tli Congress, First Session, p. 9.) 
 
II- . 
 
 ''If there is any chapter in my life (associated with a great man 
 Avho has gone) of which I am proud, and of the complete and abso- 
 lute vindication of which in history I feel sure, it is that in connec- 
 tion with the policy laid down by the administration of President Gar- 
 tield with respect to the South American States." * With these words 
 Mr. Blaine closed his testimony before a Committee of the House 
 of Representatives, which in the spring of 1882, inquired into certain 
 questions connected with affairs in Chili and Peru. How far such 
 admiration for his South American policy is justified by the facts, will 
 occupy the remainder of this examination. 
 
 THE PEACE CONGRESS. 
 
 The " policy laid down by the administration of President Gar- 
 field with respect to the South American States," will, " in history," 
 mean the policy of Mr. Blaine with respect to the war between Chili 
 and Peru. Before coming to this, however, something should be said 
 in reference to Mr. Blaine's scheme for a Peace Congress ; not because 
 it is of any importance in itself, but because he has so often alluded 
 to it as something that was great in its conception and glorious in its 
 possible results. To this Congress all the independent States of this 
 continent were invited to send delegates. In the invitations, Mr. 
 Blaine explicitly stated that "the United States will enter into the 
 deliberations on the same footing as the other powers represented," 
 and " as a single member among many co-ordinate and co-equal 
 States," and that " its sole aim shall be to seek a way of permanently 
 averting the horrors of cruel and bloody combat between countries."! 
 
 The Peace Conference, like many of Mr. Blaine's schemes, was 
 shelved by his successor, and tlie country might never have known 
 the methods whereby he intended to " avert the horrors of cruel 
 and Itloody combat J)ctween countries." Mr. Blaine, however, has 
 always regarded the failure of the Congress with a disconsolate air, 
 sometimes degenerating into bitterness, and on several occasions he 
 has published his views for the public benefit. On September 1, 
 
 •House Report, No. 1790, J7th Congress, First Session, p. 242 
 t U. S. I-'oroign UoHtlons, 18S1, p. 14. 
 
27 
 
 1882, he wrote an elaborate letter to a Chicago magazine, in which 
 he said * : — 
 
 " The Spanish American States are in special need of the help which the 
 Peace Congress would afford them. They require external pressure to keep 
 them from war. When at war they require external pressure to bring 
 them to peace. * * * The United States cannot play between nations the 
 part of the dog in the manger. We must perform the duty of humane inter- 
 vention ourselves or give way to foreign Governments that are willing to 
 accept the responsibility of the great trust." 
 
 According to the invitation, the United States is to be "on the 
 same footing as the other powers ;" but according to the above letter, 
 this country is to exercise "external pressure" and "humane inter- 
 vention." The statement in the invitation must be taken to be Mr. 
 Blaine's theory ; that in the above letter, his practice. This will be 
 seen in the examination of his policy toward Chili and Peru. It is 
 evidently his opinion that the only effectual way for the United States 
 to prevent wars between the Spanish American States, — who would 
 be singularly obtuse to purely moral suasion, — is to enforce arbitra- 
 tion in the innumerable quarrels of those excitable nations. The 
 grave and expensive responsibility of keeping up a navy and other 
 means necessary to such enforcement, would be an excess of phil- 
 anthropy which the unimaginative tax-payers of this country would 
 hardly support with enthusiasm. 
 
 That peace, however, was not to be the sole object of the Congress 
 is learned from other passages of the letter to the Chicago magazine, 
 and also from an open letter in which Mr. Blaine, on February 3, 1882, 
 took President Arthur to task for destroying the scheme. In this 
 letter he said : — 
 
 " At present, the condition of trade between the United States and its 
 American neighbors is unsatisfactory to us, and even deplorable. According 
 to the official statistics of our own Treasury Departments, the balance against 
 us in that trade last year was $120,000,000 — a sum greater than the yearly 
 product of all the gold and silver mines in the United States. This vast 
 balance was paid by us in foreign exchange, and a very large proportion of 
 it went to England, where shipments of cotton, provisions, and breadstuffs 
 supplied the money. 
 
 "If anything should change or check the balance in our favor in European 
 trade, our commercial exchanges with Spanish America would drain off our 
 reserve of gold coin at a rate exceeding $100,000,000 per annum, and would 
 probably precipitate a suspension of specie payment in this country. * * * I 
 do not say, Mr. President, that holding a peace conference will necessarily 
 change the currents of trade, but it will bring us into kindly relations with 
 
 * Conwell's Life of Blaine, pp. 351, 352. 
 
28 
 
 all the Amuiican uatious; it wiirpromote the reigu of peace, and law, and 
 Older; it -will increase inoductiou and consumption; and Avill stimulate the 
 demand for articles which American manufacturers can furnish with profit." 
 
 The alcove is an interesting example of a certain mental phenom- 
 enon Avhich an incisive writer Las defined as a fixed idea, generating a 
 detailed narrative to support and confirm it. To support and confirm 
 this idea of a Peace Congress, Mr. Blaine proceeds to the generation 
 of facts. In the first place, in calling attention to the possible sus- 
 l)ensiou of specie payment as a result of the drain of our reserve of 
 gold coin by the balance against us in South American trade, he ig- 
 nores an elementary principle of political economy which he must 
 have heard of or stumbled upon during his long career as a legislator 
 — the principle that when a nation stops exporting it stops importing, 
 and nearly in the same ratio. If the United States could no longer 
 sell to Europe, the United States would no longer buy from South 
 America. In the second place, Mr. Blaine makes the balance of trade 
 against the United States amount to $120;000,000 for the year 1881. 
 The real balance for that year in favor of the Spanish American 
 countries and against the United States was $107,000,000. But this 
 figure includes Cuba and Porto Rico. As the invitations to the Peace 
 Congi-ess were extended to the independent nations of this continent 
 and to none others, Cuba and Porto Kico would have no more right 
 to be represented than Spain or France. The omission of these two 
 countries cuts the balance of trade against the United States for that 
 year down to $53,000,000. Mr. Blaine, for the purpose of his argu- 
 ment, more than doubles the figures which he has the right to use.* 
 
 How a Peace Congress can " increase production and consump- 
 tion," and " stimulate the demand for articles which American manu- 
 facturers can furnish with profit," it is impossible to see. The decay 
 of our South American trade is due to our high tariff, and to the dif- 
 ference between American and European methods of commerce. The 
 evil cannot be cured by a synod of gentlemen engaging in the discus- 
 sion of abstract principles. The remedies — and the only remedies — 
 are much simpler and luiinbU'r. We can sell to the people of South 
 
 • The uctual ngures for this trade, compiled from the United States' Statistical Abstract 
 for the flicul year ending June 30, 1881, are as follows : — 
 
 Value of exports to the whole of Spanish America .... $54,358,789 
 
 Value of imports from the whole of Spanish America . . . 161,389,913 
 
 Value of exports to Cuba and Porto Rico 13,123,297 
 
 Value of imports from Cuba and I'orto Ulco 66,863,603 
 
 ToUil balance against the linited Suites 107,031,124 
 
 DalaiK-e omitting Cuba and Porto Kico 53,295,818 
 
29 
 
 America whenever our prices are us low as those of European nations, 
 and our facilities for transportation equally prompt and abundant.* 
 
 We now come to the consideration of Mr. Blaine's policy in re- 
 spect to the belligerent republics of Chili and Peru. It will first be 
 necessary to give a short summary of the events of the war down to 
 the time that Mr. Blaine became Secretary of State. 
 
 CHILI AND PERU. 
 
 The Chilians were the leaders in the war of independence, at the 
 beginning of this century, which resulted in the expulsion of Spain 
 from the Continent, and the organization of the Republics of Chili, 
 Peru, and Bolivia. From that time Chili has been remarkably free 
 from revolutions, has enjoyed complete religious liberty, and has es- 
 tablished a systetn of education independent of ecclesiastical control. 
 The Government, although in theory resting on popular suffrage, is 
 really a powerful oligarchy, which has always been conducted with 
 great honesty, and with the improvement of the country steadily in 
 view. In people' and government Peru affords a sharp contrast to 
 Chili. There all the vices of Spanish dominion have been inherited, 
 and retained. The lower classes are ignorant and vicious ; the 
 aristocracy indolent and corrupt; the country is priest-ridden, and 
 revolution after revolution has changed the face of the Government. 
 
 To prevent a union between Bolivia and Peru has always been a 
 cardinal principle of the policy of Chili, and she had already broken 
 up a Peru-Bolivian alliance by an appeal to arms in 1839. In 1873, 
 however, a secret treaty of alliance was signed by these two Goveru- 
 
 * Our consular reports set forth in the clearest terms the causes which iiave given to 
 the nations of Europe almost a monopoly of the South American trade. Briclly sum- 
 marized they are as follows : — 
 
 1. Regular steam communication with the principal South American ports, whereby 
 the receipt of goods can be counted on to a day. 
 
 3. The establishment of branch houses or agencies in close connection with the home 
 manufactories and exporting houses. 
 
 3. The creation of banking facilities, whereby the receiving and remitting of money 
 and the settling of balances may be effected directly, cheaply, and without trouble. 
 
 4. Ability on the part of agents and salesmen to speak the language of the country. 
 
 5. Great care in the preparation and in the packing of merchandise for exportation. 
 
 6. Attention to the styles and tastes of the South American people, and the absence of 
 all attempts to palm off upon them inferior articles. 
 
 Not one of cur consular officials, in suggesting means and agencies for improving our 
 trade relations with South America, has mentioned the use of political diplomacy in any 
 form. On the contrary. Consul Baker, of Buenos Ayres, says : " I am satisfied that steam 
 will accomplish more in the matter of making ourselves and our republican institutions 
 known to, and appreciated by, the people of this part of South America than millions of 
 dollars spent in diplomacy." 
 
 / 
 
10 
 
 ments. In addition, there had been a long dispute between 
 Chili and Bolivia, which involved the title to the coast district be- 
 tween the parallels of latitude 23° and 2.j" ; this included Autofa- 
 o-asta, the only Bolivian port, and certain nitrate and guano deposits 
 of great value. By a treaty in 1871, Chili withdrew her claims to 
 the territory, on the stipulation that Bolivia should impose no taxes 
 upon exports. The liolivians, in 1878, passed a law taxing exports 
 of nitrates from Autofagasta. A Chilian company owning the ni- 
 trate works refused payment ; the works were advertised for sale, 
 and it was reported that they were to be bought in, for the benefit of 
 a Peruvian nitrate monopoly. On Feb. 14, 1879, the date of the 
 proposed sale, on the ground that the treaty of 1874 had been broken 
 Chilian troops seized Autofagasta, and afterward extended their 
 occupation to the whole of the Bolivian coast. Bolivia replied by a 
 declaration of Avar, on March 1st. Peru sent a special envoy to 
 Chili with a proposal of mediation ; but the Chilians had discovered 
 the existence of the secret treaty of 1873, and called upon Peru for 
 an explicit declaration of neutrality. This was refused. The Chili- 
 ans saw that they would have to deal with both countries, and made 
 a formal declaration of war against Peru, on April 5th. 
 
 From the beginning victory was on the side of Chili. Within six 
 months the Peruvians lost both their ironclads. The Chilians then 
 descended upon the defenceless coast, and defeated the allies in every 
 battle. After June, 1880, Bolivia virtually withdrew, and left Peru 
 to carry on the conflict single-handed.* 
 
 The commercial and financial interests of the United States were 
 but slightly affected by the war. The Peruvian bonds, amounting to 
 82.00,000,000, were held in Europe. With both republics the trade of 
 this country was unimportant.! 
 
 The representatives of our Government, at an early period of the 
 war, ])egan tlieir exertions to hvuin; about a settlement. Mr. Os- 
 
 * Albert G. Browne, Jr. : The Growing Power of the Repubhc of Chili, 
 t In 1877, liefoi-e commerce was In any way aQccted liy the war, the trade of the two 
 countries with Great Britain, France, and the United States, was as follows : — 
 
 Grnat Tlritain, 
 Kranci', 
 United SUiloa, 
 
 CHILI. 
 
 PERU. 
 
 K.\ ports to. 
 
 Inip'tsfrom. 
 
 Kxports to. 
 
 Imp'ts from. 
 
 Sn.i'ns.ooo 
 
 6,K4(i,000 
 1,907,000 
 
 $15,442,000 
 
 3,415,000 
 
 916,000 
 
 $6,009,000 
 4,32.{,000 
 1,249,000 
 
 $22,82.5,000 
 
 11,311,000 
 
 1,497,000 
 
31 
 
 borne, Mr. Christiancy, and Gen. Adams, the Ministers of tlie United 
 States to Chili, Peru, and Bolivia, respectively, at last succeeded in 
 persuading the belligerents to accept the mediation of the United 
 States; and on October 22d, 2oth, and 27th, met the envoys of 
 Chili, Peru, and Bolivia on board the Uuited States corvette Lacka- 
 wanna, in the harbor of Arica. The allies were already substantially 
 conquered, and Chili, strong in her position, demanded the cession 
 of the Bolivian littoral and the Peruvian province of Tarapaca. 
 The allies replied that this demand alone made further negotiation 
 impossible, and the conference broke up without any result. The 
 Chilians then renewed the war with vigor, and advanced upon Lima. 
 Pierola, who had declared himself Dictator, after the fall of the reg- 
 ular Government of Peru and the flight of the President, withdrew 
 to the mountains. On the 17th of January the Chilians entered 
 Lima, and established a military government. Toward the close of 
 February the principal citizens of Lima met, and appointed Don 
 Francisco Garcia Calderon Provisional President. This action was 
 undoubtedly taken with the permission of the Chilians. 
 
 THE CALDERON GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Such was the condition of affairs when Mr. Blaine became Secre- 
 tary of State. Peru was conquered, and Chili, at the Arica Confer- 
 ence, had announced her intention to insist upon a cession of territory 
 as one of the terms of pea ce. In Peru there were two rival govern- 
 ments. The government of the Dictator, Pierola, had already been 
 recognized by the Ministers of the United States and other foreign coun- 
 tries accredited to Peru ; its envoys had met the envoys of Chili and 
 Bolivia at the Peace Conference of Arica, with the countenance and au- 
 thority of the United States ; and it was still exercising authority outside 
 of the Chilian lines. The Government of Calderon, on the other hand, 
 had never been recognized by any Government, had no real power, 
 and owed its existence to the consideration of the victors, who hoped 
 to make it an instrumient for a peace on their own terms. Of its true 
 "character Mr. Blaine received, on April 5th, April 25th, and May 5th, 
 the following information from Mr. Christiancy : — 
 
 At a superficial glance this would seem to be an attempt to get rid of 
 one dictatorship clearly adopted by the people of the whole Peruvian Ee- 
 public, and recognized by foreign Governments, including Chili, for a new 
 dictatorship adopted by the majority of a self-constituted meeting of 110 
 men of Lima and Callao, and recognized as yet by nobody else except Chili. 
 In this aspect merely it would, of course, be simply ludicrous.* 
 
 ♦ Senate Ex. Doc, No. 79, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 436. 
 
