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 .H26 EMBER / ^p^g ATHENAEUM \ Article 
 
 f\ 912 V / No. 1 
 
 ^Opy 2 ^ 
 
 The Preliminary Diplomacy 
 
 of the 
 
 Spanish-American War 
 
 By 
 LEWIS A. HARDING 
 
 GREENSBURG, INDIANA 
 
 OF THE STATE BAR ASSOCIATION OF INDIANA 
 
 WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY DR. AMOS S. HERSHEY 
 PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTER- 
 NATIONAL LAW IN INDIANA UNIVERSITY 
 
 (^^ 
 ^(^ 
 
 lii UBRARY OF COhitiiHt^ 
 
 GIVEN AT GREENSBURG, INDIANA. NOVEMBER 21. 1912. 
 BEFORE THK ATHENAEUM. A SOCIETY DESIGNED FOR RESEARCH AND WRITING 
 
 INDIANAPOI-lS 
 
 THE HOLLENBECK PRESS 
 
 1912 
 
li 
 
 1 
 
 I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Spanish-American war constitutes a turning-point in the his- 
 tory of American expansion. A sketch of the prehminary diplomacy 
 of this war, based on a careful study of available documents, is there- 
 fore of considerable interest and importance. This study of Mr. 
 Harding's deals with one of the subjects assigned at Indiana Univer- 
 sity on the John W. Foster foundation for special research in the 
 political and diplomatic history of the United States, and will be of 
 interest and value to students of American history. 
 
 ^\MOS S. HERSHEY, 
 Professor of Political Science and International Law 
 in Indiana University, 
 
 Bloomington, Indiana, November lo, 1912. 
 
 
THE PRELIMINARY DIPLOMACY OF THE 
 SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 
 
 BY LEWIS A. HARDING 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 The rise of America as a world power is the j^^reatest develop- 
 ment of modern history. An inevitable result of that development, 
 from the beginning, has been the important bearing of the Ameri- 
 can Government upon the solution of difficulties involving the appli- 
 cation of international law, as well as national policy, in certain 
 international affairs. In such affairs the United States has taken 
 a hand, not only where it has been a direct party in interest, but 
 occasionally where it has been indirectly or else only morally inter- 
 ested. In so far as the shutting out of the European state-system 
 is concerned, the United States has acted as the warder of the 
 American Continent.^ Moreover, at least in one noted instance, 
 it has interfered with some legal justification, but primarily on the 
 grounds of humanity.- Such was the case in the intervention 
 against the rule of Spain in Cuba. 
 
 During the first quarter of the nineteenth century Spain lost 
 hold on her Central and South American Colonies. It was then 
 that the king of Spain invoked the aid of Russia, Austria and 
 Prussia,^ presumably to aid him in subduing his rebellious colo- 
 nies. At this juncture the attitude of the United States toward the 
 Old World was unmistakably expressed in the Monroe Doctrine 
 of 1823.* At this proclamation of noninterference the European 
 alliance abandoned all intention of aiding Spain to reimpose her 
 old colonial system over her former colonies in America. The 
 Spanish possessions in the Western Heniis])here were thus reduced 
 to Cuba and Porto Rico, and a few small adjacent islands, which 
 remained under the control of Spain until the Spanish-American 
 war of 1898. 
 
 For a century the island of Cuba had been an object of [)cculiar 
 
 1 Lawrence, Principles of International T.aw. 3rd Kil., p. 250. 
 
 2 See Wheaton, History of the Law of Nations, Pt. IV, Section 28. 
 
 3 The same powers that formed tlie "Holy Alliance" in 1815. 
 
 * This doctrine was not new with Monroe. Its beginning may be found in the neu- 
 trality proclamation of Washington, in his farewell address, and in JctTcrson's warning 
 against "entangling alliances." Sec Richardson, Messages and Documents, \'ol. I, pp. 
 156, 222, and 323. 
 
O THE PRELIMINARY DIPLOMACY 
 
 interest and concern to the United States. At first the fear was that 
 Cuba might be acquired by France or Great Britain and the poHcy 
 of the United States in the early period was to guarantee the island 
 to Spain.^ With the consciousness of national expansion that 
 came after the Mexican War, American foreign policy assumed a 
 much more aggressive character, and Cuba became an object of de- 
 sire, not only of the slaveholding territory, but of the larger part of 
 the nation on account of the strategic position of the island. Con- 
 sequently various attempts were made at this time to annex Cuba 
 to the United States, both by purchase from Spain and forcibly by 
 filibustering expeditions.*^ After the close of the Civil War grow- 
 ing commercial interests in Cuba were held by citizens of the United 
 States. The main object of Cuban diplomacy then became the ex- 
 tension of commercial relations with the island and the protection 
 of American interests. 
 
 Spain all the while, however, maintained her old policy of ex- 
 ploitation in the island.' Often the people of Cuba revolted 
 against the iron hand of Spain, until in 1868 began the terrible 
 "Ten Years' War." That struggle was characterized by great 
 cruelty, destruction of property, and irregular methods of warfare, 
 and imposed grave responsibilities upon the United States.* Presi- 
 dent Grant seriously considered, and even threatened intervention,* 
 and intervention at this time would probably have meant annexa- 
 tion.^° But such action was postponed, and in 1878 peace was again 
 restored as a result of the exhaustion of both parties, and the prom- 
 ise of definite reforms by Spain. 
 
 For seventeen years the matter slumbered, when in 1895 the 
 Cubans again rose in rebellion against the power of Spain. It was 
 mainly in connection with this final insurrection that the questions 
 arose which became the sul:)ject-matter of the preliminary diplomacy 
 leading up to the Spanish-American War. 
 
 II 
 
 THE OCCASION AND SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE PRE- 
 LIMINARY DIPLOMACY. 
 
 In order now in the best way to view the preliminary dijilomacy 
 leading up to the Spanish-American War, it will be well, first, 
 brictly to set forth the occasion and subject-matter immediately in- 
 volved; including thus, principally the Cuban Insurrection of 1895 
 
 '^ Turner, New West, Am. Nation, \I\'. Chap. Xll; The Intervention of the United 
 States in Cul)a, J. II. Latane, North American Review, \"ol. 166. See p. 350. 
 
