DD 228 .5 .B8 1914 Copy 1 THE GERMAN EMPEROR AND THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE GERMANISTIC SOCIETY OF AMERICA JANUARY 5, 1909 BY JOHN W. BURGESS, PH.D., LL.D. DEAN OF THE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY FIRST ROOSEVELT PROFESSOR IN THE UNIVERSITY AT BERLIN PRESIDENT OF THE GERMANISTIC SOCIETY OF AMERICA ]^cw York 1909 DD 228 .5 .B8 1914 publications of tbe Oermanistic Society of Hmecica Copy 1 jj THE GERMAN EMPEROR AND THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT THE GERMAN EMPEROR AND THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE GERMANISTIC SOCIETY OF AMERICA JANUARY 5, 1909 BY JOHN W. BURGESS, PH.D., LL.D. DEAN OF THE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY FIRST ROOSEVELT PROFESSOR IN THE UNIVERSITY AT BERLIN PRESIDENT OF THE GERMANISTIC SOCIETY OF AMERICA 1909 31J\2Z% Published 1909 Reprinted 1914 Gift ... toy K isj6 THE GERMAN EMPEROR AND THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT Since my return from Germany in the autumn of 1907, at the close of my term as Roosevelt Professor at the Uni- versity in Berlin, I have been constantly importuned by newspapers and magazines and numberless societies and associations as well as individuals to say or write something about the German Emperor. Down to this time I have steadily refused to accede to any such propositions or re- quests, but now that the American public seems in some danger of being misled into what I consider a false view of this admirable man, I have concluded that it is my duty to say a few words out of my own experience, which has been a long and full experience, both as regards the German Em- peror and the German people. It is now nearly forty years since I began to know Germany and her people. As a young student of history, jurisprudence and political science in the Universities at Gottingen, Leipzig and Ber- lin, in the period of the formation of the present German Empire, I had the best of opportunities to study and ob- serve the imperial institutions in the making and the spirit of the intellectual leaders of the nation in its development. Hardly a period of two years has elapsed between then and now without my having passed several months in 5 Germany, renewing old acquaintanceships and making new, until now my personal connections there are as broad and numerous as here. And finally I spent one year work- ing among them as one of them, occupying an educational office under the Prussian Ministry of Education and giv- ing instruction in the Prussian Universities at Berlin and Bonn and in the Saxon University at Leipzig. Moreover, it is now nearly four years since I had the great honor, pleasure and advantage of making the personal acquain- tance of His Majesty, the Emperor. I have had, not one interview with His Majesty, but a number of interviews; and being for a year virtually one of his own educational officials and going to him on a mission of friendship and culture, I have reason to believe that his conversations with me have been as free and frank and confidential as with any foreigner whom he has ever honored with his invitations. I say these things in order to show that, while I have no warrant from His Majesty or from anybody else to advance the opinions which will constitute the substance of this paper, I have the warrant of a little first-hand knowledge. I know there are those who will say, "He knows too much, he is too friendly and therefore he is prejudiced." It may be that there is a tinge of truth in this claim. But there is also a prejudice which arises from ignorance and is of a far more harmful character. Ignorance and prejudice are twins like the fear and folly - twain, of which the philosopher-poet truly said : "The one closes our eyes; The other peoples the dark inane With spectral lies. " When I read long and labored editorials in the best journals on the German situation by men who do not even know the Emperor's correct title, who do not even know that he is not the Emperor of Germany but the President 6 of the United States of Germany and in this capacity enti- tled German Emperor, or if they do know this, do not understand the political and legal differences and distinc- tions between an Emperor of Germany and a German Emperor, I cannot help feeling that that harmful and hateful prejudice born of ignorance may have vitiated the entire view of such writers, and that they are but blind leaders of the blind. There is one more prefatory word which I wish to speak, namely: that nothing which I shall say is to be taken in the light of a criticism either of the German Emperor or the German people. I have too much respect and regard for both him and them to meddle with the more domestic side of their relations to each other. My long lif e and experience among the Germans and with all classes of them in their own national home has taught me that they are a strong-minded, highly educated, warm- hearted, just, generous, peace-loving, industrious and en- terprising people, and that their great Emperor is the chief among them in the possession of all these admirable quali- ties and virtues. It has never been my fortune to come into contact with a man of keener intellect, wider informa- tion, warmer heart, larger ideals, sincerer courtesy, truer deference for the opinions of others, greater desire to do good and be helpful in all directions and to everybody and stronger loyalty to friends, country and the interests of general civilization than His Majesty, the German Em- peror. Simple and temperate in his personal habits, a devoted husband and father, a true friend and benefactor, a devout believer, a great statesman and philanthropist, a genuine idealist with a rare resourcefulness, an indefatiga- ble worker for the weal of his country and the peace and civilization of the world — in a sentence a man, a Christian and a gentleman in the highest sense of these words— such is the picture of the Emperor as I know him both from afar and at rather close range. 