A,* ° -» o ^ 0* 3 . ° * ° ° A* ' ^\/* X'^^V* \"'^*V^ "v^^v' *>1 %.<,"> «1 O It ^ ***. *u A A> 0° .' W ft v O •£■ C\ *£ *^_ A 'o . . « ' ^^ !v a A <" ***** ^ ,0* oil'* ^> -;- ^ ,4o. .A ■' «> •lo. :*^P\ S a-* = %»A- a^ "- >°"A % A . °w. ,0" A* °- l ^ G °V A ? -;■ G v * o ^°^ ^ A H °- V ,0 \ V^.TT'* ^ \^ .o* TWO THOUSAND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE WAR Committee on Public Information DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS OF THE UNITED STATES MEDAI^S OF THE ALLIES ^^«t 1. UNITED STATES— Medal of Honor, Army 2. UNITED STATES— Medal of Honor, Navy 3. UNITED STATES— Certificate of Merit Medal 4. GREAT BRITAIN— Distinguished Service Order 5. GREAT BRITAIN— Victoria Cross 6. FRANCE— Croix de Guerre (Cross of War) 7. FRANCE— Medaille Militaire (Military Medal) 8. BELGIUM— Order of Leopold 9. ITALY— Medal of Military Valor Two Thousand Questions and Answers ^ »" Bulgaria up the remain. ,'■• , IP, ^"" ,,lnt '' 11 '',"' »>y the Turks and (j reeks who make than a million hut sei • , ',' r,' ','!;'" '"'I'" 1 "*'""- Together they amount to more ' l SL l'<»att iigmes tor each are not available. The German Alliance: Note the many <3 SUPJmCT NATIONALITIES OF THE OBRMAN AUUANGB 'Nationality State Number fcSE Germany 59,769 000 920 H GERMANS Austria 9.950.000 35 ^M Hungary 2.057000 98 s Tola) 71,756000 61 8 MAGYARS Hungary 10.051,000 48 1 1 BULGARS Bulgaria 3,204.000 73.8 H TURKS „ ? ? B mm » OttomanEmpire 7,000,000 35,0 Total 92,011,000 65 5 Idanes Germany 162,000 25 ^Ialsatians „ 1,629,000 25 (^^■f-rfnch „ 258,000 4 i: (LITHUANIANS „ 122,000 2 | | SORABlANS „ 157,000 0.24 POLES „ 3,834,000 59 " Austria 4.968,000 175 Total 8 8 Jt'.Oun 94 RUTHENES Austria 3,519.000 12 4 •> Hungary 473,000 2-3 Tola' 3.992,000 7. a CZECHS - Austria 6,4 36,000 227 SLOVAKS Hungary 1,968,000 94 Total H.404,000 164- I Nationality C K 3 pv£ JUGOSLAVS Austria Hungary ^1 ITALIANS ■ GREEKS GJ3 ARMENIANS (. I NESTOR I ANS I I ARABS Total Subjec, L...IQ J •* >• ■_ _. ■' Austria Hungary Bosnia ' Total Austria Turkey Bulgaria Turkey 2,036,000 2,940,000 l.89B.0dC 275,000 2,949,000 3,224,0( 768.000 2,000 000 2,000,000 2,000,000 7.2 14 100.0 I,,- -'I Expropriations of the German "AnsiedskuvjsKomjnxssion". IV, VI Jewish. Colonies inPalesline. ■ Sungurlu IsMridjftT Angora K s ft:..i - ®Konieh $ alia • ' Tarsu^ lalities dominated by the Central Powers.- _B v ° * \t n irjrale Ramsgate r> E Ter Neuzra) /"ftbLillo/ j\?" JjTbourout l.VP (tent CatilIoiN'r re ft Fourmiea j BoRm "~MoS(. . 1 aaat ^v XAumalcjy - ^ Yvetot\ Caudebec Totes Clere -p^\^t'ufchatei] > ) / -^i T o' / // 1^^ ^" D *>«'.^Gourn.yV ] EIIjc LoS Fleur}\_ A X"^ ^O Andelys / ^ ^ / • A. rvosjSsV- Ail*/ N\enSan/er, . s°* St.QljFlllin Vervlns Ribcment Kiji, fta^ •>oyon/i ^ ^iy fty, \ x f o NChateau ^SissoDnelrorcicnRetjie! 3 Thclle^* of 'reil \ Cr<, r.'J ''kit'-a A l LaX Vjferzyb VSSuippes^Ste.M, U4r. ">: .Mont? Versailles Raaibouillet/ Ho Cuperly ,/Nog.nt/ ^ ^XAvizelJ NM ^. I " ll'' lC C^t5r' ! ^^JonlmirailpWontmort^ /Chalons 1 * N B * . Coullo ._ Ksterut o Mart ^fef 7~j Va,r y/ V\ le ^,Chateauneuf \" 7 // £'.Y. CharnyW Aillanti, r CbatilloJ ^Sv Ailicrrc. iully^V A / Coli S ny ) N> ^ ^'teW^Tty^/. 1 1 th\L 9 1 § GERF B ! 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Ilr„t<-v ^„„._Ui.rc^(lilrT Amaii.li// n „ nian / Djegan isk '"f — m v_r ARMISTICE LINE dcT. 31st 1918 Greenwich Gr Hammoiid'a 8x11 Map of ABia Mii. Copyrigbt, 1916, by C.S.Ham'mopd & Co., N.T. East. ae of her most brilliant s siirrf>««f>c tl,^. W — U wr THE PAN-GERMAN PLAN as realised by War IN EUROPE AND IN ASIA "Central Europe" and its Annexe in the Near East (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey) The Entente Powers Territory occupied by Central Powers Territory occupied by Entente Powers GERMANY'S MAIN ROUTE TO THE EAST (Berlin-Bagdad, Berlin-Hodeida, Berlin-Cairo-Cape') Supplementary Routes (Berlin- Trieste, Berlin-Salonica-Athens, Berlin-Constantza-Constantinople) Uncompleted sectors The "Coc urope. UNITED STATES «^ V ^ , / '' y < T a n a ' l' °**G- -/ O.v W /-B N. D A K O T 'Da/ B /B w >■ S. D A K O T N E B R A S K C E N 1 %o Q. — When American troops took over this front line, was any German territory held by the Allies? A. — Yes. In Alsace. South of Lor- raine the French held trenches in German territory, extending from Colmar, a town in Alsace, to the Swiss border. It was a small strip, but of great sentimental and moral value to the French. Q. — What is a forlorn hope? A. — It is a service so desperate that few or none of the men who undertake it may hope to survive. For this reason, officers rarely order men to forlorn hope service, but call for volunteers. A forlorn hope rarely is called for among troops who are on the offensive. It is almost always a part of a desperate defensive, such as blowing up a bridge under terrific bombardment, holding some post to delay a victorious enemy, and so on. Now and then a victoriously advancing commander may call for forlorn hope service to attack some formidable posi- tion, knowing that the men will be de- stroyed but hoping that they will also de- stroy the enemy stronghold, and thus, by sacrificing their own lives, save the lives of many comrades. Q. — When a trench is heavily bom- barded, are the men not al- lowed to retreat from it? A. — Soldiers posted in a trench must stay in it till they get direct orders to leave it. They may crouch in bomb- proof excavations within the trenches and otherwise conceal themselves from the bursting projectiles, because they know that while the shells are falling on their trench, the enemy soldiers cannot assault it. But were they to leave it, the enemy might instantly stop his fire and send his troops in. A breach thus made in even a limited section of front might affect an army-front of many miles. Q. — Why should a successful breach in an army front im- peril hundreds of miles? A. — While a successful breach is ex- tremely difficult to establish, as we have said, such a breach, if sufficiently wide, may let the enemy force men and guns through and expand them into army for- mation on the other side, thus raising a formidable menace of rear-attack. A modern army-front cannot simply walk away from its position. Hundreds of huge cannon must be moved, and these are as heavy as industrial machinery. Thousands of other guns, lighter, but still not easily moved, must be saved from possible capture. Hundreds of tons of supplies have to be shifted. For this rea- son a threatened army cannot wait too long. It cannot always assure itself that the breach in its line is serious. The only absolute safety is to fall back and re-form where the enemy again may be faced by a solid and unpenetrated front. Q. — Is it possible for men to live through a bombardment di- rectly on the trenches? A. — Yes. The trenches are deep but narrow, and on the side toward the enemy there is a high mound of earth or of sand-bags. No matter how accurate ar- tillerists may be, it is impossible to aim so accurately that the shells shall actually fall and burst inside of the trenches. Most of them hit the sheltering mound or drop just in front of them. The ex- plosion of these shells rarely does direct damage to the men in the trenches, and the greatest danger from them is caused by flying fragments of the bursting shell. Another proportion of shells flies over the trench and bursts just beyond. These are more dangerous if they explode close to it, because the rear of the trench is not so well protected, though modern trenches do have mounds erected against this "back-fire." Even if shells burst in the trench, how- ever, they are not necessarily fatal to anybody, because of the bomb-proofs scattered along the trenches to give men shelter. In addition, as the trenches are not straight, but zig-zag, a shell bursting in- side of a trench cannot send its frag- ments through more than a limited area. "Shell-shock" is the thing that, prob- ably, puts more men out of commission than actual wounding or killing. 