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 --:\'' »' 
 
AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE POLICY OF THE UNITED 
 
 TTATES WITH REFERENCE TO CHINA, JAPAN AND 
 
 KOREA IN THE 19TH CENTURY 
 
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 NEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO • DALLAS 
 
 ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO 
 
 MACMILLAN & CO., Limited 
 
 LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA 
 MELBOURNE 
 
 THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. 
 
 TORONTO 
 
\>' 
 
 AMEEICANS IN EASTEEN ASIA 
 
 A Critical Study of the Policy of the United 
 
 States with reference to China, Japan 
 
 and Korea in the 19th Century 
 
 BY 
 
 TYLER DENNETT 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 1922 
 
 All Rights Reserved 
 
 'Mz^m'i':i{^) 
 
PEiniED IN TBB UNITED STATES OJ- AMERICA 
 
 ■ USE 
 
 Copyright, 1922, 
 
 By the macmillan company. 
 
 Set up and printed. Published November, 1922. 
 
 Press of 
 
 J. J. Little & Ives Company 
 
 New York, U S. A. 
 
 DEC 20 "22 
 
PREFACE 
 
 The reader is entitled to some intimation as to what he 
 may find in the following pages. 
 
 This is a study of the origin and development of Ameri- 
 can policy in Asia — in China, Japan, Korea, with passing 
 attention to Siam, and the regions of the Indian and 
 Pacific Oceans — in the 19th Century. It is an entirely 
 fresh study, based on original records and documentary 
 sources, the first book ever attempting to cover the entire 
 field. In large measure the human interest and the pecul- 
 iarly personal qualities of the record of Americans in Asia 
 have been retained. The actors are permitted to speak for 
 themselves in their own words. 
 
 The viewpoint is from Washington, not from Tokio, or 
 Peking. American relations with the separate^ nations of 
 the East, with the Japanese, the Chinese, the Koreans, have 
 developed not separately but as a unity which the student 
 disregards at his peril. There has not been one policy for 
 one country and another policy for another. The policy has, 
 in principle, been the same; the results of the policy were 
 different because the peoples were different. 
 
 The tap-root of American poUcy has been not philan- 
 thropy but the demand for most-favored-nation treatment. 
 One frequently meets the assumption that the Open Door 
 Policy was invented by John Hay and first applied in 1899. 
 The Open Door Policy is as old as our relations with Asia.' 
 It was pronounced in China as early as 1842, and the spirit 
 of the policy is as old as the Declaration of Independence. 
 The policy was not limited to Chinr It was enunciated on 
 the coast of Africa in 1832, and was repeated in Japan and 
 Korea many times before 1899. The policy had been so 
 fully developed before 1869 when William H. Seward 
 
vi PREFACE 
 
 retired from the Department of State, that no new principle 
 has ever been introduced since that time. Neither Mr. Hay 
 nor Mr. Hughes appears to have considered that they were 
 creating anything new. 
 
 How can most-favored-nation treatment be secured? 
 This was the persistent question in the 19th as it will be 
 throughout the 20th Century. In pre-treaty days at old 
 Canton the American merchants obtained it by conciliation 
 of the Chinese. Caleb Cushing sought to make it secure by 
 treaty and by elaboration of the principle of extraterritorial- 
 ity. Commodore Perry strongly advised the acquisition of 
 territory. Anson Burlingame set out to secure it by agree- 
 ments between China and the powers. Seward was willing 
 to join in an almost unlimited cooperative policy with the 
 powers against the Asiatic States. He even proposed a joint 
 armed expedition with the French into Korea. His suc- 
 cessors in oJSice steadily withdrew from cooperation with 
 the European Powers and turned to cooperation with and 
 support of Japan. At the time of the Sino-Japanese War 
 it was the United States alone which stood between Japan 
 and the intervention of the European powers before the 
 conflict was over. The United States not only desired the 
 open door, but it also sought the development of Asiatic 
 States strong enough to be their own door-keepers. It 
 wanted a strong East; the other powers did not. On this 
 difference of policy cooperation between the United States 
 and the other Western powers was wrecked. At the begin- 
 ning of the McKinley Administration the American Gov- 
 ernment was in a dangerous position of isolation. The open 
 door was gravely threateiled. McKinley returned to the 
 policy of territorial acquisition advocated by Perry. Then 
 John Hay set out to restore the cooperative policy and 
 found his model in Burlingame's method of- agreement be- 
 tween the powers. Hay would have preferred an alliance 
 with Great Britain, Japan and as many more powers as 
 could have been brought to agree upon the open door and a 
 strong East. Hay was a statesman fifty years, perhaps, 
 
PREFACE vii 
 
 ahead of his tune, but there are many now hving who will 
 some day witness the realization of Hay's dream. Indeed, 
 in a measure it is already realized in the treaties of Wash- 
 ington in 1922. 
 
 In the 19th Century the issue in American policy in Asia 
 was not the open door. That was never a question. The 
 real issue was whether the United States should follow an. 
 isolated or a cooperative policy to make sure of the open, 
 door. An isolated policy was essentially belligerent. 
 It inevitably led to a pitting of the United States against 
 not one but all of the powers and against the Asiatic states 
 as well. It was the isolation of 1897 following the wreck 
 of the cooperative policy which forced the United States to 
 retain the Philippines, just as the distrust of British and 
 French designs in the fifties had led to the attempt of some 
 loyal but misguided Americans to seek the appropriation by 
 the United States of Formosa. As a matter of fact the 
 American flag did fly over the principal port of the island for 
 a year. Likewise today a wreck of the newly established 
 cooperative policy would in the end lead to belligerency, 
 and very likely to still further acquisitions of territory by 
 the United States. Those who scoff at such a speculation 
 will do well to study the past records. 
 
 The maintenance of a cooperative policy is, therefore, 
 so utterly important for the peace of the East and of the 
 world, that it is well to turn one's attention to the records 
 and study well why and where the cooperative policy failed. 
 Such a study is quite as important for the Japanese, the 
 French, the British and for the other peoples of the West 
 as it is for Americans. Cooperation failed partly because 
 Americans were poor cooperators, but not wholly for that 
 reason. It also failed because other cooperating powers 
 sought to wrest the power of that cooperation to serve their 
 separate purposes. The present policy may easily be 
 wrecked upon a similar reef. 
 
 This study of the past is approached in no partisan 
 spirit. The writer does not regard himself as an apostle of 
 
viii PREFACE 
 
 peace, or of any other doctrine. He is mindful of the fact 
 that there is something in the atmosphere of Asia which 
 makes it very difficult for most people to see the half-tones. 
 All has a tendency to appear very black or very white. The 
 writer does not regard Great Britain as the benevolent 
 -source from which all blessings flow, nor does he find the 
 Englishman the arch mischief-maker of world politics. He 
 regards the Japanese neither as innocent lambs nor ravening 
 wolves. Least of all has he any desire to see created any 
 alliance of powers for the exploitation of China which must 
 remain for so many years the great unknown quantity in 
 the world equation. But whether we like or trust each other 
 or not we all have to live together in a world which is be- 
 coming smaller every day — and we must either fight each 
 other or cooperate. The basis of cooperation must be under- 
 standing. In the following pages, therefore, the English- 
 man, Continental, Chinese and Japanese as well as the 
 American are invited to view the pictures of themselves as 
 they appear in the American records. 
 
 At the risk of incurring the dislike which attaches to all 
 iconoclasts, the writer has aimed to record the facts as they 
 are, mindful that they do not lead to verdicts which have 
 long been accepted. The exultant, complacent boaster of 
 his nation's virtue, whatever the nation, will not find this a 
 satisfying source-book, not if he reads it through to the 
 end. No nation, either of the East or of the West, has 
 escaped the valid charge of bad faith. The guilt of all 
 parties being clearly proven it has seemed profitless to con- 
 tinue the discussion of guilt with a view to determining the 
 relative degrees of wickedness. Each nation, the United 
 States not excepted, has made its contribution to the welter 
 
 rof evil which now comprises the Far Eastern Question. We 
 shall all do well to drop for all time the pose of self-right- 
 eousness and injured innocence and penitently face the 
 ^ facts. 
 
 '^ Cordial relations between the United States, Japan and 
 Great Britain are now constantly being rendered unstable 
 
PREFACE ix 
 
 by the perpetuation of historical fictions which were created 
 at some time in the past to justify a position not otherwise 
 defensible, and then reiterated with such frequency as to 
 give them the currency of inspired truth. It is hoped that 
 the following pages, carrying as they do the documentary 
 evidence for the statements made, will contribute towards 
 the retirement of some of these fictions and also clear a 
 path for honest dealing and franker understanding in the 
 future. 
 
 The proportions assigned to the various phases of this 
 study would have been different had it been the purpose 
 to survey the international relations of China, Japan and 
 Korea with the Western powers. In the international 
 relations of the East with the West the last thirty years of 
 the century bulks larger than the preceding seventy years. 
 In a review of American policy the reverse is true, and this 
 fact has determined the proportions of this study. The 
 creative period in the relations of the United States to 
 Eastern Asia practically came to an end in 1868. The 
 following thirty years were relatively barren in both Ameri- 
 can enterprise and statesmanship. While the three very full 
 closing years of the century may be claimed as the vestibule 
 to a contemporaneous period which is not yet concluded, 
 these years are equally the conclusion of an epoch and bring 
 the cycle of policy back to a point of cooperation similar 
 to that when William H. Seward retired from the Depart- 
 ment of State and Anson Burlingame was launched upon his 
 mission to the Western Powers. To follow the policies of 
 the McKinley administration down through the recent years 
 to the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaties of Washington 
 would be to enter upon a discussion where speculation and 
 hearsay evidence would have to be substituted at impor- 
 tant points for documentary facts. This period hab already 
 been traversed by many excellent writers and it has there- 
 fore seemed wiser to bring this study to a close with a state- 
 ment of the initial policies of the McKinley administration 
 
X PREFACE 
 
 and a comparison of them with the precedents of the pre- 
 ceding century. 
 
 Some of the material which appears in the following 
 chapters has already been published in different and more 
 elaborate form in the Journal of International Law (Jan. 
 1922), and in the American Historical Review (Oct, 1922), 
 while several of the chapters, now much revised, were orig- 
 inally printed for the use of the American Commissioners in 
 the Conference on the Limitation of Armaments and the 
 Problems of the Pacific, but never released for general 
 circulation. 
 
 Bibliographical footnotes in a most abbreviated form have 
 been inserted wherever the subject matter appears of suf- 
 ficient importance to require them, or where the statements 
 in the text are at variance with those which have appeared 
 in other works on the subject. The student who cares pri- 
 marily for the sources of history is recommended to read 
 first of all Chapter XXXV, Notes on Bibliography, where 
 the source material for the entire field is reviewed. 
 
 Acknowledgments to writers of books and pamphlets 
 which have proved of value in the preparation of this work 
 appear in Notes on Bibliography (Chapter XXXV) and in, 
 the bibliographical index. In addition to these the author 
 is under such obligation as only those who have been 
 placed under a similar debt can fully appreciate to the fol- 
 lowing: to the officials and attendants of the Library, the 
 Bureaus of Appointment and of Rolls and Indexes of the 
 Department of State, and of the Libraries of Congress, of 
 the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, of Co- 
 lumbia University, of the New York, Wisconsin, and Min- 
 nesota Historical Societies, the Manuscripts Division of 
 the New York Public Library, and the Missionary Re- 
 search Library; to James Rankin Young for information 
 about his distinguished brother, John Russell Young; to 
 Murray Olyphant for data and literature concerning his 
 famous grandfather, D. W. C. Olyphant; to Hon. Charles 
 Denby for helpful suggestions about the period in China 
 
PREFACE xi 
 
 when he served in the American Legation at Peking under 
 his honored father; to Hon. Henry White for information 
 drawn from the rich stores of his memory as Secretary of 
 the American Embassy at the Court of St. James; to Dr. 
 J. Frankhn Jameson, Editor of the American Historial 
 Review, for encouragement and suggestions, and especially 
 for securing from His Excellency, J. Jules Jusserand, copies 
 of important dispatches contained in the archives of the 
 French Embassy at Washington, and to Waldo G. Leland 
 for securing the copy of a document from the Ministry of 
 Foreign Affairs in Paris; to Drs. Stanley K. Hornbeck, A. L. 
 P. Dennis, Henry W. Wriston, and to Gaillard Hunt for 
 many such helpful suggestions and counsel as comes from 
 frequent conversations with those who have given their lives 
 to a study of phases of the subject embraced in this volume; 
 to many friends scattered over Eastern Asia and Eastern 
 Africa from Tokio to Bombay and Cape Town who have 
 offered a ready and never-failing hospitality to a tired trav- 
 eler; and, finally, to Nelson Trusler Johnson, Edwin Lowe 
 Neville and Baron Serge A. Korff who have been patient 
 and kind enough to read the manuscript critically. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Pebfacb ? V 
 
 PART I. THE EAST INDIA TRADE 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 I. The Beginnings of American Commerce 1 
 
 The American Ports. The Vessels Employed. Crews, 
 Captains and Owners. Cargoes. 
 
 II. The Ports of Asia and the Pacific 24 
 
 Isle de France and India. Adventures — Mocha, Su- 
 matra, Siam. Batavia and Manila. The Fur Trade. 
 The Northwest Coast. 
 
 Ill, Early China Trade 44 
 
 Macao, Whampoa and Canton. Conditions of Ameri- 
 can Trade. The Americans and the British. The 
 Human Element in the Trade. Major Samuel Shaw. 
 
 PART II. THE FIRST TREATY WITH CHINA 
 
 IV. The Foundations of American Poucy in Asia .... 69 
 Review of Trade: 1815-1839. Relation of U. S. Gov- 
 ernment to American Citizens in China. Relations with 
 Portuguese and English. Relations with the Chinese 
 Government. Terranova Incident. 
 
 V. The Americans and the Anglo-Chinese War .... 91 
 Foreigners Imprisoned in the Factories. The Ameri- 
 cans Petition Congress. Congress Becomes Interested. 
 Commodore Kearny's Most-Favored-Nation Agreement. 
 The Mission Created. 
 
 VI. The American Share in the Opium Trade 115 
 
 Turkey and India Opium. Conflict with Chinese^r- 
 the Pledge. Commodore Kearny's Action. 
 
 VII. Preparation for the Gushing Mission 128 
 
 The Edmund Roberts Mission. Webster Consults the 
 Merchants. Instructions to Gushing. Caleb Gushing 
 Goes to Macao. 
 
 VIII. The Policy of Caleb Gushing 145 
 
 The Negotiations. The Immediate Application of 
 the Principles of the Treaty. Superior Advantages of 
 the Gushing Treaty. Extraterritoriality. Responsi- 
 bility Placed on the Chinese. Divergence from British 
 Policy. 
 
XIV 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 IX. 
 
 X. 
 XI. 
 
 XII. 
 X XIII. 
 
 Xxiv- 
 
 XV. 
 XVI. 
 
 PART III. A PERIOD OF CONFUSION 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The Far East Becomes a Political Question .... 175 
 The International Situation. Multiplication of Amer- 
 ican Interests in China. Commissioners and Consuls. 
 
 Settlement op the Shanghai Land Question .... 194 
 Early American in Shanghai. American Protests 
 against Exclusive Concessions. The Municipal Code. 
 Final Settlement of a Vexed Question. 
 
 Humphrey Marshall and the Taiping Rebellion . . 206 
 Growth of the Rebellion. The Dilemma Presented 
 to the Foreigners. Marshall Becomes Suspicious of 
 British Designs. Shall Shanghai Become a Free Port? 
 Marshall Forces Dissolution of Provisional System. 
 
 The Policy op Commissioner McLanb 225 
 
 The Inspectorate of Maritime Customs. McLane 
 Settles the American Claims. Treaty Revision. Mc- 
 Lane and Bowring Go to the Pei-ho. 
 
 Attempts to Open Japan to Trade 242 
 
 Japan and Early Pacific Trade. Edmund Roberts 
 and Japan. Visit of the Morrison, 1837. Revival of 
 American Interest in Japan. European Powers and 
 Japan. 
 
 Commodore Perry's Policy 260 
 
 Instructions. Negotiations and Treaty. Perry's Pro- 
 posals for Far Eastern Policy. 
 
 The Policy of Dr. Peter Parker — Formosa 279 
 
 Treaty Revision — Destruction of Barrier Forts. An 
 American Protectorate for Formosa. Disavowal by the 
 American Government. 
 
 The Buchanan Administration and the Far East . 
 
 Increase of American Prestige under Pierce. Ebbing 
 Distrust of Great Britain. Proposals for an Alliance 
 with Great Britain and France. Instructions to William 
 B. Reed. 
 
 292 
 
 PART IV. THE COOPERATIVE POLICY 
 
 XVII. William B. Reed and the Treaty op Tientsin .... 311 
 The Treaties of Tientsin. The Revised Tariff — 
 Legalization of the Opium Trade. Settlement of Claims. 
 
 XVIII. Ward and Tattnall — Exchange of Ratifications . . . 333 
 The Conflict Renewed. "Blood is Thicker than 
 Water." The American Minister Goes to Peking. 
 
 %• XIX. The Poucy of Townsend Harris in Japan 347 
 
 . Appointment of Townsend Harris — Instructions and 
 Treaty with Siam. Arrival of Harris in Japan — Con- 
 vention of 1857. Harris at Yedo. Treaty and Tariff 
 of 1858. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 XV 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 y XX. Anson Burungame 367 
 
 The Suppression of the Taiping Rebellion. Burlin- 
 game and Cooperation. The First Chinese Mission — 
 Treaty of 1868. The Burlingame Mission in Europe 
 and China. 
 
 < XXI. The United States and Japan : 1858-1869 391 
 
 / Anti-foreign Agitation. Convention of 1866. 
 
 Y XXII. Seward's Far Eastern Policy 407 
 
 Seward, Budingame and China. Coercion of Japan. 
 Alaska and Korea. Proposed Joint Expedition to Korea. 
 
 PART V. THE RISE OF JAPAN 
 
 / XXIII. First Steps in Japanese Expansion 425 
 
 The Politically Nebulous East. The Japanese Em- 
 pire Begins Consolidation. Japan on the Verge of 
 War. Formosa, the Lew Chews and Korea. 
 ■if XXIV. The United States and Korea — Treaty of 1882 . . . 450 
 Expediency of Disturbing the Status Quo. The 
 United States Inclines Towards Japan. Shufeldt and 
 the Good Offices of Li Hung Chang. The Personal 
 Views of Commodore Shufeldt. 
 
 ■^ XXV. Beginning of the Contest for Korea 466 
 
 Japanese Advance. China and Great Britain Are ♦ 
 
 Aroused. Korea, 1885-1894. 
 " XXVI. American Good Offices — SiNO-jAPANESEi War .... 489 
 American Mediation in the Franco-Chinese War, 
 1883-1884. Good Offices of the United States in Korea. 
 Korea after the Peace of Shimonoseki. 
 
 XXVII. Treaty Revision 508 
 
 Revision in China by Interpretation and Agreement. 
 Japanese Effort at Revision, 1872. Policy of Judge 
 Bingham— Treaty of 1878. The Shufeldt Treaty with 
 Korea. The Unratified Treaty of 1889. Treaties of 
 1894. 
 
 PART VI. THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE CHINESE 
 
 EMPIRE 
 
 ;<; XXVIII. Asiatic Immigration and American Foreign Pjolicy . .. 535 
 
 The Coolie Traffic. Chinese Labor in California. 
 Treaties of 1868 and 1880. Growth of 111 Feeling. The 
 Threat of Japanese Immigration. 
 XXIX The Missionaries and American Policy in Asia . . . 555 
 
 Missionaries as Diplomatic and Consular Officers. The 
 Status of Missionaries under the Treaties. Missionaries 
 and Neutrality. Persecution of Christians in China. 
 XXX. American Trade: 1844-1898 .......... 578 
 
 Decline of American Shipping. Foreign Advisors in 
 China, Japan and Korea. Foreign Concessions at the 
 Treaty Ports. Telegraphs and Cables. The First Rail- 
 ways. Railway Construction in China after 1885. 
 Spheres of Influence. 
 
 i..-"' 
 
XVI 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 XXXI. Hawaii and the Philippines 607 
 
 The Annexation of Hawaii. Suspicion of Japanese 
 Designs in Hawaii. The Philippines in the Spanish- 
 American War. Peace Negotiations with Spain. De- 
 bates on Hawaii and the Philippines. Significance of 
 Senate Approval of Treaty of Paris. 
 
 XXXII. The Reassertion of the Open Door Policy 634 
 
 The Far East in 1899. Overtures for an Alliance. 
 John Hay and the Open Door Notes. What was Ob- 
 tained? 
 XXXIII. The United States and the Boxer Insurrection . . . 650 
 The Boxer Insurrection. The Desires of the Ameri- 
 can Government. Independent or Concurrent Action. 
 
 Personalities and Principles 669 
 
 The Consular and Diplomatic Service. The Contribu- 
 tors to American Policy. The Cooperative Policy. 
 Notes op Bibliography 682 
 
 Bibliography 695 
 
 Appendix 705 
 
 Table of Presidents, Secretaries of State, and of 
 Diplomatic Representatives in China, Japan and Korea, 
 1842-1900. 
 
 Index 709 
 
 / 
 V XXXIV. 
 
 XXXV. 
 
PART I 
 THE EAST INDIA TRADE 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 THE BEGINNINGS OF AMEEICAN COMMERCE 
 
 American policy in Asia has been a development of the 
 policy of early Americans — those pioneers who crossed the 
 seas and sometimes set up their habitations on what were to 
 the western world the frontiers of the East. To understand 
 the policy in its later amplifications and applications it is 
 very important to know something of the early trade and 
 the conditions under which it was accomplished. 
 
 The term 'East India Trade' itself belongs to the genera- 
 tion which immediately followed the close of the American 
 Revolution. One finds it in the literature of the day and in 
 the speeches in Congress. The use of the term is important. 
 The Americans viewed Asia as a whole and called it the 
 East Indies. The trade so described included all the com- 
 liherce the destination or origin of which lay in either the 
 Indian or western Pacific oceans. There was not, for 
 example, at the time Adam Seybert wrote (1818) any one 
 section of the trade so conspicuous as to overshadow other 
 parts; the Calcutta, Sumatra, Northwest Coast and Canton 
 trade stood side by side. They were all more or less related 
 to each other and interdependent and, in turn, were all so 
 much a part of the South American, West Indian and 
 European commerce that the separate trade reports can 
 never be untangled. The East India trade was merely a 
 part of the fabric of the foreign commerce of the United 
 States, and yet it was conducted under certain distinctive 
 and unique conditions, political and economic, which gave 
 rise to separate policies. Even the earliest American 
 traders had to have a policy in Asia and the policy which 
 necessity as well as wisdom dictated became the foundation 
 of subsequent policies adopted by their government. Mod- 
 
4 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 I ern American policy in Asia is largely a body of precedents 
 ' which have accumulated from decade to decade since the 
 close of the war of the American Revolution. These pre- 
 cedents have a remarkable consistency due in large measure 
 to the unchanging geographical and slowly changing 
 economic and political conditions under which American 
 trade with Asia has been conducted. 
 
 This trade may best be understood when one visualizes, 
 the scenes of the activities — the economic condition of the 
 colonies at the close of the Revolution, the ships, their 
 owners, officers and crews, the departure from the Atlantic 
 seaboard, the barter for goods, the return cargoes, and the 
 life of those who tarried for a few years in the Eastern 
 ports. 
 
 Previous to the Revolution the American colonists knew 
 of Asia only through the tea which found its way to such 
 ports as Boston harbour, or was smuggled in from Holland ; ^ 
 through the small amount of expensive silks and the larger 
 amount of Chinese and Indian cottons which wore well; and 
 through the tales of the pirates who seventy-five years 
 earlier had stalked through the streets of their ports.^ At 
 the close of the war we cannot call by name more than 
 one or two native born Americans who had ever been on 
 the coasts of Asia, and in 1784 probably there were not a 
 half dozen people on all the Atlantic seaboard who had any 
 first hand knowledge whatever of the other side of the 
 world. Where the first charts came from by which the' 
 American vessels sailed to the East is a mystery . 
 
 In the last Captain Cook expedition to the Pacific, which 
 left England in July, 1776, and returned in 1781, were two 
 Americans, John Gore of Virginia and John Ledyard of 
 Connecticut.^ They were the first lieutenant and corporal 
 of the marines, respectively, on the Resolution. Of Gore 
 nothing else is known, but Ledyard's service to his country 
 was considered in later years of sufficient importance to 
 merit the attention of Jared Sparks, the biographer of 
 Washington. Ledyard had entered Dartmouth College in 
 
 ^ Small numerals in text and notes refer to bibliographical references at ends 
 of chapters. 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF AMERICAN COMMERCE 5 
 
 1772 to prepare himself to be a missionary to the Indians, 
 but had retired after a few months to go to sea. Working 
 his way back to America in the British navy, he deserted in 
 1782 and made his way home to Connecticut for a brief 
 period, and then ordained himself a missionary to American 
 merchants to convert them to trade with Asia, the limitless 
 possibilities of which had been impressed upon him when 
 he had seen fur^skins,_purchased on the Northwest coast 
 of America for a sixpence, and sold in Canton for $100. 
 
 Ledyard urged the advantages of the trade upon mer- 
 chants in New York, Philadelphia and Boston. At least 
 twice he was within sight of success, once at New London, 
 where the frigate Trumhell was actually engaged for the 
 purpose and then diverted elsewhere, and also in New York 
 where Daniel Parker was employed, presumably by Robert 
 Morris of Philadelphia, to purchase a ship for a trial voyage. 
 The ship was purchased, named the Empress of China,^ and 
 sent to Canton in February, 1784, but Ledyard, whose zeal 
 and enthusiasm did not qualify him, perhaps, for great 
 responsibilities, was never permitted to carry out the great 
 plans of which he was the author. 
 
 Within the next four or five years we hear of certain 
 Englishmen ^ who drifted to America after some years of 
 experience in the East, but none of them appear to have 
 been recognized as important assets in teaching the Ameri- 
 cans the arts of the new trade. American trade with Asia 
 was begun without the direct assistance of any others than 
 Americans and made its way, needless to say, in the face 
 of no inconsiderable opposition from British competitors, 
 notably the East India Company, as well as with the bless- 
 ing of a few Englishmen who welcomed any undermining 
 of the East India Company monopoly. 
 
 Of general causes leading to the initiation and develop- 
 ment of the East India trade little need be said. This 
 branch of the commerce of the new nation was merely a part 
 of a lively expansive movement which burst the bounds at 
 every possible point and spread over the face of the earth 
 in search of produce, trade, capital and wealth. At the close 
 
6 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 of the Revolution there were idle ships just in from their 
 privateering; there were sailors; there was a market 
 in America for the produce of Asia, which had formerly- 
 come in British vessels ; *^ and there was a market in China, 
 as the Americans already knew from the pre-revolutionary 
 trade, for at least one American product — ginseng, a root 
 utilized by the Chinese in medicines/ Furthermore, there 
 was the potent urge of poverty. As a non-manufacturing 
 people, shut up in a limited area which was not producing 
 many essential articles of diet, and impoverished by a costly 
 war, the United States was as far as possible removed from 
 economic self-sufficiency. The first Americans went to Asia 
 because they had to go^they had to go everywhere. In 
 later years, when this necessity was removed, they showed 
 their preferences by electing to remain at home. 
 
 The American Ports 
 
 The American ports especially concerned in the East 
 India trade were Salem and Boston, Providence, a few of 
 the ports of Connecticut, New York, Philadelphia, Balti- 
 more, and to a slight extent Norfolk. It is difficult to assign 
 to each of these ports its exact relative place in the growing 
 trade, for the relative positions were constantly changing, 
 and each city, from Philadelphia north, possessed at some 
 time or other its own peculiar eminence. To regard the 
 trade as having in any way been limited to any single state 
 is misleading. New York could claim the distinction of the 
 first completed voyage ; Philadelphia, as was in accord with 
 its wealth and population, had for a while the largest 
 tonnage; Salem and Boston were distinguished for their 
 ship owners; and eventually the trade showed a tendency 
 to concentrate in the Port of New York, whither Massachu- 
 setts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania and Mary- 
 land sent their agents to buy and sell, irrespective of what 
 state claimed ownership of the capital invested, or of the 
 ships employed. 
 
 The Empress of China was owned and fitted out jointly 
 by Robert Morris of Philadelphia and a group of New York 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF AMERICAN COMMERCE 7 
 
 merchants represented by the firm of Daniel Parker which 
 went bankrupt in 1785. The captain was John Green, who 
 had probably commanded a privateer in the Revolution. 
 The supercargo was Major Samuel Shaw of Boston, who had 
 served with distinction in the war and who, but for his 
 untimely death in 1794 en route from China, would prob- 
 ably have risen to eminence in the life of the young nation. 
 The Empress of China left New York February 22, 1784, 
 sailed directly to Canton and returned directly, arriving 
 home May 12^785. She was furnished with the customary 
 sea-letter with the rather inclusive introduction to the 
 "most Serene, most Puissant, High, Illustrious, Noble, Hon- 
 orable, Venerable, Wise and Prudent, Lords, Emperors, 
 Kings, Republicks, Princes, Dukes, Earls, Barons, Lords, 
 Burgomasters, Councillors, as also Judges, Officers, Justici- 
 aries and Regents of all the good cities and places, whether 
 ecclesiastical or secular, who shall see these patents or hear 
 them read." ^ The cost of vessel (360 tons), the outfit, and 
 the expenses of the voyage are reported to have been 
 $120,000.*^ The cargo, what there was of it, consisted of 
 something over forty tons of ginseng. The profits of the 
 voyage were reported as $37,727 — in Major Shaw's estima- 
 tion hardly enough to go around, and certainly very modest 
 when compared with the reported profits of the expedition 
 which followed. 
 
 The return of the Empress of China created, neverthe- 
 less, something of a sensation. To James Madison a cor- 
 respondent ^'^ wrote: 
 
 "I imagine you have heard of the arrival of an American vessel 
 at this place in four months from Canton in China, laden with the 
 commodities of that country. 
 
 "It seems our countrymen were treated with as much respect as 
 the subjects of any nation, i. e., the whole are looked upon by the 
 Chinese as Barbarians,' and they have too much Asiatic hauteur to 
 descend to any discrimination. Most of the American merchants 
 here are of the opinion that this commerce can be carried on, on 
 better terms from America than Europe, and that we may be able 
 not only to supply our own wants but to smuggle a very considerable 
 quantity to the West Indies. I could heartily wish to see the 
 merchants of our state engage in the business. 
 
8 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 "Don't you think that an exemption from duty on all goods 
 imported immediately from India in (American) bottoms to our state 
 might have a good effect?" 
 
 This agitation so soon begun for protection legislation 
 for the China trade did not lapse. Both Pennsylvania and 
 New York^^ adopted protective duties, and by 1791 the 
 federal government had extended to the China trade such 
 favors as now seem almost incredible when one comes to 
 consider their value. The China traders not only enjoyed 
 the protection of the navigation act of 1789 which imposed 
 a discriminating tonnage tax of forty-six cents per ton on 
 foreign bottoms, and the protection of the tariff act of the 
 same year which gave to the American importer a 121/2 per 
 cent, protection in duties on East India imports other than 
 tea, and on tea a protection which absolutely excluded im- 
 portation in any but American bottoms; but they also en- 
 joyed the special favor of a warehousing system with draw- 
 backs for reexportation and, most important of all, a two 
 years' delay in the payment of tea duties.^" Tea duties 
 equalled or exceeded the prime cost of the tea at Canton.^^ 
 When one adds to these favors the liberal credits extended 
 to the Americans in India and China it is not difficult to see 
 why the trade prospered. 
 
 The arrival of the Empress of China was followed shortly 
 by that of the Pallas, with a cargo of $50,000 worth of 
 teas taken by Thomas Randall, Shaw's partner and former 
 companion in arms. The Pallas had been chartered at Can- 
 ton and was commanded by Captain John O'Donnell, an 
 Englishman and former Indian merchant who immediately 
 became an American citizen and embarked upon the East 
 India trade from Baltimore. Robert Morris took the cargo 
 of the Pallas and became so enthused by the prospects of the 
 China trade that he made a proposition to Shaw and Ran- 
 dall to return to Canton as his agents. The terms, however, 
 were not considered satisfactory. Morris followed up the 
 trade from Philadelphia and the partners almost immedi- 
 ately accepted an offer from a company of New York mer- 
 chants. Shaw sailed again for Canton in 1786, planning on 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF AMERICAN COMMERCE 9 
 
 this voyage to stop at Batavia. ''The terms on which I 
 go," wrote Shaw to his brother, "promise something clever." 
 
 At least nine voyages to the Far East, some of them to 
 India but not to China, were initiated from New York be- 
 fore the end of 1787. 
 
 Two months before the Empress of China had sailed 
 from New York the sloop Harriet (55 tons) had cleared 
 from Boston, bound for Canton with ginseng. Nine months 
 after the departure of the first New York venture the Grand 
 Turk, belonging to Elias Haskett Derby, sailed from Salem 
 for the Cape on a similar errand but with a more diversified 
 cargo. Neither the Harriet nor the Grand Turk went far 
 beyond Cape Town; the sloop secured her small return 
 cargo out of the private ventures of the officers of the re- 
 turning British Indiamen, but the Grand Turk with its 
 larger cargo space did not succeed so well. 
 
 "Captain Ingersoll's object," wrote Shaw, who found the Grand 
 TurJc at the Cape on his return from Canton, "was to sell rum, 
 cheese, salt provisions, chocolate, loaf-sugar, butter, etc., the proceeds 
 of which in money, with a quantity of ginseng, and some cash brought 
 with him, he intended to invest in Bohea tea. But as the ships bound 
 to Europe were not allowed to break bulk by the way, he was dis- 
 appointed in his expectation of purchasing that article, and sold his 
 ginseng for two thirds of a Spanish dollar a pound. . . . He intended 
 remaining a short time to purchase fine teas in the private trade 
 allowed to officers on board the India ships, and then to sail to the 
 coast of Guinea to dispose of his rum, etc., for ivory and gold dust; 
 thence, without taking a single slave, to proceed to the West Indies 
 and purchase sugar and cotton with which he would return to Salem." 
 
 Captain Ingersoll assured Shaw that Derby would rather 
 sink the whole capital employed than be directly or indi- 
 rectly concerned in the 'infamous' slave traffic. 
 
 Boston was relatively slow in following up the voyage of 
 the Harriet, but Salem, especially through Derby who acted 
 on information secured at the Cape by Captain Ingersoll, 
 plunged boldly into the trade and soon had several ships 
 in the Indian Ocean, many of which reached Canton. In 
 1789 there were no less than ten Salem ships in and out of 
 the Isle de France (Mauritius). Meanwhile Boston had 
 sent out the Columbia and the Lady Washington to the 
 
10 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Northwest coast (1788), and the Massachusetts trade with 
 the Far East was well launched. The Bay State developed 
 a good deal of individuality in the East India trade. It 
 specialized to a greater degree than did the other ports, in 
 certain branches, trading much with Mauritius, Calcutta, 
 Madras, the pepper coast of Sumatra, and the Northwest 
 coast of America. While the Massachusetts shipowners 
 were also merchants, supplying their own markets, they 
 were primarily interested in the carrying trade. Their 
 vessels were, to use a modern term, 'tramp freighters.' The 
 points at which they turned homeward were usually either 
 Canton or an Indian Ocean port, but the voyage in either 
 direction might include visits to half a dozen European 
 ports, or several cities of South America. Freight rates 
 ranged from $2.25 to more than $4 per ton per month. ^* 
 Needless to say, the Massachusetts traders prospered. 
 
 Philadelphia entered the trade directly in 1787, sending 
 out at least five vessels, a total of over 1600 tons, or more 
 than could be claimed in that year for all of the other 
 ports together. The Philadelphia ship owners, Robert 
 Morris excepted, were little given to explorations or experi- 
 ments ; rather, they set to work to build up a fleet to supply 
 their needs along established and proven routes, chiefly to 
 Calcutta, Madras and Canton. The East India trade of the 
 city quickly passed into the hands of a few substantial 
 merchants of wealth like Stephen Girard and Samuel Archer 
 who managed the trade in close conjunction with their 
 wholesale or retail merchandising. In this class of trade 
 Philadelphia retained its leadership more than twenty years, 
 after which it was forced to yield gradually to New York. 
 
 The trade of Providence was very similar to that of 
 Philadelphia. It appears to have been better supplied with 
 capital at the outset than either New York or Massachu- 
 setts, but the growth of the trade was foredoomed to limita- 
 tion because Providence was a poor distributing point. 
 Before the war of 1812 Providence had already begun to 
 withdraw its capital from the trade to devote it to the 
 spinning industry.^ ^ 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF AMERICAN COMMERCE 11 
 
 The Vessels Employed 
 
 The fleets of the East India traders make a peculiar 
 appeal to the imagination. One reads in their tonnage and 
 in the records of their builders something of the economic 
 history of the struggling young nation ; in their adventures, 
 trials, failures and successes, something of the hardihood of 
 the youthful American spirit. 
 
 One cannot see without a thrill the departure of the 55- 
 ton sloop Harriet, or of the not much larger sloop Experi- 
 ment from Albany just two years later. The Harriet went 
 only to the Cape, but the Experiment, carrying a crew of 
 seven men and two boys, pushed on to China and returned 
 in eighteen months with a cargo of tea, China-ware and 
 other goods. In 1790 Captain Joseph Ingraham, formerly 
 mate on the Columbia, who had already circumnavigated 
 the globe, took a parting look at his native shore and then 
 launched the Hope,^^ ''being only 70 tons & slightly built" 
 into the bosom of the ocean for a voyage around the Horn 
 to the Northwest coast. Thirteen months later Ingraham 
 reached Macao with his cargo of pelts. And while he was 
 there, in came the 90-ton Lady Washington with Captain 
 John Kendrick from Nookta Sound, four years out of Bos- 
 ton harbor. 
 
 Such voyages as these were by no means exceptional. 
 The Pilgrim, 62 tons, sailed from Boston on a sealing voy- 
 age in the South Pacific in September, 1803, and four years 
 later arrived at Canton with between twelve and thirteen 
 thousand seal-skins. The schooner Rajah, built for the 
 Sumatra pepper trade was only 130 tons, and carried a 
 crew of only ten men. The voyage of the Betsey (93 tons) 
 of New York in 1797-8 is notable. She went to the South 
 Seas by way of Cape Horn, thence to Canton, and then back 
 to New York by way of Good Hope, a voyage of twenty- 
 three months. There was a crew of thirty, not one of whom 
 was over twenty-eight years old. The net proceeds of the 
 trip were in excess of $120,000, on an initial outlay for the 
 cost of the vessel, outfit, insurance and interest of $7,867. 
 
12 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 After deducting the duties, the shares of the captain, the 
 officers and the crew, and the capital invested, there was 
 asserted to be a clear profit to the owners of $53,118 — on a 
 twenty- three months trip of a 90- ton vessel! ^^ 
 
 We are not to beheve that these tiny sloops, snows, 
 brigantines, brigs and schooners were selected for the Pacific 
 and China trade in preference to larger craft. Their use 
 bears witness to the poverty of the traders and their lack 
 of capital. As rapidly as wealth permitted the Americans 
 built larger craft — from 250- to 300-ton vessels for the 
 Pacific and circuituous routes, and slightly larger for the 
 direct trade with India and Canton. With few exceptions 
 there were no American vessels anywhere near 1000 tons in 
 the East India trade until after 1840. Meanwhile the Amer- 
 ican ship owner came to see that although the British ships 
 of the day were ranging in size from 600 up to 1400 tons, 
 American vessels of half their size and a third their crews 
 were both safer and more economical for the East Indies. 
 The largest American vessel at Whampoa in 1813 was 493 
 tons; the smallest was 86 tons. The thirty-nine vessels 
 which touched at Honolulu between February and May, 
 1826, were of from 200 to 400 tons; ten years later at the 
 same port the vesels averaged about 320 tons, and in 1842 
 they ranged around 350 tons. The largest vessel at Batavia 
 in the summer of 1834 was 465 tons.^^ 
 
 The experience of Major Shaw with the Massachusetts 
 built especially for him and launched at Quincy, September, 
 1789, illustrates the experimental character of much of the 
 early trade, and also throws some light on the spirit of the 
 men engaged in it. 
 
 Shaw, after a thorough investigation of the methods of 
 trade used by the British and European companies in the 
 East Indies inclined to the opinion that large ships were 
 advantageous. 'The experience of nearly a century," he 
 wrote in his journal after his return to China from India 
 in 1786, "has convinced the Europeans of the utility of 
 managing their commerce with this country by national 
 companies and with large ships." Shortly after this Shaw 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF AMERICAN COMMERCE 13 
 
 and his partner, Thomas Randall, drew up a contract with 
 Eli Hayden "American merchant and supercargo of the 
 brigantine Columbia, whereof is master Solomon Bunker, 
 now riding at anchor at the port of Wharapoa and bound for 
 New York," by which Hayden was to place an order in 
 Massachusetts for a ship which would meet the needs of 
 the case as Shaw understood them. The length of the keel 
 was to be one hundred and sixteen feet, and the ship was 
 to have "three decks, and a round house with a stern 
 gallery from the round house, and a quarter gallery above 
 and below, with thirty-two ports on her second deck and a 
 forecastle on her upper deck." ^^ 
 
 "With respect to the other dimensions and disposition of the 
 ship," continued the contract, "those of the Worcester (an English 
 ship now at Whampoa) are annexed to these presents, but it is under- 
 stood by the parties to this contract and engaged by the said Eli 
 Hayden that he will build the aforesaid ship agreeably to the models 
 to be formed and given by the same (at the expense of Shaw and 
 Randall) by the person who shall hereafter be appointed for that pur- 
 pose ... it being further engaged that all the aforesaid and every 
 other article which shall enter into the construction of the said ship 
 previous to her being launched and delivered to said Shaw and 
 Randall, or their assigns, in the water and after at the risque of said 
 Eli Hayden, shall be well and truly the best, the very best quality, it 
 being the true intent, spirit and meaning of the present contract that 
 the said ship shall be built as well and as strong as wood and iron 
 can make her." 
 
 To William Hackett, of Salisbury, Massachusetts, who 
 had built the Alliance, were entrusted the responsibilities of 
 making the models and superintending the building of the 
 ship. The instructions to him contained the following 
 paragraph indicative of the national pride which character- 
 ized very many of the China traders : 
 
 "This ship is designed for the India trade, where ships from all 
 nations meet and where probably the best ships the world can produce 
 may be seen. It is the expectation of Messrs. Shaw and Randall that 
 they can produce from America such a ship as will bear the inspection 
 of the most critical eye, both as to construction and workmanship. 
 
 The Massachusetts appears to have met the qualifica- 
 tions. Both British and French naval commanders who 
 
14 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 were visiting in Boston in their national ships at the time 
 of the launching expressed their admiration of the model of 
 the vessel, and the Massachusetts was afterwards pro- 
 nounced at both Batavia and Canton to be "as perfect as 
 the then state of the art would permit." The vessel sailed 
 from Boston in March, 1790, and her commander. Job 
 Prince, afterwards reported to Hackett, her builder: 
 
 "The ship Massachusetts surpassed our most sanguine expectations 
 so that she met the approbation of all the Europeans at Canton. And 
 though their eyes were open to spy defects and their tongues ready to 
 find fault, they confessed that they could not." 
 
 The report of Amasa Delano, second officer of the 
 Massachusetts, sheds another light on the obstacles of ignor- 
 ance and inexperience which the early Canton traders had 
 to overcome before substantial success crowned their efforts. 
 Delano stated: 
 
 "The ship was as well built as any ship could be under the cir- 
 cumstances. The timbers were cut and used immediately while 
 perfectly green. It was white oak, and would have been very durable 
 had it been docked and properly seasoned. . . . She was, however, 
 rotten when we first arrived in China. She was loaded principally 
 with green masts and spars taken on board in winter directly out of 
 the water with ice and mud on them. The lower hold was thus filled, 
 and the lower deck hatches caulked down in Boston and never opened 
 until we were in Canton. The air was then found to be so corrupt 
 that a lighted candle was put out by it nearly as soon as by water. . . . 
 We had taken four or five hundred barrels of beef in the lower hold, 
 placed in the broken stowage. When fresh air was admitted so that 
 men could live under the hatches the beef was found almost boiled, 
 the hoops were rotted and fallen off, and the inside of the ship was 
 covered with a blue mould more than half an inch thick." 
 
 And yet four or five decades later the Americans had 
 learned how to carry even cargoes of ice over the same 
 route and dispose of them from Calcutta to Canton at a 
 profit. 
 
 Major Shaw seized an opportunity to sell the Massachu- 
 setts and invested his funds in a cargo which he was able to 
 freight to Bombay. At the latter port he transferred part 
 of the cargo to an American ship and took the balance in a 
 Danish vessel to Ostend to be disposed of in the European 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF AMERICAN COMMERCE 15 
 
 market. He is reported to have received $65,000 for his 
 ship. If such were the truth his venture had by no means 
 ended in disaster for it is unlikely that the Massachusetts 
 cost more than $40,000 — $50 a ton. The sale of American 
 built vessels in the ports of Asia was common in those days. 
 
 Crews, Captains and Owners 
 
 Of great interest to the student of the American policy 
 in Asia is the character of the men who sailed these ships 
 and represented the new nation in the ports of the East. 
 They were good, average American-born citizens, recruited 
 either from the sea-faring population or from the farms. 
 As late as 1834, judging from various consular reports, the 
 number of foreign born did not exceed twenty-five per cent., 
 and in the first six months of that year, out of the 276 
 sailors in 19 vessels which entered Manila, all but 25 were 
 native born. Sailors on the sealing and fur-trading voyages 
 had a share in the profits, and in the direct trade with Asia 
 they often made small ventures of their own, buying cargo 
 space in the ship in which they sailed. They had before 
 them the possibility of either working up through the grades 
 until they became masters of their own ships, as many of 
 them did, or of accumulating enough capital to buy a farm 
 or enter trade at home. The American sailors were there- 
 fore quite unlike the crews of the British Indiamen, re- 
 cruited from the dregs of English cities, which at Canton 
 spread terror in their path, creating no end of trouble for 
 the British authorities and even imperilling the continuance 
 of the trade itself.^*' The early American sailor, be it ad- 
 mitted, was also quite unlike his successor who appeared on 
 the China coast after the opening of California. The Ameri- 
 can sailor of the early fifties in China had all the vices of 
 the earlier EngHsh sailor, plus initiative and a liberty. The 
 character of the American sailor who appeared in the East 
 in the early days was a distinct asset to American trade at 
 a time when good will counted for much. He merited better 
 treatment than he sometimes received. 
 
16 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 The American consul at Canton, shortly after the close 
 of the War of 1812, reported ^^ that the American sailors 
 adrift in Canton preferred service under almost any flag 
 rather than their own. 
 
 "It has often occurred," he wrote, "that the commanders of vessels 
 which have been on long, tedious and laborious voyages, sometimes 
 two or three years, particularly on the Northwest coast of America 
 and the Pacific Ocean, illtreat and unnecessarily punish their seamen 
 for the sole purpose of driving them to desert from their vessels, that 
 they may forfeit their consular claim for wages, through which means 
 they are driven to the necessity of entering into foreign service . . . 
 this takes place particularly about the time of the arrival at this port, 
 from which period as many seamen are not wanted to navigate the 
 vessel to the United States or Europe, as were necessarily employed in 
 the previous and more lucrative part of the voyage." 
 
 The hazards of a sailor's life in those days were also 
 formidable. Out of a crew of sixty-one which had sailed the 
 Massachusetts to Canton in 1790, fifteen had in the course 
 of years died either at Canton or en route, four were mur- 
 dered at or near Macao, one contracted leprosy and one 
 became a slave in Algiers. 
 
 Of the ship masters it may be said that while some of 
 them were hard drivers and merciless, they were on the 
 whole an exceedingly able set of men, the type of the Ameri- 
 can pioneer. Many of them were sons of ship-owning 
 families, and many more were graduated into the ranks 
 of the merchants and bankers of the next generation, while 
 not a few owned their vessels and added to their holdings 
 until they had a fleet of their own. One reads the tale of a 
 Boston banker in the fifties who was reported, half a century 
 before, to have commanded a ship from Calcutta to 
 Boston "^ "with nothing in the shape of a chart on board but 
 a small map of the world in Guthrie's geography." One 
 may well question the accuracy of the details of this story 
 and yet find in it a measure of truth. 
 
 We may clearly distinguish three classes of owners. 
 Many of the smaller vessels were owned and fitted out on 
 shares. The six share-holders in the Columbia and the Lady 
 Washington in their memorable voyage to the Northwest 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF AMERICAN COMMERCE 17 
 
 coast and Canton were three Boston merchants, Charles 
 Bulfinch the architect, a son of Elias Haskett Derby, and a 
 New York merchant. There were many such expeditions. 
 Another class was the large retail and wholesale merchants, 
 particularly of Philadelphia and New York. They appear 
 to have managed their voyages for their exclusive and 
 individual interests; one does not find evidence that the 
 small adventurer had any part in these enterprises. There 
 were also the shipping companies, owned by individuals, by 
 families, or by a group of individuals. The Derbys of Salem 
 were of this class. They admitted a large number of small 
 ventures which were managed by the supercargoes on a 
 commission of 21/2 per cent and for which the owners paid 
 either the regular freight charges or divided the profits with 
 Derby. In the voyage of the Astrea in 1789, there were 
 twenty-four of these private consignments."^ One man 
 would send a few casks of ginseng, another a few boxes of 
 ''dollars," a third some snuff, and many sent wine or beer. 
 In other instances the stock in these trading companies was 
 rather widely distributed. In 1814 the firm of Oliver Wol- 
 cott and Company of New York reported sixteen individuals 
 as having a total stock of $405,000 in the China trade. 
 Among the share-holders were William Rhinelander, Rufus 
 King, Archibald Gracie and Eli Whitney.^^ 
 
 The early trade had in it a large element of speculation. 
 The price of tea fluctuated greatly and the market was fre- 
 quently glutted. The trade in Indian fabrics and in silks 
 was steadier but even under the best of market conditions 
 the trade was hazardous. A full cargo in a four or five 
 hundred ton ship was valued at from three to five hundred 
 thousand dollars. Wrecks were not uncommon, insurance 
 was high, and there were few men in the United States at 
 the beginning of the last century who could lose any large 
 amount of money and remain solvent. Following the War 
 of 1812 there was a period of intense speculation ending in 
 very extensive failures. In 1825 one Philadelphia house 
 failed -^ owing the government nearly $900,000 in unpaid 
 duties. This failure carried others with it and not long 
 
18 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 afterwards a New York house failed for $3,000,000. During 
 the third decade of the century one of the wealthiest of the 
 Boston firms claimed hardly to have made the interest on 
 the money invested. 
 
 After the War of 1812 the trade showed a marked tend- 
 ency toward concentration in the hands of a few firms. It 
 was stated that in 1825 seven eighths of the China trade 
 was conducted by four'firms: Messrs. Perkins and Company 
 of Boston; Archer who was connected with the Browns of 
 Liverpool, Jones, Oakford and Company of Philadelphia; 
 and Thomas H. Smith of New York. In 1829 one half of 
 the entire trade was said to be in the hands of the house of 
 Perkins. The day of the small trader had not entirely 
 passed but a few merchants had a very great advantage. 
 The pioneer days were over but they had served a most 
 useful purpose in American industrial and commercial de- 
 velopment. The "merchant prince" had appeared at Can- 
 ton but at the same time many an American at home had 
 withdrawn from the China trade with sufiicient capital to 
 serve his needs as he entered into the new industrial life 
 of the nation. The importance of the early China trade is 
 to be gauged not so much by the net trade returns for each 
 year as by the fact that it offered a means for the accumula- 
 tion in a few years of a large amount of capital of which 
 the rapidly growing states were in urgent need. 
 
 Cargoes 
 
 The outward cargoes of the East India traders present 
 an interesting study. 
 
 The first American merchants went to the East not so 
 much to sell as to buy. The East Indian trade arose out of 
 no notable demand in the United States for a market for 
 surplus produce, but rather out of a desire to secure for the 
 United States certain commodities such as Indian muslins, 
 spices, Chinese teas and silks for which there was a demand. 
 The East was economically self-sustaining; it required 
 nothing from the West. The problem of exchange thus 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF AMERICAN COMMERCE 19 
 
 created was the most serious obstacle which the American 
 merchant had to meet. What could he take to Asia to give 
 in exchange for the produce which he required? 
 
 Fortunately for the American the acceptable articles of 
 exchange in the various ports from Mauritius to Canton 
 were varied. There were, scattered across Asia, considerable 
 settlements of white men who were dependent in part for 
 the satisfaction of their needs, both personal and industrial, 
 upon commodities which had to be carried to Asia from the 
 West. The Americans seized upon this trade with avidity. 
 The native markets in each country would absorb certain 
 articles which the United States produced, or which the 
 American merchant could collect en route to the East. 
 Hence the advantage of the circuitous trading. A vessel 
 might start for Canton with farm produce or with flour. 
 At some European or Mediterranean port this cargo would 
 be exchanged for a cargo for Mauritius, or India or else- 
 where. Sometimes there would be three or four exchanges 
 of commodities before the ship reached Canton. 
 
 The way in which the Americans attempted to solve this 
 formidable problem of exchange may best be seen in some of 
 the old manifests. The Grand Turk of Salem carried as 
 outward cargo in 1785: pitch, tar, flour, rice, tobacco, butter, 
 wine, bar-iron, sugar, oil, chocolate, prunes, brandy, beef, 
 rum, hams, candles, soap, cheese, fish, beer, porter, port and 
 ginseng, as well as some specie. The Astrea in 1789 carried, 
 in addition to many of the articles noted above : snuff, shoes, 
 harness and saddlery. The Asia, sailing the same year from 
 Philadelphia, carried rum, specie and British manufactured 
 goods. The General Washington from Providence in 1791, 
 in addition to wine, spirits and ginseng, carried tar, iron 
 bars, anchors, shot and cannon. For many of the commodi- 
 ties in the above lists there could be only a limited demand ; 
 they were obviously intended to supply the needs of 
 Europeans rather than of Asiatics. 
 
 A few years later we find very much simpler manifests. 
 For the voyage of the ship Triton,^^ which left New York 
 for Canton in 1804, capital to the extent of $120,000 was 
 
20 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 advanced by seven New York merchants and firms, and 
 this was invested as follows: 9533 beaver skins at $5 each, 
 $47,665; and 70,372 Spanish dollars, costing $71,882. The 
 ship Lion,"'^ sailing from New York early in 1816, carried 
 among other items, 60 cases of opium, valued at $30,015, 
 and also 45 kegs, and 2 boxes of Spanish dollars, valued at 
 $110,000. The appearance of furs, opium, and an increasing 
 proportion of specie in the later manifests reveals the condi- 
 tion of the problem of exchange. The Americans had been 
 forced to fall back on Spanish dollars the demand for which 
 had pushed them to a premium, and were supplementing 
 this precious medium of exchange with furs and opium. 
 This export of specie exerted a very disturbing effect on 
 the condition of American currency, especially after the War 
 of 1812. A committee appointed to consider the subject 
 made a report in the House of Representatives in 1819 -^ 
 that '' the whole amount of our current coin is probably not 
 more than double that which has been exported in a single 
 year to India, including China in the general term." The 
 largest China merchant in New York in 1824 admitted that 
 out of his total exports to China of $1,311,057 for that year, 
 nearly $900,000 was specie. His other items of export were 
 British manufactured goods, $356,407, and American pro- 
 duce, chiefly furs and ginseng, to the extent of only $60,000. 
 At that time a Boston merchant, probably Thomas H. Per- 
 kins, wrote: 
 
 "There has been a strong prejudice existing against the China 
 trade in this country, under the idea that specie was necessarily ex- 
 ported to procure cargoes from China. So far is this from the fact, 
 in our case, that, although our importations have averaged more than 
 a million dollars annually for several years, in the products of China, 
 of which silks and nankeens form a considerable portion, that we 
 have not shipped a Spanish dollar for the past three years to China. 
 Our funds arise from the export of opium from Turkey, British goods 
 from Great Britain, lead and quick-silver from Gibraltar, and the 
 same articles on a large scale from Trieste." 
 
 The same writer asserted that he had already made the 
 experiment of shipping American cotton goods to China, 
 Manila, Java, and to the Mediterranean ports and to 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF AMERICAN COMMERCE 21 
 
 Smyrna, and was satisfied that in the "more gross cotton 
 fabrics" the American manufacturers could already compete 
 successfully with their British rivals. Another merchant 
 predicted a trade with China in raw cotton in competition 
 with the Bengal product "whenever raw cotton can be pur- 
 chased in this country at ten cents a pound." The next year 
 cotton went down temporarily to eleven cents, but the mer- 
 chant never lived to see the day of 'ten cent cotton.' The 
 exportation of cotton goods, however, of the coarser grades, 
 steadily increased. — 
 
 It was asserted in 1852 ^^ that the United States had 
 shipped silver to China since 1784 to the extent of $180,- 
 000,000. The American port records show nearly $70,000,- 
 000 to have been shipped between 1805 and 1818. As to 
 the total amount which had been received in China from 
 American ships there could only be wild guesses, for no one 
 knows how much specie for the East was collected on the 
 circuitous voyages. 
 
 The inward cargoes from the Far East consisted of 
 cotton and silk textiles from India ; spices ; and from China, 
 tea, nankeens, cassia, China-ware, straw mats and matting, 
 sugar and drugs. Tea and nankeens formed the greater part 
 of the value of the China cargoes. One has but to examine 
 this list of commodities to see how slender was the perman- 
 ent basis for the American trade with the East. When the 
 United States had become a manufacturing nation and had 
 developed the logical sources of supply nearer home, therv 
 remained only tea and spice as articles of constant demand, 
 and the United States did not become a nation of tea 
 drinkers. Tea was a luxury ^" in the early days, costing in 
 1791 from twenty-eight cents to more than a dollar a pound, 
 according to grade. Coffee became more popular, and it was 
 cheaper. Expanding population and reexportation, rather 
 than increased per capita consumption, accounted for the 
 growing East India trade. 
 
22 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. See, for example, Philip Cuyler Letter Book (N. Y. Pub. Lib. 
 
 Mss. Div.). At the outbreak of the Seven Years' War Cuyler 
 ordered several barrels of tea (July 20, 1756) from John 
 Hokson of Holland through Captain Corne "who sails this 
 day from Rotterdam." 
 
 2. Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York 
 
 (Albany, 1854). Vol. 4, pp. 307-10, 446, 459, 480. 
 
 3. "The Life of John Ledyard," by Jared Sparks, Cambridge, 1828. 
 
 4. "The Journals of Major Samuel Shaw, the first American Consul 
 
 at Canton, with a life of the author," by Josiah Quincy, Bos- 
 ton, 1847. 
 
 5. "East India Trade of Providence, 1787-1807," by Gertrude 
 
 Selwyn Kimball, Brown University Historical Papers, 1-10, 
 1894-99; 3 Dip. Corres., of U. S., Sept. 19, 1783-March 4, 1789 
 (Washington, 1837) p. 771. 
 
 6. See, for example, America and England (Mss. in Bancroft Col- 
 
 lection, N. Y. Pub. Lib.) ; and, Letters of Phineas Bond, 
 American Historical Association Reports, 1896, Vol. 1. 
 
 7. "Oriental Commerce," by William Milburn, London, 1813, 2 
 
 vols. ; "Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States 
 of America," by Timothy Pitkin, Hartford, 1816. 
 
 8. Papers of Continental Congress, Reports of Committees, Vol. 
 
 5, p. 11. (Mss. Div., Lib. of Congress) ; Annex to the Treaty 
 of Amity and Commerce of Oct 8, 1782, between the United 
 States and the Netherlands. 
 
 9. "Progress of New York in a Century, 1776-1876," by John 
 
 Austin Stevens, New York, 1876. 
 
 10. Madison Papers (N. Y. Pub. Lib.) Vol. 14; W. Grayson to 
 
 Madison, May 28, 1785. 
 
 11. Laws of Pennsylvania, 1785, p. 669; 1787, p. 241; Laws of New 
 
 York, 1787, chap. 81, cited in "American Commercial Legisla- 
 tion before 1789," by A. A. Giesecke, New York, 1910. 
 
 12. See "History of Early Relations between the United States and 
 ^' China," by K. C. Latourette, Transactions of the Conn. 
 
 Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 22, 1917, pp. 78-9, foot- 
 note, for complete summary of protective legislation and its 
 detailed changes. 
 
 13. Report on the China Trade (S. Doc. No. 31:19-1) gives much 
 
 information as to the cost of teas at Canton. 
 
 14. Kimball; "Statistical Annals of the United States," by Adam 
 
 Seybert, Philadelphia, 1818. 
 
 15. President Washington, Jan. 7, 1792, declined to furnish Brown 
 
 and Francis of Providence a recommendation to be used in 
 Europe in securing a $100,000 loan to build a vessel for the 
 East India trade on the ground that "it would be almost im- 
 possible to separate my private from my official capacity in ' 
 this case." (Misc. Letters, Dept. of State). 
 
 16. Journal of the Voyage of the Brigantine Hope, by Joseph 
 
 Ingraham (Mss. Div., Lib. of Congress). 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF AMERICAN COMMERCE 23 
 
 lY. Fanning Memorial. H. Doc. No. 57 ; 26-1 
 
 18. Consular Letters from Canton, Honolulu and Batavia. Dept. 
 
 of State. 
 
 19. Hudson Collection; Papers relating to the building of the ship 
 
 Massachusetts at Braintree, Mass., 1787-91 (N. Y. Pub. Lib.). 
 
 20. House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1821, Yol. 7. 
 
 21. Canton Letters, Yol. 1, Feb. 3, 1815. See also Misc. Letters, 
 
 Nov 1, 1816, C. J. Ingersoll to Mr, Monroe; and also see 
 H. Doc. No. 71:26-2, Sept. 22, 1805, Snow to Madison, 
 
 22. Edward Everett, in Hunt's "Lives of American Merchants," 
 
 Yol. 1, p. 139. 
 
 23. See Manifest of the Astrea, printed at length, p, 58ff,, "Hunt's 
 
 American Merchants," Yol. 2. 
 
 24. Account Books of Oliver Wolcott & Co. (N. Y. Hist. Soc.) 
 
 25. H. Doc. No. 137:19-1; S. Doc. No. 31:19-1, give an extensive 
 
 exhibit of the condition of the trade after 1820. See also 
 Worthy P. Sterns, "Foreign Trade of the United States, 
 1820-40" ; Journal of Political Economy, Yol. 8, 1899-1900. 
 
 26. Wolcott Account Books. 
 
 27. Ihid. 
 
 28. Lowndes Eeport, Jan. 26, 1819, H. Doc. Ill :15-2. 
 
 29. S. Ex. Doc. No. 49 :32-2. 
 
 30. "Old Merchants of New York," by Walter Barrett, Clerk, 5 Yols. 
 
 New York, 1885. Yol. 4, p. 213. Barrett, although making an 
 enormous number of misstatements, is nevertheless a valuable 
 source of information for all the early trade, particularly for 
 that after 1820. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 THE POETS OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 
 
 As we follow the American vessels to Asia we note that 
 there were two possible routes: around the Cape of Good 
 Hope, or around Cape Horn and westward across the 
 Pacific. 
 
 The eastward route was usually selected by the larger 
 Indiamen from Philadelphia, New York, Providence and 
 Massachusetts which engaged in the direct trade with India 
 or with China. This route also offered many advantages 
 to the tramp which depended in part on cargoes offered from 
 port to port. In any case the route lay across the Indian 
 Ocean, past the Malay peninsula, and up the China Sea. 
 Ports along the way invited attention and were, in fact, a 
 necessity for the replenishing of ship's stores, if not for 
 trade. 
 
 Isle de France and India 
 
 The American trade with Isle de France (Mauritius) 
 opened in April, 1786, when the Grand Turk arrived with 
 an assorted cargo evidently intended to meet the needs of 
 the French settlement. The ship was then chartered to the 
 extent of two thirds of the space by a Frenchman to carry 
 freight to Canton, the charterer agreeing to pay all the 
 port charges. The Grand Turk returned to Salem in May, 
 1787, with a cargo of tea, ox-hides, shammy skins, buck- 
 skins, wine, muslins and bandanna handkerchiefs. Derby 
 followed up the Mauritius and Indian trade and, finding it 
 more profitable than that with Canton, devoted himself 
 to it during the last eight years of his life. When he died in 
 1799 he was reported to be possessed" of a million dollars, 
 the largest fortune in the United States. Commerce with 
 
 24 
 
26 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Mauritius reached its height in 1800; there were seventeen 
 arrivals at Salem alone from Mauritius in the years 1797 
 and 1798. 
 
 The Mauritius trade has an interest aside from its 
 intrinsic value, for it was largely through the action of the 
 French Government in extending the hospitality of the 
 French ports in the Indian Ocean to American ships in 1783, 
 and in formally opening them to American trade the next 
 year, that the ports of British India were thrown open to 
 Americans on especially favorable terms. Indian produce 
 had become available to American vessels at the French 
 ports. The Dutch and the Danes also were friendly to the 
 Americans and they also had settlements in India. There 
 were, besides, the ports of the native princes. It was the 
 policy of Great Britain with her own nationals to control 
 the trade in such a way that all produce exported from 
 India would either be imported to England or at least pay 
 toll in London, but international competition made it im- 
 possible to maintain such a monopoly against American 
 ships. The Americans would get the cargoes in any case. 
 The East India Company, therefore, notwithstanding the 
 fact that no commercial treaty existed with the United 
 States, and in spite of such rancor and jealousy as remained 
 from the late war, determined not only to admit American 
 vessels to British India but even to offer special induce- 
 ments to bring them there.^ 
 
 The first American ship to enter an Indian port was the 
 Chesapeake of Baltimore. The vessel had been built 
 especially for the trade and was commanded by her owner, 
 Captain John O'Donnell, who had brought the Pallas into 
 New York in 1784. The Chesapeake cleared, probably from 
 Norfolk, in the latter part of 1786 and returned to Perth 
 Amboy in 1789. She was warmly welcomed in India, the 
 Supreme Council of Bengal exempting her, as a mark of 
 special favor, from all customs duties. Lord Cornwallis 
 and the Government of India issued an order that American 
 ships at the East India Company's settlements should be 
 treated in all respects as the most favored foreigners. This 
 
THE PORTS OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 27 
 
 policy was confirmed in the commercial treaty with Great 
 Britain in 1794 (Article 13). The privileges secured were 
 even greater, for Americans paid only 6 per cent import 
 duties, the same as those paid by the English, whereas other 
 nations paid 8 per cent. Furthermore, the Americans were 
 exempted from the 2 per cent export duty which was paid 
 by all others, except the British. And then, although the 
 treaty of 1794 limited the trade in American vessels to 
 direct trade with American ports, special licenses were 
 issued permitting Americans to carry Indian produce to 
 other ports of the Indian Ocean and to China, thus linking 
 the peninsula in those circuitous voyages to which American 
 ships were so well adapted. 
 
 Derby of Salem had four vessels in the Indian Ocean in 
 1787. They visited Surat, Bombay and Calcutta. They 
 carried among other commodities, Bombay cotton to Can- 
 ton, and brought Indian cotton to Salem. Derby's son 
 returned from the East in 1791 after a residence of three 
 years in which he had directed a very lively trade which 
 reached from Bombay to Canton, and was reported to have 
 made $100,000 on his various transactions. The Betsey of 
 Baltimore, the Commerce of Philadelphia, and the Leda of 
 Boston all visited India in the season of 1786-7. While 
 exact evidence is lacking it is probable that before 1790 the 
 total American tonnage in the Indian ports exceeded that 
 at Canton.* 
 
 The American tariff of 1816 ^ imposed a protective duty 
 on coarse cottons, setting on them a minimum valuation of 
 twenty-five cents a yard, the effect of which was to place 
 the India trade under a severe handicap. Nevertheless a 
 certain amount of commerce continued. In the season of 
 1829-30 there were sixteen vessels with a tonnage of 4941 
 
 *The major portion of this commerce with India had been claimed for both 
 Salem and Philadelphia, but records sufficient for comparison are lacking. 
 Between 1785 and 1799 Derby made forty-seven voyages to the East Indies. 
 Between 1800 and 1842 the vessels entering the port of Salem were : from Cal- 
 cutta, 115 ; Bombay, 20 ; Bengal, 6 ; Madras, 6. There were also two from 
 Ceylon and two from Siam. Before 1812 Joseph Peabody of Salem, out of a 
 total of 164 voyages, had 38 from Calcutta alone. During this same period 
 Peabody had only 17 voyages to Canton. The years of the greatest activity for 
 the Salem-India trade were 1802-7 and 1816-22. In 1800 twelve vessels loaded 
 at Calcutta for Boston. 
 
28 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 tons clearing from British India ports, and the following 
 year nineteen vessels. The India trade, which had dwindled 
 as the Americans learned to manufacture their own cottons, 
 picked up again in the two decades which preceded the Civil 
 War. The American tonnage at Calcutta in the second half 
 of the year 1845^ was 8889 tons (19 vessels), almost all 
 of it being from Boston or elsewhere in New England. 
 The inward cargoes at Calcutta consisted of lumber, cotton 
 goods and ice; the outward cargoes being made up chiefly 
 of hides, salt peter, indigo, and opium. The ice trade with 
 Calcutta had been initiated in 1835 and came "just in time 
 to preserve Boston's East India commerce from ruin." ^ 
 In 1857 one hundred and fifty-two American vessels de- 
 parted from British India ports with cargoes valued at 
 $11,000,000. 
 
 The appointment of an American consul in India was 
 a subject of consideration very soon after the close of the 
 Revolution. Captain O'Donnell^ of the Chesapeake had 
 applied for a position as general commissioner for the 
 United States for the Far East. He desired authority to 
 negotiate trade agreements with ''the principal independent 
 powers of Asia" which he described as Tippoo Saib, son of 
 Hyder Ally, the Marattas on the coast of Malabar, the 
 King of Acheea in Sumatra, and the Malay King of Ternati. 
 He also outlined a plan by which British merchants in India 
 would be able to evade the rules of the Company monopoly 
 by shipping their fortunes to the United States under the 
 protection of blank passports issued by O'Donnell. To this 
 plan John Jay reported to the Continental Congress some- 
 what testily that if residents of India were to come to the 
 United States, their coming should be accomplished "by 
 means perfectly unexceptional, and not by the sovereign 
 of this country giving false evidence of American property 
 ... to vessels, officers and crews entirely foreign to the 
 United States." The request was denied. As for treaties 
 with the independent powers of Asia, the Continental 
 Congress was too much preoccupied even to entertain the 
 idea. Political connections with Asia, so long as ports were 
 
THE PORTS OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 29 
 
 open and trade reasonably free, was farthest from the 
 thought of the American people. 
 
 The necessity for a consul at Calcutta increased, espe- 
 cially to care for American sailors at a time when American 
 vessels were being sold in Indian ports. George Cabot of 
 Boston, November 16, 1792, in a letter to President Wash- 
 ington ^ urged the importance of appointing a consul and 
 mentioned the "very precarious tenure" of American rights 
 in India. He thought that an agent on the spot might be 
 able to accomplish something "by availing ourselves as 
 much as possible of the competition" which existed between 
 the rival French, Dutch, Danish and English interests. 
 Cabot, as well as many other Massachusetts merchants 
 recommended the appointment of Benjamin Joy of New- 
 berryport and Boston. The appointment was made and 
 Mr. Joy reached Calcutta in 1784. He engaged William n*^y 
 Abbott, the secretary to the Nabob of Arcot, to act as con- 
 sular agent and vice consul at Madras, but was unable 
 to find a suitable person to serve in Bombay. Joy was 
 received cordially by the British Government but with- 
 out orders from London he could not be recognized as 
 consul. 
 
 Consul Joy remained in India less than two years and 
 resigned his commission froiTx Boston January 24, 1796. 
 Two successors were appointed in 1796 and in 1801, respec- 
 tively, one from Philadelphia and the other from Massa- 
 chusetts, but it does not appear that either of them ever 
 entered upon the duties of the office. The next consul was 
 James B. Higginson of Massachusetts who entered upon 
 his work in 1843. 
 
 The India trade of the United States was entirely with- 
 out political significance. However, the close association 
 of American and British merchants in both the direct India- 
 American and in the India-Canton trade exercised an influ- 
 ence on American policy in China, for it brought the 
 Americans and the English together at Canton and ac- 
 counted for the disposition of many of these merchants to 
 seek common action in 1839 and later. 
 
30 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Adventures — Mocha, Sumatra, Siam 
 
 While the national estabhshments of Great Britain and 
 the European powers in the Indian Ocean led their mer- 
 chants to confine their trade chiefly to ports under their 
 respective flags, the Americans were inclined to exploration 
 and the discovery of new markets. 
 
 American trade along the coast of Africa, Arabia and 
 Persia in the early decades of the nineteenth century ap- 
 pears to have been greater than that of all the European 
 nations combined. The Recovery of Salem (Captain Joseph 
 Ropes) opened the coffee trade with Mocha in 1798 and 
 soon a thriving commerce, by way of the Cape, was estab- 
 lished between Mocha and Smyrna. At the latter port the 
 trade was quickly related to China, as well as directly to 
 the United States, by the exchange for Turkey opium. 
 
 From Mocha the American trade spread in all directions 
 through the domains of the Sultan of Muscat whose sway 
 extended from the Persian Gulf to Cape Delgado on the 
 coast of Africa. While the trade appears to have decreased 
 after the War of 1812, its importance was considered of 
 sufiicient moment to include a treaty with the Sultan as 
 a part of the program of Edmund Roberts in 1832. In the 
 thirty-two months, September, 1832, to May, 1835, out of 
 a total of forty-one vessels with a total of 6559 tons, visiting 
 Zanzibar, thirty-two vessels of 5497 tons were American.'^ 
 Of the American vessels, twenty were from Salem, three 
 from Boston, and three from New York. The exports con- 
 sisted chiefly of gum copal, aloes, gum arable, columbo wood, 
 drugs, ivory, tortoise-shell, hides, bees-wax, and cocoa^ut 
 oil. Shortly after the ratification of the treaty a special 
 effort was made by some New York merchants to develop 
 this trade but the panic of 1837 intervened. However 
 American influence at Zanzibar was predominant, according 
 to an English historian, until at least 1859. During the 
 fifties American vessels at Zanzibar ranged from twenty- 
 four to thirty-five annually, while British vessels never 
 numbered more than six. 
 
THE PORTS OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 31 
 
 The trade with the pepper coast of Sumatra began soon 
 after 1790, when Captain Jonathan Carnes of Salem 
 brought home a cargo which sold for seven hundred per 
 cent profit. Such fabulous profits could not be kept secret 
 and the trade grew rapidly. In the spring of 1803 there 
 were twenty-one American vessels on the northwest coast 
 of Sumatra after pepper. The Americans came to have 
 practically a monopoly. In 1820 it was asserted that the 
 Americans were sending forty vessels, of about two hun- 
 dred tons each, to Sumatra annually.^ It would appear 
 that the trade at this time was nearly equal to that at 
 Canton. 
 
 As a result of the attack by the natives of Quallah 
 Battoo on the Friendship of Salem in 1830, the U. S. Frigate 
 Potomac was ordered to visit the coast and punish the 
 natives — a commission which was executed with great thor- 
 oughness.'^ The action of the natives was usually repre- 
 sented as entirely unprovoked by the Americans, but there 
 is reason to doubt such statements. There are hints that 
 some of the Americans overreached themselves in their 
 barter, even to the extent of using scales with hollow beams 
 in which quicksilver had been inserted. 
 
 Of the trade with Siam little is known. What little 
 there was appears to have been conducted from Batavia 
 and later from Singapore, and its growth was restricted by 
 excessive port charges, high duties, and the arbitrary rights 
 of preemption exercised by the king and high officials until 
 the treaty of 1833. 
 
 Batavia and Manila 
 
 The Batavia trade of the United States was of some 
 importance in itself, and more especially because of the 
 relation of Batavia to China and Japan. Although the 
 American treaty of 1782 with the Netherlands seems not 
 to have contemplated any such trade, the Americans were 
 freely admitted to the port, except for a few months at the 
 beginning of the season of 1790-1 when the Dutch gov- 
 
32 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 ernor, prompted perhaps by the Dutch East India Com- 
 pany, was disposed to prohibit it. Both the Astrea and 
 Three Sisters of Salem had difficulty in that season, but 
 Blanchard and Thomas H. Perkins, the supercargoes, man- 
 aged to "fix" matters with the authorities. Shortly after- 
 wards Major Shaw arrived on the Massachusetts, and met 
 with similar opposition. Clothed in his authority as Ameri- 
 can Consul at Canton, Shaw entered a vigorous protest 
 which aroused the disgust of the Dutch governor that the 
 Americans should be inaugurating the custom of Merchant- 
 consuls, but the restrictions on American trade were not 
 renewed. 
 
 The relations between the Dutch and the Americans 
 became very friendly, and when the newly created Batavian 
 Republic hesitated to trust the annual Company ship to 
 Nagasaki under a flag which the British might not respect, 
 the Eliza, under the American flag, was chartered for the 
 voyage (1798). For several years thereafter the American 
 flag appeared regularly in Japan each season, and when the 
 Department of State, in 1832, began to assemble informa- 
 tion with a view to treaty relations with Japan, it was 
 mainly through Dutch sources and through Americans who, 
 in the employ of the Dutch, had been to Nagasaki, that the 
 information was secured. 
 
 Unlike the British in India, the Dutch discouraged 
 American trade with Java. The import and export duties 
 for goods in foreign vessels was double what it was for the 
 Dutch. ^^ Provisions, however, such as were needed by the 
 Dutch garrison could be supplied cheaper by America than 
 by Holland, and this trade became of some value in the 
 days when it was of so much importance to collect abroad 
 as many Spanish dollars as possible for Canton. Nine 
 tenths of the importation of salt provisions into Java in 
 1825 were made by the Americans. Singapore, with its 
 freer trade regulations, became a rival to Batavia and the 
 American trade with the latter port declined sharply, being 
 in 1832 only a small fraction of what it was ten years 
 earlier. In 1834 the principal articles taken out of Batavia. 
 
THE PORTS OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 33 
 
 in American vessels were rice, sugar, pepper, coffee and 
 quicksilver. 
 
 The chief importance of Java to the Americans was 
 that the regular route to Canton was past Java Head and 
 through the straits of Anjier and after the long voyage 
 from the Cape, some place of refreshment as well as of 
 communication was a necessity. John McClallam was 
 United States commercial agent for Batavia in 1807.^^ 
 Just before the establishment of the American embargo he 
 was instructed to keep in touch with the ships passing 
 from Canton and touching at Anjier Point, and to take 
 proper measures for apprising them of the "crisis and for 
 guarding them against the risks to which it might expose 
 them." Similar instructions were sent to the consul at 
 the Isle de France, but whether either of these consuls ever 
 actually discharged any duties in their respective posts is 
 not known. The first American ofiicer to communicate 
 with the State Department from Batavia wrote in 1818, 
 acknowledging the receipt of his commission as "agent for 
 the United States for commerce and seamen." The Nether- 
 lands Government did not recognize consular representa- 
 tives in Java. 
 
 Manila, because of its geographical position, was an out- 
 post of Canton for the trader whether he approached China 
 by way of the Cape, the Horn, or the Northwest coast. 
 Independent of the China trade, the Philippines were of 
 slight importance to Americans. The exact date of the 
 beginning of the trade is difficult to fix. The Enterprise 
 (Captain Adam Babcock) left Boston in 1788 and was at 
 the Isle de France in 1792. There the America was pur- 
 chased and the two vessels went to Manila and purchased 
 sugar for Ostend. They were captured in the Straits of 
 Sunda by a squadron of British and Dutch ships and taken 
 into Calcutta, though for what reason is not known.^^ 
 This trade in sugar continued, and in 1819 the American 
 consul reported trade also in indigo, coffee and cotton. 
 There were 23 American vessels at Manila in 1819, more 
 than in any two previous years.^^ There was only one 
 
34 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 American resident in the city for the greater part of the 
 time until 1825, when the consul could find no American 
 to whom he could turn over the duties of his office while 
 he visited the United States. The rice trade from Manila 
 to Canton sprung up about this time, owing to the new 
 port regulation at Canton which permitted a reduction of 
 duty to "rice ships." ^'^ The Americans then made increas- 
 ing use of Manila as an avenue by which the onerous port 
 charges at Whampoa might be lightened. A trade in beche 
 de mer, a sea slug much prized by the Chinese as an article 
 of food, appeared about 1830. Four years later the consul 
 reported that unbleached and colored goods of coarse 
 texture, of American manufacture, had begun to come into 
 Manila by way of China. In the last six months of 1835, 
 13,876 tons of American shipping arrived, the largest 
 amount up to that date ever reported. 
 
 The policy of the Spanish Government placed no special 
 obstacles in the way of the growth of American trade 
 though the consul was not recognized. The first consul 
 was appointed in 1817. 
 
 The only American firm of importance was that of 
 Russell, Sturgis and Company, founded about 1825, and 
 subsequently incorporated in the famous Russell and Com- 
 pany at Canton. 
 
 The Fur Trade 
 
 The route around the Horn and across the Pacific to 
 China was selected by fur traders, by circuitous traders at 
 South American ports, and occasionally by "out of season" 
 vessels in the direct trade with Canton. The monsoon 
 changed about the first of November in the China Sea, 
 making difficult the direct approach to Canton from the 
 South. Those vessels therefore which did not fall in with 
 the course of the monsoons and the general tide of trade at 
 Canton, and arrived in the winter, or departed in the sum- 
 mer, often chose to effect their approach to or departure 
 from the coast of China by way of the Pacific route. 
 
35 
 
36 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 The value of ginseng as an article of exchange at Canton 
 was quickly proven to have been over-estimated. The fur 
 trade sprang up to take its place and to create for itself an 
 even greater importance. As long as the supply of furs 
 held out and the cost of collection was slight, they met ad- 
 mirably the pressing need of Americans for an article of 
 barter. 
 
 The fur trade falls easily into three classifications: the 
 furs which were brought from the interior — from the region 
 of the Great Lakes and the Mississippi Valley — to the At- 
 lantic ports and then shipped as part of the regular cargoes 
 to Canton; the seal-skin trade with the Falkland Islands 
 and the South Pacific; and the trade with the Northwest 
 coast in both land and sea skins. With the continental 
 trade through the Atlantic ports we are little concerned, 
 for while the trade was extensive for thirty or forty years — • 
 until the European market for furs offered better prices — it 
 exerted no important or distinctive influence upon Ameri- 
 can relations with the Far East.* 
 
 The seal-skin trade appears to have been begun inadvert- 
 ently. About the time of the departure of the Empress of 
 China from New York and the Grand Turk from Salem, 
 ''Lady" Haley of Boston sent her ship States to the Falk- 
 land Islands for sea-elephant oil and furs^^. The States is 
 reported to have been of the incredible size of about 1000 
 tons. This ship brought back 13,000 skins which were sup- 
 posed to be those of sea-otter. The experimental character 
 of the early trade with Asia is clearly revealed in the trans- 
 actions which followed. The cargo of the States proved to 
 be seal-skins for which there was no known certain market. 
 They were sold for a trifling sum in New York and then 
 placed on board the brig Eleanor a (Captain Metcalf) which 
 took them to the coast of India. Just why furs should be 
 taken to such a market is not very apparent. Captain 
 Metcalf sailed from New York probably about the same 
 
 *The American Fur Trade papers in the New York Historical Society and 
 the University of Wisconsin libraries, as well as the testimony of the Americans 
 in Canton, show clearly that in the thirties of the last century the continental, 
 like the Pacific fur trade with China, had practically ceased. 
 
THE PORTS OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 37 
 
 time Captains Kendrick and Grey departed for the North- 
 west coast. The Eleanora lingered on the coast of India a 
 while and then brought its cargo to Canton where it found 
 a ready market in 1788, It was the first cargo of American 
 furs carried to Canton. The Eleanora then entered the 
 Northwest coast trade and was wrecked a few years later 
 at Macao. 
 
 The seal-skin trade developed rapidly. It was carried 
 on almost exclusively by the Americans in small vessels 
 with relatively small crews. The initial capital required 
 was merely the cost of the vessel and outfit. The crew 
 slaughtered the seals, skinned them and prepared the pelts 
 for market. When the cargo was obtained the vessel sailed 
 immediately for Canton either directly or by way of the 
 Sandwich Islands. While the trade lasted, that is, until the 
 seals were nearly extinct, it was probably the most profit- 
 able branch of the East India trade. It was, however, both 
 ruthless and reckless, and within a generation the seals had 
 become so scarce that it was no longer profitable. ^^ This 
 trade quickly lured the Americans from the Falkland 
 Islands over into the South Pacific and by 1820 there were 
 relatively few good harbors in the Pacific south of the 
 Equator which had remained unvisited by American ships. 
 Over not a few of the Islands the American flag had been 
 raised,^"^ or American sailors, shipwrecked, deserted or de- 
 serting, were playing the roles of either monarch or adviser 
 to the natives, after traditional Anglo-Saxon fashion. 
 
 The Northwest Coast 
 
 The resources of the Northwest coast for the Canton 
 trade were first disclosed to the survivors of the last Cap- 
 tain Cook expedition. In 1778 Captain Cook had made 
 some surveys of the coast and had landed at Nootka Sound 
 where he acquired some furs from the Indians. Within ten 
 years after Captain Cook's visit to the Northwest coast no 
 less than seven states — Russia, England, Portugal, Spain, 
 France, Austria (Belgium) and the United States — were 
 
38 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 represented in that region all, with the exception of the 
 Austrians and Portuguese, setting up some sort of claim to 
 sovereignty over the areas which were found to be so richly 
 productive. In the face of such formidable prospective 
 competition the Americans were especially favored by the 
 handicaps placed upon their competitors. Only the English 
 and Russian efforts to promote trade became earnest. The 
 English efforts were encumbered by the monopoly of the 
 East India Company. English vessels to the Northwest 
 coast were allowed only by special permission of the Com- 
 pany, and were required to bring their cargoes back to 
 China and exchange them, not for Chinese produce which 
 could be taken to England and the Continent, but for specie 
 which must be deposited with the East India Company. 
 For this specie the Company would issue bills on London 
 at twelve months, sight.^^ The Americans, on the other 
 hand, by barter at Canton were able to get about twenty 
 per cent more for their pelts and were at the same time 
 free to carry their cargoes wherever they pleased, dispose of 
 their produce quickly, and by taking them to the Continent 
 could make a second turnover before returning to the 
 United States. The restrictions of the Company monopoly, 
 therefore, practically eliminated the British traders from 
 the competition. The Russian trade was under the handi- 
 cap of being conducted far from its base of supplies, and 
 the Russians were excluded from the Canton market, being 
 confined to the overland trade with China. Thus the 
 Americans were in a favored position which they were well 
 able to utilize. 
 
 John Ledyard's missionary work, further enriched by 
 the publication of Captain Cook's journals, and the reports 
 of the trade at Canton, bore fruit in 1787 in the fitting out 
 of the Columbia and the Ladi/ Washington in Boston. 
 Captain John Kendrick, master of the Columbia, was the 
 commander of this famous expedition. The instructions to 
 Kendrick were to send the sloop Lady Washington to Can- 
 ton as soon as a cargo of furs had been obtained, while the 
 Columbia was expected to remain on the coast. Kendrick 
 
THE PORTS OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 39 
 
 was particularly cautioned not to mistreat the rndians. His 
 wages were five pounds per month and a commission of 
 five per cent on the net proceeds of the voyage.^^ 
 
 The Columbia and her tender made a long voyage and 
 did not reach the coast until too late in 1788 to collect any 
 furs so they spent the winter at Nootka. The following 
 summer, provisions running short, Captain Kendrick trans- 
 ferred himself to the Lady Washington and sent the Co- 
 lumbia under the command of Captain Robert Grey to 
 China. While Kendrick remained on the coast Grey ex- 
 changed his furs at Canton and returned to Boston by way 
 of the Cape of Good Hope. The Columbia was so unfor- 
 tunate as to arrive in Boston when prices were depressed 
 and the voyage did not achieve financial success. However, 
 Captain Grey was sent out the second time and in May, 
 1792, anchored in the harbor on the coast of Washington 
 which bears his name, and also discovered the mouth of 
 the Columbia River, thus making one of the primary claims 
 which were later urged by the Government of the United 
 States for the possession of Oregon. 
 
 Captain Kendrick appears to have been the man with 
 the imagination. He was so enamoured of the Northwest 
 coast that he began the purchase of land at Nootka Sound. 
 One tract, eighteen miles square, he purchased from 
 Tarasson, an Indian Chief, for "two muskets, a Boat's sail 
 and a quantity of Powder"; another tract at the head of 
 Nootka Sound, nine miles around, was bought for "two 
 muskets and a quantitj of powder" ; and still another tract 
 eighteen miles square cost four muskets, a large sail and 
 some powder.^^ 
 
 To some of Captain Kendrick's heirs who subsequently 
 sought to realize on these estates, John Howell, who had 
 been a clerk on the Columbia, wrote supplying some inter- 
 esting details of the character of the man : 
 
 "I have had an opportunity of seeing most of Capt. Kendrick's 
 purchases on the IST. W. coast of America and cannot flatter you with 
 any hopes of profit from them even to your great-great-great-grand- 
 children. They cost but little, it is true; and when the Millennium 
 
40 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 shall arrive and all the nations of the earth shall be at peace your 
 posterity may perhaps settle there. That Capt. Kendrick considered 
 his title a good one I have sufficient proof of, when one day he told 
 the Commandant at Nootka Sound that lie bought his territories 
 while other nations stole them; and that if they [the Spanish] were 
 impertinent he would raise the Indians and drive them from their 
 settlements. This, though a hold, was nevertheless a moderate project 
 for a mind like his. Two of his favorite plans were to change the 
 prevalence of the Easterly winds in the Atlantic Ocean and turn the 
 Gulf Stream into the Pacific by cutting a canal through Mexico. 
 But with all his follies he was a wonderful man — and worthy to be 
 remembered beyond the gliding hours of the present generation. He 
 was stunned [sic] by his appointment to the Columbia. Empires 
 and fortunes broke on his sight. The passing, two-penny objects of 
 his expedition were swallowed up in the magnitude of his Gulliverjan 
 views, North East America was on the Lilliputian, but he designed 
 N. W. America to be on the Brobdingnagian scale." 
 
 An interesting illustration of the manner in which the 
 trade with the Indians was conducted is preserved in the 
 journal of Captain Joseph Ingraham of the Hope which 
 reached the coast in 1791. To his great disappointment 
 he found that the cloth and trinkets which he had brought 
 out from Boston were not greatly desired by the Indians, 
 previous traders having supplied their needs. Ingraham 
 ingeniously met the situation by having his blacksmith set 
 up his forge on deck and fashion iron collars, rings and 
 bracelets which became extremely popular. For one iron 
 collar he was able to obtain three skins which were worth 
 about $75 at Canton. Ingraham reached Macao in Novem- 
 ber where several fur ships had already preceded him. Be- 
 fore the end of the year there were at least seven cargoes 
 of furs placed on the market including a consignment from 
 the Spanish Company at Manila and the Lady Washing- 
 ton's from Nootka. 
 
 Washington Irving, in his "Astoria," asserted that in 
 the summer of 1792 there were twenty-one vessels on the 
 Northwest coast, the greater part of which were American 
 and owned by Boston merchants. Twenty-five years later 
 Thomas H. Perkins of Boston, who had engaged in the trade 
 very extensively, stated : "We formerly calculated that the 
 collection of sea-otters purchased by the American ships 
 annually was about 14,000 furs, the value of them in China 
 
THE PORTS OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 41 
 
 may be averaged at twenty-five dollars each — making an 
 aggregate of $350,000; the trade employed from six to ten 
 ships from 200 to 300 tons." ^^ Perkins complained that 
 the trade had already fallen off to less than a quarter of 
 its former value, due to Russian competition. About the 
 same time William Sturgis wrote that he had been on the 
 coast in company with as many as sixteen American vessels. 
 Such figures serve to show how very small this trade was 
 even in its most prosperous days, but they also show, when 
 studied in the light of the American exports from Canton 
 which were paid for in furs that the trade was exceedingly 
 profitable in proportion to the capital invested. 
 
 The fur trade was supplemented at an early date by 
 partial cargoes of sandal-wood from the Sandwich Islands 
 and other places in the Pacific, and by the trade in beche 
 de mer, only a part of which passed through Manila. 
 
 The seal-skins brought to Canton from the South Pa- 
 cific from 1805 to 1834 were reported as amounting to 
 nearly 1,800,000, the valuation of which may be placed 
 most conservatively at $3,500,000. Sea-otter pelts from 
 the Northwest coast during the same period amounted to 
 about 160,000, or at least $4,000,000. The value of the 
 land skins shipped directly from Atlantic ports was prob- 
 ably less than either of these items. The value of the 
 entire fur trade before 1805 can only be guessed at. The 
 entire fur trade of the United States from all sources with 
 Canton from its beginning until its end soon after 1830 
 may be placed at between $15,000,000 and $20,000,000.-2 
 The value of the trade when the bartered China products 
 were transferred to Europe or the United States and sold 
 would, of course, show a very great increase over the value 
 in Canton. The value of the exports from the United 
 States to the Northwest coast in the twenty-eight years 
 from 1789 to 1817 averaged annually about $163,000. No 
 known figures afford a sound basis for exact statements; 
 all that can be said is that the trade was of the utmost value 
 to the young nation at a time when vessels and crews were 
 easily obtained and Spanish dollars were scarce. 
 
42 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Unlike the trade in the South Pacific, that with the 
 Northwest coast left a permanent mark in the establish- 
 ment of a claim for Oregon Territory, in the settlement of 
 Astoria in 1811, and also in the development of a port at 
 Honolulu. A glance at the map shows that by 1832 Ameri- 
 cans had not only visited most of the Pacific Islands, but 
 had actually estabhshed themselves for longer or shorter 
 periods at no less than seven points: Sandwich Islands, 
 1787; Nootka Sound, 1788; Marquesas, 1791; Fanning, 
 1797; Fifi, 1800?; Galipagos, 1832; and Peel, 1832. Indeed, 
 this list might be greatly expanded were one to count every 
 point where Americans were known to have been. The 
 significance of the list is, however, not in its length but in 
 its shrinkage in the course of the next few decades, and in 
 its lack of influence on the development of the United 
 States. American interest gravitated into the North Pa- 
 cific; whale fisheries took the place of the Northwest coast 
 trade and sustained the development of an American set- 
 tlement at Honolulu. 
 
 An American agent for commerce and seamen was ap- 
 pointed at Honolulu in 1820. American missionaries had 
 already arrived. The Sandwich Islands was an object of 
 lively interest to American trade and philanthropy. It 
 was, however, until the American nation had crossed the 
 continent, reached the Pacific Coast, and opened up trade 
 with Japan, a lonely outpost. 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. Milburn's "Oriental Commerce" (Ed. 1813). 
 
 2. Statutes at Large, 2 :768 
 
 3. Calcutta Consular Letters. 
 
 4. "Maritime History of Massachusetts," by S. E. Morison (Boston 
 
 and New York, 1921), p. 282. 
 
 5. 3. Dip. Cor., pp. 773, 766. 
 
 6. Misc. Letters (Dept. of State). 
 
 7. Edmund Roberts Papers (Dept. of State) ; Zanzibar, the Island 
 
 Metropolis of Eastern Africa, by F. B. Pearce, pp. 133-4. 
 
 8. House of Commons Sessional Papers, 1821. Vol. 7. 
 
 9. "American Naval Vessels in the Orient," by Charles Oscar 
 
 Paullin. (Proceedings of the IT. S. Naval Institute, 1910). 
 
THE PORTS OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 43 
 
 10. Batavia Consular Letters; Milburn's Oriental Commerce. (Ed. 
 
 1813). 
 
 11. Despatches to Consuls, Yol. 1, p. 297. 
 
 12. Calcutta Consular Letters. 
 
 13. Manila Consular Letters. 
 
 14. Parliamentary Papers, 1830. Yol. 5:122; the Tan Kwae' at 
 
 Canton, by an Old Eesident (W. C. Hunter) London, 1882. 
 p. 100. 
 
 15. 'Yoyage of the Neptune," Diary of Mr. Ebenezer Townsend, Jr. 
 
 (Papers of the New Haven Colony Historical Society, 1888. 
 Yol. 14.) 
 
 16. "Yoyages Pound the World," by Edmund Panning (New York, 
 
 1838) gives many details of this trade. 
 
 17. "American Kelations in the Pacific and the Far East," by James 
 
 Morton Callahan, in Johns Hopkins University Studies, 
 Series XIX. Nos. 1-3. (1901.) 
 
 18. Sessional Papers, 1821. _ Yol. 7. _ 
 
 19. Correspondence concerning Captain Kendrick and the Settle- 
 
 ment of his Estate. (Dept. of State.) 
 
 20. Ihid. 
 
 21. lUd. 
 
 22. Fur trade statistics are to be found in a variety of sources: 
 
 Pitkin's "Commerce of the United States" (Editions 1816, 
 1835) ; "Chinese Eepository," April, 1835 ; Sessional Papers, 
 1821; Hunt's Merchants Magazine, Yol. 3 (1840). 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 EAELY CHINA TEADE 
 
 Having in mind the American vessels as they begin to 
 converge upon the port of Canton from their various routes 
 and with their varied cargoes, we may visuaUze the early 
 trade at that port. 
 
 The Empress of China arrived at Macao August 23, 
 1784, and "saluted the town." ^ Having spent a few days 
 in this historic Portuguese-Chinese port where the French 
 and Swedish consuls extended to Major Shaw and Captain 
 Green many courtesies, the Empress proceeded to Wham- 
 poa, twelve miles below Canton and anchored in the river 
 where all the foreign ships were required to discharge and 
 receive their cargoes. The Americans remained four 
 months, setting sail from Whampoa December 28, 1784. 
 A few weeks later the Pallas, a chartered ship already re- 
 ferred to, departed for New York with the second cargo 
 under the care of Thomas Randall, Shaw's partner. The 
 two vessels carried 880,100 pounds of tea. 
 
 The following table, which can be regarded as only 
 approximately accurate since exactness was never a quality 
 of the early Canton trade reports, is a fair index of the 
 relative growth of the trade before the War of 1812. In 
 comparing American with British ships and cargoes it must 
 be borne in mind that the average tonnage of the American 
 vessels was probably less than half that of the British, and 
 the American cargoes of tea contained a larger proportion 
 of the cheapest grades. 
 
 It will be noted from the table that the American trade 
 was characterized by the most astonishing fluctuations both 
 in the number of vessels visiting Canton and in the quan- 
 tity of their outward cargoes. These fluctuations reveal the 
 
 44 
 
EARLY CHINA TRADE 
 
 45 
 
 American, British, and Continental Clearances and Exportations ob* 
 Tea at Canton, Seasons 1784-5 to 1810-11 * 
 
 Clearances 
 
 Export of Tea in 
 
 lbs. 
 
 Season 
 
 Amer- 
 ican 
 
 British 
 
 Conti- 
 nental 
 
 American 
 
 British 
 
 Continental 
 
 1784-5. 
 
 2 
 
 14 
 
 16 
 
 880,100 
 
 10,583,628 
 
 16,551,000 
 
 1785-6 
 
 1 
 
 18 
 
 12 
 
 695,000 
 
 13,480,691 
 
 15,715,900 
 
 1786-7 
 
 5 
 
 27 
 
 9 
 
 1,181,860 
 
 20,610,919 
 
 10,165,160 
 
 1787-8 
 
 2 
 
 29 
 
 13 
 
 750,900 
 
 22,096,703 
 
 13,578,000 
 
 1788-9 
 
 4 
 
 27 
 
 11 
 
 1,188,800 
 
 20,141,745 
 
 9,875,900 
 
 1789-90 
 
 14 
 
 21 
 
 7 
 
 3,093,200 
 
 17,991,032 
 
 7,174,200 
 
 1790-1 
 
 3 
 
 25 
 
 7 
 
 743,100 
 
 22,369,620 
 
 2,291,560 
 
 1791-2 
 
 3 
 
 11 
 
 9 
 
 1,863,200 
 
 13,185,467 
 
 4,431,730 
 
 1792-3 
 
 6 
 
 16 
 
 13 
 
 1,538,400 
 
 16,005,414 
 
 7,864,800 
 
 1793^ 
 
 7 
 
 18 
 
 5 
 
 1,974,130 
 
 20,728,705 
 
 3,462,800 
 
 1794-5 
 
 7 
 
 21 
 
 7 
 
 1,438,270 
 
 23,733,810 
 
 4,138.930 
 
 1795-6 
 
 10 
 
 15 
 
 4 
 
 2,819,600 
 
 19,370,900 
 
 2,759,800 
 
 1796-7 
 
 13 
 
 23 
 
 3 
 
 3,450,400 
 
 36,904,200 
 
 2,515,460 
 
 1797-8 
 
 10 
 
 17 
 
 5 
 
 3,100,400 
 
 29,934,100 
 
 2,714,000 
 
 1798-9 
 
 13 
 
 16 
 
 6 
 
 5,674,000 
 
 16,795,400 
 
 4,319,300 
 
 1799-0 
 
 18 
 
 14 
 
 4 
 
 5,665,067 
 
 26,585,337 
 
 1,577,066 
 
 1800-1 
 
 23 
 
 19 
 
 7 
 
 4,762,866 
 
 29,772,400 
 
 3,968,207 
 
 1801-2 
 
 31 
 
 25 
 
 1 
 
 5,740,734 
 
 38,479,733 
 
 185,533 
 
 1802-3 
 
 20 
 
 38 
 
 12 
 
 2,612,436 
 
 35,058,400 
 
 5,812,266 
 
 1803-4 
 
 13 
 
 44 
 
 2 
 
 2,371,600 
 
 31,801,333 
 
 2,132,666 
 
 1804-5 
 
 31 
 
 38 
 
 3 
 
 8,546,800 
 
 28,506,667 
 
 3,318,799 
 
 1805-6 
 
 37 
 
 49 
 
 4 
 
 11,702,800 
 
 22,810,533 
 
 1,809,466 
 
 1806-7 
 
 27 
 
 58 
 
 2 
 
 8,464,133 
 
 32,683,066 
 
 1,534,267 
 
 1807-8 
 
 31 
 
 51 
 
 2 
 
 6,408,266 
 
 25,347,733 
 
 1,144,266 
 
 1808-9 
 
 6 
 
 54 
 
 — 
 
 1,082,400 
 
 26,335,446 
 
 none. 
 
 1809-10 
 
 29 
 
 40 
 
 — 
 
 9,737,066 
 
 26,301,066 
 
 none. 
 
 1810-11 
 
 12 
 
 34 
 
 — 
 
 2,884,400 
 
 27,163,066 
 
 none. 
 
 *Table rearranged from Melburn's Oriental Commerce, vol. 2, p. 486 (First 
 Ed.). These statistics, being based on seasons rather than upon years, and 
 being taken from Canton reports, cannot be made in every case to correspond 
 with such departures and returns from American ports as are available. They 
 are, however, the most complete set of figures known for this period. 
 
 experimental and speculative character of the beginnings 
 of the trade. In' the season of 1789-90 fourteen vessels took 
 away from Canton more than three million pounds of tea. 
 Such heavy imports into the United States produced a 
 glutted market and the following year there were only three 
 vessels and the outward cargoes from Canton amounted to 
 only about one fourth of those of the previous year. The 
 recovery of the trade which immediately followed is to be 
 explained by the reexportations of tea from the United 
 States to Europe which followed the establishment of a 
 
46 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 system of drawbacks in the American customs. During 
 the remainder of the period the American trade at Canton 
 was influenced immediately and directly by the extent to 
 which it was possible for the Americans to engage in the 
 European trade during the Napoleonic wars. Every varia- 
 tion of the political conditions in Europe and the American 
 relation to them was directly registered in the amount of 
 tea, per season, exported from Canton in American vessels. 
 American policy in Canton was therefore primarily con- 
 cerned with keeping open the supplies of tea and the ave- 
 nues of trade. 
 
 With these facts in mind it is of primary interest to 
 note the conditions under which the trade at Canton was 
 being conducted. 
 
 Macao, Whampoa and Canton 
 
 All foreigners in China were strictly confined to three 
 localities; Macao, the old Portuguese leasehold under the 
 simultaneous government of both the Portuguese and the 
 Chinese; Whampoa, the anchorage in the Canton River, 
 twelve miles below the city where foreign vessels were re- 
 quired to anchor and from which they were not permitted 
 to depart until the issuance of the final 'grand chop' indi- 
 cating that every requirement of the Chinese authorities 
 had been complied with; and, the 'factories' or 'hongs' 
 outside the city wall at Canton. 
 
 Macao had three functions in trade. It was the base 
 from which the Portuguese conducted their commercial 
 operations, and also the base for a large part of the smug- 
 gling operations in which all of the foreign merchants joined 
 impartially. The city was an outpost of the Chinese Gov- 
 ernment where, exclusively, the permits to the foreign ships 
 to go to Whampoa were issued. Every foreign vessel had to 
 approach Canton through Macao. The third function of 
 Macao was to afford a resort to the foreigners from Canton 
 in the summer months, in times of illness, or whenever their 
 conduct at Canton was obnoxious to the Chinese. Macao 
 
EARLY CHINA TRADE 
 
 47 
 
48 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 was, for example, the refuge, though by no means the sole 
 residence, of the foreign missionaries. Foreign women who 
 came to China were permitted to reside only at Macao. 
 The colony was governed by Portugal much in the same 
 way that Manila was governed by Spain, or as Batavia or 
 Calcutta, respectively, were governed except as modij&ed 
 by the tenacious jurisdiction insisted upon by the Chinese 
 who had never relinquished their sovereignty. During the 
 summer the foreigners from Canton sustained at Macao a 
 highly developed, ceremonious and luxuriant social life 
 dominated by the British and resembling the social life of 
 Calcutta and Madras. In 1832 Edmund Roberts reported 
 that the city enjoyed the reputation of being - "one of the 
 most immoral places in the world" — a statement not sup- 
 ported by other testimony. The Americans entered upon 
 this social life in proportion as their means and manners 
 allowed. Until wealth crowned their labors their part in 
 it was small. 
 
 Whampoa was the second barrier to Canton. The river 
 was not navigable to large vessels above the anchorage, 
 and the factories could not have accommodated either all 
 the foreign population or all the trade. The sailors, of 
 whom there were at the height of the season from two to 
 three thousand, lived on the ships at Whampoa and visited 
 Canton only in small groups; they were, however, allowed 
 to go ashore at the anchorage where settlements had grown 
 up which doubtless merited the reputation which Roberts 
 assigned to Macao. Provision was also made at Whampoa 
 for the repair and refitting of the foreign vessels. The lively 
 and varied scene at the anchorage never failed to impress 
 the foreigner on his first visit to China. It was the subject 
 of numberless descriptions and not a few paintings. 
 
 The first stage of the commercial operations began at 
 Whampoa. The vessel paid its port charges — which in the 
 case of the American vessels was usually about $4000 — a 
 sum which fell heavily upon the smaller craft for the pay- 
 ments were not graduated to vessels below 400 tons. A 
 linguist and a comprador, if not already obtained at Macao, 
 
EARLY CHINA TRADE 49 
 
 must be taken at Whampoa. The hong merchant who was 
 to transact the business of the vessel at Canton was also 
 secured. He immediately had the cargo transferred to 
 smaller craft and taken to Canton where it was sold or 
 bartered for the return cargo. The hong merchant paid 
 all the inward and outward duties. The master of the 
 vessel was thus relieved of all responsibility except the 
 care of his ship and the control of his crew, and the super- 
 cargo had only to follow his goods to Canton, indicate his 
 choices of commodities for the return voyage and then 
 watch carefully that he did not get cheated. Trading with 
 China thus became the simplest of transactions in which 
 the comfort of the trader was disturbed only by the thought 
 that it was quite impossible for him to know the extent to 
 which his payments for government dues and services ren- 
 dered were extortions unwarranted by law or evaded by his 
 competitor. 
 
 The factories were long narrow buildings of two or three 
 stories in height and extending back towards the city wall. 
 Goods were landed at small docks and carried across a park 
 or parade ground to the front of the factories which were 
 divided into sections perpendicularly with storage rooms, 
 offices on the lower floor and living quarters above for the 
 commission agents, supercargoes and guests. Factory and 
 residence space was rented from the merchants who owned 
 the hong. Every foreigner coming to Canton had to be 
 guaranteed by some one of the hong merchants, usually the 
 one who transacted the business of the voyage. Foreigners 
 were not permitted to enter the city nor were they allowed 
 to leave the factory grounds either by land or water except 
 under very limited conditions. They could not walk in the 
 country; they were, theoretically, denied the use of boats; 
 but on occasion, with a suitable Chinese guide and pro- 
 tector, they might visit the flower-gardens at Fati on the 
 other side of the River. The foreigners were, in fact, vol- 
 untary prisoners. 
 
 By the Chinese GoVernment the trade was limited to 
 the hong merchants, usually about a dozen in number, who 
 
50 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 paid highly for their privilege and in turn became surety for 
 the good conduct of the foreigners. These merchants were 
 organized into a 'co-hong' for concerted action in fixing 
 prices, for mutual protection, and for the management of 
 the trade. Some of the hong merchants became very 
 wealthy; others experienced frequent financial reverses due 
 either to the enmity of the government officials who levied 
 tribute or to their own native instinct for speculation and 
 gambling. 
 
 Back of the co-hong stood the provincial officials, the 
 chief of whom was the Viceroy, representing the Emperor. 
 Each official had purchased his way to the position he 
 occupied and then recouped himself from the trade. The 
 Imperial Government had only two concerns: that an ever 
 increasing amount of revenue be forwarded to Peking; and, 
 that the foreigner be so 'soothed' and controlled so that 
 foreign nations would have no opportunity of acquiring any 
 foothold in the Empire, or of advancing a mile further in 
 the direction of the capital. The obligation resting upon 
 the provincial government therefore was to keep Peking 
 satisfied and at the same time to levy from the trade as 
 much tribute as it would bear. The powers of the Viceroy 
 were very broad. His method of governing the foreigner 
 was through the co-hong. He could make or break the 
 Chinese merchant, fining, removing, even banishing him. 
 The foreigner, in turn, as already indicated, was absolutely 
 in the hands of the hong merchant from the day his vessel 
 came to anchor at Whampoa until he had his return cargo 
 on board. From the point of view of the Chinese Govern- 
 ment the system was nearly nigh perfect. The Government 
 in no way officially recognized the presence of the foreigner 
 and admitted him to no direct intercourse, and yet the 
 Government controlled the trader as only despots can. The 
 ruination of the hong merchant involved the ruination of 
 the foreigner to whom the hong was always in debt until 
 the return cargo was safely on board at Whampoa. The 
 foreigner had little choice but to submit. 
 
 There was, on the other hand, a recognition of the fact 
 
EARLY CHINA TRADE 51 
 
 that injustice to the foreigner and encroachments upon such 
 of his rights as he had not voluntarily surrendered, would 
 lead to irritation and trouble. The key-note therefore of 
 the relationship between the Chinese and the foreigners 
 was accommodation. This word occurs with great fre- 
 quency in the literature of the time. It became of obvious 
 advantage to everyone concerned that all relationships be 
 managed in such a way as to insure harmony, which is 
 another favorite Chinese word. 
 
 The last resorts of the Imperial officials for the enforce- 
 ment of their will upon the foreigners were to stop the trade 
 and then, if necessary, to cut off communications with 
 Whampoa and Macao, thus effecting the complete impris- 
 onment of the traders. Since the government recognized 
 no distinction between nations and might visit the sins of 
 one merchant upon the entire body of traders by stopping 
 the trade, a certain solidarity of public opinion developed 
 which imposed upon each individual trader the obligation 
 to accept the decisions of the majority. 
 
 Conditions of American Trade 
 
 Solidarity of interest transcending national lines was, 
 however, modified by certain stern facts. When a British 
 vessel came to Whampoa, although compelled to submit to 
 the uniform port and trade regulations, it came under the 
 shadow of the East India Company — a very powerful or- 
 ganization. Until the dissolution of the Company mo- 
 nopoly in 1834 the British merchant came to Canton only 
 by leave of the Company and remained only so long as he 
 acted in conformity with Company discipline. While these 
 regulations and restraints operated greatly to restrict lib- 
 erties both personal and commercial, and handicapped the 
 British merchants in competition with Americans, they also 
 bound them together with the protection of a mighty com- 
 mercial organization at their back. And back of the 
 Company was the British Government which was vitally 
 interested in its success. The Company, in a variety of 
 
52 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 ways, could bring pressure to bear upon the Chinese and if 
 a trial of strength became necessary, the East India Com- 
 pany with its resources and reserves was in a far better 
 position than the individual American merchant, to meet 
 a strike with a boycott. The Chinese Government professed 
 entire indifference as to whether the trade continued or not, 
 but the foreign trade of China, by the time the American 
 arrived, was so much a part of the economic fabric of many 
 parts of the Empire that the Government would have found 
 the expulsion of the foreign trader very difficult. The East 
 India Company dominated the foreign colony at Canton. 
 It could not, however, count upon such support from the 
 Americans as the British residents were compelled to give. 
 The individual American traders, far more than their Brit- 
 ish competitors, required that the harmonious relations of 
 the trade be continued from day to day. Disturbances 
 meant relatively greater losses to Americans for their re- 
 serves were less, and long continued disturbance of the 
 trade would mean ruin. 
 
 This condition was somewljat modified as the Americans 
 came to build up strong and well capitalized commission 
 houses and mercantile establishments, and as the trade 
 came into the hands of a few wealthy firms, but it was 
 modified only in degree. The Americans could not afford 
 to be very self-assertive or to meet the arrogance of the 
 Chinese with arrogance of their own. This peculiar situa- 
 tion of the Americans controlled their conduct, and made 
 them, unlike so many of their brother pioneers on the con- 
 tinental frontiers of America, a peculiarly peace-seeking 
 folk. 
 
 Furthermore, the Americans immediately upon their 
 entrance into the China trade, became very deeply involved 
 in credit transaction with the hong merchants. The Chi- 
 nese were easily able to bring to Canton a larger stock of 
 tea than the foreigners, all of whom suffered from the lack 
 of a suitable and adequate medium of exchange, could take 
 away. Notwithstanding the stringent prohibitions of the 
 government the hong merchants disposed of large amounts 
 
EARLY CHINA TRADE 53 
 
 of their surplus goods to the Americans on credit. True, 
 this surplus was usually what was left after the Company 
 had made its selection, and was inferior, but neither the 
 Americans or the Continentals who consumed the tea were 
 such connoisseurs of tea as were the British, and, besides, 
 the Americans could sell cheaply. These credit accounts 
 which were entirely dependent upon the good will of the 
 Chinese, were an additional incentive to peace. 
 
 The Americans came to occupy a middle position in 
 both the trade and politics of Canton. On the one hand 
 were their British brethren with whom their interest in 
 the continuance of the trade with the minimum of exaction 
 and interference was identical, and on the other hand were 
 the Chinese merchants whose good will and prosperity were 
 matters of the utmost concern to the Americans. Through- 
 out the pre-treaty days in China these three groups — Eng- 
 lish, American and Chinese — constituted the only important 
 elements in the situation. The representatives of other 
 foreign nations, now less, now more in number, counted for 
 little. In every issue between the foreigner and the Chinese 
 the important question was whether the Americans would \ 
 find it most to their profit to stand with the English or with / 
 the Chinese. Indeed, this alignment continued long after/ 
 the signing of the foreign treaties, and underlay American 
 political as well as trade policy for a century. Sometimes 
 the Americans stood with the British for concerted action, 
 but when the concerted action proposed by the British 
 would have a tendency to weaken the Chinese merchants, 
 or when the British adopted policies directly inimical to 
 the American trade, the Americans were disposed to sup- 
 port the Chinese. In the face of British arrogance and 
 aggression the Chinese and Americans were allies. 
 
 The Americans and the British 
 
 As may have already been inferred, the relation of the 
 Americans to the Chinese at Canton was only half the prob- 
 lem. There was also the relation of the Americans to the 
 
54 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 representatives of the other nations. The international 
 relations of the Chinese Empire were often second in im- 
 portance to the international relations of the foreigners in 
 China. 
 
 The Empress of China arrived at Canton at a time when 
 the Continental European trade was on the wane. Portu- 
 gal retained a shadow of her former greatness at Macao, 
 and Spain, dwelling indolently at Manila, carried on some 
 trade with China by way of the Pacific and South America, 
 but neither of these nations was aggressive at Canton. The 
 "Imperialists," i.e., the Germans, still retained a company 
 but it was in charge of a Scotchman who was daily expect- 
 ing instructions to close out the business. French trade 
 also was in a precarious situation. There was no French 
 company at Canton although a consul remained, and the 
 trade was being carried on by private merchants and the 
 personal assistance of the king. Sweden and Denmark were 
 represented only by a few private traders who derived no 
 small part of their profit by smuggling tea into England. 
 
 During the seasons from 1784 to 1790 the total number 
 of foreign vessels at Canton was: Portuguese, about 14; 
 Spanish, 8; Imperialists, 0; Swedish, 9; Danish, 12; French, 
 10. In the same period the Dutch had 28; the English, 
 106 Company and 97 'country' ships; and the Americans 
 had 28. 
 
 Major Shaw reported that the Netherlands, operating 
 from Batavia as a base through the Dutch East India Com- 
 pany, was, next to England, in the best commercial position 
 at Canton. But the Netherlands trade labored under the 
 handicap of a Company monopoly and was soon to fall foul 
 of the Napoleonic wars. It was never an important factor 
 in China after the Americans appeared and within a few 
 years, until the restoration of peace in Europe, the Ameri- 
 cans inherited practically all of it. 
 
 To Great Britain the British East India Company es- 
 tablishment at Canton was the outpost of a commercial 
 empire which had been steadily advancing across Asia and 
 into the Pacific since the Seven Years' War when France 
 
EARLY CHINA TRADE 55 
 
 had been practically eliminated from India. To China 
 England was bringing the accumulated experience of sev- 
 eral decades in dealing with Oriental trade and politics, and 
 the advantages of a 'half-way' station in India to which 
 the English in China could appeal thus avoiding the delay 
 incident to communication with London. Major Shaw re- 
 corded in his journal the opinion formed on the spot that 
 Great Britain apparently had the intention of monopolizing 
 the trade of China. The Americans feared that the Lord 
 Macartney Embassy to Peking (1793) had for its secret 
 object the securing of some monopolistic or exclusive trade 
 advantages from the Chinese. As early as 1816, when the 
 Lord Amherst Mission to Peking was being projected it 
 was common talk among the Americans at Canton that 
 ultimately the English would "take possession of some place 
 and make an establishment to suit their own purposes in 
 spite of the Chinese" ^ — an expectation which was realized 
 twenty-five years later in the occupation of Hongkong. 
 
 The Americans appeared at Canton lacking almost 
 every advantage which had belonged to the nations already 
 established in the trade. Between the Atlantic seaboard 
 and China by way of the Indian Ocean there was hardly 
 a single safe port of refuge or of refreshment where the 
 Americans might let down an anchor without permission 
 of Great Britain or of some European power. Furthermore, 
 while the other traders in case of difficulty might fall back 
 on supplies and support relatively near at hand, at Macao, 
 Manila, Batavia, or India, there was between the Ameri- 
 cans at Canton and their sole base of supplies a voyage of 
 at least three and perhaps six months. In addition to these 
 handicaps was the inexperience and the lack of capital 
 which characterized the initial adventures. 
 
 The Americans needed friends; they could not afford to 
 have any enemies. At Canton they inherited the friendly 
 interest of those European powers which had looked with 
 favor upon the American War of the Revolution. The 
 Empress of China was introduced to Macao and Canton 
 by French traders,^ some of whom had fought under Ad- 
 
56 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 miral Grasse in Chesapeake Bay, and the Dutch were 
 equally friendly. The officials of the British East India 
 Company were also personally very cordial to Major Shaw 
 on his first visit, but subsequently qualified their friendli- 
 ness upon orders from the Company. ''It is true," wrote 
 Shaw, "that the Court of Directors in their instructions to 
 the supercargoes the present season, have enjoined it upon 
 them to use every endeavor to prevent the subjects of 
 Great Britain from assisting or encouraging in any shape 
 the American commerce." This was to the Americans a 
 very serious matter as the Tory, Phineas Bond, fully real- 
 ized when he wrote to Lord Carmarthen from America in 
 December, 1787: "A very little matter by way of check 
 would unhinge the trade and completely damage all the 
 plans of those engaged in it." ^ So long as the Americans 
 had reason to fear the English as something more than 
 commercial competitors in a perfectly free field, that is, 
 until after the close of the War of 1812, there was little 
 friendliness between the Americans and the English in 
 China. However, policy and wisdom required the use of 
 forbearance. As Ebenezer Townsend wrote, apologetically, 
 upon his arrival at Macao in 1798, after he had made his 
 ceremonial call upon the commodore of the English ships 
 at Typa:*^ "I suppose we were under no obligation to call 
 on the Englishmen, but it is the practice." 
 
 The Americans, notwithstanding the embarrassments 
 due to the previous political activities of the European 
 powers in the East and the growing jealousy of the British, 
 had certain advantages in their youth, their small, less 
 costly and more easily managed vessels, their freedom from 
 all suspicion as plotters against the Chinese Empire, and 
 their position of political neutrals in the European conflicts. 
 In the ten years from the season of 1788-9 the amount of 
 tea exported from Canton in other than British and Ameri- 
 can vessels declined from eleven to one and one-half million 
 pounds. The European trader practically disappeared. 
 Meanwhile the American trade from Canton direct to Eu- 
 rope and indirectly through America mounted apace. In 
 
EARLY CHINA TRADE 57 
 
 1803 more than half of the tea imported to America was 
 reexported to EuropeJ 
 
 The character of the American trade in the period just 
 preceding the War of 1812 may be illustrated from the 
 claims submitted by a New York firm against the Danish 
 Government in consequence of the capture of some Ameri- 
 can vessels by Danish privateers about 1810. The claim 
 for one vessel was listed as follows:^ 
 
 Value of ship in Spanish dollars $25,000,00 
 
 Goods shipped in Canton belonging to Min- 
 
 turn and Champlin 9,851.07 
 
 Cotton shipped at New York for Gothenburg $4,038.46 
 
 Freight of same : 24,706 @ 6c 1,482.36 
 
 Insurance on 4,038 @ 10% 403.80 5,924_.62 
 
 Amount of freight of tea on board belonging 
 
 to Chinese merchants at Canton, as per 
 
 freight list and agreement, which would 
 
 have become due had the ship arrived at 
 
 Gothenburg 38,309.87 
 
 Demurrage $80 per day 33,280.00 
 
 Court charges, etc 5,000.00 
 
 $117,365.56 
 
 Capt. Eldridge's Adventure — 
 
 Invoice cost at Canton $3,270.92 
 
 Insurance @ 6% 196.26 
 
 Insurance — New York to Gothenburg @ 
 
 121/2% 408.87 
 
 Freight — Canton to N. Y. and Gothenburg 1,050.00 
 
 Interest on same for 2 years @ 6% 490.50 5,416.55 
 
 Trimmage on goods belonging to Chinese @ 
 
 5% 1,915.40 
 
 $124,697.61 
 
 In the items of the claim by the same company for 
 another ship which had been similarly captured we find : 
 
 ''Amount of the cost of tea belonging to 
 
 Houqua as per invoice $58,005.00 
 
 Premium of insurance of same to N. Y. @ 
 
 10% 6,455.00 
 
 Interest on cost of same in Canton @ 15%. . 8,700.75 
 
 Commission in New York, 5% 3,222.50 
 
 $76,373.25 
 
58 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 In the same cargo with Houqua's consignment was one 
 from Consequa, another hong merchant, for $32,009. 
 
 From the above exhibit, which appears not to have been 
 exceptional, we note the extent to which the Chinese mer- 
 chants were trading with Europe by way of America, and 
 also have some insight into the relation of the American 
 merchants to both the Oriental and the Continental trade. 
 The cargo of the ship Nimrod, landed in 1811 and sold in 
 Copenhagen about September, 1814, consisted of sugar, 
 coffee, almonds, cream of tartar, blue and yellow nankeens, 
 nutmegs, cloves, mace, cassia and nankeens. Out of the 
 same cargo casks of rice and Buenos Aires hides were sold 
 at Kiel. In short the Americans were collecting from 
 China, the Indian and the Pacific Ocean, and from South 
 America, assortments of commodities and then sending 
 them to Europe by transshipment from Atlantic ports, and 
 were levying toll in the form of profit, commissions and 
 freight, at every stage of the journey. These claims also 
 reveal how precarious were the conditions under which the 
 trade was being conducted. The firm submitting the 
 claims had become practically insolvent because of the cap- 
 ture of their vessels by Danish privateers. 
 
 The Human Element in the Trade 
 
 The human element in the early American relations 
 with China was so very important that it is worth while to 
 seek a clear understanding of it both on the Chinese and 
 on the American side. 
 
 The Chinese official was uniformly and habitually dis- 
 honest. The first American ship to come to anchor at 
 Whampoa was met with demands for "sing-songs" for the 
 hoppo, that is, for presents to the customs officer ; no vessel 
 was ever free from such demands until the inspectorate of 
 maritime customs under foreign supervision was extended 
 to all the ports after the treaties of 1858. Chinese and 
 foreigners alike, therefore, lived in an atmosphere which 
 reeked with bribery, and in which within certain broad 
 
EARLY CHINA TRADE 59 
 
 limits, law went to the highest bidder. The American 
 merchant had merely to charge up these items as a part 
 of the cost of doing business. These charges were so 
 manipulated that it was often difficult to divide with cer- 
 tainty what went to the officials and what was retained by 
 the hong merchant who in graft as well as in trade became 
 the intermediary. Nor is it easy to assert with confidence 
 where the fines imposed by the mandarins were merely 
 exactions and where they were justified. For example, the 
 owner of the ship Lion of New York, was charged $2000 
 in 1816 for a fine "imposed by the Hoppo for suspicion of 
 smuggling on board ship" which Kinqua, the hong mer- 
 chant, advised the agent to pay without complaint.^ In 
 general, it would appear that, after all port charges and 
 regular duties had been settled, the merchants according 
 to established custom, paid additional charges for the 
 privileges of smuggling. 
 
 It would be surprising to find in an atmosphere of so 
 much dishonesty that the standard of commercial integrity 
 was high. Opinions differed widely as to the righteousness 
 of the commercial codes at Canton. Major Shaw, himself 
 a man of the highest character, pronounced the commercial 
 standards of the hong merchants as good as those anywhere, 
 not overlooking the fact that the hong merchants were the 
 better for being carefully watched. Shaw's partner, Thomas 
 Randall, complained bitterly ^*^ of the dishonesty of the 
 Chinese and, indeed, complaints were very common. In 
 the instructions to a supercargo in 1815 we read that 
 "Consequa is a liberal Chinese, but involved in debt. Bab- 
 oon you must not have anything to do with." And the 
 supercargo when making his report the following year re- 
 marked: "It is unfortunately the case here that there is 
 no man to be relied upon but Houqua and he has too much 
 business." Houqua, it was asserted, charged more but he 
 was reliable both as to time and as to quality. Indeed, 
 Houqua's character was so well known in America that 
 teas bearing his chop sold at superior prices.^^ 
 
 As for the character of the Americans, again accounts 
 
60 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 differ. Probably no generalization for more than a very- 
 brief number of years could safely be made. In the track 
 of Shaw and Randall came a few adventurers, some by way 
 of India, some from the Northwest coast, who were not to 
 be trusted. As late as 1815 it as asserted that only Perkins 
 and Company, whose agent was the young John P. Gushing, 
 and Philip Ammidon were reliable. As typical of the 
 unique position of confidence which Gushing had already 
 attained not only among the Americans but also among 
 the Chinese we may cite a contract between an American 
 supercargo and a hong merchant in which the latter agreed 
 to sell "500 chests of new Hyson tea to be put on board 
 ship Lion at Whampoa at my risk and expense within two 
 months from this time, said Law to pay me the market 
 price. ... If the quality and price cannot be agreed be- 
 tween said Law and myself . . . Mr. J. P. Gushing's opin- 
 ion shall be binding." ^^ 
 
 In the estimation of the British merchants the commer- 
 cial character of the Americans was low ^^ but this estimate 
 comes from men who were feeling acutely the increasing 
 competition of the American trade. With the establish- 
 ment of regular commission houses at Canton whose com- 
 mercial relations were continuous from year to year, the 
 quality of the Americans appears to have steadily improved 
 until the adventurer without reputation to maintain or 
 character to lose was all but eliminated. 
 
 The character of the trade, the conditions at once des- 
 potic and yet lawless, demanded the general acceptance of 
 a conventional code — it would not have passed for scrupu- 
 lous honesty outside of Asia^ — which would regulate con- 
 tacts and prevent conflicts. If it be admitted that neither 
 foreigner nor hong merchant was more honest than ex- 
 pediency demanded, it must be remembered that at least 
 a moderate degree of honesty in every community is essen- 
 tial to the maintenance of peace, and peace was of the 
 utmost importance to Chinese and foreigner alike. A 
 disturbance of the peace was the cardinal sin for it meant 
 a diminution of profits. 
 
EARLY CHINA TRADE 61 
 
 The personal relations of the Chinese and Americans 
 came to be those of mutual respect and even, in many cases, 
 of affection.i^ The Americans were, for the most part, 
 Yankees who had been reared in the ignorance of a color 
 question, and who came to China directly and not, as the 
 other foreigners, through India and Malaya, where the for- 
 eigner had asserted a color supremacy and the native had 
 accepted it. The Chinese are by nature wholly unlike the 
 Malay or the natives of India, in that they demand by 
 their personal dignity and willingness to resort to methods 
 of non-intercourse, the respect of those who deal with 
 them. The Americans were willing from the outset to 
 grant this respect; the other foreigners were not. The 
 Americans were thus again left in a preferred position in 
 the^ regard of the Chinese and at a time when personal 
 relationship counted for so much. They were able to 
 capitalize this good will and make it yield dividends. 
 
 So long as the American merchant in China met his 
 foreign competitor unaccompanied by the strong arm of a 
 European government, the American held the advantageous 
 position. The moment the foreign government intervened 
 the American was placed under a handicap, for while per- 
 sonal relations counted with the Chinese in times of peace, 
 in the face of the threat of force, the Chinese with rare 
 exceptions yielded to his threatener. Perhaps it is not too 
 much to conclude that American interests in China were 
 never again in such good shape as they were between 1825 
 and 1840 when all the foreign merchants were compelled 
 to compete with each other in seeking peace and good will, 
 while the Chinese Government held the whip hand over 
 them. To be sure the Americans, as the others, were com- 
 pelled to submit to a certain amount of injustice, but the 
 injustice which the Americans suffered from the Chinese 
 in the days of the early trade was as nothing to the injustice 
 which the Americans suffered later when their competitors 
 brought to China their armies and their navies to support 
 their often arrogant and unjust pretensions. American 
 trade in China owes something of its liberties to the force 
 
62 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 of British, French, Russian, German and Japanese arms, 
 but when the balance is struck it is found that in the ag- 
 gressions of other powers upon China the Americans have 
 lost far more than they have received. 
 
 Major Samuel Shaw 
 
 One item only remains to be treated in reviewing the 
 position of the early American trader at Canton — the rela- 
 tion of the American Government to its citizens in China. 
 
 The China trade of the United States at the outset was 
 recognized as valuable, was heavily protected and practi- 
 cally ^bsidized. This system did not disappear until 1832 
 when duties on tea were removed. But to the East India 
 merchant who lived in the East the Government of the 
 United States could offer no protection or assistance. Upon 
 his return from his first voyage Major Shaw made a report 
 of the conditions at Canton and the prospects for American 
 trade to John Jay, "the Honorable, the Minister of the 
 United States for Foreign Affairs" of the Continental Con- 
 gress. Acting upon the recommendation of Jay the 
 Congress "elected" Shaw to the position of consul "at 
 Canton in China." The election was, however, more of a 
 tribute to Major Shaw, personally, than an effort to 
 promote the trade. Shaw had a distinguished record in 
 the Revolution. "Although neither salary nor perquisites 
 are annexed to it," ^^ wrote Jay to Shaw, "yet so distin- 
 guished a mark of confidence and esteem of the United 
 States will naturally give you a degree of weight and re- 
 spectability which the highest personal merit cannot very 
 soon obtain for a stranger in a foreign land." 
 
 Major Shaw regarded the appointment conscientiously 
 as an opportunity to render a public service and made two 
 subsequent extensive reports as consul in which he freely 
 placed his knowledge of the trade at the disposal of any 
 interested fellow citizen .^^ By President Washington Shaw 
 was reappointed and he continued to serve until his death 
 in 1794. Thomas Randall, Shaw's partner and vice-counsel, 
 
EARLY CHINA TRADE 63 
 
 also made an elaborate report to Alexander Hamilton, ^^ 
 with special reference to the use of specie in the trade. 
 
 The next consul was Samuel Snow of Providence who, 
 like Shaw, had first gone to Canton as a supercargo ^^ and 
 then returned to establish a commission agency. Snow ar- 
 rived in China toward the end of 1799 ^^ and remained 
 about four years, becoming the first really resident consul. 
 He did not interpret his duties so broadly as Shaw had 
 done, confining himself, largely, to the care of distressed 
 seamen and semi-annual reports of the vessels and cargoes 
 that entered and cleared. Snow left Canton at the end of 
 1804, turning over the duties of his office to Edward Car- 
 rington of Providence who succeeded to the position of 
 consul in 1806. Carrington served for about two years after 
 which the office was vacant until 1814. The post was, how- 
 ever, considered of some importance, for in 1811 George 
 E. Coles wrote to Mrs. Dolly Madison: ''Dear Cousin: 
 . . . While I was in Philadelphia some of the friends of 
 B. C. Wilcocks, with whom I became slightly acquainted, 
 requested me to recommend him as a fit person to be made 
 consul for Canton in China." ^'^ Wilcocks received the 
 appointment just before the close of the War of 1812 and 
 served for about seven years. Throughout this period and, 
 indeed, until 1854, the consul was merely a merchant whose 
 only compensation was the fees of the office, the dignity 
 of the position, and such information as to the business 
 transactions of his competitors as would become available 
 to him because of his access to official reports. 
 
 No provision whatever was made to obtain for "the con- 
 sulate the services of an interpreter. Indeed, the American 
 trade at Canton was conducted for more than forty-five 
 years before there was even one American citizen there 
 who could read, write, understand or speak Chinese with 
 any certainty. So keenly did Wilcocks feel this deficiency 
 of the Americans at Canton, as well as their need for a 
 resident physician, that in 1818 hero|fered, at his own ex- 
 pense, to educate a suitable young man to become an inter- 
 preter for the consulate.^^ He proposed to pay his expenses 
 
64 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 at the Anglo-Chinese school at Malacca which the mis- 
 sionary William Milne had established, and suggested that 
 a young physician would be the most useful. Permission 
 thus to make use of this school had been secured through 
 Dr. Robert Morrison, whose missionary career in China 
 had been begun at the American consulate under Edward 
 Carrington. 
 
 The American share in the inauguration of Dr. Mor- 
 rison's famous missionary labors is worthy of note as sup- 
 plying another indication of the difference between the 
 attitude of the British and the Americans towards the 
 Chinese. Dr. Morrison had been refused permission to 
 take passage from London for China in an East India Com- 
 pany ship and therefore came to the United States in 1807. 
 From New York, May 12, 1807, Morrison sailed for China, 
 carrying a letter from Secretary of State Madison to Con- 
 sul Carrington "requesting him to do all that he can, con- 
 sistently with the interests of his country" ^" to assist the 
 missionary. For several months after his arrival in China 
 Morrison lived in the factory of Mr. Carrington and was 
 known as an American because he did not dare to acknowl- 
 edge his British citizenship. The British had brought from 
 India a policy which involved the withholding from the 
 Chinese such benefits of the western world as would enable 
 them to meet the foreigners on equal terms. The Ameri- 
 cans, from the earlier days, never shared in such a policy. 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. Shaw's Journal is incomparably the best contemporary American 
 
 source for the beginnings of American trade in China. 
 
 2. "Embassy to the Eastern Courts of Cochin-China, Siam, and 
 
 Muscat," by Edmund Roberts (New York, 1837), p. 165. 
 
 3. William Law Papers (New York Pub. Lib. Mss.) Letter written 
 
 by Law to N. Y. correspondents, Nov. 21, 1816. 
 
 4. 3 Dip. Cor. pp. 767-8, Sept. 1, 1785, John Jay to Continental 
 
 Congress, recommending that Jefferson at Paris be instructed 
 to express the appreciation of the American Government for 
 the courtesies shown to Major Shaw at Canton. For the inter- 
 esting subsequent correspondence which took place in Paris, 
 see Americanistes et Frangais a Canton au XVIII'^ Siecle, by 
 
EARLY CHINA TRADE 65 
 
 Henri Cordier, in Journal de la Societe des Americanistes de 
 Paris (Paris, 1898). M. de Vergennes, Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs, seized the opportunity thus afforded to protest against 
 the protective measures inimical to French commerce which 
 had been adopted by various American states. 
 
 5. Letters of Phineas Bond. 
 
 6. Voyage of the Neptune. 
 
 7. Pitkin's "Commerce of the U. S." (1816). 
 
 8. William Law Papers. 
 9.. Ibid. 
 
 10. Alexander Hamilton Papers, Vol. 12, pp. 1551ff; Aug. 14, 1791, 
 
 Randall to Hamilton (Lib. of Congress). 
 
 11. William Law Papers. 
 
 12. Ibid. 
 
 13. See, for example, Majoribank's testimony. Sessional Papers, 1821, 
 
 Vol. 7. ^ 
 
 14. Hunter's "Fan Kwae" embodies the prevailing spirit of the 
 
 Americans towards the Chinese. 
 
 15. 3 Dip. Cor. p. 769, Jan. 30, 1786, Jay to Shaw. 
 
 16. Appendices, Shaw's Journal. 
 
 17. Alexander Hamilton Papers (see supra, Note 10.). 
 
 18. Kimball's East India Trade of Providence. 
 
 19. Canton Consular Letters. 
 
 20. Madison Papers, June 10, 1811, George E. Coles to Mrs. D. P. 
 
 Madison (N. Y. Pub. Lib.). 
 
 21. Misc. Letters (Dept. of State) July 4, 1818, C. J. IngersoU to 
 
 J. Q. Adams. 
 
 22. "Memoirs of the Life and Labors of Robert Morrison" (2 vols. 
 
 London 1849), Vol. 1, p. 106ff. 
 
PART II 
 THE FIRST TREATY WITH CHINA 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE FOUNDATION OF AMEEICAN POLICY IN ASIA 
 
 The early American policy in Asia, meaning merely the 
 policy of early Americans for there was no other policy, was 
 purely negative in its origins. It appeared only when there 
 was opposition or obstruction to the trade. Where trade 
 was free there was no policy. Where there was a policy its 
 weight was in direct ratio to the desire of the Americans 
 for the trade. 
 
 There never was an American political policy in the 
 Indian Ocean. The trade was either free or was open to 
 Americans on equal or on more favorable terms than those 
 enjoyed by their competitors. England took possession of 
 the Isle de France in 1810. The War of 1812 destroyed 
 the trade with British India, and the tariff of 1816 put a 
 curb on its reestablishment. Economic necessity — the gen- 
 eral poverty of the States and the need for Indian produce — 
 had forced the Americans into the Indian Ocean trade, and 
 the steady growth of wealth and industry in the United 
 States reduced the necessity for such adventures. The 
 profits which at the beginning had been steadier and more 
 certain than those in the China trade, declined and suffered 
 in the competition with British produce. The United 
 States had little produce to send to India and as for specie, 
 it yielded a better return at Canton. Furthermore, the 
 China trade had the advantage of the protection and as- 
 sistance of the Government of the United States. The 
 term 'East India trade' came more and more to mean the 
 Canton trade. 
 
 Because there had been opposition and obstruction to 
 the American trade in the Pacific Ocean there had been a 
 policy in those regions. However, it was the purely nega- 
 
 69 
 
70 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 tive one of keeping the trade routes and the markets open. 
 The Americans declined to be excluded from the Northwest 
 coast and would have opposed any curtailment of their 
 rights at Honolulu had any measures of obstruction been 
 adopted. But the fur trade ceased to be a factor in the 
 Far Eastern trade after 1820. The whale fisheries entered 
 the North Pacific but they did not immediately create a 
 new link in the chain of commerce with Asia. By the fur 
 trade Americans had been taught to look upon the Pacific 
 Ocean and the Sandwich Islands in relation to the Asiatic 
 trade ^ but it was not until the settlement of the Pacific 
 Coast of the United States, the development of Shanghai 
 and the opening of Japan, that American policy in Asia 
 came again to include the Pacific Ocean. Meanwhile 
 American policy in the Far East merely meant the policy 
 of the Americans at Canton. 
 
 The Americans at Canton had but one desire — to keep 
 the trade open to Americans on terms as favorable as, or 
 more favorable than, those enjoyed by their competitors 
 who were chiefly British. A brief review of the trade from 
 the close of the War of 1812 until the outbreak of hostilities 
 between the British and the Chinese in 1839 is therefore 
 in order. 
 
 Review of Trade: 1815-1839 
 
 The period is characterized by three facts: the consoli- 
 dation of commerce in the hands of a very few wealthy 
 firms and commission houses ; the establishment of a system 
 of exchange by which bills on London were substituted for 
 specie; and the introduction of manufactured goods, first 
 British and then American, which altered the relations of 
 the Americans to the China trade and made them begin to 
 regard China as a limitless market in which to sell rather 
 than as a limited market in which to buy. 
 
 The earliest American trade at Canton had been con- 
 ducted by supercargoes who travelled with the vessels. The 
 next step in commercial organization was the establishment 
 of permanent firms which either dealt on commission or 
 
THE FOUNDATION OF AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA 71 
 
 represented directly some mercantile house the headquar- 
 ters of which was in the United States. Shaw and Randall 
 beginning as supercargoes, established a firm to engage in 
 commission business, as well as in the transaction of their 
 personal ventures. The Columbia and the Lady Washing- 
 ton when setting out for the Northwest coast were con- 
 signed to Shaw and Randall. This firm, however, was soon 
 dissolved because of the death of Shaw, and seems never 
 to have thoroughly established itself. Samuel Snow of 
 Providence who succeded Shaw as consul established him- 
 self in Canton about 1800 as a resident commission agent, 
 presumably giving special attention to the requirements of 
 the Providence merchants. He, also, had begun as a super- 
 cargo on the Ann and Hope of Providence in 1795. Thomas 
 H. Perkins and Company of Boston established a branch in 
 1803, in charge of John P. Cushing, a youth of sixteen. 
 This firm, while primarily transacting the Perkins business, 
 also engaged in a commission trade. B. C. Wilcocks of 
 Philadelphia became a resident commission agent and in 
 time became the third American consul. Daniel Stansbury 
 of Baltimore became agent for the New York firm of 
 Minturn and Champlin. Nicholas G. Ogden and Cornelius 
 Sowle represented John Jacob Astor. Philip Ammidon with 
 Providence connections, and Samuel Russell of Middle- 
 town, Connecticut, who had begun commercial life as a 
 supercargo out of Providence appeared as residents at 
 Canton. Thus the commercial life of the American com- 
 munity developed. 
 
 Gradually the supercargo disappeared from the Ameri- 
 can vessels and his work was done by the resident commis- 
 sion agent. One hears very little of supercargoes after 
 1815. Following the close of the War of 1812 further or- 
 ganization and differentiation of the trade took place. The 
 firm of Samuel Russell and Company, of which the partners 
 were Russell and Ammidon, Edward Carrington, Cyrus 
 Butler, and B. and T. C. Hoppin of Providence, was formed 
 in December, 1818, the two first named being designated 
 to represent the firm in Canton for five years.^ At the end 
 
72 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 of this period the firm was reorganized under the name of 
 Russell and Company, with the approval and help of the 
 house of Perkins, which retired from Canton three years 
 later. The Russell house was further consolidated by the 
 incorporation of some smaller firms and came to occupy a 
 financial position in China comparable with that of the 
 famous British firms. For many years it handled only a 
 commission business although many of the partners acting 
 as individuals, were also merchants. Olyphant and Com- 
 pany at Canton was organized in 1828 out of the ruins of 
 the firm of Thomas H. Smith by D. W. C. Olyphant who 
 had served an apprenticeship in New York, Baltimore, and 
 then in Canton as the supercargo and agent of Smith. ^ This 
 firm came to occupy a position second only to that of Rus- 
 sell and Company, until Augustine Heard, leaving the Rus- 
 sell firm, established the house which long bore his name. 
 The only other important firm was that of W. S. Wetmore. 
 It is significant that out of the much larger number of 
 American merchants who came to and departed from Can- 
 ton, only these firms, Russell, Olyphant, Heard and Wet- 
 more, survived the competition of decades. Some, like 
 John C. Cushing, retired with wealth ; others failed grandly 
 and left only pitiful derelicts. 
 
 The effect of this consolidation of American interests 
 was to stabilize business, and to increase the influence of 
 the surviving merchants in their dealings with both the 
 Chinese and with the other foreigners. 
 
 The establishment of a system of exchange, by which 
 bills on London were substituted for specie, came before 
 1830 as a result of the increased commercial relationship 
 between the United States and England, and the growth 
 of the opium trade. 
 
 A part of the American trade with China was financed 
 from London even before 1800. Shortly after 1815 Ameri- 
 can merchants began to buy British manufactured goods, 
 chiefly cottons, in the English market, and to take them to 
 China where they were able to sell them cheaper than the 
 East India Company.^ Agents of the Company complained 
 
THE FOUNDATION OF AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA 73 
 
 that the American goods were not only of inferior quality, 
 even those which had been rejected by the Company in 
 London, but that the Americans even went so far as to 
 adopt a 'chop' (trade-mark) so closely representing that 
 of the Company as to deceive the purchaser. These 
 charges could hardly be controverted. The effect of this 
 trade in British manufactured goods was to make London 
 a clearing house for a considerable amount of European 
 and China trade which had formerly been settled either in 
 Canton or Europe by payments of specie. Meanwhile the 
 opium trade from India to China increased to the point 
 where China was consuming more foreign produce than the 
 value of the tea, silks, etc., which the foreigner was taking 
 out of China. China settled the balance against her in 
 silver. The Empire had become, by means of opium, a 
 buying more than a selling nation. More and more the 
 Americans came to Canton not with specie but with bills 
 on London which they disposed of in return for their out- 
 ward cargoes. In other words, by taking out Chinese 
 produce, and settling the account in London, they helped 
 the Chinese to adjust the balance of trade. Importation 
 of specie from America was reduced 80 per cent in the years 
 1831-40, over the previous decade.^ 
 
 The influence of this new development of the trade was 
 in the direction of the identification of American and Brit- 
 ish interests in China. There was, however, a check on this 
 influence. 
 
 The import of foreign merchandise in American vessels 
 into China reached its highest point in 1825 when it was 
 valued at nearly $5,500,000. In that year the value of the 
 domestic produce sent from the United States to China was 
 $160,000 although three years before the sum had ap- 
 proached half a million. In 1826 the invoices show the 
 beginning of the exportation to China of American cottons 
 to the extent of about $15,000.® This trade in American 
 domestics increased steadily and in ten years had risen to 
 $170,000. In 1838 it passed the half million dollar mark. 
 Meanwhile the Americans were bringing away from China 
 
74 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 less and less nankeens and silks, and were also taking less 
 and less British manufactured goods into China. 
 
 American domestics, coarse grades of white and printed 
 cottons, grew in popularity and successfully met the British 
 competition. In nine months from October 1, 1842, to July 
 1, 1843, the United States exported to China domestic 
 produce to the value of more than $1,700,000, and two years 
 later passed the two million dollar mark; meanwhile the 
 Americans had reduced their importations of British and 
 European produce into China to less than $200,000. True 
 the Americans were still taking from China very much more 
 produce than they were bringing to it ; in the decade ending 
 with 1840 the imports into China amounted to not quite 
 $13,000,000 and the exports from China were $61,000,000. 
 But the Americans had had a glimpse of Asia as a market 
 for American manufactured goods, and that glimpse in- 
 fluenced the policy of Americans and guided the formation 
 of the policy of their government.'^ 
 
 After 1840 American policy in Asia was always directed 
 with an eye to the future — to the day when Americans 
 would supply the seemingly limitless markets of the East. 
 Meanwhile the doors to these markets must be kept open. 
 This was as much the policy of Americans in 1840 as it was 
 American policy eighty years later. 
 
 One other fact of the trade development may be men- 
 tioned although its importance at the time was greatly 
 overestimated. At the close of the War of 1812 the Ameri- 
 cans resumed their China trade with a rush. The volume 
 of trade, exports and imports together, mounted from 
 $7,000,000 to about $19,000,000 in four years. In the sea- 
 son 1817-8 the gross amount of the American imports and 
 exports at Canton actually exceeded those of the British 
 East India Company, while the American tonnage em- 
 ployed was 18,000 as compared with 21,000 for th§ British. 
 But the Americans were speculating and paid dearly. The 
 tonnage employed in the decade ending with 1840 showed 
 an actual decrease over that in the previous decade. The 
 total British trade in 1830 was $43,000,000 as compared 
 
THE FOUNDATION OF AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA 75 
 
 with $3,500,000 for the Americans; in 1840 the American 
 exports to and imports from China were only $7,000,000. 
 It is obvious that American commercial relations with China 
 were valued not so much because of their present returns as 
 for their future possibilities. 
 
 With these facts as to the growth of the trade in mind 
 we pass to a consideration of the relation of the American 
 Government to its citizens in China from 1800 until the 
 beginning of the agitation for a treaty, i.e. after the dis- 
 solution of the East India Company monopoly in 1834. 
 
 w 
 
 Relation of United States Government to American 
 Citizens in China 
 
 The consul was not an imposing functionary. The com- 
 mon affairs of the American community were usually 
 ordered in what was really a 'town meeting' over which the 
 consul, as a courtesy, was asked to preside. The rights of 
 the minority were amply safeguarded in these meetings, for 
 the individual was subject to no law save that of expedi- 
 ency. The consul administered the estate of the dead, dis- 
 ciplined mutinous sailors and cared for such of them as 
 could not care for themselves, but he lacked even the au- 
 thority to demand accurate trade reports from the captains 
 and supercargoes. "The secret manner of transacting busi- 
 ness at Canton," wrote Samuel Snow to Secretary of State 
 Pickering (November 9, 1800) in response to a request for a 
 trade report, "made it almost impossible to obtain any 
 accurate knowledge of the cargoes in the common way. 
 . . . On that account my note to the different captains 
 bordered as closely on a demand as the nature of the thing 
 would admit of, and the reports have come in more full 
 than I had even expected myself." The only emoluments of 
 the consular office were the fees which, up to 1836, had 
 rarely exceeded $500. 
 
 The relation of the consul to the Chinese authorities 
 abounded in absurdities. They called the consul the chief 
 'tai-pan' (supercargo). Theoretically they did not recog- 
 
76 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 nize him at all, and yet actually they looked to him to 
 exercise over his countrymen as despotic a control as any 
 Chinese official similarly placed would not hesitate to em- 
 ploy. The chairman of the Select Committee of the East 
 India Company, and the French consul, unlike the American 
 official, did possess very extensive powers both judicial and 
 executive. To complicate matters still more the Chinese, 
 reasoning from the analogy of their own governmental 
 practice, assumed as a matter of course that the American 
 officials, like their own, were corrupt and dependent for 
 advancement and wealth upon methods such as their own 
 officials uniformly employed. Furthermore the consul 
 shared the contempt with which the Chinese authorities 
 looked upon all traders. The Chinese regarded men who 
 would desert their homes and the tombs of their ancestors 
 to reside in a foreign land for the purposes of trade as singu- 
 larly degraded. A Chinese merchant, similarly placed, 
 would at once be violating the law and forfeiting all privi- 
 leges of protection from his government. 
 
 The insecurity of the Americans during the trying period 
 before 1815 led them to petition Congress for a more 
 efficient consular establishment.* 
 
 The petition stated : 
 
 "The consul of the United States residing here has not the means 
 of being sufficiently useful to his countrymen with their intercourse 
 with the Chinese Government, and of supporting the dignity of the 
 flag of which he has charge; in consequence of which it frequently 
 happens that impositions are placed upon the memorialists that are 
 avoided by the citizens or subjects of other nations whose representa- 
 tives have the means to oppose with firmness and effect the first 
 attempts which, if successfully repelled, are seldom renewed ; but when 
 once a new imposition has been submitted to, it is considered an estab- 
 lished custom, and demanded as a right from the nation that has 
 yielded." 
 
 *The date of this petition, whieb is found in the first volume of Canton 
 Consular Letters, is unknown. From the signatures attached to it, it would 
 appear that it could not have been later than 1815 and it may have been pre- 
 pared as early as 1806. Dr. Robert Morrison, who embarked for China from 
 New York in the spring of 1807, mentions the movement then under way to 
 secure better protection for the consul at Canton, and two years later President 
 Jefferson received an application from Judge A. B. Woodward who wished a 
 commission to represent the United States diplomatically In China, with power 
 to negotiate a treaty.^ 
 
THE FOUNDATION OF AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA 77 
 
 The petitioners asked for a consul, unconnected with the 
 trade, at a salary of $3,000 and residence. They also urged 
 the appointment of an experienced physician to care for 
 the sailors, with the liberty to engage in private practice. 
 Allowances were also requested to pay for a linguist or for 
 the cost of translating documents. 
 
 To this appeal there appears to have been no response 
 from the Government of the United States. 
 
 The nearest to an official opinion on American policy at 
 this time is to be found in the correspondence of Thomas 
 Jefferson, at the time of the Embargo. The incident also 
 throws some light on the conditions under which its China 
 trade in those days was conducted. A Chinese merchant, 
 then in New York, wished to return to China while the 
 embargo was in operation. He appealed to President Jef- 
 ferson, even going to Washington to see him. The President 
 wrote to Albert Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury, enclos- 
 ing a blank passport for the vessel which the Chinese mer- 
 chant agreed to provide for himself, saying: ^ 
 
 "1 enclose Mr. Madison's letter which contains everything I know 
 on the subject. I consider it a case of national comity, and coming 
 within the views of the first section of the first embargo act. The 
 departure of this individual with good disposition may be the means 
 of making our nation known advantageously at the source of power 
 in China, to which it is otherwise difficult to convey inforraation." 
 
 A few weeks later President Jefferson wrote with refer- 
 ence to the same matter: 
 
 "The opportunity hoped from that, of making known through one 
 of its own characters of note, our nation, our circumstances and char- 
 acter, and of letting that government understand at length the differ- 
 ence between us and the English, and separate us in its policy, ren- 
 dered that measure a diplomatic one, in my view, and likely to bring 
 lasting advantage to our merchants and commerce with that country." 
 
 This, the first expression of opinion from so high a 
 source, correctly stated a policy with reference to China 
 which remained fundamental in American dealings with 
 China long into the future, although it showed few results 
 for at least another half century. It was difficult for the 
 
78 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Chinese to differentiate between the two English-speaking 
 nations, and consequently the English and the Americans 
 were accustomed to bear each other's sins. 
 
 Unhappily President Jefferson was, in this incident, the 
 innocent victim of a shrewd hoax. When the New York 
 merchants picked up the Commercial Advertiser of August 
 13, 1808, they learned that the distinguished mandarin was 
 none other than a dock loafer who had come to the United 
 States in a recent ship from China. Their displeasure was 
 still further increased by the fact that the vessel on which 
 he had returned to China the day before was the Beaver, 
 belonging to their enterprising competitor, John Jacob 
 Astor. 
 
 The merchants officially protested to President Jef- 
 ferson. The Commercial Advertiser made it the sub- 
 ject of an acid editorial. In a public letter Astor defied 
 the protestants offering to prove that the President had not 
 been deceived. However, the ship did belong to Astor, and 
 Picqua, the so-called mandarin, probably had no more influ- 
 ence in Peking than did his ambitious patron. Meanwhile 
 the Beaver was able to get in an extra voyage to Canton, 
 while other American ships were tied up by the unpopular 
 embargo. Astor was reported to have made no less than 
 $200,000 by the voyage.^*' 
 
 After the resignation of B. C. Wilcocks in 1821 the con- 
 sular office was filled only in a haphazard way until the 
 appointment of Peter W. Snow of Providence, son of the 
 second consul (1835). One consul died shortly after his 
 appointment ; his successor served less than two years owing 
 to the failure of the firm with which he was connected, and 
 the third appointee in the interim, although holding the 
 appointment for ten years, never lived during that time at 
 Canton. In fact, during the first fifty years of American 
 trade relations with China, the total terms of service ren- 
 dered by regularly appointed consuls continuously resident 
 at Canton was only fourteen years. In the intervals the 
 duties of the office were discharged, if at all, by some mer- 
 chant who was either delegated by the person holding 
 
THE FOUNDATION OF AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA 79 
 
 the office or who voluntarily assumed the responsibili- 
 ties. 
 
 That the American Government was not, however, en- 
 tirely unconscious of the presence of its citizens in China, 
 or regardless of the value of the trade, is evident from the 
 fact that at various times naval protection was proposed. 
 As a result of the depredations of the French privateers and 
 naval vessels, the United States ship Congress was sent to 
 the Far East in May, 1800.^ ^ This vessel reached Batavia 
 and cruised in .the Straights of Sunda for two months. She 
 offered homeward convoy to fifteen American merchant- 
 men. In 1815 the United States sloop Peacock was sent to 
 the East Indies to protect American shipping and to prey 
 upon the British trade. She also reached Batavia and cap- 
 tured four English merchantmen, all after the declaration 
 of peace, but never reached Canton. Four years later the 
 Congress, fitted out to protect the China trade from pirates 
 and to afford a practice cruise, dropped anchor at Lintin 
 (November 3, 1819), some forty miles below the mouth of 
 the Canton, or Pearl River. The Chinese authorities 
 promptly refused to allow the frigate to be supplied with 
 provisions, and through the hong merchants issued a 
 demand to the consul that the Congress leave immediately. 
 This was the customary Chinese method for dealing with 
 visits of foreign naval vessels. Only three years before H. 
 M. S. Alceste, attached to the Lord Amherst Embassy, had 
 been similarly treated and had defied the Chinese, forcing its 
 way up to Whampoa. Captain Henley of the Congress 
 would have liked to do the same, but greatly to the relief 
 of the American merchants he restrained himself. Had he 
 disobeyed the orders of the mandarins the American trade 
 would probably have been stopped. There is no more 
 certain index to the character of the policy of Americans in 
 Canton at that time than the fact that the presence of an 
 American naval vessel was an embarrassment. 
 
 Although Captain Henley was hospitably entertained at 
 the factories when he went up to Canton in a merchant 
 vessel he was made to feel that his official services were not 
 
80 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 desired. In the spring, when he offered to convoy the 
 American vessels down through the Straits the offer was 
 decHned by the merchants and captains who feared that such 
 assistance would be offensive to the Chinese. 
 
 Subsequently on several occasions American naval 
 vessels visited the mouth of the river. By the Chinese 
 authorities they were always ordered away, and by the 
 Americans they were welcomed only with apprehensions. 
 The American had no desire whatever for a 'gun-boat' 
 policy; it could only create ill feeling among the Chinese, 
 and it would interfere with the trade. 
 
 We may now review the policy of the American mer- 
 chants in meeting the irritations which arose out of the 
 contacts with other foreign powers at Canton, and out of 
 the impositions of the Chinese authorities. 
 
 Relations with the Portuguese and English 
 
 The Portuguese Governor of Macao in 1803 was unwill- 
 ing to admit the American consul to residence at Macao 
 during the summer months, an awkward and discriminating 
 action, in view of the fact that no foreigner was allowed to 
 remain at Canton after the close of the trade.* 
 
 The Americans solved the difficulty by violating the rule 
 of the Chinese, making, doubtless, a few presents to the 
 officials, and living at the factories during the summer, until 
 the Macao authorities were persuaded to extend a freer 
 hospitality. Major Shaw, the first American consul, had 
 established the precedent by spending the summer of 1787 
 at Canton with the supercargo of the Columbia and another 
 American. Indeed the Americans seem never, at that time, 
 to have been very careful about such rules. Captain Cleve- 
 land reports with reference to this custom of moving to 
 Macao in the summer: "This routine has of late years been 
 broken by the disregard of etiquette and the established 
 seasons on the part of the Americans who, coming and 
 
 *There was no treaty between the United States and Portugal at that time. 
 
THE FOUNDATION OF AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA 81 
 
 going all the year round, have inverted all the ancient rules 
 of doing business at Canton.^- 
 
 The troubles with the British authorities were much 
 more serious both for the Americans and for the English. 
 As early as the season of 1804-5 the first clash came over 
 the desertion of British seamen to American ships, and the 
 British insistence on the right of search. Desertion in those 
 days was a very serious matter, for there was no ready 
 labor supply at Canton from which to draw to fill the vacant 
 place. An Indiaman required a crew of about 130, and it 
 was not to be expected that the British captains would view 
 with indifference the escape of their men to American ships, 
 sometimes with the active solicitation of the American cap- 
 tain and the promise of higher wages and a bonus. Captain 
 Cleveland states, in describing a voyage he fitted out from 
 Canton to the Northwest coast of North America in 1799: 
 "Most of my men were deserters from the Indiamen; and 
 they were generally the worst of a bad lot." To this practice 
 was added the claims of the British war-ships which came to 
 Canton each year to convoy the returning East India Com- 
 pany fleet, of the right to take from American ships any of 
 the crew who were unable to give indisputable proof of their 
 American citizenship, and in case of necessity, to take them 
 anyway. 
 
 Towards the end of the year 1804 H. M. SS. Caroline and 
 Grampus began to search American ships and when they left 
 Chinese waters carried two American seamen with them, 
 despite the protests of Carrington. The commander of the 
 Caroline replied to the consul's protest: 
 
 "In reply to your letter of yesterday, requesting the discliage of 
 three men from His Britannic Majesty's ship under my command, 
 calling themselves subjects of the United States of America, to which 
 you sign yourself consular agent : — 
 
 "I am to inform you that all such solicitations must be made to the 
 Lords of the Admiralty in England, as without orders from them no 
 man can be discharged by a Captain of the British Navy." 
 
 These passages between the Americans and the British, 
 in which the fault was by no means exclusively on one side, 
 
82 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 continued. In November, 1807, the Topaz of Baltimore was 
 boarded by British naval forces at Whampoa, and the cap- 
 tain of the Topaz was shot. The ship was seized, her specie 
 confiscated, and the ship was sent to Bombay as a prize, on 
 the ground that the Topaz had been engaged in piracy off 
 the coast of South America. 
 
 The American brig Rambler of Boston, a letter of marque 
 vessel, captured the English Arabella of Calcutta, in 1814, 
 and in distress was forced to put in at Macao with her 
 prize. The captain of the Rambler directed the prize to be 
 anchored under the guns of the Portuguese fort, whereupon 
 the Governor of Macao ordered her to leave the harbor, 
 although she was without provisions and proper ballast. In 
 the course of the dispute a Portuguese crew took the 
 Arabella out and anchored her near the British fleet. 
 The British forthwith took possession of the vessel. Consul 
 Wilcocks complained bitterly to James Monroe, Secretary 
 of State, not merely at the ''flagrant outrage" committed 
 by Robert O'Brien, Esq., commander of H. M. S. Doris, and 
 of the "pusillanimous conduct of the Governor of Macao" 
 but also of the fact that the Portuguese had been permitting 
 the British officers to live at Macao whence they had gone 
 out to attack many American ships. 
 
 The Chinese took a hand in the quarrel between the 
 Americans and the British, demanding that the superintend- 
 ent of the East India Company send away H. M. S. Doris, 
 after she had chased an American ship up to Whampoa and 
 captured her there at the anchorage. The Doris had also 
 captured an American ship, the Hunter, off the Ladrone 
 Islands and brought her to Chinese waters as a prize. 
 When the superintendent replied that he had no authority 
 over the English men-of-war and could not order them 
 away, the Chinese ordered the servants away from the Eng- 
 lish factories, and threatened to stop the trade. The Eng- 
 lish, in turn, withdrew from Canton, and in the end the 
 Chinese gave way. In the agreement between the Chinese 
 and the English in which this controversy was settled, it 
 was stipulated that in the future the Americans should not 
 
THE FOUNDATION OF AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA 83 
 
 be permitted to dispose of prize-goods in the Canton market. 
 This provision was inserted because both the Rambler and 
 the Jacob Jones, another American letter of marque, had 
 brought to Canton no less than $10,000 in specie, forty 
 chests of opium, and some piece goods, all captured from 
 English ships, and with the loot purchased outward cargoes. 
 While American trade with Canton was all but paralyzed 
 during the War of 1812, nevertheless a system of parole was 
 estabhshed in 1814 by which American sailors were returned 
 to the consul by the captain of H. M. S. Doris, on condition 
 that they would promise not to take up arms against the 
 English navy. Meanwhile the displeasure of the Chinese 
 at the British disregard of their port regulations operated to 
 the benefit of the Americans. 
 
 Relations with the Chinese Government 
 
 From the very beginning of the trouble with the English 
 in 1804 the Americans realized that there were only two 
 possible sources of protection for them; their own govern- 
 ment, or the Chinese, and they knew full well that no help 
 was possible from the United States naval forces. There- 
 fore Carrington wrote to Captain Ratsey of H. M. Brig 
 Harrier, October 14, 1805: 
 
 "Should the demand which I have made to you not be complied 
 with, I shall make a formal representation and appeal to the Chinese 
 Government of this unprecedented and outrageous violence against 
 the rights of nations." 
 
 There being no satisfactory response to this demand, 
 Carrington called together the American merchants, super- 
 cargoes and captains, and laid the case before them. As a 
 result of this meeting a formal representation was drawn up 
 and signed by the consul and twenty-seven other Americans. 
 It was addressed to "His Excellency, John Tuck, Governor 
 of the Province of Canton." The acknowledgements of and 
 concessions to Chinese authority which were made in this 
 document were an expression of the fundamental principle 
 
84 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 which guided the American merchants in their dealings with 
 the Chinese for the next fifteen or more years, and which 
 at least some of the American merchants at Canton, even 
 after the opening of the five ports in 1844, were slow to 
 discard. After reciting the facts with reference to the con- 
 troversy with Captain Ratsey, and stating that if the 
 English officer carried out his threat to come to Whampoa 
 and search American ships anchored there, the American 
 captains had decided to repel his visits with force of arms, 
 if necessary, the representation further stated: 
 
 "The undersigned further respectfully represent to your Excel- 
 lency that the citizens of the United States have for many years 
 visited the city of Canton in the pursuit of honest commerce, that 
 their conduct during the vphole period of intercourse has been regu- 
 lated by a strict regard and respect for the hiws and usages of this 
 Empire, as well as the general law of nations, and that by their 
 fidelity in trade, and their t>eaceable demeanor, the most perfect har- 
 mony, confidence, and good understanding has ever been maintained 
 between the subjects of this country and the citizens of the United 
 States, from which has flowed a very extensive and rapidly increasing 
 commerce, mutually advantageous and honorable to both parties ; 
 
 "That by the ancient and well established laws and usages of all 
 civilized nations, the persons and property of friendly foreigners 
 within the territory and jurisdiction of a sovereign and independent 
 Empire, are under the special protection of the government thereof, 
 and any violence or indignity offered to such persons or to the flag 
 of the nation to which they belong, is justly considered as done to the 
 government within whose territory the outrage is committed; 
 
 "That by the same law of nations, the civil and military agents 
 of the government are strictly prohibited from assuming any authority 
 whatever within the territory of the other nor can they seize the per- 
 son of the highest state criminal, who may have eluded the justice of 
 their own! 
 
 "How great, then, is the outrage and indignity which has been 
 committed in the port of Canton, upon the citizens and the national 
 character of the United States ! . . . The undersigned, therefore, with 
 the highest respect and deference, pray your Excellency to exercise 
 that power and justice with which you are clothed, as well as to cause 
 the American seamen to be restored, as also to secure them from any 
 aggression of the kind in the future within the territory of China, 
 which they presume, unquestionably extends to the seas which bound 
 its shores." 
 
 It is difficult to know whether this memorial, with its 
 sweeping concessions as to the jurisdiction of Chinese 
 
THE FOUNDATION OF AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA 85 
 
 authority, was ever seen by the Governor of the province. 
 Carrington wrote to James Madison, November 25, 1805: 
 
 "As the Chinese Government does not recognize foreign ministers 
 or consuls, I consider it advisable to join the American merchants 
 residing at Canton, and the supercargoes and the commanders of the 
 American ships, with me in the representation; hoping it would have 
 the desired influence with the several security merchants to encourage 
 them to present the same to their government, and give our complaints 
 their full force." 
 
 At any rate, the hong merchants replied that their gov- 
 ernment would not take cognizance of disputes between 
 foreigners although they arose within Chinese territory, a 
 principle which, however, China did not follow consistently. 
 Nevertheless it is quite likely that the Chinese authorities 
 were entirely familiar with the contents of the memorial, 
 and fifteen years later, in accordance with it as well as with 
 their own desire, they claimed jurisdiction over the Ameri- 
 can ships at Whampoa in the Terranova case. 
 
 It could hardly be expected that this policy of non-inter- 
 course upon which the Chinese Government insisted, would 
 work out exclusively to the disadvantage of the foreigners, 
 and there were not a few occasions when the fictitious ar- 
 rangements were brushed aside by the Chinese themselves. 
 A Philadelphia merchant sued Houqua, the famous hong 
 merchant, in a Pennsylvania court for failure to keep his 
 engagements in 1818 as to the quality of tea and obtained a 
 judgment for $25,000. How the defendant was represented 
 in this suit or by what means the judgment was collected 
 is not known. ^^ The plaintiff, however, was shortly after 
 the trial revealed as a notorious smuggler who became insol- 
 vent, owing the government more than three quarters of a 
 million dollars in duties. 
 
 Several of the hong merchants were reported to have 
 been in much embarrassment because of the extent to which 
 they had supplied the American traders on credit. Houqua, 
 afterwards so friendly to some American firms, was at that 
 time extensively involved in these transactions and learned 
 to become more discriminating in his extensions of credit. 
 
86 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 One merchant, Consequa, who was reported to have lost 
 $1,000,000 in credit transactions with Americans, even went 
 so far as to address a memorial to ''His Excellency, James 
 Madison, President of the United States of America, or to 
 the President of the United States for the time being." He 
 stated that he had been led, after years of extensive dealings 
 with the Americans, to give them long credits, although it 
 was against the laws of the Empire. While trade was flour- 
 ishing he had heard no complaints, and the losses had not 
 been greater than he could well bear, but more recently he 
 had had many unhappy experiences with the American 
 traders. Some of the Americans, he stated, had not only 
 declined to pay, offering frivolous excuses, but had even 
 applied the capital to other branches of their business. 
 Consequa recites: ^^ 
 
 "When such debtors come, or reside in China, they cannot claim 
 the aid of the laws of the imperial dynasty on their behalf. They 
 [the laws] prohibit such confidence as he [Consequa] has placed in 
 the subjects of the United States, and he would not presume to avow 
 to the chief of a great nation, that he has infringed the laws of his 
 own empire, but in the full consciousness that he has been guilty of 
 no disloyal or injurious act or intention toward it, whilst to honorable 
 minds he thinks his China would be strengthened by this circumstance 
 [business with foreigners]. 
 
 "He does not presume to solicit your Excellency's protection and 
 consideration, but in so far as may be in accord with justice and the 
 laws of the United States, they being so far and so greatly celebrated 
 for their equal protection of the rich and the poor, and for their 
 dealing equal measure to their citizens and to those of aliens, but he 
 does ask for your protection and countenance in asserting and claim- 
 ing his rights in conformity to your laws and where an appeal to 
 courts of justice becomes necessary, that the forms and proceedings 
 which have been devised for the security of man, may not be allowed 
 to be wrested to his injury, a perversion to which the best are liable." 
 
 Consequa appointed a representative to present his 
 petition, ^nd supphed him with the necesssary proofs and 
 papers to show his losses. 
 
 Terranova Incident 
 
 This policy of submitting to Chinese authority found 
 its most famous expression in the well known "Terranova 
 
THE FOUNDATION OF AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA 87 
 
 case." ^^ Francis Terranova, an illiterate Italian seaman 
 from the Emily, of Baltimore, was accused at the beginning 
 of the season of 1821 of having caused the death of a boat- 
 woman who had come up to the Emily to trade with the 
 sailors. The consul attempted to settle the matter by the 
 offer of a liberal payment to the relatives of the boat-woman 
 but the captain of the Emily took matters into his own 
 hands and, backed by the majority of the American commu- 
 nity, was disposed to fight the case. The Chinese assumed 
 jurisdiction and although the Americans were persuaded 
 that the sailor was not guilty, and that the Chinese could 
 not be trusted to give a fair trial, yielded. The unfortunate 
 sailor was tried by Chinese authorities on board the Emily, 
 found guilty, and the Americans were ordered to surrender 
 him for punishment. The Americans demurred, the trade 
 was stopped, the ship's security merchant, who owed large 
 sums to Americans, was arrested, and the Americans found 
 themselves confronted by a necessity. The holding of the 
 security merchants might mean the financial ruin of his 
 American creditors. Terranova was surrendered, and a few 
 days later he was strangled, notwithstanding promises to 
 the contrary and notwithstanding the provision of Chinese 
 law making manslaughter punishable only by a small fine.^^ 
 Before the sailor was taken from the Emily a group of 
 American merchants drew up a statement of the case and 
 presented it to Houqua to give to the Chinese authorities. 
 In it they said: ^'^ 
 
 "We consider the case prejudiced. We are bound to submit to 
 your laws while we are in your waters, be they ever so unjust. We 
 will not resist them. You have followed your ideas of justice, and 
 have condemned the man unheard. But the flag of our country has 
 never been disgraced. It now waves over you. It is no disgrace to 
 submit to your power, surrounded as you are by overwhelming force, 
 backed up by a great Empire. You have the power to compel us." 
 
 This bombastic declaration, amazing as it would seem, 
 issued by any group of Americans, is still more remarkable 
 when one remembers that those who signed it were among 
 the most fearless sea-captains and pioneers that the United 
 
88 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 States had ever produced. It shows how completely the 
 Chinese held the foreigners in their power by'meansof the 
 one weapon — stopping the trade. But it shows more than 
 that. It reflects the opinion of the day in American history 
 when 'national honor' was far more loosely defined than it 
 is today. More than twelve years later the North American 
 Review, in commenting on the incident^ said: 
 
 "But as a question in the law of nations and casuistry, it would 
 bear an argument whether the United States could rightfully go to 
 war against the Chinese for administering their own laws on persons 
 voluntarily coming within their jurisdiction." 
 
 And in the treaty concluded with Siam in 1833, and ratified 
 by the Senate two years later it was agreed: "Merchants 
 of the United States trading in the Kingdom of Siam shall 
 respect and follow the laws and customs of the country in 
 all points." It is hardly to JDe doubted that the decision of 
 the Americans in submitting to Chinese jurisdiction in the 
 Terranova case, represented fairly accurately the state of 
 American public opinion on the rights of Americans in 
 China. 
 
 A few weeks later the English reversed the Terranova 
 precedent in the case of some sailors who were accused of 
 killing some Chinese in a melee. The British authorities 
 declined to surrender the sailors, but previous to 1821, they 
 had yielded to Chinese jurisdiction in many similar in- 
 stances.^^ 
 
 The next two decades of the history of American rela- 
 tions with China mark a gradual displacement of this policy 
 of submission by one more in harmony with the rising power 
 of the young nation. Indeed, as one observes the rising tide 
 of national consciousness in the American traders after 
 1822, one is reminded of the conversation recorded by Major 
 Shaw, the first American consul at Canton, in his journal 
 during his first visit. ^^ After Shaw had concluded a certain 
 bargain with a Chinese, the haggling having extended over 
 several days, the merchant asked: 
 
 ''You are not Englishman?" 
 
THE FOUNDATION OF AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA 89 
 
 "No." 
 
 "But you speak English word, and when you first come, 
 I can no tell difference; but now I understand very well 
 When I speak Englishman his price, he say 'So much, — take 
 it, — let alone.' I tell him, 'No, my friend, I give you so 
 much.' He look at me — 'Go to hell, you damned rascal; 
 what! you come here — set price my goods?' Truly, Massa 
 Typan, I see very well you no hap Englishman. All China- 
 man very much love your country." 
 
 "Thus far," writes Shaw, "it may be supposed the fel- 
 low's remarks pleased me. Justice obliges me to add his 
 conclusion: 'All men come first time China very good 
 gentlemen, all same you. I think two three times more you 
 come Canton, you make all same Englishman too.' " 
 
 This prophecy was never entirely fulfilled, for the Ameri- 
 cans found that their policy, while not always flattering to 
 national vanity and often differing widely from the spirit of 
 those other American pioneers who fought their way across 
 the American continent, was very profitable in China, and a 
 useful means of obtaining special favors. 
 
 During the entire period before the treaty of 1844, the 
 Americans in Canton were left entirely without instructions 
 from the Government of the United States. No official 
 comment was ever made on the Terranova case. In 1822 
 President Monroe gave a letter addressed to the Emperor 
 of China to an American merchant, and John Quincy Adams, 
 as Secretary of State, addressed a letter to the Viceroy of 
 Canton.-" Neither letter, so far as is known, was ever 
 accepted. 
 
 BIBLIOGEAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. Floyd EepoTt on Oregon, Eeports of Committees 45 :16-2 ; Annals 
 
 of Congress, 17-2, pp. 398 ; 418, 423, 588-6. 
 
 2. "Personal Eeminiscences, with Eecollections of China," by 
 
 Eobert Bennett Forbes (3d ed., Boston, 1892). The addenda 
 gives many details of the organization and history of Eusscll 
 and Company. 
 
 3. "Sketch of the Life of D. W. C. Olyphant," by Eev. Thatcher 
 
 Thayer (New York, 1852); Hunter's "Fan Kwae"; Barrett's 
 "Old Merchants of New York." 
 
90 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 4. Sessional Papers (1821) Vol. 7. 
 
 5. "Foreign Commerce of the United States," by J. Smith Hoinans 
 
 (New York, 1857), table, p. 181. 
 
 6. Hunt's Merchants Magazine, Vol. 11 (July -Dec., 1844), table, 
 
 p. 55. 
 
 7. Trade statistics for the period before 1840; Pitkin; Seybert's 
 
 Statistical Annals of the U. S. ; an exhaustive analysis in Ses- 
 sional Papers, 1821, Vol. 7, and in Parliamentary Papers, 1830, 
 Vols. 5 and 6, in which the American trade is somewhat exag- 
 gerated for the purpose of making a case against the East 
 India Company monopoly; Report of the Secretary of the 
 Treasury, July 1, 1840, H. Doc. 248, 26-1 ; see also H. Doc. 35, 
 27-3; and, Hunt's Merchants Magazine. 
 
 8. Madison Papers (Lib. of Congress), Vol. XXXV, May 27, 1809, 
 
 A. B. Woodward to Madison. 
 
 9. Jefferson Papers (Lib. of Congress), Jefferson to Gallatin, July 
 
 25, and Aug. 15, 1808. 
 
 10. Barrett's "Old Merchants of New York," Vol. 3, pp. 6-10. 
 
 11. Paullin's "American Naval Vessels in the Orient." 
 
 12. Shaw's Journal; and, "Voyages," by Richard J. Cleveland, New 
 
 York, 1855, p. 72 ; China Review, Vol. 5, p. 152. 
 
 13. Niles' Register, April 23, 1825. 
 
 14. Canton Consular Letters (approximate date, 1815). 
 
 15. H. Doc. 71, 26-2, Nov. 1, 1821, Wilcocks to Adams. 
 
 16. Miscellaneous Notices, by Sir Geo. T. Staunton, London, 1822, 
 
 1850, pp. 409-10. 
 
 17. North American Review, Oct., 1834, pp. 58-68. 
 
 18. See "International Relations with the Chinese Empire," by H. 
 
 B. Morse, London, 1910, Vol. 1, pp. 99-107, for a complete list 
 of the cases of homicide in which the foreigners were accused 
 by the Chinese. 
 
