f Library of Congress. I Chap Shelf.-- V UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. gQflg UNIVERSAL HISTORY UNIVERSAL HISTORY THE OLDEST HISTORICAL GROUP OF NATIONS AND THE GREEKS BY LEOPOLD von KANKE EDITED BY G. W. PROTHERO FELLOW AND TUTOR OF KING'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE NEW YORK HARPER & BROTHERS, FRANKLIN SQUARE 18S5 61269 EDITOR'S PREFACE. No apology can be needed for introducing to English readers the latest work of Leopold von Ranke. Even if the name of the author were not sufficient justification, it might be found in the fact that no similar attempt to present a con- nected view of Universal History exists in the English lan- guage. The scope and aim of the work, of which only a first instalment is here presented, are explained by the author in his preface. All, therefore, that is incumbent on the editor is to describe the way in which the translation has been pro- duced, and to point out some slight departures from the orig- inal. The first half of the present volume was translated by the Rev. D. C. Tovey, Assistant Master at Eton College; the second half and the preface were translated by the editor. Both portions have been carefully revised by Mr. F.W. Cornislj, Assistant Master at Eton College. The whole work when in proof was finally gone over again by the editor, who is solely responsible for the form in which it eventually appears. Great care has been taken to represent the ideas and thoughts of the author with the utmost fidelity, and even, wherever the nature of the language permits, to preserve his actual ex- pressions. Whatever other defects may be noted, I feel con- fident that here, at least, the reader will seldom have occasion to complain. I have ventured to depart from the original in two partic- v i EDITOR'S PREFACE. ulars, namely, the spelling of proper names and the treat- ment of the notes. In the Egyptian, Assyrian, and Jewish proper names which occur in the Bible, I have adopted the Biblical form as being more familiar to English readers, ad- hering in other cases to that adopted by Herr von Eanke. In Greek names, while the author preserves the Latinized forms which were iu ordinary use till our own time, I have preferred, in deference to modern opinion, to attempt a nearer repre- sentation of the original. In the transliteration of Greek names it is very difficult, if not impossible, to be quite con- sistent; and I do not pretend to have solved the problem. Believing, however, that in a work of this kind it is well to avoid so complete a transformation as would be involved by an attempt exactly to reproduce the original, and that an ap- proximation to the correct sound is more important than philological accuracy, I have adopted the following rules. In those cases where the word is completely disguised by the Latin form, as Aias or Odysseus, it is easy and on every ground desirable to restore the Greek form, and I have accord- ingly done so without hesitation. But the great majority of Greek names have not suffered so violent a metamorphosis, and in these cases a return to the Greek is not so indispen- sable. Nevertheless, here too some approximation seems to be called for. The most important departure from the Greek is caused by the substitution of the Latin C for the Greek K. Accordingly, where the Greek K occurs, I have used the corresponding English letter, retaining the ordinary spelling wherever it does not pervert the sound of the word. Thus, I write Alkibiades and Ivimon, but Critias and Pericles. The only exceptions to this rule are those words which, through Biblical or other usage, have been, in a sense, incorporated in the English language, as, for instance, Cyrus, Cyprus, Cilicin. The sibilation which gives to English ears so false an idea of the Greek tongue is thus, as a rule, avoided. Secondly, I EDITOR'S PREFACE. v {{ have endeavored to indicate not only sound, but quantity, by restoring the diphthong in words like Dareius, Aristeides, Nikrea, ./Egasan. In the terminations, however, I have gener- ally retained the ordinary form, as Menelaus, Phalerum, not thinking it worth while to make a change in this respect. In dealing with the notes, I have acted on the conviction that it is important in a work of this kind, treating of the broad facts of history rather than its details, and edited for an English public, to trouble the reader with as few notes as pos- sible. I have, therefore, in the first place, generally incorpo- rated the chronological notes in the text, retaining, however, in their former position such as indicate any divergence of authority with respect to dates, or touch on disputed points of chronology. I have thought it unnecessary to reprint mere references to ancient writers in support or illustration of accepted facts in Biblical or Greek history, while keeping those in which Herr von Eanke acknowledges his obligations to modern authors. All notes containing any controversial matter or anything additional to the text have, of course, been retained in full. In no case has anything been added. The second volume of the German edition concludes with an ap- pendix on the chronology of Eusebius, which has not been translated, since those readers who wish to go deeply into the subject will doubtless be able and willing to consult it in the original. Lastly, the quotations from the Old Testament which occur in the text have been given as they stand in the English Authorized Version, and therefore differ slightly here and there from the form given by Herr von Eanke. For the index to this volume, and for other valuable assist- ance, I have gratefully to acknowledge my obligations to my wife. In conclusion, it should be mentioned that the work, in the German edition, already extends to about the end of the sixth century of our era, occupying altogether a space equal to four v iii EDITOR'S PREFACE. volumes similar to that now presented to the public. The author intends to complete the work by bringing it down to our own day, and when finished it will probably occupy some six or seven such volumes. It must depend on the reception of this instalment by the public whether the translation will be continued. G. W. Peotheeo. PREFACE. History cannot discuss the origin of society, for the art of writing, which is the basis of historical knowledge, is a com- paratively late invention. The earth had become habitable and was inhabited, nations had arisen and international con- nections had been formed, and the elements of civilization had appeared, while that art was still unknown. The province of History is limited by the means at her command, and the historian would be over-bold who should venture to unveil the mystery of the primeval world, the relation of mankind to God and nature. The solution of such problems must be in- trusted to the joint efforts of Theology and Science. From this primeval world we pass to the monuments of a period less distant but still inconceivably remote, the vesti- bule, as it were, of History. These monuments have hitherto excited the admiration and defied the intelligence of succes- sive generations, but during the last hundred years we have obtained more accurate information and a clearer understand- ing of them than were possessed before. In our own day the ruins of buried cities have been disinterred, and buildings have been discovered, on the walls of which the mightiest monarchs of their day caused their deeds to be inscribed. Archaeological investigation is now everywhere pursued with a sort of filial affection, and every new fact brought to light is greeted as a fortunate discovery, while art and antiquity have become almost identical conceptions. These monuments of x PREFACE. the past are naturally connected with the relics, unfortu- nately but too fragmentary, of the ancient religions, rituals, and constitutions which have survived to our own time. Around the various centres of investigation groups of studies have grown up, each of which forms a department by itself and demands the devoted attention of a lifetime. Lastly, a universal science of language has arisen, which, based upon lcarninut the struggle was no isolated one; the Asiatic races rally round Ilium, while, on the other side, there is a union of all the (J recks, amongst whom the Acluean race takes the lead, which undertakes the contest with Ilium. It is the wide range of the interests involved which gives to these poems of Homer their background and character; but it must not be supposed that they have anything to tell us of the special points of contrast between the contending nations. Such details would have been useless in the poetical treat- ment of the action, which required another kind of interest to engage the notice of posterity. The two parties at strife with one another require to be homogeneous. Even the in- terest of victory must recede into the background, to make room for one more comprehensively human. The Trojans must be like the Greeks; they must worship the same gods, and the forms of life in the midst of which they move must be similar. Of these forms, however, we may say with con- fidence, as far as the Greeks are concerned, that they were not invented, but corresponded to the times in which the poem itself took its rise, long after the events which gave im- agination its impulse had passed away even to their faintest echoes. The German nation has the advantage of possessing the description of a crisis in its remotest past, drawn by a con- temporary historian of the first rank ; incomparably greater is the advantage of the Greeks, who have inherited from primitive times a poem of native growth, which brings before us with unmistakable truthfulness, and in a complete form, the conditions of their life in its earlier stages. Whether Agamemnon and Priam, Achilles and Hector, Men elans and Taris are historical, or in what relations these names stand to HOMER 121 the events of actual history, are questions we do not attempt to discuss.* We renounce all attempt to determine the epoch at which a Trojan war, if there ever were such a war, really took place. JJut the social conditions represented in the Homeric poems cannot be mere figments. By the Greeks they were always regarded as perfectly real, as archives, so to speak, from which very definite claims and prerogatives were derived. Although these archives take the form of a poem, I regard it as permissible and appropriate, in speaking of the Greeks, to recall to the memory of my readers in their main outlines the conditions which they portray and upon which all later history depends. The headship is invariably centred in a king, who is neither identified with the gods, as among the Egyptians, nor an ab- solute ruler over subject districts, as among the Assvrians. He may rather be compared with the petty chieftains who bore rule in the Canaanitish towns, but he has characteristics which are thoroughly unique: he is the head of a corporate organization. That the royal power was unconditionally he- reditary cannot be maintained, for otherwise Telemachus, for example, would have been regarded not only as the son but as the successor of Odysseus in Ithaca, which, however, is not the case. The chair of his father remains vacant in the as- semblies, although he is told that his race is more royal than the rest, which implies, not indeed a right, but a claim to the succession. The king has something of divine authority. From Zeus comes the sceptre ; fame and glory are granted by the god. The king's honor is from Zeus. His is an authority which secures him high personal prerogatives, but no unlim- ited power. In peace he enjoys the revenues of the Temenos, or the area of land set apart for him; on him depend counsel and action ; he collects presents from the people, for strangers, it may be ; the rest must follow his commands and bring him gifts, with which he is honored as a god and acquires riches. *I had already written this Ion-;- before I was acquainted with the essays of Midlenhoff ("Deutsche AlterthumskuiukV' i. p. 13 sq.), which agree in some points ■with the view I take. 122 ANCIENT HELLAS. In war we find him offering sacrifice. He summons and dis- misses the council ; he speaks before the people ; to him the boot}' is brought and he divides it; the greatest share is pre- sented to him. The elders feast with him. The people obey him when he bids them take a particular route or fight brave- ly. " A Zeus-nourished king has great thoughts." In peace the king is surrounded by a council composed of the ciders. These are the graybeards who no longer serve in war, but are practised in debate ; it is they who give counsel ; they sit with the king in his palace as the twelve do with Alkinous, eating at his table, pouring libations to the gods, and listening to the minstrels. The king of the Phreacians appears as chief among the thirteen heads of the people. The chiefs have seats reserved to them in the general assembly, and in trials for life and death the}' take a principal part. As in peace, so also in war, the most distinguished of the Achasans arc designated as the "elders." They too are sceptre- bearing kings ; they marshal the people to battle; the people break off their clamor to listen to them. Though there is one king who has the supreme conduct of the war, the rest, as Achilles, regard themselves as his equals ; they are present at his banquet, and their cups are kept always full. After the victory over Hector, Aias is specially honored with the chine of the ox offered in sacrifice. They assist the king with their advice, and he does nothing without them. In peace it is age, in war it is valor, which finds admission by preference to the council of the king. If a matter is deliberated upon in the presence of all the people, they too have a voice. While Agamemnon is being required to give back Chryseis, all call upon him urging her restoration. They hold their gatherings by Agamemnon's ship. They are addressed as well as the king. They are "friends, heroes, Danai, servants of Ares." As a rule they are quietly summoned to the assembly by the heralds. We also, however, find Achilles calling them together with a loud voice. In this assembly the old men speak, as well as in the other ; and Nestor distinguishes the two when he says, " We were never of different opinion either in the council or in the assembly." The people answer by acclamation, exultant HOMER. 123 shouts, and other intimations. The proceedings in Troy are the same as in the Grecian camp ; near the tower of Priam old and young gather together, not without uproar. In the Odyssey we find at times a kind of division taken to discover the opinion of the majority,* whilst in the Iliad a trial is con- ducted before the assembled people. So it is also in Ithaca. Telemachus causes the Achaeans to be summoned by the her- alds ; then he places himself upon his father's seat ; the others, the "old men," seat themselves around him. So again the market-place of the Phceacians is full of seats. Such is the character of their political constitution. They are differenti- ated by youth and age. The claims of descent are not by any means lost sight of, but there is no class of nobles with a distinctive training. The poem gives to every man his meed ; it notes who is the best man after Achilles, who it is rides the next best horse to his ; who is the handsomest, who the ugliest man, who the most excellent in his business or craft. The gen- tle and the good are praised accordingly. For the relations of family life conventional attributes have been formed," mild- giving " for the mother, " venerable " for parents generally, " dear," " beloved " for the elder brother ; young persons not yet full-grown are called "the modest." The solitary life is brought into view. The lonely man who, far from his neigh- bors, on the extremest point of land, thrusts the firebrand into the black ashes ; the hunter who sets the white-toothed hound upon the boar; others who in the heart of the mountain rouse the echoes as they fell the trees ; the reapers, who on the estate of the wealthy man work till they meet from op- posite sides; the autumn day when Zeus rains and all the rivers are full — the whole of life, in all its dignity and all its shortcomings, is set before our eyes. This it is which dis- tinguishes the poem from all others, and which rivets the reader's attention. So circumstantial is the picture that all semblance of unreality disappears. This world of men is encompassed by an analogous world * Instances are quoted by Schomann, " Griechische Alterthurner," i. p, 27, another work which I have only cursorily inspected. 10^ ANCIENT HELLAS. of gods. The struggle of the primeval powers, which forms the basis of the cosmogonies exhibited to us in Ilesiod, re- cedes in the poems of Homer into the background. The gods of Olympus* constitute the only system of religion which takes no account of the primary origin of things, and only symbolizes those general impulses which are obvious to all. It is a religion of the coasts and islands of the sea, and of those relations which have been created through the inter- course of mankind. It reveres the headship of a supreme deity, whose name reproduces the designation which other races also give to the Divine Being, but who, in the circle in which the Greeks place him, occupies a position without a counterpart elsewhere. Undoubtedly the other Greek deities also are to be connected with the notions of light and dark- ness, in fact, elementary conceptions in general, as well as the traditions of other nations which have touched these shores. But these are aspects never brought prominently forward, or developed as elsewhere. The gods are a great ruling family, with a supreme head who at last secures obedience; they have distinct characters, and innate impulses which take di- vergent directions and every moment act upon men. It is not a faith of universal range, or ideal and abstract character; the motive forces of the religion may be called autochthonous in their origin, for they are inseparably connected with the soil and the locality; they are fused with the life of human beings, and form with them one single whole. The habita- tions of the gods are in the immediate neighborhood of their worshippers. A figure that stands apart is that of the sea-god, whose displeasure can at any moment destroy all things. Other deities interfere in the employments oi life — the god of war, the god of the arts, the god of daily inter- course (an incessantly busy deity), and the goddess o( sensual love. From the head o( the supreme deity springs the god- dess o( thought. Beside the rest appears the god of prophecy and song, who is also the presiding genius of the weapon that ♦Gerhard (fiber die ew61f Cotter Griechenlands,"Abhandlungen der Berliner Akademie dor Wissenschaften," 1840, p. 889 sq.^ thinks he can liiul as early as Homer deities to the number of twelve. THE DORIANS. 125 strikes afar. A symbolism such as this was not the result of priestcraft or policy ; it was created and moulded by the fancy of a poetic age. Separate deities belong to separate districts ; the feeling of nationality finds expression in the as- sembly of the gods, and nowhere else. But, not to tarry longer in this vestibule of poetry, let us turn now to history proper. Here we encounter an event which annihilates at a blow the ancient conditions of the Achsean epoch as described in Homer. The Dorians, who are scarcely mentioned in Homer, are seen, in absolute contrast to the fixed relations exhibited throughout the poem, as lords and masters in Peloponnesus and as the dominant tribe in Greece. The manner, however, in which they became so has never been presented in a lucid and credible shape. If Herodotus represents the Dorians and Heracleida3 in the character of confederates in the enterprise against the Peloponnesus, the legend agrees with him in the main, inasmuch as it derives the claim upon which the Do- rians founded their conquests from Ilerakles, who did not belong to their race, but was the progenitor of their kings. It would not be a thing in itself unprecedented that an exiled dynasty should unite itself with a warlike people in order to establish its real or presumed title, and the allies of that dy- nasty would find their own advantage in the conquest they achieved. In the history of the Israelites we have an exam- ple of the conquest of a country on the ground of ancestral rights ; but this analogy places the Israelites in the position, not of the Dorians, but of the Heracleidse, since they all derive their descent from the patriarchs who founded the rights in question. In Greece, on the contrary, the principal fact is that another tribe associates itself in the undertaking with the rightful dynasty. In the old narratives of the event we encounter the difficulty that the Heracleidre themselves are regarded as Achreans ; there are kings of Sparta, Cleomenes for instance, who so designated themselves. I do not know whether we can leave this circumstance out of account ; it clearly implies that the Dorians were taking in hand a cause which was not originally their own. Again, this comparison with the Israelites throws a certain 12G ANCIENT HELLAS. amount of light upon the political character of the event. The Israelites utterly annihilated the native inhabitants in the districts in which they became masters, so that their old tribal constitution maintained its national character and could continue its development. The Dorians, on the other hand, subjugated but did not extirpate the older population, whence arose a constant opposition between the two nationalities included within the same frontiers. The state established by the Dorians was composed of discordant elements, of victors and vanquished. The Dorians retained their old tribal con- stitution ; but the subject peoples everywhere opposed them, and had their allies far and near. The action and reaction of these conflicting forces determined the course of all subse- quent Greek history. Let us linger, however, for the present over the earlier stages of the history. If we inquire into the causes of the success of the Dorians, we may find the principal one in their strategy, especially their advance in close order with out- stretched spears. Before this method of attack, employed by better-disciplined troops, the old tactics of the Achocans, as described in Homer, had to give way. In the Peloponnesus three kingdoms were formed side by side. The claims of the three brothers descended from Herakles, who complete the conquest, were decided by lot. Argos fell to Temenus, the eldest ; it was invaded from the sea, and conquered with difficulty. After Argos, Sikyon was subjugated by Phalkes, a son of Temenus, and from the latter region the dominion spread as far as Phlius. A son-in-law of Temenus occupied Epidaurus, with which, again, xEgina was combined by con- quest, so as to form with it a single community. Corinth also, the Ephyra of the JEolian house of Sisyphus, was cap- tured, not from the side of Argos, like the neighboring Sik- yon, but by a Dorian roving about upon his own account, who originally received in contempt of his claims only a clod of earth. Laconia had fallen to Eurysthcncs and Proclcs, the sons of the second brother. It is uncertain whether it was conquered after or before the death of their father. They fixed the cap- ital of their kingdom at Sparta, not far from the ancient seat THE LAKEDJEMONIANS. 127 of the Pelopidse. But it was a long time before they could dispossess the Achseans of the hill country of Taygetus, and the latter maintained their hold upon Amyclae. Cresphontes, to whose share Messenia fell, and who established himself at Stenyclerus, set up native chieftains over smaller districts, in which the subjects were to be on an equality with the domi- nant races ; they perhaps acknowledged dependence only on the king. His successors united themselves still more closely with the native inhabitants, and in consequence were involved in a war with the Lakedcemonians, whose animosity is indi- cated by the tradition that they bound themselves by an oath not to lay down the sword till they had conquered Messenia. The legendary history of this conquest is full of incident and variety. We must not forget that the opposition of the Messenians is pronounced hopeless at the outset, owing to the non-completion of a human sacrifice ; so that here again we have this rite coming, and yet not coming, into view. Their king Aristodemus slays himself. Then Ithome, the chief for- tress of the country, is conquered by the Lakedsemonians, and the land divided, after the manner of Laconia, for the benefit of the conquerors. Once more Messenia rises in in- surrection, under the direction of a descendant of Cresphon- tes; but the younger generation persist in and carry to a successful issue the war which their grandfathers commenced. Emigrations in great numbers confirm the subjection of the country to Lakedsemon. In these struggles Sparta, whose destiny it was frequently to take a decisive part in the common concerns of Greece, de- veloped the form of her constitution. From the very first this constitution was rather the work of an aristocratic com- munity, scrupulously true to its character even in the minutest details, than of the monarchy itself. The latter, however, re- signed itself unconditionally to the measures adopted. How the result was brought about is expressed in the almost myth- ical legend of Lycurgus. The ruling families were at feud with one another and with the monarchy. To these quarrels the man privileged by divine authority put an end by legisla- tion. Lycurgus exacted a promise that the order established by hiin should be maintained ; then he retired to Delphi, 128 ANCIENT HELLAS. where, after receiving the divine sanction for his work, he is said to have starved himself to death. The legend symbolizes the inviolability of the constitution, the basis of the greatness of Sparta, Entirely different from the policy of Lakcdoemon was that pursued by Argos. Her most imposing figure, at least as far as her political attitude and aims are concerned, is Pheidon. Having succeeded in possessing himself of the harbors of Ar- golis, he took the liveliest interest in the commercial activity of the epoch. Through intercourse with the East, commerce had now reached a point at which a trustworthy scale for measuring the value of things was indispensable. Pheidon adopted the weights and measures which the Phoenicians, herein followers of the Babylonians, had introduced into trade. The coined money which came from Lydia he rivalled by a native (J reek coinage, designed for the commerce with West- ern Asia. It has been thought that pieces of his money can be distinguished among the oldest specimens of Greek coin- age ; the impression which they bear suggests the Phoenician worship of Aphrodite. The Ilcraclid of Argos, who, whilst extending his power by armed force, has trained himself in the arts of commerce, is, as far as I know, the first personal- ity in Greek history whose date can be fixed with an approach to exactitude. lie belongs to that period of the Assyrian Empire when it embraced Cyprus and Egypt and held Phoe- nicia under its sway. His death is assigned to the year GGO before our era,* the time at which Assurbanipal suppressed the Egyptian insurrection. Pheidon was master of Epidaurus and the warlike /Egina, a powerful maritime state, where he established his mint. The circumstance that the Lakedsemo* nians were engaged in the Messenian war contributed to ren- der him supreme in the rest of the Peloponnesus. lie inter- fered arbitrarily in the Olympian games, in the foundation of which we see an effort after a settlement between the em- igrants and those native inhabitants who had retained their * I follow in this the reading which modern authorities very generally agree in adopting, in Pausanias, vi. 22, 2, according to which Pheidon is placed, not in the 8th, but in the 28th, Olympiad ; cf. Curtius, " Gric- chische Geschichte," 5th cd. i. p. 656. COLONIES. 129 independence. Herodotus designates his behavior as an out- rage inflicted by him upon all the Hellenes. But even in his own lifetime the old order was restored in the games. Phei- don is said to have been slain in a hand-to-hand encounter in the course of a struggle with Corinth. Although a Ileraclid by birth, he is exhibited in history as a tyrant, which, accord- ing to the most probable explanation, is to be traced to his having broken through the tribal relations hitherto prevailing within his dominions. A personage such as Pheidon leads the mind by a natural transition into a wider horizon, and to a subject of universal import — the maritime development of the Greeks. This is so far connected with the conquest of the Peloponnesus that the tripartite Dorians, as they are called in the Odyssey, had made themselves powerful even in Crete, which they had to a great extent made Dorian. The naval supremacy {lhalasso- kratia) was, beyond doubt, chiefly in Dorian hands. But the other Greek races also, who had not been affected by the ruin of the Peloponnesus, and moved at large in their native independence, took a very active part in maritime expedi- tions. The foundation of the colonies may be regarded as the first great enterprise of the Greek people beyond their own limits. It is the most remarkable conquest ever made. The Phoeni- cian colonies had rather a mercantile and religious interest, only expanding into political importance in Carthage. But the occupation of all the neighboring coasts by colonies which spread the characteristic life of Greece in all directions was a fact of the highest political and national significance. The colonies were fond of tracing back their origin to Apollo and the Delphic oracle; but, in point of fact, internal catastrophes and dissensions gave the principal inducement to emigration. The eastern colonies had a primitive centre of their own in Delos, where, even in the earliest times, con- gresses from the neighboring islands had taken place; thither they made pilgrimages with their wives and children ; athletic contests were established, and competitions in the arts of the Muses. An Homeric hymn boasts that neither age nor death seemed to have power over the Ionians. The festival was at- 9 130 ANCIENT HELLAS. tended by representatives not only of the twelve Ionian towns of Asia Minor, but also of Chalkis and Athens. These twelve towns, the foundation of which is traced to the pressure of population caused by the immigration of the Dorians into the central regions of Greece, were not entirely Ionic, but the Ionic element nevertheless predominated. The manner in which the immigrants procured themselves wives may be compared with the rape of the Sabine women, but the proceeding was a far more violent one; not only the hus- bands, as stated in the first account given by Herodotus, but the fathers and children of the women were slain. According to Herodotus, the after-effects of this act remained inefface- able. The xEolian colonies, attributed to Argive leaders, and established for the most part upon a narrow strip of land around the Eleatic Gulf, were also originally twelve in num- ber. But between the Greek colonists peace was maintained as little as between the parent races in Greece. Smyrna was taken and permanently occupied by the Ionians. Yet the members of each tribe possessed a certain degree of unity among themselves. Half-way between Ephesus and Miletus, near the promontory of Mycale, was the Panionium, at which the Prienians offered the sacrifice. Miletus and Ephesus, however, continued always to be the most active and power- ful cities ; the latter more intent upon the acquisition of terri- tory ; Miletus, on the other hand, one of the greatest coloniz- ing centres in history. No less than seventy -five distinct colonies are ascribed to her, for the most part on the coasts of the Black Sea, whose shores were thus drawn into the cir- cle of Greek life. The Phoenicians everywhere withdrew be- fore these influences, or else became Greek in character ; for ex- ample, Thales, the great Milesian, was remotely of Phoenician origin. To the iEolians Lesbos became by degrees a kind of me- tropolis ; Mytilcne is one of the principal seats of the older Greek civilization. It was precisely in these regions that the reminiscences of the Homeric epoch were preserved in the most vivid form ; the Ionian Chios is the seat of the Homc- ridoe, who kept up the traditions of that time. Important as these colonies were to the world, they cannot COLONIES. 131 sustain a comparison with the Dorian settlements. The south- western coasts of Asia Minor were fringed with the latter. Ilalicarnassus, " the castle by the sea," formed, with Onidos, Cos, and Rhodes, a separate Doric Amphictyony. A series of islands in the southern part of the ^Fg:ean Sea described, as it were, a line of Doric settlements, among which was Thcra ; the Cretan colonies on the shores of Lycia may also be regarded as Dorian. The legend does not omit to mention the intervention of Crete when it is necessary to account for the establishment upon the coast of Libya of a Dorian colony, Kyrene, said to have been sent from Thera. In another di- rection Megara made advances ; to this town is assigned the honor of having founded Chalkcdon, and of having been the first to recognize the advantages of Byzantium as a site for the empire of the world. It would be enough to inspire us with admiration for the Dorian name could we venture to regard the colonization of the Propontis, of the southwest of Asia Minor, and of Libya as part of one coherent plan, involv- ing the occupation of the most important maritime positions in the eastern Mediterranean. Yet this is not the full ac- count ; with these must be combined the colonics which spread the Greek name at tho same time over Sicily and southern Italy. The great metropolis for the establishments in the West was Corinth. From hence Korkyra and the opposite shores of Illyria were colonized ; Epidamnus (Dyrrhachium) is a Co- rinthian, Tarcntum a Spartan, settlement. According to tra- dition it was by an accident that the Chalkidians were driven to the coast of Sicily. These traditional accounts have almost the charm of voyages of discovery : the main fact, however, was the settlement itself. From Ortygia, which stands to Sicily in the same relation as Mytilene to Lesbos, Syracuse was founded. Rhodes established no settlements in the East, but most important ones in the West, Gela and Agrigentum being derived from her. Tho reason of this, doubtless, is that there were in the East powerful kingdoms in her neighbor- hood, which barred all farther progress, whilst in the West the Phoenicians, that is, the Carthaginians, were contented to make a beginning with the coasts most conveniently situated 132 ANCIENT HELLAS. for their purposes, leaving the other parts of the island to the Greeks, who easily mastered the native inhabitants. The same was the case in Libya. Syracuse and Agrigentum soon rose to power, as did Kyrene. Thus the Hellenes spread on both sides of the mother country, which is itself little more than sea-coast, towards east and west. They were very far from constituting what is called a power ; it was not even in their nature to do so ; but they formed an element destined to produce the greatest effect upon the world, which at once made its influence felt in all directions. No doubt their warlike training by land and sea principally contributed to tin's result, the Dorians especially reaching an extraordinary degree of perfection in this respect. The Greeks generally showed themselves excellent soldiers; their equipment made them at once superior to their neigh- bors. The bronze foundries in Chalkis were reckoned the best in the world, and although they regarded their arms as merchandise, and sent them far and wide into foreign parts, the armor of the Hoplites was peculiar to the Greeks. Their superiority in naval warfare became no less marked. Tri- remes were invented at Corinth, and subsequently served to raise Samos into a naval power. This active and vigorous population, whose elements were as infinite in their variety as they M T ere copious in number, followed in every situation an impulse of its own. To at- tempt to pursue these varieties in all their bearings would lead us too far into the explanation of local circumstances. But Greek life in general displays certain characteristics which can never cease to be significant. The Hellenes followed no common political aim ; they cannot be compared with the great powers of which we have had occasion to speak ; their provinces and towns were of insignificant extent. But the manner in which these men, with no extraneous impulse or example, lived together and ordered their public affairs de- serves the most attentive consideration. Independent and self-centred, thoy created, in a constant struggle of citizen with citizen and state with state, the groundwork of those forms of government which have been established in the world at large. We see monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, LAKEDJiMON. 133 rising side by side and one after another, the changes being regulated in each community by its past experience and its special interests in the immediate present. These forms of government did not appear in their normal simplicity or in conformity with a distinct ideal, but under the modifications necessary to give them vitality. An example of this is Lake- daemon. If one of the families of the Heracleidse aimed at a tyranny, whilst another entered into relations with the native and subject population, fatal to the prerogatives of the con- querors, we can understand that in the third case, that of the Spartan community, the aristocratic principle was maintained with the greatest strictness. Independently of this, the divis- ion of the Lakedoemonian monarchy between two lines, nei- ther of which was to have precedence, was intended to guard against the repetition in Sparta of that which had happened in Argos. Above all, the members of the Gerusia, in which the two kings had only equal rights with the rest, held a posi- tion which would have been unattainable to the elders of the Homeric age. But even the Gerusia was not independent. There exist- ed in addition to it a general assembly, which, whilst very aristocratic as regards the native and subject population, as- sumed a democratic aspect in contrast with the king and the elders. The internal life of the Spartan constitution depend- ed upon the relations between the Gerusia and the aristocratic demos. From the first, according to a primitive Iihetra,* the * I purposely avoid dealing with the alleged legislator Lycurgus, who still belongs to the realms of myth. As for the legislation itself, the de- cision given at Delphi, which is extant in its original form (Plutarch, "Lycurgus," c. 6), is the most important document; yet it presents, as is well known, various difficulties, so that I feel myself bound to support my opinion, where I dissent from others, by reference to the wording of the oracle. After directions have been given for holding the assembly at appointed times and at an appointed place, viz., within the Dorian settle- ment proper, it is further said of the order of procedure ovtojq eiacpepeiv Kai d(piv TroXiTsia, c. 15), the kings and the Ephors took to one another. In this the Ephors figure, not, properly speaking, as champions, but as representatives of the commonalty; the king swears to govern according to the laws of the city, whilst for the city the Ephors swear that so long they will leave the privileges of the king undisturbed, ry 81 TruXet, ifnrccopKovi'Tot; tictivov, uariXfiiXiKTOv rjjv fiaoi- Xtiav wapi^HV. CORINTH. 135 his campaigns. To make terms of peace was the prerogative of the Ephors. The reins of supreme power were, in fact, in their hands. The Spartan aristocracy dominated the Pelo- ponnesus. But the constitution contained a democratic ele- ment working through the Ephors, by means of which the conduct of affairs might be concentrated in a succession of powerful hands. Alongside of this system, the purely aristocratic constitu- tions, which were without such a centre, could nowhere hold their ground. The Bacchiadte in Corinth, two hundred in number, with a prytanis at their head, and intermarrying only among themselves, were one of the most distinguished of these families. They were deprived of their exclusive su- premacy by Kypselus, a man of humble birth on his father's side, but connected with the Bacchiadaa through his mother. There is a famous speech in which the Corinthians complained to the Lakedoemonians of the violence of the aristocratic gov- ernment. But they were not entirely correct, if their re- marks were pointed also at the constitution of Sparta her- self; for the Bacchiadffl rather resembled the Gerusia, which, however, maintained no real authority as compared with the Ephors. A combining element such as ruled supreme in Sparta was wanting in other cities. Only in Thebes did an exiled Bacchiad, Philolaus, succeed, by a strict legislation, principally designed to guard against the excessive subdi- vision of the estates belonging to the dominant families, in firmly establishing the aristocratic ascendency. He intro- duced an isonomy into the oligarchy, and so enabled it to hold its ground. Elsewhere the antagonism between the elements of which the cities and the country districts were respectively com- posed was attended with results which would have been intolerable in Sparta. The tyranny rested for its support upon the Achaean population, which set itself against the ex- clusive dominion of the Dorian families. Kypselus and his successor, Periander, surrounded themselves with a body- guard, by the help of which they thinned the ranks of their opponents in these families by exile or execution, but kept the commons in control by taking care to give them occupa- 136 ANCIENT HELLAS. tion.* The antagonism we have spoken of was most pro- nounced in Sikyon, where the Orthagoridoe, who were sprung from the people, absolutely changed the tribal relations and overwhelmed with ignominy the Dorian phyloa, whilst con- tinuing their hostility to Argos, to which they had formerly been in subjection.f In Megara, Theagenes, who belonged to the principal families, elevated himself to the tyranny, with the assistance of the Achseans, to whom the supremacy of those families was intolerable.^: In the Ionian cities, where the families were far from holding the same strong posi- tion as in the Dorian, the tyranny established itself without such assistance. This was especially the case in the islands and the colonies. There was need of an authority to direct the powers of the community to definite ends. There were interests not merely of the subjects as opposed to their im- migrant rulers, but of the populations generally. As the Kypselidse rose in Corinth, the metropolis of the colonies towards the west, so in the corresponding eastern metropo- lis, Miletus, Thrasybulus raised himself from the dignity of prytanis to that of tyrant ;§ in Ephesns, Pythagoras rose to power, and overthrew the Basilidre ; in Samos, Polycrates, * Kypselus, according to Herodotus (v. 92, 0) and Aristotle (" Pol." v. 9, 23=12 p. 230,4 Bekker), held the tyranny for thirty years, Periander, according to Diogenes Lacrtius (i. 98), for forty years (according to the manuscript reading in Aristotle, forty-four years; but this does not tally with the period assigned for the -whole duration of the tyranny of the Kypsclidre, which rather requires forty years). Periander died, accord- ing to Sosicrates (ap. Diogen. Laert. i. § 95), 01.48, 4=585 b.c. The fall of the Bacchiada:, according to this, must have happened seventy years before, 01. 31, 2=G55 B.C. Eusebius places it in 01. 30, 2=659-8 b.c, and O. Muller, " Doricr,'' i. p. 161, n. 9, adopts this date. t Aristotle ("Pol." v. 12=9, 21) gives to the dynasty of Orthagoras a duration of a hundred years, and observes role dpxofitvoic txp^ VT0 /'fpi'wc Kal ttoWu ro'ig vofioiq iSouXevov (cf. Curtius, " Peloponncsos," ii. p. 485). O. Muller (" Dorians," i. p. 164, n. 1) places the tyranny of the Orthagoridaj between 01.26 and 51=676-576 B.C. I The daughter of Theagenes married Kylon of Athens (Thuc. i. 126), who in 01. 35 = 640 B.C., won the prize at Olympia in the "diaulus" (double course). § Thrasybulus was a contemporary of Pisistratus (Herod, i. 20). SOLON. 137 who was master also of the Kyklades, and of whom it is re- corded that he confiscated the property of the citizens and then made them a present of it again. By concentrating the forces of their several communities the tyrants obtained the meaus of surrounding themselves with a certain splendor, and above all of liberally encouraging poetry and art. To these Polycrates opened his citadel, and in it we find Anacreon and Ibycus;* Kypselus dedicated a famous statue to Zeus, at Olympia. The school of art at Sikyon was without a rival, and at the court of Periander were gathered the seven sages ■ — men in whom a distinguished political position was com- bined with the prudential wisdom derived from the experi- ence of life. This is the epoch of the legislator of Athens, Solon, who more than the rest has attracted to himself the notice of posterity. He is the founder of the Athenian democracy. The tradition concerning Solon has many fabulous traits — for instance, his appearance in the market-place with the de- meanor of a man not quite in his senses, a story which reminds us of the legend of Brutus. In a very characteristic way the account which makes Lycurgns, on setting out upon his travels, bind the Lakedremonians to the observance of his laws, coincides with the tradition that Solon laid a similar obligation upon the Athenians, though only for ten years. There is ample justification for the doubts cast upon the narrative of the meeting between Solon and the last king of Lydia. In the main, however, the details we possess regard- ing Solon rest upon a far more solid foundation than those which concern Lycurgus. The legislation ascribed to him did, in fact, proceed from him. On the one hand, it is in keeping with the contrasts generally prevailing in the Greek cities, whilst on the other it shows its author to have been a man of much experience and knowledge of the world. Its foundations are laid in the condition and circumstances of Attica itself. * Polycrates himself wrote poetry, and had a place among the elegiac poets, amongst whom also Pittacus is reckoned ; a scolion by the latter is still extant (Bernhardy, " Griechische Literaturgeschichte, ii. 357). 138 ANCIENT HELLAS. The balance of opinion in ancient, times inclined to the view that Attica is to be counted among the Ionian districts. The Attic tribes, who had gathered together in the capital, were distinguished in the same way as the Ionian, and bore the same appellations. This fact seems to point to the ex- emption of the Attic population from intermixture, and its purport is confirmed by the oldest tradition, which goes back to a period when there was a danger of such intermixture taking place through the immigration of the Ileracleidse and the Dorians. This tradition attributes the deliverance of the country to the self-devotion of the last king, affirming that no one after this was counted worthy to succeed him. It is in accordance with the general experience of history that the autonomy of the native populations, suppressed over a wide range of country by the Heracleidae, should have asserted itself with all the greater vigor in another quarter. This movement did not immediately react upon the constitution of Athens. There also great families assumed the lead, and un- der one form or another exercised dominion and administered justice. The Areopagus, a primeval tribunal, hallowed by mythic associations, where trials were held under primitive forms, secured to them a privileged authority under the sanction of religion. This tribunal, however, did not inter- fere with the ancestral claims of families and phratrise. Phra- triae were associations of a sacred character, in which one family was, as it were, security for the existence of the other. The four tribes were connected by direct ties with the gods; and this was, in fact, the ground of their claim to equal priv- ileges.* In Athens, however, as in most other cities, there ensued a schism between the powerful families. How violent this * In one of the earliest plays of Euripides, placed by Bockh (" Grsec. Trag. principes," p. 191) in 01. 87, 4, and by Gottfried Hermann at any rate before 01. 89, Ion himself appears as a son of Apollo by Creusa, who gave birth to him secretly. From Ion is descended Teleon ; from him come also the Hopletes, Argadeis, and ^Egikoreis. The last-named occupy the Kyklades and the adjacent continents (Ion, 1580 sq.). It must, of course, be observed that this view was almost contemporary with that of Herod- otus. Xuthus is only the presumptive father of Ion. ATHENS. 139 schism was may be inferred from that law of Draco which knows but one punishment, that of death, for all transgres- sions alike,* for in a general disunion the smallest crime is as dangerous as the greatest. In Attica, as elsewhere, chiefs of parties arose, who aimed at autocratic power. One of the principal Eupatridse, Kylon, on one occasion took possession of the Acropolis. He was opposed by the family of the Alcmseonidse, but in enticing away Kylon's supporters from the sacred asylum in which they had taken refuge they outraged the religion of the country, or, in the language of pure human feeling, that higher law upon which all else was based, and which held the inhabitants together. That the soil on which they stood might be desecrated by certain acts was a dominant idea among the nations of antiquity. The family of the Alcmseonida?, which had incurred the guilt of such an act, was regarded with universal abhorrence, and was banished ; but the land itself needed again to make its peace with the gods. We have once more a reference to Crete, whence the Delphic oracle was derived. One of the Cretan Kuretes, famed for his acquaintance with the secrets of the gods, was invited to Attica, to carry out the sacred forms of a lustration, and to assure the country of its restoration to di- vine favor. By occurrences of this kind the authority of the principal families could not but be shaken to its very foundations. One of these had attempted to destroy the general freedom, an- other had offended the gods. Nevertheless, after the banish- ment of the Alcmaeonidce the rest of the Eupatridse main- tained themselves in full dignity. They cannot be compared with the Lakedaemonian aristocracy, who regarded the inhab- itants of the country as their subjects. The inhabitants of Attica were on a footing of equality in respect of hereditary rights, yet it seemed that a condition of dependence might be brought about here, as in Lakedremon. The opportunity was presented in the assertion, not of public, but of individual claims ; for, according to existing laws and usages, debt, when * The archonship of Draco falls, according to Eusebius (in the Arme- nian translation), in 01. 40=G20 B.C. I Id ANCIKNT HELLAS. it was not possible to discharge it by payment, led imme- diately to bondage and servitude. The general growth of commerce involved the consequence that Athenian citizens could be Bold into slavery, [f this had boon allowed to go on, the subjection o( the lower classes to the higher would have become the rule, and the country would have lost the chief Bouroe i^( its Btrength. Already the state itself had fallen BO low that it had allowed itself to be deprived of Salamis, which commands the harbor o( Athens. In the midst of this confusion, whilst law and religion were thus disorganized, and political weakness and incapacity were everywhere the rule, Solon appeared upon the scene. He belonged to the Eupatridee, and traced his pedigree toCodrua himsolf. But the prosperity o( his country weighed more with him than the claims of rank. If we could venture, in treating o( remote antiquity, to speak of motives which are intelligible to every one, we should attribute the legislation of Solon to the Peeling which seizes upon every patriot when he sei\s his native land in a perilous condition, out of which some way of escape must be found unless everything is to go to ruin. To him is ascribed that purification of the land which was, so to speak, a treaty oi peace with its gods ; and also the recovery of Salamis, without which the lYinous could never be o\ any real use. Solon himself was active in mercantile affairs; and this OCOUpation must o( itself have convinced him how infinitely important it was for Attica to have the free use id" her coasts and harbors, and to what a position slio might aspire by employing the natural advantages o( her sit- uation. To this end, however, the main essential was some arrangement for securing the freedom of her population. In ancient times all other distinctions sink into insignificance compared with that between freeboru men and slaves, and no circumstance has been more productive o( civil disturbance than the attempt of the wealthy oitizens to depress into the class of bondsmen the poorer members o( the community, by asserting the Legal rights oi oreditorship. Every debtor was accustomed to pledge his person for the discharge of the debt, and was compelled, himself and his family, to do service in lieu oi payment. Legal justice thus became the greatest soi.ON. 141 political injustice. Those who were incapable of payment were even Bold into foreign servitude. Never had the traffic in slaves, the focus of which was in Tyre,* received such an impulse as at this epoch. The merchants followed armies into the field, and the prisoners made were at once Bold as slaves, along with those who had been deprived of freedom for civil reasons. We may oonceive the feelings of an Athenian o( rank at seeing, among the slaves sold, his own countrymen, who a short time ago had lived in the enjoy- ment o( freedom. This was the first evil whioh Solon, when authority was given him by universal consent, undertook to remove. f lie secured his countrymen from ever again be- ing treated as chattels. No native Athenian was henceforth to he condemned to bondage, or sold into foreign parts, on account of debt. Those who hail suffered the latter fate returned again to Attica. Many had been so long abroad, passing from hand to hand, that they had forgotten their native dialect. This may, perhaps, be regarded as one t A the first steps in history towards the recognition of human dig- nity, though its action was limited only to the country it con- cerned. In other respects also monetary relations had operated in Attica with distracting results. The oppressive encumbrances Upon real property could never be got rid o( if private Con- tracts of long standing were to be carried out to the letter. We shall not go far wrong in ascribing to the personal interest which Solon took in the general commerce ol' the world the fact that he did not maintain the standard of money with rigorous adherence to its current value in Attica, lie it was who, in the coinage designed to form an Occidental or ( i reek silver standard, corresponding to the ( >riental standard of gold, debased the substance of the silver mina, and so substituted a nominal for its former real value. The measure was facilita- ted by tin' circumstance that the influx of gold was upon the * The prophet Ezekiel makes it a reproach to the Greeks that they imported slaves into Tyre. t The archonship of Solon falls in 01. 40, 3=59-1 B.0, (Clinton, "Fasti Hell." ii. 298). |.jo ANCIENT HELLAS. increase, it. being a well-known fact that, even in ancient times, the fluctuations in the relative value of gold and silver de- pended upon BUch causes. The new silver miiui was made equal in value to the old, and the leans which had been made upon the old footing oould be repaid upon the new. Political necessity out weighed private interests and claims. But the legislator, being thoroughly oonversant with matters of busi- ness, insisted that, loans upon interest should continue to be allowed, whereas elsewhere many objections were raised to the praotice o( usury. We find ourselves here in a region where we have no trust worthy landmarks o( tradition to de- pend upon. But one thing is clear, that through Solon's romediarv measures the social relations with reference to re- liffion, human freedom, and civil intercourse underwent a transformation. With this was combined that political revo- lution bv which Solon founded a great commonwealth. An innovation o( great extent and importance was the SO- Oalled timooraoy, aCOOrding to which a certain amount of means was a necessary qualification for a share in the offices o'i state. The titnocracy broke through the aristocratic insti- tutions hitherto established, inasmuch as it limited the privi- leges o( birth by exacting a census. This was fixed, accord- ing to ancient traditional usage, by the amount of produce yielded by the land held in possession. Three olasses were established, with definite privileges and duties. Even the third, however, was s^> fixed that there must have been many Eupatridffi who failed to reach its standard, and thus were ex- cluded from the most important affairs of state. There was no question of abrogating the privileges hitherto attaohed to ownership, but only o( an assessment, involving at the same time a continuation o( the title. Indeed, it is inconceivable that a dominant and still powerful nobility would have ac- cepted the monetary innovations introduced by Solon, if it had not been indemnified, SO to speak, in some other way. It was only the three higher classes which paid direct taxes and wore capable o( being elected to offices. At the Rrsl glance We see in this a contrast to the tendencies which everywhere else prevailed. There was a general bias in the Greek states and cities SOLON. li;; towards restraining the oligarchies, or rather towards depriv- ing them of decisive control over public affairs. It was on this tendency that tyranny depended. It based its power upon the elevation o( the lower strata of the population, but the representation which it gave them was violent and transi- tory. Solon sought to utilize the motive force by which tyranny was supported, by conceding to those classes whioh were excluded from the direct tenure of offices twofold right o( great importance, only on the ground that their means did not give an adequate voucher for its satisfactory exercise. This was the right of electing to otliees, and of examining, on the expiration of each term, into the way in which the duties of the office had been discharged. The suffrage was by no means universal ; it depended in all oases upon the legal as- sessments, and since the number of those entitled and com- petent to hold the highest otliees, upon whieh important issues turned, could not be very considerable, the right of voting must, chiefly have been exercised in the rejection of less popular or estimable candidates. The investigation made the highest magistrates responsible to the assembly of the people; the archons themselves might, be excluded from the honor of sitting in the Areopagus. The leading families re- tained their rank and claims, but they depended, for the attainment of their chief ambition the exercise, namely, of the supreme power — upon the judgment of the community at large. It is in this that Solon's ohief achievement consists; the classes whose members were individually excluded from the administration of state affairs received in their collective capacity an authority whieh implied the possession of the supreme power — an authority such as only the tyranny could exercise elsewhere. The constitution of Solon has the char- acter id' a reconciliation. Aristotle, to whom we are indebted for our knowledge of both these concessions, pronounces them to have been necessary and indispensable, alleging that with- out them the Demos would have been forced into a hostile attitude.* Solon further provided for the interests of the * Arist. "Pol." ii. c. 12, p. 1274, a. 15: E<$X«v yt faun n)y &vayicaiOT&rt)v 14-4 ANCIENT HELLAS. Demos by giving the demotsa a jurisdiction of their own, to guard against unjust interference in their affairs.* It was owing to the existence of two distinct elements in the community that Solon established two distinct senates. One of these, the Areopagus, was a body of aristocratic tendencies, consisting of those who had served the office of archon : its function was to maintain the laws in their integrity. The other, the Council of the Four Hundred, was a proboulentic senate, which had the prerogative of settling for the assembly of the people the subjects on which they were to deliberate, and of watching over the execution of their decrees. The four hundred members were selected from the four tribes in equal proportions. Solon is reported to have said that the security of the republic was attained by these two councils, as a ship is made fast by two strong anchors in the midst of a tossing sea. The poetical remains which passed among the ancients under Solon's name display not so much depth or majesty of thought as knowledge of what is good and desirable in the relations of human life, together with a genuine feeling for the things of religion. His proverb " Nothing in excess" indicates his character, lie was a man who knew exactly what the time lias a right to call for, and who utilized exist- ing complications to bring about the needful changes. It is impossible adequately to express what he was to the people of Athens, and what services he rendered them. That removal of their pecuniary burdens, the seisachthew, made life for the first time endurable to the humbler classes. Solon cannot be ki'vu'c Cov i'p <; hovkoQ Av efij Kai iroXfyuof. Because of a trifling oversight — if it is one — to be found ill this chapter (cf. Iuickh, " Die Staatshaus- haltung dor Athener," ii. p. 81), we cannot venture to conclude that it is not genuine. ■ Demetrius Phalereus (in a scholium to the "Clouds" of Aristophanes — Midler, " Fragm. Hist. Gwec" ii. p. 368, fragm. 8), roi Simapxovs ol -epi SoXwva taBlaravro (>■ jroXXy tnrovSy, Via oi icard ftjjftov SiS&n rai XapfiavtHTt r.i ftrata -■!.>' dXXjjXwv. Even though the word deniareh, which at a later time has rather reference to political administration, may he here mis- applied, we should have to suppose that ftjeom-ai wtrd colore were intended (cf. SchSmann, " Griechische Alterth inner," i. p. -49). SOLON. 145 said to have introduced democracy, but, in making the share of the upper classes in the government dependent upon the good pleasure of the community at large, he laid its founda- tions. The people were invested by him with attributes which they afterwards endeavored to extend. The democratic ele- ment first presents itself as indispensable in the domestic af- fairs of the commonwealth ; it was designed to counterbalance the power of the oligarchy. We have already shown that in Sparta the whole substance of power resided in the aristo- cratic assembly, and it is noticeable that Solon in one of his most famous verses declares that he has granted the people only just so much power as was necessary. But it was little likely that the Athenian Demos would content itself with this limited power, and the whole succeeding period bears witness to its efforts to expand and improve that power till it became the supreme authority in the state. In times of civil discord, the first thing needful in the mind of a legislator is to restore the disturbed equilibrium between the different authorities and classes of society. It was this which Solon intended to do for Athens, and in a great measure carried out. This constitutes his principal merit. But the revolution he effected was not a native and independent prod- uct of the soil ; the general condition of the world reacted upon Athens, and made the change at once possible and salutary. If we are not mistaken, this is the first time that the power of money made itself felt in the internal affairs of an important community. It was the general intercourse of commerce which supplied Solon with the means of effecting his principal regulations. Another vital step was the distinction established between the human being and chattels or money. Money becomes what it ought to be, a standard for the balance of political claims. The poorer classes were not only benefited by being delivered from the danger of being expelled from house and home or sold as slaves ; by the laws of Solon they were at the same time firmly attached to the communit}^, which from this time forth included them as members inseparable from it. It is a subject for lasting contemplation that this was 10 140 ANCIENT HELLAa effected by a legislator in whose mind views of tho widest ran are were fused with the sentiments of patriotism. Solon cannot he compared with Moses, who extricated a people from the Influence of conceptions winch had become ;i part of their very life, and, being at once captain, prophet, and legislator, organized them in submission to the idea of a universal relig- ion o\' relentless severity, such as completely to transform the nation and to pave the way to a great conquest. Solon made no claim to a divine mission, still less did he entertain the design of effecting a. great conquesl ; his ambition limited itself to winning back a neighboring island, which had an- ciently belonged to the country, and in the next place to uniting the different classes oi' the inhabitants, by the accom- modation iA' their disputes, into an independent and powerful Commonwealth. Moses could only bo represented in symbol; an ancient bust represents Solon as a prosperous, sagacious, and vigorous man; his was a popular nature, dexterous and practical, bis mind a storehouse of prudent thoughts. The two legislators have one point of contact : the idea of slavery is repugnant to them both; otherwise they are fundamentally distinct. That Solon's creation would prove durable appeared doubt- fid from the very first moment. The equilibrium, upon which his constitution depended, could not maintain itself in the Btruggle o[' the conflicting elements. Tyranny and oligarchy bad their centre o^ gravity in themselves. The constitution of Solon lacked such a centre. Solon himself lived long enough to see the order which he established servo as the basis of the tyranny which he wished to avoid; it was the Four Hundred themselves who lent a hand to the change. The radical cause ^\' failure was that the democratic element was \oo feebly constituted to control or to repress the violence of the families. To elevate the democracy into a true power in the state other events Were necessary, which not only rendered possible, but: actually brought about, its further de- velopment. T1h> conflicts o\' the principal families, bushed for a moment, were revived under the eyes of Solon himself with redoubled violence. The Alenueoimhv were recalled, and gathered around PEISISTRATUS. 147 them a party consisting mainly of the inhabitants of the sea- coast, who, favored by trade, had the money in their hands ; the genuine aristocrats, described as the inhabitants of the plains, who were in possession of the fruitful soil, were in perpetual antagonism to the Alcmfflonidffl ; and, whilst these two parties were bickering, a third was formed from the inhabitants of the mountain districts, inferior to the two others in wealth, but of superior weight to either in the popular assemblies. At its head stood Poisistratus, a man distinguished by war- like exploits, and at an earlier date a friend of Solon. It was because his adherents did not feel themselves strong enough to protect their leader that they were induced to vote him a body-guard chosen from their own ranks. It was the Council of the Four Hundred itself which came to this resolution ; and the assembly of the people confirmed it, no doubt be- cause the security of the poorer classes called for a powerful head of the state.* As soon, however, as the first two parties combined, the third was at a disadvantage, so that after some time sentence of banishment was passed upon Poisistratus. He did not return until he had pledged himself to a family union with the AlcmfflOnidffi. He was already in middle age, and had children ; he had no serious intention of founding a new family by a union with the guilt -stained house of the Alcmreonidte, although such a union would perhaps have put him in a position to obtain absolute supremacy ; and he was banished once more. But in this second exile he made every preparation for securing his return. One of the most important facts which mark this epoch is the first employment of mercenary troops. Poisistratus, who cultivated close relations with the despots of the neighboring islands, especially with Lygdamus of Naxos, found means to gather around him a troop of brave mercenaries, with whom, and with the support of his old adherents, he then invaded Attica. His opponents made but a feeble resistance, and ho * Whether this step was really taken in consequence of a wound inflicted, or from a more or less well-founded anxiety for the life of Peisistratus, is unimportant. In the case of Lorenzo de' Medici there was no need for such a stratagem to obtain for him the protection of a similar guard. 148 ANCIENT HELLAS. became without much trouble master both of the city and of the country. He thus attained to power; it is true, with the approbation of the people, but nevertheless by armed force. The people were disarmed, and had other and peaceful occu- pations assigned to them. Peisistratus would as little suffer them to be without occupation as to bear arms. It was upon Thracian mercenaries that his despotic government rested mainly for its support. The constitution established by Solon he had no intention of disturbing, but its character was such as to leave it possible for a man of superior gifts to take the reins of government and control it at his pleasure. In this position Peisistratus labored most profitably for a series of years to enhance the power of Athens,* and that with de- signs and in a spirit suggested by the general situation of the Hellenes. The Persians were not only lords of Asia Minor and mas- ters of the Ionian colonies settled on those coasts, but were stretching out their hands towards the islands. Peisistratus did his best to hinder the growth of this new empire of the world. He united to Athens by the closest bond the island of Delos, whose relations with Asia Minor were now severed by the Persians. He won a foothold in the colonial district by obtaining possession of Sigeum, a town on a point of land in the Hellespont. His view, that land occupied by the Greeks did not belong only to the tribe which was its immediate owner, was very important. It was clear, he maintained from Homer, that the original occupation was the work of all the Hellenes. Peisistratus won for himself an imperishable title to gratitude by making a collection of the Homeric poems ; it is probable that in undertaking it he acted on political as well as other motives. It certainly implied an opposition to the advance of Oriental culture, which was spreading like a flood over the whole of Greece. The means by which Peisis- tratus possessed himself of the ascendency in Athens cannot be approved ; his success was the consequence of divisions ♦Aristotle says that out of a period of thirty-three years he held the tyranny seventeen; according to Clinton the period of his clearly ascer- tained supremacy is included between the years 537-527. PEISISTRATUS. I49 within and open violence from without. But after lie had at- tained to the possession of power he exercised it for the bene- fit of Athens. It is under him that Athens first makes her appearance as a naval power. The conquest of the maritime districts of Thrace, with all their resources, an event of great importance in the history of Athens, was made under his rule. Athens thus obtained a certain rank among the powers by which she was surrounded. We have almost to stretch a point in order to call Peisistratus a tyrant — a word which car- ries with it the invidious sense of a selfish exercise of power. No authority could have been more rightly placed than his ; it combined Athenian with Panhellenist tendencies. But for him Athens would not have been what she afterwards be- came to the world. The greatest injustice has been done to the oldest of the exact historians, Thukydides, in attributing the good opinion which he expresses of Peisistratus to per- sonal considerations such as any historian, really intent upon his office, dismisses from his view. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that Peisistratus governed Athens absolutely, and even took steps to establish a permanent tyranny. He did, in fact, succeed in leaving the power he possessed to his sons, Ilippias and Ilipparchus. Their reign, like his own, is de- scribed in a Platonic dialogue as a golden age, so complete was the prosperity of Athens in those days of peace. But public prosperity can never efface the memory of a defective title. It could not fail to be keenly felt how much was implied in the heavy tax which the despots, in order to keep up their power, laid upon the land, whilst the people remained un- armed. The commonalty gradually dissociated themselves from the house of Peisistratus, to which they had been at- tached. Of the two brothers it was the one who had rendered most service to culture, Ilipparchus, who was murdered at the festival of the Panathensea. It was an act of revenge for a personal insult. But there is no doubt that republican senti- ment gave the dagger its edge, and the assassins were cele- brated as men who had sacrificed their own lives to the res- toration of freedom. In his dread lest he should be visited by a similar doom, Ilippias actually became an odious tyrant and excited universal discontent. 150 ANCIENT HELLAS. One effeot, however, of the loss of stability which the au- thority of the dominant family experienced was that the leading exiles ejected by Peisistratus combined in the cn- terprise which was a necessary condition of their return, the overthrow of Bippias. The Alcmeeonidse took the principal part. On their banishment by Peisistratus they had estab- lished themselves in P-hokis, where they had gained for them- selves a position which made them formidable even in exile. They were in close compact with the Delphic oracle, for which they built a splendid temple; and the Spartans were at all times inclined to combat a rising tyranny and to set oligarchical governments like their own in its place. The AicmtBOnidSB and their confederates took up a strong posi- tion in Alt ica, close to the frontier. llippias, on his side, obtained the support oi' some Thessalian cavalry; but these at the crisis were unwilling to shed their blood in a cause in which they had no concern, and withdrew. Unfortunately for llippias, his children, whom he had sent to seek their safely in Might, fell into the hands of his combined antago- nists. In onler to obtain their freedom he had to bring him- self to evacuate the citadel.* The revolution to which this opened the way could, it might seem, have but one result, the establishment of an oligarchical government ; for other leading families had joined with the Alcnueonidjc, and it cannot be doubted that the aims of the Spartans were directed to this end. l>ut the matter had a very different issue. The oligarchy could only have been established through a complete understanding and com- bination between the A lcni;vonid;o and the remaining families. But between these two parties there existed an ancient feud which was always being stirred into a Maine by new causes of discord. Another motive oi' ancient origin also made its in- fluence felt. It COllld never be forgotten in Lakeda'inon that : The expulsion of Hippiastook place in the twentieth year (Thuk. vi. 59), before the battle of Marathon (400 b.o.) therefore in 510 \'.c. In the fourth year before this (Herod. v. 55; Thuk. 1. c.) Eipparchus had been slain, i. e. in 514. As the tyranny of the sens of Peisistratns lasted eighteen years (Ar. " Pol."v. 0, 88 18, p. 880, 18, Bekker), his death must be placed in the year 587. Cf. Clinton, "Fasti Hell." ii. p. 801 sq. CLEISTIIENES. 151 the Alcmoeonida) were emigrant Mcsscnians, who had sought and found refuge in Athens. It soon appeared that, though between the Alcmeeonidffi ami the Spartans a transitory un- derstanding might ho established, no lasting concord was to be expected. In this conflict, on the one side with the families of the Eupatridffij on the other with the Spartans, the Alcnue- onid Cleisthenes conceived the thought of conferring on the democratic institutions created by Solon an authority inde- pendent of the will and pleasure of those of his own rank. For this object a thorough transformation of the Demos was necessary.* The principal step to this end consisted in break- ing up the old tribes, which in their corporate organization supported the traditional influence of the Eupatridffi. In this he followed the example of his grandfather ( lleisthenes, who, in order to bring the city of Sikyon into complete subjection to himself, had broken up the old Doric tribal associations and abolished their names. It was thus that Cleisthenes now dealt with the Ionian tribes, yet, it must be clearly under- stood, with very different ends in view. The grandfather had aimed at tyranny for himself ; the grandson opposed him- self at once to tyranny and to the authority of the Eupatridffl. He established a new partition of the people into ten tribes, which gave to the democratic principle the upper hand. This did, indeed, immediately provoke an oligarchical reac- tion, which was once more supported by the Spartans. The latter, in conjunction with their Peloponnesian allies, ad- vanced under their king, Cleomenes, in order to stay the inno- vations at their outset. They brought up once more against Cleisthenes the old guilt of the Alcmffionidffi, and he was forced for the time to retire. The Athenian democracy, which was now compelled without his assistance to defend with might and main its newly won privileges, was chiefly aided by the circumstance that the rest of the Peloponnesians were already little disposed to allow the Spartans to becoino masters of Attica. Instead of seriously engaging in (lie war, they broke up their union. This took place upon the plain of * This change of the constitution cannot hare taken place earlier than 507 B.O. Cf. Schonnmn, " Die Vcrliissungsgeschichte Athens," p. 80. 152 ANCIENT HELLAS. Elcusis. To the Pcloponnesians themselves the freedom of Athens was indispensable, if they were not to become com- pletely dependent upon Sparta. There were still Boeotians and Chalkidians in the field to maintain the cause of oli- garchy. The Athenians, with Cleisthenes now once more at their head, fought for their cause with a courage which they had never hitherto displayed, and with the best success. For "an excellent weapon," says Herodotus, "is iscgoria / each man knows that he is fighting for himself." It was thus that the democracy of Athens sprang into life. Its rise was not due immediately to the idea of universal and inalienable rights, nor was it so regarded either by Solon or by Cleisthenes ; for them it was a step dictated by political necessity. But when once established it gained an irresistible strength, and became the most efficient among the primary forces at work in the subsequent history of Greece. Chapter VI. THE ENCOUNTER BETWEEN THE GREEKS AND THE PERSIAN EMPIRE. Towards the middle of the sixth century before our era the future of the world seemed to belong to the Greeks. We know how their colonies expanded over all the coasts and bays of the Mediterranean and Black Sea. It would have been for them a step of momentous importance if their ally Pharaoh Necho of Egypt had executed his plan of uniting the Red Sea with the Mediterranean by a canal. They would thus have been brought into direct intercourse with Arabia and India. Necho was a prince who aspired as high as his epoch permitted, but who failed to achieve his aim ; the Greeks might serve to defend Egypt, not, however, to raise her to the empire of the world. There was, however, an atmosphere spreading generally over the eastern gulf of the Mediterranean which gave prom- ise of a fusion between the powers of the East and Greek aspirations and aptitudes. We are speaking now of the period between the destruction of the Assyrian and the rise of the Persian monarchy. The states and kingdoms which were at this time prominent, and were colliding with each other on various lines, sought and found among the Greeks, who possessed the best weapons and were most practiced in war, competitive offers of support. "We meet with Greek auxiliaries not only in the army of Necho, but also in the opposite Babylonian camp. Kingdoms of moderate extent, in need of foreign assistance and sufficiently provided with the means of paying for it, were, indeed, desirable neighbors for the Greeks. The Mermnadse, who ruled in Lydia, often came in conflict with the Greeks settled on the shores of Asia Minor. They compelled them to the acknowledgment of 154 GREECE AND PERSIA. their suzerainty ; but meanwhile tbc internal resources of the Ionian and . Kolian cities were daily upon the increase. The kings of Lydia, in whom the Oriental element was not particularly strong, attached themselves with the liveliest in- terest to the (J reeks. Many a Greek sanctuary was indebted to King (Vu'sns for new decorations. It was from Croesus that Delphi received the most splendid of the votive offerings brought to her shrine. The Pharaohs of the Saitic dynasty surrounded themselves with an Ionian body-guard. They maintained brigades of Greek troops in the quarters they had established at the mouths of the Nile. The commerce of Egypt, at any rate on the coast, was in Greek hands, and the reactionary movement which once more took place in favor of native Egyptian interests, though it overthrew the reign- ing dynasty, yet made no essential difference in this respect. Even Amasis. who effected the change, had a body-guard of Greeks, lie intrusted Memphis to the Greeks, and founded for them that settlement at Naucratis which was composed of Dorians, Ionians, and JEolians from the neighboring islands and coast, towns. They had a common sanctuary, called the Ilellenion ; for, according to a frequent experience, these races were most inclined to remember their fellowship with each other when they were cast among strangers. Ilalicar- nassus, the native city of Herodotus, took part in these meas- ures. The king permitted the Greeks to worship the gods after their own and not after the Egyptian fashion. Moreover, Amasis displayed almost as great reverence as Crossus for the divinities worshipped by the Greeks. Accord- ingly, though the former king subdued Cyprus, the loss to Greece was not without its compensations, since the island was thus emancipated from the Phoenician and Oriental influ- ences to which it had been subjected for centuries. We may doubtless in this case distinguish between two kinds of inter- est, the Immediate political interest and the national interest, which do net always go hand in hand. The latter found sup- port and encouragement both in Lydia and in Egypt ; with the former this was not always the case. To all this, however, the rise of the Persian monarchy put an end. The destruction of the kingdom of Lydia was a loss THE RISE OS PERSIA. 155 to the Greeks which it is impossible to estimate. The hospi- table capital of the monarch was replaced by the residence of a Persian satrap, who levied a fixed tribute from the country generally, including the Greek cities. From this condition of affairs arose in these cities the iirst attempt at a rebellion, through a native to whom had been intrusted the collection of the taxes. Put as soon as the Persian power was set in motion the attempt collapsed, and had no other consequence except that the new dominion established itself all the more; firmly. Of the cities which had taken part in the insurrec- tion some were sacked and others levelled with the ground by the superiority of the Oriental artillery. The fugitives sought the assistance of their kindred; and the Greek ele- ment, which had hitherto been pushing towards the East, was now thrown back upon its native region in the West. Results still more important followed from the subjugation of Egypt by Cambyses. The event of most importance in preparing the way for this result was the withdrawal of Cyprus from the. dominion of Egypt, through the union of the Phoenicians with Persia. Egypt depended upon the naval power of the Greeks, who now in turn lost the empire of the sea, which they had hitherto maintained. In the war which ended in the subjugation of Egypt itself the Greeks rather injured than assisted Amasis. Nevertheless his overthrow was a great calamity to themselves. In Egypt a power made itself supreme which could not possibly tolerate the (J reck influence. The Greeks never maintained friendly intercourse except with potentates opposed to the Persians. It is unde- niable that the extension of the Persian dominion over Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt gave; a violent check to the onward movement of Greek life. On the other hand, it seemed as if the great enterprise of Darius Jlystaspis against the Scythians ought to have united the Greeks and Persians. It was of a piece with the general policy of Darius that, after defeating so many other adversaries, he undertook to prevent for all succeeding time a repetition of those inroads with which, some centuries before, the Scythians had visited Asia and the civilized world, lie possessed authority enough to unite the different nations which obeyed his sceptre in a great campaign 15G GREECE AND PERSIA. against the Scythiaus. The subjection into which the Greeks Oil the coast of Asia Minor had been brought — a subjection so complete that they appear in the Persian monuments as Integra] parts of the main empire — prompted him to make use of them in order to secure a strong position on the Dan- ube, and thence to advance into the Scythian steppes. It is probable that he really cherished the design of pressing on till he reached the passes of the Caucasus, through which the Scythians had formerly made their irruption into Lydia and Media. Otherwise it would scarcely have occurred to him to fix a period, at the end of which the Ionians, who built him a bridge of boats over the Danube, might, if he did not come back, themselves return home. The Greeks were his best allies in his campaign ; they built him the bridge by which ho crossed the Bosporus, and also the bridge of boats over the Danube by which he made his invasion into the enemy's ter- ritory. The result was not one which could properly be called unfortunate; yet it was certainly of a very doubtful character. The Scythians avoided an encounter in open bat- tle with the overwhelming forces of the king. Barbarism has always this advantage over civilization : it is far more diffi- cult to attack, and so can defend itself with proportionately greater case. There were no frontiers here, as there were on the banks of the Iaxartes, which could be secured by a line of fortresses. Darius attempted something like this upon the Volga ; he erected some forts there, but only to abandon them immediately. He resolved to return to the bridge, which meanwhile had been effectually guarded for him, and to complete the subjugation of the Thracian populations as far as this had not already been achieved on his first passage through the country. Here was another conspicuous success which turned out to the disadvantage of the Greeks. A great region, in which they had already obtained very considerable influence, was closed to them once more. The Persian army brought the populations upon the Strymon, many in num- ber and individually weak, under the dominion of Persia; ami even A.myntas, the king of Makedonia, one of a race of rulers of Greek origin, was compelled to do homage to the Great King. Thus the movement which had thrust back the DAIUUS. 15 f Greeks from Egypt and Asia Minor made advances even into the regions of Europe which bordered upon Northern Hellas. It was an almost inevitable consequence of this that the Greeks were menaced and straitened even in their proper home. A pretext and opportunity for an attack upon the Greek islands was presented to the Persians by the questions at issue between the populations of the cities and the tyrants, which, by the constant bickerings they excited, sufficed of themselves to give full employment to the inhabitants. The argument is well known by which, after the passage of Darius over the Danube, the proposal to destroy the bridge— a meas- ure which would have prevented the return of the king, and would have restored the subject nations to freedom— was re- jected. It was these very tyrants who, with their followers, were in charge of the bridge. They took account of the dan- ger that, if the design were carried out, nations and cities would rise in insurrection, and that all the dominion which they enjoyed would be lost. From Miletus, where this feel- ing found the strongest advocacy, steps were taken under the direction of the tyrant Aristagoras to subdue Naxos, the most powerful of the Kyklades which still remained free, and it was designed when this was effected to make an attempt upon Eubcea also. The vision of the great and ever-encroachino- empire dominated the horizon of every other race. Even the citizens of Athens, when hard pressed by the Lakedfflmonians and Boeotians, had entertained the idea of invoking the assist- ance of the satrap of Sardis. Such support was, however, far more accessible to the Peisistratidse, who had fled to Sigeum and had relations of affinity with the tyrant of Lampsacus. Hippias brought over to his side Artaphernes, the king's brother, the same satrap of Sardis to whom the Athenians had applied. While, as we took occasion to remark, Peisistratua cherished Hellenic as opposed to Oriental views, it is obvious that, in complete antithesis to his policy, the restoration of his son would have meant the subjection of Athens to the Per- sians. The sequence of events all pointed to one end. The Greeks had lost their preponderance on the shores of the eastern Mediterranean; their colonics in Asia Minor had been over- powered, and they had been compelled to retire from their 158 GREECE AND PERSIA. Thracian dominion. These evidences of superiority were soon accompanied by an interference with the islands, which threatened to extend even to the mother country. It cannot be denied that the energetic world of Greece was in danger of being crushed in the full course of its vigorous develop- ment. It might, indeed, be said that such a suppression of the Greek spirit in its strenuous upward effort would have been in the nature of things an impossibility. Undoubtedly, if events are determined by a controlling idea, the general tendency of human development could not have brought about the subjection of the Greeks to the Persians. But the history of mankind docs not move solely upon such transcen- dental ground. The historical question is, what the causes were which prevented such a result. One cause, no doubt, was that the Greeks had no central authority to barter away the freedom of the rest. They acted as a number of free and independent communities, some of which might perhaps be brought over, in which case, however, the rest would all the more certainly be compelled to opposition. The spontaneity which was characteristic of the Greeks was not to be recon- ciled with the attributes of supreme power in Persia. This was first made apparent amongst those whom the Persians had already subdued; they could not endure their dominion for any length of time. Let us endeavor to realize the situation and circumstances in which this opposition first manifested itself. The instru- ment by whom the crisis was brought about was not a person of any great importance. It is not always great natures, or natures strong in the consciousness of their own powers, that bring on such conflicts ; this is sometimes the work of those flexible characters which, being at the point of contact be- tween the opposing forces, pass from one side to the other. Such a character was Aristagoras of Miletus. It was that very enterprise against Naxos which he had himself suggested to the Persians that led to his separating himself from them. The reason was that a barbarous punishment was inflicted by the Persian general upon a guest-friend of Aristagoras, which the latter resented as an intolerable wrong, especially since the undertaking had, properly speaking, been intrusted to ARISTAGORAS OF MILETUS. 159 himself, and the Persian leader had only the secondary part assigned to him. The Persians exacted subordination and strict discipline; the Greeks desired preferment in service and consideration for their own nationality. The failure in the enterprise against Naxos was in itself an event of im- portance, as it secured Euboea and the shores of conti- nental Greece. 