 " Latane, Diplomatic Relations of the I'nited States and Spanish-America, p. 89 et seq. 
 
 ' Rowan an(l Ramsey, Island of Cuba, pp. 183-189. 
 
 "Atlantic Monthly, Feb. 1894, Vol. 73. pp. 217, 218. 
 
 "President Crant, Annual Message, Dec. 7, 1875; Moore, Dig. Int. Law, I, p. 197; 
 Atlantic Monthly, \'ol. 7i, pp. J 17, 218. 
 
 ^^ Latane, America as a World Power, Chnp. I, \i. 5. 
 
 Gin 
 
 Author 
 
 nci* 71 IBIA 
 
OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR J 
 
 together with certain rights and sympathies involved in addition to 
 matters more or less incidental in their nature. 
 
 THE INSURRECTION OF 1895. 
 
 The reforms promised to the Cubans by Spain at the close of 
 the Ten Years' War were not carried out and the old policy of ex- 
 ploitation and oppression was continued.^ Finally, in February, 
 1895, the last insurrection against Spanish rule began. In this 
 struggle both sides were guilty of outrages. The policy of the in- 
 surrectionary chief, Maximo Gomez, was to fight no pitched bat- 
 tles, but to devastate the country and to destroy every possible source 
 of revenue for the enemy.- 
 
 On February lO, 1896, General Weyler arrived in Havana, as 
 Governor and Captain-General of Cuba, and six days later inaugu- 
 rated the "reconcentration" policy in the island. All the inhabitants 
 were directed by proclamation to "reconcentrate themselves" im- 
 mediately in the towns occupied by the troops. Any individual who 
 failed to comply with this decree was considered as a rebel and 
 shot." The unarmed pacificos who remained on their estates, Wey- 
 ler drove at the point of the bayonet from their homes into the forti- 
 fied towns. The result was that starvation soon prevailed and the 
 death rate was frightful.* But Weyler gave no heed ;. the evident 
 intention of his government was to depopulate the island by starva- 
 tion and slaughter.^ 
 
 For nearly a year and a half General Weyler's policy of exterm- 
 ination was carried on. The cry of distress from the unhappy is- 
 land increased more and more, and to the American public, it 
 seemed in time as "the voice of a brother's blood crying from the 
 ground." 
 
 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND SYMPATHIES INVOLVED. 
 
 Owing to the proximity of Cuba, occasional firebrands, so to 
 speak, thrown by the volcanic force of the rebellion, fell upon the 
 American shore, while the flames of the insurrection were fed in 
 various ways by American sympathy and adventure. 
 
 Between February 24, 1895, and January 22, 1897, some seventy- 
 five persons claiming to be citizens of the United States were arrested 
 by the Spanish authorities, cast into prison, and in some cases very 
 harshly treated." Fully three-fourths of those arrested were Cubans, 
 or sons of Cubans, who had been naturalized in the United States.'' 
 
 Other Cubans, including many who were still Spanish subjects,^ 
 
 1 See Dunning, Reconstruction, Chap. X. See also Murat Halstead, Story of Cuba, p. 
 67; and Rowan and Ramsey, Island of Cuba. pp. 183-189. 
 
 2 See Senate Docs., 58 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 25, p. 125. See also Halstead, Story of 
 Cuba, list of Spanish plantations destroyed by the insurgents, p. 303. 
 
 a Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 739. See E. G. Bonsai's Real Condition of Cuba To- 
 day, p. 108. 
 
 ••Weyler's starvation policy is said to have cost Cuba 250,000 lives. 
 
 ° A. S. Hershey, Intervention and the Recognition of Cuban Independence, Publica- 
 tions of Am. Acad. Pol. and Social Science, Ap. 1, 1898. 
 
 See Senate Doc. 84, 54 Cong., 2 Sess. 
 
 ' Senate Com. on For. Rel., Compilation of Reports, \'IT, 581-585. 
 
 * Latane, America As a World Power, Am. Nation, XX\', Chap. I, p. 8. 
 
THE PRELIMINARY DIPLOMACY 
 
 were constantly gathering military supplies or fitting out illegal 
 expeditions in the United States. To meet this situation President 
 Cleveland issued a proclamation June 12, 1895, warning 'all persons 
 within the jurisdiction of the United States against doing any of the 
 acts prohibited by American neutrality laws.^ While the great ma- 
 jority of these illegal expeditions were stopped or intercepted, a 
 number — though surprisingly small^^— did succeed in reaching the 
 coasts of Cuba. 
 
 The policies of warfare employed in the island soon paralyzed 
 the industries of Cuba and destroyed its commerce.. In these mat- 
 ters the United States was somewhat concerned, for American citi- 
 zens owned at least fifty millions of property in the island,^^ and 
 American commerce at the beginning of the insurrection amounted 
 to a hundred millions annually. Moreover, the claims on file in the 
 State Department against Spain for the destruction of property by 
 the close of 1897 amounted to sixteen million dollars.^- 
 
 Under these circumstances, the official efforts to be practically 
 impartial put forth all along by the United States were very unu- 
 suaF^ for a contest in which belligerency had not been recognized.^* 
 President Cleveland was loath to ofifend a friendly nation; but he 
 warned Spain. In his annual message of 1896 he said, "It cannot 
 be" reasonably assumed that the hitherto expectant attitude of the 
 United States will be indefinitely maintained."^^ Mr. McKinley 
 followed the same policy, w^arning Spain in various ways, but she 
 refused to heed the warnings. 
 
 The United States had all along viewed patiently the spectacle 
 in Cuba. President McKinley, however, began to take certain for- 
 ward steps— one of which was attended by the gravest incident— in 
 behalf of American interests. Early in the spring of 1897 the Presi- 
 dent demanded the release of American prisoners in Cuba and this 
 was heeded. In May he asked Congress for $50,000 for the relief 
 of Americans in the island, and this was granted and administered. 
 
 In February, 1898, the battleship Maine was sent into Cuban 
 waters on a friendly visit in behalf of American interests.^^ On 
 tlie night of the 15th of February, while the crew were sleeping, a 
 mighty column of smoke and fire arose from the water, commingled 
 witii timbers and beams and the bodies of men. The IMaine had 
 been blown to fragments and 266 of her crew had perished. i' When 
 
 "Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 591. 
 '0 Moore, Digest of International Law, VII, 1024. 
 