 19. Shaw's Journal, p. 199. 
 
 20. J. Q. Adams Memoirs, Philadelphia, 1875, Vol. 6, p. 491. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE AMERICANS AND THE ANGLO-CHINESE WAR 
 
 In the conclusion of the first American treaty with China 
 two series of actions converge: on the one hand the policy 
 of the Americans in China towards both Chinese and Brit- 
 ish ; and, on the other, the slowly awakening interest of the 
 Government of the United States in Chinese affairs. Until 
 very shortly before the decision to negotiate a treaty the 
 one had very little relation to the other. 
 
 Before 1840 the American Government assumed towards 
 its citizens resident in China an attitude not very dissimilar 
 to that taken by the Chinese towards their own emigres: 
 Let them shift for themselves. The merchants in Canton, 
 thus left to themselves, and not at all protesting at the 
 policy of the government, adopted a course in which they 
 had perfected themselves — that of conciliation — and in the 
 main they prospered. From the execution of Terranova to 
 the beginning of 1839 the annals of Chinese- American rela- 
 tions were quite uneventful. ' 
 
 Just as in all frontier communities, so at Canton, men 
 possessed influence or hot according to their abilities. Wil- 
 cocks, Ammidon, Russell and Gushing were acknowledged 
 leaders. In the third decade of the century Gushing was 
 credited with having been the most influential of all 
 foreigners among the Chinese. 
 
 Taking advantage of a rice famine in Canton in 1825, 
 and utilizing his intimate friendship with the hong mer- 
 chant Houqua, Gushing secured a reduction in the tonnage 
 dues on ships laden with rice coming to Canton. Whereas 
 other ships had to pay the full tonnage tax, ranging from 
 $3000 to $6000, whether full or empty, "rice-ships" were to 
 pay only about $1150. After 1833 these were admitted 
 
 91 
 
92 AMERICANS IN EAStERN ASIA 
 
 entirely free. This arrangement was, to the Americans 
 especially, a substantial benefit because they had an even 
 greater difficulty than the English in finding cargoes for 
 import which could be absorbed in the Chinese market, and 
 also because the regular tonnage dues fell heaviest on the 
 smallest ships, and the Americans at that time were still 
 employing relatively small vessels.^ 
 
 The dissolution of the East India Company monopoly 
 caused a ripple in the tide of American affairs, but hardly 
 more. The removal of the overshadowing 'Company' made 
 way for the rise and the increased prestige of independent 
 firms, an advantage which some of the American firms were 
 in a position to seize. In the fresh competition which fol- 
 lowed the advent of many new firms and individuals, the 
 Americans fared well, having gone through their period of 
 financial difficulties ten years earlier. The Lord Napier 
 incident caused a brief stopping of the trade, which the 
 Americans accepted with their accustomed complaisance.* 
 
 The national antipathies which had separated the 
 Americans and the English during so much of the earlier 
 period were mitigated as American houses dealt in English 
 manufactured goods, and as banking relations became more 
 intimate. From the dissolution of the Company until 1839 
 the relations between the English and Americans were un- 
 usually cordial. Their interests were much the same. 
 
 The dissolution of the East India Company monopoly 
 (1834) due in part to the extraordinary success of the inde- 
 pendent American merchants was ominous for the continu- 
 ance of peaceful relations between England and China. The 
 dissolution of the monopoly, the release of individual mer- 
 
 *Lord Napier arrived in China in July, 1834, with a royal commission as 
 chief superintendent of British trade. It was expected that he would take the 
 place of the former chairman of the Select Committee of the East India Com- 
 pany, as the representative officer of the British Government, and that he would 
 also exercise some enlarged .iudicial and executive powers which had not belonged 
 to the agents of the East India Company. The manner of his coming to China 
 was sadly bungled and the Chinese refused to receive him, at length stopping 
 the trade to force his retirement to Macao. Lord Napier died at Macao, October 
 11, 1834.= 
 
 Sir George T. Staunton,^ formerly chairman of the Select Committee of the 
 East India Company, stated : "Lord Napier, owing to the unfortunate omission 
 of our government to apply for and obtain from the Chinese authorities in due 
 time his formal recognition, . . . had no offlcial station or public privilege in 
 China whatsoever." 
 
THE AMERICANS AND THE ANGLO-CHINESE WAR 93 
 
 chants from the thrall of the Company restrictions, and 
 the greatly increased competition for the trade, also in- 
 creased the points of irritation between the English and the 
 Chinese. Most ominous was the fact that under the new 
 arrangements, affronts offered to the merchants were no 
 longer to be considered merely as difficulties of a trading 
 company. They became national insults. The blunder of 
 the English foreign office in the manner of sending out Lord 
 Napier created a bad situation. The subsequent policy of 
 Captain Charles Elliot, English superintendent of trade, 
 wavering as he did between a desire to keep the trade going 
 and to vindicate national honor, encouraged the Chinese in 
 the opinion that the mastery of the situation lay with China 
 just as it had in the past when she was able so completely 
 to control the merchants by stopping the trade. 
 
 Another factor which operated against the continuance 
 of peaceful relations was China's fear of England. The 
 Chinese Government had not been unmindful of British 
 aggression in India, Burmah, the Malay Peninsula, and the 
 archipelago. The Manchu dynasty was conscious of the fact 
 that it was really alien to China, and that it was unpopular 
 with large numbers of people, as was proved by the increas- 
 ing number of insurrections. The Peking Government 
 feared that the English might effect a coalition with rebel- 
 lious spirits within the Empire to displace the Manchus. 
 Above these general causes of distrust and irritation lay 
 the immediate facts that each year the exportations of specie 
 to pay for the opium were increasing, and the Chinese 
 economists could see in this only the gradual impoverish- 
 ment of the Empire, while the demoralizing effect of opium 
 smoking was everywhere apparent. The opium trade re- 
 ceived a new impetus in 1836 when, for a few months, it was 
 reported and confidently believed that the trade was to be 
 legalized. After a brief debate the Imperial Government 
 decided against legalization, and instead demanded the ex- 
 pulsion from Canton of nine foreigners, at least one of whom 
 was American; but the foreigners remained. The traders 
 became bolder from month to month, not only increasing 
 
94 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 the sales along the coast but bringing the drug again to 
 Whampoa, and even to Canton. The government accord- 
 ingly stiffened its opposition and a conflict became inevit- 
 able.^ In 1838 the Imperial Government determined to 
 destroy the opium trade, seizing the opportunity to effect 
 at one stroke a moral reform, establish an important 
 economic regulation, and, by no means incidentally, to 
 curb the growing power of the foreigners in South China. 
 While it had always been the fond hope of the Ameri- 
 cans, from the beginnings of their relations with the Chinese 
 Government, so to conduct themselves as to win a preferred 
 place in Chinese estimation, as far as the government 
 was concerned, the policy had not been successful. Before 
 the officials all foreigners were alike, and the Americans, 
 because of their close similarity to the English, were often 
 confused or identified with the latter to a point which 
 effectually thwarted the American effort to maintain good 
 will. The fact that the Chinese officials assumed the Ameri- 
 can share in the opium trade to be very much larger than it 
 was, added to the difficulty and made it certain that when- 
 ever the Chinese assumed the aggressive, the English-speak- 
 ing people would share alike the displeasure of the Chinese. 
 
 Foreigners Imprisoned in the Factories 
 
 On December 12, 1838, the Chinese attempted to execute 
 a Chinese opium dealer in the public square in front of the 
 factories, almost directly under the American flag. Some 
 American and British residents interfered and the execution 
 took place outside the factory boundaries. After the execu- 
 tion a "large and desperate mob was raised by the impru- 
 dence and folly of a small number of English and American 
 young men," to borrow the phrase of the American consul 
 in his official report. The mob, which numbered 7000 or 
 8000, was dispersed by the Chinese authorities and shortly 
 afterward Captain Elliot appeared with about 120 men 
 hastily collected from the ships at Whampoa.^ 
 
 The Chinese persisted. Late in the afternoon, February 
 
THE AMERICANS AND THE ANGLO-CHINESE WAR 95 
 
 26, 1839, when most of the foreigners were absent from the 
 factories taking their recreation, twenty mandarins and a 
 hundred soldiers brought another native opium dealer into 
 the square and executed him without opposition. The 
 reason given was "that all foreigners who are engaged in the 
 traffic of this prohibited article may witness the dreadful 
 punishment inflicted on the natives for their violation of 
 the laws of the Empire." 
 
 "The execution," writes the American consul, "is consid- 
 ered by the foreigners a direct and positive insult." At the 
 suggestion of Captain Elliot, and after consultation with the 
 French and Dutch consuls who agreed on common action. 
 Consul Snow, in protest, hauled down the American flag. 
 "I have," he reported, "on deliberation, concluded not to set 
 mine again until receipt of orders from you (Secretary of 
 State) to that effect, or circumstance should make it proper 
 to do so." ^ 
 
 Three weeks later, March 18, Commissioner Lin who had 
 arrived from Peking with the most explicit orders to destroy 
 the opium trade, issued an ultimatum to the foreigners. 
 Charging them with ingratitude, he pointed to the receiving 
 ships at Lintin which had been repeatedly ordered tiway, 
 asserted that he had the names of the foreign opium mer- 
 chants, and demanded that every chest on the store-ships be 
 surrendered. He gave three days in which to reply, and 
 promised to stop at no half-way measures. He also de- 
 manded that the foreigners give bonds that they would 
 bring no more opium to China and would concede to the 
 Chinese Government the right to punish violations "with 
 the extreme penalty of the law." ^ Consul Shaw reported 
 the request for the opium as a 'just demand.' Commissioner 
 Lin believed that he held in his hand a still invincible 
 weapon — the power to stop the trade. "Let our ports once 
 be closed against you," he declared, "and for what profit can 
 your several nations any longer look? Yet more : our tea and 
 rhubarb, seeing that, should you foreigners be deprived of 
 them, you therein lose the means of preserving life, are 
 without stint granted to you for transportation, year by 
 
96 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 year, beyond the seas. Favors never have been greater." 
 Consequently when the foreigners attempted parleys and 
 promised compromises he stopped the trade (March 22). 
 Five days later the compradores and coolies were withdrawn 
 from the factories and the following day, all the streets, ex- 
 cept one, leading to the square, were walled up. The for- 
 eigners became prisoners ; soldiers surrounded them on land, 
 and war junks cut off their access to the river. 
 
 All the foreigners acting together notified Lin, March 
 25, that the settlement of the opium question was to be left 
 entirely with the various consuls and national representa- 
 tives. Consul Snow therefore entered with fear and trem- 
 bling upon duties never delegated to him by his government 
 and never contemplated in his commission. So far as the 
 American merchants were concerned, the consul was put 
 forward for the time as suited their convenience, and as a 
 matter of equal convenience, later discarded.^ 
 
 Snow's not very simple problem was to disentangle 
 American from British affairs to the satisfaction of the 
 Chinese. Fortunately for him, as well as for the American 
 merchants concerned. Captain Elliot, whose policy was to 
 keep the foreigners united against the actions of Lin, was 
 disposed to assume full responsibility for the Indian opium 
 in the hands of the Americans, and it was surrendered to 
 him. Two duties remained for Snow: to prove to Lin that 
 the Americans were not concerned in the trade to an equal 
 extent with the English ; and to settle the disputed question 
 of the nature of the bond which should be given in the future 
 as a pledge of total abstinence from opium trading by 
 American merchants. He positively refused to sign the 
 bond proposed by Lin, referring the question to Washing- 
 ton, in this matter acting in concert with the Dutch, and 
 with the approval of the merchants. Eventually the 
 Americans accepted the bond in a very modified form. The 
 task of making clear the American share in and attitude 
 towards the opium trade in general was more difiicult, but 
 two weeks after the imprisonment had begun in earnest, he 
 was able to report to the State Department: "The Govern- 
 
THE AMERICANS AND THE ANGLO-CHINESE WAR 97 
 
 ment is satisfied, I think, that no opium is grown in our 
 country; that the Americans in the future will not, under 
 any circumstances, engage in the trade/' ^ 
 
 The next question facing the Americans was whether 
 the concert of action hitherto maintained with the other 
 nations, should be continued. The delivery of the opium 
 was progressing rapidly, and the port was to be opened May 
 5, to permit passage to Macao for those who desired it. 
 Captain Elliot proposed that the foreigners, acting together, 
 .should now turn the tables on the Chinese and withdraw 
 from Canton to Macao, thus stopping the trade on their 
 side, as Lin had stopped it for the Chinese. The English 
 had tried such a policy before and it had been successful. 
 It was argued that this was a suitable time to convince the 
 Chinese that they were quite as dependent on the trade as 
 were the foreigners. ^^ 
 
 But the American merchants * were of a different mind. 
 From the day when the English withdrew from Canton 
 the foreign nations went their separate ways, and fortu- 
 nately or unfortunately, according to the point of view, 
 each nation was compelled, individually, to assume for its 
 actions the responsibility which the Americans, at least, had 
 been hitherto more or less disposed to ignore or shift. 
 
 "The British residents," wrote Commander George C. 
 Read (May 28) of the U. S. East India Squadron which 
 had arrived at Macao a month earlier, "are evidently 
 displeased with the course our countrymen have adopted." ^^ 
 
 The displeasure of the English did not continue long for 
 it was-soon discovered that the presence of the Americans 
 at Canton was of very great assistance to the English in 
 getting out the cargoes which had been piling up during the 
 winter. 
 
 An American merchant, then the manager of Russell and 
 Company, many years afterward stated, in language which 
 no doubt faithfully reflects the policy of the Americans: 
 "When the English left Canton, Elliot himself personally 
 begged Russell and Company to follow his countrymen, 
 
 *For the American share in the opium trade see Chapter vi. 
 
98 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 saying, 'If your house goes, all will go, and we shall soon 
 bring these rascally Chinese to terms.' I replied that I had 
 not come to China for health or pleasure, and that I should 
 remain at my post as long as I could sell a yard of goods or 
 buy a pound of tea; that we Yankees had no queen to 
 guarantee our losses, etc. Elliot replied that he would soon 
 make Canton too hot for us." ^^ 
 
 For the next few months the Americans did a land-office 
 business. Freights between Hongkong and Canton were 
 higher than from Hongkong to America, and the Americans 
 carried the goods in and out for the English, sometimes 
 going through the formality of evading the law by loading 
 ships with English goods at Hongkong, taking them over to 
 Manila, and bringing them back to Canton without break- 
 ing bulk. Every sort of vessel that could float was pressed 
 into service including not a few, it may be feared of the 
 idle English fleet now transferred to American ownership in 
 very informal ways, and in no way entitled, according to 
 American maritime law, to fly the American flag.^^ 
 
 The gentleman above quoted wrote that afterwards 
 Captain Elliot said to him at Macao: "My dear Forbes, 
 the Queen owes you many thanks for not taking my advice 
 as to leaving Canton. We have got in all our goods, and got 
 out a good supply of teas and silk. If the American houses 
 had not remained at their posts, the English would have 
 gone in. I had no power to prevent them from going. Now 
 the trade of the season is over, and a large force at hand, we 
 can bring the Chinese to terms." 
 
 The momentous events of the three following years, so 
 far as they concern Anglo-Chinese relations, can be narrated 
 with brevity. The Chinese took the offensive, ordering the 
 English from Macao whither they had retreated from Can- 
 ton. The latter in turn, moved to Hongkong, living for a 
 time on shipboard, but gradually forming a settlement on 
 the island. A blockade of the river was established by the 
 English the next year (June 28, 1840), after the season's 
 trade had been cared for, and the trade was reopened the 
 the following year for a few weeks to take care of the 
 
THE AMERICANS AND THE ANGLO-CHINESE WAR 99 
 
 accumulated produce. So far as Canton was concerned, the 
 war ended May 27, 1841. Fifteen months later, August 29, 
 1842, the Treaty of Nanking was signed. The following 
 year, October 8, 1843, a supplementary treaty which in- 
 cluded important additional items, as well as a tariff, was 
 signed at the Bogue. 
 
 The Americans Petition Congress 
 
 In order to bring the narration of other events important 
 to the Americans in China up to 1844, when the American 
 treaty was negotiated, it is necessary to review the request 
 of the American merchants to Congress for the appoint- 
 ment of a commercial agent ; the condition of public senti- 
 ment in the United States; and the action of Commodore 
 Kearny in securing the assent of the Chinese to "most- 
 favored-nation" treatment for the Americans. 
 
 After the English had left Canton the Americans ad- 
 dressed a memorial to Congress (May 25, 1839) explaining 
 the American share in the opium trade, asking for the 
 appointment of a commercial agent to be sent to China to 
 negotiate a commercial treaty, and asking also for the dis- 
 patch to Chinese waters of a suitable naval force for the 
 protection of American lives and property.^* 
 
 The memorial, after summarizing the cause of the ag- 
 gressive measures adopted by Commissioner Lin, proposed: 
 
 "We would, therefore, with all deference and respect express our 
 opinions that the United States Government should take immediate 
 measures; and, if deemed advisable, to act in concert with the gov- 
 ernments of Great Britain, France and Holland, or either of them, 
 in their endeavors to establish commercial relations with this empire 
 upon a safe and honorable footing, such as exists between all friendly 
 powers; and by direct appeal to the Imperial Government at Peking, 
 to obtain a compliance with the following among other important 
 demands :" 
 
 These demands included: (1) Permission for foreign 
 envoys to reside near the court at Peking with the usual 
 diplomatic privileges. (2) Promulgation of a fixed tariff. 
 (3) A system of bonding warehouses, or some regulations 
 
100 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 for the transshipment of goods for reexport. (4) Liberty of 
 trading at other port or ports in China. (5) Compensation 
 for losses caused by stoppage of legal trade and guarantees 
 for the future. And the further provision (6) ''That until 
 the Chinese laws are distinctly made known and recognized, 
 the punishment for wrongs committed by foreigners upon 
 the Chinese, or others, shall not be greater than is appli- 
 cable to the like offenses by the laws of the United States, 
 or England; nor shall any punishment be inflicted by 
 the Chinese authorities upon any foreigner, until the 
 guilt of the party shall have been fairly and clearly 
 proved." 
 
 When this memorial was prepared the opium had been 
 surrendered to Captain Elliot who had thus become respon- 
 sible for the payment for it, and the drug had been de- 
 stroyed. The English had withdrawn from Cantoi* and it 
 was evident that they would soon begin hostilities. It was 
 also assumed, for it had been a matter of discussion for 
 years, that when the peace had once been broken it would 
 not be restored until other ports in China had been opened 
 to trade, and some assurances had been given as a basis for 
 stable diplomatic relations. On other matters as well the 
 time was fast approaching for a general settlement. The~ 
 memorial pointed out that the recent action of the authori- 
 ties had been indiscriminate and unjust in that it had made 
 no effort to differentiate between the innocent and the 
 guilty, and had shown scant regard for facts and evidence. 
 The present action of the Chinese Government must be 
 resented or in a short time all foreign trade would be driven 
 out. In conclusion the Americans express the 'candid con- 
 viction' that the appearance of a naval force from the 
 United States, England and France upon the coast of China 
 would, without bloodshed, obtain from the government 
 proper acknowledgments and treaties. The significant fea- 
 tures of the memorial were: absence of bitterness towards 
 the Chinese; proposals for joint action with England; and 
 the confident expectation that peaceful measures would 
 suffice. 
 
THE AMERICANS AND THE ANGLO-CHINESE WAR 101 
 
 The Americans had taken their imprisonment with good 
 humor. There had been some alarm at the outset of the 
 confinement but the intentions of Lin soon appeared ag- 
 gressive only in the sense that he was determined to enforce 
 a policy of non-intercourse. He intended no bodily harm to 
 the Americans. Prisoners they certainly were but the sup- 
 plies, while nominally cut off, were actually smuggled in 
 each night, and one of those confined afterwards reported 
 that the prisoners suffered more during their confinement 
 from over-eating and lack of exercise than from want of 
 any necessity of life.^^ The arrival, late in April, of Com- 
 mander Read with the Columbia and John Adams at Macao, 
 Had been an assurance to the entire community, and yet the 
 Americans had felt so much better able to handle the situa- 
 tion at Canton, unassisted, that the consul had asked Read 
 to delay coming to Canton until after the affair was 
 settled.^^ 
 
 "It would be a fete gratifying, I doubt not," wrote the Chaplain 
 of the Squadron, "to all the officers of our ship from the highest to 
 the lowest to force the Bogue, and to demand without delay the 
 Americans now held within their premises at Canton. But the ap- 
 prehension is that, as their numbers are comparatively so small and 
 a mob of a numerous populace is ever so ready to do the bidding of 
 the reckless and the abandoned, our approach might be attended with 
 danger from the rabble at Canton. The authorities themselves have 
 said, all that they have to do for the destruction of those now within 
 their power is to allow the mob to do their wishes. And there may be 
 truth in all this, as there is a general impression among the lower 
 classes of the Chinese at Canton that the foreign factories are filled 
 with the precious metals, and that the plunder were well worth the 
 sacrifice of the heads of a few 'foreign devils' that have the custody 
 of it." 
 
 Probably the sudden appearance of the American naval 
 .vessels had a more important influence in dissuading Com- 
 missioner Lin from occupying Macao in such a way as to 
 prevent the English from carrying out their plans to with- 
 draw to that city as soon as the opium was delivered. ^'^ 
 
 It was not so much the action of the Chinese as that of 
 the British which moved the Americans to ask for a com- 
 missioner to negotiate a treaty. Left to themselves, the 
 
102 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Americans would have been content with the old arrange- 
 ments or at least they would not have moved to change 
 them. They were even entirely willing — provided the mer- 
 chants of other nations would agree to a similar course — to 
 forego the opium trade, as the price of their future safety 
 and comfort. Indeed they would have welcomed the end 
 of the opium traffic, for its suppression would mean better 
 markets for American produce. But now that the house of 
 cards was tumbling, and the benevolent despotism under 
 which they had been living was in the way of being altered, 
 they not unnaturally wished the United States to be repre- 
 sented in the coming settlement. 
 
 Congress Becomes Interested 
 
 When Congress took up the discussion of the Anglo- 
 Chinese War in 1840, American public opinion was better 
 prepared than at any time previously to express itself. The 
 commercial interest in China, while still confined to the 
 Atlantic seaboard, had broadened. Whereas twenty-five 
 years before the steady drain of specie caused by the trade 
 had created popular prejudice against it, now the growth of 
 manufacturing in the North which looked to the South for 
 supplies of raw cotton, tended to arouse a general interest in 
 the markets of China. The reports of the American mis- 
 sionaries who had already been at work in China for a 
 decade had stimulated in the United States an ever grow- 
 ing philanthropic interest in the Empire and their reports 
 on the evils of the opium trade were a powerful factor in 
 shaping public opinion. The American people were also 
 alert to find in the conflict merely another phase of world- 
 wide British aggression with which they had been made 
 familiar in the War of 1812, the memory of which was still 
 green. The tumultuous events of 1839 at Canton were fol- 
 lowed in the United States with lively interest. 
 
 Early in January, 1840, the memorial of the American 
 merchants at Canton asking for naval protection and the 
 appointment of a commissioner to negotiate a treaty was 
 
THE AMERICANS AND THE ANGLO-CHINESE WAR 103 
 
 presented to the House by Abbott Lawrence of Massa- 
 chusetts,^^ 
 
 A resolution * passed in the House February 7, 1840, 
 asking the President for information ''respecting the condi- 
 tion of the citizens of the United States doing business 
 ■during the past year in China; the state of the American 
 trade with that country; and the interests of the people 
 and commerce of the United States, as affected by the recent 
 measures of the Chinese Government for the suppression of 
 the contraband or forcible introduction of opium into China. 
 Also whether the British Government had given notice to 
 that of the United States of a purpose to blockade the ports 
 of China, or of other hostile intentions towards that 
 Government." ^^ 
 
 In April a large group of Boston and Salem merchants 
 and ship owners interested in the China trade, apparently 
 fearing that Congress might be spurred to precipitate action, 
 also memorialized Congress, urging caution. They submit- 
 ted some additional information and expressed the fear that 
 while the attention of the Chinese Government was engaged 
 in the war the usual efforts to suppress the pirates along the 
 coast would be neglected, and that American shipping, 
 which was usually slightly armed and carried on with small 
 crews, would be endangered. They therefore approved the 
 request of their correspondents in China for an American 
 naval force in Chinese waters. But beyond taking this 
 action, they hoped that the government would proceed with 
 great deliberation. They would even deprecate giving to 
 any naval commander any powers to interfere in the conflict 
 between England and China, or to enter into any diplomatic 
 relations with the Chinese. "The result of more than one 
 attempt," they stated, "of our British neighbors to improve 
 their position with the Chinese has been upon each occa- 
 sion the imposition of further restraint upon all foreigners 
 and such, we believe, would follow any negotiations on the 
 part of the Americans based upon the established usages 
 among other nations." -" This memorial, signed as it was 
 
 *Keport submitted February 25, 1840. 
 
104 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 by many who had already spent years in China, expressed 
 the wisdom of age as compared with the wisdom of youth, 
 and the advice was accepted. The East India Squadron, 
 under Commodore Kearny, was dispatched to China, but no 
 further step was taken. 
 
 It is interesting to observe in this memorial the inference 
 that the British aggression in China, so far from being re- 
 garded as an opportunity by the Americans, was really 
 looked upon as an embarrassment. 
 
 Public sentiment in the United States at the time was 
 clearly reflected in the following episode in the House 
 (March 16, 1840) when Caleb Cushing rose to interrogate 
 the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and to 
 correct some 'misapprehensions' which appeared to 
 exist abroad as to the intentions of the United States in 
 China.-i 
 
 After recalling the fact that he had proposed the resolu- 
 tion calling upon the President for information with refer- 
 ence to China, and that the memorial of the Canton mer- 
 chants had been referred to the Committee on Foreign 
 Relations, he said: 
 
 "I am somewhat disturbed to learn, through the intelligence 
 brought by the Great Western, that these movements here are con- 
 strued in England as indicating a disposition on the part of the 
 American Government 'to join heart and hand with the British Gov- 
 ernment, and endeavor to obtain commercial treaties from the au- 
 thorities in China.' Now as for myself, I wish to say that this is a 
 great misconception, if it be not a wilful perversion, of what is con- 
 templated here. I have, it is true, thought that the present contin- 
 gency, — when the Americans in Canton, and they almost or quite 
 alone, have manifested a proper respect for the laws and public 
 rights of the Chinese Empire, in honorable contrast with the out- 
 rageous misconduct of the English there, — and when the Chinese 
 Government, grateful for the upright deportment of the Americans, 
 has manifested the best possible feeling toward them, — I have thought 
 that these circumstances afforded a favorable opportunity to en- 
 deavor to put the American trade with China on a just and stable 
 footing for the future. 
 
 "But God forbid that I should entertain the idea of cooperating 
 with the British Government in the purpose, if purpose it has, of 
 upholding the base cupidity and violence and high-handed infraction 
 of all law, human and divine, which have characterized the operation 
 of the British, individually and collectively, in the seas of China. 
 
THE AMERICANS AND THE ANGLO-CHINESE WAR 105 
 
 ... I trust that the idea will no longer be entertained in England 
 that she will receive aid or countenance from the United States in 
 that nefarious enterprise." 
 
 Thus began the myth in the United States, at a time 
 when the Americans at Canton were riding rough-shod over 
 Commissioner Lin's embargo on English trade, and smug- 
 ghng the English cargoes for the season, both in and out 
 of the port, that the American in China was an angel of 
 light. This complacency is entirely comparable with the 
 contemporaneous misrepresentations in England of Chinese 
 ethics and foreign policy. 
 
 Within a year three reports were laid before Congress; 
 a report of the Secretary of State, February 25, 1840, a re- 
 port of the Secretary of the Treasury on the China trade, 
 July 1, 1840,-^ and a supplementary report of the Secretary 
 of State, January 25, 1841,-^ the last in response to a request 
 of John Quincy Adams, chairman of the House Committee 
 on Foreign Relations, for '^copies of all documents in the 
 Department of State or other departments, showing the 
 origin of any political relations between the United States 
 and the Empire of China; the first appointment of a consul 
 to reside at or near Canton; whether such consul, or any 
 subsequently appointed, has ever been received or recog- 
 nized in that capacity ; and the present relations between 
 the Government of the United States and that of the Celes- 
 tial Empire." 
 
 These three reports and the two memorials above dis- 
 cussed comprise a documentary history of American rela- 
 tions with China, giving in great detail the Terranova 
 incident of 1821, and the events of 1839. 
 
 Public sentiment ran strongly to disapproval of the Brit- 
 ish action. It is notable that this opinion was by no means 
 confined to religious and philanthropic circles, but that it 
 extended to commercial interests. ''China has a perfect 
 right to regulate the character of her imports," -^ asserted 
 a writer in Hunt's Merchants Magazine. The leading 
 article in the same magazine for January, 1841, had pointed 
 out that while the importations of opium from India into 
 
106 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 China had created a favorable condition for English com- 
 merce, it had not been beneficial to Americans. There was 
 a general feeling that the extinction of the opium trade 
 would help the commercial interests of the United States, as 
 well as the moral and physical welfare of China. American 
 and Chinese interests were in this, as well as in other points, 
 identical. 
 
 The attitude of John Quincy Adams on the China ques- 
 tion is especially worth noting for several reasons. He had 
 been Secretary of State at the time of the execution of 
 Terranova, and while he had refrained from expressing an 
 opinion on the action of the Americans, he had been made 
 familiar with an aspect of Chinese- American relations little 
 understood or appreciated by those who were discussing the 
 question in 1840-43. He was also the chairman of the Com- 
 mittee of Foreign Affairs, and at the same time he was inti- 
 mately acquainted with the Boston and Salem merchants. 
 A clue to the way Adams' mind was working is to be noted 
 in his remarks on presenting for a third time (December 16, 
 1840) his resolution asking for the supplementary report on 
 the state of American political relations with the Celestial 
 Empire. He recounted an incident ^^ which, although not 
 then made public, should be noted here. Snow had reported, 
 after the English had withdrawn from Canton, and while 
 the Americans were enjoying such unbounded prosperity 
 through their almost complete monopoly of the trade, and 
 were in more or less conflict with the Chinese authorities 
 over the signing of the bond, and the importation of British 
 goods : 
 
 "Correspondence with this government is exceedingly troublesome, 
 for the replies to the Commissioner's edicts are seen by the Kwang- 
 Chow-foo (Prefect) for the purpose of correcting any error that may 
 be made in the translation, as any unguarded expression would bring 
 him into certain trouble. The reply, of which I now send you a copy, 
 was returned by this officer, requesting that I add an expression of 
 gratitude for all favors bestowed upon me by the great Emperor, and 
 likewise a hope for the continuation of the Celestial dynasty's trade 
 with my nation, placing the Celestial dynasty about an inch higher 
 on the paper than my nation, thereby admitting their superiority. I 
 declined doing either, and sent it as originally written. These trifles 
 
THE AMERICANS AND THE ANGLO-CHINESE WAR 107 
 
 serve to show their determination never to permit a foreign nation to 
 presume to an equality with their own." 
 
 This, thought Adams, was the 'true ground' of the war 
 then raging between Great Britain and China — 'this boasted 
 superiority above every nation on earth.' Without going 
 into a discussion of the objects and causes of the English 
 war with China, it must be recognized that whatever may 
 have been the immediate issues, Adams was right as to the 
 fundamental instability of any relationship where English- 
 men — or Americans — were called upon to submit their lives 
 and property unreservedly to a despotism, however benevo- 
 lent that despotism might ordinarily be in practice. 
 
 Adams made a careful study of both the American Gov- 
 ernment reports and the Enghsh blue books on the situation 
 in China,-*^ and in December, 1841, in a lecture before the 
 Massachusetts Historical Society, he said: 
 
 "The fundamental principle of the Chinese Empire is anti-com- 
 mercial. ... It admits no obligation to hold commercial intercourse 
 with others. It utterly denies the equality of other nations with itself, 
 and even their independence. It holds itself to be the center of the 
 terraqueous globe, equal to the heavenly host, and all other nations 
 with whom it has any relations, political or commercial, as outside 
 tributary barbarians reverently submissive to the will of its despotic 
 chief. It is upon this principle, openly avowed and inflexibly main- 
 tained, that the principal maritime nations of Europe for several 
 centuries, and the United States of America from the time of their 
 acknowledged independence, have been content to hold commercial in- 
 tercourse with the Empire of China, 
 
 'Tt is time that this enormous outrage upon the rights of human 
 nature, and upon the first principle of the rights of nations should 
 cease. ... 
 
 "This is the truth, and, I apprehend, the only question at issue 
 between the governments and nations of Great Britain and China. 
 It is a general, but I believe altogether mistaken opinion that the 
 quarrel is merely for certain chests of opium imported by British 
 merchants into China, and seized by the Chinese Government for 
 having been imported contrary to law. This is a mere incident to the 
 dispute; but no more the cause of war, than the throwing overboard 
 of the tea in the Boston harbor was the cause of the North American 
 Revolution. 
 
 "The cause of war is the koiowf — the arrogant and insupportable 
 pretensions of China, that she will hold commercial intercourse with 
 the rest of mankind, not upon terms of equal reciprocity, but upon 
 the insulting and degrading forms of relation between lord and vas- 
 sal." '' 
 
108 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 • "The excitement of public opinion and feeling by the 
 delivery of this lecture," Adams recorded in his journal, 
 "far exceeds any expectation that I had formed." Dr. John 
 Palfry, editor of the North Ainerican Review, declined to 
 print it as an article in the magazine. 
 
 Rev. Peter Parker, M. D., the first American medical 
 missionary to China, visited the United States at this time 
 and was very actively engaged in arousing and educating 
 public opinion on the China question. He laid the matter 
 before President Tyler and was frequently in touch with 
 John Quincy Adams. In March, 1841, he urged that the 
 United States extend its good offices to mediate between 
 England and the Celestial Empire. Subsequently Parker 
 asked Adams if he would consider the position of commis- 
 sioner to China, to which the latter replied that he might, 
 if the offer came from authorized quarters, but he thought 
 that a formal mission at that time (June 2, 1842) was inex- 
 pedient."^ ,V 
 
 Commodore Keaeny's Most- Favored-Nation Agreement 
 
 Six weeks after the signing of the Treaty of Nanking, 
 between England and China, Commodore Kearny, being 
 under the impression that the treaty had not yet been con- 
 cluded, addressed the following letter to the Governor of 
 Canton: ^9 
 
 "The undersigned is desirous that the attention of the Imperial 
 Government might be called with respect to the commercial interests 
 of the United States, and he hopes that the importance of their trade 
 will receive consideration, and their citizens, in that matter, be placed 
 upon the same footing as the merchants- of the nation most favored." 
 
 A week later Kiying replied : 
 
 Decidedly it shall not be permitted that American merchants shall 
 come to have merely a dry stick (that is, their interests shall be at- 
 tended to). I, the Governor, will not be otherwise disposed than to 
 look up to the heart of the great Emperor in his compassionate regard 
 towards those men from afar, that Chinese and foreigners with faith 
 and justice may be mutually united, and forever enjoy reciprocal 
 tranquillity, and that it be granted to each of the resident merchants 
 
THE AMERICANS AND THE ANGLO-CHINESE WAR 109 
 
 to obtain profit, and to the people to enjoy life and peace, and uni- 
 versally to participate in the blessings of great prosperity, striving to 
 have the same mind." 
 
 Commodore Kearny returned to Macao in January, 
 1843, after a cruise to Manila, and heard rumors that only 
 English vessels would be allowed to trade in the newly 
 opened ports. In a private conversation Admiral Sir 
 Thomas Cochrane told him that "the other nations must 
 look out for themselves." Kearny therefore took opportun- 
 ity, while communicating with the Governor about the 
 settlement of some claims, to urge the necessity for most- 
 favored-nation treatment to Americans in China. The 
 Governor, under the misapprehension that Kearny had 
 authority to settle the matter for the United States, replied 
 that it was only necessary for him to await the arrival 
 of the commissioners from the Emperor to make an agree- 
 ment with reference to the trade ''and when some plan is 
 adopted, then a personal interview may be held with your 
 honor, the commodore, and face to face, the relation of the 
 two countries may be arranged, and the same reported to 
 the Emperor." 
 
 The American officer thought he detected in the reply of 
 the Governor an assumption of superiority for China as 
 compared with the United States and therefore replied, dis- 
 claiming that the United States would come to China in the 
 attitude of begging a favor. 
 
 "The commodore also avails of this communication again to say," 
 he went on, "that what His Imperial Majesty grants to the traders 
 from other countries, his own sovereign will demand for his mer- 
 chants." 
 
 Kearny therefore urged the appointment of commis- 
 sioners to negotiate a treaty. To this the Governor replied, 
 withdrawing a little from his former cordiality, and assuring 
 the commodore that anything so formal as a treaty was 
 quite unnecessary. 
 
 On September 20, 1843, the consular agent at Canton 
 notified the Secretary of State ^" that the trade had been 
 
110 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 thrown open to all foreigners on an equal footing. He 
 stated: ''Our countrymen have now all the privileges 
 granted to the British, and the feeling of the Government 
 and people of China continues favorably disposed towards 
 Americans." 
 
 Credit for persuading the Chinese to open the ports to 
 all nations on equal terms was claimed by the English Pleni- 
 potentiary, Sir Henry Pottinger,^^ but a subsequent discov- 
 ery at Canton placed the matter in a different light. The 
 Chinese text of Article VIII of the English treaty of 1843, 
 when translated back into English, was found to be some- 
 what different from the original English text. It contains 
 the following explanation : 
 
 "Formerly the mereliants of every foreign nation were permitted 
 to trade at the single port of Canton only, but last year it was 
 agreed at Nanking, that if the Emperor should ratify the treaty, the 
 merchants of the various nations of Europe should be allowed to pro- 
 ceed to the four ports of Foochow, ISTingpo, Amoy and Shanghai for 
 the purposes of trade, to which the English were not to make any 
 objections. . . ." ^ 
 
 From this it seems clear that neither to Sir Henry Pot- 
 tinger nor to Commodore Kearny, but to the Chinese them- 
 selves belongs the credit of having opened their ports freely 
 to other nations. 
 
 In the light of subsequent history this fact becomes 
 especially interesting for the most-favored-nation clause, as 
 applied to China became what is really the foundation of 
 the more widely famed "open-door" policy. This policy, 
 while obviously to the advantage of the Americans, was, 
 equally clearly, the deliberate choice of the Chinese them- 
 selves. The Chinese have adopted a similar policy repeat- 
 edly in more recent times. 
 
 This promise of most-favored-nation treatment, the in- 
 troduction of which into Chinese international affairs in 
 the form of an iron-bound treaty agreement, is due pri- 
 marily to Commodore Kearny, became in practice something 
 far more than a block by which the door to commercial 
 privileges could be held open. The clause had not been in- 
 
THE AMERICANS AND THE ANGLO-CHINESE WAR 111 
 
 serted in the Treaty of Nanking but it did appear in the 
 British Supplementary Treaty of 1843, negotiated a few 
 months after Kearny left China, and it has been included in 
 every subsequent treaty engagement with a foreign Power. 
 The open door of equal commercial opportunity, which it 
 guaranteed, was one thing, and entirely desirable for China, 
 but quite different was the fact that it became a device by 
 which every nation thereafter could secure for itself any 
 privilege which had been extorted by some other Power 
 from China by force, or tricked from her by fraud, without 
 having to assume the moral responsibility for the method 
 by which the concession had been obtained. 
 
 Usually in after years when China took a hand in the 
 international game she must play alone, against the entire 
 and united company of Powers, a trick taken by her most 
 unscrupulous opponent counted equally for the benefit of 
 all. 
 
 The Mission Created 
 
 After the news of the signing of the Treaty of Nanking 
 had been received, President' Tyler (December 30, 1842) 
 addressed to Congress a special message written by Daniel 
 Webster, Secretary of State, dealing at length with the sit- 
 uation in the Sandwich Islands and in China. The message 
 summarized the reports of the opening of new Chinese ports 
 to British commerce but expressed ignorance as to whether 
 these ports would also be open to the trade of other nations. 
 It noted that the American trade while subject to great 
 fluctuations, had reached as much as $9,000,000 annually, 
 and would doubtless be greatly increased by means of 
 access to the new ports. 
 
 "Being of the opinion," said the message, "that the commercial 
 interests of the United States connected with China require at the 
 present time a degree of vigilance such as there is no agent of this 
 government on the spot to bestow, I recommend to Congress to make 
 appropriation for the compensation of a commissioner to reside in 
 China, to exercise a watchful care over the concerns of American citi- 
 zens, and for the protection of their persons and property, empowered 
 to hold intercourse with the legal authorities and ready, under in- 
 
112 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 structions from liis government, should such instructions become 
 necessary and proper hereafter, to address himself to the high func- 
 tionaries of the Empire, or through them to the Emperor himself." ^ 
 
 The President's message proposed a resident commis- 
 sioner, continuously attending to the commercial and diplo- 
 matic affairs. The report on the proposed action by the 
 Committee on Foreign Relations, presented January 24, 
 1843,^^ was much less specific proposing an appropriation of 
 $40,000 to enable the President to accomplish that object, 
 without deeming it necessary to designate the specific rank 
 or character of the agents whom he may employ for that 
 purpose, or more especially to limit the contingent expenses/ 
 which may occur in the process of its accomplishment." 
 This latter provision aroused the suspicions of many who 
 did not have great confidence in President Tyler, and the 
 report was passed (March 3, 1843), in an amended form 
 providing that no person should be employed in the mission 
 for more than $9,000, exclusive of outfit, and that no agent 
 should be appointed without the advice and consent of the 
 Senate. ^^ 
 
 Even this arrangement was not satisfactory to every one. 
 Senator Benton strenuously objected to the mission as 
 being "wholly personal and invented for the indemnification 
 to one person, for vacating his place for the benefit of 
 another. I repeat it," cried Benton, "the mission is not 
 created for the country but invented for one man ; and he is 
 now waiting to take it, and to go up and bump his 
 head nineteen times against the ground in order to pur- 
 chase the privilege of standing up before his Celestial 
 Majesty." 
 
 Senator Benton's remark referred to the rumor that 
 Edward Everett, then minister at the Court of St. James, 
 was to be appointed to the mission, thus creating a place in 
 London for Daniel Webster who was about to resign as 
 Secretary of State. Whatever may have been the facts at 
 the base of the rumor, and Webster denied in a personal 
 letter to Everett that there was any basis for it, the selection 
 of Edward Everett for the mission was evidence of the 
 
THE AMERICANS AND THE ANGLO-CHINESE WAR 113 
 
 extreme importance which was now attached to the estab- 
 lishment of suitable diplomatic relations with China. 
 
 "It is not intended," wrote Webster to Everett, March 10, 1843," 
 "to dazzle the Emperor by show, nor soothe him by presents ; still the 
 mission should be respectable, and the commissioner should have the 
 means proper and necessary to carry forward the undertaking. . . . 
 Mr. Adams came to see me yesterday. He feels the greatest anxiety 
 that you should undertake the China mission which he regards as a 
 most important afiair." 
 
 But Everett declined the nomination, and the post was 
 given to Caleb Gushing of Newburyport, Massachusetts, a 
 member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and a warm 
 supporter of President Tyler. Senator Benton, a bitter 
 partisan in the opposition to the President, described Cush- 
 ing ^'^ as one who had been three times rejected in one day 
 upon nomination for the position of Secretary of the 
 Treasury, and said of him: 
 
 "He had deserted his party to join Mr. Tyler. He worked for 
 him in and out of the House, and even deserted himself to support 
 him — as in the two tariff bills of the current session; for both of 
 which he voted, and then voted against them when vetoed." 
 
 A member of the House described him as the man who 
 "had voted for every bill and then justified every veto." 
 ''Cushing at the time of his appointment was forty-four 
 years old, and had served in the House as a Whig since 
 1834. He was the son of a Newburyport ship owner, an 
 amazingly brilliant lawyer, and probably as familiar with 
 the questions with which he would have to deal in China as 
 any man who could have been selected from public life. The 
 secretary of the mission was Daniel Webster's son, Fletcher. 
 
 BIBLIOGEAPHIOAL NOTES 
 
 1. Forbes' "Personal Reminiscences," p. 338; Hunt's American 
 
 Merchants, Yol. 1, p. 64; Hunter's "Fan Kwae," p. 100; Ses- 
 sional Papers, 1830, Vol. 6, p. 377. 
 
 2. Morse's "International Relations," Yol. 1, pp. 118-44, gives a full 
 
 account of the Napier incident. 
 
 3. Staunton's Miscellaneous Notices, p. 16. 
 
 4. Chinese Repository, Yol. 5, July, 1836, pp. 138-144. 
 
114 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 5. H. Doc. 119 :26-l. Dispatch No. 17, March 5, 1839. 
 
 6. Ihid. 
 
 7. Op. cit, No. 18, Mar. 22. 
 
 8. Op. cit. No. 19, Apr. 19. 
 
 9. Ihid. 
 
 10. Op. cit. No. 20, May 13. 
 
 11. Captains' Letters (Navy Dept.) May 28, 1839, No. 101. 
 
 12. Forbes' "Reminiscences," p. 149. 
 
 13. Ihid., pp. 151, 155. 
 
 14. H. Doc. 40:26-1. 
 
 15. "China and the China Trade," by R. B. Forbes (Boston, 1844) 
 
 p. 49. 
 
 16. "The Flag Ship," by Fitch W. Taylor, New York, 1840. (2 vols.) 
 
 Vol. 2, pp. 110-11. 
 
 17. H. Doc. 119 -.26-1, No. 21, May 22, 1839. 
 
 18. H. Jour. (26-1) p. 189; VIII Cong. Globe, p. 109; H. Doc. 
 
 40:26-1. 
 
 19. H. Jour. 26-1, p. 368; H. Doc. 119:26-1. 
 
 20. H.Jour. 26-1, p. 781; H. Doc. 170:26-1. 
 
 21. VIII Cong. Globe, 26-1, p. 275. 
 
 22. H. Doc. 119 :26-l ; H. Doc. 248 :26-l ; H. Doc. 71 :26-2 ; H. Jour. 
 
 26-2, p. 46. 
 
 23. H. Doc. 71 :26-2. 
 
 24. Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, March, 1843, p. 205. 
 
 25. H. Doc. 119 :26-l. Dispatch 25, Sept. 25, 1839. 
 
 26. John Quincy Adams Memoirs, Vol. 11, p. 30. 
 
 27. Chinese Repository, Vol. 9, May, 1842, p. 281. 
 
 28. "Life and Letters of the Rev. and Hon. Peter Parker, M. D.," 
 
 by Stevens and Marwick (Boston and Chicago, 1896) pp. 1S2-5, 
 220-1 ; Adams Memoirs, Vol. 10, pp. 444-5. 
 
 29. S. Doc. 139 :29-l ; The Kearny correspondence at Canton was 
 
 published with great fullness in this document. 
 
 30. Canton Consular Letters, Vol. 3. 
 
 31. Littell's Living Age, Vol. 4, p. 387, quoting an address made by 
 
 Sir Henry Pottinger. 
 
 32. Chinese Repository, Vol. 12, Mar., 1844, p. 145. (This article, 
 
 as it appears in the treaties published by the Chinese Mari- 
 time Customs, is translated still differently). See also S. Ex. 
 Doc. 67 :28-2, Gushing to Calhoun, Aug. 26, 1844. 
 
 33. H. Doc. 35 :27-3 gives this message in fuller form than Richard- 
 
 son, including the most recent trade statistics. 
 
 34. H. Report 93:27-3. 
 
 35. V. Statutes at Large, 24-28 Cong. Vol. 15, p. 624; H. Rept. 
 
 93 :27-3. XII Cong. Globe, pp. 323, 325, 391. 
 
 36. Webster Papers (Lib. of Congress). 
 
 37. Benton's "Thirty Years' View." Vol. 2, p. 514. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE AMEEICAN SHARE IN THE OPIUM TRADE 
 
 As has already been intimated the Americans entered the 
 opium trade at an early day. They carried the drug to 
 China from both Turkey and India. "Among the produc- 
 tions of Turkey, and Egypt," reads an old consular trade 
 report from Smyrna, "there are many that would answer 
 well for the internal consumption of the United States, or 
 for their foreign expeditions." ^ Opium was mentioned as 
 an article which might be shipped to India with profit, but 
 the Americans quickly learned that the growing market for 
 opium was farther East. The American trade in Turkey 
 opium began as early as 1805, perhaps earlier, when three 
 American brigs, two from Philadelphia and one from Balti- 
 more, cleared from Smyrna with the drug. In that year the 
 Americans took out one hundred and twenty-four cases and 
 fifty-one boxes of the drug. 
 
 Turkey and India Opium 
 
 The trade with Turkey increased, though not very 
 rapidly, during the first three decades of the century. Ves- 
 sels from Boston and Salem appeared in 1806," and there 
 had been one from New York the previous year. Th^ 
 American shipping returns for the year 1823 show the clear- 
 ance of 18 vessels: 12 of Boston; 1 of Salem; 1 of Duxbury; 
 3 of Baltimore and 1 of Philadelphia. The following year 
 there were 17 vessels, 14 of which were from Boston. They 
 carried 1651 cases of opium. The largest amount of this 
 drug reported as exported from Smyrna in any one year 
 before 1830 was 1741 cases and chests. Complete figures are 
 more difficult to obtain after 1828 for shortly before that 
 
 115 
 
116 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 time the Turkey trade was shifted, in part, to Constanti- 
 nople. That the trade was profitable is shown by the fact 
 that one of the special agents employed by the United 
 States at that time to study trade conditions with Turkey 
 with a view to effecting a treaty with the Empire, reported 
 that opium would probably prove to be one of the most 
 profitable items in the trade. 
 
 Direct voyages from Turkey to China were not common 
 after the first few years. The opium was either shipped 
 directly to American ports and then transshipped to China 
 after subtracting the amount necessary for the American 
 market, or else it was transferred to China-bound vessels in 
 English ports. Sometimes, however, the cargoes were trans- 
 shipped from one vessel to another at sea near Gibraltar.^ 
 
 In China the Turkey opium was not so highly valued as 
 that from India. It sold for less and was sometimes used 
 in the adulteration of the higher priced product. It is 
 quite impossible to determine with any precision the 
 amounts of Turkey opium which were delivered in China, 
 for the smuggling was great. The earliest figures from 
 Canton show the following importations: Season 1805-6, 
 102 chests; 1806-7, 180 chests; 1807-8, 150 chests. It is 
 asserted by one who traded in it extensively that from 1827 
 to 1830 the Americans disposed of from twelve to fourteen 
 hundred piculs annually.* Whatever the amount, the 
 Americans were thoroughly identified, in the minds of the 
 Chinese, with Turkey opium.° When the survivors of the 
 wrecked bark Sunda were taken to Canton in 1839 and had 
 an interview with the commissioner, one of them reported: 
 
 "He [the commissioner] asked the names of the places from 
 whence the different kinds of opium were brought and requested me 
 [Dr. Hill] to write them down for him, which I did. On mentioning 
 Turkey, he asked if it did not belong to America, or form a part of 
 it and seemed a good deal astonished on being told that it was nearly 
 a month's sail distant." 
 
 The Americans' share in the importation of opium from 
 India is even more difl&cult to determine. American ships 
 carried cargoes freely from British India to Canton, and in 
 
THE AMERICAN SHARE IN THE OPIUM TRADE 117 
 
 these consignments opium eventually appeared. At the 
 time of the surrender of the opium to Commissioner Lin in 
 1839, out of a total of 20,283 chests, there were in the pos- 
 session of Americans 1540 chests consigned to English firms. 
 None of this consignment was from Turkey, but the Ameri- 
 cans had about fifty cases of Turkey opium which they did 
 not deliver.^ 
 
 At no time did the American importation of opium form 
 a very considerable share either of the total import of the 
 drug or of the total amount of American imports, although 
 it was reported in a Boston newspaper (1839) that 
 the American interest in the ''opium affair at Canton" 
 amounted to a million and a quarter dollars. This, how- 
 ever, may have been an exaggeration. In the season 1818-9, 
 the Americans are credited with importing 807 chests of 
 Turkey opium alone, almost twenty per cent of the total 
 import of the drug, but this was exceptional. Before 1840 
 Americans usually received on consignment in Canton, or 
 carried in American vessels not more than one tenth of the 
 total importations of opium, amounting in value some years 
 to slightly more than one tenth of the total American im- 
 portations to China.'^ 
 
 In the year 1800, in response to an Imperial edict, both 
 the East India Company and the Chinese Co-hong ceased 
 to handle the drug, and after 1809 the hong merchants were 
 required to give bond that each ship secured by them car- 
 ried no opium when it came up to the Whampoa anchorage. 
 The trade was, however, carried on by the independent 
 merchants openly in disregard of the edicts and with the 
 connivance of the Chinese port authorities, until about 1821 
 when the Chinese Government again assumed a menacing 
 attitude. From that time on "receiving ships" were 
 anchored at Lintin, forty miles down the bay, and the 
 transactions were for the most part confined to the delivery 
 of the opium to the receiving ships by the inbound vessels. 
 The trade was gradually extended from Lintin by the dis- 
 patch of small sailing vessels up and down the coast. The 
 American flag flew over one or more of these receiving ships, 
 
118 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 probably without interruption, from 1821 until the readjust- 
 ment in the trade caused by the beginning of the opium war. 
 From these receiving ships was transacted other business, 
 such as the sale of ship's supplies and the sale of enough 
 rice to empty vessels to enable them to come to Whampoa as^ 
 'rice ships' thus entering under the reduced port charges, 
 but the most lucrative part of the trade was in opium. The 
 owner of the American receiving ship at Lintin from 1830 
 to 1832 stated that he had made there a sufficient fortune 
 to enable him to leave China, as he then thought, for good. 
 His explanation of his role as opium trader was 
 
 "I shall not go into any argument to prove that I considered it 
 right to follow the example of England, the East India Company, the 
 countries that cleared it (opium) for China, and the merchants to 
 whom I always have been accustomed to look up to as exponents of 
 all that was honorable in trade." 
 
 He then mentions four firms, two of Boston, one of Salem 
 and one of New York.^ 
 
 However, the leading American merchant at Canton, 
 John P. Cushing, discontinued dealing in opium after the 
 edict of 1821, perhaps influenced to do this by his good 
 friend Houqua. Cushing left Canton in 1828. 
 
 The Americans were far more deeply involved in the 
 opium trade at that time than appears from any statistics. 
 The existence of the trade itself conferred on them a direct 
 commercial benefit, for it reduced the necessity for the im- 
 portation of specie by the substitution of bills on London. 
 Opium was sold in ever increasing quantities, and the 
 Americans, as well as the English and other foreigners, used 
 the bills thus obtained in place of specie to purchase their 
 return cargoes. In this phase of the opium trade the 
 Americans, all of them, benefited as much as, or more than, 
 the other traders. As the supply of furs began to diminish, 
 after 1820, and while the American cotton trade was in its 
 infancy, the increased importation of opium from whatever 
 country and by whomever transported, was a very impor- 
 tant consideration. The system was vicious and short- 
 sighted economically, as the merchants afterwards came to 
 
THE AMERICAN SHARE IN THE OPIUM TRADE 119 
 
 see. The consumption of opium demoralized the producing 
 and consuming powers of China, led to greatly increased 
 importation of specie, and the ill-will of the people, but 
 when the capital of the American merchants was still rela- 
 tively small, and the supply of acceptable specie limited, 
 the opium trade, like slaves and distilleries, entered into the 
 foundation of many American fortunes. 
 
 It is, therefore, the more remarkable that when the 
 Chinese Government had clearly made up its mind to de- 
 stroy the trade, there was so little effort made by the 
 American merchants in China, or by their correspondents 
 at home, to effect its legalization. It is also notable that 
 at least one American firm, that of Talbot, Olyphant and 
 Company of New York (Olyphant and Company of Can- 
 ton), abstained entirely from the direct opium trade. 
 
 Conflicts with Chinese — the Pledge 
 
 Probably the most potent check on the growth of the 
 American opium trade was the recognition of the fact that 
 its existence was a constant menace to the maintenance of 
 harmonious relations with the Chinese Government for, as 
 has already been explained, peace was to the Americans 
 the supreme virtue. More than twenty years before the 
 advent of Commissioner Lin at Canton, the Americans had 
 been made to feel the dangers of the opium traffic to peace- 
 ful trade. 
 
 The ship Wabash (Captain C. L. Gantt) of Baltimore, 
 arrived in China May 22, 1817, with $7000 in specie and 
 some opium. The vessel was boarded by pirates, the chief 
 mate and some of the crew murdered or drowned, and the 
 vessel looted. In making a report of the affair to the 
 Governor, Consul Wilcocks wrote to the Secretary of State 
 that "in enumerating the loss I was careful not to mention 
 the opium." But his precautions were in vain for when 
 the pirates were arrested some of the opium was found in 
 their possession. "The latter circumstance," wrote Wil- 
 cocks, "occasioned not a little disgust on the part of the 
 
120 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Viceroy." However, the Viceroy sent a communication to 
 the acting Hoppo (Customs officer), who in turn communi- 
 cated it to the hong merchants, to give to the American 
 consul, who was to report to the President of the Unitecl 
 States of America what steps had been taken to apprehend 
 and punish the pirates. 
 
 This was followed by the first official notification ad- 
 dressed directly to the Americans on the subject of opium. 
 It was sent by the hong merchants to Wilcocks, and read 
 as follows:'' 
 
 "May He be Highly Promoted: 
 
 "We approaeli to inform you that foreign opium, the dirt used in 
 smoking, has long been prohibited by an order received; it is not 
 allowed to come to Canton; if it is presumptuously brought, the 
 moment it is discovered, it will immediately involve the security mer- 
 chant; and the cause of the said vessel bringing the dirt for smoking 
 to Canton will also assuredly be examined into; and a prosecution 
 begun which will impede her departure. The consequences are ex- 
 ceedingly important. We, being apprehensive that the foreign mer- 
 chants of your honorable country who come to Canton to trade, may 
 not all fully know the hindrance arising from bringing it to Canton, 
 do therefore especially prepare a letter to inform you. 
 
 "Benevolent Brother, to write a letter immediately back to your 
 country and tell these things to your honorable country's president, 
 that all the ships which come to Canton may be caused to know that 
 Opium, the dirt used in smoking is an article 
 
 THE CELESTIAL EMPIRE 
 
 prohibits by an order received from the Son of Heaven, and hereafter, 
 most positively, they must not buy it and bring it to Canton. 
 
 "If they bring it, the moment we examine into it and find it out, 
 certainly we will not dare to be security for the said ship, and more- 
 over will assuredly report it fully to the Great Ofl&cers of the Gov- 
 ernment who will, according to law, investigate and prosecute. De- 
 cidedly you will not dare to conceal the affair for those (who import 
 it) and thereby bring guilt on ourselves. The trade of the said ship 
 will assuredly be impeded by the smoking dirt and when seeking to 
 repeat, it will be a difficult thing (for the persons concerned) to find 
 it availing. 
 
 "Do not say that we did not speak soon enough. 
 
 "We pray you. Benevolent Brother, to write a letter immediately 
 and tell these things. It will be fortunate if you do not view it as a 
 commonplace affair, and so delay, and cause future impediments. 
 
 "To Mr. Wilcocks, Benevolent Brother, for his perusal, 
 
 "We, Younger Brothers, commonly called — " (eleven nanies). 
 
 John Quincy Adams, as Secretary of State, replied to 
 Wilcocks : 
 
THE AMERICAN SHARE IN THE OPIUM TRADE 121 
 
 "The Communication from the Co-hong merchants to yourself 
 has been published {National Register, ISIS) agreeably to the wishes 
 of those merchants." 
 
 Jji 1821 a quarrel between the various Chinese officials 
 and the Terranova case dragged once more the opium 
 smuggling into the light of day. The practice of the British, 
 American and Portuguese ships was exposed in a proclama- 
 tion from the Viceroy.^" The guilt of the Americans was 
 mitigated, observed the Viceroy, "because they had no king 
 to rule them," but all foreigners were warned that the 
 opium smuggUng must stop. Wilcocks was ordered by the 
 hong merchants, at the request of the Viceroy, to investi- 
 gate each American ship personally and put a watch on her, 
 to see that she contained and disposed of no opium. The 
 Robinson, an American vessel, was to be forbidden to come 
 to the port again and the Emily, of Baltimore, to the crew 
 of which the unfortunate Terranova had belonged, was to 
 have half her cargo confiscated, and she also was to be 
 forbidden the port. At length the Viceroy agreed to remit 
 the confiscation of half of the cargo of the vessels, but re- 
 marked in an edict to the hong merchants : 
 
 "As to one of the four ships, viz., Cowpland's (the Emily of Balti- 
 more) it contained merely about a thousand catties of foreign tin, 
 worth scarcely anything — and it paid for port charges upwards of one 
 thousand four hundred taels, from which it appears that the said 
 vessel came for no other purpose but to sell opium — Infinitely 
 Detestable. 
 
 "Rightly did Heaven send down punishment, and cause Francis 
 Terranova to commit a crime for which he was strangled. This ship 
 should be punished more severely. Only as the other ships have had 
 clemency extended to them, and the value of the cargoes given back, 
 I shall remit the sentence on all equally, and shall deal with it as with 
 the others to inflict a light punishment. 
 
 "In one word 
 
 THE CELESTIAL EMPIRE 
 
 permits tea, rhubarb, etc., to be sold to keep alive the people of the 
 said nations. Those persons who are annually kept alive thereby are 
 more than ten thousand times ten thousand. How substantial a favor 
 is this ! Yet these foreigners feel no gratitude ; nor wish to render a 
 recompense ; but smuggle in prohibited opium, which flows and poisons 
 the land. 
 
122 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 "When the conduct is referred to the heart, it must be disgusted. 
 When referred to the reason, it is contrary to it. ^'^ 
 
 "In broad day, on earth, there is the Royal Law. In Hades after 
 death are gods and demons. These foreign ships pass an immense 
 ocean, go through gales of wind, boisterous seas of unknown dangers, 
 entirely preserved by the condescending protection of 
 
 THE CELESTIAL GODS 
 
 and therefore they should hereafter rouse themselves to a zealous 
 reflection — to bitter recompense — to reformations — and alter their 
 inhuman unreasonable conduct — and they will receive forever the 
 gracious bounty of 
 
 THE CELESTIAL EMPIRE." 
 
 It was as a result of the effective measures taken by the 
 Chinese and the dangers which the hong merchants now 
 incurred by giving a bond for ships, that the opium business 
 was removed from Canton and Whampoa to receiving ships 
 at Lintin, 
 
 That the crisis of 1839 had been brought on by the 
 opium trade was clearly and frankly recognized by the 
 American merchants when they addressed to Congress their 
 memorial asking for a commissioner and a treaty. The 
 memorialists made an honest statement of the condition 
 of the traffic, drawing especial attention to the fact that 
 while it had been carried on by smuggling the Chinese 
 officials, from the lowest to the highest, had shared in the 
 accompanying bribery, large amounts of opium having been 
 delivered at Lintin directly to boats carrying the flags of 
 the high officials, the chief customs ofl&cer and even the gov- 
 ernor. The Americans pointed out that the Chinese Gov- 
 ernment possessed ample power to control the trade and 
 was now adopting a somewhat inconsistent and unjust 
 method in that it was proceeding first not against its own 
 subjects, but against the foreigners. This was a character- 
 istic method of Chinese procedure. 
 
 Before addressing the memorial to Congress most of the 
 Americans at Canton had signed a 'Voluntary pledge" to 
 abstain from the trade in the future. In this pledge the 
 other foreign merchants had joined, and it is clear from the 
 spirit of the memorial that the Americans, at the time they 
 
THE AMERICAN SHARE IN THE OPIUM TRADE 123 
 
 signed it, supposed that the foreign opium trade of China 
 was definitely finished. 
 
 'Whether we view the subject in a moral and philanthropic light," 
 stated the memorialists, "or merely as a commercial proposition, we 
 are extremely desirous to see the importation and consumption of 
 opium in China entirely at an end." " 
 
 In subsequent years the vision of their signatures to 
 this pledge to the Chinese and this memorial to Congress 
 must have plagued the signers not a little, though it did 
 not prevent them from evading and even openly violating 
 the promises they had made. The British and the Parsee 
 merchants were the first to forget their promises, and the 
 Americans were not long in yielding to the demands of 
 competition in a trade of which opium had become an 
 integral part, but there is little doubt but at the time of 
 signing these documents the Americans were perfectly 
 sincere. 
 
 However, three days after signing of the pledge, Com- 
 mander George C. Read of the U. S. Frigate Columbia re- 
 ported to the Secretary of the Navy from Macao: ^^ 
 
 "There is yet much opium on board the English vessels now lying 
 in the roads of this place, which will never be returned to the country 
 from whence it came. A sale of it must be made here on the coast, 
 and I shall not be surprised to hear of its being smuggled under 
 American colors. If such illicit commerce should be persisted in, and 
 vessels should be detected in the act, notwithstanding all the diffi- 
 culties and dangers to which it would expose the foreigners at Canton, 
 I feel that I should be justified in seizing them, but what to do with 
 them afterwards would be a question of serious consideration, and 
 merely to drive them off the coast would be to permit return. But I 
 trust there are none among them so wicked." 
 
 The opium trade began again almost immediately after 
 the surrender of the twenty thousand chests, but the 
 Americans for a time kept their pledge. One of the signers 
 of the memorial to Congress, then the superintendent of 
 Russell and Company, writing five years later said:^^ 
 
 "The trade was carried on ... we believe, entirely by the British 
 ■ — the Americans having retired from it as soon as they found it to 
 their interests to do so, fearing that it would embarrass their regular 
 
124 AMERIGANS IN EASTERN ASIA ^__ 
 
 business, and knowing that tliey would be within the power of the 
 local authorities of Canton, while the British were out of their reach 
 at Macao and at Hongkong." 
 
 On two subsequent occasions Consul Snow reported to 
 the State Departments^ that so far as he knew there was 
 not an American in China in any way engaged in the trade. 
 
 Commodore Kearny's Action 
 
 In response to the request of the Americans in Canton for 
 Naval protection (presented to Congress January 9, 1840), 
 Commodore Lawrence Kearny was dispatched to China in 
 command of the East India Squadron with orders to pro- 
 tect Americans, and also to take action against any Ameri- 
 cans who might have entered the opium trade. He found 
 upon his arrival, April, 1842, only two years after the pledge 
 had been given, evidence not to be doubted ^^ that Captain 
 Read's fears had been well grounded. The American flag 
 was being used extensively to cover opium smuggling, and 
 American citizens, as individuals, if not as firms, were ac- 
 tively engaged in the trade. 
 
 Immediately after his arrival Kearny requested the 
 American vice consul at Canton, who was afterwards shown 
 to be implicated in the smuggling, to have published the 
 following letter i^^ 
 
 "Sm: — The Hongkong Gazette of the 24th instant contains a 
 shipping report in which is the name of an American vessel engaged 
 in carrying opium, — therefore I beg yoii will cause to be made known 
 with equal publicity, and also to the Chinese authorities by the trans- 
 lation of the same, that the Government of the United States does not 
 sanction 'the smuggling of opium' on this coast under the American 
 flag in violation of the laws of China. Difficulties arising therefrom 
 in respect to the seizure of any vessels by the Chinese, the claimants 
 certainly will not under my instructions find support, or any inter- 
 position on my part after the publication of this notice." 
 
 The publication of this notice was greeted with derision 
 by the English ^^ and lost some of its force when the Gov- 
 ernor of Canton, a few days later addressed the hong mer- 
 chants : 
 
THE AMERICAN SHARE IN THE OPIUM TRADE 125 
 
 "I find, on examination, that the Americans haA^e acted in a 
 manner most highly respectful and obedient. Their vessels hitherto 
 engaged in the commerce of Canton, have always been confined to 
 the legitimate and honorable trade, and never concerned with the 
 carrying of opium." 
 
 Kearny set about with earnestness to protect the Ameri- 
 can flag from the stain of further opium smuggling, but 
 received little cooperation from the consular officer. He 
 remained on the China coast for more than a year, and 
 just before he left actually arrested the Ariel, taking away 
 her papers and sending her to Macao. To the Secretary of 
 the Navy (May 19, 1843) he wrote from Amoy: 
 
 "The American flag is now the only cover for this illicit trade, Sir 
 Henry Pottinger having issued a proclamation against it; and the 
 English craft having been turned away from the rivers, has placed 
 the Americans in a peculiarly advantageous position, as freighters, 
 under the flag of the United States. . . . 
 
 "With regard to the Ariel, I have taken her papers and colors 
 from her; and I have obliged her master to discharge the whole of her 
 cargo here, and then he is to return to Macao. Her papers are en- 
 dorsed by me in a manner which will render them unavailable, and 
 are returned sealed to the consulate. Were it not for the risk, I would 
 send her to the United States ; but she capsized once or twice in Bos- 
 ton harbor before she sailed, and is now a dangerous vessel. Should 
 I fall in with any sea-worthy vessels of her character, I shall send 
 them home, that their case may be properly decided by the laws, of 
 which the owners, as well as the consular establishment of the United 
 States, seem to have been clearly regardless in making transfers that 
 are illegal. These sham sales are well known, by which our national 
 character is daily losing ground, and will so continue to do while the 
 public consular duties are confined to merchants whose interests are so 
 deeply involved in the transactions before cited." 
 
 But the only ground Kearny could find on which to 
 arrest the Ariel was not that she was an opium smuggler, 
 but that her ownership was vested nominally in a man 
 professing American citizenship, yet who had not been in 
 the United States for at least six years. The Ariel quickly 
 resumed trade again. She had been built and sent to China 
 expressly for that purpose. 
 
 Whatever may have been the legality of the transfer 
 by which the fleet of American opium smugglers appeared 
 in Chinese waters under other than their real ownership, 
 
126 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 the interested parties had not been inattentive to the status 
 of United States law on the subject of smuggUng opium 
 into China, as may be seen from the following incident. 
 
 Commodore Foxhall A. Parker, commanding the East 
 India Squadron, was ordered to proceed to Bombay in the 
 latter part of 1843 and there take on board the newly 
 appointed American commissioner and convey him to 
 China, In his orders was the following item, substantially 
 the same as Kearny's instructions three years before: ^^ 
 
 "You will take all occasions to impress upon the Chinese and their 
 authorities that one great object of your visit is to prevent and punish 
 the smuggling of opium in China either by Americans, or by other 
 nations under cover of the American flag, should it be attempted." 
 
 While Parker was lying in the harbor waiting for the 
 arrival of Cushing, Fletcher Webster, Secretary of the Mis- 
 sion, arrived from Boston as a passenger on the brig 
 Antelope. The vessel having disembarked her passenger, 
 proceeded, under the nose of the U. S. East India Squadron, 
 to load opium for China. Whereupon Parker looked up 
 his instructions and tried to look up the American law on 
 the subject. He reported (November 27, 1843) to the 
 Secretary of the Navy : 
 
 "I cannot find any law which will authorize my interfering to 
 prevent or punish smuggling by Americans or others in foreign coun- 
 tries. The only course that appears proper for me to pursue is not to 
 interfere in their favor, should they be taken by the Chinese authori- 
 ties. 
 
 "The schooner Zephyr, of Boston, sailed from this port a few days 
 ago for China, loaded with opium, and the brig Antelope, also of 
 Boston, is now up for a freight of opium only, for the same place. 
 
 "You will oblige me by sending particular instructions on this 
 subject." 
 
 But no instructions ever came. This episode ended any 
 efforts on the part of the American naval officers to prevent 
 opium smuggling. 
 
 The American builders of the opium clippers had also 
 not overlooked the fact that these vessels could look to no 
 American authority for protection. In the first place they 
 
THE AMERICAN SHARE IN THE OPIUM TRADE 127 
 
 were built to outsail any other ships afloat, and they did. 
 In the second place they were heavily armed. The Ante- 
 lope, for example, carried two guns on each side, besides a 
 "Long Tom" amidships. Boarding pikes were arranged in 
 great plenty on a rack around the main-mast, and the large 
 arms chest on the quarter deck was well supplied with 
 pistols and cutlasses. ''We were fully prepared," wrote one 
 of the officers, "for a brush with the rascally Chinese and 
 determined not to be put out of our course by one or two 
 Mandarin boats." ^^ 
 
 BIBLIOGEAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. "Smyrna Consular Letters," Vol. 1, enclosure in, Wm. Steward, 
 
 April 25, 1803, to Secretary of State. 
 
 2. Smyrna Letters. 
 
 3. Forbes' "Reminiscences," p. 124; Sessional Papers (1S30) Vol. 6, 
 
 testimony of Joshua Bates, p. 378. 
 
 4. Forbes' "China Trade," p. 27. 
 
 5. Chinese Eepositoy, Vol. 8, Jan. 1840, p. 486. 
 
 6. Hunter's "Fan Kwae," p. 146. 
 
 7. Niles' Register, Oct. 12, 1839, p. 112, quoting- Boston Transcript; 
 
 Morse's International Relations, Vol. 1, pp. 206-11. 
 
 8. Forbes' "Reminiscences," p. 145. 
 
 9. Canton Consular Letters, Vol. 1, Sept. 23, 1817, Wileocks to 
 
 Secretary of State. 
 
 10. S. Wells Williams' "Middle Kingdom," Vol. 2, pp. 379 ff; H. 
 
 Doc. 71:26-2. 
 
 11. H, Doc. 119 :26-l, p. 31 ; H. Doc. 40 :26-l. 
 
 12. Captains' Letters (Navy Dept), May, 1839, No. 101. 
 
 13. Forbes' "China Trade," p. 50. 
 
 14. Canton Consular Letters, Vol. 3, Sept. 23, 1839, Jan. 11, 1840. 
 
 15. S. Doc. 139 :29-l. The mere fact that these reports from Kearny 
 
 were published is an indication of the policy of the Govern- 
 ment of the United States. 
 
 16. Chinese Repository, Vol. 11, April, 1842, p. 259. 
 
 17. Canton Register, April 5, 1842'. 
 
 18. East India Squadron Letters (Navy Dept.), Feb. 27, 1843,— 
 
 Sept. 25, 1845, p. 36. 
 
 19. Lubbock's "China Clippers," p. 26; Clark's "Clipper Ship Era," 
 
 p. 68. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 PEEPAEATION FOE THE GUSHING MISSION 
 
 In preparing to negotiate a treaty with China the 
 United States was at a distinct disadvantage as compared 
 with Great Britain, the only formidable commercial rival, 
 for the American Government was without any large store 
 of accumulated wisdom and precedents for dealing with 
 Oriental states. Before making the Treaty of Nanking 
 Great Britain had already concluded trade agreements or 
 political treaties with nearly every native state of Africa 
 and Asia with which the Western World was in contact. 
 England was therefore merely extending her elaborate and 
 closely integrated commercial system to include one more 
 outpost. The appropriation of Hongkong for a military, 
 naval and trade base was, for example, but the newest 
 application of a policy of commercial expansion the tech- 
 nique for which had been maturing for a century. The 
 United States, in contrast, had entered into treaty relations 
 with only two Asiatic states and in these instances the 
 American efforts had been casual, unrelated to any general 
 policy, and unproductive of much experience which could 
 be turned to account in securing a treaty with China. 
 However, a brief review of the mission of Edmund Roberts 
 to Cochin China, Siam, and Muscat in 1832-4 is important 
 not merely to complete a chapter of American history but 
 also because the Roberts Mission did have some slight 
 influence on the preparations for the Cushing Mission. 
 
 The Edmund Roberts Mission 
 
 Edmund Roberts of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, was 
 a merchant and a supercargo ^ who had risen to the rank of 
 
 128 
 
PREPARATION FOR THE GUSHING MISSION 129 
 
 ship owner only to lose what little he had accumulated by 
 "bare-faced robbery under the Berlin and Milan decrees," 
 to use his own description of the process by which his prop- 
 erty had been appropriated and his fortunes ruined. For a 
 number of years he had engaged in fruitless efforts to re- 
 habilitate himself but with little success. In 1823 he was 
 appointed United States Consul at Demarara. Four and 
 a half years later he was a supercargo on an American vessel 
 at Zanzibar where he was subjected to vexatious delays and 
 impositions by the officers of the Sultan of Muscat. To 
 his Highness he addressed a letter complaining that Ameri- 
 can vessels were not being received upon equal terms with 
 those of England. He invited the Sultan to enter into 
 correspondence with the American Government and sug- 
 gested that he offer to make a treaty with the United States. 
 Roberts did not fail to point out to the Sultan that the 
 United States "can never come in contact with your High- 
 ness as the English Government will, sooner or later, for 
 it is contrary to the constitution of the United States to 
 own colonies out of their proper territory. Acts of this kind 
 have been the cause of more devastating war than any or 
 all the other outrages put together." 
 
 The Sultan was so impressed with the representations 
 of Roberts that, although he did not wholly comply with 
 his requests, he did ask the American supercargo to procure 
 for him some bombs and shells with which to drive out the 
 Portuguese, and enjoined Roberts to keep the matter secret 
 from the English. 
 
 Roberts on this voyage probably penetrated the Orient 
 no farther than Bombay. Immediately upon his return to 
 the United States he took up with Levi Woodbury, senator 
 from New Hampshire, the suggestion which had evidently 
 been in his mind at Zanzibar, viz., "that considerable benefit 
 would result from effecting treaties with some of the native 
 powers bordering on the Indian Ocean." 
 
 Meanwhile the British Governor General of India suc- 
 ceeded in making a treaty with Siam in 1826. While the 
 negotiation of this treaty was in pro.cess John Shellaber, 
 
130 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 United States Consul at Batavia, sought a commission to 
 negotiate treaties with some of the independent native 
 sovereigns near Java, having particularly in mind a treaty 
 with Siam.^ 
 
 The report of the plundering of the pepper ship Friend- 
 ship of Salem by the natives of Quallah Battoo on the 
 northwest coast of Sumatra in 1830 roused the Government 
 of the United States to action. Meanwhile Edmund Rob- 
 erts, with the persistence which was his most conspicuous 
 characteristic, had been pressing his suggestion upon Levi 
 Woodbury who became Secretary of the Navy in the Jack- 
 son administration. In 1831 Shellaber came home from 
 Batavia on leave and renewed the proposition which he had 
 made six years before. Shellaber returned to his post the 
 next year supposing that he was to be designated to the 
 mission which was then decided upon but Roberts, backed 
 by his influential friend Woodbury, received the appoint- 
 ment January 26, 1832. The government directed the 
 U. S. S. Potomac, the sloop Peacock, and the schooner 
 Boxer, to undertake an expedition against the natives of 
 Quallah Battoo,^ and at the request of the Navy Depart- 
 ment, Roberts was made a special agent of the United 
 States to meet, confer, treat, and negotiate with the kings 
 of Siam and Cochin China. He was assigned to the Pea- 
 cock where he was entered on the rolls as "secretary to the 
 commander." The reason given for the creation of this 
 somewhat equivocal and ignominious role was secrecy, but 
 it is difficult to resist the conclusion that it was a fair index 
 of the importance of the mission in the estimation of the 
 government. The salary was fixed at $1200, and only after 
 pleadings by Roberts was it increased to $1500. During 
 part of the outward voyage the special agent was compelled 
 to sleep on the gun deck of the Peacock — an indication, per- 
 haps, of the prevailing customary scorn of naval officers for 
 civilians. 
 
 From the outset the Department of State appears to 
 have been far more interested in securing a treaty with 
 Japan and set about collecting the necessary information. 
 
PREPARATION FOR THE GUSHING MISSION 131 
 
 Some of this was secured from Shellaber, who as consul at 
 Batavia had been famihar with the Dutch trade at Naga- 
 saki, and some of it came from unknown sources. Before 
 Roberts left the United States in 1832 the State Depart- 
 ment was in possession of a large part of the information 
 about Japan on which the Perry expedition twenty years 
 later was based. A commission, similar to those already 
 issued for Cochin China and Siam, to negotiate with Japan 
 was issued to Roberts July 6, 1832. 
 
 The subject of diplomatic relations with Oriental des- 
 pots presented some embarrassments peculiar to a republi- 
 can government. In submitting an outline program for 
 the proposed negotiations Shellaber wrote to the Secretary 
 of State: 
 
 ''I beg leave to suggest that there be no expression in_ the letters 
 (from the President) to these sovereigns (of Siam, Cochin China and 
 Japan), or credentials of the mission, that may lead those people to 
 think that the United States is a republic. Those despots would af- 
 fect to become alarmed at an intercourse with the United States as 
 free as it is, if they come at the knowledge of its peculiar government 
 through its own official papers." 
 
 From the Rev. Robert Morrison, the famous British 
 missionary and sinologue of the East India Company at 
 Canton, to whom Roberts had written soliciting advice as 
 to the proper manner to approach such potentates, Roberts 
 had received some instructions which were valuable and are 
 especially interesting as coming from one who had a real 
 sympathy for the Asiatic, a thorough knowledge of his 
 ways, and had also been the Chinese secretary and inter- 
 preter of the unsuccessful Lord Amherst Embassy to Peking 
 in 1816. The advice was to avoid vague pretexts and spe- 
 cial excuses, and to approach the kings directly and boldly 
 as the representative of an independent people who would 
 have nothing to do with "kowtowing." The relationship to 
 be established must be reciprocal, not that of lord and 
 vassal. Roberts was warned, however, not to make himself 
 "too cheap" in the negotiations; he was to be kind and 
 courteous, but to insist on "some little formalities." A 
 little display and show of clothing, Morrison thought, 
 
132 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 would have a certain weight and create a favorable im- 
 pression. 
 
 Roberts advised the Department of State that "in ne- 
 gotiations with the Asiatics all apparent acknowledgment 
 of inferiority which precedes the signature to letters such 
 as 'your humble servant' would be construed all too liter- 
 ally by the potentates of Asia and ought therefore to be 
 avoided in drafting the letters from President Jackson. 
 
 The considerations raised by Shellaber, Morrison and 
 Roberts required careful thought but the Government of 
 the United States decided, while not flaunting its republi- 
 canism, nevertheless, not to conceal its true colors. The 
 letters from President Jackson carried by Roberts in 1832 
 did not obscure the fact that Andrew Jackson was "Presi- 
 dent of the United States" and the unbending salutation 
 "Great and Good Friend" fairly throbbed with a repub- 
 licanism such as the despots of Asia had never envisaged 
 in their worst dreams. 
 
 Secretary of State Livingston even went so far as to de- 
 cide not to send any presents with Roberts, but at the 
 latter's earnest solicitation this decision was reversed. The 
 list of the gifts included: 100 rifles, 100 muskets, 100 sets 
 of infantry accouterments, 2 heavily gold-mounted swords, 
 2 full length mirrors, 10 pairs of lamps, 250 yards of car- 
 peting, 5 pairs of stone statues for the king and officials 
 of Siam; and 2 pairs of glass lamps, a sword, a rifle and a 
 pair of pistols, a silk flag and a map of the United States, 
 and a set of the gold, silver and copper coins of the United 
 States, for the Sultan of Muscat. A steam engine mounted 
 on a "highly polished rail car" and a "railroad 12 feet in 
 diameter which can be screwed to the floor of the room" 
 was also included in the purchases, but owing to a delay in 
 the shipments this unusual present appears never to have 
 reached its intended recipient. 
 
 The Potomac sailed for Quallah Battoo in advance of 
 the Peacock and when the latter reached Anjier Roads the 
 expedition to Sumatra had been completed. Roberts was 
 therefore free to devote himself directly to the gentler 
 
PREPARATION FOR THE GUSHING MISSION 133 
 
 methods of diplomacy. After securing the services of J. R. 
 Morrison, as interpreter, the Peacock set sail from Macao 
 for the coast of Cochin China. The Boxer, which had been 
 intended for the use of the mission in approaching the 
 shallow harbors, had not yet arrived, and the Peacock found 
 it impossible to approach closely to Hue. Contact with 
 the local officials was established farther down the coast, 
 but Roberts met with obstacles. The Cochin Chinese im- 
 mediately raised questions of etiquette and the kowtow, 
 and the American envoy refused to yield. The Peacock 
 departed for Siam in disgust. At Bankok the reception 
 was all that could be desired, and a treaty was concluded 
 March 30, 1833. The linguistic difficulties of the negotia- 
 tions are evident in the fact that the text of the treaty 
 was in four languages — English, Chinese, Portuguese and 
 Siamese. 
 
 The Roberts treaty with Siam, when compared with the 
 British treaty of 1826, shows no notable differences. By it 
 American vessels secured a very great reduction in the 
 measurement dues such as the British had already secured. 
 There were to be no import or export duties, and freedom 
 of trade without governmental interference was stipulated. 
 There was no slightest suggestion of extraterritorial con- 
 cessions. From the American treaty, however, was omitted 
 certain provisions which had been included in the British 
 treaty defining the procedure and penalties in cases of man- 
 slaughter. 
 
 Roberts attempted to secure the legalization of 
 the opium trade which had been prohibited in the 
 British treaty, but at the last minute this Valuable 
 and highly profitable' article was placed in the list of 
 contrabands. 
 
 At Batavia Roberts received from Secretary of State 
 Livingston a letter again instructing him to proceed to 
 Japan, but Roberts decided that such an expedition at that 
 time would be impractical. The terms of service on the 
 Peacock were soon to expire, and Roberts was without 
 funds to provide for the Shogun presents which would 
 
134 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 stand comparison with those sent annually by the Dutch. 
 The wind was fair for Muscat and the Peacock took ad- 
 vantage of it. There is no evidence that the American Gov- 
 ernment had any real interest in that part of the Mission 
 which was however very near to Roberts' heart because 
 of his previous experience at Zanzibar. 
 
 A treaty with the Sultan, the first commercial treaty 
 he had ever signed, was concluded September 21, 1833. It 
 provided for a reduction of duties from seven and one-half 
 per cent on both exports and imports to a single five per 
 cent charge to be levied merely on such goods as were 
 landed. There was to be no export duty and no pilotage 
 charge. The treaty also contained a most-favored-nation 
 clause. Extraterritoriality was stipulated to the extent that 
 the American consul was to be the exclusive judge of all 
 disputes and suits in which American citizens were en- 
 gaged with each other. Six years later the British Govern- 
 ment made a treaty with the Sultan which included the 
 advantages gained under the American treaty and added to 
 them amplified extraterritorial concessions. 
 
 The treaties with Siam and Muscat were duly ratified 
 by the Senate and in March, 1835, Roberts was commis- 
 sioned to exchange their ratifications. He was also directed 
 to resume the negotiations with Cochin China and then 
 to proceed to Japan. His compensation was increased to 
 $4,400 a year but his request for an increase in rank was 
 not granted. He exchanged the ratifications as planned but 
 at Bankok contracted a disease which made his efforts to 
 get into communication with the authorities at Cochin 
 China fruitless, and as his illness increased it became neces- 
 sary to hurry on to Macao where he died June 12, 1836. 
 The untimely death of Roberts brought to an end the pro- 
 posed mission to Japan. 
 
 Webster Consults the Merchants 
 
 The omission of China from the program of Edmund 
 Roberts on both the first and the second missions is signifi- 
 
PREPARATION FOR THE GUSHING MISSION 135 
 
 cant. Neither Roberts or Shellaber had urged a treaty with 
 China and there had been no demand for it among the 
 China merchants. 
 
 As soon as Congress had approved of the proposed 
 China mission in 1843, and before it was known who would 
 be the commissioner, Daniel Webster sent a circular letter 
 to most of the American merchants resident in Boston, 
 Salem, New York and elsewhere, engaged in the China 
 trade, inviting suggestions. This letter received from 
 many persons very careful attention and the replies to it 
 are the best sources of information as to the attitude 
 of the American merchants towards the trade at that 
 time. 
 
 It is significant that only one reply even mentions the 
 subject of opium.*^ This firm wrote: 
 
 "It is most likely that the Chinese Government will urge the Com- 
 missioner to interpose the authority of his office to prevent the par- 
 ticipation of citizens of the United States in the opium trade. But 
 we conceive it would be extremely impolitic to assume any engage- 
 ments whatever concerning this traffic that would require for their 
 fulfillment the restraining, controlling, or influencing of our citizens 
 in any degree. They have always been more or less engaged in the 
 trade and probably always will be, however repugnant it unques- 
 tionably is to justice and humanity. We believe that ultimately the 
 Emperor will find it necessary to legalize the traffic under the im- 
 position of heavy duties." 
 
 Seven Boston firms and individual merchants united in 
 a joint reply to Webster's request. This letter was pre- 
 pared by John M. Forbes, a partner in the firm of Russell 
 and Company who, though then a resident in the United 
 States, had served his apprenticeship in China.^ This com- 
 munication made the following recommendations: 
 
 (1) The Mission should be accompanied by a respectable fleet, 
 because many of the Chinese are now under the impression that the 
 United States has only two naval vessels. 
 I (2) No presents, as such, should be sent, lest the Chinese should 
 \ call them tribute. But this ought not to prevent some tactful repre- 
 sentations of friendship. "The Chinese look upon us as friends, but 
 they have a great fear of encroachment by other foreign nations, and 
 if we could, in a quiet way, without infringing upon the courtesies 
 
136 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 due to Great Britain, contribute anything to the means of defense 
 against further aggression it would open the eyes of the Emperor to 
 the value of an alliance with us, more than the prospect of increasing 
 their trade a hundred fold." 
 
 (3) The Mission will find it necessary first to stop at Macao but 
 possibly it ought to go on to Canton, or preferably to the mouth of 
 the Pei-ho. 
 
 (4) The Provincial authorities at Canton should be informed in 
 advance of the coming of the Mission, and should be notified that it 
 will proceed to the North. 
 
 (5) Two interpreters will be 'necessary. Dr. Peter Parker is 
 recommended. 
 
 (6) The commissioner must be warned that the Chinese will be 
 disposed to contest every point. An appeal to arms may be necessary, 
 and it will be well, if possible, to follow the English in making a 
 treaty. If the English do not go to Peking, the American minister 
 must exercise "infinite caution" about going there. "All experience 
 in Chinese affairs shows that no foreign nation ever yet gained any 
 disputed point by peaceful negotiation." 
 
 The letter closes with some general advice. The signers 
 assume that the United States is not prepared to enforce 
 the reception of an envoy, or the making of a treaty. 
 Nevertheless the opportunity is such that, although the 
 Americans already enjoy all the privileges possessed by the 
 English, it may be possible to secure by treaty what other- 
 wise would be enjoyed only by the sufferance of the Chi- 
 nese. However, it would be well not to become involved 
 in any questions of diplomacy in such a way as to lose the 
 privileges which are already enjoyed. In conclusion the 
 merchants give the cautious advice, born of half a century 
 of experience, "If our Envoy does not see his way to suc- 
 ceed, let him do nothing ; let him wait the proper time to 
 act, and if his patience fail, let him be authorized to return 
 home, leaving some member of his mission as Charge to 
 wait an opening." 
 
 Many of the other replies to Webster's letter mentioned 
 that a merchant should not be chosen as commissioner, 
 because of the low esteem in which merchants were held by 
 the Chinese. Among the grievances mentioned which the 
 commissioner must seek to correct were the delay and 
 method of settling claims, especially those against the in- 
 solvent hong merchants, excessive tonnage dues, the cor- 
 
PEEP^FjAiiON FOR THE GUSHING MISSION 137 
 
 ruption of the customs house officials, and the arbitrary 
 stopping of the entire trade.* 
 
 A memorandum note, in the archives of the State De- 
 partment,'^ countersigned by President Tyler, shows the 
 following list of furnishings with which the Mission was 
 to be provided : a set of best charts, and if possible a globe ; 
 a pair of 6-shooting pistols, rifles, etc.; model of war- 
 steamer; model of a steam excavator; Daguerreotype ap- 
 paratus ("it can be purchased, perhaps, in France"); some 
 approved works on fortification, gunnery, ship-building, 
 military and naval strategy, geology, chemistry, and the 
 "Encyclopedia Americana"; a telephone, spy-glass, barom- 
 eter, and thermometer; and some useful articles made of 
 India rubber. Against the item "a model of a locomotive 
 steam engine, and a plan of railroad, is the pencilled nota- 
 tion: "Will require too much time to prepare. J. T." 
 
 Instructions to Gushing 
 
 The official instructions, prepared by Secretary of State 
 Webster, to guide the actions and negotiations of the first 
 
 *0n March 22, 1843, Levi Lincoln, collector of the port of Boston, trans- 
 mitted to Daniel Webster, at the latter's request, the following list of the prin- 
 cipal Boston and Salem houses aiid individuals engaged in the China trade : 
 
 William Appleton & Co. Boston 
 
 J. L. Gardner & Co. " 
 
 J. M. Forbes " 
 
 ITaniel C. Bacon " 
 
 Daniel P. Parker " 
 
 Bryant, Sturgis & Co. " 
 
 J. J. Dixwell " 
 
 Minot and Hooper " 
 
 P. W. Macondray " 
 
 Alfred Richardson " 
 
 Joseph Peabddy Salem 
 Stephen C. Phillips 
 
 David A. Neal & Bros. " 
 
 David Pingree " 
 
 Michael Shepard & Co. " 
 
 On March 24, 1843, J. S. Hone, assistant collector of the port of New York, 
 transmitted the following names for New York : 
 
 N. L. & G. Griswold 
 Talbot, Olyphant & Co. 
 Howland & Aspinwall 
 Grinnell, Minturn & Co. 
 Cary & Co. 
 Gordon & Talbot 
 Boorman, Johnston & Co. 
 Alfred A. Low. 
 Goodhue & Co. 
 
 Presumably letters were addressed to all of these firms, inviting suggestions, 
 though not all of them appear to have replied. 
 
138 AMERICANS IN EASTERiN ASL^ 
 
 American commissioner constitute the first official declara- 
 tion of American policy for China.^ 
 
 The primary object of the Mission was to be "to secure 
 the entry of American ships and cargoes into these ports 
 [Amoy, Ningpo, Foochow and Shanghai, which had been 
 opened to English trade by the treaty of Nanking, August 
 25, 1842] on terms as favorable as those which are en- 
 joyed by English merchants." As to the manner of the 
 negotiations the instructions were very explicit. Gushing 
 was to use the greatest tact towards the Chinese in allaying 
 "their repulsive feelings towards foreigners." "Your con- 
 stant aim," stated the instructions, "must be to produce a 
 full conviction in the minds of the Government and the 
 people, that your mission is entirely pacific ; that you come 
 with no purposes of hostility or annoyance; that you are 
 a messenger of peace, sent from the greatest Power in 
 America to the greatest Empire in Asia, to offer respect and 
 good will and to establish the means of friendly inter- 
 course." In this connection the Gommissioner was in- 
 structed to make very clear that the American Government, 
 so far from supporting its citizens in smuggling of any sort, 
 would relinquish all jurisdiction over such traders and "will 
 not interfere to protect them from the consequences of their 
 own illegal conduct." 
 
 Another method suggested to prove the friendly 
 intent of the Americans, was to point out the contrasts 
 between the United States and England. 
 
 "It cannot be wrong for you to make known, where not known, 
 that the United States, once a country subject to England, threw off 
 the subjection years ago, asserted its independence sword in hand, 
 established that independence after a seven years' war, and now meets 
 England upon equal terms upon the ocean and upon the land. The 
 remoteness of the United States from China, and still more the 
 fact that they have no colonial possessions in her neighborhood, will 
 naturally lead to the indulgence of a less suspicious and more friendly 
 feeling than may have been entertained towards England, even before 
 the late war between England and China. It cannot be doubted that 
 the immense power of England in India must be regarded by the 
 Chinese Government with dissatisfaction, if not with some degree 
 of alarm. You will take care to show strongly how free the Chinese 
 
PREPARATION FOR THE GUSHING MISSION 139 
 
 Government may well be from all jealousy arising from such causes 
 towards the United States." 
 
 On the other hand Gushing was warned not to adopt 
 any manner which could in any way be interpreted as 
 placing him in the category of 'tribute-bearer/ where Lord 
 Macartney, the Dutch commissioner, and Lord Amherst 
 had been classified by the Chinese in 1793, 1795, and 1816, 
 respectively. ''You will signify to all Chinese authorities 
 and others," read the instructions, "that it is deemed to be 
 quite below the dignity of the Emperor of China and the 
 President of the United States of America to be concerning 
 themselves with such unimportant matters as presents from 
 one to the other; that the intercourse between the heads 
 of two such governments should be made to embrace only 
 great political questions, the tender of mutual regard, and 
 the establishment of useful relations." 
 
 A secondary object, quite subordinate to the first, was 
 to reach the Emperor at Peking. The instructions to pro- 
 ceed to the capital of the empire were to be used as a lever 
 for securing the primary object of the mission, rather than 
 to be considered as constituting a primary purpose. "It is, 
 of course, desirable that you should be able to reach Peking 
 and the Court, and the person of the Emperor. , . . The 
 purpose of seeing the Emperor must be persisted in as long 
 as may be consistent and proper." The commissioner was 
 accordingly instructed very carefully, in case he reached 
 Peking, not to perform the kotow, on the double ground 
 that it would compromise the independence of the United 
 States before the Chinese, and that it would be a violation 
 of religious principles. 'You will represent to the Chinese 
 authorities, nevertheless, that you are directed to pay to 
 His Majesty the Emperor, the same marks of respect and 
 homage as are paid by your government to His Majesty 
 the Emperor of Russia, or any other of the great Powers 
 of the world." 
 
 In consonance with these instructions, and as still further 
 evidence that the American Government wished to keep 
 its hands entirely clean of the opium trade, the commis- 
 
140 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 sioner received (June 12, 1843) from Mr. Legare, who had 
 succeeded Webster as acting Secretary of State, positive 
 instructions to investigate the charge that the newly ap- 
 pointed consul at Canton "is likely to be associated in 
 business with a firm avowedly engaged in the opium trade," 
 and if the charge was proved, unless the consul would agree 
 to resign voluntarily, to "remove him immediately. No re- 
 port was ever rendered by Cushing on this duty, nor was 
 one ever officially asked for. According to all the evidence 
 now available it would appear that the charge was entirely 
 well founded, although it may have been true, until after 
 the visit of Cushing, that only some of the individual 
 partners, rather than the firm itself, were directly engaged 
 in the trade. 
 
 In addition to his instructions Cushing carried two 
 letters signed by President Tyler, and addressed to the 
 Emperor of China, one, "a full power," authorizing Cushing 
 "to sign any treaty which may be concluded" between the 
 commissioner and the Emperor's authorized representative ; 
 the other "a letter of credence to the Emperor, to be com- 
 municated or delivered to the Sovereign in such manner 
 as may be most convenient or agreeable to His Majesty to 
 receive it." 
 
 Something of mystery attaches to these letters. The 
 former, containing the "full power" is brusque, stiff and 
 ungracious. It contains one paragraph beginning — "The 
 Chinese love to trade with our people, and to sell them tea 
 and silk, for which our people pay silver, and sometimes 
 other articles" — which was certain to be regarded by the 
 Chinese authorities as either a studied insult to the Em- 
 peror, who never demeaned himself to recognize as a con- 
 sideration the profits of mere merchants, or as a colossal 
 breach of good manners by uncouth barbarians. The other 
 letter, briefer, is very different in tone and literary style.* 
 
 ♦This second letter is probably the one referred to in a communication from 
 Cushing to the State Department (June 27, 1843) after Webster's resignation 
 in which the commissioner encloses "a draft prepared by Mr. Webster of the 
 President's letter to the Emperor of China. Please submit it to Mr. Upshur for 
 the approval of the President and himself. It was Mr. Webster's plan to have 
 it copied in an ornamental form and placed in a suitable box." * 
 
PREPARATION FOR THE GUSHING MISSION 141 
 
 The other letter, the one which the commissioner upon 
 his arrival presented to show the authority vested in him 
 to conclude a treaty, and usually ascribed to Webster, was 
 more likely prepared by Mr. Upshur, and might have been 
 a serious handicap to Gushing in his initial efforts to estab- 
 lish cordial relations with the Chinese Government. It 
 was, in part, as follows : 
 
 "I, John Tyler, President of the United States of America — which 
 states are: Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Ehode Island, 
 Connecticut, Vermont, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Dela- 
 ware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, 
 Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, Louisiana, Indiana, Mississippi, Illinois, 
 Alabama, Missouri, Arkansas, and Michigan — send you this letter 
 of peace and friendship, signed by my own hand. 
 
 "I hope your health is good. . . . 
 
 "Now, my words are, that the governments of two such great 
 countries should be at peace. It is proper, and according to the will 
 of Heaven, that they should respect each other and act wisely. I 
 therefore send to your Court Caleb Cushing, one of the wise and 
 learned men of this country. On his first arrival in China, he will 
 enquire after your health. He has then strict orders to go to your 
 great city of Pekin, and there to deliver this letter. He will have with 
 him secretaries and interpreters. 
 
 ". . . Our Minister, Caleb Cushing, is authorized to make a treaty 
 to regulate trade. Let it be just. Let there be no unfair advantage 
 on either side. . . . We shall not take the part of evil-doers. We 
 shall not uphold them that break your laws. Therefore, we doubt not 
 that you will be pleased that our messenger of peace, with this letter 
 in his hand, shall come to Pekin, and there deliver it ; that your great 
 officers will, by your order, make a treaty with him to regulate affairs 
 of trade — so that nothing may happen to disturb the peace between 
 China and America. Let the treaty be signed by your own Imperial 
 hand. It shall be signed by mine, by the authority of our great coun- 
 cil, the Senate." 
 
 While the style and tone of this letter was hardly in 
 keeping with the instructions as to tact and courtesy, 
 nevertheless the veiled threat, implied in the conclusion, 
 was fully in harmony with the policy already fixed. The 
 last instruction to Cushing was: 
 
 "Finally, you will signify, in decided terms and a positive manner, 
 that the Government of the United States would find it impossible 
 to remain on terms of friendship and regard with the Emperor, if 
 greater privileges or commercial facilities should be allowed to the 
 subjects of any other Government than should be granted to the citi- 
 \E;ens of the United States." 
 
142 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Caleb Gushing Goes to Macao 
 
 The Ghina Mission as finally organized consisted of 
 Galeb Gushing, Commissioner; Fletcher Webster, Secre- 
 tary; Dr. E. K. Kane, afterwards known for his Arctic ex- 
 plorations. Surgeon; and a group of young men who went 
 on their own charges, "supplying dignity and importance 
 to the occasion," as Webster described it. The commis- 
 sioner's ofiicial costume consisted of the "uniform of a 
 major-general, with some slight additions in the way of 
 embroideries," a showiness much deprecated by some plain 
 Americans.^" The Mission arrived at Macao February 24, 
 1844, on the Brandywine, and Gushing established "his 
 miniature court in the house of a former Portuguese Gov- 
 ernor, creating a profound sensation by the novelty and 
 magnitude of his Mission, as well as by his attractive per- 
 sonal qualities." ^^ 
 
 On arrival Gushing added to his staff Rev. E. G. Bridg- 
 man, D. D., and. Rev. Peter Parker, M. D., who had been 
 in China since 1830 and 1834 respectively, as joint Chinese 
 secretaries. Later S. Wells Williams also assisted in the 
 Chinese correspondence. This was a somewhat reassuring 
 move, for these men had a better knowledge of the language 
 than any other Europeans in Canton at the time, and also 
 a better understanding of Chinese etiquette and modes of 
 thought, and the history of preceding American relations 
 with China. In addition t(j these qualifications they were 
 well known to the Chinese. Dr. Parker had won their re- 
 spect and confidence by his hospital, and Dr. Bridgman had 
 been so honored by former Commissioner Lin as to have 
 been invited to come to him for a special conference early 
 in 1839 with a view to securing his advice and good offices 
 in mitigating the acute difficulties which grew up over the 
 surrender of the opium. 
 
 Dr. Bridgman was also made official chaplain. Gushing 
 wrote to the New York Commercial Advertiser: ^^ 
 
 "The newspapers will have informed you that Dr. Bridgman and 
 Dr. Parker are joint interpreters. It ought to be understood in addi- 
 
PREPARATION FOR THE GUSHING MISSION 143 
 
 tion that Dr. Bridgman is chaplain of the legation in title and in fact. 
 I have deemed it essential to have religious services performed at the 
 residence of the legation every Lord's day and shall adhere to this 
 practice so long as my mission lasts." 
 
 Two months after Cushing's arrival ^^ an American 
 merchant of Canton wrote: 
 
 "Tour townsman, Mr. Gushing, is quietly living at Macao, pre- 
 paring, as he says, to go to Peking. When at Macao I had the honor 
 of seeing much of his excellency (Gushing) who has spurs on his 
 heels, and mustachios and imperial, very flourishing! Although I 
 like the man, I most heartily wish he were anywhere else but here and 
 am, as well as every other American merchant here, in great fear. As 
 Americans we are now on the very hest terms possible with the 
 Ghinese; and as the only connection we want with Ghina is a com- 
 mercial one, I cannot see what Mr. Gushing expects to do. He cannot 
 make us better ofl^ — and a very few of his important airs will make 
 us hated by the Ghinese, and then we lose all the advantages we now 
 have over the English; and though I believe Mr. G. to be as honest 
 as the most of politicians, yet I fear for the sake of being, as he 
 hopes, put face to face with Taoukwang (Emperor) he will sacrifice his 
 countrymen and the good will of the Ghinese and lose all." 
 
 The question raised by the American merchant was 
 pertinent. What could Gushing do that had not already 
 been done? The English were disposed to treat with de- 
 rision both the American and the French missions, the 
 coming of which had already been announced. The London 
 Times, in an article which was discussing the British Sup- 
 plementary Treaty of 1843, said:^* 
 
 "This treaty is looked upon in the East as the most signal triumph 
 of the British plenipotentiary, for it renders nugatory all the attempts 
 of the French and American diplomatic missions lately sent with such 
 pomp to the Ghinese coast. Laughter has already begun at the ap- 
 pearance of two ambassadors sent thither before it was known that 
 they would be received, in order to gain a purpose which was granted 
 before they appeared. They now have no grounds for negotiation 
 and must return to their own country in order to be laughed at at 
 home and abroad." 
 
 The situation was, indeed, quite unlike that in which the 
 American merchants in Canton, immediately after six 
 weeks imprisonment in the spring of 1839, had been led to 
 petition Congress to send out a commissioner to effect a 
 commercial treaty. 
 
144 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 BIBLIOGEAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. The three sources of information for Edmund Roberts are : The 
 
 Roberts Papers in the Department of State; the Roberts Papers 
 in the Library of Congress (Mss. Div.) ; and "Embassy to the 
 Eastern Courts of Cochin China, Siam and Muscat," by 
 Roberts himself, and published posthumously (New York, 
 1837). The book is the least satisfactory of these sources be- 
 cause the Department of State raised objections to its publica- 
 tion, and to comply with its wishes as regards secrecy, particu- 
 larly as to the plans for a treaty with Japan, a great deal of 
 information was suppressed. A partial report of his first mis- 
 sion was printed in the Congressional Globe. 
 
 2. Batavia Consular Letters, Vol. 1, Feb. 27, 1826. 
 
 3. PauUin's "American Naval Vessels in the Orient." 
 
 4. Text of the letters which are identical to each sovereign, 
 
 Robert's "Embassy, etc.," p. 204. 
 
 5. Miscellaneous Letters (Dept. of State), N. & G. Griswold to 
 
 Webster, May 13, 1843. 
 
 6. Op. cit. Eorbes to Webster, April 29, 1843; see also "Letters 
 
 and Recollections of John Murray Forbes," Vol. 1, p. 115. 
 
 7. Misc. Letters (Dept. of State), April 11, 1843. 
 
 8. S. Doc. 138:28-2; Webster's Works, Vol. 6, pp. 467-9. 
 
 9. China Dispatches, Vol. 1. 
 
 10. Mies' Register, July 15, 1843, p. 308. 
 
 11. S. Wells Williams' "Life and Letters," p. 126. 
 
 12. Niles' Register, August 3, 1844, p. 363. 
 
 13. Ihid., Sept. 21, 1844, p. 36. 
 
 14. Ihid., Feb. 10, 1844, p. 369. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE POLICY OF CALEB CUSHING 
 
 In taking up the discussion of the contribution of Caleb 
 Cushing to the body of American policy in Asia we are 
 again reminded of the fact that this policy at any given 
 date might more correctly be described as the policy of 
 Americans — a descrimination which need not be entirely 
 limited to American foreign policies in Asia. 
 
 Before the advent of Cushing at Macao in 1844, there 
 had been a sharply defined policy in China. It was the 
 policy of the American residents fully approved and sup- 
 ported by the opinion of the merchants in the United States 
 who were engaged in the China trade and shipping. This 
 policy had grown up out of the economic, geographical and 
 political necessities of the situation. The Americans had 
 had no other choice than to seek peace and pursue it. 
 Whether they would have adopted a different course had 
 China been a part of the mainland of the western hemi- 
 sphere is a purely speculative, though interesting, question. 
 The success which had attended the policy adopted was, 
 at any rate, a sufficient justification. There had been some 
 complaints of injustice and of discrimination but they had 
 been few and on the whole one could not claim that the 
 secondary commercial position occupied by the Americans 
 at Canton in 1844, or the fluctuating and uncertain growth 
 of the trade in the preceding twenty-five years was in any 
 way due to that policy. 
 
 In the United States during this period the fullest ex- 
 pression of policy towards the entire East India trade had 
 comprised nothing more than the demand for most-favored- 
 nation treatment. Within a decade, however, there had 
 grown up a public sentiment against the opium trade. One 
 
 145 
 
146 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 detects also in the discussions of the Anglo-Chinese War 
 the beginnings of a tone of resentment at Chinese arrogance. 
 To the growing restiveness of Americans at the exclusive 
 policy of the Government of China the American mis- 
 sionaries were making important contributions, as the pages 
 of the Chinese Repository clearly reveal. China must 
 'bend or break/ ^ remarked the missionaries in 1840; the 
 missionaries had never been able really to establish them- 
 selves under the existing regime. 
 
 Daniel Webster in his instructions to Gushing may be 
 said to have oflGLcialized existing public sentiment. One does 
 not find that in these instructions, fine as they are in diction 
 and spirit, Webster had made any contribution to the body 
 of policy. He asked primarily for most-favored-nation 
 treatment in matters of trade. To Caleb Gushing ex- 
 clusively was reserved the privilege and credit of working 
 out a method by which the Americans, whose geographical 
 and political relations to China must continue to be utterly 
 different from those of the British, might still enjoy similar 
 privileges. 
 
 The Negotiations 
 
 The political situation when Gushing reached Macao, 
 February 24, 1844, was as follows: (1) By two treaties, 
 that of Nanking (1842), and that of the Bogue (1843), 
 England had secured a peace with China granting, in ad- 
 dition to $21,000,000 and the cession of Hongkong, the 
 opening of four additional ports, the liberty to appoint 
 consuls to each of them, abolition of all monopolies, a 
 uniform published tariff, equality between officials of cor- 
 responding rank of the two countries, and an assent in 
 general terms to complete extraterritoriality. (2) By the 
 action of the Chinese Government, confirmed in a written 
 promise to Commodore Kearny, and executed by an Im- 
 perial edict, the ports had been thrown open to the trade 
 of all nations upon equal terms. Moreover, the Americans 
 were on the full tide of their greatest prosperity, at the 
 beginning of the clipper ship era, highly popular by com- 
 
THE POLICY OF CALEB GUSHING 147 
 
 parison with the English among the Chinese, and not at 
 all eager to have conditions disturbed by the introduction 
 of diplomatic questions which, even if settled entirely to 
 the liking of the Americans, could not make business any 
 better. 
 
 Nor was the American Mission welcomed by the Chinese \ 
 Government. The preceding October, in obedience to in- ; 
 structions from Washington, Paul S. Forbes, the newly ! f\ 
 appointed consul at Canton, had both formally and in- 
 formally conveyed to Kiying, the Imperial Commissioner 
 and Governor General of Kwang-tung and Kwangsi, that 
 the American Mission was on its way, only to be met with 
 the reply: "Why go to Peking when the Imperial Com- 
 missioner is already at Canton, and when the Americans 
 have already been given all the advantages in trade which 
 have been conceded to the English?" In the formal reply 
 to the official notification from Forbes, Kiying had stated : ^ 
 
 "The August Emperor, compassionating people froiu afar, cer- 
 tainly cannot bear that the American Minister by a circuitous route 
 should go to Peking, wading through over-flowing difficulties. The 
 Consul ought, therefore, to intercept and stop the American Pleni- 
 potentiary from repairing, in every respect unnecessary, to the Im- 
 perial Court." 
 
 This unwillingness and even fear on the part of the 
 Chinese for a foreign envoy to proceed to Peking was to 
 become the lever in the hands of Cushing, for the negotiat- 
 ing of the treaty. However, the concession of this point at 
 the outset, would have embarrassed all further negotiations. 
 Even before the arrival of the Brandywine at Macao a 
 general order to the members of the mission and the officers 
 and crew of the frigate had been issued, cautioning every- 
 one to be most discreet in answer to any questions, and 
 always to assert that the destination of the mission was 
 Peking. 
 
 Three days after the arrival at Macao (February 27), 
 Cushing addressed a formal letter to the acting Governor 
 General at Canton, Kiying having found it convenient to 
 retire to Peking, casually mentioning the fact that the 
 
148 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 American Plenipotentiary "finds, himself under the neces- 
 sity of landing at Macao and remaining there a few weeks, 
 until the Brandywine shall have taken on provisions and 
 made other preparations to enable her to continue her 
 voyage to the mouth of the Pei-ho." Gushing, therefore, 
 availed himself of the first opportunity, in pursuance of 
 orders from his government, to inquire solicitously after the 
 health of the Emperor, and he addressed his inquiry to the 
 Governor because, as Gushing was careful to state, he was 
 'the nearest high functionary of the Ghinese Government.' 
 The plenipotentiary intimated that an immediate answer 
 to his inquiry would be most acceptable. 
 
 Then followed a parley ^ which, save for the fact that it 
 is raised to diplomatic dignity, was otherwise not at all 
 dissimilar to a thousand daily passages in any bazaar in 
 Asia for forty centuries. This correspondence with the 
 acting Governor, explained Gushing, in a later dispatch to 
 the State Department, "not only proves to have had the 
 advantage of having settled many things, and thus prepared 
 the way for the negotiations with Kiying, but it has had 
 the further advantage of enabling me to say all the harsh 
 things which needed to be said, and to speak to the Ghinese 
 Government with extreme plainness and frankness, in a 
 degree which would have been inconvenient, if not inad- 
 missible, in immediate correspondence with Kiying." 
 
 Governor Ghing allowed Gushing's letter to go un- 
 answered for three weeks, and then replied that it "evinces 
 respectful obedience, and politeness exceedingly to be 
 praised. The Emperor is well and enjoying a happy old 
 age," wrote Ghing and added pointedly, "and is at peace 
 with all, both far and near." This touch was evidently to 
 show the American envoy that the government had not 
 overlooked the fact that the American Mission arrived in 
 a frigate. The Governor then took occasion to explain 
 to Gushing a few points in Ghinese diplomatic etiquette 
 and law. It was not customary for envoys to proceed to 
 Tientsin unless they were invited. There were no linguists 
 there, and no commissioners empowered to receive them. 
 
THE POLICY OF CALEB CUSHING 149 
 
 Even Sir Henry Pottinger, the English plenipotentiary, 
 after he had signed the Treaty of Nanking, had been forced 
 to return to Canton to negotiate the commercial agreement 
 such as, the Governor assumed, the Americans were alone 
 interested in. The Governor further reminded Gushing 
 that nearly six months ago the American consul at Canton 
 had been informed that it would be useless for the Ameri- 
 can envoy to go to Tientsin. And as for a treaty, the 
 Governor reasserted that such an agreement was quite 
 unnecessary. The nations were at peace, the tariff had been 
 settled, and ''already has your nation been bedewed with 
 its advantages." The Emperor had issued orders to soothe 
 and stop the Americans at Macao. "It is useless with 
 lofty, polished and empty words to alter these unlimited ad- 
 vantages." Nevertheless, if Gushing insisted, the Governor 
 would again memorialize the Emperor on the subject. 
 Meanwhile, for the Americans to proceed to the North 
 without Imperial permission would "put an end to civility." 
 
 Gushing promptly acknowledged the Governor's letter, 
 and regretted the impasse to which they seemed already to 
 have come. As for himself, he was under orders to proceed 
 to Peking. He was sorry that the Imperial Government 
 had neglected to have a commissioner waiting in the South 
 to receive him for it was quite possible that commercial, as 
 distinguished from political and diplomatic questions, might 
 be settled there as well as anywhere. But the most serious 
 obstacle, in Cushing's opinion, was the fact that he was, 
 obviously, quite unable to discuss these two questions of 
 the right to proceed to the Pei-ho and the necessity of a 
 treaty with any one save the Imperial Commissioner him- 
 self. 
 
 Ching replied, rather more promptly than before, that 
 he would memorialize the Emperor, and as for himself, he 
 could not take upon his shoulders "to commence move- 
 ments which may eventuate in the loss of the invaluable 
 blessings of peace." 
 
 Thus, in the first engagement, the American envoy had 
 won a point; the Emperor was to be memorialized. 
 
m AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 The correspondence, notwithstanding these obvious and 
 acknowledged disabilities of the correspondents, continued. 
 Ching notified Gushing (April 12) that no commissioner 
 had yet been appointed, and that the Americans would be 
 notified when the appointment was made. Gushing replied 
 the next day by sending the Brandywine up to Whampoa, 
 only twelve miles from Ganton, "on a visit, for a few days, 
 of courtesy and civility." The commander of the frigate 
 carried the matter a little further by proposing a suitable 
 exchange of salutes, and by inviting himself to visit the 
 Governor at his yamen in the city of Ganton. Ghing, evi- 
 dently alarmed, and yet with the customary show of 
 Ghinese ofiicial bravado, ordered the Brandywine to return 
 to Macao, and remarked rather tartly, that the visit of such 
 a formidably armed vessel was a strange exhibition of cour- 
 tesy, and had a very war-like bearing. 
 
 Meanwhile Gushing continued the unofiicial correspond- 
 ence. He reviewed the situation and ventured to give the 
 Governor a little instruction in the rules of international 
 courtesy. A refusal to receive envoys is, among Western 
 1 nations, considered as "an act of national insult and a just 
 t cause for war." The analogy between the course pursued 
 with Sir Henry Pottinger and the one the Ghinese were 
 seeking to adopt with him, would hardly be complete until 
 I the Americans had fought a war with Ghina, and had oc- 
 ] cupied one of the islands of! the Ghinese coast. He re- 
 ^ minded the Governor that the season was already passing, 
 that he had already waited a long time, that no Imperial 
 Gommissioner had even been appointed, and that he did 
 not intend to be held at Ganton until the favorable season 
 for sailing to the North had passed with the changing of 
 the monsoon. This drew an immediate reply from Ghing 
 that Kiying had been appointed as Imperial Gommissioner 
 and would arrive at Ganton in due time. 
 
 The second engagement of mighty words, supported by 
 he movements of the Brandywine, had resulted in another 
 victory for the Americans. 
 
 Gushing pursued the advantage. He chose to feel that 
 
 4 
 
THE POLICY OF CALEB CUSHING 151 
 
 he had been grossly insulted, and that the national honor 
 of the Americans had been affected. However, Gushing 
 "suspends all resentment" for the time being, and hoped 
 that ''suitable reparation will be made in due time." "I 
 commit myself," he wrote solemnly, "to the integrity and 
 honor of the Chinese Government; and if, in the sequel, 
 I shall prove to have done this in vain, I shall then consider 
 myself the more amply justified, in the sight of all men, 
 for any determination which, out of regard for the honor 
 of the United States, it may be my duty to adopt under 
 such circumstances." The next day he notified the Gov- 
 ernor that the St. Louis and Perry which had unfortunately 
 been detained at the Cape of Good Hope, would soon arrive, 
 and that the American Government had decided to enlarge 
 the fleet in Chinese waters by the addition of the Pacific 
 Squadron which was also soon to arrive. 
 
 The addition of the Pacific Squadron to Cushing's fleet 
 had been suggested to the President before Cushing's de- 
 parture from the United States, and Gushing had again 
 proposed it in a dispatch to the State Department before 
 his arrival in China. Other dispatches show that Gushing 
 had been greatly annoyed that during these early negotia- 
 tions there had not been a larger naval force at his com- 
 mand. It is not impossible that had the fleet been adequate 
 and suitably provided with vessels of light draught, such 
 as are necessary for the approach to Tientsin, he might 
 already have sailed to the North. If so, it was a happy 
 mischance that detained him at Macao. 
 
 Ching stated (May 4) that Kiying had already left 
 Peking, was travelling with incredible speed, and might be 
 expected at Canton on the fifth of June. 
 
 The interval before the arrival of Kiying was devoted 
 to still further threats, mingled with courteous correspond- 
 ence. The Imperial edict making known the appointment 
 of Kiying mentioned the fact that the United States had 
 never gone through the form of paying tribute to the Em- 
 peror, and made clear that Gushing had the choice between 
 remaining at Macao and securing the desired treaty, or 
 
152 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 going to Tientsin and failing to get it. The appointment 
 of Kiying was taken by the Americans as a favorable sign 
 for Kiying had negotiated the English treaties, had been 
 much in contact with the foreigners, and was greatly re- 
 spected for his breadth of view, as well as for his urbanity. 
 Therefore Gushing agreed to defer the discussion of the pro- 
 posed trip to the North, and although still complaining of 
 the inconveniences to which he had been subjected, settled 
 down to wait for Kiying. The latter wrote to him (June 9) : 
 "In a few days we shall take each other by the hand, and 
 converse, and rejoice together with indescribable delight." 
 The American commissioner appeared to have won in the 
 first skirmish of wits. 
 
 A not unimportant factor in the successful conclusion 
 of these first stages in the negotiations had been the fact, 
 made clear unofficially in the beginning by Dr. Peter Parker, 
 in whom the Chinese had great confidence, and later by 
 Gushing in the correspondence, that the American Govern- 
 ment had no desire to dismember Ghina or to possess any 
 part of her territory. 
 
 The actual negotiations of the treaty with China were 
 simple. Kiying was eager to conclude them before the 
 arrival of the French plenipotentiary, whose approach had 
 been announced, and the Americans had already prepared 
 a draft of the document which they desired to have signed. 
 Kiying arrived at the temple of the Lady of Mercy, just 
 outside Macao, on June 17. The next few days were given 
 to the customary visits of ceremony. Then the commis- 
 sioners delegated to their subordinates the task of conferring 
 together, and on July 3, the treaty was signed. 
 
 In submitting his project of the proposed treaty, Gush- 
 ing had written to Kiying: 
 
 "In drawing up these minutes, I have not looked to the side of the 
 United States alone. I felt that it would not be honorable, in dealing 
 with your Excellency, to take a partial view of the subject. I have 
 inserted a multitude of provisions in the interest and for the benefit 
 of China. In a word I have sought to present this draft of a treaty 
 which, as already intimated, shall be in all parts alike just and honor- 
 able to China and the United States." 
 
THE POLICY OF CALEB GUSHING 153 
 
 The Immediate Application of the Principles 
 OF THE Treaty 
 
 An incident at Canton before the arrival of Kiying had 
 threatened to embarrass the negotiations, and the ready- 
 willingness of the Americans to respect the prejudices of the 
 Chinese had doubtless left a favorable impression. The 
 mission had been supplied as a part of its equipment with 
 a flag-staff which was intended for erection over the Lega- 
 tion, but when Cushing established himself at Macao it was 
 impracticable to set it up, owing to the objection of the 
 Portuguese authorities. The flag-staff was therefore turned 
 over to the American consul at Canton, and placed in front 
 of the consulate. The staff was surmounted with an arrow 
 for a weather-vane which caused great alarm to the people 
 of the city. To its mysterious influence was ascribed the 
 serious drought then prevailing in Canton, and some also 
 found in the arrow a symbol of approaching war between 
 the United States and China. At length a Chinese mob 
 broke into the factory grounds, cut the halyards, damaged 
 the staff and sought to remove the arrow. The Americans 
 defended the staff and repulsed the mob with fire-arms. 
 The next day a second mob collected. Of such incidents are 
 wars sometimes born, but in this case the American consul 
 agreed to remove the arrow.'^ 
 
 The episode was sufficient to illustrate the insecurity 
 of the foreigners at Canton, however many treaties they 
 might negotiate. Shortly after the removal of the obnoxious 
 weather-vane a mob attacked some Americans who, in 
 defending themselves, accidentally killed a Chinese — Hsii 
 A-man. Governor Ching, who had himself been negligent 
 in providing protection from the mob, demanded that the 
 Americans surrender the murderer. The matter was re- 
 ferred to Cushing and Kiying. The former refused to de- 
 liver the man, ordered the calling of a jury of Americans, 
 and the trial of the case according to American law. The 
 jury rendered a verdict of acquittal on the ground of self- 
 defense, Kiying accepted the settlement, Subsequently, 
 
154 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 though not as a part of the judicial action in the case, the 
 family of Hsii A-man received some money from the Amer- 
 icans.^ This incident again illustrated the danger to which 
 the foreigners in Canton were exposed, and was the means 
 of securing from the authorities the promise of better pro- 
 vision for the protection of the factories — a promise which 
 was never fulfilled. 
 
 The Canton rabble, incited by minor officials and the 
 literati, were in an angry mood which boded ill for the 
 future. Kiying confessed his great difficulty in controlling 
 the people of the city and explained to Cushing that the 
 English had created a great deal of ill-will. "I have heard," 
 he wrote, ''that usually the citizens of Canton have respected 
 and liked the officers and people of the United States, as 
 they were peaceable and reasonable; that they (the Ameri- 
 cans) would, even when there was a cause of difference, 
 endeavor to accommodate the matter, which is very unlike 
 the English." 
 
 Cushing seized upon the Hsii A-man affair to establish a 
 precedent in the matter of jurisdiction over Americans 
 accused by Chinese, and to demonstrate the principle of 
 extraterritoriality, as it was incorporated in the new treaty. 
 He also used it as an argument to have placed in the 
 treaty very clear stipulations that the Chinese Govern- 
 ment must assume the responsibility for the protection of 
 Americans. 
 
 Before the American commissioner returned to the 
 United States an occasion arose in which Kiying called upon 
 the Americans for a demonstration of good faith, and re- 
 ceived it. Before the treaty had been made two American 
 ship-builders, Emery and Erazer, had leased some land op- 
 posite Hongkong, on the north side of the harbor, for a 
 ship-yard. Kiying called Cushing's attention to the fact 
 that the treaty did not provide for the leasing of land by 
 foreigners at this place and asked for his good offices in 
 securing the removal of the ship-yard. It was evident that 
 the Chinese feared that this lease-hold might some day 
 become the base for another foreign settlement. Cushing 
 
THE POLICY OF CALEB CUSHING 155 
 
 therefore, advised the Americans to relinquish their loca- 
 tion, securing for them six months in which to find another 
 one. To this Emery and Grazer agreed. 
 
 The primary object of the Mission had been accom- 
 plished in the signing of the treaty. The fulfillment of the 
 secondary purpose, the visit to Peking and the delivery of 
 the President's letter to the Emperor, greatly troubled 
 Gushing. Shortly after the arrival of Kiying at Macao in 
 June, Gushing had formally waived the right to go to 
 Peking, provided the treaty was signed, but had made a 
 reservation, viz., that if in the future any other envoy was 
 received at Peking, the Americans should have a similar 
 privilege. At the time he made this concession to the 
 Ghinese he supposed that he was on very safe ground for 
 he knew that the French plenipotentiary was approaching, 
 and he assumed that as a matter of course, France would 
 demand the reception of its envoy at the Gourt. After 
 the treaty was signed, but before the arrival of the French 
 Mission, Gushing secured from Kiying a promise to deliver 
 the President's letter to the Emperor, and later transferred 
 it to the Ghinese commissioner with suitable ceremony. 
 
 Greatly to Gushing's surprise the French, upon their 
 arrival, communicated to him that they had no instruc- 
 tions to insist upon a visit to Peking except in extraordinary 
 circumstances. Gushing, on the other hand, felt that his 
 instructions to proceed to Peking were "peremptory." True 
 the treaty had been obtained, but there seems to have been 
 the fear in Gushing's mind that the failure to carry out the 
 remainder of his instructions might be counted to his dis- 
 credit upon his return to the United States, and he there- 
 fore made his explanations for not going to the Gapital the 
 subject of several passages in his dispatches. His principal 
 argument was that a visit to Peking would have delayed, 
 if not imperilled, the negotiations for the treaty, and now 
 that the treaty had been signed, he considered that the best 
 interests of the mission would be served by his immediate 
 return to the United States where he could supplement by 
 personal explanation, anything which might be lacking in 
 
156 AMERICANS IK EASTERN ASIA 
 
 his dispatches to secure the immediate ratification of the 
 treaty. Incidentally the appropriation which had been 
 made for the expenses of the mission was entirely ex- 
 hausted. He therefore appointed Commander Foxhall A. 
 Parker as Charge, with power to attend to any diplomatic 
 questions which might arise, while Dr. Peter Parker, the 
 medical missionary, assumed the responsibility of acting as 
 official interpreter without salary. Cushing embarked on 
 the Perry August 24, 1844. 
 
 One other object of the mission, an object mentioned in 
 no instructions, remained unaccomplished. Shortly after 
 the signing of the treaty Cushing offered to Kiying some 
 models of guns and some books on military and naval 
 tactics, and fortifications, delicately expressing the opinion 
 that such information might be of value to China in the 
 future. The Chinese, however, were not ready, even after 
 their humiliating military defeats, to concern themselves 
 with the trappings of modern militarism, and Kiying replied 
 politely declining the gifts, expressing the conviction that 
 peace for China was assured, and adding: "If at a future 
 day there be occasion to use them, then we ought to request 
 your Honorable Nation to assist us with the strength of 
 its arm." 
 
 Throughout the entire negotiations the relations be- 
 tween Cushing and Kiying bore all the outward marks of 
 extreme cordiality and good feeling. The latter in his fare- 
 well letter to the American envoy wrote : 
 
 "I present my compliments and wishes that wherever you go 
 happiness may attend you, and that day by day you may advance in 
 promotion." 
 
 Imagine then the amazement of Cushing and of the 
 other Americans as well, when a few months later a copy 
 of Kiying's memorial report to the Emperor fell into the 
 hands of the foreigners and, when translated, was found to 
 contain the following: 
 
 "The original copy of the Treaty presented by the said Barbarian 
 Envoy, contained forty-seven stipulations. Of these some were diffi- 
 
THE POLICY OF CALEB CUSHING 157 
 
 cult of execution, others were foolish demands, whilst several of the 
 most important points of the Treaty were omitted on the list. The 
 sense of it was, moreover, so meanly and coarsely expressed, the words 
 and sentences were so obscure, and there was such a variety of errors, 
 that it was next to impossible to point them out. 
 
 "We clearly pointed out whatever was comprehensive to reason, in 
 order to dispel their stupid ignorance, and to put a stop to (delusive) 
 hopes, whilst expatiating with strictness upon the most binding of the 
 statutes, while we were obliged to polish those passages which were 
 scarcely intelligible, so as to render the sense somewhat more obvious, 
 in order to remove all ambiguity ; and only after four times altering 
 the copies, we adopted (the paper)." 
 
 Kiying also pointed out to the Emperor that in the 
 article in the treaty which purported to grant to the Ameri- 
 cans the privileges of renting property in the five ports he 
 had inserted a qualifying clause which made the renting of 
 such property dependent upon the willingness of the neigh- 
 bors to receive foreigners. 
 
 This report gives a fair intimation of what was to come 
 in the next fifteen years when Chinese officials, sometimes 
 friendly to foreigners and sometimes not, but always intent 
 on retaining the favor of an ill-informed and anti-foreign 
 Emperor, attempted to transact the international affairs 
 of the Chinese Empire. As for the concession in the article 
 of the treaty securing the rights of renting property, it soon 
 became evident that Cushing, in his excess of amiability, had 
 permitted himself to be completely hoodwinked by the wily 
 Kiying. 
 
 The only known contemporaneous Chinese account of 
 the negotiation of the Treaty of Wanghia is the following: ^ 
 
 "The English desired that leaders of all nations should report to 
 them first, and then pay duties ; but the French and Americans indig- 
 nantly exclaimed: — 'We are no dependencies of England nor have we 
 been "treacherous and lying." ' On this, some American ship-of-war 
 entered port, and a few mont- later, some Frenchmen too. Both 
 of them submitted letters, begging to pay tribute, and to be allowed 
 to express their devotion at an interview. They also requested to be 
 allowed to leave their ships in the South, whilst the tribute-envoys 
 and a small suite went overland to Peking; for they wished to make 
 some confidential suggestions and to assist us." 
 
158 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 " (^ Superior Advantages of the Gushing Treaty 
 
 In conducting the negotiations with the Chinese for the 
 first American treaty, Cushing had the double advantage of 
 the experience of the English and the good will of the 
 Chinese. Sir Henry Pottinger had been the pioneer. His 
 efforts had been incorporated in the Treaty of Nanking, the 
 Treaty of the Bogue, and the Regulations for Trade which, 
 while first promulgated by the Chinese alone, were signed 
 by both the Chinese and the English commissioners, and in- 
 corporated as a part of the treaty agreement between the 
 two nations. Before Cushing began the negotiations lead- 
 ing up to the American Treaty of Wanghia the arrangements 
 of the English with the Chinese had been subjected to a 
 working test in which their weakness as well as their 
 strength had been revealed. Of even greater advantage to 
 the American negotiations was the fact that th,e Chinese, 
 while bitterly resenting the defeats they had suffered at the 
 hands of the English, had already*>come to see the advantage 
 of having the good will of other Western nations. While 
 not fully understanding the benefits which would, come to 
 them later from having admitted into their international 
 relationship a strong nation whose national interests in 
 China coincided at many points with Chinese national 
 well-being, nevertheless the Chinese were not altogether un- 
 conscious of the probable effects. This is evident from the 
 fact that even before signing the Treaty -of- Nanking in '1842 
 they had deternlined to throw open th^ trade on equal terms 
 to all nations. 
 
 The Chinese, notwithstanding their show of bravado at 
 the approach of Cushing at Macao, had ^een cowed by 
 their defeat. The American commissioner,_had no English 
 war preceded his efforts, might have perfected ^arrangements 
 in which the position of the Americans in China would have 
 been slightly bettered. Certainly the Americans in Canton 
 in the summer of 1839, after Commissioner Lin had begun 
 direct communications with the American consul, thought, 
 so. Possibly had the United States joined in a naval dem- 
 
THE POLICY OF CALEB CUSHING 159 
 
 onstration on the coast of China with England and France, 
 as the memorial of the Canton merchants (May 25, 1839) 
 to Congress had advised, some sort of diplomatic relations 
 between China and the Western powers might have be^ 
 established.* But that such sweeping concessions as the 
 English had obtained, aside from the indemnity and the 
 cession of Hongkong, could have been secured otherwise 
 than as a result of military victory over the Chinese, is not 
 to be thought of. These concessions, obtained for the Eng- 
 lish by force of arms, became freely the possession of the 
 Americans. On the other hand, had the Americans chosen 
 to regard the attack on the American flag-staff at Canton in 
 June, 1844, as a cause for war, they could have doubtless, on 
 the conclusion of war, exacted any terms they liked from 
 the Chinese Government. It became ingloriously, yet very 
 profitably, the role of the United States pacifically to follow 
 England to China in the wake of war, and to profit greatly 
 by the victories of British arms. 
 
 There had been, however, no alternative for the United 
 States, save that of continuing the American trade in China 
 without a treaty, and that would have meant trade under 
 the aegis of England. So far as China was concerned, while 
 Caleb Cushing won several additional concessions from 
 China, and won them by a method hardly to be distinguished 
 from intimidation, nevertheless the treaty with the United 
 States was an anchor to windward for the Empire. In so far 
 as the Chinese Government was conscious of what was being 
 achieved, the signing of the Treaty of Wanghia may be 
 described as a brilliant stroke of diplomacy. The subse- 
 quent history of China's international relations, with the 
 United States eliminated, would have been quite different 
 from what it actually was. 
 
 It ought to be added, as a preface to the comparison of 
 the British and American treaties, that the United States 
 had an advantage over the English in the ability of its 
 
 *The Memorial of R. B. Forbes and others, H. Doc. 40 :26-l, had expressed 
 in conclusion, the "candid conviction that the appearance of a naval force from 
 the United States, England and Prance upon the coast of China, would, without 
 bloodshed, obtain from this Government such acknowledgments and treaties, etc." 
 
160 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 commissioner. As a negotiator and a writer of legal docu- 
 ments Sir Henry Pottinger was no match for the clever 
 New England lawyer. In estimating the Treaty of Wanghia 
 an effort ought to be made to put one's self in the place of 
 the Chinese and seek to determine the extent in which the 
 document was fair and just to the Empire. Such an esti- 
 mate, however, must not detract from the credit due to the 
 negotiator in whose hands were placed the commercial and 
 political interests of the United States. Caleb Cushing was 
 charged with making the best possible terms for his client. 
 That is to say, he was to make a treaty which would give 
 to American commercial interests in China the best possible 
 opportunities for the prosecution of their growing trade in 
 the face of British competition. No one can deny, after a 
 comparison of the documents, that in the Treaty of Wanghia 
 those interests were extremely well served. 
 
 The Superior Advantages of the Cushing Treaty 
 
 As a basis for the conduct of trade the American treaty 
 was greatly superior to the English agreements, made by 
 Sir Henry Pottinger ; so superior that it became immediately 
 the model for the French treaty, negotiated a few weeks 
 later, and also for the treaty with Norway and Sweden, 
 signed March 29, 1847. The superior provisions of the 
 American treaty also immediately won the approval of the 
 English and were largely used by them. Indeed the Cushing 
 treaty became the basis of China's international relations 
 until it was superseded in 1858 by the treaties of Tientsin. 
 
 From the English treaties the Americans already enjoyed 
 the following concessions: (1) The opening of four addi- 
 tional ports, and the rights of residence in these ports for the 
 transaction of business. (2) The right of equality in con- 
 sular and diplomatic intercourse. (3) A lowering of the 
 tonnage dues to less than one tenth of what had formerly 
 been paid, and a reduction of duties, confirmed by a pub- 
 lished tariff, of from one half to seven eighths of the former 
 charges. (4) The abolition of all monopolies, such as the 
 
THE POLICY OF CALEB CUSHING 161 
 
 co-hong. (5) Sweeping concessions of extraterritorial 
 rights. On the other hand, by means of the "most-favored- 
 nation" clause in the Treaty of the Bogue (Article 8) the 
 EngHsh inherited many additional advantages secured from 
 the Treaty of Wanghia. Sir John Francis Davis, who suc- 
 ceeded Sir Henry Pottinger, as British Minister and Super- 
 intendent of Trade, acknowledged the following: '^ (1) 
 Merchant ships might remain two days at any one of the 
 five ports without paying duties, provided they did not dis- 
 charge any cargo. (2) Having paid tonnage . duties ships 
 could go to another port without having to pay such duties 
 a second time. (3) Having landed cargo and having paid 
 the duties, they could reship it to another port and enter 
 it without duty by means of a customs house certificate. 
 
 (4) Permission was obtained for the employment of Chinese 
 as teachers for the foreigners and for the purchase of books. 
 
 (5) It was stipulated that the treaty might be reconsidered 
 for purposes of revision after twelve years from the date of 
 the American treaty. 
 
 The first three of the above items obviously made for 
 greater flexibility in the division of the foreign trade be- 
 tween the newly opened ports, especially in the early years 
 when the trade possibilities of each port were being ex- 
 plored. They also opened the door part way for a coasting 
 trade between the treaty ports in foreign vessels. The Eng- 
 lish had expected that Hongkong would serve at once as a 
 bonded warehouse for their entire China trade, and also as 
 a distributing point. These provisions were ingenious de- 
 vices of Cushing's by which the Americans could secure 
 advantages such as the British had expected to obtain by 
 the cession of territory. 
 
 The permission to employ Chinese teachers and purchase 
 Chinese books, while of general advantage to the merchants 
 and to the foreign governments in that it made possible the 
 development of a competent staff of interpreters and ad- 
 visers, was also of peculiar advantage to the missionaries 
 who hitherto had been able to study the Chinese language 
 and literature only surreptitiously. 
 
162 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 The American article providing for the revision of the 
 treaty after twelve years, which was also incorporated into 
 the French treaty a few weeks later, and on which the 
 Powers rested their claims for the negotiation of new treaties 
 in 1856, will be discussed subsequently more in detail. 
 
 Extraterritoriality 
 
 The doctrine of extraterritoriality received amplification 
 and greater precision of statement in the Treaty of Wanghia. 
 Owing to Chinese reluctance to grant it, or to objections in 
 England to the doctrine, Pottinger had not included it in 
 either the Treaty of Nanking, or that of the Bogue. The 
 only mention of the concession was in the Regulations of 
 Trade, Article 13 of which read : 
 
 "Regarding the punishment of English criminals, the English 
 Government will enact the laws necessary to attain that end and 
 the Consul will be empowered to put them into force: and regarding 
 the punishment of Chinese criminals, these will be tried and punished 
 by their own laws, in the way provided for by the correspondence 
 which took place at Nanking after the concluding of the peace." 
 
 From the phrasing of this article it is clear, even though 
 there were no other proof, that the doctrine in substance, 
 even though not included in the treaty, had been one of the 
 concessions obtained by Sir Henry Pottinger as a fruit of the 
 English victory.^ 
 
 The correspondence referred to was never made public* 
 The rights of extraterritoriality in the American treaty 
 were defined in two articles. 
 
 "Article XXI. Subjects of China who may be guilty of any 
 criminal act towards the citizens of the United States shall be arrested 
 and punished by the Chinese authorities according to the laws of 
 China; and citizens of the United States who may commit any crirne 
 
 *In the final instructions issued by Lord Palmerston to Charles Elliot," the 
 concession of extraterritoriality was outlined in Art. VII of the substitute 
 articles which were to be inserted in the proposed treaty with China in case the 
 British representatives were unable to secure the cession to Great Britain of 
 any islands. From the facts of the final settlement it may therefore be inferred 
 that in 1842 the Chinese Government preferred to cede Hongkong rather than 
 to grant extraterritoriality. It would also appear as though Lord Palmerston 
 regarded the possession of a military and administrative base on the coast of 
 China as, at least in part, a substitute for the concession of extraterritorial 
 privileges. 
 
THE POLICY OF CALEB CUSHING 163 
 
 in China shall be tried and punished only by the Consul, or other 
 public functionary of the United States, thereto authorized, according 
 to the laws of the United States . . ." 
 
 And 
 
 "Article XXV. All questions in regard to rights, whether of 
 property or person, arising between citizens of the United States 
 and China, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of, and regulated by 
 the authorities of their own Government." 
 
 And this article also adds: 
 
 "And all controversies occurring in China between the citizens of 
 the United States and the subjects of any other Government shall be 
 regulated by the treaties existing between the United States and 
 such Governments, respectively, without interference on the part of 
 China." 
 
 A provision which had not been legalized before. 
 
 It is interesting to note that the extraterritorial pro- 
 visions of the Treaty of Wanghia were not inserted at the 
 demand of the American merchants. The Forbes memorial 
 (May 25, 1839) which had outlined what seemed to the 
 American merchants important in a possible treaty, asked 
 for something very much less than Gushing secured. The 
 sixth article of the memorial read: 
 
 "That until the Chinese laws are distinctly made known and 
 recognized, the punishment for wrongs committed by foreigners upon 
 the Chinese, or others, shall not be greater than is applicable to the 
 like offense by the laws of the United States or England; nor shall 
 any punishment be inflicted by the Chinese authorities upon any 
 foreigner, until the guilt of the party shall have been fairly and 
 clearly proven." 
 
 Gushing made the general subject and the precise stipu- 
 lation of extraterritoriality in the Treaty of Wanghia the 
 matter of a long and detailed dispatch to the Secretary of 
 State, John G. Galhoun,^*' in which the reasons for the con- 
 cession are explained in detail. The most immediate reason [ 
 was that such a concession had already been made to the 
 English . Gushing wrote : 
 
 "I found that Great Britain had stipulated for the absolute exemp- 
 tion of her subjects from the jurisdiction of the Empire, while the 
 
 H O 
 
"^, 
 
 i 
 
 164 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Portuguese attained the same object through their own local juris- 
 diction at Macao. And in addition to all the other considerations 
 affecting the question, I reflected how ignominious would be the con- 
 dition of Americans in China, if subjected to local jurisdiction, 
 whilst the English and Portuguese among them were exempt from it." 
 
 Starting with this fact, or possibly seeking to underlay 
 the concession already obtained with substantial legal and 
 ethical principles, Gushing found them in the character of 
 the relations which China had sustained towards Western 
 nations, and in the more conspicuous incidents of the past, 
 particularly the Terranova case, where such a provision as 
 he inserted into the Treaty of Wanghia would have served 
 better the ends of justice. 
 
 While China could not be classified with the Moham- 
 medan States where the doctrine of extraterritoriality had 
 long been applied, on the ground that China, like them, was 
 uncivilized, the Empire could be placed with them as a 
 State which did not recognize the 'law of nations.' This 
 was proved, wrote Cushing, by the following facts: The 
 Chinese attempt to apply Chinese law to visiting foreign 
 war vessels ; their authorities have subjected foreign consuls 
 to personal restraint; they disregard the flag of truce; and 
 they demand, at Court, the kowtow. The states of Christ- 
 endom, said Cushing, as distinguished from the Mohamme- 
 dan and pagan states, have many of the qualities of a 
 confederated republic. 
 
 "How different is the condition of things out of the limits of 
 Christendom! From the greater part of Asia and Africa individual 
 Christians are utterly excluded, either by the sanguinary barbarism of 
 the inhabitants, or by their phrenzied bigotry, or by the narrow- 
 minded policy of their governments; to their courts the ministers of 
 Christian governments have no means of access except by force and at 
 the head of fleets and armies; as between them and us, there is no 
 community of ideas, no common law of nations, no interchange of 
 good offices ; and it is only during the present generation that treaties, 
 most of them imposed by force of arms or by terror, have begun to 
 bring down the great Mohammedan and Pagan Governments into a 
 state of inchoate peaceful association with Christendom. 
 
 "To none of the governments of this character, as it seemed to me, 
 was it safe to commit the lives and liberties of the citizens of the 
 United States." 
 
THE POLICY OF CALEB CUSHING 165 
 
 This argument derived its most impelling force from 
 the Terranova case * in 1821, which had been such a trav- 
 esty on justice. 
 
 It would appear, however, that the significance of this 
 carefully drawn provision of the Gushing treaty is to be 
 found in Cushing's purpose in this matter, as in reexporta- 
 tion and the coasting trade, to secure for the Americans 
 guarantees of actual most-favored-nation treatment without 
 the acquisition of a military and naval base like Hongkong. 
 Extraterritoriality was in a measure, as Lord Palmerston 
 seems to have recognized in 1839, a substitute for the perma- 
 nent occupation of territory. 
 
 The profound and brilliant legal mind of the American 
 commissioner found in this complex legal question of per- 
 sonal versus territorial jurisdiction a subject entirely to his 
 taste, and the result, as defined in the two articles of the 
 Treaty of Wanghia, was to Gushing a matter of no little 
 pride. 
 
 Responsibility Placed on the Ghinese 
 
 Another superiority of the American treaty which was 
 subsequently acknowledged and adopted by the English, 
 was in the locating of responsibility for the collection of 
 duties. Here again Gushing was applying his general policy. 
 The second article of the Treaty of Nanking stipulated as a 
 duty of the Gonsul "to see that the just dues and other dues 
 of the Ghinese Government, as hereinafter provided for, are 
 duly discharged by Her Britannic Majesty's subjects." In 
 the Treaty of the Bogue England assumed additional 
 responsibilities to assist the Ghinese Government in the 
 suppression of smuggling. This provision was an inherit- 
 ance from the days before the treaties, and even from 
 before the dissolution of the East India Gompany monopoly 
 
 * V. K. Wellington Koo, in his exposition of the Status of Aliens in China, 
 although examining all of the other cases of the alleged homicide by foreigners 
 which he finds entirely unjustifiable as a basis for the doctrine of extraterri- 
 toriality, unfortunately omits all discussion of the Terranova case, perhaps the 
 worst exhibition of the exercise of Chinese jurisdiction over foreigners, and 
 certainly the most compelling argument among Americans for the provision in 
 the Treaty of Wanghia. 
 
166 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 at Canton, when the Chinese authorities were accustomed 
 to hold the English superintendent responsible for the con- 
 duct of his countrymen. To the Chinese, accustomed as 
 they were to having all merchants secured by a guarantor, 
 the British provisions were a satisfactory arrangement. 
 They might also be considered as a correlative proposition 
 to the doctrine of extraterritoriality, since it was over the 
 payment of dues and duties that the offenses of foreigners 
 were most likely to arise. But in practice it made the 
 foreign government responsible for the enforcement of the 
 Chinese customs laws, and it became therefore very dis- 
 tasteful. 
 
 "Under the Treaty of Nanking," writes a British historian, "the 
 British consuls were to assist the Chinese in the enforcement of the 
 regulations; the only result of this was to penalize British subjects 
 who were fined by their own consuls for offenses which other foreigners 
 committed with impunity." " 
 
 That the English were not unwilling to adopt the pro- 
 visions of the American treaty with reference to smuggling 
 must be evident from the following letter from Sir Henry 
 Pottinger to Kiying, October 11, 1843, in answer to a com- 
 plaint from the latter that men from an English vessel had 
 landed on the Chinese coast outside any treaty port and 
 distributed hand bills announcing that they had 'woolens, 
 miscellaneous articles, opium in large and small balls, etc./ 
 for sale.^- 
 
 "I have more than ten times previously explained to your Excel- 
 lency and the other high Chinese officers, that the great and final 
 remedy for this disobedience and evil rests in the hands of the local 
 authorities; and I am most happy to observe that the remedy was 
 applied on this occasion. I allude to the people of the country being 
 carefully restrained from dealing or holding intercourse with the 
 vessels. If this rule be only rigidly enforced, the object is gained." 
 
 It is to be noted that this letter was written more than 
 six months before the negotiations of the Treaty of 
 Wanghia began, and the principle here laid down by the 
 British Minister is the' one incorporated in the American 
 treaty, viz., Chinese authorities must do their own policing. 
 
THE POLICY OF CALEB CUSHING 167 
 
 ,The Treaty of Wanghia completely freed the consul from 
 responsibility in this matter, by stipulating (Article 13) that 
 the duties should be paid in cash, either in sycee silver, or 
 in foreign currency. Perhaps in the long run it was better 
 that China should not delegate, or be allowed to delegate, 
 the responsibility which properly belonged to the Empire as 
 a sovereign state, for the enforcement of its own laws, but 
 the immediate effect of the provision was merely that the 
 Government of the United States evaded responsibility for 
 the smuggling carried on by its citizens. The Gushing treaty 
 was, in practice, the smugglers' delight, conferring even 
 more extended privileges in that regard than did the pos- 
 session of Hongkong. 
 
 The American treaty definitely specified that communi- 
 cations to Peking might be made not only through the 
 medium of the Imperial Commissioner at Canton (Article 
 31) but also, when necessary, through the Governor General 
 of the Liang Kwang, or that of the Liang Kiang. This 
 provision also was made use of by the English officials, ten 
 years later, when the Imperial Commissioner obstinately 
 refused to see them. 
 
 Divergence from British Policy 
 
 A comparison of the American and the British treaties 
 also shows a. marked divergence of the policies between the 
 two Western powers towards China. 
 
 Both in the text of the Treaty of Wanghia and in the 
 annexed tariff, opium is specifically mentioned as contra- 
 band, and any opium smuggler is made liable to arrest and 
 to the penalty of confiscation for both cargo and the vessel 
 detected in carrying it. The text was (Article 33) : 
 
 "Citizens of the TJnited States who shall attempt to trade clandes- 
 tinely with such of the ports of China as are not open to foreign 
 commerce, or who shall trade in opium or any other contraband 
 articles of merchandise, shall be subject to be dealt with by the 
 Chinese Government without being entitled to any countenance or 
 protection from that of the United States; and the United States 
 will take measures to prevent their flag from being abused by the 
 
168 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 subjects of other nations as a cover for the violation of the laws of 
 the Empire." 
 
 Thus, until the treaty of 1858, when this article was 
 omitted, the name of the United States was technically clear 
 of any complicity in the opium trade, although slight pro- 
 vision was ever made by the United States to prevent the 
 abuse of the American flag either by its own citizens or those 
 of other nations. American citizens engaged in smuggling 
 violated the treaty, yet the United States never assumed 
 any responsibility to prevent or punish such violations un- 
 less complaint was brought by the Chinese, and such action 
 the Chinese were very reluctant to take. The result was 
 that smuggling greatly increased. The only difference be- 
 tween the policy of the United States and that of England, 
 in practice, was in the extent of the participation in the 
 smuggling. 
 
 A more marked divergence of policy is to be found in 
 the stipulations conferring on foreigners the rights of resi- 
 dence in treaty ports, and in the measures adopted for their 
 protection. The Treaty of the Bogue (Article 7) provided 
 that in the treaty ports "ground and houses . . . shall be 
 set apart by the local officers, in communication with the 
 consul" for the residence of foreigners. For their protec- 
 tion the English depended upon the naval station and gar- 
 rison at Hongkong, and also upon the right secured by 
 treaty, to station a war vessel at each port. The Treaty of 
 Wanghia (Article 17) mentioned "churches, cemeteries and 
 hospitals" as well as residences, and stated: "The local 
 authorities of the two governments shall select in concert 
 sites for the foregoing objects, having due regard for 
 the feelings of the people in the location thereof." And 
 Article 19 made it obligatory upon the Chinese Government 
 to "defend them (the Americans) from all insult or injury 
 of any sort on the part of the Chinese." 
 
 The 'setting apart' of sites for foreign settlement, as 
 provided for in the English treaty, looked towards the 
 establishment of 'foreign settlements' and the granting, of 
 'concessions' which are now so numerous and which have 
 
THE POLICY OF CALEB CUSHING 169 
 
 so seriously intrenched upon the integrity of Chinese ter- 
 ritory and the sovereignty of the nation. The presence of 
 the war vessels looked towards the gun-boat policy, the 
 intimidation of local officials and even the quasi-protection 
 of smugglers. The American provision for the 'selection' 
 of sites, and for the placing of responsibility for their pro- 
 tection upon the Chinese, pointed in the very opposite 
 direction — -the maintenance of the integrity of China and 
 the support of its sovereignty. The difference was this: 
 England was approaching China through the old world, 
 through India and other Oriental countries, where every 
 precedent was in favor of the policy she was laying down; 
 the United States was approaching China as one independ- 
 ent nation to another, and the negotiations were in the 
 hands of Yankees who recognized no color line and prided 
 themselves that they yielded to no race prejudice. The 
 provision for churches and hospitals, moreover, recalls the 
 fact that Cushing was, at Macao, entirely in the hands of 
 missionaries who were his only interpreters, and bears wit- 
 ness to the ascending missionary interest in China which in 
 later years increased so much faster than the commercial 
 interest. 
 
 Again, however, the theory and the practice of the 
 Americans were not the same. Actually the Americans 
 adopted the 'foreign settlement' plan of residence, — where- 
 ever the English established it — and probably half of the 
 irritation growing up between the Americans and the 
 Chinese authorities in subsequent years was over the efforts 
 of the Americans to secure residences where 'due regard to 
 the feelings of the people in the location thereof gave the 
 Chinese authorities a cover for refusing them. The lack of 
 American war vessels in Chinese ports also permitted the 
 growth of not a few claims, often small but exceedingly irri- 
 tating, which might have been avoided had the Americans 
 depended less upon Chinese protection and more upon show 
 of force. Moreover in practice the Americans, unable to 
 claim the protection of American war vessels, found their 
 defense under the British flag. 
 
170 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Disregarding general principles, and viewing the treaties 
 in the light of the actual situation which confronted the 
 enervated and tottering Chinese dynasty in its efforts to 
 control its foreign guests, the English treaties were, aside 
 from the opium question, more beneficent towards China 
 than was the Treaty of Wanghia, although the latter may 
 have been more benevolent. Furthermore the next ten 
 years were to show that the English Government was much 
 better prepared than the United States to live up to the 
 few obligations which the foreigners had assumed towards 
 the Chinese. The United States was in the Treaty of 
 Wanghia putting on for the first time some of the garments 
 of unperialism, only to find that the nation itself had not 
 at all grown up to such ample vestments. 
 
 It was a difficult road upon which the Treaty of Wanghia 
 set the feet of the still immature and undeveloped power of 
 the western hemisphere. Even before its boundaries had 
 been pushed westward to the Pacific Ocean, the United 
 States was placed in competition with older Powers, the pur- 
 poses and policies of which were avowedly different from 
 those of the United States. In this rivalry of nations new 
 considerations of national honor and dignity must certainly 
 prompt the United States to new policies and actions. For 
 a comfortable relationship between merchants whose con- 
 trolling purpose had been always to manage and accommo- 
 date matters to avoid disturbance of the trade, was substi- 
 tuted treaty obligations, violations of which became affronts 
 to national dignity. For the newly created consular and 
 diplomatic and judicial positions which the treaty called for, 
 the United States had only a parochially-minded Congress 
 to furnish the appropriations and the 'spoils system' to sup- 
 ply the officials. The appointment of faithful party poli- 
 ticians, usually wholly untrained in consular work and 
 entirely inexperienced in the problems of international rela- 
 tions in Asia, unable, even if willing, to look forward to 
 promotion in the same service for meritorious work, opened 
 the doors to dangers both of omission and commission. It 
 was a perilous path on which the United States could not 
 
THE POLICY OF CALEB GUSHING 171 
 
 long proceed successfully without altering many habits of 
 action both at home and abroad. The policy of Caleb Gush- 
 ing was to be guide. 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. Chinese Eepository, May, 1840, p. 2. 
 
 2. China Dispatches. Vol. 1, Mar. 2, 1844, Cushing to Upshur. 
 
 3. The Cushing dispatches were published almost complete in S. 
 
 Docs. 67 and 58:28-2, the latter containing the author's ex- 
 tended discussion of extraterritoriality. 
 
 4. China Dispatches, Vol. 2, May 25, 1844, Cushing to Upshur. 
 
 5. Chinese Repository, Vol. 15, June, 1846, p. 306. It has been 
 
 stated, erroneously, that a payment of money entered into the 
 settlement of the Hsii A-man affair. 
 
 6. Chinese Account of the Opium War: Pagoda Library, No. 1 
 
 (1888), E. H. Parker (translator) p. 76. 
 
 7. Davis' "China, During the War and Since the Peace," 2 vols. 
 
 Vol. 2, p. 86. 
 
 8. Koo's "Status of Aliens in China," pp. 132ff. 
 
 9. Corres. Relative to Affairs in China, 1839-41; Private and Con- 
 
 fidential, printed for the sole use of the Cabinet, Dispatch No. 
 1, Feb. 20, 1840, Palmerston to Elliot. 
 
 10. S. Ex. Doc. 58 :28-2, Disp. No. 97. 
 
 11. A. J. Sargent's "Anglo-Chinese Commerce and Diplomacy," p. 
 
 148. 
 
 12. Accounts and Papers — China — 40, 1847, Orders, Ordinances, 
 
 etc., concerning China. 
 
PAUT in 
 
 A PERIOD OF CONFUSION 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE FAK EAST BECOMES A POLITICAL QUESTION 
 
 The Treaty of Wanghia, marking the entrance of the 
 United States into Far Eastern politics, came at the begin- 
 ning of a period characterized by great confusion in Asia, 
 Europe and America. Within a generation the Chinese 
 Empire was to pass through the Taiping Rebellion, the 
 greatest civil war the world has ever known. The Empire 
 of Japan was likewise to experience a thorough, though rela- 
 tively bloodless, revolution resulting in a great change of 
 political, economic and industrial structure. Great Britain 
 was in the struggles of educational, industrial, constitutional 
 and fiscal reform, accompanied by the introduction of Free 
 Trade, great increase in manufacturing, and the extension 
 of a commercial empire ; it was the age of Palmerston. On 
 the Continent confusion was confounded in revolution and 
 still more confounded by the entrance of Russia as a factor 
 in the politics of both the East and the West. Europe was 
 too engaged in domestic problems to look far beyond the 
 borders of the continent and thus Great Britain and the 
 United States were left almost alone to contest for the mar- 
 kets of the world. This contest was real but the United 
 States was badly handicapped because, far more than its 
 commercial rival, the United States was in confusion. The 
 conflict between the free and the slave states, accompanied 
 by a great westward thrust to reach and hold the Pacific 
 Coast and to round out both northern and southern boun- 
 daries, was to issue in the American Civil War — itself the 
 great test as to whether American republicanism would be 
 able to endure. 
 
 American policy in Asia was fabricated in the midst of 
 this confusion and was directly related to it. In 1840 the 
 
 175 
 
176 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 American Government first faced the question of framing a 
 policy for Asia. A preliminary sketch of the structure was 
 finished in 1844 in the Gushing treaty with Ghina. Within 
 the next twenty-five years, notwithstanding the succession 
 of changes in the administration of the Government of the 
 United States, the break-up of political parties, and the 
 ominous conflict of civil war, the nation had completed the 
 drawings from the sketch which came from the hand of 
 Caleb Gushing, and could claim a well-rounded, well-con- 
 sidered foreign policy for Asia which successive generations 
 had only to apply. The creation of such a poHcy in such a 
 period was a notable achievement. 
 
 The International Situation 
 
 The preeminent characteristic of the period was the 
 shortening of distances. Gommunications became quicker 
 and cheaper; it was as though the globe suddenly con- 
 tracted to a quarter of its former size. Glearly defined 
 boundaries in the West, and in the East as well, became 
 matters of supreme importance whereas they had been ig- 
 nored in previous generations when time itself was the great 
 boundary. Following rapidly upon the clipper ship with its 
 quicker and cheaper transportation came the extended de- 
 velopment of steam motive power, the transcontinental rail- 
 way lines and the transoceanic steamers, and then with the 
 introduction of the overland and submarine telegraph, the 
 earth contracted again. These inventions were accompanied 
 by the perfection of labor saving machinery and the multi- 
 plication of the uses of steam power in manufacturing. 
 Forthwith arose the question of markets for surplus prod- 
 uce. Thus the entire Far Eastern question as related to 
 the West suffered intensification and violent changes. 
 
 British foreign policy as viewed from the United States 
 was alarming. While England was steadily consolidating 
 her Indian Empire by the annexation of Gwalior, Sind, the 
 Punjab, Nagpur, Berar, Hyderabad, Tanjore, the Garnatic, 
 Oudh, Burmah and Labuan, it was confidently expected 
 
THE FAR EAST BECOMES A POLITICAL QUESTION 177 
 
 by Americans in the East that it was only a question of time 
 when Great Britain would extend her empire beyond Hong- 
 kong to include other portions of the Chinese Empire as 
 well as parts of the Japanese islands. England under 
 Palmerston was apparently girding herself both industrially 
 and politically to capture and hold the markets of Asia. To 
 the American people, to those in the South who grew cotton, 
 to those in the North who manufactured it, to the mer- 
 chants and ship-owners who carried it to Asia and were just 
 awaking to the boundless markets which might be open, the 
 program of Great Britain was formidable and perilous. 
 Perhaps these apprehensions would never have greatly in- 
 fluenced American foreign policy in the East, had they not 
 been intensified by the activities of Great Britain in the 
 western hemisphere, for after all American commercial 
 interests there were still small. The British program in 
 North America, however, was squarely before the entire 
 American people. It involved questions of boundary and of 
 strategic defense; furthermore it touched their pride. Eng- 
 land sought to break down the Monroe Doctrine. 
 
 Twice within ten years the United States and Great 
 Britain appeared to be moving toward war, once over the 
 northern boundary, and again over the control of the 
 Isthmus. Even before Caleb Gushing went to Macao the 
 British flag had been hoisted over the Sandwich Islands 
 and only the disavowal of the act by the British Govern- 
 ment had averted an ominous contest. Oregon, California, 
 Mexico, Central America, the Sandwich Islands, China, 
 Japan — these were all for the Americans either wholly or 
 partly problems of the Pacific, and taken collectively they 
 created a body of public opinion in the United States which, 
 because of the territorial and industrial questions involved, 
 became related even to the transcending issue of slavery. 
 American policy in Asia was a more important theme in 
 national politics in the decade which preceded the American 
 Civil War than it became again until the occupation of the 
 Philippine Islands in 1898. The American people were 
 moving westward and that portion of the world which, when 
 
178 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 viewed from London and Paris was called the Far East, had 
 become to the Americans not the East at all but the 
 Farthest West. 
 
 A mere catalogue of the places and dates along the 
 Pacific seaboard would suffice to make vivid the associa- 
 tion of American domestic problems and American foreign 
 policy in the Pacific and the Far East between the Anglo- 
 Chinese War and 1870.* 
 
 The two other foreign powers with which the United 
 States would have to deal in Asia were France and Russia. 
 Neither of these powers at first exerted themselves in any 
 way to attract the attention of the Americans, yet their 
 presence added to the complexity of the political situation, 
 and the manner and time of their entrance should be noted. 
 
 Immediately following the signing of the Treaty of 
 Wanghia, France negotiated a treaty with China which was 
 similar in its general outlines to the American treaty, yet 
 with one significant addition. This treaty, supplemented 
 by an imperial rescript, secured to France a somewhat vague 
 yet virtual protectorate over all Roman Catholic mission- 
 aries and their Chinese converts. This concession was to 
 become the cornerstone of French policy. France was com- 
 
 f 1843 : Lord George Paulet seizes Sandwich Islands ; the United States fails 
 to join Great Britain and France in promise never to take possession of the 
 Islands.! 
 
 1844 : Treaty of Wanghia — United States and China. Whitman coloniza- 
 tion expedition to Oregon. 
 
 1845 : Fremont exploring expedition to California. Annexation of Texas. 
 1846 : "Fifty-four-forty-or-flght" dispute with Great Britain terminates in 
 
 settlement of Oregon question by division of territory at 49th Parallel. Ameri- 
 can occupation of Monterey, Mexican capital of California. 
 
 1846 : Outbreak of war with Mexico. Treaty with New Granada (Colom- 
 bia) granting to the United States the right of communication by any form 
 across the Isthmus of Panama, in return for which the United States guaran- 
 tees the neutrality of the route and establishes a protectorate over it in the 
 interest of New Granada. 
 
 1847 : Discovery of gold in California. 
 
 1848 : Treaty of peace with Mexico, making the Rio Grande the southern 
 boundary of the United States. Authorization of surveys for a transcontinental 
 railroad and also for a transisthmian canal. Beginning of agitation for steam 
 navigation of the Pacific. 
 
 1849 : First American treaty with Sandwich Islands which follows immedi- 
 ately on French intervention at Honolulu. 
 
 1850 : Contract between Panama Railroad Company and Colombian Govern- 
 ment, and very serious dispute with Great Britain over island of Manzanillo. 
 Clayton-Bulwer treaty. 
 
 1851 : Decision to make a treaty with Japan. 
 1853 : Gadsden Purchase. 
 
 1854 : First treaty between United States and Japan. Attempted annexa- 
 tion of Sandwich Islands. 
 
 1856 : Temporary recognition of Rivas-Walker government in Nicaragua. 
 
 1867 : Alaska Purchase. First proposal to open Korea. Seward favors in 
 certain contingencies annexation of Sandwich Islands. 
 
THE FAR EAST BECOMES A POLITICAL QUESTION 179 
 
 mitted to the political support of Roman Catholic missions 
 which were in turn to become the agency of French terri- 
 torial, political and economic expansion in the Far East.^ 
 The Russian Emperor sent Nicholai Muravieff as Gov- 
 ernor General to the Russian possessions in eastern Siberia 
 in 1847.^ The steps by which this energetic official estab- 
 lished and consolidated the Russian position in Siberia and 
 North China — the building of Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka 
 in 1849, the founding of Nicholaievsk at the mouth of the 
 Amur in 1850, the expedition down the Amur in the same 
 year, the founding of Blagoveschensk at the mouth of the 
 Ussuri in 1858, and the treaty of Aigun of the same year in 
 which the Russians were given the exclusive right with the 
 Chinese to the navigation of the Amur, Sungari and Ussuri 
 rivers — were quite unnoticed by the Americans but were 
 not overlooked by the British who were closely watching 
 every southward movement of Russia into Asia. By the 
 entrance of Russia into the political and commercial arena 
 of the Far East four foreign powers — Great Britain, the 
 United States, France and Russia — came into direct rela- 
 tions with each other thus making Asiatic politics often 
 merely a phase of the politics of the western world. 
 
 Multiplication of American Interests in China 
 
 With the tremendous expansive movement of the United 
 States the development of American interests in China 
 synchronized almost exactly. American ship-owners in the 
 China trade in the fifth and sixth decades of the nineteenth 
 century profited fabulously by the enormous freight rates 
 at the time of the blockade of Canton at the beginning of 
 the Anglo-Chinese War in 1840, and by the obstacles in the 
 way of British trade at that time.* By the perfection of the 
 American type of clipper ship, which appeared about 1840, 
 they were able for a time almost to monopolize the trans- 
 portation of tea even to England, for they could carry larger 
 cargoes and deliver the tea in shorter time and in fresher 
 condition than could their competitors. The rush from the 
 
180 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Atlantic Coast to California after the discovery of gold 
 created incredibly high freight and passenger rates for a 
 voyage which carried the ship outward more than half way 
 towards China. Thus the outward voyage which under 
 ordinary circumstances was unremunerative because of the 
 lack of cargoes became even more profitable than the return 
 voyage. The abolition of the British navigation laws in 
 1850 gave the Americans, temporarily, a still further advan- 
 tage which they were well prepared to improve. The Cri- 
 mean War withdrew a large amount of European tonnage 
 for transport service, and again the Americans profited. 
 
 American trade at Shanghai * grew with rapidity. This 
 new port was, on the one hand, nearer to the Pacific Coast 
 and to San Francisco, and on the other, nearer to the actual 
 silk-growing and tea-producing districts of China than was 
 the old port of Canton. Furthermore, Shanghai, as a foreign 
 community, started de novo without the traditions which 
 had grown up at Canton. The Americans were not a tradi- 
 tion-loving people, and especially was this true when the 
 backwash from San Francisco harbor began to pour its 
 stream of derelict Americans on to the China coast. Yet 
 even among the more law-abiding residents. Canton came 
 to be looked upon as a pestilential spot from which it was 
 well, as rapidly as possible, to transfer both residence and 
 relations with the Chinese. Shanghai breathed a freer air 
 in which life was in every way more comfortable. For the 
 Americans it seemed especially desirable because it was 
 less overshadowed than Canton by the British settlement 
 of Hongkong. 
 
 The Treaty of Wanghia and the subsequent imperial 
 edicts of religious toleration had also opened the way for 
 greatly increased missionary work, and the American 
 Protestant Churches were the most energetic and aggres- 
 sive in the extension of Protestant missions in the open 
 ports. From the days of Dr. Robert Morrison down to 
 
 *So rapidly did American trade at Shansliai grow after it once started that 
 in the year ending September 30, 1833, although there had been 62 American 
 vessels as compared with 94 British vessels, the total American tonnage was, 
 41,501 as compared with 35,610 for the British." 
 
THE FAR EAST BECOMES A POLITICAL QUESTION 181 
 
 1851 there had been a total of 150 Protestant missionaries 
 to arrive in China. Of this number 15 had come from the 
 Continent, 47 from England, and 88 from the United 
 States.^ 
 
 American interests in China, therefore, in the period 
 after 1850 are seen to be both enlarged and multiplied over 
 what. they had been in the pre-treaty days. Down to the 
 time of the first treaty little mattered save the preservation 
 of undisturbed commercial relationships. Now this com- 
 merce had grown immensely and had taken very deep 
 root in at least one other port. In addition the missionaries 
 had come in large numbers to every open port and their 
 advent marked the beginning in the United States of a phil- 
 anthropic, and also a sentimental interest in China which 
 operated strongly in the formation of American public 
 opinion. Its immediate effect on the American policy in 
 China was greatly to increase the demand for a further 
 opening up of the country. The impatience of the mis- 
 sionary often exceeded that of the trader. To these two 
 interests, one commercial and the other philanthropic, was 
 now being added a third — a political interest. 
 
 The problems of Asia as viewed by the Western world 
 ceased to be purely commercial; they became political. 
 Had the Anglo-Chinese War (1839-42) been settled by a 
 purely commercial treaty the Far Eastern question might 
 have remained for a time a commercial one, but England 
 planted at Hongkong an outpost of the India Empire, which 
 had already been advancing by easy stages from Penang and 
 Singapore. The British occupation of Hongkong compelled 
 all other foreign nations from that time onward to deal with 
 Asia as a political problem. It was the delusion of some 
 American statesmen in the eighties and nineties that the 
 United States need recognize no political problem in Asia, 
 that American interests in the East were purely commercial, 
 but this assumption avoided plain facts. Caleb Cushing 
 negotiated the Treaty of Wanghia in 1844 with one eye on 
 the political establishment of Great Britain at Hongkong. 
 Commodore Perry in 1853-54 did not even make a commer- 
 
182 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 cial treaty with Japan, but he staked out a pohtical program 
 which failed of adoption through no timidity of its author, 
 and notwithstanding its failure had its influence on subse- 
 quent policy. The struggle of the Americans to secure 
 Shanghai as an international rather than a British port, at 
 the very time Perry was in the East, was more political than 
 commercial. The relations of the Western powers to the 
 Taiping Rebellion, and the relations of Great Britain, 
 France, Russia and the United States in the negotiations of 
 the treaties of Tientsin in 1858 were very far from being 
 purely commercial. The 'cooperative policy' and the entire 
 course of the first ten years of American diplomatic rela- 
 tions with Japan were controlled by political considerations. 
 The first American efforts to open Korea were of the same 
 character. 
 
 The distinction between the policy of the United States 
 and the policy of other powers in Asia in this period is not 
 that the American policy was purely commercial while the 
 others were political, but that the American policy, although 
 political, followed diplomatic rather than military channels. 
 Military proposals were not lacking from the American 
 representatives in the East ; they even issued at times from 
 the Department of State, but with very few exceptions these 
 proposals failed of execution and did not result in the occu- 
 pation of territory. American policy was preeminently the 
 policy of Americans. As will be elaborated in the following 
 pages it was a composite into the making of which went a 
 great variety of proposals, official and unofficial, some bel- 
 ligerent, others most pacific, but all directed towards secur- 
 ing for American interests in Asia a diplomatic equivalent 
 for Hongkong and what the British possession stood for, 
 viz., territorial occupation of Asia by Western powers. 
 
 By the Americans it was foreseen that some day their 
 trans-Pacific commerce would be very great. This expecta- 
 tion reacted on American policy in the Far East in two 
 ways. In the first place it made the Americans increasingly 
 alert to see that no other power should take any step which 
 would later become a handicap to American interest; that is 
 
THE FAR EAST BECOMES A POLITICAL QUESTION 183 
 
 to say, it helped to confirm an open door policy. But it did 
 more. It raised questions of how this expected great com- 
 merce with Asia might in future years receive adequate 
 protection. It sent the Americans into the Pacific to look 
 for harbors, to Japan for more open ports, and to Formosa 
 for coal mines which were deemed a necessity for the success 
 of steam navigation. This alertness and this search, this 
 planning for the future, which then seemed so sure and so 
 welcome to the cotton growers and manufacturers alike, 
 immediately put the United States in the way of interna- 
 tional collisions of grave import, for were not the Ameri- 
 cans setting out upon a path already well-trodden by Eng- 
 land? and Russia? and France? and did not the closed ports 
 of Japan lie directly in the way? 
 
 A brief reference to details will make more intelligi- 
 ble the force of this situation as it was felt in the United 
 States a few years after the signing of the Treaty of 
 Wanghia. 
 
 As early as May, 1848, T. Butler King, of the Committee 
 on Naval Affairs, introduced into the House of Representa- 
 tives a report recommending steam navigation from the 
 United States to the Sandwich Islands and China.'^ He 
 exhibited an exhaustive analysis of the conditions of the 
 American trade. While the United States and England 
 were then great competitors he argued that the English 
 imports contained one element of decay, viz., opium, and he 
 expressed the opinion that England would in the future be 
 very dependent upon the United States for the raw material 
 for her cotton trade with China. The American trade, l^e 
 asserted, was therefore in a far more favorable potential 
 position. It had already been proved that the Americans 
 could meet English competition in cheap cotton goods, and 
 it merely remained for the American manufacturer to study 
 more carefully and adapt his fabrics more to the wants and 
 tastes of the Chinese people. In spite of the growing pro- 
 duction of cotton in India, Mr. King felt assured of the 
 American cotton market in China if only the transportation 
 problem could be solved. He said : 
 
184 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 "Certainty and rapidity of intercourse only are wanted to bring 
 these two great nations [China and the United States] nearer together, 
 to give them a more perfect knowledge of each other, develop their re- 
 sources and build up a commerce more extensive than has probably 
 ever heretofore existed between two nations. The improved condition 
 of our relations with that country under the new treaties, and the 
 extension of our territorial possessions to the Pacific have placed it 
 in our power ultimately to communicate with China almost as rapidly 
 as we now do with Europe. To accomplish this, however, we must 
 extend telegraphic wires across the continent, and establish a line 
 of steamers from San Francisco, or Monterey, to Shanghai and 
 Canton." 
 
 Mr. King drew attention to the fact that a line of 
 steamers had already been established from New York to 
 Havana and Panama, and that there was already a govern- 
 ment mail line up the California coast from the Isthmus to 
 the Columbia River. Lieutenant M. F. Maury of the Naval 
 Observatory submitted a report which was attached to the 
 document showing that because of the 'great circle route' 
 to the East, the United States had already taken a step of 
 three thousand miles on its way toward China. He pointed 
 out that the steamer route from Panama by way of the 
 'great circle' was 1200 miles shorter to China than the 
 route formerly taken by way of the Sandwich Islands. New 
 Orleans, by this new route, was actually 3000 miles nearer 
 China than Panama was by way of Honolulu, and from 
 Monterey to Japan was not as far as from Panama to the 
 Sandwich Islands. 
 
 The proposed steamer line to China was not suffered to 
 be forgotten. John P. Kennedy, Secretary of the Navy in 
 the closing days of the Pierce administration, reporting to 
 the Senate in response to request (February 10, 1853),^ 
 urged the necessity of such a line of steamers without delay, 
 either by direct agency of the government, or by the en- 
 couragement of individual enterprise. Kennedy drew atten- 
 tion to the need of coal which would be created if such 
 steamers were established. He recommended the establish- 
 ment of coal deposits on some of the islands in the Pacific, 
 stating that at that time the United States did not possess 
 a single coal depot for the supply of naval steamers in either 
 
THE FAR EAST BECOMES A POLITICAL QUESTION 185 
 
 the Atlantic or the Pacific oceans. He proposed a plan by 
 which he thought such depots could be supplied in the 
 Pacific at little cost, by means of the development of an 
 outward trade to China in tobacco and an inward trade from 
 the Pacific islands in guano. He suggested with reference 
 to the tobacco trade: 
 
 "The use of opium in China has been the great cause of preventing 
 the extension of commerce into that country, while at the same time, 
 many believe, it has almost entirely shut out the lights and advantages 
 of Christianity. If, by any means that our government shall employ, 
 a trade between us and China shall be opened, there is reason to 
 suppose that our tobacco will be generally received there as a sub- 
 stitute for this poisonous drug. This article, now so abundantly pro- 
 duced in our tobacco-growing states, will then become the pioneer of 
 our trade, and open the way for our manufactures of cotton, wool, 
 and particularly of cutlery and other manufactures of iron — in which 
 latter articles the trade between Great Britain and China is now very 
 large. 
 
 "These two articles," thought Kennedy, "of tobacco and guano, 
 would alone, without other commodities, afford the means of opening a 
 rapid and profitable intercourse with China. The product of tobacco 
 would be increased in a measure corresponding to the increased de- 
 mand of the two hundred millions of Chinese consumers, and thus 
 our national wealth would be greatly augmented." 
 
 The proposal for the steamship line remained in abey- 
 ance, but the Perry expedition was already on its way to 
 secure the coal supply. 
 
 Commissioners and Consuls 
 
 Notwithstanding the recognition of the growing impor- 
 tance of American affairs in the East, they suffered neglect. 
 That their importance was recognized may be seen in the 
 Perry expedition ; that they were neglected is proven by the 
 records of the consulates and the legation in China. There 
 were fits and starts ; brilliant efforts and then lapses. Con- 
 tinuity was lacking. It would even appear as though the 
 Americans, while well equipped to initiate things effectively 
 in Asia, were either by temperament or by the constitu- 
 tional structure of their government, incapable of seeing 
 them through. 
 