13nt the division between the Persians and the Ionian Greeks, which resulted from that failure, is of more importance than the failure itself. The arch which the Persians had just erected was thus deprived of the key-stone in which all the peril of Greece was concentrated. Morally contemptible, but gifted intellectually with a range of ideas of unlimited extent, Aristagoras made for himself an imperishable name by being the first to entertain the thought of a collective opposition to the Persians on the part of all the Greeks, even contemplating the possibility of waging a great and successful offensive war upon them. Aristagoras began his undertaking with the fleet itself upon its return from Naxos. He succeeded by artifice in getting into his hands the tyrants who had taken part with their vessels in the at- tack upon Naxos, and he delivered them up to the cities which had only with reluctance endured their dominion. By this act he imparted to the most important of all Greek interests a movement destined to spread far and wide, lie announced in Miletus his own resignation of power and the restoration to the people of their old laws. The remaining cities also adopted a democratic constitution, and we may perhaps assume that in this the Ionians had been influenced by the example of Athens, where Cleisthcnes had carried out his plans of civil organization a short time before. A general overthrow of tyranny ensued, involving a revolt from Persia, and Strategi were everywhere appointed. The supreme power in the cities was based upon a good understanding between the holders of power and the Persians ; the fact that one of these rulers found the authority of the Persians intolerable was the signal for a universal revolt. Aristagoras himself voluntarily re- nounced the tyranny, the other tyrants were compelled to take the same course; and thus the cities, assuming at the same time a democratic organization, came into open hostility with KJQ GHEECE AND PERSIA. Persia. The Milesian Hecatrous, with his experience of history, had reminded his countrymen of the difficulty of setting them- selves free from Persia, a task which, in view of the power of the king, lie declared to be an impossibility ; the cities and islands which had so often been forced to submission could not hope to resist the Persians by their own unaided efforts. Even Aristagoras could not have expected so much. In his own ease the thought of opposition may have been suggested by his knowledge of the superiority of the Greek equipment to that of the Persians, lie conceived that the Orientals, with their turbancd heads, their long trousers, and their short swords, must inevitably succumb to the pupil of the naked pahestra, with his long shield, his mighty spear, and armor of bronze. He visited Lakedamion, the strongest of the Greek powers, in person, and endeavored to carry her with him in his plans. Before the Spartan king Cleomencs, who was personally inclined to enterprises of wide scope, he laid the first map of which we have distinct mention,""' a map drawn upon a sheet of copper, in which the separate provinces of the Persian Empire were marked by their frontiers, so that it no longer seemed a gigantic unity, but was grasped in detail. His object was to make Cleomencs comprehend the possibility of pushing through these provinces to Susa, the capital, and breaking up the whole empire by a single bold stroke. The Spartan king is said to have been admonished by his own daughter, still a child, who was present at his conversation with Aristagoras, not to let himself be bribed by the promises which the stranger was making to him. But there were other reasons for hesitating to accept the proposals of Aristagoras. The principal argument he adduced was that Laked;vmon was wasting her strength in a useless and bloody struggle with her neighbors, whilst the enterprise he proposed promised the greatest success and the richest spoil. But it was precisely the remoteness of the goal which deterred the Spartans from seriously weighing the proposal. Their whole energy was at * We do not attempt to determine whether this was the map of the world by lleeataais, but undoubtedly Miletus was the birthplace of car- tography. ARISTAGORAS OF MILETUS. 1G1 that very time directed to those struggles with their neigh- bors in which they were still engaged. They were proud of having expelled Ilippias, and the disgrace of having been re- pulsed by the Athenians in the last campaign added fresh in- centives to their ambition. In meditating the restoration of Ilippias they were unconsciously acting as allies of the Per- sians. But, as in the last war, so now again their confederates separated from them. They would not assist in restoring tyranny, the oppression of which they had themselves most bitterly experienced. Sparta, whilst refusing to attempt the greater aim, failed to attain its general and immediate ends. ' Rejected by Sparta, Aristngoras betook himself to Athens. The inducements which had failed to impress the king of Sparta produced upon the people of Athens just the effect which Aristagoras intended. We may suppose that the great idea of national union recommended itself to their minds, but besides this the cause of which Aristagoras was the champion was also their own. The restoration of Ilippias in the Per- sian interests would have imposed on them a double bondage under Ilippias and under the Persians. But they had now tasted of independence, and for the first time enjoyed to the full the advantages which it gave them over their neighbors. We are tempted to assign to this epoch their undertaking against Lemnos and Imbros, islands which they not only IIcl- lenized, but made, so to speak, a part of their republic; they had the courage to forestall the Persians in appropriating them.'* It was, at any rate, decisive of the issue that the Athenians granted Aristagoras twenty ships, to which the Eretrians, from * Grote, " History of Greece," iv. p. 37 : " The islands of Lemnos and Imbros seem to have passed into the power of the Athenians at the time when Ionia revolted from the Persians." It is permissible to read in Grote and elsewhere the various conjectures concerning the date of this occupation without being exactly convinced by any one of them. Throughout the whole epoch our sole authority is Herodotus, who is no chronologer, and rather follows events in their essential connection than in their exact sequence in point of time. In this account we shall follow his example in giving prominence only to the former method. That which is legendary we may leave to itself. 11 1G2 GREECE AND PERSIA. friendship to Miletus, added iive more. The courage of the tomans was thus revived, and an attack upon the Persian dominion commenced, directed, not indeed against Susa, but against. Sardis, in their immediate neighborhood, the capital of the satrapy which imposed on them their heaviest burdens. If Lvdia had given them her support, the course of events might have taken an entirely different turn. But the Lvdians were disarmed, and far removed from any sympathy with the Ionians. Sardis and its temples were consumed by fire in a tumultuous attack; the Greeks did not even venture an as- sault upon the citadel, and withdrew before the forces of the Persians as soon as those were gathered together. In their retreat they were overtaken and utterly defeated; but the event sufficed to raise the momentous issue. By the burning 6f Sardis, in which a sanctuary of Ivybele had been destroyed, the Syrian nations had been outraged in the person of their gods. We know that it was part of the system of the Per- sians to take the gods of a country under their protection. Nor would the great king who thought himself appointed to be master o( the world fail to resent an invasion of his dominions as an insult calling for revenge. The hostile at- tempts o( the Ionians made no great impression upon him, but he asked who were the Athenians, of whose share in the campaign he had been informed. They were foreigners, of whose power the king had scarcely heard. It is said that Darius drew the bow, the symbol of power, and shot an ar- row into the sky, calling at the same time upon his god (whom the Greeks call Zeus, but who was doubtless the same whom the king mentions on his monuments, namely, Ahuramazda) to grant him vengeance, or rather chastisement, upon the Athenians. The enterprise of Aristagoras had meanwhile caused general commotion, lie had by far the larger part of Cyprus, together with the Carians, on his side. All the country near the Propontis and the Hellespont was in revolt. The Persians were compelled to make it their first concern to suppress this insurrection, a task which, if attempted by sea, did not promise to be an easy one. In their fust encounter with the Phoenicians the Ionians had the advantage. When, however, the forces of the great THE IONIAN REVOLT. 1G3 empire were assembled, the insurrection was everywhere put down. In Cyprus this result was principally due to the want of union among- the Greeks themselves, in Caria to the supe- riority of the Persians in the field.* On a former occasion the Egyptians had proposed to unite their forces with those of the Greeks, against the Persians; now the Egyptian ships of war were combined with the Phoenicians. The Perso-Plueni- cian fleet appeared upon the sea with an overwhelming display of force. Yet the issue was not decided at once. Perhaps the Ionians who had collected their forces at Lade, then still an island, might have achieved a success if they had made an attack upon the Phoenician fleet. To this step the bravest of their leaders, Dionysius of Phoksea, who, however, had only contributed three triremes, endeavored to persuade them. But the Ionians were not inclined to submit to the rigorous train- ing which he prescribed. Besides this, they were told that even it* they succeeded in destroying this fleet the king would levy a power five times as great. Meanwhile the superiority of the Persian land forces had displayed itself, and amongst the Ionians the desponding conviction began to spread that all their efforts would be in vain. Whilst this impression was general the exhortations of the tyrants they had expelled, though at first rejected, found at last a hearing. Even the Samians thought it better to save their sanctuaries and then- property by submission than to forfeit them by resistance. Accordinglj', when the Phoenicians sailed to the attack on the fleet they encountered only a partial resistance, though the Chians, the countrymen of Homer, displayed conspicuous but unavailing bravery. The Ionians suffered a complete de- feat. After this, Miletus could not be retained, and towns and * "We can fix the date of these events, because Thukydides places the death of Aristagoras thirty-two years before the experiment made by the Athenians in the year 465-4 u.c. to colonize the neighborhood in which Amphipolis subsequently lay. Aristagoras, according to this, must have been put to death in 497-0. But before his decease Cyprus and Cavia had been subdued ; and Cyprus had maintained its freedom for one year (cf. Clinton on the year 497). The year of freedom must, therefore, have been 499-8. This was preceded by the insurrection of Ionia, which may accordingly be assigned to the year 500. lG-± GREECE AND PERSIA. islands in rapid succession fell into the hands of the Persians. To lay waste districts and raze cities to the ground was no part of their policy; they employed their victory to introduce a regular government, such as might bring about a lasting subjection. They made provision to deter the Ionians from disturbing the peace of the country by dissensions with one another. After some time they even abolished the tyranny, the existence of which only continued to interfere with the establishment of a uniform obedience. Athens had taken no part in the naval war, but yet she felt the misfortune of the Ionians as her own. The poet who represented it upon the stage was punished ; the Athenians felt that in the course things were taking the next blow would fall on themselves. They were compelled to prepare to defend themselves single- handed against the gigantic and overwhelming power of the Great King. It must be reckoned among the consequences of the battle of Lade, by which the combination against the Persian empire had been annihilated, that King Darius, not content with hav- ing consolidated his dominion in Ionia, once more resumed the plan of pushing forward into Europe, of which his enter- prise against the Scythians formed part. With the execution of this project he commissioned one of the principal persons of the empire and the court, the son of one of the seven Per- sians who had taken so great a share in the elevation of the Achromcnidre, Mardonius by name, whom he united to his own family by marrying him to his daughter. To Mardonius are to be ascribed the institutions lately established in Ionia. This general crossed the Hellespont* with a large army, his fleet always accompanying him along the shore whilst he pushed on by the mainland. He once more subdued Make- donia, probably the districts which had not yet, like the Make- don ian king, been brought into subjection, and gave out that his aim was directed against Eretria and Athens, the enemies of the king. For the execution of this design it seemed in- dispensable that he should subdue the whole of the mainland, barbarian and Greek, without distinction. Yet this was more * 492 B.C. according to Clinton, 493 according to Cnrtius. FIRST PERSIAN INVASION. 105 than he could compass. la the stormy waters near Mount Athos, which have always made the navigation of the .zEgean difficult, his fleet suffered shipwreck. But without naval sup- ports he could not hope to gain possession of an island and a maritime town situated on a promontor} r . Even by land he encountered resistance, so that he found it advisable to post- pone the further execution of his undertakings to another time. Yet the situation was so far unchanged that the Per- sian power as a whole continued to expand, and threatened the life of Greece with extinction. The majority of the cities and towns complied with the demand made upon them and gave the king earth and water. In order to subdue the recalcitrants, especially Athens and Eretria, another attempt was organized without delay. Under two generals, one of whom, Datis, was a Mede, the other Artaphernes, the son of the satrap of Sardis of the same name, and brother of the Darius who was in alliance with Hippias, a maritime expedition was undertaken for the immediate sub- jugation of the islands and the maritime districts. It was not designed for open hostility against the Greeks in general. "Why flee ye, holy men?" said the Persians to those of Delos. Datis burned three hundred pounds of incense at the shrine venerated as the birthplace of the two deities. The religion of Ahuramazda did not forbid them to take foreign worships under their protection, and they were anxious not to have the Greek gods against them. Their design was to utilize the internal dissensions of Greece in conquering the principal enemies upon whom the Great King had sworn vengeance, and presenting them as captives at his feet. The project succeeded in the case of Eretria. In spite of a brave resistance it fell by treachery into their hands, and they could avenge the sacrilege committed at Sardis by plundering and devastat- ing Grecian sanctuaries. They expected now to be able to overpower Athens also without much trouble. Her enemies, amongst them the .zEginetans, had sent to the king the tokens of subjection, mainly in order to assure themselves of his support against her. Moreover, the Peisistratidre still had in the city and rural districts a party which Hippias, who acted as guide to the Persians, hoped to rouse to exertion. In a 100 GREECE AND TEKSIA. Straight line from that part of the coast which lay opposite the now subjugated Eubosa, he hoped to be able to push along the familiar road to Athens. Xo one as yet had been able to make a stand before the terror of the Persian arms, It was unlikely that the Athenians would venture on a struggle which, according to all previous experience, offered no pros- pect ot* success. The moment was one of the most important in their history. If the Persians had conquered Athens the doom of the democracy would probably have been sealed for- everj the dominion of the Peisistratida? would have been restored, and it would have been no longer the old dominion, but one far more violent, and supported by a league with Persia. Athens in all probability would have fallen into the same condition as that which had once been the lot of the Ionian cities under the tyrants. The Persian spirit would gradually have predominated over every other influence. It was a circumstance of great value to the Athenians that there was a man amongst them who was familiar with the Persian tactics. This was Miltiades, the son of Kimon. The old and distinguished family from which he was descended had risen to power in the process of colonizing the Thracian Chersonese, and twenty years before the date of these events Miltiades had succeeded to their position; he possessed a kind of princedom there, and united himself in marriage to the daughter of a Thracian prince. Thus lie had already come into contact with the Persians. It was no fault of his that the bridge over the .Danube over which King Darius had passed to invade the Scythians remained unbroken. When, subsequently, in consequence of the failure of the attempt on Sard is, that reaction took place which prompted the Persians to take steps for the reduction of the islands of the -Egean, he found it impossible, especially as he was hard pressed by other enemies as well, to maintain his ground upon the Cher- sonese, lie had retired before the Persian fleet, and with four triremes — for the fifth fell into their hands — had readied Athens. Although a Thracian prince, he had never ceased to be a eiti.'.en of Athens. Here lie was impeached for having held a tyranny, but was acquitted and chosen stratcgus, for democracy could not reject a man who was so admirably MARATHON. 1G7 qualified to be at their head in the interchange of hostilities with Persia. Miltiades was conducting his own personal quar- rel in undertaking the defence of Attica. The force of the Persians was indeed incomparably the larger,-' but the plains of Marathon, on which they were drawn up, prevented their proper deployment, and they saw with astonishment the Athenian hoplites displaying a front as extended as their own. These troops now rushed upon them with an impetus which grew swifter at every moment. The Persians easily succeeded in breaking through the centre of the Athenian army ; but that was of no moment, for the strength of the onset lay in the two wings, where now began a hand-to-hand fight. The Persian sword, formidable else- where, was not adapted to do good service against the bronze armor and the spear of the Hellenes. On both flanks the Athenians obtained the advantage, and now attacked the Persian centre, which was not able to withstand the onslaught of men whose natural vigor was heightened by gymnastic training. The Persians, to their misfortune, had calculated upon desertion in the ranks of their opponents : foiled in this hope, they retreated to the shore and to their ships.f * Justin (ii. 9, 9) estimates their number at G00,000 men, Cornelius Ne- pos (Miltiades, c. 4, 2) at 100,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. Even from this total much must be deducted, for, as the troops had to be brought over by sea, their number could not have been so immense. On the other hand, the Athenians and Plaheans have been estimated at 10,000 men (Nepos, Miltiades, c. 5, 1). Justin reckons 10,000 Athenians, 1000 Pla- taeans. But when we consider that the Athenians put forth all their strength, and that later on at Platoca, although a great part of them were in the fleet, they set 1G,000 men in the field, we may, perhaps, feel some doubts as to the scantiness of their numbers. Mitford (" History of Greece," ii. Ill) supposes 15,000 heavy-armed men and as many or even more light-armed. Bockh reminds us (" Die Staatshaushaltung der Athe- ner," i. p. 276) that the estimates are only to be understood of the num- ber of the hoplites. t The battle of Marathon falls in the archonship of Phsenippus, 01. 72, 3=490 B.C., in the fifth year before the death of Darius and the tenth before the enterprise of Xerxes against Greece (cf. Clinton, "Fasti Hell." ii. under this year, and p. 24G). The day of the battle is said by Plu- tarch to have been the 6th of Boedromion. Some modern writers, how- [68 GREECE and PERSIA. Berodotna intimates that the Persians had secret intelli- gence with B party in Athens,* ami took their course round the promontory o( Sunium towards the city, in the hope of surprising it. l>ut when they came to anchor the Athenians had arrived also, ami they saw themselves once more con- fronted by the victors of Marathon. The truth o( the distinction which Aristagoras once drew between the CI recks and the Orientals was now continued, not, indeed, in an attack such as he, anticipating the remote future, had suggested, but in resistance. They had not made a OOll quest, bul Athens had been saved. I am not inclined to cloud the splendor of their exploit by a calculation of probabilities, for which extant traditions are quite inade- quate to form the basis. It was a blow which the Persians attempted in overwhelming force by Land and sea, parried by the Athenians with dexterous boldness and under successful generalship, an occurrence o( no great compass in a military sense, but pregnant with the future and like a solemn utter- ance of destiny. King Darius, in whom the spirit of the Persian power was so faithfully mirrored, was still living. Heat least succeeded in remedying by forethought the great defect attaching to monarchy in the East, the uncertainty of the succession. Among the sons borne to him by different wives he appoint- ed the one who was an Aclnetnenid also on the mother's side, Xerxes (Khshay&rsh&), to be his successor; so that a contest for the throne, such as so often broke out in later times, was avoided. The empire was at the climax of its power and prosperity. The disastrous attack on Attica was accompanied bv a commotion in Egypt. Darius subdued it, and it seemed ever, have thought it probable that Plutarch has confused the day of thanksgiving with that of the battle. In particular this is the opinion of B&ckh ( u Zur Qeschichte dor Mondcyclen der Hellenen," p. 66 sq.^; he assigns tin- battle to the 17th ofMetageitnion=2 Sept • The alcmseonidn, as many supposed: but the charge is. with good reason, contradicted by Herodotus, vi. 116, 10 1 Bq, The Alcmseonidn expelled EEippias, whom the Persians were endeavoring to restore, and introduced the democracy, to which the vigorous resistance of Athens was ohieflj due. \1K\KS. | ( ;.) quite certain that he would now resume the enterprise against Greeoe, when in the year 485 lie died. We read with pleasure, in Eerodotus, the deliberations whioh the young Xerxes, an early Porphyrogenitus, is said to have held upon the renewal «>t' a campaign against the Greeks. We gather from it all that could be said for and against the expedition. In its favor was the proud oonvicr tioh which the Persians cherished, that they were the first race in the world, and that to them belonged universal do- minion, the solo obstacle in their way being the resistance Of the Greeks; if this were overpowered, the sir of Leaven would form the sole limit o( their empire. Against il were urged the disastrous experiences ^A' the last, oampaigns of eon- quest undertaken by Cyrus, Oambyses, and Darius himself; and thus occasion is taken to bring into prominence the idea of the Greek religion that the ^n\* show no favor to those Who have reached too high a pinnacle of greatness. Never theless, the resolution was taken, upon the ground of men- acing dreams whioh constantly reonrred. Thai this account really accords with facts no one would think of maintaining; it. constitutes the beginning Of that historic epos which He- rodotus has left to posterity, a work constructed with mar- vellous narrative power, but not without n legendary element mingled with authentic history. To an historian living in a later age it might seem that the enterprise could soaroely have been the subject of much debate. The expedition of Datis and Arlaphernes had only been an attempt to decide the issue at a single blow. It was frustrated ; and the undertaking was resumed which Mardoniua had formerly contemplated in the course of the campaign beyond the Danube, and had begun to execute on an extensive scale, but which had been inter- rupted in consequence of unforeseen disasters. It is very intelligible that a young prince who had just ascended the throne should have taken it in hand. Me did so, putting forth all his resources in the full consciousness that it was a task of the very widest scope. It would he unprofitable to repeat the details which Herodotus gives in a narrative in which Persian and Grecian legends are interwoven. Yet, amid the rest, some facts of historical value emerge. In the 170 GREECE AND PERSIA. work of bridging the Hellespont we are made sensible of the difference between the times of Darius and those of Xerxes. Under Darius the Ionians had been the artificers of the bridge; under Xerxes it was chiefly the Phoenicians and Egyptians who were engaged on it. The ropes of the first bridge were made of flax ; those of the second of papyrus. The whole was the work of the most skilful craftsmen among the Ori- entals."* The same hands also pierced through the isthmus which connects Mount Athos with the mainland, so that the ships could avoid the dangers with which Mardonius had to struggle in rounding the promontory. Not merely for the campaign in which they were engaged, but for the general command of the ^Egean Sea, the undertaking was of the greatest importance, and it appears indisputable that the skill of the Oriental nations in marine engineering proved equal to the task.f In the Thermaic Gulf Xerxes united his forces on land and sea. Both were of colossal dimensions; the land forces are estimated at more than a million warriors, with the addi- tion of 80,000 cavalry, the number of the ships at more than 1200. In the army it would seem the Persians had the ex- clusive command ; on sea the Phoenician squadron was the most considerable. It was a display of power fitted to sup- port the Persian claim to the empire of the world. On the other hand, the Greeks were disunited and careless. Not only the Aleuadse in Thessaly, whose object it was to secure for themselves the dominion in that country, but also power- ful cities and communities, such as Argos and Thebes, which supposed that in this way they were best providing for their security, came over to the king's side. The sentiment of Panhellenism was only in the germ, and far from sufficient to unite the divided cities and districts. It is affirmed of Gelon, the tyrant of Syracuse, that he was only awaiting the event in order to submit to the Persians, if, as was to be ex- * The expression in Herod, vii. 36, " other master builders " (d\\oi apxi- TiKTortg), applied to those employed after the first mishap, implies no change of nationality, but only a change of persons. t As regards the fact of this achievement, I side with Leake and Grote (" History of Greece," v. p. 30). SECOND PERSIAN INVASION. 171 pected, the victory rested with them, because he might then have counted upon finding support from the Great King against the Carthaginians, by whom he was hard pressed at the time. Strictly speaking, it is only Sparta and Athens that can be regarded as determined enemies to the Persians. They had thrown the heralds of the late king, when they de- manded the tokens of subjection, into pits or wells, and had bidden them fetch earth and water from thence. They had now to apprehend the vengeance of the king, and therefore held together, without, however, any real bond of sympathy. The greatest danger for the Greeks lay in the combination of the Persian military and naval forces. The first attempt at resistance, made by a body of men gathered in the vale of Tempo, in numbers which might have been formidable in a struggle among the mountains, had to be abandoned, since the Persian fleet was able at any moment to land troops who would have attacked the defending force in the rear. In a second position, which the Greeks resolved to maintain, their maritime armament was far better able to co-operate with their land force. Whilst the Spartans, under their kino- Le- onidas, held the pass of Thermopylte, the Athenians, with daring courage, defended the strait between the mainland and the promontory of Artemisium, in Eubcea. The conduct of the Spartans at Thermopylae was characterized by steadfast valor and obedience to their laws, and has supplied a model for all later time; but they fell a sacrifice to overwhelming numbers, and to that treachery which even here was found at work. In consequence of this the Athenian fleet had to withdraw from the strait, and the stream of Persian con- quest swept on unchecked. The greater part of the Greek populations — Bceotia, Phokis, Doris — joined the Great King. It is strange to note that claims of mythological origin, based especially on Perseus and the Phrygian Pelops, recurred to men's memories. Sparta was only concerned to bar the pas- sage by land into the Peloponnesus, and the Persians were able to push without impediment into the territory of Attica. We must bear in mind the whole situation in order to do justice to the resolution formed by the Athenians. The armed force which returned from Artemisium no sooner land- 172 GREECE AND PERSIA. ed than they caused proclamation to be made that every one should leave the country with all that belonged to him, and that all capable of bearing arms should be prepared to serve in the fleet. We do not find it distinctly stated, at any rate in our oldest authority, that this step was taken in con- sequence of a vote of the democratic assembly.* There is, however, an irresistible force of circumstances which controls the resolves of men. There was no other course open. The oracle of Delphi had announced in mysterious language that all was lost, but to a second despairing appeal had replied by directing that Athens should protect herself behind wooden walls. On this occasion the Athenians profited by the pres- ence amongst them of one who was at once a born sailor and a man of the widest ideas. This was Themistocles, who had already persistently directed all the resources of the republic, even to the neglect of every individual interest, to increasing the power of his state at sea. Never had any city possessed a navy at all comparable to that of Athens, and, in spite of all her losses at Artemisium, she had emerged from that contest with the glory of successful seamanship. Although others wished to interpret the oracle by a reference to antiquity, the explanation of Themistocles, that by the wooden walls were meant the ships, found most support. The Athenians obeyed the command without resistance, yet, as may well be imagined, not without pain. They left their country, in- trusting, as it were, its numerous sanctuaries to the protec- tion of the gods. Nevertheless, the Persians encountered no * In later authors a resolution to this effect is ascribed to the assembly of the people or to the Areopagus as invested with extraordinary powers (Plutarch, " Themist." c. 10 ; Cicero, "De Officiis," i. "20, 75). In Herod- otus nothing of the kind is stated. His words would lead us to suppose that the order had proceeded immediately from the commanders of the fleet (viii. 41) : 'AOiji'aloi Karscrxov ig ti)v tavrwv. /(fr K))pv- y/xa tTroo'/ffttiTO, 'ABtjvaiwv ry nfi dvvarai fnu-fu' tu rtKi'a ts kcii rove ouceraff. The armed force declared that the country could not be saved, and that the security of its inhabitants was only to be found in flight to Salamis or other places of safety; the step is not attributed to the orders of the tribunal named above, or to any regularly conducted deliberation. Nev- ertheless, that which the commanders of the fleet proclaimed recommend- ed itself to the judgment of the country. SECOND PERSIAN INVASION. 173 obstacle in taking possession of it, and the lofty Acropolis and the temple of Aglaurus with the everlasting olive were burned. The Peisistratida?, who on this occasion also accom- panied the invading army, found only a scanty remnant of the inhabitants gathered round the priests in charge of the temples; all the rest had evacuated the country and taken to the ships. This may fairly be reckoned the greatest among the great resolves recorded in history ; it reminds us of the Gueux, betaking themselves with all their possessions to their ships, to find there a refuge for their freedom. But the self- devotion of the Athenians far excelled theirs. We might be tempted to set the evacuation of Attica beside the burning of Moscow. Yet comparisons are of little service. When all is said, the action retains a local and individual stamp which con- stitutes its character and its title to fame. The immediate question was, how far a migration of this kind could lead to the desired end. Themistocles found himself looked upon in the council of the allies as one with- out a home. With a proud consciousness of his own dignity, he protested that the home of Athens was now within her walls of wood, and that, if the Athenians were left unsup- ported in Greece, they would seek a new country for them- selves in Italy. His own design, however, supported by the inclination of the people embarked in the fleet, was, to bring on a decisive naval battle in the immediate neighborhood. To those who opposed him, many of whom would have pre- ferred to retreat to the Isthmus, Themistocles represented that, on the withdrawal of the fleet, the Persian army would make a forward movement, which would put the Pelopon- nesus into serious danger, and that, without the assistance of the Athenians, the rest of the allies would certainly be lost, whilst in the open sea, near the Isthmus, they would tight at a greater disadvantage than in the narrow Gulf of Salami's. Everything goes to show that the Greeks were under an ab- solute necessity of fighting on the spot — the Athenians be- cause they were resolved either never to leave their native land while they saw it in the possession of the enemy, or to leave it at once and forever ; the rest because they could not acquiesce in the departure of the Athenians without hazard- 174 GREECE AND PERSIA. ing their own existence. Xerxes did not doubt that he should master both elements of opposition, and, confident of victory, caused a throne to be erected upon the rocks by the sea-shore, that he might witness in person the heroism of his sailors.* He believed that he was directing the final blow which was to make Hellas his own. But at this very moment he ceased to be master of the sit- uation, for he allowed himself to be tempted by the cunning Athenian into bringing on the decisive issue in the waters of a gulf, where his superiority of force could not be displayed with advantage. The Persian vessels, advancing; in the ex- pectation of finding their enemy in flight, were received by the spirited poean of the Greeks, which — so the narrative runs — was re-echoed from the roadsteads of the island and the shores of the mainland. Themistocles awaited his opportu- nity, and restrained for a brief interval the advance of the Greek vessels, until the hour when the wind usually begins to blow more strongly, and raises a chopping sea in the gulf. This was a point in favor of the Greeks, for the Phoenician vessels, more cumbrous in their movements, were ill adapted to a struggle in narrow waters. This was the time chosen by Themistocles for beginning the main attack. He had no need to fear that his line would be turned. His one aim was to throw the approaching enemy into confusion by a vigorous and well-directed onset, and to drive them back. The result was due, above all, to the fact that, whilst the Persian king watched the emulous efforts of the various maritime nations united beneath his sway as one observing a spectacle, the leader of the Greeks, straining all the resources of his genius and his skill, and profiting by every advantage, commanded in person a people whose whole future depended upon the victory of the hour. The different squadrons of the Persian fleet were incapable of concerted action. Upon the first un- expected success of the Greeks they fell into disorder and confusion. Artemisia, Queen of Halicarnassus, who was serv- ing under the Persians, ran into and sunk a ship belonging to * The presence of Xerxes is mentioned by Herodotus (viii. 90) and by Plutarch (Themistocles, c. 13). SAL AMIS. 175 them in order to secure her own safety. Whilst the Persian ships were retiring from the struggle with the Athenians they were intercepted, and some of them captured, by the vessels of the .zEginetans, who now in the general peril had come to the support of the Athenians, and exchanged their old jeal- ousy for honorable emulation. The demeanor of Xerxes as he sat upon his throne, his astonishment, his horror, his de- spair, are incidents of capital importance in the epic story of Herodotus. The success of his whole undertaking depended, in fact, upon success in a naval engagement. He was now conscious that he was defeated, but if his fleet lost the com- mand of the sea even his return was imperilled, and with it the stability of the whole empire.* How great was the anx- iety for the king's safe return is evidenced by the story that, in the overladen ship which was conveying him past the north- ern gulfs of the iEgean Sea, he fancied himself in personal danger, but had only to say that now he should see who loved him, when a number of Persians at once flung themselves into the sea to secure their sovereign's life. Whilst the Persians thus showed how closely their internal organization and foreign dominion were bound up in the life of the king, as a necessary factor in their own existence, the Greeks, on their part, did nothing to endanger his personal safety or prevent his return. On the other hand, with a loyal attachment to their gods, they did not doubt that they would avenge on the Persians the injuries they had inflicted on their temples and their religious rites. Nevertheless, this did not tempt them to form plans of attack, such as those which had formerly been amongst the dreams of Aristagoras. But they had now, as they thought, certain evidence that the gods were * The battle of Salamis falls in the archonship of Calliades (Maruior Parium, ep. 51 ; cf. Herod, viii. 51), 480 b.c. As to the day of the battle, Plutarch, gives several discordant dates, of which only that under Ca- millus, c. 19, can be harmonized with the narrative of Herodotus. Ideler (" Handbuch der mathematischen und technischcn Chronologie," i. p. 309) cannot make up his mind between September 23 — the day adopted by Petavius — and October 20, preferred by Dodwell. Bockh (" Zur Ge- schichte der Mondcyclen bei den Hellenen," p. 74) assigns the battle to September 20. 170 GREECE AND PERSIA. not minded to see Asia and Europe united under one ruler — in other words, that the gods had not appointed Hellas to form a portion of the Persian empire. The task immediately before them was, accordingly, to compel the retreat of the Persians who were still encamped on Grecian soil. In the ensuing summer we see the two fleets lying opposite to each other, the Persians near Samos, the Greeks near Delos, without, however, joining battle. Everything depended upon the issue of the struggle by land. Mardonius, who had conducted the first expedition, and had made preparations for the second, had no intention of giving way. He still felt confident of bringing about a decision in favor of the Persians ; he de- signed even to bring the Athenians over to his side by restor- ing their land and recognizing their independence. In this he completely misconstrued the temper which his attacks had aroused in the people of Attica. Only one man, named Lykidas, was found in Salamis to advise submitting these pro- posals to the people. The mere thought was enough to ex- cite the fury of the multitude. Lykidas was stoned by the people, and as, when the traitor was stoned at Jericho, all his house had to expiate his offence, so now the Athenian women stoned the Avife and children of the obnoxious person. Who- ever took part in a trespass against the gods of the country was to be wiped from the face of the earth. It is well known that all the Greeks did not share the enthusiasm of the Athenians. A number of the Greek pop- ulations were still ranged on the side of the Medo-Persians. But now Lakedaemon roused herself in support of Athens. The republics so fundamentally opposed to each other, the 1 )euios of the Spartiatoe and the Demos of Athens, made com- mon cause. The danger was still pressing. Mardonius had quitted Attica because it offered no ground suitable for his cavalry. The Athenians had already returned in great num- bers. They marshalled their forces to the number of 8000 heavy-armed men at Eleusis. They would scarcely have been able to defend themselves against a renewed invasion, and probably they would have been ruined, if the Spartans had not brought the power of Peloponnesus to their support. On a former occasion, when the Spartans had in view the PLATiEA. 177 conquest of Athens, it was at Eleusis that the Peloponnesians had separated from them. Now, when the general freedom was at stake, they came to their aid ; to this extent, at any rate, the idea of Panhellenism had infused itself into their political life. Corinth set 5000 men in the field, Sikyon and Megara 3000 men eacli ; small contingents presented them- selves from .zEgina, the Arcadian towns, and the shores and plains in the neighborhood. The 5000 Spartiatce, led by their king, Pansanias, the guardian of the young son left by Leonidas, were each attended by seven helots. They were joined by an equal force of the Perioeki, heavily armed. All ranks of the population, the rulers, the ruled, the freemen, were united. The number of the whole army is reckoned at more than 100,000 men; but it was absolutely without cav- alry, whereas it was in their cavalry that the strength of the Persians chiefly consisted. The eye surveys a strange scene as it glances now at the Greeks, whose varieties of aspect marked the different localities from which they were gathered, and now at the host of Asiatics by whom they were confronted. Mardonins had under him not only Persians, but Medes, the principal representatives of the ancient Iran, Bactrians, even Indians of kindred stock, and finally some Scythian troops, the Sakae. These he ranged opposite to the Lakeda?- monians and their Dorian allies ; to the Athenians, on the other hand, he opposed the Greeks who had come over to his side, the Boeotians, Locrians, Phokians, and Thessalians. The shock of the two armies took place in the marches of the Platsean territory. It promised, one might suppose, to be a battle of the two nations in the grand style. Yet it did not, in fact, prove to be so. Mardonins was indisputably the better prepared. His cavalry, which had sustained some few losses, but had not been materially weakened, prevented the conveyance of provisions over Mount Kithaaron, and even cut off the Greeks from the water of the Asopus. A spring which supplied them ceased to run, and they saw themselves com- pelled to look out for another position. At the very crisis of this dangerous movement they were attacked by the Persians. There was every probability that they would bo defeated, especially since even at this juncture they were lit- 12 178 GREECE AND PERSIA. tie subservient to command, and each troop acted without concert and according to its own inclination. Mardonius had once ere this proposed to the Lakedremonians to bring the great struggle between barbarians and Greeks to a decision by a kind of duel between champions selected from the flower of the Spartan and Persian warriors. ]STo answer had been returned to this suggestion, but the course of events brought about something which resembled it. When the cavalry had desisted from the pursuit, the best-disciplined of the Persian troops advanced to fight out their quarrel with the Spartans, the flower of the Greek army. Then, however, was manifested the great distinction between barbarians and Hellenes. The former could, indeed, employ their offensive weapons with skill, but they had no defensive armor. Throw- ing themselves upon the Spartans in small companies of ten men each, they were crushed at all points, and had to abandon the struggle. Mardonius, whose presence was recognized through the white horse on which he rode, fell, mortally wounded, at the same time. His death caused a general dis- couragement among the Persians. They hastened back to their camp, which was not adequately fortified. It is strange that in both battles minor incidents — the rapid advance of the Athenians at Marathon, the resolute stand made by the Spartans at Platcea — were decisive of the issue. The Persian camp yielded to the attack of the Greeks, among whom this time the Athenians once more bore off the palm by their readiness of resource. A hideous massacre annihilated the army which had been designed for the conquest of Greece. One detachment, indeed, led by a Persian, had taken no part in the battle. They retreated in haste, owing their freedom from molestation to the fact that the news of the defeat had not } T et spread, and went first into Thrace and next to Byzan- tium, whence vessels conveyed them over into Asia. The enterprise owed its conception to Mardonius, who perished in the course of it. Two brief encounters by sea and by land had sufficed to frustrate the attempts of the Per- sians to obtain a foothold in Europe and subdue Hellas. To appreciate the contrast between the contending powers it is sufficient to call to mind the proposal made to the Spartan MYCALE. 170 king, Pausanias, to avenge Leonidas, whose body had been impaled by the Persians, by treating the corpse of Mardonius in the same manner. Pausanias rejected the proposition as an outrage, and forbade its renewal; it was worthy, he said, of a barbarian, not of a Greek. A whole world of reflections is suggested by this refusal. The contrast between East and West is expressed by it in characters which were destined to be distinctive of their subsequent history. At the same moment that the Persian power was over- thrown in Hellas the supremacy of the Hellenes in the ^Egean Sea became a reality. The occurrence of both bat- tles on the same day, and the apparently miraculous transmis- sion of the news of the victory at Platsea to the shores of Ionia, may raise questions which we prefer to leave open. Yet it is obvious that both events were homogeneous in the im- pulses from which they sprang and the consequences to which they led. The Persian fleet left its station at Samos, prob- ably because it had become evident that no reliance could be placed on the Ionians, in whose shipping the maritime strength of the Persians consisted. The Phoenicians entirely gave up their share in the struggle and sailed homewards. To save the rest of the ships there seemed to be no other course open but to draw them up on the shore and to secure them against hostile attack by means of a rampart. Thus the crews of the vessels fought with each other upon land, the scene of action being the promontory of Mycale. Here, again, the superior skill of the Greeks prevailed over the valor of the Persians. The question is said to have been discussed whether the Ionians who had been faithful to the Hellenic cause might not be transplanted once more to their native soil, and placed in possession of the districts of those tribes who had sympa- thized with Persia; but such a transference was an under- taking of too wide a scope to be attempted. All that was finally achieved was the admission of the most important isl- ands, Lesbos, Chios, and Samos, into the Symmachia, or war- like confederacy of the Hellenes. The islanders took a solemn vow not to desert that alliance. This of itself was a success of even greater moment for the future than for the present. But the integrity of the Persian empire was undisturbed. ISO GREECE AND PERSIA. The invasion of Greece by the Persians must be placed in the same category with their undertakings against the Massa- getse, the Ethiopians, and the nomad Scythians, all being at- tempts to extend the empire beyond its natural limits. In the other countries on the Persian frontier the resistance was only passive ; in Greece it took the extremely active form which henceforward characterized it throughout. For the immediate present, however, that active opposition was impeded, or rather interrupted, by internal divisions. As a rule a war marked by great events is succeeded by civil dis- turbances even in the states which have issued victorious from the struggle. This was the case after the Persian war even in Sparta, secured though she was by her rigorous legal system. It was obviously inconsistent to intrust the kings with the conduct of the army, uncontrolled as yet by the presence of an aristocratic council,* and, after they had grown accustomed to universal obedience, and had returned with the glory earned by great achievements, to attempt to subject them to the rigorous censorship of the Ephors. It may easily be conceived that the two Spartan kings who had rendered the greatest service to the common cause, Pausanias by land, Leotychides at the head of the naval force, declined to sub- mit after their return to the laws by which their power was fettered. They were compelled, first the one and then the other, to go into exile. Leotychides took refuge with the Arcadians, f who were independent members of the league; Pausanias retired to Byzantium, where his proximity to the Persian frontier gave him a certain independence, so much so that he incurred the suspicion of desiring to ally himself with the king of Persia. The Spartiatre required Pausanias to re- turn, and threatened to wage war upon him if he refused. The opposition of the kings to the aristocracy went hand in hand with a movement among their subjects, who also had * According to Thuk. v. G3, the law, in virtue of which ten ovfifiovXoi were assigned to the king, was not enacted till the year 418. t Leotychides was accused of treason to the state; it was alleged that he might have conquered all Thessaly, but had allowed himself to be bribed, and was caught in the fact (in avrotywpy ciXoi'f) with his hand full of silver (Herod, vi. 72). ' PAUSANIAS. 181 taken part in the war ; and it would seem as if the kings bad designed to set themselves at their head and deliver them- selves from the fetters of the aristocracy. But the latter had grown too powerful to be displaced. The victor of Platsea, who had obeyed the injunction to return, came to a miserable end. Religious scruples forbade his enemies to slay him in the sanctuary in which he had sought asylum, or to drag him away by force, but they removed the roof and sealed the door. They kept him prisoner thus until he was exhausted by hun- ger, and only dragged him forth when he was breathing his last.* Leotychides was too cautious to return, and died at Tegea. But the death of Pausanias was closely connected with an insurrection of the helots and a revolt of the Messe- nians, while the flight of Leotychides to Tegea is associated with a war with Arcadia and Argos. This war was only brought to a close after two great battles, whilst the helots were not suppressed without a similar effort. We here ob- tain a glance into a world in ferment, where the monarchy, in its effort for independence, makes common cause with the insubordinate members of the league and their own revolted subjects. It was only by the severest struggles that the aris- tocracy prevailed. They were even compelled, in order to subdue the Messenians, to invoke the assistance of the Athe- nians, although the latter regarded the Messenians as of kin- dred stock with themselves. Ferments still more violent had broken out in the Athe- nian commonwealth. Heads of the state are equally indis- pensable to republics, whether democratic or oligarchical, and yet are equally intolerable to either. The Athenians had for a while followed with blind acquiescence the guidance of Themistocles. Thukydides admires in Themistocles that prompt intuition which made it possible for him to hit upon the best expedient in pressing difficulties, and even to pene- trate the secrets of the future. If we understand him aright he ascribes to him the perfection of a healthy common-sense * Pausanias is instanced by Aristotle ("Pol." v. 6, 2=p. 208, 2 Bekker) to illustrate the words tdv rig fdyag y icai cvvajXEvog in /xei^ojv tlvai, 'iva fiovap- xy, and is compared with Hanno of Carthage. 132 GREECE AND PERSIA. ready to meet every crisis, without the need of previous de- liberation or discipline. He rendered an inestimable service to Greece and to the world by concentrating all the power of Athens in her maritime life, and leading her to her goal by his energy and finesse. But in this his design was directed not only against the Medo-Persians, but also against the Lake- dnemonians, the most important members of the Greek con- federacy. It was due to him that the walls of Athens were rebuilt, against the wish of the Spartans. Themistocles threw obstacles in the way of the negotiations, and purposely de- layed them until the work had advanced too far to be broken off. A model for all succeeding Athenian statesmen, he did not forget, whilst repelling the Medo-Persian invasion, to op- pose the preponderance of Sparta. The exclusion of the cities which had displayed Median sympathies from the Amphicty- onic council was prevented by him, because it would have turned the balance of power by land in favor of the Spartans. Another of his services was the fortification of the Peirpeus. This harbor, the finest in Greece, two miles in circuit, and as much as twenty fathoms deep, is well protected from the winds, and offers good anchorage. Perhaps those mighty foundation walls, which are still to be seen jutting out from the promontory which forms the entrance, across the mouth of the harbor, are to be assigned to his epoch and to his hand. In the midst of his achievements he indulged a keen sense of his personal merit. It is a saying ascribed to him by tra- dition that he did not know how to tune a lyre, but could turn an insignificant state into a great one. On the floating corpses of those slain in the naval engagement were to be seen golden chains and other ornaments. " Gather these up," said he to his attendant, "for thou art not Themistocles." To efface his own personality in the true republican spirit was not in his nature. Tie willingly bore the expense of tragic contests, but he claimed that the records of these should be inscribed with his name. He was ostentatious, insolent, and even cruel, and loved splendor even more than he loved authority. Themistocles belongs to that class of politicians who never at any time regard themselves as bound by previ- ous stipulations, but consider all means permissible which con- THEMISTOCLES. 183 duce to their end. A nature such as his, whose conduct under all conditions obeyed the impulse of an ambitious spirit, could only find a place in a democratic republic so long as great emergencies made it indispensable. The ingenious expedient employed in the Athenian re- public, of banishing by ostracism individuals whose grow- ing power endangered political equality, was directed against Themistocles.* Sparta, no less than Athens, found him in- supportable. In the proceedings against Pausanias circum- stances were brought to light which justified the reproach that he had known and concealed the designs of the Spartan king. Sparta and Athens took steps in concert to arrest the victor of Salamis for having made a compact with the enemy whom he had then repulsed. Themistocles withdrew from Argos, where he was sojourning, to Korkyra, and then to Ad- metus, king of the Molossians, in whom he feared to find an enemy, having formerly advised the rejection of a request preferred by him at Athens. The suppliant was admitted to protection, but could not tarry there long. He had a hun- dred talents with him, the Great King had set another two hundred upon his head, and to a pirate he would have proved a rich prize. Themistocles nevertheless passed safely to Eph- esus, from which, conducted by a Persian, he penetrated into the heart of the empire, and at last reached the Persian court to seek safety with the enemy whom he had driven out of Greece. He was received, not as an enemy, but as a friend. Three important cities were assigned him for his maintenance, in the chief of which, Magnesia, his grave was shown in later times. We are reluctantly compelled to reject the accounts of later historians, according to which the king to whom The- mistocles made his escape was Xerxes, who is said to have con- templated sending into the field against the Greeks the man * Diodorus (xi. 54) assigns the ostracism of Themistocles to the arch- onship of Praxiergus, 01. 75, 2=471-470 b.c. With this agrees the date in Cornelius Nepos (" Aristides," c. 3), " Aristides decessit fere post an- num quartum quam Themistocles Athenis crat expulsus." Aristeides lived to witness the representation of JEschylus's "CEdipodeia" (Plutarch, "Aristides,"' c. 3), which took place 01. 78, 1=457 b.c. ISi GREECE AND PERSIA. by whom he had been defeated.* Themistocles, it is said, could not bring himself to consent to such a proposal, and at a banquet with his friends he offered sacrifice to the gods and then slew himself. But the story indicates the light in which Themistocles was regarded by the generation which succeed- ed him. The essential feature in the accounts given of the fate of Fausanias and Themistocles, apart from the fabulous touches added by tradition, is that both the generals to whom the suc- cessful issue of the war against the Fersians was principally due soon afterwards fell into disfavor with the communities to which they belonged. Fausanias was destroyed by the Gerusia. Themistocles took refuge with the Fersians. who gave him their protection, after which he disappears. Pos- terity has not been able to recall the living image of Fausa- nias. but we know more of Themistocles. lie is perhaps the first man who appears upon the scene of universal history as a creature of flesh and blood, playing a part at times the re- verse of praiseworthy, yet always great. Amid the clash of the great forces of the world his will was to rule and never to be ruled, but those forces were too strong for him, and he was overwhelmed by them. Yet while the worker succumbed, his work survived the storm and lived for centuries. The- mistocles is the founder of the historical greatness of Athens. To return to the war between Hellenes and Fersians.it is clear from this example that the Great King had but little to * According to the tradition of Ephorus, Demon, Cleitarehus. Hera- cleides (Plutarch, '• Themist."* 37), Xerxes was then still alive. On the other hand, Thukydides makes Themistoeles arrive in Persia in the reign of Axtaxerxes. Plutarch has attempted to combine the two accounts, and thus has imparted to the first and original account an entirely fabulous aspect. The account as it appears in Plutarch presupposes a state of tranquillity such as. after the murder of Xerxes by Artabanus, who even seems to have introduced an interregnum, is not probable. The tradition here has traits of a fabulous nature. In Diodorus (zLc, 58) the legend appears less overladen with imaginary details than else- where. The main statement rests upon historical grounds, as is proved by two extant coins which Themistocles caused to be coined in Mag- nesia after the Attic standard (cf. Brandis, "Das Munz. Mass- und Ge- wichtsweseu in Vorderasien." pp. 887, 459). WAR WITH PERSIA. 1S5 fear in the way of reprisals from his enemies in the "West. It was improbable that in either the aristocratic or democratic republic, or in the Greek community at large, any power or any individual would arise likely to prove dangerous to him- self. It is, moreover, an error to ascribe to the Greeks de- signs of this kind. The overthrow of the Persian monarchy, which rested on political conditions totally dissimilar to their own, they could not have projected. But they contemplated and seriously undertook the restoration of that state of things which had preceded the attacks of Persia. They were un- ceasing in their efforts to expel the Persians from Thrace, to give freedom to the cities on the Asiatic coast, to recover their naval supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean, to sever Cyprus, and perhaps even Egypt, once more from the great monarchy. Even for this object, no voluntary combination of all the Hellenes, not even so much as concerted action be- tween Sparta and Athens, was to be expected, for, as we have said, in Sparta the paramount influence which a successful general might bring to bear upon the domestic condition of their republic was an object of dread. The Spartans had no real objection to allowing Athens to take the lead in the con- flicts with Persia, a position which seemed to be justified by the growth of her maritime power.* Sparta connived at the formation of that maritime confed- eracy in which the islands and seaports which were menaced by the Persians attached themselves to Athens, who con- tented herself in return with moderate contributions, without limiting the autonomy of her allies in home affairs. This is the Delian League, of the progress of which we shall soon have more to say. The two great men, Aristeides, alternate- ly the friend and the opponent of Themistocles, and Kimon, the son of the victor of Marathon, acted here in concert, the * Demosthenes in his third Philippic (iii. c. 33, p. 116) fixes the dura- tion of the Athenian hegemony at seventy-three years (TTjooorarai fdv vtui£ t^cofu'iKorza trt] Kai rpia tyiveaOE, Trpoardrai ci rpuiKovra iroQ Skovra Aactfai/iovtot). If we count from the end (01. 93,4=4:04 B.C.) of the Poloponnesian war. 01. To. 4=477 b.c. appears to be the date of the com- mencement of the hegemony of the Athenians, and with this Diodorus agrees, who places it (xi. 44) in the archonship of Adeimantus. 1SG GREECE AND PERSIA. first in negotiation, the second in resolute and successful en- terprises. At first Kimon directed his efforts to the north, where he could combine the advantage of the state with that private family interest of which we have spoken above. On the Strymon he attacked the Persians, by whom the Athe- nians had been expelled from those regions, and subdued them with the assistance of the surrounding tribes. The Persian general burned himself, like Sardanapalus, in the midst of his treasures. The Chersonese fell into Kimon's hands after a strucro-le with the Persians and their allies the Thracians. DO The conquered districts were portioned out to colonists from Athens. His next step, an invitation to the Greek cities on the shores of Asia to recover their freedom, could not be attended by any marked success as long as the combined naval forces of Persia and Phoenicia were paramount in the eastern Medi- terranean. Accordingly, it was against this supremacy that the chief efforts of Athens and her allies were directed. Kimon, at the head of a squadron of 200 sail, undertook an expedition designed to support the Greek cities on the south- ern coast of Asia Minor in their struggle for emancipation, and to expel the Persian garrisons still to be found there. By persuasion and force he succeeded in his object in the districts of Caria, but the Persians resolved to bar his farther progress, and sent, as their practice was, a combined naval and military armament against him.* Kimon first attacked the fleet, and the superiority of the Greeks to the Phoenicians was once more made manifest. A hundred vessels with their crews fell into the hands of the Greeks, who also captured many others which had been abandoned. The latter Kimon now employed, if we may believe the account currently ac- * We may regard Dioclorus as a trustworthy authority here, since Plu- tarch ("Cimon," c. 11) ascribes to Ephorus exactly the same details as are found in Diodorus. Accordingly, we may take it as certain that here, at any rate, Diodorus had Ephorus before him. Plutarch quotes two other historians, Callisthenes and Phanodemus, who vary from Ephorus. The name of the Persian commander as given by Callisthenes is not the same as that in Diodorus, whilst the number of the Athenian ships is differently given by Phanodemus. KIMON. 187 cepted, in the execution of a most successful stratagem. It is said that he manned the empty vessels in his turn, disguising his people in Persian clothes, of which a large supply had come into his possession. In this way he surprised at night the Persian camp by the Eurymedon, where the approaching fleet was awaited as a friendly one, attacked it at once, and, profiting by the confusion, overpowered it. Kimon, whose presence of mind did not desert him in the hour of victory, was careful to prevent his troops from separating in quest of plunder, and recalled them by a prearranged fire-signal, which they obeyed even in the heat of pursuit. After this they erected a trophy. Thus a double victory was won on the same day by land and sea.* No sooner was the naval superiority of the Greeks thus demonstrated, than the prospect was opened up to them of bringing their power to bear upon Egypt, a country in whose concerns they had already interfered. Xerxes, whom fate had spared to experience the further defeat at the Eurymedon, was slain in the following year f — an episode often repeated in the case of despotic governments in ancient and modern times, even among the Romans in the epoch of the Empire. He was the victim of a conspiracy among the men in whom he chiefly placed confidence, Arta- banus, the commander of his body-guard, and the high cham- berlain, who controlled the palace. The conspiracy, however, aimed at more than his death. In Xerxes were united the two lines of the Achaemenidse. It was the design of the as- sassins absolutely to put an end to the dominion of this race. * The battle of the Eurymedon is assigned by Clinton to 466, by Grote to 465. It is in favor of the latter of these assumed dates that, accord- ing to the account in Thukydides, Themistocles, in his flight to Asia — ■ ■which, according to the historian's account, falls in the year 465 (i. 137, iaTrifiiTEi ypd/xfiara elg (5am\sa 'Ap~a&p%r)v rbv EepZov, vewcrri fiarnXevovra) — ■ found the Athenian fleet engaged in the blockade of Naxos (i. 137), and immediately upon this, or at the same moment, followed the battle at the Eurymedon (i. 98, etc.). We have taken account of the year above, in fixing the date of the death of Aristagoras. t The statement of Diodorus that Artaxerxes himself laid violent hands on his elder brother Darius cannot be maintained, being contradicted by the evidence of Aristotle ("Pol." v. c. 10=220, 13 Bekker). 18S GREECE AND PERSIA. If we are not mistaken, this purpose must be associated with the disasters to which the policy of Darius and Xerxes had led. The reign ing family had lost its authority and was to be overthrown. Artabanns himself aspired to the throne, but matters did not come to that pass. The elder of Xerxes' sons had shared the fate of his father, but this only stimulated the second son, Artaxerxes, to a more determined resistance. The tradition runs that he saved life and throne in a personal en- counter with Artabanus. On this point accounts and opin- ions are at variance, but we may abide by the main fact that Artaxerxes, the second son of Xerxes, made the dominion of the Achremenid secure for more than a century. He was distinguished by the Greeks from other kings of the same name by an epithet which means the Long-handed, and was derived from a physical disproportion. Artaxerxes did not feel himself called upon to extend the empire and carry out his father's projects of universal do- minion ; his business was simply to maintain and to protect the power which he inherited, and which, even after the re- cent disasters, was still very extensive. The most important question was, according^, how far Artaxerxes would be ac- knowledged by the subject populations, which had by no means yet forgotten their old independence. Undoubtedly the decline of the naval power of Persia, in consequence of the battle of Eurymedon, contributed to make obedience doubtful, especially in Egypt, a region which still retained the largest measure of independence. Inarus, the prince of a Libyan district which had been annexed but not brought to complete subjection, induced the Egyptians without much difficulty to revolt from Persia, and invoked the aid of the Athenians.* Their fleet happened to be in Cyprus at the time, but immediately sailed for Egypt, where the Greeks, Libyans, and revolted Egyptians united their forces and oc- cupied the town of Memphis, with the exception of its cita- del, which was called the White Castle. Inarus availed him- * According to Diodorus, xi. 71, Inarus promised the Athenians a share in the government of Egypt (virurxvov/tEvoc avrolc, tav iXtvQepdxroxji toix AlyvTrriovg, Koivijv avrolc Trapi&aBai rr)v iSaffiXeiav). THE ATHENIANS IN EGYPT. 189 self of the wealth of corn in Egypt to establish his alliance with Athens on a firmer basis, and sent considerable supplies across the sea.* It is probable that commercial motives amongst others prompted the building of the Long Walls, by which the cita- del and town of Athens were united with the seaport. But they were needed for another reason. The misunderstand- ings between Sparta and Athens had reached such a climax that there was reason to dread an invasion of the Attic terri- tory on the part of the Spartans. We encounter here a com- plication in the general condition of public affairs. Arta- xerxes is said to have attempted to prevail upon the Spartans to invade Attica, hoping, of course, thus to relieve himself at a single blow from the hostile attacks of Athens. Such an alliance was, however, reserved for later times. At that time it would have seemed treasonable, and accordingly the Spar- tans declined the Persian proposals. Athens would indeed have secured a great position for herself if Inarus had suc- ceeded in maintaining his seat upon the throne of Egypt. But she was not in a position to employ all her power on be- half of Inarus at the critical time. We find an inscription f in which are named the members of one of the ten Attic tribes who were slain in one and the same year, in Cyprus, Egypt, Phoenicia, iEgina, Plalieis, and Megara. To this dis- sipation of the available forces of the republic we may at- tribute the result that Egypt, undoubtedly the principal the- atre of the war, was inadequately supported by the efforts of Athens. Nevertheless we cannot entirely forget the Egyptian war as a part of her history. Artaxerxes employed all his mili- tary strength, with the advantage also of some previous mili- tary training, in the subjugation of Egypt. His success cor- responded to his efforts. Upon the appearance of a Perso- * There is no question that Athens imported corn from Egypt at this epoch. Though the name of Psammetichus, who was the father of Ina- chus, is given here, which does not suit the date, we may, perhaps, as- sume a confusion between the two names (cf. W. A. Schmidt, " Das peri- kleische Zeitalter," i. p. 44). fKirchhoff. " Corpus Inscript. Att." i. n. 433. 190 GREECE AND PERSIA. Phoenician fleet at the mouths of the Nile, the investment of the citadel of Memphis, in which the Grseeo-Libyan army of Inarus was engaged, could no longer be maintained, in the absence of the Athenian fleet. The Athenians hoped to be able to hold out upon an island in the Nile, but the Persians, probably favored by the time of year, were able to dry up the arm of the river upon which they had relied for protec- tion. The Greeks defended themselves stoutly, burning their ships, that they might not fall into the enemy's hands, and pledging themselves to resist to the last. Almost the whole force was destroyed, and only a small number succeeded in reaching Kyrene.* An Athenian fleet of fifty sail appeared on the coast only when the issue was decided beyond recall, and Egypt passed once more under the power of the Persians. Egypt had already witnessed a conflict between Greeks and Persians. The victories of Cambyses were repeated by Arta- xerxes. But, as may be supposed, such a result did not satis- fy the ambition and energy of the Greeks, and it was impos- sible that Athens could look on with patience whilst the naval power of Phoenicia was recovering its old importance. Some years later, after Athens and Sparta had come to a tem- porary accommodation, Kimon undertook a new expedition, directed principally against Cyprus, but aiming further at Egypt, and even at the overthrow of the Persian empire. The project is intelligible by the light of the experiment which hud been made just before it to replace the ruling dy- nasty by another. Inarus had been captured and crucified, but, in the Delta, Amyrtreus, a pretender of true Egyptian lineage, still held his ground ; and since, as so often hap- pened, misunderstandings had arisen between the satraps and the court of the Great King, any success might of course have brought about a turn of fortune. Kimon consulted the ora- cle of Jupiter Amnion, in which he might naturally have ex- pected to find Egyptian sympathies, but before the answer *We adhere to the account in Thukydides, i. 110. The discrepancies in Diodorus, xi. 77, are of no importance, since in another place (xiii. 25) his statements are in harmony with those of Thukydides. So also arc the words of Isocrates (mpi dp{)vt]Q 87, p. 17G £>), els Alyvirrov Siaxoaiai irXtvudaai rpu'jptig ai'roif rolf 7r\j;pw/<«cri Stt9dpr]aai>. THE PEACE OF KIMON. 191 arrived he was already dead (b.c. 419), probably in conse- quence of a wound received before Kitium, in Cyprus. Un- fortunately we have very imperfect information about these events. For the most important transactions of a time in which Herodotus and Thukydides were living we are referred to mere hearsay, as set down by later authors. From Thukyd- ides we only learn that after Kimon's death the Phoenicians were successfully encountered, near Salamis, in Cyprus, in an- other double battle by land and sea. Thus, though Egypt was lost, the dominion of the sea was maintained. At this point, however, a difficulty presents itself to the critical historian which we cannot leave undiscussed, and which requires, indeed, immediate attention. To Kimon him- self is ascribed the conclusion of a peace with Persia, concern- ing which an absolute silence prevails elsewhere. It is as- serted that a formal compact was concluded between the re- public of Athens and the Great King, in which the latter expressly renounced all attempts to subjugate the Ionian cities, and besides engaged not to send his fleet to sea beyond certain clearly indicated limits. The Athenians on their part are said to have bound themselves not to attack the territories of the king Artaxerxes. This account has been the subject of much learned controversy. The fact of such a peace has generally been denied, because it is not mentioned in the principal contemporary authors. We have just alluded to the defective nature of the information about this period. But Herodotus mentions an embassy of the Athenian Callias to the Persian court, which can scarcely have had any other aim than the re-establishment of peace. The mission itself was a friendly advance, considering that the status helli still continued, and had led to events which imperilled the de- pendence of Egypt and Cyprus upon the Persian empire. In order to put an end to such dangers, the Great King would have to treat for peace, and to consider what terms he could offer to the Athenians. To Athens nothing could be of more importance than that she should remain mistress of the sea, secure from the fear of any attack by the Persians upon the Greek cities in Asia. To attain the first object was the prin- cqDal motive of Kimon's naval expedition ; the second was 192 GREECE AND PERSIA. of immense importance for the consolidation of the Athenian dominion in the Archipelago. If, therefore, it was definitive- ly settled that no Persian vessel of war was to pass beyond the line of the Phasclis and the Kyanean rocks, whilst at the same time the land forces of the satraps were to remain three days' journey from the coast, we have here the very condi- tions which the Athenians must have regarded as those it was most important to secure. Only on their fulfilment could they promise to leave the dominions of the king unassailed. No formal peace was concluded, but an understanding was apparently come to, sufficient to guarantee the general re- pose.* It is probable that the state of things which did in fact ensue was regarded as preliminary to a formal compact. The double battle near the Cyprian Salamis may be regarded as the last act in the war between Hellenes and Persians at this stage of history. The Hellenes maintained their indepen- dence, and achieved supremacy on the sea ; the Persian em- pire, however, still remained intact, and still maintained its dominant position in the world. If we might venture to measure and estimate the course of general history by the forces at work below the surface, we might say that the time for the universal supremacy of Greece was not yet come. The Greeks, in consequence of the Medo-Persian war, and of * There can be no doubt that Diodorus derived from Ephorus the in- formation which he gives us that a peace was actually effected. It is, however, not probable either that this author forged a treaty out of love for the political fancies of his master, Isocrates, or that any motive can have existed at a later time for actually engraving such a forged treaty upon a column. The treaty harmonizes too accurately with the circum- stances of the middle of the fifth century to have been invented in the fourth. That Herodotus only mentions the embassy in a cursory way, and the convention not at all, is explained when we remember that these later circumstances did not come within the scope of his history, which would have lost its unity and objectivity by too exact an explanation of later events. In the explanation of the passage in Thuk. vii. 25, 26, to which Dahlmann and Manso refer, Grote ("History of Greece," v. 454, n. 1) is, in my judgment, right. The name "Peace of Kimon " must, however, not be taken literally ; it was only an accommodation made by the Athenians about the time of Kimon's decease. RESULTS OF THE WAR. 193 the victories they had achieved, were in a state of internal commotion, in which the intellectual aspects of their life ap- peared in strong relief. These intestine struggles, which con- tinued without interruption, but led to no decisive results of importance, did not interrupt their development in any direction, but rather served to excite that emulation which is a necessary incentive to the production of works of litera- ture and art. On the other hand, a struggle with Persia would have been fatal to these tendencies even if the Greeks had been victorious; military success and the fascination of conquest would have enlisted all their energies and directed them to other ends. An epoch of equilibrium between the Persian monarchy and the Greek republics, such an equilib- rium as followed upon the battle of Mycale, and even more conspicuously upon that of the Eurymedon, was essential in order to leave the Greeks time for their internal develop- ment. In this, however, nothing was of such advantage to them as the complete independence of Athens. Here that constitution was matured which, just because it was com- posed of such divergent elements, prepared the way for the movements of mind and gave a field for its exercise in civil and social life. 13 Chapter VII. THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY AND ITS LEADERS. The political relations which we have been considering, though dominating the whole world, were, nevertheless, not the only subjects which engaged attention ; nor, indeed, after the decisive actions at Platsea and Mycalc, were they even the most important of such subjects. In the midst of these complications, the differences between one Greek city or state and another developed themselves. Above all, it was in great part due to these very complications that one of the most remarkable phenomena which the history of the world has known made its appearance ; we mean the Athenian democracy. There is a close correspondence between these internal movements and the contests waged with adverse forces from without. We have purposely brought our ac- count of the latter to the point at which a state of equilib- rium had resulted, and have abstained from mentioning in- ternal struggles that we may now contemplate them with less distraction. 1. Aristeides and Pericles as Opponents of Kimon. It is natural to regard the various forms of government as distinguished from each other by the existence in each of a political idea peculiar to itself ; but this is not the historical account of the matter. The democracy of Athens owed its origin and its founda- tion on a solid basis to the struggle between the tyranny in a monarchical form and the oligarchic rule of the leading families. Solon, in an epoch of universal confusion, had at- tempted to establish a system of equilibrium between the ar- istocracy and the commons of Athens by reserving to the lat- ter a certain share in the government of the commonwealth. DEMOCRATIC LEADERS. 195 But lie had been unable to prevent the immediate rise of a tyranny which controlled the people whilst it kept down the oligarchy. Setting himself not only against the tyranny, but against the oligarchy also, when it rose once more to the sur- face, the Alcnueonid Cleisthenes had thoroughly reformed the constitution of Solon, had remodelled the commons, and had made it his first concern to put arms in their hands. The people of Athens, now for the first time waking to a con- sciousness of political existence, received the gift with eager- ness. They resisted with resolution and success every at- tempt which the Lakedsemonians made in connection with a faction of the Eupatridos to wrest from them the concessions which they had obtained. They proved themselves able to repel the first invasion of the Persians, which aimed at the res- toration of the Athenian tyranny, and to endure the second, which aimed at a subjection of all the Greeks, with a resigna- tion and willing self-sacrifice till then without example. The leaders under whom Athens achieved her victories did not gain through their services a secure position in their own city. The aristocratic Miltiades was condemned to pay a fine, and, being unable to do so, died, it would appear, in prison. Themistocles, aiming at an exceptional position, was banished. Next to these heroic forms appear Aristeides, who had been one of the most active adherents of Cleisthenes, and Kimon, the son of Miltiades — excellent men, who in their turn, as the change of affairs demanded, maintained a high position and exercised a great influence in the state. In a sense different from that touched on above, the after-effects of the war with Persia were manifested. The old families had taken a keen interest in the war, act- ing in concert with the rising democracy. Each side could claim a share in the victoiw, but the results of the struirirle tended mainly to the advantage of the people. The prepon- derance obtained by the popular element may be traced main- ly to the Persian war, and that in two ways. The desolation with which the Persians had visited the land affected the ar- istocratic proprietors most sensibly ; and after the war they found themselves grievously impoverished. On the other hand, the victories won had raised the standard of living 196 THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. among the lower orders and increased their substance. Even during the struggle itself the effects of these disturbed rela- tions became apparent. Before the battle of Platsea, a kind of conspiracy was traced in Platsea itself among the families of distinction. Their aim is said to have been to break up the democracy, or, failing that, to pass over to the Persians. Their purpose was discovered ; the two most guilty of the conspirators saved themselves by flight ; others supposed themselves undiscovered, and would seem to have repented of their intention. Aristeides might perhaps have had sufficient authority to revive the old prerogatives, but he regarded this as impracti- cable, not merely because the relations of property had alto- gether changed, but principally because the people, having once borne arms, could not be brought back to their previous state of subordination. By arms and by victories, reputa- tions had been won, involving a natural claim to a share in the highest offices. Besides this, the people distinctly avowed that they would no longer acquiesce in the old restrictions. It is obvious that thus the equilibrium between the old fami- lies and the Demos, upon which the Solonian constitution was based, was completely destroyed. This was the natural consequence of years of war and victory. The people had tasted freedom ; they had shed their blood for it, and without violence and danger the old state of things could not have been maintained. The abrogation of the privileges of the noble and wealthy families was a necessary step towards bringing the democracy into complete relief. Aristeides was not restrained by that love of justice which is his chief title to fame from favoring this design. As ^Eschylus expresses it, in a passage which is rightly regarded as pointing to him, he wished not only to seem, but to be, just — a great saying, which we may conceive to have been suggested by the fact that he did not hesitate to acknowledge the rights won by the people in the national struggle, feeling that arms led to freedom. Through the progress of trade, of the marine, and of the dominion with which the latter was associated, the de- mocracy, although as yet not completely developed, assumed the ascendant. ARISTEIDES. 197 This ascendency at once opened the further question, how far democracy might be guided to the advantage of the whole commonwealth. For this task Aristeides was exactly adapted. Whilst Themistocles refused to efface his personality even under the democracy, it was the merit of Aristeides that he put self in the background. He withdrew a proposition at the very moment when it was being passed, because the pre- vious speeches for and against had convinced him that his plan was not perfectly adapted to its end. Propositions of undoubted utility were made by him through others, because they would otherwise have been rejected, through the jeal- ousy which his name had begun to excite. Aristeides was accounted poor, and prided himself upon being so ; neverthe- less, he had belonged to the first class in the state, the Penta- cosiomedimni, and had become arehon by virtue of the old prerogative of that class. This very prerogative he swept away. All the restrictions which excluded the larger number of the citizens from sharing in the higher offices were removed under his leadership. The electors were one and all made capable of election also, and thus an administration was formed very different to those which had preceded it. Yet it can- not be said that the change ran counter to the spirit of the constitution, for the power of the individual was still made to depend upon his property ; only the relations of property had themselves undergone a radical change in the course of the last few years. The recognition of this change was the principal work of Aristeides, with respect to the domestic polity of Athens. But his influence was felt no less sensibly in her attitude towards other powers. Themistocles had entertained the de- sign of forcing upon the islands the supremacy of Athens, but that which was premature and impossible for him was achieved by Aristeides. The opportunity was afforded by the irritating behavior of Pausanias, the Spartan king ; his arrogant proceedings wounded the pride of the admirals in command of the insular contingents, who complained of his ill-treatment of them. Belonging, as they did, to the Ionian race, they were especially sensitive at having to yield obedi- 198 THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. ence to a Dorian commander-in-chief. They were better in- clined towards their kinsmen the Athenians, who, moreover, as having done the most distinguished service in the naval war, seemed to have a special claim to direct its further prog- ress. Moreover, as Pausanias took advantage of the impor- tance which he had acquired at the head of the collective forces of Greece to demean himself in a manner which the Spartan oligarchy found intolerable, even Sparta ceased to have an interest in maintaining the chief command over the fleet. It was, indeed, remembered how an oracle had pre- dicted that the dominion of the Lakedremonians would be but a halting one, if it did not embrace at once land and sea, and in consequence the Athenians expected to have to pre- pare for war ; but a member of the Gerusia was able to con- vince the rest that a naval supremacy was not expedient for Sparta. The Spartans desisted from every attempt to coun- teract the course of things, and thus were generally under- stood to have renounced the hegemony. In brief, Athenians now assumed the chief command of the naval forces, a result to which they were especially assisted by the confidence in- spired by the modest and tranquil character of Aristcides, whose authority in these affairs was now paramount. It was in keeping with the character of the Athenian de- moerac}' to grasp the naval supremacy which the oligarchical Sparta resigned. Aristeides has been credited with having aroused the attention of the Athenians to the advantages which such a position would secure them. He was, at any rate, the principal agent in raising Athens to that position. The new relation could only be based on contributions ac- cording to a definite assessment, and Aristeides was commis- sioned to determine this for the new members of the League. The contributions were fixed at the moderate total of 460 talents, and later on, when they had been raised to three times this amount, the days of the old tribute were praised as a golden, a Saturn ian, time. At a congress of the members of the League in the temple of Apollo and Artemis, points of detail were next arranged. The members of the League had ostensibly equal rights, but this did not prevent them from falling into a state of dependence upon the Athenians, with THE DELI AN LEAGUE. 199 whom rested the appointment of the treasurers of Greece, that is, of the League. The members of the League gave in their contributions themselves, and these were originally kept in the temple of Delos. The justice of Aristeides in these transactions was reduced to some shifts, and, indeed, the an- cients never referred this attribute of his to public affairs, in which they conceived him to have been guided by the exi- gencies of his mother-country. Aristeides developed, on the one hand, the democratic con- stitution, whilst, on the other, he laid the foundation for the naval supremacy of Athens. The two achievements are close- ly linked together. In the latter his associate was Kimon, who, however, as we have explained, was at the same time prosecuting the war against the Persians on an extensive scale. To this end the naval confederacy put forth all its powers. Yet the very victories which Kimon won led to complications, and disturbances among the members of the League, most of whom had some special interest of their own. The reception of those new associates who were attracted by the victories won involved a change which could not be pleasant to every one ; and, as the payment of the prescribed contributions, if the settlement were called in question, would cause the estrangement of a portion of the fleet, the perma- nence of the whole confederacy was endangered. Athens re- solved to use her whole power to suppress every centrifugal movement. Naxos before and Thasos after the battle of the Eurymedon had this lesson impressed upon them. The par- ticular interest of the latter island conflicted with that of Athens, inasmuch as it had claims upon the gold mines of the neighboring continent, which had now fallen into the hands of the Athenians. A formal revolt ensued, which for some years in succession (b.c. 465-463) employed the warlike re- sources of Athens, until the inhabitants were at length com- pelled to give up the possession of a naval force of their own and to pay the contributions imposed upon them. For the discharge of these contributions measures were at the same time taken of a character universally binding. Kimon had allowed the smaller communities, which found it inconvenient to unite agricultural labors with service in the fleet, to pay 200 T111 ' ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. their contributions altogether in money. This concession was ascribed to his humanity, but it is obvious that the power of the leading state was augmented by a change which put into its hands the assessment and exaction of these contributions. The Delian League thus gradually transformed itself into a Supremacy of Athens, not maintained without violence, and certain to excite feelings of antipathy, especially on the part of Sparta. Sparta was at this time involved in the most embarrassing difficulties. The Messenian war had been renewed for the third time. The Spartans, despairing of success in the at- tempt to master the principal stronghold, Ithome, in which the descendants of the original population maintained them- selves, invited Athens to their assistance, in virtue of their ancient covenant. This covenant was, indeed, still binding, but various misunderstandings had arisen in the course of the last few years. In Athens they professed to have proof that the island of Thasos had applied to Sparta in its necessities, and had actually received from her secret promises of assist- ance. In the popular assembly at Athens, when the request of Sparta for assistance against Ithome was under discussion, Ephialtes, one of the most popular orators and demagogues of the time, reminded his hearers that this state was the natural enemy of Athens, and that they could have no motive for rescuing her from her perplexities. Kimon insisted that the thing must be done, and said that they ought not to "let ( ! recce be lamed, and Athens herself be deprived of her yoke- fellow." He carried his point, and was himself commissioned to lead a small but well-appointed force against Ithome. But this step did but give fresh occasion of quarrel, for the same feeling of a fundamental divergence of interests which had manifested itself at Athens was now no less conspicuous among the SpartiatSB. They were almost afraid that Athens would make common cause with their subjects, a race of her own stock, and dismissed the Athenians under the pretext that they needed them no longer. Such treatment could not fail to be resented by Athens as a slight, and the antagonism between Athens and Sparta manifested itself without disguise, with this peculiarity, that in Athens it assumed an intestine KIMON. 