4 6 Questions and Answers Q. — What is barrage fire? A. — Literally it means a fire to bar men. It is an artillery method which has be- come possible only through the modern improvements in guns and time-fuse shells, and the use of airplanes, tele- phones and wireless to keep the artiller- ists constantly informed as to the effect of their work. When it is decided to establish a bar- rage, a line of guns is so fired as to drop an incessant shower of shells along a given zone. This bursting inferno, which is kept up for as many minutes or hours as may be demanded by the particular operation, is a barrage through which no number of men can pass. Q. — How is barrage used? A. — A barrage may be "laid down" be- hind an enemy's front line, thus cutting that front line off from re-enforcements, supplies, etc. This is done by so drop- ping the shells that they explode contin- ually along every communication road and on every depot of supplies. When the front line has been thus cut off, a charge by a superior number of opponents may result in the destruction or capture of all the isolated men. Another way to use a barrage is by "advancing" it gradually — that is, the bar- rage first falls on a certain part of the enemy line, and the attacking troops ad- vance just behind it. The guns then lay the barrage a little further ahead, and the attacking force advances again, and so on. This is known as "creeping bar- ra S e " Creeping barrage aims to demolish first the enemy barbed-wire entanglements ; then the enemy trenches ; then the com- municating trenches, and so on, thus clearing the way for the attacking troops. If an attack is threatened on its own trenches, the artillery tries to lay down a defensive barrage — that is, it tries to make a zone of explosive fire in front of its own trenches to prevent the assailants from approaching, and if the attack is serious, it tries to lay a heavy barrage behind the assailants, for the double pur- pose of preventing re-enforcements and of preventing their retreat, thus making possible their capture or destruction. Q. — What is the difference between a defeat and a rout? A. — A defeat, even though it may be of the utmost gravity, still leaves the de- feated force in some sort of coherent or- ganization. It may not be able to fight again, but it has a chance. Even if it has no real chance left, it still remains a factor to be reckoned with. Until it is eliminated, the enemy, however victori- ous, has not obtained a free hand. A rout, on the other hand, is not only an utter defeat, but it is the elimination of the defeated force. A routed force, big or little, is one that has no organiza- tion left. It has disintegrated into indi- viduals who are fleeing in disordered mul- titude, leaving their military equipment on the field, and not seeking to make a stand anywhere, except as desperation may drive them. Q. — If a soldier crawls into an en- emy trench to spy, and is caught, what happens to him? A. — If he is in the uniform of his own army, he must be treated like any other prisoner of war. If he is disguised in any way, either in civilian garb or the enemy uniform, he is subject to treatment as a spy. Q. — Could raiders not get into a German trench with machine guns and clean it out? A. — They could clean out only a small part, because all trenches, German and Allied, are so dug that there are no very long straight stretches. Every little while there is a sharp bend. This is done for the very purpose of preventing such an occurrence as an "enfilading fire," which is the technical term for raking a military position. Q. — What is the meaning of "troops in reserve?" A. — In battle only a certain proportion of troops are engaged on each side. It is one of the purposes of each commander to tempt or force his opponent to throw in all his men, while he himself holds his ■own men "in reserve" — that is, he keeps a great force of men safely in the rear with the object of suddenly hurling in these fresh, unwearied, unshaken men when the men of the other side are tired out. Q. — Why would it not be better to push all the men in at once and thus strike a crushing blow in the very beginning? A. — It would be excellent, if it could be done. Sometimes, under very unusual circumstances, a military genius does do it, and he wins a great victory. But it American Fighters in France 47 cannot often be done. The geography of a battle-front, the necessity of guarding innumerable possible points of attack and so on, force generals to bring only a part of an army into actual combat at first. But there is another big reason for not throwing in all available men at once. It is the same reason that leads a prize- fighter not to put all his strength into the first few rounds — the fear of physical exhaustion. Men become vastly exhaust- ed in battle. They must, after a few hours, get relief or support. It has hap- pened many times in history that victori- ous troops have so worn themselves out to win, that in the end they were too tired to drive the victory home, and so lost its fruits because no reserves were available. Q. — What is shell-shock? A. — Shell-shock is a condition of tem- porary mental, nervous and physical col- lapse caused by an explosion occurring in close proximity to the individual, or by a prolonged period of exposure in a place where there is very heavy and incessant bursting-fire. The most usual cases of shell-shock are caused by one big explosion very close to the victim. Paralysis, mental stupor, in- tense sensitiveness of the superficial nerves, violent pains that often appear to have no real reason, involuntary muscular motions, deafness, sometimes blindness and dumbness — any or all of these symp- toms may be observed in sufferers. The condition first became a decidedly big hospital-fact in the present war. Much has been done to relieve it, but there still is much to learn about it. The chief line of treatment is directed toward cheering the mind of the patient and soothing the nervous condition or build- ing it up. The fortunate fact about it appears to be that it is generally tempo- rary. The period of recovery, however, may be very long indeed. Q. — Is it true that soldiers have liquor given to them before go- ing over the top? A. — Our men apparently are not to have liquor doled out to them, but the British practice has been to give the men a "tot" of rum (the liquor made from sugar- cane syrup) before going into any diffi- cult action and also after unusual ex- posure to weather. The French are very liberal with wine, and, in fact, French soldiers drink it largely in place of water. The American army management has not laid down the principle of teetotalism as an iron-clad law, and experience will no doubt be the guide. Q. — Do the officers go into the trenches with the soldiers? A. — The lieutenants do almost always, to a number sufficient to maintain efficient command of the company or the detach- ment in each particular trench sector. The non-commissioned officers, of course, accompany their squads. The captain of a company usually is with his men if the whole company oc- cupies a particular sector. Otherwise he may remain on detached duty in the rear, or he may occupy a bomb-proof or other station in the trenches or behind them where he can maintain uninterrupted tele- phone communication with his men. Q. — Are the men in the trenches under pretty constant gun-fire? A. — Sometimes men may hold trenches throughout their entire tour of duty with- out receiving a hostile shot. Many times soldiers hold considerable extents of trenches for two or even more weeks and experience only occasional shelling. It all depends on the conditions of war at the time. Even when things are pretty active along the entire front as a whole, there will be sections of front that seem to be neglected. Q. — Do the men in the trenches have to cook their own food? A. — Sometimes. In extreme cases where a very heavy and sustained bom- bardment destroys communications, they have to fall back on the emergency ra- tions which each modern soldier carries with him. In the ordinary course of the trench- war, however, hot meals are delivered with notable regularity. The field-kitch- ens behind the trenches supply the food, and it is carried in big cans through com- munication trenches to the men. Q. — Have the men in the trenches no cannon with which to de- fend themselves? A. — Cannon would be of no possible use in trenches. The enemy trenches are so close to ours that machine-gun and rifle-fire make a perfect defense. Even if cannon were of any use