 "Moore, Dig. Int. Law, VI, p. 121. Report of Mr. Olney, Sec'y of State, to the 
 President, Dec. 7, 1896. , ^ , , ,, t^. 
 
 "Sen. Com. on For. Rel., Compilation of Reports, \ II, 339; and Moore, Dig. of Int. 
 
 Law, VI, 121. , , .. . . r ^ u T J 1 
 
 ^ See Amos S. Hershcy, Intervention and the Recognition of Cuban Independence, 
 American Academy of Political and Social Science, April 1, 1898. See also American 
 Monthly Review of Reviews, March, 1898, p. 262. 
 
 J* Richardson, Messages and Papers, 591. , . , ,r 
 
 '"See Moore, Dig. of Int. Law, Vol. VI, p. 129, President Cleveland s Annual Mes- 
 sage, Dec. 7, 1896. 
 
 "Moore, Dig. Int. Law, VI, p. 181. 
 
 I" The lives lost included two officers and two lumdrcd and sixty-four of the crew, 
 according to Moore, Dig. Int. Law, VI, 181, an<l For. Kcl. 1898, 1029. President Mc- 
 Kinley. in his message April 11, 1898, gave the total killed as 260. See Moore, Dig. Int. 
 Law, VI, 220. 
 
OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 9 
 
 the news flashed across the country the United States was shocked 
 and aroused ; and the world was startled at the ominous event which 
 hastened an approaching crisis. 
 
 Ill 
 
 THE PRELIMINARY DIPLOMACY LEADING UP TO THE 
 
 WAR. 
 
 At the beginning-, Congress and the Executive of the United 
 States took somewhat different views as to the state of afi:airs in 
 Cuba. On June 12, 1895, President Cleveland in his first important 
 expression on the subject recognized only a state of insurgency in 
 the island.^ The 54th Congress, however, in its first session, passed 
 a concurrent resolution recognizing a state of belligerency in 
 Cuba and offering Spain the good offices of the United States for 
 the recognition of Cuban independence. This resolution passed the 
 Senate February 28, 1896, by a vote of 64 to 6, and on April 6 passed 
 the House by a vote of 246 to 27. But as the President was 
 not bound by this resolution, in spite of the overwhelming majority 
 it had received he ignored it ; and it amounted simply to an expres- 
 sion of opinion by Congress. - 
 
 Meanwhile the President was following out another line of 
 action. On April 4, 1896, Mr. Olney, the Secretary of State, ad- 
 dressed a note to the Spanish minister, in which the United States 
 offered to mediate between Spain and the insurgents for the resto- 
 ration of peace on the basis of a more complete autonomy.-'^ To this 
 note, the Spanish minister, Mr. Dupuy de Lome, replied on May 
 22, claiming that Cuba already enjoyed "one of the most liberal 
 political systems of the world."'' The note concluded with the sug- 
 gestion that the United States could contribute to the pacification 
 of the island by prosecuting "the unlawful expeditions of some of 
 its citizens to Cuba with more vigor than in the past."^ 
 
 In December Secretary Olney, in an important report to the 
 President, depicted the "reign of arbitrary anarchy" and its influ- 
 ence, which existed in the island. He declared the rebellion was on 
 a far more formidable scale than any of the preceding revolts of the 
 century ; and after nearly two years of successful resistance it ap- 
 peared to be in a condition to indefinitely prolong the contest. Guer- 
 rilla warfare was carried on over most of the island. Large Ameri- 
 can investments were exposed to the exceptional vicissitudes of the 
 war. The report alluded to the claim of the insular authorities to 
 
 1 Richardson, Messages and Papers, IX, p. 591. Sucli a status merely put into effect 
 municipal statutes; it did not bring into operation any of the rules of neutrality under in- 
 ternational law, for such a result could be brought about only by the recognition of 
 belligerency, and President Cleveland consistently refused to recognize the Cubans as 
 belligerents. See Moore, Dig. Int. Law, I, 242, 243; Scc'y Olney to Mr. Dupuy de Lome, 
 Span. Min., Moore, Dig. Int. Law, VI, pp. 105-110. , ,.. ^' 
 
 -Senate Tournal, 54th Cong., 1 Sess., 158; House Journal, 54th Cong., 1 Sess., 372. 
 
 3 Moore, Dig. Int. Law, VI, p. 109; For. Rel. 1897, 540. 
 
 * Spanish Dipl. Corresp. and Docs., 7, 8; Moore, Dig. Int. Law, VI, Mr. Dupuy de 
 Lome Span. Min., to Mr. Olney, Sec'y of State. 
 
 s Spanish Diplomatic Docs., 7, 8; Moore, Dig. Int. Law, \ I, p. 114, Mr. Dupuy da 
 Lome, Span. Mm., to Mr. Olney, Sec'y of State. 
 
10 THE PRELIMINARY DIPLOMACY 
 
 the right to arrest American citizens without process as denying the 
 orderly recourses of Spanish law guaranteed by treaty. Thousands 
 of refugees, including hundreds of American citizens, were driven 
 from peaceful pursuits into the provincial towns to face starvation. 
 To the constant killing and summary execution of non-combatants, 
 American citizens frequently were falling victims.*^ 
 
 In his annual message of December 7, 1896, President Cleveland 
 discussed the situation at length. After rejecting as inexpedient the 
 recognition of either belligerency or independence he declared it 
 already demonstrated that when the struggle "has degenerated into 
 a strife which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of 
 human life and the utter destruction of the very subject-matter of 
 the conflict a situation will be presented in which our obligation to 
 the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations, 
 which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge."' No 
 further action was taken till the administration of William 
 McKinley. 
 