32 
 
 I have now to inform you that, from all present appearances, the new 
 Peruvian Government, of which Mr. Garcia Calderon is the head, does not 
 seem likely to be recognized by the people of Peru; and so far as any mani- 
 festations of the popular will have come to my knowledge, the mass of the 
 people seems likely to continue its adherence to the Dictator Pierola. Cir- 
 cumstances yet to occur may change all this; but as yet, from the best in- 
 formation I can get, the very localities on whose concurrence the new Gov- 
 ernment counted, still adhere to Pierola; and even here in Lima, the munic- 
 ipal Government, at a meeting held yesterday, unanimously decided not to 
 recognize it.* 
 
 Upon the whole, the evidence as* yet is quite clear that the overwhelm- 
 ing majority of the people of Peru are opposed to the Provisional Govern- 
 ment, and still adhere to Pierola; and at present, if the Chilian army should 
 leave to-morrovr, the only safety of the members of the Provisional Govern- 
 ment would be to leave with them.t 
 
 On May 9th, however, only four clays after the receipt of the last 
 of these three dispatches, Mr. Blaine authorized Mr. Christiancy to 
 recognize the Calderon Government in certain contingencies, and noti- 
 fied him that he had received Senor Elmore as its confidential agent 
 at Washington. Mr. Christiancy was surprised at this, and deferred 
 a formal recognition. Replying to Mr. Blaine's communication of 
 May Uth, he wrote, on June IGth, as follows : — 
 
 I yesterday had a conference with Admiral Lynch, commander of the 
 Chilian forces here, and with Seiior Godoy, the representative of Chili in 
 political matters here, and I found at once that they do not want the Pro- 
 visional Government of Peru recognized yet, both saying to me that they 
 had not recognized it on the part of Chili, and that they did not wish it rec- 
 ognized by other nations until they had recognized it. 
 
 This Provisional Government is not, even as such, a Government de 
 facto in any part of Peru, except in a little hamlet of Magdalena.J 
 
 And again, on June 21st : — 
 
 The fact is, that it is not a Government de facto, or in the exercise of the 
 functions of Government anywhere, except so far as the Chilian authorities 
 ohoose to allow it to exercise any powers of the kind; and these are confined 
 within very narrow limits. § 
 
 On June 2.Sth Mr. Christiancy informed Mr. Blaine that he had 
 finally concluded to recognize the Calderon Government, because he had 
 kept him informed of all the facts necessary for a decision, and had 
 heaid nothing in any way modifying the instructions of May 9th, and 
 because Sefior Elmore had been received as the confidential agent of 
 that Government ; but he added the following statement : — 
 
 I must confess that, if left to act entirely on my own judgment, I should 
 
 • Senate Ex. Doc, No. 79, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 474. 
 
 t/d., p. 478. •*• +/d.,p. 502. § /d., p. 503. 
 
33 
 
 not have recognized this Provisional Government until it should have be- 
 come a government de facto, or until it should have succeedud in assem- 
 bling a quorum of Cougress, nor until we could have seen whether this Con- 
 gress or that of Pi6rola (National Assembly) at Ayacucho should represent 
 the most of the people of Peru. But I claim no right to set up my own 
 judgment against that of my Government, believing strict obedience to the 
 wishes of my Government my first and sole duty.* 
 
 And on July 6th he made the following regretful allusions to the 
 recognition : — 
 
 I have the honor to state that, as I had some reason to fear when I 
 wrote the last dispatch, I have still more reason to fear now, that the rec- 
 ognition of the Provisional Government of Francisco Garcia Calderon was 
 premature. 
 
 Tet in view of yout dispatch No. 150, as well as your previous dis- 
 patches, it is very clear that you had determined upon the recognition of 
 the Provisional Government, and that I only complied with your wish in 
 making the recognition. 
 
 I fear, however, this recognition will lead to many complications. But 
 I have obeyed what I was compelled to consider your orders, "t 
 
 From the above correspondence, therefore, it can be asserted that 
 the Calderon Government was not a de facto government ; that it was 
 recognized contrary to the wishes of the Chilians ; that it was recog- 
 nized in opposition to, and in spite of, the wishes of Minister Chris- 
 tiancy, and ou the responsibility of Mr. Blaine alone. 
 
 A NOTEL PRINCIPLE OP INTERNATIOXAL LAW. 
 
 Soon after the recognition of the Calderon Government, Mr. Chris- 
 tiancy was recalled from Peru, and Mr. Osborne transferred to Bra- 
 zil. General Hurlbut was appomted to succeed the former, and Gen- 
 eral Kilpatrick the latter. Mr. Blame then made the next develop- 
 ment in his policy by asserting, with all the weight of an existent prin- 
 ciple, that a victorious nation has no right to demand a cession of ter- 
 ritory from the vanquished, except on failure by the latter to pay a 
 money indemnity ; or, as he on one occasion somewhat obscurely ex- 
 pressed it, that " hostilities do not, from the mere existence of war, 
 confer the right of conquest until the failure to furnish the indemnity 
 and guarantee which can be rightly demanded." The time may come 
 when a victorious nation under the same circumstances as the Chilians, 
 after having conquered two nations in a war neither sought for nor 
 
 * Senate Ex. Doc, No. 79, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 505. 
 t/d., p. 506. 
 
34 
 
 expected,* may be willing to accept a money indemnity, and resign 
 the territory purcliased by so mucb blood and labor. History does 
 not warrant such a supposition, and, as a principle, it is a purely 
 original contribution by Mr. Blaine to international law. It will be 
 found in no standard work on that subject, and Mr. Blaine had only 
 to look at tlie history of wars waged in his own lifetime, and even by 
 his own country, to find precedents directly against him. From the 
 dispatches of our Ministers in South America and from the failure of 
 the Arica Conference, he had learned the temper of the Chilians on 
 the question of a cession of territory, and that even if the Government 
 of that nation had been willing to make terms based upon a money 
 iudemnity alone, the popular feeling would have rendered the execu- 
 tion of any such agreement impossible. On June 7th he received 
 the following from Mr. Osborne : — 
 
 This Government will unquestionably insist upon the relinquishment by 
 Peru of the province of Tanipacii, and unless the Peruvian authorities shall 
 be found ready to concede this, the attempt to make peace will fail.! 
 
 Only eight days after the receipt of the above, he issued these in- 
 structions to General Hurlbut : — 
 
 It will be difificult, perhaps, to obtain this from Chili; but as the Chil- 
 ian Government has distinctly repudiated the idea that this was a war of 
 conquest, the Government of Peru may fairly claim the opportunity to 
 make propositions of indemnity and guarantee before submitting to a 
 cession of territory. As far as the influence of the United States will go in 
 Chili, it will be exerted to induce the Chilian Government to consent that 
 the question of the cession of territory should be the subject of negotiation, 
 and not the condition precedent upon which alone negotiation shall com- 
 mence. If you can aid the Government of Peru in securing such a result, 
 you will have rendered the service which seems most pressing. | 
 
 On the same date he expressed himself to General Kilpatrick in 
 terms still more remarkable : — 
 
 But at the conclusion of a war avowedly not of conquest, but for the 
 solution of dilTerences which diplomacy had failed to settle, to make the 
 
 • since this war has proved so successful for Chili, it has become a usage among her 
 jKlvcrmirl.n to iisc-ribe to her long and mature .preparations for it. This is not true. It 
 wim u Hudden rcsulullon. Tlio fact that only two years before it brolie out, a bill to sell the 
 two ironcladH was passc.l by the Chamber of Deputies, proves its suddenness. So .Iocs the 
 rcducU-.n of the .National Guard, or militia, which the stringency of the finances hadcom- 
 iwlh-d. .«<o do the facts that tlicrc was no sulllcient store of munitions for a grand campaign, 
 .iiid that the hoit..,„H of the ironda.ls were so foul, that their speed was reduced nearly oue- 
 thlr.1 fr.,M, 118 normal rate. (The Growing Power of the Kepublic of Chili, by Albert G. 
 Browne, Jr.) 
 
 t Senate Ex. Doc.. No. 79, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 157. J Id., p. 501. 
 
35 
 
 acquisition of territory a sine qua non of peace, is calculated to cast suspi- 
 cions on the professions with which war was originally declared. It may 
 very well be that at the termination of such a contest, the changed condi- 
 tion and relation of all the parties to it may make readjustment of bounda- 
 ries or territorial changes wise, as well as necessary; but this, where the war 
 is not one of conquest, should be the result of negotiation, and not the abso- 
 lute preliminary condition on which alone the victor consents to negotiate. 
 ,At this day, when the right of the people to govern themselves, the funda- 
 mental basis of republican institutions, is so universally recognized, there is 
 nothing more difficult or more dangerous than the forced transfer of terri- 
 tory, carrying with it an indignant and hostile population; and nothing but 
 a necessity proven before the world can justify it. It is not a case in which 
 the power desiring the territory can be accepted as a safe or impartial 
 judge.* 
 
 The Peruvian bonds were all held in Europe, and the commercial 
 interests of England, France, and German}'^ were affected by the war 
 to a far greater extent than those of the United States ; but Mr. 
 Blaine was determined to have no European interference, and he 
 gave Gen. Kilpatrick further instructions on that point : — 
 
 The Government of the United States seeks only to perform the part of 
 a friend to all the parties in this unhappy conflict between South American 
 republics, and it will regret to be compelled to consider how far that feeling 
 might be affected, and a more active interposition forced upon it, by any at- 
 tempted complication of this question with European politics, t 
 
 GEN. HURLBUT'S ACTION. 
 
 Gen. Hurlbut, as soon as he arrived in Peru, began a series of 
 vigorous, but extraordinary, acts. He took the position that there 
 must be no cession of territory on the part of Peru, and that the 
 United States must interfere to prevent it. On August 10th and 17th 
 he expressed these views to Mr. Blaine as follows : — 
 
 The condition is very serious, and demands prompt action if it be the 
 purpose of the United States to save Peru from being obliterated as an inde- 
 pendent power, t 
 
 The situation continues to present little hope, unless the United States 
 can and will exercise a salutary pressure upon the belligerents. § 
 
 In addition to the regular duties of the Minister of the United 
 States to Peru, he assumed the decision of all questions connected 
 
 * Senate Ex. Doc, No. 79, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 158. J Id., p. 512. 
 
 t/d., p. 159. §/d.,p. 514. 
 
36 
 
 with the ■sviir, and on August 6th he sent the following notification to 
 Gen. Kilpatrick: — 
 
 "The I'^nited States are not disposed to recognize on this continent the 
 European notion of addition to territory by conquest."* 
 
 And on August 25th this self-constituted Dictator went so far as 
 to issue the following memorandum t^ Admiral Lynch, the com- 
 mander of the Chilian forces : — 
 
 Without any reference to the causes of the war, I understand my Gov- 
 ernment to be of tlie opinion tliat all legitimate purposes of war have been 
 accomplished by the overwhelming defeat of the Peruvian armies, the cap- 
 ture or destruction of their navy, and the occupation of the capital and en- 
 tire sea-coast. 
 
 * * * * * * *_* * * 
 
 The United States concede, as a matter of public law, that Chili has the 
 right (under the code of war) to full indemnity for the expenses of the war; 
 and that Peru ought to pay such indemnity as may be agreed on by the 
 parties, or be determined by a disinterested arbiter, in case they cannot 
 agree (if such mode be selected); and further, that Chili has the right to de- 
 mand securities, if time is given for the payment. 
 
 But we are also very clearly of the opinion that Peru ought to have the 
 opportunity, in full and free discussion of the terms of peace, to offer such 
 indemnity as may be satisfactory; and that it is contrary to the rules which 
 should prevail among enlightened nations to proceed at once, and as a sine 
 qua lion of peace, to transfer territory undoubtedly Peruvian to the juris- 
 diction of Chili, without first demonstrating the inability or unwillingness 
 of Peru to furnish indemnity in some other form. 
 
 Such a course on the part of Chili would meet with decided disfavor on 
 the part of the United States. 
 
 ********** 
 
 We are therefore of the opinion that the act of seizure of Peruvian tei-- 
 ritory, and annexing the same to Chili, * * * in manifest contradiction of 
 previous disclaimers of such purpose by Chili, would justly be regarded by 
 other nations as evidence that Chili had entered upon the path of aggres- 
 sion and conquest for the purpose of territorial aggrandizement."! 
 
 In the meantime, he had been devoting himself to building up the 
 Government of Calderon and destroying that of Pierola, although 
 the latter Government had at one time been recognized by the 
 United States, and had been represented at the Arica Conference. 
 
 • .Senate Ex. Doc, No. 79, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 513. 
 
 t In the dispatch inclosing tills mcinorandimi is the following passage : " Mr. Cliris- 
 tliincy \v:is In the <|iii'stioiialile habit of calling together the diplomatic corps and taking 
 counsel on almost all <|Ui'^iioii8, which practically emasculated the United States, and de- 
 prived tliciii of llicir proper leadership. The English and French ,ministei"s seem somewhat 
 «ggrlev(!<l, or pi\'teiid to ho, at action of any kind by me without concurrence; hut, as I 
 stated to one of thcni, the ])osilion of the United States is its own, an<l only to be determined 
 by lltjolf." (Senate Ex. Doc, No. 79, 47th Congress, Fii-st Session, p. 516.) 
 
37 
 
 For this purpose he even made personal appeals to the leaders of 
 various Peruvian factions, and in the following communication to 
 Garcia, Pierola's secretary, he delivered an express judgment against 
 Pierola's Government : — 
 
 The seizure of supreme power by Senor Pi6rola, and his assumption of 
 an office not known to the constitution, were revolutionary acts, and destruc- 
 tive of proper reverence for law. 
 
 The violent and forcible manner in which this revolution was accom- 
 plished, gave to the undertaking the nature of a crime against liberty. 
 
 The dictatorial office was a simple tyranny, autocratic and despotic in its 
 plans, in its titles, and in its acts. During its existence the constitution of 
 Peru was destroyed, and the mere will of one man was substituted for the 
 laws and the constitution. 
 
 ********** 
 
 The Government presided over by SeQor Calderon does not assume to 
 possess perfect regularity. It is " provisional "—that is to say, a temporary 
 means of carrying on the Government until the nation can act freely and 
 
 fairly. 
 