7 Moreover, I think I know the Emperor's leading ideas in regard to the general principles of world policy. He stands for peace and friendship between all the countries of the world and thinks that there are special reasons, ethnical, political and cultural, why such relations should obtain between Germany, England and the United States. He thinks not of territorial aggrandizement for Germany, but of trade, commerce and intercourse, under the freest possible conditions between all nations, the commerce both of mind and of matter. You all know that he is the originator of what is called the Gelehrten-Austausch, the exchange of educators, which has for its purpose the bring- ing of the men of learning of one country into other coun- tries to diffuse a better understanding between all countries and, by a comparison of fundamental ideas, to arrive at a world-philosophy and a world-morality, upon which the world's peace and the world's civilization may finally and firmly rest. I have had the very great good fortune to be able to observe the great interest and zeal and comprehen- siveness of view with which His Majesty has pursued this idea. When President Butler and I first went to him, in the summer of 1905, to say to him that Columbia Uni- versity was prepared to meet his suggestion of the preced- ing January, his pleasure was manifest and unconcealed; but he said, and this may interest people on both sides of the sea: "This belongs to the sphere of Althoff 's work and responsibilities. We must have Althoff here with us before we can do anything." He then immediately called the chief of his Civil Cabinet, von Lucanus, to him, and directed him to telegraph for Althoff to come at once to Wilhelmshohe. Two days later Alt- hoff came, and the negotiations from the side of His Majesty's government were carried on entirely through him. But I am sure the query will arise in the minds of my 8 readers why with such a perfect man and considerate ruler, on the one side, and with such a just and magnan- imous people, on the other, should there have arisen such an agitation as has recently prevailed in Germany over the publication, in an English journal, of some remarks of His Majesty upon certain events which happened some eight years ago, and which remarks were evidently in- tended to demonstrate the friendly feeling of His Majesty towards the English government and the English people. I am obliged to confess that I myself was, at first, greatly at a loss to understand it, especially after the Chancellor had explained that the Foreign Office was re- sponsible for the appearance of these remarks in the public press. But as the agitation developed it became finally manifest that a certain political party, and possibly more than one, had conceived the idea that the opportunity for forcing by popular pressure a change in the constitutional law of Germany was at hand, a change which they could not hope to effect by the regular process of constitutional amendment, namely: the change from what they termed "personal government" to what is known in political science as parliamentary government. I know that some of the leaders of these parties maintain that such a change does not involve an amendment of the constitution, that the constitution as it now stands provides that the official acts of the Emperor must be countersigned by the Chancellor, who thereby assumes the responsibility therefor, and that the budget must be voted by the legislative bodies, and that therefore the legislative bodies have only to refuse to vote the budget until the Emperor and the Chancellor acknow- ledge the political responsibility of the Chancellor to the legislature and the thing would be done, without constitu- tional amendment. Perhaps it would, but in my opinion, as a political scientist and constitutional lawyer, it would have been done by legislative usurpation. The constitu- 9 tion of the United States of America also provides that Congress shall raise the revenues and make the appropria- tions, but it would sound very strangely to an American lawyer if it should be contended that, in case Congress should refuse to do these things until the President and his Cabinet should acknowledge the political responsibility of the members of the Cabinet for the official acts of the Presi- dent to Congress, Congress would not be attempting to force a constitutional change by usurpation. It is true that the German constitution declares the Chancellor re- sponsible for the official acts of the Emperor, but it does not