186 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 President Tyler had lost no time in recommending that 
 Congress make suitable provision for the establishment of 
 diplomatic relations with China, and for carrying out the 
 purposes of the Treaty of Wanghia.'' He asked for the crea- 
 tion of the position of permanent commissioner, the enact- 
 ment of legislation for the establishment of extraterritorial 
 authority, and the replacement of the old and objectionable 
 merchant-consul system by an adequately manned consular 
 establishment independent of trade. The first of these 
 recommendations was acted on immediately although a 
 salary was fixed at a rate too low to support the commis- 
 sioner in decency; the second duty remained in abeyance 
 until 1848 and was then delegated to wholly incompetent 
 hands; while the merchant-consul system lingered until 
 1854, and then was partially replaced by consular establish- 
 ments which were in a few respects better but in most 
 respects even worse. 
 
 Early in 1845 Alexander H. Everett of Massachusetts 
 was appointed commissioner to China at a salary of $5,000, 
 and Dr. Peter Parker was named as secretary and interpre- 
 ter. Everett was charged with 'the general superintendence 
 of the spirit of the treaty,' and instructed to cultivate the 
 good will of the Chinese Government and people. He was 
 under the embarrassment, however, of being quite without 
 authority to exercise judicial or executive functions under 
 the extraterritorial grant. 
 
 "It cannot be pretended," read his instructions from James 
 Buchanan, "that one of our consuls at the five poxts could try and 
 punish an American citizen for murder or any other crime. What 
 is then to be done? Shall a citizen guilty of murder or other high 
 crime pass tmpunished? Independently of the other evil results of 
 such an impunity, nothing would more exasperate the Chinese than to 
 witness such a spectacle. . . . They never could be made to under- 
 stand that we had not violated the treaty." ^'' 
 
 The President, therefore, directed that an accused party 
 be sent home for trial. 
 
 It speaks well for the character of the community at 
 Canton that there were no occasions where it was necessary 
 to fall back on this executive order. The Americans did not 
 
THE FAR EAST BECOMES A POLITICAL QUESTION 187 
 
 begin to enter and settle in numbers at the other open ports 
 until after the consular courts had been created in 1848. 
 The great difficulties came later when laws were ample but 
 consuls were lacking or ineffective, and there was so little 
 provision for the enforcement of such judgments as came 
 from the consular courts. 
 
 The 'destitute condition of the consular establishments' 
 was made the subject of a dispatch by Commissioner 
 McLane in 1854. The facts reported at that time may be 
 taken as typical of conditions for most of the period before 
 1860, and some of the reported deficiencies were not cor- 
 rected for half a century. The consulate at Ningpo was in 
 charge of Rev. D. B, McCartee, a medical missionary who 
 received no salary, was allowed no funds for expenses other 
 than stationary, had no office quarters other than the mis- 
 sion building, and exercised no judicial functions. A new 
 consul had arrived a^Ningpo. His salary for judicial services 
 was one thousand dollars ; for the balance of his emolument 
 he had to depend upon consular fees which were next to 
 nothing. He was unable to speak the language and had no 
 allowances for an interpreter. He lived with "rigid 
 economy" but nothing could "be more disreputable and 
 derogatory to the dignity and honor of the country than the 
 condition" in which he was placed. The Foochow consulate 
 was in the hands of a merchant who had been appointed 
 acting consul by no other authority than that of his prede- 
 cessor who also had been an acting consul. The regularly 
 appointed consul was on his way but upon arrival at his post 
 his condition would be no less forlorn than that at Amoy. 
 There was little or no American trade at these ports, but 
 extraterritoriality prevailed and made them the resort of 
 outlaws who either were American citizens or claimed their 
 immunities. The newly appointed consul at Shanghai, 
 whose remuneration consisted only of $1000 a year for his 
 judicial services and his fees, was living in a seamen's board- 
 ing-house or hotel. He was without means to secure an 
 office or a 'respectable domestic establishment and subsist- 
 ence.' He was dependent upon the British consulate and 
 
188 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 upon merchants for the loan of the services of in- 
 terpreters. 
 
 In contrast to this condition Mr. McLane pointed to the 
 British estabUshment which consisted of a Minister with 
 secretary and interpreter at $30,000, and five well manned 
 consular offices at a cost of $10,000 each.^^ 
 
 The United States paid dearly in loss of prestige for 
 these economies. The opening of the new ports and the 
 boundless expectations for the new trade drew from the four 
 quarters of the globe a crowd of adventurers who had no 
 other trade or profession than to live by their wits. They 
 were of the type which gave the reputation to the usual 
 pioneer community of the western continent. Then came 
 the discovery of gold in California, followed by the rush and 
 the failure of most of the gold-seekers. Luckless adventur- 
 ers drifted out to Shanghai ; and the deserting sailors in San 
 Francisco harbor were 'shanghaied' and when they reached 
 Shanghai they promptly deserted again, scattered up and 
 down the coast, and attempted to live as best they could off 
 the country. 
 
 Those were wild days in the open ports — uncomfortable 
 for all, and for the Chinese terrifying. The reports of the 
 American consuls and the dispatches of the commissioners 
 abound in accounts of the scandals, crimes, and atrocities of 
 these derelicts. Commissioner Humphrey Marshall, for 
 example, reported in 1853 as follows: ^^ 
 
 "There are now in this port (Shanghai) at least one hundred and 
 fifty sailors ashore, men of all nations, who go into the Chinese city 
 and drink and riot and brawl, daily and nightly. They presume to 
 defy all law, because they have tried the jail and find that they 
 cannot be confined in it. No other punishment has been inflicted upjDn 
 them yet besides confinement. They have no money from which to 
 collect a fine. I earnestly request the President to give the authority 
 to lease a lot of ground in this vicinity on which to erect a jail with 
 a yard attached thereto, in which sailors may have air and exercise, 
 and that Congress shall be urged to make an appropriation for the 
 purpose of erecting a jail thereon. The marshal can reside in the 
 tenement, and the fines and forfeitures will probably pay for a guard 
 to attend the premises. 
 
 "The United States having assumed jurisdiction over their own 
 citizens in China, are expressly bound to compel them to keep the 
 
THE FAR EAST BECOMES A POLITICAL QUESTION 189 
 
 peace, and this cannot be done as long as there is no place to confine 
 the ^delinquents in, except a loathsome hole inhabited by the foulest 
 lepers, and in itself so weak that a man of American energies can 
 kick his way out in a few minutes." 
 
 These ruffians may have been deficient in character but 
 they did not lack initiative. Many of them joined the mili- 
 tary or naval service of the Taipings or of the Imperialists, 
 defying the proclamations of the representatives of their 
 government who ordered them to desist. Others enlisted in 
 the opium smuggling. Some entered the coolie trade. Still 
 others engaged in the business of 'convoying.' * 
 
 By no means all of these foreigners were Americans, but 
 even many of those who were not found it convenient to 
 claim citizenship in a country which was entirely without 
 jails, without sufficient naval vessels to prevent the abuse 
 of its flag, and possessed, at least in some cases, of indulgent 
 consular officials who could be induced to give an approval, 
 tacit or otherwise, to the fraudulent transfer of ship's 
 papers, and to practices in plain violation both of the treaty 
 and the laws of the United States. The situation was at 
 once disgraceful to the American reputation and dangerous 
 to the entire foreign community, for the depredations of 
 these individuals created ill-will and wrath among the 
 Chinese which might any day lead to the gravest conse- 
 quences for all,^* 
 
 The failure of Congress to make adequate provision for 
 consuls and for jails was by no means the worst of the 
 situation. Even the commissionership suffered. A brief 
 summary of the way in which the position of commissioner 
 was filled before 1858 will be sufficient. 
 
 Alexander H. Everett, the first commissioner, was ap- 
 pointed March 13, 1845, but owing to illness did not reach 
 China until nineteen months later (October 29, 1846) and 
 he died in China the following June. Everett was, perhaps, 
 
 *The prevalency along the coast of piracy which the Chinese Government, 
 distracted by the Taipings and other rebels, was unable to suppress, led to the 
 development of a system of protection for the native junks which was furnished 
 by foreigners, unofiScially, and which was paid for by the junk owners. At first 
 the payments were made willingly, but as abuses crept in the conveying sys- 
 tem degenerated into nothing less than blackmail and piracy.^* 
 
190 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 the ablest commissioner ever appointed, and the only experi- 
 enced diplomat. He had served as private secretary to 
 John Quincy Adams when the latter was Minister to Russia, 
 had remained for a time in the diplomatic service, and had 
 been at one time Minister at Madrid. However, he was in 
 China too short a time to render any important service. His 
 successor, John W. Davis, was appointed January 3, 1848, 
 and arrived in China in August. Thus, from the time of the 
 signing of the treaty of Wanghia until the middle of 1848 — 
 four years — there was in China a regularly appointed com- 
 missioner for only eight months. Before Everett's arrival. 
 Commodore James Biddle, to whom Everett had delegated 
 his powers, acted as commissioner, and after the death of 
 Everett, Dr. Peter Parker, secretary of the legation, served 
 as commissioner until the arrival of Davis. 
 
 John W. Davis was, by profession, a physician. He had 
 served three terms in the House of Representatives from 
 Indiana, and had been elected Speaker of the House in 
 1845. After his return from China he became governor of 
 Oregon Territory ; he was also the presiding officer of the 
 National Democratic Convention at Baltimore in 1852. He 
 retired from China in May, 1850, after a residence of a little 
 less than two years. It became extremely difficult to find 
 another to take his place. The position was offered to a 
 lawyer from Tennessee who accepted it and then declined 
 when he found that he would be unable to live on $2000 a 
 year in China, as he had hoped, thus saving $4000 a year out 
 of his salary. It was offered to another who accepted and 
 then declined also because of the salary. To still a third it 
 was offered only to be declined. In his annual message, 
 December 2, 1851, President Fillmore reported: ^^ 
 
 ''The office of commissioner .to China remains unfilled. Several 
 persons have been appointed and the place has been offered to others, 
 all of whom have declined its acceptance on the ground of the inade- 
 quacy of the compensation. The annual allowance by law is $6000 and 
 there is no provision for any outfit. I earnestly recommend the con- 
 sideration of this subject to Congress. . . . China is understood to be 
 a country in which living is very expensive, and I know no reason 
 why the American commissioner sent thither should not be placed, in 
 
THE FAR EAST BECOMES A POLITICAL QUESTION 191 
 
 regard to compensation, on an equal footing with ministers who repre- 
 sent this country at the courts of Europe." 
 
 In August, 1852, the post was offered to Humphrey Mar- 
 shall of Kentucky, Congress having not heeded the Presi- 
 dent's request that the salary be increased, and Marshall 
 accepted, reaching China in January, 1853. Meanwhile the 
 duties of the office of commissioner had been discharged by 
 the secretary. Dr. Parker, who had resigned his position as 
 a missionary and was supplementing his meagre salary of 
 $2500 by private practice as a physician, 
 
 Humphrey Marshall was a graduate of the United States 
 Military Academy at West Point, a lawyer by profession, 
 who had served two terms in Congress from Kentucky. 
 After returning to the United States, he was again elected 
 to Congress for one term. At the outbreak of the Civil War 
 he became a Brigadier General in the Confederate service.^ *^ 
 Marshall's service in China covered slightly more than a 
 year, 
 
 Robert M. McLane, who succeeded Marshall, arrived in 
 China in March, 1854, and left the following December. He 
 was the son of Lewis McLane who had served as Secretary 
 of State for a year under President Jackson and had been 
 senator from Delaware, and United States Minister to Eng- 
 land. The son had been a student at West Point, and was a 
 lawyer by profession. He had served in the House of Repre- 
 sentatives for two terms. Subsequently he held the im- 
 portant diplomatic posts of Minister to Mexico (1859-60) 
 and Minister to France (1885-89), ^^ 
 
 After the departure of McLane from China, Dr, Parker, 
 as usual, became Charge, but within a few months it became 
 necessary for him to return to the United States for reasons 
 of health. In his absence Commodore Joel Abbot, com- 
 manding the United States Squadron on the China station, 
 was delegated ''to meet any emergencies that may arise." ^^ 
 
 In June, 1855, S. Wells Williams, an unordained mis- 
 sionary who had gone to China in 1834 to take charge of 
 the printing press of the American Board of Commissioners 
 for Foreign Missions, was notified of his appointment as 
 
192 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 secretary and interpreter of the legation, at a salary of 
 $2500.* Dr. Williams had acted as interpreter for Commo- 
 dore Perry in the Japan expedition. A few weeks later 
 (September 5, 1855) Dr. Parker was appointed commis- 
 sioner under the new diplomatic law of March 1, 1855, at a 
 salary of $15,000. f Dr. Parker reached China at the begin- 
 ning of the following year and served for about twenty 
 months, retiring by his own choice, when William B. Reed, 
 a Pennsylvania lawyer, was appointed to China with the 
 title of envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary. 
 
 In the midst of these conditions of confusion — in the 
 United States, in England, on the Continent, and in China 
 — the policy of the Cushing treaty was put to its first tests. 
 This policy was, in a word, to occupy no portion of Asia as 
 a military or naval base and to depend entirely upon the 
 pledges of the Chinese Government. It soon developed that 
 American interests were to be exposed to danger at two 
 points; the aggressions and pretensions of other treaty 
 powers threatened to curtail the privileges granted to 
 Americans under the treaty; and, the Chinese provincial 
 authorities, the local gentry and rabble, sometimes sup- 
 ported by the Imperial Government at Peking, were un- 
 willing in many cases to make effective the rights accorded 
 by treaties to which China was an unwilling party. These 
 tests revealed a fallacy in the Cushing policy. The policy 
 rested upon the false assumption that the Imperial Govern- 
 ment was not only possessed of the utmost good will towards 
 the Americans, but that it was also strongly centralized and 
 able to enforce its commands upon the provinces; further, 
 that China was strong enough to resist the pressure which 
 the other treaty powers were able to exert by means of mili- 
 tary force, and would protect the Americans in the enjoy- 
 ments of the rights which the Empire had granted. 
 
 So long as foreign powers in China were competing for 
 
 ♦Commodore Perry expressed a lively interest in the appointment and hoped 
 that Williams would accept it. "In these days it is an unheard of case ; such 
 offices under our government being seldom given except on application, then too 
 frequently with little or no respect to the qualifications of the applicant. I 
 look upon this appointment as indicating a sort of moral reform at 
 Washington." ^^ 
 
 tThe following year the salary was reduced to $12,000 where it has remained 
 ever since. 
 
THE FAR EAST BECOMES A POLITICAL QUESTION 193 
 
 preferred position, and so long as the Chinese of the open 
 ports resented the presence of the foreigners, the Treaty of 
 Wanghia was of only nominal value. 
 
 BIBLIOGEAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. The simplest method of following through in greater detail the 
 
 policy of the United States in these particulars is to read the 
 historical sections under the appropriate headings to be found 
 in the index of Moore's Digest of International Law. Copious 
 extracts from the official documents will be found there. 
 
 2. Journal des operations diplomatiques de la Legation frangaise en 
 
 Chine, redige par J. M. Callery (Macao, 1845) ; "Cambridge 
 Modern History," VoL XI, pp. 811-2. 
 
 3. Morse's "International Eel. of the Chinese Empire," Vol. 1, 
 
 chap. 19. 
 
 4. Forbes' "Personal Reminiscences," p. 151. 
 
 6. H. Doc. 123:33-1, p. 374; see also Morse, Vol. 1, pp. 342-3. 
 
 6. Chinese Repository, Vol. 20, p. 520. 
 
 7. H. Eepts. 596, 30-1. 
 
 8. S. Ex. Doc. 49 -.32-2. 
 
 9. S. Ex. Doc. 58 :28-2. 
 
 10. China Instructions, Vol. 1, Apr. 15, 1845 (Dept. of State). All 
 
 of the instructions to Everett are printed in J. B. Moore's 
 Works of James Buchanan, Vol 6. 
 
 11. S. Ex. Doc. 22 :35-2, pp. 165-167. 
 
 12. H. Doc. 123 :33-l, p. 224. 
 
 13. Morse, Vol. 1, pp. 406-8. 
 
 14. H. Doc. 123:33-1, p. 167; S. Ex. Doc. 22:35-2, pp. 422, 437, 625, 
 
 732, 823 ; H. Jour. 34-1, p. 1048 ; H. Misc. Docs. 2 :35-l ; H. Ex. 
 Doc. 68:35-2. 
 
 15. Eichardson's Messages, Vol. 5, p. 122. 
 
 16. Poore's "Political Eegister," p. 524. 
 
 17. Ibid., p. 516. 
 
 18. S. Ex. Doc. 22 :35-2, p. 609. 
 
 19. S. Wells Williams' "Life and Letters," pp. 235-6. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 SETTLEMENT OF THE SHANGHAI LAND QUESTION 
 
 The British, American and French treaties with China 
 left open for further discussion a most important principle 
 as to the way in which the foreigners should occupy lands in 
 the open ports. In pre-treaty days at Canton the foreigners 
 had all lived together in the restricted area of the factories 
 where each individual or firm, regardless of nationality, 
 rented from the hong merchants who were the owners. The 
 British Treaty of the Bogue (1843) provided that under the 
 new regime in the five ports "grounds and houses . . . shall 
 be set apart by the local officers in communication with the 
 consul." The American treaty merely stated that the local 
 officers of the two governments "shall select, in concert, the 
 sites" for residences, churches, cemeteries and hospitals. 
 
 How then were the foreigners to live in the open ports? 
 Were they to continue the practice of residing together as of 
 old at Canton in a single international settlement set apart 
 for their use; or, were they to scatter, each resident inde- 
 pendently, with the consent of his consul and the local 
 Chinese official, selecting such residence as his fancy pre- 
 ferred ; or, were the nationals of each treaty power to estab- 
 lish their own national settlement, thus forming in each 
 open port a series of national concessions? When viewed in 
 the light of subsequent history it is seen that this question 
 involved one of the most fundamental principles in the 
 relations of China with the treaty powers. A single inter- 
 national settlement in each port involved a degree of inter- 
 national cooperation among the treaty powers such as had 
 no precedent. The scattering of the foreign residents 
 among the Chinese residences was open to the gravest 
 objections, sanitary, commercial and social. To the Chinese 
 
 194 
 
SETTLEMENT OF THE SHANGHAI LAND QUESTION 195 
 
 also this was objectionable because the foreigner was exempt 
 from Chinese laws. On the other hand the creation of 
 separate national settlements was likely to bring the treaty 
 powers into collision with each other and with China be- 
 cause of the most-favored-nation clause. In each port there 
 was naturally a most favored site for business purposes, 
 determined by the contour of the land and its accessibility 
 to the best anchorage. If any single nation were to occupy 
 this most favored site the other nations might invoke the 
 most-favored-nation clause in their own treaties, and de- 
 mand admission. The question came to an issue very soon 
 after the opening of Shanghai to trade. 
 
 Early Americans in Shanghai 
 
 The first American resident at Shanghai was Henry G. 
 Wolcott, representing Russell and Company. Relying on 
 the Imperial rescript which had extended the privileges 
 granted to the British to all foreigners he had gone to the 
 new port even before Caleb Cushing had reached Macao to 
 negotiate the American treaty. In the course of time Wol- 
 cott desired to lease a piece of land and went to the taotai 
 (Prefect or Intendent of Circuit) to have the lease sanc- 
 tioned.^ This official replied that he had already entered 
 into an agreement with the British consul. Captain G. 
 Balfour, that all land within certain boundaries, which in- 
 cluded the site which Wolcott desired, was to be leased only 
 through the agency of the British consul.- Wolcott then 
 addressed himself to Captain Balfour and was given permis- 
 sion to secure the land on conditions similar to those enjoyed 
 by British subjects. The lease was immediately effected 
 but complications arose. Wolcott paid a visit to the South 
 in December, 1845, and when he returned he carried a com- 
 mission granted to him by Commodore Biddle, then acting 
 commissioner, as "acting American Consul" for Shanghai. 
 
 Wolcott immediately erected a flagstaff and proceeded to 
 fly the American flag as suited his consular dignity. Captain 
 Balfour formally protested to both Wolcott and the taotai, 
 
196 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 requesting the latter to prevent use of the United States flag 
 in the British settlement. Meanwhile the British Govern- 
 ment had extended its authority over the port to the extent 
 of issuing certain port regulations which Wolcott was very 
 reluctant to accept. Affairs at Shanghai had evidently 
 reached a condition which was never contemplated in the 
 American treaty which had been signed eighteen months 
 before.^ 
 
 The British claim at Shanghai had arisen in a very 
 natural way. By Imperial rescript the taotais at the various 
 open ports had been ordered to consult with the consuls of 
 the treaty powers and to make the necessary arrangements 
 by which the foreigners of all nations could establish them- 
 selves. The only consul at Shanghai was Captain Balfour, 
 and this ofiBicial naturally exercised himself to care for 
 British interests. There is no reason to suppose that Bal- 
 four, who had come from India where all precedent was on 
 his side, ever considered the possibility of anything but a 
 series of national concessions at Shanghai. The taotai con- 
 ferred with him and in November, 1845, issued a proclama- 
 tion in which it was agreed that "the ground north of the 
 Yang King Pang and south of the Lekea Chang (two 
 creeks) should be rented to English merchants for erecting 
 their buildings and residing thereon." This tract of land, 
 lying outside the city wall and fronting on the best anchor- 
 age, was the most favorable location for foreign residence 
 and business. The taotai further agreed in the proclama- 
 tion, so it is believed, that no other than the British flag 
 should be hoisted; "that no part of the ground should be 
 rented to other than British subjects through and by the 
 British consul; and, that all Chinese dwellings thereon 
 should be as speedily as possible removed, and that no other 
 Chinese dwellings be permitted." While the claim was 
 established in a very natural way there is no reason to sup- 
 pose that the Imperial Government had the remotest inten- 
 tion of granting any exclusive rights to the British at 
 Shanghai, and the concession was certainly in conflict with 
 the spirit and intention of the American treaty which had 
 
SETTLEMENT OF THE SHANGHAI LAND QUESTION 197 
 
 been signed before the taotai had issued his procla- 
 mation. 
 
 Commodore Biddle on his way to Japan in June, 1846, 
 stopped at Shanghai and conferred with both Wolcott and 
 Balfour. The latter explained to him that the British 
 municipal and port regulations had been established to 
 prevent anarchy in the new settlement, the growing trade of 
 which required some sort of ordered government. The com- 
 modore advised Wolcott to recognize the port regulations 
 which were obviously so necessary, but not to pull down the 
 American flag. But Wolcott represented a Canton firm in 
 which the old pre-treaty traditions of conciliation and com- 
 promise were very strong. He not only accepted the port 
 regulations but also pulled down the flag. 
 
 A truce was thus established which continued until Feb- 
 ruary, 1848, when the captain of the American ship Mon- 
 tauk came into collision with some additional port regula- 
 tions which had been issued the preceding year. The 
 American captain insisted upon the right to fire a morning 
 and an evening gun. The British consul claimed that this 
 was a violation of the regulations and called upon the taotai 
 to forbid it. The Americans, now considerably increased in 
 numbers over the time when Wolcott had made his surren- 
 der, replied that they did not consider themselves subject 
 to any port regulations which had not been approved by 
 the Government of the United States. Both the British and 
 the Americans appealed the case to the representatives of 
 their respective governments at Hongkong and Canton. 
 Sir John Davis, the British minister, did not sustain the 
 contention of the British consul. The issue was thus post- 
 poned, though only for a few months. 
 
 Shortly afterwards J. Alsop Griswold, the regularly ap- 
 pointed American consul, and also a member of Russell and 
 Company, came to Shanghai and raised his flag in the Brit- 
 ish settlement, presumably at the same location where Wol- 
 cott had pulled it down two years before. The British con- 
 sul made his objections, but the flag remained. 
 
 The issue was again raised early in 1849 when the French 
 
198 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 consul secured from the taotai an area for a French settle- 
 ment between the English settlement and the city wall. In 
 this new area the arrangements as to leasing land were to be 
 similar to those in the British settlement, viz., that the per- 
 son desiring to lease should first apply to the French consul. 
 Consul Griswold immediately protested,* writing to the 
 taotai (April 11, 1849) as follows: 
 
 "There is nothing in the said treaties which gives any foreign 
 representative ■ a right to claim, or renders it incumbent on you to 
 grant, particular districts to one nation, excluding the people of other 
 countries, except by consent of the consuls to whom the grant is 
 made. . . . On July 14, 1846, your predecessor offered land which 
 includes the grant now made to the French to the United States 
 citizens. This tender was waived for the time being as Mr. Wolcott 
 considered it open for further discussion." 
 
 Griswold also pointed out to the taotai that to make such 
 grants to foreigners would alienate the sympathy of the 
 gentry for miles around. The British consul also protested 
 against the provision that to secure land in the French con- 
 cession the subjects of other nations would have to act 
 through the French consul, although this provision in the 
 French grant had been copied from the grant made to Cap- 
 tain Balfour.* Thus the British and American consuls as- 
 sumed a united front and both issued proclamations to their 
 nations informing them that the protection of the respective 
 flags would be given to land wherever situated.*^ 
 
 To United States Commissioner Davis at Macao, Gris- 
 wold wrote: 
 
 "If we are now to admit the principles of these grants, and demand 
 a similar one, it could only be given in a very unfavorable position, 
 and the majority of our citizens who come hereafter would find it to 
 their interest to locate themselves near the rest of their countrymen, 
 and thus come within the English and French concessions, rendering 
 the one we may obtain of little avail, and leaving us in the power 
 of the Chinese and foreign representatives to restrict us to the 
 allotment however unsuitable it may prove for business purposes." 
 
 In this letter Griswold reviewed the history of the con- 
 troversy and pointed out that the conditions had materially 
 
 *Morse states : "The same rule had been inserted in the agreement for the 
 English settlement, but it had not been acted on," — a very inadequate statement 
 of what actually happened.^ 
 
SETTLEMENT OF THE SHANGHAI LAND QUESTION 199 
 
 changed. When the original grant was made to the English 
 there were no other consuls in Shanghai. Now there were 
 four. Captain Balfour had insisted upon exclusive juris- 
 diction because of the necessity of preserving order. Now 
 the various governments were in a position to cooperate in 
 this matter. Griswold thought that there was little to fear 
 from the present French and English consuls, but the 
 claims to which they held might make difficulty at some 
 future date. He stated that he had never recognized the 
 British claims and that he had never had any trouble in 
 securing all the land the Americans wanted. But he 
 thought that the time had come to protest, not only against 
 the grants themselves, but also against the idea of putting 
 consuls in control of them. 
 
 American Protests Against Exclusive Concessions 
 
 Immediately upon the receipt of the report from Gris- 
 wold, Commissioner Davis took up the matter with Sen, 
 the Viceroy at Canton, drawing attention to the fact that 
 the concession to France at Shanghai violated Article 17 of 
 the Treaty of Wanghia, which jirovided for the residence 
 of Americans at the five ports. Davis wrote : 
 
 ''How can these immunities be enjoyed by the citizens of the 
 United States, if all the eligible situations for the above mentioned 
 objects have been ceded to other nations and that, too, long before 
 they have occasion to occupy them? Disclaiming any desire to 
 abridge the right granted by China to other nations by treaty, I must 
 protest against this and all other acts of a subordinate officer of the 
 Chinese Government which is intended to abrogate the rights 
 guaranteed to American citizens by treaty, and while we look to His 
 Imperial Majesty for the fulfillment of Treaty stipulations with us, 
 we must regard as a nullity any act of his subordinate officers which 
 comes in conflict with our rights under the treaty." 
 
 The Chinese High Commissioner, between two fires, 
 agreed that the local authorities at Shanghai had no right 
 to make such agreements but as the discussion with Davis 
 proceeded Sen's views came to be tempered with notions of 
 expediency. The American commissioner remained uu- 
 
200 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 moved, and at length Sen intimated that he could see no 
 good reason to repudiate the conditions in which affairs had 
 been placed by the grants to the English and the French, 
 and he hoped that the Americans would be content to have 
 a distinct quarter set apart for them elsewhere. Thus the 
 matter rested for a few months, and then Davis wrote to 
 Sen that he had decided to postpone the settlement of the 
 concession matter until some definite case arose.* 
 
 The American consul himself soon presented an oppor- 
 tunity to have the case reviewed. He purchased ground 
 inside the British concession, settled the terms with the 
 owners of the land, and presented his conveyance for the 
 seal of the intendant and for registration at the consulate 
 of the United States, without in any way recognizing the 
 right of the British consul to interfere in the transaction. 
 His deed was examined, sealed, and registered, apparently 
 without question ; and the matter of the 'concession' to the 
 use of the British merchants exclusively seemed to have 
 received a practical solution, consistent with the rights and 
 claims of the citizens of the United States. But without 
 the knowledge of the United States consul the taotai had 
 submitted the deeds of Mr. Griswold to the British consul 
 for his approval. 
 
 In the spring of 1852, Mr. Roundy, an American citizen, 
 purchased land within the British concession, and Mr. 
 Cunningham, the vice-consul of the United States, sent in 
 the conveyance to be examined and sealed by the taotai 
 and returned for registration at the consulate of the United 
 States. The official informed the vice-consul that the deed 
 must be submitted to Her Britannic Majesty's consul, and 
 must be registered in his office. This the vice-consul 
 promptly and firmly refused to do; and thereupon threat- 
 ened the taotai that if he did not perform his duty within 
 forty-eight hours communications between the authorities 
 
 *This passage between Davis and Sen, in which the representative of the 
 American Government is seen to be urging the Chinese Viceroy, with indifferent 
 success, to enforce_the rights of China under the treaty, is illustrative of the 
 anomolous situation created by the fact that the management of the foreign 
 affairs of the Chinese Empire were entrusted to a viceroy who was stationed at 
 Canton, Sen was little interested in what happened at Shanghai, 
 
SETTLEMENT OF THE SHANGHAI LAND QUESTION 201 
 
 of the United States and China at Shanghai would be 
 closed. The taotai returned the deeds with the seals prop- 
 erly affixed (March 16). 
 
 The same day Cunningham issued a proclamation to 
 the American residents of Shanghai drawing their attention 
 to the fact that purchases of land within Shanghai or its 
 neighborhood could be effected according to the terms of 
 the treaty with the Chinese officers through the American 
 consulate without the intervention in any manner of any 
 other foreign consul. The right had been uniformly main- 
 tained by the United States authorities, stated the consul, 
 and in the correspondence just closed had been fully ac- 
 knowledged by the taotai.'^ 
 
 By this very energetic action the question was disposed 
 of so far as the Chinese Government was concerned. A 
 week later, Consul Alcock, March 23, 1852, in a private 
 letter to Cunningham wrote very gracefully with reference 
 to the proclamation: 
 
 "I am glad of an opportunity of saying that I by no means con- 
 demn your circular, though it must give rise to some difficulty in 
 readjusting the terms of a joint location of foreigners recognizing no 
 common law, authority, or jurisdiction. 
 
 "I should consider myself very unvporthy of the trust confided to 
 me as the representative of the British Government here, if I desired 
 any exclusive advantage to the prejudice of any foreigner, and still 
 less of an American citizen." 
 
 Nevertheless the British consul felt it to be his duty 
 to enter an official protest to the proclamation of Cunning- 
 ham in which the British claims were repudiated. This 
 protest, with the explanatory papers was referred to the 
 British minister at Hongkong, and by him it was referred 
 to the Foreign Office. This question reached London for 
 settlement at the time when the Perry expedition was on 
 its way to Japan and American influence in the Far East 
 was becoming a factor in international affairs. The clouds 
 which foreshadowed the approach of the Crimean War were 
 already gathering over Europe and the American people 
 inclined to friendliness with Russia. Great Britain could 
 
202 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 not well afford to add fuel to the fires which had been 
 kindled in Oregon and in Nicaragua a few years before 
 where the Americans had sometimes assumed a very bel- 
 ligerent attitude. How much these considerations weighed 
 in the decision it is impossible to say, but at any rate the 
 Foreign Office decided to recognize the American contention 
 at Shanghai. 
 
 The Municipal Code 
 
 The following May (1853), Consul Alcock advised Cun- 
 ningham that "Her Majesty's Government have no desire 
 whatever to assert either exclusive right or jurisdiction over 
 the unappropriated land." Alcock thereupon submitted a 
 draft code of municipal regulations which, if accepted 
 jointly by the consuls and the taotai and then approved 
 by the home governments of the treaty powers, would have 
 the effect of converting the grant originally made to Cap- 
 tain Balfour into a grant for the use of all foreigners under 
 the joint control and supervision of the consuls and the 
 taotai. 
 
 This draft code was immediately submitted to U. S. 
 Commissioner Marshall who suggested a number of amend- 
 ments which were incorporated. He objected to the pro- 
 vision that the British consulate site, a tract of about thirty 
 acres, should be exempt from taxation, and in the final 
 draft of the regulations it was provided that "any land here- 
 after acquired by the governments of France and the United 
 States of America" were to be exempted from the regula- 
 tions, but that all such lands, the British included, would 
 "bear their share of the public burdens." 
 
 Marshall also objected to the provision which required 
 the intervention of the consul in the transfer of land from 
 one foreigner to another, and he found the stipulation 
 that a Chinese proprietor might be compelled to part with 
 his land at a price to be fixed by the consul and the taotai 
 to be 'subversive of justice.' In one other respect he pro- 
 posed to curb the power of the consuls by lodging the 
 
SETTLEMENT OF THE SHANGHAI LAND QUESTION 203 
 
 authority to determine the extension of roads, the building 
 of wharves, etc., in a committee appointed by the tax- 
 payers. 
 
 In some respects the most notable change suggested by 
 Marshall, the more remarkable because he was a South- 
 erner and might have been expected to possess some color 
 prejudices, was in the provision which would have excluded 
 the Chinese from living within the bounds of the foreign 
 settlement. This regulation he believed to be "wholly ob- 
 jectionable as creating invidious distinctions against the 
 Chinese, and exercising exactly the spirit of exclusiveness 
 towards them which we now complain of when exercised 
 towards ourselves. It cannot be sound policy to segregate 
 the populations, and instead of prohibiting the settlement 
 of Chinese among the foreigners, it should be invited. , . . 
 Prejudices will only give way before long-continued pleas- 
 ant social intercourse, and I anticipate great effect to be 
 produced by inviting the Chinese gentlemen to live among 
 the Americans and the English." The regulations as finally 
 adopted did not exclude the Chinese, merely specifying very 
 carefully the kind of houses which could be erected, with a 
 view to safeguarding the settlement from nuisances. While 
 the admission of the Chinese to the settlement in years to 
 come did not always add to the comfort of the foreigners, 
 it cannot be denied that the city thus created and governed 
 exercised a profound influence on China, just as the Ameri- 
 can commissioner predicted. 
 
 The most significant feature of the proposed regulations 
 was the definite and repeated acknowledgment of Chinese 
 sovereign rights to the land. The Chinese Government was 
 to receive a small annual tax, and deeds were to be sealed by 
 the Chinese authorities. While the foreigners were to be 
 permitted to form a municipal government of their own, the 
 source of the authority by which this was to be accomplished 
 was the Chinese Government. The rights of China as well 
 as of the foreigners were protected. 
 
 The importance of this question to American interests 
 on the China coast was considered by Commissioner Mar- 
 
204 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 shall to be very great politically as well as commercially. 
 He pointed out to Secretary of State Marcy: 
 
 "It may be considered a matter of importance to tlie government, 
 as connected with the future relations of Shanghai with the Western 
 terminus of a Pacific railroad; for I have no hind of a doubt that 
 Shanghai is destined to become the greatest city of Eastern Asia, 
 and most intimately of all connected with America. These regula- 
 tions will have a direct effect upon her future fortunes." 
 
 Final Settlement of a Vexed Question 
 
 The final settlement of the land question and the incep- 
 tion of a municipal government along the lines which had 
 been approved by the Chinese authorities and the several 
 governments concerned was reported to Secretary of State 
 Marcy by Commissioner McLane in July of the following 
 year.^ 
 
 "This system," wrote McLane, "is now in full operation, and it is 
 respected by all. I think it has the necessary strength to command 
 that respect when, from any cause, it may cease to be voluntarily 
 rendered. . . . 
 
 "These arrangements are of a very comprehensive character, 
 securing the peace and tranquillity of the foreign settlement at 
 Shanghai, and the lives, property and commercial privileges of our 
 people; while they render it impossible for any foreign power to 
 obtain an undue ascendancy. 
 
 "The land regulations, signed by the ministers of the three treaty 
 powers, renounce the pretensions heretofore set up by Great Britain 
 and France to the exclusive enjoyment of certain concessions made to 
 them respectively by the local authorities of China, and all foreigners 
 under the jurisdiction of their respective consuls enjoy the same 
 privileges; the concurrent and joint action of the consuls and the 
 local authorities of China having established a fundamental basis 
 on which the rights and privileges of all are firmly planted." 
 
 While the Shanghai land question has been treated here 
 as though it were an isolated episode in the international 
 relations of China, the full significance of it, both as related 
 to the relations of China with the powers and also to the 
 development of American policy in the Empire can only be 
 appreciated when it is remembered that the final settlement 
 of the question was being undertaken at the time when there 
 were also up for discussion two other matters of the highest 
 
SETTLEMENT OF THE SHANGHAI LAND QUESTION 205 
 
 importance; the question of the recognition of the Taiping 
 rebels, and, the question of the payment of duties at Shang- 
 hai after the capture of the city by the rebels, — a situation 
 which resulted in the establishment of the foreign inspector- 
 ate of the Chinese maritime customs. 
 
 BIBLIOGEAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. The most extended and coherent account of the early history of 
 
 the Shanghai land question is to be found in the Marshall 
 Correspondence. H. Doc. 123:33-1, Dispatch No. 23, July 26, 
 1853. Unless otherwise noted, this document is followed in 
 the ensuing narrative. See also Historic Shanghai, by C. A. 
 Montalto de Jesus, pp. 38-43. 
 
 2. Chinese Eepository, June, 1849, p. 332. 
 
 3. China Dispatches, Vol. 4. 
 
 4. China Dispatches, Vol. 5, Davis to Secy, of State, May 21, 1849. 
 
 5. Morse, Vol. 1, p. 349. 
 
 6. Chinese Eepository, June, 1849. 
 
 7. Morse, Vol. 1, p. 349. 
 
 8. McLane Correspondence, S. Ex. Doc. 22 :35-2, p. 123. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 HUMPHKEY MAESHALL AND THE TAIPING EEBELLION 
 
 The personal character of so much of the American 
 policy in Asia is well illustrated in the case of Humphrey 
 Marshall. Marshall had been chosen for the post only after 
 it had been formally offered to three others and informally 
 proposed to even more and by all declined. He was not 
 admirably fitted for the duties of diplomacy; he was auto- 
 cratic, dictatorial, pitifully vain, and gifted with singular 
 capacities for controversy, yet intellectually he was an able 
 man. In those days communication with China was so slow 
 that the commissioner could never hope to receive precise 
 instructions, and Marshall, because of the ignorance of 
 Washington as to the rapid turn of events, and because the 
 Pierce administration was just entering upon office, was left 
 largely to his own devices. Yet it happened that his term of 
 service coincided with what must be regarded as one of the 
 two or three most critical years of the last century in the 
 history of China. It fell therefore to the lot of Marshall, 
 uninstructed, unaided, and even unappreciated, to make a 
 most important contribution to American policy. To Mar- 
 shall the United States owed the discovery of the truth that 
 the weakness, or dissolution, of China, was a matter of na- 
 tional concern to the United States, and that the true policy 
 of the American Government must be to strengthen and sus- 
 tain the Chinese Government against either internal dis- 
 order or foreign aggression. 
 
 In 1853 the Gushing policy to consign American inter- 
 ests to the protection of China as a sovereign power was in 
 immanent danger of shipwreck, due to the fact that the 
 Government of China was threatened with dissolution in 
 the Taiping Rebellion. Boldly, alone, in the face of con- 
 
 206 
 
HUMPHREY MARSHALL AND TAIPING REBELLION 207 
 
 trary instructions and popular opinion, Marshall laid down 
 the second plank in the platform of American policy — ''the 
 highest interests of the United States are involved in sus- 
 taining China." 
 
 The Taiping Rebellion must be reckoned as one of the 
 most important wars of the nineteenth century when meas- 
 ured by the number of people whose destinies were involved, 
 the loss of life — S. Wells Williams gave the estimate that 
 fully 20,000,000 lives were destroyed ^ — and by the princi- 
 ples of action adopted by the foreign powers. The success 
 of the Taipings would have meant the destruction of the 
 Manchu Government and the separation of the great empire 
 into parts. The break-up of the empire in the middle of 
 the last century could have resulted within a few years in 
 nothing short of the dismemberment of China by foreign 
 powers. 
 
 Growth of the Rebellion 
 
 Like other popular revolutionary movements, the rebel- 
 lion grew out of the political, economic and social condi- 
 tions of the day. There was increasing corruption in and 
 consequent increasing hatred of the Manchu Government. 
 Its defeat in the Anglo-Chinese War had proved the Impe- 
 rial power to be a hollow sham, unable to repel the foreigner, 
 unable to stop the opium trade, impotent also to control its 
 own soldiery. The advance of the foreign trader and mis- 
 sionary within the empire had been accompanied by dis- 
 integrating influences upon the old religions and customs. 
 China was ripe for revolution, the fuel piled high awaiting 
 only the torch in the hand of some aggressive, popular and 
 able leader. That leader proved to be Hung-Siu-tshuen, a 
 native of a village thirty miles from Canton, who had moved 
 to the Province of Kwangsi to become a school teacher. 
 
 Hung-Siu-tshuen was a four-times disappointed aspirant 
 at the triennial examinations at Canton. In 1829, at the 
 age of sixteen, and then successively in 1833, 1837, and 
 1843 he had come down to the provincial city from his 
 village where his record as a scholar had been exceptional, 
 
208 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 only to fail in the higher examinations. He was defeated, 
 so he believed, by corrupt officials. But Hung was more 
 than a defeated candidate ; he was a pathological case such 
 as one would not be surprised to find in India, but in stoical, 
 common-sense China, is most unusual — a sort of Chinese 
 Mahomet, or Mad Mullah. After his third attempt at the 
 examinations he returned home in great depression of spirit 
 and sank into a delirious illness which is reported to have 
 lasted forty days. During this brief period, though never 
 subsequently so far as is known, he became subject to 
 cataleptic fits, and in his deliriums had visions of a more or 
 less religious nature.^ 
 
 While at Canton in 1837 he had purchased some tracts — 
 "Good Words to Exhort the Age" — from Liang A-fah, their 
 author, a colporteur of the London Missionary Society. 
 These tracts "consisted of sixty-eight short chapters upon 
 common topics, selected from the Bible." He took them 
 home but when he discovered that they advocated Chris- 
 tianity, he put them aside as teaching a forbidden subject. 
 Ten years later, upon the recommendation of his brother- 
 in-law, he read them and thought that he found in their 
 pages a clue to the meaning of the visions which had come 
 to him in his illness. He accepted the doctrine, added to it 
 as necessary to support his fanatical fancies, announced 
 himself as the brother of Jesus Christ, interpreted the phrase 
 Kingdom of God to mean China, proclaimed his mission and 
 began to exhort people to adopt Christianity as he under- 
 stood and construed it with the meagre assistance of Liang 
 A-fah's tracts. The next year in company with some dis- 
 ciples, he went to the mountains of eastern Kwangsi, and 
 two years later, having heard of the Rev. Issachar J. 
 Roberts, an American Baptist missionary at Canton, he left 
 disciples in charge of the preaching, and journeyed to Can- 
 ton to enroll himself as a pupil of Roberts. 
 
 Roberts ^ appears in the early records of American mis- 
 sionary work in Canton as an extremely aggressive, and 
 somewhat uncouth southerner, who labored with fanatical 
 zeal. The extent of his influence on Hung may not have 
 
HUMPHREY MARSHALL AND TAIPING REBELLION 209 
 
 been very great, for the latter remained with him only two 
 months, not long enough to win Roberts' confidence to the 
 point where the missionary was willing to receive him into 
 the church, and yet Hung seems to have remembered Rob- 
 erts with respect for in 1853, when the Taipings were estab- 
 lished in Nanking, he sent for his old teacher to come to 
 Nanking ''to assist in establishing the truth." Roberts was 
 unable to accept this invitation, perhaps because the Ameri- 
 can commissioner sternly forbade it,* and because of the 
 difficulty in reaching the Taiping capital. But soon after 
 1860 Roberts spent fifteen months at Nanking where he 
 lived, invested with yellow robes and a crown, in a house 
 suitably furnished and provided by the Taiping emperor. 
 
 The course of the rebellion from the return of Hung 
 from his visit to Roberts in 1846, can be sketched here only 
 briefly. At first it amounted only to a religious movement, / 
 the establishment of "Associations for Worshipping God," 
 in the villages of Kwangsi. These associations were re- 
 garded as treasonable, since only the emperor could worship 
 God. Hung, however, proved a popular leader, drew about 
 him some able lieutenants, and as the movement grew in 
 popularity, and as the opposition of the government in- 
 creased, it took on more and more the dimensions of a 
 political and military as well as religious campaign. Its 
 cardinal purpose became the expulsion of the Manchus. 
 Its military successes were due to its able leadership, its / 
 fanatical enthusiasm, rigid discipline, and to the rottenness 
 of Peking military affairs. ' 
 
 Sweeping up over the mountains north of Kwangsi into 
 Hunan and Kiangsi, gathering the discontented and des- 
 perate as the successful armies passed by, the Taipings 
 reached the Yangtze at the end of 1852, and, traveling down 
 the river, captured Nanking in March, 1853. By this time 
 Hung seems fully to have realized the strength which his 
 religious vagaries could lend to his political ambitions, and 
 the orders handed down to his subordinates were now issued 
 in the form of 'revelations.' The Taipings crossed the 
 Yangtze and marched northward towards Peking, reaching 
 
210 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 a place only twenty miles from Tientsin, and also spread- 
 ing westward through the adjoining provinces. But they 
 were soon forced to retire, not so much because of defeats 
 suffered as because of over-extended lines, too far removed 
 from the base which had been established on the Yangtze. 
 At Nanking, Hung was proclaimed by his army Emperor 
 of the Tai (Great) Ping (Peace) Chao (Dynasty) — hence 
 the term Taiping, which the Europeans adopted for the 
 rebellion — and settled down to perfect his organization and 
 court, the master of almost the entire Yangtze Valley from 
 below Nanking westward six hundred miles to Ichang. 
 
 The Dilemma Presented to the Foreigners 
 
 The phenomenal success of the rebels, and the quasi- 
 Christian character of the movement began to draw the 
 attention of the world. The Roman Catholic missionaries, 
 whose influence in France was paramount, were always 
 opposed to the rebels because of their iconoclastic practices 
 and their Protestant doctrines, but the Protestant mission- 
 aries, for the most part, hailed the movement with enthusi- 
 asm, believing that they saw returning to them the bread 
 which they had for years been casting on the waters. The 
 glowing accounts of the rebellion which reached England 
 and America through missionary channels created a strong 
 public sentiment in favor of the Taipings. By many they 
 were looked upon as a rising Christian power in the pagan 
 East destined to become the providential agency in the 
 conversion of Asia. The movement attracted the interest, 
 also, of the foreign governments and of the foreigners in 
 China engaged in trade.^ 
 
 The relation between the foreign powers and the Chinese 
 Government was rapidly reaching a critical stage in 1853 
 when the Taipings were in the flood-tide of their first 
 successes. The grievances of the foreigners were, briefly: 
 (1) The mercantile community, especially the English, was 
 thoroughly discontented with the commercial privileges of 
 the treaties. Hongkong, as a commercial center, had been 
 
HUMPHREY MARSHALL AND TAIPING REBELLION 211 
 
 an indifferent success. Amoy, Foochow and Ningpo had 
 been disappointments. There was a general feeling that 
 nothing less than the complete opening of China to foreign 
 trade would be satisfactory. (2) The failure to secure the 
 legalization of the opium trade was irritating to those en- 
 gaged in it, casting over them the evil reputation of smug- 
 glers although the trade was openly connived at by the 
 Chinese ofl&cials. (3) The Chinese had been able, while 
 keeping the letter of the treaty to render nugatory many 
 of its provisions both as to trade and diplomatic intercourse. 
 The city of Canton remained implacable, its gates closed, its 
 populace sullen and insulting, its governor general who was 
 also the viceroy delegated to conduct the foreign relations 
 of the Empire, incommunicado so far as the foreign min- 
 isters were concerned. Viceroy Yeh, acting under orders 
 from Peking as was afterwards revealed, absolutely refused 
 to hold personal interviews with the ministers. (4) The 
 reign of the new Empqrer who had ascended the throne in 
 1850 was seen to be marked by a pronounced anti-foreign 
 feeling. (5) The Chinese Government had shown a dis- 
 position to evade the settlement of claims due to infractions 
 of the treaty and to lack of protection offered to foreigners. 
 
 Both the Americans and the English were, by 1853, 
 agreed that the treaties of 1842-4 must be revised. Not- 
 withstanding differences of opinion in matters of detail the 
 foreigners were being drawn together by the obvious fact 
 that the Chinese had no intention whatever, except under 
 strong compulsion, of revising the treaties at all, much less 
 of making large concessions to either the governments or 
 the commercial interests. 
 
 To this list of general grievances were added in 1853 the 
 disturbances of trade at Canton and Shanghai arising from 
 the disorders of the Rebellion. The Imperial Government 
 was showing itself to be utterly unable to maintain order, 
 and this fact was brought home to the foreigners with 
 peculiar force when, September 7, 1853, Shanghai itself was 
 wrested from the imperial control by a band of rebels. For 
 months the question had been arising whether, in the face 
 
212 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 of these facts, it would not be the part of wisdom for the 
 foreign powers to turn to the Taipings, recognize them, give 
 them the necessary support in return for guarantees of 
 friendly treatment thereafter, and seize the opportunity to 
 do away with the troublesome Manchu dynasty. 
 
 "I hope Tien-Teh" (the rebel chief), wrote a member of 
 the house of Russell and Company at Shanghai to Hum- 
 phrey Marshall March 13, 1853,^ "will be successful and 
 upset the present dynasty. We cannot be worse off ; and he 
 is said to be a liberal man." This expression is fairly 
 characteristic of the prevailing public sentiment although 
 some of the conservatives were more hesitant. The North 
 American Review carried an article (July, 1854, p. 199) on 
 the rebellion in which the advantages to foreigners of a 
 breaking up of China were pointed out in the following 
 paragraph : 
 
 ''Unwittingly to himself [Tien-Teh] perhaps, he will teach us 
 where to introduce the wedge, where to rest the lever; and it will not 
 be many years ere we find European influence, hitherto so powerless 
 in the high exclusive walls of the palace of Peking, operating with 
 wonderful force at the courts of a score of kingdoms, petty in com- 
 parison with the great aggregate of which they once formed a part, 
 and all jealous of, if not divided against, each other." 
 
 President Pierce in his annual message December 5, 
 1853, appears to have had such a hope. He said: 
 
 ''The condition of China at this time renders it probable that some 
 important changes will occur in that vast Empire which will lead to 
 a more unrestricted intercourse with it. The commissioner to that 
 country who has been recently appointed is instructed to avail himself 
 of all occasions to open and extend our commercial relations, not only 
 with the Empire of China, but with other Asiatic nations." ' 
 
 It was very generally believed that, quite aside from the 
 fact of whether the rebellion would be a benefit, its success 
 was assured. "I think I may safely say," wrote Marshall to 
 the Secretary of State, April 28, 1853, "that from all I can 
 learn the Government of China is fully employed by the 
 rebels, and that any day may bring forth the fruits of suc- 
 cessful revolution, in the utter overthrow of the existing 
 dynasty." ^ Five weeks later he addressed to the Secretary 
 
HUMPHREY MARSHALL AND TAIPING REBELLION 213 
 
 of State a request for specific instructions as to the policy to 
 be pursued in case the further success of the rebels raised the 
 question as to whom the customs dues should be paid. This 
 inquiry was especially pertinent in view of the fact that it 
 was the policy of the Government of the United States to 
 recognize de facto governments.^ 
 
 Washington was entirely without information such as 
 would enable the government to issue specific instructions to 
 Marshall. The favorable opportunity offered by the rebel- 
 lion for the foreign powers to advance their interests was 
 pointed out to the Department of State by the British min- 
 ister, and its obvious yet superficial advantages were recog- 
 nized. That was the 'heydey of the filibuster' in American 
 foreign policy, characterized by no fine moral distinctions or 
 sense of duty towards weak yet sovereign states, but China 
 was too far away for American filibustering. The British 
 desired American cooperation in the Far East, but President 
 Pierce and Secretary of State Marcy were wary. In June, 
 1853, Marcy wrote to Marshall that he had been apprised 
 that Great Britain intended to avail itself of the present con- 
 ditions in China to obtain 'increased facilities of intercourse,' 
 not exclusively for its own subjects, but for all nations. It 
 had been suggested that the Government of the United 
 States send to its commissioner such instructions as would 
 '^empower him to take such a course in conjunction with 
 H. M. Plenipotentiary as will be calculated to turn to the 
 best account the opportunity offered by the present crisis to 
 open the Chinese Empire generally to the commercial enter- 
 prise of all the civilized nations of the world." 
 
 "The end proposed commends itself to the approval of 
 che President," wrote Marcy, who requested Marshall to do 
 what he could in that direction, remembering that the treaty 
 stipulations must be respected and the settled American 
 policy of non-interference in the contests which arise be- 
 tween the people and their rulers must be observed. Marcy 
 suggested that without departure from these rules of con- 
 duct it might be possible to do much in such a crises "as does 
 or may exist in China to cause an abandonment of the 
 
214 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 unwise restrictions imposed by China upon foreign inter- 
 course." However, without knowing what course the British 
 authorities might deem it expedient to take in furtherance 
 of the object in view, the President "does not enjoin upon 
 you cooperation but only cordial relations and free confer- 
 ence with them."^*' 
 
 Marshall received no further instructions on the subject 
 but the opportunist policy of Marcy may be judged from the 
 instructions to McLane, the newly appointed commissioner. 
 McLane was vested Svith large discretionary powers' be- 
 cause of the disturbance of the Taiping Rebellion, If China 
 should be divided and several governments organized, 
 McLane was to present himself to each as the diplomatic 
 representative of the United States and make such treaties 
 as he thought wise.^^ 
 
 Marshall Becomes Suspicious of British Designs 
 
 The policy of the British Government which had been 
 vaguely outlined to Marcy by the British minister in Wash- 
 ington assumed in China what appeared to Marshall to be 
 sinister aspects. On May 30 he reported to Marcy: ^^ 
 
 "The British minister has been to Nanking. His interpreter has 
 revisited it since the departure of Sir George Bonham for Honkong. 
 He goes to find out 'what the rebels are about,' and his intercourse 
 with their camp and their princes has served to awaken in his bosom 
 the warmest sympathy in their cause! The long articles in the late 
 numbers of the North China Herald are attributed to Mr. Meadow's 
 pen. His position in the legation of Great Britain, his fluency in 
 speaking and writing the Chinese language, lend every opportunity 
 of assuming the protectorate of the young power to Great Britain, at 
 least so far as to mould its first steps to suit the policy of that govern- 
 ment. The vigilance of England will be nothing strange to commu- 
 nicate to the Secretary of State. The apprehension I have is, that 
 Great Britain may obtain the opening of a western Chinese port 
 (inland) from the new Emperor at Nanking, and the right to navigate 
 the Yangtse Kiang closed to foreign commerce beyond the existing 
 port of entry. I do not doubt that with that view her war with 
 Burmah has been waged and her Indian Empire extended. The 
 portage from the Irrawaddy to the Yangtse Kiang is very short [sic] . 
 I suggest these considerations to you frankly, because they seem to 
 me to point out the propriety of preparation to assume the part the 
 
HUMPHREY MARSHALL AND TAIPING REBELLION 215 
 
 United States may find it politic to take in face of an event now so 
 likely as the dismemberment of the empire." 
 
 Six weeks later rumor had it that the Chinese Govern- 
 ment had asked for assistance,* and that the Czar of Russia 
 had already promised the necessary aid. 
 
 "Her assistance," wrote Marshall, "would probably end in passing 
 China under a Eussian protectorate, and in the extension of Russian 
 limits to the Hoangho, or the mouth of the Yangtse; or, it may be, 
 when circumstances and policy shall favor the scheme, in the parti- 
 tion of China between Great Britain and Russia. The interference 
 of the Czar would readily suppress the rebellion, by driving the rebels 
 from the great highways of commerce, and from the occupation of 
 the towns on the seaboard. Whatever might be the ultimate com- 
 pensation demanded by Russia for this timely service, China could 
 not resist its collection." ^* 
 
 Marshall then went on to say, with a wisdom which 
 stood the test of time : 
 
 "I think that almost any sacrifice should be made by the United 
 States to keep Russia from spreading her Pacific bovindary, and to 
 avoid her coming directly to interference in Chinese domestic affairs ; 
 for China is like a lamb before the shearers, as easy a conquest as were 
 the provinces of India. Whenever the avarice or the ambition of 
 Russia or Great Britain shall tempt them to make the prizes, the fate 
 of Asia will be sealed, and the future Chinese relations with the 
 United States may be considered as closed for ages, unless now the 
 United States shall foil the untoward result by adopting a sound 
 policy." 
 
 The Commissioner adds a concluding sentence which 
 may be taken as his summary of what he conceived to be 
 the true American policy in the Far East. 
 
 "It is ray opinion that the highest interests of the United States 
 are involved in sustaining China — maintaining order here, and gradu- 
 ally engrafting on this worn-out stock the healthy principles which 
 give life and health to governments, rather than to see China become 
 the theatre of widespread anarchy, and ultimately the prey of Euro- 
 pean ambition." 
 
 While Marshall did not again allude to the dangers of 
 Russian aggression, his fears possibly having been aroused 
 
 *0n May 6, 1853, Commodore Perry was asked by the Shanghai officials to 
 assist in the suppression of the rebellion.^' 
 
216 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 by a false rumor, he immediately began to turn his atten- 
 tion to measures which would thwart any sinister designs 
 which might be entertained by England. His course was 
 clear. In the face of the prevailing sympathy for the Tai- 
 pings, a sympathy which reached even from the United 
 States and which prompted severe criticism of him when his 
 policy became known, and in the face of contrary instruc- 
 tions from his government, Marshall set himself to do every- 
 thing he possibly could to support the Imperial Govern- 
 ment. For the moment this was not much. He had quar- 
 relled with Commodore Perry who was then wholly preoccu- 
 pied with his expedition to Japan, and Perry had withdrawn 
 from all cooperation with him. The capture of Shanghai by 
 rebel bands on the 7th of September, however, precipitated a 
 situation in which Marshall proceeded to apply his policy of 
 upholding the Imperial authority with all the limited means 
 at his disposal. The action of the Britjfeh authorities in the 
 weeks immediately following the fall of the city seemed to 
 Marshall to confirm his fears. We are thus led to a consid- 
 eration of the different policies of the American and the 
 English authorities after the fall of Shanghai both in the 
 payment of the customs dues and in the protection of the 
 foreign settlement. 
 
 The walled city of Shanghai came into the possession of 
 a band of rebels, who professed more or less close connec- 
 tion with the Taipings, on the 7th of September, 1853. The 
 customs house which was in the foreign settlement was 
 attacked by the rabble who took advantage of the disorder 
 to loot. That evening the British authorities, declaring that 
 a condition of anarchy existed, placed a guard over the cus- 
 toms house, and also at the bridges over the Yang King 
 Pang, the creek which flowed between the walled city and 
 the foreign settlement. In the placing of these guards the 
 Americans were not consulted. 
 
 The flight of the ofiicers of the Imperial Customs from 
 their post of duty immediately created the question of 
 whether the foreigners ought to be expected to continue to 
 pay customs dues, and if they were to pay them, how and 
 
HUMPHREY MARSHALL AND TAIPING REBELLION 217 
 
 to whom they could be paid. Upon these points there was 
 at once a difference of opinion. Merchants argued that as 
 the Imperial Government was no longer discharging its 
 obligation to protect them, and was not even supplying 
 customs officials to receive the dues, they ought to be re- 
 lieved of the obligation of paying. Others, among whom 
 Marshall was most conspicuous, argued that the foreigners 
 were by no means relieved of such an obligation, and that 
 if, through the failure of the Imperial Government to pro- 
 tect them, any foreigners suffered loss, the treaty provided 
 that the foreigners might make claims for the losses sus- 
 tained, and collect from the government. If on the other 
 hand, the foreigners repudiated the Imperial Government 
 by refusing to pay the duties, Marshall argued that certainly 
 they would have no grounds for claims against the gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 The day following the fall of the city Mr. Rutherford 
 Alcock and Mr. Edward Cunningham, the British consul 
 and American vice consul, held a conference and agreed to 
 issue orders to their nationals, respectively, stating that 
 during the absence of the Imperial customs officers, they, 
 the consuls, would collect the duties for the Imperial Gov- 
 ernment, according to the treaties. There was, however, a 
 difference between the methods to be employed. The Eng- 
 lish consul required only that the merchants deposit at the 
 consulate promissory notes which were to be held, pending 
 the decision of the Foreign Office in London, as to whether 
 the British merchants were actually to redeem the notes. 
 It was freely predicted that the Foreign Office would decide 
 against the Chinese Government and that the notes would 
 be returned, as in fact they were, a year later. The Ameri- 
 cans on the other hand were ordered to pay their duties at 
 the consulate in specie. The American merchants, by the 
 decree of the American consul, who was firmly supported 
 by the American Commissioner, were thus placed under a 
 severe handicap with reference to their British competitors. 
 The one paid duties in notes of doubtful value; the other 
 paid in cash. A still further element of confusion was in- 
 
218 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 jected into the situation by the fact that the merchants 
 of nations unrepresented by consuls in Shanghai, recognized 
 no obligations whatever to pay the duties when there were 
 no officers to collect them. In fact the very day that Alcock 
 and Cunningham issued their orders, the Prussian ship 
 Adler departed, merely recording a simple guarantee that 
 the duties would be paid in case they were required at some 
 future date — very different from a promissory note, and 
 wholly different from cash payments. Subsequently other 
 ships of nations unrepresented by consuls departed without 
 even a promise to pay. 
 
 The British authorities then took the position that the 
 Imperial authorities should not be permitted to resume the 
 collection of the customs until the Imperial authorities had 
 retaken the walled city. However, the British authorities 
 had also declared that the foreign settlement must remain 
 in strict neutrality in the conflict between the rebels and 
 the Imperialists, and that no troops, not even Imperial 
 troops, should be permitted to enter the foreign settlement. 
 At the same time the foreigners in the settlement were 
 known to be not merely openly sympathizing with the 
 rebels in the city, but also to be supplying them with am- 
 munition. Marshall, on the other hand, recognized the 
 establishment of a new imperial customs house although it 
 proved to be only some old junks moored in the river below 
 the foreign settlement. 
 
 The Americans again protested against the unequal 
 burdens placed upon them by Marshall's decisions, but Mar- 
 shall stubbornly refused to yield, asserting that the treaty 
 was still in force, and that if they suffered losses the Chinese 
 Government would be liable for damages. 
 
 Probably realizing that sooner or later an explanation to 
 the State Department would be required for this ruling 
 which was so ruinous to American merchants, Marshall 
 made his reasons the subject of a long dispatch.^ ^ The 
 American Commissioner's controlling motive was to thwart 
 what appeared to him to be the aggressive designs of Great 
 Britain. 
 
HUMPHREY MARSHALL AND TAIPING REBELLION 219 
 
 "I believe that were Great Britain assured," he wrote, "that the 
 United States would not interfere in behalf of China, she would seize 
 and hold this city permanently, and thus command the valley of the 
 Yangtse — the richest probably in the world. I believe she will yet 
 do it, unless she shall be advised that such usurpation would provoke 
 resistance on the part of the United States, to whom such a coup 
 d'etat would be a national calamity." 
 
 In support of this conviction Marshall submitted some 
 facts in addition to those which have already been enu- 
 merated. The British Government, he maintained, with the 
 cooperation of the French, were at that moment exercising 
 the rights of sovereignty on Chinese territory, and without 
 sufl&cient excuse or reason. Not only was the foreign settle- 
 ment being guarded by their marines at a time when a guard 
 seemed to him so unnecessary that he had requested no aid 
 from the American naval force then in the harbor, but they 
 had actually halted the Imperial commander-in-chief as he 
 came into the settlement to pay his respects to the foreign 
 authorities. Twice a Chinese customs boat had been driven 
 from the anchorage in front of the foreign settlement by 
 British men-of-war. Recently British H. M. S. Hermes at 
 Amoy had 'drifted' in between the vessels of the Imperials 
 and the rebel forces during an engagement at a time when 
 the Imperialists seemed to be on the point of victory. He 
 also had observed that British subjects were in communica- 
 tion with the rebel forces at Nanking. Recently a British 
 subject, bearing a letter from the Taiping authorities in 
 Nanking, when arrested by the Imperial troops as a spy and 
 returned to the British consul for punishment, had been dis- 
 missed under the purely nominal bail of $200. 
 
 "These examples," wrote Marshall, "of incidents daily occurring in 
 China will serve to place you in possession of the tendency of affairs 
 in China, and to prove that, though neutrality may be the profession 
 of Great Britain, and the aim of the Foreign Office, the practice of 
 the public authorities among the Chinese leads to the conclusion that 
 there is another policy in view." 
 
 Whatever may have been the truth of Marshall's allega- 
 tions as to the intent of the British authorities in China in 
 1853, the American policy as actually applied was twofold : 
 
220 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 immediately, to support the Imperial authority; and, to 
 continue to recognize the sovereignty of China; and to do 
 this for the ultimate purpose of helping China to maintain 
 her integrity — to prevent the dismemberment which seemed 
 so probable in event of the success of the rebellion. The 
 practical application of Marshall's policy is to be seen in his 
 handling of the Shanghai customs question. 
 
 Shall Shanghai Become a Free Port? 
 
 The issue was this: Should the port of Shanghai, dur- 
 ing the occupation of the city by rebels and the absence of 
 not only Imperial customs officers but also of Imperial 
 military protection, be considered a free port? In other 
 words was the port of Shanghai to become, at least for the 
 time being, a port such as Hongkong had always been under 
 the British administration? Favoring an affirmative answer 
 to this question were the mercantile communities regardless 
 of nationality, while the British consul, Mr. Rutherford 
 Alcock, not caring to assume the responsibility, referred the 
 matter to the Foreign Office, meanwhile accepting, as al- 
 ready described, qualified promissory notes from British 
 merchants in payment of customs dues. This action, while 
 not definitely declaring the port open, so far as British mer- 
 chants were concerned did in effect leave the port open, and 
 yet in such a way that the British treaties were not violated. 
 Against this plan of an open port was the American author- 
 ity as represented in the proclamation of the consul, sup- 
 ported by the approval of the commissioner.* 
 
 In the face of the repeated protest of the American mer- 
 chants Marshall held his ground. Replying to a second pro- 
 test of October 31, he declared: ^'^ 
 
 "It is my purpose to perform, punctiliously, every obligation 
 assumed by the United States under the treaty, and to refrain from 
 
 *The full responsibility for the measures which prevented Shanghai from 
 actually becoming a free port after the fall of the city was attributed by the 
 leading American firms to Commissioner Marshall. In a letter of protest, signed 
 by Smith, King & Co., Wetmore & Co., Augustine Heard & Co., Bull, Nye & Co., 
 September 21, these merchants stated the case as follows : "We believe that, in 
 the present lapse of legal authority, this port becomes, for the time being, a free 
 port; and it certainly would be so to us now but for the presence of the officers 
 of our government." '* 
 
HUMPHREY MARSHALL AND TAIPING REBELLION 221 
 
 embarrassing the public administration of Chinese affairs by throwing 
 unnecessary obstacles in the way. No precedent, no example furnished 
 by other powers, will induce me to forego the faithful and honest 
 execution of our plain international obligations." 
 
 Marshall Forces Dissolution of Provisional System 
 
 Marshall's position, however, became increasingly diffi- 
 cult to maintain. The ships of non-treaty powers continued 
 to go free. On the 4th of November, Vice-consul Cunning- 
 ham at Shanghai addressed a letter to the taotai, pointing 
 out that on a certain day two vessels had left the port, one 
 American and one Austrian : the former paid duties accord- 
 ing to the provisional rules, while the latter departed abso- 
 lutely free. Cunningham asserted that such a situation was 
 in violation of the most-favored-nation clause in the Treaty 
 of Wanghia, and demanded that the Americans be placed on 
 the same footing as the subjects of those nations whose ships 
 were going free. 
 
 When informed of this action the American Commis- 
 sioner, who was then in the South vainly seeking an inter- 
 view with Viceroy Yeh, replied, intimating that as it was 
 the duty of China to insist on her rights at Shanghai under 
 the treaties with England and France and that if, after 
 ample opportunity to reestablish control, China continued 
 to concede free entry and clearance, or the payment of dues 
 in promissory notes the redemption of which depended upon 
 the will of the British Government, then the American 
 Government would demand as a right under the treaty that 
 American ships also go free. Meanwhile Viceroy Yeh 
 seemed in ^no way to appreciate the battle which Marshall 
 had undertaken at Shanghai in defense of the Imperial 
 revenues, and Marshall became convinced that the bold 
 policy which he had adopted in September was not bold 
 enough. It had not brought the other foreign nations into 
 line, and it had placed upon the American merchants an 
 insuperable handicap. Therefore on the 4th of January, 
 1854, he addressed an authorization to Vice-consul Cun- 
 ningham to change his policy immediately and "to clear 
 
222 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 American ships without taking any note of the duties what- 
 ever, without requiring any port clearance, and in all re- 
 spect treating Shanghai as a free port." In conclusion Mar- 
 shall wrote: ^^ 
 
 "I congratulate you that, by the strict pursuit of our national 
 duty, we are in a position, without violating a treaty stipulation or 
 giving just offense in any quarter, to assert all our national rights and 
 to maintain the commerce of the United States on the footing of the 
 most-favored nation, without loss from any unjust discrimination 
 being possible, under any regulation whatever, made or to be made 
 by others." 
 
 The purpose of the American Commissioner was two- 
 fold: to help the American merchants out of what was be- 
 coming an impossible situation ; and to force the hand of the 
 British authorities, for under the new order it was the Brit- 
 ish commercial interests which were placed under a handi- 
 cap; while the American ships went free, the British ships 
 were still required to deposit the promissory notes and it 
 was not yet definitely known that they would not some day 
 become payable. Marshall's policy was successful. 
 
 Marshall was superseded as commissioner when the 
 Pierce administration entered office, and he left China on 
 March 13, 1854, before the arrival of his successor, Robert 
 M. McLane. Meanwhile the confusion at Shanghai had 
 become very great and the British plenipotentiary, Sir John 
 Bowring, had had a correspondence with the secretary of the 
 Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce, in which was to be 
 observed a great change in the tone and temper of the 
 British authorities. McLane reported : ^^ 
 
 "The undisguised hostility expressed towards the rebels is a new 
 feature in the intercourse which has heretofore taken place, either 
 between the superior and inferior British authorities themselves, or 
 between either of them and the Chinese authorities." 
 
 A month later McLane reported : ^'^ that he had been in 
 communication with Sir John Bowring and that the latter 
 had expressed the desire to see 'him personally before he 
 attempted to open up communications with the Chinese 
 Empire, and had expressed the further desire for 'hearty 
 cooperation' in the progress of events in China. Notwith- 
 
HUMPHREY MARSHALL AND TAIPING REBELLION 223 
 
 Standing the sympathy for the rebels which still persisted 
 among an ill-informed public in England and America, the 
 events in China, and a fuller knowledge of the rebel move- 
 ment itself which rapidly degenerated after its establish- 
 ment in Nanking, settled effectively the question of the 
 recognition of the Taipings. Towards the Taiping Rebel- 
 lion the Government of the United States pursued its set- 
 tled policy of non-intervention in the affairs of other 
 nations. In its instructions to its commissioners it followed 
 exactly a policy of neutrality, taking the ground that China 
 must settle her own troubles. Applying again the principle 
 that China was a sovereign state. Secretary of State Marcy 
 advised Dr. Parker in 1855 ^^ that the Government of the 
 United States had no right to restrain its citizens from intro- 
 ducing munitions of war into the five ports, even when it 
 was known that they were intended for the rebels. On the 
 other hand American citizens in China who did not remain 
 neutral in the conflict, must understand that they forfeited 
 all right to the protection of the Government of the United 
 States and all right to claims for redress. 
 
 In addition to this both McLane and Parker in their 
 effort to secure the appointment of commissioners to dis- 
 cuss supplementary articles and the revision of the treaty 
 hinted broadly ^" that if the Imperial Government would 
 not listen to them, they might turn to the rebels. This, 
 however, was a mere threat and the strict neutrality de- 
 clared by the American Government was in fact moderated 
 by an increased benevolence on the part of the commis- 
 sioners towards the Empire. The British policy was similar, 
 and as for the French, their dislike of the Taipings had 
 always been apparent. 
 
 At the beginning of the administration of President 
 Buchanan (1857), Lord Napier, then British Minister at 
 Washington, in the course of the conferences between the 
 United States and China which preceded the negotiations 
 for the revision of the treaties with China, left with Secre- 
 tary of State Cass a memorandum on British policy in China 
 in which is found an official statement of what had become 
 
224 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 the British policy with reference to the more fundamental 
 questions of the integrity of China. 
 
 Lord Napier wrote : ^ "The dissolution of the Chinese Empire 
 and the separation of its provinces cotild not fail to be accompanied 
 by the interception of communications, the diminution of wealth, the 
 destruction of industry, by all the calamities which check the Powers 
 of production and consumption. Such a result would be most preju- 
 dicial to Great Britain both in reference to our exportation to China, 
 and to our importation of tea, which is at once a source of revenue 
 and a necessary of life." 
 
 Thus, more than three quarters of a century ago, the 
 two great nations most interested in the trade of China, 
 reasoning wholly from the grounds of national self-interest, 
 reached the conclusion that the Chinese Empire ought not 
 to be dissolved. 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. Williams: "Middle Kingdom," Vol. 2, p. 624. 
 
 2. Hamberg: "The Visions of Hung-Siu-tshuen." 
 
 3. Cordier: "Histoire des Relations de la Chine," Vol. 1, p. 169; 
 
 China Dispatches, Vol. 3, June 2, 1846; Vol. 5, Eeb. Y, 1849 
 (Dept. of State). 
 
 4. Marshall Corres., pp. 183, 185; Brine's Taiping Rebellion, pp. 
 
 295-8. 
 
 5. British Parliamentary Papers, 1870, Vol. LXIX, Corres. re- 
 
 specting Inland Residence of English Missionaries in China, 
 p. 10. 
 
 6. Marshall Corres., p. 96. 
 
 7. Richardson's Messages, Vol. 5, p. 210. 
 
 8. Marshall Corres., p. 102. 
 
 9. Hid., p. 168. 
 
 10. China Instructions, June, 1853 (Dept. of State). 
 
 11. McLane Instructions, S. Ex. Doc. 39 :36-l. 
 
 12. Marshall Corres., pp. 168-9. 
 
 13. S. Ex. Doc. 34:33-2, Disp. No. 11, May 6, 1853. 
 
 14. Marshall Corres., p. 204. i 
 
 15. Ihid., p. 290. 
 
 16. Ihid., p. 261. 
 
 17. lUd., p. 313. 
 
 18. Ihid., pp. 366-7. 
 
 19. McLane Corres., p. 3. ■ 
 
 20. Ihid., p. 23. 
 
 21. China Instructions, Vol. 1, Oct. 5, 1855. 
 
 22. McLane Corres., p. 145; Parker Corres., p. 945. 
 
 23. Notes from the British Legation, Vol. 34, Apr. 3, 1857 (Dept. 
 
 of State). 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 THE POLICY or COMMISSIONEE McLANE 
 
 The service of Robert M. McLane as Commissioner to 
 China was brief — only nine months long — but important. 
 To him belongs the distinction of having devised a settle- 
 ment of the vexed question of the Shanghai customs which 
 was in line with the ideas of his predecessor whose policy he 
 approved, and it also fell to his lot to make some new and 
 rather startling adventures in policies of his own. 
 
 His instructions ^ which may be taken as the policy of 
 the Pierce administration in China were specific only in the 
 fact that they recommended cooperation with the other 
 treaty powers. It was a timid cooperation which Marcy 
 proposed, quite unlike the 'cooperative policy' of Seward ten 
 years later, but it was significant as an indication of the 
 turning tide in American foreign policy. The old aloofness, 
 and particularly the old hatred and suspicion of Great Brit- 
 ain and all her works w as passing. Every year the choice for 
 the American and the British governments in the Far East 
 between working with or against one another was presenting 
 itself. Cooperation seemed the course of wisdom. 
 
 The Inspectorate of Maritime Customs 
 
 In thie settlement of the Shanghai customs question 
 McLane immediately assumed leadership. On February 9, 
 1854, the British, French and American consuls at Shanghai 
 had united in recognizing a new Imperial customs house 
 which was established at Soochow Creek, and the collection 
 of dues by the Imperial authorities began forthwith. The 
 three consuls, at the suggestion of McLane, prepared a full 
 
 225 • 
 
226 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 report * of the situation as it had developed from September 
 7th, for submission to their governments with a view to 
 some final settlement.^ 
 
 The situation at Shanghai by no means cleared up with 
 the recognition of the reestablished customs house. The 
 old Chinese maritime customs service was disintegrating in 
 sheer rottenness. The city had not been retaken by the 
 Imperial authorities, and the corruption of the ofiicials 
 at the customs house was such that merchants were still 
 able to evade the payment of duties. To meet this situa- 
 tion the taotai notified the consuls, March 25, that by order 
 of the governor general, the collection of Shanghai outward 
 customs would be transferred to the interior until such 
 time as peace was restored. To this order the foreign gov- 
 ernments immediately objected as a violation of the treaties. 
 R. C. Murphy, the newly arrived American consul, joined 
 with the British and French consuls, with the full approval 
 of McLane, in a joint communication to the taotai notifying 
 him that they would not sanction the change in the manner 
 of collecting the outward customs.^ Nevertheless the cus- 
 toms house on Soochow Creek was abandoned by the 
 Chinese on May 9. Shanghai became completely what it 
 had been partially for many months — a free port. Thus the 
 Imperial Government was entirely deprived of revenue from 
 the port of Shanghai at a time when the empire was in the 
 throes of rebellion, when the Imperial coffers were sadly 
 depleted, and the dynasty was in the utmost danger of dis- 
 solution. 
 
 Meanwhile it had become clear that it was for the best 
 interests of the foreigners, in the choice between the rebels 
 and the Imperialists, to support and fortify the latter. The 
 most obvious step which could be taken, in the interest of 
 protecting the Imperial revenues, and also for the sake of 
 
 ♦Throughout Michie's account of the Shanghai customs question (The Eng- 
 lishman in China), he gives Rutherford Alcock the credit for leadership among 
 the consuls, and sees only inconsistency in the course adopted by the Americans. 
 He states, however, that the American action in declai'ing for a free port forced 
 the dissolution of the "provisional system" which had been operative so far as 
 the Americans and English were concerned. 
 
 Morse also fails to make clear the reasons for the course adopted by the 
 Americans, 
 
THE POLICY OF COMMISSIONER McLANE 227 
 
 maintaining uniformity at the five ports in the collection of 
 customs, was to devise some plan by which the corruption 
 in the Shanghai customs service might be eliminated, and 
 the collection of dues restored. 
 
 On the 21st of June, in an interview with E-liang, the 
 Viceroy and Governor General of the Liang Kiang Prov- 
 inces, in which Shanghai was situated, Commissioner 
 McLane outlined a plan by which full power "should be 
 given to the superintendent of customs at Shanghai to enter 
 into and conclude an arrangement with the consuls of the 
 three treaty powers for the administration of the customs 
 house at this port hereafter on a permanent basis." ^ It 
 called for the reestablishment of the customs house at Soo- 
 chow Creek, under the immediate direction of a board of 
 foreign inspectors. To this plan the viceroy agreed. On the 
 29th of June the three consuls and the taotai at Shanghai 
 had a conference in which the latter formally confessed his 
 inability to secure customs house officials of sufficient 
 probity, vigilance and knowledge of foreign languages for the 
 effective administration of the customs. He expressed the 
 conviction that the only solution of the problem lay in 
 securing the services of foreigners who, having been care- 
 fully selected, should be appointed by the taotai as his rep- 
 resentatives for the collection of the customs. It was fur- 
 ther agreed that a suitable establishment could be effected 
 with one or more foreigners acting under the taotai as in- 
 spectors of customs, supplemented by a staff of both foreign 
 and Chinese subordinates. The expenses of the new system 
 could be met out of the customs revenues. The consuls, on 
 their part, agreed to select and nominate to the taotai, one 
 for each consul, suitable candidates for the board of inspec- 
 tors. 
 
 To safeguard the new system from the evils of the old 
 one, these foreign inspectors were to be protected on the 
 one hand, and the Chinese Government was to be pro- 
 tected on the other, by an arrangement that any charges 
 of exaction, corruption, neglect of duty or misconduct might 
 be made to the consuls, and trials of the accused inspector 
 
228 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 would be held before a mixed court in the presence of the 
 consuls and the taotai. The inspectors would be liable to 
 dismissal only by this process. All subordinates would hold 
 office during good behavior, and subject to dismissal only 
 upon recommendation from the inspectors. 
 
 It was further stipulated in the agreement between the 
 taotai and the consuls that the records of the new customs 
 house would be kept in both Chinese and English, and that 
 an armed revenue cutter under a foreign master would be 
 secured.* 
 
 In the view of both the American State Department and 
 the British Foreign Office, the mode of selection of the 
 inspectors was objectionable in that the candidates were to 
 be nominated by the consuls. This, it was thought, ap- 
 proached too closely towards making the foreign consuls 
 responsible for the efficient conduct of the customs office. 
 In the reorganization of the foreign inspectorate under the 
 treaties of 1858, this provision was eliminated, and thus 
 China was incidentally saved, as it proved, from an invasion 
 by the American spoils system. 
 
 The foundations were thus laid in 1854, all the treaty 
 powers heartily cooperating, for the foreign inspectorate of 
 Chinese Maritime Customs as, with elaborations, it exists 
 today. Fundamentally the necessity for it grew out of the 
 provision of the American Treaty of Wanghia (1844) which 
 had thrown the entire burden for the collection of its cus- 
 toms from foreigners upon the Imperial Government. This 
 provision of the American treaty, as has been elsewhere 
 pointed out, had placed upon the Chinese Government the 
 responsibility for the existence of smuggling, and had also 
 placed at a disadvantage the British merchants who were 
 compelled to pay duties through the British consuls. The 
 
 *The credit for this plan has always been claimed for Mr. Rutherford Alcock. 
 On the other hand, Commissioner McLane who, unlike his predecessor, was a 
 very modest man, makes no special claim for credit in the matter although he 
 does report the fact, already noted, that he presented the plan personally to 
 E-liang and securM his approval. But the American merchants who protested 
 against the foreign inspectorate two j^ears later stated that the system had been 
 established "chiefly at the suggestion and by the efforts of the Hon. Mr. 
 McLane." It is therefore probable that to McLane belongs the credit of having 
 devised the general plan and initiated it. while to Alcock, as the senior consul 
 in Shanghai and as obviously the best fitted to do it, fell the work of drawing 
 up the details of the agreement.^ 
 
THE POLICY OF COMMISSIONER McLANE 229 
 
 new system, providing a way out of the difficulty for the 
 English, was broadly in harmony with the principle of the 
 American treaty which had come to be adopted by all treaty 
 powers, and was effective. 
 
 So effective was it that the American merchants in 
 Shanghai in 1856 and again in 1858, at the time of the 
 revision of the treaties, protested against it, and petitioned 
 for its removal, but the protests went unheeded by the 
 American representatives who expressed the opinion that 
 instead of removing it, the system should be extended to 
 cover the other open ports, as well as Shanghai, an action 
 which was taken in the revision of the treaties in 1858. f 
 
 The board of inspectors consisted of Thomas Francis 
 Wade, who was loaned from the British consulate in Shang- 
 hai, Arthur Smith, nominated by the French consul, and 
 Lewis Carr, an American. Of these three Mr. Wade alone 
 understood Chinese, or was experienced in China, and upon 
 him fell the duties of organizing the new service. Three 
 years later Mr. Carr absented himself from duty for a long 
 period. Meanwhile the American consul, Mr, Murphy, 
 went home on leave of absence, having first secured from 
 the taotai a promise that the latter would hold open the 
 position for someone to be nominated by Murphy. The 
 result was that the position remained vacant for a long 
 time although Dr. Parker, then Commissioner, had a nom- 
 inee whom he wished to place in the position. American 
 influence in the newly developed inspectorate was, therefore, 
 never great, the American incumbent of the board being 
 neither useful nor ornamental. The situation was an illus- 
 tration, often repeated, of how ill prepared was the United 
 States to assume responsibilities in China, however friendly 
 American policies and principles might be. On the resigna- 
 tion of Mr. Wade, Horatio N. Lay, of subsequent Lay- 
 Osborn-Flotilla fame, was appointed, and he in turn was 
 superseded by Robert Hart whose distinguished services for 
 China became so well known. The Americans in China 
 complained bitterly of the disappearance of American influ- 
 ence in the foreign inspectorate. The fault lay solely with 
 
230 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 the American Government which, though repeatedly im- 
 portuned to provide for student interpreters and a large 
 staff of consular officers to meet the growing opportunities 
 and responsibilities of the United States in China, had 
 ignored the requirements of the situation. 
 
 McLane Settles the American Claims 
 
 Having disposed of the question of the payment of cus- 
 toms dues, McLane turned his attention to the equally per- 
 plexing and disturbing question of the disposal of the com- 
 plicated claims for duties due from Americans since the 
 establishment of the 'provisional rules' of September 19, 
 1853. According to the treaty the method for settling this 
 matter would have been for the taotai to bring a complaint 
 in the consular court which would have come up to McLane 
 for official review in his capacity as supreme judge, but the 
 commissioner proposed an alternative, viz., that all the 
 parties concerned should submit the matter to him as a 
 'mediator,' agreeing to abide by his decision. Both the 
 merchants and the Chinese officials were willing to accept 
 this alternative proposal. 
 
 While McLane had the matter under review Lord Clar- 
 endon ordered Sir John Bowring to have cancelled the 
 promissory notes deposited by the English merchants on the 
 ground that ''the obligation on the part of British subjects 
 to pay duties to the Chinese Government depends upon 
 the fulfillment by the Chinese Government of its obligation 
 to afford protection to British commerce and upon the 
 ability of the Chinese authorities to collect the duties accru- 
 ing to their Government." This order from the Foreign 
 Office was embarrassing to Bowring who was then planning 
 a joint expedition with McLane to the Pei-ho to secure new 
 treaties. If the English were to cancel their notes and the 
 Americans were to pay the duties, the English would be in 
 an awkward position before the representatives of the 
 Emperor, in the negotiation of a treaty. McLane recog- 
 nized the difficulty of his brother plenipotentiary, and was 
 
THE POLICY OF COMMISSIONER McLANE 231 
 
 willing to defer his award as long as posible to enable 
 Bowring to bring the Foreign Office into line with the policy 
 which he and McLane had adopted. On the other hand, 
 McLane did not feel that Lord Clarendon's contention was 
 sound owing Ho the peculiar relations established between 
 the Chinese authorities and the authorities of Great Britain 
 and the United States' during the year of the disturbance 
 at Shanghai. McLane also recognized the injustice of 
 penalizing the American merchants for their good faith and 
 in the settlement he mitigated the penalty by allowing the 
 Chinese one third of the amount claimed, deducting a third 
 for losses which the Americans had suffered through the 
 disturbance of the trade, and a third for the increase in the 
 value of the specie which had occurred since the 'provisional 
 rules' became operative. Both merchants and taotai ac- 
 cepted this award. 
 
 But the question, even then, was not disposed of. About 
 three weeks before McLane rendered his award, Secretary 
 of State Marcy reached a conclusion similar to that of Lord 
 Clarendon's and ordered that the American notes also be 
 cancelled. When this order reached Dr. Parker in January, 
 1855, he was greatly disturbed. It did not seem to him 
 possible that satisfactory explanations could be made to 
 the Chinese for the reversal of McLane's decision. He 
 therefore wrote to the department explaining the situation, 
 and at the same time ordered Consul Murphy to return the 
 notes to the merchants, but to take in return the agreements 
 that in case the United States Government reversed its 
 decision, they would make payments in good faith. At the 
 same time he instructed Consul Murphy to explain the 
 matter to the taotai, and in case the latter protested the 
 action, to cancel the notes immediately and thus to conclude 
 the business. The taotai, however, was willing to wait 
 patiently. In due time the State Department, having 
 received more complete information, and having referred 
 the matter to Caleb Gushing, then Attorney General, de- 
 cided that the award made by McLane as a mediator could 
 not be reversed, and the amount awarded was ordered paid. 
 
232 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 And to the everlasting credit of the American merchants — 
 the same men who were then trying to have the foreign 
 inspectorate abolished — the money was paid without further 
 protest or discussion. 
 
 Treaty Revision 
 
 McLane's primary efforts in China were directed towards 
 securing from the Imperial Government some important 
 modifications of the Cushing treaty. In this as well as in the 
 customs matter he was following a policy which had. been 
 initiated by his predecessor. 
 
 In July, 1853, when Marshall had been so impressed with 
 the danger of either Russian or British intervention, he had 
 outlined to Marcy a very bold policy which he had never 
 been able to carry out because Commodore Perry had been 
 unable, and also unwilling, to cooperate with him.''' Mar- 
 shall had proposed ''an interference by the United States to 
 quiet and tranquilize China." His plan was to proceed to 
 Peking, convince the Emperor of the friendly purposes of 
 the United States and then to offer the support of the 
 American military and naval forces to the Imperial Govern- 
 ment in return for certain concessions which he outlined as 
 follows: amnesty to all rebels who might be willing to 
 return to loyalty to the Manchus ; freedom of religious opin- 
 ion and worship ; complete opening of the empire to trade ; 
 and the establishment of diplomatic relations with treaty 
 powers through a department of foreign affairs. 
 
 "It would only be intervention in vindication of the 
 rights of the American citizens," urged Marshall, "an inter- 
 vention promised in the President's inaugural address,* 
 wherever the citizen might of right be when the power is 
 involved." 
 
 *Iii his inaugural address, March 4, 1853, President Pierce had said : "The 
 rights which belong to a nation are not alone to be regarded, but those which 
 pertain to every citizen in his individual capacity, at home and abroad, must 
 be sacredly maintained. So long as he can discern every star in its place upon 
 that ensign, without wealth to purchase for him preferment or title to secure 
 for him place, it will be his privilege, and must be his acknowledged right, to 
 stand unabashed even in the presence of princes, with a proud consciousness 
 that he is himself one of a nation of sovereigns and that he cannot in legitimate 
 pursuit wander so far from home that the agent whom he shall leave behind 
 in the place which I now occupy will not see that no rude hand of power or 
 tyrannical passion is Taid upon him with impunity." » 
 
THE POLICY OF COMMISSIONER McLANE 233 
 
 Marshall's proposal never received the approval of the 
 Government of the United States. It is probable, how- 
 ever, that he would have undertaken at least that part of his 
 program which involved going to the Pei-ho and demand- 
 ing admission to the Court of Peking, had he been able to 
 command the services of a naval vessel. Commodore Aulick, 
 and Commodore Perry who succeeded to the command of 
 the China Squadron shortly after Marshall's arrival in 
 China, thwarted every effort made by Marshall to go to the 
 Pei-ho. Perry dissented strongly from the wisdom of such 
 an expedition, feeling that it would in all probability pro- 
 duce only unfriendly feelings. As for intervening on behalf 
 of the Imperial Government against the Taipings, he was 
 opposed to it, sympathizing rather with the rebels.*^ 
 
 Viceroy Yeh refused to meet McLane upon his arrival 
 in China in the spring of 1854, as he had evaded a meeting 
 with Marshall the previous year. 
 
 "The archives of our legation," wrote McLane, April 26, "present 
 a very humiliating view of our past relations with China; the inso- 
 lence of Chinese officials having rendered intercourse between the 
 two countries most unsatisfactory. It is difficult to understand 
 whether this be the result of an incorrigible antipathy on the part of 
 the Chinese towards foreigners, or a refined and cunning policy, by 
 which they maintained non-intercourse and at the same time non- 
 resistance." ^* 
 
 Sir John Bowring immediately proposed that the two 
 powers join in a naval demonstration against Canton for 
 the purpose of compelling Yeh to receive them. McLane 
 'strenuously resisted' this proposal because the British naval 
 forces in the Far East were then occupied with the Crimean 
 War, and he was of the opinion that Bowring would be 
 impotent to carry through such a policy in case of failure 
 at Canton. 
 
 McLane abruptly terminated his correspondence with 
 Yeh and departed for the North. At Foochow he failed to 
 see the Governor General although the Treaty of Wanghia 
 specified him as one of the three means of communication 
 with Peking. At Shanghai McLane found the city under the 
 
234 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 joint protection of the English, French and American naval 
 forces, the Imperial authority not having been restored 
 since the fall of the city the previous year. In June he paid 
 a visit to the rebel capital at Nanking and became thor- 
 oughly convinced that the success of the Taipings would in 
 no way benefit the foreign powers. On the basis of his 
 observations he formulated a policy not very dissimilar from 
 that of Marshall's the preceding year. He proposed to 
 enlarge the 'protectorate character' of the existing treaty. 
 
 "Could this government be made to understand and acknowledge," 
 wrote McLane to Marcy, June 14, 1854, "the true state of its relations 
 with foreign nations, it would not be difficult, even at this time and 
 in the face of the prevailing disorder, to adjust existing difficulties 
 and greatly enlarge our commercial intercourse. To accomjplish this 
 result, whether the empire be governed in whole or in part by the rul- 
 ing dynasty, or by those who are now conducting the revolutionary 
 movement, it is necessary to enlarge the powers and duties which de- 
 volve on the United States by the terms of the treaty, both to enforce 
 the stipulations of the same and to prevent the abuse of their flag, 
 when used as a cover to the violation of the laws of the Chinese Em- 
 pire. Without such an exercise of power on our part, it will be quite 
 impossible to maintain the honor and integrity of our flag, or avoid 
 those collisions which the weakness and corruption of the Chinese 
 authorities render inevitable. As a consideration for such enlarge- 
 ment of the protectorate character of the existing treaty, the interior 
 should be opened to us, where we would extend the moral power of 
 our civilization, and the material power necessary to protect the lives 
 and property of our people."" 
 
 A few days after writing the above letter McLane had 
 an interview with E-liang, the Viceroy of the Liang Kiang 
 Provinces, not far from Shanghai. In this interview E-liang 
 complained of the conduct of the Americans in China and 
 stated that the failure of the foreign powers to recognize the 
 reestablished authority of the Imperial Government at 
 Shanghai had been a great embarrassment to the govern- 
 ment. I He also complained that the foreigners had been 
 supplying the rebels with ammunition and aiding them in 
 other ways. McLane in turn pointed out how Marshall's 
 policy of requiring the American merchants to continue 
 the payment of duties at Shanghai had been an evidence of 
 the good will of the American Government, and then pro- 
 ceeded to unfold his plan for some 'supplemental articles' 
 
THE POLICY OF COMMISSIONER McLANE 235 
 
 to the Treaty of Wanghia. This projet, which was subse- 
 quently submitted in writing, explains very clearly what 
 McLane meant by the enlargement of the 'protectorate 
 character' of the existing treaty.^ ^ 
 
 In brief, McLane proposed that the United States would 
 engage to exert its power to prevent the abuse of its flag, or 
 the violation of the treaty by its citizens if, in return, the 
 Chinese Government would enlarge the commercial privi- 
 leges of the United States. McLane rested his demand that 
 the Emperor appoint a commissioner to treat with him, not 
 upon the revision clause of the Treaty of Wanghia, but upon 
 the fact that 'grave cause' existed for the revision of the 
 treaty.* The grave cause was the fact that the treaty was 
 now in abeyance at Shanghai where the Imperial Govern- 
 ment was unable to discharge its obligations to protect 
 American citizens, and that the government was further 
 unable to protect the trade of Americans at Shanghai with 
 the interior. McLane's argument was that in as much as 
 the Chinese could not protect the trade, the American Gov- 
 ernment should be allowed to do it. McLane then warned 
 E-liang that if the Emperor refused to appoint a commis- 
 sioner to negotiate with him the United States might feel 
 authorized to turn to the Taipings.f 
 
 * According to the provision of Art. 34 of the Treaty of Wanghia, negotia- 
 tions for the revision of the treaty might come up at the end of twelve years 
 (i. e., in 1856). The treaty also stated: "its provisions shall not be altered 
 without grave cause." 
 
 t McLane's proposals in detail were : 1. Americans to be admitted to any 
 port, city or harbor on the Yangtze or its tributaries, provided that duties on 
 imports are first paid at Shanghai, and that outward cargoes also pay duties at 
 Shanghai. 
 
 2. For and in consideration of the rights and privileges granted to the 
 citizens of the United States, it is further provided and stipulated that the 
 Government of the United States shall at once take active and efficient means 
 to enforce upon their citizens the prompt payments of the duties prescribed in 
 the Treaty of Wanghia, and said Government of the United States further 
 agrees to prevent, by the interposition of their own authorities, any of their 
 citizens from abusing their flag as a cover for the violation of the laws of the 
 Empire, or of the treaty. 
 
 But McLane did not intend to be caught in the assumption of such an obli- 
 gation in any way that might in the future embarrass the trade. He therefore 
 added : "For and" in as much as this additional obligation is incurred by the 
 Government of the United States, in consideration of the before mentioned privi- 
 leges granted to their citizens, it is further provided that if similar rights and 
 advantages should at any time be granted or conceded by China to any other 
 nation or nations, without this formal obligation being incurred by such nation 
 or nations, then in such case the Government of the United States shall at 
 once be released from the obligation hereby entered into, and shall enjoy said 
 enlarged advantages as fully and as absolutely as such other nation or nations." 
 
 3. Citizens of the United States to be allowed to go anywhere in China, to 
 worship as they pleased, and to enjoy accommodations for houses, places of 
 business, hospitals and churches and cemeteries, just as now at the five ports. '^ 
 
236 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 The extraordinary proposal that the Chinese Empire be 
 opened almost without restriction to Americans in return for 
 the assumption of responsibility to prevent the abuse of the 
 American flag, an obligation already assumed in the existing 
 treaty, and for further assumption of responsibility to aid in 
 the prevention of smuggling, an obligation which Great 
 Britain had freely assumed in her treaties of 1842-3, was 
 actually forwarded to Peking, although McLane was noti- 
 fied that it was sent only to Yeh at Canton. 
 
 In commenting on McLane's visit and demands E-liang 
 addressed a memorial to the throne.* 
 
 _ "Thanks to the favor," read E-liang's report of what McLane had 
 said, "of his Celestial Majesty, by which the five ports are open to 
 trade, we have been enabled to steep ourselves in advantage. Of late 
 years, however, the river communications have become impassable 
 (owing to the rebellion) and the losses hence sustained by the 
 merchants have determined us to request that his Majesty be entreated 
 graciously to permit us to trade along the Yangtze River. The 
 merchandise we bring up the river we will ourselves escort and protect. 
 If (your excellency) will not do me the honor to make a representation 
 for me to this effect to the throne, I shall be obliged to proceed to 
 Tientsin. 
 
 "Your slave told him authoritatively (as his official superior) that 
 the treaty under which the five ports were open to trade, being that 
 to which the Imperial assent had been received with reference in the 
 24th year .of Tau Kwang (1844), it became the duty of all alike, 
 native and foreigner, officials and people, to observe it obediently for 
 evermore. It was besides clearly laid down in the treaty that 'no 
 state shall hereafter send a minister to China to raise separate (or 
 fresh) discussions.' f The request now preferred, being at variance 
 with the original treaty, could not well be conveyed to your Majesty." 
 
 E-liang made a fairly accurate report of McLane's other 
 requests and then commented on his quid pro quo proposal 
 as follows : 
 
 *This memorial was subsequently found in the Viceroy's yamen at Canton 
 in January, 1858, when the British occupied the city, and was translated, along 
 with many other similar documents, by Thomas Wade of the British Mission. 
 It was not placed in the hands of the American Envoy, Mr. Reed, for some 
 unexplained reason, until after he had negotiated and signed the Treaty of 
 Tientsin. Mr. Reed stated in a speech before the Philadelphia Board of Trade, 
 May 31, 1859, that had he known of this report when he was negotiating the 
 Treaty of Tientsin, he might have been less good-natured in his dealings with 
 the Chinese commissioners, and he even intimated that he might have joined 
 with the allies, in the destruction of the Taku forts." 
 
 t E-liang is quoting the clause in Art. 34 of the Treaty of Wanghia, which 
 reads : "and no individual State of the United States can appoint or send a 
 minister to China to call in question the provisions of the same." 
 
THE POLICY OF COMMISSIONER McLANE 237 
 
 "He also handed in a communication in very obscure phraseology, 
 characters in which had been taken to signify what they did not 
 properly mean. On the whole it differed nothing from the language 
 he had employed except in the addition that if, on representation 
 made to the throne, he should be honored by (your Majesty's) assent 
 to his requests, it woiild behoove him, of course, to assist China in 
 completely removing her cause of disquiet. . . . 
 
 "It is the very humble opinion of your slave, that, in as much as 
 the American barbarians, heretofore accounted so submissive, have 
 taken advantage of the present conjuncture to press their demands, 
 reliance is surely not to be placed on their cooperation, though they 
 promise it, in the restoration of order." 
 
 E-liang also observed that the French and English would 
 probably want something if any concessions were made to 
 the Americans. 
 
 This report of E-liang's drew from the throne an order 
 that McLane must return to Canton, and that it would be 
 Yeh's duty to forestall the American commissioner's malice, 
 and to address him 'authoritatively in peremptory language.' 
 
 To the student of American policy in China the most 
 notable feature of McLane's projet is the fact that, while 
 contemplating the opening of the entire country to Ameri- 
 can trade, it departed entirely from the principles laid 
 down in the Cushing treaty that China alone must enforce 
 her own laws and also protect the Americans within her 
 borders. These departures from existing American policy 
 were entirely unauthorized, and no comment was ever made 
 on them by Marcy. 
 
 A few weeks after the close of the correspondence with 
 E-liang in which McLane had served notice that he would 
 press his demands at the Pei-ho, the American commissioner 
 received instructions from Washington to aid Sir John 
 Bowring in the renewal of the British treaties which was 
 due, according to the English interpretation of the American 
 treaty, on the 29th of August of that year.* 
 
 *The Treaty of Nanking had been signed August 29, 1842. Tlie Treaty of 
 thie Bogue, the following year, had contained a most-favored-nation clause. 
 The American treaty stipulated that "inasmuch as the circumstances of the 
 several ports of China open to foreign commerce are different, experience may 
 show that considerable modifications are requisite in those parts which relate 
 to commerce and navigation ; in which case the two Governments will at the 
 expiration of twelve years from the date of said convention, treat amicably 
 concerning the same. . . ." It was on the strength of these facts that Great 
 Britain rested the claim for a revision of the treaties — a claim which Yeh at 
 Canton promptly rejected. 
 
238 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Bowring had suffered from Yeh treatment very similar 
 to that which had been administered to Marshall and 
 McLane, and at length formally notified Yeh that he would 
 seek, in company with the American Minister, the revision 
 of the treaties at the mouth of the Pei-ho. 
 
 McLane and Bowring Go to the Pei-ho 
 
 The British Minister, unlike McLane, was under very 
 specific and well considered instructions from his govern- 
 ment as to just what he should ask for in the treaties.* 
 
 The proposals were much more moderate, as well as 
 more detailed, than those which McLane had presented to 
 E-liang. Beside them the projet of the American Commis- 
 sioner was ill-considered and rash. It is at this point that 
 the inherent weakness of the American, as contrasted with 
 the British, diplomatic establishment in China becomes con- 
 spicuously apparent, Bowring had been in China for many 
 years; McLane only a few months. Lord Clarendon had 
 been studying the relations between Great Britain and 
 China from an exceptional point of observation for m.ore 
 than a score of years. President Pierce and Secretary of 
 State Marcy had very recently come into office, and so little 
 did they know of the actual situation in China that McLane 
 was not only without detailed instructions covering such 
 points as Clarendon had outlined to Bowring, but McLane's 
 projet when reported to Washington, failed to draw any 
 word of criticism or of caution. McLane enjoyed to the 
 fullest extent the confidence of the administration and, had 
 he not insisted on the acceptance of his resignation because 
 of ill health, he would have been returned to China the 
 
 *These points were : 1. Access to all of China, or, failing this, free naviga- 
 tion of the Yangtze as far as Nangking and the opening of some more ports on 
 the coast. 2. Legalization of the opium trade. 3. Abolishment of internal or 
 transit dues on goods imported from foreign countries, or destined to be 
 exported to foreign countries. 4. Provision for the effectual suppression of 
 piracy along the coast. 5. Regulation of the emigration of Chinese laborers. 
 6. Permanent and honorable residence of a diplomatic representative of the 
 British Crown af Peking ; or, if this could not be obtained, then provision for 
 habitual correspondence between the British and the Chinese authorities at the 
 capital. 7. Provision for ready intercourse between the British representative 
 in China and the governor of any province where the representative might be 
 residing. 8. In the revised treaty the English version alone to be the authori- 
 tative text. 
 
THE POLICY OF COMMISSIONER McLANE 239 
 
 following year to take up the negotiations where he had 
 dropped them. 
 
 On November 3 Commissioner McLane and Sir John 
 Bowring had an interview in a tent near the Hae Kow Forts 
 at the mouth of the Pei-ho, with Tsung Lun, an Imperial 
 Commissioner of inferior rank. It had been intended 
 originally that the French Minister, M. de Bourboulon, 
 should accompany them to the Pei-ho, but an accident 
 to the French war vessel in which he was to go made it 
 impossible. He therefore sent Count Kleskowsky of the 
 French legation, as his representative. The French officer 
 was the guest of the American Commissioner on board the 
 U. S. war steamer Powhatan. 
 
 In the interview of November 3, Bowring did not submit 
 an outline of the changes in the treaty which he desired. 
 McLane on the contrary added to his pro jet a great many 
 details which had been omitted from the outline submitted 
 to E-Uang. The entire negotiations came to nothing. The 
 envoys were told to go back to Canton, there to wait for an 
 answer from the Emperor, It was already evident from the 
 tone of Tsung Lun's comments, that the Emperor was will- 
 ing to grant none of the important points proposed by 
 McLane. The result of the expedition was that the de- 
 mands of two of the treaty powers had been successfully 
 denied by the Imperial authorities, and the meanness of 
 their reception in the tent interview was a clear indication 
 that the Government of China would never willingly treat 
 with the foreign powers on terms of diplomatic e quality. ^^ 
 
 Tsung Lun and his associate made complete reports to 
 the Emperor on the meeting with the foreign envoys, one 
 of Tsung Lun's comments being: ^'^ "The English barbar- 
 ians are . . . full of insidious schemes, uncontrollably fierce 
 and imperious. The American nation does no more than 
 follow their direction." 
 
 McLane returned from the Pei-ho in November in no 
 mood for temporizing. After submitting a full report to the 
 President he outlined the following possible courses of 
 action: ^'^ (1) To adhere to the former policy of awaiting 
 
240 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 developments, preserving strict neutrality between the 
 rebels and the Imperialists, and protecting American inter- 
 ests as far as possible with the United States naval forces 
 then on the coast. (2) To aid the Imperial forces in sup- 
 pressing the rebellion, or, (3) for the President to address 
 a letter to the Emperor pointing out that China had violated 
 her treaty with the United States, this letter to be presented 
 at the mouth of the Pei-ho by two sloops of war and a 
 steamer. In case the Emperor will not accede to the de- 
 mand to open up friendly diplomatic intercourse with the 
 United States to secure the settlement of these pending 
 questions, and the revision of the treaty, then McLane pro- 
 posed more vigorous action. 
 
 "I would recommend," he wrote, "that the Pei-ho and the Yangtze 
 Kiang, as well as the River Min and the Whampoa Reach be placed 
 under blockade by the united forces of the three treaty powers — ■ 
 Great Britain,, France and the United States — and so held until the 
 commercial privileges of buying from and selling to all persons in 
 China, without limitation or restraint, is respected, and all the other 
 treaty stipulations recognized and enforced, where the authority of 
 the Imperial Government is paramount." 
 
 McLane felt that to pursue the first of these policies was 
 futile, and he did not believe that the Government of the 
 United States would favor the second. He heartily recom- 
 mended the joint blockade. 
 
 To this recommendation Secretary of State Marcy re- 
 plied in a letter of instructions which reached China long 
 after McLane had left,^^ that "the President will have 
 serious objections to uniting with Great Britain and France 
 in what you call the aggressive policy — that is the bringing 
 together a united naval force of the three powers in order 
 to obtain the revision of the treaties with China, securing 
 larger commercial privileges by intimidation, or possibly by 
 force. . . ." 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. S. Ex. Doe. 39 :36-l. 
 
 2. McLane Corres., S. Ex. Doc. 22:35-2, May 4, '54; see also 
 
 Michie's "The Englishman in China," Vol. 1, p. 149; Morse, 
 Vol. 2, pp. 19-88. 
 
THE POLICY OF COMMISSIONER McLANE 241 
 
 3. MeLane Corres., pp. 33-39. 
 
 4. lUd., p. 112. 
 
 5. Michie, Vol. 1, p. 152; S. Ex. Doc. 22:35-2, p. 908. 
 
 6. Sen. Ex. Doc. 22 :35-2, p. 908 ; S. Ex. Doc 30 :36-l, p. 530. 
 
 7. Marshall Corres., p. 205. 
 
 8. Richardson's Messages, Vol. 5, pp. 199-200. 
 
 9. Marshall Corres., pp. 18-24, 25, 85, 132-5, 352. 
 
 10. McLane Corres., pp. 21-2.. 
 
 11. Ihid., p. 54. 
 
 12. lUd., pp. 143 ff. 
 
 13. Ihid., p. 147. 
 
 14. S. Ex. Doc. 30:36-1, p. 452; Eeed's speech (pamphlet), p. 16. 
 
 15. For complete account of the Pei-ho expedition, see Disp. No. 20, 
 
 McLane Corres., p. 285 ff. 
 
 16. S. Ex. Doc. 30 :36-l, p. 478. 
 
 17. McLane Corres., pp. 287-292. 
 
 18. China Instructions, Vol. 1, Feb. 26, 1855. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 ATTEMPTS TO OPEN JAPAN TO TEADE 
 
 While the opening of Japan by Commodore Perry in 
 1854 came as a direct result of American trade expansion, 
 the causes which produced it were not so simple as those 
 which led to the Cushing Mission. In 1844 American rela- 
 tions with the Far East were almost exclusively with China ; 
 in 1853 they were not only with China but also with the 
 entire North Pacific Ocean. 
 
 Japan and Early Pacific Trade 
 
 The rapid growth of the Northwest Coast fur trade had 
 brought Japan for a few years within the interest of Ameri- 
 cans, yet without leading to any definite results. The 
 Lady Washington (Captain Kendrick) and the Grace 
 (Captain Douglas) visited a southern port of Japan in 1791 
 in an effort to dispose of sea-otter peltries, on their way to 
 Canton, but the Japanese had refused to trade with them. 
 This visit and refusal made so little impression that they 
 were almost immediately forgotten by Americans, few of 
 whom aside from the crews of the vessels appear to have 
 known of it.^ 
 
 In 1807 the Eclipse of Boston, chartered by the Russian- 
 American Company at Canton for Kamchatka and the 
 Northwest Coast, and carrying several British sailors who 
 had been induced to desert from Company ships at Wham- 
 poa, visited Nagasaki and was peacefully captured by the 
 Japanese, supplied freely with water and permitted to de- 
 part. The Eclipse entered the Japanese port under the 
 Russian flag which the Dutch superintendent advised them 
 to haul down because the Japanese had been so enraged 
 
 242 
 
ATTEMPTS TO OPEN JAPAN TO TRADE 243 
 
 by the conduct of Russian officers in Sakhalen the previous 
 year.^ At the close of the War in 1812, the new vigor of 
 American trade expansion is registered in the proposition 
 made by Commodore Porter to Secretary of State Monroe 
 to send an expedition to Japan. A frigate and two sloops 
 of war were proposed for the enterprise but nothing was 
 done about it.^ Porter, during the war, had occupied Madi- 
 son Island in the South Pacific, November, 1813, building a 
 fort which he manned with four guns, A month later he 
 was compelled to surrender to Commodore Hillyar of the 
 British navy near Valparaiso. Porter eventually made his 
 way back to New York where he arrived in the summer of 
 1815. His proposal to open Japan may be said to have 
 marked the high tide of American interest in the Pacific 
 until 1830.* 
 
 Another series of approaches to Japan were made 
 through Batavia. In 1797 the Eliza (Captain Stewart) re- 
 ported as belonging to New York, and carrying the Ameri- 
 can flag, appeared at Nagasaki. Captain Stewart repre- 
 sented himself as the agent of the Dutch East India Com- 
 pany of Batavia, and in some way effected an exchange of 
 cargo. The following year the Eliza returned, secured 
 another cargo, but had the misfortune to strike a rock in 
 Nagasaki harbor and was compelled to remain in port until 
 the next season. In 1799 the Eliza sailed away with its 
 cargo, but it did not go to Batavia. Four years later the 
 vessel returned, still under the American flag, but from 
 Bengal. Meanwhile both the Dutch and the Japanese had 
 become aware that the Eliza was really employed by the 
 British in an effort to create a British trade with Japan, 
 and the vessel was refused a cargo. Captain Stewart was 
 an Englishman and the vessel, while it may have been built 
 in America and sold in the East, probably was entirely with- 
 out legal right to fly the American flag.^ 
 
 The first genuinely American vessel, after the Lady 
 Washington and the Grace, to enter Japan was the Franklin 
 (Captain Devereaux) of Boston, owned by the Perkinses 
 and James Dunlap. The Franklin arrived at Batavia from 
 
244 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Boston in April, 1799, and was immediately engaged by the 
 East India Company to take the place of the annual Dutch 
 ship to Nagasaki, an American vessel being chosen because 
 of its neutral character. This was the first ripple of the 
 Napoleonic wars in Asia. Captain Devereaux was in- 
 structed to hoist the Dutch pennant "as if you were a 
 Dutch ship" as soon as he came in sight of Japan. The 
 instructions also contained one order which throws light on 
 the cause of Japanese exclusiveness, harking back to history 
 nearly two centuries old. 
 
 "All the books of the people and officers, particularly religious 
 books, must be put in a cask and headed up [upon approaching' 
 Japan] ; the officers from shore will put their seals upon the cask, and 
 take it on shore, and on the departure of the ship, will bring it on 
 board without having opened it." 
 
 The Franklin remained about four months in Nagasaki 
 harbor, and reached Batavia again December 18, 1799.*^ 
 In 1801 the Margaret (Captain Samuel Derby) of Salem, 
 secured the contract for the East India Company voyage, 
 and similar voyages were made in 1802, 1803, 1806, 1807 
 and 1809, after which the Dutch factory at Nagasaki was 
 left without word from the outside world until near the 
 close of the Napoleonic wars, when the British made a 
 second unsuccessful effort to take up the trade. In view of 
 the fact that these American vessels were compelled to hoist 
 the Dutch flag when in Japanese waters, one wonders 
 whether the American flag was actually shown at Nagasaki 
 after 1791. 
 
 Edmund Roberts and Japan 
 
 The part of the program of Edmund Roberts in 1832 
 which included Japan has already been alluded to. From 
 the inauguration of the Roberts Mission the idea of making 
 a treaty with Japan appears to have grown rapidly into 
 favor with the American Government. At the request of 
 the Department of State John Shellaber, United States Con- 
 sul at Batavia, prepared outlines of a program of treaty- 
 
ATTEMPTS TO OPEN JAPAN TO TRADE 245 
 
 making in the East which included many suggestions about 
 JapanJ He advised that an attempt to make at least some 
 sort of an agreement with the Empire would probably meet 
 with success. Previous missions had failed, he thought, 
 "owing to the jealous fears entertained by the Japanese Em- 
 perors that those powers would sooner or later, if any inter- 
 course was opened, interfere with the internal affairs of the 
 Empire, attempt to subvert its Government and probably 
 make a conquest of the country. I allude more especially 
 to England and Russia." Shellaber pointed out that the 
 Americans would be free of all suspicion, and predicted that 
 in three or four years a trade would grow up with a tonnage 
 of 5000, amounting to $300,000. At least, thought the con- 
 sul, the mission could secure in Japan a resort for American 
 whale ships. Shellaber strongly recommended that the pro- 
 posed expedition should be carried in a merchant rather 
 than a national vessel. 
 
 A few weeks after Edmund Roberts departed from Bos- 
 ton in the Peacock a commission was issued to him (June 
 26, 1832) to go to Japan, but no mention was made in it of 
 securing a treaty.^ Four months later (October 28, 1832) 
 Secretary of State Livingston wrote to Roberts again, stating 
 that the government had in contemplation a separate mis- 
 sion to that empire, but authorizing Roberts, in case the 
 prospects seemed favorable, "to fill oui one of the letters of 
 credence" and go to Japan. He was however cautioned to 
 go in a merchant vessel, having the Peacock only as a con- 
 voy. The Peacock was to wait outside for a favorable 
 development of the negotiations.'^ Roberts found it im- 
 practicable, owing to lack of funds, to carry out the sugges- 
 tion of Livingston, but he reported from Batavia, June 22, 
 1833: i« 
 
 "I have no doubt from information obtained from merchants of 
 the first respectability in this place that by judicious management 
 all the principal ports in Japan would be thrown open to the American 
 trade. The Americans are the only people who can probably effect 
 this. The Portuguese and Spaniards are by law of the Empire for- 
 ever excluded, and the unprincipled conduct of Captain Pellew of the 
 Phaeton in 1808 in the harbor of Nagasaki, has caused the Japanese 
 
246 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Government to reject every overture which has been made to them 
 since that time by the British. During the last European war several 
 American ships were chartered here for the Dutch factory at Decima, 
 and met with no difficulty on account of the flag." 
 
 Upon Roberts' return from his first mission he made a 
 report to Secretary of State McLane (May 12, 1834) in 
 which he stated that the Dutch, owing to their jealousy of 
 Americans, "whom they fear as their only rivals," had mis- 
 represented the character of the Japanese for their own 
 ends. He believed the Japanese to be free from every pre- 
 judice that would prevent Americans from trading with 
 them, and suggested that the way to the trade with Korea 
 and northern China would be open in case a treaty were 
 made with Japan. 
 
 By means of other investigations and unknown sources 
 the Department of State was advised that the proposed 
 approach to Japan ought to be made in a national ship, that 
 it should be made at some port other than Nagasaki, pre- 
 ferably nearer the seat of government, and that while 
 general trade would not at first be permitted, it seemed 
 probable that a beginning might be made. Presents to the 
 Emperor should accompany the envoy.* 
 
 In view of the success which had attended the first 
 Roberts mission, apparently all thought of a special mission 
 to Japan was abandoned, and when Roberts sailed again to 
 exchange ratifications of the treaties of Muscat and Siam, 
 he was commissioned to resume the negotiations with 
 Cochin China and then to proceed with all secrecy to Japan 
 in the Peacock. The death of Roberts at Macao in 1836 
 brought this enterprise to an end. 
 
 Visit of the Morrison, 1837 
 
 The next American effort to unlock the gates of Japan 
 was a private one undertaken by the firm of Olyphant and 
 Company of Canton in 1837. The Olyphant firm had come 
 
 ♦This information was secured in answer to a list of ten questions and was 
 contributed bv some American who had been a resident at the Dutch factory 
 perhaps in 1807 or 1809." 
 
ATTEMPTS TO OPEN JAPAN TO TRADE 247 
 
 to occupy a unique place in the commercial life of Canton 
 because of the refusal of the firm to deal in opium and 
 because of the hearty support to the Protestant missionaries 
 afforded not only by D. W. C. Olyphant the founder, but 
 also by the younger partners. Indeed it had been in part 
 due to Olyphant that the first American missionaries, Rev. 
 E. C. Bridgman and Rev. Edwin Stevens, were sent to 
 China in 1830.^^ As the Olyphant firm prospered, the sup- 
 port to the missionaries increased and widened. In 1835 
 the firm had made it possible for Medhurst and Stevens to 
 make a voyage of missionary exploration northward along 
 the coast in the brig Huron. The results of this voyage so 
 encouraged the firm that they had the Himmaleh built in 
 the United States at a cost of $20,000 and fitted out for a 
 cruise of missionary trade and exploration in the Malay 
 archipelago and Japan Sea. The Himmaleh took on Rev. 
 Edwin Stevens of the American Board and G. Tradescant 
 Lay, agent of the British and Foreign Bible Society and 
 started southward. There was no opium or firearms in the 
 cargo. The voyage proved abortive, owing in part to the 
 death of Stevens in Singapore in January, 1837. The Him- 
 maleh returned to Canton, was loaded with tea and dis- 
 patched to the United States. 
 
 The voyage of the Morrison, while not directly related to 
 the previous experiments of the Himmaleh, is to be con- 
 sidered in the light of that experience. The Morrison, be- 
 longing to Olyphant and Company, and named after the 
 famous missionary; arrived in China too late in the spring 
 of 1837 to secure a return cargo. The vessel must therefore 
 lay over a season, and C. W. King, one of the Olyphant 
 partners, only twenty-eight years old, proposed to occupy 
 the idle time with a voyage of exploration to Japan similar 
 to that undertaken by the Himmaleh to Borneo and Celebes. 
 There were at that time at Macao seven shipwrecked Jap- 
 anese sailors, three from the Northwest coast who had 
 reached China by way of London, and four who had been 
 brought in from the Pacific by way of Manila. King decided 
 not to wait for the return of the Himmaleh but rather to 
 
248 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 proceed at once to Japan to repatriate the Japanese, and to 
 seize the opportunity to open up negotiations for missionary 
 work and for trade. The Morrison was unarmed, and the 
 party included S. Wells Williams, missionary printer of the 
 American Board, Rev. Peter Parker, M. D., of the Mission- 
 ary Ophthahiiic Hospital at Canton, and Rev. Charles Gutz- 
 laff who had recently entered the service of the British 
 Government as interpreter. Gutzlaff joined the expedition 
 at Lew Chew, Napa, to which point he was conveyed in the 
 British sloop of war Raleigh. 
 
 The Morrison reached the Bay of Yedo in July, 1837, 
 anchored at Uraga, and declared the purpose of the visit. 
 It was also contemplated to offer the Japanese a teacher, 
 i.e., a missionary, if they were willing to receive him. The 
 authorities refused to have any dealings with the Morrison, 
 ordered her away and then opened fire upon the vessel from 
 the forts. A second effort was made at Kagoshima to open 
 up communications with the authorities, but a second time 
 the vessel was fired on. None of the Japanese sailors were 
 landed. 
 
 Mr. King wrote a book — "The Claims of Japan and 
 Malaysia upon Christendom, exhibited in notes of voyages 
 made in 1837 from Canton in the ship Morrison, and the 
 brig Himmaleh, under the direction of the owners" — in 
 which he urged the American Government to take up the 
 insult to the American flag and to demand a treaty. S. 
 Wells Williams returned to Macao much impressed with 
 the superior strength and culture of the Japanese, and an- 
 ticipated that 'a war-like attempt upon the nation' would 
 be attended with 'fatal influences.' He immediately under- 
 took, with the aid of the Japanese sailors, the study of the 
 language with a view to laying the foundations for future 
 missionary work.^^ While the voyage of the Morrison had 
 no immediate result, it may be said that from the time of 
 its visit to Japan, the subject of opening up the country was 
 never suffered to drop out of sight. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO OPEN JAPAN TO TRADE 249 
 
 Revival of American Interest in Japan 
 
 A 'full power' to treat with the Japanese authorities 
 was issued, to Caleb Gushing, at his suggestion, August 15, 
 1844.'^ The Secretary of State in forwarding the letter 
 remarked that 'little probability exists of expecting any 
 commercial arrangement with that country.' This authority 
 did not reach Gushing before he returned to the United 
 States. 
 
 In less than three weeks after the publication of the 
 Gushing correspondence on the Ghina treaty, Zedoc Pratt, 
 of New York, introduced a resolution in the House calling 
 for immediate measures to effect commercial arrangements 
 with the Empire of Japan and the Kingdom of Korea on 
 the ground that it was important "to the general interests 
 of the United States that a steady and persevering effort 
 should be made for the extension of American commerce, 
 connected as that commerce is with the agriculture and 
 manufactures of our country." This resolution expressed 
 the confident hope that another year would not elapse before 
 the American people would ''be able to rejoice in the knowl- 
 edge that the 'star-spangled banner' is recognized as an 
 ample passport and protection for all. . . ." The resolu- 
 tion, however, passed unnoticed.^ ^ 
 
 The whale ship Manhattan (Gaptain Mercator Gooper) 
 of Sag Harbor, had visited the Bay of Yedo April 17, 1845, 
 with a number of shipwrecked Japanese sailors and had been 
 very kindly treated although not permitted to remain more 
 than a few days. When the Manhattan left she carried 
 some Japanese stowaways who had seized the opportunity 
 thus offered to go abroad to study the western world. ^^ 
 
 Alexander H. Everett, the first American Gommissioner 
 to Ghina under the new treaty, who sailed for Ghina early in 
 June 1845, carried a commission to negotiate a treaty with 
 Japan, and Gommodore Biddle, who had been ordered to 
 convey Everett to Ghina in the U. S. S. Columbus, also had 
 instructions from the Secretary of the Navy, Bancroft, per- 
 mitting him to make a visit to Japan in case Everett did 
 
250 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 not decide to accompany him. The new commissioner be- 
 came ill on the voyage to Rio Janeiro. He was compelled 
 to return and did not reach China until October, 1846. 
 Meanwhile Commodore Biddle, to whom Everett had dele- 
 gated his duties, proceeded to China, exchanged ratifica- 
 tions of the treaty and then moved on up the coast to 
 Shanghai where he found that Henry G. Wolcott had 
 already begun to ship American cotton goods to Japan 
 through the Chinese merchants. 
 
 Commodore Biddle, with the Columbus and the Vin- 
 cennes, anchored in the Bay of Yedo July 20, 1846, and 
 inquired politely whether the Government of Japan was 
 willing to open its ports to Americans and to make a treaty. 
 The Japanese firmly refused. The conversations were 
 seriously handicapped by lack of suitable interpreters, and 
 the commodore's visit was marred by an incident which 
 otherwise might have been avoided. While Biddle was 
 about to go on board a Japanese junk to receive the formal 
 answer of the government, a Japanese soldier either struck 
 or pushed him. Biddle had not been expected by the 
 Japanese officials and there were none ready to receive him. 
 Profuse apologies were afterwards offered and Biddle stated 
 that he would be satisfied with whatever punishment for 
 the soldier the Japanese law provided. The reply to Bid- 
 die's request for the opening of trade was an anonymous 
 communication ordering him to go away and never return.^'' 
 
 The magnanimous conduct of Commodore Biddle ap- 
 pears to have been misinterpreted by the Japanese as 
 weakness and lack of dignity. Accounts of the insult, mag- 
 nified and misunderstood, spread not only throughout 
 Japan, but even to the Lew Chews and the Americans were 
 made to appear as having accepted an insult with com- 
 placency. It was believed that Biddle's visit left matters 
 in a 'less favorable position' than before. Before the report 
 of Biddle's visit reached Washington, a second commission 
 had been issued to Everett to replace the one he had given 
 to Biddle, but Everett did not live to carry out the plans 
 of his government.^ ^ 
 
ATTEMPTS TO OPEN JAPAN TO TRADE 251 
 
 From the year 1846 the subject of a treaty with Japan 
 came more and more to engage the attention of Americans. 
 With the increase of American shipping at Shanghai, and 
 the increase of the whale fisheries in the North Pacific, a 
 larger number of vessels were coming into Japanese waters. 
 The shores of Japan were largely uncharted, and rough 
 weather was not uncommon. There were not a few wrecks. 
 On June 8, 1846, Senator Dix of New York presented in the 
 Senate a memorial signed by presidents of marine insurance 
 companies, ship-builders and steam-engine manufacturers,^ 
 proposing a mission to Japan.^'' 
 
 The treatment of shipwrecked American sailors in Japan 
 became one of the important influences which kept the 
 subject alive. In May, 1846, the whaler Lawrence of Pough- 
 keepsie (Captain Baker) was wrecked and eight of the 
 crew reached shore. These survivors met with varied treat- 
 ment, some of which was very severe. After seventeen 
 months' imprisonment they were turned over to the Dutch 
 factory and sent to Java on a Dutch merchantman. They 
 had been in captivity when Commodore Biddle was 
 anchored in the Bay of Yedo. In February, 1848, the whale 
 ship Lagoda (Captain John Brown) of New Bedford struck 
 a shoal in the Japan Sea and was wrecked. The survivors 
 reached Matsumai and were transferred to Nagasaki where 
 they were carefully confined. Information of their im- 
 prisonment reached United States Commissioner John W. 
 Davis at Canton, through the Dutch consul, and Commo- 
 dore David Geissinger ordered Commander James Glynn, 
 January 31, 1849, to proceed to Nagasaki in the Preble to 
 rescue them. ''You will be careful," read Glynn's instruc- 
 tions, "not to violate the laws or customs of the country, or 
 by any means prejudice the success of any pacific policy our 
 government may be inclined to pursue." His conduct was 
 to be 'conciliatory but firm.' Glynn experienced some diffi- 
 culty in effecting the release of the prisoners who had been 
 very badly treated. Had the American Government been in 
 a mood for reprisals or war, the treatment of the Lagoda 
 survivors would have afforded sufficient excuse. Early in 
 
252 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 January, 1851, three more Americans who had found their 
 way into Japan were repatriated through the Dutch 
 factory.^" 
 
 The cruel treatment to which the Americans in Japan 
 were at times subjected is to be accounted for by the 
 fact that the Japanese authorities, perhaps because of 
 the increasing numbers of Americans who appeared in 
 Japan, had come to entertain suspicions that the Ameri- 
 cans were sending spies into the empire with sinister 
 motives. 
 
 Other factors contributing to the creation of public 
 opinion in regard to the opening of Japan had their origin 
 within the United States. 
 
 China and the East generally were rapidly coming to be 
 looked upon as the great future market for American prod- 
 uce, especially manufactured cottons.* -^ The consequent 
 new interest in Asia included Japan and Korea as well as 
 China. The effort of A. H. Palmer of New York, director 
 of the American and Foreign Agency, which carried on a 
 business as commission agents in the foreign trade, espe- 
 cially for steam vessels and machinery, were so extensive, 
 so thorough, and so persistent as to warrant special notice. 
 Palmer began a systematic study of the markets of Asia as 
 early as 1839^ He would appear to have been father to that 
 characteristically American method of commercial conquest 
 by circularization. His circulars were spread broadcast 
 through Asia, from the shores of eastern Africa to Japan. 
 In the five years, 1842-7, he sent no less than fourteen such 
 communications to Nagasaki, slipping them into Japan by 
 means of the good offices of the Dutch factory, if indeed they 
 ever went any farther. Palmer made a careful study of 
 every possible market, giving especial attention to the politi- 
 cal aspects, of the questions involved and was, presumably, 
 the best informed American on the subject in 1852. He 
 prepared at various times between 1846 and 1849 a number 
 
 ♦Unfortunately no careful study of the growth of American trade with China 
 in this oeriod has been made. The evidence for this statement meets one, how- 
 ever, throughout the British and American documents, some of which are cited 
 subsequently. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO OPEN JAPAN TO TRADE 253 
 
 of reports for the Department of State, one of which was 
 addressed directly to President Polk (January 10, 1848). 
 Palmer even prepared a plan for a mission and went so far 
 as to submit a draft of a letter to be sent by President Taylor 
 to the Emperor. He proposed that the Gushing treaty of 
 1844 should serve as a model for a treaty. Palmer was 
 afterwards described by ex-Secretary of State Clayton as 
 'entitled to more credit for getting up the Japan Expedi- 
 tion, than any other man I know of.' -^ 
 
 Meanwhile others were approaching the problem from 
 still another angle. The application of steam navigation to 
 the trans-Pacific routes by American vessels met with the 
 almost insuperable obstacle of lack of coal supplies. Steam 
 navigation on the coast of China had been attempted with 
 success during the Anglo-Chinese War, and had been taken 
 up for mercantile purposes, but the coal was brought out 
 from England and was very expensive. The voyage across 
 the Pacific was more extended between coaling stations than 
 any part of the voyage from England to China. The needs 
 of American shipping companies were imperative. Japan 
 was believed to have large supplies of coal, and her ports in 
 the days of uncertain steam navigation were absolutely es- 
 sential to the proposed line of American trans-Pacific 
 steamers.-^ 
 
 The settlement of the Pacific Coast by Americans, and 
 especially the discovery, of gold in California yielded added 
 argument for steam navigation of the Pacific. Then came 
 the agitation for an Isthmian canal, the first proposal for 
 which, apparently, was born in the brain of Captain Ken- 
 drick on the Northwest coast before 1790. As early as 1826 
 A. H. Palmer secured from the Republic of Central America 
 a concession for a canal, and went to London to interest 
 British capital in the venture.^'* In 1852 the building of the 
 trans-Isthmian railroad and the establishment of a line of 
 steamers up the Pacific Coast to San Francisco and the 
 various projects for a transcontinental railroad from the 
 Mississippi to either San Francisco or San Diego served to 
 Dring the whole question of American relations in the Pacific 
 
254 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 and in Asia more directly to the attention of Americans 
 than ever before. 
 
 The various expansive movements, political and mili- 
 tary as well as commercial, which characterized the fifth and 
 sixth decades of the last century of American history, all 
 created an atmospheric condition favorable to still further 
 adventures. The times were quite different from those 
 when Edmund Roberts was sent out to Asia in 1832 as a 
 ship's clerk, or even when Gushing went to Macao. 
 
 Before passing to the Perry Expedition we may appro- 
 priately review briefly the course of events in Japan in the 
 first half of the nineteenth century. 
 
 European Powers and Japan 
 
 Thoughtful Japanese had been made increasingly aware, 
 on the one hand, that the policy of exclusion was costly to 
 Japan and on the other, that the day was rapidly approach- 
 ing when the policy could not be sustained before the ad- 
 vance of the Western nations. To go back no further than 
 the beginning of the nineteenth century, Japan had abeady 
 felt the impact of advances from both Russia and England, 
 and had been repeatedly warned by Holland. 
 
 Russia had made herself an uncomfortable neighbor. 
 In 1804 Captain Krusenstern had appeared at Nagasaki to 
 take up the negotiations which had been begun by Lieuten- 
 ant Laxman in 1792. Laxman had passed a winter on the 
 northern coast of the island of Yezo, and visited both Hako- 
 date and Nagasaki. He had been given a paper authorizing 
 Russian vessels to enter Nagasaki harbor. With Krusen- 
 stern came Resanoff, a special envoy, and some shipwrecked 
 Japanese sailors who had been driven ashore on the coast 
 of Siberia. Resanoff asked for the opening of Japan to 
 Russian trade. The Japanese refused. In the years 1806 
 and 1807 Krusenstern, in retaliation for the refusal, sent 
 two small vessels to ravage the coast of Sakhalin and Iturup. 
 The next year a Japanese explorer went northward and 
 ascertained for the first time, so far as the Japanese were 
 
ATTEMPTS TO OPEN JAPAN TO TRADE 255 
 
 concerned, that Sakhalen was an island rather than a 
 peninsula of the mainland. ^^ In 1811 Captain Golownin, in 
 the sloop of war Diana, surveyed the Kurile Islands and 
 was made a prisoner by the Japanese. He and sev.eral other 
 officers were kept in Japan as prisoners for several years. 
 Some of the Japanese improved the opportunity to learn 
 the Russian language. In 1849 Nevelskoi, under the direc- 
 tion of Count Muravieff, had explored Sakhalen and estab- 
 lished a Russian port at Dui.-*^ Meanwhile the Russians 
 had for many years maintained a diplomatic and ecclesias- 
 tical establishment in Peking and in 1850, by the con- 
 vention of Kuldja, had established themselves in a more 
 favorable position in China. Japan feared Russia. 
 
 Nor had the advances of England in Asia passed unno- 
 ticed among the Japanese. In 1808 Captain Pellew in H. M. 
 S. Phaeton, which had already terrorized American shipping 
 at Canton, sailed into Nagasaki harbor in search of Dutch 
 merchantmen and threatened to burn the Japanese and 
 Chinese junks if not supplied with provisions and water. ^^ 
 The supplies were forthcoming and the Phaeton left 
 abruptly while the Japanese were planning a trap. The 
 visit of Captain Pellew had revealed to the Japanese that 
 the morale of the army was at low ebb; as a result of the 
 humiliation administered by the British captain, several 
 Japanese officers committed hari-kari. Five years later Sir 
 Stamford Raffles of Singapore fame had attempted to open 
 trade with the Japanese, but the Dutch director at 
 Deshima * refused to recognize the English rule in Java and 
 threatened to expose the British intrigue to the Japanese. 
 Raffles sent Dr. Ainslie, a physician, with the expedition 
 and he was permitted to remain, being known as an Ameri- 
 can. The attempt to open trade for British merchants came 
 to nothing and soon afterwards Java was returned to the 
 Netherlands. In 1818 Captain Gordon of the British navy 
 in a trading brig of 65 tons entered the Bay of Yedo from 
 Okhotsk, He was well treated but failed to attain his 
 
 *Deshima is a small island close to tke shore in Nagasaki harbor, where the 
 Dutch E. I. Company factory was located. 
 
256 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 object. The outcome of the Anglo-Chinese War (1839-42) 
 created a profound impression in Japan. In 1845 H. T^. 
 frigate Samarang visited Nagasaki, and in 1849, five weeks 
 after the Preble had left Nagasaki, the British surveying 
 ship Mariner visited both Uraga and Shimoda, making 
 surveys. 
 
 The French admiral Cecille appeared in Japan in 1846 
 shortly after Commodore Biddle left. 
 
 The Dutch trade at Deshima was not in a flourishing 
 condition at any time in the nineteenth century. The chief 
 profit was made out of the copper which was taken from 
 Japan to Java and there comed^ and circulated at a rate 
 above its intrinsic value. During the Napoleonic wars the 
 Dutch East India Company became extinct and the Dutch 
 Government took over the Nagasaki trade in 1817. Ten 
 years later the trade was turned over to a new company but 
 in 1829 it was returned to the government as being un- 
 profitable. The trade connection was retained by the 
 Netherlands for sentimental and political rather than for 
 commercial reasons. In 1844 William II of the Netherlands 
 addressed to the Shogun a personal letter in which he cited 
 the Anglo-Chinese War and stated "The future of Japan 
 causes us much anxiety." The king explained how the 
 sovereigns of Europe after the Napoleonic wars had opened 
 to their subjects every channel of trade with a view to the 
 preservation of peace. He explained how the introduction 
 of steam navigation had shortened distances and said that a 
 nation which continued to remain in seclusion could not 
 avoid the hostility of other nations. He feared that a dis- 
 aster such as had recently come to China was threatening 
 the Japanese Empire. Although the Japanese had issued a 
 mandate in 1842 ordering kindly treatment for all foreign 
 vessels in distress, the Shogun replied to the king that it 
 would be impossible to change a policy of seclusion which 
 was in accord with 'ancestral law.' Japan refused to make 
 a treaty with the Netherlands. ^^ The Dutch agents at 
 Deshima kept the Japanese informed as to the progress of 
 political events in the outside world. In 1850 they notified 
 
ATTEMPTS TO OPEN JAPAN TO TRADE 257 
 
 the Japanese authorities that the governor general^ of India 
 had secured permission to attempt fo make a treaty with 
 Japan, and when the Americans arrived in 1853 the Jap- 
 anese were well informed of their approach as well as of the 
 outcome of the recent war between the United States and 
 Mexico. 
 
 While the official policy of the Tokugawa Government 
 remained unaltered, Nagasaki was rapidly becoming a source 
 of much enlightenment to the Japanese, and new educa- 
 tional impulses were making themselves felt. A European 
 form of drill was adopted for the army and the Japanese 
 were learning the art of modern ship-building. The science 
 of western medicine was also introduced. Deshima became 
 a window which not only disclosed a view but also let in no 
 inconsiderable amount of light. 
 
 Meanwhile the political position of the Shogun's Gov- 
 ernment had been steadily disintegrating. Japan had never 
 been less able to repel an attack from a foreign nation than 
 in 1853, while the foreign nations had never been so well 
 prepared to make one. Another situation favored the pro- 
 posed American expedition to Japan : Great Britain, France 
 and Russia were becoming occupied with the Crimean 
 affairs leaving the Pacific for the moment more to the 
 Americans than it had ever been before, or would be again 
 for many decades. 
 
 In 1851, after the return of the Preble to the United 
 States, interest in Japan reached a high point. Com- 
 mander James Glynn, at the request of the President, sub- 
 mitted in writing his opinion that a commercial treaty with 
 Japan could not be long delayed. A port in Japan was, he 
 thought, absolutely necessary for the proposed line of trans- 
 Pacific steamers, and he recommended that suitable efforts 
 be made "if not peaceably, then by force." Glynn, however, 
 counselled that the approach to Japan be made on equal 
 terms, as to any European Power. "It may be desirable," 
 he remarked, "on some future occasion to justify ourselves 
 before the world in the measures used towards Japan besides 
 mere argument or entreaty." He recommended that no. 
 
258 AMEBICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 complaints for past offenses should be made and that the 
 British and Dutch governments should be conciliated. 
 
 Accepting completely this wise advice, Secretary of State 
 Webster issued a commission to Commodore J. H. Auhck 
 (June 10, 1851), commanding the U. S. China Squadron, to 
 proceed to Japan for the purpose of negotiating a treaty. 
 The commission was never executed because of the illness 
 of Aulick and also because of charges lodged against him 
 from which he was subsequently cleared by the Navy De- 
 partment, but too late to admit him to the Japan Expedi- 
 tion. 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. Morison : "Maritime History of Massachusetts," p. 182. 
 
 2. Archibald Campbell : "A Voyage Around the World," pp. 28-9. 
 
 3. DeBow's Review, Vol. 13, p. 560. 
 
 4. Capt. D. Porter : "Journal of a Cruise in the Pacific in 1812-14" ; 
 
 Callahan : "American Relations in the Pacific and the Far 
 East," pp. 25-29. 
 
 5. Richard Hildreth: "Japan as It Was and Is," pp. 446-7. 
 
 Hildreth cites Sir Stamford Raffles, and also a pamphlet by 
 Hagendorp, published in Boston, 1800, to prove that the Eliza 
 was an English enterprise. 
 
 6. Hist. Col. of Essex Institute, Vol. 2, pp. 287 ff., p. 166 ; Hildreth, 
 
 p. 456. 
 
 7. Batavia Consular Letters, Vol. 1, May 30, July 1, Aug. 12, 1831. 
 
 8. Edmund Roberts Papers (Lib. of Congress). 
 
 9. S. Ex. Doc. 59 :32-l, p. 63. 
 
 10. Roberts Papers (Dept. of State). 
 
 11. Ibid. 
 
 12. "Memoirs of Robert Morrison," Vol. 2, pp. 87, 127-8, 165, 386, 
 
 404, 458. 
 
 13. For full account of the Morrison visit see: "Journal of the 
 
 Perry Expedition (1853-4)" in Trans, of the Asiatic Society 
 of Japan, Vol. 37, Part I (1910) p. 11 ; Bibliography of the 
 Voyage of the Morrison, in (Chinese Repository, Vol. 6, (1837) ; 
 "Claims of Japan and Malaysia upon Christendom," 2 vols. ; 
 and "Journal of an Expedition from Singapore to Japan," by 
 P. Parker M. D. ; Hildreth, p. 491 ff; "Life and Letters of 
 Peter Parker," by Stevens and Marwick. 
 
 14. China Instructions, Vol. 1, Aug. 15, 1844. 
 
 15. H. Doc. 138 -.28-2. 
 
 16. H. Doc. 96 :29-2, p. 28, gives an account of the visit of the 
 
 Manhattan; see also Nitobe's Intercourse between the United 
 States and Japan. 
 
 17. China Dispatches, Vol. 3 ; S. Ex. Doc. 59 :32-l, pp. 64 ff. 
 
 18. S. Ex. Doc. 59 :32-l, p. 69. 
 
f 
 
 ATTEMPTS TO OPEN JAPAN TO TRADE 259 
 
 19. H. Doc. 96 :29-2, p. 33. 
 
 20. S. Ex. Doc. 59:32-1, gives extended account of these incidents; 
 
 Preble correspondence also published separately as H. Ex. Doc. 
 84:31-1. 
 
 21. See Clive Day: "Hist, of Amer. Commerce," pp. 498-514 for a 
 
 convenient summary. 
 
 22. H. Doc. 96:29-2; S. Misc. Docs. 80:30-1; Natl. Intelligencer, 
 
 Sept. 6, 1849; H. Misc. Docs. 10:33-2. 
 
 23. H. Rep. 569 :30-l. May 4, 1848 ; S. Ex. Doc. 49 :32-2. 
 
 24. S. Misc. Docs. 80:30-1, p. 66 £f ; H. Eept. 439 :31-1. 
 
 25. Stead: "Japan by the Japanese," pp. 149-50; Hildreth, pjp. 
 
 446-7. 
 
 26. Stead, p. 150. 
 
 27. W. G. Aston: Trans, of Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. VII, 1879. 
 
 28. D. C. Greene : Trans, of Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. XXXIV, 
 
 Part IV, pp. 110 ff. 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 
 COMMODOEE PEEEY'S POLICY 
 
 The first treaty between the United States and Japan 
 was attended by many circumstances dissimilar from those 
 which governed the making of the Treaty of Wanghia. 
 While Gushing was negotiating at Macao there was already 
 a large American trade with China which must not only be 
 protected but also left undisturbed ; there was a strong and 
 well-defined mercantile tradition as to what constituted 
 sound policy. There were other foreign powers, particularly 
 Great Britain and France, to be taken into consideration, the 
 negotiator was a lawyer, and China had just emerged from 
 disastrous war. In Japan it was different: there was no 
 trade to protect, no traditions to be reckoned with, and no 
 other foreign power to embarrass the proceedings; and 
 although he was enjoined to use only peaceful methods, the 
 negotiations were in the hands of a naval officer. There 
 were also important differences in the temper of the Ameri- 
 can people in 1853 as compared with 1844. Within the 
 decade the United States had pushed its way across the 
 continent to the Pacific Coast, and by means of a successful 
 war had extended its boundaries to the Rio Grande. 
 
 The policy of Commodore Perry for the Pacific Ocean 
 and for Asia may properly be discussed from three points of 
 view: the instructions from the Government of the United 
 States which guided Perry; the negotiations of 1853 and 
 1854 at Yedo and the resulting treaty; and the policy of 
 Perry himself as it appeared in his dispatches and subse- 
 quent utterances. We have again to remember that initial 
 American policies in Japan, as in China, were largely per- 
 sonal. They were framed by not more than three or four 
 people and executed by only one — Commodore Perry. 
 
 260 
 
COMMODORE PERRY'S POLICY 261 
 
 Instructions 
 
 The instructions for the Japanese Expedition underwent 
 a distinct development before they were issued in their 
 final form to Commodore Perry. The first set of instruc- 
 tions had been drafted by Secretary of State Webster and 
 given to Commodore Aulick June 10, 1851.^ They were 
 similar in tone to, though not so complete as, those given to 
 Caleb Cushing eight years before. Perhaps the most signifi- 
 cant feature was the omission of all reference to the insults 
 which had been offered to the American flag and the indig- 
 nities and cruelties suffered by American citizens and 
 officers in the Morrison, Biddle, Lagoda, and other affairs. 
 Webster's policy was to ignore these affronts and to start 
 anew with no thought of reparations or apologies. The 
 Webster instructions dwelt most upon the necessity of secur- 
 ing supplies of coal in order that steam navigation of the 
 Pacific might be established. "We should make another 
 appeal," wrote Webster, "to the sovereign of that country 
 to ask him to sell to our steamers not the manufactures of 
 his artisans, or the results of the toil of his husbandmen, but 
 a gift of Providence deposited by the Creator of all things 
 in the depths of the Japanese islands for the benefit of the 
 human family." Beyond the securing of coal supplies, 
 Aulick was authorized to secure a treaty, if possible, similar 
 to those with Muscat, Siam and China in which protection 
 for shipwrecked and distressed sailors would be stipulated, 
 and 'one or more' ports opened to trade. The accompany- 
 ing letter from President Fillmore to the Emperor of Japan, 
 written by Webster, asked for "friendly commercial inter- 
 course and nothing more." 
 
 For the delivery of the letter and the support of the 
 negotiations Aulick would have at his disposal on the China 
 station a very modest fleet, the steamer Susquehanna and 
 two sloops of war, the Plymouth and the Saratoga. It was 
 not even certain that all of these could be spared from the 
 China coast for an expedition to Japan. 
 
 The instructions issued to Perry by Acting Secretary of 
 
262 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 State C. M. Conrad, November 5, 1852, were quite different 
 in tone and more explicit in details.^ Perry had accepted 
 the appointment to the Expedition with some reluctance, 
 and having consented to the appointment, appears to have 
 been given a large freedom in planning the methods by 
 which it was to be carried out. Owing to the illness of 
 Webster, Perry was permitted to draft his own instructions 
 which were, of course, submitted to the Department of 
 State for revision and approval.^ Whether any revision 
 actually took place may best be judged by comparing the 
 instructions as signed by Conrad with other statements of 
 Perry in which his ideas of Far Eastern policy were un- 
 folded. At any rate the spirit of Webster had departed 
 from the Perry instructions. 
 
 While the objects of the expedition as stated by Webster 
 were left practically unchanged — protection for distressed 
 American sailors, one or more ports to be opened to trade, 
 and the right to purchase coal — the Japanese were described 
 as a 'weak and semi-barbarous people' whose conduct 
 towards shipwrecked sailors had brought them into the 
 category of those nations which "may justly be considered 
 as the common enemy of mankind." The duty of protecting 
 Americans who navigated those seas was one "that can no 
 longer be deferred." "While it is true," read the instruc- 
 tions, "that every nation undoubtedly has the right to deter- 
 mine for itself the extent to which it will hold intercourse 
 with other nations, the exercise of such a right imposes 
 duties which cannot justly be disregarded." The disregard 
 of the duty to care for distressed seamen was intolerable. 
 The instructions contained a very significant paragraph in 
 which the relations of the United States to Japan were con- 
 sidered in the light of the respective position of the two 
 nations on the Pacific Ocean — the first comprehensive state- 
 ment of the basis of an American policy for the Pacific. 
 This paragraph read : 
 
 ''Recent events — the navigation of the ocean by steam, the acquisi- 
 tion and rapid settlement by this country of a vast territory on the 
 Pacific, the discovery of gold in that region, the rapid communication 
 
COMMODORE PERRY'S POLICY 263 
 
 established across the Isthmus which separates the two oceans — have 
 practically brought the countries of the east in closer proximity to 
 our own; although the consequences of these events have scarcely 
 begun to be felt, the intercourse between them has already greatly in- 
 creased and no limits can be assigned to its future extension." 
 
 More significant than the statement of the objects to be 
 obtained were the methods to be employed. At the time the 
 instructions were issued it was expected that the fleet would 
 consist of five steamers and six or more sailing vessels — by 
 far the largest American fleet that had ever appeared in 
 Eastern waters. This formidable fleet was to be used as a 
 'persuader/ to use the word of President Fillmore many 
 years later. It was assumed that "arguments or persuasion 
 addressed to this people, unless they are seconded by some 
 imposing manifestation of power, will be utterly unavail- 
 ing." Perry was instructed to proceed to some point on 
 the coast of Japan with his whole force, to assure the 
 Japanese of the friendly feelings of the United States, but 
 to bring up the cases of the Morrison, the Lag o da and the 
 Lawrence, and to explain to the authorities that the United 
 States desired 'positive assurance' that in the future such 
 insults and indignities would not be repeated. 
 
 These desires on the part of the United States were to 
 be supported with explanations that in the United States 
 religion is free and that Japan need have no fear that the 
 American Government would, as the older European nations 
 had done two centuries before, seek to interfere with the 
 religion of Japan. Perry was also to disarm the fears and 
 prejudices of the Japanese by explaining that the United 
 States was quite separate from and very independent of 
 Great Britain whose recent war with China had been alarm- 
 ing to Japan. The Japanese were to have explained to them 
 that Japan and the United States had become neighbors 
 across the Pacific Ocean and that the choice lay with the 
 Japanese as to whether the two nations should be friendly 
 neighbors. "The President desires to live in peace and 
 friendship with the Emperor" ; but "no friendship can long 
 exist between them unless Japan should change her policy 
 
264 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 and cease to act towards the people of the United States as 
 if they were her enemies." 
 
 If such arguments did not secure any relaxation of the 
 poHcy of exclusion, or even any assurance of humane treat- 
 ment for seamen, Perry was instructed to "change his tone, 
 and to inform them in the most unequivocal terms that it is 
 the determination of this government to insist that here- 
 after all citizens or vessels of the United States that may 
 be wrecked on their coasts or driven by stress of weather into 
 their harbors shall, so long as they are compelled to remain 
 there, be treated with humanity; and that if any acts of 
 cruelty should hereafter be practiced upon citizens of this 
 country, whether by the government or the inhabitants of 
 Japan, they will be severely chastised." 
 
 It is obvious that such instructions admitted of very 
 wide latitude in interpretation and therefore, although 
 Perry was "invested with large discretionary powers" he was 
 cautioned to bear in mind that he was to avoid all provoca- 
 tion. The mission was to be pacific in character and was 
 not to resort to force unless in self-defense "in the protec- 
 tion of the vessels and crews under his command, or to 
 resent an act of personal violence offered to himself or to 
 one of his officers." The President, Perry was reminded, 
 had no power to declare war. 
 
 f A new letter from President Fillmore to the Emperor, a 
 revision of the Webster letter which had been given to 
 Aulick, written by Edward Everett, was entrusted to Perry. 
 It was broadly similar to yet more imperative than the 
 Webster letter, specifying friendship, commerce, access to 
 coal and provisions, and protection for distressed sailors as 
 the objects. As for the last mentioned the letter stated, 
 "we are very much in earnest about this." It was also sug- 
 gested that Japan might, if not yet wholly willing to aban- 
 don the policy of exclusion, at least try the experiment of a 
 suspension of the policy for five or ten years, making a 
 treaty which would be terminable at the end of a given 
 period. 
 
 The Perry Expedition, like that of Edmund Roberts, and 
 
COMMODORE PERRY'S POLICY 265 
 
 unlike the Gushing and the proposed Aulick missions, 
 carried a generous supply of presents for the Emperor, 
 including a small steam engine such as had been ordered for 
 Roberts, and suggested for Gushing. 
 
 Negotiations and Treaty 
 
 The Japan Expedition, greatly reduced as to size, con- 
 sisting of only two steamers and two sloops of war, anchored 
 in the Bay of Yedo off Uraga on July 8, 1853, and remained 
 in the bay nine days.** Having in mind the firing on the 
 Morrison in 1837, and the kidnapping of the Russian Gap- 
 tain Golownin in 1811, Perry ordered the decks to be cleared 
 for action and the guns shotted as the squadron sailed up 
 the bay.^ The fleet was anchored with a view to possible 
 attack and never for one moment during either the first 
 or the second visit, were either officers or crews permitted to 
 remove themselves so far from the vessels that they could 
 not have been protected by the guns. 
 
 Perry adopted a policy of magnifying his own office and 
 dignity which was fully in accord with the experience gained 
 by Edmund Roberts, Galeb Gushing and Commodore Bid- 
 die. He permitted no friendly approaches by minor officials 
 and surrounded himself with a majesty which the Oriental 
 always recognizes and appreciates. 
 
 To orders to retire and go to Nagasaki the commodore 
 was deaf; efforts to place the fleet under the guard of 
 Japanese boats and soldiers were met by the assertion that 
 if the Japanese authorities did not remove the guards he 
 would remove them by force; and when the Japanese be- 
 came evasive about receiving the President's letter. Perry 
 threatened that if a suitable person was not appointed to 
 receive the documents he would go ashore with a sufiicient 
 force and deliver them himself. While the Japanese were 
 considering this threat Perry ordered surveying boats, well 
 manned and armed, to begin surveys of the bay and harbor, 
 being careful not to go outside the range of the guns. When 
 requested to withdraw these surveying boats, Perry refused. 
 
266 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Indeed the Mississippi, the flag-ship, was sent still farther 
 up the bay in the direction of Yedo and the surveys of the 
 approach to the capital were extended. The commodore 
 explained that these surveys were necessary because he 
 intended to return in the spring with a 'larger force.' ^ 
 
 The Japanese were notified that if the President's letter 
 to the Emperor were not duly received and replied to, he 
 would consider his country insulted and would "not hold 
 himself accountable for the consequences." Before such 
 threats and intimidation the Japanese could not well do 
 otherwise than yield, and the letter was received with suit- 
 able ceremony on shore, Perry delivering it to "the Prince 
 of Idzu, first counsellor of the Emperor and his coadjutor, 
 the Prince of Iwami." Perry was then ordered to depart 
 but instead of obeying he immediately ordered the whole 
 squadron to get under way in the direction of Yedo, and in 
 the Mississippi Perry went to within seven miles of the 
 city. Mindful of his instructions, however. Perry paused 
 just short of the point where his movements might be 
 regarded as provocation, and retired from Japanese waters, 
 having notified the Japanese that he would return in the 
 spring with a larger force to receive an answer to the Presi- 
 dent's letter and the proposals for a treaty. 
 
 Before his return Perry had established a depot with 
 large supplies of coal at Napa,* on the island of Great Lew 
 Chew, and had directed Commander John Kelly of the 
 Plymouth to proceed to the Bonin group of islands, and 
 formally take possession of the Baily islands in the name of 
 the United States. This mission was accomplished October 
 30, 1853, the principal island being named 'Hillsborough' 
 and the port christened 'Newport,' according to Perry's 
 directions. That these islands had been named and claimed 
 for Great Britain by Captain Beechy in 1827 in no way dis- 
 turbed the commodore. 
 
 The report of the first visit of the American expedition 
 to Japan, as well as the tenor of some of Perry's dispatches 
 
 ♦The spelling is varied : the Japanese now spell it Naha, The Oreat Lew 
 Chew is called Okinawa (Great Napa), 
 
COMMODORE PERRY'S POLICY 267 
 
 had a somewhat disturbing effect in Washington where the 
 Pierce administration had succeeded that of Fillmore since 
 Perry's departure for the East, By direction of the Presi- 
 dent, Secretary of the Navy, J. C. Dobbin, immediately 
 cautioned Perry again that his mission was to be one of 
 merely peaceful negotiation and that no violence must be 
 resorted to except for self-defense/ 
 
 The fleet, somewhat enlarged, but not so large as had 
 been originally planned by the Fillmore administration, 
 returned to the Bay of Yedo February 13, 1854. The Jap- 
 anese Government had decided to meet the returning expe- 
 dition with conciliation, but the policy proposed was to 
 prevent as far as possible the approach of the Americans in 
 the direction of Yedo. Perry, on the other hand, was deter- 
 mined to advance beyond the anchorage at Uraga where the 
 negotiations of the preceding summer had taken place. 
 When the Japanese attempted to draw him back to Kami- 
 kura for a conference, he asserted that he intended to go to 
 Yedo. A compromise was effected by which the conference 
 was held at Yokohama, which is less than twenty miles 
 from Yedo (Tokio).^ 
 
 The reply to the President's letter contained the surpris- 
 ing and significant statement "for us to continue attached 
 to the ancient laws, seems to misunderstand the spirit of 
 the age." The Japanese were willing to open the port of 
 Nagasaki to the Americans under very stringent regulations 
 similar to those under which the Dutch and Chinese trade 
 had been conducted, and they also proposed to open a 
 second port to the Americans at the end of five years. They 
 were also prepared to give promises as to the reception of 
 shipwrecked sailors. However, they stipulated that what- 
 ever Americans came to Japan should be subjected to 
 restraints which amounted to little less than imprisonment. 
 Perry thereupon increased his demands: he would have 
 nothing to do with Nagasaki where traditions as to the 
 treatment of foreigners might always operate as an embar- 
 rassment to intercourse, just as similar traditions at Canton 
 were even then causing trouble. He asserted that he desired 
 
268 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 a treaty similar to that existing between the United States 
 and China and that he desired the opening of no less than 
 three ports immediately and two more within a short time. 
 He intimated that if Japan did not make these concessions 
 the United States might decide to send still more ships as 
 well as more stringent instructions. Notwithstanding the 
 clashes of opinion the negotiations proceeded with cordiality 
 and courtesy, and the treaty was signed March 31, 1854. 
 
 The treaty presented a singular contrast to the methods 
 by which it had been obtained, so much of a contrast that 
 one is justified in finding the actual American policy in the 
 treaty and in minimizing, as so many have done, the signifi- 
 cance of the method. Perry was so sure of the harmless- 
 ness of the treaty and even of its direct benefit to Japan 
 that he felt able to disregard the customary methods of 
 American diplomacy. On the other hand one cannot help 
 but feel that in the art of negotiation the Japanese had 
 surpassed the naval diplomat. 
 
 The Japanese had offered to open Nagasaki on terms 
 similar to those endured by the Dutch. Perry had shown 
 them the Gushing treaty with China and demanded three 
 ports immediately — either Uraga in Hondo or Kagoshima 
 in Kyushu ; Matsumai in Yezo ; and Napa in the Lew Chews 
 — with the promise of two more ports at a later date. By 
 the treaty the Americans were allowed to enter Hakodate, a 
 smaller town but a better harbor near Matsumai, and 
 Shimoda on the southern coast of Hondo not far from the 
 Bay of Yedo. Shimoda was entirely without value as a 
 port of trade and the harbor also was of less utility than 
 was supposed by Perry. Napa was ignored in the treaty 
 and Perry came to the conclusion before he left China that 
 the Lew Chews were really more closely related to China 
 than to Japan. Permanent residence for Americans at either 
 of the two strictly Japanese ports was not contemplated in 
 the treaty although a consul was permitted to reside at the 
 inaccessible Shimoda. While those who temporarily visited 
 these ports were not to be subjected to such humiliating 
 surveillance as the Japanese had at first proposed, the trade 
 
COMMODORE PERRY'S POLICY 269 
 
 was to be on a cash basis, specie in exchange for ship-sup- 
 plies, and was to be supervised exclusively by the govern- 
 ment officials. In fact the treaty was hardly more than a 
 shipwreck convention, the necessities of distressed mariners 
 being amply provided for. It bore no resemblance to and 
 could stand no comparison with the Treaty of Wanghia. 
 
 The treaty contained, however, a most-favored-nation 
 clause and there was one very significant omission. Perry 
 had asked for no extraterritorial rights whatever. It has 
 been claimed and there is no reason to question the assertion 
 that the absence of such a provision was due to Dr. S. Wells 
 Williams who accompanied the expedition as Chinese inter- 
 preter.^ Williams had had an opportunity to watch the 
 operation of extraterritoriality in China and was firmly per- 
 suaded that it was such an evil as a strong nation ought not 
 to force upon a weak one. Perry also was familiar with 
 the situation in China and was apparently willing to agree 
 with Williams without question. It is in the omission of 
 this provision in the Japanese treaty that the true character 
 of Perry is to be read. He would bluster, threaten, even 
 intimidate, but he would not assume the responsibility of 
 inflicting a possible evil on the Japanese. 
 
 The treaty quite failed to grant access to the supplies 
 of coal which had been the very first object, in the minds 
 of many, for the expedition. Hakodate was far removed 
 from the route of trans-Pacific travel, and even before Perry 
 left Japan he acknowledged in a separate agreement with 
 the Japanese that coal could not be procured at Shimoda.^" 
 
 Having pointed out the relatively small part of Perry's 
 original demands which had been granted, and the inten- 
 tional omission of extraterritorial rights which the foreigner 
 in China had already come to regard as too useful to be 
 dispensed with, we must however return to the fact that 
 the treaty had been obtained without firing a shot, and that 
 it left no rancor. It was in fact what its language claimed — 
 a treaty of friendship. It was far more friendly to Japan 
 than the Cushing treaty was to China. It would not be 
 fair, however, to award the credit for the treaty exclusively 
 
270 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 to the Americans. Perry departed in entire ignorance of the 
 extent to which he had been aided by circumstances and 
 influences within the Empire, and he did not live to realize 
 the extent to which his visit had intensified the struggle 
 already begun and not to be finished until the office of the 
 Shogun and feudalism were both abolished.^ ^ 
 
 Perry's Proposals for Far Eastern Policy 
 
 Viewed as a step in the development of American policy 
 in Asia the treaty of 1854, considered by itself, presents 
 some puzzling questions. When compared with the Gushing 
 treaty with China ten years earUer it would appear to have 
 been a backward step, and this notwithstanding the great 
 display of force which had attended the negotiations. If 
 we were to hmit our examination to the treaty itself, Perry 
 would seem to have been badly outwitted by the Japanese 
 or, at the moment when he might have gathered in the fruits 
 of peaceful victory, to have been stricken with indecision 
 and weakness. He had secured very little. It is not fair, 
 however, to stop with a comparison of the treaties. The 
 poHcy of Commodore Perry was much broader and far more 
 aggressive than is indicated by the terms of the treaty. The 
 Perry Expedition, viewed as a whole, marks something new 
 in policy when compared with that of Caleb Cushing at 
 Macao. Cushing had devoted himself exclusively to the 
 protection of American mercantile interests in China; Perry 
 felt that he was laying the foundations for an American 
 commercial empire in Asia and on the Pacific. Indeed, 
 Perry appears to have been the first American in official 
 position to view not merely the commercial but also the 
 pohtical problems of Asia and the Pacific as a unity. 
 
 Perry looked into the future and considered American 
 commercial interests in the Far East from the standpoint 
 of a naval strategist. There must be an ample number of 
 ports of refuge, trade bases, and even points from which 
 protection might be afforded in case of war with some 
 European power. 
 
COMMODORE PERRY'S POLICY 
 
 271 
 
 ■a a 
 
272 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 '''It is idle to suppose," wrote Perry after his return to the United 
 States, "that because the policy of the United States has hitherto 
 been to avoid by all means possible any coalition, or even connection 
 A^ath the political acts of other nations, we can always escape from 
 the responsibilities which our growing wealth and power must inevi- 
 tably fasten upon us. The duty of protecting our vast and rapidly 
 growing commerce will make it not only a measure of wisdom but 
 of positive necessity, to provide timely preparation for events which 
 must, in the ordinary course of things, transpire in the east. In the 
 development of the future, the destinies of our nation must assume 
 conspicuous attitudes ; we cannot expect to be free from the ambitious 
 longings of increased power, which are the natural concomitants of 
 national success." ^ 
 
 He looked forward to the time when there would be on 
 the Pacific and in Asia a large number of American 'settle- 
 ments/ which 'would be offshoots from us rather than, 
 strictly speaking, colonies.' These commercial settlements, 
 as he termed them, which he thought ought not to be forti- 
 fied because fortification would arouse the antagonism of 
 European nations, would 'be vitally necessary to the con- 
 tinued success of our commerce in those regions.' 
 
 In one of his dispatches he went even so far as to speak 
 of the necessity of extending the 'territorial jurisdiction' of 
 the United States beyond the limits of the western conti- 
 nent. "I assume," he wrote, "the responsibility of urging 
 the expediency of establishing a foothold in this quarter of 
 the globe, as a measure of positive necessity to the sustain- 
 ment of our maritime rights in the east." ^^ 
 
 Perry designated. three points where he wished to see a 
 beginning made. They were the Bonin Islands, Great Lew 
 Chew, and Formosa. He also intimated that the United 
 States ought to extend its "national friendship and protec- 
 tion" to Siam, Cambodia, Cochin China, parts of Borneo and 
 Sumatra, and many of the islands of the eastern archipel- 
 ago.^"^ No American before his time, and few after it, ever 
 had such an extensive ambition. Herein lies the explana- 
 tion of the inadequacies of the treaty with Japan. Perry 
 believed that he was taking but the first step in a very large 
 program which in its entirety could be .realized only by 
 degrees. A treaty of friendship with Japan was but a detail 
 in this program. 
 
COMMODORE PERRY'S POLICY 273 
 
 Commodore Perry left us in no doubt as to the nature 
 of the policy he would have liked to pursue. On the out- 
 ward voyage from the United States he evolved a plan which 
 he laid before the Secretary of the Navy in great detail. ^^ 
 He would occupy the Lew Chew Islands ''for the accommo- 
 dation of our ships of war and for the safe resort of mer- 
 chant vessels of whatever nation." This, he thought, 
 ''would be a measure not only justified by the strictest rules 
 of moral law, but what is also to be considered by the laws 
 of stern necessity." 
 
 Perry was looking forward to a time when the United 
 States would be engaged in a decisive contest with Great 
 Britain for the control of the Pacific. He wrote: 
 
 "When we look at the possessions on the east of our great maritime 
 rival, England, and of the constant and rapid increase of their forti- 
 fied ports, we should be admonished of the necessity of prompt 
 measures on our part. By reference to the map of the world it will 
 be seen that Great Britain is already in possession of the most im- 
 portant points in the East India and China seas, and especially with 
 reference to the China seas. . . . Fortunately the Japanese and many 
 other islands of the Pacific are still left untouched by this uncon- 
 scionable government; and some of them lay in a route of a great 
 commerce which is destined to become of great importance to the 
 United States. No time should be lost in adopting active measures 
 to secure a sufficient number of ports of refuge. And hence I shall 
 look with much anxiety for the arrival of the Powhatan and the other 
 vessel to be sent me." 
 
 In reply to the above described proposal Secretary of 
 State Everett replied for the President, February 15, 1853, 
 approving the occupation of the principal ports of the Lew 
 Chews, which were assumed to belong to Japan, in case ports 
 could not be obtained in Japan proper without resort to 
 force.^® Everett however cautioned Perry to take no sup- 
 plies without paying for them and to "make no use of 
 force, except in the last resort for defense, if attacked, and 
 for self-preservation." 
 
 On his first visit to Japan, Perry made Great Lew Chew 
 the rendezvous for his squadron and successfully negotiated 
 for a coal depot at Napa which had the best harbor. Dur- 
 ing the following autumn he kept one or more of the vessels 
 
274 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 of the fleet stationed there constantly, and just before his 
 return to Japan he wrote to the Secretary of the Navy 
 (January 25, 1854) reaffirming his intention of placing 
 Great Lew Chew under the American flag. He wrote: 
 
 "It is my intention, should the Japanese Government refuse to 
 negotiate, or to assign a port of resort for our merchant and whaling 
 ships, to take under surveillance of the American flag upon the 
 ground of reclamation for insults and injuries committed upoii 
 American citizens, this island of Great Lew Chew, a dependency of 
 the empire, to be held under restraint, until the decision of my govern- 
 ment shall be known, whether to avow or disavow my acts." " 
 
 K.hlMjfq --!>.■ 'J^/'zl 
 
 To this declaration Secretary of State -Dobin replied 
 (May 39, 1854) after consultation with President Pierce, 
 that the project was 'embarrassing.' 
 
 "The President," he stated, "is disinclined, without the authority 
 of Congress, to take and retain possession of an island in that distant 
 country, particularly unless more urgent and potent reasons demanded 
 it than now exist. If, in the future, resistance should be offered and 
 threatened it would be rather mortifying to surrender the island, if 
 once seized, and rather inconvenient and expensive to maintain a 
 force there to retain it." ^^ 
 
 The President hoped that the contingency of occupation 
 would not arise. In these words of hesitation and caution 
 the President appears to have had in mind Perry's warning 
 that in case the necessary preliminary steps at the Lew 
 Chews were not taken immediately "the Russians, or 
 French, or probably the English" would anticipate the de- 
 sign. Perry had urged that 
 
 "though it does not belong to the spirit of our institutions to extend 
 our dominion beyond the sea, positive necessity requires that we 
 should protect our commercial interests in this remote part of the 
 world, and in doing so, to resort to measures, however strong, to coun- 
 teract the schemes of powers less scrupulous than ourselves." 
 
 Perry's plans embraced also the Bonin Islands which lay 
 about five hundred miles south of Japan and in the direct 
 path of navigation between Honolulu and Shanghai. Be- 
 fore advancing upon Japan at all Perry personally visited 
 these islands and purchased for the Navy Department a 
 "suitable spot for the erection of offices, wharves, coal-sheds, 
 
COMMODORE PERRY'S POLICY 275 
 
 etc." ^^ at Port Lloyd on Peel Island. Four months later, 
 by Perry's order, Commander Kelly of the Plymouth took 
 formal possession of the southern group of islands which 
 had been named Baily's Islands by Captain Beechey of 
 H. M. S. Blossom, in 1827, but which Perry rechristened 
 Coffin Islands in honor of an American, Captain Coffin, who 
 had visited the islands four years earlier than Beechey.^^ 
 Perry defended this action as well as his other hostile acts 
 on his first visit to Japan on the ground that it was necessary 
 to work on the fears of the rulers of Japan. He did not, 
 however, disguise his satisfaction at having secured an 
 important port of refuge for the trans-Pacific trade about 
 which he was so optimistic. 
 
 This unceremonious and brusque appropriation of a 
 portion of the Bonin Islands was not permitted to pass 
 unchallenged by Great Britain. While Perry was lying at 
 Hongkong and gathering his forces for the second visit to 
 Japan, Sir John Bonham, British Superintendent of Trade, 
 was directed by Lord Clarendon to interview Perry and 
 obtain an explanation. The approach to the subject was 
 tactful and conciliatory as was suited to the occasion when 
 the Crimean War was in progress and the Russian Admiral, 
 Count Pontiatin, was in Chinese waters and very friendly 
 with Commodore Perry. Perry set up a counter claim to 
 the islands, resting it on the double ground that Captain 
 Coffin had preceded Captain Beechey to the island by at 
 least three years, and on the fact that since 1830 a group of 
 settlers from the Sandwich Islands, in which the Americans 
 outnumbered the British two to one, had lived at Port 
 Lloyd.^^ Perry put forward his contention in a conciliatory 
 spirit and suggested that Great Britain and the United 
 States ought to cooperate rather than to oppose one another 
 in the establishment of trans-Pacific steam navigation. 
 Perry had in mind for the islands the creation of a free port 
 which would be very similar, in matters of trade, to Hong- 
 kong. 
 
 In reporting Bonham's inquiry to ¥/ashington, Perry 
 reaffirmed his general policy. He stated : 
 
276 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 "I shall in no way allow of any infringement upon our national 
 rights; on the contrary, I believe that this is the moment to assume 
 a position in the east which will make the power and influence of 
 the United States felt in such a way as to give greater importance to 
 those rights which, among eastern nations, are generally estimated 
 by the extent of the military force exhibited." 
 
 The conciliatory spirit in which the Japanese authorities 
 met Perry on the occasion of his second visit to the Bay of 
 Yedo put an entirely new face on the situation and robbed 
 Perry of most of the reasons for his previously declared 
 policy. The Bonin Islands were forgotten, and when Japan 
 in 1862 proposed to assert a claim to them which antedated 
 by centuries the claims of both Great Britain and the 
 United States, both powers relinquished all pretensions to 
 the islands, which were, in fact, worthless. Perry concluded 
 a 'compact' with the king of the Lew Chews (July 11, 1854) 
 a few months after signing the treaty with Japan, and the 
 document was duly ratified by the Senate a few days after 
 the ratification of the treaty with Japan.-^ This compact 
 treated the Lew Chews as entirely independent of both 
 Japan and China and merely secured protection of ship- 
 wrecked sailors, and the opening of Napa as a port of sup- 
 plies and trade. When, in 1872, Japan reasserted her claim 
 to the islands the United States merely stipulated that 
 Japan should become directly responsible to the United 
 States for the maintenance of such rights for Americans as 
 the islands had conceded by treaty to the United States. 
 
 When the American squadron was being dispersed after 
 the second visit to Japan, Perry ordered two vessels to 
 Manila and to Formosa. The object in visiting the latter 
 point was to investigate the persistent reports that ship- 
 wrecked American sailors were held in captivity on the 
 islands and also to investigate the reported coal mines. No 
 sailors were found, but coal of good quality and in abun- 
 dance was discovered. No active steps were taken at the 
 time but upon Perry's return to the United States he recom- 
 mended that "the United States alone should take the 
 initiative" in "this magnificent island." -^ We shall hear 
 more of this project in the next chapter. 
 
COMMODORE PERRY'S POLICY 277 
 
 We have now before us two distinct, though not always 
 distinctly separated, proposals for American policy in Asia. 
 On the one hand is the policy of the Treaty of Wanghia 
 which repudiated the idea of territorial occupation of Asiatic 
 territory and sought to find sufficient protection for Ameri- 
 can interests in international law and treaties. On the 
 other, we have the policy of Perry which, while no less 
 peaceful as to ultimate purpose, was based on the assump- 
 tions that some such territorial occupation as the British 
 had accomplished at Hongkong was essential to the protec- 
 tion of American interests, and that to secure concessions 
 the Asiatic states must be intimidated. Between the two 
 pohcies we find Humphrey Marshall and Robert M. McLane 
 wavering, seeking to sustain and build up the sovereign 
 power of China to a point where it would in fact be able 
 to assume effectively the obligations of the Gushing treaty, 
 and yet proposing military and naval intervention in the 
 Taiping Rebellion for the purpose of throwing the entire 
 Chinese Empire open to the trade of all nations. It now 
 becomes our interesting duty to trace the fate of these two 
 policies in the course of the next fifteen years. What atti- 
 tude President Pierce and Secretary of State Marcy would 
 have taken in the face of a violent issue requiring a definite 
 choice between these policies it is difficult to say. It is, 
 however, quite clear that the surrender of Japan to the 
 peaceful demands of Commodore Perry in 1854 was a more 
 important factor in the determination of American policy 
 in Asia than any positive conviction enunciated by the 
 American Government. The policy of Pierce and Marcy, 
 while inclining towards that of Webster and Gushing, was 
 really opportunist. 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. S. Ex. Doc. 59 :32-l, p. 80. 
 
 2. S. Ex. Doc. 34:33-2. 
 
 3. Griffis : "Perry." p. 303. 
 
 4. The primary sources of importance for the Perry Expedition are : 
 
 the Perry Correspondence, S. Ex. Doc. 34:33-2; "Journal of the 
 Perry Expedition (1853-4)," by S. Wells Williams, Trans, of 
 
278 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Asiatic 8oc. of Japan, Vol. XXXVII, Part II, 1910 ; "Jap.an 
 and Around the World," by J. W. Spalding; "Matthew Cal- 
 braith Perry," by Wm. Elliot Griffis; "Perry's Japan," by 
 Francis L. Hawks ; and "Narrative of the Japan Expedition," 
 published as H. Ex. Doc. 97 :33-2. 
 
 5. Spalding, p. 143. 
 
 6. S. Ex. Doc. 34:33-2, pp. 43 fi. 
 
 7. Ihid., p. 57. 
 
 8. Ihid., pp. 116 ff. 
 
 9. Williams' Journal, p. vii. 
 
 10. S. Ex. Doc. 34 :33-2, p. 161. 
 
 11. "History of Japan from 1853 to 1869," Kinse Shiriaku, translated 
 
 by E. M. Satow; "Progress of Japan, 1853-71," by J. H. 
 Gubbins ; "Intercourse between the United States and Japan," 
 by Inazo Nitobe; "International Position of Japan as a Great 
 Power," by Seiji G. Hishida. 
 
 12. "Narrative of the Japan Expedition," Vol. 2, pp. 173 ff. 
 
 13. S. Ex. Doc. 34:33-2, p. 81. 
 
 14. Narrative of Jap. Exp. op. cit. 
 
 15. S. Ex. Doc. 34:33-2, pp. 12-4. 
 
 16. Ihid., p. 15. 
 
 17. Ihid., p. 109. 
 
 18. Ihid., p. 112. 
 
 19. Ihid., p. 39. 
 
 20. Ihid., pp. 66-7 ; Chas. Oscar Paullin : U. 8. Naval Institute Pro^ 
 
 ceedings, 1911, p. 269-70. 
 