in trenches, which they are not, it would be mad- ness to put them there, because any drive 4 8 Questions and Answers that succeeds in breaking through a trench anywhere would thus result in a loss of valuable artillery. Modern artillery has such immense range that it can perfectly defend the trenches from situations so far behind them that it is absolutely out of danger of capture from any ordinary attacks. Q. — What is the trench-mortar? A. — This is a weapon produced by the modern trench-warfare. It is a little mortar, so light that it can be transported with ease by a couple of men; and un- like other gunnery weapons it requires comparatively little science. Practically speaking, it simply supplements the hand- thrown grenade — that is, it throws a bomb into the enemy trench in the same way in which a man would toss a hand- grenade. Its range does not have to be much greater than that attained by a hand- thrown bomb, for it is used solely for trench-to-trench war. It shoots its big oval or sausage-shaped bomb well up into the air with a muffled boom, and the pro- jectile describes a big curve. The bomb is fitted with a time-fuse as a rule, but may also be made to explode on impact. Q. — Do aircraft drop many bombs into the trenches? A. — Very few. The anti-aircraft guns force airplanes to remain as high as from 5,000 to 10,000 feet. At this height the trenches are only like a thin streak to the airman's eye. In addition, as an airplane can never stop while in the air, but must keep moving continuously and at a high speed, it is practically impossible to fix the right instant for dropping a bomb so that it will hit any small object below Therefore trenches are rarely badly bombed, except when some very extraor- dinary circumstance gives a plane the chance to swoop low and speed along the length of a trench for a sufficient distance to loose bombs with some degree of ac- curacy. Q. — Have the men in trenches any shelter against the weather? A. — Sometimes the trenches, especially where a line has been held for some time, are fitted with very comfortable under- ground dwellings with light and heat. But men soon become inured to outdoor exposure. City people, softened by house- living, do not realize how large a propor- tion of every population spends the great part of its life in exposure to all kinds of weather, not only without suffering, but actually with much better health than the city-dwellers. Q. — How do soldiers in France get water? A. — In the army zone, reservoirs and hydrants are erected near camps-, bar- racks and hospitals, and tank stations spaced along the roads for the accommo- dation of the traveling kitchens and mo- tor tank wagons. These hold 1,000 gal- lons and they bring water to the fighting line, where it is removed in kegs or skins into the trenches. A water supply is also obtained from springs and properly fitting them out to avoid contamination. Wells are cleaned out, disinfected and provided with a pumping plant. Many new wells are driven, and where a large supply of water is required, veritable waterworks have been constructed, with pumping machines and pipe lines several miles in length. The water supply department of the French Army consists of 3,500 men and 75 officers. It has fitted out 3,800 existing wells and sunk 2,000 new ones. The total amount of piping laid amounts to 200 miles. Q. — What is the exact technical composition of a "sector"? A. — Technically it is that part of the front line occupied by a battalion. The organization of a sector consists of: (1) Accessory defenses which are made to arrest and retard the enemy advancing under fire of the defense ; (2) The first line of surveillance occu- pied by a few men from which all ground in front can be well seen ; (3) The line of resistance occupied strongly, which must be defended what- ever happens ; (4) Lines of support which are strongly organized centers, defended while new lines in the rear are being formed ; all are connected by communication trenches and protected by barbed wire. Q. — What is the first thing men do in a trench if they see enemies approaching to attack? A. — Soldiers rarely attack a trench-line that way. A trench usually is pounded by artillery first, to destroy it and drive its defenders out, or so stun and decimate them that they cannot offer resistance to the enemy charge, which does not follow till the artillery has done its work. Against a charge such as is suggested American Fighters in France 49 the men in the trenches would direct a converging fire from all the machine guns in their line, supplemented by "sheet- fire" from their rifles, all discharged as fast as the defenders can shoot, so as to make a zone of destruction through which assailants cannot pass. Meantime they will have telephoned or telegraphed to their headquarters in the rear, and the officers there will instantly order heavy fire from their artillery to sweep the front of the threatened trench sector. Q. — Is No Man's Land a neutral zone? A. — It is just the reverse. The zone between the opposing trenches is called No Man's Land because it is not possible for either side to hold it, and because no man may venture on it except at immi- nent risk of death. It is over this No Man's Land that the daring detachments from both sides creep out at night to make raids on the enemy lines, or to gather information. Q. — Is the term "Jam Pot" a nick- name for something else? A. — In the very early stages of the war it was a nickname only in a partial sense. The British troops, being unprepared for hand grenade work, while the Germans were well equipped for that kind of war- fare, converted jam pots and similar things into emergency grenades, loading them with explosives and tossing them into German trenches with lighted fuses attached. Now that the Allies are well supplied with regular grenades, the term remains as a nickname pure and simple. Q. — How many kinds of hand grenades are there? A. — So many that apparently only a few specialists in explosives can tell off- hand how many varieties are being used. They are all similar, however, in the main principle : that is, whatever their shape and size may be, they are high-explosive bombs to be tossed by hand-power into enemy positions. Some are thrown like a baseball. Others are hurled from slings. Still others are attached to sticks. The most simple are provided with a common fuse that is lit by the soldier just before he tosses the grenade. The more elaborate ones are fitted with very in- genious exploding devices, some being so- called time-fuses, others being contact devices. The great object is to insure explosion of the bomb the moment it gets to the "right place." Slow fuses often enable the enemy to snatch a bomb when it ar- rives and throw it back at the men who sent it. On the other hand a fuse that discharges the grenade too swiftly may make it burst "at home." Q. — Does the term "sapper" mean anything? A. — It means literally a soldier who saps — that is, drives a tunnel or a trench toward an enemy position. Such an ap- proach by digging is known as "sapping" and the trench or tunnel is called a "sap." Sappers, miners and pioneers are among the very oldest military formations of the world. They were important parts of armies long before gunpowder was in- vented. The Romans, who besieged Car- thage in the days of Hamilcar and Han- nibal, used sapping extensively. The modern sapper is part of the en- gineer corps of the army, and sappers are employed like the other arms of that service for all kinds of engineering work, from building roads and bridges to driv- ing the old-fashioned tunnel under an enemy fortification and blowing it up. Q. — Is the so-called fire-trench an advanced trench? A. — No. The fire-trench is the actual front line of trenches permanently held by the regular front-line troops. It rep- resents the true and actual battle-front. It is called "fire-trench" to distinguish it from the many subsidiary trenches of a defense system, such as communication trenches, lateral trenches, listening post trenches, etc. Q. — Are listening posts inside of the trenches or outside? A. — Listening posts are in No Man's Land between the trenches. They are in trenches that have been dug out toward the enemy trench, and they are as near