declare to whom he is responsible. There are three alternatives,. therefore, either of which may be arrived at by interpretation. He may be responsible to the Emperor, responsible to the courts, or responsible to the legislature. The commentators and the practice for nearly forty years have fully decided that it is not the last. It may be the second, but in that case it would be only a criminal respon- sibility, such as the President and civil officers of the United States are placed under, leaving his political responsibility to the Emperor alone. This is the situa- tion as Prince Bismarck, the chief author of the con- stitution, understood it, and the substitution of the political responsibility of the Chancellor to the legislature for it can be lawfully effected only by a constitu- tional amendment. This is something which the Emperor alone cannot make and cannot lawfully assent to, except through the members of the Federal Council represent- ing the Prussian State, whom he as King of Prussia, in accordance with the constitution of Prussia, appoints and instructs. But let us return a little from this digression in order to explain the meaning of the appearance also of more con- servative elements in the fomenting of the recent agitation, elements which made themselves heard much more respect- 10 fully and guardedly. They certainly were not moved by the hope of securing out of the turmoil the introduction of the parliamentary system of government. But almost without exception they were guided by the men who have been protesting against the centralizing tendencies of re- cent years, the states rights men, the modern particularists. Consciously or unconsciously to themselves, I am fully persuaded that their particularism was the secret force which caused them to exaggerate the supposed effects of His Majesty's remarks on the diplomacy and government of the Empire. Through this sentiment they were actually betrayed into a position in which they appeared to the outside world to be acting in harmony with the advocates of parliamentary government, for the purpose of curbing what these latter termed "personal government." It be- came quickly manifest, however, that this apparent har- mony was only momentary and that the nation as a whole is making no demand for parliamentary government, but that, on the contrary, the large majority of the people, and that majority containing the best elements of the people, would most probably oppose its introduction. Being anxious that my own fellow countrymen should understand this situation correctly, I am going to examine into this question of parliamentary government for Germany with some degree of minuteness. In the first place, let me say a word about this great bug- bear called "personal government." In a certain sense all government is personal, that is, it is carried on through the activity of certain persons or a certain person. From this point of view the only question with which we have to deal is, who is the best person to be entrusted with authority in a given sphere? The government of the United States is a strongly personal government from this point of view, and the President of the United States is vested with a power of personal discretion in conducting the administration not 11 exceeded, on the whole, by that of any King or Emperor in Europe. I suppose, however, that what most writers intend by the term "personal government" is arbitrary govern- ment, that is, government by some one person or group of persons without any constitutional limitations or in defi- ance thereof, provided such exist. If such be its intended meaning then it has no more application to the German Emperor than to our President. Germany has a written constitution, framed and adopted by the German princes and the German people, which defines the powers of the government and the liberties of the States of the Union and of the people; and if the German Emperor has in any of his governmental acts overstepped the powers vested in him by the constitution, I have no knowledge of it, nor have I seen that he has been charged with it by anybody. Talk is not government, certainly talk about something that happened six to eight years ago is not government. But some say it was an indiscretion, "a blazing indiscre- tion," and some people seem to think that this is a violation of the constitution, and an exhibition of autocracy. Well, we in this republican country have long held up to re- proach the mystery which guards the King, and now when a King and Emperor, who is, in every sense of the word, a man, steps forward out of that mystery and expresses his ideas about the situation of the world or even about ancient history, we call it indiscretion. Perhaps it is, but there is another fault equally as grave, namely: inconsistency. Discretion in speech is usually a desirable quality, not al- ways. I do not rate it among the virtues of the first class. Moreover there is a petty discretion and a "grand" dis- cretion and what often appears to most men as indiscretion is really "grand" discretion. My memory goes back now a long way. I remember when for years the man who did more than any other in our history, perhaps more than all others taken together, to call the attention of the nation to 12 the