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A 
 
 OF 
 
 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 EMBRACING 
 
 LOGIC, METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS. 
 
 DESIGNED AS A TEXT-BOOK FOR THE USE OF SCHOOLS.. 
 
 > 
 
 by - /: ?^~?~: 
 
 Rev. A. Louage, C. S. OS ^ - '<- ^ 
 
 PROFESSOR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME. 
 
 BALTIMOEE: 
 
 KELLY, PIET & COMPANY. 
 
 1873. 
 

 THE LIBRARY 
 OF CONGRESS 
 WASHINGTOW 
 
 Entered, according to an Act of Congress, in the year 1873, by 
 
 KELLY, PIET & COMPANY, 
 
 In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 
 
PREFACE 
 
 T is the unanimous opinion of those best qualified 
 to judge, that a knowledge of the first principles 
 of Philosophy is necessary to complete any course 
 of classical or scientific studies. Experience as well 
 as reason teaches that those who complete their edu- 
 cation with a course of sound Philosophy, thus 
 acquire an accurate method for the continuation of 
 their studies, for the instruction of others, or for the 
 pursuit of any calling to which they may devote 
 their talents. 
 
 The man who learns what truth is, learns also to 
 love it ; and will not be easily led astray by the sys- 
 tems of error which are everywhere paraded before 
 him, labelled with the false appellation of Philos- 
 ophy : he despises the contradictions of pseudo- 
 philosophers, he abhors the repulsive doctrines of 
 the wicked, and avoids with care the corruption of 
 morals which always accompanies them. Every- 
 where and always he perceives the presence of the 
 Divinity, and is accordingly filled with awe and 
 reverence : he sees also, with consolation, the excel- 
 lence of his own soul and its future destiny, and not 
 only preserves it from the contamination of vice, but 
 also adorns it with every virtue ;• thus conscientiously 
 discharging all the duties of his station in life, he 
 must ascend higher and higher in the scale of being, 
 
4 PREFACE. 
 
 When we thus point out the abundant and inesti- 
 mable fruits of Philosophy, it is evident that we do 
 not speak of that so-called Philosophy which ignores 
 the light of Divine revelation, but of that true 
 Christian Philosophy which is guided as far as pos- 
 sible by reason, but which freely admits the light of 
 faith where that of reason fails : for, as we shall see, 
 reason alone is not capable of completely solving 
 some of the most serious problems which concern the 
 salvation of man. 
 
 The young man who, while at college, has either 
 wholly neglected to study the rules of judging and 
 knowing, or who has not engraven them deeply on 
 his mind, wanders without a guide through dark 
 and devious ways, and is " carried about by every 
 wind of doctrine. ' ' He reads indiscriminately every 
 book, good or bad, that chance throws in his way, 
 and peruses them with little attention or reflection. 
 Hence he fills his mind with imperfect notions of 
 things, without any order ; everywhere he sees con- 
 tradictory systems, and in the midst of this general 
 darkness he remains uncertain of the truth, and 
 even becomes doubtful of the very existence of cer- 
 titude. Soon the truth of religion appears to him 
 as not sufficiently proved ; and, owing to the preju- 
 dices to which he has yielded, he begins to deny that 
 there is any excellence in virtue or any turpitude in 
 vice. Passions rise in his heart, which, not being 
 restrained, but rather flattered and excited by many 
 causes, soon lead to deplorable results ; for they 
 shake his reason, which is already weak and deprived 
 of its natural support, they destroy the vigor of his 
 
PREFACE. O 
 
 physical system, they deprave his nature, and finally 
 carry the unfortunate youth to utter destruction. 
 
 That this is not an overdrawn picture is plain to 
 any one who chooses to look around him with an 
 unprejudiced eye; and it shows conclusively the 
 importance of a knowledge of the primary principles 
 of Philosophy. On this knowledge, in truth, de- 
 pends the progress which we shall make in science, 
 the solidity of our mind ; our love of truth and 
 detestation of falsehood, our sagacity in choosing 
 what is best, the integrity of our morals, the peace 
 of families, the well-being of society, in a word, our 
 happiness both in public and in private life. 
 
 The teacher, therefore, who is incompetent, neg- 
 ligent or dishonest, is the cause of an irreparable 
 loss to those under his care ; while he who is learned, 
 diligent and consistent in his instruction, sows in 
 the minds of those committed to his charge the seeds 
 of truth and virtue which will bring forth an abun- 
 dant harvest of the richest fruits of a good education. 
 To attain so desirable an end, the pupil should be 
 guided, not by obscure and uncertain precepts, but 
 by those which are established upon the clearest 
 principles of reason : even as a child as yet unac- 
 quainted with the way is guided, not by the hand 
 of an ignorant or a dangerous man, but by that of 
 his father. 
 
 We do not approve of the method of teaching 
 Philosophy by lecture ; for long lectures, however 
 well developed, are not always understood by the 
 student and are very easily forgotten : we are rather 
 in favor of placing in the hands of the pupil a 
 
b PREFACE. 
 
 small but comprehensive text-book, which, he can 
 readily commit to memory, and easily retain. Such 
 a text-book should be concise without being obscure, 
 so that the attention of the student may be sufficiently 
 attracted and exercised ; but, more than all, a book 
 written for this object should be exact. 
 
 An elementary book of this kind is not often 
 found ; indeed it may be doubted whether one pos- 
 sessing all the qualities mentioned above exists in 
 any modern tongue. Some excellent compendiums 
 written in the Latin language have been published 
 since 1825 ; but they cannot serve our purpose, 
 which requires a manual of Philosophy adapted par- 
 ticularly to the wants of those who are not acquainted 
 with the classics. To unlock the treasures of Phi- 
 losophy for them, we concluded that it would be well 
 to prepare a text-book having as far as possible the 
 requisites mentioned above. 
 
 During the preparation of our manual we have 
 diligently consulted the best works on the subject ; 
 and we now submit the result of our labors in the 
 form of an elementary text-book on Philosophy, 
 which we trust will meet the requirements of those 
 for whom it is intended : and may God grant that, 
 owing to the good intentions of the author, this book 
 may be the means of advancing the best interests of 
 the youths for whom it was written. 
 
 S. K D. B. 
 
INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 BEFOBE entering the sanctuary of Philosophy, 
 a few words are necessary by way of introduc- 
 tion. We shall arrange these preliminary remarks 
 under four heads. Under the first we shall give the 
 Definitions of several woeds of common occurrence : 
 under the second we shall examine the Definitions 
 of Philosophy: under the third we shall give the 
 Divisions of Philosophy : and under the fourth we 
 shall say something of Argument. 
 
 I. 
 
 Definitions of Words. 
 
 A being or thing is that which exists or may exist : 
 it is therefore twofold, real or possible. 
 
 Existence is the real union of the parts or attri- 
 butes which constitute a being. 
 
 Possibility is the agreement of the attributes which 
 constitute a being, in such a way that its existence 
 does not involve any contradiction. 
 
 The attributes are the qualities of a being : they 
 are essential or constitutive when the thing cannot 
 exist without them, and accidental when the thing 
 can exist without them. 
 
 The essence of a being; consists of the collection of 
 
O INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 its essential or necessary attributes. The essence of 
 a thing is also called its nature ; although the word 
 nature is more extensive than essence, since the 
 nature of a being sometimes includes its accidental 
 as well as its essential attributes. Nature is also 
 used to signify the whole collection of corporeal 
 beings. 
 
 A genus is a collection of beings having one or 
 more attributes common to each. A genus must be 
 sufficiently general to be divided into subordinate 
 classes, called species. 
 
 A species, therefore, is a collection of beings be- 
 longing to one and the same genus, but having par- 
 ticular and constitutive properties by which they are 
 distinguished from any other collection of beings of 
 the same genus. 
 
 For example, being, the most general genus, is 
 divided into two species, corporeal and incorporeal 
 beings. These two species are each divided into 
 other species, and consequently they are genera 
 with reference to the subsequent divisions. Corpo- 
 real bodies form two species, things with life and 
 things without life. Things with life, considered 
 -with reference to a further division, form a genus 
 which is divided into two species, animals and vege- 
 tables. 
 
 The genus may be either remote or proximate. It 
 is remote when there is at least one division inter- 
 vening between the species and the genus referred 
 to. For instance, when I say, Man is a rational 
 being, the genus, being, is remote ; but it is proxi- 
 iinate when I say, Man is a rational animal. 
 
INTRODUCTORY. 9 
 
 Each species must have an essential attribute which 
 makes it distinct from every other species of the 
 same genus : this attribute is called the difference. 
 When this difference consists of an attribute which 
 separates every being of the species from every being 
 of another species, it is called the specific difference. 
 We have an example of this difference in the follow- 
 ing definition, Man is a rational animal, where the 
 word rational indicates the specific difference, dis- 
 tinguishing man from any other species of the genus 
 animal. 
 
 Individuals are those beings to which, considered 
 separately, the same genus and the same difference 
 pertain. 
 
 In Ontology we shall give the definitions of Sub- 
 stance, Modification, Subject and Object, also of Order 
 and Relation. 
 
 Science is a series of notions deduced from princi- 
 ples firmly established, disposed in a methodical 
 order and referring to one and the same object. 
 
 Science is either subjective or objective; subjective 
 when we consider it as existing in our own minds, 
 and objective when we consider it as existing in the 
 object contemplated : it is again either speculative or 
 practical. 
 
 Practical science is the source of art . 
 
 Art is the application of science to external things, 
 according to determined rules. We will here ob- 
 serve that the same species of knowledge may be at. 
 the same time a science and an art. Arithmetic and 
 Geometry, considered in themselves, are sciences ; 
 but applied to external things they are arts. Logic, 
 1* 
 
10 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 considered in itself, is a science ; but applied to trie 
 investigation of truth and its manifestation, accord- 
 ing to determined rules, as in the method of Aris- 
 totle, it is the Art of Eeasoning, or the Art of 
 Thinking. 
 
 Knowledge, in general, is the representation 
 taking place in the mind, of something, in some 
 manner ; it differs very little from idea, as we shall 
 see. It is intuitive when the object appears so 
 clearly to our intellect that we perceive it without 
 reasoning, and discursive when we need some de- 
 monstration to perceive the object. 
 
 Knowledge has for its objects either natural or 
 supernatural things. 
 
 Faith, in general, is the assent of the mind to 
 some truth, on the testimony of another person. 
 When this assent is founded upon the authority of 
 G-od, it is Divine Faith ; it is Human Faith when 
 established upon the testimony of men. 
 
 II. 
 
 Definitions of Philosophy. 
 
 It often becomes necessary to give definitions, in 
 order to avoid obscurity or uncertainty. A defini- 
 tion is an explanation of a word or of a tiling. The 
 definition of a word is said to be etymological when 
 its origin is given, and significative when its mean- 
 ing is explained. 
 
 The definition of a thing is that which shows the 
 nature of the thing. It may be merely descriptive, 
 and then the definition is called imperfect; or it 
 
INTRODUCTORY. 11 
 
 may be accurate and perfect, and this only deserves 
 the name of definition. Description is suitable to 
 oratory, but definition belongs especially to Philos- 
 ophy : it gives precisely what is necessary in order 
 that the thing may be understood and distinguished 
 from every other thing, by enumerating its essential 
 qualities. 
 
 Three conditions are requisite to a perfect defini- 
 tion : 1st, It must be clear, that is, free from any 
 obscure or ambiguous expression ; 2nd, It must be 
 orief, that is, free from all unnecessary words ; and 
 3d, It must give the 'proximate genus and the specific 
 difference. When these three conditions are found, 
 the definition applies to the thing defined, and to 
 nothing else, so that the thing and its definition are 
 reciprocals. 
 
 Philosophy has been defined as "the science of 
 things knowable by the light of reason," or "the 
 science of reason." 
 
 But these definitions, while they distinguish Phi- 
 losophy from theology, do not separate it from the 
 physical and mathematical sciences ; and in our day 
 these sciences have been so far extended that they 
 have ceased to belong to Philosophy, as it is now 
 taught in the schools. The following definition of 
 Philosophy might consequently be accepted : ' ' The 
 science of supersensible things knowable by the light 
 of reason." This definition has the three requisite 
 marks : it is clear, short, and contains the proximate 
 genus, "science," and the specific difference, "super- 
 sensible," which word distinguishes Philosophy 
 from the physical sciences, and "knowable by the 
 
12 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 light of reason," which words distinguish Philos- 
 ophy from theology. 
 
 III. 
 
 Divisions of Philosophy. 
 
 Division, in general, is the distribution of a whole 
 into its parts. A whole is that which is formed of 
 parts really or logically distinct. The whole is said 
 to be metaphysical, jjhysical or logical, according as 
 its parts belong to one or other of these orders. 
 
 The division, to be accurate, must have these 
 three conditions : 1st, It must be adequate, that is, 
 it must include as many members as there are in 
 the whole which is to be divided ; 2nd, It must be 
 distinct, that is, one part must not be included in an- 
 other ; 3d, The parts must be proximate, otherwise 
 there would be confusion, the following division, for 
 instance, would be wrong : Living beings are divided 
 into three classes, men, beasts and plants. A prox- 
 imate division would be : Living beings are divided 
 into two classes, animals and vegetables, and so 
 continue, always giving first the proximate, or 
 nearest, division, and the subdivisions in like order. 
 
 Philosophy, as we have learned, is the science of 
 supersensible things. In order to proceed method- 
 ically in the acquisition of this science, we must 
 first give the rules for the investigation of truth, 
 and then investigate the things which form the object 
 of this science, beginning with the most important, 
 namely, God and the soul. The nature of God and 
 the soul being known, we may examine the relations 
 existing between God and the soul, between the soul 
 
INTRODUCTORY. 13 
 
 and the body, and finally the relations of men to 
 each other considered as social beings. We have 
 then three parts which form the Divisions of Phi- 
 losophy: namely, Logic, Metaphysics, and Ethics. 
 
 IV. 
 
 Argument. 
 
 The different points to be treated under this head 
 will be given in Logic. We will here say only a 
 few words in regard to equivocal propositions, which 
 we may sometimes' have to deal with. 
 
 1st. We must distinguish and point out clearly 
 the equivocal expressions. 
 
 2nd. If these expressions are not clear of them- 
 selves, we must define and explain them. 
 
 3d. We must concede the proposition in the sense 
 in which it is true, and deny it in the sense in which 
 it is false ; and in both cases give our reasons for 
 doing so, if necessary. 
 
A COURSE OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 PART I.— LOGIC. 
 
LOGIC. 
 
 Definition — Division. 
 
 FOR the acquisition of science the human mind 
 must first be provided with rules, and so be 
 enabled to avoid error and establish truth on the 
 solid foundation of reason. 
 
 The word philosophy, as we have seen, is as uni- 
 versal as the word science itself, and logic is the key 
 of this science. Logic is consequently the first part 
 of Philosophy, the part which treats of the first 
 efforts of the human mind to discover truth, and 
 afterwards gives rules by which this truth may be 
 demonstrated. We may therefore define Logic to 
 be, "The science which directs the operations of our 
 mind in the investigation and demonstration of 
 truth/' 
 
 When this science is put in practice it becomes 
 "The Art of Reasoning," which words may be ac- 
 cepted as a definition of logic, considered as an art. 
 In the foregoing definitions we find the three re- 
 quisite conditions of a good definition : 1st, clearness, 
 2nd, conciseness, and 3d, reciprocity, that is, the 
 proximate genus and the specific difference are 
 given. 
 
18 LOGIC. 
 
 The natural order observed by the mind in the 
 investigation of truth may be described as follows : 
 We first represent objects*to ourselves, we next judge 
 of them, we then compare our judgments and draw 
 conclusions, and, finally, we arrange these conclu- 
 sions in a certain order. Hence we have in the 
 science of logic four different .parts or divisions ; the 
 first treating of our Ideas of objects, the second of 
 our Judgments concerning those ideas, the third of 
 our Eeasoning concerning the judgments, and the 
 fourth of the Method in which we dispose of the con- 
 clusions of our reasoning. 
 
 As soon as we have considered these four divisions 
 of the science we shall apply it to a the investigation 
 of the existence of truth, or Certitude ; and, logically 
 speaking, this question comes first. Is there any- 
 thing certain, is there any certitude? and, if so, how 
 can Ave prove its existence ? Although this question, 
 in reality, forms the introduction to the study of 
 Philosophy, since without an affirmative answer to 
 it we cannot make one step in the science, yet some 
 authors treat it as a part of logic ; and we adopt this 
 plan as more convenient, and shall therefore treat of 
 certitude as the fifth part of logic. 
 
 FIRST DISSERTATION. 
 
 ON IDEAS. 
 An idea may be considered as existing either in 
 the mind or out of it : consequently this first disser- 
 tation may be divided into two chapters. 
 
LOGIC. 19 
 
 CHAPTEK FIKST. 
 
 Of Ideas Considered as Existing in the Mind. 
 
 " An idea is the mere representation in the mind 
 of some object." We cannot, therefore, have an 
 idea of nothing ; for nothing has no property or attri- 
 bute by which it might be represented in the mind. 
 The definition- of an idea being given, we have now 
 to examine, 1st, the division of ideas, 2nd, their 
 properties, and 3d, the operations of our mind in 
 regard to them. 
 
 §1. The Division oe Ideas. 
 
 r 
 
 In regard to their origin, some authors divide 
 ideas into three classes : First, innate ideas, or those 
 born 'with us ; second, adventitious ideas, or those 
 coming to us from various causes in the course of 
 time ; and third, factitious ideas, or those formed by 
 ourselves. 
 
 In regard to their object, we have, first, the idea 
 of substance, when we consider the substance of a 
 thing as abstracted from its modifications ; second, 
 the idea of modification, when we consider the mod- 
 ifications of a thing as abstracted from its substance 
 (these two ideas are called abstract ideas) ; and, 
 third, the idea of modified substance, which is called 
 a concrete idea. 
 
 Concrete ideas may be produced by sensation or 
 by the imagination. They are produced by sensa- 
 tion when they represent objects which strike our 
 senses and which, therefore, really exist : they are 
 produced by the imagination when they represent 
 
20 LOGIC. 
 
 objects which, may exist, hut which do not strike our 
 senses. 
 
 All these ideas are called ideas of sensible things 
 when their objects are sensible things ; and they are 
 called ideas of intellectual things when the objects 
 which they represent cannot affect the senses : the 
 ideas of moral things belong to this second class. 
 
 An idea is simple when the object represented can- 
 not be divided, as, "an affirmation ;" complex when 
 the object is qualified, as, " a good man ;" compound 
 when the object may be divided into several parts, 
 as, "a horse," " a tree ;" collective, when the object 
 is a unity formed of several objects belonging to the 
 same species, as, "an army;" universal when the 
 object represents all the beings of the same species, 
 as, " man in general;" particular when the object 
 represents only a part of the beings belonging to the 
 same species, as, "several men;" singular when the 
 object refers to one individual of a collection, as, 
 "Peter," "John;" and adequate when the object 
 appears with all its attributes : God only has ade- 
 quate ideas, we have but inadequate ones. 
 
 §11. Properties of Ideas. 
 
 Ideas are, first, either true or false. They are 
 true when they conform with their objects, false 
 when they do not. But since this conformity is 
 always with the objects as represented in our minds, 
 and not as they may be in reality, we may, with 
 this explanation, admit the opinion of those who 
 pretend that there are no false ideas. Ideas are, in 
 the second place, either clear or obscure, and these 
 
LOGIC. 21 
 
 words need no explanation. Thirdly, they are 
 either distinct or confused. An idea is distinct when 
 it can be readily separated from any other idea, as 
 the idea of "a certain house" or of "a certain per- 
 son;" and it is confused when the object cannot be 
 distinctly determined. If I say, " Many persons are 
 standing at a distance from me, and I cannot see 
 whether they are armed or not, ' ' I have a confused 
 idea. . 
 
 ' The comprehension of an idea signifies the sum of 
 the attributes which constitute the nature of the 
 object. The comprehension of the idea of man in- 
 cludes everything necessary to constitute a man, as 
 man, thus distinguishing him from everything else, 
 as a tree or a stone. 
 
 The extension of an idea signifies the whole collec- 
 tion of the individuals which the same idea embraces. 
 The extension of the idea of man includes all those 
 beings that have the human nature, that is, all men. 
 
 § III. Opeeations of the Mind in Begaed to Ideas. 
 
 The principal operations of the mind in reference 
 to ideas are attention, abstraction and comparison. 
 
 Attention is that operation of the mind by which 
 we lay our ideas, as it were, before the eyes of the 
 mind, in order to examine them with care and 
 master them. Attention and reflection constitute 
 the foundation of science and the source of learn- 
 ing. 
 
 Abstraction is that operation of the mind by which 
 we consider one or more qualities of an object, the 
 other qualities being laid aside. Abstraction is not 
 
22 LOGIC. 
 
 only possible and even easy of attainment, out it is 
 also necessary. 
 
 Having examined several qualities and found that 
 they belong to a certain object, if we unite these 
 qualities in order to form this object again, we per- 
 form an operation which is called synthesis : on the 
 contrary, if an object is given us to study, and we 
 divide it into its parts, examining successively each 
 part, we perform an operation which is called analy- 
 sis. We may, therefore, see that analysis is a de- 
 composition, while synthesis is a recomposition. 
 
 When, in order to form a species, we collect several 
 individuals having Common properties, we perform 
 an operation which is called generalization. 
 
 When we consider two or more ideas, in order to 
 find their consistency or their inconsistency, we per- 
 form an operation which is called comparison. This 
 operation is, of course, the most important ; without 
 it we could not improve in any branch of science or 
 art. 
 
 CHAPTER SECOND. 
 
 Of Ideas Considered as Existing Out or the Mind. 
 
 There are three ways by which we may express 
 what we represent to our mind, namely, gestures, 
 speech and writing ; and these three are designated 
 by the general appellation of signs. 
 
 For the development of this chapter see the re- 
 marks on the "Origin of Language," in experi- 
 mental Psychology. 
 
LOGIC. 23 
 
 SECOND DISSERTATION. 
 
 ON JUDGMENT. 
 
 When the mind after having compared two ideas 
 declares their consistency or their inconsistency, it 
 makes a judgment. Consequently c ' Judgment is 
 that operation of the mind hy which it pronounces 
 on the consistency or the inconsistency of two ideas, 
 or declaring that a certain quality exists or does not 
 exist in a certain object. We may readily under- 
 stand that our errors proceed from mistaken judg- 
 ments only, for we cannot err in perceiving or in 
 feeling. 
 
 Here again we may consider judgment as existing 
 either in the mind or out of it, and consequently 
 this dissertation is also divided into two chapters. 
 
 CHAPTEK FIKST.~ 
 
 Of Judgment Considered as Existing in the Mind. 
 
 Judgment is a positive act of the mind, and not a 
 mere sensation, as Condillac said, or a perception, 
 according to the opinion of Mallebranche. It is an 
 act, since we judge and pronounce, and we can do 
 neither without acting ; it is, besides, a simple act, 
 since it consists of an affirmation or a negation, and, 
 consequently, cannot be divided. 
 
 Judgment is very probably produced both by the 
 intellect and by the will. 
 
 A judgment is either necessary or free. A neces- 
 sary judgment is one formed when the mind is so 
 strongly impelled to judge that it cannot refrain 
 from judging. ' ' I exist, " is a necessary judgment. 
 
24 LOGIC. 
 
 A free judgment is one which the mind is not forced 
 to pronounce. 
 
 A judgment is, in the second place, either true or 
 false, depending on the fact as to whether the things 
 are, or are not, as the mind declares them to he. 
 
 Thirdly, a judgment is certain when it is estab- 
 lished on an infallible foundation, as, "Our Lord 
 died," "Bodies exist/' 
 
 Fourthly, a judgment is evident when it rests upon 
 a clear and distinct perception of the consistency or 
 the inconsistency of two ideas, as, "Two and two 
 equal four." 
 
 Lastly, a probable judgment is one established on 
 trustworthy, but not infallible, reasons, as, " It is 
 probable that a sick man will recover when several 
 good physicians are of opinion that such will be the 
 "case." 
 
 CHAPTEE SECOND. 
 
 Of Judgment Considered as Existing out of the Mind. 
 
 "When we express our judgment we form what is 
 called a proposition. To constitute a proposition 
 three terms are necessary, a subject, a verb, and an 
 attribute, one or even two of which may be under- 
 stood. 
 
 In every proposition the attribute always expresses 
 a notion more extensive than the subject. Aristotle 
 gives ten classifications of attributes, which he calls 
 cle categoriis ; Kant gives but four. Nothing is 
 more obscure and less useful than such classifica- 
 tions. 
 
 A proposition is universal when the subject is taken 
 
LOGIC. 25 
 
 in all its extension, as, " Every substance is divisi- 
 ble/' "No spirit is mortal." 
 
 A proposition is particular when the subject is 
 not taken in its full extension, as, "Some men are 
 learned." Even such expressions as "All young 
 men are fickle" are but particular propositions. 
 
 A proposition is singular when the subject is but 
 one individual, as, " Cassar was a great general." 
 
 A proposition is affirmative when the attribute is 
 declared to be consistent with the subject, negative 
 when declared inconsistent. 
 
 The following axioms in reference to affirmative 
 and negative propositions are given in this connec- 
 tion ; we shall need them farther on : 
 
 1st Axiom. The attribute of an affirmative propo- 
 sition is taken in its entire comprehension, but not 
 in its entire extension ; consequently, the attribute 
 of an affirmative proposition is a particular term. 
 For example, if I say "All angels are spirits," the 
 attribute ' ' spirits ' ' is taken in its entire compre- 
 hension, but not in its entire extension ; for other 
 beings than angels may be spirits. 
 
 2d Axiom. The attribute of a negative proposition 
 is not taken in its entire comprehension, but is taken 
 in its entire extension ; consequently, the attribute 
 of a negative proposition is a universal term. For 
 example, if I say, "A man is not a stone," the at- 
 tribute ' ' stone ' ' is not taken in its entire compre- 
 hension, since both "man" and "stone" have the 
 comprehension of material substance ; but it is taken 
 in its whole extension, for no stone whatever is a man. 
 
 A proposition is grammatical when we consider 
 2 
 
26 LOGIC. 
 
 only the terms as abstracted from the sense, and 
 logical when we consider the proposition as having 
 a determined sense. 
 
 The sense of a logical proposition may be proper or 
 foreign: it is proper, or natural, when we give to the 
 words their ordinary meaning ; and it is foreign when 
 we give to the terms a signification which is not 
 their own. 
 
 The sense may also be either divided or composite ; 
 or, to use the Latin expressions, the proposition may 
 be taken either in sensu diviso or in sensu composite. 
 For instance, if I say, "The blind may see," the 
 proposition is true in sensu diviso, but false in sensu 
 composito. In the first sense the proposition means, 
 "The blind, if restored to sight, may see ;" in the 
 second it means, "The blind, though remaining 
 blind, may see." In the course of this work we 
 shall have more to say of this distinction. 
 
 A proposition is true when it declares its subject 
 to be as it is in reality, as, " God is powerful ;" and 
 false when it declares its subject to be as it is not in 
 reality, as, " God is cruel." 
 
 Sometimes a proposition has two senses, and then 
 it is called equivocal. To obtain the true sense of a 
 proposition it is often necessary to stake the propo- 
 sition in a different manner, to change the order in 
 which the terms have been first presented ; some- 
 times also when two propositions are given and 
 compared it becomes necessary to judge of the con- 
 trary or the contradictory of one of them: it is 
 therefore necessary for us to learn something of the 
 conversion and the opposition of propositions. 
 
LOGIC. 27 
 
 §1. Conversion of Propositions. 
 
 The conversion of a proposition is the changing of 
 it into another proposition of the same -meaning. 
 
 This conversion is simple when the whole attribute 
 is substituted for the subject, and the subject for the 
 attribute ; and it is accidental when a part only of 
 the attribute takes the place of the subject. 
 
 The following rules must be observed in the con- 
 version of propositions : 
 
 Kule I. The quality and the quantity of the prop- 
 osition must be retained in the conversion. 
 
 Rule II. A universal negative proposition and a 
 particular affirmative proposition may both be conr- 
 verted by simple conversion : for, in the first, both 
 terms are universal (2d Axiom), and in the second, 
 both are particular (1st Axiom); consequently, the 
 quality and the quantity are kept in the conversion. 
 Examples of simple conversion : 
 
 No man is a stone ; no stone is a man, 
 
 Some men are good persons ; some good persons 
 are men. 
 
 Rule III. A universal affirmative proposition 
 cannot be converted by simple conversion, for its 
 attribute is a particular term (1st Axiom) ; except 
 in necessary and reciprocal statements, that is, when 
 they are identical in regard to the sense, as is the 
 case in definitions. For example, " All priests are 
 men" is not equivalent to "All men are priests" 
 but to "Some men are priests." But "All circles 
 are round" is equivalent to its reciprocal, "All 
 round figures are circles." 
 
 Rule IV. A particular negative proposition cannot 
 
28 LOGIC. 
 
 be converted either simply or accidentally ; for such 
 a conversion would violate the first rule, by chang- 
 ing the quality or the quantity of one of the terms. 
 
 §11. Opposition of Propositions. 
 
 When I say "Peter is a learned man," and " Pe- 
 ter is not a learned man," I have two propositions 
 which are opposite. 
 
 Opposition is, therefore, the negation in one prop- 
 osition, and the affirmation in another, of the same 
 attribute, concerning the same subject and with the 
 same reference. Consequently, in these two propo- 
 sitions, " Peter is good" and "Paul is not good," 
 there is no opposition ; nor is there .any opposition in 
 the following, "Peter is learned in philosophy" 
 and "Peter is not learned in theology." To con- 
 clude, two propositions are in opposition when one of 
 them denies what the other affirms. It follows that 
 two negative propositions cannot be in opposition. 
 
 Two propositions are said to be contrary when in 
 one of them more is said than is necessary to refute 
 the other. Example : "All men are just. No man 
 is just." 
 
 Two propositions are called contradictory when in 
 one is said precisely what is necessary to refute the 
 other ; as, " All men are just. A certain man is not 
 just." 
 
 Evidently, two contradictory propositions cannot 
 both be either true or false ; for, if so, the same 
 thing wQiild be and not be at the same time ; that 
 is, the same attribute would be consistent and not 
 consistent with the subject, which is absurd. 
 
logic. 29 
 
 As a corollary, since two contradictory proposi- 
 tions cannot be true and false at the same time, it 
 follows that when one is true the other is false, and 
 vice versa. 
 
 Two contrary propositions cannot both be true at 
 the same time, but both may be false : for, as two 
 contradictory propositions cannot both be true at 
 the same time, since in one of them is said precisely 
 what is sufficient for the refutation of the other ; so, 
 a fortiori, two contrary propositions cannot both be 
 true at the same time, since in one of those proposi- 
 tions more is said than is needed for the refutation 
 of the other : also, since, in one of the two contrary 
 propositions more is said than is necessary to refute 
 the other, there may be a middle term which is the 
 true one ; and consequently the two contrary propo- 
 sitions may both be false. 
 
 Examples: " All men are just. No man is just," 
 — both false. The middle term, "some men," is 
 the true subject ; and "some men are just " is the 
 true proposition. 
 
 THIRD DISSERTATION. 
 
 ON EE ASOJSTING . 
 
 When after comparing several judgments we draw 
 a conclusion from them we are said to reason. Rea- 
 soning is, therefore, an act of the mind deducing a 
 judgment from other judgments ; and when expressed 
 in words it forms an Argument. Argument then is 
 to reasoning what the proposition is to judgment, 
 namely, its formal expression in words. 
 
30 LOGIC. 
 
 Seasoning is said to be immediate when no com- 
 parison is needed, and mediate when a comparison 
 is necessary. 
 
 Reasoning affects only formal truth ; hence, if we 
 assume a false principle we shall, by good reasoning, 
 deduce a false conclusion. 
 
 There are many sorts of argument, of which the 
 syllogism is the most common. 
 
 We shall divide this dissertation into five chap- 
 ters. In the first we shall treat of the syllogism 
 and its rules ; in the second, of the different kinds 
 of syllogisms ; in the third, of the forms of argument 
 other than the syllogism ; in the fourth, of sophisms ; 
 and in the fifth, of the sources of sophisms. 
 
 CHAPTER FIRST. 
 
 Of the Syllogism and its Rules. 
 
 The syllogism is an argument consisting of three 
 propositions so arranged that from the first two, 
 called the premises, the third necessarily follows as 
 a conclusion. 
 
 In every syllogism there are three terms, the 
 major, or greater, the minor, or less, and the middle. 
 
 The major term is the attribute of the conclusion, 
 of which the minor is the subject : as we have already 
 learned, the attribute is always a greater term than 
 the subject. The middle term, which is the term 
 of comparison, is not found in the conclusion. 
 
 The first proposition of the syllogism is called the 
 major proposition, because it contains the major 
 term ; the second is called the minor, because it con- 
 
LOGIC. 31 
 
 tains the minor term ; and the third, which, as we 
 have just seen, contains both the major and the 
 minor term, is called the conclusion. 
 
 The major and the minor are together called the 
 premises, or the antecedent; and the conclusion is 
 also called the consequent. 
 
 Example : 
 
 Middle Term. Major Term. "*| 
 
 Major. All bad men are miserable ; Premises, or 
 
 Minor Term. Middle Term. ( Antecedents. 
 
 Minor. All tyrants are bad men ; J 
 
 Conclusion. All tyrants are miserable. Conse- 
 quent. 
 
 The minor premise may precede the major. 
 
 Eules of the Syllogism : 
 
 1st. The syllogism must have but three terms. 
 
 2d. No term must be greater in the conclusion 
 than it is in the premises. 
 
 3d. The middle term must be at least once a gen- 
 eral term. 
 
 4th. No conclusion can be deduced from two pre- 
 mises which are either negative or particular. 
 
 5th. Two affirmative propositions cannot produce 
 a negative conclusion. 
 
 6th. The conclusion follows the weaker premise. 
 That is, when one of the premises is a negative prop- 
 osition the conclusion will be negative, and when 
 one of the premises is a particular proposition the 
 conclusion will be particular. 
 
 Examples of faulty syllogisms : 
 
 Against Rule 1st. 
 
 Every man is a spirit; 
 
32 LOGIC. 
 
 Every substance is divisible. — -Four terms, no con- 
 clusion. 
 
 Against Rule 2d. 
 
 Every animal is a living being ; 
 
 Every animal is a substance ; 
 
 Every substance is a living being. 
 
 Every substance, in the conclusion, is a general 
 term, and it is a particular one in the minor. 
 
 Against Rule 3d. 
 
 Every man is an animal ; 
 
 Every brute is an animal; 
 
 Every man is a brute. 
 
 The middle term is taken twice in a particular 
 sense and with a different reference, which consti- 
 tutes two different terms, consequently, there are 
 four terms in the premises. 
 
 Against Rule 4th. 
 
 No man is a stone ; 
 
 Man is not marble. — No conclusion. 
 
 Against Rule 6th. 
 
 The Italians are soft ; 
 
 The Italians are men ; 
 
 Hence (some) men are soft. 
 
 This syllogism is good, but the following would 
 be wrong : 
 
 No man is a stone. 
 
 Marble is stone. 
 
 Marble is man. 
 
 Syllogisms may be divided into four classes accord- 
 ing to the position of the middle term. 
 
LOGIC. 33 
 
 In the first class — The middle term is the subject 
 of the major and the attribute of the minor. 
 
 In the second class — -The middle term is the attri- 
 bute of both premises. 
 
 In the third class — The middle term is the subject 
 of both premises. 
 
 In the fourth class — The middle term is the at- 
 tribute of the major and the subject of the minor. 
 
 In the first two classes we may have four cases, or 
 forms of syllogism ; in the third class we may have 
 six forms ; and in the fourth, five forms. Each of 
 these cases, or forms, is designated by a word con- 
 taining three vowels. The first two vowels indicate 
 the quantity of the premises, and the third indicates 
 the quantity of the consequent. 
 
 There are, as we have seen, four kinds of proposi- 
 tions, which are indicated as follows : 
 
 1st. Universal affirmative — by the vowel a. 
 
 2d. Particular affirmative — by the vowel i. 
 
 3d. Universal negative — by the vowel e. 
 
 4th. Particular negative — by the vowel o. 
 
 We will illustrate the use of these vowels by two 
 examples : 
 
 Middle 
 
 First. All virtuous men are happy 
 
 Middle. I f ^Uq 
 
 All good men are virtuous ; 
 
 One form 
 
 of the 
 first class. 
 
 All good men are happy. 
 Second. 
 
 Middle. ^ C)r\Q 
 
 No vicious conduct is praiseworthy; ? 
 
 ' term 
 
 Middle. ^ of the 
 
 All truly heroic conduct is praiseworthy ; ( '-, 
 
 J '■ | second 
 
 No truly heroic conduct is vicious. J class. 
 
 2* 
 
d4 LOGIC. 
 
 In the first example, "both of the premises and the 
 conclusion are universal affirmative propositions, 
 and, "by the notation given above, must each be indi- 
 cated by the vowel a. Hence the word used to desig- 
 nate this example must contain the vowel a three 
 times. Barbara is the word used for this purpose. 
 