201 form, the rise of the democracy causing aristocratic sympa- thies to seek and find a support in Sparta. A breach with Sparta was a disadvantage for the aristocrats at Athens, an advantage for the democracy. Kimon espe- cially was destined to feel this to his cost. He was an aristo- crat to the core. In person lie was tall, with luxuriant curly hair, no orator, as most Athenians were, and without the re- finements of social life, but a simple, truth-loving man, of upright intentions, a thoroughly aristocratic nature, and one, moreover, of those which impress the people without exciting their hatred. IJis maritime victories and the authority which he exercised in the naval confederacy earned for him high respect. lie was the richest man in Attica, and by the liber- ality with which he employed his wealth, and the structures and works of art on which he expended it, he played towards his city something like the part of a patron. lie opened his gardens to the public, and helped the needy by largesses of food, with the natural result that he had the influence of the lower classes on his side. Though he is said to have under- stood nothing of the fine arts, the influence which he exer- cised upon art and its productions in his own epoch was great and stimulating. From Thasos he brought Polygnotus to Athens, who illustrated the greatness of Miltiades in the por- ticoes which he adorned. There the hero was to be seen at the battle of Marathon cheering on his warriors to the attack. Among the thirteen figures of bronze given by the Athenians as a votive offering to the Delphic oracle appeared the form of Miltiades alongside of the gods of the race and country. The master hand of Pheidias paid him here the same tribute as Polygnotus had paid him at Athens. Kimon gave to the memory of his father and of the great victories achieved against the Persians the devotion of a life- time. This, too, is the corner-stone of his policy. Since those victories had been won through the league between Lakcdsemon and Athens, Kimon, whilst straining every nerve to prosecute the struggle with Persia, was no less anxious to maintain a good understanding with Lakcdsemon. In this he was supported by all those who derived benefit from such aristocratical privileges as still survived, whilst the democratic 202 THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. movement was carried out in opposition to his policy. Two parties were formed, with antagonistic sympathies and aims; one regarding the struggle with the Medo-Persians as its prin- cipal task, and, as a consequence, the maintenance of the old gradations of rank and the alliance with Lakedamion ; the other placing in the foreground the opposition to Lakedremon, straining every nerve to make Athens the first power in Greece, and, with this end in view, developing democratic in- stitutions to their fullest extent. Pericles became the head of the latter party. He, too, was sprung from one of the leading families; he was the son of the victor of Mycale, Xanthippus, the man who brought against Miltiades the charges to which he fell a victim. The struggle between the victors of Marathon and Mycale was renewed in their sons. The successes of Kimon could not fail to disquiet Pericles. Competition for the supreme power has in every state been the cause of variance between its leading citizens, and it has often happened that a member of one of the principal fami- lies has, in order to combat another aristocrat, taken up the cause of the people and helped to open a free course to dem- ocratic tendencies. Pericles was supported by Ephialtes, the same who had spoken against the expedition to Ithome, the ill success of which, with the consequent excitement at Athens, operated powerfully in his favor and that of Pericles. They could venture to propose laws the effect of which was to change fundamentally the relative position of parties. Most of those institutions upon which the authority of the principal families depended had already been dissolved. The Areop- agus now shared their fate, its judicial functions, which still remained to attest the magisterial authority of the upper classes, being, with a single and very exceptional reservation, abrogated and transferred to the lleliaaa.* No one can main- tain that a regard for the better administration of justice was the real motive for this change. The Areopagus, whose im- memorial privileges possessed the sanction of religion, was the * In the uncertainty of all chronological data we welcome the state- ment of Diodorus (xi. 77), that the law against the Areopagus was passed 01. 80, 1=460-459. "We may fairly assume that the law by which Kimon was exiled was of earlier date ; cf. Fischer, " Kleinc Schriftcn," i. 42 n. PERICLES AND EPHIALTES. 203 body in which were concentrated the prerogatives of the prin- cipal families. The ordinance of Aristeides, according to which the outgoing archons, even according to the new sys- tem of election, became members of the Areopagus, had not produced any material effect. The predominant influence of Kimon secured to the Areopagus a constant and uninterrupted authority. To put an end to this there was but one course open. The Areopagus would have to be divested of the ju- dicial functions, which continued to give it all the authority of a supreme magistracy. The Helisea, to which those func- tions, with the exception of an insignificant residuum, were transferred, was the whole Athenian people, under an organ- ization adapted to the administration of justice. It consisted of 6000 citizens, chosen by lot for the purpose, who again were divided into ten distinct dicasteries, each of which num- bered 500 members, so that 1000 were left over, to fill up vacancies as they occurred. Actions were brought before the archons as before, but their duty was now limited to laying them before one of the dicasteries of the Helisea, which found a verdict and gave sentence. In this way, by a single stroke, the judicial power was wrested from the body which had held it by a traditional right and placed in the hands of the people. Here the question forces itself upon us, how far each citizen could have found it possible to reconcile the claims of his daily business with these additional obligations. Pericles and Ephialtes succeeded in securing a small remuneration for the heliasts while actually engaged in their duties. From the comic poets we see that, as a rule, the older men, who were less engrossed in ordinary avocations, were selected for this purpose. The authority which was to be taken from the Areopagus being of a political as well as a judicial character, an oath was required from the heliasts, by which they bound themselves, above all things, to favor neither tyranny nor oli- garchy, nor in any way to prejudice the sovereignty of the people." Other obligations, affecting the administration of * That Demosthenes is in error in ascribing the form of oath to Solon is proved by the fact that the law speaks of the Council of the Five Hun- dred, which, in Solon's time, was not in existence. The wording- is char- >_>,)! THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. justice, appear in the oath ; but the most important points are those which WQ have just touched upon, in which we recognize a complete fusion oi the political and judicial views therein predominant. Nothing less was intended than that the Arc- opagns should bo altogether deprived of its influence, which was to he bestowed upon a democratic assembly. It must not, however, be imagined that this assembly was democratic in a modern sense. Pericles and Ephialtes carried out legislative acts by which almost a third oi those who had hitherto been citizens were excluded from the citizenship, The citizenship was originally an amalgamation oi various distinct elements. The new law provided that each and every one should be excluded from it who did not belong to it by descent at least in the two pre- ceding generations. It has been assumed that the law was purposely so framed as to affect prejudicially, by its retro- spective action, the family of Kimon. Nevertheless, it Mas at the same time one oi the greatest political measures under- taken at this epoch. Whilst the citizens obtained rights which they had never possessed before, their number under- went a most important limitation. It is from this time that we are able to regard the Athenian Demos as a community propagating itself and making its influence felt in the world, without any admixture of alien elements. The commons al- ready derived some benefit from the state. Some were glad to avail themselves of the remuneration bestowed upon the heliasts. Others were kept in good humor by receiving the price oi admission to the theatre as a grant from the public treasury. What was more important, for protracted service in the tleet a stated pay was given. x " The distribution of aoteristic, and itself a proof of genuineness, Meier and SchGraann, in their history of Athenian legal procedure ("Qeschichte des attischen Processes "), have justlj insisted upon the support of this document a variation in Pollux (Onomasticon) affects only a suhordinate issue, * This may be inferred with distinctness from the statements oi Plu- tarch c - Pericles," c, 1 1\ in which the citizens are designated as ;■><.. lu Plutarch's "Cunon" (c id we arc farther informed that the pay was taken out of the contributions of the members of the naval confederacy, SQ tliat the citiiens of Athens exercised control over those at whose i \ PERICLES and RPHIALTE& 206 conquered districts in definite allotments was an especial ad- vantage to the Athenian citizens. Their authority was fur- ther increased when tlie treasury of the naval confederacy was transferred from Delos to Athens, and the disposition of the t'utuls plaoed in their hands. This is not the place to in- quire how far these arrangements harmonise with the normal conception of a state, or whether they were the best adapted to reconcile personal responsibilities with general interests. We are but noting the appearance oi a politioal society, which possessed and exercised power in foreign affairs, whilst at the same time maintaining civil equality, to the advantage o( each individual. The Demos was a genuine power, control- ling other powers, and making constant Btrides to empire. We have Been that in Athens, as elsewhere, democracy was not o( natural growth, but owed its origin to the events of the time and the policy o( its leading spirits. Vet it is a creation, endowed with an internal energy and holding a po- sition in the world, which, together, make it a phenomenon of the highest importance. The direction which Athenian tendencies were taking at this time may be gathered from the building of the Long Walls, the principal aim of which was to unite Athens with her Seaport, and from the fact that, a short time before, the town o( B£egara,at the suggestion o( Athens, had effected a similar junction. The growth o( her maritime connections at that epoch, extending, as we have already remarked, even to the native rulers o( Egypt, rendered it desirable to make Athens herself a kind o( seaport town. There was, however, another and a paramount motive. The understanding which had hitherto been maintained between the democracy o( Athens and the aristocracy o( Sparta had been interrupted by the affair o( [thome. The garrison of [thome had been re- duced by the Spartans upon the withdrawal of the Athenian troops, but had so far been supported by Athens that she ob- pense tlu'v received their pay. The statement generally made, that Per icles introduced pay tor service on land also, depends upon a passage t'rom a late scholiast ow Demosthenes, which cannot be regarded as per* fectty satisfactory evidence. 206 TIIE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. tained for them a refuge in the Locrian Naupactus. In Nau- pactus and its harbor the Athenians secured for themselves one of the most important positions on the western coast. We encounter here what we may call the Fate of Greece. Over and over again we note the after-effects of that cam- paign of the Heracleidse by which Sparta and her aristocracy were founded. Athens, on the other hand, was the principal locality in which the populations which had not succumbed to the Dorian invasion maintained themselves. The Athe- nians saw in the Messenians their own kinsmen, and made use of those who had survived the struggle to found a position which seriously menaced the Peloponnesus, and especially Corinth. They had, moreover, dissociated Megara from the Peloponnesian league, and drawn it into the naval confed- eracy. The opposition between the democracy, now supreme at Athens, and the aristocracies by which it was surrounded made itself everywhere felt. This was especially the case in Boeotia, where the less powerful towns sided with Athens, while, on the other hand, Thebes was taken into the protection of Sparta. It was when things were in this state of ferment that the Spartans seized the occasion of a dispute between Doris and Phokis to send a considerable force to central Greece. They successfully disposed of this contest, but, be- ing apprehensive of encountering difficulties in their home- ward march, they took up a position in Boeotia and menaced Attica itself. A short time before, they had declined to invade Attica at the suggestion of the Persians; but that which they were then unwilling to do in the interests of the Great King they were now preparing to do on their own ac- count. It was a step which, taken in conjunction with the complications to which we have referred, did more than para- lyze the attacks upon Persia. It imperilled the very exist- ence of democracy at Athens. It was believed that the land- owners of Attica, who were generally displeased with the erection of the Long Walls, had come to an understanding with the Lakedsemonians to stay the progress of the works and to abolish the democracy. The war had not yet broken out, but every one saw it to be BATTLE OF TANAGRA. 207 imminent. The leading man at Athens, whose policy was menaced by it, was not disposed to await the danger: his plan was to anticipate it by prompt action. That the Athe- nians had in this another aim as well, and were earnestly re- solved to suppress a certain domestic faction, is shown by their conduct towards Kimon, who made his appearance at the very crisis of the struggle, in order to take part in it. His services Avere rejected by order of the Council of Five Hundred, because he was regarded as a friend to the Lake- diemonians. And undoubtedly he was what he was called — a Philolakon, that is, he desired the restoration of the old friendly relations with Sparta. Yet he was very far from wishing to force such an alliance upon Attica by means of external pressure. In his enforced inaction lie persuaded his friends and dependents to oppose the stoutest resistance to the Lakedoemonians. They sided with Athens when Pericles, with a force very inadequate to the requirements of his en- terprise, marched to encounter the Peloponncsians at Tanagra. On his side were ranged the Argives and Thessalians, then confederates of Athens ; but the Thessalian cavalry were the first to desert their place in the field and to pass over to the enemy. The Athenian army was defeated. The adherents of Kimon carried off the palm of valor, and fell side by side to the number of a hundred (November, b.c. 457). The defeat sustained by the Athenians, though severe, was scarcely decisive. Probably, too, the united front presented by Athens left little hope of successful intervention in Attica, and accordingly the Lakeda3monians, after making a few raids in the district of Megara, withdrew to Peloponnesus, leaving their allies, the Boeotians, to themselves. The latter had al- ready, two months after the battle of Tanagra, been defeat- ed by the Athenians at (Enophyta, so that Athens now con- solidated her power in Boeotia for the first time. Her internal dissensions had also ceased. Kimon, relieved from all sus- picion by the conduct of his friends, and regarded by the people with a sort of regretful longing, was again recalled, and attained, if not his old authority, at any rate to high respect. Once more he threw himself into those warlike enterprises in the eastern Mediterranean which characterize the last years 208 TI11 '< ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. of his career. There even seemed to be some prospect of in- ducing Lakedf&mon to give these efforts a direct support. Pericles, too, was in accord with Kimon in this, his principal aim. Wo hear of his plan of bringing about a Panhellcnic association, designed to renew the war against the king of Persia and proseoute it with the utmost vigor. The motive was, as before, the duty of avenging on the Persians the out- rages committed on Grecian sanctuaries. Delegates from the different tribes were to meet at Alliens. We are informed that Pericles sent out four distinct embassies to this end, the most important of which is said to have been that sent to Sparta. There, however, Pericles failed to obtain a hearing, Sparta not having so completely resigned the possession of that hegemony which she had enjoyed in earlier days as to concede to her rival, Athens, the pre-eminence which this position would have secured her. Sparta might decline to assist the king of Persia against Athens, but could not bring herself to make common cause with Athens against the king. Without- Sparta the war against Persia could not be con- ducted with the energy which was necessary to insure the triumph upon which Kimoifs hopes were set. The utmost that could be attained was an armistice between Athens and Sparta, which was actually effected in the year 450. Athens had to adopt this expedient, without which she could not have Continued the war against Persia. Even in Sparta the mo- tives to hostility were not urgently felt in the immediate present, especially as long as Kimon was once more powerful and respected at Athens. The relations of war or peace with Sparta, the progress or resumption of the Persian war, the comparative influence of the two states upon the rest of Greece, tin' growth of the Delian League and its dependence upon Athens, the exile and return of Kimon, the plans of Pericles at this epoch and his personal relations to his great antagonist, are matters closely connected together and mutu- ally dependent. They form a parti-colored web, in which various efforts and tendencies, each with its own local charac- teristics, are combined. The armistice with Sparta was indis- pensable ti» the campaigns o( Kimon. But a great change inevitably took place when Kimon perished in the course of TRUCE WITH SPARTA. 209 tho war, and that pence was concluded by which a period was put to the enterprises of the Persians against the ( i recks, and to those of the Athenians against the Persians. 2. The Administration of Pericles. The life of Pericles entered, we may say, upon a new phase when the great rival with whom ho had so often contended and been reconciled was no more. Delivered from his oppo- sition, and, at the same time, from tho dangers of a war with Persia, he was able to indulge without impediment the design of bringing to an issue the struggle with Sparta. The occa- sion was this time afforded by a question which affected the whole Grecian world. As was the case in later days with the great hierarchical power of the West, it was indispensable to the satisfactory dis- charge of those semi-religious, semi-political functions which belonged to the Delphic oracle, that sanctuary and priesthood should alike be free from the territorial sovereignty of any foreign power. In the utterances of the oracle no deference was to be paid to the influence of a dominant state; it was to be itself of paramount authority. But the Athenians were of opinion that the priesthood, unable to dissociate itself entirely from human tendencies, was biassed in favor of Sparta, and therefore they raised no objection when the Phokians made themselves masters of the sacred district. This step, however, roused the Lakedieinonians to sympathetic efforts in defence of the sanctuary; they sent a military force which restored it, to its independence of the Phokians. At the same time they secured for themselves the jwomemteia, or the right of prece deuce in consulting the oracle, and caused the decree made on the subject to be engraved upon the forehead of the brazen wolf, a votive offering of the Delphians themsolves, which stood by the great altar. In this transaction Athens dis- covered a grievance. Without designing to break by the step the armistice which was still maintained, Pericles neverthe- less marched in his turn to Delphi, restored the territorial supremacy of the Phokians, and caused the right of precedence to be assigned to the Athenians, and the decree to that effect to be engraved upon the right side of the brazen wolf. 14 210 THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. It was a question of honor between the two leading states. The ambition of Athens was satisfied by the new inscription, but the Spartans were in the highest degree annoyed by the whole proceeding. The understanding which had prevailed for some years was dissolved, yet some such understanding was essential to the maintenance of the general tranquillity. The old variances, so recently suspended, at once broke out anew. First of all, in Bceotia the party lately subdued by the Athenians rose once more. The Athenians immediately interfered with an armed force in favor of their own parti- sans, but were this time defeated at Coroneia (b.c. 447). This was the signal for a general movement against the power of Athens. The party in Locris and in Eubcea which was hostile to the Athenians had taken part in the battle, and the victory procured it the ascendency in both places. Athens could not prevent the restoration of the old autonomy in Bceotia, and when Pericles turned to Eubcea, in order here, at any rate, to maintain that supremacy which was most essential to the maritime power of Athens, he had to submit to see Megara, at the instigation of her kinsmen the Corinthians, revolt from Athens and join the Peloponncsian confederacy. A crisis occurred on the invasion of a Spartan army, under Pleistoanax, one of the two kings. Pericles earned the grati- tude of his countrymen by inducing in some way or other the Spartans to retire.* The Athenians succeeded in subduing Euboea and settling it according to their pleasure. Yet upon * I purposely abstain from repeating the statement that Pericles bribed the Spartan king himself, or Cleandridas, whom the Ephors associated with him. This was the conclusion arrived at in Sparta from an assertion of Pericles about the expenditure of a certain sum of money. So we sec from a fragment of Ephorus (fragm. 118 in "Hist. Graec. fragm." ed. Muller, i. p. 20G). Thukydides mentions the matter three times. In the place in his narrative to which it properly belongs he says not a word of the alleged bribery ; in the two other passages he tells us that Pleistoanax incurred the suspicion of having taken a bribe (ii. 21, ») tpvyi) avrif iyevero ik 27r«pr//c v6£avri xP'll- laffl iruoQ)\vai Tt)v avax<*>pi}aiv — cf. V. 1G). It he had regarded the charge as true, he would no doubt have adopted it in his history. Plutarch, however, with his invariable propensity to anecdote, does not hesitate to adopt it in his Life of Pericles as an indisputable fact (c. 22). THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE. 211 the mainland they continued to be at a very great disadvan- tage. The Peloponnesian league had acquired fresh strength, and the Athenians saw themselves compelled to give up their possessions in Peloponnesus, especially Achaia, as well as Trcezene and Pagae, an important position for their com- munication with the peninsula. Even Nisaea was abandoned. Yet these losses, sensibly as they affected their influence upon the Grecian continent, were counterbalanced by a conces- sion still more significant, the acknowledgment of the Delian League. It was left open to states and cities which were members of neither confederacy to join either at pleasure. These events happened in 01. 83, 3 (b.c. 445) — the revolt of Mcgara and Eubcea, the invasion of Pleistoanax, the re-con- quest of Eubcea, and the conclusion of the treaty, which as- sumed the form of an armistice for thirty years. Great im- portance must be attributed to this settlement, as involving an acknowledgment which satisfied both parties and did jus- tice to the great interests at stake on either side. If Athens renounced some of her possessions, the sacrifice was compen- sated by the fact that Sparta recognized the existence of the naval supremacy of Athens, and the basis on which it rested. We may perhaps assume that the compromise between Peri- cles and Pleistoanax was the result of the conviction felt by both these leading men that a fundamental dissociation of the Peloponnesian from the Delian league was a matter of neces- sity. The Spartans wished to be absolutely supreme in the one, and resigned the other to the Athenians. There can be no doubt that Pericles was fully aware of what he gave up and what he gained in the transaction. After succeeding not only in rescuing Athens from a great peril, but in promoting her most essential interests, he obtained thenceforth a more unlimited control over public affairs. At the head of an in- telligent, restless, and enterprising Demos, requiring at once to be guided and to be kept in good-humor, he assumed a great position, which well repays the study of the historian. Pericles, the son of the victor of Mycale and of Agariste, the niece of that Cleisthenes who obtained for the democracy its preponderance at Athens, was thus by birth the inheri- tor of both tendencies — the tendency to develop the foreign 212 THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. power of Athens and the tendency to perfect her internal or- ganization. JEe had taken no share himself in the great Per- sian wars; lie had not helped to light out the great battle for life or death ; he came first upon the scene when the relative positions of both parties in the struggle were finally adjusted. For the place which he assumed as head and leader of the Demos lie was admirably adapted by education and training. His earliest training, one in thorough conformity with Greek conceptions, he received through a practised teacher, of whom, however, it was said that his mind was wholly set upon the art of eloquence after the model of the Sicilian school, which was also in vogue at Athens, in which politics and rhetoric were combined. It is perhaps still more im- portant to note that philosophers found a hearing at Athens, and were especially welcome guests in the house of Pericles. The ruling spirit in this society was Anaxagoras, of whom we shall have to speak later on. If we were called upon to give prominence to one of his views as exercising a greater immediate influence than the rest, we should select his doc- trine that those phenomena which lilled other men with ap- prehension for the future are to be conceived as natural occur- rences, on the score of which there was nothing to be feared. One who thus attached himself to the philosophers must ob- viously have been raised, in the formation of his designs and the whole conduct of life, far above others who were still encumbered by deixidaimonia, or the traditional superstition associated with unusual phenomena. Such a man was able always to keep a single eye to the business in hand. It was repeatedly affirmed in ancient times that Pericles originally had oligarchical leanings, that he avoided personal competition and endeavored to distinguish himself in war, but that as soon as he began to take a part in public affairs, and found himself confronted by an aristocratic faction, ho became aware that he could only attain to importance by securing the support of the people. We have already seen how unreservedly he took this course, and how, in conjunction with Ephialtes, he may be said to have been the true founder of the Demos as an independent power. Ephialtes in the meantime had been assassinated, it did not distinctly appear CHARACTER OF PERICLES. 213 by whom ; but, if the act was intended as a death-blow to democracy, it had rather the opposite effect, Pericles rose through it to still greater influence. In his personal bearing Kimon had a vein of popularity which was wanting in Pericles. The latter is charged with haughtiness, and, though lie was really exempt from this fault, his character contained the analogous element of a proud reserve. Elevated as he was above trivialities of every kind, he preferred to remain a stranger to the ordinary relations of social life. Pericles took no other walk than that from his own house to the assembly in which he spoke. lie moved sedately, and is said to have prayed that no unseasonable word might ever escape his lips. From the fact that this is related of him we may perhaps con- clude that he really attained to the perfection he desired.* lie never displayed emotion, and even insults were powerless to excite him. We must bear in mind the influences which acted upon the Demos of Athens — a stage unrivalled in any age of the world, a plastic art no less magnificent, and the impetus which culture in its upward efforts never fails to impart to the minds of men. Much was required in order to guide, still more to control, as Pericles did, an assembly of this kind. As Thukydides says, he did not follow the multitude, the multitude followed him ; he did not flatter the many, but often took a line which brought him into collision with public opinion ; he inspired courage when men were inclined to fear, and when the people betrayed a presumptuous self-confidence likely to be detri- mental, he emphasized all the dangers to which such conduct might lead. The people possessed the power to decide, but Pericles was able so to guide the assembly that the power of the people was but the basis of his own authority. Every one recognized that he sought nothing for himself, but made the greatness and well-being of Athens his sole end and aim. Under him the democracy acquired almost a monarchical * The principal evidence is that of Stesimbrotus, whose statements Plutarch has combined with some expressions from the comic poets. Such passages are even now read with pleasure. W. A. Schmidt (" Das perikleischc Zcitaltcr," ii. p. 9) reckons Stesimbrotus among the primary authorities for the epoch. 214 THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. character; the city was ruled by its first citizen. We have a bust of Pericles, a work of antiquity, of which the full face seems to wear an expression of dignity and energy, whilst the profile indicates a flexible and even designing character. Whilst he directed the general business of the state, he had to use every means in order to keep down his opponents. They were aristocrats who were still attached to Sparta; with these lie fought many a battle; but he had the Demos upon his side, lie succeeded in removing his antagonists by ostracism, and in the course of these encounters he acquired a most un- usual degree of power. He gathered in his own hands the substance of administrative authority, for he was president of the Stratcgi, and with this office was associated the duty of providing for the tranquillity of the city. To him was com- mitted the care of the public festivals, and, most important of all, the disposition of the finances. Possessed of this authority — an authority sufficient to determine the policy of the state — Pericles, instead of attempting to recover by direct aggres- sion, which would probably have been fruitless, the ground he had lost, made it his object not only to maintain the mari- time supremacy of Athens, which the last armistice had con- firmed, but to develop it into a power which should no longer be compelled to take account of the Peloponncsians. The island of Sam OS, to which belonged the glory of having been the earliest naval power of importance amongst the Hel- lenes, refused to submit to the leadership of Athens. The treasury of Delos had now been transferred to that city, and she exercised a sensible constraint over the internal affairs of the members of the league. Put even in her foreign rela- tions, for instance, with Miletus, Samos would suffer no inter- ference. Things came to such a pass that the Samians, who still retained an oligarchical constitution, made an alliance with the satrap of Sardis, which enabled them to look forward to the support of a Phoenician fleet. Pericles, who had just made preparations to besiege Samos, considered it necessary at all hazards to forestall the interference of the Phoenicians. Put whilst he diverted his attention to Caria, in order to en- counter the Phoenicians when they should approach, the Sami- ans succeeded in attacking and destroying his siege-works. REVOLT OF SAMOS. 215 He was compelled to return to Samos, where, in consequence of the arrival of succors from Athens, and through the as- sistance of adherents in the island itself, he succeeded in com- pletely overmastering the Sainians and compelling them to submit to Athens (n.c. 440). There was no further motive for the despatch of a Pho3iiician licet, and accordingly we hear no more of it. It is very probable that the Persians recalled to mind the compromise which had been effected a few years before. They were unwilling to take a course which would give the pretender in Egypt, who still held his ground, the assistance of a Grecian fleet. The fact that the oligarchical party in Samos endeavored to support itself in its resistance to Athens by calling in the aid of Persia, lent to the democracy of Athens a Panhcllenic coloring which be- came it well, while the subjugation of that island gave Attica a more decisive ascendency over the league than she had ever before possessed. Pericles had instituted experimental cruises once a year, each squadron consisting of sixty ships, which were eight months at sea ; and for this the citizens who served on board received pay. In this way, however, the fact was made strik- ingly apparent that the money of the confederates was used by Athens to maintain the fleet by which she kept the league under her control. Pericles regarded it as absolutely neces- sary that the maritime forces should be ready for service at any moment. Fresh attention was also bestowed upon the improvement of the siege-train, already a point in which Athenian strategy excelled. Pericles himself was famous as the inventor of the ram and the testudo, although perhaps Artemon had most to do with their invention. This also must have contributed towards keeping the members of the league in a state of subjection. The principal grievance of the confederates, that the money which they had collected in order to maintain a common cause was arbitrarily expended at Athens, had found an echo in Athens itself, where there was always more or less a party of opposition. Pericles replied that Athens was under an obliga- tion to protect the members of the league ; provided she ful- filled this duty, it was quite within her province to dispose of 21G THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. their contributions at her pleasure. This disposal of public moneys in the interest of a single nationality dominant over the rest was something new in the world. We still possess a monument of this epoch in the ruins of the buildings raised by Pericles, which still enthrall the admiration of mankind. In the era of Pericles the art of sculpture seems to have reached its climax. The annals of the Parthenon, which Pericles erected, and against which the waves of eventful fortune have continued to break from century to century even to the most recent times, are a familiar tale: even the deportation of its still surviving fragments is part of that chain of events which links together East and West. Let us endeavor to grasp the historical conditions under which that splendid edifice was raised. The sanctuaries of the citadel of Athens, destroyed by the Persians, had already been restored. Pericles chose for the erection of an additional temple a site which the Peisistratidae had already designed for that purpose, the still vacant area of the Hecatompedon. From this elevation the view extends from the marble hills of Attica, over shore and sea, as far as yEgina. Here a sanctuary was constructed, designed not so much for worship in the strictest sense as for festal proces- sions, and with a very practical and even political object as well. This object was the custody of the public treasure, which was then more considerable than ever before or after- wards ; it amounted to 10,000 talents, a very large part of which, about three fifths, had been contributed by the mem- bers of the league. This sum, whether of coined money or not, was intended, as Pericles himself once announced, for prospective warlike enterprises on a large scale, and formed a reserve fund on which Athens, should she find herself em- barrassed, might depend. The control of the treasury was confided to a number of Athenian citizens; the money itself, however, was, as more than one inscription testifies, kept in the 02)isthodomos of the Parthenon. In the cella were votive offerings of great value, and at the entrance stood the colossal image of the goddess, emblematic of the power and spirit and the self-reliance of Athens. The statue of Athene was chrys- elephantine, and proceeded, like the Olympian Zeus, from ATHENS UNDER PERICLES. 217 the hand of Pheidias. In one hand she bore a Nike, adorned with garlands, the symbol of those victories to which all was due; on the other side were seen the spear and shield, whilst on her breast was the a'gis with the Gorgon's head. Bold indeed would have been the hand that approached her sacri- legiously. * Even into the great affairs of state there entered a personal element. The honors paid to the victories over the Persians magnified at the same time the names of Miltiades and of Kimon, and here, in like manner, the likeness of Pericles was figured upon the shield of the goddess. It might be said that in this monument the whole administration of Pericles was imaged — first, the great place in the world which he had won for Athens; next, her maritime preponderance; for the members of the league were the servants of the powerful capital, and had no voice even in the disposal of their own money. The same feeling is expressed in the other struct- ures of Pericles. Such, for example, was that theatre upon the promontory of Sunium, which had for its spectacle the manoeuvres of the triremes, and commanded a view of the Kyklades. Such, above all, was Peirseus, the port of Athens, with its spacious squares, its broad streets, intersecting one another at right angles, and its separate harbors for the war- like and the mercantile marine, which have served as the model of all similar structures in later times. In one of these harbors was concentrated the power, in the other the wealth, of Athens, in the days of Pericles. In the Acropolis the ancient sanctuaries of the city were, so to speak, shut off from the rest by a row of Caryatides. Stately rows of columns served at once to unite and to sep- arate the upper and the lower city. These were the Propylcea, the type of which has formed a model for all succeeding * Thus Pausanius describes the statue which he saw. Yet it is very noteworthy that in the statuette which is almost universally acknowl- edged to be the best copy of the original, and which was found by my lamented friend Lenormant, ;vgis, spear, and shield arc wanting. But this is but one among a thousand doubtful points connected with the whole subject, as may be seen from the work of Michaelis on the Par- thenon. 218 THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. efforts of art. In the lower city Pericles established places of exercise for the future manhood of the state, in the old Lyceum, as well as in the gardens of the Academy, which, refreshed by the waters of the Ilissus, recovered their rural aspect. The Gymnasium, the Lyceum, the Academy, are names the mere mention of which enables us to recognize how precious to posterity arc these institutions, designed alike for the improvement of the body and of the mind, and serving, so to speak, as types in the history of culture. Whether we admire the policy of Pericles or not, the spirit- ual energy with which he gave life to the happy inventions of his creative genius has raised up for him an enduring mon- ument in the history of our race.* In the execution of his buildings Pericles was assisted by a number of men of tried or rising ability, over whom Phei- dias exercised a certain superintendence. It may with good reason be asserted that Pericles, in undertaking these works, had also social and political ends in view, lie designed that the lowest class of citizens, which scarcely took any part in the maritime expeditions and warlike enterprises, should yet derive some benefit from the state. He gave employment to manual labor — such employment, indeed, that the whole arti- san class, whose assistance was invited by those immediately concerned in the buildings, found adequate occupation. No one was to be idle or dilatory ; every one was to have the means of subsistence. The buildings rose with a rapidity which astonished the world. f Athens became a city in the true sense of the word, whilst the other Greek sites remained villages — the first city in the West, and in the world. The works of art which Pericles called into existence wcro of a religious nature, and the goddess to whose glory they were dedicated was the object of universal adoration. Put for that protection of philosophy to which we have already referred the powerful statesman had special and personal mo- tives. In the position which he held, it was an advantage to * The description of Alt ion ami Athens, as they were at this epoch, may he read with pleasure in Curtins, "Gr. Gcsch." ii. 326 sq. t The Parthenon was completed in 438, the Propyleea in 433-32. RUPTURE WITH SPARTA. 219 him that he was an Alcmreonid ; for nothing is more capti- vating to the popular mind than the union of personal merit, high birth, and popular aims. In the case of Pericles, how- ever, the advantage had its darker side. The destiny of the AlcmaeonidsB was closely linked with a trespass against the gods who guarded the rights of asylum — a trespass for which they had been forced to pay a heavy penalty. The purifica- tion which Epimenides had made had by no means sufficed to efface the memory of the deed. It was brought up once more against Pericles himself. The Lakednemonians, who saw in him their most prominent enemy, upon one occasion called upon the Athenians to banish him as one upon whom a stain rested. Nevertheless, we are told that the denuncia- tion, as coming from the enemy, made but little impression upon the people of Athens. Yet the Lakedaunonians had an unbroken succession of sympathizers in Athens, and we may perhaps assume that in this vulnerable side of his position lay one motive for his attachment to the philosophers, and espe- cially to Anaxagoras, whose teaching included a rational prin- ciple, which gave no encouragement to accusations of this kind. To a similar motive may be traced the reproaches levelled at his friend Aspasia, who, not being an Athenian, could not be legally married to him, but who lived with him as his wife. She was what was called a sojy/iistria, with none of the preju- dices which limited the horizon of the Greek women gener- ally, and she fascinated him not only by her beauty, but by her genius and the charms of her conversation. She was ac- cused not only of encouraging various domestic irregularities, but also of want of reverence for the gods: she is said to have distinguished the women of her household by the names of the Muses. Pheidias incurred a similar suspicion by trac- ing on the shield of Athene the figures of Pericles and of himself. This combination of popular absolutism with a philosophic divergence from the popular belief provoked a reaction which at times proved embarrassing. No one would be inclined to deny the general statement that subordinate motives of a personal character have at times exerted an influence in affairs of the greatest compass. But 220 THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. the situation which we are now to consider cannot be ex- plained by such motives. The policy which Athens had fol- lowed during the years immediately preceding the time we have arrived at led inevitably to a breach with Sparta. There were, in particular, two questions at issue which tended to this result. Pericles and the Athenian people, not content with the dominion of the eastern Mediterranean, had always kept an eye upon the West. As they had colonized Sinope, on the Black Sea, so they planted colonies of Ionian descent in Italy, as, for example, at Thurii, and they took part in the founda- tion of Naples. In the West, however, the Dorian colonies, especially those from Corinth, were in the ascendant, and it was not possible to wrest anything from them as long as they re- mained united. According^, the rupture which took place between Korkyra, the principal Corinthian colony, and the mother city, must have been a welcome event to the Athe- nians. A war ensued, in which the Korkyrceans, just at the crisis when they were in danger of being overpowered, re- ceived support and deliverance from Athens. The Atheni- ans had more immediate cause to be jealous of Corinth than of Sparta. Their precarious relations with Megara were due to Corinth, and at this juncture another conflict of interests arose in the neighborhood of the Thracian possessions of Ath- ens. Here Athens had drawn into her league towns which were Corinthian colonies, and which still maintained various relations with their mother city. This was especially the case with Potidsea ; and whilst Athens would not tolerate this intercourse, Potid&a, true to a venerable tradition, would not desist from it. The latter received support in this quar- rel from the king of Makedonia, who saw with reluctance the growth of the Athenian power in his immediate neighbor- hood. It was of the utmost importance to Athens to main- tain against this powerful king her colonies in the North, and the maritime preponderance which their possession helped to secure. Kimon had been blamed for not inflicting, when the opportunity presented itself, a crushing blow on the kingdom of Makedonia. When we reflect what consequences arose at a later time from the relations with Makedonia, we cannot RUPTURE WITH SPARTA. 221 shut our eyes to the fact that an interest which intimately concerned the whole Hellenic world was here ill question. The power of the Athenians in the North formed a common bulwark for all alike. But the requirements of foreign pol- icy are very often found irreconcilable with the conditions of internal tranquillity. It cannot be doubted that the conduct of the Athenians in interfering in the disputes between a me- tropolis and one of her colonies, and in trying to sever the ties by which another was still attached to her, did violence to the fundamental ideas of the old Hellenic world, and was only too well adapted to rouse lasting enmity against them. The Athenians could not, perhaps, avoid this, since their power in the West and North brought them into conflict with Corinth. If Athens was to strengthen her power in the North, or extend it in the West, a struggle with Corinth was inevitable. Such a struggle, however, could not fail to bring into the completest relief the old opposition between Athens and Sparta. Both in Botidsea and in Korkyra Athens en- countered that Dorian element which had its chief support in the power of Lakedsemon. The Lakedsemonians hesitated for a while, but presently made demands, especially one for the autonomy of all Greek cities, with which Athens could not have complied without renouncing her whole system. Bericles, in spite of this protest, boldly determined to con- tinue his course. The question was not whether he should undertake the war, but whether he could avoid it. Bericles would not abandon the policy he had hitherto pursued, even at the risk of war with Sparta. In the speech to the people which is ascribed to him, special prominence is given to the advantage which naval forces have over land forces in open warfare. The naval power of Athens was, in fact, the main- spring of every public act, and the democratic people followed implicitly the line of thought taken by its leader. The way in which the Spartans viewed the matter is clear from the declaration of one of the Ephors that they could not allow the Athenians to become any greater, or see the members of the league sacrificed to their ambition. We may, perhaps, at this point, recall to mind the last accommodation, by which the power of Athens was checked 222 THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. upon the mainland and directed towards the sea. On the latter element Athens had now become so strong that she could not have endured any subordination to Sparta, such as would have been implied in her giving way to the allies of Sparta in the North and "West. Thus the Delian League was, so to speak, encroaching upon the province of the Pelo- ponnesian. On the other hand, the Spartans made demands — such, for example, as that for the abrogation of a decree made to prevent the commerce of the Megarians in Attica — which galled the proud independence of a free community. At this time, also, the Thebans, who were allies of Sparta, made in the immediate neighborhood of Athens an attempt to master Platrea, an ally of Athens, which led to proceed- ings of extraordinary violence.* Thus the war became inev- itable. The Lakedremonians, under their king, Archidamus, took the field. An emissary was sent by them on purpose to as- certain whether, now that the war was really imminent, the Athenians were not alarmed, and accessible to peaceful sug- gestions. But the Athenians sent him back without so much as hearing him, and refused to accept any proposals from an enemy in the field. Pericles, to whose influence this resolu- tion may be traced, had already made preparations such as he thought would enable him to brave without anxiety an inva- sion of the enemy. Never was the authority of a leading cit- izen, who still remained but a citizen like the rest, more sig- nally displayed. Plis intention was to limit the defence to the city and a few strong places ; the open country he resigned unreservedly to the enemy. In the country the old indepen- dent life of its different inhabitants, which had been inter- rupted some centuries before by the union of all in one city, was not yet forgotten ; after the devastation of the Persian wars the proprietors had established themselves again, and loved to spend their days upon their estates. By the ordi- * From this event the breaking-out of the Pcloponnesian war is dated ; in fact, Thukydides himself makes this the starting-point (ii. c. 1 ad in.). According to the calculations of Bockh ( u Zur Geschichte der Mondcyclen," p. 78 sq.) the surprise of Platsea took place in the beginning of April, 431 (01.87,1). OUTBREAK OF WAR. 223 nance passed at the instance of Pericles, through which they were, one and all, compelled to abandon house and home, and to withdraw into the city, they were touched in the most sensitive point. Nevertheless, they acquiesced ; many even broke away the woodwork of their houses, and took it with them within the walls. In their search for places in which to establish themselves, they were directed to whatever open spaces still remained, or to the temples and shrines, which were made over to them. Their discomfort increased their ill -humor, which reached its climax when the Lakedsemo- nians burst into Attica, and the population pent within the walls saw their property ravaged almost before their eyes, without being allowed to employ their arms in self-defence. It was part of the design of Pericles to avoid a battle in the open field; only the strong places and fortresses were to be held ; the real battle was to be fought on the sea. The idea which had been ascribed to Themistocles was thus realized in its fullest extent, although under circumstances very different to those originally contemplated. For Themistocles had com- bated the national enemy, who menaced the country with per- petual bondage. The Lakedsemonians only wished to prevent the predominance of Athens, and to maintain the balance of power. Yet the consequence was now, no less than then, that the open country was laid waste far and wide. Pericles de- signed to retaliate for the ravages committed in Attica b} 7 rav- ages in Laconia; the Lakedsemonians, however, were able to send timely assistance to defend the places menaced, and as yet the descents made by the Athenians were affairs of no great moment. There was, however, another action of theirs which augured hostilities of the severest character. Amid the confusions occasioned by the accession of Megara to the Athenian league and the alliance formed in consequence between Corinth, Ep- idaurus, and .zEgina, the Athenians had succeeded in getting possession of .zEgina itself, and the island was compelled to give up its fleet and to acknowledge the supremacy of Ath- ens. The Spartans, being at that time at peace with Athens, had not interfered. But, when the war broke out, vEgina, as being situated between the regions in which the rival powers 224 THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. were respectively supreme, became the natural object of their mutual jealousy. Sparta demanded the liberation of iEgina ; Athens ascribed the hostility of Sparta to the instigation of the discontented /Eginetans. On the outbreak of war she resolved to render the island incapable of any resistance, and not merely to subdue it — that, indeed, she had already done — but to appropriate it entirely. It was as if the old antago- nism between Dorians and Ionians were here reappearing, with no attempt at disguise. The yEginetans, who were of Dorian stock, were expelled, with their wives and children, from their possessions, which were divided among Athenian kleruchs, who were regarded as Ionians by descent. Some of the exiles found an asylum in Spartan territory, such as the Athenians had on a former occasion provided for the Messe- nians. Such an event was well adapted to revive the old enmity between Dorians and Ionians, and nothing was to be expected but a long and bitter struggle. The Athenians had never been more powerful ; but, on the other hand, the Lakedcemo- nians were in a condition to maintain the balance against them. The situation of the Athenians involved, indeed, pos- sible perils, but at the same time held out to them magnificent prospects, when they were visited by a misfortune for which no human being could have been prepared. In the second year of the war a pestilent malady broke out, against which no effective remedy could be discovered, and which demanded innumerable victims. "Whole families perished. It is proba- ble that the plague was introduced through the commerce by sea from Ethiopia and Egypt, where, it is said, it had first ap- peared ; for it manifested itself first in the port of Athens. But it cannot be doubted that the gathering of the popula- tion in the capital under the circumstances we have already mentioned — circumstances so pernicious to physical well-be- ing — contributed much to the intensity and to the spread of the disease. The disease, if originally due to other causes, was able to attack a closely packed population with disastrous effect. An oracle was quoted, according to which a curse had been laid upon any attempt to build in certain quarters remote from the centre of the city. Thukydides observes THE PLAGUE AT ATHENS. 225 that the misfortune arose, not from the curse, but from the circumstances which rendered building in these regions a necessity. The pestilence at that time broke out only in populous places, and the Peloponnesus, where everything con- tinued under the old and familiar conditions, was unassailed by it. At the very moment when it broke out in Athens, Archidamus and his army had once more advanced into At- tica. In consequence of the fresh immigration, especially of the humbler classes, which was thus occasioned, the pestilence increased in severity, and the Spartans found no real opposi- tion. But the smoke which rose from the cremation of tho dead in the city reminded them that they might themselves catch the infection, and they withdrew without delay. Mean- while the sickness, which seemed to be in alliance with tho Spartans, appeared in the Athenian fleet as well. The fleet had again attempted descents, in which it had succeeded bet- ter than in the previous year, and had done considerable dam- age. The spectacle of two powers, which, if united, might have achieved a world-wide influence, tearing each other to pieces in this furious and hopeless struggle, is indeed a fear- ful one to contemplate. The situation of Pericles in Athens itself grew daily more difficult. In consequence of the devastation of the country and of the pestilence he lost the good -will of the people, ready, as usual, to attribute every calamity to its leaders. Scarcely, however, had he recovered his authority when tho pestilence, now almost extinct, seized him and carried him off (cir. Sept. 429 B.C.). Pericles is one of those leaders of aristocratic origin who, having placed themselves at the head of the people, have roused them to the kind of life proper to democracy. He cannot be compared to Aristeides, or even to Solon. lie had not the moral purity of impulse by which these were guided. He followed completely in the footsteps of his great uncle Cleisthenes. Cleisthenes was the proper founder of the Demos, and Pericles made the Demos master of the wholo body politic, and so perfected its organization that the possi- bility of reviving the aristocratic principle seemed almost out of the question. The aim which prompted all his acts was 15 220 THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. tho development of the power of Athens. This end the de- mocracy itself was adapted to further, inasmuch as there were democratic movements taking place in every part of Greece, which now sought support in Athens. At the same time, however, Pericles made the authority of Athens over the maritime league so strong as to overbear all resistance. lie prevented the formation of any connections with Persia among the members of the league, and suppressed by force of arms the attempt made by the most important among the islands to assume an independent position. The greatness of the city was founded upon her influence as a democracy and as a maritime power. In each of these directions Pericles came in conflict with Sparta, not to speak of the antagonism which he inherited as an Alcmceonid. lie was well aware that he was not a match for the power of the Peloponnesians on land, but, in order not to succumb to it at the first onset, he had recourse to a method which, however heroic in itself, was destined to be fatal to himself and to Athens. It would, no doubt, have been possible, whilst sacri- ficing the open country to the inroads of the Peloponnesians, to maintain and even to strengthen the substantial power of Athens, and thus to establish her maritime preponderance on a secure basis ; while the enemy's attacks by land would have to be gradually abandoned, had they led to no result. It was a tragic fatality which, as we have seen, frustrated these an- ticipations by the intervention of natural forces against which no foresight could have provided. That pestilence broke out which is known to every reader through the incomparable description of Thukydides. It crippled forever the efforts of Athens, and brought the life of Pericles to an end in the full tide of his active career. To what goal he would have guided Athens few would be bold enough to conjecture. However vast his enterprises, ideal aims and the sense of beauty had the same fascination as ever for his spirit. By one side of his character he was led in promoting art to strengthen re- ligion, by the other in promoting philosophy to clear the way for freedom of scientific inquiry. The result has been that one of the great epochs of culture is designated by his name. If there be earthly immortality, it is this. CLEON. 227 The death of Pericles was followed by radical changes in the state. It is a general truth that men of high importance can never be replaced, unless, indeed, the circumstances could be repeated out of which all that made their position indi- vidual has grown. The death of the great leader and first citizen was doubly felt, because he left no successor. Amid all the agitation of democracy Pericles had maintained unim- paired the unity which results from a guiding idea. After his death a general disintegration was inevitable, and the di- visions which he had been able to keep in abeyance refused any longer to be postponed. 3. Cleon and Ms Epoch. Among the opponents of Pericles who towards the close of his career struggled against the power with which he was invested, one of the most energetic was Cleon, a man whom the great comic poet of the time has exposed to the derision and contempt of posterity. Cleon was one of the industrial order, and supported himself by a tannery, in which he em- ployed slaves. His business bringing him into contact with those classes which formed the great bulk of the citizens, he shared their sentiments and expressed their views in effective speeches, and thus after the death of Pericles attained pre- dominant influence. He was a man of humble origin, with- out the education which was then regarded as essential, whether for private or public life. But from the very nature of democracy it was to be expected that a man of this kind might make his influence felt in the vortex of political strife. In Aristophanes Cleon appears as "the heaven-hated tanner," the "scandalous bawler," the "raker-up of filth," with whose rancor all public deliberations and trials are tainted. In one play he is represented as the steward of Demos, who contrives to rule his master and ill-treat all the other slaves. It is one of the acts upon which Aristophanes prides himself, that when no one had sufficient courage to put on the mask of Cleon for the forthcoming representation of this piece at the Lensean festival, he himself undertook the part, a step by which he necessarily incurred the deadly hatred of the satirized dema- gogue. *22S THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. This picture has in later times been regarded as historical ; yet I should not venture to give a place in history even to isolated traits from it, so natural was it for comedy to bring upon the stage a caricature adapted to the humors of the time. The representation has no doubt some traits of truth, on which it must have depended for its effectiveness, but its sole support is the inventive malice of the poet. If we wish, I will not say to defend, but to judge of Cleon, we must only try to estimate the share which he really took in the adminis- tration of the state ; and there we see evidences of a fierce and violent disposition. "We must proceed without delay to speak of the conflicts in which he took a prominent part, because they bring into distinctness those relations between Athens and her maritime confederacy which form one of the most important among the motive forces of the time. Cleon appears as a democratic leader who despised no means by which he might win and secure the favor of the multitude. From him proceeded the increase of the pay of the heliasts to three times its previous amount, a heavy bur- den to the state, which, however, served to establish in the popular assembly a party absolutely under the control of the demagogue. The nature of his influence may be gathered from his conduct upon the revolt of Lesbos. This revolt im- plied an attempt to break through the whole system upon which the power of Athens depended. The Lesbians were the most powerful of the allies of Athens in the league, and the least burdened of any, but, as it is expressed in the speech which Thukydides attributes to their ambassadors, it was only mutual fear which maintained even a tolerable under- standing between Athens and Lesbos. To the Athenians the considerable naval power possessed by the Lesbians was a source of suspicion and annoyance, whilst the superiority of the Athenians excited in the Lesbians feelings of anxiety and mistrust, and they were afraid that after being employed to subjugate others they would themselves have to undergo the same fate in their turn. So long as Athens was in full possession of her overwhelming power they kept quiet. But the Athenians had now been weakened by the various costly enterprises on which they embarked, and more still by tho REVOLT OF LESBOS. 229 pestilence, whilst at the same time the vicissitudes of the war encouraged the Lesbians to hope for the support of Lake- dsemon, to whom they had previously appealed in vain. They began therefore seriously to entertain the idea of opposing the Athenians. The Athenians heard of the first steps taken in this direc- tion, and hastened to encounter them. On the other hand, the Mytilemeans, who headed the movement in Lesbos, learned what was intended against them, and prepared to secure their own safety. Accordingly, when the Athenians required the Mytilcnfeans to destroy their fortifications and deliver up their ships, the latter resolved to refuse such a demand (July, 428 B.C.). Nor had they much trouble in drawing to their side the Lakedremonians and the Peloponnesian league. The chief inducement was the hope that all the members of the Delian League would then take the same course, and be en- abled to sever their connection with Athens, a blow by which her power would be utterly annihilated. The mere fact that Lesbos abandoned the Athenian league and passed over to the Peloponnesian was in itself a momentous reverse. Yet the consequences were disastrous to Mytilene. The Pelopon- nesians did indeed send a fleet to sea, but it did not make its appearance in the iEgean until it was too late. The Athe- nians, with their wonted promptitude, had brought all their forces to bear upon Mytilene, and had a portion of the in- habitants of the island on their side ; they were chiefly as- sisted, however, by a democratic movement in the city itself. The constitution of Mytilene was oligarchical, and thus far relations were already established between the city and the Peloponnesians. But in the urgent danger of their invest- ment by the Athenians, who established also some smaller fortifications, from which they pressed the city hard, the Mytilenceans resolved to arm the populace, and that too with the equipment of heavy-armed troops. Herein they followed the advice of a Lakedsemonian emissary, but the result quite belied their expectations. Once in possession of these arms, the commons of Mytilene thought they might renounce their allegiance to the ruling families, and, by threatening to desert to the Athenians, they compelled the authorities to conclude 230 THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. a peace with the latter, the conditions of which implied noth- ing less than a surrender at discretion. The democracy of Athens was in league with the democrats of Mytilene. The popular assembly at Athens,- in which Cleon's voice was at this time paramount, had an opportunity of sitting in judg- ment upon the men who were doubly their enemies, antago- nistic alike to their polity and their power. The first resolu- tion of the Athenians was accordingly such as was to be ex- pected from the rage to which they were transported by the conduct of Mytilene, a rage which the powerful demagogue fanned into a flame. The principal offenders, nearly a thousand in number, had been sent by the Athenian admiral to Tenedos. The resolu- tion of the assembly was to execute not only these, but with them all the adult Mytileneeans, and to make their wives and children slaves, in the exercise of that terrible right of war out of which, as we have shown, slavery first and principally arose in the East. Cleon insisted upon this, maintaining that the whole body of the people was guilty, not the leaders alone ; that the revolt had taken place without any justifica- tion whatever, and must be punished without mercy, in order to deter others who might be inclined to follow this example ; that otherwise the power of Athens, which was derived from the contributions of the members of the league, would be in danger of collapsing. The thing seemed, he said, so obvious that he suspected all who were of a different opinion of hav- ing proved accessible to bribes from the Mytilenseans. It was, in fact, Cleon's intention to exact a revenge of unmiti- gated severity, which would be effective in proportion to its speedy execution, and would serve to keep the whole league in check. He was so far successful that a ship was de- spatched to the general in command at Lesbos with direc- tions to carry out the punishment without delay. But Cleon had not yet disposed of all opposition. On the following day the question was brought once more before the popular assembly, and Diodotus, one of Cleon's antagonists, rose to give effect to the arguments on the other side. He rejected triumphantly and with dignity the insinuations of Cleon. Adopting the premise of Cleon, that the naval do- CLEON AND DIODOTUS. 231 minion and the support derived from it must be maintained at any cost, lie showed that this end could not be reached by punishing all desertions with death and destruction ; deser- tions would still take place, and it would be impossible to be always engaged in besieging and overpowering suspected al- lies, who, when they had nothing but the extreme of ven- geance to expect, would be driven to defend themselves to the last drop of their blood. The best policy was to take care of the interests of their allies, and to avoid vexatious in- terference with them. The speeches both for and against are set side by side in the inimitable account given by the his- torian of the epoch. Cleon does not deny that the dominion which was exercised was a tyranny; if the Athenians have no just right to it, their duty is, he argues, to give it up and lead quiet lives at home ; if, on the other hand, they think they have a title to empire, they must shrink from no extreme of violence in order to maintain it. Though Diodotus ob- jected that such a course was more likely to imperil than to consolidate their dominion, a doubt may well be entertained whether lie could have made much impression by an argu- ment in itself of questionable cogency ; but he adduced an- other which was well adapted to strike home. In all the cities connected with the league there were two parties, the one aristocratic and averse from the Athenians, the other democratic and inclining to their side. The victory in Les- bos had been due simply to the fact that the commons, so soon as the opportunity was given them, set themselves in opposition to the aristocracy. To execute the decree already passed would have been nothing less than to annihilate the natural allies of Athens. All the democracies which formed part of the league would have been alienated at a single stroke. So great was the influence of Cleon that the result was still uncertain ; but when the question was put to the vote the resolution of the previous day was rescinded, and another vessel was sent after the one which had already departed witli the message, the former being amply furnished with every- thing needful to enable and to encourage the oarsmen to re- lieve one another at their work, and thus to secure a rapid 232 T JIE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. passage. The consequence was that the second vessel entered the harbor at the very moment when the Athenian com- mander was reading the first despatch, which had just reached him, and which was now recalled. The city suffered no fur- ther punishment, but the principal offenders, who were then at Tenedos, were executed without exception — a savage re- venge, which nevertheless, as we have seen, was by compari- son an act of grace. These events took place in the spring of 427 b.c. The main result was that the maritime ascendency of Athens in the archipelago remained unimpaired. A Lake- dsemonian fleet which appeared in these waters returned home again, having effected nothing. The celebration of a great festival at Delos was utilized in order to lend a religious sanc- tion to the restored supremacy of Athens. By land, however, the Peloponnesians maintained their su- periority. The reduction of Platoea, which, after a long and strenuous resistance, fell in the summer of 427 B.C. into the hands of the Thebans, was a sensible loss to Athens. The victorious Thebans surpassed even the Athenians in atrocity. They had promised the vanquished, on their withdrawal from the town, that their lives should be secure, but when the latter came out they were slaughtered to a man. The Athenian general, Demosthenes, conceived the bold design of interfer- ing in the disputes between Acarnania and ^Etolia, and thus opening for himself a way by land by which he might pass into Bceotia, in order to restore the balance in these parts also (summer of 42G b.c.). His plan, however, w T as ruined by the instantaneous rising of the yEtolian districts, the inhabitants of which still clung to a primitive simplicity of life ; and when the fortune of war turned once more in favor of the Atheni- ans, the Acarnanians thought it their best course to put an end to their disputes with their neighbors by a truce for a hundred years. At a later date the complications between these outlying regions bore with decisive results upon the great events of history ; not so, however, at this time. On the other hand, the Athenians succeeded in striking a blow in the Peloponnesus itself, which the Lakedaemonians felt most keenly. Almost by mere accident, in the course of a voyage to the western waters, the Athenians, under the SPHACTERIA. 233 command, as before, of Demosthenes, whose views in this matter were, however, not at all approved by the other officers of the fleet, established themselves in the harbor of Pylos, which the Spartans had neglected (June, 425 b.c.) Hastily, but with the best success, they erected upon the rugged and precipitous shore a little fortification, which they proceeded to occupy. The pride of the Lakeda3monians was outraged by seeing their hated enemy in possession of a stronghold within their own territory. They hastened at once to expel the intruders, but the Athenians were sufficiently prepared for attack to repel the first attempt to effect a landing, in which the brave Spartan general Brasidas was wounded. Soon afterwards the main fleet of the Athenians, on their return from their expedition to the West, entered the harbor, and inflicted upon the Lakedseraonians, who had also brought up their fleet to secure the place, losses which almost amounted to a defeat. The principal incident of the struggle was, how- ever, yet to follow. Into the island of Sphacteria, which lay before the entrance of the harbor, the LakcxUemonians had thrown a division of hoplites, taken partly from their own forces, partly from those of their allies, and this detachment, severed from the rest by the Athenian fleet, which was now master of the sea, seemed irrevocably doomed to the terrible fate with which in these times the victor was accustomed to visit his vanquished enemy. In Lakedaemon their peril excited the greatest commotion, especially since many of those who were shut up in the island belonged to the most influential families in the land. The Spartans resolved to make proposals for peace at Athens, and an arrangement was made with the Athenian generals that, until these proposals were accepted or rejected, hostilities in the harbor of Pylos and upon the island should be suspended. A Lakedaemonian embassy was sent to offer the Athenians not merely peace and friendship, but an alliance, if they would but let the troops upon the island go free. It was repre- sented to the Athenians how unwise it was to add private and inexpiable enmities to the public causes of quarrel, and how well the opportunity might be improved in restoring peace to both republics and to the Greeks at large. But the leading 234 TIIE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. demagogue explained to tliein that they had a prize in their hands, for the redemption of which they might exact far more than this, and he was not contented with that restitu- tion of the status quo, which was all that the offer of the Lakedsemonians implied. lie thought that they might be brought to give back once more the places which Pericles had resigned to them on the conclusion of the thirty years' truce. These places, however, had either been reinstated in their old independence or restored to their former possessors. The whole arrangement had been a compromise by which the Athenians had received great compensating advantages. The Lakediemonian ambassadors, confounded by such ex- travagant claims, suggested the appointment of a commission with which they might quietly discuss points of detail. But their proposal excited the most violent opposition on the part of Cleon, who would not hear of any negotiations except such as were conducted in the presence of the whole people, where, as he knew, the decision would depend upon himself. What- ever else we may think of Cleon, he must be admitted to have played an important part in history ; it was through him that, at a moment exceptionally favorable for the termination of a war which had ceased to have any true vaison d'etre, the negotiations for peace were broken off. We may distinguish two classes of politicians — those who have the present situa- tion, and the gains it immediately offers, exclusively in view ; and those who take account of consequences and of the dan- ger of provoking a general resistance which may in the end prove overwhelming. It was to the former class that the high-handed and tempestuous demagogue of Athens belonged. He was simply concerned to profit to the utmost by the ad- vantage of the moment, as the best means of attracting a ma- jority of voices in his favor. The notion that the war, if it were resumed, might have an unfortunate issue for Athens, never once occurred to him, and it was not in his nature to take account of the wider interests of the whole Grecian world. In spite of the numerous follies of which lie was guilty, he was favored by fortune. He was himself instrumental, little as he desired it, in bringing about his own nomination as gen- SPHACTERIA. 235 era], with the commission to capture Sphacteria, the blockade of which was attended with many inconveniences. A mere accident, the result of carelessness, had set fire to the wood which covered the island and made attack difficult. This accident, and the preparations which Demosthenes thereupon made for an immediate occupation, were advantages by which the new general so profited that the beleaguered Spartiata?, attacked with much skill by a superior force, were at last really compelled to yield themselves prisoners (end of summer 425 b.c). The number of the survivors amounted to about 300, the rest having succumbed to the fierce and impetuous assault. Cleon brought them in triumph to Athens. The Spartans then renewed their proposals for peace, which, how- ever, led to no result, the demands of the Athenians becom- ing more and more extravagant. One evidence, amongst others, of the determination of the Demos to prosecute the war with might and main is found in the increase of the tax imposed upon the members of the league in the archonship of Stratocles, in which the conquest of Sphacteria took place. It was raised to an amount sometimes a little more, some- times a little less, than double the contribution hitherto ex- acted. The Athenians had, to begin with, an advantage which we can scarcely overestimate, in having the prisoners from Sphac- teria in their hands. How absolutely they were determined to make the utmost use of this advantage may be inferred from their resolve to slay their prisoners upon the first at- tempt of the Lakedsemonians to invade Attica anew. As the invasions were in fact discontinued, the Athenians were ena- bled, by the tribute received from the members of the league, to throw themselves with increasing energy into the war, and were repaid by conspicuous successes, principally in places where the democracy assisted them by rising against a domi- nant aristocracy. In this way they became masters of Kor- kyra (425 b.c.) and of Kythera (424 b.c), while elsewhere too, in places on the sea -coast, they obtained advantages. Yet they still failed in enterprises on a large scale, as in those, for example, against Corinth and Thebes. At Tanagra they suf- fered a defeat at the hands of the Boeotians (end of 424 b.c). 286 THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. A i longtl^ too, the Spartans roused themselves again to open hostilities; and, without direotly attaoking Attica, they took a course which perhaps was more effectual, by turning their arms against the possessions ^\' Athens in the north. Their design in this w:is the Bame as that which had already given occasion to the episode o\' Lesbos; it was io dissociate from the Athenians the members of their League. The at- tempt had failed by sea, and was now made by land. Potidsea, indeed, after a siege of two years' duration, had been com- pelled to yield, and had submitted once more to the Atheni- ans. These regions, however, were In a perpetual state of ferment. By one Beotion o\' the population, which had al- ready begun to revolt, the assistance of the Lakedsemonians had been invited; and another section, without any thought of insurrection, vol hoped to obtain a more independent posi- tion by drawing oloser to Lakedeemon. Moreover, it was Well known that King Terdieeas of Makodonia cherished a crrudffe aarainst the Athenians for the affronts he had received from them when lie first ascended the throne, and was anx- ious to obtain supporl from Lakedramon both against them and against other enemies on his frontier. To l.akodicmon, molested by the Athenians both from Pylos and from Kv- thera, and even imperilled by her insecure hold upon the helots, who were inclined to join the enemy, it was in itself a matter o( great concern to excite hostilities in other quarters against her restless and indefatigable opponents. Accordingly Brasidas betook himself to Thrace, not, how- ever, without encountering many difficulties in his march through Thessak. His design was to convert the allies o( Athens iutO allies of Sparta. 1 le purposed to abstain from interference in the internal disputes of the cities, and espe- cially to avoid favoring the aristooraoy at the expense oi the democraoy. The ruling powers in Lakedeemon had assured him most solemnly that they would leave unimpaired the freedom of the communities which passed over to their side. Accordingly Brasidas, presenting himself Bret at Acanthus, promised to achieve for the inhabitants, and for all the Hel- lenes, freedom from the yoke oi Athens; but at the same time, with an appeal to the gods and heroes oi the country. BRASIDAS. 287 he threatened to punish any refusal by laying waste the dis- trict. The choice, therefore, was between a change of Bides and subjection by force. The inhabitants, as a body, were not inclined to maintain their position as a dependency o( Athens at the risk o( life ami limb. In Aeantlms a formal VOte was taken on the proposal o( Urasulas ; ami the majority was in favor o\' accepting it. We may, perhaps, assume that this result was partly due to the doubling of the tribute, which was then being for the first time enforced. The hos- tility io the Athenians assumed, in oonsequenoe o( this defec- tion, greater dimensions than any which they had eueounterod hitherto. Brasidas was a man of a steadfast and soldierlike tempera- ment, of stainless virtue and heroic courage, who possessed the gift of confirming the attachment o( his friends, while Combating the hostility o( his foes. It was a great event when this commander, supported by the descendants iA' the an Oient inhabitants in the city and neighborhood, made himself master of Amphipolis, the eolony which the Athenians had founded between the arms K>i>t on this point without lu'silation tho iinr : uunl of I'luikwluu's v .\ 183) ni'.vni ok m;.\sin\s ■••;•.) After this ho sailed to the Si rvmon, where he took Up B pOSi tioQ near Kion, ft plaOO which the historian Thnk \ didc >, al that time in command of the Soot, bad allowed to fell Into the hands of Brasidas after the loss of A.mphlpolis. Oleon intended to wail tliere for the auxiliaries of L*erdiooas and other neighboring ohiof tains, in order to begin the war with all the resources be could muster. But be had not the pa tienoe to remain in a position in which be might ba\ o defond ed himself with Buooess, his troops having no confidence in bis generalship, and indulging themselves In outting obsorva< tions at bis expense. A demagogue far more than acorn mander, he forgot, whilst at the head of bis troops, what should have been his duty in a military sense. He abandoned his excellent position with the objeot <>\' making himself per sonally acquainted with the tone and temper of the country. While thus engaged be was surprised by the military skill of Brasidas, and the presumptuous demagogue suooumbed to the practised Bl fatCgist.* Brasidas, who had marched Into the neighborhood of Am phipollS, so laid his plans thai, whilst, he made a direct and unexpected attack upon the Athenians with n body of picked troops, they were at the same time assailed from the town itself. The discomfited Athenians, whil;.! attempting to re treat, were utterly routed, ('icon himself was slain. Brasi das was wounded, and shortly afterwards died (late summer, 122 B.o.). If was a most important, although not a decisive, event. On the Spartan side the brave warrior had fallen who had aohioved t ; o tnuoh that he had already exoited the jealousy ^\' the LakedcBmonian aristooraoy, on the Athenian the powerful demagogue whose voice more than any other commanded R bearing at Athens; and if might now be hoped that an :ir rangement oould be efifeoted, there being solid reasons to make both parties incline to peace. To the Lakedremonians no objeot oould be more desirable * [n anothor tradition, preserved in Dlodorus, Gleon is roprosontod inn better light than in Thukydldos, whom, nevertheless, wa prefer (<> follow Implicit ly, 240 THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. than a relief from the constant invasions to which their terri- tories were exposed from Pylos and Kythera, and which ex- cited the original inhabitants of the country against their masters, whilst their very existence would be imperilled if Argos, with which they had only concluded an armistice, soon to expire, renewed its old hostilities. On the other hand, the Athenians were aware that the fabric of the league, upon which their power was based, was shaken. They had capt- ured Del ion by surprise, a place admirably situated for the maintenance of their ascendency in Eubcea, but in a subse- quent battle there they had met with a reverse. The Boeo- tians and Corinthians had once more wrested Delion from them, a circumstance in itself very destructive to their pres- tige. The defeat at Amphipolis, one of the heaviest the Athenians ever suffered, must have been still more disastrous in its effect upon the maritime league. Lakedseraon had now a price to offer, in return for the complete evacuation of the Peloponnesus, in the restoration of Amphipolis. The control of Athens over her Thracian allies was not indeed re-established to the extent to which it had latterly been carried. Nothing was to be exacted be- yond the old tribute which Aristeides had formerly imposed. With this were coupled conditions securing the freedom of the towns in their internal affairs, notwithstanding their de- pendence upon Athens. A period was thus put to the hos- tilities on the Strymon, which had developed so rapidly and had taken a turn so menacing to Athens (April, 421 B.C.). The peace which was effected upon these terms led further to the restoration of the prisoners from Sphacteria, among whom were a hundred and twenty Spartans of pure race. Conditions such as Cleon had once demanded for their libera- tion were now out of the question. The peace was a compromise between Lakedamion and Athens. It was called for at Athens by those who had al- ready, in opposition to Cleon, consistently urged it, and es- pecially bv Nikias, the most conspicuous of the Athenian generals, who is said to have remarked that he wished never to run the least risk of suffering a reverse which might injure his mother country — a pardonable egotism, since it sprang THE PEACE OF NIKIAS. 241 from a want of confidence in himself. In Lakediemon the peace was chiefly promoted by Pleistoanax, who in this was true to the course he had taken in his retreat from Attica. His conduct on that occasion was no longer resented. The peace came, as we see from Aristophanes, to meet a univer- sal need and craving. In the true spirit of the ancient come- dy, Aristophanes, in whom there ran a vein of Panhellenism, appends to the play in which he celebrates the peace an ad- monition to maintain it. Exactly in this, however, lay the difficulty. 