 21. Ihid., pp. 80-86. 
 
 22. Ihid., p. 174. 
 
 23. "Narrative of Japan Exped." op. cit. 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 
 THE POLICY OF DR. PETER PARKER— FORMOSA 
 
 Dr. Peter Parker had arrived in China in 1834 as a 
 medical missionary under the auspices of the American 
 Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions.^ He was a 
 native of Massachusetts, had been a student at Amherst 
 College and had been graduated at Yale in 1831. He 
 studied theology at Yale Divinity School and then took a 
 course in medicine in Philadelphia. He opened the 
 Ophthalmic Hospital at Canton the year, after his arrival 
 and thus became the founder of medical missions in China. 
 The hospital won the support of hong merchants and 
 foreigners alike, and Dr. Parker, who was of amiable disposi- 
 tion, became a very popular and trusted person. He was a 
 member of the Morrison expedition to Japan, and was in 
 Washington in 1840 when the first discussions with reference 
 to the Anglo-Chinese War took place. He married a distant 
 relative of Daniel Webster's while on this visit to the United 
 States, thus forming an alliance which made his entrance 
 into government service especially easy. He acted as one of 
 the interpreters for Caleb Cushing in 1844, and the next year 
 he was appointed Chinese secretary and interpreter to the 
 newly created legation. Dr. Parker thus became the one 
 element of continuity in the diplomatic relations of the 
 United States with China during the many replacements 
 and resignations of the following ten years and he was at 
 length appointed (September, 1855) Commissioner. He was 
 the only Commissioner or Minister ever appointed to China 
 who could speak, read or write the Chinese language, and 
 with two exceptions he was the only person ever appointed 
 by way of promotion from a subordinate position in the 
 diplomatic service in China. 
 
 279 
 
280 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Dr. Parker's service, which lasted less than two years, 
 was characterized by three objects: the accomplishment of 
 the revision of the Gushing treaty; the achievement of an 
 entente cordiale with Great Britain and France for the pur- 
 suit of a cooperative policy; and the acquisition of the 
 island of Formosa for the United States. 
 
 Treaty Revision — Destruction of Barrier Forts 
 
 The time for the revision of the treaty falling legally due 
 in 1856, Dr. Parker was supplied with full powers to conduct 
 the negotiations and was instructed to seek to obtain three 
 concessions: (1) residence for a diplomatic officer at Peking; 
 (2) unlimited extension of trade; (3) the removal of every 
 restriction to personal liberty.^ So much impressed was the 
 American Government, in the face of the steady opposition 
 of the Chinese to all reform and even to full compliance 
 with the treaties, with the necessity of cooperation with 
 the other treaty powers, that Dr. Parker was authorized 
 to proceed to his post by way of London and Paris and to 
 confer with Lord Clarendon and with the French Ministry 
 of Foreign Affairs with a view to the adoption of a common 
 policy in China. He was, however, entirely without author- 
 ity to do more than have conversations. The commis- 
 sioner's enthusiasm for common action may have been a 
 little misleading to the British and the French, encouraging 
 them to expect in the way of cooperation, very much more 
 than the Government of the United States was prepared to 
 give. 
 
 Of an interview with Lord Clarendon, October 26, 1855,^ 
 Dr. Parker reported : 
 
 "I remarked that it being the desire of the United States Govern- 
 ment that the same concurrent policy and action which hitherto had 
 so happily characterized the three powers in China should continue, I 
 was solicitous to see his lordship on the subject, . . ." 
 
 In the conclusion of the interview Clarendon remarked ; 
 "I shall have great pleasure, on the opening of Parliament 
 
THE POLICY OF DR. PETER PARKER— FORMOSA 281 
 
 to speak of the triple alliance." Parker himself was 
 thoroughly in favor of such a formal arrangement. 
 
 In Paris the American commissioner had a similar inter- 
 view at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then set out for 
 China where he arrived in December, 1855. He was deter- 
 mined to take "high ground" in securing the new treaty, but 
 Commissioner Yeh continued his insolent, unbending atti- 
 tude and even refused to hold an interview with Parker. 
 The American commissioner demanded and threatened, but 
 in vain. To Sir John Bowring and to the French represen- 
 tative Parker proposed joint energetic action but his pro- 
 gram and his methods did not commend themselves to 
 either of these gentlemen.* Parker had apparently not 
 made a very good impression in either London or Paris. 
 The British, at least, had determined to proceed slowly and 
 run no risk of a second rebuff such as had been administered 
 to Bowring and McLane at the mouth of the Pei-ho in 1854. 
 
 Having failed to see the Viceroy at Canton Parker pro- 
 ceeded to Foochow where he was able to hold an interview 
 with the Governor General, to whom he entrusted for deliv- 
 ery at Peking the letter from the President to the Emperor 
 which contained the request for treaty revision. Some 
 weeks later this letter was returned to the commissioner, 
 the seals broken and with other marks of careless handling 
 and of disrespect. Parker was directed to present the letter 
 to Viceroy Yeh for transmission to Peking. The return of- 
 the letter Parker regarded as a national insult and he would 
 have proceeded to the mouth of the Pei-ho in a war-vessel 
 to demand explanations as well as to open treaty negotia- 
 tions had not an accident to the San Jacinto deprived him 
 of a means of conveyance. 
 
 In the latter part of October Admiral Seymour (British) 
 
 *Cordier enumerated the points in Dr. Parker's program of revision as: (1) 
 residence of tlie Frencli, Britisli and American ministers at Peking, and the 
 residence of Chinese ministers at Paris, London and Washington ; (2) unlimited 
 extension of trade; (3) universal liberty of opinion for the Chinese; (4) reform 
 of the Chinese courts of justice. These were, presumably, points which Dr. 
 Parker discussed with Count Waleski, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, when 
 in Paris in the fall of 1855. They seem to have been discussed also with Sir 
 John Bowring. The stipulations for the reform of the Chinese courts of jus- 
 tice, and for the residence of Chinese ministers in Paris, London and Washing- 
 ton, which were ridiculed alike by contemporaries and historians, were quite 
 unauthorized, and in fact were never presented to the Government of China.* 
 
282 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 had breached the walls of Canton as a result of the unwill- 
 ingness of Yeh to make the required amends for an alleged 
 insult to the British flag in the 'Arrow Affair,' and for a few 
 hours had occupied the Viceroy's yamen. During the early 
 part of November a state of intermittent warfare was main- 
 tained. At the request of Yeh, who declared that he could 
 no longer protect the foreigners of neutral nations, the 
 Americans decided to withdraw from Canton. As Com- 
 mander Foote of the American Navy was on his way up to 
 Canton on the 15th of November to escort the Americans 
 down the river, he was fired on by the Barrier Forts which, 
 upon the withdrawal of the British, had been reoccupied by 
 the Chinese. The next day Commodore James Armstrong, 
 commanding officer of the American naval forces on the 
 China station, ordered the destruction of the Barrier Forts, 
 and within the next two days this was accomplished. This 
 action was hailed with delight, not only by the Americans 
 but by the English as well, for it seemed to indicate that at 
 last the Government of the United States would be com- 
 pelled to adopt towards China a more energetic policy. Yeh 
 did not fail to see the danger of the situation, and on the 
 5th of December rendered a complete apology.^ 
 
 Greatly stirred by these events as well as stung by the 
 rebuffs of the Chinese authorities, and the recollections of 
 being called for more than twenty years a ''foreign devil," 
 Dr. Parker addressed to Marcy a comprehensive dispatch 
 (December 12, 1856) in which he offered the most extensive 
 program yet proposed for the settlement of the affairs of 
 the treaty powers in China. He suggested : 
 
 "Were the three representatives of England, France and America, 
 on presenting themselves at the Pei-ho, in case of their not being 
 welcomed to Peking, to say, the French flag will be hoisted in Corea, 
 the English again at Chusan, and the United States in Formosa, and 
 there remain till satisfaction for the past and a right understanding 
 for the future are granted ; but, being granted, these possessions shall 
 instantly be restored, negotiation would no longer be obstructed, and 
 the most advantageous and desirable results to all concerned secured." 
 
 He admitted that such a novel program should be under- 
 taken only as a 'last resort.' ^ 
 
THE POLICY OF DR. PETER PARKER— FORMOSA 283 
 
 The events as well as the recommendations of Dr. Parker 
 for the occupation of Chinese territory were very disquiet- 
 ing to President Pierce and Secretary of State Marcy. 
 There had been reported in the London papers another inci- 
 dent in connection with the occupation of Canton which 
 was equally disturbing. It was stated that the American 
 Consul at Hongkong, James Keenan, had not only been 
 present with the attacking British forces at Canton, but 
 that he had actually carried the American flag over the wall 
 into the city. No mention of this event had been made in 
 the official reports to the Department of State. The Presi- 
 dent, while withholding severe censure from Commodore 
 Armstrong, did regard the sending of the boat the San 
 Jacinto to make soundings near the forts at a time of so 
 much disturbance as not a 'discreet act.' "From a cursory 
 reading of the documents which have been received," wrote 
 Marcy to Parker,'^ 
 
 "I think he is inclined to regret that there had not been more 
 caution on the part of our naval force in the beginning, and more 
 forbearance in the subsequent steps. The British Government evi- 
 dently has objects beyond those contemplated by the United States, 
 and we ought not to be drawn along with it, however anxious it may 
 be for our cooperation. The President sincerely hopes that you, as 
 well as our naval commander, will be able to do all that is required 
 for the defense of American citizens and the protection of their 
 property, without being included in the British quarrel, or producing 
 any serious disturbance in our amicable relations with China." 
 
 As for the indiscretion of Consul Keenan, provided the 
 reports in the London papers were correct, Dr. Parker was 
 instructed to transmit to the consul a letter removing him 
 from office. Keenan denied Parker's authority and was 
 never removed. 
 
 Those were the closing days of the Pierce administration 
 and the government was disinclined to mark out a policy 
 in China for the succeeding administration. Dr. Parker was 
 left without further specific instructions as to treaty revi- 
 sion, and the rumor that he was to be superseded had 
 already reached him. His impatient efforts "to place in the 
 crown of the present administration the laurel of establish- 
 
284 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 ing the United States Legation at Peking and the material 
 extension" of American commerce with China" had come to 
 nothing except the near approach to the gravest of entangle- 
 ments in the Far East. Dr. Parker, however, found much to 
 occupy his attention in the effort to establish an American 
 protectorate over Formosa. 
 
 An American Protectorate for Formosa 
 
 There were three possible sources from which coal for 
 the proposed trans-Pacific steamship line might be secured : 
 Japan, the mainland of China, or Formosa. Of these three 
 Formosa had, in point of time, been the first to draw the 
 attention of the American authorities in China. 
 
 In 1847 officers of both the British and the American 
 navy made surveys of the coal resources of Formosa. Some 
 samples of the coal were sent to the Navy Department for 
 analysis, and at about the same time the Peninsula and 
 Oriental Steamship Company contracted with residents of 
 Formosa for 7000 tons of coal at $7 a ton. Only about 300 
 tons were ever delivered. The Chinese Government became 
 alarmed at the interest the foreigners were taking- in the 
 island and took possession of the mines, placing obstructions 
 in the way of exporting coal to Hongkong. 
 
 In July, 1849, the U. S. brig Dolphin (Captain Ogden) 
 made an expedition to Kilung, Formosa, for further explora- 
 tions. Captain Ogden was strongly dissuaded by the magis- 
 trate from visiting the mines, and he contented himself with 
 securing some samples for analysis. The Chinese Reposi- 
 tory, July, 1849, in a report of this expedition stated that 
 the coal seemed to be better than that which was brought 
 out from Liverpool. The editor remarked : 
 
 "The existence of coal at this accessible point and the desirable- 
 ness of depending less upon supplies brought from Europe, will soon 
 induce the foreign authorities to stir in the matter." 
 
 Commodore Perry's opinion on the desirability of an 
 American protectorate over Formosa has already been 
 stated. 
 
THE POLICY OF DR. PETER PARKER— FORMOSA 285 
 
 There was in Canton at that time an old friend of 
 Parker's, Gideon Nye, Jr., whose firm had recently failed for 
 a very large sum of money. Nye was now looking about for 
 ways to recoup his fortunes. Formosa had been forced upon 
 Mr. Nye's attention a few years before when the American 
 ship Kelpie, carrying his brother, had sailed homeward from 
 Canton only to be wrecked off the rocky coast of Formosa, 
 and there had been no survivors. For years the rumor per- 
 sisted in Canton and Hongkong that the survivors had been 
 cast ashore on Formosa, and then captured and held in slav- 
 ery by some savage Formosan tribe. Indeed, one of the 
 objects of the visit of the Dolphin to Formosa in 1849 had 
 been to search for the survivors of the Kelpie. 
 
 The visit of Commodore Perry to the island in 1854 had 
 stimulated anew the interest of the Americans and a com- 
 mercial company consisting of an American firm, Robinet 
 (a Peruvian naval ofiicer who had become an American 
 citizen in a somewhat informal way) and Gideon Nye, had 
 been formed to exploit the trade from a point called Ape's 
 Hill. Robinet and Nye made explorations and secured a 
 monopoly of the camphor trade, and the privilege of an 
 establishment at Takow, in return for which the traders had 
 agreed to pay $100 tonnage duties on each ship and to 
 protect Takow from pirates. Improvements had been made 
 to the extent of $45,000, and the American flag had been 
 raised at the entrance to the harbor. More recently the 
 natives had become dissatisfied and the traders had been 
 obliged to "threaten them with forcible measures if they 
 did not act faithfully." As a result of these measures the 
 American company had become "pretty much independent 
 of the authorities." 
 
 Nye and Robinet, realizing that it might be difficult to 
 secure the occupation of the island by American naval 
 forces, and that there were few precedents for what they 
 desired, rather timidly suggested that they were perfectly 
 willing, provided they were assured of the approval and 
 protection of the American Government, to set up an inde- 
 pendent government in Formosa.^ 
 
286 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Parker was very hospitable to the idea. Perhaps he was 
 the more eager because he already knew that the privilege 
 of revising the treaty was not to be for him, and that his 
 days in China were already numbered. Here was the oppor- 
 tunity for one grand stroke. On February 12, 1857, he wrote 
 to the State Department, enclosing Nye's proposition : 
 
 "The subject of Formosa is becoming one of great interest to a 
 number of our enterprising fellow-citizens, and deserves more con- 
 sideration from the great commercial nations of the West than it has 
 yet received; and it is much to be hoped that the Government of the 
 United States may not shrink from the action which the interests of 
 humanity, civilization, navigation and commerce impose upon it in 
 relation to Tai-Wan, particularly the southeastern portion of it, at 
 present inhabited by savages, to whose depraved cruelties we have 
 every reason to believe many Europeans, and among them our own 
 friends and countrymen, have fallen victims." 
 
 Parker drew attention to his dispatch of December 12, 
 for which there had not yet been time for an answer, and 
 solicited the earnest consideration of the President. The 
 more Parker meditated upon the subject of Formosa, the 
 more his imagination kindled. Ten days after sending the 
 dispatch of February 12, becoming impatient lest delay 
 might be fatal to the destinies of the United States in 
 Formosa, Parker hastily summoned Commodore Armstrong 
 from Hongkong to Macao for a conference on ''this subject of 
 great delicacy, and it may be of vast importance to the 
 United States in particular and to the western nations 
 generally." Parker wrote that he had reasons for feeling that 
 if anything was to be done, it must be done quickly. The 
 commodore came to Macao with all speed. He had a 
 kindred spirit in the matter but had been rendered, perhaps, 
 a little more cautious by the fact that no official approval 
 for having destroyed the Barrier Forts three months before 
 had as yet been received. What proposition Parker brought 
 forward at the conference is not stated, but its nature may 
 be inferred from the memoranda of the conference.^ 
 
 After having read that portion of Parker's dispatch of 
 December 12 which referred to Formosa, Armstrong agreed 
 with Parker on the following points: (1) the measure would 
 
THE POLICY OF DR. PETER PARKER— FORMOSA 287 
 
 be justified by the acknowledged principles of international 
 law; (2) the claims and grievances then pending with the 
 Chinese Government amply justified reprisals; (3) Formosa 
 was a most desirable island and would be particularly valu- 
 able to the United States; (4) but that its immediate occu- 
 pation was impracticable with the present naval force, in 
 view of the possibility that the Chinese Government might 
 oppose it. It was admitted "that in any other country than 
 China the measure would be regarded as a virtual dissolu- 
 tion of avowed amicable relations." The commodore agreed, 
 however, that Parker had done his duty, and if the United 
 States failed to acquire the island, the fault would not be 
 upon the shoulders of the commissioner. 
 
 Parker followed his already numerous dispatches on 
 Formosa with another marked 'confidential' (March 10, 
 1857) in which even more impatiently he urged action. He 
 had by then forgotten entirely that part of his original 
 proposal which concerned the immediate restoration of the 
 island to China the moment satisfaction might be obtained. 
 Now he wrote : ^^ 
 
 "In event of the establishment of a line of steamers between 
 California, Japan and China, this source of supply of coal will be 
 most advantageous. That the islands may not long remain a portion 
 of the empire is possible; and in the event of its being severed from 
 the empire politically, as it is geographically, that the United States 
 should possess it is obvious, particularly as respects the great prin- 
 ciple of the balance of power.'' 
 
 And then the commissioner surrendered to his imagina- 
 tion completely. 
 
 "Great Britain has her St. Helena in the Atlantic, her Gibraltar 
 and Malta in the Mediterranean, her Aden in the Red Sea, Mauritius, 
 Ceylon, Penang and Singapore in the Indian Ocean, and Hongkong 
 in the China Sea. If the United States is so disposed and can 
 arrange for the possession of Formosa, England certainly cannot 
 object." 
 
 As to just cause for occupying the island, Parker, smart- 
 ing under twenty-five years experience of being called a 
 "foreign devil/' found ample grounds. 
 
288 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 "If there ever was a State whicli has laid herself open to just 
 reprisals it is China, 'which has refused to fulfill a perfect obligation 
 which she has contracted' with the United States, 'and does not 
 permit them to enjoy rights which they claim' under the solemn 
 stipulations of treaty; and in event of her persisting in this course, 
 it seems clear that, by the acknowledged principles of international 
 law, the United States have the right, if they have the inclination, to 
 take Formosa by way of reprisal 'until a satisfactory reparation 
 should be made for injuries they have sustained.' See Wheaton's 
 ^International Law,' p. 362." 
 
 Much reading of international law since the eye-doctor 
 became the diplomat had made Dr. Parker a little mad. He 
 assured the Secretary of State that he had made up his mind 
 to exercise his 'full powers' to revise the treaty and adjust 
 all claims and to refer the matter to Washington for ap- 
 proval or disavowal, but intimated that he had been un- 
 able to carry Commodore Armstrong with the logic of the 
 case. 
 
 The weeks sped by, and yet the commissioner might 
 expect no answer to even his first dispatch on Formosa for 
 at least another couple of months. Meanwhile the British 
 Admiral at Hongkong applied to Robinet (March 21) for 
 information about Formosa, and during the conversation 
 remarked, ''This island ought not to be allowed to exist in 
 the hands of such a people, which cannot control even the 
 cannibals of the eastern part, who murder our wrecked sea- 
 men." Admiral Seymour then asked Robinet if he had any 
 objection to permitting an English naval officer to come to 
 his establishment to live a while and observe conditions. 
 Robinet asked for time to consider the matter and quickly 
 notified Dr. Parker.^ ^ 
 
 The American commissioner immediately addressed Sir 
 John Bowring a solemn protest on behalf of the United 
 States Government against England's taking possession of 
 Formosa.^" 
 
 "In event of the Island of Formosa being severed politically from 
 the Empire of China," declared the commissioner, "I trust to be 
 able to substantiate a priority of claim to it on the part of the United 
 States; first by contracts already entered into with the imperial 
 authorities of the island by citizens of the United States; and 
 secondly by their actual settlement upon it with the consent of the 
 
THE POLICY OF DR. PETER PARKER— FORMOSA 289 
 
 Chinese, over which the United States flag has been hoisted for 
 more than a year. . . . 
 
 "I embrace this opportunity ... to acquaint your Excellency that 
 it is my full conviction that the Government of the United States 
 is disposed to adopt the same policy in China as is represented by 
 your Excellency to be that of Great Britain" (i.e., not to establish 
 any exclusive rights or privileges). 
 
 Sir John Bowring replied immediately, disavowing any 
 designs on Formosa and somewhat sharply making Parker 
 a 'distinct' proposition for a more pressing task — the occu- 
 pation by the combined American, French and English 
 forces of the city of Canton. Parker was quite unable to 
 accept such a 'distinct proposition' because he had no more 
 authority for it than he had for the then existing American 
 flag in Formosa. Probably Bowring knew this when he 
 made the proposal. Parker, so intent on his project in the 
 island, quite failed to catch the twinkle in Sir John's eye 
 when he added to his disavowal: 
 
 "I hear for the first time, officially, that the United States flag has 
 been hoisted for more than a year in that island. ... I can assure 
 your excellency T see without jealousy or annoyance the extension of 
 American commerce in these regions, and will cordially support your 
 excellency in the attempt to give to it the strength and security of 
 legality." 
 
 Parker, apparently wholly lacking a sense of humor, 
 hastened to show the letter to Commodore Armstrong, and 
 expressed great satisfaction that thus the English minister 
 was on record in the matter. Meanwhile the commodore 
 had been reconsidering his decisions. There were still two 
 months before instructions could be received from Washing- 
 ton. Armstrong knew that he was unable to occupy the 
 island without express orders, but he was able to think of a 
 way out of the dilemma. He proposed to Parker that he 
 was willing to detach an officer from the squadron to go to 
 Formosa and make another investigation for shipwrecked 
 sailors "with instructions to keep his headquarters and flag 
 at the premises of our countrymen, provided such an ar- 
 rangement meets with your approval and sanction." The 
 approval and sanction were not lacking and Parker 
 replied: ^^ 
 
290 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 "I conceive that the settlement of our countrymen at Takow will 
 afford the best facilities for making the investigation; and the fact 
 of this officer being there holding his headquarters and flag may have 
 an important bearing on the future." 
 
 Disavowal by the American Government 
 
 To the later and more impetuous proposals that he be 
 given authority to complete the acquisition of Formosa, Dr. 
 Parker never even received an answer from the Secretary of 
 State, but to his original proposal that the three powers join 
 in taking temporary possession of Korea, Chusan and For- 
 mosa, he did receive the most unmistakable reply. In the 
 closing days of the Pierce administration. Secretary of State 
 Marcy wrote to Dr. Parker that the subject had akeady 
 been submitted to the President by the French Minister and 
 that the President did not beheve 
 
 "that our relations with China warrant the last resort' you speak of, 
 and if they did, the military and naval forces of the United StatP5 
 could only be used by the authority of Congress. The 'last resort' 
 means war, and the executive branch of this government is not the 
 war-making power. . . . For the protection and security of Americans 
 in China and for the protection of their property, it may be expedient 
 to increase our naval forces on the China station, but the President 
 will not do it for aggressive purposes." 
 
 In less than a week the Buchanan administration came 
 into office, William B. Reed was appointed Minister to 
 China, and Dr. Parker immediately dropped all preparations 
 for his expedition to Formosa. The instructions to Minister 
 Reed are most explicit, in reply to all of Dr. Parker's pro- 
 posals and to the ambitions of any Americans in China to 
 acquire territory at the expense of the Empire.^* 
 
 "This country, you will constantly bear in mind, is not at vpar with 
 the Government of China, nor does it seek to enter into that empire 
 for any other purpose than those of lawful commerce, and for the 
 protection of the lives and property of its citizens. The whole nature 
 and policy of our government must necessarily confine our action 
 within these limits, and deprive us of all motives either for territorial 
 aggrandizement or the acquisition of political power in that distant 
 region. . . . You will not fail to let it be known to the Chinese 
 authorities that we are no party to the existing hostilities, and have 
 no intention to interfere in their political concerns, or to gain a foot- 
 
THE POLICY OF DR. PETER PARKER— FORMOSA 291 
 
 hold in their country. We go there to engage in trade, but under 
 suitable guarantees for its protection. The extension of our com- 
 mercial intercourse must be the work of individual enterprise, and 
 to this element of our national character we may safely leave it." 
 
 One may close this chapter of American history with a 
 smile, and yet one is to remember it as an illustration of the 
 fact that, contrary to popular impression, no bacillus has 
 ever been introduced into the blood of Americans which 
 renders them immune to imperialistic ambitions when 
 others have the malady and when commercial conditions 
 favorable for the infection are present. 
 
 However, with the issuance of the instructions to Min- 
 ister Reed in 1857, the policy which had been proposed by 
 Commodore Perry came definitely to an end, never to appear 
 again until the day more than forty years later when Presi- 
 dent McKinley cabled to the American Commissioners at 
 Paris to demand the cession of the Philippines to the 
 United States. 
 
 Dr. Parker's policy had not been complicated or subtle, 
 and requires no analysis. He belonged to the Perry school 
 of Asiatic policy. 
 
 BIBLIOGEAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. Stevens and Marwick : "Life and Letters of Peter Parker." 
 
 2. Parker Corres. (published with the McLane Corres. in 2 vols.), 
 
 S. Ex. Doc. 22 :35-2, pp. 610 ff. 
 
 3. Ihid., p. 619. 
 
 4. Cordier: "L'Expedition de Chine," p. 10; Morse, Vol. 1, pp. 
 
 416-7. 
 
 5. Although the incident is fully reported in the Parker Corres., 
 
 the simplest account, fairly complete, is in Morse, Vol. 1, pp. 
 > 432-3. 
 
 6. Parker Corres., p. 1083. 
 
 7. S. Ex. Doc. 30 :36-l, p. 4. 
 
 8. Parker Corres., pp. 1184, 1211-5. 
 
 9. Ihid., p. 1211-18. 
 
 10. Ihid., p. 1208. 
 
 11. Ihid., p. 1246. 
 
 12. Ihid., pp. 1247-9. 
 
 13. Ihid., p. 1250. 
 
 14. S. Ex. Doc. 30 :36-l, p. 8. 
 
CHAPTER XVI 
 
 THE BUCHANAN ADMINISTKATION AND THE FAE EAST 
 
 Increase of American Prestige under Pierce 
 
 During the Pierce administration American prestige in 
 Asia had risen rapidly to a point of determining influence. 
 Perhaps never again in the nineteenth century did the 
 United States possess such actual and potential influence 
 as in 1855 and 1856. Not only had the Americans opened 
 Japan, an accomplishment which other nations had come to 
 regard as impossible without hostilities, but the American 
 representatives in China had the most important achieve- 
 ments to their credit. The British and the French had been 
 led to relinquish their exclusive pretensions at Shanghai, the 
 Inspectorate of Maritime Customs under foreign direction 
 had been set up, and the possibility of intervention in favor 
 of the Taiping rebels had been averted. All this was fully 
 in accord with the American policy to strengthen and sup- 
 port the Imperial Government of China, 
 
 Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that for these accom- 
 plishments the Pierce administration could claim little or no 
 credit. The Japan expedition had been planned, organized 
 and set out under Fillmore. The only changes in the orig- 
 inal plans had been the reduction in the size of the fleet to 
 be placed under the command of Perry. Neither Pierce nor 
 Marcy made any positive or constructive contribution to 
 the task of opening the ports of Japan. Marshall, who was 
 easily the outstanding figure among the American com- 
 missioners, had been an appointee of Fillmore and had been 
 recalled by Pierce. McLane, while in general accepting and 
 carrying out the policy of Marshall, had made one import- 
 ant personal contribution — the idea of the Inspectorate of 
 
 292 
 
BUCHANAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE FAR EAST 293 
 
 Maritime Customs— but for this the Pierce administration 
 could claim no credit. The step was taken by McLane unin- 
 structed from Washington. Indeed, the American position 
 in Asia had been magnified not at all as a result of any 
 instructions issued from the Department of State. In part 
 it had arisen out of the peculiarities of the European diplo- 
 matic and military situation and the Crimean War. As a 
 powerful and successful neutral in Asia the United States 
 not only assumed but was assigned a position of great 
 influence. 
 
 With the return of peace to Europe Great Britain set 
 about not merely to regain the place of preeminence which 
 had been lost in Far Eastern affairs, but also to make an- 
 other advance. These efforts coincided with the entrance 
 of the Buchanan administration into the American Govern- 
 ment. In the next four years we shall witness the steady 
 retirement of American influence in Asia. The causes were 
 not simple. Domestic problems in the United States were 
 pressing closely upon the American people and eclipsing the 
 former interest in the Orient. Great Britain was striving to 
 regain her former relative place in China. And of at least 
 equal importance was the fact that the American people 
 and the administration did not prize or appreciate the vic- 
 tories which had been won in the East. Little effort was 
 made to sustain what had already been accomplished, and 
 the ignorance, timidity, and diplomatic ineptitude of Bu- 
 chanan and Cass turned what little effort was made to the 
 disadvantage of the United States. To this sweeping state- 
 ment one exception must be made. The Townsend Harris 
 commercial treaty with Japan in 1858 became easily the 
 most brilliant diplomatic achievement of the United States 
 in Asia for the entire century, a feat indeed which has never 
 since been equalled, but one has to remember that Harris 
 had been instructed and sent to Japan under the preceding 
 administration, and no credit whatever for his success 
 belongs to either Buchanan or to Cass, nor in fact to any one 
 save Harris alone. 
 
 The study of the Buchanan-Cass policy in Asia becomes 
 
294 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 a survey of the decay of American influence. The two ques- 
 tions of pohcy of the utmost importance were bequeathed to 
 the administration by Pierce and Marcy : the decision as to 
 whether the United States should enter an aUiance with 
 Great Britain and France for the settlement of the Far 
 Eastern question ; and the revision of the treaty. Without 
 attempting to point a moral or to be wiser than those whose 
 duty it was to solve these puzzles, let us subject these prop- 
 ositions to close analysis. 
 
 Ebbing Distrust of Great Britain 
 
 The history of the ebbing distrust of Great Britain and 
 the growing desire for the- adoption of a cooperative policy 
 in China presents some interesting details. A few incidents 
 selected from the period immediately after the ratification 
 of the Treaty of Wanghia will illustrate the strength of the 
 existing American sentiment against England. 
 
 Shortly after the ratifications of the Treaty of Wanghia 
 were exchanged (December 31, 1845) by Commodore James 
 Biddle and Kiying, the latter sent a friend to confer with 
 the American representative about the difficulties which 
 then existed between Kiying and Sir John Francis Davis. 
 The English plenipotentiary had demanded of the Chinese 
 viceroy a pledge that when the English should restore the 
 island of Chusan and Kuling-fu, then held as security for 
 the payment of the indemnity, the Chinese should give 
 pledge that these islands should never be ceded to any other 
 foreign nation. Biddle advised Kiying to resist such a 
 demand, and seized the opportunity to point out to Kiying 
 how much better off China would be if only she would admit 
 resident ministers to Peking. The commodore also pressed 
 upon the high commissioner the wisdom of having China 
 take up the study of the modern arts of war, in order that in 
 the future she might be able to defend herself in the con- 
 flicts which Biddle plainly foresaw. 
 
 A month later Biddle wrote to Buchanan : "The refusal 
 (of the English) to withdraw these troops from Chusan is a 
 
BUCHANAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE FAR EAST 295 
 
 clear violation of the Treaty of Nanking" (February 21, 
 1846). 1 
 
 At this interview with Commodore Biddle the other chief 
 point of irritation between the English and the Chinese was 
 discussed — the question of the right, under the British 
 treaty, of entrance into Canton, The British demanded that 
 the gates of the city be opened to foreigners; the Chinese 
 absolutely refused to yield to the demand. They based their 
 refusal on both the hostile temper of the Canton gentry and 
 populace and on the Chinese text of the treaty, which it had 
 been agreed was to be equally authoritative with the Eng- 
 lish text. They explained that in the Chinese text the word 
 used with reference to the opening of the city was not the 
 Chinese word for 'walled city' but the word which should be 
 translated 'port' or 'mart.' The Americans acquiesced in 
 this explanation, and although the American consul at 
 Canton made it the subject of a formal request, he did not 
 press the matter.* Commodore Biddle advised Kiying's 
 emissary that he considered that they were perfectly right 
 in refusing to yield to Great Britain f in the matter.^ 
 
 Four months after his arrival in China Commissioner 
 Everett reported a conversation between Dr. Parker, secre- 
 tary of the Legation, and a 'high mandarin.' ^ The latter, 
 referring to the currently reported proposal of the English 
 to open up relations with China through Assam, had re- 
 marked that the British seemed determined to get posses- 
 
 * The Chinese Repository, which was edited by Rev. B. C. Bridgman and S. 
 Wells Williams, two of the best Chinese scholars among the foreigners, stated 
 in a review of this question of entry into Canton (May, 1849, p. 276-9) : "It is 
 so local (this feeling about foreigners entering Canton) that the Chinese com- 
 missioners at Nanking, having never been at Canton, seem not to have given 
 it a thought, — at least they did not agree in plain terms that the foreigners 
 should enter its gates, or those of any other of the five ports, and nothing in 
 the treaty, nor in those of the Bogue, Wanghai, or.Whampoa, can be construed 
 as promising it even by implication. The idea which a native would derive 
 from reading these four treaties is that foreigners have permission to reside at 
 the five ports, in the places where trade is carried on, the term kiang kan, or 
 river's mouth, referring t© the location on shore where traders collect from 
 their ships to barter and exchange their goods. Such places are not neces- 
 sarily walled in, nor are they called ching, i.e., citadels or walled cities, and 
 resort to the former has no reference in, — certainly does not include ingress into 
 . — the latter. The phrase is varied in the Treaty of Whampoa to kan shi-fan 
 U fang, i.e., seaport, market places, so as to restrict the residence of French 
 citizens where trade is carried on." 
 
 t The question of entry into Canton never became an issue between the 
 Americans and the Chinese, notwithstanding the fact that it actually precipi- 
 tated hostilities between the Chinese and the English. For a review of the 
 long negotiations over the subject see Morse.^ 
 
296 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 sion of China — "not perhaps immediately but at some future 
 time." Everett himself was so much impressed with the 
 truth of this view that a month later he wrote to 
 Buchanan: ^ 
 
 "The conviction that the British Government is determined to 
 get possession of their country, which, as I mentioned in a late dis- 
 patch, was expressed to a member of this legation by one of the 
 leading mandarins at Canton some weeks ago, has been freely avowed, 
 on former occasions, to Commodore Biddle. ... It is probably uni- 
 versal among the educated and well informed men of the empire." 
 
 Everett then drew on his previous experience as a diplo- 
 mat in the courts of continental Europe, and proposed that 
 the United States take the lead in the formation of a com- 
 bination of Russia, France and the United States fo get 
 England to agree to abstain from aggressions in China. No 
 comment on this plan was forthcoming from Washington, 
 and Everett died a few months later (June 28, 1847). 
 
 Dr. Peter Parker, who became Charge upon the death 
 of Everett was so convinced of the hostile intentions of 
 England in the controversy over the opening of the gates of 
 the city of Canton that (September 25, 1847) he addressed 
 a confidential dispatch to Buchanan, warning him of the 
 'impending crisis.' He stated that it was common remark 
 among the American merchants that in a little while they 
 would be paying duties through an English customs house 
 at Canton. Parker thought it likely that within another 
 twelve or fifteen months the British would place a minister 
 in Peking, and demand redress for many grievances. He 
 strongly urged upon the American Government the neces- 
 sity of taking action at once to place an American minister 
 in Peking 'before the dismemberment of the empire is com- 
 menced.' 
 
 The new commissioner, John W. Davis, who arrived in 
 August 1848, did not share at all the suspicions of his pre- 
 decessors as to the intentions of England and informed the 
 State Department that the English did not seem disposed 
 to make any trouble. The following March he reported that 
 gome of the Americans in Canton have been urging that the 
 
BUCHANAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE FAR EAST 297 
 
 United States join with Great Britain the following month 
 in forcing the gates of the city.*^ A year later he sent a dis- 
 patch which marked the rise, by the side of the old suspi- 
 cions, of a new sentiment of cooperation between the English 
 and the Americans. He wrote: "^ 
 
 "The English Government at Hongkong has dispatched a war 
 steamer to the mouth of the Pei-ho with a communication from the 
 court at London to that of this country, evidently with an intention, 
 if possible, to open up a direct intercourse with His Imperial Majesty. 
 Had there been a suitable American vessel of war on this station, I 
 should have taken the responsibility of suggesting to the Commander 
 a similar project on our part, satisfied (as I stated in a former dis- 
 patch) that until our intercourse is directly with the Court of this 
 country, we must always labor under great embarrassments in all 
 diplomatic relations and correspondence." 
 
 A few weeks later Davis returned to the United States, 
 and Dr. Parker again became Charge. The following year 
 Dr. Parker sent a confidential dispatch to Daniel Webster, 
 who had become for the second time Secretary of State, in 
 which he reviewed at length the political situation both as 
 regards England and China, and stated : ^ ''To prevent the 
 necessity of any one of these powers adopting coercive 
 measures, it is proposed that joint pacific steps be taken by 
 all." Parker then outlined a plan for the powers to proceed 
 simultaneously to Peking, and jointly to insist upon placing 
 representatives at the capital with access to the Imperial 
 Court — substantially the plan which was actually adopted 
 in 1858, He reported that Dr. John Bowring, then British 
 consul at Canton, as well as the French and Spanish repre- 
 sentatives, were interested in the plan. Bowring is reported 
 by Parker to have said that if England acted it would prob- 
 ably be a hostile action, but if the Western powers acted 
 conjointly the action might be peaceful. The drift of pub- 
 lic sentiment in China may thus be clearly marked. 
 Whereas, in 1847, the American commissioner proposed a 
 plan to block England in any aggressions she might be con- 
 sidering, the new plan proposed to include England in a 
 common program for the purpose of moderating her action. 
 The new policy was very sound. 
 
298 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Proposals for an Alliance with Great Britain 
 AND France 
 
 The sticking-point for the Americans in the matter of 
 cooperation with the British or any other power in Asia, 
 then and always, was whether the combined power thus 
 obtained from cooperation would be turned at some future 
 time to the disadvantage of legitimate American interests. 
 In 1847 Great Britain had made no declaration of policy 
 either directly or obliquely which was to the Americans in 
 any way reassuring. Within the next five years the situa- 
 tion had materially changed. The British had at Shanghai 
 conceded every point for which the Americans had con- 
 tended, and the British Government through its representa- 
 tives in Washington had made direct overtures, accompanied 
 by a declaration of policy, for American cooperation. Great 
 Britain assured the United States that while it sought the 
 complete opening of China to trade, it would ask for no 
 exclusive advantages for itself. The reason for these over- 
 tures is obvious and was well expressed by a great British 
 statesman. In the great debate in the House of Commons 
 February, 1857, on the "Arrow affair" and upon the char- 
 acter of British policy in China, as a result of which Parlia- 
 ment was dissolved and Palmerston went to the country for 
 an approval of his policies, Disraeli remarked : ^ 
 
 "Fifty years ago Lord Hastings offered to conquer China with 
 20,000 men. So great a captain as the Marquess of Hastings might 
 have succeeded ; but since the time when our Clives and Hastings 
 founded our Indian Empire the position of affairs in the East has 
 greatly changed. Great Powers have been brought into contact with 
 us in the East. We have the Russian Empire and the American 
 Republic there, and a system of political compromise has developed 
 itself like the balance of power in Europe; and, if you are not cautious 
 and careful in your conduct now in dealing with China, you will 
 find that you are likely not to extend commerce, but to excite the 
 jealousy of powerful states, and to involve yourselves in hostilities 
 with nations not inferior to yourselves." 
 
 That Disraeli had not misread the trend of events, and 
 that he had not been ill advised in thus placing in associa- 
 
BUCHANAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE FAR EAST 299 
 
 tion the two names of Russia and America in Far Eastern 
 policy is shown by the fact that in the revision of the 
 treaties of 1858 the American and the Russian ministers 
 sustained to each other relations which were even more 
 intimate than those subsisting between Lord Elgin and 
 Baron Gros, although France and England were actually 
 allied in China. As early as 1851 the American officials in 
 China had been directed by the State Department to extend 
 such assistance as was possible to Russian subjects in China 
 and the Sandwich Islands whenever it might be necessary.^ ^ 
 Russia was studiously cultivating American friendship. 
 
 Great Britain could not profitably entertain the hostility 
 of too many Powers, and it was plain that she was in the 
 way to acquire the active opposition of the United States to 
 whatever she might attempt in China, at the time of the 
 revision of the treaties when she needed cooperation. On 
 the other hand it was equally evident to the Government of 
 the United States that cooperation rather than irritating 
 conflicts with Great Britain were desirable in the face of the 
 stolid opposition of China to all friendly advance from the 
 American representatives. 
 
 Early in 1854, Commissioner McLane noted a disposition 
 on the part of Sir John Bowring to seek the heartiest coop- 
 eration with the United States in the revision of the treaties. 
 Bowring did not possess the confidence of the American 
 community in China, and McLane was cautioned by Marcy, 
 May 8, 1854, not to rely too much upon the judgment of his 
 British colleague.^ ^ McLane was, however, instructed in 
 the same letter to cooperate, which he did in the joint 
 expedition to the Pei-ho in November, 1854. 
 
 The visit of Dr. Peter Parker, who was a most enthusi- 
 astic advocate of cooperation, to London and Paris in the 
 latter part of 1855, has already been referred to. The 
 failure of this effort was due to several reasons : the British 
 were not then ready for an active movement in China; Dr. 
 Parker did not win the confidence of Lord Clarendon; and 
 the Pierce administration, now drawing to a close and 
 estranged from Great Britain by the objectionable activities 
 
300 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 of the British consuls and Sir John Crampton * in securing 
 enlistments for the Crimean War, was hardly in a mood to 
 cooperate with England in the Far East. 
 
 Encouraged by the visit of Dr. Parker to London the 
 preceding year, by the cordial relations between Dr. Parker 
 and Sir John Bowring after Dr. Parker's return to China, 
 and then by the action of Commodore Armstrong at the 
 Barrier Forts, Lord Clarendon felt the time opportune, at 
 the beginning of the Buchanan administration, to sound out 
 the American Government on the subject of an actual alli- 
 ance of the three treaty powers — Great Britain, France and 
 the United States — for a revision of the treaties. Indeed, 
 the matter seems to have been taken up in the closing days 
 of the preceding administration by the French Minister, for 
 before Dr. Parker's proposal for the occupation of territory 
 was received, President Pierce was already familiar with the 
 plan, and had verbally expressed his disapproval. 
 
 On the 14th of March, 1857, Lord Napier, the British 
 Minister at Washington, took up with Secretary of State 
 Cass the request that the United States would grant that 
 "concurrent and active cooperation which the Government 
 of France has already accorded, and that they will authorize 
 their naval and political authorities in China to act heartily 
 in concert with the agents of the two allied powers." ^- At 
 the same time the British Minister explained fully to the 
 United States the intentions of Great Britain in China, 
 transmitting a memorandum in which were given the in- 
 structions to Sir John Bowring for the revision of the trea- 
 ties, and the instructions which had been issued to the Brit- 
 ish naval forces. The plan contemplated the complete 
 destruction of the Barrier Forts, and, if that were not suffi- 
 cient, then the blockade of the Yangtze River as far as the 
 Grand Canal, and a further blockade of the mouth of the 
 Pei-ho. The instructions for the revision of the treaty 
 included : residence at Peking for diplomatic representatives 
 of Foreign Powers; extension of commercial intercourse with 
 
 *The preceding summer the British minister in Washington had been given 
 his passports by Marcy for having insisted on the right to stir up sympathy in 
 the United States for England during the Crimean War. 
 
BUCHANAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE FAR EAST 301 
 
 the coast and into the interior; abolition of transit taxes in 
 the interior; no exclusive privileges for Great Britain. The 
 legalization of the opium trade was not mentioned. 
 
 The negotiations at Washington continued for a month. 
 March 30 Lord Napier forwarded to Cass a memorandum to 
 be placed in the hands of the President. In this document 
 the British plan for an alUance was argued under the follow- 
 ing points : 
 
 1. China will not be able to offer greater resistance tban sbe did 
 in the war of 1842, for since then she has been worn down by revo- 
 lution and the financial resources of the empire are exhausted. On. 
 the other hand to the strength of England is now added that of 
 France. 
 
 2. "It is best to 'abridge' the struggle as much as possible, and 
 not to weaken more than necessary the Imperial Government." 
 
 3. "The Allied Powers have declared their objects wsich are 
 humane, honorable, and pregnant with future benefits. They aim at 
 no territorial extension; their moderate and solitary demands are 
 comprised in the establishment of diplomatic relations, the enfran- 
 chisement of the trade, and the regulation of duties, the suppression 
 of piracy, and the toleration of the Clvistian religion." 
 
 As the situation then stood four Powers had recognized the inter- 
 course with China ; Great Britain and France were about to make 
 war; Russia and the United States were neutral. The Russian 
 Minister in Washington had expressed the opinion that Russia would 
 not oppose the Allied Powers in China, but it was the hope of Lord 
 Napier that the United States would not be content with a position 
 similar to that of Russia. The relations of the United States with 
 China, he pointed out, were quite difl^erent from the relations between 
 Russia and China. 
 
 "No country has availed itself so extensively as the United States 
 of the increased access first opened up by England in the year 1842, 
 and no country has so much to gain by a perfect emancipation of the 
 trade. The amount of business transacted by the United States with 
 China may still be inferior to that in which Great Britain is engaged, 
 but it increases with greater rapidity, and is now unquestionably 
 destined to exceed that of all other nations hereafter." The United 
 States, therefore, would find it a calamity if the ports of China were 
 blockaded for long. 
 
 While the United States did not recognize the existence of a 
 sufficient cause for war with China, aj-gued Lord Napier, "there is, 
 apparently, nothing in their political constitution, nor in the relations 
 of domestic parties, or in the general temper of the nation, which 
 should prevent them contributing to the success of the common cause, 
 and the consolidation of the common good by that degree of pacific 
 and amicable concurrence which would be embodied in the following 
 measures : 
 
302 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 (a) Declaration of approval of the objects of the Allied Nations; 
 
 (&) Appointment of a distinguished person as Plenipotentiary 
 who should proceed to his destination in a vessel of war befitting 
 the dignity of his country and his mission; the envoy to be empowered 
 to attend the movements of the ministers of Great Britain and 
 France, and to visit London and France to secure the most recent 
 information about China before proceeding to his post; 
 
 (c) Increase of the American squadron in the China Seas. 
 
 "The presence of an able Plenipotentiary," continued Lord Napier, 
 "and commander with a competent force, acting even in pacific con- 
 currence with the agents of Great Britain and France would manifest 
 to the Chinese that our desires are identical, though our measures may 
 be different, and that the only course left open to them is a frank and 
 unhesitating accession to our proposals. 
 
 "Finally, it may be remarked that if the pending differences be 
 adjusted by the combined action of the United States with England 
 and France, the beneficial effects of such an alliance will be felt 
 beyond the present time, and the scene on which it is first exerted. 
 The Chinese Government will know that it had contracted weighty 
 engagements of future good conduct towards a confederacy prepared 
 to enforce their rights by a harmonious cooperation, and the three 
 Powers, fortified by the prestige of unanimity and success may then 
 point their efforts^to the improvement of their relations with Japan, 
 which has been ^ready partly brought within the pale of European 
 commerce by tHe ifnaided enterprise of the United States." 
 
 To this careiiill;p worded proposal for an alliance of the 
 three powers for the settlement of the Far Eastern question, 
 Cass replied, April 10, 1857: 
 
 "True wisdom . . , dictates the observance of moderation and 
 discretion in our attempts to open China to the trade and intercourse 
 of the world. To be safe and successful the effort must be the work 
 of time, and of those changes which time gradually brings with it."' 
 
 Cass pointed out that, under the Constitution, Congress; 
 is the war-declaring power in the United States and that a 
 military expedition into Chinese territory could not be; 
 undertaken without the consent of the national legislature. 
 And, moreover, the relations of the United States with 
 China did not justify war. On the other hand, the United 
 States would heed the request for the appointment of a new 
 plenipotentiary, but it was clearly stated that the United 
 States would not become a party to any treaty which might 
 be negotiated jointly by England and France with China, 
 and that the conventional arrangements of the United States 
 
BUCHANAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE FAR EAST 303 
 
 with China would be confined solely to the r vo latter 
 powers. ■■) 
 
 In May, 1857, William B. Reed was appointed envoy 
 extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to China and 
 charged with the duty of revising the treaty.^^ Accc^mpany- 
 ing his instructions was the Lord Napier correspondence to 
 which his attention was especially directed : 
 
 "There seems to be an entire unanimity of sentiment and ' \ction," 
 wrote Cass, "between Great Britain and France, extending ven to 
 armed cooperation, and you will find from the papers annex ,d that 
 the United States has been invited to join the alliance and to artici- 
 pate in its hostile movements. The reasons of the Presirtont for 
 declining this participation are sufficiently stated in the com nunica' 
 tion to the British minister already referred to, together with hia 
 opinions as to the extent to which the United States may fairly co- 
 operate with the allied powers in China." 
 
 Thus ended, so far as the United States was concerned, 
 the first efforts on the part of another powe^ to secure an 
 alliance for the settlement of the Far EaLUvn question. 
 Thus ended also for more than forty years . ^ consideration 
 of the possibilities of actual hostilities between the United 
 States and China. 
 
 The Buchanan administration, in 1857, was faced with 
 difficult choices in the Far East as well as at home. The 
 President could have laid before Congress the facts that 
 China had failed to observe the stipulations of the Treaty 
 of Wanghia (1844). He could have pointed out that the 
 Government of China had failed to protect the lives 
 and property of American citizens in China and that 
 failing in that, China had evaded payment of claims 
 for reparation. Diplomatic correspondence had been im- 
 peded, interviews with the Imperial Commissioner at Can- 
 ton, and with the Governor General at Foochow had 
 been repelled, and a letter of President Pierce to the 
 Emperor of China had been treated with indignity, hav- 
 ing been returned to the commissioner without answer, 
 and with broken seals. On the basis of these facts 
 President Buchanan might have asked Congress to authorize 
 a military and naval expedition to China to demand repara- 
 
304 1 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 tions. Had Congress yielded to this request he might have 
 sought its further approval for the joint expedition with 
 Great Bfitain and France. Two American commissioners in 
 China htid recommended such a course. Lord Napier urged 
 it. The American residents in China, for the most part, 
 would h ive approved. But to neither of these propositions 
 was it ^even remotely possible that Congress would have 
 given its assent. Public opinion would have seen in them 
 only a) trick by which England was seeking the aid of the 
 Uniteit States in her efforts to secure the legalization of the 
 opium jtrade. 
 
 On the other hand, the Government of the United 
 States could have ignored the causes for war, which upon 
 examination proved to be very slight, and could have con- 
 tinued a policy of conciliation, waiting for time to do its 
 work in softening the prejudices of the Chinese and leading 
 them to see the advantages to them of the fullest possible 
 harmony and cooperation with the United States. Such a 
 policy, within a few years, would doubtless have met with 
 some success. However, one large factor in such a success 
 would have been the chastisement which Great Britain had 
 already determined to administer to China. 
 
 There had been even a third honest course open to the 
 United States. It could have said to Great Britain and 
 France that while in the approaching crisis the United 
 States would remain neutral, it would instruct its diplomatic 
 officers in China to abstain from pressing any claims on 
 China for the revision of the treaty, and would practically 
 withdraw from the open ports while the allied powers had a 
 free hand. This course would have been exceedingly unsat- 
 isfactory to Great Britain whose good will the United States 
 was then seeking to cultivate. England already felt that in 
 the war of 1839-42 she had really been fighting the battle of 
 American as well as British merchants, and that the time 
 had come for the United States to share some of the burdens 
 incident to the advantages its citizens in China enjoyed. In 
 the United States also there would have been an objection to 
 such a policy, for still in the opinion of many Great Britain 
 
BUCHANAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE FAR EAST 305 
 
 could not be trusted in China and required a great deal of 
 watching. 
 
 The policy actually adopted represented a compromise 
 at every point and assigned to the United States an igno- 
 minious role. President Buchanan rejected the proposal of 
 war with China, but he yielded to Lord Clarendon and Lord 
 Napier in that he agreed to dispatch to China a plenipoten- 
 tiary to be present during the hostilities, with instructions 
 to press the American claims for reparations and a revision 
 of the treaty at any opportune time. 
 
 There is reason to believe that this decision was satis- 
 factory to Great Britain. It involved the assent of the 
 United States to the plan of chastisement and thus fore- 
 stalled any opposition, such as Humphrey Marshall had 
 made in 1853, to the English program of operations. While 
 it placed upon Great Britain a burden of expense which it 
 would have been glad to share, yet it removed from the 
 arena a power with which England would otherwise have 
 had to share the certain prestige of victory. In 1858 Great 
 Britain was preparing not merely to open up China to the 
 trade of the world, but also to 'claim her place of priority 
 in the East,' ^'^ and there were few regrets that the United 
 States was unprepared to assert a similar claim. Meanwhile 
 an American envoy extraordinary and minister plenipoten- 
 tiary was to be dispatched to the other side of the world to 
 stand under the tree, with his basket, waiting for his asso- 
 ciates above to shake down the fruit, and he was even 
 instructed to offer mediation in case those in the tree be- 
 came involved with the owners of the orchard. Surely a 
 representative of the United States never played a more 
 inglorious role in international affairs. 
 
 Instructions to William B. Reed 
 
 As long as such a policy was to be pursued it would have 
 been wise to select an experienced diplomat, but instead 
 President Buchanan appointed his friend William B. Reed 
 of Pennsylvania. Reed's diplomatic experience had been 
 
306 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 1 
 
 confined to a brief period when at the age of twenty he 
 served as private secretary to Joel R. Poinsett, U. S. minis- 
 ter in Mexico (1825-7). He was a lawyer by profession and 
 and had been active in state politics, having been a member 
 of the legislature and attorney general. For the six years | 
 previous to his departure for China he had been professor 
 of American history in the University of Pennsylvania.^^ 
 Mr. Reed's instructions from Lewis Cass were: ^^ 
 
 1. Communicate freely with the British and French ministers 
 and make known to the Chinese that the President believes that the 
 objects of the Allied Powers are "just and expedient." Confine your- 
 self to firm representations to the Chinese, bearing in mind that the 
 Government of the United States is not at war with China, and 
 leaving to the government to determine what shall be the next step in 
 case your representations are fruitless. 
 
 2. Have the same friendly relations with the envoy of Russia as 
 with those of France and England. Enlist his support for your 
 representations to the Chinese Government. "There is nothing in the 
 policy of the United States with respect to China which is not quite 
 consistent with the pacific relations which are understood to exist , 
 between that empire and Russia." ■ 
 
 3. Make clear to the Chinese authorities that the United States T 
 seeks only the enlargement of opportunities for trade, and that it 
 desires neither territory nor to interfere in China's domestic affairs. 
 
 4. The United States does not seek the legalization of the opium 
 trade, and will not uphold its citizens in any efforts they make to 
 introduce the drug into the country. 
 
 5. Secure the establishment of some basis of exchange which 
 will provide for the recognition of the legal currency of the United 
 States at its true value when offered in payment for goods. 
 
 6. Secure the enforcement of the existing treaty in the matter of 
 the satisfaction of claims, the right of protection for the life and , 
 property of American citizens, and obtain modifications which will I 
 permit to Americans the right of residence in the open ports without ' 
 interference. 
 
 7. It was also intimated that Mr. Reed might assume the role 
 of mediator. "It is possible even that it [Reed's neutral position] 
 may be employed with advantage as a means of communication be- 
 tween the belligerent parties, and tend in this way to the termination 
 of the war." 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. China Desp. Vol. 3 (Dept. of State). 
 
 2. Ihid., Jan. 8, 1846. 
 
 3. Morse, Vol. 1, pp. 37Y-80. 
 
 4. China. Desp. Vol. 3, Feb. 28, 1847. 
 
 5. Ibid., Apr. 10, 1847. 
 
BUCHANAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE FAR EAST 307 
 
 6. China Desp. Vol. 5, Mar. 26, 1849. 
 
 Y. China. Desp. April 22, 1850. 
 
 8. China Desp. Vol. 6, Apr. 22, 1851. 
 
 9. Hansard, Series 3, 'Yol. CXLIV, Feb. 3, 1857-Mar. 21, 1851, p. 
 
 1836. 
 
 10. China Instructions, Vol. 1, June 21, 1851. 
 
 11. lUd., May 8, 1854. _ 
 
 12. Notes from the British Legation, Vol. 34, Napier to Cass, Mar. 
 
 14, 30, 1857 (Dept of State). 
 
 13. S. Ex. Doc. 30:36-1. 
 
 14. Walrond's Letters and Journals of James, Eighth Earl of Elgin, 
 
 p. 253; see also pp. 207 and 209 for similar clues to the policy 
 adopted by Lord Elgin in China. 
 
 15. Twentieth Century Bibliographical Dictionary of Notable 
 
 Americans. 
 
 16. Eeed Corres., S. Ex. Doe. 30:36-1, p. 68. 
 
PART IV 
 THE COOPERATIVE POLICY 
 
CHAPTER XVII 
 
 WILLIAM B. EEED AND THE TEEATY OF TIENTSIN 
 
 William B. Reed, the first American Minister Plenipo- 
 tentiary to China, arrived at Hongkong in November, 1857, 
 and six months later reached the mouth of the Pei-ho in 
 company with Count Putiatin, Baron Gros and Lord 
 Elgin, the Russian, French and British envoys respectively. 
 Elgin and Gros had been instructed to demand full repara- 
 tions for insults and injuries including particularly the 
 hauling down of the British flag on the lorcha Arrow, a 
 vessel which had been engaged in opium smuggling, and the 
 murder of Abbe Chapedelaine, a French Roman Catholic 
 missionary in Kwangsi, and also to secure a full revision of 
 the treaties. They had been accompanied to China by 
 formidable fleets of war vessels and transports and were 
 fully prepared for hostilities. The American envoy was in- 
 structed to secure "modifications" of the Gushing treaty, 
 and Putiatin was seeking an entirely new convention 
 which would admit Russia to the sea-borne trade of China 
 on the same terms as those enjoyed by the other treaty 
 powers.^ 
 
 The events from the arrival of Reed to the beginning of 
 negotiations at the Pei-ho must be summarized briefly. 
 Commissioner Yeh at Canton refused to see Reed and 
 asserted that a revision of the treaty was unnecessary. 
 Meeting with similar treatment. Lord Elgin and Baron Gros 
 turned matters over to the allied naval authorities and the 
 bombardment of Canton began December 28. A week later 
 the city was invaded and occupied. Yeh was made prisoner 
 and subsequently transported to Calcutta where he died. 
 The British and French troops remained in occupation of 
 Canton while the allied envoys, preceded by Reed and 
 
 311 
 
312 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Putiatin, advanced to Shanghai. Notwithstanding some 
 misunderstandings with Lord Elgin who from the outset 
 assumed complete leadership of the allied expedition, Reed 
 worked in cooperation with the allied envoys. He addressed 
 a separate yet practically simultaneous note with the others 
 to Peking demanding a revision of the treaties and approv- 
 ing the demands of the British and French. Notwithstand- 
 ing this effort to cooperate, Mr. Reed was subjected to the 
 most pusillanimous abuse by the Times correspondent who 
 accompanied Lord Elgin,- and was made to feel that the 
 only cooperation really desired was one in which Lord Elgin 
 would dictate the movements and policy of the combined 
 missions.^ The American envoy had been assigned to an 
 impossible role. At Shanghai he received additional instruc- 
 tions from Secretary of State Cass, again cautioning him to 
 limit his cooperation to purely peaceful measures. The 
 coldness of Lord Elgin and the cordiality of Count Putiatin 
 tended more and more to separate the four envoys into 
 pairs, and the increasing intimacy of Reed with the Russians 
 became an additional annoyance to the British. At the 
 Pei-ho Reed determined to adopt an independent course of 
 action. It may be gravely questioned whether it was not 
 a fundamental error of policy for the Americans to be pres- 
 ent at what was evidently intended to be a hostile demon- 
 stration, but being there, no other than an independent 
 course of action was consistent with Reed's instructions, or 
 with his self-respect. 
 
 Reed and Putiatin began negotiations with Tan, an 
 Imperial Commissioner with limited powers, early in May. 
 Elgin and Gros refused to meet Tan on the ground that his 
 powers were too limited. Tan reported that the Emperor 
 would concede the opening of seven new ports, five on the 
 coast and two in Formosa, the absolute toleration of Chris- 
 tianity, a modification of the tonnage dues to the advantage 
 of American bottoms, and an inclusive most-favored-nation 
 clause. The opening of the rivers to trade and the right of 
 either occasional or permanent diplomatic residence at Pe- 
 king were absolutely refused.^ 
 
WILLIAM B. REED AND THE TREATY OF TIENTSIN 313 
 
 Against the advice of Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, Mr. 
 Reed decided to continue the conferences with the Chinese 
 officials, although it was definitely known that the refusal 
 of the Emperor to consent to diplomatic residence at or 
 visits to the capital, and the refusal to open up the rivers, 
 left the allied envoys no alternative but to proceed up the 
 river, using whatever force might be required. On the 19th 
 of May S. Wells Williams and W. A. P. Martin were in the 
 midst of a conference with some of the subordinate officers 
 of the Imperial Commission where articles of the treaty 
 were being drafted when a note from Mr. Reed warned 
 them that the allied powers were to bombard the forts the 
 following day. The American minister instructed them to 
 discontinue the conference. 
 
 Promptly at ten o'clock, May 20, the allies attacked the 
 Taku forts which offered only a feeble resistance. Having 
 taken possession of the forts within two hours, the allied 
 forces moved on up the river. 
 
 Mr. Reed's intention to withdraw from the scene of brief 
 conflict was not carried out. Indeed, a large number of 
 officers from the squadron which was compelled to lay at 
 anchorage well off shore came inside the river to the 
 Antelope, a small steamer which had been chartered at 
 Shanghai and attached to the squadron for service in shal- 
 low water, to view the attack. Hardly was the struggle over 
 when Dr. Williams received a note from one of the attaches 
 of the Chinese Commission expressing the hope that the 
 Americans would not withdraw. And the next day Count 
 Putiatin and Mr. Reed received a formal request urging 
 them to remain and follow the allied envoys up to Tientsin. 
 Lord Elgin also urged that the neutral envoys continue 
 their cooperation as far as possible. On the 29th of May 
 Lord Elgin and Baron Gros proceeded up the river in a 
 British vessel flying both the British and the French flags, 
 and shortly after Count Putiatin and Mr. Reed followed 
 in the Russian steamer Amerika, which flew both the Rus- 
 sian and the American ensigns. At Tientsin the allied pleni- 
 potentiaries took up residence in a large temple, while the 
 
314 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 neutral envoys found less commodious but more comfortable 
 quarters together in a private residence. 
 
 This advance of the allied and neutral plenipotentiaries 
 to a point half way between the mouth of the Pei-ho and 
 Peking had an immediate effect on the Imperial Court. 
 Two commissioners, Kweiliang, a cabinet minister, and 
 Hwashana, president of the Board of Civil Office, with 
 powers which were practically unlimited, were at once ap- 
 pointed to proceed to Tientsin. Lord Elgin met them for 
 an interview on June 4th, Baron Gros the following day, and 
 Mr. Reed on the 7th. The negotiations were carried forward 
 with rapidity, under the steady pressure of the allied powers. 
 The Russian treaty was signed on the 13th, the American on 
 the 18th, the British on the 26th, and the French the next 
 day. Before the end of the first week in July the foreigners 
 had retired from Tientsin and returned to Shanghai. 
 
 The Treaties of Tientsin 
 
 The negotiations of Mr. Reed when compared either 
 with those of Caleb Cushing at Macao in 1844 or with those 
 of Lord Elgin, were quite without distinction. The result- 
 ing treaty lacked both in detail and in thoroughness what 
 were outstanding characteristics of the Treaty of Wanghia 
 and also of the British treaty of Tientsin. Just as the ac- 
 knowledged superiority of the Cushing treaty had made it 
 the basis of China's foreign relations between 1844 and 1858, 
 so the Elgin treaty became the basis of the international 
 relations of the Chinese Empire for the future. The priority 
 of Great Britain among the powers represented in China 
 was established. The conspicuous mark of the Reed treaty 
 was an exceedingly inclusive most-favored-nation provision 
 which made the citizens of the United States the inheritors 
 of all that had been won by allied arms, diplomacy, and a 
 most careful study of the situation. 
 
 Mr. Reed at Tientsin had three tasks before him : the re- 
 vision of the treaty; the fixing of the new tariff; and the 
 settlement of American claims. These tasks were made the 
 
WILLIAM B. REED AND THE TREATY OF TIENTSIN 315 
 
 subjects of separate negotiations, and were settled in sep- 
 arate agreements. They therefore became the natural 
 divisions of our study. First let us consider the more im- 
 portant settlements of the treaties themselves. 
 
 There had been an entire unanimity among the powers 
 that first in importance was the establishment of diplomatic 
 representatives of the foreign powers at Peking with the 
 privilege of corresponding with the Imperial Government 
 on terms of perfect equality. There was little hope of re- 
 moving the causes of misunderstanding and irritation be- 
 tween the Imperial Government and the foreign powers so 
 long as the diplomatic representatives of the powers were 
 held at arm's length and treated as inferiors. The system 
 which made the governor general of Canton the foreign 
 minister of China seemed wholly wrong. 
 
 With the resumption of the negotiations at Tientsin, 
 Mr. Reed assumed towards the new commissioners Kwei- 
 liang and Hwashana a more decided and positive tone, 
 warning them that the United States which had persisted in 
 a peaceful policy towards China would not be satisfied in the 
 final settlement with any terms which discriminated against 
 the Americans. The Chinese, on the other side, were con- 
 vinced of the necessity of a conciliatory policy. Although 
 still absolutely refusing to concede the right of residence in 
 Peking, they agreed to a compromise which was written into 
 the American treaty (Articles 4 and 5) to the eft'ect that the 
 highest diplomatic representative of the United States 
 would not only have the right to correspond under seal with 
 the Privy Council in Peking, but that whenever business 
 required he would have the right of visit and sojourn in the 
 capital. By the Chinese this was regarded. as a great con- 
 cession, and to Mr. Reed it seemed satisfactory. With him 
 agreed Count Putiatin and Baron Gros into whose treaties, 
 respectively, similar provisions were incorporated. These 
 stipulations were fortified by a further agTeement that if at 
 any time another power secured the full rights of residence 
 at Peking, the same privilege would inure to the United 
 States. 
 
316 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 The fundamental objection of the Chinese to admitting 
 the foreign ministers to Peking appears to have been that 
 it would result in a loss of prestige to the Emperor — a most 
 serious matter at a time when the Empire was torn by 
 ominous rebellion. Hitherto only tribute-bearing envoys 
 had been admitted to Peking and their visits had been ar- 
 ranged in such a way as to indicate to the Chinese people 
 the manifest of supremacy of their emperor over all the 
 nations. There may also have been some fear of the Eng- 
 lish, that their entrance into Peking might result even in the 
 overthrow of the empire itself.^ 
 
 Lord Elgin, however, was insistent upon the stipulation 
 for diplomatic residence at Peking, regarding it as 'far the 
 most important matter gained by the treaty,' and even at 
 the last moment he was prepared to insist upon it, though 
 another show of military strength might be required to 
 force the assent of the Emperor.® In the British treaty it 
 was stipulated (Article 3) that "the Ambassador, Minister, 
 or other Diplomatic Agent, so appointed by Her Majesty 
 the Queen of Great Britain, may reside with his family and 
 establishment, permanently at the capital, or may visit it 
 occasionally, at the option of the British Government." 
 
 The other point upon which Mr. Reed at Taku had met 
 with the firm resistance of the Imperial Government, was 
 the free navigation of the rivers, especially the Yangtze. 
 The demand for this concession from China had been pecul- 
 iarly an American one. It had first been proposed by Hum- 
 phrey Marshall in 1853, and had been in the pro jet submit- 
 ted to Tsung Lun at the Pei-ho in 1854 by Robert M. 
 McLane. Dr. Parker also had been instructed to ask for it 
 in 1856. On the other hand, both the British and the 
 French had been more cautious jn this point. Count 
 Walewski, Minister of Foreign Affairs, May 19, 1856, had 
 felt that the proposed demands of Dr. Parker were probably 
 more than the Chinese would grant and nearly a year earlier 
 had expressed the opinion that the opening of the Yangtze 
 even as far as Nanking might prove sufficient. In similar 
 tone the instruction to Sir John Bowring in 1854 had only 
 
WILLIAM B. REED AND THE TREATY OF TIENTSIN 317 
 
 called for the opening of the Yangtze as far as NankingJ 
 Upon this question of the opening of the rivers of China to 
 navigation by foreign vessels there was also a difference of 
 opinion in China. S. Wells Williams wrote: ^ 
 
 "I have no doubt, the more I see the entire bearing of the demand, 
 that the Chinese may just about as well abdicate their independence 
 as allow the free navigation of the Yangtze River. If they could be 
 induced to encourage their own people to buy and run foreign 
 steamers and schooners, the desired advantages would be gained with- 
 out forcing this wrong upon them. They will have to yield, I suppose, 
 and with the liberty let go for ever the integrity of their own terri- 
 tory to the lust of gain and power on the part of those who ought 
 to consider something of the results of their policy." 
 
 Mr. Rutherford Alcock, the British consul at Shanghai, 
 in a memorandum to Lord Elgin, expressed a similar 
 opinion: ^ 
 
 " 'The worthless character of a numerous gathering of foreigners 
 of all nations, under no effective control, is a public calamity. They 
 dispute the field of commerce with honester men, and convert privi- 
 leges of access and trade into means of fraud and violence. In this 
 career of license, unchecked by any fear of their own governments, and 
 protected in a great degree by treaties, from the action of the native 
 authorities,' the Chinese are the first and greatest, but by no means 
 the only sufferers. There is no government or nation of the great 
 European family that does not suffer in character, and in so far as 
 they have any interests at stake in China, in these also both immedi- 
 ately and prospectively. This is the danger which has long threatened 
 the worst consequence in widespread hostility and interrupted trade.' 
 Access to the inner waters will increase the evil to an enormous 
 extent." 
 
 Mr. Reed came rapidly to see the force of these argu- 
 ments and did not press the matter in the renewed negotia- 
 tions at Tientsin. In explaining his action to Cass, after 
 reviewing the arguments already mentioned, he added: ^^ 
 
 "Besides, I could not but feel that their assertion of a right of 
 absolute sovereignty over the rivers was one that I, least of all, had 
 a right to question ; and whilst I might wish to see them, as a matter 
 of mere commercial interest, allow the foreigner to go and trade up 
 their rivers at pleasure, yet they had a perfect right to refuse. 
 
 In this, as in the matter of residence at Peking, Lord 
 Elgin was determined. Almost at the last minute before 
 
318 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 signing the British treaty the Chinese Gommissioners re- 
 ceived from Peking a refusal to grant the right of residence 
 and the expression of a desire, on the part of the Emperor, 
 to defer the question of the navigation of the Yangtze until 
 the rebellion had been suppressed. Kweiliang and Hwa- 
 shana feared that their own lives might be the forfeit if 
 they were to sign away these concessions to Great Britain, 
 and they asked Gount Putiatin and Mr. Reed to take to 
 Lord Elgin a statement of the case, and to urge him to recede 
 from his demands.* The French treaty already drafted and 
 approved, though not signed, had not included such an 
 unlimited concession. ^^ The two neutral envoys, therefore, 
 took the matter up with Baron Gros and he ventured to 
 approach Lord Elgin on the subject, yet with no success. 
 Lord Elgin himself, in a letter to his family, records his 
 answer to Baron Gros's intervention: ^- 
 
 "I sent for the Admiral; gave him a hint that there was a great 
 opportunity for England ; that all the Powers were deserting me on a 
 point which they had all, in their original applications to Peking, 
 demanded, and which they all intended to claim if I got it; that 
 therefore we had it in our power to claim our place of priority in the 
 East, by obtaining this when others would not insist on it. Would 
 he back me? . . . This was the forenoon of Saturday, 26th. The 
 treaty was signed in the evening." 
 
 "The British treaty stipulated, Article 10, that as soon 
 as peace had been restored in the rebellious territory, British 
 vessels should be admitted to the Yangtze as far as Hankow, 
 and that the port of Chingkiang, even then held by the 
 Imperial Government, should in any event be opened at the 
 end of a year from the signing of the treaty. The French 
 treaty called for the opening of Nanking as soon as it should 
 be recaptured from the rebels.^ ^ 
 
 Closely associated with the opening of the Yangtze 
 was access to the interior of the Empire. In the earlier 
 negotiations for the revision of the treaties, in 1854 
 and 1856, the American representatives had proposed the 
 unlimited opening of the Empire. The objectionp co this 
 
 *S. Wells Williams states that the Imperial Commissioners were told that 
 it would be worse than useless for Putiatin and Reed to interfere in their 
 dealings with Lord Elgin. 
 
WILLIAM B. REED AND THE TREATY OF TIENTSIN 319 
 
 were similar to those against the opening of the rivers to 
 navigation, and in the American treaty of Tientsin there is 
 no reference to it. In view of earlier American demands, 
 Mr, Reed's comments on provisions in the British and 
 French treaties for travel in the interior are interesting. 
 He wrote: ^^ 
 
 "This [access to the interior] is provided for in both the English 
 and French treaties, and, of course, with its limitations, inures to us. 
 The provision of the former treaty is very comprehensive for, with 
 the limitation of requiring a passport, the form of which the consuls 
 and not the Chinese are to determine, any foreigner may go anywhere 
 in China 'for pleasure, or for purposes of trade, and may hire vessels 
 for the carriage of his baggage or merchandise." No routes are speci- 
 fied; no limit to the character or amount of merchandise which may 
 be taken into the interior, and there is nothing to prevent a foreigner 
 — Englishman, Frenchman, Russian, or American — from unloading 
 his ship load of cottons or, if he happen to be unscrupulous, of opium, 
 
 at Shanghai, or , when it shall be opened, and carrying it in 
 
 one or a fleet of junks, or small craft steamers, to the frontiers of 
 Thibet, or by the grand canal to Tientsin and Peking, or in short, any- 
 where, selling it as he goes along. But this is not all. He carries 
 with him his 'extraterritoriality' ; for the article which provides for 
 his transit in the interior also provides for his immunity. 'If,' says 
 the British treaty, 'he shall commit any offense against the law, he 
 shall be handed over to the nearest consul for punishment, but he 
 must not be subjected to ill-usage in excess of necessary restraint.' 
 This rendered into plain language means that the foreigner who com- 
 mits a rape or murder a thousand miles from the sea-board is to be 
 gently restrained, and remitted to a consul for trial, necessarily at a 
 remote point where testimony could hardly be obtained or relied on. 
 These are the abuses and dangers which this new system of unlimited 
 intercourse seems to foreshadow. ..." 
 
 Upon the subject of extraterritoriality Mr. Reed enter- 
 tained very strong convictions. He did not deny the neces- 
 sity for such concessions as had been obtained by Sir Henry 
 Pottinger in 1842 and by Caleb Gushing in 1844, but he 
 found the American abuse of the privileges had been wholly 
 disgraceful. He wrote: ^^ 
 
 ". . . no greater wrong could be done to a weak nation, no clearer 
 violation of the letter and spirit of a treaty, than claiming exemption 
 from the local law for our citizens who commit crime, and then failing 
 to punish them ourselves. We extort from China 'extraterritoriality,' 
 the amenability of guilty Americans to our law, and then we deny "to 
 our judicial officers the means of punishing them. There are consular 
 courts in China to try American thieves and burglars and murderers. 
 
320 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 but there is not a single jail where the thief or burglar may be con- 
 fined. Our consuls in this, as in many other particulars, have to ap- 
 peal to the English or French liberality, and it often happens that the 
 penitentiary accommodations of England and France are inadequate 
 to their own necessities, and the American culprit is dischargecl. 
 Hence it follows that many claim the privilege of American citizen- 
 ship, in order to have the benefit of this immunity, and every vaga- 
 bond Englishman, Irishman, or Scotchman, any one who, speaking our 
 language, can make out a prima facie claim to citizenship, commits 
 crime_ according to his inclination, secure that if he is tried in the 
 American courts there is no power of punishment. ... 
 
 "I consider the exaction of *ex-territoriality' from the Chinese, so 
 long as the United States refuse or neglect to provide the means of 
 punishment, an opprobrium of the worst kind. It is as bad as the 
 coolie or opium trade. Were it not that I have strong confidence that 
 when this matter is fully understood Congress will apply the remedy, 
 I should be ashamed to put my name to a treaty which asserts this 
 boasted privilege of 'ex-territoriality.' " 
 
 In the revision of the articles of the treaty bearing on 
 extraterritoriality Mr. Reed inserted an additional provision, 
 as a protection to China, by which it became lawful for 
 Chinese as well as American officers to arrest an American 
 citizen, but this slight alteration in the treaty could, by 
 itself, do little to redeem the American name from the dis- 
 grace into which it had fallen in the preceding decade. 
 
 At Taku the Chinese Commissioners had agreed to the 
 opening of seven new ports : Tai-wan and Tam-sui in For- 
 mosa; Hai-kau on the island of Hainan; and on the main- 
 land, Tienpeh and Swatow in Kwang-tung, Tsienchow in 
 Fukien, and Wanchow in Chekiang.^*^ At Tientsin, how- 
 ever, Kweiliang and Hwashana, for some unexplained 
 reason, receded from the previous liberality and would allow 
 Mr, Reed only two ports, the same to be chosen from those 
 already mentioned at Taku. Accordingly, in the American 
 treaty, the only additional ports opened were Swatow and 
 Tai-wan. Lord Elgin, who proposed to do nothing by 
 halves, although for some strange reason he omitted Tien- 
 tsin from his list, secured the opening of no less than eleven 
 new ports. Two of these, Tang-chow and Newchwang, 
 afforded outlets for Shantung and Manchuria, opening up a 
 trade along the coast northwards, fifteen hundred miles 
 above Shanghai. Incorporated also in the British treaty 
 
WILLIAM B. REED AND THE TREATY OF TIENTSIN 321 
 
 were reduction of tonnage dues, and rights of exportation 
 which, in Mr. Reed's judgment, would be hkely to transfer 
 most of the coasting trade of China from native to foreign 
 vessels, which were already being preferred on account of 
 their speed, safety from pirates, insurability and cheapness. 
 Mr. Reed also believed that by these regulations the small 
 American vessels on the coast would have an advantage over 
 all others. In these expectations his hopes were largely 
 realized. China was compelled to surrender not only her 
 rights to the exclusive navigation of her rivers, but also to 
 open her coasting trade — privileges which the United States 
 had been accustomed to guard most jealously. 
 
 The nearest claim to distinction for the American treaty, 
 unless it be a distinction to have abstained from demanding 
 the above mentioned privileges of the British treaty, lay in 
 the article granting religious toleration, which will be dealt 
 with in a subsequent chapter. 
 
 A clause in Article 1 of the American treaty stipulated: 
 "if any other nation should act unjustly or oppressively, the 
 United States will exert their good offices, on being informed 
 of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement of the 
 question, thus showing their friendly feelings." This be- 
 came the subject of much ironical comment, which, had the 
 clause been inserted by the Americans, would have been 
 quite justified when one considers the circumstances under 
 which the treaty was signed. But this clause was added 
 to the text by one of the assistants of Kweiliang and 
 Hwashana.^'^ Such action on the part of the Chinese must 
 not, however, be taken for more than it was worth. Al- 
 though it had been a cardinal point in American policy 
 since the days of Caleb Cushing's negotiations at Macao 
 and before, to win just such confidence from China as this 
 clause would seem to indicate, it actually meant in TS58" 
 little more than that the shrewd Chinese diplomat was seek- 
 ing to pay a compliment to the United States and possibly 
 isolate them from the European powers. A few months 
 later Mr. Williams, then acting as Charge, wrote to Mr. 
 Cass:i« 
 
322 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 "It is quite a mistake to suppose that the rulers of China have 
 any regard for one nation more than another; that they are more 
 friendly, for instance, towards the Americans than towards the 
 English; they may, perhaps, fear the English and Russians more than 
 they do the Americans, but they would be glad if none of them ever 
 came near them." 
 
 It cannot be denied, however, that the American treaty 
 of Tientsin did lay the basis for the friendship between 
 China and the United States which grew rapidly in the 
 next decade. Yet from the smashing blow which had been 
 dealt to China in the British treaty of 1858 no friend could 
 rescue her. Even had she chosen to make a friend of the 
 United States fourteen years earlier, there was little that 
 could have been done to save her. The Empire had brought 
 the calamity upon itself. China has ever been the despair 
 of her friends. This fact, however, mitigates the responsi- 
 bility neither of Great Britain which had acted with so little 
 regard for the evil consequences of such an opening up of 
 the Empire, nor of the United States which sent an envoy to 
 play the part of Saul holding the coats of those who com- 
 mitted the assault. That China in later years received 
 benefits from the breaking down of her walls of pride and 
 exclusion is undeniable, but it is equally undeniable that 
 much of the evil that followed in its train might have been 
 avoided had Lord Elgin been less possessed of the deter- 
 mination to chastise an ancient Empire and to establish 
 once for all the priority of Great Britain in the' Far East. 
 
 The Revised Tariff — Legalization of the Opium Trade 
 
 In the American Treaty of Tientsin it was agreed that the 
 tariff annexed to the Treaty of Wanghia was to continue 
 "except so far as it may be modified by treaties with other 
 nations; it being expressly stipulated that citizens of the 
 United States shall never pay higher duties than those paid 
 by the most favored nation" (Article 15). In the treaty 
 with Russia the tariff question was covered merely by the 
 insertion of a most-favored-nation agreement. To the 
 French treaty there had been annexed as a provisional tariff 
 
WILLIAM B. REED AND THE TREATY OF TIENTSIN 323 
 
 a schedule similar to the one adopted in the French Treaty 
 of Whampoa (1844), with the understanding that it would 
 be replaced by a new tariff to be determined subsequently 
 at Shanghai. Lord Elgin was much more specific. In the 
 British treaty (Article 26) it was stipulated that the Em- 
 peror was to delegate a high officer of the board of revenue 
 to meet representatives of the British Government at 
 Shanghai for the purpose of revising the tariff with a view 
 to bringing it into harmony with a five per cent ad valorem 
 rate.* 
 
 The British treaty also included an agreement (Article 
 28) for the regulation of transit dues — a vexed question 
 which had caused a great deal of irritation to merchants of 
 all nations, especially since the outbreak of the Taiping 
 rebellion when local governments were greatly in need of 
 additional revenues. Mr. Reed had felt that it was impos- 
 sible to regulate the transit dues by treaty/^ but Lord Elgin 
 was not so easily satisfied. He secured an agreement that in 
 no case were these dues to exceed two and one half per cent 
 ad valorem, and that British merchants should have the 
 right to pay in one sum the entire transit taxes for goods 
 consigned inland (Article 28). To have enforced this 
 article China would have been compelled to reorganize the 
 entire fiscal system of the Empire. In practice the stipula- 
 tion was the source of perennial irritation. 
 
 The Emperor appointed Kweiliang and Hwashana who 
 had negotiated the treaties of Tientsin to represent China 
 in the tariff revision conferences, but the actual work was 
 done by secretaries and subordinates who conferred with 
 Mr. Thomas Wade, representing Great Britain, and Dr. S. 
 Wells Williams who, at the invitation of Lord Elgin, was 
 delegated to represent the United States informally. Mr. 
 H. N. Lay, formerly of the British consular service and now 
 of the Foreign Board of Inspectorate of Customs at Shang- 
 hai, was also a member of the conference. 
 
 *The tariff of 1843, while imposing specific duties, had aimed to establish 
 approximately a Ave per cent ad valorem rate. Since the fixing of that schedule 
 the prices of various articles in China had, for the most part, fallen, so that 
 in 1858 many of the specific duties were actually more than five per cent 
 reckoned on an ad valorem basis. 
 
324 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Although Mr. Reed shifted entirely to Lord Elgin the 
 responsibility for the revision of the tariff and for fixing the 
 specific rates for the transit tax, and avoided becoming a 
 party to the negotiations between Lord Elgin and the two 
 Chinese Commissioners, he thought it well to include the 
 tariff, when it was completed, in the form of a 'supplemen- 
 tary convention' which had the force of a treaty. To this 
 proposal the Chinese assented.^" The general tendency of 
 the new tariff was sHghtly to reduce the duties which had 
 previously been in force, and the details are relatively unim- 
 portant. More important than the tariff itself was the pro- 
 vision made for the reorganization of the Foreign Inspector- 
 ate of Chinese Customs, and the extension of the system, 
 which had hitherto been operative only at Shanghai, to the 
 other open ports. Many American merchants strongly 
 objected to the system for no very apparent reason other 
 than that it was effective and reduced the possibilitjes of 
 smuggling, but Mr. Reed, after careful investigation, gave 
 his cordial assent to its extension. 
 
 The revised tariff was most notable in that it provided 
 for what had so long been desired by Great Britain and by 
 the foreigners generally in China^ — the legalization of the 
 opium trade. The part played by the American envoy in 
 effecting this legalization requires attention. The instruc- 
 tions received by Mr. Reed from Secretary of State Cass on 
 the subject of the opium trade, while more vague were 
 broadly similar to those which had been given to Caleb 
 Cushing by Webster.^^ 
 
 "Upon proper occasions you will make known to the Chinese 
 officers with whom you may have communication that the Government 
 of the United States does not seek for their citizens the legal estab- 
 lishment of the opium trade, nor will it uphold them in any attempt 
 to violate the laws of China by the introduction of that article into 
 the country." 
 
 In the first draft of the proposed treaty presented at 
 Taku there was inserted an article 'denouncing and forbid- 
 ding' the opium trade by American citizens,-" but at Tien- 
 tsin this article was withdrawn and in the treaty as signed 
 
WILLIAM B. REED AND THE TREATY OF TIENTSIN 325 
 
 there was no reference to opium.* Lord Elgin, although he 
 had been definitely instructed to secure the legalization of 
 the trade, had abstained from inserting any reference to it 
 in the text of the treaty. Until the revision of the tariff, 
 therefore, the status of the opium trade remained as it had 
 been since the treaties of 1842-4. But in the revised tariff 
 the trade in opium was legalized by the following rule: 
 
 "Opium will henceforth pay thirty taels per picul Import Duty. 
 The importer will sell it only at the port. It will be carried into the 
 interior by Chinese only, and only as Chinese property; the foreign 
 trader will not be allowed to accompany it. The provisions of Article 
 9 of the Treaty of Tientsin, by which British subjects are authorized 
 to proceed into the interior with passports to trade, will not extend 
 to it, nor will those of Article 28 of the same Treaty, by which the 
 Transit Dues are regulated. The Transit Dues on it will be arranged 
 as the Chinese Government see fit; nor in future revisions of the 
 Tariff is the same rule of revision to be applied to Opium as to other 
 goods." 
 
 While Mr. Reed could not be held wholly accountable 
 for the insertion of the above rule, he not only approved of 
 it but even initiated the correspondence with Lord Elgin in 
 which he recommended the legalization of the traffic, thus 
 reversing himself and in a measure violating the instructions 
 of his government. His reasons were that between two evils 
 — the legalization of the trade, and the existing open defi- 
 ance of the Gushing treaty in which Americans were dealing 
 in the drug at every port and carrying it along the coast 
 under the American flag — legalization of the trade with 
 heavy duties and the exclusion of foreigners from the trans- 
 portation and sale of the drug in the interior was preferable. 
 It was Mr. Reed's idea that the Chinese would, under the 
 proposed regulation, be better able than formerly to restrict 
 the importation by fixing a high tariff and by the control 
 of their own merchants. The American Commissioner was 
 debating, as related to a drug, the old and also modern 
 question of the relative merits of ineffective prohibition as 
 compared with high license and regulation. If Mr. Reed 
 
 *In the Treaty of Wanghia trading in opium had been prohibited to Ameri- 
 can citizens, and in the annexed tariff opium had been included in the list of 
 contraband articles. 
 
326 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 was on the wrong side of the argument there is no reason 
 whatever to suppose that his error was any other than that 
 of judgment, and with him stood many foreigners of long 
 experience in China who could be charged with no friendli- 
 ness towards the opium trade. Dr. Williams in a letter to 
 his wife said: ^^ 
 
 "By this tariff you will perhaps be surprised to learn that opium 
 is legalized and pays thirty taels per picul as import duty. The 
 Chinese Government has yielded in its long resistance to permitting 
 this drug to be entered through the customs house, the opium war of 
 1840 ending in the Treaty of Nanking has triumphed, and the 
 honorable English merchants and government can now exonerate 
 themselves from the opprobrium of smuggling this article. Bad as 
 the triumph is, I am convinced that it is the best disposition of this 
 perplexing question; legalization is preferred to the evils attending 
 the farce now played, and throwing ridicule on the laws against 
 it by sending the revenue boats to the opium hulks to receive a duty 
 or bribe from the purchaser." 
 
 Although the full correspondence of Mr. Reed with ref- 
 erence to the legalization of the opium trade was not only 
 reported at the State Department but also published in 
 1860, the action of the American plenipotentiary seems to 
 have aroused no general adverse comment in the United 
 States. 
 
 - Settlement of Claims 
 
 Of the two primary reasons which dispatched Mr. Reed 
 to China in 1857, the revision of the treaty and the settle- 
 ment of claims due to American citizens, the latter was the 
 more easily to be defended, and the settlement obtained pre- 
 sented the brighter page in the history of the relations 
 between the United States and China. 
 
 The first official settlement of the claims of American 
 citizens against the Government of China was secured by 
 Commodore Lawrence Kearny in the winter of 1842-3, and 
 amounted to about a quarter of a million dollars. ^^ These 
 claims had arisen out of injuries suffered by Americans at 
 the time of hostilities between the English and the Chinese 
 in the first Anglo-Chinese War, and also from the depreda- 
 tions of a mob at Canton in 1842. Commodore Kearny 
 
WILLIAM B. REED AND THE TREATY OF TIENTSIN 327 
 
 made a peremptory demand for the payment of the losses, 
 and the demand was complied with. There was no examin- 
 ation of the claims with a view to the determination of 
 their value. 
 
 Shortly after the exchange of ratifications of the Treaty 
 of Wanghia, a mob attacked and pillaged the house of the 
 Rev. Issachar J. Roberts, a missionary who subsequently 
 became associated with the Taiping rebellion. The claim 
 presented by Roberts was regarded as excessive, and an 
 award was made by a joint commission composed of Ameri- 
 cans and Chinese. The Imperial High Commissioner, how- 
 ever, was unwilling to settle. Commissioner John W. Davis 
 in 1848 again presented the claim to the Viceroy who again 
 refused to pay. Davis then referred the matter to Washing- 
 ton with a request for instructions. The Department of 
 State was somewhat in doubt as to the strength of the 
 Roberts claim, and instructed Commissioner Humphrey 
 Marshall to investigate and report as to whether it and two 
 others were "of such a character as to warrant the ofl&cial 
 interposition of the government." ^^ Marshall was of the 
 opinion that the claim ought to be enforced, and reported 
 that to enforce it he was prepared to blockade the port of 
 Canton, if necessary, "in fine, to collect the money by any 
 means short of war," "^^ but nothing was done. Withhold- 
 ing payment for duties was strongly urged by Commissioner 
 Robert L. McLane, as the most effective method for securing 
 the payment of the claims which, while still not large, had 
 greatly increased by the end of 1854.^7 In case the Chinese 
 should attempt to retaliate by threatening to stop the trade 
 as they had in the old pre-treaty days, he recommended that 
 the naval forces of the United States should be used to sup- 
 port the action of the commissioner. This method of 
 coercing the Chinese authorities was used in several in- 
 stances by the various consuls without authority from the 
 commissioner. In January, 1856, the consul at Shanghai 
 reported that he had collected a claim of $18,000 by stop- 
 ping intercourse with the taotai for two weeks. ^^ At about 
 the same time the American consuls at Amoy and Shanghai 
 
328 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 threatened to use similar measures either to collect claims 
 or to secure the attention of the Chinese authorities, but 
 this method was promptly frowned on by the Government 
 of the United States, and Dr. Parker was instructed to forego 
 such belligerent methods. ^^ The consuls were reluctant to 
 surrender such an effective weapon and the unauthorized 
 action of the American consul at Foochow in 1857 in with- 
 holding duties almost resulted in the declaration of Foochow 
 as a free port.^^ As the time for the revision of the treaty 
 drew near, the instructions from Washington were that the 
 settlement of claims must not be pushed to a point with 
 the Chinese authorities which would jeopardize the revision 
 of the treaty. 
 
 A third possible method for the settlement of claims was 
 outlined by Dr. Peter Parker in a confidential communica- 
 tion to Sir John Bowring at the end of December, 1856.^^ 
 With reference to the losses which had been suffered by the 
 Americans in the British attack on Canton in the preceding 
 month. Dr. Parker proposed that the British Government 
 should assume these claims and collect them from the Gov- 
 ernment of China along with those of their own citizens. 
 This proposal to have the British Government collect 
 American claims was promptly repudiated by Lewis Cass, 
 Secretary of State, in his instructions to Mr. Reed.^^ 
 
 At the time of the negotiations for the revision of the 
 treaty Mr. Reed found the Chinese authorities at first quite 
 unwilling to admit the validity of the claims of Americans 
 for losses suffered during the existing war. They implied 
 that for these losses the English were responsible and that 
 Great Britain rather than China ought to make the repara- 
 tions.^^ Subsequently the Chinese authorities sought to 
 place the responsibility entirely upon the local authorities 
 where the losses had occurred. This was in accordance with 
 Chinese law, or custom, for the central government did not 
 usually assume such responsibility for local affairs. If the 
 local Chinese officials had done wrong, they argued, then 
 they ought to make reparations out of the local revenues.^^ 
 Mr. Reed yielded to Kweiliang and Hwashana on this point, 
 
WILLIAM B. REED AND THE TREATY OF TIENTSIN 329 
 
 and the Treaty of Tientsin was signed without any settle- 
 ment of the claims. 
 
 Immediately after the signing of the treaty, however, 
 Mr. Reed renewed the discussion. At first the commis- 
 sioners were disposed to evade the matter but on the 25th 
 day of June they entered into an agreement for settlement 
 to "be considered as of the same force and virtue as if it was 
 embodied in the treaty." This agreement stipulated that 
 claims for indemnity to the amount of 600,000 taels should 
 be liquidated by deducting one fifth of all the tonnage, 
 import and export duties, which were paid by American 
 ships at the three ports of Canton, Foochow and Shanghai. 
 These deductions were to be made by the consuls and the 
 total amount was to be reported by the American minister 
 each year to the Chinese authorities until the entire amount 
 of the claims had been settled. 
 
 Mr. Reed was not entirely satisfied with this settlement 
 and therefore reopened the question a few months later at 
 Shanghai.^^ First he asked from the American claimants for 
 revised statements and was able to reduce the estimated 
 damages from 600,000 to 525,000 taels. Kweiliang and 
 Hwashana, not unwilling to do a little bargaining, then 
 agreed that if the total amount would be reduced to 500,000 
 taels, they on their part would agree to the issuing of 
 debentures, 300,000 taels for Canton, and 100,000 taels each 
 for Foochow and Shanghai, and for the gradual payment of 
 them out of the customs revenue from American vessels 
 beginning with the following New Year (February 3, 1859). 
 Mr. Reed then recommended to the President of the United 
 States that a commission of two be appointed to examine 
 the claims in detail and make final awards. This recom- 
 mendation was accepted, approved by Congress, and the 
 commission appointed. 
 
 One other indication of the spirit in which Mr. Reed 
 approached the settlement of these claims is to be found in a 
 passage in his address before the Philadelphia Board of 
 Trade after his return to the United States. The claims, 
 representing the bulk of the total, which arose out of the 
 
330 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 British attack upon Canton in 1856, Mr. Reed undertook 
 to support only with reluctance. He said: ^^ 
 
 "The total amount of our pecuniary claims . . . never amounted 
 to a million dollars, and did not at the beginning of the war amount 
 to more than a fifth of that sum, for you will recollect the bulk of our 
 claims are of recent occurrence, for loss of property at the factories, 
 when the Chinese were defending their own soil, and for which they 
 are only responsible on the un-Christian principle of English and 
 American public law, that the assailed party always pays the dam- 
 ages." 
 
 However, so eminent an authority as John W. Foster re- 
 marked, many years later, that notwithstanding the various 
 reductions of the claims, and the close examination to which 
 they were finally subjected, ''many of those allowed were of 
 questionable validity in international law." ^^ 
 
 The claims commissioners were Charles W. Bradley, 
 American consul at Ningpo, and Oliver E. Roberts, lately 
 of the customs service. They began their hearings at 
 Macao, November 10, 1859, and the report was submitted 
 to the American minister February 27, 1860. The entire 
 amount of the awards totalled $489,694.78, thus leaving a 
 balance of about $220,000 which, when paid by the Chinese 
 customs authorities, was deposited in the Oriental Bank of 
 Hongkong.* ^^ 
 
 ♦While the final disposition of this surplus money was not settled until 
 1885 when, with some further deductions for claims subsequently allowed, the 
 surplus and accumulated interest, amounting to $453,400, was returned to China 
 by the act of Congress, it is of interest to note various proposals which were 
 made in the interval for the disposition of this money. When S. Wells Williams 
 Was in Washington in 1860 he submitted to the Secretary of State an outline 
 for the utilization of it in the establishment of an American-Chinese College 
 in China in which Chinese students should be instructed in Western learning, 
 and in which American students could receive such instruction as would fit 
 them for positions in the consular, diplomatic, customs and commercial life of 
 China. Anson Burlingame supported this proposition, and it seems to have met 
 with the approval of President Lincoln. Congress, however, took no action on 
 it. Another proposal was that the money should be used to build American 
 consulates and a legation in China, but this was rejected on the ground that 
 the money really belonged to China. However, the first money paid over for 
 the purchase of the present legation in Peking was taken from this fund, 
 though it was afterwards returned to the fund by order of the Secretary of 
 State. Still another proposal was that the money be held as a fund out of 
 Which any claims arising in the future might be paid. This also was discarded 
 on the ground that the Government of China ought always to be made to feel 
 the direct responsibility for the settlement of any claims which might arise. 
 The most notable proposal, of course, was that involving the creation of an 
 American-Chinese College, for in it was clearly foreshadowed the system of 
 'indemnity students' for which provision was made at the time of the return 
 of the Boxer Indemnity surplus nearly 50 years later.^" The balance of the 1858 
 indemnity was returned by act of Congress in 1885, two years after the return 
 of the Japanese 'ndemnity. 
 
 I 
 
WILLIAM B. REED AND THE TREATY OF TIENTSIN 331 
 
 Thus was settled between the United States and China 
 a difficult problem "without the utterance of a single harsh 
 word." 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. The important American sources for this chapter are: Reed 
 
 Corres., published in full (S. Ex. Doc. No. 30:36-1); Journal 
 of S. Wells Williams, edited by F. W. Williams (Journal of 
 the North-China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 
 XLII, Shanghai, 1911) ; W. A. P. Martin : "A Cycle of Ca- 
 thay" ; Speech of Hon. W. B. Reed at Board of Trade, Phila- 
 delphia, May 31, 1859. 
 
 2. George Wingrove Cooke: "China," p. 380. 
 
 3. Reed. Corres., pp. 21-22. 
 
 4. Ibid., p. 299. 
 
 5. Williams' Journal, p. 54. 
 
 6. Walrond: "Life and Letters of Lord Elgin," p. 253. 
 
 Y. Cordier: "L'Expedition de Chine," p. 11, p. 8; Morse: Vol. 1, 
 p. 672. 
 
 8. Williams' Journal, p. 75. 
 
 9. Cited by Sargent: Anglo-Chinese Commerce and Diplomacy, 
 
 p. 102. 
 
 10. Reed Corres., p. 352. 
 
 11. Williams' Journal, p. 77. 
 
 12. Walrond, p. 253. 
 
 13. Reed Corres., p. 385. 
 
 14. Ihid., p. 384. 
 
 15. Ibid., p. 355. 
 
 16. Ibid., p. 311. 
 
 17. Williams' Journal, p. 61; "Cycle of Cathay," p. 183. 
 
 18. Reed Corres., p. 549. 
 
 19. Ibid., p. 358. 
 
 20. Ibid., pp. 442, 493. 
 
 21. Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
 
 22. "Cycle of Cathay," p. 184. 
 
 23. Williams' Journal, p. 96. 
 
 24. S. Doc. 139:29-1. 
 
 25. China Instructions, Vol. 1, Sept. 20, 1852 (Dept. of State); 
 
 Marshall Corres., p. 223, July 30, 1853. 
 
 26. Marshall Corres., pp. 277, 283. 
 
 27. McLane Corres., p. 458. 
 
 28. Parker Corres., p. 549. 
 
 29. Ibid., pp. 546, 637, 677. 
 
 30. Ibid., pp. 1162, 1291, 1351, 1420; Reed Corres., pp. 34, 35, 36, 99. 
 
 31. Parker Corres., pp. 1098, 1099. 
 
 32. Reed Corres., pp. 13, 14. 
 
 33. Ibid., pp. 300, 310, 316, 317. 
 
 34. Ibid., pp. 371 ff. 
 
 35. Ibid., pp. 520 fi. 
 
332 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 36. Speecli of William B. Eeed, p. 5. 
 
 37. "American Diplomacy in the Orient," p. 244. 
 
 38. Claims Report : H. Ex. Doc. No. 29 :40-3. 
 
 39. Diplomatic Corres., 1862, p. 843; 1864, p. 346; 1867, pp. 459, 507; 
 
 1868, p. 510; 1871, p. 226; 1872, p. 136; 1885, pp. 181, 182. H. 
 Rept. 970:48-1; see also H. Rept. 113:45-3; H. Rept. 
 1142 :46-2. 
 
CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 WAED AND TATTNALL— EXCHANGE OF EATIFICATIONS 
 
 The American Treaty of Tientsin was approved by the 
 Senate and ratified by President Buchanan December 21, 
 1858. William B. Reed dispatched his resignation to the 
 President even before he began the negotiations for the 
 treaty. To John E. Ward of Georgia/ who had been the 
 presiding officer at the convention which nominated 
 Buchanan for the presidency,- now confirmed as Minister to 
 China, was given the task of exchanging the ratifications. 
 Under normal circumstances this duty would not have been 
 difficult. The treaty and the two supplementary conven- 
 tions covering the tariff and the settlement of claims had 
 been approved by the Imperial Government before Mr. 
 Reed left China, and was already recognized as having the 
 force of law. To the Chinese, unaccustomed to the methods 
 of European diplomacy, the exchange of ratifications, prob- 
 ably, did not seem to be a very important matter. 
 
 The Conflict Renev^ed 
 
 But before Mr. Ward had arrived in China the impres- 
 sion had become prevalent among the foreigners that China 
 would make some effort to evade the fulfillment of the 
 treaties, at least so far as concerned the permission for 
 diplomatic residence in Peking. Whether this suspicion 
 was well grounded in actual facts, or whether it grew out of 
 the feeling, so widely prevalent, that in the affair at Taku 
 the Imperial Government had come off too easily, and that 
 China had not yet been sufficiently chastised, admits of 
 dispute. It is at least clear that at the beginning of 1859 
 
 333 
 
334 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 the foreigners, particularly the English in China, were ex- 
 pecting more trouble. 
 
 Mr. Ward reached Hongkong in May, 1859, and an- 
 nounced his arrival to Frederick W. A. Bruce, Lord Elgin's 
 brother, now British Minister to China, and to M. de Bour- 
 boulon, the French Minister who was at Macao. Wishing, 
 however, to avoid complications with the British Govern- 
 ment which were threatened by the hostility of American 
 and British sailors in the port, Mr. Ward departed almost 
 immediately for Shanghai where the Chinese Commission- 
 ers, Kweiliang, Hwashana and Tan, who had negotiated 
 the tariff with Lord Elgin a few months before, were stay- 
 ing. The American Minister addressed them a formal com- 
 munication to the effect that he was in possession of the 
 ratified copy of the Treaty of Tientsin "which he has been 
 instructed to exchange at Peking," and that he also had a 
 letter from the President to the Emperor which he expected 
 to deliver to his Imperial Majesty.^ 
 
 It did not seem to have occurred to Mr. Ward that there 
 was nothing in the American Treaty of Tientsin which 
 guaranteed him the right of a personal audience with the 
 Emperor, nor did he realize, probably, that in raising such 
 a question, he was directly stirring up a controversy — the 
 right of audience with the Emperor — which involved the 
 most cherished Chinese prejudices. Even in his assertion 
 of right to exchange the ratifications of the treaty in Peking, 
 he was on most uncertain ground. The American treaty 
 (Article 30) merely stipulated that the ratifications should 
 be exchanged within one year from the date of the signa- 
 tures, i.e., before June 18, 1859. The place for this ceremony 
 was not named. It is true that the treaty also provided 
 that the American Minister could go to Peking 'whenever 
 he has business' but this was safeguarded by the further 
 stipulation that he should not 'request visits to the capital 
 on trivial occasions' (Article 5). 
 
 The British treaty specified that the exchange of ratifi- 
 cations should take place at Peking within one year, and the 
 provision of the French treaty was similar. But while the 
 
WARD AND TATTNALL— RATIFICATIONS 335 
 
 American treaty was loaded down with numerous 'most- 
 favored-nation' clauses, under them it could not be held that 
 the Americans had any rights included in the other treaties 
 until those treaties had been ratified. Mr. Ward was there- 
 fore clearly outside his rights in his intentions to proceed to 
 Peking to have an audience with the Emperor, and the right 
 to exchange ratifications in Peking depended entirely upon 
 whether such a ceremony was of sufiicient importance to be 
 dignified by such a settling. At Shanghai Ward argued this 
 point with the Commissioners who at once appeared rather 
 reluctant to have him proceed to the North. 
 
 The Commissioners stated that they had remained in 
 Shanghai to complete some business with Lord Elgin, and 
 gently urged Ward to delay a while in Shanghai. At an 
 interview a few days later they repeated their explanations ; 
 they had promised Lord Elgin to remain in Shanghai until 
 his return from Hongkong. He had not returned but Mr. 
 Bruce had been appointed in Lord Elgin's stead and would 
 be in Shanghai in a very short time. After their business 
 with Mr. Bruce was finished they would go to Peking and 
 there await the arrival of the allied ministers whose treaties 
 provided that the ratifications were to be exchanged in 
 Peking. It would be entirely agreeable to the Chinese Gov- 
 ernment to have Mr. Reed accompany the other two minis- 
 ters, so that the three ratifications might be exchanged 
 together. Although at first Mr. Ward had been reluctant to 
 consent to such an arrangement he at length agreed, pro- 
 vided the commissioners would give him a statement that 
 the validity of the treaty would in no way be affected by 
 this delay in the exchange of the ratifications.^ 
 
 From this point onward in the narrative not only are 
 nearly all the facts a matter of dispute, but equally so is the 
 interpretation of such facts as can be established. The 
 Chinese version of the situation as it appears in the official 
 dispatches of Mr. Ward and in the accounts of Dr. S. Wells 
 Williams, who was present with the American Minister, 
 vary widely from the assertions which were placed before 
 the British Government and offered in England as the justi- 
 
336 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 fication of the second Anglo-French War with China in 
 1859-60. 
 
 The Chinese explanation of the situation, which has 
 never been systematically set forth in histories of the 
 period, is as follows : When Mr. Bruce arrived at Shanghai 
 early in June prepared to push to Peking, the Chinese Com- 
 missioners agreed (June 6) that the ratifications should be 
 exchanged in Peking but they desired to have settled before 
 going there certain matters with reference to Canton which 
 still remained in the hands of the English and French. 
 "But as Canton is not yet restored," they remarked, *'it 
 would seem that no time should be lost in arriving at a 
 satisfactory decision regarding it." On the same day, in a 
 separate communication, the Imperial Commissioners stated 
 that although ample arrangements for the reception of the 
 British legation at Peking would be made, the exchange of 
 ratifications had been assigned to them exclusively. No 
 one could act as their substitute. It would be impossible, 
 they stated courteously, for them to reach Peking for at 
 least two months.^ 
 
 In his reply to these communications, Mr. Bruce im- 
 mediately assumed that the Commissioners were acting in 
 bad faith. 
 
 "It is with regret that the undersigned finds," he stated, "at the 
 outset of a mission sent by her Brittanic Majesty as evidence of her 
 desire for peaceful relations, that he is met, not as he has a right to 
 expect, with a cordial and frank invitation to the capital, but with 
 delays and hesitations ill-calculated to cement a good understanding.* 
 The undersigned will not, however, swerve in the least from the course 
 he has laid down in his letter of the 18th ultimo. He is resolved to 
 proceed forthwith to Peking, there to exchange the ratifications of the 
 treaty, and to deliver in person the letter intrusted to his charge by 
 his gracious sovereign to his Imperial Majesty, to whom it is ad- 
 dressed, nor will he quit the capital until satisfied that effect will be 
 given without reserve to every provision of the Treaty of Tientsin." 
 
 Mr. Bruce then notified the Commissioners that Admiral 
 Hope, Commander in Chief of the British naval forces, -had 
 already started for the mouth of the Pei-ho, and warned 
 them that upon the Chinese Government must rest the 
 entire responsibility for any trouble that might arise. 
 
WARD AND TATTNALL— RATIFICATIONS 337 
 
 The question of fact is whether the Chinese Government 
 was actually sincere in its promise that the British and 
 French ministers would be received in Peking according to 
 the provisions of the treaty. The Russian minister, Nicho- 
 las Ignatieff, who could hardly be called an unbiased wit- 
 ness, but whose testimony in this case seems clear, stated 
 (July 7) : « 
 
 ". . . preparations had been made here to receive, for the ratifica- 
 tions of the treaties of Tientsin, the plenipotentiaries of America, of 
 France and of England. Lodgings had been arranged, by order of 
 the Emperor, for the three embassies." 
 
 Whatever may have been the intentions of the Emperor 
 as regards the admission to Peking, it is evident that it was 
 not the intention of the Chinese Government that the allied 
 envoys should proceed to the capital by way of the Taku 
 forts and the passage to Tientsin which had been utilized by 
 the foreigners the year before. Nor was it the disposition 
 of the Chinese to permit the allied envoys to be accompanied 
 to Peking by a large military force. The treaties did not 
 specify that the route must be by way of Taku, and while 
 the British treaty was silent on the subject, the American 
 treaty clearly limited the number of those who might accom- 
 pany the minister in his visits to Peking. The Chinese 
 maintained that it had been the intention of the Imperial 
 Government to receive the envoys at Pehtang, a place about 
 ten miles north of Taku, on another outlet of the river. 
 The Governor General of Chihli stated to Mr. Ward that 
 he had received orders from Peking to receive the envoys at 
 Pehtang and to facilitate their journey to Peking.'^ 
 
 S. Wells Williams, a careful observer, and the one among 
 all the foreign legations most familiar with the Chinese, 
 said: ^ 
 
 "I am convinced that the intention of the Emperor and his cabinet 
 has been all along in favor of permitting the envoys of the three 
 powers to go to his capital to exchange their treaties. . . ." 
 
 In reply to Mr. Bruce's communication stating that the 
 British Admiral with his squadron had already proceeded 
 
338 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 to the Pei-ho, the Imperial Commissioners at Shanghai 
 advised the British minister to proceed to the mouth of the 
 Tientsin River, to ''anchor his vessel of war outside the 
 bar, and then, without much baggage, and with a moderate 
 retinue" to proceed to the capital. Meanwhile they would 
 notify the Peking officials of the situation, and they ex- 
 pressed the expectation that in view of the peaceful mission 
 on which his excellency was bent, 'his treatment by the Gov- 
 ernment of China will not fail to be in every way most 
 courteous.' Mr. Ward was also invited 'by the Commis- 
 sioners to proceed to the mouth of the Pei-ho. 
 
 "Blood is Thicker than Water" 
 
 Upon Mr. Ward's arrival in the U. S. frigate Powhatan 
 (Commodore Josiah Tattnall) June 21, he was notified by 
 Admiral Hope that the mouth of the river had been ob- 
 structed with barriers. The British Admiral had issued an 
 ultimatum to the authorities stating that unless they them- 
 selves removed the barriers, he would have it done, accord- 
 ing to instructions received from the allied envoys. Mr. 
 Ward thereupon found himself faced with a dilemma similar 
 to that which had confronted Mr. Reed at the same place 
 the year before and he, also, decided that he must adopt 
 an independent course of action.^ The American minister 
 sought to announce to the Chinese authorities his presence 
 and purpose. In this he was unsuccessful and the next day, 
 June 24, in company with Commodore Tattnall, he set out 
 in the Toeywan, a small chartered steamer, for the mouth of 
 the river with a view to passing the barrier in front of the 
 forts. It was his intention to proceed until he was stopped, 
 but the Toeywan ran aground in a falling tide. The British 
 gun-boat Plover came alongside, and warned the American 
 party that they were in danger of being fired upon. The 
 commanding officer offered the services of the Plover to 
 Commodore Tattnall, and suggested that the party trans- 
 ship to the gun-boat, proposing that Tattnall hoist the 
 American flag at the Plover's peak. This offer was declined. 
 
WARD AND TATTNALL— RATIFICATIONS 339 
 
 The Plover was unable to pull off the Toeywan, which was 
 lying well inside the line of the British war vessels. A 
 message was sent to the shore stating that the American 
 minister was in the Toeywan and that he was on his way to 
 Peking. The Chinese replied that passage by way of the 
 river was prohibited, that there was no officer present who 
 could receive a communication. They stated that it was 
 rumored that the Governor General of Chihli had been 
 instructed to meet the envoys at the north entrance to the 
 river, some ten miles above. That evening the Toeywan 
 floated and dropped down below the line of British war 
 vessels. 
 
 During the night the British made some ineffectual 
 efforts to blow up the barrier, and the following afternoon 
 when the British admiral started to ascend the river with 
 two gun-boats the forts opened fire and the battle com- 
 menced. The forts had been rebuilt and greatly strength- 
 ened since their destruction the year before by the allied 
 forces, and the English and French, quite unprepared for 
 so great a resistance, found the battle going against them. 
 About five o'clock the report reached Commodore Tattnall, 
 who with his party was witnessing the fray, that Admiral 
 Hope had been seriously wounded. Then ensued the soon 
 internationally famous "Blood-is-thicker-than-water" epi- 
 sode. 
 
 During the progress of the battle an English officer in 
 charge of a junk loaded with British troops who had not 
 been ordered to advance, came on board the Toeywan for a 
 better view of the battle. As the struggle began to go 
 against the allies he let it be known, although he did not 
 directly ask for aid, that he wished to get his junk up to the 
 line of battle but was unable to do so on account of the 
 strength of the tide.^° Commodore Tattnall conferred with 
 Mr. Ward and the latter gave his unqualified approval to 
 the suggestion that the Commodore offer the assistance of 
 the Toeywan to tow up the reserves in the junks. Accord- 
 ingly Tattnall transferred Mr. Ward and his suite to one of 
 the barges still at anchor, and offered his services to the 
 
340 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 officer of the other barges to tow them into action. The 
 offer was gladly accepted. 
 
 When the Commodore reached the battle, knowing that 
 Admiral Hope was wounded, his sense of the kinship of 
 Caucasian blood got the better of what little sense of neu- 
 trality had remained and, jumping into his boat, he ordered 
 the crew to pull him away to the Cormorant where he found 
 Admiral Hope utterly exhausted from his wound. In the 
 process of coming alongside the British gun-boat Tattnall's 
 barge was struck by a shot from the forts and the coxswain 
 was killed. While another barge was being found to return 
 the American party to the Toeywan, and while Commodore 
 Tattnall was extending his sympathy to Admiral Hope the 
 American sailors, by the Commodore's orders, assisted their 
 British companions and helped to serve the guns.* Tattnall 
 returned to the Toeywan and again towed up some barges, 
 and later in the evening when the British stormed the forts 
 the Commodore ran the Toeywan in towards shore and took 
 a number of British fugitives on board. 
 
 Three days later, "determined to leave no effort untried 
 to carry into effect the strongly expressed wishes of the 
 President" Mr. Ward sent some members of his suite in the 
 Toeywan to find the other entrance to the river to which he 
 had been already directed. Meanwhile the Chinese authori- 
 ties on their own initiative communicated to Mr. Ward that 
 the way to Peking by way of Pehtang was open to him. 
 
 The British and French ministers, immediately after the 
 battle at Taku, broke off negotiations with the Chinese and 
 returned to Shanghai, strongly urging Mr. Ward to do Hke- 
 wise. 
 
 The American Minister Goes to Peking 
 
 Mr. Ward, now relying on the provisions of the Ameri- 
 can treaty alone, announced to the Chinese that he wished 
 
 *The most reasonable explanation of this episode is to be found in the 
 fact that the struggle of the allied forces with the Chinese had assumed in the 
 eyes of both Tattnall and Ward, who were Southerners, the aspect of a conflict 
 of color. An eye-witness of the episode recorded in Jois diary that Commodore 
 Tattnall finally exclaimed : "Blood is thicker than water" and that he'd "be 
 damned if he'd stand by and see white men butchered before his eyes. No, 
 sir ; old Tattnall isn't that kind, sir. This is the cause of humanity. Is that 
 boat ready? Tell the men there is no need of side-arms."" 
 
WARD AND TATTNALL— RATIFICATIONS 341 
 
 to proceed to Peking upon important business, viz., the 
 ratification of the treaty. In thus resting his case he was 
 on solid ground, and he met with no opposition from the 
 Imperial officers. However, his inexperience in China, 
 coupled probably with his unwillingness to take the advice 
 of Dr. Williams, soon placed him in difficulties which a more 
 experienced diplomat might have avoided. The treaty pro- 
 vided that the Chinese authorities should arrange for the 
 conveyance of the minister to the capital — a provision which 
 they were glad to comply with for the manner of the first 
 entrance of an American envoy to Peking was to them an 
 important matter. Mr. Ward should have demanded that 
 sedan chairs be provided for the journey, for this was the 
 customary mode of conveyance for the highest officers of 
 the government. Being ignorant of this fact, or not realiz- 
 ing its importance, he consented that the party be conveyed 
 in carts. Thus the first American envoy and his suite to 
 enter the Imperial capital proceeded thither in equipages 
 similar to those in which rode the Korean and other tribute- 
 bearing envoys in their periodical journeys to Peking, and 
 to the inhabitants en route, as well as to the populace of the 
 city, the party was represented as coming to pay tribute 
 to the Son of Heaven.* ^^ 
 
 Having reached Peking, Mr. Ward made another mis- 
 take in immediately yielding to the desires of the Chinese 
 that the mission should not go abroad in the city until after 
 the audience with the Emperor. Furthermore, although the 
 American flag had been brought along, it was not permitted 
 to be flown over the temporary legation building. Indeed 
 the American minister and his suite were practically pris- 
 oners, denied the privilege of going out of the house, and 
 not permitted to communicate freely with even the Russian 
 minister,^^ 
 
 Aside from these two criticisms on points which would 
 in prospect seem unimportant to one not familiar with 
 
 *William W. Rockhill states, although giving no authority for the assertion : 
 "Here [Pehtang] he landed and was taken to Peking, part of the way in carts 
 and part in boats ; but over the carts and boats floated an ominous little yellow 
 pennant with the words : 'Tribute-bearers from the United States.' " There 
 is no question but that the mission was so represented to the Chinese people. 
 
342 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 previous visits of embassies to Peking, Mr. Ward conHucted 
 himself with credit. The Chinese decUned to discuss the 
 matter of the exchange of ratifications until the question of 
 the details of the audience with the Emperor had been fixed. 
 The Imperial authorities demanded a modified kotow 
 from Mr. Ward when he should be presented to his Imperial 
 Majesty. Mr. Ward replied with firmness as well as in a 
 characteristically Southern manner that although he was 
 willing to 'bend the body and slightly crook the right knee,' 
 he was accustomed to kneel only to God and woman .^* 
 Although the Chinese persisted, Mr. Ward remained ada- 
 mant on the subject of the kotow and no satisfactory com- 
 promise could be reached. In the course of the prolonged 
 discussion it became apparent that the Emperor was really 
 more eager to see the envoy than the latter was to see his 
 Imperial Highness.^ ^ At length Mr. Ward, his patience 
 exhausted, demanded that conveyances be provided for his 
 departure from the capital. Reluctantly the Chinese agreed, 
 and the ratifications were exchanged at Pehtang at the con- 
 clusion of the journey to the coast. 
 
 After the exchange of ratifications the Chinese brought 
 in an 'American prisoner' who had been captured at Taku 
 in June.^*' This prisoner had been to the Chinese an evi- 
 dence that in the battle of Taku the Americans had joined 
 with the allies, and no doubt this conviction that the Ameri- 
 cans had not maintained their neutrality had been a great 
 obstacle to Mr. Ward's negotiations at Peking. But the 
 American prisoner proved to be a Canadian who had not 
 only asserted that he was a citizen of the United States, but 
 had also told the Chinese that he had been one of a party of 
 no less than two hundred Americans who had joined in the 
 fight. The lack of truth in these assertions was satisfactorily 
 proven to the Chinese authorities. Mr. Ward then revealed 
 rather more kindliness of nature than the situation required 
 by offering to take the Canadian to Shanghai and to restore 
 him to his countrymen. 
 
 Immediately upon the conclusion of the ceremonies, the 
 American envoy and his suite departed from Pehtang, 
 
WARD AND TATTNALL— RATIFICATIONS 343 
 
 arriving at Shanghai August 22, 1859. From this place Mr. 
 Ward reported to the Secretary of State: ^^ 
 
 "The disastrous result of the battle of the Pei-ho has done much 
 to unsettle the condition of things in China. The whole manner and 
 bearing of the Chinese population towards the foreigners have been 
 changed, and the people of this place have been for weeks past under 
 the painful apprehension of an outbreak and an attack upon the for- 
 eign settlement." 
 
 Late in 1860 Mr. Ward retired from China, hastening 
 home to take part in the secession. The post of United 
 States Minister in China remained vacant until the appoint- 
 ment of Anson Burlingame the following year. 
 
 Commodore Tattnall received the approval of the Secre- 
 tary of the Navy for his conduct at Taku and President 
 Buchanan, in reporting the conclusion of the settlement 
 with China, complacently stated: ^^ 
 
 "Our minister to China, in obedience to his instructions, has re- 
 mained perfectly neutral in the war between Great Britain and 
 France and the Chinese Empire, although, in conjunction with the 
 Russian minister, he was ever ready and willing, had the opportunity 
 offered, to employ his good offices in restoring peace between the 
 parties. It is but an act of simple justice, both to our present minister 
 and his predecessor, to state that they have proved fully equal to the 
 delicate, trying, and responsible positions in which they have on 
 different occasions been placed." 
 
 The story of the second Anglo-French War with China 
 does not require telling. In August, 1860, the allied forces 
 landed at Pehtang. Having captured the Taku forts they 
 advanced to Tientsin. Rapidly the allies forced their way 
 towards Peking. The Emperor fled to his hunting lodge at 
 Jehol. Early in October the British and French forces 
 reached the capital, sacked the Summer Palace, and were 
 admitted without further fighting to Peking. The Summer 
 Palace, already gutted of its priceless contents, was ordered 
 burned as a further ocular demonstration that the British 
 Government in Asia might not safely be trifled with. In 
 the ensuing settlements, additional indemnity was agreed 
 to, the unreserved right of diplomatic residence in Peking 
 was conceded, the French secured additional concessions for 
 the Roman Catholic missionaries, and Tientsin was added 
 
344 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 to the list of open ports. Early in November the allied 
 troops withdrew from the city. 
 
 Beyond a doubt the great Empire of China was now 
 opened, for ill and for good, to the Western World. 
 
 Inasmuch as the close of the second Anglo-French War 
 with China, and the retirement of Ward as American minis- 
 ter mark the close of a period in the relations of the United 
 States with China, a brief summary is in order. 
 
 The war, although it had produced no effect whatever 
 on the great mass of the Chinese Empire, had shattered the 
 old system by which the Peking Government had been able 
 to transact the affairs of its international relations through 
 the southern port of Canton. While in retirement at Jehol 
 the Emperor Hienfeng died (August 22, 1861). By means 
 of a silent revolution within the court, Prince Kung, brother 
 of Hienfeng, and uncle of the boy emperor, Tungshih, be- 
 came president of a newly created Board of Foreign Affairs. 
 Prince Kung had already come into contact with the 
 foreigners in the negotiations for the ratification of the 
 treaties in 1860 and, while by no means a liberal or enlight- 
 ened statesman, he recognized the necessity of conciliating 
 the determined foreigners. Associated with the prince were 
 Kweiliang, one of the commissioners who had met the 
 foreigners at Tientsin in 1858, and Wensiang, the ablest 
 modern Chinese statesman until the rise of Li Hung Chang. 
 At the same time the two dowager empresses assumed the 
 regency and the empress mother Yehonala, sometimes called 
 the Empress of the Western Palace to distinguish her from 
 the less able and aggressive Empress Consort who lived in 
 the Eastern Palace, entered upon her remarkable regime in 
 Chinese affairs. 
 
 For the United States also the year 1861 marks many 
 important changes. Among the American merchants the 
 pre-treaty traditions of old Canton had entirely disappeared. 
 A new kind of international trade competition had arisen 
 in which the merchants of other nations could bring to their 
 help a political and military support such as the American 
 Government was quite unwilling to render to its nationals. 
 
WARD AND TATTNALL— RATIFICATIONS 345 
 
 The international situation, hitherto relatively simple, with 
 France appearing as the obliging and retiring ally of Great 
 Britain, was changing. Great Britain and France were 
 falling apart as a result of Palmerston policies in Europe. 
 Other European nations were stirring. Russia had at length 
 come into actual contact with the European powers in the 
 Far East. Within the next ten years six other nations, 
 Germany, Portugal, Denmark, Spain, Holland and Italy, 
 were to conclude treaties with China. In place of the old 
 conciliatory policies of Canton had come an intense inter- 
 national rivalry and trade conflict which the American Gov- 
 ernment, much against its will, had been forced to consider. 
 The United States was not free to select and follow a policy 
 in accord with its earlier traditions. It must enter inter- 
 national politics in China or forfeit its place in the trade. 
 In the treaty of 1858 the United States had compromised its 
 traditional principles for the sake of holding its place in the 
 international competition. The treaty was not such as Mr. 
 Reed would have liked to make. Mr. Ward in China was 
 like a lost soul not knowing to what world he belonged, and 
 probably much more interested in the developments of the 
 Secession than in the task in hand. 
 
 That American policy in China from 1854 to 1860 did 
 not correctly express the American people becomes very 
 evident when we compare it with the policy of the United 
 States in Japan where the Americans, still following the 
 cooperative policy, had none the less the acknowledged 
 leadership. 
 
 BIBLIOGKAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. The Ward Correspondence is printed, in part, in S. Ex. Doc. 
 
 No. 30 :36-l, in the same volume with the Reed Correspondence. 
 
 2. Poster: "American Diplomacy in the Orient," p. 245. 
 
 3. Ward Corres., p. 575. 
 
 4. Ihid., pp. 577-9. 
 
 5. Ihid., pp. ,581-5. 
 ^^. Ihid., p. 611. 
 
 7. Ward Corres., p. 593. 
 
 8. Williams' Journal, p. 143 
 
 9. Ward Corres., p. 586. 
 
346 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 10. Williams' Journal, pp. 120 ff. 
 
 11. Private papers of Rear Admiral Stephen Decatur Trenchard, 
 
 U. S. Navy, ed. by Edgar Stanton Maclay : U. 8. Naval Insti- 
 tute Proceedings, Vol. 40, pp. 1085 ff. 
 
 12. William W. Rockhill: "Diplomatic Missions to the Court of 
 
 China": Amer. Hist. Beview, July, 1897, p. 638. 
 
 13. Williams' Journal, pp. 169 ff. 
 
 14. Foster : "American Diplomacy in the Orient," p. 250. 
 
 15. Williams' Journal, p. 184. 
 
 16. Ward Corres., p. 598. 
 
 17. lUd., p. 618. 
 
 18. Richardson's Messages, Vol. 5, p. 643 (Annual Message, Dec. 3, 
 
 1860). 
 
CHAPTER XIX 
 
 THE POLICY or TOWNSEND HAKRIS IN JAPAN 
 
 Before considering the policy of Townsend Harris in 
 Japan which was being written into a treaty engagement at 
 the very time Reed was proceeding to the Pei-ho in the 
 company of the fleets of France and England, and was being 
 applied at the time Ward and Tattnall were participating 
 in the attack at Taku in 1859, it will be well to review some 
 of the fundamental differences between China and Japan as 
 the two nations faced the future in 1858. 
 
 The Chinese Empire, notwithstanding the despotism of 
 the Manchus, a state religion and a common classical litera- 
 ture was conspicuously lacking in unity. It was sprawled 
 over half a continent, divided by great mountain ranges and 
 deserts, without the means of rapid communication, speak- 
 ing no common language, and permitting such large degree 
 of provincial and local autonomy as greatly weakened the 
 central authority. Japan, on the other hand, was small and 
 compact, had relatively easy communications, a common 
 spoken as well as written language, and while there was also 
 a decentralized government as in China, yet the form of 
 decentralization was feudalistic and gave to the government 
 of the Shogun a representative character which was wholly 
 lacking in China. The Shogun was compelled to take coun- 
 sel with the feudal nobles who constituted a territorial 
 representation in the government. The Chinese adminis- 
 tration was in the hands of a mandarinate recruited by an 
 impractical system of civil service : the only form of protest 
 available for the people was either riot or rebellion. The 
 decision of the Shogun rested more nearly than that of the 
 Chinese Emperor on the will of the people. Japan, a com- 
 pact Empire, possessed a very lively patriotism such as was 
 
 347 
 
348 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 impossible in decentralized China ruled by an alien dynasty. 
 The Chinese system of government had repressed the devel- 
 opment of political leadership, while the Japanese system 
 had the effect of cultivating and encouraging it. In 1858 
 China was without competent leaders, while Japan had 
 many of exceptional ability. To all these advantages in 
 favor of Japan must be added the presence of a military 
 spirit and tradition such as the needs of a small and secluded 
 and feudalistic nation demanded, and such as China had not 
 required and had indeed discouraged. Japan, less exposed 
 because of her isolation and relative poverty, was vastly 
 better prepared than China in 1858 to meet the onrush of 
 Western aggression. 
 
 Appointment of Townsend Harris — Instructions and 
 Treaty with Siam 
 
 Townsend Harris ^ had been a merchant in New York 
 City, distinguished for his public spirit and service. He had 
 been president of the Board of Education and was "a sound, 
 reliable and influential Democrat." Giving up his business 
 in New York he sailed for San Francisco in May, 1849, in a 
 vessel of which he was part owner, and later embarked upon 
 a leisurely trading enterprise in the Pacific and Indian 
 oceans. On Christmas, 1849, he was *'at sea in the North 
 Pacific Ocean"; 1850, at Manila; 1851, at Penang; 1852, at 
 Singapore; 1853, at Hongkong; 1854, at Calcutta. His 
 enterprises, while at first successful, ended in failure, and in 
 1853, describing himself as a resident of Hongkong, he 
 applied for the position of American consul at either Hong- 
 kong or Canton;- Notwithstanding the efforts of influential 
 friends in the United States he was assigned to the consu- 
 late at Ningpo (August 2, 1854) an unimportant and trivial 
 post with a remuneration of $1000 for judicial services and 
 such fees as the slight American trade at that port afforded. 
 Harris, whose face was already turned towards home, ap- 
 pointed a missionary. Dr. D. C. Macgowan, as acting consul, 
 and set out for New York.^ Immediately upon his arrival 
 
THE POLICY OF TOWNSEND HARRIS IN JAPAN 349 
 
 he secured the interest of his New York friends on behalf of 
 a possible appointment to the newly created post of consul- 
 general in Japan. To President Pierce he wrote (August 4, 
 1855) : "I have a perfect knowledge of the social banish- 
 ment I must endure while in Japan, and the mental isola- 
 tion in which I must live, and am prepared to meet it." 
 He stated that even though he were offered the choice 
 between the posts of commissioner to China and consul- 
 general to Japan, he would "instantly take the latter." 
 His efforts were successful, and within two weeks after his 
 arrival in New York, he had received his appointment which 
 was later confirmed by the Senate. 
 
 Harris was a man of urbanity, character and ability. 
 While living at Hongkong he appears to have won the confi- 
 dence and friendship of Sir John Bowring, and to have 
 attracted the attention of Commodore Perry. He was also 
 a friend of William E. Seward, then senator from New 
 York.* As to convictions in Far Eastern policy Harris ap- 
 pears to have occupied a middle position between Perry and 
 Parker, on the one side, and Cushing and the early Canton 
 traders on the other. He thought, for example, the United 
 States ought to acquire Formosa, but he would have had the 
 acquisition made by purchase, and so recommended in a 
 letter to Marcy.^ 
 
 To the duties of the American representative in Japan 
 were added those of special agent to secure a new treaty 
 with Siam which was to be negotiated while en route to 
 Shimoda. The motives of President Pierce in making the 
 appointment were expressed by Marcy (September 12, 
 1855) as follows: "The President entertained the hope that 
 by your knowledge of Eastern character and your general 
 intelligence and experience in business you would make such 
 an impression upon the Japanese as would in time induce 
 them to enter into a commercial treaty with us." "^ Marcy 
 did not outline specifically the sort of treaty which was 
 desired but referred him to a draft of the proposed treaty 
 with Siam, the stipulations of which would be satisfactory 
 for a treaty with Japan — "at least for a beginning." 
 
350 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 In addition to the written instructions Marcy appears to 
 have given some verbal ones, including the necessity for 
 securing extraterritoriality which had not been included in 
 either the Roberts treaty with Siam or the Perry treaty with 
 Japan. Marcy was somewhat apologetic about this stipula- 
 tion which, he said, was necessary because the Senate would 
 not ratify a treaty in which it was lacking.* 
 
 The Roberts treaty with Siam, while stipulating the 
 omission of all tariff duties, had been of little value to 
 American trade because the tonnage dues — the only charge 
 for foreign trade, and exactly similar to those which had 
 been included in the preceding British treaty — were so 
 excessive as to exclude practically all foreign trade. A few 
 years after the signing of the Roberts treaty a system of 
 monopolies had been created in Siam which had still further 
 retarded the trade. In 1849 Joseph Balestier,^ consul at 
 Singapore, had been appointed a special envoy to negotiate 
 treaties with Siam, Cochin China, Borneo, Subi, Bally and 
 Lambok Islands, as well as with the pepper coast of Suma- 
 tra. He was instructed to make a new treaty with Siam, 
 correcting the tonnage dues and securing the right to ap- 
 point a consul at Bankok. Balestier's negotiations had 
 come to nothing because of his ill temper. The Siamese 
 had sent a message to the American Government through 
 the missionaries and American naval officers which, after 
 remarking that Balestier was a "person of much excitabil- 
 ity" said: 
 
 "Should the high ministers of the United States of America 
 appoint an officer hereafter to come here for friendly negotiations it 
 is requested that they may appoint an efficient, prudent and well dis- 
 posed person, not inclined to anger, but like Mr. Roberts." 
 
 American interests in Siam in 1855 were largely mission- 
 ary, there having been American Protestant missionaries 
 
 *In a letter many years later Harris stated : "The provision of the treaty 
 giving the right of extraterritoriality to all Americans in Japan was against 
 my conscience. In a conversation with Governor Marcy, the Secretary of State 
 in 1855, he strongly condemned it as an unjust interference with the municipal 
 law of a country which no western nation would tolerate for a moment ; but 
 he said that it would be impossible to have a treaty with an Oriental nation 
 unless it contained that provision. The examples of our treaties with Turkey, 
 Persia, and the Barbary States gave a precedent that the Senate would not 
 overlook." ' 
 
THE POLICY OF TOWNSEND HARRIS IN JAPAN 351 
 
 there for more than twenty years. Harris was therefore 
 instructed to secure for them the treaty right to pursue their 
 work unmolested, but he was cautioned that in Japan the 
 prejudice against missionaries was so great that he would 
 probably not be able to secure missionary liberty. 
 
 The immediate occasion of this new effort to make a 
 treaty with Siam was the recent project of Great Britain for 
 a new treaty. Harris was cautioned that he might expect 
 to find the Siamese somewhat alarmed at the prospect of 
 European aggression and he was therefore instructed to 
 make clear the distinctions between the traditional foreign 
 policies of the United States and Great Britain. Marcy 
 wrote: ^ 
 
 "It is obvious . . . that you will be at no loss for argument to 
 show the difference between the foreign policies especially of this 
 country and Great Britain. While the latter is herself an Eastern 
 Power and as such by the late Burmese war has since become a near 
 neighbor to Siam, we covet no dominions in that quarter. It is 
 undoubtedly in the interest of Siam to be liberal in her commercial 
 policy towards the United States." 
 
 Harris proceeded to England and thence by leisurely 
 stages to India and Ceylon and was picked up by the U. S. 
 frigate San Jacinto at Penang.^" The expedition arrived at 
 the anchorage of the Menam River April 16, 1856. At Ban- 
 kok Mr. Harry Parkes was just concluding the ratifications 
 of the British treaty which had been negotiated by Sir John 
 Bowring, and Harris experienced no difficulty in effecting a 
 similar compact in which extraterritoriality was granted, 
 the rate of import tariff fixed at 3 per cent, and export 
 duties determined according to a schedule attached to the 
 treaty. Revision could be effected at the end of ten years at 
 the desire of either party. Opium was to be admitted free 
 of all duty, but could be sold only to the "opium farmer'^ 
 or his agents. The Siamese would have been very willing to 
 go very much farther in their treaty with the United States 
 had Harris not discouraged them. Indeed they wished an 
 alliance, or protectorate. Harris reported: ^^ 
 
 "In my confidential interviews with the ministers, they expressed 
 both fear and hatred of England. They read in the history of Burmah 
 
352 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 the fate that probably awaits them, and which they consider only a 
 question of time. 
 
 "They were most anxious to be taken under the protection of the 
 United States. They plainly told me that if I would make a treaty 
 of alliance they would give us all we could ask, even to a monopoly 
 of the trade." 
 
 Upon leaving Siam Harris appointed as consul Rev. 
 Stephen Mattoon, a missionary who had been there ten 
 years. The treaty was at first an impetus to trade. Russell 
 and Company established a branch at Bankok, and other 
 American traders appeared, but the large extension of the 
 open ports in China after the treaty of 1858 appears to have 
 curtailed the development of the trade with Bankok. Rus- 
 sell and Company soon withdrew its representative. There 
 was delay in securing a suitable consul for the post; Con- 
 gress made no provision for a salary, and the fees were 
 hardly sufficient to cover the necessary boat hire. Ameri- 
 can relations with Siam did not become important. How- 
 ever the negotiations had given Harris some practice in 
 treaty-making and many of the provisions of the treaty 
 between England and Siam appeared again in the first com- 
 nlercial treaty between the United States and Japan two 
 years later. 
 
 Arrival of Harris in Japan — Convention of 1857 
 
 The San Jacinto, after many prolonged delays due to 
 defective machinery, arrived at Shimoda with Townsend 
 Harris August 21, 1856. The consul general was not wel- 
 come. The Japanese officials protested that the Perry treaty 
 did not require them to receive him; they asked him to 
 leave ; they asked him to write to his government requesting 
 his recall, and they begged Commodore Armstrong to take 
 him away ; all in vain. After setting up a flagstaff in front 
 of the temple which the Japanese at length placed at his 
 disposal for a residence, and after landing the envoy with a 
 salute of thirteen guns, yards manned, the San Jacinto 
 sailed away and left him — to be unvisited by any naval 
 vessel for fourteen months. Harris was without communi- 
 
 ll 
 
THE POLICY OF TOWNSEND HARRIS IN JAPAN 353 
 
 cations from the Department of State for eighteen months. 
 No representative of the American Government was ever 
 left more to his own devices. 
 
 The treaty situation at that time was as follows: ^^ 
 Admiral Sir James Sterling had concluded a convention 
 similar to Perry's in October, 1854. It contained a most- 
 favored-nation clause and also a stipulation for elementary 
 extraterritoriality. This treaty was as little satisfactory to 
 Great Britain as the Perry treaty was to Americans, and at 
 Hongkong Sir John Bowring had told Harris that he had 
 received a commission to proceed to Japan with a large 
 naval force to demand and secure the complete opening of 
 the empire to foreign trade. Bowring had given Harris per- 
 mission to use this information freely in his own peaceful 
 negotiations. However, the disturbances in China, the 
 Indian Mutiny, and the then unformed state of British 
 policy in China were to delay the expedition contemplated 
 for Bowring for nearly two years. 
 
 Twenty months after the conclusion of the Perry treaty 
 the Dutch representative, Donker Curtius, was able to 
 effect a "preliminary Convention of Commerce," thus carry- 
 ing out a project which the Netherlands had tried to accom- 
 plish in 1844. Sir John Bowring had given to Harris a copy 
 of this convention. It marked several notable advances in 
 concessions for foreigners. In addition to extraterritoriality, 
 and greatly enlarged personal freedom, the island of 
 Deshima at Nagasaki, which had served the Dutch traders 
 at once as a prison and trading post for two centuries, was 
 to be sold outright to the Netherlands factory, thus estab- 
 lishing the precedent for the sale of land to foreigners for 
 residence and trade. The convention also mentioned the 
 fact that the Dutch were permitted to reside at Nagasaki. 
 
 The Netherlands envoy secured a more elaborate com- 
 mercial treaty which was signed January 30, 1856, eight 
 months before the arrival of Harris. This treaty permitted 
 the Dutch to bring their wives and children to the open 
 ports, and there was a stipulation that they should be 
 allowed ''to practice their own or the Christian religion 
 
354 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 within their buildings." Import duties were fixed at 35 per 
 cent, but the export duties were left undetermined. These 
 agreements, consisting of a treaty, additional articles and a 
 "supplement to additional articles," were not ratified when 
 Harris arrived. 
 
 The Russians also had been active. Count Putiatin, 
 who had first appeared at Nagasaki shortly after the con- 
 clusion of Perry's first visit to the Bay of Yedo, and who had 
 vainly sought the cooperation of Perry in a joint expedition 
 for 1854,^^ concluded a treaty of "commerce, navigation and 
 delimitation" at Shimoda, in January, 1855. Aside from 
 opening three ports — Nagasaki, Shimoda and Hakodate — 
 stipulation for the residence of consuls at the two latter 
 places, and bilateral extraterritoriality, the convention fixed 
 the boundaries of the two nations, assigning the island of 
 Urup to Russia, Iturup and the Kuriles to Japan, and 
 leaving the two empires in joint occupation of Sakhalin. 
 Russia then proceeded to further explorations of Sakhalin 
 and discovered coal mines which led to Russian attempts to 
 abrogate the joint possession of the island.^'* However, the 
 ratifications of the Putiatin treaty were exchanged at 
 Shimoda shortly after the arrival of Harris. Japan was 
 probably even more alarmed at the advances of Russia than 
 she was at the Anglo-French war with China. 
 
 Townsend Harris, left alone at Shimoda except for the 
 companionship of his interpreter, C. J. Heusken, a natural- 
 ized Hollander who had been selected because Dutch was 
 the language of diplomacy in Japan, proceeded slowly. 
 Shimoda was wholly unsuited to either trade or diplomacy. 
 It was the seat of a large stone quarry, but was without pro- 
 duce suitable for export, and was shut off from the surround- 
 ing country by almost impassable hills. The harbor was 
 small and had been rendered nearly useless by a tidal wave 
 which the year before had removed nearly all the "holding 
 ground" from the bottom of the bay, and had wrecked com- 
 pletely the Russian corvette Diana. The spot had obviously 
 been selected by the Japanese because of its inaccessibility. 
 It was certainly not a favorable point from which to nego- 
 
THE POLICY OF TOWNSEND HARRIS IN JAPAN 355 
 
 tiate a new treaty with Yedo. Harris' first impression of 
 the Japanese officials was unpleasant. While he became 
 convinced that the common people were ready to welcome 
 the foreigner, he regarded the officials as "the greatest liars 
 on earth" and told them as much. And yet he set out to 
 win their confidence and good will and so far succeeded as 
 to be able to sign a convention June 17, 1857, in which the 
 Japanese conceded directly by treaty what had by inference 
 from the most-favored-nation clause of the Perry treaty 
 accrued to the Americans in the British, Russian and Dutch 
 conventions. These concessions were: the opening of 
 Nagasaki as a port of call; the right to have a vice consul 
 at Hakodate; extraterritoriality and the right of residence 
 at Shimoda and Hakodate ; the privilege of paying for ship's 
 supplies in "goods" in case money were not available; and 
 settlement of a new basis for exchange which fixed the 
 value of the Japanese ichibu* at 34i/^ cents, whereas under 
 the Perry convention it had been valued at a dollar in 
 silver. The convention also abrogated the agreement of 
 the Perry treaty which had placed all trade under the im- 
 mediate supervision of the government, and greatly en- 
 larged the personal freedom of Harris by admitting that 
 he had the right in his official capacity to travel beyond 
 the limits of seven n which had been fixed in the Perry 
 treaty. While the new convention was not as explicit as the 
 Dutch treaty in matters of commercial privilege and resi- 
 dence, it contained greater concessions than had been ex- 
 pected by the American Government in 1855 when Secre- 
 tary Marcy had issued his instructions to Harris. f 
 
 Harris at Yedo 
 
 The work of Townsend Harris at Shimoda deserves a 
 more honored place in American history than it has re- 
 ceived. His health failed as his supplies became exhausted, 
 
 * Ichibu=one hu; a 6m being a certain weight of silver or gold, not a coin. 
 
 tThe treaty was duly ratified June 15, 1858, by advice of the Senate. It 
 has been confused by at least one British historian with the amplified treaty of 
 commerce of 1858." 
 
356 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 and his government neglected him. At length he was re- 
 duced to little more than a Japanese diet which nearly cost 
 him his life. He was without medical attention when it 
 was urgently needed, and he was "as one may say in a 
 prison — a large one it is true — but still a prison." Not- 
 withstanding the handicaps laid upon him and the obvious 
 intentions of the authorities to thwart his purpose, we see 
 him entering the capital city of Yedo (November 30, 1857) 
 five and one-half months after signing the convention, with 
 the promise that he should be permitted to deliver in per- 
 son the letter from President Pierce to the Shogun. It was 
 an extraordinary achievement in which he had surrendered 
 no particle of the official dignity of his position and had 
 won his way by argument and by absolute candor. The 
 contrast between Commissioner Ward's entry into Peking 
 and Consul-General Harris' entry into Yedo is striking. The 
 honor accorded to Harris was, however, a mark of the 
 greater political astuteness of the Japanese Government as 
 well as of the finer diplomatic skill of the New York mer- 
 chant. Yedo had read correctly the designs of Russia, while 
 Peking, wholly deceived, had taken the Russian envoy to 
 her bosom; the mere intimation of British intentions in 
 Japan had been alarming, while the destruction of the Taku 
 forts in 1858 by the allied British and French forces had 
 been dismissed by the Manchu Government with fatuous 
 indifference. 
 
 Harris was not content at Yedo with the delivery of the 
 President's letter ; he had come to make a commercial treaty 
 with the Shogun's government, and before the end of Feb- 
 ruary, 1858, he had succeeded in securing the approval of 
 the Yedo officials to a satisfactory draft. 
 
 The arguments which Harris used are a clear revelation 
 of his policy.^" Intercourse with the United States, he said, 
 should consist of free commerce and diplomatic representa- 
 tion. By means of steam navigation California was only 
 eighteen days removed from Japan, and by means of the 
 transcontinental telegraph another hour would carry a mes- 
 sage to Washington. "To acquire possessions in Asia/' 
 
 I 
 
THE POLICY OF TOWNSEND HARRIS IN JAPAN 357 
 
 stated Harris, remembering the failure of the American 
 Government to act on the suggestions to acquire Formosa, 
 and the denial of admission of the Sandwich Islands to the 
 United States in 1854, "is prohibited by the government." 
 Not only did the United States have no territorial ambi- 
 tions, but it was even contrary to American policy to join 
 alliances with other Western powers which had designs in 
 Asia. He mentioned the refusal of Presidents Pierce and 
 Buchanan to enter into an alliance with Great Britain and 
 France in the existing war in China. He warned Japan that 
 Great Britain had designs on Formosa, and that France 
 wanted Korea, and expressed the opinion that if China did 
 not now surrender to their allied arms, the two Western 
 nations would probably divide China between them.* 
 
 "Misfortunes are now threatening Japan," stated Harris in effect, 
 "in consequence of the state of things in England and the European 
 states. England is not satisfied with the treaty made with Japan 
 by Admiral Sir James Sterling. The English Government hopes to 
 hold the same kind of intercourse with Japan as she holds with other 
 nations, and is ready to make war on Japan, as I will now show. 
 England greatly fears Russia will disturb her East Indian possessions. 
 Quite lately England and France united to fight against Russia be- 
 cause the latter was disposed to annex other countries. England does 
 not want Russia to hold Sakhalin and the Amur. England fears that 
 Russia will take possession of Manchuria and China. She may then 
 attack the possessions of England in the East Indies, and then war 
 will break out again between England and Russia. Should Russia do 
 as above indicated, it will become very difficult for England to defend 
 herself, and in order to be in a position to defend herself successfully 
 she desires to take possession of Sakhalin, Yezo and Hakodate. 
 Should England take possession of these places, she will send a large 
 fleet to each place and cut off communications between Petropauloski, 
 the port of Kamtchatka and Sakhalin. England would rather have 
 possession of Yezo than Manchuria." f 
 
 Harris explained to the Japanese that there would be a 
 "great difference between a treaty made with a single in- 
 
 *In making these assertions Harris was doubtless correctly reflecting cur- 
 rent opinion among the foreigners in China at the time he passed through 
 Hongkong on his way from Banl^ok to Shimoda. The dispatches of Commodore 
 Perry and the proposals of Dr. Parker for a joint naval demonstration against 
 China for the acquisition of Formosa, reflected a similar opinion. 
 
 t This is a Japanese version of Harris's argument, and some allowances may 
 be made for misunderstandings in the interpretation which was from English 
 into Dutch and thence into Japanese. That Harris spoke with so much blunt- 
 ness and so little qualification of statement seems unlikely, but that the Japa- 
 nese had caught the main points of his argument seems very probable. Per- 
 haps Harris spoke with the more confidence because of the very free conversa- 
 tions which he had had with Sir John Bowring at Hongkong in 1856. 
 
358 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 dividual unattended, and one made with an envoy who 
 would bring fifty men-of-war to these shores." He warned 
 them against the evils of the opium trade, and recounted 
 what the Siamese had told him of their fears of Great 
 Britain. He explained to them the present condition of 
 India. He even offered the services of American military 
 and naval officers and shipyards, to help Japan strengthen 
 her defenses, and intimated that the United States might 
 be willing to accept a position as mediator in any conflicts 
 which Japan might have with Western powers. In con- 
 clusion Harris argued that Japan's best safeguard against 
 such threatened aggressions was to abandon entirely the 
 policy of seclusion and admit all nations freely to her trade, 
 thus making the rivalries of the Western world her ally in 
 an effort to preserve her integrity. 
 
 Harris's representations, viewed as an expression of Far 
 Eastern policy, were in entire accord with what was already 
 traditional American policy in China. The United States 
 desired to see the Asiatic states sustained and made strong 
 to withstand by their own might the encroachments of the 
 European powers. Americans, argued the American repre- 
 sentatives in China as well as in Japan, were likely to fare 
 better in Asia with the sovereignty and integrity of the 
 Asiatic states preserved, than with the territories divided 
 up among European governments. In short, the United 
 States desired for its citizens an open door to trade, and the 
 surest way to open this door and to keep it open, was on the 
 one hand to persuade the sovereign states of Asia to open 
 their doors, and then to strengthen these states so that they 
 themselves would be able to keep them open. That Harris 
 was correctly representing American policy in Yedo in 1858 
 there can be no doubt, and yet so gradual had been the ac- 
 cumulation of the precedents which had established this 
 policy, and so meagre had been the official utterances of 
 the American Government on the subject, that one will 
 search in vain in the official records for any such declara- 
 tions as we have summarized above. American policy was 
 not a pronouncement ; it was a body of precedent to which 
 
THE POLICY OF TOWNSEND HARRIS IN JAPAN 359 
 
 Harris himself was in his turn making important contri- 
 butions in precision of statement. 
 
 Treaty and Tariff of 1858 
 
 Harris became a teacher of pohtical economy. He pro- 
 ceeded to instruct the Japanese in the theories of economics 
 — theories which he had learned in America rather than in 
 England where the doctrine of Free Trade was more firmly 
 established. He showed them how the revenues of the gov- 
 ernment might be met in part or even wholly by tariffs on 
 foreign trade. He warned them against the evils of export 
 duties, and held up the advantages of a relatively high 
 tariff — and yet not too high. (The Dutch had already fixed 
 the import duties at 35 per cent.) ^^ When the Japanese at 
 length agreed to make such a commercial treaty as he pro- 
 posed, they entrusted to him the duty of devising the tariff, 
 while expressing their preference for a flat 121/2 per cent 
 rate on both exports and imports. Even 121/2 per cent 
 seemed to Harris far too high for ship's supplies which 
 the whaling vessels would require and which constituted 
 at that time the only American trade in view. Harris at 
 length induced the Japanese to agree to a 5 per cent duty 
 on these supplies; 5 per cent on all exports; 35 per cent 
 on imported alcoholic drinks, which he abhorred and which 
 were not an article of American export; and 20 per cent 
 on all other imports. This schedule was a comfortable one 
 for Americans, reducing the import duties on the only ar- 
 ticles which seriously interested American traders to the 
 extent of about 85 per cent. "I have drawn regulations," 
 reported Harris to Cass (August 7, 1858),^^ "with a view 
 to the protection of the revenue, and the tariff is arranged 
 with a view first to secure an income to the Japanese Gov- 
 ernment, and second to enable our whaling ships in the 
 North Pacific Ocean to obtain their supplies on reasonable 
 terms." It was an ingenious device: while American trade 
 was taxed at 5 per cent it left British manufactures at 20 
 per cent and French wines at 35 per cent to provide the bulk 
 
360 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 of the revenue for the Japanese Government. Needless to 
 say the arrangement was quite unsatisfactory to Great Brit- 
 ain and France. Lord Elgin ^^^ a few months later secured 
 a reduction of the tariff to 5 per cent for the bulk of Brit- 
 ish produce, and not long afterwards there were still further 
 reductions. Harris did not approve of this whittling down 
 of the Japanese revenues, and did not appear to see that the 
 English and French were merely applying his own 
 principle.-*' 
 
 The treaty of 1858 between the United States and 
 Japan became the basis of Japan's foreign relations until 
 near the close of the century, just as Cushing's treaty with 
 China had been the basis of China's relations with the treaty 
 powers until it was replaced with Lord Elgin's treaty in 
 1858. The Harris treaty, while including all the advanta- 
 geous terms of the convention of the preceding year, went 
 very much farther in the direction for free diplomatic and 
 commercial intercourse. It consisted of thirty-four articles 
 and seven trade regulations, which included the tariff sched- 
 ule. Some of the details need not be noted, but many of 
 the stipulations are important. 
 
 A diplomatic agent was to be permitted to reside in Yedo, 
 and consular agents were to reside in all the open ports. 
 The diplomatic representatives and the consul general were 
 to have the right to "travel freely" in any part of the Em- 
 pire of Japan. American citizens were to reside perma- 
 nently in the open ports and could "lease ground and pur- 
 chase buildings thereon." Trade was to be free "without 
 the intervention of any Japanese officers." 
 
 It was stipulated that the President of the United 
 States, "at the request of the Japanese Government will 
 act as a friendly mediator in such matters of difference as 
 may arise between the Government of Japan and any Euro- 
 pean power." "There is nothing in this article," wrote 
 Harris in his journal,-^ "that requires a treaty stipulation, 
 but I inserted it to produce an impression on the govern- 
 ment and people and it had that effect." Another article 
 of similar character permitted the Japanese to "purchase 
 
 I 
 
THE POLICY OF TOWNSEND HARRIS IN JAPAN 361 
 
 or construct in the United States ships of war, steamers, 
 merchant ships, whale ships, cannon, munitions of war, 
 arms of all kinds," and to engage ''scientific, naval and mili- 
 tary men, artisans of all kinds, and mariners to enter its 
 service." This article was expected to win the approval 
 of the daimyos whose opposition to a treaty was already 
 making itself felt at Yedo. 
 
 In drafting the treaty Harris went as far in the direc- 
 tion of a political alliance with Japan as he dared. While 
 the Japanese were encouraged to look to the United States 
 for military and naval instructors and supplies, it was agreed 
 that Japan would open the three ports of Yokohoma, Naga- 
 saki and Hakodate as depots of supplies for American naval 
 vessels. Harris felt that this was a great advantage secured 
 to his government because it would make possible the re- 
 moval of the American naval depot at Hongkong. A war 
 between Great Britain and the United States in the Far 
 East seemed to him, as it had to Perry, a possibility. What 
 Perry had sought to accomplish by the appropriation of 
 naval bases at the Bonin and Lew Chew Islands, Harris 
 felt that he had effected by pacific negotiations with the 
 Shogun's ministers. 
 
 Americans in Japan were not only to be permitted the 
 free exercise of their rehgion within their own dwellings, 
 but were to have the right to erect suitable places of wor- 
 ship. Apparently as a concession to Japanese fear of mis- 
 sionaries this article also stipulated that neither Americans 
 nor Japanese were to "do anything that may be calculated 
 to excite religious animosity." The next year Harris, who 
 had become in his lonely exile a very devout man and a 
 great believer in Christian missions, made a strong effort to 
 secure a concession stipulating "full toleration of religion 
 among the Japanese themselves" but failed. However, 
 wrote Harris, "the first blow has been struck." Even then 
 Verbeck was on his way to Japan. 
 
 Harris at first stoutly contended for the opening of eight 
 ports, ^- for the right of residence in Kioto which as the 
 residence of the Mikado was considered as little less than 
 
362 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 holy ground, and for the right of unrestricted travel for all 
 Americans of good character after a residence of one year 
 in the open ports. He was led to abandon the second and 
 third of these contentions when it was represented to him 
 that they might lead to such opposition from the daimyos as 
 would cost him the entire treaty, and he consented to a 
 reduction of the total number of ports to six, to which was 
 added the right of residence for all Americans in Yedo 
 after January 1, 1862. Kanagawa, for which Yokohama 
 was later actually substituted, and Nagasaki were to be 
 opened July 4, 1859; Niigata, or some more suitable port 
 on the northern coast of Hondo, January 1, 1860; and 
 Hiogo, near Osaka, January 1, 1863. 
 
 The tariff was notable, aside from the points already 
 mentioned, in two respects : opium was prohibited as in the 
 Russian and Dutch treaties; and the tariff was a "con- 
 ventional" one, i.e., a part of the treaty in such a way that 
 its revision became a revision of the treaty itself. The 
 treaty, like the British and American treaties with Siam, 
 was subject not to termination at a definite date, but only 
 to "revision" at the end of ten years "upon the desire of 
 either" party, but the tariff was to be subject to revision, 
 if the Japanese desired, five years after the opening of 
 Kanagawa, i.e., July 4, 1864. It was farthest from Harris's 
 intention to fasten upon Japan a 5 per cent tariff which 
 could not be altered except with the consent of the Euro- 
 pean powers, but such was the effect of his treaty, the text 
 of which was accepted by Lord Elgin and later envoys as 
 the basis of the subsequent treaties with other powers. 
 
 As the treaty came from the hands of Harris in the 
 spring of 1858 it was not only more liberal in its provisions 
 than the Gushing treaty with China, but even more liberal 
 than the treaties of Tientsin which had followed the occu- 
 pation of Canton and the destruction of the Taku forts. 
 The treaty was also both in intent and in the textual provi- 
 sions, more just to Japan than the corresponding treaties 
 were to China and also more expedient. Like the Perry 
 treaty it was not a source of rancor among the Japanese. 
 
THE POLICY OF TOWNSEND HARRIS IN JAPAN 363 
 
 As a means of further cementing the good relations between 
 the two nations, it contained the provision, inserted by the 
 Japanese, that the ratifications were to be exchanged in 
 Washington. 
 
 Opposition to the treaty developed so fast during the 
 negotiations, which were concluded about the end of Feb- 
 ruary, that Harris was induced to consent to a delay before 
 the final signatures were affixed in order that the Yedo ofii- 
 cials might have time to secure the assent of the Mikado. 
 While they had "roared with laughter" -^ a few weeks be- 
 fore when Harris had alluded to the supposed Japanese 
 veneration for the Mikado, they now expressed the opinion 
 that the Mikado's assent would add weight to the engage- 
 ment and should be secured if possible. They promised 
 Harris that the signatures would be affixed within sixty 
 days, and told him that if the Mikado refused to confirm 
 the agreement, they were prepared to disregard the Im- 
 perial wishes. On March 10 Harris returned to Shimoda on 
 a Japanese Government steamer, purchased in Holland. 
 He became very ill at Shimoda — so ill that his life was 
 despaired of and he was attended most solicitously by the 
 Shogun's physicians. 
 
 The Harris treaty precipitated a crisis in Japanese do- 
 mestic politics. ^^ The negotiation .of the documents was 
 seized upon by those daimyos who opposed the Shogun and 
 had in mind his overthrow. The consideration of the treaty 
 was thus not permitted to proceed on its merits alone. The 
 Imperial Court, at first almost persuaded to give approval, 
 was then overshadowed by the anti-Tokugawa party and 
 the Mikado's assent was withheld. Most of the daimyos of 
 the Empire had also opposed the proposed abrogation of 
 the policy of seclusion. 
 
 Harris returned to Yedo in April, only to receive assur- 
 ances that the treaty would be signed, but that the date of 
 signing would be further postponed. Meanwhile the Dutch 
 authorities, who had received a copy of the treaty, stood 
 ready to sign one in which would be omitted the clauses 
 and articles which were most objectionable to the Japanese. 
 
364 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 To thwart the Dutch and to save his own treaty, Harris 
 secured a written agreement that the Japanese would not 
 sign any other treaty until thirty days after his was signed. 
 Then he returned again to Shimoda. 
 
 The treaty question was abruptly taken out of domestic 
 politics by the news of the conclusion of the treaties of 
 Tientsin and the reported intention of Lord Elgin to proceed 
 to Yedo immediately. On June 23 and 24, 1858, the 
 U. S. S. Mississippi and Powhatan, respectively, arrived at 
 Shimoda with the news. Harris seized the opportunity, re- 
 turned to the Bay of Yedo with the American naval vessels, 
 and sent a hurried call to Yedo for a conference. The Jap- 
 anese were in consternation. Arriving at the conclusion 
 which Harris had always urged, that it was safer to let the 
 American treaty stand as a model for other treaties than to 
 longer delay, and fortified by a written statement from 
 Harris that he was willing to act as mediator with Great 
 Britain and France, the compact was signed on board the 
 Powhatan July 29, 1858. 
 
 The treaty did not have the approval of the Mikado, 
 and by signing it the Shogun party had laid itself open to 
 the most serious criticisms before the very princes and 
 daimyos who were already seeking means whereby the 
 Tokugawa regime in Japanese affairs might be eliminated. 
 Harris was quite unaware of the extent of the domestic 
 disturbance throughout the Empire to which he had been 
 contributing. 
 
 Three other treaties followed in quick succession: with 
 the Netherlands, August 18; with Russia, August 19; with 
 Great Britain, August 26 ; and with France, October 7. 
 
 While by no means of equal importance with the diplo- 
 macy of Benjamin Franklin, there were qualities in the work 
 of Townsend Harris at Yedo which remind one of Frankhn 
 in London and Paris. Longford, British historian, describes 
 his service as ''not exceeded by any in the entire history of 
 the international relations of the world." ^^ The further 
 diplomatic service of Harris in Yedo will be treated in a 
 later chapter. 
 
THE POLICY OF TOWNSEND HARRIS IN JAPAN 365 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. The primary sources for the life and diplomatic service of Town- 
 
 send Harris are : Japan Despatches, Vols. 1 and 2 (Dept. of 
 State) ; Griffis : "Townsend Harris", which is based on the jour- 
 nals of Harris and includes very generous extracts of them; 
 a typewritten copy of a part of the Harris journal (Library of 
 Congress) ; and the records of the Bureau of Appointments, 
 Dept. of State. Very few of the Harris dispatches to the Dept. 
 of State were ever published, but the extracts from Harris's 
 journal, printed in Griffis's book, are in many cases practically 
 identical with the dispatches. 
 
 2. Records of the Bureau of Appointment, Dept. of State. Grif- 
 
 fis makes an incorrect guess as to the way in which the Harris 
 appointment came about. 
 
 3. Ningpo Letters, Vol. 1, June 22, 1855, Macgowan to Marcy 
 
 (Dept. of State). 
 
 4. Japan Instructions, Vol. 1 (Dept. of State). 
 
 5. Dip. Corres., 1862, p. 822. 
 
 6. Griffis: "Harris," pp. 15, 16. 
 
 7. E. H. House: "The Martyrdom of an Empire," Atlantic Monthly, 
 
 Vol. XLVII, p. 622. 
 
 8. Balestier Corres., S. Ex. Doc. 38 :32-l. 
 
 9. Japan Instructions, Vol. 1, Sept. 12, 1855. 
 
 10. W. M. Wood, U. S. Surgeon on the San Jacinto, wrote a book — 
 
 "Fankwei"; or, "The San Jacinto in the Seas of India, China 
 and Japan," in which eight chapters are devoted to the Harris 
 Mission to Bankok. Japan Dispatches, Vol. 1, Nos. 5-8, con- 
 tain Harris's own reports of the negotiations. 
 
 11. Japan Dispatches, Vol. 1, June 2, 1856. 
 
 12. J. H. Gubbins : "Progress of Japan," 1853-71, reprints in an 
 
 appendix all of these early treaties. 
 
 13. S. Ex. Doc. No. 34 :33-2. 
 
 14. Stead : "Japan by the Japanese," p. 150. 
 
 15. Sir Robert K. Douglas: "Europe and the Far East," p. 155. 
 
 16. "Foreign Relations," 1879, pp. 27 ff. These reports, while no 
 
 doubt based upon inaccurate interpretation, appear to be a 
 reliable record nowhere else obtainable of the negotiations 
 at Yedo. 
 
 17. Gubbins : p. 257. 
 
 18. Japan Dispatches, Vol. 1, Aug. 7, 1858. 
 
 19. The Elgin negotiations are given in the British Parliamentary 
 
 Papers, 1859. 2 Sess. Com. 33. Corres. rel. to the Earl of 
 Elgin's special Mission to China and Japan, 1857-59; see also 
 Oliphant's "Lord Elgin's Mission." 
 
 20. It is hardly fair to place the blame for reducing the tariff exclu- 
 
 sively on Great Britain, as Payson J. Treat does in his gener- 
 ally admirable Early Diplomatic Relations between the United 
 States and Japan, 1853-65, p. 117. 
 
 21. Griffis : "Harris," p. 267. 
 
366 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 22. Harris Journal (Lib. of Cong.), Section III, p. 43. 
 
 23. Ihid., p. 46. 
 
 24. The most thorough reviews, based on Japanese sources, of the 
 
 domestic situation in Japan are: Treat's Early Diplomatic 
 Relations; Gubbins: The Progress of Japan. The student is 
 fortunate in the study of this period in that so much Japanese 
 material has been made available in English, by both Japanese 
 and English scholars. See Bibliography for complete list. 
 
 25. Longford: "Story of Old Japan," p. 302. 
 
CHAPTER XX 
 
 ANSON BURLINGAME 
 
 Anson Burlingame/ the first American Minister to 
 reside in Peking, was about forty-one years old when he 
 arrived in China in the latter part of 1861. By birth he 
 belonged to pioneer American stock, his parents having 
 moved from New England to northern New York where 
 he was born, and then to Michigan Territory where he re- 
 ceived his primary and academic education. But by choice 
 Burlingame belonged to the culture and traditions of Bos- 
 ton; he went to Harvard for his training in law, married 
 in Cambridge, and entered Massachusetts politics at an 
 early age. His character and career bear witness both to 
 the pioneering spirit of his parental heritage and the urban- 
 ity and culture of his social environment.^ 
 
 Burlingame served three terms in Congress but in 1860, 
 notwithstanding his anti-slavery sentiments and his support 
 of Lincoln, he was defeated for reelection. In the House 
 of Representatives he had served as a member of the com- 
 mittee on foreign affairs, where his freedom-loving nature 
 expressed itself in an ardent championship of Kossuth and 
 Sardinian independence. Even more characteristic of the 
 man was his denunciation of Preston Brooks in the House 
 of Representatives for the assault on Charles Sumner. Be- 
 cause of this rebuke Brooks challenged him to a duel and 
 Burlingame promptly accepted, naming rifles as the 
 weapons and Deer Island, near Niagara Falls, as the place. 
 Brooks then declined to meet him. Early in 1861 President 
 Lincoln appointed Burlingame Minister to Austria, but be- 
 fore he arrived at his post the Austrian Government ex- 
 pressed disapproval of the appointment on the ground that 
 Burlingame had been too ardent an advocate of Kossuth. 
 
 367 
 
368 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 The post at Peking was then offered to BurHngame and 
 accepted. 
 
 Burlingame arrived in China in October, 1861, and en- 
 tered upon residence in Peking in the summer of 1862. 
 In 1865 he returned to the United States on leave, probably 
 with the expectation of resigning his post and reentering 
 politics, but he was persuaded to return to China. He 
 reached Peking to begin the second part of his service in 
 the latter part of 1866, after an absence of fifteen months, 
 and a year later, November 21, 1867, he resigned ^ "in the 
 interests of my country and civilization" ; he had accepted 
 the position of envoy of the Empire to all of the Western 
 powers then having treaties with China. With two Chinese 
 associates and a retinue of thirty people he set out for the 
 United States. 
 
 In June, 1868, on behalf of China, he negotiated with 
 Seward * eight additional articles to the Treaty of Tientsin, 
 and then departed for London. He secured from Lord Clar- 
 endon, who had recently returned to the Foreign Office 
 with the first Gladstone Ministry, an agreement which, 
 while not so formal as a treaty, nevertheless fully answered 
 his purpose. Thus strengthened by his successful negotia- 
 tions with the United States and Great Britain, he moved 
 on to the Continent visiting Paris, Berlin, and the capitals 
 of the northern kingdoms, arriving in Petrograd early in 
 1870. There he contracted pneumonia and died February 
 23, thus terminating before the age of fifty a truly brilliant 
 career. Some of the more conspicuous of his achievements 
 in China and for China must be noted in detail, and in the 
 records of these will be found the marks of his peculiar 
 qualities of heart and mind. Burlingame was easily the 
 most capable American diplomatic representative in China 
 since Caleb Gushing who, though superior to him in intel- 
 lect, lacked his unselfish idealism and breadth of statesman- 
 ship. 
 
 The survey of the work of Anson Burlingame falls natu- 
 rally into three parts: his service in Peking; the supplemen- 
 tary articles to the treaty of Tientsin; and the reception 
 
ANSON BURLINGAME 369 
 
 of the Burlingame Mission in England and Europe, as well 
 as its influence in China. 
 
 The Suppression of the Taiping Rebellion 
 
 Notwithstanding the continuing strength of the 
 Taipings after the establishment of the rebel capital in 
 Nanking in 1853 — a strength which was purely relative to 
 the utter weakness of the Imperial forces — and notwith- 
 standing the continuance of a considerable sympathy for 
 the rebels on the part of the Christian nations, and among 
 foreign traders and adventurers in China who found profit 
 in assisting and ministering to the needs of the rebels, the 
 fate of the rebellion was sealed when Lord Elgin and Baron 
 Gros concluded their negotiations with Prince Kung in Pe- 
 king in 1860. Great Britain had decided that it was better 
 policy to support and strengthen the dynasty than to per- 
 mit the Empire to fall to pieces in rebellion. Thus the 
 policy first advocated in theory by Humphrey Marshall for 
 the United States became the practice of all the treaty 
 powers, Russia included, seven years later. 
 
 For assisting the Imperial Government the United 
 States, because of the Civil War, was quite unable, even 
 had it been willing, to lend the aid recommended by Mar- 
 shall. The American naval forces in China in 1861 were 
 almost entirely withdrawn. The United States could do 
 nothing except give approval to what the other powers 
 proposed. The American share in the suppression of the 
 Taipings, while by no means inconsiderable, was entirely 
 unofficial and individual. 
 
 Alluring as the subject is, the part played by General 
 Frederick T. Ward,^ by his successor Burgevine, and by 
 other Americans who joined the Ever- Victorious Army can 
 hardly claim attention as important in a study of the policy 
 of the United States in China. General Ward, who organ- 
 ized the force of Chinese with the assistance of a cosmopoli- 
 tan corps of foreign adventurers as subordinate officers, was 
 sponsored by Admiral Sir James Hope, and by him was 
 
370 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 introduced to Burlingame shortly after the latter's arrival 
 in Shanghai in 1862.*^ The American minister accepted 
 Ward because of this introduction, and because of the suc- 
 cesses with Chinese troops which Ward had achieved, but 
 the promotion of Ward in the Chinese service was due to 
 his own worth and to the British Admiral's backing rather 
 than to any assistance from American officials. Indeed 
 the Americans, already disgraced so often by the unre- 
 strained license of adventurers in China, appear to have 
 placed confidence in Ward only cautiously. In the later 
 part of 1862 Ward was fatally wounded and the leaderless 
 army thrown into confusion. But by that time the value 
 of such a force was so evident that its dissolution would 
 have been regarded by all of the foreign representatives 
 and perhaps by the Imperial Government as a catastrophe. 
 It had proved to be a most useful means by which the for- 
 eign governments could unofficially support the Imperial 
 Government in its desperate struggle with the rebels, yet 
 without raising embarrassing questions either among them- 
 selves or with the Chinese Government. Ward's force had 
 also demonstrated a fact which must never be forgotten, 
 namely, that the Chinese, under competent leadership, 
 make excellent soldiers. 
 
 Meanwhile the utmost harmony existed between the 
 representatives of the foreign powers in Peking. Upon the 
 death of Ward it was agreed that his successor ought also, 
 in the interests of equality of influence for the foreign 
 powers, to be an American. The British authorities were 
 especially willing to agree to this because at that time the 
 offices in the Foreign Inspectorate of Customs had passed 
 largely into British hands, and plans were already under 
 way to create a naval flotilla for China which also would be 
 under a British officer. Both Sir Frederick Bruce and Bur- 
 lingame joined in urging the appointment to the Ever- Vic- 
 torious Army of Burgevine, another American who had been 
 an associate of Ward's and of high rank among his foreign 
 officers. The appointment was made with disastrous re- 
 sults into the details of which it is not possible to go. 
 
ANSON BURLINGAME 371 
 
 Burgevine was an adventurer with an exceptional imagina- 
 tion and perhaps cherished the idea of carving out for him- 
 self an empire in AsiaJ His motives were suspected from 
 the outset, and of the successes of his army Li Hung Chang, 
 its titular head, was jealous. Burgevine lost his temper and 
 played into the hands of Li Hung Chang. When removed 
 from his command he deceived Burlingame and made the 
 American minister again his advocate. For a time the 
 Burgevine affair not only imperilled the Imperial efforts to 
 suppress the rebels but also seriously embarrassed Mr. Bur- 
 lingame's relations with the Chinese Government.^ Had 
 Burgevine not failed to live up to the confidence which was 
 reposed in him, the result of the part that General Ward 
 played in the Ever Victorious Army might have been the 
 greatest of benefits for the improvement of the already cor- 
 dial relations between Burlingame and Prince Kung. The 
 Imperial Government, immediately after the death of 
 Ward, heaped his memory with posthumous honors and set 
 apart two memorial chapels to him. But the failure of 
 Burgevine, to which was subsequently added the prolonged 
 and irritating negotiations and representations over the 
 Ward estate,^ more than counteracted all the initial good 
 so far as concerns the relations between the United States 
 and China. To Major Gordon of the British Army was 
 entrusted, with the approval of all, the task which fell from 
 the hand of Ward, and the even more difficult responsibility 
 of finally disbanding the Ever- Victorious Army before its 
 adventurer-officers fell under the temptation to which 
 Burgevine had succumbed and created fresh troubles for dis- 
 traught China. 
 
 Burlingame's extraordinary personal magnetism as well 
 as his evident desire to deal fairly with everyone overcame 
 many obstacles in both his dealings with Prince Kung and 
 with his diplomatic colleagues, and notwithstanding his mis- 
 take in supporting Burgevine, his influence in Peking in- 
 creased rapidly. In the difficult matter of the disposal of 
 the Lay-Osborn Flotilla in 1863 ^^ Prince Kung sought his 
 advice and followed it, and the confidence then acquired by 
 
372 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 the Chinese Government in his justice and sagacity con- 
 tributed in large measure to his appointment as envoy to 
 the foreign powers in 1867. 
 
 The greatest contribution of the American minister, 
 however, to the international relations of the Chinese Em- 
 pire during the period of his service, was his application of 
 the policy of cooperation in the difficult years of 1863, 1864 
 and 1865. 
 
 BURLINGAME AND COOPERATION 
 
 Every American representative since the days of Hum- 
 phrey Marshall had been instructed to cooperate with the 
 other powers in every way consistent with the peaceful 
 policy of the United States in China, and consistent with 
 the policy of the open door of equal opportunity for all. 
 Cooperation, however, had broken down because neither 
 Great Britain nor France were willing to accept peaceful 
 methods of settling disputes, because their ultimate inten- 
 tions in the empire were matters of suspicion and because 
 the American government was unwilling to incur any of 
 the financial or political liabilities incident to cooperation. 
 In 1863 the foreign powers had secured from China all that 
 they desired, and the ground was therefore prepared for 
 Burlingame. Burlingame's proposals were based upon the 
 assumption, to which Sir Frederick Bruce heartily agreed, 
 and to which the other ministers acceded either from con- 
 victions or because of its obvious immediate advantages, 
 that the interests of the treaty powers in China were iden- 
 tical. All desired the fulfillment of treaty obligations, none 
 of them was prepared to enforce them alone if such en- 
 forcement were to call for the last resort, and the best as- 
 surance of peaceful success was in the forgetting of rivalries 
 and in the presentation of a united front to the Imperial 
 Government. 
 
 One of the most important questions in which a policy 
 of cooperation seemed necessary, was the proper interpre 
 tations of rights in the so-called concessions for the resi 
 dence of foreigners. Notwithstanding the declarations at 
 
ANSON BURLINGAME 373 
 
 Shanghai in 1853-1854, the tendency was for the foreigners 
 to treat land concessions, the number of which had been 
 greatly increased in 1858, as actual cessions of territory to 
 which China no longer could claim the sovereign rights. 
 In the face of all such claims Burlingame contended that 
 "any concession of territory would be an abridgment of 
 our treaty rights." Thus again American interests were 
 seen to coincide with the interests of the empire itself. The 
 territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire became a cardi- 
 nal doctrine of American policy. 
 
 interviews [with the Chinese officials] to keep the non-concession 
 doctrine before them, because I had been made aware in Shanghai, 
 by conversations with the British consul, that he and the British resi- 
 dents supposed they had a quasi territorial concession at Shanghai 
 over which they could maintain jurisdiction not only over British 
 subjects but over Chinese. This assumption led the French to make 
 like claims, and the result was that there was a race, apparently, be- 
 tween the British and French local authorities as to which could 
 secure the most. I brought the question, in many conversations, to 
 the attention of the British and Russian ministers, and since his 
 arrival, to the French minister. I am happy to say that I found my 
 views accorded with theirs, and that we are now, on this most im- 
 portant question, in perfect agreement ; and this agreement is a guar- 
 antee of the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire." 
 
 The policy of cooperation, under Burlingame, became 
 very specific and practical whereas it had hitherto been 
 theoretical and vague. Its origin, development and appli- 
 cation may best be described in its author's own words. The 
 basis of the policy Burlingame stated as follows :^^ ". . . if 
 the treaty powers could agree among themselves to the neu- 
 trahty of China, and together secure order in the treaty 
 ports, and give their moral support to the party in China 
 in favor of order, the interests of humanity would be sub- 
 served, ..." 
 