 In the second example, the major premise is uni- 
 versal negative, and therefore indicated by e; the 
 minor is universal affirmative, and hence indicated 
 by a; while the conclusion, universal negative, is 
 designed by e: the word celarent, therefore, desig- 
 nates the form represented by this example. 
 
 It will now be enough, without further explana- 
 tion, to give the words used to designate each form 
 in the four classes of svllo2;isms : 
 
 1st Class. 
 
 2d Class. 
 
 3d Class. 
 
 4th Class. 
 
 Barbara, 
 
 Celarent, 
 
 Darapti, 
 
 Bramantip, 
 
 Cesare, 
 
 Camestres, 
 
 Disamis, 
 
 Camenes, 
 
 Darii, 
 
 Festino, 
 
 Datisi, 
 
 Dimaris, 
 
 Ferio. 
 
 Fakoro. 
 
 Felapton, 
 
 Fesapo, 
 
 
 
 Dokamo, 
 
 Fresison. 
 
 
 
 Feriso. 
 
 
 CHAPTER SECOND. 
 
 Of the Different Sorts of Syllogisms. 
 
 The syllogism may be simple, complex, or com- 
 pound. The simple syllogism is that of which we 
 have treated in the preceding chapter. A complex 
 syllogism is one whose conclusion contains complex 
 terms ; it may always be reduced to a simple syllo- 
 gism. 
 
LOGIC. 35 
 
 Example : 
 
 f Divine law obliges us to honor the pas- 
 p i J tors of the Church ; 
 
 1 '" | Benedict is a pastor of the Church ; 
 
 [_ Hence, divine law obliges us to honor him. 
 This syllogism is equivalent to the following : 
 f Our pastors ought to be honored ; 
 Simple. A Benedict is our pastor ; 
 
 [Hence, he ought to be honored. 
 The syllogism is compound when the major is a 
 conditional, disjunctive, or negative conjunctive 
 proposition. 
 
 I. The major is conditional when it consists of 
 two parts, the one called the antecedent and the 
 other the consequent, united by if. In this case, 
 when we concede the antecedent in the minor we 
 must affirm the consequent in the conclusion, and 
 when we deny the consequent in the minor we must 
 also deny the antecedent in the conclusion — verum 
 prius, ergo et poster ius ; falsum consequens, ergo et 
 antecedens — that is, the first being true, the second 
 is true ; and the second being false, the first is also 
 false. 
 
 Example : 
 
 If Peter is wise he will stay away from gambling 
 houses ; 
 
 1st. But Peter is wise ; hence, he will stay away, 
 &c. 
 
 2d. But Peter will not stay away, &c; hence, 
 Peter is not, &c. 
 
 II. The major is disjunctive when it consists of 
 two or more parts incompatible with one. another, 
 and united by either — or. In this case, when one 
 
LOGIC 
 
 part is affirmed in the minor the other is denied in 
 the conclusion. The parts forming the major must 
 be contradictory propositions. 
 Example : 
 
 We must either restrain our passions or yield to 
 them ; 
 
 But we must restrain them (since reason and re- 
 ligion teach us to do so) : 
 
 Hence, we must not yield to them. 
 Since the two propositions forming the major 
 ought to he contradictories, there should he no mid- 
 dle term between them. 
 Example : 
 
 We must either obey governments commanding 
 evil to be done, or we must revolt against them : 
 
 But we must not obey governments commanding 
 evil. &c: 
 
 Hence, we must revolt against them. 
 Here, the major term, which should consist of two 
 contradictories, is made up of two contraries, both 
 of which, as we have seen, may be false : hence the 
 error in this example. The truth is contained in a 
 middle proposition. "We must suffer persecution.'"' 
 III. The major is negative conjunctive when it 
 consists of two contrary propositions. In this case, 
 when we affirm in the minor we must deny in the 
 conclusion, for both propositions cannot be true ; 
 but if we deny in the minor we cannot absolutely 
 affirm in the conclusion, for two contrary proposi- 
 tions may both be false. The rule is. therefore, s 
 follows : One part ought to be affirmed in the minor 
 and the other denied in the conclusion. 
 
LOGIC. 61 
 
 Example : 
 
 No one can serve God and mammon ; 
 The avaricious man serves mammon ; 
 Hence, lie does not serve God. 
 
 CHAPTER THIRD. 
 
 Of the Forms of Argument other than the 
 Syllogism. 
 
 1st. The EntJiymeme. — This is an abbreviated 
 syllogism, in which one of the premises is omitted. 
 
 Example : 
 
 God is good ; 
 
 Henee he should be loved. 
 
 The major, " We should love those who are good," 
 is omitted. 
 
 2d. The Epichireme.- — This is a syllogism whose 
 major and minor are accompanied with proofs. The 
 substance of Cicero's beautiful " Oration tor Milo" 
 is given in the following Epichireme : 
 
 It is lawful to kill those who lie in wait to kill us 
 (this is proved by the natural law and by the laws 
 of nations — many examples) ; 
 
 But Clodius lay in wait to kill Milo (this is proved 
 fey the number of armed men who accompanied 
 Clodius, his absence from Rome .at the time of the 
 attack, &c); 
 
 Hence, it was lawful for Milo to kill Clodius. 
 
 An Epichireme may be reduced to a single syllo- 
 gism. 
 
 3d. The Sorites.- — This is an accumulation of prop- 
 ositions, so connected that, the attribute of each is 
 
38 LOGIC. 
 
 made the subject of that which follows, and the sub- 
 ject of the first becomes the attribute of the last. 
 
 The propositions must be well " chained/'" so that 
 there may be no middle term between the attribute 
 of one proposition and the subject of the following ; 
 and no equivocal proposition should be employed. 
 
 Example : 
 
 Avaricious men desire manv things, 
 
 Those who desire many things are in need of 
 many things, 
 
 Those who are in need of many things are dissat- 
 isfied with their condition, 
 
 Those who are dissatisfied with their condition 
 are not happy ; 
 
 Hence, avaricious men are not happy. 
 
 4th. The Dilemma.- — This is an argument in 
 which we conclude of the whole major, which is 
 generally a disjunctive proposition, what we have 
 concluded of each j>art. It is called a horned argu- 
 ment, because it strikes on both sides. 
 
 Example : 
 
 When the wicked die, either they are utterly 
 destroyed or their souls are immortal : 
 
 If they are utterly destroyed there is no hope of 
 eternal happiness for them ; 
 
 If their souls are immortal there is also no hope 
 of eternal happiness for them, since God is just ; 
 
 Hence, there is no hope of happiness for the wicked 
 after death. 
 
 To have the dilemma good no middle term must 
 be possible in the major, and the conclusion must be 
 true after each part. 
 
LOGIC. * 39 
 
 5th. Induction or Enumeration.- — This is an argu- 
 ment in which the major is an enumeration of partic- 
 ulars, from which a universal conclusion is deduced. 
 That the argument may be absolutely conclusive, 
 the enumeration must be complete. 
 
 6th. The Example. — This is a common form of 
 argument in which a single conclusion is drawn 
 from a single proposition. This may be done in 
 three ways : by' similitude, or comparison {a pari), 
 by opposition, or contrast (e contrario), and by su- 
 periority (a fortiori) . 
 
 Examples : 
 
 1st. apari. God forgave David when he repented ; 
 a pari, He will forgive me. . 
 
 2d. e contrario. Intemperance is hurtful to health ; 
 e contrario, Temperance is favorable to health. • 
 
 3d. a fortiori. John's conversation for even one 
 hour is tedious ; a fortiori, it would be tedious for a 
 whole day. 
 
 CHAPTER FOURTH. 
 
 Of Sophisms. 
 
 The word sophism comes from the G-reek sophizo, 
 which signifies to teach ivisdom; and the Greek noun 
 sophismos means wise invention. From this etymol- 
 ogy it is easy to understand that the word sophism 
 had not in the beginning the meaning which it has 
 at present. Men of subtle intellects, falsely called 
 philosophers, have abused their powers of reasoning 
 so far as to construct a theory for reasoning falsely, 
 a theory by which fallacies are logically established 
 
40 LOGIC. 
 
 as if they were truths. This is what is now called 
 sophistry. A sophism, then, is a false reasoning, 
 with the intention of deceiving. "When the sophism 
 results from ignorance in the reasoner, it is called a 
 paralogism. 
 
 Aristotle divides sophisms into three classes : 1st. 
 formal sophisms ; 2d. material sophisms, or sophisms 
 extra dictionem ; and 3d. verbal sophisms, in dictione, 
 that is, sophisms existing in the words used. 
 
 Formal sophisms are syllogisms badly constructed. 
 Of these we have already spoken. 
 
 Material sophisms are the following : 
 
 (a) Ignoraiitia elenchi, which may be translated, 
 "ignorance of the subject." This occurs when we 
 prove what is not in question, or what is not denied 
 by our opponents ; also when we suppose them to be 
 actuated by principles which they disavow, or when 
 we draw from their words or actions inferences which 
 they would not admit. This sophism is of common 
 occurrence ; it comes from precipitation, prejudice, 
 and feelings of pride or hatred towards our oppo- 
 nents, but still more from equivocation in terms not 
 well defined. In order to avoid this last source of 
 error, we must know both the precise sense and the 
 exact extent of the expressions used by our oppo- 
 nents. 
 
 (b) Petitio principii, or "begging the question." 
 * This species of false reasoning takes place when we 
 
 suppose as proved that which is to be proved. There 
 is no substantial difference between this sophism and 
 that called the vicious circle (circulus vitiosus), or 
 arguing in a circle, which consists in proving two 
 
LOGIC. 41 
 
 propositions by one another, neither of them being 
 otherwise proved. 
 
 Examples : 
 
 The earth is immovable, because the sun moves 
 around it. 
 
 Evidence is infallible, because God is infinitely 
 true ; and God is infinitely true, because it is evi- 
 dent, &c. 
 
 (c) Non causa pro causa, or "Not the cause for 
 the cause." This sophism occurs whenever we give 
 as the cause of some effect that which is not its cause. 
 This happens frequently, especially in the case of 
 "Post hoc, ergo propter hoc," — after this, therefore 
 on account of this. 
 
 (d) Imperfect enumeration . No explanation needs 
 to be given of this kind of false argument. 
 
 (e) Fallacy of objection. This sophism results 
 when we consider as a cause, or as an essential, that 
 which is only an accident. 
 
 The following are examples of the fallacy of ob- 
 jection : 
 
 (1) Philosophy rendered many men impious ; 
 then philosophy is a bad thing. 
 
 (2) False miracles have been believed; then no 
 faith ought to be given to miracles, &c. 
 
 Verbal sophisms, or sophisms in dictione, are the 
 following : 
 
 (a) Fallacy of division and composition. Passing 
 from a distributive to a collective sense in the use of 
 words. 
 
 Example : 
 
 Two and one are . even and odd ; 
 
42 LOGIC. 
 
 But two and one are three ; 
 
 Therefore three is even and odd. 
 
 One and two are even and odd when divided (in 
 sensu diviso), but not when united (in sensu compos- 
 ite)). This distinction is the only one to he given in 
 such cases. We may see that in the above sophism 
 there are four terms : two and one are taken in sensu 
 diviso, or distributively, in the major ; and in sensu 
 composite, or collectively, in the minor. Hence the 
 syllogism involves an error against the 1st rule. 
 
 2d. Passing from a collective to a distributive 
 sense ; or attributing to several parts of a collection 
 what is true only of the collection itself. 
 
 Example : 
 
 The Apostles were twelve ; 
 
 Peter and James were Apostles ; 
 
 Therefore Peter and James were twelve. 
 
 Here again we have four terms in the premises. 
 The Apostles are taken together (in sensu composite) 
 in the major ; and separately (in sensu diviso) in the 
 minor, — and no conclusion can be drawn. 
 
 (b) Fallacy of accident. This consists in assert- 
 ing something of a subject in a general sense, in one 
 of the premises ; while in the other premise we con- 
 nect with that subject some accidental peculiarity. 
 
 Example : 
 
 You now have the same feet that you always had ; 
 
 But you once had small feet ; 
 
 Therefore you now have small feet. 
 
 Putting this sophism in the form of a regular syl- 
 logism, we shall perceive that there are four terms 
 in the premises. 
 
L G I c . 43 
 
 Your present feet are those of your childhood ; 
 
 The feet of your childhood were small feet ; 
 
 Therefore your present feet are small feet. 
 
 In the major, the u feet of childhood" means the 
 essence of those feet, while in the minor it means 
 their form or shape. Hence the middle term being 
 taken in two different senses we have four terms in 
 the premises and can draw no conclusion. 
 
 Besides these two kinds of verbal sophisms, we 
 have (c) that of Equivocation, (d) that of Amphib- 
 ology, and (e) that of Figure. 
 
 Example of a sophism of figure : 
 
 No creature laughs but man ; 
 
 But a meadow laughs ; 
 
 Hence a meadow is a man. 
 
 We may observe that ' ' meadow ' ' is first taken in 
 a figurative sense and then in a literal. 
 
 Doctor Ubaghs, speaking of these last three so- 
 phisms (c, d, and e), says that they do not deserve to 
 be mentioned, since they could embarrass no one but a 
 child or a person of very dull mind. 
 
 CHAPTEK FIFTH. 
 
 Of the Sources of Sophisms. 
 
 The sources of sophisms are : 
 
 1st. Precipitation. We are liable to commit a 
 sophism whenever we pronounce a judgment on any- 
 thing which we have not well considered or which 
 is not sufficiently well known. 
 
 2d. Prejudice. In this case we form a judgment 
 •in accordance with our wishes and without previous 
 examination. 
 
44 LOGIC. 
 
 3d. Our passions. There are impressions vio- 
 lently agitating our mind and forcing it in different 
 directions. 
 
 4th. Our senses. The senses have been given to 
 lis by G-od that" we may judge of external bodies, not 
 as they are in themselves, but as they appear to us. 
 
 5th. Our imagination. The imagination is that 
 faculty of the mind which pictures to itself material 
 objects that do not affect the senses. 
 
 Although the human mind is very imperfect, still 
 it would never be deceived if we always acted pru- 
 dently in the investigation of truth, abstaining from 
 judging until the truth shows itself manifestly to 
 the mind. We should then be ignorant of many 
 things, and know others imperfectly ; but we should 
 not err. 
 
 FOURTH DISSERTATION. 
 
 ON METHOD . 
 
 We have now explained the notions of Ideas, the 
 nature of Judgment and of Reasoning, and we have 
 given rules for judging and reasoning correctly. It 
 remains for us to examine in what order we should 
 arrange these mental operations for the investigation 
 and manifestation of truth. This arrangement and 
 order is called Method, or ' ' The way we must go in 
 order to reach the end we have in view." 
 
 Definition. — Method is that operation of the mind 
 by which we dispose our thoughts in that order 
 which is most suitable for detecting the truth which 
 
LOGIC. 45 
 
 we do not know and showing it as soon as we know 
 it. 
 
 Evidently the necessity of method shows the weak- 
 ness of our mind ; but without it progress cannot be 
 made, nor can pleasure be found, in the reading of 
 books or the teaching of masters. 
 
 Method being the application of the science of 
 logic, is consequently an art ; and this art is ac- 
 quired rather by practice and experience than by 
 precept, and it depends more on the rectitude and 
 attention of our mind than on rules. 
 
 Division. — Some authors divide method into two 
 kinds, the analytic and the synthetic. This division 
 cannot be accepted ; for, according to it, the analytic 
 method, which is the same as the method of induc- 
 tion, would proceed always by analysis ; but this 
 would too much restrict the method of induction, in 
 which we have to proceed as much by synthesis as 
 by analysis, as experience shows. We must then 
 take a more accurate division. 
 
 There are two divisions of method, or two methods ; 
 the method of invention, which comprises observa- 
 tion and induction ; and the method of demonstra- 
 tion, or dialectics. 
 
 1st Division, the Method of Invention. 
 
 The difference between observation and induction 
 may be stated thus : When our attention is directed 
 towards a phenomenon or a fact, in order only to 
 know it, we make an observation ; but when that 
 attention is directed to the same fact or phenomenon, 
 in order to discover some law, or to deduce some 
 
46 LOGIC. 
 
 conclusion from principles, we make, in the first 
 case, an induction, and in the second, a deduction. 
 
 Observation is consequently a serious attention of 
 the mind, in order to know some fact, which fact 
 may be either exterior or interior. 
 
 In order to observe well, four operations are ne- 
 cessary : First, attention ; and this attention must 
 be intense, persevering, and free from prejudice ; 
 second, distinct perception of the fact, that is, we 
 must determine well the circumstances of its exist- 
 ence, and its essential elements ; third, analysis, 
 which should be complete, the examination being 
 minute and exhaustive ; and fourth, synthesis, which 
 should also be complete, the recapitulation being 
 made in proper order. These rules ougbt to be fol- 
 lowed not only in observing but also in making ex- 
 periments. 
 
 Induction, which always supposes previous observ- 
 ation, is an oj>eration of the mind inducing us to 
 affirm of things not observed that which we have 
 observed in similar things. 
 
 Four conditions are necessary in order that the 
 induction may be good : " First, abstraction ; second, 
 comparison: third, generalization (This, as we have 
 seen, signifies the discovery of a quality common to 
 several similar objects ; and this common quality 
 serves as a distinguishing mark for the class in 
 which all the similar objects are contained. Classi- 
 fication is the formation of these classes, and we may 
 see that generalization affords the materials for classi- 
 fication.); and fourth, induction, properly so called, • 
 which is the extension of the common quality di.s- 
 
LOGIC. 47 
 
 covered by generalization to other objects of a similar 
 kind. 
 
 Note. — This method leads lis to a certain knowl- 
 edge of the truth. There are other modes of inves- 
 tigation which lead us, no£ to a sure, but to a more 
 or less probable knowledge of the truth ; these are : 
 analogy, hypothesis and the calculation of proba- 
 bilities. 
 
 Analogy is an operation of the mind attributing 
 to one object some quality observed in another. 
 
 Example : A certain medicine has proved to be 
 good for a certain sick person ; analogy would lead 
 us to believe that it would be good for another person 
 sick in like manner. 
 
 Analogy must be grounded on obvious resem- 
 blance, and the resemblance must have necessary 
 connection with the conclusion which we draw. 
 Hence the science called cranioscopy, and others of 
 that kind, are false. 
 
 Hypothesis is the supposition of a cause, in order 
 to explain several effects of which the cause is con- 
 cealed. An hypothesis is also called & postulate. 
 
 Example : The hypothesis of the existence of a 
 neutral electric fluid in all bodies, in order to ex- 
 plain electric phenomena. 
 
 Hypotheses are very useful, but subject to many 
 serious inconveniences. In order to proceed wisely 
 when we form an hypothesis, we must first examine 
 well the case which we wish to explain by hypothe- 
 sis, and notice all its circumstances ; for the degree 
 of probability of an hypothesis depends on the num.- 
 
48 LOGIC. 
 
 ber of circumstances which it explains : and, in the 
 second place, we should chose out of those circum- 
 stances that which is most important, and try to 
 explain it by the hypothesis ; hut although our hy- 
 pothesis may explain this most important circum- 
 stance, yet if it he in contradiction to any other 
 circumstance it must he rejected. 
 
 The calculation of probabilities, so far as it has 
 reference to philosophy, will he spoken of in several 
 other places, especially in Ethics. 
 
 2d Division, the Method of Demonstration, or 
 Dialectics. 
 
 To demonstrate is to prove ; and a demonstration 
 is an argument in which the truth of a proposition 
 is deduced from one or more propositions which are 
 known to be true. The proposition from which the 
 conclusion is drawn is called the principle of the 
 demonstration ; and as this principle may be either 
 sure or probable, the deduction will be accordingly 
 either certain or only probable. 
 
 The parts of a demonstration are as follows : 
 
 1st. The question, or proposition to be demon- 
 strated. When the question is concerning a truth 
 to be demonstrated, it is called a theorem, a thesis, 
 or simply a proposition ; and when it is concerning 
 a truth to be discovered, it is called ^.problem. The 
 question must be defined, divided into its parts, 
 precise, and well arranged. 
 
 Example : The question is, is the human soul 
 immortal ? Immortality must be defined ; and the 
 question must be divided into its two parts concern- 
 ing internal immortalitv and external immortality. 
 
LOGIC. 49 
 
 The first part of the question may be passed over, 
 as evident ; and then the real question comes, which 
 is, whether the soul, after the death of the body, 
 will pass to another life, a life without end. We 
 next arrange this question into its two parts, (a) 
 _ whether the soul, on leaving the body, will pass to 
 another life, and (b) whether that life is eternal. 
 
 2d. The principle of the demonstration. This 
 principle, or these principles, must be certain and 
 connected with the question. They may be axioms, 
 or facts of experience, or simply postulates. These 
 two first parts, the question and the principle, are 
 called the matter of the demonstration. 
 
 3d. The form of the demonstration, or the con- 
 nection of the conclusion with the principle. This 
 connection must first be accurate, that is, nothing 
 should be used in the argument which does not be- 
 long to the question ; and second, it must be clear. 
 
 The demonstration may be : 
 
 1st. Analytical, ascending, going from the ques- 
 tion to some general principle ; or synthetical, de- 
 scending, starting from some general principle and 
 coming to the question. 
 
 2d. Direct, or indirect. 
 
 3d. A 'priori, the effects being proved by the 
 cause ; or a posteriori, the cause being proved by the 
 effects. 
 
 4th. Absolute, resulting from a true principle ; or 
 relative, grounded on a principle admitted as true 
 by our opponent, whether really true or not. This 
 last demonstration does not prove that the conclu- 
 sion is absolutely true, but only that it cannot be 
 
50 LOGIC. 
 
 denied by those who admit the principle on which 
 it is based : it is therefore called the argumentum ad 
 hominem. 
 
 FIFTH DISSERTATION. 
 
 ON CEETITUDB. 
 
 CHAPTER FIRST. 
 Preliminary Notions — Definitions. 
 
 Certitude is the firm adhesion of the mind to the 
 truth made known to it. Certitude is at the same 
 time a state and an act of the mind. As a state it 
 may be defined to be, a disposition by which the 
 mind tends to adhere firmly to the known truth. 
 
 Truth is, " that which is." Truth is either ne- 
 cessary or contingent. Necessary truth is that which 
 cannot but be, and which cannot but be as it is. 
 Such is the truth of the existence of God. 
 
 A contingent truth is one which, although it may 
 exist, yet might not have existed, or might have 
 existed in a different manner. 
 
 Truth cannot be known by the intellect unless it 
 is cognoscible. That by which truth is cognoscible, 
 or rendered capable of being perceived by the intel- 
 lect, is called evidence. Evidence has an objective 
 sense, as the term has been used by all good philos- 
 ophers ; although some have pretended that evidence 
 being a perception has only a subjective sense. 
 
 Certitude is subjective when considered as existing 
 in the mind ; and it is objective when considered as 
 
LOGIC. 51 
 
 existing in the object, in which case it is the same 
 as truth itself, inasmuch as it is surely known, or 
 inasmuch as it is the object of our certitude. 
 
 Evidently subjective certitude cannot exist with- 
 out the objective, but objective certitude may exist 
 without the subjective. 
 
 Evidence is also subjective as well as objective. 
 Objective evidence is that which is perceived by the 
 mind ; it is objective evidence that is defined above. 
 Objective evidence is the visibility of truth, and sub- 
 jective evidence is the vision of truth. 
 
 Certitude is implicit, that is direct, common or 
 spontaneous, when the mind adheres to the truth 
 from what is only an implicit knowledge of the mo- 
 tion or cause which determines that adhesion. Cer- 
 titude is explicit, philosophical or scientific, when 
 the mind adheres to the truth from an explicit 
 knowledge of the motion or cause which determines 
 that adhesion. Both implicit and explicit certitude 
 are true. 
 
 Certitude is immediate when the evidence of the 
 truth is intuitive, and mediate when the evidence is 
 discursive, or the result of a course of reasoning. 
 
 Evidence is itself immediate or intuitive when a 
 truth manifests itself to the mind without the aid of 
 another truth, as in the axiom. The whole is 
 greater than any of its parts ; and it is mediate or 
 discursive when truth is made manifest by the aid 
 of reasoning. 
 
 Note. — Mediate evidence is formed from that 
 which is immediate, and requires more labor from 
 our minds for its perception. 
 
52 LOGIC. 
 
 It is not possible by noting the manner in which 
 the perception takes place in our mind to fix the 
 line between intuitive and discursive evidence ; we 
 must, for this purpose, accept the definitions and 
 take them as rules for making the distinction be- 
 tween the two kinds of evidence. 
 
 A primary truth is one which is intuitively evi- 
 dent ; and a secondary truth is one which is discur- 
 sively evident. 
 
 Metaphysical certitude is that which is based upon 
 the essence of things, and which can on no hy- 
 pothesis be different from what it is. 
 
 Physical certitude is that which is based upon the 
 laws of nature, and which cannot be other than it is 
 except by a miracle. 
 
 Moral certitude is that which is based upon the 
 laws of our moral constitution, and which cannot be 
 otherwise without affecting the condition of human- 
 ity. 
 
 In regard to the subject, certitude is one and the 
 same for all, though it admits of several degrees' in 
 the clearness of our perception of the truth and in 
 the intensity of our adhesion to it. 
 
 CHAPTEE SECOND. 
 Of the Criterion of Certitude. 
 
 A criterion is a sign by which something may be 
 distinguished from everything else ; consequently, 
 the criterion of certitude is the sign by which certi- 
 tude is perfectly distinguished from error. Evident- 
 ly such a sign must exist, but in order to proceed 
 
LOUIC. 5d 
 
 methodically let us first examine what is the crite- 
 rion of truth. 
 
 I. Proposition. Objective evidence is the criterign 
 of truth. To prove this proposition we proceed as 
 follows : 
 
 That which is so evidently the characteristic of 
 truth that it cannot be attributed to falsehood, is the 
 criterion of truth. 
 
 Such a characteristic is objective evidence, — that 
 is, the property by which truth is cognoscible to our 
 minds, and consequently by which truth -is distin- 
 guished from what is not truth ; for if evidence could 
 be attributed to falsehood as well as to truth it 
 would not be that by which what is true is distin- 
 guished from what is not true. 
 
 Hence, evidence, taken objectively, is the criterion 
 of truth. 
 
 In order to meet objections that may be brought 
 against this proposition, let us observe that there is 
 a difference between judging and perceiving. We 
 judge sometimes that such a thing is so and so, and 
 perceive afterwards that we have made a mistake. 
 In the first case we judge erroneously of something, 
 which afterwards, on account of evidence, wejperceive 
 exactly as it is. 
 
 II. The criterion of certitude differs from the 
 criterion of truth. The criterion of truth is the 
 character proper to truth, and consequently some- 
 thing essentially objective ; but the criterion of cer- 
 titude is the character proper to our knowledge, and 
 consequently something both objective and subjec- 
 tive. It is, after all, the criterion of truth applied 
 
54 LOGIC. 
 
 to our mind, the criterion of truth being the cause 
 of our certitude. 
 
 In order to determine in what the criterion of 
 certitude consists, let us first see what are the con- 
 ditions or marks which ought to he found in such a 
 criterion. 
 
 This criterion ought to he : 1st, necessarily con- 
 nected with truth; 2d, known by itself; and 3d, 
 universal, that is, it ought to he the last reason of 
 certitude. 
 
 Proposition. A clear perception is the only crite- 
 rion of certitude. Argument : 
 
 That is a criterion of certitude which has the 
 requisite qualities for establishing such a criterion ; 
 
 But a clear perception has such qualities ; 
 
 Hence, a clear perception is the criterion of cer- 
 titude. 
 
 Proof of the minor. 1st. Such a clear perception 
 has a necessary connection with truth ; what we 
 clearly perceive is evident, and it cannot be evident, 
 as we have said, unless it be true. 2d. It is some- 
 thing known by itself, since it is a perception ; for 
 nothing is more known to us than what we see. 3d. 
 It is the last reason of certitude ; for the last reason 
 which we can give for our certitude is this : " I see," 
 ' 1 1 percei ve clearly . ' ' 
 
 We have said that this clear perception is the only 
 motive of certitude ; for the other motives of certi- 
 tude, of which we shall speak hereafter, are all 
 grounded on this criterion. The last reason which 
 we bring forward is always, "I see clearly/' 
 
LOGIC. 55 
 
 CHAPTEE THIRD. 
 
 Of the Existence of Certitude. 
 
 Some philosophers have altogether denied the 
 existence of certitude, while others have estahlished 
 erroneous systems concerning its attributes. The 
 following are the schools which we shall refute by 
 the exposition of the true philosophical doctrine 
 concerning the existence and the motives of certitude : 
 
 1st. Universal or subjective scepticism, also called 
 Pyrrhonism. This denies, or at least doubts, the 
 existence of subjective certitude ; and since one who 
 doubts his own existence may doubt anything this 
 subjective scepticism is called universal scepticism. 
 
 This was the system of the sophist Pyrrho and 
 his disciples, and also of the " new sceptics,'' a sect 
 that renewed the errors of Pyrrho at the beginning 
 of the Christian era. Among modern philosophers 
 Montaigne, Bayle and Hume have indirectly adhered 
 to the same system. 
 
 2nd. Objective scepticism, or Kantism. This is 
 the doctrine of those who accept subjective, but reject 
 objective certitude. It is the system of the modern 
 German school, represented by Kant, Hermes and 
 Fichte. Some French philosophers, of the school of 
 Jouffroy, have accepted the doctrine of Kant with 
 modifications. 
 
 3d. Idealism and Empiricism. The idealists are 
 those philosophers who, extolling too much the cer- 
 titude of pure reason, destroy in part the certitude 
 of experience. Berkeley and Mallebranche are the 
 chief representatives of this system. Descartes ad- 
 
5G LOGIC. 
 
 liered more or less to the system of Mallebranche, 
 and he was also of opinion that the perception of 
 the senses, of itself, could not produce certitude. 
 
 The empiricists reject the certitude of pure reason, 
 and teach that sensation is the only cause of certi- 
 tude ; they are also called materialists and sensists. 
 Of this class were Condillac and Helvetius, and in 
 our time Augustus Comte, Littre, &c. 
 
 4th. Historical scepticism. This is the system of 
 all those who attack historical certitude. It is of 
 two kinds, general, when it rejects all historical 
 certitude, and particular when it refuses to admit 
 some particular historical fact. We find this sys- 
 tem, in regard to its principles, in Bayle, and in 
 the writings of Craig, a Scotch mathematician, and 
 also of Laplace and Lacroix. 
 
 A branch of this system has been called the theory 
 of Mythism, which is mythism applied to history 
 and religion. Philosophers, or rather infidel writers, 
 try to explain in a mythical way the best authenti- 
 cated facts of history. This system appears in the 
 dangerous writings of Vico, Michelet, Dupuis, Vol- 
 ney, Strauss, Hegel, and, lately, Kenan. 
 
 5th. Bationalisin. This is the doctrine of those 
 who do not admit any revealed truth, and try to 
 explain in a natural manner the miracles and mys- 
 teries of revealed religion. We shall see hereafter 
 that revelation is possible, that it is an infallible 
 motive of judging, that the doctrine revealed by 
 God may be perceived by human reason, &c. 
 
 The system of rationalism is widespread. It has 
 been taught in France by Cousin, Jouffroy and 
 Damiron. 
 
LOGIC . 57 
 
 6th. Fideism. This is the doctrine of several 
 philosophers who think that genuine certitude can- 
 not be obtained except by faith, either human or 
 divine. As we may see, it is directly opposed to 
 rationalism. 
 
 To this system belongs (a) the doctrine of Huet, 
 who taught that reason, of itself, cannot give true 
 certitude, but must be assisted by divine faith, and 
 also (b) the doctrine of Lamennais, the author of the 
 famous book "Essai sur 1' Indifference," who was 
 of opinion that what he calls "individual reason" 
 cannot give us true certitude, but that what he calls 
 "general reason" is necessary for this purpose. 
 Lamennais' s system is founded on a vicious circle; 
 for the reasons which determined him to reject indi- 
 vidual reason must also determine him to reject 
 general reason, which, after all, is composed of indi- 
 vidual reasons. The whole system rests upon ob- 
 scure and inaccurate definitions and explanations. 
 It created much excitement in the beginning on 
 account of its novelty and obscurity, and also on 
 account of the talent of its author. 
 
 6th. Traditionalism, or the system of those who 
 think that tradition, that is, revelation made to 
 man and handed down by the testimony of men, is 
 necessary to us in order that we should have certain 
 knowledge of truths of the natural order. Dr. Bon- 
 netty was the author of this system, which was con- 
 demned in the provincial council of Rheims, France, 
 in 1853, the condemnation being apj)roved by Pope 
 Pius IX., who, at the same time, condemned the 
 following errors : 
 
58 LOGIC. 
 
 (a) They err who teach that human reason is, by 
 its nature, inimical to divine revelation, or opposed 
 to it. 
 
 (b) They err who teach that the force of human 
 reason, in the present condition of our fallen nature, 
 has been almost destroyed, or rendered powerless. 
 
 (c) They err who teach that no interior power 
 has been left man by which he may acquire truth, 
 or that all truths and notions come to us from exte- 
 rior source, by speech and revelation. 
 
 (d) They err who affirm that man cannot with 
 his reasoning powers perceive and demonstrate cer- 
 tain truths of the metaphysical and moral order. 
 
 (e) They err who teach that man cannot naturally 
 admit any metaphysical or moral truth, unless he 
 has first believed by an act of supernatural faith, 
 through divine revelation. 
 
 (f) They err who do not admit a distinction be- 
 tween the natural divine law and the positive divine 
 law. 
 
 Having named and described the systems accord- 
 ing to which certitude is either disfigured or its 
 existence totally denied, it now remains that we 
 should affirm and demonstrate it. For this purpose 
 the following propositions are stated and demon- 
 strated : 
 
 First Proposition. — Certitude Exists. 
 
 It is certain that certitude exists if there are any 
 truths which the mind accepts without any fear of 
 erring ; for then it perceives these truths clearly, 
 and this clear perception is the criterion of certitude. 
 
LOGIC. 59 
 
 But there are such truths; for when we say "Two 
 and two are equal to four," the mind accepts the 
 fact without any fear of erring. Hence certitude 
 exists. 
 
 Second Proposition. 
 
 The existence of certitude is a fact which cannot 
 he rigidly demonstrated, hut which nevertheless 
 becomes clearly manifest on mere statement or rep- 
 resentation to the mind. 
 
 Certitude is a fact which cannot he demonstrated, 
 if it he necessary for its demonstration that we should 
 take as a principle that which is to he demonstrated. 
 But such is the case in regard to the existence of 
 certitude ; for to demonstrate it we should first have 
 to take as granted certain premises, — which assump- 
 tion would of itself suppose the existence of certitude ; 
 hut this would he the petitio principii, or begging 
 the question. It is enough then to show or state 
 the existence of certitude ; for this is so clear of itself 
 that no one can seriously doubt it when thus pre- 
 sented to the mind. 
 
 Third Proposition. 
 
 No one can doubt the existence of certitude with- 
 out falling into a contradiction. 
 
 He who supposes in the premises what he wishes 
 to deny in the conclusion, contradicts himself. But 
 such is the case with one denying the existence of 
 certitude ; for his conclusion would be the affirma- 
 tion of his belief in the. non-existence of certitude, 
 and as an affirmation is the expression of a certitude 
 it follows that he contradicts himself. 
 
60 LOGIC. 
 
 Sceptics bring many objections against tbis tbesis. 
 They say tbat we may find arguments both for and 
 against every proposition, and that therefore we 
 must doubt; and, again, that the human mind is 
 fallible and knows nothing fully, and that for this 
 reason also we should doubt. It is true that we 
 must sometimes doubt, but not always ; and hence 
 certitude does exist. When they add that perhaps 
 life is a dream, we need not stop to answer them. 
 
 This thesis refutes both subjective and objective 
 scepticism. 
 
 CHAPTEK FOUETH. 
 
 Of the Motives of Certitude. 
 
 A motive, in general, is that which disposes the 
 mind to adhere firmly to some truth. . We have seen 
 that evidence clearly perceived is the general motive 
 of certitude ; but this evidence affects the mind 
 diversely in regard to its adhesion to the truth, 
 according to the different orders of truth. Hence, 
 there are different motives, which we shall examine 
 successively : 
 
 First Motive. — The Certitude of Pure Reasox. 
 
 Pure reason, or simply reason, is the faculty by 
 which our mind perceives wbat is absolutely neces- 
 sary. We have already seen what is meant by a 
 necessary truth, and have shown that the evidence 
 which pertains to necessary truth is the evidence of 
 contradiction, that is., an evidence which does not 
 allow us to suppose that the truth is other than it 
 is without contradicting ourselves, or saying implic- 
 
LOGIC, 61 
 
 itly that the same, thing may be and not be at the 
 same time. 
 
 Eeason has for its principle all necessary truths, 
 that is all truths which are intuitively evident. 
 These truths are the sources from which all other 
 truths are derived, and it is on this account that 
 they are called the principles of pure reason. These 
 principles have been also called axioms ; and, 
 although some writers have made a distinction be- 
 tween axioms and principles, we shall consider the 
 two words as synonimous. 
 