4. Alkibiades. The relations between Athens and Sparta were altogether of a very peculiar nature. A combination between these two states, one in nationality but contrasted in history and in po- litical constitution, was indispensable, not only on the ground of Panhellenic interests, for on such a combination, as in the time of the Persian wars, the safety of Greece depended, but also on more selfish grounds, for while Athens could not en- dure a Lakedaunonian invasion of Attica, the presence of an Athenian force in the Peloponnesus was equally intolerable to Lakedaimon. Peace was now concluded between them. The leading states were not, however, the whole body of the Hellenes, and it was at once found that the cities next to them in power declared against the treaty. Thebes was to lose Panacton, a place on her frontier the possession of which had cost her a long struggle, while Corinth was to part with Anactorion, a colony which, in conjunction with Korkyra, she had founded in Acarnania ; and both resented as a grievous injustice the treatment they were receiving at the hands of Sparta. In the agitation which ensued the pe- culiar character of the Greek states and cities was strikingly displayed. They were all independent, and jealously concerned to maintain their separate individuality. Each state had dis- played all the acuteness characteristic of the Greeks in in- clining the balance of its policy, both internal and external, to one or the other side. Their emissaries were incessantly passing to and fro to maintain unimpaired the interests of one state with another. The phenomenon of a number of 16 242 THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. communities, small indeed, but highly organized, with no su- perior power to control them even from a distance, forming a system kept together only by the sympathies and antip- athies which were at work within its limits, is one which has never been repeated. In the ancient world, at a later date, the Makedonians and the Romans interfered in the af- fairs of the Greeks, and in the Italian republics of the Mid- dle Ages the Papacy and the Empire were never entirely left out of sight, and it is for this reason that the vicissitudes of these states, in themselves of little moment, excite the atten- tion which is still bestowed upon them. At the crisis which we have reached, the Corinthians took the initiative. The terms of the pacification being disadvan- tageous to their state, they represented to the other powers that the sole object of Athens and Sparta was to keep the rest of Greece under their joint control. They turned to Argos, a state which had become much more powerful of late years, and which, having adopted a democratic constitu- tion, was less likely than before to prolong her armistice with Sparta. If the old struggle should be renewed, Argos had willing allies in her near neighbor Mantineia, a town which had lately risen to great power, and in the Elcans, who had, like Argos, conformed to the democratic model, and had be- come involved with the adjacent state of Sparta in quarrels in which it is impossible to say which of the disputants had right upon their side. The budding league had this further and noteworthy result, that the Thebans declined to deliver up Panacton, without levelling its fortifications, to the Athe- nians. They appealed to an arrangement which had been made upon a former occasion, according to which Panacton was to be open ground, accessible to both parties. The Lakedsemonians in effect acceded to their representations. But the Athenians were astonished and exasperated. They thought themselves defrauded inasmuch as the frontier for- tress was not delivered up to them intact, according to the terms of the peace. The Lakedromonians, instead of com- pelling the Boeotians to deliver up the fortress, as the peace required, rather took their side. Thus, from the action of the smaller states impeding the complete execution of the ALKIBIADES AND ARGOS. 243 terms of peace, there arose a fresh misunderstanding between the two leading states which had concluded it. Once more Nikias was sent to the Spartans to require them to break off their alliance with Thebes ; but his efforts were unsuccessful. A further consequence of this, however, was that the opponents of Nikias and his party gained ground in the Demos ; and the young Alkibiades now appeared at their head. He belonged to one of the principal families of the Eupatridae, and his mother was an Alcmseonid.* He was educated in the house of Pericles, whose policy he continued so far as it was directed towards the improvement of the naval power of Athens and the extension of her dominion without regard to Sparta. Alkibiades is said to have been displeased with the Spartans for having employed the inter- vention of Nikias in making advances to Athens, whilst the old terms of hospitality on which his ancestors on the father's side had stood with Sparta, and which he himself had re- newed, gave him, as he thought, a well-grounded claim to be intrusted with the charge of their interests. It is very pos- sible that a young man, conscious of his own powers, proud of his descent, and eager to achieve personal distinction, may have resented this neglect. But Athens generally shared his estrangement from Sparta. To unite in a common policy the oligarchical government of Sparta and the democracy of Athens was an undertaking scarcely to be compassed. On the other hand, there could have been no intention of renew- ing the war. Even Alkibiades had no such purpose, but he thought it well to counteract the combination between Sparta and Thebes, which might prove extremely dangerous should Argos join it, by uniting Athens with Argos once more. These little states form a world in which action is in every case followed by reaction. If Corinth had sought a union with Argos, in order to resist the policy of the two greater powers, we see Athens now, in opposition to Sparta, entering * Alkibiades, his grandfather, an ally of Cleistlienes, had a son Cleinias, who married Deinomache, the granddaughter of Cleisthenes. Cleisthenes was, therefore, great-grandfather of the younger Alkibiades. It will be remembered that he was also great-uncle of Pericles. 244 THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. into an alliance with Argos which forced Corinth to renew her old relations with Sparta. The democratic constitution of Argos was a further motive for advances on the part of Athens. In Argos as well as Sparta Alkibiades had personal friends, and after a short time a defensive league was made between Argos, Mantincia, and the Eleans on the one side and Athens on the other, by which it was covenanted that whoever attacked any one of the parties should be regarded as the enemy of all. The state of universal tension which this league produced may be seen from the fact that the Spartans were prevented by the Eleans, supported as they were by Mantincia, Argos, and now by Athens as well, from taking part in the Olympic games (420 B.C.), the very purpose of which was to represent and to maintain peaceful relations between the different tribes of (J recce, however warlike their attitude at other times. Contrary to all expectation, the Spartans bore this insult pa- tiently. Nor were they roused to action until the Argives, at the instigation of Alkibiades, made an attempt to subjugate Epidaurus. With the view of relieving the apprehensions of the Argives, a troop of helots was sent from Athens to disturb the Lakedffiinonian territory (winter of 419-8 B.C.). Even then the Spartans carefully abstained from any hostility against Athens, and made it their principal aim either to overpower Argos or gain her to their side. With this in- tention King Agis took the iield. He did in fact succeed, with the assistance of a party in Argos with whom he kept up an understanding, in concluding an armistice for four months (summer of 418 B.C.), which appeared certain to lead to a permanent peace. At this crisis, however, Alkibiades once more arrived at ArgOS. l>y his influence the arrangement was pronounced invalid, and Argos and her allies, including the Athenians, attacked the Lakediemonians, in accordance with the terms of the treaty. They captured Orchomenus, and liberated the hostages of the conquered towns, who had been transported thither by the Lakediomonians ; then they pushed on against Tegeia, which had hitherto been the most faithful of the allies of Sparta. In this peril, menaced by an overwhelming force DESTRUCTION OF MELOS. 245 in the heart of the Peloponnesus, the Lakedaraoniana bestirred themselves with all their old energy. As chance willed it, in the course of a desultory march, when they had no ex- pectation of a battle, they encountered their enemies, who had taken up a good position at Mantineia (August, 418 B.C.). But their old discipline, which Spartan training and Spartan modes of life had maintained in all its vigor, asserted itself with conspicuous success, and their king Agis was enabled once more to clear himself from the censure under which he lay on account of his retreat some years before. The battle resulted in favor of the Lakedseraoniana, and, though not im- mediately, had shortly afterwards the effect of bringing the party which favored their cause once more into the ascendant at Argos. Thereupon the Argivcs, together with the Eleans and Mantineians, concluded a league with the Spartans, the principal aim of which was to exclude the Athenians forever from the Peloponnesus (winter of 418-7 B.O.). It was round this question that the mutual opposition of Athens and Sparta mainly centred. The Lakeda3monians would not endure the presence of any Athenians in the Peloponnesus, while the Athenians refused to give up the ties which they had formed within that region. Once more Alkibiadcs betook himself to Argos, and never were his talents as an agitator more brill- iantly demonstrated. He brought about the overthrow of the oligarchy which had been established by Spartan influ- ence, and all the principal supporters of this party were ban- ished and placed under Athenian supervision. The Argivcs displayed the utmost zeal in attaching themselves to Athens, and at the instance of Alkibiadcs they built long walls, as Patrsa had done a short time before, in order that their mari- time connection with Athens might not be interrupted. In spite of the conflict of interests which the political situa- tion so strikingly reveals, no open breach between Sparta and Athens immediately ensued. Indeed, the Lakeda3mouians ac- quiesced when the little island of Mclos, one of their own colonies, was overpowered and punished with the most cruel severity by the Athenians, whose league it had refused to join (winter of 415-4 b.c.). The revenge which Cleon had proposed to take upon Mytilene was here mercilessly put into 24G THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. execution ; the men were put to death, the women and chil- dren carried away as slaves. It is related of Alkibiades that although he had been chiefly instrumental in carrying this decree, he, nevertheless, reserved to himself a female captive who had attracted his admiration, and by whom a son was born to him, whom he brought up in his own house. It is illustrative of the state of opinion at this time that his con- duct, instead of being regarded as a matter of reproach, was on the contrary commended as a trait of humanity. Alkibiades now figured as the principal personage at Athens, taking the same rank as Kimon before him, although belonging to the opposite party. There was an element of truth in his assertion that in the splendid display which he made with his four-horse chariots at Olympia, where he won with them the first, second, and third prizes, he had only the glory of his native city in view, for it was, indeed, one way of showing Greece that Athens still possessed rich and powerful citizens. He was liberal in his expenditure for the public service and for the amusement of the people. But there was something in his whole character and conduct which tran- scended the republican standard and the traditions of citizen life. There was about him something of the prince, although he achieved influence through the democracy alone and by courting popularity. His brilliant exterior dazzled but did not offend. In his personal beauty, in his way of speaking, and even in his defective pronunciation, there was something which seemed to plead in his favor. In his youth he was told that he might attain to greater authority even than Pericles in public affairs. On the other hand, Socrates called his atten- tion to his imperfections. Alkibiades once remarked that when he heard Pericles speak he was left with the impression that Pericles had spoken well. " But," he continued, " when I listen to the words of this Marsyas " — it was thus he desig- nated Socrates — " my heart leaps within me, and I shed tears, and he brings me to such a pass that I feel I can hardly en- dure the life I am leading." The mutual attraction between older men and those in early manhood, which is justly re- garded as one of the most objectionable features in Greek life, was exalted in the relations between Socrates and Alki- CHARACTER OF ALKIBIADES. 2A7 biades above the vulgar level, and acquired an educational, and we might almost say a political and military, value. It was only by virtue of his mental superiority and moral influ- ence that Socrates brought Alkibiades to return his affection, mutual proofs of which were given in the presence of the enemy, when Socrates saved Alkibiades after he had fallen exhausted at Potidaea, and was saved by him in turn in the retreat from Delion. The natural propensities of Alkibiades, in spite of this friendship, held their course unchecked. His ambitious love of display, while it fascinated the multitude, which, says Aris- tophanes, loved him and hated him, but still could not live without him, excited the apprehensions of quiet and serious- minded men, who foreboded nothing but mischief from his proceedings. " Go on," said the misanthrope Timon, seeing him in the full enjoyment of popularity : "you will bring all these folks to ruin." In spite of his Socratic discipline Alki- biades remained untamed and untrustworthy. That he enter- tained great designs from the first — that, for example, of making himself despotic or bringing Italy and Africa under the yoke of Athens— is more than we can say of him without some reservation. But he certainly aimed at making himself and his country great. He fixed his entire attention on the political conditions of the moment, and developed their ten- dencies with this end in view. It is easy to understand why he took the opposite side to Nikias. The insecurity of the situation in which Athens was placed, so long as the terms of peace were not carried out in their integrity, enabled him to set himself at the head of the people, and, young as he still was, to take the guidance of affairs into his own hands. The democracy needed a leader. Such a leader they found in Alkibiades, but he was the most dangerous they could have chosen. He could already point to great successes, especially to the alliance with Argos, which he had persuaded to oppose the Lakedsemonians in the Peloponnesus. This alliance, moreover, associated together democratic constitutions, and thus gave him a double authority in his character as a leader of the people. The combination of these tendencies did not, however, imply a breach with Sparta, for the notion of mak- 248 THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. ing Sparta herself democratic could never have been enter- tained. But the course upon which Athens had now entered tended to restrict the influence of Sparta within the small- est possible compass, and to leave the field open to the Athe- nians. These considerations prepare us for the appearance upon the political horizon of an enterprise on the part of Athens for the subjection of Sicily. This enterprise may be re- garded from one point of view as an episode in universal history, inasmuch as it affected, in the widest sense, the rela- tions between various states and the modes of thought by which those relations were determined. It is an old observa- tion that the relations between the Greek settlements in Sicily and the Phoenician settlements founded by Carthage were in a manner connected with the general opposition be- tween East and West. The story is well known that the vic- tory at Salami's coincided with a corresponding success won by the Sicilian Greeks over the Carthaginians at Himera. This, indeed, is only a legend, traceable to the feeling that some such connection did in fact exist, but similar incidents really occurred. The Greeks in Sicily had been favored with time to develop themselves peacefully, until they became able to hold their own against the Carthaginians in the island and to restrict them to a few places upon the coast. Yet there is no trace of any design on the part of Alkibiades and Athens to set themselves at the head of the Sicilian Greeks against the Carthaginians, although Alkibiades included Libya in his calculations. Their views, so far as they took shape in action, were confined to the internal disputes which agitated the Greek world. It was the Dorian settlements, whose in- habitants were closely connected with the Lakedsemonians, which were in the ascendant in Sicily. These were constant- ly at feud with the Ionian settlements, with which the Athe- nians were connected by a similar tie. To assist the latter was no departure from the direct course of Athenian policy. It was a design which Pericles had already entertained. Several years before this time, when the Leontines, who were of Ionian descent, were hard pressed by Syracuse, the princi- pal Dorian colony, various attempts were made to give them THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION. 249 assistance, the only effect of which, however, was to strengthen the power of Syracuse. Egesta also, involved in a quarrel on the subject of territorial rights with the neighboring city of Selinus, was put in jeopardy by Syracuse, which came to the assistance of the latter. There was no tribal relationship to give Athens a plea for making the cause of Egesta her own, for the latter city belonged to a colony reputed to be of Trojan origin, and was even on good terms with the Cartha- ginians. But Egesta insisted with success upon another mo- tive — namely, the constantly increasing power of Syracuse, which, by the subjection both of the Leontines and the people of Egesta, would become absolutely supreme in Sicily, to the detriment of the naval power of Athens and of her kinsmen of the Ionian stock. We recognize here the special character of the hostilities between Greek and Greek, as depending upon the antagonism of the races, but this opposition had never had consequences so extensive as those which were now in prospect. In Athens the advocates of peace, and especially Nikias, were absolutely opposed to the notion of assisting Egesta. The people of that city had indeed represented that Syracuse would always side with Sparta, but it seemed dangerous by an attack upon Syracuse to provoke open hostilities with the latter. To judge from the experience of the last few years, a war with Sparta offered little prospect of success, while it in- volved the greatest hazards, especially since all the other en- emies of Athens would be roused to action at the same time. Alkibiades, as might be expected, combated these views. He was much assisted in his efforts by the alliance with Argos, which he had himself effected. Athens did not, as hitherto, stand single-handed, but had formed connections, through which the exclusive power of Sparta in the Peloponnesus was very greatly impaired. Alkibiades exerted all the power im- parted both by his personal influence and his prestige. The noble speech which Thukydides puts in his mouth cannot be regarded as an exact report of what he said, but the principles therein expressed are of the greatest importance as illustrat- ing the political views of the period. At the time of the subjugation of Melos, a proceeding not to be justified on any 250 THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. other ground, the Athenians had maintained the maxim that the inferior power must always give way to the greater; it was, they affirmed, proved by experience that this was the will of the gods, to whom Melos vainly appealed. Their mean- ing was that territorial independence must inevitably, in the course of events, through which the divine will is displayed, yield to the sovereignty of a real power, embracing all its neighbors within the sphere of its influence. The feeling that might implies right was extended by Alkibiades to the conclusion that a constantly progressive power, such as that of Athens, need not, when its assistance is invoked, be scrupu- lously careful to consider whether justice is on the side of the suppliants, or even whether it may expect, in case of emer- gency, to receive support from them in turn, but cannot avoid giving assistance. Everything in Athens depended, he said, upon the development of her naval power ; no limit could be fixed at which this was to be arrested, for power excited a natural jealousy ; it was always lawful to anticipate rather than to await attack, and necessary to take one side or the other. The leading idea in this argument is simply that power, once established, must go on growing, because it cannot ex- actly estimate the hostile forces by which it may be opposed. This was the principle, as is well known, upon which Napo- leon I. justified his wars; it was the cause of his ruin. It was the principle also of the Romans, who succeeded in car- rying it out, and based their world-wide empire upon it. We see it here for the first time at Athens, dawning upon the mind of a leading statesman; it was the issue towards which the march of Athens, in the development of her power, was tending. Democracy, in order to establish itself, had to de- prive the old aristocracy of some of the prerogatives which it had formerly possessed. By the same process the individual independence of the members of the Delian league had been gradually broken down. Sparta was the only support to which malcontents of either class could turn. Alkibiades aimed chiefly at securing the dominion over all Hellas, to which Athens had already, in his view, a claim, by a victory over Syracuse: he thought little of the hostility of Sparta, which he accepted as an inevitable consequence. THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION. 251 It is obvious that these views must have encountered op- position, for, though it might be true that they had been put in practice already, no one had as yet openly professed them. The older men were more inclined towards Nikias, whilst the younger, eager for action, ranged themselves upon the side of Alkibiades. Alkibiades, however, insisted that both classes were essential to the composition of the state, and that its power depended upon their united action. His counsels pre- vailed, and the preparations were undertaken on a magnifi- cent scale. It was well known that the enemy to be assailed was expert in naval warfare. To conquer him a fleet of a hundred triremes was prepared. The universal emulation extended to the material equipment. But especial pains were taken with the requisite exercises, especially in trials of speed in rowing. Sixty of the vessels were purely ships of war; forty were at the same time intended to serve as transports. Thirty-four ships were added by the members of the league, so that complete control of the sea was assured beyond a doubt. The Athenians were, however, determined to be pre- pared at all points for their enterprise, remembering that they would have to fight on shore as well as at sea. The number of hoplites embarked exceeded 5000, of whom 1500 were Athenian citizens and furnished their own equipment; 700 more were Athenian citizens armed at the public ex- pense ; the rest were allies, among whom the contingents of Argos and Mantineia occupied a prominent place. All were hopeful of bringing the impending war to a successful issue, and of gaining from it glory and personal advantage. They had not neglected to provide against the attacks of cavalry, to which they would be exposed on their landing in Sicily. They lost no time in strengthening their forces with archers and slingers, principally from Crete. Above all, they reck- oned on the support of the Ionian settlements in Sicily, and on plentiful contributions from Egesta. It was an enterprise to which the past history of Greece afforded no parallel. It called forth all the energies of the commonwealth of Athens and of her allies; and the Athenian people, always confident, ambitious, and apt to bo tempted by wide projects, set the greatest hopes upon it. 252 TIIE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. Nor can it be maintained that these hopes were unfounded, in view of the general situation at the time. The Carthagin- ians had already once been checked, and were now engrossed in other enterprises ; amongst the Greeks no force could be raised by sea and land which could at all approach the Athe- nian expedition in magnitude, whilst the Persians had their hands tied by the Peace of Kimon. Thukydides makes Al- kibiades expressly say that he had set his eye upon Italy and Libya, but always with the design of falling upon Pelopon- nesus with the power thence derived, as well as with barbarian, especially Iberian, auxiliaries, and with fresh triremes built of materials which Italy was to furnish. In this way, he ex- plained, he had hoped to make himself master of the whole Hellenic world. This would have been, indeed, to take up a magnificent position in the midst of the opposing forces of the universe. Yet we may question at the very outset whether Athens was really capable, not only of commencing, but carrying to a successful issue, a struggle of this description. Even if such hopes were not unjustifiable in view of the opposing forces which the enterprise was destined to call into action, there is another reason which claims consideration. For the exten- sion of a power which has but itself to depend upon, whilst making the whole world its antagonist, unity in the end and aims proposed is essential, whether it be the power of a prince who executes plans which he has himself framed, or of a com- monwealth where a policy is firmly seized and as firmly main- tained. But at the very outset it was manifest that Athens was not such a commonwealth. Alkibiades, who had been chiefly instrumental in bringing the enterprise about, was nevertheless very far from holding a really commanding po- sition, or even from being sure of the more limited authority which he actually possessed. One night, in the midst of the preparations for the departure of the fleet, the marble busts of Hermes which stood in front of the citizens' houses were mutilated. This outrage threw the city into a ferment such as had never before been experienced. The act was construed into an attack upon religion and upon the constitution. It was against Alkibiades that the popular ill-humor was di- MUTILATION OF THE HERIVLE. 253 rected. Like Pericles, he was generally out of sympathy with the prevalent religion, and inclined rather to philosophic opin- ions ; he had, indeed, gone so far as to parody at a nocturnal debauch religious rites which were regarded by the multitude with reverential awe. It is certain that he had nothing to do with the disorderly act in question, but by the accusations which were brought against him in the inquiry to which it gave occasion he felt his position shaken and imperilled. His personal conduct was so defiant of established rules and do- mestic morality that he was believed capable of anything. Alkibiades was convinced that it would be impossible for him to sail unless the matter were legally decided and his own acquittal pronounced. It would be better, he said, that he should be put to death at once than that he should proceed upon an undertaking of such magnitude, and fraught with such critical issues to the state, while burdened with a sus- picion of this kind. It is true that the superstitious multi- tude was excited against him, but it is equally undeniable that his political antagonists seized this as a favorable oppor- tunity to shake his authority. A little reflection, however, sufficed to convince them that on the very eve of an enter- prise upon which all eyes were directed, and in the presence of so many armed citizens enlisted for the campaign, they could effect nothing against the general, who, although asso- ciated with two other commanders, Nikias and Lamachus, had the principal conduct of the undertaking. They even wished the expedition to Sicily to start at once, as they would then be in a position to proceed to further machinations un- disturbed. Without entering into the case itself the people came to a formal resolution that the fleet should set sail with- out delay.* Alkibiades was thus relieved from the immedi- * I depart here from the usual view that the trial was postponed till the return of Alkibiades in consequence of a formal determination; for, in the first place, this would have been the exact opposite of the course which Alkibiades had desired, and it would, in the case of one so pow- erful, have brought about a reaction in his favor. But, besides this, how could the party of his opponents have had the effrontery, in the face of such a decision, to proceed against him ? In Thukydidcs no such state- ment is made ; the proposals of certain orators are by no means repre- 254 THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. ate danger of legal proceedings, but, on the other hand, his opponents did not renounce their intention of bringing fresh charges against him in his absence. Under such circum- stances it was scarcely to be expected that an undertaking should succeed in which everything depended upon the un- broken spirit of its commander-in-chief. There is one further question which we cannot leave unin- vestigated — the question to what precise point the aims of Athens were directed ; for it is impossible that she could have rested content with the general but very vague idea of a con- quest of Sicily. Diodorus Siculus, who for this chapter of history supplies us with several valuable details in amplifica- tion of the narrative of Thukydides, states that in a confer- ence between the generals elect and the leading members of the Council of Five Hundred, which took place on the day before the departure of the fleet, it was resolved to prosecute the war against Syracuse and Selinus to the utter destruction of those communities. Since it was against them that the as- sistance of Athens had been invoked by the people of Egesta and Leontini, it was purposed to render that assistance with- out let or stint. The other Sicilian republics were to be left unhurt, but to be forced to enter into an alliance. The league between Athens and a number of subject allies, which had been maintained in the East against the Persians, was now to be extended to the "West as a check upon the Carthaginians, an arrangement which would have given Athens a command- ing position over the greater part of the Mediterranean as well as of Greece itself. The mass of the people can scarcely have had much knowledge of these intentions; their minds sented as acquiesced in by the people (vi. 29). His words are, ido%e irksiv rbv 'A\KtPuidt)v. Plutarch, -whose account is really only an expan- sion of that of Thukydides, perhaps suggests something of the kind, but nowhere actually says as much (Alcibiades, c. 19). Andokides has, in- deed, so stated the matter, but it has been sufficiently demonstrated that his statements are not entirely to be depended on. To me the only cer- tain fact seems to be that in the vote of the people which was to pro- nounce upon the accusation they proceeded to the order of the day. This, however, was only the question of the departure of the fleet. Every- thing else remained undecided. THE ATHENIANS AT CATANA. 255 were occupied simply by the vastness of the enterprise and by the hopes and fears which were linked with it. Every one knows the description of the state of feeling at Athens which is given by Thukydides. lie tells us further that on the departure of the fleet the customary prayers and libations were offered upon the ships at the voice of the herald. Dio- dorus adds that the shore of the harbor was covered with censers and consecrated goblets, and that the people on their part made libations; he represents, however, that this was not the unanimous act of all, but of those only whose proper function it was to minister in religious worship. Such were the circumstances under which the fleet put to sea, in the archonship of Chabrias, about midsummer, b.c. 415. On arriving at the shores of Italy, towards which they first steered, they discovered that they had not the slightest hope of obtaining from Egesta the supplies of money which they had expected. Nikias therefore proposed that they should limit themselves to fulfilling the obligations which they had undertaken, by obtaining for the people of Egesta, in what- ever way they could, the rights they claimed, and should then return home, refraining from attempts which would involve the state in incalculable expense and endanger their great armada. This, however, would have been to stultify the whole proceeding; and Alkibiades urged that it would be better to obtain a firm footing upon the island, gain over some allies, and, having laid this foundation, begin hostilities against Syracuse. His view prevailed, and, in conformity with that right of the stronger which Athens had proclaimed, they got possession, not without some double-dealing, of the city of Catana, in the harbor of which the Athenian fleet then found shelter. Of the colonies connected by race with Ath- ens, Naxos came to her side, and it would perhaps havo needed only a single success to bring about a great revolution in Sicily.* * The well-informed authority whom Diodorus follows says expressly that the cities of the Sikeli, though leaning for their own part towards the Syracusans, would have looked on quite quietly and awaited the issue of the struggle (xiii. 4) : eri rwv ZiKtXwv 7ro\£i£ ry fiiv evi>oi(f Trpog Zu- paKooiovQ ipptirov, o/xa>£ 5' iv r/X'£ [tzvovaai to avufiiiGontvov tKapa^oKovv. 250 TIIE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. But at the very moment when the enterprise was thus fairly begun in accordance with the projects of Alkibiades, the Salaminian trireme appeared in the harbor of Catana to recall him. His antagonists, who, at the time when Alki- biades carried the resolution in favor of the expedition, had bound themselves to counteract the execution of his scheme, and to put a period to the dangerous growth of his influence, had lately renewed their attacks. It was a son of Kimon who accused him of having derided Demeter and Persephone, the goddesses of Eleusis, and in his absence procured a reso- lution calling him to account for having turned the Eleusin- ian mysteries into ridicule.* So much importance was still attached at Athens to his connection with the Argives and the Mantineians, who continued to be attached to him, that he was not at once put under arrest, but was allowed a cer- tain degree of freedom in the return voyage to Athens, in the course of which the vessels touched at the shores of Italy. At Thurii, however, Alkibiades, with some others who were implicated in the same accusation, fearing that on his arrival at Athens he would be condemned to death, quitted the ship — it was his own — on which he was sailing, and succeeded in making good his escape. He was once asked if that was all the trust he placed in his native country ; his answer was that in a danger which threatened his life he would not trust even his own mother, who might easily make a mistake be- tween a black ball and a white one. Yet unquestionably he had made up his mind to prove to his native city, by all the means at his command, not merely that he was still alive, but that she could do nothing without him, and even from a dis- tance to chastise the enemies who had banished him from home and country. Animated by the proudest consciousness of his own worth, he felt himself no longer a citizen of the state to which he belonged, and severed without hesitation every tie, to enter upon a course in which he obeyed the guid- ance of his own star alone. * According to Thukydides, the resolution to recall Alkibiades was formed with the express intention of destroying him (vi. 01, j3ov\6/isvoi avruv is Kpiviv ayayuvrei; airoKTEivai). SIEGE OF SYRACUSE. 257 Something resembling this had already been seen in the instance of Themistoclcs. But to Thcmistocles his position at Athens was all in all, and, at the crisis when he was ex- pected to light against his native land, his death, probably self-determined, put him beyond the reach of this necessity. Alkibiades, on the contrary, contemplated from the outset an attack upon Athens, lie declared that the Lakedffimonians were nut such deadly enemies to Athens as the party in his native city which had expelled him, Alkibiades, the people's best friend. It would even have displeased him had Athens, without his help, obtained supremacy over Greece, and the commanding position in the world which he had desired to procure for her, for that position would then have been the portion of his antagonists. These it was his principal aim to crush, and he even thought it better to put the Spartans in possession of a supremacy which they would wield with mod- eration, than to let it fall into the hands of a government so unjust as that of Athens. The development of the naval power of Athens to its furthest possible extent, that idea which had hitherto, under all her leaders, whatever their party, given life and aim to the energies of Athens, on the lines initiated by Thomistocles, was abandoned by the very man who had been its most vigorous advocate and champion. This historian of the epoch was told that Alkibiades, who repaired under a safe-conduct to Sparta, made two suggestions of a nature disastrous to Athens. The- first was to establish in the district of Attica a fortified place, from which they might harass the country without intermission, and so impair the inland resources of Athens as to render illusory tho ob- jects for which her long walls were built. Tho second was to send the Syracusans considerable assistance, or at least an experienced general to conduct their defence. In the nature of things, there is no reason why w T o should not assume that the Spartan Ephors, men of intelligence and observation, could have arrived without assistance at notions so obvious as these ; but we have followed the authority of the conscien- tious and well-informed historian who attributes these plans to the inspiration of Alkibiades ; and no one would attempt to deny that ho contributed towards their adoption. The 17 o;,S THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. mission of a skilful leader to Syracuse was in particular a matter o( urgent necessity. Nikias had meanwhile opened and prosecuted the war against Syracuse with success, though the town was stoutly defended by Hermocrates; his hoplites had achieved some advantages by land and taken possession of the heights which commanded the fortifications of Syra- cuse, whilst the fleet out off all communication with Greece. Turbulent movements began to make their appearance in the city, and it appeal's that an accommodation was contemplated, by which Syracuse would have secured her existence on con- dition o( acknowledging the sovereignty o( Athens. This was the very danger oi' which Alkibiades warned the Spartans, and he advised them above all things to prevent any arrangement between Athens and Syracuse. Accord- ingly a Corinthian vessel, succeeding in spite of the Athenian fleet in reaching Syracuse, brought the news that Lakedeemon, the ancient capital of the Dorian race, would not abandon them, but would shortly Bend them an experienced general. The news was decisive oi the war. The Syracusans recovered confidence in their cause, and soon afterwards the Spartan Gylippus appeared to take in hand the defence (late summer, I 1 I B.C.). The sense of relationship combined with the great interest at stake to secure exact obedience to his orders, and the defence was soon transformed into an attack upon the besiegers, in which the latter found their situation at even- step more disadvantageous. At the same time a Corinthian Bquadron suoceeded in making its way into the harbor o( Syracuse. The Athenians had designed not only to over- power Syracuse, but to make it a position from which they mighl become masters o\' Peloponnesus ; it was therefore in the defenoe o\' Syracuse that all the forces i^( Peloponnesus were now combined. A considerable reinforcement which arrived from Athens was unable to restore the balance in favor of the Athenians, and they determined to seek safety in a hasty retreat whilst retreat was still possible. The cause which prevented them was a very noteworthy One. It was no other than the ancient superstition which Pericles and the philosophers had combated, one closely con- nected with those rites the presumptuous mockery o{ which RUIN OF THE SYRACUSAN EXPEDITION. 359 had occasioned the recall of Alkibiades. It is, indeed, strange to see on the one hand the principle of might pursued, as at Melos, to its extreraest consequences, just as though there wore no protecting deities to take up the cause of the weak, and jet, on the other hand, this blind adherence to the old be- lief in the gods. When all was ready for their departure, the occurrence of an eclipse of the moon (August 27, 413 b.c.) threw the troops and their leader, Nikias, into such a state of terror that they gave up the retreat, and they pur- posed, according to the directions of the soothsayers, to wait thrice nine days before coming to a decision. This delay was their destruction. The proceedings connected with the mutilation of the Hermes had checked their enterprise, after it had been undertaken past recall. And now the occurrence of an eclipse of the moon prevented the deliverance of the fleet when it was still possible to effect it. The Athenians were, indeed, even now more numerous than their enemies in the harbor, but the limited space deprived them of the su- periority which they derived in naval actions from greater rapidity of movement. Their antagonists had improved their triremes by additions which made them superior to the Athenian vessels in a conflict of ship against ship. In the first serious encounter the Athenian fleet, the mainstay of the power of the republic, was annihilated. A like destruction next overtook the land forces. The survivors of those who had hoped to conquer the world were condemned to labor in the stone quarries. The two commanders-in-chief by land and sea were put to death by the Syracusans. Whilst the design of extending the power of Athens tow- ards the West was thus completely shipwrecked, the course of events brought about a blow still more disastrous to her power in the other direction, in which it had been consoli- dated by Miltiades and Kimon. Her Ionian allies now roused themselves to the endeavor to relieve themselves of the op- pressive yoke which the Athenians had imposed upon them. And here we remark that the event of the struggle at Syra- cuse exercised an important influence upon the general situa- tion in its widest extent. In Sicily the Carthaginians, who had enlisted a portion of the Athenian mercenaries, men 2G0 THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. whose ideas were limited to the payment they could get for military service, obtained a preponderance which at length, although only gradually, made itself felt. In Asia Minor the action taken by the allies of Athens excited the ambition of Tissaphernes, the satrap of Sardis. Here once more we find the influence of Alkibiades at work. It was through his in- tervention that Lakedsemon entered into a league with the Persians, directed against the maritime power of Athens. That power still existed in the YEgean Sea and on the coasts of Ionia, but had already become impaired. Even Chios re- linquished her usual caution and fell away from her. These events took place in the summer of 414 b.c. In order com- pletely to crush the maritime authority of the Athenians, the Persians guaranteed to the Lakedcemonians subsidies which enabled them to send a considerable fleet to sea. The centre of universal interest was thus transferred to an- other point, and the great question, to which all others were secondary, was whether the power of Athens would be main- tained or not. Every other consideration, compared with this, had to withdraw into the background. The novel spec- tacle was presented of the Greeks assisting the Great King to subdue his revolted nobles,* in return for his promise to send Phoenician ships to the help of the Peloponnesians, combined against Athens. The treaties which had been made with the Persians hitherto had been only of a transitory nature, and even in the districts which had nominally remained under Persian control the power of the Athenians had been strong enough to collect the tributes established in their league. In the events which were now taking place we see a complete reversal of that condition of things which had resulted a generation earlier in the arrangement called the Peace of Kimon. The main condition of this compact was the com- plete exclusion of the Persians from the affairs of Greece by sea as well as by land, in return for which the Athenians had pledged themselves to leave the Persian empire unmolested. * Amorgcs, the natural son of Pissuthnes, satrap of Lydia, 'who had made an alliance with the oligarchs at Samos in the year 440 (Thuk. viii. 28). ALLIANCE BETWEEN SPARTA AND PERSIA. 261 Now, however, the latter — and that too by the instrumentality of the great leader of Athens in alliance with the Lakedte- raonians — was relieved of that obligation, and the reappear- ance of Phoenician ships in the Archipelago approved. The Lakedaemonians conceded that the whole region which be- longed to the king, whether then or formerly, was to remain in its allegiance or return to it.* They thus virtually gave up the claim of the maritime districts to be emancipated from the Persian dominion, and in this they found considerable support in the islands, which had long been weary of the Athenian rule. The way in which the Athenians, even in this difficult situation, still maintained their ground, has always excited admiration. They appropriated the thousand talents which were reserved in the citadel for emergencies of this kind. The idea of a state treasury as conceived by Pericles thus proved most salutary. The Athenians, moreover, had still the Argives upon their side. They succeeded once more in effecting a landing upon the shores of Asia Minor, and in overcoming the revolted city of Miletus, as well as the Lake- dsemonians who had come to its assistance (end of summer, 412 b.c.). We remark here in general that the tribal relations, that legacy of a remote past the memory of which had been so often recalled in more recent times, were in these trans- actions completely disregarded. In spite of their Ionian ori- gin the Milesians went over to the Lakedsemonians, while the Argives, who were Dorians, fought on the side of the Athe- nians. Kept together by no common sentiment, the unity of Hellas broke up into groups united by ephemeral alli- ances. In the battle of which we have just spoken Ionians, as rep- resented by the Milesians, maintained their ground against Dorians, as represented by the Argives, whilst on the other hand the allies of Miletus, the Lakedaemonians, were defeated * In the first treaty concluded between the Lakedaemonians and the Persians the words are, oiroai^v x^pav Kai iroXeig fiamXevg f "xa, Kai ol irartpeg ol fiamXeuig el X ov, fiaaiXeiog ioru (Thuk. viii. 18) ; in the third, efl'ected in the winter 411-ilO (Thuk. viii. 57), x & P av t,)v paotKkug, ua n rfe 'Aaiag tarl, fiamXsug tivai Kai 7repi Tqg X"P a Q "?£ iavrov /3ovXtvtTu> fiamXtvg 'oTrwg t3ovXtrai. 2(32 THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. by the Athenians, Ionians of ancient descent. The latter ad- vantage decided the battle. The Athenians determined to besiege Miletus, by the conquest of which they hoped once more to become masters of the whole sea-coast. Alkibiades was on the spot, and is said to have advised the Spartan fleet, which arrived at this juncture, and which now included some Sicilian triremes, twenty-one from Syracuse and two from Selinus, not to look on quietly whilst Miletus was reduced, but to attack the Athenian fleet, then lying at anchor before the town, without delay. The Athenians, however, did not feel themselves strong enough to resist so formidable a com- bination. It was the same as that to which they had suc- cumbed in the harbor of Syracuse. Their principal antago- nist at Syracuse, Hermocrates, was in this very fleet, and there was besides every probability that the Persians would attack them by land. Phrynichus, the Athenian admiral, was un- willing to bring upon himself the fate of Nikias and Demos- thenes. He made a timely retreat to Samos, and the siege of Miletus was raised. The Peloponnesians had gained, not, in- deed, an actual victory, but still a decided advantage. The revolt already commenced could now no longer be repressed. On the contrary, it spread both towards the north and the south, lthodes, Sestos, and Abydos fell away, and Lesbos showed an inclination to follow their example. The Delian League, on which the greatness of Athens depended, was fall- ing to pieces. Even in Euboea an insurrection broke out. The position of Alkibiades in the midst of this conflict, which he had himself brought about, is a peculiar one. It suggests a general observation, which we may be permitted to make in this place. All the states of antiquity were held together and animated by the feeling of a common bond be- tween citizen and citizen ; sovereignty was regarded as resid- ing in the community as a whole, and no one could dissociate himself from the interests of the rest, upon pain of forfeiting his life. Alkibiades, however, had broken this fundamental law. He made an arbitrary use of his personal position to thwart his native city. Being nothing more than a citizen, he yet followed a policy peculiar to himself in order to over- power his opponents, who, though simple citizens themselves, ALKIBIADES IN OPPOSITION. 263 held the supreme power at Athens in their hands. We shall see elsewhere that this was the way in which the Roman re- public, the greatest which ever existed, was transformed into a monarchy. Alkibiades was never in a position to conceive such a design ; he had not at his command, like Caesar, a power of his own by which to maintain his authority against his antagonists. He could only achieve this end by setting her most powerful neighbors in motion against his native city. It soon, however, became apparent that the interests of these states were divergent from his own. Originally in league with the Lakedaemonians, Alkibiades now found it necessary to oppose them. It could never have been his in- tention to procure for the Lakedaemonians an unconditional preponderance ; this would have been only to give himself a change of masters. His keenest efforts were actuated by a desire to obtain a footing in Athens once more, but at the same time he wished to maintain her autonomy against the Lakedaemonians. Herein he found a supporter in Tissa- phernes, whom he is said to have reminded that it was not to the interest of Persia to allow the dominion of the sea to fall into the hands of Sparta, but rather to keep Athens and Sparta in equilibrium. In this case, as in others, a political idea, in itself obvious enough, is attributed to the influence of Alkibiades. It was an idea of vital importance for the preservation of Athens. But it is obvious that it could not be acted on without the consent of the supreme authorities in the city itself. Here, in the natural course of things, op- posite parties had been formed, and views widely divergent were entertained. In order to understand the somewhat in- tricate course of the movements which were decisive of the main result, Ave must once more make Athens the principal object on which our eyes are to be fixed. 5. State of Things at Athens during the Years immediately before and after the End of the Peloponnesia?i War. The admirals of the fleet at Samos were convinced that re- sistance to the combined forces of Lakedaemon and Persia was impossible. They were therefore inclined to welcome the prospect opened to them by a coalition between Alkibia- 0(54. THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. des and Tissaphcrnes against the Lakeda?monians, while they favored a movement in the city opposed to the absolutism of a pure democracy. The internal commotions of the Athe- nian community were undoubtedly the result of external com- plications. The democracy, to which Alkibiades owed his banishment, stood condemned, so soon as it was seen to be no longer capable, in spite of all its efforts, of defending the state. Its maintenance became impossible when it appeared that Alkibiades would have to be recalled, if his negotiations with Tissaphcrnes were to be brought to a successful termi- nation. Alkibiades, however, had no wish to be recalled by those who had expelled him. On the contrary, his passionate desire for vengeance could be satisfied by nothing less than their destruction. His aims were furthered by the state of the democracy at the time. It was easy to find just cause of complaint against it in the pay given to the heliasts and the political supremacy which the lower classes had obtained. But the opposition which the democracy had to encounter was of a twofold nature. The democratic government in its present form was to be abolished. So far all were agreed. The question was, What would be the effect of such a change in so thoroughly democratic a state as Athens? What form of government was to take the place of the democracy ? What in fact happened was that the commanders of the fleet and the opponents of republican government in the city decided on measures of revolutionary violence against the democracy. The course of events was similar to that which took place in the Italian republics of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when a "Balia" used to be intrusted with the revision of the constitution. At Athens a commission was nominated by popular vote for a similar object. Certain men of the highest authority took sides with the coming oli- garch}'. The most important of these was Antiphon, the founder of the art of rhetoric, who appears to have taken the lead throughout. What he proposed, or rather what the com- mission resolved, bore the stamp of a violent reaction. Five men of similar views were to increase their number by co- optation to a hundred. Each of these was empowered to add three more. The Council of Four Hundred thus composed SUPPRESSION OF THE DEMOCRACY. 205 were thenceforward to exercise control over public affairs. Here, too, we are reminded of the Italian parliaments. Al- most exactly in the Italian fashion the people were then sum- moned to meet at Colonus, and gave their sanction to all that was done (411 B.O.). Thereupon the democratic Five Hun- dred retired from the council-hall and made way for the four hundred oligarchs. The change was as thorough as it was sudden. A popular assembly of Five Thousand was indeed supposed to exist, but whether it should meet or not was left to the Four Hundred to decide. They governed as they thought fit. The most important matter which called for their consideration was their position with regard to Sparta. Their inclination did not go quite so far as submission to the Lakedamionians. A Lakedamionian column marching from Dekeleia was repelled from the walls of Athens. But, though unwilling to submit, they were quite willing to make peace and even alliance with Lakedffimon. Theramenes himself, a worthy colleague of Antiphon, declared that the constitutional change was accepted by the people because it was likely to inspire confidence towards Athens in the minds of the Lake- damionians.* Partiality for Lakedfemon was, however, directly opposed to the intentions of the fleet. If an oligarchy of this kind were established, Alkibiades would have no chance of return. The fleet at Samos, engaged in a struggle with the Lakedse- monians for maritime supremacy, could not humble itself so far as to sue the enemy for peace. On the contrary, it in- sisted that Tissaphernes should be won over by Alkibiades. Against all that Alkibiades had hitherto projected or carried out sound objections may be raised. But at this juncture, when the safety of Athens was at stake, his conduct was blameless and even noble. lie came in person to Samos. It was at the very moment when the naval force, enraged at the proceedings at Athens, was preparing for an attack on the Peirams and the oligarchy was arming itself for resistance. *Xenophon, " Hellenica," ii. 3,45. The observations of Grote ("His- tory of Greece," viii. 18, note 2) may perhaps be ascribed to a precon- ceived opinion, which has sometimes a detrimental effect on the work of that excellent historian. L > ( ; { ; THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. At this point Alkibiadea showed himself superior to party spirit, He represented to the trierarchs the danger to which their conduct would expose the power oi Athens at every point; Ionia ami the Hellespont would at once desert their cause, and the Lakedseuionians would become Omnipotent in that quarter. Wo had now become one of the Strategi, and he used his official position to bring about a reconciliation be- tween the two parties. Ho declared that, for his own part, reconciliation with the Four Hundred was impossible, but that he should be satisfied if the resolution already mentioned wore carried into effeot, and the Assembly oi Five Thou- sand were endowed with the reality instead oi the semblance oi authority. This compromise was oi a nature very agreeable to his per Bona! feelings. 'The democracy was to be restored, hut not the democracy by which he was banished, for the Five Thousand consisted only of those who were capable of providing them- selves with arms. The whole tendency oi things at Athens pointed the same way. A division showed itself in the ranks of the Four Hundred. The extreme oligarchs were inclined to go further in the direction oi alliance with Sparta than the moderate party thought compatible with the welfare oi the state. In the midst oi this erisis a battle between the fleets oi Athens and Sparta took place off the eoast oi Fuboea. The former, which had to cope with the hostility oi the islanders as well, was beaten, and the island fell into the power oi the l.aked;vmonians. This event eaused extreme anxiety at Athens. Kesistanee to the l.akedamionians would have been impossible had they made an immediate attack upon the Pet rams. The historian of the period allows that nothing but their dilatoriness saved Athens. The danger was imminent. and, sinee aid could no longer be expected from any quarter except the fleet and army at Samos. their demands eould not be refused. All hesitation eame to an end. The popular as- sembly in the Pnyx accepted the proposals oi the ileet, Alki- biades was recalled, the Council oi Four Hundred was abol- ished (411 B.O.). On the other hand, the Assembly oi Five Thousand was called into being, and was recognized as the sovereign people oi Athens. THE DEMOCRACY RESTOBED. 2G7 Thukydides holds this to bo the host considered of all the political reforms that took place at Athens during his lifetime. It will appear shortly that various fresh complications were connected with the change, but for the time being the idea of the democracy was saved, while it was clothed in a more moderate and practical form. It is nevertheless the opinion of our historian that all would have boon lost had the I'lwe- nician fleet of a hundred and fifty sail, which was already in the neighborhood, made common cause with the Lakedsamo- nians. Alkibiades always look credit for persuading Tissa- phernes to send the ileet home, and I see no reason for refusing to believe him. The vacillating policy of Tissapherncs can only be explained on the hypothesis that he was unwill- ing to see the total destruction of Athens, and nothing but the presence in Athens of Alkibiades, in whom he had great confidence, could hinder this event. It was a matter ofMess importance that Tissapherncs' neighbor, Pharnabazus, satrap of Phrygia, clung to the league between the king of Persia and the Peloponncsians, and supported the latter with all his might. The Phoenician fleet failed to appear, and the more considerable of the two satraps renounced the cause of the Peloponncsians. The Athenians could show themselves again with greater confidence at sea. This confidence was much in- creased when, in the first collision with the Lakedffimonian and Syracusan fleets off Kynossema, they won a decisive victory over the allies (411 b.o.). This triumph seemed to wipe off the stain of the defeat in the harbor of Syracuse. The hopes which the victory raised at Athens were strengthened soon after by another great success. A battle by sea and land, in which Alkibiades took part, was fought near Kyzikus. The Peloponncsians were defeated with great loss, and Kyzikus itself was reconquered by the Athenians (410 b.c). The Lakc- diemonian commanders were deeply depressed by this event; their announcement of it began with the words, "Our good luck is gone." The desertion by Alkibiades of his country's cause inflicted the severest losses on Athens. It was his reconciliation which, more than any other event, prevented her complete overthrow. To him was due even the recon- qucst of Byzantium. 208 THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. Had lie stopped short at this point, had he secured Athens in a position of safety, and established her among the great powers of the world, he would have won immortal renown as the savior of his country. But this consummation was again hindered by political differences with his allies. Everything depended on his inducing the satrap to spare Athens and desert Lakedeemon. But Tissaphernes was not an independ- ent prince, and the Great King felt himself bound to Laked©- mon by the treaty which he had shortly before made with that power. A satrap might, in the confusion of the moment, resolve on reconciliation with Athens, but such a measure was not likely to meet with approval at Susa. It was merely a personal resolution of the satrap, which set him at variance with his government. lie had no sooner taken up this new line than he had to abandon it again, and Alkibiades himself was the first to discover the change in his attitude. Full of the self-confidence with which recent successes had inspired him, he had returned to Tissaphernes, with the intention, one may well suppose, of establishing the alliance on a permanent footing. But the satrap was no longer what he had been. All his former cordiality had disappeared, and Alkibiades, perceiving that he was in danger of imprisonment, resolved to make his escape as soon as possible. The satrap does not appear to have pursued his former friend with all the vindic- tiveness which is customary in such cases, but a continuation of their former relations was impossible. The alliance be- tween Athens and the satrap of Sardis came to an end. Tis- saphernes soon afterwards made way for Cj'rus, the king's younger son, who appeared as Karanos of Asia Minor. "VVe shall have more to say about him presently ; it is enough at this point to state that he at once re-established the ancient alliance between Persia and Sparta. The historian who ex- amines these circumstances after the lapse of centuries is struck by the extent to which the fate of Greece in general, and of Athens and Alkibiades in particular, was dependent on the fluctuations of Persian policy. Alkibiades returned to Athens on the day of the festival of the Plynteria (May, 408 B.C.), on which the statues of the patron goddess used to be veiled. The day was considered RETURN OF ALKIBIADES. 269 unlucky. Later authors described his return as a triumph ; the nearest contemporary witness has a different story to tell. According to this authority Alkibiades did not disembark immediately on coming to land, but waited till his nearest relations made their appearance in the port. Then, attended by a large crowd, he advanced towards the city. The crowd was not, however, all of one mind. Many considered him the source of all the misfortunes that had befallen Athens. But the majority took his side, on the ground that the charges made against him on a former occasion were false. It was nothing but stern necessity, said they, that compelled him, even at the risk of his life, to ally himself with the enemies of his country. In the popular assembly Alkibiades declared the rumor that he had insulted the Eleusinian mysteries to be unfounded. Thereupon he was chosen commander-in-chief, with absolute power. There was no opposition, for no one would have ventured, by dissenting from the proposal, to bring the wrath of the assembly in its present mood upon himself. Alkibiades was now regarded as the only man capable of restoring Athens to her old position. He himself must have already ceased to be confident of success in this direction, for lie was fully aware that he had lost the support of Persia. The aspect of his native city, so fallen from her high estate, could only strike him with a deeper melancholy, for he was bitterly conscious of having been the main cause of her down- fall. He laid the blame on no one, either on the people or his own foes ; he complained only of his evil fortune. He was eager to reconcile himself with his country and her gods, and his chief anxiety was that the sacred procession to Eleusis should again pass along the customary way towards the shrine. This project he carried out, attended by so strong a guard that the Lakedremonians, though near at hand, did not venture to molest the procession. This done, he put to sea again with a goodly fleet (Oct., 408 B.C.). It was still expected of him that he would restore the greatness of Athens, but the Lake- daemonians had meanwhile been reinforced, and offered a re- sistance that he could not overcome. The advantages which he contrived to win at sea were rendered unavailing by the 270 THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. obstinacy of the defeated cities, which naturally put forth all their strength to avoid falling again under the yoke of Athens. His plans were still further thwarted by a severe repulse which the fleet met with off the Ionian coast. Personally Alkibiades was not to blame, but the defeat was laid at his door. lie had, it was said at Athens, appointed an officer as his lieutenant who showed himself unfit for the post. The fact was that, even under the newly constituted democracy, he had never recovered his popularity with the masses, while the crews of the fleet placed no confidence in him. This, indeed, is not to be wondered at. Great performances on his part were the only means of justifying his restoration to power. It is at this point that the decisive influence of Persia on these affairs makes itself most clearly felt. The needful vic- tories became impossible so soon as Persian gold in abundance began to pour into the coffers of Lakedamion. Alkibiades saw clearly enough the altered condition of affairs, but he dared not return, for the people of Athens showed their dis- pleasure by putting other commanders in his place. The in- dividuality of his character consisted in this, that he pushed whatever project he had in hand as far as was possible, and seized upon any means of escape that remained, when his pol- icy appeared impracticable and his own safety was endan- gered. In the present difficulty his decision was quickly taken. He resolved to leave the fleet and retire to his forti- fied residence near Pactj'e, on the Thracian Chersonese. There he proposed to live as an independent prince, but by no means to cut himself adrift from public affairs. It is time to return to the war in which Athens was en- gaged. Its peculiarity consists in this, that it had to be car- ried on against the allied forces of Persia and Lakedsemon, and against the revolted allies to boot. To the credit of the Athenian democracy it must be said that it maintained the unequal conflict with all its native energy. When the Spartans under Callicratidas again won the upper hand at sea, the Athenians strained their resources to the utmost. In the space of thirty days they manned a fleet of a hundred and ten triremes with freemen and slaves. These efforts were reward- BATTLE OF ARGINUS^. 271 ed by a decisive victory off Arginusos (Sept., 406 B.C.), in which the Lakedaemonians lost nineteen ships, with their com- manders. But at the same time the old violence of party spirit broke out anew in Athens. The eight Athenian stra- tegi had been prevented by a storm from rescuing the crews of the disabled ships, and from burying the dead who had fallen in the fight. The Athenian people, animated as usual by an excessive regard for religious ceremonial, considered this omission as a criminal offence. They were not satisfied with depriving of their offices the commanders who had won so great a victory. Two of the commanders, who doubtless knew the temper of the people, saved themselves by flight. The rest were all condemned and executed. Men like Socra- tes opposed the proceeding in vain. The chief evil of these religious antipathies was that political parties made use of them in the struggle with their opponents. We have seen an instance of this already in the trial of Alkibiades. Diomedon, one of the commanders, died in the very act of beseeching the people to perform the vow which he and his colleagues had made to Zeus the Preserver, to Apollo and the Venerable Goddesses, through whose aid the victory had been won. While Athens was in this manner banishing or putting to death the best men in the state, the Spartan oligarchy man- aged so far to overcome its prejudices as to intrust the su- preme command to one who, whatever might be urged against him on other grounds, was the fittest man they could find for the post. This man was Lysander. The most ancient tradi- tion informs us that he did not belong by birth to the ruling class, but to the Mothakes, a class consisting of those who, being of free descent, were adopted into the families of the Spar- tiatse, were educated with the Spartiate youth, and, by going through the whole course of Spartan discipline, became capa- ble of advancement to high positions in the state. Lysander imbibed to the full that craving for personal distinction which was the product of Spartan education. Though he never allowed himself to be seduced by bribes, he was well aware what bribes could do. Brave as he was — and none were braver — he is nevertheless related to have said, " When the lion's skin fails one must try the fox's hide." To the simplicity 272 T IIE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. and straightforwardness of Callicratidas he brought the aid of craft and canning, lie used to say that falsehood was in its nature no worse than truth ; everything depended on the use to which it was applied. This was the man to whom the Spartans intrusted the supreme command against Athens. The struggle was in itself uneven. The Spartans might be defeated, and yet not lost, whereas the very existence of Athens depended on the safety of her wooden walls. In spite of this the Athenians displayed great want of cau- tion in the management of their affairs. The field of battle was again the Hellespont. Lysander had taken Lampsacus; the Athenians encamped opposite to him at /Egospotami. Alkibiades, who was residing in the neighborhood, rode up to the Athenian camp and advised them to shift their quarters to a point nearer Lesbos, because their ships were separated from each other while fetching provisions from thence. " We are the commanders, not you," was the only answer he re- ceived. But in the midst of their disorder they were attacked by Lysander, who, by means of frequent feints, had lulled them into a false security. He assailed them now in real earnest. The Athenians w r erc taken by surprise. Of all the commanders Conon alone offered any resistance. Three thou- sand men of proved courage were taken prisoners and put to death without exception, while no less than seventy ships fell into Lysander's hands (Oct., 405 b.c.). This was the blow through which Athens was to fall. There was neither fleet nor army left. Lysander took possession of all the islands. He restored the inhabitants of JEgina and Melos to their homes. In this proceeding he enjoyed the aid of Cyrus the younger, who at that time held supreme com- mand over Asia Minor. TItis circumstance explains the pre- eminence of Lysander in Sparta itself, and the universal anxi- ety which was felt as to what he would do. His fleet and a Lakedsemonian army appeared simultaneously before the city. The Athenians were afraid that they were about to share the fate which they had dealt out to others, and their fears were not groundless. The question was actually discussed whether Athens should be allowed any longer to exist. The Thebans were for expelling the inhabitants of Attica and converting FALL OF ATHENS. 273 the country into pasture land again ; others, on the contrary, declared, with more justice, that it would be folly to deprive Greece of one of her eyes. The result, however, was that Athens owed her existence to the mercy of Sparta. The Long "Walls and the fortifications of the Peiraeus were levelled with the soil, to the sound of Spartan military music (April, 404 b.c). On these conditions alone was Athens suffered to exist. One can scarcely conceive it possible that Athens should have been annihilated by Sparta and her allies. And yet how was it possible, how was it intended, that she should exist henceforward? She lost all her foreign possessions and all her naval force with the exception of a few ships. The con- nection between town and harbor was broken. Her free con- stitution, the source of all her opposition to Sparta, was as little likely to be tolerated here as in the other cities which Sparta had conquered. At all times it had been regarded as the conqueror's privilege to raise his friends and supporters to power in the places over which lie had won control. The return of Alkibiades, with all its results, even the last war with Sparta itself, were due to the democracy. It was plain, there- fore, that the democracy could exist no longer. The Spartans offered their protection to the party which, before the return of Alkibiades, had wished to make peace and alliance with them. The restoration of the Four Hundred was, of course, out of the question, and so large a number of rulers was un- necessary. It was enough that the collective authority should come into the hands of the party in which oligarchical ten- dencies were now embodied. The means adapted in order to accomplish this aim resembled those employed on the former occasion. A popular assembly was still regarded as representing, in the last resort, the sovereignty of the state. In a popular as- sembly, therefore, a committee was again selected, whose busi- ness it was to draw up a constitution, but which was to exer- cise supreme authority until the constitution should be com- pleted. The committee consisted of thirty persons, whose memory is preserved in later history under the title of the Thirty Tyrants. In reality only a third part of them were 18 274 THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. elected. Twenty were already nominated either by the Lake- dsemonians or by the heads of the oligarchical faction. All were, however, accepted by the people. But if their origin must therefore be regarded as constitutional, their subsequent proceedings hardly merit the title. As is frequently the case with constituent bodies, they postponed indefinitely the exe- cution of their task. Meanwhile they kept all authority in their own hands and nominated to all offices of state. The lead among them was taken by Critias, a clever pupil of Soc- rates, but a man who regarded the possession of power as the highest aim of a statesman. His intention was to purify the state before giving it a constitution. The purification was effected by means of violence and bloodshed. The proscrip- tion fell not only on the sycophants of the democracy, but on good and honorable men who were suspected of lukewarmness towards the oligarchy. Greed, as usual, linked itself with political animosity. A Lakedremonian body-guard lent its aid to the execution of these violent measures. The conse- quence was that, as no hope of safety appeared, large numbers of persons left the city, and all classes of those who remained behind were thrown into a state of ferment. Critias merely remarked that such was the inevitable result of a great politi- cal revolution, and that such a revolution could not be accom- plished, especially in a city so populous and so accustomed to independence as Athens, without getting rid of all opponents. In the execution of this policy not even Alkibiades, then re- siding in Persia, was forgotten. Alkibiades had come to an understanding with the satrap Pharnabazus, and it was considered possible that he might win him over to the side of Athens. It is very probable that the opponents of the oligarchy at Athens, in their hopes that af- fairs in general would take a turn, cherished this expectation. Critias declared that, so long as Alkibiades lived, ho could never finish his work at Athens. Thereupon the Spartans, who were old allies of Pharnabazus, appear to have prevailed on the satrap to compass the destruction of Alkibiades. The latter was just about to make a journey to Susa, to visit the Great King. The house in which he w T as passing the night wa6 surrounded with logs and brushwood, which were then DEATH OF ALKIBIADES. 275 set on fire. In the conflagration which ensued Alkibiadcs per- ished. The combination of Persian and Spartan policy, which he had himself promoted, at last destroyed the man who had held in his hand the fate of Athens. The complexities of human action and passion, or, if we prefer the word, of destiny, are displayed in a manner quite unique in the career of Alkibiadcs. Never at heart a citizen, but following the dictates of personal ambition, he lived to see the moment when the might of Athens and his own great- ness appeared to be one and the same. But, checked in his victorious career, and obliged to defend himself against politi- cal opponents, he turned to the ancient enemies of his country. He meant only to destroy those opponents, but he shattered the foundations of Athenian power. This power he hoped still to save, by the aid of one of the two foes he had himself aroused, whom he now alienated from the other and brought over to his country's side. But at the very moment when he again appeared at the head of the state, and when his hopes seemed near completion, this alliance broke down. The two foes joined hands anew against him and his country, and Athens and Alkibiadcs fell together. Among the oligarchs who now divided power in Athens there appeared, in spite of outward unity, certain differences of opinion. Many of those who had brought about the peace with Laked?emon, and had helped to pass the resolutions which established the dominion of the Thirty, began at last to recoil from the consequences of their own proceedings. Such was the attitude of Theramenes. He made light of the destruction of the Long Walls, for if, said he, the welfare of the city had once demanded their erection, their destruction was equally indispensable. On the other hand, he objected to the violent conduct of Critias, on the ground that the execution of inno- cent citizens could not but alarm and alienate the rest. The Lakedsemonians, he said, could not mean to deprive Athens of her best citizens and of all her resources. Had that been their object it might have been easily attained by stopping the supplies, for sickness, following in the track of famine, would have destroyed the whole population. Hence it appears that Theramenes considered it advisable to maintain a moderate 276 THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. system of government under the protection of Lakedoemon. But failure is sure to l>e the lot of those politicians who fancy that they can nt the same time secure the existence of a com- munity by submission to the enemy, and its domestic wcll- being by moderation at home — for widespread influence be- longs to independent ideas alone. Critias had made up his mind to prevent the democracy that had caused them so much ill from ever lifting up its head again. In its annihilation he beheld the most important means of maintaining undisturbed the general political situa- tion. In his attempt to bring other tendencies into play, both in the intimate counsels of the Thirty and in the deliberative assembly, Thcramenes appeared not only as a deserter, but as a traitor to the cause. Critias himself came forward as his accuser, struck his name out of the list of fully qualified citi- zens, who could only be brought to trial in a, regular way, and then of his own authority pronounced against him the sen- tence of death. Thcramenes tied to the altar of Ilestia, but was torn away from the sanctuary, lie atoned by an heroic death for the blot which his vacillating attitude had fixed upon his character. In the civil disturbances at Home his memory was revered by those who, like Cicero, for example, were ani- mated by feelings of a similar kind. The men of this epoch awaken, even in our own day, sym- pathy and antipathy, just because the political and religious contrasts which they represent are such as constantly reappear under new conditions and in other forms. The most remarka- ble effort of the Thirty was that which aimed at establishing a constitution by an act of absolute power. The whole popu- lation, with the exception of three thousand persons, was dis- armed. These three thousand were not only allowed to keep possession of their weapons, but were also guaranteed the privilege of full citizenship, a privilege which had been re- fused to Thcramenes, and which implied security from vio- lence and from all proceedings but those of a legal nature. Thus constituted, the state consisted of the thirty holders of power, the legal functionaries whom they had appointed, and the selected citizens who retained possession of their arms. It is impossible to conceive anything more unlike the earlier THE THIRTY TYRANTS. 277 constitution, in which the whole community was endowed with equal rights, while the government was carried on by deliberative bodies proceeding from that community, and by officers chosen by lot or elected by the people. It was not, however, in the nature of tilings that so vigorous a state as Athens should permanently submit to a rule of vio- lence like this. It often happens that in great political crises there come to light elements of sufficient strength to resist the extremity of the evil even when it appears overwhelming. In this case everything turned upon the fact that Greece in general found the weight of Spartan supremacy intolerable. The satrap of Sardis had sought in the interests of Persia to maintain a balance of power between Athens and Sparta. The Greeks, too, felt the need of some counterpoise to Sparta, which made use of its preponderance fur the most selfish ends. It was in Thebes, hitherto the implacable foe of Athens, that this revulsion of feeling was first apparent. The conduct of the Thebans was not in realit} r so inconsistent as it may at first sight appear. They had begun by proposing the complete annihilation of the Athenian state, which would have given them the control of Attica. Now that the existence of Athens was to be maintained, under a constitution agreeable to Spartan ideas, they exclaimed loudly against this turn of affairs, for thereby Sparta gained a position in the immediate neighbor- hood of Thebes which would be fatal to their independence. Lysander was unwilling that the political system lately set up at Athens should be exposed to attack from exiles, lie there- fore issued a decree that exiles should not be received into any city that called itself the ally of Sparta. The purport of this measure was plain to all. Thebes refused to obey the command. The democratic exiles from Athens found shelter and protection in oligarchical Thebes. Differences of consti- tution and distinction of race alike gave way before higher political interests, and when the exiles, under the leadership of Thrasybulus, a man who had highly distinguished himself towards the end of the conflict with Lakedcemon, made as if they would invade Attica, the Thebans promised to connive at the attempt. Thrasybulus was thus enabled to march into Attica with 27S THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. a numerous band of exiles, and was joyfully received in the Peirseus, the population of which was of the same mind. The oligarchical party in the city attempted to put down the re- volt. Fortunately for the democrats, their chief opponent, Oritias, lost his life in the attempt. This success did not, however, give them the command of the city, and their posi- tion became critical when Pausanias, the Spartan king, arrived with an army on the scene and at once gained a decisive ad- vantage over them. It now depended entirely on Pausanias under what constitution Athens should continue to exist. At this juncture the Spartans themselves perceived the necessity of keeping an autonomous Athens at their side. The Athe- nian oligarch}' conferred upon Lysander, to whom it owed its foundation and its permanence, a preponderating influence, not only in Athens, but in Sparta as well; and Pausanias feared that the maintenance of this oligarchy might recoil upon himself. The hereditary champion of the oligarchical system in Sparta and in Greece manifested an inclination fa- vorable to democracy in Athens. Under these circumstances an understanding was come to, in consequence of which Thrasvbulus and his comrades entered the city (Sept., 403 B.C.). In the Acropolis itself he passed a resolution to re- store the ancient constitution of Athens, together with the Solonian and even the Draconian laws. These laws were modified to some extent, but the changes were of slight im- portance. The revolution consisted mainly in this, that an elective council was again substituted for that which had been appointed by a body of irresponsible rulers. The Athenian system combined democratic and conserva- tive tendencies. The democracy was hallowed by the most ancient national traditions. Its restoration was in accordance with history as well as with the sympathies of the masses. Thrasvbulus had been fortunate enough to seize the exact moment when this restoration was possible. Put to him and his companions belongs the imperishable glory of having commenced their undertaking with skill and courage in spite of the most unfavorable conditions. Thrasvbulus now repre- sented the autonomy of Athens. The Spartan king had only the merit of having allowed its recovery. The Thirty, who RESTORATION OF THE DEMOCRACY. 279 had taken up their quarters in Elensis, no longer supported by Sparta, and deserted by their own friends, gave way before the overwhelming foree of their opponents. A general am- nesty, which aimed at the reconciliation of oligarchs and democrats, put an end to the universal confusion. It is the first amnesty recorded in history. Athens was no longer the great naval power of old, pos- sessed of far-reaching authority, and striving for universal empire by sea and land. In the attempt to become the polit- ical capital of Hellas she had failed, but the intellectual de- velopment which had accompanied that attempt was a gain which no misfortune could destroy. Athens had thereby be- come the metropolis of intellectual culture for the whole human race. Observed from the point of view of universal history, many a movement, whose influence is not universally decisive, may, and indeed must, be passed over. But that culture which has become the common property of other nations and succeeding centuries will only receive the closer attention. Chapter VIII. ANTAGONISM AND THE GROWTH OF RELIGIOUS IDEAS IN GREEK LITERATURE. The political life, whose main features we have now ex- amined, was accompanied by an intellectual development which manifested itself in literature. These two aspects of national life were closely connected, but not identical. The creations of the intellect, though subject in their origin to the influence of general political conditions, are nevertheless independent in their growth. Greek literature, from the end of the sixth to the second half of the fourth century, presents an intellectual phenomenon of the utmost importance to man- kind. The poets and thinkers of Greece attempted to solve the hardest questions connected with the relations of things divine and human ; and between them all, while each inquirer made the attempt in his own way, an unbroken connection may be traced. Their productions, taken together, are of in- estimable value to mankind, not so much as a body of teach- ing and dogma, but as the expression of those great thoughts whence springs the inner life of the intellectual world. It will not, I trust, appear out of place if I introduce into the histor- ical narrative some remarks on this intellectual development. 1. The Older Philosophers in the Colonics, especially in those of the West. It must not be supposed that contact with Oriental concep- tions had no effect upon the Grecian world. But there is no historical proof that the mythological and religious systems of the East had penetrated to Greece and come to light again in the most ancient dicta of Greek philosophy. What influ- enced the Greek intellect was not Oriental mythology, of which THE IONIAN PHILOSOPHERS. 281 there was enough already in Greece, but Oriental science. If we consider the Greek cosmogony in its entirety, as conceived and expounded by Ilesiod, we shall see that it is diametri- cally opposed to the astronomy of the Babylonians. This astronomy, passing through the medium of the Phoenicians, made its way at length to Greece. The Ionian colonies were naturally the first affected. Above the darkness of the ages rises the figure of Thales of Miletus, a man of ancient Phoenician descent, who stands at the head of all Greek philosophers. He is famous for hav- ing foretold an eclipse of the sun, and for having invented a theory of the origin of things, which deduced everything from one primary substance — namely, water. These two points are closely connected. The cosmogony of the Greeks was scattered to the winds by the first contact with the science of astronomy, and this gave rise to the attempt to find a real- istic basis for the material world in which we live. Thus philosophy soon took up an attitude hostile to mythology. Anaximander declared the countless orbs which he perceived in the sky to be the heavenly gods, but distinguished from these again an eternal and immutable basis or ground of things, which was itself divine.* Xenophanes, who at the time of the Median invasion left Ionia, and after many wan- derings found a home in the Phokaean colony of Elea, placed himself in direct opposition to the orthodox religion. Among other things Xenophanes rejected the notion of a Golden Age, and held, on the contrary, that man had improved his lot in the course of time. lie declared outright his belief that the gods derived their origin from men, not men from the gods, so human was the character attributed to the latter. He regarded the rainbow as nothing but a cloud, on which * Comp. Brandis, " Handbuch der griechisch-roniischen Philosopliie," i. p. 138. Meu, according to Anaximauder's theory of their origin, first lived in water like fishes, because they could not have kept themselves alive on dry land on account of their helplessness during the first ages of their existence; afterwards, when they took to dry land, they did not become capable of life till they had burst the fishes' skins in which they were clothed. This theory is doubtless connected with the fish-gods of the Phoenicians. 050 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. different colors play. These ideas, directly opposed as they were fco a belief in the gods, inspired the men of Elea, the pu- pils of Xenophanes, in the making of their laws. Cosmogony, religion, and politics were as yet one and the same. About the same time this connection manifested itself in another place on a greater scale and with more splendor than before. Pythagoras is a sort of heroic figure in the history of an- cient philosophy. The reverence which he inspired became poetical, and shrouded his real character in obscurity. His birthplace, Samoa, was in his day a central point of inter- national relations, and was in close political connection with Egypt. Those journeys to distant regions which tradition attributes to Pythagoras can hardly have been necessary. Without leaving Samos he could acquaint himself by personal observation with the national characteristics of the East, and gain instruction in Eastern modes of thought. But Samoa, where the inhabitants on one occasion threatened to persecute a philosopher because he overthrew an altar sacred to the Universe, was no place for Pythagoras. He betook himself to the Dorian colonics in Southern Italy, and collected in Orotona a school of pupils, who revered him as an infallible master. It is quite possible that Oriental traditions may have influ- enced his teaching, but there is nothing Eastern in the essen- tial portion of the Pythagorean doctrine. This doctrine was based upon a perception of the invariable mathematical laws which govern the motions of the heavenly bodies. In these motions numerical relations appeared of such importance that the philosopher, confusing form with substance, fancied he recognized in number a divine creative force which ruled all things from the beginning. Number, whose importance was indubitably manifest in music, appeared in like manner to be the basis oi the universal harmony of things. It was but a short step further to speak of the music of the spheres. In views like these there was no room for that reverence for the gods which was in vogue among the Greeks. The most ancient authorities agree in saying that Pythagoras set forth, in opposition to the public religion, a secret religion of his own, in which his views of nature, veiled in mysterious and solemn phrases, contradicted all that was ordinarily re- PYTHAGORAS AND EMPEDOCLES. 