 * * * *•* * * * * * 
 
 You are mistaken when you state that they are in sympathy with the 
 Chilians. They are not. They want peace, as the whole country wants it, 
 but they will not sacrifice the national honor nor cede the national territory 
 to obtain it. 
 
 The ChiUan authorities are in communication with both parties in Peru, 
 and you yourself have written to Admiral Lynch. Chili wants and demands 
 the territory of Tarapaca, and will recognize any one who will cede it. The 
 Calderon Cabinet will not; it remains to be seen whether the Pierola Cabinet 
 will.* 
 
 On September 20th he concluded an agreement with the Calderon 
 Government for the grant of a naval and coaling station at Chim- 
 bote, although that place was in the possession of the Chilians, and 
 of an unfinished railway, which was to be "turned over to him," as 
 intermediary, or trustee, to transfer the same to an American com- 
 pany " to complete, develop, and operate it."t About the same time 
 he telegraphed to the Minister of the United States at Buenos Ajres, 
 to request the Government of the Argentine Republic to send an 
 envoy to Lima, although he knew that the feeling in that country 
 was very bitter against Chili, and that the Government was only 
 prevented, by fear of Brazil, from interfering actively in the war. 
 
 These acts of Gen. Hurlbut created intense excitement in Chili. 
 After the publication of the Lynch memorandum the Chilian Gov- 
 ernment appealed to Gen. Kilpatrick ; and although contrary to 
 diplomatic usage, he attempted to explain away the effect of Hurl- 
 
 * Senate Ex. Doc, No. 79, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 621. 
 fid., p. 530 
 
38 
 
 but's proceedings on the assumption that he had acted beyond his 
 authority. The influence of the United States had now brought 
 about a state of affairs that was scandalous. On the one hand, Gen. 
 Hurlbut was enticing the Calderon Government from all thoughts of 
 peace, by declaring that the United States would preserve the territo- 
 rial integrity of Peru ; and on the other, Gen. Kilpatrick was 
 attempting to soothe the Chilians ; while each minister, in his dis- 
 patches to his Government, was throwing the blame upon the other. 
 The Chilians saw that they must take a decided step, and with their 
 usual determination they took it. Calderon had flooded the country 
 with paper money, and under Hurlbut's influence he now refused to 
 listen to any suggestion of negotiation on Chilian terms. On the 
 28th of September, Admiral Lynch issued a decree that, with the 
 exception of the municipal authorities, all government over the terri- 
 tory occupied by the Chilian forces should cease except their own 
 military rule. As it had only existed on Chilian sufferance, the Cal- 
 deron Government fell by that decree. Calderon, however, in 
 defiance of these orders, continued to exercise authority until the 
 Chilians, by his arrest, on November 6th, suppressed his Government 
 effectually. During that interval, from September 28th to December 
 3d, he was continually encouraged and supported by Gen. Hurlbut, 
 who on informing Mr. Blaine, on October 4th, of the decree against 
 the Calderon Government, said : — 
 
 I am not positive as to the real meaning of these extraordinary acts, but 
 am inclined to think that the purpose is to abolish by force all respectable 
 authority in Peru, and especially the one which the United States have rec- 
 ognized. 
 
 * * * * * ** * * * 
 
 It is a self-evident proposition that no act of Chili, whether from its civil 
 or military authorities, can in any way operate upon the relations which the 
 United States have maintained, or may choose to maintain, with any govern- 
 ment in Peru, nor can any military order prevent my treating with Mr. 
 CakliMon as representing the sovereignty of Peru. I doubt whether even the 
 Chiliau doctrine, as expounded by Lynch, of the rights of conquerers, 
 will go so far as that. 
 
 There is a very decided tone of arrogance both in the press of Chili and 
 among tlicir ofiBcers — born, I tliink, of their singular success in this war — which 
 may easily become offensive.* 
 
 On October 13th : — 
 
 I felt it a point of honor to establish on a basis of popular support this 
 Govfiimicnt, n-cogiii/.ed as such by the United States, and noti recognized 
 by England and France. 
 
 ♦ Senate Ex. Doc., No. 79, 47th CongresB, First Session, p. 528. 
 t Italicized in the originaL 
 
39 
 
 My diplomatic colleagues, especially the British minister, are quite at- 
 tentive now, and the latter volunteered the statement to me that he was 
 ready to accompany Mr. Caldferon to Arequipa, if he went there.* 
 
 In reply to the above dispatch of October 4th, Mr. Blaine sent 
 the following telegram on October 31st : — ■ 
 
 Continue to recognize Calderon Government until otherwise specially 
 instructed, t 
 
 The Calderon Government might really be called the Hnrlbut- 
 Calderon Government. To nourish and sustain it had been the aim 
 of Gen. Hurlbut's policy ; and as this telegram contained the first in- 
 structions in regard to the policy of the home Government since Gen. 
 Hurlbut's arrival in Peru, it must be taken not only as an assent to 
 the position taken by him in the dispatch of October 4th, but as a 
 complete approval of his policy down to October 31st. 
 
 In giving his views of Gen. Hurlbut's policy at a later day, Mr. 
 Blaine said : — 
 
 He was a man of very great intelligence ; he was a man of very great zeal, 
 and his whole heart was in this question; his whole heart was enlisted with 
 the Peruvian people and the Peruvian cause, more so, indeed, than was pru- 
 dent for a Minister representing a friendly country— a country friendly to 
 both parties. 
 
 Indeed, he committed some imprudences. They were mere indiscretions; 
 they did not in the remotest degree affect his honor or integrity; they were 
 simply indiscretions. It was indiscreet in him to hold communication with 
 the Chilian admiral; it was indiscreet in him to hold communication with 
 the Government of Pierola when he had been accredited to the Government 
 of Calderon; it was indiscreet in him to ask the Argentine Confederation 
 to hurry up a Minister to Peru; it was indiscreet in him to enter into nego- 
 tiations for the transfer of any rights on Peruvian soil to the United States, 
 which was done in the agreement made with him to cede to us the Bay of 
 Chimbote. * * » I sent down, therefore, a reprimand. I do not like to 
 use so strong a word as that, for I wrote it in the most kindly frame of mind, 
 and the words are not unkind at all. They contained all through expressions 
 not only of official conhdence, but of personal regard to General Hurlbut.J 
 
 The reprimand was not sent down until November 2'2d. By that 
 time it was evident that the State Department would soon pass into 
 other hands ; and Mr. Blaine put himself on record against General 
 Hurlbut. Even then he only took him mildly in hand, and chided him 
 for his diplomatic freaks with a parental air. Of the severity of the 
 reprimand the following is an example : — 
 
 I learn with regret that a construction has been put upon your lan- 
 guage and conduct indicating a policy of active intervention on the part of 
 
 * Senate Ex. Doc, No. 79, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 532. t Id., p. 545. 
 
 X House Report, No. 1790, 47th Congress. First Session, p. 241. 
 
40 
 
 this Government, beyond the SQope of your instructions. As tliose in- 
 structions "were clear and explicit, and as this Department is in the posses- 
 sion of no information which would seem to require the withdrawal of the 
 confidence reposed in you, I must consider this interpretation of your words 
 and acts as the result of some strange and perhaps prejudiced misconcep- 
 tion. 
 
 * *■* * * * * * * * 
 
 I would have preferred that you should hold no communication with 
 Admiral Lynch on questions of a diplomatic character. He was present as 
 a military commander of Chilian forces, and you were accredited to Peru. 
 Nor do I conceive that Admiral Lynch, as the commander of the Chilian 
 army of occupation, had any right to ask or receive any formal assurance 
 from you as to the opinions of your Government. 
 
 ********** 
 
 If there was anything in your proceedings in Peru to which the Gov- 
 ernment of Chili could properly take exception, a direct representation to 
 this Government, through the Chilian Minister here, was due, both to the 
 Government and to yourself. 
 
 ********** 
 
 I must also express the dissatisfaction of the Department at your tele- 
 gram to the Minister of the United States near the Argentine Confederation 
 
 suggesting that a Minister be sent by that Government to Peru. 
 
 ********** 
 
 As to the convention with regard to a naval station in the bay of Chim- 
 bote, I am of the opinion that although it is a desirable arrangement, the 
 
 time is not opportune. 
 
 ********** 
 
 Having thus stated with frankness the impression made upon the De- 
 partment by sucli information as you have furnished it, it becomes my duty 
 to add that this Government is unable to understand the abolition of the 
 Calderon Government, and the arrest of President Calderon himself, by the 
 Chilian authorities, — or I suppose I ought to say by the Chilian Government, 
 — as the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of that Government has in a formal com- 
 munication to Mr. Kilpatrick declared that the Calderon Government "was 
 at an end." As we recognized that Government in suj^posed conformity 
 with the wishes of Chili, and as no reason for its destruction has been given 
 us, you will still consider yourself accredited to it, if any legitimate repre- 
 sentative exists in the place of President Calderon.* 
 
 With General Kilpatrick, for his informal but well-meaning efforts 
 to keep down the excitement wrought in Chili by General Hurlbut's 
 excesses, he was much harsher : — 
 
 Your letter is not approved by the Department. You had had ample 
 opportunity, and, as you have before stated, availed yourself of it, to make 
 known to the Government of Chili the scope of your instructions, and to 
 give it abundant assurance of the friendly feeling of your own Government. 
 
 If the conduct of Mr. Hurlbut in Peru had given sufficient ground of 
 complaint to the T'liilian Government, that complaint should have been 
 made in Washington. Mr. Hurlbut's presentatior speech to President Cal- 
 
 * Senate Ex. Doc, No 79, 47th Congress, First Session, pp 565-667. 
 
41 
 
 deron, ]iis incmoranduin to Admiral l^yncli, his letter to Garcia, and tele- 
 graphic reports from Buenos Ayres, were not subjeets upon which you were 
 called to pass judgment, nor upon which you should have been intcrro,i;ated 
 by the Chilian Government. Nothing in your conduct or language had ex- 
 cited its apprehensions, and no explanation was due, or could have been ex- 
 pected from you, of the language or conduct of your colleague in Peru. I 
 should have been glad if it had occurred to you to call the attention of the 
 Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the impropriety of such a communication; 
 and in referring to the fact that your instructions, which you were author- 
 ized to communicate to him, gave all tlie assurance which he could either 
 desire or ask, of the friendly disposition of the United States, I should have 
 much preferred that you had furnished him with a copy of those instruc- 
 tions instead of submitting a paraphrase which does not fully represent 
 their spirit and meaning.* 
 
 General Kilpatrick had been very ill for a long time, and was dead 
 before this dispatch arrived in Chili. The difference in tone of the 
 two dispatches shows very clearly what was the feeling of Mr. Blaine 
 himself. The inference from certain passages in both dispatches is, 
 that the Chilian Government had made no direct representation about 
 General Hurlbut's conduct, through its representative at Washing- 
 ton. Now. the dispatch to General Kilpatrick was written on Novem- 
 ber 22d, the same day as that to General Hurlbut. Almost a month 
 before, on October 24th, Senor Martinez, the Chilian Minister at Wash- 
 ington, wrote to Mr. Blaine inclosing certain newspaper articles and 
 reports, "which," he said, " will let you know the political course which 
 Minister Hurlbut is pursuing in Peru." f On October 27th he wrote 
 again and inclosed a confidential dispatch, dated September 12th, from 
 the Chilian Minister of Foreign Affairs to himself. The delay in com- 
 municating with the Government in Washington was probably the 
 only reason why an appeal was ever made by the Chilian Government 
 to General Kilpatrick. To show that, in spite of Mr. Blaine's disin- 
 genuous allusions, that Government did take the proper method of 
 addressing the Government of the United States, and did so with 
 perfect frankness, we give full extracts from the dispatch, just as 
 it came into the hands of Mr. Blaine : — 
 
 By dispatches which were in due season addressed to you, by Don 
 Joaquin Godoy, from Lima,- you will have been informed of the very uncir- 
 cumspect conduct of the Minister of the United States recently accredited 
 to the Provisional Government of Senor Garcia Calderon. 
 
 From the time of his arrival at Lima, Mr. Hurlbut has omitted no signs 
 of decided partiality in favor of Peru, giving it to be understood that the 
 
 * Senate Ex. Doc. No. 79, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 168. 
 t Id., p. 164. 
 
42 
 
 Goveinnieiit of the United States would resist any arrangement which Chili 
 might endeavor to ert'ect with that republic, and which might involve the 
 cession of any part of its territory. 
 
 These ideas, which obtained a footing among the public men of Peru, 
 acquired still greater persistence after the address delivered by the Ameri- 
 can Minister on the public occasion of presenting his credentials to the Pro- 
 visional President. From that moment Mr. Garcia Calderon, the members 
 of his Cabinet, and all persons who had any influence whatever upon the 
 public opinion, deemed themselves encouraged by the words and demon- 
 strations of the representative of the United States, believing that they saw 
 therein the expression of the policy which the Cabinet at Washington pro- 
 posed to adopt. 
 
 Our plenipotentiary, Mr. Godoy, carefully observed the reaction which 
 was brought about in the Peruvian mind by the conduct of Mr. Ilurlbut. 
 To the negotiations which have been initiated in a conciliatory and accom- 
 modating spirit before the arrival of the American ]\[inister, there succeeded 
 after his arrival a sudden and unlooked-for change, the explanation of 
 which can only be attributed to the influence, directly or indirectly, pro- 
 duced by the attitude of the representative of the United States. In this 
 state of affairs our plenipotentiary deemed it proper to suspend the negotia- 
 tions already set on foot, and went to Chili to confer with my Governnient. 
 
 Being desirous of inquiring if the conduct of Mr. Hurlbut responded to a 
 political plan of his Government, I held a conference with Mr. Kilpatrick, 
 who expressed himself dissatisfied with the manner in which his colleague 
 in Lima had begun his diplomatic mission. Mr. Kilpatrick did not hesitate 
 to afiirm that Mr. Hi;rlbut did not faithfully represent the policy of absten- 
 tion and neutrality of his Government. 
 
 ********** 
 
 It is not possible to ignore the fact that the presence of Mr. Hurlbut in 
 Lima has been in a high degree prejudicial to the conclusion of arrange- 
 ments for peace. I have ground to believe that he continues to place at the 
 service of the purposes of the Provisional Government all the influence 
 which can be given by the representative character he holds. 
 