giant wrong of slavery was for years and decades fairly cursed for his indiscretions of speech, even by the men who agreed with him in regard to the desirability of the end which he sought. And now he is universally revered for his prescience and goodness. I remember that when Abra- ham Lincoln resolved to put that famous Freeport question to Douglas in regard to the power of the people of a United States Territory to exclude slavery during the Territorial period, all of his friends, most of whom were considered men of intellect and judgment, declared to him that it would be the height of indiscretion, and now we all know that it was the thing, above all others, which de- feated Douglas for the presidency and made Lincoln President. And who will now venture to claim that the ordinary discretion of speech in high places would have roused the moral sense of this nation to its present resolu- tion to put an end to unlawful and dishonest practices in all business great and small. If I understand the present situation of this world the greatest dangers to the peace of the world spring from two sources, namely: the suspected purpose of England to isolate Germany and cripple its commerce, and the suspected future purpose of Japan to control China and middle Asia and close their doors to free commerce with other nations. The German nation within the German Empire numbers some sixty-five mil- lions of the most intelligent, moral, capable, peace-loving and enterprising people in the world, increasing in number by more than a half million of souls annually through ex- cess of births over deaths, inhabiting a territory of less than two hundred and ten thousand English square miles, sixty thousand square miles less than our single state of Texas, and seeking to provide for these teeming millions, not by any policy of territorial aggrandizement, but by a policy of peaceable trade and commerce with the world, confer- ring thus benefit as well as receiving it. Any successful 13 attempt to restrict this sound development, sound both from a national and a world point of view, is bound to re- sult in an explosion which will rock Europe from one end to the other and threaten the welfare of America. Again, China and middle Asia, with a population of six hundred millions of people, have now appeared at the threshold of modern civilization and are about to open their doors to free commerce and intercourse with all civilized nations, for the welfare and advantage of all concerned. Any suc- cessful attempt by Japan alone, or by Japan, England and Russia in league, to bar the way of this development would be, not only a mortal affront to China and middle Asia, but a challenge to all other nations, and would inevitably pro- duce a struggle between the Orient and the Occident, in which the powers of the Occident might be themselves di- vided. No more perilous situation to these United States of America and the civilization of the modern world could be imagined than this. Now if the recent excitement oc- casioned—I will not say caused— by the words of His Majesty, the Emperor, shall call the earnest attention of all nations to these two greatest of perils to civilization and the peace of the world, then will those words be seen to have been words of the highest discretion and the most far- reaching wisdom. Before men can rightly distinguish the discreet from the indiscreet, either in speech or action, men must cease to be foolish, narrow-minded and short-sighted themselves, and I greatly fear from many recent evidences that the world is still in the condition, in that respect, which Carlyle so cynically described some fifty years ago. I have lived long enough to know that the words and deeds of the frank, spontaneous, impulsive man, especially when they flow out of a full intellect and a fixed purpose for good, are far more likely to be discreet, in a large sense and in the long run, than those of all the Talleyrands whom the world has ever produced. 14 But let us go back now to the question of parliamentary government for Germany. And first of all, what is par- liamentary government? One would think from the ordi- nary newspaper comments on this question that the phrase and the thing designated by it were synonymous with con- stitutional government. As a matter of fact, however, from the point of view of the American idea of constitutional government, namely: limited government, parliamen- tary government is the least constitutional and the most arbitrary form of government known to modern times. Parliamentary government means ultimately the almighty unlimited legislature. More than that, it means the al- mighty unlimited lower house of the legislature. More ultimately still, it means the almighty unlimited rule of the majority party in the lower house of the legislature; and at the very last stage in the development, it means the al- mighty unlimited rule of the leader of that majority, re- strained at best only by a sort of gentlemen's agreement, which can very easily become a rogue's agreement. And it makes little difference whether you have a written constitution back of such a legislature or not. It has the ultimate interpretation of that constitution and it can construe away any paper limitations which such a con- stitution