 The attitude of the new administration, which began March 4, 
 1897, was officially communicated to Spain in Secretary Sherman's 
 note of June 26.** In this he protested in the name of humanity 
 and the interests of the United States against the acts and decrees 
 of General Weyler, particularly his reconcentration order. ^ To 
 this Mr. Dupuy de Lome replied, but not until August 4, asserting 
 that affairs in Cuba were not as bad as depicted ; that at the date of 
 Sherman's note, only twelve per cent, of the fifty thousand dollars 
 appropriated for the relief of Americans in Cuba had been spent 
 because no further need existed. He declared that General Wey- 
 ler's orders were no more severe than the measures adopted by Sher- 
 idan in the Valley of Virginia or by Sherman in Georgia. Attention 
 was called to the operations of the Cuban, Junta in New York and 
 to the aid the insurgents were receiving from the United States. ^° 
 
 On July 17, 1897, General Woodford succeeding Hannis Taylor, 
 received his instructions as minister to Spain. ^^ September 23 he 
 presented at length the views of the McKinley administration, and 
 tendered the good offices of the United States for the adjustment of 
 Cuban affairs, presumably on a basis of independence. He called 
 attention to the resolution passed by Congress the year before and to 
 the fact that Congress was soon to convene again. 1- On the 29th 
 the Spanish ministry resigned and on October 14 the liberal minis- 
 try of Sagasta took the oath of office. Sefior Gullon became minis- 
 
 » Report of Mr. Olney, Sec'y of State, to the Prcs., Dec. 7, 1896, For. Rel. 1896, 
 LXXX. 
 
 ■ Richardson, Messages and Papers, IX. 772. , , , , , 
 
 'At this critical juncture, in order to reward Marcus A. Hanna, who had managed the 
 McKinley campaign. Tohn Sherman, of Ohio, was induced to give up his seat in the, 
 United States Senate and to accept the post of Secretary of State. Sherman's "iin<l was 
 beginning to show the weakness of age, and although he had in Judge Wm. R. Dayt a 
 very alile assistant secretary, the conduct of the department was very far from satisfactory. 
 Sec Latane, American Nation, XXV, p. II. r. ■^,■ t 
 
 BMr Sherman, Sec. of State, to Senor Don Enrique Dupuy de Lome, Span. Mm., June 
 26, 1897, For. Rel. 1897, 507; Moore, Dig. Int. Law, VI, p. 130-132. 
 
 '" Spanish Diplomatic Corrcsp. and Docs., 28. 
 
 " Moore, Dig. Int. Law, VI, 143, 144. 
 
 "Foreign Rels., 1898, p. 568. 
 
OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR II 
 
 . ter of State and Senor Aloret, Alinister of the Colonies. Three days 
 later General Blanco was appointed to succeed General Weyler as 
 Governor and Captain-general of Cuba. 
 
 October 2t^ General \\'oodford received from Senor Gullon an 
 answer to the tender of good offices. The new mjnistrv promised 
 to grant autonomy to Cuba, and— appealing to the doctrine of the 
 Geneva arbitration — again urged the United States to enforce more 
 vigorously her neutrality laws.^^ Secretary Sherman, however, 
 in a note to Mr. Woodford November 20, set forth that the strug- 
 gle in Cuba was merely a domestic insurrection, by which the obli- 
 gations attaching to a condition of belligerency were not exacted 
 of a third party ; that the rights and duties of the United States 
 were only such as devolved upon a friendly nation, and that such 
 obligations had been faithfully observed. ^'^ The Secretary de- 
 clared that the neutrality laws of the United States had been kept 
 according to the rule laid down in the case of Wiborg v. The United 
 States,^ 5 and questioned the applicability of the doctrine of Geneva 
 to the case of Cuba. 
 
 President AIcKinley, in his annual message of December 6, 
 1897, dwelt particularly on the possibility of intervention, but he 
 concluded it was only fair to give the new government of Sagasta 
 time to test its policy of autonomy. He added that Weyler had 
 been recalled, the order of concentration modified, some specified 
 prisoners released ; and that "not a single American citizen is now in 
 arrest or confinement in Cuba of whom this government has any 
 knowledge.^" 
 
 But in Cuba the memory of the past was revolting, and affairs 
 had reached such a condition that the grant of autonomy was too 
 late. On January 13, 1898, riotous demonstrations against the 
 scheme occurred in Havana.^ ^ Consul General Fitzhugh Lee ex- 
 pressed doubt as to whether Blanco could control the situation. 
 While Blanco fully desired to give the Cubans a fair measure of 
 autonomy, "the army and the Spanish citizens did not want genuine 
 autonomy, for that meant government by the Cuban people."^ ^ 
 
 At the time of the riots in January, General Lee advised his 
 government that the presence of warships might later become neces- 
 sary. When Assistant Secretary Day informed him that the Maine 
 would call at Havana in a day or two on a friendly visit, General 
 Lee advised that the visit be postponed till the last excitement had 
 subsided. But the Maine had already sailed for Havana where she 
 arrived January 25 without any demonstration on the part of 
 the populace.^'* This action of the United States was resented by 
 
 "For. Rel. 1898, p. 582; Senor Gullon, Min. of State, to Mr. Woodford, Am. Min., 
 Oct. 23, 1897, Moore, Dig. Int. Law, \'I, 144-153. 
 
 " Mr. Sherman, Sec. of State, to Mr. Woodford, Min. to Spain, Nov. 20, 1897, Moore, 
 Dig. Int. Law, VI, 159-160. 
 
 1= 163 U. S. Rep'ts, 632. 
 
 w Richardson, Messages and Papers, X, 131. 
 
 " American Nation, XX\', Ch. I, p. 14. 
 
 ^s Speech of Senator Proctor, Cong. Record, 55 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 296. 
 
 " For. Rel. 1898, p. 1025. 
 
12 THE PRELIMINARY DIPLOMACY 
 
 the Spanish adherents in Cuba and is said to have been freely criti- 
 cised by the Spanish Minister at Washington.-'' 
 
 About this time occurred an incident which led to the retirement 
 of the Spanish minister, Seiior Dupuy de Lome, February 8, 1898, 
 the New York Journal published the facsimile of a letter written 
 by Senor de Lome to a friend in Havana, which reflected on Presi- 
 dent McKinley. It referred to him as "a bidder for the admiration 
 of the crowd" and "a would-be politician." In addition the letter 
 revealed the bad faith of the minister in the negotiation then in 
 progress for a reciprocity arrangement with Cuba.-^ Mr. Day, who 
 was now practically in charge of the State Department,-- at once 
 called on Seiior de-Lome and asked him if the letter was genuine. 
 He admitted it was but contended that the translation had intensi- 
 fied certain phrases which he claimed were permissible in private cor- 
 respondence. 
 