 As late as yesterday I learned, in a confidential way, but one entirely 
 trvistworthy, that he has sent a telegram to Mr. Kilpatrick, in Santiago, 
 begging him to forwai-d it to his colleague at Buenos Ayres. In this tele- 
 gram Mr. Hurlbut seconded, doubtless, the plans of Mr. Garcia Calderon, 
 and asks his colleague in Buenos Ayres that he should represent to the Ar- 
 gentine Cabinet the urgent necessity of accrediting, without loss of time, a 
 representative at Lima. There are no reasons to think that the Government 
 of Senor Garcia Calderon would welcome the presence of an Argentine min- 
 ister in P^ru, in order to seek therefrom mild or effective aid against us. 
 
 These considerations, to which you will give all the importance which 
 they themselves possess, induce me to charge you to endeavor to see the 
 Secretary of State, in order to let him see, in a confidential and delicate 
 way, the manner in which Mr. Hurlbut is interpreting his policy in Peru. 
 You will endeavor, also, with the greatest discretion, to obtain from the 
 American Government some act or declaration widch will tend to destroy the 
 bad impression caused by the conduct of their representative in Lima* to avoid 
 
 ' Italics in the original. 
 
43 
 
 in future that he shall contiuuc to create difliculties foreign to liis official 
 character, and contrary to the ever friendly and loyal j^olicy of the United 
 
 States.* 
 
 MR. BLAINE'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR GENERAL HUBLBUT'S 
 PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 Our examination now brings us to a very important question : 
 What is tlie extent of Mr. Blaine's responsibility for General Hurl- 
 but's actions in Peru ? There is a wonderful similarity between the 
 method of General Hurlbut toward Chili and that of Mr. Blaine 
 toward other countries. With Mexico, with Colombia, with Eng- 
 land, Mr. Blaine had acted as we might very easily imagine Hurlbut 
 would have acted if he had been Secretary of State instead of ISIr. 
 Blaine. Both men impress us as being guerillas in diplomacy. They 
 belong to no school, and follow no rule or principle. One of the 
 strongest impressions derived from General Hurlbut's dispatches is, 
 that the writer believed himself to be standing on very solid ground. 
 He had ' ' personal " conversations with Mr. Blaine before he left this 
 country, which influenced his course, and he was astonished even by 
 the mild disapproval of November 22d. Of this there is positive 
 evidence. In his examination before the Chili-Peruvian Investigation 
 Committee, Mr. Wm. Henry Hurlbut, the editor of the New York 
 World, produced a letter from his brother. General Hurlbut, from 
 which the following is an extract : — 
 
 " My personal talk with Blaine and Garfield will not appear in any offi- 
 cial correspondence, but it was the motive for my action. I think they will 
 throw me overboard unless Congress backs up the American line I have 
 taken. Personally I care little about it, but I must say that in Blaine's letter 
 of 22d November to me, there is a manifest disposition to hedge." t 
 
 Mr. W. H. Hurlbut also testified that he saw Mr. Blaine on sev- 
 eral occasions^ in reference to the policy of the Government in Peru 
 and its relations with his brother ; that he conversed with him " more 
 than once" between September 27th — the date of the receipt of the 
 dispatch containing the Lynch Memorandum — and November 22d, 
 the date of the dispatch of disapproval, and Mr. Blaine had given 
 him " not the slightest reason to suppose that he disapproved of the 
 course of the Government in Peru during that interval." 
 
 Apart from this positive evidence,— the negative evidence,— the 
 evidence of Mr. Blaine's masterly inactivity is decisive. Toward the 
 latter part of December, General Hurlbut received Mr. Blaine's 
 
 * Senate Ex. Doc, No. 79, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 166. 
 t/d.,p. ISl. 
 
44 
 
 dispatch of November 22d, and iu his reply, dated December 22d, 
 he said : — 
 
 *' I have also tried to show that the dignity of the United States and its 
 legitimate influence demanded a temperate hut firm operation of certain great 
 principles of international law which apply, and ought to apply, to such cases 
 on this continent, and which have been officially recognized by Chili in the 
 beginning of this war. To the repeated statements so made by me to the 
 Department, in all of which I asked speedy answer, I have received none 
 until the dispatch No. 19,* except telegraphic instructions to continue to 
 support the Calderon Government; which instructions I considered tacitly 
 approved, "t 
 
 General Hurlbut sent his fii'st dispatch from Lima on August 10th, 
 and from that time forth he kept Mr. Blaine informed of his official 
 acts at intervals of not more than four or five days. On September 
 22d, Mr. Blaine heard from General Kilpatrick that "Hurlbut's pro- 
 ceedings will not only create bad feeling here in Chili, but com- 
 promise my action." | On September 27th he received from General 
 Hurlbut the dispatch inclosing the memorandum to Admiral Lynch. 
 In this dispatch General Hurlbut said, " I am confident you will ap- 
 prove the substance of the memorandum, and I would like General 
 Kilpatrick to be instructed to express similar views in case of oppor- 
 tunity given." 
 
 By the end of September, therefore, Mr. Blaine was fully and 
 accurately informed of all the details of General Hurlbut's behavior. 
 More than that, the Secretary saw that the latter was acting in 
 accordance with what he believed to be the wishes of the State 
 Department. Then was the time for a stern and speedy reprimand. 
 Not until November 22d, almost two months after, did Mr. Blaine 
 express the slightest disapproval of what he afterward called General 
 Hurlbut's "mere indiscretions." He had found time on October 
 27th to send a telegram about the Credit Industriel, on August -ith, 
 on October 17th, and 19th, to give elaborate instructions about the 
 Landreau and Cochet claims, but during the whole period from June 
 15th, the date of his first instructions to General Hurlbut, to Nov- 
 ember 22d, he communicated with him only once iu regard to the 
 general policy of the Government. This was in the telegram of Oct- 
 ober 31st, which instructed him to continue to recognize the Calderon 
 Government, even after its abolition by Chili, and was, therefore, a 
 virtual approval of his conduct up to that time. 
 
 * The dispatch of November 22d. 
 
 t Senate Ex. Doc, No. 7!», 47th Congress, First Session, p. 592 
 
 X Id., p. 162. 
 
45 
 
 We are therefore forced to one of two conclusions : either that Mr. 
 Blaine directly encouraged General Hurlbut in his outrages upon 
 Chili, or that he was so neglectful of the duties of his office as to 
 make those outrages practically his own. 
 
 Between June 15th and November 22d (as above mentioned), Mr. 
 Blaine communicated with General Hurlbut once about the general 
 policy of the Government, and four times about certain private enter- 
 prises. This ratio of four to one shows that these schemes must 
 have occupied a large share of Mr. Blaine's attention during a very 
 critical period of South American affah's. We have reviewed the 
 policy of the Government down to the time of the special mission of 
 Mr. Trescot. Before going further, we shall devote to these financial 
 schemes a portion of the attention that they evidently deserve. 
 
 THE CREDIT INDUSTRIEL. 
 
 One legitimate enterprise was organized and two dead claims re- 
 suscitated by the prostration of Peru. These were the Credit Indus- 
 ti'iel and the Cochet and Landreau claims. The Credit Industriel 
 was a French Company', which represented Peruvian bondholders in 
 France, Belgium, and Holland to the extent of about seyenty-five 
 million of dollars. This Company, in 1880, entered into a contract 
 with Peru by which it was to have a monopoly of the shipment of 
 nitrates and guano, to pay a war indemnity to Chili, to pay the bond- 
 holders, and to reserve a certain per cent of the proceeds for compen- 
 sation. It was a sound business undertaking, backed by abundant 
 capital. As it was known that the Government of the United States 
 looked with disfavor upon any European intervention for the settle- 
 ment of the difficulties between the two countries, the representatives 
 of the Company appealed to this Government for its mediation. They 
 submitted their prospectus, or " programme," as they called it, to 
 Mr. Evarts, who was Secretary of State when the contract was made. 
 He considered the aims of the Company to be very advantageous to 
 Peru, and on February 17, 1881, authorized Mr. Christiancy to sub- 
 mit the plan to the Peruvian Government for discussion in connec- 
 tion with the question of peace. 
 
 Mr. Blaine became Secretary of State in March, and, as the 
 Credit Industriel was opposed to a cession of territory by Peru, 
 was willing to pay a war indemnity to Chili, and had been precluded 
 from looking to any foreign government for mediation by the action 
 of the United States, it would seem not improbable that Mr. Blaine 
 might follow his predecessor in giving it his favorable consideration. 
 
, 46 
 
 On this point there is a question of veracity between Mr. Blaine and 
 Mr. Robert E. Randall, the counsel for the Credit Industriel in this 
 country. Mr. Randall testifies that Mr. Blaine gave him to under- 
 stand that the propositions of the Company were " entirely satisfac- 
 tory' ; " that they " were feasible in every way ; " and " that the United 
 States would carry them out so far as it was proper in their negotia- 
 tions in South America ; that is, they would utilize the programme ; " 
 that Mr. Blaine approved of his going to Europe about the matter ; 
 that he went to Europe on June 9th ; that on his return Mr. Elmore, 
 the Peruvian Minister, wrote to him that Mr. Blaine had inquired why 
 Mr. Randall had not called upon him ; that he then called upon Mr. 
 Blaine, and had interviews with him on November 23d, 27th, 28th, 
 30th, and December 1st, 9th, and 11th, and that he (Randall) " had 
 the impression that the programme was looked on with favor at all 
 those interviews." * 
 
 Mr. Randall says that after the publication of Mr. Blaine's dis- 
 patches he was very much surprised to find that on October 27th 
 Mr. Blaine sent to General Hurlbut this telegram : — - 
 
 Influence of your position must not be used in aid of Credit Industriel 
 or any other financial or speculative association. 1 
 
 And also to find that, on Aug. 4, he had sent instructions concerning the 
 Landreau and Cochet claims, which were directly in conflict with the 
 Credit Industriel. Mr. Blaine, on the other hand, testifies that he 
 considered it "the most extraordinary proposition in the world," 
 that "there was a neat little job coiled up right there;" and 
 that the matter was one which he (Mr. Blaine) "utterly refused to 
 have anything whatever to do with." J But let him speak for him- 
 self : — ' 
 
 I never had a conversation with Mr. Robert E. Randall that, by intima- 
 tion or insinuation, or any kind of hint or innuendo, even approached the 
 confines of approving it.§ * * * The only conversation — the only special one 
 that I remember — was prior to his going to Europe, which must have been 
 some time in the summer — I think, possibly in June, but I will not pretend 
 to locate it. I did not regard it as of the slightest importance. || * * * I do not 
 remember any interview at all more than the most casual form of every-day 
 
 * House Report, No. 1790, 47th Congi-ess, First Session, pp. 326, 327. 
 t Senate Ex. Doc, No. 79, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 545. 
 i House Report, No. 1790, 47th Congress, First Session, pp. 344, 345. 
 § Id., p. 345. \\Id., p. S46. 
 
47 
 
 politeness. I never had any interview with him of any consequence at all.* 
 My idea was this: they were perfectly fiank, and 1 aiu not in tlic least de- 
 gree charging anything dishonorable upon them. On the contrary, I tliink 
 their association is one of great strength and character. They were perfectly 
 frank in wanting the great power of the United States behind them, to pull 
 the chestnuts out of the fire for the benefit of England, France, Holland, and 
 Belgium: and the United States, so far as I had any power in administering 
 its fJovernment, did not propose to use its power in that way.t 
 
 Mr. Blaine is very positive, but the evidence in rebuttal is very 
 strong. In the first instructions of Mr. Blaine to General Hurlbut, 
 those of June 15th, is the following passage: — 
 
 As you are aware, more than one proposition has been submitted to the, 
 consideration of this Government looking to a friendly intervention by which 
 Peru might be enabled to meet the conditions which would probably be im- 
 posed. Circumstances do not seem at present opportune for such action; 
 but if upon full knowledge of the condition of Peru, you can inform this 
 Government that Peru can devise and carry into practical effect a plan by 
 which all the reasonable conditions of Chili can be met without sacrificing the 
 integrity of Peruvian territory, the Government of the United States would 
 be willing to offer its good offices toward the execution of such a project. } 
 
 Now, in Mr. Blaine's examination before the committee of the 
 House of Representatives, to which reference has been made, he 
 answers certain questions as follows : — 
 
 Mr. Belmont. " As you are aware, more than one proposition has been 
 submitted to the consideration of this Government, looking to a friendly in- 
 tervention by which Peru might be enabled to meet the conditions which 
 would probably be imposed." Now, what proposition ? 
 
 The Witness. Oh, the Credit Industriel. 
 
 Q. Well, what other one ? — A. None. 
 
 Q. Well, why did you say more than one? — A. Oh, they submitted 
 several. 
 
 Q. They submitted several ? — A. Yes, several different forms. 
 
 Q. And this refers only to the Credit Industriel? — A. Yes; this is the 
 only one I had any knowledge of at all.§ 
 
 And in the examination of Mr. Trescot, who was, as will be seen 
 later, sent by Mr. Blaine on a special mission to Chili, Peru, and Bo- 
 livia, we find this : — 
 
 Mr. Belmont. The pui'pose of my question was to get at the meaning of 
 the instructions of June 15th. I did not so much care to have the private cor- 
 respondence between you and Mr. Randall; but I would like to know 
 whether the plan of the Crt^dit Industriel to furnish an indemnity to Chili, 
 and to prevent the cession of Tarapaca, was intended in the instructions of 
 June 15th. 4 
 
 * House Report, No. 1790, 47th Congress, Fh-st Session, p. 348. 
 t/d.,p. 351. 
 
 } Senate Ex. Doc, No. 79, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 601. 
 § House Report, No. 1790, 47th Congi-ess, First Session, p. 226. 
 
48 
 
 The Witness. I should think so, unquestionably, to this extent, that 
 those instructions were written with a knowledge that the Credit Industriel 
 had proposed some plan, or two or three plans, and that if the Credit Indus- 
 triel could furnish an indemnity to Peru whenever the time came that Peru 
 was allowed to negotiate for an indemnity, that then it would be a matter of 
 very great interest to know what she could do. As I would have understood 
 the instructions if written to me, and as I understood the extent of my privi- 
 lege in dealing with these Governments there, I would, without hesitation, 
 have urged upon Chili the adoption of any reasonable plan that the Credit 
 Industriel had offered; but if that plan had gone further, and required the 
 United States to guarantee any plan they suggested, I would have considered 
 I could go no further, and would have been bound to submit such a plan to 
 the Department for its examination and decision. But so far as urging upon 
 the Chilian Government, if I had an opportunity, the adoption of the offer of 
 the Credit Industriel to furnish the money to pay the indemnity, I would 
 not have hesitated to do it; I would have urged it upon them. 
 