may contain, and will do it. Whether there shall be any individual liberty under it depends entirely upon the disposition of the legislature, and whether there shall be any local self-government under it depends on the same thing. We don't want that kind of government in this coun- try. We won't have it. Let us examine briefly what our attitude has been towards it. There was a time when this kind of government was proposed here, namely: in the Convention of 1787, which framed our present constitution, at its first sitting. It is well known that the resolutions proposed by Governor Edmund Randolph of Virginia 15 formed the basis of the discussions in the Convention. These resolutions proposed the creation of a government composed of a legislature, the lower house of which should be chosen by the voters, the upper house of which should be chosen by the lower, a legislature which should elect the executive, create the courts by statute, and which should have the power to veto all the acts of the legislatures of the States of the Union. Following the principles of these resolutions Mr. Charles Pinckney of South Carolina presented the first draft of a constitution, and the parliamentary system was before the Convention. For nearly four months the Con- vention, in committee of the whole and in regular sittings, discussed these propositions, and when it finally voted the constitution as it now stands, there was not a shred left of them, except the election of the lower house of the legisla- ture, that is, of the Congress, by the voters. On the other hand, the Convention voted to create a Senate, an upper house of the legislature, whose members should be chosen by the legislatures of the States of the Union, an executive, who should be chosen by electors appointed in each State of the Union as the legislature thereof should direct, and a judiciary whose members should be appointed by the President and Senate, with tenure of good behavior and with salaries undiminishable during their periods of office. And finally it voted to drop the proposition for a veto power of Congress over the acts of the legislatures of the States of the Union, to give the President a veto power over the acts of Congress, to establish a constitutional do- main of individual immunity against all governmental power, and to vest the judiciary with the power to protect the same against encroachment either by the executive or the legislature. Now why did this Convention, beginning with this proposition of parliamentary government, make this radical departure from it and finally vote the exact contradictory? The answer to this query is easy, clear and 16 satisfactory and can be stated in a single sentence, namely : that in the course of its discussions the Convention became firmly convinced, that with parliamentary government at the center neither the liberty of the individual nor the autonomy of the States of the Union could be preserved, and that parliamentary government, in its final stage of development, is more autocratic than any royal government which could be well conceived. After the constitution of 1787 was adopted and the new government created by it went into operation, a certain defect in the machinery for the election of the President enabled the Congress to gain gradually a control over the tenure of the President which threatened to result in the development of a quasi-parliamentarism. This became finally clear to the people in the election of 1824, and at the next following opportunity, in the election of 1828, the people under the leadership of General Jackson rose in might against it and restored the independence of the executive over against the legislature so effectively that for forty years it was not again threatened. Finally, after the military despotism of the presidency during the Civil War and the struggle with President Johnson over the problem of Reconstruction, the Congress made a last effort to subordinate the executive power to itself, which effort culminated in the impeachment scandal of 1868, inaugu- rated by the House of Representatives, rebuked by the Senate and repudiated by the people, and so ended the last attempt to establish parliamentary government in these United States. And now shall we recommend this cast-off thing for Germany and represent to our own people that Germany does not have a constitutional government unless she ac- cepts it? Is the political situation of Germany and the Germans so different from our own, that what is unfit for 17 us is the correct and only proper thing for them? Will anybody who knows anything about the present Constitu- tion of the German Empire pretend that this is true? Let us examine the principles of that constitution with a little minuteness and some thought. If I should designate the entire political fabric organized by it as "the United States of Germany," I would give the American mind a much clearer and truer conception of it than the title "German Empire" conveys. It is a federal or dual system of gov- ernment, resting upon a written constitution, framed by the princes and people of the twenty-five States of the Union, which contains a process for its own amendment fully as easy of application as our own. The constitution pro- vides a central government