to the foe as the conditions permit. They are elaborately surrounded with barbed wire, and are used mostly at night, when a soldier creeps into the post and listens for any sound in the enemy lines that may warn him of an intended raid, of any movement or transfer of troops, etc. Q. — Why do men at the front call an unexploded shell a "dud"? A. — "Dud" is a slang English word, meaning something the same as the American slang-word "dub." It was a 50 Questions and Answers natural thing to apply the term to a shell that fails to explode after it strikes. Q. — If two armies not quite equal in numbers meet, must the smaller one always take the de- fensive ? A. — If the armies are well matched in quality and in natural positions, the smaller one must take the defensive al- most always, but not always. It depends on the commanding officers. If these are well matched, the larger army will usually force the offense, thus leaving nothing but defense to the smaller. But a supe- rior general often assumes a successful offensive with a smaller army; and, vice versa, an inferior general will prosecute an offensive with his larger army so un- skilfully that as the battle develops he will find himself forced into the de- fensive. Q. — What would be the military advantage to either side of go- ing through Switzerland? A. — If it were not for the fact that Switzerland is prepared to defend her neutrality bloodily, a surprise attack through the northwestern corner of Switzerland, where it abuts on the Ger- man and French lines, might be of ad- vantage, for the assailant could hope to push so big an army through that his enemy's whole front would have to fall back. Thus German forces pouring through that corner might force an abandonment. of the entire Vosges line and leave the French Verdun line critically "in the air." A French invasion of Germany through that part of Switzerland might force the Germans to abandon all of Alsace. Considered in practical detail, however, such an attack would present huge diffi- culties to either side. The troops and their vast lines of supplies would have only very narrow mountain valleys to pass through, and either side could probably block the narrow outlets. Q. — How can an American send gifts to soldiers at the front? A. — By parcel post or express, but only if sender can show a written request from the soldier, approved by his commanding officer. Tie parcel securely, but do not seal, as it must be inspected. The sender's name and address should be written plainly on the upper left hand corner. The address of the soldier must be as follows : JOHN SMITH, Company C, 9th Infantry, American Expeditionary Forces, France. The exact location or station of the company must not be given on the ad- dress. Q. — Must foreign tariff duty be paid on gifts sent to men abroad ? A. — The following announcement has been received through the State Depart- ment of the conditions whereby gift par- cels containing dutiable goods sent by parcel post may be delivered free of duty in Great Britain, when intended for offi- cers and men of the U. S. Army and Navy serving in the United Kingdom, for soldiers of American nationality serving in the British or Canadian forces, or for American medical officers serving in Brit- ish military or base hospitals : "The British Board of Customs an- nounce the following conditions whereby gift parcels containing dutiable goods may be delivered free of duty: Such parcels intended for officers and men of United States Navy in United Kingdom should be addressed for delivery on board ship in which addressee is serving ; when in- tended for members of American Army in United Kingdom, should be addressed to regimental address of recipient ; when intended for soldiers of American nation- ality in British or Canadian armies or for American medical officers serving in Brit- ish military or base hospitals, should be addressed in care of Committee for American Soldiers and Sailors of the American Red Cross, 154 New Bond street, London, England, which committee will verify right of addressee to duty-free concession and arrange for delivery of parcels. Dutiable goods must be specific- ally described as tobacco, cigarettes, chocolate, etc. Foregoing relates solely to dutiable goods imported by parcels post." Q. — What postage must our men abroad pay on mail to Amer- ica? A. — Under an Act of Oct. 3, I9I7, # all troops, sailors and marines of the United States serving abroad are entitled to free postage on their mail back to the United States provided that this mail bears the sender's name, etc., in the upper left hand American Fighters in France 5i corner or bears other evidence to indi- cate that it is from a soldier or sailor. Q. — What is meant by "tagging" a soldier? A. — All armies engaged in the war, with the possible exception of the Rus- sians, supply their men with identification tags, generally worn on a string passing around the neck. Modern warfare is so terrible that the ordinary means of iden- tification fail completely, and if it were not for these tags families would be caused untold misery because of inability to learn the fate of their loved ones. The British soldier is provided with a circular aluminum tag containing his draft num- ber, name, regiment and religion. The French are using a metal tag made in duplicate and capable of being split. This allows one half of the tag to be left with the dead body while the other half is forwarded to the proper authorities for checking purposes. The Germans make use of a similar tag. The American Navy has a tag which is decidedly unique, in that it carries the thumbprint of the bearer. Q. — What is the cost of equipping an American infantryman? A. — The War Department states that the cost of equipping the average soldier is $156.71. Of this amount $101.62 is ex- pended for clothing, $7.73 for eating uten- sils, and $47.36 for fighting equipment. Q. — What are the food require- ments of a large army? A. — For an army of 500,000 men two and a half million pounds of food must be allowed daily. In a month an army of this size will use thirteen million pounds of beef, fifteen million pounds of pota- toes, one million pounds of coffee and three million pounds of sugar. Q. — Is the Government employing women telephone operators to go abroad? A. — Women telephone operators to be sent abroad by the War Department will wear a distinctive uniform and will be considered from a military standpoint as in a similar position to the members of the British Women's Auxiliary Corps, according to information given out by the U. S. Signal Corps. Wives of Army officers and enlisted men now in Europe or about to go will not be accepted for the unit, it is stated. It is very probable that a large number of women will be re- quired as General Pershing has found it impossible to obtain satisfactory opera- tors with the necessary linguistic require- ments. To become eligible to this unit women must be between twenty-three and thirty-five years of age, with a few pos- sible exceptions in case of maximum age. They must be in good health, and speak both French and English with ease. It is preferred that they have had some ex- perience in telephone switchboard operat- ing, as even in cases of experienced operators it has been found necessary to give some preliminary training in this country before sending them abroad. Sal- aries range from $60 to $125 a month, with allowances of rations and quarters, the same as now accorded to Army nurses. Q.— What is meant by the "Hin- denburg Line?" A. — The Hindenburg Line is a system of German entrenchments on the western war front, so called after the commander of the German Field Forces, who estab- lished it after the Somme fighting in 1916. This line, which was maintained through 1917 and until open warfare suddenly be- gan in 1918, consisted of three main sec- tions, the northern end being the "Wotan" line, the center the "Siegfried" line and the southern end the "Albrecht" line. It had the general shape of a crescent, with the horns at the North Sea on the north and the Aisne River on the south. Q. — How were American troops placed at first? A.