 ********** 
 
 Q. Do you understand that there was any other plan proposed by which 
 peace could be brought about between Chili and Peru, and an indemnity 
 paid under the good offices of the United States? — A. I never understood 
 that there was any other plan by which the money could be furnished, ex- 
 cept some plan could be devised by the Credit Industriel, when it came to 
 consider the matter. 
 
 Q. And you understood that the instruction of June 15th did embrace the 
 Credit Industriel? — A. Unquestionably; I have no doubt about that, as a 
 Minister, reading that dispatch.* 
 
 Mr. Trescot is good authority as to the meaning of the instructions 
 of June 15th, because, from other portions of his evidence, the natural 
 inference is that he drafted them himself. 
 
 As to the instructions given to him by Mr. Blaine at the time of 
 the special mission, Mr. Trescot says : — 
 
 I will state that I understood the policy of the State Department toward 
 the Credit Industriel to be this: that if that company could furnish the 
 money to Peru to pay an indemnity that would satisfy Chili, it would be a 
 source of gratification to the Department, and of course would facilitate its 
 negotiations very much; but that that support was to go no further than a 
 friendly attitude toward it; that if the plan submitted by the Credit Indus- 
 triel reciuired the guarantee of the United States or a protectorate over 
 Peru, or anything of that kind, the whole matter must be referred back to 
 the Depai-tment for consideration and decision, with an indication (very 
 strong, I think, in his instruction) that the Secretary did not approve of 
 such a final result or approve of assuming such a responsibility. But I was 
 not authorized to do anything further than to report to the Department 
 what the conditions and the details were of the plan that was proposed. 
 
 Q,. With that tiualiiicatien on the part of the Department, I understand 
 you to say that the Department had a friendly disposition toward the 
 Credit Industriel, and encouraged it, subject to that qualification. — A. I 
 
 • House Report, No. ITtH), 47th Cougress, First Session, pp. 381, 863. 
 
49 
 
 would have felt in my position that I was hound to give it any encourage- 
 ment and help that I C(^uld, subject to that limitation.* 
 
 This evidence serves to show that the Stiite Department did feel 
 some interest in the Credit Industriel. For the purpose of securing 
 corroboration to his testimony, Mr. Randall addressed a number of 
 interrogatories to Mr. Elmore, the Peruvian Minister, and in every 
 instance Mr. Randall is confirmed by Mr. Elmore. The latter says : — 
 
 I subsequently saw Mr. Blaine frequently in your company, by appoint- 
 ment and otherwise, and it would be difficult to find a man more uniformly 
 cordial in his manner and attentive to business than Mr. Blaine was in all 
 our interviews, without exception. I always understood that you were 
 present, and acted on behalf of the Credit Industriel. We discussed solely 
 the Chili-Peruvian question, and the means to secure an honorable peace 
 that would be lasting between the belligerent republics. Secretary Blaine 
 always recognized that this could be obtained only by the intervention of 
 the United States, and showed that he was ready and willing to act. I 
 always understood from him that the Credit Industriel programme was ap- 
 proved of by him, as offering Peru the only means to pay a war indemnity, 
 and preserve at the same time her territorial integrity; and I understood 
 Mr. Blaine that he expected it would be necessary to utilize that pro- 
 gramme, t 
 
 On various occasions when I saw Mr. Blaine alone, after my return from 
 Europe on 19th August last, and before your return on 6th Xovember, be 
 always very kindly asked about you, and after your arrival in New York, he 
 asked me why you did not come to Washington to see him. I recollect, as I 
 was myself desirous to see you, that I stated in one of my notes to you Mr. 
 Blaine's wish, and begged that you would lose no time in coming to give the 
 Secretary the result of your conferences with the French parties represent- 
 ing the Credit Industriel programme. J 
 
 Mr. Elmore also brings out this episode : — 
 
 I remember the incident you refer to. It was very interesting, and took 
 place in one of our early interviews with Secretary Blaine, at the State De- 
 partment. 
 
 After discussing the subject of the intervention of the U»ited States, 
 and the chances of securing peace, the question arose. What would the 
 United States do in case Chili would refuse to take an indemnity, as she had 
 intimated she was willing to do, and should nakedly insist on retaining the 
 Peruvian province of Tarapaca in defiance of the wishes of the United 
 States? Would the United States submit? While we were discussing this 
 question, Mr. Blaine, quietly, without our knowledge, must have sent a 
 messenger to the Navy Department. In a little while a memorandum was 
 brought in and handed to him, which, after he had read it, he handed to 
 you, and which you with his permission read aloud. It stated the number 
 of war vessels which the United States had then in the Pacific — I believe 
 
 • House Report, No. 1790, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 363. t /d., p. 376. 
 
 t Id., p. 378. 
 
50 
 
 there were five. You at once said to the Secretary, "This is too small a 
 naval force for any demonstration against Chili." The Secretary replied to 
 you, in substance, that the force did not signify; they were quite sufficient 
 to make Chili understand what she might expect.* 
 
 This is Mr. Blaine's explanation of the incident : — 
 
 The incident related by Mr. Randall and Mr. Elmore about my send- 
 ing to the Navy Department to get an estimate of our naval strength in the 
 South Pacific, with the apparent intention of some warlike demonstration, 
 is very amusing. It needs little comment beyond the following statement: 
 
 July 18, 1882. 
 
 " In May last, after General Hurlbut was confirmed as Minister to Peru, 
 he requested that a naval vessel might be detailed to convey him from Pan- 
 ama to Callao. As private secretary to the Secretary of State at the time, I 
 went to the Navy Department to get a list of the naval vessels in the South 
 Pacific squadron, with their respective locations, with the view of ascertain- 
 ing the probable time of a vessel being at Panama. 
 
 " That occasion, and the subsequent one, when a naval vessel was asked 
 
 to convey Mr. Trescot from Panama to Valparaiso, were the only times 
 
 when I heard of our naval strength in the South Pacific being discussed or 
 
 in any way referred to in the Department of State. 
 
 Walker Blaine." 
 
 When the list was brought to me, Mr. Randall and Mr. Elmore were in 
 the department, and some remarks were made in an amusing vein about our 
 great naval strength on the South Pacific coast, contrasting it with the 
 seven English iron-clads then on the same station. The fertile imagination 
 and defective memory of Mr. Randall and Mr. Elmore have invested the in- 
 cident with a significance for which there was never the slightest justifica- 
 tion.! 
 
 And this is Mr. Randall's retort : — 
 
 Mr. Blaine, it will be seen, admits that at an interview with mysdf and 
 Mr. Elmore he exhibited to us a list of the naval force of the United States 
 in the Soutli Pacific, which he sent for to the Navy Depai'tment, and that we 
 commented together upon it in connection with the strength of "the seven 
 English iron-clads then on the same station," But he now gives it to be 
 understood tliat his object in sending for the list was to ascertain at what 
 time a United States man-of-war would probably be at Panama to convey 
 the American Minister, General Hurlbut, to Callao. It might be pertinent, 
 were Mr. Blaine under a cross-examination, to inquire why the Secretary of 
 State should have discussed with the Peruvian Minister and the attorney of 
 the Credit Industricl of France the question of sending an American Minis- 
 ter to Peru in a man-of-war, if he was not holding " confidential" relations 
 with them. It might be pertinent, also, to inquire, in that case, why the 
 Secretary of State should have gone into a contrast of our squadron with the 
 " seven English iron-clads," if no (juestion of a possible collision of policy 
 and interests between the English and the American Governments on issues 
 
 * House Report, No. 1790, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 377. 
 t Id., p. 381. 
 
51 
 
 arising in South America had been raised between himself and his inter- 
 locutors. 13ut in vindication of my own version of an incident which Mr. 
 Blaine, while in one breath he calls it " imaginary," in the next breath ad- 
 mits to have occurred precisely as it was stated in my sworn testimony to 
 have occurred, it is sufficient for me now to call the attention of your hon- 
 orable committee to the fact that the interview referred to took place in 
 April, 1881, some time before General Ilurlbut had been named as Minister 
 to Peru, and at least seven months before the idea of sending Mr. Trescot to 
 South America was so much as dreamed of.* 
 
 It is quite clear that Mr. Blaine's contemptuous dismissal of the 
 Credit Industriel on the witness-stand, was hardly warranted by his 
 actions toward the company while Secretary of State. His instruc- 
 tions of June 15th to General Hurlbut, show that at first he regarded 
 the project as worthy of the " good offices " of this Government. This 
 is hardly a refusal " to touch it, or to think of touching it," even if 
 he did regard it as a " neat little job coiled up right there."! His 
 own explanation of the man-of-war incident does not help the matter 
 at all. It either shows that he was on very confidential terms with 
 Mr. Elmore and Mr. Randall, and that at one interview, at least, there 
 was something more " than the most casual form of every-day polite- 
 ness ; " or that he was in the habit of jesting on serious subjects, 
 and bandying the secrets of the State Department in a very free and 
 easy way. It would have been more creditable for him to admit, as 
 the evidence shows, that he first loolved upon the Cnklit Industriel 
 with some favor ; that he afterward modified his views, but did not 
 take the trouble, or was top courteous, to inform the representatives 
 of the company of the change. What produced this chauge may 
 appear from the examination of his attitude in respect to the Landreau 
 and Cochet claims. 
 
 THE COCHET CLAIM. 
 
 Alexander Cochet was born a Frenchman, and remained a French 
 subject until his death. It was claimed that in 1840 he had discov- 
 ered the fertilizing properties of guano, and that under a law of Peru, 
 of 1833, which provided that any one who " should discover property 
 belonging to the State, shall have a right to one-third jjart of such 
 property," he had become entitled to one-third part of all the guano 
 <in Peru. Cochet died in Paris, in 1854, leaving an illegitimate son. 
 From this son it was alleged that the claim had come, by assignment, 
 into the possession of a company which represented itself as organ- 
 ized under the name of the Peruvian Company, in accordance with a 
 
 * House Report, No. 1790, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 384. t W., p. 345. 
 
52 
 
 charter granted by the State of Georgia. This company was the 
 i:)rodu(jt of the ingenuity of one Jacob R. Shipherd, and like the 
 Credit Industriel, proposed to take possession of the guano beds, 
 and pay a war indemnity to the Chilians ; but, unlike the French 
 company, it was sustained by no one of wealth or respectability, and 
 its sole capital was this claim of a foreigner, which had been rejected 
 by the Peruvian Government, and in which the United States could 
 have no right nor interest. Mr. Shipherd composed the whole corpo- 
 ration, and in his prospectus he estimated the value of the claim, 
 with interest, at the handsome sum of $1,000,000,000. 
 
 In the review of his negotiations with our Government for aid in 
 the enforcement of his claim, Mr. Shipherd's own testimony, where 
 it is not corroborated by the words or acts of others, will be rejected. 
 He has too much the appearance of a man who has long since lost 
 whatever conception of truth he may have once had. After the 
 omission of his evidence, it still appears that this unknown and vis- 
 ionary adventurer, with a fraudulent claim for a fabulous amount, 
 found no difficulty in securing the aid of a Senator of the United 
 States, and a hospitable reception by the Department of State. 
 Senator Blair, of New Hampshire, without the hope of reward, but 
 from his sympathy with Peru, and his "view of the international 
 importance of her rescue," * became the friend and supporter of the 
 Peruvian Company, and on July 25th introduced Mr. Shipherd to the 
 Secretary of State. On July 26th the Secretary, the Senator, and 
 Mr. Shipherd discussed the whole matter jn a very friendly interview, 
 of which Senator Blair, in his testimony, gives the following 
 account : — 
 
 The substance of it was a discussion, and a pretty thorough discussion, 
 of the Cocbet claim, in wbicb Mr. Sbipberd explained bis views in regard to 
 it, and stated the views of his counsel, Governor Boutwell, who had examined 
 the matter. Mr. Blaine made the point that it was a claim originating be- 
 tween the Peruvian Government and a French citizen, and that upon Mr. 
 Shipherd's own statement of it, it came through a French citizen to a Peru- 
 vian, and his assignment was from a Peruvian; so that, as Mr. Blaine claimed, 
 Mr. Sbipberd, or those who were interested with bim, could have no rights 
 tbat the Peruvian would not have in the same claim, and that the Peruvian 
 could bave no rights to American protection or countenance, in any regard 
 whatever. Upon that point I remember tbat JNIr. Walker Blaino joined m 
 the discussion, sustaining the view wbicb bis father took. Mr. Sbipberd 
 controverted tbat, and also placed bis claim principally upon the ground tbat 
 the title was not to a rigbt in action, but it was to actual property, and to a 
 
 ♦ House Report, No. 1790, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 293. 
 
63 
 
 portion of the soil of Peru, — the real estate of Peru, — and standinj^ Tipon 
 that ground, and that his rights (and I think Mr. Blaine substantially 
 seemed to concede that, if that were the case) were practically the same as 
 though they had originated between Peru and an American citizen, t t t 
 As the result of that interview I think ^Ir. Blaine explained the instructions; 
 I think he explained them verbally, and I do not know but he read to us from 
 them. I will not say in regard to tliat at this time, but I think he communi- 
 cated to us the instructions he had given to General Ilui-lbut and to General 
 Kilpatrick, which instructions were all Mr. Shipherd, as he expressed 
 himself, had any desire for whatever.* 
 
 Mr. Shipherd also represented himself as interested in the Lan- 
 dreau claim, and as a further result of this interview Mr. Blaine, on 
 August 4th, sent instructions to Gen. Hurlbut about both the Cochet 
 and Landreau claims. The instructions relative to the Cochet claim 
 were as follows : — 
 
 The two claims for which special consideration and active intervention 
 have been asked, are those known as the Cochet claim and the Landreau 
 claim. In reference to the Cochet claim there has been no information laid 
 before the Department of a sufficiently definite character to warrant a spec- 
 ific instruction, and in the absence of the requisite data here you will be left 
 to take such steps as may seem expedient on investigating the origin and 
 character of the claim. The primal point at issue is, whether any American 
 citizen or association of citizens has acquired an interest in the claim in a 
 manner entitling him or them to the good offices of this Government in mak- 
 ing any representation to Peru. As the American holders of the claim, or 
 their attorneys, will be on the ground, you will no doubt be placed in posses- 
 sion of all the facts, but you will take no step committing your Government 
 to the use of its good offices without first reporting in full to the Department 
 for well-considered and definite instruction, t 
 
 In the course of three months, howeve.r, Mr. Blaine discovered, 
 what was evident at a glance, that the Cochet claim was too worth- 
 less for presentation; and on November 17th he wrote to Gen. 
 Hurlbut :— 
 
 After the instruction in my No. 7 in regard to -this subject had been 
 mailed, I became convinced that there was no need of even the preliminary 
 inquiry which I suggested in regard to the Cochet claim. There is no just 
 ground whatever on which this Government could intervene on behalf of it. 
 In so far as there may be any basis for the claim at all, it originates in the 
 demand of a native Peruvian against his Government. If American citizens 
 purchased an interest in such claim, they purchased nothing more than the 
 original claimant possessed. They did not and could not purchase the good 
 offices of this Government, and you are instructed not to extend them in the 
 case of the Cochet claim. 
 