 "Upon my arrival at Pekin," wrote Burlingame, "I at once elab- 
 orated my views and found, upon comparing them with those held by 
 the representatives of England and Russia, that they were in accord 
 with theirs. After mature deliberation, we determined to consult 
 and cooperate upon all questions. . . . Preliminary to entering into 
 thorough cooperation, I held it to be my duty to ascertain the ulterior 
 
374 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 purposes of the treaty powers having, by position and trade, a leading 
 place in China. 
 
 "I found Mr. Balluzee, the Russian minister, prompt to answer, 
 in the spirit of the Russian treaty, that his government did not desire 
 to menace at any time the territorial i ntegrity of China, but on the 
 contrary, wished to bring it more and more into the family of 
 nations, subject, in its relations with foreign powers, to the obliga- 
 tions of international law. That he was but too happy to cooperate 
 in a policy that would engraft western upon eastern civilization, 
 without a disruption of the Chinese Empire. 
 
 "With Sir Frederick Bruce, the British minister, my conversa- 
 tions were elaborate and exhaustive. I said to him frankly, that we 
 represented the first trading powers here, and that our interests were 
 identical, and I was ready not only from individual desire, but be- 
 cause of the wishes of my government, to cooperate with him. He 
 met me in a large and generous spirit, and said that he had ever 
 desired to cooperate with the other treaty powers, and pointed out in 
 dispatches to his government the evidences of such desires, and ex- 
 pressed his delight that the representative of the United States should 
 hold views so coincident with his owb. I said to him that while I 
 paid full homage to the energy of his government in opening China, 
 and for affording protection to the citizens of the United States, still 
 I felt, looking to British antecedents, a little distrust about the 
 future; that our trade by the way of California was increasing, and 
 I felt anxious about its future condition. I illustrated my views of 
 distrust by reference to the controlling influence of the British in the 
 custom-house, and in the pretensions set up by his countrymen in the 
 treaty ports in favor of territorial concessions. He agreed with me 
 that the sensitiveness was natural, and replied that he would be 
 pleased to remove every ground for it. He said that circumstances 
 more than design had given the English the seeming control of 
 affairs at the treaty ports ; that in the first place the English trade 
 was very large; and besides, from long connection with the East, 
 many of his countrymen had acquired knowledge of the Chinese 
 language, and when persons were wanted it was natural that those 
 most qualified in that respect should be selected. He pointed out 
 that long ago he had recommended that the custom-house should be 
 put upon a cosmopolitan footing, and that Mr. Lay, who was at the 
 head of it, had endeavored to carry out his views. 
 
 "I must admit that in this he was right. I was applied to by the 
 Chinese, through their employe, Mr. Hart, then at the head of the 
 customs, for Americans to fill places, but I could not find any who had 
 studied Chinese. One of the first places in the Chinese service was 
 tendered to our consul, Mr. Seward, but he could not, he thought, with 
 justice to his own government accept it. If we had had a school for 
 interpreters, our proper influence would have been far greater than 
 it is now. Besides, the English have been compelled to defend the 
 treaty ports without any assistance from us, and we have enjoyed the 
 fruits of that protection. But in the face of these obvious facts, Sir 
 Frederick admitted that it was not in the interest of England to hold 
 a position which gave her special privileges, and subjected her need- 
 
ANSON BURLINGAME 375 
 
 lessly to the criticism of the other treaty powers, and therefore he 
 was willing to have any arrangements made by which she would not 
 be put in a false position. 
 
 "He did not wish, as far as he was concerned, that English officers 
 should lead against the Taipings. He prefers that the Chinese should 
 employ for purposes of drill and discipline, men from the smaller 
 states of Europe, and that I might rely upon it that he would do all 
 he could to relieve England from the charge of being the 'great bully' 
 of the East ; to relieve her 'from the dilemma of being forced by local 
 clamor to commit acts of violence which, though in accordance with 
 past usage, and perhaps justified by our (their) former situation, do 
 not fail to jar unpleasantly on the conscience of England and of the 
 civilized world.' The force policy was wrong, and he was certain that 
 his government had had enough of wars brought about through hasty 
 action of men in the East not under the sway of large ideas. He was 
 for a change of policy, . . . 
 
 "Upon this frank avowal of the policy of England, it would be 
 impossible to refuse cooperation. The Russian minister and myself 
 both concurred in the view that the position of Sir Frederick was 
 just what we desired, and we hailed with delight its avowal. The 
 French minister, Mr. Berthemy, agrees with us. Being a broad and 
 experienced statesman, he at once saw the advantage that would flow 
 from the casting down of all jealousies, and by a cooperation on evei'y 
 material question in China. Indeed he has realized largely the ad- 
 vantages of such action; the French Charge d'Ajf aires before him, 
 acting upon the old-school policy of antagonizing everybody, thus 
 causing the Chinese to believe that we were divided among ourselves, 
 for one year failed to get justice from the Chinese Government, where 
 it was due, in a case in which we were all interested. 
 
 "The policy upon which we are agreed is briefly this : that while 
 we claim our treaty right to buy and sell, and hire, in the treaty 
 ports, subject, in respect to our rights of property and person, to the 
 jurisdiction of our own governments, we will not ask for, nor take 
 concessions of, territory in the treaty ports, or in any way interfere 
 with the jurisdiction of the Chinese Government over its own people, 
 nor ever menace the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire. 
 That we will not take part in the internal struggles in China, beyond 
 what is necessary to maintain our treaty rights. That the latter we 
 will unitedly sustain against all who rnay violate them. To this end 
 we are now clear in the policy of defending the treaty ports against 
 the Taipings, or rebels ; but in such a way as not to make war upon 
 that considerable body of the Chinese people, by following them into 
 the interior of their country. In this connection, while we feel de- 
 sirous, from what we know of it, to have the rebellion put down, still 
 we have come to question the policy of lending government officers 
 to lead the Chinese in the field, for fear of complications among our- 
 selves, growing out of the relative number to be employed, &c. That 
 while we wish to give our moral support to the government, at the 
 present time the power in the country which seems disposed to main- 
 tain order and our treaty rights, we should prefer that it would 
 organize its own people as far as possible for its own defense, taking 
 
376 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 only foreigners for instruction in the arts of peace and war, and these, 
 as far as possible, from the smaller treaty powers. 
 
 "To maintain the revenue laws of the government, to relieve the 
 treaty powers from the burdens attending the suppression of piracy 
 along the coast, the Chinese Government has been persuaded to pur- 
 chase several small war steamers, and to man them temporarily with 
 foreigners. This fleet is coming out under the command of Sherard 
 Osborn, and is manned chiefly by English sailors, with the under- 
 standing that it is a temporary arrangement; and that, too, is to 
 become cosmopolitan; and on the idea that we are to cooperate upon 
 all questions in China, no special objection is made to the force by 
 the other treaty powers. I confess that I should be pleased, were it 
 more cosmopolitan now, but it was arranged before I came out, and 
 before the above policy was developed and agreed upon. While Sir 
 Frederick Bruce shall remain, or while the policy now agreed upon 
 shall be maintained, no harm can come from it. 
 
 ''That the indemnity may be collected and accounted for, and 
 that the Chinese Government may have a fund to maintain a national 
 force, organized upon European principles; that the local authorities 
 may be checked in their corrupt practices, and a uniform system for 
 the collection of the revenue maintained, it is agreed on all hands 
 that the present foreign custom-house system is the best as yet de- 
 vised, and, as it has been administered by Mr. Lay, entitled to our 
 support. Indeed it is alone through such instrumentalities that we 
 can hope to advance in the cause of civilization in China. As Sir 
 Frederick states, there can be nothing more unmeaning than antago- 
 nism between the United States and Great Britain in China. I need 
 not attempt to prove the advantages which must flow from coopera- 
 tion; that we should do so all must admit. By the favored-nation 
 clause in the treaties, no nation can gain by any sharp act of diplo- 
 macy any privilege not secured to all. 
 
 "The circumstances conspire to make this a fortunate moment in 
 which to inaugurate the cooperative policy. 
 
 "The treaty powers are represented here by men of modern ideas ; 
 by men who, in this land, where everything is to be done, do not 
 choose to embarrass each other by sowing distrust in the Chinese 
 mind, but who with an open policy and common action, deepen each 
 other's confidence and win the respect of the Chinese. That the too 
 sanguine hopes in relation to China of our more advanced civilization 
 may be fully realized by any action we may take, ought not to be 
 expected. The peculiar people we are among must be remembered; 
 how hoary is their civilization, and how proud they are, and how 
 ignorant of us they have always been, and how little their knowledge 
 of some of us has tended to create in their minds a desire for a 
 change. Their government is good in theory, but not now well admin- 
 istered. The people are free to license, and, as in our own country, 
 we find a portion of them in rebellion, because they have felt too little 
 the influence of the central government. 
 
 "The trouble here now is that we are dealing with a regency 
 which in a few years must hand over its doings to the Emperor, and 
 those he may call around him. The regency dare not depart in the 
 
ANSON BURLINGAME 377 
 
 smallest particular from the old traditions, and yet these will not do 
 for these times. They are distrustful of us, and are afraid of their 
 censors and distant local authorities. Besides, there is a large anti- 
 foreign party here. There are members of the foreign board who, 
 if left to themselves, would at once place China in perfect interna- 
 tional relations with us ; but sitting with them are spies, who paralyze 
 them in their action with us, to fall, as they frequently do, far short 
 of their promises. In their weakness they resort to tergiversations to 
 such an extent as to invite menace, and to cause us in our passionate 
 modes almost to despair of holding, with dignity, any relations at all 
 with them." 
 
 One detects in this dispatch many of the personal quali- 
 ties which gave distinction to the character of its author, 
 and especially his enthusiastic optimism. It is therefore not 
 to be wondered at that the sober-minded and experienced 
 Secretary of State felt that the application of such a policy 
 was almost too much to expect. He wrote to Burlingame:^^ 
 
 "One may very reasonably fear that the beneficial policy thus 
 agreed upon would fall into disuse if those ministers, or any of them, 
 should at any time give place to less intelligent and able statesmen. 
 But this consideration does not deter the President from giving it 
 his entire approval; and he sincerely hopes that a successful trial of 
 it, during the residence of those ministers in China, will render its 
 continuance afterwards a cardinal fact in the policy of all the mari- 
 time powers." 
 
 Seward had indeed placed his finger on the weak spot. 
 The policy of cooperation was purely personal, depending 
 entirely upon the enthusiastic and sincere convictions of 
 Bruce and Burlingame, and no sooner had these men dis- 
 appeared from China than the policy began to lapse, al- 
 though efforts were sometimes made to drag it out in the 
 service of some power otherwise unable to accomplish its 
 own peculiar purposes. 
 
 That Burlingame was not unaware of the difficulties is 
 apparent from a subsequent letter of his to the consul gen- 
 eral at Shanghai in which he summarized the policy as 
 follows: ^^ 
 
 _ "You will_ perceive that we are making an efFort to substitute 
 fair diplomatic action in China for force; and thus cooperation be- 
 comes the rule in carrying out these relations. It should be sincere; 
 and to be effective requires in the first place a predisposition to get 
 
378 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 on well with one's colleagues; and in the second, that just modera- 
 tion which cannot fail to win the respect and confidence of one's 
 associates." 
 
 The First Chinese Mission — Treaty of 1868 
 
 There were several reasons which predisposed the Im- 
 perial Government to think well of the Burlingame Mis- 
 sion to the Western powers in 1867. In addition to the 
 great confidence which was reposed in Burlingame was the 
 fact that the following year the British treaty of Tientsin 
 would be due for revision, and the Chinese knew that the 
 British merchants, never as contented as their government 
 with the advantages secured under that treaty, were prepar- 
 ing to urge upon China further demands, some of which 
 the Imperial authorities intended firmly to resist. Per- 
 haps the most important of the expected demands, in the 
 estimation of the Chinese, was the throwing open of China, 
 regardless of treaty ports, for railways and telegraphs. ^^ 
 But there were more general reasons. Instructed by the 
 experiences in 1839 and 1858, the Chinese authorities saw 
 clearly that any resistance to the demands of foreign powers 
 might lead again to invasion and war. The more liberal 
 element in the Chinese Government was already having a 
 most dif&cult time in the face of the reactionary party, and 
 the application of further force by foreign nations would 
 cost the liberal party its leadership and result fatally for 
 the empire. 
 
 China had already assumed many obligations to the 
 treaty powers which the officials at Peking were not fully 
 able to discharge because of the large amount of autonomy 
 possessed by the provinces. Peking might propose but the 
 provinces disposed. Where the terms of a treaty conflicted 
 with the long established rights and practices of the local 
 authorities, it was as difficult to bring the provinces into 
 line as it was subsequently difficult to bring the Pacific 
 Coast states into harmony with the national government in 
 the matter of Asiatic immigration to the United States. The 
 treaties of Tientsin in the duties they imposed upon China, 
 
 fli 
 
ANSON BURLINGAME 379 
 
 really called for the reorganization of the Empire itself in 
 such grave matters as provincial autonomy, the collection 
 of inland revenue and the disposal of military forces, but 
 such reorganization of the Empire while the Imperial 
 authority was so weak was utterly impossible. China was 
 clearly not in a position with safety to itself to assume even 
 more extensive obligations to the powers such as would be 
 inevitable in the revision of the treaties of 1858. 
 
 Burlingame's reasons for accepting the novel post, aside 
 from purely personal ones, are also not difficult to see. Dur- 
 ing his absence in the United States the previous year, Sir 
 Frederick Bruce having already been transferred to Wash- 
 ington, the policy of cooperation among the ministers, just 
 as Seward feared it might, had largely broken down. To 
 resuscitate this cooperative spirit and give it guaranties for 
 the future required something more than the personal as- 
 sent of the various ministers. It must be secured by agree- 
 ment with the governments they represented. On the other 
 hand if the policy were to fail utterly it was clear to Bur- 
 lingame, to Hart, to any impartial observer, that the conse- 
 quences not only for China but for the entire world must 
 eventually be most serious. The partition of the Empire 
 following a conflict of foreign nations within the bounds of 
 China itself seemed very possible. To contribute anything 
 towards the avoidance of such a calamity was a motive 
 worthy to inspire the best efforts of any man, and Bur- 
 lingame was fully conscious of the vast issues which might 
 hang on the success of his mission. 
 
 Late in February, 1868, the Burlingame Mission sailed 
 from Shanghai for San Francisco. It met in the United 
 States with the heartiest of receptions. The picturesque 
 appearance of the retinue and the moving eloquence of 
 Burlingame, who managed the tour according to the best 
 traditions of the showman's art, captured the imagination 
 of the American people. The people of the United States 
 were now little interested in securing new trade concessions 
 in China, and heartily enjoyed the diversion and entertain- 
 ment which the Mission afforded. Into the details of the 
 
 <^ 
 
380 AMERICANS IK EASTERN ASIA 
 
 tour from San Francisco eastward and the numerous re- 
 ceptions and dinners it is impossible to go. But the supple- 
 mentary articles to the Treaty of Tientsin, usually known 
 as the Burhngame Treaty, signed at Washington July 28, 
 1868, will repay careful study as an expression of both 
 American opinion and American policy towards China. 
 
 Considered as a treaty, aside from the immigration stip- 
 ulations, the articles are not of great importance. Their 
 negotiation was quite unauthorized, so far as China was 
 concerned. There is no reason to suppose that Prince Kung 
 was anything but surprised to be presented with these ar- 
 ticles for ratification. As for the United States the articles 
 were unnecessary. They added little either to American 
 privileges or obligations. But as an expression of public 
 sentiment in the United States and as a solemn declaration 
 of ofiicial policy towards China the supplementary articles 
 of 1868 were, in some respects, more authoritative than 
 either the Cushing Treaty of 1844 or the Reed Treaty of 
 1858. They were entirely removed from the atmosphere of 
 commercial competition, they were negotiated freely and not 
 under compulsion, and they were written by the American 
 Secretary of State with the Envoy of China, as it were, 
 standing at his elbow, telling him what to write.^*' Fur- 
 thermore, the drafting of the articles had been preceded 
 by a period of intensive education of public opinion in which 
 the envoy of China had been allowed to plead his case be- 
 fore the American people. 
 
 There were eight articles to the agreement and for 
 nearly all of them there was a background of history in 
 Burlingame's six years of experience as American minister 
 in Peking. 
 
 The appointment of Chinese consuls (Article 3) in the 
 United States was in line with the efforts already made by 
 Sir Robert Hart, by Burlingame, and by Seward, to en- 
 courage the Government of China to send official repre- 
 sentatives abroad. 
 
 Freedom from persecution because of religious beliefs 
 in China had been stipulated in Article 29 of the American 
 
ANSON BURLINGAME 381 
 
 Treaty of Tientsin, Article 6 of the supplementary treaty 
 extended this guarantee of tolerance to include also the 
 Chinese in the United States. This article "recalls the great 
 doctrine of the Constitution which gives to a man the right 
 to hold any faith which his conscience may dictate," to use 
 Mr. Burlingame's own explanation ^"^ of what therefore 
 seems to be a quite unnecessary treaty stipulation. 
 
 Likewise the article (7) stipulating that "citizens of the 
 United States may freely establish and maintain schools 
 within the Empire of China at those places where foreigners 
 are by treaty permitted to reside ; and, reciprocally, Chinese 
 subjects may enjoy the same privileges and immunities in 
 the United States," was meaningless except as it gave the 
 American missionary in China a little better leverage for 
 the strengthening of his work. The missionaries had al- 
 ready begun to establish schools long before 1868. The re- 
 mainder of this article by which access to government 
 schools in each country should be given to students of the 
 other, looked in the direction of a policy already urged by 
 S. Wells Williams and Burlingame, to encourage the Chi- 
 nese to take up Western education in a school to be estab- 
 lished in China with the balance of the indemnity money. 
 It was also in line with the fact that already Dr. W. A. P. 
 Martin, an American missionary, was teaching in a gov- 
 ernment college in Peking where Chinese pupils were to be 
 prepared for the customs service, and was soon to become 
 director of the school.^ ^ The other articles of the treaty 
 deal with matters of more far-reaching consequence. 
 
 The United States disclaimed and disavowed (Article 
 8) "any intention or right to intervene in the domestic ad- 
 ministration of China in regard to the construction of rail- 
 roads, telegraphs, or other material internal improvements." 
 At the same time the United States engaged to nominate, 
 if at any time they were desired, "suitable engineers to be 
 employed by the Chinese Government." This article was, 
 on the one hand, fully in harmony with the policy already 
 adopted by Seward and Burlingame with reference to the 
 efforts of an American company to secure and operate a 
 
382 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 concession for a telegraph line along the coast/^ and on 
 the other, looked towards the building up of a system of 
 foreign technical advisers who should enter Chinese ser- 
 vice as Raphael Pumpelly, an American engineer, had done 
 in 1863.^" This plan was also merely an extension of the 
 arrangement by which foreigners had taken service in the 
 Chinese Maritime customs, and by which Anson Bur- 
 lingame himself now appeared in the role of political ad- 
 viser to the Chinese Government. That Article 8 of the 
 Burlingame Treaty was an expression of permanent Ameri- 
 can policy jn China is amply proved by the long succession 
 of distinguished Americans who have since appeared in the 
 service of the Chinese Government. The article also regis- 
 tered the corresponding stern disapproval by the United 
 States of any system of commercial exploitation of the 
 resources of Chin^ by foreigners who would depend upon 
 the mihtary forces of their governments to sustain and ex- 
 tend their privileges. 
 
 The fifth and sixth articles of the Burlingame Treaty 
 dealing with the question of Chinese immigration to Cali- 
 fornia will be considered in Chapter XXVIII. The most 
 significant part of the supplementary articles, however, 
 from the viewpoint of American policy were Articles 1 and 
 2 in which were asserted in the most uncompromising terms 
 that China possessed, in spite of the doctrine of extraterri- 
 toriality, and in spite of the engagement already made to 
 the powers, full sovereign rights over her territory. The 
 meaning of these articles was explained by Burlingame as 
 follows : 
 
 "In the first place, it declares the neutrality of the Chinese waters 
 in opposition to the pretensions of the exterritoriality doctrine, that 
 inasmuch as the persons and the property of the people of the foreign 
 powers were under the jurisdiction of those powers, therefore it was 
 the right of parties contending with each other to attack each other in 
 the Chinese waters, thus making those waters the place of their con- 
 flict. The treaty traverses all such absurd pretensions. It strikes 
 down the so-called concession doctrines, under which the nationals 
 of different countries located upon spots of land in the treaty ports 
 had come to believe that they could take jurisdiction there not only 
 of their own nationals, not only of the person and property of their 
 
ANSON BURLINGAME 383 
 
 own people, but take jurisdiction of the Chinese and the people of 
 other countries. When this question was called under discussion and 
 referred to the home governments, not by the Chinese originally, but 
 by those foreign nations who felt that their treaty rights were being 
 abridged by these concession doctrines, the distant foreign countries 
 could not stand the discussion for a moment. And I aver that every 
 treaty power had abandoned the concession doctrines, though some 
 of their officials at the present time in China undertake to contend 
 for them, undertake to expel the Chinese, to attack the Chinese, to 
 protect the Chinese, although the territory did not belong to them. 
 China has never abandoned her eminent domain, never abandoned on 
 that territory her jurisdiction, and I trust she never will. This treaty 
 strikes down all the pretensions about all the concessions of terri- 
 tory." '' 
 
 From such words it is clear that the intention of Mr. 
 BurHngame in his mission to the Western powers was not 
 merely to give his policy of cooperation among the powers in 
 China the force of treaty engagements but also to bring the 
 powers to the formal affirmation of the objects for which the 
 cooperation was to be employed.-^ The policy of coopera- 
 tion was a two-edged sword which might cut either way, 
 and Burlingame was seeking a formal agreement to the prin- 
 ciples upon which he and Sir Frederick Bruce had been 
 in such hearty agreement in Peking a few years before but 
 which were evidently not in accord with the ideas of the 
 British mercantile community nor with those of the impor- 
 tant French officials.-^ It seems equally clear that these 
 first two articles of the Burlingame Treaty officially ex- 
 pressed what might already be called the traditional Ameri- 
 can policy with reference to China: the sovereignty and 
 integrity of China must be maintained, and the door for 
 equal opportunities in trade must be left open for the free 
 competition of all nations with due regard for the sov- 
 ereign rights of the Empire. On the other hand the articles 
 entirely blinked the fact that the treaties of 1858 had in 
 practice, as well as in the way in which they were nego- 
 tiated, already seriously transgressed on the rights of China 
 as a sovereign power. 
 
 Fundamentally Mr. Burlingame's object was to read 
 China back into the family of nations from which the Em- 
 pire had been read out by Caleb Cushing in 1844, when he 
 
384 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 rested his doctrine of extraterritoriality on the ground that 
 China was a pagan state.-* In his address before the city 
 council of Boston Burlingame said : 
 
 "Again this treaty recognizes China as an equal among the na- 
 tions, in opposition to the old doctrine that because she was not a 
 Christian nation, she could not be placed in the roll of nations. But 
 I will not discuss that question. The greatest living authority upon 
 Eastern questions is here tonight — Mr. Cushing. He has stated that 
 position more fully than any one else, while his heart has leaned ever 
 up to the side of the Chinese." 
 
 Mr. Burlingame's effort, however, rested upon a premise 
 far less sound than Mr. Cushing's, for it assumed as true 
 what was entirely contrary to fact, viz., that the Chinese 
 Empire was a strong centralized government capable of 
 controlling its own provinces and equally capable of dealing 
 with the European powers on terms of military equality. 
 
 This false assumption that China was able to exercise 
 all the functions of sovereignty has underlaid a very large 
 part of the entire political relations of the United States 
 with reference to China. 
 
 Before concluding a review of the Burlingame Mission 
 in the United States one must note not merely the Bur- 
 lingame Treaty but also the speeches of the man whose 
 name it bears. Mr. Burlingame was an orator, skilled in 
 all the arts of a style of oratory which has now largely 
 passed away. His orations abounded not in logic, not in 
 reasoned deductions from carefully ascertained and clearly 
 described facts, but in illustrations and flights of eloquence 
 designed not so much to induce a conclusion as to produce 
 an impression. While they clearly reflected his own con- 
 victions they did not always keep step with the facts as 
 seen by more sober-minded observers. One illustration, 
 from his famous address at a dinner given in honor of the 
 Mission in New York will suffice.-^ 
 
 "China, seeing another civilization approaching on every side, has 
 her eyes open. She sees Russia on the north, Europe on the west, 
 America on the east. She sees a cloud of sail on her coast, she sees 
 the mighty steamers coming from everywhere — bow on. She feels 
 the spark from the electric telegraph falling hot upon her everywhere; 
 
ANSON BURLINGAME 385 
 
 she rouses herself, not in anger, but for argument. She finds that by 
 not being in a position to compete with other nations for so long a 
 time she has lost ground. She finds that she must come into relations 
 with this civilization that is pressing up around her, and feeling that, 
 she does not wait but comes out to you and extends to you her hand. 
 She tells you she is ready to take upon her ancient civilization the 
 graft of your civilization. She tells you she is ready to take back 
 her own inventions, with all their developments. She tells you that 
 she is willing to trade with you, to buy of you, to sell to you, to help 
 you strike off the shackles from trade. She invites your merchants, 
 she invites your missionaries. She tells the latter to plant the shining 
 cross on every hill and in every valley. For she is hospitable to fair 
 argument. . . . 
 
 "Let her alone ; let her have her independence ; let her develop 
 herself in her own time and in her own way. She has no hostility to 
 you. Let her do this and she will initiate a movement which will be 
 felt in every workshop of the civilized world. She says now : 'Send us 
 your wheat, your lumber, your coal, your silver, your goods from 
 everywhere — we will take as many of them as we can. We will give 
 you back our tea, our silk, free labor, which we have sent so largely out 
 into the world.' ... It has overflowed upon Siam, upon the British 
 provinces, upon Singapore, upon Manila, upon Peru, Cuba, Australia 
 and California. All she asks is that you will be as kind to her na- 
 tionals as she is to your nationals. She wishes simply that you will 
 do justice. She is willing not only to exchange goods with you, but 
 she is willing to exchange thoughts. She is willing to give you what 
 she thinks is her intellectual civilization in exchange for your material 
 civilization. Let her alone, and the caravans on the roads of the 
 north, toward Russia, will swarm in larger numbers than ever before. 
 Let her alone, and that silver which has been flowing for hundreds 
 of years into China, losing itself like the lost rivers of the West, but 
 which yet exists, will come out into the affairs of men. . . . The 
 imagination kindles at the future which may be, and which will be, 
 if you will be fair and just to China." 
 
 The assertion by the official spokesman of the Empire 
 that China invited the foreign merchants and the foreign 
 missionaries, and was ready for the latter to plant 'the 
 shining cross on every hill and in every valley' was a trav- 
 esty of the truth, and the statement made in the same 
 speech that China was willing to accept Western interna- 
 tional law rested on little more than that Dr. W. A. P. 
 Martin had translated Wheaton's "Elements of Inter- 
 national Law" into Chinese, and that it was being taught 
 in the recently established customs college.^® 
 
 Such assertions created wrong impressions as to the 
 exact condition of China and stimulated an optimism from 
 
386 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 which there must be an inevitable reaction when the facts 
 were known. In China such statements filled the foreigners 
 with dismay.^'^ Happily for the Mission when it reached 
 England and the Continent there were few opportunities for 
 speeches, and Burlingame's talents could be directed to per- 
 sonal negotiations for which his rare political qualities 
 fitted him nearly as well as for speech-making. 
 
 The Burlingame Mission in Europe and China 
 
 The Burlingame Treaty had the effect, most emphati- 
 cally, of an oflScial approval by the American Government 
 on the Burlingame Mission and its objects. Far more im- 
 portant than as a treaty engagement, these supplementary 
 articles were the adroit vehicle for the pronouncement of 
 American policy not merely vis-a-vis China, but even more 
 particularly with reference to the relations of the United 
 States with the other foreign powers in China. This pro- 
 nouncement, applied to the then immediate present, was 
 the official opinion of the United States as to the revision 
 of the British Treaty of Tientsin which was already a mat- 
 ter of negotiations between Sir Rutherford Alcock in Peking 
 and the Chinese Government. The Burlingame Treaty was 
 the official American declaration against the so-called "gun- 
 boat" policy of applying local pressure in China to secure 
 what between sovereign nations would ordinarily be the 
 subject of diplomatic action with the central government. 
 
 Fortunately for the success of the Mission in England, it 
 arrived in London about the time of most important 
 changes in the British Government. On December 4, 1868, 
 the first Gladstone ministry took office and Lord Clarendon 
 was placed in the Foreign Office. The Palmerston foreign 
 policy which had found its most complete expression in 
 China in the Anglo-French War (1857-60) was to be re- 
 placed by a policy reflecting the growing liberalism in Eng- 
 lish politics, — a policy which had been clearly foreshad- 
 owed in Peking by Sir Frederick Bruce five years earlier. 
 
 Mr. Burlingame was able to secure from Lord Claren- 
 
ANSON BURLINGAME 387 
 
 don, December 28, 1868, an official declaration which was 
 far more practical and specific than the formal treaty stipu- 
 lations of the American treaty.-^ In a letter from Lord 
 Clarendon to Mr. Burlingame the former made the follow- 
 ing statements: 
 
 1. The Chinese Government is fully entitled to count upon the 
 forbearance of the foreign nations, and the British Government has 
 neither a desire nor intention to apply unfriendly pressure to China 
 to induce her government to advance more rapidly in her intercourse 
 with foreign nations than is consistent with safety and with due and 
 reasonable regard for the feelings of her subjects. 
 
 2. On the other hand, China must observe the treaties and protect 
 British subjects within her empire. 
 
 3. The British Government announces its preference rather for 
 ah appeal to the central government than to local authorities for the 
 redress of wrongs done to British subjects. It is for the interest of 
 China that her central government be not only fully recognized but 
 also established within the empire. 
 
 4. The British agents in China have been instructed to act in 
 the spirit and with the objects as explained above. 
 
 Thus armed the Burlingame Mission moved on to Paris 
 and the other European capitals but nowhere in Europe did 
 it meet with the degree of success which had been attained 
 in the United States and England. France was non-com- 
 mittal, Bismarck was favorable, but vague ; the negotiations 
 in St. Petersburg were left unfinished at the death of Bur- 
 lingame. This failure of the Mission in Europe — if indeed 
 it be just to describe as a failure an unfinished task which 
 was terminated by a personal fatality — may be explained 
 partially on grounds other than the existing political confu- 
 sion on the Continent. The truth was that while Great 
 Britain appeared willing to change her policy in China, yet 
 this change came at a time when she was already securely 
 established both commercially and politically in the Far 
 East. The European powers, on the other hand, were being 
 asked, before they had secured similar power and influence 
 in China, to deny themselves the very methods which 
 Great Britain, and in some degree the United States, had 
 used so successfully. The character of the reception ac- 
 corded to the Burlingame Mission on the Continent clearly 
 
388 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 foreshadowed the quarter from which the Chinese Empire 
 might in the future expect serious dangers to both its sov- 
 ereignty and its integrity. 
 
 "In one way or another, however we may disguise it/' 
 wrote Sir Rutherford Alcock,^^ "our position in China has 
 been created by force — naked, physical force; and any in- 
 teUigent policy to improve or maintain that position must 
 still look to force in some form, latent or expressed, for the 
 results." It was equally true that for other powers to 
 achieve similar positions in China similar methods must be 
 employed. To establish a solid basis for cooperation it 
 would have been necessary for the Powers already lodged 
 in China to surrender much that had been obtained in 1842, 
 1858, and 1860. Such a surrender no power was willing to 
 make. 
 
 The success of the Burlingame Mission in the United 
 States and England had two very definite immediate in- 
 fluences in China: it prevented a revision of the British 
 treaty in a manner satisfactory to the British merchants; 
 it also encouraged the Government of China not merely to 
 oppose more strongly than before any increased aggres- 
 sions of the foreign powers but also to stiffen their opposi- 
 tion to a full compliance with engagements to the powers 
 which had already been extorted from them by the Anglo- 
 French War of the preceding decade. It encouraged them 
 to believe that now they might indulge with more impunity 
 the thorough-going distrust and even hatred of the foreigner 
 which Burlingame in his fervid eloquence had perhaps 
 never fully measured and certainly had never set forth in 
 either the United States or England. This immediate 
 change of front on the part of the Chinese Government was 
 bitterly resented by most of the foreigners in China, and 
 Burlingame, no longer able to plead his case and unable to 
 finish in China the work which he had commenced abroad, 
 was blamed. But in thus blaming him, might not his 
 critics also have been bestowing upon the first Chinese 
 Envoy to the Western powers the signal honor of having 
 been the agent to secure for China in her otherwise im- 
 
ANSON BURLINGAME 389 
 
 potent struggle with the Western nations a truce without 
 which the Empire would soon have been dissolved? Euro- 
 pean colonial expansion, meeting with obstacles in the Far 
 East, turned for a time to regions nearer home. 
 
 BIBLIOGEAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. The primary sources for Anson Burlingame and his work are: 
 
 F. W. Williams : "Anson Burlingame and the First Chinese 
 Mission" — a very sympathetic biography which is based on all 
 the known sources of information; the volumes of Diplomatic 
 Correspondence covering the period of his service in China, 
 include practically every dispatch of any importance, as well as 
 Seward's instructions; China Notes, Vol. 1, i.e., notes from 
 the Chinese Legation to the Dept. of State, contain some 
 valuable reports on the progress of the Chinese Mission in 
 Europe. 
 
 2. Williams : "Burlingame," pp. 1 ff . 
 
 3. Dip. Corres., 1868, pp. 493-503. 
 
 4. F. W. Seward: "Eeminiscences," pp. 375 ff, 378, 380-l._ 
 
 5. There is no satisfactory account of Ward and Burgevine. The 
 
 most complete story of their careers in China is a sketch on 
 Ward in E. Alexander Powell's popularly written "Gentlemen 
 Rovers." Powell uses sources of information not generally 
 available, but does not state what they are. The general ten- 
 dency of British historians, with the exception of Andrew 
 Wilson's "The Ever- Victorious Army," is to minimize or ignore 
 Ward and exalt Gordon. Wilson knew both Ward and Burge- 
 vine personally and is an excellent authority. 
 
 6. China Despatches, Vol. 20, Mar. 6, '62, Burlingame to Seward. 
 
 (Dept. of State.) 
 
 7. Wilson : "The Ever- Victorious Army," p. 91. 
 
 8. Dip. Corres., 1863, p. 866. 
 
 9. For. Relations, 1888, pp. 199 ff; S. Ex. Doc. 48:45-2. 
 
 10. Dip. Corres., 1864, pp. 343 ff. 
 
 11. Op. cit, 1864, p. 851. 
 
 12. lUd., pp. 859 ff. 
 
 13. lUd., p. 882. 
 
 14. Op. cit., 1864, p. 430. 
 
 15. Cordier : "Relations de la Chine," Vol. 1, p. 285. 
 
 16. Williams : "Burlingame," p. 145. 
 
 17. lUd., p. 149. 
 
 18. Martin: "Cycle of Cathay," pp. 241, 293 ff. 
 
 19. Dip. Corres., 1867, pp. 471, 483, 509. 
 
 20. Op. cit., 1864, pp. 362 ff; Pompelly : "Across America and Asia." 
 
 21. Williams: "Burlingame," pp. 148-9. 
 
 22. Notes, China, Jan. 18, 1870, Burlingame to Fish. 
 
 23. Dip. Corres., 1862, p. 833 ; 1863, p. 851 ; 1864, pp. 379, 419, 426 ; 
 
 1866, pp. 489, 528; 1867, pp. 429, 466; 1868, pp. 547 ff. 
 
390 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 24. S. Ex. Doc. 58:28-2, pp. 5-14; Williams: "Burlingame," p. 149. 
 
 25. Williams : "Burlingame," pp. 138-9. 
 
 26. Martin: "Cycle of Cathay," pp. 221, 222; Dip. Corres., 1864, 
 
 p. 332. 
 
 27. See Morse, Vol. 2, chap. IX, for an excellent review of the atti- 
 
 tude of the foreigners in China towards the Mission. 
 
 28. Williams : "Burlingame" : chap. "The Clarendon Letter and 
 
 British Policy," pp. 161 ff; Morse, Vol. 2, pp. 197 ff; Cordier, 
 op. cit., pp. 295 ff. 
 
 29. Michie: "The Englishman in China," Vol. 2, p. 221. 
 
CHAPTER XXI 
 
 THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN: 1858-1869 
 
 The phase of American relations with Japan which be- 
 gan with the signing of the treaties of 1858 came to natural 
 end in 1869 with the beginning of the Meiji Era in Japan 
 and the withdrawal of William E. Seward from the Ameri- 
 can Department of State. Few generalizations as to policy 
 are possible.^ 
 
 American interests were represented in Japan by four 
 different men. Early in 1859, shortly after his treaty of 
 the preceding year had been approved by the Senate, 
 Townsend Harris was raised to the newly created post of 
 Minister Resident. Harris presented his resignation soon 
 after the inauguration of the Lincoln administration and 
 was relieved by his successor, Robert H. Pruyn of Albany, 
 in April, 1862. Pruyn, who had been prominent in New 
 York state politics and was a friend of Seward's, served 
 three years, after which A. L. C. Portman, Secretary of the 
 Legation, who had been Dutch interpreter for Commodore 
 Perry, became Charge d'Ajfaires for one year. R. B. Van 
 Valkenburgh, also. of New York, arrived in August, 1866, 
 and retired in November, 1869. 
 
 While such frequent changes in the service could not be 
 otherwise than costly to American interests, and were par- 
 ticularly unfortunate at the time of the retirement of 
 Pruyn, who left at a most delicate and critical stage, it may 
 be noted that the British diplomatic service was also fre- 
 quently interrupted. Rutherford Alcock,^ after fourteen 
 years in the British consular service in China, with the rank 
 of consul general, was made the first British representative 
 in Japan. He arrived in July, 1859, taking up residence in 
 Yedo at the same time with Harris. He was absent on 
 
 391 
 
392 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 leave from March, 1862, until March, 1864, having been 
 in the interim made a Knight Commander of the Bath. 
 Alcock was recalled abruptly a few months later, although 
 he was subsequently vindicated and promoted to Peking, 
 where he succeeded Sir Frederick Bruce. He was replaced 
 by Harry S. Parkes,^ who also had had a long and far- 
 famed career in the Chinese consular service. Parkes ar- 
 rived in August, 1865, thus beginning a mission in Japan 
 which extended over nearly twenty years. British policy, 
 however, was directed step by step from London, and had a 
 continuity and consistency which was lacking in American 
 policy. Before the close of the American Civil War, the 
 United States had yielded to England its position of priority 
 in Japan. Seward, distracted and preoccupied by the Civil 
 War, gave to American interests in Japan an astonishing 
 amount of attention, and yet his advice to the American 
 representatives was rarely helpful and of course the United 
 States was able to give only nominal naval support to its 
 ministers in Yedo. Steward's policy for Japan will be 
 treated in the next chapter. American policy continued 
 to be in Japan as it had been and was in China, the policy 
 of Americans more than the policy of their government. 
 
 The American Government held consistently to one 
 principle without compromise: the achievements of Perry 
 and Harris must not be lost; the Japanese must not be per- 
 mitted to return to a policy of seclusion. It is in the appli- 
 cation of this principle that we encounter difficulties in 
 defining policies. The Americans swung between two 
 courses. On the one hand it was of the utmost importance 
 to cooperate with the other treaty powers, particularly with 
 the British, French and Dutch, and on the other, it suited 
 the American spirit as well as the exigencies of the time, 
 to show towards the Japanese conciliation, moderation, and 
 a spirit of compromise. These two courses were often op- 
 posed to each other, for moderation was not a characteristic l< 
 of the British in Japan, and they dominated the situation. ' 
 
 Cooperation with the other treaty powers, even when it 
 required the Americans to join in a use of force such as 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN: 1858-1869 393 
 
 had never characterized the pohcy in China, and never again 
 appeared in Japan, was rendered the more easy by the fact 
 that the Japanese Empire was then passing through a mo- 
 mentous struggle of clan feuds and of rival rulers in which 
 there was always one faction definitely committed to the 
 expulsion of the foreigners and to a return to seclusion. 
 Into the details of this most intricate and involved domestic 
 Japanese conflict it is impossible for us to go, and yet 
 without a knowledge of these details it is often difficult to 
 estimate correctly the courses proposed and the actions 
 taken by the foreigners. Briefly the situation was as 
 follows : 
 
 Anti-foreign Agitation 
 
 The signing of the treaties (1854-8) stirred the opposi- 
 tion of a large section of the articulate public opinion of 
 the Empire which was sincerely opposed to the abandon- 
 ment of the policy of seclusion, and it was seized upon by 
 powerful daimyos (feudal lords) who had no strong anti- 
 foreign convictions but who were eager to find in the acts 
 of the Shogun's government an object of criticism by which 
 the Takugawa regime might be weakened and overthrown.* 
 The anti-foreign and the anti-Shogun forces tended to 
 coalesce into a single body demanding reform in Japanese 
 affairs. The foreign relations of the Empire were retired to 
 a secondary place in the public interest, and yet a by-prod- 
 uct of the domestic struggle was a stubborn and unreasoning 
 opposition to the foreigners, coupled with demands for their 
 expulsion. Conciliation and isolated action were weak staffs 
 for the foreigners to lean upon in the face of this opposition 
 which was so blind, so indirect, and so irresponsible. A 
 cooperative policy with force to back it up was absolutely 
 essential and would have been necessary for the Americans 
 had there been no Civil War to create a political reason for 
 cultivating harmony with foreign powers. 
 
 * The Shogun (Tycoon, i.e., Great Prince) was theoretically an offlcer of the 
 Imperial Court of Kioto and was appointed by the Emperor to repress disturb- 
 ances and maintain order. Practically the office carried with it complete control 
 of the Emperor whom the Shogun set up and deposed at will, and also pos- 
 sessed important economic and commercial privileges not equally enjoyed by the 
 less important princes. 
 
394 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 The course of American policy may best be reviewed, 
 perhaps, by noting the more important steps which were 
 taken, explaining in each case the underlying domestic sit- 
 uation in Japan, and then comparing the course of the 
 Americans with that of the other foreigners. 
 
 Although the provision in the Harris Treaty stipulating 
 that ratifications should be exchanged in Washington within 
 one year had been inserted at the request of the Japanese, 
 the Tycoon's officers were soon forced to seek delay for this 
 visit to the United States.* Notwithstanding the represen- 
 tation of Lord Hotta, the Shogun's emissary to the Mikado, 
 that the resumption of international relations might be 
 made the first step in securing for Japan the ''hegemony 
 over all nations" which, he stated, ''is doubtless in conform- 
 ity with the will of Heaven," ^ the throne withheld approval 
 of the treaties. The Shogun was thus placed in the position 
 of having violated a fundamental law of the Empire, and for 
 a mission to go abroad would be to incur the death penalty. 
 The Tycoon pleaded for delay in sending the embassy to the 
 United States and Harris sympathetically approved, stipu- 
 lating, however, that in the interim no other embassy was to 
 depart from Japan. While the Japanese regarded all 
 treaties in the light of "necessary evils," wrote Harris to 
 Seward, "there is no doubt that the Japanese regard us in a 
 more friendly light than any of the other powers with whom 
 they have come in contact." 
 
 The embassy actually sailed February, 1860, in the U. 
 S. S. Powhatan, which had been placed at its disposal by 
 request of the Japanese. Congress appropriated $50,000 
 for the entertainment of the guests, who were received and 
 feted with great ceremony. After seven weeks of amazing 
 sight-seeing the embassy was returned directly to Japan in 
 the U. S. S. Niagara. 
 
 Meanwhile affairs in Japan were becoming difficult alike 
 for the Shogun's government and for the foreigners. Harris 
 had even intimated to the Yedo officials that the powers 
 might find it necessary to turn to the Mikado if the Shogun 
 did not show a greater desire to fulfill the stipulations of the 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN: 1858-1869 395 
 
 treaty. It soon became evident, however, that the Sho- 
 gun's position was not simple. He did not possess the power 
 to enforce order or to protect the foreigners. The foreigners 
 themselves had given great offense. The treaties had left 
 the currency question in an unsatisfactory condition. The 
 Japanese Government had for centuries maintained the 
 ratio between silver and gold at about 5 to 1. The new 
 treaties compelled the Japanese to accept foreign silver at 
 the foreign valuation. The foreigners were not slow to see 
 the avenue of profit thus opened to them. They could 
 bring their foreign silver to Japan, exchange it for Japa- 
 nese silver at par, and with the latter buy Japanese gold 
 at the rate of 5 or 6 to 1, and then export the gold thus 
 cheaply purchased to China, where it could be disposed of 
 according to the current rates of international exchange. 
 Nearly everyone, ministers, consuls, and naval officers, as 
 well as merchants, joined in these speculations which began 
 rapidly to drain the Empire of its gold. The scandal was 
 notorious and became a subject of investigation by Parlia- 
 ment. Great Britain sought the cooperation of the United 
 States in correcting the evil and Secretary of State Cass 
 directed Harris to comply with the British request, but be- 
 fore the matter was adjusted much ill will had been 
 generated.^ 
 
 Less easily defined, yet equally productive of evil, was 
 the personal conduct of the foreigners towards the Japa- 
 nese. Most of the foreigners came to Japan from China 
 and brought with them an impudence and arrogance which, 
 while as irritating to Chinese as to Japanese, created more 
 disorder in Japan because of the presence of so many skillful 
 samurai swordsmen and retainers. The Japanese were not 
 only inclined but were well prepared to meet insult with 
 retaliation. Sometimes this revenge was executed directly 
 upon the guilty party, but more often it took the form of 
 hostility to all foreigners, and within two years after the 
 opening of Yokohama the foreigners were actually im- 
 perilled by multitudes of assassins seeking either revenge or 
 an opportunity to stir up trouble which might eventuate 
 
396 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 in the expulsion of the foreigners from the Empire. The 
 Tokugawa government at Yedo, unsupported by the Kioto 
 government, and strongly opposed in domestic affairs by 
 many powerful princes, was quite unable to control the 
 situation. 
 
 Early in January, 1861, Heusken, the interpreter of the 
 American Legation, while returning home after dark, was 
 cut down in the streets of Yedo and expired within a few 
 hours.'^ The murder of Heusken was the seventh assassi- 
 nation of foreigners within eighteen months and greatly 
 excited the foreign community. Harris, while greatly 
 shocked, took the position that his interpreter had been 
 foolhardy in thus exposing himself to attack in the dark- 
 ness. Harris himself had been careful, even at the expense 
 of a great deal of personal liberty, to avoid giving the 
 sworded gentry such opportunities as they so much de- 
 sired, but such a surrender of rights did not suit the dignity 
 of many other foreigners. Rutherford Alcock,^ with the 
 French, Dutch and Prussian representatives retired from 
 Yedo, as a result of the murder of the American inter- 
 preter, demanding that the government give satisfactory 
 guarantees of security to life and property before they 
 would return. Harris not only remained in Yedo, but even 
 went so far as to request from his government discretion- 
 ary powers to waive the right granted by treaty for for- 
 eigners to reside in Yedo after January 1, 1862. 
 
 The murder of Heusken and this request for delay in 
 opening Yedo to residence were the first matters presented 
 to Seward from Japan after he became Secretary of State. 
 His attitude will be considered subsequently. SuSice it to 
 state here that Harris's advice was accepted and reparation 
 for the murder of Heusken was settled by the payment of 
 $10,000 to the interpreter's mother. The contrast between 
 the policy of Harris and that of the British representatives 
 is illustrated not only in the withdrawal of Alcock for a time 
 from Yedo, but also by the size of the indemnities required 
 by the British Government for contemporaneous assassina- 
 tions of British subjects. These ranged from $10,000 for 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN: 1858-1869 397 
 
 wounding two members of the British Legation a few 
 months later, to £110,000 gold for the murder of Richard- 
 son (September 14, 1862). Alcock's proposed remedy for 
 assassination was $20,000 to $50,000 indemnity for every 
 foreigner killed. 
 
 Harris and Alcock were irreconcilable in temperament, 
 previous training, and in their attitude towards the Japa- 
 nese. It is difficult to see how a policy of cooperation could 
 have been carried out in Yedo had Harris remained as 
 American minister. It also seems probable that had Harris 
 continued in Japan, the course of American pohcy for the 
 following five years would have been quite different. 
 
 One of the first requests presented to Pruyn after his 
 arrival in 1862 was that the Japanese might exercise their 
 treaty right to purchase three war steamers in the United 
 States. Although the Japanese were obviously preparing 
 not merely for possible civil war but also to defend them- 
 selves against the steadily increasing pressure of Great 
 Britain and the other treaty powers, Pruyn approved of the 
 request, and himself became the commercial agent for the 
 Japanese Government in the transaction,* a highly irregular 
 proceeding.^ 
 
 By pressing so hard upon the Tycoon for the execution 
 of the treaties the British Government, unknowingly, was 
 really playing into the hands of those within the Empire 
 who were seeking to weaken the Yedo government. The 
 Shogun officials clearly saw the possibility of civil war early 
 in 1863, and approached the American minister with an in- 
 quiry as to how the United States would regard such a 
 conflict. Pruyn replied cautiously that in a conflict between 
 supposedly anti-foreign forces and the government of the 
 Shogun with which the treaties had been made, he believed 
 that, if requested, all the treaty powers "would be justified" 
 by self-defense in aiding the Shogun.^ ^ Further study and 
 reflection, however, led Mr. Pruyn to modify this opinion 
 and less than six months later (June 27, 1863), he recom- 
 
 *Gideon Welles, who subsequently became familiar with the details of the 
 way in which this contract was executed in the United States, sharply criti- 
 cized the proceedings.^" 
 
398 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 mended to Seward a joint naval demonstration of the 
 treaty powers, such as Seward had proposed two years be- 
 fore, to compel the Mikado to ratify the treaties. Seward 
 was willing to act on this suggestion but at that time the 
 Lord John Russell did not favor it. 
 
 Meanwhile the Throne had issued a number of decrees 
 ordering either the complete expulsion of the foreigners or 
 the closing of all ports save those of Nagasaki and Hako- 
 date. Many efforts had been made to induce Pruyn to re- 
 tire from Yedo and in May, 1863, the legation was burned. 
 Six weeks later an American vessel, the Pembroke, was 
 fired on in the Straits of Shimoneseki by the forces of the 
 Prince of Choshiu and within a few days a French and a 
 Dutch vessel also were fired on. This prince had taken 
 literally the Mikado's orders to expel the barbarians. The 
 Yedo officials, under orders from Kioto, formally notified the 
 foreign representatives that the port of Yokohama was to be 
 closed to trade. At the same time the British fleet in Jap- 
 anese waters, under Admiral Kuper, now numbering ten 
 vessels, was instructed to proceed to Kagoshima on the 
 island of Kiushiu to demand reparations directly from the 
 Prince of Satsuma for the murder of Richardson, who had 
 been cut down by the express orders of one of the Satsuma 
 daimyos. In the midst of all this confusion one fact stood 
 out clearly: the foreigners to maintain their place in Japan 
 must not only defend themselves but must retaliate. The 
 Yedo government was quite powerless to control many pow- 
 erful princes, or to carry out the treaties, and was ap- 
 parently passing into a subordination to Kioto such as had 
 not been known in Japan since the establishment of the 
 Shogunate. 
 
 July, 1863, was a tumultuous month in western Japan. 
 Commander McDougal in the U. S. S. Wyoming, which had 
 fortunately appeared at Yokohama in the course of a hunt 
 for the Alabama, proceeded to the Straits of Shimoneseki 
 with the intention of capturing the offending Choshiu war 
 vessels and presenting them to the ShoguD, but when the 
 Choshiu shore batteries opened fire upon the Wyoming, 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN: 1858-1869 399 
 
 McDougal engaged them in battle, and while no effort 
 was made to capture the batteries, a war steamer and a brig 
 were sunk.^- A few days later the French admiral, Jaures, 
 landed a small force at the same spot, destroyed one of the 
 batteries, and burned a village. Meanwhile Admiral Kuper 
 proceeded to Kagoshima, a Satsuma city, and commenced 
 a bombardment which resulted in the destruction of most 
 of the city by fire. The effect of these expeditions, coupled 
 with certain concurrent developments of domestic politics, 
 was to reduce the opposition of the western clans to for- 
 eign intercourse and, for a time, to strengthen the Tycoon. 
 
 Acting upon emphatic and very explicit instructions 
 from Seward, Pruyn demanded of the Yedo government 
 the settlement of all American claims. Seward had based 
 his instructions on the conclusion that ''the Government of 
 Japan had failed to keep its faith solemnly pledged by 
 treaty," ^^ and intimated that the United States could not 
 maintain its dignity or self-respect if it were to permit 
 Japan to evade the payment of the modest American claims 
 while the other powers were making very much greater de- 
 mands. Seward threatened to support the demand with an 
 additional naval force. Pruyn asked for a total of $32,000 
 —$10,000 for the burning of the legation, $20,000 for as- 
 saults on Americans at Yokohama, and $2,000 for an Ameri- 
 can citizen who had been deported from the Bonin Islands 
 by the Japanese.^'* Payment for the Pembroke claim, 
 $10,000, had already been made. When the Japanese de- 
 clined to meet the demands, Pruyn reminded them that the 
 United States had never consented to the delay in the 
 opening of Hiogo and Niigata for which discretionary powers 
 had been given to Harris, and that if the claims were not 
 paid, he would feel at liberty to declare that these ports 
 were open, under the stipulations of the American treaty. 
 
 Pruyn relented slightly in the urgency of his demands 
 which had been presented in the form of an ultimatum, 
 but a few months later he went to Yedo in the U. S. S. 
 Jamestown, landed with a guard of sixty-five sailors and 
 marines, and secured a settlement. In this adjustment he 
 
400 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 proposed that the claims of the Americans at Yokohama 
 should be submitted to the Emperor of Russia for arbitra- 
 tion, but the Japanese authorities preferred to settle them 
 directly. 
 
 An important by-product of the conferences over the 
 American ultimatum had been the securing of a convention 
 by which the Japanese agreed to lower from 20 per cent to 
 5 per cent the import duty on machines and machinery, 
 iron in pigs and bars, sheet iron and iron ware, tin plates, 
 sugar, glass, clocks, watches, wines and liquors.^ ^ A few 
 days later the Japanese voluntarily reduced to 6 per cent 
 the duties on several other classes of importation. 
 
 Sir Rutherford Alcock returned to Yedo in March, 1864. 
 His government, which had been severely criticized in Par- 
 liament for the burning of Kagoshima, had provided him 
 with instructions of moderation. Alcock, however, became 
 convinced that the thinly concealed object of the Japanese 
 Government was to expel the foreigner, and he proposed 
 to "make war for the purpose of forestalling war." ^*^ Thus 
 he would prevent the closing of the port of Yokohama and 
 at the same time he would open the Inland Sea to navi- 
 gation and force the Japanese Government to change its 
 entire policy towards the foreigners. The plan met with the 
 approval of the other foreign representatives and was car- 
 ried out in a joint naval expedition to the Straits of Shi- 
 moneseki in the latter part of August, 1864. The com- 
 bined fleet consisted of nine British, four Dutch, three 
 French and one American, vessels. The American vessel 
 was a rented merchant steamer of light draught equipped 
 with a few guns and sailors from the Jamestown, which, 
 being a sailing vessel, was of no use to the fleet. The bom- 
 bardment and assault occupied four days and as a result the 
 Prince of Nagato agreed to the opening of the Straits, and 
 also to pay a ransom for the city, which the allied forces 
 had refrained from destroying.^''' The expedition had been 
 undertaken with at least the tacit approval of the Yedo gov- 
 ernment, which had experienced the most determined oppo- 
 sition from this Prince. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN: 1858-1869 401 
 
 The fleet then returned to Yokohama and the diploma- 
 tists took up the task of settlement with the government. 
 The Yedo officials agreed (September 23) to abrogate the 
 order closing the port of Yokohama, and also engaged to 
 seek from the Mikado an approval of the treaties. A few 
 days later the Tycoon agreed to assume an indemnity of 
 $3,000,000 in six quarterly instalments to pay the expenses 
 of the Shimoneseki expedition. ^^ The method of division 
 of the sum was left to the determination of the powers, and 
 it was stipulated that the payment would be remitted in 
 case the Japanese should open to trade some port in the 
 Inland Sea. 
 
 The Shimoneseki expedition was approved by President 
 Lincoln and Secretary Seward/^ and although it had been 
 undertaken in violation of instructions then on their way 
 from Lord Russell to Alcock, its complete success was suffi- 
 cient to transmute a reprimand and recall for Alcock into 
 a promotion to Peking.-^ Viewed in the light of history, 
 particularly Japanese domestic history, there is little to 
 bring forward in defense of the expedition. It was cer- 
 tainly a marked departure from traditional American pol- 
 icy both in its cooperative aspects and in its confessed pur- 
 pose to intervene in the domestic conflict of the Japanese 
 Empire. It was more straightforward than Tattnall's par- 
 ticipation in the affair at Taku in 1859, and yet it was the 
 kind of action which both the Pierce and Buchanan ad- 
 ministrations had decHned to sanction in China. It had 
 little to commend it but its success. The Shimoneseki ex- 
 pedition had broken the back of the anti-foreign movement 
 in Japan. 
 
 Convention of 1866 
 
 Pruyn retired from Japan in April, 1865, leaving Port- 
 man as Charge. A few months later Harry Parkes arrived 
 to supersede Alcock. From the time of his arrival British 
 influence entirely dominated the foreign relations of Japan. 
 Parkes had entered the British service in China as a mere 
 boy and had been reared in the traditions of the British 
 
402 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 merchants of the forties and fifties. His career had been 
 much honored by those who advocated with Lord Palmer- 
 ston that in deahng with the Chinese people the ordinary- 
 rules of morality did not apply. Lord Elgin had commended 
 him. By others, by most Americans probably, he was re- 
 garded as the prime evil genius in the relations between the 
 foreigners and the Asiatics. It was Parkes' rashness which 
 had precipitated the affair of the lorcha Arrow at Canton in 
 1856, and his services in the ensuing war had on several occa- 
 sions been of an inflammatory sort. Added to his aggres- 
 siveness in every effort which looked towards the extension 
 or protection of British trade was the fact that he had a 
 temper which he often thought it not worth while to con- 
 trol.^^ The difference between Parkes in Yedo and Sir Fred- 
 erick Bruce in Peking was as the difference between the 
 poles. 
 
 Upon arrival Parkes immediately assumed the initia- 
 tive and the leadership among the foreign representatives. 
 Although he had received rather general instructions, and 
 although Lord John Russell had always inclined towards a 
 course of moderation, Parkes, as an American historian has 
 aptly said, ''knew what his government desired, and he pro- 
 ceeded to accomplish it." ^^ The Shogun's government, un- 
 able to open the desired port in the Inland Sea, had elected 
 to pay the Shimoneseki indemnity, but after the first instal- 
 ment, found itself financially embarrassed and requested de- 
 lay in the other payments. This request provided Parkes 
 with the desired opportunity. He secured the assent of 
 the other foreign representatives to a proposal which called 
 for the transference of the negotiations from Yedo to 
 Osaka, accompanied by a naval demonstration. This ex- 
 pedition, in which Charge Portman represented the United 
 States in a British war vessel, arrived at Osaka early in 
 November, 1865.-^ Parkes' letter to the Japanese authori- 
 ties, which he took the trouble to remind them was dated 
 from the admiral's flag-ship, demanded a "prompt and sat- 
 isfactory settlement." The Japanese were given the choice 
 between punctual payment of the indemnity or the imme- 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN: 1858-1869 403 
 
 diate opening of Hiogo and Osaka, the formal consent of 
 the Mikado to the treaties, and "the regularization of the 
 tariff on a basis of five per cent." In case the Japanese 
 chose the second alternative, the treaty powers would gra- 
 ciously remit $2,000,000 of the indemnity. When the Jap- 
 anese delayed their answer and appeared to be preparing to 
 defy the foreign representatives, the latter sent identic 
 notes containing a threat "to act as we may judge con- 
 venient." A Japanese minister came to the flag-ship Sep- 
 tember 24 and announced to Parkes that the Mikado had 
 ratified the treaties, that the Shogun would consent to the 
 revision of the tariff, but that rather than open the port be- 
 fore the appointed time, the government preferred to pay 
 the full remaining indemnity. On the part of the foreigners 
 the visit to Osaka was a brutal proceeding, the method of 
 which the Japanese in later years found many opportuni- 
 ties to imitate in dealings with Korea and China. 
 
 The tariff settlement with the Japanese Government 
 was embodied in a convention which was signed in Yedo 
 June 25, 1866. This convention is notable in American pol- 
 icy for several reasons. It, and the preceding convention of 
 1864, which had been signed by Pruyn jointly with the Brit- 
 ish, French and Dutch representatives, are among the very 
 few, if not the only instances in the nineteenth century in 
 which the United States entered into a joint treaty. While 
 it was not altogether exceptional for the United States to 
 make similar treaties, concurrently with other powers, as in 
 China in 1858, it marked a wide departure from traditional 
 policy for the American Government to sign a treaty jointly 
 with other nations. In 1857 William B. Reed had been 
 specifically instructed not to make such a treaty. The con- 
 vention was also remarkable for the fact that it stated an 
 untruth, viz., that the foreign representatives had "received 
 from their respective governments identical instructions for 
 the modification of the tariff." Portman had received no 
 such instructions. The treaty was, however, duly ratified by 
 the American Government the following year. In the third 
 place, the proposed "regularization" of the tariff took the 
 
404 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 form of the China treaties of 1858 in that the duties were 
 made specific and the precise amounts estimated on ad va- 
 lorem basis of five per cent. The tariff was not terminable 
 at a definite date, but like both the Chinese and Japanese 
 treaties of 1858 was merely "subject to revision" on the 
 first day of July, 1872. The effect of this provision was to 
 place Japan entirely within the power of the united foreign 
 nations, or of any one of them which would not consent 
 to revision, notwithstanding the fact that the increasing 
 prices of many articles of trade had the effect of lowering 
 the duty rate, estimated on an ad valorem basis, until in 
 later years the duties received amounted to little more than 
 the cost of collection. Judged by any standard of foreign 
 policy, the convention of 1866 with Japan may be regarded 
 as one of the most thoroughly un-American treaties ever 
 ratified by the American Government. 
 
 The American policy of cooperation continued after the 
 American Civil War was over, and the most urgent reasons 
 for its practice had disappeared. Civil war broke out in 
 Japan at the beginning of 1868 and Van Valkenburgh joined 
 with the other foreign representatives in the approval of a 
 joint occupation of the approaches to Yokohama by the 
 combined naval forces.^^ The powers declared their neu- 
 trality in the domestic conflict. This had the effect of in- 
 fluencing the Mikado, who had taken over the powers of the 
 Shogun at the latter's request, February 3, 1868, to seek the 
 good will of the foreign powers. The American minister 
 was received in audience by the Mikado at Yedo, January 
 3, 1869, and a month later, the Restoration having become 
 an accomplished fact, Van Valkenburgh, in concert with 
 the other ministers, withdrew the notice of neutrality. The 
 American authorities then turned over to the Japanese 
 Government a war steamer which the Shogun had previously 
 purchased in the United States but which on its arrival at 
 Yokohama had been retained by the American authorities 
 in order that it might not be used by the Shogun's party to 
 oppose the Restoration.^^ 
 
 In summary of this most complicated period we may 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN: 1858-1869 405 
 
 note two facts: just as in China at the revision of the 
 treaties in 1858, the American Government had signally 
 failed while sustaining a cooperative policy with the other 
 foreign powers, to exert upon the combined action of the 
 powers any notable influence. Cooperation had meant, after 
 the departure of Townsend Harris, not only British leader- 
 ship but, under Parkes, British dictation. On the other 
 hand, as in China, the United States had come out of the 
 contest with Japan with more good will from the Japanese 
 people than was enjoyed by any other foreign power. It is 
 doubtful whether any Japanese or any Americans in 1869 
 realized how the joint Convention of 1866 could be used 
 to obstruct Japanese fiscal and industrial development. 
 American policy was clear: the United States no t only 
 desired no exclusive advantages, but, unlike the other 
 powers, was as thoroughly committed to siipporting and 
 sustaining Japan in its efforts to become a strong nation, just 
 as it was committed to a similar course in China. 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. The primary American sources for this period are: Japan In- 
 
 structions, Vol. 1, and Japan Despatches, Vols. I-XI. (The 
 reports for the years 1861-8 in "Diplomatic Correspondence" 
 are very complete. Treat's "Early Diplomatic Relations be- 
 tween the United States and Japan, 1858-65," a most valuable 
 intensive study, makes generous ixse of the papers of R. B. 
 Pruyn which are, however, usually practically identical with 
 the Pruyn dispatches in the Dept. of State. Treat also makes 
 use of a large number of translations from Japanese sources 
 some of which are unavailable in any except the best stocked 
 American libraries. Gubbins's "Progress of Japan" presents 
 the Japanese sources very fully. Two scholarly studies and 
 interpretations by Japanese can be recommended — ISTitobe's 
 ''Intercourse between the United States and Japan" (Johns 
 Hopkins Univ. Studies in Hist, and Pol. Sci., extra Vol. 9, 
 1891), and Hishida's "International Position of Japan as a 
 Great Power" (Columbia Univ. Studies in Hist. Economics 
 and Public Law, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1905). 
 
 2. Alcock's "The Capital of the Tycoon, a Narrative of Three Years' 
 
 Residence in Japan," 2 vols., makes a very full record of 
 Alcock's service in Japan before 1862 ; see also Michie ; "The 
 Englishman in China." 
 
 3. Dickens and Lane-Poole: "Life of Sir Henry Parkes"; Sir 
 
406 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Ernest Satow's "A Diplomat in Japan," throws some valuable 
 side-lights on Parkes' early career in Japan. 
 
 4. S. Ex. Doc. 25 :36-l. 
 
 5. Treat: "Early Diplomatic Relations," pp. 99-100. 
 
 6. Townsend Harris' Journal, Pt. II, p. 101 (Lib. of Cong.) ; Japan 
 
 Instructions, Vol. 1, Apr. 2, 1860, Cass to Harris; see also 
 Satow's "A Diplomat in Japan." 
 
 7. Japan Dispatches, Vol. 5, Jan. 22, Feb. 13, '61 ; Dip. Corres., 1862, 
 
 pp. 795 ff. 
 
 8. Alcock : "The Capital of the Tycoon," Vol. 2, chaps. 24, 25. 
 
 9. S. Ex. Doc. 33:37-3. 
 
 10. Diary of Gideon Welles, Vol. II, pp. 188-92, 561. 
 
 11. Dip. Corres., 1863, p. 982. 
 
 12. Ihid., pp. 1040 fi. 
 
 13. Hid., p. 1057. 
 
 14. Hid., 1864, pp. 466 ff. 
 
 15. Ihid., 1864, p. 479. 
 
 16. Parliamentary Papers, 1865, Comm. 57, pp. 18-36, cited by 
 
 Treat, p. 324. 
 
 17. Dip. Corres., 1864, pp. 553 ff. 
 
 18. lUd., p. 578. 
 
 19. Hid. (1865), p. 229. 
 
 20. Treat : p. 373, citing British sources. 
 
 21. See Morse, Vol. 1, pp. 422 ff, for an estimate of Parkes. 
 22 Treat ■ x> 395 
 
 23! Dip. Corres., 1865, p. 276, 1866, p. 191. 
 
 24. Japan Dispatches, Vol. 9, Apr. 3, 1868, Van Valkenburgh to 
 
 Seward. 
 
 25. Dip. Corres., 1868, p. 730. 
 
CHAPTER XXII 
 
 SEWARD'S FAE EASTERN POLICY 
 
 By 1861, by a process of negation and opportunism as 
 well as by foresight and design, the American Government 
 had acquired a fairly definite Far Eastern Policy. This pol- 
 icy had grown out of certain precedents and decisions and 
 was incorporated in two treaties — one with China and an- 
 other with Japan. The foundation of this policy was ''most- 
 favored-nation" treatment, equivalent to what is now called 
 the "open-door" policy. Above this lay the decision, many 
 times repeated, not to acquire any territorial possessions or 
 protectorates in Asia or the Pacific Ocean. Deduced from 
 the necessities of the most-favored-nation policy was the 
 decision to "sustain China" and, by inference, to sustain 
 Japan, thus placing the United States in opposition to any 
 movement on the part of Western powers to injure the 
 territorial integrity or the political sovereignty of Asiatic 
 states. The United States desired that China and Japan 
 become sufficiently strong to rnaintain their own open doors. 
 Furthermore, the American Government had been commit- 
 ted by the Pierce and Buchanan administrations to coopera- 
 tion with the other treaty powers in all peaceful measures to 
 secure the execution of the treaties and the protection of 
 foreign interests. On the other hand, the United States had 
 declined to enter an alliance with Great Britain and France, 
 and Mr. Reed had been instructed to avoid any joint treaty 
 with China. Upon these foundations Seward had to build 
 in the tempestuous years 1861-9. 
 
 Seward entered the Department of State with large and 
 positive convictions on the nature and the future of Ameri- 
 can relations with Asia. This is evident from his previous 
 record in the Senate. More than most men of his day his 
 
 407 
 
408 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 face was turned towards the West. As to the future expan- 
 sion of the American people to the Pacific Coast he was 
 firmly optimistic. He was a hearty supporter of every 
 movement to establish American foreign trade on a firmer 
 basis. "The nation," he said, "must command the empire 
 of the seas, which alone is real empire." This empire, it 
 seemed to him, must include the Pacific as well as the At- 
 lantic. Indeed he foresaw the day when the Atlantic inter- 
 ests of the United States would "relatively sink in impor- 
 tance, while the Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and 
 the vast regions beyond" would become the "chief theatre 
 of events in the world's great hereafter." This famous as- 
 sertion, made in 1852 while the Japan Expedition was in 
 preparation, was no isolated flight of oratory. Seward had 
 a very definite idea as to the function of the American 
 people in the commerce of the Pacific Ocean. Foreign 
 trade, he thought, was to replace military conquest and to 
 become the vehicle for a commerce of ideas. The great 
 American contribution to the world, it seemed to him, was 
 political theory. Just as the Atlantic states through their 
 commercial, social and political sympathies were steadily 
 renovating the governments and social constitutions of 
 Europe and Africa, so "the Pacific states must necessarily 
 perform the same sublime and beneficent functions in Asia." 
 Seward appears to have expected that Asia thus enriched 
 from America would repay the debt in gratitude. He said, 
 while Perry was in the East, "Certainly no one expects the 
 nations of Asia to be awakened by any other influence than 
 our own from the lethargy into which they sunk nearly three 
 thousand years ago. If they could be roused and invigor- 
 ated now, would they spare their European oppressors and 
 spite their American benefactors?" 
 
 r Seward was so convinced of the value of the Pacific 
 
 I Coast to the United States that he would, notwithstanding 
 
 his convictions on the subject of slavery, vote to receive 
 
 \ California as a state even though it were to become slave 
 
 territory. He believed in the Japan Expedition, expressing 
 
 the conviction that the proper question for the Senate to ask 
 
SEWARD'S FAR EASTERN POLICY 409 
 
 was not why it had been sent, but why it had not been sent I 
 before. He urged the completion of surveys of the Pacific \ 
 Ocean; he favored the encouragement of Chinese immigra- 
 tion to Cahfornia; and among the projects to which he lent 
 persistent and energetic leadership, were the construction 
 of a transcontinental railroad and the inauguration of a line 
 of mail steamers from San Francisco via the Sandwich 
 Islands to Japan and China. ^ He also gave approval and 
 support to the proposal to connect America with Asia by 
 means of a telegraph line through Alaska, across the Aleu- 
 tian Islands and down the coast of Asia to the mouth of the 
 Amur.^ Lincoln could not have chosen from among the 
 conspicuous leaders of the day a secretary of state who 
 would bring to the Far Eastern question more previous 
 thought and conviction. 
 
 During Seward's term of service the problem of com- 
 munications between Washington and the Far East, which 
 had been almost a determining factor in the previous poli- 
 cies, was partially solved. The opening of the transconti- 
 nental telegraph in 1862 and the increase in the frequency 
 of trans-Pacific travel brought Japan within a month of 
 Washington, while a similar development of transportation 
 and telegraphy from Hongkong to England, shortened to 
 some degree the distance from China westward. However, 
 during the winter months the Chinese capital was ice- and 
 snow-bound, receiving its mail only by courier service from 
 Shanghai. The American representatives in China, and to 
 a less extent in Japan, must still exercise broad discretionary 
 powers and therefore had the control of American policy 
 largely in their own hands. As an offset to better communi- 
 cations came the Civil War, which so distracted the Ameri- 
 can Government as to leave little time for the considera- 
 tion of Far Eastern policy. Seward, under different condi- 
 tions, would probably have shown from the outset much 
 initiative in dealing with the East, but as it was, his hands 
 were tied. Nevertheless he found it possible in the course 
 of eight years to bring both Alaska and Korea within the 
 range of Far Eastern policy, and also to modify in a marked 
 
410 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 degree many of the precedents of his office. At the risk of 
 some confusion we have already examined the contributions 
 of Burhngame and Harris ; let us now retraverse the ground 
 and note the policies of Seward. 
 
 Seward, Burlingame and China 
 
 About Seward and China little need be said. Burlingame 
 required few suggestions or instructions. He appeared in 
 China in the calm which followed the storm. It was a 
 period especially favorable for constructive work such as 
 must follow destructive war. Notwithstanding his enthu- 
 siasm and amiability, Burlingame was a masterful per- 
 sonality, sure to dominate any situation. He dominated 
 Peking while he was there, and in like measure he domi- 
 nated American policy in China. Seward wisely permitted 
 Burlingame to have his way; there were between them no 
 conflicts, nor even differences of opinion. Even the cus- 
 tomary long letter of instructions usually given to a new 
 minister was omitted.^ Seward's part in Chinese policy was 
 limited to approval of Burlingame; the Secretary of State 
 initiated nothing except the immigration section of the 
 Treaty of 1868.* 
 
 Some months after Burlingame's arrival in China 
 (March 6, 1862), Seward took occasion, while approving the 
 minister's course in the closing contests of the Taiping Re- 
 bellion, to urge him to "consult and cooperate" with the 
 other representatives. The instruction was hardly neces- 
 sary, for the policy was already in operation and Burlingame 
 was the sort of man who could work no other way.* Shortly 
 after the close of the Civil War Seward summarized his Chi- 
 nese policy (August 14, 1865) as follows: 
 
 "The Government of the United States is not disposed to be tech- 
 nical or exacting in its intercourse with the Chinese Government, 
 but will deal with it in entire frankness, cordiality and friendship. 
 
 * The so-called Burlingame Treaty (1868) might more properly be called the 
 Seward Treaty, for Seward, rather than Burlingame, appears to have espe- 
 cially desired it and Seward wrote it. It was really an immigration treaty to 
 which were attached some declarations of foreign policy. As a part of Seward's 
 policy it will be treated in Chapter XXVIII. 
 
SEWARD'S FAR EASTERN POLICY 411 
 
 The United States desires neither to interfere with the distinct and 
 ancient habits and customs of the Chinese people, nor to embarrass 
 the members of the foreign board in their difficult and responsible 
 task." ' 
 
 While always insistent that American life and prop- 
 erty must be protected, Seward was careful to avoid any- 
 thing which looked towards the disregard of Chinese rights. 
 He sustained the decision of S. Wells Williams in 1866 that 
 the treaty of 1858 clearly prohibited the foreigners from 
 sending steamers through the inland waterways, thus plac- 
 ing himself in opposition to the Shanghai merchants who 
 were making a vigorous effort to break down the treaties.^ 
 He expressed himself very clearly as opposed to the abuse of 
 the American flag, the use of which was being sold by 
 American merchants to Chinese lorcha and junk owners.'^ 
 When the American bark Rover was wrecked off the coast of 
 Formosa in 1867, and the crew murdered by aborigines of 
 the island, Seward ordered a thorough investigation and 
 instructed Dr. Williams to urge the Chinese Government to 
 occupy the ports and shores of Formosa more effectively, 
 but at the same time he ordered it made clear to China that 
 the United States in no case desired to "seize or hold posses- 
 sion" of any part of Formosa.^ Rear Admiral Bell con- 
 ducted a punitive expedition against the aborigines with the 
 U. S. S.S. Hartford and Wyoming. With a landing party of 
 181 he advanced on the uncivilized people at the south 
 end of Formosa on June 13, 1867. The savages were pur- 
 sued into the hills where they frequently led the American 
 force into ambush. The American casualties were one 
 death and fourteen cases of sun-stroke. This expedition, an 
 application in a measure of the "gun-boat policy" which 
 Burlingame was so anxious to avoid, was undertaken by 
 order of the Navy Department, yet no doubt with Seward's 
 approval. The expedition was the precedent upon which 
 the Japanese relied in 1874 to justify their more ambitious 
 and inclusive attack upon the island.^ 
 
 When Seward visited China in 1870 he took occasion to 
 defend and justify American policy to one of his country- 
 
412 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 men who was very critical of its weakness. Seward reviewed 
 the difficulties of the Civil War and examined one by one 
 the alleged deficiencies of American influence in the Em- 
 pire and remarked: "I think we are obliged to conclude 
 from all these premises that a policy of justice, moderation 
 and friendship is the only one that we have had a choice to 
 pursue, and that it has been as wise as it has been unavoid- 
 able." He concluded: "The United States cannot be an 
 aggressive nation — least of all against China." ^^ 
 
 Coercion in Japan 
 
 Seward's policy in Japan was of a somewhat different 
 nature. It was based on the assumption that the Japanese 
 Government was seeking to evade the fulfillment of its ob- 
 ligations under the treaties, and that the foreigners were in 
 grave danger of being expelled from some or all of the open 
 ports. Seward was also under the impression that the do- 
 mestic confiict in Japan was a clean-cut contest between 
 the liberal forces under the leadership of the Tycoon and 
 the reactionary and anti-foreign forces back of the Mikado. 
 These assumptions as we have seen were quite inaccurate. 
 The Takugawa government was evading the requirements 
 of the treaties at least in part because it was utterly power- 
 less to carry them out. The foreigners were probably not 
 in such imminent danger of being expelled as they believed. 
 The forces back of the Mikado were by no means entirely 
 anti-foreign. In the face of what Seward believed to be the 
 dangers of the situation his policy was aggressive and bel- 
 ligerent. He believed that "very large interests, not of our 
 own country only, but of the civilized world, are involved 
 in retaining the foothold of foreign nations already acquired 
 in the Empire of Japan." ^^ Towards Japan Seward di- 
 rected a policy far more vigorous than any preceding secre- 
 tary of state had directed towards China, but at no time had 
 China appeared to be seeking to expel the foreigners. 
 
 Immediately upon receipt of information as to the mur- 
 der of Heusken, which reached Seward just at the out- 
 break of the Civil War, the Secretary of State initiated a 
 
SEWARD'S FAR EASTERN POLICY 413 
 
 proposal to the treaty powers — France, Great Britain, Rus- 
 sia and Prussia — for a joint naval demonstration against 
 Japan to compel Japan to comply with the stipulations of 
 the treaties.* ^^ 
 
 This proposal, as we have seen, was quite contrary to 
 the judgment of Townsend Harris, who even recommended 
 that he be given discretionary powers to postpone the open- 
 ing of Yedo and Osaka. Seward rather reluctantly con- 
 curred with Harris, urgently insisting, however, that there 
 be no relaxation of the demand for the fulfillment of the 
 treaties until the Japanese had rendered abundant satis- 
 faction for Heusken.^^ 
 
 While Seward's energetic proposal in May, 1861, may 
 have been a part of a larger policy by which he sought to 
 secure the cooperation of the European powers in a joint 
 undertaking to divert them from intervening in the domes- 
 tic conflict of the United States, nevertheless Seward was 
 not slow to return to proposals for coercive measures against 
 Japan whenever he thought the situation required them. 
 "You cannot too strongly advise the Government of Japan," 
 he wrote, December 13, 1862, "that it can only have friend- 
 ship or even peace with the United States by protecting 
 the citizens and subjects of foreign powers from domestic 
 violence." ^^ Six months later (June 29, 1863) he stated: 
 
 "The United States having no grievances of their own to complain 
 of against Japan, will not unite in hostilities against that govern- 
 ment, but they will at the same time take care not to disapprove of 
 or censure, without just cause, the measures of Great Britain which 
 will result in greater security for all." " 
 
 A few days later he wrote that while Pruyn's whole moral 
 influence must be exerted to preserve peace between Japan 
 and the Western powers, the Wyoming would have author- 
 
 * This proposal called for the presentation of a joint note accompanied by 
 the assembly of a combined fleet in Japanese waters. An answer to the demands 
 was to be required after a certain period of delay. If the answer were unfa- 
 vorable or evasive, Seward proposed that the diplomatic representatives be 
 withdrawn "and such hostilities be commenced and prosecuted as the naval 
 commanders may deem most likely to bring the Japanese to a sense of their 
 obligations." To this proposal there were attached two qualifications : (1) that 
 the United States would make a special demand for satisfaction for the murder 
 of Huesken ; (2) that "this convention is not to be considered as obligatory 
 on" the United States until the sanction of Congress has been obtained to the 
 beginning of hostilities. (May 20, 1861.) ^^ 
 
414 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 ity to "use her guns" for the protection of the Legation or of 
 American citizens. Seward approved of the expedition of 
 the Wyoming to Shimoneseki in July, 1863, and authorized 
 Pruyn to use a firm and strong policy to induce Japan to 
 to live up to its duties under the treaties. The joint expedi- 
 tion to Shimoneseki in September, 1864, met with Seward's 
 full approval, even though it marked an absolute departure 
 from traditional American policy in the matter of joint 
 naval operations with other powers. He also approved, 
 though he did not authorize, the visit of Portman to Osaka 
 on a British war vessel in 1865 in the joint naval demonstra- 
 tion by which the Mikado was induced to approve the 
 treaties, and the government made to revise and lower the 
 tariff schedule. Indeed, one receives the impression from 
 a review of the correspondence that with Japan Seward was 
 disposed towards more forceful measures than the Ameri- 
 can representatives thought it wise to employ. Seward, 
 more than any secretary of state before or since his day, 
 was favorably disposed toward a "gun-boat policy." 
 
 How much of Seward's policy for Japan was due to the 
 necessities of the international situation arising out of the 
 American Civil War it is difficult to say. He was thoroughly 
 committed to the cooperative policy, but in China the 
 cooperation was directed towards moderation and pacific 
 measures, while in Japan it eventuated in joint hostilities. 
 
 In his instructions to Pruyn (November 15, 1861) 
 Seward expressed the fear that Japan, which had been 
 "gently coerced" by the United States into friendship, might 
 seize the present opportunity "to underrate our power" and 
 "to disregard our rights." ^'^ He looked forward to the day 
 when "our domestic differences being ended, we are able 
 once more to demonstrate our power in the East and estab- 
 lish our commerce there on secure foundations." Mean- 
 while Pruyn was to make a brave show of confidence and 
 power and thus seek to preserve friendly relations. The 
 United States, declared the Secretary, sought no exclusive 
 advantages. "Preserve friendly relations with all European 
 powers. Leave behind you all memories of domestic or 
 
SEWARD'S FAR EASTERN POLICY 415 
 
 European jealousies or antipathies." And then as the diffi- 
 culties with the European powers over the Civil War in- 
 creased, Seward wrote (December 19, 1861): 
 
 "I cannot too earnestly enjoin upon you the duty of cultivating 
 the best possible understanding with these representatives [the other 
 foreign ministers] and of doing all in your power to maintain har- 
 mony of views and policy between them and yourself." " 
 
 When Pruyn expressed to the ministers of the Shogun 
 government the personal opinion that the foreign powers 
 would be disposed to support the Shogun against the clans, 
 Seward commented that while the United States would 
 cooperate with the Japanese authorities to secure the ful- 
 fillment of the treaties, no inference must be drawn that the 
 United States would separate itself from cooperation with 
 the other treaty powers.^^ The measures to which this 
 policy of cooperation appeared to be leading the United 
 States in the joint Shimoneseki expedition and the joint 
 convention which followed it, may have been a little dis- 
 quieting but nevertheless, in view of the reason for co- 
 operation, Seward wrote: "I am authorized by the Presi- 
 dent to assure you that they are fully approved."* ^° 
 
 In the revolution which accompanied the Restoration 
 Seward advised Van Valkenburgh to adhere to the existing 
 government, i.e., the Tycoon, so long as that government 
 retained its power.^- Two years later, after he had visited 
 Japan, he stated that he had used all his influence to ''pre- 
 vent the late revolution" because he thought it was a ''retro- 
 grade movement." "I little dreamed," he explained, "that 
 the Mikado would excel the dethroned Tycoon in emulating 
 Western civilization." 
 
 On the subject of religious toleration Seward entertained 
 very decided views. When a persecution of Christians at 
 Nagasaki broke out in 1867, he took up with other powers 
 the question of a united appeal to Japan to repeal and abro- 
 gate the laws which prohibit Christianity. And a year 
 later he wrote: "Humanity indeed demands and expects 
 a continually extending sway of the Christian religion." 
 
 ♦Gideon Welles expressed strong dissent from this approval." 
 
416 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 However he expected this to come by a "diffusion of knowl- 
 edge and calm and persevering appeal to the reason and 
 consciences of men." He directed Van Valkenburgh to 
 warn Japan that "when one foreign Christian shall have 
 suffered martyrdom for his faith, Christendom will be 
 shocked to its center and it may demand that the policy of 
 forbearance and encouragement which the treaty powers 
 have hitherto practised in Japan shall be reversed." ^^ 
 
 Alaska and Korea 
 
 Seward appears not to have been conscious that the 
 American Civil War was to mark a new phase of American 
 development in which internal growth would quite eclipse 
 the interests of foreign trade as he had viewed them in the 
 fifties. He returned to his former interest in the extension 
 of American trade in the Pacific when the war cares were re- 
 moved. He negotiated the purchase of Alaska in 1867 and 
 at the same time initiated a movement to secure, jointly 
 with France, the opening of Korea. -^ 
 
 While the motives which inspired the purchase of Alaska 
 have been a matter of doubt and dispute, and were care- 
 fully concealed from Stoeckl, the Russian minister, at the 
 time of the negotiations, it is difficult to resist the conclu- 
 sion that Seward saw in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands 
 a way of "extending a friendly hand to Asia." ^^ Indeed his 
 son stated definitely that the motive back of the purchase 
 of Alaska was the desire for "advanced naval outposts" such 
 as had been lacking in the north Pacific as well as in the 
 West Indies during the recent war.-® The United States 
 took possession of the Midway Islands in August, 1867.^'^ 
 A few months later Seward wrote to the American represen- 
 tative at Honolulu (September 12, 1867), "that a lawful 
 and peaceful annexation of the islands to the United States 
 with the consent of the people of the Sandwich Islands, is 
 deemed desirable by this government." ^^ Seward had in 
 mind American expansion in the Pacific and shortly after 
 his departure from the Department of State he outlined to 
 
 I 
 
SEWARD'S FAR EASTERN POLICY 417 
 
 the people of Oregon a program of statesmanship for the 
 Pacific Coast which called for the United States to "own 
 and possess" islands in the Pacific, He urged them to re- 
 gard the extension of American invention and enterprise 
 into Japan, China, Australia and India as worthy of consid- 
 eration equally with international commerce between the 
 United States and the countries of western Europe.-^ 
 
 The opening of Korea was forced upon the attention of 
 Seward by the reported aggressions of France. In March, 
 1866, a number of French Roman Catholic missionaries and 
 their converts were massacred in Korea. When rumors of 
 the facts reached China Rear Admiral Roze, of the French 
 squadron in the China Seas, was dispatched to Korea to 
 make an investigation and also to conduct a preliminary 
 survey of the coast with a view to the dispatch of a more 
 formidable expedition later. Admiral Roze returned with 
 the information that the General Sherman, an American 
 vessel which was seeking to open up trade with the Koreans, 
 had been burned and the crew murdered.* ^^ At about the 
 same time an American schooner, the Surprise, was wrecked 
 on the coast of Korea and the crew was treated with civility 
 and kindness, being returned to China by way of Mukden 
 and Newchwang. 
 
 Meanwhile the General Sherman affair and the French 
 action after the murder of the missionaries was creating a 
 great deal of uneasiness in China among the foreign repre- 
 sentatives. M. de Bellonet, the French Charge, without 
 authorization from Paris had made an abrupt demand on 
 the Chinese Government for satisfaction for the action of 
 the Koreans. He addressed to Prince Kung an extraor- 
 dinary note in which, reminding him that the Fren<3h were 
 a people who loved war, he calmly announced that in a 
 few days the French military forces would "march to the 
 
 *The actual details of the General Sherman affair were not known for nearly 
 twenty years. It was eventually established, however, that the General Sherman 
 entered the mouth of the Ta-dong River at the time of a freshet and was 
 stranded in the river when the water suddenly fell. The crew, which was 
 heavily armed, misunderstood the advances of the Korean authorities, and sub- 
 jected them to many indignities. Whereupon fire-rafts were set out in the river 
 to drift down on the General Sherman and the crew was put to death. If the 
 fault for the loss of the vessel and its crew was partly that of the Koreans, 
 at least it was probably not exclusively theirs.^i 
 
418 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 conquest of Korea/' even going so far as to state that only 
 the Emperor of France now had the "right and power to 
 dispose, according to his good pleasure, of the country and 
 the vacant throne." Bellonet stated that "the prince 
 to whom will be confided the destinies of Korea, under the 
 protectorate of his Majesty, the Emperor (French), must 
 become a Christian." ^^ Prince Kung, probably upon the 
 advice of Burlingame, made public the correspondence 
 which had passed between him and the French Charge, 
 much to the latter's discomfiture. Admiral Roze followed 
 up his preliminary survey with a strong expedition in Oc- 
 tober but was unable to accomplish anything beyond the 
 destruction of Kang-hoa, a city on an island north of 
 Chemulpo. The Roze expedition was looked upon by 
 Koreans, Chinese and foreigners alike as a virtual defeat 
 for France, It was expected that in the following spring 
 the French would coUect a more powerful expedition and 
 make a second attack. Sir Rutherford Alcock was pre- 
 paring to attend the expedition, whether invited or not, 
 with a British naval force to look out for the British inter- 
 ests, and Burlingame, as alarmed as his colleagues at the 
 disclosure of such extensive French ambitions, urged that 
 he be instructed to join the expedition. He wrote (Decem- 
 ber 15, 1866) : 
 
 "If my advice can have weight, it will be that our presence there 
 should rather restrain than promote aggression, and serve to limit 
 action to such satisfaction only as great and civilized nations should, 
 under the circumstances, have from the ignorant and the weak." ** 
 
 Proposed Joint Expedition to Korea 
 
 The interest of France in Korea was not news to the 
 Department of State. Ten years before the French minis- 
 ter at Washington had solicited the cooperation of President 
 Pierce in a plan by which France would occupy Korea as 
 part of a joint plan to compel China to revise the treaties. 
 In 1861 Townsend Harris had reported that there was talk, 
 at the time the Russians occupied Tsushima, that France 
 
SEWARD'S FAR EASTERN POLICY 419 
 
 was contemplating with Great Britain the partition of 
 Japan. Seward, on receipt of the reports of Bellonet's 
 correspondence with Prince Kung and the presence of the 
 French forces in Korea, jumped to the conclusion that the 
 expected partition of Asia had begun. Four days after re- 
 ceiving the Burlingame dispatch of November 12, not know- 
 ing that the French expedition was unauthorized, Seward 
 found an opportunity to propose to Berthemy, the French 
 minister at Washington, that the United States and France 
 unite in joint action to obtain from Korea satisfaction for 
 the murders of the French and the Americans. Berthemy, 
 ignorant of Seward's motives and knowing nothing of the 
 Bellonet correspondence, was mystified, and yet was in- 
 clined to approve the proposal. But before Seward's pro- 
 posal had reached Paris the French Government, embar- 
 rassed alike by the necessity of withdrawing the French 
 forces from Mexico and by the reports of Admiral Roze's 
 failure, had found it expedient to announce to the Corps 
 Legislatif that the first reports from Korea were mislead- 
 ing and that actually a great victory had been achieved. 
 M. de Bellonet, instead of being recalled in disgrace, was 
 promoted to Stockholm, and Admiral Roze escaped repri- 
 mand. No reason now existed for a joint expedition with 
 the American forces into Korea, so the proposal of Seward 
 was declined graciously. By a fortuitous course of blunders 
 and accidents the United States was thus released from obli- 
 gation to carry through what could hardly have failed to be a 
 thoroughly disagreeable program.^* 
 
 The next year (1867) the American naval forces in the 
 Far East made two attempts to learn the details of the 
 fate of the General Sherman, but in vain. Then Seward's 
 nephew. Consul General George F. Seward of Shanghai, 
 sought a commission to proceed to Korea with a view to 
 making a treaty, and the request was granted. George F. 
 Seward was given a letter from President Johnson to the 
 king, and was authorized to proceed to Korea, supported 
 by a naval force, "to procure a treaty of amity and com- 
 merce as nearly similar in its provisions to those existing 
 
420 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 between the United States and Japan as may be found 
 practicable and expedient." ^^ 
 
 In the instructions to young Seward was a paragraph in 
 which the Secretary of State, no longer embarrassed by the 
 threatened annexation of the peninsula, resumed a policy 
 more in accord with the general spirit of American relations 
 in Asia. He wrote : 
 
 "The design of this government is to render your visit a generous 
 and friendly one, reserving the question of force, if fovmd necessary, 
 for ultimate consideration. You will not be expected therefore either 
 to direct the exercise or make any display of force by way of intimi- 
 dation, but on the other hand you will be expected to practise dis- 
 cretion, prudence and patience, while firmly asserting the dignity and 
 maintaining the demands of the United States. You will however 
 give notice to the Korean Government, if you find it expedient, that 
 this government cannot suffer the outrage committed in the case of 
 the General Sherman to remain indefinitely without receiving proper 
 guaranty of adequate and ample redress." 
 
 This expedition to Korea was not undertaken because 
 when the instructions arrived in Shanghai it had been dis- 
 covered that it was not likely to meet with success. 
 
 A survey of Seward's eight-year record in the Depart- 
 ment of State leads inevitably to the conclusion that he 
 was the greatest Secretary of State, so far as Far Eastern 
 matters are concerned, since Daniel Webster. Indeed, we 
 may say, at the risk of anticipating a conclusion the facts 
 for which appear in subsequent chapters, that Seward was 
 the only Secretary of State in the nineteenth century, until 
 John Hay, who appears to have had a firm grip on the sit- 
 uation. And when compared with Hay it will be found 
 that Seward had superior abilities to follow a policy through 
 when beset with diflEiculties. In many of the stipulations of 
 the Burlingame Treaty Americans may take honest pride, 
 yet in this compact the immigration question was not 
 treated with statesmanship. The most conspicuous feature 
 of Seward's policy, aside from its aggressiveness, was his 
 desire for cooperation with other treaty powers. Where 
 other occupants of the office both before and after his time 
 dodged and evaded the problem of cooperation, Seward met 
 it boldly. For the sake of maintaining cooperation he at 
 
SEWARD'S FAR EASTERN POLICY 421 
 
 times sacrificed American ideals. Over against the treaty 
 with China there stands to his credit two of the most un- 
 American actions, one accomplished and the other proposed, 
 in all American history. The joint Convention with Japan 
 in 1866, and the proposed joint expedition for the coercion 
 of Korea were not worthy, even after all possible explana- 
 tions have been made and accepted, of American traditions. 
 But in neither case was Seward acting as a free agent. He 
 was paying the price of cooperation with states which had 
 entirely different ideals as to the execution of their poli- 
 cies in Asia. To later administrations such cooperation was 
 distasteful, and was abandoned. There is, however, this to 
 be said, that after 1868 American interests in Asia steadily 
 receded until three decades later when the American Gov- 
 ernment resumed the policy of cooperation. The with- 
 drawal of the United States from cooperation was one, 
 though not the only, cause of this retirement of American 
 influence. 
 
 BIBLIOGEAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. Geo. E. Baker : "Works of William H. Seward," Yol. 1, pp. 51 ff, 
 
 236 ff, 249-50, 356; Yol. 4, p. 125, pp. 24, 25. 
 
 2. Papers Relating to the Intercontinental Telegraph; Seward to 
 
 the Committee of Commerce of the Senate, Gov't. Printing 
 Office (1864). 
 
 3. Burlingame was first appointed minister to Yienna, but was 
 
 unacceptable to the Austrian Government because of his sym- 
 pathies for the cause of Kossuth. While in Paris Burlingame 
 received notice of his appointment to Pekin. This, in part, 
 may account for Seward's failure to issue the customary in- 
 structions. China Despatches, Yol. 20, July 6, 1861, Burlin- 
 game to Seward. See F. W. Williams : "Anson Burlingame." 
 
 4. Dip. Corres., 1862, p. 839. 
 
 5. Ihid., 1865, Yol. II, p. 461, Aug. 14, 1865. 
 
 6. lUd., 1866, p. 536. 
 
 7. Ihid., 1866, p. 536. 
 
 8. China Instructions, Yol. 1, June 20, 1867. 
 
 9. C. O. Paullin: C7. 8. Naval Imt. Proceedings, 1911, pp. 1139 ff. 
 
 10. William H. Seward's "Travels Around the World," P- 216. 
 
 11. Japan Instructions, Yol. 1, Dec. 19, 1861. 
 
 12. Dip. Corres., 1862, pp. 814-16, p. 547. 
 
 13. Notes to Russian Legation, Yol. YI, p. 102, May 20, 1861, 
 
 Seward to Stoeckl. 
 
 14. Dip. Corres., 1862, pp. 813, 814. 
 
422 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 15. Ihid., 1862, p. 974. 
 
 16. Hid., 1863, p. 1036. 
 
 17. Ihid., 1862, p. 817. 
 
 18. lUd., 1862, p. 819. 
 
 19. Ihid., 1863, p. 1013. 
 
 20. Ihid., 1865, p. 229. 
 
 21. Diary of Gideon Welles, Vol. 2, p. 210; Vol. 3, p. 89. 
 
 22. Dip. Corres., 1868, p. 705. 
 
 23. Japan Instructions, Vol. 1, Sept. 5, 1868 ; see also Oct. 7, 1867, 
 
 July 14 and Oct. 5, 1868 ; For. Eel., 1868, p. 757. 
 
 24. See Tyler Dennett: "Seward's Far Eastern Policy," Amer. Hist. 
 
 Rev., Oct. 1922, pp. 45-62, for a discussion of the purchase of 
 Alaska in the light of recently discovered evidence of a con- 
 temporaneously proposed joint expedition with the French to 
 Korea. 
 
 25. Frank A. Golden: "Purchase of Alaska," Amer. Hist. Rev., Vol. 
 
 XXV, No. 3, pp. 11 ff; Speech of Chas. Sumner of Mass., on 
 the Cession of Russian America, p. 1. 
 
 26. F. W. Seward: Reminiscences, p. 360. 
 
 27. S. Ex. Doc. 79:40-2; S. Rept. 194:40-3; Moore's "Digest," Vol. 
 
 1, p. 555. 
 
 28. Moore's "Digest," Vol. 1, p. 484 (footnote). 
 
 29. Seward's Works, Vol. 5, pp. 577 ff. 
 
 30. Henri Cordier: "Relations de la Chine," Vol. 1, pp. 267 ff ; W. E. 
 
 Griffis: "Corea, the Hermit Nation," pp. 373, 482-3; Korean 
 Repository, July, 1898; Dip. Corres., Vol. 1, pp. 414-5, 419 ff. 
 
 31. Korean Despatches, Vol. 2, Mar. 29, 1885, Foulk to Chandler 
 
 (filed by date); Griffis: "Corea," p. 395 (footnote). 
 
 32. Cordier: "Relations," Vol. 1, p. 268. 
 
 33. Dip. Corres., 1867, Vol. 1, p. 426. 
 
 34. The documentary evidence of Seward's proposal for the joint 
 
 expedition into Korea is a despatch of Berthemy to Marquis 
 de Moustier, Mar. 2, 1867, in the archives of the French Em- 
 bassy at Washington. See also F. F. Low to Hamilton Fish, 
 Feb. 1, 1873, China Desp., Vol. 33, which encloses a draft of 
 the answer which was sent to Berthemy from Paris in reply 
 to Seward's proposal. See Tyler Dennett in Amer. Hist. Rev., 
 Oct., 1922, for a full discussion of these documents and for the 
 details of Seward's Far Eastern policy. 
 
 35. Dispatches to Consuls, Vol. 49, p. 267; For. Rel., 1870, pp. 336-9. 
 
PART V 
 THE RISE OF JAPAN 
 
CHAPTER XXIII 
 
 EIEST STEPS IN JAPANESE EXPANSION 
 
 The contrasts between China and Japan, always strik- 
 ing, were never more so than at the time of the Japanese 
 Restoration (1867). China, spread over more than thirty 
 degrees of longitude, including every sort of climate, soil 
 and mineral resource, was economically self-sufficient, and 
 believed herself to be politically independent. Japan, a 
 small island empire of which only a little more than one- 
 seventh was arable land, with relatively few known mineral 
 resources, unable to procure such essential articles as sugar 
 and cotton, frankly recognized her economic dependence 
 and her potential political weakness. Her rocky and storm- 
 bound coasts, a sure defense under a policy of seclusion in 
 the days of sail-navigation were, in the new era which had 
 been ushered in by foreigners in heavily armored, steam- 
 propelled vessels, as much prison walls as defenses. Only 
 the merest fringe of the Chinese Empire had been touched 
 by the foreigner. Canton, the rocky island of Hongkong, 
 the new city of Shanghai, Tientsin, and even Peking had at 
 times within the past generation been occupied by foreign 
 military forces, but these cities were only on the circum- 
 ference of an immense world which comprised nearly a 
 fourth of the population of the entire globe. Even if the 
 foreigners had permanently held every one of these points 
 and many more, the Chinese people would not have been 
 greatly embarrassed commercially, industrially, or even po- 
 litically. Between the mountains and the sea China had 
 every possible resource necessary for comfort as well as for 
 existence, and to the advance of the foreigner there was op- 
 posed a vast mass of civilized, organized, industrious hu- 
 manity. In comparison with China, Japan was a prison. 
 
 425 
 
426 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Within its narrow borders the Japanese people might con- 
 tinue to hve as they had in the past, but no longer as volun- 
 tary prisoners; they would be in the position of captives. 
 If the foreigners were to hold her few harbors, Yokohama, 
 Hiogo, Nagasaki, the Straits of Shimoneseki and Hakodate, 
 which has the qualities of a Gibraltar, they could reduce the 
 proud Japanese Empire to an industrial and political condi- 
 tion incomparably inferior to what was possible for any 
 other oriental state, with the possible exception of the 
 Malay peninsula and archipelago. 
 
 The political theories about which the two empires were 
 organized had a common characteristic; each nation re- 
 garded its sovereign as either actually or potentially over- 
 lord of the world. In oriental political economy there were 
 but two possible classifications of states — tribute-bearing 
 and tribute-receiving. Both China and Japan belonged to 
 the latter class. The Emperor of China had insisted that 
 the European nations bring tribute and perform the 
 kotow if they would enter his presence. Japan held its 
 Mikado in religious reverence; he was of divine origin — a 
 tribal god — yet possessed of discretion sufficient to pre- 
 vent him from demanding in fact the obeisance of the world 
 which was believed to be due in theory. The contrast be- 
 tween China and Japan at this point lay in the fact that 
 while China's claims to over-lordship were undercut by an 
 essentially democratic and peace-seeking domestic organiza- 
 tion, and crumpled before the impact of the Western World, 
 Japan's claims were supported by popular assent and reli- 
 gious enthusiasm and at the opening of the nation to the 
 Western World entered a renascence of vitality. 
 
 When Lord Hotta, the Shogun's prime minister, went to 
 Kioto in March, 1858, to seek the assent of the Mikado to 
 the Harris treaty, he unfolded to his sovereign in an address 
 to the throne a theory of sovereignty in which this religio- 
 political idea is defined with precision. He wrote: 
 
 "Among the rulers of the world at present, there is none so noble 
 and illustrious as to command universal vassalage, or who can make 
 his virtuous influence felt throughout the length and breadth of the 
 
FIRST STEPS IN JAPANESE EXPANSION 427 
 
 whole world. To have such a ruler over the whole world is doubtless 
 in conformity with the will of Heaven. . . . 
 
 ". . . and in establishing relations with foreign countries, the 
 object should always be kept in view of laying a foundation for secur- 
 ing the hegemony over all nations." 
 
 As a first step in the accomplishment of this purpose, after 
 the domestic affairs of Japan had been renovated and for- 
 eign relations established, he recommended that Japan 
 should "join hands with nations whose principles may be 
 found identical with those of our country. 
 
 "An alliance thus formed should also be directed towards pro- 
 tecting harmless but powerless nations. Such a polity could be 
 nothing else but the enforcement of the power and authority deputed 
 (to us) by the Spirit of Heaven. Our national prestige and position 
 thus insured, the nations of the world will come to look up to our 
 Emperor as the Great Ruler of all the nations, and they will come 
 to follow our policy and submit themselves to our judgment." * ^ 
 
 This same idea reappears at regular intervals in the litera- 
 ture of Japan throughout the remainder of the nineteenth 
 century. There is nothing comparable to it in the utter- 
 ances of contemporaneous Chinese statesmen. 
 
 The Politically Nebulous East 
 
 With these fundamental differences between China and 
 Japan in mind let us turn to a brief consideration of the 
 political situation thus created. 
 
 Eastern Asia was in a politically nebulous state, which 
 might be compared roughly to a solar system before the 
 orbits of the planets had become fixed or the satellites prop- 
 erly distributed. There were certain central masses, some 
 with greater, some with lesser degrees of specific gravity, 
 and there were smaller organisms which swung on irregular 
 orbits in between the larger spheres. These latter bodies, 
 while influenced in their movements by each of the larger 
 masses, were still not wholly assigned to any one of them. 
 
 *Prof. W W. McLaren states : "Expansion and aggrandizement of the 
 Empire had formed an integral part of the teaching of the loyalist schools 
 before the Restoration Yoshida Shoin . j^e Chpshiu patriot, had published a 
 book in which he had predictedr^fe d: consequence of therestoration of the 
 Emperor, the conquest of Formosa, the Kurile Islands, Kamchatka, Korea, 
 and a large portion of Manchuria and Siberia." ^ 
 
 1 
 
428 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 The large spheres were China, Japan, Russia in Asia and 
 Great Britain in Asia. The potential satellites were the 
 islands off the coast of Asia — the Kuriles, Sakhalin, Yezo, 
 Tsushima, the Bonin Islands, the Lew Chew group, and 
 Formosa; and the so-called tributary states surrounding 
 China — Burmah, Annam, Tibet and Korea. Until the 
 Europeans came with their rapid and reliable communica- 
 tion and attempted to apply the rules of Western inter- 
 national law, these regions and islands had given to the 
 larger Asiatic states only a moderate degree of trouble; 
 lacking the steamship and the telegraph wire both Japan 
 and China were quite content with the political status quo. 
 Now the situation was radically changed. Immediate rea- 
 sons appeared for a closer organization of the politically 
 nebulous East. We see the consolidation taking place 
 within China and Japan; we note also a proportionate in- 
 crease in the power of gravitation which these masses, with 
 which may be included the Russian and British Empires 
 and France, began to pull upon the intervening islands 
 and the outlying regions. The laws of physics operated 
 in international politics. The pull upon these semi-de- 
 tached spheres was in direct ratio to the specific gravity of 
 the neighboring masses, and in inverse ratio to the distance. 
 China's relation to these satellite bodies was simple. 
 Formosa ^ was an integral part of the Chinese Empire, ad- 
 ministered as a part of the Province of Fukien, and yet re- 
 maining largely in the possession of unconquered, unsub- 
 dued aborigines. The Lew Chew Islands'* had their own 
 king, who, however, received his investiture from the Chi- 
 nese Emperor and paid a regular tribute to Peking through 
 the customs oj0&cer at Foochow. Korea,^ Burmah and An- 
 nam likewise had their own kings, but received investiture 
 from and paid tribute to Peking. Tibet, similarly to For- 
 mosa, was an integral part of the Chinese Empire. Into 
 the history of the origin and growth of these relationships 
 it is not necessary to go. In the middle of the nineteenth 
 century they were entirely voluntary and mostly ceremo- 
 nial. There had been an extension of the traditional 
 
FIRST STEPS IN JAPANESE EXPANSION 429 
 
 patriarchal system on a regal scale. The dependence in so 
 far as it was actual was more economic than political. 
 China was a source upon which any economically deficient 
 nation might draw to supplement its resources. The trib- 
 ute-bearing embassies were accompanied by trading expedi- 
 tions. On the other hand these territories, while of no ac- I 
 tual value to China, had a potential importance in that they / 
 would be a menace to the empire were they to fall into 
 unfriendly hands. Rather than call them active buffer- 
 states, we may describe them as c omforta ^^'^ nisb^"^^^^^-' 
 Probably none of them in the nineteenth century could or 
 would have gone to war to defend the Chinese Empire. 
 China would not have gone to war to protect them from 
 injury, nor did she compel Siam to continue to pay tribute 
 after 1834. Indeed China had not only already acquiesced 
 in the entrance of the British in Burmah and the French 
 in Annam, but had even ceded a part of one of her own 
 provinces, the left bank of the Amur, to Russia in 1860. 
 The situation with Japan was very different. To no part 
 of the mainland of Asia did Japan lay any claim except that 
 Korea, until 1832, had been accustomed to pay tribute to 
 Japan as well as to China.^ The Korean tribute was partly 
 like that to China, ceremonial and symbolic of a trade rela- 
 tionship, and partly an oriental form of black-mail such as 
 all tribute had once been, by which Korea purchased im- 
 munity. The Lew Chew Islands paid a similar tribute 
 which, however, went directly to the Prince of Satsuma 
 rather than to the Mikado or Shogun. . All of the islands 
 north and east of the Lew Chew group Japan claimed as a 
 part of the Japanese Empire. The Bonins had been discov- 
 ered centuries before by a Japanese navigator. Tsushima, 
 lying between Japan and Korea, was purely Japanese and 
 under the rule of a daimio. Yezo (now called Hokkaido) 
 was Japanese beyond dispute, although it was sparsely set- 
 tled. The Kurile Islands were claimed but not occupied. 
 Sakhalin also was claimed although it was not until 1808 
 that a Japanese navigator first sailed around the island and 
 discovered that it was not a peninsula of Asia.'^ Japan did 
 
430 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 not administer Sakhalin, nor were there on the island more 
 than a very few Japanese settlers. These islands were to the 
 Japanese Empire what the surrounding states of her neigh- 
 bor were to China — buffers of little or no value until they 
 were threatened by some hostile power. That these islands 
 might be valuable as sources of raw materials did not be- 
 come apparent to the Japanese until their potential wealth 
 had been pointed out to them by foreigners. On the other 
 hand, Formosa, to which the Japanese set up no sort of 
 claim, already seemed desirable because of its supplies of 
 tropical produce. 
 
 We have now before us a view of the stage upon which 
 Japan was to enact the j&rst scenes in its unfolding drama 
 of political expansion. 
 
 The Japanese Empire Begins Consolidation 
 
 In 1861 Russia occupied the island of Tsushima, which 
 is of great strategic value because it commands the southern 
 entrance to the Sea of Japan. The Russians built barracks 
 and planted seed as though they had every intention of 
 remaining permanently. "For the last eighteen months," 
 wrote Townsend Harris in reporting the situation, ''many 
 officials, English and French, civilians and naval men, have 
 frequently declared that war with Japan was inevitable, and 
 that it could only end in the partition of the country 
 (Japan). It is said that the Russian commander justified 
 his action by referring to these declarations, adding that he 
 remains at Tsushima solely for the purpose of preventing 
 its falling into the power of the English or French." ^ To 
 this dispatch Seward replied with a confidence in his ability 
 to influence the Far Eastern policy of Russia which now 
 seems amazing: 
 
 "If the occupation of Tsushima is still an object of anxiety to his 
 Majesty, the Tycoon, I will at once call the attention of the President 
 to the matter, and with his authority, which I doubt not will be 
 granted, I will, in the name of this government, as the friend of 
 Japan, as well as of Russia, seek from the latter explanations which 
 I should hope would be satisfactory to Japan." 
 
FIRST STEPS IN JAPANESE EXPANSION 431 
 
 Seward was as alert to meet any efforts looking towards the 
 partition of Japan as Humphrey Marshall had been to pre- 
 vent the partition of China. 
 
 Before Seward's offer of good offices reached Japan 
 Admiral Sir James Hope, supported by a formidable British 
 fleet, had ordered the Russians to leave the island and they 
 had obeyed. Meanwhile Japan, which had other matters of 
 dispute with Russia, had entered into friendly negotiations 
 with her threatening neighbor through the Japanese Em- 
 bassy then visiting Europe. 
 
 With Russia Japan was in the midst of prolonged nego- 
 tiations over the possession of Sakhalin and the Kurile 
 Islands. The Russians had lodged a claim for Sakhalin as 
 early as 1804.*^ By the treaty of 1855 the boundary in the 
 Kuriles had been fixed between Urup and Iturup but the 
 two nations had been left in joint occupation of Sakhalin. 
 In 1859 Count Muravieff entered Yedo accompanied by a 
 naval force and demanded the cession of the entire island 
 to Russia. When reminded of the treaty he declared that in 
 making it Count Putiatin had exceeded his instructions 
 and that the compact, notwithstanding the ratifications, was 
 invalid. The Japanese would not yield. Three years later 
 the two nations agreed in principle to the division of the 
 island at the 50th parallel, but the agreement was not 
 consummated owing to the state of Japanese domestic 
 affairs. 
 
 In 1866 the Shogun's government sent an envoy to St, 
 Petersburg to reach a settlement but nothing was accom- 
 plished. Four years later the newly constituted Mikado's 
 government instituted a Board of Exploration for Sakhalin. 
 That same year the Japanese Government sought the good 
 offices of William H. Seward when he was passing through 
 Japan on his tour of the world, to secure the mediation of 
 the United States in the controversy. Seward suggested 
 that a simple solution of the difficulty would be for Japan to 
 buy the Russian claims to the island just as the United 
 States had purchased Alaska. ^*^ The Japanese did not relish 
 the idea of buying what they believed to be theirs by right. 
 
432 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 The suggestion, however, was adopted, but Russia rejected 
 the proposal. The Japanese Government made formal ap- 
 plication through the American minister, C. E. De Long, for 
 the good offices of the United States, and Secretary of State 
 Fish immediately took up the matter in an informal way 
 with the Russian Government. Russia replied both gra- 
 ciously and adroitly that it would not be possible to submit 
 such a matter to mediation because a precedent would thus 
 be established which some unfriendly European power 
 might subsequently attempt to utilize to the disadvantage 
 of Russia.^ ^ 
 
 Several attempts to fix the boundary were made in the 
 next few years and in 1875 Admiral Enomoto signed a 
 treaty in St. Petersburg by which Russia received the whole 
 of Sakhalin, while certain rights in the island were secured 
 to Japan, and Japan took most of the Kuriles. Tokio had 
 seized a moment to settle the matter while Russia was 
 again becoming involved in the Balkans. Japan was willing 
 to make a concession in this settlement because by it Japan 
 was for the first time negotiating the revision of a treaty on 
 equal terms with a European power. This precedent Japan 
 deemed valuable at the time when she was setting out on her 
 long negotiations for the revision of the treaties of 1858 and 
 1866.12 
 
 Towards the end of 1861 the Japanese formally notified 
 Townsend Harris that they intended to reoccupy the Bonin 
 Islands which they claimed by right of discovery in the 
 sixteenth century. They declared that the rights of Ameri- 
 cans would not be disturbed. Seward allowed the matter to 
 pass without comment although Commander John Kelly 
 had formally taken possession of the Coffin group of the 
 Bonins in 1853. Japan was forced to withdraw from the 
 Bonins for a time during the domestic disturbances, but 
 returned to them again. The Japanese yoke did not rest 
 easily upon the Americans in the islands who had long been 
 a law unto themselves and had even adopted piracy as a 
 profession. 1^ There were several protests; in 1864 Pruyn 
 collected $1000 in settlement of a claim made by a sailor 
 
FIRST STEPS IN JAPANESE EXPANSION 433 
 
 from Perry's fleet who had been left there.^* But in 1873 
 Secretary of State Fish formally ruled that inasmuch as the 
 possession of the islands had never been expressly sanctioned 
 by the American Government those citizens who had gone 
 there were to be regarded as having expatriated them- 
 selves.^^ Great Britain after investigation also abandoned 
 its claim. The Japanese came into undisputed possession of 
 the islands which they now regard as legally a part of the. 
 mainland of Japan. 
 
 It was the assumption of the foreign representatives in j\ 
 China in 1866 that Korea was a dependency of the Chinese fj 
 Empire.^ *^ Japan, while still holding to such claims on the; ' 
 peninsula as had been represented by the tribute which was/ 
 paid regularly before 1832, gave tacit assent to the priority ^ 
 of China in Korea. In that year Prince Kung, foreseeing \ 
 that the assertion of Chinese suzerainty over Korea at the 
 time of the murder of the French missionaries would lead 
 directly to a demand on China for reparations to be paid to 
 France, adopted the characteristically Chinese policy of 
 evading responsibility for these claims. This act of the 
 Chinese Government, while appearing to be the easiest way 
 out of a difficulty, was a repudiation by China of suzerainty 
 over the peninsula. The French Charge, Bellonet, had 
 forthwith seized upon this repudiation, and proceeded 
 against Korea as an independent kingdom. The Chinese 
 Government expressed no interest in the American expedi- 
 tions of the following year under Commanders Robert W. 
 Shufeldt and John C. Febiger respectively. The contrast 
 between the policy of China and that of Japan at this point 
 is significant. 
 
 The Japanese, although in the midst of the disturbances 
 which preceded the Restoration, immediately expressed con- 
 cern in both the French expeditions and the visits of the 
 American naval vessels. The Tycoon announced (May, 
 1867) to United States Minister Van Valkenburgh his inten- 
 tion to send an envoy to Korea because he had learned that 
 there was war between the French and the Koreans. He 
 was also much disturbed over the troubles between the 
 
i 
 
 434 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Koreans and the Americans because Korea "is a neighbor of 
 Japan" and the "United States and Japan are friends." 
 He extended the good offices of Japan and expressed the 
 hope that through Japanese influence the Korean king 
 would sue for peace, and that the flag of the United States 
 would return to the peninsula.^ ''^ 
 
 "This friendly proceeding is highly appreciated," replied 
 Seward. "It is deemed proper to add that the Government 
 of the United States will feel obliged, should no satisfactory 
 explanation or apology be furnished by Korea, to consider 
 how proper reparation can be obtained and honor main- 
 tained." A few months later (January 27, 1868), while he 
 was considering the possibility of a treaty with Korea, Sew- 
 ard added an expression of satisfaction that "the United 
 States may be able to avail themselves of the good offices 
 of the proposed Japanese Legation." ^^ 
 
 Meanwhile Japan experienced many difficulties in re- 
 suming intercourse with the peninsula. The Tycoon was 
 unable to send the proposed envoy in 1867. The next year 
 So, the daimio of Tsushima, through whose office the previ- 
 ous intercourse with Korea had been carried on, was ordered 
 to send a special mission to announce the Restoration. 
 ^ Three years before King Chul-chong died without issue and 
 boy selected from another branch of the Ni family had 
 )een installed with his father, the later well known Tai-wen- 
 [un, as regent. The latter was anti-foreign in policy. To 
 lim is ascribed the responsibility for having caused the mas- 
 sacre of the French missionaries. The Tai-wen-Kun had 
 regarded the expedition under Admiral Roze as a complete 
 victory for Korea but it had left him greatly enraged against 
 the Japanese because many of the troops used in the French 
 expedition had been drawn from the French garrison at 
 Yokohama. The regent believed that Japan should have 
 prevented the sending of these troops, and the fact that 
 Japan did not interfere was interpreted by him to mean 
 that the Japanese had not only abandoned their policy of 
 seclusion but had even gone so far as to enter into an 
 alliance with the French. The Korean government refused 
 
FIRST STEPS IN JAPANESE EXPANSION 435 
 
 to receive the Japanese mission and likewise refused to deal 
 with two other missions dispatched in 1869.* 
 
 Thus the first overtures to Korea, with which had been 
 coupled a demand that Korea resume the custom of paying 
 tribute, utterly failed. In 1868 Herr von Brandt, the Ger- 
 man representative in Tokio, whom the Japanese had in- 
 vited as they did the Americans, to approach Korea through 
 the good offices of Japan with a view to securing a treaty, 
 was unceremoniously denied correspondence with the Ko- 
 rean government on the ground that he had been accom- 
 panied to Fusan by Japanese officers. To one of these 
 Japanese commissions the Tai-wen-Kun is believed to have 
 replied in the following bellicose manner: 
 
 "Your demand is so unreasonable that instead of Korea paying 
 you tribute, it is for you to return the money paid by Korea. In your 
 dispatch you have made many insinuations of your having adopted 
 foreign customs; but we can assure you that Japan is Japan — Korea 
 is Korea, but Korea has its own customs. Some years back we had a 
 difference with a country called France which is, among barbarians, 
 considered to be very powerful and very large, whilst Korea is very 
 small — but we defeated that gi'eat country ! ... To show our honesty, 
 when the barbarians went to your country, we immediately wrote you 
 that we had made every preparation to help you. But when the 
 French attacked Korea you neither sent us aid, nor any answer to our 
 dispatch. From that day our treaty of friendship was at an end. . . . 
 
 "Not only have you broken the treaty as we have described, but 
 you have also broken another very chief point of the treaty, in adopt- 
 ing the mann&rs and customs of the Western barbarians. Our infor- 
 mation is that you have adopted French drill — and when you want 
 money you go to England ; and if you wish to tax your own people or 
 impose duties you take the advice from Americans. You think the 
 Western barbarians are great people. We, Koreans, are a very small 
 country, but yet we have the courage to put into writing to you that 
 Western barbarians are beasts. The above is intended as a direct 
 insult to you and your allies — the barbarians." ™ 
 
 Hanabusa, chief secretary of the Japanese Foreign Office, 
 was sent to Korea in 1871 with two war vessels to remon- 
 strate with the Koreans but they decUned to be intimidated 
 and the expedition accomplished nothing. The Koreans 
 were particularly disgusted because Hanabusa had adopted 
 
 *One of these latter missions was charged with an investigation of the 
 relations then existing between Korea and Russia. Many Japanese officials at 
 that time were urging that Japan refuse to yield to the Russian claims for all 
 or even any part of Sakhalin.^" 
 
436 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 foreign styles of clothing. Japan was now on the point of 
 going to war with Korea. 
 
 About this time further light on the relations between 
 Korea and China was being revealed through the corre- 
 spondence of United States Minister F. F. Low with the 
 Chinese officials in Peking, In preparation of the American 
 expedition to Korea in 1871,* which was really the con- 
 summation of the plans made by Seward in 1868, Low 
 invited the good offices of China and asked the Peking 
 officials to transmit to Korea a letter stating the purpose of 
 the proposed expedition. The Chinese complied with the 
 request, but stated equivocally that although Korea was a 
 ''country subordinate to China," nevertheless it was "wholly 
 independent in government, religion, prohibitions and laws." 
 Low interpreted this answer to mean that China was seek- 
 ing not to make clear the relations between the two coun- 
 tries, but to avoid the assumption of any liability for the 
 loss of the General Sherman or the unrequited murder of 
 the French missionaries. 
 
 An answer to Mr. Low's letter to the King of Korea was 
 duly received in Peking before the departure of the expedi- 
 tion in 1871 and what purported to be a copy of it was 
 reluctantly transmitted to the American minister. While 
 in Korea Mr. Low received from the Koreans a copy of the 
 letter as originally addressed to the Chinese officials. When 
 compared with the document which the Chinese had given 
 to Mr. Low, it was found that the Chinese had omitted to 
 transcribe a part of the letter in which the King of Korea 
 had made the most profuse acknowledgments of vassalage 
 to the Emperor of China. Low reached the conclusion from 
 a comparison of the two documents that China was actually 
 very much opposed to the opening of Korea to the Western 
 nations. He wrote (August 3, 1871) : 
 
 "That Korea acknowledges the svipremacy of China in a manner 
 amounting almost to servility is quite apparent, and it is quite rea- 
 sonable to suppose that China does and will use all the means in her 
 power short of provoking the hostility of western nations to maintain 
 and perpetuate the present status so far as the relation of the two 
 
 *The Low-Eogers Expedition is reviewed in the following chapter. 
 
FIRST STEPS IN JAPANESE EXPANSION 437 
 
 countries is concerned. So long as Korea maintains her present atti- 
 tude of non-intercourse the supremacy of China will be acknowledged 
 and observed. This magnifies the importance of China in the estima- 
 tion of her people and, in the opinion of the officials, adds to their 
 dignity and importance. Were Korea opened to foreign intercourse, 
 the bonds of vassalage which bind her to China would be weakened, 
 if not broken entirely, and the tribute which now comes annually 
 to Peking would soon be numbered among the things of the past. This 
 the Peking officials see clearly and hence the desire to see Korea re- 
 main as she is." ^^ 
 
 Japan on the Verge of War 
 
 While affairs between Korea and Japan remained still 
 unsettled, the latter dispatched (April, 1871) a representa- 
 tive to Peking with the rank of Envoy Extraordinary and 
 powers to negotiate a treaty with China.^- There were 
 many rumors in the foreign settlements both in Japan and 
 in China that the intent of this mission was to create an 
 offensive and defensive alliance of Japan and China which 
 would be directed against the foreign powers. The mission 
 was halted at Tientsin and a treaty was signed July 29, 
 1871. To the Japanese its provisions were unsatisfactory 
 because it did not provide for most-favored-nation treat- 
 ment and because it contained only the most grudging con- 
 cessions of extraterritoriality with bilateral application. In 
 the treaty ports Japanese merchants were to be under the 
 joint jurisdiction of the Japanese consul and the local 
 Chinese official, and in the interior under the Chinese alone. 
 To the foreigners there was one disquieting article in which 
 the rumors of the treaty ports appeared to be realized.* It 
 provided for a defensive alliance. 
 
 The American minister, possibly the other foreign rep- 
 resentatives as well, felt that an alliance between China and 
 Japan would be "calamitous" and he exerted his influence to 
 have the article stricken out of the treaty. He believed that 
 
 ♦Article 2, according to the Chinese text, read : "The two countries having 
 a good understanding must naturally feel an interest in each other. If any 
 other country treat either with injustice, in such case each will mutually assist 
 the other as soon as informed of the necessity, or acting as intermediary, will 
 try to skillfully arrange the difficulty, — in this way the friendship will be 
 strengthened." 
 
 A translation of the Japanese text was more ambiguous : "China and Japan 
 being friendly, either shall in case of experiencing injustice or wrong from 
 another state, be entitled to assistance or good offices of the other." ^^ 
 
438 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 the Japanese were quite different from the Chinese and that 
 the former represented a ''power to be welcomed as an ally 
 and to be dreaded as a foe by all civilized states should 
 trouble occur with China, or our troubles with Korea en- 
 large and increase." ^^ This objection to any form of alli- 
 ance between the two states appears to have arisen out of 
 the fear that in the association thus formed Japan would 
 not only acquire the power but also the desire to adopt 
 reactionary policies like those of China with reference to 
 the modernizing of the empire. Secretary of State Fish, in 
 his reply to De Long (December 30, 1872), expressed this 
 fear. 
 
 "In any conversation you may have with a view to influencing the 
 proceedings of the Japanese Government in its intercourse with 
 China it is advisable to induce the Japanese to separate themselves 
 as far as possible from the exclusive policy of the Chinese and to 
 adopt the progressive policy of free commercial and social intercourse 
 with the powers." * ^ 
 
 The fears of the foreigners were not very well justified by 
 the facts of the existing situation. China had treated the 
 Japanese mission with scant courtesy and had made few 
 concessions. Meanwhile the Japanese were becoming con- 
 vinced that the hostility of the Koreans was being inspired 
 from Peking. A still more delicate situation was growing 
 up over the possession of the Lew Chew Islands. 
 
 When the feudal nobles surrendered their powers to the 
 Mikado after the Restoration, the rights of the Prince of 
 Satsuma in the Lew Chew Islands were forthwith trans- 
 ferred to the Crown. The nature of these rights cannot 
 easily be defined. Hitherto they had involved nothing more 
 /han the payment of annual tribute. f The Japanese Gov- 
 /ernment now interpreted them to involve Japanese sov- 
 ereignty. An order was issued (September, 1872) to the 
 king of the Lew Chews to appear in Tokio to announce his 
 accession to the throne and to congratulate tl^ Japanese 
 
 ♦This reference to free social intercourse is rather amusing in view of the 
 fact that both in China and in Japan in all social functions the foreigners had 
 adopted the policy of rigidly excluding both Chinese and Japanese from their 
 society^" 
 
 fPor Commodore Perry's opinion on the political status of the Lew Chews, 
 see pp. 268, 272.=" 
 
FIRST STEPS IN JAPANESE EXPANSION 439 
 
 upon the establishment of the new government. The king- 
 dom of the Lew Chews was formally incorporated into the 
 Japanese Empire, the king being reduced to the rank of 
 Japanese prince and given a pension of 30,000 yen. Japan 
 assumed the responsibilities incurred by the Lew Chewans 
 under their treaties with the foreign powers, and the latter 
 accepted the new status of the islands,-^ China, however, 
 protested at what appeared to them nothing less than a 
 high-handed piece of robbery. 
 
 In the estimation of the Chinese the Japanese added 
 insult to injury not many months after this when the latter 
 made a claim on China for reparations for some Lew Chew 
 sailors who had been wrecked on the coast of Formosa and 
 murdered by the aboriginal inhabitants. The claim was 
 based on the ground that these sailors were subjects of 
 Japan. 
 
 Japan thus arrived in the latter part of 1872 at a very 
 alarming situation, Russia was clinging tenaciously to Sak- 
 halin, Korea was insulting, China was aggrieved. There 
 was also a most disturbed condition of domestic affairs. 
 The ablest Japanese leaders had been dispatched on the 
 famous Embassy to the Western powers with the hope of 
 securing a revision of the treaties, and at home the samaurai, 
 recently disestablished and accorded a financial settlement 
 which proved a most unsatisfactory solace to men whose 
 profession was arms, were in a bellicose mood which pre- 
 saged either civil or foreign war. The Korean insults which 
 had been followed by the prohibition of all trade, and the 
 unavenged death of the Lew Chew sailors afforded an oppor- 
 tunity for the harassed government to divert the attention 
 of the unhappy soldiery from a civil war which would 
 paralyze all the recently inaugurated domestic reforms. 
 
 Minister De Long reported from Tokio in the latter part 
 of November, 1872, that Japan was about to embark upon 
 a most ambitious military program. The Koreans were to 
 be punished for their persistent refusal to pay tribute as 
 well as for the insults rendered; an expedition was to be 
 undertaken to Formosa to punish the aborigines; and an 
 
440 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 embassy was to be dispatched to Peking which would be 
 authorized to demand an audience with the Emperor and to 
 threaten war on China in case the audience was denied, 
 De Long was unable to resist the intrigues of an oriental 
 court and found a great deal of satisfaction in giving the 
 Japanese an extraordinary degree of sympathy and assis- 
 tance in the execution of these rash purposes.* 
 
 In the latter part of November, 1872, C. W. Le Gendre, 
 United States consul at Amoy since 1862, happened to pass 
 through Japan on his way home on leave. He had taken a 
 prominent part in the American expedition to Formosa in 
 1868 following the wreck of the bark Rover, and claimed to 
 have a considerable amount of military experience. De 
 Long introduced Le Gendre to the Japanese authorities who 
 immediately recognized him as a valuable assistant in the 
 proposed negotiations with China and the expedition against 
 Formosa. Le Gendre advised the Japanese that the Chinese 
 Government did not exercise sovereignty over that portion 
 of Formosa where the Lew Chew sailors had been murdered. 
 He assured them that a small expeditionary force sent to 
 Formosa could easily effect a landing and that, once estab- 
 lished, it would be very difficult to dislodge them. The 
 Japanese engaged Le Gendre as counsellor to the proposed 
 mission to Peking, agreed to make him a general in the 
 Japanese army in case of war with Formosa, and held out 
 the inducement that in case Japan were to remain perma- 
 nently in Formosa, Le Gendre would be made governor of 
 the island. De Long felt much gratified at the arrangement 
 which, it seemed to him, would still farther separate Japan 
 from China, avert civil war in Japan, and place Formosa 
 and possibly Korea, under "a flag of a nation in sympathy 
 with the Western powers." ^'^ Into the details of the em- 
 bassy to Peking it is not possible to go although it con- 
 stitutes one of the most amusing as well as significant epi- 
 sodes in the history of Japanese relations with China. ^^ 
 Soyeshima, with a diplomatic rank superior to that of any 
 
 *When the full extent of De Long's activities became known in Washington 
 the next year, he was .immediately recalled. 
 
FIRST STEPS IN JAPANESE EXPANSION 441 
 
 diplomatic resident in Peking, with a large suite, clothed 
 in Western dress, attended by Le Gendre as Counsellor, and^ 
 accompanied by two war vessels, appeared in China in 
 March, 1873. The ostensible purpose of the mission was to 
 exchange ratifications of the treaty of 1871. The intent was 
 to secure the assent of China to the annexation of the Lew 
 Chews, to the expedition against Formosa, and also to 
 secure from China a disclaimer of sovereignty over Korea. 
 Li Hung Chang at Tientsin was disposed to receive the 
 mission with contempt, and the foreign representatives at 
 Peking were almost equally scornful. The Japanese insisted 
 upon the most exact observance of international law, espe- 
 cially in the matter of diplomatic rank, thus claiming for 
 Soyeshima as ambassador a precedence over the representa- 
 tives of the foreign powers who were only ministers. Le 
 Gendre did not prove a help to the embassy. The diplo- 
 matic negotiations, even when one accepts the Japanese 
 account of them, could hardly be called straight-forward. 
 The mission failed to secure Chinese assent to the annexa- 
 tion of the Lew Chews ; but it did secure as definite a 
 waiving of responsibility for Korea as had been given to 
 Mr. Low in 1871, and the evasive answers of the Chinese 
 with respect to Formosa were such as to give the Japanese at 
 least a shadow of permission for the proposed expedition.* 
 
 Incidentally Soyeshima forced the audience question to 
 an issue when it was hanging in suspense and while he was 
 in Peking the entire diplomatic body was for the first time 
 received in audience by the Emperor, Soyeshima being 
 accorded precedence over all the other representatives. 
 
 The maturing bellicose plans of Japan now experienced 
 an interruption from within. The Iwakura Embassy while 
 in Europe heard of the proposed plans and were in dismay. 
 
 * Japan confronted*' China with the principle of international law thatK 
 sovereignty over territory was not to be recognized where the power claiming 
 sovereignty did not exercise the functions of government. To this claim China 
 replied with a quotation from her classics which she understood better than 
 international law. "Formosa is an island lying far off amidst the sea," wrote 
 Prince Kung to the ministers of the Japanese Department of Foreign Affairs, 
 May 14, 1S74, "and we have never restrained the savages living there by any 
 legislation, nor have we established any government over them, following in 
 this a maxim mentioned in the Rei Ri: 'Do not change the usages of a people, 
 but allow them to keep their good ones.' But the territories inhabited by these 
 savages are truly within the jurisdiction of China." ^^ 
 
442 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 They had seen enough of European poHtics to reahze that 
 Asia would not be left undisturbed in the fighting of its own 
 battles and they hastened home to plead for peace. Im- 
 mediately upon their return there was a division in the cab- 
 inet between peace and war, and the issue was submitted to 
 the Emperor. The arguments for peace were overwhelm- 
 ing: Japan was without an army and the only way in which 
 one could be raised was to ask for contributions of soldiers 
 for the ex-daimios whose return to power would be an ob- 
 struction to the newly organized government; the Empire 
 lacked the necessary money; and then there were the 
 Western powers to be considered. Okubo, one of the mem- 
 bers of the Iwakura Mission, pointed out this danger, in 
 effect, as follows: 
 
 "Of all the foreign powers Russia is the most to be feared, and her 
 southward movement is well known ; so that if Japan and Korea fight 
 with one another, both will fall an easy prey to Russia. 
 
 "England is also a powerful nation, from whom Japan has already 
 borrowed much money, so that if Japan and Korea fight and we can- 
 not pay the interest in consequence of the war, she would make it a 
 pretext for interfering in our internal afi^airs, thus making Japan 
 another India." ^^ 
 
 The young Emperor cast his vote for peace. This 
 action enraged the war-seeking daimios, one of whom had 
 been so eager for war with Korea that he had offered to go 
 to the peninsula and expose himself to further insults and 
 even death to provide the Japanese with a sufficient excuse 
 for a declaration of war. But the Emperor's decision had 
 not avoided the issue of war. If a foreign war were not to 
 be permitted, then civil war would ensue. In the spring 
 of 1874 Japan decided to carry out the Formosan expedition. 
 
 Formosa, the Lew Chews and Korea 
 
 The Formosan Expedition was organized in April, 1874. 
 Two Americans in addition to Le Gendre were engaged in it 
 and an American steamer was secured as a transport. As 
 soon as the true nature of the expedition became known the 
 American Government requested that the Americans be 
 
FIRST STEPS IN JAPANESE EXPANSION 443 
 
 detached from it, and the AmeFscan steamer returned to its 
 owners. There was much excitement along the coast of 
 China. Le Gendre was arrested by the American consul at 
 Amoy and sent to Shanghai. The Japanese effected a land- 
 ing early in May, and showed every intention of remaining 
 in possession of the eastern portion of the island. In Octo- 
 ber, 1874, a Japanese envoy arrived in Peking to settle the 
 Formosa dispute. There was a war of words and then a 
 rupture of the negotiations. As the Japanese envoy was 
 about to leave Peking Dr. S. Wells Williams suggested arbi- 
 tration, but the envoy stated that the matter was 'too com- 
 plicated' for arbitration. 2^ 
 
 But the Japanese were not to be permitted to settle the 
 Formosan affair in their own way. Sir Thomas Wade, the 
 British Minister, had already, so it is believed, intimated to 
 the Japanese that Great Britain would not view the Jap- 
 anese occupation of Formosa with satisfaction owing to the 
 close trade relations of Formosa with the British merchants 
 in China, and now he intervened and became mediator of 
 the dispute. An agreement was signed October 31, 1874.^^ 
 
 In the treaty between China and Japan in 1874, for the 
 settlement of the Formosan trouble, Japan cleverly inserted 
 the following sentence: ''The raw barbarians of Formosa 
 once unlawfully inflicted injury on the people belonging to 
 Japan, and the Japanese Government with the intention of 
 making the said barbarians answer for their acts sent troops 
 to chastize them." The treaty also stated that Japan had 
 acted justly in the matter. Thus Japan cut the ground from 
 under the Chinese claims of suzerainty over the Lew Chews, 
 for the people referred to as belonging to Japan were Lew 
 Chew sailors. The Chinese claim, in the judgment of the 
 Japanese, no longer had a standing in international law, 
 and when the Chinese discovered the way in which they had 
 been outwitted, they fell back on sullen defiance. In 1879 
 the Lew Chew prince was still further reduced by the 
 Japanese because his emissaries had been seeking the good 
 offices of the American and other ministers in Tokio, with a 
 view to having the old relationship to China restored. The 
 
444 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 American Government had contented itself, when Japan 
 formally annexed the islands, with the assurances that 
 American rights would in no way be disturbed, and never 
 interfered with the program of Japan; it regarded the con- 
 troversy as purely between China, the King of the Lew 
 Chews, and Japan. 
 
 The points of irritation between China and Japan mul- 
 tiplied after the Formosan affair in 1874, and when General 
 Grant visited Peking in 1879 the two nations were on the 
 point of war. Grant saw very clearly that the European 
 nations might seize the opportunity to enhance their own 
 interests. It was therefore a matter of satisfaction to Gen- 
 eral Grant when the Chinese proposed and the Japanese 
 agreed to submit the Lew Chew question to his mediation. 
 
 After many conferences with the Chinese in Peking and 
 a thorough review of the question in Tokio, General Grant 
 wrote a letter, August 18, 1879, to Prince Kung which, be- 
 fore being sent was shown to the Emperor of Japan and 
 received his approval.^^ In this letter Grant made the 
 following proposals: (1) China to withdraw certain threat- 
 ening and menacing dispatches which had been addressed to 
 Japan on the subject; (2) each country to appoint a com- 
 mission, and the two commissions to confer on the subject; 
 (3) no foreign power to be brought into the discussion, but 
 in case the commissions could not agree they might appoint 
 an arbitrator whose decisions should be binding on both 
 Japan and China. General Grant then took the opportunity 
 to point out to China the necessity for peace. His language 
 is interesting for its earnestness and as an indication of 
 General Grant's conclusions on the impending conflict in 
 Asia. He wrote: 
 
 "In the vast East, embracing more than two thirds of the human 
 population of the world there are but two nations even partially free 
 from the domination and dictation of some one or other of the Euro- 
 pean Powers, with strength enough to maintain their independence — 
 Japan and China are the two nations. The people of both are brave, 
 intelligent, frugal and industrious. With a little more advancement 
 in modern civilization, mechanics, engineering, etc., they could throw 
 off the offensive treaties which now cripple and humiliate them, and 
 could enter into competition for the world's commerce. . . . 
 
FIRST STEPS IN JAPANESE EXPANSION 445 
 
 "Japan is now rapidly reaching a condition of independence, and 
 if it had now to be done over, such treaties as exist could not be forced 
 upon her. What Japan has done, and is now doing, China has the 
 power — and I trust the inclination — to do. I can readily conceive 
 that there are many foreigners, particularly those interested in trade, 
 who do not look beyond the present and who would like to have the 
 present condition remain, only grasping more from the East, and 
 leaving the natives of the soil merely 'hewers of wood and drawers 
 of water' for their benefit. I have so much sympathy for the good 
 of their children, [the foreigners] if not for them, that I hope the 
 two countries will disappoint them." 
 
 It has been stated, and probably correctly, that General 
 Grant went even so far as to recommend that Japan and 
 China form an alliance against the Western powers.* 
 
 Both nations accepted Grant's proposal and the two 
 commissions met in Peking. After three months' discus- 
 sion they arrived at a settlement according to which the 
 islands were to be divided. f However, on the day fixed for 
 the signatures China suddenly withdrew the question from 
 the commission and referred it to the Chinese superin- 
 tendents of trade of the northern and southern districts.^^ 
 "A glaring instance of international treachery" on the part 
 of China, the North China Daily News (January 27, 1883) 
 called it, but it was subsequently discovered that Japan, not 
 content with the settlement of the Lew Chew question by 
 its self, had, at the last minute, insisted upon the inclusion 
 in the agreement of some additional provisions opening new 
 ports and trading privileges in China to Japan. 
 
 China had been predisposed to settle the matter in 1880 
 because of the strained relations with Russia, although the 
 surrender of Chinese territory to a foreign power during 
 the minority of the emperor was a risk such as few Chinese 
 statesmen would have dared to assume. As soon as the 
 trouble with Russia was over, the Lew Chew question again 
 
 *The Government of the United States feared that the good ofBces of the 
 United States were being accepted by the two powers under a misapprehension 
 that General Grant in some way officially represented the United States, and 
 instructed its representatives to make clear that he had acted in an entirely 
 personal capacity.^o 
 
 fit has been frequently stated " that General Grant himself proposed the 
 partition of the islands between China and Japan. As a matter of fact, the 
 most important point in the mediation by General Grant was that China and 
 Japan should, if possible, settle their own disputes without the admission of 
 any European into the controversy. 
 
446 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 became the subject of great irritation. Li Hung Chang out- 
 lined China's position as follows: China would not under 
 any circumstances consent to the destruction of the au- 
 tonomy of the islands, or the division of them between 
 Japan and China. He desired that the islands should be re- 
 stored to their original conditions of tributary state to both 
 China and Japan. Failing this, he thought China would 
 agree to enter into treaty stipulations with Japan by which 
 both powers would guarantee the absolute independence of 
 the Lew Chews. ^^ 
 
 In 1882 Li Hung Chang was not unwilling to fight Japan 
 for the possession of the islands and war seemed imminent. 
 The international situation remained the same. A war 
 between China and Japan would be destructive to the best 
 interests of both nations, and also detrimental to the inter- 
 ests of the United States. John Russell Young, then Ameri- 
 can minister in Peking, who as a newspaper correspondent 
 had accompanied General Grant around the world, and who 
 was also on very intimate terms with Li Hung Chang, 
 strongly urged the Viceroy not to enter into hostilities with 
 Japan. The question had passed beyond the stage where it 
 might be controlled by considerations of justice. China had 
 signed away her rights in the treaty of 1874. Japan had 
 formally annexed the islands and had been administering 
 them for several years. But more important even was the 
 fact that China was in no condition to enter a war. Peace 
 at any price was the only safe policy for the Empire. 
 
 The Lew Chew question was soon lost in the greater 
 problem which confronted China in the aggressions of 
 France upon her southern border, and the annexation of the 
 Lew Chews by Japan became a jait accompli. 
 
 ^ Meanwhile Japan had accomplished the first step of her 
 program in Korea. 
 
 In September, 1875, a Japanese surveying party was 
 fired on while surveying the Korean coast near the mouth 
 of the Han River. Immediately General Kuroda and Gen- 
 eral Inouye were sent to Korea to settle the matter. At the 
 same time an envoy was sent to Peking. The envoy to 
 
FIRST STEPS IN JAPANESE EXPANSION 447 
 
 Peking again secured a disclaimer of any Chinese responsi- 
 bility for Korea, and became convinced that China would 
 not interfere so long as Japan did not take any Korean 
 territory. Japan therefore decided to be content with 
 merely opening the country, and found inspiration and sug- 
 gestions for the role in the way Commodore Perry had 
 opened Japan. Without bloodshed, but in the presence of 
 an imposing naval and military force, Korea was led to make 
 a treaty with Japan at Kang-hoa February 27, 1876. 
 
 The Treaty of Kang-hoa was Japan's entering wedge on 
 the mainland of Asia. Its most important provision was 
 contained in the first article : "Chosen, being an independ- 
 ent state, enjoys the same sovereign rights as does Nip- 
 pon." ^" Thus the first step was taken; Korea was led, 
 adroitly, to disavow Chinese suzerainty. The treaty also 
 provided for the opening of several ports, acknowledged 
 Japan's right to make surveys of the coast, stipulated that 
 consular and diplomatic relations could be established and 
 granted to Japan extraterritoriality in criminal matters. In 
 general the treaty was unilateral, and similar to those which 
 the foreign powers had imposed upon both China and 
 Japan. 
 
 "The treaty of 1876," states a Japanese historian, "was the first 
 clear announcement of Japan's foreign policy as regards Korea. The 
 policy of annexation, though not impossible to carry out, was from 
 the very first rejected in view of the possible conflict with China (and 
 later with Russia also) ; but neither China nor any other nation was 
 to be allowed to substantiate its claim of suzerainty over Korea on 
 the ground of free competition." ^^ ^i 
 
 BIRLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. Satah, Lord Hotta, p. 74, cited by Treat: "Early Diplomatic 
 
 Relations," pp. 99-100. 
 
 2. W. W. McLaren : "Political Hist, of Japan," p. 35. 
 
 3. James W. Davidson: "The Island of Formosa" (1903), particu- 
 
 larly chaps. 9-13. 
 
 4. Foreign Relations, 1880, pp. 194 ff, Dee. 11, 1879, Seward to 
 
 Secretary of State; 1875, p. 786, Feb. 9, 1875, Bingham to 
 Secretary of State. 
 
 5. W. W. Rockhill : "China's Intercourse with Korea from the 
 
 Fifteenth Century to 1895." 
 
448 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 6. Griffis : "Hermit Kingdom," pp. 58, 159, 372. 
 
 7. Stead : p. 150. 
 
 8. Japan Desp. Vol. 4, Oct. 7, 1861 ; for Seward's answer see Japan 
 
 Instructions, Vol. 1, Feb. 5, 1862. 
 
 9. Stead : pp. 149 ft'., give a history of the Sakhalin controversy. 
 
 10. William H. Seward's "Travels Around the World," p. 58. 
 
 11. Japan Desp. Vol. 13, Jan. 11, 1870; Japan Instr. Vol. 1, Jan. 17, 
 
 1871; Russia Instr., Nov. 11, 1870; Russia Disp., Dee. 9, 1870. 
 
 12. Stead: p. 175. 
 
 13. The Benjamin Pease, referred to in Misc. H. Doc. 31 :45-2, p. 12, 
 
 pp. 32, 66, 200 ft., made his headquarters in the Bonin Islands. 
 
 14. Dip. Corres., 1864, III, p. 518; Treat, op. cit, pp. 309, 344. 
 
 15. For. Relations, 1874, pp. 635, 637. 
 
 16. Dip. Corres., 1867, I, np. 419 £E. 
 
 17. Dip. Corres., 1867, II, p. 36. 
 
 18. Dip. Corres., 1868, p. 634. 
 
 19. Stead: p. 148. 
 
 20. Japan Gazette, July 18, 1872, reprinted in Japan WeeTcly Mail. 
 
 21. China Desp., Vol. 30, Aug. 3, 1871. 
 
 22. Stead : p. 154. 
 
 23. Martens' "Recueil de Traites," 61, p. 502, gives the Japanese 
 
 form of this article. The treaties published by the Maritime 
 Customs give the longer form of the article in which a defi- 
 nite defensive alliance is provided for. This is the first 
 instance, of which there have been others in more recent 
 years, where the Japanese and Chinese texts of agreements 
 between the two nations do not agree. 
 
 24. Japan Desp., Vol. 18, July 6, 1871. 
 
 25. For. Relations, 1873, p. 567; see also Japan Instr., Vol. 1, Aug. 
 
 24, 1871. 
 
 26. See accounts of receptions to W. H. Seward in "Travels Around 
 
 the World." 
 
 27. S. Ex. Doc. 34:33-2 (Perry Corres.), pp. 139, 143, 168. 
 
 28. For. Relations, 1873, pp. 553, 564. 
 
 29. Japan Desp., Vol. 21, Nov. 22, 1872. 
 
 30. While there are references to the Soyeshima Embassy in the 
 
 despatches of Low to Fish (For. Relations, 1873, pp. 177, 186 
 et seq.) the most interesting account, evidently based on 
 Japanese documentary sources or reminiscences, is found in 
 Stead, pp. 159 ff. 
 
 31. China Desp., Vol. 36, Aug. 22, 1874, Williams to Fish. 
 
 32. Stead : p. 166. 
 
 33. China Desp., Vol. 37, Oct. 29, 1874. 
 
 34. P. P. China No. 2 (1875) Corres. resp. settlement of difficulties 
 
 bet. China and Japan ; Further Corres. presented Mar. 9, 1875 ; 
 For. Relations, 1875, p. 221, Williams to Fish, Nov. 12, 1874. 
 
 35. China Desp., Vol. 61, Oct. 9, 1882, Young to Frelinghuysen ; 
 
 John Russell Young: "Men and Memories," Vol. 2, p. 294; 
 "Around the World with General Grant," Vol. 2, pp. 410-12; 
 415; 543-6; 558-60 "The Loochoo Islands," by Charles S. Leav- 
 enworth, p. 159 ff., gives extracts from Li Hung Chang's Let- 
 
FIRST STEPS IN JAPANESE EXPANSION 449 
 
 ters and Despatches on the Lew Chews. These documents are 
 not in agreement with Mr. Young's account in several details. 
 
 36. Tor. Eolations, 1881, p. 243, Apr. 4, 1881. 
 
 37. Robert P. Porter : "Japan, the Rise of a Modern Power," p. 119 ; 
 
 Morse: "International Relations," Vol. II, p. 322, and many 
 others. 
 
 38. For. Relations, 1881, p. 229; see also 1873, pp. 188, 553, 564; 
 
 1879, p. 637 ; 1880, p. 194. 
 
 39. "Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi," Appendix A, pp. 
 
 316 ff. ; China Desp., Vol. 58, Nov. 19, 1881. 
 
 40. Stead : p. 177, contains summary of contents with comments 
 
 of Japanese historian. 
 
 41. Ihid., p. 179. 
 
[ CHAPTER XXIV 
 
 THE UNITED STATES AND KOEEA— TEEATY OE 1882 
 
 The preceding chapter on Japanese expansion closed, 
 not because a convenient date had been reached, but because 
 it is now necessary to describe another line of activity be- 
 fore going on with the account of Japan's efforts to consoli- 
 date a satisfactory territorial position in Asia. In taking 
 the next step in Korea Japan was greatly aided by the 
 desire of Western nations, particularly the United States, to 
 see the peninsula opened to trade. 
 
 The movement to open Korea, first seriously initiated 
 by William H. Seward in 1868 and accomplished in 1882 
 by Commodore R. W. Shufeldt, was by far the most im- 
 portant political action undertaken by the United States 
 in Asia until the occupation of the Philippines in 1898. 
 To disturb Korea in any way was to disturb the equilibrium 
 of the Far East. By the treaty of 1876 in which Korea was 
 led to disavow Chinese suzerainty, a balance had been estab- 
 lished between China and Japan. The transcending politi- 
 cal question for the Western nations was whether to recog- 
 nize the contention thus set up by Japan that Korea was 
 independent, or to continue to accept the evasive utter- 
 ances of China as implying the existence of Chinese suze- 
 ranity. 
 
 Expediency of Disturbing the Status Quo 
 
 One is forced to the conclusion from a study of the 
 declarations of both Chinese statesmen and Korean leaders 
 of the time that there was involved for the Western nations 
 no question of political righteousness. Notwithstanding 
 the unconvincing nature of the disavowals of Chinese 
 
 450 
 
UNITED STATES AND KOREA— TREATY OF 1882 451 
 
 sovereignty, China in 1876 had no valid claim to Korea. 
 Peking exercised no administrative functions and had re- 
 peatedly denied any control of Korean affairs. The Chinese 
 had disavowed any responsibility for claims arising out of 
 the damage to foreign life and property in the peninsula; 
 they undertook no measures whatever to prevent shipwrecks 
 or the recurrence of such events as the murder of the French 
 missionaries. Even when one gives to the Chinese asser- 
 tions of the subordinations of Korea to the Empire a value 
 unmodified by the accompanying disavowals of responsi- 
 bility, one is forced to the conclusion that the Chinese were 
 pursuing merely a dog-in-the-manger policy. They did not 
 want Korea, but they did not want Korea to come under 
 the shadow of any other power, nor did they relish the idea 
 of Korean independence. Likewise Japan had not the 
 shadow of a claim to possession of Korea. Japan's clainis 
 were purely economic. In a measure Japan was dependent 
 upon Korea for food-stuffs. To admit that the economic 
 dependence of one nation upon another constitutes a valid 
 claim for territorial possession by the dependent country is 
 to admit a proposition which renders insecure the bounda- 
 ries of most of the nations of the earth. 
 
 On the other hand, there was in the existing relationship 
 between Japan and Korea a question of political expediency 
 for the Western nations, which merited a greater degree of 
 study than was given to it by American statesmen in their 
 various efforts to enter into treaty relationship with the 
 Korean people. For Korea there were four possibilities: 
 Chinese suzerainty; Japanese suzerainty; the suzerainty of 
 some European power such as France or of Russia ; or, politi- 
 cal independence. In framing a policy to meet such an un- 
 certain situation the Americans could bring forward two 
 traditional ^^and characteristically American policies : the 
 United States had already registered its disapproval of the 
 advance of European powers in Asia, and was committed to 
 a policy of recognizing and even sustaining in a feeble way 
 the independence of the Asiastic states; and, Americans 
 were prone to hold that every people, with the exception of 
 
452 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 the American Indians, were and by right ought to be free 
 and independent. 
 
 Among the four possibilities enumerated above the 
 question of the future status of Korea was purely one of 
 expediency. The Koreans, at least their rulers, were bitterly 
 anti-foreign. They were disposed to adhere to a blind and 
 irrational policy of seclusion. That they did not desire to 
 be subjected to any Western power was obvious. That they 
 would not welcome Japanese domination was equally evi- 
 dent. Where they stood as between Chinese suzerainty and 
 political independence was not clear when the Americans 
 came to consider the question of a treaty. Obviously the 
 United States was under no obligations to consider them 
 independent if they did not so desire. But at this point 
 another question intervened : which was better for American 
 trade, Chinese suzerainty or Korean independence? Korea 
 under the shadow of China presumably would resist rather 
 than encourage foreign trade and domestic renovation. This 
 consideration appears to have had influence. That a condi- 
 tion of technical independence, undefended and defenseless, 
 might be worse than Chinese suzerainty, seems never to 
 have occurred to the American Government. 
 
 There were three possible ways to approach Korea: 
 directly, through Japan, or through China. The United 
 States tried them all impartially, moved by a single desire to 
 make a treaty and to open the country. 
 
 Direct negotiations were, as we have already noted, 
 authorized by William H. Seward in 1868.^ Had the Jap- 
 anese succeeded in 1868 or 1869 in establishing friendly 
 relations with the Koreans it is very probable that the 
 Government of the United States would have accepted the 
 Japanese invitation, as the German representative at Tokio 
 did, and would have sought an entrance into Korea by 
 means of Japanese good offices. The failure of the Japanese 
 negotiations, however, induced the American Government 
 to make its next effort through Peking. 
 
 The correspondence between U. S. Minister Low and 
 the Tsung-li Yamen at Peking in 1870-1 has already been 
 
 I 
 
tJNiTED STATES AND KOREA— TREATY OF 1882 453 
 
 alluded to. The details of the visit of the Americans to 
 Korea in 1871 were as follows: 
 
 The expedition under the joint direction of Mr, Low 
 and Admiral John Rogers was designed to be carried out 
 after the pattern of the"^ Perry visit to Japan in 1853. It 
 was as much of a failure as most imitations are. With a 
 fleet of five steamships the Americans arrived off the coast 
 on May 19, 1871, and a few days later came to anchor in 
 the Salee River below Seoul. Communications with the 
 shore were opened through some minor officials who visited 
 the ship but the objects of the expedition were not revealed. 
 Shortly afterwards a Korean fort fired on a surveying party 
 which had proceeded up the river, and in the engagement 
 which took place two Americans were wounded, and many 
 Koreans were killed or wounded. Mr. Low demanded an 
 apology which was not forthcoming. The Americans then 
 resorted to retaliation, destroying five forts and killing or 
 wounding 350 Koreans. Again Low demanded communica- 
 tions with high officials with a view to making a treaty, but 
 now the Koreans were stubborn and refused to forward 
 Low's letters to the King. The Americans were thus pre- 
 sented with a choice between further military measures or 
 retirement. Not being prepared, or authorized, to under- 
 take the conquest of Korea, Rear Admiral Rogers, like his 
 predecessor, the French Admiral Roze in 1866, decided to 
 retire, which he did on July 3.- 
 
 Korea was again left in the belief that the foreigners 
 had been compelled to retreat before her army, and the 
 expedition was looked upon by the Chinese also as a defeat 
 for foreigners. The outcome of the expedition was regretted 
 by the foreign communities because it tended to lower the 
 prestige of the foreign powers in Asia at a time when the 
 Chinese were stiffening their opposition to the revision of 
 the treaties. The expedition reflected no credit on the 
 Americans. 
 
454 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 The United States Inclines to Japan 
 
 The developments of the next few years materially 
 altered the situations of both China and Japan with refer- 
 ence to the peninsula. Mr, Low became persuaded that the 
 Chinese Government had been acting with duplicity, and 
 that while professing indifference it had secretly exerted its 
 influence to thwart the expedition. Meanwhile other factors 
 were at work to mar the relations between the Chinese and 
 the foreigners. While the Americans had regarded the 
 murder of the French Catholic converts in the Tientsin 
 massacre in 1870 as due more to the rashness and unscrupu- 
 lous conduct of the French than to the savagery of the 
 .'Chinese, the murder of the British envoy, Margery, on the 
 Burmah border in 1875, had been a shock to the entire 
 I foreign body in China and a sinister reminder of the fact 
 / that China tolerated the foreigners only because their armies 
 and navies protected them. The persecution of Christians 
 i and missionaries was increasing. Furthermore the Chinese 
 ' immigration question in California was becoming acute. 
 As an indication of the attitude of American public opinion 
 we may cite the fact that although Congress had extended 
 permission to the Japanese students to enter the naval 
 academy at Annapolis, the repeated requests of the Chinese 
 Government for a similar courtesy had been ignored.^ 
 
 Japan, on the other hand, was steadily rising in the 
 estimation of Americans. The first steps in the expansive 
 movement noted in the preceding chapter had provoked ad- 
 miration, although those who knew the details of the Jap- 
 anese negotiations in Peking regarded them as treacherous. 
 Meanwhile the Japanese efforts at domestic reform had won 
 the approval of the American Government to such an extent 
 that in 1878 Secretary of State William H. Evarts was 
 willing to sign a revision of the treaty of 1866. 
 
 While De Long had been recalled from Tokio for his 
 indiscretions, his contention had come to be accepted by the 
 American Government, viz., that Japan held the key by 
 which to unlock the East. Soyeshima in Peking in 1873 
 
UNITED STATES AND KOREA— TREATY OF 1882 455 
 
 had forced the Chinese to abandon a most cherished tradi- 
 tion and secured for the diplomatic corps an audience with 
 the Emperor in which no kotow had been exacted. Three 
 years later Japan had succeeded in negotiating a treaty with 
 Korea in which several ports were thrown open to Japanese 
 trade. Although the European powers and the foreign 
 diplomats in China were most reluctant to realize and 
 admit it, Japan was, in the opinion of America, rapidly 
 achieving the leadership of Eastern Asia.* 
 
 The Japanese were exerting themselves to gain this 
 very recognition. Japanese policy was being directed 
 towards inducing the foreign powers to deal with Korea 
 through Japan. An article supplementary to the treaty of 
 August 24, 1876, had stipulated that in case any foreigners 
 were wrecked on the coast of Korea they were to be deliv- 
 ered to the Japanese authorities who would assume respon- 
 sibility for their repatriation.^ This article was obviously 
 intended to transfer to Japan a relationship which had 
 formerly existed between Korea and China. In 1866 the 
 crew of the Surprise had been repatriated across the Chinese 
 border and by the agency of Chinese officials. 
 
 The next American effort to open Korea was made by 
 Commodore R. W. Shufeldt who had commanded the U. 
 S. S. Wachusetts which visited Korea in 1866-7 to investi- 
 gate the General Sherman affair. Shufeldt's instructions 
 from R. W. Thompson, Secretary of the Navy, were dated 
 October 29, 1878, and to them were added a letter from 
 Secretary of State Evarts to Thompson, dated November 
 9, 1878 — a little more than three months after the conclu- 
 sion of the new treaty with Japan. 
 
 Evarts expressed no great interest in the opening of 
 Korea. So far as he knew there had been no material 
 change in the prospects since 1871. He drew attention to 
 the provision of the treaty of 1876 relating to the return of 
 shipwrecked seamen by way of Japan as possibly indicating 
 
 * Perhaps the decisive factor in inclining American policy toward Japan, 
 was the influence of General Grant who had, in 1879, been more favorably 
 impressed by the Japanese. Grant's visit to the Bast may be reckoned as a 
 very important date in the history of American policy in Asia. 
 
456 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 an "intimacy between those two countries which may be 
 taken advantage of" and stated that he would be glad to 
 have Shufeldt investigate and report as to whether Korea 
 would be willing to make a treaty "similar in spirit and 
 purpose to those already in existence with other oriental 
 countries." Thompson directed Shufeldt, in the course of 
 a cruise in the U. S. S. Ticonderoga which was to include 
 visits to unfrequented parts of Africa, Asia, and the islands 
 of the Indian Ocean and adjacent seas, to "visit some part 
 of Korea with the endeavor to open by peaceful measures 
 negotiations with that government. It is believed that the 
 attack upon the Korean forts in 1871 is susceptible of satis- 
 factory explanation and that a moderate and conciliatory 
 course towards the government would result in opening the 
 ports of that country to American commerce." ^ That the 
 American Government was aware in thus resuming the 
 efforts to open Korea that it was taking any step of impor- 
 tance is not apparent. 
 
 In April, 1880, Commodore Shufeldt in the Ticonderoga 
 reached Nagasaki. His appearance and mission took the 
 Japanese by surprise. United States Minister John A. 
 Bingham had been instructed to invite the Japanese Gov- 
 ernment to give to Shufeldt suitable letters of introduction 
 to the Korean authorities. The Japanese hesitated. 
 Foreign Minister Inouye stated that the Japanese Govern- 
 ment was reluctant to disturb the Koreans at a time when 
 its own relations with them were still so largely unsettled. 
 The best that Bingham was able to secure was a letter of 
 introduction to the Japanese consul at Fusan. 
 
 Shufeldt arrived at Fusan May 4, 1880, and immediately 
 attempted to send a letter to the King of Korea through 
 the Japanese consul. The consul reported that the governor 
 of the district refused to forward the letter. Shufeldt then 
 returned to Japan and went personally to Tokio. With no 
 little reluctance Inouye was persuaded to send Shufeldt's 
 letter with one of his own to the King of Korea, on the 
 condition that Shufeldt would remain at Nagasaki for an 
 answer. Thus the Americans were made to appear as 
 
UNITED STATES AND KOREA— TREATY OF 1882 457 
 
 though they were dealing with Korea through Japanese 
 channels. This second attempt failed as dismally as the 
 first, and in the reply of the Korean minister of ceremony 
 there appeared the following sentence which was so lacking 
 in truth as to raise suspicions as to its origin : 
 
 "It is well known to the world that our foreign relations are only 
 with Japan, neighboring to us, which have been maintained since three 
 hundred years, and that other foreign nations are not only situated 
 far from us, but there has never been any intercourse with them." " 
 
 It was reasonably clear to Shufeldt that Japan was 
 actuated by no earnest desire to have the trade of Korea 
 thrown open to the world, and that the Japanese were 
 manipulating the negotiations to serve their own purpose. 
 
 Shufeldt and the Good Offices of Li Hung Chang 
 
 While Shufeldt was waiting at Nagasaki for his answer 
 from Korea his presence and purpose was made known to 
 Li Hung Chang at Tientsin, To the Viceroy the news was, 
 probably, somewhat alarming. China was then on the verge 
 of war with Russia. In the prospective conflict China would 
 be helpless as General Gordon, who was summoned to give 
 advice because of his success in the Taiping Rebellion, 
 bluntly advised Li Hung Chang. The presence of Shufeldt 
 in Japan could only be interpreted as meaning that the 
 American Government, approving the treaty of 1876 in 
 which the Chinese suzerainty over Korea was not acknowl- 
 edged, was about to throw the weight of its influence on 
 the side of Japan in the controversy over Korea. Thus 
 China was menaced directly by Russia and also, so it ap- 
 peared, by a combination of Japan and the United States, 
 and as a result of either of these dangers China might lose 
 its position in the peninsula. Chinese diplomacy, however, 
 was by no means unequal to such a situation, and Li Hung 
 Chang lost no time in inviting Shufeldt with very flattering 
 words to come to Tientsin. The Commodore, stung by what 
 he believed to be Japanese duplicity, was quite willing to 
 accept the invitation. Li assured Shufeldt that he would 
 
458 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 use his influence to secure a treaty from Korea, and then 
 dangled before the commodore's eyes the possibihty of a 
 position in the Chinese navy. Thus the astute Viceroy 
 scored a victory against Japan, and diverted the United 
 States to dealing with Korea through China. As for the 
 American Government, its purpose was merely to get results. 
 That in some way it was being made use of first by Japan 
 and then by China appears to have received no thoughtful 
 consideration. 
 
 Having received from the Viceroy the assurance of his 
 good offices, Commodore Shufeldt returned to the United 
 States in the Ticonderoga. In March, 1881, Shufeldt was 
 ordered to special duty at the U. S. Legation at Peking, 
 under instructions from both the Secretary of the Navy and 
 the Secretary of State. The latter requested the American 
 minister, James B. Angell, to facilitate in any way possible 
 the appointment of Shufeldt to the Chinese navy, and Shu- 
 feldt was instructed to follow up the promises of Li Hung 
 Chang. Shufeldt arrived in China in June, 1881, and estab- 
 lished himself at Tientsin. 
 
 Notwithstanding the fact that the cooperative policy 
 which had been inaugurated under Burlingame was still 
 supposed to be in force it was not understood among the 
 foreign representatives that cooperation could be expected 
 to include assistance to any one nation in securing for its 
 nationals any of the influential positions in the Chinese 
 service, and Shufeldt quickly fell foul of the intrigues of 
 various powers which did not wish to see an American placed 
 in a position of such influence. So embarrassing did the 
 Commodore's position at Tientsin become that he finally 
 declined to have anything more to do with the Viceroy's 
 proposal. It is by no means sure that Li Hung Chang had 
 ever been very much in earnest about it. 
 
 The Viceroy assured Shufeldt that he had sent a letter 
 to Korea advising that a treaty be made, and requested that 
 Shufeldt remain at Tientsin until a reply had been re- 
 ceived.''' In December, 1881, Li was willing to make the 
 treaty. The actual negotiations took place in Tientsin in 
 
UNITED STATES AND KOREA— TREATY OF 1882 459 
 
 the following spring between Li Hung Chang and Shufeldt 
 who was assisted by Chester Holcombe, then Charge d' Af- 
 faires at Peking. The Viceroy's first draft is of peculiar 
 interest because it reveals the motives of the Government 
 of China in encouraging the treaty, and also shows the atti- 
 tude of the Chinese with reference to their own treaties with 
 foreign powers. In the first article of the treaty Li wished 
 to have inserted a good-offices clause similar to that in the \ 
 American treaty of Tientsin, and also the phrase : "Chosen, 
 being a dependent state of the Chinese Empire, etc." In 
 other articles he specified: inland trade to be reserved for 
 the Koreans; importation of opium to be prohibited; 
 foreigners to be permitted to rent land but with the explicit 
 understanding that the land could not be alienated from 
 Korea; extraterritoriality to be granted 'temporarily,' but 
 Korean officials should be permitted to arrest Koreans in 
 the service of foreigners; no merchant consuls; missionary 
 work to be excluded; import duties to be 10 per cent on 
 necessities and 30 per cent on luxuries, and the export 
 duties to be 3 per cent ; the treaty to come to an end in five 
 years; and the Chinese language to be used in official 
 intercourse. 
 
 Shufeldt was willing to accept many of Li's propositions 
 either as they stood or with slight modifications, but he 
 pointed out that for the United States to sign a treaty with 
 Korea in which the latter was stated to be a dependent state 
 of the Chinese Empire would be equivalent to placing Korea 
 under the joint protection of China and the United States. 
 This was exactly what the Viceroy desired. The Commo- 
 dore explained to Li that he had no authority to enter into 
 an alliance with China, and that the presence of such a 
 clause in the treaty would cause its rejection in the United 
 States. The Viceroy was inclined to insist upon its inclu- 
 sion and at length Shufeldt, eager to accomplish the great 
 purpose of his life, telegraphed (April 19, 1882) to Secretary 
 of State Frelinghuysen for instructions as to whether he 
 should comply with the Viceroy's stipulation. No answer 
 to this request was received. Meanwhile Shufeldt reached 
 
460 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 a compromise with the Viceroy in which he agreed to ac- 
 knowledge the dependence of Korea in two ways : he would 
 write a letter to Li officially stating that he had requested 
 the assistance of China in making the treaty because Korea 
 was a dependency of China; he would also transmit to the 
 President of the United States a letter from the King of 
 Korea in which the latter stated that the treaty had been 
 made by consent of the Chinese Government. 
 
 The treaty as agreed upon was sent to Korea in a Chinese 
 naval vessel and the following day Shufeldt followed in the 
 U. S. S. Swatara. The compact was signed without discus- 
 sion by the Korean envoys on May 22, 1882. 
 
 A letter from the King of Korea to the President of 
 the United States was then given to Shufeldt, dated two 
 days before the signing of the treaty, although Li had 
 promised that it should be dated after the treaty, in which 
 the king made the following statement: 
 
 "Chosen has been from ancient times a State tributary to China. 
 Yet hitherto full sovereignty has been exercised by the kings of 
 Chosen in all matters of internal administration and foreign rela- 
 tions. Chosen and the United States in establishing by mutual con- 
 sent a treaty are dealing with each other upon a basis of equality. 
 The King of Korea distinctly pledges his own sovereign powers for the 
 complete enforcement in good faith of all the stipulations of the treaty 
 in accordance with international law. 
 
 "As regards the various duties which devolve upon Chosen, as a 
 tributary state to China, with these the United States has no con- 
 cern whatever." 
 
 Li Hung Chang had failed to accomplish his purpose. 
 Indeed at the end he had been led to approve a convention 
 in which the Chinese claim to suzerainty was specifically 
 ignored. The two supplementary letters which he had de- 
 manded were worthless. Li had evidently come to the con- 
 clusion that Korea could not much longer be kept in seclu- 
 sion and that regardless of Chinese pretensions, it was to 
 the advantage of both Korea and China that the first treaty 
 be made with the United States. Had the first treaty been 
 with France, there would probably have been a religious- 
 toleration clause in it such as had given so much trouble 
 
UNITED STATES AND KOREA— TREATY OF 1882 461 
 
 to China; and had the first treaty been with England, it 
 might have been difficult to exclude a provision for the 
 legahzation of opium. The treaty would be a model for the 
 others, and the United States would set a liberal standard. 
 But Li Hung Chang came bitterly to regret his mistake in 
 permitting the Shufeldt treaty. Indeed it was one of the 
 great mistakes of his career, largely impairing his claim as a 
 statesman. The treaty between Japan and Korea in 1876 
 had been the first wedge to separate Korea from China ; the 
 Shufeldt treaty was the second wedge, and of even greater 
 importance because by it China assented to the claim first 
 made by Japan six years before that Korea was as independ- 
 ent as Japan. The Shufeldt treaty was a step towards the 
 dismemberment of the Chinese Empire, just as surely a step 
 in that direction as the treaties with England or France with 
 reference to Burmah and Annam. It was an unintended 
 blow dealt at the security of the Chinese Empire. 
 
 The United States had no direct interests to serve in 
 making the treaty. Secretary of State James G. Blaine 
 (November 14, 1881) in the official instructions to Shufeldt 
 had clearly reflected the casual attitude of the American 
 Government. He wrote: 
 
 "While no political or commercial interest renders such a treaty 
 urgent, it is desirable that the ports of a country so near Japan and 
 China should be opened to our trade and to the convenience of such 
 vessels of our Navy as may be in those waters, and it is hoped that 
 the advantages resulting from the growing and friendly relations 
 between those great empires and the United States will have attracted 
 the attention and awakened the interest of the Korean Government. 
 
 "If the Government of Korea (or Chosen) is willing to open its 
 ports to our commerce as China and Japan have done, we will with 
 pleasure establish such friendly relations, but we do not propose to 
 use force or to entreat such action." * 
 
 On its surface the treaty appeared to be a highly benevolent 
 act towards Korea for it not only opened the nation to 
 Western civilization and trade but also, in a measure, re- 
 moved it from the blight of Chinese restraint. But more 
 closely scrutinized, and viewed in the light of history, the 
 treaty is seen to have been the instrument which set Korea 
 
462 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 adrift on an ocean of intrigue which it was quite helpless to 
 control. 
 
 The Personal Views of Commodore Shufeldt 
 
 The treaty is another illustration of the peculiarly per- 
 sonal character of much of American policy in Asia. It 
 appears to have been authorized primarily because of the 
 . , ambition and importunities of Commodore Shufeldt. The 
 II ambition was entirely worthy and above reproach, but it 
 was hardly a sufficient justification for such a project. In 
 this connection it is of importance to note an incident in the 
 personal relations of the Commodore and the Viceroy which 
 also throws some light on the growing anti-Chinese senti- 
 ment in the United States. 
 
 Shufeldt returned to China in 1881 well disposed 
 towards the Chinese for he had before him the possibility of 
 distinguished service in building up the Chinese navy as 
 well as the distinction of opening up Korea. At Tientsin 
 Shufeldt was rather shabbily treated. While enduring these 
 affronts from the Viceroy, Shufeldt wrote to Senator A. A. 
 Sargent of California a personal letter in which he expressed 
 his disgust with brutal frankness. Unhappily the letter was 
 published in American papers and after Shufeldt left China 
 was printed widely in the East. It expressed sentiments 
 greatly at variance with the generous spirit of the treaty 
 with Korea. The letter is to be taken rather as significant 
 of a kind of temper and disposition towards the Chinese 
 which had never been entirely absent from the foreign 
 settlements in China but was rarely expressed by Americans 
 until the Chinese immigration trouble arose. It was, how- 
 ever, typical of a growing sentiment in the United States 
 which exerted an important influence in the shaping of 
 American policy in both China and Korea. 
 
 "Six months residence in this city (Tientsin)," wrote Shufeldt, 
 "the political center of the Chinese Government, and an intimacy 
 rather exceptional with the ruling element, has convinced me that 
 deceit and untruthfulness pervade all intercourse with foreigners; 
 that an ineradicable hatred exists, and that any appeal across this 
 
UNITED STATES AND KOREA— TREATY OF 1882 463 
 
 barrier, either of sympathy or gratitude, is entirely idle. The only 
 appeal or argument appreciated is force. . . . All sympathy will be 
 construed into weakness, all pity into fear." 
 
 Contrasting the policies of the United States with those 
 of Great Britain which, thought Shufeldt, was the real ruler 
 of China, he wrote : 
 
 ''The United States standing, or endeavoring to stand, upon a 
 higher plane than that of mere physical force, pursues in China a 
 policy of moral suasion which neither convinces nor converts the 
 Chinaman to the doctrine of common brotherhood of men or nations — 
 for high as the heavens are above the earth, so high is his conceit; 
 as deep as the waters of the sea is the measure of his contempt for 
 the 'outside barbarians.' " 
 
 "Any high moral ground in the field of diplomacy — any appeal to 
 the motives which ordinarily govern nations — indeed, any argument 
 unaccompanied by the outward and visible sign of force, is used only 
 for the purpose of delay, which in the end is equivalent to victory. 
 Yet the United States has interests in China destined in the future 
 to be greater than those of any other nation— possessing as we do 
 the Pacific Ocean as a common highway — geographically with 
 reference to the continent, politically with reference to each other. . . . 
 Our policy therefore should be positive and governed, to the extent 
 of the moral law, by American interests alone, and followed up by 
 the argument which they understand — the argument of force, pressure, 
 not persuasion." 
 
 Shufeldt noted with the eye of a naval man that "all 
 martial spirit has died out" of the Chinese race, and ven- 
 tured the assertion that to the American form of government 
 the Chinese were most antagonistic. He pointed to the 
 condition of the returned Chinese students whom, he 
 thought, had been made the "victims of the oriental hatred 
 of popular institutions, and the innocent cause of dislike on 
 the part of the mandarins for everything American." 
 
 "Under these circumstances," he continued, "portrayed without 
 prejudice, even without sentiment — I am of the earnest conviction 
 that the policy of the United States in China, and towards the 
 Chinese in America, should be with us as with them — purely selfish — ■ 
 coming as it ought to, under the universal law of right and justice, 
 but by no means governed by the fallacious idea of international 
 friendship, or even the broader ground of a common brotherhood." 
 