— Early in the campaign the Allied front was divided into three sections, a British front from the North Sea to the Oise River, a distance of about 125 miles, a French front from the Oise to Verdun, some 150 miles; and an American front from Verdun to the Swiss frontier. The plans provided for an independent system of railroads from each front to certain selected seaports, making distinct lines of communication from the sea to the firing line. The American front generally was designated as the "Lorraine Front." Q. — What are the duties of a com- pany clerk when his company is sent to France? A. — Ordinarily a company clerk would perform his duties away from the firing line. The exigencies of the service, how- ever, especially in war time, demand many departures from ordinary rules and 52 Questions and Answers customs and a company clerk going abroad may be required to perform duty anywhere. Q. — How many shoes does a sol- dier need? A. — General Pershing has requested shipment of 18,590 pairs of shoes for each 25,000 men monthly, which is approxi- mately nine pairs of shoes per man per year. "This quantity," said Secretary Baker, "is in excess of actual consump- tion, and is being used by General Persh- ing to build up a reserve for all troops in France. When such a supply is accumu- lated, the quantities will be reduced." The Quartermaster-General's Depart- ment had on hand before the end of February, 1918, and due on outstanding contracts 7,564,000 field shoes and 7,873,- 000 marching shoes. By July, 1918, 27,- 249,000 pairs of shoes had been bought for the entire army, at home and over- seas. Q. — Are there accurate figures showing the magnitude of gen- eral army supplies? A. — Yes, and the magnitude is astound- ing. Between April, 1917, when we en- tered war, and August 1, 1918 (15 months), the War Department bought and delivered 55,958,000 pairs woolen socks, 10,507,000 pairs woolen breeches, 9,000,000 woollen coats, 5,377,000 over- coats, and 4,373,000 spiral puttees (leg- gings). There were purchased 9,860 motor am- bulances, 17,988 motor trucks, 3,420 pas- senger cars, 27,000 motorcycles, and 25,874 side-cars for motorcycles. Animals amounted to 237,007 horses and 129,385 mules. Of these all were bought in the United States except 58,093 horses and 5,745 mules which were bought in France. Q. — What extra army pay is al- lowed for foreign service? A. — Foreign service pay is twenty per cent of the pay of the grade without the war increase. For instance, an enlisted man who receives $15 on his first enlist- ment, if serving in France, will receive $3 for foreign service pay and $15 war in- crease, a total of $33. Q. — How many soldiers voted in the first election under arms? A. — In the election of November, 1917, the entire military vote (cast by recruits in national encampments at home, citizen soldiers in France, and citizen sailors on naval vessels) was 50,475. Q. — How much does it cost to feed a soldier? A. — A little less than 40 cents a day in the camps in the United States. The figures from one camp, Camp Devans in Massachusetts, show that when the men were first assembling there the cost for each man per day was 40^2 cents. In September, 1917, when the supply had been organized thoroughly the cost was 3854 cents. Q. — How can soldiers in France get eyeglasses if they break the ones they have? A. — There are optical units with the army. A base plant is provided with elaborate optical machinery and work- men, capable of turning out several hun- dred pairs of glasses a day with all the accuracy of an optical manufacturing es- tablishment at home. Automobile units will work immediately behind the lines for emergency repairs, fitting, etc. Q. — How many soldiers can a ship carry ? A. — The old estimates used to be one man to every two tons of cargo capacity. This was the European army usage. There has been some dispute in America since the troops began to go over-seas, because some experts hold that two tons is not a sufficient allowance for a modern soldier with the great amount of equip- ment and supply that must accompany troops. The Secretary of War adhered to the two-ton calculation. Others as- serted that the amount needed for each man was five tons, but it may be said that this is extreme. It is evident that some of the experts who hold to the five-ton calculation are figuring not simply on the acutal transport per man, but also on the tonnage needed to continue sending supplies after the man has landed in France. Q. — Does a soldier's outfit actually weigh two tons ? A. — Not at all. "Tons" means space, not weight. This "tonnage" measurement of merchant ships really was not invent- ed by sailors or ship-builders. It was devised by tax-collectors. In the days American Fighters in France 53 of the Stuarts in England it was decided by that habitually hard-up government to levy port taxes and dues of all sorts on shipping. To ascertain what each vessel should pay, the tax collectors devised the scheme of taxing each according to the number of "tuns" (great hogsheads) that it could carry. These tuns probably were selected because at that time wine, tobacco, and many other cargoes were carried in tuns. Certain measurements of cargo space were laid down, and, ac- cording to this "tunnage" the ship was taxed. Q. — What are corps troops? A. — They are an addition to the army corps devised to meet the necessities of warfare on the French front. When the five-division corps was organized, this body of "corps troops" was added. Corps troops are made up of artillery units, engineers and many other types of serv- ice battalions, and their duty is to main- tain the line of communication for their own corps. They comprise about 30,000 men. Q. — What is a line of communica- tion? A. — In the first place, you must under- stand that it is a "line" only technically. Actually it is the system of roads and depots situated safely behind an army, from and over which there must go an unending stream of supplies to the troops in front. An American field army in France (which would consist of five army corps) must have from 125,000 to 130,000 men (corps troops) to maintain all the avenues of supply. As a matter of fact, General Pershing's "lines of com- munication" extend from the Lorraine trenches clear across France to the ports where the ocean transport service lands the supplies from America. Q. — What "lines of communica- tion" had we built in France? A. — By the summer of 1918 we had developed enormous ports in France ca- pable of handling 750,000 tons a month. American foresting organizations had gone into the French woods, erected saw- mills shipped "knocked-down" from America, and built docks and other fa- cilities. Fourteen regiments and nineteen bat- talions railway engineers (over 45,000 Americans) were engaged in railroad con- struction and operation in France. Nine regiments of railway engineers had been in France since August, 1917. There were produced by August, 1918, for the railroad operations of the War Department in France more than 22,000 standard gauge freight cars, and more than 1,600 standard gauge locomotives in addition to purchases of cars and loco- motives abroad. A double line of railroad communica- tion had been secured from the French by army engineers, extending from the coast of France to the battlefront. It included the construction of hundreds of miles of trackage for yards and the nec- essary sidings, switches, etc. Q. — How will American artillery- be repaired in France? A. — A huge artillery base was started early in 1918 to cost approximately 25 million dollars. The works were planned to have a capacity for re-lining more than 800 big guns a month (putting in new bores and rifling to replace the core worn out by firing). There was also to be a works for repairing 50,000 small arms and machine guns a month with a re- loading plant to re-load about 100,000 artillery cartridges a day. To do all this (and to make the repairs on motor vehicles and the other equipment), more than a hundred buildings were necessary. Q. — How was our army off for artillery ? A. — Sixteen plants were built here, many of them "from the ground up," to produce heavy artillery of every type. The first of four government-owned shell- fitting plants had begun to produce by August, 1918, in addition to many private plants already long engaged in quantity production. Motorization of field artil- lery was