 * House Report, Xo. 1790, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 257. 
 t Senate Ex. Doc, No. 79, 47tli Congress, First Session, p. 609. 
 
54 
 
 Tlie statements which you say were made to you hy Mr. Jacoh R. Ship- 
 herd are very extraordinary. It is in the lirst i)hice extraordinary that he 
 should have written to you at all, for I carefully advised him that Ministers 
 of the United States in foreign countries Avere not permitted to extend their 
 good offices in aid of any claim unless so instructed by tlie Departmentof 
 State. I repeatedly told him that any representations on behalf of the claims 
 he was urging must be made at Lima, by his own agents. His writing you 
 was therefore an impropriety, and his attempting to instruct you as to what 
 I had written you was as grotesquely absurd as the language he attributes to 
 me. He simply makes the mistake common to a certain class of honest en- 
 thusiasts who imagine that the polite and patient listener is the author of 
 their own extravagant fancies. I recognize several of the singular proposi- 
 tions imputed to me as having been made by Mr. Shipherd, and not in any 
 sense admitted or assented to by me. I told him in the three or four inter- 
 views which he sought with me that I could see no possible ground on which 
 the United States Govei-nment could lend its good offices in aid of the Cocliet 
 claim. You will therefore pay no attention whatever to anything Mr. Ship- 
 herd may write you in regard to claims against the Government of Peru.* 
 
 Even at this time Mr. Shipherd was still an " honest enthusiast," 
 and in another dispatch to Gen. Hurlbut, on November 19th, the 
 Peruvian Company was mentioned as an "American organization, 
 composed of reputable citizens ; " but on December 5th Mr. Blaine 
 awoke to a realization of Shipherd's true character, and wrote to him 
 in the sternest of terms, striking him from the list of attorneys in 
 any case before the State Department, and threatened to have him 
 prosecuted for making " an improper and unlawful proposition " to 
 Gen. Hurlbut.f 
 
 About Shipherd and his bubble company there is a certain Oriental 
 splendor. That tales of wealth rivaling those of the "Arabian 
 Nights," and fashioned by the imagination of an obscure adventurer, 
 should have received for a single moment the serious attention of the 
 State Department, is illustrative alike of Mr. Blaine's credulity and 
 liis eagerness to listen to any project, however fantastic, which 
 might be used as a weapon against Chili. For, in spite of Shipherd's 
 trenchant dismissal, after a period of four months there is every 
 probability that Mr. Blaine looked with favor ui)on the Peruvian 
 Company, as he looked at one time upon the Credit Industriel. 
 According to his own statements, he had interviews with Shipherd 
 on July 2r)th and 2Gth, October 15th, and November 3d. The claims 
 dispatch of August 4th was the result of the interview of July 25th 
 and 26th ; and the telegram of October 1st to Gen. Hurlbut, warning 
 
 * Spiiutc Ex. Doc, No. 79, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 562. 
 t W , p. C8:!. 
 
55 
 
 him against using his intlucncc in favor of the Credit Industriel, was 
 without doubt sent iu consequence of the false assertion nuidc by 
 Shipherd that Gen. Hurlbut was exerting himself in favor of that 
 Company. All of Shipherd's letters, papers, and prospectuses in 
 regard to the Cochet claim were received and lilod in the Department 
 of State some time iu October. Senator Blair wrote to Shipherd as 
 follows : — 
 
 I can only now assure yon that the United States will utter lier voice in 
 a manner wliicli will mark an era in American diplomacy. The matter is 
 being prepared, and within a week or two you will know what is done. You 
 should act at once as though the American ships of war were on the way to 
 the Pacific cost. Perfect your plans. Everything here has been just as you 
 have wanted it all the time. The policy of the Government has been exactly 
 right, and is now. Any man who proposes to take part in your project 
 should now take hold iu earitest.* 
 
 And from the time of his first interview with JNIr. Blaine down 
 to the time when he was finally disowned, on December 5tli, the acts 
 of Shipherd himself afford unconscious but powerful evidence that 
 he was not without substantial encouragement at home. His letters 
 to Gen. Hurlbut are not those of a disappointed man ; they are 
 voluminous, sanguine, and full of assurances of the assistance that 
 he will have from the Government of the United States. 
 
 Neither the Credit Industriel nor the Peruvian Company were 
 adapted for interposition by the United States between Peru and her 
 conqueror ; the former because it was not an American company, 
 the latter because it was finally discovered to be utterly baseless and 
 fraudulent ; and hence Mr. Blaine's rejection of them Iwth. With 
 these two financial schemes he merely coquetted, but for the third 
 and last, the Landreau Claim, he conceived a lasting affection. 
 
 THE LANDREAU CLAIM, 
 
 Jean Theophile Landreau, a citizen of France, claimed to have 
 discovered deposits of nitrate and guano in Peru to the value of 
 $400,000,000. He had pursued his investigations secretly, but 
 after his alleged discoveries he offered to sell the results to the 
 Peruvian Government. A contract was made in 1865, with the stipu- 
 lation annexed that he should renounce all diplomatic intervention, 
 "it being an expressed condition that should he ever employ such 
 means, that sole fact will destroy the effect of this resolution, and he 
 
 * House Report, No. 1790, 47th Congress, Fint Session, p. 262. 
 
56 
 
 will be unable to claim any premium whatsoever." * This contract the 
 Executive Department repudiated, because " the premium stipulated 
 to be accorded to him is of such great amount that it can never be 
 given by the Government," and "it is hereby decreed that, as a basis 
 for a new contract, said new guano deposits shall be examined by a 
 special commission appointed for the purpose." f This was consid- 
 ered by Landreau as a denial of justice ; and while there is no evi- 
 dence that the Peruvian Government refused to pay what it consid- 
 ered a fair price for his services, the parties could not agree upon 
 the terms of a new contract. Landreau then appealed to the legis- 
 lature and the courts : the former refused to pass judgment on the 
 Executive ; the latter decided that they had no jurisdiction. He then 
 turned to his own Government (France), which declined to interfere. 
 Fortunately, however, for his hopes of foreign intervention, he had 
 a brother, John C. Landreau, who claimed to be a naturalized citizen 
 of the United States, and who asserted that he had an interest in the 
 investigations of Th^ophile Landreau. In proof of the allegations 
 of such interest, he produced certain letters from his brother, of 
 which only two are of any importance. In the first, dated July 15, 
 1859, Theophile says : — 
 
 " For my part I accept you as my partner in this business, as well as the 
 advice you give regarding it, and at the same time wait with great impatience 
 the receipt of the five thousand dollars which you say shall be sent to me." 
 
 And in the second, dated January 2, 1860, he acknowledges the 
 receipt of $6,250. 
 
 These facts were brought to the attention of our State Department 
 as early as 1871, and on March 9th of that year Mr. Fish wrote to 
 Mr. Brent, the Charge cV Affaires of the American legation in Peru, 
 inclosing a letter from J. C. Landreau, which complained of the 
 action of the Peruvian Government. Mr. Brent made an inquiry into 
 the matter, and reported adversely. The claim, however, was pressed, 
 and in June, 1874, Mr. Henry O'Connor, one of the Government 
 counsel engaged in the Bureau of Claims, gave a favorable opinion 
 upon it. On the strength of this opinion Mr. Fish, on July 28, 
 1874, wrote to Mr. Thomas, the American Minister to Peru, that he 
 could use his " good offices unofficially ;" and again, on November 5th 
 of the same year, that it being merely an implied contract, the Depart- 
 ment did not regard such questions of an international character, and 
 
 * Senate Kx. Doc, No. 79, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 655. 
 t /d , p. 656. 
 
57 
 
 that his course must be limited to unofficial good offices. The claim 
 then remained quiescent until the House of Representatives, in Feb- 
 ruary, 1880, passed a joint resolution that the " President be reijuested 
 to take such steps as in his opinion may seem proper to secure an 
 adjustment of the claim of John C. Landreau, and if, in his opinion, 
 it is proper to do so, the President invite the Government of France 
 to co-operate with the United States in his behalf." This resolution 
 was lost in the Senate. 
 
 Such was the history of the claim to the time of the Garfield ad- 
 ministration, and the natural feeling is one of amazement that our 
 Government should have given it any attention, and that a lawyer 
 should have given a favorable opinion in regard to it. John C. Lan- 
 dreau could only appeal to the Government of the United States on 
 the ground that he was a citizen of the United States at the time his 
 interest in the claim occurred, and that the claim was in his own 
 behalf against Peru. He was not naturalized until 1867, and there- 
 fore during the investigations of his brother, and at the date of the 
 contract with Peru, he was still a citizen of France. Except on the 
 theory of a partnership, the claim of John C. Landreau could not be 
 against the Peruvian Government. There is no evidence of a part- 
 nership, nothing to show that there was any agreement between the 
 two brothers to share profits and losses, or that the money sent by 
 John C. Landreau to Theophile was on account of any agreement. 
 In the contract between the Peruvian Government and J. Theophile 
 Landreau there is no mention of the name of John C. Landreau. 
 
 The consideration for this contract on the part of Theophile Lan- 
 dreau was the delivery to the Peruvian Government of a list of the 
 discoveries which he had made himself. When this contract was 
 executed by the delivery of this list, how could there be any privity 
 or connection between John C. Landreau and Peru, or direct claim 
 obtained by the latter against the Government of that country ? If 
 John C. Landreau had any claim, it was against his brother for the 
 money advanced. The only partnership that seems to have existed 
 between these Landreau brothers, was for the purpose of obtaining a 
 recognition of the claim from the Peruvian Government through the 
 intervention of the United States — a partnership in which Theophile 
 contributed the claim as his share of the capital, and John his 
 
 citizenship. 
 
 As the claims dispatch of August 4th to General Hurlbut was the 
 result of the interviews of July 25th and 26th with Shipherd and 
 Blair, the inference is that the representations of Shipherd first drew 
 Mr. Blaine's attention to the existence and character of the Landi-eau 
 
58 
 
 claim, which occupied a large portiuu of that dispatch. According 
 to the following testimony, however, he interested himself in its suc- 
 cess without a suggestion from any one interested : — 
 
 Q. Who, if any one, presented to you the claim of J. C. Landreau against 
 Peru? — A. It was presented by the Congress of the United States, by the 
 unanimous recommendation of this committee, and by a vote of the House of 
 Kepresentatives. 
 
 Q. Then it was presented by no person ? — ^-1. No, sir; it was not lobbied 
 at all by anybody; it had no big company to back it. There had been a reg- 
 ular attorney for it, and it was a matter which tlie Congress of the United 
 States had deemed of sufficient importance to call the attention of the Secre- 
 tary of State to. 
 
 Q. Then there was no attorney who presented tlie claim to the Depart- 
 ment ? — A. Mr. Christy had been the attorney here — a modest gentleman who 
 stood as the representative of it. 
 
 Q. Uid he present it ? — A. No, sir; not to me, personally. 
 
 Q. He did not ?—A. No, sir. 
 ********** 
 
 Q. I ask you, did you make any personal examination of it ? — A. No, sir; I 
 took that as res adjudicata ; I took the opinion of the law officer of the 
 State Department * and the opinion of the House of Representatives of the 
 United States; I made no examination besides that, t 
 
 This application of res adjudicata is extraordinary. The govern- 
 ment of France had refused to interfere, although the real claimant 
 was a French citizen ; the House of Representatives had declared it 
 worthy of inquiry, but the Senate had tabled the resolution ; the De- 
 partment of State had shown no desire to enforce it. Mr. Blaine, 
 however, of his own accord, began to agitate it, and, as is shown by 
 the following passage from his dispatch of August 4th, he did so in a 
 manner that contrasted strangely with the mild and perfunctory sug- 
 gestions of Mr. Fish : — 
 
 In regard to tlie Landreau claim, I see no reason to differ from the con- 
 clusion to which my predecessors seem to have arrived. John C. Landreau 
 was an Amet'ican citizen, apparently entitled, under a lawful contract, to rea- 
 sonable compensation for important services to the Peruvian Government. In 
 conformity with the established i^ractice of our Government, while you can- 
 not, in such case make an official demand for the settlement of this claim, 
 you will employ your good offices to procure its prompt and just considera- 
 tion. You will have observed tliat in the contract made by the Peruvian Gov- 
 ernment with Landreau and his brother, it is expressly stipulated that any 
 
 *Mr. Henry O. Connor, on whose opinion Mr. Blaine leased niucli of his energy in re- 
 gard to tlie claim, Is reported to have changed liis views of its validity. (See House lie- 
 port, No. 1790, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 224. 
 
 t House Report, No. 1790, 47th Congress, Fii-st Session, p. 208. 
 
59 
 
 questions arising under its provisions should be submitted to the judicial 
 tribunal of Peru, and that in no case shall diplomatic intervention be asked. 
 You will also notice that the supreme court of Peru, sustaining a decision of 
 the court below, has ruled that it had no jurisdiction of this contract, thus 
 leaving Landreau in a position in wliicli he can neither appeal to liis own 
 Government nor obtain a judgment from tlie tribunals to which, by the con- 
 tract, he was authorized to apply. 
 