 We may define an axiom, or principle of pure 
 reason, to be a necessary and self-evident truth, from 
 which other truths proceed. 
 
 These principles are : 1st. The principle of iden- 
 tity or essence; namely, "What is, is." This is 
 the same as the principle of contradiction ; namely, 
 " The same thing cannot be and not be at the same 
 time," a principle implicitly contained in every 
 necessary truth. 2nd. The principle of equality and 
 inequality; namely, "Two things which are each 
 equal to a third are equal to each other," and " Two 
 things, of which one is equal to a third, while the 
 other is not equal to this third, are unequal to each 
 other." 3d. The principle of substance ; namely, 
 "The mode supposes the substance." 4th. The 
 principle of casuality ; namely, "That which has a 
 beginning has a cause." 
 
 These axioms being given, we prove the following 
 
 Proposition. — Pure reason gives certitude of neces- 
 sary truths. 
 
 (a) This proposition is clear according to the 
 
62 LOGIC. 
 
 very definition of reason. Season is a perception ; 
 but if the mind could never adhere to truth, reason 
 would at the same time he a perception and not a 
 perception. It would he a perception according to 
 the hypothesis, and it would not be a perception 
 because we should always doubt ; that is, the same 
 thing would, at the same time, both be and not be, 
 which involves a contradiction. Hence, when reason 
 perceives clearly it gives true certitude. 
 
 (b) This proposition cannot be seriously opposed, 
 if it be false argument to suppose as true what we 
 attack as false. But such is the case with any ar- 
 gument contrived against the legitimacy of reason, 
 since he who would argue against reason would sup- 
 pose that reasoning is a lawful mode for the attain- 
 ment of certitude. 
 
 Second Motive. — Consciousness. 
 
 Consciousness is the interior feeling by which our 
 mind is aware of its present condition or state. 
 
 Proposition. — Consciousness produces a true certi- 
 tude in regard to our interior feelings and affections. 
 
 Consciousness gives a true certitude, if there is a 
 necessary connection between it and the truth of the 
 judgments formed by it. But such is the case, since 
 the object and the subject are the same individual ; 
 consequently, consciousness cannot be deceived, 
 although it may deceive. Hence consciousness 
 gives true certitude ; and the judgments formed by 
 it concerning .the appearances of things which have 
 affected it are essentially true, since they express the 
 present state of the soul. 
 
LOGIC. G3 
 
 Here again, we cannot demonstrate the truth, but 
 simply show it ; for any truth which we could bring 
 forward as a principle of demonstration would rest 
 on reason and on consciousness, which latter is 
 aware of the evidence produced in our' mind. These 
 two motives, reason and consciousness, are, as we 
 see, chained together. 
 
 Our own existence is, in regard to ourselves, the 
 first truth known of itself, or self-evident. 
 
 Third Motive. — The Evidence of the Senses. 
 
 The evidence of the senses is that invincible pro- 
 pensity which induces us to refer our sensations to 
 the bodies which, according to our convictions, have 
 been the causes of them ; and by which, therefore, 
 we judge of the existence of the bodies themselves. 
 
 Our senses lead us into many errors and illusions, 
 and consequently some philosophers have refused 
 to acknowledge that our senses may give us true 
 certitude. Hence the origin of objective scepticism, 
 of idealism and of traditionalism. Against those 
 philosophers we establish the following 
 
 Proposition.- — By the evidence of the senses we can 
 judge infallibly of the existence of bodies in general. 
 
 That* is infallibly true which we are irresistibly 
 forced by nature to believe as true. But we are 
 irresistibly forced by nature to believe in the truth 
 of the existence of bodies in general, which we per- 
 ceive by our senses. Hence, by the evidence of the 
 senses we can judge infallibly of the existence of 
 bodies in general. 
 
 We prove the minor as follows : A propensity 
 
64 LOGIC. 
 
 ■which is universal, constant, and irresistible may 
 be considered to be the effect of truth, or the voice 
 of nature, and consequently to exclude every doubt. 
 But that propensity by which we are led to judge of 
 the existence of bodies in general is universal, con- 
 stant and irresistible. It is universal, since we find 
 it in all men ; constant, for all men have it during 
 their whole life ; and irresistible, since we cannot 
 overcome it whatever efforts we make. It is then 
 the voice of nature, the expression of truth. 
 
 Indirect demonstration. — If there "were no bodies, 
 there would be no difference between the phantoms of 
 our imagination and real bodies ; but we know that 
 this difference does exist, and hence bodies must exist. 
 
 The evidence of the senses, according to the more 
 probable opinion, gives immediate certitude ; and, 
 consequently, in regard to the strength of the con- 
 viction produced in our mind, the certitude given 
 by the evidence of the senses is equal to that given 
 by reason or by consciousness, from which it differs 
 only in regard to the object, which is metaphysical 
 in one case and physical in the other. 
 
 The propensity by which we are led to believe in 
 the existence of bodies in general, will also enable 
 us to judge in favor of the existence of bodies and 
 external events, in particular ; for the same argu- 
 ment may be brought forward in this second part of 
 the thesis as in the first. But in this case four con- 
 ditions are required in order that the evidence of the 
 senses may be an infallible motive of certitude : 
 
 1st. The organs of sense must be sound and in 
 their, normal condition. 
 
LOGIC. G5 
 
 2nd. The bodies themselves must he within the 
 limits of the perception of our senses. 
 
 3d. Nothing must intervene between the organs 
 of sense and the bodies, so as to interfere with the 
 ordinary laws of their action. 
 
 4th. Each of the senses must be exerted upon an 
 object upon which it can properly act. 
 
 These conditions being observed, the evidence of 
 the senses gives a true certitude in judging of the 
 relative properties of bodies in particular, but not of 
 their essence ; that is, we may judge of them as they 
 appear to us, but not as they are, in themselves. 
 
 Fourth Motive. — The Consent of Mankind in 
 Things of the Moral Order. 
 
 By the consent of mankind, we do not mean una- 
 nimity, or metaphysical universality, but that gene- 
 ral consent which is called moral, being the consent 
 of the greater and sounder part of mankind. 
 
 This consent is the result of common sense, and 
 common sense is nothing else than that general 
 knowledge of first notions or principles which is 
 found in all men. 
 
 In order that such a consent may be a criterion of 
 certitude, it must be constant, uniform, reasonable,. 
 and not indifferent in regard to its object. 
 
 Proposition. — The consent of mankind, ivith the 
 conditions prescribed above, is an infallible motive of 
 judging, in regard to several moral truths. 
 
 1st. Either such a consent ought to be admitted 
 as a criterion of certitude, or some private opinion 
 should be preferred to it ; but such a preference 
 
66 LOGIC. 
 
 would be absurd, and therefore the general consent 
 must be admitted. 
 
 2nd. A man who would defend an opinion contrary 
 to common sense ought to defend it with irresistible 
 arguments ; but he could not find such arguments, 
 (a) in his reason, for his reason must be in harmony 
 with universal reason ; nor (b) in the consent of 
 mankind, for he rejects this motive of certitude : he 
 would, then, be obliged to admit this consent or be 
 in contradiction with himself. 
 
 3d. Direct argument. — It would be absurd to ad- 
 mit that the majority of men, and most sound part 
 of humanity, would deceive, or could be deceived ; 
 but if one should deny the proposition under consid- 
 eration this absurdity would result. Consequently 
 the general consent must be accepted as an expression 
 of the truth. 
 
 4th. This consent has been accepted in all ages 
 and at all times as an infallible motive of judging. 
 To show this, it will be sufficient to quote the fol- 
 lowing, from Cicero : ' ' What is established upon 
 the laws of nature must be true, if anything is true ; 
 but a general consent of mankind, which is constant, 
 uniform, and refers to something of great import- 
 ance, as the existence of a Supreme Being, the ne- 
 cessity of worshiping the Deity, &c, is the voice of 
 nature. 
 
 To solve any objections to this proposition,, we 
 have only to refer to the four conditions already 
 indicated. 
 
. LOGIC. 67 
 
 Fifth Motive. — The Testimony of Men. 
 
 As we have already said, we can judge by our 
 senses only of those facts which we have witnessed : 
 for other facts we must rely on the testimony of men. 
 But, by its nature, such testimony is not necessarily 
 infallible ; and we have to examine under what con- 
 ditions it may be considered an infallible motive of 
 certitude. We shall first give some general notions 
 concerning the facts, the witnesses, and the conditions 
 which the testimony must have in order to be an 
 infallible motive of certitude. 
 
 (A) The facts may be first, contemporaneous or 
 past ; second, public or private ; third, of great or of 
 little importance ; fourth, favorable to the views of 
 the people, or opposed to them ; fifth, clear or ob- 
 scure ; and sixth, natural or supernatural. 
 
 (B) The witnesses may be, first, eye-witnesses or 
 historical witnesses ; and second, contemporaneous 
 with the events or posterior to them. 
 
 (C) The testimony, in order to be an infallible 
 motive of certitude, must have the following condi- 
 tions : First, the fact must be possible ; second,, it 
 must be important ; third, there must be several 
 witnesses who were not deceived, who would not 
 deceive, and who could not deceive, even if they 
 wished ; and fourth, these witnesses must speak 
 clearly and be clearly understood. 
 
 Bayle and his followers have attacked the legiti- 
 macy of the testimony of men as an infallible motive 
 of certitude, and have gone so far as to deny the 
 possibility of establishing with certainty the truth 
 
68 LOGIC. 
 
 of any historical fact. This system has been called 
 Historical Pyrrhonism ; and it must he rejected, for 
 the following reasons : First, it is as much repug- 
 nant to the nature and moral disposition of men as 
 is Universal Scepticism ; second, it is opposed to 
 reason, which naturally admits that several wit- 
 nesses cannot be deceived in regard to the substance 
 of an important fact, and that they would not and 
 could not deceive : this second part is grounded (a) 
 on the love of truth which is natural to man and (b) 
 on the principle of veracity or the inclination which 
 all men have to speak this truth : the impossibility 
 of deceiving may come from the fact itself, and this 
 takes place when many relate a fact which is hurtful 
 or useless to them, or one concerning which their 
 previous interests are divided ; or the impossibility 
 may come from the nature of the testimony, as when 
 many persons relate the event in the same way, even 
 in the smallest details ; or, again, it may come from 
 the character of the witnesses, and is very clear 
 when they are all honest. 
 
 Pyrrhonism must, in the third place, be rejected 
 because its acceptance would result in the subversion 
 of religion, of society and of private rights. The 
 truth of religion is established by facts ; while society 
 rests upon a system of customs, laws and forms of 
 government, which, in regard to their origin, are 
 based on tradition, or the testimony of men ; and 
 private rights, so far as their origin is concerned, 
 depend upon titles and documents handed down 
 from generation to generation by the testimony of 
 men. Bayle's doctrine must therefore be rejected. 
 
LOGIC. 69 
 
 From what has "been said, it is indirectly proved 
 that the testimony of men is sufficient authority for 
 the existence of facts of which we have not been eye- 
 witnesses, including historical facts. 
 
 We have now to proceed to the direct proof of the 
 proposition that the testimony of men is an infallible 
 motive of certitude in regard to facts. As the facts 
 may be either natural or supernatural, it is evident 
 that the question at issue is a double one ; we shall 
 therefore examine it in two sections. 
 
 § I. Authority of the testimony of men concerning 
 natural facts. 
 
 1st. Proposition.— The testimony of men is an in- 
 fallible motive of judging of contemporaneous facts. 
 
 We may judge that a fact is true when the wit- 
 nesses have not been deceived, and when they would 
 not and could not deceive. But such is the case 
 with facts which are contemporaneous and of great 
 importance. This minor has been fully developed 
 in the preceding remarks ; therefore the testimony 
 of men is an infallible motive, &c. 
 
 Note. — When we speak of facts we mean the sub- 
 stance of them, for we may be deceived in regard to 
 secondary circumstances. 
 
 It is not necessary that the number of the wit- 
 nesses should be great, provided, 1st, that they are 
 honest, 2nd, that their account is uniform, 3d, that 
 they persevere in giving the same testimony at all 
 times, and 4th, that it is evident they are not influ- 
 enced by motives of interest or pleasure, or that their 
 interests are divided, or that the fact is opposed to 
 
70 LOGIC. 
 
 their interests, or tliat the fact is of such notoriety 
 that any fraud might be detected by other contem- 
 porary witnesses, v 
 
 TTe may accept the evidence of even one eye-wit- 
 ness when he is entirely trustworthy and when the 
 fact which he relates is in necessary connection with 
 other known facts, and especially when the witness 
 is of great wisdom and virtue, and still more if he 
 attests by miracles the truth of his testimony. 
 
 The objections to this first proposition, given 
 under different forms, are expressed in the following 
 major: "If the testimony of one man gives only 
 probability, the testimony of several men will give 
 only several probabilities, but no certainty.''' We 
 deny the major ; the amount of probabilities is not 
 to the point : the question is not concerning the value 
 of testimonies taken separately, but concerning the 
 value of testimonies taken together. Consequently 
 the objection is a sophism, which we have called 
 ignorant ia elenclu, or a mistaking of the question at 
 issue. 
 
 2d. Proposition.— The testimony of men is some- 
 times an infallible motive of judging of past events. 
 
 Argument : The testimony of men is an infallible 
 motive of judging of past facts, provided there be 
 several means by which truth comes to us. But 
 such is the case, the means being : tradition, history 
 and monuments. 
 
 The force of the argument from tradition comes, 
 first, from the moral impossibility that many men 
 have been deceived, or that they have deceived ; this 
 has been sufficiently developed already : and, second, 
 
LOGIC. 71 
 
 from the argument of prescription, according to 
 which the actual existence of a tradition or a uni- 
 versal custom, the reason for which cannot be given 
 unless the fact on which it is based he accepted, 
 makes it necessary to accept the fact ; for such a tra- 
 dition could not originate in error or falsehood, it 
 not being possible in regard to facts of a serious na- 
 ture and having a serious consequence, that an error 
 should have either suddenly appeared or slowly 
 grown through centuries without some protestation 
 against the falsehood. "We are therefore justified in 
 assenting to the truth of a fact which is attested by 
 tradition : the argument is considered good even in 
 respect to moral obligations. 
 
 History must be authentic, true and entire. The 
 authenticity of a book may be established by Oral 
 and written tradition, and also by an examination 
 of the book itself. A book is authentic when its 
 style is the same as the style of other books known 
 to be by the same author, and when the contents of 
 the book are in harmony with the known views, 
 doctrines and opinions of the author. An historical 
 work is true when the facts related, whether con- 
 temporaneous or past, are of great importance, are 
 public in their nature, and are not contradicted by 
 any historian of the same period. A history is 
 known to be entire, when a comparison with the 
 original manuscripts, or the first printed editions, 
 shows no omission or alteration of statements in 
 regard to important circumstances. When such a 
 comparison cannot be made, we may judge by the 
 unity of style and plan, and the satisfactory connec- 
 tion of events, that the work is entire. 
 
72 LOGIC. 
 
 In regard to monuments, it is necessary that they 
 should have a necessary connection with the events 
 commemorated, whether erected at the same time or 
 afterwards. 
 
 It is objected that a certitude cannot be perfect 
 which is diminishing gradually by the lapse of time 
 and the loss of titles, which rests upon the testi- 
 mony of witnesses less trustworthy than eye-wit- 
 nesses, which becomes less clear as the date of the 
 facts becomes more remote, and which, finally, has 
 often been the source of deception. We answer, 
 that a certitude once established is always a certi- 
 tude ; and though it may not afterwards affect our 
 sensibilities so deeply, nevertheless its intrinsic na- 
 ture is not thereby changed^ and we always have 
 sufficient means to detect a falsification when this 
 takes place. 
 
 §11. Authority of the testimony of men concern- 
 ing supernatural facts. 
 
 A supernatural fact differs from a natural fact 
 only with reference to the cause and the manner of 
 its production. In regard to the effect, or the fact 
 itself, it is a natural one. With this explanation, 
 we proceed to demonstrate the following 
 
 Proposition.- — The testimony of men is an infallible 
 motive of judging of supernatural facts . 
 
 The truth of supernatural facts may be established 
 by the testimony of men, provided this 'testimony 
 has the same force for proving such facts, that it 
 has for proving natural facts. But such is the case ; 
 for, as we said in the introduction to this proposi- 
 tion, and this assertion is denied by no one, a super- 
 
LOGIC. T3 
 
 natural fact, in regard to its effect and exterior 
 motive, is only a natural fact, and consequently can 
 be established by similar proof, so that we might 
 here repeat the argument already given in regard 
 to natural facts. The testimony of men is true, 
 when many witnesses relate the same fact, whether 
 this be a miracle or a mere natural fact, provided it 
 be evident that these witnesses have not been de- 
 ceived and have not deceived. Hence the testimony 
 of men is an infallible motive, &c. 
 
 The objections to this proposition rest upon the 
 following assertion : A miracle is impossible. In 
 this assertion there is an implied contradiction ; for 
 to pretend that all the witnesses to the miracles of 
 our Lord were deceived or did deceive, is to assert a 
 miracle in the moral order greater than the facts 
 which are denied. 
 
 From what has been said, we may understand 
 what is meant by authority: It is the motive by 
 which we judge of those things which we do not 
 know ourselves. Authority is human when it is 
 the source of human faith or belief, and divine when 
 our adhesion to it constitutes divine or supernatural 
 faith. 
 
 Sixth Motive. — Memory. 
 
 Memory is that faculty by which we recall to mind 
 feelings that are past. 
 
 Proposition. — Memory is an infallible motive of 
 judging of a past state of the mind of which we have 
 a clear recollection. 
 
 4 
 
74 LOGIC. 
 
 This proposition cannot be proved : it can only be 
 explained. 
 
 I. There is certitude where there is a clear per- 
 ception of a truth .; but by memory, when our recol- 
 lection is distinct, we have such a perception. Hence 
 we have certitude. 
 
 II. Judgments based upon a universal, constant 
 and irresistible propensity are infallible.* This is 
 admitted by every one ; and were it not true we 
 might doubt of everything, even of God himself. 
 But by memory we form Judgments which are based 
 upon an irresistible, constant and universal pro- 
 pensity ; these judgments are therefore infallible. 
 Hence memory is an infallible motive_, &c. 
 
 Memory, like consciousness,, produces an imme- 
 diate certitude, and consequently cannot be demon- 
 strated, since the demonstration should rest on 
 memory itself. It is, in fact, by memory that we call 
 to mind the very first principles, the bases, of every 
 demonstration. 
 
 Seventh Motive. — Induction or Analogy. 
 
 We reason by induction when we pass from phe- 
 nomena observed and known to phenomena which 
 are neither known nor observed. The following 
 definition of induction may therefore be given : In- 
 duction is the operation by which, from several par- 
 ticular phenomena, the mind concludes the existence 
 of a general law of nature. 
 
 The principle of induction rests upon the laws of 
 nature. These laws may be summed up in these 
 three axioms : 1st. There exists a constant and gen- 
 
LOGIC. Vo- 
 
 meral order in the things which have been created, 
 that is, in nature ; 2nd. Every natural cause follows 
 a certain order in the production of its effects ; 3d. 
 The same natural cause, placed in the same circum- 
 stances, produces the same effect. 
 
 We may now proceed to establish the following 
 proposition concerning the principle of induction. 
 
 Proposition. — A persuasion of the constancy and 
 generality of the laws of nature is an infallible motive 
 of certitude. x 
 
 What is born with us must be in harmony with 
 the truth, and consequently an infallible motive of 
 certitude ; for if a persuasion natural to our mind 
 could be false, the very constitution of the mind 
 itself would be false, which would be the destruction 
 of all certitude. But a persuasion of the constancy 
 and generality of the laws of nature is innate ; for it 
 is universal, irresistible, and anterior to reason itself, 
 as we see in the case of children, who instinctively 
 avoid what is hurtful ; such a persuasion is therefore 
 an infallible motive of certitude. 
 
 We have seen, from the exposition of the princi- 
 ples of induction, that there are in nature general 
 laws ; but is it possible to have a true certitude in 
 regard to the existence of the laws of nature in par- 
 ticular ? In order to solve this question we proceed 
 to establish this 
 
 Proposition. — Induction sometimes gives time certi- 
 tude concerning the laws of nature in particular. 
 
 We have true certitude when we clearly perceive 
 some truth, and when we may affirm it without any 
 fear of erring. But by induction we know surely, 
 
76 LOGIC. 
 
 and consequently perceive clearly, the existence of 
 some laws of nature in particular ; for instance, that 
 fire will burn wood, melt lead, &c; and we affirm 
 the existence of these laws without any fear of erring. 
 Certitude, then, sometimes gives us true certitude, 
 <rc. 
 
 Notes.- — Induction gives certitude concerning the 
 existence of a law of nature in particular, when there 
 is some identity of circumstances in the phenomena 
 which are observed, and this identity may be dis- 
 covered by an attentive observation. 
 
 The certitude of facts known by induction is some- 
 times merely conditional and sometimes absolute. 
 
 The laws of nature, considered individually, are 
 contingent, and Grod can suspend them when this 
 suspension is not in opposition to his attributes, but 
 not when such suspension would be in contradiction 
 to any of these attributes. For instance, He could 
 not cause a multitude of persons to agree among 
 themselves to tell an untruth which would be inju- 
 rious to their own interests. Prom this explanation, 
 we may know when the certitude given by induction 
 is conditional, and when it is absolute. 
 
 The laws of nature are two-fold, physical and 
 psychological : the former governing corporal bodies, 
 and the latter regulating spiritual substances. Moral 
 laws are included in the psychological laws. By 
 induction, we may learn the existence of. psycholog- 
 ical as well as of physical laws. 
 
 Appendix . - — Probability . 
 
 Although, in itself, certitude is complete and 
 
LOGIC. 77 
 
 indivisible, yet it sometimes happens that a propo- 
 sition true in itself, appears to us to approach the 
 truth more or less nearly, according as we have more 
 or less reason for believing it to be true. Those 
 reasons which leave our minds in a state of uncer- 
 tainty are called probabilities. When the probabil- 
 ities in favor of a proposition are equal to those 
 against it, we -have what is called doubt; and when 
 those in favor are more numerous than those against 
 we have verisimilitude. Probability , then, is the 
 motive which inclines us, in a greater or less degree, 
 to believe as true that which is not completely de- 
 monstrated. As it is often very difficult to deter- 
 mine the degree of probability in favor of or against 
 a given proposition, we must be cautious and not 
 judge beyond what we perceive. 
 
 We admit historical facts which are only probable, 
 whenever we have to doubt on account of the diffi- 
 culty of criticising the sources of the history. In 
 our daily actions, also, we often have to conduct our- 
 selves according to information which is only proba- 
 ble. The further elucidation of this question belongs 
 to theology. 
 
 In many questions relating to future events the 
 issue depends upon a certain number of unknown 
 possibilities : the probability of one of these possi- 
 bilities may therefore be determined mathematically, 
 and upon the result obtained, certain calculations 
 may be based. In this manner contracts of insur- 
 ance are drawn up, certain games of chance are 
 predicted, &c. But evidently logic has nothing 
 further to do with this subject. Here, then, closes 
 the First Part of this work. 
 
PART II. 
 METAPHYSICS. 
 
METAPHYSICS. 
 
 METAPHYSICS literally means above nature, 
 and ' l nature ' ' here signifies the material 
 world. The following definition of metaphysics is 
 generally accepted : The science of supersensible and 
 merely speculative things, as known to us by reason. 
 By the words "merely speculative ' ' metaphysics is 
 distinguished from the other parts of philosophy. 
 
 Metaphysics is divided into two parts, general and 
 special. General metaphysics has been called ontol- 
 ogy, or the science of being ; and special metaphysics 
 has been called pneumatology , or the science of spir- 
 itual substances. 
 
 Pneumatology is divided into two parts, the first 
 treating of God and His attributes, and the second 
 of the human soul, its faculties and qualities. The 
 first is called theodicy, or the science of God, and 
 the second psychology , or a dissertation on the soul. 
 
 This order in the division of pneumatology is man- 
 ifestly the proper one, for the knowledge of God and 
 of his attributes is necessary in order to treat of 
 various questions concerning the human soul. The 
 destination of the soul for another life, for instance, 
 
 cannot be proved until we have demonstrated the 
 4* 
 
82 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 existence of God and his providence with his infinite 
 wisdom and justice, ready after this life to render to 
 every one according to his deserts. 
 
 FIRST DISSERTATION. 
 
 ON ONTOLOGY. 
 
 The word ontology conies from two Greek words, 
 ?i6yos and &v, which together signify "discourse on 
 being." Ontology may therefore be defined to be 
 that part of philosophy which treats of being in gen- 
 eral, and of the general species and relations of being. 
 In this dissertation we consider being as abstracted 
 from existence ; and as we may have a positive idea 
 of being thus abstractly considered, the title of this 
 dissertation, "Ontology," or being in general, is 
 correct. 
 
 We shall divide the subject of ontology into five 
 chapters., treating in the first of the notion, essence 
 and possibility of a being in general, in the second 
 of its causes and its effects, in the third of its species, 
 in the fourth of its properties, and in the fifth of 
 space and duration. 
 
 CHAPTER FIRST. 
 
 Of the Notion, Essence and Possibility of a Being 
 in General. 
 
 A being is that which exists or may exist. The 
 notion of being is the first of all notions. We can- 
 not think of anything unless there be some being ; 
 
METAPHYSICS. 83 
 
 hence the notion of being is logically prior to our 
 thought, the notion of being is necessarily involved 
 in thought. 
 
 The essence of a being is that without which a 
 being can neither be nor be conceived to be. For 
 instance, we cannot conceive the idea of a man with- 
 out the notions or attributes of intelligence and ani- 
 mality. 
 
 The agreement among the essential attributes of 
 a being forms the possibility of its existence. Con- 
 sequently if certain attributes involve a Contradic- 
 tion they cannot constitute a being — that being is 
 not possible. There is such a contradiction in a 
 round square, consequently a round square is an 
 impossibility. 
 
 The possibility, as we understand it here, abstract- 
 ing it from the idea of existence, is what the philos- 
 ophers call metaphysical or intrinsic possibility. 
 
 This accord among the essential attributes, which 
 constitutes the possibility is immutable, and conse- 
 quently necessary. It is immutable, for if it could 
 be changed there would be, at the same time, accord 
 and discord among the essential attributes of a being ; 
 that is, the same thing would at the same time both 
 he and not be, which involves a contradiction and 
 which is therefore absurd. That accord is then ne- 
 cessary since it is immutable: hence that accord, 
 which is the essence or possibility of a being in gen- 
 eral, does not depend on the free will of God ; but 
 since it is immutable and necessary, like God, it has 
 its seat or foundation in God Himself, in the divine 
 intellect, in the very essence of God. Descartes 
 
84 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 therefore was mistaken when he said the contrary. 
 
 Possibility of itself is not a sufficient reason for 
 existence ; that is, from the fact that a being is pos- 
 sible we cannot conclude that it exists. Existence 
 is more than mere possibility ; and if mere possibil- 
 ity were a sufficient reason for existence the effect 
 would be greater than the cause, what is plus would 
 be contained in what is minus ; but this would involve 
 a contradiction. 
 
 It follows, that since mere possibility is not a suf- 
 ficient reason for existence, some existence must 
 have existed before any possibility : hence, from this 
 notion we deduce the idea of an eternal, necessary 
 and infinite being. 
 
 The essential attributes of a being, or its essence, 
 either metaphysical or physical, constitutes the 
 nature of that being. The word nature, however, 
 has a greater extension than the word essence ; it 
 comprehends not only the attributes which are essen- 
 tial, but also what flows from them. Hence, those 
 attributes are essential without which a being can 
 neither be nor be conceived to be ; and those attri- 
 butes are natural which are formed in a being by 
 the force of its essence. For instance, the roots, the 
 trunk and the branches are the essential parts of a 
 tree ; but its bulk, height, &c, are its natural parts. 
 
 Two axioms are drawn from the considerations 
 made in this chapter, with regard to essence : 
 
 1st. What is, is ; or, negatively, the same thing 
 cannot be and not be at the same time. This is gen- 
 erally called the principle of contradiction. 
 
 2nd. Whatever is involved in a being must be 
 
METAPHYSICS. 85 
 
 affirmed of its essence; and what3ver is excluded 
 from a being must be denied of its essence. 
 
 CHAPTER SECOND. 
 Of the Causes and the Effects of Beings. 
 
 Let us first establish the difference which exists 
 between principle and cause. Principle is that which 
 contains the reason for the existence of something. 
 Our mind, for instance, is the principle of our 
 thoughts ; that is, our thoughts could not come from 
 a substance different in its nature from our mind : 
 in other words, the substance from which thought 
 flows is spiritual and active. 
 
 When the principle contains the whole reason for 
 the possibility or the existence of a being it is called 
 adequate, if the principle does not contain the whole 
 reason it is called inadequate. The adequate prin- 
 ciple is also called the sufficient reason. 
 
 Cause is that which produces something, or which 
 concurs in the production of something. Hence 
 there are two kinds of causes. The first is called 
 the efficient cause ; and this only, properly speaking, 
 is a real cause, for only this produces an effect. The 
 other concurs in the production of the effect, and is 
 only improperly called a cause. 
 
 This last, or incomplete, Cause may be material, 
 formal, instrumental, final, or exemplary, according 
 as we consider the material, the form, the instru- 
 ment, the end, or the mo4el which has been used by 
 the agent. 
 
 The efficient cause is either necessary or free. 
 
86 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 The cause is necessary .when it necessarily produces 
 its effects, and it is free when it may either produce 
 them or not produce them. The human mind, in 
 regard to its free determinations, is a free cause. 
 
 The efficient cause may also be either a first cause 
 or a secondary cause. It is a first cause when it 
 does not depend upon another cause in order to act, 
 and a secondary cause when it does depend on another 
 cause in order to act. 
 
 The efficient cause is also either physical or mora 
 physical, when it produces an effect which belongs 
 to the physical order ; and moral, when the effect is 
 a moral one. The man who orders another to com- 
 mit a murder is the moral cause of the death which 
 he has ordered. The physical cause is also called 
 the direct cause, and the moral cause the indirect 
 cause. 
 
 The efficient cause is moreover either general or 
 particular, which words are readily understood ; and 
 also either actual or virtual ; actucd, if we consider 
 the effect produced, and virtual, if we consider the 
 power of producing it as residing in the cause. 
 
 The efficient cause is, finally, a cause per se, when 
 it produces the effect which it aims at ; and a cause 
 per accidens, when the effect produced is not the one 
 intended, but an accidental one. 
 
 Note. — 'There is a difference between the cause 
 and the condition. The condition is the difficulty 
 to be conquered in order to obtain the effect. It is 
 consequently the way of producing the effect. 
 
 An intelligent cause does not act without aiming 
 
METAPHYSICS. 87 
 
 at some end : the end, then, is that which involves 
 the reason why an action is undertaken ; it has been 
 improperly called the final cause. 
 
 The end may he either primary or secondary, prox- 
 imate or remote, intermediate or final. The end is 
 intermediate when it is connected with two others, 
 one preceding and the other following ; and it is 
 final when the agent, after having obtained it, is at 
 rest, that is, has accomplished his purpose. 
 
 The means (media) are everything instrumental 
 ■ in the production of an effect. These means must 
 be in proportion to the cause that uses them, and to 
 the end which is aimed at. Some of them are neces- 
 sary, and others only useful. 
 
 Order, in general, is the regular arrangement of 
 causes, means and ends. When Ave consider that 
 arrangement in reference to the essence of things, 
 we have the metaphysical order ; when we consider 
 it in reference to the existence of bodies, we have 
 the physical order ; and when we consider the same 
 arrangement in reference to the free actions of God, 
 of the angels, or of the souls of men, we have the 
 moral order. 
 
 The moral order is called religious when it refers 
 to the worship of Grod, social when it regulates the 
 intercourse of men with one another, and political 
 when its object embraces the correlative duties of the 
 State and its citizens. 
 
 The metaphysical order is the foundation of the 
 other two. In the whole universality of things there 
 exists a perfect subordination of causes, means and 
 
88 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 effects, so that all possible and existing beings are 
 perfectly chained together. 
 
 This three-fold order being the object of science, 
 it follows that science is metaphysical, physical and 
 moral : and as everything which is known, or which 
 may be known, by reason only, forms the object of 
 philosophy, and everything which is made manifest 
 to us by divine revelation constitutes the object of 
 theology, it appears further that the order of science 
 is double, natural and supernatural. 
 
 From what has been explained in this chapter we 
 may deduce the following axioms : 
 
 I. He who wills the end wills the means. 
 
 II. The means must be in proportion to the end. 
 
 III. There is no effect without a cause. 
 
 IV. The cause is prior to the effect. 
 
 V. The perfections of the effect cannot be greater 
 than those of the cause. 
 
 If a perfection in the effect could exceed the per- 
 fection in the cause, that perfection would be without 
 a cause, which is absurd. 
 
 The cause may contain its effect in a three-fold 
 manner : 
 
 1st. Formally, — as a heap of gold contains for- 
 mally, or according to their nature and forms, several 
 particles of the same metal. 
 
 2d. Virtually, — as the architect has in his mind 
 the plan of the building which he is to erect. 
 
 3d. Eminently, — as when the cause contains all 
 the perfections of the effect, in a most eminent 
 manner and one quite unknown to us. God has in 
 
METAPHYSICS. 89 
 
 himself, in a most eminent manner, all the perfec- 
 tions of his creatures. 
 
 The following corollaries result from the axioms 
 given above : 
 
 I. No being can be its own cause ; for, if so, it 
 would, at the same time, be prior and posterior to 
 itself. 
 
 II. Two beings cannot be mutually their own 
 cause. 
 
 CHAPTEE THIKD. 
 
 Op the Different Species of Being. 
 
 1st. A being exists either in itself or in another 
 being : in the first case we have what is called sub- 
 stance, in the second modification. 
 
 2nd. A being is either finite or infinite. 
 
 3d. A being is either material or spiritual. 
 
 Hence the division of this chapter into three 
 articles. 
 
 Article First. — Substance and Modification. 
 
 A substance is a being existing in itself : this does 
 not mean that such a being is independent of a cause, 
 but only that it is independent of another substance 
 as an object in which it should lie in order to exist ; 
 thus, a stone is a substance_, for it does not need 
 another being to which it must be attached in order 
 to exist. 
 
 A modification is that which needs another being 
 to which it may adhere in order to exist, as color. 
 Modification is also called accident ; it is the sub- 
 stance appearing to us with such or such determined 
 
90 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 form. Hence the modification is not something of 
 a positive being added to the substance ; but it is the 
 substance itself determined in such or such manner. 
 The following axiom is clear of itself: " Modification 
 supposes substance." It follows from the foregoing 
 definitions that modification cannot exist without 
 substance, nor substance without modification ; and 
 that the modification, materially speaking, or con- 
 sidered in a material jjoint of view is perceived before 
 the substance. 
 
 Substance is created or not created, and complete 
 or not complete. 
 
 A complete substance is a substance sui juris (of its 
 own right), that is, one which is not united to an- 
 other substance in order to be perfect, and which, 
 consequently, is the principle of its own operations, 
 if it has any. Peter is a complete substance. A 
 complete substance is also called a suppositum. 
 
 A substance is incomplete when it is united to 
 another substance in order to be perfect, as the body 
 by itself, the soul by itself. 
 
 There is a difference between a substance and a 
 suppositum. A suppositum is always a substance, 
 but a substance is not always a suppositum. 
 
 When the suppositum is endowed with reason it 
 becomes a, person. 
 
 When a person is composed of several substances, 
 united in order to constitute it, we have the hypos- 
 tasis, or hypostatic union. 
 
 From what has been said, we deduce the following 
 axioms : 
 
 I. Actions are personal ; that is, actions ought not 
 
METAPHYSICS. 91 
 
 to be attributed to each or any substance composing 
 a person, but to the union of all, or the person itself. 
 
 II. Actions share the dignity of the person acting. 
 Hence the actions of our Lord were of an infinite 
 value. 
 
 III. Names belong to the persons or suppositums. 
 
 Article Second. — Infinite and Finite Substances. 
 
 Substance is infinite or finite. 
 
 Infinite substance is that having no limitation. It 
 is the same as simple being, or absolute being (ens 
 simpliciter). 
 
 Finite substance is that which is limited. 
 
 Some authors divide the infinite into the infinite 
 actu, or the actual infinite, that which is the highest 
 and most perfect that can be imagined, namely, God 
 alone ; and the infinite potentia, or the potential or 
 virtual infinite, which can be infinitely increased or 
 diminished. But certainly this division cannot be 
 accepted ; since the infinite, and a substance which 
 can be increased, are two terms involving a contra- 
 diction. That which is infinite is so of its own 
 nature, and can therefore be neither increased nor 
 diminished. The infinite absolutely excludes limita- 
 tion ; hence it is immutable. The so-called virtual 
 infinite should be called the indefinite. 
 
 We shall see farther on, that the infinite being is 
 the same as the necessary being, and the finite being 
 the same as the contingent being. 
 
 That we have in our mind the*idea of the infinite 
 is certain, for we can define it, and it is in our mind 
 distinct from any other idea. This idea, according 
 
92 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 to Descartes, Mallebranche, Leibnitz and Bossuet, 
 in opposition to Locke and the other sensists, is a 
 positive idea, hut not an adequate, though a true 
 - and clear one. Evidently it has been placed in our 
 mind by God himself, since the finite could not give 
 the idea of the infinite : no one can give what he has 
 not himself. 
 