well under way. A 5-ton ar- mored truck had been developed in 1918 to haul 4.1-inch howitzers, weighing 9,000 pounds, over rough country. Approxi- mately $90,000,000 was being spent to pro- duce nitrates for explosives. The plan for our artillery operations in France was colossal. It included everything from trench mortars to 16-inch monsters. TROOP TRANSPORT OVER SEAS Q. — Did American troops go to Europe immediately after war was declared? A. — The first American force of any size was sent in June, two months after the American Declaration of War, which was made April 6, 1917. Q. — Were the first troops sent in warships ? A. — No. They were sent in merchant vessels fitted out as transports, and armed only lightly with a few light, quick-firing naval guns, firing 5- and 6-inch shells. Q. — How can such transports de- fend themselves ? A. — They are expected to defend them- selves only in a pinch. They are pro- tected by warships. Q. — Why could not troops be sent in battleships? A. — Because there is not enough room on warships to carry any considerable number of soldiers. In addition, the function of a warship is to seek for and meet an enemy, whereas the function of a transport is to avoid him. Q. — How do warships defend transports ? A. — Warships defend transports against the attack of enemy warships by convoy- ing them. To do this, the transports, steaming in line or in double line, are surrounded by cordons of warships of different types. Far in advance, and sweeping the ocean on both sides, sometimes as far as three hundred miles away, are the swift scout cruisers, whose mission it is to find the enemy and wireless the warning to their own ships. Surrounding the transports and keep- ing them always in sight, are the heaviest ships, the battle-cruisers and dread- naughts. It is their business to meet an attacking foe at such a distance from the transports, that he cannot come within range of them. Forming separate cor- dons are swift, light cruisers and de- stroyers — some ranging far over the seas to scout, others staying close to the trans- ports to protect them against destroyer attack, which is particularly to be feared at night. Q. — Has not the submarine changed the convoy system? A. — Yes. The fact that the big ships of the German Navy cannot take the sea is what has made cordons of cruisers and battleships unnecessary for our trans- ports. Against submarines alone these big vessels are not needed, and, indeed, would be useless. As the only menace to our transports comes from submarines, the convoying vessels may consist wholly of destroyers, whose greatest value is their speed. Ow- ing to this speed, a limited number of destroyers can establish a very intensi- fied patrol around quite a large fleet of transports. As they have speeds ranging from 28 to 36 miles (statute) an hour, it is cal- culable that a submarine showing its peri- scope exactly between two destroyers five miles apart, would have both of them down on it in exactly five minutes, if they were thirty-mile boats. Q. — How can destroyers find sub- marines? A. — Only by continued cruising and watching. There are only two factors that are really in the destroyers' favor. One is that the submarine naturally tries to lie on the surface (for resting its men, replenishing its air-supply, and re-charg- ing its electric motors) whenever the commander thinks it safe. The other fac- tor is that a submarine cannot successfully attack a vessel without, at least, getting a glimpse of it from the surface. That means that the submarine must show its periscope, and, furthermore, must leave a noticeable wake as it moves along close under the surface. Q. — What is the periscope? A. — It is, in effect, a great eye at the top of a mast-like tube, about 5 inches in diameter. This eye is a very powerful lens, and when the periscope tube has emerged from the water, the watchers in the still submerged submarine see a re- flected image of any vessels within the range of sight. The powerful lens at the top is so made that it gets a maxi- mum amount of view. The observer in 54 Troop Transport Over Seas 55 the submarine can turn it in all direc- tions. The most modern submarines have a very wonderful "all-around" periscope, which reflects a view of the whole en- circling water-world in all directions. An elaborate system of lenses within the tube reflect this image into the observation room of the submarine. Q. — Is not the periscope a very small object? A. — Very small, and its visibility to others varies according to conditions. In a very smooth sea it sometimes shows up with surprising distinctness. In rough water, or when the sun happens to be wrong, it is very hard to see, being only about 5 inches in diameter. Q. — Is there no other way to de- tect a submarine? A. — Yes. When a submerged sub- marine has come so close to the surface that it can protrude its periscope, it creates a noticeable commotion on the top of the water. The periscope tube in it- self makes a wake, and a bigger disturb- ance still is caused by the movement of the large hull under the surface. Q. — Can the submarine lie still and await its prey? A. — No. A submarine that has been brought near the surface to make an at- tack, cannot lie still in that position. It must keep moving, if it is to retain its level. To lie motionless, a submarine must either come wholly to the surface or it must so fill its ballast tanks as to sink. If a submarine with periscope pro- truding were to stop its propeller, which, with its balancing fins, keeps it in a de- sired depth, it would bob up like a cork and be a big mark. A submarine, even when submerged, never has so much water ballast aboard as to destroy its buoyancy. It must retain its tendency to float to the surface, otherwise it would be bound to sink. Q. — How long is the periscope tube? A. — From 18 to 20 feet in the average submarine. The submarine thus can sight a ship while it still is that far below the surface. Q. — Does the submarine sink if its tube is shot away? A. — No. The only effect is to make it "blind"— that is, without a periscope the crew of the submarine would have to bring their craft to the surface so that they could see through the glass-win- dowed conning-tower if they wanted to attack ships. But the loss of the peri- scope does not prevent them from navi- gating under water and they can, there- fore, run away . submerged until they get clear of an enemy zone. After that they can run on the surface when no foe is near, and so get home. But they can do no more torpedoing from submerged position. Thus, though they can still manage to get back to port, their capac- ity for harm would be gone. Q. — Why not simply shoot away their periscopes and thus make them harmless? A. — That is one of the various things the submarine-hunters try to do. But it is very difficult. It cannot be done ex- cept now and then by lucky chance. The mark is too small. Besides, as we know now, the submarines have mechanics who can make remarkable repairs. Besides, modern submarines have spare periscopes. Every submarine nowadays has at least two, and it is understood that the very latest German submarines have more. Q. — When the periscope protrudes, will exploding shells sink the submarine ? A. — Twenty feet of water, or much less, make a powerful cushion against explo- sion. While a good part of the shock is transmitted through the water, a greater part of the explosive violence goes in the lines of least resistance; that is, the air. In addition, there is the immense dif- ficulty of hitting exactly that part of the water under which the submarine is mov- ing. There comes, too, the fact that shells impinge on the sea at an angle, and this makes many of them "ricochet" — that is, they bound, much as a tennis ball does. Q. — What do the soldiers on a transport do when a torpedo hits? A. — The soldiers are, of course, drilled every day in putting on the life preserv- ers, and hastening to the lifeboats, which generally hold about 48 men each. Each man goes to a particular boat and sits in a certain seat. The signal to take to the boats is five short blasts on the ship's whistle. Each lifeboat is in command of 56 Questions and Answers an officer, and absolute order and silence are imposed on all. Q. — What happens