 In accordance with instructions from Secretary Sherman, on 
 February 10 Woodford informed the Spanish minister that the 
 President expected the immediate recall of Sefior de Lome. The 
 minister replied, as Mr. Woodford later explained he understood 
 it,-" that his government sincerely regretted the indiscretion of 
 their minister ; and that his resignation had already been accepted 
 by cable.'-* February 11, 1898, Sehor du Bosc, of the Spanish 
 legation, informed the Department of State that, his government 
 having accepted Seiior de Dupuy de Lome's "renunciation" of the 
 office of minister, he had been designated as charge d'affaires ad 
 interim. -■'' When three days latei" Woodford requested a formal 
 disavowal of the sentiments expressed by de Lome, Seiior Gullon, 
 the minister of State, replied that the Spanish government con- 
 sidered the acceptance of Senor de Lome's resignation as sufficient 
 amend. ^^ Senor Polo Bernabe was then appointed minister to 
 Washington and Mr. Day instructed Woodford to consider the in- 
 cident as closed.-^ 
 
 Suddenly, before the excitement of the de Lome incident had 
 subsided, the world was startled by the catastrophe of the Maine in 
 Havana Harbor. On February 15, at 9:40 p. m., while she was 
 lying quietly in her moorings, a terrific explosion utterly destroyed 
 the vessel and killed 266 of her crew. Brief despatches telling of 
 the disaster were at once sent to Washington by Consul General Lee 
 and Captain Sigsbee, the commander of the ill-fated vessel. Expres- 
 sions of condolence were made by many foreign governments and 
 
 ^ Officially, the Spanish government returned the compliment by sending the ^'iscaya 
 to the New York harbor, where she remained one week. 
 
 ^ See Mr. Sherman, Sec. of State to Mr. Woodford, Min. to Spain, Aloore, Dig. Int. 
 Law, VI, 175. 
 
 -- Latane, American Nation, XXV^, p. 11. 
 
 -'See Mr. Woodford to Mr. Sherman, Sec. of State, Mch. 8, 1898, Moore, Dig. Int. 
 Law, VI, 180. 
 
 -'Moore, Dig. Int. Law, VI, 17-4. 
 
 ■'- Ibid. 
 
 -"Senor Gullon, Min. of State, to Mr. Woodfor.l. Min. to Spain, Feb. 15, 1898, Moore, 
 Dig. Int. Law, VI, 179. 
 
 -' Mr. Day, Acting Sec. of State, to Mr. Woodford, Min. to Spain, Feb. 18, 1898, 
 Moore, Dig. Int. Law, VI, 179. 
 
OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR I3 
 
 officials including the Queen Regent and the government of Spain 
 and various officials in Spain and Cuba.-"* The two governments 
 each at once appointed a naval commission to investigate and report 
 on the disaster. 
 
 jNIeanwhile, after. these "changing lights thrown upon the situa- 
 tion,"-^ Secretary Sherman, in a note marked "confidential," to Mr. 
 Woodford, March i, 1898, reviewed the situation in Cuba to date. 
 He said no change had supervened in the conduct of hostilities on 
 either side save fewer excesses were reported on the part of the 
 Spanish troops ; that the autonomist government appeared to have 
 been extended from Havana to several districts of the island, but 
 that its success was uncertain and beset with hard financial prob- 
 lems ; that for the most part no disposition was shown on the part 
 of the leaders of the rebellion to accept autonomy as a solution ; and 
 that the condition of the island in its financial and productive aspects 
 ,was if an3thing, worse than ever. "The few estates," he added, 
 "which under guard of troops, have endeavored to resume opera- 
 tions do not afiford lodgment for a tithe of the destitute."^ °-^" 
 
 At about this time Spain raised some objections to Consul 
 General Lee. In an interview with i\Ir. Woodford, Senor Moret, 
 Spanish minister of thq colonies is reported to have said: "Spain 
 cannot consider Lee a reliable man, and is entitled to say that his 
 reports are misleading and untrustworthy. Consul Lee freely admits 
 he is corresponding with the insurgents and openly avows that he is 
 deadly against autonomy. The insular government distrusts him as 
 well, and is much inclined to solicit his recall."^^'' Mr. Day, acting 
 Secretary of State replied: "The President will not consider any 
 proposal to withdraw General Lee. Our information and belief is 
 that throughout this crisis General Lee has borne himself with 
 great ability, prudence, and fairness. "3- 
 
 In a personal letter to the President, March 17, 1898, and num- 
 bered 43, Mr. Woodford stated he had reluctantly reached the con- 
 clusion that the only certainty of peace lay in the American owner- 
 ship and occupation of the island. In a letter numbered 44 written 
 next day, Woodford stated that in an unofficial interview, after he 
 had outlined to Senor Moret a possible plan for the ultimate trans- 
 fer of the island, the latter said to him substantially : "The right 
 way can be found, if we will both do our best and I will work with 
 you for peace, and I am sure we shall get together as to details. "^^ 
 In another letter, numbered 46, Mr. Woodford thought that Senor 
 Moret regarded the parting with Cuba as inevitable, but quoted 
 Moret as saying of the queen, that "she would rather abdicate the 
 reo-ency than be the instrument of parting with any of the patrimony 
 of the Spanish Crown."^* 
 
 2SFor Rel., 1898, 1029-1032, 1045, 1046-1070. 
 
 2> Mr. Sherman, Sec. of State, to Mr. Woodford, Min. to hpain, 'Confidential," Mch. 
 1, 1898, Moore Dig. Int. Law, VI, 184. 
 2» Ibid. 
 