 The idea of a finite being, considered materially, 
 that is, as having a real existence, is also a positive 
 idea ; but considered formally, that is, as deprived 
 of some reality which it might possess but does not, 
 is a negative idea. 
 
 Article Third.- — Material axd Spiritual 
 Substances. 
 
 Substance is, again, either material or spiritual. 
 
 A material being is one which is essentially exten- 
 sive and inert ; and a spiritual being is one which is 
 essentially active and thinking. There is conse- 
 quently a fundamental difference between these two 
 beings. 
 
 Matter is essentially divisible, since it is extensive ; 
 but whether matter is infinitely divisible, and what 
 are the elements of matter, have been questions of 
 dispute. 
 
 The opinion of Descartes and his followers is that 
 matter is infinitely divisible ; for, they say, since 
 extension belongs to the essence of matter, as long 
 as you have matter you have extension, and conse- 
 quently divisibility! In their view, a simple ele- 
 ment becoming extensive by aggregation involves a 
 contradiction. 
 
METAPHYSICS. 93 
 
 On the other hand, Leibnitz and his disciples are 
 of opinion that the monads, which is the name given 
 by them to the elements of matter, are simple beings ; 
 an infinite divisibility, in their view, involving a 
 contradiction. Any composite being, they teach, is 
 formed of composing elements : but with the system 
 of Descartes we should have a composite substance 
 without composing elements. 
 
 In both these systems we find at least apparent 
 contradictions. According to the system of Descar- 
 tes, the infinite is contained in the finite ; while, 
 according to the system of Leibnitz, a substance, or 
 a simple monad, which is essentially unextensive, 
 becomes extensive by aggregation. 
 
 It is morally impossible to give a satisfactory so- 
 lution of these questions : still, the system of Leib- 
 nitz seems, in general, to be more acceptable than 
 that of Descartes. 
 
 Spiritual substance is quadruple; namely, God, 
 the Angels, the human soul and the soul of the 
 beasts. 
 
 Material substance is multiple, as may be seen in 
 the study of Natural Philosophy. 
 
 CHAPTER FOURTH. 
 
 Of the Properties qe Being. 
 
 The properties of a being are those parts which 
 constitute the being ; they are so called because they 
 are its own proper parts (propria). 
 
 I. Some properties are common to all beings, con- 
 sidered in themselves .; these are : Unity, truth and 
 
94 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 goodness. Every being must be one, true and good. 
 
 First, unity. No positive definition can be given 
 of the unity commonly called numerical, but by the 
 philosophers metaphysical. 
 
 The following negative definition of unity is given 
 by the scholastics: One is that which is divided, 
 that is distinct, from every other being, but undi- 
 vided in itself. 
 
 The metaphysical unity is found in every being ; 
 for every being must be undivided. If a being could 
 be divided into several parts, each part would be a 
 separate being, and there would be several beings 
 instead of one. On the other hand, it is clear that 
 every being must be distinct from every other. 
 
 This numerical or metaphysical unity may be : 
 
 1st. Substantial Unity, or simplicity, which be- 
 longs to substances that cannot be divided, be- 
 cause they exclude composition of parts. Such is 
 the unity of the soul, or of any of the spirits. 
 
 2nd. Physical Unity, which is composed of parts 
 united by some physical bond. Such is the unity of 
 the human body. 
 
 3d. Moral unity, which is composed of parts 
 united by a moral tie, as the unity of a family. 
 
 Second, truth. A being is true when it agrees 
 with its own attributes. The truth of a being is its 
 conformity with its own archetype, that is, with the 
 idea of that being as it exists in the divine intellect. 
 This truth, which is the metaphysical truth, is found 
 in all beings, even those which are merely possible. 
 * Truth is also either moral or logical, according as 
 it refers to beings which belong to the moral or to 
 the logical order. 
 
METAPHYSICS. 95 
 
 Third, goodness. Goodness is the aptitude of a 
 being to attain its own ends. It is clear that this 
 property is found in all beings, since God is infi- 
 nitely wise. 
 
 This definition is of metaphysical or absolute good- 
 ness. Moral goodness is a property of reasonable 
 and free beings. 
 
 Goodness does not pertain to bad actions ; for a 
 bad action, or a sin, is something merely negative. 
 A bad action is an action lacking in righteousness ; 
 but the lack or absence of righteousness is nothing 
 positive, nor is it any being, but the negative of be- 
 ing and of perfection. 
 
 II. Some properties are merely relative ; that is, 
 they pertain to beings when compared with other 
 beings. All beings are in continual relations with 
 one another. We may define relation, in general, 
 to be a property pertaining to a being when com- 
 pared with another being. In a relation, considered 
 in general, there are three elements, a subject, a 
 term and a foundation. If, for instance, I compare 
 the whiteness of paper with that of snow, the paper 
 is the subject, the snow is the term to which I refer 
 the subject, and whiteness is the foundation or the 
 reason for referring the first element to the second. 
 The term and the subject are the correlatives. 
 
 These elements are essential, or natural ; or they 
 are arbitrary, or accidental. They are essential 
 when they flow from the very essence of things, as 
 the relations between a cause and its effects. They 
 are arbitrary when they are grounded on the mere 
 opinions of men. Such are all the symbolical ob- 
 
96 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 jects, in relation to the moral beings which they sig- 
 nify, as the relation between the olive branch and 
 peace ; and also all the moral relations, as that ex- 
 isting between a king and his subjects. 
 
 Among the relations are classed identity and dis- 
 tinction. 
 
 Identity may be taken in several senses, but here 
 it is the perseverance of a being in the same state. 
 This identity may be physical or moral. Living 
 beings have a moral identity, not a metaphysical or 
 absolute one. 
 
 The identity of the human soul is not an accidental 
 one ; that is, it is not an identity consisting in the 
 maintainance of the similitude of modifications, but 
 is a substantial identity. 
 
 Individuals endowed with reason retain their per- 
 sonal identity so long as they maintain their subsist- 
 ence and rationality. 
 
 Distinction is the negative of identity. There is 
 a difference between distinction and diversity. What 
 is diverse is distinct ; but that which is distinct is 
 not always diverse. Heaven and earth are distinct 
 and diverse ; Peter and Paul are distinct, but not 
 diverse. Distinction excludes identity, and diver- 
 sity excludes similitude. 
 
 Two beings entirely alike may exist, for their ex- 
 istence involves no contradiction. 
 
METAPHYSICS. 97 
 
 CHAPTER FIFTH. 
 
 Of Space and Time. 
 
 Space, in general, is extension, in wliicli bodies 
 exist, or in which they may exist or he conceived as 
 possible. Hence the division of space into real space, 
 in which bodies actually exist, and abstract space, in 
 which they are conceived as possible. Abstract 
 s]3ace is the object of geometry. 
 
 The conception of abstract space is formed in our 
 minds by abstraction in the same manner as we form 
 all our conceptions of possible beings. For instance, 
 when we see many bodies having among themselves 
 relations of situation and position, our minds may 
 abstract, or remove, every other property pertaining 
 to these bodies, even their actual existence, and con- 
 sider that sole property by which they may occupy 
 various positions with regard to one another, then 
 we have the idea of an abstract extension, or of ab- 
 stract space. 
 
 Space, conceived abstractly, is eternal, necessary 
 and immutable, in the same manner as we conceive 
 as eternal, necessary and immutable all possible 
 beings. Space is virtually (potentia) infinite, using 
 the word "infinite," as we have before explained, 
 in the sense of indefinite. It is also immense and 
 indefinitely divisible. 
 
 A place is a determined part or point of space. 
 
 Time is the duration of a being, or the permanence 
 of its existence. Time is also defined to be the du- 
 ration in which contingent beings succeed each 
 other, or may continue those successions. Time 
 5 
 
t)3 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 also, we may observe, is, like space, real and ab- 
 stract. 
 
 Time is divided, first, into past, present and 
 future, and, second, into real and abstract time, all 
 of which words are sufficiently clear. 
 
 Eternity, properly so called, is duration without 
 a beginning or an end ; and eternity, improperly so 
 called, is duration without an end, but with a be- 
 ginning : this last is the same as immortality, and 
 by the scholastics is called eternity aparte post. As 
 succession requires a first point, eternity, properly 
 so called, has no succession, for it has no beginning. 
 Consequently the idea of time as lasting from all 
 eternity involves a contradiction ; hence, the eternal 
 being does not exist in time, because this being does 
 not admit of succession. We may say, however, 
 that the eternal being in its immutable duration 
 co-exists with the successive mutations of contingent 
 beings. 
 
 There have been many opinions expressed by the 
 learned concerning the nature of space and time, 
 the two main ones being those of Clarke and Leib- 
 nitz. 
 
 Clarke, whose opinion was accepted by Newton, 
 taught that what he called absolute or abstract space 
 and time are nothing else than the immensity and 
 the eternity of God. This opinion is not acceptable 
 for the following reasons : 
 
 1 st. We do not conceive abstract space and abstract 
 time as things actually infinite, but only virtually 
 so, that is, as things always admitting of increase ; 
 while, at the same time, we conceive the eternity 
 
METAPHYSICS. 99 
 
 and the immensity of God as two attributes actually 
 infinite, and we cannot conceive them differently. 
 Consequently the notions of space and time, as we 
 conceive them, are contradictory to the notion of 
 the infinite. 
 
 2nd. We do not conceive abstract space and abstract 
 time as things really and individually existing, but 
 as two abstractions of the mind ; while eternity and 
 immensity exist really and individually in God, 
 although they cannot be separated from the divine 
 substance. 
 
 3d. It is evident that the opinion of Clarke much 
 favors pantheism ; for since, as we have seen, space 
 and time are not actually infinite, but only virtual- 
 ly so, which is the same as indefinite or finite with 
 no determined limits, it follows that if space and 
 time may be considered as attributes of the divine 
 substance, nothing can prevent us from considering 
 the other finite beings also as attributes of God. 
 
 Leibnitz teaches that space and time are not beings 
 distinct from the other contingent beings , but that 
 they are mere relations of those beings, space being 
 the relation of situation among bodies, and time the 
 relation of succession anion 2j contingent beings. 
 
 o o o 
 
 Consec|uently, if there were no contingent beings 
 there Avould be neither space nor time ; and when 
 contingent beings began to exist then also began 
 the existence of space and time. 
 
 This explanation seems true, and gives full satis- 
 faction to the mind. But Leibnitz mingles with 
 this part of his doctrine some notions concerning the 
 extension of matter, taken from his system of monads, 
 
100 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 which, do not seeni so satisfactory. Omitting these 
 notions, we may accept the explanation given above. 
 
 Epicurus, Democritus, and several among the 
 moderns, make space to be a substantial being which 
 is infinite and contains all bodies. Descartes does 
 not admit of abstract space, but teaches that space 
 is a material and substantial being. 
 
 Kant, who denies the objectivity of bodies, applies 
 his system to this question. His idealism has been 
 indirectly refuted in Logic, where we established the 
 truth that the evidence of the senses is an infallible 
 motive of certitude. 
 
 SECOND DISSERTATION. 
 
 ON THEODICY. 
 
 This subject is naturally divided into two parts, 
 in the first of which we treat of the existence of God, 
 and in the second of his attributes. 
 
 PAET FIRST.— THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 
 
 Some men do not admit the existence of God, and 
 these are called Atheists, a name derived from the 
 Greek (a Oeog, no God). We may consequently 
 call those who believe in the existence of God the- 
 ists. This first part is therefore naturally sub- 
 divided into two chapters. 
 
METAPHYSICS. 101 
 
 CHAPTEK FIKST. 
 
 Of Atheism. 
 
 Atheists are either speculative or practical disbe- 
 lievers in the existence of God : the former do not 
 acknowledge his existence ; the latter know that he 
 exists, hut live as if they did not know it. Specula- 
 tive atheists are called negative when they simply 
 deny the existence of God, and positive when they 
 attempt to prove that he does not exist : the positive 
 atheists are also called systematic atheists. 
 
 Note. — There is a difference between theism and 
 deism, although the two words have substantially 
 the same etymology. Theism is the doctrine of 
 those who believe Jin God and in his operations ; 
 while Deism is the doctrine of those who also believe 
 in God, but entirely reject divine revelation. 
 
 The causes of atheism proceed from the intellect 
 or from the will ; being in the first case (a) an im- 
 perfect knowledge, or (b) an abuse of certain sciences ; 
 and in the second (a) corruption, or (b) pride. 
 
 § 1. Is it prudent to remain indifferent concerning 
 the existence of God ? 
 
 Such indifference is certainly very unwise ; for it 
 is a question upon which depends our greatest hap- 
 piness or our greatest misery. 
 
 The atheists reason in this manner : ( ' I do not 
 know who placed me in this world ; nor do I know 
 what the world is, or even what I am myself. I do 
 not know what my body is, or my senses, or my soul, 
 or this part of me which thinks of what I am now 
 
102 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 saying. I see those frightful spaces of the universe 
 which surround me ; and I find myself fixed on a 
 speck of this immensity, not knowing why I have 
 been placed here rather than elsewhere ; nor why 
 the small space of time which I have to live has been 
 assigned to me at this moment rather than at any 
 other moment of eternity. I see immensities every- 
 where ; they engulf me as an atom, or as a shadow 
 that lasts but for an instant. All that I know is 
 that I shall soon die ; and yet that which I try most 
 to forget is this very death which I cannot avoid. 
 As I do not know where I came from, so I do 
 not know where I am going to ; I know only 
 that, leaving this world, I fall forever into nothing- 
 ness, or else into the hands of an angry God : and 
 not knowing which of these alternatives will be my 
 lot, I conclude that it is better for me to pass my life 
 without thinking of what shall happen to me ; and 
 believe that I have but to follow my inclinations 
 without reflection or anxiety concerning what ought 
 or ought not to be done in order not to fall into eter- 
 nal, damnation, in case that what is said of this be 
 true. Perhaps I might find some light to dissipate 
 my doubts, but I do not wish to take any trouble 
 about the -matter, nor do I care to make one step to 
 find this light ; and so, looking with contempt on 
 those who trouble themselves with such cares, I pre- 
 fer to go on, and wait without fear for that great 
 event, allowing myself to be carried on quietly to 
 death in the uncertainty of my future condition." 
 Such are the horrible sentiments of the Atheist. 
 The chief argument of the Atheists is an evident 
 
METAPHYSICS. 103 
 
 absurdity. They say : If G-cd exists he is infinitely 
 good, consequently there is nothing to be feared. 
 They forget that God is also infinitely just. 
 
 §2. Are there any evils resulting from the adop- 
 tion of the theory of the Atheists ? 
 
 This system is the source of many evils to men, 
 whether considered individually or collectively, that 
 is, as members of society. 
 
 1st. Atheism is hurtful to men considered as indi- 
 viduals ; for it takes away from them all security, all 
 comfort in misfortune, and every hope of happiness. 
 It takes away all security ; for in all the labors of life, 
 what gives us courage is the consideration that God 
 will bless our efforts for own welfare and for that of 
 those dependent upon us. It takes away all conso- 
 lation and hope, and consequently stifles the voice of 
 nature to which the pagans themselves gave ear. 
 We find no real happiness in this world, because 
 here every good is mingled with sorrow and of short 
 duration, because many suffer constantly, and be- 
 cause the thought of death disturbs our joys. Hence 
 Atheism, which takes away the hope of a better 
 world, is hurtful to man, considered individually. 
 
 2d. Atheism is also hurtful to men considered as 
 members of society, for (a) it leaves authority with- 
 out restraint. (Authority cannot be judged, con- 
 demned and punished by its own subjects). And 
 (b) it leaves the citizen without morals. (Whence 
 would come restraint against vice, if Atheism pre- 
 vailed ? Without God there would be no other life, 
 nor would conscience exist, nor would the laws have 
 any sanction). 
 
104 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 Atheism breaks every bond of union among men. 
 Those bonds are the virtues : gratitude, deference, 
 obedience, sincerity, justice, &c, and without God 
 there would be no virtue. 
 
 §3. Is theism better than atheism? The observ- 
 ations made above are sufficient to give an affirma- 
 tive answer to this question. 
 
 §4. Is theism safer than atheism? 
 
 A doctrine in which there is nothing to be dreaded, 
 if false, and everything to be hoped, if true, is safer 
 than one in which there is nothing to be hoped for, 
 if true, and much to be dreaded, if false. But such 
 is the case in regard to this question ; hence theism 
 is safer than atheism. 
 
 §5. Is atheism worse than polytheism? 
 
 That doctrine is the worse which restrains our 
 passions the less. Atheism restrains our passions 
 less than polytheism ; for polytheism admits the be- 
 lief in another life. Consequently, atheism is worse 
 than polytheism. 
 
 It is objected to this, that without God, 1st, there 
 would be the natural law ; 2nd, that religion has been 
 the cause of many wars ; 3d, that many atheists 
 have been good men, while many theists have been 
 bad men ; 4th, that the atheist is inclined to do evil 
 by his nature only, while the polytheist is inclined 
 to evil both by his nature and by the example of his 
 gods ; and 5th, that it is better to deny God than to 
 attribute to him vices which debase him. 
 
 We answer, to the 1st, that without God there 
 would be no sanction to the natural law, and with- 
 out a sanction no law can have force ; to the 2nd, 
 
METAPHYSICS. 105 
 
 that religion has been the pretext, but not the cause 
 of war (We may here observe that we speak of re- 
 ligion as being the aggressive power ; for religion 
 has often been obliged to defend herself. The cause 
 of these wars was ambition, or a spirit of revenge 
 on the part of princes who were censured by the 
 popes, or some other cause of similar nature) ; to the 
 3d, that neither theists nor atheists were logical in 
 their conduct, and that therefore no conclusion can 
 be drawn from their conduct, to deduce a general 
 conclusion from exceptional facts is a fallacy per 
 accidens ; to the 4th, that the poly theists have some 
 motives for restraining their passions, for example, 
 the belief in another life ; and to the 5 th, that the 
 ignorance of the polytheists is not the result of a bad 
 will, that consequently their intentions are good, 
 and that since the intention constitutes the merit 
 or the demerit of our actions, the conduct of the 
 atheists is worse than that of the polytheists. 
 
 CHAPTER SECOND. 
 Of the Proofs of the Existence of God. 
 
 No truth has been more firmly established than 
 that of the existence of Grod. The arguments by 
 which this truth is proved are of three kinds, being 
 taken respectively from the metaphysical, the phys- 
 ical and the moral order ; and consequently the 
 present chapter is divided into three articles. 
 
 Article First. — Metaphysical Arguments. 
 
 These arguments are so called because they are 
 5* 
 
106 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 grounded upon the essence of things, and are drawn 
 from considerations purely intellectual. 
 
 Some preliminary notions more fully explained in 
 Ontology must be summarily repeated in this con- 
 nection : 
 
 No being exists without a reason for its existence. 
 This reason may come from the nature of the being, 
 or from a cause which is extrinsic to it. A being 
 which has in its own nature the reason of its exist- 
 ence, or which exists by itself out of its own nature, 
 is called a necessary being, or a being a se. The 
 opposite of a necessary being is called a contingent 
 being, that is, a being which has received its exist- 
 ence from an extrinsic cause. 
 
 An infinite being is one which admits of no limit ; 
 it is also called ens sim/pliciter, because it excludes 
 negation in every way. The notion of infinite ne- 
 cessarily excludes that of number or series : the idea 
 of an infinite number or series is contradictory in 
 itself. 
 
 First argument, taken from the notion of a ne- 
 cessary being. 
 
 Proposition. — From the existence of a necessary 
 being ive conclude that God exists. 
 
 Argument: God exists if there is a necessary be- 
 ing ; but such is the case ; therefore God exists. 
 
 Proof: There is a necessary being. For, among 
 the beings now existing, either there is a necessary 
 being or all beings are contingent. But this latter 
 supposition cannot be true ; for, if all existing beings 
 are contingent they must have received their exist- 
 ence from another being : but it cannot be that all 
 
METAPHYSICS. 107 
 
 existing beings have received their existence, for, if 
 they had, they must have received it from a being 
 taken either outside or inside the collection of existing 
 beings : but neither of these suppositions can be trne ; 
 for, since none but contingent, beings exist, the be- 
 ing upon which they depend cannot be taken out- 
 side of them ; and it cannot be taken from inside 
 their collection, for then it would be both contingent 
 and non-contingent ; it would be cause and effect, 
 prior and posterior to itself, which is a contradiction : 
 there must therefore be a beins; which is not contin- 
 gent, that is, a necessary being. 
 
 Conclusion. — The necessary being is infinite. It 
 is infinite if it has all the perfections, existing or 
 possible, of all existing or possible beings ; but such 
 is the case : for all contingent beings come from the 
 necessary being ; but perfections are modifications 
 of beings ; hence, all perfections existing in contin- 
 gent beings come from the necessary being : this 
 necessary being must have all possible perfections 
 also, for otherwise these perfections would be pos- 
 sible and not possible at the same time. Therefore 
 the necessary being is the infinite, and the infinite 
 is God. 
 
 Second argument, taken from the idea of Gfod. 
 
 Proposition. — From the idea of God ive conclude 
 that God exists. 
 
 Argument : From the idea of God we . conclude 
 that God exists, if we have really that idea, and if 
 that idea is necessarily connected with- the actual 
 existence of God. But such is the case ; hence, from 
 the idea of God we conclude that God exists. 
 
108 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 Proof: 1st. We hare the idea of God, that is, of 
 a heing infinitely perfect : this idea is clear in our 
 mind, and distinct from any other notion. 
 
 2nd. The actual existence of God is necessarily 
 connected with the idea of God ; for if not we might 
 conceive him as possible only, but we cannot con- 
 ceive God as merely possible. "We cannot conceive 
 a being without its essence ; the essence of God'is 
 to be : we cannot therefore conceive God except as 
 actually existing. Hence, the idea which we have 
 of God is necessarily connected with the existence of 
 God ; and, consequently, from the idea of God we 
 conclude that God exists. 
 
 Third argument, taken from the idea of the in- 
 finite. 
 
 Proposition. — From the idea of the infinite toe con- 
 clude that God exists. 
 
 Argument : The infinite exists, and consequently 
 God exists, if we have the idea of the infinite ; but 
 such is the case ; hence, from the idea of the infinite 
 we conclude that God exists. 
 
 Proof: The idea of the infinite involves the exist- 
 ence of the infinite, since this idea can come but from 
 the infinite itself. 
 
 1st, The idea of the infinite cannot be given to us 
 by a finite being ; for, if so, we should have an effect 
 greater than its cause, which involves a contradic- 
 tion. 
 
 2nd. JS~o one can give what he has not ; hence, 
 the idea of the infinite comes from the infinite itself. 
 
 We have the idea of the infinite ; for, as in the 
 case of the idea of God, we perceive it ; it is clear 
 
METAPHYSICS, 109 
 
 and distinct in our mind. Hence, the idea of the 
 infinite involves the existence of the infinite., and 
 consequently, the existence of God. 
 
 Article Second.— Physical Argument. 
 
 The physical argument is taken from the aspect 
 of the universe, and the "beautiful order found there- 
 in. The Atheists pretend that the world was made 
 by chance, and Epicurus embodied this system in 
 the following manner: From all eternity an im- 
 mense vacuum existed, and in this vacuum matter 
 was found to have existed from all eternity. This 
 matter was not found collected in one mass, but 
 divided into its primitive atoms. To these atoms 
 Epicurus gives the following properties : They had 
 various forms ; they were eternal and necessary ; 
 they were indivisible on account of their extreme 
 hardness ; they moved in the vacuum in straight 
 lines. It happened that some of these atoms devi- 
 ated from the straight lines and adhered to other 
 atoms, thus forming various bodies, until gradually 
 the world resulted from this disorder. 
 
 We may observe that these principles are quite 
 arbitrary ; and that, our definitions of the words 
 necessary and infinite being accepted, these same 
 principles are also absurd and contradictory. Besides, 
 the consequences are false ; for, from our definition of 
 the necessary being, it follows, that the world has 
 been created, and created by G-od ; while, from the 
 system of Epicurus, it follows, that the order of har- 
 mony, the conservation and reproduction of material 
 beings, are merely the result of the deviations of atoms 
 
110 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 wandering in a vacuum, in which an infinite matter 
 is found. Who does not smile at such incoherencies ! 
 It is needless to say more of this system. Let us 
 come to our argument, and establish the following 
 
 Proposition. — The order of the physical world indi- 
 rectly proves the existence of God. 
 
 Argument: This proposition is true provided 
 there is order in the physical world, and that this 
 order comes from a being of supreme intelligence ; 
 but such is the case, and consequently the order of 
 the physical world proves the existence of God. 
 
 Proof. — A. Order is found in the physical world. 
 The parts which constitute the physical world are 
 the planetary and stellar systems, and the two-fold 
 kingdom of nature, the inorganic and the organic. 
 In the inorganic it will be sufficient to point out the 
 atmosphere ; while in the organic we have the vege- 
 table and the animal creation. In all these we find 
 a beautiful order ; that is, the most suitable dispo- 
 sition of means for the end in view. 
 
 B. This order comes from a being of supreme in- 
 telligence. This assertion is true, provided (a) the 
 author of this order is a being distinct from matter 
 and endowed with intelligence ; and provided (b) 
 the cause of this order infinitely surpasses the human 
 mind in intelligence. As both of these are true, it 
 follows that this order comes from a being of supreme 
 intelligence. 
 
 (a) That the cause is intelligent and distinct from 
 matter appears from this ; Order is a disposition of 
 the means necessary to reach an end ; consequently, 
 the author of this order must be able to know both 
 
METAPHYSICS. Ill 
 
 the end and the means necessary to reach it ; it 
 must then be an immaterial and intelligent cause, 
 since matter is inert, blind and void of intelligence. 
 
 (b) This cause infinitely surpasses the human mind 
 in intelligence. All admit that the order found in 
 the works of nature is far superior to anything pro- 
 duced by the human mind. This order is so perfect 
 that the human mind has never been able to dis- 
 cover all its perfections ; new wonders are found 
 every day, while many more escape the most inge- 
 nious researches. Hence it appears that this intel- 
 ligent cause immeasurably surpasses the human 
 mind, and therefore it must be God. 
 
 This argument destroys the system of Epicurus, 
 since it proves that the order of the universe does 
 not spring from chance, that is, from a blind cause ; 
 it also overturns the system of the Pantheists, who 
 pretend that God is not distinct from matter : but 
 it does not absolutely prove the existence of God, 
 that is, it does not prove that the intelligence that 
 formed the universe is infinite, but only that it im- 
 measurably surpasses mere human intelligence. 
 
 Note. — From what has been said, we may con- 
 clude that matter is contingent and consequently 
 that it has been created ; hence, its existence proves 
 that of a creator. Matter, we have further seen, is 
 inert ; and we may conceive it as existing without 
 motion : hence, motion is not a necessary quality of 
 matter, and as motion exists, we conclude that there 
 has been a prime mover. These observations will 
 supply the^ means of answering the objection raised 
 against the creation from the axiom ex nihilo nihil 
 
112 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 fit. If "nihilo" here means a cause, the axiom is 
 true ; but if the axiom means that what was merely 
 possible may not become actual, it is false. 
 
 Article Third. — Moral Argument; 
 
 Amoral proof is one drawn from some fact that 
 belongs to the moral nature of man ; that is, a fact 
 based on the propensities or opinions which are com- 
 mon to all men. Such proof produces in the mind 
 a certitude not less than that resulting from meta- 
 physical or physical proofs. Hence, the certitude 
 resulting from a moral argument ought not to be 
 confounded with what is called moral certitude, a 
 term which often signified nothing more than prob- 
 ability. 
 
 First argument, taken from the common consent 
 of mankind. 
 
 Proposition. — From the unanimous consent of man- 
 kind, if follows that God exists. 
 
 Argument : If at all times and among all nations 
 men have believed in the existence of God, we may 
 conclude that God does exist. But there has always 
 and among all nations been such a belief. Hence, 
 the unanimous consent of mankind proves the exist- 
 ence of God. 
 
 Proof: The fact may be established as follows : 
 we may know that all peoples have at all time be- 
 lieved in the existence of God, if we find everywhere 
 and in all ages prayers, temples, altars, sacrifices 
 and religious rites. But this fact is abundantly 
 proved for ancient times by all the writers, sacred 
 or profane, who deserve our confidence. The fact 
 
METAPHYSICS. 113 
 
 is as clearly evident for our own times, from the tes- 
 timony of numberless travelers and writers. No 
 nation, civilized and enlightened, or barbarous and 
 savage, has been found where some form of worship 
 could not be discovered. 
 
 This consent is universal, uniform, and constant, 
 and no one denies that the fact to which it testifies 
 is of the greatest importance ; consequently this tes- 
 timony has all the conditions required in the treatise 
 on certitude to constitute an infallible motive of cer- 
 titude. Therefore God exists. 
 
 This proof is complete, and allows us to conclude 
 the existence of an infinite being ; because such is 
 the notion, although sometimes obscure, which is 
 found in the minds of all people concerning God. 
 
 Second argument, taken from the existence of the 
 natural law. 
 
 Proposition. — The existence of the natural law 
 proves the existence of God. 
 
 Argument : God exists if there is a natural law, 
 but there is a natural law, hence He exists. 
 
 Proof: The natural law is that rule, commanding 
 ' what is right and forbidding what is wrong, which 
 is found in the conscience of every man. Since it is 
 found in all men, it is the voice of truth, that is, 
 the voice of God. But there is no law without a 
 legislator ; and since the natural law is implanted 
 in the hearts of ail men the legislator must be prior 
 to man and superior to him, that is God. 
 
114 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 PAST SECOND.— THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 
 
 An attribute is a quality declared to "belong to a 
 being ; and as perfection is an attribute which it is 
 better to have than not to have, it follows that all 
 the attributes of God are perfect ; hence, to speak of 
 the attributes of G-od is the same as to speak of his 
 perfections. 
 
 Perfections are absolute when they exclude any 
 limitation, and relative when they admit some lim- 
 itation. The first are found in God alone, and the 
 others in the creation ; but God necessarily possesses 
 all absolute perfections formally, that is, as they are, 
 and all relative perfections modo eminenti in an em- 
 inent manner. 
 
 Concerning the question as to which is the pri- 
 mary attribute of God, we find four opinions. Some 
 say that it is his unity, that is, his existence by 
 himself. The Thomists contend that God is first 
 an eminent and actual intelligence ; while the Scotists 
 declare that his primary attribute is his infinity ; 
 but in all these opinions we have conceptions of God 
 considered in reference to the creation ; these con- 
 ceptions must consequently be posterior, logically 
 speaking, to the conception of his being, or of his 
 existence : the fourth opinion, therefore, according 
 to which, logically speaking, the primary attribute 
 of God is u to be simply," would seem to be more 
 satisfactory. 
 
 The attributes of God are divided into two classes, 
 relative and absolute. The relative attributes are 
 those which are proper to each of the three persons 
 
METAPHYSICS. 115 
 
 of the Holy Trinity : the discussion of these belongs 
 to theology. The absolute attributes are those 
 which belong to the divine essence. 
 
 As we have said, God is a simple substance ; the 
 assertion of the contrary would involve a contradic- 
 tion. The difficulty then is to explain these attri- 
 butes of God. Is the distinction given above real, 
 or logical, that is, virtual only ? Is it real ; that is, 
 does there exist in God the same distinction of attri- 
 butes as there exists in the human soul between the 
 will and the intellect ? or, is this distinction virtual 
 only, that is, the result of the action or manifesta- 
 tion of God's attributes, appearing to us as if there 
 was a real distinction in them? 
 
 The Scotists teach that there is a real distinction 
 among God's attributes, and the Thomists affirm 
 the contrary. The doctrine of the Thomists certain- 
 ly offers less difficulty in reasoning on this myste- 
 rious question. St. Augustine, before St. Thomas, 
 gave the second opinion as his own. "No," says 
 he, " there is no real distinction among the attributes 
 of God ; but it is the essence of God which is, at the 
 same time, most simple and most manifold, being a 
 simple multiplicity and a multiple simplicity." It 
 must be confessed that these antitheses do not throw 
 any light on the subject. 
 
 We shall divide this question concerning the 
 attributes of God into thirteen chapters ; treating 
 successively of his unity, his eternity, his immuta- 
 bility, his liberty, his independence and omnipo- 
 tence, his simplicity, his immensity, his intelligence 
 and knowledge, his wisdom, his sanctity and truth, 
 
116 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 his goodness and happiness, his justice, and his 
 providence. 
 
 CHAPTEE FIKST. 
 
 Of the Unity of God. 
 
 This attribute of God has been denied by the 
 Polytheists and by the Manicheans. The Poly- 
 theists admitted a plurality or multiplicity of gods, 
 while the Manicheans affirmed that there are two 
 principles of all things, one bad, who is the origi- 
 nator of all evil, and the other good, who is of course 
 the cause of all good. In order to proceed method- 
 ically, let us divide the present chapter into three 
 articles. 
 
 Article First. — The Unity of God Proved Against 
 the Polytheists. 
 
 The forms of Polytheism have been manifold; 
 being denominated Demonolatry, or worship of 
 demons, Anthropolatry, or worship of men, Herol- 
 atry, or worship of heroes, Zoolatry, or worship of 
 animals, Idolatry, or worship of idols or statues, and 
 Fetichism, or worship of objects having no deter- 
 mined form. 
 
 It is impossible to find out exactly when Polythe- 
 ism made its first appearance in the world ; but it is 
 certain that it has never been general, that, besides 
 the philosophers, the generality of the people had 
 some idea, though a confused one, of the unity of 
 God. It is certain, moreover, that Monotheism was 
 prior to it, contrary to the teaching of some writers 
 
METAPHYSICS. 117 
 
 who pretend that Christianity- is hut a phase of Poly- 
 theism. It is clear also that Polytheism did not 
 grow more perfect in the course of time, but it 
 degenerated and engendered general corruption, 
 placing the world on the verge of an abyss, so that, 
 according to the opinion of Bossuet, the world would 
 have relapsed into chaos again if Jesus Christ had 
 not come to save it. It has been asked whether 
 Polytheism sprang from the will or from the intel- 
 lect. We may accept as the true opinion that 
 Polytheism originated mainly from the corruption 
 of the will. 
 
 Against the Polytheists we proceed to establish 
 the following 
 
 Proposition. — God is one. 
 
 1st. We have shown that God is a necessary be- 
 ing, or a being simply, that is, one who has in him- 
 self the whole fullness of being, or existence. He 
 cannot therefore be multiple ; for if there were any 
 being or a plenitude of being extrinsic to him it 
 could not be said that he possesses the whole fullness 
 of being. 
 
 2nd. The necessary being is infinite ; that is, the 
 necessary being excludes any limitation: hence he 
 is one, otherwise there would be limitation. 
 
 3d. The unity of harmony which is found in the 
 creation shows that its author and preserver is one. 
 
 4th. We may add to the above reasons the con- 
 sent of nations ; for it may be clearly demonstrated 
 that the Pagans themselves admitted the unity of 
 
118 metaphysics. 
 
 Article Secoxd. — The Unity of God Proved 
 Against the Dualists. 
 
 We find among the Semitic races, especially in 
 Egypt and Persia, a belief in the existence of two 
 first principles, one the principle of matter, and the 
 other the principle of spirit. This Dualism is not 
 that which we propose to examine in this article, 
 hut rather that which was put forth hr llanes in the 
 second and third centuries of the Christian era, and 
 revived hy Bayle in the seventeenth century. These 
 men taught that all evil 'comes from the had prin- 
 ciple and all good from the good principle ; hut their 
 doctrine cannot he accepted, for, 
 
 1st. God is one — there cannot he two necessary 
 "beings. The necessary heing is infinite ; the infinite 
 "being contains the fullness of heing or existence : 
 he cannot therefore he multiple ; and hence he is 
 one. 
 
 2nd. Of these two "beings one would he infinitely 
 perfect and the other infinitely imperfect ; but im- 
 perfection is a negation, that is nothing ; hence the 
 principle of evil would he infinitely nothing, which 
 is an absurdity. 
 
 3d. Laying aside the former considerations, 
 neither of these beings would be omnipotent, and 
 neither would be happy, unless they made an agree- 
 ment with each other concerning all things which 
 should be clone, and then we should have fatalism, 
 that is, human liberty would be annihilated. 
 
 4th. In conclusion, we will say that this system 
 is not necessary in order to explain any difficulties 
 in the mechanism of the world. 
 
metaphysics. 119 
 
 Article Third. — The Origin of Evil Under a 
 Being Infinitely Good. 
 
 It is true that it appears difficult to explain the 
 origin of evil under a being infinitely good ; still we 
 cannot reject the unity of God on account of this, for 
 that truth has been established. 
 
 Let us then make a few considerations concerning 
 this question of the origin of evil. The evil in the 
 world is three-fold. 
 
 1st. The evil which is called metaphysical consists 
 in this, that God has granted more or less perfec- 
 tions to his creatures. It is plain that there is no 
 disorder in this ; it is even necessary as the source of 
 order, for this very variety while harmoniously dis- 
 posed constitutes the foundation of that beauty and 
 order in the moral world which excites our admira- 
 tion. It is the principle of society, the source of 
 heroism and the origin of all the virtues. 
 