 While this Government will not, as at present informed, undertake to 
 construe the contract or to decide upon the extent of the compensation due 
 Landreau, you are instructed to call the attention of the Peruvian Govern- 
 ment to this injustice, and say that the Government of the United States will 
 expect some adequate and proper means to be provided by which Landreau 
 can obtain a judicial decision upon his rights. If the constitution of the 
 Peruvian courts or the interpretation of the law by Peruvian judges deprives 
 Landreau of the justice which the contract itself guaranteed him, then, in 
 the opinion of this Government, Peru is bound, in duty and in honor, to do one 
 of three things; viz., Supply an impartial tribunal, extend the jurisdiction of 
 the present courts, or submit the case of Landreau to arbitration. I desire 
 also to call your attention to the fact that in the anticipated treaty which is 
 to adjust the relations of Chili and Peru, the latter may possibly be com- 
 pelled to submit to the loss of territory. If the territory to be surrendered 
 should include the guano deposits which were discovered by Landreau, and 
 for the discovery of which Peru contracted to pay him a royalty upon the 
 tonnage removed, then the Peruvian Government sliould in the treaty stipu- 
 late with Chili for the preservation and payment to Landreau of the amount 
 due under his contract. If transfer be made to Chili, it should be understood 
 that this claim of an American citizen, if fairly adjudicated in his favor, shall 
 be treated as a proper lien on the property to whicli it attaches, and that 
 Chili accepts the cession with that condition annexed. As it may be pre- 
 sumed that you will be fully informed as to the progress of the negotiations 
 between Chili and Peru for a treaty of peace, you will make such effort as 
 you judiciously can to secure for Landreau a fair settlement of his claim. 
 You will take special care to notify both the Chilian and Peruvian authorities 
 of the character and status of the claim in order that no dejinitive treaty of 
 peace shall be made in disregard of the rights which Landreau may be found 
 to possess.* 
 
 The words italicized afford another instance of the adoption of 
 an idea by Mr. Blaine, and his subsequent generation of facts to sup- 
 port it. John C. Landreau, as was shown above, at the time the 
 contract was made, was not an American citizen ; he never performed 
 any services important or unimportant for the Government of Peru ; the 
 contract was never made with him and his brother, but with his 
 brother alone, and the name of John C. Landreau does not occur once 
 in the contract. Yet for the purpose of giving strength to the claim, 
 he is elevated by Mr. Blaine to the position of Th^ophile. 
 
 • Senate Ex. Doc, No. 79, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 509. 
 
60 
 
 In searching for an exi)lanation of Mr. Blaine's attitude toward 
 the Landreau claim, we turn to his testimony before the Committee of 
 the House, where he discusses the matter in the following homely but 
 effective style : — 
 
 If the claim is decided against him that is the end of it; but if it is 
 decided in his favor, then I shall expect that the English bondholders and 
 the French claimants, and all those men, shall not gobble up and carry to 
 Europe the very property to which this claim attaches. I can show you how 
 the United States comes to be interested in it. It has discredited a claim 
 which the House of Representatives had indorsed, and of course out in Peru 
 and Chili the very action which had been taken three times by the State 
 Department and once by the House of Representatives has, by certain 
 public opinion, been discredited, and under that the English bondholders 
 have gone ofE with half a million tons of guano, and have got $30,000,000 for 
 it; and they have got in England to-day the very property to which this 
 claim attached if it had been adjudicated.* 
 ****** 
 
 If you decide in his favor, let him, although he is an humble citizen of a 
 Government that seems afraid to go out over night, let him be taken into this 
 account, and let him have some of the crumbs, at least, that fall from the 
 rich Englishman's table in the settlement of the Chilian-Peruvian matter.! 
 ********** 
 
 The Chilian Government has put up by advertisement 1,000,000 tons of 
 guano, which I suppose is worth $60,000,000 in Liverpool, and they pledge 
 tliemselves in the advertisement to pay one-half of it into the Bank of 
 England for the benefit of the English bondholders who put up the job of 
 this war on Peru. It was a put-up job; that is all there was to it; it was loot 
 and booty. It had not as much excuse in this as Hastings and Clive had in 
 what they did in India. The war on Peru has been made in the same 
 interest that Clive and Hastings had in India, and England sweeps it all in. 
 ********** 
 
 It was to get possession of it. It was the old story of Naboth's vine- 
 yard which looked so inviting over the wall. They wanted this territory, and 
 were determined to get it. I observed by this morning's papers that the 
 English war fleet of seven large iron-clad vessels have concluded to slip 
 down the coast from Callao to Valparaiso, and they have had a strong force 
 there all the time — the English have. 
 
 ********** 
 
 It is an English war on Peru, with Chili as the instrument, and I take 
 the responsibility of that assertion. Chili would never have gone into this 
 war one inch but for her backing by English capital, and there was never 
 anything played out so boldly in the world as when they came to divide the 
 loot and the spoils. They said, we will take half, and we will divide this in- 
 heritance among ourselves; and as to these American citizens about whom 
 ■ they talk, they have been discredited at home; and what right has an Amer- 
 ican citizen to be regarded down here? We are going to settle this ourselves. 
 
 * House Il«port. No. 1790, 47th Cougreas, First Session, p. 214. f Id-, p- 216. 
 
61 
 
 And we earned in the end, the high rank and title of beintj absolutely the 
 subject of funny cartoons, in which the American Navy is represented as 
 being blown out of the water by the Chilian Hcct, and it is believed all over 
 Chili to-day that we backed down for fear of being thrashed. The Chilian 
 papers all say we escaped a great thrashing by getting out of it just in tiie 
 right time. And that is the terrible war that I was going to uigc the country 
 into, in which the United States was to be ruined by Chili — eighteen hun- 
 dred thousand people, eight thousand miles away, were going to whip the 
 
 United States.* 
 
 ***#♦*♦*♦♦ 
 
 Q. It certainly could not have helped Peru to pay it at that time, though? 
 
 —.■1. Oh, no ; but it would have helped Landreau, if he had got it, very much, 
 
 and it would not have hurt her any more than to have it go to FJuglish claimants, 
 
 if a portion of the $60,000,000 /i«d gone to Landreau instead of to the English 
 
 bondholders ; and I think that Peru would rather have Landreau have it than 
 
 these other fellows A 
 
 It is curious to compare Mr, Blaine's enthusiasm in behalf of Lan- 
 dreau, with his sluggishness respecting other naturalized citizens who 
 were in English prisons. In the one case, he was deaf to pathetic 
 appeals; in the other, he pressed of his own accord, without a sug- 
 gestion or petition from any one interested, a groundless claim which 
 he found slumbering in the archives of the State Department. It 
 certainly was singular morality to place the alleged secret interest of 
 a naturalized citizen of the United States in a Frenchman's claim, in 
 the same category with the bonded indebtedness of Peru ; it was 
 morality still more singular to call a proposed arrangement by Chili 
 for paying the debt of Peru, " dividing the loot and .the spoil. "| To 
 Mr. Blaine, the guano and nitrates seemed to have been only so much 
 " loot and booty." He did not like to see the foreign bondholders 
 come in for a share with no American participation. "The execu- 
 
 •House Report, No. 1790, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 217. 
 
 tJd., p. 219. 
 
 ton November 10, 1S80, the Chilian Minister of Foreign A fTalrs Issued a circular to 
 foreign powers, in which he announced that the surrender of the Territory of Tarapaci 
 involved on the part of the Buccessful power a recognition of the mortgages and Incum- 
 brances created upon it by Peru to her foreign creditors. 
 
 The publication of this circular aroused discussion In the Chilian press and Congress 
 and the Minister issued another circular on December 4. 1^80. In this he stato.l that he did 
 not wish to be understood as committing Government to the payment of any part of the 
 Peruvian debt, but that the claims must be settled in accordance with the pnnciples of 
 international law. See Senate Ex. Doc. No. 79. 47th Congress, First Session pp. 142 148. 
 
 in the Iglesias treaty with Peru, which was ratified by the Chilian Congress 
 January 16. 1884. the foreign creditors of Peru were excluded from any right over the guano 
 and nitrate tei^itory which had been pledged to them as security. These f..cts are a 
 commentary upon Mr. Blaine's statement that the war was a put-up 30b on Peru, for the 
 purpose of divitUng the " loot and spoil " among the English bondholders. 
 
62 
 
 tive, legislative, and judicial functions of Peru " — 'according to his 
 own statement — "were in abeyance."* The Calderon Government 
 was existing by the support of the United States ; the Peruvian peo- 
 ple were looking to our Government as their only hope of territorial 
 salvation. Under such circumstances Peru would doubtless have 
 changed her views of the worthlessness of the claim, and " would 
 rather have Landreau have it than those other fellows " who had 
 loaned money to her, and taken bonds in return. According to Mr. 
 Blaine, the amount of the claim was then to be a prior lien upon Peru- 
 vian territory, and its payment annexed as a condition to any treaty 
 between Chili and Peru, 
 
 Less respectable than the Credit Industriel, and a paltry sum com- 
 pared with the product of Shipherd's glowing imagination, it was 
 something American, and was to afford to Mr. Blaine another excuse 
 for American intervention. 
 
 THE SPECIAL MISSION. 
 
 Affairs in South America had now reached a crisis. In view, 
 perhaps, of his approaching retirement from office, Mr. Blaine con- 
 cluded to intrust their management to more dexterous hands. He 
 notified General Hurlbut and General Kilpatrick that he would no 
 longer need their services in the settlement of the " pending difficul- 
 ties." He selected Mr. William Henry Trescot, of South Carolina, 
 one of the most experienced diplomatists of this country, as special 
 envoy to Chili, Peru, and Bolivia. In the words of Mr. Blaine, his 
 " polic}' was reaffirmed with even more confidence and strength, "f and 
 the instructions to Mr. Trescot would have been expressed in 
 stronger terms if President Arthur had not objected to certain 
 phrases. J The following passages will show that they were strong 
 enough to produce further complications between this country and 
 Chili. 
 
 The Congress which was assembled within the neutral zone for tliat pur 
 
 * Senate Ex. Doc, No. 79, 47th Congresg, First Session, p. 159. 
 
 t House Report, No. 1790, 47th Congress, 1st Session, p. 241. 
 
 J According to Mr. Blaine, one of tlic clianges was as follows : — 
 
 " As it Is probal)!*', that some time will elapse before the completion of all the arrange- 
 ments necessary for a Hnal negotiation, this Government would suggest a temporary 
 convention, which, recognizing the spirit of our pending intei^'ention, would bring Peru and 
 Chili into amicable conference, and provide for a meeting of plenipotentiaries to negotiate 
 a permanent treaty of peace. 
 
 " Wi'U, 'intervention ' was a little too strong a word, the President thought, and that 
 was changed to 'the spirit of our present friendly representation.^ That change was made 
 asthe President suggested." See House Report, No. 1790, 47th Congress, 1st Session, p. 207. 
 
63 
 
 pose by the Chilian authorities, and wlii.li was further allowed by the Chilian 
 Government to provide for the military impositions by the use of the national 
 credit, and thus recognized as tlic representative of the Peruvian people, 
 authorized President Calderon to negotiate a peace, but upon the condition 
 that no territory should be ceded. 
 
 As soon as these facts indicated the possibility of a real and independent 
 vitality in the constitution of the Calderon Government, the Chilian military 
 authorities issued an order forbidding any exercise of its functions within 
 the territory occupied by the Chilian army — that is, within the entire terri- 
 tory west of the mountains, including the capital and ports of Peru. 
 
 Unable to understand tliis sudden, and, giving due regard to the profes- 
 sions of Chili, this unaccountable change of policy, this Government in- 
 structed its Minister at Lima to continue to recognize the Calderon Govern- 
 ment until more complete information would enable it to send further instruc- 
 tions. If our present information is correct, immediately upon the receipt 
 of this communication they arrested President Calderon, and thus, as far as 
 was in their power, extinguished his Government. The President does not 
 now insist upon the inference which this action would warrant. He hopes 
 that there is some explanation which will relieve him from the painful im- 
 pression that it was taken in resentful reply to the continued recognition of 
 the Calderon Government by the United States. If, unfortunately, he should 
 be mistaken, and such a motive be avowed, your duty will be a brief one. 
 You will say to the Chilian Government that the President considers such a 
 proceeding as an intentional and unwarranted offense, and that you will com- 
 municate such an avowal to the Government of the United States, with the 
 assurance that it will be regarded by the Government as an act of such un- 
 friendly import as to require the immediate suspension of all diplomatic inter- 
 course. You will inform me immediately of the happening of such a contin- 
 gency, and instructions will be sent you. 
 
 But I do not anticipate such an occurrence. From the information before 
 the Department, of which you are possessed, it is morr probable that this 
 course will be explained by an allegation that the conduct and language of 
 the United States Minister in Peru had encouraged the Calderon Government 
 to such resistance of the wishes of Chili as to render the negotiation of a 
 satisfactory treaty of peace with the Calderon Government impossible. Any 
 explanation which relieves this action of the Chilian Government of the char- 
 acter of an intentional offense, will be received by you to that extent, pro- 
 vided it does not require as a condition precedent the disavowal of Mr. Ilurl- 
 but. Whatever may be my opinion as to the discretion of all that may have 
 been said or done by Mr. Hurlbut, it is impossible for me to recognize the 
 right of the Chilian Government to take such action without submitting to the 
 consideration of this Government any cause of complaint which it icas prejmred 
 to allege against the proceedings of the representative of the United States. The 
 Chilian Government was in possession of the instructions sent to that Minis- 
 ter, as well as those to his colleague at Santiago. There was no pretense 
 that the conduct of General Kilpatrick was anything but friendly. Chili was 
 represented here by a Minister who enjoyed the confidence of his Govern- 
 ment, and nothing can justify the assumption that the United States was act- 
 ing a double part in its relations to the two countries. If the conduct of the 
 United States Minister seemed inconsistent with what Chili had every reason 
 to know was the friendly intention of the United States, a courteous represen- 
 
64 
 
 tation through the Chilian Minister here would have enabled this Government 
 Tpromptly to correct or confirm him. 
 
 You are not, therefore, authorized to make to the Chilian Government 
 any explanation of the conduct of General Hurlbut, if that Government, not 
 having afforded us the opportunity of accepting or disavoioing his conduct, 
 insists upon making its interpretation of his proceedings the justification of 
 it^ recent action. 
 
 There is something vronderfnl about these reiterated statements 
 that uo appeal had been made by Chili to the Government of the 
 United States. It is necessary to refer again to the letters of Senor 
 Martinez to Mr. Blaine of October 24th and 27th, the latter containing 
 the communication of the Chilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, which 
 reported and denounced the actions of General Hurlbut.* December 
 1st was the date of Mr. Trescot's instructions. Therefore at the 
 time when Mr. Blaine wrote the above words, he had for more than 
 one month been in possession of a " courteous representation through 
 the Chilian Minister," which afforded him " the opportunity of ac- 
 cepting or disavowing General Hurlbut's conduct." 
 Mr. Trescot's instructions continued as follows : — 
 
 It is difficult for me to say now how far an explanation would be satis- 
 factory to the President which was not accompanied by the restoration or 
 recognition of the Calderon Government. The objects which he has at 
 heart are, first, to prevent the misery, confusion, and bloodshed which the 
 present relations between Chili and Peru seem only too certain to renew; 
 and, second, to take care that in any friendly attempt to reach this desirable 
 end, the Government of the United States is treated with the respectful con- 
 sideration to which its disinterested purpose, its legitimate influence, and 
 its established position entitle it. The President feels in this matter neither 
 irritation nor resentment. He regrets that Chili seems to have misconceived 
 both the spirit and intention of the Government of the United States, and 
 thinks her conduct has been inconsiderate. He will gladly learn that a calmer 
 and wiser judgment directs her counsels, and asks in no exacting spirit the 
 correction of what were perhaps natural misunderstandings. So he would 
 be satisfied with the manifestation of a sincere purpose on the part of Chili 
 to aid Peru, either in restoring the present 2'>rovisional government, or establish- 
 ing in its place one which will be allowed the proper freedom of action neces- 
 sary to restore internal order, and to conduct a real negotiation to some 
 substantial result. 
 