 It was an amazing letter, but it was far more restrained 
 in its descriptions of the Chinese than were very many of 
 
464 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 the speeches in CaUfornia and in Congress during the ab- 
 sorbing discussions of the Chinese exclusion question. It 
 has been asserted that the pubhcation of this letter, coupled 
 with the changes in the Department of State incident to 
 the inauguration of the Arthur administration, may account 
 for the fact that Shufeldt was left without an answer to his 
 telegram in which he had inquired whether the American 
 Government would accept a treaty with Korea in which 
 dependency upon China was expressed. It seems more 
 likely, however, that no answer to the telegram was sent 
 because now for the first time the Department of State was 
 being forced to reconsider the entire question of the policy 
 toward Korea in the light of the relations of that country 
 to China and Japan respectively.* To the American Gov- 
 ernment this was a new and perplexing question, and before 
 an answer was devised, Shufeldt had already signed the 
 treaty. While the treaty was ratified, it was perhaps not 
 exactly welcomed by Secretary of State Frelinghuysen. To 
 the declining popularity of the Chinese in the United States, 
 as well as to the embarrassment of the Department of State, 
 may perhaps be assigned the reason why the letter of the 
 King of Korea to the President, expressing dependence upon 
 China, was promptly pigeon-holed and never officially pub- 
 lished in any record. 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. The best review of the events leading up to the opening of Korea 
 is C. O. PauUin: "The Opening of Korea" (Pol 8ci. Quart, 
 VoL XXV, No. 3). This article forms a chapter in Paullin's 
 "Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers." This, 
 however, is based on the Navy Dept. records and does not 
 include those of the State Dept. except as the latter appear in 
 
 *"This telegraphic message," noted Jobn Russell Yeung, who had been asked 
 to review the Korean question and who had filed a report May 1, 1882, "read 
 in the light of the confidential dispatch to Mr. Holcombe . . . would seem to 
 invite the question as to whether the proposed treaty is for the benefit of 
 China or Korea. How far should we commit ourselves to a convention which 
 China would regard as protecting her frontiers from some dreaded ultimate 
 danger on the part of Russia or Japan, and which Russia and Japan might deem 
 an unwarranted interference in Asiatic affairs?" Young recommended that 
 the question be evaded by making a purely commercial treaty. Shufeldt had, 
 in a measure, exceeded his instructions in making so broad a treaty when he 
 had been expected to secure little more than a shipwreck convention." 
 
 Young was soon to depart for the East under appointment as minister at 
 Peking. While passing through Tokio he learned that the treaty had actually 
 given great offense in Japan. 
 
UNITED STATES AND KOREA— TREATY OF 1882 465 
 
 the Shufeldt papers, and the Journal of the Cruise of the Ticon- 
 deroga (Mss.), both of which are in the Navy Dept. library. 
 Griffis : "Hermit Empire," chaps. 44-46, 48, is also valuable. 
 
 2. Reports of the Low-Rogers Expedition, For. Relations, 1871 ; 
 
 Nov. 22, 1870, p. Ill; Apr. 3, 1871, pp. 116, 121, 124, 142; 
 1874, p. 254. 
 
 3. For. Relations, 1871, p. 77, Jan. 10, 1871, Low to Fish, gives 
 
 a summary of conditions in China as viewed by the American 
 minister. The empire was reported to be in a state of decline 
 and ruin. 
 
 4. China Desp., Vol. 43, Nov. 30, 1876, Seward to Secretary of State. 
 
 5. Cruise of the Ticonderoga (Mss.), Navy. Dept. Archives. 
 
 6. Japan Desp., Vol. 43, Sept. 14, 1880, Bingham to Secretary of 
 
 State. 
 
 7. The official reports of the Shufeldt negotiations with Li Hung 
 
 Chang are in China Desp., Vols. 55, 57-59, filed according to 
 dates: Oct. 11, 1880, Oct. 22, 1880; Dec. 19, July "l, 1881; 
 Jan. 20, 23, Mar. 11, 28, Apr. 10, 28, May 13, 22, 24, 29, 
 June 8, 12, 26, 1882. 
 
 8. China Instr., Vol. 3, Nov. 14, 1881. 
 
 9. China Desp., Vol. 59, May 1, 1882. 
 
CHAPTER XXV 
 
 BEGINNING OF THE CONTEST FOE KOEEA 
 
 The signing of the Shufeldt treaty (May 22, 1882) dis- 
 closed to the world the contest which had already begun for 
 Korea. Not only Japan and China, but every Western 
 power interested in the Far East were involved. 
 
 Japanese Advance 
 
 Under different conditions it might have been expected 
 that Korea itself would cast the deciding vote as to the 
 possession of the peninsula, but the Korean Government 
 was utterly deficient. A change in dynasty in 1863 had 
 brought to the throne a boy under the regency of his father 
 who was known as the Tai-wen-Kun.^ The regent was anti- 
 foreign, a blind patriot, a Confucianist, usually pro-Chinese, 
 but chiefly concerned in the retention of his personal place 
 and clan influence. Ten years later the king attained his 
 majority. He had married into the Min family, and thus 
 acquired as queen a strong-minded, aggressive woman, some- 
 what disposed towards progress and violently opposed to 
 the Tai-wen-Kun who was immediately retired. The treaty 
 of 1876 had been signed with the approval of China which, 
 in the midst of its wavering policy towards Japan was, for 
 the moment, seeking conciliation. But the execution of the 
 treaty met with strong opposition from the reactionary Ko- 
 rean party. Japan, so suave and conciliatory when dealing 
 with the Western powers, was from the outset harsh in 
 Korea. The reports of returning explorers, not a few of 
 whom visited the peninsula in the next five years, are in 
 entire agreement upon this point. Because the arrogant and 
 ruthless character of the Japanese settlers and officials 
 
 466 
 
BEGINNING OF THE CONTEST FOR KOREA 467 
 
 played directly into the hands of the seclusion party, Japan 
 found it wise to proceed very cautiously in entering upon the 
 new privileges. While a Japanese settlement was immedi- 
 ately developed at Fusan, where Korean trade with Japan 
 had been transacted for centuries, it was not until 1880 that 
 Gensan, on the eastern coast at Broughton's Bay, and 
 In-chuin, near Chemulpo, were opened to Japanese trade 
 and then in the face of much opposition. 
 
 The progressive element in Korea found a measure of 
 leadership in the young king and queen, and was nourished 
 by Japanese contacts. Two embassies were sent to Tokio 
 where the visitors were treated to sight-seeing as the Japa- 
 nese embassies of 1860 and 1872 had been treated in the 
 United States. Just as the Americans had made efforts to 
 stimulate progress in Japan, so Japan displayed before the 
 astonished Koreans the advantages of Western civilization. 
 A "Civilization Party" came into being in 1880. Thus 
 developed a most complicated domestic conflict in Korea 
 which somewhat resembles the pre-restoration struggles in 
 Japan. The issue was not clear-cut between the two par- 
 ties although the Tai-wen-Kun, as leader of the reaction- 
 aries, was pro-Chinese while the progressive party inclined 
 towards the Japanese largely because Japan was at that 
 time the only source of enlightenment. In 1881 twenty- 
 four Koreans were sent to Japan to study, but at the same 
 time more than three times as many were sent to China 
 for the same purpose.- 
 
 Japan steadily pushed its influence at Seoul and in 1882 
 a Japanese ofiicer was installed as drill-master for Korean 
 troops. Military supplies were also ordered from Japan. 
 The intentions of the Japanese when Shufeldt arrived in 
 Korea were unknown. As soon as it was reported in Tokio 
 that the American envoy was about to leave Tientsin, the 
 Japanese representative in Seoul, then in Japan, was rushed 
 with all possible speed to Korea where he arrived the day 
 after the appearance of Shufeldt and the Chinese fleet. 
 Shufeldt received the impression that the Japanese would 
 have liked to retrieve the ground lost in their blunder of 
 
468 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 two years before by manipulating the negotiations in such 
 a way that the American treaty would have been obtained 
 through Japanese agencies. Li Hung Chang had amply 
 provided for such a contingency and the Japanese, who for 
 the moment were involved in serious controversies with the 
 Koreans, were unable to intervene. 
 
 The increase of Japanese influence, coupled with the 
 signing of the Shufeldt treaty, provoked the reactionary 
 forces and drew the Tai-wen-Kun again into the arena. 
 Two months after the signing of the treaty (July 23, 1882) 
 the ex-regent, supported by a mob, made an effort to seize 
 the persons of the king and queen, attacked and burned the 
 Japanese legation, and assassinated some of the more im- 
 portant leaders of the Civilization Party, including mem- 
 bers of the queen's, the Min, family. The king and queen 
 escaped, although it was at first reported that the latter had 
 been killed, and the Japanese legation, which was a mili- 
 tary as well as a diplomatic organization, escaped from the 
 city, made its way to the coast, and after many adventures 
 was picked up and taken to Japan in a British surveying 
 vessel. 
 
 It was freely predicted in the treaty ports and also 
 y abroad that war between China and Japan was rapidly 
 approaching.* 
 
 Undoubtedly the American Government, though unin- 
 tentionally, had incurred an obligation in making a treaty 
 with Korea. While this fact may not have been fully 
 realized in Washington, it was evidejat to John Russell 
 Young who, at the time of the disturbance in Seoul, was 
 passing through Japan on his way to his newly appointed 
 
 *The Spectator (London, September 2, 1882), for example, stated: "The 
 outbreak of hostilities between China and Japan is one of the most likely 
 events to happen within the next few weeks." It was also remarked in this 
 same article that in event of hostilities the United States had "always shown 
 a greater disposition to act through Japan than through China." In a pre- 
 vious article (March 11) the Spectator, in reviewing the various steps in 
 Japanese expansion, had characterized them as "entered without a sufficient 
 reason and of their own accord," and described them as part of a "policy 
 which can only be characterized as one of reckless and unscrupulous ambi- 
 tion. It was freely predicted that in the approaching struggle China, whose 
 navy had been recently greatly strengthened, and then consisted of about 
 seventy vessels, sixteen of which would compare in efficiency with those of any 
 navy in the world, would win. China was buying her navy in England and 
 training it under British auspices. The Chinese navy later passed under 
 German influence. 
 
BEGINNING OF THE CONTEST FOR KOREA 469 
 
 duties as minister at Peking, Young, as already noted, 
 had reviewed the Shufeldt despatches before leaving Wash- 
 ington. Better than anyone else he was able to understand 
 their significance because he had only recently returned 
 from the East with General Grant. Young was a devout 
 admirer of Grant and had been fully conversant with 
 Grant's views on the futility of war between China and 
 Japan. In Tokio, Inouye, Japanese Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs, had intimated to Young that Japan was disposed to 
 feel that the Shufeldt treaty had been made in the interest 
 of China, and that it would have the effect of disturbing 
 the relations between Korea and Japan. In Shanghai 
 Young learned from the Japanese consul of the events of 
 July 23 in Seoul. From what he knew of Japanese de- 
 termination to hold the place already won in Korea, the 
 prospect for peace appeared ominous and it became neces- 
 sary for him swiftly and without instructions from Wash- 
 ington to devise a policy. With the approval of Admiral 
 Clitz, he despatched the U. S. S. Monocacy to Korea with 
 instructions to watch the proceedings, preserve the strictest 
 neutrality, and offer "good offices" if convenient. Com- 
 mander Cotton was ordered not to join with the Japanese 
 in any demonstration, to use his influence to dissuade the 
 Japanese from any belligerent movement, and at the same 
 time to make the visit of the Monocacy an act of courtesy 
 to the Japanese. 
 
 While the visit of the Monocacy cannot be said to have 
 been the influence which averted war, as was claimed for it, 
 the seriousness of the situation had not been underesti- 
 mated by Young. The Japanese immediately mobilized 
 both naval and military forces and sent the Japanese min- 
 ister, Hanabusa, back to Seoul with a large military escort. 
 Meanwhile Li Hung Chang had despatched a fleet and four 
 thousand troops "to support the government." Hanabusa 
 reentered Seoul August 16, and two weeks later the Korean 
 Government complied with his demands which included 
 the promise to pay 550,000 yen indemnity in five yearly 
 instalments, permission for the maintenance of Japanese 
 
470 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 troops in Seoul for the protection of the legation, a special 
 embassy to Japan to offer apologies, and additional trade 
 privileges for the Japanese, The Chinese envoy watched 
 the proceedings and then retired with his troops, taking 
 with him into exile in China the Tai-wen-Kun who had 
 provoked the trouble. Li Hung Chang had again, just as 
 in 1876, avoided the issue with Japan, concurring in the 
 second advance of Japan in the peninsula. 
 
 A few weeks later the King of Korea issued a proclama- 
 tion which was designed to allay the fears of the Koreans. 
 Scholars were urging that Japan be kept at a distance, but 
 this, urged the king, was both unwise and impossible. If 
 Korea were to adhere to a policy of seclusion she would 
 remain isolated, and would be deprived of all assistance. 
 ''Let there be no more talk," stated the king, "about Japa- 
 nese and foreigners." ^ 
 
 China and Great Britain Aroused 
 
 Notwithstanding this declaration the fundamental facts 
 of the situation remained unaltered. In September, 1882, 
 Li Hung Chang issued some trade regulations for China and 
 Korea which bore no evidence of having even received the 
 approval of the King of Korea. They asserted that the 
 peninsula was a tributary state and that the concessions 
 granted to China were "not within the scope of the favored- 
 nation rule existing between the several treaty powers and 
 China." The Chinese were to be permitted to open ware- 
 houses in two suburbs of Seoul, and there was to be a 
 uniform duty of 5 per cent on all exports and imports except 
 red ginseng which was to pay 15 per cent.^ 
 
 While Korean subjects in China were not to have ex- 
 traterritoriality, Chinese subjects in Korea were granted 
 greater immunities than those enjoyed by any other power. 
 A Korean envoy was to be sent to China but he was to 
 reside at Tientsin rather than Peking, and would have a 
 rank equivalent only to that of consul. Li Hung Chang, 
 to whose yamen the envoy was related, was thus elevated 
 
BEGINNING OF THE CONTEST FOR KOREA 471 
 
 to a dignity equal with that of the king. Finally, the 
 Koreans were to consent to granting a subsidy to a line of 
 Chinese steamers between the two countries. China was 
 thus set forth not merely as abandoning none of her former 
 claims upon the peninsula, but as actually adopting an 
 aggressive policy to meet the Japanese advance. 
 
 Li Hung Chang followed the proclamation of the trade 
 regulations by placing his personal representative, Herr 
 von Mollendorff, formerly of the German consular service, 
 as Inspector of the Korean Customs and member of the 
 Foreign Office. 
 
 A brief survey of the international situation thus created 
 now becomes necessary. 
 
 China was rapidly slipping into chaotic conditions which 
 rivalled those of the Taiping Rebellion. Domestic affairs 
 were passing into the hands of reactionaries who were 
 ignorant, corrupt and weak. The prevailing policy was to 
 resist every reform and to meet every crisis with weak com- 
 promises. The management of foreign affairs was more 
 and more being turned over to Li Hung Chang who, as 
 Viceroy of Chili since 1871 and northern Superintendent 
 of Trade with headquarters at Tientsin, was entrusted also 
 with the inauguration of whatever measures were taken to 
 renovate the defenses of the empire. Li Hung Chang was 
 not a great statesman, except as compared with his country- 
 men; he was not the equal of any one of several of his 
 Japanese contemporaries. 
 
 China was beset by hostile powers. In 1867 France had 
 annexed three provinces of Cochin China as the first steps 
 in a program of territorial aggression at the expense of 
 China which was yet to be completed. Russian troops had 
 occupied Kuldja and the province of Hi (in Chinese 
 Turkestan) where they remained until 1881 when China 
 regained part of the territory by the payment of an in- 
 demnity and the granting of other terms unfavorable to 
 China. Japan had taken the Lew Chews and had shown 
 a disposition to take Formosa. Russia as well as Japan 
 was threatening Korea, Worst of all China was becoming 
 
472 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 the back yard of European politics. The opening of Korea 
 disclosed the ugly outlines of European intrigue as they 
 had not been revealed before. 
 
 Russia, although working at first quietly and secretly, 
 was vitally interested in the future of Korea. The Trans- 
 Siberian Railway had been projected as early as 1862, 
 although not actually begun until 1891. Vladivostock was 
 closed by ice from two to four months in the winter and 
 was too far removed from the markets of Asia to be of first 
 rate commercial importance. Korea, in the possession of 
 a power hostile to Russia, would be not only a barrier to 
 warm water, but also to southern markets. Whoever con- 
 trolled Korea could also control the Sea of Japan and the 
 approaches to Vladivostock. Without Korea Russia had 
 no assurance that she could even hold what she had already 
 obtained in Siberia, much less penetrate into Manchuria. 
 
 France, long since separated from alliance with Great 
 Britain, was now becoming the creditor of Russia and was 
 at the same time seeking the good will of Japan. French 
 interests in South China as well as French interests in 
 Russia brought France into line against China. 
 
 The opening of Korea was therefore alarming to Great 
 Britain. The latter was primarily concerned with placing 
 obstacles in the way of the southward movement of Russia 
 at every point along the far-flung frontier. In this contest 
 with Russia, China occupied the position of a gigantic bar- 
 rier state between Russia and India. So long as Korea re- 
 mained under the shadow of China, British interests found 
 a measure of protection. Korea, severed from China, was 
 all the more likely to fall into the hands of Russia. Even 
 before Li Hung Chang had invited Shufeldt to make a 
 treaty with Korea the Viceroy, so it is believed, had given 
 a similar invitation to the British Minister at Peking which 
 for some reason was declined. While Great Britain inter- 
 posed no objections or obstructions to the American treaty 
 with Korea, British interests immediately upon its signa- 
 ture became very active and set about to thwart the execu- 
 tion of the agreement in such a way as would definitely 
 
BEGINNING OF THE CONTEST FOR KOREA 473 
 
 sever Korea from the Chinese Empire. Thus Great Britain 
 became, without the formality of an alliance, the ally of 
 China, and was ranged against not only Russia and France, 
 but also against Japan.^ 
 
 It had never been the intention of Li Hung Chang to 
 relinquish Chinese claims in Korea, and when he found 
 that the document which he and Shufeldt had drafted, in- 
 stead of affording protection to Chinese interests in the 
 peninsula actually operated to weaken them, he set about, 
 with the advice of the British and not improbably at their 
 instigation, to rectify his blunder. -- 
 
 Into this mass of conflicting interests, most of which 
 had their roots in a century of European diplomacy and 
 intrigue, came the United States which was not only 
 utterly detached from the European conditions of which 
 the Far East was coming to be but a phase, but also con- 
 temptuous of alliances and international entanglements. 
 Where, in such slippery places as the Korean peninsula 
 afforded, was the United States to stand? With every one 
 of the contesting European parties the United States was 
 on the friendliest terms, and to the proposed victims of 
 their intrigues it was bound either by "good offices" or 
 mediation clauses in existing treaties. Had the alignment 
 in Korea been merely between the East and the West, the 
 United States would not have found it difficult to choose. 
 Traditional American policy indicated the support of the 
 East. But the line was north and south as well as east and 
 west. To take sides for or against either China or Japan 
 was to depart from an historic friendship with either one 
 or the other of the only remaining strong Eastern states. 
 The United States had thrust itself into the situation 
 prompted more by a spirit of adventure than led by any 
 wise counsels of statesmanship. Once in, the American 
 Government desired nothing but peace. The unofficial 
 recommendations of General Grant had been taken up into 
 the ofiScial American policy: peaceful relations between 
 China and Japan were necessary in the interest of the 
 building up of a strong East to meet the aggressive West, 
 
474 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 and they were equally important for American trade inter- 
 ests. But American statesmanship was too unfamiliar with 
 the facts and too inexperienced to frame and execute a 
 policy which would remove the causes of war and make 
 peace possible. 
 
 While instructing its representatives in Tokio and 
 Peking to do everything possible to allay the growing ir- 
 ritation between the two countries, the American Govern- 
 ment determined to adhere to the policy of regarding 
 Korea as a sovereign and independent state. A diplomatic 
 post equivalent in rank to those at Tokio and Peking was 
 created at Seoul and Lucius H. Foote was appointed to it 
 in February, 1883. Secretary of State Frelinghuysen drew 
 attention to the anomalous trade situation created by the 
 Chinese commercial regulations of the preceding year. 
 Under these regulations the Americans were denied the 
 following privileges which were permitted to the Chinese: 
 to reside and trade at four points in the interior; to travel 
 in the interior under passport; to transport native produce 
 from one port to another. In addition the duties were 
 discriminating in favor of China. ''To this the United 
 States cannot consent," stated Frelinghuysen.*^ Minister 
 Foote arrived at Chemulpo May 12, 1883. 
 
 The Japanese had now become very well reconciled to 
 the American treaty with Korea. Foote visited Tokio on 
 his way through Japan and was supplied with a Japanese 
 interpreter who accompanied him to Seoul. The Japanese 
 recognized that the American policy in Korea was, in effect, 
 distinctly friendly to Japan. Li Hung Chang, when he 
 learned of the visit to Tokio and of the presence of a Japa- 
 nese interpreter in the American legation at Seoul, was as 
 disgusted as the Japanese were pleased. The interpreter 
 remained only a few months. 
 
 The other foreign powers adopted towards Korea a very 
 different policy. While Russia remained in the background 
 Great Britain, Germany and France hastened to Korea after 
 the signing of the Shufeldt treaty. Admiral Willes con- 
 cluded a treaty for Great Britain two weeks later, following 
 
BEGINNING OF THE CONTEST FOR KOREA 475 
 
 the very liberal provisions of the American treaty, but this 
 was never ratified. In November of the following year a 
 second treaty with less liberal provisions which were more 
 in accord with the views of British merchants was signed 
 by Sir Harry Parkes. A treaty with Germany was signed 
 the same day. Great Britain then showed the trend of its 
 policy by appointing as diplomatic representative a consul 
 general who was made responsible to the British minister 
 in Peking, Thus England was supporting the Chinese 
 claim to suzerainty over Korea by making the British dip- 
 lomatic establishment in the peninsula an appendage of the 
 British Legation in China. Germany was represented by 
 a consul who reported directly to Berlin; France by a 
 "Commissaire" reporting directly to Paris; and Japan by a 
 Charge, Minister, or Ambassador Plenipotentiary, as suited 
 the situation. In 1884 Congress reduced the post at Seoul 
 to that of Minister Resident, equal in rank to that at 
 Bankok. Foote thereupon resigned. The Chinese Govern- 
 ment then requested that the American Government make 
 the Seoul Legation an appendage of the American Legation *V 
 in Peking, but the United States declined (December 5, 
 1885). 
 
 The policy of China was equally significant. In Oc- 
 tober, 1883, a Chinese commissioner "to manage the com- 
 merce of Korea" appeared in Seoul and without consulta- 
 tion with or the approval of the Korean Government posted 
 the following astonishing notice on one of the gates of the 
 city: 
 
 "I wish to inform the people that I have received the appointment 
 of Commissioner for China to manage the Commerce of Korea; and 
 also that I arrived at Chemulpo on October 14th; came to Seoul on 
 the 16th, and opened my office on the 20th. 
 
 "Whereas Korea has been dependent upon China since the time 
 Kuichi was appointed King of Chosen, several thousand years ago, 
 and the people devoted themselves to the teachings of Si-Su and 
 Eejei-Mi, and for the past two hundred years have been wonderfully 
 obedient to our existing dynasty; and the peoples, officials and our 
 merchants, in their intercourse with our people have acted in a 
 laudable manner; and as at present various nations are opening 
 commercial relations with Korea; — 
 
 "Therefore, the Chinese Government has issued trade regulations 
 
 / 
 
476 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 benefiting Korea; and I hope the merchants and citizens will ap- 
 preciate this fact, and obey and adhere to these regulations, that 
 harmonious feelings may exist between China and Korea, especially 
 as Korea is a dependency of China, and we wish to live in peace and 
 harmony. My duty is to manage the commerce which is known to 
 our merchants and if any questions arise, or any business needs at- 
 tention of whatever import, it is your duty to appeal to me for a 
 proper understanding and settlement of the same. 
 "Seoul, October 20, 1883. 
 
 "Chin-Chu Tang." 
 
 Later the Chinese representative in Seoul was known as 
 a "Resident," the term being apparently borrowed from 
 India where the British representative in the court of a 
 native state is usually known as the British Resident. This 
 Chinese Resident, Yuan Shi Kai, was the personal repre- 
 sentative of Li Hung Chang, acting under the immediate 
 direction of the Viceroy. His diplomatic status vis-a-vis 
 his European colleagues was always a delicate and irritating 
 point. Should he be treated as a diplomatic representative? 
 If so what was his relative rank in such a diplomatic corps? 
 This resident immediately claimed for himself a position 
 quite different from that of the representatives of the other 
 countries. He demanded and received permission to be 
 carried in his chair, accompanied by his attendants, through 
 the central gate to the palace when he came for audience 
 with the king, while the other representatives were com- 
 pelled to leave their chairs at the gate and walk more than 
 half a mile to the hall of audience. His exact status and 
 the scope of his powers was never defined and when the 
 United States addressed to the Tsungli Yamen an official 
 inquiry about it in 1889 the Chinese officials replied with 
 some asperity: "It would seem to the Prince and the min- 
 isters that there is also no necessity of making inquiry 
 about it." ^ 
 
 Japan having won another point in the contest for 
 Korea in the settlement of August 30, 1882, paused and 
 waited for another favorable opportunity to advance. The 
 Yokohama Specie Bank advanced a sum of money for 
 founding newspapers in Korea, for training Korean soldiers, 
 and for other means of peaceful penetration.^ Takezoye, 
 
BEGINNING OF THE CONTEST FOR KOREA 477 
 
 a man well learned in Chinese, was sent to Seoul as Min- 
 ister. 
 
 China, while adopting energetic measures in the pe- 
 ninsula, was not yet prepared to fight. In 1882 Li Hung 
 Chang was requested to prepare a plan for the invasion of 
 Japan, but he was able to persuade the Board of Military 
 Affairs that such, a step would be premature. Notwith- 
 standing the clan struggles in Japanese politics, the large 
 national debt and the relative isolation in which Japan 
 stood, the Viceroy was of the opinion that in case of war 
 the Powers would be on her side. 
 
 "If Japan should discover prematurely," argued Li, "our plans to 
 make war against her, then her government and people will be 
 reunited, she will ally with a foreign power, and accumulate money 
 by issuing loans, increase her army and navy, build and purchase war- 
 ships, with the result that we should be in a disadvantageous position, 
 pregnant with danger. An ancient maxim says : 'Nothing is so 
 dangerous as to expose one's plans before they are ripe.' It is for 
 this reason that I recommend to your Majesty that we maintain 
 extreme caution, carefully concealing our object whilst all the time 
 increasing our strength." * " 
 
 The King of Korea, catching a glimpse of the vistas of 
 independence, and becoming impressed with his importance 
 in international affairs, stood erect and turned to the 
 Americans for help. He did not relish the idea of having 
 three or more thousand Chinese troops quartered in Korea. 
 Under the old relationship, whatever it may have been, 
 not only were there no Chinese envoys and no Chinese 
 troops in Korea, but there were no Chinese merchants ex- 
 cept at the border. The average Korean probably did not 
 know a Chinese by sight before the Shufeldt treaty. The 
 increase of Chinese influence in the peninsula was as much 
 resented as the coming of the Japanese had been. The 
 king appealed to the American Government (October, 
 1883) to send him an adviser for the office of foreign affairs, 
 
 *However, the evidence makes very probable the inference that Li Hung 
 Chang did not fully appreciate the strategic value of Korea to China until 
 after the Shufeldt treaty. He appears to have consented to the treaty of 1876 
 between Korea and Japan ; he engineered the Shufeldt treaty ; he acquiesced in 
 the settlement with Japan in September, 1882 ; and he argued in the reply 
 to the Chang Pei Lun memorial that China did not have a valid case against 
 Japan in Korea. It appears to have been Great Britain which aroused the 
 Viceroy to exert himself in Korea. 
 
478 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 and asked for instructors for his army.^" He also placed 
 orders for munitions with an American firm of Yokohama. 
 The king even telegraphed for Commodore Shufeldt to re- 
 turn to Korea and enter his employ. 
 
 Shortly after the arrival of Minister Foote the Korean 
 Government sent an embassy to the United States. The 
 embassy was entertained by the American Government and 
 returned after a brief visit in the U. S. S. Trenton with 
 Ensign George C. Foulk of the U. S. Navy in attendance. 
 Foulk became Naval Attache at the Legation and com- 
 pletely won the confidence of the king.^^ When Foote re- 
 turned from Seoul shortly after the coup d'etat of 1884, 
 Foulk became Charge. In September, 1884, Dr. H. N. 
 Allen, Presbyterian medical missionary, arrived and within 
 a few months other missionaries followed. The king made 
 an ofiicial request to the American Government for school 
 teachers. American influence in Seoul was easily para- 
 mount. 
 
 The opportunity for which Japan had been waiting 
 came in the latter part of 1884, when China found herself 
 confronted with a war with France. As soon as the hos- 
 tilities had begun Takezoye waited upon the King of Korea, 
 painted the probable fate of China in the darkest of colors, 
 and offered to remit the indemnity agreed to two years 
 before, if the king would introduce military reforms in 
 Korea, with a view to the elimination of Chinese influence. 
 The Japanese minister promised the support of Japan if 
 Korea would assert her independence. A month later he 
 demanded that Japanese merchants be given most-favored- 
 nation treatment on the basis of the Chinese trade regula- 
 tions of September, 1882. This was granted. Still later he 
 pointed out the danger to Korea if Japan and China were 
 to fight on Korean soil, a possibility which seemed to the 
 Japanese minister very probable.^ ^ Meanwhile a plot was 
 formed between Japanese officials and certain progressive 
 Koreans to seize the king and queen. This plot was exe- 
 cuted in the midst of much assassination on the night of 
 December 4, 1884, on the occasion of a dinner given to the 
 
BEGINNING OF THE CONTEST FOR KOREA 479 
 
 diplomatic corps to celebrate the opening of a Korean postal 
 system. The king and queen were surrounded by the lead- 
 ers of the plot and by the Japanese officials, and the follow- 
 ing day the king issued orders creating widespread reforms, 
 as well as declaring Korean independence of China. The 
 next day Yuan Shi Kai with several thousand soldiers put in 
 an appearance, recaptured the palace, and forced the Japa- 
 nese — -only 130 in all — to retreat to Chemulpo where they 
 found refuge on the Japanese war vessels. 
 
 The old form of government was immediately restored 
 under the direction of Yuan Shi Kai, and such pro-Japanese 
 leaders as had not escaped with the Japanese were assassi- 
 nated. The cowp d'etat of December 4 again brought 
 China and Japan to the verge of war, 
 
 France had been urging Japan to declare war on China 
 because France needed the use of Japanese ship-yards which 
 were not available under Japan's proclamation of neutrality. 
 Japan though willing to aid France was wary of French 
 associations. Count Inouye proceeded to Seoul and reached 
 an agreement with Korea (January 8, 1885) in which the 
 latter consented to a moderate indemnity and the punish- 
 ment of those guilty of the murder of a Japanese officer, 
 and further promised to rebuild the Japanese legation and 
 barracks for the Japanese soldiers. 
 
 Japan then despatched Count Ito to Tientsin where 
 negotiations for a treaty with China were opened with Li 
 Hung Chang April 3. Count Ito, according to a Japanese 
 historian, stated his case as follows: 
 
 "The claims of China over Korea were historical only . . . The 
 claims of Japan over Korea were economical, i.e., she did not claim 
 any legal authority over Korea, but from her geographical position 
 and the necessity of providing for her constantly increasing popula- 
 tion, she was intent on utilizing Korea as the best source from which 
 the defect in the home produce of rice was to be supplied, as well as 
 the nearest field in which the future sons of Japan might find employ- 
 ment. For this purpose Japan would have Korea always independent 
 and under no foreign influence ; but within late years China was send- 
 ing military and political agents to Korea, and interfering with 
 Korean international afl^airs^ as if she intended to make good her 
 claim over Korea, long since become purely historical. This state of 
 
480 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 things had to be rectified, for Japan would never consent to Korea's 
 becoming in reality a part of the Chinese Empire." " 
 
 Two days after the the opening of the negotiations the war 
 between China and France was brought to a close in what 
 amounted to at least a partial victory for China. Japan 
 was thus left in no position to act arbitrarily at Tientsin. 
 Count Ito had to content himself with a treaty which still 
 fell short of a recognition of the independence of Korea^, 
 yet substantial advances were made. It was agreed that 
 both China and Japan should have the right to send troops 
 into Korea, upon the notification of each other, m case of 
 emergency; the instructors of the Korean army were to be 
 foreign drill-masters, not Chinese or Japanese ; and Li Hung 
 Chang promised to send a commission to Korea to investi- 
 gate the charge that Chinese soldiers had been acting in a 
 disorderly and brutal manner. In short, the treaty raised 
 Japan to a position of paramount importance equal to that 
 of China in the peninsula. 
 
 Then Russia began to show her hand. A treaty similar 
 to those with Great Britain and Germany was signed in 
 July, 1884. Soon there were rumors that Korea had also 
 entered into a secret treaty by which Russia promised "to 
 protect the integrity of Korea against all attacks by whom- 
 soever made," in return for which Russia was to supply the 
 instructors for the army and Korea was to "loan" Port 
 Lazareff to Russia for a winter harbor.^ ^ The treaty was 
 reported to establish complete Russian suzerainty over the 
 peninsula. Great Britain then ordered the occupation of 
 Port Hamilton, an island off the southern coast of Korea, 
 and reckoned as a part of the kingdom. This was accom- 
 plished April 15, 1885.1^ 
 
 The King of Korea protested that he had no knowledge 
 of the treaty and when Alexis de Speyer, formerly of the 
 Russian Legation in Tokio, arrived as "Agent Provisoire" of 
 Russia in June, 1885, the Korean Government refused to 
 carry out the terms of the agreement on the grounds that 
 military drill-masters had already been requested from the 
 United States and that the treaty with Russia was un- 
 
BEGINNING OF THE CONTEST FOR KOREA 4S1 
 
 authorized. The negotiations with Russia were found to 
 have been the work of von Mollendorff. Probably the 
 Viceroy had known nothing of this adventure of his auto- 
 cratic representative. The latter was dismissed, the treaty 
 went unratified, and Russia discreetly withdrew her claims. 
 
 Meanwhile the American Government delayed in se- 
 curing the authorization of Congress to the loan of military 
 instructors to Korea and it was not until April, 1888, that 
 three officers arrived.* The . Korean confidence in the 
 United States had been greatly shaken by the delay. The 
 United States was an uncertain friend to lean on in time 
 of trouble. 
 
 Upon the departure of von Mollendorff, the Korean 
 Customs, which hitherto had been managed exclusively by 
 Korea, were unceremoniously taken under the care of Sir 
 Robert Hart, of the Chinese Maritime Customs. Although 
 the funds thus collected were turned over to the Korean 
 Government, the returns were published in the Chinese 
 Customs Reports as though Korea were a province of 
 China. Sir Robert Hart's policy, to use his own words, was 
 to ''keep steadily in view the possibility of union between 
 the Koreans and the Chinese Customs — such a result will 
 be best for both Korea and China." ^"^ The new customs 
 inspectorate was henceforth utilized as an agency for re- 
 claiming the peninsula to China, and was a step in the 
 direction of eventual annexation. Sir Robert in this in- 
 stance had no difficulty in serving two masters for both the 
 government of which he was a subject and the one of which 
 he was an employe wanted the same thing. 
 
 The Korean Government made some feeble protests 
 against the occupation of Port Hamilton to which were 
 added the protests of the Chinese. Great Britain then took 
 up negotiations with China and when China secured from 
 Russia a distinct promise that it would not occupy any 
 Korean territory after the evacuation of the island, the 
 British flag was hauled down (February 27, 1887). These 
 
 ♦Both China and Japan had officially endorsed the Korean request for these 
 teachers. 
 
482 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 negotiations were conducted as though Korea were a part 
 of the Chinese Empire. 
 
 Between Japan and the realization of her program for 
 Korea, Great Britain as well as Russia and China were seen 
 to stand squarely in the way. The United States stood 
 aloof from the contest and although very kindly disposed 
 towards Japan studied neutrality. The American policy, 
 howeveSr, had already been to Japan as helpful as an 
 alliance. Great Britain working in the interest of China in 
 Korea was never able to accomphsh°for China as much as 
 the United States had wrought for Japan. 
 
 Korea, 1885-1894 
 
 Notwithstanding the fact that both the Chinese and the 
 Japanese troops were withdrawn from the peninsula in 
 July, 1885, the struggle between the two empires continued. 
 Japan, now passing into the arduous labors of treaty re- 
 vision, and also preoccupied with domestic reforms, was 
 passive for several years, but China, encouraged by the 
 support of Great Britain, became very aggressive. 
 
 The Tai-wen-Kun, after three years of comfortable exile 
 in China, was returned to Korea with ceremonious escort. 
 He could be counted on to oppose Japan. H. F. Merrill, an 
 American who had served in the Chinese Customs service, 
 replaced von MoUendorff as chief commissioner of Korean 
 customs. Mr. Merrill was charged by Sir Robert Hart to 
 seek the consummation of a union of the Chinese and 
 Korean Customs. ^'^ At the same time Li Hung Chang, who 
 was jealous of Hart's influence in Peking, appointed 0. N. 
 Denny, an American who had served with credit in the 
 American consular service in China, as an adviser to the 
 Korean Government. The Viceroy expected thus to have 
 two representatives in Seoul — Denny and Yuan Shi Kai. 
 These two gentlemen, however, did not get on well to- 
 gether. Yuan Shi Kai sought to keep Denny in a position 
 subordinate to himself and the result of his efforts in that 
 direction was to place Denny in opposition to Yuan and 
 
BEGINNING OF THE CONTEST FOR KOREA 483 
 
 then to ally him with the cause of Korean independence. 
 Denny resigned (April 1, 1888) after forcing an issue with 
 Yuan Shi Kai in which Li Hung Chang sustained Yuan 
 Shi Kai.* 
 
 In the summer of 1886 a rumor was circulated, pre- 
 sumably by agents of Yuan Shi Kai, and with the knowl- 
 edge of Li Hung Chang, that Russia had entered into a 
 secret treaty with Korea, the effect of which would have 
 been to accomplish all that von Mollendorff and de Speyer 
 had attempted the previous year, viz., to transfer to Russia 
 the suzerainty over Korea which was claimed by China. A 
 plot was formed by Yuan, so it is beheved, to take posses- 
 si6n of the king, queen and crown prince and deport them 
 to China, placing the Tai-wen-Kun again in power. Thus 
 it was hoped to accomplish the next step in the annexation 
 of the peninsula. A forged treaty between Korea and Rus- 
 sia was published and circulated but the plot was detected 
 and exposed by Denny, Merrill, the British consul general 
 and others.^ ^ The scheme was reminiscent of the pro- Japa- 
 nese coup d'etat of December 4, 1884. It failed disastrously 
 and resulted in great loss of prestige for China. At about 
 the same time the attempt of Yuan Shi Kai to smuggle 
 ginseng to China on Chinese war vessels was exposed. 
 
 The next year, probably as a direct result of the Chinese 
 interference in Korean affairs, the Korean Government de- 
 cided to establish regularly constituted diplomatic repre- 
 sentation abroad. China interfered and Secretary of State 
 Bayard telegraphed to Peking a very sharp communication 
 expressing "surprise and regret" at the Chinese action. ^^ 
 The Korean Mission to Washington eventually effected its 
 departure from Korea (November 13, 1887) on board the 
 
 * Morse believes that Denny "wrought much mischief," which is true if one 
 accepts the contention that Korea should have been made into a Chinese 
 province. Morse asserts, quoting a despatch of Rockhill. January 28, 1887, 
 that Yuan was a progressive leader, urging Korea to adopt useful reforms. 
 Rockhill was in Seoul for only three months, as Charge, and had come from 
 Peking where even the Americans favored the Chinese program of annexation. 
 The consensus of opinion of the Americans in Korea for the decade, was that 
 Yuan was actually an obstructive influence, seeking uniformly the elimination 
 of all non-Chinese leadership in the peninsula, and opposing all reforms which 
 would tend toward the invigoration of Korea. He opposed Dr. Allen's hospital, 
 and even discouraged any efforts of the Americans to organize a famine relief 
 fund. 
 
484 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 U. S. S. Ossipee, thus eluding six Chinese war vessels which 
 had been sent to stop it.^*^ Two years later when Pak Chun 
 Yang, the Korean minister at Washington, returned to 
 Korea, Yuan Shi Kai demanded that he be punished for 
 having acted independently of the Chinese minister in 
 Washington. The Korean envoy to Europe never pro- 
 ceeded farther than Hongkong. 
 
 At the time when Denny's controversy with Yuan Shi 
 Kai was agitating both Seoul and Tientsin, Li Hung Chang 
 asked the American Government to recall Ensign Foulk 
 who had been acting for the second time as Charge at Seoul 
 since September, 1886, on the ground that Foulk as well 
 as Denny had been encouraging the king in independent 
 courses of action. This request was supported by the official 
 approval of the Korean Foreign Office which was completely 
 under the control of Yuan Shi Kai, but was somewhat 
 weakened by secret messages from the king imploring Foulk 
 to remain in Korea. At the same time the Foreign Office 
 issued a formal request for all foreigners to withdraw from 
 Seoul. Foulk was recalled, but his conduct was approved 
 by the Department of State and some years later, having 
 resigned from the United States Navy, Foulk entered the 
 faculty of the Doshisha, an American missionary college, 
 at Kioto, Japan. The request for the departure of the 
 foreigners from Seoul was not pressed. 
 
 China, meanwhile, set out to secure a practical mo- 
 nopoly of the telegraph lines. Japan had secured the rights 
 for a cable line from Fusan to Japan. This line was in- 
 corporated into the system of the Great Northern Telegraph 
 Company to which Japan had granted a monopoly of cable 
 lines to China. China proceeded to build a land line from 
 Tientsin to the border and thence to Seoul, or rather to a 
 suburb of Seoul. While this was in course of construction, 
 Japan asked for permission to build a line from Fusan to 
 Seoul which would thus afford Tokio also direct communi- 
 cation with the capital. The Korean Government refused 
 to grant the concession but agreed to build the line as a 
 Korean enterprise. This was done — but under Chinese 
 
BEGINNING OF THE CONTEST FOR KOREA 485 
 
 direction. The result of this contest was that Japan was 
 effectually prevented from acquiring telegraph rights in the 
 peninsula equal to those enjoyed by China. 
 
 Japan, not only preoccupied with domestic affairs and 
 treaty revision, but also alarmed at the advance of Russia 
 which Tokio was powerless to check, appears to have be- 
 come for the time being little interested in Korean affairs.* 
 By some this was interpreted to mean that Japan, already 
 preparing to fight China, was not unwilling that the pe- 
 ninsula be annexed to China. Annexation by China would 
 settle the question of title and leave Japan free to wrest 
 the peninsula from her rival in a successful war. 
 
 The most sensitive feature of Japanese-Korean relations 
 was the exportation of food-stuffs from the peninsula. 
 Japan looked to Korea for supplies of rice and beans. In 
 the autumn of 1889 the Korean governor of one of the east- 
 ern provinces, alleging a prospective shortage of food-stuffs, 
 prohibited the exportation of beans or bean-cake at Wonsan 
 (Broughton's Bay). Although the prohibition was re- 
 moved in two months and Japan, at that time badly in- 
 volved in domestic discord, contented itself merely with 
 protests, two years later the controversy was revived and 
 the Japanese minister in Seoul presented a claim for 140,000 
 yen on behalf of Japanese merchants. So much time 
 had elapsed that investigation of the facts was difficult but 
 the Korean Foreign Office offered 47,000 yen in settlement. 
 The Japanese minister was recalled, charged with lack of 
 energy, and was replaced by Oishi, a young Japanese 
 politician who advanced the Japanese claim to 176,000 yen 
 and presented an ultimatum (May, 1893) demanding pay- 
 ment within fourteen days. Japan would have been willing 
 to accept the good offices of the American minister in Seoul, 
 Augustine Heard, but Li Hung Chang acted quickly and 
 met the emergency by advising Korea to settle the matter 
 with 110,000 yen, an offer which was accepted by the Japa- 
 
 *"If matters in Korea come to a crisis Japanese politicians ought to make 
 up ttieir minds to have nothing to do with that country." Whether Korea 
 retains its independence is a matter of "comparatively little concern to us." 
 'NicM Nichi Sliimhun, Mar. 7, 1887. 
 
486 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 nese. The Koreans made the settlement reluctantly, and 
 greatly resented the conduct of Japan. The effect was to 
 destroy Japanese prestige which had been growing for sev- 
 eral years during the oppressions of Yuan Shi Kai. Just as 
 Korean sentiment had swung towards Japan after the dis- 
 closure of Yuan Shi Kai's plot in 1886, so now it turned 
 back toward China which, whatever its intentions, knew 
 how to temper its measures with tact. 
 
 The next autumn (1893) the Korean Government 
 placed an embargo on the exportation of rice. There were 
 indications that the Chinese were engaged in an effort to 
 drive the Japanese traders from the peninsula. Korean 
 sympathies were now running strongly against the Japanese 
 who were acting arrogantly. The prohibition of rice exports 
 was removed at the end of three months (February, 1894). 
 But meanwhile the Tong-haks (Society of Eastern Learn- 
 ing) a semi-religious organization reminiscent of the Tai- 
 pings, yet conspicuously anti-Christian, and fanatically 
 anti-foreign and anti-Japanese, began to gather force in the 
 southern provinces, and advanced on Seoul at the end of 
 March, 1894.* ^i 
 
 The Tong-hak movement was accompanied by the mur- 
 der at Shanghai of Kim Ok-kiun, an intensely anti-Chinese 
 and progressive Korean. Kim had been a fugitive in Japan 
 since the coup d'etat of December 4, 1884, and several 
 efforts had been made, either with the approval or by the 
 instigation of Yuan Shi Kai, to cause his assassination or 
 bring about his extradition to Korea. Kim's murderer, a 
 Korean, and the corpse, were returned to Korea in a 
 Chinese war vessel. The corpse was divided into eight 
 parts one of which was exhibited with much oriental en- 
 thusiasm in each of the eight provinces, and the murderer 
 
 * Morse states : "... such political aims as tbere were in the Tong-hak 
 movement may fairly be said to have been in the interest of Japan." =- This is 
 true only to the extent that the movement was intensely nationalistic, and 
 sought the elimination of all foreign influence in Korea, including the Chinese. 
 It is true that the elimination of the Chinese was in the interest of Japan for 
 Korea was utterly unable to maintain independence. The Tong-haks did not 
 intend to work in the interest of Japan. Their slogan was, as Morse states, 
 "Down with the Japanese and all foreigners." Insulting notices were even 
 posted on the Japanese legation, and the Japanese authorities prepared to 
 remove their women and children from Korea. 
 
BEGINNING OF THE CONTEST FOR KOREA 487 
 
 was received in Seoul with approval. The career and fate 
 of Kim Ok-kiun from the time of the plot in 1884 until his 
 quartered body was distributed in the provinces of Korea 
 left the authorities of Japan, China and Korea, all, to 
 do considerable explaining and reveals the wretched condi- 
 tions which had been created in the peninsula since the 
 first treaty in 1876. One is left with the feeling that in 
 the approaching war there were no rights whatever except 
 the rights of the inoffensive and oppressed Korean people, 
 and these rights had never been an issue. 
 
 The Tong-hak movement led directly to a request from 
 the King of Korea to Li Hung Chang for troops. Yuan 
 Shi Kai would have preferred that the situation be made 
 the occasion for Chinese intervention, which would have 
 been the next logical step in Yuan's program, but the 
 Viceroy was more cautious. The Chinese troops and war 
 vessels were despatched from Tientsin June 6, and a notifi- 
 cation to that effect was sent to Tokio,* in accordance with 
 the stipulation of the treaty of 1885, but the Japanese forces 
 were more mobile and when the Chinese arrived at Seoul 
 they found the Japanese troops already there. Meanwhile 
 the Tong-hak movement had been suppressed by the 
 Korean troops. Japan then proposed to China joint action 
 in the reformation of the Korean Government. China de- 
 clined, asserting with a self-righteousness which appears 
 amusing in the light of the history of the preceding decade, 
 that although suzerain in the peninsula, she did not inter- 
 fere in the affairs of her vassal state. Japan thereupon 
 took the matter in her own hands, and as a first step 
 towards the elimination of the obstructive Chinese influ- 
 ence, demanded that the king declare the independence of 
 Korea. On July 27 the king, now a captive in the hands 
 of the Japanese, complied, declared war on China, and in- 
 vited the Japanese troops to expel the Chinese from his 
 territories. 
 
 *TliGre appears to have been no truth in the charge that China did not send 
 this notification which the treaty required. A Japanese historian states that 
 the notice was sent, but says that it was objectionable because it contained the 
 statement that Korea was a protectorate and a dependency of China.^' 
 
488 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. Geo. H. Jones, Korean Repository, July, 1898, — sketch of the 
 
 life of the Tai-wen-Kun; see also Griffis : "Hermit Kingdom." 
 
 2. An excellent synopsis of Korean history is H. C. Allen's "A 
 
 Chronological Index of Events in Korea" (Seoul, 1901). The 
 author was closely associated with all the events after 1883, 
 serving at various times in the employ of the Korean Govern- 
 ment, and then as secretary, charge, and minister for the U. S. 
 There are some typographical errors in this index. 
 
 3. See contemporary English papers in both Japan and China. 
 
 4. Text of this treaty in Customs edition of "China Treaties and 
 
 Conventions," Vol. 2, pp. 1521-7. 
 
 5. For an account of Korean history, 1882-94, in which it is assumed 
 
 that China had a legal claim to suzerainty over Korea, and 
 that it was to the interest of Korea, as well as of China and 
 Great Britain, that the claim be sustained, see Morse, Vol. 3, 
 chap. 1. Morse represents the prevailing British view, and 
 more especially the ideas of Sir Robert Hart. 
 
 6. Korea Instructions, Vol. 1, May 12, 1883. 
 
 7. China Desp., Vol. 85, July 13, 1889. 
 
 8. Stead, p. 189. 
 
 9. Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi, Appendix A, p. 318. 
 
 10. Senate Rept. 1443 :48-2, Eeb. 26, 1885. 
 
 11. The Papers of George C. Eoulk are deposited in the New York 
 
 Public Library. 
 
 12. Stead, pp. 190 ff. While Prof. Nagao Ariga, the writer of the 
 
 account, does not state that Takezoye organized the coup d'etat 
 which followed, the inference that he was by no means inno- 
 cently involved, as the Koreans claimed and as Foulk believed, 
 is very reasonable. 
 
 13. Ihid., p. 197. 
 
 14. The alleged text of this treaty was published in the North China 
 
 Daily News, Aug. 5, 1885. Li Hung Chang told Young that 
 the text was substantially correct; China Desp., Vol. 76, Aug. 
 21, 1885. 
 
 15. China, No. 1, 1887. Port Hamilton Corres. Command Papers, 
 
 4976-5053. 
 
 16. Morse: Vol. 3, p. 13; see footnotes to following pages for Sir 
 
 Robert Hart's very able defense of his objects. 
 
 17. Ibid., p. 18. 
 
 18. The facts of the plot were exposed in a pamphlet; China and 
 
 Korea, by O. N. Denny, 1888. 
 
 19. For. Relations, 1888, p. 220. 
 
 20. Allen : "Chronological Index." 
 
 21. For. Relations, Vol. 2, 1894, p. 15. 
 
 22. Morse : Vol. 3, p. 20. 
 
 23. Stead: p. 203. 
 
CHAPTER XXVI 
 
 AMEEICAN GOOD OFFICES— SINO-JAPANESE WAE 
 
 The United States was well situated to play the role 
 of mediator in Asia. The American Government was far 
 removed, by geographical position, by international policies, 
 by commercial interests, from either the conflicts between 
 Japan and China or the designs of other Western powers on 
 Asiatic trade and territory. The Americans desired above 
 all else peace in the Far East, for war meant to them a 
 disturbance of trade. They also desired the repression of 
 the growing European influence in those regions for the 
 advance of Europe in Asia was a threat at the open door. 
 This latter fact made the United States in some degree a 
 partisan of the East against the West, and in the eyes of 
 Europe disqualified the Americans as mediators. The 
 powers did not desire mediation; they distrusted it. The 
 Europeans sought not justice but privilege in Asia. 
 
 The United States was bound by treaties to extend good 
 ofiices at the request of China and Korea, and to act as 
 friendly mediator at the request of Japan. But the mean- 
 ing of these pledges has been wholly misunderstood by 
 many modern friends of the Asiatic people. "I think it 
 proper to observe," wrote Secretary of State Fish to Min- 
 ister De Long (April 28, 1871), when Japan sought the good 
 ofl&ces of the United States in the Sakhalin dispute, "that 
 it is not supposed that the President can mediate in a con- 
 troversy or dispute between Japan and other countries 
 unless both parties to the controversy accept him as media- 
 tor." ^ Both parties, of course; or else mediation becomes 
 nothing less than interference and intervention. 
 
 There were in the nineteenth century no disputes be- 
 tween either the oriental states, with trivial exceptions, or 
 
 489 
 
490 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 between one of them and a western nation, in which both 
 sides honestly sought justice, or in which both parties to 
 the controversy were prepared to siabmit to an examination 
 of the facts in a court of mediatioiL^We have now seen how 
 Russia evaded mediation in the case of Sakhalin, and, how 
 Japan was equally reluctant to submit the Formosan ques- 
 tion to mediation in 1874. Russia was an aggressor, Japan 
 was equally so. Russia would not submit to mediation; 
 Japan submitted not to mediation, but to the intervention 
 of Great Britain. At first the Lew Chew controversy ap- 
 pears to be an exception to our sweeping generalization but 
 we have seen in the end that it was not. Japan upset the 
 decision of the conference at Peking by bringing in at the 
 last moment some extraneous demands. Another case in 
 point was a request for American good ofiices in the inter- 
 val between the battle at the Taku forts (1859) and the 
 renewal of the Anglo-French War against China in 1860. 
 The Chinese, alarmed at their easy success at Taku where 
 they had forced the allied fleets to withdraw, appealed to 
 United States Minister Ward, even before the American 
 treaty had been ratified, to mediate with the ministers of 
 Great Britain and France. Ward invited the Chinese to 
 renew the invitation after they had ratified the treaty upon 
 which they were basing their appeal.^ They were appar- 
 ently ashamed to renew the request after the treatment 
 given to the American legation in the subsequent visit to 
 Peking, but there is no reason whatever for believing that 
 had the request been made again the British and French 
 representatives would have been willing to submit the facts 
 to impartial review. The evidence in the American records 
 leads to the conclusion that the British and French were 
 wholly wrong, and there is nothing in their records, aside 
 from assertions, which controverts this conclusion. 
 
 The case of the Maria Luz (1872) is one of the rela- 
 tively trivial exceptions. A Peruvian coolie ship from 
 China in distress was forced to put in at Yokohama. The 
 Japanese promptly freed the coolies. Peru sought the good 
 ofiices of the United States in the settlement of the conse- 
 
AMERICAN GOOD OFFICES— SINO-JAPANESE WAR 491 
 
 quent claim against Japan. The American Government ac- 
 cepted the duty with the express stipulation that it could do 
 nothing which would imply approval of the coolie trade. 
 At the suggestion of the United States, the claim was re- 
 ferred to the Emperor of Russia, who awarded the decision 
 to Japan, May 29, 1875. The reference of this matter to 
 Russia became especially easy because in 1864 Mr. Pruyn 
 had agreed to submit a disputed claim of the United States 
 against Japan, to the arbitration of the Czar. As a matter 
 of fact the American claim had been settled without refer- 
 ence to St. Petersburg, but the discussion had given the 
 United States an opportunity to show its willingness to 
 conform its practice to its preaching.^ 
 
 American Mediation in the Franco-Chinese War, 
 
 1883-1884 
 
 A more important case in which American good offices 
 were invoked was the Franco-Chinese controversy over 
 Annam. This is an important episode, the narration of 
 which is also necessary in order to show more fully the 
 nature of Chinese-American relations during the period 
 following the Shufeldt treaty with Korea. 
 
 Soon after the French Charge in Peking had announced 
 (1866) to the astonished Yamen that his government was 
 about to annex Korea, France would appear to have con- 
 cluded to seek territorial expansion only in the south. 
 France had made a treaty with Annam in 1862, and twelve 
 years later concluded a second one in which France recog- 
 nized the complete independence of Annam, in much the 
 same way as Japan recognized by treaty the independence 
 of Korea two years later. Indeed French policy in Annam 
 afforded Japan a model for policy in Korea — a similar 
 satellite of China. In 1874 France also actually acquired 
 Cochin China. China protested because the treaty in effect 
 made France, rather than China, the suzerain over Annam. 
 The matter remained in dispute until the latter part of 
 1883 when Li Hung Chang signed a convention with France 
 
492 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 according to which the Chinese troops were to be withdrawn 
 from Annam, and the two nations were jointly to guarantee 
 the independence of this territory which for two centuries 
 had paid tribute to Peking. There was a sudden change of 
 government in France and the convention was repudiated 
 at Paris. The new French cabinet proposed an expedition 
 to China and a liberal credit was voted. Then a French 
 officer, Riviere, was killed in an engagement with the Black 
 Flags, an irregular company of troops which were supposed 
 to be more or less supported by the Chinese Government. 
 War became all but inevitable. Indeed, it seems quite 
 plain that France was seeking to provoke war for the sake 
 of securing more territory in the south. 
 
 China, stung by the charges of bad faith, defiant and 
 unhumbled, still quite ignorant of the weakness of the 
 empire, perhaps misled by encouragements from Germany 
 and England, and quite underestimating the strength of 
 France, was determined to yield no territory to France, and 
 also not to yield suzerainty over Annam. At this point 
 John Russell Young, the American minister, whose rela- 
 tions with Li Hung Chang were very intimate and confiden- 
 tial, and whose relations with Tsung-li Yamen were cordial, 
 pleaded for peace. The question was, as he tried to explain, 
 not whether China was in the wrong or in the right, but 
 whether she could afford a war with a foreign power. She 
 had relatively few troops with a modern training, and they 
 were in the north. To transport them to Annam there was 
 no railroad, and the Chinese Navy could not protect them 
 by sea. France was studiously cultivating Japan with a 
 view to securing joint action against China. Russia was 
 an eternal menace to the Chinese northern frontier. Eng- 
 land was busy in Egypt, and presumably not unwilling that 
 France should become involved in China, For China itself 
 war seemed likely to en4 in disaster.^ 
 
 At length the counsels of Mr. Young had their effect 
 and he was asked to invite the good offices of the President 
 to secure a mediation of the dispute. To this request Secre- 
 tary of State Frelinghuysen replied, July 13, 1883 : 
 
AMERICAN GOOD OFFICES— SINO-JAPANESE WAR 493 
 
 "This government cannot intervene unless assured that its good 
 offices are acceptable to both. In such case it would do all possible 
 in the interests of peace. The United States Minister at Paris has 
 been directed to sound French Government, and ascertain if it will 
 admit our good offices in the sense of arbitration or settlement." ® 
 
 The answer was not long delayed. France declined to ac- 
 cept the good offices of the United States.*^ 
 
 The French forthwith proceeded to declare a blockade 
 of Tonquin and Annam, and although negotiations con- 
 tinued at Shanghai, the troops of the two nations came into 
 active conflict in December, 1883. On May 11, 1884, Li 
 Hung Chang signed with Commandant Fournier a conven- 
 tion which was intended by the Chinese to be the protocol 
 to a treaty. In the Fournier Convention France waived a 
 claim for indemnity in return for the acknowledgment of 
 her territorial and commercial claims in Annam. There 
 was entire disagreement between the Chinese and the 
 French as to the interpretation of this protocol, and even as 
 to its authorized text, and on June 23, 1884, Colonel 
 Dugenne and twenty-two French soldiers were killed in 
 an engagement at Bade.* 
 
 Again China appealed to the good offices of the United 
 States and again (July 20, 1884) Minister Young referred 
 the matter to Washington. China wished to submit to 
 arbitration the question as to whether she had acted in bad 
 faith with reference to the Fournier Convention. Again 
 France declined to admit the good offices of the United 
 States, 
 
 China was thus brought face to face with war. The 
 American minister renewed his efforts to find a peaceful 
 solution, feeling that peace at any price which France might 
 demand would be better than conflict. At length Prince 
 Kung asked Mr. Young to go to Shanghai, see M. Patenotre, 
 the French representative, and obtain a settlement. China 
 
 *H. B. Morse, who was present at the Li Hung Chang-Pournier negotiations 
 and saw the documents, gives personal testimony as well as other evidence to 
 prove that the French Government was guilty of extremely bad faith in the 
 observance of this convention. His verdict is : "It is only on the ground that 
 an Asiatic nation has no rights which the white man is bound to respect that 
 the course of France is to be explained." For the French statement of the 
 case see Cordier.'' 
 
494 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 was even willing to agree to any indemnity which Young 
 might recommend. The American minister referred the 
 request to Washington for approval, but Secretary of State 
 Frelinghuysen was wary, having already been twice re- 
 pulsed by France, and withheld his approval. An August 5 
 Admiral Lespes attacked Keelung in Formosa. After this 
 attack all hopes of peace vanished. The Chinese were 
 roused. Prince Kung was retired, and with the retirement 
 of the prince came the eclipse of Li Hung Chang, who had 
 clearly realized the folly of resisting the French. 
 
 Early in September the China Merchants Steam Navi- 
 gation Company which had been purchased a few years 
 before from Russell and Company, was resold to the former 
 owners, and the American flag was raised over the fleet of 
 steamers. France, thus deprived of the opportunity of 
 making a most profitable reprisal upon China, was now less 
 than ever willing to accept any good offices from the United 
 States. However, the American Government kept in very 
 close touch with the rapidly developing situation and on 
 several subsequent occasions was the medium of communi- 
 cation between Paris and Peking. Sir Robert Hart also 
 undertook the task of mediation and after more than a year 
 of work succeeded in bringing about the signing of a proto- 
 col, April 4, 1885.8 
 
 Mr. Young, although his efforts at mediation between 
 China and France had failed, was determined to demon- 
 strate the good faith of the United States in its advocacy 
 of arbitration as a means of settling disputes, and was able 
 to secure the consent of the Chinese Government to the 
 arbitration of the 'Ashmore Fisheries Case' by the British 
 and the Netherlands consuls at Swatow. The case involved 
 the action of the Chinese officials in depriving Dr. W. Ash- 
 more, an American missionary at Swatow, of a fishery which 
 he had purchased in connection with a mission. An award 
 of $4600 was made to Dr. Ashmore June, 1884.^ Earlier in 
 the same year Mr. Young had proposed that the claims of 
 the foreigners arising out of a riot at Canton in September, 
 1883, be submitted to arbitration, but he was unable to 
 
AMERICAN GOOD OFFICES— SINO-JAPANESE WAR 495 
 
 secure the consent of the Chinese to such a statement of the 
 disputed points as would have satisfied the British authori- 
 ties." 
 
 <^ 
 
 D Offices of the United States in Korea 
 
 Having in mind the foregoing review of previous Ameri- 
 can efforts to mediate the disputes of the Far East, we are 
 in a position to return to a survey of American policy in 
 the rapidly maturing conflict in the Korean peninsula. 
 
 Since the ratification of the Shufeldt treaty the Ameri- 
 can Government had consistently maintained a policy, 
 sound in legality but weak in statesmanship, that it would 
 recognize Korea as a sovereign, independent nation in all 
 that pertained to foreign relations.* The policy would have 
 been perfect in a perfect world, but in fact it rested upon as 
 great a fallacy as that which had underlain the Gushing 
 treaty with China. Korea lacked the vitality which alone 
 makes possible the exercise of sovereignty. The Korean 
 Government was a vine, not a very lovely one either, which 
 trailed in the dust unless it could cling to some stronger 
 power for support. Of independence there was nothing 
 save a pitifully feeble cry of desire. There were many con- 
 testants for this position of supporting power in Korea, but 
 the United States was not one of them. The Korean Gov- 
 ernment was in the position of an incompetent defective 
 not yet committed to guardianship. The United States 
 was her only disinterested friend — but had no intention of 
 becoming her guardian. 
 
 When the American Government became aware that the 
 Chinese and Japanese troops were facing each other in the 
 peninsula the American Minister in Seoul, Mr. Sill, was 
 instructed (June 22, 1895) : 
 
 "In view of the friendly interest of the United States in the wel- 
 fare of Korea and its people, you are, by direction of the President, 
 
 ♦"With the reserved relation of Korea to China we cannot properly inter- 
 fere to raise any question unless the course of China should be such as to 
 manifestly shift accountability as regards foreign interests and intercourse to 
 the shoulders of China." Wharton to Heard, Aug. 25, 1890." 
 
 / 
 
496 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 instructed to use every possible effort for the preservation of peaceful 
 conditions." ^ 
 
 The Koreans, caught between the mill-stones, and quite 
 powerless to act effectively for peace, appealed to Russia, 
 France, England, and the United States for help, and Mr. 
 Sill, the American minister, joined with the representatives 
 of the other powers in asking China and Japan to agree to 
 a simultaneous withdrawal of their troops from Korean 
 soil. Both China and Japan refused. On July 5th the 
 Korean representative in Washington asked that the Presi- 
 dent ''adjust the difficulty" arising out of the fact that the 
 Japanese minister in Seoul had presented to the Korean 
 King a long list of administrative reforms and was pressing 
 that they be immediately adopted. At about the same time 
 the Chinese Government at Peking sought the good offices 
 of England and Russia to secure a peaceful solution. The 
 British minister in Peking urged, through Charles Denby, 
 Jr., American Charge, that the United States take the initia- 
 tive in uniting the great Powers in a joint protest at Tokio 
 against the beginning of hostilities in Korea by Japan. On 
 July 8 Denby wired that Li Hung Chang had officially ex- 
 pressed the desire that the United State take the initiative 
 as the British minister had suggested. 
 
 It could not be argued that in the conflict now beginning 
 for the control of the peninsula Japan was innocent of blame. 
 The Japanese Empire, vis a vis Korea, was placed some- 
 what similarly to England and the kingdom of the Nether- 
 lands which had been created by the Congress of Vienna in 
 1815. The two island kingdoms could not but view with 
 concern the nature of the control of the adjacent mainland. 
 Great Britain was pleased to witness the creation of a 
 Belgium; the Japanese had since 1871 been working to 
 create on the Korean peninsula a political condition sim- 
 ilarly favorable to their empire. Japan could not honestly 
 assume the role of injured innocence. Indeed, after 1892 
 the attitude of Japan towards China became distinctly un- 
 compromising and even menacing. In an address before the 
 Diet (December, 1892) Count Aoki, Minister of Foreign 
 
AMERICAN GOOD OFFICES— SINO-JAPANESE WAR 497 
 
 Affairs, sought to divert the attention of the Diet from 
 troublesome criticism of domestic affairs and the failure 
 of treaty revision. He said : 
 
 "As for the position -of the country, everybody is agreed that it is 
 excellent. If you look at the map of the world you will see that 
 America has her back turned to us, and that on her western coast, 
 thousands of miles away from our shores, no good port lies open. 
 Europe is only less distant from us for all practical purposes. But 
 here in Asia, the case is very different. At your doors sits a nation 
 of 2,700,000 people, ready to take your manufactures and products, 
 and to give you its own in return. Look at the coal fields of your 
 country in the north and in the s5uth. Are not these landmarks set 
 by nature to indicate the position your country ought to take ?" 
 
 Thus far Aoki would appear to have been advocating merely 
 a policy of peaceful economic penetration into the mainland 
 of Asia, but a following paragraph practically incited an 
 attack upon China: 
 
 "Occupying such a position and possessing such capacities, why is 
 it that the people of Japan do not devote more thought to the foreign 
 policy of the Empire ? If you go back in your history to the Ashikaga 
 era, you will find that the men of southern Japan whom some may 
 perhaps call pirates, launched themselves in little boats and harried 
 the coasts of China with its hundreds of millions of people, coming 
 and going at will and taking and leaving at will. Surely it seems 
 somewhat petty that the descendants of such men as those should 
 allow their mental vista to be occupied entirely with the four ideo- 
 graphs jouaku haisei (treaty revision). It seems to me that larger 
 subjects invite their attention. The present, however, is not the 
 occasion for me to dwell at length upon this phase of our foreign 
 policy." (Reported in Japan Daily Mail, December 20, 1892.) 
 
 It could not have escaped the attention of the American 
 Government that in June, 1894, Japan had reached a very 
 ominous crisis in its domestic affairs in which a foreign war 
 would be a very welcome diversion to the repeated inter- 
 ference of the Diet in the affairs of government. On June 
 2, 1894, the Diet had been dissolved by the Emperor for 
 the third time since December 25, 1891. There was within 
 the Empire a clear-cut contest between the oligarchy which 
 had governed the country since the Restoration and a more 
 popular form of government in which the lower house of 
 the Diet was seeking control of the purse strings.^ ^ Only a 
 
498 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 foreign war, it seemed, could stop this contest, the issue of 
 which was so greatly to be dreaded by the oligarchy. 
 
 Notwithstanding these facts the United States gave no 
 evidence of a disposition to join with China and the 
 European powers in opposing Japan in Korea. The treaties 
 demanded the tender of good offices. The United States 
 made the offer and it was rejected. The obligation under 
 the treaties was therefore for the moment discharged. In- 
 tervention was now the only alternative, but intervention 
 with the other foreign powers involved support of a policy 
 which would really weaken rather than strengthen Asia. 
 
 Japan having refused to heed the protests of the United 
 States as well as those of England and Russia, Secretary of 
 State Gresham told the Korean envoy in Washington on 
 July 9 that the American Government would not intervene 
 either forcibly, or jointly, with the European powers; that 
 it would maintain "impartial neutrality," and that it would 
 seek to influence Japan only in a "friendly way." Mr. 
 Gresham expressed to the Japanese minister in Washington 
 the hope that Japan would deal "kindly and fairly with her 
 feeble neighbor." 
 
 To China's request for intervention Gresham replied 
 advising that China offer the whole question for friendly 
 arbitration. He did not then believe that Japan would re- 
 sort to war. China was not prepared to submit the entire 
 question to arbitration. The fundamental point at issue 
 was the validity of Chinese suzerainty over Korea. This 
 pretension would have had a most doubtful status before 
 any board of arbitration when studied in the light of the 
 various treaties which had been made by Korea beginning 
 with the Japanese treaty in 1876, and also when considered 
 in the light of existing treaties between Japan and China. 
 China by 1894 had surrendered too much and acquiesced 
 in too much, ever to establish a position of technical 
 suzerainty over Korea. 
 
 On October 8, the British Charge approached the Ameri- 
 can Government with a proposition for joint intervention 
 by the United States, Germany, France, Russia and Great 
 
AMERICAN GOOD OFFICES— SINO-JAPANESE WAR 499 
 
 Britain on the basis of an indemnity to be paid by China to 
 Japan, and the guarantee by the Powers of the independ- 
 ence of Korea. A month later China formally invoked the 
 good offices of the United States, citing the treaty of 1858, 
 and asking for joint action with the other foreign powers. 
 Before this invitation was received, Gresham directed U. S. 
 Minister Dun in Tokio to inquire whether good offices 
 would be acceptable to Japan, and the same day Gresham 
 carefully defined the position of the United States in a note 
 which clearly explained why the American Government had 
 been unwilling to join the European powers in intervention: 
 
 "The deplorable war between Japan and China endangers no 
 policy of the United States in Asia. Our attitude towards the 
 belligerents is that of an impartial and friendly neutral, desiring the 
 welfare of both. If the struggle continues without check to Japan's 
 military operations on land and sea, it is not improbable that other 
 powers having interests in that quarter may demand a settlement not 
 favorable to Japan's future security and well-being. Cherishing the 
 most friendly sentiments of regard for Japan, the President directs 
 that you ascertain whether the tender of his good offices in the 
 interests of peace alike honorable to both nations would be acceptable 
 to the Government at Tokio." 
 
 In the above friendly warning to Japan one reads be- 
 tween the lines that Gresham clearly understood the inter- 
 national situation. The proposals for intervention had been 
 directed against Japan with a view to repressing her ad- 
 vancing power and influence in Asia. These proposals had 
 not been primarily in the interests of any Asiatic state, but 
 in the interests of European political and commercial am- 
 bitions in Korea. Dressed in their best clothes these pro- 
 posals looked in the direction of a protectorate in Korea; 
 viewed more cynically and critically, they looked in the 
 direction of dismemberment not merely of Korea, but also 
 further dismemberment of China and perhaps of Japan. 
 
 Japan, however, disregarded the admonitions of the 
 United States, and, instead of pausing at a point where the 
 good offices of the United States might have been valuable 
 in saving Asia in general from a large increase of European 
 influence, overreached herself by continuing the war so 
 
500 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 1 
 
 successfully begun. Japan thus invited the very interven- 
 tion which Gresham expected. 
 
 From the policy of cooperation as followed by William 
 H. Seward and Anson Burlingame, the United States had 
 swung to the opposite extreme of absolute isolation. Suc- 
 ceeding administrations, after Seward, had no taste for ac- 
 tive cooperation with European powers in Asia on the only 
 terms upon which it was offered, i.e., cooperation to repress 
 and weaken the Asiatic states, and there was no disposition 
 to knight-errantry like Burlingame's. There was at the 
 most only a feeble interest in Asiatic affairs. The American 
 Government appears to have concluded in the second Cleve- 
 land administration that if only the Monroe Doctrine could 
 be sustained for the entire western hemisphere, the political 
 conditions on the other side of the Pacific might safely be 
 ignored. All that can be said for this absurd assumption 
 is that it marked a very definite phase in the political de- 
 velopment of the American nation. 
 
 China's position was fast becoming desperate. While 
 the American Government, ever since the Korean treaty of 
 1882, had steadily and consistently discouraged China in 
 the belief that in case of a crisis in Korea the United States 
 would support the contentions of China, Great Britain had 
 consistently supported China's pretensions. Now Great 
 Britain, aside from ineffectual efforts to draw the European 
 powers and the United States into a concert of intervention 
 to thwart Japan, did nothing. British neutrality was, in 
 effect, benevolent towards Japan which in an unbroken 
 series of victories found herself at the end of November, 
 1894, in possession of the seas, the peninsula, and even of 
 Port Arthur which practically controlled the avenues to 
 Peking. The American legations in Peking and Tokio, re- 
 spectively, had been in charge of the Japanese and Chinese 
 archives since the outbreak of the war, and Japan now leti 
 it be known that she would be willing to entertain direct f 
 overtures from China through the Americans. On the day 
 after the fall of Port Arthur, November 22, Charles Denby, 
 American minister at Peking, was authorized by the 
 
 ♦ 
 
AMERICAN GOOD OFFICES— SINO-JAPANESE WAR 501 
 
 Tsung-li Yamen to begin negotiations through Edwin Dun, 
 American minister at Tokio. Denby proposed peace on the 
 following terms: the independence of Korea; and the pay- 
 ment by China of a reasonable indemnity. Japan replied 
 that when peace was made she would dictate the terms as 
 became a victor. Strategically Japan was in a position to 
 exact any terms she might desire. 
 
 China, unable to secure any assistance from the United 
 States and deserted by England, still clung fatuously to the 
 belief that somewhere, somehow, help would issue out of the 
 West. She turned again to England and she turned to 
 Russia.* That China was not sincere in her approaches to 
 Japan is abundantly proved by the details of the prelimi- 
 nary negotiations. Even while Denby, by authority of the 
 Yamen, was negotiating through Dun in Tokio, Li Hung 
 Chang sent Mr. G. Detring, his personal representative, to 
 Japan as an envoy and yet without any of the powers of 
 a plenipotentiary. The Japanese refused to receive him. 
 A month later China sent two officials of inferior rank with- 
 out suitable credentials, one of whom could not fail to be 
 particularly objectionable to the Japanese. They were met 
 in Japan by John W. Foster, formerly Secretary of State 
 toward the close of the Harrison administration, and more 
 recently legal adviser to the Chinese legation in Washing- 
 ton.^^ General Foster had been summoned by the Chinese 
 Government to act as adviser in the peace negotiations. He 
 promptly told the envoys that they were without proper 
 credentials, and the envoys were in fact repulsed by the 
 Japanese Government. 
 
 Japan also was not ready for peace. While the Chinese 
 envoys were in Japan the Japanese forces were advancing 
 on Wei-hai-wei, and on January 31 this fortress was sur- 
 rendered. There still remained Formosa which Japan had 
 desired for more than twenty years and which she would 
 
 ♦"Negotiations were kept up between China and Japan by the American 
 ministers until late in January, 1895. It would serve no good purpose to 
 recount them here. The two nations mistrusted each other, and China was 
 always trying to ascertain in advance what the demands of Japan would be, 
 in order that she might procure the intervention of England or Russia." 
 (Charles Denby. )^* 
 
502 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 have held in 1874 but for the intervention of Great Britain. 
 It was not until March 20 that Li Hung Chang, equipped 
 with full powers, met the Japanese plenipotentiaries, Count 
 Ito and Count Mutsu, at Shimoneseki. Even then the 
 Chinese were resting their hopes on the intervention of 
 European powers, and it was not until May 24 — more than 
 a month after the treaty of peace between China and Japan 
 — that the Japanese forces landed in Formosa. 
 
 Korea after the Peace of Shimoneseki 
 
 The Treaty of Shimoneseki (April 17, 1895) and the 
 Treaty of Commerce (July 21, 1896) are important in the 
 study of American policy in only two respects and to these 
 we must limit our discussion. The defeat of China was the 
 beginning of a new commercial era within that empire, the 
 relation of which to American policy will be discussed else- 
 where. The victory of Japan also carried with it the partial 
 realization of a program of Japanese expansion which, as 
 already noted, had been projected at least as early as the 
 days of the Restoration. J apan came i nto possession of. 
 Formosa and the Pescaderoes, thus acquiring a strategic 
 position controlling the southern avenue of approach ]to_ 
 central China and all northern Asia. Japan also held Wei- 
 hai-wei as well as Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsula 
 which controlled the approaches to Peking. China was_ 
 further compelled to recognize the full independence, and 
 autonomy of Korea, a victory for Japan which would prob- 
 ably have been consummated in 1885 but for the sudden_ 
 ending of the Franco-Chinese War. 
 
 That Japan regarded this recognition of the independ- 
 ence of Korea as merely the sievering of Chinese ties, and 
 not as a satisfactory solution of the Korean question is 
 evident from Japanese policy already inaugurated in the 
 peninsula when the treaty of Shimoneseki was signed. 
 While the king was practically a prisoner in his palace, the 
 Japanese demanded a franchise for all the railroads in 
 Korea for fifty years, all the telegraphs for twenty-five 
 
AMERICAN GOOD OFFICES— SINO-JAPANESE WAR 503 
 
 years, and all the posts for five years. They sought to 
 eliminate the foreign advisers to the Korean Government, 
 and they urged Korea to dispose of the Korean legation in 
 Washington and to place Korean affairs in the United 
 States in the hands of the Japanese legation. This program 
 received a sudden check when Germany, Russia an'ct'^faricir 
 preseTrted~ar7oint request, amounting to a demand, that, 
 Japan recede~from the Liaotung Peninsula, returning Port 
 Ajrthur to China, and followed up this demand, which Japan 
 KadTib choice but to agree to, by pressure to make certain 
 the withdrawal from Wei-hai-wei, a port which Japan had 
 agreed to hold only until the indemnity provided for in the 
 treaty with China had been paid. Japan thus discovered, 
 as Secretary of State Gresham had warned many months 
 before, that she was not to be permitted to consummate 
 her program. Meanwhile Great Britain as well as the other 
 powers, including the United States, protested against the 
 proposed franchises in Korea. 
 
 Japan was represented at Seoul by Viscount Miura, a 
 military man who was fairly representative of the extreme 
 expansionist party in Japanese politics. Meeting with re- 
 sistance not only from the other treaty powers, but also 
 from the Koreans, Miura became a party to, if not the in- 
 stigator of, a plot similar to the coup d'etat of 1884 and 
 the abortive plans of Yuan Shi Kai two years later, to elimi- 
 nate the queen and her party from Korean politics, and 
 indeed, to demolish all opposition to Japan. This plot was 
 accomplished October 8, 1895, in an attack on the palace 
 and the murder of the queen followed by the burning of 
 her body. Viscount Miura was recalled, court-martialed, 
 and although his complicity in the crime was proven, he 
 was acquitted on a technicality.^^ Miura had served Japan 
 badly. When the Japanese influence at Seoul became 
 ascendant in the summer of 1894, all foreigners who wished 
 Korea well had been disposed to welcome the change from 
 the reactionary regime of Yuan Shi Kai. Now the for- 
 eigners were shocked, and the Koreans also turned against 
 Japan. Japanese influence suffered a rapid decline. 
 
504 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Russia, which probably would not otherwise have come 
 forward in the peninsula until the completion of the trans- 
 Siberian railway, now seized the opportunity and began to 
 displace Japan, although not with the entire approval of 
 the Koreans who wished not only to be rid of both Chinese 
 and Japanese interference, but also to be free. The king, 
 however, one of the most pitifully abject and unworthy 
 sovereigns recorded in the pages of history, took refuge in 
 the Russian legation (February 11, 1896) and Russia as- 
 sumed as complete a control of Korean affairs as China and 
 Japan, respectively, had tried and yet failed to acquire. 
 Under Russian influence the government became more and 
 more corrupt. By a series of agreements (Lobanoff-Yam- 
 agata, June 9, 1896, Waeber-Komura, May 14, 1897, and 
 Rosen-Nissi, April 25, 1898) ^'^ Japan yielded to Russia to 
 the extent of recognizing, for the first time, the political 
 status quo, in return for which Russia granted to Japan a 
 freedom in its commercial and industrial relations with 
 Korea which would permit of a policy of economic penetra- 
 tion, and would at the same time allow Japan time enough 
 to build the fleet and organize the army which was necessary 
 for the conflict with Russia which was clearly in view. 
 
 This see-sawing of foreign influence in Seoul created a 
 difficult position for the American Government. The pos- 
 sible pitfalls were innumerable. Both Russia and Japan 
 made bids for American sympathy and encouraged the in- 
 vestment of American capital in the peninsula. Both 
 powers were obviously seeking to commit American interests 
 in such a way that when the crisis came the United States 
 would turn to their respective sides. In August, 1895, 
 Korea granted a concession to an American company for 
 the operation of a gold-mine, and in April of the following 
 year the contract for a railroad from Chemulpo to Seoul was 
 awarded to Americans, with Russian approval and help. 
 But the events of 1897 frightened American capital and the 
 railroad contract was turned over the following year to the 
 Japanese. Japanese capitalists then appealed to America 
 for capital to be invested in Korea under Japanese guar- 
 
AMERICAN GOOD OFFICES— SINO-JAPANESE WAR 505 
 
 antees. Concurrently the Japanese Government withdrew 
 its protests against the annexation of Hawaii, adopted a 
 very conciliatory policy on the immigration question, and 
 when Philippine annexation was under discussion, expressed 
 the hope that the Americans would retain the islands. 
 
 The Americans in Korea were less cautious than their 
 government. When Japan promised a better government 
 for the Koreans in 1894, they had favored the Japanese. 
 When, after the disgraceful murder of the queen, the Rus- 
 sians came forward and promised to put an end to Japanese 
 intrigues, they favored the Russians. When Russia proved 
 to be only another wolf in the Korean fold, they fell back 
 upon the characteristically American doctrine of Korean 
 independence. That Korea could become actually inde- 
 pendent only by the intervention of the American Govern- 
 ment not merely in Korea, but also in the rapidly increasing 
 snarl of European politics does not seem to have occurred to 
 them. 
 
 The American Government sought to restrain its citi- 
 zens, most of whom were missionaries, from contributing to 
 the hopes of the Koreans that help must some day certainly 
 come from the United States. But American law is deficient 
 in its power to impose restraints on the expression of per- 
 sonal opinion by American citizens in foreign countries. 
 There was, however, one thing which could be done. The 
 American minister at Seoul, as the official representative of 
 his government, could be restrained. Following the emeute 
 of October 8, 1895, Secretary of State Gresham telegraphed 
 to Minister Sill, "Intervention in the political concerns of 
 Korea is not one of your functions," ^^ and when the minis- 
 ter persistently failed to preserve the absolute neutrality 
 which his government had assumed, he was replaced, though 
 not until the McKinley administration had been inaugu- 
 rated. Dr. H. N. Allen (July 27, 1897) was raised to the 
 post from the position of Secretary of the Legation. The 
 American policy was clearly defined (November 19, 1897) 
 by Secretary of State Sherman in his instructions to Dr. 
 Allen. 
 
506 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 "You have been appointed to this interesting mission at a time 
 when there is reason to believe that rival purposes and interests in the 
 east may find in Korea a convenient ground of contention, and it 
 behooves the United States and their representatives, as absolutely 
 neutral parties, to say or do nothing that can in any way be construed 
 as taking sides with or against any of the interested powers. And 
 such particularity would not only be in itself improper but mi^ht 
 have the undesirable and unfortunate effect of leading the Koreans 
 themselves to regard the United States as their natural and only ally 
 for any and all such purposes of domestic policy as Korea's rulers 
 may adopt." ^ 
 
 The Secretary then reaffirmed the principle that the use of 
 good offices was in no way equivalent to a promise of inter- 
 vention, and was entirely dependent upon the acceptance of 
 the good offices by both parties to the controversy. 
 
 At the end of the century the situation in Korea was as 
 follows: The Korean Court was more corrupt than ever; 
 while Russia still held her place nominally, Japanese influ- 
 ence was in the ascendancy again ; and Great Britain, having 
 deserted China, was supporting Japanese aspirations. 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. Japan Instr., Vol. 1, Apr. 28, 18Y1, Fish to De Long. 
 
 2. Ward Corres., p. 594, Aug. 20, 1859, Ward to Cass. 
 
 3. For. Relations, 1863, II, p. 1079 ; 1873, I, p. 613 ; Payson Jackson 
 
 Treat : "Japan and the United States," pp. 100, 101, 70 ; For. 
 Relations, 1873, I, pp. 524-5; Moore's "Digest," II, p. 655'. 
 
 4. Mr. Young refers to the conference with Li Hung Chang in 
 
 "Men and Memories," Vol. 2, p. 308. See also Tyler Dennett : 
 "American Good Offices in Asia," Journal of International 
 Law, January, 1922. 
 
 5. China Instr. Vol. 3, July 13, 1883, Frelinghuysen to Young. 
 
 6. Cordier: "Relations, etc.," Vol. II, p. 399. This is the sole 
 
 reference by historians to these overtures. 
 
 7. Morse: Vol. II, pp. 353-7; Cordier: Vol. II, pp. 435 ff. 
 
 8. For. Relations contain no references whatever to the Young- 
 
 Li Hung Chang or the Frelinghuysen-Morton correspondence 
 for the arbitration of the Franco-Chinese War. The Young 
 dispatches, among the ablest papers in the archives of the 
 Dept. of State, are as follows : China Desp., Vol. 65, Aug. 8, 
 1883, Aug. 16, 1883, Sept. 7, Oct. 8, 1883; Vol. 67, Dec. 24, 
 1883; Vol. 68, Jan. 6, 1884; Vol. 71, Aug. 21, 1864; Sept. 4, 
 1884; Vol. 73, Dec. 22, 1884. The details of the Hart nego- 
 tiations will be found in Morse, op. cit., pp. 364-7. 
 
 9. Moore's "Arbitrations," II, 1875. 
 
AMERICAN GOOD OFFICES— SINO-JAPANESE WAR 507 
 
 10. For. Relations, 1883, p. 209 ; 1884, p. 46 ; Morse, op. cii., p. 320. 
 
 11. Korean Instr., Vol. 1, Aug. 25, 1890, Wharton to Heard. 
 
 12. For. Relations, 1894, II, p. 22. The following pages in Foreign 
 
 Relations bring together and give in great detail the diplo- 
 matic correspondence of the American Government in relation 
 to the Sino-Japanese War. 
 
 13. See W. W. McLaren : "A Political History of Japan," chaps. 9, 
 
 10. 
 
 14. Charles Denby : "China and Her People," Vol. 2, p. 132. 
 
 15. John W. Foster : "Diplomatic Memories," Vol. II, chaps. 30-32. 
 
 These chapters together with Denby's chap. 10 give a fairly 
 complete, account of the entire peace negotiations. The cor- 
 respondence of the peace negotiations was published in the 
 English newspapers in both Japan and China. The official 
 documents were collected and published in pamphlet form by 
 the Tientsin Times. 
 
 16. Japan Daily Mail, Feb. 1, 1896, gives the report of the Miura 
 
 court-martial proceedings. 
 
 17. These, as well as other treaties with or concerning Korea, have 
 
 been collected in a convenient booklet entitled "Korea : 
 Treaties and Agreements," published by the Carnegie Endow- 
 ment for International Peace (1921). They will also be found, 
 of course, in the various larger collections of treaties. 
 
 18. For. Relations, 1895, p. 972, £^. 11, 1895; see Sill's reply, p. 977 
 
 19. Korea Instr., Vol. 1, Nov. 19, 1897, Sherman to Allen. 
 
 Ho^. 
 
CHAPTER XXVII 
 
 TEEATY ENVISION 
 
 The tap-root of American policy in Asia was always 
 commercial and political most-favored-nation treatment — 
 equality of privilege. While the other Western powers 
 might fairly claim a similar basis for their policies, there 
 was a difference. All treaties started with most-favored- 
 nation treatment as a base, but the European powers and 
 Great Britain constantly sought to whittle down to a 
 minimum the safeguards interposed by treaties for the 
 political and commercial independence of the Asiatic states, 
 and to manipulate the interpretation or revision of the 
 treaties in some way which would actually create a pre- 
 ferred position for the nationals of the power thus exerting 
 itself. At this point the American Government parted com- 
 pany with the other treaty powers after 1866. The United 
 States desired not merely to protect the Asiatic states in 
 the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by treaty, but also 
 to remove or modify any restrictions upon their liberties 
 which would thwart their development as strong states. 
 The United States wanted a strong East; the other powers 
 did not. 
 
 The United States entered the period of treaty revision 
 with another policy not easily reconciled with the purpose to 
 promote, a strong East. Cooperation with other powers was 
 difficult so long as that cooperation was to be manipulated 
 for the repression of Asia. The cooperative policy, there- 
 fore, which reached its height under Seward in the Con- 
 vention of 1866 and the Burlingame treaty, was abandoned. 
 It is difficult to name an exact date when this took place. 
 While it was nominally sustained by the Department of 
 State until 1877 when Hamilton Fish retired at the end of 
 
 508 
 
TREATY REVISION 509 
 
 the Grant administration, actually cooperation had ceased 
 in Japan by 1870, and in China did not survive the de- 
 parture of Burlingame. The name continued in Peking 
 throughout the century, a polite fiction, a synonym for 
 ordinary diplomatic courtesy, but the spirit of the coopera- 
 tion was well described by John Russell Young, American 
 minister at Peking, 1882-5, who wrote : 
 
 "This policy, when studied, simply meant in practical experience 
 that when matters went to please Great Britain there was joint action. 
 Otherwise there would be no action until Great Britain was pleased, 
 and as there were very few questions in which the United States 
 were concerned, it was deemed best for the American interests that 
 the Legation should act alone and, like its British associate, unite in 
 "joint action" when such a course served the United States." * ^ 
 
 While the period of treaty revision did not formally 
 start until 1868, hardly before the signatures to the treaties 
 were dry the efforts to modify them had begun. The 
 foreigners were bent on increasing their advantages; China 
 and Japan were seeking to reduce them. The three main 
 objects of attack were the five per cent tariff, extraterritor- 
 iality, and further opening of the country. To all of these 
 provisions, in Japan as well as in China, the United States 
 was well committed in 1858. 
 
 Revision in China by Interpretation and Agreement 
 
 China's power of resistance reached its lowest ebb at the 
 conclusion of the Anglo-French War in 1860, which coin- 
 cided with a revival of the Taiping Rebellion. In the next 
 forty years China lost much, both by treaty-interpretation 
 and by new treaties, and gained nothing except as foreign 
 powers occasionally opposed the aggressions of their own 
 or some other's nationals. During the four years in which 
 Sir Frederick Bruce and Anson Burlingame worked together 
 in Peking, the efforts of the mercantile communities, not- 
 ably at Shanghai, to secure loose interpretations of the 
 
 *Charles Denby, American minister at Peking from 1885 to 1898, writes of 
 the cooperative policy as thougli it did not disappear until the struggle for 
 concessions which followed the Sino-Japanese War. The erroneous nature of 
 this assumption will appear in the following pages.'' 
 
510 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 treaties in favor of increased privileges for foreigners met 
 with effective resistance. British pubhc opinion underwent 
 a great change in the sixties which is represented in the 
 inauguration of the first Gladstone ministry in 1868.* 
 
 Official policies for the United States and Great Britain, 
 respectively, are registered in the Burlingame treaty of 1868 
 and the Lord Clarendon letter, but after them "all regulat- 
 ing influences seem to have been removed," and ''the utmost 
 pretensions of the merchants, commercial, fiscal, and munici- 
 pal, have in the course of time, one after another, been 
 attained." ^ The coasting trade, contrary to the desire or 
 intention of the Chinese Government, passed into the hands 
 of foreigners ; for many years the Americans were the chief 
 beneficiaries. The effort to secure Chinese representation 
 in the municipal government at Shanghai was thwarted, and 
 while the technical sovereignty of the Empire over the city 
 was not abolished, the power of the Imperial government 
 to levy taxes was curtailed. Shanghai contributed nothing 
 to the Imperial revenues except through customs. Extra- 
 territoriality was stretched to cover law as well as jurisdic- 
 tion and the foreigners even reserved for themselves the 
 exclusive right to interpret the law under the treaties. The 
 imperial government was prevented from fully enforcing 
 the penalties for smuggling. Eventually the immunity from 
 inland taxation secured under the British tariff of 1858 by 
 the payment of an additional 2^^ per cent duty at the ports 
 was greatly broadened to include a large amount of trade 
 which was not only not a part of the foreign commerce of 
 the Empire, but was not even carried on by foreigners. 
 Thus in a measure China lost even the power to regulate 
 internal taxation. The provision of the Burhngame treaty 
 (Article 8) by which the United States disavowed "any 
 intention or right to intervene in the domestic administra- 
 
 *"It is not too much to say that ten years later the treaty of Tientsin in 
 its entirety would have been an impossibility ; not but what the Chinese 
 authorities could have been compelled to yield all that it contains ; but that 
 the British Government yielding to the democratic impulse that has, in the 
 interval, passed over Europe and America, would have hesitated to impose all 
 the conditions to which the Chinese Government then submitted." (Address 
 of J. Barr Robertson before the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic 
 Society, May 16, 1870.=) 
 
TREATY REVISION 511 
 
 tion of China in regard to the construction of railroads, 
 telegraphs, or other material internal improvements," never 
 accepted in a formal way by other powers, was of no value 
 except to exclude Americans from privileges of interference 
 enjoyed by their competitors. Meanwhile, because of rising 
 prices, the five per cent duties ceased to be effectively five 
 per cent. This also amounted to a revision in the interests 
 of the foreigner. While the treaties of 1858 were, during 
 the nineteenth century, never actually and formally revised, 
 a revision by interpretation and special agreement was 
 steadily taking place, and almost uniformly to the disad- 
 vantage of China. In 1900 the commercial and political as 
 well as the geographical sphere in which the Empire might 
 exercise its sovereign rights was much smaller than in 1860. 
 As the years went on this form of revision became of less 
 and less benefit to American interests and even became 
 disadvantageous, but after the day of Burlingame and Sew- 
 ard, the American Government offered no effective opposi- 
 tion.^ 
 
 Treaty revision in Japan proceeded in less subtle ways 
 and was characterized by the very aggressive policies of the 
 Japanese Government which forced the conflict of interests 
 into the light of day. The steps in the revision are clearly 
 definable. The first efforts were made immediately by the 
 foreigners and went against Japan. They were directed first 
 at the tariff which under Townsend Harris had been favor- 
 able to Japan as well as to the United States. In 1866 
 Japan was forced by a joint naval demonstration to consent 
 to 'regularize' the various tariff reductions which had been 
 secured by Lord Elgin, Mr. Pruyn, and by the voluntary 
 concessions of the Japanese, in a conventional tariff of 
 specific duties similar to those of the British tariff of Tien- 
 tsin. Similarly, as in China, the rise in prices had the effect 
 of reducing this tariff so that in another ten years the 
 specific duties amounted to less than four per cent when 
 calculated on an ad valorem basis. 
 
 After 1866 American cooperation in treaty revision 
 ceased. From that time onward American policy is marked 
 
512 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 in five stages: Japanese efforts in 1872 to which may be 
 joined certain decisions of the American Government in the 
 limitation of extraterritoriality; the treaty of 1878; the 
 Shufeldt treaty with Korea in 1882, which is an official state- 
 ment of policy for that date ; the treaty revision conferences, 
 1882-8, concluding with the unratified treaty of 1889; and 
 the actual revision accomplished in 1894. In passing it may 
 be noted that the history of American policy in tariff revi- 
 sion in Japan might, during this period, have been repeated 
 in China had the latter government been in a position to 
 invite it. 
 
 Japanese Efforts at Revision 
 
 The revision of the treaties with Japan was due in 1872. 
 Among the foreigners there was a movement on foot to de- 
 mand the unlimited opening of the country to travel, resi- 
 dence and trade. The Japanese, realizing the difficulties of 
 the approaching crisis, set out to meet them just as China 
 had done in 1868 by means of an embassy, consisting of 
 Lord Iwakura and four 'Vice-ambassadors." Although 
 American influence in Tokio had reached its lowest point 
 since the opening of the Empire,* the United States was 
 looked upon as friendly to Japan, and the embassy planned 
 to visit America first, as the Burlingame mission had done, 
 possibly with a view to securing similar official approval in 
 the United States which might be used effectively in 
 Europe. 
 
 While Japan gave formal notice in 1871 of its desire to 
 revise the treaties the following year, it appears that the 
 original intention of the Emperor had been to postpone the 
 revision until the return of the embassy.! For some reason, 
 perhaps because of advice received in the United States and 
 
 *"With the overthrow of the Tycoon American prestige in Japan went 
 down, for with him into exile went all those others whose minds first imbibed 
 impressions from foreign powers and wisdom from the shadow of Perry's fleet, 
 and the wise counsels of our first minister, Mr. Harris. Since then no exhibi- 
 tion of our power or greatness has ever been made in these seas, whilst other 
 nations have carefully made displays of theirs." (De Long to Fish, Jan. 
 19, 1871.) « 
 
 t"As soon as the embassy returns home we will consider the revision of the 
 treaties, and accomplish what we have expected and intended." (Letter of the 
 Emperor to President Grant.') 
 
TREATY REVISION 513 
 
 because of the enthusiastic reception accorded to the Jap- 
 anese, it was deemed wise to proceed at once to a revision 
 of the treaty, and Ito and Okubo, two of the envoys, were 
 sent back to Japan to secure the necessary full powers. 
 They returned to Washington with a draft of the revision 
 as desired by Japan. This draft contained a provision which 
 would give to Japan tariff autonomy and probably stipu- 
 lated that in return for the opening of either more ports or 
 the interior of the Empire, the foreigners should relinquish 
 either part or all of their extraterritorial rights.* In the 
 midst of the negotiations which ensued the embassy with- 
 drew the proposal, at the crafty advice, so it is said, of the 
 German minister in Tokio, von Brandt, who advised the 
 envoys that it was not to the advantage of Japan to nego- 
 tiate separately with the different powers.^ ^ The American 
 Government, it is believed, had warned Japan against mak- 
 ing any more joint treaties, but it was always the policy of 
 the other powers in Tokio to maintain joint action in treaty 
 revision negotiations and usually to thwart attempts to 
 transfer the negotiations from Japan to a foreign capital. 
 The Japanese announced that a conference of the treaty 
 powers soon would be called in Europe and that the nego- 
 tiations would there be resumed. The embassy remained in 
 Europe more than a year, visiting all of the capitals and 
 studying intently every aspect of Western life, and then 
 hurried home to avert the proposed wars in 1873 and also 
 to report that the Western powers, by means of the treaties, 
 had deliberately assigned Japan to an inferior political 
 status like that of the other oriental states. f The powers 
 were not only indisposed to make any concessions in the 
 
 * The writer has not seen a draft of this proposed treaty. The inferences 
 are based on a letter from De Long to Fish (April 29, 1872) in which the 
 former returns a draft of the treaty with comments. 
 
 t "Until the late Embassy came to Europe, no Japanese had any correct 
 idea of the true nature or of the international bearings of the treaties which 
 bind Japan. The higher classes had vaguely felt that the treaties were one- 
 sided, but they did not possess sufficient knowledge of European history and 
 law to be able to measure them with precision. It was not until the members 
 of the Embassy reached Europe that they were able (especially during their 
 stay in Paris) to study the question thoroughly. They then perceived that 
 the Japan treaties are but another application of the rules and precedents 
 which Europe has employed toward all Eastern powers since the capitulations 
 were made with Turkey." Frederic Marshall, an attache of the Japanese lega- 
 tion in Paris, to Lord Derby, May 6, 1874.^ 
 
514 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 revision of the treaties but were acting together to demand 
 the unhmited opening of the Empire. There is no record 
 of the answers prepared by the American Government to 
 the Japanese proposals but it is probable that the United 
 States, while refraining from demands for the unlimited 
 opening of the Empire, would have been quite unwilling to 
 surrender extraterritorial rights or grant tariff autonomy, 
 although minor concessions might have been offered. 
 
 Upon the return of the Iwakura Embassy, Japan set out 
 to devise a program for the accomplishment of treaty 
 revision. The general principles of this program were: to 
 establish as rapidly as possible precedents of equality in 
 negotiations; to break down the joint action of the powers 
 and to isolate them from each other, introducing a principle 
 of reciprocity; and to carry on the negotiations for treaty 
 revision away from home. The specific objects to be at- 
 tained were: tariff autonomy, to which was joined the inten- 
 tion to raise the duties in order to increase the revenues of 
 the government and possibly to afford protection to infant 
 industries ; recovery of control of the coasting trade ; and the 
 abolition of extraterritoriality. The method to be adopted 
 was opportunist: not to insist upon the realization of the 
 entire project at once, but to seize every opportunity to 
 advance its details. 
 
 Russia and the United States provided the first op- 
 portunities. In 1875, as already noted, Russia consented to 
 the negotiation in St. Petersburg of a revision of the bound- 
 ary treaty of 1855.^*^ Russia, for reasons the full force of 
 which appear in the history of her relations with China and 
 Korea, had never positively engaged herself to support the 
 cooperative policy and, until the close of the Sino- Japanese 
 War, usually preferred isolated action. The United States 
 joined (1873) with the other treaty powers in urging Italy 
 to refuse to ratify a treaty in which it was proposed to open 
 the interior to Italians under Japanese jurisdiction.^^ 
 Nevertheless that same year the American Government con- 
 sented to a Postal Convention with Japan which was nego- 
 tiated and signed in Washington (August 6, 1873). This 
 
TREATY REVISION 515 
 
 was the first treaty with Japan in which the full equality in 
 the negotiations was recognized.^ ^ This action on the part 
 of the United States was much resented by the diplomats 
 in Tokio. Americans were engaged to organize the Japanese 
 postal system. The United States took other steps toward 
 limiting the application of the principles of extraterritorial- 
 ity. In the face of the pretensions of the other foreign 
 powers that newly enacted laws were not valid for foreign- 
 ers unless approved by the foreign governments — a conten- 
 tion which was sustained in China — the American Govern- 
 ment ordered the Americans to conform to the hunting reg- 
 ulations in 1874, to the new press-laws in 1876, and to the 
 quarantine regulations in 1878 and 1879.^^ United States 
 Minister Bingham also assented, with the approval of the 
 government, to the proposition that Americans, entering the 
 interior under passport, should submit themselves to Japa- 
 nese laws, it being reserved only that trial and punishment 
 for violation of these laws must be under consular juris- 
 diction.^* 
 
 Policy of Judge Bingham — Treaty of 1878 
 
 Judge John A. Bingham of Ohio, American minister in 
 Tokio from 1873 to 1885, deserves equal rank with Town- 
 send Harris among the determined and uncompromising 
 American friends of Japan which the last half of the nine- 
 teenth century produced in abundance. He represented not 
 so much the American Government with which he often had 
 differences of opinion, as the American people. He was a 
 characteristic American of the period.* 
 
 Immediately upon his arrival in Tokio Judge Bingham 
 set himself to secure the revision of the treaties and formal 
 abrogation by the United States of the policy of coopera- 
 tion which he detested as un-American, as inimical to Japan, 
 and as opposed to American commercial interests. He be- 
 
 *Bingham had been long in public life before he went to Japan. He was a 
 member of the House of Representatives almost continuously from 1855. Dur- 
 ing the Civil War he was judge advocate in the army, and took part in the 
 trial of the Lincoln conspirators. He had been one of the managers from the 
 House in the impeachment proceedings against President Johnson.^^ 
 
516 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 lieved the policy of the other treaty powers was being 
 directed to prevent Japan from becoming strong, rich or 
 democratic, and to secure control of Japanese markets and 
 resources. The Convention of 1866, urged Bingham, was 
 operating in a manner detrimental to American commercial 
 and political interests for it opened the door to excessive 
 European importations, prevented the growth of Japanese 
 industries, and restricted the revenues of the government. 
 Its effect was to cause Japan to pay tribute to England at 
 the expense of the other powers. He noted that in 1874 
 Japan was forced to settle the balance of trade by a payment 
 of about $8,000,000. He pointed out that one of the causes 
 back of the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877 was an agrarian 
 movement arising out of the excessive land taxes which the 
 Japanese Government, unable to increase its customs, was 
 forced to levy. Steadily and persistently Judge Bingham 
 denounced the existing treaties and demanded their revision, 
 or even their abrogation.^^ 
 
 With equal vigor Bingham set himself against the co- 
 operative policy which was being steadily invoked to sus- 
 tain the political and commercial purposes of the other 
 treaty powers. This brought him into conflict with Sir 
 Harry Parkes who had been chiefly responsible for the 
 Convention of 1866, and had since dominated the diplomatic 
 corps in Tokio. It also arrayed him against the British 
 mercantile community, and the British-owned newspapers 
 of the open ports. Bingham was looked upon as little less 
 than a traitor to foreign trade and the attacks upon him 
 were vitriolic. It was a magnificent yet probably unneces- 
 sary struggle in which Japanese and American interests 
 quickly found themselves allied. American influence in 
 Tokio rose rapidly and Japanese opposition to the other 
 treaty powers stiffened. The Japan Herald (December 12, 
 1873) asserted that "England should again introduce into 
 Japan a little of the gun-boat policy." But ten years later 
 the Japan Weekly Mail (January 20, 1883) mourned the 
 fact that in Japan ''British influence remains at a palpable 
 discount" and "among all Japan's treaty friends she (the 
 
TREATY REVISION 517 
 
 United States) is at present the most trusted and the most 
 consulted." 
 
 Bingham, at length supported by his government, had 
 won his battle for Japan. Dissatisfaction with the British 
 pohcy under Parkes had been making itself felt in England 
 and a Parliamentary investigation was threatened. That 
 year (1883) Parkes was transferred from Tokio to Peking. 
 The greatest obstruction to treaty revision favorable to 
 Japanese aspirations had been removed. Bingham found 
 his ov/n government slow to relinquish the cooperative 
 policy although not unwilling to consider reasonable meas- 
 ures for treaty revision, and on at least two occasions ^^ the 
 American minister -,vas sharply recalled to his duty of coop- 
 eration, but in the end he won a complete victory in the 
 Department of State. In 1876 the Japanese Government, 
 through its minister in Washington, Yoshida, approached 
 Secretary of State Fish with a desire for a revision of "small 
 clauses in the old treaties." ^^ Yoshida pointed out that the 
 expenses of the government had greatly increased with the 
 coming of the foreigners and that the customs receipts had 
 not increased proportionately. The increasing taxation laid 
 upon the Japanese people was, he said, drying up the springs 
 of national prosperity. The duties were now "in many 
 cases" down to less than one per cent if calculated on an 
 ad valorem basis. A return to even an effective five per 
 cent would, for example, increase the receipts at Yokohama 
 by at least $100,000 a year. Fish found the request "very 
 reasonable and proper." He sympathized with the desire to 
 increase the revenues and to "protect industries." The 
 conversations continued for about a year. 
 
 What Japan specifically desired, stated Yoshida, was: 
 the revision of the Convention of 1866 in separate negotia- 
 tions with each power, thus breaking down the habit of 
 joint action; the transfer of negotiations from Tokio to the 
 foreign capitals; the recovery of control over the coasting 
 trade which in Japan, as it had in China, was passing into 
 the hands of foreigners; the restoration of the right of 
 tariff autonomy, with which was joined the desire to elim- 
 
518 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 inate conventional tariffs altogether and to increase the 
 duties; the introduction of a principle of reciprocity such 
 as would witness to the sovereign independence of the Em- 
 pire. The question of extraterritoriality was for the time 
 being put aside. The only objection by Fish to the proposed 
 program was over the question of most-favored-nation treat- 
 ment in case the United States were to agree to the revision 
 while the other powers did not. It cannot be claimed that 
 Fish showed as much interest in the proposed revision as did 
 Judge Bingham, and the negotiations remained unfinished 
 at the close of the Grant administration. Meanwhile Japan 
 was enlarging her demands. 
 
 Four months after William M. Evarts assumed his duties 
 of office in the Hays administration Yoshida presented 
 (July 27, 1877) a complete draft of the convention desired 
 by his government. The revision of small clauses previ- 
 ously proposed now appeared as a proposition for an en- 
 tirely new treaty which would abrogate the Convention of 
 1866, and which would also carry with it the abrogation of 
 the treaty of 1858 in another five years. The objections of 
 Mr. Fish were met in the following provision : 
 
 "It is also agreed that the present convention shall take effect 
 when Japan shall have concluded a similar convention or conventions 
 either collectively or severally, with all the other parties to the . 
 Tariff Convention of 1866, similar in effect to the present convention." 
 
 This was amended in the complete draft (Article 10) so 
 that to make it effective Japan would have to secure revi- 
 sions not merely with the signatories of the Convention of 
 1866 but also with ''all the other treaty powers holding 
 relations with Japan." 
 
 Evarts was from the outset favorably disposed toward 
 the treaty, the more so because of the fact that a few years 
 before Sir Harry Parkes, in cooperation with the German 
 representative, arbitrarily defined the meaning of "iron 
 manufactures" and Parkes had also ruled that coal should 
 pay an export duty only when it was taken away in sailing 
 vessels. These actions were taken without consultation with 
 
TREATY REVISION 519 
 
 either the Japanese authorities or Judge Bingham.* They 
 were, in fact, a revision of the tariff by two treaty powers 
 acting alone. The negotiations in Washington proceeded 
 leisurely and in secret. After many changes in phraseology 
 and the omission of all reference to the treaty of 1858, the 
 treaty was signed July 25, 1878, without any consultation 
 with the other treaty powers. The change in American 
 policy in a decade was marked. Before signing the Bur- 
 lingame treaty Seward had telegraphed the text to all the 
 other treaty powers.^^ Now, ten years later, the American 
 Government definitely and even secretly abrogated the 
 cooperative policy. 
 
 The publication of the treaty was received with great 
 displeasure alike by the American friends of Japan who 
 objected to the reservations of Article 10, and by the foreign 
 powers which saw not merely the advance of Japan towards 
 the achievement of its aspirations, but also deflection from 
 the useful cooperative pohcy. By Americans Evarts was 
 accused of trickery in Article 10 — a charge which was wholly 
 groundless. ^^ By Sir Julian Pauncefote, of the British 
 Foreign Office, Evarts' independent and secret action was 
 characterized as "contrary to all usage." ^^ A combination 
 of the European treaty powers, led by Germany and Eng- 
 land, was immediately formed to prevent the treaty from 
 coming into operation and this was successful, although it 
 was known that both Italy and Russia had been favorably 
 disposed towards revision. The rage of the British-owned 
 journals of the treaty ports was boundless. The next year 
 Great Britain attempted to secure an offset to the leadership 
 of America by proposing a treaty revision conference to be 
 held in London. Japan declined to enter it unless her right 
 to tariff autonomy was admitted. In the tentative tariff 
 
 *"It appears from your dispatch, No. 276. that Great Britain and Germany 
 changed by a protocol the terms of the Convention of 1866 in a certain par- 
 ticular so far as it applied to their respective countries ; and in your dispatch, 
 No. 549, you report that the British minister at Tokio has compelled the Japa- 
 nese Government to adopt an apparently forced and unauthorized construction 
 of one of the provisions of the Convention. As the Convention of 1866 was 
 a joint convention to which the United States was a party and as other govern- 
 ments that participated in it have assumed to revise its provisions no objec- 
 tions can legitimately be urged against the United States pursuing the same 
 course." (Evarts to Bingham, June 21, 1877.") 
 
520 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 ^ 
 
 revision then being discussed the United States was to be 
 punished for its break with the cooperative pohcy by having 
 the new duty on kerosene, then the chief American import, 
 increased from five to twenty per cent, while cottons and 
 woolens, the chief British articles of import, were to pay 
 only ten per cent. 
 
 'The next year (1880) the United States, in return for 
 the immigration treaty with China, negotiated at Peking a 
 partial revision of the treaty of Tientsin in which opium was 
 again placed on the prohibited list for American importers. 
 This was a second though less abrupt repudiation of the 
 cooperative policy. 
 
 The Shufeldt Treaty with Japan 
 
 The United States, now well embarked upon an inde- 
 pendent course of action, turned its attention as already 
 noted to Korea. In 1882 it was evident that even though 
 Shufeldt were to fail a treaty with some power could not 
 long be delayed. There had already been no less than ten 
 efforts to open Korea.^^ 
 
 The Shufeldt treaty deserves attention in the history of 
 treaty revision even though it was a new treaty, for it re- 
 flects the general policy of the American Government at the 
 time, and the treaty made the following year by Sir Henry 
 Parkes and by the German minister from Peking show with 
 equal clearness how wide had become the gulf between 
 American and European policies in Asia. 
 
 The only important stipulations which Li Hung Chang 
 had failed to persuade Shufeldt to include in the Korean 
 treaty were the acknowledgment of Chinese suzerainty, the 
 prohibition of the importation of religious books — a pro- 
 vision which was aimed to prevent missionary work — and 
 the reservation of the right to Korea to impose transit taxes. 
 The treaty provided that while the tariff was to be issued by 
 Korea as a sovereign power, the duties were not to exceed 
 ten per cent on ordinary articles, or thirty per cent on luxur- 
 ies. Opium was excluded, the purchase of land was not 
 
TREATY REVISION 521 
 
 stipulated, and revision was possible in five years. A simi- 
 lar treaty signed by Admiral Willes for the British Govern- 
 ment aroused great opposition from the British mercantile 
 community.^'* The Yokohama Chamber of Commerce, rep- 
 resenting the merchants of all nations, but chiefly composed 
 of British subjects, even went so far as to protest officially 
 to Judge Bingham against the restrictions to trade in the 
 Shufeldt treaty, the ratification of which it was thought 
 would be detrimental to the interests of the foreigners in 
 the pending treaty revision negotiations in Japan.* British 
 interests were also affected, as already noted, by the failure 
 to recognize Chinese suzerainty. 
 
 The Admiral Willes treaty was not ratified and the fol- 
 lowing year Sir Harry Parkes was sent to Korea to make 
 a compact which would be satisfactory to British commer- 
 cial interests. The contrasts between the compact thus 
 negotiated and the Shufeldt treaty are marked. The right 
 of diplomatic officers and consuls to "travel freely in any 
 part" of the country was inserted, and the right of the 
 Korean Government to withdraw the exequatur of consuls 
 was omitted. Two interior points were opened to trade; 
 British subjects were to be allowed to purchase as well as 
 rent land ; free exercise of religion was permitted ; part of 
 the yearly rental for British settlements was to be reserved 
 as a municipal fund to be held under the joint control of 
 the Korean and British authorities; freedom of travel for 
 either pleasure or trade within 100 li of any open port was 
 stipulated, and the tariff and trade regulations were revis- 
 able, as in Japan, only by ''mutual consent." The penalty 
 
 ♦"Understanding that negotiation of a treaty of commerce with the Korean 
 Government is contemplated by the Government of the United States, I am 
 directed by the committee of the Yokohama General Chamber of Commerce to 
 express the hope that your government will favorably consider the wish of the 
 members of the chamber (which, you are doubtless aware, represents the gen- 
 eral mercantile community of Yokohama and comprises firms of all national- 
 ities) that an opportunity be afforded them of stating their views on the com- 
 mercial clauses of the proposed treaty before its final ratification, and ask you 
 to be good enough to forward this application to the proper quarter for 
 consideration. 
 
 "It is obvious to your government, bearing in mind the negotiations now 
 pending between the Japanese Government and the Foreign Powers for the 
 revision of existing treaties that concessions to Korea involving restrictions on 
 travel not hitherto in force in Japan, will undoubtedly operate prejudicially 
 against satisfactory completion of their negotiations," (James P, Mallison to 
 Bingham, August 23, 1882.) 
 
522 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 for smuggling was lightened; revision of the treaty at the 
 end of ten years was possible, again "by mutual consent"; 
 and the Shufeldt clauses were amended as follows: the im- 
 port tariff was to be conventional and specific, and was 
 graded in four schedules of five, seven and one half, ten, and 
 twenty per cent respectively. Cotton and woolen manufac- 
 tured goods were to pay seven and one half per cent, and 
 metals, raw cotton, thread, raw wool and yarns, constituting 
 the bulk of the probable British importations were placed in 
 the five per cent class. While the prohibition of opium was 
 retained, an exception was made in favor of "medicinal 
 opium." The coasting trade was thrown open to British 
 subjects. In short, the new treaty was an exceedingly busi- 
 nesslike and thoroughgoing affair in which Korea sur- 
 rendered not only what had been granted to the foreigners 
 by treaty in both China and Japan, but also a considerable 
 amount of what the foreigners had obtained also by the 
 extra-treaty method of interpretation. British support to 
 Chinese claims of suzerainty over the peninsula was pur- 
 chased at the expense of Korea in a treaty which out-dis- 
 tanced in many particulars any treaty previously made in 
 the interests of foreigners in the Far East. Just as the 
 Harris treaty with Japan in 1858 and the Shufeldt treaty 
 revealed the kind of policy the United States would like 
 to pursue when uninfluenced by European competition, so 
 the Parkes treaty with Korea showed the kind of policy 
 which British and Continental commercial interests desired 
 to follow when conditions were favorable. The effect was 
 still further to increase American prestige in Tokio where 
 the American policy was appreciated as much for its com- 
 mercial as for its political implications. 
 
 The Unratified Treaty of 1889 
 
 The attempts at treaty revision in Japan in 1878-9 had 
 ended in failure, but the action of the Americans had been a 
 great encouragement. Another effort was made in 1880 in 
 which it was proposed to deal with the treaty powers jointly, 
 
TREATY REVISION 523 
 
 and to accomplish the recovery of both judicial and tariff 
 autonomy by degrees, according to a graduated scale. The 
 premature publication of a draft of this treaty by a news- 
 paper which had received it from one of the European 
 ministers, aroused popular opposition to such compromises 
 and the proposal was dropped.-^ 
 
 Two years later another effort was made. Japan pro- 
 posed a new tariff which would increase duties to eleven and 
 even to twenty-six per cent. The powers replied with a 
 counter proposal which would have yielded about $1,000,000 
 less revenues annually. In this draft kerosene was reduced 
 from twenty to fifteen per cent, cotton yarn from ten to 
 seven per cent, and opium as medicine was to be admitted at 
 ten per cent. Looking toward the abolition of extraterri- 
 toriality the Japanese Government proposed the introduc- 
 tion of foreign associate judges whose services were to be 
 continued from six to ten years. Judge Bingham sat in this 
 conference at the request of the Japanese and with the ap- 
 proval of Evarts, though without the power to commit the 
 American Government. This effort also came to nothing for 
 a variety of reasons. The Chinese and Korean relations of 
 Japan were becoming difficult, and great popular opposition 
 developed in Japan when the terms of the treaty became 
 known. The provision in regard to opium especially at- 
 tracted attention because of a suspected attempt of Sir 
 Harry Parkes some years before to introduce the opium 
 trade in Japan. ^*' 
 
 It may fairly be claimed that the next effective blow for 
 treaty revision was struck not in Japan but in the United 
 States. In his annual message to Congress, December 4, 
 1883, President Arthur took occasion to state: 
 
 ''This government is disposed to consider the request of Japan to 
 determine its own tariff duties, to provide such proper judicial tri- 
 bunals as may commend themselves to the Western powers for the 
 trial of causes to which foreigners are parties, and to assimilate 
 the terms and duration of its treaties to those of other civilized 
 states." =" 
 
 This open declaration created still further discomfort in the 
 foreign communities in Japan. It was characterized as 
 
524 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 lacking in political sagacity by the Japan Daily Mail (May 
 5, 1883) which pointed to the treaty of 1878, the Korean 
 treaty, the return of the Shimoneseki indemnity (February 
 22, 1883) ; meanwhile the Chinese indemnity money was 
 still withheld, and the Chinese Exclusion Act seemed to the 
 Daily Mail to indicate a disposition to discriminate between 
 China and Japan in favor of the latter which was ''the 
 smaller and in every way inferior power." 
 
 It is not possible to establish a direct connection but it 
 seems very probable that President Arthur's declaration of 
 December 4th had some influence on Great Britain, for 
 seven days later Lord Granville issued a memorandum in 
 which he expressed an hitherto unknown willingness to 
 accept, not a restoration of autonomy, but a revision of the 
 tariff such as had been proposed in the counter draft of 
 1882. Germany also assented. "Signs are not wanting," 
 stated a writer in the London Times, June 9, 1884, "that 
 the beginning of the end has come." It would, however, be 
 unfair not to mention in this connection that for several 
 years the tone of the British press towards treaty revision 
 had been changing, and in 1884 Japan had some advocates 
 in London as warm as any in the United States. Indeed, a 
 comparison of press clippings on Japanese affairs in the 
 British and Continental press suggests that for the past ten 
 years Japan had been systematically carrying on a press 
 campaign abroad to create the necessary public sentiment 
 in support of her contentions. The beginning of 1884 may 
 be reckoned as an important turning point in the affairs of 
 the Far East for it marks the turn of British policy towards 
 the conciliation of Japan. At almost any time from then 
 until the signing of the treaties in 1894 Japan might have 
 obtained substantial concessions from the European powers, 
 but as the opposition began to give way Japan steadily 
 advanced her claims and became more and more unwilling to 
 accept compromises. 
 
 Japan received further encouragement from the United 
 States in 1886 when (April 30), the day before another 
 treaty revision conference opened, President Cleveland 
 
TREATY REVISION 525 
 
 agreed to an extradition treaty with Japan, "because," as he 
 stated later in sending the treaty to the Senate, "of the sup- 
 port which its conclusions would give to Japan in her efforts 
 towards judicial autonomy and complete sovereignty." ^^ 
 
 Such declarations from the United States, coupled with 
 entire withdrawal from the cooperative policy, and the de- 
 parture of Judge Bingham from Tokio in 1885 had the 
 effect of eliminating the American Government from a posi- 
 tion of influence in the prolonged treaty revision conferences 
 of 1886-7. It was no longer necessary for Japan to consult 
 and conciliate the United States and her ministers then 
 turned their attention to the European states with a view 
 to causing still further deflections from cooperation. It was 
 beheved that Count Ito entered into an understanding with 
 Bismarck which, however, was quite different from that with 
 the United States. ^^ The American Government had given 
 its support to Japan freely; Germany asked for compensa- 
 tion in the form of increased privileges for its nationals. 
 The increase of German influence not merely in Tokio but 
 even on the entire political structure of the government was 
 marked. Neither the American nor the British ideals of 
 democracy were consistent with the ideals cherished by 
 Japanese leaders for their nation. Modern Germany af- 
 forded a more acceptable model. Hitherto Germany had 
 acted in the Far East in the closest cooperation with Great 
 Britain. The winning of Germany to the Japanese side 
 greatly weakened the position of England, and paved the 
 way for a better Anglo-Japanese understanding. Thus, 
 while the Western nations were making the Far East the 
 back yard of European politics, Japan boldly entered Eu- 
 rope in an effort to make the Continent the playground of 
 Japanese statesmen only thirty years after the nation had 
 first opened its doors to the Western world. 
 
 Into the details of the treaty revision conferences of 1884 
 and 1886-7 it is not necessary to go in a study of American 
 policy. Only their abrupt termination in the summer of 
 1887 is important. Inouye, who had been Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs for eight years, was on the point of conclud- 
 
526 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 ing treaties which would have involved not merely the 
 establishment of a judiciary of foreigners, but also the sub- 
 mission of Japanese laws to the approval of the treaty 
 powers. While the proposed treaties represented an advance 
 towards independence, they were very far removed from 
 granting either judicial or tariff autonomy. The immediate 
 advantage to Japan would lie in the fact that in return for 
 a tariff which would leave British trade in nearly its old 
 position of advantage, Great Britain was willing to yield 
 important concessions in the matter of extraterritoriality. 
 British and German manufactures were to be taxed, on the 
 average about seven per cent, while American products 
 would be taxed from twelve to fourteen per cent. Chinese 
 sugar, China not being represented in the treaty revision 
 conferences, was to pay twenty per cent. Great opposition 
 to the treaties developed in Japan. Count Katsu, an influ- 
 ential Tokugawa leader, presented a memorandum to the 
 Cabinet enumerating "twenty-one faults of the time" in 
 which he severely castigated the hurried and superficial 
 measures for westernizing the Empire which had been con- 
 comitant with the efforts to revise the treaties, ^'^ and 
 General Tani, Minister of Commerce and Agriculture, who 
 had been sent to Europe by the Emperor to study interna- 
 tional politics, returned and entered a protest against the 
 treaties which was emphasized by his resignation from office. 
 The Tani memorial which, although suppressed by the gov- 
 ernment was secretly printed and circulated by the thou- 
 sands, was credited with causing the resignation of Count 
 Inouye. This memorial throws much light on currents of 
 Japanese thought. ^^ 
 
 Viscount Tani pointed out that Japan need not be in 
 such great haste about the revision of the treaties. While 
 Japan was a small nation it was to be remembered that size 
 by itself had little to do with independence. Greece, Swit- 
 zerland and Belgium were independent, while India, Poland 
 and Turkey were not. The important consideration in 
 independence was that foreign powers have no voice in the 
 government. The proposed treaties, therefore, marked not 
 
TREATY REVISION 527 
 
 the independence but the dependence of Japan, for they 
 gave to foreign powers a control over even the laws of the 
 Empire. Tani urged the postponement of treaty revision. 
 No nation, he thought, would be likely to send an army to 
 Japan to compel revision, and while the international rival- 
 ries were creating so much confusion and so many jealousies, 
 Japan was in a way to profit by waiting and by watching 
 European politics. 
 
 "When I was abroad," wrote Tani, "I quietly observed that our 
 government was inclined towards Germany. Science, commerce, 
 military system and even the style of clothing, all seemed to follow 
 Germany. . . . The object of the foreigners who cross the ocean to 
 Japan is commerce, but if they find everything to favor Germany, 
 and protection given only to Germans in matters of commerce in 
 which rightfully all nations ought to be able to compete, it will only 
 lead to our receiving the ill will of England, America, France and 
 Russia. . . . 
 
 "Gur condition may be compared to that of an immoral woman 
 who endeavors to get the love of many, but at last gets a bad reputa- 
 tion and is rejected by all without exception. Is it not indeed 
 shameful ? 
 
 "Then what policy must we pursue? 
 
 "Cease holding the policy and principles of the past, laying aside 
 the spirit of dependence, improve our internal government affairs, 
 make our country secure by military preparation, not to bring dis- 
 grace upon the name and honor of our country by making an outward 
 show only of truth, justice and authority; encourage and protect the 
 people at home and then wait for the time of the confusion of 
 Europe* which must come eventually sooner or later, and although 
 we have no immediate concern with it ourselves we must feel it, 
 for such an event will agitate the nations of the Orient as well, and 
 hence, although our country is not mixed up in the matter, so far as 
 Europe is concerned, we may then become the chief nation of the 
 Orient. 
 
 "If, therefore, we at this time provide twenty strong warships 
 and an army 100,000 strong we can hold the balance among the 
 Eastern nations and show a strong front to Western countries. Then 
 if there is war between England and Russia, Russia can control 
 England by uniting with us, and England can crush Russia if she 
 forms an alliance with us. In case of war between China and France, 
 our relations towards Russia and England would be the same as 
 already stated. Should we remain neutral the advantage to us would 
 be great as an asylum, and for providing provisions and communica- 
 tions which both have such an important bearing upon success or 
 defeat. It is therefore evident that we can seize the opportunity and 
 obtain the balance of power in the East and thus compel others to 
 
 * Italics by T. D. 
 
528 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 esteem and fear us. In the same way we may stand with European 
 countries. 
 
 "Is not this a pleasant picture?" 
 
 Probably this sagacious advice of Viscount Tani, so 
 reminiscent of Lord Hotta's memorial in 1858, was not 
 taken very seriously by the foreign governments, although it 
 furnishes the key to an understanding of Japanese politics 
 both domestic and international for the next generation, but 
 even had it been taken seriously there is nothing to indicate 
 that the Americans would not have regarded it with com- 
 placency. 
 
 Count Okuma replaced Inouye as minister of Foreign 
 Affairs early in 1888, and a new treaty revision program was 
 adopted in which Japan resolved never again to enter a joint 
 conference with the powers on the subject. The following 
 November Japan signed a treaty with Mexico in which the 
 national aspirations were at last realized. The treaty was 
 uniformly bi-lateral, extraterritorial jurisdiction was elim- 
 inated, tariff autonomy was granted, and the most-favored- 
 nation clause was so qualified that a special concession 
 granted to one nation in a reciprocal agreement, could not 
 be claimed by the other except in exchange for some equiva- 
 lent concession. In the closing days of the Cleveland ad- 
 ministration, Richard B. Hubbard, the American Minister 
 in Tokio, by direction from his government, signed a some- 
 what similar treaty for the United States. These treaties 
 produced the collapse of the cooperative policy. Germany 
 signed a treaty on June 11 and Russia indicated a willing- 
 ness for revision.^^ 
 
 Treaties of 1894 
 
 The signing of these treaties brought great confusion 
 both to the domestic and to the international affairs of 
 Japan. Great objection to the treaties with the United 
 States and Germany developed in Japan because the pro- 
 vision for foreign judges as a temporary measure had been 
 retained and the tariff schedule was still conventional.^^ 
 The treaties were not regarded as any great improvement 
 
TREATY REVISION 529 
 
 over those which had been rejected the year before. While 
 the Cabinet was still debating the question Count Okuma 
 was attacked by an assassin and narrowly escaped death. 
 The Cabinet then resigned and Viscount Aoki became Min- 
 ister of Foreign Affairs. Meanwhile Great Britain is be- 
 lieved to have secured from Germany an agreement that the 
 treaty would not be ratified until Great Britain had taken 
 action. This promise, whether formal or informal does not 
 matter, had the effect of throwing the control of the situa- 
 tion almost entirely into the hands of Great Britain where it 
 remained until the treaty of 1894 was actually signed. Dis- 
 satisfaction in Japan with the treaty increased and the 
 Japanese Government asked the American Government, 
 which had not ratified the treaty, to hold it in abeyance for 
 the time being. 
 
 Great Britain, while still holding tenaciously to the 
 favorable commercial privileges of the Convention of 1866, 
 as modified by the various proposed tariff revisions in the 
 eighties, was no longer disposed to block Japanese aspira- 
 tions. Indeed England may be said to have moved meas- 
 urably towards the position long held by the United States 
 that the advance of Japan in Asia would be beneficial to 
 Western trade. British policy tended towards conciliation 
 and towards the admission of Japan to a place in British 
 estimation, not equal to that of Western powers, but rather 
 coordinate with that assigned to China. Japan, as well as 
 China, was now seen to be essential to the British opposi- 
 tion to Russia. Viscount Tani's predictions were already 
 being realized. The treaty between Great Britain and Japan 
 was signed July 16, 1894, in London. This compact, which 
 was to take the place of all other treaties, was a compromise. 
 While extraterritoriality was to be abolished in five years, a 
 partially conventional tariff was retained, and Japan did not 
 receive the right to absolute control of her coasting trade. 
 In return for these concessions, Japan agreed to open the 
 Empire, with the stipulation that foreigners were not to be 
 permitted to own land. The existing perpetual leases in the 
 foreign settlements, however, were confirmed, thus placing 
 
530 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 upon the emancipated Empire a disfiguring mark of her 
 former captivity. A similar yet more hberal treaty with 
 the United States was signed in Washington, November 22, 
 1894. 
 
 In the long diplomatic struggle thus brought to an end 
 we may note the following summary conclusions : 
 
 Japan had won a notable victory not merely in opening 
 the way for the definite abrogation of extraterritoriality but 
 also in the establishnjent of the beginnings of a cordial 
 understanding with Great Britain. Japan had placed her- 
 self, potentially, above China at the very moment when 
 China was relying on England to help her in Korea. 
 
 Great Britain, as we view the situation in the light of 
 subsequent history, had won an even greater diplomatic 
 victory for she had been able to transfer herself from a posi- 
 tion of hostility to Japan to one of growing friendliness and 
 good feeling, and this without more than a partial sacrifice 
 of the commercial advantages of the old tariff of 1866: 
 Japan was so filled with gratitude for the removal of British 
 opposition that her people were inclined to overlook the fact 
 that it was the American Government which had forced 
 Great Britain into treaty revision. The good will which had 
 formerly been directed towards the Americans was now 
 turned towards the English. 
 
 The United States, having discarded all diplomacy and 
 finesse in the abrogation of the cooperative policy and the 
 ready concession to Japan of what were her legitimate de- 
 mands, had received little material benefit. Indeed, it 
 appears that Japan and the United States were now ap- 
 proaching the parting of the ways. The Japanese Govern- 
 ment had successfully entered European politics and the 
 United States, in the second Cleveland administration, had 
 lapsed into almost complete political isolation. Meanwhile 
 the question of Japanese immigration to the Pacific Coast 
 had already appeared as a factor to disturb perfect harmony 
 between the two powers. With the revision of the treaties 
 and the action of the United States in the Sino- Japanese 
 War we may say that the first chapter in the relations be- 
 
TREATY REVISION 531 
 
 tween Japan and the United States came to a close. There 
 was no rupture, good feeling continued, but Japan had dis- 
 covered that while it was necessary for national safety to 
 give less and less attention to America, the other Western 
 powers demanded a great deal of attention ; if not made the 
 friends of Japanese expansion, they would become its in- 
 superable obstacles. 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. "Men and Memories," by John Russell Young, Vol, 2, p. 322. 
 
 2. Charles Denby : "China and Her People," Vol. 2, pp. 151,_ 162. 
 
 3. J. Barr Robertson: "The Convention of Peking," reprinted 
 
 from the North China Herald, June 2, 1870. 
 
 4. Morse : Vol. 2, p. 158. 
 
 5. Morse : Vol. 2, chaps. 6 and 7 give an excellent review in detail 
 
 of the course of treaty revision in China. 
 
 6. Japan Disp., Vol. 17, Jan. 19, 1871, De Long to Fish. 
 
 7. Charles Lanman: "The Japanese in America" (1872) p. 37. 
 
 This book by the American Secretary of the Japanese Legation 
 in Washington gives many interesting details of the Iwakura 
 Embassy. 
 
 8. Stead: "Japan by the Japanese," p. 156. To the student this 
 
 essay by Nagao Arega, Japanese legal delegate at the first 
 Hague Peace Conference, on Japanese diplomacy is highly 
 recommended. It has the advantage of having been prepared 
 by one who had access to many authentic sources of informa- 
 tion. The sections on treaty revision are especially valuable. 
 See also Count Aoki's review of treaty revision history before 
 lower House of Diet Dec, 1890. Reprinted in Japan Daily 
 Mail Dec. 19, 1890. 
 
 9. The Marshall letter to Lord Derby was never published. 
 
 10. Stead: p. 175. 
 
 11. For. Relations, 1874, p. 645. 
 
 12. E. H. House : "The Thraldom of Japan," Atlantic Monthly, Nov. 
 
 1887, pp. 731-2. 
 
 13. For. Relations, 1874, pp. 637, 645, 653, 663, 773, 779; 1878, 
 
 p. 486; 1879, pp. 604 ff . ; 1876, pp. 363, 367; 1878, p. 514. 
 
 14. Payson J. Treat: "Japan and the United States, 1853-1921"; 
 
 pp. 119 ff. give a good review of the American policy. 
 
 15. John W. Foster: "Diplomatic Memoirs," Vol. 1, pp. 5 S. 
 
 16. Judge Bingham arrived in Japan Sept. 25, 1873. His first 
 
 dispatch urging treaty revision was dated Jan. 17, 1874. Japan 
 Desp., Vol. 27, Jan. 17, 1874. 
 
 17. For. Relations, 1874, p. 675, Apr. 20; p. 698, Aug. 26. 
 
 18. There is a documentary record of these interesting negotiations 
 
 in Notes from the Japanese Legation, Vol. 2, beginning Apr. 
 
532 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 24, 1876, Dept. of State. See also Stead, p. 205 ff. for the 
 statement of policy being pursued by Japan, 
 
 19. Japan Inst., Vol. 2. 
 
 20. Seward's "Travels Around the World," p. 200. 
 
 21. E. H. House: "The Martyrdom of an Empire," Atlantic 
 
 Monthly, Jan.-June, 1881, Vol. XLVII, p. 621. 
 
 22. Moore's "Digest," Vol. 5, p. 753. 
 
 23. Allen : "Chronological Index of Korea." 
 
 24. Reports on Korea from the British Minister in Japan. Japan, 
 
 1883, (C. 3455) Japan, 1884 (C. 4044). 
 
 25. Stead : p. 206. 
 
 26. Stead : p. 207. 
 
 27. Richardson's Messages, Vol. 8, p. 175. 
 
 28. Richardson's Messages, Vol. 8, p. 402. 
 
 29. Chinese Times (Tientsin), Nov., 1887. 
 
 30. Stead : p. 208. 
 
 31. Stead : p. 208, refers to the "Tani Memorial," W. W. McLaren 
 
 in Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. XLII, 
 Part I, gives what appear to be extracts from the Tani 
 Memorial, but does not include the parts I here quote. 
 
 32. Stead : p. 211, gives a synopsis of the treaty with Germany. 
 
 33. lUd. 
 
PART VI 
 
 THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE 
 CHINESE EMPIRE 
 
CHAPTER XXVIII 
 
 ASIATIC IMMIGRATION AND AMERICAN FOREIGN 
 
 POLICY 
 
 Asiatic immigration in the United States viewed his- 
 torically is much more than a domestic question; it has 
 exercised a marked influence on foreign policy. We have 
 seen in preceding chapters how in the last quarter of the 
 nineteenth century the American Government steadily sup- 
 ported Japanese aspirations. We have also noted that in 
 the conflict between China and Japan the United States, 
 while maintaining technical neutrality, showed a tendency 
 towards courses which were distinctly favorable to Japan. 
 A partial explanation for this is found in a study of the 
 Asiatic immigration question.* 
 
 The immigration problem on the Pacific Coast in the 
 nineteenth century was compounded of three conflicts: 
 It was economic; a struggle between working men who 
 sought to maintain high wages and employers who desired 
 cheap labor. It was social; a color conflict in which issues 
 broadly similar to those of the negro question appeared in 
 the West. It was also political; a contest between the 
 Democratic and Republican parties to win the support of a 
 doubtful bloc of independent voters in the course of several 
 hotly contested state and national elections.^ 
 
 The Coolie Traffic 
 
 Swift clipper ships carried across the Pacific the news of 
 the gold-strike and of the demand at San Francisco for 
 food-stuffs, building materials, and also for cheap labor. 
 About the same time, in some instances even earlier, Aus- 
 
 * Another phase of the subject is discussed in Chapter XXIX, The Mis- 
 sionaries and American Policy in Asia. 
 
 535 
 
536 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 tralia, Panama, Chili, Demarara, Cuba and other West 
 Indian ports began to ask for Chinese laborers. Vessels of 
 all nations were drawn into the transportation of laborers to 
 these various destinations. Competition became very keen 
 and abuses appeared which aroused the attention of the 
 civilized world. The infamous 'coolie trade' was in full 
 swing by 1854. This traffic, which must be distinguished 
 from Chinese immigration to California, employed some 
 American vessels.* 
 
 The evils of the coolie trade in general were as follows: 
 As the demand for laborers increased, artificial methods for 
 stimulating recruiting were employed and large numbers of 
 ignorant men were decoyed either to 'barracoons' at Macao 
 or directly to the vessels where they were detained by force 
 and became practically slaves. They were crowded into 
 ships which were sometimes not even sea-worthy, and sup- 
 plied with insufficient food and water; the mortality en 
 route was very high, ranging in the case of vessels entering 
 Havana in 1857 from 9% per cent for American vessels to 
 3814 P^r cent for Portuguese. At their destination the 
 laborers were often transferred to contractors who sold them 
 like slaves. They were miserably treated and subjected to 
 all the customary evils of the contract labor system so that 
 at the expiration of the term of the contract they were 
 unable to return to China. Although the government was 
 apathetic, the scandals in connection with the enlistment 
 of the laborers in China aroused the gentry and added to the 
 anti-foreign sentiment among the Chinese so that a general 
 uprising against foreigners was threatened at various south- 
 ern ports. Great Britain took action in 1855 in the so-called 
 British Passengers Act which carefully regulated the trade 
 from Hongkong, subjecting it to close inspection and for- 
 bidding British vessels to carry contract laborers to other 
 than British ports. Other governments were slower to act. 
 Tlie trade at the South China ports was transferred to 
 
 *At Swatow in 1855, out of a total of twelve vessels carrying 6388 coolies, 
 five were American ; they took out 3050. The Hongkong returns for the 
 coolie trade for 1857 showed that out of a total of 70 vessels employed, 22 
 were American. In the same year 9 of the 63 vessels bringing coolies to 
 Havana were American." 
 
ASIATIC IMMIGRATION— AMERICAN POLICY 537 
 
 Macao where government officials were very indulgent, or 
 to other ports where the control of neither the Chinese nor 
 the treaty powers was effective, and American vessels con- 
 tinued to share in the opprobrious trade until 1862 when 
 they were prohibited by act of Congress. Meanwhile the 
 American representatives in China without the support of 
 legislation made vain efforts to check the evils of the traffic.^ 
 Reputable firms withdrew entirely from the trade but in- 
 dividuals brought much disgrace upon the American flag 
 and added to the anti-foreign sentiment in China. 
 
 Chinese Labor in California 
 
 The immigrants to California do not appear to have 
 been, at the outset, very different in character from those 
 to other regions. The passage to San Francisco cost about 
 $50. This money was usually supplied by some capitalist, 
 native or foreign. The laborer engaged himself either in 
 China or California by contract to work for a period of years 
 at a stipulated wage. The contracts were transferable. 
 The Chinese usually entered into the contracts freely, no 
 doubt, yet at their destination they did not become abso- 
 lutely free laborers.* 
 
 In later years the management of these Chinese immi- 
 grants fell into the hands of large Chinese companies and 
 
 ♦Specimen of a contract : ''Chin Suy to serve for on whose 
 
 account Bryson makes this agreement, or for any party who may 
 
 appoint to control his affairs, as shepherd, laborer, or in whatever capacity 
 may be required, in the State of California, for a term of 5 years ; and the 
 said Chin Suy hereby states his readiness to obey in every respect any orders 
 
 and directions which he may at any time receive either from or 
 
 from any party nominated by , or Bryson, to manage his affairs. 
 
 "And Bryson hereby agrees on the part of said that Chin 
 
 Suy shall receive wages at the rate of $35 per month, which shall be paid hira 
 at the close of each quarter ; and that payment of wages to Chin Suy at this 
 rate shall commence from the beginning of his service in the said state ; 
 Bryson also undertakes to provide Chin Suy with a good sleeping place and 
 with food equal in quality to such as is ordinarily eaten by workmen in China ; 
 Chin Suy also agrees to repay by means of four equal quarterly instalments, 
 to be deducted from his wages, the sum of $6 which has been advanced to him 
 by Bryson, or by the party on whose account Bryson makes the agreement ; 
 and as words alone furnish no proof of the above agreement having been duly 
 contracted, this Deed has been executed in duplicate, each of the contracting 
 parties keeping a copy." 
 
 It will easily be seen that such a contract afforded wide latitude for 
 abuses in the enlistment in China, on the voyage, and in California.^ While 
 this contract, which was used in 1852, may not be typical, it is illustrative of 
 the method by which the trade had to be financed owing to the poverty of the 
 laborers. 
 
538 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 they applied a system of financing and handling of labor 
 which, while customary and entirely acceptable in China, 
 seemed very mysterious and un-American in California. 
 The laborers were consigned to some Chinese company in 
 San Francisco and upon arrival went to work, usually at 
 some task assigned to them by the company, to pay off the 
 debt which had been incurred for transportation. Much has 
 been written in defense of the system to prove that these 
 laborers were not 'coolies' such as were shipped to other 
 countries, and that they were not slaves. One may accept 
 this conclusion, admitting that the Chinese who came to 
 California were superior, and were eager to come, and yet 
 not reach the further conclusion that they were free. That 
 some of them were free seems altogether probable, but so 
 secretive and so impenetrable were the methods of Chinese 
 trade relationships it was rarely possible to distinguish with 
 certainty between the free and the contract laborer.^ 
 
 At first the Chinese in California were welcomed by 
 everyone, but as soon as the rush for gold subsided and 
 ordered industrial communities developed, in which there 
 was increasing unemployment among disappointed white 
 gold-seekers, the Chinese, in company with all non-white 
 laborers, became unpopular. They were the objects of 
 attack not merely because they were cheap laborers but also 
 because they were not Caucasians. It is estimated that 
 about one third of the white population of California be- 
 tween 1850 and 1860 were from the southern states. There 
 was also a large influx of European immigrants, mainly Eng- 
 lish and Irish. The number of Chinese on the Pacific Coast 
 rose rapidly to about 25,000 in 1852, and 50,000 in 1867. 
 The next year there were large importations of coolies to 
 work on the Pacific railroads and in 1869, out of a total of 
 10,000 railroad laborers, nine tenths of them were Chinese. 
 By 1875 the number of Chinese on the Pacific Coast, not- 
 withstanding the large numbers who had returned to China, 
 had risen to 100,000, and in 1882 there were 132,000 of 
 whom nearly 40,000 had entered in that year.*^ 
 
 Various repressive measures were undertaken by the 
 
ASIATIC IMMIGRATION— AMERICAN POLICY 539 
 
 Pacific Coast states to restrict this increase. The Chinese 
 were from the outset denied citizenship, and after 1852 they 
 were subjected to discriminating taxes. Between 1850 and 
 1870 one half of the total California state revenues were 
 derived from the miners' licenses which were paid very 
 largely by the Chinese. They were at the same time sub- 
 jected to an increasing amount of abuse, injustice, intim- 
 idation and assault from the white residents, particularly in 
 the cities where the unemployed gathered in large numbers. 
 Without offering any justification for this treatment which 
 was brutal and appalling, it is evident from the figures that 
 California was actually engaged in a very elemental conflict 
 for race supremacy. South China had a superabundant 
 population ; California was sparsely settled and yielded large 
 returns not merely in its mines but in its agriculture to the 
 plodding, indefatigable labor of the Oriental. If natural 
 laws were permitted, unchecked, to assert themselves it was 
 only a question of time when the Chinese with lower stand- 
 ards of living and lower wage standards, would be able to 
 displace the whites. The condition in the southern states 
 after the emancipation of the slaves was ever before the 
 citizens of California, so many of whom had come from the 
 South, On the other hand many employers, looking to the 
 immediate returns, welcomed the cheap labor. 
 
 Treaties of 1868 and 1880 
 
 William H. Seward, as was consistent with his convic- 
 tions as a trade expansionist, was a cheap-labor man. So far 
 as he had any views on the subject Anson Burlingame, com- 
 ing from New England where the problem of cheap labor 
 was i)eing solved by European immigration, was of similar 
 persuasion. The Burlingame treaty of 1868, which has 
 already been discussed as to its foreign policy, was a cheap- 
 labor treaty. Indeed the mystery of why it was thought 
 necessary to write a treaty for the expression of what Lord 
 Clarendon put far more tersely in a letter to Burlingame is 
 explained when we come to study the immigration clauses 
 
540 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 of the Burlingame treaty. It would appear that Seward, 
 who wrote the document, was as much interested in the 
 labor problem as he was in the extension of American trade 
 across the Pacific. At the moment he was particularly con- 
 cerned about the delays in the completion of the Pacific rail- 
 road due to the inability of the contractors to secure labor. 
 Chinese coolies offered a solution of the problem, but the 
 supply was imperilled at two points. There was a growing 
 hostility in California, and while the Chinese Government 
 was apathetic, the departure of Chinese from the Empire 
 was actually a violation of ancient Chinese law. The treaty 
 was intended at once to regularize the Chinese immigration 
 at its source, and to protect it in the United States.* 
 
 The text of the famous declaration (Article 5) which a 
 subsequent American minister ^ to Peking declared to be 
 'buncombe' was: 
 
 "The United States of America and the Emperor of China 
 cordially recognize the inherent and inalienable right of man to 
 change his home and allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of 
 the free migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects 
 respectively from one country to the other for purposes of curiosity, 
 of trade, or as permanent residents." 
 
 The treaty, which was bi-lateral, guaranteed to Chinese sub- 
 jects "visiting or residing in the United States . . . the 
 same privileges, immunities, and exemptions in respect to 
 travel or residence as may there be enjoyed by the citizens 
 or subjects of the most favored nation." Nevertheless the 
 right of naturalization was reserved; that is, it was not 
 obligatory upon a state. The privilege of the Chinese Gov- 
 ernment to appoint consuls at American ports was stipu- 
 lated. Other articles prohibited contract laborers and safe- 
 guarded the Chinese in America, as well as the Americans 
 in China, in the exercise of religious freedom. 
 
 * "The treaty concluded with the United States recognizes broadly the right 
 of China to the jurisdiction of its own affairs and offers substantial protection 
 to the Chinese in California. It was this latter consideration which led to the 
 adopting of the more solemn form of a treaty in the United States. A treaty 
 being the supreme law of the land overrides the obnoxious local legislation 
 against the Chinese immigrants." (Burlingame to Bismarck, written in Berlin, 
 January 4, 1870.') 
 
 "If I have been rightly informed by those who ought to know, that treaty 
 was made, not at the request of Mr. Burlingame or of the Chinese Government, 
 but at the request of Secretary Seward." (Pres. James B. Angell, in the 
 Journal of Social Science, May, 1883.) 
 
 I 
 
ASIATIC IMMIGRATION— AMERICAN POLICY 541 
 
 California in 1868 was still attempting to control the 
 Chinese immigration by means of state legislation, and the 
 Burlingame treaty was ratified by the Senate without op- 
 position from labor interests and to the general satisfaction 
 of employers. But that year, a presidential year, the Demo- 
 cratic party in the state raised an anti-Chinese issue and 
 elected a Democratic governor. From that time onward the 
 immigration question became the football of politics, state 
 and nation.^ The number of Chinese steadily though not 
 rapidly increased. Meanwhile various state laws directed 
 against the Chinese were found to be unconstitutional. 
 Oregon and Nevada became interested in the matter. The 
 political parties in California were evenly balanced and 
 while the Republican party, the party of Seward and Bur- 
 lingame, had generally favored Chinese immigration it was 
 now seen that to continue that support was to lose the vote 
 in doubtful states. The Chinese question was revived again 
 in 1876, and was fanned to a blaze in the summer of 1877 in 
 the sand-lot meetings under the infamous appeals of Dennis 
 Kearney. In the Constitutional Convention of 1878-9 the 
 legislature was empowered to pass legislation prohibiting 
 corporations from employing any Mongolian and was au- 
 thorized to remove the Chinese from the state. A Republi- 
 can legislature, now standing in fear of the labor vote, 
 passed a law making it a misdemeanor for any corporation 
 to employ a Chinese. This law was declared in a federal 
 court to be in conflict with the Burlingame treaty. 
 
 In March, 1876, the Republican State Committee of 
 California had passed a resolution requesting the President 
 to enter into negotiations for a modification of the treaty 
 of 1868, and two months later Senator A. A, Sargent intro- 
 duced in Congress a bill to that effect. Instead, a Congres- 
 sional investigation was ordered. ^*^ Owing to the illness of 
 Senator Oliver P. Morton, chairman of the committee, and 
 the withdrawal of members from New York and Massachu- 
 setts, the investigation was conducted before a commission 
 made up of two Californians and one member from Ten- 
 nessee. As a result of this investigation, which was devoid 
 
542 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 of all judicial character, Congress passed in 1879 the Fifteen 
 Passenger Bill which would have hmited the number of 
 Chinese immigrants to be brought in any one vessel to 
 fifteen. President Hayes vetoed the bill but immediately 
 instituted a commission to proceed to China to secure either 
 modifications of the existing treaty or a new one. The com- 
 mission consisted of one Calif ornian, John T. Swift, subse- 
 quently minister at Tokio, one southerner, W. H. Trescott 
 of South Carolina, and President James B. Angell of the 
 University of Michigan, who was also to be United States 
 Minister at Peking, succeeding George F. Seward. 
 
 The commission was Republican. There was a presiden- 
 tial election approaching in November, 1880, and both 
 parties had recorded themselves in their platforms as op- 
 posed to Chinese immigration. The commission arrived in 
 China at a time when the government was particularly well 
 disposed towards the United States because of the popular- 
 ity attained by General Grant the previous year. China was 
 greatly embarrassed by Russia over the unsettled Kuldja 
 dispute and was contending unsuccessfully with the treaty 
 powers for the right to increase the tariff duties. The agita- 
 tion against the opium trade had been renewed and was at 
 its point of greatest earnestness since 1838. It was a fortu- 
 nate time for the Americans to bring up the immigration 
 question. The commission asked for a revision of the treaty 
 which would grant to the United States the right, at its 
 discretion, not merely to regulate, limit or suspend, but also 
 to prohibit the immigration of Chinese laborers. The 
 Chinese Government, never greatly interested in the welfare 
 of its subjects away from home, and for the last thirty years 
 desperately occupied with internal questions and foreign 
 aggressions within the empire, had never been disposed to 
 make the treatment of Chinese abroad a subject of per- 
 sistent protest, although it had not passed unnoticed. But 
 now well informed by its diplomatic representatives in 
 Washington of the political aspects of the trouble, and 
 greatly encouraged by Americans who sympathized with the 
 Chinese, the Yamen asserted itself and absolutely refused to 
 
ASIATIC IMMIGRATION— AMERICAN POLICY 543 
 
 yield the right to the American Government to prohibit the 
 immigration. The demands of the Americans had aroused 
 the pride of a very proud race. 
 
 The treaty which was signed November 17, 1880, was a 
 compromise reflecting the moderating influence of President 
 Angell, and also the fact that the presidential election, 
 already passed, had recorded a Republican victory. To the 
 United States was given the right to "regulate, limit or 
 suspend" but not to prohibit the coming of Chinese laborers 
 "whenever in the opinion of the Government of the United 
 States, the coming of Chinese laborers to the United 
 States, or the residence therein, affects or threatens to 
 affect the interests of that country or of any locality within 
 the territory thereof." Laborers already in the United 
 States were secured in the right of most-favored-nation 
 treatment, and "Chinese subjects, whether proceeding to the 
 United States as teachers, students, merchants, or from 
 curiosity" were to have equal privileges.^ ^ Concurrently, a 
 treaty of commercial intercourse was negotiated in which 
 Americans were excluded from the opium trade by a very 
 stringent agreement. The Chinese were very much pleased 
 with this clause "their object being, if possible," to use the 
 words of President Angell's report, "to isolate the British 
 Government on this question from the other Christian pow- 
 ers, and to compel that Government to take the odium of 
 forcing this wicked and demoralizing traffic for the avowed 
 purpose of financial advantage." ^^ While not breaking so 
 abruptly with the cooperative policy as in Japan, the United 
 States thus indicated a preference for independent action in 
 treaty revision. The commission had succeeded in handling 
 delicate subjects successfully, and relations between the two 
 governments remained friendly. 
 
 Growth of III Feeling 
 
 The Pacific Coast states were not at all content with 
 the stipulations of the treaty of 1880. They were demand- 
 ing absolute exclusion. As a compromise with this extreme 
 
544 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 demand Congress passed a law, May 6, 1882, suspending the 
 immigration of Chinese laborers for ten years, and defining 
 the word laborer to include both skilled and unskilled work- 
 ers, as well as those engaged in mining. To prevent fraud in 
 the readmission of laborers who returned to America after 
 a visit in China a system of customs-house registry and 
 certificates was devised. The certificates were to be issued 
 to all departing Chinese, with the exception of diplomatic 
 officers.^^ The bill was passed only after President Arthur 
 had already vetoed one providing for suspension of immi- 
 gration for twenty years, but even ten years was twice as 
 long, according to President Angell, as any period mentioned 
 in the negotiations at Peking in 1880. The new law also 
 prohibited any state from granting citizenship to Chinese. 
 Two years later, just before a presidential campaign (July 
 5, 1884), the law was amended by making the system of 
 identification more exact, and by the addition of a new 
 definition of laborers which would also exclude hucksters, 
 peddlers, or those engaged in taking, drying or otherwise 
 preserving shell or other fish either for home consumption 
 or for exportation. The certificates issued to returning 
 Chinese laborers must now be vised before departure from 
 China by an American diplomatic or consular officer.^ ^ The 
 consular service, upon which this new duty was imposed, 
 was not strengthened to meet the responsibility, and was 
 not prepared to comply with the law either effectively or 
 honestly.^ ^ Thus in less than four years after the negotia- 
 tion of the treaty the United States, as even President 
 Arthur stated, had clearly departed from the spirit, if not 
 from its letter as the Chinese Government understood it.^^ 
 The serious disturbance of friendly relations between the 
 two governments may be said to date from this time. 
 
 The Chinese immigration question appeared as a factor 
 in national politics at the very moment when the American 
 Government was formulating a Korean policy. While Con- 
 gress was passing the restriction law. Commodore Shufeldt 
 was waiting at Tientsin for a reply to his telegram inquiring 
 whether he should admit a recognition of Chinese suzerainty 
 
ASIATIC IMMIGRATION— AMERICAN POLICY 545 
 
 over Korea in the text of his proposed treaty. Another dis- 
 turbing factor in the situation had been the sudden recall, 
 the previous year, of all of the Chinese students who had 
 been sent to America.* While it is difficult to trace with 
 exactness the influence of the growing unpopularity and 
 distrust of the Chinese on American policy in Korea, the 
 fact stands out that for the next decade the Chinese were 
 steadily losing popularity in the United States while their 
 rivals, the Japanese, with whom the Americans had very 
 few direct or personal contacts, were in equal measure win- 
 ning confidence and approval. 
 
 The letter of Commodore Shufeldt to Senator A. A. Sar- 
 gent, already alluded to, while important only because of 
 the fact that it was written by a diplomatic officer of the 
 government, may be cited as an indication of the growing 
 American distrust of the Chinese. 
 
 It is not possible to show from the diplomatic records 
 that the treatment of the Chinese in the United States 
 caused the Chinese Government to adopt a particularly un- 
 friendly policy towards Americans in China, although offi- 
 cials like Prince Kung and Li Hung Chang bitterly resented 
 the treatment. The Chinese Government was generally 
 anti-foreign and as between the persecution of Chinese in 
 the United States which was remote, and the opium trade, 
 the aggressions of France, and the general arrogance of the 
 foreigner which was ever before the eyes of the Chinese, the 
 Americans escaped adverse discriminatory action. It is, 
 rather, in Washington to which the perfection of communi- 
 
 *Beginning in 1872 China had sent several companies of boys, in all more 
 than one hundred, to be placed in American schools and colleges. The ages 
 ranged from eight to sixteen. Various explanations — lack of funds for their 
 support, resentment at the growing anti-Chinese feeling in America, and the 
 growth of reactionary sentiment in China — were offered for the recall of these 
 students, une of the students who subsequently rose to eminence in Chinese 
 affairs, Tong Shao-yi, told the writer personally that the real cause was the 
 fear that the boys were becoming too much Americanized. They had even 
 petitioned their Chinese tutor for permission to cut off their queues. The 
 tutor, himself a very conservative Chinese scholar, reported this to Peking and 
 an order for their recall was immediately issued. The contrast thus presented 
 between the Japanese who had gone so far as to adopt Western dress, and the 
 Chinese who declined to permit the boys to remove their queues, is striking. 
 There were in the United States at that time a large number of Japanese 
 students, but they were usually of a much more mature age than the Chinese. 
 The fundamental difficulty with the Chinese students was that they were sent 
 away from home too young, even before they had attained a moderate mastery 
 of their own difficult language. Whatever the cause, the withdrawal of the 
 students made a bad impression in the United States," 
 
546 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 cations had largely transferred the direction of American 
 policy, that we may study the influence of the anti-Chinese 
 prejudices. Between 1885 and 1894 public opinion was 
 being prepared for the choice between China and Japan 
 which was presented at the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese 
 War. During this period the Chinese representatives found 
 abundant causes for creating many embarrassments to the 
 Department of State. The causes were conspicuously just, 
 but it may be questioned whether the Chinese Government 
 would not have been more astute, in view of the graver 
 issues in the East, in adopting a more conciliatory policy in 
 Washington. 
 
 The inauguration of the first Cleveland administration 
 was inauspicious for the Chinese in the United States. 
 There had been riots at Rock Springs, Wyoming, and also at 
 Tacoma and Seattle in which Chinese had been killed or 
 injured. China, accustomed to prompt demands from the 
 treaty powers for indemnity for similar events in China, now 
 found some satisfaction in making equally prompt demands 
 for indemnity from the American Government. President 
 Cleveland recognized the moral obligation of the claim and 
 made it the subject of two messages to Congress in 1886, but 
 Congress granted it reluctantly and with poor grace after 
 much delay. California called a state convention and ad- 
 dressed a memorial to Congress demanding absolute prohi- 
 bition of Chinese immigration, the elimination of Chinese 
 labor from all public works, and the boycott of all employ- 
 ers of Chinese labor. Then the Tsung-li Yamen proposed to 
 Minister Denby in Peking, and Secretary of State Bayard 
 suggested to the Chinese minister in Washington, on the 
 same day (January 12, 1887), that a new treaty be nego- 
 tiated. Bayard desired the exclusion of the Chinese laborers 
 for thirty years ; the minister declined to discuss the proposi- 
 tion while the claims for indemnity remained unsatisfied. 
 However, a new treaty was signed fourteen months later 
 (March 12, 1888), in another presidential year, which stip- 
 ulated for prohibition for twenty years, and for payment of 
 indemnity to the extent of $276,619.75. In executive ses- 
 
ASIATIC IMMIGRATION— AMERICAN POLICY 547 
 
 sion the Senate amended the treaty by the insertion of 
 provisions which would shut out at least 20,000 Chinese who 
 were residents of the United States but then visiting in 
 China. On September 13, 1888, Congress enacted a law to 
 make effective the pending treaty as soon as the treaty 
 should be ratified.^^ 
 
 Ten days later a press report from London contained the 
 rumor that the Chinese Government would not ratify the 
 pending treaty. Those were the closing days of the presi- 
 dential campaign in which President Cleveland was seeking 
 reelection. In spite of the official information that China 
 was merely reserving the treaty for further deliberation, 
 Congress pas'sed (October 1, 1888) the Scott Act which ab- 
 solutely prohibited the return of all Chinese laborers who 
 had gone to China for a visit,^^ even though they held cer- 
 tificates already issued by the customs houses. The bill was 
 signed by President Cleveland on the ground that China 
 had not properly cooperated with the United States in the 
 immigration question. ^^ China immediately entered a pro- 
 test at the extraordinary action, and July 8, 1889, the 
 Chinese Minister in Washington addressed an exhaustive 
 argument to the Department of State in which he stated, 
 tartly, that he had yet to learn that it was customary for 
 governments to act on the strength of mere newspaper 
 reports. '^So far as the legation knows," he wrote, "the 
 treaty is still pending, and awaiting the reply of the State 
 Department to the amendments proposed in the legation 
 note of September twenty-fifth last." 
 
 "I was not prepared to learn . . . that there was a way recognized 
 in the law and practice of this country whereby your country could 
 release itseJf from treaty obligations without consultation or the con- 
 sent of the other party; it can hardly be contended that my govern- 
 ment was exceeding diplomatic practice or courtesy in following the 
 example of the Senate and proposing amendments. , . ." ^^ 
 
 During the Harrison administration a condition amount- 
 ing practically to non-intercourse existed between the 
 Chinese legation and the Department of State. The Ameri- 
 can Government was in a position, notwithstanding its 
 
548 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 legality as sustained by the Supreme Court, utterly inde- 
 fensible from the viewpoint of diplomacy. The conduct of 
 Lord Elgin at Tientsin and Peking, of Sir Harry Parkes in 
 Tokio, and of the French minister at Shanghai in 1883 was 
 not more brutal and bullying than that of the American 
 Government after 1888. The only important difference was 
 that the American Government had done wrongly what it 
 had a perfect right to do if other measures had been em- 
 ployed, viz., regulate its own immigration questions, while 
 the powers in China had done what they had no moral right 
 to do under any conditions. All parties had degraded the 
 principles of international law. It is becoming for Ameri- 
 cans in criticizing the actions of other governments in Asia 
 to be humble if not charitable.* 
 
 The original restriction act of 1882, as amended two years 
 later, presumably did not expire until 1894 but in 1892, with 
 another presidential election approaching, Congress again 
 took up the immigration question and enacted (May 5, 
 1892) the Geary law, the most stringent exclusion act yet 
 passed. ^^ According to this law no bail was to be permitted 
 in habeas corpus proceedings, and the burden of proof that 
 a Chinese had the right to be in the United States was 
 placed upon the Chinese himself. In other words he was 
 presumed to be guilty of illegal residence until he could 
 prove himself innocent. The punishment for violation of 
 the law was hard labor for one year and then deportation. 
 Later (November 3, 1893) the definition of the word laborer 
 was enlarged to include certain other classes such as laun- 
 drymen. Under the amendment the certificate which each 
 laborer was required to secure as proof of his right to be in 
 the country must bear his photograph. In other respects 
 the rigor of the Geary law was somewhat modified.-^ The I 
 
 *The resentment of the Cbinese Government at the treatment of the immi- 
 gration question by the United States is shown in the refusal to accept Senator 
 Henry W. Blair of New Hampshire as minister in 1891. Blair had been so 
 unfortunate as to make remarks in the Senate in connection with both the 
 restriction act of 1882 and the acts of 1SS8 which rendered him persona non 
 grata to the Chinese. -= The rejection of Blair by China accounts in part for 
 the fact that Charles Denby, who had been a Cleveland appointee in 1885, 
 continued as minister at Peking throughout the Harrison (Republican) admin- 
 istration. Denby was reappointed in the second Cleveland administration and 
 continued under McKinley until 1898. 
 
ASIATIC IMMIGRATION— AMERICAN POLICY 540 
 
 following year (March 17, 1894) a new immigration treaty 
 with China was signed in which the prohibition of the ad- 
 mission of Chinese laborers for ten years was agreed to. 
 The exempt classes of Chinese — teachers, students, mer- 
 chants, travelers and officials — were carefully defined, and 
 transit across the country was permitted. The Chinese 
 legally resident in the United States were guaranteed most- 
 favored-nation treatment. The stipulation requiring regis- 
 tration was made bi-lateral, applying equally to Americans 
 resident in China. 
 
 Clearly the American Government, after all its em- 
 barrassments in dealing with China on the immigration 
 question, was not in any mood at the outbreak of the Sino- 
 Japanese War to become in any marked degree a partisan of 
 China. Scrupulous neutrality it did maintain, but the 
 American people, who knew much by hearsay of the Chinese 
 in America, and nothing of the Far Eastern question, were 
 not disposed to favor an extension of Chinese influence in 
 the Korean peninsula, or anywhere else. 
 
 The Threat of Japanese Immigration 
 
 The Japanese immigration question also exercised some 
 influence upon American policy in Asia, though in a very 
 different way. 
 
 Although tenaciously holding to the assertion of her 
 rights,* the Japanese Government was very careful to avoid 
 any clash with the American Government over the immigra- 
 tion question during the period of treaty revision. John T. 
 Swift of 'California, who had been very active in the anti- 
 Chinese agitation in the United States, succeeded Richard 
 B. Hubbard of Texas as American minister at Tokio in May, 
 1889. Following the death of Mr. Swift at his post in 
 March, 1891, Frank L. Coombs, also of California, was made 
 minister for the remainder of the Harrison administration. 
 
 *The Japanese treaty with Peru, 1873 (Art. 7), contained a stipulation to 
 the effect that no restriction be placed by either government on immigrant 
 laborers in any lawful capacity and that they might go freely from one country 
 to the other. 
 
550 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Thus, at the time when the Japanese immigration question 
 was first arising, the United States was represented in Japan 
 by men especially alert to note its possible dangers. i 
 
 Swift warned his government that the treaty of 1889, f 
 negotiated by Hubbard and awaiting ratification by both 
 governments, contained a bi-lateral immigration clause such 
 as had already been agreed to in the Japan-Mexico treaty, 
 which would open the United States to Japanese immigra- 
 tion as the Burlingame treaty had opened the country to 
 the Chinese. For this reason the American Government 
 was relieved of some embarrassments when Japan formally 
 requested that the ratification of the treaty be held in abey- 
 ance. Such a provision could not have secured the approval 
 of the Senate in 1890. Coombs, shortly after his arrival in 
 Japan, had a conference with Viscount Enomoto who prom- 
 ised to bring about a satisfactory regulation of Japanese im- 
 migrants by Japan, On August 22, 1892, the Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs issued instructions to the governor of prefec- 
 tures, requiring them to discourage immigration to the 
 United States. 
 
 "It would be needless to call your attention to the fact," he wrote, 
 "that the most cordial and friendly .relations have been happ_ily 
 existing between Japan and the United States; besides, our com- 
 mercial interests in the United States are becoming more and 
 more important; and these relations we cannot permit to be dis- 
 turbed on account of such a minor question as labor immigration." 
 
 A month later the Minister of Foreign Affairs instructed the 
 Japanese consul general at Honolulu to endeavor to dis- 
 suade Japanese from going to the Pacific Coast, That it 
 was the policy of the Japanese Government to discourage 
 undesired labor emigration was confirmed (October, 1893) 
 by Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Hayashi to U. S. Minis- 
 ter Edwin Dun. 
 
 In the treaty of 1894 between the United States and , 
 Japan the following paragraph was inserted to take care of | 
 the immigration question, as well as to safeguard Japan in 
 her policy of withholding the right of foreigners to purchase 
 land in Japan: 
 
ASIATIC IMMIGRATION— AMERICAN POLICY 551 
 
 "It is, however, understood that the stipulations contained in this 
 and the preceding article (relating to liberty of trade, residence, 
 leasing of land, ownership of property, etc.) do not in any way effect 
 the laws, ordinances and regulations with regard to trade, the immi- 
 gration of laborers, police and public security, which are in force or 
 which may hereafter be enacted in either of the two countries." * 
 
 Thus far the only effect of the immigration question had 
 been to deter the United States from being the first of the 
 great powers to ratify the revised treaty which Japan had 
 proposed in 1888. Great Britain was awarded the credit, 
 which more properly belonged to the United States by virtue 
 of its consistent record on treaty revisions ever since 1878, 
 for being the first to relieve Japan of the onerous extra- 
 territorial stipulations. 
 
 The Japanese immigration question was, however, exert- 
 ing a more positive effect on American policy in another 
 direction. The planters of the Hawaiian Islands, gravely 
 handicapped by lack of willing labor, had encouraged the 
 immigration of both Chinese and Japanese coolies. The 
 treaty of 1871 with Japan had been followed by a second 
 convention (March 6, 1886) by which it was agreed that the 
 Japanese Government would furnish laborers, as requested, 
 for Hawaii, on thirty days notice. There were in 1890 
 slightly more than 12,000 Japanese in the Sandwich Islands, 
 out of a total population of about 90,000. There were also 
 15,000 Chinese.25 In November, 1893, at the time of the 
 revolution in the islands, after the rejection of the Ameri- 
 can annexation treaty, the Japanese Government sent a war 
 vessel to Honolulu to protect Japanese subjects. 
 
 After the withdrawal from the Senate of the Hawaiian 
 annexation treaty by President Cleveland (March 9, 1893), 
 the Japsniese Government assumed a more positive tone 
 towards the newly established Hawaiian Republic. Japan 
 demanded that the Japanese immigrants to Hawaii be given 
 the same rights as the native Hawaiians which included the 
 
 *"We strongly objected to this clause which America tacked on to Article 
 2 but our obiections were of no avail. Mr. Griscom [Oresham], the American 
 Secretary of State, absolutely refused to agree to revise the treaty at all unless 
 the clause was admitted. We were loath to agree, but did so because the revi- 
 sion of the English treaty was problematical on account of the probationary 
 clause, and it was necessary to make a start." (Secret Memoirs of Count 
 Hayashi, p. 248.) 
 
552 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 rights of citizenship and office-holding from which they had 
 always been excluded.* Japan based this demand upon the 
 most-favored-nation clause in her original treaty with 
 Hawaii in 1873, and a treaty between Spain and Hawaii 
 (1863) in which the Spanish had been granted the same 
 rights and privileges as those enjoyed by the Hawaiians. 
 The disposition of the Hawaiian Republic was to restrict all 
 oriental immigration, but to this the Japanese Government 
 made firm objections and in 1897 went so far as to send a 
 war vessel to Honolulu with a demand for free immigration. 
 Meanwhile the Republic had been unsuccessful in limiting 
 the immigration by means of a restrictive legislation and at 
 length arrested 1100 newly arrived Japanese with a view of 
 deporting them. 
 
 The majority report on the joint resolution for the an- 
 nexation of Hawaii presented to the House May 17, 1898, 
 stated that this "rapid growth of Japanese element" was "a, 
 most threatening fact" in the existing Hawaiian situation 
 for if the Japanese demands for citizenship were granted the 
 Japanese voters (there were reported to be 24,000 Japanese 
 in the islands at the time, 19,000 of them men) would con- 
 trol the government and would be able to effect a revision or 
 abrogation of the reciprocity treaty of 1887 by which Pearl 
 Harbor had been granted to the exclusive use of the United 
 States as a naval base. This argument carried much weight 
 in the debate both in the House and in the Senate. Senator 
 George Frisbie Hoar, who only a few months later desper- 
 ately opposed the annexation of the Philippines, voted for 
 the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands and rested his argu- 
 ment for their acquisition in no small measure upon the 
 menace of Japanese control of the islands. Senator Hoar 
 stated: "They [the islands] will fall, Mr. President, if we do 
 not prevent it, a prey to Japan, not by conquest but by im- 
 migration. This result all parties agree that we must pre- 
 vent. Japan is not, according to the opponents of annexa- 
 
 *The constitution of Hawaii, promulgated July 7, 1887, had limited citizen- 
 ship and ofHce-holding to Hawaiians and to those of either American or Euro- 
 pean parentage. The Americans and Europeans were not required to forswear 
 their original citizenship.^^ 
 
ASIATIC IMMIGRATION— AMERICAN POLICY 553 
 
 tion of this body and of the press, to be allowed to get the 
 Sandwich Islands either by force or by absorption. . . , The 
 danger is, as I have said, that there will be an infusion of 
 Japanese and then an attempted annexation to Japan." 
 Senator Hoar urged that the possession of the islands must 
 either be settled then peaceably by annexation or later by 
 force in a conflict between America and Asia. 
 
 BIBLIOGEAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. The following general sources of information on Chinese immi- 
 
 gration are recommended : J. W. Foster : "American Diplo- 
 macy in the Orient/' chap. 8, — valuable because the author was 
 intimately associated in public life and in the service of the 
 Chinese Government with the later phases of the subject; 
 Charles Denby : "China and Her People," Vol. 2, chap. 9 — 
 Denby was the American minister in Peking, 1885-98 ; Alleyne 
 Ireland: "China and the Powers" (privately printed, 1902), 
 chap. 3 contains concise summary; Mary Roberts Coolidge: 
 "Chinese Immigration" — Dr. Coolidge gave to the domestic 
 phases of the subject most exhaustive study, and yet the author 
 was so carried away by the injustices dealt to the Chinese as to 
 fail to present adequately the fundamental issues in the con- 
 flict of races. The bibliographical notes are exceptionally 
 valuable. The present writer has made no very extended 
 study of Chinese immigration as a domestic question aside 
 from the diplomatic records of the Department of State. 
 
 2. Marshall Corres., pp. Y8, 84-4, 116-7, 106 ; Parker Co.rres., pp. 632, 
 
 669; Paliamentary Papers, Accounts and Papers, 43, 1857-8, 
 Report to the House of Commons on the Coolie traffic, ordered 
 printed July 27, 1858, p. 78. 
 
 3. Parker Corres., p. 625 ; Reed Corres., pp. 67-76, 78, Reed to Cass, 
 
 Jan. 13, 1858, pp.. 185, 204, 489. 
 
 4. S. Doc. 99:34-1, pp. 119 ff. Parker Corres. on Robert Browne 
 
 affair. 
 5 Foster, p. 282, thinks the Chinese laborers in California were 
 "perfectly free," and cites a great many authorities. None of 
 the similar statements on this point seems to the present 
 writer convincing. 
 
 6. Table, Coolidge, p. 498. 
 
 7. Notes from Chinese Legation, Vol. 1, Jan. 18, 1870, Burlingame 
 
 to Fish. 
 
 8. Denby : Vol. 2, p. 98. 
 
 9. Coolidge is particularly valuable for tracing the various stages 
 
 of the party conflict on the immigration question. 
 
 10. Foster: pp. 286 ff . ; S. Rept. 689:44-2; S. Misc. Doc. 20:45-2. 
 
 11. Negotiations of the Treaty Commission, For. Relations, 1881, 
 
 pp. 168-203 ; J. B. Angell : "Diplomatic Relations of the United 
 
554 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 States and China," Amer. Jour, of Social Science, Vol. 17, 
 pp. 24 ff.); Chester Holcombe: The Outlook, 1904, Apr. 23, 
 pp. 993-4. 
 12. China Desp., Vol. 56, Nov. 17, 1880, Angell to Blaine. This 
 sentence is omitted in the dispatch as printed in For. Relations, 
 1881. 
 ,13. St. at Large, Vol. 22, pp. 58-61. 
 
 14. St. at Large, Vol. 23, pp. 115-118. 
 
 15. Denby: Vol. 2, p. 105. 
 
 16. See Pres. Arthur's opinion, Richardson's Messages, Vol. 8, p. 236. 
 
 17. Chinese Students in U. S., For. Relations, 1872, pp. 130, 135, 
 
 138; 1873, pp. 140, 186; 1875, p. 227; 1885, p. 144. 
 
 18. Statutes at Large, Vol. 25, pp. 476-479. 
 
 19. Ibid., p. 504. 
 
 20. S. Ex. Doc. 273 :50-l. 
 
 21. ■ For. Relations, 1889, p. 132. 
 
 22. Pres. Harrison's Message, Apr. 4, 1892, Rejection of Henry W. 
 
 Blair; For. Relations, 1892. 
 
 23. St. at Large, Vol. 27, pp. 25-6. 
 
 24. Ihid., Vol. 28, pp. 7-8. 
 
 25. S. Ex. Doc. 76 :52-2, Table, p. 60. 
 
 26. 7&td, p. 26. 
 
CHAPTER XXIX 
 
 THE MISSIONAEIES AND AMEEICAN POLICY IN ASIA 
 
 While a review of the broader aspects of the influence 
 of the American missionaries on the social and political as 
 well as the religious life of the Asiatic states is very alluring, 
 we must confine ourselves rigidly to a more precise subject — 
 the influence of the missionaries on American policy. It is 
 discussed in the following phases : the assistance of the mis- 
 sionaries either as themselves ofiicial representatives of the 
 government or to those who were officials; the status as- 
 signed to the missionaries in the various treaties or obtained 
 by special conventions and interpretations; missionaries 
 and American neutrality; and the protection of the mis- 
 sionaries by the Government of the United States.^ 
 
 Missionaries as Diplomatic and Consular Officers 
 
 Notwithstanding the repeated requests of the American 
 consuls, commissioners, and ministers from 1816, onward, 
 their government made no provision for the training of a 
 single interpreter for a consulate or legation until 1864.^ 
 Throughout the century the American officials, only a very 
 few of whom, unless they had previously been missionaries, 
 had any accurate knowledge of either the written or spoken 
 language of the countries to which they were assigned, were 
 largely dependent in China, Japan and Korea upon either 
 native interpreters, upon foreigners of other nationalities, 
 or upon the missionaries. There were only four salaried 
 American interpreters connected with diplomatic and con- 
 sular service in China as late as 1899, according to a report 
 of Minister Conger. Until about 1833, when Rev. E. C. 
 Bridgman,^ the first American to acquire the Chinese lan- 
 
 555 
 
556 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 guage, became available at Canton, the Americans in China 
 depended very largely upon Rev. Robert Morrison, the 
 British missionary employed by the East India Company, 
 or upon his son John H. Morrison for both translation and 
 interpreting. Bridgman, in company with Rev. David 
 Abeel,* arrived in 1830. They were followed by S. Wells 
 Williams^ (1833), a missionary printer, and Rev. Peter 
 Parker, M. D.*^ (1834), a missionary physician. From that 
 time onward Bridgman, Parker or Williams actually trans- 
 acted the greater part of the American official business with 
 the representatives of the Chinese Government for nearly 
 forty years. 
 