 2nd. Physical evil consists of the pains which 
 afflict the human body in many ways. These are the 
 consequences of the actual condition of man ; and it 
 derogates nothing from the perfections of God, that, 
 though infinitely good, he has established this con- 
 dition. For it may be demonstrated that the good 
 is greater than the evil, even from this physical 
 point of view, as is evident from the fact that there 
 is no one who does not prefer to live rather than to 
 die. Besides, these evils are the source of moral good 
 to many, and thus become the occasion of eternal 
 happiness : the greatest virtues have their origin in 
 the existence of these evils or pains. Moreover, we 
 
120 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 know that physical pains are often the result of moral 
 evil. 
 
 In a Christian sense the evil does not exist, hut as 
 punishment ; original sin explains everything ; hut 
 in this work we consider the question philosophi- 
 cally. 
 
 3d. Moral evil is sin. God was not obliged to 
 prevent sin for these reasons : 
 
 (a) Not on account of Ms sanctity or holiness : God 
 is holy if he be not sullied with sin and if he hate 
 it ; hut such is the case. 
 
 (b) Not on account of Ms justice : God is just if he 
 have established man in a condition good in itself, 
 and if he do not punish him unjustly ; but such is- 
 the case. 
 
 (c) Not on account of Ms goodness : God is good if 
 he have granted to man liberty, which is good both in 
 itself and in the intention of God ; but such is the 
 case. 
 
 (d) Not on account of Ms ivisdom: God is wise if 
 he have done nothing but for a good end, and have 
 chosen the best means to reach that end ; but such 
 is the case. He proposed to reward the virtues of 
 men, and gave them the most efficacious means that 
 they might not abuse their liberty. 
 
 The objections to our arguments are taken from 
 the fact of God's foreseeing the abuse which men 
 would make of the liberty he gave them. The prin- 
 ciples for refuting these objections are as follows : 
 The intention of God was good, the gift was good, the 
 foresight of God had no influence on human liberty, 
 God helps human weakness, and, finally, all'agree 
 hat existence, as it is, is better than non-existence. 
 
METAPHYSICS. 121 
 
 CHAPTEE SECOND. 
 
 Of the Eternity of God. 
 
 Proposition. — God is eternal. 
 
 Argument : God is eternal if he be necessary, but 
 God is necessary ; then he is eternal. 
 
 Proof: We have already proved that God is ne- 
 cessary. A necessary being is one whose essence it 
 is to be; and, since we cannot conceive a being with- 
 out its essence, the necessary being must always 
 have been : hence he is eternal. 
 
 If the necessary being were not eternal he would 
 have been produced by another being, for he could 
 not have produced himself, that is, he Avould be 
 contingent ; but we have proved that God is the 
 necessary being, he is then eternal. 
 
 Several authors have considered the question 
 whether there is succession in the eternity of God. 
 We have seen that the necessary being is infinite, 
 but infinity and succession in the same being in- 
 volve a contradiction. Succession is composed of 
 moments added to one another, each of course being 
 limited ; but the infinite excludes limitation, while 
 succession includes series, a series being a collection 
 of finite beings : hence, the infinite and series, or 
 succession, are terms involving a contradiction. The 
 eternity of God is therefore not successive, but sim- 
 ple, like his own being. God is. For him, there 
 is neither past nor future, but all is present : his 
 essence is to be. 
 
 6 
 
122 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 CHAPTEK THIRD. 
 Of the Immutability of God. 
 
 Proposition. — God is immutable. 
 
 Argument : God is immutable if immutability can 
 be ascribed only to contingent beings, but such is 
 the case, and hence God is immutable. 
 
 Proof: Mutation is the transition from one condi- 
 tion to another, consequently the transition from 
 the possible to the real : hence mutation can be 
 applied only to contingent beings, and the infinite 
 and the mutable are terms involving a contradiction. 
 
 In God everything is infinite ; hence nothing can 
 be changed, either in his perfections or his decrees ; 
 there can be in him nothing which is contingent. 
 God is then immutable. 
 
 In order to solve the objections which are advanced 
 against this attribute of God, let it be remembered 
 that in God there is neither past nor future. These 
 words cannot be applied to God, to whom everything 
 is present. 
 
 CHAPTER FOURTH. 
 
 Of the Liberty of God. 
 
 Liberty is the power of choosing. The object of 
 liberty is either an act which brings to its author 
 some perfection or imperfection, or else an act which 
 brings to him neither perfection nor imperfection : 
 hence we see that the object of liberty is within the 
 limits of what is good. 
 
 Liberty may be considered as freedom either from 
 
METAPHYSICS. 123 
 
 external force, otherwise called freedom from coac- 
 tion ; or as freedom from necessity, otherwise called 
 freedom of election. 
 
 The acts may also be either exterior or interior. 
 For God, the interior acts are those whose object is 
 himself. 
 
 Evidently God is free from coaction ; but, in his 
 interior acts, he is not free from necessity. 
 
 The liberty of God has been attacked by the Pan- 
 theists, who, admitting only one substance, make 
 every phenomenon a necessary modification of God ; 
 and also by the Optimists, but these deny God's 
 liberty only indirectly. 
 
 We shall divide this chapter into three articles : 
 in the first we shall demonstrate the fact of the liberty 
 of God ; in the second we shall explain and refute the 
 doctrine of the Pantheists ; and in the third that of 
 the Optimists. 
 
 Article First. — The Existence of the Liberty of 
 God. 
 
 Proposition — God is free in liis exterior acts. 
 
 Argument : God is free if liberty is a perfection, 
 and if no cause could have compelled him to create 
 from necessity, but such is the case, and therefore 
 he is free in his exterior acts. 
 
 Proof : Liberty is a perfection ; for a being who is 
 free, is independent in his acts and the supreme 
 arbiter of what he does ; and independence is better 
 than dependence^ and consequently an absolute per- 
 fection ; but God being infinite possesses infinitely 
 all absolute perfections ; hence he is free. 
 
124 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 God possesses infinitely all the perfections which, 
 are found in his creatures ; but we are free, and there- 
 fore he must be free. 
 
 No cause could have obliged God to create from 
 necessity : neither his happiness nor his glory, for in 
 these he suffices for himself; nor his internal perfec- 
 tions, for if this were so we should conclude that 
 God, considered in his essence, is not infinitely per- 
 fect, but certainly this would be untrue. 
 
 It appears difficult to reconcile the immutability 
 of God with his liberty. Three systems have been 
 formed for this purjDose, but they are not satisfactory. 
 It is enough for us that both attributes have been 
 proved to exist in God: the "difficulties spoken of 
 only serve to show the weakness of human reason. 
 
 Article Second.— Pantheism. 
 
 Pantheism is the system of those who admit the 
 existence of but one substance, which substance, ac- 
 cording to them, is infinite. Hence, the Pantheists 
 agree with the Atheists in making matter exist from 
 necessity, and consequently in making it eternal and 
 infinite. 
 
 The doctrines of Pantheism may be reduced to 
 these three heads : First, what exists, exists from 
 necessity ; second, what exists forms one substance ; 
 and, third, this one substance is infinite. 
 
 The above principles are evidently false : For, in 
 the first place, it has been proved that there is but 
 one necessary being ; and that we are contingent, 
 since we have received our existence. Secondly, 
 there is a multiplicity of substances in the world, if, 
 
METAPHYSICS. 125 
 
 for instance, there exists an essential difference 
 between my soul and the bodies around me. Again, 
 if there were but one substance, this substance would 
 be either material or spiritual, or at the same time 
 both spiritual and material ; but certainly all the 
 substances in the world are not spiritual only, or 
 material only, nor are they at the same time both 
 spiritual and material, for this would be a contra- 
 diction. Thirdly, as the infinite is simple, that is, 
 not composed of parts, it is clear that matter cannot 
 be infinite. 
 
 The doctrine of Pantheism is pernicious in its 
 consequences, for these reasons: 1st. It takes away 
 all obligation and sanction from the moral laws, 
 since according to this system there is no superior 
 being. We speak thus absolutely, although the 
 Pantheist will say that conventions may be held 
 and their decisions accepted for the sake of peace : 
 we all know that no convention not approved of God 
 can ever find the human conscience. 2nd. Panthe- 
 ism destroys man's liberty, and consequently takes 
 from him all responsibility for his actions ; for if 
 matter be necessary so also are its volitions or 
 modifications, the actions of men, according to the 
 Pantheists, being but modifications of the one neces- 
 sary substance. 3d. Pantheism would oblige us 
 to admit logically certain consequences which are 
 evidently absurd ; as, for instance, that God is a 
 stone, a plant, or a beast. 
 
 Pantheism was taught among the ancients, in the 
 Eleatic school ; and, indirectly, by some writers of 
 the middle ages. But the doctrine which we have 
 
126 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 explained is modern pantheism., as reduced to a sys- 
 tem by Spinosa, a Jew, of Amsterdam, Holland. 
 
 Pantheism has been taught also in Germany, by 
 Kant, Fichte, Hegel, &c. All those writers insist 
 upon the unity of substance ; there is according to 
 them no distinction except a logical one, between the 
 ego and the non-ego ("me " and il not me") that is, 
 there is but a logical, and not a real, distinction be- 
 tween the subjective and the objective. This doc- 
 trine of Spinosa and the German philosophers is based 
 upon the following definition of substance, which is 
 ambiguous ; ' ' Substance is that which is in se (in 
 itself) , and which is conceived to exist by itself ; that 
 is, it is that of which we may conceive ; without con- 
 ceiving of some other being by which it might have 
 been formed." Evidently there is here an allusion 
 to the modification, which does not exist indepen- 
 dently of the substance, and which presupposes sub- 
 stance in order that it should exist itself. 
 
 Pantheism is the doctrine of the French Commu- 
 nists, called Saint Simonists, Phalansteriens, Four- 
 ierists, &c. ; and it is notorious what calamities have 
 lately resulted from their doctrine in Europe, and 
 especially in France. 
 
 Article Third. — Optimism. 
 
 Optimism is a system originated by Mallebranche 
 and Leibnitz, in order to vindicate the providence of 
 God and to refute the objections of Bayle and others 
 against the goodness of God on account of the evil 
 which exists in the world. Both Leibnitz and Mal- 
 lebranche admit the existence of evil ; but according 
 
METAPHYSICS. 127 
 
 to them the evil is necessary for the perfection of the 
 universe, and does not detract from this perfection. 
 According to Mallebranche, God was free to create, 
 and could consequently have refrained from creating. 
 He was also free to choose among several worlds 
 equally perfect that which he wished to form ; but, 
 owing to the perfections of his attributes, he was 
 not free to choose a less perfect world, rejecting 
 others more perfect. 
 
 According to Leibnitz, God, on account of his 
 wisdom and goodness, was not free not to create, nor 
 was he free to create any but the most perfect world. 
 God could not even choose among several worlds 
 unequally perfect, taking one in preference to an- 
 other. Still, even when God acts according to what 
 is absolutely required by his attributes, he remains 
 free. 
 
 Both systems must be rejected, first, because they 
 destroy, at least indirectly, the liberty of God, 
 notwithstanding the contrary assertion of both phil- 
 osophers. They must also be rejected because they 
 assume that the ultimate reason for the exterior acts 
 of God is the goodness of the object of these acts ; 
 while, in fact, this ultimate reason for God's exte- 
 rior acts is his own will, for which reason he may 
 choose -a less perfect object in preference to a more 
 perfect one, if he wills it, provided this choice be not 
 in derogation of any of his attributes. 
 
 Thirdly, their system must be rejected because its 
 assertion that God was obliged to create the most 
 perfect world involves an impossibility : for the most 
 perfect world would be one of such perfection that 
 
128 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 none more perfect could be imagined ; but the per- 
 fection of the world could never be such that a more 
 perfect one might not be imagined ; for however 
 perfect it might become, it would still be finite, that 
 is limited ; and what is limited is capable of increase, 
 that is, it is imperfect : hence, the most perfect world 
 must be infinite in perfection, which is an impossi- 
 bility. The systems of Mallebranche and Leibnitz 
 must therefore be rejected. 
 
 CHAPTER FIFTH. 
 Of the Omnipotence and Independence of God. 
 
 1st. Omnipotence is the power of producing, or of 
 bringing into existence, that which is merely possi- 
 ble. By what is possible, we mean that which does 
 not exist, but the idea of which involves no contra- 
 diction. 
 
 Proposition. — God is omnipotent . 
 
 Argument : God is omnipotent if he can do what- 
 ever is possible ; but such is the case, and hence he 
 is omnipotent. 
 
 Proof : God can do whatever is possible : for either 
 he has this infinite power, or else he can do nothing 
 or only something ; but the latter supposition cannot 
 be correct, since, if it were so, God's power would 
 not be so great as we may conceive it to be, and 
 consequently not infinite. But he is infinite, and 
 hence he can do everything which is possible : he is 
 therefore omnipotent. 
 
 Xote. — It is evident that God cannot do what is 
 impossible ; for instance, he could not make a square 
 
METAPHYSICS. 129 
 
 circle, because that involves a contradiction : the 
 essence of a circle is roundness, and no being can 
 have an essence other than its own ; for, if it could, 
 the being would both be and not be at the same 
 time. 
 
 It is also plain that God cannot make what is 
 infinite ; for, if so, the infinite would have a begin- 
 ning, that is a limitation, but the infinite has no 
 limitation, no beginning, hence it cannot be pro- 
 duced by God. 
 
 2nd. Proposition. — God is infinitely independent. 
 
 Argument : God is infinitely independent if he 
 depends on no one for his existence, or for the mode 
 of that existence ; but such is the case, and therefore 
 he is infinitely independent. 
 
 Proof: Independence consists in this, that the 
 being who is independent depends on no one for his 
 existence, or for the mode of that existence. Such 
 is the case in regard to God. We have demon- 
 strated that he exists in himself (a se); hence he 
 depends on no one for his existence. The second 
 part is but a corollary of the first ; for if God depends 
 on no onefor his existence he is equally independent 
 as to the mode of that existence, since the mode, or 
 modification, necessarily follows the substance. 
 
 CHAPTER SIXTH. 
 
 Of the Simplicity of God. 
 
 This attribute of. God has been denied by the 
 Polytheists, the Pantheists, the Materialists and 
 the Anthropomorphites. These last were heretics 
 
130 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 of the fourth, century who, taking the words of 
 Scripture in a literal sense, maintained that God 
 has eyes, mouth, hands, &c. 
 
 Proposition. — God is Simple. 
 
 Argument : God is simple if he is infinite ; but 
 he is infinite, hence he is simple. 
 
 Proof: If God is not simple he is composed of 
 parts ; and these parts cannot be infinite, but must 
 be finite. But God himself is infinite, and we can- 
 not admit that a compound of finite parts, the es- 
 sence of which is to be limited, can constitute a being 
 which is infinite, or the essence of which is to be 
 unlimited. Hence, God is simple ; and hence, also, 
 he is not corporeal. This latter conclusion is against 
 the Anthropomorphites. 
 
 CHAPTEE SEVENTH. 
 Of the Immensity of God. 
 
 We call that immense which cannot be measured. 
 The immensity of God is that attribute by virtue of 
 which his presence cannot be limited, or by virtue 
 of which he is present to everything that exists : 
 hence, immensity means the same as omnipresence ; 
 and, since God is an intelligence, he is omnipresent 
 not only by his knowledge and operations, but also 
 in his Substance. 
 
 Proposition. — God is Immense. 
 
 Argument : God is immense if he is infinite ; 
 but he is infinite, hence he is immense. 
 
 Proof: We have shown that God is infinite, that 
 is, that he is without any limitation : hence, accord- 
 
-METAPHYSICS. 131 
 
 ing to the definition, he is immense. He is there- 
 fore substantially present everywhere. 
 
 Note. — This substantial immensity of God is not 
 of course a corporeal presence, but a spiritual one, 
 since G-od is infinitely simple ; for the same reason, 
 although God is whole in each part of space, still 
 his substance is not multiple. Finally, we may say 
 correctly that God is everywhere and also that he is 
 nowhere : in saying that he is nowhere, we mean 
 that he does not occupy a limited point of space, 
 or a space of certain distance or dimensions, as 
 creatures do. Here again we meet with a difficulty 
 in explaining how God can be simple and immense 
 at the same time ; but we have shown that he 
 possesses both these attributes, and that they do not 
 involve any contradiction. 
 
 CHAPTER EIGHTH. 
 
 Of the Knowledge of God. 
 
 Men before knowing must conceive, judge and 
 reason ; but such is not the case in regard to the 
 knowledge of God. He knows, or rather sees, 
 everything. All philosophers admit, first, that 
 God alone knows himself perfectly ; second, that 
 everything past is present to him, for otherwise his 
 immutability would be destroyed ; third, that every- 
 thing present, even the most secret things are 
 known to him ; fourth, that he knows everything 
 which is possible and that he realizes those same 
 things ; and, fifth, that he knows all future things 
 which are necessary, that is, which flow necessarily 
 from the laws established by him. 
 
132 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 In regard to those future things which are called 
 contingent, that is, those things which may happen, 
 but which are dependent on the free choice of men, 
 Cicero and many other pagan writers, and after- 
 wards the Socinians, as well as certain modern 
 theorists, have maintained that God has only a 
 contingent knowledge. 
 
 But it is certain that God knows all future things, 
 even those which are conditional and contingent ; 
 and this may he proved in the following manner : 
 
 1st. God is immutable ; hence he knows every- 
 thing, for otherwise he might acquire knowledge, 
 and consequently change. 
 
 2nd. God is infinite. But if God did not know 
 everything we might conceive a being more perfect 
 than God, and this would destroy his infinity. 
 
 3d. God is eternal. Eternity is the permanence 
 of existence, or being. Eternity is one and simple, 
 and we have proved that it cannot be successive ; 
 consequently, such words as ""prevision," "'pre- 
 science/' and "conjecture," are inaccurate when 
 applied to the eternal being, that is, to God. God 
 is, and, consequently, knows ; and neither in his 
 being nor in his knowing can there be any limita- 
 tion, any priority or posteriority. 
 
 4th. All mankind have ever been convinced of 
 this truth. 
 
 The scholastics have asked in what way it is that 
 God sees all things, and what is the character of 
 his knowledge. All admit that it is more perfect 
 to know a thing directly than indirectly, or to see 
 a thing in itself, that is, in its essence, rather than 
 
METAPHYSICS. 133 
 
 in a being distinct from the thing. Hence it follows 
 that God sees himself, and all possible things, as 
 well as all future necessary things, in their own 
 essence. 
 
 St. Thomas says that God also sees future free 
 and contingent things in their essence, that is, that 
 he sees them in his eternal and immutable decrees ; 
 for nothing, even a free action, happens except by a 
 decree of God, in such a way that in our free actions 
 God is an efficient cause. But Molina and his dis- 
 ciples contend that with such a system it is impos- 
 sible to defend human liberty ; and they say that 
 God sees the future as contingent on the free deter- 
 minations of his creatures. We can accept either 
 system. 
 
 In order to answer objections to the foreknowledge 
 of God, we have but to remember the words of St. 
 Jerome : " The actions of men foreseen by God do 
 not happen because God foresees them, but God 
 foresees them because they are going to happen." 
 
 CHAPTER NINTH. 
 
 Of the Wisdom of God. 
 
 Wisdom is that attribute according to which a 
 being proposes to himself a good end and takes the 
 most proper means to reach that end ; but God has 
 this attribute, for, first, he is infinitely perfect, 
 second, the order existing in the world proclaims 
 his wisdom, and, third, we have shown that God 
 possesses in an eminent degree all the perfections 
 found in his creatures. 
 
134 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 CHAPTEE TENTH. 
 
 Or the Sanctity and Veracity op God. 
 
 Sanctity consists in the love of what is good and 
 the hatred of what is evil : it is evident that such 
 an attribute must he found in a being who is infi- 
 nitely perfect. 
 
 Yeracity consists in this, that a being can neither 
 deceive nor be deceived : God being holy cannot 
 deceive, and having a knowledge which is infinite, 
 he cannot be deceived. 
 
 CHAPTEE ELEVENTH. 
 
 Oe the Goodness and Happiness of God. 
 
 Goodness, or benignity, is that attribute by which 
 a being is inclined to do good to others gratuitously. 
 Evidently such an attribute is a perfection, and con- 
 sequently it is an attribute of God. This all men 
 in all ages have believed: God has always been 
 called Deus optimus maximus. u God very good 
 and very great." To the goodness of God we must 
 refer his mercy, which is rather an attribute in a 
 theological sense., but which is also infinite. 
 
 Happiness consists in the enjoyment of the good 
 and the absence of the evil : but God being inde- 
 pendent cannot be subject to evil, and being infi- 
 nitely perfect he must possess and of course enjoy 
 all good. Hence God is infinitely good and infi- 
 nitely happy. 
 
METAPHYSICS. 135 
 
 CHAPTER TWELFTH. 
 
 Of the Justice of God. 
 
 Justice is the attribute according to which, we 
 give to others what belongs to them. God of course 
 possesses this attribute, for if he did not act thus, 
 he would not be equitable, and consequently not in- 
 finitely perfect. We might' here, if necessary, cite 
 the testimony of men ; but all agree on this point. 
 
 CHAPTER THIRTEENTH. 
 
 Oe the Providence of God. 
 
 . We divide this last Chapter on the Attributes of 
 God into two Articles. 
 
 Article First. — The Existence of Providence. 
 
 Providence is the care which God extends over 
 his creatures ; or, it is the action by which he directs 
 his creatures, either the reasonable or the unreason- 
 able, to the end which is proper, to each individu- 
 ally, and to all in general. 
 
 The Epicureans, the Stoics, who held the doctrine 
 of fatalism, and some modern philosophers contend- 
 ing, that God's providence would destroy man's 
 liberty, and that God is too great and too high to 
 take such care of us, deny the existence of provi- 
 dence. Against them we establish this 
 
 Proposition. — God 's providence exists and extends 
 to all things. 
 
 Argument : The existence of providence must be 
 accepted if it be required by those attributes of God 
 
136 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 which are believed by all, and which are necessary 
 in order to explain the order of the world ; but such 
 is the case, and hence providence does exist, and 
 must extend to all things. 
 
 Proof: 1st. All admit that it is good, that it is 
 a perfection, to take care of what we have produced ; 
 hence, God, who is infinitely perfect, must have this 
 perfection. 
 
 Providence is required by the wisdom and good- 
 ness of God. God's wisdom requires that he should 
 do what is necessary in order that his creatures may 
 reach the end he has designed for them ; and we are 
 so ignorant, so weak, and so wickedly disposed,, that 
 without providence we could not reach this end. 
 
 The goodness of God requires that he should do 
 what is necessary in order that we may obtain hap- 
 piness ; but we have just seen that without God's 
 providence we could not reach our end, hence we 
 could not be happy, and God would not be good : 
 but since God is good providence must exist. 
 
 2nd. All people, in all ages, and in all countries, 
 have believed in the existence of providence, as 
 might easily be shown by the testimony of Christian 
 and pagan writers ; and this testimony, so universal, 
 so uniform, so constant, and concerning such an im- 
 portant question, is a criterion of certitude : we may 
 therefore again conclude that providence exists. 
 
 3d. The constancy and uniformity of the effects, 
 or rather of the order perpetuated in the world, is 
 after all the most striking proof of the care which 
 God takes of his creatures : and if this argument is 
 so clear, and so generally confessed by every one, in 
 
METAPHYSICS. 137 
 
 regard to the physical world, a fortiori it is likewise 
 conclusive in regard to the moral world. 
 
 To these proofs we may add the following consid- 
 eration : Existence is something contingent to us, 
 since it does not belong to our essence ; consequently, 
 existence must be renewed at every instant of our 
 life. Then, in order that we may live, it is neces- 
 sary that God perpetuate, that is, renew at every 
 instant, the act of his will by which he created us. 
 Providence is therefore a continued creation ; and, 
 so far as God's will is concerned, it is a necessity. 
 But with God, to will and to act are the same ; hence 
 the action of God upon us during our life is con- 
 stant, and this is what we mean by his providence. 
 
 In order to answer the objections to this proposi- 
 tion, we have but to observe that the preservation 
 of his creatures does not injure the majesty of God 
 any more than their creation ; and that such care 
 cannot cause trouble or grief to God who is infinitely 
 happy and immutable. 
 
 Article Second. — Consequences of the Existence of 
 Providence in Regard to the Free Actions of 
 
 - Men. 
 
 From the definition given above, it follows that 
 God directs everything in the world towards its own 
 end ; and, consequently, that this action must have 
 some influence over the free actions of men. This 
 influence may be natural or supernatural. It is 
 natural when the actions are considered without 
 reference to future life, and supernatural when these 
 actions are considered with reference to future life. 
 
138 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 This supernatural influence is God's grace, a sub- 
 ject belonging to theology. 
 
 We have here to examine only the natural influ- 
 ence of God over the free actions of man. We shall 
 first consider whether this influence exists, and if so 
 what is its nature. 
 
 I. Does this influence of God exist ? 
 
 The existence of this influence has been denied 
 by several modern philosophers. But that the 
 influence does exist is certain, for (a) God is the 
 primary cause, and this attribute requires that 
 everything which is a perfection in the creature 
 should proceed from God ; but evidently the good 
 use of liberty is a perfection, nay, even the greatest 
 perfection in man, hence this good use proceeds from 
 God. Good use here signifies the free and right 
 determination of men, but under the influence of 
 God, since this way of acting, which is a perfection, 
 must proceed from him. 
 
 (b) We may here again bring forward the 'consent 
 of mankind. We all pray to God, that he may 
 guide us, correct us, help us, inspire us, &c. 
 
 Evidently, this influence takes place only for the 
 good use of liberty. In regard to its wrong use, 
 God cannot have an immediate, but only a mediate 
 influence on man's actions, in the sense that he has 
 granted liberty, of which a bad use is made against 
 his suggestions : his sanctity forbids that he should 
 act immediately in that case. 
 
 II. What is the nature of this influence? 
 
 The Molinists pretend that this influence is posi- 
 tive and direct, but not on our will, which it neither 
 
METAPHYSICS. 139 
 
 moves nor determines^ but simply helps, and with 
 which it acts in concurrence for the performance of 
 actions, so long as our will remains within the 
 limits of what is good. As this assistance consists 
 in affording a concourse of circumstances the most 
 suitable for the determination, the followers of this 
 system have been called Congruists. 
 
 The Thomists maintain that the above system too 
 much restrains the actions of God, who is the pri- 
 mary cause of everything which is a perfection in 
 his creatures ; and they contend that the influence 
 of providence is direct even upon the will, but how- 
 ever that Grod_, whose knowledge is infinite, keeps 
 human liberty always safe. 
 
 It seems difficult to conceive how man's liberty is 
 preserved, according to the system of the Thomists ; 
 and equally difficult to understand how the supreme 
 dominion of Grod is respected, according to the sys- 
 tem of the Molinists. 
 
 This question, like many others, occasioned by 
 the difficulty of explaining the attributes of Grod, 
 became the subject matter of many books, which 
 now, as Bouvier says, sleep in the dust, and the 
 question is not solved, and remains insoluble. 
 
 There are other opinions, and especially that of 
 St. Augustine, but they are rather theological than 
 philosophical, and consequently we shall omit them, 
 and here finish this treatise on Theodicy, which is 
 the first part of Pneumatology, or spiritual meta- 
 physics. 
 
140 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 THIRD DISSERTATION. 
 
 ON PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 The word Psychology is derived from the Greek 
 tpvxv' toyo$, and signifies a discourse upon the soul. 
 We may define this branch of pneumatology to be 
 the science which has for its object the general 
 lnowledge of the human soul. 
 
 Psychology is divided into two parts : the first 
 treating of the human soul more according to expe- 
 rience than reason ; and the second treating of it 
 more according to reason than experience. The first 
 is called experimental psychology, and the second 
 rational psychology. We shall treat of these two 
 parts in succession. 
 
 PART FIRST.— EXPEEIMENTAL 
 PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 Experimental Psychology may be defined to be 
 the science which treats of the faculties of the human 
 soul by the method of experience. According to 
 this definition we shall naturally divide the subject 
 of experimental psychology into as many parts as 
 there are faculties of the human soul. 
 
 We find in the soul three faculties, or general at- 
 tributes : namely, activity, which is the fundamental 
 attribute, and the sensibility and the intellect, which 
 are the faculties that excite the soul to action. 
 
 Since activity is not put in motion in the soul 
 until it is first excited by the sensibility and the in- 
 
METAPHYSICS. 141 
 
 tellect, we shall treat first of the sensibility, next 
 of the intellect and afterwards of activity. 
 
 CHAPTER FIRST. 
 
 Of Sensibility. 
 
 The Sensibility of the soul may be considered 
 either in general or particular. 
 
 Sensibility, in general, is the faculty by which 
 the human soul experiences emotions which are ordi- 
 narily pleasant or unpleasant. A pleasant emotion 
 is called pleasure, and an unpleasant one pain. 
 
 The elements of sensibility are two. As soon as 
 the soul perceives a sensation it instinctively turns 
 to the object causing the sensation ; we have there- 
 fore two elements, the sensation perceived and the 
 reactive motion of the soul:- in the first case the soul 
 is passive, and in the second it is active, but this 
 activity is instinctive and necessary. 
 
 This sensible emotion is merely passive and sub- 
 jective, and is thus distinguished from the intellec- 
 tual perception, which is a modification of the soul 
 merely passive, but also objective ; because the in- 
 tellectual perception represents an object as distinct 
 from the modification itself, 
 
 The reactive motion of the soul is called by the 
 moralists motus primo primus, and its ordinary ap- 
 pellation is appetite. This reaction is attractive 
 when the emotion is agreeable, and repulsive when 
 it is disagreeable. 
 
 The source from which these attractive and re- 
 pulsive emotions, or all the appetites of our soul, 
 proceed, is the love of ourselves. 
 
142 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 Sensibility, in particular, is exterior and physical 
 when the emotion is produced by the action of the 
 organs of sense, and interior when this emotion is 
 produced without such action. 
 
 (A) Physical sensibility is the power of experien- 
 cing sensation. By sensation we understand the 
 emotion which the soul experiences on account of 
 some action of the organs of sense. Three elements, 
 then, are found in physical sensibility r the organic 
 impression which precedes and causes the sensation ; 
 the sensation itself; and the appetite, or the re- 
 action after the sensation. 
 
 (a) The organic impression is the impression 
 made on one of the organs of sense by an external 
 body, and transmitted to the brain by the nerves. 
 
 The senses are five in number : taste, touch, smell, 
 hearing and sight. No sensation is experienced 
 before the impression made on the organ of sense 
 has reached the brain. The brain is an organ con- 
 sisting of a soft, whitish, nerve-like substance, situ- 
 ated in the skull. That part in the upper front 
 part of the head is the direct and immediate organ, 
 not only of physical sensibility, but also of interior 
 sensibility, of the intellect} and even of the will ; 
 so that if that part of the brain is removed or para- 
 lyzed the man loses his power of feeling, of under- 
 standing, and even of controlling the acts of his 
 will. 
 
 The brain is divided into two parts, or lobes, one 
 on the right side and the other on the left, and each 
 part is subdivided into many smaller ones. Upon 
 these divisions the system of the phrenologists is 
 built. 
 
METAPHYSICS. 143 
 
 The nerves are either sensitive or motive. The 
 sensitive nerves are those that transmit the impres- 
 sions made on the organs of sense to the brain ; and 
 the motive nerves, or motors, are those that serve, • 
 as we might say, as the tools of the will. How 
 these impressions are conveyed to the brain, and 
 how the desires of the will are carried back again, 
 are questions to which no answer has been given. 
 
 (b) Sensation. — From what has been said it is easy 
 to see the difference between sensation and the organic 
 impression, which causes sensation. Sensations are 
 either pleasant or unpleasant ; and our power of 
 knowing by means of the nerves the place of the 
 impression enables us to determine what part of the 
 body feels pleasure or pain. 
 
 There are some sensations which we may call 
 indifferent. Although in morals no human act is 
 indifferent in regard to salvation, yet we may accept 
 the opinion of a large number of authors who con- 
 sider many of our sensations as indifferent, that is, 
 as affording neither pain nor pleasure, or, at most, 
 very little of either pleasure or pain. 
 
 (c) Appetite.- — Appetite is the reactive motion of 
 the soul after it has experienced a sensation, whether 
 agreeable or disagreeable. It is now customary to 
 call the appetite resulting from an unpleasant or 
 repulsive sensation a repugnance. We can now 
 readily understand the difference between sensation 
 and appetite. 
 
 It is not by sensation only that appetite is excited 
 in the soul : the remembrance of a sensation is suffi- 
 cient to produce appetite. 
 
144 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 Appetites are periodic, as that of hunger, &c; 
 and accidental, as that for a certain kind of food, &c. 
 
 It is obvious that the end to be obtained by appe- 
 tite is the preservation of the body. 
 
 (B) Interior sensibility is the power of experien- 
 cing sentiments. A sentiment is the emotion produced 
 in the soul by an intellectual notion. A sentiment 
 differs from a sensation in two respects : first, a 
 sentiment is produced by an intellectual notion., 
 while a sensation is produced by an impression on 
 the organ of one of the senses; and, second, the 
 nature of the resulting emotions of pleasure or pain 
 are different. 
 
 The reactive emotion arising from a sentiment is 
 called passion. 
 
 Interior sensibility considered in relation to its 
 object is three-fold in character : 1st, in relation to 
 the personal affections, 2nd, in relation to social de- 
 sires, and 3d, in relation to those sentiments which 
 involve a certain conception of pure reason. 
 
 (a) Personal affections. These are the disposi- 
 tions, good or bad, with which we regard our fellow 
 men ; and which determine us to wish them good or 
 evil ; they are accordingly either benevolent or ma- 
 levolent. 
 
 The benevolent affections are either particular or 
 general, and the others universal. The particu- 
 lar benevolent affections are those of the family, 
 friendship, gratitude, commiseration, &c. The gen- 
 eral benevolent affections are charity, love of country, 
 &c. Among the malevolent affections we may men- 
 tion rivalry, envy, &c. 
 
METAPHYSICS. 145 
 
 The principal distinctions between the benevolent 
 and the malevolent affections are : first, a benevo- 
 lent affection is always accompanied with an agree- 
 able emotion ; second, a benevolent disposition is 
 natural to man ; and, third, in regard to the object, 
 benevolence is more extensive than malevolence. 
 
 (b) Social desires. These are emotions of the soul 
 by which we are inclined to seek for certain advan- 
 tages that are found only in society, as reputation, 
 power, &c. These desires may be reduced to five : 
 1st, the desire for social companionship, which is 
 natural to all men ; 2nd, the desire of knowing ; 3d, 
 the desire of acquiring esteem and consideration ; 
 4th, the desire of superiority, and 5th, the desire of 
 property. These words need no explanation. 
 
 (c) Sentiments involving some conception of pure 
 reason. There exist within us certain sentiments 
 which originate in the soul by the influence of the 
 conceptions of pure reason ; as, for example, by the 
 conceptions of the ideas of truth, of beauty, of the 
 infinite, &c. 
 
 The chief sentiments of this kind are : the senti- 
 ment of truth ; the sentiment of beauty, or the 
 aesthetic sentiment ; the sentiment of goodness, or 
 the moral sentiment ; the religious sentiment ; and 
 the sentiment of the infinite. There is such an 
 affinity. between the objects of these sentiments and 
 our intelligence that the soul cannot perceive them 
 without experiencing some agreeable emotion, and 
 this emotion is called the love of truth, of beauty, of 
 goodness, &c. 
 1 
 
146 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 CHAPTER- SECOND. 
 Of the Intellect. 
 
 We nave already, in Logic and in the Introduc- 
 tion, examined most of the notions concerning the 
 intellect, and we shall now only briefly recapitulate 
 them. 
 
 The intellect is the thinking power. The facul- 
 ties of the intellect may be divided into two classes, 
 the perceptive faculties by which the mind perceives, 
 and the reflexive faculties, by which the mind makes 
 use of these perceptions. This Chapter is therefore 
 divided into two Articles, to which we shall add a 
 third on the nature and origin of ideas. 
 
 Article First. — The Perceptive Faculties. 
 
 There are two kinds of perception, the perception 
 of contingent things, otherwise called experimental 
 perception or experience ; and the perception of neces- 
 sary things, otherwise called rational perception or 
 pure reason, or simply reason. 
 
 (A) The experimental perceptive faculties are: 
 Consciousness ; memory, to which may be added 
 what is called the association of ideas ; and the per- 
 ception of the senses. 
 
 It is well to observe here that there is an essential 
 difference between sensation and the perception of 
 the senses. As we have said, sensation is a phe- 
 nomenon purely subjective. For instance, the 
 sensation of smell is altogether an affection of the 
 soul, and represents nothing distinct from this sen- 
 
METAPHYSICS. 147 
 
 sation ; for if there were a representation of something 
 accompanying the sensation it would not belong 
 to the sensation itself, but to the perception or the 
 imagination. The perception of the senses, on the 
 contrary, is a phenomenon both subjective and ob- 
 jective, which represents something which is outside 
 the soul. The confusion of these two notions was the 
 origin of sensism. 
 