2S3 garded as truth. I shall not exaggerate the importance of the Pythagorean league if I sec in it an institution which suc- cessfully opposed the advance of Phoenician superstition, then issuing from Carthago to overflow the Western world, and which even exerted an influence on the natural religion of the Western nations. It is perhaps an exaggeration of this influence when it is maintained that the teaching of the Druids in Gaul shows traces of Pythagorean doctrine. In the colonies its aristocratic proclivities prepared the way for its downfall. l\Kan while, in the immediate neighborhood, that is, in Sicily, there appeared a thinker of original power, whoso tendencies differed widely from those of Pythagoras. Of all the products of Sicily none, says an ancient poet, was so ad- mirable, none so holy, as Empedocles of Agrigentum. Agri- gentum was at this time a city of exceptional splendor. Its flourishing condition was due to the trade with Carthage, which imported thence the productions of the fertile Sicilian soil. The city, it is said, contained a population, including foreigners, of two hundred thousand inhabitants. It was in this place that Empedocles, who was a member of one of the richest and noblest families in the state, struck out a course for himself both in religion and politics. He overthrew the aristocratic government of the Thousand, which at that time ruled the city. At the very doors of the temple which its governors had built in honor of Olympian Zeus, of Heracles, and other deities, and whose ruins form, perhaps, the best extant example of early Doric architecture, he un- folded a doctrine which rejected all the gods and attacked their worship with hostility and contempt. His mind applied itself to nature alone, the phenomena of which, as visible not far off in .Etna, were likely to attract special study and at- tention. Into the doctrine of a primary substance, which came to Sicily from Ionia, he introduced some consistency through the notion of four elements, which he was the first to distinguish. This fundamental conception, firmly main- tained both in ancient and modern times, held its ground until it was overthrown by the discoveries of our own day. Among these elements lie gave fire, as a primary force, the 2Stt PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. most important place. It was in the crater of iEtna, we are told, that he himself met with his death. Some fragments of his works are still extant, which bear witness to the depth and boldness of his intellect and still afford food for thought.* They are less closely connected with Pythagoras than with the notions about Eternal Being, which had been brought into prominence by the followers of Xenophanes in Elea. This triad of ancient seats of philosophy, Crotona, Elea, and Agrigentum, is very remarkable. In the Grseco-Sicilian colonies those ideas were developed which owed their origin to the contact of Greek and Eastern minds in Ionia. They form the foundation of all the philosophy of the human race. But at that time, immediately before the Persian wars or during their continuance, conceptions of this kind could not force their way into the heart of Hellas. In Greece itself reverence for the gods firmly held its ground, and was strengthened by the nature of the struggle with Persia, a struggle deeply tinged throughout its whole course by relig- ious feeling. The victories of the Greeks were at the same time the victories of their gods. But mere dull credulity was not natural to the Greek nation. The echo of those philo- sophical ideas which opposed the traditional faith could not die away without producing some effect. Even if they were not accepted, the thoughtful mind could not fail to see the contradiction between the cosmogony of Ilesiod and the Idea of the Divine. The religious conceptions of the day, based on the ancient Greek view, which was still on the whole maintained, may best be traced in the writings of the poets. Poetry had helped to found the mythological system, and its influence continued to be felt throughout the conflicts by which that system was gradually modified. 2. Pindar. The first incentive to the exercise of the poetic art was "Empedocles was of opinion that it was not till after various unsuc- cessful attempts that creatures capable oi' life were produced; comp. Zeller, " Ueber die griechischen VorgSnger -Darwin's," AbhanJl. dcr Kon'hjJ. Akademie dcr Wiasensdh. vu Berlin, \S"!S, p. 115. PINDAR. 285 given by the gymnastic games. Prizes were contested for in these games, in which worship was paid to the gods, and all the powers of the body, as well as the resources which wealth and worldly position could supply, were exerted to the utmost. The Epinikia, or odes in praise of the victors, performed a double task : they added splendor to the act of worship and ennobled the distinguished men who carried off the prize. A happy fate has preserved these odes of victory to our own day. In them we find expressed a condition of mind which can devote itself to the highest ideas without renouncing the traditional worship of the gods. The chief representative of this phase of the Greek intellect is Pindar. It is not to be denied that the systems of Pythagoras and Thales were known to Pindar, or that he appropriated some part of their teaching. But we need not go further into this question. Our object is to discover his general position. Early mythology, which dealt with the origin of the uni- verse, had been subjected to anthropomorphic tendencies. Pindar intentionally combats the unworthy conception which these tendencies had introduced into the Idea of divine nature. He refuses to believe that the gods were gluttonous, as the story of Tantalus and Pelops would imply. Ho in- vents for himself another method for the rescue of Pelops, more in accordance with the Greek temperament. The punishment of Tantalus he deduces from his overweening pride. For the same reason he shrinks from narrating the victories of Heracles over the gods, while he cannot value too highly his other triumphs. Only that which is seemly must be told of the gods. To slight the gods appears to Pindar a kind of madness. Pindar does his best in all cases to bring into prominence the religious and moral elements in the legends with which he deals, as, for instance, the modesty and self-restraint displayed by Peleus out of respect for Zeus Xenius, or the pride of Ixion, which brought down upon him the wrath of the gods. To the gods all things are subject. In accordance with this view the ancient story of the struggle between the gods and the Titans is toned down. Typhoeus, the symbol of the law- less forces of nature, as he is represented even in Pindar, is 2S6 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. made to appear full of pride and violence, hostile alike to the gods and to the Muses. The gods, in fact, are unapproachable and terrible, but their might rests on moral foundations, an- swering to the ideals of human existence, and of these ideals Pindar has a lofty conception. One of his fundamental thoughts is that everything is due to inborn virtue and to natural gifts. We live not all for the same end. The goddess of birth and the goddess of fate, Eileithuia and Moira the inscrutable, are united in Pindar's mind. The virtue conferred on man by fate is in time per- fected as fate decrees. He who knows only what he has learned marches with no certain foot towards his goal ; he pursues the most diverse aims and brings nothing to com- pletion. " Become that which thou art," says Pindar, and nobler counsel has never been given ; for, indeed, what can a man become but that for which his inborn nature intends him ? But without toil comes no good-fortune ; labor tries the man, and nothing is without the gods. From them comes the ability to bring a thing to completion ; from them come boldness, wisdom, eloquence. Pindar demands of all men modesty and zeal. Jason appears to be a model of all that he admires in man ; Jason, who has a rightful claim, but urges it with noble gentleness and youthful modesty ; Jason, who shrinks not from the labor laid upon him by the unrightful possessor of the authority that is his own, and who is sup- ported by the gods, by Hera and Poseidon, even by Aphrodite, and, above all, by Zeus. The heroes in the Argo take courage when they perceive the signs of Zeus that promise them suc- cess. In this world, in which native vigor and laborious toil are favored by Heaven, glory finds its proper place. Talent, virtue, glory, are all really one, or, at any rate, are found to- gether. Glory is the remedy for toil. Virtue grows, when watered by the words of the wise, as the tree by dew. Song, which issues from the depths of the soul with the favor of the Graces, is the natural accompaniment of noble deeds. If these remain unsung they perish after death. Thus the poet appears in the midst of this world as part and parcel of it, in- separable from the rest. Pindar praises the victors in the PINDAR. 287 games, their families, their fatherland, and the games them- selves. He sees all things in their widest mythical, poetical, and national connection. He connects Kyrene and Rhodes, Syracuse, Agrigentum, and the Epizephyrian Locri with the central point of the national religion, the Omphalus at Del- phi.* Men like him did much to keep up the consciousness of Greek nationality. Pindar can value at their proper worth good-fortune and well-being, but he always demands that they shall be com- bined with some virtue or other, and his songs of praise are interspersed with warnings. In the same light he regards the future beyond the grave. He differs widely from all his predecessors in representing evil deeds as punished by a " re- morseless doom," while the good, honored by the gods to whom they have kept their word, behold the same sun night and day, and brighten with tales and memories their mutual converse. The future life which Pindar imagines is, like his conception of the present, an endless festival after the games. Elsewhere he makes the spirits of the wicked wander to and fro between earth and heaven, while he places the spirits of the just in heaven itself, "praising the mighty dead."f When we turn our gaze upon the material conditions which are brought to light in the poetry of Pindar, the old aristo- cratic world of the Greeks comes before our eyes in all its splendor.;}: On all sides are to be seen wealthy and distin- guished families rich enough to keep a four-horsed chariot. It adds to the fame of the family that the colts were broken un- der their own hands. The masters themselves put on them the shining harness; then they call upon Poseidon, and spur * " 6fi(pa\6e dicebatur lapis albus in adyto templi in quo duae aquilse aureae." They showed the presence of Zeus, who presided over the oracle. On the myth of the meeting of the two eagles " a finibus terrae " comp. Dissen on "Pyth." iv. § ii. 219. t Md/capa fieyav atiSovT iv vfivoiQ. Threni iii. in Bockh (Bergk, " Poetse Lyrici Graeci," p. 291, fragm. 97). J Pindar indicates very unreservedly the different constitutions, the tyrannis, the rule of the unbridled people (\afipog arparoc), the rule of the wise. In his opinion fairness and wisdom are always the best ("Pyth." iii.). 28S PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. their horses to their highest speed. Pindar shows us even the domestic life of those he celebrates. In him, as in Ho- mer, we see the walls surrounding the outer court ; within it stands the building itself, its roof supported by pillars ; and last of all the "oikos," the human dwelling, in which the feast is spread when the games are done. All these families, great and small, trace their origin to the gods. The Euneidce in Athens, a family whose calling it was to attend sacred processions as dancers and lute-players, traced their descent from Euneus, the son of Jason. The Iamidse, a family endowed with prophetic gifts, were descended from Apollo : to this family belonged Tisamenus, the soothsayer of the Spartans.* On Mount Pelion dwelt the Cheironidoe, a race who devoted themselves to the science of medicine and traced their origin to the Cheiron of Homer. We see the physicians handing soothing potions to the sick, or binding up the wounded limbs with medicinal herbs, and uttering meanwhile a kind of charm — a class not unwilling to make profit of their skill. Everything in Pindar has a dignity and character of its own. The clan of the Aleuadee, at whose head stand three brothers, rules the republic of Thessaly. In the towns hered- itary government is to be seen, and affairs are conducted wisely by good men. The ode to Thrasydosus of Thebes is written with the intention of warning him to shrink from any attempt to set up a tyranny. The poet, though a native of Thebes, shows especial prefer- ence for ./Egina. Asopns, a river of Bceotia, was regarded as father of the two sisters ^Egina and Thebe, while between Heracles, whose shrine was in the house of Amphitryon at Thebes, and the Eakidaa in iEgina is said to have existed of old a brotherhood of arms. The alliance between Thebes and the warlike yEgina had in reality an origin and reason of quite another kind, but Pindar's gaze is always directed upon those ties which unite mankind with the heroes and the gods. In Pindar, too, every thing has its peculiar virtue: iEgina, for * "Olympic in ara Jovis maxima oraculi praesides vatcsque hereditario jure fuerunt." — Bockh, ii. 2, p. 152. ^ESCHYLUS. 289 example, is famed for having produced the champions most distinguished in war, and for being, at the same time, a seat of righteousness. At the time of the battle of Marathon Pindar was over thirty years old ; at the time of the battle of Salamis lie was over forty. He had taken up his position while still very young, and had formed himself before the outbreak of the war with Persia, in which, as a Theban, he took no part. He lays before us the broad characteristics of Greek society, as that society was constituted before the conclusion of the Per- sian wars. 3. sEschylus. ^Eschylus was a contemporary of Pindar, probably a few years older than the latter, but he was an Athenian. In poli- tics he was no democrat, but rather an aristocrat by birth, for he came of a noble family in Eleusis. In the war, however, men of all parties in Attica fought side by side. vEschylus took his share in the battles of Marathon, Salamis, and Pla- tsea, and could show honorable scars from the wounds which he had received. His works belong entirely to the new pe- riod, which begins after the Persian wars. They present to us all the internal ferment of the Greek mind. From the stage of the newly created theatre, another offspring of relig- ious festivals, ^Eschylus draws the masses into the thick of intellectual strife. He has no particle of the gentle and con- ciliatory spirit that distinguishes Pindar. In the " Prometheus Bound," one of the boldest and most original dramas that have ever been written, ^Eschylus ap- proaches the great questions about the world and the gods from the point of view offered by the myth of the Titans. To the primeval deities and their creations, which have been conquered and all but annihilated by Zeus, belongs man. He, too, is destined to annihilation, or, at any rate, would have been condemned to a miserable and bestial existence in sun- less dens, had not his part been taken by one of the Titans, who had allied himself with Zeus against the rest. Prome- theus brings men fire, and through fire they arrive at a knowl- edge of the arts. He teaches them to distinguish the seasons of the year, and to subdue the wild beasts to their service; he 19 290 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. shows them how to build houses and to sail the sea ; he strengthens and sharpens their understanding. In Prome- theus, at once Titan and god, is to be seen a personification of the human intellect, which in its origin is independent of Zeus and the twelve greater gods. The Greek deities had come victorious out of the struggle with the Persian. ./Eschylus acknowledged their dominion, but scarcely their omnipotence, still less the justice of such omnipotence. The piece that we are examining breathes throughout a lofty solitude, where el- ements and ideas alone come into conflict. Therein appears the spirit of man, with its inherent vigor, as one of the Titans, who, unlike the rest of his fellows, has not been vanquished by the gods. The dominion of the victorious deities, who have only baffled the forces of nature by the exercise of pow- ers resembling those of man, is new and therefore violent. Henceforward no one is free excepting Zeus. He pronounces judgment ; he is the absolute ruler, responsible to none. His one opponent he subjects to a chastisement of pain, which is renewed day by day. He would kill him if he had the power; but Prometheus knows that he has forces on his side which lie beyond the tyranny of the present. Rather than submit he will suffer, and wait till this tyranny has run its course. We leave him in the midst of an earthquake, in which sea and sky are mingled together, calling once more the primeval powers to witness the injustice which he has to bear. Here, at the very threshold of dramatic poetry, we find the spirit of man pictured in outlines whose grandeur has never been surpassed — that ambitious, defiant spirit of invincible courage which stands upon its rights, which never gives way, which behind every outward form of things foresees the ad- vent of another. AVe can never cease to regret that the sec- ond part of the trilogy, the " Prometheus Unbound," is not extant. In this stage, where the riddle comes before us in its crudest and sharpest form, the answer would have been more than ever instructive. All that we know of the play is that Prometheus speaks the word which secures Zeus in his domin- ion. As a sign of his subjection he wears a wreath of withy, the tree whose twigs are generally employed as bonds. A similar contrast makes itself apparent in the other dra- jESCHylus. 291 mas of iEschylus. In the "Seven against Thel)es" the mo- tive of the plot is the religions contrast between the besiegers and the defenders of the city. The besiegers disregard the unfavorable omens of sacrifice ; they boast that they will take the city whether the gods will it or no. On their shields they bear the symbols of pride ; as, for instance, a picture of Ty- phoeus vomiting forth smoke and flame. On the other hand, the defenders of the city cling to the protection of the gods with a fervor that is even troublesome to their commander. A splendid figure is Eteocles, a man resolute and circumspect, who feels sure of victory through the favor of the gods in the face of all his enemies' pride. lie has the advantage over Polyneikes in that he defends his native altars and his father- land. But beyond the conflict his fate awaits him. The Erinyes, aroused by the unholy marriage, are yet nnappeased, and to them he falls a victim in the moment of victory. Another aspect of victory through alliance with the gods appears in the " Persians." The fall of Xerxes is the result of the crime which he committed in stripping the statues of the gods and in burning their temples, and of his violence in aspiring to bind the river of God, the Bosporus and the sa- cred Hellespont. His father is called up from the under- world to foretell his fate. The land was now, as the poet- adds, allied with the gods, and endowed with wisdom and un- tiring courage. We may be permitted to take a glance at the other dramas of yEschylus from the same point of view. In the " Suppli- ants" the king would doubtless be regarded as the protago- nist. At any rate, everything depends upon the resolution which he takes when the suppliants threaten to destroy them- selves at the very feet of the statues of the gods. He decides to protect them rather than permit such a defilement of the land. lie ventures this step in conjunction with his people, though aware that it will involve him in war. The following play, the " Danaids," of which only a few verses are preserved, no doubt showed that his expectations were not deceived. The relations between gods and men receive special illustra- tion in this drama from the way in which the gods of the country at one time ward off the foreigner and at another 292 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. take him into their protection. With such great contrasts our poet is always concerned. Into the depth of these contrasts we arc introduced in the " Oresteia." The first choric ode of the ''Agamemnon" brings the old conflict of the gods to our recollection. The chorus sides with him who lias been thrice victorious in this conflict, with Zeus, whoever he may be, Zeus, who leads men by suffering to thought. The plot depends on Agamemnon's resolution to appease the wrath of Artemis by the sacrifice of his child. He bows to necessity, and, as he does so, thoughts unholy and criminal come into his mind. The chorus relates with sympathetic horror how the evil deed was done upon the innocent child. In this religion there is a strange contradic- tion in that, in order to please the gods, it is necessary to do that which is evil. Agamemnon at length returns, covered with glory, his task accomplished ; but vengeance awaits him in his own home. The murderess, magnificent in the studied composure with which she carries out her plan, can, at least, say that her hand fulfils only the ends of justice, that it is her spouse who has brought evil on the house. The chorus do not venture to deny her plea. It is only against her immoral connection with yEgisthus, and against .zEgisthus himself, who has polluted the hero's bed and then helped in his murder, that they pour forth their rage and horror. It is this sin which brings vengeance on the guilty pair. Apollo will not allow the union between man and wife, a union sanctified by the favor of Zeus and of Hera, the goddess of wedlock, to be dishonored in this fashion. By every kind of encouragement and threat he urges on the son of the murdered man to slay the murderers in like manner as they slew his father. The play of the " Choephoroe " shows how Orestes carries out the oracular command, lie slays zEgisthus. As he is about to slay his mother, and as she kneels before him, he hesitates a moment ; his friend urges him on, for no word of Apollo, says he, may remain unfulfilled ; it were better to have all else against one than the gods. l>ut hardly has the hor- rid deed been done when Orestes feels himself under the con- trol of another power. Apollo has promised him that he shall be free from guilt, but this docs not save him from the results ^ESCHYLUS. 203 of his action, lie feels his senses at once go astray, like a chariot carried out of its course in the race, and the Furies, the avengers of his mother, their heads wreathed with ser- pents, throw themselves upon him like savage hounds. The Furies are the daughters of ancient Night. They did not pursue Clytaminestra, because she was of different family from Agamemnon ; but to exact vengeance for a deed of blood, like that which the son had done upon the mother, is the object of their existence. That is their office and their prerogative, and the whole world would be out of joint if they did not fulfil it. When Apollo takes the part of the wretched man, whom his oracular reply has induced to brave this dan- ger, their wrath is aroused against the new gods, by whom they are robbed of the honor due to them, and whose new- fangled laws are to upset the ancient order of the world. They refuse to give way to Apollo, though he appeals to Zeus, or to Pallas, with whom Orestes has taken refuge, though they recognize her wisdom. Who, then, is to decide between the justice of the primeval world and the decrees of the new gods, between the violation of the marriage tie, which is the prov- ince of the latter, and the violation of filial duty, over which the former preside? Strange to say, ^EscbyluS lays the deci- sion before a human tribunal. The votes are equally divided, but the goddess in whose hands the right to decide in such a case is acknowledged to lie gives her vote for Orestes. Ills cause is also that of the gods themselves: the ground of the verdict is the will of Zeus alone. A still more important point, treated with such detail as to show clearly the weight attached to it by the poet, is that the Erinyes, though on this occasion they are balked of their prey, are to be revered for all future time. No house, it is agreed, can prosper without them, and the lot of the man who does them honor will be blessed. These are scenes out of the conflict between things human and divine, between the powers of nature, which have a moral weight, and laws, which have a later origin. It is these laws which get the upper hand. The gods are powers which must be acknowledged and revered, because they have jurisdiction over men, and can confer blessings on them if they will. 294 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. .zEschylus leads us into the thick of the struggle, which Pin- dar looks back upon after its close. The ideal of ^Eschylus is activity and courage. The ideal of Pindar is rest and glory when the prize is won. The dramatic poet and his audience, which in this case is the people, constantly act and react upon each other. The thoughts which ^Eschylus expressed gain a peculiar historical value from the fact that they were understood and echoed by the people. But he had at last to discover that he was no longer in sympathy with them. The judges chosen out of the ten tribes adjudged the prize to a younger rival, Sopho- cles, who was his junior by thirty years. The spirit of the age was ripe for a change in the mode of representation as well as in the subjects represented on the stage. 4. Sophocles. In Sophocles I do not discover that severance between the gods and the powers of the primeval world of which JEschy- lus is so full. Such thoughts as these are alien to his age and to its views of life. Nor, again, do I discover any actual con- flict with the gods, such as that undertaken by the Seven or by other heroes in JEschylus. The utmost to which the charac- ters of Sophocles can be incited is a sort of defiant trust in their own powers ; such, for instance, as appears in Aias. But great destinies are not affected by this conduct: they are in- dependent of all human interference. In the drama of " (Edipus Bex " no guilt rests upon the king. There is no mention even of any earlier crime which might be still crying for vengeance. (Edipus is a king, who has been elected because he freed the city from the hideous toll exacted by the Sphinx. He enjoys the fullest reverence as the first of men, universally trusted in all kinds of difficul- ties. "When the troubles begin he distinguishes himself nobly by his care for the community in general, and for every in- dividual among his subjects. But a fate impends of which he knows nothing. The royal house of Thebes, when evil is foretold by the oracle, does all in its power to hinder its ful- filment, but by these very efforts bring about the disaster they would avoid. The mother exposes her son ; the son, arrived SOPHOCLES. 295 at manhood, flees from his supposed parents : yet each helps to fulfil his destiny. The tragedy of (Edipus is full of living dramatic interest. (Edipus, conscious of perfect innocence, and asserting that innocence in terms of passionate indigna- tion, seeks to discover the secret of the evil by which the city is oppressed. He searched far and wide until the hid- eous truth is known, and an act revealed on which the sun ought never to have shone, and which no water can wash away. Happiness, genuine happiness, turns to misery and tears, and (Edipus is forced to regard himself as the man of all others most hateful to the gods. He puts out his own eyes in order to escape from the community of earthly things and creatures. The ordinances of nature, which appear in Sophocles as the ordinances of the gods, have been violated by his birth. They can only be restored by his annihila- tion. It is equally impossible to discover any guilt worthy of punishment in Deianeira and Heracles. The "Trachinise," as the piece is called, ends with an outspoken indictment of the gods. In this play, too, there hangs over all the shadow of a terrible fate, which is brought to pass by the very effort to avoid it. The slaying of the centaur Nessus, on which every- thing turns, cannot be regarded as a guilty deed ; for his death was but the punishment which he deserved. As little can the connection of Heracles with Iole be regarded in this light, for that would be opposed to Greek ideas. The ap- proach of fate reveals no cause of misfortune except a terri- ble destiny. It would be a mistake to say that in all cases guilt must be forthcoming to account for the course of events, for destiny accomplishes itself independently of such justifi- cation. It was one of the merits of Heracles that he rid the world of a centaur at once violent and lustful. But the slain centaur leaves a legacy behind him, in consequence of which the hero who chastised him is doomed to perish. There is no moral lesson to be learned here ; the gods see the ap- proach of fate, but do not defend even their own offspring from the blow. In the " Aias" the insulted goddess goes so far as to drive the hero into madness, to make his life intolerable to him, 290 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. and afterwards to boast of the deed. Nor can we sec any sufficient cause for the woes of Philoctetes. The only reason why he should linger for nine long years in agony and soli- tude is that Troy is not to be taken till the tenth. There is no severance here between the gods and fate. On the con- trary, these powers have struck a terrible alliance, to which men can only submit. " In all that happens there is nothing in which the highest divinity does not play a part." Nor can we doubt that these views corresponded to the received opinions of the day. There is no choice but submission to the gods, whose sway is unapproachable and absolute. The oracles have a dread reality ; their responses are universally believed, however unexpected their fulfilment may be. The poet, convinced of the nothingness of human existence, believes in the necessity of submission, and considers it his duty to confirm the people in the same belief. But the stage would become intolerable if all its efforts were directed only to display the development of fate. Such is by no means the intention of Sophocles : he prefers to lay the chief stress upon the bearing of a man when he meets his end. (Edipns dis- plays the elevation of a noble resolve originating in self-abhor- rence. Aias, who at one time seems inclined to submit, puts an end to his own life, and prepares for the deed in a solilo- quy of unequalled grandeur. In the " Trachiniea " the psy- chological motive of the play is to be found in the character of Deianeira, who, though not devoured by jealousy, seeks to secure her husband's affections by means to all appearance harmless, but, at the very moment when she comes to this decision, begins again to doubt, and perishes before the man whose death she has occasioned. Sophocles always weaves one or other of the strongest mo- tives of personal life into his tragedies. In the "Trachiniai" it is the affection of a wife, in the "(Edipus at Colonus" the affection of a daughter. In the " Antigone " is displayed a sister's love, in the " Aias " the manly and successful devo- tion of a brother. Sophocles possessed one advantage over iEschylus in being able to employ a third actor, the so-called Tritagonist. He was thus enabled to give more distinctness to his characters, and to place them in all their variety and SOPHOCLES. 297 individuality before our eyes. The special merit of this poet consists in his complete illustration of the hidden but simple motives of human action. In the " Antigone " as well as in the " Electra " we are re- minded of iEschylus. In the first of these two pieces, as in vEschylus, the rights of Dike, of the under-world, and of the Erinyes appear inviolable. But in Sophocles Zeus and Dike are allied. The contradiction which disturbs the world makes its appearance in Creon. He can hardly be charged with in- justice in aiming a stern command against the man who has marched with hostile intent upon the city of his fathers. But by this severity he offends the eternal and unapproachable powers. lie refuses burial to the dead, though Hades has a sort of right to demand it. He displays his cruelty in con- demning to death the sister who has performed the ceremony of burial in spite of his prohibition, although she belongs to the gods of the upper and visible world. His son, to whom the maiden is betrothed, is thereupon brought on the stage, and his character portrayed in rapid touches. Full as he is of respect for paternal authority, sympathy for his mistress drives him into suicide. The character of Antigone, in which reverence for the divine, haughty resentment against the pow- ers that be, and graceful maidenly reserve are mingled, is, indeed, inimitable. Her act has public opinion on its side, though that opinion hardly dares to make itself heard. It receives approval from the retainers of the house, and last of all from the blind seer, who appears as the interpreter of the laws of Heaven. Creon accomplishes his own ruin by resist- ing all persuasion till it is too late. Sophocles keeps ./Eschylus nowhere more clearly before his eyes than in the " Electra." The subject is the same as that of the " Choephoroe." The most prominent motive which serves to bring on the development, namely, the dream of Clytaemnestra and her consequent resolution to make an of- fering to the shade of the murdered man, is borrowed from ^Eschylus, together with the false report of the death of Orestes. But in spite of this similarity a profound difference is throughout apparent. The threads are cut short just at the point where they are connected with the great whole 298 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. which ./Eschylns has in his mind. There is no mention here of the Furies who in iEschylus seize upon Orestes. In the dream that Agamemnon's sceptre puts forth fresh buds the act of Orestes is prefigured as a reassertion of his hereditary rights. No trace is to be found in Sophocles of that contrast between the murder of yEgisthus and the murder of Clytsem- nestra which forms the very foundation of the earlier play. The poet approves the act, and regards it as an act of justice. The main interest of the play centres in the character of Electra. She it was who saved Orestes, and this act subjects her to treatment of the most oppressive nature, which seems likely to end in something worse. Still she refuses to sub- mit: she impersonates wisdom and goodness attacked by evil. From fear of Zeus she keeps to what is lawful, but she is on the point of resolving to attempt the deed of vengeance, when the brother whom she believed to be dead appears. Sophocles takes great pains to develop in detail the character of Electra in her relation to her sister, her mother, and her brother. At the moment when the latter is about to do the deed she in- cites him, with masculine and even cruel vehemence, to carry out his purpose. To accomplish her revenge she uses deceit, and mingles her deceit with savage irony. She is the very daughter of Clytammestra as she appears in the "Agamem- non" of ./Eschylns. Resistance to tyrannical power is altogether a peculiar ele- ment in Sophocles. It appears in Aias, in Harmon and Teire- sias, in (Edipus, and most of all in Antigone. The contrast between eternal justice and a law which is the offspring of caprice is nowhere more clearly marked than in Sophocles. The spirit of these plays is directly opposed to the unmiti- gated dominion of political interests, which combine force and fraud, while sufferings due to such a cause acquire a special character and arouse the most intense sympathy. Creon in "(Edipus Ilex' 1 is a figure worth examining from this point of view. The difference between the personal influence of a man in high position and mere official authority is aptly pointed out, and the preference given to the former. What gives the play of " Philoctetes " its special meaning is the fact that Neoptolemus, after promising Odysseus at the out- SOPHOCLES. 299 set that he will employ craft and cunning to obtain the end which they have in view, returns to his better self and to the law of humanity, and refuses to serve in such a cause. lie is a young man of frank and open character, who abhors the ways of secrecy. In the same spirit the seer tells (Edipus that he is not in the service of the king, but in the service of God. The reverence due to the state and the reverence due to God are here opposed to each other, and urge their respective claims as they do throughout the whole of history. Sophocles constantly reveres the unwritten laws of the gods. Olympus is their father ; they are begotten in the everlasting tether ; they are not the mere offspring of human intelli- gence, nor can they ever be forgotten. It is, perhaps, only the ancient quarrel renewed upon an- other field. It becomes clearer and more instructive by being brought down into the region of the human from that of the divine, and represented as a conflict between the moral powers and the empire of the day. The poet's voice is always raised in behalf of the established political system, of those ideas on which the fabric of society rests, on the reverence due to the gods : on these things none may lay his hand. But the at- mosphere of thought is already imbued with political feeling. When Menelaus was honored in Sparta as a Spartan hero, and Aias in Athens as an Athenian, it cannot be mere chance that they are opposed to each other in the play, and that Menelaus, expressly called a king of Sparta, is portrayed in so disadvantageous a light. The subject of the " GMipus at Colonus" is the contrast between Thebes, which banishes her king, and Athens, which receives him and provides him with a grave. The religious feeling and prudent moderation that distinguish Athens are represented as the sources of her gran- deur and success. Theseus is a highly gifted and kingly nat- ure ; his conduct is rewarded by promises which foretell the safety and future greatness of Athens. But, while touching this string, the poet is only the more eager to adorn the death of the ill-fated G^dipus with all the graces of dramatic repre- sentation. The conflict of his soul, between love for the daughters who tend him and hatred for the son who has ex- pelled him, is at once elevated and terrible. The political 300 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. relatione are overshadowed by the ideal representation of a tragic fate, and are forgotten by the spectator. In these plays Hie narratives are especially successful, but the dialogue vies with them in its argumentative power, while the soaring flight of the ohorio odes is not to be excelled. The language of Sophocles is the most solid, the purest, the must beautiful which has ever served to express the emo- tions of the human spirit. 5. Euripides, Euripides was too young to strive with JEschylus for the dramatio prize; his immediate predecessor and rival was Sophocles. Twelve years after the appearance of the latter, Euripides, then twenty-live years old, brought his first piece upon the Stage. The extant plays of these two dramatists are nearly contemporary, beginning with the date H<> b.o. in the one case, and with l.".s b.o. in the other. The greater part of them were brought out during the time of the Peloponne- sian war. Euripides, like his predecessors, seized upon the material supplied by the Legends of gods and heroes, in which the nation had enshrined its ideas of heavenly and earthly things. In the way in which he approaches the question he is far removed from /Eschylus, Like Sophocles and Pindar, lie re- gards the Olympian gods as absolute rulers, lie says nothing of the Struggle between the gods and the powers of nature, or of the contrast, between a dominant hut. artificial order of the world and the physical and intellectual forces, which have sucoumbed in the conflict, l'ut if we would obtain a definite idea of his peculiar mode of thought, which was, or, at least, became, the thought of his age, we must, not shun the labor of examining In detail the internal composition of his plays. What appears as an exception in the ''Aias 1 ' <>( Bophooles — namely, the personal share taken by the goddess In the hero's misfortunes is in Euripides the rule. Pheedra falls in love with llippolvtus, as Aphrodite confesses, by her advice. It is Hera by whom Heracles, having performed the tasks laid upon him by Kurvstheus, is driven into madness: Iris herself brings Lyssa, the daughter of Night, to destroy him. EUBIPIDE8, 803 The destinies of [phigeoeia and Macaria arc what they are because offerings have to be made to Artemis : 1 1 1 « 1 to Deme ter. Achilles himself appears as a god when be restrains the Grecian ships on the eve of their departure from Troy till Polyxena is sacrificed in bis honor. Neoptolemus has to die for the insult he lias done to Apollo, be his repentance ho • hep as it will ; at the critical moment a voire from the in- most, shrine demands ln's death. That Apollo is the author Of all the ills which fall upon the head of OrCStCS is more harshly apparent here than even in iEschylus. The chid' motive; in the tragedy of Knripidcs is, in fact, the personal hatred of the k o, ' s - 5 et this hatred has do further justification; it provokes no real resistance; it merely deter mines the lot of men. It is of essential importance that the event;; of the play are introduced by a prologue, and that the. catastrophe is brought about l»y the sudden appearance of a god. I let ween these two points the heroes move to and fro in human wise ; but with all their impulses, their passions, their virtues, ami their thoughts they exercise no decisive in* fiuence on the event. These conditions lend to some of the plays of Knripides, for instance, the " Troades," ;in inexhawstihle charm. The Subject of this play is the allotment of the c;iptivc women after the eoinpiesf of Troy and the slaughter of the one SUr vivin^ scion of the royal house win* might he expected to at- tempt the restoration of the city. The Greeks perform the work of destruction with the strictest logical completene . J > ii t, with happy intuition, Knripides extends the scope of his prologue on this occasion far heyond the point to which fin; Spectator is led in the drama itself. Prophecies of evil to come make themselves heard through all the din of victory, and one is made aware that these cruel conquerors are t hem- Helves doomed to destruction. Nothing can he more im« IVC than tin; hymeneal ode which ('assandra sin^s for herself. Sh<; has the inspired conviction that if is through his union with her that tin; destroyer is to he destroyed. Euripides took Ids model from tin; complete destruction of conquered cities, which in Greece was the order of the day, and in which many a woman must have shared the fate of I J em ha. 302 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. In Euripides I am especially struck by the contrast be- tween barbarians and Hellenes, agreeing in the main with the conception of that contrast which we rind in Herodotus. It appears in the " Mcdcia," in the " Iphigeneia in Tauris," and even in those pieces which are taken from the cycle of Trojan legend. Euripides reckons even the Trojans as bar- barians. They arc distinguished by looser modes of thought, by more splendid clothing, by unconditional obedience to their lords, by a certain coarseness of character. Between them and the Hellenes no friendship can exist. The object with which the Greeks sail to Troy is that they may strike a blow at barbarism. Euripides does not take the trouble to adapt his plays to the past times of the heroic world, but transfers to his heroes the conditions which he sees before his eyes. Several of his dramatic complications rest upon mistakes in which the art of writing is concerned. Theseus and Heracles talk philosophy about the nature of the gods. Euripides transplants not only the political but the domestic conditions of his day into the heroic world, and in handling great destinies he develops the sentiments of each member of the different families. In the play of ^Eschylus on the war against Thebes the whole stress is laid upon the disposition of Eteocles alone. But Euripides in the u Phosnissffi " brings the mother on the stage, though according to other tradition she had long been dead, and rep- resents her as trying to reconcile the unnatural brothers. In the " Orestes" the uncle and his restored spouse interfere with decisive effect ; the aged Tyndarcus and the whole royal house appear. So, too, in the " Andromache" Peleus is con- trasted with his obstinate grauddaughter-in-law, while in the "Iphigeneia in Aulis" we see father and uncle, mother and bridegroom, play their different parts. The play of " Electra," in spite of the lofty and mythical nature of its subject, gives one almost the impression of a tragedy of domestic life. Electra is living in virgin wedlock ; in her home the scene of the whole play is laid. Mythical tone and color are sacriiied to a less ambitious realism. Both Sophocles and Euripides represent Electra as at strife with Clytaminestra, but while the former lays stress upon the idea EURIPIDES. 303 of justice, the latter dwells on the one hand on the connection between Agamemnon and Cassandra, and on the other on the cruel treatment of Clytoemnestra's children, resulting from her marriage with ./Egisthus. Regarding affairs from this point of view, it is not surprising that Euripides should have framed a sort of domestic philosophy : at any rate we find constantly in him reflections of a domestic kind which may be worked into a consistent scheme. Domestic feeling is the groundwork of the " Medeia " and the " Phrcdra," which may be regarded as his most successful plays. Medeia may well be compared with the Deianeira of Sophocles, but while the latter only seeks to secure her hus- band's affections Medeia directs all her fury against her rival and her own children. She has no desire to kill Jason ; all that she wishes to compass is the ruin of his happiness. The future bliss he aims at building up for himself, in despite and in contempt of his former love, fills her soul with savage reso- lution. There is nothing in the range of poetry at once more pregnant and more terrible than the farewell which Medeia takes of her children. It cannot be called a mental conflict, for she has no doubts ; she is fully conscious of her love for her children, and expresses it with the utmost warmth, but her fury and her hate are stronger still, and she sacrifices her offspring in spite of all her love, like the barbaric lioness she is. As to the " Pluedra," it has long ago been pointed out how far the development of passion is carried in that play be- yond all possibility of imitation in later times. Euripides, with all his defects, is one of the most powerful and inventive poets that have ever lived. There is no single piece of his which did not charm the spectator with the glamour of some thrilling situation. To the rich material of heroic legend, which was employed by his predecessors, he added the cycle of myths that centred round Heracles, and made it completely his own. In all that he writes he seeks to bring into prominence some human interest, and especially those points which give rise to a conflict of passions. The innocence of youthful manhood engaged in the service of the temple, or its fresh and manly courage displayed in field sports and the chase, maidenly self-sacrifice to a great idea, as 30± PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. in Iphigeneia and Polyxcna, or -svifely devotion for a hus- band, as in Alkestis, are portrayed in touches as imperishable as those which illustrate the pangs of jealousy or the fury of passion. I know not if Euripides attained to what the theory of tragedy demands ; he was, at any rate, a poet of the keenest sensibility and the greatest talent, which he employed with infinite success. During his lifetime the fame and popularity of his works had reached to Sicily. They spread gradually through the whole circumference of the Greek and after- wards of the Roman world, either directly or b} r means of imitations. It has been justly remarked that they form one of the most important elements of later culture, and it is cer- tain that they have contributed not a little to mould existing opinion. We shall therefore be justified in alluding once more to the phase of religious thought to which they give expression. Euripides sides with Pindar, who refused to believe in the feast of Tantalus. His Iphigeneia says that they must have been murderous wretches who laid such things to the charge of the gods. In the conversation between Theseus and Her- acles, to which allusion has already been made, the one is highly offended by the marriage of brother and sister in the case of Zeus and Hera, and by the chaining of Kronos, while the other holds these stories to be mere poetical inventions. But it is not so eas} r to explain away the immoral acts of the gods when, as generally happens, they arc of the essence of the piece. In such cases mankind, who suffer at the hands of the gods, show no scruple in blaming them. Even the pious Ion is offended when they who make the laws refuse to keep the laws. He attacks the sanctuary which guarantees impunity to the transgressor. In the "Andromache" Apollo is accused of acting like an evil man, in whom an old quarrel rankles still. In the "Ilippolytus" we are told that it is through boldness and violence, and not through piety, that man accomplishes his end. In the " Bellerophon " we are told that the weak, however pious they may be, have to sub- mit to the strong. " There are no gods," he exclaims; "they have no existence." IIEItODOTUS AND TIIUKYDIDES. 305 It is clear that only a philosophical spirit like this could free itself from the trammels of a traditional religion, often indistinguishable from superstition. As Heracles says, in the place alluded to above, " the God who is verily God has no wants." Euripides is in doubt whether we are to find the necessity of things in God or in the human spirit. " Custom and law lead us to recognize the existence of the gods, but right and wrong owe their distinction to men." Nothing can be more opposed to the idea of the Eumenides, as conceived by ^Eschylus, than the declaration of Orestes in the play of Euripides that it was his evil conscience that pursued him, and that he was fully aware of what he had done. Justice is the daughter of Time ; in due course she brings all wicked- ness to light. Earth and heaven begat all things; the earthly returns to earth, the immaterial to heaven. The happiest man is he who beholds the universal laws which rule imper- ishable things. One may fairly say that, by this kind of treatment, legen- dary heroic history, the great intellectual possession of the nation, was shaken to its foundations and all but destroyed. It would have been better to portray men directly, as they appeared in real life, than to transplant them, with all their actions and their omissions, into the heroic world. After such changes as these philosophy and history had become indis- pensable. 6. Herodotus and Thukydides. Herodotus and Thukydides stand in much the same chron- ological relation to each other as Sophocles and Euripides. Herodotus was the elder of the two : according to an ancient calculation, often disputed but never displaced by any sounder hypothesis, he was fifty-three years old, and Thukydides forty, at the beginning of the Peloponne&ian war. But the situa- tions and fortunes of the two men who laid the foundations of historical science and historical composition w T ere widely different, or rather were diametrically opposed. Herodotus was born on the coast of Asia, in a city which stood in close commercial and political connection with the Oriental peoples to the examination of whose history he 20 30G PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. naturally devoted part of his life. Thence he migrated to Samos, the great metropolis of trade, and afterwards to Athens, then at the climax of her maritime power. He was a stranger in Athens, but he attached himself to the Athe- nians with his whole heart and with warm admiration. Thu- kydides, on the contrary, was a born Athenian. A man of distinguished birth, he had attained to one of the most impor- tant posts in the state, the independent command of a naval squadron. But he was on one occasion unfortunate enough to allow the Peloponnesians to forestall him, and to occu- py Amphipolis about twenty-four hours before he arrived. Through this failure he forfeited the favor of the Athenian people, at that time under the headlong guidance of a demo- cratic leader. He was punished by exile, and passed the rest of his life on an hereditary property which belonged to him, partly under the protection of the Lakedcemonians. This misfortune enabled him to undertake, under peculiarly advan- tageous conditions, the history of the war, a project which he had already formed at the beginning of the struggle. No longer confined to the reports and narratives that passed cur- rent in his native city, he was able to form a fair notion and to give an impartial account of the course of affairs. Though an exile, his natural impulse was still to give the preference to Athens; though an Athenian, he had nevertheless good ground for regarding the proceedings of his countrymen with- out any one-sided patriotism. No less important is the second distinction between these two great authors. Herodotus spent his life in watching the mighty conflict between Persia and Greece, which, as he wrote, occupied the attention of the world. Thukydides was drawn into the thick of the struggle among the Greeks them- selves, and especially that between Athens and Sparta. It is true that the internal rivalries of Greece are mentioned by Herodotus, while the conflict between Greeks and Persians is referred to by Thukydides, but in Herodotus the former, in Thukydides the latter, is kept in the background. Herodotus bestowed especial attention on the joint effort abroad, Thu- kydides on the internecine conflict at home. Herodotus was primarily a traveller. His native city, Hali- HERODOTUS. 307 carnassnS) took part in founding the commercial settlement at Naucratis, through which the trade with Egypt was thrown open to the Greeks. One may suppose that it was this con- nection which first attracted the gaze of Herodotus to Egypt, and which afterwards secured him a favorable reception in that country even when the connection had ceased to exist. lie was the first foreigner who bestowed on the monuments of Egypt the attention they deserved ; he visited Phoenicia and beheld the wonders of Babylon ; by the great road which leads from Ephesus to Sardis, and from Sardis to Susa, he penetrated to the interior of the Persian empire, and went as far as Ecbatana. And yet the East did not draw him into the circle of her votaries, as some time afterwards she attracted Ctcsias. Herodotus never shut his eyes to the superiority of the Greeks, and never forgot that lie was a Greek himself. His descriptions of the coasts and landscapes of Greece are so accurate that it is easy to perceive he must have seen most of them with his own eyes. In Athens he felt himself, as it were, at home,* for his native city, while paying tribute to the Great King, had a close political connection with Athens. * It cannot be doubted that Herodotus about the year 444 spent a considerable time at Athens. Hence, perhaps, we may explain certain verses in the " Antigone " of Sophocles which imply an acquaintance with the works and views of Herodotus. In accordance with this is the notice in Eusebius (" Chron." sub. Olymp. 83, 4=445-4 B.C.) that Herodotus had read his history publicly in Athens and been honored there. Now an ancient historian named Diyllus, not without value as respects Athenian history, relates that Herodotus received ten talents, by vote of the ecclesia, from the city of Athens. We are not told the reason of this gift, which may have been by way of compensation for losses incurred in leaving Ilalicarnassus, or by way of assistance, as ho was about to go with a colony to Thurii. It certainly cannot have been intended as payment for flattering views of Athenian policy to be inserted in his history. In the book irepi rijc ' U poSorov KaKoi]9ealc, attributed to Plutarch, through which we know of this passage from Diyllus, a protest is made against such a supposition, on the ground that there is much in the history of Berodotus which must have displeased the Athenians. This little work is very un- just to Herodotus, and excessively calumnious, but it declares outright that the hypothesis in question is a slander : ruvro ftoiiOn T i[i 'RpoSdry irpbq yctivqv T))v diufioXi'/v, )}v tx° l KoXaKtiiaar rove 'A&rjvaiovr, upyvpiov iroXv \afte~tv Trap' avTwv (chap. 20). 30S PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. Tims Herodotus obtained a personal acquaintance with all the districts which made up the civilized world of his day. He was led to visit them by an innate impulse towards self- instruction, and we can easily see how his zeal for knowledge attended him from place to place. The work in which Herodotus put together the results of his inquiries forms in itself an clement in the history of the century. In the author's mind are reflected all sorts of national peculiarities, for wherever he went he made inquiries about the country and the people, and the reports he obtained lie side by side in his book. The ethnographical information which we owe to him is of itself of great value, but its im- portance is doubled by the historical element with which it is woven into a single whole. His informants, of course, knew little of the past beyond the memory of living men. It is easy to perceive from his remarks about the Assyrian empire that Herodotus, anxious as he was to write about Assyrian history, was but slightly instructed on the matter. Had he known more about it he would have considerably moditied his notions about the con- nection between Egypt and Assyria under the Saitic dynasty. But the fact was that Assyria had already been forgotten by the contemporaries of Herodotus, whose recollections were absorbed by the rise of Persia and by the undertakings of the Persian kings. As to the origin of the Persian empire noth- ing but legendary reports existed, which Herodotus transmits to us in the shape in which he received them from the Per- sians and Egyptians. On the other hand, the hostile collision of Persia and Greece was fresh in the memory of all. The great decisive battles had long been fought, and Herodotus can hardly have had any personal recollection of them, but their effects were still perceptible and determined the mutual relations of the East and the Grecian world. The forces on both sides had all been set in motion by that conflict, and measured against each other. On the Persian invasion of Greece, its failure, and the measures of retaliation taken by the Greeks, rested the existing condition of the world. These events then formed another subject for the inquiries of Herodotus. To combine HERODOTUS. 309 them with the rest of his information and to present the whole in its proper connection was the worthiest aim that he conld set before him. The result was the first real history that was ever written. History conld not grow up on national ground alone, for it is not till they come into contact with one another that nations become conscious of their own existence. It is then, too, that a writer of wide sympathies can do jus- tice, as Herodotus does, to both the conflicting nationalities. Herodotus has no hatred for the barbarians, or he would not have taken pains to depict them. He has often been accused of partiality towards Athens. The favorable judg- ment he passes on her conduct in the Persian war has been attributed to personal motives. But I am not inclined to agree with this view. The famous passage in which he points out that the salvation of Greece was due to the resolution of the Athenians to defend themselves by sea is strictly and clearly true. The facts are as Herodotus states them. The no- tion he had formed of what would be} T ond all doubt have taken place, had not the Athenians acted as they did, inspired him to write that passage, which, regarded as a piece of historical and political criticism, is perhaps the best in the whole work. Not only is there an incomparable charm in the graceful simplicity with which Herodotus relates separate events, but he possesses also a sympathetic insight into the relations of universal history. His work has never been equalled, much less excelled, in the grandeur of its combinations. At the same time it cannot, of course, be said to satisfy all the condi- tions of a perfect historical work. All that Herodotus tells us rests on oral tradition, and the main subject of his book is an event which took place several decades before, with which he was acquainted only at second-hand, and for which trust- worthy authorities were not everywhere to be found. An- other service had yet to be performed — the presentation of an event which had actually taken place before the author's eyes. Such a narrative could afford to dispense with oral tradition respecting earlier epochs, which always rests upon a basis com- paratively insecure. For the charm of a general survey of past times was now to be substituted a minute and accurate description of contemporary events. 310 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. Herein lies the great merit of Thukydides. The subject of his work is not a struggle embracing the whole area of the known world, but a conilict between two republics, each in its way of the highest importance. From the moment when their smouldering resentment broke into open hostility Thu- kydides watched the course of the struggle with the full in- tention of describing what he saw. The tasks which Herodotus and Thukydidcs respectively performed arc of so inconsistent a nature that they could not have been executed by one man. Their execution required two authors of different character and different gifts. Each of these historians expresses views corresponding to his cir- cumstances and his time. In his commerce with different nationalities, during which he always paid special attention to religious matters, Herodotus conceived ideas unlike those which passed current among the Greeks. As an historian he raises objections to the fabulous stories about the gods. In his opinion the ancient Pelasgians, and after them the Ilel- Lenes, used to worship the gods without distinction of name. The names of the gods were afterwards introduced from Egypt into Greece. The historian Avas informed at Dodona that the oracle had once been formal!}' asked whether these names should be recognized, and had approved their recogni- tion ; that in later times Homer and Ilesiod had attached titles to the gods, determined their respective occupations, and invented the theogony ; but that all this was, so to speak, a thing of yesterday ; at all events not to be compared in respect of antiquity with the ancient faith of the Egyptians. Not only had Herodotus visited Dodona, but he was also acquainted with the Eleusinian mysteries, and had been initi- ated into those of the Cabeiri in Lemnos. With respect to the latter he imposes silence on himself, but now and then he hints that, behind the belief in the gods, which the ceremo- nies implied, there was something which he neither could nor would divulge. This does not, however, lead him to deny the existence of gods and heroes. On the contrary, he is afraid that his remarks about them may arouse their animos- ity. If he disputes the truth of a story about Heracles, he begs the gods and heroes to pardon his presumption. It ap- HERODOTUS. 311 pears, therefore, that he has no doubts about the existence and the reality of the gods. But he repeats the doctrine that even they cannot escape from fate, which lies, according to him, beyond their control. He enters into no details respect- ing the dealings of particular gods, but he recognizes the ex- istence of a divine power, which exerts a constant and pene- trating influence on human affairs. With respect to this influence, two ideas of Herodotus call for special notice. On the one hand, the gods give their sup- port to courage and understanding, but on the other they pur- sue with a sort of envy all that is pre-eminent. Any one who reads Herodotus attentively for some little time, and surren- ders himself to the general impression produced as the author passes from one point to another, will perceive the one con- stant element to be a belief in the direct interference of the Deity. Herodotus venerates the gods as beings of real po- tency, revenging themselves on the man who insults them, even unintentionally, announcing their will by means of ora- cles, and accomplishing it without fail. Such was the belief of iEschylus, such, in the main, the belief of Euripides, who upbraids the gods with their acts of injustice and violence. The gods, indeed, rule the human world, but their power is not absolute. We see traces of a yet deeper and older relig- ion in the idea of Nemesis, wdiom Herodotus recognizes even where men in general fail to perceive her power. The divergence between the religious views of Herodotus and those of Thukydides has attracted attention from early times. This divergence does not amount to a direct contra- diction,* for this would have implied the resuscitation of those * The locus classicus (Herod, i. 22), in which a writer as early as Lucian fancied he found cause to blame Herodotus, can be explained as having no reference to religion. It may be regarded simply as the expression of an historical conviction with respect to the course of human affairs, and the writer does not appear to have had any doctrinal end in view. In the passage of Lucian referred to the author's own opinion is the most important matter. He transcribes only the words that suit his views, and explains them in his own way (ttwq M loropiav ovyypdQuv, chap. 42). One cannot help being reminded at this point of the story of Herodotus's public reading at Olympia. I hold it to be an invention of the rhetori- 312 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. ideas of antiquity about the gods which were rejected by He- rodotus. But Thukydides was under the influence of the uni- versal tendency to which wc find the poets giving expression, and by means of which faith in the gods was undermined or even destroyed. Like the poets, he recognized something di- vine pervading human things. He complains that men com- bine together not to maintain the laws of God, but to break them. He speaks with disapproval of a growing want of piety. But lie shows no trace of the idea that the gods interfere di- rectly in human affairs. It is true that he does not deny the authority of oracles in so many words — he even adduces evi- dence which might be held to justify a belief in prophecy ; but, with regard to such matters, he constantly maintains a sceptical attitude. For example, when an earthquake in Lak- edcemon is attributed to the violation of a sanctuary, to which some Helots had fled for refuge, he relates the fact, but with- out giving the slightest hint that he believes in the explana- tion, lie was not unaffected by the growth of natural sci- ence. It is with a certain irony that he mentions the belief of the inhabitants of Lipari that the smithy of Hephajstus was in their island. He has very different notions about the smoke which they see by day and the flames that ascend by night. If on any occasion natural phenomena are allowed to influence the decisions of mankind, he comments on the fact with disapproval. A characteristic example of this attitude of mind is to be found in his remarks on the curse which was supposed to be laid on the appropriation of the so-called Pe- lasgikon at Athens for the purpose of human habitation. He rejects the idea that subsequent misfortunes were due to dis- regard of this curse, and in the curse itself he sees nothing but a prevision that the spot would not be used for such a purpose except under disastrous circumstances. The real advance made by Thukydides consists, perhaps, in this, that he perceived the motive forces of human history to lie in the moral constitution of human nature. To estab- ciaus, of whom Lucian himself was one. These people travelled from town to town, lecturing as they went, and Herodotus is made out to have done the same. TI1UKYDIDES. 313 lish this we need not have recourse to passages bearing on the subject which he weaves into his speeches, for these speeches are framed in accordance with the character of the speaker. But now and then he makes in his own person observations on human affairs. lie declares that such and such an event is due to the dominion of passion over human nature ; that men contemn what is right, and cannot bear anything supe- rior; that the furious longing for revenge is a still greater evil ; that the man who yields to such passions violates the very laws by which he is protected, and provokes his own de- struction, lie traces the origin of all disorder in the cities of Greece to the greed of those in power. It is generally, says he, nothing but a pretext when men talk of the blessings of moderate aristocracy or of democratic equality ; their in- tention is only to get the better of their opponents ; a virtu- ous reputation is of far less account than shrewdness and cun- ning. National misfortunes on the one side, and on the other complications resulting from war, give occasion for all such hypocrisy, and bring fresh evils in their train. Man himself, especially in his vices and his sufferings, is the central figure in the history of Thukydides. From this point of view he stands in much the same relation to Herodo- tus as that in which Euripides stands to Sophocles, or rather to iEschylus. But the change in the case of Thukydides is easier to justify than in the case of the poet, for, while trag- edy cannot be conceived as existing without fiction, history takes man himself for its subject. One of its essential condi- tions is that it should grasp human affairs as they are — should comprehend them, and make them intelligible. Thukydides strips off all that is legendary and fictitious, and claims special credit for having done his best to discover the truth about events exactly as they came to pass. The miraculous, which has such charm for Herodotus, disappears in Thukydides be- hind the unadorned fact. The tone of his narrative is some- times as simple as that of a chronicle ; it impresses one as at once trustworthy and intelligent. Although he owed his security to the Lakedtemonians, it is impossible to reproach him with Laconian proclivities. It was his nature to do jus- tice to both sides. Scrupulous adhesion to the simple truth, 314 PHILOSOPHY AMD LITERATURE. and the confinement of his investigations to human projects, give to his history, for the short period of which it treats, a clearness of outline and a vividness of descriptive power which demand our highest admiration. The narrative of Thnkydides is throughout annalistic in character. Accurate chronology is especially to his taste; he arranges every event under the summer or winter in which it happened, lie includes in his survey many events which might seem to others unimportant, for his intention is to give an exact account of what took place. But in this chronolog- ical order are visible certain lines of development which, from time to time, are brought into prominence, so that the read- er's attention is constantly directed to what is general as well as to details. The merit of the narrative varies according to its subject. In one place Thnkydides relates all the political movements and discussions connected with the quarrel be- tween Argos and Lakedsemon in so monotonous a style that the story hardly awakens even a moderate interest. Then comes the battle of Mantineia, which he depicts with special reference to the habits and military skill of the Lakedauno- nians. lie tells us where his information is at fault, and thereby inspires us with confidence in what he bids us be- lieve, lie discusses the conduct of every single troop and every national division in turn, and yet never allows the read- er's attention to wander. The description of the fight itself is net to be surpassed. It is intelligible in all its complica- tions. The Spartan king, full of eagerness to disprove the reproaches to which his former conduct has given occasion, pressing impatiently forward, then restraining his ardor and arranging his troops for the tight, presents a figure notable in the annals o( military history. The impartiality of Thukvd- ides leads him to be circumstantial. In Herodotus such a result could hardly have been attained, for with him the gods play too great a part. Thnkydides, on the contrary, brings before us human action pure and simple, although he does not omit to relate that a I.akedannonian army is sometimes disbanded merely because the sacrifices at the frontier prove unfavorable. It is quite in accordance with his style that he should give THUKYDIDES. 315 us the different treaties, even when comparatively unimpor- tant, not only word for word, but in the very dialect in which they were drawn up. Yet, with all this exactness of detail, we come upon a difficulty the mention of which cannot be avoided in this place. How are we to explain the fact that Thukydides does not reproduce word for word the letter which Nikias wrote home to Athens concerning the state of affairs in Sicily, but interpolates another, in which the matter is set forth more concisely ? And, further, what arc we to say about the authenticity of the speeches, which constitute, perhaps, the most excellent portion of his book? Were they really spoken as he transmits them to us? It is evident, to say the least, that the speeches arc remark- ably suited to the purpose which the author had in view in writing history. The speech of the Corinthians at Sparta, in the first book, is for the most part a comparison between Athens and Lakedeeraon. Nothing could be more service- able to the student of history at the opening of a work which depicts the struggle between these two cities. The subse- quent oration of Pericles dwells chiefly on the superiority of naval over land forces. This superiority had great effect on the course of affairs, and is therefore very suitably placed in the foreground. Nevertheless, in both these speeches the motive forces, which were of real importance in determining the general position, are explained with striking correctness. The speech of the Mytileneans at Olympia, and the speech of Cleon about the revolt of Lesbos, when taken together, throw abundant light upon the incompatibility which disturbed the relations between the sovereign state of Athens and the most powerful of her allies. But it may well be doubted whether Cleon actually spoke as he is here reported to have done. At all events, a political culture, such as is displayed by the speech in question, is not elsewhere attributed to the dema- gogue. In the deliberations which preceded the expedition to Sic- ily Thukydides has taken more pains to bring to light the reasons which lay at the root of the matter than the personal motives which actually led to the passing of the resolution. It is notorious that Diodorus, a very respectable author, as- 316 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. cribcs to Nikias a speech on the proposal to attack Syracuse, which differs widely from that which Thukydides attributes to him, but which is, nevertheless, on the whole, much to the point. Finally, we can scarcely believe that the long dialogue between the Athenians and the Melians, in which the latter insist on their independence and the former demand submis- sion and entrance into their league, is word for word true. The principles on which both parties rely are matters of uni- versal history ; on the side of the Athenians they are the same as those applied to defend the expedition against Syra- cuse. The peculiarity of the discussion consists in the dialec- tical form in which the arguments on either side are cast. It is true that the attention of Thukydides is chiefly direct- ed towards Athens, but it is a mark of his superiority as an historian that he has formed clear conceptions about her oppo- nents, lie uses the speeches as a means of expressing these conceptions. In the excellent speeches of Brasidas are to be found views the scope of which extends far beyond contem- porary affairs. Nor is less approbation due to the speech of llermocrates, who predicts the failure of the Athenian expe- dition against Syracuse from causes similar to those which frustrated the Persian expedition against Greece, and em- braces in his survey the attitude maintained by Carthage and the resources of that power. We can appreciate the breadth of view which these remarks imply, but we may well ask how it was possible for Thukydides to obtain accurate ac- counts of the speeches on either side which were made in Syracuse, or of that other oration which Demosthenes ad- dressed to the troops at Pylos. The description of the con- flict at Pylos is a gem of historical writing, but it would be hazardous to suppose that the speeches which animated the combatants have been literally reproduced. It is through these speeches that we gain an insight into the hidden con- trasts which set in motion the Hellenic world. These con- trasts are depicted with a luminous accuracy in which all that is hypothetical is avoided. The historian has no theories to propound, and the reader becomes so much the more convers- ant with realities. It must, however, be allowed that in the speeches there is a departure from exact truth, for the per- INTELLECTUAL LIFE IN ATHENS. 317 sonal views of the historian appear in the guise of history. It is a moment in which the science of history and the science of rhetoric, then flourishing at Athens, unite their forces. The master from whom Thukydides learned the latter art was Antiphon, of whom we have already spoken. Thukyd- ides says of him that he was a man the vigor of whose thought was only equalled by the vigor of his diction. These words are exactly applicable to the speeches of Thukydides. It is well known that they were considered masterpieces of eloquence, and that they were studied by Demosthenes. Thu- kydides is at once orator and historian, but he keeps the two arts distinct. While banishing rhetoric from his narrative, in his speeches he allows it full play. The union of the two characters was in such close agreement with the public life of antiquity that it was imitated by later historians, and, although it often degenerated in after-times into mere display, may be said to be the chief characteristic of ancient historiography. 7. Intellectual Life in Athens. There is something almost miraculous in this simultaneous, or nearly simultaneous, appearance of such different types of genius, accomplishing, in poetry, philosophy, and history, the greatest feats which the human mind has ever performed. Each is original, and strikes out his own line, but all work in harmony. By one or other of these masters are set forth all the greatest problems concerning things divine and human. Athens rejoiced in the possession of a theatre the like of which, whether for sport or earnest, has never been seen in any other city. The people lived in constant enjoyment of the noblest dramatic productions. Sophocles was not dispos- sessed by Euripides : their works appeared at the same time upon the stage. The history of Herodotus was read aloud in public meetings. Thukydides was reserved for more private study, but his works had a wide circulation in writing. A high standard of culture is implied in the fact that the Demos was as capable of following the speeches of Pericles, and of arriving at decisions about the hardest political questions, as of giving a verdict in the transactions of the Heliaea. This democracy permitted greater freedom of discussion 31 S PHILOSOPHY AND LITEKATURE. than was to be found anywhere else in the world. It attract- ed men of similar aims from the colonies in the East and in the West, and guaranteed to all a safe asylum. As Herodotus migrated thither from Halicarnassus, so did Anaxagoras from Clazomenae. In his own home he found himself so cramped that he abandoned all his interests there and came to Athens. Her increasing greatness offered him an infinite prospect, for a state whose power has reached its zenith has less attraction for an ambitious spirit than one whose power is not yet fully grown. In Athens Anaxagoras found a sphere of influence such as he needed. We have already touched upon his rela- tions with Pericles, and certainly his doctrines deserved to obtain a hearing. Empedocles, as we have seen, traced all motion to Hate and Love in primary matter — that is, to its own internal im- pulses. But Anaxagoras found this explanation insufficient, and refused to believe that a settled order of the world could be produced by the motion of the elements. It appears to have been chiefly due to this observation that he arrived at the idea of an omnipotent Mind. This mind, as the origin of all motion, he opposed to matter — a fresh departure of such universal import that it announced a totally new system of thinking. " The Mind," says Anaxagoras, " is infinite, self-con- trolling, unmixed. It lives of itself. It is a simple essence possessing power and knowledge. It has ordained all that was, is, and is to be." These are great thoughts, through which philosophy, following the lines once adopted, accepting here and rejecting there, proceeding from one reflection to another, at last reaches the idea of the unity of God, who, however, is not the Creator, but the indwelling Euler of the universe.* Anaxagoras is said to have declared the object of human life to be the observation and knowledge of the heavenly bodies. He was a physicist and an astronomer; in reirardino: the sun and moon as bodies of the nature of * The God of Anaxagoras lias the same relation to things as the soul to living beings. It is characteristic that the hypothesis of the vo?<: was regarded as a last resource (orav a-6p>)(ry, rdre TraptXnEi rbv vovv, Anst. " Metaph." i. 4, p. 985 a). EARLY PHILOSOPHERS. 319 worlds — in fact, resembling the earth — he offended popular prejudices, but had thinking men on his side. Anaxagoras attached to himself both Euripides and Thukj T dides, and in their writings, especially in those of the former, we find the ideas of this philosopher reproduced. The masters of philosophy and rhetoric, attracted by the political supremacy of Athens, were already migrating thither from Italy and Sicily. Among them the Eleatics Zeno and Parmenides are mentioned. The teaching of philosophy was closely connected with the art of logic and rhetoric, which made its way in like manner from Sicily. Athens, in fact, became the very centre and home of the Greek in- tellect. In order to appreciate the intellectual greatness of Athens we must remember that Polygnotus, Pheidias, and Ictinus, the architect of the Parthenon, were all living at Athens at this time. There can be no doubt that Greek art was based upon Egyptian, but it had a peculiar development of its own. Greek plastic art is the offspring of Greek gymnastics. Take, for example, the iEginetan marbles, preserved to us by a happy fate from the earliest times. On the pediment of a temple of Athene in iEgina are represented scenes out of the Trojan war. In the midst of the combatants, struggling over the bodies of the Grecian dead, appears Athene, in all the severe dignity of the ancient style. The combatants are copied immediately from life. Some traces of Egyptian stiffness have been observed, but in general the nude figures, in their vigorous movement and in the way they handle their weapons, are life-like even to individuality. It is otherwise with the features of the face. The facial proportions are incorrectly given ; the eyes are too prominent, and the corners of the mouth are drawn upwards : but this may, perhaps, be defended on the ground that an individual elaboration of the heads and faces would have been out of place in such a scene. The general aspect of the struggle was the matter of most importance. Unity of style is visible throughout ; all is fresh and original ; and the spectator is impressed with a sense that he is in the very presence of the ancient world. In the same place where these figures are now preserved are to be 320 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. found sonic specimens of Egyptian sculpture. Physiological observers tell us that they appear to have been copied from models resembling skeletons ; but the Greeks copied the liv- ing man, in all the fulness of life and energy. Those monuments belong, so far as we can see, to the pe- riod before the Persian wars. After the Persian wars the tri- umphs of that epoch took the place of the memories of Troy. But, like the latter, they were still treated as the immediate results of divine interference. The combination of the wor- ship of the gods with courageous resistance to the foreign invader is the chief characteristic of these sculptures. We have already mentioned the group of thirteen figures in bronze, which the Athenians presented as a thank-offering to the Delphic shrine, representing the gods of the country and of the Athenian clans, and in their midst Miltiades, the hero of Marathon. There is something noble in the conception of victory, as at once a triumph for men and for the gods, which is manifested here. The same idea is expressed in the colos- sal statue of Athene Promachos, which lvimon commissioned Pheidias to set up. The master of sculpture and the master of painting joined hands in the endeavor to express this feel- ing, and used the national legends as symbols of their intent. Athene was regarded as at once the patroness of Athens and the ally of Zeus in his conflict with the Titans. Kimon brought home from Thasos the bones of Theseus, the ancient national hero, and laid them in a separate shrine, in the dec- orations of which were celebrated his heroic deeds against, the Centaurs, the representatives of untamed natural force, and against the Amazons, the invaders of his country. In a similar spirit Polygnotus took part in the adornment of Ki- mon's house. In the building which went by the name of the Painted Portico he renewed the memories of Troy, giv- ing special prominence to the deeds of the Athenian contin- gent, but his chief work was to give form and expression to the stories of the battle of Marathon. But it is not only patriotism which raises these works of art above all that preceded them. Both Pheidias and Polyg- notus had at the same time an ideal end in view. In the LeseliL 1 at Delphi. Polygnotus, taking as one of his subjects PHEIDIAS AND POLYGNOTUS. 321 the under-world, attempted to put the justice of the gods into a visible form. He is famed also as a painter of character, who never lost sight of the bearing which rightly belonged to those whom he portrayed. Of his painting of Polyxena, when being sacrificed as an atonement to the shade of Achil- les, an ancient observer says that the whole story of the Tro- jan war was in her eyes. The fame of Pheidias was raised to a still higher point by the chryselephantine statue of Zeus at Olympia. It is an old tradition that as he fashioned it the verses of Homer were in his mind, in which the poet speaks of the brows and hair of the deity, and how Olympus trem- bled at his nod. iEinilius Paulas, that victorious Philhellene, remarked that in the statue appeared the Homeric Zeus com- plete, nay, rather the essence of divinity itself. Pheidias, adds another Roman, carved gods still better than men, and even religion profited by his aid. Thus art, too, had some- thing to say in these discussions on the divine and human which occupied Greek minds. Her influence was a living influence, and, in the form which it took in the hands of these artists, might even balance the speculations of Anax- agoras. But just at this time the intellectual movement received a new stimulus from the influence of Sicily. In that country philosophical culture and political theory availed themselves to the full of the technical improvements recently made in the art of speech. The first theoretical book on any art was a treatise on rhetoric, written in Sicily. Elsewhere, too, there arose schools, in which the art of dialectic and orator}' was taught in conjunction with philosophical doctrine. These were the first public schools in which voluntary learners at- tached themselves to a master. During the time of the Pelo- ponnesian war we find the most distinguished representatives of these schools at Athens. Gorgias of Leontini, who came to Athens originally as an ambassador from his native city, was a man remarkable for the splendor of his diction and the dignity of his personal ap- pearance. From Sicily too, where he had taught for pay, came Protagoras of Abdera. Besides these there came Hip- pias of Elis, Prodicus of Keos, and from Chios the brothers 21 322 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. We find these men in the anterooms of the most distinguished citizens, or in the gym- nasia, attended as they paced to and fro by numerous pupils, both strangers and natives. Every pointed remark that falls from their lips is received with loud applause, and those who are put to rout by their logical skill are laughed at by the rest. They sit on benches and make answer to all who ques- tion them, or they rest on couches and talk in a voice loud enough to fill the room. They receive fees from their pupils, and Protagoras is said to have made a larger fortune than Fheidias. These men, among whom were to be found persons worthy of all respect, were called Sophists. The flavor of evil repu- tation that hangs about this title is principally due to the at- titude which they took up towards philosophical opinions, for, whether they inclined towards the Ionian school, like Pro- tagoras, or, like Gorgias, to the Sicilian, the prominent char- acteristic of their teaching is the complete uncertainty of all things. Starting from the position that everything rests on two movements independent of one another, the one that of the subject, or sentient being, the other that of the object, or sensible being, Protagoras held that all perception originated in the meeting of these two, which meeting belonged, in the nature of things, to the domain of chance. Perception he considered to be a purely subjective sensation, the object of which is of an essentially fleeting nature and only attains to reality through being felt. Similar or even more advanced ideas were promulgated by the followers of Parmenides. The fundamental principle of the Sophists — namely, that what is unreal has no existence at all — was developed by them into the axiom that a lie is impossible. They expected an oppo- nent to begin by proving to them that such a thing as false opinion could exist, and that deceitful appearances could pen- etrate into the region of thought. These doubts about the existence of truth reacted of ne- cessity on religious as well as political views. When men went so far as to say that the gods were only recognized in accordance with custom and law, it was but a short step to SOCRATES. 323 the statement — a statement put forward even at this early date, and frequently repeated under very diverse conditions — that religion owes its origin to a political artifice of ancient date, when it was thought to be expedient to represent the gods as overseers of human virtue and vice. Other thinkers went on to connect the idea of law and justice with the ephemeral opinion of ruling parties. The statement attrib- uted in Plato's "Republic" to Thrasymachus, that justice is that which is profitable to the ruler, must doubtless, as we gather from Cicero, have actually occurred in his writings. It was a question which, as we learn from Xenophon's "Mem- orabilia," occupied the attention of Pericles, and that, too, with immediate reference to the existing polity. Pericles re- marks that he has been in doubt whether that which is estab- lished by the caprice of the mob is to be regarded as law or violence. 