 In 1858 United States Minister Reed, who had come to 
 China with scant regard for missionaries, wrote to Secretary 
 of State Cass : 
 
 "... I am bound to say further that the studies of the missionary 
 and those connected with the missionary cause are essential to the 
 interests of our country. Without them as interpreters the public 
 business could riot be transacted. I could not but for them have 
 advanced one step in the discharge of my duties here, or read, or 
 written, or understood one word of correspondence or treaty stipula- 
 tions. With them there has been no difficulty or embarrassments. 
 
 "It was the case also in 1844, when Mr. Cushing's interpreters and 
 assistants in all their public duties were all from the same class; in 
 1853, with Mr. Marshall, and in 1854 with Mr. McLane, Dr. Bridgman, 
 who was the principal assistant in all these public duties, still lives 
 in an active exercise of his usefulness; and I am glad of the oppor- 
 tunity of expressing to him my thanks for the incidental assistance 
 and constant and most valuable counsel. ... 
 
 "There is not an American merchant in China (and I have heard 
 of but one English) who can write or read a single sentence of 
 Chinese." ' 
 
 The condition described by Mr. Reed continued, and for 
 the remainder of the century, except for the briefest inter- 
 vals, there were some American missionaries employed either 
 in important posts in the consulates or in the legation in 
 China, and it was these men rather than their titular su- 
 periors who, in most cases, had the actual contacts with the 
 Chinese ofiicials. A similar condition existed in Siam as 
 well as in Korea. Chester Holcombe, formerly a missionary 
 and then secretary and Charge in the legation at Peking, did 
 
MISSIONARIES AND AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA 557 
 
 at least half the work in the negotiation of the Shufeldt 
 treaty with Li Hung Chang; and Dr. H. N. Allen, the first 
 American missionary in Korea, and subsequently secretary 
 of the Korean legation and then American minister at Seoul, 
 carried the brunt of the diplomatic correspondence between 
 Korea and the United States. Indeed at least one instance 
 is known where an American minister, nameless in this 
 record, lay hopelessly intoxicated in his legation while the 
 missionaries not only ministered to his physical needs but 
 even wrote the dispatches to the Department of State at a 
 very critical moment in political affairs. 
 
 Due to the fact that the Dutch language was the lingua 
 franca in Japan and that the Japanese very quickly acquired 
 English the problem of interpretation was never so difficult 
 in Japan as elsewhere in Asia. For this reason and also, 
 perhaps, because the American Government was especially 
 careful not to offend the anti-Christian prejudices of the 
 Japanese inherited from the old Jesuit days, the missionaries 
 never played a prominent part in the direct relations of the 
 two governments. 
 
 The Chinese Repository ^ (1832-51), of which Bridgman 
 and Williams were not merely the editors but to which they 
 were often the chief contributors, is easily the most accurate 
 and faithful chronicle which has come down to us of the 
 period which it covers. Indeed, a close comparison of the 
 Repository with the Treaty of Wanghia shows that Caleb 
 Cushing in his negotiations in 1844 was very greatly in- 
 debted to Bridgman, not merely for his work as interpre- 
 ter but also as adviser. Several of the articles of the treaty 
 appear to have grown directly out of discussions which had 
 preceded them in the Repository. 
 
 On Cushing's departure Dr. Parker immediately entered 
 upon a distinguished service as unofficial and then official 
 interpreter and secretary to the legation. This service must 
 not be overlooked in an appraisal of his less valuable ser- 
 vices as Commissioner (1855-7). Until 1854 the consulates 
 at Amoy and Ningpo, when they were cared for at all, were 
 for the most part in charge of missionaries. The remarkable 
 
558 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 services of S. Wells Williams for the government began 
 officially in 1853-4 as interpreter in the Perry expedition, 
 and were resumed a year later when he resigned from mis- 
 sionary work and became secretary and interpreter in the 
 legation, a position which he held for twenty years, becom- 
 ing during the period charge d'affaires no less than seven 
 times. After 1880 the m^issionary became less important as 
 an interpreter in the legation because Li Hung Chang, with 
 whom much of the more important business was transacted, 
 had provided himself with interpreters, among them W. H. 
 Pethick, drawn from the American consular service, to act 
 as his personal interpreter. Meanwhile, however, other mis- 
 sionaries had been drawn into the consular service and in 
 succeeding decades rose to positions of great responsibility 
 either in it or in the diplomatic service. 
 
 A less direct yet even broader influence on American 
 policy in Asia came from the books published by the mis- 
 sionaries. Until 1847 the American public knew about 
 China chiefly through British writers, many of whose books 
 were republished in the United States. In that year a New 
 York publisher brought out the first edition of Williams' 
 "Middle Kingdom," though not until nearly every other 
 publisher had declined the venture and the company which 
 undertook it was guaranteed against loss by a Canton mer- 
 chant.^ One of the objects of this monumental work was 
 to put an end to "that peculiar and almost indefinable im- 
 pression of ridicule" which Williams thought was being be- 
 stowed upon the Chinese "as if they were the apes of Euro- 
 peans and their social state, arts and government the bur- 
 lesque of the same things in Christendom." For the next 
 forty years or more it is not too much to say that the books 
 written by missionaries (including those of W. E. Griffis 
 who, while not a missionary, occupied a similar position and 
 view-point) were practically the only American source of 
 any adequacy or accuracy for the formation of public opin- 
 ion about China, Japan and Korea. During the greater part 
 of the nineteenth century Americans looked upon Asia 
 through the eyes of missionaries. 
 
MISSIONARIES AND AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA 559 
 
 The American missionary was not merely the interpreter 
 for his countrymen; he also played a most important role 
 as the interpreter of his country to the Asiatic. Bridgman 
 published (1838) a geographical history of the United States 
 in the Chinese language which was twice revised (1846, 
 1862), and exerted an influence in predisposing the Chinese 
 Government to friendliness towards the United States. ^'^ 
 The linguistic studies of the missionaries, their dictionaries 
 and similar works, opened up the channels of communica- 
 tion. While the British and Continental missionaries 
 shared in these labors, until 1858 the Americans were the 
 leaders. With the exception of Rev. W. A. P. Martin,^ ^ 
 who entered the Chinese service in 1862 as a teacher in the 
 Tungwen College, later becoming president of the Imperial 
 University, and Rev. D. B. McCartee, who held important 
 posts in the Chinese diplomatic service, American mission- 
 aries did not to a great degree become employees of the 
 Chinese Government. But in Japan and in Korea there 
 were notable instances where missionaries like Verbeck, 
 Allen and Hulbert occupied official positions of influence. ^^ 
 Verbeck is credited with having proposed and stimulated 
 the organization of the Iwakura Embassy from Japan in 
 1872. 
 
 The Status of Missionaries under the Treaties 
 
 The legal status of the missionaries in the various coun- 
 tries to which they went is not always easy to define. In 
 China, Japan and Korea the American missionary intro- 
 duced himself by subterfuge which was accompanied by the 
 tolerance and indulgence of native officials. The first mis- 
 sionaries in Canton in the early part of the nineteenth cen^ 
 tury were not only without legal right to be there but were 
 in violation of imperial regulations. They were sponsored 
 by obliging hong merchants who represented them to be 
 clerks attached to the mercantile houses. But in 1844, due 
 to the gratitude of one of the subordinate Chinese com- 
 missioners whose parents had been patients of Dr. Parker, 
 
560 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 the right to erect churches at the open ports was inserted 
 in Article 17 of the Gushing treaty, at the suggestion of the 
 Chinese.^ ^ The treaty, however, contained no stipulation 
 conferring upon the missionaries any liberty to seek con- 
 verts. Later, through the efforts of the French envoy, the 
 Emperor issued a rescript granting a degree of religious 
 toleration.* ^* This rescript referred only to the '^religion of 
 the Lord of Heaven," i.e., the Roman Catholic faith. f 
 Kiying, without the formality of securing a second imperial 
 rescript, followed with an order that the Imperial proclama- 
 tion should apply to Protestants as well as Catholics. 
 
 To neither Catholic nor Protestant missionaries was the 
 rescript very satisfactory. While it legalized their work in 
 the open ports it shut them off from the interior of the 
 country where the Catholic missionaries had already been 
 at work for many years. It was estimated by Abeel that in 
 1830 the Roman Catholic missionaries were employing no 
 less than four bishops and nineteen priests — French, Portu- 
 guese, Italian and Spanish — and claimed more than 200,000 
 converts. These labors were by no means confined to Macao, 
 there being missionaries even in far-away Szechuan. After 
 the treaties of 1844 the missionaries, Protestant and Catho- 
 lic, American and European alike, quickly spread to the 
 newly opened ports, and notwithstanding the stipulations of 
 
 * "Kiying, imperial commissioner, minister of state, and governor general of 
 Kwang-tung and Kwang-si, respectfull.v addresses the throne by memorial. 
 
 "On examination it appears that the religion of the Lord of Heaven is that 
 professed by all the nations of the West ; that its main object is to encourage 
 the good and suppress the v?icked ; that since its introduction into China dur- 
 ing the Ming dynasty it has never been interdicted, that subsequently, when 
 Chinese, practising this religion, often made it a covert for wickedness, even 
 to the seducing of wives and daughters, and to the deceitful extraction of the 
 pupils from the eyes of the sick, government made an investigation and inflicted 
 punishment, as is on rec&rd : and that in the reign of Kiaking special clauses 
 were first laid down for the punishment of the guilty. The prohibition, there- 
 fore, was directed against evil doing, under the covert of religion, and not 
 against the religion professed by the Western foreign nations. 
 
 "Now the request of the French Aml)assador. Lagrene, that those Chinese, 
 doing well, who practise this religion, be exempt from criminality, seems feasible. 
 It is right, therefore, to make the request, and earnestly to crave celestial favor 
 to grant that henceforth all natives and foreigners without distinction, who 
 learn and practise the religion of the Lord of Heaven and do not excite 
 trouble by improper conduct, be exempted from criminality. ... As to those 
 of the French and othor foreign nations who practise the religion, let them 
 only be permitted to build churches at the five ports open for commercial inter- 
 course. They must not presume to enter the country to propagate religion. ... 
 
 "Let it be according to the counsel (of Kiying).- This is from the 
 Emperor." . 
 
 t Subsequently the term "Religion of the Lord Jesus" was introduced into 
 the Chinese vocabulary to designate the Protestant faith. 
 
MISSIONARIES AND AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA 561 
 
 the rescript, frequently made tours into the surrounding 
 country. The most awkward feature of the open violation 
 of the laws of the empire was that regardless of whether 
 their activities were lawful or not, the missionaries were 
 exempted from Chinese jurisdiction by extraterritoriality. 
 The British authorities made some efforts to restrain British 
 and even American missionaries, but the French and the 
 American Governments did not.^^ While no specific viola- 
 tions of the law on the part of the American missionaries 
 were brought to the attention of the American Government 
 in the next ten years, fully half the claims, trivial in amount 
 yet several in number, for reparation and damages, were 
 filed by missionaries who had proceeded to establish mission 
 work in locations which were in violation of the Chinese 
 interpretation of the treaty, and which had been resented in 
 some way either by the officials, the gentry, or the rabble 
 of the various localities. While these claims were usually 
 settled by conciliation and compromise, they created no 
 small amount of irritation. 
 
 The actual negotiations of the American treaty of Tien- 
 tsin were in the hands of Dr. S. Wells Williams and Rev. 
 W. A. P. Martin, the latter acting as interpreter of Man- 
 darin which Williams did not at that time speak. At the 
 preliminary negotiations at Taku, before the destruction of 
 the forts by the British and French, Dr. Williams drew up 
 an article stipulating full toleration for all persons profess- 
 ing Christianity, and permission for American missionaries 
 to travel anywhere in the country, renting or buying houses 
 or land, and living with their families. The Chinese commis- 
 sioner rejected t?iis article as being too broad. But Count 
 Putiatin secured an article which would permit the Russian 
 missionaries to propagate as well as practice their faith in all 
 open localities {"toutes les localites ouvertes") . This privi- 
 lege was to be governed by passports to be issued by the 
 consuls in conference with the local Chinese authorities. 
 
 At Tientsin Dr. Williams, therefore, drafted a similar 
 article for the American treaty, but Mr. Reed objected to it 
 because of the passport provision and also because it as- 
 
562 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 signed to the consul and the Chinese authorities the respon- 
 sibility of determining what missionaries should be worthy 
 to receive passes. This latter provision was then stricken 
 out, and the article submitted to the Chinese. They ob- 
 jected to it and made a proposal to limit the American mis- 
 sionaries to the open ports, and to make their number sub- 
 ject to the determination of the consuls alone. This was 
 less than had been secured in the Russian treaty which was 
 already signed, and was therefore very unsatisfactory to Dr. 
 Williams. Mr. Reed was impatient to sign the treaty the 
 following day, and would have omitted the article altogether 
 had it been necessary to secure the desired consummation of 
 his task. However, Dr. Williams persisted and in the morn- 
 ing was able to draft an article which was acceptable.^^ 
 It reads : 
 
 "Article 29. — The principles of the Christian religion, as professed 
 by the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches, are recognized as 
 teaching men to do good, and to do to others as they would have 
 others do to them. Hereafter those who quietly profess and teach 
 these doctrines shall not be harassed or persecuted on account of their 
 faith. Any person, whether citizen of the United States, or Chinese 
 convert, who, according to these tenets, peaceably teaches and prac- 
 tises the principles of Christianity shall in no case be interfered with 
 or molested." 
 
 It will be noted that this article omitted all definition 
 of locality in which the missionaries might live and work, 
 and that by the insertion of a provision for religious tolera- 
 tion within the empire into a foreign treaty, China was 
 actually making as much of a surrender of those sovereign 
 rights in domestic legislation whi<3h states usually reserve 
 for themselves, as in the commercial provisions of the Lord 
 Elgin treaty. The British treaty contained an article very 
 similar to that in the American treaty. The French treaty 
 carried provision for missionary liberty a step further by 
 stipulating that "an efficacious protection shall be given to 
 the missionaries who peaceably go into the interior. . . ." 
 Two years later the French Convention of Peking (October 
 25, 1860) added very important concessions for Roman 
 Catholics. China engaged to proclaim throughout the Em- 
 
MISSIONARIES AND AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA 563 
 
 pire that people were permitted to propagate and practice 
 the 'teachings of the Lord of Heaven,' that those who indis- 
 criminately arrested Christians would be duly punished ; and 
 further, that all real estate formerly owned by Christians 
 and confiscated at the time when the Catholics were expelled 
 from the empire, would be paid for. The right to rent and 
 purchase land and erect buildings thereon in all the prov- 
 inces was also inserted, surreptitiously, in the Chinese text 
 of the Convention. This latter provision, although not 
 binding upon the Chinese since the French text alone was 
 authoritative, was later actually assented to by the Chinese 
 Government (1865).^''^ 
 
 The aggressiveness of the American missionaries in their 
 disposition to force the opening of the empire is notable. 
 It is entirely in accord with what had been the prevailing 
 spirit in missionary circles from the beginning. Before 1858 
 the missionary suffered far more from the restriction im- 
 posed upon him than did the merchant. Consequently the 
 missionary was the more impatient for greater liberty under 
 treaty protection. It has already been noted that Dr. 
 Parker, as commissioner, would have embarked upon a pro- 
 gram looking towards the dismemberment of the empire by 
 the appropriation of Formosa for the United States. In 
 proposing this project he appears to have been reflecting a 
 spirit which was at the time far more characteristic of the 
 missionaries than of the merchants. Even the implacable 
 Lord Elgin, fresh from his victories at Tientsin, was a little 
 shocked at the sentiments of Dr. Bridgman, dean of the 
 American missionaries, who appears to have been willing 
 to go him one better.^ ^ The missionaries were, in 1858, 
 greatly influenced by the Taiping Rebellion with which they 
 for the most part greatly sympathized, and which seemed 
 to hold out the prospect of a complete revolution. For the 
 Manchu government the missionaries had scant respect, and 
 the sovereignty and integrity of the Empire seemed to them 
 much less important considerations than the opening of 
 doors to evangelization. Theirs was not a very farsighted 
 policy. 
 
564 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 One may also pause at this point, which was the turning 
 point in all missionary work, to speculate as to the impres- 
 sion which the American missionaries had made upon the 
 Chinese. To the Imperial officials, wholly ignorant of the 
 Western world, the distinction between the relation of the 
 French Government to Roman Catholic missionaries and 
 converts and the relation of the American Government to 
 American missionaries could not have been very obvious. 
 The Americans made much of the fact that in the United 
 States there was complete separation of Church and State, 
 and yet in China there were Bridgman, Parker and Williams 
 negotiating the treaty of Wanghia, there was Parker enter- 
 ing the diplomatic service and rising to the highest rank, 
 there were Williams and Martin at Taku and Tientsin, and 
 at the same time there were the missionaries in frequent 
 communication and open sympathy with the Taipings at 
 Nanking. Not only had the Taiping-wang borrowed the 
 color of the doctrines he was proclaiming from the mission- 
 aries, but in 1860 it was the Rev. Issachar J. Roberts, the 
 chief rebel's old teacher, who proceeded to Nanking and, 
 invested with yellow robes and a crown, became the erst- 
 while minister of foreign affairs in the rebel camp.^^ Chris- , 
 tianity in either its Catholic or Protestant forms was a di§-| 
 integrating influence in the Manchu Empire and it must 
 have been difficult for the American missionaries to free 
 themselves from the suspicion which was freely harbored 
 against the French missionaries that they were in someii 
 undefined way the agents of a government which sought the ' ^ 
 disruption of China. 
 
 The American missionaries entered Japan without the 
 protection of any express treaty stipulation for their work. 
 The laws of Japan against the Christian religion were well 
 known and Commodore Perry was instructed to make clear 
 the American separation of Church and State. No mention 
 of religion appears to have occurred in the negotiation of 
 the treaty of 1854. But before Harris had negotiated the 
 treaties of 1857 and 1858 the Dutch had secured toleration 
 
MISSIONARIES AND AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA 565 
 
 for the worship of "their own or the Christian religion" 
 within their own dwelUngs, One of the projects nearest to 
 the heart of Townsend Harris was to secure the opening of 
 Japan to American missionaries and he was most careful to 
 impress the authorities with his own personal devotion to 
 Christian faith and practice. He had, however, at length 
 to content himself with an article on religious freedom which 
 merely enlarged slightly the privileges already granted to 
 the Dutch. Americans were to be permitted the free exer- 
 cise of their religion, the erection of suitable places of wor- 
 ship, and on the other hand were not to "do anything that 
 may be calculated to excite religious animosity." Never- 
 theless several of the American missionary societies, already 
 informed of the possible opening for their work in Japan by 
 S. Wells Williams and the chaplains of Perry's fleet, had 
 undertaken to meet the situation. Rev. Guido Verbeck, 
 born in Holland and in 1858 an applicant for American 
 citizenship, was sent to Nagasaki by tfie Reformed Dutch 
 church. Upon his arrival he found Dr. J. C. Hepburn, 
 Presbyterian, and Rev. John Liggins and M. C. Williams, 
 Episcopalian missionaries, had preceded him to their posts 
 to which they had been transferred from China.-^ The 
 existing prohibitions against aggressive evangelization were 
 not serious handicaps for there had to be, just as previously 
 in China, a large amount of language study before the mis- 
 sionaries could enter effectively upon their duties. Mis- 
 sionary work in Japan began, as elsewhere, with educational 
 and medical service. Meanwhile the missionaries enjoyed 
 merely the protection which was extended to all citizens 
 under the treaty. 
 
 The course of American missions in Japan was in some 
 respects quite different from that in China. Although the 
 government was prone to look upon the Christianization of 
 Japanese subjects as undermining loyalty to the Empire and 
 the Mikado,* nevertheless the missionary, as a teacher of 
 Western civilization, became more and more acceptable to 
 
 *"We . . . obtained from their high officers the distinct and positive avowal 
 that the Mikado's government is based on the Shintoo creed, and for its per- 
 
566 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 the Japanese, who were, unlike the Chinese, most eager to 
 learn. As Japan entered into the long contest for treaty 
 revision the westernization of Japan became a cult which 
 had the support and aggressive encouragement of the high- 
 est Japanese authorities, and the missionaries greatly- 
 profited. Influential ofiicials and Japanese students sent 
 abroad to study became Christians and in Japan formed for 
 the missionaries a substantial constituency such as did not 
 exist in China at any time in the nineteenth century. Hav- 
 ing established themselves in the treaty ports the mission- 
 aries began gradually to extend their work into the interior, 
 using passports which granted them the right to travel for 
 "health or scientific research." This subterfuge was winked 
 at by the Japanese authorities until about 1888 when public 
 opinion began to undergo a reaction against such rapid 
 westernization of the Empire. From that time onward for 
 a few years the authorities became more critical of the 
 presence of missionaries in the interior, some of whom had 
 openly established regular mission stations where they re- 
 mained for long periods without other authorization than 
 their passports. 
 
 In 1890 the anti-foreign feeling in Japan expressed itself 
 in attacks on several missionaries, one of whom was an 
 American. The American minister asked for a declaration 
 of policy from the Japanese Government, and Foreign Min- 
 ister, Count Aoki, stated that while the practices of the 
 missionaries as regards travel in the interior were irregular, 
 their privileges would not be withdrawn. -- 
 
 In the missionary question, as well as in so many other 
 respects, Japan became far more tactful towards the Chris- 
 tian nations than did China. Within a decade after the 
 opening of Japan to trade a discovery was made that in 
 southern Japan communities of Japanese Roman Catholic 
 Christians, their faith and practice somewhat corrupted by 
 their long isolation, had been able to exist during the long 
 
 petuity depends upon the maintenance of that faith at all hazards. That they 
 foresee in the propagation of Christianity the overthrow of this faith and the 
 consequent fall of the Mikado's dynasty. . . ." (De Long to Fish, Jan. 22, i 
 1870.) =1 
 
MISSIONARIES AND AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA 567 
 
 period since the Catholics were expelled from Japan in the 
 early part of the seventeenth century. One of the first edicts 
 issued by the restored Mikado in 1868 renewed the prohibi- 
 tions against Christianity, and forthwith the removal and 
 banishment of the newly discovered Christians was begun. 
 This action drew a strong and identic protest from the 
 foreign representatives which was warmly supported by the 
 American Government. Seward, apparently fearing that the 
 persecution of Christians might lead to an intervention of 
 foreign nations with direful results to the Empire, instructed 
 Van Valkenburgh to convey to the Japanese authorities a 
 very blunt warning. The persecution of the native Chris- 
 tians continued and two years later Secretary of State Fish 
 took up with the British, French and German governments 
 the question of joint action to restrain Japan. Lord Claren- 
 don replied that it seemed unwise to take any action which 
 would in any way embarrass the new sovereign in the estab- 
 lishment of his newly devised domestic administration, and 
 the matter was dropped. ^^ 
 
 The Japanese, however, were quick to realize in 1872 
 when the Iwakura Embassy reached the United States that 
 the persecution of Christians was depriving Japan of the 
 confidence of Christian nations which was so essential to 
 the accomplishment of treaty revision. When Okubo and 
 Ito were sent back to Japan for full powers and instructions 
 for the proposed treaty with the United States they carried 
 the message from the Embassy that Japan must abandon 
 the program for the extirpation of Christianity.^^ Mean- 
 while the missionaries themselves had been winning the 
 confidence of the authorities. Verbeck had already been 
 called to Tokio to organize the Imperial University, and 
 not a few of the American teachers who had been secured 
 for the government schools were stoutly maintaining their 
 purpose to engage in missionary work in an unofficial and 
 personal way. The Japanese Government, at a time when 
 Chinese authorities were seriously considering the possibility 
 of expelling the missionaries, changed its policy and began 
 to conciliate if not to welcome them. This contrast in policy 
 
568 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 was as profitable to Japan as it was costly to China, in the 
 formation of public opinion. Between the American and 
 the Japanese governments there never was any conflict or 
 irritation on the question of missionaries or Christianity 
 after 1870. 
 
 In Korea American missionary work started in much the 
 same extra-legal way as in Japan and China. Catholic 
 Christianity had been introduced into the peninsula by a 
 Chinese priest in 1794.-^ He was put to death in 1801 but 
 the Seminaire des Missions Etrangeres of Paris took up the 
 project and renewed the work under French priests. Some 
 priests were decapitated in 1839. The massacre of 1866, 
 resulting in the energetic action of M. de Bellonet and Ad- 
 miral Roze, has already been referred to. France had as- 
 sumed the protectorate of Roman Catholic missions and 
 converts in the East and before 1880 had made clear that the 
 disturbance of Christian converts was likely to be followed 
 by demands on the part of France, not merely for large in- 
 demnities, but even for the surrender of territory. Korea 
 was both anti-Christian and anti-foreign and China was in 
 fear that the unauthorized projects of Bellonet might some 
 day be renewed in more authoritative fashion. When Com- 
 modore Shufeldt arrived at Tientsin in 1881 he found that 
 while Li Hung Chang was willing to assist in securing a 
 treaty with Korea he was equally disposed to draft a com- 
 pact in which missionary work would be prohibited. The 
 first draft prepared by the Viceroy and submitted to Shu- 
 feldt and Holcombe contained a prohibition against the 
 importation of religious books which was framed to accom- 
 plish this purpose. Upon the representation of Holcombe 
 that such a stipulation would probably defeat the ratifica- 
 tion of the treaty in the United States, the Viceroy with- 
 drew it, leaving the treaty without any reference to reli- 
 gion.-*' By the treaty of 1882 the American missionary 
 enjoyed in Korea only the rights which belonged to all 
 American citizens. 
 
 The missionaries, long eager to enter the Hermit King- 
 dom, appeared at Seoul in 1883-4. Dr. H. N. Allen opened 
 
MISSIONARIES AND AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA 569 
 
 a government hospital (February, 1885) and two months 
 later a regular Presbyterian evangelistic mission was opened 
 by Rev. H. G. Underwood.-''' Soon after this the Methodist 
 Episcopal church entered Korea with Rev. W. B. Scranton, 
 M. D., and Rev. H. G. Appenzeller.-^ Another Christian 
 influence was introduced when Korea officially requested 
 the American Government to nominate some school 
 teachers and Messrs. Gilmore, Bunker and Hulbert, edu- 
 cated in an American theological seminary, arrived in the 
 summer of 1886. American missions, which occupied the 
 field to a greater extent than British or Continental, not 
 only prospered in Korea but won the confidence of the 
 highest authorities, including the king and queen. Under 
 the provisions of the British and German treaties, by means 
 of the most-favored-nation clause in the American treaty, 
 they entered the interior and established sub-stations far 
 removed from the treaty ports. These Americans, who came 
 in time to outnumber the mercantile representatives, be- 
 came sources of a very strong unofficial American influence. 
 Thus emerged a very difficult problem for the American 
 Government which will be discussed in the following section. 
 
 Missionaries and Neutrality 
 
 Because of the wise and conciliatory policy of Japan the 
 missionaries within the Empire were never placed in a posi- 
 tion which might be considered as equivalent to hostility to 
 the existing government. In both China and Korea very 
 different situations developed, one in connection with the 
 Taiping Rebellion and the other in the matter of Korean 
 independence. 
 
 The influence of the missionaries on the beginnings of 
 the Taiping Rebellion has already been noted. The sym- 
 pathy of the Protestant missionaries with the Taipings, 
 which continued at least until 1860, has also been men- 
 tioned. When, in 1853, the American Government adopted 
 toward the rebellion a policy of technical neutrality and 
 non-interference, and when at the same time Marshall 
 
570 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 ignored his instructions and adopted the poHcy of sustaining 
 and supporting the Imperial authority, the attitude and 
 sympathy of the American missionaries became a great 
 obstacle to the accompHshment of his purpose.-^ He en- 
 joined them to neutrality, but at least one of them defied 
 him and visited the rebel camp at Nanking.^*^ Marshall's 
 only recourse, for the enforcement of his injunction, was 
 the public withdrawal of the protection of the United States 
 from those who violated it. He had no power to force them 
 to desist. At the same time the country was in great tur- 
 moil, the Imperial power was paralyzed, and the mission- 
 aries might indulge their sympathies with the utmost im- 
 punity. Meanwhile their government in Washington, by 
 no means as positive in its convictions as their representa- 
 tive in China, was disposed to look upon the revolution 
 without disfavor. The missionaries were in this one respect 
 in a common class with the smugglers. The American Gov- 
 ernment had taken the position that it was the duty of 
 China to enforce her own laws, and so long as the Imperial 
 Government was unable to prevent the importation of 
 opium, or munitions for the rebels, or to prevent the com- 
 munication of the missionaries with Nanking, there was 
 nothing to be done. No effective solution of the problem 
 was devised and it solved itself a few years later when the 
 missionaries, in common with other foreigners, both officials 
 and others, came to see that their confidence in the rebels 
 had been misplaced. 
 
 From the very beginning of diplomatic relations between 
 the United States and Korea the American Government 
 sought to discourage the Koreans from assuming that the 
 American treaty implied any more than was stated, viz., 
 that the United States recognized the independence of the 
 kingdom. The good offices clause was not to be interpreted 
 as including any protectorate functions whatever. The mis- 
 sionaries, however, were in a different position from the 
 diplomatic representatives. Very early in their work Li 
 Hung Chang and his representative, Yuan Shi Kai, by 
 opposing and obstructing them, forced the missionaries into 
 
MISSIONARIES AND AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA 571 
 
 opposition to the gradually unfolding purposes of China. 
 The missionaries proceeded on the theory that the govern- 
 ment which was most favorable to their work was the best 
 government for the kingdom. The reduction of Korea to a 
 province of China would mean the extension to Korea of 
 the anti-foreign and anti-Christian influences which from 
 the time of the Tientsin massacre were preparing the way 
 in China for the Boxer uprising. As the Korean Govern- 
 ment became more and more friendly towards them, the 
 missionaries repaid the confidence with a sturdy and char- 
 acteristically American support of Korean claims to de facto 
 as well as de jure independence. This support was, in turn, 
 a great encouragement to the Koreans. It encouraged them 
 to oppose Yuan Shi Kai in the period preceding the Sino- 
 Japanese War, and it was an even greater encouragement 
 to the opposition which arose against the intrigues of 
 Japan and Russia in the years that followed. That it misled 
 the Korean people into the assumption that the American 
 Government would, in some time of emergency, intervene 
 and assume protectorate functions over the peninsula, there 
 can be little doubt. 
 
 After the Sino-Japanese War Seoul became a center of 
 incredible intrigue exceeding even that which preceded the 
 war. The American missionaries openly sided with the king 
 in his feeble efforts to preserve the independence of his 
 kingdom. Both the Russian and the Japanese governments 
 at different times complained at the actions of the mission- 
 aries. At length, unwillingly, and upon repeated orders 
 from the Department of State, the American Minister sent 
 to every American citizen in Korea the following notice 
 which was also published in The Independent (Seoul, May 
 15, 1897): 
 
 "Legation of the United States. 
 Seoul, Korea, May 11, 1897. 
 Sir, — 
 
 By direction of the Secretary of State I am required to make 
 publicly known to every citizen of the United States sojourning or 
 being temporarily or permanently in Korea, the repeatedly expressed 
 view of the Government of the United States that it behooves loyal 
 
572 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 citizens of the United States in any foreign country whatsoever to 
 observe the same scrupulous abstention from participating in the 
 domestic concerns thereof which is internationally incumbent upon 
 his government. They should strictly refrain from any expression of 
 opinion or from giving advice concerning the internal management 
 of the country, or from any intermeddling in its political questions. 
 If they do so, it is at their own risk and peril. Neither the repre- 
 sentative of this government in the country of their sojourn, nor the 
 Government of the United States itself, can approve of any such 
 action on their part, and should they disregard this advice it may 
 perhaps not be found practicable to adequately protect them from 
 their own consequences. Good American citizens, quitting their own 
 land and resorting to another, can best display their devotion to the 
 country of their allegiance and best justify a claim to its continued 
 and efficient protection while in foreign parts, by confining them- 
 selves to their legitimate avocations, whether missionary work, or 
 teaching in schools, or attending the sick, or other calling or business 
 for which they resort to a foreign country, 
 
 I am Sir, 
 
 Yours respectfully, 
 John M. B. Sill, 
 Minister Resident and Consul General." 
 
 Persecution of Christians in China 
 
 The treaty of Tientsin had created an anomalous posi- 
 tion for American missionaries in China. They were citizens 
 of a government which had held consistently to the separa- 
 tion of church and state, and they were thoroughly imbued 
 with conscientious convictions as to the Tightness of this 
 principle. Under other circumstances they probably would 
 not have demanded preferential treatment, and yet the 
 treaty unquestionably created them a special and preferred 
 class with privileges not accorded to the mercantile popula- 
 tion. Their privileges were still further defined, if not 
 increased, by the French treaty and the Convention of I860, 
 the advantages of which they might claim under the most- 
 favored-nation clause. By the Berthemy Convention 
 (1865) all vagueness as to rights was removed when China 
 definitely conceded the right of the French missionaries to 
 purchase land as well as pursue their calling in every pro- 
 vince. And yet the missionaries felt themselves to be on not 
 very certain ground. Did they, or did they not, have all the 
 
MISSIONARIES AND AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA 573 
 
 rights of the Roman Catholic missionaries? There was not 
 entire agreement among the succeeding American ministers 
 and secretaries of state on this point.^^ The American Gov- 
 ernment appears to have been reluctant to recognize that the 
 missionaries in China were a preferred class, and the mis- 
 sionaries themselves do not appear to have coveted the dis- 
 tinction, but in time all the treaty rights granted to the 
 French missionaries and applicable to the Americans were 
 claimed for them by their government and exercised. The 
 missionaries established themselves in the interior, they 
 acquired "perpetual leases" of land, and they demanded pro- 
 tection from the Chinese authorities. Their government 
 collected their claims for damages and in at least one in- 
 stance the American minister, with the approval of the 
 Department of State, intervened to secure the religious tol- 
 eration for native Christians which was guaranteed by 
 treaty.^^ In 1896, following an outburst of anti-missionary 
 and anti-foreign riots in various provinces the American 
 Government secured a direct and explicit statement from 
 China that the missionaries had every right which had been 
 granted to the French. ^^ In the course of years the mis- 
 sionary question as viewed by the American Government 
 had come to be one of national prestige. To accept less for 
 the Americans than was given to the French would be inter- 
 preted by the Chinese, so it was believed, as a weakness on 
 the part of the United States which would lead to even 
 greater troubles between the two governments."* The mis- 
 sionary question was another illustration of the fact that 
 direct American relations with the Asiatic states were sub- 
 ject to the modifications of international competition. 
 
 The rights granted to the missionaries were made the 
 basis by the merchants for a demand for further opening 
 of the country to trade, and it seems reasonable to believe 
 that at any time in the century at least after 1870, the 
 Chinese Government would have at least removed all mis- 
 sionaries from the interior had it been free to do so.^^ The 
 Protestant missionaries were objectionable to the local au- 
 thorities, to the gentry, and to large masses of the ignorant 
 
574 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 populace because their converts rejected ancestor worship, 
 refused to join in the expenses of idol-processions and temple 
 repairs, and because of their generally disturbing influence 
 on the indolent and corrupt practices of the local authori- 
 ties.^*' The Catholic missionaries were still more objection- 
 able because they claimed official rank in the hierarchy of 
 Chinese officials, because they interfered where their con- 
 Verts were concerned with the operations of the courts and 
 police, and because, through the French Government, they 
 assumed a protectorate over the Chinese converts. They 
 were an imperium in imperio. Religious toleration became 
 to the ruling classes less and less a voluntary toleration and 
 assumed the character of still another imposition by foreign 
 powers. Thus the missionaries came to be placed in 
 an utterly false position such as they had escaped in Japan 
 and Korea, and yet from which it was difficult for either 
 them or their government to retire. Christianity was, in a 
 measure, like opium, being imposed upon China without the 
 consent of the people. The Chinese were free to abstain 
 from either, but they were not free to prohibit them. No 
 candid friend of Christianity and the missionaries can well 
 shut his eyes to these facts. 
 
 With the details of the various riots from the massacre 
 of Tientsin (1870) until the Boxer uprising we cannot be 
 concerned. In general we may note that in these riots the 
 Protestants suffered less than the Catholics, and among the 
 former the American missions suffered least of all. This fact 
 may be offered in testimony that the affairs of the American 
 missions were managed with greater tact, with more concih- 
 ation, or were less associated in the minds of the Chinese 
 than were other missions with the suspected territorial 
 designs of foreign governments. The American as well as 
 the British Government consistently abstained from any 
 cooperative, action with other powers which would have 
 tended to support the pretensions of France for the Roman 
 Catholic missionaries and in time, i.e., in the second Cleve- 
 land administration where the entire cooperative policy was 
 repudiated, the United States withdrew from any coopera- 
 
MISSIONARIES AND AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA 575 
 
 tion whatever with other governments in the settlement of 
 missionary troubles. 
 
 China was blindly and injudiciously contending for the 
 integrity not merely of an empire but also of a form of social 
 organization both of which were disintegrating before her 
 eyes. Had China been possessed of more intelligent and 
 skillful rulers she might have won the sympathy of the 
 Americans in her hopeless struggle for there was a measure 
 of justice on her side, but her leaders were utterly incompe- 
 tent to meet the situation, and China lost the confidence she 
 so sorely needed to sustain her claims to Korea and against 
 Japan. The missionaries were contending for the establish- 
 ment of religious toleration and missionary freedom without 
 which it seemed that their work could not run its natural 
 course. When one compares the hospitality they received 
 from the Japanese and Korean governments which were 
 never coerced by the foreign powers to give it, with the 
 hostility of the Chinese who had granted freedom to mis- 
 sionaries in 1858 and 1860 only after they had been intimi- 
 dated by the powers, one wonders whether there is not here 
 a clear case of cause and effect. It would appear that the 
 Christian missionary work in China did not receive a net 
 benefit from the protection of foreign governments. 
 
 On the other hand the philanthropic and spiritual inter- 
 est of an increasing number of Americans in the welfare of 
 China, which was directly created by the missionaries, was 
 the one constant force operating upon American public 
 opinion in the last decades of the nineteenth century. The 
 commercial interest of the United States in China rose and 
 fell with the trade returns. The political interest ran par- 
 allel with the course of trade. Both declined steadily from 
 1860 to 1895. In general one may conclude that while the 
 missionary contributed much to the disintegration of the 
 Chinese Empire in the last century, and the weakness result- 
 ing from the prostration of China must by itself now be 
 looked upon as a catastrophe, he was at the same time creat- 
 ing much which in more recent years has operated strongly 
 to repair the damage which had been done. 
 
576 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 From the history of Christian missions in China, Japan 
 and Korea one conclusion stands out sharply: much harm 
 and little good has come from governmental patronage and 
 protection of missionary work; and the missionary renders 
 the most enduring service to the people among whom he 
 labors when he separates himself farthest from political 
 concerns. 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. The best general sources on the missionary question are : the 
 
 various volumes of Foreign Relations, to consult which their 
 index is an indispensable guide; Moore's Digest which con- 
 tains important excerpts and references under appropriate 
 headings in the sections on China, Japan and Korea, respec- 
 tively; S. Wells Williams' "Life and Letters"; W. A. P. 
 Martin's "Cycle of Cathay"; Charles Denby: "China and 
 Her People," Vol. 1, chap. 17 ; Chester Holcombe : "The Real 
 Chinese Question," chap. 6. The Missionary question in 
 Foreign Relations is presented more completely than almost 
 any other subject. Practically nothing of importance in the 
 dispatches was omitted. 
 
 2. For interpreters in the consular and diplomatic service in China 
 
 see H. Misc. Docs. 31 :45-2, part 1, pp. 480 ff. 
 
 3. Eliza J. Gillett Bridgman: "Life and Labors of Elijah Cole- 
 
 man Bridgman" (New York, 1864) — a very inadequate book. 
 
 4. David Abeel : "Journal of a Residence in China" (2d Ed., N. Y., 
 
 1836). 
 
 5. S. Wells Williams' "Life and Letters" ; Williams' Journal in 
 
 Proceedings of the N. China Branch of the Royal Asiatic 
 Society, and in the Japan Asiatic Society, respectively, al- 
 ready referred to. 
 
 6. Life, Letters and Journals of Rev. and Hon. Peter Parker, M. D. 
 
 7. Reed Corres., p. 360, June 20, 1858, Reed to Cass. 
 
 8. "Chinese Repository," Vols. 1-20, 1832-1851, Canton, Macao and 
 
 Victoria. The field of the Repository, after its cessation, was 
 occupied by the China Review and the Chinese Recorder. 
 
 9. Williams' "Life and Letters," p. 155. 
 
 10. An excellent review of the labors of the various American mis- 
 
 sionaries will be found in "Memorials of Protestant Mis- 
 sionaries in China" (Shanghai, 1867). ^ 
 
 11. Martin: "Cycle of Cathay." 
 
 12. Griffis : "Verbeck of Japan" ; Allen : "Chronological Index of 
 
 Korea" ; Homer B. Hulbert : "The Passing of Korea." 
 
 13. "Life of Peter Parker," p. 328. 
 
 14. Williams' "Middle Kingdom," Vol. 2, pp. 356 3.; "Chinese 
 
 Repository," Vol. 14, p. 195. 
 
 15. Walter Lowrie: "Memoir of the Rev. Walter M. Lowrie" (Phila- 
 
 delphia, 1854). 
 
MISSIONARIES AND AMERICAN POLICY IN ASIA 577 
 
 16. S. Wells Williams' Journal, p. 86. 
 
 lY. Henri Cordier: "Relations," Vol. 1, cliaps. 4 and 5. 
 
 18. Theodore Walrond : "Letters and Journals of James, Eighth 
 
 Earl of Elgin." 
 
 19. Lindsay Brine: "The Taeping Rebellion in China," pp. 295-8. 
 
 20. Otis Gary: "A History of Christianity in Japan" (New York, 
 
 1909); W. E. Griffis: "Verbeck of Japan" (New York, 1900). 
 
 21. For. Relations, 1870, p. 461. 
 
 22. Japan Desp., Vol. 61, Jan. 2, 1890, Swift to Secy, of State. 
 
 23. For. Relations, 1868, I, pp. 749, 753, 827 ; 1870, pp. 455, 460, 482. 
 
 24. Stead : "Japan by the Japanese," p. 156. 
 
 25. Henri Cordier: "Relations," Vol. 1, chap. 18. 
 
 26. Holcombe, p. 163, makes a slightly different statement of the 
 
 settlement of the religious question from the statement con- 
 tained in the diplomatic dispatches. The writer has followed 
 the latter. For references see chap. 24. 
 
 27. L. H. Underwood: "Underwood of Korea" (New York, 1918); 
 
 "The Call of Korea," by H. G. Underwood (New York, 1908). 
 
 28. W. E. Griffis : "A Modern Pioneer in Korea" (biog. of Henry G. 
 
 Appenzeller). 
 
 29. Marshall Corres., pp. 183 &. 
 
 30. Charles Taylor, M. D. : "Five Years in China," pp. 38 if. 
 
 31. Moore's "Digest," Vol. 5, pp. 452 ff. ; see Koo : "Status of Aliens 
 
 in China," chap. 16, for a digest of the policies of the various 
 treaty powers, with special reference to Great Britain, France 
 and Germany. 
 
 32. Moore's "Digest," Vol. 5, p. 460. 
 
 33. Ibid., p. 458 ; see also China Desp., Vol. 103, July 10, 1897, Denby 
 
 to Secy, of State. 
 
 34. For. Relations, 1875, pp. 333, 399. 
 
 35. For Tientsin massacre and Wensiang note, see For. Rel., 1870, 
 
 pp. 355 ff.; 1871, pp. 97 ff. 
 
 36. Arthur H. Smith: "China in Convulsion," Vol. 1, chaps. 3, 4, 
 
 give an excellent exposition as viewed by a liberal Protestant 
 missionary. 
 
CHAPTER XXX 
 
 AMEKICAN TEADE: 1844-1898 
 
 The broad history of the American commerce with Asia 
 is too large a subject to be brought within the scope of this 
 study and yet certain phases of it cannot be neglected if one 
 would understand the course of American policy. The very 
 intimate relation between trade and politics in the first half 
 of the century has already been shown. In the next fifty 
 years both trade and politics became more complex and it is 
 not always so easy to trace the relationship. Trade history 
 under the treaties falls naturally into three periods, each 
 with marked and peculiar characteristics. These periods 
 are: 1844-58, 1859-95 and 1896-1900. The treaties of 1858 
 are a clear dividing line after which the trade which had 
 hitherto been confined to China, and to five open ports, 
 spread out to a steadily increasing number of cities in China, 
 and also extended itself to Japan, and then to Korea. The 
 close of the Sino-Japanese War is also a dividing line, coin- 
 ciding as it does, roughly, with the new industrial and mer- 
 cantile development of the United States which followed 
 the recovery from the panic of 1893. The end of the century j | 
 finds this new development in the full tide of its growth. 
 Meanwhile the close of the war in Asia had set in motion a 
 new commercial and political activity to which was related 
 the McKinley-Hay policies with which our study comes to 
 a close. A comprehensive survey of the trade history would 
 include an examination of American relations with the 
 Pacific Islands, and the Indian Ocean ports, but for our 
 purposes we can afford to neglect them because they appear 
 to have exercised practically no influence on policies. In 
 the last quarter of the century until 1898 the attention of 
 
 578 
 
AMERICAN TRADE: 1844-1898 579 
 
 Americans, in so far as it extended to Asia at all, was cen- 
 tered on Japan and China with occasional reference to 
 Korea and the Hawaiian Islands. 
 
 Both American commerce and tonnage increased rapidly 
 from 1844 to 1858. But it was also the time during which 
 the first generation, the pioneer traders in China, disap- 
 peared. American trade was being carried on by the sons 
 and relatives, for the most part, of the men who had founded 
 it. The significant fact, looking towards the future, was 
 that the third generation in these families was not remaining 
 in the trade.* It is, probably, no injustice to those who 
 came later, to state that the American mercantile com- 
 munity in the East reached its point of maximum vigor 
 before the outbreak of the American Civil War. Dry-rot 
 was already setting in and the domestic development of the 
 United States was such that men of ability and character 
 equal to that of the pioneers in Asia could now find ampler 
 rewards at home in the fields of manufacturing, banking and 
 transportation. The East India trade was no longer an El 
 Dorado. 
 
 The period of 1859-95 was characterized by the decay, 
 withdrawal or failure of all the American mercantile houses 
 famous before the treaties of Tientsin, and by the entrance 
 of no new merchants who rose to equal eminence. The fail- 
 ures of Olyphant and Company in December, 1878, and of 
 Russell and Company in June, 1891, eliminated two of the 
 most famous of the older American firms, and surrendered 
 to British and German competitors a prestige and commer- 
 cial leadership in China which Americans have never re- 
 gained. No younger firms and no American banks had been 
 developing to take over American interests and carry them 
 on. The new firms which had appeared since the Civil War 
 were, with very few notable exceptions, not well supplied 
 with capital, and sometimes inclined to speculations and 
 
 *One may trace this fact in the history of nearly all of the American 
 familie-s prominently identified with the East India trade before 1850 — there 
 never were more than a score of them. In the second half of the century it 
 is rare to find an American merchant in either China or Japan by the name 
 of Perkins, Russell, Forbes, Gushing, Olyphant, Talbot. Griswold, Low, Wet- 
 more or Wolcott, who was born after 1830. On the other hand these names 
 occur with increasing frequency in the domestic commercial life of the nation. 
 
580 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 methods which brought little credit to American trade. 
 This was especially true in China. 
 
 In measuring the influence of trade on political policy it 
 must also be borne in mind that the trade was never a large 
 proportion of the total American foreign trade.^ From 
 1821 to 1897 the ratio of the total value of merchandise im- 
 ported into and exported from the United States in the trade 
 with all Asia ranged from 5.90 to 6.97 per cent of the total 
 American former trade. While it rose in an exceptional 
 period of nine months in 1843 to nearly 14 per cent, from 
 1850 to 1890 it ranged either slightly above or slightly below 
 5 per cent. The exports from the United States were small 
 as compared with the imports — from a third to as low as a 
 tenth as much. The value of the trade with China dropped 
 steadily from 1860 to 1897 from 3 to less than 2 per cent of 
 the total American trade, and while the trade with Japan 
 was steadily increasing from nothing, it had reached only 
 2 per cent of the total American foreign trade in 1897. 
 These facts lead to the inevitable conclusion that in the 
 four decades following the close of the American Civil War 
 the trans-Pacific trade of the United States was of slight im- 
 portance to the American people. It was the missionary 
 and political interests of America in Asia which kept the 
 Far Eastern problem before the American people, to even 
 the slight degree in which it held their attention. 
 
 One finds in the relative status of the China and the 
 Japan trade another reason why American policy steadily 
 inclined towards Japan. While the volume of trade with 
 China indicated a fairly steady increase after the close of 
 the Civil War, its value showed an actual shrinkage due to. 
 the declining value of silver. The increase in volume of; 
 trade was not even sufficient to offset the decrease in 
 values.* While the trade was valued at $22,472,605 in 
 1860, thirty years later it was only $19,206,680. On the 
 other hand the trade with Japan, beginning with $193,865 
 in 1860, advanced to $26,335,967 in 1890, having surpassed 
 
 *The haekwan tael declined from $1,522 (January 1, 1874) to $1.01 (1893) ; 
 $.849 (1894) ; and $.703 (1900). 
 
AMERICAN TRADE: 1844-1898 
 
 581 
 
 Value in Gold of Merchandise Imported into and Exported from the 
 United States, Fiscal Years 1865 to 1904 * 
 
 years 
 
 1889 
 1890 
 1891 
 1892 
 1893 
 1894 
 1895 
 1896 
 1897 
 1898 
 1899 
 1900 
 1901 
 1902 
 1903 
 1904 
 
 CHINESE empire ' 
 
 Exports to 
 
 Dollars 
 2,669,449 
 3,145,231 
 3,578.808 
 3,980,014 
 5,203,238 
 3,116,381 
 2,070,832 
 2,936,835 . 
 1,062,598 
 843,121 
 1,464,524 
 1,390,360 
 1,707,872 
 3,604,546 
 2,651,677 
 1,101,383. 
 5,447,680 
 5,895,983 
 4,080,322 
 4,626,578 
 6,396,500 
 7,520,581 
 6,246,626 
 4,582,585 
 5,791,128 
 2,946,209 
 8,701,008 
 5,663,497 
 3,900,457 
 5,862,426 
 3,603,840 
 6,921,933 
 11,921,433 
 9,992,894 
 14,493,440 
 15,259,167 
 10,405,834 
 24,722,906 
 18,898,163 
 12,862,202 
 
 Imports 
 from 
 
 Dollars 
 5,129,917 
 10,131,142 
 12,112,440 
 11,384,999 
 13,207,361 
 14,565,527 
 20,064,365 
 26,752,835 
 26,353.110 
 18,144,210 
 13,473,600 
 12,353,943 
 11,130,495 
 15,887,820 
 16,431,344 
 21,769,618 
 22,317,729 
 20,214,341 
 20,141.331 
 15,616,793 
 16,292,169 
 18,972,963 
 19,076,780 
 16,690,589 
 17,028,412 
 16,260,471 
 19,321,850 
 20,488,291 
 20,636.535 
 17,135.028 
 20,545,829 
 22,023,004 
 20,403,862 
 20,326.436 
 18,619,268 
 26,896,926 
 18,303,706 
 21,055,830 
 26,648,846 
 29,342,488 
 
 HONGKONG 
 
 Exports to 
 
 Dollars 
 
 1,493,372 
 
 1,286,008 
 2,102,224 
 3,339,532 
 3,229,834 
 3,262,709 
 3,290,522 
 2,877,392 
 2,916,854 
 3,227,897 
 3,777,759 
 3,083,849 
 4,149,311 
 4,056,236 
 2,984,042 
 3,351,952 
 3,686,384 
 4,439,153 
 4,768,697 
 4,894,049 
 4,216,602 
 4,209,847 
 4,253,040 
 4,691,201 
 6,060,039 
 6,265,200 
 7,732,525 
 8,485,978 
 8,009,848 
 8,030,109 
 8,772,453 
 10,412,548 
 
 Imports 
 from 
 
 Dollars 
 
 838,649 
 
 449,230 
 
 1,202,816 
 
 493,690 
 
 1,171,189 
 
 2,232,663 
 
 1,653,350 
 
 2,251,089 
 
 2,399,828 
 
 2,424,092 
 
 1,918,894 
 
 1,504,580 
 
 983,815 
 
 1,072,459 
 
 1,436,481 
 
 1,445,774 
 
 1,480,266 
 
 969,745 
 
 563,275 
 
 763,323 
 
 878,078 
 
 892,511 
 
 776,476 
 
 1,419,124 
 
 923,842 
 
 746,517 
 
 2,479,274 
 
 1,256,267 
 
 1,416,412 
 
 1,277,755 
 
 1,359,905 
 
 1,652,038 
 
 Exports to 
 
 Dollars 
 
 41,913 
 
 254,779 
 
 712,024 
 
 769,471 
 
 1,291,936 
 
 571,186 
 
 476,173 
 
 906,213 
 
 1,174,854 
 
 1,046,965 
 
 1,661.933 
 
 1,099,696 
 
 1,252,346 
 
 2,246,827 
 
 2,676,924 
 
 2,552,888 
 
 1,468,976 
 
 2,540,664 
 
 3,376,434 
 
 2,528,529 
 
 3,057,415 
 
 3,135,533 
 
 3,335,592 
 
 4,214,382 
 
 4,619,985 
 
 5,232,643 
 
 4,807,693 
 
 3,290,111 
 
 3,195,494 
 
 3,986,815 
 
 4,634,717 
 
 7,689,685 
 
 13,255,478 
 
 20,385,541 
 
 17,264,688 
 
 29,087,475 
 
 19,000,640 
 
 21,485,883 
 
 20,933,692 
 
 24,955,032 
 
 Imports 
 from 
 
 Dollars 
 
 285,176 
 
 1,815,364 
 
 2,618,283 
 
 2,424,153 
 
 3,245,317 
 
 3,052.026 
 
 5,298,153 
 
 6,537,584 
 
 7,903,794 
 
 6,468,460 
 
 7,759,569 
 
 15,470,047 
 
 13,687,061 
 
 7,446,547 
 
 9,845,562 
 
 14,510,834 
 
 14,217,600 
 
 14,439,495 
 
 15,098,890 
 
 11,274,485 
 
 11,767,956 
 
 14,885,573 
 
 17,114,181 
 
 18,621,576 
 
 16,687,992 
 
 21,103,324 
 
 19,309,198 
 
 23,790,202 
 
 27,454,220 
 
 19,426,522 
 
 23,695,957 
 
 25,537,038 
 
 24,009,756 
 
 25,223,610 
 
 26,716,814 
 
 32,748,902 
 
 29,229,543 
 
 37,552,778 
 
 44,143,728 
 
 47,166,576 
 
 a From 1865 to 1872 includes Hongkong. 
 *> Prior to 1873 included in "Chinese Empire." 
 
 * Adapted from Monthly Summary of Commerce and Finance, Sept. 1904, 
 p. 1211. 
 
582 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 the China trade.* After the Sino-Japanese War the entire 
 trade with Asia was greatly stimulated but Japan retained 
 the lead. In 1897 the total trade between the United States 
 and China was $32,328,295 while the trade with Japan had 
 reached $37,265,234. (See above table.) The more im- 
 portant factors in the increase of the Japan over the China 
 trade were : the purchase of an increasing proportion of tea 
 and silk in Japan for which China had been the sole source 
 before 1860; and the beginning of manufacturing in Japan 
 which created a market for an increasing amount of Ameri- 
 can raw cotton. The trade with Korea was trivial.f An- 
 other factor tending to promote the Japanese trade was the 
 entrance of Japanese commission houses into the United 
 States after the Centennial Exposition of 1876. 
 
 A better understanding of the trade conditions at the 
 beginning of the McKinley administration comes from a 
 review of the commercial policies of the competing nations 
 in the preceding generation. What were the possible meth- 
 ods of promoting trade and how far had the Americans 
 adopted those methods with success? Broadly speaking 
 there were, aside from the simple exchange of commodities, 
 the following methods : ownership of merchant fleets ; plac- 
 ing of foreign advisers in positions of influence in the ser- 
 vice of Asiatic states where their influence would tend to 
 divert purchases; securing of concessions for the operation 
 of telegraphs, railroads or mines ; and loaning money to the 
 various governments. 
 
 * Tbe statistics used for China do not include Flongltong. If the latter trade 
 is added, it will be found that the China trade retained first place ; however, 
 the ratio of increase was greater for the Japan trade. 
 
 t It Is difficult to appraise the exact share of the Americans in the Korean 
 trade which had reached a total of a little more than $9,500,000 gold in 1897. 
 A certain amount of American produce was brought into Korea through Japa- 
 nese and Chinese sources, and the American firms in Korea dealt almost exclu- 
 sively with Japanese or Chinese merchants. The Decennial Reports of the 
 Chinese Maritime Customs for the years 1882-91 show the Americans to have 
 had but 2 per cent of the import trade at Chemulpo (Jenchuan) one of the 
 three Korean ports of entry. The bulk of the Korean trade was divided 
 between the English and the Japanese with the latter steadily gaining the 
 ascendancy. 
 
AMERICAN TRADE: 1844-1898 583 
 
 Decline of American Shipping 
 
 The decline of the American merchant marine which 
 became so marked after the Civil War was somewhat re- 
 tarded in Chinese and Japanese waters by special circum- 
 stances. 
 
 The treaties of Tientsin by increasing the number of 
 open ports and opening the Yangtze River as far as Hankow 
 to foreign ships created a new demand for vessels which 
 were more dependable than the native junks. The dis- 
 ordered internal conditions of China and Japan made it 
 especially convenient not only for the foreigners but also for 
 native merchants to entrust their cargoes to insurable vessels 
 under foreign flags which were best able to command the 
 respect of insurgents and most likely to have their claims 
 paid in case of loss by capture. These conditions coincided 
 with the improvement of steam navigation. The result was 
 the creation immediately of a considerable fleet of relatively 
 small steamers under foreign flags which obtained a very 
 large share of the rapidly developing trade. The number of 
 these vessels was swollen in China by the practice of selling 
 to the Chinese lorcha owners the right to use a foreign flag 
 over their vessels. This was accomplished by an ingenious 
 transaction in which the technical ownership of the lorcha 
 was transferred to the foreigner who in turn gave back to 
 the Chinese a mortgage for the full value of the vessel which 
 carried with it the right to operate the craft. The foreign 
 flag was then hoisted as an evidence of foreign ownership 
 but the foreigner named in the vessel's papers never ap- 
 peared except in case of trouble with either the native or 
 foreign authorities when his technical ownership was sufii- 
 cient to bring any legal troubles which might arise into the 
 extraterritorial courts. These semi-fraudulent transac- 
 tions were winked at by the foreign authorities and led to 
 great abuses for many years. ^ The lorcha Arrow which gave 
 so much trouble to Viceroy Yeh at Canton in 1856 had been 
 flying the British flag under such an arrangement. There 
 was at least one American merchant in the two decades fol- 
 
584 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 lowing the treaties of 1858 who specialized in this class of 
 business. 
 
 The American mercantile houses had entered the coast- 
 ing trade of China under the transshipment provisions of 
 the Gushing treaty and as a part of the opium traffic, and 
 were well prepared to enter into the new opportunities 
 created by the treaties of 1858. Russell and Company or- 
 ganized the Shanghai Steam Navigation Company and 
 within a few years had no less than sixteen steamers en- 
 gaged in the coast-wise and river trade. Four of these had 
 been built in the United States and had carried American 
 registers. One was built in the United States and sold to 
 a Japanese daimio who resold it to the Shanghai company. 
 Six were built in Scotland after 1868 and brought to Shang- 
 hai under British register. Five had been built at Shang- 
 hai.^ They were operated under the American flag under 
 consular "sailing-letters," the flag being merely an evidence 
 of American ownership but not, of course, of American 
 registry. Owing to the scarcity of American seamen and 
 masters in the Far East, and still more because Chinese or 
 other non- American labor was cheaper it became customary 
 to dispense almost or even entirely with American citizens 
 in the operation of these vessels, even the master being in 
 some cases an Englishman. The practice was at least some- 
 what irregular and could not stand very close scrunity ac- 
 cording to American maritime law, but it was winked at by 
 the Shanghai consulate and was not unknown to the De- 
 partment of State. It is the presence of these vessels and 
 the lorchas already described which partially accounts for 
 the fact that American shipping in Chinese waters appears 
 to have retained its place long after the American mercantile 
 marine had begun to disappear from other .foreign ports. 
 
 Another factor in keeping the American flag on the 
 Pacific was the establishment of the Pacific Mail Steamship 
 Company line in 1867.^ By act of Congress (February 16, 
 1865) a subsidy which in the course of ten years amounted 
 to a little more than $4,500,000 was granted in this line. In 
 1872 an additional vessel was authorized with an additional 
 
AMERICAN TRADE: 1844-1898 585 
 
 subsidy of $500,000 annually, but two years later it was 
 discovered that a million dollars had been spent to secure 
 this additional assistance from the government and in 1877 
 when the original grant expired all subsidy was eliminated. 
 This line of steamers was originally intended to run by way 
 of Honolulu to Japan and Shanghai, but the company was 
 released from the obligation to stop at the Hawaiian Islands 
 and was thus able to reduce the distance to be sailed by 
 taking the great-circle route. The subsidizing of this line 
 of steamers was often referred to in later years when the 
 perennial question of ship-subsidies appeared, either as an 
 argument to prove the value of them or to show their cor- 
 rupting influence. Probably more important than the gov- 
 ernment aid was the rapid development of the Chinese immi- 
 gration, which was extremely profitable. It is a notable fact 
 that the Pacific Mail continued to operate its lines after the 
 subsidy was removed, and that in later years another com- 
 pany, the Occidental and Oriental, put on four additional 
 vessels. It ought also to be mentioned that these latter 
 steamers were of British construction and ownership, being 
 merely leased to an American company. 
 
 Neither the Japanese nor the Chinese accepted with 
 complacency the passing of their coast-wise trade into the 
 hands of foreigners. Japan immediately entered upon a pro- 
 gram of nautical education and ship-building and as rapidly 
 as possible entered both the California and the China trade, 
 while China also displayed an unwonted degree of enterprise 
 which resulted in the organization, under the patronage of 
 Li Hung Chang, of the China Merchants Company, with a 
 view to competition with the steamers under foreign flags. 
 For the assistance of this new company a form of subsidy 
 was devised in which the company was permitted to trans- 
 port the government rice from the Yangtze and Shanghai to 
 Tientsin at rates in excess of current freight rates. The 
 American vessels were unable to meet this competition, ac- 
 companied as it was by the undoubted anti-foreign senti- 
 ment of Chinese merchants and government alike, and in 
 1877 Russell and Company sold its fleet to the China Mer- 
 
586 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 chants.^ During the Franco-Chinese War the entire China 
 Merchants fleet was i;esold to Russell and Company but 
 after the war the Chinese forced the return of the fleet by 
 declining to continue the rice-freights so long as the steam- 
 ers remained in foreign hands. The American flag then 
 practically disappeared from the merchant marine in 
 Chinese waters. The significant facts are that this fleet had 
 never been under American registry and had never complied 
 with the American law as to American construction and op- 
 eration ; that at the time when the American fleet was sold 
 to the Chinese in 1877 a British fleet of nine steamers was 
 already in successful operation up the Yangtze and along the 
 coast; and that notwithstanding the use of the American 
 flag in the trans-Pacific trade, the total volume of American 
 trade with China does not appear to have been greatly bene- 
 fited by it. The greater part of the freight from China to 
 America was carried in foreign vessels — after the opening of 
 the Suez Canal by way of the Mediterranean and across the 
 Atlantic. While the American fleet was of some unques- 
 tioned advantage to the American traders, the causes of the 
 relative unimportance of the Far Eastern trade of the 
 United States in the last forty years of the century lie much 
 deeper than in a declining merchant marine. 
 
 Foreign Advisers in China, Japan and Korea 
 
 The most remarkable instance of the use of foreign 
 advisers was in the Foreign Inspectorate of Chinese Mari- 
 time Customs. As already shown the Chinese Customs 
 came under the direction of Messrs. Wade, Lay and Hart, 
 respectively, not so much because British claims were being 
 urged, as because the Americans were simply without com- 
 petent candidates. It is indeed fortunate for the Maritime 
 Customs that Americans did not come into control of it 
 for in all probability, had they done so, it would have been 
 made the victim of the spoils system of American politics.* 
 
 ♦William H. Seward, beset with office-seekers at the beginning of the Lin- 
 coln administration, was under the impression that he had the official right 
 to dictate appointments to the Chinese Maritime Customs. One of his first 
 
 4 
 
AMERICAN TRADE: 1844-1898 587 
 
 The first experience of the Chinese Government with 
 American assistants was in the employment of Ward and 
 Burgevine in the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion. 
 Ward rendered an honorable service, but Burgevine left a 
 stain upon his country's reputation. The purchase of the 
 Lay-Osborne Flotilla in England led to a new interest in 
 coal mines, the product of which would be so much in de- 
 mand for steam navigation of government vessels. Raphael 
 Pumpelly, an American who had just completed similar 
 geological surveys for the Japanese Government, was in- 
 vited to make a report on Chinese coal resources. This might 
 have led to an early development of Chinese mines under 
 American supervision had not the Lay-Osborne Flotilla be- 
 come such a source of embarrassment to' the Tsung-li 
 Yamen. The return of this fleet not only put an end to the 
 interest in coal mines but also made the government wary 
 of foreign advisers like Mr. Lay.^ 
 
 Following the end of the Taiping Rebellion several Eng- 
 lishmen and Frenchmen from Ward's or Gordon's armies 
 entered Chinese service, especially in the supervision of 
 arsenals. No Americans were similarly employed for there 
 were no competent candidates. The next important post 
 in the Chinese service for which an American was a possible 
 candidate was in connection with the Chinese navy which 
 Li Hung Chang had begun to develop about 1880. Com- 
 modore Shufeldt thought that he was deprived of the posi- 
 tion through the intrigues of other governments. There 
 may have been a measure of truth in Shufeldt's suspicions, 
 but it seems hardly probable that the man who wrote, even 
 in confidence, the famous Sargent letter, could have ren- 
 dered a very effective service to either the Chinese or his own 
 countrymen. It cannot be denied that in the employment 
 of foreign advisers for China the American interests were 
 not well represented, but they would appear to have had as 
 much representation as they deserved or as was warranted 
 by the proportion of American to the total foreign trade of 
 
 official communications to the American representative in China was to ask 
 him to replace an American then in the Customs service with one of Seward's 
 political friends. 
 
588 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 China. The failure of Russell and Company in 1891 greatly 
 prejudiced the Chinese against Americans. The Chinese 
 Government lost heavily in this failure and Li Hung Chang 
 is reported to have stated shortly after the failure, which 
 came at a time when the immigration question was produc- 
 ing the maximum amount of trouble, that he would never 
 again employ an American for any purpose. 
 
 Japan turned freely to America for advice and was 
 fortunate in securing a large number of Americans of excel- 
 lent ability and character.'^ However, the greater number 
 of the Americans in Japanese service were employed either 
 in the development of the school system or otherwise in 
 positions which were only remotely related to trade. Japan 
 turned to the United States for assistance in building her 
 new navy after the Restoration, and even earlier had pur- 
 chased several American-built naval vessels, but in such 
 matters the Americans were at an obvious disadvantage 
 because the American navy was itself rapidly declining, and 
 American ship-yards had already lost their world-wide su- 
 premacy. The Japanese orders for naval vessels during the 
 American Civil War appear to have been handled in a way 
 which could not lead to extended future orders. Japanese 
 interests were badly served. However the rapid increase of 
 American trade with Japan may be somewhat attributed to 
 the influence of American advisers as well as to the influence 
 of the returned Japanese students, so many of whom in the 
 seventies and eighties were being educated in the United 
 States. 
 
 The indifference of the American Government to the 
 desires of Korea for American advisers has already been 
 noted, and the reason for it indicated. Korea was an im- 
 poverished country with little money to spend for any 
 purpose and a preponderance of American influence in 
 Korea was more embarrassing than profitable. 
 
 Foreign Concessions at the Treaty Ports 
 
 The word concession is used loosely in two different 
 senses meaning in the one case the foreign settlement at a 
 
AMERICAN TRADE: 1844-1898 589 
 
 treaty port, and in the other a business privilege or contract 
 granted to foreigners by the government. 
 
 In the foreign settlements estabhshed after the treaties 
 of Tientsin in China the Americans came out badly. While 
 the American minister was "junketing" through Europe to 
 the Orient and back in 1859 and 1860 — the term accurately 
 describes the conditions under which John E. Ward assumed 
 and discharged the duties of his office — there was no one 
 to uphold the principles of the international foreign settle- 
 ment as they had been worked out at Shanghai in 1853-4. 
 Unopposed, the British reverted to the plan which Hum- 
 phrey Marshall had overthrown, and established at Hankow 
 and Canton British settlements in which the British Gov- 
 ernment leased the land from China and then issued titles 
 to applicants in the form of sub-leases. Thus disappeared 
 even the safe-guard to Chinese sovereignty which had ap- 
 peared in the earliest Shanghai land regulations where the 
 title, although registered at the British consulate, was actu- 
 ally issued by the taotai. There was no disposition on the 
 part of the Chinese to discriminate against the Americans 
 and when Tientsin was opened a lease for a settlement 
 was actually issued to the American consul, but it was never 
 approved by his government. At the new ports the Ameri- 
 cans were quite satisfied with their allotments of land, but 
 the fact remains that the idea of an international settlement 
 had been superseded by that of a series of national settle- 
 ments such as the British and French had originally contem- 
 plated. The effect of this change was to place the desirable 
 water-front or mercantile property at each newly opened 
 treaty port under the control of some power other than 
 China and to make the Americans tenants of some European 
 nation. The result was that when in later years new Ameri- 
 can firms appeared in China the most desirable locations 
 were all preempted and the Americans had to take what was 
 left. Prospective American interests in 1858-61 suffered in 
 this respect in China because they were indolently repre- 
 sented. In 1862 Burlingame found that both the French 
 and the British residents were disposed to assume that the 
 
590 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 leases of land in the various foreign settlements were equiv- 
 alent to cession of territory. In 1862 France withdrew from 
 the international settlement at Shanghai. In June, 1863, 
 the Chinese Government formally granted permission to the 
 Americans to erect residences, business houses and go-downs 
 at Hong-kew,^ across Soochow Creek and outside the legal 
 limits of the settlement, but a few months later the Ameri- 
 cans at Hong-kew, some of whom had established themselves 
 there many years before without formal permission, heartily 
 agreed to the merging of the new area in the International 
 Settlement under new Land Regulations. The French, how- 
 ever, stood aloof. 
 
 In the treaty ports in Japan, and later in Korea, different 
 conditions prevailed from the outset. The Japanese never 
 relinquished control of their ports, and although the foreign- 
 ers virtually maintained their own municipal government 
 in the open ports no rights discriminating in favor of any 
 nation were granted. In Korea the Americans were first on 
 the ground, after the Japanese and obtained preferred build- 
 ing locations, some of which were subsequently given up 
 merely because there was no reason for holding them. 
 
 Telegraphs and Cables 
 
 Americans were the first to project the plan of trans- 
 Pacific telegraph communications. The first proposal was 
 for a line northward through British Columbia, thence by 
 way of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, down the coast of 
 Siberia to the mouth of the Amur.'' It was hoped by thus 
 utilizing land lines for the greater part of the way to avoid 
 the difficulties which were encountered with the first sub- 
 marine cables. During the Civil War this project was 
 being urged. The necessary rights to cross British and 
 Russian territory were secured and Congress voted assist- 
 ance. The project collapsed upon the completion and suc- 
 cessful operation of the second Atlantic cable. In 1865 
 Anson Burlingame secured a verbal agreement from the 
 Tsung-li Yamen that China would grant permission to the 
 
 I 
 
AMERICAN TRADE: 1844-1898 591 
 
 East India Telegraph Company of New York to lay cables 
 along the coast of China as far south as Hongkong.^^ The 
 line thus projected would be linked up to the Russian tele- 
 graph already completed to Kiatka, 800 miles from Peking, 
 to the Russo-American line by way of Kamtchatka and 
 Alaska, and at Hongkong to a proposed British line from 
 India. In order to bring about an amicable adjustment of 
 the rival claimants for this important concession it had 
 become necessary for the Americans to agree to make the 
 company international in character by admitting both Brit- 
 ish and French share-holders. But the East India Telegraph 
 Company does not appear ever to have passed beyond the 
 promotion stage. With the collapse of Ihe Russo-American 
 company it also disappeared. Indeed it is difficult to see 
 how such an extensive plan could ever have been realized by 
 Americans without generous assistance from abroad, al- 
 though the Russo-American company, which was almost 
 identical with the Western Union Telegraph company, spent 
 $3,000,000 before abandoning the northern line. 
 
 A part of the plan thus first promoted by Americans was 
 immediately taken up by the Danes, who occupied an espe- 
 cially favorable political position because they were friendly 
 with both Russia and Great Britain. The Great Northern 
 Telegraph Company (Danish) supported by Sir Thomas 
 Wade at Peking secured in 1870 the privilege of laying a 
 cable along the coast northward from Hongkong to Shanghai 
 with the understanding that the cable ends at the various 
 ports were to be carried to hulks moored in the ports and not 
 to be landed. The entrance of the Danish Company marked 
 the disappearance of American interests from the telegraph 
 situation in China. However the Americans gave the most 
 cordial support to the Great Northern Telegraph Company 
 and assisted in its promotion in a multitude of ways. In 
 1874, when the military value of the telegraph was revealed 
 to the Chinese at the time of the threatened Japanese at- 
 tack on Formosa M. M. De Lano, the American consul at 
 Foochow, represented the Danish interests and conducted a 
 large part of the negotiations by which the Great Northern 
 
592 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Telegraph Company secured the rights not only for a cable 
 to Formosa but also for certain land lines in Fukien.^^ At 
 about the same time the Woosung Railway Company 
 granted permission to the Danes to land their line at Woo- 
 sung and carry it to the international settlement at Shanghai 
 over the property recently purchased for the railway. 
 
 The Chinese, however, viewed the extension of tele- 
 graphs with timidity. Not only were there objections from 
 the superstitious people and geomancers who urged that the 
 wires would disturb the Jung-shui, but the government also 
 feared that it would be unable to protect the lines and that 
 their injury by either thieves or the superstitious would 
 result in the inevitable claim for damages and perhaps for 
 further demands by the treaty powers. The Woosung- 
 Shanghai line was ordered removed, the cable to Formosa 
 was postponed, and the government purchased the land hues 
 in Fukien and then destroyed them. Before 1875 the 
 Chinese Government had adopted the policy also in opera- 
 tion in Japan of excluding foreigners from the ownership 
 or control of both telegraphs and railroads. The difference 
 between China and Japan at this point was that while the 
 Japanese were earnestly seeking to perfect themselves in the 
 skill necessary for the successful operation of such utilities, 
 sending multitudes of students abroad and employing many 
 foreign teachers at home, the Chinese Government was pur- 
 suing its customary policy of advancing to meet no problem 
 and solving each one as much by denial and evasion as 
 possible. 
 
 Military necessity, aided by the enlightened convictions 
 of Li Hung Chang and a few other military officials, was 
 nevertheless slowly crowding the Chinese Government to 
 take action and in 1881, while retaining Chinese ownership 
 of the lines, the Tsung-li Yamen gave to the Great Northern 
 Telegraph Company the contract for the construction of 
 some new land lines in the vicinity of Tientsin and Peking. 
 The American Government viewed this advance of Danish 
 interests without dissatisfaction, although Secretary of State 
 Fish (March 4, 1875) had already expressed disapproval of 
 
AMERICAN TRADE: 1844-1898 593 
 
 the evident monopolistic character of the Danish intentions. 
 But the Americans became alarmed at the advance of the 
 Great Northern Telegraph Company when it became known 
 that Li Hung Chang had negotiated with the company for a 
 monopoly of the cable lines. According to the reported con- 
 tract any American company would be excluded for twenty 
 years from the right even to land a cable at a Chinese port. 
 The American Government protested energetically 
 against the ratification of this contract but in vain. Prince 
 Kung officially stated that whenever an American company 
 might desire to lay a cable between Japan and China an 
 arrangement would be made "which shall not disappoint the 
 American company in the least degree." ^^ This answer 
 seemed at the time to be reasonably satisfactory but in fact 
 it was not, for the Great Northern Telegraph Company 
 made a secret contract with the Japanese Government which 
 secured a monopoly of cables westward from Japan. The 
 precise form of Prince Kung's statement leaves one wonder- 
 ing whether he knew of the monopoly in Japan or whether 
 the wording of the statement had been suggested to him by 
 those who did. At any rate the Americans were now com- 
 pletely excluded from carrying a trans-Pacific cable to 
 China by way of Japan which was the natural route. More 
 alertness in Tokio might have prevented the consummation 
 of an arrangement so disadvantageous to Americans.* 
 
 The First Railways 
 
 Eveji before the Restoration was accomplished both the 
 Japanese and the foreigners became interested in railroads 
 in Japan. British, French and American interests were 
 competing for privileges. While United States Minister 
 Van Valkenburgh was absent from Yedo at the opening of 
 Osaka in January, 1868, A. L. C. Portman, temporarily act- 
 
 *When in the nineties the American Government sought to promote the 
 laying of a trans-Pacific cable, Japan was more than willing to cooperate in a 
 Japanese-American cable, but was prevented by the Danish monopoly from 
 granting to Americans the right to land in Japan or Formosa cables which 
 would connect either with China or Luzon. The Americans were therefore 
 forced to lay the trans-Pacifle cable by way of Guam with extensions to Japan 
 and China. 
 
594 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 ing as charge at Yedo, apparently without any instructions 
 either from his superior or from Washington, and also with- 
 out any definite financial support, secured from the Yedo 
 government (January 16, 1868) a concession for a railroad 
 from Yokohama to Tokio to be built and owned by Ameri- 
 cans. The contract provided that the government would 
 have the right to purchase the road at any time at fifty per 
 cent above its cost. The new government, however, refused 
 to ratify the contract, and immediately adopted the policy 
 of keeping all railroads as well as telegraph lines exclusively 
 in Japanese ownership. Shortly afterwards H. N. Lay, of 
 Lay-Osborne Flotilla fame, appeared in Japan as the agent 
 of British firms which desired to build railroads. An agree- 
 ment was reached as a result of which Mr. Lay proceeded to 
 London and advertised (April 23, 1870) a loan of £100,000 
 to be made to Japan for the construction of a railroad. Lay 
 stated that the receipts of the road as well as the customs of 
 all the treaty ports would be pledged for payment. The 
 Japanese repudiated this statement of Mr. Lay who was 
 again betraying his inclination to misinterpret and exceed 
 his instructions just as he had done in the purchase of the 
 flotilla for China eight years before. The terms of the loan 
 were changed, but British capital was secured and British 
 engineers were engaged. The line from Yokohama to Tokio 
 was opened in the summer of 1872, and soon construction, 
 was begun on a line from Osaka to Kioto. These two seg-| 
 ments became part of a main trunk line from Tokio to Kobe 
 which was rapidly pushed to completion. 
 
 The first proposal for a railway in China came from Eng- 
 lish and American merchants.^ ^ In 1863 the exigencies of 
 the closing struggles with the Taipings were believed to 
 afford a sufficient occasion for demonstrating to the Chinese 
 the utility of steam transportation. A petition for permis- 
 sion to build a line from Shanghai to Soochow signed byi 
 twenty-seven foreign firms, mostly British, was presented tof I 
 Li Hung Chang, who was then in general charge of the mih- 
 tary operations, in the capacity of Imperial Commissioner 
 and Governor of Kiangsu. Li Hung Chang with the embar- 
 
AMERICAN TRADE: 1844-1898 595 
 
 rassments of the Lay-Osborne Flotilla and the defection of 
 Burgevine fresh in his mind, replied that railways could be a 
 benefit to China only if they were exclusively in the hands 
 of the Chinese, and he declined even to present the petition 
 to Peking. A few months later Sir MacDonald Stephenson 
 came to China, at the suggestion of British merchants, and 
 made a somewhat superficial survey of possible railway 
 routes. 
 
 The next effort to introduce railway building into the 
 empire was stimulated by the construction of the Yoko- 
 hama-Tokio line. At the port of Shanghai there was a 
 transportation problem somewhat like that at Tokio. The 
 foreign shipping found it convenient to anchor in the Woo- 
 sung River a dozen miles below the foreign settlement. A 
 railroad from the anchorage to the city would serve a pur- 
 pose similar to the Yokohama-Tokio line. Oliver B. Brad- 
 ford, American vice consul at Shanghai, with the approval of 
 George F. Seward, the consul general, and of- United States 
 Minister Low at Peking, as well as with the knowledge of the 
 Department of State, undertook to promote the construc- 
 tion of a narrow gauge railroad from the anchorage at Woo- 
 sung to Shanghai.^* 
 
 Three obstacles appeared. At the request of the Chinese 
 Government which had become alarmed at the prospective 
 demands of foreigners for railroad privileges in the ap- 
 proaching revision of the treaties, Anson Burlingame had 
 secured from the United States in the treaty of 1868 the 
 stipulation (Article 8) that the United States "do hereby 
 freely disclaim and disavow any intention or right to inter- 
 vene in the domestic administration of China in regard to 
 the construction of railroads, telegraphs or other material 
 improvements." The second obstacle was that the Chinese 
 had assumed the policy of reserving all railroad rights to 
 themselves. Third, Bradford had no adequate financial 
 backing. He was purely a promoter. The first obstacle was 
 ignored, the second was met by fraud and the third, after 
 vain attempts to interest American capital which at that 
 time was not even equal to financing railways in America, 
 
596 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 was overcome by admitting a preponderating British inter- 
 est into the company. 
 
 The "Woosung Road Company" was formed by Brad- 
 ford to purchase land for a "horse-road." Shortly after- 
 wards the interests of this company were transferred to the 
 "Woosung Tramway Company" (in the Chinese text of the 
 transfer: the "Woosung Carriage-Road Company") and 
 land was purchased for the ostensible purpose of a carriage 
 road. When title to the land had been secured, grading was 
 begun and rails were laid with the knowledge, of course, yet 
 without the approval of the local Chinese officials. The 
 first official information received by the Chinese Govern- 
 ment as to the true nature of the undertaking was a request 
 to the customs to admit duty-free the locomotive and cars 
 which had arrived from England. Notwithstanding the pro- 
 tests of the government as well as of the local Chinese land 
 holders the road was partially opened for traffic June 30, 
 1876, and continued in operation for a few weeks until at the 
 time of the Chefoo agreement the government secured from 
 Sir Thomas Wade a stipulation that China should have the 
 privilege of buying the line from the company which was 
 now a British concern. By order of Wade the operation of 
 trains was temporarily discontinued and when the Chinese i 
 had completed the purchase of the line, the rails were torn ' 
 up and the entire equipment shipped to Formosa. The 
 immediate cause of the failure of the enterprise was the 
 killing of a Chinese by a train, and the opposition of the 
 local people, but back of this lay the belief of the Chinese 
 officials that if they were to permit such a high-handed j 
 scheme to succeed a precedent would be established which 
 would upset entirely the Chinese poHcy of controlling its 
 own railway development.* 
 
 *"I have been to much trouble to ascertain from the Chinese officials their 
 reasons, etc., for their action in the premises and I submit the following, as 
 near their language as possible. They declare that '. . . the removal of the 
 Woosung Railway is being carried out solely in consequence of the political 
 necessity of the act. That to allow it to remain where it is would utterly 
 stultify the action of the authorities and afford the strongest encouragement 
 to similar invasions of Chinese territory and of her independence as a nation.' 
 By a general consensus of opinion, both of the Chinese officials and Chinese 
 merchants, the net result of the scheme carried out by the Woosung Road Com- 
 pany is to brand all railway schemes (and even ordinary road -making pro- 
 
AMERICAN TRADE: 1844-1898 597 
 
 The Woosung Railway episode has been given at some 
 length because it serves to throw light on the contemporary- 
 conditions of American trade. American capital was not 
 seeking an entrance into either Japan or China in this 
 period, while British capital was eager for opportuities. 
 The Americans who stand forth in the trade history of this 
 period were adventurers and promoters lacking both the 
 character and the business connections which would have 
 been necessary to establish and carry through large under- 
 takings. They were utterly unlike the earlier Americans 
 who by just, generous and conciliatory business methods 
 won the confidence of Chinese merchants in the old pre- 
 treaty days at Canton. Now, while British and Continental 
 merchants and capitalists were appearing in China with 
 ample resources and respectable personnel, prepared to 
 make investments, loan money, or otherwise meet the needs 
 of the situation, the American merchants were steadily 
 losing ground and the American consulates reeked with 
 malodorous scandals. Americans were not prepared to do 
 business in the East on a large scale. Both citizens and capi- 
 tal could find more satisfactory returns at home within the 
 borders of the United States. 
 
 Railway Construction in China after 1885 
 
 Railway construction in China again became a mooted 
 question in 1885, at the close of the Franco-Chinese War. 
 In 1886 there were gathered at Tientsin and Peking the 
 largest number of "concession-hunters" yet seen in China. 
 A German syndicate had sent representatives who were 
 reported to be seeking to loan to China £35,000,000 for rail- 
 
 posals) with suspicion and dislike in the eyes of the Chinese officials and the 
 government itself, and to tend to retard for severs^! years their introduction 
 into the empire. This feeling has no connection with the merits of such enter- 
 prises, which the Chinese do to a considerable extent both understand and 
 appreciate, but it is due wholly and solely to the deceit and fraud practiced 
 at the commencement by the original promoters of the scheme." (Consul 
 General G. Wiley Wells to Department of State, November 20, 1877.'=) 
 
 The excerpt is from a report on the moral delinquencies of the American 
 consulate at Shanghai which resulted in an exhaustive investigation by the 
 Department of State, a Committee of the House of Representatives, and then 
 the proposed impeachment of George F. Seward. One of the indictments 
 against Bradford was his connection with the railroad. Both Bradford and 
 Seward were removed from office. 
 
598 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 way construction. A French syndicate, encouraged by the 
 clause in the recent French treaty of 1885 which stipulated 
 that if China decided to build railways the French Govern- 
 ment would give to China every facility to procure in France 
 the personnel she might need, was established at Tientsin in 
 a $100,000 mansion with a liberal expense account for enter- 
 taining. Meanwhile there appeared the Kaiping Railway 
 Company, a Chinese concern with Wu Ting Fang as direc- 
 tor, Li Hung Chang as patron, and with construction already 
 started on a line in the direction of the Kaiping coal mines. 
 This company had close British affiliations. It was espe- 
 cially favored by the Chinese who were now clearly deter- 
 mined to retain control not merely of the ownership but of 
 the construction of whatever railways might be built. 
 
 The American Government was represented by Charles 
 Denby of Indiana who, before coming to China in 1885 as 
 minister, had been prominently identified with railroad 
 building in the United States. Denby was keenly and intel- 
 ligently interested in the Chinese transportation problem 
 which was in some respects so similar to that which the 
 American people had been solving for the last quarter cen- 
 tury. He was also convinced that the time had come when 
 American interests in China ought to be pushed aggressively. 
 General James H. Wilson, ^"^ an American engineer, arrived 
 about the same time and no opportunity was lost to present 
 to the Chinese the superiorities of American methods of rail- 
 way construction and operation. A model of American rail- 
 way track and a small train operated by clock-work was even 
 set up within the palace grounds for the amusement of the 
 boy Emperor and the Court. The French syndicate, how- 
 ever, was quick to offset this advantage by the gift of even 
 more elaborate equipment of French design. Denby 's ^dvice 
 was freely drawn upon, especially after he expressed his 
 sympathy with the Chinese in their desire to retain control 
 of their railways.* 
 
 American interests, operating through Russell and Com- 
 
 *The charter for the Kaiping Railway Company, which in 1887 became the 
 China Railway Company, was based upon a model charter for a stock companj 
 supplied by Denby. 
 
AMERICAN TRADE: 1844-1898 599 
 
 pany, bid for the construction of a line from Tientsin to 
 Taku which would actually become a link in the projected 
 Tientsin-Kaiping road, but American capitalists were un- 
 willing to advance a loan for the work and the contract went 
 to the Kaiping Company. At about the same time the 
 Americans made a bid for the construction of 80 miles of 
 road in Formosa, but were under-bid by a British company 
 which secured the contract. 
 
 The year 1887 was one of great activity among the 
 foreign investors. A Chinese- American bank was projected. 
 This was supported by the so-called Philadelphia Syndicate 
 and received the approval of Li Hung Chang. It was pro- 
 posed to loan the government 80,000,000 taels to finance 
 railway construction, and to organize a mint. The same 
 interests also secured extensive concessions including the 
 right to install telephone systems. The Yamen refused to 
 ratify the agreement, and although efforts were made subse- 
 quently to revive the scheme nothing ever came of it. It is 
 quite probable that it had been from the outset more a 
 promoters' than an investors' proposition. 
 
 The French syndicate likewise failed to secure the desired 
 concessions and was diverted to the construction of fortifica- 
 tions at Port Arthur. A considerable amount of American 
 equipment was used in the Tientsin-Kaiping line which was 
 opened in 1888, but it could not be claimed that Americans 
 had accomplished much towards regaining the commercial 
 position in China which they had occupied in 1860. The 
 causes of their failure had been lack of capital and inade- 
 quate authoritative representation in China able to conclude 
 business agreements. 
 
 The close of the Sino-Japanese War marked the begin- 
 ning of an entirely new phase of China's financial relations 
 with the West. Before 1894 the Chinese Government had 
 been proceeding on the principle of borrowing as little as pos- 
 sible and retaining complete control of both mines and rail- 
 roads. The policy had been successful in a purely negative 
 way. China became debtor to foreigners to only a slight 
 extent, but meanwhile Chinese capital had not been forth- 
 
600 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 coming to build railways. The Chinese investors distrusted 
 Chinese stock companies and they had no relish for lending 
 money to their government. As a matter of fact current 
 rates of interest among the Chinese were very much higher 
 than the rates at which money could be borrowed from 
 abroad; it was only a question of time in 1894 when China 
 would be forced into the foreign markets. The expenses of 
 the war with Japan rather than the need for railways cre- 
 ated the immediate necessity. At the close of the war China 
 was indebted to foreign money lenders to the extent of 
 £7,000,000 secured by the customs. It then became neces- 
 sary to borrow 200,000,000 taels to pay the indemnity to 
 Japan. American bankers offered to make all or part of this 
 loan but their competitors offered more favorable terms. 
 About £16,000,000 were supplied by Russian and French 
 banks with interest at 4 per cent under a guaranty by the 
 Russian Government, and an equal amount by a British- 
 German syndicate at 5 per cent, secured by customs receipts. 
 China now entered upon the most discouraging and dis- 
 astrous phase of her foreign relations. Having been more 
 or less estranged from the United States by both the immi- 
 gration and the Korean matters, and having been practically 
 deserted by Great Britain in the war with Japan, the 
 Chinese Government, led by Li Hung Chang, turned to 
 Russia. Possibly it would be more accurate to say that Li 
 Hung Chang had decided to enter European politics aggres- 
 sively where Japan had been operating so successfully for a 
 decade. But China, unlike Japan, was unprepared to take 
 such a step. The Empire now had to gather the bitter har- 
 vest of a half-century of reactionary, foreign-hating policy 
 which had been characterized by arrogance and stupidity. 
 Even Li Hung Chang, China's most progressive and ablest 
 leader, had never set his foot on foreign soil until he went 
 to Shimoneseki to sign the fateful treaty with Japan. While 
 Japan had been earnestly studying the international situa- 
 tion and faithfully training her leaders to cope with it, China 
 had recalled the few students she had sent abroad and 
 sought to turn back the hands of the clock. Now in her hour 
 
AMERICAN TRADE: 1844-1898 601 
 
 of greatest need China was helpless ; rich in resources and in 
 intellectual ability but impoverished by a corrupt and unen- 
 lightened government. By a tactful and conciliatory policy 
 at Peking, Russia had long been preparing for this hour of 
 opportunity. Suffice it to say, for the moment, that while 
 it cannot be shown that in the closing years of the century 
 American trade or American investors had actually suffered 
 a net loss because of the disastrous treaties and agreements 
 which China made voluntarily or otherwise with Russia, 
 France and England, yet the presence of large European 
 fleets and the steady pressure of the diplomatic representa- 
 tives at Peking exercised a disturbing influence on the letting 
 of such contracts for railway construction as the Americans 
 desired. The Americans, unsupported by guarantees of 
 their government, were at a disadvantage in bidding against 
 Europeans who had become political agents as well as 
 money-lenders. 
 
 Three or four American companies, one from Japan, but 
 the others hitherto unknown in China, appeared in 1896 
 seeking the opportunity to build railways. A preliminary 
 agreement was made to give the contract for a line from 
 Hankow to Peking to one of two competing American firms 
 but Belgians, backed by French and Russian capital, were 
 prepared to give more favorable terms to China. The 
 Chinese were disposed to favor the Americans and at the last 
 minute would have given them the contract, so it is believed, 
 but the representatives of the American banks were without 
 authority to act quickly, if at all, and the diplomatic pres- 
 sure at Peking, notwithstanding the opposition of the Brit- 
 ish, turned the contract over to the Belgian company.* The 
 struggle for contracts had assumed a political character but 
 the Americans retained a clear advantage over their com- 
 petitors because the Chinese recognized that the United 
 States had no territorial designs. In April, 1898, after a 
 
 *It has been frequently stated that this contract was lost to the Americana 
 because the Department of State would not support the claims of the Ameri- 
 can company. This would appear to be a mistaken assumption. U. S. Minister 
 Denby wrote, Octoher 20, 1897 : "The night before the Belgian contract for 
 the Hankow-Paoting-fu line was let, it was offered to an American but he ha4 
 no power to accept it." 
 
602 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 great deal of manoeuvering the Chinese minister in Wash- 
 ington signed a contract for an American syndicate to build 
 the Canton-Hankow line. At about the same time China 
 expressed a willingness to give to Americans the right to 
 build a line northward from Peking to Kalgan. With both 
 this and the Canton-Hankow line went valuable mining 
 privileges. When a contract was signed by which American 
 capital would have been used to finance the Tientsin- 
 Chinkiang line, the Germans protested, but American capi- 
 tal could have been admitted to a share (1898) in this line 
 which was actually built by the British and Germans 
 jointly, had the Americans been prepared to handle the 
 necessary loan. 
 
 The subsequent history of the Canton-Hankow line does 
 not come within the nineteenth century.^^ It is, however, 
 significant for our study that the Americans delayed the 
 beginning of operations and then allowed the control to pass 
 contrary to the terms of the contract into Belgian hands 
 from which it was later purchased and then resold to China. 
 The death of Calvin Brice, the head of the syndicate formed 
 to carry through the Canton-Hankow contract, was disas- 
 trous to the enterprise. Two conclusions of importance 
 stand out: American capitalists, not yet seriously inter- 
 ested in investments in China, had actually secured more 
 contracts than they were prepared to execute ; and the loss of 
 American prestige and influence and the lack of experience, 
 so manifest in the business relations of the last quarter 
 century, had now become a serious handicap to effective 
 competition with other foreign nations. 
 
 Out of an estimated total of nearly 7500 miles of railway 
 concessions granted before December 1, 1898 the Americans 
 had actually accepted or secured only 300 miles. They had 
 lost several times as much through inability to provide 
 capital on acceptable terms. 
 
AMERICAN TRADE: 1844-1898 603 
 
 Spheres of Influence 
 
 Concurrently with the struggle for contracts and con- 
 cessions which followed the Sino-Japanese War, the inter- 
 ference of the treaty powers in the affairs of China was be- 
 coming so marked as to arouse Americans to the impending, 
 if not present, danger. Notwithstanding the fact that in this 
 period American capital had secured for the immediate 
 present more than it could digest, it was felt that the future 
 was very bright for the Americans if only the field of free 
 competition were to remain open. In this respect the 
 Americans of 1898 were like the China merchants in the 
 fifties. The tide, they believed, was beginning to turn. 
 The one unsecured essential for successful trade with China 
 was the assurance of a field of free competition. Now the 
 field was being threatened by a series of treaties and agree- 
 ments between China and the other primary treaty powers 
 that looked towards the closing of doors which had swung 
 open to Americans on terms equal with those of their com- 
 petitors for a hundred years. For Americans it was a day 
 of uncertainty similar to that which preceded the treaties of 
 Wanghia and of Tientsin. More accurately, perhaps, the 
 Americans were face to face with the problem which Hum- 
 phrey Marshall had envisaged in 1853 when he believed that 
 foreign intervention in the Taiping Rebellion would result 
 in the partition of China. 
 
 While it is not necessary for the purpose of this study to 
 concern ourselves with the mass of details which attended 
 the delimitation of spheres of influence and the execution 
 of "non-alienation" agreements in China, it is important, as 
 we approach the annexation of the Philippines, to have 
 clearly in mind the extent to which the Chinese Empire in 
 the summer of 1898 had actually been withdrawn from the 
 field of free commercial competition.^^ France had secured 
 from China the promise that French citizens would be pre- 
 ferred above those of all other nationalities in the exploita- 
 tion of all mines in the three southern provinces of Yunan, 
 Kwangsi and Kwangtung; that all railways having Pakhoi 
 
604 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 as a starting-point would be constructed by either French or 
 Franco-Chinese companies; and that no part of the three 
 provinces would be alienated from China or leased to any 
 other power. France also obtained a lease for the Bay of 
 Kwangchow-wan, the best harbor south of Hongkong. 
 Russia had secured the right to preference in the construc- 
 tion of all railroads north and northeast of Peking, as well as 
 the recognition of all Mongolia and Manchuria as a Russian 
 sphere of influence, and had leased Port Arthur, which com- 
 manded the naval approach to Peking and North China. 
 The Russian agreements carried administrative and military 
 privileges which involved the actual, though not theoretical, 
 transfer of sovereignty. Germany had secured the right to 
 preference for capital or material needed for any purpose in 
 Shantung, and had leased Kiaochow, the best naval base 
 south of Port Arthur. Great Britain had secured a non- 
 alienation agreement for the Yangtze Valley and the prom- 
 ise that so long as the British trade preponderated in the 
 Empire a British subject should remain the head of the cus- 
 toms service. Finally Japan had secured a non-alienation 
 agreement for the province of Fukien which carried with it 
 the exclusion of leases to any other power. 
 
 These agreements had been accompanied by the signing 
 of railway and mining contracts which had been secured by 
 intimidation and had been attended by a display of naval 
 forces in Chinese waters which revealed utter contempt for 
 the sovereignty of the Empire. Clearly China was in danger 
 and partition among the powers along the lines of the 
 spheres of influence was being freely discussed. Were the 
 dismemberment of the Empire to be accomplished, and the 
 various regions thus marked out to fall to the exclusive con- 
 trol of the powers now claiming them, China would become 
 a group of colonies from which the American merchant 
 could be excluded at the will of the respective powers just 
 at the time when, after long years of waiting, he seemed to 
 be on the point of realizing his dreams. In fact he was 
 already practically excluded, by agreements actually exe- 
 cuted before the summer of 1898, from the mining and rail- 
 
AMERICAN TRADE: 1844-1898 >• 605 
 
 way rights in almost every valuable field. If it had been the 
 sincere intention of the powers to permit free competition 
 in their respective spheres there was obviously no reason 
 whatever for the existing agreements. 
 
 BIBLIOGKAPHICAL I^OTES 
 
 1. Several studies of American trade with Asia were made by the 
 
 Bureau of Statistics of the U. S. Treasury Dept. after 1898. 
 The more useful of these are: "Commercial Japan in 1899"; 
 Monthly Summary of Commerce and Finance j July, 1899 ; 
 ' "Commercial China in 1900" ; ihid., June, 1901 ; "Commercial 
 Korea in 1904" ; %bid., Jan., 1904. See also Monthly Summary 
 of Trade and Finance, Apr., 1898, pp. 1632-3, 1638-9; ihid., 
 Sept., 1904, p. 1211 ; Jan., 1904, p. 2330. See, "China and the 
 Far East," George H. Blakeslee, editor, chaps. 2, 3, 5 and 6. 
 
 2. The use, and misuse, of the American flag in China may best 
 
 be studied in the so-called Seward-Bradford investigation, H. 
 Kept. 134:45-3, and H. Misc. Doc. 31:45-2 (Part II). 
 
 3. H. Misc. Doc. 31-45-2 (Part II), pp. 228-31. 
 
 4. Royal Meeker; "History of Shipping Subsidies" (New York, 
 
 1905); Walter T. Dinsmore: "Shipping Subsidies" (Boston 
 and New York, 1907) ; David A. Wells : "Our Merchant Ma- 
 rine" (New York, 1882); H. Rept. 1210:51-1. Meeker has a 
 full bibliography. H. Rept. 1210, pp. 136 if., gives a complete 
 review of the trans-Pacific American shipping. 
 
 5. Foreign Relations, 1877, p. 88. 
 
 6. Raphael Pumpelly : "Across America and Asia" (New Yorkj 
 
 1870), chaps. 15-22. This book is also very valuable for the 
 light it throws on the political conditions in the East in 1863. 
 
 7. Inazo Nitobe: "Intercourse between United States and Japan," 
 
 pp. 116 ff. ; Robert E. Lewis: "The Educational Conquest of 
 the Far East," especially tables, appendix, pp. 223-4. 
 
 8. H. Misc. Doc. 31:45-2 (Part II), p. 561; Historic Shanghai by 
 
 Montalto de Jesus. 
 
 9. Papers Relating to the Intercontinental Telegraph (Govt. Print- 
 
 ing Off., 1864) ; George Kennan : "Tent Life in Siberia." 
 
 10. For. Relations, 1867, Part I, pp. 452, 456, 471 ft., 484; 1866, 
 
 Part I, p. 475 ; 1874, pp. 246, 323, 335 ; 1875, pp. 260 ff. 
 
 11. H. Misc. Doc. 31 :45-2 (Part II) gives the DeLano correspondence 
 
 very fully. 
 
 12. For. Relations, 1881, pp. 224, 275, 280; 1882, p. 115. 
 
 13. Percy Horace Kent: "Railway Enterprise in China" (London, 
 
 1907). This is a good general survey, but for the details of 
 American projects it should be supplemented by American 
 sources. 
 
 14. H. Misc. Doc. 31 :45-2 (Part II) gives the documentary history 
 
 of the Woosung Railway in great detail. 
 
 15. Ihid., p. 139. 
 
606 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 16. James H. Wilson: "China: Travels in the Middle Kingdom," 
 
 first edition, 1887, was the first book to be published in the 
 United States describing the opportunities for railroad de- 
 velopment in China. The third edition (1901) includes the 
 author's account of the Boxer uprising; General Wilson was 
 second in command of the American forces in China in 1900. 
 
 17. William Barclay Parsons: "An American Engineer in China" 
 
 (New York, 1900). Mr. Parsons was the engineer for the 
 Brice Syndicate for the survey of the Canton-Hankow line 
 in 1899. 
 
 18. John Y. A. MacMurray: "Treaties and Agreements with and 
 
 Concerning China, 1894-1919," 2 vols. (New York, 1921). The 
 various compacts by which China signed away so many of her 
 sovereign liberties are given in the first volume of this in- 
 valuable collection. 
 
CHAPTER XXXI 
 
 HAWAII AND THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 In 1898, at the end of one hundred and fourteen years 
 of relations with the Pacific and Asia, the poHtical aspects 
 of the Far Eastern question were for the first time presented 
 for the serious consideration of the American people in 
 definite proposals for the annexation of the Hawaiian 
 Islands and the cession of the Philippines. 
 
 There had been brief, fragmentary and partisan discus- 
 sions in Congress in 1843 when the Cushing Mission was 
 authorized, in 1852 when the Perry Expedition was on its 
 way eastward, and for the remainder of the sixth decade of 
 the century Congress had kept a sharp eye on the condition 
 of affairs as is indicated by the publication during that 
 period of the entire diplomatic correspondence with China — 
 more than twenty-five hundred pages of documents. Indeed 
 the first years of the Buchanan administration occupied, in 
 relation to Far Eastern affairs, a somewhat similar position 
 to the first years of the McKinley administration. In each 
 case the nation, having recovered from a period of financial 
 depression and panic, found itself with a surplus of produce 
 for which a foreign market seemed desirable and necessary.^ 
 In both instances the new mercantile energy of the Ameri- 
 can people was contemporaneous with disorganization and 
 uncertainty in the Far East to which was joined the fear 
 that other nations might seize the opportunity to obtain 
 preferred positions and perhaps to close the doors.* In both 
 cases Great Britain found in the United States a sufficient 
 encouragement to justify approaches to the American Gov- 
 ernment with a view to the achievement of a cordial under- 
 
 *One does not fail to note the striking similarities of the situations in 
 1859 and 1897 with that at the close of the World War in 1918. 
 
 607 
 
608 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 standing if not an alliance for the settlement of the Far 
 Eastern question.- Both Buchanan and Hay, who became 
 Secretary of State in September, 1898, were promoted to 
 positions of great influence in American foreign policy from 
 periods of acceptable diplomatic service at the Court of St. 
 James following crises in Anglo-American relations which 
 had brought the American people to the brink of war with 
 England. But in 1857 President Buchanan had been so sure 
 of the general indifference of the American people that he 
 had not even presented the Far Eastern question to them for 
 consideration, whereas forty years later McKinley had 
 neither the disposition nor the power to keep it from them. 
 The same identical questions which had been decided by 
 Marcy, Buchanan and Cass in the later fifties, reappeared 
 in the late nineties. Indeed these questions, though often 
 decided, had never been disposed of. Seward had faced 
 them; so had Fish, Frelinghuysen, Blaine, Bayard and 
 Gresham. They were : Should the United States establish 
 protectorates or acquire territory in the Pacific and the Far 
 East? To what extent should the United States take action 
 to assert and to maintain the open door in China and to 
 sustain its sovereignty and integrity? What were the limits 
 to the degree of cooperation which should be established be- 
 tween the United States and Great Britain in the pursuit of 
 a common object and policy? The broad outlines of the 
 American problem in Asia had not changed in forty years; 
 no, not in more than half a century. The task of Caleb 
 Gushing in 1844 had been to obtain for Americans a non- 
 territorial equivalent for Hongkong. He had only partially 
 succeeded. The task for American statesmen in the last 
 three years of the century was to obtain for Americans a 
 real equivalent, territorial or otherwise, not merely for 
 Hongkong but now also for Kwangchow-wan, Foochow, 
 Tsingtao, Wei-hai-wei and Port Arthur, spheres of influence, 
 and the non-alienation agreements of five powers. The rea- 
 son why the task had gone so long unfinished was merely 
 that the American people had not cared enough about the 
 markets of Asia to finish it. But in March, 1897, the month 
 
HAWAII AND THE PHILIPPINES 609 
 
 of McKinley's inauguration, American steel rails began to 
 sell in the European markets at $18 a ton, and this was 
 assumed to indicate that at length the American people had 
 reached the point in their industrial development where 
 they could no longer safely neglect the markets of the 
 world. ^ It was believed by McKinley, by Mark Hanna, 
 perhaps by John Hay, and by some, though not all capi- 
 talists and "captains of industry," that the American people 
 were now ready to resume the task for wich the policy of 
 Daniel Webster and Caleb Gushing had proved to be so 
 inadequate. 
 
 The Annexation of Hawaii 
 
 The annexation of the Hawaiian Islands was the hors 
 d'oeuvre. The acquisition of these islands, however, while 
 indubitably a piece of Far Eastern policy, was equally a 
 measure of coast defense, as is clearly revealed in the fifty- 
 five years' history of the question.* 
 
 The American interest in Hawaii from 1842 onward 
 rose and fell with the corresponding interest in the Far 
 East. Tyler and Webster were of the opinion (December 
 30, 1842) that the United States would make a "decided 
 remonstrance" if any other power were to take possession 
 of the islands or subvert the native government. A few 
 months later when Lord George Paulet seized the islands"^ 
 foFGreat Britain, Gommod^ore Kearny, returning from his 
 sTiucessTiire'fforts to secure for the United States most- 
 favored-nation treatment in China, entered a vigorous pro- 
 test. Acting Secretary of State Legare wrote to Edwarcl' 
 "Everett in London that the American Government might 
 feel justified in "interfering by force," and the action of 
 Paulet was disavowed. Otherwise it seems very probable 
 that the Hawaiian question would have taken on something 
 of the "fifty-four-forty-or-fight" spirit. At that time the 
 American interest in the islands arose out of their value to 
 the Pacific and trans-Pacific trade, particularly to the 
 American whalers in the North Pacific which found at 
 Honolulu a convenient place to refit. When the French 
 
610 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 took possession of Honolulu in 1849, though without haul- 
 ing down the Hawaiian flag, the American Government an- 
 nounced that it could not view with indifference the passing 
 of the islands under the control of any other power. Two 
 years later the king placed in the hands of the American 
 representative an unregistered deed of cession of his do- 
 mains, and while the deed was never executed, Marcy 
 stated (December, 1853) while Perry was negotiating with 
 Japan, that it seemed "inevitable" that the islands would 
 come under the control of the United States. Less than 
 four months later he authorized the American representa- 
 tive to sign a treaty of annexation.* The treaty was not 
 ratified by the United States because of the excessive annui- 
 ties stipulated for the native rulers and because it provided 
 that the islands should be admitted into the Union as a 
 state. 
 
 In 1863 the rank of the American representative was 
 raised to that of Minister Resident. About the time of the 
 purchase of Alaska and the acquisition of the Midway 
 Island in 1867 a new reciprocity treaty was negotiated but 
 it was never ratified, just as a similar reciprocity treaty of 
 1855 had failed. Seward considered annexation preferable 
 to reciprocity if the two were in conflict. 
 
 The settlement of the Pacific Coast, the increase of 
 trans-Pacific commerce, and the improvement of steam 
 navigation now brought the Hawaiian Islands within the 
 purview of coast defense. The annexation question was 
 revived in 1871 and Secretary of State Fish recognized the 
 value of Honolulu as a "resting spot in mid-ocean between 
 the Pacific Coast and the vast domains of Asia which are 
 now opening to commerce and Christian civilization." 
 
 In 1875 a convention of commercial reciprocity con- 
 taining a non-alienation agreement very similar in import 
 to those negotiated in China in 1898-9 was effected. The 
 United States was given preferred treatment not open to 
 other nations under the most-favored-nation clause. In 
 
 ♦This authorization by Marcy was sent to Honolulu immediately after the 
 receipt of Perry's first dispatches in which he unfolded his plan for the exten- 
 sion and protection of American trade in the Pacific and the East. 
 
HAWAII AND THE PHILIPPINES 611 
 
 1881 Blaine, while expressing the desire of the United 
 States that the "real and substantial independence" of the 
 islands be maintained, reasserted their strategic importance 
 and stated that occupation by a foreign power in case of 
 international difficulties would be a "positive threat" which 
 could not be "lightly risked" by the United States. New 
 factors in the situation had arisen. The Chinese immi- 
 grants, brought in to work on the sugar plantations, had 
 increased to a point where they threatened the "substitution 
 of Mongolian supremacy for native control," while the 
 sugar industry under the reciprocity convention of 1875 had 
 greatly increased the value of the islands and the wealth 
 of the Americans. "The Hawaiian Islands," stated Blaine, 
 "cannot be joined to the Asiatic system. If they drift from 
 their independent station it must be toward assimilation 
 and identification with the American system to which they 
 belong by the operation of natural laws and must belong by 
 the operation of political necessity." 
 
 An extension of the reciprocity treaty was negotiated 
 in 1884 and when it reached the Senate, so important now 
 appeared the strategic value of the islands, that an amend- 
 ment to the treaty was added by which Pearl Harbor^ near 
 Honolulu, was leased to the United States as a naval base. 
 About the time this treaty was being ratified (1887) the 
 United States declined to enter into a convention with 
 Great Britain and France jointly to guarantee the neu- 
 trality of the islands. 
 
 Candor must compel one to admit that the American 
 policy in the Hawaiian Islands was showing marked paral- 
 lels to the existing and later policies of China and Japan in 
 Korea: economic penetration under the treaties of 1875 
 and 1887, insistence on no disturbance of the trade, and 
 demands for preferred commercial and political treatment. 
 
 Passing over many details of the domestic political de- 
 velopment in Honolulu we come to the peaceful revolution 
 of 1893 which was followed by the abdication of the re- 
 actionary Queen Liliuokalani, the establishment of a pro- 
 visional government with Sanford B. Dole as President, and 
 
612 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 the negotiation, concurrently, of an annexation treaty which 
 was signed February 14, and presented to the Senate in 
 the closing days of the Harrison administration. The 
 President characterized the Hawaiian monarchy as "effete," 
 and the native government as "weak and inadequate." The 
 choice seemed to him to be between making a formal pro- 
 tectorate, which had informally existed for half a century 
 and had come to be tacitly recognized by all powers, or 
 annexation. He urged the latter. 
 
 President Cleveland, scandalized at what appeared to 
 him to have been the intervention of American citizens, if 
 not of American officials, in the coup d'etat of January, 
 1893, withdrew the treaty from the Senate and started an 
 investigation. The important difference between the va- 
 rious coup d'etats in Korea by which the Tai-wen-Kun, the 
 Chinese and Japanese successively sought to obtain control 
 of the government was that at Honolulu the efforts of the 
 Americans who were determined upon annexation were 
 unstained by assassinations and such barbarities as the 
 murder ana burning of a queen — a very important differ- 
 ence. The Cleveland investigation only served to make 
 more certain that the Hawaiians were incapable of main- 
 taining unaided an enlightened, just and stable government. 
 The delay incident to the investigation proved that the 
 newly created republic while well able to maintain itself in 
 the face of all native dissent, was not capable of meeting 
 the pressure of foreign powers like Japan. One of the 
 earliest projects of the McKinley administration was to 
 revive the question of annexation and to negotiate a treaty 
 to that effect (June 16, 1897). "Annexation is not a 
 change," stated McKinley, "it is a consummation." 
 
 Suspicion of Japanese Designs in Hawaii 
 
 The treaty met with opposition in two quarters: from 
 certain sections of American public opinion which will be 
 described below ; and from the Japanese Government which, 
 elated by its success in the Sino-Japanese War and enriched 
 
HAWAII AND THE PHILIPPINES 613 
 
 by the Chinese indemnity which was being devoted to naval 
 and military purposes, was undergoing a wave of popular 
 enthusiasm both for expansion and for the assertion of 
 racial dignity. 
 
 The Japanese Government through United States Min- 
 ister Buck at Tokio, and even more energetically through 
 the Japanese Minister, Hoshi Torn, at Washington, entered 
 a vigorous protest— probably the most vigorous protest that 
 up to that time had ever been issued by Japan to another 
 power. This protest was doubly significant because it en- 
 larged the question which might have been supposed to 
 concern Japan. Not only did Japan protest that the an- 
 nexation of the islands would endanger the settlement of the 
 Japanese claims over the immigration question then pend- 
 ing, and the general rights of Japanese in the islands under 
 the treaties between Japan and Hawaii, but also that the 
 annexation would "disturb the status quo in the Pacific." 
 While the Japanese Government took occasion to deny that 
 it entertained designs against the territorial integrity or the 
 sovereignty of the islands, the fact remained that the Japa- 
 nese claim for the right of citizenship in the islands was not 
 withdrawn. Did, then, Japan have in mind a program of 
 economic penetration similar to that which was already in 
 operation in Korea? Such a conclusion is not absolutely 
 necessary for it must be remembered +hat while Japan had 
 succeeded in holding Formosa in 1895 the hold was not 
 very secure, and Japan may have felt that the annexation 
 of the Hawaiian Islands would precipitate a scramble for 
 islands in the Pacific in the confusion of which Japan would 
 be separated from Formosa just as she had been forced to 
 retire from the Liaotung peninsula. The maintenance of 
 the status quo, by which Japan was in possession of For- 
 mosa, the Pescaderoes, the Lew Chews, the Bonins and the 
 Kurile islands, was an important matter to Japan. ^ 
 
 But Japan could not well afford to alienate American 
 public opinion, nor the sympathies of the American Gov- 
 ernment which had stood Japan in such good stead for 
 so many years. Just at the moment things were going badly 
 
614 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 with Japan in Korea. After the murder of the queen the 
 king had taken refuge in the Russian legation, and now the 
 pohtical affairs of Korea were being directed from St. 
 Petersburg. Meanwhile Japan was seeking friends for her- 
 self in the struggle for the peninsula which was merely- 
 postponed. Specifically Japan desired to induce American 
 capital to invest in Korea under Japanese auspices with a 
 view to ranging the United States on the Japanese side in 
 the coming struggle. Japan quickly though informally 
 withdrew its protest against the disturbance of the status 
 quo in the Pacific and confined its later negotiations to the 
 immigration and claims questions. It was at length agreed 
 that the Hawaiian Republic should settle the claims for 
 about $130,000 and Japan then adopted a conciliatory atti- 
 tude on the immigration question which was at length dis- 
 missed without any specific promises having been made by 
 the American Government. When the annexation of the 
 islands was accomplished a stipulation was inserted that 
 American immigration laws would be extended to the 
 islands thus bringing the Japanese immigrants under the 
 provision of the treaty of 1894 between Japan and the 
 United States. To this as well as to the extension of Ameri- 
 can immigration laws to the Philippines the Japanese Gov- 
 ernment made another very sharp protest, but without 
 effect. 
 
 While the military and economic value of the islands 
 was sufficient to commend the annexation to many it was 
 the Far Eastern question which at length upset the balance 
 of opinion and hastened the incorporation of the islands. 
 Following the declaration of a state of war with Spain 
 (April 20, 1898) Commodore George Dewey destroyed the 
 Spanish fleet at Manila May 1. Three days later Francis 
 G. Newlands of Nevada introduced into the House a joint 
 resolution to annex Hawaii to the United States. The de- 
 bate on the bill began June 11. The House approved of it 
 by vote of 209 to 91, and the Senate passed it July 6, 42 to 
 21. On July 8, 1898, President McKinley gave to the joint 
 resolution his very ready assent and the Hawaiian Islands 
 
 I 
 
HAWAII AND THE PHILIPPINES 615 
 
 became a part of the territory of the United States. The 
 commission appointed by the President to make recom- 
 mendations for legislation reported (December 6, 1898). 
 By act of Congress April 30, 1900, the 'Territory of 
 Hawaii" was created and a territorial form of government 
 authorized. 
 
 In order that we may have clearly before us the intimate 
 relation between events and opinions in those momentous 
 days, and may consider together the debates on the an- 
 nexation of Hawaii and the cession of the Philippines, it 
 is well at this point to review briefly the course of the 
 Spanish American War. 
 
 The Philippines in the Spanish-American War 
 
 No relation whatever can be established between the 
 outbreak of hostilities with Spain and the Far Eastern 
 question except that there was a concurrence of dates in 
 the disturbed conditions in China and the climax of the 
 often recurring disturbances in Cuba, and that both syn- 
 chronized with the expansive movement in American trade 
 which had followed the recovery from the Panic of 1893.® 
 The Sino- Japanese War had caused a very notable strength- 
 ening of Continental fleets in Chinese waters.* 
 
 Notwithstanding the warnings of naval oflacers fre- 
 quently offered in the last quarter of a century, the Ameri- 
 cans were without a naval base in the Far East.f There- 
 
 *The naval forces in the Far East at the end of November, 1895, were as 
 follows : ' 
 
 British — total displacement — 58,908 tons 
 
 Russian " " 58,838 " 
 
 French " " 28,669 " 
 
 German " " 23,078 " 
 
 American " " 18,553 " 
 
 The American naval force was even weaker than the figures would indicate for 
 it included -some antiquated vessels like the Monocacy, an old side-wheeler, 
 which upon the outbreak of the war in 1898 was stuck in the mud at Shanghai 
 and could not be moved even to comply with the declaration of neutrality by 
 the Chinese Government. Between 1895 and the spring of 1898 the American 
 fleet was actually decreased, but at the battle of Manila Bay Commodore 
 Dewey's vessels had a total displacement of about 19,000 tons. 
 
 t The Secretary of the Navy, in his annual report for 1884, about four 
 months before the occupation of Port Hamilton by the British naval forces, 
 recommended that "additional coaling and naval stations" be established at 
 nine points, among which he mentioned Port Hamilton as well as Honolulu. 
 "From which latter naval station [Port Hamilton] and the ports of Korea there 
 
616 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 fore at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War the 
 American fleet in the Far East was left by the declarations 
 of neutrality of Japan, China and Great Britain, in a posi- 
 tion which required either a retirement of the fleet to 
 Honolulu from which a declaration of neutrality by the 
 Hawaiian Republic might have barred it, or an attack upon 
 Manila. The retirement of the American forces from the 
 Far East in the spring of 1898 when the Chinese Empire 
 was in such precarious condition would have resulted in a 
 very great loss of American prestige and perhaps an attack 
 upon American life and property, for the Chinese had al- 
 ways been quick to interpret such events as an involuntary 
 weakening of a foreign power. American shipping, also, 
 would have been exposed to attack from the Spanish fleet 
 at Manila. 
 
 The attack upon Manila by the American forces was 
 not, however, accidental or unforeseen. Commodore George 
 Dewey was ordered to Japan (October 21, 1897) to assume 
 command of the Far Eastern Squadron.* Ten days after 
 the destruction of the U. S. S. Maine at Havana Harbor 
 Dewey was instructed to hold himself in readiness to en- 
 gage the Spanish Squadron at Manila and to conduct offen- 
 sive operations against the Philippines. The intent of 
 these orders, however, appears plainly to have been to 
 remove the menace of the Spanish fleet rather than to ac- 
 quire Manila. 
 
 The American fleet was ordered to rendezvous at Hong- 
 kong and measures were immediately taken to secure ade- 
 quate supplies. Dewey was even prepared to ignore any 
 declaration of neutrality which might be made by the Chi- 
 nese Empire.^ He was informed that Japan, which at that 
 
 should be established a regular line of steamers carrying the United States flag, 
 connecting with the present line between San Francisco and Japan." 
 
 Dr. H. C. Allen stated that W. W. Rockhill once remarked to him that the 
 King of Korea had at one time through Admiral Shufeldt offered Port Hamil- 
 ton to the United States as a naval station. This offer was made, presumably,, 
 after the evacuation of the island by the British in 1887. 
 
 * The partisan and political influences under which the entire war with 
 Spain was conducted are well illustrated by the fact that Dewey, in order to 
 make sure of the assignment to the Par Eastern Squadron, felt compelled to 
 invoke the political influences of Senator Proctor of Vermont, his native state. 
 He took this action upon the advice of Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary or 
 the Navy. 
 
HAWAII AND THE PHILIPPINES 617 
 
 time was badly frightened by the presence of such large 
 European forces in the East, would maintain the most scrup- 
 ulous neutrality — a neutrality which, nevertheless, Japan 
 was induced to relax slightly a few months after the war 
 broke out. Upon the announcement that a state of hostili- 
 ties existed between the United States and Spain (there was 
 no declaration of war by either side) the British representa- 
 tives at Hongkong requested the American fleet to leave 
 by 4 p. M., April 25. Commodore Dewey complied and 
 with no unnecessary delay proceeded to Manila Bay. The 
 battle of May 1st with its swift and brilliant victory left 
 Dewey in control of the bay, with the city in his power. 
 Owing to the lack of a sufficient landing force Dewey re- 
 frained from occupying the city which he would have been 
 unable to police. Manila was not taken until August 13 
 and then after some little resistance which probably would 
 not have been presented had the Americans been prepared 
 on May 1st to reap the fruits of their naval victory. 
 
 Two concurrent events, significant in a study of policy, 
 demand attention. 
 
 There had been incipient or open rebellion in the Philip- 
 pines for more than a decade. The execution by the Span- 
 ish authorities of Dr. Jose Rizal, the Filipino patriot, De- 
 cember 30, 1896, had produced a short-lived insurrection 
 which was suspended early in 1897 by the arrival of Spanish 
 reinforcements and the agreement of the rebel leaders, 
 Andres Bonifacio and Emilio Aguinaldo, upon the payment 
 of several hundred thousand dollars, to retire from the 
 island. These men went to Hongkong and established a 
 Filipino Junta with the money thus obtained and were able 
 to continue their patriotic agitation. This Junta formally 
 sought the intervention and protection of the United 
 States and later proposed an alliance. The insurgents had 
 previously sought the aid of Japan. Early in 1898 there 
 were insurrections in both Luzon and Cebu. In April, 1898, 
 Commodore Dewey had several conferences with the Fili- 
 pino leaders at Hongkong, and in the latter part of the 
 month E. Spencer Pratt, United States consul general at 
 
618 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Singapore, had an interview with Aguinaldo, recently ar- 
 rived from Hongkong, and appears to have proposed to 
 him that he return to China, join Dewey's forces, and ac- 
 company the Americans to Manila with a view to assisting 
 them in the Philippines just as Gomez and Garcia had been 
 helping the American forces in Cuba, by promoting insur- 
 rection against the Spanish authority. Dewey approved 
 of the suggestion and May 19 Aguinaldo was brought to 
 Manila in the U. S. dispatch boat McColloch, upon 
 Dewey's order.^ While Dewey was careful to make no 
 promises to Aguinaldo, he did give no little encouragement 
 and turned over to him the arsenal at Cavite and permitted 
 him to organize his insurgent forces within the American 
 lines. Consul General Rounseville Wildman had also as- 
 sisted the insurrectos to purchase arms in Hongkong. 
 Aguinaldo gave out the statement to the Filipinos that the 
 United States would assist the insurrectors. 
 
 It does not appear that Admiral Dewey or any of the 
 American representatives in contact with the insurgents 
 before the arrival of the first expeditionary forces June 30, 
 had any suspicion that the United States would acquire 
 the Philippines. "Every American citizen who came in 
 contact with the Filipinos at the inception of the Spanish 
 War," stated General Thomas M. Anderson, who was the 
 first to give to Dewey the news that there was talk in the 
 United States of the retention of the islands, "or at any 
 time within a few months after hostilities began probably 
 told those he talked with . . . that we intended to free 
 them from Spanish oppression." In other words. Consul 
 General Pratt, Admiral Dewey, and many more were re- 
 affirming what had been stated hundreds of times by 
 American representatives in the East since the days in 1832 
 when Edmund Roberts made his treaties, viz., that the 
 United States had neither the intention nor the constitu- 
 tional right to acquire colonies. In support of this opinion 
 there was also the very recent declaration of President 
 McKinley at the outbreak of the war that the acquisition 
 of territory was not the purpose of the United States. 
 
HAWAII AND THE PHILIPPINES 619 
 
 The Filipino insurgents appear, however, to have con- 
 sidered the possibihty that the American Government 
 might alter its traditional policy, and to have decided that 
 at any rate it would be well to accept such aid as was being 
 immediately offered and to meet future problems as they 
 arose, Aguinaldo organized a government on June 12, pro- 
 claimed a provisional constitution June 23, and on August 
 6, a week before the American forces occupied Manila, 
 issued an appeal to the nations of the world for recognition 
 of the independence and belligerency of his government. 
 Meanwhile the insurrectos established military control over 
 part of Luzon, 
 
 The second significant event of this period was the 
 action of the three European powers which only three years 
 before had intervened to demand the recession of the 
 Liaotung peninsula to China and subsequently forced the 
 Empire to lease the various ports already referred to as 
 well as to grant the spheres of influence, Germany, espe- 
 cially, had revealed an alarming land-hunger, and was 
 known to be intriguing in Europe to bring about interven- 
 tion in the Spanish-American war. At Hongkong Prince 
 Henry, the Kaiser's brother, who had been dispatched to 
 China to make sure of the lease of Kiaochow, remarked to 
 Dewey that he did not believe that the European powers 
 would permit the United States to retain Cuba, Shortly 
 after May first two German cruisers appeared at Manila 
 and other German war vessels followed. Indeed a trans- 
 port with 1200 reserves was anchored in the harbor for a 
 month. Vice Admiral von Dietrichs stated to Dewey rather 
 sharply: "I am here by order of the Kaiser, sir," and 
 proceeded to show a notable indifference to the blockade 
 regulations which Dewey had established. The German 
 force at the end of June was larger than the blockading 
 squadron. At the same time the Germans sustained very 
 intimate relations with the Spanish authorities within the 
 uncaptured city, and made themselves familiar with the 
 military situation. President McKinley is reported to have 
 believed that war with Germany was imminent. 
 
620 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Meanwhile the ranking officer of the British naval ves- 
 sels, Admiral Chichester, also observing the proceedings, 
 upon orders from his government fully sustained Dewey's 
 blockade regulations, and on August thirteenth when the 
 American fleet proceeded to attack the city in cooperation 
 with the American land forces, the British Admiral moved 
 H.M.S. Immortalite to a point which placed it between the 
 American fleet and the vessels of the European powers. 
 Upon receiving notice that the city had surrendered to the 
 Americans, the British vessel alone offered a salute to the 
 American flag. 
 
 Peace Negotiations with Spain 
 
 The peace negotiations between the United States and 
 Spain began July 22, with a message from the Queen to 
 President McKinley, transmitted through Jules Cambon, 
 the French Ambassador at Washington.^" To the inquiry 
 of the Queen as to the possible terms of peace the President 
 replied, July 30, stipulating (1) the relinquishment by 
 Spain of Cuba; (2) the cession of to the United States, and 
 the evacuation by Spain of the islands of Porto Rico and 
 the other islands now under sovereignty of Spain in the 
 West Indies, and also the cession of an island in the 
 Ladrones to be selected by the United States; (3) the right 
 to occupy and hold "the city, bay and harbor of Manila 
 pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall de- 
 termine the control, disposition, and the government of the 
 Philippines." The question of pecuniary indemnity was 
 reserved for subsequent discussion. The stipulation for the 
 cession of an island in the Ladrones had reference to a cable 
 station which, as already noted, had become necessary be- 
 cause of the monopoly of the Great Northern Telegraph 
 Company in Japan and China. The carefully drawn speci- 
 fications as to Manila and the Philippines indicates either 
 that McKinley, encouraged by the decision of Congress on 
 the Hawaiian annexation, had already determined to hold 
 some part of the Philippines if possible, or at least that he 
 
HAWAII AND THE PHILIPPINES 621 
 
 was giving this question close consideration. It must have 
 been quite obvious to any one familiar with the dispatches 
 from Tokio, Seoul and Peking in the summer of 1898, that 
 the Philippines offered a most important strategic position 
 for the United States in case the threatened partition of 
 China along the lines of the spheres of influence should take 
 place. A close study of the trade conditions during the 
 century since the American flag first appeared in Manila 
 Bay, would have indicated that the commercial value of 
 the islands was of very much less importance than the 
 strategic advantages.^ ^ 
 
 "The terms relating to the Philippines seem," replied 
 the Spanish Minister of State (August 7) "to our under- 
 standing, to be quite indefinite." He pointed out that the 
 Spanish flag still waved over Manila and that the control of 
 Spain of the archipelago was still unquestioned by any 
 military operations. However, the protocol, signed August 
 12, contained the stipulation with reference to the Philip- 
 pines substantially as outlined by President McKinley 
 twelve days before. 
 
 In his instructions to the Peace Commissioners (Sep- 
 tember 16) the President revealed an expanding purpose in 
 the Far East by ordering them to demand "the cession in 
 full right and sovereignty of the island of Luzon, and equal 
 port and trade rights with the Spanish in all unceded ter- 
 ritory in the islands." McKinley elaborated his reasons 
 for these demands: 
 
 "Without any original thought of complete or even partial acquisi- 
 tion, the presence and success of our a.rms at Manila imposes upon us 
 obligations which we cannot disregard. The march of events rules 
 and overrules human action. Avowing unreservedly the purpose 
 which has animated all our efforts, and still solicitous to adhere to 
 it, we can not be unmindful that without any desire or design on 
 our part the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which 
 we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose 
 growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has 
 plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization." 
 
 The above paragraph was obviously a reference to the 
 alarming international situation in the Far East. Asia was 
 
622 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 in imminent danger of a convulsion which, once started, 
 could hardly have failed to involve the entire world. The 
 Philippines were unlikely to remain long in the hands of 
 Spain which, impoverished by war, was unable to defend 
 them and badly in need of money. Either by conquest or 
 by purchase they would very probably fall into the out- 
 stretched hands of some waiting European power — very 
 likely Germany — if the Americans were to stand aside, 
 
 "Incidental to our tenure of the Philippines is the commercial 
 opportunity to which American statesmanship can not be indifferent," 
 continued Mclvinley. "It is just to use every legitimate means for 
 the enlargement of American trade; but we seek no advantages in 
 the Orient which are not common to all. Asking only the open door 
 for ourselves, we are ready to accord the open door to others. The 
 commercial opportunity which is naturally and inevitably associated 
 with this new opening depends less on large territorial possessions 
 than upon an adequate commercial basis and upon broad and equal 
 privileges," 
 
 This, the first use in an American document of the 
 "open door" phrase establishes the connection between 
 McKinley's Chinese and Philippines policies. A fortui- 
 tous concurrence of events had brought within American 
 grasp the very expedient which Commodore Perry and Dr. 
 Peter Parker had urged in 1853 and 1857. Manila might 
 become the equivalent for Hongkong, and the leased ports 
 of China, for the lack of which American trade and interests 
 in the Far East were, in the summer of 1898, in serious 
 prospective if not present embarrassment. 
 
 Exactly forty days after signing the instructions to the 
 Peace Commissioners who had departed immediately for 
 Paris where the conference was held. Secretary of State 
 Hay (October 26) still further enlarged the American de- 
 mands by cabling to the Commissioners : 
 
 "The information which has come to the President since your 
 departure convinces him that the acceptance of the cession of Luzon 
 alone, leaving the rest of the islands subject to Spanish rule, or to 
 be the subject of future contention, can not be justified on political, 
 commercial, or humanitarian grounds. The cession must be of the 
 whole of the archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible 
 and the former must therefore be required.''' 
 
HAWAII AND THE PHILIPPINES 623 
 
 The precise nature of the information which induced 
 McKinley thus to increase his demands would appear to 
 have been gathered from the reports of the American mili- 
 tary and naval authorities and from the diplomatic corre- 
 spondence from the various foreign capitals in both the 
 East and the West. While Admiral Dewey had thought so 
 little of the first German interference at Manila that at 
 first he had not even made a report upon it, the facts were 
 reported to Europe or London by at least one foreign con- 
 sul at Manila and were known by the President. Various 
 American military and naval officers from Manila were dis- 
 patched to Paris where they appeared before the Peace 
 Commissioners in October and expressed themselves very 
 frankly.* Russia was reported to be desirous of establishing 
 at least a naval base in the islands. It was very unlikely 
 that France, the possessions of which in South China were 
 most immediately concerned, would let such another op- 
 portunity pass unutilized. Japan, fearful whether in an- 
 other scramble for islands she might not be separated from 
 Formosa as she had been from Port Arthur, was very de- 
 sirous that the Philippines be brought under American pro- 
 tection, though not unwilling to effect an understanding 
 with the United States by which the Empire could share 
 in the possession of the islands. Great Britain was alarmed 
 at the prospect of the increase of European influence so near 
 Hongkong, Singapore and her South Pacific possessions. 
 The arguments against the retention by the United States 
 either of a mere naval base or of the island of Luzon were, 
 from the standpoint of military and political affairs, over- 
 whelming. The complete relinquishment or only partial 
 possession of the islands would have promoted war rather 
 than peace in Asia. 
 
 After many protests and with the utmost reluctance 
 
 ♦"Senator Frye : Q. If we should adopt your line of demarcation what do 
 you think Spain would do with the balance of those islands? 
 
 A. Sell them to -Germany. 
 
 Q. Is not Germany about as troublesome a neighbor as we could get? 
 
 A. The most so, in my opinion. I think it probable that the balance of 
 the Spanish possessions in the Pacific not acquired by us will go to Germany. 
 Germany has long desired to possess the Carolines, and she hoisted her flag 
 at Yap in 1S8G." (Statement of Commander R. B. Bradford, U. S. N., October 
 14, 1898, before the United States Peace Commission at Paris. '2) 
 
624 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Spain, while she "relinquished" all claims to sovereignty 
 over Cuba, "ceded" Porto Rico, Guam and the Philippines 
 to the United States in the Treaty of Paris (December 10, 
 1898). It was agreed also in lieu of the assumption by the 
 United States of the Spanish debt in Cuba or the Philip- 
 pines, that Spain should receive $20,000,000 for the Philip- 
 pines, 
 
 Debate on Hawaii and the Philippines 
 
 Five phases of the debates in Congress over the annexa- 
 tion of Hawaii and the Philippines may be distinguished. 
 It was a partisan contest in which both the Democratic and 
 Republican party leaders kept an eye upon the presidential 
 campaign of 1900. There was the clear-cut legal question 
 as to whether the American Government had the constitu- 
 tional right to acquire non-contiguous territory not designed 
 to be admitted to statehood in the Union. There was the 
 moral question arising out of the consent-of-the-governed 
 doctrine. There was the economic question which included 
 on its industrial side the fear of the introduction of Asiatic 
 cheap labor and on the commercial side the ambitions of 
 the trade expansionists. There was, also, the question of 
 expediency: All other phases of the subject being dismissed 
 as settled, did political, military or commercial expediency 
 demand annexation? It was one of the greatest debates in 
 American congressional history.^^ 
 
 Of the partisan passages in the debate little need be 
 said, although one would like to record them as an illustra- 
 tion of the futile demagogic clap-trap of the politician such 
 as always intrudes itself in popular government.* How- 
 ever, neither question was decided on purely partisan lines, 
 and in the final vote on the Treaty of Paris, while several 
 Republicans voted against it, there were enough Democratic 
 
 *Por example, in the debate on Hawaii : "But above all, William McKinley 
 ■will have sore need for the three electoral votes of Hawaii in the melancholy 
 days of November, in 1900, when he again faces at the polls the great tribune 
 of the people, William Jennings Bryan, of Nebraska." And again : "There is 
 a pressing necessity for two rotten borough Senators to eke out the single 
 gold-standard majority at the other end of the capitol." These were two ofj 
 the three reasons assigned by Champ Clark (Dem.) to the Republicans as 
 being the actual motives for the annexation of Hawaii. 
 
HAWAII AND THE PHILIPPINES 625 
 
 and Populist votes to secure the necessary two-thirds ap- 
 proval. At the beginning of 1899 the annexation of the 
 Philippines had become so popular in various parts of the 
 country that the Democratic leaders, Bryan included, 
 deemed it unwise to oppose it. Within six months after 
 Dewey's victory the territorial enlargement of the nation 
 had ceased, in large measure, to be a partisan question. 
 
 The constitutional and moral aspects of the choice were 
 discussed in able and elevated manner quite in contrast 
 with the partisan debate. The opinion of Chief Justice 
 Taney in the Dred Scott case was frequently alluded to.* 
 Much was made of the fact that both in Hawaii and the 
 Philippines whatever government might be set up after 
 annexation had been accomplished would be without the 
 consent of the governed, and that the transfer of the ter- 
 ritories themselves was being advocated without any clear 
 indication of the consent of the people. This argument, 
 strong in fact, lost much of its force from those who while 
 advancing it still maintained that naval bases both at Pearl 
 Harbor and in the Philippines ought to be acquired. 
 
 The minority report on the joint resolution for the 
 annexation of Hawaii was presented in the House by Hugh 
 A. Dinsmore who had for two years (1887-9) been the 
 United States Minister Resident at Seoul. Dinsmore 
 argued that the annexation would be neither constitutional 
 nor desirable. "If we acquire Hawaii, it is but the first 
 step in the progress of colonial aggrandizement," stated 
 Dinsmore. "What must we expect if we enter upon a 
 colonial policy? Suppose we set our feet upon territory in 
 the Orient. From that moment we become involved in 
 every European controversy with reference to aggressions 
 and the acquirement of territory there. No longer will our 
 ancient peace abide with us." Much of the opposition to 
 annexation was based on the assumption that by the con- 
 tinuance of a policy of territorial and political isolation it 
 
 * "There is certainly no power given by the constitution to the Federal 
 Government to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United States 
 or at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure, nor to enlarge 
 its territorial limits in any way except by the admission of new States." 
 
626 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 would be possible for the United States to avoid war. 
 Senator George Frisbie Hoar (Massachusetts), although he 
 had already set his face like flint against the acquisition of 
 the Philippines, nevertheless saw the futility of this argu- 
 ment when applied to Hawaii. After a conference with 
 President McKinley in which the latter had told him of 
 the landing of the Japanese immigrants at Honolulu, of 
 the evidence of their military training, of the patent de- 
 termination of Japan to acquire the islands, Hoar went into 
 the Senate and made a powerful speech in advocacy of 
 annexation. He based his argument largely upon the con- 
 viction that the failure to annex at that time would lead 
 to inevitable conflict with Japan at some future date. He 
 pointed out that were a line to be drawn from the point of 
 American territory in the Aleutian Islands nearest Asia to 
 the southernmost point of American territory on the Pacific 
 Coast, Hawaii would lie eastward of that line. The an- 
 nexation of Hawaii was to Senator Hoar, indeed to most 
 Americans, primarily a measure of coast defense. While 
 Dewey's victory at Manila served to expedite the considera- 
 tion of the question, it was the fear of Japanese aggression 
 which carried the greater weight in the debate and it 
 seems probable that this argument alone would have been 
 sufficient to accomplish the annexation. 
 
 In the course of the Hawaiian debate practically all the 
 partisan, constitutional, and moral grounds were traversed 
 and in the consideration of the Philippine question no new 
 principles were brought forward. But the facts were in 
 some respects very different. Whatever may have been the 
 intent of the makers of the Constitution in respect to the 
 acquisition of non-contiguous territory for colonial pur- 
 poses it is at least certain that no adequate provision had 
 been made for specific constitutional means to meet the 
 situation which developed at Manila after May 1st, 1898. 
 In the first place the American fleet in Manila Bay was in 
 actual danger. The arrival of reinforcements from Spain, 
 the stiffening of either Spanish or Filipino opposition to 
 Dewey's presence, or the intervention of European powers 
 
HAWAII AND THE PHILIPPINES 627 
 
 were all possible eventualities. There were the gravest mili- 
 tary reasons for strengthening the American forces, and for 
 the occupation of the city of Manila. Additional naval 
 vessels were sent and by the end of July there had arrived 
 from San Francisco an expeditionary force of nearly 11,000 
 although Dewey had asked for only 5000. The occupation 
 of Manila, August 13, did not greatly alter the military 
 situation even though an armistice had been established. 
 Talk of European intervention still continued, the Germans 
 extended their interest to other islands of the archipelago, 
 and the attitude of the insurrectos was most uncertain. In 
 all probability conflict with the Filipinos might have been 
 avoided had the American Government possessed the power 
 to issue immediately a statement guaranteeing ultimate 
 autonomy to the Islands under an American or even an 
 international protectorate. But no such power existed. 
 
 While these facts were sufficient to account for the new 
 aspects of the case presented to Congress in December, 
 1898, there was another fact of greater actual potency. 
 President McKinley and his advisers at some date which 
 may be clearly fixed as not earlier than May 1, and not 
 later than the end of that month, became persuaded that 
 the retention of at least Manila would be desirable for 
 either military or commercial reasons, or for both. The 
 President became convinced also that the American people 
 would support such a program. It soon became evident, 
 however, that it would be unsafe to retain Manila without 
 taking the entire archipelago for much the same reasons 
 that it had been accepted as unsafe to retain Pearl Harbor 
 without annexing all of the Hawaiian Islands. The result 
 was that a situation was deliberately, as well as of necessity, 
 created in the Philippines which made the debate on the 
 approval of the Treaty of Paris somewhat different from 
 the debate on Hawaii. When Congress met in December, 
 and when the article of the Treaty of Paris was sent to the 
 Senate early in January, there were already more than 
 15,000 American soldiers, mostly volunteers, in the Islands, 
 and they were in danger of a Filipino uprising. This new 
 
628 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 situation abounded in opportunities to appeal to American 
 national pride, and placed both the politician and the 
 statesman who viewed with alarm the prospect of colonial 
 possessions in positions where only the wisest of men ought 
 to be. Nothing in all previous American political expe- 
 rience afforded an adequate precedent or guide. 
 
 On December 10, 1898, the day the Treaty of Paris was 
 signed. Senator George G. Vest (Missouri) introduced a 
 joint resolution: 
 
 "That under the Constitution of the United States no power is 
 given to the Federal Government to acquire territory to be held and 
 governed permanently as colonies. 
 
 "The colonial system of European nations can not be established 
 under our present Constitution, but all territory acquired by the 
 Government, except such small amount as may be necessary for coal- 
 ing stations, correction of boundaries, and similar governmental pur- 
 poses, must be acquired and governed with the purpose of ultimately 
 organizing such territory into States suitable for admission into the 
 Union." 
 
 Two days later the debate began but the President did not 
 wait for a decision. On December 21, he instructed the 
 War Department to extend the military government al- 
 ready established at Manila over the entire archipelago as 
 rapidly as possible. McKinley described American rights 
 in the islands as acquired by conquest.^'* This instruction, 
 which was a few days later telegraphed to Manila and pub- 
 lished, consolidated the opposition of the insurrectos to 
 the United States, whereas the passage of the Vest resolu- 
 tion would probably have prevented the approaching re- 
 bellion.* 
 
 Senator Augustus 0. Bacon (Georgia) introduced on 
 January 11 a resolution which also would have prevented 
 the impending rebellion. 
 
 "That the United States hereby disclaim any disposition or in- 
 tention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said 
 islands, and assert their determination, when a stable and independent 
 
 *"They begged for some tangible concession from the United States Govern- 
 ment — one which they could present to the people and which might serve to 
 allay the excitement." (Report of meeting. January 9, 1899, of American 
 officers appointed by Major General E. S. Otis to confer with commission rep- 
 resenting the Aguinaldo government.) ^^ 
 
HAWAII AND THE PHILIPPINES 629 
 
 government shall have been duly erected therein entitled to recogni- 
 tion as such, to transfer to said government, upon terms which shall 
 he reasonable and just, all rights secured under the cession by Spain, 
 and to thereupon leave the government and control of the islands to 
 their people." 
 
 The passage of this resolution would have given to the 
 Philippines a status similar to that already accorded to 
 Cuba. February 14th, a vote on the Bacon resolution re- 
 sulted in a tie, and Vice President Hobart cast the deciding 
 vote against it. The same day a joint resolution, previously 
 introduced by Samuel D. McEnery (Louisiana) was passed, 
 26 to 22, in which it was stated that "it is the intention of 
 the United States to establish on said islands a government 
 suitable to the wants and conditions of the inhabitants of 
 said islands, to prepare for them local self-government,^ 
 and in due time to make such disposition of said islands as 
 will promote the interests of the citizens of the United 
 States and the inhabitants of said islands." Permanent an- 
 nexation was expressly disavowed. After so much en- 
 couragement from the opposition which was conducting an 
 active campaign for immediate withdrawal of the American 
 forces, the Filipinos were less than ever prepared to accept 
 a status as a theoretically conquered people. In point of 
 fact the American forces had not even conquered the island 
 of Luzon. The most that can be said in extenuation is that 
 the policy and the resolution had been adopted in great 
 ignorance of the actual facts in the islands, and in a blissful 
 and exalted assumption that any race ought to regard con- 
 quest by the American people as a superlative blessing. 
 
 Significance of Senate Approval of Treaty of Paris 
 
 The vote on the Treaty of Paris was set for February 
 6. Two days before the vote the insurgents and the 
 American military forces came into actual conflict, and 
 some American soldiers were killed. That this fact in- 
 fluenced the decision of the Senate there can be little doubt. 
 
 ♦Italics by T. D. 
 
630 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 The vote was 57 to 27, three Repubhcan senators voting 
 with the opposition. A change of two votes would have 
 defeated the treaty. While there would appear to be no 
 foundation for the charge that the American military forces 
 in the Philippines had deliberately brought on the conflict 
 of February 4 with a view of influencing the Senate, it is 
 quite evident that while the treaty was under consideration, 
 the Administration had created a condition in the Islands 
 which in the end exercised a coercing influence on the 
 Senate. That such a policy had appeared to be necessary 
 at the time reveals how utterly inadequate are the provi- 
 sions of the American Constitution enabling the govern- 
 ment to initiate wise preventive measures to meet such 
 threatening situations as were now constantly recurring in 
 Asia. 
 
 "The war that followed it," w.rote Senator Hoar seven years later, 
 "crushed the Republic that the Philippine people had set up for 
 themselves, deprived them of their independence, and established 
 there, by American power, a government in which the people have no 
 part, against their will. No man, I think, will seriously question 
 that that action was contrary to the Declaration of Independence, the 
 fundamental principles declared in many State constitutions, the 
 principles avowed by the founders of the Republic, and by our states- 
 men of all parties down to a time long after the death of Lincoln." " 
 
 Such a passage, which was and is still more or less char- 
 acteristic of the opposition to the acquisition of the Islands 
 is worthy of note. It assumed what was not true. The 
 Filipinos had not set up a "republic"; the nature of the 
 government which they would select, or which Aguinaldo 
 and his advisers would have selected for them, was not clear, 
 and the measures which they had actually adopted by 
 February 1, 1899, by no means prove that they were likely 
 to set up democratic institutions. The rebellion arose not 
 in support of a republic but in opposition to the proposed 
 conquest by the United States. 
 
 But even were one to grant the entire truth of every 
 similar assertion made by Senator Hoar and so many others, 
 one need not reach his conclusion in the absence of any 
 constructive suggestion for dealing with the international 
 
HAWAII AND THE PHILIPPINES 631 
 
 situation as it existed in the Far East in 1898. Nowhere 
 in the debates on the PhiUppine question does one find any- 
 adequate meeting of the facts by the opponents of the Ad- 
 ministration policy. Granted that the President, his ad- 
 visers and the military diplomats at Manila blundered into 
 very unnecessary and tactless positions before the Filipinos, 
 yet what else was there to do but to remain and to extend 
 the American domain to the entire archipelago? To have 
 retired would, at the worst, have precipitated war in the 
 Far East, or, at the best, it would have created another 
 Korea. 
 
 The more important conclusions to which we may come 
 from a study of these events are: (1) The United States 
 could not withdraw from the Philippines in 1898. (2) 
 Notwithstanding the opposition of a very considerable sec- 
 tion of the American people, the majority, led by the Ad- 
 ministration, clearly wished the Philippines to be retained. 
 (3) The diplomatic negotiations with the Filipinos were 
 badly handled and the President, while declining to exceed 
 his constitutional powers by granting the "tangible con- 
 cessions" desired, did none the less severely strain his 
 executive war-making authority by ordering the extension 
 of the military government over the archipelago, which was 
 equivalent to authorizing a campaign of conquest, while the 
 Senate was discussing the question. (4) McKinley created 
 a situation in the Philippines either because of supposed 
 military necessity or because of the international situation, 
 which had the effect of coercing the Senate. (5) Like Cass's 
 instructions to Reed in 1857, and like Seward's policy in 
 Japan and his proposed policy in Korea, the McKinley 
 policy in 1898 was profoundly influenced by the desire to 
 assert American rights in the East in the face of European 
 aggression. 
 
 The McKinley policy in the Philippines was not new: 
 it was a return in principle to the policy of Seward. Funda- 
 mentally it was not a departure from but a continuance of 
 traditional American policy in Asia, for it was exerted in 
 the interest of the open door and of sustaining China, yes, 
 
632 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 of sustaining Asia against the aggressions of Europe. It 
 was, however, a reversal of American policy as it had been 
 applied so futilely in Korea since 1882, Notwithstanding 
 the Filipino insurrection, the anti-foreign outbreak in 
 China, and the annoyance of many Japanese at the in- 
 crease of American domain, the United States was at the 
 end of the century more nearly allied, by political and com- 
 mercial necessity, to Asia, and to Asiatic aspirations, than 
 to Europe. 
 
 The most unfortunate feature of the entire debate had 
 been that it was settled without any clear understanding 
 by the American people of the relation of Hawaii and the 
 Philippines to the still larger question of American policy 
 in Asia. 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. C. A. Conant: "The United States in the Orient." This is a 
 
 discussion of the economic and industrial condition of the 
 United States and Europe at the close of the century, with 
 special reference to its influence on the demands for oppor- 
 tunity for foreign investments. 
 
 2. "Letters from the Kaiser to the Czar" (edited by Isaac Don 
 
 Levine, New York, 1920), p. 49. This reference to a proposed 
 alliance to include the United States is discussed in the follow- 
 ing chapter. 
 
 3. "Addresses of John Hay" (New York, 1900), pp. 163 ff. Me- 
 
 morial address on William McKinley, delivered Feb. 27, 1902. 
 
 4. See Moore's "Digest," Vol. 1, pp. 475 S., for an exhaustive digest, 
 
 based on manuscript archives as well as on printed documents 
 of American policy with reference to Hawaii. 
 
 5. President McKinley, however, fully credited the belief that 
 
 Japan had designs on Hawaii. See George F. Hoar: "Auto- 
 biography of Seventy Years" (New York, 1906), Vol. 2, 
 chap. 33, particularly pp. 305-7. 
 
 6. "Autobiography of George Dewey" (New York, 1913), pp. 168 ff. 
 
 For an exhaustive and critical bibliography of every phase of 
 early American relations with the Philippines see James A. 
 Le Roy: "The Americans in the Philippines" (Boston and 
 New York, 1914), 2 vols. The contemporary discussion of all 
 phases of the Philippine question was so partisan and often so 
 misleading that the critical bibliographical notes by Le Roy 
 in his footnotes are an indispensable guide. No other single 
 phase of American relations with the Far East has ever been 
 so critically and judicially studied. See A. Yiallate: "Les 
 preliminaires de la guerre hispano-americaine et I'annexion 
 
HAWAII AND THE PHILIPPINES 633 
 
 des Philippines par les etats-unis," Revue Historique, juillet- 
 aout, 1903, pp. 282-3, for a Continental point of view; also 
 Baron von Eckardstein's "Ten Years at the Court of St. 
 James 1S95-1905." 
 
 7. North China Daily News, Nov. 29, 1895. 
 
 8. Dewey : "Autobiography," 168 ff. 
 
 9. Le Roy gives a thoroughly adequate discussion, based on Filipino 
 
 as well as American documents of the relations of Pratt, Wild- 
 man and Dewey to Aguinaldo. For a much less judicial and 
 more partisan discussion see James H. Blount : "The Ameri- 
 can Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912." The pamphlet 
 literature, magazine articles, and government documents are 
 too multitudinous to admit of inclusion here. 
 
 10. Moore's "Digest," vol. 1, pp. 520 ff. John Bassett Moore had 
 
 been in the Department of State for several years, and became 
 Secretary of the American Peace Commission at Paris. 
 
 11. For a highly enthusiastic estimate of the possibilities of Ameri- 
 
 can trade with Asia- — really a campaign document for the 
 Administration policy — see Frank A. Vanderlip, Century 
 Magazine, August, 1898. This was partially reprinted in 
 S. Doc. 62 :55-3, Pt. I, pp. 563 ff. 
 
 12. S. Doc. 62:55-3 (Pt. I) p. 484. 
 
 13. A very adequate collection of these debates is to be found in 
 
 Marion Mills Miller : "Great Debates in American History" 
 (New York, 1913) 14 vols.— Vol. 3, chaps. 5 and 6. 
 
 14. S. Doc. 331:57-1, pp. 776-8. 
 
 15. S. Doc. 208 :56-l, p. 62. 
 
 16. Hoar's "Autobiography," Vol. 2, p. 304, 
 
CHAPTER XXXII 
 
 THE EEASSEETION OF THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY 
 
 In the McKinley administration the most aggressive 
 force in the relations of the Government with Asia was not 
 the Department of State. The PhiUppine poHcy issued 
 from the President and he entrusted its execution to the 
 miUtary branch of the government. The Department of 
 State does not appear to have had much to do with it. It 
 was carried forward by miHtary rather than by diplomatic 
 measures. Much subsequent trouble would probably have 
 been avoided had it been otherwise. There are at least 
 intimations that McKinley would have been willing to 
 adopt in China a policy similar to that which was being 
 applied in the Philippines. Happily the entrance of John 
 Hay into the McKinley cabinet in the autumn of 1898 re- 
 stored the ascendancy of diplomacy over military interven- 
 tion and led to measures which not only averted the dis- 
 memberment of China but likewise rendered unnecessary 
 a program such as McKinley might otherwise have pro- 
 posed.* On the other hand, the determination of the Presi- 
 dent gave to the Hay diplomacy a support without which 
 it might have been less successful. f 
 
 *John W. Foster reports a conversation between McKinley and Hay in 
 which the former is asserted to have expressed a willingness to share in the 
 partition of China in case the dismemberment of the Empire were actually to 
 take place. 1 
 
 tJohn Hay, U. S. Ambassador at the Court of St. James since the begin- 
 ning of the McKinley administration, was. invited to become Secretary of State, 
 August 13, 1S98, in place of R. W. Day, who had been appointed a member of 
 the Peace Commission. Hay assumed the duties of the new oflSce September 30. 
 He was the most experienced diplomat appointed to this office in the nineteenth 
 century, and one of the best informed men of his day upon European politics. 
 In the direction of diplomatic affairs in the Far East Mr. Hay was ably 
 assisted by W. W. Rockhill who. at that time Director of the Bureau of 
 American Republics, had been almost continuously in the diplomatic service 
 or the Department of State for fourteen years. Rockhill entered the diplo- 
 matic service at his own charges at the Legation in Peking in 1884, retiring 
 three years later. In 1887 he served for a few months as charge d'affaires at 
 Seoul at a very critical time. Subsequently he extended his knowledge of Far 
 Eastern afCairs by travels and researches, and in 1899 was exceedingly well 
 
 634 
 
THE REASSERTION OF THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY 635 
 
 The Far East in 1899 
 
 The close of the Sino-Japanese War had revealed a 
 working agreement between Russia, Germany and France. 
 The most subtle force in this informal alliance, perhaps, 
 was Germany, which was already seeking to divert the at- 
 tention of Russia from the Near to the Far East.* Whatever 
 the relations between Germany and Russia it is evident that 
 the place of France in the concert was due not to any desire 
 to assist Germany but rather to the fact that the extension 
 of Russian military and commercial influence in the Far 
 East promised an ever widening field for French investors. 
 In contrast to this concert of powers we find the other three 
 nations which were interested in China, the so-called ''trad- 
 ing nations" — Great Britain, Japan and the United States 
 — severally in diplomatic isolation, and yet collectively 
 opposed to Russia, Germany and France, and thus drawn 
 by a common interest to each other. 
 
 The diplomatic cordiality between Russia and the 
 United States, so noticeable in China after 1850, certainly 
 did not arise out of any spiritual kinship between the Rus- 
 sian and the American political theories or institutions. It 
 was, however, profitable to both nations and was studiously 
 cultivated by Russia. In her long struggle with England 
 
 prepared to interpret the situation in the Bast. It has often been said that 
 Rockhill's position in the Bureau of American Republics was secured for him 
 in order that the Department of State might still have the benefit of his advice 
 on diplomatic matters in Asia. Hay regarded him as one of the two best 
 American diplomats, the other being Henry White. = The extent of Hay's 
 dependence upon Rockhill has, perhaps, not yet been fully appreciated. 
 
 *Russia was for the moment usually regarded as the leader in the concert 
 of powers which brouglit about the recession of the Liaotung peninsula. There 
 were even rumors that Li Hung Chang had been assured by Russia before the 
 Treaty of Shimoneselti that Port Arthur would be returned to China. General 
 Foster, who would be expected to know, denied this. Count Witte in his 
 Memoirs states that he was the initiator of the plan and records that the deci- 
 sion was reached on March 30. 1895. KorfE and other Russians credit Witte's 
 statement. Cordier believes that France was the initiator, having addressed 
 a communication to Russia on the subject April 10. The writer has heard it 
 asserted by one who was intimately associated with the diplomatic corps at 
 the time that it was usually accepted that the plan for intervention was first 
 put forward by the French Legation at Peking. There is also another version 
 of the affair which was credited by Minister Denby but which seems never to 
 have been widely known. It was believed that throughout the negotiations at 
 Shinioneseki Li Hung Chanc was in telegraphic communication with Herr von 
 Brandt, formerly German Minister at Peking and then attached to the German 
 Foreign Office. It was believed that Li Hung Chang, after feigning illness for 
 two days, signed the treaty immediately upon receipt of a telegram from von 
 Brandt stating that the powers would come to the rescue of China. Count 
 Hayashi believed that Germany was the initiator of the concert.^ 
 
636 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 she sought the United States, also opposed by England, as 
 a friend and possible ally. So long as Great Britain was 
 seeking to break down the Monroe Doctrine she was creat- 
 ing favorable conditions for a Russo- American understand- 
 ing. Russian friendship for the United States was always 
 related to British policy; the sale of Alaska was a case in 
 point. While Stoeckl made it appear that Russia was re- 
 luctant to sell, the situation was in fact quite otherwise. 
 Russia was eager to place in the keeping of the United 
 States a territory which Great Britain could so easily have 
 taken from Russia in the case of a war such as seemed 
 probable. Russia was equally glad to be free to devote her 
 energies to Eastern Asia. Almost immediately after the 
 sale of Alaska Russia adopted in Peking a policy which 
 aroused the suspicion of the American representatives.* 
 
 The policy of Russia in China appears to have been 
 always to conciliate China and win her especial good will 
 with a view to capitalizing it subsequently as was illus- 
 trated in the relations between Russia and China after 1895. 
 There had been many similar episodes in the preceding 
 thirty-five years. Russia never sincerely accepted the co- 
 operative policy in China. Russian policy in Korea was 
 equally devious. These methods and designs in the East, 
 coinciding as they did with the reports of the Siberian exile 
 atrocities, the new outbursts of Jewish persecutions, as well 
 as with the new cordial understanding between the United 
 States and Great Britain, definitely ended the traditional 
 friendship which had led Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1871 
 to pen his poetic invocation: "God bless the Empire that 
 loves the Great Union, Strength to her People ! Long Life 
 to the Czar!" 
 
 Cordial relations between Germany and the United 
 States in China existed until 1882. Then Germany be- 
 
 *In a personal letter, March 13, 1873, Minister Low stated to Secretary of 
 State Fish that he had reason to believe that Russia was not sincerely cooper- 
 ating with the other ministers in the common plan to force the audience ques- 
 tion. He believed that Russia was secretly advising the Chinese not to yield. 
 He thought that Russia was either seeking to prevent the other powers from 
 increasing their influence, or was hoping to provoke hostilities between China 
 and the powers, thus creating conditions similar to 1860 which would be 
 favorable for Russia to acquire more Chinese territory.* 
 
THE REASSERTION OF THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY 637 
 
 trayed indications of an aggressive policy which raised 
 questions as to how far the Americans ought to carry co- 
 operation.* The advance of German influence in Japan in 
 the next decade was accomplished at the expense of the 
 United States and still further separated the two powers. 
 The seizure of Kiaochow and the establishment of the Ger- 
 man sphere of influence in Shantung brought Germany into 
 direct conflict with fundamental American policy. At the 
 same time the harmonious relations between Berlin and, 
 Washington were being disturbed by questions of reciprocal 
 tariff arrangements. 
 
 There had been no kinship between the policies of 
 France and those of the United States in China at least 
 since 1862 when the French withdrew from the Interna- 
 tional Settlement at Shanghai. The Americans were wholly 
 opposed to the French protectorate of the Roman Catholic 
 missions and regarded French policy as one which tended 
 to create general hostile feeling among the Chinese for all 
 foreigners. American policy had, however, never taken 
 the form of active opposition to French interests and while 
 the United States had sought to mediate in the Franco- 
 Chinese War (1884-5) the attitude of Frelinghuysen had 
 ^been one of the most scrupulous and even timid neutrality. 
 In 1899 the relations between the United States and France 
 were cordial, but the American Government was as far 
 removed from sympathy with French as with Russian or 
 German designs in the East. 
 
 The old cordiality between Japan and the United States 
 was cooling, but it W9.s not cold. The United States had 
 stood by Japan in the Sino-Japanese War, and the immi- 
 gration and Hawaiian questions had only created a passing 
 chill. ' The emeute of October 8, 1895, in Seoul, the murder 
 of the queen and the subsequent acquittal of Miura had 
 greatly reduced American regard for the Japanese but there 
 
 *"The government with whom we have been most in sympathy is Ger- 
 many. . . ." But "in recent years Germany has shown activity in the Bast. 
 Her policy has been eager, decisive, and peremptory, going so far ... as to 
 land troops on Chinese soil, and prevent the Chinese from carrying out their 
 interpretation of the treaties. The advance of German influence had been 
 marked and steady." (Young to Frelinghuysen, February 4, 1883.*) Cordier 
 relates the episode at Swatow where German marines were landed." 
 
638 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 had been little to choose between the methods of China and 
 of Japan in Korea except that one had failed and the other 
 ^ had been successful. The American occupation of the 
 Philippines was the best test of the quality of Japanese- 
 American relations. Before 1898 the Filipino insurgents 
 had sought aid from Japan and a small quantity of arms 
 had been smuggled into Luzon from Japanese sources. 
 When the insurgents turned against the United States in 
 1899 they again appealed to Japan for sympathy and help. 
 Through a German firm in Japan some munitions were 
 actually started on their way to the Philippines, but they 
 were intercepted and there is no reason to suppose that the 
 effort ever received any sympathy from the Japanese Gov- 
 ernment. Japan was never in a more difficult situation than 
 in 1898 and the Japanese Government, as well as the more 
 conservative press, expressed the earnest wish that the 
 United States would remain in the Philippines. Among 
 all the possible neighbors to Japan, particularly to Formosa, 
 Japan vastly preferred the United States to any other 
 Western power. Furthermore, the traditional American 
 policy was as favorable to Japan in China as it had been 
 to Japan in Korea. The closing of the doors in China 
 before Japan had really entered them in force, or the par- 
 tition of the Empire at a time when Japan was wholly 
 unable to share in the supposed benefits, were as inimical 
 to Japan as to the United States. The two nations were 
 natural allies and Japan, recently so roughly treated by the 
 concert, probably would have been not unwilling to effect 
 a formal alliance with both Great Britain and the United 
 States. 
 
 The relations between the United States and Great 
 
 Britain in the Far East had never been actually unfriendly 
 
 since 1853. They reached their maximum of cordiality in 
 
 both China and Japan in 1866 and then cooled slowly until 
 
 in the second Cleveland administration all semblance of 
 
 1 cooperation disappeared. But in 1898-9 Great Britain 
 
 1 found herself diplomatically isolated in Europe and opposed 
 
 1 in the East by the three most powerful European powers. 
 
THE REASSERTION OF THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY 639 
 
 She then turned agam to the United States just as she had 
 under shxiilar conditions in 1854 at the outbreak of the 
 Crimean War. England had always boasted that she, 
 like the United States, desired the open door in China 
 The assertion was true in a measure, but with this qualifica- 
 tion, that since 1842, while the door had been open, the 
 vestibule, i.e., the trade routes, either by way of the Cape 
 or by way of Gibraltar, Suez, Ceylon, Malacca, Singapore 
 and Hongkong — the only trade routes from Europe — had 
 been in the well fortified keeping of Great Britain. She 
 could have effectually closed the door from Europe to Asia 
 at any time, and no doubt would have closed it to any 
 nation which ventured to take up arms against her, not 
 merely in China, but anywhere else in the world. After 
 1895 Great Britain's strategic position in the East under- 
 went a relative diminution. Japan acquired Formosa, thus 
 assuming potential control of the trade routes north of 
 Hongkong. Germany obtained an equivalent to Hongkong 
 on the Shantung peninsula which was calculated to tap the 
 trade of North China as effectively as Hongkong had 
 drained the trade of the South. Russia came into possession 
 of a supposedly impregnable fortress at Port Arthur and 
 controlled practically all the coast of Northern Asia down to 
 Shanhaikwan where the Great Wall meets the sea. 
 Meanwhile a new trade route in the North — the Trans- 
 Siberian Railway — was in the course of construction. In 
 1899 Great Britain was in a relatively weaker position in 
 China than she had ever been before. It is not to be won- 
 dered at that Admiral Chichester placed the Immortalite 
 between the American and the European fleets on the 
 morning (August 13, 1898) when the Americans moved to 
 the attack on the city of Manila. Had Russia, Germany 
 or France, instead of the United States, been the attacking 
 party it is difficult to see how Great Britain could have done 
 otherwise than oppose them. And yet England, about to 
 be engaged in South Africa, could have offered only a very j 
 uncertain resistance to any coalition of European powers, j 
 Events thus conspired to bring the United States, Japan 
 
640 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 and Great Britain together. Their interests in China ap- 
 peared to be identical. The closing of the door was an 
 obstacle alike to all three. As for American interests, the 
 Spanish-American War and the Filipino insurrection had 
 created a diplomatic situation novel in American history 
 since the Civil War, for which the truculent, non-coopera- 
 tive policy of Cleveland and Gresham was no solution. 
 
 Overtures for an Alliance 
 
 When the famous Hay notes of September 6, 1899 are 
 isolated from the details of the international situation in 
 which they were launched they lose much of their signifi- 
 cance. As a definition of policy on the part of the United 
 States we may think of them as the answer of the American 
 Government to certain informal proposals from British 
 sources which had invited an alliance of three or four 
 powers for purposes very similar to those which were 
 eventually expressed in the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 
 1902. 
 
 -^ An Anglo-Japanese alliance was no new idea even in 
 1899. British writers had been proposing such a relation- 
 ship intermittently for a quarter of a century. The steady 
 advance of Japan had convinced many even before 1880 
 that the assumption of British foreign policy that Japan 
 was a weak and negligible quantity while China was the 
 only nation in the Far East worth cultivating, was 
 erroneous.* 
 
 * The Japan Daily Herald (November 9, 1875) notes without disapproval an 
 article in the London Spectator in which it was suggested that by means of an 
 alliance with Japan England might be able to engage unemployed Japanese 
 samaurai in war against China over the murder of Margery. The Spectator 
 remarked that England needed an island and an ally in the Far East. The 
 Shanghai Courier and Gazette (reprinted in the Japan Gazette, August 5, 
 1876) replied that for an ally England could count on Japan, and as for an 
 island it might be possible to secure either the Lew Chews from Japan or 
 Quelpert from Korea. The Japan Gazette, February 5, 1877, reprinted from 
 the Pall Mall Budget an article in which the question was raised : "Are we 
 laying the seeds of a valuable and sincere alliance?" The German Army 
 Gazette (alluded to in the Japan Herald, October 29, 1879) had advocated an 
 offensive and defensive alliance between Germany and Japan. 
 
 Japan's unique strategic position had also not passed unnoticed by some 
 Americans. De Long had felt that an alliance between Japan and the United 
 States might some dav be desirable. Harris appears to have been not unmindful 
 of the advantages of such an arrangement, and General Grant may have 
 recognized it. 
 
THE REASSERTION OF THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY 641 
 
 The abrupt change of attitude on Japanese treaty re- 
 vision in 1886 was an indication of changing British policy, 
 but it was so little marked that until the outbreak of the 
 war in 1894 Japan suspected that England was in secret 
 alliance with China. ^ When it became clear that there was 
 no such pact Japanese statesmen would appear to have 
 begun seriously to consider the possibility of some sort of 
 an Anglo-Japanese convention. This was fully in line with 
 the policy which had been suggested by Lord Hotta in 
 1858 and by Viscount Tani in 1887. The Japanese halted 
 between an alliance with Russia and one with England, 
 On the whole Japan had less to forgive if she chose Russia, 
 but she also would have more co fear. 
 
 A new impetus to the discussion was given by the visit 
 of Lord Charles Beresford, representing the Associated 
 Chambers of Commerce of Great Britain, to China and 
 Japan in the winter of 1898-9. Both in China and in Japai).-, 
 in public addresses Lord Beresford developed at length the 
 idea that the open door in China could not be maintained 
 in the face of the opposition of France and Russia unless 
 there was a combination of powers which were willing to 
 fight to keep it open.* Beresford proposed an elaborately:i 
 devised scheme for the creation of a police force in China 
 in which Chinese troops would be directed by British, Ger- 
 
 *"Our policy as declared by the Cabinet, approved by the country, and I 
 am perfectly sure by every one in this room, is what is called the 'open door.' 
 . . . Ministers have raved with their hands over their heads, declaring that 
 they will fight for the 'open door.' " (Speech of Beresford at annual dinner 
 of Shanghai Branch of China Association, reported in North China Daily News, 
 November 21, 1898.) 
 
 "Great Britain, as you know, has declared in the most public manner that 
 her policy in the future with regard to the safety of her interests and trade 
 and commerce, must be the policy of the open door, and as far as I can gather 
 from the many kind interviews I have received in this country, the people of 
 this great Empire are determined that the policy of the open door shall con- 
 tinue in China so far as they are concerned. Therefore I say that our policy 
 and our interests for the future are identical." Beresford then proposed, as 
 he had in China, a "commercial alliance or understanding based on the prin- 
 ciple of the open door." But the open door would not be of very much use, 
 he believed, unless the integrity of China was maintained. Therefore he pro- 
 posed an alliance of the four trading nations — Great Britain, Japan, the United 
 States and Germany — "with the definite understanding on the integrity of 
 China, so that the door can be kept open." To the possible objection that 
 Germany might not be ready to agree to the open door, Beresford pointed out 
 that Germany had already declared Kiaochow an open port. "I am suggesting 
 to you nothing new," remarked the speaker. The policy was supposed already 
 to exist, but he believed that an alliance was necessary to guarantee it. 
 (Beresford speech before the Tokio Japanese-Oriental Association, reported in 
 the Japan Times, January 22, 1899.) 
 
642 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 man, Japanese and American military instructors. The 
 open door, he thought, would be of little use "unless the 
 room inside is in order." The proposed police force would 
 operate in much the same way as the Ever-Victorious Army 
 under Ward and Gordon had aided in the suppression of 
 the Taiping Rebellion, but Beresford's plan would have 
 involved placing the Chinese troops under foreign control. 
 ''Why," he asked in Japan, "should not the Japanese officers 
 try to put the Chinese army in order, on the understanding 
 that China will keep the door open? ... I believe I per- 
 sonally was the first public man in England that ventured 
 to suggest that what would be for the interest of your coun- 
 try and ours would be an alliance between the Empire of 
 the West and the Empire of the East. (Applause.)'^ 
 
 The Beresford speeches were an exercise in diplomatic 
 kite-flying. It was officially denied in Parliament that he 
 was speaking in any other capacity than as a representative 
 )f the Chambers of Commerce, but it is to be noted that 
 I early in 1898, before Beresford departed from England, 
 jJoseph Chamberlain and others had supported a proposal 
 For an alliance of Great Britain with both Germany and 
 the United States. This semi-official proposal reached the 
 fSrm of actual conversations with the German ambassador 
 in London '^ and was even taken up officially with Mr. Hay.* 
 Lord Beresford returned from the Far East by way of 
 America where he made many speeches in the early part 
 of 1899. That the Beresford proposals as outlined in 
 China and Japan found their way to President McKinley, 
 Secretary Hay and Mr. Rockhill, there can be little doubt. 
 The Beresford plan accomplished nothing except the 
 creation of a rumor that the Department of State had made 
 a "secret alliance with England." How utterly baseless this 
 
 *". . . I saw in the evening papers the news of the Anglo-German agree- 
 ment to defend the integrity of China and the Open Door. This is the greatest 
 triumph of all. Lord S. [Salisbury] proposed this to me before I left England. 
 I could not accept it because I knew that unspeakable Senate of ours would 
 not ratify it, and ever since I have been laboring to bring it about without any 
 help, and succeeded as far as was possible for one power to do." (Hay to 
 
 C S H , October 29, 1900, in "Letters and Diaries of John Hay," 
 
 Vol. 3, p. 199. Printed but not published, Washington, 1908.) 
 
 Hay subsequently expressed some doubt as to the sincerity of Germany in 
 the Anglo-German convention. 
 
THE REASSERTION OF THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY 643 
 
 rumor was ought to have been apparent when in April, 
 1899, Great Britain entered into a convention with Russia 
 by which the two powers agreed to respect each other's 
 spheres of influence in the Yangtze Valley and outside the 
 Great Wall, respectively. This agreement was, in effect, a 
 certificate of title granted by each to the other for special 
 privileges in a very large part of the Chinese Empire. A 
 similar agreement between Germany and England had been 
 ■ made the preceding year. Affairs in China were daily be- 
 coming more complicated and each new agreement was 
 inimical to the United States as well as to China. It was 
 quite true that England would have liked to save China 
 for open trade but British diplomacy had no other resource 
 than the alliance. British commerce was far better off with 
 the existing low Chinese tariffs and an open door to the 
 entire trade than it would have been with a part of China 
 under exclusive British control and the other fragments 
 closed to free commercial intercourse, but England appar- 
 ently felt that she must fight fire with fire.* If England 
 could not rely upon the support of the United States, and , 
 apparently she could not, she was likely to adopt a policy iif 
 China which would be as objectionable to the United States 
 as were the policies of Russia, France and Germany. For 
 America to ignore the British calls for help and at the same 
 time to offer no substitute for an alliance was to drive Eng- 
 land still farther along towards the partition of China and 
 render more certain the dismemberment of the Empire. 
 
 The choice before the United States in 1899 was just 
 what it had been in the fifties: cooperation with Great 
 Britain, or independent action. To reject an alliance and 
 offer nothing in its place was a purely negative policy which 
 only increased the difficulties and pitted the United States 
 against not one, but all of the other powers. It is a signifi- 
 cant fact that the rejection of the offer of an alliance in 
 1857 had accomplished nothing for China and had resulted 
 
 *". . . we have hitherto, at any rate^ — whatever the future may have in 
 store for us — maintained the principle of the open door in that country." 
 (Joseph Chamberlain at the meeting of the Wolverhampton Chamber of Com- 
 merce, reported in the London Times, January 19, 1899.) 
 
644 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 in the eclipse of American prestige. In the settlement at 
 
 Tientsin in 1858 the United States had no influence. 
 
 Otherwise the Americans might have exercised a restraint 
 
 upon the dictatorial and ruthless Lord Elgin. Again, in 
 
 Japan the retirement of the United States from a cordial 
 
 cooperation with England had resulted in the elimination 
 
 of American influence in the final treaty revision. What 
 
 it had accomplished for Japan might have been obtained 
 
 ^-""by other means; it had been costly to the United States. 
 
 \ So now in 1899 the United States was in grave danger of 
 
 I complete elimination from influence in China. The choice 
 
 I was really between cooperation with such powers as had 
 
 I similar interests and exercising upon them as much of a 
 
 1 restraining influence as a powerful ally always possesses, 
 
 \or futilely opposing the entire company of the powers. 
 
 John Hay and the Open-Door Notes 
 
 England wanted an alliance. It is unlikely that Japan 
 would have hesitated to join. Probably John Hay, had he 
 been at hberty to make a perfectly free choice, would have 
 favored it, although the Beresford plan was in its details 
 open to the gravest of objections.* Beresford's plan 
 would have driven the Chinese into the arms of Russia and 
 provoked a war terrible to contemplate. But an alliance to 
 protect China rather than to destroy her had much to com- 
 mend it. Those who talk so glibly about the superlative 
 advantages of independent action in American foreign re- 
 lations cannot bring to the support of their arguments any 
 large array of facts gathered from American relations with 
 the East since 1899. It seems highly probable that an 
 alliance of Great Britain, Japan and the United States at 
 that time in support of a common policy in China, such as 
 Mr. Hay could have defined and the other powers would 
 
 *"The fact is, a treaty of alliance is impossible. It could never get through 
 the Senate. As long as I stay here no action shall be taken contrary to my 
 conviction that the one indispensable feature of our foreign policy should be 
 a friendly understanding with England. But an alliance must remain, in the 
 present state of things, an unattainable dream." ° (Hay to Henry White, 
 September 24, 1899.) 
 