 The errors generally attributed to the perception 
 of the senses come from three sources : 1st, dreams 
 and delirium, 2nd, affirmation of more than the senses 
 perceive, and 3d, weakness or unsound condition of 
 some of the organs of sense. To avoid mistakes from 
 these sources, we should affirm nothing more than 
 we really perceive, and if possible use more than 
 one sense to observe the same phenomenon. Be- 
 sides, we should renew our observations under dif- 
 ferent circumstances. 
 
 (B) The rational perceptions are, first, ideas, or 
 rational conceptions, the principal of which are 
 those of being (idea entis), of unity, of infinity, of 
 substance, of cause, of truth, of beauty, and of good- 
 ness, concerning all of which we have already 
 spoken sufficiently; and, second, the necessary 
 truths, or the principles of pure reason, which we 
 have explained in the Dissertation on the motives 
 of certitude. 
 
 Article Second. — The Eeflexive Faculties. 
 
 The reflexive faculties are those by which the soul 
 exercises its activity upon the perceptions. They 
 are, as we have explained in Part First : Attention, 
 
148 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 abstraction, judgment, reasoning, imagination, and 
 the expression and transmission of thought by lan- 
 guage. 
 
 The imagination is that faculty by which the soul 
 
 O Jo 
 
 represents to itself an object under a sensible form, 
 without the present or actual exercise of the percep- 
 tion of the senses. The imagination may be creative, 
 as well as reproductive ; for we may by imagination 
 represent to ourselves certain intellectual notions 
 under sensible forms. 
 
 The imagination is affected by the vicissitudes of 
 the body and the influence of physical agents more 
 than any other intellectual faculty : it is modified by 
 the influence of age, temperament, sickness, manner 
 of living and diversity of climate. 
 
 When the imagination is well directed it affords 
 much aid towards the happiness and moral improve- 
 ment of mankind ; but when badly directed, especially 
 when sustained by the reading of novels and bad 
 books, its influence is most pernicious. 
 
 The expression and transmission of our ideas by 
 language is a subject which must be treated more 
 fully. 
 
 (a) General Notions. 
 
 Language, in general, is any sensible sign by 
 which men may communicate to one another their 
 thoughts, feelings and affections : it is either natural 
 or acquired. 
 
 Natural language is that which men use and 
 understand without any previous instruction ; such 
 as gestures, looks, shouts, &c. This kind of Ian- 
 
METAPIIYSICS. 149 
 
 guage, which is also called gesticulation, is very 
 expressive in certain circumstances, but generally is 
 too vague, uncertain and incomplete. 
 
 Acquired language is that which can neither be 
 expressed nor understood without previous instruc- 
 tion and knowledge of the native tongue. This 
 kind of language is either spoken or written. Spoken 
 language, being uttered by the tongue and other 
 organs of speech, is language properly so called, or 
 the tongue, as we say the English tongue, the French 
 tongue, &c. 
 
 Language is natural to men, in the sense that 
 they have suitable organs for its use ; but it is also 
 conventional, in the sense that the meaning given 
 to the sounds issuing from the organs of speech is 
 fixed almost altogether by the agreement of men. 
 
 It is clear that spoken language is far more useful 
 than that which we have called natural language, 
 or gesture. 
 
 Written language is a collection of fixed and per- 
 manent figures, by the use of which men give 
 expression to their ideas. It is of three kinds, 
 ideographic, or picture writing (as the figures in 
 arithmetic, algebra, geometry and chemistry); 
 alphabetic ; and hieroglyphic, which is a mixture of 
 the other two.. 
 
 (b) Language Corpsidered in Relation to Thought. 
 
 Language is not the producing cause of our ideas, 
 but it is necessary in order that the human intellect 
 should attain the degree of perfection of which it is 
 capable. In regard to abstract and purely intel- 
 
150 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 lectual ideas, language is necessary to develop and 
 preserve them ; for it is impossible without language 
 -to meditate upon things which do not belong to the 
 sensible order, as, for instance, God and his attri- 
 butes, &c. 
 
 In order that the language be well composed, it 
 is necessary that it be full, clear and harmonious. 
 The rules to be followed in its use are given in the 
 text-books on grammar. 
 
 (c) The Origin of Language. 
 
 The enquiry on this subject is two-fold : we have 
 first to consider the question of fact, and secondly 
 that of possibility. 
 
 First. — The Question of Fact. 
 
 I. It is certain from Genesis that God gave to our 
 first parents a supernatural knowledge of articulate 
 or spoken language. 
 
 II. The most ancient traditions of all nations 
 agree in admitting .the existence of what they call 
 the golden age, during which God conversed with 
 men and instructed them. 
 
 III. All history is silent concerning an invention 
 of language. 
 
 IV. The study of philosophy has shown conclu- 
 sively that all languages have had a common origin, 
 or that there was a primitive language which fur- 
 nished the roots of all other tongues ; and it is surely 
 more simple and reasonable to explain this fact by 
 the supernatural gift of language to man in the be- 
 ginning, than by the invention of a first language 
 
METAPHYSICS. 151 
 
 which must have been imperfect and incomplete, 
 and which consequently could not have been the 
 original of all languages. 
 
 Second.' — The Question of Possibility. 
 
 Is it possible that our first parents could of them- 
 selves have invented language ? 
 
 I. All the materialists and sensists affirm that 
 our first parents could have done this. Some Chris- 
 tian philosophers hold the same opinion, and say : 
 First, that men can naturally express what they 
 feel by some external signs, and consequently that, 
 if they can think before speaking, they can manifest 
 their thoughts by spoken language ; but, they 
 farther assert, men can think before speaking, and 
 hence could have invented language. Secondly, 
 they say, that by attention men can have ideas of 
 individual things, and afterwards express these 
 ideas in words ; then pass from this point to abstrac- 
 tion, generalization, &c, and so gradually form 
 language. 
 
 II. De Bonald is the principal defender of the 
 opinion that it is impossible that men should have 
 invented language ; and most of the Catholic phil- 
 osophers side with him. They say, first, that 
 without language it is imposible to acquire reflexive 
 ideas of immaterial things ; and this is proved by 
 daily experience and by the mental state of the deaf 
 and dumb who have not been taught an artificial 
 language, as well as by the state of mind of certain 
 unfortunate persons who have lived in the wilder- 
 ness without human society from their infancy. 
 
152 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 Secondly, as is shown in the case of children, abstract 
 and general ideas, even of material things, cannot be 
 acquired, except gradually and with the knowledge 
 of the language: these ideas require reflexion, and 
 reflexion requires words. Thirdly, in order to in- 
 vent language it would first be necessary to know 
 its law and structure ; but these cannot be known 
 without reflexion, and the same difficulty occurs as 
 before. Fourthly, language could not be invented 
 by one man, since he could not be understood by the 
 rest of men, nor could he obtain their consent to use 
 the language formed by him ; nor could it be in- 
 vented by a number of men, for this would suppose 
 an agreement, and no agreement is possible without 
 language. Fifthly, they conclude language can- 
 not have been invented gradually, since it forms a 
 whole of which all the parts exist at the same time. 
 Neither of these opinions is sufficiently conclusive. 
 Either, however, may be accepted without opposing 
 the Catholic doctrine. 
 
 Article Third. — The Nature and Origin op our 
 Ideas. 
 
 1st. The Nature of our Ideas. 
 
 We have already spoken of this subject in Logic; 
 but there we considered ideas especially in regard to 
 the objects which they represent. We have now to 
 examine the question subjectively, and enquire 
 whether our ideas of things, corporeal or incorporeal, 
 are only modifications of the mind representing ob- 
 jects to itself; or whether they are images distinct 
 
METAPHYSICS. 153 
 
 from these modifications and also from the objects 
 represented. According to the first hypothesis, 
 there are hut two things to he considered in connec- 
 tion with the idea, namely, the subject and the 
 object, while, according to the second hypothe- 
 sis, there is, besides the subject and the object, 
 an image which is a medium between the two. 
 Philosophers are divided in opinion on this question. 
 Arnauld, Thomas Keed and Scotists advocate the 
 first hypothesis ; while Aristotle, Democritus, Mal- 
 lebranche, Locke and the Materialists defend the 
 second. Some of these latter consider the medium 
 to be a material image, which is absurd. 
 
 It seems probable that the first hypothesis is the 
 correct one ; for the other is entirely gratuitous, and 
 besides does not solve the difficulty, which is : How 
 does the soul, a spiritual substance, see corporeal 
 things ? This difficulty reappears on the introduc- 
 tion of the medium. 
 
 Id. The Origin of our Ideas. 
 
 Ideas are pure, or rational, when their objects are 
 necessary things, and empiric when they represent 
 contingent things. But as empiric ideas come from 
 experience, we need not here enquire of the origin 
 of this sort of ideas, but only of those which are 
 pure, or rational ; besides, ideas ought not to be 
 considered as abstract, but as concrete, for undoubt- 
 edly abstract ideas come from abstraction. 
 
 The question then is : What is the origin, or the 
 source of concrete rational ideas, such as the idea of 
 existence, of unity, of truth, of substance, &c. 
 
154 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 There have been three opinions entertained by 
 philosophers concerning the origin of ideas : that of 
 the Sensists, that of those who teach the doctrine of 
 innate ideas and that concerning the intuition of 
 God, entis siinpliciter . 
 
 (a) The System of the Sensists. 
 
 This is the system of those who derive all our 
 ideas, even rational ideas, from the senses. Their 
 axiom is : There is nothing in the intellect which 
 was not first in the senses. All the Sensists agree 
 that at the time of its creation the soul is like a sheet 
 of blank paper, void of all ideas. 
 
 There is a difference between the Materialists and 
 the Sensists ; the former contend that the soul is a 
 material substance, the latter do not. Among the 
 Sensists we find the names of Bacon, Locke, Condil- 
 lac, Laromiguiere. 
 
 This system ought to be rejected, if it is true that 
 rational ideas cannot come from the senses ; but it 
 is true that these ideas cannot come from this source, 
 either directly by the perception of the senses or 
 indirectly by reflexion : for the senses perceive only 
 bodies and their phenomena ; and reflexion, acting 
 upon ideas of contingent things, can derive nothing 
 from them but what they contain, that is, what is 
 contingent and mutable. Consequently, reflexion 
 cannot derive from ideas of contingent things the 
 ideas of truth, infinity, justice, &c, the objects of 
 which are necessary and immutable things. This 
 conclusion is strictly logical, and established upon 
 the principle of contradiction. 
 
METAPHYSICS. 155 
 
 (b) The Doctrine of Innate Ideas. 
 
 This' is the doctrine of those who say that the 
 mind is possessed of ideas which it did not acquire 
 by its own power, but which were given to it by 
 God, probably at the moment of its creation. Those 
 who hold this doctrine say also that these ideas are 
 not actually present to the mind at the moment of 
 its creation, but only habitually present, and, as it 
 were, remain slumbering in the soul, even as certain 
 notions are stored up in the memory without being 
 actually thought of until they are called forth by 
 an effort of the mind. In like manner, they say, 
 when reason becomes active these ideas become 
 actual, or actively present, and the attention of the 
 soul is directed towards them. 
 
 The defenders of the doctrine of innate ideas claim 
 that Descartes and Leibnitz favor their system. 
 Descartes says that "some ideas are born with us, 
 and that the germs of truth are deposited in our 
 souls and gradually come to light by the activity of 
 reason." Leibnitz speaks in the same sense, and 
 compares these germs to the veins in marble which 
 form the figure of some object : the object needs only 
 the hand of the artist to bring it forth. 
 
 It is evident that we cannot pronounce this sys- 
 tem altogether false. The objections to it are : 
 First, that if these ideas were in the mind we should 
 have some consciousness of their presence ; but no 
 one can say positively that we have this conscious- 
 ness. Second, this doctrine explains nothing if it 
 is meant by it that we have in the mind certain 
 
156 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 dispositions only, or mere faculties, according to the 
 explanation of Descartes and Leibnitz ; if, however, 
 it is meant by the doctrine, that at the moment of 
 creation there are in the soul virtual notions, the 
 supposition is gratuitous. Accordingly we may 
 make another supposition, which is that, instead of 
 those ideas, which are improperly called innate, the 
 soul receives notions, at every moment, by the in- 
 tuition of God ; and this is the third system. 
 
 (c) The Doctrine of the Intuition of God. 
 
 This is the doctrine of those who maintain that 
 rational ideas come into the mind by the intuitive 
 perception of the simple being, or of God. Accord- 
 ing to this doctrine, which is the true one, God is 
 present to our intellect and is seen by it ; and from 
 this perception the idea of the simple being, that is 
 the idea of God, is present to our mind : and as the 
 simple being is also infinite, necessary, eternal, &c, 
 the intuition of this being contains in itself and pro- 
 duces in our mind the ideas of infinity, necessity, 
 eternity, &c, in a word, all the rational ideas, 
 which, after all, are nothing else than the idea of 
 the simple being considered in itself. 
 
 This doctrine has been held by St. Augustine, 
 St. Anselm, St. Bonaventure, Bossuet and many 
 others. 
 
 We must observe that this intuition is not the 
 beatific vision, which we can enjoy only in heaven ; 
 but is an intuition by which we may see God ob- 
 scurely, and as it were, to use the Apostle's expres- 
 sion, in an enigma. 
 
METAPHYSICS. 157 
 
 This doctrine satisfactorily explains the origin of 
 ideas ; still it is only a hypothesis. 
 
 CHAPTER THIRD. 
 
 Of Activity. 
 
 Activity is the power or faculty of acting : it is 
 both interior and exterior. Interior activity is the 
 soul's activity, considered independently of its 
 action on the body ; while exterior activity, on the 
 contrary, is the soul's activity, considered with 
 reference to the movements of the body: exterior 
 activity has therefore been called the motrix faculty. 
 
 Interior activity is twofold, free and spontaneous ; 
 the latter must not be confounded with the soul's 
 passivity. 
 
 Spontaneous activity is exercised in two ways, 
 from instinct and from habit. Instinct differs from 
 habit in this, that instinct proceeds from nature 
 while habit is the result of a frequent repetition of 
 the same acts. Instinct is found in animals as well 
 as in men, and in children as well as in adults. 
 Habit has been denned as the disposition to act 
 acquired from a frequent repetition of the same acts. 
 The soul and the body have each their own habits. 
 It is evident that actions proceeding from mere 
 habit are not free in themselves, though they may 
 be so indirectly, that is, in their cause. 
 
 Free activity, or the liberty of the soul, will now 
 be treated at large, forming the chief part of this 
 chapter. The other subjects belong directly to 
 theology. 
 
158 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 The Freedom of the Human Soul. 
 
 "We first give a definition of the will : The icill 
 is that faculty by which the soul chooses the good 
 proposed to it by the intellect and avoids evil. 
 Hence we conclude that nothing is willed unless it 
 first be known. 
 
 The will is either necessary or free. In the first 
 case, the one who wills cannot refrain from willing, 
 and this is will properly so called ; in the second 
 case, one may refrain from willing that which is 
 proposed by the intellect and choose something else, 
 and this is called freedom. Freedom, therefore, is 
 the power either to will or to refrain from willing ; 
 or, more simply, it is the power of choosing. 
 
 Among the philosophers who have denied the 
 freedom of the will, we find, first, the Stoics, who 
 were strict fatalists ; second, the Pantheists, who 
 cannot admit freedom without being in contradic- 
 tion with themselves ; third, the Manicheans, who 
 pretended that we do good or evil according as the 
 good or the evil principle inspires us ; fourth, the 
 Mahometans, who are fatalists ; fifth, several modern 
 religious systems which teach that we are predestined 
 to do good by grace, and to do evil by concupiscence, 
 thus confounding the notions of the voluntary 
 and the free, and of course destroying freedom ; 
 sixth, the followers of Cousin and Gall, who indirect- 
 ly teach fatalism ; and, seventh, the Materialists, 
 whose system, like that of the Pantheists, destroys 
 human liberty. 
 
 Note. — Euler and some other philosophers have 
 
METAPHYSICS. 159 
 
 contended that freedom is essential to spiritual sub- 
 stances. We feel constrained to deny this, and to 
 say that G-od might have created us without liberty, 
 at least without the liberty of doing wrong. 
 
 We have now to discuss the question as to whether 
 we have the liberty of choosing, and will proceed to 
 prove the 
 
 Proposition.— The human mind is truly free. 
 
 Argument : That ought to be admitted as true 
 which is proved to be true by the testimony of con- 
 sciousness, by the consent of mankind, by the absurd 
 consequences of fatalism and by reason ; but such is 
 the case with the above proposition, and hence the 
 human soul is free. 
 
 Proof: First. Consciousness. We have seen that 
 consciousness is an infallible motive of judging of 
 the present state of the soul. Now, we feel sure 
 that in many of our actions we are free : we perceive 
 that there is an essential difference between the ac- 
 tions which are performed with deliberation and 
 those which are done without deliberation. The 
 remorse that follows our bad actions helps us to 
 make this distinction more evident. We may there- 
 fore conclude that the freedom of the will is proved 
 by our own consciousness. 
 
 Second. The consent of mankind is a clear and 
 powerful proof in this case. We find everywhere, 
 and in all ages, laws, treaties, rewards, punish- 
 ments, &c. Among themselves men naturally use 
 entreaties., threats, exhortations, &c. Even the 
 fatalists do not deny these facts, although they pre- 
 tend to believe that this general persuasion proceeis 
 
160 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 from necessity. But we cannot admit that God, in 
 his wisdom and love of truth, would permit all men 
 to remain in such a state of delusion ; and we there- 
 fore hold this consent of mankind as conclusive in 
 favor of the freedom of the human soul. 
 
 Third. If the doctrine of fatalism were admitted, 
 we should be hut machines, deprived of reason. It 
 would he absurd to speak of reasoning, deliberation, 
 prudence, wisdom, &c, or of a distinction between 
 virtue and vice or good and evil. There would be no 
 merit in being a poet, an orator, or a philosopher, 
 since necessity would compel certain persons to fill 
 these positions. Xo one is willing to admit the ex- 
 istence of these consequences, which, however, are 
 logically true if we are not free. 
 
 Fourth. Eeason. We might here use an argu- 
 mentum ad liominem. "Would those philosophers 
 who deny the existence of human liberty refrain 
 from asking for punishment for any one who should 
 strike or rob them? And yet, if they were logical, 
 they would not consider those persons guilty who 
 do these things. The illogical conduct of the fatal- 
 ists themselves then shows that we are free. 
 
 We conclude : 
 
 1st. That the existence of our freedom is as clear 
 as that of our thought. 
 
 2nd. That the denial of our freedom leads to the 
 denial of certitude itself. 
 
 3d. That the existence of human freedom must 
 be considered a primary truth. 
 
 It is in the doctrine of the moderate fatalists that 
 we find objections raised against the existence of 
 
METAPHYSICS. 161 
 
 human freedom. By moderate fatalists we mean 
 those philosophers who considering the strength of 
 our physical nature, blinded more or less as it is by 
 ignorance, habit or prejudice, exaggerate its influ- 
 ence over the determination of the will. 
 
 That this influence exists, and is in some cases 
 very strong and very pressing, is of course true ; but 
 it can never have such power over our determination 
 as to make us act from necessity. We may always 
 ascertain that we have been free, even in those ac- 
 tions in which our temper, our habits, &c, have 
 had most influence over us. 
 
 PART SECOND.— RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 CHAPTER FIRST. 
 
 Of the Nature of the Human Soul, or of its 
 Spirituality. 
 
 Those philosophers who admit the spirituality of 
 the human soul are called Spiritualists, and those 
 who deny it are called Materialists. Besides the 
 school of Epicurus, we may rank among the Mate- 
 rialists, Locke, La Mettrie, Voltaire, Cabanis, Hel- 
 vetius, d'Holbach and Diderot. 
 
 Among the ancients many admitted the spiritu- 
 ality of the soul, as Cicero and Aristotle. 
 
 Proposition. — The soul is a simple substance, and 
 absolutely distinct from matter. 
 
 Argument: Two substances cannot be identical 
 when they have opposite properties ; but such is the 
 case in regard to the soul and matter. 
 
162 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 Proof: In order to prove trie above proposition 
 we will establish the fact that the soul is endowed 
 with three properties which matter cannot have : the 
 power of thinking, that of judging, and a free will, 
 or activity. 
 
 I. The soul has the power of thinking, a power 
 which cannot be found in any material substance, 
 that is, in a substance which has extension and is 
 capable of division ; for if a material substance could 
 have the power of thought, (1) the whole thought 
 must be located in the whole substance, or (2) in 
 each part of the substance, or (3) in one part only. 
 
 The first hypothesis cannot be accepted ; for if it 
 were true we should have to admit that thought may 
 be divided into as many parts as there are in the 
 substance, and consequently there would be no part 
 which would be conscious of the whole thought or 
 perceive its entire object. 
 
 The second hypothesis is equally absurd ; for if it 
 were true, the thought would be multiple, instead of 
 divisible, but we feel that our thought is one. 
 
 The third hypothesis is also inadmissible, because 
 the same difficulties come back. This part of the 
 matter would itself be matter, and consequently di- 
 visible, and of course the thought must again be 
 either divisible or multiple, and this is against the 
 general conviction and feeling of our consciousness 
 that the power of thinking is simple. 
 
 II. The soul has the power of judging. In order 
 to compare there must be a comparer who examines 
 the two notions to be compared ; this comparer 
 therefore must have the attribute of unity, but unity 
 
METAPHYSICS. 163 
 
 cannot be found where there is divisibility, that is, 
 in matter. Hence this power belongs to a simple 
 substance. 
 
 III. The human soul is active. We have proved 
 that we are free ; to be free is, first, to be active ; 
 but matter has no activity, being inert by nature : 
 hence the soul must be an immaterial substance. 
 
 We might add other observations to the above : 
 First, that taken from the identity of the thinking 
 principle within us. We are conscious of this iden- 
 tity. We feel that we are now the same beings that 
 we have ever been ; and yet our bodies have been 
 changed many times, being constantly renewed. 
 
 Second, that taken from the consciousness which 
 we have at the same time of several sensations of a 
 different character : I see, hear, smell, taste and 
 touch at the same time, and am conscious that it is 
 the same principle that perceives these various sen- 
 sations. If, according to Epicurus, this principle 
 were nothing else than the organs of the different 
 senses, I could be conscious of but one sensation at 
 the same time. 
 
 Third, that drawn from the consent of mankind 
 may be added to the above, and we conclude that 
 the immateriality of the soul is proved. 
 
 In order to answer the objections made against 
 this proposition, let us observe that from the mutual 
 influence of the soul and body over each other we 
 cannot conclude that the two substances are identi- 
 cal, for these reasons : 
 
 (a) There is no contradiction in the action of a 
 spiritual substance on a material one, (b) As Grod, 
 
164 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 who is a spiritual substance, acts upon material 
 creatures, so may the soul act upon the body, (c) 
 Many examples show these substances to be different ; 
 as very often a powerful mind is found in a weak 
 and feeble body, (d) The body is to the soul what 
 a musical instrument is to a musician : the musician 
 tunes his instrument by degrees, and so the soul acts 
 on the body during all the periods of our existence. 
 From what has been said we may conclude, first, 
 that the soul is a substance endowed with activity, 
 sensibility, intellect and freedom ; and, second, that 
 it is a substance which is a unit in every man, sim- 
 ple and always identical with itself. 
 
 CHAPTER SECOND. 
 
 Or the Union of the Soul with the Body. 
 
 From the last chapter it follows that the human 
 soul and the human body are of different natures ; but 
 between them there is the closest unio.n, the effects 
 of which we experience at every instant. All admit 
 this union, but in regard to the manner of explain- 
 ing it several systems have been invented. 
 
 First system. This is called the system of phys- 
 ical influence, according to which the soul has a 
 real influence over the body, as well as the body 
 over the soul. This influence is called physical, 
 not that it is material, but because the soul acts on 
 the body as really and directly as one physical ob- 
 ject would act upon another. This system was the 
 only one received before the time of Mallebranche 
 and Leibnitz, and even now it is generally accepted. 
 
METAPHYSICS. 165 
 
 The second system,- that of a plastic or operating 
 mediator, is taught by those who believe that there 
 is between the soul and the body a middle substance, 
 by the aid of which the soul and the body mutually 
 act upon each other. According to the philosophers 
 who teach this doctrine, this mediator is an active 
 and incorporeal substance, but is deprived of sensi- 
 bility and intelligence. 
 
 The third system, that of occasional causes, is the 
 one taught by Mallebranche. According to this 
 system there is no real action of the soul upon the 
 body, or of the body upon the soul : but the opera- 
 tions of the mind are only occasions, and these being 
 present God himself acts upon the body ; in like 
 manner, the modifications of the body are occasions, 
 which. being also present, God modifies the mind, 
 that is, excites sensations in it. 
 
 The fourth system, that of a pre-established har- 
 mony, is the system of Leibnitz. This philosopher 
 teaches that there is no direct action of the soul 
 upon the body, or of the body upon the soul ; nor 
 does God act directly upon the body on account of 
 the operations of the mind, nor upon the mind on 
 account of the modifications of the body ; but He so 
 disposes, or prepares, both body and soul at the 
 time of their creation that the whole series of voli- 
 tions of the mind answers, in the most perfect har- 
 mony, to the whole series of the motions of the 
 body. 
 
 As the second system complicates rather than 
 explains the difficulty, we must reject it. 
 
 The fourth system does not differ from the third 
 
166 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 in regard to the present difficulty, which is to de- 
 termine whether there is a mutual influence of the 
 soul and the body on each other. Both systems 
 deny that there is any such influence, and in this 
 respect they do not differ, although in other respects 
 they differ greatly. In each, however, especially in 
 that of Leibnitz, we do not see how human freedom 
 would be safe. 
 
 There remains the first system, shall we admit 
 the existence of a real mutual influence, a true 
 causality, between the soul and the body ; or, accord- 
 ing to the third system, a mere occasionally ? That 
 there is a real influence we propose to prove by the 
 following 
 
 Proposition. — The soul has a direct influence upon 
 the body, and the body upon the soul. 
 
 Argument : If the existence of this mutual influ- 
 ence is not shown to be impossible, and if it is even 
 proved by many facts that the influence does exist, 
 then the proposition must be accepted as true ; but 
 such is the case, and hence the soul has a direct 
 influence, &c. 
 
 Proof: 1st. It has never been shown that the 
 existence of this influence is impossible. When we 
 say that the soul can act directly upon the body, we 
 do not mean that it acts materially, for it is a spir- 
 itual substance ; but we mean that the soul has a 
 natural power of moving the body. That the exist- 
 ence of this power of spirit over matter is not impossi- 
 ble is evident from the fact that G-ocl, who is a pure 
 spirit, does move material substances. 
 
 That the influence of the body upon the soul is a 
 
METAPHYSICS. 167 
 
 passive one is evident from the fact that the body, 
 being matter, is inert of itself. The body is like an 
 instrument in the hands of a workman ; it acts, or 
 has influence, upon his will in proportion to its 
 degree of fitness and perfection. Besides, it has not 
 been shown that the forces of attraction and repul- 
 sion, existing among the molecules of matter accord- 
 ing to the arrangement made by God, do not exercise 
 some action or influence upon the soul. 
 
 2nd. Many facts and circumstances prove the 
 mutual influence of the body and the soul. • These 
 facts are : 
 
 (a) The testimony of consciousness. Whenever I 
 move my body I am conscious, not only of my will 
 to move my body, but even of a certain effort of the 
 soul to move it, and I clearly perceive that the move- 
 ment of my body responds to the effort of my soul. 
 
 (b) The universal persuasion of mankind. All 
 men are convinced that the human will is the mov- 
 ing cause of bodily action, and also that the body 
 reacts upon the soul. This testimony, as we have 
 proved, is a sufficient argument to establish certitude. 
 
 (c) The unity of human personality. Personality, 
 in man, is a union between the soul and the body, 
 so complete that they form one individual who 
 attributes to himself all the actions of the soul and 
 the body, who can say with equal correctness, /think 
 and I walk. It is clear that we could not thus ex- 
 press ourselves if we did not know and feel that our 
 actions are indeed our own, and not the result of 
 the actions of Gfod in consequence of the volitions of 
 our mind or the movements of our body. 
 
168 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 (d) The power icliich the mind has of directly per- 
 ceiving corporeal objects. This lias been established 
 in Logic, in treating of the evidence of the senses. 
 The existence of this power shows that the senses 
 have a direct influence upon the soul. The first sys- 
 tem may therefore be now considered as fully proved 
 to be the true one. 
 
 Notes. — (1) Philosophers have examined the ques- 
 tion concerning the origin of the soul. It is clear, 
 and also generally admitted, that souls are created 
 immediately by God, without the co-operation of 
 parents ; and, consequently, the soul does not exist 
 before the conception of the body, for this pre-exist- 
 ence, which is contrary to the teaching of theology, 
 seems entirely opposed to reason and to the wisdom 
 of God. 
 
 (2) In regard to the consequences of the union of 
 the body with the soul, there are two kinds of phe- 
 nomena ; the first ones are the result of the influence 
 of the body upon the mind, as has been noticed in 
 Experimental Psychology, in treating of sensation, 
 memory, &c, when both soul and body are in a 
 normal condition, and in treating of delirium, &c, 
 when they are in an abnormal condition ; and the 
 others are the result of the influence of the mind 
 upon the body, as it has been said in treating of the 
 changes of the voice, countenance, &c, when we 
 wish to show the feelings of the soul, in other words, 
 when the influence of the soul is exercised upon the 
 body. 
 
METAPHYSICS. 169 
 
 CHAPTER THIRD. 
 
 Or the Destiny of the Soul. 
 
 It has been shown that the soul and the body- 
 are two substances, entirely distinct and different. 
 The dissolution of the body does not involve that of 
 the soul, since the soul is not divisible, that is, is 
 not composed of parts. The dissolution of the body 
 does not necessitate the annihilation of the soul ; 
 for if such were the case it would be because the 
 soul could not exercise her faculties without the 
 body, but this is not so, for there are in the soul 
 many faculties which by their nature have no con- 
 nection with the body : such are the faculties of 
 thinking, judging, reasoning, &c. Hence we may 
 conclude that the soul may outlive the body. This 
 property of the soul is its immortality. 
 
 Since the soul may outlive the body, there must 
 be another life ; at least, the above remarks will 
 justify us in concluding that the existence of an- 
 other life is possible. Does this life then exist? 
 This question properly belongs to Ethics, and we 
 shall only consider it briefly in this place. 
 
 The existence of another life is rendered neces- 
 sary, 1st, by two attributes of G-od, His justice and 
 His wisdom. 2nd. It is shown by the desire born 
 with us to enjoy a felicity not to be found here, and 
 which must be found somewhere. 3d. It is proved 
 by the natural inclination of men to seek for repu- 
 tation, glory and immortality. 4th. It is proved 
 by the common consent of mankind, who have 
 always in their treatment of the dead shown their 
 8 
 
170 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 conviction of the existence of another life. It can- 
 not be objected to this that the testimony of a good 
 conscience, or the hope of reward, are a sufficient 
 sanction to the natural law ; for experience shows 
 that a time comes for some men when these impres- 
 sions are of no avail. 5th. It is proved by the 
 consequences which would be the result of the con- 
 trary belief. 
 
 Note. — The eternal duration of the other life is 
 not in contradiction to reason. 
 
 CHAPTER FOURTH. 
 
 Of the Souls of Animals. 
 
 Besides God, the angels and the human soul, 
 there is the inferior soul of animals. By this soul 
 we mean the principle by which the animal has its 
 life. Let us examine, first, what are the faculties 
 of this soul, and, second, what is its nature and des- 
 tination. 
 
 Article First. — -The Faculties of the Souls of 
 Animals, 
 
 We find in those animals that have the most 
 perfect organization these faculties, sensibility, in- 
 tellect and activity. 
 
 (a) Sensibility. Animals have (1) a physical 
 sensibility which is superior in acuteness to that of 
 man, as that of sight in the eagle. They have (2) 
 physical appetites as men have. (3) In some of 
 them we find desires and passions, as the inclina- 
 tion to live in society, emulation, ostentation, envy 
 
METAPHYSICS. 3*71 
 
 and avariciousness. (4) We find in some animals 
 affections, that is sentiments either good or had. 
 
 (h) Intellect. The degree of intellect is not the 
 same in the different classes of animals. The mam- 
 mals have the greatest amount of intellect. They 
 are found to possess the following faculties : (1) By 
 the organs of sense they perceive certain qualities 
 of many bodies placed before them ; and this per- 
 ception produces a conviction which excludes any 
 doubt, as in the case of oats placed before a horse. 
 Hence (2) they have consciousness of their own sen- 
 sations and operations. (3) They are capable of 
 being attentive, as a hunting dog scenting game. 
 
 (4) They have memory. A horse will after years 
 recognize a road through which lie has once passed. 
 
 (5) Some animals have imagination ; and this is the 
 only way of explaining their dreams. (6) Many 
 animals have the power of expressing themselves 
 exteriorly, or of communicating their sentiments. 
 (7) It would not be unreasonable to admit in them 
 something more than attention, in fact a sort of 
 calculation on their part, in order to explain some 
 extraordinary phenomena. 
 
 (c) Activ'ty. Some of the actions of animals are 
 spontaneous and others voluntary ; some proceed 
 from instinct, some from choice, and others again 
 from acquired habits. 
 
 Instinct in animals takes the place of reason ; 
 certain actions of theirs, as we have said, proceed 
 from choice, as, for instance, a dog will abstain from 
 food for fear of a stick with which he is threatened. 
 
 The difference between men and the inferior an- 
 
172 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 imals is (1) that men are endowed with reason, 
 which belongs to the nature of the human soul ; 
 consequently, by their nature men are superior. It 
 is by reason that men distinguish what is good, true, 
 beautiful, &c, and it is certain that the lower ani- 
 mals cannot make these distinctions. (2) The lower 
 animals are incapable of morality : having no moral 
 liberty, their actions are not characterized by moral 
 good or malice. 
 
 Article Secoxd. — The Nature and Destiny of the 
 Souls of Animals. 
 It is evident that there is in all animals some im- 
 material substance. We must believe this (1) since 
 they exhibit activity, sensibility, and phenomena 
 indicating an inferior intellect ; and (2) since these 
 phenomena allow us to conclude in favor of the ex- 
 istence of a substance which is active, sensible and 
 has an inferior intellect ; and (3) since such sub- 
 stance ought to be immaterial. 
 
 (1) We have seen in the first Article that animals 
 show signs of activity, etc. 
 
 (2) We may conclude from the existence of these 
 signs or phenomena, what we logically concluded 
 concerning the human soul, namely, the existence 
 of a substance which is active, sensitive and intel- 
 ligent. 
 
 (3) This substance must be essentially immate- 
 rial, since these faculties are essentially different 
 from the properties found in matter. 
 
 We may therefore reject the doctrine of Descartes, 
 who says that beasts are mere machines, and also 
 
METAPHYSICS. 173 
 
 the doctrine of some modern dreamers, called phi- 
 losophers, who pretend that men are not superior to 
 beasts. 
 
 The soul of the inferior animal cannot of course 
 be dissolved by the dissolution of its body, since it 
 is an immaterial substance ; but as there is no rea- 
 son for admitting the existence of another life for 
 such souls, we may consider as reasonable the opin- 
 ion of those who think that such substances are 
 annihilated as soon as their services are no longer 
 needed. 
 
PART III 
 ETHICS; OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
ETHICS; 
 
 OR, 
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
 THE words Ethics and Morals have the same 
 meaning : the first comes from the Greek aeoc, 
 and the second from the Latin mores. 
 
 Ethics is the practical science which directs human 
 actions toward honesty. 
 
 Human actions are those which we perform as 
 human beings, that is, with the knowledge of •the 
 intellect and the consent of the will. Actions per- 
 formed without this knowledge or consent are called 
 the actions of man {actus hominis). 
 
 We have already said, in Ontology, that there 
 exists in the world a two-fold order, the physical 
 and the moral. 
 
 Beings deprived of their liberty necessarily follow 
 the order assigned them by their Creator ; so that 
 if there is disorder, the disorder cannot be attributed 
 to them as the cause thereof: consequently they 
 deserve neither praise nor blame. 
 
 Beings endowed with liberty are responsible for 
 their actions; according to their own wish, they 
 follow or refuse to follow the order assigned them : 
 and this is the first principle of human actions. 
 
178 ethics; 
 
 Human actions may be considered both in general 
 and in particular ; hence the division of this Part 
 into two dissertations. 
 
 FIRST DISSERTATION. 
 
 ON HUMAN ACTIONS IN GENEEAL. 
 
 Human actions are considered in general when 
 they are examined abstractly, that is, the special 
 state of man being laid aside. 
 
 We have hrstto examine whether there are actions 
 which are good and others which are bad, also what 
 is the source of each and how we may make a dis- 
 tinction between them. Hence the division of this 
 dissertation into three chapters ; in the first of which 
 we shall treat of the difference between good and 
 bad actions, in the second of the principles of these 
 actions, and in the third of the rules marking dis- 
 tinctions between them. 
 
 CHAPTER FIRST. 
 
 Of the Difference Between Good and Bad Actions. 
 