 Should the Chilian Government, while disclaiming any intention of 
 offense, maintain its right to settle its difficulties with Peru without the 
 friendly intervention of other powers, and refuse to allow the formation of 
 any government in Peru which does not pledge its consent to the cession of 
 Peruvian territory, it will be your duty, in language as strong as is consis- 
 tent with the respect due an independent power, to express the disappoint- 
 
 Quoted on p. 41. 
 
65 
 
 ment and dissatisfaction felt by the United States at such a deplorable 
 policy. * * * This Government also holds, that between two independent 
 nations hostilities do not, from the mere existence of war, confer llie rij^ht 
 of conquest until the failure to furnish the indemnity and guarantee which 
 can be rightfully demanded. 
 
 The United States maintains, therefore, that Peru has the right to 
 demand that an opportunity should be allowed her to find such indemnity 
 and guarantee. Nor can this Government admit that a cession of territory 
 can be properly exacted far exceeding in value the amplest estimate of a 
 reasonable indemnity. 
 
 If our good offices are rejected, and this policy of the absorption of an 
 independent state be persisted in, this Government will consider itself dis- 
 charged from any further obligation to be influenced in its action by the 
 position which Chili has assumed, and loill hold itself free to appeal to the 
 other republics of this continent to Join it in an effort to avert consequences 
 which cannot be confined to Chili and Peru, but which thi'eaten with extremest 
 danger the political institutions, the peaceful progress, and the liberal civili- 
 zation of all America.* 
 
 It is a significant fact that Mr. Blaine's farewell to his South 
 American Policy was made tlirough the medium of the Landreau 
 claim. On December 14th, in his last dispatch relative to Chili-Peru- 
 vian affairs, he " reaffirmed" as follows : — 
 
 While disabusing the mind of the Chilian Government of any impression 
 that the United States meditates intervention on behalf of private claims, 
 beyond the use of its good offices, you will say that justice seems to demand 
 that Landreau should have an opportunity to be heard in support of his 
 claim before a tribunal in Peru competent to decide it, and that, if decided 
 in his favor, a treaty of peace which might cede territory to Chili should not be 
 made in disregard of any rights which Mr. Landreau may be found, after an 
 impartial judicial investigation, to possess.^ 
 
 If the instructions to Mr. Trescot had been carried out, this coun- 
 try, in all probability, would have been drawn into a war with Chili 
 before the people of the United States became aware of any disagree- 
 ment with that country. In those insti'uctions the abolition of the 
 Calderon Government is considered as an insult to the United States, 
 and the restoration of that Government, or of some other Government 
 approved by Mr. Blaine, is demanded. No explanation is made of 
 the acts of General Hurlbut, although the Chilian Minister had, more 
 than a month before, made representations concerning his conduct ; 
 the imaginary and novel principle of international law is re-stated ; 
 the Landreau claim is made a condition of any peace ; and an alli- 
 ance against Chili is threatened. "When Mr. Trescot arrived in Peru, 
 
 • Senate Ex. Doc, No. 79, 47th Congress, First Session, pp. 176-178. 
 t /A, p. 186. 
 
66 
 
 Mr. Blaine was no longer Secretary of State, and Mr. Frelinghuysen 
 hastened to revoke the instructions. The revocation followed so 
 quickly upon the original, that both came simultaneously before the 
 public, who regarded the whole series of events as belonging to the 
 past, and never realized that the United States was on the eve of war 
 with Chili, the only American republic which approaches us in re- 
 spectability, civilization, and character. 
 
 THE FEELING IN CHILI. 
 
 It is no misrepresentation to say that there was danger of a war, 
 which would not only have embroiled the United States with Chili and 
 other Spanish American republics, but also with some of the Vauo- 
 pean Powers. The proceedings of General Hurlbut ; the belief that 
 the United States bad determined to intervene for the purpose of 
 preventing a cession of Peruvian territory ; a published letter of Mon- 
 tero, Vice-President of the Calderon Government, thanking General 
 Hurlbut for this promised intervention ; the rumors that American 
 claims without foundation were to be injected into the negotiations, 
 and their payment made a condition of peace, — all these facts had 
 driven the Chilians to desperation. Santa-Maria, the President of 
 Chili, called together the leading statesmen in consultation, and all 
 expressed their willingness to accept war with the United States 
 rather than its dictation of terms of peace with Peru and Bolivia. 
 
 Soon after his arrival in Chili, Mr. Trescot, on January 13th, wrote 
 to Mr. Frelinghuysen : — 
 
 Postponing to next mail a careful appreciation of the very delicate and 
 difficult character of tlie question with which it has been made my duty to 
 deal, I can only say now that I found here a state of feeling excited far be 
 yond anything that I had anticipated.* 
 
 This excitement had existed for a long time before Mr. Trescot's 
 arrival. After the death of General Kilpatrick, Mr. Foote, the 
 United States Consul at Valparaiso, had written on December 9th to 
 Mr. Blaine : — 
 
 It seems to me, with less haste more progress might have been made. 
 This country need not have been agitated and alarmed by this imprudent 
 zeal, and our intluence, which has for years been paramount here, need not 
 have been destroyed. 
 
 The Senate and House of Deputies have been in secret session for days 
 
 ' U. S. Foreign UelationB, 18S2, p. 58. 
 
67 
 
 in the discussion of these questions. 'Vlw loading Senator of tlio party op- 
 posed to the Government said to me : — 
 
 " We are a unit. The United States may crush a sister Republic if she 
 can afford to do so; but she shall not intimidate and dictate to us; we will 
 die hard, and we will make use of every resource which God and nature have 
 given us." 
 
 And knowing as I do the temper of the people, I believe this to be the 
 universal sentiment. * 
 
 * Senate Ex. Doc, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 183. 
 
 That a vigorous renewal of Mr. Blaine's policy may be expected, should he ever have 
 an opportunity to renew it, is seen from the following : "I think it will be demonstrated 
 in the very near future, that the I'nited States will have to assume a much more decided 
 tone in South America than the one which I took, and which was rescinded, or else it will 
 have lo back out of it, and say that it is a domain that does not l)elong to us, and we sur- 
 render it to Europe." House Iteport, No. 17!I0, 47ih Congress, First Session, p. 3.V2. 
 
 ]\Ir Blaine has declared that his policy could have been carried to a successful issue 
 without the United States firing a gun. There is every reason, however, for believing that 
 he would have been mistaken in relying upon the pliability of Chili. The feeling among 
 the people was intense, and in addition to their hope of European interference, the Chili- 
 ans were assured beforehand of the sympathy of Brazil and of almost all the other Spanish 
 American States 
 
 The following comparisonof the Chilian navy with that of the United States from the 
 New York Herald of September 17, 1883, prepared by the special correspondent at Lima, 
 shows that whatever the issue of such a war, the immediate efi"ect8 would have been 
 disastrous to this country. 
 
 "The Chilian N.wv. — The report of the Chilian Minister of Marine, Sefior Don Carlos 
 Castellon, presented to the Congress now in session at Santiago, under date of June 1, 1883, 
 contains some tables of the available force of the Chilian Navy, which I combine and 
 translate as follows :- ■ 
 
 Iron-clads : Tonnage. Steamers : ' Tonnage. 
 
 Blanco Encalada .... 2,0:;3 Abtao .... 1,057 
 
 Almirante Cochrane . . . 2,033 Tolten 240 
 
 Huascar 1,130 Transport: 
 
 Corvettes: Chile 1,173 
 
 O'Higgins 1,101 Storeships : 
 
 Clmcubuco 1,101 Thalaba .... 800 
 
 Gunlioats: Valdivia .... 700 
 
 Magal lanes 775 Mirallores .... 1,000 
 
 Pircoinayo 600 
 
 Cruisers: Total . . . 15,661 
 
 Araazonas 1,373 
 
 Angamos 465 
 
 In supplementary tables it enumerates besides : — 
 Storeships— Elvira Alvarez, Pachitea, and Kate Kellock. 
 Steamers— Lautaro, Toro, Isluga, Gaviota, and Valparaiso. 
 
 Torpedo Launches — Fresia, Colocolo, Tucapel, Guacolda, Lauca, Glaura, Tegualda 
 Janequee, Guale, Quidora, and Rucumilla. 
 
 Six of those torpedo launches are each 100 feet long, three 86 feet, and two 48 feet. 
 It should be understood also though the Minister of Marine does not allude to it, 
 that besides these armed vessels the South Ameriian Steamship Company, a Chilian 
 corporation, possesses ten large stcsmers engaged at present in private trade between 
 Valparaiso and Callao and Valparaiso and Europe. Some of them, as for example the 
 Maipo, the Mapocho, and the Cachapoal, are of nearly three thousand tons (according co 
 the present scale of British registered tonnage), and are the newest and finest passenger and 
 freight steamers afloat in the Pacific Ocean. All are available for use by the Chilian 
 Government as naval transports. 
 
 The United States Pacific Squadron*. — Now let us compare with the Chilian navy 
 
68 
 
 THE RETERSAL OP MR. BLAINE'S POLICY, 
 
 Mr. Blaine retired from office at tlie close of 1881. Mr. Freling- 
 
 huysen entered upon the duties of Secretary of State on January 1st. 
 
 1882. On January 3d he telegraphed to Mr. Trescot as follows : — 
 
 Exert pacific influence. Avoid any issue leading to your withdrawal 
 from Chin.* 
 
 On the same day he sent another telegram, in about the same terms. 
 On the next day he telegraphed again. 
 
 Secretary Frelinghuysen informed Mr. Trescot by telegraph on this date, 
 that it was the wish of the President that our friendly offices should be ex- 
 tended impartially to both republics; that a pacific influence should be 
 exerted, and every issue, which might lead to otfense, avoided; that questions 
 gi'owing out of the suppression of the Calderon Government could be at- 
 tended to at Washington ; and that it was preferable that he should uot visit 
 Buenos Ayres on his way home, t 
 
 On January 9th, in the following dispatch, he rescinded Mr. 
 Blaine's policy distinctly and entirely. 
 
 The President wishes in no manner to dictate or make any authoritative 
 utterance to either Peru or Chili as to the merits of the controversy existing 
 between those republics, as to what indemnity should be asked or given, as 
 to a change of boundaries, or as to the j^ersonnel of the Government of Peru. 
 The President recognizes Peru and Chili to he independent republics, to which 
 he has no' right or inclination to dictate. 
 
 Were the United States to assume an attitude of dictation toward the South 
 American republics, even for the purpose of preventing war, the greatest of evils, 
 
 the Pacific squadron of the United States. It consists of live wooden screw steamers and a 
 Btoreship, whose rates, tonnage, * * * are stated as follows in the last edition of tlie 
 Naval Register : — 
 
 Second Uates. Tonnage. Third rates. Tonnage. 
 
 Hartford 1,800 Iroquois 695 
 
 Lackawanna 1,026 Wachusett 695 
 
 Storeship. Adams 615 
 
 Onward 704 
 
 Total 8445 
 
 The steam-power of the vessels and the calibre and species of their guns are not given 
 in the Register; but it is notorious that their armament is as antiquated as are the ships 
 themselves. It consists of old smooth-bores, a few of which have been fitted with rifle- 
 cores. There is not a first-rate or a second-rale vessel in the Chilian navy whose arma- 
 ment would not pennit her to shell and sink all the ships in this American squadron if, by 
 Buiierior speed, she could keep beyond the range of the enemy's old guns." 
 
 * U. S. Foreign Relations, 18S2, p. 56. 
 
 tSenate Ex. Doc, No. 79, 47th Congress, First Session, p. 186. 
 
 Mr. Trescot had been instructed by Mr. Blaine to return by the way of Buenos Ayres 
 and Bio de Janeiro for the purpose of calling attention to the importance of the proposed 
 Peace Conference. 
 
69 
 
 or to preaerve the autonomy of nations, it must be prepared by ar-my and navy to 
 enforce its mandate, and to tfiis end tax our people for the exclusive benefit of 
 I'oreir/n nations. 
 
 The President's policy with the South American republics and otlier 
 foreign nations, is that expressed in the immortal address of Washington, 
 with which you are entirely familiar. AVhat tlie President does seek to do, 
 is to extend the kindly offices of the United States impartially to both Peru 
 and Chili, whose hostile attitude to each other he seriously laments; and 
 he considers himself fortunate in having one so competent as yourself to 
 bring the powers of reason and persuasion to bear in seeking the termination 
 of the unhappy controversy; and you will consider as revoked that portion of 
 your original instruction which directs you on the contingency therein stated 
 as follows : — 
 
 " You will say to the Chilian Government that the President considers 
 such a proceeding as an intentional and unwarranted offense, and that you 
 will communicate such an avowal to the Government of the United States, 
 with the assurance that it will be regarded by the Government as an act of 
 such unfriendly import as to require the immediate suspension of all diplo- 
 matic intercourse. You will inform me immediately of the happening of 
 such a contingency, and instructions will be sent to you."* 
 
 Believing that a prolific cause of contention between nations is an 
 irritability which is too readily offended, the President prefers that he shall 
 himself determine, after report has been made to him, whether there is or is 
 not cause for offense. 
 
 It is also the President's wish that you do not visit (although indicated 
 in your original instruction you should do so), as the envoy of this Govern- 
 ment, the Atlantic republics after leaving Chili. 
 
 The United States is at peace with all the nations of the earth, and the 
 President wishes hereafter to determine whether it will conduce to that 
 general peace, which he would cherish and promote, for this Government to 
 enter into negotiations and consultation for the promotion of peace with 
 selected friendly nationalities without extending a like confidence to other 
 peoples with whom the United States is on equally friendly terms. 
 
 If such partial confidence would create jealousy and ill will, peace, the 
 object sought by such consultation, would not be promoted. 
 
 The principles controlling the relations of the republics of this hemi- 
 sphere with each other and with other nationalities may, on investigation, 
 be found to be so well established that little would be gained at this time by 
 reopening a subject which is not novel. The President at all events prefers 
 time for deliberation, t 
 
 With this judgment on Mr, Blaine's South American Policy, pro- 
 nounced by a Republican administration, we close our examination 
 his career as Secretary of State. 
 
 * See p. 63. 
 
 t Senate Ex. Doc, No. 79, 47th Congress, First Session, p/ 
 
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