8. /Socrates. Scepticism was thus triumphant. Men doubted of the ob- jectivity of perceptions, of the truth or untruth of speech, of the existence of the gods, which was made dependent on hu- man opinion, even of the difference between right and wrong. In the midst of this chaos of conflicting opinion Socrates ap- peared. His very exterior was remarkable. He went about barefoot, in mean attire ; his wants were few and easily satis- fied, for he fancied that thereby he approached the gods, who stand in need of naught. He was daily to bo seen in the market-place, in the workshops, in the gymnasia ; he con- versed with young and old, high and low, and yet without pretending to be a teacher. No one with whom he came in contact could escape from the iron grasp of his dialectic. lie appealed only to the verdict of sound human intelligence, making it his business to bring this intelligence to a con- sciousness of itself. The Sophists lived in the region of es- tablished notions, and on this foundation they built up their views and systems. Socrates made it his duty to examine these notions,, and applied to them the touchstone of that in- sight which is implanted in the breast of every human being. lie put in question all the notions from which the Sophists started ; he inquired into what they called rational, right, or 32i PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. equable ; he subjected these notions to criticism by the stand- ard of innate ideas, which alone he held to be true. By this method he gathered from the multiplicity of opinion a sum of irrefragable truth. The knowledge which he obtained has been rightly defined as the science of ideas. It is only on the foundation of such a knowledge that safe rules of moral con- duct can be based, for virtue and knowledge are thus made to coincide. The human mind has never been placed in a more com- manding position. It contains in itself the criterion of all truth ; it is, in fact, in possession of truth. The essence of Socratic principles lies in the declaration that, in order to dis- cover what is true, it is only necessary to sever tenable ideas from those notions that are untenable. Socrates regards the human mind as the source and warrant of all ideas, and es- pecially of moral ideas ; but the ideas themselves he deduces from insight. Science thus changed its character: it took, as its starting-point, the ideas that are innate in man. It was remarked in ancient times that Socrates had brought back philosophy from heaven to earth. The same may be said to have been done by Thukydides in history, and by Euripides in the drama. It was, in fact, the tendency of the age. Nev- ertheless Socrates went to work with great prudence. Anax- agoras, who flourished while Socrates was still young, had done undeniable service by declaring those occurrences, such as eclipses of the moon or monstrous births, which filled men with alarm for the future, to be merely natural phenomena, having no connection with human acts or intentions. Socra- tes opposed him on the ground that the explanations given of these phenomena were either insufficient or inapplicable. He expressed his belief that there were certain things which the gods had reserved as the special area of their activity, while at the same time he accepted the idea that all things were swayed by a single divine intelligence. The human mind was, in his view, the offspring of this intelligence, and thereby connected with the gods. On similar grounds he clung firmly to the conviction that the gods took an imme- diate share in directing human affairs, and manifested in miraculous wise their kindly care for man. He had the live- SOCRATES. 325 liest sense of the mysterious connection between the divine and human, and went so far as to declare that he had with- in him a daemon, distinct from himself, which warned him against any mistake that he was in danger of committing. All this did not prevent him from opposing the prevailing notions about the gods. lie held, for instance, that it was wrong to imagine that men could do them any service, but their omnipresence, their omnipotence, and their goodness re- ceived from him full recognition. Socrates undertook one of the greatest and noblest tasks that were set before Athe- nian society, the task, namely, of cleansing the ancient faith from its superstitious elements, and of combining rational and religious truth. Such a man was sure to be misunderstood. Every one knows how the great comic poet, one of the strongest intellects of the day, misused his name ; for the Socrates of Aristoph- anes is as far apart from the Socrates of real life as earth from heaven.* It may fairly be said that the Socrates of comedy is the Protagoras of the Platonic dialogue, for Aris- tophanes represents him as supporting that which the Soc- rates of history did his best to overthrow. These attacks were supported by a popular reaction against anti-traditional modes of thought. Such modes had found favor with Pericles, but the democracy held fast to the old superstition. It appears that Cleon made use of the soothsayer Diopeithes, and of oracles in general. It was on the ground of an oracle that he carried out, in the sixth year of the Pelo- ponnesian war, a purification of Delos, which was attended * In his treatise " De Vita Aristophanis " (in " Aristoph. Com." ed. Meineke), p. xviii., my brother, Ferdinand Ranke, a man as learned as be was amiable, remarks, " Excepta paupertate, parsimonia, abstiuentia, labo- rum patientia, aliisque rebus laudi potius et honori inservientibus quam justae reprehensioni obnoxiis reliqua omnia nihil esse nisi aut mendacia aut errores, omne, quod a Xenopbonte et Platone de Socrate narratur, luculenter docet. Neque enim prioribus neque posterioribus vita? annis discipulos in domum recepit aut naturalem philosophiam aut dialecticam arteni docuit." The piece was published as early as the year 424-3, un- der the archonship of Isarchus, at a time when the peculiar position of Socrates was not as yet rightly understood. D26 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. with much violence. Nikias, too, was in communication with Diopeitlies. In the trial occasioned by the mutilation of the Hernias the populace, infuriated by the violation of mysteries and the insults done to the rites it adored, gave free vent to its animosity. It was about the same time that Protagoras was expelled from Athens and his atheistical works commit- ted to the flames. Whether, as some say, it was one of the Four Hundred who brought the charge against him must re- main uncertain. Even the worship of Kotytto and Kybele was introduced from abroad, and met with the warmest recep- tion. How resolutely men clung to their old religious views may be best seen in the condemnation of the generals after the battle of Arginusa?, a step which was opposed by Soc- rates. Socrates, as we have seen, clung originally to the positive faith, as modified to meet the requirements of a higher intel- ligence ; but to the form in which it was acceptable to the democracy, and in which it became idolatrous, he openly de- clared himself an opponent. The unfortunate issue of the Peloponnesian war, and the victories of the Lakedcemonians, who clung firmly to ancient principles, were not without effect upon Athenian feeling both with respect to religion and the constitution. The frequent revolutions experienced by the republic since the death of Pericles had shaken the confidence of all thinking men in the dominant political system. In the struggle between oligarchy and democracy Socrates did not actually take sides with either. But after this struggle had passed through various phases, and the democracy had at length got the upper hand, public opinion about Socrates was influenced by the fact that, whatever he was, he was not a democrat. On the contrary, he found himself in antagonism to the fundamental idea of democracy. He founded his ethical sys- tem on an intellectual basis, and he regarded political systems from the same point of view. His doctrine was that he should rule who best understood the art of ruling. A ruler excelling all his contemporaries in intelligence was, indeed, not forthcoming. Alkibiades was far from corresponding with such an ideal. Critias, the most violent of the Thirty SOCKATES. 327 Tyrants, was still further removed from it. It was one of the most damaging charges against the philosopher that Alki- biades and Critias were his pupils, however little he is to be blamed for their excesses. The political ideas of Socrates had rather a negative tendency ; among other things, he ob- jected to the conferring of office by lot ; for who, said he, would place confidence in a helmsman chosen in this fashion? But, in taking up this position, he put in question the claim of those who possessed the franchise to exclude others from the state, and to assume its whole direction ; and this, too, at a time when, in consequence of the recent conflict, it had been resolved to restore the laws of Solon, which were based upon this very principle, in their original form. The main current of political feeling flowed in this direction, and the restoration of Athenian power was believed to depend upon the restora- tion of the democracy. The execution of this project implied the maintenance of the ancient religion, on which the political system in great measure rested, with undiminished authority. Now Socrates, it could not be denied, performed all his civil and religious duties. But his speculations went far beyond these duties; he did not, as became a born Athenian, adopt as his own the idea of the constitution and of the popular religion. His thoughts, at any rate, were free from any specifically national element. His philosophy strove to grasp what is common to humanity in those fundamental ideas which range far beyond the outward forms of social life at Athens, of the Athenian state, and the Athenian religion. And these ideas he by no means kept to himself; he communicated them in conversa- tion with younger men, and compelled their recognition. In happier times, when there was nothing to fear, the Athenian republic might have been content to look quietly on at con- duct of this kind, but it could no longer afford to be tolerant. The democratic principles, according to which the restored Council of Five Hundred, the holders of supreme authority, were chosen by lot or by a chance majority, were diametri- cally opposed to the doctrines of Socrates, who taught that good government was absolutely incompatible with such con- ditions. But the times required that all should lend their aid 328 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. to the restoration of the state. A man who enjoyed the ven- eration of all impartial or youthful minds, and made use of his power to inveigh against the axioms on which the exist- ing social system depended, could no longer be allowed free play. We must not depreciate the intrinsic importance of the question which was thus brought forward. It is the question whether the legislative power should not originate in some- thing better than the authority of popular leaders or a major- ity of the people. In the latter case law itself appeared as a mere act of power, and on that account could not be regarded as unconditionally binding ; while beyond existing forms there lay the idea of a state grounded on wisdom and insight, which could not be made dependent on the support of the masses, and still less on the fortune of the lot. The manner in which laws are to be passed is the weightiest problem that can be laid before any administration. When, therefore, Socrates deviated from the principles which underlay the de- mocracy, he incurred the hatred of the democratic leaders — a hatred which, regarded from the point of view of the existing state, was not without its justification. He was brought to trial by a man named Anytus, who had taken part in the re-estab- lishment of the republic under Thrasybulus, and two literary comrades — a poet, who undertook to conduct the prosecution, and a rhetorician. It is quite possible that the influence which Socrates had obtained over a son of Anytus was at the root of the latter' s animosity. The philosopher was declared to be a perverter of youth, a person who not only despised the old gods, but endeavored to introduce the worship of new. There was just this much in support of the charge, that Socrates refused credit to those portions of the mythology which attributed human passions to the gods, and spoke of his daemon in a way which made his own conscience the reposi- tory of absolute truth. In the fate of Socrates there is some- thing deeply tragic. The free and imposing development with which he identified himself, true and noble as it was, brought him into collision with the dominant tendencies which were at work on the restoration of the state. In him sentiments common to mankind came into conflict with a SOCRATES. 329 passing phase of patriotism, and his idea of the deity clashed with the established religion of the state. Socrates had devoted his life before all things to his native city; he had never left Athens except when some military expedition in which he had to take part carried him beyond her walls. He was now convinced that Athens was no place for him. lie saw that he must perish, and hand over the maintenance and development of his doctrines to other men and to happier circumstances. His daemon warned him not to oppose the sentence which was about to be pronounced against him. There was, indeed, great truth in the claim he made that he should be allowed to dine in the Prytaneum at the public expense. He was worthy of that reward, but to grant it would have been to deny the absolute validity of those very principles which his judges were most eager to proclaim. There can be no doubt that Socrates was innocent ; he was not attacked on the score of his actions, but on the score of his opinions, and these were the noblest that had yet found expression in Athens, and were based on a profound acquaint- ance with the nature of man. It was to the honor of Athens that this appeal to the source of irrefragable truth that exists in the breast of every intelligent human being was made within her walls. But she could not tolerate the appeal, for it was antagonistic to the political restoration which was then in progress, and to this restoration Socrates fell a victim. As for himself, he suffered nothing that he would have regarded as a misfortune. He had passed the age of seventy years;* he had lived his life, and fulfilled the task to which he felt himself called ; and he swallowed the fatal hemlock without a pang. 9. Plato and Aristotle. By the death of Socrates a gulf was placed between those * So, at least, says Plato (" Apol." p. 17), whom I would rather trust on such a point than Apollodorus. The latter places the birth of Socrates in the month Thargelion, in the year 468. Socrates died in the month Thargelion, in the year 399, under the archonship of Laches, so that, ac- cording to the ordinary calculation, he had just entered upon his seven- tieth year, which does not agree with what Plato says. 330 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. philosophical speculations which tended towards a positive but intellectual form of faith and the idolatrous religion of the state. The state set itself to oppose every attempt to popularize the new ideas, but philosophy was fortunately al- lowed to continue its own development. As the ancient fable puts it, there sprang from the breast of Socrates a swan — the bird of Apollo. This swan was Plato. The Sophists were foreigners in Athens; Socrates belonged to the poorer class of citizens; but Plato sprang from one of the most distinguished families in the state, a family that traced its descent from the last of the kings. Critias, who passed for a pupil of Socrates, was a near relation of Plato's mother, and one of Plato's brothers fell at the side of Critias in the fight with Thrasybulus. At the time when that con- flict came to a close Plato was already a pupil in the school of Socrates, whose society lie enjoyed for a period of ten years. If Anytus, as a democrat, reproached Socrates with having ruined his son, the aristocratic famil} r of Plato were probably of the opposite opinion. Plato was thus enabled to attach himself with all his heart to the great master of logic and of ethics. After the death of Socrates he considered it advisable to leave Athens. He betook himself first to Mega- ra, where Euclcides was endeavoring to combine the Socratic method with the views of the Eleatic school, and then to Ky- rene, where he found a friend of that school engaged in the study of mathematical science. Thence he went to Southern Italy, where the doctrines and discipline of Pythagoras still produced men like Archytas, who obtained such influence in Tarentum as to control the issues of peace and war. In his zest for travelling Plato somewhat resembled Herodotus. We are assured that he even went to Egypt, to make himself ac- quainted with the ancient wisdom of the priests of Amnion, and that he intended to explore the doctrines of the Persian Magi, had he not been hindered by the outbreak of war. In Plato the philosophical opinions of the contemporary world were reflected, as Herodotus reflected its historical recollec- tions, but he allowed nothing to seduce him from the idealism of Socrates. In Plato's life the three gradations of apprenticeship, travel, PLATO. 331 and teaching may be clearly distinguished.* On his return to Athens he was strongly advised to enter upon a political career, to which his noble birth would have insured him im- mediate admission. But the fate of Socrates had made it clear that genuine philosophical conviction was incompatible with political activity. He therefore rejected all such propo- sals, and devoted his life to the development of philosophical doctrine. He lived in his own house, close by the Academus, a garden adorned with monuments of the gods and heroes, overshadowed with noble plane-trees, and thickly planted with the native olive, whose origin was supposed to be divine. Here his pupils collected round him in much the same way as they had once collected round the Sophists, and with them he discussed the conflict which his teacher had carried on with antagonistic systems and opinions. His works are the record of these scientific discussions. They are conversations in which Socratic views are maintained against all comers, and developed in a ceaseless conflict of logic. In this home he read and wrote and worked, till at length, in advanced old age, but with all his powers unimpaired, he was overtaken by the common fate of man. One tradition declares that he breathed his last in the midst of a. joyous feast ; another, that he died in the act of writing, his stylus in his hand. It is no mere accident that Plato's writings are in the form of dialogues; they were taken directly from the life. Dia- logue brings to view the inner processes of the mind; it throws light, as it were, upon the very growth of thought. One is struck, in reading the dialogues of Plato, by the har- mony of form and matter, the union of happy invention and appropriate expression. In a word, they are the work of a great writer. No one has ever more clearly shown the per- manent value of careful and correct composition. It does not come within the scope of this work to trace the development of that system which all subsequent genera- tions have striven to fathom and to understand. We can only * I purposely omit Plato's residence in Sicily and his adventures there. The facts themselves are doubtful, and a detailed examination would not be in place here. 332 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. touch upon the connection of Plato's thoughts with those questions of universal interest which agitated the intellect of (Greece. The theological problem, which occupied the atten- tion of all Greek poets and thinkers, rests upon the assump- tion of a conflict between the primary forces of nature and the Olympian gods. The gods exist, as the heroes exist ; the gods rule the universe, and the universe is subject to their laws. But they are to be regarded, as we have already seen in Herodotus, rather as active powers than as divine beings: the true essence of the divine does not make its appearance in them : they are subject to fate. The primary forces, which have a moral as well as physical importance, exist apart from them, and in conflict with them. Herodotus is far from de- nying the existence of the gods, but when the truly divine is in question he always takes refuge in the mysteries. Pin- dar rejects all that is immoral and unseemly in the legends of the gods. Sophocles resembles him in refusing to believe that the gods are ever to be found in opposition to what is right. In Euripides, on the contrary, all that is reprehensible in the legends of the gods is brought forward without reserve. ./Eschylus and Herodotus have a profounder insight into this contradiction than any other authors. The most important point in .Eschylus is the view that man himself belongs to the primeval world, and supported by the primary forces of nature as opposed to the gods, wins his way to the free culti- vation of his physical and intellectual powers. In this anal- }'sis, then, the existence of a something essentially divine is assumed, and it is this of which philosophical discussion aims at forming an ideal conception. Plato, in common with Pindar and Herodotus, combats the view of the gods which we find in Homer and Hesiod. He defines the tales about Uranus ami Cronus as "a great lie about the greatest things," and an ill-favored lie to boot. It appears to him preposterous that the gods should be supposed to engage in war and conflict with one another. If God is good, how can he do harm j If he is truth itself, how can he deceive ? Plato rejects the fables not only of epic but also of lyric poetry, according to which it is alwavs easy for a god to find a pretext for ruining men. All that one may lawfully PLATO. 333 affirm is, that the deity does what is right and good, and that when an)' one is chastised it is for his advantage. To give expression to these opinions was comparatively unimportant, for they already carried conviction to the minds of thought- ful and independent men, but how to defend them against the analytical doctrines of the Sophists was a problem which demanded immediate solution. Plato introduces us to all the most famous Sophists. Some- times he exerts himself to annihilate the dogmatism and tine speeches of some particular opponent. For instance, in the " Protagoras," which may be regarded' as the easiest and most graceful introduction to Platonic views, the peculiar proposi- tions of that philosopher are overthrown, and on their ruins those of Plato are marshalled in splendid array. At other times he attacks the sophistic method in general. In the " Euthydemus," for example, Dionysodorus is made to refute himself by successive affirmations and denials, and the sophis- tic trick of embarrassing an opponent by using the same word in different senses is exposed in all its hollowness. A closer analysis of the dialogues in their bearing on the sophistic method of the day brings out with ever-increasing clearness what particular antagonist Plato had in view on each occasion. lie sometimes combines several different opinions; and, while appearing to desert one in favor of the other, aims at the de- struction of both. He not only attacks simultaneously Pro- tagoras, Gorgias, and the sophistic followers of Parmenides, but he refutes Ileracleitus with the arguments of Empedocles, and Empedocles with the arguments of Ileracleitus.* The opinions, however, which are thus attacked are not treated as personal, but as universal, errors. In the " Thea^tetus" Plato refutes certain views which reappeared in full force and activ- ity in the eighteenth century. On the one hand the commonplace notions about gods and things divine are rejected, on the other the schemes of philoso- phers opposed to these notions are overthrown. Between the two, now attaching itself to one side, now to the other, rises the intelligent mind, the one Being that thinks and is. This is * Comp. Cousin, Introduction to the Lysis, " CEuvres de Platon," iv. 22. 334 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. wry plain, for example, in the "Sophist.'* In this dialogue, in the course of his examination of the sophistic method, Plato c< Miics upon the idea of I'eing and Not-being. Difference he deduces from the movements of Not-being. Movement pro- duces species, so that something arises which partakes of Being, which is and yet is not Being. Plato does not think it alto- gether a mistake to declare all to be one, as many persons do, sineo things in general may be regarded as one and yet are many. To elucidate the relation of unity and multiplicity is a problem not only of great general interest, but of supreme importance for any metaphysical system. In this relation lies something divine. It might be said that Prometheus stole this thought together with the fire from heaven. An idea is unity in multiplicity: it is real Being in every respect: there can be even an idea of ideas. To know is to seize the idea : ideas are the realities of the universe. By means of this one thought, a thousand times repeated, stated, inculcated, the world comes to have a lofty intellectual purport, with which the thinking mind stands in immediate relation. It would, Recording to Plato, be impossible to combat false notions about the gods, if the idea of good was not forthcoming as a standard by which to test them. There is an apposite remark on this subject in the "Euthyphron," to the effect that the holy is not holy because it is loved of the gods, but is loved of the gods because it is holy. Plato docs not express any opinion on the question how far the gods really exist; but not nn frequently, and especially where he is speaking of public institutions, as, for instance, in the " Laws," he expressly recognizes their existence. It is only the mythical notions of popular superstition that he ab- solutely rejects. If we recall the conflict of opinion between Herodotus and Thukydides, we find Plato siding with the lat- ter, although he is superior in that his views collectively form one universal philosophical system. The idea of good is the deepest foundation of being and thought. Plato seems to have conceived of it as spirit, but not as absolutely self-deter- mined.* The divine he describes as immutable, truthful, ♦Brandis, "Handbuch dor Qeschichte in griechisch-rSmischen Phi- losophic"".^.-:. 1,216.841. PLATO AND ARISTOTLE. 335 blissful, just, free from envy, and having no part or lot with evil.* In the "Timams" God appears as ruler of the universe. Ideas are associated, but not directly, with Becoming. Time, in its course, which controls Becoming, is only a copy of eternity. The transition from the idea to divine personality is nowhere, so far as I can see, explained : it is rather assumed from the existence of the gods than independently proved.f The deities of the popular faith are condensed into one living Divine Being. Following a method like this, it was impossible to do more than to place a philosophical conviction alongside of the common faith. The latter held good for the multitude, the former for the philosophic classes. Still, it was an inestimable gain that a comprehensible doctrine had been propounded, a doctrine which embraced all that was tenable in the older religious and philosophical notions, a doctrine which at once satisfied and stimulated thoughtful minds. The origin of the soul is wrapped in the same obscurity as the personal existence of the Deity. But its calling is clear: it is to recognize the idea, and to live according to it. Political rhetoric, practised by the majority as an art ena- bling its master to play a part in public affairs, is immeasura- bly inferior to the true science of politics. Such is Plato's opinion. Let us endeavor to connect with this point of view the body of thought which his great pupil and successor, Aristotle, left to posterity. Aristotle was born at Stageira, in * The passage in the "Timrcus" is well known. Some have seen in it nothing but the declaration of the author's own incompetence; to others it seems to be an ironical and almost scoffing attack upon belief in God. It is probably a declaration of incompetence, with a tendency towards negation. t Such is the opinion of Zeller ("Die Philosophic der Gricchcn," ii. 1, p. COO). " Plato," says he, " nowhere attempts to combine these religious notions more accurately with his scientific ideas, and to prove their com- patibility." Ilcgel (" Vorlesungen iibcr die Gesch. der Philos." ii. 259) says, " When God was only the Good, lie was only a name, not yet self- determining and self-determined." I adduce these quotations, which agree with my views, as an excuse for venturing to give the results of my own studies of the works of Plato. 336 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. Chalkidike, one of that group of Greek colonies which are scat- tered over the frontier of Thrace and Makedonia. For many years he enjoyed the society of Plato, and was a pupil in his school ; he was a warm adherent of the idealistic philosophy developed by Plato from the teaching of Socrates ; his ad- miration for Plato is evident throughout his works. With- out Plato Aristotle would have been impossible. Nevertheless the pupil is not seldom in opposition to the master, and it is on these occasions that his work is most im- portant. The difference between them began on a decisive point. Plato had assumed that primary matter was without beginning, but had been set in order at a certain time by the Deity. Aristotle disputed this assumption in one of his ear- liest works, on the ground that no conception can be formed of the Deity without presupposing an order of the world. He assumed the eternity of the world, of the human race as com- prised therein, but he held that mankind had passed through various stages of development, and thus might even be said to have had several beginnings. He too, like his master, re- garded the Deity as the quintessence of all perfection, but avoided the objection to which Plato, in not completely identi- fying the idea of good with the Deity, had laid himself open. His philosophy, in fact, rests on a union of the dialectic of Socrates with the views of Anaxagoras. The God of Plato and Aristotle is simply the Nous of Anaxagoras, Reason en- dowed with being, whom they regard, however, as the creator of the universe. The religious and poetical vein of Plato is not to be found in Aristotle : he remains ever secure on his intellectual heights. He hardly thinks it worth while even to mention the anthropomorphic conceptions of the Deity to which popular faith still clung, and which Plato combated. "With him the Deity is but the object of reverence and adoration. Aristotle did not aim at giving an exhaustive description of the kingdoms of nature : he rather sought to explain them with reference to his doctrine of the soul. His observations on nature are an introduction to all scientific physiology, and cannot be read without admiration. Equally important is his exposition of the difference between man and other living PLATO'S REPUBLIC. 337 creatures. His remarks about the distinction between active and passive reason, of which the former, autonomous, semi- divine, and therefore immortal, is alone to be regarded as true, are, in my opinion, the best that could have been made, revelation alone excepted. The same, if I am not mistaken, might be said of Plato's doctrine of the soul. The doctrine of the substantiality and immortality of the soul was so far developed by him that no philosopher of later times has been able to add anything to it. "With the religious intensity peculiar to him, Plato directed his gaze upon the future beyond the grave and upon the soul in itself. The soul appears at last, stripped of all that could ob- scure its essential nature, before the judge, who, no longer in danger of deception through eye and ear, beholds, as a spirit, the spirit as it really is. Thus we can measure the depths and heights of human knowledge of divine things in the works of these two philoso- phers. Their doctrines cannot be regarded as simply belong- ing to them alone : they are the product of the reflective power of a whole epoch, which has since then been revived at intervals, and has made its appearance in the greatest literary productions of all ages. What they offer us is not a fully de- veloped doctrine, but a series of the most elevated thoughts. The views of these two philosophers with regard to prac- tical life, and their relations to one another in this respect, are of especial interest. Once severed from the bonds of con- temporary politics, Plato explored all the more eagerly the conditions of an ideal polity. He has left us two ideals of the state. The one, which he develops in the "Laws," is based upon a system of originally equal allotments of land. This equality has to be rigidly maintained, for to inequality and the wish to grow rich Plato attributes all evil passions. The anger of the gods should be invoked by means of sacrifices on the head of those who buy or sell. The second of Plato's schemes, the most important and truly ideal of the two, is ex- pounded in the "Kepublic," repeated in the "Timosus," and maintained in other books. It is based on a community of goods. Its chief object is to provide a system embodying the idea of justice and holiness, and possessed of an authority 22 338 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE. which shall "enable mankind fully to subdue the hundred- headed beast that dwells with men." The Republic of Plato is not a vague ideal only. It implies the most decided opposition to existing political systems, and especially to the republic of Athens. From such systems as these the philosopher should, as far as possible, cut himself adrift. The principle on which the Athenian constitution depended — namely, that the possession of land and the right to trade and make gain entail the duty of aiding in the na- tional defence — was radically opposed by Plato, who wished to exclude the agricultural and trading classes from the use of arms. This right is reserved for a distinct class, designated guardians, that is to say, warriors, whose actions are to be entirely under the control of their commanders. The com- manders themselves are to be philosophers, that is to say, men who aim at nothing but the common good of all and the per- fecting of the individual. It may perhaps be said that prin- ciples, in the abstract identical with these, formed the ground- work of that political system which in the Middle Ages held universal sway in Europe. That system combined a subject population with a higher class alone possessing the right of hearing arms, under a government in which the idea of the divine was prominent, and which set itself to raise mankind to the level of that idea. In Plato there is the same close al- liance between monarchy and priesthood which for centuries held dominion over the world. In the second book of the "Republic" the subject of edu- cation is treated. It is only the guardians Avhose culture is discussed ; but this may be accidental. The chief principle insisted on is that the Deity should be represented as good and true, not as deceitful and mischievous, not only because such statements arc false, but because they ruin the youthful soul that hears them. In the demand that the divine should rule, not only in the individual soul, but also in public life, may be discerned a distant approach to the hierarchical ideas of later times. The substantiality of the soul, immortality, the corrupting influence of the world, and the possibility of purification hereafter lead on to the Christian idea, whose sway succeeded that of Plato. In both the soul is related to ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS. 339 that which is divine and eternal. The thousand years' wan- dering reminds one on the one hand of Egyptian conceptions, and on the other of the "Divina Oommedia" of Dante. The changes of historical epochs appear first of all in the mind of the philosopher who has emancipated himself from the dominion of the outward forms of life around him. Aris- totle held an acknowledged sway over the philosophic minds of the Middle Ages. Bnt in respect of the ideals which men set before them in ordinary life, his influence was far less powerful than that of Plato. The latter leads us away from the existing world : the former leads us back to it and recog- nizes the conditions which it implies. Aristotle's conception of the state is far more realistic than that of Plato. He even disapproves of so complete a withdrawal from politics as that in which Plato lived, and holds, on the contrary, that a share in political life is indispensable to intellectual development. lie brings into prominence those conditions of political power which are neglected by Plato — for instance, the advantages of a maritime position in respect of trade and commerce — while lie accepts the most important bases of civic life, which Plato entirely rejects. According to Aristotle the state cannot dis- pense with the family, in which everything has to give way to the father's will. lie even recognizes slavery as a neces- sity. He condemns the custom according to which the Greeks made slaves of their conquered compatriots, on the ground that all Greeks are originally equal ; but he allows that nature itself has destined one half of mankind to subjection, and the other half, that which is more capable of thought, to dominion. Without slaves domestic life seems to him impracticable ; and without domestic life no state can exist. Thus all Plato's ideals vanish away. Aristotle combats Plato's views on the necessity of an equal division of land with the acute observa- tion that, in that case, the number of children must always correspond with the number of parents, which is impossible. He is still more strongly opposed to the community of goods, on the ground that this would deprive mankind of the incen- tive to labor which is supplied by the desire to possess prop- erty and to transfer it to others. lie points out further that disputes would not be avoided by such means, for it is well 840 PHILOSOPHY ami LITERATURE, known that among those who have common possession of any pro pert v disputes are the rule. While thus holding fast the principles which are the basis of all political life, Aristotle fixes his eyes mainly on the po litioal Bystem *>t" 1 hr existing Hellenic state. In politics, as elsewhere) his oirole of vision is wider than that of Plato. Se makes a distinction between the Greeks and the barbaric na- tions to the north and cast. A.mong the Northern barbarians, says ho, is to be touiul military oourage, which enables them to maintain their freedom: among the Eastern, adaptability and cleverness, hut a want o\' oourage, so that their freedom is not maintained. The Greeks are distinguished by the combina- tion of oourage and intellect, so that with all their intellectual aotivity they still remain free. Certain remarks on monarchy may BCOm to imply that Aristotle had the rising kingdom o( Makedonia in his eyes the toaohor o( Alexander the Great may well have held such views. But, when wo look more closely at what he says, it will be Been that the monarchy rec- ommended by Aristotlo has little in common with the Make- donian an absolute power indissolubly connected with the nation by the righl of hereditary desoent, Aristotle rejects the very quality which is the most prominent characteristic oi monarchy, namely, heredity, on the ground that the best oi monarchs may leave behind him a thoroughly worthless heir, lie approves oi monarchy only in ease the nation is unfit to govern itself. Prom this point of view the idea of aristocracy is connected with that oi monarchy. The chief point in favor oi these forms of government is that the idea oi the state can- not he grasped and represented by the masses so well as by one man or even as by a small body oi persons. The evil which Aristotle aims at remedying is the supremacy oi the democratic movement, which in his day ruled far and wide in Greece. Ele disapproves oi despotism, ami is careful to dis- tinguish it from monarchy ; but it appears to him a still greater evil that the people should be seduced by demagogues into illegal acts; for on such occasions, says he, demagogues be- come the minions oi the populace. Nevertheless the basis on which everything rests is, accord- ing to Aristotle, the community. The community has con- AK1SIOTLK. 841 trol of peaoe and war. Office is not to be conferred by lot, but those persons are to bo preferred who are fitted for it by wealth or other qualifications. The members of the com- munity are not to devote themselves to agriculture or trade; their business is to defend and administer the Btate. In his Bcheme of education Aristotle will not allow gymnastics, which lit. men for the former duty, to predominate, but gives equal prominence to music. Music is the very language oi' the emotions, and impresses itself on the temperamenl for life. l>ut it is only good for education; the full-grown man must, never practise it ; he is to devote himself with all his heart to public affairs. Here we find Plato and Aristotle again in agreement. The grand aim of both philosophers is the forma- tion of a sapient spirit, at once desirous and Capable of exer- cising power for the common good. The elementary concep- tions on which their scheme is based are identical in their origin and form one harmonious whole- the divine spirit that rules the universe, the human being trained to intellectual activity, the supremacy of the wise within the state. Chapter IX. RELATIONS OF PERSIA AND GREECE DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE FOURTH CENTURY B.C. Was the development of ideas which we have traced in the previous chapter strong enough to maintain itself against the material forces that threatened it with destruction ? The importance of the answer to this question must be evident at the very first glance. It is characteristic of the age that, while the great minds of Greece were opening out new ways for the future life of all mankind, the Grecian states wasted their strength in separate and individual efforts. The idea of na- tionality found no one to represent it. Even the great con- test with Persia, which hitherto had kept alive the national feeling of Greece, was no longer maintained. The voice of opposition was not altogether silenced; on the contrary, it still gave forth at intervals a resonant and vigorous note. But the concluding events of the Peloponnesian war made it clear that this feeling no longer exercised any real influence. The centre of the forces that moved the world lay, it must he allowed, in the alliance between the Persian monarchy, as it appeared in Asia Minor, and the Lakedamionian power, as developed through the struggle with Athens. The most powerful men of the day were Cyrus the Younger, who rep- resented the Acluvmenida* in Asia Minor, and Lysander, who was employed in overthrowing democracies wherever he found them, and in setting up oligarchies of the Lakcdamionian type. All that happened is to be traced to their initiative. The forces of the Lakedaunonians and their allies by land and sea worked in harmony with the Persian gold which supplied their equipment. The vitality possessed by this combination was derived from the fact that the Persian satraps and the mercenary states of Greece were indispensable to each other. CYRUS AND ARTAXERXES. 343 But in other respects the alliance was fleeting and insecure, for neither Cyrus nor Lysander was master of the situation in his own country. The latter had many enemies in Sparta, and still more in the rest of Greece : the former was subject to the orders of the Great King, who naturally followed his own interests. It was an undertaking of the widest import when Cyrus the Younger resolved to place himself, by the aid of Grecian arms, on the throne of Persia. A pretext was found in a point left unsettled by the constitutional law of that country. It was matter of dispute whether the right of succession be- longed to the eldest son, or to the son born first after his father's accession to the throne. The accession of Xerxes had been decided by the fact that he was born during the reign of Darius. On similar grounds, when Darius Nothus died, Cyrus the Younger, the only son born during his fa- ther's reign, claimed the preference over his brother Arta- xerxes. On this occasion, as before, the queen was for the younger brother, but could not bring her consort over to his side. Artaxerxes, surnamed Mnemon, became king; Cyrus was appointed satrap of Lydia and the regions that bordered on the sea.'- It was no ordinary satrapy which thus fell to the lot of the king's son : he was described in his father's edict as Karanos, that is, Lord or Sovereign, a special title such as was not unfrequently conferred upon satraps related to the royal house. But Cyrus was not contented with this honor. He considered himself, in virtue of his personal qual- ities, more capable than his brother of filling the post of king. Artaxerxes, we are told, was of a gentle nature, a lover of peace, of genial and placable disposition — a character, in fact, well suited to the representative of Ormuzd. Cyrus, on the other hand, was ambitious, adventurous, and warlike — a sol- dier after the manner of those Greek mercenaries whom he attracted in considerable numbers to his flair. * The words of Plutarch (Artax. 2), 6 TrptafivrtpoQ airedeix d 1 PaeiXevg, 'Apra&p&g pETOVopaaOeig, Kvpog 8k AvSiag oarpcnriiQ *«< rwv Itti 0a\ac7»'or was this all. The gravest anxiety was felt in Sparta when Athens began to recover herself, and to set about the restoration of her ancient maritime supremacy. In this double catastrophe the Lake* daunonians felt that their very existence was at stake, and a complete revolution in their policy was the result. There had always been a party in Sparta which disapproved the Mar with Persia. This party now bestirred itself again. Its mem- bers declared that the only escape from the troubles in which the state was involved lay in peace with Persia, since all the misfortunes which they had experienced were due to the breach with the king. Antalkidas, the leader of this party, had attached himself to Lysander, and maintained his princi- ples throughout all the recent troubles. His persistence at length obtained a hearing, and he was sent first to Asia Minor, and then to the Persian court at Susa, in order to restore peace. The conditions which were found satisfactory and accepta- ble to both sides deserve examination. The most important of them was that which concerned the division of power be- tween Sparta and Persia. After the turn which naval affairs had taken, Sparta could no longer maintain the authority which she had won on the coasts of Asia Minor and in the Archipelago. On the contrary, the danger was that the supremacy in those districts might pass into the hands of her foes, especially of Athens, now fast recovering her position. It was therefore to the interest of Sparta herself that the supremacy should be restored to the Great King. For Persia this was an enormous gain. The maritime districts, which PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS. 35 1 for years had been the object of continuous war, became hers without any exertion on her part, simply in consequence of the mutual rivalries of the Greeks. The complications in Cyprus caused some difficulty, but since the Athenians had won the upper hand here as elsewhere, the Spartans without much hesitation resolved to acquiesce in the restoration of Persian dominion in Cyprus. In one point only they showed some respect for Athens. It will be remembered that the Athenian dominion over Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros was of very ancient date. Accordingly, as her consent was wanted for the peace, it was thought well to leave Athens in posses- sion of the three islands. But all the Greek towns in Asia Minor were to be under the Great King. In a word, the prizes for which Greece and Persia had struggled so long were given up by Lakedsemon to her ancient enemy, and care was taken that no other party should be able to claim them for some time to come. But this was only one side of the peace. Lakcdamion, see- ing herself thwarted and endangered by the close alliance be- tween Argos and Corinth, and by the fairly compact power of Thebes, obtained from the Great King the decision that all towns in Greece should be autonomous. In this direction the ideas of Brasidas had long ago pointed, and Sparta had declared the independence of the colonies and subject districts to be the principle for which she took the field. The revolu- tion which had proved impracticable on the earlier occasion, Sparta now endeavored to carry out over a wider area. It was not, however, Athens that was aimed at, for her league had not been re-established, but Thebes, which exercised a supremacy over the confederation of free Boeotian cities, of which she was the head. This supremacy could no longer be suffered to exist. In its suppression the Great King was in- terested, for it was only from such confederations that danger to the newly established state of things could arise, but the chief gain was on the side of Sparta, which would thus be enabled to get rid of a dangerous rival to her power. She persuaded the Great King to threaten with active hostility any state that should oppose the arrangement just concluded. Strange complications of policy ! Lakedimnon, with the sup- 352 PERSIA AND GREECE. port of Persian gold, had overthrown Athens. Then, when the dispute between Sparta and Persia occurred, it was main- ly through the exertions of Athens that forces were brought into the field against the former, to cope with which her strength proved insufficient. To avoid the destruction that was impending, Sparta again appealed to Persia for aid. In this way the decisive voice in the affairs of Greece came to be that of the Great King and his satraps in Asia Minor. lie now allied himself with Lakedsemon, in order to introduce a system into Greece which should render hopeless any attempt to build up a compact political union. In order to save her- self, LakedflBUQOn was willing to see the rest of Greece de- stroyed. \'y the first article of the peace the immediate do- minion of Persia was widened to no small extent. By the second, Persia obtained a sort of suzerainty over Greece. This was the upshot of the Peace of Antalkidas (387 B.C.). The power of the Greeks in Asia was thereby given up, and a system of extreme decentralization was established in Hellas itself. Sparta, however, and Sparta alone, retained her ancient preponderance. At first all seemed to go well. No sooner did the Spartans perform the usual sacrifices on the frontier, preparatory to an invasion of the Theban territory, than the Thebans found themselves obliged to surrender their authority over Bceotia. The Spartans followed up this stroke by warning the Corin- thians to expel the Argivc garrison from their city, and the Argives to withdraw their forces. Thereupon the garrison retired, and the exiled aristocrats were enabled to return. Lastly, Mantineia was compelled to dissolve its union; the inhabitants thenceforward lived, as before, in villages. The Spartans everywhere took up the cause of the weaker party, for instance, that of Platsea in Bceotia, and of Pisa in Elis. All who belonged to this category thus became their friends. They re-established the Peloponnesian League, and ruled over it unopposed. But with one city, namely, Thebes, the peace was by no means secure, and here it was that a rising took place which proved fatal to the Spartan power. "We come to that page of history on which the names of Thebes and Epa- meinondas arc most prominently inscribed. LEONTIADES AND TIICEBIDAS. 353 In Thebes the oligarchs and democrats, under their respec- tive leaders, were engaged in a deadly struggle. A Spartan army under the command of Phoebidas, destined to carry out the stipulations of the peace in Chalkidike, passed by the city. This gave the oligarchs their opportunity. At the invitation of their leader, Leontiades, who wished to gain the support of Sparta, Phoebidas surprised and occupied the citadel of the Cadmeia.* It is not necessary to assume that he had direct commands from Sparta to undertake this enterprise. Agesi- laus once remarked that a general was not forbidden to act occasionally on his own initiative ; the only point was whether his act was expedient or not. Now nothing could have ap- peared more expedient than the seizure of the citadel of Thebes. That citadel formed a strong position on the great road to the north, and Leontiades had expressly proposed that, so soon as the oligarchy should be restored in Thebes, the Thebans should unite with the Spartans. Phcebidas himself is described to us as an ambitious man, desirous of distinguish- ing himself, but lacking in real caution. The result of the event was what nright have been foreseen. The democrats, expelled by the victorious oligarchs, found refuge in Athens, as Thrasybulus on a former occasion had found refuge in Thebes. Some } r ears, however, elapsed be- fore they were able to return. At length, aided by their ac- quaintances in the city, they came back, and, with mingled ferocity and cunning, rid Thebes of the Polemarchs who ruled her.f This event brought prominently forward the two men * Curtius places the occurrence in 01. 00, 2 = 483 B.C., Clinton in 01. 99,3. t Plutarch, in the " Life of Pelopidas, ,, chaps. 7-12, and in the treatise on the Daemon of Socrates, gives a detailed narrative of this event, which it is impossible to read without interest. I confess that I can sec in Lis story nothing hut a romantic and highly colored account of a simple event. "What Xenophon tells us is no doubt the truth, and even he found different versions of the story already in existence. The simplest of these is perhaps contained in the words " wr Kuifiarrrur tlnkSavras rove ifubl MiXujva airoKTUvat tovq TroXffjLapxovc " (Xen. "Hell." V. 4, 7). That there was a banquet is certain ; whether the murderers really introduced themselves in the guise of women is very doubtful ; as for the rest of the story, I cannot bring myself to believe it. The event took place in 01. 23 354 PERSIA AND GREECE. whose names are imperishably linked with that of Thebes, Pelopidas and Epameinondas. The former led the returning democrats, the latter prepared the Theban youth to aid them in their attempt when the decisive moment should arrive. Epameinondas was descended from a family which traced its origin to the times of Cadmus, a family of limited means, but widely known for hospitality. Among others a disciple of Pythagoras, whose school had been dispersed in all direc- tions, just then sought refuge in Thebes, and became an in- mate of the house. Epameinondas, in his youth, took part in all that Hellenic education demanded, but grew up princi- pally under the care of this old philosopher, whose instruc- tion he preferred to every other amusement. Under him he probably acquired a habit for which he was much com- mended, the habit, that is, of listening with self-restraint and attention to every one who spoke to him, and of withholding his objections till the speaker had concluded his remarks. His was one of those characters in which moderation and temperance, prudence and self-respect, a quiet and thoughtful judgment, seem to be innate. Such qualities cannot fail to impress all who come in contact with them, and to secure for their possessor a certain moral authority. Epameinondas was so poor that he is said to have been obliged to remain at home when his cloak was at the fuller's, but the uprightness which he showed in all positions of trust procured for him, espe- cially in the conduct of financial affairs, a leading position. The excesses of Boeotian festivity had no attraction for him. He was so taciturn that one of his friends remarked he was acquainted with no one who knew so much and said so little : but what he said was so much to the point as to become proverbial. In his military exercises he paid attention, not so much to the development of bodily strength as to activity and the proper use of weapons. He is said to have bidden the young men about him not to take credit for their strength, but rather to count it shame that they tamely endured the do- minion of the Lakcdeemonians in spite of their own superior- 100, 2, in the winter of the year 379 B.C. (Plutarch, " Pelopidas," chap. 2 : cf. Xen. " Hell." v. 4, 14). PELOPIDAS AND EPAMEINONDAS. 355 ity. Even a narrow and exclusive patriotism can give birth to feelings of enthusiasm, provided that it summon the tradi- tions of a glorious past to aid it in shaking off the opprobrium of the present. Such patriotism is fostered by rivalry with neighboring states, especially when the latter are of overpow- ering strength. The splendid personal qualities of Epamei- nondas, his culture, his zeal in gymnastic exercises, his mili- tary talents, his generalship, so inventive and original as to amount to genius, shone with peculiar lustre owing to the fact that, before all things, he was a good Theban. Pelopidas, though belonging to a wealthy and distinguished family, attached himself closely to Epameinondas. Through his friendship Epameinondas was, as it were, raised to an equality with the class to which Pelopidas belonged. On one occasion Epameinondas refused to leave Pelopidas when grievously wounded, determined that at any rate the enemy should not have his corpse. He made use of the influence gained by such devotion to draw his friend over to his views. In the undertaking through which Thebes was freed Pelopi- das was the most prominent figure. But his success would not have been permanent had not the youth of Thebes been brought up under the influence of Epameinondas, and pre- pared to take advantage of the occasion. In circumstances where the general interests of Hellas were at stake, Greek patriotism was seldom active. It was promi- nent where the interests of separate states were concerned ; and among the states of Greece Thebes was not unimportant. She could claim to be regarded as the third city of Hellas, and it was due to the efforts of these two friends that this claim became a reality. On the department of military af- fairs they bestowed the most attentive study. War was now becoming a science and an art, and from Agesilaus himself, in his repeated invasions of Boeotia, they are said to have learned much. Their primary object was to overthrow the autonomy established by the Peace of Antalkidas. They re- covered their hold upon Platsea, and in a short time we find the Bceotarchs reappearing as Theban officials. Plutarch relates a conversation between Epameinondas and Agesilaus, which sets clearly before us the importance of this 356 PERSIA AND GREECE. dispute. To the question whether Thebes would leave the cities of Boeotia free, Epameinondas answered with the ques- tion whether Sparta would give the Messenians their freedom. The weapon which the Peace of Antalkidas had placed in the hands of Sparta was thereby turned against Sparta herself. The question could only be decided by an appeal to arms. The Thebans knew well how to develop the tendency to comradeship which was common to all Greeks, and is based upon personal honor ; and the result was the Sacred Band. The Spartan hoplites found their match in the Theban infan- try, while to the Theban cavalry they had nothing to oppose. The Spartan king, Cleombrotus, stung by the suspicion of leanings towards Thebes, determined upon battle under the excitement of a banquet. The Thebans had the advantage of a leader in Epameinondas, whose cool judgment enabled him to take advantage of every opportunity. On the plain of Leuctra the Spartans were, for the first time in history, completely defeated (July 7 or 8, b.c. 371). In the two Theban leaders, as we have seen, there throbbed a pulse for the greatness of their state, which urged them, even against the will of their fellow-countrymen, to the bold- est efforts. The year after the battle they undertook, chiefly at the invitation of the Peloponnesians, an invasion of Laconia. In this attempt it would appear that they exceeded their pow- ers, for in the army there were many who raised their voices against the campaign. This, however, only spurred them to greater exertions, in order to anticipate a change of feeling which might force them to give way to leaders whose opin- ions differed from their own. The allies joined forces at Sel- lasia, and marched down the valley of the Eurotas. The Spar- tan ladies were horror-struck when they beheld the smoke of burning villages driving over the plain. Agesilaus is said to have been unable to conceal his admiration when he saw Epameinondas, but it was due to his courageous resistance that the Thebans met with a rebuff at the Hippodrome in front of Sparta. This, however, did not hinder the restora- tion of Messenia. To the music of Argive and Boeotian flutes a new city arose on Ithome, the scene of Messenian exploits in days of old. The Perioeki and Helots, whom it was no ATTITUDE OF ATHENS. 357 longer possible to distinguish from Messenians, were admitted to all the privileges of the latter. This done, Pelopidas and Epameinondas returned to Thebes, and were actually brought to trial for acting without orders. "Let us then set up a column," said Epameinondas, "with an inscription that I was condemned because I compelled you to conquer at Leuctra ; because I made all Greece free in one day ; because I restored Messenia, and surrounded Sparta with a perpetual blockade." In words like these we see that lofty self-respect which in later times has been regarded as a dis- tinctive feature of the Roman character. At this time everything in Greece depended on the attitude of Athens. It appeared to be her interest, at a crisis so disas- trous to Sparta, to form an alliance with the enemies of her ancient foe. A popular assembly was held, in which the Athenians were reminded of the wrongs which they had re- peatedly suffered at the hands of Spartans, and of the con- stant efforts of Sparta to undermine the greatness of Athens. But these times were long past, and even a popular assembly can pass resolutions in which passion has no part. In Athens the ancient hate of Sparta gave way before a new-born jeal- ousy of Thebes. The Athenians felt that if they made com- mon cause with the Thebans to crush Lakedsemo'n, their own destruction at the hands of the former would be the speedy and certain consequence. They therefore resolved to support the Lakeda?monians with all their force, a step which at once checked the progress of Thebes. In the conflict that arose, it was a matter of no small moment that Sparta still possessed the benefit of Persian aid. An envoy of the Phrygian satrap, Ariobarzanes, appeared at Delphi. His primary object was to establish a compromise. This failing, he made use of the money with which he was abundantly provided, to raise an army of mercenaries in aid of Sparta. In this manner an al- liance was formed between Persia, Athens, and Sparta, which seemed calculated to restore the prestige of Sparta, so griev- ously shaken by Thebes. To escape destruction, the Thebans hit upon the idea of claiming Persian help for themselves (368-7 b.c). Such reversals of policy had already taken place in Greek history. A similar step had been taken by 358 PERSIA AND GREECE. Athens during the Peloponnesian war, and by Sparta in the time of her greatest peril. Even Pelopidas so far overcame his pride as to seek help in person at the court of Artaxerxes. The first Persian war was not yet forgotten, and the remark of Pelopidas, that the present enemies of Thebes had been of old the most formi- dable opponents of the Great King, won him admission to the Persian court. It was, moreover, clear that the Persians would never have anything to fear from Thebes ; while, on the other hand, Athens, now in alliance with Sparta, was dis- playing a restless and dangerous activity. She had restored the ancient league of Delos. The recollection of her former greatness impelled her, as of old, towards the coast of Asia Minor, and fostered in Athenian bosoms a spirit of hostility to Persia. It might be said that the Spartans were now rather the allies of the Athenians, than Athens the ally of Sparta. It thus came about that the influence over Grecian affairs, which Persia constantly exerted herself to maintain, now en- tered upon a new phase. The king broke off his connection with Sparta, and lent a willing ear to the proposals of Pelopi- das. The Persians had hitherto rejected the Theban claim that the enactments of the Peace of Antalkidas should be ex- tended to Messenia. The king now made amends by issuing an edict that Messenia" should be recognized as independent of Sparta, while at the same time he warned the Athenian fleet to put back again into port. A Persian ambassador ac- companied Pelopidas back again to Thebes in order to prove the authenticity of this edict by showing the seal appended to it. We are not informed that the execution of the king's commands was supported by presents of money, and we may infer the contrary from the fact that the Arcadians, who had taken part in the embassy to Persia, complained of the pov- erty of the king's treasury, and declared that not even a grass- hopper could find shelter in the fabled shade of his golden plane-tree. Nevertheless, the declaration of the king, whom the Greeks were now accustomed to regard as a sort of ar- biter in their disputes, was of great importance to Thebes, and enabled her to establish an understanding with Argos and Messenia. TREATY BETWEEN PERSIA AND THEBES. 359 Tegea and a great part of Arcadia were also allied with Thebes, but another part of Arcadia, under the leadership of Mantineia, had deserted the Theban league. In order to re- cover the latter, Epameinondas again took the field. A bat- tle took place at Mantineia in which all the forces of Greece met in conflict. A final decision seemed to hang upon the event. Epameinondas displayed all the foresight and mili- tary talent peculiar to him, and was on the point of winning the day, when he was mortally wounded by an arrow. He would not allow it to be withdrawn until he had heard that the Thebans were victorious. He died as a Theban, for the independence of Thebes — we can hardly say for the inde- pendence of Hellas. By means of the recent treaty between Persia and Thebes the influence of the former upon the internal affairs of Greece was advanced a step further, and was only confirmed by the issue of the battle, the result of which, especially owing to the death of Epameinondas, was by no means decisive. Xenophon, who breaks off his history at this point, expresses an opinion that a balance of power among the Grecian cities and states still existed. Athens had been prevented by Sparta from usurping the hegemony of Hellas. Sparta had been thwarted by Athens and Thebes. Thebes was now held in check by Athens and Sparta. This state of things prevented the for- mation of a compact power, or even the union of all Grecian states in a common confederation. The more powerful states were constantly engaged in warfare with each other, and dragged the weaker into the conflict. Their only aim was to get possession of the means which enabled them to overpower their neighbors. Once accustomed to draw subsidies from abroad, the Spartans scrupled not to accept payment from those who were engaged in rebellion against the king. When the king gave judgment against them in the question of Mes- senia and formed an alliance with Thebes, the Spartans felt no further obligation towards him. It is a blot on the char- acter of Agesilaus that, after being the first to undertake a great war against the Persians, he now entered the service of a tyrant of Egypt. His assistance conferred some solidity on the Egyptian revolt, established Nectanebus on the Egyptian 3G0 PERSIA AND GREECE. throne, and confirmed the independence of Egypt for some years. A complete change in the political situation had not been contemplated by Agesilans. The chief motive of his action was the necessity under which the Spartans lay of obtaining extraneous assistance against their Hellenic neighbors. Such assistance Agesilaus provided for them. Nectanebus dis- missed him with a considerable present of money. Agesilaus died on the way home (35S e.g.), but the money which he brought with him reached Laconia, and the Spartans were again enabled to play an active part in the wars of Greece. The anti-Spartan league was still in existence, and found the support it needed in the restored power of Messenia. The warfare never ceased. Diodorus mentions five battles in one year. In the first of these the Lakcdannonians won a victory over a far more numerous body of the enemy, while in the three following battles the allies had the upper hand. The fifth, however, and the most important of all, was a victory for Lakedaeraon. An armistice was the result. We have already pointed out the danger to all Hellas in- volved in the selfishness which produced the Peace of Antal- kidas. 13 ut the state which suffered most was Sparta herself. She bled to death from the wounds which she thought to in- dict upon others. Sparta was, indeed, no longer the Sparta of Lycurgus. The introduction of the Perioeki and Helots into the army, which had lately been determined on, was at variance with his ideas. Moreover, so many of the Spartiates had fallen in the late wars that the old democratic aristocracy which they formed had no longer any vitality. Aristotle rec- ognizes only one thousand families of the ancient Spartiates ; and their landed possessions, the very groundwork of their state and its discipline, had in great measure passed into the hands of women. The time when Sparta could maintain her supremacy single-handed was gone by. Athens, at this time allied with Sparta, could on her side no longer maintain the restored naval league. When she attempted to revive her old supremacy, Chios, Rhodes, and Cos, probably with the as- sistance of the Carian despot, Mausolus, rose in rebellion against her. On the outskirts of the league, Byzantium was DECLINE IN THE POWER OF GREECE. 3G1 ill revolt. Athens was no longer strong enough to reduce the rebels to obedience. In an attack upon Chios, Chabrias perished. He might have saved himself by swimming, but held it unworthy of him to leave his ship, and preferred to die on board with arms in his hand. Chares was not the man to replace the fallen admiral, and Athens had to content her- self with retaining the smaller islands in her league. A power so mutilated was very different from that which had been once so formidable. This decay in the power of Athens and Sparta, and of Greece in general, cannot be attributed to want of energy. The science and practice of war, both by land and sea, had never been carried to a higher pitch of excellence. The gen- erals mentioned to us by name appear, without exception, to have been experienced and thoughtful commanders. But, as we have seen even in Pelopidas, they had no idea of a great confederation which could embrace all individualities. It has been already remarked that patriotic feelings were found only in connection with separatism, a national peculiarity which it has been reserved for the history of Germany to repeat. The development of military strength in individual states, and the weakness of the nation at large, were to each other as cause and effect. With the feebleness of the Greek republics the development of the mercenary system went hand in hand. Mercenaries, ready to serve any one for pay, were the only troops now worthy of the name of soldiers. At this epoch the Persian power again rose to a dangerous height. After a sanguinary and fratricidal contest, Artaxerxcs Ochus had ascended the throne of Persia (359-8 e.g.). Arta- bazus, who, as Karanos of Asia Minor, held a position supe- rior to that of an ordinary satrap, undertook to make himself independent, and, with the aid of Greek mercenaries, was at first successful in repelling the satraps sent against him. A corps of Thebans were his chief support. The king defeated the rebellious satrap by sending a sum of three hundred tal- ents to the Thebans, who thereupon deserted their employer. Artabazus was forced to flv, and took refuge with Philip, king of Makedonia. The growing power of Persia caused much anxiety to the 3G2 PERSIA AND GREECE. Greeks, and it was proposed at Athens to take the lead of the Hellenic race in a national war against the Persians. But Demosthenes, the leading orator of his time, declared himself against the proposal. He objected, and doubtless with good reason, that the Persian king, if attacked, would raise enemies against the Athenians in Greece itself and imperil the safety of Athens. Demosthenes refrained from opposing feelings so deeply rooted in the national mind as those which centred round a war with Persia, but he gave it as his opinion that Athens must first of all muster all her resources and make her- self formidable, for not till then would she find allies for the great undertaking. Regarded independently of these consid- erations, the occasion was no unfit one for attacking the Per- sians. Not only did Egypt under Nectanebus continue to maintain a hostile attitude towards the king, but just at this moment Phoenicia, too, broke out in revolt. It is not clear whether the rebellion began with a casual insurrection, or owing to a formal resolution in Tripolis. At any rate, the Phoenicians struck a close alliance with Nectanebus, and de- stroyed the pleasure-house, or paradeisos, in which the Per- sian magnates, when they visited the country, used to reside. Many Persians who had been guilty of acts of violence were murdered. The neighboring satraps were not slow in mak- ing war upon the rebels, but their attacks were repelled by the Prince of Sidon, who had summoned to his aid a strong body of Greek mercenaries from Egypt. Cyprus, too, joined the league. The nine so-called kings of the cities of Cyprus hoped, through the Phoenician insurrection, to obtain their own independence, and therefore joined in the revolt. If the Greeks had taken part in these movements the Persian power would have been exposed to great danger. Just the opposite, however, took place. The Prince of Ca- ria, summoned by Artaxerxes against Cyprus, not only col- lected a goodly fleet, but also an army, over which the Athe- nian Phokion was placed in command. Phokion had little difficulty in reducing the Cyprian princes. At this moment Ochus had brought together a great force by sea and land, with which he hoped to subdue both Egypt and Phoenicia. At sight of this army, which made as formidable an appear- 1 THE EGYPTIAN REVOLT. 363 ance as any by which the Phoenicians had been defeated on previous occasions, the Prince of Sidon lost courage. He resolved, without further scruple, to betray his allies, the Egyptians, to the king, for it was only by paying this price that he could hope for forgiveness. He sent the king secret information that he was in a position to give him the best opening for the conquest of Egypt, being on good terms with many in the country, especially with the dwellers on the coasts. Ochus is said to have hesitated for a moment, gladly as he heard these proposals, before accepting them by stretch- ing out his right hand — the form which was necessary to ren- der his acceptance valid. The envoy declared that, if this were not done, his master would consider himself released from all his promises, whereupon Artaxerxes Ochus gave the desired assurance. Sidon was betrayed to the Persians by a horrible act of treachery on the part of its own prince, who had won over the Greek mercenaries to insure success for his plan. In the midst of violence and treason the inhabitants of Sidon once again displayed the unconquerable resolution of the ancient Phoenician race. They had burned their ships in order that no one might withdraw himself by flight from the duties of defence. Now that the foe was within their walls, they shut themselves up and set fire to their houses. The number of the dead was reckoned as high as forty thou- sand. In spite of his plighted word, King Ochus put to death the prince who had betrayed his city. His death did not interfere with the campaign against Egypt, for which Ochus had already made the most extensive preparations. Special embassies were sent to demand aid of the Greek cities. Athens and Sparta promised to remain neutral. The importance of this is clear when we recollect that it was these two cities which had set up and maintained the independence of Egypt. The Thebans and the Argives were less scrupulous. They had no hesitation in sending their hoplites to help the Persians against Egypt. The Ar- gives were led by Nicostratus, a man of enormous bodily strength, who imagined himself a second Heracles, and went to battle clothed in a lion's skin and armed with a club. The mercenary troops from Greece and Asia Minor, who sailed to 364 PERSIA AND GREECE. the aid of Artaxerxes, formed together a body of ten thou- sand men. "When we consider that the mercenaries of Greek descent who had come from Egypt also went over to the king, the success of the latter may fairly be attributed not so much to the Persian force as to the Greeks by whom he was assisted. It resulted from the general position of affairs that Xecta- nebus on his side, too, sought aid from the Greeks. He had made all possible preparations, but, unfortunately, he neither possessed the qualities requisite for the control of so large a force, nor could he bear to stand aside and leave the command to the mercenary captains who were capable of exercising it. In spite of their promise, some Spartans and Athenians had come to his aid, it appears, without the authority of their gov- ernments, and their leaders, Diophantus of Athens and La- mius of Sparta, would have been in a position to rescue !Nec- tanebus if he had left them freedom of action. When he retreated to Memphis it became impossible to defend Pelu- sium. Among the Hellenes on either side a strange kind of rivalry made its appearance. Although in hostile camps, those on the one side sought to excel those on the other in feats of arms. Nevertheless, a good understanding between the Greek mercenaries and the Orientals, whose cause they had espoused, could not long be maintained. Moreover, the old prestige of the Persian monarch recovered its influence with the Egyptians. They were assured that the sooner they got rid of the Greek garrisons which occupied their fortresses the more easily would they recover favor with the king. It had always been so. At every decisive crisis the longing to gain the king's favor had led to the submission of his rebel- lious subjects. The Persians were now laying siege to Bubas- tus. The Egyptians betook themselves to the eunuch Bagoas, who possessed the chief authority in the king's council, and begged him to use his influence with the king on their behalf. The Greeks, on their side, discovered this intrigue, and com- municated with Mentor, the commander of the Greek merce- naries in the pay of Persia, who had already distinguished himself at the capture of Sidon. It must be allowed that the course taken by the Egyptians THE EGYPTIAN REVOLT. 305 was but natural. The Oriental nations who fought their bat- tles with Grecian arms were well advised in resolving to come to terms with each other and drive out the Greeks. But this time the attempt was unsuccessful. Mentor promised his aid to the Greek garrison, and when, in accordance with the wishes of the Egyptians in the town, a body of Persians inarched in to expel the Greeks, a union of the Greek forces in the two camps took place. A hand-to-hand conflict result- ed in the defeat of the Persians and Egyptians. Bagoas was in the greatest danger, and owed his life only to the interven- tion of Mentor.* The combined Greek forces might possibly have been able at this moment to wrest Egypt from the do- minion of Persia. But what could they have done with Egypt ? Mentor had no intention of making such a conquest. He looked at the question from the point of view of personal interest, and concluded a treaty — so we are positively assured — with Bagoas, by which the two commanders agreed to di- vide the supreme power. Bagoas promised thenceforward to do nothing without previously informing Mentor and obtain- ing his permission. This was equivalent to a partition of power, since the control of the Persian administration was in the hands of Bagoas. The agreement was confirmed by mutual oaths, and was faithfully kept. The result was that Mentor became omnipotent in Asia Minor. He collected a large body of Hellenic mercenaries for the service of Arta- xerxes, and in his new position displayed both prudence and good faith. It is clear that these events changed the whole aspect of affairs in the then known world. Egypt and Asia Minor again obeyed the king of Persia, and it was Greek in- tervention which had produced this great result. The historian of later times who observes the mutual rela- tions of Greece and Persia must be strongly impressed by the fact that neither the one nor the other formed a really inde- pendent power. On the one hand, the internal affairs of * The reduction of Egypt is placed by Diodorus in the archonship of Apollodorus, b.c. 350-49. Bockh (on Manctho and the dog-star period in Schmidt's "Zeitschrift fur Geschichtswissenschaft," ii. p. 780) places the event, in accordance with the indications of Manctho, in the year 340 b.c. 36G PERSIA AND GREECE. Greece were constantly subject to the influence of the Great King. On the other hand, the empire of Persia depended upon the support which it received from the military resources of Greece. But a change was at hand. Between these two powers a third arose which, starting from small beginnings, speedily threatened to become the strongest of the three. Chapter X. THE MAKEDONIAN EMPIRE. Not only are arms indispensable to a community for the purpose of external action, but without arms it is inconceiv- able that a community can hold together. Mankind at large is constantly occupied with those natural hostilities in which nations and political societies become involved. Every com- munity must be in a position to defend itself and all who belong to it, otherwise it cannot provide the necessary pro- tection for individual freedom and activity. The security of the nation as a whole is an indispensable condition for the security of the individual. To maintain this security is the principal object of human combinations : it is the common aim of all constitutions. Care is bestowed upon this object in proportion to the severity of the hostilities which may be expected, and the Greek republics were organized only for a conflict with their equals. But when whole nations come into collision, a more complete political organization is neces- sary. There must exist a supreme authority capable of unit- ing all the forces of the nation against foreign enemies. In the collision of powers military monarchies are formed, whose success depends, not so much upon their numerical superiority, as upon their military organization. War is inevitable, and a battle lost or won decides the fate of nations for ages to come. The course of the world's history depends upon attack and resistance. "What, then, is a power? Only such a national community as is organized and equipped alike for attack and defence. Neither the Greeks nor the Persians in their long struggle with each other had been able to arrive at such an organiza- tion. Between these two the Makedonians now made their appearance, and the Makedonians succeeded in creating a real 3G8 THE MAKEDONIAN EMPIRE. power. The influence which they exerted may be fairly styled immeasurable. It was an influence which forms an epoch in the history of the world. 1. Philip, King of Mdkcdon, and Demosthenes. Among the peoples of Thracian nationality who occupied the confines of Asia, and with whom the Greeks in the estab- lishment of their northern colonies came in contact, powers of native origin and some importance had now and then been set up. Such a power was that of Sitalkes, who was able to bring into the field an army of 150,000 men. These powers were of short duration. It was different with the dynasty, probably of Greek origin, which ruled in the mountainous territory of Emathia.* This dynasty held sway over a group of half-barbarian clans who had settled in that district, as others had settled in Epeirus. Though in habitual contact with Thracians and Illyrians, it maintained its vitality, and gradually became important. Strabo says that the Makedonian people consisted of Thracians and Illyrians, but it is undeni- able that Hellenic elements contributed in a greater degree than perhaps any other to the formation of the state. It is still a question whether the Makedonians should be regarded as barbarized Hellenes, or Hellenized barbarians : a coalition of both elements may be inferred from their earliest tradi- tions. This is of importance in its bearing on the course of universal history, into the scope of which the nation in ques- tion enters at this point. Originating in a fusion of diverse elements, and surrounded by neighbors belonging to a differ- ent race, it presents a character unique in history. Before the battle of Platrea, the Makedonian prince rode * In the two traditions of the foundation of the Makedonian empire, given by Herodotus (viii. 137) and by Justin (vii. 1), who repeats Theo- poinpus, the following important facts are common to both, viz. the de- scent of the kings from Heracles, the mention of Midas, the first seat of their power, and the gradual nature of their conquest. In Eusebius there is a further legend that the king of the Orcstians being at war with his neighbors, the Eordians, sought help of the Karanos of Makedon, and gave him half of his kingdom as recompense (Eusebius, i. p. 227, ed. Schone). ARCHELAUS AND AMYNTAS. 3(59 np to the Grecian camp to signify his sympathy ; for, as he said, he was a Greek, though king of the Makedonians. The sum of Makedonian history consists in this mutual action and reaction of the Greek and Makedonian elements upon each other. We have already made mention of King Pcrdiccas, who waged war with his neighbors with constant fluctuations of fortune. For his own purposes, he summoned to his aid the Lakedaemonians under Brasidas, who, in helping him, took care to look after their own interests. On this occasion the superiority of Greek military skill over that of the northern barbarians first made itself felt. After several variations of policy, the Ulyrians ventured to attack the Greeks, to whom they were vastly superior in point of numbers. Tiie speech which Thukydides puts in the mouth of Brasidas on this oc- casion is of importance in universal history. He promises the Greeks that they will repel the disorderly and noisy attack of the Ulyrians, if they will only retreat in the close order of battle which he had taught them to maintain. The success of this measure was complete, and aroused universal admira- tion. It was the first time in these regions, where war was still conducted in barbaric fashion, that an army, in close bat- tle array, made its appearance and won a victory. Greek culture had also its attractions for the Makedonians. At the court of Archelaus* poets and musicians found an asylum in which they were disturbed by no civic strife. There, it was said, they could breathe freely. The court was, how- ever, in constant dependence on the Greeks, whose influence was decisive in the troubles between the reigning family and its subjects. Amyntas had himself enjoyed the benefit of a Greek edu- cation, and when, upon his death, which took place in 370-69 * Archelaus was son of Perdiccas, whose death is placed in the archon- ship of Peisander, 01. 91, 3 = 414-13 b.c. (Clinton, "Fasti Hell." ii. p. 223). If we are to believe Syncellus (p. 2G3, A. ed. Par.), whose state- ments about the dates of the Makedonian kings arc taken, according to Scaliger, from Dexippus, according to Karl Midler ("Fragm. Hist, Grtec." iii. p. 672), from Porphyrius, Archelaus reigned fourteen years, and was murdered in the archonship of Laches (Diodorus, xiv. 37), b.c. 399. 24. 370 TIIE MAKEDONIAN EMPIRE. B.C., fresh disturbances broke out, his widow Eurydike sought help of the Thebans. Pelopidas appeared as an arbiter be- tween the parties, and the queen intrusted to him her young son Philip, who followed the famous general back to Thebes. This prince was Philip, the father of Alexander the Great. Nothing could have been more favorable to a soldier's edu- cation than a few years' sojourn in Thebes, whose military greatness at that time was such as to form an epoch in Grecian history. Philip lived in a family which enjoyed the intimacy of Epameinondas. After three years he was recalled (365 B.C.), and at first intrusted with the administration of a small district under his brother's rule. After the death of the lat- ter, a career of the widest prospects, but full of danger, lay before him.* The land was threatened by Illyrians and Pseo- nians, while a number of pretenders were struggling for the throne, and supporting themselves by the aid of foreign powers. In this plight, Philip set about the formation of an efficient army on the principles of Epameinondas, whose military sys- tem undoubtedly supplied him both with stimulus and ex- ample. Following in his footsteps he gradually developed the phalanx, f formed a body of peltasts from among the moun- taineers of his country, and established a well-drilled body of cavalry. With these forces he repulsed the Illyrians, and compelled their garrisons to evacuate the Makedonian towns which they had occupied. It was his military establishment which gave him the upper hand in Makedonia. " He found you," so Arrian makes the son of Philip say to ♦According to Satyrus,in Athcnajus, xiii.p. 557 C, Philip ruled twenty- two years; according to Diodorus(xiv. 1), twenty-four years; according to Syncellus,twenty-three years. As Philip was murdered in the second half of the year 33G, in the archonship of Pythodemus, the beginning of his reign should be set about the year 359 B.C. tDiodorus (xvi. 2) mentions the Homeric 8ynaspismu8, or locking of shields, which Philip imitated (iTrevotjcre Tt)v tFiq (pdXayyog iruKVoT^ra ical Ka.TaffKEV))v, fii/j.i]). Eustathius, on " Iliad," iv. 150, remarks that Lycurgus introduced something of the same kind in his legislation, but that Lysander was the first to introduce it among the Spartans, Charidemus among the Arcadians, Epameinondas anions the Boeotians. PHILIP OF MAKEDON. 371 the Makedonians, " clothed in skins, feeding your sheep upon the mountains, a prey to Illyrians, Triballi, and Thracians ; he led you down from your mountain heights, and made you a match for your enemies, by enabling you to make use not only of the roughness of your country, but of your own in- nate valor. You were slaves of the barbarians, and he made you their leaders." A king of their own blood was readily followed by the aristocracy of the land. Philip introduced the custom that the younger members of the noblest families should do ser- vice at his court, and accompany him in the chase. In this manner incongruous elements united to lay the foundation of anew military empire. The art and practice of war, so high- ly developed by the Greeks, were combined with the aristo- cratic and popular elements which rallied to the banner of a native king. The political importance of these reforms lies in this : that Philip, while imitating the Greeks, raised up an independent power at their gates. He not only emancipated Makedonia from the dominant Greek influence, but he raised his country to a position of vantage whence it could advance against Greece. It could not be doubtful for a moment what would be the aim of Philip's first efforts. It was the natural object of Makedonia to get possession of the stretch of coast which was occupied by the Greeks. Greek disunion was in this matter Philip's best ally. The Greek settlement of Olynthus, situated on the coast of Thrace and Makedon, on the very confines of either nation, and in alliance with all its neigh- bors, had come into notice during the times of the Pelopon- nesian war, and had gradually acquired a considerable power. The number of civic communities in alliance with or subject to Olynthus was reckoned at about thirty. By military means this city kept the neighboring Thracian princes in dependence, and held control over Lower Makedonia with its mixed popu- lation. A better support for Greece in general than such a state could not be found, and it was especially fitted to keep Makedonia within proper bounds. But upon the fate of Olynthus, the Peace of Antalkidas, whether intentionally or by chance, had a destructive influence. 