 It would be useless to give rules of conduct if there 
 were no difference between good and evil. We 
 must consequently first determine whether there is 
 such a difference, and if so whether there is any 
 natural obligation of doing good and avoiding evil. 
 In order to proceed methodically we shall divide this 
 chanter into five articles. In the first we shall ex- 
 
OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 179 
 
 amine whether there is any difference between good 
 and evil ; and in the second, whether there is an 
 obligation to do good and avoid evil, that is, whether 
 there is a natural law : in the third we shall estab- 
 lish the fact of the promulgation of that law ; in 
 the fourth we shall prove that the law is immutable ; 
 and in the fifth we shall show what is its sanction. 
 
 Article First. — The Difference Between Moral 
 Good and Moral Evil. 
 
 This difference has been denied by Epicurus and 
 his disciples, by Hobbes and Spinosa, and by 
 the modern deists, as Helvetius, La Mettrie and 
 d'Holbach. Their principles are, first, that man 
 has received no useless faculties from nature, and 
 consequently that what is possible to him is also law- 
 ful for him ; and, second, that, in order to obtain 
 security for themselves, men made an agreement to 
 abstain from actions which might be injurious to the 
 general welfare, from which, they say, resulted the 
 distinction between good and evil. 
 
 But we affirm that there is an essential difference 
 between good and evil, as there is an essential differ- 
 ence between truth and falsehood ; and, to prove 
 this, we will establish the following 
 
 Proposition. — Moral good and moral evil are es- 
 sentially different. 
 
 I. We prove this proposition first by its own evi- 
 dence. What the mind clearly perceives as existing 
 does really exist. But we clearly perceive the 
 difference spoken of in the proposition ; it therefore 
 does exist. For instance, the mind clearly perceives 
 
180 ethics; 
 
 that it is right to honor our parents and wrong to in- 
 sult them. The knowledge of this difference being 
 a primary truth, its existence cannot be directly de- 
 monstrated. 
 
 II. In the second place, we prove this truth by 
 the unanimous consent of mankind. That this con- 
 sent exists we mar know by daily experience, by the 
 annals of all nations and by the language of every 
 people. We may moreover prove it by the manner 
 of acting of those whose advantage it would be to 
 deny the existence of this difference. There is not 
 a wicked person who would not like to call his bad 
 actions good, if he could do so ; and the very fact 
 that he tries to do it shows that he admits that there 
 is a difference between good and evil. The remorse 
 which he feels is the best evidence of the truth of the 
 proposition. It may further be proved by the man- 
 ner of acting of those who deny theoretically the 
 existence of the difference ; for these same deists, 
 like all men, praise virtue and condemn vice. Since 
 then this general consent exists, since it concerns a 
 matter of great importance, and since it is in oppo- 
 sition to our passions, it must be an infallible motive 
 of certitude. As we have said in Logic., such a 
 consent could not come from education, prejudice or 
 agreement ; it must therefore come from nature, 
 and is consequently the expression of truth. 
 
 III. Thirdly, we prove this proposition by noting 
 the absurd consequences of the opposite doctrine. 
 If this difference did not exist, then good and evil 
 would be the same ; but this is in contradiction to the 
 common sense of men and their practices in daily 
 
OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. • 181 
 
 life. If this difference is not essential, but the re- 
 sult of an agreement, it would follow that to-morrow 
 men might agree that it is right to insult our parents 
 and wrong to honor them, which is evidently ab- 
 surd. Hence we conclude that there is an essential 
 difference between good and evil, that this difference 
 is based upon the essence of things and upon the 
 first principles of morals, and that neither God nor 
 man could alter them. 
 
 The principles of morals are of course the same 
 for all men. However, in regard to the application 
 of these principles we find a great diversity of 
 opinion ; and, in regard to their remoter conse- 
 quences, even the most learned men do not agree. All 
 peoples, for instance, know that it is right, and even 
 obligatory on us, to honor our parents ; yet nations 
 are found where men think it an act of kindness to 
 kill their parents when they become very old. The 
 love of parents for their children has also been 
 strangely abused by those who, through fear of 
 future want or misery, think it allowable to kill 
 their own offspring. Objections to our proposition 
 may. be answered by the aid of these remarks. 
 
 Article Second. — The Obligation of Doing Good 
 
 and Avoiding Evil, or the Existence oe the 
 
 Natural Law. 
 
 The word law is probably derived from ligare, to 
 bind. A law is a precept which is common to all, 
 just, stable, given by a superior, sufficiently pro- 
 mulgated and sanctioned. 
 
 Law is a precept, and not an advice ; common to all 
 
182 ethics; 
 
 and consequently different from a mandate, which 
 is made for certain persons ; just, for no one can 
 command that which is unjust ; stable, because it is 
 not a transitory act, permanence being essential to 
 it ; sufficiently promulgated, for it must be made 
 known, and this can be done only by promulgation ; 
 given by a superior, a legitimate superior only having 
 the power to command and to exact obedience ; 
 sufficiently sanctioned ; for otherwise the superior 
 could not realize his end. 
 
 There is no superior unless there are subjects. 
 
 The power to command supposes the obligation of 
 obedience. 
 
 The obligation of obedience to lav/ is not deduced 
 from human reason, considered in itself, but from 
 the supreme dominion of God. The obligation of 
 obedience to a law cannot be deduced from the 
 human reason considered absolutely ; because, in 
 order to impose an obligation, two wills are necessary, 
 the one of a superior having a right to command, 
 and the other of an inferior who is bound to obey : 
 but the human will, considered abstractly from God, 
 is not that of a superior, all men being naturally 
 equal ; hence the human will cannot create an 
 obligation. The obligation must therefore come 
 from the authority of God ; and when a man com- 
 mands he does so as holding the place of God : omnis 
 auctoritas a Deo, all authority proceeds from God. 
 
 Consequently, according to the Atheists there could 
 be no obligation of obedience. 
 
 From all eternity, God sees the supreme order of 
 the essence and relations of things. This order 
 
OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 183 
 
 constitutes the law which, is called moral, when 
 considered in reference to free and intelligent beings ; 
 and the disturbance of this same order constitutes 
 moral evil. 
 
 The supreme reason existing in God, determining 
 in a fixed manner what may be done and what may 
 not bs done, is called the eternal law. The eternal 
 law is therefore the Avill of God commanding the 
 maintenance and forbidding the disturbance of the 
 natural order of things. 
 
 The natural law is a participation of the eternal 
 law by rational creatures. We may define it to be 
 a precept by which God commands us to fulfill the 
 duties which arise from the nature of things ; the 
 necessity of which our reason may know, either by 
 itself, or by the aid of another being. 
 
 Proposition. — There exists a natural law. 
 
 I. We might first give as an evidence of this truth 
 several passages of the Holy Scripture, quoted or 
 found even in the writings of pagans, as that of 
 Psalm xxxiii — 15, Diverte a malo et fac bonum, 
 avoid evil and do good. 
 
 II. We have seen that there exists in the world a 
 supreme order, but it is impossible to admit that 
 God does not take care to have that order respected 
 and observed by his free creatures : to admit that 
 God looks with indifference on all our actions would 
 be to deny his wisdom, his sanctity, etc. 
 
 III. If we except the Epicureans, we find that 
 the legislators and the peoples of all ages have be- 
 lieved that God regards the actions of men, in order 
 to reward the good and punish the wicked ; and we 
 
IS! ethics; 
 
 know that such a consent is an infallible motive of 
 certitude. 
 
 Article Third. — The Promulgation of the Natural 
 Law. 
 
 I. There is no one having the use of reason who 
 does not perceive within himself the presence of a 
 light by the aid of which he can discern good from 
 evil, and judge surely that some of his actions are 
 right and others wrong. This light, found in the 
 minds of all men. must come from God. the author 
 of nature, and must therefore be the means of show- 
 ing us what is his will. Thus the natural law is 
 made manifest to us. and this manifestation is its 
 promulgation, and creates for us an obligation of 
 obedience. Xo form is required for such promulga- 
 tion : it is sufficient for us that the will oV God has 
 been made known to us . 
 
 In the same manner the first precepts of morals 
 are made evident to our souls. However, this light, 
 which is merely rational, is exceedingly feeble in 
 some men. and in others it is almost obscured, espe- 
 cially concerning several consequences deduced from 
 first principles. In order to help our natural weak- 
 ness God has further enlightened our minds by 
 revelation, by the authority of the Church and by 
 tradition. 
 
 To conclude, we may say that conscience, even 
 when aided by education, could not discover many 
 things which by deduction belong to the natural 
 law : it is therefore no "wonder that many philos- 
 ophers, not enlightened by revelation, have given 
 forth so manv absurd and even monstrous syst 
 
OH, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 185 
 
 II. It lias been a question whether, in the present 
 state of things, there can be an invincible ignorance 
 of the natural law. By invincible ignorance is un- 
 derstood such an ignorance as cannot be removed by 
 the ordinary help of nature and grace. The con- 
 trary is called vincible ignorance. Some rigid doc- 
 tors, chiefly of the University of Louvain, have 
 contended that there can be no invincible ignorance 
 even of the most remote consequences of the viola- 
 tion of the natural law ; because, they contend, these 
 consequences are essentially bad, and no one can be 
 invincibly ignorant of what is essentially wrong, 
 
 This opinion is generally rejected. We know 
 that this invincible ignorance exists,, since we see 
 the most learned' doctors, as St. Thomas and St. 
 Bonaventure, giving contradictory solutions to ques- 
 tions resting on the natural law. But concerning 
 the primary precepts of the natural law and the 
 proximate conclusions deduced from them, there is 
 of course no invincible ignorance in any man with 
 the use of his reason. 
 
 III. The judgment of the mind concerning the 
 morality of an action performed or about to be per- 
 formed by it is called the conscience. Hence in 
 Ethics we do not consider the conscience merely as 
 a faculty, but also as an action. 
 
 As this subject belongs to theology we shall here 
 content ourselves with a few general remarks. 
 
 Conscience is either true or false, certain or 
 doubtful. 
 
 A true conscience is one which declares lawful or 
 
186 ethics; 
 
 unlawful that which really is so ; a false one being, 
 of course, the contrary. 
 
 A certain conscience is one 'which judges pru- 
 dently, and without any fear of probable error, that 
 some action is good or bad. Hence we may see that 
 a certain conscience may not be a true one ; such a 
 conscience, when in error, is said to be invincibly 
 erroneous. 
 
 A doubtful conscience is one which abstains from 
 judging, because it perceives on both sides opposing 
 reasons. 
 
 1st. It is plain that a true, or at least a certain, 
 conscience must be the rule of all our actions. 
 
 2nd. It is never allowable for us to act against 
 our conscience, even if it should 'afterwards appear 
 that our conscience was is error ; for to act against 
 our conscience is to be willing to commit sin. 
 
 Article Fourth. — The Immutability of the Natural 
 Law. 
 
 The immutability of the natural law consists in 
 this, that what is declared good by the natural law 
 can never become bad, and vice versa. 
 
 Proposition.- — The natural law is immutable. 
 
 This is proved, first, by the intrinsic goodness of 
 certain actions, and the intrinsic badness of others. 
 
 Certain actions, as the honor due to God, are per- 
 ceived by us to be so intrinsically good, and others 
 are perceived to be so intrinsically bad, that never, 
 in any hypothesis, can they be otherwise. Hence 
 the law which commands us to observe this necessary 
 order is immutable. 
 
OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 187 
 
 In the second place, the moral axioms, or the first 
 principles of the natural law, are necessary truths, 
 just as the mathematical axioms are necessary truths. 
 The principle ' ' We must give to every one what 
 belongs to him," is as necessarily true and immuta- 
 ble as the axiom " The whole is equal to the sum 
 of its parts." Hence the natural law is immutable, 
 and can suffer neither dispensation nor derogation. 
 
 Some facts of Holy Scripture have been quoted 
 against the truth of this proposition ; as the com- 
 mand of God to Abraham to kill his son, and to the 
 Israelites to take the vessels of the Egyptians. In 
 the first there was no violation of the natural law, 
 for this law forbids us to inflict death on our fellow- 
 men by private authority ; but God, being the su- 
 preme master of our lives, may, in virtue of his 
 divine authority, command any one for a just cause 
 to take away the life of another. In the case of the 
 Egyptians, the Hebrews merely took back what was 
 their own. In neither case therefore was there any 
 dispensation or abrogation of the natural law. 
 
 Article Fifth. — The Sanction of the Natural Law. 
 
 By the sanction of the natural law, we understand 
 the reward bestowed on those who observe the law, 
 and the punishment inflicted on those who violate 
 it. In regard to this sanction we proceed to prove 
 the following propositions :* 
 
 First Proposition. — God has established a sanction 
 for the natural law. 
 
 God being infinitely wise and powerful, has taken 
 the proper means to secure the observation of the 
 
18S ethics; 
 
 laws which lie has established. But, considering 
 the natural disposition of men, it is evident that a 
 sanction is necessary for the enforcement of the 
 natural law ; for if left to his own inclinations man 
 will not obey unless he forces himself, and he will 
 not force himself unless he is compelled to do so : 
 for this compulsion duty is not always a sufficient 
 motive ; rewards and punishments must he provided. 
 Hence God must have established a sanction for the 
 natural law. 
 
 Second Proposition. — The natural law lias some 
 sanction even in this world, but this sanction is incom- 
 plete and even void if separated from the sanction of 
 another life. 
 
 1st. The natural law has some sanction even in 
 this world, that is, some reward is bestowed on those 
 who observe the law, and some punishment is in- 
 flicted on those who violate it ; for experience shows 
 that virtue makes a man happy, so far as it is pos- 
 sible to be happy in this world, and, on the contrary, 
 that vice makes him unhappy. 
 
 2nd. This sanction, in the present life, is incom- 
 plete ; because it is not in strict proportion to the 
 merit of virtue or the demerit of vice ; and because, 
 as we all know, there are many virtuous actions that 
 have no reward in this world, and many vicious ones 
 that receive no punishment. 
 
 3d. Moreover this sanction, in the present life, is 
 almost void if separated from the sanction of the 
 future life. Virtue makes one happy because it 
 brings peace of conscience, and vice renders one un- 
 happy because it is followed by remorse of conscience ; 
 
OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 189 
 
 "but if we remove the certitude of another life this 
 peace and this remorse would have no real founda- 
 tion. 
 
 All admit, when they speak seriously, that the 
 desire of enjoying a good name among men, the 
 intrinsic beauty of virtue, and the deformity of vice, 
 are not sufficient motives for securing the observance 
 of the natural law. 
 
 We may conclude, from these considerations, that 
 there is another life ; and that that life will be eter- 
 nally happy for the good, for Grod can never cease 
 to love them ; and eternally unhappy for the wicked, 
 this eternity of punishment not being repugnant to 
 the justice, wisdom or goodness of God. This last 
 conclusion, concerning the eternal duration of re- 
 wards and punishments, has always been believed by 
 the generality of mankind. 
 
 Note.' — It is worthy of inquiry whether one who 
 observes the law on account of its sanction, that is, 
 on account of the hope of reward or the fear of pun- 
 ishment, performs a good moral action. 
 
 We must distinguish: 1st. He who abstains from 
 evil on account of mere hope or fear, but retains the 
 desire to do evil if the sanction were removed, does 
 not perform a good action, because his will is evil. 
 2nd. He who observes the law, on account of the 
 hope of reward or the fear of punishment, but also 
 with the desire of thus doing his duty, performs a 
 good action, for he does good on account oT the duty 
 resting upon him. 3d. He who observes the law 
 on account of the hope of reward or the fear of pun- 
 
190 
 
 ethics; 
 
 ishment, without considering the question of right 
 or duty, does not indeed perform a bad action ; but 
 his action is less perfect than that of the man who 
 acts on account of duty. 
 
 CHAPTEK SECOND. 
 Of the Principles of Good and Bad Actions. 
 
 These principles are the sources of goodness and 
 wickedness ; they are, the intellect, liberty and the 
 will. 
 
 1st. It is certain that in order that an action be 
 good or bad, it is necessary ihe intellect should know 
 it to be such before it is performed. An act done 
 without the knowledge of the intellect is not a human 
 action. 
 
 2nd. It is also certain that liberty in the actor is 
 necessary for the morality of a human action. If 
 the actor is not free, the act cannot be considered 
 his own. An act done through necessity must be 
 charged, not to the agent, but to the cause which 
 determined him to act. 
 
 3d. Again, it is certain that the will only is the 
 cause and the foundation of sin ; as it is also the 
 cause and the foundation of virtue. The will, 
 understood in this sense, is consequently human 
 liberty in exercise. 
 
 The will considered in the act, is either simple or 
 free. Its operation is called volition.* Volition is 
 itself either simple or free. It is simple when there 
 is knowledge of the intellect and consent of the will ; 
 
 * This word means here what the authors express by voluntarium. 
 
OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 191 
 
 it is free when besides these two there is also delib- 
 eration. Hence what is free is voluntary, but what 
 is voluntary is not necessarily free. For instance, 
 we seek our happiness voluntarily, but not freely. 
 It is free volition only which is the principle of our 
 actions. 
 
 Volition is direct when something is positively 
 and in itself .intended by the agent ; and indirect 
 when something is willed, not in itself, but in the 
 cause of which it is the effect. For instance, if one 
 burst a shell for mere amusement, and thus accident- 
 ally kill a man, he does not will the death of the man 
 directly but indirectly. 
 
 Volition is perfect if it does not suppose any re- 
 pugnance of the will, otherwise it is imperfect. An 
 example of imperfect volition is that of a merchant 
 at sea who throws his goods overboard for fear of 
 shipwreck. 
 
 The causes which may diminish or destroy the 
 freedom of the will are : force, fear, error, ignorance 
 and passion. 
 
 CHAPTER THIRD. 
 
 Rules for Distinguishing G-ood from Bad Actions. 
 
 It is clear that we must avoid everything which 
 is bad, but that we are not obliged to do everything 
 which is good, as this latter would be impossible. 
 Hence, the precept to avoid evil is negative and uni- 
 versal, whereas the command to do good is affirmative 
 and particular. The first obliges always and in all 
 cases ; while the second obliges always, but not in 
 all cases. The questions which belong to this chapter 
 
192 
 
 ethics; 
 
 are all theological, and are fully examined in the 
 treatise on "Human Actions." 
 
 SECOND DISSERTATION. 
 
 ON HUMAN ACTIONS IN PAKTICULAK. 
 
 Alan, as a moral agent, may he considered in three 
 points of view, in his relations with God, with 
 himself and with his fellow-men. Hence the three 
 varieties of His special duties. 
 
 Duty means the same as obligation. It is a moral 
 restriction of the natural powers of a person. This 
 is called a moral restriction, because duty imposes 
 not a physical, but a moral restraint. 
 
 This restriction is the result of the power which 
 one being has either of doing something without 
 hindrance from another being, or of exacting some- 
 thing from that other being : this last power is 
 called right. Hence right is the cause or origin of 
 duty ; they are correlative, and one cannot exist, or 
 be conceived, without the other. 
 
 Eight is then the lawful authority of one being to 
 do something, or to exact something of another 
 being. From this definition, it is easy to' conceive 
 how duty results from right: First, if a being has 
 lawful authority to act in a certain manner, all other 
 beings are bound not to impede his action : and^ 
 second, if a being has lawful authority to exact an 
 action from another being, that other being is bound 
 to perform the required action. 
 
OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 193 
 
 The duties of men are of three kinds, according 
 to the division given above : duties towards God, 
 towards themselves, and towards one another. There 
 can be no other kind of duties, as, for 'instance, 
 towards beings without reason ; for such beings can 
 have no right, and hence there can be no obligation 
 in regard to. them. 
 
 CHAPTER FIRST. 
 
 Of the Duties of Men towards God. 
 
 The duties of men towards God, taken altogether, 
 are called worship. Concerning this we have two 
 questions to examine, 1st, Is man bound to worship 
 God? and, 2nd^ Did God supernaturally reveal to 
 man the manner in which He must be worshiped? 
 
 This second question, which is theological, is fully 
 discussed in the treatise u On Religion/' in the- 
 ology. Here we have to examine only the first 
 question, which we shall do by establishing the ne- 
 cessity of religious worship, and by giving the 
 causes which induce .men either to neglect or to 
 corrupt that worship. . 
 
 *A.rticle First. — -The Necessity of Religious 
 Worship. 
 
 "Worship is both interior and exterior. Interior 
 worship is the sum of all our duties towards God, 
 in so much as they consist in certain interior acts of 
 the mind, as to love, to submit our will to the will 
 of God, etc. Exterior worship is the outward man- 
 ifestation of our interior worship ; and is itself either 
 9 
 
194 ethics; 
 
 private or public. Private worship is that paid to 
 God by men in their own name ; and public wor- 
 ship is that rendered to God by men as members of 
 society. 
 
 Concerning the necessity of religious worship, as 
 thus explained, we establish the following proposi- 
 tions : 
 
 First Proposition. — Man is hound to give interior 
 tvorsliij) to God. 
 
 Man is bound to act towards God in accordance 
 with the attributes of God and man's own condi- 
 tion ; and both of these require an interior worship 
 of man towards God. 
 
 1st. The attributes of God. God is infinitely 
 perfect, and must therefore be loved by his creatures ; 
 he has supreme dominion over all things, and must* 
 therefore be adored : but love and adoration are both 
 acts of interior worship. 
 
 2nd.. The condition of man. Man having been 
 created by God, is obliged in return to give to him, 
 as to his last end, all his actions and even his being 
 itself; having been the object of the divine favor, he is 
 obliged to return thanks to God ; and being in need 
 of divine assistance, he is obliged to ask the help of 
 God : but the direction of our actions towards Goa, 
 thanksgiving for favors and petitions for help, are 
 all acts of interior worship. Hence the proposition. 
 
 Interior worship consists, first, in loving, for love 
 being the noblest faculty of the soul is also the first ; 
 and second, in obeying, for obedience is the proof of 
 our love. Besides these duties, adoration, offering 
 
OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 195 
 
 one's self to God, thanksgiving and prayer are so 
 many acts of interior worship. 
 
 Second Proposition. — Man is obliged to render to 
 God an exterior worship. 
 
 This proposition may he proved, first, by the ne- 
 cessity there is for this worship, in order that we 
 may he assured of the reality of our interior worship ; 
 for man cannot feel deeply without showing what 
 he feels hy some exterior signs. Hence, where there 
 is no exterior worship there may be doubt whether 
 there is any interior. 
 
 It may be proved, in the second place, by the 
 necessity of exterior worship for the preservation of 
 the interior. Experience shows that the sense of 
 religion is not long retained in our mind unless it 
 is stirred and warmed, as it were, by exterior signs. 
 
 Thirdly, exterior worship is necessary, because it 
 is the tribute paid by our body to God, as interior 
 worship is the tribute of the soul. Both owe wor- 
 ship to God, who is the author of both soul and 
 body. 
 
 Third Proposition. — Man is bound to give public 
 ivorship to God. 
 
 This proposition is ^proved by these two consider- 
 ations : 1st. Public worship is necessary for the 
 preservation of both interior and exterior worship ; 
 experience shows the truth of this, especially in the 
 case of ignorant and uncultivated persons. 2nd. 
 Public worship is the tribute due to God by the 
 moral body called society ; and, besides, society, as 
 a body, having need of. assistance, must seek it from 
 God. 
 
196 ethics; 
 
 Fourth Proposition. — The necessity of interior, 
 exterior and public worship is proved by the unani- 
 mous consent of mankind. 
 
 This is a fact which no one can deny ; and this 
 unanimous consent is an infallible motive of certi- 
 tude. Cicero says: "Each state has its own reli- 
 gion;" and Plutarch: " Xo one has ever seen a 
 place without worship." 
 
 Note. — The principal signs that constitute as it 
 were the essence of exterior and public worship are : 
 vocal prayer, singing, certain reverential motions 
 and postures of the body, sacrifice and burning of 
 incense. 
 
 When man frequently fulfills his duties to God 
 he acquires an ease and pleasure in worship which 
 soon becomes a habit. This habit is called piety, 
 or a religious disposition. 
 
 Piety is therefore the virtue which inclines men 
 to give to God the veneration and worship, both 
 interior and exterior, which is his due. There is, 
 however, a difference between piety and a disposition 
 to fulfill our religious duties. This religious dispo- 
 sition is the state of mind of one who is unwilling 
 to omit to render to God the worship which is due 
 to him ; while piety disposes one not only to render 
 to God the worship which is due to him, but also to 
 do this with fervor and great reverence. 
 
 Piety is both interior and exterior : the first is a 
 habitual intercourse existing interior]}* between God 
 and the soul ; the second consists in exterior prac- 
 tices of devotion. Piety is true and solid only when 
 
OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 197 
 
 it is both interior and exterior. Solid piety is the 
 most sure foundation of morality. 
 
 Article Second. — The Causes which Induce Men 
 either to Neglect or to Corrupt the Worship of 
 God. 
 
 I. The causes that lead men to neglect divine 
 worship are of two kinds : those that lead them to * 
 deny even in theory the necessity of divine worship, 
 and those that induce them to omit this worship in 
 practice. Of the first kind are atheism, and a false 
 opinion of providence, as in the case of those who 
 deny that G-od wants any worship, or that he cares 
 for it. Of the second are indifference in matters of 
 religion, very common as we all know, and the 
 slavery of the passions ; this slavery is very much 
 opposed to the worship of God, as it is a true 
 idolatry.. Very many of these idolators are found 
 in the world. 
 
 II. The causes that alter and corrupt divine wor- 
 ship are : idolatry, superstition, and lack of solid 
 interior piety, that is, lip-worship instead of heart- 
 worship. These causes corrupt not only divine 
 worship, hut also public morals. This is especially 
 the case with idolatry : the pagan world furnishes 
 a most shameful example of the fact. 
 
 CHAPTER SECOND. 
 
 Op the Duties of Man towards Himself. 
 
 These duties may be reduced to two : the obliga- 
 tion of preserving the life of the body, and that of 
 cultivating: the faculties of the mind. 
 
198 ethics; 
 
 Article First. — The Obligation of Preserving the 
 Life of the Body. 
 To preserve his life man must avoid suicide, and 
 not otherwise expose himself without sufficient cause 
 to the danger of losing his life or his health. 
 
 I. Suicide. 
 
 Suicide is the act of a man who willingly and 
 knowingly kills himself. We will first proceed to 
 show that suicide is unlawful, and, secondly, that the 
 arguments which are brought forward to justify it 
 are futile. 
 
 First Proposition. — Suicide is unlawful. 
 
 That is unlawful which is contrary to the destiny 
 intended for man upon earth, and which is opposed 
 to the glory of God, to the good of society and to 
 the natural propensities of men ; but such is suicide. 
 
 1st. Suicide is contrary to the destiny intended 
 for man upon earth. The present life is a time of 
 probation : this follows from the fact of human lib- 
 erty, and that of the existence of another life. For, 
 since man can do either good or evil, and con- 
 sequently gain merit or demerit, and since he is 
 destined for another life which will be eternally 
 happy or eternally miserable, it is evident that the 
 present life is a time of probation. That it is not 
 lawful for a man, by his own authority, to diminish 
 the time of this probation imposed by God, is also 
 clear ; because it must be unlawful for a creature to 
 oppose the end designed by his creator, and because 
 it is essential to the nature of probation that its 
 duration be not left to the choice of him who is in 
 
OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 199 
 
 the state of probation, but rather of Him who has 
 established the probation. 
 
 But by suicide a man diminishes the time of his 
 probation, since he voluntarily deserts the station 
 in which he has been placed by God. Hence suicide 
 is, in the first place, contrary to the destiny intended 
 by his Creator for man upon earth. 
 
 2nd. Suicide is opposed to the glory of God, since 
 man by continuing to practice virtue glorifies God, 
 whereas if he commits suicide he voluntarily refuses 
 to serve God and thus opposes himself to the promo- 
 tion of God's glory. 
 
 Suicide is also opposed to the good of society ; for 
 if suicide were declared lawful there is no doubt that 
 many would persuade themselves that it would be 
 better for them to die, and thus numbers of useful 
 members would be cut off from society. 
 
 Suicide, finally, is opposed to the natural propen- 
 sities of men : it is opposed to common sense, for all 
 men admire and esteem those who are patient' and 
 resigned in the sufferings of this life ; it is opposed 
 to our instinctive love of life, and this love being 
 acknowledged by all men must be the voice of nature, 
 which it is unlawful for us to disobey. 
 
 Observation. — Suicide is a most cruel act to one's 
 self, since it hurls him headlong into the midst of 
 the greatest calamities. He who is guilty of this 
 crime dies in the actual commission of a bad action, 
 and consequently puts it out of his power to make 
 any atonement for the wrong which he does. His 
 fate is the most deplorable that can befall a human 
 Tbeina;. 
 
200 ethics; 
 
 Second Proposition. — The arguments in favor of 
 suicide are futile. 
 
 This proposition is a corollary of the first : if sui- 
 cide be unlawful, then all arguments in its favor must 
 be vain. We shall, however, completely expose the 
 fallacy of all these arguments. Some declare that 
 suicide is lawful, because, they say, life is a gift 
 which we can renounce ; others pretend to believe it 
 an act of courage; others, again, affirm that it is a 
 right of nature ; and others, finally, would persuade 
 us that it is an act quite indifferent in its character. 
 
 First reason : That life is a gift of God which we 
 may renounce whenever it is useless to us and to 
 others, and, a fortiori, whenever it becomes an intol- 
 erable burden. 
 
 Life is not a mere gift, granted without any con- 
 dition and to be renounced whenever we please. By 
 the very fact of our existence we are bound to serve 
 God, not as we will, but as He wills ; and, conse- 
 quently, as long as He keeps us in this life, we must 
 serve Him, and we are never allowed to change, by 
 our own will, that way of serving him, by passing 
 into another life. Hence we cannot lawfully re- 
 nounce the gift of our own existence. 
 
 Nor is life ever useless to man. Whatever be his 
 condition he can always make himself more and 
 more worthy of that future beatitude for which this 
 present life is a preparation. 
 
 Nor even when life seems to be an intolerable bur- 
 den is it allowed to man to take it away. Whatever 
 be the sufferings which make life seem intolerable, 
 they can never constitute a motive for committing 
 
OR; MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 201 
 
 suicide ; on the "contrary, trie greater the trials of 
 this life the better are they to enable us to reach the 
 end for which we have been destined, and indeed 
 life, in order to be a probation, must be burdensome. 
 
 Besides, it is not true that life is ever entirely 
 intolerable ; for the trials of life are never so great 
 that man may not bear them, provided he has firm 
 confidence in Grocl. The examples of many good 
 persons have amply proved this in their sufferings. 
 If therefore one who does not believe in the existence 
 of Providence finds himself unable to bear the ills 
 of this life, he cannot bring forward his unbelief as 
 a lawful cause for committing suicide. 
 
 Second reason : That suicide is lawful and praise- 
 worthy because it is an act of courage. 
 
 Such was the assertion of the Stoics ; but it is not 
 true, for the man who kills himself because he can- 
 not bear his trials does not perform a courageous act, 
 but a cowardly one, as even the pagans themselves 
 acknowledged. 
 
 Third reason : That suicide is a natural right, as 
 J. J. Eousseau and other deists have pretended. 
 
 This is false, since men cannot have received from 
 nature a right which is in opposition to the design 
 which their Creator had in view, namely, as we have 
 seen, that this life should be a time of probation. 
 Suicide is opposed to this design of G-od, and hence 
 cannot be a natural right. 
 
 Fourth reason : That suicide is an act indifferent 
 in its character, as Montesquieu, Voltaire, and the 
 Encyclopedists have affirmed, since, says Montes- 
 9* 
 
202 ethics; 
 
 quieu, suicide does not disturb the order established 
 by divine Providence. 
 
 We have shown, in our answer to the third rea- 
 son and elsewhere, that suicide does disturb the 
 order established by Providence, since it is opposed 
 to the end designed by Grod ; hence it is not an indif- 
 ferent act. 
 
 From the answers given above, we may conclude, 
 first, that it is not lawful to kill one's self in order 
 to avoid a more cruel death, and, secondly, that it 
 is not lawful to commit suicide even in order to 
 avoid the danger of committing sin, for to him that 
 confides in G-od the occasion of sin is never insur- 
 mountable. 
 
 II. Danger of Losing Life or Health. 
 
 1st. It is clear that we are not permitted to expose 
 our life when there is not a good reason for so doing, 
 which reason must be of equal gravity with the 
 danger incurred. Consequently, it is not lawful to 
 expose our life for mere amusement. 
 
 2nd. It is clear, on the other hand, that it is lawful 
 for us to expose ourselves to a probable or a certain 
 danger of death, provided there is a reasonable cause 
 for so doing, the gravity of the cause being in pro- 
 portion to that of the danger. We may expose our 
 life in order to obtain a greater good, as for the wel- 
 fare of the State, or to preserve the life of another. 
 
 3d. It is further clear that such exposure of life 
 is not only lawful but even praiseworthy. 
 
 4th. And, finally., it is clear that sometimes it is 
 not only lawful and praiseworthy, but even obliga- 
 
OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 203 
 
 tory for us to expose ourselves to certain danger of 
 death. This is always the case in reference to our 
 duties ; for instance, a soldier must keep his post at 
 any risk, and a priest must attend his sick parish- 
 ioners, even when they are dying of pestilence. 
 
 Observation. — Although certain trades and occu- 
 pations are unhealthy, or otherwise endanger life, 
 yet on account of their general utility it is lawful to 
 follow them, even though this utility he of mere 
 temporary importance. 
 
 What we have said concerning the danger of losing 
 life may also he applied to the danger of losing our 
 health. 
 
 Article Second. — The Obligation of Cultivating 
 the Faculties of the Mind. 
 
 Proposition. — We are all obliged to cultivate and 
 perfect the natural faculties and aptitudes of our mind. 
 
 God gave us those faculties and aptitudes only 
 that we might use them for promoting His glory 
 and the good of ourselves and our fellow men. In 
 order to promote the glory of Grod, we must culti- 
 vate the seeds of virtue which have been implanted 
 in our heart ; and in order to do good to ourselves 
 and our fellow men, we must cultivate those apti- 
 tudes which we have received for following some 
 occupation useful to mankind. 
 
 The faculties which we must cultivate are the 
 intellect, the sensibility and the will. 
 
 (a) Culture of the Intellect. ■ 
 The intellect is cultivated by the acquisition of 
 
204: ethics; 
 
 knowledge; and this knowledge may be necessary, 
 useful or hurtful. 
 
 1st. Necessary knowledge. Every one should 
 acquire that knowledge which is necessary to enable 
 him to attain his end, in other words, that knowledge 
 which concerns the general duties of men. These 
 duties are nowhere so clearly pointed out as in the 
 Christian doctrine. Every one should also apply 
 himself to the study of those things which concern 
 his special duties in life. 
 
 2nd. Useful knowledge. By useful knowledge is 
 meant, not that which is necessary to enable us to 
 discharge the duties of life, but that which may 
 enable us to discharge these duties in a more perfect 
 manner. But the acquisition of that knowledge 
 which is only useful should never interfere with the 
 acquisition of that which is necessary. A knowledge 
 of the liberal arts and the sciences constitutes what 
 may be called useful knowledge. 
 
 3d. Useless or hurtful knowledge. It is not 
 lawful to waste our time in the acquisition of useless 
 knowledge ; and the acquisition of hurtful know- 
 ledge, such as may be had from the reading of 
 bad books, is positively forbidden : for by such 
 knowledge the intellect is weakened and corrupted, 
 and we are prevented from attaining the end for 
 which we have been placed in this world. * 
 
 Note. — -In order to acquire sound knowledge, we 
 should, 1st, be careful not to study too many things 
 at the same time ; 2nd, with the assistance of some 
 experienced person, Ave should choose the best books, 
 and read them with the most serious attention ; and, 
 
OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 205 
 
 3d, we should take particular notice of everything 
 important which we come across in reading. 
 
 It has been made a question whether the study of 
 the arts and sciences is hurtful to morals ; and also 
 whether it is profitable for people in general to 
 engage in the study of the sciences and the liberal 
 arts. 
 
 First question. — J. J. Rousseau, in a discourse 
 delivered at Dijon, tries to show that the study of 
 the arts and sciences corrupts good morals ; and, 
 consequently, of course, that this study does not im- 
 prove the morals. Against these assertions, we 
 establish the following 
 
 Proposition, — The culture of the arts and sciences 
 does not of itself corrupt the morals ; on the contrary, 
 this study exerts a powerful influence in favor of good 
 morals. 
 
 1st. That these studies do not corrupt the morals 
 is evident from the fact that the arts and sciences are 
 good in respect to their object, which object is the 
 development of a series of truths from certain prin- 
 ciples, or the expression of the beautiful in the physi- 
 cal and the moral order, or some other equally good 
 and proper end ; and the object being always thus 
 proper and good, the study which has this object in 
 view cannot be corrupting to the morals. 
 
 Experience also shows the falsity of Rousseau's 
 assertion ; for how many learned men are there whose 
 hone*sty and purity of morals are as remarkable as 
 their attainments in science. 
 
 Even Rousseau's own confession refutes him ; for 
 he has said in another discourse that he put forth 
 the above paradox for the sake of vanity. 
 