THE REASSERTION OF THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY 645 
 
 have accepted, would have been vastly preferable to the 
 Anglo- Japanese alUance of 1902 which would have been 
 rendered unnecessary. 
 
 The peculiar contribution of Hay at this critical mo- 
 ment was not the invention of the open door policy, for 
 that was as old as our relations with China, but the direct- 
 ing of a diplomatic technique by which the open door could, 
 in a measure, be guaranteed without actual resort to either 
 force or alliances. It was not an adequate measure but it;' 
 is difficult to see how any more effective measure could' 
 have been devised under the circumstances. Two factors 
 contributing to the success of Hay's efforts were : the recent 
 military successes of the United States and the presence 
 in the East of a large expeditionary force with large reserves 
 in the United States; and the natural identity of British, 
 Japanese, and possibly German, interests in China. Al- 
 though no shadow of treaty engagements existed, a certain 
 amount of "give-and-take" had been going on between 
 Japan, England and the United States for several months. 
 The United States had declined to intervene in Korea after 
 the murder of the queen, and had recalled an anti-Japanese 
 American representative; Japan had withdrawn her pro- 
 tests at the annexation of Hawaii; England had stood by 
 the United States in the Spanish-American War; and now 
 the American Government was making the utmost effort 
 to maintain the strictest neutrality in the Boer War in the 
 face of no inconsiderable anti-British and pro-Boer Ameri- 
 can sentiment. The Hay-Pauncefote treaty was in process 
 of negotiation, and England had expressed willingness to 
 make concessions to promote the construction of an Ameri- 
 can, rather than an Anglo-American Isthmian canal. In 
 a word, the United States was now well embarked again 
 upon a cooperative policy like that of Seward's. 
 
 But John Hay was a very different type of man from 
 William H. Seward, and when he turned to the Chinese 
 question he found the model not in Seward's bellicose policy 
 in Japan but in the more direct, straightforward, irenic and 
 independent course of Anson Burlingame, who had set out 
 
646 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 to save China from the rapacity of the powers by agree- 
 ment. On September 6, 1899, Hay instructed the American 
 representatives in London, Berhn and St. Petersburg (Jo- 
 seph H. Choate, Andrew D. White and Charlemagne Tower, 
 respectively) to approach the governments to which they 
 were accredited with similar though not identic proposi- 
 tions concerning commercial rights in China. He pointed 
 to the various verbal or written statements which had 
 already been made by each power respecting freedom of 
 trade for all nations on equal terms and asked for ''formal 
 declarations" to the following effect: ® 
 
 "First. [That it] Will in no wise interfere with any treaty port 
 or vested interest within any so-called 'sphere of influence' or leased 
 territory it may have in China. 
 
 "Second. That the Chinese tariff of the time being shall apply to 
 all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within said 
 'spheres of interest' (unless they be 'free ports') no matter to what 
 nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected 
 by the Chinese Government. 
 
 "Third. That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of 
 another nationality frequenting any port in such 'sphere' than shall 
 be levied on vessels of their own nationality, and no higher railroad 
 charges over lines built, controlled, or operated within its 'sphere' on 
 merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities 
 transported through such 'sphere' than shall be levied on similar 
 merchandise belonging to its own nationals, transported over equal 
 distances." 
 
 The propositions received immediate attention.* The 
 proposals were not entirely acceptable to any of the powers 
 addressed. Even England wished to have exceptions made 
 to meet the peculiar conditions of her own interests. It is 
 notable that although the notes contemplated the applica- 
 tion of the declaration to all leased territory. Lord Salisbury 
 excluded the newly leased area at Kowloon from his assent. 
 Great Britain really regarded this land as for all practical 
 purposes a part of the ceded territory of Hongkong. It had 
 been taken in the form of a lease rather than as a cession 
 in order that Germany, Russia and France might not have 
 
 ♦When the correspondence was published it was agreed to omit from it 
 the various notes which carried the negotiations and to include only the final 
 answers. This fact has proved misleading to many who have assumed that 
 only Great Britain made an immediate reply. 
 
THE REASSERTION OF THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY 647 
 
 precedent for transmuting their respective leases into actual 
 cessions of territory. With this single, and in principle not 
 unimportant exception, England agreed to the declaration 
 (November 30). Germany stated (December 4) that she 
 "would raise no objection" if the other powers agreed. 
 France, which was approached November 22, replied De- 
 cember 16. Russia gave a very evasive declaration two 
 days later. Japan and Italy, which were approached after 
 the other powers, agreed promptly December 26 and Jan- 
 uary 7, respectively. The news of the negotiations was 
 released to the press January 3, 1900. 
 
 What was Obtained? 
 
 What had been obtained? Not so much as is popularly 
 supposed. The United States had not secured more than 
 already accrued to it under the ''most-favored-nation" 
 clauses in the treaties. The preferential railway and min- 
 ing privileges had in no way been disturbed. Although the 
 United States expressly stipulated that it did not recognize 
 the spheres of influence the replies to the notes had in 
 each case afforded an opportunity of reaffirming that there 
 were such spheres. There remained no good harbor on the 
 entire coast of China where the American Government 
 could have leased a port had it so desired. On March 20, 
 1900, Secretary Hay announced that he regarded as "final 
 and definitive" the declarations of the several powers that 
 the open door would be maintained and that China would 
 continue to collect the customs and therefore exercise the 
 rights of sovereignty in the sphere of influence, but as a 
 matter of fact only the partition of the Empire had been 
 halted. The Hay notes, which are believed to have been 
 drafted by Rockhill, were as significant in their omissions 
 as in their contents. By their omissions they marked vir- 
 tual surrenders which the American traders in the forties 
 and fifties would probably have contemplated with little 
 satisfaction. These notes have been popularly mislabeled. 
 They did not secure a completely open door. But they did 
 
648 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 \ avert the immediate partition of the Empire, for the Powers 
 
 \ assented to the recognition of the sovereign tax-collecting 
 
 I rights of China. They also averted the accomplishment 
 
 1 of any scheme of foreign-officered police such as Lord 
 
 IBeresford had proposed. 
 
 The Hay Notes may be best appreciated when they are 
 regarded as a purely temporary expedient to meet a specific 
 situation. As such they were a success. As a permanent 
 measure they are less to be commended for they did not 
 secure the open door as had been hoped and they did not 
 avert further threatening engagements among the powers, 
 notably the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The United States 
 had, in fact, missed a great opportunity to serve both its 
 own interests and those of China, but the failure cannot be 
 ascribed to John Hay. 
 
 The open door policy has become so much a phrase to 
 
 conjure with in American politics that a definition of it as 
 
 it was in 1899 is in order. Based on sixty years of history 
 
 and on the circumstances as well as the text of the notes the 
 
 definition was as follows: The United States still adhered 
 
 \ to the policy, to which Seward alone had made exception, 
 
 \ of independent rather than allied action. This indepen- 
 
 \ dence was not, however, to preclude cooperation. The 
 
 lAmerican Government relinquished the right to lease a port 
 
 m China like Kiaochow or Port Arthur for all the good ports 
 
 were either leased or preempted by non-alienation agree- 
 
 ! ments. The United States was making no specific demand 
 
 for the open door for investments; there was not enough 
 
 American money seeking investment to make it worth while 
 
 to quarrel about the preferential rights to construct rail- 
 
 ■^ ways or operate mines which had already been given to the 
 
 \ other powers. The United States merely demanded an 
 \ open door for trade in that part of China in which American 
 \ merchants were already interested, viz., the area westward 
 «s|rom Kwangtung on the South to Manchuria on the North. 
 As for Korea, the United States was not politically or com- 
 mercially interested. And as for those parts of the tradi- 
 tional Chinese Empire in the extreme south where France 
 
THE REASSERTION OF THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY 649 
 
 had already carved out an empire, or along the Amur where 
 Russia had begun the partition of China in 1860, the United 
 States had never murmured a protest. 
 
 What the American Government would have done had 
 the powers withheld assent from the Hay proposals is a 
 speculative, yet interesting and important question. It 
 seems clear that the United States would not have taken 
 up arms either to enforce assent to the open door policy, 
 or to prevent the partition of the Empire. On the other 
 hand, had the dismemberment of China been started, there 
 would have been a very strong sentiment in the United 
 States against remaining aloof from the division of the 
 spoils. Considering what John Hay had to work with, and 
 what he had to work against, his must be regarded as, if not 
 a famous victory, then at least an important diplomatic 
 coup. The United States had not secured a great deal, as 
 the next score of years revealed, but what it had obtained 
 cost nothing, was accompanied by the assumption of no 
 obligations, and was in return for no actual concessions. 
 
 BIBLIOGEAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. John W. Foster: "Diplomatic Memoirs," Vol. 2, p. 257. 
 
 2. William Eoscoe Thayer: "Life and Letters of John Hay," Vol. 
 
 2, p. 244. 
 
 3. For the different assertions with reference to the return of Port 
 
 Arthur to China, see "Memoirs of Count Witte," p. 84; S. A. 
 Korff: "Eussia's Foreign Eelations during the Last Half Cen- 
 tury," p. 57; "Eecollections of a Foreign Minister" (Memoirs 
 of Alexander Iswolsky) ; Chas. Louis Seeger, translator, p. 3(3 ; 
 Cordier: "Eelations, etc.," Vol 3, p. 288; "Secret Memoirs of 
 Count Hayashi," pp. 51 ff. 
 
 4. China Dispatches, Vol. 34, Mar. 13, 1873, Low to Fish. 
 
 5. Foreign Eelations, 1883, p. 191; Cordier: "Eelations," Vol. 2, 
 
 pp. 577 ff. 
 
 6. Hayashi Memoirs, p. 45. 
 
 7. "Letters from the Kaiser to the Czar," p. 48. 
 
 8. Thayer: "John Hay," Vol. 2, p. 221. 
 
 9. The Hay Notes and correspondence are printed in For. Eel. 
 1899, pp. 128 ff. under the caption "Correspondence Concern- 
 ing American Commercial Eights in China." Moore's "Digest," 
 Vol. 6, pp. 534 ff., gives all the essential material. 
 
CHAPTER XXXIII 
 
 THE UNITED STATES AND THE BOXEE INSUKRECTION 
 
 Excluding all details of the Boxer affair extraneous to 
 a study of policy, we may outline our theme in four ques- 
 tions: What happened? What did the American Govern- 
 ment desire? What methods were employed? What were 
 the successes and failures? 
 
 The Boxer Insurrection 
 
 The disturbances in China which culminated in the 
 Boxer affair had been approaching for many years. For 
 three quarters of a century the alien Manchu dynasty had 
 been losing the loyalty and confidence of the Chinese peo- 
 ple. The Chinese entertained no special dislike for the 
 Manchus as aliens or as conquerors, but the corruption and 
 weakness of their government made them objectionable as 
 rulers. In return for the taxes, which were steadily increas- 
 ing, the government did not maintain peace within the 
 Empire nor was it successful in protecting China from the 
 attacks of other nations. Brigands, pirates and revolution- 
 ists continually disturbed the orderly conditions necessary 
 for trade. The humiliating defeats at the hands of foreign 
 powers, 1839-42, 1856-60, 1894-5, to which were added 
 numberless other impositions and exactions by foreigners, 
 costing the Empire large sums of money and some losses of 
 territory, revealed the Manchus as incapable of effectively 
 discharging the trust which had been reposed in them. 
 After 1853 the Manchu dynasty owed its power in China 
 not to its own vitality or the loyalty of its subjects, but 
 rather to the fact that the foreign powers had willed that it 
 
 650 ' 
 
UNITED STATES AND THE BOXER INSURRECTION 651 
 
 remain. Otherwise the Manchus probably would not have 
 survived the Taiping Rebellion. 
 
 The Chinese people do not appear to have had any- 
 conspicuous hatred of the foreigner as such. They liked the 
 foreign trade for it was profitable. They hated the for- 
 eigner only because his presence in the Empire increased 
 their taxes, disturbed their peace, and because his extra- 
 territorial privileges gave to him a privileged social, religious 
 and economic position. He was able to evade many of the 
 onerous local taxes which fell the more heavily upon the 
 Chinese. Roman Catholic converts, and to some slight de- 
 gree Protestant converts also, passed under the protection 
 of foreign powers. After 1860 the French missionaries went 
 through the country and demanded the return of church 
 property which had been sequestered more than two cen- 
 turies ago and had long since passed into the possession of 
 innocent proprietors who supposed that their titles were 
 valid. The demands of the bishops and priests for majes- 
 terial rank was a constant irritation. The attitude of the 
 converts was often insolent and intolerable. Likewise the 
 opium trade, while unchallenged by the populace, aroused 
 the resentment of the few who could justly claim public 
 spirit and patriotism. Meanwhile the prompt and often 
 unjust demands for reparations and for the settlement of 
 claims, which were collected locally even though they were 
 paid from Peking, again touched the Chinese people on their 
 most sensitive nerve, their money, and aroused resentment. 
 The officials and the gentry whose privileges were most 
 threatened by the anti-Manchu movements were not slow 
 to direct the unrest of the people against the foreigners. 
 
 In a word, both the Manchu government and the for- 
 eigners were steadily inviting and stimulating the antago- 
 nism of the Chinese. One wonders how the latter endured 
 as much as they did. 
 
 The powers sustained the Manchu government not be- 
 cause they respected it, but because they did not dare to 
 take the risk of permitting successful revolution which 
 would have resulted either in the separation of the Empire 
 
652 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 into fragments, or the establishment of some new vigorous 
 central authority which, while restoring order and promot- 
 ing the development of the country, would likewise have 
 been able to set up an effective opposition to the encroach- 
 ment of the powers. To the latter it was most profitable 
 to sustain a weak government which they could intimidate 
 and control. The policy of the foreign governments was to 
 crowd the Chinese to a compliance with every foreign de- 
 mand, but to stop just short of creating the causes for suc- 
 cessful revolution. A weak, disintegrating China made pos- 
 sible the continuance of extraterritoriality, an absurdly low 
 tariff, and an hundred kindred privileges such as the Japa- 
 nese, who were eluding the grasp of the powers, were more 
 and more able to escape. Probably the most effective ally 
 of China was the mutual jealousies of the powers. 
 
 Had the powers realized that Japan would be victorious 
 in the war of 1894-5 and that as a result of the Chinese 
 defeat the Chinese people also would slip for the moment 
 from the indirect control, presumably they would have in- 
 tervened and driven the Japanese back to their island 
 homes. What they had expected was a victory for China 
 which would cripple Japan and restore the latter to their 
 power. But the treaty of Shimoneseki revealed the Manchu 
 government enfeebled beyond all hope of recovery. It also 
 showed Japan preparing to assert herself not merely in the 
 Korean peninsula but also elsewhere on the mainland of 
 Asia. 
 
 The weakness of the Empire, the growing ambitions of 
 Japan, the political rivalries of Europe and the overflowing 
 coffers of European money-lenders, created conditions 
 favorable for a stampede among the powers. The leasing 
 of ports, the acquirement of spheres of influence, the non- 
 alienation compacts followed. The Manchu government 
 was being treated with derision by the powers, and the 
 Chinese people saw themselves the present and future vic- 
 tims. They would have to pay. They were therefore ready 
 to turn upon the Manchus not because they were Manchus 
 but because they were collecting taxes under false pretenses. 
 
UNITED STATES AND THE BOXER INSURRECTION 653 
 
 They were rendering poor government and surrendering 
 their domain. The Chinese were also ready to turn against 
 the foreigners, not because they were foreigners, but because 
 they were secondarily the disturbing influence. 
 
 Following the Sino-Japanese War the powers, had they 
 been united in a desire to help China, might have given sup- 
 port to a reform movement which would have resulted in a 
 better government and set the Chinese people on the path of 
 advance. But the powers were utterly divided. Only the 
 United States wanted a strong China and the United States 
 was after all only slightly interested. The Empress Dow- 
 ager therefore seized the opportunity. She, also, was not 
 conspicuously anti-foreign, but she was shrewd enough to 
 see that her best hope of sustaining the Manchu dynasty 
 and her own influence was to exterminate or expel the for- 
 eigners. This program, successfully carried through, would 
 restore the vanished prestige of her government. The 
 powers, by their jealousy of each other and by their unvar- 
 nished greed, played directly into her hand by furnishing 
 her each day with fresh illustrations of rapacity. The for- 
 eigners, from the Parsee opium trader up the scale to the 
 most unselfish and untiring Christian missionary, owed their 
 lodgment in the Empire to the "naked force" of some for- 
 eign vessel of war which had never been out of call since 
 1842. Between the muzzle of these guns and the people at 
 whom they were aimed were a multitude of foreigners, many 
 of them seekers after peace, honest and kindly in their deal- 
 ings, but no amount of uprightness could conceal the guns 
 which supported them and which were each month becom- 
 ing more numerous. The people, ignorant and incredibly 
 superstitious, were goaded to desperation. While the for- 
 eigner remained aloof, the Empress Dowager, "Old 
 Buddha," skillfully diverted from herself and her dynasty to 
 the foreigner the wrath which in spite of its horrible mani- 
 festations was none the less the proof of the innate vitality 
 of the Chinese people. Thus the Manchus escaped a few 
 years longer. The foreigners became the victims. Collec- 
 tively they richly deserved their fate; but as so often hap^ 
 
654 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 pens the individuals who paid the terrible price were in 
 equal measure innocent. 
 
 The important events of the Boxer insurrection, which 
 have been chronicled by a multitude of writers, may be tabu- 
 lated with brevity.^ On September 22, 1898, following a 
 ''hundred days" of unintelligent and frantic reform under a 
 rash young Emperor, the Empress Dowager resumed her 
 place as captain of the Chinese junk of state. The follow- 
 ing winter the Legations at Peking found it wise to bring up 
 small companies of guards from the foreign fleets. The total 
 number of guards that winter was 141, of which the Ameri- 
 cans supplied 18. In the spring the guards retired and it was 
 not thought necessary for them to return the following 
 winter, but the rapid increase of hostility to foreigners and 
 the murder of several of them elsewhere in North China 
 alarmed the foreign community and May 31, 1900, a much 
 larger force representing eight nationalities was brought up 
 from Tientsin.* Meanwhile the Boxer bands were closing 
 in upon Peking and were being merged in the Imperial 
 troops. The attitude of the Chinese Government became 
 obviously hostile and on June 10, a relief expedition from, 
 the foreign vessels of war, 475 strong, under Admiral Sir 
 Edward H. Seymour, set out to afford the foreign com- 
 munity in Peking additional protection. The next day a 
 member of the Japanese Legation was murdered and on the 
 14th the Legations were definitely cut off from communica- 
 tion with the outside world. On the 17th the forts at Taku 
 were taken by the joint action of the foreign fleets, the 
 Americans not participating; three days later the Imperial 
 troops at Peking opened fire upon the Legations and the 
 German Minister, von Ketteler, was shot in the street. The 
 Seymour expedition had encountered resistance and had 
 been compelled to return to Tientsin. The viceroys and 
 governors of the Yangtze and Southern provinces held aloof 
 from the insurrection and for the most part protected the 
 foreigners, thus confining the conflict to the North and espe- 
 cially to Shantung and Chihli. 
 
 *There were 458 foreigners actually engaged as military in the siege ; 56 
 were American. 
 
UNITED STATES AND THE BOXER INSURRECTION 655 
 
 After the capture of the Taku forts the Chinese engaged 
 in a systematic attack upon the foreign community at Tien- 
 tsin, and on July 14 the city was captured by the joint 
 efforts of the foreign forces, the American forces participat- 
 ing. On July 30 the Tientsin Provisional Government, a 
 civil organization under the direction of the military, was 
 set up. 
 
 The Peking relief expedition did not actually start from 
 Tientsin until August 4. It comprised about 19,000, of 
 which 2,500 were Americans with Major General Adna R. 
 Chaffee commanding. Germany was unrepresented in this 
 expedition; it was composed chiefly of Russians and Jap- 
 anese. There was no allied command, each nation operating 
 independently yet with a semblance of conference between 
 the commanding officers. The Russians betrayed a lack of 
 good faith and revealed suspicious ulterior motives. The 
 Legations were relieved on August 14 at the end of one of 
 the most thrilling episodes in modern history. Although 
 the American flag was first on the walls of the Tartar city, 
 the British preceded the Americans into the Legation area. 
 On August 24 Li Hung Chang and Prince Ching were for- 
 mally appointed as Chinese plenipotentiaries. About two 
 months later Count Waldersee, a German Field Marshal, 
 with the approval of all the foreign governments, assumed 
 the duties of Generalissimo of the foreign forces in China, 
 and thus supplied a nominal unity to the military govern- 
 ment, the relation of which to the. diplomatic body was never 
 very clearly defined. On December 24 the foreign repre- 
 sentatives presented to the Chinese Government a joint note 
 which contained their demands as a basis for peace. Two 
 days later these demands were accepted and the negotiations 
 for the terms of the protocol were begun. There were many 
 delays in the perfecting of this convention, due chiefiy to 
 the inability of the powers to agree among themselves, and 
 it was not signed until September 7, 1901. 
 
 With this rapid survey of events in mind, let us 
 pass to a review of American policy at the end of the 
 century. 
 
656 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 The Desires of the American Government 
 
 When the true nature of the insurrection became known 
 the American Government naturally shared to the fullest 
 extent in the common desire of the powers to effect the 
 rescue of their Legations, to make sure of reparations for 
 the damage done and for the expense of their naval and 
 military forces, but on the question of the correction of the 
 conditions which had made possible the insurrection, the 
 agreement among the powers was less marked. 
 
 The American Government had already defined the 
 general principles of its political and commercial policy in 
 the Hay notes, but now something more specific was re- 
 quired. Secretary of State Hay addressed a circular note to 
 the powers on July 3, which became the base-line for all 
 subsequent American policy. 
 
 "In this critical posture of affairs in China it is deemed ap- 
 propriate to define the attitude of the United States as far as the 
 present circumstances permit this to be done. We adhere to the policy 
 initiated by us in 1857 of peace with the Chinese nation, of further- 
 ance of lawful commerce, and of protection of lives and property of 
 our citizens by all means guaranteed under extraterritorial treaty 
 rights and by the law of nations. If wrong be done to our citizens we 
 propose to hold the responsible authors to the uttermost accounta- 
 bility. We regard the condition at Peking as one of virtual anarchy, 
 whereby power and responsibility are practically devolved upon the 
 local provincial authorities. So long as they are not in overt collu- 
 sion with rebellion and use their power to protect foreign life and 
 property, we regard them as representing the Chinese people, with 
 whom we seek to remain in peace and friendship." ^ 
 
 The reference to the policy of 1857 is illuminating, and 
 recalls the continuity of American policy. Hay did not 
 conceive himself to be the originator of new principles. 
 Great Britain, France, Russia and Japan had all been at war 
 with China; the United States, never. But the kernel of 
 the policy in 1900 was to forestall a declaration of war and a 
 military movement by one or more of the Powers against 
 the Chinese Empire. "Anarchy" at Peking might be dealt 
 with locally and was susceptible of settlement by repara- 
 tions, but war against the Empire would probably involve 
 
UNITED STATES AND THE BOXER INSURRECTION 657 
 
 permanent occupation or the surrender of territory. A 
 declaration of war against China by any one of them would 
 quite probably have been followed in a short time by hostili- 
 ties between rival powers. Hay, greatly aided by the jeal- 
 ousies of the other powers, was entirely successful in this 
 phase of his policy. It cannot be asserted that Hay was 
 solely responsible for no declaration of war against China, 
 but it seems fair to rate the circular note of July 3 as an im- 
 portant contribution to the peaceful solution of the Chinese 
 problem. It- was unaccompanied by any compromising 
 acquiescence in the programs of other powers such as in 
 1857 had rendered the policy of Buchanan and Cass so 
 futile and hypocritical. 
 
 Hay elaborated in a few carefully phrased sentences the 
 general policy of the United States adding both definiteness 
 and scope to what had been stated in the notes of the pre- 
 vious year: 
 
 ". . .the policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a 
 solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, 
 preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all 
 rights to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safe- 
 guard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with 
 all parts of the Chinese Empire." 
 
 Such phrases as "territorial and administrative entity" and 
 "all parts of the Chinese Empire" reveal a certain vigor and 
 precision of purpose which were lacking in the Open Door 
 Notes. One has a feeling that since September 6, of the year 
 previous, American policy in China had been taking shape 
 and stiffening. 
 
 Hay's broad purpose as revealed in the course of the 
 Protocol negotiations was substantially as follows : to main- 
 tain harmony among the Powers and by united action to 
 secure as quickly as practical the removal of the foreign 
 military forces from Chinese territory; to secure adequate 
 reparations and adequate punishments for the responsible 
 instigators of the insurrection and yet to prevent the imposi- 
 tion upon China of injustices which would be fruitful of new 
 antagonisms and sow the seeds for an even more formidable 
 
658 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 popular uprising; and to secure such administrative and 
 fiscal reforms as would make China in the future the best 
 possible market for international trade. He viewed China 
 as the weak link in the international political and commer- 
 cial system. Enlightened self-interest dictated that the 
 powers should unite to strengthen this link. The American 
 policy in 1900 has since been clothed with a garb of altruism 
 which it could not properly claim. Its motive was not con- 
 spicuously benevolent, but its object was, nevertheless, 
 highly beneficent. 
 
 The rescue of the foreigners at Peking and the cessa- 
 tion of atrocities having been accomplished without a decla- 
 ration of war, the next pressing questions were the punish- 
 ment of the guilty and the fixing of the form and amount of 
 reparations. Germany brought forward the proposal that 
 the foreigners should not only designate the guilty but also 
 become their executioners. The American Government 
 opposed such a plan. Russia, in harmony with its estab- 
 lished policy of conciliating China, supported the United 
 States. In the end the views of the United States and 
 Russia partially prevailed. The demands for capital pun- 
 ishment were eventually reduced from ten to four, many 
 names were removed from the lists, and lighter forms of 
 punishment were indicated for others. The execution of the 
 penalties was carried out by the Chinese Government. 
 Likewise the American Government opposed further puni- 
 tive expeditions after the occupation of Peking and Tientsin. 
 Here the policy of the United States was unsuccessful and 
 Mr. Hay's purpose was foiled. The punitive expeditions of 
 some of the powers, notably Germany, Russia and France, 
 exhibited to the Chinese the worst phases of Caucasian char- 
 acter and made the white man in many localities of China 
 an object of terror which still lingers. 
 
 In the determination of the amount of the indemnity the 
 American proposals likewise failed. The Department of 
 State reached the tentative conclusion that the most that 
 China could pay without permanent damage to the Empire 
 was about $150,000,000, an estimate which was subse- 
 
UNITED STATES AND THE BOXER INSURRECTION 659 
 
 quently increased to $200,000,000. It was believed that any 
 larger amount "would not only entail permanent financial 
 embarrassment on the country, but might possibly result in 
 either international financial control, or even loss of ter- 
 ritory." The United States was willing to accept bonds 
 issued at par, bearing 3 per cent interest and running for 
 thirty or forty- years. The American claims were fixed at 
 the maximum lump sum of $25,000,000. The other Powers 
 had scant sympathy for such a proposal and the indemnity 
 was eventually placed at $333,000,000. It would perhaps 
 have been even larger had it not been for the opposition of 
 the United States. The bonds were issued at par and bore 
 4 per cent. 
 
 Russia would have preferred that the Chinese indemnity 
 be guaranteed by the powers rather than paid in bonds 
 issued directly by the government. This proposal met with 
 the immediate opposition of the powers which wished to 
 protect China as much as possible from subsequent Euro- 
 pean interference, but Mr. Hay at length agreed that he 
 would support the objectionable guaranty plan if measures 
 were taken to reduce the amount of the indemnity. To this 
 the powers would not consent. The American Government 
 opposed the suggestion for the creation of an international 
 fortress at Peking or elsewhere, and would not support the 
 proposal that the powers jointly forbid the importation into 
 China of arms, ammunition or material for their manufac- 
 ture. In a word the United States opposed all measures 
 which were calculated to weaken the resistance of China in 
 future conflicts with encroaching powers. 
 
 Russia, which was suspected of having already entered 
 into a secret agreement with China that she would use her 
 influence in China's favor in return for the actual or virtual 
 cession of Manchuria, just as in 1860 she had obtained the 
 left bank of the Amur as a reward for her supposed influence 
 in persuading the French and the British armies to retire 
 from Peking, suggested that the whole question of the 
 indemnity be referred to the Hague Tribunal. The United 
 States supported this proposition, but the other powers 
 
660 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 would not listen to it. However, they did agree to the sug- 
 gestion of Mr. Hay that the indemnity be fixed in a lump 
 sum to be divided among the powers subsequently by 
 mutual agreement. This arrangement protected China from 
 the pressure of individual powers and made it impossible for 
 any power to commute its financial claim into a demand for 
 territory or special privilege. For the sake of further shield- 
 ing the Empire from the rapacity of the powers the Ameri- 
 can Government would have liked to see the entire negotia- 
 tions for the Protocol transferred from Peking to some 
 foreign capital. This proposition received no support ex- 
 cept from Russia which doubtless would have greatly 
 profited from such an arrangement. 
 
 The next most important point in the negotiations was 
 the proposal to increase the customs dues to provide more 
 ample funds for the payment of the huge indemnity. 
 France and Russia desired to have the tariff, which was at 
 that time only about 3.17 per cent effective, increased to 
 10 per cent. Mr. Hay suggested (April 11) that there 
 should be a thorough revision of the commercial treaties, 
 following the signing of the Protocol, and that in return for 
 certain long desired reforms in Chinese domestic taxation, a 
 new tariff be made in which the duties be increased to from 
 5 to 15 per cent according to the character of the goods, 
 the scale being graded according to whether the articles were 
 necessities or luxuries.* Mr. Rockhill was very cautious in 
 
 ♦Paraphrase of telegram, Hay to Rockhill, April 11, 1899 : "... the 
 essential object of the revision of consular treaties is to favor Chinese financial 
 stability and promote ability to buy in any market and to exchange native 
 products, wherever produced, on equal terms with all nations. Inequalities of 
 likin should be removed, and fixed rates for all China should be scheduled 
 according to the importance and value of imports — some higher than now and 
 others lower, as they can safely stand. Trade with the interior is made 
 speculative and uncertain by the present irregular likin. Customs duties 
 should be scheduled anew. Besides discriminating against cheaper necessaries, 
 the present uniform rate yields inadequate revenue. Five to fifteen per cent, 
 according to the character of the goods, would equalize trade without partiality 
 or burden, and, as trade penetrates the interior, would yield steadily increasing 
 revenue. Application to the whole of China of the open door is required to do 
 this. Equal opportunity should be had by all trading nations to sell through- 
 out the Empire. Lower duties should be attached to imports tending to 
 develop Chinese productiveness. Agricultural implements and simpler manu- 
 facturing machinery should be especially favored." 
 
 "The Chinese can gain prosperity so as to buy what they do not produce 
 only by developing native productions. Special trade favors to any Power 
 on the ground of reciprocity, territories, occupation, or spheres of influence 
 should be guarded against by stringent favored-nation clause now and for the 
 future. It is necessary to secure increased access to interior markets. . . ." * 
 
UNITED STATES AND THE BOXER INSURRECTION 661 
 
 committing the American Government to raising the tariff 
 because he recognized on the part of the nations like Russia, 
 which were least interested in the trade, a disposition to 
 make large the indemnities and then to shift the burden of 
 payment upon the trading nations by increasing the tariff. 
 He also was unwilling to separate the tariff question from 
 that of internal fiscal reform whereas the non-trading na- 
 tions were not unwilling to see the continuance of the inter- 
 nal abuses which had always been such an embarrassment 
 to the trader. China would, indeed, have been better off 
 with a $150,000,000 indemnity and an only 5 per cent effec- 
 tive tariff than with a $333,000,000 indemnity and a 10 per 
 cent tariff, but what was needed was a genuine fiscal reform. 
 Mr. Rockhill specified as compensating advantages for 
 treaty revision: abolition of likin on imports and exports, 
 including transit pass duty ; right of foreigners to reside and 
 do business throughout the Empire ; revision of inland navi- 
 gation rules; creation of a mining bureau and good regula- 
 tions; strict adherence to principle of equal opportunity to 
 people of every nationality; the opening of Peking as a 
 treaty port; and the adoption of measures for the improve- 
 ment of the river approaches to Shanghai, Tientsin and 
 Newchwang.'* 
 
 When the stupendous indemnity had been decided upon, 
 and when Mr. Rockhill encountered general opposition to 
 thorough reforms Hay cabled (June 21) that the American 
 Government was opposed to raising the revenue above 5 
 per cent effective.* At the same time he instructed Rockhill 
 to refrain from opposing the proposition that a 10 per cent 
 
 *Tliat the opposition of Mr. Hay to a 10 or even 15 per cent tariff was 
 due to the fact that the indemnity had been raised to so high a figure and the 
 likin was not abolished is perfectly clear from the correspondence. 
 
 John A. Kasson, special commissioner plenipotentiary, to Hay, March 2, 
 1901 : "It would appear to be the better opinion that the duties on imports 
 must be raised to at least 15 per cent ad valorem in lieu of the present rate. 
 The calculations must, of course, be based upon the amount of the indemnity, 
 now unknown. Assuming this is not to exceed .1)200,000.000, and further 
 assuming that the Powers will accept the bonds of China instead of compelling 
 her to sell these bonds to raise the indemnity money in the open market with 
 a further loss of capital . . ." ° 
 
 John Foord, Secretary of the American Asiatic Association, to Hay, January 
 2.5, 1901 : "The American Asiatic Association, recognizing the financial neces- 
 sities of the Chinese Empire, has no objection to offer to the proposed increase 
 of duties on foreign imports. The suggestion which, according to Sir Robert 
 Hart, was formulated last spring by the special commission appointed to 
 consider the subject of tariff revision, is deemed a reasonable one. This was 
 
662 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 tariff be reserved for future discussion if the withdrawal of 
 American objections would aid in bringing the Protocol 
 negotiations to a close. Meanwhile Great Britain refused 
 to consider a 10 per cent tariff. In the Protocol it was 
 determined that the tariff be raised to 5 per cent effective, 
 on the condition that all existing ad valorem duties be 
 changed to specific duties, the average value of merchandise 
 for the years 1897, 1898 and 1899 being taken as the basis 
 of estimate. Peking^ was not given the status of a treaty 
 port. The American demand for the opening of the entire 
 Empire to trade did not commend itself to those who were 
 most familiar with the conditions because of the extraterri- 
 torial status of foreigners. It would have been highly unjust 
 to China to force her to admit foreigners as freely as Mr. 
 Hay had contemplated, while they were exempt from 
 Chinese law and so much removed from effective control by 
 their own governments. Mr. Rockhill was, however, able 
 to have specified in the Protocol that the river approaches 
 to Tientsin and Shanghai be improved under a plan by 
 which the Chinese and the foreigners jointly bore the ex- 
 pense. Through the jealousy and short-sightedness of the 
 powers an opportunity had been lost to do much towards 
 setting China on a firm foundation which would in the end 
 have been as profitable for the powers themselves as for the 
 Empire. Meanwhile the United States had acquired the 
 reputation of having opposed the increase of Chinese tariffs 
 which is a partial and quite inaccurate statement of the 
 facts.* 
 
 The Protocol, as signed, stipulated the following points : 
 
 to the effect that the import duty should be fixed at 10 per cent plus 5 per 
 cent transit dues, payable simultaneously, coupled with the total abolition of 
 all other taxes on such imports forever after and everywhere." " 
 
 *Two other minor proposals made by the United States were lost. Mr. Hay 
 suggested that it would be well to stipulate that in the reorganization of the 
 Tsung-li Yamen upon which all the powers were agreed, only an official speaking 
 some Western language be appointed to conduct the foreign relations. This 
 proposal was unwise as Rockhill immediately pointed out, for it would have 
 eliminated from the direction of foreign affairs all the ablest Chinese. Mr. Hay 
 also suggested that China be made to indemnify Chinese Christians for wrongs 
 to their persons and property. Conger, although an ardent friend of the 
 missionaries, did not believe such a policy wise. It would have reopened the 
 question of the French protectorate of Catholic missions in its most objec- 
 tionable form. These minor proposals betray the fact that Secretary of State 
 Hay, although directly supervising the negotiations by telegraph, actually 
 was not at all well informed as to general conditions in China.' 
 
UNITED STATES AND THE BOXER INSURRECTION 663 
 
 (I) apology to Germany for the murder of Baron Ketteler, 
 and the erection of a memorial to him at the place where he 
 was shot; (2) punishment of Chinese officials responsible 
 for the insurrection; (3) apology to Japan for the murder of 
 Sugiyama, chancellor of the Japanese Legation; (4) suspen- 
 sion of official examinations in all cities where foreigners 
 were attacked or murdered; (5) erection of expiatory monu- 
 ments in foreign cemeteries which had been desecrated; 
 
 (6) China to forbid for two or more years the importation of 
 arms, ammunition and materials used in their manufacture ; 
 
 (7) indemnity of 450,000,000 Haekwan taels and a 5 per 
 cent effective tariff; (8) reservation of the Legation Quarter 
 at Peking under the exclusive control of the Legations with 
 the right to make it defensible; (9) razing of forts at Taku 
 between Peking and the sea; (10) the occupation by the 
 foreigners of certain points, thirteen in number including 
 Tientsin, as a security of open communications to Peking; 
 
 (II) publication of certain edicts tending to prevent renewal 
 of Boxer propaganda; (12) China to agree to the amend- 
 ment of commercial treaties and to the Pei-ho and Whangpu 
 conservancy projects; (13) abolition of the Tsung-li Yamen 
 and the creation of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs; (14) 
 evacuation of Peking, with exception of Legation guards on 
 September 17, 1901. 
 
 Independent or Concurrent Action 
 
 In the sixty years of official American relations with the 
 Far East, the fundamental American purpose had been 
 definite, consistent and unvarying. The United States 
 sought the open door for American trade. But the methods 
 employed had been subject to many changes. What the 
 Americans asked for and what they obtained at Peking in 
 1900-1 is therefore of less significance than the diplomatic 
 methods employed. 
 
 There were three possible stages of independent or iso- 
 lated action: absolute neutrality; intervention in favor of 
 Asia; and mediation. Likewise there were three stages of 
 
664 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 cooperation: concurrent yet separate action; joint action; 
 and an alliance with some one or more foreign powers. Any- 
 one of these might conceivably become a means for main- 
 taining the open door and Asiatic integrity. In the course 
 of its diplomatic relations in Asia the United States had 
 been forced to consider each of these methods and had em- 
 ployed more or less energetically every one of them except 
 the last. In 1840, at the outbreak of the Anglo-Chinese 
 War, some of the Americans had proposed joint naval action 
 with England, France and Holland against China. Others 
 suggested mediation. The United States adopted neutrality. 
 In 1853 at the opening of Japan and during the troubles at 
 Shanghai, the American representatives had rejected coop- 
 eration and followed an absolutely isolated course. Four 
 years later, at the time of the revision of the Chinese treaties 
 and of the making of the commercial treaties with Japan, 
 the American Government, officially rejecting both isolated 
 and joint or allied action, adopted a concurrent policy which 
 in effect involved cooperation in all peaceful measures. 
 During the Seward administration cooperation was the slo- 
 gan. In Japan it was carried to the point of joint military 
 action and a similar policy on an even more extended scale 
 was contemplated in Korea. Then followed a period of 
 non-cooperation. The opening of Korea and the revision of 
 the Japanese treaties had been accomplished by isolated 
 action. Both concurrent and joint action in the Sino-Jap- 
 anese War had been rejected, as had also armed or allied 
 intervention in favor of Korea. The Hay notes of 1899 
 may be classified in two ways. They represented isolated, 
 diplomatic intervention in favor of China and against 
 Europe ; but they were also the expression of an underlying 
 cooperative policy which fell only a little short of joint action 
 with Japan and Great Britain against Russia. They were 
 as near to an Anglo-Japanese-American alliance as the 
 United States was able to go. Their underlying spirit was 
 the farthest possible removed from that of Gresham in 1894. 
 Of these possible methods, which was the United States 
 to choose at the outbreak of the Boxer trouble? It could 
 
UNITED STATES AND THE BOXER INSURRECTION 665 
 
 not remain neutral between the East and the West, for 
 American lives and American property had been attacked. 
 It could not intervene against Europe — not directly. An 
 offer of mediation would have been interpreted as an indi- 
 cation of American weakness and an encouragement to the 
 Manchu government, just as the failure to support the 
 Italian demands for a leased port in 1899 had been construed 
 as an encouragement to China. Extreme isolated action 
 would be futile: some form of cooperation was necessary, 
 but an alliance was out of the question. Only concurrent or 
 joint action was practical. 
 
 "Act independently in protection of American interests 
 where practicable," telegraphed Hay to United States Min- 
 ister E. H. Conger June 8, 1900, "and concurrently with rep- 
 resentatives of other powers if necessity arises." ^ Two days 
 later he amplified this with a second message : "We have no 
 policy in China except to protect with energy American 
 interests, and especially American citizens and the Legation. 
 There must be nothing done which would commit us to 
 future action inconsistent with your instructions. There 
 must be no alliances." In the circular of July 3d to the 
 powers Hay defined the method again: "The purpose of 
 the President is, as it has been heretofore, to act concurrently 
 with other powers; first, in opening up communications 
 with Peking and rescuing the American officials, mission- 
 aries and other Americans who are in danger; secondly, in 
 affording all possible protection everywhere in China to 
 American life and property; thirdly, in guarding and pro- 
 tecting all legitimate American interests; and fourthly, in 
 aiding to prevent a spread of the disorders to the other 
 provinces of the Empire and a recurrence of such disasters." 
 It will thus be seen that between June 8 and July 3 the 
 American Government had come to see the futility of exclu- 
 sively independent action, even in the protection of Ameri- 
 can interests, and was prepared for cooperation — for a larger 
 degree of cooperation, probably, than the jealousies of the 
 other powers made it possible to achieve. Thus while 
 eschewing the commitments of alliances or their equivalent, 
 
666 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 in the face of a great crisis, the United States forsook the 
 timidities of the past and announced itself as ready to lead 
 in cooperation. 
 
 The word "concurrent" is the key to the interpretation 
 of American policy at this time. This word had a long his- 
 tory. It first appeared in the discussions of the early fifties 
 which preceded the adoption of the policy of 1857. The 
 earlier American policy has been primarily obstructive to 
 England. But it was seen that an independent obstructive 
 policy might actually prove to be less obstructive to a dis- 
 memberment of China than would a cooperative policy. 
 Concurrent action, therefore, came to mean cooperation for 
 the purpose of restraining England and France. It utterly 
 failed in 1858 owing to the ineptitude of the American rep- 
 resentative, but the idea was taken up by Seward and used 
 with some success. It succeeded in China but failed in 
 Japan because there was lacking a man of Anson Bur- 
 lingame's caliber to carry it out. The policy was sound but 
 it required an able executive. A concurrent policy was the 
 one to which Mr. Hay returned in the summer of 1900 and 
 to insure its success he dispatched his trusted aid, W. W. 
 Rockhill, as Commissioner (technically, Special Agent) to 
 China in the latter part of July when the fate of the Lega- 
 tions and of Minister Conger was still in doubt. There does 
 not appear to have been any serious differences of opinion 
 between Conger and Rockhill, but when two men ride a 
 horse one must ride behind and early in 1901 Mr. Conger 
 found it desirable to ask for permission to return to the 
 United States, leaving Mr. Rockhill as plenipotentiary to 
 carry out the negotiations and sign the Protocol for the 
 American Government.* 
 
 "While we maintained complete independence," stated 
 Mr. Rockhill in making his final report, "we were able to act 
 harmoniously in the concert of powers, the existence of 
 which was so essential to a prompt and peaceful settlement 
 of the situation, we retained the friendship of all the nego- 
 
 *It is interesting to note that in the settlement of the Boxer affair the 
 Senate had no part. Neither Rockhlll's appointment as Special Agent nor the 
 Protocol required the approval of the Senate, 
 
UNITED STATES AND THE BOXER INSURRECTION 667 
 
 tiation powers, exerted a salutary influence in the cause of 
 moderation, humanity and justice, secured adequate repara- 
 tion for wrongs done our citizens, guaranties for their future 
 protection, and labored successfully in the interests of the 
 world in the cause of equal and impartial trade with all 
 parts of the Chinese Empire." ^ Complete independence, 
 yes ; but not the sort of independence which had been main- 
 tained in Korea or the independence of President Cleveland. 
 There was military and naval cooperation, and there was 
 diplomatic "give and take" in which the American Govern- 
 ment most of all showed a willingness to make concessions 
 for the sake of securing harmony of action and a real con- 
 cert of the powers. 
 
 At the signing of the Protocol the diplomatic grouping 
 of the principal powers remained about what it had been for 
 the preceding two years. Great Britain and Japan stood 
 together and were separated from the United States only by 
 the greater extent of their political and commercial interests 
 in China. All three stood opposed to Russia which was sup- 
 ported consistently by France. Germany was playing a 
 dubious game, now encouraging Russia and then making a 
 convention with England to oppose her. Even in 1901 it 
 probably would not have been impossible to form a conven- 
 tion of Great Britain, Germany, Japan and the United 
 States to safeguard China from every assault if only the 
 American Government could have been counted on to invest 
 its fair share of military and naval support. The United 
 States was in a position of potential leadership which it 
 allowed to slip from its grasp primarily because the Ameri- 
 can people misread the events of the three preceding years. 
 They supposed that their influence had been due to their 
 independence and isolation, whereas it had been brought 
 about by concurrence and cooperation. But more funda- 
 mental as a cause for the failure of the United States to 
 grasp the opportunity to continue its beneficent work for 
 Asia, was the fact that the American people did not prize 
 the influence Mr. Hay and his collaborators had secured for 
 them.i« 
 
668 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. There are no books on the Boxer Insurrection or on the Protocol 
 
 which can be recommended as a substitute for the official docu- 
 ments. Foreign Relations for 1900, and the Appendix volume 
 for 1901 (also published as Sen. Doc. 67 :57-l) containing the 
 Rockhill Correspondence, and Notes on China, Aug., 1900^ — 
 War Dept. Document 124, Publication XXX — are the primary 
 sources. Moore's "Digest," Vol. 5, pp. 476 ff., contains an 
 excellent summary but does not make excerpts from corre- 
 spondence not previously published. Paul H. Clements : "The 
 Boxer Rebellion, a Political and Diplomatic Review" (Studies 
 in History, Economics and Public Law, Columbia Univ., Vol. 
 LXVI, No. 3) is excellent so far as it goes, but is deficient in 
 background and not discriminating in references to earlier 
 history. For a chronicle of events, H. B. Morse: "Intern. Rel. 
 of the Chinese Empire," Vol. 3, is recommended. For adequate 
 bibliography, see Clements. Stanley K. Hornbeck: "Con- 
 temporary Politics in the Far East," chap. 13, and elsewhere, 
 is an admirable interpretation which is especially valuable for 
 the understanding of the Protocol in the light of more recent 
 history. 
 
 2. Rockhill Correspondence, p. 12. 
 
 3. Ihid., p. 368. 
 
 4. Ihid., p. 171. 
 6. Ihid., p. 210. 
 
 6. Ihid., p. 217. 
 
 7. Ihid., pp. 349, 45. 
 
 8. For. Relations, 1900, p. 143. 
 
 9. Rockhill Corres., pp. 6-7. 
 
 10. Thayer's "John Hay," Vol. II, chap. XXVI, "The Boxer Ordeal 
 and the Open Door," sheds some light on the general phases of 
 Mr. Hay's policy, but for some reason, possibly from an excess 
 of caution on the part of the biographer, is singularly lacking 
 in answers to many of the important details of the negotia- 
 tions; so also are the "Letters and Diaries of John Hay," 3 
 vols. Printed but not published, Washington, 1908. 
 
CHAPTER XXXIV 
 
 PEKSONALITIES AND PRINCIPLES 
 
 The Consular and Diplomatic Service 
 
 American relations with Asia in the nineteenth century 
 were so largely personal and individual that the Americans 
 who made the contacts assumed a transcending importance. 
 At no time during the century did the Chinese or the Ko- 
 reans become travelers, and while the Japanese manifested 
 an extreme desire to go abroad and study, nevertheless for 
 the great mass of the people what knowledge of the United 
 States was obtained came through the American official and 
 unofficial representatives in Japan. To the inhabitants of 
 Eastern Asia the Government of the United States was 
 what the American diplomatic and consular officers repre- 
 sented it to be. The personalities and personal character 
 of the diplomatic and consular representatives became a 
 legitimate object of study. 
 
 The American consular service throughout the century 
 presents a picture over which one would wish to draw the 
 veil. The system of merchant consuls continued in China 
 without change until 1854 when they were replaced at the 
 five ports by others whose only legitimate emoluments were 
 $1000 a year for judicial services under extraterritoriality, 
 and part or all of the fees of their office.* It was hardly a 
 change for the better. The older merchant consuls had 
 been of the type of the merchant prince. While it was true 
 that they smuggled opium and manipulated the powers of 
 their office, sometimes to the prejudice of their competitors, 
 they did take pride in their position, and towards the 
 
 ♦Merchant consuls were reintroduced a few years later at unimportant 
 points in spite of the protests of the Chinese Government. 
 
 669 
 
670 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 Chinese they maintained the same benevolent, if patroniz- 
 ing, attitude which characterized their business relations. 
 The men who displaced them were often appointed from the 
 lower ranks of political "hangers-on" in the United States 
 and were set down in strange places where the cost of re- 
 spectable living ranged upwards from three or four thou- 
 sand dollars a year. Consulates were not provided and the 
 allowances for rent and for clerical help were meager. At 
 Canton, Shanghai and later at Yokohama they handled 
 large sums of money for, in addition to the fees of the office, 
 there was the fund for the relief of distressed seamen and 
 the estates of intestate deceased fellow citizens. To the per- 
 sonal temptations which accompany residence in a foreign 
 land where public sentiment is of slight support to personal 
 character there was the constant temptation to peculation. 
 The theory of their government was to make the consular 
 system support itself by the fees it collected, and the pre- 
 vailing theory of the occupants of office was to gather in as 
 much as the probably brief tenure of office would permit. 
 The fee system made this especially easy.^ 
 
 We know that there were consular officers who rendered 
 honest and efficient service even under these adverse condi- 
 tions, but it would appear, even from the printed reports of 
 consular inspectors, that the average grade of honesty and 
 efficiency was deplorably low. In concluding his report 
 covering Asia and South America in 1872 Special Inspector 
 DeB. Randolph Keim stated: 
 
 "It will have been seen that there was not a single consulate at 
 which a complete set of record-books from the beginning as required 
 by the regulations, was to be found. . . . Almost every consulate had 
 some defects in its history, owing to the incompetency, low habits, 
 and vulgarity of some of its officers during the endless round of 
 evils incident to official rotation. Abuses had been committed in the 
 collection of fees; in the exercise of judicial powers; in the adjust- 
 ment of the business affairs of American citizens; in the settlement, 
 where permitted, of the estates of intestate American citizens dying 
 abroad ; in selling the American flag ; in 'running-out' * ships ; in 
 
 *" Running-out" ships was a practice by which the consul connived with a 
 ship captain in forcing a crew shipped in an American port to desert in an 
 Asiatic port where a new crew of Asiatic sailors could be obtained at a very 
 great reduction in wages. The American sailor, forced by the abuse of the 
 captain to desert, lost the wages due him for the outward voyage, thus effecting 
 a second saving for the owners. 
 
PERSONALITIES AND PRINCIPLES 671 
 
 discharging seamen; in establishing American settlements abroad; in 
 issuing illegal passports ; in countenancing shipping-masters ; in tax- 
 ing Chinese emigrants. Indeed, the most important feature of my 
 investigations was the iniquity displayed by consular officers, since 
 the act of 1856 particularly, in defrauding the government and grasp- 
 ing gains from various outside sources." ^ 
 
 The best that can be said for the consular system at that 
 time in Asia is that every instance of extreme dishonesty 
 can be matched with one of even more extensive malfeasance 
 from consulates in some other quarter of the globe, and one 
 may also remember that those were the days of scandals in 
 Washington over the payment for Alaska, the Pacific Mail 
 Subsidy, and the Credit Mobilier. Inspector Keim expressed 
 the opinion that the consular irregularities reached their 
 highest point among the appointees of the Buchanan admin- 
 istration, but it is to be noted that at that early day many 
 of the possible avenues of graft were still relatively unex- 
 plored and the methods of the dishonest consul underwent 
 many refinements in the following forty years. At the end 
 of the century the American consular establishments in 
 Asia were still a stench which succeeding administrations 
 had been singularly loath to correct, and the long urgent 
 reforms did not appear until the second Roosevelt term.* 
 While honest American trade suffered from this pro- 
 cession of pilfering, low-living and inefficient officials, it was 
 American relations with the native peoples which suffered 
 most. The American Government had demanded the ex- 
 emptions of extraterritoriality and then sent the off-scour- 
 ings of the "spoils system" to become the agents of American 
 law and justice. In the act of May 16, 1848, Congress 
 authorized the establishment of consular courts by which 
 the consuls were enabled to hear and determine civil cases 
 where the debt or damage did not exceed $1000 and to try 
 
 * Third Assistant Secretary of State. Herbert H. D. Pierce, reported in 
 1904, after a tour of consular inspection : "Unfortunately, beset by the 
 temptations wbich are rife in the East, it has sometimes happened that some 
 of our consular officers, finding their salaries inadequate to meet the constant 
 drain upon their resources, have yielded to this temptation and, under the cover 
 of such protection as our unfortunate system of partial compensation by fees 
 affords, have tnken advantage of it to extort unwarranted charges for 
 services of an unofficial character, and in other instances have employed their 
 official positions to increase their incomes improperly, thus bringing the office 
 into contempt." ^ 
 
672 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 and punish criminal offenders where the fine did not exceed 
 $100 or imprisonment for 60 days.'* The law was to be that 
 of the United States, supplemented by the "common law, 
 and the law of equity and admiralty," to which might be 
 added "decrees and regulations" having the force of law, 
 which the minister was authorized to promulgate with the 
 approval of such consuls as were accessible. For the more 
 important cases, the consul was required to invite some 
 fellow citizens to sit with him in the hearing of the case, and 
 appeal was possible to the minister, and through him in 
 some cases, to the United States circuit court in California. 
 The effect of the arrangement was that the consul might 
 combine in himself all the functions of government, legis- 
 lative, judicial and executive. He was a member of the 
 legislature, judge, jury, prosecuting attorney and police 
 officer all in one. He was never selected for his legal train- 
 ing. If, in addition to all this, the consul was a dishonest 
 man or one who nourished that contempt for the colored 
 races which the white man often acquires when he goes to 
 Asia, imagination fails to grasp all the possibilities which 
 were invested in his person for the creation of ill feeling and 
 hatred among the Orientals who were so miserable as to fall 
 in his path. When one encounters even today the sporadic 
 outbursts of distinctly anti- American, as well as anti-foreign 
 feeling, in Eastern Asia, the recollection of this shameful 
 page of past history will do much to explain and extenuate 
 the hatred for Americans which still lingers in many an 
 Oriental breast. 
 
 One turns with relief from the consular to the diplomatic 
 service. From the days when John Quincy Adams in his old 
 age was suggested as the most suitable first Commissioner 
 to China and Edward Everett at the Court of St. James was 
 actually appointed to the post, it was recognized by the 
 American Government that its diplomatic representatives in 
 the East ought to be men even above the grade of those who 
 were sent to many European capitals. During the century, 
 not counting those who were appointed and declined, and 
 omitting the various charges d'affaires, there were thirty-five 
 
PERSONALITIES AND PRINCIPLES 673 
 
 American diplomatic representatives in China, Japan and 
 Korea. Peter Parker, George F. Seward, H. N. Allen, Edwin 
 Dun and W. W. Rockhill were selected from those who had 
 already held lower positions in the diplomatic service in the 
 East; Alexander H. Everett had a previous and extended 
 diplomatic career in Europe. A few typical ''shirt-sleeves" 
 diplomats like Richard B. Hubbard ^ in Tokio found their 
 way to these high appointments, and the picture of Charles 
 E. De Long, revolver bulging from his belt, driving ex-Secre- 
 tary Seward through the streets of Tokio behind a pair of 
 ponies and cracking his whip over the backs of scurrying 
 pedestrians is not edifying,^ but there were very few such 
 ministers and at the most not more than three instances of 
 conspicuously weak character, one of these being a dipso- 
 maniac.'^ On the other hand Cushing, Perry, Harris, Bur- 
 lingame, Young, Bingham, Denby and Rockhill represented 
 the best of contemporary American life. Although it was 
 customary for each new administration to make new ap- 
 pointments. Judge Bingham served at Tokio for thirteen 
 years, and Colonel Denby served slightly longer at Peking 
 and had the distinction of being in two Republican as well 
 as in two Democratic administrations, the latter being one 
 in which he was first appointed. In general the quality of 
 diplomatic representation in the East rose and fell with the 
 character of the administration and the quality of the 
 appointees in the Department of State. On the whole the 
 legations at Peking and Tokio compared favorably with the 
 department to which they were responsible. 
 
 A word, in passing, ought to be added in regard to the 
 American naval officers who also represented their govern- 
 ment to the peoples of Eastern Asia. Usually they were an 
 exceptionally fine set of men, sustaining a higher average, 
 perhaps, than those of any other class. The naval officers 
 were feared by the consuls whose delinquencies they re- 
 ported, and not always welcomed by the civilian ministers 
 who resented their frequently lordly ways, but they had a 
 fine regard for the honor of the flag under which they 
 served and rarely disgraced it. 
 
674 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 The Contributors to American Policy 
 
 In bringing our study to a close it is well to repeat that 
 American policy in Asia has been an accretion which was 
 built up from no exclusive single source. It did not spring 
 full-grown from the mind of any individual, nor was it care- 
 fully projected from a planning-board or group. In this 
 respect it was utterly unlike the foreign policy of Japan, of 
 Great Britain, and of the European powers. Contributions 
 came from three different sources: from the American rep- 
 resentatives in Asia; from the Department of State or the 
 administration in Washington; and, in a single instance, 
 from Congress in response to a popular demand. We may 
 review briefly the nature and significance of each one of 
 these classes of contributors. 
 
 Every item in American policy in Asia as we find it at 
 the end of the century was first the personal contribution of 
 some individual representative of the government in Asia. 
 To this statement there are no exceptions. It is equally 
 notable that every item of policy was, in principle, on record 
 before 1870. After that date came only sifting, integration, 
 elaboration, and the application to specific situations. 
 Throughout the century the fundamental purpose of the 
 United States remained unaltered: the American Govern- 
 ment demanded most-favored-nation treatment ; demanded 
 it from China, Japan and Korea, and demanded it also 
 from Western powers which sometimes threatened to close 
 the door of equal opportunity in regions where the American 
 merchant was interested. 
 
 What methods should be employed to maintain the 
 open door? Ought the United States to depend solely on 
 treaties or ought it to acquire territory as Great Britain, 
 Russia and France were doing? Again, ought the American 
 Government to adopt a cooperative policy or was it wiser 
 to keep to political isolation? The drama of the second half 
 of the century revolves around the discussion of these differ- 
 ing methods of realizing a single purpose — most-favored- 
 nation treatment. 
 
PERSONALITIES AND PRINCIPLES 675 
 
 Caleb Gushing, in harmony with the general instructions 
 of Daniel Webster, devised a plan by which the United 
 States would depend solely upon the force of treaties and 
 the strength of international law. Commodore Perry had 
 less confidence in legal documents and earnestly recom- 
 mended the acquisition of territory as a base of operations 
 from which the door might, in case of necessity, be forced to 
 remain open. Burlingame followed Cushing, while Parker 
 sided with Perry, and carried forward a policy which, while 
 rejected by his superiors, was taken up in principle by 
 Seward. At the end of the century we find the two schools 
 of thought both represented and merged in the McKinley 
 administration to such a degree that we may not with 
 certainty separate those who held one and those who advo- 
 cated the other. Cushing's policy was still held to be sound 
 in theory but in practice it had proved inadequate. Perry's 
 method had been premature at its inception but was now 
 found to meet the facts as they had developed and to be 
 not exclusive of the Cushing policy. If McKinley inclined 
 towards the school of Perry and Seward, certainly John Hay 
 found himself more at ease with Cushing and Burlingame. 
 
 To what extent the men at the end of the. century were 
 conscious that they were following in the footsteps of pred- 
 ecessors we do not fully know, but in speculating upon this 
 question we may be guided by the fact that the American 
 Government in its foreign relations possesses a continuity 
 which is not always appreciated by its commentators. Ad- 
 ministrations come and go; Secretaries of State and of the 
 Navy pass through the departments to which they are 
 appointed, and with them come — in the past probably more 
 than is likely in the future — new appointments to subordi- 
 nate positions, but the new administrations cannot eradicate 
 the records of the past and they ignore them at their peril. 
 Policies as well as international law and diplomatic practice 
 are built up layer by layer and while American foreign 
 policies have undergone some changes and even reversals in 
 the generations which are past, those changes were neither 
 abrupt nor revolutionary. As concerns the Far East certain 
 
676 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 unchanging geographical, or slowly changing industrial and 
 political facts have made a channel within the boundaries 
 of which American policy must contain itself. It it were 
 true that the McKinley administration adopted policies 
 without knowing that they were returning to old ones it 
 would also be true that two sets of men removed a genera- 
 tion from each other discovered the same major facts and 
 found themselves forced to similar conclusions. That indi- 
 vidual American representatives of the forties and fifties 
 should have so clearly forecasted the conclusions of their 
 successors at the end of the century, and now, is a tribute to 
 the quality of their political sense. 
 
 Twice within the century a Secretary of State or a 
 President picked up the Far Eastern question and set it 
 forward with important personal contributions. That these 
 contributions were indeed personal is only too apparent from 
 the records. When the Senate gave its approval of the con- 
 ventions of 1864 and 1866 with Japan it was still preoccu- 
 pied with war-time affairs, and it is not evident that there 
 was any intelligent appreciation of the issues involved or of 
 Seward's way of handling them. One finds it difficult to 
 believe that Seward would have found in Congress sufficient 
 support for his proposed Korean policy. Seward's policies 
 were peculiarly personal to himself and did not even have 
 the unqualified support of his own representatives in Peking 
 and Yedo. McKinley likewise had the advantage of a war- 
 time Congress, and even then he had to coerce Congress to 
 secure the approval he needed for his Philippine policy. 
 Congress handled the Philippines more as a domestic than 
 as a foreign question. The adroit John Hay was able to 
 accomplish his policy in China by eliminating the Senate 
 from its consideration and then by giving the policy an 
 aspect of independence which concealed its true cooperative 
 nature. 
 
 Once Congress intervened in Far Eastern affairs and 
 seized the initiative. The Asiatic immigration policy be- 
 longs to Congress and arose directly out of the people who 
 were being touched on the bare nerve of their industrial 
 
PERSONALITIES AND PRINCIPLES 677 
 
 and social life. Congress steadily forced the hand of the 
 Presidents and of the Secretaries of State. This policy 
 formed the only really national item in our relations with 
 the Far East for it was the only one which was adopted after 
 full discussion and investigation in Congress. Unquestion- 
 ably it represented the will of the people. But it is signifi- 
 cant that the question was discussed as a purely domestic 
 issue and was settled in utter and brutal disregard for 
 foreign relations and existing treaties. The settlement of 
 this question is an illustration that the American system of 
 government presents no insuperable obstacles to the control 
 of foreign policy by the people where the economic and 
 social interest is sufl&cient, and is also a warning that other 
 items of foreign policy are liable to initiation or revision by 
 similar measures. That the American people are prone to 
 resolve all questions into partisan and domestic issues and 
 are deficient in a sense of cooperative responsibility in inter- 
 national affairs is evident. This fact becomes somewhat 
 disquieting when one turns to the political situation in the 
 Far East and notes how necessary a cooperative policy 
 has become. 
 
 The Cooperative Policy 
 
 When closely scrutinized it appears that the United 
 States never during the century actually retired from the 
 cooperative policy first timidly proposed in the fifties and 
 then followed with so much vigor in the sixties. When the 
 American Government withdrew from close cooperation 
 with Great Britain, France and Russia, it had already 
 entered, without any formality or documentary pledge, into 
 cooperation with and support of Japan. The United States 
 did not retire from cooperation ; it merely changed partners. 
 The corollary of the open door was the policy of promoting 
 an Asia strong enough to be its own door-keeper. When 
 England and France revealed a disposition to use the power 
 of a cooperative policy to repress and weaken Asia the 
 United States withdrew from cooperation with them and 
 sought the accomplishment of its purpose by cooperation 
 
678 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 with an Oriental power. Then, in the McKinley adminis- 
 tration, when Great Britain had come to adopt the Amer- 
 ican contention that a strong Japan was advantageous to 
 the trading nations, the United States resumed its cooper- 
 ative pohcy with England. The principles of American 
 policy were entirely consistent from the days of Seward 
 onward. 
 
 Only the cooperative policy stood the test of time. In 
 the necessities of the case this must have been so. An iso- 
 lated policy committed the American Government to one of 
 two courses; either to retirement when American interests 
 were threatened, or the defense of those interests with suffi- 
 cient force to protect them. An isolated policy in Asia tends 
 inevitably either to a surrender of most-favored-nation 
 treatment or a defiance of all comers. It is essentially bel- 
 ligerent. Commodore Perry was entirely consistent when, in 
 addition to his non-cooperative policy, he advocated the 
 establishment of protectorates over half a dozen pieces of 
 Asiatic territory. If the United States were to pit its 
 strength against the world in the Pacific it must fortify its 
 position after the most approved military manner. 
 
 That the cooperative policy suffered from mishandling 
 in the following forty years there can be no doubt. While 
 charging the other Powers with bad faith and with wresting 
 the power of the policy to serve purposes which were not in 
 the interest of all the cooperating powers, we may properly 
 confess the American share in the wreck of general coopera- 
 tion. Seward approached dangerously close to bad faith and 
 he sometimes used the policy not as a statesman but as a 
 sharp politician. The withdrawal of the United States from, 
 cooperation with the European powers in Japan found an 
 excuse in the brutal conduct of Sir Harry Parkes, but the 
 withdrawal was petulant and probably unnecessary. All 
 that it accomplished in bringing about a change in British 
 policy favorable to the promotion of a strong, enlightened 
 and prosperous Japan, probably could have been better ac- 
 complished had the American Government continued the 
 cooperative policy and exercised a more diplomatic influence 
 
PERSONALITIES AND PRINCIPLES 679 
 
 upon the British Foreign Office. Judge Bingham proved 
 himself to be a fine type of American during his long service 
 in Tokio but he was neither a statesman nor a diplomat. 
 The American policy in Korea also, while not properly open 
 to the charge of having betrayed the Koreans, was certainly 
 lacking in political sagacity and was most deficient in its 
 contempt for general cooperation. Statesmanship was no- 
 where apparent. 
 
 A cooperative policy is not a trust company to which a 
 government may consign the management of its foreign rela- 
 tions and then feel free to bestow its executive and diplo- 
 matic posts as badges of honor upon men who are merely 
 loyal Republicans or sound Democrats. American interests 
 in the Far East unquestionably suffered, but the fault was 
 not so much in the cooperative policy as in the fact that 
 the American representatives and the American administra- 
 tions were less capable than those with which they were 
 cooperating. Fatality to American interests always fol- 
 lowed the appearance of an incompetent American diplomat 
 or a provincial Secretary of State. It was true at Tientsin 
 in 1858, in Japan after Harris left, in China after Bur- 
 lingame's retirement. The wreck of the cooperative policy 
 in the East in the nineties was due as much to American 
 ineptitude as to European jealousies. 
 
 It was the utter wreck of the cooperative policy which 
 made it necessary for the United States to retain the 
 Philippines and one may at least question whether the 
 annexation of Hawaii would have taken place had not Japan 
 betrayed an inclination to encroach upon the islands. Only 
 the reestablishment of cooperation between Great Britain, 
 Japan and the United States prevented the dismemberment 
 of the Chinese Empire. In the resumption of cooperation in 
 1899 the United States suffered no loss for it was ably rep- 
 resented. 
 
 The only unknown quantity making a cooperative policy 
 a gamble for the United States is the quality of American 
 representation. But the uncertainties of American politics 
 are always a liability to be reckoned with, and as disastrous 
 
680 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 to an isolated as to a cooperative policy. The history of 
 American policy in the nineteenth century, and there does 
 not appear to be any different testimony from more recent 
 history, indicates that American interests in Asia, which are 
 best served by the open door and the development of strong 
 Asiatic states, fare best under a cooperative policy in which 
 the American Government is ably and energetically repre- 
 sented. That under such a policy the United States will 
 attain the full measure of its desires is unlikely, but under 
 an isolated policy it will certainly obtain even less both for 
 itself and for Asia. The American people delight to honor 
 Seward and Hay both of whom reached this conclusion, but 
 perhaps even yet they have not grasped the secret of their 
 statesmanship. The cooperative policy in Asia has not been 
 lifted to a place in American foreign policy by the side of 
 the Monroe Doctrine where it is above the reach of issue- 
 hunting campaign managers. 
 
 In conclusion, we repeat that the tap-root of American 
 policylmtsia is most-favored-nation treatment. An .iiiii: 
 
 tude of self-righteousness is neither becoming nor justified. 
 American policy is not philanthropic ; it is not, in its motive 
 and history, benevolent ; but it is beneficent, for the United^ 
 States is so situated that American interests in Asia are be st 
 promoted by the growth of strong, prosperous and enlight- 
 ened Asiatic states. Indeed it is diflficult for an American 
 to believe that the repression or weakening of any part o f 
 Asia is a benefit to any power. The United States is com- 
 mitted to its policy by geographical, economic and political 
 facts, and in the same measure is also bound to a policy oCIT 
 cooperation with all powers which sincerely profess a similar , 
 purpose. '""^ 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
 
 1. The documentary and pamphlet literature on the consular system 
 is voluminous. The student is referred to the index to Foreign 
 Relations, and to the following documents : A Report to the 
 Hon. George S. Boutwell, Secretary of the Treasury, upon the 
 Consular Service of the U. S. A. by DeB. Randolph Keim 
 (Washington, 1872) ; the Keim Report is also given in S. Ex. 
 
PERSONALITIES AND PRINCIPLES 681 
 
 Doc. 7:41-3; Report to the Hon. John Hay, Secretary of State, 
 upon a tour of consular inspection in Asia, by Herbert H. D. 
 Pierce (Washington, 1904) ; also H. Misc. Doc. 31 -.45-2 (Part 2) 
 which contains the documentary evidence as to the conditions 
 in the consular service of China, with special reference to 
 Shanghai up until 1877; this document should be studied with 
 H. Eept. 134:45-3, Investigation of Geo. F. Seward. Seward 
 while serving as minister at Peking was charged with corrup- 
 tion in his previous service as Consul General at Shanghai. 
 The Committee on Expenditures in the State Department in 
 the House presented a bill of impeachment against Seward 
 which was referred (June 4, 1879) to the Committee on 
 Judiciary from which it never reappeared. The following year 
 Seward was replaced at Peking by James B. Angell. Chester 
 Lloyd Jones : "The Consular Service of the United States, its 
 History and Activities" (Univ. of Pa. Series in Political 
 Economy and Public Law, No. 18, Philadelphia, 1906) is a 
 good general summary of the development of the entire consular 
 system, but it contains only passing references to Asia. 
 
 2. Keim: Eeport, p. 183. 
 
 3. Pierce: Report, p. 15. 
 
 4. Moore's "Digest," Vol. 2, pp. 613 ff. ; S. Ex. Doc. 72 :31-1 (the 
 
 report of John W. Davis). 
 
 5. Hubbard was so unwise as to write a book after his return from 
 
 Tokio. It is a very revealing document. Richard B. Hubbard : 
 "The United States in the Far East, or. Modern Japan and the 
 Orient" (Richmond, Va., 1899). 
 
 6. William Seward's "Travels Around the World," p. 89. 
 
 7. Foulk Papers (New York Public Library, Manuscripts Div.). 
 
CHAPTER XXXV 
 
 N®TES ON BIBLIOGEAPHY 
 
 Quotation or exact citation with attached bibliograph- 
 ical reference where statements of fact are, or may be, mat- 
 ters of dispute have been uniformly utilized in this study. 
 Other quotations have been introduced to give the reader 
 the peculiar flavor of the sources quoted, for in the deter- 
 mination of policy prejudices and personal feelings were- 
 fully as influential as facts. A bibliographical list is ap- 
 pended which, while abbreviated in form, is sufficient for 
 the identification of the source. In this list will be found 
 some titles of little known contemporary sources throwing 
 light on various phases of domestic history or on American 
 foreign relations outside of Eastern Asia. 
 
 The attempt to supply a complete and critical bibliog- 
 raphy of the subject has been abandoned because it cannot 
 be done satisfactorily except at great length. Such a bib- 
 liography would be most satisfactory were it the result of 
 collaboration rather than of purely individual selection. 
 Many general works of reference to which the student nat- 
 urally turns for general information, and even many histories 
 bearing directly upon the subject are not mentioned in the 
 bibliographical citations. Some comments of a general 
 nature at the end of this chapter will give the reason for 
 this omission. The appended list, containing as it does every 
 title cited in the text, does constitute a selected bibliography 
 of the sources which the writer has found sufficiently accu- 
 rate to justify quotation. The citation of a book for a 
 specific reference does not however constitute an endorse- 
 ment of the book as a whole. In general books on the Orient 
 are very uneven in quality. 
 
 The writer has had exceptional privileges of access to 
 
 682 
 
NOTES ON BIBLIOGRAPHY 683 
 
 the archives of the Department of State and it has seemed 
 that the most valuable personal contribution he can make 
 towards the critical bibliography which is so sorely needed, 
 is in the way of comparison of these records with the printed 
 documents and with such other manuscripts or printed 
 sources as run parallel to the government archives. This 
 contribution is offered in payment of the debt of gratitude 
 due to those writers who have already pioneered in the field 
 and have published bibliographies. 
 
 The primary documentary source for American affairs in 
 the East Indies and Eastern Asia before 1844 are the con- 
 sular letter books in the Department of State. The Canton 
 Letters, however, begin approximately with 1800 and while 
 the Calcutta Letters begin in 1793 they are very incomplete 
 and the student must look elsewhere for the bulk of the 
 material. The Miscellaneous Letters of the Department of 
 State archives, for which there is a calendar in the Depart- 
 ment, contain some correspondence from merchants engaged 
 in trade and throw light on the relations of such men as 
 Astor, Girard, and the Providence and Boston merchants to 
 the Embargo, War of 1812, appointment of consuls, etc. 
 The first volume of Canton Letters contains some mis- 
 placed correspondence with reference to the Columbia and 
 Lady Washington expedition to the Northwest Coast, and a 
 packet of letters and documents, unbound, in the State 
 Department Library, gives further information about the 
 Northwest Coast trade. 
 
 The most complete printed contemporary sources of in- 
 formation for the period preceding 1800 are: Shaw's Jour- 
 nals, published in 1847, which not only include Shaw's 
 reports to John Jay, but also supply much additional infor- 
 mation as to the circumstances under which the East India 
 trade was initiated, and the manner of conducting it in the 
 East; the O'Donnell correspondence in Diplomatic Corre- 
 spondence 1783-9, Volume 3; Spark's "Life of John Led- 
 yard" ; the biographical sketches of Elias Haskett Derby and 
 others in Hunt's "American Merchants"; the "Letters of 
 Phineas Bond," and William Milburn's "Oriental Com- 
 
684 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 merce," the editions of 1813 and 1825 being unlike and both 
 valuable. 
 
 Thes^ printed sources are supplemented by many scat- 
 tered manuscripts. The Library of Congress contains the 
 Ingraham Journal of the Voyage of the Hope, a long letter 
 from Thomas Randall to Alexander Hamilton and other less 
 important items. The Hudson Collection in the New York 
 Public Library contains papers relating to the building of 
 the ship Massachusetts for Samuel Shaw in 1784, and the 
 Bancroft Collection in the same library contains copies of 
 some of the Phineas Bond letters as well as reports of other 
 British agents which are of the utmost importance in deter- 
 mining the initial East India trade of Philadelphia, Balti- 
 more, New York and the Rhode Island ports. 
 
 The documentary sources in the Massachusetts libraries 
 are given in S. E. Morison's incomparable "Maritime His- 
 tory of Massachusetts" and K. S. Latourette's "Early Rela- 
 tions between the United States and China" gives an exten- 
 sive though not complete list of contemporary sources both 
 manuscript and printed. 
 
 The Canton Consular Letters from 1800 to 1840 were 
 published in part in H. Doc. 119:26-1 and H. Doc. 71:26-2. 
 While no important information bearing on the question 
 before Congress, namely, the proposed treaty with China, 
 was omitted from these documents the unpublished ma- 
 terial is of the greatest historical interest, and contains 
 many shipping reports and comments which throw much 
 light on early American economic and industrial develop- 
 ment. The Kearny Correspondence, published in full in 
 S. Doc. 139:29-1, is an indispensable introduction to the 
 Cushing negotiations, and in part supplies the deficiency 
 due to the fact that the consular correspondence beyond 
 1840 was not published. 
 
 The Edmund Roberts papers are deposited in the 
 Library of Congress. They must, however, be supple- 
 mented by the Roberts papers, unbound, in the library of 
 the Department of State, and by the Batavia Consular 
 Letters. The Chinese Repository for the period contains 
 
NOTES ON BIBLIOGRAPHY 685 
 
 some important comments on the Roberts Mission. Ed- 
 mund Roberts' own book is of very slight value for the 
 historian owing to the editorial supervision it received from 
 the Department of State. 
 
 The published consular correspondence for the period is 
 supplemented by Paullin's "Early Voyages of American 
 Naval Vessels in the Orient," which is based on the archives 
 of the Navy Department, and contains full quotations and 
 citations. Seybert, Pitkin and Milburn supply much sta- 
 tistical and other information, but the best sources for the 
 conditions of American trade are found in the Parliamen- 
 tary Papers. While many statements were made in the 
 various Parliamentary investigations which tended to ex- 
 aggerate the growth of American trade, these reports are, 
 on the whole, more reliable than the incomplete figures in 
 the Consular Letters, and are more comprehensive than 
 those of Seybert or Pitkin. 
 
 The Caleb Cushing Correspondence is published with 
 the omission of no important details in S. Docs. 67 and 
 58:28-2. 
 
 Between 1844 and 1853 very little of the diplomatic or 
 consular correspondence was published. The Chinese Re- 
 pository in a measure supplies this gap and is also a valuable 
 supplement to all the published documents during the years 
 (1832-51) of its publication. For the years 1828-61 the 
 Hasse Index of U. S. Documents Relating to Foreign Affairs 
 is a certain and invaluable guide which renders unnecessary 
 the compilation of complete lists in this volume. 
 
 From 1853 to 1869 practically all of the diplomatic cor- 
 respondence of the American representatives in China and 
 Japan was published. The Department of State apparently 
 had no compunctions about publishing material which con- 
 tained or implied a criticism of other powers. The volu- 
 minous and highly entertaining as well as instructive cor- 
 respondence of Humphrey Marshall for 1853 was printed 
 almost without editing or the omission of the many con- 
 fidential dispatches. This and the correspondence of his 
 successors, McLane, Parker, Reed and Ward, more than 
 
686 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 2500 pages in all, constitute a primary source not merely 
 for American but for British and French history in China. 
 These volumes have been uniformly ignored by the British 
 and French historians of the period and yet so important 
 is their contribution that the entire history of the period 
 may well be rewritten from them. These documents, to 
 which may be added S. Wells Williams' Journal of the Reed 
 and Ward Missions, have an unique value which gives them 
 precedence over the British Blue Books. The latter were 
 published while the British Government was being sub- 
 jected to searching criticism, and they were obviously de- 
 signed to justify a policy already determined upon. The 
 American documents were not edited to meet a criticism 
 and were designed to plead no case. They record events, 
 month by month, as they occurred and are an historical 
 source of surpassing value. They are the birth records of 
 American policy. 
 
 The Diplomatic Correspondence, begun by Seward, 
 when compared with the manuscript dispatches, reveals a 
 continuance of the policy to supply the fullest possible 
 information on the relations of the United States to China 
 and Japan. Only a small amount of editing took place. 
 The China dispatches contain relatively little of importance 
 which was not printed. The same may be said for Japan 
 with the exception that the information relative to the 
 convention of 1866 was very defective, and much of the 
 negotiation with reference to Korea, having been entirely 
 verbal, was omitted entirely. 
 
 The Townsend Harris correspondence was published 
 only in fragments but the deficiency has been largely sup- 
 plied in Grifiis' "Harris" which was based on Harris' Journal 
 and contains extensive excerpts. The Harris Papers are 
 now deposited in the Library of the College of the City of 
 New York, and there are in addition to them some Harris 
 papers in the New York Public Library. Griffis did not 
 have access to the latter papers but they contain nothing 
 which would modify greatly the facts already published. 
 The present writer has added in the text certain facts not 
 
NOTES ON BIBLIOGRAPHY 687 
 
 hitherto known relating to the appointment of Harris to 
 his various posts. The Pruyn papers to which Treat had 
 access and from which he printed many excerpts would 
 appear to be very similar in content to the dispatches in 
 the Department of State. 
 
 The Burlingame private papers do not appear to have 
 been extensive and Williams' biography is complete except 
 for certain details of the negotiations in Europe which were 
 reported in more or less private letters to Seward and are 
 bound up in the first volume of Notes from the Chinese 
 Legation in the Department of State. 
 
 Some additional correspondence for the period covered 
 by Seward's term of office appear in the documents report- 
 ing the investigations of 0. B. Bradford and George F. 
 Seward, in the document supplying information on the 
 Ward-Hill claim against China, and in the reports relative 
 to the return of the Chinese and Japanese indemnities. 
 
 Parts of the missing documents with reference to Sew- 
 ard's negotiations over Korea have been printed in the text, 
 and more completely by the writer of this book in the 
 American Historical Review. 
 
 A change of policy with reference to the publication of 
 diplomatic correspondence by the Department of State ap- 
 pears after 1870. The dispatches were subjected to an in- 
 creasing amount of editing. The reason may be found in 
 the complaints of the American representatives in Peking 
 and Tokio. The full publication of their dispatches had 
 become a source of extreme embarrassment. The English 
 newspapers, most of them bitterly and vituperously hostile 
 to Americans, seized upon the volumes of Foreign Relations 
 with avidity and published long extracts, with com- 
 mentaries. For several years thereafter the ministers them- 
 selves were permitted to designate the dispatches which 
 they were willing to have published, and then a system of 
 editing was introduced into the State Department which 
 was very conservative and erred only on the safe side. The 
 effect of this system was to render the succeeding volumes 
 of Foreign Relations of decreasing value to the student of 
 
688 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 American policy in the East. One is not safe in making 
 jany generalizations based on the published dispatches in 
 Foreign Relations from 1875 to 1894. But the relations of 
 the American Government to the Sino-Japanese War was 
 ;exhibited with no important omissions, and the Boxer cor- 
 respondence is in no way misleading. 
 
 The voluminous documents relating to the Philippine 
 question are of a different character. They are fully and 
 critically discussed by LeRoy. In general we may note that 
 they resemble in character the British Blue books on the 
 Elgin Expedition and the Treaty of Tientsin. They were 
 published to justify a policy and to influence public opinion 
 and as such must be used with the greatest caution. They 
 represent the first instance in the 19th century in Ameri- 
 can relations with the East where government documents 
 were used as polemics to justify a policy already adopted. 
 
 The manuscript or printed material running parallel 
 with the diplomatic records for the period since 1868 is 
 scanty. The Shufeldt papers are deposited in the Navy 
 Department Library and the Foulk papers, containing 
 letter-press copies of practically all his reports and diplo- 
 matic dispatches and some personal notes and correspond- 
 ence (1884-7) with reference to Korean matters, are in the 
 New York Public Library. These two collections constitute 
 an independent documentary record of American relations 
 with Korea down to 1887. They are of the utmost impor- 
 tance and are another block of material which materially 
 changes a chapter of American history. Perhaps no phase 
 of American history has been more mishandled and more 
 wrested to serve partisan purposes. 
 
 Other manuscript material relating to this period is 
 known to exist but so far as the writer is aware it has not 
 been made generally available to students. The John 
 Russell Young papers covering the years 1882-5, provided 
 they are not lost, will yield a record of surpassing value for 
 affairs in both China and Japan and also in Korea. The 
 Young dispatches contain the best portraiture of Li Hung 
 Chang at that period that the writer has seen. Likewise 
 
NOTES ON BIBLIOGRAPHY 689 
 
 the Young papers will probably throw light on the inter- 
 national significance of the tour of General Grant in the 
 East which, so far as American policy is concerned, marked 
 an epoch. It is to be hoped that in time the literary records 
 of more recent Americans, many of them still living, may 
 find their way into libraries. 
 
 American historical literature is not rich in the biog- 
 raphies and published letters of American representatives 
 in the East. Many of the Americans were not literary men 
 and even where the records are ample it would appear that 
 there has been a regrettable lack of interest in their pub- 
 lication. There are in American historical literature very 
 few volumes comparable for historical importance and 
 readability, with Oliphant's "Elgin Expedition," Walrond's 
 "Letters of Lord Elgin," Michie's "Englishman in China," 
 or Lane-Poole's "Life of Parkes." Williams' biography of 
 Burlingame, the "Life and Letters of Williams," the 
 Williams Journals of the Perry, Reed and Ward missions, 
 and Foster's "Diplomatic Memoirs" only partially meet the 
 need. The books of Young, Holcombe and Denby, while 
 valuable, leave much to be desired. The result of this 
 poverty of American historical literature and the general 
 ignorance of the vast mass of government documents for 
 the period before 1860 has been that American relations 
 in the East have been very inadequately treated by his- 
 torians and also very badly misrepresented. One cannot 
 refer to a single history of the period which is not exposed 
 to the charge of grave misstatements of fact, and equally 
 serious errors of interpretation. 
 
 Some few works by American and British writers have 
 had such a currency and have been so widely used and 
 generally cited as authorities that a few critical comments 
 upon them may not be out of order. 
 
 H. B. Morse's "International Relations of the Chinese 
 Empire," three volumes, is an invaluable chronicle of events 
 in China. It is also an important interpretation by one 
 who made an honest effort to be just and fair to all, and had 
 a liberal view-point. Mr. Morse's distinguished career iu 
 
690 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 the "Chinese Maritime Customs," and his close association 
 with Sir Robert Hart gave him access to invaluable sources 
 of information. These three volumes are an exposition of 
 the point of view of a liberal Englishman in China. The 
 second and third volumes reflect in a pronounced way the 
 views of Sir Robert Hart. All the volumes have, however, 
 two very serious deficiencies. By confining the study to 
 China with some attention to Korea, and by excluding 
 Japan, they present a distorted picture, for it was the policy 
 of all the Powers to regard the Far or Extreme East as a 
 unity. The second deficiency is due not to the limitation 
 of the theme but to the use of sources. In the first volume, 
 which brings the narrative down to 1860, and which covers 
 the period in which American policy had its birth, Mr. 
 Morse draws upon only seven American sources, most of 
 which are not contemporary, and none of which are ofiicial 
 records. The result is a volume in which the British Blue 
 books and other British sources supply the information and 
 control the conclusions. It is an extremely unreliable guide 
 to the study of American policy. The two later volumes 
 are less deficient in their use of American sources, and yet 
 American interests are slighted and misrepresented. 
 
 The writings of S. Wells Williams demand special at- 
 tention. As a source book of Chinese history the ^'Middle 
 Kingdom" still occupies a unique position. The abridg- 
 ment of this monumental work by the author's son in "A 
 History of China," shares the merits of the larger work. 
 However, for some reason, possibly because of Dr. Williams* 
 intimate and confidential association with the American 
 Government for so many years, the phases of American re- 
 lations with China are slighted to an extraordinary degree,, 
 and these volumes are of Httle value in a study of American 
 policy. On the other hand the Williams' Journals, pub- 
 lished in China and Japan, and little known to American 
 readers, are of superlative importance. 
 
 John W. Foster's "American Diplomacy in the Orient" 
 has been for nearly a score of years the only book by an 
 American author to cover the field which the present writer 
 
NOTES ON BIBLIOGRAPHY 691 
 
 has chosen. The book may not fairly be judged for what 
 it did not purport to be. It was not based on manuscript 
 sources, nor did it attempt a critical handling of any source. 
 Its most important contribution was for those years in 
 which the author was himself an actor in the events he 
 described. Its later chapters were written with the extreme 
 caution of a gentleman who was writing about his friends 
 and political associates, and the entire volume reflects a 
 complacent judgment which has had the effect of presenting 
 American policy in Asia as a form of philanthropy. Per- 
 haps the most serious defect of the book is its failure to 
 bring out the importance of events before 1860. General 
 Foster appears to have regarded the questions as they arose 
 in the last three decades of the century as novel, whereas, 
 in principle, they were but the recurrences of older questions 
 in the settlement of which ample precedents had been laid 
 down. Of more importance to the student is Foster's 
 ''Diplomatic Memoirs," the chapters of which devoted to 
 the Sino-Japanese War and the Treaty of Shimoneseki, are 
 a primary historical source. 
 
 There are no books on American policy in Korea which 
 can be recommended. The information upon which they 
 have been written has been scanty and very partisan. 
 American policy has been misrepresented. This was not a 
 very bright page in American history, but it is not open to 
 the charges which have been brought against it. 
 
 The British writers, Boulger, Parker, Michie, Lane- 
 Poole, Douglas, Alcock, and others, all have the deficiencies 
 noted in Morse. They did not find it worth while to consult 
 American sources of information. While not uncritical of 
 British policy, they incline to accept the British Blue Books 
 as the inspired word of truth, and the facts of American 
 relations receive only passing attention and the most as- 
 tonishing interpretations. They perpetuate many state- 
 ments which, according to American sources of the highest 
 historical value, would appear to be utterly untenable. 
 Sargent's "Anglo-Chinese Commerce and Diplomacy" is of 
 a different character, admirable and alone in its class. 
 
692 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 In conclusion we draw attention to a group of studies by 
 American scholars of certain limited phases of the American 
 policy. Callahan's "American Relations in the Pacific and 
 the Far East, 1784-1900/' was the pioneer. It was written 
 just after the occupation of the Philippines and reflects the 
 resurgence of American imperialism of the period. It has 
 been much criticised but it had many merits as an introduc- 
 tion to the subject. Callahan grasped the cycle of events 
 and realized that in 1898 the United States was really re- 
 turning to a phase of policy similar to that of the fifties. 
 This was an important contribution which not all students 
 were ready to appropriate. Paullin's "Diplomatic Negotia- 
 tions of American Naval Officers," and his even more 
 valuable "Early Voyages of American Naval Vessels in the 
 Orient" set a high standard of scholarship and remain in 
 this field unchallenged. Their deficiency is merely in the 
 scope, for they were based too exclusively upon the naval 
 records. The State Department archives are necessary to 
 complete the picture and when PauUin wrote the more re- 
 cent ones were not available. Treat's "Diplomatic Rela- 
 tions between the United States and Japan, 1853-65," is 
 another scholarly study. While the present writer has not 
 always found it possible to accept Treat's interpretations, 
 and has rejected the valuation which he placed upon the 
 services of one man, he has used the book with very great 
 appreciation. Treat's more recent "Japan and the United 
 States, 1853-1921," is of less value and the irenic nature of 
 the lectures which it comprises would appear to have em- 
 barrassed a perfectly impartial statement of the facts. 
 LeRoy's intensive study of the first few years of American 
 policy in the Philippines stands in a class by itself. It is 
 the indispensable guide to the student. Likewise, Morison's 
 "Maritime History of Massachusetts, 1783-1860," is an 
 incomparable book. It has only the defect of the limita- 
 tion of the subject. From Morison one might easily reach 
 the conclusion that the contribution of Massachusetts to 
 the early East India trade of the United States was greater 
 than it actually was. Philadelphia and New York would 
 
NOTES ON BIBLIOGRAPHY 693 
 
 appear from the records, incomplete though they are, to 
 have had an importance which is not assigned to them by 
 Morison, The most adequate single source for the entire 
 period is the historical sections of Moore's ''Digest." 
 
 Passing from the mature works of American historians 
 we come to a group of academic studies by post graduate 
 students. At the head of this list, in value, stands Koo's 
 "Status of Aliens in China." Next to it is Nitobe's study 
 which now possesses, in addition to its scholarly research, 
 the value of a historical document for it is an interpreta- 
 tion by a Japanese student in an American university in the 
 early nineties. Hinkley's "American Consular Jurisprudence 
 in the Orient" gives a good summary of extraterritoriality; 
 it is deficient in statements of historical fact. Latourette's 
 "Early Relations between the United States and China," 
 1784-1844, is particularly valuable for its critical bibliog- 
 raphy. Clements' "Boxer Rebellion" is good. There is a 
 steadily increasing list of doctorate theses by Japanese and 
 Chinese students in American universities. They are of 
 very unequal value. Their too common defects are a 
 neglect of original sources, and a tendency towards special 
 pleading. Many of the Japanese students have made im- 
 portant contributions by supplying translations from Japa- 
 nese sources not otherwise available. A few Chinese have 
 made similar contributions, but there is a regrettable lack 
 of Chinese source material in the output of Chinese stu- 
 dents and an undiscriminating use of British sources which 
 often weakens the cause so dear to their hearts. While 
 Chinese sources may not be available to Chinese students 
 in America, and while many of the Chinese historical rec- 
 ords were conveniently destroyed by the vandalism of 
 foreign invading armies at Peking in 1860 and in 1900, there 
 is nevertheless in China a very considerable amount of 
 historical record of the highest value which only the 
 Chinese graduate student is competent to make use of. 
 Hitherto China has rarely spoken for herself in the writing 
 of history, and for this reason the Chinese story has suffered 
 greatly in the telHng. The publication of Chinese source 
 
694 AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA 
 
 material on the history of China's foreign relations would 
 doubtless work havoc in all existing histories. Meanwhile 
 the Chinese students have by no means made the most of 
 the Chinese sources which are^ available in American Gov- 
 ernment documents. 
 
 It is also very regrettable that greater inducement has 
 not been given to post-graduate historical students to edit 
 and publish as theses the vast amount of manuscript ma- 
 terial which lies unused and unknown in the various manu- 
 script collections, particularly in the libraries of the north- 
 ern Atlantic seaboard. Some of these manuscripts, com- 
 petently edited, would be at least as good a test of scholarly 
 ability as the theses which appear from year to year, and 
 to the general public they would be of vastly greater value. 
 
 i , 
 
• - BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Manuscripts in United States Government Archives 
 
 Department of State. • 
 
 Despatches to Consuls. 
 
 Batavia Consular Letters. 
 
 Canton Consular Letters. 
 
 Honolulu Consular Letters. 
 
 Ningpo Consular Letters. 
 
 Manila Consular Letters. 
 
 Smyrna Consular Letters. 
 
 British Legation, Notes from, 
 
 China Instructions. 
 
 China Despatches. 
 
 Chinese Legation, Notes from. 
 
 Japan Instructions. 
 
 Japan Despatches. 
 
 Japanese Legation, Notes from. 
 
 Korea Instructions. 
 
 Korea Despatches. 
 
 Russia Instructions. 
 
 Russia Despatches. 
 
 Russian Legation, Notes to. 
 
 Townsend Harris Papers. Bureau of Appointments. 
 
 Capt. John Kendrick. Correspondence concerning Settlement of his 
 Estate. Library, D. of S. 
 
 Miscellaneous Letters. 
 
 Edmund Roberts Papers. 
 Navy Department. 
 
 Captains' Letters. 
 
 East India Squadron Letters. 
 
 Commodore R. W. Shufeldt: "Cruise of the Ticonderoga." 
 ■ : Papers (deposited in Library). 
 
 Other Manuscripts 
 
 Bancroft Collection. America and England. New York Public Library. 
 
 Papers of- Continental Congress. Library of Congress. 
 
 Philip Cuyler Letter Book. New York Public Library. 
 
 George C. Foulk Papers. New York Public Libraiy. 
 
 Alexander Hamilton Papers. Library of Congress. 
 
 Townsend Harris Papers. College of the City of New York Library. 
 
 . New York Public Library. 
 
 Journals (typewritten copy). Library of Congress. 
 
 Hudson Collection. New York Public Library. 
 
 Joseph Ingraham. "Journal of the Voyage of the Hope." Library of 
 Congress. 
 
 695 
 
696 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Thomas Jefferson Papers. Library of Congress. , 
 
 William Law Papers. New York Public Library. 
 James Madison Papers. Library of Congress. 
 
 . New York Public Library. 
 
 Edmund Roberts Papers. Library of Congress. 
 Daniel Webster Papers. Library of Congress. 
 Oliver Wolcott and Co. Account Books. New York Historical Society. 
 
 United States Government Publications. 
 
 Congressional Documents (given below in the order of publication). 
 Lowndes Report on Coinage. H. Doc. Ill, 15th Cong. 2nd Sess. 
 Floyd Report on Oregon. H. Repts. 45, 16-2. 
 China Trade, Report on, Feb. 6, 1826. S. Doc. 31, 19-1. 
 Tea Smuggling. H. Doc. 137, 19-1. 
 
 Forbes, R. B. and Others, Memorial of. H. Doc. 40, 26-1. 
 Fanning, Edmund, Memorial of. H. Doc. 57, 26-1. 
 Canton Consular Letters. H. Doc. 119, 26-1. 
 Boston and Salem Merchants, Petition of. H. Doc. 170, 26-1. 
 China Trade, Secretary of Treas. Report on. H. Doc, 248, 26-1. 
 Canton Consular Letters. H. Doc. 71, 26-2. 
 Pres. Tyler, Message of July 1, 1842. H. Doc. 35, 27-3. 
 Adams, John Quincy, Report on China Mission Appropriation. H. Repts. 
 
 93, 27-3. 
 Cushing, Caleb, Correspondence of. S. Doc. 67, 28-2. 
 
 . S. Doc. 58, 28-2. 
 
 Webster, Daniel, Instructions to Cushing. S. Doc. 138, 28-2. 
 
 Pratt Resolution on Treaty with Japan. H. Doc. 138, 28-2. 
 
 Kearny Correspondence. S. Doc. 139, 29-1. 
 
 Palmer, Aaron Haight, Letter to Buchanan, H. Doc. 96, 29-2. 
 
 . Memoir Geographical, Political and Commercial on Siberia, 
 
 Manchuria, and Asiatic Islands of the N. Pacific Ocean. S. Misc. Doc. 
 
 80, 30-1. 
 King, T. Butler, Report of Com. on Naval Affairs. H. Repts. 596, 30-1. 
 Davis, John W., Corres. on Consular Courts. S. Ex. Doc. 72, 31-1. 
 Glynn, Commander James, Correspondence of. H. Ex. Doc. 84, 31-1. 
 Balestier, Joseph, Correspondence of. S. Ex. Doc. 38, 32-1. 
 Webster, Daniel, Report on Present Relations with Japan. S. Ex. Doc. 
 
 59, 32-1. 
 Kennedy, John P., Report on Trans-Pacific steamers. S. Ex. Doc. 49, 
 
 32-2. 
 Marshall, Humphrey, Correspondence of. H. Ex. Doc. 123, 33-1. 
 Perry, M. C, Correspondence of. S. Ex. Doc. 34, 33-2. 
 Palmer, Aaron Haight, Memorial to Senate. S. Misc. Doc. 10, 33-2. 
 Rockhill, John A., Report on Trans-Isthmian Canal. H. Rept. 145, 33-2. 
 Parker, Peter, Correspondence on Coolie Trade. S. Ex. Doc. 99, 34-1. 
 McLane, Robert M., Correspondence of. S. Ex. Doc. 22, 35-2, 2 vols. 
 Parker, Peter, Correspondence of. S. Ex. Doc. 22, 35-2, 2 vols. 
 Consular Officers, Compensation for. H. Ex. Doc. 68, 35-2. 
 Reed, William B., Correspondence of. S. Ex. Doc. 30, 36-1. 
 Ward, John E., Correspondence of. S. Ex. Doc. 30, 36-1. 
 Marcy, William H., Instructions to McLane. S. Ex. Doc. 39, 36-1. 
 Harris, Townsend, Corres. on Japanese Mission. S. Ex. Doc. 25, 36-1. 
 Japan, Purchase of War Steamers in U. S. S. Ex. Doc. 33, 37-3. 
 Midway Islands, Occupation of. S. Ex. Doc. 79, 40-2. 
 Japanese Immigration to Hawaiian Islands. S. Ex. Doc. 80, 40-2. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 697 
 
 Midway Islands, Harbor Improvement. S. Rept. 194, 40-3. 
 
 China, American Claims on. H. Ex. Doc. 29, 40-3. 
 
 Consular Service Inspection. S. Ex. Doc. 7, 41-3. 
 
 Chinese Immigration Investigation. S. Rept. 689, 44-2. 
 
 Chinese Immigration. Oliver P. Morton Opinion. S. Misc. Doc. 20, 45-2. 
 
 Shanghai Consulate Investigation. H. Misc. Doc. 31, 45-2. 
 
 Seward, Geo. F., Report of Investigation. H. Rept. 134, 45-3. 
 
 Chinese Indemnity, H. Rept. 970, 48-1; see also, H. Ex. Doc. 29, 40-3; 
 
 H. Ex. Doc. 69, 41-2; H. Rept. 113, 45-3; H. Rept. 1142, 46-2. 
 Korean Army, American Instructors for. S. Rept. 1443, 48-2. 
 China, Report on Pending Treaty, Sept. 18, 1888. S. Ex. Doc. 273, 50-1. 
 Merchant Marine in Foreign Trade (1890). H. Rept. 1210, 51-1. 
 Hawaiian Islands, Harrison Message on Annexation. S. Ex. Doc. 76, 52-2. 
 Philippines, McKinley Transmits Treaty of Paris to Senate. S. Doc. 62, 
 
 55-3. 
 Aguinaldo, Communications with. S. Doc. 208, 56-1. 
 Philippine Islands, Senate Hearings. S. Doc. 331, 57-1, 3 parts. 
 Rockhill, W. W., Correspondence on Boxer Settlement. S. Doc. 67, 57-1. 
 China, U. S. Military Operations in. War Dept. Doc. 124, Pub. XXX. 
 
 (For complete list of congressional documents 1828-1861, see Adelaide 
 R. Hasse. Index to U. S. Docs, relating to Foreign Affairs [Washington, 
 1914, 3 parts] ; for further details of printed diplomatic correspondence 
 1861-1900, see index volume to Foreign Relations.) 
 
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 U. S. Statutes at Large. 
 
 Diplomatic Correspondence, Sept. 19, 1783-Mar. 4, 1789. 
 Annals of Congress. 
 
 Intercontinental Telegraph, Seward Report to Senate (1864). 
 Charles Sumner, Speech on Cession of Russian America (1867). 
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 Rejection of Henry W. Blair by Chinese Government (1892). 
 Monthly Summary of Commerce and Finance, April, 1898. 
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 Pierce, Herbert H. D. "Tour of Consular Inspection" (1904). 
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 . "Digest of International Law" (1906). 
 
 Collections of Treaties and Agreements 
 
 "Treaties and Conventions between the United States and Other Powers 
 
 1776-1887, with Notes" (1889). 
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 between the United States and Other Powers 1776-1909." Compiled 
 
 by WilHam M. Malloy. 2 vols. S. Doc. 357, 61-2. 
 Rockhill, W. W. "Treaties and Conventions with or Concerning China 
 
 and Korea, 1894-1904" (1904); Supplement (1908). 
 MacMurray, J. V. A. "Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning 
 
 China, 1894-1919." 2 vols. (New York, 1921.) 
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 Maritime Customs, 2d ed. Shanghai, 1917.) 
 "Traites et Conventions entre I'Empire du Japon et les Puissances 
 
 Etranges" (Tokio, 1908). 
 Martens' "Recueil de Traites" (Deuxieme Series. Gottingue, 1876). 
 Korea. Treaties and Agreements (Washington, 1921). 
 
698 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 British Parliamentaky Papers 
 
 House of Commons, 1821, Vol. 7. 
 
 House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1830, Vols. 5-6. 
 
 Correspondence Relative to Affairs in China, 1839-41. Private and Con- 
 fidential. 
 
 China. 40. 1847. Orders, Ordinances, etc. (795). 
 
 Coolie Trade and Emigration from Hongkong, 1857-8 (481). 
 
 Hansard's Debates. Series 3, Vol. CXLIV. 
 
 Lord Elgin- Yeh Correspondence. 1857-8 (2322). 
 
 Lord Elgin-Earls of Clarendon and Malmesbury Corres. 1860 (2618). 
 
 Lord Elgin Report, 1861 (2754). 
 
 Bruce Correspondence. 1860 (2587, 2606, 2641, 2677). 
 
 Japan, Nos. 2-3, 1865 (3429, 3459). 
 
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 Formosa, Settlement of Difficulty between China and Japan, 1875 (CI 164, 
 C1289). 
 
 Korea, Reports on, from British Minister in Japan. 1883 (C3455). 
 
 Korea, Treaty of, Nov. 26, 1883. 1884 (C4044). 
 
 Port Hamilton Correspondence. China, 1887 (C4991). 
 
 Books, Pamphlets, Magazines and Newspapers 
 
 (Editions noted in titles given below are those to which references are 
 made in the foregoing pages. In many cases there are other editions.) 
 
 Abeel, David. "Journal of a Residence in China" (2d ed.. New York, 1836). 
 
 Adams, J. Q. "Memoirs," 12 vols. (Philadelphia, 1875). 
 
 Alcock, Rutherford. "The Capital of the Tycoon," 2 vols. (London, 
 
 1863). 
 Allen, H. N. "A Chronological Index of Events in Korean History" 
 
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APPENDIX 
 
 Presidents, Secretaries of State, and Diplomatic Representatives in China, Japan, 
 AND Korea (1842-1900) 
 
 JOHN TYLER 
 
 Daniel Webster (Mass.) (Mar. 5, '41-May 8, '43). 
 
 China Japan Korea 
 
 Caleb Oushing," (Mass.) 
 (May 8, '43 — Com- 
 niissione'r ; also E. 
 E. & M. P.). 
 John C. Calhoun (So. Car.) (April 1, 1844-Mar. 10, 1845). 
 Caleb Gushing'' (Mass.) 
 (Aug. 1.5, '44). Com- 
 missioner. 
 JAMES K. POLK 
 
 James Buchanan (Perm.) (Mar. 11, '45-Mar. 7, '49). 
 
 Japan 
 Alexander H. Everett * 
 (Mass.). 
 
 China 
 Alexander H. Everett 
 
 (Mass.) (Mar. 13, 
 
 '45-June 28, '47). 
 John W. Davis (Ind.) 
 
 (Jan. 3, '48-May 25, 
 
 '50). 
 
 ZACHARY TAYLOR and MILLARD FILLMORE 
 
 John M. Clayton (Del.) (Mar. 7, '49-July 22, '50). 
 Daniel Webster (Mass.) (July 22, '50-Oct. 24, '52). 
 
 Japan 
 John H. Aulick " (June 
 
 10, '51). 
 M. C. Perry" (Nov. 5, 
 
 '52). 
 
 China 
 Thomas A. R. Nelson 
 (Tenn.) (Mar. 6, 
 '51 ; resigned). 
 Joseph Blunt (N. Y.) 
 (Oct. 15, '51 ; de- 
 clined). - 
 Humphrey Marshall 
 
 (Ky.) (Aug. 4, '52- 
 Jan. 27, '54). 
 Edward Everett (Mass.) (Nov. 6, '52-Mar. 3, '53) 
 
 FRANKLIN PIERCE 
 
 William L. Marcy (N. Y.) (Mar. 7, '53-Mar. 6, 
 
 '57). 
 
 Japan 
 Townsend Harris " (N. 
 Y.) Cone. Gen. 
 (Sept. 13, '56-Jan. 
 19, '59). 
 
 China 
 Robert J. Walker 
 
 (Miss.) (June 22, 
 
 '53 ; declined). 
 Robert M. McLane 
 
 (Md.) (Oct. 18, '53- 
 
 Dec. 12, '54). 
 Peter Parker " (Mass.) 
 
 (Aug. 16, '55-Aug. 
 
 25, '57). 
 
 JAMES BUCHANAN 
 
 Lewis Cass (Mich.) (Mar. 6, '57-Dec. 12, '60). 
 
 China 
 
 Japan 
 
 
 William B. Reed » •» 
 
 Townsend Hams "^ 
 
 (N. 
 
 (Pa.) (Apr. 18, '57- 
 
 Y.) (Jan. 19, 
 
 '59- 
 
 Dec. 8, '58). 
 
 Apr. 26, '62). 
 
 
 John E. Ward (Ga.) 
 
 
 
 (Dec. 5, '58-Dec., 
 
 
 
 '60). 
 
 
 
 Korea 
 
 Korea 
 
 Korea 
 
 Korea 
 
 705 
 
706 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 ABRAHAM LINCOLN and ANDREW JOHNSON 
 
 William H. Seward (N. Y.) (Mar. 6, '61-Mar. 3, '69). 
 
 China 
 Anson Burling'ame 
 
 (Mass.) (July 15, 
 
 '61-Nov. 21, '67). 
 J. Ross Browne (CaL) 
 
 (Mar. 11, '68-July 5, 
 
 '69). 
 
 ULYSSES S. GRANT 
 
 Japan 
 Robert H. Pruyn (N. 
 
 Y.) (Jan. 22, '62- 
 
 Oct. 25, '65). 
 Chauncey M. Depew 
 
 (N. Y.) (Nov. 15, 
 
 '65 ; declined). 
 Robert B. Van Valken- 
 
 burgh (N. Y.) (Jan. 
 
 18, '66-Nov. 11, 
 
 '69). 
 
 Hamilton Fish (N. Y.) (Mar. 17, '69-Mar. 12, '77). 
 
 Japan 
 Charles E. DeLong ^ 
 (Nev.) (Apr. 21, 
 '69-Oct. 7, '73). 
 John A. Bingham 
 (Ohio) (Dec. 11, 
 '73-July 2, '85). 
 
 China 
 
 William A. Howard 
 (Mich.) (Apr. 17, 
 '69 ; declined). 
 
 Frederick F. Low 
 (Cal.) (Dec. 21, '69- 
 Mar. 28, '74). 
 
 Benjamin P. Avery 
 (Cal.) (Apr. 10, '74- 
 Nov. 8, '75). 
 
 George F. Seward 
 (Cal.[?]) (Jan. 7, 
 '76-Aug. 6, '80). 
 
 Korea 
 George F. Seward « 
 (N. Y.) (July 27, 
 '68). 
 
 Korea 
 Frederick F. Low * 
 (Cal.) (1870). 
 
 RUTHERFORD B. HAYES 
 
 William M. Evarts (N. Y.) (Mar. 12, '77-Mar. 7, '81). 
 China Japan 
 
 James B. Angell '^ 
 (Mich.) (Apr. 9, 
 '80-Oct. 4, '81). 
 
 Korea 
 
 JAMES A. GARFIELD and CHESTER A. ARTHUR 
 James G. Blaine (Me.) (Mar. 7, '81-Dec. 19, '81). 
 China Japan 
 
 Frbdeeick T. Frelinghuysen (N. J.) (Dec. 19, '81-Mar. 6, 
 John Russell Young 
 
 (N. Y.) (Mar. 
 '82-Apr. 8, '85). 
 
 15, 
 
 Korea 
 R. W. Shufeldt (Cal.) 
 (Nov. 14, '81). 
 
 '85). 
 Lucius H. Foote (Cal.) 
 (Feb. 27, '83-Jan. 
 19, '85). 
 
 GROVER CLEVELAND 
 
 Thomas F. Bayard (Del.) (Mar. 7, '85-Mar. 6, '89). 
 China Japan 
 
 Charles Denby (Ind.) Richard B. Hubbard 
 
 (May 29, '85-July (Texas) (Apr. 2, 
 
 15, '98). 
 
 BENJAMIN HARRISON 
 
 James G. Blaine (Me.) (Mar. 
 China 
 Henry W. Blair (N. H.) 
 (Feb. 27, '91 ; unac- 
 ceptable to China). 
 
 '85-May 15, '89). 
 
 ■, '89-June 4, '92). 
 
 Japan 
 John F. Swift (Cal.) 
 
 (Mar. 12, '89-Mar. 
 
 10, '91). 
 Frank L. Coombs (Apr. 
 
 20, '92). 
 
 John W. Foster (Ind.) (June 29, '92-Feb. 23, '93). 
 
 Korea 
 William H. Parker <= 
 
 (D. C.) (Feb. 19, 
 
 '86-Oct. 29, '86). 
 Hugh A. Dinsmore 
 
 (Okla.) (Jan. 12, 
 
 '87). 
 
 Korea 
 William 0. Bradley 
 
 (Ky.) (Mar. 30, 
 
 '89 ; declined). 
 Augustine Heard 
 
 (Mass.) (Jan. 30, 
 
 '90-June 27, '93). 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 707 
 
 GROVER CLEVELAND 
 
 Walter Q. Gresham (IU.) (Mar. 6, '93-May 28, '93). 
 China Japan 
 
 Edwin Dun (Ohio) 
 (Apr. 4, '93-June 
 30, '97). 
 Richard B. Olney (Mass.) (June 10, '95-Mar. 5, '97). 
 
 WILLIAM McKINLEY 
 
 John Sherman (Ohio) (Mar. 6, '97-Apr. 26, '98). 
 
 Korea 
 John M. B. Sill (Cal.) 
 (Jan. 12, ■&4-Sept. 
 13, '97). 
 
 Japan 
 Alfred E. Buck (Ga.) 
 (Apr. 13, '97-Dec. 
 4, '02). 
 28, '98-Sept. 16, '98). 
 '98-). 
 
 Korea 
 Horace N. Allen (Ohio) 
 (July 17, '97-Dec. 
 10, '01). 
 
 China 
 Edwin H. Conger (111.) 
 (Jan. 19, '98-Mar. 8, 
 '05). 
 William R. Day (Ohio) (Apr. 
 John Hay (D. C.) (Sept. 30, 
 William W. Rockhill * 
 (Pa.) (July 19, '98- 
 Sept. 8, '01). 
 
 * Commissioned to make treaty. 
 
 " Post raised to Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. 
 "= Post reduced to Minister Resident and Consul General. 
 <• Post raised to Minister Resident. 
 
 ^ The dates given below the names of the diplomatic representatives indicate dates 
 of appointment or confirmation, and of retirement or resignation. 
 
 * Special agent. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Abbot, Com. Joel: 191 
 
 Adams, John Quincy: 89; 105; 
 106; lecture before Mass. Hist. 
 Soc, 107; opium, 120; 672 
 
 Advisers, foreign: in China, 587; in 
 Japan, 588 
 
 Africa: v; 30 
 
 Aguinaldo, Emilio: 617-8 
 
 Alaska: telegraph, 409; purchase, 
 416; 590; 610; 636; payment, 
 671 
 
 Alcock, Sir Rutherford: 201; 217ff.; 
 226; 228; 317; 386; "naked 
 force," 388; 391-2; 396; policy 
 in Japan, 400 ; 401 ; 418 
 
 Aleutian Islands: 409; 416; 590 
 
 Allen, Dr. H. N.: 478; 483; made 
 minister, 505 ; 557 ; 569 ; 616 
 
 Alliance: with Great Britain, vi; 
 • 281 ; 298ff. ; Siam, 351 ; 357 ; 361 ; 
 China-Japan, 437-8; 608; over- 
 tures in 1898, 640; Beresford 
 tour, 641-2; 664 
 
 American Policy, see United States 
 
 Amoy: 211; 327; 557 
 
 Amur River: 179; 357; 409; 429; 
 590; 649 
 
 Anderson, Gen. T. M.: 618 
 
 Angell, James B.: 458; on treaty 
 of 1868, 540; treaty of 1882, 543 
 
 Anglo-Chinese War, 1839-42: Amer- 
 ican rel. to, 91ff. ; cause of, 
 106-7; 179; 181; influence in 
 Japan, 256; 304; 664 
 
 Anglo-French War with China : 343 ; 
 354; 386; 388; 490; 509 
 
 Anglo-Japanese alliance : 640-1 ; 644 
 
 Annam: 428; French relations, 
 491-2 
 
 Annapolis: Jap. students at naval 
 academy, 454 
 
 Aoki, Count: address to Diet, 497; 
 529; missionaries, 566 
 
 Arbitration: U. S. proposed to 
 Japan, 400; 443; 490-1; 491; 
 494; Sino-Jap. War, 498; Boxer 
 Protocol discussions, 659 
 
 Archer, Samuel: 10; 18 
 Armstrong, Com. James: Ba,rrier 
 
 Forts, 282 ; Formosa, 286ff. ; 300 
 "Arrow" affair: 282; 311; 402 
 Arthur, Pres. Chester A.: 464; on 
 
 treaty revision, 523-4; Chinese 
 
 immigration, 544 
 Ashmore Fisheries dispute: 494 
 Astor, John Jacob: 71; 78; 683 
 Audience question: 334; 441; 636 
 Aulick, Com. J. H.: commissioner 
 
 to Japan, 258; 261 
 
 Bacon, Augustus 0.: joint resolu- 
 tion, 628-9 
 Balestier, Joseph : 350 
 Balfour, Capt. G.: 195 
 Balluzec: Russian Minister, Peking, 
 
 374 
 Baltimore: 6; 26; 115; Wabash of, 
 
 opium ship, 119-20 
 Bankok, see Siam 
 Barrier Forts: Americans attack, 
 
 282; 300 
 Batavia and Batavian Republic, see 
 
 Java 
 Bayard, Thomas F.: 546; 608 
 Beche de mer: 34; 41 
 Belgium: Hankow-Peking railroad, 
 
 601-2 
 Benton, Senator Thos.: 112 
 Beresford, Lord Charles: visit to 
 
 East, 641 ; proposes alliance, 
 
 642; 644 
 Berthemy, J. F. G.: 375; and 
 
 Seward, 419 
 Betsey of N. Y.: 11 
 Biddle, Com. James: 190; Shanghai, 
 
 197; Japan, 249-50; and Kiying, 
 
 294 
 Bingham, John A.: and Shufeldt, 
 
 456; on treaty revision, 515ff. ; 
 
 523; retirement, 525; 673 
 Blaine, James G.: instructions to 
 
 Shufeldt, 461; 608; Hawaii, 611 
 Blair, Henry W., rejection of: 548 
 "Blood Thicker than Water": 338ff. 
 
 709 
 
710 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Boer War: 639; 645 
 
 Bombay: 27; Com. Parker, opium, 
 126; Roberts at, 129 
 
 Bond, Phineas: opinion of, 56 
 
 Bonham, Sir John: 275 
 
 Bonifacio, Andreas: 611 
 
 Bonin Islands: U. S. flag raised, 
 266; 272; 274; British claims, 
 275; 361; 428; Japan asserts 
 sovereignty, 432-3 
 
 Boston: 5; 27; trade with Zanzibar, 
 30; merchants' memorial to 
 Congress, 103; 115; list prin- 
 cipal merchants, 137; 683 
 
 Bourboulon, M. de: 334 
 
 Bowring, Sir John: 222; 230ff.; at 
 Pei-ho, 238-9; 281; Formosa, 
 288; 297; 299; and Townsend 
 Harris, 349 ; Siam treaty, 351 ; 
 Japan mission, 353; 357 
 
 Boxer Insurrection: 650ff. ; Protocol, 
 655ff. 
 
 Bradford, Oliver B.: railways, 595-7; 
 687 
 
 Brandt, von: 435; 513; 635 
 
 Brice, Calvin: railways in China, 
 602 
 
 Bridgman, Rev. E. C: Chinese 
 sect'y, chaplain, Cushing mis- 
 sion, 142; 295; 555-6; 559; 563 
 
 British, see Great Britain 
 
 Broughton's Bay: 467; 485 
 
 Bruce, Sir F. W. A.: 334; 336ff.; 
 and Buriingame, 372ff.; trans- 
 ferred to Washington, 379 
 
 Buchanan, James: to Everett, 186; 
 223; 293; poHcy of administra- 
 tion, 293ff.; on Ward mission, 
 343; 607; consular system, 
 671 
 
 Burgevine, Henry A.: 369-71; 586; 
 595 
 
 Buriingame, Anson: vi; sketch, 
 367; service of in China, 368£f.; 
 in U. S. and Europe, 368; 
 death, 368; mission to western 
 powers, 378ff.; "shining cross" 
 speech, 385; and Seward, 410; 
 418; 589; telegraphs, 590; 595; 
 papers, 687 
 
 Burmah: 428; Margery, 454 
 
 Cables, see Telegraphs 
 
 Cabot, George: letter to Pres. 
 Washington, 29 
 
 Calcutta: 3; 10; 27; Consular Let- 
 ters, 683 
 
 California: 177; 180; adventurers, 
 188; 253; 374; Chinese immigra- 
 tion, 536ff.; demands Chinese 
 exclusion, 546; 549 
 Callahan, J. M.: 692 
 Canton: 3; methods of early trade, 
 49-51; flag-staff incident, 153; 
 180; 211; British attack, "Ar- 
 row" affair, 281-2; right of 
 entry, 295-6; capture, 311-2; 
 336; riot, 1883, 494; mission- 
 aries, 559; 589; consulate, 670; 
 Consular Letters, 683 
 Cape Horn: 24; 34 
 Cape of Good Hope: 9; 24 
 Cape Town, see Cape of Good Hope 
 Captains, see Ship-masters 
 Cargoes: 19ff.; California, 180 
 Carr, Lewis: 229 
 Carrington, Edward: 63 
 Cass, Lewis: policy of, 293ff.; 
 Napier corres., 300ff.; instruc- 
 tions to Reed, 306; 328; Harris 
 to, 359; 608 
 Chaffee, Maj. Gen. Adna R.: 655 
 Chamberlain, Joseph: 642; 643 
 Chapedelaine, Abbe: murder of, 311 
 Chemulpo: 467; 474 
 Chesapeake: 26 
 Chichester, Admiral: 620; 639 
 China: and Pacific, 177; compared 
 with Japan, 347; ihid., 425ff.; 
 and Korea, 436-7; Am. trade 
 with, table, 580-1; 
 — Sea: Perry on control of, 273; 
 —Dismemberment of: 206; 220; 
 British attitude, 223-4; 296; 
 379; and Buriingame, 388-9; 
 claims to Korea, 451ff.; 461-2; 
 threatened war with Japan, 
 468; political conditions, 1881, 
 471; 603-4; 621; 649; 
 — Merchants Co. steamers: 471; 
 Franco-Chinese War, 494-5 ; 585 ; 
 See also Chinese, Anglo-Chinese, 
 Franco-Chinese, Sino-Japanese, 
 Manchu, Tsungli Yamen, 
 Treaties and Conventions, and 
 names of individuals and places 
 China trade: early importance of, 
 
 18; speculation, 74 
 Chinese: dishonesty, 58; account 
 
 Treaty Wanghia, 157 
 Chinese Government, international 
 relations of: ix; 54; orders 
 foreigners expelled, 93; de- 
 termines destruction opium t., 
 
INDEX 
 
 711 
 
 94; opens Five Ports to all na- 
 tions, 110; opium, 1817, 120-1; 
 189; 345; Burlingame mission, 
 386 ; policy in Korea, 460ff. 
 
 Chinese Government : Americans 
 apply for protection, 83-4; arro- 
 gance, 106; and treaty revision, 
 378-9; policy on telegraphs and 
 railroads, 592ff.; Woosung Rail- 
 way Co., 596; turns to Russia, 
 600 
 
 Chinese Repository: 556; 684-5 
 
 Chinese students in U. S.: 463; 545; 
 600 
 
 Civil War, American: 392; 409; and 
 Seward's policy, 414; 416; 579; 
 588; 590 
 
 Claims: 169; 211; Shanghai, 1854, 
 230; 306; review of Am., 326ff.; 
 commission, 329-30; Japan, 399; 
 Bonin Islands, 432; Ashmore 
 Fisheries, 494; 651; Boxer 
 claims, 658-9; Ward-Hill, 687; 
 See also Arbitration, Good Offices, 
 Mediation, Indemnity 
 
 Clarendon, Lord: 230; 238; on 
 Bonin Islands, 275; Parker 
 visits, 280-1; 299; 305; 368; 
 Burlingame and, 386ff . ; 510 ; 567 
 
 Clemens, Paul H.: 693 
 
 Cleveland, Pres. Grover: 524-5; 530; 
 Chinese immigration, 546; 547; 
 withdraws Hawaiian treaty, 
 551; 612; 640 
 
 Clippers: opium, 126-7; introduc- 
 tion, 179-80 
 
 Coal: 183ff.; Japan, 253; 261ff.; 
 269; Formosa, 276; 284ff.; 
 Parker to Marcy, 287; Lay-Os- 
 born flotilla, 587; Kaiping Com- 
 pany, 598 
 
 Coasting trade: China, 161; 321; 
 510; Japan, 514; Korea, 522; 
 China and Japan, 585 
 
 Cochin China, proposed treaty, 
 1832, 128; Roberts visit, 1832, 
 133; 134; 272; France annexes, 
 471; 491-2 
 
 Co-hong, see Hong-merchants 
 
 Columbia, voyage of: 9; 16; 38; 683 
 
 Columbia River: 39 
 
 Commissioner, U. S.: proposed by 
 Tyler, 111; not merchant, 136; 
 See also Diplomatic service and 
 appendix 
 
 Commission firms: 17; 52; 60; 
 growth of Am. firms, 71 
 
 Communications: 176; 206; short- 
 ened, 409 
 See also Telegraphs, Steam Navi- 
 gation, Railroads 
 
 Concessions (foreign settlements) : 
 China, 168; 194ff.; Shanghai, 
 196; Burlingame doctrine, 373; 
 382; 589; in Japan and Korea, 
 590; 
 — (commercial) : in China, 588- 
 90; 597-601; Korea, 504 
 
 Conger, Edwin H.: 555; 665; retires 
 on leave, 666 
 
 Congress: petitioned for consular 
 system at Canton, 76; discusses 
 Anglo-Chinese War, 102; 303-4; 
 Korea, 475 ; 481 ; Chinese immi- 
 gration, 544ff.; Act of May 6, 
 1882, 544 ; Act of Sept. 13, 1888, 
 547; Scott Act, 547; Geary Act, 
 548; annexation of Hawaii, 552; 
 Pacific Mail subsidy, 585; trans- 
 Pacific Telegraph, 590; Ha- 
 waiian annexation, 614; debates 
 on Hawaii and Philippines, 624ff. 
 
 Congress, cruise of: 79 
 
 Connecticut: 6 
 
 Consequa: 58; petition to Pres. 
 Madison, 86 
 
 Consular service: 63; 75; 170; 
 Tyler on, 186ff.; McLane re- 
 port, 187; 230; courts, 319-20; 
 Chinese immigration, 544 ; 
 scandals, 597; general survey of, 
 669ff. ; Keim report, 670; Pierce 
 report, 671; Act of May 16, 
 1848, 671 
 
 Cook, Capt.: 4 
 
 Coolie trade: 189; 320; Maria Luz, 
 490; 536ff. 
 See also Immigration 
 
 Coombs, Frank L.: 549-50 
 
 Cooperative policy: vi; at Canton, 
 1839, 96; rejected, 97; Canton 
 merchants propose, 99; Caleb 
 Gushing on, 104; Boston and 
 Salem merchants, 136; 159; 182; 
 211; 213; British desire, 223; 
 McLane instructions, 225 ; Bow- 
 ring, 233; Shanghai, 1854, 334; 
 McLane 's proposal for joint 
 blockade, 240 ; Parker-Claren- 
 don interview, 280-1 ; for Can- 
 ton, 289; Marcy, 290; Alex. H. 
 Everett, 296 ; Buchanan-Cass, 
 303ff.; Reed, 312ff.; Ward, 
 338ff.; Burhngame and, 372£f.; 
 
712 
 
 INDEX 
 
 in Japan^ 392-3; 405; Seward's 
 policy, 410ff. ; complete abroga- 
 tion, 500; 508ff.; Bingham on, 
 516-7; treaty of 1878, 608; 643; 
 review of, 664ff. ; necessity for, 
 677 
 
 Cornwallis, Lord: 26 
 
 Cotton: beginnings of Am. export 
 of, 20-21; tariff of 1816, 27; 34; 
 73; growers, 102; 177; King re- 
 port, 183; Japan, 252; 319; raw 
 cotton trade with Japan, 582 
 
 Credits: at old Canton, 52 
 
 Crews: character Am. sailor, 15; 
 British sailor, 15; treatment, 16 
 
 Crimean War: 180; 201; 233; 257; 
 275; 300; 639 
 
 Cunningham, Edw.: 200; 217ff. 
 
 Curtius, Donker: 353 
 
 Cushing, Caleb: vi; 104; China 
 mission, 113; preparation for 
 mission, 128ff. ; instructions, 138; 
 mission organized, 142; at 
 Macao, 143; policy of, 145ff.; to 
 Act'g Gov. Ching, 149ff.; com- 
 pared with Sir H. Pottinger, 
 159-60 ; on extraterritoriality, 
 164ff.; 175-6; 181; failure of 
 policy, 192; 206; opinion as 
 Att'y Gen. on claims, 232; 
 Japan, 249; 254; and Perry poli- 
 cies, 277; compared with Bur- 
 lingame, 368; 384; missionaries, 
 556; 607; 608; published corres., 
 685 
 
 Cushing, John P.: character of, 60; 
 71; "rice-ships," 91; opium, 118; 
 579 
 
 Danish, see Denmark 
 
 Davis, Sir J. F.: analysis of Treaty 
 
 of Wanghia, 161 
 Davis, John W.: sketch, 190; 197; 
 
 Griswold to, 198; to Viceroy, 
 
 199; Japan, 251; and Kiying, 
 
 294; 296-7; 327 
 DeLano, M. M.: telegraphs in 
 
 China, 591-2 
 DeLong, C. E.: 432; on China-Jap. 
 
 alliance, 437-8; recalled, 454; 
 
 673 
 Democratic party: 535; 541; 624 
 Denby, Charles: Sino-Jap. War, 
 
 500-2; on cooperation, 509; 
 
 Chinese immigration, 546; rail- 
 ways, 598-600; 673 
 Denby, Charles Jr.: 496 
 
 Denmark: 26; 57; 345; Great 
 Northern Teleg. Co., 591ff.; 592 
 
 Denny, O. N.: in Korea; 482-3 
 
 Department of State, 182; 675 
 
 Derby, Elias Haskett: 9; 17; 24; 
 27; biography, 683 
 
 Derby, Lord: 513 
 
 Deshima: 246; 256; 353 
 
 Dewev, Com. George: 614; fleet, 
 6i5; Battle Manila Bay, 616-7 
 and Germans, 619 
 
 Dietrichs, Admiral von: 619 
 
 Dinsmore, Hugh A.: 625 
 
 Diplomatic service: 170; 186ff. ; re- 
 view of, 189ff.; salary, 190ff.; 
 purchase legation, Peking, 330; 
 general survey, 672ff. ; "shirt- 
 sleeves" diplomats, -673 
 
 Disraeli: 298 
 
 Dole, Sanford B.: 611 
 
 Dun, Edwin: 499 
 
 Dutch, in India: 26; in Japan, 246; 
 256; 363-4; language in Japan, 
 557; 
 — East India Co.: at old Canton, 
 54; Japan, 243-4; extinct, 256 
 
 Duties: American unpaid, 17; at 
 old Canton, 91; Siam, 133; Mus.- 
 cat, 134; 
 China, responsibility for collec- 
 tion, 165; Shanghai, 1853, 
 216ff.; Japan, 1858, 359; 
 See also Tariff, Smuggling, 
 Treaties and Conventions 
 
 East Indies Company: 5; 26; rel. 
 to N. W. Coast trade, 38; influ- 
 ence at Canton, 51 ; 54 ; attitude 
 to Americans, 56; dissolution of 
 monopoly, 92; opium, 117 
 East India Telegraph Co.: 591 
 East India: trade, 3; causes, 5; 69; 
 
 British possessions, 357; 579 
 Eleanore: seal skins to India, 36 
 Elgin, Lord: 311ff.; 360; 364; 644 
 E-liang, Viceroy: McLane inter- 
 view, 227; 234ff. 
 Eliza: goes to Japan, 1798, 32; 
 Elliot, Charles: policy of, 93 
 Embargo: American, 1808, 33; 
 Korean on food-stuffs, 486 ; 683 
 Emery and Frazier: ship-yard, 154 
 Empress Dowager: 344; 653 
 Empress oj China: 5; 6; 8; at Can- 
 ton, 44; 
 See also Samuel Shaw 
 Englishmen, see British 
 
INDEX 
 
 713 
 
 Evarts, William M.: instructions to 
 Shufeldt, 455-6; treaty of 1878, 
 Japan, 518-9 
 
 Ever-Victorious Army: 369-71; 642; 
 See also F. T. Ward, Burgevine, 
 Gordon 
 
 Everett, Alex. H., Com. to China, 
 186; sketch, 190; Japan, 249; 295 
 
 Everett, Edward: 112; 264; on 
 Perry proposals, 273; 672 
 
 Exchange, problem of: 18ff. ; bills 
 on London, 72; basis in Japan, 
 355; 
 See also Specie 
 
 Expemnent: 11 
 
 Extraterritoriality: Gushing, vi; 
 Americans acknowledge Chinese 
 jurisdiction, 84; Terranova in- 
 cident, 87ff.; Canton merchants, 
 100; Siam, 133; Muscat, 134; 
 Hsii A-man affair, 153; Treaty 
 of Wanghia, 162ff.; 186; omitted, 
 Perry treaty, 269; 319; Marcy 
 on, Siam and Japan, 350; Siam 
 351; 353; Russia-Japan, 354 
 384; in Korea, 447; Korea, 470 
 510; Japan, 513; 514ff.; 526 
 Japan treaties, 1894, 529; mis- 
 sionaries and, 561 ; and coasting 
 trade, 583; and consuls, 669ff.; 
 consular courts, 671 ; 
 See also Treaty revision, Treaties 
 and Conventions 
 
 Factories, see Hongs 
 
 Faulkland Islands: 37 
 
 Fillmore, Pres. Millard: message, 
 190-1 ; to Emperor, Japan, 261 ; 
 263; 292-3 
 
 Fish, Hamilton: on China-Jap. al- 
 liance, 438; on mediation, 489; 
 cooperation, 508-9; treaty revi- 
 sion, 517-8; missionaries, 567; 
 on telegraph monopoly, 592-3; 
 608; 610 
 
 Foochow: 187, 211; McLane, 233; 
 Parker, 281 ; 328 
 
 Foord, John: to Hay, 661 
 
 Foote, Com. Lucius H. : appointed 
 to Seoul, 472; resigns, 475 
 
 Forbes, J. M.: to Webster, 135-6; 
 579 
 
 Forbes, Paul S.: notifies Kiying, 147 
 
 Formosa: U. S. flag over, vii; coal, 
 183; Perry's opinion, 272; Perry 
 orders investigation, 276; Par- 
 ker's policy of acquisition, 284ff . ; 
 
 320; Townsend Harris, 349 
 357; U. S. punitive exp., 411 
 427; Japanese expedition, 440 
 490; Sino-Jap. War, 501ff.; 591 
 railways, 599; 612; 638 
 
 Foster, John W.: 501; 635; books, 
 690 
 
 Foulk, George C. in Korea : 478 ; re- 
 called from Korea, 484; papers, 
 
 France: expedition Korea, vi; at 
 old Canton, 54; plenipo. at 
 Macao, 152; 178; Shanghai, 198; 
 Parker visits, 281; Korea, 282; 
 290; 296; 300; 301; 359-60; 
 Korea, 417ff.; in E. Asia, 428; 
 451 ; Tientsin massacre, 454 ; 
 460; annexes Cochin Chii;ia, 
 471 ; urges Japan to declare w. 
 on China, 479-80; expansion, 
 491-2; recession of Liaotung 
 Peninsula, 503; Tani/on, 527; 
 withdraws from intern'l settle- 
 ment, Shanghai, 590;' Syndicate 
 of Tientsin, 598; Hankow-Pe- 
 king railroad, 601 ; sphere of in- 
 fluence, 603-4; Sandwich Is., 
 612; entente with Ger. and Rus- 
 sia, 635; Franco-American rela- 
 tions, 637; 
 See also Franco-Chinese War, 
 Anglo-French War, Treaties and 
 Conventions 
 
 Franco-Chinese War: 478; and 
 China-Japan treaty, 480; Amer- 
 ican good offices, 391ff.; 502; 
 586; 597; 637 
 
 Freight rates: 10; Hongkong-Can- 
 ton, 1840, 98; ISO; Chinese sub- 
 sidy, 586 
 
 Frelinghuysen, F. T.: 464; instruc- 
 tions to Foote, 474; Franco- 
 Chinese War, 492-4; 608; 637 
 
 French, see France 
 
 Fukien, Province: Japanese sphere, 
 604 
 
 Fur trade : price furs, 5 ; voyage of 
 Betsey, 11; 20; 36; seal-skins, 
 36ff. ; and opium, 118; and 
 Japan, 242; 
 value of: 12; 40ff.; 
 See also Northwest Coast, In- 
 graham, Columbia, Nootka 
 Sound 
 
 Fusan: Shufeldt at, 456; Jap. settle- 
 ment, 467; Japanese telegraph, 
 484 
 
714 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Geary Act: 548 
 
 General Sherman: wreck of, 417ff. 
 
 Gensan: 467 
 
 Gentlemen's Agreement with Japan: 
 550 
 
 Germany: at old Canton, 54; 345; 
 Korea, 475 ; and Franco-Chinese 
 War, 492; recession of Liaotung 
 Peninsula, 503; 520; growth of 
 influence in Japan, 525 ; Tanr on, 
 527; syndicate, 1885, 597; 602; 
 sphere of influence, 604; and the 
 Philippines, 619-20; entente 
 with France and Russia, 635; 
 relations with U. S., 636-7; aid 
 to Filipino insurgents, 638 
 
 Gifts: U. S. to Siam, Muscat, etc., 
 132; to China, 135-6; list of to 
 China, 137; Cushing mission, 
 139; to China declined, 156; to 
 Japan, 265 
 
 Ginseng: 6; 7; 17; 36 
 
 Girard, Stephen : 10 ; 683 
 
 Gladstone ministry: 510 
 
 Glynn, Com. James: Japan, 251; 257 
 
 Good offices : Tientsin treaty, 321 ; 
 431-2; Shogun offers, 434; 473; 
 general survey of American, 
 489ff.; Sherman, 506; 
 See also Arbitration, Mediation 
 
 Gordon, Major Charles G. "Chi- 
 nese"; 371 
 
 Gore, John: 4 
 
 Grand Turk: 9; 19; 24 
 
 Grant, Pres. U. S.: good offices to 
 Japan and China, 444-5; 455; 
 469; policy adopted by U. S., 
 473-4; 518; 542 
 
 Great Britain: 5; commercial 
 policy at Canton, 54-5; Ameri- 
 cans have trouble with, 81 ; ag- 
 gressions, 93; policy before 1842, 
 128; Roberts on pohcy, 129; 
 Webster on, 138; Kiying, 
 Chinese ill will, 154; extra- 
 territoriality, 162; smuggling, 
 166; 168-9; foreign policy, 1840- 
 53, 176ff.; Navigation laws, 180; 
 consuls in China, 188; claims at 
 Shanghai, 196; Marshall on, 
 218-9; and Taipings, 219ff.; 
 Bowring demands, 1854, 238; 
 early efforts to open Japan, 
 243ff.; and Japan before 1853, 
 255; Perry on, 273; Parker on, 
 287; Am. distrust of, 294ff.; 
 Alex. H. Everett on, 296; pro- 
 
 poses alliance with U. S., 298ff.; 
 intentions in China, 300; "pri- 
 ority," 318; policy in China, 
 353; Harris on, 357; Clarendon 
 to Burlingame, 387; interests in 
 E. Asia, 428; 461; Shufeldt on, 
 463; on Am. policy, 468; and 
 opening of Korea, 472-3; 475ff. ; 
 and Franco-Chinese War, 492; 
 Sino-Jap. War, 500ff. ; on treaty 
 of 1878, 519; conciliation of 
 Japan, 524; Tani on, 527; 
 British Passengers Act, 536; 
 sphere of influence, 604; Sand- 
 wich Islands, 609-10; Philip- 
 pines, 620; sympathy with 
 Japan and U. S., 635; relations 
 with U. S., 1899, 638-9; agree- 
 ment with Russia, 643; 
 
 Great Britain: manufactures: sold 
 by Americans in China, 72; Ja- 
 pan, 360; 
 
 minister in Wash.: 213; 223; 
 
 proposes alliance, 300 ff.; inter- 
 vention, Sino-Jap. War, 498-9 
 
 Great Northern Telegraph Co.: 
 591ff. ; 592; monopoly in China, 
 593; 620 
 
 Green, Capt. John: 7 
 
 Gresham, Walter Q. : Sino-Jap. War, 
 495ff.; states pohcy, 499; 502; 
 608 
 
 Griffis, W. E.: 558; 686 
 
 Griswold, J. Alsop: 197, 579 
 
 Gross, Baron: 31 Iff. 
 
 Haley, "Lady": 36 
 
 Hankow: settlement, 589; railways, 
 602 
 
 Hanna, Mark: 609 
 
 Harriet: 9; 11 
 
 Harris, Townsend: 293; sketch of, 
 348; instructions, 349-50; minis- 
 ter resident, 391; 419; and mis- 
 sions, 565; papers, 686 
 
 Harrison, Pres. Benj.: 547-8; 549; 
 Sandwich Is., 612 
 
 Hart, Sir Robert: 229; 374; Korean 
 customs, 481; to H. C. Merrill, 
 482; Franco-Chinese War, 494; 
 
 Hasse Index: -686 
 
 Hawaiian Islands: Am. vessels at 
 1826, 12; N. W. coast trade, 42 
 70; British flag hoisted, 177 
 275; 357; 416; 505; Jap. immi- 
 gration, 550; 551-2; 585; gen- 
 eral survey Am. relations with, 
 
INDEX 
 
 715 
 
 607-9; annexation, 609ff. ; revo- 
 lution, 611-2; Newlands joint 
 resolution, 614 ; debates on, 
 624ff.; Hoar on, 626; 679 
 
 Hay, John: V; 420; 608; 622; enters 
 cabinet, 634; Salisbury proposes 
 alliance, 642; contrilDution of, 
 645 ; Hay-Pauncef ote treaty, 
 645 ; open door notes, 646-7 ; Cir- 
 cular note of July 3, 1899, 656-7; 
 Protocol negotiations, 657ff. 
 
 Hayes, Pres. Rutherford B.: 
 Chinese immigration, 542 
 
 Heard, Augustine: 72 
 : in Korea, 485 
 
 Hepburn, Dr. J. C: 565 
 
 Heusken, C. J.: 354; murder of, 396; 
 Seward on, 412-3 
 
 Hienfeng, Emperor: d. 1861, 344 
 
 Higginson, James B.: U. S. consul, 
 Calcutta, 1843, 29 
 
 Hinkley, F. E.: 693 
 
 Hiogo: 362 
 
 Hoar, George F.: on Hawaiian an- 
 nex., 552 ; 626 ; Philippines, 630-1 
 
 Holcombe, Chester: assists in Ko- 
 rean treaty negotiations, 459; 
 464; 556-7 
 
 Holland: 4; 345; 
 See also Dutch, Treaties and Con- 
 ventions 
 
 Hong-Kew: Am. settlement, 590 
 
 Hongkong : occupation predicted, 
 55; British occupy, 98; British 
 expansion, 128; Am. ship-yard 
 moved, 154; bonded warehouse, 
 161; 165; 181; 210; coolie trade, 
 536; Am. trade with, table, 581; 
 telegraph, 591; 608; Dewey, 617 
 
 Hong-merchants: 49; 59; co-hong, 
 opium, 117; to Wilcocks on 
 opium, 120-1; 559 
 
 Honolulu, see Hawaiian Islands 
 
 Hope, Admiral Sir James: 336; 
 Tattnall assists, 340; and Gen. 
 F. T. Ward, 369-70; Tsushima, 
 431 
 
 Hope: 11 
 
 Hoppo: 59 
 
 Hotta, Lord: to Mikado, 394; 426-7; 
 528; 641 
 
 Houqua : 57 ; honesty, 59 ; sued in 
 Phila., 85; opiurn, 118 
 
 House of Representatives, ' appro- 
 priation, China mission, 112; 
 Burlingame in, 367 
 See Congress 
 
 Hubbard, Richard B.: 528; 673 
 
 Hughes, Charles E.: vi 
 
 Hung-Sin-tshuen : see Taiping Re- 
 bellion 
 
 Hunt's "Lives of Am. Merchants": 
 683 
 
 Ignatieff, Nicholas: 337 
 
 Immigration, Asiatic: 378; 380; 
 Seward, 410; 454; Shufeldt- 
 Sargent letter, 462; general sur- 
 vey of Am. policy, 535ff.; char- 
 acter of Chinese immigrants 
 537-8; Treaty of 1868, 539-41 
 Fifteen Passengers Bill, 542 
 Treaty of 1882, 542-3; Act of 
 May 6, 1882, 544; and Korean 
 policy, 545; Scott Act, 547; 
 Geary Act, 548; Japanese, 549ff.; 
 Hawaiian Islands, 550-2; 585; 
 611; 677; Hawaiian Islands, 
 550-2 ; Gentlemen's agreement, 
 550; 585; 611; 677 
 
 Tn-chuin, see Chemulpo 
 
 Indemnity : 376 ; 381 ; Shimoneseki, 
 401 ; Korea to Japan, 469 ; anti- 
 Chinese riots in U. S., 546; 
 Boxer, 660-2; 
 See also Claims 
 
 India Trade: opening of, 26; special 
 privileges, 27; extent, 28; ap- 
 pointment U. S. consul, 28; 
 India-Canton trade, 29; opium, 
 116ff. 
 
 Ingraham, Capt. Joseph: 11; 684 
 
 Inouye: 456; and J. R. Young, 469; 
 479; 525 
 
 Inspectorate of Maritime Customs: 
 58; inauguration, 225ff.; 324; 
 370; efforts to make cosmopoli- 
 tan, 374; British head, 604 
 
 Interpreters : at Canton, 63 ; Roberts 
 mission, 133; Gushing mission, 
 136; 142; 161; Ningpo, 187; 
 230; Seoul, 474; missionaries, 
 555 
 
 Intervention: effect in China, 61; 
 Marshall, 232-3 
 
 Isle de France: see Mauritius 
 
 Italy: 345; 519 
 
 Ito, Count: treaty with China, 479- 
 80; treaty of Shimoneseki, 
 502ff.; 513 
 
 Irving, Washington: 40 
 
 Iturup, Island of: 354 
 
 Iwakura Embassy: 439; returns to 
 Japan, 441-2; 559; 567 
 
716 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Jackson, Pres. Andrew: letters to 
 Oriental sovereigns, 132 
 
 Japan: V; 32; U. S. interest in, 1832 
 131ff.; 175; and Pacific, 177 
 182; 183; and N. W. coast trade 
 242ff.; attempts to open, 242ff. 
 Edmund Roberts mission, 244 
 Gushing, 249; Zedoc Pratt, 249. 
 and European powers before 
 1853, 254ff.; internal conditions, 
 1853, 257; claims to Bonins and 
 Lew Chews, 276; proposed alli- 
 ance against, 302; and China 
 compared, 347; 349; anti-foreign 
 feeling, 393; and China, 425-6; 
 and Korea, 429; expansion of, 
 430ff.; and Korea, 434ff.; claim 
 to Korea, 451 ; threatened war 
 with China, 468; Ito on Korea, 
 479-80; food-stuffs controversy, 
 485-6; policy in Korea after 
 1895, 502ff.; and treaty revision, 
 51 Iff.; Iwakura Embassy, 512-3; 
 and Hawaiian Islands, 551-2; 
 Am. trade with, table, 581 ; rail- 
 ways, 594-5; sphere of influence, 
 604; Honolulu, 612-3; and 
 Philippines, 623; relations with 
 U. S., 1899, 638; 
 See also Sino-Japanese War, 
 
 Treaties and Conventions; 
 — Expedition: 192; review of, 
 260ff . ; instructions, 261 ; con- 
 ciliatory spirit of Japanese, -276; 
 
 Japanese Embassy: 1860, to U. S.: 
 394; see Iwakura 
 —Policy: 267ff.; astuteness, 356; 
 crisis, 1858, 363-4; 393ff.; civil 
 war, 398ff.; expulsion of for- 
 eigners, 398; in Sino-Japanese 
 War, 497ff.; treaty revision, 
 512ff.; missionaries, 567; 
 — Restoration : 404-5 ; Seward's 
 policy, 415; 497 
 
 Java: Am. vessels at Batavia, 1834, 
 12; Am. exports to, 21; review 
 of trade with, 31-2; Americans 
 to Japan, 243; 
 —Head: 33 
 
 Jay, John: 28; 62 
 
 Jefferson, Thomas: policy of, 77 
 
 Jehol: 343 
 
 Joy, Benjamin: first U. S. consul, 
 Calcutta, 29 
 
 Kagoshima: British bombard, 398; 
 399; criticism, 400 
 
 Kaiping Railway Co.: 598 
 
 Kanagawa: 362; see Yokohama 
 
 Kagoshima: 248 
 
 Kasson, John A.: on Chinese re- 
 sources, 661 
 
 Katsu, Count, memorial: 526 
 
 Kearny, Commodore Lawrence : 
 104; demands most-favored- 
 nation treatment, 108ff.; ordered 
 to China, 125ff.; 327; 609; pub- 
 lished corres., 684 
 
 Keenan, Consul James: 283 
 
 Keim, DeB. Randolph: consular 
 service, 670 
 
 Kendrick, Capt. John: sketch of, 
 39-40 
 
 Kennedy, John P.: report, 184 
 
 Ketteler, Baron, murder: 663 
 
 Kiaochow: 604; 637 
 
 Kiatka: 591 
 
 Kim Ok-kiun: murder of, 486; 
 career, 487 
 
 King, C. W.: voyage of Morrison to 
 Japan, 247-8 
 
 King, T. Butler: report, 183 
 
 Kioto: 361 
 
 Kiying : to Kearny, 108-9 ; notified 
 of Cushing mission, 147; de- 
 cline's Cushing's gifts, 156; to 
 Emperor, 156-7; 294 
 
 Koo, V. K. W.: 693 
 
 Korea: V; 182; Roberts, 246; 249; 
 France, 282; 357; 409; Seward 
 and, 417ff. ; proposed Jap. con- 
 quest, 427; tribute to Japan, 
 429; Sovereignty and China, 
 433; treaty with Japan, 1876, 
 447; treaty with U. S., 450ff.; i 
 Low-Rogers Expedition, 452-3; 
 Shufeldt turned away, 457; 
 treaty signed, 460; King of, to 
 Pres. of U. S., 460; 464; domes- 
 tic conditions after 1863, 466; 
 Civilization Party, 467; treaty 
 with Japan, 1882, 469; Chinese 
 trade regulations, 470 ; survey of 
 intern, rels., 471ff. ; and Russia, 
 472; Foote, 474; Admiral 
 Willes, 474; Parkes's treaty, 
 475; treaty with Ger., 475; 
 Chinese resident, 475-6; King 
 asks for Am. advisers, 477; em- 
 bassy to U. S., 478; coup d'etat, 
 Dec, 1884, 478-9; Russian 
 treaty, 480; survey, 1885-94, ■ 
 482ff.; attempted coup d'etat, 
 1886, 484; sends minister to 
 
INDEX 
 
 717 
 
 Wash., 484; food-stuffs for 
 Japan, 485-6; declares indep. of 
 China, 487; weakness of gov't 
 495; Sino-Jap War, 496ff. 
 China recognizes indep., 502 
 Jap. policy, .502ff.; coup d'etat 
 of 1895, 503-4; King in Russian 
 Legation, 504; mining conces- 
 sion, 504; analyses of Shufeldt 
 treaty, 520ff.; Christian mis- 
 sions, 568; trade with, 582; 612; 
 offers U. S. naval base, 616 
 
 Korff, S. A.: 635 
 
 Kowtow: Roberts mission, 133; 
 Webster to Gushing, 139; 164; 
 Ward, Peking, 342; 426; 455 
 
 Kuldja: dispute, 471; 542 
 
 Kung, Prince: 344; 380; Bellonet 
 correspondence, 418; Grant to, 
 444-5 ; Franco-Chinese War, 
 493-5 ; Chinese immigration, 
 545; 593 
 
 Kurile Islands: 255; 427; divided, 
 431-2 
 
 Kwangchow-wan : lease of, 604 
 
 Ladrone Islands: 620 
 
 Lady Washington: 9; 16; in Japan, 
 242 
 
 Latourette, K. S.: 684; 693 
 
 Lay, Horatio N.: 229; 376; 587; 
 railways in Japan, 594 
 
 Lay-Osborn flotilla: 229; 370; dis- 
 posal of, 371; 376; 587; 595 
 
 Ledyard, John: 4; 38 
 
 Legations, see Diplomatic service 
 
 LeGendre, C. W.: 440; 443 
 
 LeRoy, J. A.: 689 
 
 Lew Chews: 250; U. S. coal depot, 
 266; sovereignty, 268; Perry's 
 opinion, 272; Pres. Pierce and 
 Edw. Everett, 273 ; Perry at, 
 273-4; 361; 428; China-Japan 
 controversy, 438-9; Japan an- 
 nexes, 444-6; 490 
 
 Li Hung Chang: 344; and Burge- 
 vine, 371 ; and Soyeshima, 441 ; 
 Lew Chew controversy, 446; in- 
 vites Shufeldt, 457; negotiates 
 treaty, 460ff.; 468; trade regula- 
 tions, Korea, 470; 471; policy 
 in Korea, 473ff. ; 474; on war 
 with Japan, 477; negotiations 
 with Ito, 479-80; appoints O. N. 
 Denny to Korea, 482ff. ; asks re- 
 call of Foulk, 484; advises 
 Korea to conciliate Japan, 485; 
 
 sends troops to, 487 ; convention 
 with France, 1883, 491-2; 
 Franco-Chinese War, 492-5; Li- 
 Fournier convention, 493; asks 
 U. S. mediation in Sino-Jap. 
 War, 496; sends Detring to 
 Japan, 501 ; goes to Shimone- 
 seki, 502; Chinese immigration, 
 545; and missionaries, 568; 585; 
 Chinese navy, 587; 588; tele- 
 graphs, 592; railways, 594ff.; 
 598; 599; turns to Russia, 600; 
 635 ; Boxer settlement, 655 
 Liaotung Peninsula: 501; recession 
 
 of, 503 
 Liliuokalani, Queen: 611 
 Lin, Imperial Commissioner: ulti- 
 matum, 95 
 Likin tax: 301; 323; 510; 520 
 Lintin Island: opium ships, 117; 122 
 Livingston, Edw.: 132; Roberts, 
 
 Japan, 245 
 Loans: Japan, 594; China, 599; 600 
 Low, F. F. : expedition to Korea, 
 436; 452-3; 595; on Russian 
 policy, 636 
 
 McCartee, Rev. D. B.: 187 
 
 McEnery, Samuel D.: joint resolu- 
 tion, 629 
 
 McKinley, Pres. William: vi; 607; 
 609; annexation of Hawaii, 
 613; instructions to peace com- 
 mission, 621-2; decides to retain 
 Philippines, 627; and open 
 door, 634ff.; 642; 676 
 
 McLane, Robert M.: on consulates, 
 187; sketch, 191; Shanghai land 
 q., 204; instruction, 214; 222-3 
 policy of, 225ff. ; mediator, 230 
 McLane to Marcy, 240; 277 
 299; 327; 556 
 
 Macao: 46; Gushing at, 142; 330; 
 coolie trade, 536 
 
 Macartney, Lord, Embassy: 55 
 
 Madison, James: 7 
 
 Madras: 10 
 
 Manchu: dynasty fears displace- 
 ment, 93; and Taipings, 207; 
 347; 356; 650 
 
 Manchuria: 320; 357; 427; Russia 
 and, 472; 604; Russian schemes 
 in 1900, 659 
 
 Manila: export Am. cottons, 1824 
 20; first Am. relations, 33; 98 
 276; Dewey, 614; Battle of, 617 
 occupation of city, 627 
 
718 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Marcy, Wm. H.: Marshall to, 204; 
 coop, policy, 214; 223; to 
 McLane, 225; Shanghai claims, 
 231; 238; against joint action, 
 240 ; 277 ; attack on Barrier 
 Forts, 283 ; to Parker's imperial- 
 ism, 290; 299; to Harris, 351; 
 608; 610 
 
 Margery: murder of, 454 
 
 Maria Luz, case of: 490-1 
 
 Marshall, Frederic: to Lord Derby, 
 513 
 
 Marshall, Humphrey: report on 
 crime, 188; appointed com. to 
 China, 191 ; on Shanghai mu- 
 nicipal code, 203-4; and Tai- 
 pings, 206ff.; 277, 327; 369; 556; 
 and missionaries, 560; 589; 603 
 
 Martin, Rev. W. A. P.: 313; 381; 
 translates Wheaton's Intern. 
 Law, 385; 559; 561 
 
 Maryland: 6 
 
 Massachusetts: 6 
 
 Massachusetts: building of, 13; 684 
 
 Mauritius: 10; 24 
 
 Mediation: 306; Harris offers to 
 Japan, 358; clause, Japan-U. S. 
 treaty, 360; 443; U. S. Grant, 
 444-5; 473; Japan treaty, 489; 
 Maria Luz, 490; 
 See also Good Offices and Arbitra- 
 tion 
 
 Mediterranean trade: 21 
 
 Meiji Era: 391 
 
 Merrill, H. F.: Korean customs, 482 
 
 "Middle Kingdom": first edition, 
 558 
 
 Midway Islands: U. S. takes posses- 
 sion, 416; 610 
 
 Mikado: 362; 364; ratifies treaties 
 of 1858, 403; 404; 412; reverence 
 for, 426; 
 See also Japan 
 
 Milburn's Oriental Commerce: 683 
 
 Min family, Korea: 468 
 
 Missionaries : 102 ; Anglo-Chinese 
 War, 146; 161; 169; France and, 
 179; 180-1; 187; 191; and Tai- 
 ping Reb., 207£f.; Japan, 248; 
 Abbe Chapedelaine, 311; Treaty 
 of Peking, 343; 348; 352; 361; 
 Burlingame treaty, 381; 385; 
 417; Tientsin massacre, 454; 
 478; 494; 505; 520; general sur- 
 vey, 555ff.; legal status, 559ff. ; 
 extraterritoriality, 561 ; aggres- 
 sive spirit, 563; policy of Jap. 
 
 Govt., 564ff.; Jap. patriotism, 
 565-6; Seward, 567; Shufeldt 
 treaty, 568; and neutrality, 
 569ff.; rights in China, 572ff.; 
 580; French protectorate of R. 
 C. Missions, 637; 651 
 
 Miura, Viscount : in Korea, 503 
 
 Mocha: 30 
 
 MoUendorf, Herr von: Korea, 471; 
 treaty with Russia, 481 
 
 Monopoly: 352; telegraphs in 
 China, 593 
 
 Monocacy, U. S. S.: dispatched to 
 Korea, 469 
 
 Monroe Doctrine : 177 ; 636 
 
 Monsoon: 34 
 
 Morris, Robert: 5; 6; 8; 10 
 
 Morrison, Dr. Robert: American 
 support of, 64; 76; to Edmund 
 Roberts, 131 ; 181 ; 550 
 
 Morrison: voyage of to Japan, 246ff. 
 
 Morse, H. B.: 689 
 
 Morrison, S. E.: Maritime History 
 of Mass., 684 
 
 Most-favored-nation treatment: V; 
 VI; 108ff.; and open door, 110; 
 Muscat, 134; Gushing instruc- 
 tions, 141; 145; Chinese grant, 
 158; 195; 222; 237; 312; 314; 
 353; 355; 376; basis of Am. 
 policy, 407; 478; 680 
 
 Muravieff, Gov.-Gen. Nicholas: 179; 
 Japan, 255; 431 
 
 Murphy, R. C: 226, 229 
 
 Muscat: 30; Roberts to Sultan of, 
 129; treaty with U. S., 133-4; 
 261 
 
 Nagasaki: first American visits, 32; 
 243ff.; Phaeton incident, 245; 
 265; 267; 352; 355; persecu- 
 tions, 415; Shufeldt, 456-7 
 
 Nanking: 209; 316; opening of, 318; 
 See also Treaty of Nanking 
 
 Napier (Lord) incident: 92 
 
 Napoleonic wars: and China t'-ade, 
 46; 256 
 
 Naval demonstration, 158; 402; 
 Seward's proposed joint, 413 
 
 Newchwang opened: 320 
 
 Newlands, Francis G.: Hawaii, 614 
 
 New York: 6; merchants, 8; 17; 20; 
 trade with Zanzibar, 30; list 
 principal merchants, 137; Town- 
 send Harris, 348-9 
 
 Ningpo: 187, 211; Townsend Harris, 
 348; 557 
 
INDEX 
 
 719 
 
 Non-Alienation Agreements: 603-4 
 
 Nootka Sound: 42 
 
 Norfolk: 6; 26 
 
 Northwest Coast: 3; Ledyard, 5; 
 Mass. trade, 9; general survey 
 of trade, 37ff.; 70; 683; 
 See also Fur Trade 
 
 Nye, Gideon Jr. and Formosa: 285 
 
 Occidental and Oriental Steamship 
 Co.: 585 
 
 O'Donnell, Capt. John: 8; 26; 28; 
 683 
 
 Okuma, Count : 528 
 
 Olyphant, D. W. C: organizes firm, 
 1828, 72; opium, 119; voyage of 
 Morrison, 247-8; failure of firm, 
 599 
 
 Open Door Policy: v; and most- 
 favored-nation clause, 110; 
 Chinese choice, 158ff.; 183; Am. 
 policy, 1858, 358; in 1861, 407; 
 608; McKinley, 622 ; 631; 634ff.; 
 England and, 639; Beresford, 
 641 ; 643; Hay notes, 646-7; defi- 
 nition of policy, 647-8; 677 
 
 Opium: exportation from N. Y., 
 20; Turkey, 30; 115-6; 117; in- 
 fluence of trade on exchange, 
 73; and specie, 93; 118; pro- 
 posed legalization, 1836, 93; 
 proposed destruction, 94; execu- 
 tion of dealer. Canton, 95; sur- 
 render, 96; Americans quit 
 trade, 97; Caleb Cushing on, 
 104; 105; .American share in t., 
 115ff.; pledge, 122-3; Siam 
 treaty, 1832, 133; N. Y. mer- 
 chant to Webster, 135; instruc- 
 tions to Cushing, 140; Treaty 
 Wanghia, 168; King report, 
 183; and tobacco, 185; 189; and 
 Taiping, 207; 211; 300; 304; 
 306; 320; legalization, 324-6; 
 Siam, 351; HaiTison, 358; pro- 
 hibited by Japan, 362; Korea, 
 461; 521; 523; 542; 651; 669 
 
 Oregon Territory: 39; 177 
 See also N. W. Coast 
 
 Osaka: 362; 402 
 
 Pacific Ocean: 42; 175; commerce, 
 182; 243; steam navigation, 253; 
 Am. policy in, 262-3; Perry on 
 control of, 273; 275; Seward's 
 views, 408-9; Shufeldt, 462; 
 trans. Pacific trade, 580; 608; 
 
 Sandwich Islands, 609ff.; status 
 quo in, 1898, 613 
 
 Pacific Mail Steamship Co.: 584-5; 
 scandal, 671 
 
 Pallas: 8; 44 
 
 Palmer, A. H.: Japan expedition, 
 252-3 
 
 Palmerston, Lord: instructions to 
 Elliot, 162-3; 165; 175; 177; 
 298; 345; 386 
 
 Panama: 184; 253; canal, 645 
 
 Parker, Daniel: 5; 7 
 
 Parker, Com. Foxhall A.: opium 
 smuggling, 126; Charge in 
 China, 156 
 
 Parker, Rev. Peter, M. D.: in 
 Wash., 1841, 108; 136; Chinese 
 sect'y, Cushing mission, 142; 
 152; interpreter, 156; sect'y 
 legation, 186; 190; 191; 229; 
 visits Japan, 248; policy of re- 
 viewed, 279ff. ; and Formosa, 
 284ff.; 295; 297; 299; 328-9; 
 357; 555; 557; 622 
 
 Parkes, Sir Harry : 351 ; 392 ; arrives 
 Japan, 401; policy, 402ff.; Con- 
 vention of 1866, 402; and co- 
 operation, 405; and Bingham, 
 516; 518-9 
 
 Paulet, Lord George: 609 
 
 PauUin, C. 0.: 685 
 
 .Passports: 515; 561; Japan, 566 
 
 Pauncefote, Sir Julian: 519; 645 
 
 Peacock, cruise of: 79 
 
 Pearl Harbor: leased, 611 
 
 Pehtang : 337 ; 340 ; ratifications, 342 
 
 Pei-ho river: 136; McLane-Bowring 
 exped., 230ff.; 233; 297; block- 
 ade of, 300; Reed at, 312ff.; 336; 
 343; river conservancy, 663 
 
 Peking: Cushing's proposal, 147; 
 Cushing waives right to go, 155; 
 296; dip. residence, 300; Wardj 
 334ff. ; capture, 343; telegraphs, 
 592; legation guards, 654; siege, 
 654; legation quarter, 663 
 
 Pennsylvania: 6; 306 
 
 Pembroke fired on: 398; claim, 399 
 
 Pepper: 10; 11; review of trade, 31; 
 Friendship plundered, 130 
 
 Perkins, T. H.: 18; 20; 32; 40; 71; 
 243; 579 
 
 Perry, Com. M. C: acquisition of 
 territory, VI; 131; 181-2; and 
 coal, 185; 192; 201; Taipings, 
 215; on intervention in China, 
 233; policy in Japan and Paci- 
 
720 
 
 INDEX 
 
 fie, 260ff.; instructions, 262; 
 spirit of, 269; Far Eastern 
 policy, 270ff.; 357; 607; 622 
 
 Pescaderoes : 501 
 
 Philadelphia: 6; 10; 17; 115; Syndi- 
 cate, 599 
 
 Philippines: retention of, VII; 177; 
 291; 450; and China, 603; and 
 annexation of Hawaii, 614; re- 
 bellion, 617-9; 620ff.; debate on, 
 628ff.; 679 
 
 Pierce, Pres. Franklin: 184; 206; 
 Taipings, 212; 222; on protec- 
 tion of Am. citizens, 232; 238; 
 peaceful policy, Japan, 267; on 
 Lew Chews, 273; 277; 283; 290; 
 review of policy, 292-3; Harris 
 to, 349; 
 See also Marcy 
 
 Pierce, H. H. D.: on consular re- 
 form, 671 
 
 Pirates: 189; 376 
 
 Polk, Pres. James K.: 253 
 
 Putiatin, Count: 275; 31 Iff.; 354; 
 431 
 
 Potomac, U. S. Frigate: 31 
 
 Port Arthur: Japan captures, 500; 
 502; 503; 599; 604 
 
 Port Hamilton : British occupy, 480 ; 
 retire, 481 ; offered to U. S., 616 
 
 Port Lazareff: 480 
 
 Portman, A. L. C: 391; Conven- 
 tion of 1866, 401ff.; railways, 
 593-4 
 
 Portugal: policy at Macao, 54; 
 towards Americans, 80ff.; 345 
 
 Pratt, E. Spencer: 618 
 
 Pratt, Zedoc: Japan, 249 
 
 Protection, legislative: 8; 27; 517 
 
 Providence: 6; 10; 683 
 
 Pruyn, Robert H. : 391 ; review of 
 policy, 397ff . ; war-steamers, 
 397; 414; mediation, 491 
 
 Pumpelly, Raphael: 382; 587 
 
 Quallah Battoo: 31; 130; 132 
 
 Railroads: 378; Burlingame treaty, 
 381; Chemulpo-Seoul, 504; 511; 
 first in Japan, 593-4; in China, 
 594-9; Kaiping Railway Co., 
 598; Tientsin-Taku, 599; 
 Americans seek concessions, 
 601-2 ; Hankow-Peking, 601 ; 
 Hankow-Canton, 602; 604 
 
 Randall, Thomas: 8; report to 
 Hamilton, 62; 684 
 
 Reed, William B.: 192; 236; 290-1; 
 appointment and instructions, 
 302ff.; review of policy, 311ff.; 
 settlement of claims, 328-9; on 
 missionaries, 556 
 
 Religious toleration: 180; 244; 263; 
 
 312; 321; 353; 361; 381; 415; 
 
 460; Korea, 520-1; 559-60; 573; 
 
 See Missionaries and Treaties and 
 
 Conventions 
 
 Republican party: 535; 541; 542; 
 543; 624; 630 
 
 Residence, rights of: China, 168; 
 194ff.; 381; Japan, 268-9; Naga- 
 saki, 353; Shimoda, Hakodate, 
 355 ; 360 ; 393 ; rights waived, 396 
 
 Rizal, Dr. Jose: 617 . 
 
 Rhode Island: 6; 
 See Providence 
 
 Roberts, Edmund: treaty with 
 Muscat, 30; review of mission, 
 127ff.; death, 134; and Japan, 
 245; 254; Siam treaty, 350; 618; 
 684 
 
 Roberts, Rev. Issachar J.: 208; 327; 
 at Nanking, 564 
 
 Robertson, J. Barr, address: 510 
 
 Rockhill, W. W.: 341; 483; 616; 
 sketch, 634; 642; 660ff.; 666 
 
 Rover, wreck of: 411; 440 
 
 Russell and Company: 34j forma- 
 tion, 1818, 71; 97; 123; J. M. 
 Forbes, 135-6; at Shanghai, 195; 
 197; 212; Bankok, 352; China 
 merchants, 494; failure of, 579; 
 584; 585; 588; railways, 598-9 
 
 Russell, Sturgis and Company: 34 
 
 Russia: Northwest coast trade, 38; 
 178; 201; Taipings, 215; 242; 
 and Japan before 1853, 254; 
 Perry, 275; 296; 298; 300; 306; 
 345'; 356; Harris on R. policy, 
 357 ; 428 ; and Tsushima, 430-1 ; 
 Japan feared, 442; 451; and 
 Korea, 472; treaty of 1884 
 480-1; 483; 490; Maria Luz, 
 491; Sino-Jap. War, 501ff.; re- 
 cession of Liaotung Peninsula, 
 503; in Korea, 504; on treaty 
 revision, 521; Tani, 527; con- 
 ciliation of China, 601 ; Han- 
 kow-Peking railroad, 601 ; 
 sphere of influence, 604 ; entente 
 with Ger. and France, 635; rela- 
 tions to U. S. and China, 635-6; 
 agreement with Eng., 643; bad 
 faith, 655 
 
INDEX 
 
 721 
 
 "Sailing letters": 584 
 
 Sailors, see Crew 
 
 Sakhalin: 243; 254; Russia-Japan, 
 354 ; 357 ; 428 ; negotiations, 431 
 
 Salem: 6; trade with Zanzibar, 30; 
 merchants' memorial to Con- 
 gress, 103; 115; list principal 
 merchants, 137 
 
 Sandalwood trade: 41 
 
 Sandwich Islands, see Hawaiian 
 Islands 
 
 San Francisco: 180; 535; 538 
 
 Sargent, Senator A. A.: letter from 
 Shufeldt, 462-3; Chinese immi- 
 gration, 542; 545 
 
 Satsuma Rebellion: 516 
 
 Scott Act: 547 
 
 Sea-letter: 7 
 
 Seal-skins : trade, how conducted, 37 
 
 Seoul: 467; attack on Jap. legation, 
 1882 ; 468 ; 469 ; foreigners asked 
 to withdraw, 484; Tong-haks, 
 486; 503 
 
 Seward, Geo. F.: 375; Burlingame 
 to, 377-8; commissioned to 
 make Korean treaty, 419-20; 
 542 ; railways, 595-7 ; published 
 
 / corres., 687 
 /Seward, William H.: open door, v; 
 approves Burlingame policy, 
 377; and Japan, 392; 401; re- 
 view of Far Eastern policy, 
 407ff.; joint naval demonstra- 
 tion, 413; Tsushima, 430; Sak- 
 halin, 431-2; 450; Treaty of 
 1868, 539-41; missionaries, 567; 
 \ spoils system and China, 586; 
 608; 673; 676 
 
 Seybert, Adam: 3 
 
 Seymour, Admiral Sir E. H.: relief 
 of Peking, 654 
 
 Shanghai: Am. trade with, 180; 
 consulate, 187; lawless, 188; 
 land question, municipal code, 
 194ff.; Montauk, 197; import- 
 ance to U. S., 204; fall of, 1853, 
 211; 216; free port, 220ff.; In- 
 spectorate Maritime Customs, 
 226ff.; 327; 342; 510; Steam 
 Navigation Co. organized, 584; 
 internat'l settlement, 589; 590; 
 telegraph, 592; railways, 594-7; 
 river conservancy, 667; consu- 
 late, 670 
 
 Shantung: 320; 604 
 
 Shaw, Major Samuel: 7; owner of 
 Massachusetts, 13; at Batavia, 
 
 \ 
 
 32; reports, as consul, 62; 88; 
 Journals, 683 
 
 Shellaber, John: U. S. Con., Batavia, 
 and treaties, 130; and Japan 
 mission, 244-5 
 
 Sherman, John: to Allen, defining 
 policy, 506 
 
 Shimoda: opened, 268; no coal, 269; 
 Harris arrives, 352; U. S. con- 
 _ sulate, 354ff. 
 
 Shimoneseki, Straits of: Pembroke, 
 398; Wyoming fights, 399; joint 
 naval expedition, 400; 401; 414; 
 treaty of, 502ff. 
 
 Ship-building: 13; 179; Japan-U. S. 
 treaty, 1858, 361 
 
 Ship-masters: character of Ameri- 
 cans, 16 
 
 Ship-owners: 13; 16; profits, 179-80 
 
 Shogun: William II of Holland to. 
 256; 270; 347; 356; 363; 364; 
 393; retires in favor of Mikado, 
 404; 412; and Korea, 433; 512 
 
 Shufeldt, Com. Robert W.: 433; 
 450ff.; and Korea, 455ff.; or- 
 dered to China, 458; treaty ne- 
 gotiations, 458ff.; Blaine's in- 
 structions, 461 : letter to Sar- 
 gent, 462-3; 467; 545; 587; 616; 
 papers, 688 
 
 Siam: beginnings of trade with, 31: 
 extraterritoriality, 88 ; British 
 treaty, 1826, 129; Roberts visit, 
 133; 261; Perry's opinion, 272; 
 Townsend Harris, 349ff.; stops 
 Chinese tribute, 429 ; 
 See also Treaties and Conven- 
 tions 
 
 Siberia: Russian aggression, 179; 
 and Japan, 427; 590; 
 See also Trans-Siberian 
 
 Silk: 4; 17; Shanghai, 180; transfer 
 of trade to Japan, 582 
 
 Sill, J. M. B.: good offices in Korea, 
 495-6; reproved by Gresham, 
 505 ; neutrality proclamation, 
 571-2 
 
 Silver, see Specie 
 
 Singapore: 32; 181 
 
 Sino-Japanese War: VI; events pre- 
 ceding, 485-7; 496ff.; 530; 546; 
 549; 571; Am. trade after, 582; 
 599 
 
 Skins, see Furs 
 
 Slaves: 9; 
 
 See also Coolie trade 
 
 Smith, Thomas H.: 18; 72 
 
722 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Smuggling: at Canton, 59; opium 
 clippers, armed, 127; Webster 
 to Gushing, 138; 165; opium, 
 211; Shanghai, 1854, 226; 
 opium, 326; 510; 524; 669 
 
 Smyrna: trade with Mocha, 30; 
 opium, 115-6 
 
 Snow, Peter W., consul at Canton: 
 strikes flag, 95; 96ff.; 106; re- 
 ports on opium, 124 
 
 Snow, Samuel: 63; 71 
 
 South America: 3 
 
 Sovereignty, Chinese : Shanghai, 
 203; 219; Marcy, 223; Burlin- 
 game treaty, 382; 384 
 
 Soyeshima: mission to Peking, 441; 
 455 
 
 Spain: early policy at Manila, 34; 
 54; 345; Filipino rebellion, 
 617ff.; peace negotiations with 
 U. S., 620 
 
 Spanish-American War: 615ff.; 
 peace terms, 620 
 
 Spanish dollars, see Specie 
 
 Specie: 20; drained from U. S., 20; 
 Randall report, 63; 72; drained 
 from China, 93; and opium, 118; 
 payment of duties, 217; Ja- 
 pan, 269; drained from Japan, 
 395 
 
 Spheres of influence : 603ff. 
 
 Spices: 10 
 See also Sumatra, Pepper 
 
 States, voyage of: 34 
 
 Steam navigation: 183; and open- 
 ing of Japan, 253 ; 256 ; 275 ; and 
 Formosa, 287; 356; Seward, 409; 
 Chinese coasting trade, 583; 
 Sandwich Is., 610 
 
 Stephenson, Sir McDonald: 595 
 
 Straits of Anjier: 33 
 
 Sumatra: 3; 10; 11; 130; 272 
 
 Summer Palace: 343 
 
 Supercargo: Shaw, 7; commissions, 
 17; 70 
 
 Surat: 2-7 
 
 Swatow: opened, 320; 494; coolie 
 trade, 536 
 
 Swift, John T.: 542; minister to 
 Japan, 549-50; Japanese immi- 
 gration, 550 
 
 Taiping Rebellion: 175; 182; 189; 
 205 ; review of, 207flf . ; 277 ; sup- 
 pression of, 369ff . ; 375 ; 509 ; and 
 missionaries, 564 ; 587 ; 594 
 
 Tai-wen-Kun: 434; 466ff.; 482; 483 
 
 Takezoye: 476-7; coup d'etat of 
 Dec, 1884, 478-9 
 
 Taku Forts: attack on, 313; 333; 
 337; battle, 339; 342; request 
 for mediation, 490 ; railway, 599 ; 
 Boxer insurrection, 654; 663 
 
 Tani Memorial: 626-7; 641 
 
 Tariff, revision of: China, 322ff.; 
 Japan, 362; Japan reduces, 400; 
 Convention of 1866, 403ff.; 
 China, 511; Japan and tariff au- 
 tonomy, 513; Jap. proposed 
 tariff, 1879, 520; proposals in 
 1886, 526; Chinese tariff, 1900, 
 660-1 ; 
 — U. S.: act of 1789, 8; of 1816, 
 27, 69 
 
 Tattnall, Com. Josiah: 338£f.; con- 
 duct approved, 343 
 
 Tea: 4; tariff on, 8; continental 
 trade declines, 56; re-exporta- 
 tion to Europe, 57; 121; Shang- 
 hai, 180; transfer of trade to 
 Japan, 582; 
 — price of: 8; speculation, 17; 
 21 ; first cargoes, 44 ; and clipper 
 ships, 179 
 
 Telegraphs : 378 ; Burlingame treaty, 
 381; Seward, Alaska, 409; 
 Chinese monopoly in Korea, 
 484; 511; trans-Pacific, 590-1; 
 Great Northern Teleg. Co., 
 59 Iff.; Woosung-Shanghai, 592; 
 Fukien-Formosa, 592; China- 
 Japan, 593; 620 
 
 Terranova case: 85; account of, 87; 
 91; and opium, 121; 164 
 
 Tibet: 428 
 
 Ticonderoga, cruise of: 456 
 
 Tientsin: 210; 313; opened, 343; 
 364; massacre, 452; 583; settle- 
 ment, 589; telegraphs, 592; con- 
 cession-hunters, 597 ; railway, 
 599; Chinkiang railroad, 602; 
 Boxers, 654-5; river conserv- 
 ancy, 663; 
 See also Treaty of 
 
 Times (London) : 312; 524 
 
 Tobacco: 185 
 
 Tokio: Yokohama railway, 594 
 
 Tokugawa: opposition to, 363; 393 
 
 Tonk-hak Society: 486 
 
 Trade, review of: 3ff.; early trade 
 compared, 27; Zanzibar, 30; 
 Sumatra, 31 ; Siam, 31 ; Batavia, 
 31; Manila, 32; Canton trade 
 before 1812, 45; 54; survey of 
 
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