when the ex- plosive shell strikes the water? A. — A great deal depends upon the shape of the shell and the angle at which it strikes. The shells in general use have been inclined to bound from the water into the air, especially when the water has been smooth, and the shells struck the water at an angle of less than 10 de- grees. Sometimes these shells have trav- eled for a straight mile after bounding before striking the water again. A shell designed to overcome this tendency, and known as a diving shell, has been devised by American naval engineers. Q. — How long does it take a ship to make a round-trip to France? A. — It ought to take big, modern ships, such as the requisitioned German Vater- land and others, only about three weeks to take a load of men and supplies to France and get back to an American port. As a matter of fact, however, the under- takings are so great that it has taken 40 days and more to make a round trip. Aside from the congestion, the faster ships are held down in speed by the necessity of taking the rate of speed on a given trip that the whole convoy must adopt, which is, of course, the speed of the slowest ship in it. By August, 1918, we had cut the time for a round trip to about a month under favorable circumstances. Q. — What is a depth-bomb? A. — It is the best device so far found for fighting the submarine. Depth-bombs are bombs loaded with 200 or 300 pounds of very high explosive, generally trinitro- toluol. They are carried in a special ap- paratus at the stern of ships that hunt submarines, and they are so adjusted that they can be dropped into the sea instantly by pulling a lever. Q. — How are they used? A. — When a destroyer or other sub- marine-hunting vessel sights a periscope, it races toward the spot at full speed, generally firing as it goes. While the submarine generally manages to submerge before the patrol-ship can reach it, there is almost always a surface disturbance, due to the motion of the under-water craft. If the patrol vessel can reach the spot in reasonably good time, there is a fair chance to ascertain with some degree of accuracy where the submarine is. The bombs are dropped then, and they ex- plode under water. Q. — Suppose the depth-bomb does not hit the submarine? A. — It will explode anyway. Depth- bombs are provided with an appliance that is set to go off automatically at any desired depth. As the force of the ex- plosion under water is enormous, a sub- marine may be damaged sufficiently to sink it if the bomb explodes anywhere within one hundred feet of it. Q. — What is a smoke-box? A. — It is a box pierced with holes and filled with chemicals. When it is desired to screen a vessel from a submarine, the box is thrown overboard. Water rushes in and the chemicals immediately produce a dense smoke, which hides the ship ex- actly as if it had entered a fog bank. Q. — Is it true that the British lost hardly any soldiers at sea dur- ing the war? A. — They had astoundingly few losses. At the end of January, 1918, it was an- nounced in England on the authority of a naval authority (unnamed) that since the beginning of the war only 9 British trans- ports had been sunk, and that the total loss of life was only 2,000. In that time 11,000,000 soldiers had been transported for greater or shorter distances. The bulk of this huge transportation figure, of course, is produced by the troops that were moved back and forth across the English Channel. Q. — Did we lose any troops at sea? A. — The losses were astoundingly small. July 1, 1918, the Secretary of War re- ported : "The total number of our troops lost at sea and casualties is 8,165, and of these, by reason of the superbly efficient protection which the navy has given our transport system, only 291 have been lost at sea." Q. — Did we lose any transports? A. — Three, but their men were saved with exception of the number noted. The losses to August 1, 1918, were Antilles, torpedoed October 17, 1917; Zaanland, torpedoed May 13, 1918; President Lin- coln, torpedoed some time later; Mount Vernon, torpedoed in early September, 1918, with loss of only 35 men. MAN UNDER WATER (The Submarine) Q. — Who invented the first sub- marine? A. — So far as is known the first sub- marine was built by an American named Bushnell, in 1775. It was a one-man af- fair, manually propelled, and was just large enough to hold the navigator. It was built of wood, and was submerged by admitting water, which was pumped out when the occupant desired to come to the surface again. The air in the boat would support life for thirty minutes. Bushnell used his boat during the Ameri- can War of Independence, and tried to attach a bomb to the bottom of the Brit- ish warship Eagle. It, however, failed to explode. Fulton, also an American, and the originator of the steamboat, de- voted some time to submarine boats. He used manual propulsion, but, by making use of compressed air, he was able to stay beneath the water for four hours. Di- rectly encouraged by Napoleon, he built a boat for France in 1801. Q. — Did Americans ever use sub- marines in war? A. — Many submarines, all manually pro- pelled, were built during the American Civil War, but Holland, in 1877, was the. first to build a really efficient submarine, mechanically propelled. He, too, was an American, so that we can truthfully say that the submarine was an American in- vention. The French did more to develop the craft than any other people, but the original idea was not theirs. The inter- nal combustion engine made the subma- rine possible, just as it made possible the aeroplane and Zeppelin. Q. — How big are English sub- marines ? A. — The latest pre-war British type, the F class, of which there were eight built, or building, in 1914, has a displacement of 1,200 tons, 5,000 horsepower, a surface speed of 20 knots, and a submerged speed of 12 knots. They have six torpedo tubes, and two quick-firing guns. The AEi and AE2, which were lost, were 800 tons, and had engines of 1,750 horsepower, which gave them a surface speed of 16 knots. Submerged, they could do 10 knots. They had four torpedo tubes and two quick- firers. They were 176 feet long and 23 feet diameter. The latest French vessels, though smaller than the huge Fs, have almost all eight torpedo tubes. Particu- lars of the German submarines are not available, but they are, at least, as large and as powerful as our own. Q. — When did we build our first modern submarine? A. — Congress made an appropriation in March, 1893, for building an experimental boat, and Holland obtained the contract in competition with other inventors who submitted designs and bids. It was not until 1895, however, that he was able to begin construction of the first submarine, named Plunger. It was designed for steam power on the surface and electric power submerged, and was launched in 1897, but by that time Holland had so many improved ideas that he left the Plunger unfinished and built a new boat — Holland No. 8. Again he made improve- ments and replaced the second boat with Holland No. 9, which was launched in 1898, and became the American navy's first submarine. Q. — What is the Diesel engine? A. — It is the most successful type of internal combustion engine using heavy oil. It can be driven with ordinary pe- troleum, and does not require the highly explosive oils used in motor car and aero- plane engines. The main difference be- tween this engine and other heavy-oil en- gines which preceded it, is in the fact that no external combustion is applied, and no actual explosion takes place. It has to operate at much higher pressure than any other internal combustion engines, and this caused some alarming accidents in the early days of its use. The present machines are safe and easy to operate. Owing to the perfect combustion of the oil there is hardly any dirt or smell, and very little waste of power. Less than one-half pint of crude oil gives one brake horsepower. It is the invention of a Ger- man, Otto Diesel, who committed suicide, under peculiar circumstances, and it has been greatly improved during the war. It is used in the German sub- marines. Diesels are already consider- 57 58 Questions and Answers ably used in auxiliary sailing ships, and several very successful Diesel motor ships have made voyages as long as 5,000 miles. Q. — What is the very latest Ger- man submarine like? A.