372 THB MAKEDONIAN EMPIRE. The enactment that all Greek cities wore to bo autonomous was canicd out by Sparta in the north as well as elsewhere. This was just what the Makcdonians wanted. But the libera- tion of subject cities was not carried out so thoroughly, in the case of OlyntliUS, as to prevent that city from quickly rising again to a considerable power. The result of this was that she came into collision with Athens, just then occupied, with the connivance of Persia, in the restoration of her colonial empire, While Athens seized places like Methone and Pydna, the Olynt'hians succeeded in winning Amphipolis, a town on the possession of which the Athenians had always laid the greatest, importance. This rivalry between the two cities, with both of which Philip had to deal if he was to make himself master of his own country, was of the greatest assistance to him. It is at this point that we first make acquaintance with the double- dealing and unscrupulous policy with which Philip consis- tently pursued his own advantage. In the shifting course of events it. came about that A in phi polis received a JMakedonian garrison. Athenian ambition was still directed towards re- covering possession of that town, and Philip could make no greater concession to Athens than by withdrawing his troops. The Athenians, to whom he had agreed to hand over Amphip- olis, promised him in its stead Pydna, the old fortress of the Tenien'uhe, from whom the JMakedonian kings traced their descent. But Philip had no real intention of handing over Amphipolis to the Athenians. After a short time, he garri- soned the town anew, and at the same time got possession of Pydna (355 b.c). He also took Potid»a,and handed it over to the Olynthians, with whom he was anxious to keep on good terms. Lastly he garrisoned Methone (353 B.C.). These movements resulted in open war between Makedonia and Athens, a war destined to be derisive for both parties. It was a war of arms and diplomacy. .Demosthenes, whose Bound judgment enabled him to weigh accurately the relative importance o( Pacts, defines the position with admirable clear- ness from a military point of view.* He points out that * In the 3d Philippic, § -IT aq., p. 128 sq. PHILIP OF MAKEDON. 373 Philip waged war, not only with the heavy-armed phalanx, but with light-armed troops, cavalry, archers, and mercena- ries. A force of this kind was entirely different from that of the Lakedremonians and other Greek states, whose troops re- mained only four months in the field, and then returned home. Philip, on the contrary, waged war at all seasons. If he found no opposition in the open country, he took to besieg- ing the fortified towns. The difference between his diplo- macy and that of his enemies was not less important. In the democratic republic, everything depended upon the issue of public discussions: the king, on the other hand, took counsel only with himself. Demosthenes ascribed the losses which Athens suffered principally to the negligence of the republi- can government, and consistently maintained that it was the possession of Mcthone and Potidsea, which Philip had again occupied, that secured his control over the whole district. Philip was, in fact, the incarnation of the military mon- archy. He was in a position to carry out his plans with pre- cision the moment he had conceived them. His troops were an instrument applicable to every kind of service. Athens was at this moment hampered by the naval war which result- ed in the loss of her allies. Philip, on the other hand, through his seizure of the mines of Crenides, famous as far back as the time of Herodotus, made himself master of a source of wealth which was indispensable for the payment of his mer- cenaries. Both from the political and military point of view, he was now entirely independent. But these events, important as they were, would not have alone sufficed to make his success permanent. It was not so easy to eradicate the ancient influence of Athens in those re- gions over which she had so long held sway. Other events, however, took place, which gave King Philip the opportunity of taking up a position in the centre of Greece, and dealing a fatal blow at Athens from that point of vantage. Among these events was one which was thoroughly characteristic of the political anarchy then prevailing in Hellas. What should have proved a bond of union for the Greeks, led, more than anything else, to their disruption. The Phokians, who shortly before had been freed by the 374 THE MAKEDONIAN EMPIRE. Thebans from the dominion of Sparta, were resolved not to put up with the dominion of Thebes. They were eager to secure a separate independence, and resolved to rid themselves forever of the inconvenient influence exercised by the Del- phic priesthood. They claimed, on the authority of a line of Homer, that the presidency of the shrine belonged of right to them. An adventurous leader named Philomelus succeeded in seizing the temple, not without the secret support of Sparta, with a force composed of Phokians and foreign mercenaries (357-6 b.c.).* This naturally aroused the hostility of Thebes, and under Theban influence a meeting of the Amphictyonic Council was held, at which it was resolved to protect the tem- ple, and to declare war upon the Phokians. Philomelus availed himself of the treasures of the temple, as Sparta made use of Egyptian money, and Philip of the mines of Crenides. But his action had been too outrageous to allow him to maintain his position, and the treasures of the temple were insufficient for a real war. Defeated by superior forces, and wounded in the conflict, Philomelus, in order to avoid the disgrace of capt- ure, threw himself from a precipice (354-3 B.C.). The situa- tion was, however, little altered by his death. The Phokians found another leader in Onomarchus, the head of one of their noblest families. This man took the place of Philomelus, and managed, by dint of constant warfare with his neighbors, to maintain his position. We have now arrived at a point where it will be necessary to explain how it was that a Makedonian king who did not belong to the Hellenic society came to interfere in these dis- turbances. It came about as follows. The Thessalians, who of old belonged to the Amphictyonic league, were thoroughly at one with Thebes in their effort to put an end to the dis- graceful state of things at Delphi. But among themselves they were as disunited as the Greeks in general. The family of the Aleuadse, who exerted a dominant influence in Thes- saly, were opposed by the reigning family of Pherce, at whose head was Lycophron. This man, perhaps under the influence * Schafer (" Demosthenes und seine Zeit," ii. p. 449) fixes the beginning of the wai' in the first months of the rear 355 B.C. THE SACRED WAR 375 of a bribe, made common cause with Onomarchus, and thus enabled the latter, now in every respect well armed, to con- template the overthrow of the Aleuadge, and therewith the reduction of the whole of Thessaly. The centre of interest was thus transferred from the general dispute to a quarrel in the interior of Thessaly, the most important aspect of which was the feud between the tyrant of Pherse and the Thessa- lians in alliance with the Amphictyonic league. The latter, finding themselves in danger of being crushed by Onomar- chus, called in the aid of Philip. Philip at first met with considerable success. But when Onomarchus came to the aid of Lycophron with superior forces, the king had to give way. Twice beaten in the open field, and finding his hold upon his mercenaries relaxing, he retired to Makedonia. Here he found means of recruiting his forces, and again invaded Thessaly, with 20,000 infantry and 3000 horse. Meanwhile, Onomarchus had made considerable progress in Boeotia, and, when summoned by Lycophron to his aid, took the field against Philip in Thessaly with a large and well-drilled army. The stake that depended on the issue of the conflict was no small one. "We may regard as a legend- ary addition of later times* the story that Philip hastened to battle with the ensign of the Delphian god, which so terri- fied the Phokians that, struck with remorse for their crime, they allowed themselves to be defeated. What we know for certain is that the victory of Philip was especially due to the Thessalian cavalry, which had rallied in numbers to his flag. But the legend is true in so far as it implies that Philip's triumph was also a triumph of the Amphictyons and the Del- phic shrine over the Phokians. In the flight Onomarchus perished (353-2 b.c). The issue of the provincial quarrel was decisive for the general war. Philip's victory made him master of Thessaly. He occupied the Gulf of Pagasse and declared Phera? a free city. The Thessalians, whom he had rescued, gladly espoused his cause. It was of even more importance that he could now * Justin gives this version (viii. 2, 3). It is probably true, as Justin de- clares, that Philip was formally appointed Strategus in Thessaly. 37C THE MAKEDONIAN EMPIRE. represent himself as the champion of the independence of the Delphic oracle. As such, he won over all those who clung to their ancestral religion. At first, however, his sound judg- ment bade him pause in his career of victory. lie took good care not to attack the Athenians, who, with the consent of the Phokians, had occupied Thermopylae. Philip made no at- tempt to force a way through the pass. It was enough that he had attained a position which might, indeed, arouse hostili- ty, but which secured him allies. He refrained from press- ing the advantage which he had won in central Greece, and turned his attention in the next place to the regions of Thrace. Olynthus, then in alliance with Athens, was the mark at which he aimed. How much depended on Olynthus at this moment may be understood from the declaration of Demosthenes that as soon as Philip should have got possession of that city he might be expected in Attica. It is equally apparent from Philip's own remark that he must cither subdue Olynthus, or give up his hold on Makedonia. This, no doubt, has reference to the fact that his brothers, who still refused to recognize his au- thority, found a refuge in that city. The Olynthians, as the Athenians saw, in resisting Philip, were fighting the battles of Athens. The rivalry of the two cities had at an earlier date enabled Philip to fix himself in Thrace. Their alliance was all the more likely to impel him to rid himself of the Olynthians. The three-and-thirty cities of Chalkidike, which were now in alliance with Olynthus, offered little resistance, and were taken by Philip one after another. Not till he threatened Olyn- thus itself did the Athenians send any help to the Olynthians (340-8 b.c). Put the help which they sent was not sufficient to save their hard-pressed allies. Of the commanders who led the Athenian contingent, one, Chares, was devoid of military talent; the other, Charidemus, was notorious for debauchery. It was not to be expected that men of this kind should prove a match for the king, who was a thorough soldier. To these disadvantages must be added civil troubles in Olynthus. The result was that in the autumn of the year 348 the town fell CAPTURE OF OLYNTHUS. 377 into the hands of Philip. He availed himself of the right of conquest with ruthless cruelty, for lie had no intention of let- ting a town like this ever again recover its prosperity. This, it appears to me, must be regarded as the second great victory of Philip over the Greek community. In the fall of Olynthus, Athens herself received a deadly blow. The king made use of the prisoners who had come into his hands to send proposals of peace to the Athenians. These pro- posals were not rejected, for it was to be feared that Philip would otherwise proceed to make himself master of the Chersonese and the Hellespont. On the maintenance, and even on the autonomy, of the colonies in that quarter, de- pended not only the naval power of Athens, but her very ex- istence, for she drew her supplies in great measure from the Black Sea. It was, therefore, a great advantage for Athens that Philip offered to make peace on the condition that each side should retain what it then held. The possession of Lem- nos, Imbros, and Scyros was thereby assured to Athens. But with the conclusion of peace, desirable as it was in itself, another question of great importance arose. The allies of both parties were to be included in the peace. The ques- tion was, who were these allies? The Athenians demanded that all those who should within three months declare them- selves allies of Athens should be recognized as such. Had Philip agreed to this, all his enemies in Hellas would have taken the Athenian side. Another point closely connected with this question pressed for immediate settlement. The Athenians wished to have the Phokians recognized as their allies. But just at this moment the Phokians and Philip were again at open war. The Thebans and Thessalians, find- ing themselves unable to get the better of the Phokian army, summoned Philip to their aid. It was to the interest of Philip to put an end to the little war in that quarter, which laid waste the whole district and kept everything in confusion. He had on the earlier occasion hesitated to march against the Phokians because the latter were supported by Athens and Sparta, but this support was theirs no longer. Sparta had made a demonstration in favor of Phokis, but, deceived — so we are told — by promises which Philip made to the Spartan 378 the makedonian empire. envoy at Pella, she deserted tlie Phokian cause. The Athe- nians found their hands tied by the peace.* They would have rendered it insecure if they had ventured to oppose the king. The Phokian general, Phalffictis, a son of Onomarchus, was in sorry plight. Not only could he reckon upon no aid from abroad, but in Phokis itself his position was unsafe. When therefore Philip, who had now concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with Thebes, appeared in Thessaly with a force which seemed to be invincible, Phalsecus despaired of holding his ground. lie resolved to give up his fortified camp on condition of being allowed to retreat unhindered (346 B.C.). In this way Philip gained a complete victory without even drawing the sword. lie was able to pass Ther- mopylee without opposition, to invade Phokis, to take posses- sion of Delphi, and to establish a new Amphictyonic league. From this league the Phokians were excluded, Avhile the highest position in it was conferred upon Philip himself. He presided at the Pythian games, during which he was visited by Athenian ambassadors. To the resolutions which were there arrived at, the Athenians, much as they disliked them, could make no opposition. In order to understand the condition of affairs upon which we are now entering, we must study the speech of Demosthe- nes on the Peace. The Attic orator appears as the chief antagonist of the Makedonian king, whose power, advanced with all the resources of diplomacy and war, made swift and steady progress. Demosthenes perceived clearly the danger to which Athens was exposed, but found no other means of meeting it at his command except the influence of his oratory on the Demos of Athens. He had now to contend, not only * The proposal to make peace with Philip was accepted by the popu- lar assembly on the 19th clay of Elaphebolion (Demosth. " De Falsa Lcga- tione," § 57, p. 339), in the archonship of Themistocles, 01. 108, 2= April 10, 350. After the return of the envoys, -who had been sent to the king, the vote followed on the 16th day of Scirophorion = the 10th of July (Demosth, " De Fal. L.," § 49, p. 459). It ran as follows : " Idv fit) iroiwoi a;/:£7c; ii Set Kai Trapadtdioai Tohj AfupiKruoai to lepbv on fioiiOljffei 6 ^fifioQ 6 'AOiji'aitiiv Itti rovtj SiaKwXuoyrac ravra yiyvtadcu" (§ 49, p. 355). ATHENS AND THEBES. 379 with those at whose advice the peace had been made, but with those who, alarmed at the progress of Philip, now clam- ored for war against him. The advice of Demosthenes was to keep the peace. " We have now," said he, " given up Am- phipolis to Philip. We have allowed the Cardians to sever themselves from the other inhabitants of the Chersonese. We have permitted the Carians to take possession of the islands of Chios, Cos, and Khodes. We have acquiesced in all these losses, and made a treaty affecting the very basis of our empire, and why? Because we expect greater advantage from tranquillity than from a continuation of the struggle." In a word, it would have been better not to make a peace in which so much was given up, but it would be in the highest degree dangerous at this moment to break it, since it was to be feared that the Amphictyony might combine to make war upon Athens. It was quite possible that Athens might be involved in war with Philip, owing to some dispute between the two powers in which his allies were not concerned. In such a case his allies, at any rate Thebes, would hardly take sides with Philip, for they might well be anxious lest their own safety should be endangered by a man who was always on the watch for his own advantage. To be sure, it was also possible that Thebes might take up arms on account of her own special quarrel with Athens, but under such circum- stances Thebes would find no allies. The most disastrous policy for Athens would be, argued Demosthenes, to give all her enemies pretexts for making war upon her at once. Athens should avoid irritating the Peloponnesians by making a closer alliance with Lakedoemon ; the Thebans and Thes- salians, by giving refuge to their exiles ; and Philip, by pre- venting him from taking his place among the Amphictyons. The caution and width of view with which the orator, who was not only orator, but statesman, weighed the foreign af- fairs of his country, are very remarkable. As things stood at the time, he was decidedly in favor of receiving Philip into the league of Amphictyonic Hellenes. But while giving way on this point he claimed for Athens in other respects an independent position. From a material point of view the Athenians had every 380 THE MAKEDONIAN EMPIRE. reason to be satisfied with the peace. The fall of Sidon and Olynthus were advantageous to Athens, which now became the undisputed metropolis of trade. Commerce rapidly de- veloped, and there was no want of money. To this period we may ascribe the establishment of an arsenal under the care of the architect Philon,* and the amendment of certain laws which were disadvantageous to commerce. In matters of general importance, on which maritime power could be brought to bear, Athens presented a bold front to Philip. It was desirable in this respect that the relations of Athens with Persia should stand on a better footing, and this actually took place. The restoration of the Great King's authority in Asia Minor called forth a political reaction there. The satrap who a short time before had taken refuge with the Makcdonians was again admitted, by the intervention of Mcmnon, to the favor of Artaxerxes, and returned to Asia. In the life of Aris- totle f mention is made of Ilermias, who was his most inti- mate friend, and with whom he at that time resided. Iler- mias was tyrant of Atarneus, a fortified place, to which other towns and strongholds had attached themselves. Mentor, by means of treachery, destroyed this budding independence. lie invited Ilermias to a personal meeting of which he took advantage to make him prisoner, and, by means of his signet ring, got possession of Atarneus and the surrounding places. It cannot be doubted that this restoration of the Persian power in Asia Minor was of advantage to Athens in her struggle with Makedonia. That power had to withdraw within its former limits. Nor was this all. The Athenians had yet another weapon in Greece itself to use against Philip. This was the hatred of tyrants, which had been developed into a sort of national religion, and which burned as iiercely as ever in Grecian bosoms. The so-called tyrannicides who had slain Jason of PherSQ were everywhere received with enthusi- asm. In Corinth it was the virtuous Timolcon who murdered * Curt. Wiiclismuth, " Gcsch. von Atlicn." i. 597. t We arc told that Ilermias was still in Atarneus in 344. Aristotle be- came in 343 the tutor of Alexander, -which may have had something to do with political changes. ATHENS AND PERSIA. 381 his own brother for endeavoring to establish a despotism, a deed which excited the deepest wrath in the heart of their common mother, but called forth the admiration of their con- temporaries. Demosthenes succeeded in arousing this hatred of tyrants against Philip. He went in person to Argos and Messene to impress upon those states the impossibility of maintaining their alliance with the king. He warned them that their fate would be like that of most of Philip's allies ; but what he chiefly relied on was the incompatibility of a monarchy with a free civic constitution. These arguments he urged with all his eloquence, and found approval among his hearers. It was in vain that Philip complained of the orator's insinuations and described them as insults to himself, lie made little impression on the Athenians, for Demosthenes represented to the Demos that the king cared not for justice, but for dominion. Thus it was that Athens, relying upon her ancient fame, her vigorous navy, her good understanding with the Persians, lastly, on the deeply rooted national hatred of tyrants, stood forth as the one power which could cope with Philip. In- deed, she appeared to him still so dangerous that he began to contemplate a revision of the terms of peace. But the con- sequences might have gone further than he wished had he agreed to the Athenian demand that, not the possessions, but the rights, of each state should be taken as the basis of peace. The existing situation would thereby have been rendered in- secure, and, above all, Philip's own position would have been shaken. At this moment the Thracian Chersonese, which Persia had recognized as part of the Athenian empire, and whose maintenance in that condition had been the chief ob- ject of the peace, was threatened by Philip. Cardia, an inde- pendent town, had been recognized in the peace as one of Philip's allies. It happened that some Athenian troops, dis- satisfied with their pay, committed ravages in the district of Cardia and the neighboring Makedonian territory. Philip chose to regard this as an act of hostility, and at Athens pub- lic opinion was in favor of recalling the general who was to blame for the disturbance. This measure was opposed by Demosthenes. He had considered it dangerous to break with 382 THE MAKEDONIx\N EMPIRE. Philip on the question of the Amphictyony. But he was strongly of opinion that the special interests of Athens as against the king of Makedonia, especially in the district of the Chersonese, should be strenuously protected. He expressed his convictions on this score in a vigorous speech which has, with great justice, been considered the best of all his orations, namely, the Third Philippic. In this speech he reckons up the grudges which Athens had against Philip, and shows that in reality he was then at open war with Athens. Who would venture to doubt, says he, that an enemy who sets up his siege-train round a city is on the point of attacking it? Philip's fine words were utterly unworthy of credence : with fine words he had deceived Olynthus, he had deceived the Phokians, and, last of all, Phone, and the fate that had be- fallen those states would soon befall Athens. Philip, in fact, was at war with Athens, while Athens was not at war with Philip. Such a state of things must, at all costs, be brought to an end. Against the positive proposals of Demosthenes many ob- jections might be made. The value of his speeches lies in his general observations, which rest upon a wide survey of affairs, and are enforced, one may fairly say, with irresistible logic. For it is not in high-sounding words, but in incontro- vertible reasoning, which, however close, is yet intelligible to the masses, that the excellence of these orations consists. Philip and Athens were now engaged for the second time in open conflict. Philip's first step was an attack upon the fortified town of Perinthus. This town, built in terraces along the coast, contained an industrious and courageous population. Philip had already succeeded in carrying the outer walls, and the fall of the inner town was expected, when some Athenian mercenaries made their appearance. It was Persian gold which paid these troops, for the Persians were as anxious as the Athenians not to let the Makedonian monarchy gain control over the straits, whose possession was of such world-wide importance. In those regions, where dif- ferent nationalities have, in all periods of the world's history, come into collision, since no state will allow another to possess them, a very unexpected, but at the same time natural, union BYZANTIUM. 383 of Greek and Persian interests took place. The result was that Philip had to raise the siege of Perinthus (340-39 B.C.). The scene of action now shifted to Byzantium. Here the Athenians were able to bring their whole power to bear against the king. Chares drove the Makedonian fleet out of the Golden Horn. Phokion, who owed his refuge in Byzan- tium to the fame of his virtue, defended the fortifications on the land side. Here, too, Philip had to retreat. But his combinations had never been on a wider or more magnificent scale. By an expedition against the Scythians he hoped to get possession of the mouths of the Danube. He would then have become master of the Black Sea, after which the Greek colonies in that quarter would have been unable long to maintain their independence. But in these lands there still existed free peoples, whose movements were not to be fore- seen or calculated, and the expedition against the Scythians failed to attain its aim. It was not altogether unsuccessful, for the king returned richly laden with booty, but on his way back he was attacked by the Triballi, who inflicted on him such serious loss that he had to relinquish the idea of making further conquests in the Thracian Chersonese. The Atheni- ans, who were hardly aware that they had allies in the Tri- balli, maintained, in conjunction with the Persians, their maritime supremacy. Once more the Athenian navy proved itself a match for the Makedonian king, and the general position of affairs would have allowed this balance of power to exist for a time if the old feud about the shrine of Delphi had not been revived. The cause of this was, politically speaking, insignificant. It was a quarrel on a point of honor, such as when Pericles and Sparta were rivals for the Promanteia.* This time the rivalry was between Thebes and Athens. The Athenians had restored a votive offering in Delphi, the inscription on which commemorated the victories they had won alike over the Persians and the Thebans. The Thebans felt this insult the more keenly because their relations had, since that time, undergone a complete transformation. At the next meeting * That is, the right of precedence in consulting the oracle. 384 'JT IIE MAKEDONIAN EMPIRE. of the Amphictyonic Council, at which envoys from Athens again took part, the Ilieromnemon of Amphissa, the chief town of the Ozolian Locrians, brought the matter forward. It will be remembered that the Locrians were especial enemies of the Phokians, and the most zealous supporters of the Del- phian god. In the course of his speech the Ilieromnemon gave utterance to sentiments offensive to the Athenians, whom lie could not forgive for their alliance with the Phoki- ans. He went so far as to say that their presence could not be tolerated in the holy place. One of the envoys of Athens was the orator ./Esehines, who was not himself Ilieromnemon, but acted as his deputy. Far from seeking to excuse the Athenians, he turned the tables on the people of Amphissa by charging them with seizing the property of the Delphian god, namely, the harbor of Kirrha, which was visible from the place of meeting. After the victories of Philip, public opinion had turned strongly in favor of protecting the pos- sessions of the temple. ^Eschines succeeded in persuading the Amphictyons to undertake the expulsion of the Locrians from their new possession. They were naturally resisted, and the resistance they met with was stigmatized as sacrilege. It was resolved to hold a special sitting of the Amphictyonic Council, in order to deal with the question. Demosthenes was alarmed when he heard of this challenge. To wage war on behalf of the Amphictyons and the shrine of Delphi was totally at variance with the established policy of Athens, which had hitherto countenanced encroachments on the shrine. Was Athens now to take part in a war in favor of the Amphictyony- — that is, in favor of King Philip, who was at the head of the league? Such was the counsel of ./Eschincs, in whose eyes the piety and justice of the war overbalanced other considerations. He hoped to make use of this opportunity in order, with the consent of Philip, to wrest Oropus, long a subject of dispute, from the Thebans. Demosthenes set himself against this plan with all the force of his political convictions. Here we may remark the rad- ical distinction between the two orators. The one was at- tracted by a momentary advantage, the other kept the gen- eral state of affairs consistently in view. At the same time PHILIP APPOINTED STRATEGUS. 385 we are struck by the incapacity of a democratic assembly for the conduct of affairs when great political interests are con- cerned. Such an assembly is a slave to the impulse of the mo- ment, arid to the impressions of the tribune. Further than this, the personal rivalry of the two orators made itself felt in decisions of the greatest moment. At first .zEschines suc- ceeded in passing a resolution to declare war against Am- phissa. Thereupon Demosthenes passed another resolution directly at variance with the first, against taking sides with the Amphictyons, or even sending envoys to the contem- plated meeting. Here was a change of front indeed! In the first vote were involved peace and friendship with Phil- ip; the second vote meant nothing short of open hostilities against him. The people of Amphissa, at first rejected, were immediately afterwards taken into favor. Thus encouraged, they showed a bolder front to the Amphictyons. Here we are compelled to ask whether the great master of eloquence did not lay himself open to the charge of incon- sistency. How was it that he counselled resistance to the Amphictyons and therefore at the same time to King Philip, a proceeding which he had always denounced as in the high- est degree dangerous ? He defended this policy on the ground that Athens was already at open war with Philip, and that she could not possibly be allied, in a question of internal pol- itics, with a prince against whom she was fighting elsewhere. For Philip, however, no step could have been more advan- tageous. Too weak at sea to resist Athens on that element, he was now provided with occasion and pretext for bringing his overpowering land force into the field against her. At the invitation of the Thessalians, he led his army into Thes- saly. The Amphictyons appointed him Strategus, with inde- pendent and irresponsible authority — for that is the meaning of the word " autocrator," which was added to the title of Strategus. Thus provided with legal authority, he appeared, in the winter of 339-S, in Hellas. Neither the Locrians, though aid- ed by an Athenian contingent, nor the people of Amphis- sa, were able to resist him. It was probably owing to a false report, spread by himself, that he was allowed a free passage 25 386 THE MAKEDONIAN EMPIRE. through Thermopylae, lie then occupied Elateia, which se- cured his retreat to Makedonia. These advances produced yet another revolution in Panhellenie affairs. Thebes, after having promoted the Amphictyonic war against Phokis, and after assisting Philip in his other movements, now deserted his side. No Theban envoys appeared at an extraordinary assembly of the Amphictyons, which met at Pylse. We may infer that the Thcbans were anxious lest Philip, after over- powering Athens, should turn his arms against themselves ; and undoubtedly their anxiety was well founded. Thebes had, on a previous occasion, actively contributed to the over- throw of the Lakcdaunonian power and the rule of the Thirty Tyrants in Attica. This had revived the power of Athens, which in return aided Thebes in the recovery of its indepen- dence. It was not likely that the Thebans would stand by and sec Athens crushed by Philip. The offence which they had taken at the votive shield was soon forgotten, but, unfor- tunately, there was another very intelligible ground of jeal- ousy between the two cities. This was the seaport of Oro- pus, then in the hands of the Thebans, a port much coveted by Athens on account of its convenience for the trade with Euboea. ./Eschines had hoped that Athens, by the aid of Philip, would be able to take permanent possession of this town. Here he was opposed by Demosthenes. If King Philip was ever again to be successfully resisted, it could only be done by the restoration of a good understanding between Athens and Thebes. Thus, and thus only, could a power be formed capable of taking up the cudgels with Philip. The idea of this alliance was in the mind of Demosthenes day and night. That the alliance came about is to be regarded as the great- est service which Demosthenes rendered at this crisis. He succeeded in persuading the Athenians — and it can have been no easy matter to persuade them — to give up the claim upon Oropus, which they had hitherto strenuously maintained. The victory which Demosthenes won in Athens was a victory of national interests over a separatist policy. Immediately afterwards he went in person to Thebes. By recognizing the headship of Thebes in Bceotia, in spite of all Philip's com- ALLIANCE OF ATHENS AND THEBES. 387 mands and threats, he succeeded in consummating the alli- ance of the two cities, on the success of which the very exist- ence of the Greek community depended.* All Greece was thereupon traversed by embassies from either party. Philip persuaded the Messenians, the Arcadians, and the people of Elis to take no part in the war. From the Spartans he had nothing to fear, for at this moment they were occupied with an expedition to Italy, in order to support Tarentum against the Lucanians. But there were a few states who clang fast to the idea of a Panhellenic bond. Athens and Thebes found allies in the Eubceans and the Achceans, in the inhabitants of Corinth and Megara, as w r ell as in the distant Leucadians and Korkyrreans. In Athens, as well as in Bceotia, there were many who would have preferred peace, but the orator had united the two capitals with too strong a chain. When the Athenians appeared before Thebes they were received, contrary to the habit of previous centuries, with a hearty welcome. The combined armies took the field together. The first skirmishes that took place turned out well for the allied cities, and a golden crown was voted in Athens to Demosthenes. But popular enthusiasm was premature in thinking that success was attained. In the very first movements of the war the superior generalship of Philip was displayed. He drove the Thebans from their position of vantage by attacking Bceotia in their rear. The Thebans, impelled by their territorial sympathies, despatched a portion of their forces in that direc- tion, and Philip was thus enabled to occupy the plain of Choc- roneia, a position very favorable for deploying his cavalry. It was on this field that the two hosts met for the decisive conflict. Philip commanded an army fully equipped and accustomed to combined action, and he commanded it with unequalled skill. He had turned to his own use the expe- riences of Theban and Athenian commanders durins; several * Theopompus (" Demosthenes," chap. 18) remarks on the speech of Demosthenes at Thebes, " t) tov pfiropog Siva/uc iKpnr'tZovoa tov Qv^tov avrwv Kai Cucaiovaa ti)v cpiXoTiftiav, t7r£•_> THE MAKEDONIAH EMPIRE. we have an army fitted for the greatest undertakings, an ;irmy without a rival in its day, entirely dependent on the will of the Bffakedonian king. On the other side, we have a civilisa- tion thoroughly national in character, but capable of exercis- ing a universal influence. The combination of these two ele- ments is the distinctive feature of Philip's political work: it was, so to speak, his mission. Victories gained by a people like the Macedonians, however decisive, could not by them- selves have had a very deep influence upon universal history. Their world-wide importance is due to the fact that the Make- doniana united themselves with the Greeks, whose national culture, developed by the free action of internal forces, must ever be one of the principal elements in that civilization which forms the goal of humanity. It was through this alliance, intimate enough, if on one side involuntary, that the Make- donian monarchy produced so incalculable an effect upon the history of later ages. The Greeks, bad they remained alone, would never have succeeded in winning for the intellectual life which they had created a sure footing in the world at large. Indeed, the connection with Persia, so lately renewed, might well have had the very opposite effect Put what could not have otherwise been secured was attained by their alliance with Makedonia. It was inevitable that Demosthenes should be the enemy of Philip. The philosopher, to whose care Philip committed his son Alexander, was. on the other hand, Alexander's best ally. That alliance embraced the po- litical and the intellectual world, which thenceforward pro- ceeded side by side in separate, but yet as it were concentric, orbits. We cannot agree with the oft-repeated assertion that Philip at this moment stood at the climax of his fortune, and that. with Europe at his feet, he flattered himself with the prospect of speedily overthrowing Asia. A statesman and commander oi his experience was not likely to shut his eyes to the diffi- culties which stood in his way on either side. But he was determined to carry through the enterprise to which the ten- dency of events had led him. and which he was now preparing to execute. Deeds of world-wide significance and startling grandeur were universally expected of him, when suddenly ACCESSION OF ALEXANDER 303 the news spread that, at a festival arranged by him at /Egffl, he had fallen by the hand of an assassin. Polygamous relations were the cause of this oatastrophe. Philip had divorced his wife Olympian, who was descended from the Epeirot family of the JSakid®, and had wedded the niece of Attains, who belonged to one of the noblest families in Makedonia, This event caused a bitter fend between the friends of the two wives, and between Alexander, the son of Olympias, and the uncle of the second wife. Philip hoped to reconcile the parties by a marriage between his daughter Cleopatra and the brother of Olympias. It was at the festival given on this occasion that he was murdered, while walking between his son Alexander and his son-in-law of the same name (autumn of 33G B.O.).* One of his chief and most trusted servants, Pausanias, had done the deed. We need pay no attention to the motives, alike disgusting and insufficient, which have been attributed to him. The explanation points to legendary additions, which frequently mingle the vulgar and the tragic. In Athens the news was received with manifestations of delight. Demosthenes appeared in the popular assembly clad in a festive robe. lie rejoiced to sec his country rid of the tyrant who had loaded her with chains. In the mind of the orator, everything was to give way to the autonomy of the Greek republics, which was clearly less in danger from the Persians than from the Makodonians. But, in leaning to the former, he espoused the weaker side. The Makedonian mon- archy passed from the strong hand which had founded it to one stronger still. The JSakid Alexander ascended the Makedonian throne. 2. Alexander the Gnat. It was a significant remark with which Alexander took pos- session of the government. He said that the king his lord * In a close investigation of this affair, a letter of Alexander (Arrian, i. 25, and ii. 14), in which he attributes his father's death to the Persians, would appear worthy of consideration, were not the authenticity of the letter doubtful. Aristotle ("Polit." v. 8 [10]) gives a very short sketch of the ordinary story. 394 THE MAKEDONIAN EMPIRE. had perished, hut lie would be as zealous in the conduct of affairs as ever his father had been. Therewith lie entered upon the career which his father had marked out for him. He had to hold the semi-barbaric tribes in check, to maintain his authority in Greece, and to carry on war with Persia. A short visit to Greece, not without some parade of military force, sufficed to induce the Diet of the Greek States, which he summoned to meet in Corinth, to hand over to him the supreme command which they had formerly conferred upon his father. On this occasion the command was conferred with the distinct object of carrying on war against Persia. It was the preparations for this war which gave rise to the first danger that assailed the young king. At talus, who denied the Makedonian origin of the king and regarded him in the light of an enemy, succeeded in se- ducing the troops over whom Philip had placed him in com- mand. He established an understanding with the Greeks, and, instead of waging war with Persia, seemed inclined to make common cause with them against Alexander. But At- talus was murdered : the obedience of the Makedonian troops was secured by Parmenio, and the war with Persia went on. At first the Makedonians met with no great success. They were compelled to raise a siege which they had undertaken, and in Troas were beaten out of the field — events which caused intense excitement through the length and breadth of the Grecian world. Philip and Alexander have been strikingly compared with the kings of Prussia, Frederick William the First and Fred- erick the Second. It is true that each father bequeathed to his son a powerful army ready in every respect to take the field. Almost the first efforts of the two sons — we are dis- tinctly told this of Alexander as well as of Frederick — were directed to securing the obedience of the troops. But the difference is, that Frederick the Second commenced a policy which was entirely his own, and began a war which his father would never have undertaken. Alexander, on the contrary, took up and continued the political and military schemes which his father had begun. We first make acquaintance with him and his army during CAMPAIGN IN THRACE. 395 his campaign against the tribes on the northern frontier of Makedonia. This campaign he carried out with energy equal to that of Philip, and with more success (spring of 335 b.c). The distinctive feature of the war was that the Makedonian phalanx, the organization and equipment of which were adapted from Grecian models, everywhere won and main- tained the upper hand. At the passage of the Hsemus, the most difficult points were fortified by the Thracians with a bulwark of wagons. These war-carriages were rolled down from the steepest heights in the hope of throwing the mili- tary array of the Makedonians into confusion. Arrian, who begins his history of Alexander's campaigns with this feat of arms, describes the skilful inventions by which this plan was met and frustrated.* When the real battle began, the Thra- cians, who, according to the traditions of barbaric warfare, had taken the field without weapons of defence, fled from their fortified positions. In their flight they were joined by the Triballi, who were in alliance with the Thracians, and had re- sisted all the efforts of King Philip to pacify them. Their king Syrmus retreated to Peuke, an island in the Danube ; but with the mass of the nation the Makedonians again came into collision. Protected by a thick forest, the Triballi awaited their attack. Alexander managed to entice them from their shelter by means of an attack on the part of the archers and spearmen. The event was still doubtful, when the phalanx, drawn up in greater depth than usual, marched against them, while at the same time the Makedonian cavalry made an * onslaught. Thus threatened, the Triballi retreated from the field. In this episode we come upon regions, peoples, and condi- tions, among which the history of the world has more than once, in later times, been decided. Even at this epoch By- zantium was rising into importance. That city had, owing to its hostility with Persia, deserted the side of the Greeks for that of the Makedonians. It was from Byzantium that Alex- ander summoned triremes to help him against the island in the Danube on which the king of the Triballi had taken ref- * Arrian's account h confirmed by Strabo, vii. 8, p. 301. 30G THE MAKEDONIAN EMPIRE. ugc, and to facilitate his passage to the left bank of the river. The island was protected from attack by steep banks, a rapid stream, and the sturdy resistance of its inhabitants, but the Byzantine squadron enabled the king to transport his troops across the river. Just as the phalanx had proved too much for the unskilled efforts of the mountaineers of Thrace, so on this occasion the Greek triremes showed themselves incom- parably superior to the log canoes with which the Getee, the principal tribe of the district, used to navigate the stream. Boats of this kind were, however, used, together with the tri- remes, to carry a larger number of troops over the river. The Geto?, who awaited the king in hostile array, were astonished at the speed and apparent slightness of preparation with which he appeared in their neighborhood. The phalanx was drawn up in a long and threatening line, and when the cav- alry, under command of the king himself, formed for attack, they at once gave way. They were still in a half-nomadic condition, and retreated, with their wives and children, and all their possessions, into the wilderness of the steppe, whither it was impossible to follow them. More than this Alexander did not intend to do. He could now return in triumph and security across the stream. The expedition itself bears a close resemblance to that of Darius Hystaspis, but regarded from a wider point of view a great contrast is apparent. On the earlier occasion the Persian forces returned from the Danube to attack Makedonia and Greece. It was now the turn of Makedonia and Greece to appear independent and triumphant in the districts where Persia was once victorious. The great successes of Alexander induced all the neighbor- ing nationalities to accept the proposals of friendship which he made to them. *\Ve hear mention on this occasion of the Kelts, who at that time dwelt on the coasts of the Adriatic Sea. They appear to have underrated the power of the king, but Alexander, though expressing his surprise at their con- duct, considered it advisable to make alliance with them. These events should not be left unnoticed. They served to put an end to the ferment in the Balkan peninsula, and al- lowed the king to turn his attention in other directions. On THE TAULANTII AST) AGRIANI. 307 these frontiers the military forces of the civilized world main- tained a fluctuating conflict with the undisciplined hordes of the aboriginal or immigrant tribes down to the times in which Arrian wrote. The names by which he designates the enemies of Alexander were probably transferred from the tribes of his own day. With these victories, however, Alexander's task in these regions was not yet done. The nation of the Tanlantii made hostile movements against him. The manners and customs of the Tanlantii may be inferred from the story that, at the approach of the Macedonians, they sacrificed three boys and throe girls, together with three black rams. Alexander had made an alliance with the neighboring tribe of the Agriani, who were hostile to the Taulantii, and whose archers were of great service to him. The Gnrco-Makedonian military sys- tem was here, as usual, victorious. In spite of the mountain- ous ground, the phalanx showed a capacity for manoeuvring in the closest order, and in the most diverse directions, such as it never before displayed. The rapid advance, which no local difficulties could hinder, the charge itself, the clash of the spears striking against the shields, so terrified the enemy that they fled from the strongholds which they had occupied, but did not venture to defend. Thus it was that the military science of the Greeks, before whose steady array the Illyrians had formerly recoiled, now still further developed by Philip and Alexander, became supreme in the territory of the bar- baric and semi-barbaric nations which surrounded Makedonia. Alexander completed the task which his father had left un- finished, and could now, after his example, turn his arms in other directions. In Greece false reports concerning the progress of events in the north had raised to fever heat the general ferment which naturally existed. Alexander relied upon the resolutions of the League of the Public Peace, which had recognized his father and afterwards himself as its head. But he was now opposed by all those who were unable to forget their former condition, and who preferred the alliance with Persia which had left them independent, to the league with Makedonia which robbed them of their autonomy. Let us not too hastily 39 S THE MAKEDONIAN EMPIRE. condemn Demosthenes for yielding to these ideas. Thebes took the lead of the malcontents, and set about ridding her- self of the garrison which Philip had placed in the Cadmeia. She thus became the centre of the whole Hellenic opposition. The enemies of Makedon, who had been exiled from every city, assembled in Thebes, and did their best to rouse the people by recalling to their minds the triumphs of Epamei- nondas and his glorious activity. The same party was stirring in Lakedoemon, in Arcadia, in ^Etolia, and, above all, at Athens. From Athens the Thebans were supplied, through the media- tion of Demosthenes, and doubtless by means of Persian gold, with arms, of which they were likely to stand in need. When we consider that Persia w T as at this time omnipotent in Asia Minor, and that Alexander had his hands full in the north, we can see that the prospects of the Theban rising were by no means hopeless. But Alexander had no sooner settled with his enemies in the north than he turned to Hellas. So rapid was his move- ment that he found the pass of Thermopylre still open, and, long before he was expected, appeared before the walls of Thebes. His primary object was to relieve the Cadmeia, the most important position in Boeotia. The Thebans were act- ively engaged in the siege of the fortress, and had already surrounded it with a kind of circumvallation. The same fate appeared to threaten the Makedonian garrison which had once befallen the Lakedremonian. The Thebans thought first to seize the fortress, and then to defeat the king. Alexander at once advanced against them from a strong position which he had occupied in the neighborhood. In the proclamations of the heralds, which answer to the manifestoes of our day, we clearly see the point at issue, and the grounds on which either side relied for justification. Alexander offered pardon to all who would return to the League of the Public Peace. The Thebans claimed the assistance of all those who were minded, in alliance with the Great King, to maintain the au- tonomy of the Hellenes. It is clear that Alexander, in whose army there served a large body of Greek allies, whose own troops were flushed with recent victory, and whose garrison still held the fortress, DESTRUCTION OF THEBES. 399 was from the first superior to the enemy. It was a striking outcome of Greek autonomy that the Thebans, in spite of their inferiority, determined to resist. They believed that the military exercises gone through in their gymnastic schools, and the physical strength with which they were endowed by nature, would enable them to withstand any foe. It is re- markable that they paid no attention to the unfavorable omens that occurred before the battle. Such omens, they said, had occurred before the battle of Leuctra, and yet that battle had been their greatest triumph. Philosophic doubt had made its way even to Thebes, and the Thebans hoped to overcome the opposition of fate by dint of manly resolu- tion. ]S"o doubt the exiles from other cities, whose only chance of safety lay in Thebes, kept up and even heightened their zeal. But with all their exertions they were no match for their too powerful enemy. Of the battle and its issue we have two accounts, differing according to the point of view of the two parties. According to the one, the Thebans were overpow- ered in front of their walls, and, as they retreated, the Make- donians pressed in with them into the city itself. According to the other account, the Thebans made an energetic and suc- cessful resistance to the Makedonian attack in front of their city until Alexander forced his way through a gate but slight- ly guarded, and was followed by his troops into the town. However this may be, the result was a catastrophe disastrous for Thebes. In the market-place, in the streets, in the very houses, there ensued a hideous massacre. The friends of the Thebans assure us that not one of the conquered bowed the knee before the conqueror, or pleaded for mercy, but that they died as men who welcomed death. The Hellenic allies of Alexander appear to have equalled, if not exceeded, the Makedonians in bloodthirstiness. The victors were, however, not satisfied with the slaughter. Alexander summoned a meeting of his League, by which the complete destruction of Thebes was decreed, and this destruction was actually carried out (October, 335 b.c). In Grecian history it was no unheard-of event that the members of the defeated nation should be sold into slavery, 400 THE MAKEDONIAN EMPIRE. and so it happened on this occasion. The sale of the slaves supplied Alexander with a sum of money which was no in- considerable addition to his military chest. But his main ob- ject was to strike terror, and" this was spread through Greece by the ruthless destruction of the city of (Edipus, of Pindar, and of Epameinondas. The dwelling-house of Pindar, who had sung the praises of the iEakida?, from whom Alexander claimed descent, is said to have been spared in the destruction which spared nothing else. Deep and universal horror fell upon the Greeks. All the movements against Alexander which had been contemplated were stifled in their birth. On this occasion, as before, the attitude of Athens was of the greatest importance. Her submissiveness did not go to the length of giving up to Alexander his principal opponents, the orators, the mouthpieces, as it were, of the idea of autonomy. This last disgrace was avoided ; but the Athenians promised to bring to trial those of whom Alexander complained. This concession sufficed for the moment, for the issue of the con- flict with Thebes had worked almost as powerfully as the bat- tle of Chaeroneia to render the king's party supreme in the assembly. When those about him expressed their astonish- ment that the Greeks had been so rapidly dispersed, Alex- ander answered that only the habit of putting nothing off had secured him the victory. The close connection that existed at this moment between Grecian and Persian affairs forbade him to lose a moment in turning his arms towards Asia. It has always been assumed that Alexander, from the moment that he ascended the throne, had contemplated the overthrow of the Persian empire : that he saw his calling, so to speak, in this enterprise. I cannot venture to repeat this opinion without some limitations; but no doubt the tendency of events led him more and more strongly in that direction. A war between Alexander and Persia was inevitable, not only on account of the relation of the Greeks to Makedon, whose yoke they were very loath to bear, but on account of their relation to Persia, on whose sup- port they leaned. But an intention to make war upon Persia is not the same thing as an intention to overthrow the Persian empire. All that was necessary was to expel the Persians AFFAIRS IN PERSIA. 401 from the districts which they had once wrested from the Lyd- ians; for in those districts all who opposed the Makedoni- ans found a refuge. The advantages which Alexander had won in Greece seemed likely to be but of momentary dura- tion so long as the great power on his flank lent support to his foes. Let us return for a moment to the relations formed during the recent conflict between Artaxerxes and Nectanebus. It will be recollected that the Persians owed the reconquest of Egypt and the recovery of their dominion in Asia Minor to the skill and bravery of Greek mercenaries. Mentor, the leader of these troops, had, however, not served Persia for nothing. He had lent his aid, as we saw above, on certain conditions, and as a reward for his services he now shared the complete command with Bagoas, who was omnipotent at the court of Susa. Mentor kept control over the Persian forces in Asia Minor, in the Mediterranean, and on its coasts. "VVe have already seen what use he made of these forces against Philip of Makedon. He held a commanding position when Alexander ascended the throne. The latter, if he was to maintain the supremacy which his father had seized, was obliged to make war on Mentor and the Persians, as formerly on the Triballi and on Thebes. The career which Philip had begun, and in which Alexander was now proceeding, led of necessity to a struggle with the power that held sway in Asia Minor. Until that power were defeated, the Makedonian kingdom could not be regarded as firmly established. Since an attack on Asia Minor involved open hostilities with the empire of the Achaemenida3, it was fortunate that such an undertaking was facilitated by the events which just then took place in Persia. A dispute about the succession to the throne had again broken out. As was not uncommon in Persia, the dispute took place during the lifetime of the reigning prince. Bagoas could therefore take measures to assure himself of power in the future. We are told that the eunuch himself put to death the aged monarch, and set aside all his sons excepting Arses, the youngest of them, whom he placed upon the throne. After some years he is said to have fallen out with the new king, and to have disposed of 26 402 THE MAKEDONIAN EMPIRE. him in like manner. In the place of Arses he set up one of his friends, Darius Codomannus, who belonged to another line of the Acha3inenid house.* Not long after his friend had taken possession of the throne of Darius llystaspis, Bagoas quarrelled with him like the rest. It is said that he offered the king a poisoned cup, but that Darius, warned in time, compelled him to drink it himself. We cannot investigate the truth of these stories in detail, but the mere fact of a vio- lent change in the government, even if this did not involve a change of dynasty, shook the whole empire to its base. The death of Bagoas, who had hitherto wielded the supreme power, must have made a great difference in the internal affairs of Persia. The power of Bagoas had been intimately connected with the authority of the commander of the mer- cenaries in Asia Minor. Mentor himself was dead, but his brother Memnon managed to retain possession of the power which the former had exercised. His relation to the Great King, to whom he remained faithful, was essentially different from that which his brother had established by his services in PhoBnicia and Egypt. The rise of a second line of the Achce- menid house could not fail to have its effect upon the holders of the highest offices of state and especially the satraps. We cannot say with certainty that it was these circum- stances which induced Alexander to undertake his campaign, but the circumstances were notorious and tended to his ad- vantage. We may, however, regard the matter from another point of view. The enterprise of Alexander, while owing its * According; to Diodorus, Darius ascended the throne a little before the time of Philip's death (Diod. xvii. 7: Aape'iog TrapciXapuv n)r fiamXeiav Tpi'i fi'tv -i/<," 4>«\il buoIi (owns as Thebes, Elalioarnassus, Tyre^ and Gala; and in India, of the mountain Portress Aonms, and d( the capital of the .Main, ah those were military triumphs »'i 1 1 u^ very first rank, and followed each other in one Uninterrupted B6 Qiionoe "i suooosB. The share taken by Alexander in the progress of geography QOnsistS mainly in this: thai In- redisco\ ered the maritime route from the months of the Euphrates to the mouths o( the Indus, and Ilia! ho not only rediscovered it, hut. put it. to actual use. 'This exploit, united all the conquered territories into one whole. Within the circle of these conquests we ma v perhaps say that his greatest leal consisted in reestablish- ing over an immense ares the supremacy of polytheism) which had been muoh reduced by the Persian dominion. It was ow in;- l<> him that the Greek, Egyptian, and Syrian religions he came fused in one another. Towards the Jews he showed tolemtionj for in their religion ho beheld a national instilu lion, lie overthrew the Persians, ye! without suppressing their religious opinions. Against the Brahmins he oliarapiofied the cause of tin" Grecian gods. Bui something he brought with him from Greooo greater than its gods. The Greeks had arrived at an idealistic con- ception oi the world, BO far as such :» conception is attainable by the human mind. They had created a literature which ombraoed all tendencies o( thought the earliest and the most brilliant ^( the literatures o( the world. To the ideas which animated this literature Alexander threw open the Mast, ami even subjooted it to their domination. To the Influence of thought he added the inlluenee of force. His victories are not merely events in military history, but also .steps In the onward course of human civili. .at ion, especially in relation 1»> art and commerce. For these he everywhere founded new homes, which he delighted to mark hv his own 11:11111'. The mixture o( polytheism with the greatest elVorts oi culture is the distinctive mark of the opooh. The religion o( humanity, which in later times became prominent, has always adhered firmly io its connection with the ideas of Boienoe and oiviliia< (ion. CHABACTEB OT ALEXANDER. |:;:» In Alexander, as he it described to as, there is somewhat of the ideal which the Greeks incorporated in their Dionysus, the god wliu, born of lightning and the earth Tor that is what the story of Bemele means— traverses the world noto- rious and irresistible; the god who, in the midst of all his victories, wears a wreath of vine leaves, or carries agoblet to gether with his sceptre. Alexander, like him, delighted in the enjoyments of life. He was riotous at the banquet, full of confidence and affection to those about him, and generous even to lavishness. But woe to the man who irritated liim, for in his wrath he lost all self-command, though afterwards he gave bimself up to the bitterest feelings to which man can be ;i pre)', the remorse for an evil deed which can never he undone. He was thoroughly human, and was easily influ- enced by the most opposite impulses. He did not shun the company of Thais, but could honor Sisygambis. He thrust Darius IV the ihrone, hut afterwards avenged his death. Wii.h all his defects, he always manifested an innate feeling, a sort of instinct, for the magnificent and truly great. Ili« persona] appearance showed a, rare combination oi muscular strength and agility. In his eyes men thought they recog ui/.eil the expression, not only of Ptoletnseus. Perdiccas was murdered in liis tent.* Thereupon a council of generals met, who, loyal as ever to the hereditary reigning family of Makedonia, in- trusted Antipater with the duties of government. At this point our attention is forcibly drawn to the fact that it was in itself an Impossible task to keep together under any form of government the empire which Alexander had appeared to leave behind him. I say appeared, because his different conquests had not been compacted into anything like a, state. In the provinces, which had once formed sepa- rate kingdoms, the. idea of reviving these kingdoms naturally cropped up. But, further, the Makedonian commanders had no intention of maintaining the combination of the (Jrcck element with the Makedonian. It is intelligible that the commanders of Greek extraction regarded with favor a su- preme authority like that of Perdiccas, for snch a comman- der-in-chief gave them some support against the preten- sions of the inferior Makedonian officers. The latter showed their feelings by raising Antipater to the position of a grand vizier. This they did of their own authority, although it was impossible to appeal to any indication in Antipater's favor on the part of Alexander, and they did it. at the very timc when he had just put down an insurrection in (i recce. At the same time they condemned to death Eumenes, the only Greek among them, on the charge of having been a par- tisan of Perdiccas. Eumenes of Cardia had been tho private secretary of King Philip during his later years, and had been continually em- ployed by Alexander, to whom he had attached himself, in business of tho first importance, lie had had the credit of bringing about the compromise which was made after tho ♦Clinton ("Fasti Hell." il, Kit) fixes the death of Perdiccas in the Bpring of 821 B.C. (01. 114, 3), so that he exercised supreme authority only two .years, not three, according to Diodorus (xviii. 30). 29 450 TIIE DIADOCHI. king's death between the rank and file of the Makedonian army and the principal commanders. For this service he had been rewarded with the satrapy of Cappadocia, which, however, he had first of all to reduce to complete subjection. He would probably have been able to maintain his position had he held iirmlv to the arrangement which he himself had brought about, but his adherence to Perdiccas was regarded as a crime worthy of death. Antipater felt himself impelled to intrust Antigonus, the most important of the generals who had allied themselves with Ptolemseus, with a general com- mission for the destruction of Eumenes. The latter found unexpected support in the complications produced by the death of Antipater, which took place just at this time (319 B.C.). Antipater bequeathed the supreme authority, which the army had placed in his hands, to Polysperchon, a member of a com- paratively unimportant family in Epeirus. Polysperchon at- tempted to acquire greater consideration by summoning back to Makedonia the queen dowager, Olympias, who had taken refuge in Epeirus. This step was a great deviation from the policy -which had hitherto been followed, for Olympias had been hostile to Antipater; but its chief importance for the col- lective empire, if we may use the phrase, was that it brought into existence a new embodiment of the supreme power. Olympias, Polysperchon, and Eumenes were naturally allied together. They represented a supreme authority, closely con- nected with the monarchy, and independent alike of the pro- vincial authorities and the military commanders. The mili- tary and political power of the Makedonian generals inevita- bly came into collision with each several member of this alli- ance. The combination was first of all disastrous for Eumenes. The chief soldiers of the phalanx, who were distinguished by silver-plated shields, whence their name of Argyraspides, had hitherto held firmly to him, and refused to recognize the sen- tence uttered on the banks of the Nile. Put a defeat expe- rienced by Eumenes, which threatened to tarnish the lustre of their reputation, impelled them to deliver up their general to Antigonus. Eumenes was shortly afterwards put to death (816-15 b.c). He was the only Greek in the Makedonian EXTINCTION OT THE BOYA1 FAMILY. 1 5 J military hierarchy. The Grecian element, which had had bo large a share in the conquests of Alexander, was excluded by the commanders of Blakedonian origin. Against Polysperchon and Olyrapias the independent ten- dencies of the Makedonian officers found an ally like-minded with themselves in Oassander, the son of Antipater, who could not bear the loss of the authority which had belonged to his father. Antigonus supplied him with a considerable fleet and army. Thus equipped, he appeared before Alliens, which was unable to make any resistance. The Mal.edo- nians, enraged at the tyranny of Olympias, to whom they as- cribed the death of ArrhidsBus,* which occurred about this time, took the side of (Jassandor. The supporters of Poly- Sperchon were everywhere annihilated. At last Olympias herself, after standing a long siege in Pydna, fell into the hands of her enemies. She was treated with horrible cruelty, being stoned to death by tlje relatives of the Makedonians whom she had executed (spring of 815 b.o.). But it was not oidy on account of her crimes and deeds of violence that she died : in her the race of the Makedoniau kings Came to an end. Hers was a tragic fate, for by furthering the enter- prj es of her son she created circumstances which led to her own destruction. In the first movements of the Makedonians on behalf of their hereditary royal family the two sons of Alexander the Great were murdered one after another. The one, Alexan- der JSgus, whose mother was Boxana, was the boy for whom the monarchy was at one time destined ; the other, named Heracles, was also of Peri ian descent, being the son of a (laughter of Artabazus, Memnon's widow. A like Eate befell Cleopatra, the widowed sister of Alexander, the last repre- sentative of the royal house. The chief generals had been rivals for her hand, because the Makedonians clung to their veneration for the hereditary royal family. So far as can be made out she inclined to PtolemfiBUS the son of Lagus, who ruled in Egypt, but she thereby aroused the hatred of An- + According to Diodorue (\\\. LI) Arrhidera* was king for Bit years and four months: bis death therefore occurred in the autumn of :)I7 b.c. 452 THE DIADOCHI. tigonus, who compassed her murder — so at least was said — by means of her female slaves. In her perished the last of those who could base a claim to the throne on the ground of descent. The only question now was whether any of the chief generals could maintain a su- premacy over the rest. This claim was put forward by An- tigonus, whom Antipater had named Strategus of x\sia against Eumenes. The rest, however, refused to acknowledge him as supreme, and war was therefore inevitable. Ptolemreus the son of Lagus, the ruler of Egypt, was most decided in re- jecting such a supremacy. In order to maintain his father's claim, Demetrius Poliorketes, the son of Antigonus, brought a numerous army, provided with Indian elephants, into the Held. In the year 312 b.o. a decisive battle took place at Gaza, in which Demetrius met with a repulse. This battle established the independence of Egypt. At the same time a general change of ideas began to show itself. Demetrius and Ptolemeens rivalled each other in their lust for fame and territory, but this very rivalry involved some sort of mutual recognition. The conflict appeared to them a kind of civil war, but the prizes to be gained in this war were vast provinces which aimed at becoming, and might become, kingdoms in themselves. Cassander took up a po- sition similar to that of Ptolenncus, and championed similar interests. Demetrius, defeated by land, but still maintaining his supremacy at sea, now set sail for Greece. Here lie got the better of Cassander, in spite of the assistance from Egypt which the latter enjoyed. He next turned his forces against the fleet of Ptolenncus, which lay off Cyprus. A battle took place, not less important than that of Gaza, but with a differ- ent issue. Ptolemams had one hundred and fifty ships, which in case of need could be strengthened by sixty more from Sa- lamis. Against this auxiliary squadron Demetrius despatched only ten ships, but his line of battle was stronger by thirty ships than that of the enemy.* This superiority of force enabled him to inflict a severe defeat upon Ptolemicus. The latter escaped * Plutarch, " Demetrius," chap. 10. Slightly different numbers are given by Diodorus (xx. 47,49). DEMETRIUS AND ANTIGONUS. 453 with difficulty, accompanied only by eight ships, while seven- ty fell into the hands of Demetrius (spring of 30G B.C.). The victorious general won much credit for moderation and generosity. He provided his fallen enemies with a splendid funeral, and presented the Athenians witli twelve hundred complete suits of armor; for he consistently aimed at rendering himself famous for magnanimity. But the battle had very un- expected results. Immediately after the event Demetrius in- trusted one Aristodemus, a confidential friend of his family, who had already been active in furthering their interests in Greece, with the duty of bringing the news to his father, who at the time was living at Antigoneia. Before any one had heard of the victory Aristodemus stopped his ship at some distance from the land, and went ashore in a small boat by himself. He refused to answer any questions till he reached the palace. Antigonus, extremely eager to hear the news, came out to meet him at his door, while the people stood in crowds around. Then Aristodemus with a loud voice ex- claimed, " O King Antigonus, we have won the victory ; Cyprus is ours." This address may be said to have inaugu- rated a new era. The title of king, uttered by Aristodemus, was taken up by the people with a shout of " Long live King Antigonus !" and was accepted by Antigonus himself, who at the same time conferred the title on his son. Antigonus was a man of imposing appearance and rugged exterior, fond of joking with his soldiers, but to others hard of access and domineering. He was careful to husband his resources, and, through frequent success, had conceived a high notion of his power. It may fairly be assumed that he intended to revive the Macedonian monarchy, and to insist on universal submission to his word. He had already made attempts in this direction, for the war which he was carrying on had originated in his claim for supremacy. Now that ho had won a great victory he had no hesitation in assuming a title which raised him above all competitors. While claim- ing full independence for himself, he refused to recognize a similar claim on the part of his opponents, Ptolemsens and Cassander. It was not, however, likely that the latter would give way. They too resolved, one after another, to assume 451 THE DIADOCHI. the royal title. This was done in direct opposition to Antig- onus, who thought to strengthen his claim for supremacy by taking the name of king. The assumption of the same title by others implied that they were his equals, as absolute as he was and independent of his authority. Although Ptolemfeus had lost Cyprus, he was, nevertheless, proclaimed king in Egypt. The possession of the mortal remains of Alexander the Great, which had been handed over to his keeping by those who had the care of the funeral equipage, seems to have procured him a sort of mysterious reputation in that country. An attempt on the part of Antigonus to attack Ptolemreus in Egypt failed rather through unfavorable weather and the difficulties of the climate than from military causes. On the other hand, Demetrius, who, after his victory at Cyprus, sailed to Rhodes, encountered the most strenuous opposition in that island, and was at last compelled to recognize its neutrality. The resistance which Rhodes and Egypt offered to Deme- trius is closely connected with the appearance of other inde- pendent states in the midst of this universal warfare and confusion. The most important of these powers was that of Seleucus, who ruled in Babylon and in Upper Asia. Seleucus was one of the younger companions of Alexander, who had won his reputation mainly in the Indian campaigns. On ac- count of the share he had taken in the overthrow of Per- diccas he was raised by the Makedonians of Antipater's party to the satrapy of Babylon. In the conflict with Eumenes he took the side of Antigonus, but on the conclusion of that struggle there ensued between him and Antigonus a feud which in its origin is indicative of the general state of affairs. Antigonus, by virtue of his royal power, attempted to control the satrap of Babylon, and demanded an account of the reve- nues of his satrapy. This was refused by Seleucus, on the ground that he, too, had been named satrap by the Makedo- nians, and was, therefore, independent of Antigonus. At first Antigonus was too strong for his opponent. Seleucus, un- able to hold his ground, took to flight with a body of faith- ful followers, and found refuge with Ptolemreus, who had the reputation of giving read} 7 help to his friends in need. Seleucus took a prominent part in the earlier conflicts be- SANDROCOTTUS. 455 tween Antigonus and Ptolemreus, and especially in the battle of Gaza, which secured the independence of Egypt. In con- sequence of this battle Selcucus was enabled to return to Babylon. That Antigonus had never made good his footing in that city is shown by the attitude of the Chakhvans, who informed him that he must secure the person of Selcucus if he was to escape destruction at his hands. Selcucus was wel- comed back to Babylon. It is a matter of great importance that it was in these centres of the most ancient and peculiar civilization, such as Egypt and Babylon, that the Makedonian generals first succeeded in establishing governments which awoke territorial sympathies and gave birth to new kingdoms. Selcucus established an independent authority in the interior of Asia. This success was principally due to the fact that he entered into a sort of partnership with an Indian ruler named Sandrocottus. In the rise of Sandrocottus there are to be seen, if I mis- take not, traces of national and religious influences. A Bud- dhist tradition is extant according to which Sandrocottus* was persuaded by the Brahmins to make himself master of the kingdom of the Prasii, which Alexander had threatened but had not actually attacked. This was the origin of the king- dom of Palimbothra. Selcucus was not in a position to over- throw this power, and was content to make a treaty with Sandro- cottus, in accordance with which live hundred elephants were placed at his disposal. These animals henceforward formed the nucleus of the force with which Selcucus subdued the inland provinces of Asia. Against a combination between Babylon and India, and in the face of the allied Indian and Gra3co-Makedonian forces, Persia was unable again to raise her head. In addition to these successes other circumstances enabled Selcucus to interfere actively in the disputes which disturbed the provinces of Asia Minor. The most important cause of the struggle which broke out in those districts was the following : Lysimachus, who had reduced the inhabitants of his Thra- * In Indian tradition he appears as Sandragupta (Lassen, " Indische Altertlnunsknndc," ii. pp. 200 sq.). i; u ; THE DIADOCHI. eian satrapy to a greater degree of subjection than Philip or even Alexander, had, like other satraps, raised himself to a position of independence. He refused to submit to Antigo- nus, and assumed the royal title. The same course of action was pursued in Makedonia by Cassander, whose effigy appears on his coins as king, although it is probable that in documents be did not uso the royal style. It was natural that a sort of league should be established between Seleucus, Lysimaehus, and Cassander against the prerogative which Antigonus claimed, and which the Ptolemies also refused to recognize. Antigo- nus set himself tirst of all to subdue Cassander in Makedonia. In this attempt he principally relied on the activity and talent of his son Demetrius. With the latter be was always on good terms, and was glad that the world should know it. Demetrius, like bis father, was a man of imposing presence. Though not quite equal to Antigonus in stature, he combined a grace and beauty of bis own with the awe-inspiring and dignified appearance which be inherited from the latter, and the haughty expression of his countenance was softened by an air of princely magnanimity, lie was fond of societ}', ami delighted in feasting with his comrades, but this did not ren- der him less attentive to more serious employment. He had a leaning towards Greek culture, and Mas even ambitious of being initiated into the Mysteries. The Athenians revered him as a god. .Demetrius, by promising freedom to the Creeks, became involved in new hostilities with Cassander. In this conflict be maintained bis superiority; be not only wrested from Cas- sander his dominions in Greece, but threatened him in Make- donia. Cassander began to think it advisable to open friendly negotiations with Antigonus. The latter, however, rejected. all efforts at reconciliation in which any conditions were of- fered. Indignant at this treatment, Cassander sought help of Lysimaehus, to whom the independence of Makedonia was indispensable for the maintenance of his own position in Thrace. At the same time he applied to the two new mon- archs, rtolennvus and Seleucus, who had already made them- selves independent. The four kings combined their forces against the fifth, who laid claim to a universal supremacy. BATTLE OF IPSUS. 457 At Ipsus, in Phrygia, the armies came into collision, in the summer of the year 301. Antigonus had at first spoken of his enemies with contempt, as a flock of birds whom he would disperse witli a single stone ; but he could not fail to be im- pressed by the combination which Lysimachus and Seleucus effected on the banks of the Ilalys. His enemies brought a force into the field which, though not more numerous than liis own, possessed an undoubted superiority in the elephants which accompanied Seleucus. In the warfare of the time elephants formed a very formidable and effective arm. An- tigonus possessed seventy-five of these animals, but Seleucus brought four hundred into the field. This fact alone seems to have produced in the camp of Antigonus a presentiment of coming misfortune. Indeed, Antigonus himself, who on all previous occasions felt certain of success, is said to have called upon the gods either to grant him victory or save him by a speedy death from the disgrace of defeat. At the first col- lision the cavalry of Demetrius were successful, but their vic- tory was rendered useless by the rashness of their leader, who pressed on too far in the pursuit. The soldiers of the phalanx did not venture to close with the elephants. If their enemy was no Poms, their leader was no Alexander, and they were not prepared to risk everything in order to protect Antigonus against the other captains of the Makedonian army. Accord- ingly, when Seleucus summoned the phalanx to come over to his side, a large body obeyed his invitation. Antigonus in vain awaited his son's return ; before the latter came back from the pursuit in which he was engaged, his father was killed by a javelin. He was already more than eighty years old. Demetrius withdrew to his fleet, upon which alone he could now place reliance. It may be worth while to remark that the battle of Ipsus was not decided by any real conflict between the Makedonian forces in either army, but by a portion of one army changing sides. The unity of the Makedonian forces was still to some extent maintained. The battle of Ipsus bears great resem- blance to the events that had lately taken place on the Nile. In that conflict the first man who, after the death of Alexan- der, had laid claim to universal authority succumbed, while at 45S THE DIADOCHI. Ipsus the second claimant, who believed himself entitled to exercise a similar if less extensive authority, was overthrown and set aside. That event decided that henceforward the military monarchs were to be on an equality. But at the same moment another question, rather provincial than universal in its nature, was raised by the dissolution of the kingdom of Antigonus and the division of his territory among the victors. Seleucus enlarged his dominions in Western Asia by the ad- dition of Mesopotamia, Armenia, and Syria as far as the Eu- phrates, while Ptolenueus established himself in possession of Koele-Syria. In this manner two new empires of wide extent and established authority came into existence. While these incidents ushered in a new state of things in the East, events in Europe were following a different, and in- deed opposite, course. In the East the power of Antigonus was destroyed ; in the West his descendants obtained posses- sion of the throne of Makedonia. Let us endeavor to explain in a few words how this took place. Demetrius Poliorketes, who had already won the greatest reputation among the military commanders of his daj r , held his ground in Cyprus and on the neighboring coasts of Cilicia and Phoenicia. But he could have had no intention of look- ing farther eastward. The element on which he possessed real power was the sea, and his interests called him to Greece, where a short time before he had been raised to the position of Strategus. He had indeed to experience a diminution of authority in Greece, owing to the issue of the battle of Ipsus, for Athens, at whose hands, as he justly declared, he deserved better treatment, deserted his cause, and other cities followed her example. But their desertion only heightened the ambi- tion of Demetrius, who now had some appearance of right on his side ; he therefore turned his forces against Athens. That city found support in the kings of Thrace, Makedonia, and Egypt. It was a question of universal interest whether De- metrius would overpower Athens or not. Demetrius was aided by the excesses of the democracy, which in Athens exercised a sort of tyranny. While the strength of the city was wasted in violent internal feuds, he used his navy with such effect that an Egyptian squadron sent GENEROSITY OF DEMETRIUS. 459 to aid the Athenians could gain no advantage over him. He then proceeded to cut off the Athenian supplies, so that the inhabitants, wasted by internal strife and pinched by famine, were forced to submit. Every one has heard how Demetrius assembled the people in the theatre, and instead of inflicting upon them the penalties which appeared imminent — for they were completely surrounded by the victorious army — gave them a free pardon, restored their liberties, and made them a welcome present of provisions. It was, in great measure, to the glory of her literature that Athens owed her escape on this occasion, for Demetrius was by nature susceptible to in- fluences of this kind, and was eager to be credited with gen- erosity. After this success Demetrius thought comj^aratively little of losing the remainder of his father's dominions in Asia, which fell into the hands of his neighbors, for a new field was now open for his activity. Cassander, King of Makedonia, was lately dead,* and among his sons there was no one to take his place. The eldest of them, who succeeded his father, died young, and his brothers were soon at open war over his in- heritance. The struggle for power has never caused more horrible crimes than in the period with which we are now dealing, and the most horrible of all was committed by the elder of the surviving sons of Cassander. He put his mother to death becanse he believed that she gave the preference to his younger brother, Alexander — an act which has involved him in eternal infamy. The younger son, Alexander, was of a vacillating character, and subject to extraneous influence. It is therefore not surprising that the Makedonians turned their eyes to Demetrius, who was son-in-law of the elder An- tipater, and of whose temperate conduct they preserved a fa- vorable recollection. Demetrius caused Alexander to be put to death at a fes- tival in Larissa. The Makedonian troops who accompanied him went over to Demetrius, and the latter followed him to Makedonia, where he found a favorable reception, especially * According to Porphyrius, in 01. 120, 4; according to Eusebius, in 01. 120, 3 (Niebubr, « Klciuc Hist, und Philol. Scbriften, p. 223), B.C. 297. 4G0 TIIE DIADOCHI. as he brought with him his son, Antigonus Gonatas, the grandson of Antipater, who was to be his heir. Encouraged by this success, he formed the plan of passing over again into Asia and reviving his father's dominions in that quarter. But while preparing to carry out this intention he was deserted by the troops whom he had collected for the purpose. These troops had been willing enough to make Demetrius master of Makedonia, for in so doing they had run no great risk ; but to accompany him to Asia and to restore to him his father's power would of necessity involve a sanguinary contest with other troops who themselves belonged to the Makedonian army. Such an undertaking was therefore by no means to their taste. The events which had occurred on the Nile and on the field of Ipsus were repeated a third time on this occa- sion. The Makedonians refused to serve a prince who at- tempted to entangle them in a dangerous struggle, in which only his personal interests were involved. It was clear, then, that the military power gave up the at- tempt to combine the conquests of Alexander into one united empire. It acquiesced in the necessity of a partition of terri- tory, in itself of very extensive nature, and continually in- volving fresh difficulties. Lysimachus had lately established a kingdom in Thrace, which included a portion of Asia Mi- nor. The continued existence of this kingdom was perhaps desirable in order that resistance might be made to the neigh- boring barbarian races, not so much to those of Scythian as to those of Keltic origin. But the Thracian kingdom could not establish itself on a firm basis. On one of its borders it was constantly exposed to attacks from Makedonia, against which, however, Lysimachus was able to defend himself. Demetrius followed a rash and adventurous policy. By at- tempting at one and the same time to maintain himself in Makedonia and Greece, to conquer Thrace, and to attack Asia, he became involved in hostilities with Scleucus. In the course of these hostilities he fell into the hands of that prince, and died in prison (283 b.c.). Successful against Demetrius, Lysimachus quarrelled with Seleucus. The two princes had combined against Antigonus and his son, but when there was nothing more to fear from ANTIGONUS GONATAS. 4G1 these opponents they fell out with each other. They were the two last living companions of Alexander the Great, but in spite of this and of their advanced age these generals trans- formed into kings were animated by a restless craving for the exclusive possession of a supreme power which had no legitimate representative, a craving which led to the destruc- tion of their families and continually embittered their mutual relations. As the Makedonian prince alluded to above made away with his mother, so Lysimachus put to death his son as soon as he appeared to become dangerous. The friends and supporters of the latter took refuge with Seleucus, whereupon war broke out between the two kings. At the very first col- lision with Seleucus, Lysimachus succumbed.'" His power melted away and his kingdom disappeared. Above the ruins of the kingdom of Thrace the kingdom of Makedonia maintained its footing, or, rather, we may say, was established anew. In the universal confusion known as the time of the anarchy, Antigonus Gonatas, son of Deme- trius and grandson of Antipater, succeeded to the throne of Makedonia (270 B.C.). Here, too, the authority of the ancient kings came into the hands of a race whose founder was one of Alexander's generals. The government of Antigonus Gonatas forms an epoch in the history of his country. He maintained the influence of Makedonia in Greece, but re- spected the independence of the latter. He kept up a stub- born contest with the Northern barbarians, and at the same time came into contact with the Western powers, who were struggling with each other for the possession of Italy. We shall come upon this kingdom by and by in a different con- nection, but our present object is to trace the history of the two other kingdoms which followed the path that Alexander had opened to them. Their development is one of the most splendid episodes in the history of the world. Among the great names of antiquity, that of Seleucus Nica- * This is the battle spoken of by Porphyrins, " kv ry mpl KSpov mSiov H&xy" ("Fragm. Hist. Grac." ed. Midler, iii. 638). It took place in the summer of 281 B.C. (Clinton, "Fasti Hell." ii. append. 4, p. 235). Ap- pian places it near the Hellespont (" Syriake," chap. G2, " mpi &pvyiav tjjv i(p' 'E\\7] 7ro\tfiiov "). 462 TIIE DIADOCHI. tor is conspicuous, as a star of the second magnitude, indeed, but of the most brilliant lustre. His history, like the histo- ries of Cyrus and llomulus, is enveloped in legend, a proof, at any rate, of the importance attached to him by his contem- poraries. To him we must ascribe a decisive share in most of the great military events of the epoch. He had originally divided Asia Minor with Lysimachus, but, in consequence of the battle alluded to above, the hitter's share was added to his own. His dominions thus extended from the Hellespont to the Indus, and it was chiefly through him that the Graeco- Makedonian power in Asia became firmly established. The power of the Persian empire, maintained by depriving the subject races of independent armaments, prepared the way for the supremacy of the Greeks and Makedonians. Alexan- der showed tact in announcing that he intended to free the Asiatic peoples from the Persian yoke ; for the only real resistance which he experienced from the populations with which he came into contact was in Tyre and on the Indus. Nevertheless, this dominion was by no means secure when it came into the hands of Perdiccas. It might, indeed, have been expected that it would have been weakened by the mu- tual rivalries of the commanders; but, as we have already remarked, their conflicts were never very sanguinary. The Makedonian army avoided what, at a later epoch of the world's history, was of frequent occurrence in the Frankish army, with which it had much resemblance. A serious strug- gle between two portions of the former body never took place. If these portions agreed to separate, a compensation was to be found in the fact that this severance enabled them better to consolidate their respective dominions. The dominion of Seleucus can hardly be regarded as a con- tinuation of that of Alexander or of the Persian empire, for its true centre was at Babylon ; on the contrary, it was rather a revival of the Assyrio-Babylonian empire, which, by the aid of the Grreco-Makedonian army, freed itself from the grasp of the Medes and Persians. The Magi were, so to speak, ex- pelled by the Chaldaeans. Bel, the god of Babel, attained in Seleukeia, the capital of Seleucus, to a religious influence over the interior of Asia which in earlier times he had never en- THE ASSYRIO-BABYLONIAN EMPIRE. 