 31 Moore, Dig. Int. Law, VI, 187. 
 
 32 For. Rel. 1898, 676. 
 
 33 Moore, Dig. Int. Law, VI, 188. 
 3»Ibid. 
 
14 THE PRELIMINARY DIPLOMACY 
 
 By telegram on March 21, Woodford asked the President that 
 nothing be done until after receipt of the three letters (numbered 
 43, 44 and 46) unless the report on the Maine required immediate 
 action."^ Mr. Day in a telegram to Mr. Woodford next day said: 
 "Confidential reports show the naval board will make unanimous 
 report that the Maine was blown up by a submarine mine * * * 
 The feeling in the United States is very acute. * * * The Maine 
 loss may be peacefully settled if full reparation is promptly made.""° 
 Spain at this point promised to do all "the highest honor and just- 
 ice require" in regard to the Maine.^' 
 
 On March 21 the report of the United States Board of Inquiry 
 Ivas completed and seven days later a summary of the report was 
 transmitted to the Spanish government. The findings of this court 
 were that the Maine was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine 
 mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more of the for- 
 ward magazines. But no evidence was obtained fixing the responsi- 
 bility upon any person or persons."^ On March 28 the Spanish 
 minister at Washington, Sehor de Bernabe communicated to the 
 Department of State a summary of the report of the Spanish Com- 
 mission.^" This report, based mainly on depositions of "eyewit- 
 nesses and experts,"'*" concluded that the destruction of the vessel 
 was produced by an internal cause.* ^ 
 
 The American public had suspended judgment until the investi- 
 gation was over. When, however, the court of inquiry reported 
 that the explosion was caused by a mine the pent-up feelings of the 
 nation burst forth and the demand for war was overwhelming. Still 
 the President determined to give Spain one more chance. The 
 Spanish ministry really desired peace ; but they recognized the 
 troublesome fact that public opinion in Spain would not countenance 
 such concessions as the Cubans demanded.*- On March 22 Wood- 
 ford in an interview with the minister for the colonies informed him 
 that without considering at all the Maine, unless an agreement 
 which would insure immediate and honorable peace in Cuba should 
 be reached within a very few days, the President must submit the 
 whole matter to the decision of Congress.*" 
 
 The Spanish ministry sought delay. On Alarch 23 the minister 
 for foreign affairs asked to put the matter off until the rainy season 
 and asserted his belief that the insular government during the in- 
 
 35 Mr. Woodford, to Prcs., tcl., March 19, 1898, Moore Dig. Int. Law, \'I, 188. 
 
 3» Mr. Day. Acting Sec. of State, to Mr. Woodford, Min. to Spain, tel., Mch. 20, 1898, 
 For. Rel. 1898, 692. 
 
 " Mr. Woodford, Min. to Spain, to Pres., tel., Mch. 25, 1898, Moore, Dig. Int. Law, 
 VI, 192. 
 
 ^* Summary of report made by United States Board of Inquiry, Mr. Sherman, Sec. of 
 State, to Mr. Woodford, Min. to Spain, teL, Mch. 26, 1898, Moore, Dig. Int. Law, VI, 
 181-183. 
 
 •'"The full report of the Spanish Commission was communicated to the Department of 
 State April 2. 1898. See Sen. Rep'ts 885, 55 Cong., 2 Sess.; For. Rel. 1898, 1045. 
 
 ■"' See Extract from the report of the Spanish Commission of Inquiry, Moore, Dig. Int. 
 Law, VI, 183. 
 
 " The real responsihility has never been disclosed. It is not believed by tliose in a 
 position to judge that the Sjianish government cither iilotted or countenanced the destruc- 
 tion of tlie Maine. It may have l>ccn the work of Cuban insurgents whose object was to 
 bring on war. .See Long, The New American Navy, I, 144. 
 
 <=IIannis Taylor, in N. Am. Rev., CLXV, 628. 
 
 "Mr. Woodford, Min. to Spain, to Pres., tel., March 22, 1898, Moore, Dig. Int. Law, 
 VI, 190. 
 
OF THE SPAXISII-AMEKICAN WAR 15 
 
 terval would in some way adjust matters with the insurgents.^* 
 Next day the minister for the colonies proposed that the question of 
 an early and honorable peace in Cuba be submitted to the Cuban 
 Congress to convene at Havana ^lay 4.*'^ The minister for foreign 
 affairs said on the day following that in such event, if the United 
 States asked for immediate armistice, he believed Spain would grant 
 and enforce it on the sole condition that the insurgent government 
 would do the same*" 
 
 Four days later, on March 29, at a personal interview with the 
 Spanish ministry, General Woodford presented the ultimatum of 
 the United States in the following terms : " The President instructs 
 me to say that we do not want Cuba. He also instructs me to say 
 with equal clearness, that we do wish immediate peace in Cuba. He 
 suggests an armistice, lasting until October i, negotiations in the 
 meantime being had looking to peace between Spain and the insur- 
 gents through the friendly offices of the President of the United 
 States." An informal discussion followed in which Sagasta said 
 Spain would grant an armistice only if the insurgents asked for it."'* 
 Two days later, in a formal reply he handed General A\'oodford cer- 
 tain counter-propositions to the effect that the question of the iMaine 
 should be submitted to arbitration; that the reconcentration order 
 having been revoked, the Spanish government would assist the 
 country people to return to their labors, although this could not be 
 well done until military operations had ceased ; that the pacification 
 of the island would be left to a Cuban parliament which was to con- 
 vene Alay 4 ; that meantime the governor-general would be author- 
 ized to accept a suspension of hostilities if asked for by the insur- 
 gents.*** In transmitting these proposals. General Woodford, who 
 was earnestly striving to avoid war. said that the Spanish ministry 
 had gone as far as they could go without causing a revolution in the 
 Peninsula.*^ 
 
 While these tedious negotiations were going on in Spain, public 
 feeling in America ran high, and it was only with the greatest dif- 
 ficulty that the President, who really wanted peace, could hold Con- 
 gress in check. At this juncture Spain again sought delay. At 
 eleven o'clock, Monday night, April 4, the following despatch was 
 sent to General Woodford: "We have received today a copy of the 
 manifesto of the autonomy government. It is not armistice. It is 
 simply an invitation to the insurgents to submit. It need scarcely 
 be pointed out that this is a very different thing from an oft'ered 
 armistice. The President's message will go in Wednesday after- 
 noon."^'' 
 
 After the rejection of his ultimatum. President McKinley had no 
 further pretext for delay. He decided therefore with reluctance to 
 
 " Mr Woodford, Min. to Spain, to Pres., tel., March 23, 1898, For. Rel. 1898, 696. 
 « Mr! Woodford, Min. to Spain, to Pres., tel., March 24, 1898, Moore Dig. Int. Law, 
 