206 ethics; 
 
 2nd. The culture of the arts and sciences even im- 
 proves the morals. History shows that the ferocity 
 of men has always been in proportion to their igno- 
 rance. 
 
 We have shown that of itself this culture does 
 not corrupt morals : it may, however, do so inci- 
 dentally ; and hence we sometimes see learned men 
 whose conduct instead of being virtuous is exceed- 
 ingly vicious. These men abuse their knowledge, 
 and the more learned they are the greater is the 
 abuse of which they are guilty, according to the 
 maxim : corruptio optimi pessima, (the worst cor- 
 ruption is that of the wise) . But from this abuse of 
 knowledge certainly nothing can be proved against 
 knowledge itself, or against the culture of the arts 
 and sciences. 
 
 It is objected against this proposition that the 
 Egyptians, Greeks and Komans became wicked as 
 they became more learned. 
 
 Intellectual culture had nothing to do with this, 
 for the arts and sciences flourished in those countries 
 long before the people became corrupt. Many ex- 
 amples may be given, on the other hand, of nations 
 that became great and illustrious in consequence of 
 the spread of knowledge among them ; as the Franks 
 under Charlemagne, the Italians under Leo X., &c. 
 
 It is said also that many ancient nations remained 
 invincible so long as they remained ignorant ; as the 
 Persians, the Eomans, &c. The inference that 
 science caused the weakness of those nations is false ; 
 for it has not been proved that the study of science 
 lessens the warlike spirit. And even supposing 
 
OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 207 
 
 that such culture had weakened the courage of those 
 peoples, Ave should still have to examine whether 
 they were less happy after this warlike spirit declined 
 than they had been while their heroism rendered 
 them invincible : for, as the most courageous people 
 are often the slaves of the lowest vices, it is certain 
 that a warlike spirit alone is not sufficient to cause 
 the other virtues to flourish in a nation. 
 
 Second question. — Whether it is profitable for 
 people in general to engage in the study of the 
 sciences and the liberal arts. 
 
 That it is profitable for all people to know how 
 to read and write, and be acquainted with the 
 common branches of knowledge, is something which 
 we all know by experience. Beading especially 
 is very useful to help them in the acquisition of 
 the religious knowledge which is indispensable to 
 them. But it may perhaps remain a question 
 whether it is always profitable to children in humble 
 circumstances to be instructed in those arts and 
 sciences which will be of no service to them in the 
 sphere of life in which they have been placed by 
 Providence ; for such studies generally serve only to 
 disgust them with their condition, without enabling: 
 them to rise above it, unless indeed they are pos- 
 sessed of great natural talent. 
 
 (b) Culture of the Sensibility. 
 
 The various propensities of the sensibility may be 
 reduced to two : love and hatred. The first was 
 called by the ancients the concupiscible appetite, or 
 the appetite of desire ; and the second the irascible 
 appetite, or the appetite of anger. 
 
208 ethics; 
 
 1st. Love should be directed towards the supreme 
 good; and diverted from all bad or dangerous objects. 
 The supreme good is God, and all created good 
 must be loved for his sake, and in proportion to the 
 degree of its perfection, or its approach to the su- 
 preme good. 
 
 Love should be diverted from every bad and dan- 
 gerous object, that is, from everything which could 
 prevent man from attaining his end. Among these 
 dangerous objects are, bad books, most theatrical 
 exhibitions, public balls, masks, etc. 
 
 2nd. Hatred must be overcome by the repression 
 of the irascible appetite, so that it may not become 
 a habit, which would be so much opposed to our own 
 happiness and to the good of others. In order to 
 correct this natural disposition to anger, which is. 
 the source of hatred, we should always think well 
 of our neighbor's intentions and abstain from show- 
 ing any external marks of ill-humor. 
 
 (c) Culture of the Will. 
 
 The will is the first and constitutive faculty of 
 human morality. Its culture is of even more im- 
 portance that of all the other faculties, since they 
 serve only for the perfecting of the will. The cul- 
 ture and good, use of the will consists in avoiding 
 evil and doing good ; and, consequently, this culture 
 is the final object of the whole science of Ethics. 
 
OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 209 
 
 CHAPTER THIRD. 
 
 Of the Duties of Men towards One Another. 
 
 The first question that presents itself in this con- 
 nection is whether man was created for society, or 
 not. When this has been answered we will con- 
 sider the duties of men in their relations with 
 society. 
 
 Society is the union of many persons for the pur- 
 pose of attaining certain ends by their united efforts. 
 Since society is threefold, domestic, civil and uni- 
 versal, we shall consider the different duties of men 
 in reference to this threefold society. 
 
 Preliminary Article. — Destiny of man for the 
 state of society, and consequences resulting from 
 this state. 
 
 (A) Destiny of man for the state of society. 
 
 We here propose to give our chief attention to 
 the refutation of Rousseau, who pretended to believe 
 that man was not destined for the state of society, 
 and that the state of society is actually hurtful to 
 him, since it is the source of all the calamities and 
 all the vices in the world. 
 
 Proposition. — -Man toas born to live in society with 
 Ms fellow men. 
 
 Argument : Man was born for that state which is 
 required by his propensities and his necessities ; but 
 his propensities and necessities demand that he 
 should live in society with his fellows, and hence 
 he was born for that society. 
 
 Proof: 1st. His propensities require the state of 
 
210 ethi.cs; 
 
 society ; for all men have a certain inclination to 
 live in society, an inclination which we call the de- 
 sire of society : now this propensity is natural to 
 man, since it is found in every man and is inherent 
 in the human mind itself. That this propensity is 
 universal is evident from the fact that men have 
 always lived in society. In the beginning, as soon 
 as mankind became too numerous for the family 
 form of government, they established among them- 
 selves a sort of public polity, by which the supreme 
 authority was placed . in the h ands of one or more 
 persons. From this fact, which is well established 
 by history and tradition, we conclude that man was 
 created to live in civil and political, as well as in 
 domestic society. This propensity is inherent in 
 the human mind ; for experience shows that nothing 
 is more tedious to man than solitude. Consequent- 
 ly, the propensities of man jDrove that he was born 
 to live in society. 
 
 2nd. Man's necessities require the state of society. 
 Domestic society is necessary for the development of 
 man's intelligence and morality. A few examples 
 of persons who have lived in the forests like wild 
 beasts prove the truth of this assertion. 
 
 Civil society is necessary to man for the complete 
 development of his faculties. To fully develop his 
 aptitude for the cultivation of the arts and sciences, 
 man must have imitation and emulation, which are 
 to be found only in civil society. The wants of man 
 therefore render society necessary to man, and con- 
 sequently prove that he was born for society. 
 
 Principles to be observed in answering objections : 
 
OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 211 
 
 (a) The abuses sometimes found in society, as the 
 tyranny of rulers and the slavery of those subject 
 to them, do not prove that the state of society is in- 
 jurious to man ; because, first, these abuses are not 
 essentially connected with society, since they are not 
 found everywhere ; and,, secondly, the abuses of 
 tyranny and servitude would be greater and more 
 frequent in the savage state than they are in the 
 state of civilized society. 
 
 (b) Sickness and other infirmities, which are 
 sometimes said to be more frequent in a state of so- 
 ciety than in a savage state, do not show that the 
 state of society is hurtful to man ; because, first, 
 temperate and sober men, no matter where they live, 
 are always in good health ; and, secondly, although 
 the dwellers in the wilderness are often stronger, 
 they are not happier than those in civilized society, 
 for happiness is found only in the development of 
 all the powers of the body and the mind, especially 
 those of the latter, which are but feebly developed 
 in a savage state. 
 
 (B) Consequences resulting from the state of so- 
 ciety. — Inequality of condition in life, and right of 
 property. 
 
 Men cannot live in society with one another 
 unless there be some inequality of condition among 
 them, and unless the right to acquire and OAvn 
 property be recognized. 
 
 (a) Inequality of condition. 
 
 Here again we have to refute Eousseau, who taught 
 that this inequality is an evil and contrary to natural 
 right. Tliis doctrine has been accepted and taught 
 
212 ethic s ; 
 
 by St. Simon and Lis disciples who have labored to 
 do away with every privilege of origin, condition, 
 sex and nationality. To refute this system we 
 propose the following 
 
 Proposition. — Inequality of condition among men 
 is not opposed to natural right. 
 
 Argument : That which necessarily results from 
 man's nature, and from his destiny to live in society. 
 c mnot be contrary to natural right ; but such is the. 
 case with inequality of condition among men, hence 
 this inequality is not opposed to natural right. 
 
 Proof: First, this inequality results from man's 
 nature, since that nature subjects children to parents, 
 the younger to the older, the weaker to the stronger, 
 the ignorant to the learned, &c.,and thus establishes 
 unequal conditions among men : secondly, it results 
 from the destiny of men to live in society ; for no 
 civil society can exist unless there be rulers and 
 magistrates, the executors and defenders of the 
 laws, which the citizens are bound to respect, and 
 consequently unless there be among the citizens the 
 inequality resulting from the necessary exercise of 
 authority. 
 
 (b) The right of property. 
 
 We have already given the definition of right. 
 The right of property, or property, is the lawful 
 power of doing something or of requiring something 
 to be done for our own benefit, and of preventing 
 others from using that right. The things that form 
 the object of property are either movable or immova- 
 ble : that is, capable of being moved from place to 
 place without serious injury, or incapable of such 
 movement. 
 
OK, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 213 
 
 The right of property has been lately attacked 
 by the Communists, whose system has been reduced 
 to the following words : u La propriete c'est le vol," 
 our property is whatever we wish to take. Against 
 this false doctrine we establish the following 
 
 Proposition. — The right of property is a lawful 
 right. 
 
 Argument: That is lawful which necessarily re- 
 sults from our activity, which has been acknowl- 
 edged as lawful by all men, and which is necessary 
 for the existence and well-bein^; of society. 
 
 Proof: 1st. This right naturally flows from our 
 activity ; for when a man by his own activity and 
 industry has improved some portion of matter 
 which was not before occupied by another, he has, 
 by that very fact, attached to the matter something 
 which is his own, and which cannot be taken from 
 him without depriving him of what is his, and con- 
 sequently without injuring him. Hence the right 
 necessarily results from our activity. 
 
 2nd. The lawfulness of the right of property has 
 been acknowledged by all men. History shows this. 
 
 3d. Without this right domestic society is not 
 possible. This society would be destroyed if pa- 
 rents could not feed, educate and provide for the 
 livelihood of their children ; but it is plain that 
 they could not perform these duties if they had not 
 the right of property, and consequently could not 
 make donations, wills, &c. 
 
 4th. Civil society also is impossible without this 
 right ; for the industrious will cease to exert them- 
 selves as soon as they find that they have to divide 
 
214 ethics; 
 
 the fruits of their toil with the lazy. Hence the 
 truth of the proposition. 
 
 Corollary. — We may conclude that the right of 
 property does not originate in civil authority, al- 
 though this authority may direct and regulate it : 
 civil authority should protect, but never destroy 
 this right. 
 
 It is objected to the proposition that the soil is 
 necessary for the exercise of human labor ; and, 
 consequently, that being thus necessary for the gen- 
 erality of mankind it«cannot become the property of 
 any particular man ; and hence that no one can have 
 any exclusive right to property. 
 
 The minor of this argument is false : for as soon 
 as any one by his own labor has improved anything 
 which was not before occupied, he has the right, as 
 we have shown, to retain that thing as his own ; 
 otherwise he would be deprived of the fruits of his 
 own labor. Nor can it be said that it is lawful to 
 take property thus improved on account of the right 
 which every one has to make use of some part of 
 the earth : for we cannot admit that there can exist 
 any right in opposition to another prior and well 
 established right. Hence some part of the soil may 
 become the exclusive property of one person. 
 
OR j MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 215 
 
 DUTIES OF MEN IN THEIK KELATIONS 
 WITH SOCIETY. 
 
 Article First. — The Duties of Men in Eelation to 
 Domestic Society. 
 
 Domestic society is the union of husband and wife, 
 together with their children, besides servants and 
 other immediate dependents, all forming one family. 
 Domestic society is therefore threefold, conjugal, 
 parental and herile. 
 
 (a) Conjugal society is that established between 
 husband and wife by marriage. The first end of 
 marriage is the birth of children, that the number 
 of those who love and honor God may be thus in- 
 creased. The second end of marriage is that each 
 one may find in the society of a consort help and 
 support in order to bear more easily the burdens of 
 life. Two other ends, less perfect but not unlawful, 
 may be added to these : marriage is contracted to 
 enable each one to avoid more easily the sins of im- 
 purity ; and also sometimes in order to have heirs 
 to names, properties and dignities. 
 
 The choice of a partner for life should be attended 
 with the greatest care : first, by asking light from 
 God ; secondly, by seeking the advice of parents ; 
 thirdly, by endeavoring to choose a person remarka- 
 ble for piety and virtue ; fourthly, by observing, as 
 far as possible, a similarity of age, condition, for- 
 tune, &c; and, fifthly, by being honest and truthful 
 towards one another before the marriage is contracted. 
 
 The duties of married persons arc : mutual love, 
 
216 ethics; 
 
 conjugal fidelity, mutual obedience, and mutual 
 help. 
 
 (b) Parental society is that existing between pa : 
 rents and children, especially in reference to the 
 education of the latter. 
 
 The duties of parents toward their children con- 
 sist, first, in providing them food, raiment and 
 shelter ; second, in teaching them the elements of 
 the Christian doctrine and giving them habits of 
 piety and morality ; third, in giving them an edu- 
 cation suitable to their condition and talents ; and, 
 fourth, in providing them with the means of making 
 their own livelihood. 
 
 The duties of children towards their parents con- 
 sist in honor, respect, love, obedience and assistance. 
 
 (c) Her lie society is that existing between em- 
 ployer and employed, for their mutual advantage. 
 
 The duties of employers consist in treating those 
 in their employ with humanity, kindness and justice ; 
 in keeping the contracts or agreements made with 
 them ; in watching over their moral conduct ; and 
 in giving them opportunities of attending to their 
 religious duties. 
 
 The duties of servants to their masters consist in 
 reverence, obedience and fidelity. 
 
 Article Segond.— The Duties of Men in Relation 
 to Civil Society. 
 
 We shall first make some general remarks con- 
 cerning civil society, and then speak of the duties 
 of men as members of this soeietv. 
 
OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 21 7 
 
 I. Civil Society Considered in Itself. 
 
 (A) Nature and forms of civil society. 
 
 Civil society is an association of men living together 
 under the same supreme power, in order to derive 
 from it certain temporal advantages. By these last 
 words civil is distinguished from spiritual society. 
 
 Civil society is threefold in form : monarchy, 
 aristocracy and democracy ; according as the supreme 
 power resides in one man, in several citizens or in 
 the whole people. 
 
 Monarchy (pdvog dpxn) is the form of civil society 
 in which the supreme power resides in one man, 
 who is called king, emperor, &c. The monarchy is 
 either elective or hereditary. 
 
 Aristocracy (apiang^ Kp&rog") is the form of civil so- 
 ciety in which the supreme power is in the hands of 
 an order of citizens of high rank : when the number 
 of those thus holding the supreme power is but few, 
 we have what is called an oligarchy (o?ayog ipxn), 
 but this word is generally used in a bad sense. 
 
 Democracy (<%o? icp&rog") is the form of civil society 
 in which the supreme power is placed in the whole 
 body of the citizens, certain classes, however, are 
 often excepted. 
 
 Some forms are called mixed governments, as the 
 limited monarchy, called also a constitutional gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 Every form of civil society has its own advan- 
 tages, but also, on account of the passions of men, 
 its disadvantages ; and it may be said that no one 
 form is equally suitable for all peoples. 
 
 10 
 
218 ethics; 
 
 (B) The supreme power in civil society. 
 
 By the supreme power in civil society is meant 
 the power which governs that society without any 
 subordination to another power residing in the same 
 society. 
 
 The necessity of such a power is evident ; but we 
 must examine several questions in reference to it : 
 (a ) What are the characteristics and attributes of 
 the supreme power in civil society, " (b) what is the 
 origin or foundation of this power, (c) by what 
 means it is acquired, and (d) what are the causes 
 for which it may be taken away. 
 
 (a) Characteristics and attributes of the supre.me 
 power. 
 
 This power must first be independent of any other 
 authoritv residing in the same state, for otherwise 
 it would not be supreme ; and, second, it must be 
 one, for otherwise there would be a perpetual strug- 
 gle, and consequently civil war. anarchy and ruin. 
 
 The attributes proceed from the duties and rights 
 which pertain to this society. They are of three 
 kinds, legislative, judicial and executive: these 
 attributes of framing laws, of pronouncing judg- 
 ment, and of carrving laws and sentences into effect 
 are incidental to the supreme power. 
 
 (b) Origin or foundation of the supreme power. 
 Whence originates this power of making laws and 
 
 punishing those who do not obey them? Some say 
 that it originates in the will of the people, who 
 confer upon the magistrate the authority necessary 
 for the exercise of his office. Others contend that 
 this supreme power in civil society derives its au- 
 
OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 219 
 
 thority from the will of God, who, having destined 
 man for this society, has for this reason established 
 supreme power, and attached to it the right to com- 
 pel obedience. This latter opinion is the one enter- 
 tained by the Christian philosophers ; and, to prove 
 it to be correct, we establish with them the followin g 
 Proposition. — The supreme authority in civil society 
 comes ultimately from God, and not from the people. 
 
 (1) This authority does not come from the people : 
 for, as we have before said, to create an obligation 
 two wills are necessary, one of a superior and the 
 other of an inferior ; but the will of the people is 
 not that of a superior, since all men are by nature 
 equal ; consequently, neither the will of one man 
 nor that of several, considered abstractly from the 
 will of God, can impose any obligation upon another 
 man. Men may choose one man, or several men, to 
 exercise the supreme authority ; but they cannot 
 confer any authority, since they have none. 
 
 (2) The supreme authority comes from God. 
 Since God wills that all men should live in civil 
 society, he must have established a supreme author- 
 ity, for without this authority civil society cannot 
 exist. God therefore wills that a supreme author- 
 ity exist among men ; hence he creates it, and it 
 conies from him and not from the j)eople. 
 
 (c) Means by which the supreme power is acquired. 
 
 This question is twofold : How was supreme power 
 acquired in the beginning ; and how is it acquired 
 now, when society is formed and consolidated ? 
 
 1st. Four opinions have been entertained concern- 
 ing the manner in which supreme power was ac- 
 
220 ethics; 
 
 quired in the beginning : The first of these is that 
 authority was acquired by election ; the second 
 opinion is that the supreme authority in civil society 
 is but an extension of the paternal authority ; ac- 
 cording to the third opinion, men wanting protection 
 acknowledged themselves dependent on others more 
 powerful than they were ; the fourth opinion is that 
 G-od intervened directly and thus established su- 
 preme authority. 
 
 The fourth opinion is brought forward gratu- 
 itously, and we reject it in like manner. The 
 second and the third opinion, unless they be con- 
 sidered substantially the same as the first, may also 
 be rejected ; for acknowledgment of superiority and 
 paternity does not of itself constitute supreme au- 
 thority, or even the right to exercise this authority, 
 unless an election take place, that is, unless the peo- 
 ple choose their rulers ; and this is the first opinion, 
 which is the true one. 
 
 2nd. How may supreme authority be now acquired, 
 that is when society is already formed? 
 
 Four means are considered lawful for such an ac- 
 quisition : election, succession, victory in a just war, 
 and prescription; The first three of these need no 
 explanation. In regard to prescription it is held 
 that a ruler who is at first a usurper may after a 
 time and under certain circumstances exercise a 
 lawful authority. The lawfulness of such authority 
 is grounded on reason and the consent of the people. 
 
 Reason teaches that one who has for many years 
 exercised supreme ppwer, even though originally a 
 usurper, ought not to be deprived of this power at 
 
OK, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 221 
 
 the imminent risk of greater calamities. In such 
 cases God will confer supreme authority, because 
 the welfare of the people is the supreme law. 
 
 The consent of the people also shows the lawful- 
 ness of prescription : it is recognized everywhere 
 now, and we find examples of it in almost every 
 country. 
 
 (d) Causes for which supreme power may he taken 
 from a ruler. 
 
 These are : first, abdication ; second, expiration 
 of the term of election or appointment ; third, 
 expulsion after defeat in an unjust war ; fourth, 
 revocation on the part of the, appointing power ; 
 fifth, removal for causes provided for in the con- 
 stitution, as was the case in some parts of G-ermany 
 during the middle ages in regard to princes who 
 forfeited their power on becoming heretics. Con- 
 cerning these five causes there is no controversy. 
 
 But it has been made a question whether insur- 
 rection against constituted authority be a law- 
 ful cause for taking away supreme power from a 
 ruler. Three opinions have been given in answer 
 to this question. The first is that of J. J. Rous- 
 seau, who pretends that a people may revolt against 
 their rulers and expel them for any cause whatever. 
 Rousseau logically deduces this opinion from his 
 system concerning the origin of power, but the con- 
 sequence is as false as the premises. The second 
 opinion is that of Suarez, Bellarmin and others, 
 who say that in case of tyranny it is lawful to re- 
 volt against a ruler and expel him. A third opinion 
 is held by Bossuet and others, who teach that it is 
 
222 ethics; 
 
 never lawful to revolt against a ruler, however 
 tyrannical his government may be. These two 
 opinions may he defended ; still it must he confessed 
 that the opinion of Bellarinin, though more plausi- 
 ble in theory, is rather dangerous in practice, being 
 fraught with fearful consequences. 
 
 II. Duties of Men Considered as Members of Civil 
 Society. 
 
 (A) Duties of all citizens to their country : First, 
 they must obey the laws ; second, they should exert 
 their talents for the good of their country, by fol- 
 lowing some occupation useful to society ; third, 
 they must contribute from their wealth to the sup- 
 port of the government (by taxes, &c); and, fourth, 
 when necessary, they must even sacrifice their life 
 for their country. 
 
 (B) Duties of magistrates : First, they are bound 
 in all their actions to aim at the good of civil society ; 
 second, they should strictly follow the dictates of 
 justice, by bestowing offices and honors on the most 
 deserving, hj inflicting punishments in proportion 
 to crimes and not tolerating any conduct opposed to 
 the public welfare, and by refraining from wronging 
 the people by granting injurious monopolies and 
 from wronging foreign nations by unjust treaties or 
 alliances. To these should be added two other 
 duties : those placed in supreme power should be- 
 come thoroughly acquainted with the science of 
 government in all its departments, and above all 
 they should always show a good example in all 
 things. 
 
OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 223 
 
 (C) Duties of citizens towards their chief magis- 
 trates. These" duties are respect and obedience to 
 their authority ; for, as we have seen, this authority 
 comes from Grod. 
 
 Artigle Third. — Duties of Men Towards One 
 Another. 
 
 These duties may be reduced to two: to do unto 
 others as we would have them to do unto us, and 
 not to do unto others what we would not have them 
 do unto us. The first are positive duties and the 
 others negative. 
 
 I. Positive Duties. 
 
 These may be named in the following order: 
 First, we must love our fellow men, since we are all 
 the children of God ; and, second, we must do good 
 to them, for idle charity is unavailing. The good 
 works which we must perform for other persons are 
 both spiritual and temporal. 
 
 A certain order should be observed in our charity. 
 According to St. Bernard, the rule of charity is that 
 those in most need should receive first. In other 
 cases we should prefer those who are near to us in 
 blood, friendship or religion. " True charity begins 
 at home." 
 
 II. Negative Duties — Duels. 
 
 Negative duties are those that prescribe something 
 to be avoided. We must avoid everything which 
 may injure our neighbor, either in soul or in body. 
 
 We injure the souls of our fellow men by scandal ; 
 and we injure their bodies, first, by homicide, or by 
 
224 ethics; 
 
 mutilating, wounding or striking them (out evi- 
 dently there is no injustice in injuring, or even kill- 
 ing, an unjust assailant); second, by stealing from 
 them or otherwise injuring their property ; and, 
 third, by injuring their good name. 
 
 Duels. — A duel is a private combat between two 
 persons, according to a previous agreement, the 
 place, time and arms, being also agreed upon. 
 Against this unholy practice we establish the fol- 
 lowing 
 
 Proposition. — Duelling is opposed to natural right. 
 
 Natural right forbids us to kill another, or to ex- 
 pose our own life, without sufficient reason. But 
 he who fights a duel endangers his own life and that 
 of his adversary without sufficient reason. The reason 
 given must be, for instance, to prove one's innocence, 
 to avenge an injury, to preserve one's honor, or to 
 show that one is coura°;eous ; but none of these rea- 
 sons is a sufficient cause for eno-airino; in a duel : for, 
 first, the innocent one may be killed, and thus it 
 may be made to appear that he is guilty ; secondly, 
 no one has a right by his private authority to 
 avenge himself; thirdly, honor cannot be acquired 
 by a duel, it is rather a mark of heroism, and con- 
 sequently of honor, to bear injuries with patience ; 
 and, fourthly, true courage is shown by practicing 
 patience, and by reserving the sacrifice of one's life 
 for the acquisition of something preferable to life 
 itself, as the safety of our family or our country. 
 
 Observation. — Duelling, which is forbidden by 
 the natural law when undertaken by private author- 
 itv, may become lawful when performed under the 
 
OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 225 
 
 direction of the magistrate for the good of the state, 
 as when David went forth from the army of Saul to 
 challenge Grolliath to mortal combat. 
 
 The Church forbids duelling under pain of sepa- 
 ration from her communion. 
 
 To answer objections,, let us observe that there are 
 two kinds of honor, true and fictitious : true honor 
 is that founded on virtue, and fictitious honor is 
 that based upon the opinions of men. We must 
 defend true honor, even at the risk of life ; for virtue 
 is preferable to life itself : but fictitious honor ought 
 not to be preserved at the risk of life, for human 
 glory is no virtue. True honor never requires a 
 duel for its preservation ; on the contrary it requires 
 that duelling should be avoided. 
 
 Sonle persons object that no one is obliged to 
 suffer the loss of his reputation . This is false : if 
 fame among men cannot be preserved without vio- 
 lating natural right and divine law, let it perish. 
 
 They add also that sometimes, especially among 
 soldiers, a duel cannot be avoided without serious 
 inconvenience, and consequently that in such a case 
 it is allowed. Again the consequent is false: no 
 inconvenience can render that lawful which is wrong 
 in itself and forbidden by the natural law. 
 
 They still add that he who refuses to engage in a 
 duel lowers himself in his own estimation. This 
 objection is not a serious one : such a man should 
 modify his opinion of himself, for it is a false one ; 
 his error cannot make duelling lawful. 
 
 The above exposition of our duties is deemed 
 sufficiently developed for a course of philosophy. 
 10* 
 
226 ETHICS. 
 
 Let us close by saying that it is not enough for us to 
 know our duties, we must practice them ; otherwise, 
 our knowledge, being without good works, would 
 •only make us worse in the sight of God. With the 
 help of God, let us endeavor to bring forth fruit by 
 the practice of good works, so that being more wise 
 we may be more virtuous. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Preface 3 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 I. 
 
 Definitions of Words ? 
 
 A being — Existence — Possibility — Attributes — Essence and nature of a 
 thing — Genus — Species — Individuals — Science — Art — Knowledge — Faith. 
 
 II. 
 
 Definitions of Philosophy • • 10 
 
 III. 
 Divisions of Philosophy. 12 
 
 IV. 
 Argument 13 
 
 PART FIRST.— LOGIC. 
 Definition — Division 17 
 
> 230 CONTENTS. 
 
 FIRST DISSERTATION.— ON IDEAS. 
 
 Chapter Ferst. 
 
 Of Ideas considered as existing in the mind 10 
 
 I I. — Division of Ideas 19 
 
 § II. — Properties of Ideas 20 
 
 § III. — Operations of the mind in regard to Ideas 21 
 
 Chapter Second. 
 Of Ideas considered out of the mind , 22 
 
 SECOND DISSERTATION.— ON JUDGMENT. 
 
 Chapter First. 
 Of Judgment considered as existing in the mind 23 
 
 Chapter Second. 
 
 Of Judgment considered as existing out of the mind 24 
 
 § I. — Conversion of Propositions 27 
 
 \ II. — Opposition of Propositions 28 
 
 THIRD DISSERTATION.— ON REASONING:. 
 Chapter First. 
 
 Of the SyllogiSni and its rules 30 
 
 Chapter Secoxd. 
 
 Of the different sorts of Syllogisms 34 
 
 Chapter Third. 
 
 Of the forms of argument other than the Syllogism 37 
 
 Chapter Fourth. 
 Of Sophisms 39 
 
CONTENTS. 231 
 
 Chapter Fifth. 
 Of the sources of Sophisms 43 
 
 FOURTH DISSERTATION.— ON METHOD. 
 
 First Division, the Method of Invention 45 
 
 Second Division, the Method of Demonstration, or Dialectics 48 
 
 FIFTH DISSERTATION— ON CERTITUDE. 
 
 Chapteb First. 
 
 Preliminary notions — Definitions 50 
 
 Chapter Second. 
 
 Of the Criterion of Certitude 52 
 
 Chapter Third. 
 
 Of the Existence of Certitude 55 
 
 Chapter Fourth. 
 
 Of the Motives of Certitude 60 
 
 1st Motive — The Certitude of pure reason 60 
 
 2nd Motive — Consciousness 62 
 
 3d Motive — The evidence of the senses 63 
 
 4th Motive — The consent of mankind in things of the 
 
 moral order 65 
 
 5th Motive — The testimony of men 67 
 
 § I . — Authority of such testimony concerning natural 
 
 facts 69 
 
 § II. — Authority of the same testimony concerning 
 
 supernatural facts , 72 
 
 6th Motive— Memory 73 
 
 7th Motive — Induction or analogy 74 
 
 Appendix— Probability 76 
 
232 CONTENTS. 
 
 PART SECOND— METAPHYSICS. 
 
 FIRST DISSERTATION.— ON ONTOLOGY. 
 
 Chapter First. 
 Of the notion, essence, possibility of a being in general 82 
 
 Chapter Second. 
 Of the causes and the effects of beings 85 
 
 Chapter Third. 
 
 Of the different species of being 89 
 
 Article First. — Substance and modification 89, 
 
 Article Second. — Infinite and finite substances 91 
 
 Article Third. — Material and spiritual substances 92 
 
 Chapter Fourth. 
 
 Of the properties of being 93 
 
 Chapter Fifth. 
 
 Of space and time 97 
 
 SECOND DISSERTATION.— ON THEODICY. 
 
 part first.— the existexce of god. 
 
 Chapter First. 
 
 Of Atheism 101 
 
 § 1st. — Is it prudent to remain indifferent concerning the 
 
 existence of God? 101 
 
 § 2nd. — Are there any evils resulting from the adoption 
 
 of the theory of the Atheists? 103 
 
 I 3d.— Is Theism better than Atheism ? 104 
 
 § 4th. — Is Theism safer than Atheism? 104 
 
 § 5th. — Is Atheism worse than Polytheism? 104 
 
CONTENTS. 233 
 
 Chapter Second. 
 
 Of the proofs of the existence of God 105 
 
 Article First.- — Metaphysical argument 105 
 
 Article Second. — Physical argument 109 
 
 Article Third. — Moral argument 112 
 
 part second.— the attributes of god. 
 Chaptek First. 
 
 Of the unity of God 116 
 
 Article First. — The unity of God proved against the 
 
 Polytheists 116 
 
 Article Second — The unity of God against the Dualists 118 
 Article Third. — The origin of evil under a being infi- 
 nitely good 119 
 
 Chapter Second. 
 Of the eternity of God 121 
 
 CnAPTER Third. 
 Of the immutability of God 122 
 
 Chapter Fourth. 
 
 Of the liberty of God 122 
 
 Article First. — The existence of the liberty of God 123 
 
 Article Second. — Pantheism 124 
 
 Article Third. — Optimism 126 
 
 Chapter Fifth. 
 Of the omnipotence and independence of God 128 
 
 Chapter Sixth. 
 
 Of the simplicity of God 129 
 
 Chapter Seventh. 
 Of the immensity of God ..,.,. 130 
 
234 CONTENTS. 
 
 Chapter Eighth. 
 
 Of the knowledge of God 131 
 
 Chapter. Ninth. 
 
 Of the wisdom of God 133 
 
 Chapter Tenth. 
 
 Of the sanctity and veracity of God 134 
 
 Chapter Eleventh. 
 
 Of the goodness and happiness of God 134 
 
 Chapter Twelfth. 
 
 Of the justice of God 135 
 
 Chapter Thirteenth. 
 
 Of the providence of God 135 
 
 Article First. — The existence of providence 135 
 
 Article Second. — Consequences of the existence of prov- 
 idence in regard to the free actions of men 137 
 
 THIRD DISSERTATION.— ON PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 part first— experimental psychology. 
 Chapter First. 
 
 Of sensibility 141 
 
 (A) Physical sensibility 142 
 
 (a) Organic impressions 143 
 
 (b) Sensations 143 
 
 (c) Appetite 143 
 
 (B) Interior sensibility 144 
 
 (a) Personal affections 144 
 
 (b) Social desires 145 
 
 (c) Sentiments involving some conception of pure 
 reason 145 
 
CONTENTS. 235 
 
 Chapter Second. 
 
 Of the intellect 146 
 
 Article First. — The perceptive faculties 146 
 
 (A) Experimental perceptions 146 
 
 (B) Rational perceptions, or pure reason 147 
 
 Article Second. — The reflective faculties — Language... 148 
 
 (a) General notions 148 
 
 (b) Language considered in relation to thought 149 
 
 (c) Origin of language 150 
 
 1st. The question of fact 150 
 
 2nd. The question of possibility 151 
 
 Article Third. — The nature and origin of our ideas . . • 152 
 
 1st. The nature of our ideas 152 
 
 2nd. The origin of our ideas 153 
 
 (a) System of the Sensists 154 
 
 (b) The doctrine of innate ideas ^155 
 
 (c) The doctrine of the intuition of God 156 
 
 Chapter Third. 
 
 Of activity 157 
 
 The freedom of the human soul 158 
 
 part second.— rational psychology. 
 
 Chapter First. 
 
 Of the nature of the human soul, or of its spirituality 161 
 
 Chapter Second. 
 
 Of the union of the soul with the body 164 
 
 Chapter Third. 
 
 Of the destiny of the soul 169 
 
 Chapter Fourth. 
 
 Of the souls of animals 170 
 
 Article First.— The faculties of the souls of animals. . . . 170 
 Article Second. — The nature and destiny of the souls of 
 animals 172 
 
236 CONTENTS. 
 
 PART THIRD.— ETHICS ; OR, MORAL 
 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 FIRST DISSERTATION.— ON HUMAN ACTIONS IN 
 GENERAL. 
 
 Chapter First. 
 
 Of the difference between good and bad actions 178 
 
 Art cle First. — The difference between moral good and 
 moral evil 179 
 
 Article Second — The obligations of doing good and 
 
 avoiding evil, or the existence of the natural law 181 
 
 Article Third. — The promulgation of this natural law. . 184 
 Article Fourth. — The immutability of the natural law. . 186 
 Article Fifth. — The sanction of the natural lav/. 187 
 
 Chapter Second. 
 
 Of the principles of good and bad actions 190 
 
 Chapter Third. 
 
 Rules for distinguishing good from bad actions 191 
 
 SECOND DISSERTATION.— ON HUMAN ACTIONS IN 
 PARTICULAR. 
 
 Chapter First. 
 
 Of the duties of men towards God < 193 
 
 Article First.— The necessity of religious worship 193 
 
 Article Second.— The causes which induce men either to 
 neglect or to corrupt the worship of God 197 
 
 Chapter Second. 
 
 Of the duties of man towards himself ■ 197 
 
 Article First.— The obligation of preserving the life of 
 the body • • • • 1£ ^ 
 
CONTENTS. 237 
 
 Article Second. — The obligation of cultivating the facul- 
 ties of the mind 203 
 
 (a) The culture of the intellect 203 
 
 (b) The culture of the sensibility 207 
 
 (c) The culture of the will. 208 
 
 Chapter Third. 
 
 Duties of man towards his fellow men 203 
 
 (A) Destiny of man for the state of society ..... 209 
 
 (B) Consequences resulting from the state of society: 
 Inequality of conditions in life — right of property 211 
 
 DUTIES OF MEN IX THEIR RELATIONS WITH SOCIETY. 
 
 Article First. — Duties of men in relation to domestic 
 society 215 
 
 (a) Conjugal society * 215 
 
 (b) Parental society 216 
 
 (c) Herile society £16 
 
 Article Second. — The duties of men in relation to civil 
 
 society 216 
 
 I. Civil society considered in itself 217 
 
 (A) Nature of civil society and its various forms 217 
 
 (B) The supreme power in civil society 218 
 
 (a) Characteristics and attributes of the supreme 
 power 218 
 
 (b) Origin and foundation of the supreme power 218 
 
 (c) Means by which it is acquired 219 
 
 (d) Causes for which supreme power may be taken 
 from a ruler 221 
 
 II. Duties of men considered as members of civil so- 
 
 ciety 222 
 
 Article Third. — Duties of men towards one another. . . . 223 
 
 I. Positive duties , 223 
 
 II. Negative duties — Duels 223 
 
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