— Rear-Admiral^ Degouy, of the French Navy, who is one of the leading naval experts of the world, gave some account of them in the Revue des Deux Mondes, published in Paris. He said that there is a submersible armed with a veritable "armored battery," constructed over a nearly cylindrical shell. "This battery, provided with 'a number (as yet unascertained) of guns of 120 — perhaps even of 150 — millimeters (5 or 6 in.) — would be flush with the surface of the sea, and the part of the shell unprotected with armor would be covered by the water. All that would be necessary would be to defend that portion of the subma- rine above the water against the weak guns of merchantmen armed for de- fense...! shall speak now of the 2,000- ton submarine, which certainly has been put in service, probably at the same time as the commercial submarine Deutschland, whose tonnage is no less. Judging from the characteristics which are attributed to this new craft, it will readily be seen that we have here a deep-sea cruiser most ac- ceptable for operating along the Allies' lines of communication with America. These are the details : Length, 85 meters over all ; four Diesel motors of 7,000 horsepower; speed of 22 knots (14 when submerged) ; ability to cover 6,500 sea miles on the surface (in other words, twice _ the distance across the Atlantic) ; capacity for fresh water and provisions enough to last six or eight weeks ; arma- ment consisting of 8 torpedo tubes for sixteen 55-centimeter torpedoes, 50 auto- matic mines, 4 medium-sized guns (per- haps of 150 millimeters, perhaps of 120), adapted for firing against aircraft; upper bridge lightly armoured ; two boats ; fifty men in the crew, together with five of- ficers, including two mechanicians." Q. — Have we anything like the same number of submarines as Germany? A. — We have not, and in this war we do not need them. The German object in submarine warfare is destruction of mer- chant tonnage, and for this purpose they need as big a fleet of under-water boats as they can possibly turn out. America and the Allies have for their stategic object the destruction of enemy warships and nothing else, if these ever come out of their "holes" to fight. Submarines are of only limited value for fighting other submarines, and the work can be done far better by destroy- ers ; Therefore, the American Navy can limit its submarine fleet to the numbers actually desirable for operations against warships. However, we have a decidedly imposing fleet. It numbered more than 75 in 1917 before we entered war, and it has been heavily increased. Q. — Have we more than one kind of submarine? A. — Yes. We have two kinds — the smaller submarine, known as a coast de- fense submarine, and the larger sea-go- ing kind, which is known as a fleet sub- marine, because it is designed to accom- pany a fleet in sea operations. Q. — Are any American submarines equal to the biggest German ones? A. — We have applied the lessons learned during the war, but the details are natur- ally not things to publish, though most naval students know pretty well what the United States is accomplishing. Before the war began we had already started the construction of many under-water ves- sels, which were twice the size of any- thing that ever had existed in American fleets before then. These big fleet submarines were almost 300 feet long, and they were of 1,000 to 1,200 tons and more, practically equalling in tonnage some of our modern destroy- ers. They were designed to carry enough fuel (oil) to go from 6,000 to 7,000 miles on the surface and 3,000 miles submerged, with speed close to 20 knots (22^2 statute miles) on the surface (by oil-driven motor), and 12 to 14 knots under the sur- face (by electric motor). They were armored, carried batteries of at least three 4-inch rifled cannon, and had ten torpedo tubes. Q. — What made the German use of submarines hideous? A. — They destroyed ships without warn- ing, or, at best, if they gave warning, set crew and passengers adrift, in small boats, sometimes at a great distance from land. Thus they regularly violated international law and humanity ; while in special cases (particularly with the crews of the Q-boats or decoy craft) they committed barbarities of "f rightfulness" which horri- fied the world. Man Under Water (The Submarine) 59 Q. — Did British submarines per- form notable exploits? A. — The British submarine E-9 got al- most under the guns of Heligoland Sep- tember 13, 1914, and torpedoed the Ger- man light cruiser Hela (2,000 tons) prac- tically in the fortress zone. But the most notable exploit (and probably the most brilliant submarine exploit ever per- formed) was the exploit of the British B-11 which, on December 11, 1914, made its way into the Dardanelles, passing under five rows of mines ! This daring submarine deed resulted in the torpedo- ing of the Turkish battleship Messoudieh, 10,000 tons, actually inside of the land and sea defenses of Turkey. Q. — What was the enemy's chief success? A. — Probably the most spectacular instance of the fighting powers of the submarine was furnished in the torpedo- ing of three big British cruisers by one submarine, which attacked and destroyed them in turn, early in the war. The British ships were all of the same type — armored cruisers of 12,000 tons each. Their names were Aboukir, Cressy, and Hogne (names commemorating three famous British victories). They were op- erating toward the German North Sea base of Kiel on September 22, 1914, when the German U-29 struck one with a tor- pedo. The others tried to stand by, and were torpedoed in swift succession and sunk. Q. — How many battleships did submarines sink during the war? A. — Up to the beginning of 1918, the battleships listed as submarine losses were : Formidable, 15,000 tons, torpedoed January 1, 191 5, in the North Sea; Go- liath, 13,000 tons, sunk May 12, 1915, Dardanelles ; Triumph, 12,000 tons, sunk May 25, 1915, Dardanelles; Majestic, 15,000 tons, sunk May 27, 1915, in Dar- danelles ; Cornwallis, 14,000 tons, sunk September 1, 1917, in Mediterranean. These were the British losses, and do not count in such losses as the Audaeious, which was sunk mysteriously, but prob- ably not by a submarine. The French had lost the battleship Bouvet 12,000 tons, sunk March 18, 1915, at the Dardanelles ; and the Stiff em, 13,- 000 tons, sunk November 26, 1916, off Lisbon. The Italians had lost no battleships by submarine action, though they lost a num- ber of large armored cruisers, as did the French and British. Italian battleship losses were due to explosion and mines. The Germans, having kept their fleet in hiding, had lost only an armored cruiser and three light cruisers, all sub- marined in the Baltic in 1915. The Aus- trians have, apparently, lost only one cruiser to submarines. The Turks lost the Messoudieh, and the battleship Kyehr- Ed-Din, torpedoed in the Sea of Mar- mora Sept. 8, 1915. Q. — Can submarines fight subma- rines? A. — Not when submerged, though towards the end of 1917 they were being more and more employed to locate the enemy. They can, of course, fight each other with guns and torpedoes on the surface, but that is only like other craft. Submerged, they cannot fight each other, because the crew of submarines cannot see under water. It is true that the conning-towers have glazed look-out places, but even in clear water .the den- sity of the water-world is such that men can see only a few yards. It is conceiv- able that two submarines might, by guess and luck, blunder into each other, and try to use torpedoes; but it is a remote possibility. Q. — Are duels under seas likely in the future? A. — There remains a chance that sound- transmitting apparatus may be so highly perfected that a submarine can find its prey by sound, and succeed in determin- ing its^ whereabouts even though it re- mains invisible. In that case, there may some day be under-water hunts by and of submarines. It is the dream, of course, of naval in- ventors to discover some way to make fairly extended sight possible under water. This would make the submarine more than doubly as dangerous to sur- face ships as it now is, for then it might approach a ship without showing its peri- scope at all. But so fa