 ^ ■^''« Mr^^Woodford, Min. to Spain, to Pres., tel., March 25, 1898, For. Rel. 1898, 703. 
 "For. Rel. 1898. 719. 
 ■•s Spanish Dip. Corresp. and Docs., 107. 
 «> For. Rel. 1898. 727. 
 =• Foreign Relations, 1898, 733. 
 
l6 THE PRELIMINARY DIPLOMACY 
 
 shift the responsibihty to Congress. At this juncture, impressed by 
 the Holy See, the Spanish government expressed itself as willing to 
 suspend hostilities provided the American squadron should abandon 
 Cuban waters. ^^ Wednesday, April 6, arrived but no notice came 
 that hostilities had been suspended. On that day, however, the 
 Powers made a formal appeal to the President for peace. ^^ But 
 it was too late. The die had been cast. The President now decided 
 to withhold his message until Monday, April ii, but this was to al- 
 low a safe departure of American citizens from Havana.."*^ 
 
 On Saturday the representatives of the European Powers called 
 on the Spanish minister of State and urged Spain to accede to the 
 requests of the Pope and grant immediate armistice.^* The 'next 
 day, Sunday, April lo, the Spanish minister at Washington in- 
 formed Secretary Sherman that the queen had yielded to the wishes 
 of the Pope and had directed General Blanco to suspend hostilities ; 
 and that after May 4, when the Cuban Parliament was to convene, 
 the Cubans would have all the liberty they could expect. These con- 
 cessions were held by some to be a complete surrender on the part 
 of Spain. ^= The scheme in contemplation, however, left to General 
 Blanco the duration and detail of the suspension of hostilities ; and 
 the promise of liberty seemed vague and indefinite."*' The Presi- 
 dent therefore considered the communication another play for time, 
 and merely alluded to it in his message to Congress. 
 
 In the special message of April 11, 1898, President ]\IcKinley 
 came to the plausible conclusion that forcible intervention was the 
 only solution of the difficulty. ^^ After a lengthy review of the 
 whole situation, he referred to the Maine only incidentally as "a 
 patent and impressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that is in- 
 tolerable." Concluding he said : "In the name of humanity, in the 
 name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests 
 * * =•= the war in Cuba must stop." 
 
 With this the inevitable was at hand, and responsibility of final 
 action was shifted from the gentler hands of diplomacy to a body 
 whose only foreign power is the war power."* 
 
 After a prolonged conference, at 3 o'clock on the morning of the 
 19th of April, Congress adopted a joint resolution which declared, 
 that the ]ieople of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be 
 free and independent, authorized the President to use the war power 
 in carrying out the resolution, and declared also that the United 
 States had no intention to exercise sovereignty over the island.'^'* 
 This resolution, which was virtually equivalent to a declaration 
 
 "Span. Dip. Concsp. and Does., 110; For. Rel. 1898, 732. 
 " "= See Joint Note of the Powers, Moore, Dig. Int. Law, VI, 205, 206. 
 
 ">» For. Rcl. 1898, 743. 
 
 ■■' Mr. Woodford, Min. to Spain, to Mr. Day, Ass't Sec. of Slate, tel., .\pril 9, 1898, 
 Moore, Dig. Int. Law, VI, 207. 
 
 "The Nation, LXXIII, 4. 
 
 '"' See Senor Polo de Bernabe, Span. Min., to Mr. Sherman, Sec. of State, Apr. 10, 
 1898, Moore, Dig. Int. Law, VI. 208ff. 
 
 " Pres. McKinley, Special Message, April 11, 1898, House Doc. 405, 55 Cong., 2 
 Scss. 
 
 "Congress has no diplomatic relations; its only power in dealing with foreign nations 
 is the war power. Elson, History of the United States, p. 891. 
 
 »"U. S. Statutes at Large, XXX, 7iS.. 
 
 The vote was 42 to 35 in the Senate and 311 to 6 in the House. See II. Doc. 428, 55 
 Cong., 2 Sess. 
 
OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR IJ 
 
 of war, was approved by the President, April 20, and at once offi- 
 cially made known to the Spanish envoy, Senor Polo de Berna1)e.'^'^ 
 
 On the same day IMr. Woodford was directed to communicate 
 the resolution to the government of Spain with instructions that 
 the United States would proceed without notice to carry the same 
 into effect, if Spain had made no response whereby the ends of 
 peace might be assured, by noon Saturday, April 23."^ But as it 
 finally happened these instructions were never formally received by 
 the Madri4 government. °- 
 
 \\'hen the Spanish envoy received a duplicate of the instructions 
 he immediately replied that the resolution was of such a nature that 
 his continuance in the United States became impossible. "^ He at once 
 asked for his passports and having entrusted the interests of Spain 
 in Washington to the French Ambassador and the Austro-Hungar- 
 ian minister he was given conveyance out of the territory of the 
 United States. The telegram to General Woodford,, however, 
 reached him on the morning of April 21. But. when he oft'ered to 
 present the communication, the Spanish minister of State notified 
 him that the Madrid government regarded the joint resolution as an 
 "evident declaration of war" and had already ordered its minister in 
 Washington to withdraw, thereby breaking off all diplomatic re- 
 lations.*^* General Woodford then turned the American legation 
 over to the British embassy,^'' and having demanded safe passport, 
 he quitted Madrid on the same day. On 'April 21st a blockade of 
 part of the coast of Cuba was proclaimed, and the American Con- 
 gress dated the existence of a state of war from that event.*^*^ 
 
 IV 
 
 THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE AMERICAN INTER- 
 VENTION. 
 
 The interference of the United States in Cuba involved some 
 mooted doctrines relative to the validity of the intervention. ^ In 
 strictness, according to some authorities, the internal immorality 
 which formed a large burden of the preliminary diplomacy was en- 
 tirely without the pale of international law as such.- In any case, 
 strictly, intervention deals with questions of international policy as 
 
 0° Mr. Sherman, Sec. of State to Senor Polo de Bernabe, Span. Min., April 20, 1898, 
 
 ' 01 Mr Sherman, Sec. "of State, to Mr. Woodford, Min. to Spain, tel., .\pril 20, 1898, 
 H. Doc. 55 Cong., 2 Sess.; Moore, Dig. Int. Law, VI, 225. 
 