of enumerated powers, consist- ing of a legislature, the members of the lower house of which are chosen by the suffrage of all male citizens over twenty-five years of age and those of the upper house by the States of the Union, and of a President of the Union, who must always be the wearer of the Prussian crown, and in his capacity of President of the Union is entitled Ger- man Emperor. It reserves all other powers of government not expressly or implicitly vested in the central govern- ment to the States of the Union, gives the Emperor no general veto power over legislative acts, but a special veto power over certain enumerated acts, leaves the creation and organization of the judiciary to legislative statutes, and makes the executive politically independent of the legislature in administration. The German political sys- tem is thus in principle the counterpart of our own with the two exceptions, that the imperial constitution does not create the judiciary immediately and by its own provisions, but vests the power for this in the imperial legislature, and does provide the hereditary tenure for the executive. Now do these differences make parliamentary govern- ment necessary or even desirable for Germany while 18 it is unfitted to our case? Let us see. No Amer- ican will venture to claim, I think, that because the German constitution does not by its own provisions create and organize the courts of Justice, Germany should therefore have parliamentary government. On the other hand, the vast majority of Americans will say that the legis- lature in the German system has already too much power over the judiciary, and that the Germans would improve their constitution greatly by so amending it as to give the courts constitutional independence both against the legisla- ture and the executive and by vesting them with the power to override the legislative interpretation of the constitu- tion, whenever the legislative acts should, in their judg- ment, trench upon the constitutional immunities of the individual against governmental power. In fact, some publicists contend that the imperial court at Leipzig and the subordinate courts in the States, in spite of their statu- tory nature, already have this power, on the principle enun- ciated by the great jurist, Prof. Rudolf von Gneist, in the period of the adoption of the imperial constitution. He claimed that the constitution is law, the supreme law, that the courts must apply the law in every case, and that when there is, in the opinion of the court, a conflict between the law in the constitution and the law in the legislative act, the courts must follow the former and disregard the latter. On the basis of this principle, the imperial court and the subordinate courts may work out by judicial interpretation a sphere of immunity for the individual against govern- mental power very nearly corresponding to our own. The difference between the German system of govern- ment and our own in fundamental principle is thus really reduced to the one point of the difference in the executive tenure. And the final question of the whole discussion is this, namely: does the hereditary tenure of the Emperor 19 make necessary or even desirable parliamentary govern- ment for Germany while it is unfitted and undesirable for us? I cannot see that the mere tenure of the executive has any significance at all in this question. I can see that the absolute irresponsibility of the Emperor both to the legislature and the courts makes it necessary, in order to maintain constitutional government against his possible arbitrary acts, that all his governmental acts should be countersigned by an agent who does not enjoy his absolute irresponsibility. This is already provided for in the impe- rial constitution, which declares that all the governmental orders and decrees of the Emperor must be countersigned by the Chancellor, who becomes expressly responsible therefor and impliedly responsible also for the official acts of all the imperial ministers, since they are only his subor- dinates. As I have already said, the constitution does not expressly declare to whom the Chancellor is responsible and the practice of nearly forty years has decided that it is not to the legislature. It can be, therefore, nothing more than the same kind of responsibility as that provided in our own constitution for the President and those who counter- sign his governmental orders and other civil officers, namely : a responsibility, enforced only through "impeach- ment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors." This is all that is necessary in the way of executive responsibility to carry on consti- tutional government here, and it is likewise all that is necessary there. There is thus nothing which renders par- liamentary government less unfitted for Germany than for these United States, and there is one thing of which I have not yet spoken, which renders it much more unfitted for Germany than for these United States, namely: geo- graphical location. Wedged in between Russia, Austria and France, a powerful independent executive in command of a vast military force is the only thing which has rescued 20 Germany from being the seat of war and the field of booty for Europe, and it is the only thing which can