4G3 joyed. In Media, if not in Persia, colonics of no small im- portance, sent out by the new monarch, are to be found. In spite of the independence of Sandrocottus, the connec- tion with India, as is proved by the coins of Grecian work- manship which are found in those regions,* was maintained. In other districts, as under Alexander, a certain fusion of the Oriental and Makedonian civilizations took place. In Arme- nia a Persian named Orontes had established his power, and as early as the middle of the third century we find, from the evidence of a coin, that a king named Arsames was reigning in that country. Cappadocia was ruled by Ariarathes, who claimed descent from an intimate friend of Darius. In the second century we find in this country a king of Greek cult- ure named Ariarathes the Fifth. The kings of Pontus, who bore the title of Mithridates, and were recognized by the suc- cessors of Alexander as early as the year 300, declared them- selves to be descendants of a Persian grandee named Arta- bazus, of the time of Darius Hystaspis. From an early date they paid attention to Greek culture, and one of them is de- scribed as an admirer of Plato. In the northwestern table- land of Media a portion of the old Persian empire survived. x\fter the fall of that empire Atropates remained as satrap in this region, and his name lived on for many centuries in the name of the territory over which he ruled. Swarms of ma- rauders often issued from this country by the passes near the Caspian Sea, and traversed the dominions of Seleucus as far as Ecbatana ; and the connection between the Caspian and Black seas, which Seleucus attempted to maintain, was fre- quently interrupted. Of the hostilities between Media and Syria, which, accord- ing to Strabo, led to the revolt of Bactria and Parthia, we have only vague and fragmentary information. In the terri- tory of Bactria, the home of an ancient civilization, the Greek dominion maintained itself, though not always under the su- * Among the Bactrian coins of Greek stamp are to be found some ■which bear the name of Antiochus II. of Syria. They appear to belong to the time when Diodotus made himself independent, but still recog- nized the king of the Syrians (see Von Danenberg in Von Sybel's "Hist. Zeitschrift" [1879], p. 491). 4G4 TIIE DIADOCHI. premacy of the Syrian monarchs. So early as the middle of the third century there appear independent rulers of Greek origin, such as Diodotus. His family was driven out by Eu- thydemns, whose son Demetrius appears as king of the Indians. The Greeks had established themselves firmly in Bactria, and thence extended their power to India. Histori- cal research is acquainted with these kings only through their coins, from which it is ascertained that they were frequently at war with one another. As representatives of Greek power and culture in the most distant regions, they deserve to escape oblivion. So far as can be discovered, it was at the moment of their separation from the Syrian kingdom that the Parthi- ans, too, rose against the Seleukidte. Their rising took place under the leadership of Arsakes, who is described by Strabo as a native of Scythia. The Parthians were a nation of horse- men, who, in earlier times, had always assisted the Persians, but refused to be kept in subjection by the Greeks. It is evident from these considerations that the Syrian mon- archy was far from ruling all that had belonged to Persia. In reality its power was confined to Mesopotamia, Babylon, Asia Minor, and Syria. Let us take a rapid survey of the latter. Syria, properly so called, contained four important towns, two of which, namely, Antioch and Apameia, were in the interior. The latter was the arsenal of the Seleukuhi', and was provided with a fortification on a hill, where the prince kept his stud of elephants. The other two cities were on the coast. One of these, named Seleukeia, was built on a spur of the Pierian mountains, difficult of access on all sides and strongly fortified, so as to form a refuge in case of need. Where the rocky hillside drops towards the sea a harbor had boon made, around which a seaport sprang up, but this sea- port was quite separate from the city itself, which was acces- sible only to foot passengers, by means of precipitous paths. The ruins of the city are still to be seen. Somewhat farther south we find another fortified place with a better harbor, named Laodikeia, a city deriving great wealth from its trade in wine. A road, of incomparable interest from the variety and cultivation of the districts through which it passed, led from Laodikeia to Antioch. These cities formed the Syrian THE KINGDOM OF SYRIA. 465 Tetrapolis. Seleucus named Antioch after his father, Laodi- keia after his mother ; and these two cities, founded by him- self, lie probably regarded as the most important in his do- minions. Apameia was named after his Persian wife, Selcu- keia after himself. Seleucus may be regarded as one of the greatest founders of cities who has ever lived. Centuries afterwards he is cele- brated by Appian as a man endowed with an energjr and ac- tivity which always attained their aim, who out of miserable peasants' huts created great and flourishing cities. A lono- list of cities founded by him continues the tale of those which keep alive the recollection of Alexander in the East. These cities, however, must not be reckoned solely to the credit of Seleucus and Alexander. Their origin was closely connected with the main tendencies of Greek colonization. The Greeks had struggled long and often to penetrate into Asia, but so long as the Persian empire remained supreme they were en- ergetically repulsed, and it was only as mercenaries that they found admittance. This ban was now removed. Released from all restrictions and attracted by the revolution in politi- cal affairs, the Greeks now streamed into Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt. We find them everywhere ; even Judrea found herself, on all her frontiers, exposed to the influence of Greek culture, which, emanating from Syria or Egypt, hemmed her in on every side. The Jews profited by the opportunity thus afforded to take part in the general movement, but without breaking the ties which bound them to their high-priest and to Jerusalem. The kings of Syria granted them a share in the municipal administration of the towns, with whose con- sent the Greeks had been introduced, but the Hellenic ele- ment remained universally predominant. If we inquire, then, which are the towns that owed their origin to this movement of the nations, we shall find that Antioch had already been founded by Antiochus, who colo- nized it partly with Makcdonians, but still more with Athe- nians. The orators praise the fertility of its soil and the beauty of its scenery, the mildness of its climate in winter, and the coolness of its summer breezes. The city was traversed by a street of unusual dimensions, three-quarters of a mile in 30 4GG T11E diadociii. length, resembling those of Naples and Palermo in later times. A mile from the city lay a grove sacred to Apollo and Diana, called Daphne, where art and nature combined to form a re- sort of pleasure and debauchery. Still more splendid was the position of Alexandria in Egypt, the most important of all the foundations of Alexan- der. The Ptolemies maintained their supremacy in the Med- iterranean. They conquered Cyprus and made Rhodes their ally ; Egyptian merchants were to be found even in the Black Sea. The close connection between Egyptian and Greek civ- ilization which thus sprang up is shown by the fact that a statue of the Stygian Zeus was brought from Sinope to Egypt, to be worshipped there as the Serapis-Osiris of the under- world. In the internal disputes that raged among the Greeks of the mother country the Ptolemies exercised a very strong political influence. One of the consequences of this probably was that the most ancient myths about the connection be- tween Egypt and Greece were now revived. But what gave Egypt under the Ptolemies a world-wide importance, little in- ferior to that which it had enjoyed under the Pharaohs, was the revival of maritime trade with India. It was in accord- ance with the position of the Ptolemies that this trade should be still further developed. At the spot where the continents of Africa and Asia are almost severed from each other by the Hed Sea, the Ptolemies created a waterway to join the Med- iterranean with the Southern Ocean. This had been formerly attempted by Necho, but his canal had been choked by sand. Restored by Ptolemy Philadelphia, it existed till the time of the Romans. At the same time the Red Sea was swept clear of Arabian pirates, so that trade with India could again be conducted with safety. The merchandise, which came from the farthest East as well as from Arabia and Ethiopia, was brought to the harbor of Alexandria, whence it was distrib- uted all over the world. By these means Egypt attained to a condition of wealth and prosperity such as it had never yet enjoyed. Without giving credit to the exaggerated statements which have been made respecting its population, there can be no doubt that, however populous the more ancient centres of industry may ALEXANDRIA. 467 have been, they were far exceeded by those of Egypt under the Ptolemies. "We need not inquire deeply into the statis- tics of the Egyptian treasury, which is said to have contained 74,000 talents ; for even if these were only talents of copper, the quantity of money must have been very considerable. The armed force of the nation was estimated at 3500 ships of war and an army of 240,000 men. This army, owing to the fact that it originally consisted of Makedonian troops, always maintained a certain amount of independence. The prince ascended the throne only after the troops had acknowl- edged him as king. This dual control was not incompatible with an equality of civic rights. The different national ele- ments, Egyptian and Greek, which co-existed in the cities, and to which in Alexandria we must add the Jews, were placed on an equality in point of citizenship. If the great movements of the time rendered it less important to set up a new empire in the place of the old than to bring into har- mony the different national elements, often hostile to each other, this object was nowhere so fully attained as in Egypt. The Egyptian and Greek religions had a mutual attraction for one another. The Hellenistic Ptolemies fostered the native religion, and Ptolemy the son of Lagus is said to have spent the sum of fifty talents in the effort to discover the lost bull Apis. After ages of obscurity Egyptian antiquities were again brought to light. As Berosus connected Babylonian traditions with the house of the Selcukidoc, so Manetho re- garded the ancient dynasties of Egypt, whose existence he discovered from their monuments, as predecessors of the Ptolemies, and held the latter to be legitimate successors of the ancient kings. The version of the Old Testament made at Alexandria, and called, after the seventy translators, the Septuagint, has obtained a sort of sanctity. In that transla- tion there is no reference to the present; the earliest times are presented in their unadorned simplicity. But the fact of the greatest importance for after ages is that Alexandria became a new metropolis for the develop- ment of Greek literature and learning. The immediate cause of this lay in the constant struggle between the great inter- ests and powers which disturbed and ravaged Greece. Safety 468 THE DIADOCHI. and leisure for study, which had once been looked for in Makedonia, were now offered by Alexandria. "We must not, indeed, expect to find in Alexandria philosophical or poetical productions of the first rank ; for this the times, altered as they were, were no longer suited. What the Greek genius was still capable of doing in these branches was done on the soil of the mother country. But in Alexandria a library was created which was intended to contain all the monuments of Greek literature. Men appeared who possessed a talent for universal learning, such as hitherto could not have been man- ifested. The chief of these was Eratosthenes, without doubt one of the greatest librarians that has ever lived. His love of work amounted to a passion. "When his eyes refused to serve him, so that he could read no longer, he is said to have refused to prolong his life and to have starved himself to death. The great political position which Egypt held was not without influence in the sphere of science, and gave a new impulse to physical research. Eratosthenes was the first to compile, though with insufficient means, a table of degrees of latitude and longitude. A knowledge of Oriental cos- mology, especially of the observations of the Chalda?ans, was indispensable for the prosecution of inquiries into the rela- tion of the earth to the system of which it forms a part. These inquiries would, however, have been impossible with- out the development of mathematical science. None of the triumphs of Greek genius surpass the elaboration of the math- ematical method which Euclid brought to perfection in Alex- andria. In the same town Archimedes also studied for some time. The grammatical sciences on the one hand, the math- ematical and physical on the other, flourished in Alexandria side by side, and formed a foundation for all the later science of the world. Chapter XII. A GLANCE AT CAKTHAGE AND SYRACUSE. The political condition of the Eastern world depended on the balance of power between the three Grceco-Makedonian kingdoms. But in addition to them there was another power, of a nature essentially different, which occupied a dominant position in the West. So long as the Greek nationality and the Greek genius were excluded from the East, they had pressed on by means of trade and warfare towards Western Europe, for forces once developed have a constant tendency to unlimited extension. But in the West they were met by the naval power of Carthage. There arose a struggle be- tween the Greek cities in Sicily, the chief of which was Syra- cuse, and the Carthaginians, who strove without intermission to maintain and to strengthen the position in the island which they had already obtained. This struggle bears some analogy with that between Makedonia and Persia, with which at one time, as we shall see, it was actually connected. Nevertheless it bears in reality quite a different character, for it was not fought out between great kings, but between two republics. One of these — namely, Carthage — was of Semitic origin, and manifested oligarchical tendencies, while the other, Syracuse, was closely connected with the mother country of Greece, and was under a government in which democratic forms, now and then alternating with a tyranny, preponderated. Let us in the first place describe as briefly as possible the position of Carthage. Strabo is the first writer who remarks the unity and compactness of those regions on the shores of the Mediterranean which lie beyond the point where the western promontory of Sicily approaches most nearly to the coast of Africa. The strait, as Strabo calls it, is here only 470 CARTHAGE AND SYRACUSE. about ninety miles across. At this spot, on the northern coast of Africa, the Tynan colony of Carthage had established a maritime empire of its own. In the most ancient times the Greeks tried in vain to obtain a footing in Corsica and Sar- dinia, and were obliged to give up the attempt. Cagliari is a Punic, that is to say, a Carthaginian colony. The island of Malta or Melita received its name, which means a place of refuge, from Punic seamen. So, too, Panormus is but a trans- lation of the Punic name Am-Machanath, derived from its extensive harbor. Composed of the same elements, and ani- mated by the same impulses as Tyre, Carthage possessed this advantage over its mother city, that there were no powerful states engaged in conflict in its rear. From the Greeks in Kyrene it was separated by a desert in which the frontier had been hallowed by a human sacrifice, represented by tradition as having been of a voluntary nature. The Libyan neighbors of Carthage were subject to no foreign influence, so that the Carthaginians were in undisputed possession of a considerable territory. All attempts on the part of foreigners to reach the Strait of Gibraltar by sea were opposed by the Carthaginians with a jealousy regardless of consequences. They sank all the ships which ventured to invade their domain. Beyond the strait they founded colonies both in Spain and Africa. Southern Spain was covered with Libyo-Phoenician settlements, and Tartessus, a city which had repelled Grecian attacks, was forced to recognize the supremacy of the Carthaginians. We have an account of their voyages in a southern direction in the course of which they sailed round Cape Bojador. Traces have been found in their histories of their having reached the coast of Senegambia, where they founded colonies. The con- nection between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Ocean was exclusively in their hands. For the maintenance of their supremacy, and for the completion of their mercantile empire, the possession of Sicily, disputed by the Greeks and especially by the Syracusans, was all -important. In order to under- stand the general position of the world at this epoch it is in- dispensable that we should take a glance, at any rate, at the leading events of this struggle. IIERMOCRATES. 471 If the Atheniaus had succeeded in their attack on Syra- cuse, the Carthaginians would hardly have been able to main- tain their footing on the island. The disastrous issue of that enterprise not only freed them from their danger, but turned out to their advantage. The tribes whom the Athenians had summoned to their aid were for some time longer most useful to the Carthaginians. Other levies, less efficient, but still more numerous, were collected in Libya, Spain, and Ita- ly by Hannibal, grandson of that Hamilcar who had fallen at Himera, and carried across by him in the year 410 to Sicily. At the spot where he first landed, Lilybjeum, after- wards one of the chief arsenals of the Carthaginians, was built. He took Selinus, in spite of a strenuous resistance, which continued even after a breach had been made in the walls, and overcame the people of Himera. He brought the prisoners, 3000 in number, to the spot where his grandfather had fallen, and there slew them all as a horrible sacrifice to the hero's shade. Under pressure of the terror inspired by this event the Greek population showed nothing but weakness. In Her- mocrates, indeed, Syracuse possessed a man who might have been able to check the progress of the Carthaginians. He had distinguished himself above all others in the strusrsrle with Athens, and had afterwards aided the Lakedoemonians on the coast of Asia Minor. Thukydides says of him that in skill and courage he had no superior. But it was often the case in these republics that civil strife caused the banishment of their best citizens, and Hermocrates was exiled from Syra- cuse. For a time he carried on war in Sicily on his own ac- count. He partially restored Selinus, and made several not unsuccessful forays into Carthaginian territory. These feats gained him universal recognition from all but his political en- emies. The latter had no intention of recalling hira, and when he attempted, with the help of his partisans, to force his way into the city, he was struck down and killed in the market-place (408-7 b.c). The violence of party feeling in this case, as in others, stifled all respect for personal merit, however great. Soon after these events the Carthaginians appeared again 472 CARTHAGE AND SYRACUSE. in Sicily. Agrigentum, the second city of the island, fell into their bands after a siege of seven months (November, 406 B.C.). The very size of the city and the number of its inhabitants facilitated its reduction by famine. This event inspired universal terror among the Sicilian Greeks. They feared that it would be impossible for them to hold out against the superior numbers of the Carthaginians, and many fled with their wives and children into Italy. They felt no further confidence in Syracuse, for they argued that, if the Syracusan generals had wished to do so, they might have saved Agrigentum. It was even supposed that the latter were in- clined to favor the Carthaginians, and perhaps were bribed by them. In Syracuse itself the panic caused by the progress of the Carthaginians brought about a change of constitution, and placed the government in the hands of a tyrant. The people of Agrigentum urged their complaint against the Syra- eusan generals for some time in vain, for the reputation and political influence of the latter were so great that no one dared to incur their enmity. At length, however, one of the old companions of llermoerates, named Dionysius, a man of hum- ble birth, ventured to give expression to public opinion. In his attempts he had the support of the historian Philistus, a wealthy citizen of good family, who promised to help him with money if his enterprise miscarried. It was, however, com- pletely successful, for the people of Syracuse were convinced of the truth of the charges, and were fully awake to the im- portance of the crisis. The result was that the generals were deprived of their office, and Dionysius with certain others put in their place. After a short time, and without much trouble, Dionysius got the supreme power into his hands. At first, however, no alteration took place in the general position of affairs. On the contrary, Dionysius considered it desirable, for the sake of his own reputation in the city, to be recognized by the Carthaginians. He therefore concluded a peace, by which the latter were allowed to retain Ilimera, Selinus, and Agrigentum. It was also provided that the mu- tual independence of all the Greeks who were not subject to the Carthaginians should be maintained, a proceeding which involved a complete disruption of the Grecian power. In DIONYSIUS THE ELDER. 473 Dionysius the Elder we find a character compounded of de- cision, cunning, and violence, and endowed with a vigor and activity which enabled him to maintain his position in the stormy ferment of a democratic community. If we may be- lieve Aristotle, Dionysius, like Peisistratus before him, raised himself to power by arousing in the popular mind a fear of the aristocracy. Real virtue, which is transparent in its nat- ure, is not to be looked for in such a man. Philistus, who probably during the critical period of his life helped him with good counsel, was afterwards ill-treated by him, but, never- theless, Dionysius has received more justice at the hands of Philistus than from any other historian. Dionysius, as soon as he felt his power in some degree established, ventured to renew the war with Carthage. His armaments were considerable, but Syracuse could not, unaid- ed, measure swords with Carthage. Ilimilco, who belonged to the same family as Hannibal,* took the field against Dio- nysius with a force undoubtedly far superior to that of the Syracusans, even if we refuse credit to the statement of Timeeus that his army numbered 400,000 men. Dionysius did not venture to fight a pitched battle in the Carthaginian territory, where he had made great progress before Ilimilco appeared. He retreated to his capital, where he was soon ex- posed to a combined attack by land and sea on the part of his successful and vindictive enemy. The temple of Deme- ter, one of the chief sanctuaries of that goddess, was plun- dered, and the suburb of Achradina was taken. The besiegers made very serious progress, and the enemies of Dionysius within the town began to stir. A great disaster appeared im- minent, but, as had been the case in the Athenian expedition, the Syracusans were saved by the situation of their city and by a climate fatal to all but natives of the place. The tem- perature, varying between frost at night and intolerable heat by day, combined with the exhalations of the marshy neigh- borhood to produce an infectious pestilence in the Carthagin- ian army. The plague — for such it was — made such ravages * Hamilcar, who died in 480 B.C., had three sons, Ilimilco, Ilanno, and Gisgo. Gisgo's son was Hannibal; the son of Hanno was Himilco. 4 7 ± CARTHAGE AND SYRACUSE. that Ilimilco was forced to raise the siege (39G b.c). Dionys- ius, however, refused to allow the Carthaginians to retire un- molested until they had paid him a considerable sum of money. The people of Carthage had already heard of the disaster, and on Himilco's return thronged the quays in a state of painful expectation. Loud lamentations broke forth when the few survivors disembarked, last of all the commander himself, without his arms and in slave's attire. The first words he uttered were those of regret that he had not himself perished. Loudly lamenting his misfortune, and attended by a vast crowd, he passed through the city to his own house. There he dismissed his attendants, and shutting the door upon the multitude, without even bidding his son farewell, he put an end to his life. In consequence of this disaster the Cartha- ginians gave up Tauromenium and withdrew within the fron- tier of the Ilalycus. Although they were still powerful, Syra- cuse maintained her independence and greatness ; and we can- not but credit Dionysius the Elder with making active use of his power. He defeated the Illyrian and Sardinian pi- rates, as well as the Italian Greeks, and reigned with brilliant success until his death in the year 367 b.c. His son was not capable of carrying on his system of government, and civil disputes soon broke out in Syracuse. Dion, a near relation of Dionysius, the head of the aristocratic party, and an intimate friend of Plato, engaged in conflict with the democrats. In consequence of these troubles the Carthaginians became so powerful that the Syracusans, under the combined pressure of civil and foreign war, at last de- manded aid of their mother city, Corinth. Help was brought to them by Timoleon, a strong supporter of democratic prin- ciples, and at the same time a commander of the first rank. He belonged to the school of Iphicrates and Chabrias, and was completely master of the military science which the Greeks had brought to such perfection, and which was ap- parent in the mercenary armies of the day. He came to the aid of the Syracusans with a force of 12,000 men, and fought a battle on the Crimissus, in which he drove an army of 70,000 Carthaginians from the field (June, 339 b.c). Two years later Timoleon died. TIMOLEON. 475 It was always the Greek democracy which, first of all un- der the tyrants, and then under the tyrannicides, of whom Timoleon himself was one, defended the independence of Sicily against Carthage. A striking episode in universal his- tory is formed by the conflict between these two communi- ties, composed of elements so essentially diverse and so di- ametrically opposed to one another — on the one hand Syra- cuse, the outpost of Hellenic culture in the West, a centre of intellectual, political, and commercial activity, yet maintain- ing the most intimate connection with the mother country; and on the other Carthage, the outpost of Phoenician power, and mistress of the seas, isolated, independent, and myste- rious. Carthage was affected but not injured by the result of the Persian wars. The fall of Tyre put an end to the political, and probably to the commercial, relations between Phoenicia and its greatest colony. Carthage stood in direct opposition to Alexander, who was believed, as we have already said, to have contemplated an attack upon that city.* It is impossi- ble to sa} 7 , if such an attack had been undertaken, what would have been its result. The immediate successors of Alexander were too fully occupied in conflicts with each other to turn their eyes towards the west. But just at this time it hap- pened that a power arose in Syracuse which renewed the war with Carthage in such a way as to threaten that city with sud- den destruction. Among those who, through Timolcon's influence, had ob- tained the franchise in Syracuse was an inhabitant of Rhc- gium. His son, named Agathocles, at first followed his fa- ther's trade of potter — that is, he probably made the orna- mental vases and urns which at that time were so much in request for sepulchral use in Italy and Etruria. Afterwards he became a soldier and rose to a high position. lie was a young man in whom extraordinary physical strength was com- * According to Justin (xxi. 6) the Carthaginians scut an embassy to Alexander, which obtained information and sent in a report as to his plans against them. A similar statement is to be found in Frontinus (" Stratcg." i. 2, 3). 476 CABTHAGB AND SYRACUSE. bined with beauty and the most resolute audacity with Gun- ning and caution.* By his marriage with the widow of a rich and distinguished citizen lie connected himself with the aristocracy, who, however, showed him little favor on that account. Sent as commander of a body of troops to the aid of Croton, he established a legitimate claim to the prize of valor, but this prize was refused him by the oligarchs of Syracuse. Nothing could have more deeply wounded the susceptibilities of an ambitious young man than the refusal, on party grounds, of an honor so eagerly coveted. In the civil quarrels which disturbed Syracuse, Agathocles now took the side of the people, lie -was banished, recalled, then banished a second time. The aristocrats persecuted him, the people were unable to protect him. and on one occasion it was only through the precaution of putting another man into his clothes that he escaped death. The unfortunate person so disguised was actually slain. Outside the walls of the city he attained an independent position. Southern Italy and Sicily were t-t ill a prey to all the misery of civil and foreign war, which in Greece itself had been happily diminished by the League of the Public Peace, established by King Philip. Numerous exiles were everywhere to be found, who were en- gaged in unceasing feud with the cities whence they had been expelled. At the head of such a body of exiles Agath- ocles made his reputation. After having been driven out of Syracuse for the second time, he collected round him a vagabond troop of outlaws, who regarded him as their chief, * The history of Agathocles is known to us from two authors, who, however, contain only selections from others, viz., Diodorus Sieulus and Tragus Pompeius, the latter of whom comes down to ns in the form of excerpts made by Justin. Whence did these authors draw their informa- tion i That TrogUS had Timants before Ids eyes is clear from a passage of Polybius. This passage, however, refers only to an event in the youth of Agathocles, Diodorus. too, cites Timauis here and there, hut rejects him. It is assumed that he follows Callias, who wrote in favor o{' Agatho- cles. This, however, is not probable, because the cruelties ot' Agatho- eles are drawn by Diodorus in colors too dark to be traced to a flat- terer. All that is certain is that there are two distinct narratives, each of which shows internal consistency and possesses some value. From Polyamus. who merely connects anecdotes, I can get no real information. AGATHOCLES. 477 invested him with absolute power, and made themselves very troublesome to the Syracusans. So far we can follow the biographical accounts which Dio- dorus has incorporated in his work. According to him the later events in the life of Agathocles, like the earlier, are to be traced almost exclusively to party struggles in the city ; but in another account, taken from Trogus Pompeius by Justin, the relations between Agathocles and Carthage, doubtless the most important in which he was involved, are placed in the foreground. According to Justin, the Syracusans, who at that time were on friendly terms with the Carthaginians, called in the latter to help them against Agathocles, and one of the commanders of the Carthaginian army, named Ilamil- car, appeared to give them the assistance they required. But the Carthaginians were never honest friends of Syracuse. Ilamilcar, it is true, brought about a reconciliation between Agathocles and the civic authorities, which resulted in the admission of the former, with his followers, into the city, but he was already a condottlere on his own account, and the entry of his troops could not but bring disturbances in its train. These disturbances we find more fully described in Dio- dorus than in Justin, and the difference between the two authors is very instructive. According to Diodorus the exiles were re-admitted after taking an oath to do nothing against the democratic constitution of the city: the dispute therefore was, in his view, purely an internal one. Justin, on the other hand, tells us that Ilamilcar supported Agathocles with 5000 of his savage African troops, on the latter taking an oath that he would forthwith recognize the supremacy of Carthage.* In both authors Agathocles takes an oath, but in each case it is an oath of which the other author knows noth- ing. One is inclined to regard both obligations as having been actually entered into, but to suppose that neither the * Justin, xxii. 2. That the " domestica potentia," to the furtherance of which Agathocles binds himself, is no other than the Carthaginian, is shown by the following words: "Amilcari expositis insignibus Cereris tactisque in obsequia Pconorum jurat," words which only imply an in- ferior position in the alliance made between him and Ilamilcar. 47$ CARTHAGE AND SYRACUSE. Carthaginians nor the Syracusans knew what had been prom- ised to the other side. Both, as it turned out, were de- ceived. In Syracuse there ensued one of the most horrible deeds of violence which ever took place in an Hellenic city — a two days' massacre, in which both the aristocracy and the most prominent members of the popular party suffered alike. The number of those slain was reckoned at 4000, while C'^00 more were forced to seek safety in flight, after which Agatho- cles seized on the supreme power, and established what may fairly be called a military tyranny. It is hardly intelligible that Ilamilcar should have been an idle spectator of these horrors if he had not had an understanding with Agatho- cles, and had not expected that the. latter would show him- self submissive to Carthage. But Agathocles, once in power, began to aim at re-establishing the independence of the neigh- boring towns, and showed no scruple in treating the allies of Carthage as enemies. The latter naturally turned to Carthage, and reproached Ilamilcar with having allowed a man to come to power in Syracuse from whom nothing could be expected but constantly increasing hostility towards Carthage. Un- doubtedly Ilamilcar had acted in the matter without instruc- tions, and such action was always regarded in Carthage as an unpardonable crime if it did not turn out to be successful. The Carthaginian government, bj T a secret vote, and without allowing Ilamilcar a chance of clearing himself, condemned him to death. It was regarded at the time as a special grace of the gods that he died by a natural death before the sentence could be put into execution. A serious war was now more than ever inevitable. The army which the Carthaginians brought into the field under a second Ilamilcar, the son of Gisgo, was far superior in numbers to that of Syracuse. Agathocles, who was by no means a match for the enemy, met with a defeat at Himera (310 b.c), due principally to the slingers from the Balearic Islands, who hurled large stones with an unerring skill which they had acquired from early practice. Without pausing to lay siege to Gela, which Agathocles had brought under his control by means as cruel as those which he had employed in his own city, Ilamilcar at once laid siege to Syracuse. There- AGATHOCLES. 479 upon the whole island rose against Agathocles. The inhab- itants of Camarina and Leontini, of Catana, Tauromenium, and Messana, all joined the Carthaginians. The destruction of Agathocles, hard pressed by superior forces both by land and sea, and unprepared for defence, seemed imminent. In this crisis he hit upon a most audacious but ingenious plan, which, especially owing to subsequent events, made his name famous in later times. He knew that the power of Carthage in Africa itself was insecure, and determined, though actually besieged at the time, to defend himself from the Carthaginian invasion by a counter-attack upon Africa. For this purpose he collected a band of well-armed and devoted followers. He concealed his ultimate intentions, and bade all stay behind who would not follow his fortunes with implicit trust. Out of those who gave in their unconditional adhesion he formed a compact body, in which he even included some slaves of soldierly character, whom he bound by an oath to his person. Attended by more good-fortune than he could have expected, he crossed over to Africa.* His followers were without ex- ception thorough soldiers, men for whom his name had over- powering attraction. The object of his enterprise was, first of all, to conquer the Libyan territory, and then to make an attack upon Carthage itself. The prospect which Agatho- cles laid before his army was, that if they took Carthage they would be masters both of Libya and Sicily, but he made his attempt rather as a condottiere on his own account than in the name of Syracuse. The ships which he brought over with him he set on fire, as a sacrifice, he said, to the Sicilian goddesses Demeter and Persephone. His enterprise was an act of despair: both he and his troops were as good as lost if they did not succeed entirely; but the consciousness of this gave them double energy. They completely defeated a Carthaginian army, whose command- ers, it appears, had fallen out with each other. Thereupon a number of cities, the walls of which the Carthaginians had * Agathocles set sail from the harbor of Syracuse a short time before August 15, 310 B.C., on which day there was an eclipse of the sun (Dio- dorus, xx. 5 ; Justin, xxii. 6). 480 CARTHAGE AND SYRACUSE. demolished, fell into the hands of Agathocles. The native population rose in his favor and a Libyan prince came over to his side. He took possession of Utica. Lastly, while the Carthaginians were thus hard pressed by a Sicilian army, trained in the Greek school of military tactics, another enemy from the side of Kyrene made his appearance in the field. Kyrene had been occupied by a Makedonian named Ophel- ias, a trusty follower of Alexander the Great, in the name and with the support of Ptolemseus the son of Lagus. The city had thus been brought into contact, with the Gnvco-Makedo- nian kingdoms. Ophelias had since then made himself inde- pendent, and now gave free play to his ambition. He con- templated nothing less than the conquest of Africa, and formed an alliance with Agathocles. The latter declared that he would content himself with Sicily, and willingly leave Africa to Ophelias, on the understanding that they should join their forces to overpower Carthage. It is evident that, if the Make- donian troops who were at the disposal of Ophelias, and who might have been strengthened by reinforcements from Athens, had marched upon Carthage in combination with the troops of Agathocles, that great metropolis would have been in the most serious danger. The invading army had even reason to expect that, a Carthaginian general named Bomilcar would make common cause with them. It was thus, then, the military power of Hellas with which Carthage had to struggle for its existence. The intention which had been ascribed to Alexander appeared likely, some thirteen years after his death, to be carried into effect. The struggle between the Greek and Oriental divinities, which had been fought out by Alexander at Tyre, was transferred to a new battle-field, and the dominion of the Gneco-Makedonian element, lately founded on so firm a basis in the East, now threatened to extend itself to the West. Efforts, to which we shall have occasion to return, had already been made from the side of Epeirus to establish a Greek supremacy in Italy. It is clear, then, that the enterprise of Agathocles must not be regarded as an isolated adventure, for it is in reality one more event in the history of Greek genius striving for the empire of the world. SIEGE OF CARTHAGE. 481 111 the face of this danger the old religions fanaticism of the Semitic race awoke in the people of Carthage to its full strength. They called to mind all the faults which they had ever committed against their religion — the tithes which they had not fully paid to Ilerculcs-Mclkart in Tyre, but above all the fact that they had omitted to carry out their horrible cus- tom of offering their first-born to Cronus-Moloch. Children had been imported from abroad, secretly brought up, and offered instead of their own. For these religious transgres- sions and shortcomings they believed themselves now to be Buffering punishment. They determined to renew the sac- rifice of their children according to the established ritual, by which they were laid in the hands of the huge Cronus, open, and pointed towards a furnace at his feet, into which the victims fell. Two hundred children from the principal families of Carthage were selected and publicly offered up. Many who found themselves suspected of similar guilt gave themselves or their children up to sacrifice. The ships were draped in black. Every general who made a mistake, or gave any ground for suspicion, was punished with death. Carthage, in the depth of her gloom, collected all her ener- gies to repel the attack with which she was threatened in Libya. On the other side the Greeks were as little able as ever to combine in a great undertaking without some dominant authority to lead them. Ophelias, who brought with him an army of 20,000 men, was treacherously put to death by Agath- ocles. The Kyrenian army, however, joined the Sicilian, so that for the great struggle with Carthage some advantage seemed to be gained by this act of treachery. But Agathocles could not reckon upon the loyalty of his troops, even of those lie had brought with him, much less on that of the Kyrenian forces who had gone over to his side. There was, as we have already mentioned, a partisan in Carthage who had shown an inclination to side with him, but at the last moment he was deterred by the disturbances which broke out among the Grecian soldiery. Agathocles himself was called away from Africa by the troubles which broke out in Sicily during his absence. He 31 4S2 CARTHAGE AND SYRACUSE. intrusted his army in Africa to the command of his son Archagathus. In consequence of the fame which preceded him he again won the upper hand in Sicily, but the Cartha- ginians made effective resistance in their own country, and brought three considerable armies into the field. On the other hand there arose a misunderstanding between Archas:- athus and his troops on the subject of their pay, which the Bon said he was obliged to withhold until his father's return. When Agathocles returned to Africa, not long after this,' he told his troops that their relation towards him was not pre- cisely that of mercenary soldiers, but rather that the fruits of victory were to be divided between them : they might, he said, find their pay in Carthage. A coup de main might pos- sibly have been successful if undertaken immediately, but Agathocles was not in a position to carry on a lengthened cam- paign. He succeeded in persuading his troops to march a second time against the enemy ; but when fortune turned against him a mutiny broke out in his camp, which compelled him to seek safety from his own troops in flight. His son was slain by the mutineers. Agathocles himself made good his escape,'- but his whole enterprise disappeared in smoke, like a meteor which flashes across the sky. It has no real impor- tance except from the fact that it disclosed the method by which the power of Carthage was fated eventually to be destroyed. In Sicily, however, it enabled Agathocles to establish him- self more firmly. Like the Makedonian generals, he assumed the title of king. AYe have it on the common authority of an- tiquity, and we are expressly assured by Polybius, that after having in the first instance established his power with the greatest cruelty, he wielded it in the most temperate fashion. But there could be no idea of repeating his enterprise in Africa. Agathocles found himself compelled to conclude a peace with the Carthaginians, by which they recovered * According to the reckoning in Meltzer's "Geschichteder Karthager" (\. 628), which is founded on the statement of Diodorus (xx. 69), M Ik-\h- oaQKara rtjvSvmv ti'ic wKu&Soq \ftfuoror ovroc," Agathocles left Africa about the middle of October, B.C. 307. RISE OF ROME. 483 the whole dominion which they had formerly possessed in Sicily. This success was followed by a fresh development of the Pnnic empire. While in the East the genius and the power of the Greeks preserved their supremacy, the Carthaginian power in the West maintained itself with undiminished lustre. Between these two elements, the Greek and the Cartha- ginian, the Western world would have remained divided but for the appearance in their midst of a new power, that of Rome. INDEX. A. Abraham, in Canaan, 23; blessed by Mcl- chizedck, "24. Absalom, rebels, 50; slain by Joab, ib. Academy, the, 218, 331. Achsemenidse, the, 95; their power, 100. Acropolis, the, 139; burned, 173; descrip- tion of, 217, 218. Adonijah, 51 ; his death, 52. .E^ina, 128; conquered bv the Athenians, 223. JEgiuctans help Athenians, 176. yEgospotami, battle of, 272. .Esehines, at Delphi, 381 ; for war with Amphissa, 385 ; opposed by Demosthe- nes, 38G. -Eschylus, 111, 19G ; " Prometheus Bound," 289 ; religious views of, 290, 332 ; li Seven against Thebes," 291 ; ' ; Persians," ib. ; " Suppliants," ib. ; "Danaids,"292; "Or- esteia," ib. ; i: Agamemnon," lb. ; li Choe- phoree, ib. Agathocles, rise of, 475; relations with Carthage, 477; supreme power seized by, 478; invades Africa, 479; leaves Africa, 482; concludes peace with the Carthaginians, ib. Agesilaus, king of Lakedremon, 34G ; char- acter of, 347; invades Asia, ib.; attacks Pharnabazus, ib. ; return of, 349; resists Epameinondas, 357 ; in Egypt, 359 ; death of, 3(50. Agrigcntum, 131, 132; splendor of, 283; fall of, 472. Ahab, 61, G2. Ahriman, 10G, 107. Ahura, god of the Persians, 105. Ai, conquered, 31. Alemxonidrc, family of the, 139; recall of the, 147, 150 ; destiny of the, 219. Aleuadae, clan of the, 28*8, 374. Alexander (.Egus), murder of, 451. Alexander, brother of Demetrius, 459. Alexander the Great, becomes king, 393; compared with Erederick the Great, 394 ; in Thrace, 395 ; destroys Thebes, 399; decides on war against Persia, 401; ideas of, 403, 404 ; army of, 405 ; invades Persia, 40G ; at Ephesus, 409 ; resolves to attack Phoenicia, 412, 413; in Egypt, 415, 41G ; visits the shrine of Anion, 417 ; crosses the Tigris, 419; in Babylon, 420, 421; adopts Persian customs, 423 ; suc- cessor of Darius, 42G; invades India, 427, 428, 430; his zeal for discovery, 432 ; sails down the Indus, ib. ; rejoins his fleet, 436; returns to Babylon, ib. ; later schemes of, ib. ; career of victory of, 437 ; work and character of, 438, 439 ; bust of, ib. ; marriage of, 440 ; death of, ib. ; off- spring of, 443. Alexandria (in Egypt), founded, 41G; de- scription of, 4GG. ■ (on the Indus), 433. Alkibiadcs, opposes Nikias, 243; at Argos, 214; central figure at Athens, 24G; char- acter of, ib. ; speech on the Sicilian ex- pedition, 249 ; recalled, 256 ; escapes, ib. ; in Sparta, 257; in Persia, 260; position of, 262 ; opposes Laked:emonians, 263 ; recall of, 266; commander-in-chief, 269; leaves Athens, 270 ; death of, 274, 275. Amalek, war against, 41. Amasis,his body-guard, 154. Amencmhat II., 9, 10, 13. Amenemhat III., 7. Atnmon, tribe of, 23, 35; David conquers, 147. Amon, god of Egypt, 3, 16; sole worship of, 11; temple of, 12, 15, 97; oracle of, 190; shrine of, visited by Alexander, 417. Amorites, war with Israelites, 29, 30. Amphictyonic Council, 182; declares war on Phokians, 374 ; new league, 378 ; votes against Locrians, 384. Amphipolis, taken by Brasidas, 237; by Olynthians, 372 ; by Philip, 372, 379. Amu, tribe of, 8. 4S6 INDEX. Amyntas, king of Makcdonia, 15G. Anaxagoras, 212, 318. Anaximander, 281. Angro-mainyus, 105. Anointing, ceremony of, 40. Antalkidas, peace of, 350. Antigonus (Gonatas), heir of Demetrius, 459, 4G0 ; king of Makcdonia, 461. Antigonus, in Phrygia, 448; allied with Ptolemajus, 450; named Strategus, 452 ; saluted as king, 453; death of, 457 ; pow- er of, destroyed, 458. Antioch, 465; description of, 466. Antipater, left in Greece, 405 ; takes place of Perdiccas, 449 ; death of, 450. Antiphon, 317. Aornus, siege of, 429. Apameia, 465. Apis, type of Osiris, 4 ; worship of, 22, 97 ; lost, 467. Apollo, in the " Agamemnon," 292. Arabia known to the Israelites, 59. Arabians, relations with Egyptians, 11 ; compared with Israelites, 34. Arachosia subdued, 103. Arantha (Orontes), 16. Arbela, battle of, 419,420. Archelaus, court of, 369. Archidamus, king, 222. Archimedes, 468. Archons, 143. Areopagus, ancient form, 138, 143; power of, reduced, 203. Arginusaj, battle of, 271. Argo, heroes in the, 280. Argos, 126; policy of, 128; allied with Corinth, 212; league with Athens, 244; league with Sparta, 245. Argyraspides, 450. Aristagoras, of Miletus, 158, 159 ; at Athens, 161. Aristeides, 194, 195; his authority, 196; re- forms of, 197; establishes supremacy of Athens, 198; joins with Kimon,199. Aristophanes, his view of Cleon, 227; the " Peace," 240, 241 ; his view of Socrates, 325. Aristotle, disagrees with Xcnophon, 115; on Solon's reforms, 143 ; pupil of Plato, 336; philosophy of, U>. ; views on nature, ib.; influence on the Middle Ages, 339; conception of the State, ib.; combats Plato's views, 340; teacher of Alexan- der, ib. ; scheme of education, 341 ; death of, 448. Armenia, rising in, 104; religion of, 108; under the Diadochi, 463. Arrhidanis, half-brother of Alexander, 443 ; recognized as king, 444 ; death of, 451. Arrian^ 397, 405, 414. Artabazus, as Karanos, 361. Artapherncs, 165. Artaxerxes (Mncmon) made king, 343. (Ochus), 361. , second son of Xerxes, 188 ; subdues Egypt, 190. Artemisium, battle of, 171. Ascalon, religion of, 21. Ashdod, taken by Sargon, 73. Aspasia, friend of Pericles, 219. Assur, god of Assyria, 104, 105. Assur-banipal, in Egvpt, 78 ; power of, 79, 91. Assur -nasir-habal, king of Assyria, 67; reaches the Mediterranean, 68; his death, 69. Assyria, rise of monarchy in, 65 ; palaces of, 66 ; military power of, 75 ; religion of, ib.; power of, 81; collapse of, 82. Assvriaus, advance of, 68, 69; in Canaan, 95. Astarte, in Canaan, 14, 17, 19 ; (Venus Ura- nia), 21 ; in Jerusalem, 55. Astyages, king of Media, 94. Asura, the, 105. Athaliah, daughter of Jezebel, 64. Athens, constitution of, 138; rise of, 149; democracy of, 152; helps Aristagoras, 161 ; saved by Marathon, 168 ; after Persian war, 181; walls of, 182; at war in Egypt, 190; dominion in the Archi- pelago, 192; democracy of, 194; suprem- acy of, 198; art of, 201, 216, 319; a sea- port, 205; armistice with Sparta, 208; under Pericles, 216 ; power of, 220 ; in the north, ib.; naval power of, 222; revolu- tion of, 411 B.C., 264; intellectual life in, 317; philosophers at, 320; maritime su- premacy restored, 350 ; joins Sparta against Thebes, 357; decay of, 3G1; war with Makcdonia, 372; makes peace with Philip, 377; alone opposes Philip, 381; allied with Thebes, 386; joy in, at Phil- ip's death, 393 ; aids Thebes against Alexander, 398; peace with Alexander, 400; submits to Antipater, 447; opposes Demetrius, 458. Athos, wreck of Persian fleet off, 165. Attica, an Ionian district, 138. Auramazda, god of Persia, 102 ; influence of, 105, 106, 112, 113. Autonomy, in Bceotia, 210; in peace of An- talkidas, 351 ; restoration of, in Bceotia, m ' B. BAAL, in Egvpt, 2; in Canaan, 11, 14, 17; religion of, 19,20, 21,25,28, 35; temple in Samaria, 62, 64; in Asia, 86; priest- hood of, 403 ; worship of, favored by Al- exander, 421. INDEX. 48^ Babel (Babylon), 65. Babylon, science of, 4, 281 ; religion of, 19- 21 ; atmosphere of, 19 ; duodecimal sys- tem in, 19; mythology of, 20; cosmog- ony of, 21, 22 ; kings of, G7 ; conquest of, 95 ; revolt of, 101 ; centre of Seleucus's kingdom, 462. Bacchiadie in Corinth, 135. Bactria, satrapy of, 103, 110; invaded by Alexander, 425 ; revolt of, 464. Bagoas, 364, 365 ; power of, 401 ; death of, 402. Bashan, kingdom of, 30. Bedouin Arabs, possession of Delta by, 10 ; (Schasu), 14. Bel, god of Babylon, 66. Ben-hadad (Ben-hidri) of Damascus, 69. Beni-Hassan, sepulchral chambers of, 7. Berosus, 467. Beyrout, 13. Bibacta, island of, 435. Bithynia, 109. Bceotarchs, the, 355. Boeotia, 206 ; parties in, 210. Brahmins, 455 ; attacked by Alexander, 433. Brasidas, wounded, 233 ; in Thrace, 236 ; his character, 237 ; death of, 239; ideas of, 351 ; speech of, 369. Bundehesh, the, 107. Byzantium, founded, 131; reconquest of, by Athens, 267; revolt of, 360, 361; de- fended against Philip, 383; importance of, 395. Cadmeia, the, surprised, 353 ; Makedonian garrison in the, 391. Callicratidas, 270. Cambvses, 97; crime of, 98; his death, 99." Canaan, connected with Egypt, 14, 75 ; con- dition of, 29 ; rise of power in, 48 ; re- ligion of Jehovah in, ib. Canal of Suez, 466. Cappadocia, governed by satraps, 109 ; un- der Ariarathes, 463. Captivity, Jewish, 87. Caramania, Alexander arrives in, 435. Caria, prince of, 362. Carthage, founded, 60; independence of, 81, 129; power in Sicily, 259, 260, 471 ; attack on, contemplated by Alexander, 436 ; origin of, 469 ; position of, ib. ; mar- itime power of, 470; effect of Persian wars on, 475 ; besieged by Agathoclcs, 480, 481. Caryatides, the, 217. Cassander, son of Antipater, 451; in Makc- donia, 456 ; death of, 459. Caucasus, known to Jews, 59, 60; barrier of the, 108. Chxroneia, battle of, 387, 388. Chahkeans, astronomy, 19, 468 (see Baby- lon). Chalkedon founded, 131. Chalkidike, invaded by Brasidas, 237; at- tacked by Philip, 382. Chalkis, foundries in, 132. Chain (Phoenicians), 12. Cheironidas, the, 288. Chemosh, fire-god, 55. Chersonese (Thracian) threatened by Philip, 381. Cheta attacked by Sethos, 15, 16, 17. Chios, seat of the Homeridaj, 130; rebels against Athens, 360. Chnumhotep, 7. Cilicia allied to the Lydians, 91. Cimmerian tribes, advance of, 90. Cleisthenes, reforms of, 151; banished, ib. Cleitus, saves Alexander, 407; death of, 425. Cleombrotus, king of Sparta, 151, 160. Cleomenes, king of Sparta, 151, 160. Cleon, character of, 227; power of, 228; op- poses peace, 234 ; in Thrace, 238 ; death of, 239. Cleopatra, sister of Alexander, 451. Cnidus, battle of, 349. Coinage, of Argos, 128; of Athens, 141, 112. Colchis, 119. Colonies, yEolian, 130; Dorian, 130, 220 ; in the West, 220. Conor), Athenian commander, 272. Cophcn (Cabul) crossed by Alexander, 430. Corinth, early history, 126, 131; war with Korkyra, 220; joins Argos, 242; helps Syracuse, 258: war with Sparta, 349; con- gress at, 391, 394. Corinthian war, the, 349. Coroneia, first battle of, 210; second battle of, 349. Cranon, battle of, 446. Craterus, 416. Crimissus, battle of the, 474. Critias, 274-276; his death, 278. Croesus, king of Lydia, 95, 154. Cunaxa, battle of, 344, 345. Cuneiform inscriptions, 74, 75, 88, 104. Cush, king of, 78. Cyprus, ruins of Kitium, 74; subjugation of, 77; subdued by Amasis, 154; Persian dominion in, 351; revolt against Persia, 362; under Alexander, 413; battle of, 452. Cyrus (the elder), founder of Persian em- pire, 94, 95. Cyrus (the younger), 268, 342; aids Ly- sander, 272 ; death of, 345. 488 INDEX. D. Dagon, fish-god, 38, 73. Dante compared with Plato, 339. Damascus, taken by Egyptians, 13; com- merce of, 4.">. Pericles, 194 ; head of democracy, 202; sup- ported by Ephialtes, ib, .- reforms of, 208 : legislation of, 204; administration of. 209; at Delphi, ft.; leader of the Demos, 21 1 ; character of, 218, --••J."> ; busl of. 21 1 ; care of navy, 215 ; prepares tor war, 222 ; death of, 225, Perinthus attacked by Philip, 882, Perioeki, the, 177; introduced into army, 860. Pcrsepolis, buildings of, 111 ; Alexander at, 421. l'-.rsii. eastern origin ■. i - religion ' 105, 107 ; monarchy, 98 : inscriptions, 99 : formation of empire, L04; solidity i>( power, 108; rise of monarchy, L58, 155; growth of empire, 157, 160; first inva- sion of Greece, 165; second invasion, 169; war continued, 185; Sparta allied with, 260; influence of Greece, 270; at- tacked by Span i. 846; allied with Vill- ous, 848; allied with Sparta, 850; ob- tains suzerainty over Greece, 852, 868; allied with Thebes, 858; growing power of, 861 ; relations with Greece, 865; res- toration of,in Asia Minor, 880; Alexan- der renews war with, 394 ; weakness *>(. 408; invaded by Alexander, 106. Pharnabozus, '.M7. .1 16. Pheidias, 201 ; art o\\ 217, 820; statue v( Zeus by, 821. Pheidon, tyrant of ArgOS, 128. Philip, king *>( Makedonia, 861 ; education of, 870 ; forms an army, /.'>. .■ repulses the Ulyrians, ib,; first efforts of, o7l ; di- plomacy of, 872 : seizes Amphipolis, ib, : military monarchy of, 878; attacks the Phokians, 875 ; master ofThessaly, ift.; occupies Chalkidike, 876; takes Olyn- thus, /,'>. .• takes Delphi, 878; ai the Pythian games, ib,; again at war with Alliens, 882; expedition against the Scythians, 888; appointed Strategus, B85; poliiieal work of,892; death of, 893; compared with kings of Prussia, 894, Philistines, conquer the Delta, 10; cods of the, 88; victory of Israel over, II ; .shel- ter David, 18; power of, r>; influence on Israel, 61; reduced by Assur, 70; conquered by Sargon, 7;>; subjugated by Assyrians, 76. Philolaus, 185. Philomelus, ">7 1. Philon, the architect, B80. Phmbidas, 858. Phoanicia, traces of, in Egypt, 10; religion >>r. 19; commerce of, .''•.», »'><>, i'. I ; revolt of, 862. Phoenicians, voyages <-■(. 59 ; connected with the Hebrews, 60; colonies o( the, 129; retire before Greeks, 180; in the west, 181; importance of navy, 168,411; in- ferior to Greeks, 186. Phokians, their supremacy at Delphi, 209; eager for independence, 874; excluded from Amphictyonic league, 878. Phokion, commands Athenian fleet, 862; opposes war with Philip, I 15. Phraortes, revolt of, 102. Phratrise, 188. Phrynichus, 262, Pindar, mythology of, 285; morality <>f. 286; views of, 291 ; preference forjEgina, 288 ; religious views o(, "•.'!'.'. Plague at Athens, 224, Platssa, battle of, 177 ; Theban attempt on, 222 ; reduced, 232. Plato, early life of, 380; Best for travelling, l"6. : phases of life of, 831 : dialogues of, religious views of. 882; attacks the Sophists, 833 ; " Euthydemus," " Hiete- tetus," i!\ : "Sophist," •• Euthyphron," •• Laws." .">;'. I ; " Timseus," 885 ; doctrine of the soul, 837 ; " Republic," 888. Pleistoanax invades Attica, 210. Plutarch, life >.<( Epameinondas, 866. Polcmarchs in Thebes, - : Polycrates in Samoa, 186. Polygnotus, painter, 201 ; ideal of, 820. Polysperchon allied with Eumenes, lot). Pontus, kings o(, 468. 1'orns opposes Alexander, 480. Potid8oa,220,221 ; taken by Athenians, 286, Promanteia, the, 2Q§. Prometheus, 290. Protagoras of Abdera, 821, 822; expelled from Athens, 826. Psammetichus, son o( Necho, 83, 91, Pseudo-Smerdis, 100. Ptah, god o( Egypt, ". Ptolemssus (son of Lagus), IIS; beaten by Demetrius, 452; proclaimed king, 464, Ptolemies, the, 166, Public Peace, league of the, 890, 897, -17G. Punt, land of balm. 12, INDEX. 493 Pyramids of Gizeh, 4. Pythagoras, in Ephesus, 136; doctrines of, "'282; league of, 283. K. Ea, god of Egypt, 3, 17. Rameses-Miamun, 17. Rchoboam succeeds Solomon, 56. Ketcnnu, the, 12. Rhodes, her colonies, 131 ; resists Deme- trius, 464. Rome, first appearance of, 483. Roxana, 443. Rutcn (Palestine), 11, 12, 15. S. Sacred Hand, the, 350; destruction of, 388. Sacred war, begun, 374; continued, 378. Salami?, recovered by Athens, 140; battle of, 174; battle near (Cyprian), 192. Salmanassar, 69; death of, 72. Samas, the god, 72. Samos, first revolt of, 214; fleet at, 2G5. Samuel, the prophet, 38; removes gods of the Philistines, ib. ; selects a king lor Israel, 40; quarrel with Saul, 41 ; school of the prophets founded bv, 55 ; books of, 58. Samson, 37. Sandrocottus, rise of, 455. Sardanapalus, 65 ; legend of, 83. Sardis, seat of Persian satrapy, 95, 109; burning of, 1G2; taken by Alexander, 408. Sargou (Sarkin), attacks Gaza, 72; con- quers Arabia, 73 ; death of, 75. Satrapies of Persia, 109. Saul, elected king, 41; his conquests, ib.; death, 43. Schasu (Bedouin Arabs), 14. Scythian tribes, 90; at Ephesus, 91 ; inva- sion of Semitic world by, 93; attacked by Philip, 383 ; by Alexander, 395. Seisachtheia at Athens, 141, 144. Seleucus (Nicator), in Babylon, 454: en- larges his dominions, 458; his history. 462 ; dominion of, ib. ; founder of cities, 4G4. Seleukeia, 462, 464. Semele, legend of, 439. Semiramis, 65. Sennacherib, conquers Egypt, 75; besieges Jerusalem, 76. Septuagint, the, 467. Sesostris, legend of, 18. Sethos I., II. Seti, king, 15. Sheba, queen of, 55. Shcmaiah the prophet, 57. Shepherd -kings in Egypt, 10; receive Moses, 24. Shepherd-peoples in Egypt, 1. Sheshon, expedition against Judah, 72. Sliiloh, ark of the covenant at, 33; settle- ment of tribes at, 34; laid waste, 38. Shishak,*wai with Judah, 61. Sicilian expedition, origin of, 248; depart- ure of, 254 ; destruction of, 259. Sicily, colonies of, 131; Dorians in, 248; invaded by Athens, 253; intellectual in- fluence of, 321 ; rivalry of Carthage and Syracuse in, 469. Sidon, independent of Israel, 31 ; its antiq- uity, 60; subdued by Assyria, 68, 76; betrayed by the Persians, 363. Sikyon, 126; school of art at, 137.. Sinai, 21. 25. Singar (Shinar), 15. Sisicottus, 427. Sisygambis, mother of Darius, 443. Slaves, traffic in, 141. Socrates, friendship with Alkibiades, 247; opposes condemnation of generals, 271; dialectic of, 323 ; principles of, 324 ; op- poses Anaxagoras, ib. ; in Aristophanes, 325 ; political views of, 326 ; trial of, 328 ; daemon of, ib. ; death of, 329. Sogdiana, 110. Solomon, anointed king, 52; his marriage, 53 ; alliance with Tyre, ib. ; compared to Pharaoh, 54 ; government of, 56 ;■ death of, 56. Solon, legislator, 137; reforms of, 140; timocracy founded by, 142; poetical re- mains of, 144 ; unlike Moses, 146 ; bust of, ib. Sophists, principles of the, 322. Sophocles, characters of, 294; " CEdipus Rex," ib. ; " Trachinia;," "Aias," 295; " Antigone," "CEdipus at Colonus,"296; " Electra," 297; employs the Tritago- nist, 296; compared with .Esehylus, 297; resistance to tyrannical power, 298; lan- guage of, 300; religious views of, 332. Spain, Phoenician settlement in, 470. Spaniards compared to Israelites, 35. Sparta, her constitution, 127, 133; at Ther- mopylae, 171 ; after Persian war, 180 ; declines naval supremacy, 198; difficul- ties of, 200; antagonism with Athens, ib.; allied with Thebes, 206; refuses to join Athens against Persia, 208 ; breach with Athens, 220; helps Syracuse, 258; allied with Persia, 260; supremacy of, 277; makes war on Persia, lilt!; allied with Persia, 350; end of supremacy, 356; decay of, 360; will not oppose Philip, 387; nor Antipater, 446. Spartiatse, the, 177. 494 INDEX. Sphacteria, battle of, 233, 235. Sphinx, story of the, 111). Strabo, 308. Sultan (Siltan), 73. Susa, 112; taken by Alexander, 421. Sutech (Baal), 2, 11, 17. Sychcm, scat of secular power, 31; meet- ing of tribes at, 66. Symmachia of the Hellenes, 179. Syracuse, founded, 1S1; siege of, 258; struggle with Carthage, 4G9; change of constitution in, 472; besieged by llimil- co, 473; renews war with Carthage, 475. Syrian monarchy, the, -1(34. Taanach, 13. Tanagra. battles of, 207, 235. Tantalus, story of, 285. Taraco, king of Kush, 78, 79. Tarshish, GO. Tartcssus, independence of, 81 ; submits to Carthage, 170. Taulantii beaten by Alexander, 397. Taxiles joins Alexander, 430. Tegeia, ally of Sparta, 244. Temenos, the, 121. Ten Thousand, retreat of the, 345. Tbachis, land of, 13. Thales, 130, 281. Thasos subdued, 199. Theagenes, 136. Thebes (in Egypt), G; (in Boeotia), 135; sides with l'ersia, 17G; allied with Sparta, 20G; attacks Plataca, 222; aids Thrasybulus, 277; breach with Sparta, 352; wins hegemony, 355 ; allied with Persia, 358; held in check by Athens and Sparta, 359; allied with Philip, 378; allied with Athens, 3SG; destroyed, 399. Themistocles, 172, 174; power of, 181; character of, 182; flight of, 183; fate of, 184, 195, 197. Theramenes, 275 ; his death, 27G. Thermopylae, battle of, 171. Theseus, legend of, 118. Thessaly, republic of, 288. Thirty Tyrants, the, 275; expelled, 27'.'. Thirty Years' Truce, the, 211. Thrace, maritime districts of, 149 ; under Lysimachus, 455. Thrasybulus, 278. Thukydides, oldest exact historian, 149 ; his failure at Eion, 239 ; of Athenian birth, 306; compared with Herodotus, ib.; merits of, 310; advance made by, 312; history of, 313; descriptive power of, 314; speeches of, 31G, 317, 471. Thutmosis (I.), 11; (II.), ib.; (III.), 12. Tiglath-Pileser, 71. Timocracy of Athens, 142. Timolcon, 380, 474 ; death of, 474. Tissaphernes, 2G0; supports Alkibiades, 264 ; his vacillating policy, 2G7 ; his death, 347. Titans, the, 285. Triballi, attack Philip, 383; beaten by Al- exander, 39G. Tribes (of Israel), march of the, 33 ; settle- ment in Canaan, 34; rebellion of ten, 57; (of Attica), 138, 151. Triremes invented, 132. Trojan war, 119. Turn, god of Egypt, 17. Tutanch-Amon, 14. Tyrants, the Greek, 135; hatred of, in Greece, 381. Tyre, religion of, 19, GO, G2; subdued by Assyria, G8; besieged by Nebuchadnez- zar, 87 ; taken by Alexander, 414. V. Yendidap, the, 10G. Xencthanks, 281. Xenophon, on the ruin of Nineveh, 82 ; his " Cyropredeia," 107, 115 ; " Anabasis," 110,846. Xerxes, invasion of, 1G9 ; flight of, 175, 187 ; bis claim to the throne, 343. Z. Zadok, high-priest, 52. Zarathnstra, 106. Zedekiah, king, S5. Zend-Avesta, the, 105-107, 113. Zeus, 121. Zion (Jehus, Jerusalem), 45. Zoroaster, religion of, 110. VALUABLE AND INTERESTING WORKS FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIBRARIES, Published by IIARrER & BROTHERS, New York. Bar- Por a full List of Books suitable for Libraries published by Habpkb & Brothers, set II.ua"i u's Cataiootb, which may be had gratuitously on application to the publishers personally, or by letter enclosing Ten Cents in postage stamps. ZW 1Iaet"kr & Brothers i!';7J send their publications by mail, postage prepaid, on receipt of the pries. MACAULAYS ENGLAND. The History of England from the Accession of James II. By Thomas BABINGTON Maoui.ay. New Edition, from New Electrotype Elates. 6 vols., in a Box, Svo, Cloth, with Paper Lahels, Un- cut Edges, and Gilt Tops, $10 00. Sold only in Sets. Cheap Edition, 5 vols., in a Box, 12mo, Cloth, $2 50; Sheep, $3 7.".. MACAULAY'S MISCELLANEOUS WORKS. The Miscellaneous "Works of Lord Macaulay. Eroin New Electrotype Plates. 5 vols., in a Box, Svo, Cloth, with Taper Labels, Uncut Edges, and Gilt Tops, $10 00. Sold only in Sets. HUME'S ENGLAND. History of England, from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Abdication of James II., 1GSS. By David Hi-mic. New and Elegant Library Edition, from New Electrotype Elates. G vols., in a Box, Svo, Cloth, with Paper Labels, Uncut Edges, and Gilt Tops, $ 12 00. Sold only in Sets. Popular Edition, vols., in a Box, 12mo, Cloth, $3 00; Sheep, $i 50. GIBBON'S ROME. The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Em- pire. By Edward Gibbon. With Notes by Dean Milman, M. Guizot, and Dr. William Smith. New Edition, from New Electrotype Elates. (I vols., Svo, Cloth, with Taper Labels, Uncut Edges, and Gilt Tops, $12 00. Sold only in Sets. Popular Edition, G vols., in a Box, 12mo, Cloth, $3 00; Sheep, $1 50. HILDRETH'S UNITED STATES. History of the United States. First Series : From the Discovery of the Continent to the Organization of the Gov- ernment under the Federal Constitution. Second Series: From the Adop- tion of the Federal Constitution to the End of the Sixteenth Congress. By RlCHAKD Hildreth. Popular Edition, G vols., in a Box, Svo, Cloth, with Paper Labels, Uncut Edges, and Gilt Tops, $12 00. Sold only in Sets. MOTLEYS DUTCH REPUBLIC. The Rise of the Dutch Republic. A His- tory. By John Lothrop Motlky, LL.D., D.C.L. With a Portrait of Will- iam of Orange. Cheap Edition, 3 vols., in a Box, Svo, Cloth, with Paper Labels, Uncut Edges, and Gilt Tops, $G 00. Sold only in Sets. Original Library Edition, 3 vols., Svo, Cloth, $10 50; Sheep, $12 00; Half Calf, $17 25. Valuable Works for Public and Private Libraries. MOTLEY'S UNITED NETHERLANDS. History of the United Netherlands : En>m the Death of William the Silent to the Twelve Years' Truce — 1584-1G09. With a full View of the English-Dutch Struggle against Spain, and of the Ori- gin and Destruction of the Spanish Armada. By John Lothkop Motley, LL.D., D.C.L. Portraits. Cheap Edition, 4 vols., in a Box, Svo, Cloth, with Taper Labels, Uncut Edges, and Gilt Tops, $8 00. Sold only in Sets. Orig- inal Library Edition, 4 vols., Svo, Cloth, $14 00; Sheep, $16 00; Half Calf, $23 00. MOTLEY'S JOHN OF B ARNEVELD. The Life and Death of John of Barne- veld, Advocate of Holland. With a View of the Primary Causes and Move- ments of the "Thirty Years' War." By John Lothkop Motley, LLD., D.C.L. Illustrated. Cheap Edition, 2 vols., in a Box, Svo, Cloth, with Paper Labels, Uncut Edges, and Gilt Tops, $4 00. Sold only in Sets. Orig- inal Library Edition, 2 vols., Svo, Cloth, $7 00; Sheep, $S 00; Half Calf, $11 50. GOLDSMITH'S WORKS. The Works of Oliver Goldsmith. Edited by Peteb Cunningham, F.S.A. From New Electrotype Plates. 4 vols., Svo, Cloth, Paper Labels, Uncut Edges, and Gilt Tops, $8 00. Uniform with the New Library Editions of Maeaulay, Hume, Gibbon, Motley, and llildreth. GEDDES'S JOHN DE WITT. History of the Administration of John De Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland. By James Geddes. Vol. I. — 1623-1G54. With a Portrait. Svo, Cloth, $2 50. HUDSON'S HISTORY OF JOURNALISM. Journalism in the United States, from 1G90 to 1S72. By Frederic Hudson. Svo, Cloth, $5 00; Half Calf, $7 25. SYMONDS'S SKETCHES AND STUDIES IN SOUTHERN EUROPE. By John Addington Symonds. 2 vols., Post Svo, Cloth, $4 00. SYMONDS'S GREEK POETS. Studies of the Greek Poets. By John Ad- dington Symonds. 2 vols., Square lGmo, Cloth, $3 50. TKEVELYAN'S LIFE OF MACAULAY. The Life and Letters of Lord Ma- caulay. By his Nephew, G. Otto Trevelyan, M.P. With Portrait on Steel. 2 vols., Svo, Cloth, Uncut Edges and Gilt Tops, $5 00; Sheep, $6 00; Half Calf, $9 50. Popular Edition, 2 vols, in one, 12mo, Cloth, $1 75. TREVELYAN'S LIFE OF FOX. The Early History of Charles James Fox. By George Otto Trevelyan. Svo, Cloth, Uncut Edges and Gilt Tops, $2 50. MULLER'S POLITICAL HISTORY OF RECENT TIMES (1S16-1S75). With Special Reference to Germany. By William Miller. Translated, with an Appendix covering the Period from 1S7G to 1S81, by the Rev. John P. Peters, Ph.D. 12mo, Cloth, $3 00. LOSSING'S CYCLOPEDIA OF UNITED STATES HISTORY. From the Aboriginal Period to 1S7G. By B. J. Lossing, LL.D. Illustrated by 2 Steel Portraits and over 1000 Engravings. 2 vols., Royal Svo, Cloth, $10 00. {Sold by Subscription only.) Valuable Works for Public and Private Libraries. LOSSING'S FIELD-BOOK OF THE REVOLUTION. Pictorial Field-Book Of the Revolution ; or, Illustrations by Pen and Pencil of the History, Biography, Scenery, Relics, and Traditions of the War for Independence. By Benson J. LOSSUMJ. 2 vols., 8vo, Cloth, $14 00; Sheep or Roan, $15 00; Half Calf, $18 00. LOSSING'S FIELD-BOOK OF THE WAR OF 1812. Pictorial Field-Rook of the War of 1812; or, Illustrations by Pen and Pencil of the History, Biog- raphy, Scenery, Relics, and Traditions of the last War for American Inde- pendence. By BENSON J. Lossing. With several hundred Engravings. 1088 pages, 8vo, Cloth, $7 00; Sheep, $8 50; Half Calf, $10 00. PAR TON'S CARICATURE. Caricature and Other Comic Art, in All Times and Many Lands. By James Pakton. 2015 Illustrations. 8vo, Cloth, Un- cut Edges and Gilt Tops, $5 00; Half Calf, $7 25. MAHAFFY'S GREEK LITERATURE. A History of Classical Creek Liter- ature. By J. P. Maiiaffy. 2 vols., 12mo, Cloth, $-1 00 ; Half Calf, $7 50. SI.MCOX'S LATIN LITERATURE. A History of Latin Literature, from Ennius to Boethias. By George Augustus Simcox, M.A. 2 vols., 12mo, Cloth, $4 00. DU CHAILLU'S LAND OF THE MIDNIGHT SUN. Summer and Winter Journeys in Sweden, Norway, and Lapland, and Northern Finland. By Paul B. Du Chaillu. Illustrated. 2 vols., 8vo, Cloth, $7 50; Half Calf, $12 00. DU CHAILLU'S EQUATORIAL AFRICA. Explorations and Adventures in Equatorial Africa; with Accounts of the Manners and Customs of the People, and of the Chase of the Gorilla, Leopard, Elephant, Hippopotamus, and other Animals. By P. B. Du Chaillu. Illustrated. Svo, Cloth, $5 00; Sheep, $5 50; Half Calf, $7 25. DU CHAILLU'S ASI1ANGO LAND. A Journey to Ashango Land, and Further Penetration into Equatorial Africa. By P. B. Du Chaillu. Illus- trated. Svo, Cloth, $5 00 ; Half Calf, $7 25. DEXTER'S CONGREGATIONALISM. The Congregationalism of the Last Three Hundred Years, as Seen in its Literature : with Special Reference to certain Recondite, Neglected, or Disputed Passages. With a Bibliographical Appendix. By II. M. Dextku. Large Svo, Cloth, $G 00. STANLEY'S THROUGH THE DARK CONTINENT. 'Through the Dark Continent; or, The Sources of the Nile, Around the Great Lakes of Equatorial Africa, and Down the Livingstone River to the Atlantic Ocean. 140 Illustra- tions and 10 Maps. By II. M. Stanley. 2 vols., Svo, Cloth, $10 00; Half Morocco, $15 00. BARTLETT'S FROM EGYPT TO PALESTINE. Through Sinai, the Wil- derness, and the South Country. Observations of a Journey made with Special Reference to the History of the Israelites. By S. C. Bautlett, D.D. Maps and Illustrations. Svo, Cloth, $3 50. FORSTER'S LIFE OF DEAN SWIFT. The Early Life of Jonathan Swift (1GG7-1711). By John Forster. With Portrait. Svo, Cloth, Uncut Edges and Gilt Tops, $2 50. Valmibu Works for Public ami Private Libraries. GREEN'S ENGLISH PEOPLE. History of the English People. By John Richard Grbrn, 51. A. With Maps. 4 vols., Svo, Cloth, $2 50 per vol- ume. GREEN'S MAKING OF ENGLAND. The Making of England. By J. R. Grebn. With Maps. 8vo, Cloth, $2 50. GREEN'S CONQUEST OF ENGLAND. The Conquest of England. By J. K. Grebn. With Maps. 8vo, Cloth. $2 60. SHORT'S NORTH AMERICANS OF ANTIQUITY. The North Americans of Antiquity. Their Origin, Migrations, and Type of Civilization Considered. By John T. Shout. Illustrated. 8vo, Cloth. $3 00. SQUIKR'S PERU. Peru : Incidents of Travel and Exploration in the Land of the Incas. By E. Gborqb Squibr, M.A., F.S.A., late U. S. Commissioner to Pern. With Illustrations. 8vo, Cloth, $o 00. BENJAMIN'S CONTEMPORARY ART. Contemporary Art in Europe. By s. <.;. W. Benjamin. Illustrated. 8vo, Cloth, $8 50. BENJAMIN'S ART IN AMERICA. Art in America. By S. C. W. Bbh- jamix. Illustrated. Svo, Cloth. $4 00. REBER'S HISTORY OF ANCIENT ART. History of Ancient Art. By Dr. Franz vox RbbBR. Revised by the Author. Translated and Augmented by Joseph Thacher Clarke. "With 310 Illustrations and a Glossary of Tech- nical Terms. 8vo, Cloth, $8 50. ADAMS'S MANUAL OF HISTORICAL LITERATURE. A Manual of Historical Literature. Comprising Brief Descriptions o( the Most Important Histories in English, French, and German. By Professor C. K. Adahs, Svo, Cloth, $2 50. KINGLAKE'S CRIMEAN WAR. The Invasion of the Crimea: its Origin, and an Account of its Progress down to the Heath of Lord Raglan. By Ai - exander William Kinglakb, With Maps and Plans. Four Volumes now ready. I2m0, Cloth, $2 00 per vol. MAURY'S PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE SEA. The Physical Geog- raphy ^\ the Sea, and its Meteorology. By M. F. MAURT, LL.D Svo, Cloth, $4 00. EIALLAM'S LITERATURE. Introduction to the Literature of Europe during the Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Centuries. By Benrt H.u.i .am. •2 vols., Svo. Cloth, $4 00; Sheep, $5 00. HALLAM'S MIDDLE AGES. View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages. By 11- HAH vm. Svo, Cloth, $2 00: Sheep, $2 50, HALLAM'S CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND. The Con- stitutional History o( England, from the Accession of Henry Yll. to the Death of George II. By Hbnrt Hai.i.am. Svo, Cloth. $2 00; Sheep, $2 50. NEWCOMR'S ASTRONOMY. Popular Astronomy. By Sniox NrweoMn, 1.1..D. With L12 Engravings, and five Maps of the Stars. Svo. Cloth. (2 60 : School Edition, l'Jmo, Cloth. $1 80. Valuable Works for Public and Private Libraries. ENGLISH MEN OF LETTERS. Edited by John Morley. The following volumes are now ready. Others will follow : Johnson. By L. Stephen. — Gibbon. By J. C. Morison. — Scott. By II. II. Ilutton. — Shf.li.ky. By J. A. Symonds. — GOLDSMITH. By W. Black. — Hume. By Professor Huxley. — Defok. By W. Miuto. — Burns. By Prin- cipal Shairp. — Spenser. By II. W. Church. — Thackeray. By A. Trollope. — Burke. By J. Morley. — Milton. By M. Pattison. — Southey. By E. Dowden. —Chaucer. By A. W. Ward. — Bonyan. By J. A. Fronde. — CYrwTEK. By G. Smith. — Pore. By L. Stephen. — Byron. By J. Nichols. — Locke. By T. Fowler. — Wordsworth. By F. W. II. Myers. — Haw- thorne. By Henry James, Jr. — Drtden. By G. Saintsbury. — Landor. By S. Colvin. — De Qeincey. By 1). Masson. — Lamb. By A. Aingcr. — — Bentley. By R. C. Jebb.— Dicicens. By A. W. Ward.— Gray. By E. W. Gosse. — Swift. By L. Stephen. — Stkrnf,. By II. 1). Traill. — Macau- lay. By J. C. Morison. — FIELDING. By Austin Dobson. — Sheridan. By Mrs. OHphant. — Addison. By W. J. Courthope. — Bacon. By E. W. Church. 12mo, Cloth, 7") cents per volume. PRIME'S POTTERY AND PORCELAIN. Pottery and Porcelain of All Times and Nations. With Tables of Factory and Artists' Marks, for the Use of Collectors. By William C. Prime, LL.D. Illustrated. Svo, Cloth, Un- cut Edges and Gilt Tops, $7 00 ; Half Calf, $'.> 25. (In a Box.) CESNOLA'S CYPRUS. Cyprus: its Ancient Cities, Tombs, and Temples. A Narrative of Researches and Excavations during Ten Years' Residence in that Island. By L. P. di Cesnola. With Portrait, Maps, and 100 Illustrations. Svo, Cloth, Extra, Uncut Edges and Gilt Tops, $7 50. TENNYSON'S COMPLETE POEMS. The Poetical Works of Alfred Tenny- son. With numerous Illustrations by Eminent Artists, and Three Characteris- tic Portraits. 8vo, Paper, $1 00; Cloth, $1 50. VAN-LENNEP'S BIBLE LANDS. Bible Lands: their Modern Customs and Manners Illustrative of Scripture. By Henry J. Van-Lennf.i\ D.D. 350 Engravings and 2 Colored Maps. Svo, Cloth, $5 00; Sheep, $G 00; Half Morocco, $8 00. GROTE'S HISTORY OF GREECE. 12 vols., 12mo, Cloth, $18 00; Sheep, $22 80 ; Half Calf, $ 30 00. FLAMMARION'S ATMOSPIIEKE. Translated from the French of Camili.e Flammarion. With 10 Chromo-Lithographs and 80 Woodcuts. Svo, Cloth, $G 00 ; Half Calf, $8 25. STRICKLAND'S (Miss) QUEENS OF SCOTLAND. Lives of the Queens of Scotland and English Princesses connected with the Regal Succession of Great Britain. By Agnes Strickland. 8 vols., 12mo, Cloth, $12 00; Half Calf, $20 00. BAKER'S ISMA1LIA: a Narrative of the Expedition to Central Africa for the Suppression of the Slave-trade, organized by Ismail, Khedive of Egypt. By- Sir Samuel W. Baker. With Maps, Portraits, and Illustrations. Svo, Cloth, $5 00 ; Half Calf, $7 25. ValuabU Works for Public and Private Libraries. LIVINGSTONE'S SOUTH AFRICA. Missionary Travels and Researches ia Sooth Africa: including a Sketch of Sixteen Years' Residence in the Interior of Africa, and a Journey from the Cape of Good Hope to Loanda, on the West Coast; thence across the Continent, down the River Zambesi, to the Eastern Ocean. By David Livingstone. With Portrait, Maps, and Illustrations. Svo, Cloth, $4 50. LIVINGSTONE'S ZAMBESI. Narrative of an Expedition to the. Zambesi and its Tributaries, and of the Discovery of the Lakes Shirwa and Nyassa, 1858 to 1S04. By David and Charlks Livingstone. Illustrated. Svo, Cloth, $5 00 ; Sheep, $5 50. LIVINGSTONE'S LAST JOURNALS. The Last Journals of David Living- stone, in Central Africa, from 1865 to his Death. Continued by a Narrative of his Last Moments, obtained from his Faithful Servants Chuma and Susi. By Horace Waller. With Portrait, Maps, and Illustrations. Svo, Cloth, $5 00; Sheep, 86 00. Cheap Popular Edition, Svo, Cloth, with Map and Illustrations. $2 50. BLAHOE'S LIFE OF DAVID LIVINGSTONE. Memoir of his Personal Life, from his Unpublished Journals and Correspondence. By W. G. Blaikie, D.D. With Portrait and Map. Svo, Cloth, $2 25. SHAKSPEARE. The Dramatic Works of Shakspeare. With Notes. Engrav- ings. 6 vols., 12mo, Cloth, $9 00. 2 vols., 8vo, Cloth, $4 00 ; Sheep, $5 00. In one vol., Svo, Sheep, $4 00. CURTIS'S LIFE OF BUCHANAN. Life of James Buchanan, Fifteenth Pres- ident of the United Slates. By George Ticknor Curtis. With Two Steel- Plate Portraits. 2 vols., Svo, Cloth, Uncut Edges and Gilt Tops, §6 00. GENERAL BEAUREGARD'S MILITARY OPERATIONS The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the States, 1861 to I860 ; including a brief Personal Sketch, and a Narrative of his Services in the War with Mexico, 1846 to 1818. By Ai fred Roman, formerly Aide-de-Camp on the StatY of General Beauregard. With Portraits, &C 2 vols., 8vo, Cloth, $3 50; Sheep, £1 50; Half Morocco, $5 50; Full Morocco, §7 50. (Sold only by Subscription.} GIESELER'S ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY. A Text-Book of Church His- torv. By Dr. John C. L. GlESELER. Translated from the Fourth Revised German Edition. Revised and Edited by Rev. Henry B. Smith, D.D. Vols. I., II., III., and IV., Svo, Cloth, $2 25; Vol. V., Svo, Cloth, $3 00. Complete Sets, 5 vols., Sheep, $14 50; Half Calf, $-23 25. ALISON'S HISTORY OF EUROPE. From the Commencement of the French Revolution, in 178'.), to the Accession of Louis Napoleon, in 1S52. S vols., Svo, Cloth, $1G 00. NEANDER'S LIFE OF CHRIST. The Life of Christ ; in its Historical Con- nection and its Historical Development. By AUGUSTUS Neander, Trans- lated from the Fourth German Edition by Professors M'Clintock & Bi.umen- 1 u w . of Dickinson College. Svo, Cloth, $2 50. I'aluab/c Works for Public and Private Libraries. NORDIIOFF'S COMMUNISTIC SOCIETIES OF THE UNITED STATES. The Communistic Societies of the United States, from Personal Visit and Ob- servation; including Detailed Accounts of the Economists, Zoarites, Shakers, the Amana, Oneida, Bethel, Aurora, learian, and other existing Societies. By Chaulks NoRDHOFF. Illustrations. 8vo, Cloth, $4 00. GRIFFIS'S JAPAN, The Mikado's Empire: Book I. History of Japan, from 660 B.C. to 1872 A.D. Book II. Personal Experiences, Observations, and Studies in Japan, from 1870 to 1874. By W. E. Guniis. Copiously Illus- trated. 8vo, Cloth, $4 00; Half Calf, $6 25. SMILES'S HISTORY OF THE HUGUENOTS. The Huguenots: their Set- tlements, Churches, and Industries in England and Ireland. By Samuel Smiles. With an Appendix relating to the Huguenots in America. Crown 8vo, Cloth, $2 00. SMILES'S HUGUENOTS AFTER THE REVOCATION. The Huguenots in France after the Revocation of the Edict of 'Nantes; with a Visit to the Country of the Vaudois. By Samuel Smilks. Crown Svo, Cloth, $2 00. SMILES'S LI FE ( ) F THE STEPHENSONS. The Life of George Stephenson, and of his Son, Robert Stephenson; comprising, also, a History of the Inven- tion and Introduction of the Railway Locomotive. By Samuel Smilks. Il- lustrated. Svo, Cloth, $3 00. SCHWEINFURTH'S HEART OF AFRICA. Three Years' Travels and Ad- ventures in the Unexplored Regions of the Centre of Africa — from 1868 to 1871. By George Schweihfubth. Translated by Ellen E. Fbewer. Illustrated. 2 vols., Svo, Cloth, $8 00. SCIILIEMANN'S ILIOS. Ilios, the City and Country of the Trojans. A Narrative of the Most Recent Discoveries and Researches made on the Plain of Troy. By Dr. Heney Sciiliemann. Maps, Flans, and Illustrations. Im- perial Svo, Illuminated Cloth, $12 00; Half Morocco, $15 00. SCIILIEMANN'S TROJA. Troja. Results of the Latest Researches and Dis- coveries on the Site of Homer's Troy, and in the Heroic Tumuli and other Sites, made in the Year 1882, and a Narrative of a Journey in the Troad in 1881. By Dr. Henry Schliehank. Preface by Professor A. II. Sayco. With Woodcuts, Maps, and Plans. Svo, Cloth, $7 50. NORTON'S STUDIES OF CHURCH -BUILDING. Historical Studies of Church-Building in the Middle Ages. Venice, Siena, Florence. By Ciiakles Eliot Nokton. Svo, Cloth, $3 00. THE VOYAGE OF THE "CHALLENGER." The Atlantic: an Account of the General Results of the Voyage during 1873, and the Early Part of 1870. By Sir Wtvillb THOMSON, K.C.B., F.R.S. Illustrated. 2 vols., Svo, Cloth, $12 00. BOfWELL'S JOHNSON. The Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D., including a Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides. By James Boswell. Edited by J. W. Choker, LL.D., F.R.S. With a Portrait of Boswell. 2 vols., Svo, Cloth, $4 00 ; Sheep, $5 00 ; Half Calf, $8 50. 8 Valuable Works for Public and Private Libraries. JOHNSON'S COMPLETE WORKS. The Works of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. With an Essay on his Life and Genius, by A. Murphy. 2 vols., 8vo, Cloth, $4 00 ; Sheep, $5 00 ; Half Calf, $S 50. ADDISON'S COMPLETE WORKS. The Works of Joseph Addison, embrac- ing the whole of the Spectator. 3 vols., 8vo, Cloth, $G 00. OUTLINES OF ANCIENT HISTORY. From the Earliest Times to the Fall of the Western Roman Empire, A.D. 476. Embracing the Egyptians, Chal- deans, Assyrians, Babylonians, Hebrews, Phoenicians, Medes, Persians, Greeks, and Romans. By P. V. N. Myers, A.M., President of Farmers' College, Ohio. 12mo, Cloth, $1 75. BROUGHAM'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY. Life and Times of Henry, Lord Brougham. Written by Himself. 3 vols., 12mo, Cloth, $G 00. BLUNT'S BEDOUIN TRIBES OF THE EUPHRATES. Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates. By Lady Anne Blunt. Edited, with a Preface and some Account of the Arabs and their Horses, by W. S. B. Map and Sketches by the Author. 8vo, Cloth, $2 50. THOMPSON'S PAPACY AND THE CIVIL POWER. The Papacy and the Civil Power. By the Hon. R. W. Thompson. Crown 8vo, Cloth, $3 00. ENGLISH CORRESPONDENCE. Four Centuries of English Letters. Selec- tions from the Correspondence of One Hundred and Fifty Writers, from the Period of the Paston Letters to the Present Day. Edited by W. Baptiste Scoones. 12mo, Cloth, $2 00. THE POETS AND POETRY OF SCOTLAND : From the Earliest to the Present Time. Comprising Characteristic Selections from the Works of the more Noteworthy Scottish Poets, with Biographical and Critical Notices. By James Grant Wilson. With Portraits on Steel. 2 vols., 8 vo, Cloth, $ 10 00; Gilt Edges, $11 00. THE STUDENT'S SERIES. Maps and Illustrations. 12mo, Cloth : France. — Gibbon. — Greece. — Rome (by Liddell). — Old Testament History. — New Testament History'. — Strickland's Queens of Eng- land. — Ancient History of the East. — Hallam's Middle Ages. — Hal- lam's Constitutional History of England. — L yell's Elements of Geology. — Merivale's General History of Rome. — Cox's General History of Greece. — Classical Dictionary. — Skeat's Etymological Dictionary. $1 25 per volume. Lewis's History of Germany. — Ecclesiastical History. — Hume's England. $1 50 per volume. BOURNE'S LOCKE. The Life of John Locke- By H. R. Fox Bourne. 2 vols., Svo, Cloth, $5 00. COLERIDGE'S WORKS. The Complete Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Witli an Introductory Essay upon his Philosophical and Theological Opinions. Edited by Professor W. G. T. Shedd. With Steel Portrait, and an Index. 7 vols., li'mo, Cloth, $2 00 per volume; $12 00 per set. Valuable Works for Public and Private Libraries. 9 DARWIN'S VOYAGE OF A NATURALIST. Voyage of a Naturalist. Journal of Researches into the Natural History and Geology of the Countries Visited during the Voyage of H.M.S. Beagle round the World. By Charles Darwin. 2 vols., 12mo, Cloth, 82 00. CAMERON'S ACROSS AFRICA. Across Africa. By Verney Lovett Cameron. Map and Illustrations. Svo, Cloth, $5 00. BARTH'S NORTH AND CENTRAL AFRICA. Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa: being a Journal of an Expedition undertaken under the Auspices of H.B.M.'s Government, in the Years 1849-1855. By Henry Barth, Ph.D., D.C.L. Illustrated. 3 vols., Svo, Cloth, $12 00. THOMSON'S SOUTHERN PALESTINE AND JERUSALEM. Southern Palestine and Jerusalem. Biblical Illustrations drawn from the Manners and Customs, the Scenes and Scenery, of the Holy Land. By W. M. Thomson, D.D. 140 Illustrations and Maps. Square Svo, Cloth, $6 00; Sheep, $7 00; Half Morocco, $8 50 ; Full Morocco, Gilt Edges, $10 00. THOMSON'S CENTRAL PALESTINE AND PHCENICIA. Central Pales- tine and Phoenicia. Biblical Illustrations drawn from the Manners and Customs, the Scenes and Scenery, of the Holy Land. By W. M. Thomson, D.D. 130 Illustrations and Maps. Svo, Cloth, $6 00 ; Sheep, $7 00 ; Half Morocco, $S 50; Full Morocco, $10 00. CYCLOPAEDIA OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN POETRY. Edited by Epes Sargent. Royal Svo, Illuminated Cloth, Colored Edges, $4 50. NICHOLS'S ART EDUCATION. Art Education Applied to Industry. By G. W. Nichols. Illustrated. Svo, Cloth, $4 00 ; Half Calf, $6 25. CARLYLE'S FREDERICK THE GREAT. History of Friedrich II., called Frederick the Great. By Thomas Carlyle. Portraits, Maps, Plans, &c. G vols., 12mo, Cloth, $7 50. CARLYLE'S FRENCH REVOLUTION. The French Revolution : a History. By Thomas Carlyle. 2 vols., 12mo, Cloth, $2 50. CARLYLE'S OLIVER CROMWELL. Oliver Cromwell's Letters and Speeches, including the Supplement to the First Edition. With Elucidations. By Thomas Carlyle. 2 vols., 12mo, Cloth, $2 50. PAST AND PRESENT, CHARTISM, AND SARTOR RESARTUS. By Thomas Carlyle. 12mo, Cloth, $1 25. EARLY KINGS OF NORWAY, AND THE PORTRAITS OF JOHN KNOX. By Thomas Carlyle. 12mo, Cloth, $1 25. DAVIS'S CARTHAGE. Carthage and her Remains: being an Account of the Excavations and Researches on the Site of the Phoenician Metropolis in Africa and other Adjacent Places. By Dr. N. Davis. Illustrated. Svo, Cloth, $4 00; Half Calf, $G 25. BULWER'S LIFE AND LETTERS. Life, Letters, and Literary Remains of Edward Buhver, Lord Lytton. By his Son, the Earl of Lytton ("Owen Meredith"). Volume I. Illustrated. 12mo, Cloth, $2 75. 10 Valuable Works for Public and Private Libraries. BULWER'S HORACE. The Odes and Epodes of Horace. A Metrical Trans- Iation into English. With Introduction and Commentaries. With Latin Text from tlie Editions of Orelli, Macleane, and Yonge. 12mo, Cloth, $1 75. BULWER'S MISCELLANEOUS WORKS. Miscellaneous Prose Works of Edward Bulwer, Lord Lytton. In Two Volumes. 12mo, Cloth, $3 50. PERRY'S ENGLISH LITERATURE. English Literature in the Eighteenth Century. By Thomas Sergeant Perky. 12mo, Cloth, $2 00. TROLLOPE'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY. An Autobiography. By Anthony Trollope. With a Portrait. 12mo, Cloth, $1 25. TROLLOPE'S CICERO. Life of Cicero. By Anthony Trollope. 2 vols., 12mo, Cloth, $3 00. EATON'S CIVIL SERVICE. Civil Service in Great Britain. A History of Abuses and Reforms, and their Bearing upon American Politics. By Dorman B. Eaton. Svo, Cloth, $2 50. PERRY'S HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND. A History of the English Church, from the Accession of Henry VIII. to the Silencing of Convocation. By G. G. Perry, M.A. With a Sketch of the History of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States, by J. A. Spencer, S.T.D. Crown 8vo, Cloth, $2 50. ABBOTT'S HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. The French Revolution of 1789, as Viewed in the Light of Republican Institutions. By John S. C. Abbott. Illustrated. Svo, Cloth, $5 00 ; Sheep, $5 50 ; Half Calf, $7 25. ABBOTT'S NAPOLEON. The History of Napoleon Bonaparte. By John S. C.Abbott. Maps, Illustrations, and Portraits. 2 vols., 8vo, Cloth, $10 00; Sheep, fll 00; Half Calf, $14 50. ABBOTT'S NAPOLEON AT ST. HELENA. Napoleon at St. Helena ; or, Anecdotes and Conversations of the Emperor during the Years of his Captivity. Collected from the Memorials of Las Casas, O'Meara, Montholon, Antom- marchi, and others. By J. S. C. Abbott. Illustrated. Svo, Cloth, $5 00 ; Sheep, $5 50 ; Half Calf, $7 25. ABBOTTS FREDERICK THE GREAT. The History of Frederick the Sec- ond, called Frederick the Great. By John S. C. Abbott. Illustrated. Svo, Cloth, $5 00 ; Half Calf, $7 25. M'CARTHY'S HISTORY OF ENGLAND. A History of Our Own Times, from the Accession of Queen Victoria to the General Election of 1880. By Justin M'Carthy. 2 vols., 12mo, Cloth, $2 50. WATSON'S MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS. By Paul Barron Watson. Crown 8vo, Cloth, $2 50. FOLK-LORE OF SHAKESPEARE. By the Rev. T. F. Tiiiselton Dyer, M.A., Oxon., Author of "British Popular Customs, Past and Present." 8vo, Cloth, $2 50. THOMSON'S THE GREAT ARGUMENT. The Great Argument ; or, Jesus Christ in the Old Testament. By W. H. Thomson, M.A., M.D. Crown Svo, Cloth, $2 00.