 'o^ Moore, Dig. Int. Law, VI, 235 ,, ci c f c, , \ on irqq 
 
 es Seiior Polo de Bernabe, Span. Mm., to Mr. Sherman, Sec. of btate, Ap. 20, 1898, 
 
 ' 61 See Mr Woodford", Min". to Spain, to Mr. Sherman, Sec. of State tel., April 21. 
 1898, Moore, Dig. Int. Law, VI, 228; see also, Moore. Dig. Int. Law. NT. at 235 
 
 «!> Great Britain was the only European power that was really friendly to the United 
 States during the war that followed. See the American Monthly Review of Ucvicws, \ ol. 
 19 p. 62. 
 
 '=« War was formally declared against Spain, April 25. 
 
 1 Lawrence, Principles of International Law, pp. 116-117. 
 
 2 See Hall, Treatise on International Law, p. 259 (5th cd.). 
 
l8 THE PRELIMINARY DIPLOMACY 
 
 distinguished from those of law.^ In a case such as Cuba, however, 
 pubHcists have proceeded to apply certain doctrines of intervention, 
 in a way that international law has fallen into complicity with it.'^ 
 
 It is now generally agreed that intervention is legally justifiable 
 when it is undertaken to ward off imminent danger to the interven- 
 ing power.-'' It is also held by some authorities, that although no 
 general right of intervention on grounds of humanity may be recog- 
 nized, yet when lawlessness and cruelty have reached a more than 
 usually horrible pitch, a State may have ample moral justification for 
 bringing themj to an end.*' Did the case of Cuba come ^^•ithin the 
 purview of these rules ? 
 
 The incessant troubles arising out of the situation constituted a 
 perpetual menace, not indeed to the existence, but to the essential 
 interests, of the United States. The weakness of Spain as a pacifi- 
 cator made Cuba a standing temptation to ambitious potentates ; and 
 the island in the hands of a powerful European state would have 
 been "a pistol pointed at the heart of the American Union." 
 
 It is possible to argue that practical independence could have 
 been secured for Cuba without war; and if this proposition were 
 proved American intervention would stand condemned. But the 
 most favorable view of Spanish concessions does not induce a very 
 profound belief in the likelihood of a genuine surrender of Cuba to 
 the Cubans.'^ The island was rife with rampant devastation, rapine, 
 torture, and tyranny, and no power but an external power was 
 capable of putting an end to them. It was certainly within the rules 
 of international propriety for the United States to interfere and to 
 stamp out the plague, and in doing so it performed a service to 
 humanity. 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 PRIMARY SOURCES. 
 
 Senate Documents, 54 Congress, 2nd sess.. No. 84 ; and 58 Congress, 
 
 2nd sess.. No. 25, etc. 
 Moore, Digest of International Law, A^^ls. I and VI. 
 Richardson, Messages and Documents of The Presidents, Vols. I, 
 
 IX and X. 
 Foreign Relations, 1896, 1897, 1898. 
 
 3 A. S. Hershey, Intervention and the Recognition of Cuban Independence, Publica- 
 tions of tiie American Academy of Political and Social Science, April 1, 1898. See also 
 Historicus, Letters on Some Questions of International Law, I. 
 
 * See Hall. Treatise on International Law, 290. 291. 
 
 => Ibid, p. 285; Lawrence, Principles of International Law, p. 118. 
 
 "Lawrence, p. 565; see an article by T. G. Shearman, Outlook. \'ol. 58, p. 986; Hall 
 (pp '89-^90) seems opposed to intervention on the ground of humanity in any case. 
 
 Wheaton (Elem. II, Ch. I, sec. 9), Bluntschli (sec. 478), Mamiani (p. 86) give the 
 right of aiding an oppressed race. Calvo (sec. 186) and Fiore (I, 446) think that states 
 can intervene to put an end to crimes and slaughter. Mamiani (112), on the other 
 hand refuses to recognize intervention on this ground. The reason is doubtfully ad- 
 mitted by Phillimore ,(I, sec. CCCXCIV) and Ilallcck (1,465) as accessory to stronger 
 ones, such as self-defense or the duties of a guarantee. . 
 
 ' See a dissertation on Spain's colonial system in Cuba, by A. Cuyas. New Constitu- 
 tional Law for Cuba, published by the .Vssociated Spanish and Cuban Press, New \ork, 
 1897. 
 
OF THE Sl'AXISH-AMKKKAX WAR ly 
 
 ^ Compilation of Reports, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
 \II. 
 Murat Halstead, The Story of Cuba. 
 Senate Journal, 54th Congress. 
 House Journal, 54th Congress. 
 U. S. Statutes at Large, Vol. 30, p. 738. 
 Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, 7, 8, 107, 128. 
 
 SECONDARY .SOURCES. 
 
 Turner, The Xew West, American Nation Series, Chapters XII and 
 
 XIV. 
 Latane, Diplomatic Relations of The United States and Spanish 
 
 America, p. 89 et seq. 
 Rowan and Ramsey, The Island of Cuba. p. 183-189. 
 Latane, America as a World Power, American Nation Series, Vol. 
 
 XX\'. 
 Elson, History of the United States. 
 E. G. Bonsai, The Real Condition of Cuba Today. 
 
 GENERAL REFERENCES. 
 
 Hershey, The Essentials of International Public Law. 
 Hall, A Treatise on International Law. 
 Dunning, Reconstruction, Chapter X. 
 163 United States Reports, 632. 
 Lawrence, Principles of International Law. 
 Bluntschli, Mamiani, Calvo and Fiore. 
 ■ Wheaton, History of The Law of Nations. 'Part IV. 
 
 Chadwick, The Relations of The United States and Spain — Diplo- 
 macy. 
 
 PERIODICALS. 
 
 Atlantic Monthly, Feb., 1894. 
 
 Publications of The American .\cademy of Political and Social 
 Science, Intervention and The Recognition of Cuban Independ- 
 ence, Amos S. Hershey, April i. 1898. 
 
 Review of Reviews. ^March, 1898. 
 
 Xorth American Review, Vol. 165, p. 628. 
 
 The Nation, Vol. 73. 
 
 Xorth American Review, The Intervention of The United States in 
 Cuba, Vol. j66, p. 350. 
 
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