preserve it against these scourges. I do not need to argue this ques- tion with anybody who knows anything about the history of Europe from the Middle Ages to the present, and I am going to assume that all my readers do, and not occupy their time further on this point. No ! parliamentary government is even less fitted for the United States of Germany than for the United States of America, and is no more likely to be realized there than here. I am sure that the majority of the Germans do not want it now, and that very few of them would want it, if they understood its full and final meaning, and I am also sure that we Americans, with the like understanding, would not wish to see this calamity imposed upon them, even by themselves. The constitutional development of the United States of Germany lies in another and very different direc- tion, in a direction for which we ourselves have, in respect to the point considered, set the chief example. I have undertaken this exposition much against my own inclinations, but it has seemed to me to be my duty to do what I could to clear away the apparent misunderstanding in the minds of some of my countrymen, that because the German governmental system is not parliamentary gov- ernment, it is not constitutional government, and most im- portant of all in order to prevent misrepresentations of this kind from exercising a baleful influence over the judg- ment of my countrymen in regard to what should be the transcendent purpose of our world-policy and what are the proper and necessary steps and measures for its realization. I cannot in silence see anything obscure the great fact that among all the rulers of the world the German Emperor is our most intelligent and sincere friend, and among all the peoples the German nation, or the truth of the idea that the 21 peace and civilization of the world depend more upon the friendship and cooperation of Germany, England and the United States than upon anything else or everything else that the wit of mortals can devise. 22 GERMANISTIC SOCIETY QUARTERLY The Germanistic Society Quarterly is issued by the Germanistic Society of America, a corporation. The officers of the Germanistic So- ciety of America are Antonio Knauth, president ; Wilhelm A. Braun, secretary ; Carl L. Schurz, treasurer. The principal place of business of the corporation and the address of the officers is the Deutsches Haus, 419 West 117th Street, New York City. The Quarterly is addressed to the members of the Germanistic Society and to all others interested in the objects for which it was founded, viz. , to promote the knowledge and study of German civilization in America and of American civilization in Germany. It is the purpose of the edi- torial board of the magazine to contribute to this result by the publica- tion of such lectures delivered before the Society, either in English or in German, as make a particularly wide appeal and from the nature of their subjects have more than a temporary interest, with the view of thus making them available for a much larger audience than originally was able to listen to them. Many things of interest and value, too, to the members of the Germanistic Society outside of its own immediate activities can only be communicated through the medium of a publica- tion. The Quarterly, in both these directions, is intended to supply a continuity that has hitherto been lacking in the work of the Society and to supplement it in a way to assure it a larger currency and a wider influence. The Quarterly is issued in March, June, September, and December, each volume beginning with the March number. Annual subscription, one dollar ; single number, thirty cents. All communications should be addressed to the Germanistic Society Quarterly, at Lancaster, Pa., or at the Deutsches Haus, 419 West 117th St., New York City. Subscriptions may also be entered and single numbers purchased at the Deutsches Haus. Publications of the Germanistic Society of America I. Germany and the United States. An address delivered before the Germanistic Society of America, January 24, 1908, by John W. Burgess, Ph.D., LL.D., Presi- dent of the Germanistic Society of America. New York, 1 908. II. The German Emperor and the German Government. An address delivered before the Germanistic Society of America, January 5, 1909, by John W. Burgess, Ph.D., LL.D., First Roosevelt Professor in the University of Berlin, President of the Germanistic Society of America. New York, 1 909. HI. Das Geheimnis der Gestalt. Vortrag gehalten vor der Germanistischen Gesellschaft von Amerika, 2. Dezember, 1908, von Carl Hauptmann. New York, 1909. IV. The Activities of the Germanistic Society of America, 1904 — 1910. New York, 1910. V. The Activities of the Germanistic Society of America, 1910. New York, 1911. VI. Germany's Economic Progress and National Wealth, 1888—1913. By Dr. Karl Helfferich, Director of the Deutsche Bank, Berlin. New York, 1914. Annual Reports of the Germanistic Society of America, 1911, 1912, 1913. The Germanistic Society Quarterly. Copies of the above publications will be furnished upon application to the Corresponding Secretary of the Germanistic Society of America, Deutsches Haus, 4 1 9 West 1 1 7th Street, New York. 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